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My high school "Guidance Counselor" hopes you never read this.
What does John Kennedy have to do with marketing as we know it today? A lot.
Having a hard time getting the attention of your prospects and customers?
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{"url":"https:\/\/tex.stackexchange.com\/questions\/290490\/make-a-pgfkeys-path-take-precedence-over-another-path-for-a-whole-scope","text":"# Make a PGFkeys path take precedence over another path for a whole scope\n\nI've been writing a package for LaTeX lately called TikZ-Feynman. It is an extension to TikZ and just like PGFplots, it defines a new environment within {tikzpicture} called {feynman} and makes available new commands and styles within.\n\nI have defined all my keys and styles related to TikZ-Feynman within a branch called \/tikzfeynman in PGFkeys and ideally I would like to have it such that within the {feynman} environment, the \/tikzfeynman path is always searched first before moving on.\n\nThe way I have been achieving this so far is basically to have:\n\n\\pgfkeys{\n\/tikzfeynman\/.cd,\n\/tikzfeynman\/.search also={\/tikz},\n...\n}\n\n\nBut looking at it now, it seems like a suboptimal solution. Firstly, it requires the whole .cd and .search also to be prefixed everywhere, and it seems to be incompatible with new .style that make use of keys within \/tikzfeynman (see this bug).\n\nThe issue is further complicated by the fact that TikZ-Feynman uses the graph drawing library and thus in some occasions, it will have to search the \/tikz\/graphs and \/graph drawing paths too (but not always).\n\nI have been trying to look at how PGFplots handles this with its {axis} environments, but so far I haven't been able to identify what I need (if PGFplots even does this).\n\nSo is there a way to make a PGFkeys path (or family) take precedence within a \\begingroup ... \\endgroup (or \\scope ... \\endscope)? And (optionally), can this also apply inside a graph?\n\nHere is a minimal (non-)working example that illustrates the issue I would like to fix.\n\n\\documentclass[tikz]{standalone}\n\n%% Hidden to the user\n\\pgfkeys{\n\/foo\/.is family,\n\/foo\/.search also={\/tikz},\n}\n\\def\\fooset{\\pgfqkeys{\/foo}}\n\\fooset{\nkey a\/.style={\nkey b,\nkey c,\n},\nkey b\/.style={\n\/tikz\/red,\n},\nkey c\/.style={\n\/tikz\/thick,\n},\n}\n\n\\makeatletter\n\\def\\fooenv{\n\\begingroup\n% Neither of the following seem to do anything as the \/.cd only applies to\n% keys within the same command call.\n\\pgfkeys{\/foo\/.cd,\/foo\/.search also={\/tikz}}\n\\scope[\/foo\/.cd,\/foo\/.search also={\/tikz}]\n}\n\\def\\endfooenv{\n\\endscope\n\\endgroup\n}\n\\makeatother\n\n%% What a user might do\n\\fooset{\nmy key\/.style={\nkey c,\nblue,\n},\n}\n\n\\begin{document}\n\\begin{tikzpicture}\n% The following should fail because we are not in fooenv.\n\\draw [key a] (0, 0) -- (1, 0);\n\\begin{fooenv}\n% The following should work since we are now in fooenv, but don't.\n\\draw [key a] (0, 0) -- (1, 0);\n\\draw [my key] (0, 0) -- (0, 1);\n% In this case, it finds key a fine, but fails to find key c.\n\\draw [\/foo\/my key] (0, 0) -- (1, 1);\n\\end{fooenv}\n\\end{tikzpicture}\n\\end{document}\n\n\u2022 You can first \/.try and then pass it to \\tikzset \u2013\u00a0percusse Feb 1 '16 at 7:53\n\u2022 Unless I'm mistaken, what you're suggesting is equivalent to what I'm current doing. By setting \/.search also and \/.cding into the right path, PGFkeys first attempts to find the key in \/tikzfeynman and if that fails, tries in the paths given in the \/.search also. Also, this doesn't really set \/tikzfeynman as the first search path within the whole scope which is the main issue I'm facing. Please correct me if you meant something else. \u2013\u00a0JP-Ellis Feb 1 '16 at 9:37\n\u2022 If you \/.try it only tries in the current context. Then if fails you can then push it to \\pgfkeysalso and other places. \/.search also basically expands the current key family to include others. \u2013\u00a0percusse Feb 1 '16 at 9:39\n\u2022 Are you saying that I should get users of TikZ-Feynman to write \/.try? I'm not quite sure how that would be implemented. Also, what would happen if I wanted to override a \/tikz key so that my key takes precedence? I have updated the initial post with a minimal (non-)working example that illustrates the issue. \u2013\u00a0JP-Ellis Feb 1 '16 at 10:08\n\u2022 There is a fatal deficiency in your code: \\draw[key a] passes key a to \\tikzset, so \/tikz is always the a choice, and in fact the first choice. \u2013\u00a0Symbol 1 Feb 2 '16 at 17:01\n\n# An non-pgfkeys approach\n\nLet \\tikzset be \\foobar inside your environment. This might be the easiest way. (In the manner that I added just one line.)\n\n\\documentclass[border=9,tikz]{standalone}\n\n%% Hidden to the user\n\\pgfkeys{\n\/foo\/.is family,\n\/foo\/.search also={\/tikz},\n}\n\\def\\fooset{\\pgfqkeys{\/foo}}\n\\fooset{\nkey a\/.style={\nkey b,\nkey c,\n},\nkey b\/.style={\nred,\n},\nkey c\/.style={\nthick,\n},\n}\n\\def\\fooenv{\n\\begingroup\n\\let\\tikzset\\fooset\n}\n\\def\\endfooenv{\n\\endgroup\n}\n\n%% What a user might do\n\\fooset{\nmy key\/.style={\nkey c,\nblue,\n},\n}\n\n\\begin{document}\n\n\\begin{tikzpicture}\n\\begin{fooenv}\n\\draw [key a] (0, 0) -- (1, 0);\n\\draw [my key] (0, 0) -- (0, 1);\n\\draw [\/foo\/my key] (0, 0) -- (1, 1);\n\\end{fooenv}\n\\end{tikzpicture}\n\n\\end{document}\n\n\n# A pgfkeys handler approach\n\nIn TeX's language, what you try to do is much like\n\n\\let\\oldtikzpath=\\tikzpath\n\\def\\tikzpath={\\foopath \\oldtikzpath}\n\n\nThis function is provide by TeX at the lowest level. Pgfkeys does not have this function yet. But we can create it by something like\n\n\\pgfkeys{\n\/handlers\/.cd redirect\/.code={\n% store the redirection target somewhere\n},\n\/handlers\/.new cd\/.code={\n% check if user set new target manually\n% cd properly\n}\n}\n\n\nA small example goes\n\n\\pgfkeys{\n\/handlers\/.cd redirect\/.code={\n\\pgfkeyssetvalue{\\pgfkeyscurrentpath\/cd target}{#1}\n},\n\/handlers\/.new cd\/.code={\n\\pgfkeysgetvalue{\\pgfkeyscurrentpath\/cd target}\\pgfkeysredirectpath\n\\ifx\\pgfkeysredirectpath\\relax\n\\edef\\pgfkeysdefaultpath{\\pgfkeyscurrentpath\/}\n\\else\n\\edef\\pgfkeysdefaultpath{\\pgfkeysredirectpath\/}\n\\fi\n}\n}\n\n\\pgfkeys{\n\/bar\/.cd redirect={\/foo},\n}\n\n\\pgfkeys{\n\/foo\/foo\/.code={foo-foo},\n\/bar\/bar\/.code={bar-bar}\n}\n\n\\pgfkeys{\n\/bar\/.cd,\nbar\n}\n\n\\pgfkeys{\n\/bar\/.new cd,\nfoo\n}\n\n\nWe can even redefine .cd by how we define .new cd.\n\nJust one step away: \\xxxxset-family are define by \\pgfqkeys. The manual say that it is equivalent to \\pgfkeys{#1\/.cd,#2}. In reality, \\pgfqkeys defines \\pgfkeysdefaultpath without calling handler .cd. So we have to redefine \\pgfqkeys, either by calling .new cd or copy-and-pasting the if-statement again.\n\nA sidenote: the manual claims\n\nThe setting of a key is always local to the current TEX group.\n\nSo it is OK to say \/tikz\/.cd redirect=to somewhere or something similar in your own environment. The effect \"expires\" once you leave the environment.\n\nThe design of pgfkeys makes no easy way to \"cut the line\". By \"line\" I mean that if you say\n\n\\pgfkeys{\n\/a\/.search also={\n\/b,\n\/c\n}\n}\n\n\nthen pgfkeys will try to search \/a\/x, \/b\/x, \/c\/x in this order if one issues \/a\/.cd,x=something. That is, \/a, \/b, \/c are \"lined up\" and you cannot reorder it.\n\nIn your example, \\draw[key a] is ultimately passed to \\tikzset{key a}. Therefore\n\n\u2022 pgfkeys will search under \/tikz;\n\u2022 pgfkeys will NOT search \/foo unless you says \/tikz\/.search also={\/foo}.\n\u2022 Even if you said so, \/tikz is still the first candidate.\n\u2022 And the worst thing is: it destroys colors specification and arrows specification.\n\nTo come over this, you have to add alias under \/tikz manually. There are already plenty of aliases: every picture, every axis, every graph, etc.\n\nOtherwise you have to ask package users to put options at proper place. Just like\n\n\\tikz\\path(0,0)[rotate=30]node{rotated?};\n\n\nand\n\n\\tikz\\path(0,0)node[rotate=30]{rotated?};\n\n\nNonetheless, here there is still good news: For options passed to \\fooset, pgfkeys will try \/foo\/x and \/tikz\/x in this order provided that you said \\fooset{.search also={\/tikz}} somewhere before.\n\nHence you might want to create special commands such as \\foodraw to replace \\draw. Then you are certain that \\foodraw[key a] does pass key a to \\fooset.\n\n\u2022 Thanks for the answer. What you suggest is mostly what I have been doing already. Trying to define alternatives to the standard TikZ commands and also make use of the every <element>\/.style keys; however, this only gets me so far. I was hoping there be a better way. \u2013\u00a0JP-Ellis Feb 2 '16 at 23:25\n\u2022 I can't find time to write an example but \\tikzset is nothing but a pgfkeys shortcut. You can hack it at the start of the environment and pass everything to a \/foo\/key\/.try first and, depending on the success or not, pass to TikZ. That allows an unknown key to avoid an error but instead set an if clause. \u2013\u00a0percusse Feb 3 '16 at 1:25\n\u2022 @percusse at the beginning OP is not sure if all options are passed through \\tikzset. For me the point is different: I recognize pgfkeys as an alternative to primitive TeX commands. So in any case I prefer pgfkeys (handler) approach. \u2013\u00a0Symbol 1 Feb 3 '16 at 1:45\n\u2022 Yes but It is a pgfkeys approach. \/.try \/.retry etc. are all valid key handlers. If you have time, you can install a filter as pgfplots does. \u2013\u00a0percusse Feb 3 '16 at 1:54\n\u2022 @percusse at the beginning OP is not sure if all options are passed through \\tikzset. For me the point is different: I recognize pgfkeys as an alternative to TeX primitives. So in any case I prefer pgfkeys (handler) approach. In this particular case, we should not develop decorative commands unless we have appropriate handlers. And even the handler (.new cd) should be defined by handlers, such as .if defined then else. \u2013\u00a0Symbol 1 Feb 3 '16 at 1:56\n\nI think something like this should work though I didn't test properly. What I did is fiddle with the foo\/.unknown part and then copy the rest of the \/tikz\/.unknown part.\n\nWhat happens is that once \/foo\/<key>=<value> fails we give up on the family of foo and change to TikZ. The detail needs to be handled (and that's the part I copied) is that colors, arrows and shapes are not styles! So stealth-latex actually goes and looks for a style for that named key and then falls back to the handler I've copied.\n\nSo they need to be taken care of properly (which is amazing to start with that this exists for my taste of user friendliness).\n\n\\documentclass[tikz]{standalone}\n\n%% Hidden to the user\n\\pgfkeys{\/foo\/.is family}\n\\def\\fooset{\\pgfqkeys{\/foo}}\n\\makeatletter\n\\def\\installfooset{\n\\def\\tikzset{\\pgfqkeys{\/foo}}%\n\\pgfkeys{\/foo\/.unknown\/.code={%\n\\let\\foo@key\\pgfkeyscurrentname%\n\\pgfkeys{\/tikz\/.cd,\/tikz\/\\foo@key\/.try={##1}}%\n\\ifpgfkeyssuccess\\typeout{I've passed \"\\foo@key\" to TikZ}\\else%\n\\let\\tikz@key\\foo@key%\n% Start copying and print on the terminal\n\\typeout{TikZ also didn't like \"\\foo@key\"! Maybe arrow,color, or shape?}\n\\expandafter\\pgfutil@in@\\expandafter!\\expandafter{\\tikz@key}%\n\\ifpgfutil@in@%\n% this is a color!\n\\edef\\tikz@textcolor{\\tikz@key}%\n\\else%\n\\pgfutil@doifcolorelse{\\tikz@key}\n{%\n\\edef\\tikz@textcolor{\\tikz@key}%\n}%\n{%\n% Ok, second chance: This might be an arrow specification:\n\\expandafter\\pgfutil@in@\\expandafter-\\expandafter{\\tikz@key}%\n\\ifpgfutil@in@%\n% Ah, an arrow spec!\n\\expandafter\\tikz@processarrows\\expandafter{\\tikz@key}%\n\\else%\n% Ok, third chance: A shape!\n\\expandafter\\ifx\\csname pgf@sh@s@\\tikz@key\\endcsname\\relax%\n\\pgfkeys{\/errors\/unknown key\/.expand\nonce=\\expandafter{\\expandafter\/\\expandafter t\\expandafter\ni\\expandafter k\\expandafter z\\expandafter\/\\tikz@key}{##1}}%\n\\else%\n\\edef\\tikz@shape{\\tikz@key}%\n\\fi%\n\\fi%\n}%\n\\fi%\n\\fi%\n}\n}\n}\n\\def\\fooenv{\\begingroup\\installfooset\\scope[]}\n\\def\\endfooenv{\\endscope\\endgroup}\n\\makeatother\n\n\\fooset{\nkey a\/.style={key b,key c,},\nkey b\/.style={\/tikz\/red!40},\nkey c\/.style={\/tikz\/thick},\n}\n%% What a user might do\n\\fooset{my key\/.style={key c,blue}}\n\n\\begin{document}\n\\begin{tikzpicture}\n% Fails with unknown [key a] ... Done!\n%\\draw [key a] (0, 0) -- (1, 0);\n% Works... Done!\n\\begin{fooenv}\n\\draw [key a] (0, 0) -- (1, 0);\n\\draw [my key] (0, 0) -- (0, 1);\n% Does it overwrite? Done!\n\\draw [\/foo\/my key,dashed,key b,blue] (0, 0) -- (1, 1);\n\\end{fooenv}\n% Uninstalled? ... Done!\n%\\draw [key a] (0, 0) -- (1, 0);\n\\end{tikzpicture}\n\\end{document}\n\n\nIt will hopefully print out the following to the terminal\n\nI've passed \"draw\" to TikZ\nI've passed \"line width\" to TikZ\nI've passed \"draw\" to TikZ\nI've passed \"line width\" to TikZ\nTikZ also didn't like \"blue\"! Maybe arrow,color, or shape?\nI've passed \"draw\" to TikZ\nI've passed \"line width\" to TikZ\nTikZ also didn't like \"blue\"! Maybe arrow,color, or shape?\nI've passed \"dashed\" to TikZ\nTikZ also didn't like \"blue\"! Maybe arrow,color, or shape?\n\n\nNotice how red!40 doesn't appear because it travels the legitimate \/.unknown code.\n\nHaving said that, what you are trying to do is against the TikZ design essentials. The idea is to get out of the way of the user and leave entrance points to modify every detail as much as possible. Hence overwriting existing keys are pretty against this mantra. That's why you have lots and lots of every ...\/.style=... keys in TikZ.\n\nIf you overwrite a TikZ key you are shaving off some of the functionality that might be needed for a power user.\n\n\u2022 Thanks a lot for this! I'll have a look at whether I can get it to fix this issue. Also I realize that overriding keys is against the general way TikZ works and I definitely do not intend to do it much at all; however, I don't think it is unreasonable to slightly modify certain keys only within the {feynman} environment. \u2013\u00a0JP-Ellis Feb 3 '16 at 11:07\n\u2022 Curiously, is there a reason (other than to integrate the typeout commands) for including the whole TikZ .unknown\/.code instead of using \\pgfkeysgetvalue{\/tikz\/.unknown\/.@cmd}{\\orig@tikz@search} like I have in my answer? \u2013\u00a0JP-Ellis Feb 3 '16 at 11:35\n\u2022 @JP-Ellis Not really it's a habit since I usually modify stuff. Here you can also push your other package dependent options etc. following the TikZ mantra with a custom key execute at unknown key for example. So that you can execute other non-TikZ but pgfkeyed stuff and so on. Also notice that this is now foo\/.unknown you have tikz\/.unknown as a difference \u2013\u00a0percusse Feb 3 '16 at 12:22\n\nOne of the ideas of toying with is trying to override certain TikZ function within the scope of the environment. In particular, trying to override \/tikz\/.unknown\/.@cmd such that it first search \/foo before doing what it would usually do.\n\nThis is not the best solution for me because this does not allow me to override keys in \/tikz with keys in \/foo, though admittedly this isn't a deal breaker since I wouldn't want to do that too much as it could lead to some confusion to people using the package.\n\nThis works for keys which are explicitly specified (such as key a and my key) but unfortunately it does not seem to work for keys referred to within the style. The error message is I do not know '\/key b', so for some reason keys within styles are handled differently... but how?\n\nAnother peculiarity is the case of \/foo\/my key. Since this is a full key, it does not need to be searched for, and instead key c passes through \/tikz\/.unknown and is successfully found. What is then strange is that it fails to find blue and actually produces some errors (extra \\else, and many incomplete \\if and \\ifx).\n\nHere is a modified version of the MWE above which implements the modified \/tikz\/.unknown:\n\n\\documentclass[tikz]{standalone}\n\n%% Hidden to the user\n\\makeatletter\n\\pgfkeys{\n\/foo\/.is family,\n\/foo\/.search also={\/tikz},\n}\n\\def\\fooset{\\pgfqkeys{\/foo}}\n\\fooset{\nkey a\/.style={key b, key c},\nkey b\/.style={red},\nkey c\/.style={thick},\n}\n\n\\def\\fooenv{\n\\scope\n\\ammend@search@path\n}\n\\def\\endfooenv{\n\\endscope\n}\n\n\\def\\ammend@search@path{%\n\\pgfkeysgetvalue{\/tikz\/.unknown\/.@cmd}{\\orig@tikz@search}\n\\pgfkeys{\/tikz\/.unknown\/.code=%\n\\let\\unknown@key\\pgfkeyscurrentname\n\\pgfkeys{\/foo\/\\unknown@key\/.try={##1}}\n\\ifpgfkeyssuccess\\else\n\\let\\pgfkeyscurrentname\\unknown@key\n\\orig@tikz@search##1\\pgfeov\n}\n}\n\\makeatother\n\n%% What a user might do\n\\fooset{\nmy key\/.style={key c, blue}\n}\n\n\\begin{document}\n\\begin{tikzpicture}\n% The following should fail because we are not in fooenv.\n\\draw [key a] (0, 0) -- (1, 0);\n\\begin{fooenv}\n% The following should work since we are now in fooenv, but don't.\n\\draw [key a] (0, 0) -- (1, 0);\n\\draw [my key] (0, 0) -- (0, 1);\n% In this case, it finds key a fine, but fails to find key c.\n\\draw [\/foo\/my key] (0, 0) -- (1, 1);\n\\end{fooenv}\n\\end{tikzpicture}\n\\end{document}","date":"2019-06-24 09:10:16","metadata":"{\"extraction_info\": {\"found_math\": true, \"script_math_tex\": 0, \"script_math_asciimath\": 0, \"math_annotations\": 0, \"math_alttext\": 0, \"mathml\": 0, \"mathjax_tag\": 0, \"mathjax_inline_tex\": 0, \"mathjax_display_tex\": 0, \"mathjax_asciimath\": 1, \"img_math\": 0, \"codecogs_latex\": 0, \"wp_latex\": 0, \"mimetex.cgi\": 0, \"\/images\/math\/codecogs\": 0, \"mathtex.cgi\": 0, \"katex\": 0, \"math-container\": 0, \"wp-katex-eq\": 0, \"align\": 0, \"equation\": 0, \"x-ck12\": 0, \"texerror\": 0, \"math_score\": 0.7935292720794678, \"perplexity\": 3227.8905317132862}, \"config\": {\"markdown_headings\": true, \"markdown_code\": true, \"boilerplate_config\": {\"ratio_threshold\": 0.18, \"absolute_threshold\": 10, \"end_threshold\": 15, \"enable\": true}, \"remove_buttons\": true, \"remove_image_figures\": true, \"remove_link_clusters\": true, \"table_config\": {\"min_rows\": 2, \"min_cols\": 3, \"format\": \"plain\"}, \"remove_chinese\": true, \"remove_edit_buttons\": true, \"extract_latex\": true}, \"warc_path\": \"s3:\/\/commoncrawl\/crawl-data\/CC-MAIN-2019-26\/segments\/1560627999298.86\/warc\/CC-MAIN-20190624084256-20190624110256-00182.warc.gz\"}"}
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LG CNS sets goal to become reliable partner in corporate digital transformation
Lim Chang-won Reporter(cwlim34@ajunews.com) | Posted : July 14, 2022, 10:42 | Updated : July 14, 2022, 10:42
[Courtesy of LG CNS]
SEOUL -- LG CNS, the information technology wing of South Korea's LG Group, has set a new goal to become a reliable partner in corporate digital transformation, not content with its current status as a system integration software provider. The company is expanding its business scope to a non-fungible token exchange platform that supports various marketing activities.
Non-fungible tokens (NFTs) are a unique and non-interchangeable unit of data stored on a digital ledger and can be bought and sold digitally. In 2018, LG CNS launched a blockchain platform called "Monachain," which provides digital authentication, community token, and supply chain management. The platform targets enterprise clients and can be applied in finance, public, telco and manufacturing industries.
LG CNS uses Monachain to develop an NFT exchange platform and release Token as a Service (TaaS) in November 2022. Companies will be allowed to produce and issue NFTs on Monachain at low costs as it is charged depending on the time of service use. The initial target will be small and medium companies that feel a great strain on time and money to come up with their own solutions.
"Next year, we will first target the distribution sector, which is experiencing the rapid issuance of NFTs, and then expand the scope to the financial sector," Yoon Chang-deuk, head of LG CNS' blockchain technology department, said in an interview with Aju Business Daily.
In May 2022, LG CNS partnered with Plateer, an e-commerce solution company in South Korea, for the launch of TaaS by adding Plateer's e-commerce and marketing solutions to Monachain to help corporate customers easily implement NFT marketplaces. "We are also considering providing services not only to domestic but also to overseas regions," said Yoon.
Yoon said that an application program interface (API) would help MZ generations buy and use NFTs while enjoying them on a collective virtual shared space created by the convergence of virtually enhanced physical reality and physically persistent virtual space.
Various South Korean companies have actively adopted metaverse platforms to bridge the gap between online and offline spaces. LG CNS has invested in establishing Bithumb Meta, the metaverse subsidiary of Bithumb, a major cryptocurrency exchange in South Korea, which was launched in February 2022 to develop social metaverse platforms.
South Korea's virtual currency market has been dogged by fraud, cyberattacks and other illegal activities. As a result, public skepticism lingers over blockchain businesses and NFT, but Yoon voiced optimism, referring to NFT's positive role in proving personal identity.
"NFT has to be purchased through cryptocurrency through the mainnet, so the value of NFT seems to change depending on the market price of cryptocurrencies. However, the NFT ecosystem is progressing," Yoon said. "NFTs are also used as a means of proving personal identity, not just buying and selling. This is why even if NFT is linked to cryptocurrency, it cannot be viewed negatively."
An NFT ecosystem has been created "to some extent" in South Korea, Yoon said, presenting his goal to provide a digital space in which "trust and connection" between users are guaranteed. "This is because information must be smoothly shared between users on the premise that personal information is protected."
For digital transformation, Yoon hopes to become a digital growth partner and provide a service that combines technologies such as artificial intelligence, big data analysis, network, and cloud, based on blockchain. "Just because you're good at only one blockchain field, you can't provide customers with the core value of digital transformation. We will help corporate customers achieve the digital transformation they really want."
In 2020, LG CNS joined hands with Evernym, a software company that develops decentralized, self-sovereign identity applications, to push for the development of ID cards that work everywhere in the world, using decentralized identity (DID), which is a blockchain-based encrypted identifier that normally uses public keys to establish secure communication channels.
LG CNS and Evernym cooperate in establishing international standards at the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) and implementing a new authentication system with blockchain technology. Evernym offers a platform that enables organizations and governments to issue, accept, and verify credentials that operate like a digital passport.
(This story is based on a Korean-language interview conducted by Aju Business Daily reporter Choi Eun-jong)
LG CNS releases subscription-type OT security service for smart factories and power plants
LG CNS launches AI logistics robot subscription service for efficient warehouse operations
LG CNS applies for government permission to become second private 5G network operator
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{"url":"https:\/\/www.physicsforums.com\/threads\/perturbation-theory-qualitative-question.603217\/","text":"Perturbation theory (qualitative question)\n\nLogicX\n\nHomework Statement\n\nHow does the energy change (negative, positive or no change) in the HOMO-LUMO transition of a conjugated polyene where there are 5 double bonds when a nitrogen is substituted in the center of the chain? The substitution lowers the potential energy in the center of the box (everywhere else V(x)=0 for particle in a box).\n\nWhen there are 6 double bonds, the opposite change happens. Why?\n\nHomework Equations\n\nE1=<\u03c80|H1\u03c80>\n\nE(pertubed)= E0 + E1\u03bb\n\nThe Attempt at a Solution\n\nOk, so if you look at the particle in a box \u03c8*\u03c8 for n=5 and for n=6, the center of the n=5 is at the top of a peak, while for n=6 it is at a node (i.e. where the probability=0). I'm not sure how to use this info to say how the excitation energy would change.\n\nI think it means that for n=6 there is no change because there is no probability of an electron being there so the substitution does not change the excitation energy. And for n=5 there is a decrease in potential energy so E1 is more negative and the gap would be larger? (or would a decrease in V(x) mean that the gap is smaller?)\n\nDoes any of that make sense? Again, I just need a qualitative answer, and it basically boils down to how E1 changes with the substitution.\n\nEDIT: I noticed this thread seems to be related but I'm still not quite sure of the answer:","date":"2023-02-08 07:02:16","metadata":"{\"extraction_info\": {\"found_math\": false, \"script_math_tex\": 0, \"script_math_asciimath\": 0, \"math_annotations\": 0, \"math_alttext\": 0, \"mathml\": 0, \"mathjax_tag\": 0, \"mathjax_inline_tex\": 0, \"mathjax_display_tex\": 0, \"mathjax_asciimath\": 0, \"img_math\": 0, \"codecogs_latex\": 0, \"wp_latex\": 0, \"mimetex.cgi\": 0, \"\/images\/math\/codecogs\": 0, \"mathtex.cgi\": 0, \"katex\": 0, \"math-container\": 0, \"wp-katex-eq\": 0, \"align\": 0, \"equation\": 0, \"x-ck12\": 0, \"texerror\": 0, \"math_score\": 0.8174025416374207, \"perplexity\": 411.6100010717658}, \"config\": {\"markdown_headings\": false, \"markdown_code\": true, \"boilerplate_config\": {\"ratio_threshold\": 0.18, \"absolute_threshold\": 20, \"end_threshold\": 15, \"enable\": true}, \"remove_buttons\": true, \"remove_image_figures\": true, \"remove_link_clusters\": true, \"table_config\": {\"min_rows\": 2, \"min_cols\": 3, \"format\": \"plain\"}, \"remove_chinese\": true, \"remove_edit_buttons\": true, \"extract_latex\": true}, \"warc_path\": \"s3:\/\/commoncrawl\/crawl-data\/CC-MAIN-2023-06\/segments\/1674764500719.31\/warc\/CC-MAIN-20230208060523-20230208090523-00764.warc.gz\"}"}
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{"url":"https:\/\/electronics.stackexchange.com\/questions\/16530\/im-buying-my-first-pic-what-kit-do-i-need","text":"# I'm buying my first PIC, what kit do I need?\n\nSo I'm probably going to buy a dsPIC33F to build a synth with.\n\nI've used Atmel micros in the past, but this will be my first PIC chip, I wanted to know if there's anything in particular I need or will have to look out for?\n\nI'll need to be able to program the chip using my laptop which has USB and is running a Linux based operating system (Ubuntu).\n\nThanks.\n\nEdit: (To clarify my question)-\n\nI will be using the dsPIC33F from Microchip Technology Inc I want to use it for real time audio synthesis, probably additive synthesis using wave table generated sine waves, much like the application discussed in this question on the electronics.stckexchange. I have a crummy old Dell laptop with which to program the dsPIC33F chip with, it has USB 2.0 ports on it, and that's about it. I run a Linux system (Ubuntu 10.10 Maverick Meerkat to be specific), what software \/ hardware will I require to program the dsPIC33F chip using the afore mentioned computer system??\n\n\u2022 +1 to this. It looks for me that 16-bit PICs have a greatest user base. And dsPIC are more convenient software wise. I wonder what people think \u2013\u00a0user924 Jul 8 '11 at 15:51\n\u2022 I use a Pickit2 clone programmer with the pk2cmd program in Linux. I use it with pic16 and pic18, but it appears it should work with dsPIC33 \u2013\u00a0Majenko Jul 8 '11 at 16:02\n\u2022 Try the Microchip forums: microchip.com\/forums\/Default.aspx? \u2013\u00a0Leon Heller Jul 8 '11 at 16:06\n\u2022 These are a bargain at twice the price. microchip.com\/stellent\/\u2026 \u2013\u00a0kenny Jul 8 '11 at 19:46\n\u2022 @Kenny - Great, that looks like a nice easy package to start programming, I may just go down that route \u2013\u00a0Jim Jul 9 '11 at 8:41\n\nWorking with PIC chips in Linux is both a daunting and a surprisingly easy task at the same time.\n\nFirst you need to get yourself a PIC programmer. The one I got was a clone of the PicKit2 off ebay for only a few pounds. There are many others around. The PicKit3 is probably a better option that the PicKit2, but I have had good results with mine so far.\n\nSecondly there is the software. For the actual programming of the PIC, you will need software suitable for the programmer you get. For my PicKit2 I use the Linux command-line utility pk2cmd downloadable from Microchip. At first, when I started using it, I was very very lost about what the command line options were - the documentation is rather poor. But, after some digging I worked out the following command line that I always use:\n\n$sudo pk2cmd -p -m -r -f file.hex That auto-detects the chip you are using (-p), programs all the memory (-m), resets the PIC after programming so it runs (-r) and uses the file \/path\/to\/hex\/file (-f ...) Another useful one is:$ sudo pk2cmd -p -i\n\nWhich tells you about what PIC it has detected.\n\nNow, I ran up against a problem with pk2cmd recently - it doesn't support the very newest PIC chips (in particular the PIC18F46K22 I was trying to use). However, there is another version somewhere on the Internet (I can't remember where right now) which has been modified to support the very latest versions of chips. You may or may not need that depending on which PIC you go for.\n\nThen there is the programming of the firmware itself. Microchip have very thoughtfully ported their MPLAB-X IDE to Linux, so you can get all the software you need for the programming here. It's still in beta at the moment, so expect a few bugs, but you can get the IDE, and all the C implementations you like there. The on-line documentation inside the IDE is pretty good, but you will need the data sheet for your chosen PIC at hand.\n\nWhile there are other IDEs available, this is the one I have had best results with (i.e., it's the only one I have actually had working under Ubuntu).\n\nPS. I have community wiki'd this answer so people can build on it.\n\n\u2022 Nice one Matt - just what I'm looking for, will have to check out the PIC kit programmers \u2013\u00a0Jim Jul 9 '11 at 10:32","date":"2020-08-04 17:42:15","metadata":"{\"extraction_info\": {\"found_math\": true, \"script_math_tex\": 0, \"script_math_asciimath\": 0, \"math_annotations\": 0, \"math_alttext\": 0, \"mathml\": 0, \"mathjax_tag\": 0, \"mathjax_inline_tex\": 1, \"mathjax_display_tex\": 0, \"mathjax_asciimath\": 1, \"img_math\": 0, \"codecogs_latex\": 0, \"wp_latex\": 0, \"mimetex.cgi\": 0, \"\/images\/math\/codecogs\": 0, \"mathtex.cgi\": 0, \"katex\": 0, \"math-container\": 0, \"wp-katex-eq\": 0, \"align\": 0, \"equation\": 0, \"x-ck12\": 0, \"texerror\": 0, \"math_score\": 0.20838312804698944, \"perplexity\": 1809.1802873985018}, \"config\": {\"markdown_headings\": true, \"markdown_code\": true, \"boilerplate_config\": {\"ratio_threshold\": 0.18, \"absolute_threshold\": 10, \"end_threshold\": 15, \"enable\": true}, \"remove_buttons\": true, \"remove_image_figures\": true, \"remove_link_clusters\": true, \"table_config\": {\"min_rows\": 2, \"min_cols\": 3, \"format\": \"plain\"}, \"remove_chinese\": true, \"remove_edit_buttons\": true, \"extract_latex\": true}, \"warc_path\": \"s3:\/\/commoncrawl\/crawl-data\/CC-MAIN-2020-34\/segments\/1596439735881.90\/warc\/CC-MAIN-20200804161521-20200804191521-00073.warc.gz\"}"}
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{"url":"https:\/\/book.huihoo.com\/making-tex-work\/ch04.html","text":"## Chapter\u00a04.\u00a0Macro Packages\n\n$Revision: 1.1$\n\n$Date: 2002\/08\/23 14:31:13$\n\nEveryone who uses TeX uses a macro package (also called a \u201cformat\u201d). A macro package extends TeX to provide functionality that is suited to a particular task or set of tasks.\n\nThis chapter provides a summary of TeX macro packages. General-purpose packages designed to typeset a wide range of documents---articles, books, letters, and reports---are examined first. The general-purpose packages described are Plain TeX, Extended Plain TeX, LaTeX2e, LaTeX, AMSTeX, AMSLaTeX, Lollipop, and TeXinfo. After surveying the general-purpose packages, several special-purpose packages designed to handle specific tasks---typesetting transparencies, music, chemistry or physics diagrams, etc.---are described. The special-purpose packages surveyed are SliTeX, FoilTeX, Seminar, MusicTeX, ChemStruct, and ChemTeX.\n\nThere are a lot of overlapping features and similar commands in the general-purpose packages. To understand why this is the case, consider how a new macro package comes into existence. An ambitious person, who is very familiar with TeX, decides that there are some things she would like to express in her documents that are difficult to express with existing formats. Perhaps, for example, no existing format produces documents that match the precise specifications required for publishing in her field, or perhaps she has in mind a whole new document structuring paradigm. A more mundane possibility is simply that she has been customizing an existing format for some time and now feels it has enough unique features to be useful to others.\n\nIn any event, a new format is born. Now, if this format is designed for a very specific task, writing multiple-choice mathematics exams, for example, it might not have very many general-purpose writing features. On the other hand, if it is designed for writing longer, more general documents (e.g., history textbooks or papers to appear in a particular journal) then there are a number of features that it is likely to include; provisions for numbered lists, cross references, tables of contents, indexes, and quotations are all examples of features common to many documents.\n\nTo support these common features, many macro packages have similar control sequences. This stems from the fact that they are all built on top of a common set of primitives and that macro package authors tend to copy some features of other packages into their own.\n\nYou may find that you'd like to use the features of several different packages in the same document. Unfortunately, there is no provision for using multiple formats to process a single document. The features required to process most documents are shared by all of the general-purpose formats, however. You are more likely to need multiple macro packages if you want to use a special format to construct a diagram or figure and incorporate it into a document. Chapter\u00a0Chapter\u00a06, Chapter\u00a06, describes several ways to take \u201celectronic snippets\u201d of one document and insert them into another, which is one possible solution to this problem.\n\nIf you're beginning to feel a little lost, have no fear. Most general-purpose formats are sufficient for most documents. And there's no reason why every document you write has to be done with the same format. Many people find LaTeX and Plain TeX sufficient, but if you're writing an article for a particular journal and someone has written a format specifically for that journal's documents, by all means use it. It is more likely, however, that someone has written a style file which tailors LaTeX to the requirements of the journal.\n\nIn addition to describing some common macro packages in this chapter, I'll describe how to build format files for them. If the packages that you want to use have already been installed at your site, you can ignore the installation sections.\n\nThe packages that you find most convenient will depend on the tasks you perform and how well each package suits your work style. The list of packages in this chapter is not meant to be all-inclusive, nor is it my intention to suggest which packages are best. Use the ones you like, for whatever reasons.\n\nI can hear some of you already, \u201cI don't really need a macro package,\u201d you say, \u201cI can roll my own with just TeX.\u201d\n\nAnd you are absolutely correct.\n\nI don't recommend it, however. It's akin to using your compiler without any of the built-in functions. Most TeX primitives offer little support by themselves for writing documents.\n\n## Installation: Making Format Files\n\nA format file, as described in Chapter\u00a0Chapter\u00a03, Chapter\u00a03, is a special \u201ccompiled\u201d version of a macro package. The iniTeX program interprets all of the control sequences in a macro package and writes the corresponding memory image into a file. Loading a format file is much faster than loading individual macro packages in your document because TeX does not have to interpret any of the control sequences while it is also processing text.\n\nIn general, all format files should be stored in the same directory.[40] If you install TeX in a directory called tex, then formats typically go in a directory called formats in the tex directory. This is not universally the case because you need separate format directories for big and small TeXs.[41]\n\nUsually, an environment variable indicates where the format files are located. Environment variables are a common way of customizing your interaction with programs. They are usually set in your AUTOEXEC.BAT file for MS-DOS, CONFIG.SYS for OS\/2, or the rc-file for a shell (i.e., .cshrc, .kshrc) on unix systems. Any good reference book for your operating system or shell will describe how to use environment variables.\n\nA common name for the environment variable that indicates where TeX formats are located is TEXFORMATS. Implementations that provide big and small TeXs need another variable to indicate the directory that contains formats for big TeX.\n\nIniTeX is not always a separate program. Some implementations of TeX combine the functionality of TeX and iniTeX into a single program and use a special switch at runtime to determine which function to perform. In this chapter, all of the examples use the program name initex to identify iniTeX. If you use an implementation that doesn't provide a separate iniTeX program, you should use the TeX program with the iniTeX switch instead. For example, for emTeX, use tex \/i instead of initex when you build a format.\n\nLike TeX, iniTeX needs to be able to find input files. Usually, this is accomplished by searching the directories listed in the TEXINPUTS environment variable. Place the input files that iniTeX needs in a directory on the TEXINPUTS path before running iniTeX unless otherwise directed. The TEXINPUTS environment variable is discussed in the \u201cthe section called \u201cUser Files\u201d\u201d section of Chapter\u00a0Chapter\u00a03.\n\n### Hyphenation Patterns\n\nIn order for TeX to correctly hyphenate words, every format file must contain a set of hyphenation patterns. The patterns are part of an algorithmic solution to the problem of breaking a word into syllables for hyphenation.\n\nThe details of the hyphenation algorithm (given in Appendix H of The TeXbook\u00a0[kn:texbook]) are too complex to describe here, but two aspects of this solution deserve particular emphasis. First, using patterns means that a dictionary of hyphenated words is not necessary.[42] This saves a lot of space and time. Second, by loading different sets of patterns, TeX can achieve equal success at hyphenating any language---even English ;-). There are actually at least two sets of hyphenation patterns for English, one for British English and one for American English. Chapter\u00a0 Chapter\u00a07, Chapter\u00a07, describes how to load multiple sets of hyphenation patterns for typesetting multilingual documents.\n\n## General-purpose Formats\n\nThis section describes several macro packages that are designed for formatting standard documents like articles or books. In order to provide some form of comparative measure, each macro package is used to create the same document, a one-page report that looks like Figure\u00a0Figure\u00a04.1. I constructed this example to demonstrate a few common elements in a document: several sizes of headings, a paragraph of text, inline and displayed mathematics, and a few fonts. There are lots of other things that aren't shown (tables, figures, footnotes, etc.), and these elements vary as much as any other in the different macro packages.\n\nObservant readers will notice that the examples are shown in the Computer Modern fonts while the rest of this book uses different fonts.[43] There are a number of reasons why the example is shown in Computer Modern. For one thing, all of the formats discussed here use the Computer Modern fonts by default. Using a different set of fonts would only add more complexity to each example. A more subtle problem is that I do not have appropriate mathematics fonts for Garamond. There are a number of complex issues involving the use of fonts in TeX. They are discussed in Chapter\u00a0Chapter\u00a05, Chapter\u00a05.\n\n### Plain TeX\n\nPlain TeX is the format written by Donald Knuth during the development of TeX. It is described fully in The {TeX}book\u00a0[kn:texbook].\n\nPlain TeX ties together the TeX primitives in a way that makes it practical to work in TeX. If you do not have a computer programming background, you may find Plain TeX a little bit intimidating. It is definitely a \u201croll your own\u201d environment. Although it demonstrably contains all of the functionality required to write everything from letters to books, there is very little \u201cuser-friendly\u201d packaging around the internals of TeX.\n\nAside from user interface considerations, which are highly subjective, Plain TeX lacks some functionality when compared to other formats. There is no provision in Plain TeX for automatically numbered sections, labelled figures, tables of contents, indexes, or bibliographies. Any of these functions can be constructed in Plain TeX if you are willing to invest the time and energy required to write your own macros, but they are not built into Plain TeX.\n\nIf you enjoy writing your own macros or plan to produce novel types of documents, a firm grasp of Plain TeX will allow you to write anything in TeX. A firm grasp of Plain TeX also makes it easier to understand and modify other formats (like LaTeX) that are built on top of Plain TeX.\n\nIn addition, Plain TeX is the only format that is always distributed with TeX. The other formats discussed in this chapter are freely available but do not come with TeX.\n\nThe Plain TeX input that produces the report in Figure\u00a0Figure\u00a04.1 is shown in Example\u00a0Figure\u00a04.2.\n\n#### Building the Plain TeX format\n\nTo build Plain TeX, you need only two files: plain.tex and hyphen.tex. These files are distributed with TeX so they should be available as soon as you have installed TeX. The hyphen.tex file is language-dependent. Readers who frequently work with non-English text should read Chapter\u00a0 Chapter\u00a07 for more information about obtaining non-English hyphenation patterns.\n\nThe command:\n\n\\$initex plain \\dump will create the Plain TeX format. Move the resulting files, plain.fmt and plain.log, into your TeX formats directory. ### Extended Plain TeX Extended Plain TeX extends Plain TeX in a number of useful ways without forcing you to use any particular \u201cstyle\u201d of output. The argument is this: although Plain TeX really doesn't provide all of the features that you need (tables of contents, cross references, citations, enumerated lists, convenient access to verbatim input, etc), many of these features don't have any direct impact on the appearance of your document. Unfortunately, other general-purpose macro packages like LaTeX, which do provide these features, tend to force you to accept their notion of what the typeset page should look like.[44] Extended Plain TeX is an attempt to solve that problem. It provides many behind-the-scenes features without providing any general page layout commands (like \\chapter or \\section), which means that these features can be used inside Plain TeX without much difficulty and without changing the layout of typeset pages. #### Building the Extended Plain TeX format To build the Extended Plain TeX format, you need the plain.tex and hyphen.tex files required to build the Plain format as well as the eplain.tex file distributed with Extended Plain TeX.[45] Make and install the Plain TeX format first, then change to the directory that contains the Extended Plain TeX distribution. The command: $ initex \\&plain eplain \\dump\n\n\nwill create the Extended Plain TeX format. Move the resulting files, eplain.fmt and eplain.log, into your TeX formats directory.\n\n### LaTeX2e Versus LaTeX\n\nThe tremendous popularity of LaTeX in the TeX community has had an unfortunate side effect: because it is a very familiar and flexible format, many people have used it as the basis for extensions of one sort or another. This has resulted in a wide range of (slightly) incompatible formats and a lot of frustration.\n\nThis situation is being rectified by a new release of LaTeX, currently called LaTeX2e. The new release replaces the existing dialects of LaTeX (LaTeX with and without NFSS, SliTeX, AMSLaTeX, etc.) with a single core system and a set of extension packages. LaTeX2e includes a compatibility mode which will allow it to continue to format existing documents without change (provided that they do not rely on local modifications to the LaTeX format, of course). Local modifications can also be incorporated into the LaTeX2e system as extension packages, making LaTeX2e a complete replacement for all existing versions of LaTeX and packages closely derived from LaTeX.\n\nThe most significant and least compatible difference between LaTeX and LaTeX2e is the font selection scheme. There are many control sequences for selecting fonts in LaTeX. Some control the typeface (\\rm, \\tt, \\sc, etc.); some the size (\\small, \\normalsize, \\large, etc.); and some the appearance (\\it, \\bf, \\em, etc.). Under the Old Font Selection Scheme (OFSS), the control sequences for selecting a font completely override any font selection already in place. Consider, for example, the control sequences \\it and \\bf, which switch to italic and boldface. Using \\bf\\it produces italic text, and \\it\\bf produces boldface text, and neither produces boldfaced-italic text (which is probably what you wanted).\n\nUnder the New Font Selection Scheme, typeface (called family in NFSS parlance), appearance (called series and shape), and size are viewed as orthogonal components in font selection. Because these parameters are independent, selecting an italic appearance with the \\it control sequence switches to italic in the current typeface and size. Under the NFSS, \\bf\\cs{it} does select boldface-italic in both the current typeface and size (if it is available).\n\nLaTeX2e supports only the NFSS, version 2 (called NFSS2). For more than a year, the NFSS (initially version 1, and more recently version 2) has been available as an extension for LaTeX 2.09. However, in light of stable test releases of LaTeX2e, the NFSS2 package for LaTeX 2.09 has been withdrawn. The discussion of NFSS in this book applies equally well to LaTeX 2.09 with NFSS2, but it is described in terms of LaTeX2e in an effort to be more applicable in the future. The NFSS is discussed in more detail in Chapter\u00a0Chapter\u00a05.\n\n### LaTeX2e\n\nLeslie Lamport's LaTeX format is probably the most commonly used TeX format. It is described in LaTeX: A Document Preparation System\u00a0[ll:latexbook] and many other TeX books. LaTeX2e is the new standard LaTeX. It is described in {The LaTeX Companion}\u00a0[latexcompanion]. The next edition of LaTeX: A Document Preparation System\u00a0[ll:latexbook] will also describe LaTeX2e.\n\nThe central theme of LaTeX is \u201cstructured document preparation.\u201d An ideal LaTeX document is described entirely in terms of its structure: chapters, sections, paragraphs, numbered lists, bulleted items, tables, figures, and all the other elements of a document are identified descriptively. For example, you enclose figures in a figure environment identified by the control sequences \\begin{figure} and \\end{figure}.\n\nWhen you are ready to print your document, select an appropriate document class, and LaTeX formats your document according to the rules of the selected style. In the case of the ideal document, it might first be printed in a magazine or newsletter using the article class. Later, when it is incorporated into a book, selecting the book class is all that is required to produce appropriate output; the document itself is unchanged.\n\nLaTeX is written on top of Plain TeX. This means that almost any control sequence or macro that you learn about in Plain TeX can also be used in LaTeX. Of course, LaTeX insulates you from many Plain TeX commands by wrapping a much more user-friendly interface around them.\n\nThe LaTeX2e input that produces the sample page in Figure\u00a0Figure\u00a04.1 is shown in Example\u00a0Figure\u00a04.3. The only difference between this document and an old LaTeX document is the use of the \\documentclass declaration instead of the \\documentstyle declaration.[46] For more complex documents, other minor changes may also be necessary.\n\n#### Building the LaTeX2e format\n\nThe LaTeX2e distribution is available from the directory macros\/latex2e\/core in the CTAN archives.\n\nThe following steps will build the LaTeX2e format. For more complete installation instructions, read the file install.l2e in the LaTeX2e distribution.\n\n1. Place the LaTeX2e distribution in a temporary directory and make that directory the current directory. After the installation is complete, you will need to move only selected files into the standard places.\n\n2. Restrict to only the current directory the directories that TeX searches for input files\n\nThis can usually be accomplished by setting the environment variable TEXINPUTS[47] to a single period or the absolute path name of the current directory.\n\n3. Copy the hyphen.tex file from the Plain TeX distribution into the current directory.\n\n4. Issue the command:\n\n\\$initex unpack2e.ins This will unpack all of the distribution files. 5. Build the format file by issuing the command: \\$ initex latex2e.ltx\n\n\nMove the resulting files latex2e.fmt and latex2e.log into the TeX formats directory.\n\n6. In addition to the files needed to build the format, unpacking the LaTeX2e distribution creates many files that are needed for formatting documents. These files must be placed in a location where TeX will find them. However, in order to maintain a functioning LaTeX 2.09 system, you must not place the new files in the same input directory as the existing files.[48]\n\nCreate a new directory (or folder) for the new files. On the unix system that I use, where existing input files are stored in a directory called \/usr\/local\/lib\/tex\/inputs, I created \/usr\/local\/lib\/tex\/latex2e to store the new files. You will have to add the new directory to the front of the list of directories that TeX searches for input files whenever you format a document with LaTeX2e.\n\nMove the files that the installation script produces into the new directory. Move the files docstrip.tex, latexbug.tex, sfontdef.ltx, slides.ltx, testpage.tex, and all of the files that end in .cfg, .cls, .clo, .def, .fd, and .sty. You should also move the files gglo.ist and gind.ist someplace where MakeIndex can find them. (MakeIndex is described in Chapter\u00a0 Chapter\u00a012, Chapter\u00a012.)\n\nOne of the aspects of the test releases that continues to change is the exact list of files that must be moved. Consult the install.l2e file in the distribution for the exact list. The list above is from the test version of January 28, 1994.\n\n### LaTeX\n\nThis section briefly covers LaTeX version 2.09. This version of LaTeX is still very widely used but it is being phased out.\n\nThe LaTeX input to produce the sample page in Figure\u00a0Figure\u00a04.1 is shown in Example\u00a0Figure\u00a04.4.\n\nSupport for the NFSS in LaTeX 2.09 has been withdrawn. If you need to build a format with support for NFSS, consult the \u201cthe section called \u201cLaTeX2e\u201d\u201d section of this chapter.\n\n#### Building the LaTeX format with the OFSS\n\nThe LaTeX distribution[49] includes three subdirectories, sty, doc, and general. All of the LaTeX files required to build the format file are in the general subdirectory. You will also need the hyphen.tex file required to build the Plain format.\n\nIn the general subdirectory, the command:\n\n\\$initex lplain will create the LaTeX format. Move the resulting files, lplain.fmt and lplain.log, to the TeX formats directory. In order to complete the installation, copy the files from the sty directory in the LaTeX distribution into a directory where TeX searches for input files. ### AMSTeX When the American Mathematical Society selected TeX as a document preparation system, they decided to extend it in a number of ways to make the creation of papers and journals easier. They had two goals: to make it easier for authors to write mathematical papers in TeX and to make the resulting papers conform to a particular set of style specifications. AMSTeX is described completely in The Joy of TeX [ms:joyoftex]. AMSTeX provides many commands that resemble LaTeX environments. These have the form \\environment \u2026 \\endenvironment. In addition, AMSTeX provides the notion of a document style to control style-related formatting issues. Another important contribution made by the American Mathematical Society when creating AMSTeX was the construction of a large number of new fonts. The American Mathematical Society provides fonts with many more mathematical symbols than the fonts that come with TeX. These fonts are available as a separate package and can be used with any TeX macro package, not just AMSTeX. The AMSTeX input required to produce the document in Figure Figure 4.6 is shown in Example Figure 4.5. The result of formatting this document does not appear exactly like Figure Figure 4.1 because AMSTeX uses the style conventions of the American Mathematical Society. Figure 4.5. AMSTeX Input File #### Building the AMSTeX format In order to build the AMSTeX format, you need the plain.tex and hyphen.tex files from Plain TeX and the amstex.ini and amstex.tex files from the AMSTeX distribution. The command: \\$ initex amstex.ini\n\n\nwill create the AMSTeX format. Move the resulting files, amstex.fmt and amstex.log, into your TeX formats directory.\n\n### AMSLaTeX\n\nAMSLaTeX, like AMSTeX, provides many features to make typesetting mathematics convenient while meeting the standards of the American Mathematical Society for publication. However, AMSTeX lacks many of the features that are present in LaTeX, like automatically numbered sections and tools for creating tables of contents and indexes.\n\nWhen LaTeX gained popularity, many authors requested permission to submit articles to the American Mathematical Society in LaTeX. In 1987, the American Mathematical Society began a project to combine the features of AMSTeX with the features of LaTeX. The result is AMSLaTeX.\n\nAMSLaTeX provides all of the functionality of LaTeX because it is an extension of LaTeX. It also provides the functionality of AMSTeX in LaTeX syntax and access to additional mathematical constructs and math symbols not present in LaTeX. .\n\nThe input required to produce Figure\u00a0Figure\u00a04.1 is not shown because they do not differ significantly from the LaTeX sample. Because the sample document doesn't use any of AMSLaTeX's additional features, it is exactly the same as the LaTeX document.\n\n#### Building the AMSLaTeX format\n\nThe AMSLaTeX macros are embodied entirely in style files for LaTeX. It is not necessary to build a special format file. However, the AMSLaTeX macros require the New Font Selection Scheme (NFSS). Consult the section on LaTeX, above, for instructions on building the LaTeX format with NFSS.\n\n### Lollipop\n\nIt can be argued that LaTeX has the following deficiency: although there are many different style options available, it is not easy for a novice user to change a style option. Changing the internals of most LaTeX style options requires a deep understanding of TeX.\n\nThe Lollipop format is very different from the other formats. The central thrust of Lollipop is that it should be easy to change and customize document styles. All Lollipop documents are built from five different generic constructs: headings, lists, text blocks, page grids, and external items.\n\nThe Lollipop input required to produce a document like the sample page in Figure\u00a0Figure\u00a04.1 is shown in Example\u00a0Figure\u00a04.7.\n\nFigure\u00a04.7.\u00a0Lollipop Input File\n\n#### Building the Lollipop format\n\nTo make the Lollipop format, you need the Lollipop distribution and the file hyphen.tex from the Plain TeX distribution.\n\nThis command will create the Lollipop format:\n\n\\$initex lollipop \\dump It should be performed in the directory where you installed the Lollipop distribution so that all of the Lollipop files can be located. Move the resulting files lollipop.fmt and lollipop.log into your TeX formats directory. ### TeXinfo The TeXinfo format is a general-purpose format, but it was designed to support a particular application: to produce both online documentation and professional quality typeset documentation from the same source file. It is discussed in more detail in Chapter Chapter 10, Chapter 10. The input file shown in Example Figure 4.8 produces the typeset output shown in Figure Figure 4.9. The input file for this example is complicated by the fact that it contains mathematics. None of TeX's sophisticated mechanisms for handling mathematics are applicable to plain ASCII online documentation. The online documentation produced by the example in Example Figure 4.8 is shown in Figure Figure 4.10. The TeXinfo format is the official documentation format of the Free Software Foundation (FSF). Although less commonly used, a LaTeX variant called LaTeXinfo is also available. Figure 4.8. TeXinfo Input Figure 4.10. Online documentation produced by MakeInfo ### Other Formats There are a number of other macro packages available for TeX. Some of them are summarized below. The fact that they are not discussed more fully here (or listed below, for that matter) is not intended to reflect on the quality of the format. The formats discussed above are examples of the ways in which TeX can be extended. All of the formats below extend TeX in a way similar to one of the formats already mentioned. For any particular application, one of these macro packages might be a better choice than the formats discussed above. EDMAC Provides support for typesetting critical editions of texts in a format similar to the Oxford Classical Texts with marginal line numbers and multiple series of footnotes and endnotes keyed by line number. EDMAC is available from the CTAN archives in the directory macros\/plain\/contrib\/edmac. INRSTeX Provides support for multilingual documents in French and English. INRSTeX is available from the CTAN archives in the directory macros\/inrstex. LamSTeX Extends AMSTeX with LaTeX-like features and improved support for commutative diagrams. LamSTeX is available from the CTAN archives in macros\/lamstex. REVTeX Extends LaTeX to provide support for typesetting articles for journals of the American Physical Society, the Optical Society of America, and the American Institute for Physics. REVTeX is available in the directory macros\/latex\/contrib\/revtex of the CTAN archives. TeXsis Provides facilities for typesetting articles, papers, and theses. It is particularly tuned for physics papers. TeXsis also provides support for other kinds of documents, such as letters and memos. It is based upon Plain TeX. TeXsis is available from the CTAN archives in the directory macros\/texsis. In addition to REVTeX and TeXsis, there are several other packages in the macros directory on CTAN that were designed for typesetting documents about physics: PHYSE, PHYZZX, and PSIZZLE. TeX\/Mathematica Supports interactive use of Mathematica on unix workstations running GNU emacs. Mathematica explorations can be annotated with TeX\/LaTeX, and Mathematica graphics can be incorporated into documents. TeX\/Mathematica is available from the CTAN archives in the directory macros\/mathematica. ScriptTeX Supports typesetting screenplays in TeX. ScriptTeX is available from the CTAN archives in the directory macros\/scripttex. VerTeX Supports typesetting articles for economic journals. VerTeX is available from the CTAN archives in the directory macros\/plain\/contrib\/vertex. ## Special-purpose Formats In addition to the general-purpose packages discussed above, there are dozens, if not hundreds, of extensions to TeX that are designed for very specific tasks. Many of the extensions are LaTeX style files; they provide styles for many academic journals, university theses, resum\\'es, diagrams of various sorts, PostScript interfaces, linguistics, multinational language support, unix \u201cman\u201d pages, program listings, and countless other tasks. To give you a feel for the range of tasks that TeX can perform, I've selected a few packages to highlight the latitude of customization that is possible. Figure Figure 4.11 shows the chemical structure of caffeine (a molecule dear to my heart) rendered with the ChemTeX package. The source is shown in Example Figure 4.12. Another chemistry package, ChemStruct, was used to draw Figure Figure 4.13. Its source is shown in Example Figure 4.14. Taking TeX in another direction, the MusicTeX package was used to typeset the first two bars of Mozart's K545 sonata in C-major in Figure Figure 4.15. The MusicTeX input is shown in Example Figure 4.16. Several more examples are presented in Chapter Chapter 7 where formats for typesetting non-English languages are described. Figure 4.12. The ChemTeX Source for Caffeine Figure 4.14. The ChemStruct Source for the Lithium Cation Figure 4.16. The MusicTeX Source for Figure Figure 4.15 Another popular special-purpose application of TeX is the production of transparencies, also called foils or slides. There are a few different options for this application. ### SliTeX SliTeX is part of the standard LaTeX distribution. Input to SliTeX consists of a main file and a slides file. Individual slides are composed in a slide environment. SliTeX has provisions for black-and-white slides, color slides, and overlays. Unlike the other slide-making formats, which rely on \\special printer commands[50] to incorporate color, SliTeX produces separate output pages for each color. For example, if you use red to highlight words on an otherwise black-and-white slide, SliTeX will produce two output pages for the slide: one with all the black text (excluding the words in red) and one with just the red words. Both of these pages will be printed in black. You must construct the colored slide by copying the pages onto colored transparencies and overlaying them. Producing slides with overlays in the same color is accomplished with a special \u201cinvisible\u201d color. This method of producing colored transparencies has been made obsolete by modern color printers. Of course, nothing prevents you from using the \\special extensions of your DVI driver in SliTeX to produce colored transparencies directly on a color printer. SliTeX has always been a separate macro package, distinct from and not 100\\% compatible with LaTeX. With the introduction of LaTeX2e, SliTeX is simply an extension package to the LaTeX2e core format. Support for a separate SliTeX format is being phased out. ### FoilTeX FoilTeX is an extension of LaTeX for producing slides. The primary advantage of FoilTeX over SliTeX is that it is completely compatible with LaTeX.[51] Note, however, that the defaults in many cases are not precisely the same as LaTeX because of the radically different goal of FoilTeX. FoilTeX provides support for running headers and footers, modified theorem environments for better mathematics in slides, support for AMS and PostScript fonts, and colors. Color slides in FoilTeX are handled by DVI driver \\special commands (most commonly dvips \\specials). However, FoilTeX includes a number of new and extended features for better handling of color. See the section \u201cthe section called \u201cAMSTeX\u201d\u201d later in this chapter for a detailed discussion of using color in TeX. ### Seminar The Seminar style is another alternative for producing slides and notes. Like FoilTeX, the Seminar style is designed to work on top of LaTeX. (Seminar also works with AMSLaTeX.) \\ The Seminar style is designed to produce output for a PostScript printer. It isn't strictly necessary to produce PostScript output, but if you do not, many of Seminar's features will be unavailable to you. Seminar provides for a mixture of portrait and landscape styles and can support color using either a color-separation technique (similar to SliTeX's method) or direct use of PostScript color. In either case, the PSTricks macro package is required. (Consult the section \u201cthe section called \u201cPSTricks\u201d\u201d in Chapter Chapter 6, Chapter 6, for more information.) The Seminar style has support for a number of interesting options (including two-up printing of slides), automatic resizing by changing a magnification parameter, instructions for converting your SliTeX slides, and several extensive demonstration files. Also included are explicit instructions for placing Encapsulated PostScript drawings in your slides. ## TeX in Color With color printers and copiers becoming more common, the application of color, especially in transparencies, is more important than ever. Unfortunately, TeX knows nothing about color. A little reflection about the design of TeX will make it clear why this is the case. TeX produces device-independent output. Even when color printers are as common as \u201cregular\u201d printers, if that ever becomes the case, it will always be true that color is an inherently device-dependent attribute. It does not make sense for TeX to understand color. However, this does not prevent TeX from using color. At the lowest level, all that is required to use color in TeX is some way of telling the printer \u201cstart printing in <color> here.\u201d This is easily accomplished with a \\special command. In the discussion that follows, the dvips \\special commands are used as concrete examples, but conceptually, any color printer can be used in this way. ### Setting Up Color Color support at the DVI driver level is provided by \\special commands, but these are not typically convenient to enter directly into your document. Frequently, these commands are specified in terms of percentages of red, green, and blue (RGB color) or cyan, magenta, yellow, and black (CMYK color). Higher-level support is provided by a collection of color control sequences. These sequences are loaded either by inputting the file colordvi.tex (in Plain TeX, for example) or using the colordvi style file (in LaTeX). dvips defines the colors in terms of \u201ccrayon names.\u201d If you need very precise control of the colors, you can adjust the precise mix of CMYK values in the file colordvi.tex after comparing the output of your printer with a standard scale (typically, the PANTONE scale). The following color names are standard in dvips. Apricot Emerald OliveGreen RubineRed Aquamarine ForestGreen Orange Salmon Bittersweet Fuchsia OrangeRed SeaGreen Black Goldenrod Orchid Sepia Blue Gray Peach SkyBlue BlueGreen Green Periwinkle SpringGreen BlueViolet GreenYellow PineGreen Tan BrickRed JungleGreen Plum TealBlue Brown Lavender ProcessBlue Thistle BurntOrange LimeGreen Purple Turquoise CadetBlue Magenta RawSienna Violet CarnationPink Mahogany Red VioletRed Cerulean Maroon RedOrange White CornflowerBlue Melon RedViolet WildStrawberry Cyan MidnightBlue Rhodamine Yellow Dandelion Mulberry RoyalBlue YellowGreen DarkOrchid NavyBlue RoyalPurple YellowOrange ### Using Color After dvips has loaded colordvi, typesetting text in color is simply a matter of using the appropriate color control sequence. For example, to typeset something in red, use the \\Red control sequence in your document, like this: \\Red{something in red} Alternatively, you can change the default text color with the \\text\\texttt{color} control sequences. To make default color for all text blue, enter: \\textBlue To change the background color, use the \\background macro. For example, to make the current and all future pages yellow, enter: \\background{Yellow} You can enter a precise color by specifying it in terms of its CMYK components. The \\Color and \\textColor macros exist for this purpose. To typeset some text in a color that is 25\\% cyan, 35\\% magenta, 40\\% yellow, and 10\\% black,[52] enter: \\Color{.25 .35 .4 .1}{some text} ### Now I've Got Color, but I Need Black and White! If you have reason to print a colored TeX document on a black and white printer, you don't have to tear out all of the color commands. dvips includes a blackdvi file (analogous to colordvi---an input file or style file depending on your macro package), which translates all color commands into black and white. Alternatively, \u201cgood\u201d implementations of PostScript in a black and white printer should translate all colors into shades of grey. This can be an inexpensive way to preview a color document. Most screen previewers simply ignore color commands so they print in black and white even if the document is colored. ### Color Under LaTeX2e At the time of this writing, the LaTeX2e team has not officially adopted a standard for using color. However, it is likely to follow a slightly different model than the one described above. The final design should provide color selection commands that are device-independent at the DVI driver level (in other words, the color commands will not insert device-specific commands, like snippets of PostScript, into the DVI files). ### Color Is Subtle Color commands implemented as \\special commands may introduce occasional problems. For example, if TeX introduces a page break in a paragraph that you have typeset in yellow (\\Yellow{This is a long paragraph...}), the resulting output may print the page footer (and even the header) in yellow, although that was not intended. Circumventing these problems may require careful use of color commands in front of text that you want to appear black. For example, in Plain TeX the difficulty described above can be avoided by specifying that the page number should be printed this way: \\footline{\\Black{\\hss\\tenrm\\folio\\hss}} This definition guarantees that the page number will be set in black, and because it is a local color change, colored text can flow across the page around it. You may want to make sure that other typographic elements are printed in the current global color (which may vary). dvips provides a local color macro called \\globalColor for that purpose. Every time the text color is changed globally (with a \\text\\texttt{Color} command), \\globalColor is redefined to print text in that color. ### Further Reading Read the documentation for your DVI driver carefully with respect to color. Because it is device-dependent, there is a lot of room for interpretation, and it may not always be obvious why some things appear the way they do. And DVI drivers are free to implement color in any way they choose. [39] At the time of this writing, it's actually still in test-release, but it may be available as a standard release by the time you read this. [40] On Macintosh systems and other environments that don't have directories, format files are typically stored in their own folders (or other metaphorically appropriate place ;-). [41] The distinction between big and small TeX is described in the section called \u201cthe section called \u201cWhat Do You Run?\u201d\u201d in Chapter Chapter 3. [42] {A small set of exceptions is maintained because the algorithm isn't perfect.} [43] {Really observant readers may have noticed that it's a version of Garamond ;-)} [44] {Of course, that's not strictly true. You can change the page layout of LaTeX (and most other packages) to be almost anything, but it does require learning a lot about the macro package. If you are already familiar with Plain TeX (or some other Plain TeX-derived package), you probably have a set of macros that produce documents in the style you like. Why reinvent the wheel? [45] {Extended Plain TeX is available in the macros\/eplain directory in the CTAN archives.} [46] {LaTeX2e will process documents that use \\ documentstyle in LaTeX 2.09 compatibility mode.} [47] {Under emTeX, this variable is called TEXINPUT. On the Macintosh, file searching is frequently controlled by a configuration file or dialog box.} [48] {Strictly speaking, this is only true for files that have the extension .sty because the old version of LaTeX will not attempt to use the other files.} [49] {LaTeX is available in the macros\/latex\/distribs\/latex directory in the CTAN archives.} [50] {The$\\\\$special mechanism is a way of passing arbitrary information through TeX to the DVI driver that will ultimately print the document.}\n\n[51] {With the caveat that it still uses the Old Font Selection Scheme.}\n\n[52] {I made these numbers up. 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{"url":"https:\/\/wikimili.com\/en\/Ground_track","text":"# Ground track\n\nLast updated\n\nA ground track or ground trace is the path on the surface of a planet directly below an aircraft's or satellite's trajectory. In the case of satellites, it is also known as a suborbital track, and is the vertical projection of the satellite's orbit onto the surface of the Earth (or whatever body the satellite is orbiting). [1]\n\n## Contents\n\nA satellite ground track may be thought of as a path along the Earth's surface that traces the movement of an imaginary line between the satellite and the center of the Earth. In other words, the ground track is the set of points at which the satellite will pass directly overhead, or cross the zenith, in the frame of reference of a ground observer. [2]\n\n## Aircraft ground tracks\n\nIn air navigation, ground tracks typically approximate an arc of a great circle, this being the shortest distance between two points on the Earth's surface. In order to follow a specified ground track, a pilot must adjust their heading in order to compensate for the effect of wind. Aircraft routes are planned to avoid restricted airspace and dangerous areas, and to pass near navigation beacons.\n\n## Satellite ground tracks\n\nThe ground track of a satellite can take a number of different forms, depending on the values of the orbital elements, parameters that define the size, shape, and orientation of the satellite's orbit. (This article discusses closed orbits, or orbits with eccentricity less than one, and thus excludes parabolic and hyperbolic trajectories.)\n\nTypically, satellites have a roughly sinusoidal ground track. A satellite with an orbital inclination between zero and ninety degrees is said to be in what is called a direct or prograde orbit , meaning that it orbits in the same direction as the planet's rotation. A satellite with an orbital inclination between 90\u00b0 and 180\u00b0 (or, equivalently, between 0\u00b0 and \u221290\u00b0) is said to be in a retrograde orbit . (Direct orbits are by far the most common for artificial satellites, as the initial velocity imparted by the Earth's rotation at launch reduces the delta-v needed to achieve orbit.)\n\nA satellite in a direct orbit with an orbital period less than one day will tend to move from west to east along its ground track. This is called \"apparent direct\" motion. A satellite in a direct orbit with an orbital period greater than one day will tend to move from east to west along its ground track, in what is called \"apparent retrograde\" motion. This effect occurs because the satellite orbits more slowly than the speed at which the Earth rotates beneath it. Any satellite in a true retrograde orbit will always move from east to west along its ground track, regardless of the length of its orbital period.\n\nBecause a satellite in an eccentric orbit moves faster near perigee and slower near apogee, it is possible for a satellite to track eastward during part of its orbit and westward during another part. This phenomenon allows for ground tracks that cross over themselves in a single orbit, as in the geosynchronous and Molniya orbits discussed below.\n\n### Effect of orbital period\n\nA satellite whose orbital period is an integer fraction of a day (e.g., 24 hours, 12 hours, 8 hours, etc.) will follow roughly the same ground track every day. This ground track is shifted east or west depending on the longitude of the ascending node, which can vary over time due to perturbations of the orbit. If the period of the satellite is slightly longer than an integer fraction of a day, the ground track will shift west over time; if it is slightly shorter, the ground track will shift east. [2] [3]\n\nAs the orbital period of a satellite increases, approaching the rotational period of the Earth (in other words, as its average orbital speed slows towards the rotational speed of the Earth), its sinusoidal ground track will become compressed longitudinally, meaning that the \"nodes\" (the points at which it crosses the equator) will become closer together until at geosynchronous orbit they lie directly on top of each other. For orbital periods longer than the Earth's rotational period, an increase in the orbital period corresponds to a longitudinal stretching out of the (apparent retrograde) ground track.\n\nA satellite whose orbital period is equal to the rotational period of the Earth is said to be in a geosynchronous orbit. Its ground track will have a \"figure eight\" shape over a fixed location on the Earth, crossing the equator twice each day. It will track eastward when it is on the part of its orbit closest to perigee, and westward when it is closest to apogee.\n\nA special case of the geosynchronous orbit, the geostationary orbit, has an eccentricity of zero (meaning the orbit is circular), and an inclination of zero in the Earth-Centered, Earth-Fixed coordinate system (meaning the orbital plane is not tilted relative to the Earth's equator). The \"ground track\" in this case consists of a single point on the Earth's equator, above which the satellite sits at all times. Note that the satellite is still orbiting the Earth \u2014 its apparent lack of motion is due to the fact that the Earth is rotating about its own center of mass at the same rate as the satellite is orbiting.\n\n### Effect of inclination\n\nOrbital inclination is the angle formed between the plane of an orbit and the equatorial plane of the Earth. The geographic latitudes covered by the ground track will range from \u2013i to i, where i is the orbital inclination. [3] In other words, the greater the inclination of a satellite's orbit, the further north and south its ground track will pass. A satellite with an inclination of exactly 90\u00b0 is said to be in a polar orbit, meaning it passes over the Earth's north and south poles.\n\nLaunch sites at lower latitudes are often preferred partly for the flexibility they allow in orbital inclination; the initial inclination of an orbit is constrained to be greater than or equal to the launch latitude. Vehicles launched from Cape Canaveral, for instance, will have an initial orbital inclination of at least 28\u00b027\u2032, the latitude of the launch site\u2014and to achieve this minimum requires launching with a due east azimuth, which may not always be feasible given other launch constraints. At the extremes, a launch site located on the equator can launch directly into any desired inclination, while a hypothetical launch site at the north or south pole would only be able to launch into polar orbits. (While it is possible to perform an orbital inclination change maneuver once on orbit, such maneuvers are typically among the most costly, in terms of fuel, of all orbital maneuvers, and are typically avoided or minimized to the extent possible.)\n\nIn addition to providing for a wider range of initial orbit inclinations, low-latitude launch sites offer the benefit of requiring less energy to make orbit (at least for prograde orbits, which comprise the vast majority of launches), due to the initial velocity provided by the Earth's rotation. The desire for equatorial launch sites, coupled with geopolitical and logistical realities, has fostered the development of floating launch platforms, most notably Sea Launch.\n\n### Effect of argument of perigee\n\nIf the argument of perigee is zero, meaning that perigee and apogee lie in the equatorial plane, then the ground track of the satellite will appear the same above and below the equator (i.e., it will exhibit 180\u00b0 rotational symmetry about the orbital nodes.) If the argument of perigee is non-zero, however, the satellite will behave differently in the northern and southern hemispheres. The Molniya orbit, with an argument of perigee near \u221290\u00b0, is an example of such a case. In a Molniya orbit, apogee occurs at a high latitude (63\u00b0), and the orbit is highly eccentric (e = 0.72). This causes the satellite to \"hover\" over a region of the northern hemisphere for a long time, while spending very little time over the southern hemisphere. This phenomenon is known as \"apogee dwell\", and is desirable for communications for high latitude regions. [3]\n\n### Repeat orbits\n\nAs orbital operations are often required to monitor a specific location on Earth, orbits that cover the same ground track periodically are often used. On earth, these orbits are commonly referred to as Earth-repeat orbits, and are often designed with \"frozen orbit\" parameters to achieve a repeat ground track orbit with stable (minimally time-varying) orbit elements. [4] These orbits use the nodal precession effect to shift the orbit so the ground track coincides with that of a previous orbit, so that this essentially balances out the offset in the revolution of the orbited body. The longitudinal rotation after a certain period of time of a planet is given by:\n\n${\\displaystyle \\Delta L_{1}=-2\\pi {\\frac {T}{T_{E}}}}$\n\nwhere\n\n\u2022 ${\\displaystyle T}$ is the time elapsed\n\u2022 ${\\displaystyle T_{E}}$ is the time for a full revolution of the orbiting body, in the case of Earth one sidereal day\n\nThe effect of the nodal precession can be quantified as:\n\n${\\displaystyle \\Delta L_{2}=-{\\frac {3\\pi J_{2}R_{e}^{2}cos(i)}{a^{2}(1-e^{2})^{2}}}}$\n\nwhere\n\n\u2022 ${\\displaystyle J_{2}}$ is the body's second dynamic form factor\n\u2022 ${\\displaystyle R_{e}}$ is the body's radius\n\u2022 ${\\displaystyle i}$ is the orbital inclination\n\u2022 ${\\displaystyle a}$ is the orbit's semi-major axis\n\u2022 ${\\displaystyle e}$ is the orbital eccentricity\n\nThese two effects must cancel out after a set ${\\displaystyle j}$ orbital revolutions and ${\\displaystyle k}$ (sidereal) days. Hence, equating the elapsed time to the orbital period of the satellite and combining the above two equations yields an equation which holds for any orbit that is a repeat orbit:\n\n${\\displaystyle j\\left|\\Delta L_{1}+\\Delta L_{2}\\right|=j\\left|-2\\pi {\\frac {2\\pi {\\sqrt {\\frac {a^{3}}{\\mu }}}}{T_{E}}}-{\\frac {3\\pi J_{2}R_{e}^{2}cos(i)}{a^{2}(1-e^{2})^{2}}}\\right|=k2\\pi }$\n\nwhere\n\n\u2022 ${\\displaystyle \\mu }$ is the standard gravitational parameter for the body being orbited\n\u2022 ${\\displaystyle j}$ is the number of orbital revolutions after which the same ground track is covered\n\u2022 ${\\displaystyle k}$ is the number of sidereal days after which the same ground track is covered\n\n## Related Research Articles\n\nIn celestial mechanics, an orbit is the curved trajectory of an object such as the trajectory of a planet around a star, or of a natural satellite around a planet, or of an artificial satellite around an object or position in space such as a planet, moon, asteroid, or Lagrange point. Normally, orbit refers to a regularly repeating trajectory, although it may also refer to a non-repeating trajectory. To a close approximation, planets and satellites follow elliptic orbits, with the center of mass being orbited at a focal point of the ellipse, as described by Kepler's laws of planetary motion.\n\nTidal acceleration is an effect of the tidal forces between an orbiting natural satellite and the primary planet that it orbits. The acceleration causes a gradual recession of a satellite in a prograde orbit away from the primary, and a corresponding slowdown of the primary's rotation. The process eventually leads to tidal locking, usually of the smaller body first, and later the larger body. The Earth\u2013Moon system is the best-studied case.\n\nA geosynchronous orbit is an Earth-centered orbit with an orbital period that matches Earth's rotation on its axis, 23 hours, 56 minutes, and 4 seconds. The synchronization of rotation and orbital period means that, for an observer on Earth's surface, an object in geosynchronous orbit returns to exactly the same position in the sky after a period of one sidereal day. Over the course of a day, the object's position in the sky may remain still or trace out a path, typically in a figure-8 form, whose precise characteristics depend on the orbit's inclination and eccentricity. A circular geosynchronous orbit has a constant altitude of 35,786\u00a0km (22,236\u00a0mi).\n\nA geostationary orbit, also referred to as a geosynchronous equatorial orbit (GEO), is a circular geosynchronous orbit 35,786\u00a0km (22,236\u00a0mi) in altitude above Earth's Equator and following the direction of Earth's rotation.\n\nSidereal time is a timekeeping system that astronomers use to locate celestial objects. Using sidereal time, it is possible to easily point a telescope to the proper coordinates in the night sky. In short, sidereal time is a \"time scale that is based on Earth's rate of rotation measured relative to the fixed stars\", or more correctly, relative to the March equinox.\n\nAn equatorial bulge is a difference between the equatorial and polar diameters of a planet, due to the centrifugal force exerted by the rotation about the body's axis. A rotating body tends to form an oblate spheroid rather than a sphere.\n\nThe orbital period is the amount of time a given astronomical object takes to complete one orbit around another object. In astronomy, it usually applies to planets or asteroids orbiting the Sun, moons orbiting planets, exoplanets orbiting other stars, or binary stars.\n\nA geosynchronous transfer orbit or geostationary transfer orbit (GTO) is a type of geocentric orbit. Satellites that are destined for geosynchronous (GSO) or geostationary orbit (GEO) are (almost) always put into a GTO as an intermediate step for reaching their final orbit.\n\nA geocentric orbit or Earth orbit involves any object orbiting Earth, such as the Moon or artificial satellites. In 1997, NASA estimated there were approximately 2,465 artificial satellite payloads orbiting Earth and 6,216 pieces of space debris as tracked by the Goddard Space Flight Center. More than 16,291 objects previously launched have undergone orbital decay and entered Earth's atmosphere.\n\nThe Molniya series satellites are military and communications satellites launched by the Soviet Union from 1965 to 2004. These satellites use highly eccentric elliptical orbits known as Molniya orbits, which have a long dwell time over high latitudes. They are suited for communications purposes in polar regions, in the same way that geostationary satellites are used for equatorial regions.\n\nA Molniya orbit is a type of satellite orbit designed to provide communications and remote sensing coverage over high latitudes. It is a highly elliptical orbit with an inclination of 63.4 degrees, an argument of perigee of 270 degrees, and an orbital period of approximately half a sidereal day. The name comes from the Molniya satellites, a series of Soviet\/Russian civilian and military communications satellites which have used this type of orbit since the mid-1960s.\n\nA Sun-synchronous orbit (SSO), also called a heliosynchronous orbit, is a nearly polar orbit around a planet, in which the satellite passes over any given point of the planet's surface at the same local mean solar time. More technically, it is an orbit arranged so that it precesses through one complete revolution each year, so it always maintains the same relationship with the Sun.\n\nA graveyard orbit, also called a junk orbit or disposal orbit, is an orbit that lies away from common operational orbits. One significant graveyard orbit is a supersynchronous orbit well beyond geosynchronous orbit. Some satellites are moved into such orbits at the end of their operational life to reduce the probability of colliding with operational spacecraft and generating space debris.\n\nIn astronautics and aerospace engineering, the bi-elliptic transfer is an orbital maneuver that moves a spacecraft from one orbit to another and may, in certain situations, require less delta-v than a Hohmann transfer maneuver.\n\nA Tundra orbit is a highly elliptical geosynchronous orbit with a high inclination, an orbital period of one sidereal day, and a typical eccentricity between 0.2 and 0.3. A satellite placed in this orbit spends most of its time over a chosen area of the Earth, a phenomenon known as apogee dwell, which makes them particularly well suited for communications satellites serving high-latitude regions. The ground track of a satellite in a Tundra orbit is a closed figure 8 with a smaller loop over either the northern or southern hemisphere. This differentiates them from Molniya orbits designed to service high-latitude regions, which have the same inclination but half the period and do not loiter over a single region.\n\nThe Moon orbits Earth in the prograde direction and completes one revolution relative to the Vernal Equinox and the stars in about 27.32 days and one revolution relative to the Sun in about 29.53 days. Earth and the Moon orbit about their barycentre, which lies about 4,670\u00a0km (2,900\u00a0mi) from Earth's center, forming a satellite system called the Earth\u2013Moon system. On average, the distance to the Moon is about 385,000\u00a0km (239,000\u00a0mi) from Earth's center, which corresponds to about 60 Earth radii or 1.282 light-seconds.\n\nA geosynchronous satellite is a satellite in geosynchronous orbit, with an orbital period the same as the Earth's rotation period. Such a satellite returns to the same position in the sky after each sidereal day, and over the course of a day traces out a path in the sky that is typically some form of analemma. A special case of geosynchronous satellite is the geostationary satellite, which has a geostationary orbit \u2013 a circular geosynchronous orbit directly above the Earth's equator. Another type of geosynchronous orbit used by satellites is the Tundra elliptical orbit.\n\nNodal precession is the precession of the orbital plane of a satellite around the rotational axis of an astronomical body such as Earth. This precession is due to the non-spherical nature of a rotating body, which creates a non-uniform gravitational field. The following discussion relates to low Earth orbit of artificial satellites, which have no measurable effect on the motion of Earth. The nodal precession of more massive, natural satellites like the Moon is more complex.\n\nThe nodal period of a satellite is the time interval between successive passages of the satellite through either of its orbital nodes, typically the ascending node. This type of orbital period applies to artificial satellites, like those that monitor weather on Earth, and natural satellites like the Moon.\n\n## References\n\n1. \"suborbital track\". AMetSoc.org Glossary of Meteorology. Retrieved 15 March 2022.\n2. Curtis, Howard D. (2005), Orbital Mechanics for Engineering Students (1st\u00a0ed.), Amsterdam: Elsevier Ltd., ISBN \u00a0 978-0-7506-6169-0 .\n3. Montenbruck, Oliver; Gill, Eberhard (2000), Satellite Orbits (1st\u00a0ed.), The Netherlands: Springer, ISBN \u00a0 3-540-67280-X .\n4. Low, Samuel Y. W. (January 2022). \"Designing a Reference Trajectory for Frozen Repeat Near-Equatorial Low Earth Orbits\". 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The Academic Health Economists' Blog hosts the Health Economics Journal Club. The meeting times vary; click here to see details of upcoming meetings. Discussions last 1 hour and take place on various platforms, such as Twitter and Google Hangouts, as well as on the blog. Everybody is welcome to contribute.
The Health Economics Journal Club primarily discusses working papers, and is lead by a discussant. In some cases a guest author may be invited. A discussant will be required to write a short summary of their chosen paper and a short discussion, totalling no more than 1000 words. If there is a paper you would like to discuss and you are interested in leading a meeting, or if you would like to contribute in any other way, please get in touch.
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Why should I volunteer to be a discussant?
We all read academic literature. Many of us probably wish we made the time to read more. Volunteering as a discussant is a good way of committing oneself to thoroughly reading and analysing the contents of a paper. This is particularly valuable for students wanting to develop their skills in critical appraisal. Furthermore, publishing on the blog is a good way to gain recognition with colleagues. You may also be able to make a substantive contribution to the author's work-in-progress and help advance the field, with minimal effort.
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<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<clinical_study>
<!-- This xml conforms to an XML Schema at:
https://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/html/images/info/public.xsd -->
<required_header>
<download_date>ClinicalTrials.gov processed this data on May 11, 2018</download_date>
<link_text>Link to the current ClinicalTrials.gov record.</link_text>
<url>https://clinicaltrials.gov/show/NCT02567188</url>
</required_header>
<id_info>
<org_study_id>ML22439</org_study_id>
<nct_id>NCT02567188</nct_id>
</id_info>
<brief_title>A Study of MIRCERA in Participants With Chronic Kidney Disease Stage 3-4 and Not on Dialysis</brief_title>
<sponsors>
<lead_sponsor>
<agency>Hoffmann-La Roche</agency>
<agency_class>Industry</agency_class>
</lead_sponsor>
</sponsors>
<source>Hoffmann-La Roche</source>
<brief_summary>
<textblock>
An observational, longitudinal, multi-center, non-interventional study in participants with
chronic kidney disease (CKD) stage 3-4, assessed by Modification of Diet in Renal Disease
(MDRD) to collect data regarding safety and efficacy in participants with pre-dialysis
situation who are treated with MIRCERA in normal clinical environment.
</textblock>
</brief_summary>
<overall_status>Completed</overall_status>
<start_date>April 2009</start_date>
<completion_date type="Actual">April 2011</completion_date>
<primary_completion_date type="Actual">April 2011</primary_completion_date>
<study_type>Observational</study_type>
<has_expanded_access>No</has_expanded_access>
<study_design_info>
<observational_model>Case Control</observational_model>
<time_perspective>Cross-Sectional</time_perspective>
</study_design_info>
<primary_outcome>
<measure>Percentage of Participants Reaching a Hemoglobin (Hb) Value of Greater Than (>) 100 and Less Than (<) 120 Grams Per Liter (gm/L) at Month 6 Before Inclusion</measure>
<time_frame>Pre-baseline (Month -6)</time_frame>
</primary_outcome>
<primary_outcome>
<measure>Percentage of Participants Reaching a Hb Value of >100 and < 120 gm/L at Month 3 Before Inclusion</measure>
<time_frame>Pre-baseline (Month -3)</time_frame>
</primary_outcome>
<primary_outcome>
<measure>Percentage of Participants Reaching a Hb Value of >100 and < 120 gm/L at Baseline</measure>
<time_frame>Baseline</time_frame>
</primary_outcome>
<primary_outcome>
<measure>Percentage of Participants Reaching a Hb Value of > 100 and < 120 gm/L at Month 3 After Inclusion</measure>
<time_frame>Month 3</time_frame>
</primary_outcome>
<primary_outcome>
<measure>Percentage of Participants Reaching a Hb Value of > 100 and < 120 gm/L at Month 6 After Inclusion</measure>
<time_frame>Month 6</time_frame>
</primary_outcome>
<primary_outcome>
<measure>Percentage of Participants Reaching a Hb Value of > 100 and < 120 gm/L at Month 9 After Inclusion</measure>
<time_frame>Month 9</time_frame>
</primary_outcome>
<primary_outcome>
<measure>Percentage of Participants Reaching a Hb Value of > 100 and < 120 gm/L at Month 12 After Inclusion</measure>
<time_frame>Month 12</time_frame>
</primary_outcome>
<primary_outcome>
<measure>Mean Hb Value at Month 6 Before Inclusion</measure>
<time_frame>Pre-baseline (Month -6)</time_frame>
</primary_outcome>
<primary_outcome>
<measure>Mean Hb Value at Month 3 Before Inclusion</measure>
<time_frame>Pre-baseline (Month -3)</time_frame>
</primary_outcome>
<primary_outcome>
<measure>Mean Hb Value at Baseline</measure>
<time_frame>Baseline</time_frame>
</primary_outcome>
<primary_outcome>
<measure>Mean Hb Value at Month 3 After Inclusion</measure>
<time_frame>Month 3</time_frame>
</primary_outcome>
<primary_outcome>
<measure>Mean Hb Value at Month 6 After Inclusion</measure>
<time_frame>Month 6</time_frame>
</primary_outcome>
<primary_outcome>
<measure>Mean Hb Value at Month 9 After Inclusion</measure>
<time_frame>Month 9</time_frame>
</primary_outcome>
<primary_outcome>
<measure>Mean Hb Value at Month 12 After Inclusion</measure>
<time_frame>Month 12</time_frame>
</primary_outcome>
<primary_outcome>
<measure>Percentage of Participants With Hb Fluctuation From Pre-Baseline (Month -6) to Baseline</measure>
<time_frame>Pre-baseline (Month -6) to Baseline</time_frame>
<description>Hb fluctuation was defined as change in Hb value >15 gm/L between 2 visits.</description>
</primary_outcome>
<primary_outcome>
<measure>Percentage of Participants With Hb Fluctuation From Baseline to Month 12</measure>
<time_frame>Baseline to Month 12</time_frame>
<description>Hb fluctuation was defined as change in Hb value >15 gm/L between 2 visits.</description>
</primary_outcome>
<secondary_outcome>
<measure>Percentage of Participants With Change in MIRCERA Treatment</measure>
<time_frame>Months 3, 6, 9, and 12</time_frame>
<description>Change in MIRCERA treatment included changes in dose, frequency, and route of administration.</description>
</secondary_outcome>
<secondary_outcome>
<measure>Percentage of Participants With Number of MIRCERA Dose Changes</measure>
<time_frame>Baseline to Month 12</time_frame>
</secondary_outcome>
<secondary_outcome>
<measure>Correlation of Hb Levels With Underlying Disease</measure>
<time_frame>Baseline to 12 months</time_frame>
</secondary_outcome>
<secondary_outcome>
<measure>Correlation of Hb Levels With Levels of Inflammation</measure>
<time_frame>Baseline to 12 months</time_frame>
</secondary_outcome>
<secondary_outcome>
<measure>Percentage of Participants With Changes in Iron Supplement</measure>
<time_frame>Pre-baseline (Months -6 and -3), baseline, Months 3, 6, 9 and 12</time_frame>
<description>Percentage of participants who had any change in their iron supplement medication at a specified visit were reported.</description>
</secondary_outcome>
<secondary_outcome>
<measure>Percentage of Participants With Changes in Immunosuppressive Treatment</measure>
<time_frame>Pre-baseline (Months -6 and -3), baseline, Months 3, 6, 9 and 12</time_frame>
<description>Percentage of participants who had any change in their immunosuppressive medication at a specified visit were reported.</description>
</secondary_outcome>
<secondary_outcome>
<measure>Percentage of Participants With Changes in AntihypertensiveTreatment</measure>
<time_frame>Pre-baseline (Months -6 and -3), baseline, Months 3, 6, 9 and 12</time_frame>
<description>Percentage of participants who had any change in their antihypertensive medication at a specified visit were reported.</description>
</secondary_outcome>
<secondary_outcome>
<measure>Number of Participants With Different Medication Treatment</measure>
<time_frame>Pre-baseline (Month -6) to Month 12</time_frame>
<description>Number of participants who were receiving different treatments (antihypertensive, immunosuppressive, iron supplements, and others) before and/or after baseline were reported. Same participant could be reported in more than one category.</description>
</secondary_outcome>
<secondary_outcome>
<measure>Percentage of Participants Who Required Blood Transfusion</measure>
<time_frame>Pre-baseline (Months -6 and -3), baseline, Months 3, 6, 9 and 12</time_frame>
</secondary_outcome>
<secondary_outcome>
<measure>Percentage of Participants Who Required Renal Replacement Therapy</measure>
<time_frame>Months 3, 6, 9, and 12</time_frame>
<description>Renal replacement therapy was defined as hemodialysis and peritoneal dialysis.</description>
</secondary_outcome>
<number_of_groups>1</number_of_groups>
<enrollment type="Actual">144</enrollment>
<condition>Anemia</condition>
<arm_group>
<arm_group_label>Cohort of CKD Participants</arm_group_label>
<description>Pre-dialysis participants with CKD treated with MIRCERA according to the current standard of care and in line with the current local summary of product characteristics were observed for maximum of 12 months.</description>
</arm_group>
<intervention>
<intervention_type>Other</intervention_type>
<intervention_name>MIRCERA</intervention_name>
<arm_group_label>Cohort of CKD Participants</arm_group_label>
</intervention>
<eligibility>
<study_pop>
<textblock>
Adult participants with CKD Stage 3-4 treated with MIRCERA
</textblock>
</study_pop>
<sampling_method>Non-Probability Sample</sampling_method>
<criteria>
<textblock>
Inclusion Criteria:
- Adult participants above 18 years of age
- Pre-dialysis participants with CKD stage 3-4 treated with MIRCERA and continue in the
pre-dialysis state for the whole study period
- Estimated glomerular filteration rate (e-GFR) between 15-60 milliliter per minute
(mL/min) (calculated)
Exclusion Criteria:
- Participants involved in interventional trials
- Participants with life expectancy less than 1 year
- Active malignancy
- Planned living kidney transplant within 6 months.
</textblock>
</criteria>
<gender>All</gender>
<minimum_age>18 Years</minimum_age>
<maximum_age>N/A</maximum_age>
<healthy_volunteers>No</healthy_volunteers>
</eligibility>
<overall_official>
<last_name>Clinical Trials</last_name>
<role>Study Director</role>
<affiliation>Hoffmann-La Roche</affiliation>
</overall_official>
<location>
<facility>
<address>
<city>Angeholm</city>
<zip>S-262 81</zip>
<country>Sweden</country>
</address>
</facility>
</location>
<location>
<facility>
<address>
<city>Bollnas</city>
<zip>821 81</zip>
<country>Sweden</country>
</address>
</facility>
</location>
<location>
<facility>
<address>
<city>Eskilstuna</city>
<zip>63188</zip>
<country>Sweden</country>
</address>
</facility>
</location>
<location>
<facility>
<address>
<city>Gaevle</city>
<zip>80187</zip>
<country>Sweden</country>
</address>
</facility>
</location>
<location>
<facility>
<address>
<city>Goeteborg</city>
<zip>41345</zip>
<country>Sweden</country>
</address>
</facility>
</location>
<location>
<facility>
<address>
<city>Gothenburg</city>
<zip>S-402 76</zip>
<country>Sweden</country>
</address>
</facility>
</location>
<location>
<facility>
<address>
<city>Huddinge</city>
<zip>14186</zip>
<country>Sweden</country>
</address>
</facility>
</location>
<location>
<facility>
<address>
<city>Jonkoping</city>
<zip>55185</zip>
<country>Sweden</country>
</address>
</facility>
</location>
<location>
<facility>
<address>
<city>Karlshamn</city>
<zip>S-374 80</zip>
<country>Sweden</country>
</address>
</facility>
</location>
<location>
<facility>
<address>
<city>Karlstad</city>
<zip>65185</zip>
<country>Sweden</country>
</address>
</facility>
</location>
<location>
<facility>
<address>
<city>Kristianstad</city>
<zip>29185</zip>
<country>Sweden</country>
</address>
</facility>
</location>
<location>
<facility>
<address>
<city>Linkoeping</city>
<zip>S-581 85</zip>
<country>Sweden</country>
</address>
</facility>
</location>
<location>
<facility>
<address>
<city>Mölndal</city>
<zip>S-431 80</zip>
<country>Sweden</country>
</address>
</facility>
</location>
<location>
<facility>
<address>
<city>Norrkoeping</city>
<zip>60182</zip>
<country>Sweden</country>
</address>
</facility>
</location>
<location>
<facility>
<address>
<city>Skövde</city>
<zip>54185</zip>
<country>Sweden</country>
</address>
</facility>
</location>
<location>
<facility>
<address>
<city>Stockholm</city>
<zip>17176</zip>
<country>Sweden</country>
</address>
</facility>
</location>
<location>
<facility>
<address>
<city>Stockholm</city>
<zip>18288</zip>
<country>Sweden</country>
</address>
</facility>
</location>
<location>
<facility>
<address>
<city>Umea</city>
<zip>90185</zip>
<country>Sweden</country>
</address>
</facility>
</location>
<location>
<facility>
<address>
<city>Värnamo</city>
<zip>33185</zip>
<country>Sweden</country>
</address>
</facility>
</location>
<location>
<facility>
<address>
<city>Västervik</city>
<zip>59381</zip>
<country>Sweden</country>
</address>
</facility>
</location>
<location_countries>
<country>Sweden</country>
</location_countries>
<verification_date>January 2016</verification_date>
<!-- For several months we've had both old and new date name tags -->
<!-- Now, the old date names have been dropped. -->
<!-- The new date name replacements are: -->
<!-- OLD (gone) NEW (in use) -->
<!-- lastchanged_date becomes last_update_submitted -->
<!-- firstreceived_date becomes study_first_submitted -->
<!-- firstreceived_results_date becomes results_first_submitted -->
<!-- firstreceived_results_disposition_date becomes disposition_first_submitted -->
<study_first_submitted>September 28, 2015</study_first_submitted>
<study_first_submitted_qc>September 30, 2015</study_first_submitted_qc>
<study_first_posted type="Estimate">October 2, 2015</study_first_posted>
<results_first_submitted>November 2, 2015</results_first_submitted>
<results_first_submitted_qc>November 24, 2015</results_first_submitted_qc>
<results_first_posted type="Estimate">December 30, 2015</results_first_posted>
<last_update_submitted>January 14, 2016</last_update_submitted>
<last_update_submitted_qc>January 14, 2016</last_update_submitted_qc>
<last_update_posted type="Estimate">February 15, 2016</last_update_posted>
<responsible_party>
<responsible_party_type>Sponsor</responsible_party_type>
</responsible_party>
<clinical_results>
<participant_flow>
<group_list>
<group group_id="P1">
<title>Chronic Kidney Disease (CKD) Participants</title>
<description>Pre-dialysis participants with CKD treated with MIRCERA according to the current standard of care and in line with the current local summary of product characteristics were observed for maximum of 12 months.</description>
</group>
</group_list>
<period_list>
<period>
<title>Overall Study</title>
<milestone_list>
<milestone>
<title>STARTED</title>
<participants_list>
<participants group_id="P1" count="144"/>
</participants_list>
</milestone>
<milestone>
<title>COMPLETED</title>
<participants_list>
<participants group_id="P1" count="109"/>
</participants_list>
</milestone>
<milestone>
<title>NOT COMPLETED</title>
<participants_list>
<participants group_id="P1" count="35"/>
</participants_list>
</milestone>
</milestone_list>
<drop_withdraw_reason_list>
<drop_withdraw_reason>
<title>Death</title>
<participants_list>
<participants group_id="P1" count="10"/>
</participants_list>
</drop_withdraw_reason>
<drop_withdraw_reason>
<title>Terminated Mircera Treatment</title>
<participants_list>
<participants group_id="P1" count="9"/>
</participants_list>
</drop_withdraw_reason>
<drop_withdraw_reason>
<title>Lost to Follow-up</title>
<participants_list>
<participants group_id="P1" count="5"/>
</participants_list>
</drop_withdraw_reason>
<drop_withdraw_reason>
<title>Adverse Event</title>
<participants_list>
<participants group_id="P1" count="1"/>
</participants_list>
</drop_withdraw_reason>
<drop_withdraw_reason>
<title>Withdrawal by Subject</title>
<participants_list>
<participants group_id="P1" count="1"/>
</participants_list>
</drop_withdraw_reason>
<drop_withdraw_reason>
<title>Refused Treatment/ Did not Cooperate</title>
<participants_list>
<participants group_id="P1" count="1"/>
</participants_list>
</drop_withdraw_reason>
<drop_withdraw_reason>
<title>Moved and Changed Clinic</title>
<participants_list>
<participants group_id="P1" count="1"/>
</participants_list>
</drop_withdraw_reason>
<drop_withdraw_reason>
<title>Started Hemodialysis</title>
<participants_list>
<participants group_id="P1" count="2"/>
</participants_list>
</drop_withdraw_reason>
<drop_withdraw_reason>
<title>Protocol Violation</title>
<participants_list>
<participants group_id="P1" count="5"/>
</participants_list>
</drop_withdraw_reason>
</drop_withdraw_reason_list>
</period>
</period_list>
</participant_flow>
<baseline>
<population>All enrolled participants with available data for baseline characteristics.</population>
<group_list>
<group group_id="B1">
<title>CKD Participants</title>
<description>Pre-dialysis participants with CKD treated with MIRCERA according to the current standard of care and in line with the current local summary of product characteristics were observed for maximum of 12 months.</description>
</group>
</group_list>
<analyzed_list>
<analyzed>
<units>Participants</units>
<scope>Overall</scope>
<count_list>
<count group_id="B1" value="141"/>
</count_list>
</analyzed>
</analyzed_list>
<measure_list>
<measure>
<title>Age</title>
<units>years</units>
<param>Mean</param>
<dispersion>Standard Deviation</dispersion>
<class_list>
<class>
<category_list>
<category>
<measurement_list>
<measurement group_id="B1" value="66.2" spread="16.5"/>
</measurement_list>
</category>
</category_list>
</class>
</class_list>
</measure>
<measure>
<title>Gender</title>
<units>participants</units>
<param>Number</param>
<class_list>
<class>
<title>Female</title>
<category_list>
<category>
<measurement_list>
<measurement group_id="B1" value="64"/>
</measurement_list>
</category>
</category_list>
</class>
<class>
<title>Male</title>
<category_list>
<category>
<measurement_list>
<measurement group_id="B1" value="77"/>
</measurement_list>
</category>
</category_list>
</class>
</class_list>
</measure>
</measure_list>
</baseline>
<outcome_list>
<outcome>
<type>Primary</type>
<title>Percentage of Participants Reaching a Hemoglobin (Hb) Value of Greater Than (>) 100 and Less Than (<) 120 Grams Per Liter (gm/L) at Month 6 Before Inclusion</title>
<time_frame>Pre-baseline (Month -6)</time_frame>
<population>All enrolled participants. Here, number of participants analyzed= participants with non-missing Hb assessment at specified time frame for this outcome measure.</population>
<group_list>
<group group_id="O1">
<title>CKD Participants</title>
<description>Pre-dialysis participants with CKD treated with MIRCERA according to the current standard of care and in line with the current local summary of product characteristics were observed for maximum of 12 months.</description>
</group>
</group_list>
<measure>
<title>Percentage of Participants Reaching a Hemoglobin (Hb) Value of Greater Than (>) 100 and Less Than (<) 120 Grams Per Liter (gm/L) at Month 6 Before Inclusion</title>
<population>All enrolled participants. Here, number of participants analyzed= participants with non-missing Hb assessment at specified time frame for this outcome measure.</population>
<units>percentage of participants</units>
<param>Number</param>
<analyzed_list>
<analyzed>
<units>Participants</units>
<scope>Measure</scope>
<count_list>
<count group_id="O1" value="125"/>
</count_list>
</analyzed>
</analyzed_list>
<class_list>
<class>
<category_list>
<category>
<measurement_list>
<measurement group_id="O1" value="56.8"/>
</measurement_list>
</category>
</category_list>
</class>
</class_list>
</measure>
</outcome>
<outcome>
<type>Primary</type>
<title>Percentage of Participants Reaching a Hb Value of >100 and < 120 gm/L at Month 3 Before Inclusion</title>
<time_frame>Pre-baseline (Month -3)</time_frame>
<population>All enrolled participants. Here, number of participants analyzed= participants with non-missing Hb assessment at specified time frame for this outcome measure.</population>
<group_list>
<group group_id="O1">
<title>CKD Participants</title>
<description>Pre-dialysis participants with CKD treated with MIRCERA according to the current standard of care and in line with the current local summary of product characteristics were observed for maximum of 12 months.</description>
</group>
</group_list>
<measure>
<title>Percentage of Participants Reaching a Hb Value of >100 and < 120 gm/L at Month 3 Before Inclusion</title>
<population>All enrolled participants. Here, number of participants analyzed= participants with non-missing Hb assessment at specified time frame for this outcome measure.</population>
<units>percentage of participants</units>
<param>Number</param>
<analyzed_list>
<analyzed>
<units>Participants</units>
<scope>Measure</scope>
<count_list>
<count group_id="O1" value="116"/>
</count_list>
</analyzed>
</analyzed_list>
<class_list>
<class>
<category_list>
<category>
<measurement_list>
<measurement group_id="O1" value="56.0"/>
</measurement_list>
</category>
</category_list>
</class>
</class_list>
</measure>
</outcome>
<outcome>
<type>Primary</type>
<title>Percentage of Participants Reaching a Hb Value of >100 and < 120 gm/L at Baseline</title>
<time_frame>Baseline</time_frame>
<population>All enrolled participants. Here, number of participants analyzed= participants with non-missing Hb assessment at specified time frame for this outcome measure.</population>
<group_list>
<group group_id="O1">
<title>CKD Participants</title>
<description>Pre-dialysis participants with CKD treated with MIRCERA according to the current standard of care and in line with the current local summary of product characteristics were observed for maximum of 12 months.</description>
</group>
</group_list>
<measure>
<title>Percentage of Participants Reaching a Hb Value of >100 and < 120 gm/L at Baseline</title>
<population>All enrolled participants. Here, number of participants analyzed= participants with non-missing Hb assessment at specified time frame for this outcome measure.</population>
<units>percentage of participants</units>
<param>Number</param>
<analyzed_list>
<analyzed>
<units>Participants</units>
<scope>Measure</scope>
<count_list>
<count group_id="O1" value="139"/>
</count_list>
</analyzed>
</analyzed_list>
<class_list>
<class>
<category_list>
<category>
<measurement_list>
<measurement group_id="O1" value="42.4"/>
</measurement_list>
</category>
</category_list>
</class>
</class_list>
</measure>
</outcome>
<outcome>
<type>Primary</type>
<title>Percentage of Participants Reaching a Hb Value of > 100 and < 120 gm/L at Month 3 After Inclusion</title>
<time_frame>Month 3</time_frame>
<population>All enrolled participants. Here, number of participants analyzed= participants with non-missing Hb assessment at specified time frame for this outcome measure.</population>
<group_list>
<group group_id="O1">
<title>CKD Participants</title>
<description>Pre-dialysis participants with CKD treated with MIRCERA according to the current standard of care and in line with the current local summary of product characteristics were observed for maximum of 12 months.</description>
</group>
</group_list>
<measure>
<title>Percentage of Participants Reaching a Hb Value of > 100 and < 120 gm/L at Month 3 After Inclusion</title>
<population>All enrolled participants. Here, number of participants analyzed= participants with non-missing Hb assessment at specified time frame for this outcome measure.</population>
<units>percentage of participants</units>
<param>Number</param>
<analyzed_list>
<analyzed>
<units>Participants</units>
<scope>Measure</scope>
<count_list>
<count group_id="O1" value="122"/>
</count_list>
</analyzed>
</analyzed_list>
<class_list>
<class>
<category_list>
<category>
<measurement_list>
<measurement group_id="O1" value="41.0"/>
</measurement_list>
</category>
</category_list>
</class>
</class_list>
</measure>
</outcome>
<outcome>
<type>Primary</type>
<title>Percentage of Participants Reaching a Hb Value of > 100 and < 120 gm/L at Month 6 After Inclusion</title>
<time_frame>Month 6</time_frame>
<population>All enrolled participants. Here, number of participants analyzed= participants with non-missing Hb assessment at specified time frame for this outcome measure.</population>
<group_list>
<group group_id="O1">
<title>CKD Participants</title>
<description>Pre-dialysis participants with CKD treated with MIRCERA according to the current standard of care and in line with the current local summary of product characteristics were observed for maximum of 12 months.</description>
</group>
</group_list>
<measure>
<title>Percentage of Participants Reaching a Hb Value of > 100 and < 120 gm/L at Month 6 After Inclusion</title>
<population>All enrolled participants. Here, number of participants analyzed= participants with non-missing Hb assessment at specified time frame for this outcome measure.</population>
<units>percentage of participants</units>
<param>Number</param>
<analyzed_list>
<analyzed>
<units>Participants</units>
<scope>Measure</scope>
<count_list>
<count group_id="O1" value="113"/>
</count_list>
</analyzed>
</analyzed_list>
<class_list>
<class>
<category_list>
<category>
<measurement_list>
<measurement group_id="O1" value="41.6"/>
</measurement_list>
</category>
</category_list>
</class>
</class_list>
</measure>
</outcome>
<outcome>
<type>Primary</type>
<title>Percentage of Participants Reaching a Hb Value of > 100 and < 120 gm/L at Month 9 After Inclusion</title>
<time_frame>Month 9</time_frame>
<population>All enrolled participants. Here, number of participants analyzed= participants with non-missing Hb assessment at specified time frame for this outcome measure.</population>
<group_list>
<group group_id="O1">
<title>CKD Participants</title>
<description>Pre-dialysis participants with CKD treated with MIRCERA according to the current standard of care and in line with the current local summary of product characteristics were observed for maximum of 12 months.</description>
</group>
</group_list>
<measure>
<title>Percentage of Participants Reaching a Hb Value of > 100 and < 120 gm/L at Month 9 After Inclusion</title>
<population>All enrolled participants. Here, number of participants analyzed= participants with non-missing Hb assessment at specified time frame for this outcome measure.</population>
<units>percentage of participants</units>
<param>Number</param>
<analyzed_list>
<analyzed>
<units>Participants</units>
<scope>Measure</scope>
<count_list>
<count group_id="O1" value="106"/>
</count_list>
</analyzed>
</analyzed_list>
<class_list>
<class>
<category_list>
<category>
<measurement_list>
<measurement group_id="O1" value="33.0"/>
</measurement_list>
</category>
</category_list>
</class>
</class_list>
</measure>
</outcome>
<outcome>
<type>Primary</type>
<title>Percentage of Participants Reaching a Hb Value of > 100 and < 120 gm/L at Month 12 After Inclusion</title>
<time_frame>Month 12</time_frame>
<population>All enrolled participants. Here, number of participants analyzed= participants with non-missing Hb assessment at specified time frame for this outcome measure.</population>
<group_list>
<group group_id="O1">
<title>CKD Participants</title>
<description>Pre-dialysis participants with CKD treated with MIRCERA according to the current standard of care and in line with the current local summary of product characteristics were observed for maximum of 12 months.</description>
</group>
</group_list>
<measure>
<title>Percentage of Participants Reaching a Hb Value of > 100 and < 120 gm/L at Month 12 After Inclusion</title>
<population>All enrolled participants. Here, number of participants analyzed= participants with non-missing Hb assessment at specified time frame for this outcome measure.</population>
<units>percentage of participants</units>
<param>Number</param>
<analyzed_list>
<analyzed>
<units>Participants</units>
<scope>Measure</scope>
<count_list>
<count group_id="O1" value="110"/>
</count_list>
</analyzed>
</analyzed_list>
<class_list>
<class>
<category_list>
<category>
<measurement_list>
<measurement group_id="O1" value="45.5"/>
</measurement_list>
</category>
</category_list>
</class>
</class_list>
</measure>
</outcome>
<outcome>
<type>Primary</type>
<title>Mean Hb Value at Month 6 Before Inclusion</title>
<time_frame>Pre-baseline (Month -6)</time_frame>
<population>All enrolled participants. Here, number of participants analyzed= participants with non-missing Hb assessment at specified time frame for this outcome measure.</population>
<group_list>
<group group_id="O1">
<title>CKD Participants</title>
<description>Pre-dialysis participants with CKD treated with MIRCERA according to the current standard of care and in line with the current local summary of product characteristics were observed for maximum of 12 months.</description>
</group>
</group_list>
<measure>
<title>Mean Hb Value at Month 6 Before Inclusion</title>
<population>All enrolled participants. Here, number of participants analyzed= participants with non-missing Hb assessment at specified time frame for this outcome measure.</population>
<units>gm/L</units>
<param>Mean</param>
<dispersion>Standard Deviation</dispersion>
<analyzed_list>
<analyzed>
<units>Participants</units>
<scope>Measure</scope>
<count_list>
<count group_id="O1" value="125"/>
</count_list>
</analyzed>
</analyzed_list>
<class_list>
<class>
<category_list>
<category>
<measurement_list>
<measurement group_id="O1" value="113.2" spread="11.7"/>
</measurement_list>
</category>
</category_list>
</class>
</class_list>
</measure>
</outcome>
<outcome>
<type>Secondary</type>
<title>Percentage of Participants With Change in MIRCERA Treatment</title>
<description>Change in MIRCERA treatment included changes in dose, frequency, and route of administration.</description>
<time_frame>Months 3, 6, 9, and 12</time_frame>
<population>All enrolled participants. Here, number of participants analyzed= participants evaluable for this outcome measure. n = number of participants evaluable at the specified time frame.</population>
<group_list>
<group group_id="O1">
<title>CKD Participants</title>
<description>Pre-dialysis participants with CKD treated with MIRCERA according to the current standard of care and in line with the current local summary of product characteristics were observed for maximum of 12 months.</description>
</group>
</group_list>
<measure>
<title>Percentage of Participants With Change in MIRCERA Treatment</title>
<description>Change in MIRCERA treatment included changes in dose, frequency, and route of administration.</description>
<population>All enrolled participants. Here, number of participants analyzed= participants evaluable for this outcome measure. n = number of participants evaluable at the specified time frame.</population>
<units>percentage of participants</units>
<param>Number</param>
<analyzed_list>
<analyzed>
<units>Participants</units>
<scope>Measure</scope>
<count_list>
<count group_id="O1" value="130"/>
</count_list>
</analyzed>
</analyzed_list>
<class_list>
<class>
<title>Month 3 (n= 130)</title>
<category_list>
<category>
<measurement_list>
<measurement group_id="O1" value="43.1"/>
</measurement_list>
</category>
</category_list>
</class>
<class>
<title>Month 6 (n= 117)</title>
<category_list>
<category>
<measurement_list>
<measurement group_id="O1" value="30.8"/>
</measurement_list>
</category>
</category_list>
</class>
<class>
<title>Month 9 (n= 110)</title>
<category_list>
<category>
<measurement_list>
<measurement group_id="O1" value="22.7"/>
</measurement_list>
</category>
</category_list>
</class>
<class>
<title>Month 12 (n= 112)</title>
<category_list>
<category>
<measurement_list>
<measurement group_id="O1" value="23.2"/>
</measurement_list>
</category>
</category_list>
</class>
</class_list>
</measure>
</outcome>
<outcome>
<type>Secondary</type>
<title>Percentage of Participants With Number of MIRCERA Dose Changes</title>
<time_frame>Baseline to Month 12</time_frame>
<population>All enrolled participants. Here, number of participants analyzed= participants with available data for this outcome measure.</population>
<group_list>
<group group_id="O1">
<title>CKD Participants</title>
<description>Pre-dialysis participants with CKD treated with MIRCERA according to the current standard of care and in line with the current local summary of product characteristics were observed for maximum of 12 months.</description>
</group>
</group_list>
<measure>
<title>Percentage of Participants With Number of MIRCERA Dose Changes</title>
<population>All enrolled participants. Here, number of participants analyzed= participants with available data for this outcome measure.</population>
<units>percentage of participants</units>
<param>Number</param>
<analyzed_list>
<analyzed>
<units>Participants</units>
<scope>Measure</scope>
<count_list>
<count group_id="O1" value="91"/>
</count_list>
</analyzed>
</analyzed_list>
<class_list>
<class>
<title>No change</title>
<category_list>
<category>
<measurement_list>
<measurement group_id="O1" value="26.4"/>
</measurement_list>
</category>
</category_list>
</class>
<class>
<title>One change</title>
<category_list>
<category>
<measurement_list>
<measurement group_id="O1" value="41.8"/>
</measurement_list>
</category>
</category_list>
</class>
<class>
<title>Two changes</title>
<category_list>
<category>
<measurement_list>
<measurement group_id="O1" value="17.6"/>
</measurement_list>
</category>
</category_list>
</class>
<class>
<title>Three changes</title>
<category_list>
<category>
<measurement_list>
<measurement group_id="O1" value="13.2"/>
</measurement_list>
</category>
</category_list>
</class>
<class>
<title>Four changes</title>
<category_list>
<category>
<measurement_list>
<measurement group_id="O1" value="1.1"/>
</measurement_list>
</category>
</category_list>
</class>
</class_list>
</measure>
</outcome>
<outcome>
<type>Secondary</type>
<title>Correlation of Hb Levels With Underlying Disease</title>
<time_frame>Baseline to 12 months</time_frame>
<population>The units usage at and between study centres did change during the study and therefore no descriptive statistics could be performed on the laboratory variables.</population>
<group_list>
<group group_id="O1">
<title>CKD Participants</title>
<description>Pre-dialysis participants with CKD treated with MIRCERA according to the current standard of care and in line with the current local summary of product characteristics were observed for maximum of 12 months.</description>
</group>
</group_list>
<measure>
<title>Correlation of Hb Levels With Underlying Disease</title>
<population>The units usage at and between study centres did change during the study and therefore no descriptive statistics could be performed on the laboratory variables.</population>
<analyzed_list>
<analyzed>
<units>Participants</units>
<scope>Measure</scope>
<count_list>
<count group_id="O1" value="0"/>
</count_list>
</analyzed>
</analyzed_list>
</measure>
</outcome>
<outcome>
<type>Secondary</type>
<title>Correlation of Hb Levels With Levels of Inflammation</title>
<time_frame>Baseline to 12 months</time_frame>
<population>The units usage at and between study centres did change during the study and therefore no descriptive statistics could be performed on the laboratory variables.</population>
<group_list>
<group group_id="O1">
<title>CKD Participants</title>
<description>Pre-dialysis participants with CKD treated with MIRCERA according to the current standard of care and in line with the current local summary of product characteristics were observed for maximum of 12 months.</description>
</group>
</group_list>
<measure>
<title>Correlation of Hb Levels With Levels of Inflammation</title>
<population>The units usage at and between study centres did change during the study and therefore no descriptive statistics could be performed on the laboratory variables.</population>
<analyzed_list>
<analyzed>
<units>Participants</units>
<scope>Measure</scope>
<count_list>
<count group_id="O1" value="0"/>
</count_list>
</analyzed>
</analyzed_list>
</measure>
</outcome>
<outcome>
<type>Secondary</type>
<title>Percentage of Participants With Changes in Iron Supplement</title>
<description>Percentage of participants who had any change in their iron supplement medication at a specified visit were reported.</description>
<time_frame>Pre-baseline (Months -6 and -3), baseline, Months 3, 6, 9 and 12</time_frame>
<population>All enrolled participants. Here, number of participants analyzed= participants evaluable for this outcome measure and n= participants evaluable for specified time points.</population>
<group_list>
<group group_id="O1">
<title>Cohort of CKD Participants</title>
<description>Pre-dialysis participants with CKD treated with MIRCERA according to the current standard of care and in line with the current local summary of product characteristics were observed for maximum of 12 months.</description>
</group>
</group_list>
<measure>
<title>Percentage of Participants With Changes in Iron Supplement</title>
<description>Percentage of participants who had any change in their iron supplement medication at a specified visit were reported.</description>
<population>All enrolled participants. Here, number of participants analyzed= participants evaluable for this outcome measure and n= participants evaluable for specified time points.</population>
<units>percentage of participants</units>
<param>Number</param>
<analyzed_list>
<analyzed>
<units>Participants</units>
<scope>Measure</scope>
<count_list>
<count group_id="O1" value="142"/>
</count_list>
</analyzed>
</analyzed_list>
<class_list>
<class>
<title>Pre-baseline (Month -6) (n= 134)</title>
<category_list>
<category>
<measurement_list>
<measurement group_id="O1" value="31.3"/>
</measurement_list>
</category>
</category_list>
</class>
<class>
<title>Pre-baseline (Month -3) (n= 125)</title>
<category_list>
<category>
<measurement_list>
<measurement group_id="O1" value="12.8"/>
</measurement_list>
</category>
</category_list>
</class>
<class>
<title>Baseline (n= 142)</title>
<category_list>
<category>
<measurement_list>
<measurement group_id="O1" value="15.5"/>
</measurement_list>
</category>
</category_list>
</class>
<class>
<title>Month 3 (n= 130)</title>
<category_list>
<category>
<measurement_list>
<measurement group_id="O1" value="11.5"/>
</measurement_list>
</category>
</category_list>
</class>
<class>
<title>Month 6 (n= 115)</title>
<category_list>
<category>
<measurement_list>
<measurement group_id="O1" value="13.0"/>
</measurement_list>
</category>
</category_list>
</class>
<class>
<title>Month 9 (n= 109)</title>
<category_list>
<category>
<measurement_list>
<measurement group_id="O1" value="9.2"/>
</measurement_list>
</category>
</category_list>
</class>
<class>
<title>Month 12 (n= 112)</title>
<category_list>
<category>
<measurement_list>
<measurement group_id="O1" value="12.5"/>
</measurement_list>
</category>
</category_list>
</class>
</class_list>
</measure>
</outcome>
<outcome>
<type>Primary</type>
<title>Mean Hb Value at Month 3 Before Inclusion</title>
<time_frame>Pre-baseline (Month -3)</time_frame>
<population>All enrolled participants. Here, number of participants analyzed= participants with non-missing Hb assessment at specified time frame for this outcome measure.</population>
<group_list>
<group group_id="O1">
<title>CKD Participants</title>
<description>Pre-dialysis participants with CKD treated with MIRCERA according to the current standard of care and in line with the current local summary of product characteristics were observed for maximum of 12 months.</description>
</group>
</group_list>
<measure>
<title>Mean Hb Value at Month 3 Before Inclusion</title>
<population>All enrolled participants. Here, number of participants analyzed= participants with non-missing Hb assessment at specified time frame for this outcome measure.</population>
<units>gm/L</units>
<param>Mean</param>
<dispersion>Standard Deviation</dispersion>
<analyzed_list>
<analyzed>
<units>Participants</units>
<scope>Measure</scope>
<count_list>
<count group_id="O1" value="116"/>
</count_list>
</analyzed>
</analyzed_list>
<class_list>
<class>
<category_list>
<category>
<measurement_list>
<measurement group_id="O1" value="112.6" spread="13.2"/>
</measurement_list>
</category>
</category_list>
</class>
</class_list>
</measure>
</outcome>
<outcome>
<type>Primary</type>
<title>Mean Hb Value at Baseline</title>
<time_frame>Baseline</time_frame>
<population>All enrolled participants. Here, number of participants analyzed= participants with non-missing Hb assessment at specified time frame for this outcome measure.</population>
<group_list>
<group group_id="O1">
<title>CKD Participants</title>
<description>Pre-dialysis participants with CKD treated with MIRCERA according to the current standard of care and in line with the current local summary of product characteristics were observed for maximum of 12 months.</description>
</group>
</group_list>
<measure>
<title>Mean Hb Value at Baseline</title>
<population>All enrolled participants. Here, number of participants analyzed= participants with non-missing Hb assessment at specified time frame for this outcome measure.</population>
<units>gm/L</units>
<param>Mean</param>
<dispersion>Standard Deviation</dispersion>
<analyzed_list>
<analyzed>
<units>Participants</units>
<scope>Measure</scope>
<count_list>
<count group_id="O1" value="139"/>
</count_list>
</analyzed>
</analyzed_list>
<class_list>
<class>
<category_list>
<category>
<measurement_list>
<measurement group_id="O1" value="117.5" spread="15.0"/>
</measurement_list>
</category>
</category_list>
</class>
</class_list>
</measure>
</outcome>
<outcome>
<type>Primary</type>
<title>Mean Hb Value at Month 3 After Inclusion</title>
<time_frame>Month 3</time_frame>
<population>All enrolled participants. Here, number of participants analyzed= participants with non-missing Hb assessment at specified time frame for this outcome measure.</population>
<group_list>
<group group_id="O1">
<title>CKD Participants</title>
<description>Pre-dialysis participants with CKD treated with MIRCERA according to the current standard of care and in line with the current local summary of product characteristics were observed for maximum of 12 months.</description>
</group>
</group_list>
<measure>
<title>Mean Hb Value at Month 3 After Inclusion</title>
<population>All enrolled participants. Here, number of participants analyzed= participants with non-missing Hb assessment at specified time frame for this outcome measure.</population>
<units>gm/L</units>
<param>Mean</param>
<dispersion>Standard Deviation</dispersion>
<analyzed_list>
<analyzed>
<units>Participants</units>
<scope>Measure</scope>
<count_list>
<count group_id="O1" value="122"/>
</count_list>
</analyzed>
</analyzed_list>
<class_list>
<class>
<category_list>
<category>
<measurement_list>
<measurement group_id="O1" value="120.2" spread="13.2"/>
</measurement_list>
</category>
</category_list>
</class>
</class_list>
</measure>
</outcome>
<outcome>
<type>Primary</type>
<title>Mean Hb Value at Month 6 After Inclusion</title>
<time_frame>Month 6</time_frame>
<population>All enrolled participants. Here, number of participants analyzed= participants with non-missing Hb assessment at specified time frame for this outcome measure.</population>
<group_list>
<group group_id="O1">
<title>CKD Participants</title>
<description>Pre-dialysis participants with CKD treated with MIRCERA according to the current standard of care and in line with the current local summary of product characteristics were observed for maximum of 12 months.</description>
</group>
</group_list>
<measure>
<title>Mean Hb Value at Month 6 After Inclusion</title>
<population>All enrolled participants. Here, number of participants analyzed= participants with non-missing Hb assessment at specified time frame for this outcome measure.</population>
<units>gm/L</units>
<param>Mean</param>
<dispersion>Standard Deviation</dispersion>
<analyzed_list>
<analyzed>
<units>Participants</units>
<scope>Measure</scope>
<count_list>
<count group_id="O1" value="113"/>
</count_list>
</analyzed>
</analyzed_list>
<class_list>
<class>
<category_list>
<category>
<measurement_list>
<measurement group_id="O1" value="120.0" spread="13.8"/>
</measurement_list>
</category>
</category_list>
</class>
</class_list>
</measure>
</outcome>
<outcome>
<type>Primary</type>
<title>Mean Hb Value at Month 9 After Inclusion</title>
<time_frame>Month 9</time_frame>
<population>All enrolled participants. Here, number of participants analyzed= participants with non-missing Hb assessment at specified time frame for this outcome measure.</population>
<group_list>
<group group_id="O1">
<title>CKD Participants</title>
<description>Pre-dialysis participants with CKD treated with MIRCERA according to the current standard of care and in line with the current local summary of product characteristics were observed for maximum of 12 months.</description>
</group>
</group_list>
<measure>
<title>Mean Hb Value at Month 9 After Inclusion</title>
<population>All enrolled participants. Here, number of participants analyzed= participants with non-missing Hb assessment at specified time frame for this outcome measure.</population>
<units>gm/L</units>
<param>Mean</param>
<dispersion>Standard Deviation</dispersion>
<analyzed_list>
<analyzed>
<units>Participants</units>
<scope>Measure</scope>
<count_list>
<count group_id="O1" value="106"/>
</count_list>
</analyzed>
</analyzed_list>
<class_list>
<class>
<category_list>
<category>
<measurement_list>
<measurement group_id="O1" value="120.0" spread="14.3"/>
</measurement_list>
</category>
</category_list>
</class>
</class_list>
</measure>
</outcome>
<outcome>
<type>Primary</type>
<title>Mean Hb Value at Month 12 After Inclusion</title>
<time_frame>Month 12</time_frame>
<population>All enrolled participants. Here, number of participants analyzed= participants with non-missing Hb assessment at specified time frame for this outcome measure.</population>
<group_list>
<group group_id="O1">
<title>CKD Participants</title>
<description>Pre-dialysis participants with CKD treated with MIRCERA according to the current standard of care and in line with the current local summary of product characteristics were observed for maximum of 12 months.</description>
</group>
</group_list>
<measure>
<title>Mean Hb Value at Month 12 After Inclusion</title>
<population>All enrolled participants. Here, number of participants analyzed= participants with non-missing Hb assessment at specified time frame for this outcome measure.</population>
<units>gm/L</units>
<param>Mean</param>
<dispersion>Standard Deviation</dispersion>
<analyzed_list>
<analyzed>
<units>Participants</units>
<scope>Measure</scope>
<count_list>
<count group_id="O1" value="110"/>
</count_list>
</analyzed>
</analyzed_list>
<class_list>
<class>
<category_list>
<category>
<measurement_list>
<measurement group_id="O1" value="118.4" spread="12.8"/>
</measurement_list>
</category>
</category_list>
</class>
</class_list>
</measure>
</outcome>
<outcome>
<type>Primary</type>
<title>Percentage of Participants With Hb Fluctuation From Pre-Baseline (Month -6) to Baseline</title>
<description>Hb fluctuation was defined as change in Hb value >15 gm/L between 2 visits.</description>
<time_frame>Pre-baseline (Month -6) to Baseline</time_frame>
<population>All enrolled participants. Here, number of participants analyzed= participants with at least 2 non-missing Hb assessments between pre-baseline (Month -6) and baseline.</population>
<group_list>
<group group_id="O1">
<title>CKD Participants</title>
<description>Pre-dialysis participants with CKD treated with MIRCERA according to the current standard of care and in line with the current local summary of product characteristics were observed for maximum of 12 months.</description>
</group>
</group_list>
<measure>
<title>Percentage of Participants With Hb Fluctuation From Pre-Baseline (Month -6) to Baseline</title>
<description>Hb fluctuation was defined as change in Hb value >15 gm/L between 2 visits.</description>
<population>All enrolled participants. Here, number of participants analyzed= participants with at least 2 non-missing Hb assessments between pre-baseline (Month -6) and baseline.</population>
<units>percentage of participants</units>
<param>Number</param>
<analyzed_list>
<analyzed>
<units>Participants</units>
<scope>Measure</scope>
<count_list>
<count group_id="O1" value="126"/>
</count_list>
</analyzed>
</analyzed_list>
<class_list>
<class>
<category_list>
<category>
<measurement_list>
<measurement group_id="O1" value="36.5"/>
</measurement_list>
</category>
</category_list>
</class>
</class_list>
</measure>
</outcome>
<outcome>
<type>Primary</type>
<title>Percentage of Participants With Hb Fluctuation From Baseline to Month 12</title>
<description>Hb fluctuation was defined as change in Hb value >15 gm/L between 2 visits.</description>
<time_frame>Baseline to Month 12</time_frame>
<population>All enrolled participants. Here, number of participants analyzed= participants with at least 2 non-missing Hb assessments between baseline and Month 12.</population>
<group_list>
<group group_id="O1">
<title>CKD Participants</title>
<description>Pre-dialysis participants with CKD treated with MIRCERA according to the current standard of care and in line with the current local summary of product characteristics were observed for maximum of 12 months.</description>
</group>
</group_list>
<measure>
<title>Percentage of Participants With Hb Fluctuation From Baseline to Month 12</title>
<description>Hb fluctuation was defined as change in Hb value >15 gm/L between 2 visits.</description>
<population>All enrolled participants. Here, number of participants analyzed= participants with at least 2 non-missing Hb assessments between baseline and Month 12.</population>
<units>percentage of participants</units>
<param>Number</param>
<analyzed_list>
<analyzed>
<units>Participants</units>
<scope>Measure</scope>
<count_list>
<count group_id="O1" value="117"/>
</count_list>
</analyzed>
</analyzed_list>
<class_list>
<class>
<category_list>
<category>
<measurement_list>
<measurement group_id="O1" value="43.6"/>
</measurement_list>
</category>
</category_list>
</class>
</class_list>
</measure>
</outcome>
<outcome>
<type>Secondary</type>
<title>Percentage of Participants With Changes in Immunosuppressive Treatment</title>
<description>Percentage of participants who had any change in their immunosuppressive medication at a specified visit were reported.</description>
<time_frame>Pre-baseline (Months -6 and -3), baseline, Months 3, 6, 9 and 12</time_frame>
<population>All enrolled participants. Here, number of participants analyzed = participants evaluable for this outcome measure and n= participants evaluable for specified time points.</population>
<group_list>
<group group_id="O1">
<title>CKD Participants</title>
<description>Pre-dialysis participants with CKD treated with MIRCERA according to the current standard of care and in line with the current local summary of product characteristics were observed for maximum of 12 months.</description>
</group>
</group_list>
<measure>
<title>Percentage of Participants With Changes in Immunosuppressive Treatment</title>
<description>Percentage of participants who had any change in their immunosuppressive medication at a specified visit were reported.</description>
<population>All enrolled participants. Here, number of participants analyzed = participants evaluable for this outcome measure and n= participants evaluable for specified time points.</population>
<units>percentage of participants</units>
<param>Number</param>
<analyzed_list>
<analyzed>
<units>Participants</units>
<scope>Measure</scope>
<count_list>
<count group_id="O1" value="142"/>
</count_list>
</analyzed>
</analyzed_list>
<class_list>
<class>
<title>Pre-baseline (Month -6) (n= 135)</title>
<category_list>
<category>
<measurement_list>
<measurement group_id="O1" value="23.0"/>
</measurement_list>
</category>
</category_list>
</class>
<class>
<title>Pre-baseline (Month -3) (n= 125)</title>
<category_list>
<category>
<measurement_list>
<measurement group_id="O1" value="4.0"/>
</measurement_list>
</category>
</category_list>
</class>
<class>
<title>Baseline (n= 142)</title>
<category_list>
<category>
<measurement_list>
<measurement group_id="O1" value="5.6"/>
</measurement_list>
</category>
</category_list>
</class>
<class>
<title>Month 3 (n= 129)</title>
<category_list>
<category>
<measurement_list>
<measurement group_id="O1" value="8.5"/>
</measurement_list>
</category>
</category_list>
</class>
<class>
<title>Month 6 (n= 114)</title>
<category_list>
<category>
<measurement_list>
<measurement group_id="O1" value="8.8"/>
</measurement_list>
</category>
</category_list>
</class>
<class>
<title>Month 9 (n= 109)</title>
<category_list>
<category>
<measurement_list>
<measurement group_id="O1" value="2.8"/>
</measurement_list>
</category>
</category_list>
</class>
<class>
<title>Month 12 (n= 111)</title>
<category_list>
<category>
<measurement_list>
<measurement group_id="O1" value="5.4"/>
</measurement_list>
</category>
</category_list>
</class>
</class_list>
</measure>
</outcome>
<outcome>
<type>Secondary</type>
<title>Percentage of Participants With Changes in AntihypertensiveTreatment</title>
<description>Percentage of participants who had any change in their antihypertensive medication at a specified visit were reported.</description>
<time_frame>Pre-baseline (Months -6 and -3), baseline, Months 3, 6, 9 and 12</time_frame>
<population>All enrolled participants. Here, number of participants analyzed = participants evaluable for this outcome measure and n= participants evaluable for specified time points.</population>
<group_list>
<group group_id="O1">
<title>CKD Participants</title>
<description>Pre-dialysis participants with CKD treated with MIRCERA according to the current standard of care and in line with the current local summary of product characteristics were observed for maximum of 12 months.</description>
</group>
</group_list>
<measure>
<title>Percentage of Participants With Changes in AntihypertensiveTreatment</title>
<description>Percentage of participants who had any change in their antihypertensive medication at a specified visit were reported.</description>
<population>All enrolled participants. Here, number of participants analyzed = participants evaluable for this outcome measure and n= participants evaluable for specified time points.</population>
<units>percentage of participants</units>
<param>Number</param>
<analyzed_list>
<analyzed>
<units>Participants</units>
<scope>Measure</scope>
<count_list>
<count group_id="O1" value="141"/>
</count_list>
</analyzed>
</analyzed_list>
<class_list>
<class>
<title>Pre-baseline (Month -6) (n= 135)</title>
<category_list>
<category>
<measurement_list>
<measurement group_id="O1" value="78.5"/>
</measurement_list>
</category>
</category_list>
</class>
<class>
<title>Pre-baseline (Month -3) (n= 125)</title>
<category_list>
<category>
<measurement_list>
<measurement group_id="O1" value="22.4"/>
</measurement_list>
</category>
</category_list>
</class>
<class>
<title>Baseline (n= 141)</title>
<category_list>
<category>
<measurement_list>
<measurement group_id="O1" value="22.7"/>
</measurement_list>
</category>
</category_list>
</class>
<class>
<title>Month 3 (n= 130)</title>
<category_list>
<category>
<measurement_list>
<measurement group_id="O1" value="12.3"/>
</measurement_list>
</category>
</category_list>
</class>
<class>
<title>Month 6 (n= 115)</title>
<category_list>
<category>
<measurement_list>
<measurement group_id="O1" value="13.0"/>
</measurement_list>
</category>
</category_list>
</class>
<class>
<title>Month 9 (n= 109)</title>
<category_list>
<category>
<measurement_list>
<measurement group_id="O1" value="16.5"/>
</measurement_list>
</category>
</category_list>
</class>
<class>
<title>Month 12 (n= 111)</title>
<category_list>
<category>
<measurement_list>
<measurement group_id="O1" value="19.8"/>
</measurement_list>
</category>
</category_list>
</class>
</class_list>
</measure>
</outcome>
<outcome>
<type>Secondary</type>
<title>Number of Participants With Different Medication Treatment</title>
<description>Number of participants who were receiving different treatments (antihypertensive, immunosuppressive, iron supplements, and others) before and/or after baseline were reported. Same participant could be reported in more than one category.</description>
<time_frame>Pre-baseline (Month -6) to Month 12</time_frame>
<population>All enrolled participants. Here, number of participants analyzed= participants evaluable for this outcome measure.</population>
<group_list>
<group group_id="O1">
<title>CKD Participants</title>
<description>Pre-dialysis participants with CKD treated with MIRCERA according to the current standard of care and in line with the current local summary of product characteristics were observed for maximum of 12 months.</description>
</group>
</group_list>
<measure>
<title>Number of Participants With Different Medication Treatment</title>
<description>Number of participants who were receiving different treatments (antihypertensive, immunosuppressive, iron supplements, and others) before and/or after baseline were reported. Same participant could be reported in more than one category.</description>
<population>All enrolled participants. Here, number of participants analyzed= participants evaluable for this outcome measure.</population>
<units>participants</units>
<param>Number</param>
<analyzed_list>
<analyzed>
<units>Participants</units>
<scope>Measure</scope>
<count_list>
<count group_id="O1" value="142"/>
</count_list>
</analyzed>
</analyzed_list>
<class_list>
<class>
<title>Anti-hypertensive treatment</title>
<category_list>
<category>
<measurement_list>
<measurement group_id="O1" value="123"/>
</measurement_list>
</category>
</category_list>
</class>
<class>
<title>Immunosuppressive treatment</title>
<category_list>
<category>
<measurement_list>
<measurement group_id="O1" value="35"/>
</measurement_list>
</category>
</category_list>
</class>
<class>
<title>Iron treatment</title>
<category_list>
<category>
<measurement_list>
<measurement group_id="O1" value="71"/>
</measurement_list>
</category>
</category_list>
</class>
<class>
<title>Other treatment</title>
<category_list>
<category>
<measurement_list>
<measurement group_id="O1" value="55"/>
</measurement_list>
</category>
</category_list>
</class>
</class_list>
</measure>
</outcome>
<outcome>
<type>Secondary</type>
<title>Percentage of Participants Who Required Blood Transfusion</title>
<time_frame>Pre-baseline (Months -6 and -3), baseline, Months 3, 6, 9 and 12</time_frame>
<population>All enrolled participants. Here, number of participants analyzed= participants evaluable for this outcome measure and n= participants evaluable for specified time points.</population>
<group_list>
<group group_id="O1">
<title>CKD Participants</title>
<description>Pre-dialysis participants with CKD treated with MIRCERA according to the current standard of care and in line with the current local summary of product characteristics were observed for maximum of 12 months.</description>
</group>
</group_list>
<measure>
<title>Percentage of Participants Who Required Blood Transfusion</title>
<population>All enrolled participants. Here, number of participants analyzed= participants evaluable for this outcome measure and n= participants evaluable for specified time points.</population>
<units>percentage of participants</units>
<param>Number</param>
<analyzed_list>
<analyzed>
<units>Participants</units>
<scope>Measure</scope>
<count_list>
<count group_id="O1" value="142"/>
</count_list>
</analyzed>
</analyzed_list>
<class_list>
<class>
<title>Pre-baseline (Month -6) (n= 136)</title>
<category_list>
<category>
<measurement_list>
<measurement group_id="O1" value="0"/>
</measurement_list>
</category>
</category_list>
</class>
<class>
<title>Pre-baseline (Month -3) (n= 128)</title>
<category_list>
<category>
<measurement_list>
<measurement group_id="O1" value="2.3"/>
</measurement_list>
</category>
</category_list>
</class>
<class>
<title>Baseline (n= 142)</title>
<category_list>
<category>
<measurement_list>
<measurement group_id="O1" value="5.6"/>
</measurement_list>
</category>
</category_list>
</class>
<class>
<title>Month 3 (n= 131)</title>
<category_list>
<category>
<measurement_list>
<measurement group_id="O1" value="1.5"/>
</measurement_list>
</category>
</category_list>
</class>
<class>
<title>Month 6 (n= 115)</title>
<category_list>
<category>
<measurement_list>
<measurement group_id="O1" value="1.7"/>
</measurement_list>
</category>
</category_list>
</class>
<class>
<title>Month 9 (n= 109)</title>
<category_list>
<category>
<measurement_list>
<measurement group_id="O1" value="3.7"/>
</measurement_list>
</category>
</category_list>
</class>
<class>
<title>Month 12 (n= 110)</title>
<category_list>
<category>
<measurement_list>
<measurement group_id="O1" value="1.8"/>
</measurement_list>
</category>
</category_list>
</class>
</class_list>
</measure>
</outcome>
<outcome>
<type>Secondary</type>
<title>Percentage of Participants Who Required Renal Replacement Therapy</title>
<description>Renal replacement therapy was defined as hemodialysis and peritoneal dialysis.</description>
<time_frame>Months 3, 6, 9, and 12</time_frame>
<population>All enrolled participants. Here, number of participants analyzed= participants evaluable for this outcome measure and n= participants evaluable for specified time points.</population>
<group_list>
<group group_id="O1">
<title>CKD Participants</title>
<description>Pre-dialysis participants with CKD treated with MIRCERA according to the current standard of care and in line with the current local summary of product characteristics were observed for maximum of 12 months.</description>
</group>
</group_list>
<measure>
<title>Percentage of Participants Who Required Renal Replacement Therapy</title>
<description>Renal replacement therapy was defined as hemodialysis and peritoneal dialysis.</description>
<population>All enrolled participants. Here, number of participants analyzed= participants evaluable for this outcome measure and n= participants evaluable for specified time points.</population>
<units>percentage of participants</units>
<param>Number</param>
<analyzed_list>
<analyzed>
<units>Participants</units>
<scope>Measure</scope>
<count_list>
<count group_id="O1" value="130"/>
</count_list>
</analyzed>
</analyzed_list>
<class_list>
<class>
<title>Hemodialysis done: Month 3 (n= 130)</title>
<category_list>
<category>
<measurement_list>
<measurement group_id="O1" value="0.8"/>
</measurement_list>
</category>
</category_list>
</class>
<class>
<title>Hemodialysis done: Month 6 (n= 113)</title>
<category_list>
<category>
<measurement_list>
<measurement group_id="O1" value="0.9"/>
</measurement_list>
</category>
</category_list>
</class>
<class>
<title>Hemodialysis done: Month 9 (n= 107)</title>
<category_list>
<category>
<measurement_list>
<measurement group_id="O1" value="0.9"/>
</measurement_list>
</category>
</category_list>
</class>
<class>
<title>Hemodialysis done: Month 12 (n= 110)</title>
<category_list>
<category>
<measurement_list>
<measurement group_id="O1" value="1.8"/>
</measurement_list>
</category>
</category_list>
</class>
<class>
<title>Peritoneal dialysis done: Month 3 (n= 130)</title>
<category_list>
<category>
<measurement_list>
<measurement group_id="O1" value="0.8"/>
</measurement_list>
</category>
</category_list>
</class>
<class>
<title>Peritoneal dialysis done: Month 6 (n= 113)</title>
<category_list>
<category>
<measurement_list>
<measurement group_id="O1" value="0"/>
</measurement_list>
</category>
</category_list>
</class>
<class>
<title>Peritoneal dialysis done: Month 9 (n= 107)</title>
<category_list>
<category>
<measurement_list>
<measurement group_id="O1" value="0.9"/>
</measurement_list>
</category>
</category_list>
</class>
<class>
<title>Peritoneal dialysis done: Month 12 (n= 110)</title>
<category_list>
<category>
<measurement_list>
<measurement group_id="O1" value="1.8"/>
</measurement_list>
</category>
</category_list>
</class>
</class_list>
</measure>
</outcome>
</outcome_list>
<reported_events>
<time_frame>Pre-baseline (Month -6) to Month 12</time_frame>
<desc>All enrolled participants with data recorded for adverse events were included.</desc>
<group_list>
<group group_id="E1">
<title>CKD Participants</title>
<description>Pre-dialysis participants with CKD treated with MIRCERA according to the current standard of care and in line with the current local summary of product characteristics were observed for maximum of 12 months.</description>
</group>
</group_list>
<serious_events>
<category_list>
<category>
<title>Total</title>
<event_list>
<event>
<sub_title>Total, serious adverse events</sub_title>
<counts group_id="E1" subjects_affected="0" subjects_at_risk="141"/>
</event>
</event_list>
</category>
</category_list>
</serious_events>
<other_events>
<frequency_threshold>0</frequency_threshold>
<default_vocab>Volume 9A of EU CTD</default_vocab>
<default_assessment>Non-systematic Assessment</default_assessment>
<category_list>
<category>
<title>Total</title>
<event_list>
<event>
<sub_title>Total, other adverse events</sub_title>
<counts group_id="E1" subjects_affected="1" subjects_at_risk="141"/>
</event>
</event_list>
</category>
<category>
<title>Skin and subcutaneous tissue disorders</title>
<event_list>
<event>
<sub_title>Skin Reaction</sub_title>
<counts group_id="E1" subjects_affected="1" subjects_at_risk="141"/>
</event>
</event_list>
</category>
</category_list>
</other_events>
</reported_events>
<certain_agreements>
<pi_employee>Principal Investigators are NOT employed by the organization sponsoring the study.</pi_employee>
<restrictive_agreement>The study being conducted under this Agreement is part of the Overall Study. Investigator is free to publish in reputable journals or to present at professional conferences the results of the study, but only after the first publication or presentation that involves the Overall Study. The sponsor may request that the confidential information be deleted and/or the publication to be postponed inorder to present the Sponsor's intellectual property rights.</restrictive_agreement>
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<point_of_contact>
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<organization>Hoffmann-LaRoche</organization>
<phone>800-821-8590</phone>
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"redpajama_set_name": "RedPajamaGithub"
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{"url":"https:\/\/ask.sagemath.org\/question\/51380\/latex-and-sagemath\/","text":"# Latex and SageMath\n\nI donot know how to exactly state my question. I gonna give an example.\n\nStep 1. Type in A=matrix([[1,-3,-4,3],[-4,6,-2,3],[-3,7,6,-4]])\n\nStep 2. latex(A) gives the latex code for this matrix.\n\nMy question is that given a latex code, is there a way to converts to SageMath code?\n\nI am new to SageMath. As an instructor of math for 5 years, I have many resources prepared in latex code.\n\nSo I really wanna converts them to SageMath instead of type it again.\n\nedit retag close merge delete\n\nWell, yes, but there are many ways to typeset matrices in LaTeX. Can you give some example(s) which you want to convert?\n\n( 2020-05-12 08:05:25 +0200 )edit\n\nThanks a lot for replying my question.\n\n \\left(\\begin{array}{rrr}0 & 1 & 2 \\\\ 1 & 0 & 3 \\\\ 4 & -3 & 8 \\end{array}\\right)\n\n( 2020-05-12 10:03:08 +0200 )edit\n\nAre you able to give me some reference to read?\n\n( 2020-05-12 19:20:56 +0200 )edit\n\nSort by \u00bb oldest newest most voted\n\nHere is a function to convert the LaTeX string of a matrix into a Sage matrix.\n\nThe function includes a bit of documentation with an example.\n\ndef matrix_from_latex(mat):\nr\"\"\"\nReturn a Sage matrix corresponding to this LaTeX matrix.\n\nConvert the LaTeX string for a matrix with integer entries\ninto a Sage matrix.\n\nEXAMPLE:\n\nConvert a Sage matrix to LaTeX and back::\n\nsage: a = matrix([[0, 1, 2], [1, 0, 3], [4, -3, 8]])\nsage: a\n[ 0 1 2]\n[ 1 0 3]\n[ 4 -3 8]\nsage: b = latex(a)\nsage: print(b)\n\\left(\\begin{array}{rrr}\n0 & 1 & 2 \\\\\n1 & 0 & 3 \\\\\n4 & -3 & 8\n\\end{array}\\right)\nsage: c = matrix_from_latex(b)\nsage: c\n[ 0 1 2]\n[ 1 0 3]\n[ 4 -3 8]\n\"\"\"\nbits = [r'\\left(\\begin{array}', r'\\end{array}\\right)', 'r', '{}']\nfor b in bits:\nmat = mat.replace(b, '')\nrow = mat.split(r'\\\\')\nreturn matrix([[ZZ(a) for a in row.split('&')] for row in rows])\n\n\nTo start directly from a string such as in a comment to the question:\n\nsage: z = r'\\left(\\begin{array}{rrr}0 & 1 & 2 \\\\ 1 & 0 & 3 \\\\ 4 & -3 & 8 \\end{array}\\right)'\nsage: matrix_from_latex(z)\n[ 0 1 2]\n[ 1 0 3]\n[ 4 -3 8]\n\n\nNote that the function provided above works for matrices with integer entries.\n\nIt could be adapted to more general entries.\n\nmore\n\nThank you so much. It seems that I'd better type the matrix into the system since I just occasionally use sagemath.\n\n( 2020-05-13 15:43:35 +0200 )edit\n\n## Stats\n\nSeen: 251 times\n\nLast updated: May 12 '20","date":"2022-05-16 19:54:27","metadata":"{\"extraction_info\": {\"found_math\": true, \"script_math_tex\": 0, \"script_math_asciimath\": 0, \"math_annotations\": 0, \"math_alttext\": 0, \"mathml\": 0, \"mathjax_tag\": 0, \"mathjax_inline_tex\": 0, \"mathjax_display_tex\": 0, \"mathjax_asciimath\": 1, \"img_math\": 0, \"codecogs_latex\": 0, \"wp_latex\": 0, \"mimetex.cgi\": 0, \"\/images\/math\/codecogs\": 0, \"mathtex.cgi\": 0, \"katex\": 0, \"math-container\": 0, \"wp-katex-eq\": 0, \"align\": 0, \"equation\": 0, \"x-ck12\": 0, \"texerror\": 0, \"math_score\": 0.9012001752853394, \"perplexity\": 1454.0201334536766}, \"config\": {\"markdown_headings\": true, \"markdown_code\": true, \"boilerplate_config\": {\"ratio_threshold\": 0.18, \"absolute_threshold\": 10, \"end_threshold\": 5, \"enable\": true}, \"remove_buttons\": true, \"remove_image_figures\": true, \"remove_link_clusters\": true, \"table_config\": {\"min_rows\": 2, \"min_cols\": 3, \"format\": \"plain\"}, \"remove_chinese\": true, \"remove_edit_buttons\": true, \"extract_latex\": true}, \"warc_path\": \"s3:\/\/commoncrawl\/crawl-data\/CC-MAIN-2022-21\/segments\/1652662512229.26\/warc\/CC-MAIN-20220516172745-20220516202745-00513.warc.gz\"}"}
| null | null |
\section{Introduction}
Advances in trapping of ultracold quantum gases have enabled the realization of systems with significant dipolar interactions. Experimentalists have been able to trap atoms that have a naturally large magnetic dipole moment, eg. ${}^{52}\text{Cr}$ \cite{Griesmaier2005,Bismut2010}, ${}^{168}\text{Er}$ \cite{Aikawa2012} and ${}^{164}\text{Dy}$ \cite{Lu2011,Lu2012}. These atoms have much stronger magnetic dipole moments compared with alkali atoms \cite{Lahaye2009}. Alternatively, clouds of polar molecules can be trapped and their electric dipole moment controlled by an external electric field \cite{Ni2008, Deiglmayr2008, Stuhl2012}. This interest in dipolar gases is due to the long range and anisotropy of the interaction between dipoles, which is in distinct contrast to the contact interaction \cite{Menotti2008}. Since the strength of the dipole-dipole interaction (DDI) is proportional to the square of the dipole moment, and combined with the use of Feshbach resonances to tune the van der Waals interaction {\em away} from unitarity, it is possible to create purely dipolar ultracold atomic gases \cite{Koch2008,Lahaye2009b}. This opens up a rich spectrum of new physics \cite{Micheli2006,Lahaye2009,Baranov2012} including dipolar Bose-Einstein condensates \cite{Griesmaier2005} and control of chemical reactions \cite{Ospelkaus2010,Quemener2012}. However, the dipolar interactions can also inhibit the ability to trap a stable cloud \cite{Lahaye2009}.
Along with the experimental realization of ultracold dipolar gases the many-body dipolar gas has been studied theoretically \cite{Baranov2012,Lahaye2009}. Much work has also been done on the scattering theory of the DDI \cite{Deb2001,Gao1999,Kanjilal2008,Melezhik2003}, including the development of anisotropic pseudopotentials \cite{Derevianko2003}, prediction of Efimovian universal three-body bound states \cite{Wang2011,Wang2011b} and the scattering of dipoles in one- and two-dimensional geometries \cite{Volosniev2013,Ticknor2009,Ticknor2010,DIncao2011,Cai2010,Koval2014,Volosniev2011}. Reduced dimensional systems are particularly interesting for the appearance of dipolar confinement-induced resonances \cite{Giannakeas2013}. The dipolar two-body problem has also been studied in a spherically symmetric harmonic trapping potential \cite{Kanjilal2007,Wang2012}. However, the few-body physics of trapped dipolar atoms is not as advanced as for neutral atoms with a contact interaction. Here we extend techniques developed for the two-component Fermi gas \cite{Bradly2014} to a system of two and three three dipolar bosons in a spherically symmetric harmonic trap. This involves the application of a correlated gaussian basis optimized using the stochastic variational method \cite{Suzuki1998,Mitroy2013} that allows matrix elements to be calculated quickly and efficiently. We also employ the coupled-pair approach as a physically consistent way to counter the increase in complexity of exact diagonalization problems as the number of particles increases. The DDI potential allows for many resonances across multiple scattering channels and choosing the important correlations is a good test for extending these methods to more complex systems.
\section{Dipole-dipole scattering}
Before considering trapped particles we look at the low-energy scattering properties of two aligned dipoles with a view to its application to the harmonically trapped system. The DDI potential may be written
\begin{equation}
\vdd = \frac{\cdd}{4\pi} \frac{1-3\cos^2\theta}{r^3} = -\frac{\hbar^2}{M} \frac{D}{r^3} \sqrt{\frac{16\pi}{5}} Y_2^0(\hat{\rr})
\label{eq:DDI}
\end{equation}
where $\theta$ is the angle to the axis of polarization (assumed to be the $z$-axis). In this work we choose the relative coordinates so that all reduced masses are the same as the single particle mass $M$. The strength of the interaction is determined by the type of particle. For magnetic dipoles with magnetic moment $\mathbf{d}_\text{m}$, \smash{$\cdd=\mu_0 d_\text{m}^2$}, while for molecules with polarizability $\alpha$ in an electric field $\mathbf{\mathcal{E}}$, \smash{$\cdd = \scE^2\alpha^2/\epsilon_0$}. In either case, it is useful to parameterize the strength of the interaction with an associated length scale, \smash{$D=M\cdd/4\pi\hbar^2$}.
The DDI
is both long-ranged and anisotropic. The anisotropy means that two dipoles can experience attraction, if their collision axis is close to the $z$-axis, or repulsion, if it is closer to the transverse plane.
Although we do not have global spherical symmetry, since the anisotropy is expressed as a single spherical harmonic the DDI neatly couples different partial waves. Furthermore, since the dipoles are aligned with the $z$-axis, the system retains axial symmetry. Therefore, we suppose that in each channel the asymptotic form of the wavefunction is \smash{$\psi_l(\rr) = r u_l(r)Y_l^{m}(\theta,\phi) $} and the phase shifts are found by integrating the radial Schr\"odinger equation with the potential of \eref{eq:DDI}, and matching the solutions to spherical waves at large separation distance. This obtains a set of coupled radial equations
\begin{equation}
\frac{d^2u_l}{dr^2}+\left( k^2 - \frac{l(l+1)}{r^2} \right)u_l + \frac{2D}{r^3} \sum_{l'} \scY(m;l',l)u_{l'} = 0,
\label{eq:DipolarSE}
\end{equation}
where the angular integration has been performed to give the coupling coefficients \cite{Wang2012}
\begin{alignat}{1}
\scY(m;l',l) &= \sqrt{\frac{16\pi}{5}}\int\!\! d\hat\rr {Y_{l'}^m}^*(\hat\rr)Y_2^0(\hat\rr)Y_l^m(\hat\rr) \nonumber \\
&= (-1)^m 2 \sqrt{(2l'+1)(2l+1)} \begin{pmatrix} l' & 2 & l \\ 0&0&0 \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} l' & 2 & l \\ -m&0&m \end{pmatrix},
\label{eq:ThreeYSymbol}
\end{alignat}
expressed by Wigner 3-$j$ symbols. These coefficients reveal that the dipole interaction only allows coupling between channels for which \smash{$l-l' = -2,0,2$}. Since the DDI preserves the axial symmetry of the system different $m$ channels decouple, although they are not necessarily degenerate. However, since higher $m$ states cannot couple to lower $l$ states (if \smash{$|m|>l$}), we expect that higher $m$ channels will have little impact on the bosonic ground state and here we restrict our study to \smash{$m=0$}. The partial wave expansion not only handles the anisotropy of the DDI, but also determines the parity of the wavefunction and thus its symmetry. Aligned bosonic dipoles only admit states with even angular momentum $l$, thus neatly matching the allowed $l$ couplings of the DDI.
Having dealt with the anisotropy, we now turn to the long-ranged nature of the potential. Ignoring for the moment the coupling to other channels, we must deal with an attractive $-1/r^3$ potential in each channel, since the coupling coefficients $\scY(m;l',l)$ are non-negative for \smash{$m=0$}. Recently, some advanced methods have been developed including a multichannel pseudopotential for dipolar scattering \cite{Derevianko2003} and exact solutions for the isotropic pure-repulsive $1/r^3$ potential based on quantum defect theory \cite{Gao1999}. However, in view of the application of the coupled-pair approach to a system of trapped dipoles we require a more straightforward approach and replace $\vdd$ with \smash{$\tanh^{15}(r/\rc)\vdd$} \cite{Wang2012}, where $\rc$ is the cutoff distance. The cutoff avoids the unphysical $1/r^3$ potential at short distances and since it is smooth it will be better handled by the correlated gaussian basis, compared to e.g.~a hard-sphere cutoff \cite{Kanjilal2007}. Note that, apart from being large enough to make the cutoff steep, the power of 15 is arbitrary and the smoothness of $\tanh^{15}(r/\rc)$ is more important.
To solve \eref{eq:DipolarSE} we employ the Johnson log-derivative algorithm \cite{Johnson1973}. The algorithm is applied starting from the inner boundary \smash{$r=0$} out to some large $r_\text{max}$, at a fixed small collision energy \smash{$k=\sqrt{2\times 9.36\times 10^{-9}}/\rc$}. This is much the same as a single channel problem but since the DDI is long-ranged, we must take extra care to ensure that $r_\text{max}$ is sufficiently large. For our purposes, the short-range cut-off $\rc$ serves as a convenient length scale and the strength of the DDI is parameterized by the ratio $D/\rc$. Once the inner-region solution is found it is matched to the solution in the outer region at $r_\text{max}$. Although a log-derivative matrix is slightly more complicated, this outer solution can still be expressed in terms of Bessel functions, similar to single channel scattering. The Johnson log-derivative method then neatly allows for the determination of the $K$-matrix from the solution at $r_\text{max}$. The elements of the $K$-matrix encode the phase shifts, which in turn can be expressed as scattering lengths $a_{ll'}$, where the channels are labeled by their angular momenta.
\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\columnwidth]{scattering_length}
\caption{Scattering lengths (a) $a_{00}/\rc$, (b) $a_{20}/\rc$ and (c) $a_{22}/\rc$ for two bosons with DDI showing the first few resonances as a function of dipole length $D$.}
\vspace{-0.5cm}
\label{fig:DDIScattering}
\end{figure}
In \fref{fig:DDIScattering} we plot the scattering lengths (a) $a_{00}/\rc$, (b) $a_{20}/\rc$ and (c) $a_{22}/\rc$ for two bosonic dipoles. There is a sequence of resonances that appear over a large range of $D/\rc$, beginning with \smash{$D/\rc=5.86,19.28,36.34$}. The resonances are broadest in the $s$-wave channel (a) but appear at the same interaction strengths for higher partial waves. We can also see in (b) and (c) that away from resonances the scattering lengths change linearly with $D/\rc$. This linear dependence in the higher partial waves is predicted by the Born approximation for the DDI \cite{Kanjilal2008}. However, it also predicts \smash{$a_{00}/\rc=0$}, which is clearly not the case. The behavior of $a_{00}$, including the width and position of the resonances is affected by the short-range details of the potential, in particular, the cut-off distance $\rc$ as well as the type of cut-off function. It is not expected that the dipolar gas will display universal properties with respect to the short-ranged physics and we have picked the $\tanh^{15}(r/\rc)$ cut-off with the gaussian basis in mind.
\section{Trapped dipolar bosons}
Having mapped out the scattering properties of the DDI, we now turn to the problem of dipolar atoms in a spherically symmetric harmonic trapping potential.
The focus here is to test the application of a correlated gaussian basis, and in particular the coupled pair approach, to a system with a more complicated interaction potential. Thus, we will only look at \smash{$N=2$} and \smash{$N=3$}. The relative Hamiltonian for $N$ trapped dipolar atoms is
\begin{alignat}{1}
H &= \sum_{i=1}^{N-1}\left[-\frac{\hbar^2}{2M}\nabla_i^2 + \frac{1}{2}M\omega^2 x_i^2 \right] + \sum_{i<j}^{} V_\text{dd}(\ww_{ij}^\intercal\xx),
\label{eq:3bHamiltonian}
\end{alignat}
where the first term is the kinetic energy and the second is the external spherically symmetric trapping potential of frequency $\omega$. The coordinates are contained in $\xx$, which is a supervector of all relative coordinate vectors. The coordinates are similar to Jacobi coordinates but rescaled such that all reduced masses are equal to the single-particle mass $M$. The particular coordinates for each $N$ are detailed later. The last term in \eref{eq:3bHamiltonian} contains the DDI potentials between all possible pairs of particles. The selection vector $\ww_{ij}$, defined by $\ww_{ij}^\intercal\xx=\rr_i-\rr_j$, picks out the relative vector $\rr_i-\rr_j$ from the full set of relative coordinates $\xx$.
The harmonic trapping potential promotes the use of a correlated gaussian basis for the radial degrees of freedom and the long-ranged nature of the DDI is a good test for the flexibility and efficiency of this basis. A gaussian basis is also effective for the short-ranged correlations in the system provided we employ a smooth cut-off function, as opposed to a hard-sphere boundary condition. The anisotropy of the DDI means that the basis must also incorporate angular degrees of freedom and, like the free-space scattering, this is done by having basis elements with well-defined total relative angular momentum $\{l,m\}$. The total (unnormalized and unsymmetrized) basis element is therefore
\begin{equation}
\braket{\xx|A,\uu;l} = \exp\left( -\tfrac{1}{2}\xx^\intercal A\, \xx \right)| \uu^\intercal\xx|^l Y_l^m\left( \widehat{\uu^\intercal\xx} \right),
\label{eq:GVBasisFunction}
\end{equation}
where $l$ is the total relative angular momentum, $A$ is an $(N-1)\times(N-1)$ diagonal matrix whose $i^\text{th}$ entry is $1/\alpha_i^2$, where $\alpha_i$ is the Gaussian widths for the $i^\text{th}$ coordinate and $\uu$ is a normalized global vector with \smash{$N-1$} components that describes the distribution of internal angular momentum among the angular degrees of freedom. The gaussian widths $\alpha_i$ and the components of $\uu$ are the \smash{$2N-3$} nonlinear variational parameters of the basis. Since angular momentum is not conserved in the presence of the DDI, it is preferable to use a continuous variational parameter for describing the angular degrees of freedom, as opposed to coupled sets of discrete angular momenta. All relevant matrix elements with this basis can be calculated analytically \cite{Suzuki1998}. We note that, even though the evaluation of these matrix elements is efficient, the inclusion of angular momentum and degrees of freedom does require more operations than for the isotropic gaussian-only basis used for the two-component Fermi system \cite{Bradly2014}. Furthermore, this basis can only describe states with natural parity, precluding the investigation of three fermionic trapped dipoles without significant extension.
We first consider \smash{$N=2$} trapped dipolar bosons, since the \smash{$N=3$} system is built from these solutions. The DDI will couple states with different angular momentum, but since there is only a single relative coordinate, \smash{$\xx=(\rr_1-\rr_2)/\sqrt{2}$}, we do not need the global vector. In fact, the angular degrees of freedom manifest as a standard spherical harmonic in each basis element. The machinery of the global vector representation is simplified and is essentially equivalent to use of the coefficients \smash{$\scY(m;l',l)$} of \eref{eq:ThreeYSymbol}. Therefore, for \smash{$N=2$}, the angular degrees of freedom are determined by the number of angular momentum channels included. Like the free-space scattering case, bosons are distinguished by restricting the angular momentum channels to even $l$.
While the channel coupling is simplified, the two-body problem is nonetheless a test of using a gaussian basis to tackle a system with long-range interactions. We apply the stochastic variational method (SVM) \cite{Suzuki1998} to choose the gaussian widths, but with some extra considerations as to the allowed range they can take. For the trapped system, $\aho$ is taken to be the standard length-scale, but we now also have $D$, characterizing the long-ranged strength of the DDI, and $\rc$, characterizing the short-range cut-off. Since the form of the DDI in \eref{eq:DDI} is only valid at sufficiently large separations, we do not want to examine the zero-ranged limit \smash{$\rc\to 0$}. Instead, we choose \smash{$\rc/\aho=0.01$} (i.e.~maintaining the limit \smash{$\rc\ll\aho$}) and examine changing $D/\aho$. With $\rc$ given, we can use the scattering results to consistently determine the strength of the DDI. At the other end of the scale, the long-ranged nature of the interaction means that $\aho$ is not as hard an upper limit as for the unitary two-component Fermi system \cite{Bradly2014}, where the SVM would optimize the gaussian widths to \smash{$\alpha_{i}/\aho\lesssim 1.1$}, reflecting that $\aho$ was the largest physical correlation in the problem. For dipolar particles, we still insist that \smash{$\alpha_{i}\gg\aho$} would violate the idea that the particles have low energy, but even for small $D/\aho$ it is necessary to allow the widths up to \smash{$\alpha_{i}/\aho\approx 3$}. Even if correlations larger than the size of the trap contribute only a small amount to the problem, it is physically meaningful to include them due to the long range of the DDI. These bounds are used to semi-stochastically select the trials in the SVM, meaning that while most trials satisfy \smash{$\rc<\alpha_i<3\aho$}, 10\% of trials satisfy \smash{$\rc>\alpha_i$} and 10\% satisfy \smash{$3\aho<\alpha_i$}. This ensures that both long- and short-ranged correlations are probed, subject to optimization.
\begin{figure}[t!]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\columnwidth]{2bDDIspectrum}
\caption{(a) The energy spectrum of \smash{$N=2$} bosonic dipoles near the first resonance. The short-range cut-off is fixed at \smash{$\rc/\aho=0.01$} so the resonance occurs at \smash{$D/\aho=0.0586$}, as shown by the dotted vertical line. (b) A close-up near \smash{$E=5.5\hbar\omega$}, which shows one state decreasing much faster than the others. These states can be characterized by their angular-momentum in the non-interacting limit, which are, from bottom to top, \smash{$l=0,2,4$}, respectively. Note also the avoided crossing between the other two states at small $D/\aho$, which is due to the short-range cut-off imposed on the DDI.
\vspace{-0.5cm}
\label{fig:2bDDISpectrum
\end{figure}
The energy spectrum is calculated by solving a generalized eigenvalue problem for a range of the DDI strength, $D$. The correlated gaussian basis allows fast and efficient calculation of the matrix elements of the Hamiltonian, \eref{eq:3bHamiltonian}, and the overlaps between basis elements. In \fref{fig:2bDDISpectrum}(a) we plot the energy spectrum for \smash{$N=2$} trapped bosonic dipoles as a function of the interaction strength $D/\aho$ near the first resonance. The basis includes the first four angular momentum channels, \smash{$l=0,2,4,6$} and uses a fixed short-range cut-off parameter \smash{$\rc/\aho=0.01$}. On this scale, the position of the first resonance occurs at \smash{$D/\aho=0.0586$}, and is marked by a vertical dotted line. Not all states are strongly affected by the DDI resonance, with only one state in each level `stepping down' by $2\hbar\omega$ across the resonance. If we characterize the states by their angular momentum in the non-interacting limit (\smash{$D/\aho=0$}) then it is the \smash{$l=0$} state which is most affected. Away from resonance, the DDI has only a weak effect, which is hard to see on this scale but is visible in \fref{fig:2bDDISpectrum}(b), which shows a close-up of the spectrum near \smash{$E=5.5\hbar\omega$}. On this scale we can see that these energies decrease as the DDI strength increases. Note also the avoided crossing between the higher states at small $D/\aho$ that is due to the short-range cut-off imposed on the DDI.
Recently, Refs.~\cite{Giannakeas2013} have shown that confinement-induced resonances can occur in dipolar systems that are confined by a quasi-1D external trapping potential. However, the resonance that we study here is not confinement-induced but is the resonance from the DDI only.
In principle, the SVM optimization should be performed separately at each value of $D/\aho$. In practice however, we find that for a sufficiently large basis (more than 30 gaussians in each angular momentum channel), refining the SVM optimization does not obtain a different basis as $D/\aho$ is varied. That is, provided that the basis contains terms at all relevant length scales then it can efficiently handle the weakly interacting and resonant regimes equally.
\section{Results for $N=3$}
For \smash{$N=3$} dipolar bosons, we employ the coupled-pair approach \cite{Bradly2014} with the global vector representation. The relative coordinates are \smash{$\xx_1=(\rr_1-\rr_2)/\sqrt{2}$} and \smash{$\xx_2=\sqrt{2/3}[(\rr_1+\rr_2)/2-\rr_3]$}. This means we allow for the explicit interaction between particles 1 and 2, but not between this pair and particle 3. That is, the scattering channel for \smash{$N=3$} has one interacting pair correlation (IPC), where the range of gaussian widths must account for the DDI as discussed above, and one noninteracting correlation (NIC), where the range of gaussian widths only needs to account for the noninteracting length scales, chiefly $\aho$. Within these ranges, the gaussian widths are optimized stochastically as two independent two-body problems and then combined to calculate the matrix elements for the \smash{$N=3$} system. Other scattering channels are accounted for by symmetrizing the basis by application of \smash{$\scS = 1 + \scP_{13} + \scP_{23}$} to the basis elements. As with the free-space and \smash{$N=2$} cases, bosons require even total relative angular momentum to maintain the correct symmetry and this means we do not need to explicitly apply $\scP_{13}$. Stochastic variation of the global vector $\uu$ does the work in choosing the internal angular momenta.
\begin{figure}[t!]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\columnwidth]{3bDDIspectrum}
\caption{(a) The energy spectrum of \smash{$N=3$} bosonic dipoles for near the first resonance at fixed short-range cut-off \smash{$\rc/\aho=0.01$}. The basis includes the first four angular momentum channels. Many bound states appear to cluster around the position of the two-body DDI resonance at \smash{$D/\aho=0.0586$}. The ground state diverges before this point differently to the others as shown in (b).}
\vspace{-0.5cm}
\label{fig:3bDDISpectrum}
\end{figure}
With these alterations for bosons and the DDI, we apply the coupled-pair approach and the SVM as before. Each two-body subsystem is solved independently using SVM to determine the gaussian widths. These are combined to make the correlation matrices $A$ for the three-body problem. The gaussian part of the basis is then replicated for each value of $l$. Again, with a sufficiently large basis, it is not necessary to repeat this procedure for different values of $D/\aho$ since the refinement phase of the SVM does not improve upon the basis as $D/\aho$ in changed by a small amount. Upon solving the generalized eigenvalue problem, \fref{fig:3bDDISpectrum} shows the energy spectrum for three bosonic dipoles. Here, the basis includes the first four angular momentum channels, \smash{$l=0,2,4,6$} with \smash{$\uu=(1,0)$} (as justified below). There are many more bound states than for \smash{$N=2$}, but they mostly cluster around the two-body resonance at \smash{$D/\aho=0.0586$}. These states are due to more particles being able to interact. However, the ground state diverges at a smaller value of $D/\aho$ and behaves differently to the others. This is best seen in \fref{fig:3bDDISpectrum}(b), where the bound state energies are plotted on a $|E|^{1/8}$ scale. Here we see that most of the bound states converge in the deeply bound limit but the ground state displays distinctly different behavior and stays separate.
We note also that although variational optimization strictly applies to only the ground state, the \smash{$N=3$} problem is small enough that a large basis can be used, and the energies of excited states are converged within the line width of \fref{fig:3bDDISpectrum}.
The optimization of the global vector $\uu$ is more complicated. The spectrum presented in \fref{fig:3bDDISpectrum} used \smash{$\uu=(1,0)$} for all basis states, which requires some justification. For \smash{$N=3$} the global vector can be written as \smash{$\uu = (\cos \varphi,\sin\varphi)$}; essentially reducing to the single variational parameter $\varphi$, for which it is sufficient to consider \smash{$0\le\varphi\le \pi/2$}. Since \smash{$\uu$} does not appear for \smash{$N=2$}, the coupled-pair approach does not apply to this variational parameter. Instead, we must investigate the angular degrees of freedom separately at the three-body level. Since \smash{$\uu$} does not appear for \smash{$N=2$}, the coupled-pair approach does not apply to this variational parameter. Instead, we must investigate the angular degrees of freedom separately at the three-body level. We still wish to avoid the labor of applying SVM to the entire problem so, similar to the scan over interaction strength $D$, we apply the coupled-pair SVM approach once with a large basis and then reuse the gaussian widths when varying $\varphi$. We note that for a large enough basis, such that the radial part has converged (in this work, at least 150 gaussians were used per angular momentum channel), the result is independent of the initial value of $\varphi$ used. It is also not necessary to optimize $\varphi$ stochastically because the coupled-pair approach has decoupled the variational parameter $\varphi$ from the gaussian widths $\alpha_i$.
\begin{figure}[t!]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\columnwidth]{varying_theta}
\caption{The \smash{$N=3$} bosonic dipolar spectrum for varying global vector parameter $\varphi$. The strength of the DDI is fixed just above the resonance, at \smash{$D/\aho=0.06$}. In this picture, more bound states (i.e.~lower energies) appear at \smash{$\varphi=0$}, meaning that this is the optimal value of the variational parameter.}
\vspace{-0.5cm}
\label{fig:3bVaryTheta
\end{figure}
In \fref{fig:3bVaryTheta} we plot the spectrum at \smash{$D/\aho=0.06$}, just above the resonance, for \smash{$0\le\varphi\le \pi/2$}. At \smash{$\varphi=\pi/2$} there are no bound states, implying the resonance appears at a higher \smash{$D/\aho$}. Bound states appear as $\varphi$ is lowered, meaning that the position of the resonance is lowered. This continues until \smash{$\varphi=0$} for which the energies are are at their lowest value. In accordance with the variational principle, we should therefore take \smash{$\varphi=0$} as the optimal value. Since $\varphi$ is a smooth variational parameter, it is not generally clear how it determines the internal distribution of angular momentum. However, for extremal values it implies that all the angular momentum of a state is in one two-body sub-system. For example, \smash{$\varphi=0$}, i.e.~\smash{$\uu=(1,0)$}, means that the total relative angular momentum $l$ of a basis state is entirely found in the correlation of particles 1 and 2, while the motion of particle 3 relative to the pair is $s$-wave. Although this effect is best visualized at an interaction strength just above the resonance, we note that \smash{$\varphi=0$} gives the lowest energy for all $D/\aho$ considered in this work.
\begin{figure}[t!]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\columnwidth]{DDI_structural}
\caption{(a) The single-particle density, $P_1(r)$ and (b) the pair-correlation function, $P_{12}(r)$, for \smash{$N=3$} aligned dipolar bosons. The three curves are for \smash{$D/\aho=0.05$} (solid black), \smash{$D/\aho=0.0586$} (dotted red) and \smash{$D/\aho=0.06$} (dashed blue).}
\vspace{-0.5cm}
\label{fig:DDIStructural}
\end{figure}
Finally, we can also look at the structural properties for \smash{$N=3$} trapped dipolar bosons. By diagonalizing the relative Hamiltonian we not only obtain the energy spectrum but the relative wavefunction. Combining this with the center-of-mass wavefunction we obtain the total wavefunction $\Psi(\xx)$.
From $\Psi(\xx)$ we can calculate a general structural property
\begin{alignat}{1}
P(r)=\int\!\! d\rr'\,\frac{\delta(r-r')}{4\pi r'^2} \int\!\! d\xx\, \delta(\ww^\intercal\xx-\rr') |\Psi(\xx)|^2,
\label{eq:GeneralDensity}
\end{alignat}
where $\rr$ (and $\rr'$) is a coordinate describing the property of interest and $P(r)$ is normalized to unity. Here $\xx$ is a general set of coordinates such as the center-of-mass plus relative coordinates as defined above or the single-particle coordinates and $\ww$ is a selection vector that picks out $\rr$ from $\xx$, much like for the interaction potential. In particular we calculate the single-particle reduced density \smash{$P_1(r)/\aho^{-3}$}, with \smash{$\rr=\rr_1$} in \eref{eq:GeneralDensity} and the (scaled) pair correlation function \smash{$4\pi r^2 P_{12}(r)/\aho^{-1}$}, with \smash{$\rr=\rr_1-\rr_2$} in \eref{eq:GeneralDensity}.
The wavefunction for dipolar bosons includes contributions from higher angular momentum channels, but since we are only looking at the \smash{$m=0$} subspace, both the single-particle density, $P_1(r)$, and pair correlation function, $P_{12}(r)$, remain functions of $r$ only.
In \fref{fig:DDIStructural}(a) we plot the single particle density function, $P_1(r)$, for different values of $D/\rc$. Below the resonance, \smash{$D/\aho=0.05$} (solid black), the density is a low wide peak extending over the whole trap. This reflects the regime of weak interactions. At the first DDI resonance, \smash{$D/\aho=0.0586$} (dotted red), the single-particle density is more sharply peaked with an exponential decay beyond \smash{$r=\aho$}. Just above the resonance, \smash{$D/\aho=0.06$} (dashed blue), the density is more sharply peaked still. This shows that the atoms are being held closer together as the DDI strength increases and becomes more attractive. The scaled pair-correlation function, $4\pi r^2P_{12}(r)$, is shown in \fref{fig:DDIStructural}(b) for the same values of $D/\aho$. Below resonance (solid black) the pair-correlation function has a single peak near \smash{$r/\aho\approx1.5$}, suggesting that without strong interactions the particles are dispersed. Near resonance (dotted red) the correlation is peaked near \smash{$r/\aho\approx0$}. In the limit $r/\aho\to 0$, $4\pi r^2P_{12}(r)$ would go to a finite value except that we have a short-ranged cut-off. This is similar to the near-vertical drop seen for the two-component unitary Fermi gas \cite{Bradly2014}. However, unlike the Fermi gas, there is no second peak, which means that the atoms are not weakly bound. Above resonance (dashed blue) the scaled correlation function diverges as \smash{$r/\aho\to 0$} and decays to zero much quicker than near resonance, which reflects that above resonance the ground state is in a deeply bound regime, as expected from the energy spectrum of \fref{fig:3bDDISpectrum}.
\section{Conclusion}
The goal of this work was to apply the coupled-pair approach to a system with a more complicated interparticle interaction. The dipole-dipole interaction is both long-ranged and anisotropic and we have considered the problem of \smash{$N=2$} and \smash{$N=3$} bosonic dipoles in a harmonic trap by extending the gaussian basis to include angular degrees of freedom. We have investigated the scattering properties of the dipole-dipole interaction and then calculated the eigenenergy spectrum and structural properties of \smash{$N=3$} aligned dipoles near a resonance. Like the Fermi gas, deeply bound states appear near the resonance but here they form in all angular momentum channels. The ground state is distinctly differently to the excited states in the deeply-bound regime. The structural properties, especially the pair-correlation function, show that the DDI becomes more attractive as its strength is increased, and across the resonance the atoms form more deeply bound pairs, while on resonance the ground state has similarities to the unitary Fermi gas. This demonstrates that the coupled-pair approach can be applied to more complex systems with long-ranged and anisotropic interactions.
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class User < ActiveRecord::Base
devise :database_authenticatable, :registerable, :omniauthable,
:recoverable, :rememberable, :trackable, omniauth_providers: [:bike_index]
def self.from_omniauth(uid, auth)
where(email: auth.info.email).first_or_create do |user|
user.email = auth.info.email
user.password = Devise.friendly_token[0, 20]
end
end
def self.new_with_session(params, session)
super.tap do |user|
if data = session['devise.bike_index_email'] && session['devise.bike_index_data']['extra']['raw_info']
user.email = data['email'] if user.email.blank?
end
end
end
end
|
{
"redpajama_set_name": "RedPajamaGithub"
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| 2,392
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AI reading list: 8 interesting books on artificial intelligence for study
These eight books on artificial intelligence cover a range of topics, including ethical issues, how AI influences the labor market, and how organizations can use AI to gain competitive advantage.
Artificial intelligence (AI) is a growing technology. With a number of different uses, it is easy to see why it is being implemented more and more frequently. These titles answer common questions about AI, talk about the AI technologies that businesses are using, how people can lose control of AI, and more.
T-Minus AI: counting humanity down to artificial intelligence and the new pursuit of global power
In T-Minus AI, author, national expert, and first U.S. Air Force Chairman Michael Kanaan outlines a human perspective on AI. It offers an insight into our history of innovation to show what we should all know about modern computing, AI, and machine learning. In addition, Kanaan considers the global implications of AI by highlighting existing cultural and national vulnerabilities as well as future emergencies.
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The alignment problem: Machine learning and human values
The "alignment problem," according to researchers, occurs when the technical systems that people try to teach do not do what they want or expect. Best-selling author Brian Christian talks about "first responders" the alignment problem and their plans to solve the problem before it gets out of hand people. Using a combination of history and on - the - spot narration, Christian pursues the growth of machine learning in the field and explores our current technology and culture.
Rise of the Robots: Technology and the Future of Unemployment Threat
With the potential for AI to do jobs like paralegals, journalists, and even computer programmers obsolete, author Martin Ford looks at the future of the labor market and how it continues to transform. Rise of the Robots help us understand how employment and society need to adapt to the changing market.
Artificial Intelligence: A Guide to Human Thinking
In Artificial intelligence, author Melanie Mitchell asks urgent questions about AI today: How intelligent are the best AI programs? How do they work? What can they do, and when will they fail? How like people do we expect them to grow, and how quickly do we have to worry about them overtaking us? Mitchell will also cover the strongest models of modern AI and machine learning, advanced AI programming, and human investors in AI.
READ E-commerce trends, growth marketing forecast - TechCrunch
AI Ethics (MIT Press Essential Knowledge Series)
AI ethics considers the key ethical issues raised by artificial intelligence and addresses a number of concrete issues. Author Mark Coeckelbergh uses narratives, relevant philosophical discussions, and describes various approaches to machine learning and data science. AI ethics looks at privacy concerns, responsibility and delegation of decisions, transparency and bias as it arises at all stages of data science processes, and much more.
Advantage of AI: How to implement the artificial intelligence conversion (cut control)
In Advantage of AI, Thomas Davenport offers practical guidance on using AI in a business setting. Davenport not only explains what AI technologies are available, but also how companies can use them to gain competitive advantage.
The Big Nine: How the Tech Titans and Their Thinking Tools Could Destroy Humanity
In her book, author Amy Webb looks at how the basics of AI are broken - all the way from the people who work on the system to the technology itself. Webb suggests that the nine major corporations (Amazon, Google, Facebook, Tencent, Baidu, Alibaba, Microsoft, IBM, and Apple) could "build and enable large arrays of intelligent systems that are not share our motivation, our desire, or our hope for the future of humanity. "
Artificial Intelligence: 101 Things You Need to Know Today About Our Future
Artificial Intelligence: 101 Things You Need to Know Today About Our Future there are many topical topics related to AI, including: Self-driving cars, robots, chatbots, as well as how AI affects the labor market, business processes, and overall businesses. As the title suggests, readers can learn the answers to 101 questions about artificial intelligence, and access a large number of resources, ideas and suggestions.
Samsung Galaxy Tab A7 Lite vs Galaxy A7: What Should You Buy?
Amazon resets mask orders across all warehouses
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"redpajama_set_name": "RedPajamaCommonCrawl"
}
| 3,794
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const Factory = require("./../src/factory.js")
module.exports = Factory
|
{
"redpajama_set_name": "RedPajamaGithub"
}
| 9,969
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\section{Introduction}
No-hair theorems \cite{Israel1967,Carter1971,Robinson1975} are probably one of the best-known mathematical results in the theory of general relativity, for both specialists and non-specialists alike. The suggestive metaphor coined by Wheeler has been used during decades in order to motivate further research and capture the imagination of the general public. There are still many aspects to be understood regarding these theorems, from mathematical technicalities \cite{Wald1984,Carter1987,Carter1997,Mazur2000} to the study of their interplay with observations \cite{Johannsen2010,Bambi2015,Cardoso2016,Krishnendu2017,Thrane2017}.
We deal here with new aspects that extend the applicability of these results. No-hair theorems have been associated with event horizons (infinite-redshift surfaces) in classical general relativity, restricting the number of independent multipole moments that are needed in order to characterize black holes. In static situations, to which we limit our present discussion, Israel's theorem \cite{Israel1967} establishes that the event horizon must be spherically symmetric: a static and isolated black hole cannot be deformed away from sphericity.
The very idea of testing observationally no-hair theorems pushes to the limit the essence of experimental confirmation. Experimentally, the best one would be able to do is to place constraints on the size of deformations around astrophysical black holes, and correlate these constraints with other observables such as the gravitational redshift or the spacetime curvature. Ideally, one would like to be able to carry out these tests without the need of assuming the existence of event horizons, given that these tests will be carried out on finite-redshift surfaces.
However, no-hair theorems do not apply unless the existence of an event horizon is assumed. This implies that the multipolar structure of spacetimes that do not contain an infinite-redshift surface, but only surfaces in which the redshift is extremely large although finite (these can share most of the observational properties of actual black holes \cite{Cardoso2017,Carballo-Rubio2018b} and are therefore often called ``black hole mimickers''), is not constrained by no-hair theorems and may therefore be arbitrary in principle. This may seem to open the possibility of having largely different multipolar structures, that would point (if detected) to a non-Kerr nature of astrophysical black holes; it is worth mentioning that experiments such as the Event Horizon Telescope are starting to probe regions in which tests of this kind would be possible \cite{Giddings2016}. However, in this work we show that the existence of surfaces with extremely large redshift places by itself strong limits on the allowed multipolar structures. This has implications for the search of physics beyond general relativity, but also for the understanding of the physics behind no-hair theorems.
As our goal in this paper is generalizing Israel's theorem \cite{Israel1967} to spacetimes without event horizons, we have decided to follow as close as possible the notation and conventions in this seminal work, in order to facilitate comparisons and stress the novelty of the present discussion. This is also important given that Israel's theorem is the starting point for more general no-hair theorems dealing with charged and rotating black holes; sticking to the original notation may also simplify extending our results to these situations.
\section{Setting}
We will be working with static spacetimes, characterized by a hypersurface-orthogonal timelike Killing vector field $\xi$. The line element can be written as
\begin{equation}
\text{d}s^2=-V^2(x^1,x^2,x^3)\text{d}t^2+g_{\alpha\beta}(x^1,x^2,x^3)\text{d}x^\alpha\text{d}x^\beta,\label{eq:4dmetric}
\end{equation}
where $V^2=|\xi|^2>0$ and the coordinate $t$ has been chosen such that $\nabla t=\xi V^{-2}$. In the following, Greek indices run from 1 to 3, lower case italic indices from 1 to 2, and upper case italic indices from 0 to 3.
The hypersurfaces $\Sigma$ are defined by constant values of $t$. The induced metric is given by
\begin{equation}
\left.\text{d}s^2\right|_{\Sigma}=g_{\alpha\beta}(x^1,x^2,x^3)\text{d}x^\alpha\text{d}x^\beta.\label{eq:3dmetric}
\end{equation}
We now choose $V$ as one of the coordinates in the hypersurfaces $\Sigma$, so that in the following we will write $(x^1,x^2,x^3)=(V,\theta^1,\theta^2)$. Moreover, we can choose the coordinates $(\theta^1,\theta^2)$ on $\mathscr{B}_V$ to be orthogonal to the equipotential surfaces, $g^{\alpha\beta}\partial_\alpha\theta^a\partial_\beta V=0$. The (spacelike) normal vector to the two-dimensional subspaces $\mathscr{B}_V$ of $\Sigma$ defined by constant values of $V$ is given by
\begin{equation}
n_\alpha=\rho\partial_\alpha V,
\end{equation}
where
\begin{equation}
\rho=\frac{1}{\sqrt{g^{\alpha\beta}\partial_\alpha V\partial_\beta V}}.
\end{equation}
This function $\rho$ is related to the trace of the extrinsic curvature $K$ of the two-dimensional subspaces $\mathscr{B}_V$ as
\begin{equation}
\frac{\partial\rho}{\partial V}=\rho^2 K.\label{eq:rel4}
\end{equation}
The metric in Eq. \eqref{eq:3dmetric} can be written as \cite{Israel1967,Israel1967b}
\begin{equation}
\left.\text{d}s^2\right|_{\Sigma}=g_{ab}(V,\theta^1,\theta^2)\text{d}\theta^a\text{d}\theta^b+\rho^2(V,\theta^1,\theta^2)\text{d}V^2.\label{eq:3dmetricb}
\end{equation}
\begin{figure}[h]%
\caption{Two-dimensional subspaces in $\Sigma$ defined by constant values of $V$. The internal region has been emptied in order to emphasize that the proof below only needs to consider the vacuum spacetime region with $V\geq\epsilon$. The white region will generally have a nonzero stress-energy tensor that violates the classical energy conditions, being filled with horizonless objects such as wormholes, gravastars or black stars.}\label{fig:fig1}
\vspace{0.4cm}
\includegraphics[width=0.4\textwidth]{figure1.png}
\end{figure}%
\noindent
In this setting, there are several relations of purely geometric origin (but that hold only for static vacuum spacetimes) that were derived in \cite{Israel1967}. For the sake of conciseness we shall not duplicate their derivation here. In particular, there are three relations that include a total derivative with respect to $V$ of the functions introduced above, which will be useful for our discussion. The first of such relations is
\begin{equation}
\frac{\partial}{\partial V}\left(\frac{g^{1/2}}{\rho}\right)=0,\label{eq:rel1}
\end{equation}
where we have used the notation $g=\mbox{det}(g_{ab})$ (to which we will stick troughout the paper). The second and third ones are, respectively,
\begin{equation}
\frac{\partial}{\partial V}\left(\frac{g^{1/2}}{\rho^{1/2}}\frac{K}{V}\right)=-\frac{2g^{1/2}}{V}\left[g^{ab}\nabla_a\nabla_b(\rho^{1/2})+\frac{1}{\rho^{3/2}}\left(\frac{1}{2}\partial_a\rho\partial^a\rho+\psi_{ab}\psi^{ab}\right)\right]\label{eq:rel2}
\end{equation}
and
\begin{equation}
\frac{\partial}{\partial V}\left[\frac{g^{1/2}}{\rho}\left(KV+\frac{4}{\rho}\right)\right]+g^{1/2}Vg^{ab}R_{ab}=-g^{1/2}V\left[g^{ab}\nabla_a\nabla_b(\ln\rho)+\frac{1}{\rho^2}\left(\partial_a\rho\partial^a\rho+2\psi_{ab}\psi^{ab}\right)\right].\label{eq:rel3}
\end{equation}
In the two last equations we have defined
\begin{equation}
\psi_{ab}=\rho\left(K_{ab}-\frac{1}{2}g_{ab}K\right).\label{eq:psidef}
\end{equation}
It will be useful later to note that $\psi_{ab}=0$ and $\partial_a\rho=0$ imply spherical symmetry \cite{Israel1967}. The three relations \eqref{eq:rel1}, \eqref{eq:rel2} and \eqref{eq:rel3} are valid for any vacuum static spacetime. We will eventually integrate these equations on $\Sigma$. It will be then useful to recall that
\begin{equation}\label{eq:top0}
\int\text{d}\theta^1\text{d}\theta^2\,g^{1/2}g^{ab}\nabla_a\nabla_b f=0,
\end{equation}
where $g^{ab}\nabla_a\nabla_b$ is the two-dimensional Laplace operator on the two-dimensional subspace spanned by $(\theta^1,\theta^2)$, and $f=f(\theta^1,\theta^2)$ an arbitrary function of these variables. Also, the Gauss-Bonnet theorem implies (note that the Gaussian curvature is $\mathcal{K}=g^{ab}R_{ab}/2$) that
\begin{equation}\label{eq:top1}
\int\text{d}\theta^1\text{d}\theta^2\,g^{1/2}g^{ab}R_{ab}=-8\pi.
\end{equation}
The last geometric relation that will be needed below is the decomposition of the (four-dimensional) Kretschmann scalar as
\begin{equation}
R_{ABCD}R^{ABCD}=\frac{8}{V^2\rho^2}\left[\frac{2}{\rho^2}\partial_a\rho\partial^a\rho+K_{ab}K^{ab}+\frac{1}{\rho^4}\left(\frac{\partial\rho}{\partial V}\right)^2\right].\label{eq:krets}
\end{equation}
Let us now formulate the main result in this paper.
\section{Statement}\label{sec:statement}
Let us make the following assumptions (the first two ones are exactly the same as in \cite{Israel1967}):
\begin{itemize}
\item[(a)]{The spacetime is static, foliated by spatial hypersurfaces from which we can take any representative $\Sigma$.}
\item[(b)]{$\Sigma$ is regular, empty, noncompact, and asymptotically Euclidean, in the following sense: there exists a coordinate system in which the metric \eqref{eq:4dmetric} has the asymptotic form
\begin{align}
g_{\alpha\beta}=\delta_{\alpha\beta}+\mathscr{O}(r^{-1}),\qquad \partial_\gamma g_{\alpha\beta}=\mathscr{O}(r^{-2}),\qquad V=1-\frac{m}{r}+\eta,
\end{align}
where $m\in\mathbb{R}$, $\eta=\mathscr{O}(r^{-2})$, $\partial_\alpha\eta=\mathscr{O}(r^{-3})$, $\partial_\alpha\partial_\beta\eta=\mathscr{O}(r^{-4})$ and $r=(\delta_{\alpha\beta}x^\alpha x^\beta)\rightarrow\infty$ or, equivalently, $V\rightarrow1$}.
\item[(c)]{The equipotential surfaces with constant $V$ in $\Sigma$, $\mathscr{B}_V$, are regular, simply connected and closed two-dimensional spaces with finite area $\mathscr{S}_V$, the shapes of which deviate slightly from spherical symmetry.}
\item[(d)]{The spacetime is vacuum for $V\geq\epsilon$, with $0<\epsilon\ll 1$ parametrizing the redshift of the innermost equipotential surface that is strictly outside the non-vacuum internal region (in the case of a black hole the relevant innermost equipotential surface corresponds to the event horizon, which means that $\epsilon=0$ for a black hole).}
\item[(e)]{The Kretschmann scalar $R_{ABCD}R^{ABCD}$ is bounded from above, for instance due to the Einstein field equations being valid only up to a certain critical value of the curvature.}
\end{itemize}
As we demonstrate below, under these conditions one can show that the vacuum spacetime region is arbitrarily close to the Schwarzschild solution in the $\epsilon\rightarrow 0$ limit. This extends Israel's theorem, in the sense that the latter is naturally included as the particular case $\epsilon=0$.
\section{Proof}
\subsection{Preliminaries}
Let us start with a couple of considerations regarding the coordinates $(\theta^1,\theta^2)$. The form of $g_{ab}(V,\theta^1,\theta^2)$ in Eq. \eqref{eq:3dmetricb} can be further constrained using the remaining freedom in the choice of these coordinates. From our assumptions above, we can deduce that it is always possible to choose coordinates $(\hat{\theta}^1,\hat{\theta}^2)$ such that they correspond to the usual spherical coordinates in the limit $r\rightarrow\infty$ (or $V\rightarrow1$). Eq. \eqref{eq:rel1} implies then that $g^{1/2}$ and $\rho$ are related by a multiplicative function that is independent of $V$, which is univocally determined by the asymptotic conditions (b) so that we can write
\begin{equation}
\sqrt{g(V,\hat{\theta}^1,\hat{\theta}^2)}=m\rho(V,\hat{\theta}^1,\hat{\theta}^2)\sin\hat{\theta}^1.\label{eq:rel5}
\end{equation}
The normalization constant $m$ is determined from the asymptotic behavior of the two functions of $V$ involved. The previous equation suggests that it would be useful to introduce a normalized metric $h_{ab}$ as
\begin{equation}\label{eq:metrel}
g_{ab}(V,\hat{\theta}^1,\hat{\theta}^2)=m\rho(V,\hat{\theta}^1,\hat{\theta}^2)h_{ab}(V,\hat{\theta}^1,\hat{\theta}^2),
\end{equation}
which satisfies the constraint $\mbox{det}(h_{ab})=\sin\hat{\theta}^1$. Eq. \eqref{eq:3dmetricb} reads then
\begin{equation}
\left.\text{d}s^2\right|_{\Sigma}=m\rho(V,\hat{\theta}^1,\hat{\theta}^2)h_{ab}\text{d}\hat{\theta}^a\text{d}\hat{\theta}^b+\rho^2(V,\hat{\theta}^1,\hat{\theta}^2)\text{d}V^2.\label{eq:3dmetricc}
\end{equation}
\subsection{Spacetimes that are almost spherically symmetric}\label{sec:curbound}
From Israel's theorem \cite{Israel1967}, which is the particular case $\epsilon=0$ of the statement in Sec. \ref{sec:statement}, we know that for $\epsilon=0$ the coordinates $(\hat{\theta}^1,\hat{\theta}^2)$ are the usual spherical coordinates on the 2-sphere. Also, spherical symmetry demands that $\rho$ is not a function of these angular coordinates, with the Schwarzschild solution arising for a specific functional relation $\rho(V)$.
In this paper, we want to understand the behaviour of spacetime when small deviations from spherical symmetry are introduced. From Israel's theorem, it is intuitively natural to expect that these perturbations must be proportional to $\epsilon$. How this intuition is realized in a precise way, and its connection to condition (e) in Sec. \ref{sec:statement}, will be discussed in the following sections.
In this section, we introduce a dimensionless perturbation parameter $X$ that characterizes the deviations from spherical symmetry, and study the behavior of the relevant functions, namely $\rho(V,\hat{\theta}^1,\hat{\theta}^2)$ and $h_{ab}(V,\hat{\theta}^1,\hat{\theta}^2)$, in terms of this parameter. The metric $h_{ab}$ will be simply given by
\begin{equation}\label{eq:pertmet}
h_{11}=1+\mathscr{O}(X),\qquad h_{22}=\sin^2\hat{\theta}^1+\mathscr{O}(X),\qquad h_{12}=h_{21}=\mathscr{O}(X).
\end{equation}
The subleading terms $\mathscr{O}(X)$ in the equation above cannot be independent in order to satisfy the constraint $\mbox{det}(h_{ab})=\sin\hat{\theta}^1$ (that must be satisfied at all orders in $X$), but it is not necessary to derive the corresponding relations for our discussion. Let us stress that, in general, $X=X(V)$ is a function of the coordinate $V$, although we do not write this dependence explicitly in order to simplify the notation in the equations below.
On the other hand, we can write
\begin{equation}\label{eq:pertrho}
\rho(V,\hat{\theta}^1,\hat{\theta^2})=\rho(V)+\rho(V)\sum_{l=0}^\infty\sum_{m=-l}^l\sigma_{lm}(V)Y_{lm}(\hat{\theta}^1,\hat{\theta^2}),
\end{equation}
where $Y_{lm}(\hat{\theta}^1,\hat{\theta^2})$ are the usual spherical harmonics and $\sigma_{lm}(V)=\mathscr{O}(X)$ are dimensionless coefficients due to the introduction of $\rho(V)$ in front of the summation symbols.
Also, exploiting the transformation of the Ricci scalar under a conformal transformation, it follows that (note the sign convention for the Ricci tensor $R_{ab}=R^c_{\ abc}$)
\begin{equation}
g^{ab}R_{ab}(V,\hat{\theta}^1,\hat{\theta^2})=-\frac{2}{m\rho(V,\hat{\theta}^1,\hat{\theta^2})}+\mathscr{O}(X).\label{eq:ricsca}
\end{equation}
A last useful relation for the trace of the extrinsic curvature $K$ can be obtained using the previous equation as well as the geometric identity
\begin{equation}\label{eq:rel6}
g^{ab}R_{ab}=K_{ab}K^{ab}-K^2-\frac{2}{\rho}\frac{K}{V}.
\end{equation}
First of all, in the presence of deviations from spherical symmetry we will have
\begin{equation}
K_{ab}=\frac{1}{2}Kg_{ab}+\mathscr{O}(X).
\end{equation}
Hence, Eq. \eqref{eq:rel6} becomes
\begin{equation}\label{eq:rel6b}
g^{ab}R_{ab}=-\frac{1}{2}K^2-\frac{2}{\rho}\frac{K}{V}+\mathscr{O}(X).
\end{equation}
Evaluating this equation on $V=\epsilon\ll1$ and taking into account Eq. \eqref{eq:ricsca}, we can see that the first term on the right-hand side of Eq. \eqref{eq:rel6b} is $\mathscr{O}(\epsilon)$ and therefore subdominant, so that we can write
\begin{equation}\label{eq:tracek}
\frac{K(\epsilon,\hat{\theta}^1,\hat{\theta}^2)}{\epsilon}=-\frac{1}{2}\rho(\epsilon,\hat{\theta}^1,\hat{\theta}^2)\left.g^{ab}R_{ab}\right|_{V=\epsilon}+\mathscr{O}(X_\epsilon,\epsilon^2)=\frac{1}{m}+\mathscr{O}(X_\epsilon,\epsilon^2).
\end{equation}
In this equation, we have defined $X_\epsilon=X(\epsilon)$. We will keep using this notation in the equations below, also for other functions of $V$.
\subsection{Imposing the boundary conditions}
We can now use the relations derived in Sec. \ref{sec:curbound} in order to integrate the three identities \eqref{eq:rel1}, \eqref{eq:rel2} and \eqref{eq:rel3}:
\begin{itemize}
\item{Let us start with Eq. \eqref{eq:rel1}, from which (together with the asymptotic conditions in our main statement) we obtained Eq. \eqref{eq:rel5}. Integrating this equation on the 2-sphere we obtain
\begin{equation}
\mathscr{S}_V=\int_{\mathscr{B}_V}\text{d}\hat{\theta}^1\text{d}\hat{\theta}^2\sqrt{g}=4\pi m\langle\rho(V,\hat{\theta}^1,\hat{\theta}^2)\rangle,
\end{equation}
where the average on the right-hand side is the standard one on the 2-sphere. This general equation reduces, for perturbative deviations with respect to spherical symmetry, to
\begin{equation}\label{eq:res1}
\mathscr{S}_V=4\pi m\rho(V)+\mathscr{O}(X).
\end{equation}
This is the relation that one would expect, on the basis of Eq. \eqref{eq:3dmetricc}, in situations close to spherical symmetry.}
\item{Let us now turn our attention to Eq. \eqref{eq:rel2} and integrate it on the interval $V\in[\epsilon,1]$ as well as on the angular variables,
\begin{equation}\label{eq:firstj}
\int_\epsilon^1\text{d}V\int_{\mathscr{B}_V}\text{d}\hat{\theta}^1\text{d}\hat{\theta}^2\frac{\partial}{\partial V}\left(\frac{g^{1/2}}{\rho^{1/2}}\frac{K}{V}\right)=8\pi\sqrt{m}-\int_{\mathscr{B}_V}\text{d}\hat{\theta}^1\text{d}\hat{\theta}^2\left.\frac{g^{1/2}}{\rho^{1/2}}\frac{K}{V}\right|_{V=\epsilon}=-P(\epsilon)\leq0,
\end{equation}
where the asymptotic value ($V=1$) has been evaluated using the asymptotic form of the spacetime metric imposed in Sec. \ref{sec:statement}, and we have used Eq. \eqref{eq:top0} in order to simplify the integral of the right-hand side of Eq. \eqref{eq:rel2} (the equation being integrated) and define
\begin{equation}\label{eq:jdef}
P(\epsilon)=2\int_\epsilon^1\text{d}V\int_{\mathscr{B}_V}\text{d}\hat{\theta}^1\text{d}\hat{\theta}^2\,\frac{g^{1/2}}{V\rho^{3/2}}\left(\frac{1}{2}\partial_a\rho\partial^a\rho+\psi_{ab}\psi^{ab}\right)\geq0.
\end{equation}
Direct substitution of Eqs. \eqref{eq:rel5} and \eqref{eq:tracek} leads to
\begin{equation}
8\pi\sqrt{m}\leq4\pi\sqrt{\rho_\epsilon}+\mathscr{O}(X_\epsilon,\epsilon).\label{eq:res2}
\end{equation}
}
\item{The same integration over Eq. \eqref{eq:rel3} allows us, using Eq. \eqref{eq:top1}, to write
\begin{equation}
-\int_{\mathscr{B}_V}\text{d}\hat{\theta}^1\text{d}\hat{\theta}^2\left.\frac{g^{1/2}}{\rho}\left(KV+\frac{4}{\rho}\right)\right|_{V=\epsilon}+4\pi=-Q(\epsilon)\leq0,\label{eq:rel3b}
\end{equation}
where we have taken into account Eq. \eqref{eq:top0} in order to simplify the integral of the right-hand side of Eq. \eqref{eq:rel3}, which can be written simply as
\begin{equation}
Q(\epsilon)=\int_\epsilon^1\text{d}V\int_{\mathscr{B}_V}\text{d}\hat{\theta}^1\text{d}\hat{\theta}^2\frac{g^{1/2}V}{\rho^2}\left(\partial_a\rho\partial^a\rho+2\psi_{ab}\psi^{ab}\right)\geq0.
\end{equation}
We just now need to use Eq. \eqref{eq:rel5} and take into account that the $KV$ term is subleading, in order to write
\begin{equation}
\rho_\epsilon\leq 4m+\mathscr{O}(X_\epsilon).\label{eq:res3}
\end{equation}
}
\end{itemize}
\noindent
We can combine these relations in order to obtain stronger statements. For instance, Eqs. \eqref{eq:res2} and \eqref{eq:res3} imply that
\begin{equation}\label{eq:rho4m}
\rho_\epsilon=4m+\mathscr{O}(X_\epsilon,\epsilon),
\end{equation}
which, in turn, makes Eq. \eqref{eq:res1} equivalent to
\begin{equation}
\mathscr{S}_\epsilon=16\pi m^2+\mathscr{O}(X_\epsilon,\epsilon).\label{eq:areares}
\end{equation}
Moreover, we can use the fact that the integrands in the definitions of both $P(\epsilon)$ and $Q(\epsilon)$ are definite positive to extract constraints on $\partial_a\rho$ and $\psi_{ab}$. In Israel's theorem both $P(\epsilon)$ and $Q(\epsilon)$ have to vanish due to the corresponding version of Eq. \eqref{eq:rho4m}. For the present discussion, it is only $P(\epsilon)$ which is useful, due to the different dependence on $V$ of both integrands. This is, however, enough to derive the constraints
\begin{equation}\label{eq:rhopsiconst}
\partial_a\rho\partial^a\rho=\mathscr{O}(X_\epsilon,\epsilon),\qquad \psi_{ab}\psi^{ab}=\mathscr{O}(X_\epsilon,\epsilon).
\end{equation}
This concludes the proof that any spacetime satisfying the assumptions previously stated is a perturbation of the Schwarzschild solution.
\section{Calculating the strength of multipoles \label{eq:multi}}
In order to understand the physical implications of our result above, it is useful to characterize in terms of multipoles the strength of the deviations from spherical symmetry proportional to the parameter $X$. The vacuum Einstein field equations imply that the function $V$ in Eq. \eqref{eq:4dmetric} satisfies \cite{Israel1967}
\begin{equation}\label{eq:lapeq0}
g^{\alpha\beta}\nabla_\alpha\nabla_\beta V=0.
\end{equation}
The relevant equation to solve is the Laplace equation in the Schwarzschild background for $l=0$,
\begin{equation}
\sqrt{1-\frac{2m}{r}}\frac{\text{d}}{\text{d} r}\left(r^2\sqrt{1-\frac{2m}{r}}\frac{\text{d} V}{\text{d} r}\right)=0.
\end{equation}
It is straightforward to show that its solution is given by
\begin{equation}
V=V(r)=\sqrt{1-\frac{2m}{r}}.
\end{equation}
We want to understand the behavior of perturbations with respect to this spherically symmetric solution with angular variables $(\theta,\phi)$,
\begin{equation}
V(r,\theta,\phi)=V(r)+\sum_{l=1}^\infty\sum_{m=-l}^lf_{lm}(r)Y_{lm}(\theta,\phi),
\end{equation}
which, in a perturbative treatment, verify
\begin{equation}\label{eq:pertdiffeq}
\sqrt{1-\frac{2m}{r}}\frac{\text{d}}{\text{d} r}\left(r^2\sqrt{1-\frac{2m}{r}}\frac{\text{d} f_{lm}}{\text{d} r}\right)-l(l+1)f_{lm}=0.
\end{equation}
Solving this equation allows us to understand the asymptotic behavior of multipole moments that are perturbative at $V=\epsilon$ (and, therefore, remain perturbative when the redshift decreases). Let us perform some algebraic manipulations in order to find the general solution to this equation, starting with the change of variables
\begin{equation}
z=\frac{r}{m}-1\geq 1,
\end{equation}
which allows us to rewrite Eq. \eqref{eq:pertdiffeq} as
\begin{equation}
\frac{\text{d}}{\text{d}z}\left[(z^2-1)\frac{\text{d}f_{lm}}{\text{d}z}\right]-\frac{\text{d}f_{lm}}{\text{d}z}-l(l+1)f_{lm}=0.
\end{equation}
Now we can redefine
\begin{equation}
f_{lm}(z)=\left(\frac{z-1}{z+1}\right)^{1/4}y_{lm}(z),
\end{equation}
which results in
\begin{equation}
\frac{\text{d}}{\text{d}z}\left[(z^2-1)\frac{\text{d}y_{lm}}{\text{d}z}\right]-l(l+1)y_{lm}-\frac{1}{4}\frac{1}{z^2-1}y_{lm}=0.
\end{equation}
This equation is a particular case of the associated (or general) Legendre differential equation \cite{Olver2010} (the standard Legendre equation would be obtained dropping the last term). In the interval of interest, namely $z\in(1,\infty)$, there are two independent solutions $P^{1/2}_l(z)$ and $Q^{1/2}_l(z)$ \cite{Olver2010}. However, the condition of asymptotic flatness permits us to discard the first one, which is divergent in the $z\rightarrow\infty$ (i.e., $r\rightarrow\infty$) limit. Hence, the relevant solution to the previous equation is
\begin{equation}
y_{lm}(z)=C_lQ^{1/2}_l(z),
\end{equation}
where $C_l$ is an integration constant. Hence,
\begin{equation}
f_{lm}(r)=C_l\left(1-\frac{2m}{r}\right)^{1/4}Q^{1/2}_{l}(r/m-1).
\end{equation}
All we need is the asymptotic behavior of this special function, which is given by \cite{Olver2010}:
\begin{equation}\label{eq:asymp1+}
Q^{1/2}_l(z)\simeq\frac{\sqrt{\pi}}{2\Gamma(l+3/2)}\left(\frac{z+1}{z-1}\right)^{1/4},\qquad z\rightarrow1^+\qquad (r\rightarrow 2m),
\end{equation}
and
\begin{equation}\label{eq:asympinf}
Q^{1/2}_l(z)\simeq\frac{\sqrt{\pi}}{\Gamma(l+3/2)}\frac{1}{(2z)^{l+1}},\qquad z\rightarrow\infty\qquad (r\rightarrow\infty).
\end{equation}
We now want to impose that the value of $V(r,\theta,\phi)$ at $r=r_\epsilon=2m/(1-\epsilon^2)$ represents a perturbative deviation with respect to the Schwarzschild geometry, namely
\begin{equation}
V(r_\epsilon,\theta,\phi)=\epsilon\left[1+\mathscr{O}(X_\epsilon)\right].
\end{equation}
From this imposition and Eq. \eqref{eq:asymp1+}, and taking into account that the different $(1-z)$ factors in $f_{lm}(r)$ cancel in the $z\rightarrow1^+$ limit, it follows that
\begin{equation}
\lim_{r\rightarrow 2m}f_{lm}(r)\simeq \frac{\sqrt{\pi}}{2\Gamma(l+3/2)} C_l,
\end{equation}
so that the constant of integration $C_l$ must verify
\begin{equation}\label{eq:mults}
C_l\propto \epsilon X_\epsilon+\mathscr{O}(X_\epsilon^2).
\end{equation}
On the other hand, we can see explicitly from Eq. \eqref{eq:asympinf} that this constant of integration $C_l$ gives precisely the (dimensionless) strength of the mass multipoles $M_l$ in the asymptotically flat region of spacetime (e.g., \cite{Cardoso2016}). It is straightforward to see that, for $X\ll1$, only perturbative multipoles can be induced (which is certainly reasonable).
\section{Implications and conclusions \label{sec:imp}}
We are now in position of extracting the physics of the results above. In qualitative terms, one just needs three independent parameters to describe the situation: $m$, the mass measured asymptotically; $\epsilon$, the parameter measuring the compactness of the central object; and $X$, the parameter that controls the deviations from spherical symmetry (alternatively, we can use the strength of the mass multipoles $M_l$). The discussion above relies on a perturbative expansion in the parameter $X$ which, when valid, implies that deviations with respect to sphericity are small enough\footnote{Let us stress that this is indeed the kind of physical situation one is most interested in; moreover, it is this situation which illustrates more sharply that even tiny deviations from spherical symmetry have dramatic consequences for compact enough configurations.}.
The main conclusion that we want to highlight here is that even these small perturbations from sphericity can have significant effects on the curvature. In fact, plugging Eqs. \eqref{eq:pertrho} and \eqref{eq:rho4m} into the first term on the right-hand side of Eq. \eqref{eq:krets}, it is straightforward to see that
\begin{equation}\label{eq:mc1}
\left.R_{ABCD}R^{ABCD}\right|_{V=\epsilon}\gtrsim\frac{1}{m^4}\left(\frac{X_\epsilon^2}{\epsilon^2}\right).
\end{equation}
The first multiplicative factor on the right-hand side of this equation is the typical value of the curvature in the surroundings of the gravitational radius of a black hole with mass $m$. The second factor depends on the depth of the gravitational well $\epsilon$ and the shape of the closed surface $V=\epsilon$. If this closed surface is spherically symmetric ($X_\epsilon=0$), no additional contributions to the curvature are generated. However, if one deforms continuously this closed surface up to $\epsilon\ll X_\epsilon\ll 1$, the curvature largely grows.
Let us introduce a scale $L$ that determines the typical curvature generated for fixed values of the two parameters $X_\epsilon$ and $\epsilon$. Also, we can use Eq. \eqref{eq:mults} to determine that the typical strength of the corresponding multipoles is $M_l\propto \epsilon X_\epsilon$. It follows that
\begin{equation}\label{eq:mc2}
\frac{1}{L^2}\gtrsim\frac{1}{m^2}\sum_{l=1}^\infty\left(\frac{M_l}{\epsilon^2}\right).
\end{equation}
We can illustrate the meaning of these two equations \eqref{eq:mc1} and \eqref{eq:mc2} by considering an initial condition given by a spherically symmetric static star with $m=\mathscr{O}(M_\odot)$ and a given compactness (as measured by $\epsilon$), and discussing what happens when applying a deformation:
\begin{itemize}
\item[1)]{$\epsilon=\mathscr{O}(1)$: this would correspond to the compactness of a typical neutron star. It is possible to modify the shape of these configurations and introduce multipoles of $\mathscr{O}(1)$ without changing the order of magnitude of the curvature, given by $1/m^2$.}
\item[2)]{$\epsilon=\ell/m\ll1$: this corresponds to a structure that is a Planck length $\ell$ away (as measured in the proper radial length) from forming a horizon (there are different proposals of structures with this compactness; e.g., \cite{Mazur2004,Mottola2010,Visser2003,Barcelo2007,Barcelo2009,Carballo-Rubio2017}). This structure becomes more stiff, in the sense that even introducing tiny multipoles proportional to $\epsilon$ induces curvatures of order
\begin{equation}
\frac{1}{m^2}\left(\frac{m}{\ell}\right)\gg \frac{1}{m^2}.
\end{equation}
While the above observation holds on the basis of our perturbative analysis in $X_\epsilon$, it is interesting to note that there is no reason to expect that the validity of Eqs. \eqref{eq:mc1} and \eqref{eq:mc2} could not be extended to situations in which $X_\epsilon$ takes greater values such that $M_l\sim 1$. One should conclude then that $\mathscr{O}(1)$ multipole moments always induce Planckian curvatures in objects with this compactness.
}
\item[3)]{$\epsilon=\ell^2/m^2\ll1$: this kind of structure is even more compact (we could think about ultracompact wormholes \cite{Visser1989,Visser1989b}, for instance) and, from our perturbative analysis, we can conclude that even tiny multipoles of $M_l\sim\epsilon$ induce Planckian curvatures.
}
\end{itemize}
\noindent
We can understand our results in this paper as a kind of smoothing of the singularities that appear when non-spherical deformations are applied to static event horizons. As shown in Israel's theorem \cite{Israel1967}, these deformations lead to infinities and therefore one must conclude the uniqueness of the Schwarzschild geometry. In fact, we can recover smoothly Israel's theorem if we choose $L$ and $\epsilon$ as independent parameters (so that $X_\epsilon$ becomes a function of them) and take then the limit $\epsilon\rightarrow0$. From Eq. \eqref{eq:mc1}, it is straightforward to show that keeping $L$ fixed in the limit $\epsilon\rightarrow0$ implies that $X_\epsilon$ vanishes as $X_\epsilon\propto\epsilon$. Then, equations that depend on $X_\epsilon$ (and perhaps $\epsilon$) become only dependent on $\epsilon$; an example is given by Eq. \eqref{eq:rhopsiconst}.
In our case, the spacetime curvature remains always bounded due to the fact that $\epsilon\neq0$, but it grows monotonically (for multipole moments with fixed values) as $\epsilon\rightarrow 0$. Even if curvature remains bounded, arbitrarily high curvatures must also be regarded suspiciously. Actually, it is broadly expected that general relativity is an effective theory valid below the Planck curvature (see \cite{Burgess2003} for instance), which would fix $L\propto\ell$ with $\ell$ the Planck length. Let us stress that this does not necessarily implies that one cannot maintain the effective notion of a classical geometry, as it may be the case that an effective field theory that includes in its action higher-order terms in the curvature still provides an adequate description (see, e.g., \cite{BeltranJimenez2017,Heisenberg2018}). A convenient way of rephrasing our main result is then the following: deforming extremely compact objects would quickly push us beyond the regime of applicability of general relativity.
From an observational perspective, the generalized no-hair theorem allows us to devise an independent test of general relativity in vacuum. Our result is translated in terms of constraints between three parameters, that we may take to be the observed spacetime curvature $1/L_{\rm obs}^2$ around the gravitational radius, the innermost redshift that can be probed as parametrized by $\epsilon$ (see \cite{Carballo-Rubio2018b,Carballo-Rubio2018} for a thorough discussion), and the strength of multipoles as measured by $M_l$. We just need to rearrange equation \eqref{eq:mc2} to show that, if general relativity is valid, then
\begin{equation}\label{eq:lastconst}
M_l\lesssim \left(\frac{m}{L_{\rm obs}}\right)^2\epsilon^2.
\end{equation}
Let us imagine for instance what would happen if observations conclude that $L_{\rm obs}\sim m$ and that $\epsilon\ll 1$; $M_l$ should be then proportional to $\epsilon^2$. This could be compared with other independent determinations of these parameters through observations of the environment of astrophysical black holes, such as the ones that will be carried out by the Event Horizon Telescope \cite{Ricarte2014,Psaltis2018}. Hence, Eqs. \eqref{eq:mc2} or \eqref{eq:lastconst} provide a new test of general relativity in vacuum up to the value of the redshift parametrized by $\epsilon$, regardless of the nature of spacetime enclosed by the corresponding equipotential surface (namely, the white region in Fig. \ref{fig:fig1}).
During the last stages of the preparation of this manuscript, we noticed the existence of the recent work \cite{Raposo2018} that deals with the same problem but from a different perspective, and using a different approach (namely, constructing explicitly a family of geometries that include perturbative deviations from the Schwarzschild solution). We wanted to remark that the results of both works are, when overlapping, compatible. Also, the paper \cite{Glampedakis2017} is related to some of the ideas discussed here, focusing its discussion instead on some of the possible implications that a different multipolar structure would have for gravitational waves.
\acknowledgments
Financial support was provided by the Spanish Government through the projects FIS2017-86497-C2-1-P, FIS2017-86497-C2-2-P (with FEDER contribution), FIS2016- 78859-P (AEI/FEDER,UE), and by the Junta de Andalucia through the project FQM219. CB and RCR would like to thank Jos\'e Luis Jaramillo for useful discussions that planted the motivation for the analysis of this problem, in particular, during the X JARRAMPLAS meeting held in April 2018.
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package goscrape
import (
"errors"
"net"
)
/*
Session stores the details of a single tracker session.
This includes the connection object, the connection ID,
and the URL to use for reconnecting.
*/
type Session struct {
Conn *net.UDPConn
ConnID uint64
URL string
}
/*
Result represents the scrape result for a single torrent.
It includes the 40 character base64 bit torrent info hash,
Seeders, Leechers, and Completed counts.
*/
type Result struct {
Btih string
Seeders int
Leechers int
Completed int
}
func newConn(url string) Session {
conn, id, _ := udpConnect(url)
return Session{conn, id, url}
}
func (sess Session) scrape(btihs []string) ([]Result, error) {
if sess.Conn == nil {
return []Result{}, errors.New("session uninitialized")
}
return udpScrape(sess.Conn, sess.ConnID, btihs)
}
|
{
"redpajama_set_name": "RedPajamaGithub"
}
| 8,297
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{"url":"http:\/\/mathoverflow.net\/questions\/79095\/how-to-understand-coxeter-groups-geometrically\/79125","text":"# how to understand coxeter groups geometrically\n\nI keep reading in the literature \"Let $X$ be a Coxeter Group\" but I can't think of any examples. I know they arise as Weyl groups, there are affine-Weyl groups ones as well. This list is not exhaustive.\n\nWhat about examples from Kac Moody algebras. How do I understand those geometrically?\n\n-\nI'm not sure I understand how to reconcile \"I can't think of any examples\" with \"Weyl groups.\" \u2013\u00a0 Qiaochu Yuan Oct 25 '11 at 17:04\ndon't laugh ... \u2013\u00a0 john mangual Oct 25 '11 at 19:41\nFor an alternative geometric point of view, I think it's worth mentioning the Davis--Moussong complex. See Mike Davis' book The Geometry and Topology of Coxeter Groups for details. \u2013\u00a0 HJRW Oct 25 '11 at 20:40\n\nSee Humphreys, starting from II.5.3. Given a Coxeter system $(W, S)$ let $V$ be the free vector space on symbols $\\alpha_s, s \\in S$. We define a bilinear form on $V$ by extending\n\n$$B(\\alpha_s, \\alpha_t) = - \\cos \\frac{\\pi}{m(s, t)}$$\n\nlinearly, and we define a canonical linear representation $\\sigma : W \\to \\text{GL}(V)$ respecting $B$ by extending\n\n$$\\sigma_s \\lambda = \\lambda - 2 B(\\alpha_s, \\lambda) \\alpha_s$$\n\nmultiplicatively. This representation is faithful (II.5.4), so we can study $W$ using it. The most familiar case is when $B$ is positive-definite, and this occurs if and only if $W$ is finite (II.6.4). Cases where $B$ is positive-semidefinite include the affine Weyl group case, and in general what kind of geometry we get depends on the signature of $B$ (see for example II.6.8).\n\nAlternately, the geometric pictures are perhaps clearest for Coxeter systems of rank $3$, where the corresponding groups are essentially the triangle groups. These can be understood as symmetries of tilings of the sphere, the Euclidean plane, or the hyperbolic plane by triangles depending on the signature of $B$. This picture should be compatible with the one above (I think one just needs to consider the action of $W$ on the \"unit ball\" in $V$) but I haven't checked the details.\n\n-\nYour statement about the unit ball is correct modulo the fact that in the Euclidean and hyperbolic cases, the unit ball has two connected components, and you should only look at one of them (you can see that all the reflections preserve the components, since they fix the hyperplane where $B(\\alpha_s)$ vanishes). \u2013\u00a0 Ben Webster Oct 25 '11 at 21:27","date":"2014-04-17 01:20:43","metadata":"{\"extraction_info\": {\"found_math\": true, \"script_math_tex\": 0, \"script_math_asciimath\": 0, \"math_annotations\": 0, \"math_alttext\": 0, \"mathml\": 0, \"mathjax_tag\": 0, \"mathjax_inline_tex\": 1, \"mathjax_display_tex\": 1, \"mathjax_asciimath\": 0, \"img_math\": 0, \"codecogs_latex\": 0, \"wp_latex\": 0, \"mimetex.cgi\": 0, \"\/images\/math\/codecogs\": 0, \"mathtex.cgi\": 0, \"katex\": 0, \"math-container\": 0, \"wp-katex-eq\": 0, \"align\": 0, \"equation\": 0, \"x-ck12\": 0, \"texerror\": 0, \"math_score\": 0.8945639729499817, \"perplexity\": 264.80847529057615}, \"config\": {\"markdown_headings\": true, \"markdown_code\": true, \"boilerplate_config\": {\"ratio_threshold\": 0.18, \"absolute_threshold\": 10, \"end_threshold\": 15, \"enable\": true}, \"remove_buttons\": true, \"remove_image_figures\": true, \"remove_link_clusters\": true, \"table_config\": {\"min_rows\": 2, \"min_cols\": 3, \"format\": \"plain\"}, \"remove_chinese\": true, \"remove_edit_buttons\": true, \"extract_latex\": true}, \"warc_path\": \"s3:\/\/commoncrawl\/crawl-data\/CC-MAIN-2014-15\/segments\/1397609526102.3\/warc\/CC-MAIN-20140416005206-00270-ip-10-147-4-33.ec2.internal.warc.gz\"}"}
| null | null |
Public Release: 18-Aug-2016
Female forensic scientists more stressed than males
IMAGE: Forensic scientists generally are stressed but happy with their jobs -- and female scientists are particularly stressed, finds a federally funded study led by Michigan State University criminologist Thomas Holt. view more
Credit: Michigan State University
EAST LANSING, Mich. -- Women may be at the forefront of the fast-growing forensic science field, but they're also more stressed than their male counterparts, indicates new research led by a Michigan State University criminologist.
Females working in forensic science labs were almost two times more likely to report high stress levels than males, according to the study, funded by the U.S. Department of Justice. Forensic scientists aid criminal investigations by collecting and analyzing evidence such as fingerprints, ballistics and DNA.
"It's not clear why female scientists reported more stress than males," said Thomas J. Holt, MSU professor of criminal justice, "though it may stem from differences in the experiences of female scientists who are not sworn law-enforcement officers working in a quasi-military structure where more males are sworn officers, particularly in supervisory roles."
Employment for forensic science technicians is expected to grow 27 percent between 2014 and 2024, according to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Fueled by shows like "CSI" and "Bones," the field has surged in popularity, particularly among women, who greatly outnumber men in undergraduate and graduate forensic science programs.
At MSU - home of the nation's first forensic science program, started in 1946 - Holt led one of the first studies to examine the job satisfaction and stress of forensic scientists. The researchers surveyed 670 scientists in 25 states; 62 percent of participants were women.
Overall, forensic scientists were happy with their jobs, but also stressed. "The fact that forensic scientists appear to have as much stress as police and corrections officers was somewhat surprising," Holt said.
Specific findings include:
About 78 percent of participants reported mid to high levels of jobs stress, with female forensic scientists reporting higher levels than males. This finding is consistent with past research that found higher stress levels among female police officers.
About 84 percent of forensic scientists reported mid to high levels of job satisfaction.
Scientists who testified more often in court were happier with their jobs. About 51 percent of participants had testified one to five times in the previous year, and about 27 percent had testified six or more times.
Forensic scientists worked on average about 42 hours per week. Despite dwindling state and local budgets, Holt noted that law enforcement and prosecutors are placing increasing emphasis on the use of forensic evidence and that forensic science labs are under pressure to clear case backlogs such as rape kits.
"Managers of forensic science labs should consider ways to minimize the overtime that scientists work, though this may be difficult if scientists must work more than 40 hours a week to clear backlogs or because of state mandates and a lack of trained staff to more evenly distribute hours," Holt said.
He added that well-defined policies and clear lines of communications should be established across the whole organization - from forensic science laboratories to police departments to prosecutors' offices.
"This can give forensic scientists direct access to upper management and foster trust between all parties," Holt said.
The study is published online in the Journal of Crime and Justice. Holt's co-investigators are Ruth Waddell Smith, associate professor of forensic chemistry at MSU, and Kristie Blevins, associate professor of criminal justice at Eastern Kentucky University.
Andy Henion
henion@msu.edu
@MSUnews
http://msutoday.msu.edu/journalists/
Journal of Crime and Justice
LAW ENFORCEMENT/JURISPRUDENCE
SCIENCE/HEALTH AND THE LAW
SCIENCE/HEALTH/LAW
SOCIAL/BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE
VIOLENCE/CRIMINALS
Thomas Holt, Michigan State University (IMAGE)
http://go.msu.edu/TJy
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\begin{document}
\noindent Nature Communications \textbf{5}, 4829 (2014) \\
DOI: 10.1038/ncomms5829 \\
\url{http://www.nature.com/ncomms/2014/140919/ncomms5829/full/ncomms5829.html}
\vspace{0.6cm}
\title{Gravitaxis of asymmetric self-propelled colloidal particles}
\author{Borge ten Hagen}
\affiliation{Institut f{\"u}r Theoretische Physik II: Weiche Materie,
Heinrich-Heine-Universit{\"a}t D{\"u}sseldorf, D-40225 D{\"u}sseldorf, Germany}
\author{Felix K{\"u}mmel}
\affiliation{2.\ Physikalisches Institut, Universit{\"a}t Stuttgart, D-70569 Stuttgart, Germany}
\author{Raphael Wittkowski}
\affiliation{SUPA, School of Physics and Astronomy, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, EH9 3JZ, United Kingdom}
\author{Daisuke Takagi}
\affiliation{Department of Mathematics, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Honolulu, Hawaii
96822, USA}
\author{Hartmut L{\"o}wen}
\affiliation{Institut f{\"u}r Theoretische Physik II: Weiche Materie,
Heinrich-Heine-Universit{\"a}t D{\"u}sseldorf, D-40225 D{\"u}sseldorf, Germany}
\author{Clemens Bechinger}
\email{Electronic address: c.bechinger@physik.uni-stuttgart.de}
\affiliation{2.\ Physikalisches Institut, Universit{\"a}t Stuttgart, D-70569 Stuttgart, Germany}
\affiliation{Max-Planck-Institut f{\"u}r Intelligente Systeme, D-70569 Stuttgart, Germany}
\date{\today}
\begin{abstract}
Many motile microorganisms adjust their swimming motion relative to the gravitational field and thus counteract sedimentation to the ground. This gravitactic behavior is often the result of an inhomogeneous mass distribution which aligns the microorganism similar to a buoy. However, it has been suggested that gravitaxis can also result from a geometric fore-rear asymmetry, typical for many self-propelling organisms. Despite several attempts, no conclusive evidence for such an asymmetry-induced gravitactic motion exists. Here, we study the motion of asymmetric self-propelled colloidal particles which have a homogeneous mass density and a well-defined shape. In experiments and by theoretical modeling we demonstrate that a shape anisotropy alone is sufficient to induce gravitactic motion with either preferential upward or downward swimming. In addition, also trochoid-like trajectories transversal to the direction of gravity are observed.
\end{abstract}
\maketitle
\dropcap{G}ravitaxis (known historically as geotaxis) describes the response of motile microorganisms to an external gravitational field and has been studied for several decades. In particular, negative gravitaxis, i.e., a swimming motion opposed to a gravitational force $\mathbf{F}_{\mathrm{G}}$, is frequently observed for flagellates and ciliates such as \emph{Chlamydomonas} \cite{roberts2006mechanisms} or \emph{Paramecium} \cite{roberts2010mechanics}. Since this ability enables microorganisms to counteract sedimentation, gravitaxis extends the range of their habitat and allows them to optimize their position in environments with spatial gradients \cite{roberts2010mechanics}. In case of photosynthetic flagellates such as \textit{Euglena gracilis}, gravitaxis (in addition to phototaxis) contributes to their vertical motion in water which enables them to adjust the amount of exposure to solar radiation \cite{ntefidou2003photoactivated}. In order to achieve a gravitactic motion, in general a stable orientation of the microorganism relative to the gravitational field is required. While in some organisms such alignment is likely to be dominated by
an active physiological mechanism \cite{hader1997graviperception,hader2009molecular}, its origin in other systems is still controversially discussed \cite{richter2007gravitaxis,hemmersbach1999graviorientation,hader1999gravitaxis,nagel2000physical,machemer1996gravitaxis,roberts2002gravitaxis,roberts2006mechanisms, roberts2010mechanics,mogami2001theoretical,streb2002sensory}. It has been suggested that gravitaxis can also result from purely passive effects like, e.g., an inhomogeneous mass density within the organism (bottom-heaviness), which would lead to an alignment similar to that of a buoy in the ocean \cite{durham2009disruption, kessler1985hydrodynamic}.
(We use the term ``gravitaxis'', which is not uniformly defined in the literature, also in the context of passive alignment effects.)
Under such conditions, the organism's alignment should be the same regardless whether it sediments downward or upward in a hypo- or hyper-density medium, respectively, as indeed observed for \textit{pluteus larvae} \cite{mogami2001theoretical}. However, corresponding experiments with immobilized \textit{Paramecium} and \textit{gastrula larvae} showed an alignment reversal for opposite sedimentation directions \cite{mogami2001theoretical}. This suggests another mechanical alignment mechanism which is caused by the organism's fore-rear asymmetry \cite{roberts2002gravitaxis,roberts2006mechanisms, roberts2010mechanics,mogami2001theoretical}.
To explore the role of shape asymmetry on the gravitactic behavior and to avoid the presence of additional physiological mechanisms, in our experiments we study the motion of colloidal micron-sized swimmers with asymmetric shapes in a gravitational field.
The self-propulsion mechanism is based on diffusiophoresis, where a local chemical gradient is induced in the solvent around the microswimmer \cite{anderson1989colloid}. It has been shown that the corresponding type of motion is similar to that of biological microorganisms \cite{howse2007self,hong2007chemotaxis,gibbs2009autonomously,jiang2010active,golestanian2005propulsion,theurkauff2012dynamic,PalacciPRL2010}.
Based on our experimental and theoretical results, we demonstrate that a shape anisotropy alone is sufficient to induce gravitactic motion with either upward or downward swimming. In addition to straight trajectories also more complex swimming patterns are observed, where the swimmers perform a trochoid-like (i.e., a generalized cycloid-like \cite{Yates}) motion transversal to the direction of gravity.
\section{Results}
\subsection{Experiments}
For our experiments we use asymmetric L-shaped microswimmers with arm lengths of 9 and \unit{6}{\micro\metre}, respectively, and \unit{3}{\micro\metre} thickness that are obtained by soft lithography \cite{badaire2007shape,kummel2013circular} (see the Methods section for details). To induce a self-diffusiophoretic motion, the particles are covered with a thin Au coating on the front side of the short arm, which leads to local heating upon laser illumination with intensity $I$ [see Fig.\ \ref{Fig.1}(d)]. When such particles are suspended in a binary mixture of water and 2,6-lutidine at critical composition, this heating causes a local demixing of the solvent which results in an intensity-dependent phoretic propulsion in the direction normal to the plane of the metal cap \cite{kummel2013circular,volpe2011microswimmers,buttinoni2012active}.
To restrict the particle's motion to two spatial dimensions, we use a sample cell with a height of \unit{7}{\micro\metre}. Further details are provided in the Methods section. Variation of the gravitational force is achieved by mounting the sample cell on a microscope which can be inclined by an angle $\alpha$ relative to the horizontal plane [see Fig.\ \ref{Fig.1}(b)].
\subsection{Passive sedimentation}
Figure \ref{Fig.1}(a) shows the measured orientational probability distribution $p(\phi)$ of a sedimenting passive L-shaped particle ($I=0$) in a thin sample cell that was tilted by $\alpha=\unit{10.67}{\degree}$ relative to the horizontal plane. The data show a clear maximum at the orientation angle $\phi=\unit{-34}{\degree}$, i.e., the swimmer aligns slightly turned relative to the direction of gravity as schematically illustrated in Fig.\ \ref{Fig.1}(b). A typical trajectory for such a sedimenting particle is plotted in Fig.\ \ref{Fig.1}(c),1.
To estimate the effect of the Au layer on the particle orientation, we also performed sedimentation experiments for non-coated particles and did not find measurable deviations. This suggests that the alignment cannot be attributed to an inhomogeneous mass distribution.
The observed alignment with the \emph{shorter} arm at the bottom [see Fig.\ \ref{Fig.1}(b)] is characteristic for sedimenting objects with homogeneous mass distribution and a fore-rear asymmetry \cite{roberts2002gravitaxis}. This can easily be understood by considering an asymmetric dumbbell formed by two spheres with identical mass density but different radii $R_{1}$ and $R_{2}>R_{1}$. The sedimentation speed of a single sphere with radius $R$ due to gravitational and viscous forces is $v \propto R^{2}$. Therefore, if hydrodynamic interactions between the spheres are ignored, the dumbbell experiences a viscous torque resulting in an alignment where the bigger sphere is below the smaller one \cite{roberts2002gravitaxis}.
\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\breite]{fig1}
\caption{\label{Fig.1}\AU{Characterization of the experimental setup.} (\textbf{a}) Measured probability distribution $p(\phi)$ of the orientation $\phi$ of a passive L-shaped particle during sedimentation for an inclination angle $\alpha=\unit{10.67}{\degree}$ [see sketch in (\textbf{b})]. (\textbf{c}) Experimental trajectories for the same inclination angle and increasing illumination intensity: (1) $I=0$, (2-5) $\unit{0.6}{\micro\watt\micro\rpsquare\metre} < I < \unit{4.8}{\micro\watt\micro\rpsquare\metre}$, (6) $I > \unit{4.8}{\micro\watt\micro\rpsquare\metre}$.
All trajectories start at the origin of the graph (red bullet). The particle positions after \unit{1}{\minute} each are marked by yellow diamonds (passive straight downward trajectory), orange squares (straight upward trajectories), green bullets (active tilted straight downward trajectory), and blue triangles (trochoid-like trajectory). (\textbf{d}) Geometrical sketch of an ideal L-shaped particle (the Au coating is indicated by the yellow line) with dimensions $a=\unit{9}{\micro\metre}$ and $b=\unit{3}{\micro\metre}$ and coordinates $x_{\mathrm{CM}}=\unit{-2.25}{\micro\metre}$ and $y_{\mathrm{CM}}=\unit{3.75}{\micro\metre}$ of the center of mass CM (with the origin of coordinates in the bottom right corner of the particle and when the Au coating is neglected). The propulsion mechanism characterized by the effective force $\mathbf{F}$ and the effective torque $\mathbf{M}$ induces a rotation of the particle that depends on the length of the effective lever arm $l$. $\mathbf{\hat{u}}_{\parallel}(\phi)$ and $\mathbf{\hat{u}}_{\perp}(\phi)$ are particle-fixed unit vectors that denote the orientation of the particle (see the Methods section for details).}
\end{figure}
In Fig.\ \ref{Fig.1}(c) we show the particle's center-of-mass motion in the $x$-$y$ plane as a consequence of the self-propulsion acting normally to the Au coating [see Fig.\ \ref{Fig.1}(d)]. When the self-propulsion is sufficiently high to overcome sedimentation, the particle performs a rather rectilinear motion in upward direction, i.e., against gravity (negative gravitaxis \cite{roberts2002gravitaxis}, see Fig.\ \ref{Fig.1}(c),2-4). With increasing self-propulsion, i.e., light intensity, the angle between the trajectory and the $y$ axis increases until it exceeds $\unit{90}{\degree}$. For even higher intensities, interestingly, the particle performs an effective downward motion again (see Fig.\ \ref{Fig.1}(c),5). It should be mentioned that in case of the above straight trajectories, the particle's orientation $\phi$ remains stable (apart from slight fluctuations) and shows a monotonic dependence on the illumination intensity (as will be discussed in more detail further below).
Finally, for strong self-propulsion corresponding to high light intensity, the microswimmer performs a trochoid-like motion (see Fig.\ \ref{Fig.1}(c),6).
\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\breite]{fig2}
\caption{\label{Fig.2}\AU{Measured particle orientations.} Long-time orientation $\phi_{\infty}$ of an L-shaped particle in the regime of straight motion as a function of the strength $P^{*}$ of the self-propulsion for $\alpha=\unit{10.67}{\degree}$.
The symbols with error bars representing the standard deviation show the experimental data with the self-propulsion strength $P^{*}$ determined using eq.\ \eqref{eq:F} and orange squares and green bullets corresponding to upward and downward motion, respectively [see Fig.\ \ref{Fig.1}(c)]. The solid curve is the theoretical prediction based on eq.\ \eqref{eq:phipro} with $D^{\parallel}_{\mathrm{C}}$ as fit parameter (see the Methods section for details).}
\end{figure}
To obtain a theoretical understanding of gravitaxis of asymmetric microswimmers, we first study the sedimentation of \emph{passive} particles in a viscous solvent \cite{Brenner72} based on the Langevin equations
\begin{equation}
\begin{split}
\dot{\mathbf{r}}&=\beta \DT \mathbf{F}_{\mathrm{G}} + \boldsymbol{\zeta}_{\mathbf{r}} \;,\\
\dot{\phi}&= \beta \mathbf{D}_{\mathrm{C}}\!\cdot\!\mathbf{F}_{\mathrm{G}} + \zeta_{\phi}
\end{split}
\label{eq:passiveLangevin
\end{equation}
for the time-dependent center-of-mass position $\mathbf{r}(t)=(x(t),y(t))$ and orientation $\phi(t)$ of a particle.
Here, the gravitational force $\mathbf{F}_{\mathrm{G}}$, the translational short-time diffusion tensor $\DT $, the translational-rotational coupling vector $\mathbf{D}_{\mathrm{C}}$, the inverse effective thermal energy $\beta=1/(k_{\mathrm{B}}T)$, and the Brownian noise terms $\boldsymbol{\zeta}_{\mathbf{r}}$ and $\zeta_{\phi}$ are involved (see the Methods section for details).
Neglecting the stochastic contributions in eqs.\ \eqref{eq:passiveLangevin}, one obtains the stable long-time particle orientation angle
\begin{equation}
\phi_{\infty} \equiv \phi(t \rightarrow \infty) = -\arctan\!\bigg(\frac{D^{\perp}_{\mathrm{C}}}{D^{\parallel}_{\mathrm{C}}}\bigg)\,,
\label{eq:phigra
\end{equation}
which only depends on the two coupling coefficients $D^{\parallel}_{\mathrm{C}}$ and
$D^{\perp}_{\mathrm{C}}$ determined by the particle's geometry.
\subsection{Swimming patterns under gravity}
Extending eqs.\ \eqref{eq:passiveLangevin} to also account for the \emph{active} motion of an asymmetric micro\-swimmer yields (see the Methods section for a hydrodynamic derivation)
\begin{align
\dot{\mathbf{r}}&= (P^{*}/b) \big(\DT \mathbf{\hat{u}}_{\perp}+l\mathbf{D}_{\mathrm{C}} \big)
+ \beta \DT \mathbf{F}_{\mathrm{G}} + \boldsymbol{\zeta}_{\mathbf{r}} \;,\label{eq:Langevinr}\\
\dot{\phi}&= (P^{*}/b) \big(l D_{\mathrm{R}} +\mathbf{D}_{\mathrm{C}}\!\cdot\!\mathbf{\hat{u}}_{\perp}\big) + \beta \mathbf{D}_{\mathrm{C}}\!\cdot\!\mathbf{F}_{\mathrm{G}} + \zeta_{\phi} \,,
\label{eq:Langevinphi
\end{align
where the dimensionless number $P^{*}$ is the strength of the
self-propulsion, $b$ is a characteristic length of the L-shaped particle [see Fig.\ \ref{Fig.1}(d)], $l$ denotes an effective lever arm [see Fig.\ \ref{Fig.1}(d)], and $D_{\mathrm{R}}$ is the rotational diffusion coefficient of the particle.
As shown in the Methods section, one can view $F=\lvert\mathbf{F}\rvert=P^{*}/(b \beta)$ and $M=\lvert\mathbf{M}\rvert=Fl$ as an
effective force (in $\mathbf{\hat{u}}_{\perp}$-direction) and an effective
torque (perpendicular to the L-shaped particle), respectively, describing the self-propulsion of the particle [see Fig.\ \ref{Fig.1}(d)]. This concept is in line with other theoretical work that has been presented recently \cite{Friedrich2008,JekelyEtAl2008,Radtke2012,Volpe2013,Crespi2013,Marine2013}.
The above equations of motion are
fully compatible with the fact that, apart from gravity, a self-propelled swimmer
is force-free and torque-free (see the Methods section).
The self-propulsion strength $P^{*}$ is obtained from the experiments
by measuring the particle velocity (see the Methods section for details). The rotational motion of the microswimmer depends on the detailed asymmetry of the particle shape and is characterized by the
effective lever arm $l$ relative to the center-of-mass position as the reference point [see Fig.\ \ref{Fig.1}(d)].
Note that the choice of the reference point also changes the translational and coupling elements of the diffusion tensor. If the reference point does not coincide with the center of mass of the particle, in the presence of a gravitational force an additional torque has to be considered in eq.\ \eqref{eq:Langevinphi}.
In line with our experiments [see Fig.\ \ref{Fig.1}(c)], the noise-free asymptotic solutions of eqs.\ \eqref{eq:Langevinr} and \eqref{eq:Langevinphi} are either straight (upward or downward) trajectories or periodic swimming paths. Up to a threshold value of $P^{*}$, the effective torque originating from the self-propulsion [first term on the right-hand-side of eq.\ \eqref{eq:Langevinphi}] can be compensated by the gravitational torque [second term $\beta \mathbf{D}_{\mathrm{C}}\!\cdot\!\mathbf{F}_{\mathrm{G}}$ on the right-hand-side of eq.\ \eqref{eq:Langevinphi}] so that there is no net rotation and the trajectories are straight. In this case, after a transient regime the particle orientation converges to
\begin{equation}
\phi_{\infty} = - \arctan\!\bigg(\frac{D^{\perp}_{\mathrm{C}}}{D^{\parallel}_{\mathrm{C}}}\bigg)
+ \arcsin\!\Bigg(\!\!-\frac{P^{*}}{\beta b F_{\mathrm{G}}} \frac{D^{\perp}_{\mathrm{C}}+l D_{\mathrm{R}}}{\sqrt{D^{\parallel 2}_{\mathrm{C}}
+ D^{\perp 2}_{\mathrm{C}}}}\Bigg)
\label{eq:phipro
\end{equation}
with the gravitational force $F_{\mathrm{G}}=\lvert\mathbf{F}_{\mathrm{G}}\rvert$. Obviously, $\phi_{\infty}$ is a superposition of the passive case [first term on the right-hand-side, cf.\ eq.\ \eqref{eq:phigra}] with a correction due to self-propulsion (second term on the right-hand-side). The theoretical prediction given by eq.\ \eqref{eq:phipro} is visualized in Fig.\ \ref{Fig.2} by the solid line, which is fitted to the experimental data (symbols) by using $D^{\parallel}_{\mathrm{C}}$ as fit parameter.
The restoring torque caused by gravity depends on the orientation of the particle and becomes maximal at the critical angle $\phi_{\mathrm{crit}} = \arctan (D^{\parallel}_{\mathrm{C}}/D^{\perp}_{\mathrm{C}})-\pi$. According to eq.\ \eqref{eq:phipro}, this corresponds to a critical self-propulsion strength
\begin{equation}
P^{*}_\mathrm{crit} = \beta b mg \sin \alpha \frac{\sqrt{D^{\parallel 2}_{\mathrm{C}}
+ D^{\perp 2}_{\mathrm{C}}}}{D^{\perp}_{\mathrm{C}}+ l D_{\mathrm{R}}}
\label{eq:Fcrit
\end{equation}
with the particle's buoyant mass $m$ and the gravity acceleration of earth $g=\unit{9.81}{\metre \rpsquare\second}$.
When $P^{*}$ exceeds this critical value for a given inclination angle of the setup, the effective torque originating from the non-central drive can no longer be compensated by the restoring torque due to gravity [see eq.\ \eqref{eq:Langevinphi}] so that $\dot{\phi}\neq 0$ and a periodic motion occurs.
To apply our theory to the experiments, we use the values of the various parameters as shown in Table \ref{tab}. All data are obtained from our measurements as described in the Methods section.
\begin{table}
\caption{\label{tab}Experimentally determined values of the parameters used for the comparison with our theory.}
\begin{ruledtabular}
\begin{tabular}{lcc}
translational diffusion coefficients & $D_{\parallel}$ & $\unit{7.2 \times 10^{-3}}{\micro \squaren \metre\reciprocal\second}$ \\
& $D_{\perp}$ & $\unit{8.1 \times 10^{-3}}{\micro \squaren \metre\reciprocal\second}$ \\
& $D_{\parallel}^{\perp}$ & $\unit{0}{\micro \squaren \metre\reciprocal\second}$ \\
\hline
coupling coefficients & $D^{\parallel}_{\mathrm{C}}$ & $\unit{5.7 \times 10^{-4}}{\micro\metre\reciprocal\second}$ \\
& $D^{\perp}_{\mathrm{C}}$ & $\unit{3.8 \times 10^{-4}}{\micro\metre\reciprocal\second}$ \\
\hline
rotational diffusion coefficient & $D_{\mathrm{R}}$ & $\unit{6.2 \times 10^{-4}}{\reciprocal\second}$ \\
\hline
effective lever arm & $l$ & $\unit{-0.75}{\micro\metre}$ \\
\hline
buoyant mass & $m$ & $\unit{2.5 \times 10^{-14}}{\kilogram}$ \\
\end{tabular}
\end{ruledtabular}
\end{table}
\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\breite]{fig3}
\caption{\label{Fig.3}\AU{State diagram for moderate effective lever arm.} (\textbf{a}) State diagram of the motion of an active L-shaped particle with an effective lever arm $l=\unit{-0.75}{\micro\metre}$ [see sketch in Fig.\ \ref{Fig.1}(d)] under gravity. The types of motion are straight downward swimming (SDS), straight upward swimming (SUS), and trochoid-like motion (TLM). Straight downward swimming is usually accompanied by a drift in negative (SDS-) or positive (SDS+) $x$ direction.
The transition from straight to circling motion is marked by a thick black line and determined analytically by eq.\ \eqref{eq:Fcrit}.
Theoretical noise-free example trajectories for the various states are shown in the inset. All trajectories start at the origin and the symbols (diamonds: \mbox{SDS-,} circles: SDS+, squares: SUS, triangles: TLM) indicate particle positions after \unit{5}{\minute} each. (\textbf{b}) Experimentally observed types of motion for $\alpha=\unit{10.67}{\degree}$. The different symbols correspond to the various states as defined in (\textbf{a}) and are shifted in vertical direction for clarity. The error bars represent the standard deviation.}
\end{figure}
\subsection{Dynamical state diagram}
Depending on the self-pro\-pul\-sion strength $P^{*}$ and the substrate inclination angle $\alpha$, different types of motion occur [see Fig.\ \ref{Fig.3}(a)]. (For clarity we neglected the noise in Fig.\ \ref{Fig.3}, but we checked that noise changes the trajectories only marginally.)
For very small values of $P^{*}$ the particle performs straight downward swimming (SDS). The theoretical calculations reveal two regimes where on top of the downward motion either a small drift to the left (SDS-) or to the right (SDS+) is superimposed.
For zero self-propulsion this additional lateral drift originates from the difference $D_{\parallel}-D_{\perp}$ between the translational diffusion coefficients, which is characteristic for non-spherical particles.
Further increasing $P^{*}$ results in negative gravitaxis, i.e., straight upward swimming (SUS). Here, the vertical component of the self-propulsion counteracting gravity exceeds the strength of the gravitational force.
For even higher $P^{*}$, the velocity-dependent torque exerted on the particle further increases and leads to trajectories that are tilted more and more until a re-entrance to a straight downward motion with a drift to the right (SDS+) is observed. For the highest values of $P^{*}$ the particle performs a trochoid-like motion (TLM).
The critical self-propulsion $P^{*}_{\mathrm{crit}}$ for the transition from straight to trochoid-like motion as obtained analytically from eq.\ \eqref{eq:Fcrit} is indicated by a thick black line in Fig.\ \ref{Fig.3}(a).
Indeed, the experimentally observed types of motion taken from Fig.\ \ref{Fig.1}(c) correspond to those in the theoretical state diagram. This is shown in Fig.\ \ref{Fig.3}(b) where we plotted the experimental data for $\alpha=\unit{10.67}{\degree}$ as a function of the self-propulsion strength $P^{*}$. Apart from small deviations due to thermal fluctuations, quantitative agreement between experiment and theory is obtained.
\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\breite]{fig4}
\caption{\label{Fig.4}\AU{State diagram for large effective lever arm.} The same as in Fig.\ \ref{Fig.3}(a) but now for an active L-shaped particle with effective lever arm $l=\unit{-1.65}{\micro\metre}$ (see left inset). Notice that the regime of upward swimming is missing here. Only straight downward swimming (SDS) [with a drift in negative (SDS-) or positive (SDS+) $x$ direction] and trochoid-like motion (TLM) are observed. The right inset shows three experimental trajectories whose corresponding positions in the state diagram are indicated together with error bars representing the standard deviation.}
\end{figure}
According to eqs.\ \eqref{eq:Langevinr} and \eqref{eq:Langevinphi}, the state diagram should strongly depend on the effective lever arm $l$. To test this prediction experimentally, we tilted the silicon wafer with the L-particles about $\unit{25}{\degree}$ relative to the Au source during the evaporation process. As a result, the Au coating slightly extends over the front face of the L-particles to one of the lateral planes which results in a shift of the effective propulsion force and a change in the lever arm. The value of $l$ was experimentally determined to $l=\unit{-1.65}{\micro\metre}$ from the mean radius of the circular particle motion which is observed for $\alpha=\unit{0}{\degree}$ \cite{kummel2013circular}. The gravitactic behavior of such particles is shown for different self-propulsion strengths in the inset of Fig.\ \ref{Fig.4}. Interestingly, under such conditions we did not find evidence for negative gravitaxis, i.e., straight upward motion. This is in good agreement with the corresponding theoretical state diagram shown in Fig.\ \ref{Fig.4} and suggests that the occurrence of negative gravitaxis does not only depend on the strength of self-propulsion but also on the position where the effective force accounting for the self-propulsion mechanism acts on the body of the swimmer.
\section{Discussion}
Our model allows to derive general criteria for the existence of negative gravitaxis, which are applicable to arbitrary particle shapes. For a continuous upward motion, first, the self-propulsion $P^{*}$ trivially has to be strong enough to overcome gravity. Secondly, the net rotation of the particle must vanish, which is the case for $P^{*}\leqslant P^{*}_{\mathrm{crit}}$ [see eq.\ \eqref{eq:Fcrit}]. Otherwise, e.g., trochoid-like trajectories are observed.
As shown in the state diagrams in Figs.\ \ref{Fig.3} and \ref{Fig.4}, the motional behavior depends sensitively on several parameters such as the strength of the self-propulsion and the length of the effective lever arm. This may also provide an explanation why gravitaxis is only observed for particular microorganisms as, e.g., \emph{Chlamydomonas reinhardtii} and why the gravitactic behavior is subjected to large variations within a single population \cite{hemmersbach1999graviorientation}.
In our experiments, the particles had an almost homogeneous mass distribution in order to reveal pure shape-induced gravitaxis.
For real biological systems, gravitaxis is a combination of the shape-induced mechanism studied here and bottom-heaviness resulting from an inhomogeneous mass distribution \cite{campbell2013gravitaxis}.
In particular for eukaryotic cells, small mass inhomogeneities due to the nucleus or organella are rather likely.
Bottom-heaviness can straight-forwardly be included in our modeling by an additional torque contribution \cite{wolff2013sedimentation} and would support negative gravitaxis.
Even for microorganisms with axial symmetry but fore-rear asymmetry \cite{roberts2002gravitaxis} like \emph{Paramecium} \cite{roberts2010mechanics} both the associated shape-dependent hydrodynamic friction and bottom-heaviness contribute to gravitaxis so that the particle shape matters also in this special case.
In conclusion, our theory and experiments demonstrate that the presence of a gravitational field leads to straight downward and upward motion (gravitaxis) and also to trochoid-like trajectories of asymmetric self-propelled colloidal particles. Based on a set of Langevin equations, one can predict from the shape of a microswimmer, its mass distribution, and the geometry of the self-propulsion mechanism whether negative gravitaxis can occur. Although our study does not rule out additional physiological mechanisms for gravitaxis \cite{hader1997graviperception,hader2009molecular}, our results suggest that a swimming motion of biological microswimmers opposed to gravity can be entirely caused by a fore-rear asymmetry, i.e., passive effects \cite{roberts2002gravitaxis}. Such passive alignment mechanisms may also be useful in situations where directed motion of autonomous self-propelled objects is required as, e.g., in applications where they serve as microshuttles for directed cargo delivery.
Furthermore, their different response to a gravitational field could be utilized to sort microswimmers with respect to their shape and activity \cite{Volpe2013}.
\section{Methods}
\subsection{Experimental details}
Asymmetric L-shaped microswimmers were fabricated from photoresist SU-8 by photolithography. A \unit{3}{\micro\metre} thick layer of SU-8 is spin coated onto a silicon wafer, soft baked for \unit{80}{\second} at \unit{95}{\degreecelsius}, and then exposed to ultraviolet light through a photomask. After a postexposure bake at \unit{95}{\degreecelsius} for \unit{140}{\second} the entire wafer with the attached particles is covered by a several nm thick Au coating. During this process, the substrate is aligned by a specific angle relative to the evaporation source. Depending on the chosen angle, the Au coating can selectively be applied to specific regions of the front sides of the short arms of the particles. Afterwards the particles are released from the substrate by an ultrasonic treatment and suspended in a binary mixture of water and 2,6-lutidine at critical composition (28.6 mass percent of lutidine) that is kept several degrees below its lower critical point $T_{\mathrm{C}} = \unit{34.1}{\degreecelsius}$. Time-dependent particle positions and orientations were acquired by video microscopy at a frame rate of 7.5 fps and stored for further analysis.
\subsection{Langevin equations for a sedimenting passive particle}
The Langevin equations for the center-of-mass position $\mathbf{r}(t)$ and orientation $\phi(t)$ of an arbitrarily shaped passive particle that sediments under the gravitational force $\mathbf{F}_{\mathrm{G}}=(0,-mg \sin \alpha)$ are given by eqs.\ \eqref{eq:passiveLangevin}. The key quantities are the translational short-time diffusion tensor
$\DT =\,D_{\parallel}\mathbf{\hat{u}}_{\parallel}\otimes\mathbf{\hat{u}}_{\parallel}
+D^{\perp}_{\parallel}(\mathbf{\hat{u}}_{\parallel}\otimes\mathbf{\hat{u}}_{\perp}+\mathbf{\hat{u}}_{\perp}\!\otimes\mathbf{\hat{u}}_{\parallel})
+D_{\perp}\mathbf{\hat{u}}_{\perp}\!\otimes\mathbf{\hat{u}}_{\perp}$
with $\otimes$ denoting the dyadic product and the translational-rotational coupling vector
$\mathbf{D}_{\mathrm{C}}=D^{\parallel}_{\mathrm{C}}\mathbf{\hat{u}}_{\parallel}+D^{\perp}_{\mathrm{C}}\mathbf{\hat{u}}_{\perp}$
with the center-of-mass position as reference point. The orientation vectors $\mathbf{\hat{u}}_{\parallel}=(\cos\phi,\sin\phi)$ and $\mathbf{\hat{u}}_{\perp}=(-\sin\phi,\cos\phi)$
are fixed in the body frame of the particle. (Notice that eqs.\ \eqref{eq:passiveLangevin} could equivalently be written with friction coefficients instead of diffusion coefficients \cite{MakinoD2004}. In this article we use the given representation since the diffusion coefficients can directly be obtained from our experiments.)
Finally, $\boldsymbol{\zeta}_{\mathbf{r}}(t)$
and $\zeta_{\phi}(t)$ are Gaussian noise terms of zero mean and
variances $\langle\boldsymbol{\zeta}_{\mathbf{r}}(t_{1})\otimes\boldsymbol{\zeta}_{\mathbf{r}}(t_{2})\rangle
=2\:\!\DT \:\!\delta(t_{1}-t_{2})$,
$\langle\boldsymbol{\zeta}_{\mathbf{r}}(t_{1})\:\!\zeta_{\phi}(t_{2})\rangle
=2\:\!\mathbf{D}_{\mathrm{C}}\:\!\delta(t_{1}-t_{2})$, and
$\langle\zeta_{\phi}(t_{1})\:\!\zeta_{\phi}(t_{2})\rangle=2\:\!D_{\mathrm{R}}\:\!\delta(t_{1}-t_{2})$.
Within this formalism, the specific particle shape enters via the translational diffusion coefficients $D_{\parallel}$, $D^{\perp}_{\parallel}$, and $D_{\perp}$, the coupling coefficients $D^{\parallel}_{\mathrm{C}}$ and
$D^{\perp}_{\mathrm{C}}$, and the rotational diffusion coefficient $D_{\mathrm{R}}$.
\subsection{Langevin equations for an active particle under gravity
\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\linewidth]{fig5}
\caption{\label{Fig.5}\AU{Sketch for the slender-body model.} Illustration of a rigid L-shaped particle with arm lengths $a$ and $2b$. The position $\mathbf{r}(t)$ of the center of mass CM and the orientation angle $\phi(t)$ evolve over time due to the gravitational force $\mathbf{F}_{\mathrm{G}}$ and fluid slip velocity $V_\mathrm{sl}$ on the particle surface. The unit vectors $\mathbf{\hat{u}}_\parallel$ and $\mathbf{\hat{u}}_\perp$ indicate the particle-fixed coordinate system.}
\end{figure}
In the following, we provide a hydrodynamic derivation of our equations of motion \eqref{eq:Langevinr} and \eqref{eq:Langevinphi} to justify their validity. Our derivation is based on slender-body theory for Stokes flow \cite{Batchelor}. This approach has been applied successfully to model, e.g., flagellar locomotion \cite{Lighthill,Lauga09}. The theory is adapted to describe the movement of a rigid L-shaped particle in three-dimensional Stokes flow as sketched in Fig.\ \ref{Fig.5}. A key assumption is that the width $2\epsilon$ of the arms of the particle is much smaller than the total arc length $L=a+2b$ of the particle, where $a$ and $2b$ are its arm lengths. Though $\epsilon=\unit{1.5}{\micro\metre}$ is only one order of magnitude smaller than $L=\unit{15}{\micro\metre}$ in the experiments, the slenderness approximation $\epsilon\ll L$ offers valuable fundamental insight into the effects of self-propulsion and gravity on the particle's motion, as examined below.
The centerline position $\mathbf{x}(s)$ of the slender L-shaped particle is described by a parameter $s$ with $-2b\leq s\leq a$:
\begin{eqnarray}
\label{centerline}
\mathbf{x}(s)= \mathbf{r}-\mathbf{r}_{\mathrm{CM}}+\begin{cases}
s\mathbf{\hat{u}}_\parallel\,, & \text{if\;} -2b\le s\le 0\,, \\
s\mathbf{\hat{u}}_\perp\,, & \text{if\;\,} 0< s\le a\,.
\end{cases}
\end{eqnarray}
Here, $\mathbf{r}$ is the center-of-mass position of the particle, $\mathbf{\hat{u}}_\parallel$ and $\mathbf{\hat{u}}_\perp$ are unit vectors defining the particle's frame of reference, and $\mathbf{r}_{\mathrm{CM}}=(a^2\mathbf{\hat{u}}_\perp-4b^2\mathbf{\hat{u}}_\parallel)/(2L)$ is a vector from the point where the two arms meet at right angles to the center of mass CM (see Fig.\ \ref{Fig.5}). The fluid velocity on the particle surface is approximated by $\mathbf{\dot{x}}+\mathbf{v}_\mathrm{sl}(s)$, where $\mathbf{v}_\mathrm{sl}(s)$ is a prescribed slip velocity averaged over the intersection line of the particle surface and the plane through the point $\mathbf{x}(s)$ adjacent to the centerline. Motivated by the slip flow generated near the Au coating in the experiments, we set $\mathbf{v}_\mathrm{sl}=-V_\mathrm{sl}\mathbf{\hat{u}}_\perp$ along the shorter arm ($-2b\le s\le 0$) and no slip (i.e., $\mathbf{v}_\mathrm{sl}=\mathbf{0}$) along the other arm. According to the leading-order terms in slender-body theory \cite{Batchelor}, the fluid velocity is related to the local force per unit length $\mathbf{f}(s)$ on the particle surface and given by
\begin{equation}
\mathbf{\dot{x}}+\mathbf{v}_\mathrm{sl}=c (\mathbf{\underline{I}}+\mathbf{x'}\!\!\otimes\!\mathbf{x'})\mathbf{f}
\label{eq:fluidv}
\end{equation}
with the constant $c=\log(L/\epsilon)/(4\pi\eta$), the viscosity of the surrounding fluid $\eta$, the identity matrix $\mathbf{\underline{I}}$, the vector $\mathbf{x'}=\partial\mathbf{x}/\partial s$ that is locally tangent to the centerline, and the dyadic product $\otimes$. The force density $\mathbf{f}$ satisfies the integral constraints that the net force on the particle is the gravitational force,
\begin{equation}
\mathbf{F}_\mathrm{G}=\int_{-2b}^a \!\!\!\!\!\!\!\mathbf{f}\,\dif s \;,
\label{force
\end{equation}
and that the net torque relative to the center of mass of the particle vanishes,
\begin{equation}
\begin{split
&\mathbf{\hat{e}}_z\!\cdot\!\!\int_{-2b}^a \!\!\!\!\!\! (-\mathbf{r}_{\mathrm{CM}}+s\mathbf{x'})\!\times\!\mathbf{f}\,\dif s \\
&=\int_{-2b}^0 \!\!\!\!\!\!\! s\mathbf{\hat{u}}_\perp\!\!\cdot\!\mathbf{f}\,\dif s
-\!\int_{0}^a \!\!\!\! s\mathbf{\hat{u}}_\parallel\!\cdot\!\mathbf{f}\,\dif s \\
&\quad\,+\frac{1}{2L}(a^2\mathbf{\hat{u}}_\parallel\!\cdot\!\mathbf{F}_\mathrm{G}+4b^2\mathbf{\hat{u}}_\perp\!\!\cdot\!\mathbf{F}_\mathrm{G})\\
&=0\;,
\end{split
\label{torque
\end{equation}
where $\mathbf{\hat{e}}_z$ is the unit vector parallel to the $z$ axis. Thus, in
the absence of gravity the self-propelled particle is force-free and torque-free as required.
We differentiate eq.\ \eqref{centerline} with respect to time and insert it into eq.\ \eqref{eq:fluidv}.
This leads to
\begin{equation}
\begin{split
&\mathbf{\dot{r}}+\mathbf{v}_\mathrm{sl}+\frac{\dot{\phi}}{2L}(a^2\mathbf{\hat{u}}_\parallel+4b^2\mathbf{\hat{u}}_\perp) \\
&= \begin{cases
c(\mathbf{\underline{I}}+\mathbf{\hat{u}}_\parallel\!\otimes\!\mathbf{\hat{u}}_\parallel)\mathbf{f}-s\dot{\phi}\mathbf{\hat{u}}_\perp\,, & \text{if\;} -2b\le s\le 0\,, \\
c(\mathbf{\underline{I}}+\mathbf{\hat{u}}_\perp\!\!\otimes\!\mathbf{\hat{u}}_\perp)\mathbf{f}+s\dot{\phi}\mathbf{\hat{u}}_\parallel\,, & \text{if\;\,} 0< s\le a\,.
\end{cases
\end{split
\label{slender
\end{equation}
The $\mathbf{\hat{u}}_\parallel$ and $\mathbf{\hat{u}}_\perp$ components of eq.\ \eqref{slender} are
\begin{equation}
\begin{split
\mathbf{\hat{u}}_\parallel\!\cdot\!(\mathbf{\dot{r}}+\mathbf{v}_\mathrm{sl})
+\frac{a^2\dot{\phi}}{2L} = \begin{cases}
2c\mathbf{\hat{u}}_\parallel\!\cdot\!\mathbf{f}\,, & \text{if\;} -2b\le s\le 0\,, \\
c\mathbf{\hat{u}}_\parallel\!\cdot\!\mathbf{f}+s\dot{\phi}\,, & \text{if\;\,} 0< s\le a\,,
\end{cases}
\end{split
\raisetag{4ex
\label{n
\end{equation}
and
\begin{equation}
\begin{split
\mathbf{\hat{u}}_\perp\!\!\cdot\!(\mathbf{\dot{r}}+\mathbf{v}_\mathrm{sl})
+2\frac{b^2\dot{\phi}}{L} = \begin{cases}
c\mathbf{\hat{u}}_\perp\!\!\cdot\!\mathbf{f}-s\dot{\phi}\,, & \text{if\;} -2b\le s\le 0\,, \\
2c\mathbf{\hat{u}}_\perp\!\!\cdot\!\mathbf{f}\,, & \text{if\;\,} 0< s\le a\,.
\end{cases}
\end{split
\raisetag{4ex
\label{t
\end{equation}
After integrating eqs.\ \eqref{n} and \eqref{t} over $s$ from $-2b$ to $0$ and separately from $0$ to $a$
the unknown $\mathbf{f}$ can be eliminated using eqs.\ \eqref{force} and \eqref{torque}. This results in
the system of ordinary differential equations
\begin{equation}
\begin{split
\eta \mathbf{\underline{H}} \begin{pmatrix}
\mathbf{\hat{u}}_\parallel\!\cdot\!\mathbf{\dot{r}} \\
\mathbf{\hat{u}}_\perp\!\!\cdot\!\mathbf{\dot{r}} \\
\dot{\phi}
\end{pmatrix}
\!\!&=\!
\frac{1}{2c}\!\!\begin{pmatrix}
2(a+b) & 0 & -a^2b /L \\
0 & a+4b & -2ab^2 /L \\
-a^2b/L & -2ab^2 /L & A
\end{pmatrix} \!\!\!
\begin{pmatrix}
\mathbf{\hat{u}}_\parallel\!\cdot\!\mathbf{\dot{r}} \\
\mathbf{\hat{u}}_\perp\!\!\cdot\!\mathbf{\dot{r}} \\
\dot{\phi}
\end{pmatrix} \\
&=\begin{pmatrix}
\mathbf{\hat{u}}_\parallel\!\cdot\!\mathbf{F}_\mathrm{G} \\
\mathbf{\hat{u}}_\perp\!\!\cdot\!\mathbf{F}_\mathrm{G} \\
0
\end{pmatrix} +
\begin{pmatrix}
0 \\
2bV_\mathrm{sl}/c \\
-2 ab^2 V_\mathrm{sl}/(cL)
\end{pmatrix}
\end{split
\raisetag{10ex
\label{eq:sprop
\end{equation
with the constant $A=((8L^2-6ab)(a^3+8b^3)-6L(a^4+16b^4))/(12L^2)$. It is important to note that the matrix $\mathbf{\underline{H}}$ is identical to the grand resistance matrix (also called ``hydrodynamic friction tensor'' \cite{Kraft13}) for a passive particle (see further below).
Since eq.\ \eqref{eq:sprop} is given in the particle's frame of reference, we next transform it to the laboratory frame by means of
the rotation matrix
\begin{eqnarray}
\mathbf{\underline{M}}(\phi)=
\begin{pmatrix}
\cos \phi & - \sin \phi & 0 \\
\sin \phi & \cos \phi & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 1
\end{pmatrix}.
\end{eqnarray}
As obtained from the hydrodynamic derivation, the generalized diffusion tensor
\begin{equation}
\mathbf{\underline{D}}=\frac{1}{\beta\eta}\mathbf{\underline{H}}^{-1} = \left(\begin{array}{ccc}
D_{\parallel} & D_{\parallel}^{\perp} & D^{\parallel}_{\mathrm{C}} \\
D_{\parallel}^{\perp} & D_{\perp} & D^{\perp}_{\mathrm{C}} \\
D^{\parallel}_{\mathrm{C}} & D^{\perp}_{\mathrm{C}} & D_{\mathrm{R}}
\end{array}\right),
\end{equation}
where $\beta=1/(k_{\mathrm{B}}T)$ is the inverse effective thermal energy, is determined by the parameters
\begin{align
D_\parallel &= \left(\!(a+4b)A-\frac{4a^2 b^4}{L^2}\right)\!K\;, \\
D_\parallel^\perp &= \frac{2 a^3b^3 K}{L^2}\;, \\
D_\perp &= \left(2(a+b)A-\frac{a^4 b^2}{L^2}\right)\!K\;, \\
D_\mathrm{C}^\parallel &= \frac{a^2b(a+4b)K}{L}\;, \\
D_\mathrm{C}^\perp &= \frac{4 ab^2 (a+b)K}{L}\;, \\
D_\mathrm{R} &= 2(a+b)(a+4b)K
\end{align
with the constant
\begin{equation}
\begin{split
K &= \frac{2c}{\beta}\Big(2(a+b)(a+4b)A \\
&\qquad\;\;\; -\frac{a^2 b^2}{L^2}\big(4abL + a^3 +8b^3\big)\!\Big)^{-1} .
\end{split
\end{equation}
Defining
\begin{align
P^* &= \frac{2\beta b^2V_\mathrm{sl}}{c} \;, \\
l &= -\frac{ab}{L}
\end{align
one finally obtains
\begin{align
\dot{\mathbf{r}}&= (P^{*}/b) \big(\DT \mathbf{\hat{u}}_{\perp}+l\mathbf{D}_{\mathrm{C}} \big)
+ \beta \DT \mathbf{F}_{\mathrm{G}} \;,\label{eq:Langevinrs}\\
\dot{\phi}&= (P^{*}/b) \big(l D_{\mathrm{R}} +\mathbf{D}_{\mathrm{C}}\!\cdot\!\mathbf{\hat{u}}_{\perp}\big) + \beta \mathbf{D}_{\mathrm{C}}\!\cdot\!\mathbf{F}_{\mathrm{G}}\;,
\label{eq:Langevinphis
\end{align
where $\DT$ is the translational short-time diffusion tensor, $\mathbf{D}_{\mathrm{C}}$ the translational-rotational coupling vector, and $D_{\mathrm{R}}$ the rotational diffusion coefficient of the particle.
Up to the noise terms, which follow directly from the fluctuation-dissipation theorem and can easily be added,
eqs.\ \eqref{eq:Langevinrs} and \eqref{eq:Langevinphis} are the same as our equations of motion \eqref{eq:Langevinr} and \eqref{eq:Langevinphi}.
This proves that our equations of motion are physically justified and that they provide an appropriate theoretical framework to understand our experimental results.
Finally, we justify the concept of effective forces and torques by comparing the equations of motion of a self-propelled particle with the equations of motion of a passive particle that is driven by an external force $\mathbf{F}_\mathrm{ext}$, which is constant in the particle's frame of reference, and an external torque $M_\mathrm{ext}$. To derive the equations of motion of an externally driven passive particle, we assume no-slip conditions for the fluid on the entire particle surface. In analogy to the derivation for a self-propelled particle (see further above) one obtains
\begin{equation}
\begin{split
\eta \mathbf{\underline{H}} \begin{pmatrix}
\mathbf{\hat{u}}_\parallel\!\cdot\!\mathbf{\dot{r}} \\
\mathbf{\hat{u}}_\perp\!\!\cdot\!\mathbf{\dot{r}} \\
\dot{\phi}
\end{pmatrix}
\!\!&= \!
\frac{1}{2c}\!\!\begin{pmatrix}
2(a+b) & 0 & -a^2b /L \\
0 & a+4b & -2ab^2/L \\
-a^2b/L & -2ab^2/L & A
\end{pmatrix} \!\!\!
\begin{pmatrix}
\mathbf{\hat{u}}_\parallel\!\cdot\!\mathbf{\dot{r}} \\
\mathbf{\hat{u}}_\perp\!\!\cdot\!\mathbf{\dot{r}} \\
\dot{\phi}
\end{pmatrix} \\
&=\begin{pmatrix}
\mathbf{\hat{u}}_\parallel\!\cdot\!\mathbf{F}_\mathrm{G} \\
\mathbf{\hat{u}}_\perp\!\!\cdot\!\mathbf{F}_\mathrm{G} \\
0
\end{pmatrix} +
\begin{pmatrix}
\mathbf{\hat{u}}_\parallel\!\cdot\!\mathbf{F}_\mathrm{ext} \\
\mathbf{\hat{u}}_\perp\!\!\cdot\!\mathbf{F}_\mathrm{ext} \\
M_\mathrm{ext}
\end{pmatrix} .
\end{split}\raisetag{10ex
\label{eq:ext
\end{equation}
We emphasize that the grand resistance matrix $\mathbf{\underline{H}}$ in eq.\ \eqref{eq:ext} for an externally driven passive particle is identical to that in eq.\ \eqref{eq:sprop} for a self-propelled particle. Formally, the two equations are \textit{exactly} the same if $\mathbf{\hat{u}}_\parallel\!\cdot\!\mathbf{F}_\mathrm{ext} = 0$, $\mathbf{\hat{u}}_\perp\!\!\cdot\!\mathbf{F}_\mathrm{ext} = 2bV_\mathrm{sl}/c$, and $M_\mathrm{ext} = -2 ab^2 V_\mathrm{sl}/(cL)$. This shows that the motion of a self-propelled particle with fluid slip $\mathbf{v}_\mathrm{sl}=-V_\mathrm{sl}\mathbf{\hat{u}}_\perp$ along the shorter arm is identical to the motion of a passive particle driven by a net external force $\mathbf{F}_\mathrm{ext}= F \mathbf{\hat{u}}_\perp = (2b V_\mathrm{sl}/c) \mathbf{\hat{u}}_\perp$ and torque $M_\mathrm{ext} = -( ab/L) F = lF$ with the effective self-propulsion force $F=2b V_\mathrm{sl}/c$ and the effective lever arm $l=-ab/L$. (Note that while the equations of motion of a self-propelled particle and an externally driven passive particle are the same in this case, the flow and pressure fields generated by the particles are different.)
Consequently, the concept of effective forces and torques, where formally external (``effective'') forces and torques that move with the self-propelled particle are used to model its self-propulsion, is justified and can be applied to facilitate the understanding of the dynamics of self-propelled particles.
\subsection{Analysis of the experimental trajectories}
For the interpretation of the experimental results in the context of the theoretical model, it is necessary to determine the self-propulsion strength $P^{*}$ for the various observed trajectories. This is achieved by means of the relation
\begin{equation}
P^{*}= b \frac{v_x - \beta F_{\mathrm{G}}(D_{\parallel} - D_{\perp}) \sin\phi \cos\phi}{l D^{\parallel}_{\mathrm{C}} \cos \phi - (D_{\perp} + l D^{\perp}_{\mathrm{C}})\sin \phi} \,,
\label{eq:F
\end{equation}
which is obtained from eq.\ \eqref{eq:Langevinr}. It provides $P^{*}$ as a function of the measured center-of-mass velocity $v_{x}$ in $x$ direction. On the other hand, the gravitational force $F_{\mathrm{G}}=mg\sin\alpha$ is directly obtained from the easily adjustable inclination angle $\alpha$ of the experimental setup.
\subsection{Determination of the experimental parameters}
For the comparison of the theory with our measurements the particular values of a number of parameters have to be determined. These are the various diffusion and coupling coefficients, the effective lever arm, and the buoyant mass of the particles. The translational and rotational diffusion coefficients $D_{\parallel} = \unit{7.2 \times 10^{-3}}{\micro \squaren \metre\reciprocal\second}$, $D_{\perp} = \unit{8.1 \times 10^{-3}}{\micro \squaren \metre\reciprocal\second}$, and $D_{\mathrm{R}} = \unit{6.2 \times 10^{-4}}{\reciprocal\second}$ are obtained experimentally from short-time correlations of the particle trajectories for zero gravity \cite{kummel2013circular}. Since $D_{\parallel}^{\perp}$ is negligible compared to $D_{\parallel}$ and $D_{\perp}$ here, we set $D_{\parallel}^{\perp}=0$. The relation between the two coupling coefficients $D^{\perp}_{\mathrm{C}}$ and $D^{\parallel}_{\mathrm{C}}$ is determined from sedimentation experiments with passive L-particles. The peak position $\phi=\unit{-34}{\degree}$ of the measured probability distribution $p(\phi)$ [see arrow in Fig.\ \ref{Fig.1}(a)] implies $D^{\perp}_{\mathrm{C}} = 0.67 D^{\parallel}_{\mathrm{C}}$ via eq.\ \eqref{eq:phigra}. The only remaining open parameter is the absolute value of the coupling coefficient $D^{\parallel}_{\mathrm{C}}$, which is used as fit parameter in Fig.\ \ref{Fig.2}. Best agreement of the experimental data with the theoretical prediction [see eq.\ \eqref{eq:phipro}] is achieved for $D^{\parallel}_{\mathrm{C}} = \unit{5.7 \times 10^{-4}}{\micro\metre\reciprocal\second}$. The diffusion coefficients have also been calculated numerically by solving the Stokes equation \cite{Carrasco99} and good agreement with the experimental values has been found \cite{kummel2013circular}. The influence of the substrate has been taken into account by applying the Stokeslet close to a no-slip boundary \cite{Blake71}. The effective lever arm of the L-shaped particles is determined to $l=\unit{-0.75}{\micro\metre}$ by assuming an ideally shaped swimmer with homogeneous mass distribution and the effective self-propulsion force acting vertically on the center of the front side of the short arm [see Fig.\ \ref{Fig.1}(d)]. Finally, the buoyant mass $m= \unit{2.5 \times 10^{-14}}{\kilogram}$ is obtained by measuring the sedimentation velocity of passive particles.
\bibliographystyle{naturemag}
|
{
"redpajama_set_name": "RedPajamaArXiv"
}
| 1,372
|
The Adesas Sentinel Low Voltage Protection has been developed to ensure that the Driver / Operator never compromises the engine start batteries, by leaving any loads on, to a point, where there is insufficient power to restart the vehicle.
Can prevent batteries going flat by isolating loads at a pre-determined threshold.
Simple reset push button with LED.
With the engine stopped and loads left on, the Adesas Sentinel unit monitors both load voltage and duration.
At a pre-determined point the system will isolate. Once isolation has taken place the green LED on the reset push button will come on and remain on until the system is reconnected. A simple push of the reset button re-connects the system. When the voltage is above the pre-determined threshold, the green LED light will go out.
Green LED OFF = Batteries connected – power available.
|
{
"redpajama_set_name": "RedPajamaC4"
}
| 4,420
|
Many insects (not just moths) are drawn to the light. Researchers are like that too. Turn on a light (that is to say provide funding for a topic) and the insects will flutter around it. Turn it off and then switch on another light, and these very same insects will flutter over to the new light. Very rarely will any of the insects question the light or challenge whether it is appropriate. That's because they are caught in a loop, constantly reinventing themselves in exactly the same form that they were the day before, only calling themselves by a different name. Deep down they are just the same people caught-up in western (European) ideology, and certainly not interested in exploring the taken for granted assumptions, values, etc. which all those so called 'value-free' researchers are not prepared to have exposed to the public gaze.
So what happens when a light is turned on, but the light lies outside the spectral range of all those insects?
The above is a brief glimpse, into how to unleash the forces of creative destruction against the economies of the western world. People in China and India should take note of my past and future blogs about the nature of time, about Europe being cursed by Nemesis and condemned by Zeus, and about the Tao. Few of those with European/Western minds will understand what I am talking about. They still think that the whole world is going to play by their stupid Enlightenment rules! The new competitive advantage of the nation lies in culture and the empty materialist and soulless culture of the Western world has no future. It is time to change.
And all you binary thinkers note that this does not mean that I agree with the way that China deals with those who show dissent. But in this, they do what all with power do, the only difference between them and the West, is the trigger point at which they react and the means they use to enforce conformance. In the end all governments are evil – the point of difference is the degree of evil. And all will, given the right circumstances, hand to the dissenters, that phial of hemlock that Socrates preferred to drink rather than to surrender to the will of the small minded empty people who, in seeking power, find it in the institutions of the Nation State and now also supra level state institutions such as those found in the EU, and in particular, in the European Commission and its research programmes, and once more we are back to those insects and, next week, the ICT Research Programme, where there are many insects fluttering around lights.
|
{
"redpajama_set_name": "RedPajamaC4"
}
| 2,128
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Q: C# add minutes to timer (WPF/XAML) Need some help. Took a timer from one of the other site users, work wonderful, but I need to add buttons (methods) to increase time when timer is on. Tried this, but it doesn't work. When program is working and I press the buttons time seems to be added but in the same millisecond it returns to its place. And even if you increase the time before the start of the timer at startup, it is reset. Please help
public partial class MainWindow : Window, INotifyPropertyChanged
{
//for timer
private DateTime _startCountdown; // time start
private TimeSpan _startTimeSpan = TimeSpan.FromMinutes(10); // start time until the end of the timer
private TimeSpan _timeToEnd; // time to stop. Changes when timer is on
private TimeSpan _interval = TimeSpan.FromMilliseconds(15); // interval
private DateTime _pauseTime;
//for additional time
private TimeSpan _plusOneMinute = TimeSpan.FromMinutes(1);
private TimeSpan _plusTwoMinutes = TimeSpan.FromMinutes(2);
private DispatcherTimer _timer;
public MainWindow()
{
InitializeComponent();
_timer = new DispatcherTimer();
_timer.Interval = _interval;
_timer.Tick += delegate
{
var now = DateTime.Now;
var elapsed = now.Subtract(_startCountdown);
TimeToEnd = _startTimeSpan.Subtract(elapsed);
};
StopTimer();
releaseButton.IsEnabled = false;
pauseButton.IsEnabled = false;
}
//methods for work with timer(buttons)
public TimeSpan TimeToEnd
{
get
{
return _timeToEnd;
}
set
{
_timeToEnd = value;
if (value.TotalMilliseconds <= 0)
{
StopTimer();
MessageBox.Show(winnerName, "we have a winner!");
lotesView.Clear();
lotes.Clear();
}
OnPropertyChanged("StringCountdown");
}
}
public string StringCountdown
{
get
{
var frmt = TimeToEnd.Minutes < 1 ? "ss\\.ff" : "mm\\:ss";
return _timeToEnd.ToString(frmt);
}
}
public bool TimerIsEnabled
{
get { return _timer.IsEnabled; }
}
public event PropertyChangedEventHandler PropertyChanged;
private void OnPropertyChanged(string name)
{
if (PropertyChanged != null)
PropertyChanged(this, new PropertyChangedEventArgs(name));
}
private void StopTimer()
{
if (TimerIsEnabled)
_timer.Stop();
TimeToEnd = _startTimeSpan;
}
private void PlusOneMinute()//doesn't work
{
TimeToEnd = TimeToEnd + _plusOneMinute;
}
private void PlusTwoMinutes()//doesn't work
{
TimeToEnd = TimeToEnd + _plusTwoMinutes;
}
private void StartTimer(DateTime sDate)
{
_startCountdown = sDate;
_timer.Start();
}
private void PauseTimer()
{
_timer.Stop();
_pauseTime = DateTime.Now;
}
private void ReleaseTimer()
{
var now = DateTime.Now;
var elapsed = now.Subtract(_pauseTime);
_startCountdown = _startCountdown.Add(elapsed);
_timer.Start();
}
private void Button_Click(object sender, RoutedEventArgs e)
{
StartTimer(DateTime.Now);
pauseButton.IsEnabled = true;
startButton.IsEnabled = false;
}
private void Button_Click_1(object sender, RoutedEventArgs e)
{
StopTimer();
pauseButton.IsEnabled = false;
releaseButton.IsEnabled = false;
startButton.IsEnabled = true;
}
private void Button_Click_2(object sender, RoutedEventArgs e)
{
PauseTimer();
pauseButton.IsEnabled = false;
releaseButton.IsEnabled = true;
}
private void Button_Click_3(object sender, RoutedEventArgs e)
{
ReleaseTimer();
releaseButton.IsEnabled = false;
pauseButton.IsEnabled = true;
}
private void Button_Click_PlusOne(object sender, RoutedEventArgs e)
{
PlusOneMinute();
}
private void Button_Click_PlusTwo(object sender, RoutedEventArgs e)
{
PlusTwoMinutes();
}
}
A: It is not working since the part that calculating the time to end is your .Thick implementation
_timer.Tick += delegate
{
var now = DateTime.Now;
var elapsed = now.Subtract(_startCountdown);
TimeToEnd = _startTimeSpan.Subtract(elapsed);
};
when you change the TimeToEnd var it changes again on the next tick event.
you can change the addtion of timeing like this:
private void PlusOneMinute()//doesn't work
{
_startCountdown += _plusOneMinute;
}
private void PlusTwoMinutes()//doesn't work
{
TimeToEnd += _plusTwoMinutes;
}
this way you will change the time remains on the Tick event and it should work
|
{
"redpajama_set_name": "RedPajamaStackExchange"
}
| 9,475
|
#ifndef TOOLS_PLUGIN_HPP
#define TOOLS_PLUGIN_HPP
#include <kdb.hpp>
#include <pluginspec.hpp>
#include <toolexcept.hpp>
#include <map>
#include <string>
#include <vector>
namespace ckdb
{
typedef struct _Plugin Plugin;
}
namespace kdb
{
namespace tools
{
/**
* This is a C++ representation of a plugin.
*
* It will load an Elektra plugin using the module loader
* from Elektra.
*
* Then you can either check the plugins configuration
* using loadInfo(), parse() and check.
* Symbols can then be retrieved with getSymbol().
*
* Or you can use the normal open(), close(), get(),
* set() and error() API which every plugin exports.
*/
class Plugin
{
private:
typedef void (*func_t) ();
private:
ckdb::Plugin * plugin;
PluginSpec spec;
kdb::KeySet info;
std::map<std::string, func_t> symbols;
std::map<std::string, std::string> infos;
void uninit ();
public:
/**
* @brief Do not construct a plugin yourself, use Modules.load
*/
Plugin (PluginSpec const & spec, kdb::KeySet & modules);
Plugin (Plugin const & other);
Plugin & operator= (Plugin const & other);
Plugin (Plugin && other) = delete;
Plugin & operator= (Plugin && other) = delete;
~Plugin ();
/**
* @brief Is toggled during serialization.
*
* (is a hack, only allows a single serialization!)
*/
bool firstRef;
/**
* Gets the configuration for the plugin.
* (will be done in Modules.load)
*/
void loadInfo ();
/**
* Creates symbol and info table.
* (will be done in Modules.load)
*/
void parse ();
/**
* Does various checks on the Plugin and throws exceptions
* if something is not ok.
*
* - Check if Plugin is compatible to current Version of Backend-API.
*
* @throw PluginCheckException if there are errors
* @param warnings for warnings
*
* @pre parse()
*/
void check (std::vector<std::string> & warnings);
ckdb::Plugin * operator-> ();
/**
* Gets the whole string of an information item.
* @pre loadInfo()
*/
std::string lookupInfo (std::string item, std::string section = "infos");
/**
* Searches within a string of an information item.
* @pre loadInfo()
*/
bool findInfo (std::string check, std::string item, std::string section = "infos");
/**
* Returns the whole keyset of information.
* @pre loadInfo()
*/
kdb::KeySet getInfo ()
{
return info;
}
/**
* In the plugin's contract there is a description of which
* config is needed in order to work together with a backend
* properly.
*
* @return the keyset with the config needed for the backend.
* @see getConfig()
* @pre loadInfo()
*/
kdb::KeySet getNeededConfig ();
/**
* @brief return the plugin config
*
* @return the config supplied with constructor
* @see getNeededConfig()
*/
kdb::KeySet getConfig ();
/**
* Returns symbol to a function.
* @pre parse()
*/
func_t getSymbol (std::string which)
{
if (symbols.find (which) == symbols.end ()) throw MissingSymbol (which);
return symbols[which];
}
/**
* Calls the open function of the plugin
* @pre parse()
*/
int open (kdb::Key & errorKey);
/**
* Calls the close function of the plugin
* @pre parse()
*/
int close (kdb::Key & errorKey);
/**
* Calls the get function of the plugin
* @pre parse()
*/
int get (kdb::KeySet & ks, kdb::Key & parentKey);
/**
* Calls the set function of the plugin
* @pre parse()
*/
int set (kdb::KeySet & ks, kdb::Key & parentKey);
/**
* Calls the error function of the plugin
* @pre parse()
*/
int error (kdb::KeySet & ks, kdb::Key & parentKey);
/**
* @return the name of the plugin (module)
*/
std::string name ();
/**
* @return the fullname of the plugin
*/
std::string getFullName ();
private:
friend class ErrorPlugins;
friend class GetPlugins;
friend class SetPlugins;
/**
* @return the name how it would be referred to in mountpoint
*
* # name # label # (when called the first time)
* or
* # ref
*
* @note Its not the same as getRefName(), and is only suitable for serialization!
* @warning Its stateful in a really weird way!
*/
std::string refname ();
};
typedef std::unique_ptr<Plugin> PluginPtr;
} // namespace tools
} // namespace kdb
#endif
|
{
"redpajama_set_name": "RedPajamaGithub"
}
| 6,689
|
{"url":"https:\/\/www.techwhiff.com\/learn\/old-isaac-took-a-little-nosedive-from-his-perch\/302160","text":"# Old Isaac took a little nosedive from his perch on Mrs\n\n###### Question:\n\nOld Isaac took a little nosedive from his perch on Mrs. Cohen\u2019s window ledge 25 feet above ground. Given that he fell as a result of a gentle tap to his noggin, how fast is Isaac traveling when he hit\u2019s the ground? (gravity is -32ft\/sec^2).\n25ft=\u00bd(32ft\/sec^2)t^2\nt=1.25sec\n-32ft\/sec=(vf - 0)\/1.25s\nVf=-40ft\/sec\n\n#### Similar Solved Questions\n\n##### Yes No No Yes Quicksort is asymptotically faster than bubblesort - a. In the worst case...\nYes No No Yes Quicksort is asymptotically faster than bubblesort - a. In the worst case b. On average To sort 8 numbers it is necessary to make at least a. 17 comparisons b. 18 comparisons No Yes Yes No...\n##### 2. Which of the following sets are convex? (a) A slab, i.e., a set of the forn {rE Rn l \u03b1-ar-\u03b2} (b) A rectangle, i.e., a set of the forin {2. E Rn | Qi-Z'i is sometimes called a hyperrectangle wh...\n2. Which of the following sets are convex? (a) A slab, i.e., a set of the forn {rE Rn l \u03b1-ar-\u03b2} (b) A rectangle, i.e., a set of the forin {2. E Rn | Qi-Z'i is sometimes called a hyperrectangle when n > 2. ,n). A rectangle A, i = 1, (d) The set of points closer to a given point than...\n##### The coefficient of static friction between the flat bed of the truck and the crate it...\nThe coefficient of static friction between the flat bed of the truck and the crate it carries is 0.29. Determine the minimum stopping distance s which the truck can have from a speed of 50 km\/h with constant deceleration if the crate is not to slip forward. The coefficient of static friction betwee...\n##### Cups A and B are cone shaped and have heights of 33 cm and 29 cm and openings with radii of 10 cm and 13 cm, respectively. If cup B is full and its contents are poured into cup A, will cup A overflow? If not how high will cup A be filled?\nCups A and B are cone shaped and have heights of 33 cm and 29 cm and openings with radii of 10 cm and 13 cm, respectively. If cup B is full and its contents are poured into cup A, will cup A overflow? If not how high will cup A be filled?...\n##### A) What is the resolution (minimum distinguishable input voltage) of a 8-bit ADC with VRH 5V...\na) What is the resolution (minimum distinguishable input voltage) of a 8-bit ADC with VRH 5V and Suppose that there is a 12-bit AD converter with VRL = 1V and VRH-5V. Find the corresponding voltage values for the A\/D conversion results of 12, 180, and 1200 b) Assume that we have a 20-bit Successive ...\n##### The primary purpose of the patient record is to provide continuity of care, which means\nThe primary purpose of the patient record is to provide continuity of care, which means.a. documenting services so others have a source from which to base care. b.evaluating the quality of patient care. c.providing information to third-party payers for reimbursement. d.serving the medicolegal intere...\n##### Calculate the amount of depreciation to report during the year ended December 31 for equipment that...\nCalculate the amount of depreciation to report during the year ended December 31 for equipment that was purchased at a cost of $88,000 on October 1. The equipment has an estimated residual value of$3,000 and an estimated useful life of five years or 20,000 hours. Assume the equipment was used for 1...\n##### Do you think Morality\/Ethics exists outside of humanity?\nDo you think Morality\/Ethics exists outside of humanity?...\n##### Which of the following statements is true? Select one: O a. The determination of whether a...\nWhich of the following statements is true? Select one: O a. The determination of whether a taxpayer is subjust to underpayment payments is made on a quarterly basis. O b. All of these statements are true. O c. For 2020 the due dates for estimated taxes will be April 15, 2020, June 15, 2020, Septembe...\n##### A financial intermediary is hired to make a transaction \"go forward\". The intermediary can do a...\nA financial intermediary is hired to make a transaction \"go forward\". The intermediary can do a good job that costs the intermediary $13,450, or do a bad job that costs$0. If the intermediary does a good job the transaction will go forward. If the intermediary does a bad job the transaction...\n##### : A network consists of the following list. Times are given in weeks. Activity Preceding Duration...\n: A network consists of the following list. Times are given in weeks. Activity Preceding Duration A -- 9 B A 2 C A 12 D A 5 E B 6 F B 8 G C, F 3 H D 2 I H 8 J G, I 6 K E, J 2 Draw the network diagram....\n##### Note: Course: Electromagnetics-2nd, Transmission Lines. Please help me solving this problem step-by- step. Thank you for...\nNote: Course: Electromagnetics-2nd, Transmission Lines. Please help me solving this problem step-by- step. Thank you for your great time and support 4. For a lossless transmission line the normalized total impedance is given by, Z(T- with\u300c(x) =\u300coe-j2da Similarly, the reflection coeffic...\n##### Show that the cross ratios corresponding to 24 permutations of four 20, 21, 22, 23 can have only ...\nShow that the cross ratios corresponding to 24 permutations of four 20, 21, 22, 23 can have only the following six values: , 1-\u03bb, \u03bb-1, Show that the cross ratios corresponding to 24 permutations of four 20, 21, 22, 23 can have only the following six values: , 1-\u03bb, \u03bb-1,...\n8. Gamble: What is the APR in the preceding problem if the holding period were 18 months? (5 or-5) 9. What is the beta of an equally-weighted portfolio containing stocks with betas of 1.4.0.9 and 1.72 (5) 10. What is the cost of debt when bonds incur a $25 charge and have a par value of$1000, a pri...","date":"2022-12-01 01:19:32","metadata":"{\"extraction_info\": {\"found_math\": true, \"script_math_tex\": 0, \"script_math_asciimath\": 0, \"math_annotations\": 0, \"math_alttext\": 0, \"mathml\": 0, \"mathjax_tag\": 0, \"mathjax_inline_tex\": 1, \"mathjax_display_tex\": 0, \"mathjax_asciimath\": 1, \"img_math\": 0, \"codecogs_latex\": 0, \"wp_latex\": 0, \"mimetex.cgi\": 0, \"\/images\/math\/codecogs\": 0, \"mathtex.cgi\": 0, \"katex\": 0, \"math-container\": 0, \"wp-katex-eq\": 0, \"align\": 0, \"equation\": 0, \"x-ck12\": 0, \"texerror\": 0, \"math_score\": 0.42915311455726624, \"perplexity\": 1873.2381809575534}, \"config\": {\"markdown_headings\": true, \"markdown_code\": true, \"boilerplate_config\": {\"ratio_threshold\": 0.18, \"absolute_threshold\": 10, \"end_threshold\": 15, \"enable\": true}, \"remove_buttons\": true, \"remove_image_figures\": true, \"remove_link_clusters\": true, \"table_config\": {\"min_rows\": 2, \"min_cols\": 3, \"format\": \"plain\"}, \"remove_chinese\": true, \"remove_edit_buttons\": true, \"extract_latex\": true}, \"warc_path\": \"s3:\/\/commoncrawl\/crawl-data\/CC-MAIN-2022-49\/segments\/1669446710777.20\/warc\/CC-MAIN-20221130225142-20221201015142-00326.warc.gz\"}"}
| null | null |
const mysql_database_config = {
host: '',
user: '',
password: '',
database: '',
charset: 'utf8mb4',
}
// configs for config 'koa-session and built-in cookie'
const session = {
// name and key must be the same
name: 'koa:sess',
key: 'koa:sess',
keys: ['blog', 'bgs'],
maxAge: 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000,
overwrite: true,
httpOnly: true,
signed: true,
rolling: false,
}
// base info of the website
const website_info = {
// website's name
title: '',
// website's main url
url: '',
// website front page's default background picture
default_front_pic: '',
// hostname of the website
host: '',
// port used by the website
port: 3000,
// if the website is in debug mode, for login or other function
debug: true,
log_level: '',
// session used when in debug mode
debug_session: 1,
debug_avatar: '/images/avatar.jpeg',
}
// config regulation for label's hotmark
const label_hotmark_rule = {
add: 5,
view: 3,
// no action now 😢
query: 2,
}
const query_config = {
// items to get when query a database
step: 10,
}
// config info for qq login
const qqlogin = {
appid: '',
secret: '',
redirect_url: website_info.default_front_pic + '',
state: 1,
allowed_openid: '',
}
const mail_config = {
connect: {
// see nodemailer
// https://nodemailer.com/about/
},
admin: '',
}
exports.database_config = mysql_database_config
exports.website_info = website_info
exports.label_hotmark_rule = label_hotmark_rule
exports.query_config = query_config
exports.qqlogin = qqlogin
exports.session = session
exports.mail_config = mail_config
|
{
"redpajama_set_name": "RedPajamaGithub"
}
| 5,137
|
source third_party/shflags.sh
DEFINE_boolean clean false "Clean the directory of build artifacts." c
DEFINE_string envname env "The virtualenv environment to create." e
DEFINE_string out exporter "The name of the output binary" o
FLAGS $@ || exit $?
eval set -- ${FLAGS_ARGV}
set -e
[ ${FLAGS_help} -eq ${FLAGS_TRUE} ] && exit 0
# Cleans the directory of build artifacts.
function clean() {
rm -rf ${FLAGS_envname} ${FLAGS_out}
}
# Builds the output binary.
function build() {
TMP_FILE=$(mktemp -u).zip
zip ${TMP_FILE} *.py
echo "#!/usr/bin/env python" | cat - ${TMP_FILE} > ${FLAGS_out}
chmod +x ${FLAGS_out}
rm ${TMP_FILE}
}
# Creates a virtualenv environment and runs the output binary in it.
function run() {
[ ! -d ${FLAGS_envname} ] && virtualenv ${FLAGS_envname}
source ${FLAGS_envname}/bin/activate
pip install lxml python-gflags pytz
./${FLAGS_out} $@
deactivate
}
if [ ${FLAGS_clean} -eq ${FLAGS_TRUE} ]; then
clean
exit
fi
build
[ ${#@} -gt 0 ] && run $@
|
{
"redpajama_set_name": "RedPajamaGithub"
}
| 7,535
|
Orthotic Shoes Canada has partnered with your health professional and Premier Orthotics Lab to supply footwear that will improve your health and well being. With our easy to use interface, you can choose the shoes that you would like to have custom orthotics manufactured to exact specifications for. Our website shows descriptions, high res photographs and has daily updated size availability. We add new product every day.
Custom Foot Orthotics help in providing relief for painful foot problems or an injury, especially for those who must walk, or stand excessively on the job or in every day activities.
The mechanical properties of the Custom Foot Orthotic help to maintain the normal positioning of the bones in the foot, the joints in the ankle and knees leading up to the hips and lower back. The muscles and ligaments holding these bones in their intended anatomical positions are prevented from over stretching and becoming lax over time.
With enough functional correction from a Custom Foot Orthotic, the foot structure can be aligned to give more propulsion, making walking, running and even cycling more efficient biomechanically.
Along with aligning the foot structure, the Custom Foot Orthotic reduces muscular fatigue and helps to promote more efficient muscle performance thus enhancing performance during the gait cycle.
|
{
"redpajama_set_name": "RedPajamaC4"
}
| 9,198
|
\section{Introduction}
The multi-armed bandit (MAB) model is one of the most fundamental settings in reinforcement learning. This simple scenario captures crucial issues such as the tradeoff between exploration and exploitation. Furthermore, it has wide applications to areas including operations research, mechanism design, and statistics.
A basic challenge about multi-armed bandits is the problem of \emph{best-arm identification}, where the goal is to efficiently identify the arm with the largest expected reward. This problem captures a common difficulty in practical scenarios, where at unit cost, only partial information about the system of interest can be obtained. A real-world example is a recommendation system, where the goal is to find appealing items for users. For each recommendation, only feedback on the recommended item is obtained. In the context of machine learning, best-arm identification can be viewed as a high-level abstraction and core component of active learning, where the goal is to minimize the uncertainty of an underlying concept, and each step only reveals the label of the data point being queried.
Quantum computing is a promising technology with potential applications to diverse areas including cryptanalysis, optimization, and simulation of quantum physics. Quantum computing devices have recently been demonstrated to experimentally outperform classical computers on a specific sampling task~\cite{arute2019supremacy}. While noise limits the current practical usefulness of quantum computers, they can in principle be made fault tolerant and thus capable of executing a wide variety of algorithms. It is therefore of significant interest to understand quantum algorithms from a theoretical perspective to anticipate future applications. In particular, there has been increasing interest in \emph{quantum machine learning} (see for example the surveys by~\citealt{biamonte2017quantum,schuld2015introduction,arunachalam2017guest,dunjko2018machine}). In this paper, we study best-arm identification in multi-armed bandits, establishing quantum speedup.
\paragraph{Problem setup.}
We work in a standard multi-armed bandit setting~\cite{pac_bandits_evendar_mansour} in which the MAB has $n$ arms, where arm $i \in [n] \coloneqq \{1,\ldots,n\}$ is a Bernoulli random variable taking value $1$ with probability $p_i$ and value $0$ with probability $1-p_i$. Each arm can therefore be regarded as a coin with \emph{bias} $p_i$. As our algorithms and lower bounds are symmetric with respect to the arms, we assume without loss of generality that $p_1\geq\cdots\geq p_n$, and denote $\Delta_i \coloneqq p_1-p_i$ for all $i\in\{2,\ldots,n\}$. We further assume that $p_1>p_2$, i.e., the best arm is unique. Given a parameter $\delta\in(0,1)$, our goal is to use as few queries as possible to determine the best arm with probability $\geq1-\delta$. This is known as the \emph{fixed-confidence setting}. We primarily characterize complexity in terms of the parameter
\begin{equation}
H \coloneqq \,{\sum_{i=2}^n\ \frac{1}{\Delta^2_i}}
\end{equation}
which arises in the analysis of classical MAB algorithms (as discussed below).
We consider a quantum version of best-arm identification in which we can access the arms \emph{coherently}. This means we have access to a quantum oracle $\mathcal{O}$ that acts as
\begin{equation}\label{eq:quantum-bandit-defn}
\begin{aligned}
\mathcal{O}&\colon \ket{i}_I\ket{0}_B\ket{0}_J\\
&\quad\mapsto \ket{i}_I(\sqrt{\vphantom{1-}p_i}\ket{1}_B\ket{v_i}_J+\sqrt{1-p_i}\ket{0}_B\ket{u_i}_J),
\end{aligned}
\end{equation}
where $\ket{v_i}$ and $\ket{u_i}$ are arbitrary states, for all $i\in[n]$. We have used standard Dirac notation which we review in the Preliminaries section. Register $I$ is the ``index'' register with $n$ states that correspond to the $n$ arms. Register $B$ is the single-qubit ``bandit'' register with two states, $\ket{1}$ corresponding to a reward and $\ket{0}$ corresponding to no reward. Register $J$ is a multi-qubit ``junk'' register. For convenience, we omit register labels when this causes no confusion. Compared to pulling an arm classically---which can be implemented by measuring the bandit register---the quantum oracle allows access to different arms in superposition, a necessary feature for quantum speedup. In real-world applications, we usually have junk when instantiating our oracle (see below). When deriving our results however, we will assume there is no junk (i.e., we set $\ket{v_i}=\ket{u_i}=1$ for all $i\in[n]$ in \eq{quantum-bandit-defn}). This is without loss of generality as the algorithm we construct is insensitive to junk.
Previous work on quantum algorithms for clustering~\cite{kerenidis2019qmeans, wiebe2015quantum} and reinforcement learning~\cite{dunjko2016quantum,dunjko2018machine} has discussed how to instantiate $\mathcal{O}$. In clustering, $\mathcal{O}$ is created using the $\SWAP$ test where for each $i$, $p_i$ encodes the distance between some fixed vector and the $i^\text{th}$ vector in some collection. Our algorithm can be used to speed up the algorithms of~\citet{kerenidis2019qmeans} and~\citet{wiebe2015quantum}. In reinforcement learning, $\mathcal{O}$ naturally appears in stochastic agent environments; for instance, $\mathcal{O}$ can be viewed as a special case of the oracle in~\citet{dunjko2016quantum} for a Markov decision problem (MDP) of epoch length $1$ and state set $\{0,1\}$, where the goal of the agent is to reach the state $1$.
As a concrete example, consider a classical Monte Carlo strategy\footnote{This is Monte Carlo tree search without tree expansion.}: at a given position, evaluate the quality of a next move $i$ by uniformly randomly playing out games $x\in X(i)$, where $X(i)$ is the set of valid games from move $i$ onwards, and querying a computer program $f$ that computes a bit $f(i,x)\in\{0,1\}$ indicating if game $x$ is won $(1)$ or lost $(0)$.
In the classical case, we obtain one sample of win or loss using one query to $f$. In the quantum case, we can also instantiate one query to the quantum oracle in Eq.~\eqref{eq:quantum-bandit-defn} using just one query to $f$. To do this, we apply the circuit for $f$, made reversible in the usual way~\cite[Sec.~1.4.1]{nielsen2000book}, on the quantum state corresponding to uniformly random play as follows:
\begin{equation}
\begin{aligned}
&\ket{i}\ket{0}\frac{1}{\sqrt{|X(i)|}}\sum_{x\in X(i)}\ket{x} \\
\overset{f}{\mapsto}&
\ket{i}\sum_{x\in X(i)}\frac{1}{\sqrt{|X(i)|}}\ket{f(i,x)}\ket{x} \\
=&\ket{i}(\sqrt{\vphantom{1-}p_i}\ket{1}\ket{u_i} + \sqrt{1-p_i}\ket{0}\ket{v_i}),
\end{aligned}
\end{equation}
where $\ket{u_i}$ and $\ket{v_i}$ are some states, and $p_i$ is the empirical probability that move $i$ leads to a win. Our quantum algorithm then uses quadratically fewer calls to $f$ compared with classical Monte Carlo search to find the best next move.
We stress that we do not need to know the $p_i$s to instantiate the quantum oracle above. We also remark that our algorithm does not apply to every MAB situation. For example, in clinical trials to identify the best drug, we cannot instantiate the quantum oracle because human participants, unlike computer programs, cannot be queried in superposition.
Our algorithm can also be adapted to work when the reward distributions are promised to have bounded variance (for example, if they are sub-Gaussian). The adaptation essentially follows by replacing amplitude estimation (introduced in the Preliminaries section) with quantum mean estimation~\citep{montanaro2015quantum}, which works on any distribution with bounded variance. We remark that the situation is different for the other main type of bandits: adversarial bandits. Studies on adversarial bandits are mainly focused on regret minimization and a quantum analogue first requires a proper notion of regret which we are unsure how to even define.
\paragraph{Contributions.}
In this paper, we give a comprehensive study of best-arm identification using quantum algorithms. Specifically, we obtain the following main result:
\begin{Theorem}\label{thm:main-confidence}
Given a multi-armed bandit oracle $\mathcal{O}$ and confidence parameter $\delta\in(0,1)$, there exists a quantum algorithm that, with probability $\geq1-\delta$, outputs the best arm using
$\tilde{O}\bigl(\sqrt{H}\bigr)$
queries to $\mathcal{O}$. Moreover, this query complexity is optimal up to poly-logarithmic factors in $n$, $\delta$, and $\Delta_2$.
\end{Theorem}
This represents a quadratic quantum speedup over what is possible classically. The speedup essentially derives from Grover's search algorithm~\cite{grover1996fast}, where a marker oracle is used to approximately ``rotate'' a uniform initial state to the marked state. One way to understand the quadratic speedup is to observe that each rotation step, making one query to the oracle, increases the amplitude of the marked state by $\Omega(1/\sqrt{n})$. This is possible since quantum computation linearly manipulates amplitudes, which are square roots of probabilities.
However, to establish \thm{main-confidence} we use more sophisticated machinery that extends Grover's algorithm, namely variable-time amplitude amplification (VTAA)~\cite{ambainis2012VTAA,childs2015quantum} and estimation (VTAE)~\cite{chakraborty2018power}. We apply VTAA and VTAE on a variable-time quantum algorithm $\A$ that we construct. $\A$ outputs a state with labeled ``good'' and ``bad'' parts. Using that label, VTAA removes the bad part so that only the good part remains, and VTAE estimates the proportion of the good part. In our application, the good part is eventually the best-arm state.
We emphasize that our quantum algorithm, like classical ones~\cite{pac_bandits_evendar_mansour, gabillon2012best, jamieson2014lil, karnin2013almost, mannor2004sample}, does not require any prior knowledge about the $p_i$s.
Given knowledge of $p_1$ and $p_2$, our quantum algorithm is conceptually related to the classical successive elimination (SE) algorithm~\cite{pac_bandits_evendar_mansour}. Namely, we use that knowledge to help eliminate sub-optimal arms $i$ by checking whether $p_i < (p_1+p_2)/2$, say. The quantum quadratic speedup arises because we can check this ``in superposition'' across the different arms. For intuition only, checking in superposition can be thought of as a form of checking in parallel. We stress however that while it does not make sense to compare the parallel (classical) sample complexity of best-arm identification with its usual (classical) sample complexity, it does makes sense to compare the latter with the quantum query complexity. We also stress that the similarity of our quantum algorithm to SE, given knowledge of $p_1$ and $p_2$, ends at the conceptual level. Technically, our algorithm makes the SE concept work by first marking all sub-optimal arms and then rotating towards the unmarked best arm in quantum state space via a careful application of VTAA. This has no classical analogue.
It is classically easy to remove any assumed knowledge of $p_1$ and $p_2$ because classical samples from a multi-armed bandit contain information about their values. Quantumly however, we cannot simply ask our quantum multi-armed bandit to supply \emph{classical} samples as that would prevent interference, eliminating any quantum speedup. Therefore, we need to do something conceptually different in the quantum case. We construct another quantum algorithm whose goal is to estimate both $p_1$ and $p_2$ to precision $\Theta(\Delta_2)$ using $\tilde{O}(\sqrt{H})$ quantum queries. For a given test point $l$, VTAE (roughly) gives us the ability to \emph{count} the number of arms $i$ with $p_i>l$, and thus allows us to perform binary search to find $p_1$ and $p_2$.
\paragraph{Related work.}
Classically, a naive algorithm for best-arm identification is to simply sample each arm the same number of times and output the arm with the best empirical bias~\cite{pac_bandits_evendar_mansour}. This algorithm has complexity $O(\frac{n}{\Delta_2^2}\log(\frac{n}{\delta}))$ but is sub-optimal for most multi-armed bandit instances. Therefore, classical research on best-arm identification~\cite{pac_bandits_evendar_mansour, gabillon2012best, jamieson2014lil, karnin2013almost, mannor2004sample} has primarily focused on proving bounds of the form $\tilde{O}(H)$ (recall that $H \coloneqq \sum_{i=2}^n\frac{1}{\Delta^2_i}$), which can be shown to be almost tight for every instance. The first work to provide an algorithm with such complexity is~\citet{pac_bandits_evendar_mansour}, giving $O(H\log(\frac{n}{\delta}) + \sum_{i=2}^n\Delta^{-2}_i\log(\Delta^{-1}_i))$. This was further improved to $O\bigl(H\log(\frac{1}{\delta}) + \sum_{i=2}^n\Delta^{-2}_i\log\log(\Delta^{-1}_i)\bigr)$
by~\citet{gabillon2012best, jamieson2014lil, karnin2013almost}, which is almost optimal except for the additive term of $\sum_{i=2}^n\Delta^{-2}_i\log\log(\Delta^{-1}_i)$~\cite{mannor2004sample}. More recent work~\cite{chen2015optimal, chen2016towards} has focused on bringing down even this additive term by tightening both the upper and lower bounds, leaving behind a gap only of the order $\sum_{i=2}^n\Delta_i^{-2}\log\log(\min\{n,\Delta^{-1}_i\})$.
Prior work on quantum machine learning has focused primarily on supervised~\cite{lloyd2013quantum,lloyd2013supervised,rebentrost2014QSVM,li2019classification} and unsupervised learning~\cite{lloyd2013supervised,wiebe2015quantum,amin2018quantum,kerenidis2019qmeans}. \citet{dunjko2017advances,dunjko2017exponential,jerbi2019framework} gave quantum algorithms for general reinforcement learning with provable guarantees, but do not consider the best-arm identification problem. The only directly comparable previous work on quantum algorithms for best-arm identification that we are aware of are~\citet{casale2020quantum} and~\citet{wiebe2015quantum}.\footnote{\citet{wiebe2015quantum} is not framed as solving best-arm identification, but is partly concerned with this problem.} By applying Grover's algorithm,~\citet{casale2020quantum} shows that quantum computers can find the best arm with confidence $p_1/ \sum_{i=1}^n p_i$ quadratically faster than classical ones. However,~\citet{casale2020quantum} does not show how to find the best arm with a given \emph{fixed} confidence, which is the standard requirement. In fact, there is a relatively simple quantum algorithm, analogous to the naive classical algorithm, that can achieve arbitrary confidence with quadratic speedup in terms of $n/\Delta_2^2$. This algorithm, which appears in Fig.~3 of~\citet{wiebe2015quantum}, works by using the quantum minimum finding of~\citet{durr1996quantum} on top of quantum amplitude estimation~\cite{amplitude_estimation}. As in the classical case, we show that this simple quantum algorithm is suboptimal for most multi-armed bandit instances. Specifically, we show that a quantum algorithm can achieve quadratic speedup in terms of the parameter $H$.
\section{Preliminaries}
\paragraph{Definitions and notations.}
Quantum computing is naturally formulated in terms of linear algebra.
An $n$-dimensional \emph{quantum state} is a unit vector in the complex Hilbert space $\C^{n}$, i.e., $\vec{x}=(x_{1},\ldots,x_{n})\trans$ such that $\sum_{i=1}^{n}|x_{i}|^{2}=1$. Such a column vector $\vec{x}$ is written in \emph{Dirac notation} as $\ket{x}$ and called a ``ket''. The complex conjugate transpose of $\ket{x}$ is written $\bra{x}$ and called a ``bra'', i.e., $\bra{x} \coloneqq \vec{x}^\dagger$. The reason for the names is because the combination of a bra and a ket is a inner product bracket: $\braket{x|y}\coloneqq \bra{x}\ket{y} = \vec{x}^{\dagger}\vec{y} =\langle x,y\rangle\in \mathbb{C}$.
The \emph{computational basis} of $\C^{n}$ is the set of vectors $\{\vec{e}_{1},\ldots,\vec{e}_{n}\}$, where $\vec{e}_{i}=(0,\ldots,1,\ldots,0)\trans$ is a one-hot column vector with $1$ in the $i^{\text{th}}$ coordinate. In Dirac notation, it is common to reserve symbols $\ket{i} \coloneqq \vec{e}_{i}$ and $\bra{i} \coloneqq \vec{e}_{i}^\dagger = \vec{e}_{i}\trans$. Then, for example, $\ket{x} = \sum_{i=1}^nx_i\ket{i}$ and $\bra{x} = \sum_{i=1}^nx_i^*\bra{i}$.
The \emph{tensor product} of quantum states is their Kronecker product: if $\ket{x}\in\C^{n_{1}}$ and $\ket{y}\in\C^{n_{2}}$, then
\begin{align}
\ket{x}\ket{y} &\coloneqq \ket{x}\otimes\ket{y} \\
&\coloneqq (x_{1}y_{1},x_{1}y_{2},\ldots,x_{n_{1}}y_{n_{2}})\trans\in\C^{n_{1}}\otimes\C^{n_{2}}.
\end{align}
A quantum algorithm is a sequence of unitary matrices, i.e., a linear transformation $U$ such that $U^{\dagger}=U^{-1}$.
For any $p \in [0,1]$, we define the \emph{coin state} in $\C^2$ as
\begin{align}
\ket{\coin{p}} \coloneqq \sqrt{\vphantom{1-}p}\ket{1} + \sqrt{1-p}\ket{0} = (\sqrt{1-p}, \sqrt{\vphantom{1-}p})\trans.
\end{align}
Measuring $\ket{\coin{p}}$ in the computational basis gives $1$ with probability $p$, hence the name.
\paragraph{Quantum multi-arm bandit oracle.} Recall the quantum multi-armed bandit oracle defined in \eq{quantum-bandit-defn}. The arms are accessed in \emph{superposition} by applying the unitary oracle $\mathcal{O}$ on a state $\ket{x}_I\ket{0}_B$ in the joint register of $I$ and $B$. This results in the output quantum state
\begin{align}\label{eq:quantum-mab}
\mathcal{O}\ket{x}_{I}\ket{0}_{B}=\sum_{i=1}^{n}x_{i}\ket{i}_{I}\ket{\coin{p_i}}_B
\end{align}
(recall that we assume there is no junk).
A classical pull of the $i$-th arm can be simulated by choosing $\ket{x}_I = \ket{i}_I$ with $\ket{i}_I\ket{\coin{p_i}}_B$ as the output, and then measuring register $B$ to observe $1$ with probability $p_i$.
In this paper, we mainly focus on \emph{quantum query complexity}, which is defined as the total number of oracle queries. If we have an efficient quantum algorithm for an explicit computational problem in the query complexity setting, then if we are given an explicit circuit realizing the black-box transformation, we will have an efficient quantum algorithm for the problem.
\paragraph{Amplitude amplification and estimation.} Our quantum speed-up can be traced back to \emph{amplitude amplification and estimation}~\cite{amplitude_estimation}. For a classical randomized algorithm for a search problem that returns a correct solution $y$ with probability $p_\mathrm{succ}$, the success probability can be amplified to a constant by $O(1/p_\mathrm{succ})$ repetitions. Let $\A$ be a quantum procedure that outputs a quantum state $\sqrt{p_\mathrm{succ}}\ket{1}\ket{y} + \sqrt{1-p_\mathrm{succ}}\ket{0}\ket{y^\prime}$ for some arbitrary quantum state $\ket{y^\prime}$. Measuring the output state yields the solution $y$ with probability $p_\mathrm{succ}$ just like a classical randomized algorithm. \citet{amplitude_estimation} provided an amplitude amplification procedure that amplifies the amplitude of $\ket{1}\ket{y}$ to a constant with $O(1/\sqrt{p_\mathrm{succ}})$ queries to the quantum procedure $\A$. This effectively provides a randomized algorithm with constant success probability with query complexity $O(t/\sqrt{p_\mathrm{succ}})$ if $\A$ makes $t$ queries to the oracle. The same speed-up can be achieved for the closely related task of estimating $p_\mathrm{succ}$ with \emph{amplitude estimation}.
Amplitude amplification and estimation originates from \emph{Grover's search algorithm.}~\cite{grover1996fast}. The formal statements of Grover's algorithm and amplitude amplification and estimation are postponed to the start of the appendix. We refer the interested reader to the book~\citet{nielsen2000book} on quantum computing for a detailed introduction to basic definitions (Section 3), Grover's algorithm and amplitude amplification (Section 6), and related topics.
\paragraph{Variable-time amplitude amplification and estimation.} \emph{Variable-time amplitude amplification} (VTAA) and \emph{estimation} (VTAE) are procedures that apply on top of so-called variable-time quantum algorithms that may stop at different (variable) time steps with certain probabilities. More precisely, for $t = (t_1, t_2, \cdots, t_m)\in\mathbb{R}^m$ and $w = (w_1, w_2, \cdots, w_m)\in\mathbb{R}^m$, a $(t,w)$-variable-time algorithm $\A$ is one that can be divided into $m$ steps (i.e., $\A = \A_m\cdots\A_1$) where $t_j$ is the query complexity of $\A_j\cdots\A_1$ and $w_j$ is the probability of stopping at step $j$. We have:
\begin{Theorem}[Informal: Variable-time amplitude amplification and estimation--\citealp{ambainis2012VTAA,childs2015quantum, chakraborty2018power}]
\label{thm:vtaa_vtae}
Given a $(t,w)$-variable-time quantum algorithm $\A = \A_m \cdots \A_1$ with success probability $p_\mathrm{succ}$, there exists a quantum algorithm $\A^\prime$ that uses $O(Q)$ queries to output the solution with probability $\geq \frac{1}{2}$, where
\begin{equation}~\label{eq:vtaa_complexity_main}
Q \coloneqq t_m \log(t_m) + \frac{t_{\mathrm{avg}}}{\sqrt{\psucc}}\log(t_m).
\end{equation}
with $t_\mathrm{avg} \coloneqq \sqrt{\textstyle\sum_{j=1}^m w_j t_j^2}$ being the root-mean-square average query complexity of $\A$.
There also exists a quantum algorithm that uses $O(\frac{Q}{\epsilon}\log^2 (t_m)\log\log(\frac{t_m}{\delta}))$ queries to estimate $\psucc$ with multiplicative error $\epsilon$ with probability $\geq1-\delta$.
\end{Theorem}
For comparison, recall that applying amplitude amplification and estimation procedures on general quantum algorithms requires $O(t_m/\sqrt{p_\mathrm{succ}})$ queries. See the first section of the appendix for a rigorous definition of variable-time algorithms and formal statements of the query complexities of variable-time amplitude amplification and estimation.
\section{Fast Quantum Algorithm For Best-arm Identification}\label{sec:BAI}
In this section, we construct a quantum algorithm for best-arm identification and analyze its performance. Specifically:
\begin{Theorem}\label{thm:quantum-BAI-confidence}
Given a multi-armed bandit oracle $\mathcal{O}$ and confidence parameter $\delta\in(0,1)$, there exists a quantum algorithm that outputs the best arm with probability $\geq 1-\delta$ using $\tilde{O}(\sqrt{H})$ queries to $\mathcal{O}$.
\end{Theorem}
Throughout this section, the oracle $\mathcal{O}$ is fixed, so we may omit explicit reference to it. All $\log$s have base $2$.
There are essentially two steps in our construction. In the first step, we construct two subroutines $\Amplify$ and $\Estimate$ using VTAA and VTAE, respectively, on a variable-time quantum algorithm $\mathcal{A}$. Roughly speaking, given $l\in [0,1]$, $\Amplify$ outputs an arm index $i$ randomly chosen from those $i$ with $p_i>l$ while $\Estimate$ counts the number of such $i$s. This means that if we knew the values of $p_1$ and $p_2$, we could take $l$ to be $(p_1+p_2)/2$, then $\Amplify$ would output the best arm. But we can use $\Estimate$ in a binary search procedure to estimate $p_1$ and $p_2$. This is exactly what we do in the second step and so we are done.
We now discuss the construction more precisely. $\Amplify$ and $\Estimate$ actually use two thresholds $l_2$, $l_1\in [0,1]$ with $l_2<l_1$ instead of a single threshold $l$. In the first step, we construct a variable-time quantum algorithm denoted $\A$ (\algo{vtalgo}) that is initialized in a uniform superposition state $\ket{u} \coloneqq \frac{1}{\sqrt{n}}\sum_{i \in [n]}\ket{i}$ (since initially we have no information about which arm is the best). Given an input interval $I=[l_2,l_1]$, $\A$ ``flags'' arm indices in $\Sright' \coloneqq \{i \in [n]: p_i \geq l_1\}$ with a bit $f=1$ and those in
$\Sleft' \coloneqq \{i \in [n]: p_i \leq l_2\}$ with a bit $f=0$. The flag bit $f$ is written to a separate flag register $F$, so that the state (approximately) becomes $\frac{1}{\sqrt{n}}\bigl(\sum_{i\in \Sright'}\ket{i}\ket{1}_F + \sum_{i\in \Sleft'}\ket{i}\ket{0}_F + \sum_{i\in \Smiddle'}\ket{i}\ket{\psi_i}_F\bigr)$ for some states $\ket{\psi_i}\in\C^2$, where $\Smiddle' \coloneqq [n] - (\Sleft'\cup\Sright') = \{i \in [n]: l_2<p_i<l_1\}$. The flag bit $f$ stored in the $F$ register indicates whether VTAA (resp.\ VTAE), when applied on $\A$, should ($f=1$) or should not ($f=0$) amplify (resp.\ estimate) that part of the state. We then apply VTAA and VTAE on $\A$ to construct $\Amplify$ and $\Estimate$, respectively. $\Amplify$ produces a uniform superposition of all those $i$s with $F$ register in $\ket{1}$, i.e., it amplifies such $i$s relative to the others. $\Estimate$ counts the number of such $i$s. More precisely, $\Estimate$ (approximately) counts the number of indices in $\Sright'$, as their $F$ register is in $\ket{1}$, plus some (unknown) fraction of indices in $\Smiddle'$ as dictated by the fraction of $\ket{1}$ in the (unknown) states $\ket{\psi_i}$.
In the second step, we use $\Estimate$ as a subroutine in $\Locate$ (\algo{locate}) to find a interval $[l_2,l_1]$ such that $p_2 < l_2 < l_1 < p_1$ and that $|l_1 - l_2| \geq \Delta_2/4$. Then, running $\Amplify$ with these $l_2,l_1$ in $\BestArm$ (\algo{bestarm}) gives the state $\ket{1}$ containing the best-arm index because only $p_1$ is to the right of $l_2$. $\Locate$ is a type of binary search that counts the number of indices in $\Sright'$ using $\Estimate$. There is a technical difficulty here because $\Estimate$ actually counts the number of indices in $\Sright'$ plus some fraction of indices in $\Smiddle'$. Trying to fix this by simply setting $l_2=l_1$, so that $\Smiddle' = \emptyset$, does not work as it would increase the cost of $\Estimate$. We overcome this difficulty via the $\Shrink$ subroutine (\algo{shrink}) of $\Locate$, which employs a technique from recent work on quantum ground state preparation~\cite{lintong}. See \fig{flowchart} for an illustration of the overall structure of the algorithm.
\begin{figure}[htbp]
\centering
\scalebox{0.65}{
{\tikzset
>={Latex[width=2mm,length=2mm]},
base/.style = {rectangle, rounded corners, draw=black,
minimum width=4cm, minimum height=1cm,
text centered, font=\sffamily},
result/.style = {base, fill=green!30},
new/.style = {base, fill=blue!15},
old/.style = {base, minimum width=2.5cm, fill=yellow!30},
}
\begin{tikzpicture}[node distance=2cm,
every node/.style={fill=white, font=\sffamily, scale=1.07}, align=center]
\draw [rounded corners] (-9.5,-1) rectangle node[pos=0.25]{Quantum best-arm\\ identification (Alg.~\ref{algo:bestarm})} (2.6,2.7);
\node (A-known-p) [result] {Amplify (best) arm $i$ ($=1$)\\
with $p_i > p_2+\Delta_2/4$ (Alg.~\ref{algo:vtalgo})};
\node (locate) [new, above = 0.7 cm of A-known-p] {Estimate $p_1$ \\and $\Delta_2 = p_1-p_2$ (Alg.~\ref{algo:locate})};
\node (shrink) [new, left = 2.5 cm of locate] {Shrink confidence interval \\ for $p_1$, $p_2$ via VTAE (Alg.~\ref{algo:shrink})};
\draw[->] (locate) -- (A-known-p);
\draw[->] (shrink) -- node {subroutine} (locate);
\end{tikzpicture}}}
\caption{Overview of our best-arm identification algorithm.}
\label{fig:flowchart}
\end{figure}
\subsection{$\Amplify$ and $\Estimate$}\label{sec:step_one}
We first construct a variable-time quantum algorithm (\algo{vtalgo}) that we call $\A$ throughout. $\A$ uses the following registers: input register $I$; bandit register $B$; clock register $C=(C_1,\ldots, C_{m+1})$, where each $C_i$ is a qubit; ancillary amplitude estimation register $P=(P_1,\ldots, P_m)$, where each $P_i$ has $O(m)$ qubits; and flag register $F$. We set $m \coloneqq \ceil{\log(1/(l_1-l_2))}+2$ as assigned in \algo{vtalgo}.
$\A$ is indeed a variable-time quantum algorithm according to \defn{variable_time_algorithm}. This is because we can write $\A = \A_{m+1}\A_{m}\cdots\A_{1}\A_{0}$ as a product of $m+2$ sub-algorithms, where $\A_0$ is the initialization step (\lin{vtalgo_initial}), $\A_j$ consists of the operations in iteration $j$ of the for loop (Lines~\ref{lin:vtalgo_forloop1}--\ref{lin:vtalgo_forloop4}) for $j\in [m]$, and $\A_{m+1}$ is the termination step (Lines~\ref{lin:vtalgo_terminate1}--\ref{lin:vtalgo_terminate2}). The state spaces $\H_C$ and $\H_A$ in \defn{variable_time_algorithm} correspond to the state spaces of the $C$ register and the remaining registers of $\A$, respectively. $\A_{m+1}$ ensures that Condition \ref{it:vtqa_final} of \defn{variable_time_algorithm} is satisfied.
\begin{algorithm}[htbp]
\KwInput{Oracle $\mathcal{O}$ as in \eq{quantum-bandit-defn}; $0 < l_2 < l_1 < 1$; approximation parameter $0<\alpha<1$.}
$\Delta \leftarrow l_1-l_2$
$m \leftarrow \ceil{\log \frac{1}{\Delta}}+2$
$a \leftarrow \frac{\alpha}{2mn^{3/2}}$
Initialize state to $\frac{1}{\sqrt{n}}\sum_{i=1}^n{\ket{i}}_I\ket{\coin p_i}_B\ket{0}_C\ket{0}_P\ket{1}_F$\label{lin:vtalgo_initial}
\For{$j = 1, \ldots, m$\label{lin:vtalgo_forloop}}{
$\epsilon_j \leftarrow 2^{-j}$\label{lin:vtalgo_forloop1}
\If{register $I$ is in state $\ket{i}$ and registers $C_1,\ldots, C_{j-1}$ are in state $\ket{0}$}{
Apply $\GAE(\epsilon_j,a; l_1)$ with $\mathcal{O}_{p_i}$ on registers $B$, $C_j$, and $P_j$\label{lin:vtalgo_gae}
}
Apply controlled-$\NOT$ gate with control on register $C_j$ and target on register $F$\label{lin:vtalgo_forloop4}
}
\If{registers $C_1,\ldots, C_{m}$ are in state $\ket{0}$\label{lin:vtalgo_terminate1}}{
Flip the bit stored in register $C_{m+1}$\label{lin:vtalgo_terminate2}}
\caption{$\A(\mathcal{O},l_2,l_1,\alpha)$}
\label{algo:vtalgo}
\end{algorithm}
With $\Delta := l_1-l_2$ being the length of $[l_2,l_1]$, we define the following three sets that partition $[n]$:
\begin{align}
\Sleft &\coloneqq \{i \in [n]: \,p_i < l_1 - \Delta/2\}\label{eq:Sleft},
\\
\Smiddle &\coloneqq \{i \in [n]: \, l_1-\Delta/2\leq p_i
<l_1-\Delta/8\}\label{eq:Smiddle},
\\
\Sright &\coloneqq \{i \in [n]: \,p_i \geq l_1 - \Delta/8\}\label{eq:Sright}.
\end{align}
These sets play the roles of aforementioned $\Sleft'$, $\Smiddle'$, and $\Sright'$.
They can be regarded as functions of (the input to) $\A$. For later convenience, we also define $S_{\mathrm{lm}}\coloneqq\Sleft \cup \Smiddle$ and $S_{\mathrm{mr}}\coloneqq\Smiddle \cup \Sright$.
\begin{Lemma}[Correctness of $\A$]\label{lem:vtalgo_correctness}
Let $\psucc$ denote the success probability $\A$. Then $\abs{\psucc-\psucc'}\leq \frac{2\alpha}{n}$ where $\psucc' = \frac{1}{n}\bigl(\abs{\Sright}+\sum_{i \in \Smiddle}\abs{\beta_{i,1}}^2\bigr)$ for some $\abs{\beta_{i,1}}^2\in [0,1]$.
\end{Lemma}
At a high level, at iteration $j$, \lin{vtalgo_gae} approximately identifies those $i\in \Sleft$ with $p_i \in [l_1-2\epsilon_j,l_1-\epsilon_j)$ and stops computation on these $i$s by setting their associated $C$ registers to $\ket{1}$. \lin{vtalgo_forloop4} then flags these $i$s by setting their associated $F$ registers to $\ket{0}$, indicating failure. We defer the detailed proof to the supplementary material which is mainly concerned with bounding the error in the aforementioned approximation, as well as the lemma as follows.
\begin{Lemma}[Complexity of $\A$]\label{lem:vtalgo_complexity}
With $\Delta = l_1 - l_2$ being the length of the interval,
we have:
\begin{enumerate}[nosep]
\item The $j^\text{th}$ stopping time $t_j$ of $\A_j\A_{j-1}\cdots \A_{0}$ is of order $\sum_{k=1}^j\frac{1}{\epsilon_k}\log\frac{1}{a} \leq 2^{j+1}\log\frac{1}{a}$. In particular, $t_{m+1}=O(\frac{1}{\Delta}\log\frac{1}{a})$.
\item The average stopping time squared, $t_{\mathrm{avg}}^2$, is of order
\begin{equation}\label{eq:t_avg}
\frac{1}{n}\biggl(\frac{\abs{\Sright}}{\Delta^2} + \sum_{i\in S_{\mathrm{lm}}} \frac{1}{(l_1-p_i)^2}\bigg) \log^2\Bigl(\frac{1}{a}\Bigr).
\end{equation}
\end{enumerate}
\end{Lemma}
Now we fix algorithm $\mathcal{A}$ and its input parameters. We always assume that $\abs{\Sright}\geq1$, which we need for some of the following results to hold. This is without loss of generality as we can always add an artificial arm $0$ with bias $p_0=1$ to the bandit oracle $\mathcal{O}$, as we do in \lin{shrink_append} of \algo{shrink}.
We apply VTAA and VTAE (\thm{vtaa_vtae})\footnote{The state spaces $\H_C$, $\H_F$, and $\H_W$ correspond to the state spaces of the $C$, $F$, and remaining registers of $\A$, respectively.} on our variable-time quantum algorithm $\A$ to prepare the state $\ket{\psi_{\textrm{succ}}}$ and to estimate the probability $\psucc$, respectively. This gives two new algorithms $\Amplify$ and $\Estimate$ with the following performance guarantees.
\begin{Lemma}[Correctness and complexity of $\Amplify(\A, \delta)$, $\Estimate(\A,\epsilon,\delta)$]~\label{lem:vtaa_vtae_on_vtalgo}
Let $\A = \A(\mathcal{O},l_2,l_1,0.01\delta)$.
Then $\Amplify(\A, \delta)$ uses $O(Q)$ queries to output an index $i\in S_{\mathrm{mr}}$ with probability $\geq 1-\delta$, and $\Estimate(\A, \epsilon, \delta)$ uses $O(Q/\epsilon)$ queries to output an estimate $r$ of $\psucc'$ (defined in \lem{vtalgo_correctness}) such that
\begin{equation}~\label{eq:vtae_estimate_quality}
(1-\epsilon)\Bigl(\psucc'-\frac{0.1}{n}\Bigr) < r < (1+\epsilon)\Bigl(\psucc' + \frac{0.1}{n}\Bigr)
\end{equation}
with probability $\geq 1-\delta$,
where $Q$ is
\begin{equation}\label{eq:coarse_vtaa_query_general}
\biggl(\frac{1}{\Delta^2} + \frac{1}{\abs{\Sright}}\sum_{S_{\mathrm{lm}}} \frac{1}{(l_1-p_i)^2}\biggr)\,
\poly\Bigl(\log\Bigl(\frac{n}{\delta \Delta}\Bigr)\Bigr),
\end{equation}
where $\Delta = l_1 - l_2$.
\end{Lemma}
This lemma follows by applying \lem{vtalgo_correctness} and \lem{vtalgo_complexity} to \thm{vtaa_vtae}. The proof detail is given in the appendices.
\subsection{Quantum algorithm for best-arm identification}\label{sec:step_three}
In this subsection, we use $\Amplify$ and $\Estimate$ to construct three algorithms (Algorithms~\ref{algo:locate}--\ref{algo:bestarm}) that work together to identify the best arm following the outline that we described at the beginning of this section.
\begin{algorithm}[htbp]
\KwInput{Oracle $\mathcal{O}$ as in \eq{quantum-bandit-defn}; confidence parameter $0<\delta<1$.}
$I_1, I_2 \leftarrow [0,1]$
$\delta \leftarrow \delta / 8$
\While{$\min I_1 - \max I_2 < 2\abs{I_1}$\label{lin:locate_while}}{
$I_1 \leftarrow \Shrink(\mathcal{O},1, I_1, \delta)$
$I_2 \leftarrow \Shrink(\mathcal{O},2, I_2, \delta)$
$\delta \leftarrow \delta/2$\label{lin:locate_delta_halve}
}
\Return{$I_1, I_2$}
\caption{$\Locate(\mathcal{O},\delta)$}
\label{algo:locate}
\end{algorithm}
\begin{algorithm}[ht]
\KwInput{Oracle $\mathcal{O}$ as in \eq{quantum-bandit-defn}; $k \in \{1,2\}$;
interval $I=[a,b]$; confidence parameter $0<\delta<1$.}
$\epsilon\leftarrow (b-a)/5$
$\delta\leftarrow \delta/2$
Append arm $i=0$ with bias $p_0=1$ to $\mathcal{O}$; call the resulting oracle $\mathcal{O}'$\label{lin:shrink_append}
Construct variable-time quantum algorithms $\A_1,\A_2$:
\quad $\A_1 \leftarrow \A(\mathcal{O}', l_2 = a+\epsilon, l_1 = a+3\epsilon, 0.01\delta)$\label{lin:shrink_vtalgo1}
\quad $\A_2 \leftarrow \A(\mathcal{O}', l_2 = a+2\epsilon, l_1 = a+4\epsilon, 0.01\delta)$\label{lin:shrink_vtalgo2}
$r_1 \leftarrow \Estimate(\A_1, \epsilon = 0.1, \delta)$\label{lin:shrink_estimate1}
$r_2 \leftarrow \Estimate(\A_2, \epsilon = 0.1, \delta)$\label{lin:shrink_estimate2}
$B_1\leftarrow \mathds{1}({r_1 > \frac{k+0.5}{n+1}})$; $B_2\leftarrow \mathds{1}({r_2 > \frac{k+0.5}{n+1}})$
\Switch{$(B_1,B_2)$}
{
\textbf{case} \ $(0,0): I \leftarrow [a, a+3\epsilon]$\label{lin:shrink_switch_case1}
\textbf{case} \ $(0,1): I \leftarrow [a+\epsilon, a+4\epsilon]$
\textbf{case} \ $(1,0): I\leftarrow [a+\epsilon, a+4\epsilon]$
\textbf{case} \ $(1,1): I \leftarrow [a+2\epsilon, a+5\epsilon = b]$\label{lin:shrink_switch_case4}
}
\textbf{return} \ $I$
\caption{$\Shrink(\mathcal{O},k,I,\delta)$}
\label{algo:shrink}
\end{algorithm}
\begin{algorithm}[ht]
\KwInput{Oracle $\mathcal{O}$ as in \eq{quantum-bandit-defn}; confidence parameter $0<\delta<1$.}
$\delta \leftarrow \delta/2$\label{lin:bestarm_delta}
$I_1,I_2 \leftarrow \Locate(\mathcal{O},\delta)$\label{lin:bestarm_locate}
$l_1 \leftarrow \min I_1$ (left endpoint of $I_1$)\label{lin:bestarm_l1}
$l_2 \leftarrow \max I_2$ (right endpoint of $I_2$)\label{lin:bestarm_l2}
Construct variable-time quantum algorithm $\A$:
\quad $\A \leftarrow \A(\mathcal{O}, l_2, l_1, 0.01\delta)$
\label{lin:bestarm_vtalgo}
$i \leftarrow \Amplify(\A, \delta)$
\Return{i}
\caption{$\BestArm(\mathcal{O},\delta)$}
\label{algo:bestarm}
\end{algorithm}
We state the correctness and complexities of $\Amplify$ and $\Estimate$ as follows:
\begin{Lemma}[Correctness and complexity of \algo{locate}]\label{lem:locate}
Fix a confidence parameter $0<\delta<1$. Then the event $E = \{p_1\in I_1 \text{ and } p_2\in I_2 \text{ in all iterations of the while loop}\}$ holds with probability $\geq1-\delta$. When $E$ holds, \algo{locate} also satisfies the following for both $k\in\{1,2\}$:
\begin{enumerate}[nosep]
\item its while loop (\lin{locate_while}) breaks at or before the end of iteration $\ceil{\log_{5/3}(\frac{1}{\Delta_2})}+3$ and then returns $I_k$ with $p_k\in I_k$ and $\min I_1 - \max I_2 \geq 2\abs{I_1}$; during the while loop, we always have $\abs{I_1} = \abs{I_2} \geq \Delta_2/8$; and
\item it uses
$O\bigl(\sqrt{H} \, \poly\bigl(\log\bigl(\frac{n}{\delta \,\Delta_2}\bigr)\bigr)\bigr)$ queries.
\end{enumerate}
\end{Lemma}
\begin{Lemma}[Correctness and complexity of \algo{shrink}]
\label{lem:shrink}
Fix $k\in\{1,2\}$, an interval $I = [a,b]$, and a confidence parameter $0<\delta<1$. Suppose that $p_k\in I$ and $\abs{I} \geq \Delta_2/8$. Then \algo{shrink}
\begin{enumerate}[nosep]
\item outputs an interval $J$ with $|J| = \frac{3}{5}\abs{I}$ such that $p_k\in J$ with probability $\geq 1-\delta$, and
\item uses $O\bigl(\sqrt{H} \, \poly\bigl(\log\bigl(\frac{n}{\delta \,\Delta_2}\bigr)\bigr)\bigr)$ queries.
\end{enumerate}
\end{Lemma}
The proofs of \lem{locate} and \lem{shrink} appear in the supplementary material.
The following theorem is equivalent to \thm{quantum-BAI-confidence}.
\begin{Theorem}[Correctness and complexity of \algo{bestarm}]\label{thm:bestarm}
Fix a confidence parameter $0<\delta<1$. Then, with probability $\geq1-\delta$, \algo{bestarm}
\begin{enumerate}[nosep]
\item outputs the best arm, and
\item uses $O\bigl(\sqrt{H}\,\poly\bigl(\log\bigl(\frac{n}{\delta \,\Delta_2}\bigr)\bigr)\bigr)$ queries.
\end{enumerate}
\end{Theorem}
\begin{proof}
Note that $\delta$ is halved at the beginning, on \lin{bestarm_delta}. For the first claim, we know from the first claim of \lem{locate} that, with probability $\geq1-\delta/2$, the two intervals $I_k$ assigned in \lin{bestarm_locate} have $\min I_1 - \max I_2 \geq 2\abs{I_1} \geq \Delta_2/4$
and $p_k\in I_k$. Assuming this holds, we have $p_2<l_2<l_2+\Delta_2/4 \leq l_1<p_1$ for the endpoints $l_k$ assigned in Lines~\ref{lin:bestarm_l1} and \ref{lin:bestarm_l2}. This means that the variable-time quantum algorithm $\A$ defined in \lin{bestarm_vtalgo} has $\Sright\cup\Smiddle=\{1\}$, so $\Amplify(\A,\delta/2)$ returns index $1$ with probability $\geq1-\delta/2$. Therefore, the overall probability of \algo{bestarm} returning the best arm is at least $1-\delta$.
The second claim follows immediately from adding the complexity of $\Locate(\mathcal{O},\delta/2)$ (\lem{locate}) and $\Amplify(\A,\delta/2)$ (\lem{vtaa_vtae_on_vtalgo}, using $l_1-l_2\geq\Delta_2/4$).
\end{proof}
By establishing \thm{bestarm}, we have established \thm{quantum-BAI-confidence}, our main claim.
As discussed previously, the main complexity measure of interest in the classical case is $H$, and we see that we get a quadratic speedup in terms of this parameter.
We can see that the poly-logarithmic factor has degree about $6$ from \eq{detailed_vtaa_query_general}, \eq{detailed_vtae_query_general}, and \eq{bestarm_complexity}. It would be interesting to reduce this degree. A more fundamental challenge is to remove the variable $n$ that appears in our log factors. In the classical case, $n$ was already removed from log factors in early work~\cite{pac_bandits_evendar_mansour} by a procedure called ``median elimination''.
However, quantizing the median elimination framework is nontrivial, as the query complexity for outputting the $n/2$ smallest items among $n$ elements is $\Theta(n)$~\cite[Theorem 1]{ambainis2010new}, exceeding our budget of $O(\sqrt{n})$.
As corollaries of our main results in the fixed-confidence setting, we provide results on best-arm identification in the PAC (Probably Approximately Correct) and fixed-budget settings. In the $(\epsilon,\delta)$-PAC setting, the goal is to identify an arm $i$ with $ p_i \geq p_1 - \epsilon$ with probability $\geq1-\delta$. Our best-arm identification algorithm can be modified to work in this setting as well. More precisely, we can modify $\Locate$ (\algo{locate}) by adding a breaking condition to the while loop when $|I_1|$ (or equivalently $|I_2|$) is smaller than $\epsilon$. This gives the following result:
\begin{Corollary}
There is a quantum algorithm that finds an $\epsilon$-optimal arm with query complexity
$O\bigl(\sqrt{\min\{\frac{n}{\epsilon^2},H\}}\cdot \poly\bigl(\log\bigl(\frac{n}{\delta \,\Delta_2}\bigr)\bigr)\bigr)$.
\end{Corollary}
Note that our modification means that the $\Amplify$ step in \algo{bestarm} takes an input interval $I$ with $|I| = l_1 - l_2\in[\epsilon/2, \epsilon]$. The correctness and complexity follow directly from \lem{vtalgo_correctness} and \lem{vtaa_vtae_on_vtalgo}. For comparison,~\citet{pac_bandits_evendar_mansour} gave a classical PAC algorithm with complexity $O\bigl(\frac{n}{\epsilon^2}\log\bigl(\frac{n}{\delta}\bigr)\bigr)$, which was later improved to $O\bigl(\sum_{i=1}^n\min\{\epsilon^{-2},\Delta_i^{-2}\}\cdot\log\bigl(\frac{n}{\delta\Delta_2}\bigr)\bigr)$ by~\citet{gabillon2012best}.
In the supplementary material, we also show how to identify the best arm with high probability for a fixed number of total queries (the fixed-budget setting) given knowledge of $H$.
\section{Quantum lower bound}\label{sec:quantum-lower}
In this section, we describe a lower bound for the quantum best-arm identification problem. Our lower bound shows that the algorithm of \thm{quantum-BAI-confidence} is optimal up to poly-logarithmic factors.
\begin{restatable}{Theorem}{quantumlower}\label{thm:quantum-BAI-confidence-lower}
Let $p\in (0,1/2)$. For any biases $p_i \in [p,1-p]$, any quantum algorithm that identifies the best arm requires $\Omega(\sqrt{H})$ queries to the multi-armed bandit oracle $\mathcal{O}$.
\end{restatable}
To prove this lower bound, we use the quantum adversary method to show quantum hardness of distinguishing $n$ oracles $\mathcal{O}_x$, $x\in [n]$, corresponding to the following $n$ bandits. In the $1^\text{st}$ bandit, we assign bias $p_i$ to arm $i$ for all $i$. In the $x^\text{th}$ bandit for $x\in\{2,\ldots,n\}$, we assign bias $p_1+\eta$ to arm $x$ and $p_i$ to arm $i$ for all $i\neq x$, where $\eta$ is an appropriately chosen parameter. This hard set of bandits is inspired by the proof of a corresponding classical lower bound~\cite[Theorem 5]{mannor2004sample}.
More precisely, for a positive integer $T$, consider an arbitrary $T$-query quantum algorithm that distinguishes the oracles $\mathcal{O}_x$. The main idea of the adversary method is to keep track of certain quantities $s_k\in \mathbb{R}$ where $k\in \{0,1,\dots, T\}$. For each $k$, $s_k$ quantifies how close the states of the quantum algorithm are when it operates using $k$ queries to the different $\mathcal{O}_x$. At the start, when $k=0$, $s_0$ must be large because when no queries have been made, the states must be close. At the end, when $k=T$, $s_T$ must be small because the states are distinguishable by assumption.
The key point is that we can also bound how much $s_k$ can change in one query, that is we can bound the quantities $\abs{s_{k+1}-s_k}$ for each $k$. Of course, this bound immediately gives a lower bound on $T$, the number of queries it takes to go from $s_0$ (large) to $s_T$ (small). To bound $\abs{s_{k+1}-s_k}$, the key point is to bound the distance between oracles, i.e. matrices, $\mathcal{O}_x$ and $\mathcal{O}_y$ for different $x,y\in [n]$.
We defer the full proof and full description of the quantum adversary method to the supplementary material.
\section{Conclusions}
In this paper, we propose a quantum algorithm for identifying the best arm of a multi-armed bandit, which gives a quadratic speedup compared to the best possible classical result. We also prove a matching quantum lower bound (up to poly-logarithmic factors).
This work leaves several natural open questions:
\begin{itemize}
\item Can we give fast quantum algorithms for the exploitation of multi-armed bandits? In particular, can we give online algorithms with favorable regret? The quantum hedging algorithm~\cite{hamoudi2020hedging} and the quantum boosting algorithm~\cite{arunachalam2020boosting} might be relevant to this challenge.
\item Can we give fast quantum algorithms for other types of multi-armed bandits, such as contextual bandits or adversarial bandits (e.g., \citealt{beygelzimer2011contextual, agarwal2014taming,auer2002nonstochastic})?
\item Can we give fast quantum algorithms for finding a near-optimal policy of a Markov decision process (MDP)? MDPs are a natural generalization of MABs, where the goal is to maximize the expected reward over sequences of decisions. \citet{pac_bandits_evendar_mansour} gave a reduction from this problem to best-arm identification by viewing the Q-function of each state as a multi-armed bandit.
\end{itemize}
\section{Ethics Statement}
This work is purely theoretical. Researchers working on theoretical aspects of bandits and quantum computing may immediately benefit from our results. In the long term, once fault-tolerant quantum computers have been built, our results may find practical applications in multi-armed bandit scenarios arising in the real world. As far as we are aware, our work does not have negative ethical impact.
\section{Acknowledgements}
DW thanks Robin Kothari, Jin-Peng Liu, Yuan Su, and Aarthi Sundaram for helpful discussions. This work received support from the Army Research Office (W911NF-17-1-0433 and W911NF-20-1-0015); the National Science Foundation (CCF-1755800, CCF-1813814, and PHY-1818914); and the U.S.\ Department of Energy, Office of Science, Office of Advanced Scientific Computing Research, Quantum Algorithms Teams and Accelerated Research in Quantum Computing programs. DW and TL were also supported by QISE-NET Triplet Awards (NSF grant DMR-1747426) and TL by an IBM PhD Fellowship.
\newcommand{\arxiv}[1]{
\href{https://arxiv.org/abs/#1}{\ttfamily{arXiv:#1}}\?}\newcommand{\arXiv}[1]{
\href{https://arxiv.org/abs/#1}{\ttfamily{arXiv:#1}}\?}\def\?#1{\if.#1{}\else#1\fi}
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"redpajama_set_name": "RedPajamaC4"
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\section{Introduction}
\label{intro}
Our understanding of extra-solar planetary systems has grown significantly since the first exoplanet was discovered in 1995 \cite{Mayor1995}. One major aspect of this field, is the analysis, exploration, and modelling of planetary atmospheres; all of which require a careful treatment of opacities. For example, atmospheric spectroscopy makes use of wavelength-dependent opacities to determine the chemical constituents present in the observable part of the atmosphere of exoplanets. Projects such as \textit{ExoMol}\footnote{https://www.exomol.com} \cite{Tennyson2016}, \textit{HITRAN}\footnote{https://hitran.org/} \cite{Gordon2017}, \textit{HITEMP}\footnote{https://hitran.org/hitemp/} \cite{Rothman2010}, which are dedicated to generating line-lists for spectroscopy, have facilitated our aim of understanding the atmospheric properties of other worlds \cite{Tsiaras_2018,Tsiaras2019,Edwards2020,Skaf2020,Pluriel2020,Guilluy2021,Mugnai2021,Giacobbe2021,Changeat_2021}. In contrast, when theoretically modelling an exoplanetary atmosphere, opacities are often used to estimate the global temperature profile and the location of the radiative-convective boundary. This approach can work with wavelength-dependent or wavelength-averaged opacities, in which the former is generally accepted to be a more rigorous and accurate representation of real systems than the latter.
Although the aforementioned projects primarily focus on line-lists, they can be converted into opacity tables \cite{Yurchenko2018} that can be more straightforward to operate with; \textit{ExoMol} \cite{Chubb2021} and \textit{DACE}\footnote{https://dace.unige.ch/opacityDatabase/} (Data and Analysis Center for Exoplanets) \cite{Grimm2021} provide such conversions. Whereas wavelength-dependent opacities can be used in theoretical models, they require computationally-intensive simulations \cite{Pluriel2020,Fortney2007,Nettelmann2011,Petralia2020}; it is, therefore, common to rely on Rosseland and Planck mean opacities (shortened to RM for the former, PM for the latter, and RPM when referring to both) that only depend on the temperature and pressure of the system. The use of RPMs has several benefits that include (1) their wavelength independence makes them simpler and faster to use, (2) they can be implemented in Grey and semi-Grey models to provide a reasonable estimation of the temperature structure of astrophysical and planetary environments, and (3) such modelling can provide exact solutions.
Whereas we do not explore Grey and semi-Grey approaches in this paper, it is pertinent to discuss them because they are widely used in various academic fields, and they make use of RPMs. Grey and semi-Grey models are approximate analytical solutions to the radiative transfer analyses of gaseous environments, which are defined as using either one (the infrared) or two (the infrared and visible) wavelength-averaged opacities, respectively. In atmospheric sciences, such approaches were popularised by Sir Arthur Eddington \cite{Eddington1916} and then expanded upon by various others \cite{Chandrasekhar1935,King1955,King1956,Chandrasekhar1960,Matsui1986,Weaver1995,Pujol2003,Hubeny2003,Chevallier2007,Hansen2008,Burrows2010,Guillot2010,Shaviv2011}. A rigorous comparison of the Grey and semi-Grey models available in the literature has previously been done \cite{Parmentier2014}, so it will not be explored in this study. With the recent launch of the \textit{JWST} \cite{Greene2016} on December 24th 2021, and several upcoming astronomical missions like \textit{Ariel} \cite{Tinetti2018,Tinetti2021} and \textit{Twinkle} \cite{Edwards2019}, there is a strong motivation for further exploring extra-solar planetary atmospheres. We also recognise that grey and semi-grey approaches may also be used in planetary formation models \cite{Pollack1985,Henning1995,Henning1996} and engineering \cite{Viskanta1987,Moreno1991,Wang2014}.
Despite the advantages of Grey and semi-Grey approaches, RPM data are not commonly produced. This has motivated some researchers to assume constant values \cite{Guillot2010}, or adopt simple analytic approximations \cite{Kurosaki2014}. In light of this problem, we present \texttt{RAPOC}, a Python program that converts the readily available wavelength-dependent opacities into RPMs.
\textit{Caveat -- }the \texttt{RAPOC}\ code is not a replacement for more rigorous radiative transfer approaches\cite{Fortney2007,Nettelmann2011,Petralia2020,Pluriel2020}. Instead, it is built to provide pressure and temperature-dependent RPMs in a spectral range of choice so that Grey and semi-Grey models can include more complex opacity behaviour. This may increase the efficacy of such approaches, assuming that the pressure-temperature models used are appropriate approximations of reality. Whenever and wherever possible, the authors recommend using more rigorous approaches instead of Grey and semi-Grey approximations.
\section{What is \texttt{RAPOC} ?}
\label{sec:1}
\texttt{RAPOC}\ (Rosseland and Planck Opacity converter) is a fast and user-friendly program that is fully written in Python 3 and converts wavelength-dependent opacities into RPMs as a function of the temperature and pressure for the wavelength range of choice. RPMs are usually given as a function of density and temperature (not pressure) \cite{Semenov2003,Mayer2005}, because opacities are defined as $k_{\nu} \equiv \kappa_{\nu} \rho \equiv \alpha_{\nu} n$, where $k_{\nu}$ is the volume opacity (not further referenced in this study), $\kappa_{\nu}$ is the mass opacity, $\alpha_{\nu}$ is the extinction coefficient, $\rho$ is the density, and $n$ is the number density. \textit{ExoMol} and \textit{DACE} provide opacities as a function of temperature, pressure and wavelength, but not density;this is because their opacities are computed from line lists that are pressure-broadened. More information on the input data can be found in sect.~\ref{sec:inputs}. \texttt{RAPOC}\ is publicly available on Pypi\footnote{https://pypi.org/project/rapoc/}, so it can be installed using the \textit{pip} command
\begin{lstlisting}[language=bash]
$ pip install rapoc
\end{lstlisting}
or it can be compiled directly from the source, and downloaded from the GitHub repository\footnote{https://github.com/ExObsSim/Rapoc-public} with
\begin{lstlisting}[language=bash]
$ cd Rapoc
$ pip install .
\end{lstlisting}
All data generated in this paper used \texttt{RAPOC}\ version 1.0.5. This version, and all future versions, are available on the GitHub repository. For the complete and extensive \texttt{RAPOC}\ guide, please refer to the software documentation\footnote{https://rapoc-public.readthedocs.io/en/latest/}.
\subsection{Rosseland mean opacity}
The Rosseland mean opacity (RM) is defined as \cite{Lenzuni1991}
\begin{equation} \label{eq:rosseland}
\frac{1}{\kappa_r} = \frac{\int_{0}^{\infty} \kappa_{\nu}^{-1} u(\nu, T) d\nu} {\int_{0}^{\infty} u(\nu, T) d\nu},
\end{equation}
where $\kappa_\nu$ is the opacity provided by the input data at a given frequency $\nu$, and $u(\nu, T)$ is the Planck black body derivative with respect to the temperature $T$. Because opacity data is generally not available across the entire electromagnetic spectrum, a shorter range is selected (i.e., multigroup opacities). With \texttt{RAPOC}, the user selects the frequency range of interest $(\nu_1, \nu_2)$ to compute the mean opacity. Eq.~\ref{eq:rosseland} can therefore be rewritten as
\begin{equation}\label{eq:rapoc_rosseland}
\frac{1}{\kappa_r} \simeq \frac{\int_{\nu_1}^{\nu_2} \kappa_{\nu}^{-1} u(\nu, T) d\nu} {\int_{\nu_1}^{\nu_2} u(\nu, T) d\nu}.
\end{equation}
Due to the definition of RM, if the wavelength-dependent opacity, $\kappa_{v}$, were zero at a given wavelength, Eq.~\ref{eq:rosseland} would be numerically undefined. This causes an error, so we included a fail-safe correction where the zero is replaced by an arbitrarily small value. This \textit{ad-hoc} correction keeps the code functional.
\subsection{Planck mean opacity}
The Planck mean opacity (PM) is defined as \cite{Lenzuni1991}
\begin{equation} \label{eq:planck}
\kappa_p = \frac{\int_{0}^{\infty} \kappa_{\nu} B_\nu(T) d\nu}{\int_{0}^{\infty} B_\nu(T) d\nu},
\end{equation}
where $B_\nu(T)$ is the Planck black body law computed at temperature $T$. For the same reasons given previously, Eq.~\ref{eq:planck} is rewritten as
\begin{equation}\label{eq:rapoc_planck}
\kappa_p \simeq \frac{\int_{\nu_1}^{\nu_2} \kappa_{\nu} B_\nu(T) d\nu}{\int_{\nu_1}^{\nu_2} B_\nu(T) d\nu}.
\end{equation}
\subsection{Inputs}
\label{sec:inputs}
The first step in the code is to load the opacity data to initialise the \texttt{Model} class. This data can be provided as a file or in a custom-made Python dictionary format. The data must contain an opacity table with a corresponding list of pressures, temperatures and wavenumbers (or wavelengths or frequencies) so that the opacities can be sampled.
\subsubsection{Input data file}
As of the writing of this paper, the \texttt{RAPOC}\ code only accepts \textit{ExoMol} cross-sections in the TauREx format \cite{Al-Refaie2020} format, and \textit{DACE} opacities \cite{Grimm2021} as input data\footnote{Future versions of \texttt{RAPOC}\ will implement a load function for different input files by using the dedicated \texttt{FileLoader} class.}.
\paragraph{\textit{ExoMol} cross-section (TauRex format).}
Raw opacity data is available for a large sample of molecules on the \textit{ExoMol} website\footnote{https://exomol.com/data/data-types/opacity/} \cite{Barber2014,Yurchenko2017,Polyansky2018,Coles2019,Chubb2021}. \textit{ExoMol} data is structured as a grid of pressures, temperatures, wavenumbers, and cross-sections. By using the \texttt{units} module of the \texttt{Astropy} package \cite{astropy}, \texttt{RAPOC}\ attaches units to the data so that conversions are straightforward. By default, pressure is expressed in $Pa$ and temperature in $K$; the wavenumber grid (expressed in $1/cm$) is converted into wavelengths ($\mu m$), and frequencies ($Hz$). All previously mentioned information is stored in the \texttt{Model} class. Finally, the cross-sections contained in the \textit{ExoMol} file are loaded. These are given in units of $cm^2/molecule$, so to convert them into opacities, the mass of the molecule is retrieved using the \texttt{molmass} Python package\footnote{https://pypi.org/project/molmass/} and then divide through by the absorption table. After taking into consideration the necessary unit conversions, the opacities expressed in $m^2/kg$ are obtained. The steps mentioned above lead to a three-dimensional Numpy array \cite{oliphant_numpy} table of opacities with indexes corresponding to the pressure, temperature, and wavenumber grids, respectively. These are stored in the \texttt{Model} class under the attribute \texttt{opacities}.
\paragraph{\textit{DACE} opacities.}
The \textit{DACE} database collects line-lists produced by projects like \textit{ExoMol}, \textit{HITRAN}, and \textit{HITEMP}, and converts them into opacities using the \texttt{HELIOS-K} opacity calculator \cite{Grimm2015}. The opacity data can be downloaded from the \textit{DACE} database in a directory for each molecule containing the binary files. Each of these files contains the opacity as a function of the wavenumber, pressure, and temperature. The downloaded opacities come in units of $cm^2/g$. \texttt{RAPOC}\ accepts the directory address as input and parses the contained files to build a three-dimensional Numpy array of opacities ordered for pressure, temperature, and wavenumber. All units are then converted into SI units and, subsequently, all of the aforementioned information is stored in the \texttt{Model} class.
\subsubsection{Input Python dictionary}
As previously mentioned, instead of an input file, the user may use a Python dictionary as the required input. The dictionary content must be of the same type as the one described for the input file due to \texttt{RAPOC}\ handling the contained data in the same way. Therefore, the dictionary must contain the following five entries: (1) \texttt{mol} -- a string for the molecule name, (2) \texttt{pressure} -- an array for the pressure grid data, (3) \texttt{temperature} -- an array for the temperature grid data, (4) \texttt{wavenumber} -- an array for the wavenumber grid data, and (5) \texttt{opacities} -- a three-dimensional array of the opacities (in units of area over mass) ordered by pressures, temperatures and wavenumbers. Optionally, the dictionary can contain the molecular mass, under (6) \texttt{mol\_mass} key. If this key is not present, \texttt{RAPOC}\ will compute this quantity automatically. We point the reader to Table~\ref{tab:input_dictionary} for a schematic representation of the dictionary structure or, alternatively, to the \texttt{RAPOC}\ documentation for a full description.
\begin{table}[]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{p{0.15\linewidth} | p{0.18\linewidth} | p{0.4\linewidth}|p{0.10\linewidth}}
\hline
\textbf{keyword} & \textbf{data type} & \textbf{description} &\textbf{required} \\
\hline
\texttt{mol} & \textit{string} & Molecule name. & Yes\\
\texttt{pressure} & \textit{numpy.array or Quantity} & Pressure grid. & Yes \\
\texttt{temperature} & \textit{numpy.array} or \textit{Quantity} & Temperature grid. & Yes\\
\texttt{wavenumber} & \textit{numpy.array} or \textit{Quantity} & Wavenumber grid. & Yes\\
\texttt{opacities} &\textit{numpy.array} or \textit{Quantity} & Three-dimensional array of the opacities ordered by pressure (axis 0), temperature (axis 1), and wavenumbers (axis 2). & Yes \\
\texttt{mol\_mass} & \textit{float} or \textit{Quantity} & Molecular weight. & No\\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Input dictionary structure. A custom made Python dictionary can be used as a \texttt{RAPOC} input if it contains the indicated keywords.}
\label{tab:input_dictionary}
\end{table}
\subsection{Rayleigh scattering} \label{sec:rayleigh}
\texttt{RAPOC}\ includes a module for producing Rayleigh scattering RPMs for the atomic species given in table~\ref{tab:polarisabilities} that is found in Appendix \ref{sec:rayleigh_tab}. The Rayleigh scattering wavelength-dependent opacity is given by \cite{CRC92,Modirrousta2021},
\begin{equation}
k_{Ray}(\lambda) = \frac{128 \pi^5 }{3 \mu \lambda^4} \cdot \alpha^2,
\end{equation}
where $\mu$ is the atomic mass expressed in SI units and $\alpha$ is the static average electric dipole polarisability of the gaseous species being considered, which is given in Table~\ref{tab:polarisabilities}. The resulting $k_{Ray}(\lambda)$ values are expressed in $m^2/kg$ and processed in the RPM modules to compute their respective mean opacities. Although the Rayleigh scattering opacity is independent of temperature, RPMs are not due to the black-body equation (or its derivative), as shown in Eq. \ref{eq:rosseland} and \ref{eq:planck}. Conversely, pressure is not required, so whether or not a pressure is inserted, \texttt{RAPOC}\ will ignore it.
\subsection{Estimation algorithms}
The \texttt{RAPOC}\ code offers two estimation methods. For the first method, given the requested pressure $P$ and temperature $T$ input by the user, \texttt{RAPOC}\ finds the closest pressure and temperature in the data grid, extracts the opacity data, and computes the desired mean opacity in the frequency range (or wavelength or wavenumber) of choice (i.e. $\nu_1, \nu_2$). Eq. \ref{eq:rapoc_rosseland} and Eq. \ref{eq:rapoc_planck} are used to calculate the RMs or PMs respectively.
The second method consists of an interpolation of the estimated RPM values. For this method, \texttt{RAPOC}\ first produces a map by computing the model mean opacity (RM or PM with Eq.~\ref{eq:rosseland} or Eq.~\ref{eq:planck}, respectively) at the indicated frequency band $(\nu_1, \nu_2)$ for every pressure and temperature available in the data. To make the code faster, once the map is built, the code will not reproduce it, unless the user changes the investigated frequency bands in a successive iteration. This map can be used to interpolate the model opacity values for given pressures and temperatures as long as they are within the bounds of the data grids. The aim of this code is to compute RPMs from given input data in a reliable and efficient manner. Therefore, extrapolation methods are not implemented into \texttt{RAPOC}. Hence, inserting an input pressure or temperature outside the data range will result in an error. Nevertheless, the interpolation is handled by the \texttt{Scipy} \texttt{griddata} module \cite{scipy} using the \textit{linear} mode described in the documentation. As input data usually contains a wide range of pressures, \texttt{RAPOC}\ also contains a \textit{loglinear} mode, which is the same as \textit{linear} but the pressure is in a logarithmic form when the interpolation is made. We stress that the Scipy \texttt{griddata} algorithms should be used carefully as the quality of the interpolation is dependent on the local environment as well as the mode requested, so unphysical estimations may occur. Both estimation algorithms allow the user to compute the RPMs for either a single input pressure and temperature, or for a grid, by giving a list of pressures and temperatures as inputs.
\subsection{Outputs}
An example of the possible outputs is shown in Table~\ref{tab:rapoc_estimates}. In the table, estimates are provided for \textit{ExoMol}'s water \cite{Polyansky2018} and carbon dioxide \cite{Yurchenko2020} data using the \textit{linear} method. In Fig.~\ref{fig:rapoc_example}, we show the RPM values estimated by \texttt{RAPOC}\ compared to the input opacity as a function of wavelength, temperature and pressure. Using \texttt{RAPOC}, one can generate a map of RMs and PMs for each combination of pressure and temperature available in the input data; examples of these maps are shown in Fig.~\ref{fig:rapoc_map_example} and \ref{fig:rapoc_map_example_0307}. The two figures demonstrate that opacities usually do not have a monotonic behaviour in their respective pressure and temperature grids. By comparing Fig.~\ref{fig:rapoc_map_example} with Fig.~\ref{fig:rapoc_map_example_0307} one sees that the estimated opacities are strongly dependent on the wavelength range considered.
\begin{table}[]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{c|c|c|c|c}
\hline\noalign{\smallskip}
{\bf \centering Molecule} & {\bf \centering P} & {\bf \centering T} & {\bf \centering RM} & {\bf \centering PM} \\
& {\centering [bar]} & { \centering [K]} & {\centering [$\mathrm{m}^2/\mathrm{kg}$]} & {\centering [$\mathrm{m}^2/\mathrm{kg}$]} \\
\hline\noalign{\smallskip}
$\rm H_2O$ & $0.01$ & $1000$ & $0.0043$ & $22.8322$ \\
$\rm H_2O$ & $1.0$ & $500$ & $0.0012$ & $40.4905$ \\
$\rm H_2O$ & $1.0$ & $1000$ & $0.0341$ & $23.0859$ \\
$\rm H_2O$ & $1.0$ & $1500$ & $0.1002$ & $14.7822$ \\
$\rm H_2O$ & $1.0$ & $2500$ & $0.2484$ & $8.1571$ \\
$\rm H_2O$ & $100.0$ & $1000$ & $0.1185$ & $22.3517$ \\
$\rm CO_2$ & $0.01$ & $1000$ & $0.0000$ & $43.3707$ \\
$\rm CO_2$ & $1.0$ & $500$ & $0.0000$ & $29.2340$ \\
$\rm CO_2$ & $1.0$ & $1000$ & $0.0000$ & $43.6445$ \\
$\rm CO_2$ & $1.0$ & $1500$ & $0.0000$ & $28.1226$ \\
$\rm CO_2$ & $1.0$ & $2500$ & $0.0001$ & $12.1506$ \\
$\rm CO_2$ & $100.0$ & $1000$ & $0.0000$ & $39.5779$ \\
\noalign{\smallskip}\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{RPMs estimated by \texttt{RAPOC}\ for different temperatures and pressures in the $\rm 1-50 \, \mu m$ wavelength range for water and methane using \textit{ExoMol} data. This estimation has been performed using the \textit{linear} method.}
\label{tab:rapoc_estimates}
\end{table}
\begin{figure}[th]
\centering
\begin{subfigure}[b]{0.48\textwidth}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{H2O_P_0.001_bar_T_500.0_K.png}
\caption{H$_2$O mean opacities in the $\rm 1 - 50 \, \mu m $ range at $\rm P=0.001 \, bar$ and $\rm T=500 \,K$.}
\end{subfigure}
\hfill
\begin{subfigure}[b]{0.48\textwidth}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{H2O_P_1.0_bar_T_1000.0_K.png}
\caption{H$_2$O mean opacities in the $\rm 1 - 50 \, \mu m $ range at $\rm P=1 \, bar$ and $\rm T=1000 \,K$.}
\end{subfigure}
\begin{subfigure}[b]{0.48\textwidth}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{CO2_P_0.001_bar_T_500.0_K.png}
\caption{CO$_2$ mean opacities in the $\rm 1 - 50 \, \mu m $ range at $\rm P=0.001 \, bar$ and $\rm T=500 \,K$.}
\end{subfigure}
\hfill
\begin{subfigure}[b]{0.48\textwidth}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{CO2_P_1.0_bar_T_1000.0_K.png}
\caption{CO$_2$ mean opacities in the $\rm 1 - 50 \, \mu m $ range at $\rm P=1 \, bar$ and $\rm T=1000 \,K$.}
\end{subfigure}
\caption{The mean opacities computed by \texttt{RAPOC}\ for four different cases. In each panel the grey line represents the input data opacities (\textit{ExoMol}) with their corresponding pressures and temperatures in the given wavelength range. The blue and red lines are the computed RMs and PMs, respectively. These have been estimated with the \textit{closest} method. In the top row, the opacities of water are shown, while the bottom row is for methane. The right column reports the results for $\rm P=0.001 \, bar$ and $\rm T=500 \, K$, while the left row shows the equivalent for $\rm P=1 \, bar$ and $\rm T=1000 \, K$. In all of the panels the wavelength range is $\rm 1 - 50 \, \mu m $.}
\label{fig:rapoc_example}
\end{figure}
\begin{figure}
\centering
\begin{subfigure}[b]{\textwidth}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{H2O_map.png}
\caption{H$_2$O mean opacities in the $\rm 1 - 50 \, \mu m $ range.}
\end{subfigure}
\begin{subfigure}[b]{\textwidth}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{CO2_map.png}
\caption{CO$_2$ mean opacities in the $\rm 1 - 50 \, \mu m $ range.}
\end{subfigure}
\caption{Opacity map produced with \texttt{RAPOC}\ for H$_2$O\cite{Polyansky2018} (top row) and CO$_2$\cite{Yurchenko2020} (bottom row) over the $\rm 1-50 \, \mu m$ range using \textit{ExoMol} input data. RMs are reported on the left column, while PMs are reported on the right column.}
\label{fig:rapoc_map_example}
\end{figure}
\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{H2O_map_0307.png}
\caption{Opacities map produced with \texttt{RAPOC}\ for H$_2$O\cite{Polyansky2018} over the $\rm 0.38-1 \, \mu m$ range from \textit{ExoMol} input data. RMs are reported on the left, while PMs are reported on the right.}
\label{fig:rapoc_map_example_0307}
\end{figure}
\section{Discussion}
\subsection{Other Opacity Rosseland \& Planck Opacity Sources} \label{sec:comp_literature}
There are various resources for RPMs in the literature, but most focus on primordial gas mixtures with different metallicities \cite{Cox1976,Alexander1989,Lenzuni1991,Alexander1994,Iglesias1996,Mayer2005,Freedman2008,Freedman2014}. Whereas the values of mixtures are useful for modelling planetary formation or stellar interiors, they are not as applicable to planetary atmospheres. We, therefore, focus on papers providing RPMs for individual molecules because they allow for a straightforward comparison with the RPM values provided by \texttt{RAPOC}. Most of the individual molecule RPM values present in the literature are estimated directly from line-lists \cite{Badescu2010,Kurosaki2014}. Alternatively, \texttt{RAPOC}\ uses precomputed opacities for single molecules to estimate their wavelength-averaged values, which allows for faster and easier computations, and a straightforward integration into other codes. \texttt{RAPOC}, therefore, relies on precomputed data, such as the one provided by \textit{ExoMol} and \textit{DACE}, instead of line lists. Furthermore, if the opacities of a gas mixture are required, the user must manually account for the contributions of the individual species calculate by \texttt{RAPOC}. In the following, we compare the estimates obtained by \texttt{RAPOC}\ with others found in the literature.
We compare our RPM opacity estimations for water vapor with those of Hottel \cite{Hottel1954}, Abu-Romia \& Tien \cite{aburomia1967}, and Kurosaki et al. \cite{Kurosaki2014}. Hottel estimated the IR Planck mean opacities from emissivity data, whereas Abu-Romia \& Tien found IR RPMs from spectral data using selected
bands in the $2.7 - 20 \, \mu m$ range, which contribute appreciably to the emitted energy. Kurosaki et al., however, produces a monotonic power-law fit (their Eqs.~A.5--8) for estimating water RPMs in the visible and thermal wavelengths using HITRAN data. The power-law approximation presented in Kurosaki et al. has been tuned for two wavelength ranges: visible ($0.4 - 0.7 \, \mu m$) and thermal ($0.7 - 100 \,\mu m$). For a comparison with \texttt{RAPOC}, we estimate RPMs with $0.4 - 0.7 \, \mu m$ and $0.7 - 50 \, \mu m$ wavelength ranges for visible and thermal range respectively. Our comparison is found in Fig.~\ref{fig:comp_kurosaki}. Because Abu-Romia \& Tien and Hottel only provide results the IR range, we only show Kurosaki et al. for the visible range.
We are aware that for simple molecules such as $\rm H_{2}$ that are weakly absorbing in the infrared and visible wavelengths, the collisional absorption may be crudely approximately by a power law as a function of pressure and temperature. However, as soon as a hydrogen gas is slightly enriched by other molecules, the power-law approximation begins to fail \cite{Freedman2008,Freedman2014}. In addition, for molecules like $\rm H_{2}O$ and $\rm CO_{2}$, there are other sources of opacity such as electronic transitions, molecular rotations, and vibrations, meaning that the opacity is not at all monotonic. Because of this, and the different wavelength ranges considered, the model by Kurosaki et al. predicts opacities that differ by up to five orders of magnitude from what is estimated by \texttt{RAPOC}. Fig.~\ref{fig:comp_kurosaki} shows how Kurosaki et al. predicts opacities that are significantly greater than the wavelength-dependent values available from \textit{ExoMol}.
As previously mentioned, Abu-Romia \& Tien and Hottel results are only applicable to the IR range. The data reported in Abu-Romia \& Tien \cite{aburomia1967} are displayed in figures with temperature on the x-axis (in units of Rankine) and opacity (as inverse feet) in the y-axis. We convert their estimates by dividing their opacities by the local gas density, which is estimated using the ideal gas equation
\begin{equation}
\rho = \frac{M P}{R T},
\end{equation}
where $M$ is the molar mass of the gas ($M_{H_2O} = 18.01528 \, g/mol$ for water), $P$ is the pressure, $R$ is the ideal gas constant, and $T$ is the temperature.
Fig. \ref{fig:comp_kurosaki} shows that \texttt{RAPOC}'s Planck Mean Opacity estimate is compatible with the value reported in Abu-Romia \& Tien and Hottel. The Rosseland Mean Opacity given by Abu-Romia \& Tien is, however, several orders of magnitudes larger than both the value estimated by Kurosaki et al. and \texttt{RAPOC}.
\begin{figure}[ht]
\centering
\includegraphics[width = \columnwidth]{comparison_kurosaki.png}
\caption{Comparison between Kurosaki et al. \cite{Kurosaki2014}, Abu-Romia \& Tien \cite{aburomia1967}, Hottel \cite{Hottel1954} and \texttt{RAPOC}. The shaded lines in both plots represent the raw data loaded from \textit{ExoMol}'s water opacities \cite{Polyansky2018}. The blue lines are Rosseland Mean Opacities with the filled lines being from Kurosaki et al., the dash-dotted line from Abu-Romia \& Tien, and the dashed lines from \texttt{RAPOC}. The red lines are Planck Mean Opacities with the filled lines being from Kurosaki et al., the dash-dotted line from Abu-Romia \& Tien, the dash-dot-dotted line from Hottel, and the dashed lines from \texttt{RAPOC}. The black dotted line is the median value of the raw wavelength dependent opacities. The left panel is for the visible wavelength range ($0.3$ to $0.7 \, \mu m$) and right panel is for the IR wavelength range ($0.7$ to $50 \, \mu m$). Both panels use the same pressure (1.01325 bar) and temperature (1500 K).}
\label{fig:comp_kurosaki}
\end{figure}
\begin{figure}[ht]
\centering
\includegraphics[width = \columnwidth]{comparison_abu.png}
\caption{Comparison between Abu-Romia \& Tien \cite{aburomia1967}, Hottel \cite{Hottel1954} and \texttt{RAPOC}. The shaded lines in all plots represent the raw data loaded from \textit{ExoMol}'s carbon dioxide opacities \cite{Yurchenko2020}. The blue lines are Rosseland Mean Opacities with the dash-dotted lines being from Abu-Romia \& Tien, and the dashed lines from \texttt{RAPOC}\ . The red lines are Planck Mean Opacities with the dash-dot-dotted lines being from Hottel, the dash-dotted lines from Abu-Romia \& Tien, and the dashed being from \texttt{RAPOC}. The black dotted line is the median value of the raw wavelength dependent opacities. The three panels refer to different gas temperatures: right is for $T=1500 \, K$, centre is for $T=2000 \, K$, and right is for $T=2500 \, K$. All panels use the same pressure (1.01325 bar).}
\label{fig:comp_abu}
\end{figure}
Regarding $\rm CO_{2}$, we compare the Planck opacities calculated by \texttt{RAPOC}\ with those given in Abu-Romia \& Tien \cite{aburomia1967} and Hottel \cite{Hottel1954}; the Rosseland opacities are compared to those of Badescu \cite{Badescu2010}. The comparison for the PM is shown in Fig.~\ref{fig:comp_abu}, where the Planck opacities are given for three different temperatures. The opacities from Abu-Romia \& Tien \cite{aburomia1967} were extracted from their graphs, as described previously, but by using the molar mass of carbon dioxide $M_{CO_2} = 44.01 \, g/mol$. As shown in Fig~\ref{fig:comp_abu}, the \texttt{RAPOC}\ Planck opacities are consistent with those of Abu-Romia \& Tien and Hottel.
For the Rosseland mean opacities, Table~6 of Badescu \cite{Badescu2010} is considered. In their calculation, a wavelength range of $\rm 0.5~\mu m$ to $\rm 100~\mu m$ was used, which is beyond the limit provided by \textit{ExoMol} data \cite{Yurchenko2020}. Hence, a wavelength range of $0.5~\mu m$ to $\rm 50~\mu m$ will be adopted when making the comparison. The results are shown in the first row of Fig.~\ref{fig:comp_baduscu_co2}. The figure shows that Badescu's estimates are closer to the median value of the wavelength dependent opacities from \textit{ExoMol} than what \texttt{RAPOC}\ calculates. The bottom row of the same figure reports the same estimates performed on the $5-10~\mu m$ wavelength range. A major advantage of the \texttt{RAPOC}\ code is that the wavelength range can be specified, whereas using Badescu's values are given for a set wavelength range.
\begin{figure}[ht]
\centering
\includegraphics[width = \columnwidth]{comparison_badescu_co2.png}
\caption{Comparison between Badescu \cite{Badescu2010} and \texttt{RAPOC}\ estimates. The shaded lines in all plots represent the raw data loaded from \textit{ExoMol}'s carbon dioxide opacities \cite{Yurchenko2020}. The blue lines are Rosseland Mean Opacities with the filled lines from Badescu and the dashed lines from \texttt{RAPOC}. The red dashed lines are \texttt{RAPOC}'s Planck Mean opacities, and the black dotted lines are the median value of the raw wavelength dependent opacities. The left column is for low pressure ($567 \cdot 10^{-3}$ bar) and the right column is for high pressure (11.467 bar); both columns use the same temperature (300 K). The wavelength range is different in the two rows as the top row uses $0.5$ to $50 \, \mu m$ range, while the bottom row uses $5$ to $10 \, \mu m$.}
\label{fig:comp_baduscu_co2}
\end{figure}
For the water and carbon dioxide cases, there are significant differences between the RPMs given by \texttt{RAPOC}\ and those available in the literature; the only exception being the Planck mean opacities that are consistent with those of Abu-Romia \& Tien \cite{aburomia1967} and Hottel \cite{Hottel1954}. These differences are the result of different wavelength ranges investigated, or the adoption of simple analytic approximations, such as the power-law fit introduced in Kurosaki et al. \cite{Kurosaki2014}. The major advantage of \texttt{RAPOC}\ is that it provides a flexible and systematic avenue for calculating RPMs with widely available input data. As shown in the above, this flexibility is coupled with \texttt{RAPOC}'s ability to better represent the weighted mean opacity of a gaseous species at a given spectral window, or across a large range than the other approaches in the literature. Despite these advantages, \texttt{RAPOC} is dependent on the input data (excluding the Rayleigh scattering opacities), and it cannot extrapolate outside the given wavelength, temperature, and pressure bounds.
\subsection{Limitations with Rosseland and Planck Mean Opacities}
Whereas RPMs have their uses, they are also limited. For instance, in optically-thin environments, RPMs may overestimate the opacities present as photons could traverse through `spectral windows', which might be very different from a few strong opacity regions. Furthermore, RM and PM have different functional forms corresponding to the different averages they are providing. The RM opacity uses the derivative of the Planck distribution as the weighting function, which it then uses to find the harmonic mean of the opacity. Consequently, RMs are extremely sensitive to the opacity minima and can provide erroneous values if a molecule is fully transparent at a given wavelength. Conversely, PM opacity uses the Planck function as the weighting function and then finds the arithmetic mean, so it is strongly affected by the more opaque regions of the spectrum. Due to their different averaging prescriptions, RM and PM opacities can differ by over two orders of magnitude which, depending on thermodynamic properties of the system, could lead to substantially different temperature profiles.
\section{Summary and Conclusion}
In this paper we present the \texttt{RAPOC}\ code that is able to convert wavelength-dependent opacity data into Rosseland and Planck mean opacities (RPMs) in an efficient manner. Our code is fully written in Python and publicly available on GitHub and Pypi. \texttt{RAPOC}\ uses \textit{ExoMol} and \textit{DACE} data, but user-defined data can also be used as an input as long as it is within a readable format. By incorporating the pressure and temperature dependence of RPMs, \texttt{RAPOC}\ provides a more complex treatment of the mean opacities than what is sometimes used in the literature, notably, assuming constant values or adopting simple analytic formulations. Whereas RPMs should not be used as a replacement for more rigorous opacity analyses, they have certain benefits. For example, RPMs allow one to use Grey or semi-Grey models when analysing gaseous environments, which are simpler and have exact solutions. We note that \texttt{RAPOC}\ should not be used as an alternative to more thorough approaches such as those using wavelength-dependent opacities. However, for simpler models, \texttt{RAPOC}\ provides a prescription for evaluating wavelength-dependent opacities, which can be used for exploring a larger parameter space, as well as benchmark testing.
\section{Applications}
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{
"redpajama_set_name": "RedPajamaArXiv"
}
| 6,708
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In August 2011, a number of riots took place across the capital which were mainly started over the death of Mark Duggen, who was shot dead by police when he was apparently unarmed. Over the next few days, some parts of London were left in a state of chaos and destruction with many buildings being looted or becoming victims of arson attacks. These events were mainly believed to have been started and organised in mass numbers due to social networking sites.
30% of users agreed strongly that censorship currently exists on the Internet.
More than 70% of users agreed or agreed strongly that more government involvement would make the Internet too controlled or would limit content they can access.
86% agreed or agreed strongly that freedom of expression should be guaranteed.
60% of respondents agreed or agreed strongly that Internet access has contributed significantly to civil action and political awareness in their country.
These results show that their is a strong togetherness from people around the world that internet censorship is considered as a threatening aspect to how and what people can publish on the internet due to a small minority of people that abuse this right of freedom of speech. The final statistic in particular relates very much to the London riots, as the use of the internet played a pivotal part in looting and arson of buildings and companies in London.
Outcome 3 – How it's becoming increasingly difficult to creative an original film idea.
Directors have always been hailed for their originality and it is those original ideas that carry through to an audience and make them say, "wow, I would not of thought of that". An original idea whether it be the story, the cinematography or a twist in a plot can be the difference between a good film and a great film. However there is a dark cloud looming over the film industry as of recent years sequels and adaptations are taking control of the box office. Hollywood is at the brunt of the problem with 7 of the top 10 films (US) in 1981 being original and in 2011, 0 out of 10 of the top films were original. But it isn't the director's faults; many contracts come with the promise of money but with little self invention. Large industries such as Disney who have already established so many original films are pushing for sequels and remakes.
Technology is advancing at such a rapid pace that it has become more and more accessible and affordable for filmmakers to come forward and present their ideas. We are at a period of recycling and are feeding off by-gone tails like Alice in Wonderland and Hansel and Gretel to scrape at the ideas of originality. But why the problem? Why should we be worried that there are less and less original ideas? As an audience we flock into cinemas, pouncing on the newest creations in film but with all these sequels does it become predictable. In comedy if someone already knows the punch line to a joke, the joke is no longer funny and this is true for films. Technically it can be brilliant, but at the end of the day the audience is left thinking "Saw that coming" rather than "wow". So what is the solution? Personally even though this is a modern topic around magazines, journalists and newspapers I don't think we have to worry world wide events inspire film makers alike for example 9/11, 2012 are two significant recent events that effect everyone in some way, with everything that is going on in the world it leaves film makers the opportunities to find them and bring back the originality to cinema. Another question that needs to be asked is predictability something that would draw an audience in or push them away. On one hand if something is predictable as mentioned it could become boring and stale depending on how it's delivered. For example nightmare on elm street (1984) was fantastic and ahead of the game for the horror genre at that time, as a slasher it frightened the audience not only on screen but off screen as it played on peoples real life fears of someone coming into a house and killing them (burglary). As an original film this also plays on the over exaggerated audience fear of violence in our social economic world. As an American film it reflected an era when the crime rate in America was at an all time high, burglaries were on the increase and this film plays on public fears, the fear that something could actually happen. It also has interesting connotations of this in the story plot where the characters real life fears are being brought out in their dreams and the audiences real life fears are being brought out by watching these dreams. However, as the sequels flooded in the simplicity of the first film was lost and it turned into a comedy / horror with the main character performing a rap at the beginning. Sequels are fine as long as they don't lose sight of where they came from. Some Directors play on exaggerated violence / racial stereotypes and explicit language to evoke emotions in an audience for, example Django Unchained directed by Quentin Tarantino was helped in terms of popularity because of the negativity towards the film which helped fuel its success. This links to the effects debate and oppositional audience responses when looking at the uses and gratifications theory. Quentin Tarantino directs Django in a way that goes against the mediated and non – provocative needs of the audience evoking an oppositional audience response. This audience represents a focus group for the effects of violence and how it ties into our own ideologies of social protocols.
Originality can also be mistaken for something that we haven't seen for a long time and maybe forgotten about. For example Paranormal Activity was one of the first mainstream handheld camera horrors but in fact it was derived from the blare witch project. And the reason the Blair Witch Project came about in the first place was because of the rise in accessibility for hand held cameras. Originality can also be linked to the directors themselves. When you go to see a film you can tell which film has had an influence from a specific director. For example Christopher Nolan adds a sense of drama and seriousness to his films, the "Christopher Nolan Treatment" is a phrase now reflected in his adaptations of comic book classics with Superman to take the next leap forward.
In conclusion we have nothing to worry about. New directors will come along with a fresh take on things and old directors will explore new areas. Socially we will change and film will adapt to that change. In terms of audience the quality of the films are still there it is just the critical opinion of them that has changed, the fact that adaptations and sequels should be slated because they come from existing works is wrong, they should hold merit in their own right and will not lose the interest of the audience ads long as they don't deviate from their roots too much. There are more ideas out there than their are people or even films most haven't been realised yet.
Money – directors / producers making films just for the cash.
Safe investments, putting money into ideas that are proven to work (Marvel).
Safety of current economy. Audience sees something they like, they spend money on it, they will want to see something similar, which is where sequels and their demand come into play.
Who's to blame, Hollywood or us?
Answer in marketing for riskier original ideas, audiences will want to watch them, for example the artist.
The questionnaire I used had some very specific questions, which were designed to get a certain type of answer. The questionnaire itself is based on answers we already know but the point of it is to see the public opinion. This means when comparing I will be checking the public answers against the preferred answers.
Evaluation Q1 – This is completely as expected, more people vote for 'no' , this could be down to fanboyism where people don't like the fact that someone is accusing their industry or a part of their industry of going downhill.
Evaluation Q2 – Most people chose Lord of the Rings: Fellowship of the Ring which is interesting as it isn't an original, just an adaptation of the JR Tolkien books. I can see why people chose it, it was the first of its kind in terms of scale. The fellowship was also the first of the three part sequel. The films in this which are actually originals and not adaptation are Pearl Harbour and Monsters Inc. These two came joint second highest. Then evidence tells me that the original films do stand out however sometimes people are mislead because they don't know the roots of where the story has actually come from.
Q3. Do you tend to watch the sequels of good films you have seen before?
Because the first one had good story, plots etc.
Evaluation Q3 – Everyone voted yes which is as predicted. The reasons why listed below generally centre on the fact that story in the first one was good then they put trust in the sequel.
Q4. Why do you think there are more original films in 1981 as apposed to 2011?
Evaluation Q4 – All results tend to fix on how in 1981 things were simpler, and how if the ideas were simple the idea was usually a true original idea. It also seems that in contrast producers in 2011 worry less about the story and more about the budget for special effects and how much money it would make.
Q5. Have you seen the film UP? If yes what element attracted you to the film. (Select two). If no see Q6.
Evaluation Q5 – The questions were worded in a way which played around the story without mentioning it. The point of question 5 was to examine the deeper reasons why the story is so important in an original story. 3 people selected "That is was about friendship, parental responsibilities and a flipside of the monster under the bed tale" and 2 people for "That it was about resolution of dreams that hadn't happened". This was the trick question in a way. The option people were looking for was 'the story'. Instead I gave a statement, which describes the meaning behind the story. Some people selected this because they were looking for 'Story' and this was the closest one to it, however interestingly the most voted for "the combination of unique characters totalling 9 votes from both questions. This suggests that the audience when looking for an original film directs their attention to the characters and how the are integral to the film and other characters around them. It is about connection between these characters and how they translate the meaning of the film.
Evaluation Q6 What do you think the success of an original film depends on? (Select one) is in a way, a trick question. An original film is not just one element; it is a combination of things. I treated this as an observational experiment as well so that while they were filling out the questionnaires I stood nearby and waited for questions to be directed at me because some of the questions were only allowing one choice. The audience response especially for Q6 is that the majority didn't want to pick just one. In fact a few people even pointed out that they believed it was a collaboration of all the elements that made an original film. From this I have gained more in-depth qualitative data and it is also a more true representation of public thinking. However that being said the one option they still had to choose gave a god insight into how the public perceives films. 8/9 people chose 'The Idea and nothing else' for Q6 the one that didn't chose 'The director'. This is interesting because most of the creative ideas come from the director, so this links into the other answers. From this I can see that although original films are a collaboration of elements, they're epicentre is a good original idea.
Collectively I can evaluate that the audience, when looking for an original film directs there attention to the story and how the characters work within that story. The characters have to have strong connections between each other. Looking for widely, the story is the root of the original idea but is, and needs to be supported by other factors, like who directs it, what direction they take it in etc.
Gender – Male/Female Age . . . Ethnic Origin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Transport . . . . . . . . . . . .
Q1. Do you have any body modifications?
Q2. How low do you wear your jeans?
Q3. Do you own a tumblr account?
Q4. How often do you use Social Networking sites?
Q5. How long do you scroll through your news feed?
Q6. What film/T.V genres is your favourite?
4.Other . . . . . . . . . . .
Q7. How many hours do you spend watching T.V/films during one week?
Q8. How often do you change your profile picture?
Q9. If you see a person drop their wallet do you . . .
Q10. How often do you drink?
Q11. What do you use YouTube for?
4.If none above please state . . . . . . . . . . . .
Q12. How much of your parent's electricity do you drain with all your devices being used at once?
Q13. You're at home the Internet goes off for the next day, what do you do?
Q14. What two items would you take on a desert island?
Mostly A. If your answers are mostly A.
You are Barack Obama. Smartly dressed interactive person who goes out and enjoys the real world and not a 2D/3D screen.
Mostly B. If your answers are mostly B.
You are Gwyneth Paltrow. You know your way round technology and not afraid to go outside. You must being doing something right because you're dating Iron Man.
Mostly C. If your answers are mostly C. You are Batman. Retirement has hit you fast as you've changed your ways from being the almighty superhero to a down right sloth!
Mostly D. If your answers are mostly D. You are Sheldon Cooper. You are an emotional busy body, who distance themselves from friends, relationships and any other social activities.
|
{
"redpajama_set_name": "RedPajamaC4"
}
| 1,071
|
Q: ConfigError: Missing region in config when i am using amazon ses with Node.js I have used an env file and i used the structure like this and getting this error how to resolve that
"AWS_SES_REGION":"us-east-1" and i have put us-west-2 also but still getting the same error
"AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID":"value"
"AWS_SECRET_KEY":"value"
and here is the code which i am using to send the email can anyone suggest me how to solve this problem
require('dotenv').config();
const AWS = require('aws-sdk');
const SESConfig = {
apiVersion:"2010-12-01",
accessKeyId:process.env.AWS_SECRET_KEY,
accessSecretKey:process.env.AWS_SECRET_KEY,
region:process.env.AWS_SES_REGION
}
// AWS.SESConfig.update({region: 'eu-central-1'});
var params = {
Source: 'xyz045@gmail.com',
Destination: {
ToAddresses: [
'yyy45@gmail.com'
]
},
ReplyToAddresses: [
'xyz05@gmail.com',
],
Message: {
Body: {
Html: {
Charset: "UTF-8",
Data: 'IT IS <strong>WORKING</strong>!'
}
},
Subject: {
Charset: 'UTF-8',
Data: 'Node + SES Example'
}
}
};
new AWS.SES(SESConfig).sendEmail(params).promise().then((res) => {
console.log(res);
}).catch(error => {
console.log(error)
});
A: Try to load the config using the AWS.Config class.
Example:
require('dotenv').config();
const AWS = require('aws-sdk');
const SESConfig = {
apiVersion: "2010-12-01",
accessKeyId: process.env.AWS_SECRET_KEY,
accessSecretKey: process.env.AWS_SECRET_KEY,
region: process.env.AWS_SES_REGION
}
let config = new AWS.Config(SESConfig); // Load the configuration like this.
/*
Or you could update the config like this.
AWS.config.update(SESConfig);
*/
var params = {
Source: 'xyz045@gmail.com',
Destination: {
ToAddresses: [
'yyy45@gmail.com'
]
},
ReplyToAddresses: [
'xyz05@gmail.com',
],
Message: {
Body: {
Html: {
Charset: "UTF-8",
Data: 'IT IS <strong>WORKING</strong>!'
}
},
Subject: {
Charset: 'UTF-8',
Data: 'Node + SES Example'
}
}
};
new AWS.SES().sendEmail(params).promise().then((res) => {
console.log(res);
}).catch(error => {
console.log(error)
});
|
{
"redpajama_set_name": "RedPajamaStackExchange"
}
| 7,847
|
Netherlands vs Paraguay: South American challenge
16 November 2009 | Words Paul Brown | Photo UFWC Trophy
NETHERLANDS vs PARAGUAY, Heerenveen 18/11/09
UFWC champions the Netherlands, some say Holland, will defend their title against South American opposition on Wednesday, with Paraguay standing between the Dutch and a full year of UFWC supremacy.
The Netherlands will have been champions for 364 days when they take on Paraguay, having taken the title from Sweden on 19 November 2008.
And Paraguay will be the first South American side to challenge for the UFWC in three years, since Uruguay lost the title in November 2006.
Paraguay have won seven UFWC title matches, the last of which was a 3-0 victory over Chile back in November 1979 – thirty years ago this month.
Paraguay are ranked 22nd in the UFWC all-time rankings, compared to Holland's 5th placing, and were beaten 2-0 by Qatar at the weekend.
However, the South Americans qualified impressively for World Cup 2010, beating Brazil and Argentina along the way.
Paraguay will be captained by Sunderland defender Paulo De Silva, and will boast an attack led by Roque Santa Cruz of Manchester City.
The Netherlands will be without Arsenal striker Robin van Persie, who suffered torn ligaments in the early stages of Saturday's 0-0 draw with Italy.
This match will mark an end to UFWC competition for 2009. If the Netherlands can retain their title, they have a friendly match pencilled in for March in which they would defend the title against the USA.
Who will take the UFWC title into 2010? Make your prediction below, and read a match report here after the game.
← Italy 0-0 Netherlands Netherlands 0-0 Paraguay →
2 thoughts on "Netherlands vs Paraguay: South American challenge"
David H 16/11/2009 at 7:31 pm
The Netherlands are strong favourites to be champions going into 2010. Here are the odds for who will be UFWC champions after this match:
Netherlands: 1/12
Paraguay: 9/2
Hideo 18/11/2009 at 1:10 pm
I would expect Netherlands to keep the title until next year, and with potentially easier opposition in pre-World Cup friendlies I wouldn't be surprised to see Netherlands take the title into the World Cup. Do they have a chance to become undisputed World Champion and do what Italy failed to do on Saturday and unify the titles? Unilkely, but not impossible.
|
{
"redpajama_set_name": "RedPajamaCommonCrawl"
}
| 4,004
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\section{Introduction}
Top quarks are the heaviest known fundamental particles, and the precise
theoretical understanding of their production and decay mechanism, within
or beyond the Standard Model, has deep implications on countless aspects of
the LHC physics programme.
At the LHC, top quarks are mainly produced as $\Pt\bar\Pt$ pairs and via
single-top production in the $t$-channel or in the associated Wt mode.
At 8\,TeV these latter single-top channels amount to $40\%$ and $10\%$
of the $\Pt\bar\Pt$ cross section, respectively. In spite of their smaller
cross sections, they play an important role as direct probes of top-quark
weak interactions and of their flavour structure.
The separation of top-production into individual top-pair and single-top
contributions poses non-trivial experimental and theoretical challenges,
which are mainly due to the similarity among the final states associated
with the various mechanisms of top-production and decay. In particular,
the definition of $\Pt\bar\Pt$ and $\mathswitchr W\mathswitchr t$ production involves notorious and
quite subtle theoretical issues~\cite{White:2009yt}.
In the five-flavour (5F) scheme, $\mathswitchr W\mathswitchr t$ production proceeds via b-quark
induced partonic channels like $\mathswitchr g\mathswitchr b\to\mathswitchr W^-\mathswitchr W^+\mathswitchr b$, and the presence of a
single b-jet represents a clearly distinctive feature with respect to
$\ww\bbbar$ final states associated with $\Pt\bar\Pt$ production. However, beyond LO
this separation ceases to exist, since $\mathswitchr g\Pg\to\ww\bbbar$
enters also the next-to-leading order
(NLO) corrections to $\mathswitchr W\mathswitchr t$ production. The resulting $\Pt\bar\Pt$
contamination represents a huge NLO correction, which jeopardises the
perturbative convergence of the $\mathswitchr W\mathswitchr t$ cross section in the 5F scheme. To
circumvent this problem within the 5F scheme, various approaches have been
proposed aimed at subtracting the contribution of a second top resonance in
$\mathswitchr p\Pp\to\mathswitchr W\mathswitchr t+X$~\cite{White:2009yt}. However, these prescriptions either break
gauge invariance or are not applicable to a realistic experimental setup.
Moreover they neglect the quantum interference between top-pair and
single-top contributions.
A theoretically more rigorous approach consists of \linebreak adopting the four-flavour
(4F) scheme, where initial-state \linebreak b-quarks result from gluons via explicit
$\mathswitchr g\to\Pb\bar\Pb$ splittings. In this framework, the process $\Pp\Pp\to\ww\bbbar+X$
provides a unified description of Wt and $\Pt\bar\Pt$
production~\cite{Kauer:2001sp}, and the presence of the $\Pt\bar\Pt$--Wt
interference at LO stabilises the perturbative expansion. In the 4F scheme,
treating finite-top-width effects in the complex-mass
scheme~\cite{Denner:2005fg} ensures a consistent off-shell continuation of
top-quark propagators and allows one to include double-, single-, and
non-resonant contributions to $\Pp\Pp\to\ww\bbbar+X$ with all relevant
interferences.
Moreover, the ill-defined separation of top-pair and Wt production can be
replaced by a gauge-invariant separation of $\Pp\Pp\to\ww\bbbar$ into its
narrow-top-width limit, which corresponds to on-shell top-pair production and
decay, and a finite-width remainder that includes off-shell $\Pt\bar\Pt$ effects
as well as single-top and non-resonant contributions plus related
interferences.
The presence of four final-state particles and intermediate top-quark
resonances render the simulation of $\ww\bbbar$ production quite
challenging beyond LO.
First NLO calculations with massless b-quarks
have been presented in~\cite{Denner:2010jp,Denner:2012yc,Bevilacqua:2010qb}.
For $\ww\bbbar$ production with two hard b-jets, apart from a few noticeable
exceptions~\cite{Denner:2012yc},
most observables turn out to be completely dominated by the on-shell $\Pt\bar\Pt$ contribution.
In phase-space regions with unresolved b-quarks,
the importance of off-shell and single-top contributions is expected to increase
quite substantially. However, due to the presence of collinear singularities,
such regions are not accessible in the massless b-quark
approximation of~\cite{Denner:2010jp,Denner:2012yc,Bevilacqua:2010qb}.
To fill this gap, in this paper we
present a complete NLO $\ww\bbbar$ calculation including off-shell W-boson decays and massive
b-quarks in the 4F scheme.
A similar calculation has been presented very recently in~\cite{Frederix:2013gra}.
These simulations provide NLO accurate $\ww\bbbar$ predictions in the full phase
space and allow one to investigate, for the first time, top-pair and
single-top production in presence of jet vetoes or jet bins, such as in the
case of the $\mathswitchr H\to\mathswitchr W^+\mathswitchr W^-$ analysis. An important advantage of NLO
$\ww\bbbar$ predictions in the 4F scheme is that they provide a fully
differential NLO description of both final-state b-jets and a
correspondingly accurate modelling of jet vetoes, while in the 5F scheme a
similar level of accuracy for spectator b-quarks in Wt production
would require an NNLO calculation.
\section{Technical tools and ingredients of the calculation}
We will focus on NLO predictions for $\Pp\Pp\to\nu_{\Pe} \Pe^+ \mu^- \bar{\nu}_{\mu}\Pb\bar\Pb$, which comprises
$\Pt\bar\Pt$ production and decay in the opposite-flavour di-lepton channel.
For brevity we will denote this reaction as $\ww\bbbar$ production, keeping in
mind that all off-shell and interference effects related to the $\nu_{\Pe} \Pe^+ \mu^- \bar{\nu}_{\mu}$
final state are consistently handled in the complex-mass
\linebreak scheme~\cite{Denner:2005fg}, where finite-width effects are systematically
absorbed in the imaginary part of the renormalised pole mass.
The complex-mass scheme is used also for the
off-shell continuation of top-quark resonances~\cite{Denner:2012yc}.
Examples of tree diagrams involving two, one and no top-quark resonances are
illustrated in \reffis{fig:treegraphsA} and~\ref{fig:treegraphsB}. The
second diagram in \reffi{fig:treegraphsA} is the 4F-scheme analogon of
$t$-channel $\mathswitchr g\mathswitchr b\to\mathswitchr t\mathswitchr W^-$ production in the 5F scheme, and
the initial-state $\mathswitchr g\to\Pb\bar\Pb$ splitting is related to the
b-quark parton distribution in 5F PDFs. At NLO we include the full set
of tree, one-loop and real-emission diagrams that contribute to
$\nu_{\Pe} \Pe^+ \mu^- \bar{\nu}_{\mu}\Pb\bar\Pb$ production without applying any approximation. In particular
non-resonant $Z/\gamma\to\nu_{\Pe} \Pe^+ \mu^- \bar{\nu}_{\mu}$ sub-topologies like in the second diagram of
\reffi{fig:treegraphsB} are included also in the virtual and real corrections.
The bottom- and top-quark masses are renormalised in the on-shell scheme,
and their contributions are retained everywhere.
\begin{figure}
\begin{center}
\includegraphics{diagrams/DRtchanneltopggveepmumvmxbbx.pdf}
\includegraphics{diagrams/diagramsggveepmumvmxbbxSRbmod.pdf}
\end{center}
\caption{Representative $\Pt\bar\Pt$-like (left) and Wt-like (right) tree diagrams.}
\label{fig:treegraphsA}
\end{figure}
\begin{figure}
\begin{center}
\includegraphics{diagrams/diagramsggveepmumvmxbbxNR.pdf}
\includegraphics{diagrams/diagramsuuxveepmumvmxbbxNRoff.pdf}
\end{center}
\caption{Representative tree topologies without top resonances and with two (left) or only one (right) resonant W-boson.}
\label{fig:treegraphsB}
\end{figure}
The entire calculation has been performed with highly flexible and
automated NLO programs, and the high complexity resulting from the presence
of multiple top- and W-resonances, as well as from the wide spectrum of
involved scales, render $\Pp\Pp\to\ww\bbbar$ an excellent technical benchmark to
test the performance of the employed tools.
To evaluate tree, virtual, and real-emission amplitudes, we \linebreak employed
{\scshape OpenLoops}\xspace~\cite{Cascioli:2011va},
a new one-loop generator that will become public
in the next future. The {\scshape OpenLoops}\xspace program
is based on a novel numerical recursion, which is formulated in terms of loop-momentum
polynomials called ``open loops'' and allows for a fast evaluation of
scattering amplitudes with many external particles. It uses the \linebreak {\scshape Collier}\xspace
library~\cite{collier} for the numerically stable evaluation of tensor
integrals~\cite{Denner:2002ii,Denner:2005nn} and scalar
integrals~\cite{Denner:2010tr}.
Together with \cite{Cascioli:2013gfa,Cascioli:2013era}, the present study is one of the very
first applications of {\scshape OpenLoops}\xspace.
Phase-space integration and infrared subtractions
are performed with an in-house NLO Monte-Carlo framework~\cite{SKtool}, which
is interfaced with {\scshape OpenLoops}\xspace and provides full automation along the entire
chain of operations that are required
for NLO calculations. This tool is applicable to
any Standard-Model process at NLO QCD. Infrared singularities are handled with
dipole subtraction~\cite{Catani:1996vz,Catani:2002hc}, and since collinear $\mathswitchr g\to\Pb\bar\Pb$
splittings are regularised by the finite b-quark mass, corresponding subtraction terms
are not included.
The phase-space integrator is based on the
adaptive multi-channel technique~\cite{Kleiss:1994qy}
and implements dedicated channels for the dipole subtraction terms,
which improve the convergence, especially for \linebreak multi-resonance processes.
Multiple scale variations in a \linebreak single run are also supported.
This tool has been validated in several NLO processes and, in combination with {\scshape OpenLoops}\xspace
and {\scshape Collier}\xspace,
it is also applicable to NNLO calculations~\cite{Grazzini:2013bna}.
The correctness of the results is supported by various checks:
{\scshape OpenLoops}\xspace has been validated against an independent in-house generator for more than hundred
partonic processes, including $\ww\bbbar$ production with massless b-quarks and various processes
with massive heavy-quarks. For the process at hand we checked the cancellation of infrared and ultraviolet singularities.
The correctness of phase-space integration and dipole subtraction was tested
by means of a second calculation based on {\scshape OpenLoops}\xspace in combination with
{\scshape Sherpa}\xspace~\cite{Gleisberg:2007md,Gleisberg:2008ta} and {\scshape Amegic++}\xspace~\cite{Krauss:2001iv}.
\section{Input parameters, cuts and jet definition}
In the following, we present NLO results for $\ww\bbbar$ production at the 8\,TeV LHC.
For the heavy-quark and gauge-boson masses we use
\begin{eqnarray}
&m_{\Pt}=173.2~\mathrm{GeV}
,\quad
m_{\Pb}=4.75~\mathrm{GeV}
,&\nonumber\\
&M_\mathrm{Z}=91.1876~\mathrm{GeV}
,\quad
M_\mathrm{W}=80.385~\mathrm{GeV}.
\end{eqnarray}
The electroweak coupling is
derived from the Fermi constant,
${G_\mu}=1.16637\times10^{-5}\mathrm{GeV}^{-2}$,
in the ${G_\mu}$-scheme,
\begin{equation}\label{eq:GFscheme}
\alpha=\frac{\sqrt{2}}{\pi}{G_\mu}\/M_\mathrm{W}^2\left(1-\frac{M_\mathrm{W}^2}{M_\mathrm{Z}^2}\right).
\end{equation}
In the complex-mass scheme the electroweak mixing angle is evaluated as
\begin{equation}
\cos^2\theta_\mathrm{w} = \frac{M_\mathrm{W}^2-\mathrm{i}\Gamma_\PWM_\mathrm{W}}{M_\mathrm{Z}^2-\mathrm{i}\Gamma_\PZM_\mathrm{Z}},
\end{equation}
and for the widths we use the NLO QCD values
\begin{equation}
\label{eq:GammaWZ
\Gamma_\mathswitchr W=2.09530~\mathrm{GeV}
,\qquad
\Gamma_\mathswitchr Z=2.50479~\Ge
\end{equation}
everywhere, i.e.\ for LO as well as for NLO matrix elements.
The Higgs-boson mass and width are set to
$M_\mathrm{H}=126~\mathrm{GeV}$ and $\Gamma_\mathswitchr H=4.21~\mathrm{MeV}$.
To guarantee consistent top-decay \linebreak branching fractions,
matrix elements and top-width input parameters must be taken at the same perturbative order.
For the LO and NLO top-quark widths we use the values
\begin{equation}\label{eq:GtfwW}
\Gamma_{\Pt}^{\LO}=1.47451~\mathrm{GeV}
, \qquad
\Gamma_{\Pt}^{\NLO}=1.34264~\mathrm{GeV},
\end{equation}
which are computed with massive b-quarks
and off-shell W-bosons~\cite{Jezabek:1988iv}.
Consistently with the use of massive b-quarks we employ 4F parton
distributions. Specifically, at NLO the LHApdf implementation of the
4F NNPDF2.3 parton distributions~\cite{Ball:2012cx} and the corresponding
running strong coupling are used. More precisely, we use a
reference set\footnote{NNPDF23$\_$nlo$\_$FFN$\_$NF4$\_$as$\_$0118} that
is obtained
from a variable-flavour set with $\alpha_{\rs}^{(5)}(M_\mathrm{Z})=0.118$ via inverse
5F evolution down to $\mu_\mathrm{F}=m_{\Pb}$ and subsequent upward evolution
with four active flavours. Since the \linebreak NNPDF2.3 release does not include LO
parton distributions, for LO predictions we adopt the
NNPDF21$\_$lo$\_$nf4$\_$100 4F set, which corresponds to a
reference strong-coupling value $\alpha_{\rs}^{(5)}(M_\mathrm{Z})=0.119$.
While the 4F running of $\alpha_{\rs}$ misses heavy-quark-loop effects,
corresponding $\mathcal{O}(\alpha_{\rs})$ contributions are consistently included
in the virtual corrections via zero-\linebreak momentum subtraction of the top- and
bottom-quark loops in the renormalisation of $\alpha_{\rs}$.
To investigate NLO corrections to top-pair and Wt production
we select events with two oppositely charged leptons, $\ell=\mathswitchr e^+,\mu^-$, with
\begin{eqnarray}\label{eq:LHCcuts}
p_{\mathrm{T},\ell}&>&20\,\mathrm{GeV}
, \quad
{|\eta_{\ell}|<2.5}
,\quad
{p_{\mathrm{T,miss}}>20\mathrm{GeV}},
\end{eqnarray}
where $p_{\mathrm{T,miss}}$ is obtained from the vector sum of the neutrinos'
transverse momenta.
Final-state QCD partons, including b-quarks, are recombined into IR-safe
jets using the anti-$k_\mathrm{T}$ algorithm~\cite{Cacciari:2008gp} with
jet-resolution parameter $R=0.4$. \linebreak Events are categorised according to
the total number, $N_{j}$, of jets with $p_\mathrm{T}>30~\mathrm{GeV}$ and $|\eta|<2.5$ and
the number of b-jets, $N_{\Pb}$, within the same acceptance region.
We classify as b-jet any jet involving at least a b-quark, which
includes also the case of collimated $\Pb\bar\Pb$ pairs resulting from the
splitting of energetic gluons. In fixed-order calculations the implementation of this b-jet definition
is possible only in presence of massive b-quarks, while collimated $\Pb\bar\Pb$ pairs
must be handled as ``gluon-jets'' in the massless case.
\section{Scale choice for top-pair and single-top production}
In order to isolate off-shell and single-top effects associated with the
finite top-quark width ($\mathrm{FtW}$) we decompose the differential $\ww\bbbar$ cross section as
\begin{equation}\label{nwa1}
\mathrm{d}\sigma_{\ww\bbbar}=
\mathrm{d}\sigma_{\Pt\bar\Pt}
+\mathrm{d}\sigma^{\mathrm{FtW}}_{\ww\bbbar},
\end{equation}
where the ${\Pt\bar\Pt}$ term
represents on-shell top-pair production
and decay in spin-correlated narrow-width approximation.
The $\Pt\bar\Pt$ contribution is obtained from
the numerical extrapolation of the full $\ww\bbbar$ cross section in the
narrow-width limit~\cite{Denner:2012yc},
\begin{equation}\label{nwa2}
\mathrm{d}\sigma_{\Pt\bar\Pt}=\lim_{\Gamma_{\Pt}\to 0}
\mathrm{d}\tilde\sigma_{\ww\bbbar}(\Gamma_{\Pt}),
\end{equation}
with
\begin{equation}\label{nwa3}
\mathrm{d}\tilde\sigma_{\ww\bbbar}(\Gamma_{\Pt})=
\left(\frac{\Gamma_{\Pt}}{\Gamma_{\Pt}^{\mathrm{phys}}}\right)^2
\mathrm{d}\sigma_{\ww\bbbar}(\Gamma_{\Pt}),
\end{equation}
where the factor $({\Gamma_{\Pt}}/{\Gamma_{\Pt}^{\mathrm{phys}}})^2$
compensates the 1/$\Gamma_{\Pt}^2$ scaling of the cross section in such a
way that top-decay branching fractions remain constant when $\Gamma_{\Pt}\to 0$.
By construction the $\mathrm{d} \sigma^{\mathrm{FtW}}_{\ww\bbbar}$ remainder in~\refeq{nwa1}
contains all finite-top-width effects, including off-shell $\Pt\bar\Pt$
production as well as single-top and non-resonant contributions.
As compared to $\ww\bbbar$ production with two hard b-jets,
the fully inclusive case involves a much wider spectrum of scales, ranging from
$m_{\Pb}$ to $m_{\Pt\bar\Pt}$. This renders theoretical calculations significantly more involved.
In particular, given that the $\Pt\bar\Pt$ and Wt contributions to $\ww\bbbar$ production
are characterised by very different scales, it is a priori not clear if
a conventional QCD scale choice can ensure a perturbatively stable description
of both contributions. For $\Pt\bar\Pt$ production, a scale of the order of the
geometric average of the top-quark transverse energies,
\begin{equation}\label{eq:ttscale}
\mu_{\Pt\bar\Pt}^2=E_{\mathrm{T},\mathswitchr t} E_{\mathrm{T},\bar\mathswitchr t}
\quad\mbox{with}\quad
E^2_{\mathrm{T},i}=m_i^2+p^2_{\mathrm{T},i},
\end{equation}
is known to ensure a good perturbative convergence~\cite{Denner:2012yc}.
In the case of the single-top $\PWm\Pt$ contribution
one has to deal with two sub-processes: a collinear $g\to\Pb\bar\Pb$
initial-state splitting followed by $\mathswitchr g\mathswitchr b\to \mathswitchr W^-\mathswitchr t$ hard scattering.\footnote{The
charge-conjugate channels are implicitly understood.}
The respective characteristic scales are
the bottom- and the top-quark transverse energies, $E_{\mathrm{T},\mathswitchr b}\ll E_{\mathrm{T},\mathswitchr t}$, and
a QCD scale of type
\begin{equation}\label{eq:twscale}
\mu_{\mathswitchr t\mathswitchr W^-}^2=E_{\mathrm{T},\mathswitchr t} E_{\mathrm{T},\bar\mathswitchr b}
\end{equation}
should represent an appropriate choice, since
\begin{equation}
\alpha_{\rs}^2(\mu^2_{\mathswitchr t\mathswitchr W^-}) \simeq \alpha_{\rs}(E^2_{\mathrm{T},\mathswitchr t})
\alpha_{\rs}(E^2_{\mathrm{T},\bar\mathswitchr b})
\end{equation}
guarantees that the $\alpha_{\rs}$ factor associated with
the collinear $\mathswitchr g\to\Pb\bar\Pb$ splitting is effectively evaluated at the scale
$E_{\mathrm{T},\mathswitchr b}$, similarly as in the resummation of initial-state
b-quark emissions in the evolution of 5F PDFs.
Vice versa, using a global QCD scale of the order $m_{\Pt}$
might underestimate the single-top component
of $\Pp\Pp\to\ww\bbbar$ by up to a factor \linebreak
$\alpha_{\rs}(m_{\Pb})/\alpha_{\rs}(m_{\Pt})\sim 2$ at LO.
This would be compensated by $\ln(m_{\Pb})$-enhanced higher-order corrections,
resulting in a \linebreak poor perturbative convergence.
For an accurate description of the single-top contribution, the above considerations
motivate a dynamic QCD scale that interpolates between
\refeq{eq:ttscale} and \refeq{eq:twscale} in $\Pt\bar\Pt$- and Wt-dominated regions,
respectively. Such a scale can be defined as
\begin{equation}\label{eq:wwbbscale1}
\mu_{\PW\PW\Pb\Pb}^2=
\mu_{\mathswitchr W^+\mathswitchr b}\,
\mu_{\mathswitchr W^-\bar\mathswitchr b},
\end{equation}
with
\begin{equation}\label{eq:wwbbscale2}
\mu_{\mathswitchr W\mathswitchr b}
=
P_{\Pb}
(p_{\PW},p_{\Pb})\,
E_{\mathrm{T},\mathswitchr b}+
P_{\Pt}(p_{\PW},p_{\Pb})\,
E_{\mathrm{T},\mathswitchr t},
\end{equation}
where $\mathswitchr W\mathswitchr b$ represents either $\mathswitchr W^+\mathswitchr b$ or $\mathswitchr W^-\bar\mathswitchr b$, and the
functions $P_{\Pb}$ and $P_{\Pt}=1-P_{\Pb}$ describe
the probability that
the b-quark of a given $\mathswitchr W\mathswitchr b$ pair
arises from an initial-state $\mathswitchr g\to\Pb\bar\Pb$ splitting or from a
$\mathswitchr t\to\mathswitchr W\mathswitchr b$ decay, respectively.
Their approximate functional form can be obtained from the leading matrix-element
singularities associated with the $\mathswitchr g\to\Pb\bar\Pb$ and
$\mathswitchr t\to\mathswitchr W\mathswitchr b$ sub-processes,\footnote{
The $\chi_{\Pb}$ and $\chi_{\Pt}$ distributions are defined as dimensionless functions
by introducing $m_{\Pt}$-terms in the
numerator. This convention is however irrelevant, since
the probabilities resulting from \refeq{eq:wwbbscale4} and \refeq{eq:wwbbscale5}
are independent of the normalisation of $\chi_{\Pb}$ and $\chi_{\Pt}$.}
\begin{equation}\label{eq:wwbbscale3}
\chi_{\Pb}
= \frac{m_{\Pt}^2}{E^2_{\mathrm{T},\mathswitchr b}},
\quad
\chi_{\Pt}
= \frac{m_{\Pt}^4}{[(p_{\PW}+p_{\Pb})^2-m_{\Pt}^2]^2+\Gamma_{\Pt}^2m_{\Pt}^2},
\end{equation}
by requiring that $P_{\Pb}/P_{\Pt}\propto\chi_{\Pb}/\chi_{\Pt}$. This
yields
\begin{equation}\label{eq:wwbbscale4}
P_{\Pb} = 1-P_{\Pt} =
\frac{\chi_{\Pb}}{\chi_{\Pb}+R\chi_{\Pt}}.
\end{equation}
The constant $R$
can be derived from the condition
\begin{equation}\label{eq:wwbbscale5}
\int\mathrm{d} \sigma^{\mathrm{FtW}}_{\ww\bbbar}
=
\int \mathrm{d}\Phi \left[1-P_{\mathswitchr t}(\Phi) P_{\bar\mathswitchr t}(\Phi)\right]
\frac{\mathrm{d}\sigma_{\ww\bbbar}}{\mathrm{d}\Phi},
\end{equation}
i.e.\ by requiring that finite-top-width corrections to the inclusive $\ww\bbbar$ cross
section correspond to the contribution from non-$\Pt\bar\Pt$ events according to the
probability distributions $P_{\Pb}$ and $P_{\Pt}$.\footnote{Here we assume that finite-top-width effects
are dominated by non-$\Pt\bar\Pt$ contributions. Note also that the finite-top-width term on the left-hand side of
\refeq{eq:wwbbscale5} must be extracted through $\Gamma_{\Pt}\to 0 $ extrapolation by keeping $\Gamma_{\Pt}$ and $R$ fixed in
\refeq{eq:wwbbscale3}--\refeq{eq:wwbbscale4}.}
The tuning of $R$ is performed in LO approximation
on the fully inclusive level and yields $R=7.96$.
At NLO, the kinematic quantities that enter $\mu_{\PW\PW\Pb\Pb}$
are defined in terms of b- and $\bar\mathswitchr b$-jet momenta that
are constructed with a modified jet algorithm
where $\Pb\bar\Pb$ pairs are not clustered and light partons with $|\eta|>4.5$
are excluded from the recombination procedure.
The latter prescription guarantees the collinear safety
of the reconstructed top mass, $(p_{\mathswitchr W}+p_{\mathswitchr b})^2$,
with respect to collinear light-parton emission from the initial state.
In the reconstruction of the top and anti-top masses $(p_{\mathswitchr W}+p_{\mathswitchr b})^2$ that enter
\refeq{eq:wwbbscale3}, remaining hard jets are clustered with the $\mathswitchr t$- or $\bar\mathswitchr t$- system
if the resulting invariant mass turns out to be closer to $m_{\Pt}$.
Top-jet clusterings are applied only if they yield $P_\mathswitchr t>0.5$. If that holds for $\mathswitchr t$- and $\bar\mathswitchr t$- system, the clustering to maximise the $\Pt\bar\Pt$ probability, $P_{\mathswitchr t}P_{\bar\mathswitchr t}$, is chosen.
\section{Predictions for the LHC at 8\,TeV}
In the following we present predictions for $\Pp\Pp\to\ww\bbbar$ at 8\,TeV
in presence of the leptonic cuts \refeq{eq:LHCcuts}. If not stated
otherwise, the renormalisation and factorisation scales are set to
\begin{equation}\label{eq:RFscales} \mu_{\mathrm{R},\mathrm{F}}=\xi_{\mathrm{R},\mathrm{F}}\mu_0
\quad\mbox{with}\quad \mu_0={\mu_{\PW\PW\Pb\Pb}}, \end{equation} where $\xi_{\mathrm{R}}=\xi_{\mathrm{F}}=1$
corresponds to the default scale choice. Theoretical uncertainties are assessed
by applying the scale variations $(\xi_\mathrm{R},\xi_\mathrm{F})=(2,2)$, $(2,1)$, $(1,2)$, $(1,0.5)$, $(0.5,1)$,
$(0.5,0.5)$.
\begin{figure}
\begin{center}
\hspace*{-15mm}
{\includegraphics[width=.45\textwidth]{plots/oneplot-extrapolation-width-phys-LHC8-incl-gp.pdf}}
\end{center}
\caption{Numerical extrapolation of the LO and NLO $\ww\bbbar$ cross section with leptonic cuts
in the narrow-top-width limit, $\Gamma_{\Pt}\to 0$. Results are shown as relative deviations (in percent)
with respect to the $\ww\bbbar$ cross section with $\Gamma_{\Pt}=\Gamma_{\Pt}^{\mathrm{phys}}$.
Results with inclusive jet emission are compared to a $\Pt\bar\Pt$-signal analysis
with two b-jets.
}
\label{fig:nwext}
\vspace{-1.mm}
\end{figure}
Figure~\ref{fig:nwext} illustrates the extrapolation of the $\ww\bbbar$ cross section
in the narrow-top-width limit \refeq{nwa1}--\refeq{nwa2}.
The results are well consistent---at the
few-permil level---with the expected linear convergence of the NLO
cross section in the $\Gamma_{\Pt}\to 0$ limit. This provides a non-trivial check of the consistency of
the calculation, since the narrow-width limit involves delicate
cancellations of logarithmic singularities that arise from virtual and real
soft-gluon corrections to the resonant top-quark propagators.
Finite-width effects turn out to be at the sub-percent level if
one requires the presence of two b-jets, like in a typical $\Pt\bar\Pt$-signal
analysis. For
the total cross section they are instead clearly more important. Their net effect,
which results from the interplay of
negative off-shell corrections and positive single-top contributions,
amounts to about +6\%(8\%) at NLO(LO).
\begin{table}[h]
\setlength{\tabcolsep}{1.2ex}%
\caption{
LO and NLO predictions for $\Pp\Pp\to\ww\bbbar$ at 8\,TeV
with scale variations and corrections, $K=\sigma_{\mathrm{NLO}}/\sigma_{\mathrm{LO}}$,
for different scale choices:
total cross section with leptonic cuts
and partial contributions with 0,1 and $\ge 2$ jets.
Full $\ww\bbbar$ predictions ($\sigma$) are compared to finite-top-width
contributions ($\sigma^{\mathrm{FtW}}$).
}
\label{tab:XSjet}
\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{llllll}\hline
\input{XStable.jet.tex}
\end{tabular}
\end{center}
\end{table}
Predictions for the integrated cross section and in exclusive jet bins are
listed in \refta{tab:XSjet}. To assess the influence of the scale choice,
results based on $\mu_0=\mu_{\PW\PW\Pb\Pb}$ are compared to the case of the
conventional scale $\mu_0=m_{\Pt}$. For the total cross section
we find positive corrections of about 40\%.\footnote{
We note that these results are not directly comparable
to those of~\cite{Denner:2012yc},
which reports a significantly smaller $K$-factor. In particular,
while we apply the same cuts on leptons, missing energy and jets,
here we do not restrict ourselves to the case of two b-jets,
we adopt a smaller jet-resolution parameter and a different QCD scale choice.
Moreover we employ a 4F PDF set, which implies an enhancement of the gluon density
due to the absence of $\mathswitchr g\to\Pb\bar\Pb$ splittings in the PDF evolution.
The LO PDF sets used in~\cite{Denner:2012yc}
and in the present study feature also significantly different values of $\alpha_{\rs}$,
which influences LO results and $K$-factors. Finally, in addition to uniform scale
variations considered in~\cite{Denner:2012yc}, here also
independent $\mu_{\rR}$ and $\mu_{\rF}$ variations are taken into account.}
Scale uncertainties decrease from about 30\% at LO to 10\% at NLO, and the
differences between the two scale choices are consistent within scale
variations.
The last three columns of \refta{tab:XSjet} display jet cross
sections in bins with $N_{j}=0,1$ and $N_{j}\ge 2$ jets, where $N_{j}$ refers to
the total number of b-jets and light jets. The different bins receive quite
different corrections, and the relative weight of the individual bins in
percent changes from 3:30:67 at LO to 2:21:76 at NLO. This indicates that a
significant fraction of the 0- and 1-jet bin cross sections migrates to the
inclusive 2-jet bin. We attribute this feature
to the rather high probability of light-jet emissions with $p_\mathrm{T}\gsim 30\,\mathrm{GeV}$.
While NLO scale uncertainties turn out to be fairly small in
all jet bins, matching to the parton
shower is certainly important for a more reliable description of such
radiative processes. Comparing the two scale choices, also in jet bins we do not
observe any dramatic difference: absolute LO and NLO results are well
consistent within scale variations, and also
K-factors and scale variations themselves turn out to be quite similar.
Finite-top-width (FtW) contributions are shown in the \linebreak lower part of
\refta{tab:XSjet}. For what concerns the total $\ww\bbbar$ cross section their
impact is around $6\%$, and the scale $\mu_{\PW\PW\Pb\Pb}$ guarantees a good
perturbative convergence: FtW contributions receive only minor NLO
corrections, and the residual scale dependence is about 10\%, while setting
$\mu_0=m_{\Pt}$ yields larger corrections and scale uncertainties.
As compared to complete $\ww\bbbar$ predictions, FtW contributions are distributed
in a completely different way among jet bins. The relative weight in percent
of the 0-, 1- and 2-jet bins is 14:78:8 at LO and 12:57:31 at NLO.
These results suggest that FtW effects are dominated by a single-top $\PW\Pt$
component, which is concentrated in the 1-jet bin at LO and tends to migrate
to the 2-jet bin due to light-jet emissions at NLO. The fact that the FtW part
of the 2-jet bin features a 40--50\% NLO uncertainty is irrelevant, since this
contribution represents less than 3\% of the complete cross section in the
2-jet bin. In the 0- and 1-jet bins, whose FtW components amount to 32\%
and 16\%, respectively, NLO scale uncertainties are as small as 10\% or so.
\begin{table}
\setlength{\tabcolsep}{1.2ex}%
\caption{Full $\ww\bbbar$ predictions and finite-top-width contributions
for bins with 0,1 and $\ge2$ b-jets.
Same conventions as in~\refta{tab:XSjet}.}
\label{tab:XSbjet}
\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{llllll}\hline
\input{XStable.bjet.tex}
\end{tabular}
\end{center}
\end{table}
In \refta{tab:XSbjet} we report analogous results for the $\ww\bbbar$ cross
section and its FtW contribution in b-jet bins. As compared to the case of
generic jets, we observe that $\ww\bbbar$ K-factors feature a less pronounced
dependence on the b-jet multiplicity
if the $\mu_{\PW\PW\Pb\Pb}$ scale is used.
This is due to the fact that NLO emissions consist of light jets and
are thus less likely to induce bin migrations in the case of b-jet bins.
Scale uncertainties at NLO
are at the 20\%, 15\% and 10\% level in the bins with 0, 1, and $\ge 2$ b-jets,
respectively. Finite-top-width contributions turn out to be even
more stable than full $\ww\bbbar$ results with the scale $\mu_{\PW\PW\Pb\Pb}$, while the
scale $m_{\Pt}$ tends to give larger uncertainties. Using the $\mu_{\PW\PW\Pb\Pb}$ scale,
FtW effects in the 0-, 1-, and 2-b-jet bins turn out to be 31, 14 and 0.4
percent of the respective $\ww\bbbar$ cross sections at NLO. Employing
$\mu_0=m_{\Pt}$ these percentages become 25, 13 and 0.5, respectively. In
general, jet- and b-jet-bin results indicate that the conventional scale
$\mu_0=m_{\Pt}$ yields a similarly good perturbative convergence as
$\mu_0=\mu_{\PW\PW\Pb\Pb}$. However, it is a priori not clear
if this holds also for more exclusive observables. For what concerns theoretical
uncertainties in jet and b-jet bins, we checked that NLO scale variations remain
similarly small as in Tables~\ref{tab:XSjet}--\ref{tab:XSbjet} if the
jet-rapidity acceptance is increased up to $|\eta|<4.5$.
\begin{figure*}
\begin{center}
{\includegraphics[width=.45\textwidth]{plots/LHC8-allDS2-XS-distributionCV-cp05KfactorCV-cp03Delta-pTveto-jet-1st-new-gp.pdf}}
\hspace{10mm}
{\includegraphics[width=.45\textwidth]{plots/LHC8-allDS2-XS-distributionCV-cp05KfactorCV-cp03Delta-pTvetoexcl-1jet-new-gp.pdf}}
\end{center}
\caption{
LO and NLO $\ww\bbbar$ cross sections in the exclusive bins with $N_{j}=0$ (left) and $N_{j}=1$ (right)
jets as functions of the jet-$p_\mathrm{T}$ threshold, $p^{\mathrm{thr}}_{\rT,\mathrm{jet}}$. The middle of each bin corresponds to
the actual value of $p^{\mathrm{thr}}_{\rT,\mathrm{jet}}$. The central and lower frames show the $K$-factor and the relative
impact in percent of finite-top-width contributions.
Where depicted, bands correspond to independent scale variations of $\mu_{\mathrm{R},\mathrm{F}}$ by a
factor of two around the central scale $\mu_{\PW\PW\Pb\Pb}$, not taking into account antipodal variations.}
\label{fig:ptjet}
\vspace{-1.mm}
\end{figure*}
To illustrate jet-veto and jet-binning effects in more detail, in
\reffi{fig:ptjet} we plot the integrated $\ww\bbbar$ cross section in exclusive
bins with $N_{j}=0$ and $N_{j}=1$ jets versus the $p_\mathrm{T}$-threshold that defines
jets. The 0-jet bin corresponds to the integrated cross section in presence
of a jet veto, $p_{\mathrm{T},\mathrm{jet}}<p^{\mathrm{thr}}_{\rT,\mathrm{jet}}$. At large $p^{\mathrm{thr}}_{\rT,\mathrm{jet}}$ the
$K$-factor and the FtW contributions converge quite smoothly towards their
inclusive limit. In contrast, the region of small transverse momentum
features a very pronounced dependence on $p^{\mathrm{thr}}_{\rT,\mathrm{jet}}$: FtW corrections grow
from 6\% up to more than 40\%, and the $K$-factor decreases very fast due to
the presence of a soft singularity at $p^{\mathrm{thr}}_{\rT,\mathrm{jet}}\to 0$. For a jet veto with
$p^{\mathrm{thr}}_{\rT,\mathrm{jet}}=30\,\mathrm{GeV}$ we observe a 98\% suppression of the $\ww\bbbar$ cross
section. Yet the moderate size of the $K$-factor and NLO scale variations
indicates that the perturbative expansion is still rather stable in this
regime. In the 1-jet bin, the limit of small $p^{\mathrm{thr}}_{\rT,\mathrm{jet}}$ is driven by the effect of the
veto on the second jet, and NLO and FtW corrections behave rather similarly as
for the 0-jet bin in this region. In the opposite regime, $p^{\mathrm{thr}}_{\rT,\mathrm{jet}}$ mainly
acts as a lower $p_{\mathrm{T}}$ bound for the first jet, and $\Pt\bar\Pt$ production
with LO on-shell kinematics turns out to be kinematically disfavoured at
large $p^{\mathrm{thr}}_{\rT,\mathrm{jet}}$, while the relative importance of NLO jet emission and FtW
effects increases quite dramatically.
\begin{figure*}
\begin{center}
{\includegraphics[width=.45\textwidth]{plots/LHC8-allDS2-XS-distributionCV-cp05KfactorCV-cp03Delta-pTveto-bjet-1st-new-gp.pdf}}
\hspace{10mm}
{\includegraphics[width=.45\textwidth]{plots/LHC8-allDS2-XS-distributionCV-cp05KfactorCV-cp03Delta-pTvetoexcl-1bjet-new-gp.pdf}}
\end{center}
\caption{
LO and NLO $\ww\bbbar$ cross sections in the exclusive bins with $N_{\Pb}=0$ (left) and $N_{\Pb}=1$ (right)
b-jets versus the b-jet-$p_\mathrm{T}$ threshold. Same conventions as in \reffi{fig:ptjet}.}
\label{fig:ptbjet}
\vspace{-1.mm}
\end{figure*}
Analogous results for exclusive bins with $N_{\Pb}=0$ and $N_{\Pb}=1$ b-jets are displayed in
\reffi{fig:ptbjet}. In this case the reduced sensitivity of b-jet bins to
NLO real emission is clearly reflected in the much better stability of the $K$-factor
with respect to variations of $p^{\mathrm{thr}}_{\rT,\mathrm{bjet}}$. Similarly as for jet bins, FtW corrections
are strongly enhanced at small $p_{\mathrm{T}}$.
This effect can be attributed to the single-top Wt channels,
and the inclusion of $\Pt\bar\Pt$--$\PW\Pt$ interferences, as in the present $\ww\bbbar$ calculation,
is clearly advisable in this regime.
Finally, in \reffi{fig:pt0jet} we show distributions in the azimuthal-angle-separation
and in the invariant mass of charged leptons in the 0-jet bin.
These observables play a key role for the measurement of the $\mathswitchr H\to\mathswitchr W^+\mathswitchr W^-$ signal
at the LHC, and the accurate modelling of top-backgrounds is very important
for the experimental analyses. In this context, \reffi{fig:pt0jet} shows
that NLO and FtW effects are quite significant.
In particular, the impact of FtW contributions reaches up to 40\%.
Shape distortions due to the kinematic dependence of FtW and NLO contributions
are at the 10\% level, and scale variations do not exceed 10\% at NLO.
The fact that FtW corrections are fairly stable with respect to NLO
corrections provides further evidence of the stability
of the perturbative description.
\begin{figure*}
\begin{center}
{\includegraphics[width=.45\textwidth]{plots/LHC8-allDS2-XS-distributionCV-cp05KfactorCV-cp03Delta-phi-emmup-new-gp.pdf}}
\hspace{10mm}
{\includegraphics[width=.45\textwidth]{plots/LHC8-allDS2-XS-distributionCV-cp05KfactorCV-cp03Delta-m-emmup-new-gp.pdf}}
\end{center}
\caption{Differential distributions in the 0-jet bin: azimuthal-angle separation (left)
and invariant mass (right) of the two charged
leptons.
Same conventions as in \reffi{fig:ptjet}.
}
\label{fig:pt0jet}
\vspace{-1.mm}
\end{figure*}
\section{Summary and conclusions}
We have presented a complete NLO simulation of $\ww\bbbar$ production at
the LHC, including W-boson decays in the opposite-flavour di-lepton channel, finite W- and
top-width effects, and massive b-quarks in 4F scheme. The finite b-quark
mass acts as a regulator of collinear singularities and allows one to
describe the full b-quark phase space, including single-top contributions
that arise from initial-state $\mathswitchr g\to\Pb\bar\Pb$ splittings followed by $\mathswitchr g\mathswitchr b\to
\mathswitchr W\mathswitchr t$ scattering. This yields a gauge-invariant description
of top-pair, single-top, and non-resonant $\ww\bbbar$ production
including all interferences at NLO QCD. We
introduced a dynamical scale choice aimed at an improved perturbative
stability of initial-state $\mathswitchr g\to\Pb\bar\Pb$ splittings in single-top
contributions. Using this scale, the NLO $\ww\bbbar$ cross section in bins with
0, 1 and 2 jets features NLO scale uncertainties at the 10--15\% level. The
more conventional choice $\mu_0=m_{\Pt}$ yields similarly small NLO uncertainties
in jet bins. While providing further evidence of the
good convergence of the perturbative expansion, this means
that a sophisticated dynamical scale is unnecessary for the
rather inclusive observables considered in this letter. However, such a dynamical scale
might become important for more exclusive observables, like jet-$p_\mathrm{T}$ distributions.
Finite-top-width corrections
mainly originate from \linebreak single-top and off-shell $\Pt\bar\Pt$ contributions. They
represent 6\% of the integrated cross section and are strongly sensitive to the jet
multiplicity. In the 2-jet bin they are as small as 2\%,
while in the 1- and 0-jet bins they reach the 16\% and 32\% level, respectively. Also
NLO corrections vary quite strongly with the jet multiplicity.
Moreover, finite-top-width contributions receive quite different corrections
as compared to on-shell $\Pt\bar\Pt$ production.
The non-trivial interplay of NLO and finite-width effects
is especially relevant for the 0- and 1-jet bins. It plays an important role for the
accurate description of associated $\mathswitchr W\mathswitchr t$ production, as well as for
top-backgrounds to $\mathswitchr H\to\mathswitchr W^+\mathswitchr W^-$ and to other searches based on leptons,
large missing energy and jet vetoes.
All employed tools are fully automated and can be easily exploited
to extend the present results to the like-flavour di-lepton channel
or to simulate any other Standard-Model process at NLO QCD.
\begin{acknowledgements}
We thank A.~Denner, S.~Dittmaier and L.~Hofer for providing us with the
one-loop tensor-integral library {\scshape Collier}\xspace. We are grateful to
S.~H\"oche and F.~Siegert for {\scshape Sherpa}\xspace technical support.
Our research
is funded by the SNSF and supported, in part, by the European
Commission through the
network PITN-GA-2010-264564 ({\it LHCPhenoNet}).
\end{acknowledgements}
|
{
"redpajama_set_name": "RedPajamaArXiv"
}
| 510
|
Q: how to obfuscate google keys in Android using ProGuard I have been searching this solution everywhere but I cannot make it work yet. My google API key is stored in a string inside res folder, I have enabled proguard in my project, set the properties, later generating the APK (tried both unsigned and signed) but still being able to do reverse engineering to my generated APK to get the Google Key again (using Android Studio or even http://www.javadecompilers.com/apktool).
Google recommends in their documentation to store API keys in the res folder to use it in the manifest, but never explains how to help with reverse-engineering security on that key.
My AndroidManifest.xml has this piece of code:
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<manifest xmlns:android="http://schemas.android.com/apk/res/android"
package="com.proyecto.cutcsa.cutcsa" >
...
<application
android:allowBackup="true"
android:icon="@drawable/app_icon"
android:label="@string/app_name"
android:theme="@style/AppTheme"
android:name="android.support.multidex.MultiDexApplication">
...
<meta-data
android:name="com.google.android.geo.API_KEY"
android:value="@string/google_key" />
...
</application>
</manifest>
My build.gradle has the next:
apply plugin: 'com.android.application'
android {
compileSdkVersion 25
buildToolsVersion "23.0.3"
useLibrary 'org.apache.http.legacy'
defaultConfig {
applicationId "com.proyecto.cutcsa.cutcsa"
minSdkVersion 16
targetSdkVersion 25
versionCode 1
versionName "1.0"
multiDexEnabled true
}
buildTypes {
release {
debuggable false
minifyEnabled true
shrinkResources true
proguardFiles getDefaultProguardFile('proguard-android.txt'), 'proguard-rules.pro'
}
debug {
debuggable false
minifyEnabled true
shrinkResources true
proguardFiles getDefaultProguardFile('proguard-android.txt'), 'proguard-rules.pro'
}
}
dexOptions {
javaMaxHeapSize "4g"
}
}
dependencies {
...
}
And my `proguard-rules.pro
-optimizationpasses 5
-dontusemixedcaseclassnames
-dontskipnonpubliclibraryclasses
-dontpreverify
-verbose
-optimizations !code/simplification/arithmetic,!field/*,!class/merging/*
-keep public class * extends android.app.Activity
-keep public class * extends android.app.Application
-keep public class * extends android.app.Service
-keep public class * extends android.content.BroadcastReceiver
-keep public class * extends android.content.ContentProvider
-keep public class com.android.vending.licensing.ILicensingService
-assumenosideeffects class android.util.Log {
public static *** d(...);
public static *** v(...);
}
-keepclasseswithmembernames class * {
native <methods>;
}
-keep public class * extends android.view.View {
public <init>(android.content.Context);
public <init>(android.content.Context, android.util.AttributeSet);
public <init>(android.content.Context, android.util.AttributeSet, int);
public void set*(...);
}
-keepclasseswithmembers class * {
public <init>(android.content.Context, android.util.AttributeSet);
}
-keepclasseswithmembers class * {
public <init>(android.content.Context, android.util.AttributeSet, int);
}
-dontwarn java.awt.**
-keepclassmembers enum * {
public static **[] values();
public static ** valueOf(java.lang.String);
}
-keep class * implements android.os.Parcelable {
public static final android.os.Parcelable$Creator *;
}
-keepclassmembers class **.R$* {
public static <fields>;
}
Can somebody help me with this problem? I will really appreciate it. Thank you in advance!
A: To obfuscate string values (like API keys) you could take a look at DexGuard which is the commercial variant of ProGuard. It supports inlining of resource values and encryption of strings to make it much more difficult to reverse-engineer sensitive data from an apk.
|
{
"redpajama_set_name": "RedPajamaStackExchange"
}
| 5,873
|
package main
import (
"flag"
"fmt"
"gonatsd/gonatsd"
"math/rand"
"os"
"time"
)
var configFilename = flag.String("config", "", "path to gonatsd config file")
func main() {
rand.Seed(time.Now().UnixNano())
flag.Parse()
config, err := gonatsd.ParseConfig(*configFilename)
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "Invalid config: %s\n", err.Error())
os.Exit(1)
}
server, err := gonatsd.NewServer(config)
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "Failed to start server: %s\n", err.Error())
os.Exit(1)
}
server.Start()
}
|
{
"redpajama_set_name": "RedPajamaGithub"
}
| 8,710
|
Chinese (23) + -
RCMP (10) + -
Chinese New Year (7) + -
Argentine (5) + -
Birthday (5) + -
Celebration (5) + -
Chilean (5) + -
Dance (5) + -
Latino (5) + -
Macau (5) + -
Childhood (4) + -
Party (4) + -
Guyanese (3) + -
Jamaican (3) + -
Toronto Raptors Dance Pak (3) + -
vacation (3) + -
Country Music (2) + -
Haitian (2) + -
YTV (2) + -
YTV Achievement Awards (2) + -
road trip (2) + -
Regina (6) + -
Montreal (5) + -
Peterborough (2) + -
Saskatchewan (6) + -
Quebec (4) + -
United States of America (2) + -
journal (x)
1/4" reel audio tape (x)
projected graphic (x)
videorecording (x)
Amateur films (x)
Muslim (x)
Wong family videos : family reunion 70
Project and donor contributed description follows:"A clip documenting the Red Packet (hóngbāo) ceremony taking place at Mr Wong's 70th birthday celebration in 2002. During this ceremony family members were called up in a particular order to accept a red envelope of money from Mr Wong. Deanna Wong, Mr. Wong's daughter who found and digitized this video, recalls that family members were called up according to age and lineage. For example, Mr. Wong's siblings would be called first, followed by their children and grandchildren. In this video Mr Wong's eldest son, Terry was called first, and then, since their middle son Ted was not present, Deanna, the youngest of the three, came next. Following her came Terry's kids from eldest to youngest. And since Deanna nor Ted had children at the time, the eldest cousin and his wife, and their kids etc followed. As the eldest of 13 siblings, Mr. Wong would have had many envelopes to hand out! Originally from Hong Kong, Mr. Wong came to Canada to study engineering at McGill University in the mid-1950s, where he met Deanna's mother. Mrs. Wong's father, Deanna maternal grandfather, immigrated to Canada in 1921 and paid the $500 head tax in order to enter the country. Mr Wong's father, Deanna's paternal grandfather, was a doctor specializing in acupuncture, which was illegal in Canada at the time, so he settled in California. Now his family lives around the world, including the United States, Singapore, Japan and in various places in Canada. This milestone birthday presented a great opportunity for a family reunion. And to accommodate everyone, this celebration took place in the home of Deanna's eldest brother and Mr. Wong's eldest son, Terry. Now a longtime resident of Toronto, Deanna calls Winnipeg home where she and her two brothers grew up. Although they were one of the few families of colour around, she remembers her neighbourhood and her experiences fondly. Her parents, particularly her mother, worked hard to build a Chinese community where the children could have Chinese friends and be exposed to their culture. They started a Mandarin school, even though Cantonese was their mother tongue, and began a summer camp. Family and community come together again at this celebration, one of many for the Wong family."
Home Made Visible collection (F0723)
Chan family videos : Acting out play titled Fun with Toy
Project and donor contributed description follows: "George Chan gets Kate and her siblings to act out a play he's labelled 'Fun with Toy' The toy is the mechanical alligator that came directly from China right before Christmas along with customized clothes. They play doctor and nurse with their new presents, the Ben Casey kits. Stan, plays a mischievous boy who startles the doctor played by Kate. Linda plays the nurse, and Joyce plays the mother of a sick child (the doll). Kate calls it a 'play toy within a play of toys'."
[196-?]
Chan family videos : Christmas turkey dinner
Item consists of footage of carving and eating a turkey dinner. Project and donor contributed description follows: "It's Christmas dinner in 1953, the Chan family sits around the table, Stan, Joyce, Linda and Kate. They are joined by Dad's first son, Karl Chan, sitting to the right of Kate's mother, Clara. Karl came to help out in the Virden Café as Virden was in the midst of an oil bloom. Kate's dad George always remained behind the camera. "
Chan family videos : Cleaning up
Project and donor contributed description follows: "Mom and Joyce picking up the wrapping and cleanup, etc."
Chan family videos : Opening presents and playing
Project and donor contributed description follows: "Kate and her siblings open presents and set the scene for a play her dad directed with typewriter and doctor/nurse kits. Kate's mom is in the silk housecoat. Joyce plays piano and they all gather to sing around her."
Chan family videos : Queen Elizabeth's Christmas message
Project and donor contributed description follows: "George films the TV and captures Queen Elizabeth's message to start off the Christmas day."
Chan family videos : House with Christmas decorations
Item consists of footage of a snowy house with Christmas decorations on the lawn. Project and donor contributed description follows: "George Chan filmed Christmas decorations in town, day and night."
Chan family videos : RCMP dinner at Virden Café
Item consists of footage of town decorations and individuals at a restaurant. Project and donor contributed description follows: "An RCMP dinner at Virden Café including all of the grooms and brides."
Chan family videos : Christmas 1962 sign
Item consists of footage of a sign with Christmas 1962 written on red. Project and donor contributed description follows: "Christmas 1962: George captures holiday decorations, neon lights, dinner and his kids opening presents, etc."
Chan family videos : RCMP weddings : part 4 of 4
Project and donor contributed description follows: "In the 1960s Kate's dad, George admired the RCMP and made a point of befriending them. This segment includes four RCMP weddings. Here at Virden United Church George, like much of the town, waits to see the bride and groom. George would later go on to screen these films at the town Holiday parties. The Chan family was the only Chinese family in the community and his relationship with the RCMP helped him maintain his business as the owner of the Virden Café. It also helped that Kate's mother, Clara, was Russian and hostess at their café."
1 video file (39 sec., 0.3 GB) : MOV, sd.
Chan family videos : Virden Cafe sign
Item consists of footage of a sign that reads: Virden Cafe : fish & chips, chop suey. Project and donor contributed description follows: "The neon lit café sign of the Virden Café at night, Kate's dad's Chinese Canadian restaurant."
Chan family videos : Chinese new year preparations
Project and donor contributed description follows: "On January 24th, 1963, Kate's mother, Clara Chan, prepares for Chinese New Year the night before, setting the table and filling red envelopes with money her kids. Cut to the next day where Stan, Joyce, Linda and Kate, are coming downstairs to receive their red envelopes. Everyone sings around the piano as Joyce plays. Upon further observation Kate's friend notices that they are singing 'Away in a Manger'. Clara is a Russian refugee who came to Canada after the war in 1950. Fortunately for Clara the Manitoba law that prohibited white woman from working in Chinese restaurants was repealed in 1948. Her parents met in the Virden Café in 1950."
Chan family videos : Stan marching with a tuba is in his Virden Band uniform
Project and donor contributed description follows: "Filmed by Kate and Stan's dad, George, in 1963. George staged this shot of Stan is in his Virden Band uniform marching with his alto horn in his bedroom before going downstairs into the world. Four years later the Virden Band would go on to play at Expo '67 in Montreal."
Chan family videos : bathroom mirror selfie
Project and donor contributed description follows: "Ahead of his time Kate's dad, George, takes one of the original selfies and films himself in his bathroom mirror on Super8 Kodachrome film in 1963. Kate's brother, Stan, recalls seeing his dad set up lights to make this possible. George was a real film buff, a fan of Charlie Chaplin, and actively sought out arts and culture. Life and Time magazines came through the mail every week, and Kate says if it weren't for him taking up these interests she wouldn't have a worldview outside of small town Prairie Manitoba."
Lo family videos : backyard harvest
Project and donor contributed description follows: "The year is 1981 and the Lo family are spending a summer afternoon picking vegetables and fruits from their backyard. One of the twins, Lorna helps their father harvest cabbage while the other twin, Vivien keeps Aylwin – the youngest and only a year old accompanied on a blanket. Featured through out the clip is the one outdoor activity that remained a family tradition over the year, picking apples from the beloved Crab Apple tree."
Lo family videos : twins giving a tour of the house
Project and donor contributed description follows: "Lorna '… remembers filming that specific clip'—the video of the twins giving a home tour of their new home. The camera would routinely come out during gatherings, a feature in the background of their lives, but this was the one home movie Lorna remembers the most. She remembers seeing the house and thinking 'A room dedicated for toys, that was unheard of. I thought it was the greatest thing.' Moving into this home marked a new chapter in the Lo's family history."
[between 1978-1982]
Lo family videos : Christmas : part 4 of 4
Item consists of a video recording that features children opening Christmas presents and performing a dance in a living room. Project and donor contributed description follows: "During this Christmas, the family have their cousin Sau Fong visiting. The children are waving excitedly to the camera as they open and show their gifts. Over the years, uncles and aunts would occasionally stay with the Lo family while studying English at the local college. Home movies were one of the ways they stayed connected to relatives in Macau and shared their life living in Canada. Copies were routinely made to send back."
Item consists of a video recording that features children opening and playing with Christmas presents. Project and donor contributed description follows: "During this Christmas, the family have their cousin Sau Fong visiting. The children are waving excitedly to the camera as they open and show their gifts. Over the years, uncles and aunts would occasionally stay with the Lo family while studying English at the local college. Home movies were one of the ways they stayed connected to relatives in Macau and shared their life living in Canada. Copies were routinely made to send back."
1 video file (1 min., 9 sec. ; 1.26 GB) : MOV, si.
Item consists of a video recording that features adults outside on a snowy day and two children playing on a swing set in the winter. Project and donor contributed description follows: "Their extended family are visiting from Macau for their first Winter visit. For many of them it was the first time experiencing the Canadian cold. "I remember we were outside playing in the snow for a really long time… the adults were playing in it just as much as the kids", Lorna recalls. The children can be seen playing on the swing bundled up in coats and snow pants."
Item consists of a video recording that features two children playing on a swing set in the winter. Project and donor contributed description follows: "Their extended family are visiting from Macau for their first Winter visit. For many of them it was the first time experiencing the Canadian cold. "I remember we were outside playing in the snow for a really long time… the adults were playing in it just as much as the kids", Lorna recalls. The children can be seen playing on the swing bundled up in coats and snow pants."
Joudaki family videos : Iran vacation
Item consists of footage of landscapes, cityscapes, and heritage sites in Iran. Project and donor contributed description follows: "Both Bita and her father, Abbas, contributed to this write up. Bita felt protective of her family and their image, and chose to contribute a clip that didn't centre people but a place. The scenery itself is a beautiful valuable contribution of a country in flux. In 1998, Abbas visits Iran with his daughter Bita for the first time in sixteen years since moving to Canada. Bita at the time was a shy eight year-old and recalls that she didn't speak for the first three weeks of the trip and that this was her first time leaving Canada. In this clip Abbas is alone behind the camera capturing historical sites. He was prompted to take this trip because an Iranian friend in Vancouver couldn't go home and asked him to make these movies of Cyrus the Great, Isfahan, etc. and to bring them back to show on local Persian TV. He did end up making these movies on a miniDV camcorder but never did give them to his friend. The clip starts out at night time in Shiraz, with the Takht-e Lamshid built for Cyrus the Great. Then moves on to Isfahan, the "Great Mosque" that in farsi they call the Shah Mosque based in Naghsh-e Jahan Square. Abbas recalls at the time wondering how locals knew he hadn't been living their for 16 years. People could tell that he had left and was living somewhere else. For Abbas, these clips show a country rich with stories and pride. After years of searching for these tapes, they found them again in the summer of 2018 the night before Bita returned to Iran for the second time in her life."
Isaac family videos : Sacré-Cœur Christmas concert
Item consists of footage of speeches, performances such as children singing, and audience members at a francophone Catholic school's Christmas recital. Project and donor contributed description follows: "Stella Isaac's sister films her at her elementary school, École élémentaire catholique du Sacré-Coeur during their annual Christmas concert in 2004 at la Paroisse du Sacré Coeur located at Sherbourne and College. The footage captures a particular experience and community of mostly Black students of Congolese, descent attending the French school, which was located at Sherbourne and Bloor. Now located near Christie Pits, the community and neighborhood is no longer remembered in the same way. On stage during the concert the school's principal mentions the students' practice of prayer exemplifying the experience of religiosity at the school. Education at Sacré-Coeur is rooted in Catholicism and Christianity. Stella recalls a time when students in the class would put their Bibles and crosses on their tables before tests for an extra blessing. This was normal practice. Stella enjoyed attending a Catholic School and has fond memories of the experience, especially when receiving mentorship from particular teachers who pushed their students to prepare for success in their futures. ""I have a slight obsession with this time period and this school, especially as it relates to what it was like educating Black students. It was in an environment where I had a teacher that completely pushed us and believed in us and our intelligence. The footage also documents images of Stella's younger brother, Jordan, who has Down Syndrome. She describes him lovingly: "It was nice seeing my little brother making tons of noise and yelling my sister's name, rubbing my mom's face." In relation to Home Made Visible, Stella shares: "It's great to allow families the opportunity to revisit old footage, explore their history and share that. A lot of people don't think of Black people in Canada just existing. It's a great way to change the Canadian narrative."
Kwan family videos : Birthdays in Greater Vancouver Area
Item consists of footage of children playing, celebrating birthdays, opening presents, and eating sweets. Project and donor contributed description follows: "This footage documents a series of four of Derek Kwan's birthdays in Vancouver in the nineties between October 1991 and 1994. In October 91, the setting is a McDonald's ball pit in the greater Vancouver area. Surrounded by friends, family and cousins, Kwan and other kids are wearing the McDonald's card paper hats eating birthday cake, with his mom sitting behind him. At present opening time, seen in the shot is his uncle, cousins, and grandma. For Derek's 3rd birthday in October 1992, we are located in Richmond, a suburb 20 minutes away from the city of Vancouver. We are indoors and adults are encouraging Derek to hit a piñata of Mickey Mouse's head that was made by Derek's mom, Victoria. She loved to create themed birthday parties, and DIY party favors with her friends, and Derek remembers having a piñata every year, until he got too old for it. Victoria made the piñata incredibly strong, and it's very difficult to break. Eventually the adults jump in and start helping the kids break through the Mickey piñata. Derek shares: "Disney holds cache to it as a kid growing up in the 90s as the happiest place on earth." Each year, when Derek opens his gift, he consistently receives boxes from the Bay, which he notes is interesting as a staple Canadian store. At his third birthday he also receives a table hockey set, another inherently Canadian gift, and the family excitedly surrounds the set. At Derek's fourth birthday in 1993, we are located at Chuck E Cheese. Much like the McDonalds ball pit, Chuck E Cheese was a go-to sport for 90s kids birthday parties. Derek receives action figures, and a ninja turtle toy. Documented at Derek's fifth birthday in 1994, is Derek's childhood home in East Vancouver, where he lived during elementary and high school. We see the backyard and kids playing surrounding the basketball hoop. Derek shares that thoughts of being Chinese took a back seat and he didn't think too deeply about it growing up. East Vancouver was very diverse and being white was the minority. He grew up around Chinese, Vietnamese, Pilipino and East Indian people. Although race wasn't a forefront in Derek's mind, it was brought to his attention during family functions when everyone spoke Cantonese, and for cultural festivals like Chinese New Year."
Marchant family videos : 3 J.P Birthday 1 year Old 1976 : Part 4 of 4
A video clip recording from 1976 to 1978 with the first half consisting of children and adults gathered in a garage and backyard, and the second half capturing Niagara Falls during the wintertime. Project and donor(s) contributed description follows: "These clips show episodes from Jean-Pierre Marchant's childhood in the mid-1970s Montreal. His parents were immigrants, recently arrived from Argentina and Chile. Throughout Jean-Pierre's childhood, they documented the family's life with a Super 8 camera (and would later switch to video). These clips depict him as a playful child, trips, and well-attended birthday parties. Looking back, Jean-Pierre recognizes that these parties were a big opportunity for the adults to get together and celebrate. The Marchants mostly socialized with people from similar backgrounds, and Jean-Pierre says that "it was important for my parents, who were trying to make a life in a new place, to associate with others who spoke their language."
A video clip recording from 1976 to 1978 consists of several everyday moments including children playing in the snow during winter and by the pool during the summer, parties and celebrations, a trip to Niagara Falls, and a tour of a house for sale. Project and donor(s) contributed description follows: "These clips show episodes from Jean-Pierre Marchant's childhood in the mid-1970s Montreal. His parents were immigrants, recently arrived from Argentina and Chile. Throughout Jean-Pierre's childhood, they documented the family's life with a Super 8 camera (and would later switch to video). These clips depict him as a playful child, trips, and well-attended birthday parties. Looking back, Jean-Pierre recognizes that these parties were a big opportunity for the adults to get together and celebrate. The Marchants mostly socialized with people from similar backgrounds, and Jean-Pierre says that "it was important for my parents, who were trying to make a life in a new place, to associate with others who spoke their language."
A video clip recording from 1976 to 1978 featuring adults and children having a barbecue in a park, hanging out in a car, and meeting Santa Claus. Project and donor(s) contributed description follows: "These clips show episodes from Jean-Pierre Marchant's childhood in the mid-1970s Montreal. His parents were immigrants, recently arrived from Argentina and Chile. Throughout Jean-Pierre's childhood, they documented the family's life with a Super 8 camera (and would later switch to video). These clips depict him as a playful child, trips, and well-attended birthday parties. Looking back, Jean-Pierre recognizes that these parties were a big opportunity for the adults to get together and celebrate. The Marchants mostly socialized with people from similar backgrounds, and Jean-Pierre says that "it was important for my parents, who were trying to make a life in a new place, to associate with others who spoke their language."
A video clip recording from 1976 to 1978consisting of a party with adults and children dancing, footage of and from the top of the CN tower, a child playing around the house and pool, and a child playing with a soccerball wearing a 1978 Argentina Championship t-shirt. Project and donor(s) contributed description follows: "These clips show episodes from Jean-Pierre Marchant's childhood in the mid-1970s Montreal. His parents were immigrants, recently arrived from Argentina and Chile. Throughout Jean-Pierre's childhood, they documented the family's life with a Super 8 camera (and would later switch to video). These clips depict him as a playful child, trips, and well-attended birthday parties. Looking back, Jean-Pierre recognizes that these parties were a big opportunity for the adults to get together and celebrate. The Marchants mostly socialized with people from similar backgrounds, and Jean-Pierre says that 'it was important for my parents, who were trying to make a life in a new place, to associate with others who spoke their language.'"
|
{
"redpajama_set_name": "RedPajamaCommonCrawl"
}
| 5,623
|
{"url":"https:\/\/chemistry.stackexchange.com\/questions\/41886\/how-to-tell-which-species-has-the-highest-ionization-energy","text":"# How to tell which species has the highest ionization energy?\n\nI am preparing for my final exam, and I am very confused about ionization energy. An example question would be:\n\nBetween the species $$\\ce{Ne, Na+, Mg^2+, Ar, K+, \\&~Ca^2+}$$, which one has the highest ionization energy?\n\nI thought that ionization energy increased from left to right in a period and from down to up in a group in the periodic table, so I thought that $$\\ce{Ne}$$ would be the one with the highest ionization energy. But the right answer is $$\\ce{Mg^2+}$$. I assume that this has something to do with the electrons, but I don't know what.\n\n\u2022 Take a neutral atom. Remove one electron. That took some energy. Now remove a second electron. Does that take more energy, or less energy than to remove the first electron? \u2013\u00a0Jon Custer Dec 8 '15 at 19:53\n\u2022 Those aren't compounds. \u2013\u00a0EJC Dec 8 '15 at 21:03\n\nLike most chemical conundrums you need to simplify the problem using some knowledge of chemistry.\n\nFirst there are two electron configurations. $$\\ce{Ne, Na+}$$ and $$\\ce{Mg^{2+}}$$ all have the configuration $${1s^2 2s^22p^6}$$. $$\\ce{Ar, K+}$$ and $$\\ce{Ca^{2+}}$$ all have the configuration $${1s^2 2s^22p^6 3s^2 3p^6}$$.\n\nFor $$\\ce{Ne, Na+}$$ and $$\\ce{Mg^{2+}}$$, $$\\ce{Mg}$$ has the highest atomic number so of these three, it would be most difficult to ionize $$\\ce{Mg^{2+}}$$.\n\nFor $$\\ce{Ar, K+}$$ and $$\\ce{Ca^{2+}}$$, $$\\ce{Ca}$$ has the highest atomic number so of these three, it would be most difficult to ionize $$\\ce{Ca^{2+}}$$.\n\nNow it is just necessary to compare the ionization of $$\\ce{Mg^{2+}}$$ to $$\\ce{Ca^{2+}}$$. Since the $$2p$$ orbitals are closer to the nucleus than the $$3p$$ orbitals, it will be harder to ionize $$\\ce{Mg^{2+}}$$ than $$\\ce{Ca^{2+}}$$.\n\nAxiom 1: Ionisation energy increases from left to right along a period.\n\nAxiom 2: Ionisation energy decreases from top to bottom along a group.\n\nBoth of these are often or mostly correct. However, there is more. Remember that the electron you are extracting carries a negative charge ($$\\ce{e-}$$). So:\n\nAxiom 3: Ionisation energy increases dramatically for every positive charge introduced.\n\nAnd also, to state the concept of core versus valence electrons:\n\nAxiom 4: The first ionisation energy of a core electron will be dramatically more than that of a valence electron.\n\nIn your case, you have six atoms to compare which all have core electrons only (if you count the fully populated shell of the noble gases as core electrons which isn\u2019t strictly correct but close enough). Thus we do not need to consider axiom 4. Axiom 3 tells us, that $$\\ce{Mg^2+}$$ and $$\\ce{Ca^2+}$$ are the only contestants for maximum ionisation energy since they both have the highest charge. And comparing the two according to axiom 2, we arrive at $$\\ce{Mg^2+}$$ having the highest ionisation energy of these atoms.","date":"2021-01-28 12:05:30","metadata":"{\"extraction_info\": {\"found_math\": true, \"script_math_tex\": 0, \"script_math_asciimath\": 0, \"math_annotations\": 0, \"math_alttext\": 0, \"mathml\": 0, \"mathjax_tag\": 0, \"mathjax_inline_tex\": 0, \"mathjax_display_tex\": 0, \"mathjax_asciimath\": 0, \"img_math\": 0, \"codecogs_latex\": 0, \"wp_latex\": 0, \"mimetex.cgi\": 0, \"\/images\/math\/codecogs\": 0, \"mathtex.cgi\": 0, \"katex\": 0, \"math-container\": 27, \"wp-katex-eq\": 0, \"align\": 0, \"equation\": 0, \"x-ck12\": 0, \"texerror\": 0, \"math_score\": 0.6962787508964539, \"perplexity\": 322.8035650893229}, \"config\": {\"markdown_headings\": true, \"markdown_code\": true, \"boilerplate_config\": {\"ratio_threshold\": 0.18, \"absolute_threshold\": 10, \"end_threshold\": 15, \"enable\": true}, \"remove_buttons\": true, \"remove_image_figures\": true, \"remove_link_clusters\": true, \"table_config\": {\"min_rows\": 2, \"min_cols\": 3, \"format\": \"plain\"}, \"remove_chinese\": true, \"remove_edit_buttons\": true, \"extract_latex\": true}, \"warc_path\": \"s3:\/\/commoncrawl\/crawl-data\/CC-MAIN-2021-04\/segments\/1610704843561.95\/warc\/CC-MAIN-20210128102756-20210128132756-00598.warc.gz\"}"}
| null | null |
Carlos Rubio puede hacer referencia a:
Carlos Rubio y Colell (1833-1871), escritor y político español.
Carlos Rubio Álvarez (1862-1936), sacerdote católico español.
Carlos Rubio Carvajal (1950-), arquitecto español.
Carlos Rubio López de la Llave (1951-), profesor y traductor español, experto en literatura japonesa.
|
{
"redpajama_set_name": "RedPajamaWikipedia"
}
| 4,110
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How Old Is Kamala Harris,The Dark Side Of Kamala Harris People Are Not Talking|2020-12-29
Kamala Harris & Willie Brown: 5 Fast Facts You Need To …
Aug 13, 2020How 29-year-old Kamala Harris began an affair with powerful San Francisco politician Willie Brown, then 60 and married, who appointed her to ….com is a registered trademark of CBS Interactive Inc.Kamala Harris and lawyer Douglas Emhoff in 2014.;m really comfortable with my children.If Joe Biden offers the vice presidential slot to Sen.He is based in California but also licensed to practice in Washington D.While some Republican lawmakers said they won't vote against the President's veto, others vow that they will and believe a veto override will be successful." The same article described how Brown had a "long-estranged wife, Blanche.He is based in California but also licensed to practice in Washington D.Related: Find out who our experts think will win Super Bowl 2021 (Updated Weekly).Additional accomplishments include a successful lawsuit against the false advertising of the for-profit Corinthian Colleges chain, as well as continued legal pursuit of the classified advertising service Backpage, which led to its CEO pleading guilty to facilitating prostitution and money laundering after Harris moved on to the Senate.Dalton Ross of Entertainment Weekly wrote that the series is having its best season ever and was positive about the series' take on different genres, writing The end result is a bolder, more badass collection of stories that manages to feel narratively cohesive while, at the same time, visually and tonally independent.
Kamala Harris's Affair With San Francisco Mayor Willie …
Her mother's name is Shyamala Gopalan Harris and her father's name is Donald Harris.Tennant was a familiar face in the fashion industry, having appeared in several couture spreads in magazines like Italian, British and French Vogue.Now 86, Brown's argument, made before Harris accepted the position, was that "the glory would be short-lived.They got married on 22 August 2014.Emily Hannemann of TV Insider also noted the series' improvement over previous seasons and praised the character development, plot and dialogue.Conference of Mayors' 86th annual Winter Meeting at the Capitol Hilton January 25, 2018 in Washington, DC.Aug 13, 2020Emhoff, Kamala Harris's husband, is an entertainment attorney.Kamala Harris raised and spent her childhood in her hometown.On , during a Martin Luther King Jr.She has got a younger sister and her name is Maya Harris.Aug 13, 2020How 29-year-old Kamala Harris began an affair with powerful San Francisco politician Willie Brown, then 60 and married, who appointed her to ….Not to mention that the zombies are still treated as things to be scared of.
55 Things You Need To Know About Kamala Harris – POLITICO
They were engaged in March 2014 after the blind date arranged by her friend.Red Dead Redemption 1 is the start of the series and is just as great a game as its sequel.Later, she was admitted to the California State Bar in 1990.Her mother's name is Shyamala Gopalan Harris and her father's name is Donald Harris.(NewsNation Now) — No explosives were found in a suspicious vehicle that shut down Highway 231 South Sunday in Wilson County, Tennessee, according to authorities.Harris then enrolled at the University of California, Hastings College of the Law, earning her J.15 when he replaced Hoyer in the second quarter and went 19-for-36 with a touchdown and interception in a 26-24 loss.They both used to sing in Baptist choir." The same article described how Brown had a "long-estranged wife, Blanche.In November 2016, Harris handily defeated Congresswoman Loretta Sanchez for a U.
They have two children, Ella, and Cole from her previous marriage.She was recruited by Louise Renne in 2000, and she worked as chief of the Community and Neighbourhood Division.Kamala Harris, my advice to her would be to politely decline.Kamala Harris and lawyer Douglas Emhoff in 2014.He represents large domestic and international corporations and some of today's highest profile individuals and influencers in complex business, real estate and intellectual property litigation disputes.Oct 07, 20202.So what?" In that column, Brown said he supported Harris's career but "had also helped scores of other politicians over the years," the Post reported, adding that he wrote, "The difference is that Harris is the only one who, after I helped her, sent word that I would be indicted if I 'so much as jaywalked' while she was D.Harris is active in social media as well.
They got married on 22 August 2014.Alarms blare in the background and cries of people in great distress ring in the background. Los Angeles Mayor Eric Garcetti (L) and former San Francisco Mayor Willie Brown visit during the U.It is the third entry in the Red Dead series and a prequel to 2010's Red Dead Redemption and was released onfor PC.She holds American citizenship and she has a mixed ethnicity of Asian and Black.Forgot your password?Don't have an account? Sign up here.Now that Democratic Presidential Candidate Joe Biden has chosen her as his running mate, making her the first Black woman and first Asian American to be picked as a vice presidential running mate on a major-party ticket, the scrutiny will only get worse.What Raimi can't find is a center.Brown hasn't gone away easily; he's penned two recent op-eds about Harris.Harris also pushed back against Pence's assertions that a President Biden would ban fracking and immediately raise taxes, and defended her own record as California attorney general.Where was that all year?.
Kamala Harris – Wikipedia
" After she agreed to the nomination, Brown changed his mind and declared himself pleased by it, according to SFGate.Of course, the non-stop thrill ride will roll all the way until Super Bowl LV, with games nearly every day for fans to enjoy.Currently, she is the vice president of the US.After serving as ahead, she became successful to arrest the criminal by more than a half.That article called Brown "Harris' spurned ex-lover and unsolicited political backer.The fashion industry is already mourning the loss of the legendary supermodel, with British Vogue editor Edward Enninful and Versace posting tributes to Tennant on social media.Harris is a tested and proven campaigner who will work her backside off to get Biden elected.The Republican-led Federal Communications Commission is writing new regulations for Section 230 that would penalize companies for censoring content.She became managing attorney of the Career Criminal Unit in the San Francisco District Attorney's Office in 1998, and in 2000 she was appointed chief of its Community and Neighborhood Division, during which time she established the state's first Bureau of Children's Justice.Additional accomplishments include a successful lawsuit against the false advertising of the for-profit Corinthian Colleges chain, as well as continued legal pursuit of the classified advertising service Backpage, which led to its CEO pleading guilty to facilitating prostitution and money laundering after Harris moved on to the Senate.
Posted in Support Your Immune System Leave a comment
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{
"redpajama_set_name": "RedPajamaCommonCrawl"
}
| 7,966
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Q: GET or import $var as input value to Form after the page is loaded - onClick Button? I have a FORM with 2 input fields $first_name and $last_name.
<?
$first_name = get_post_meta($post->ID, 'fname', true);
$last_name = get_post_meta($post->ID, 'lname', true);
$fname_tmp = 'Foo' ; // First Name TEMP
$lname_tmp = 'Bar' ; // Last Name TEMP
?>
<input type="text" value="<? echo $first_name;?>" name="first_name" />
<input type="text" value="<? echo $last_name;?>" name="last_name" />
I want to add a onClick "GET/IMPORT" Button/function in this form. So if a user press this button then inputs field first_name should show Foo and last_name should show Bar
How can I do this? Using PHP?
Many thanks in advance.
A: Have a .php file which will respond to the onclick event triggered in the form.
<?php
$result['fname'] = 'FOO';
$result['lname'] = 'Bar';
echo json_encode($result);
?>
Write a jQuery function to trigger the event and receive response from php
You can add this javascript code anywhere in your page, but between your is recommended.
<script src="http://ajax.googleapis.com/ajax/libs/jquery/1.10.2/jquery.min.js"></script>
<script type="text/javascript">
$(document).ready(function() {
$('.button').click(function() {
$.get('/path-to-php-file', function(data) {
result = $.parseJSON(data);
$("input[name='first_name']").val(result.fname);
$("input[name='last_name']").val(result.lname);
});
});
});
</script>
Create a button in your form
<input class="button" type="button" value="Get/Import" />
A: I try it. it work. Here is your code.
<script src="http://ajax.googleapis.com/ajax/libs/jquery/1.7.2/jquery.min.js"></script>
<script type="text/javascript" >
$(function() {
$(".buttonclass").click(function()
{
var fname_tmp = $("#fname_tmp").val();
if($("#fname_tmp").val()=='') fname_tmp="";
var last_name = $("#lname_tmp").val();
if($("#lname_tmp").val()=='') last_name="";
document.getElementById('first_name').value=fname_tmp;
document.getElementById('last_name').value=last_name;
});
});
</script>
<?php
//$first_name = get_post_meta($post->ID, 'fname', true);
//$last_name = get_post_meta($post->ID, 'lname', true);
$fname_tmp = 'Foo' ; // First Name TEMP
$lname_tmp = 'Bar' ; // Last Name TEMP
?>
<input type="hidden" name="fname_tmp" id="fname_tmp" value="Foo"/>
<input type="hidden" name="lname_tmp" id="lname_tmp" value="Bar"/>
<input type="text" value="<?php echo $first_name;?>" name="first_name" id="first_name"/>
<input type="text" value="<?php echo $last_name;?>" name="last_name" id="last_name"/>
<input type="button" name="mybutton" id="mybutton" value="Click Me" class="buttonclass" />
|
{
"redpajama_set_name": "RedPajamaStackExchange"
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| 6,384
|
title: How to Interpret a Correlation Coefficient R
localeTitle: كيفية تفسير معامل الارتباط R
---
## كيفية تفسير معامل الارتباط R
هذا هو كعب. [ساعد مجتمعنا على توسيعه](https://github.com/freecodecamp/guides/tree/master/src/pages/mathematics/how-to-interpret-a-correlation-coefficient-r/index.md) .
[سيساعدك دليل النمط السريع هذا على ضمان قبول طلب السحب](https://github.com/freecodecamp/guides/blob/master/README.md) .
#### معلومات اكثر:
|
{
"redpajama_set_name": "RedPajamaGithub"
}
| 9,197
|
Duje Čop (Vinkovci, 1 de fevereiro de 1990) é um futebolista profissional croata que atua como atacante, atualmente defende o Standard Liège.
Carreira
Duje Čop fez parte do elenco da Seleção Croata de Futebol da Eurocopa de 2016.
Futebolistas da Croácia
Futebolistas do HNK Hajduk Split
Futebolistas do Clube Desportivo Nacional
Futebolistas do GNK Dinamo Zagreb
Futebolistas do Cagliari Calcio
Futebolistas do Málaga Club de Fútbol
Futebolistas do Real Sporting de Gijón
Futebolistas do Standard de Liège
Futebolistas do Real Valladolid Club de Fútbol
Jogadores da Seleção Croata de Futebol
Jogadores da Eurocopa de 2016
|
{
"redpajama_set_name": "RedPajamaWikipedia"
}
| 637
|
Q: Errors while upgrading from Sharepoint 2010 foundation to Sharepoint enterprise I currently have sharepoint foundation installed and the version number it says is 14.0.4762.1000
I am planning to upgrade to Sharepoint 2010 enterprise.
Before upgrading to sharepoint 2010 enterprise, I completed pre-requisite checker and also installed Office plus 2010 (64 bit).
The server I am planning to install Sharepoint 2010 enterprise is windows 2008 R2 server with SQL 2008Rs (64 bit).
Now I click setup.exe and key-in license key, the progress bar moves for couple of minutes and gives error
"Microsoft sharepoint server 2010 encountered an error during setup". When I check 14 hive and logs folder, I do see some log files but I don't see like any errors and sometimes it makes me think that those log files may not be related to this installation.
How to troubleshoot these log files? Is the log file location I mentioned correct?
Please suggest how do I proceed?
Update 1 : Below is what I found from the log file in TEMP folder. It talks about registry keys etc but I have logged in as admin and also I launched setup.exe with Run as 'admin'.
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): DWFolder = C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\DW\'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): SETUPINTLDLLDIRECTORY = C:\Users\ADMINI~1\AppData\Local\Temp\3\Setup000018a0\'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): LAUNCHEDBYSETUPEXE = 1'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): Manufacturer = Microsoft Corporation'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): ProductCode = {90140000-1015-0409-1000-0000000FF1CE}'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): ProductLanguage = 1033'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): ProductName = Microsoft SharePoint Foundation 2010 1033 Lang Pack'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): ProductVersion = 14.0.4763.1000'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): UpgradeCode = {00140000-1015-0000-1000-0000000FF1CE}'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): BUILD = 4750_1000\x64\ship\1033\wssmui'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): DWLANGUAGE = 1033'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): INSTALLLANGUAGE = 1033'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): SetupExeMetadata = PACKAGE.XML_90101504091000;SETUP.XML_90101504091000;BRANDING.XML_1033'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): RequiredOnAllServers = 1'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): emptysource_Ref = emptysource_Ref'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): DISABLEFEATURES = DISABLE_SHAREPOINT_CHECKBOX\'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): product_Ref = product_Ref'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): ProductNameBase = Microsoft Windows SharePoint Services 4.0'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): ProductNameNonQualified = Microsoft Windows SharePoint Services 4.0'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): ProductNameNonQualifiedShort = Microsoft Windows SharePoint Services 4.0'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): ProductNameNonVersioned = Microsoft Windows SharePoint Services 4.0'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): ProductNameQualified = Microsoft Windows SharePoint Services 4.0'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): InstalledByCatalyst_Ref = 0'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): SetARPINSTALLLOCATIONProperty_Ref = 0'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): standardexecuteactions_Ref = standardexecuteactions_Ref'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): SETUPSUPPORTURL = http://support.microsoft.com/?kbid=xxxxxx'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): ERRORSUPPORTTEXT_RETAIL_DEFAULT_PROBLEM_PRE = If problem persists, contact Microsoft Product Support Services (PSS) for assistance. For information about how to contact PSS, see '
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): ERRORSUPPORTTEXT_RETAIL_DEFAULT_PROBLEM_POST = .'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): ERRORSUPPORTTEXT_RETAIL_DEFAULT_PERMISSION_PRE = Verify that you have sufficient permissions to access the registry or contact Microsoft Product Support Services (PSS) for assistance. For information about how to contact PSS, see '
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): ERRORSUPPORTTEXT_RETAIL_DEFAULT_PERMISSION_POST = .'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): ERRORSUPPORTTEXT_RETAIL_DEFAULT_PRE = Contact Microsoft Product Support Services (PSS) for assistance. For information about how to contact PSS, see '
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): ERRORSUPPORTTEXT_RETAIL_DEFAULT_POST = .'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): ERRORSUPPORTTEXT_OEM_DEFAULT = Contact your computer manufacturer's product support for assistance.'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): ERRORSUPPORTTEXT_OEM_DEFAULT_PERMISSION = Verify that you have sufficient permissions to access the registry or contact your computer manufacturer's product support for assistance.'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): ERRORSUPPORTTEXT_OEM_DEFAULT_PROBLEM = If problem persists, contact your computer manufacturer's product support for assistance.'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): InstalledByServerCatalyst_Ref = 0'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): ARPSYSTEMCOMPONENT = 1'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): NetFrameworkVer = v3.5.21022'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): USINGUIINSTALLMODE = #1'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): SETUPTYPE = CLEAN_INSTALL'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): ALLUSERS = 1'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): SecureCustomProperties = DISABLEFEATURES;DWLANGUAGE;ERRORSUPPORTTEXT;LAUNCHEDBYSETUPEXE;OFFICESERVERSETTINGS;PIDKEY;PIDREPAIR;SETUPHELPFILEDIR;SETUPINTLDLLDIRECTORY;SETUPPSSHELPFILEDIR;SETUPSUPPORTURL'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): MsiHiddenProperties = PIDKEY'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): PackageCode = {36B7350E-C792-4C9F-A91D-2A79948C1147}'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): ProductState = 5'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): ProductToBeRegistered = 1'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): ADDLOCAL = ALL'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): CURRENTDIRECTORY = \tsclient\U\Microsoft\Servers\SharePoint\2010\SharePoint Server 2010\en_sharepoint_server_2010_x64_dvd_518634'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): REBOOT = ReallySuppress'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): MSIRESTARTMANAGERCONTROL = Disable'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): SETUPEXEINSTALLUILANGUAGE = 1033'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): CLIENTUILEVEL = 3'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): MSICLIENTUSESEXTERNALUI = 1'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): CLIENTPROCESSID = 6304'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): PRODUCTLANGUAGE = 1033'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): VersionDatabase = 200'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): VersionMsi = 5.00'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): VersionNT = 601'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): VersionNT64 = 601'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): WindowsBuild = 7600'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): ServicePackLevel = 0'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): ServicePackLevelMinor = 0'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): MsiNTProductType = 2'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): WindowsVolume = C:\'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): System64Folder = C:\Windows\system32\'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): SystemFolder = C:\Windows\SysWOW64\'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): RemoteAdminTS = 1'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): TempFolder = C:\Users\ADMINI~1\AppData\Local\Temp\'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): ProgramFilesFolder = C:\Program Files (x86)\'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): CommonFilesFolder = C:\Program Files (x86)\Common Files\'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): AppDataFolder = C:\Users\Administrator\AppData\Roaming\'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): FavoritesFolder = C:\Users\Administrator\Favorites\'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): NetHoodFolder = C:\Users\Administrator\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Network Shortcuts\'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): PersonalFolder = C:\Users\Administrator\Documents\'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): PrintHoodFolder = C:\Users\Administrator\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Printer Shortcuts\'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): RecentFolder = C:\Users\Administrator\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): SendToFolder = C:\Users\Administrator\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\SendTo\'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): TemplateFolder = C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Templates\'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): CommonAppDataFolder = C:\ProgramData\'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): LocalAppDataFolder = C:\Users\Administrator\AppData\Local\'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): MyPicturesFolder = C:\Users\Administrator\Pictures\'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): AdminToolsFolder = C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Administrative Tools\'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): StartupFolder = C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): ProgramMenuFolder = C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): StartMenuFolder = C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): DesktopFolder = C:\Users\Public\Desktop\'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): FontsFolder = C:\Windows\Fonts\'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): GPTSupport = 1'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): OLEAdvtSupport = 1'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): ShellAdvtSupport = 1'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): MsiAMD64 = 6'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): Msix64 = 6'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): Intel = 6'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): PhysicalMemory = 4096'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): VirtualMemory = 4489'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): AdminUser = 1'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): MsiTrueAdminUser = 1'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): LogonUser = administrator'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): UserSID = S-1-5-21-3936247695-3404464505-3220683015-500'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): UserLanguageID = 1033'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): ComputerName = CRMLAB01'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): SystemLanguageID = 1033'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): ScreenX = 1024'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): ScreenY = 768'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): CaptionHeight = 19'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): BorderTop = 1'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): BorderSide = 1'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): TextHeight = 16'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): TextInternalLeading = 3'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): ColorBits = 32'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): TTCSupport = 1'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): Time = 9:46:58'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): Date = 9/12/2012'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): MsiNetAssemblySupport = 4.0.30319.1'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): MsiWin32AssemblySupport = 6.1.7600.16385'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): RedirectedDllSupport = 2'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): MsiRunningElevated = 1'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): Privileged = 1'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): USERNAME = Windows User'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): Installed = 00:00:00'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): DATABASE = C:\Windows\Installer\9aca3.msi'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): OriginalDatabase = C:\Windows\Installer\9aca3.msi'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): UILevel = 2'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): Preselected = 1'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): ACTION = INSTALL'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): ROOTDRIVE = C:\'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): CostingComplete = 1'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): OutOfDiskSpace = 0'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): OutOfNoRbDiskSpace = 0'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): PrimaryVolumeSpaceAvailable = 0'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): PrimaryVolumeSpaceRequired = 0'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): PrimaryVolumeSpaceRemaining = 0'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): INSTALLLEVEL = 1'
MSI(INFO): 'Property(S): ServicesToRestart = ReportServer=R;SPTIMERV4=R;SPADMINV4=R;SPTRACEV4=R;SPUSERCODEV4=R;'
MSI(INFO): '=== Logging stopped: 9/12/2012 9:46:58 ==='
MSI(COMMONDATA): '1: 2 2: 0 '
MSI(COMMONDATA): '1: 2 2: 1 '
MSI(TERMINATE): ''
Successfully rolled back the configuration of package:
|
{
"redpajama_set_name": "RedPajamaStackExchange"
}
| 3,059
|
\section{Introduction}
Introduced first by A. Grothendieck in \cite{G2}, the theory of $p$-summing operators was exhaustively studied by A. Pietsch \cite{Pi} and J. Lindenstrauss and A. Pe{\l}czy\'{n}ski \cite{LP}. In 1955, A. Grothendieck \cite{Gro} introduced and studied nuclear and integral operators that are central to his theory of tensor products. A. Persson and A. Pietsch \cite{PP} introduced and investigated $p$-nuclear and $p$-integral operators that are natural generalizations to arbitrary $1\leq p\leq \infty$ of the classes of nuclear operators and integral operators. The classes of $p$-summing, $p$-nuclear and $p$-integral operators have extreme utility in the study of many different problems in Banach space theory. We recommend \cite{DJT} and \cite{P} for a complete study of the topics. So it is natural to generalize these three classes of operator to various settings. In 1998, the generalization of the theory of $p$-summing operators to the noncommutative setting was first developed by G. Pisier \cite{Pis} by means of the so called \textit{completely $p$-summing maps}. Successively, the classes of nuclear operators, integral operators and other ideals of operators were generalized to the noncommutative setting ([12,19] etc.). In 2009, J. Farmer and W. B. Johnson started in \cite{FJ09} studying the $p$-summing operators in the nonlinear setting, which they called \textit{Lipschitz $p$-summing operators}. The paper \cite{FJ09} has motivated the study of various classes of classical operator ideals in the nonlinear setting (see, for instance, \cite{JMS},
\cite{Dom11}, \cite{CZ12}, \cite{BC}, etc).
By comparison to the noncommutative setting and the nonlinear setting, it seems that the theory of $p$-summing, $p$-nuclear and $p$-integral operators in the Banach lattice setting attracts much less attention.
In 1971, U. Schlotterbeck \cite{Schl} (see also \cite{Sch}) characterized abstract $M$-spaces ($AM$-spaces for short) and abstract $L$-spaces ($AL$-spaces) in a way quite different from the classical Kakutani's representation theorems for $AM$-spaces with a unit and $AL$-spaces: A Banach lattice $X$ is isometric lattice isomorphic to an $AL$-space ($AM$-space, respectively) if and only if every positive unconditionally summable sequence in $X$ is absolutely summable (every norm null sequence in $X$ is order bounded), that is, the identity map $I_{X}$ on $X$ takes positive unconditionally summable sequences to absolutely summable sequences ($I_{X}$ takes norm null sequences to order bounded sequences). In 1972, H. H. Schaefer \cite{Sch1} generalized this property of the identity map on $AL$-spaces ($AM$-spaces, respectively) in a natural way and introduced the concept of the so called \textit{cone absolutely summing operators} (\textit{majorizing operators}, respectively). Furthermore, H. H. Schaefer \cite{Sch1} characterized cone absolutely summing operators (majorizing operators, respectively) by factoring positively through $AL$-spaces ($AM$-spaces, respectively). On the other hand, by introducing the $l$-norm on the class of all cone absolutely summing operators (the $m$-norm on the class of all majorizing operators), H. H. Schaefer \cite{Sch1} extended Schlotterbeck's characterizations of $AL$-spaces ($AM$-spaces, respectively).
In 1971, L. Krsteva in \cite{Kr} written in Russian (see also \cite{GC}) extended cone absolutely summing operators to the so-called \textit{latticially $p$-summing operators}.
Being unaware of \cite{Kr} and \cite{GC}, O. Blasco ([3,2]) introduced the notion of positive $p$-summing operators, which is exactly the same as latticially $p$-summing operators.
Having latticially $p$-summing operators at hand, it is natural to think about $p$-nuclear and $p$-integral operators in the Banach lattice setting.
In 1998, O. I. Zhukova \cite{Zhu} defined and investigated a partially positive version of $p$-nuclear operators-\textit{latticially $p$-nuclear operators}. By using of latticially $p$-nuclear operators, O. I. Zhukova \cite{Zhu} naturally introduced the notion of latticially $p$-integral operators and proved
some of well-known results analogous to the classical theory of $p$-summing, $p$-nuclear and $p$-integral operators.
This paper is a continuous work of \cite{CBC}.
The aim of the present paper is to develop the theory of $p$-nuclear and $p$-integral operators in the Banach lattice setting. The paper is organized as follows.
It was known \cite[Theorem 18.2.5]{P} that the adjoint operator ideal $[\mathcal{N}_{p},\nu_{p}]^{*}$ of $[\mathcal{N}_{p},\nu_{p}]$ is equal to $[\prod_{p^{*}},\pi_{p^{*}}]$. This formula described the dual space $(\mathcal{N}_{p}(E,F))^{*}$ as the space $\prod_{p^{*}}(F,E^{**})$ if $E^{*}$ and $F$ have the metric approximation property. O. I. Zhukova \cite{Zhu} established an analogous representation theorem for $(\widetilde{\mathcal{N}}_{p}(E,X))^{*}$, the dual space of the latticially $p$-nuclear operators, in terms of latticially $p$-summing operators if $E^{*}$ has the metric approximation property or $X$ has the positive metric approximation property. In Section 2, we introduce the notion of positively $p$-nuclear operators that is a partially positive version of right $p$-nuclear operators (\cite{Per},\cite[Sec.6.2]{R}). Firstly, we show that the class of positively $p$-nuclear operators does not coincide with the class of right $p$-nuclear operators. Secondly, we establish a representation theorem for $(\widetilde{\mathcal{N}}^{p}(X,E))^{*}$, the dual space of the positively $p$-nuclear operators, by means of positive $p$-majorizing operators introduced by D. Chen, A. Belacel and J. A. Ch\'{a}vez-Dom\'{i}nguez \cite{CBC} if $E$ has the approximation property or $X^{*}$ has the positive metric approximation property. Recall that when $E^{*}$ has the approximation property, any operator $T:E\rightarrow F$ with nuclear adjoint is nuclear and both nuclear norms coincide (see for instance \cite[Proposition 4.10]{R}). The analogous result for $p$-nuclear operators due to O. I. Reinov \cite[Theorem 1]{Rei} states that when $E^{*}$ or $F^{***}$ has the approximation property, then an operator $T:E \rightarrow F$ with $p$-nuclear adjoint is right $p$-nuclear and the $p$-nuclear norm of $T^{*}$ and the right $p$-nuclear norm of $T$ coincide.
As a corollary of our representation theorem for $(\widetilde{\mathcal{N}}^{p}(X,E))^{*}$, we prove that when $E^{***}$ has the approximation property or $X^{*}$ has the positive metric approximation property, then an operator $T:X\rightarrow E$ with a latticially $p$-nuclear adjoint is positively $p$-nuclear and the latticially $p$-nuclear norm of $T^{*}$ and the positively $p$-nuclear norm of $T$ coincide. Furthermore, we use O. I. Zhukova's representation theorem for $(\widetilde{\mathcal{N}}_{p}(E,X))^{*}$ to prove that when $E^{*}$ has the approximation property or $X^{****}$ has the positive metric approximation property, then an operator $S:E\rightarrow X$ with a positively $p$-nuclear adjoint is latticially $p$-nuclear and the positively $p$-nuclear norm of $S^{*}$ and the latticially $p$-nuclear norm of $S$ coincide. Finally, we use our representation theorem for $(\widetilde{\mathcal{N}}^{p}(X,E))^{*}$ to
describe the space of positive $p$-majorizing operators via positively $p$-nuclear operators and nuclear operators.
The operator ideal of $p$-integral operators is defined to be the maximal hull of the ideal of $p$-nuclear operators (\cite{P}). Following A. Defant and K. Floret \cite{DF}, the maximal hull of a Banach operator ideal is defined by finite dimensional subspaces and finite co-dimensional subspaces. It should be mentioned that the maximal hull can be restated by finite rank operators (see \cite[Theorem 8.7.4]{P}). Based on this restatement, O. I. Zhukova \cite{Zhu} defined the class of latticially $p$-integral operators to be the left positive maximal hull of the class of latticially $p$-nuclear operators. In Section 3, we define the class of positively $p$-integral operators to be the right positive maximal hull of the class of positively $p$-nuclear operators. Relating to order completeness, we show that positively $p$-integral operators can be characterized by finite dimensional sublattices and finite co-dimensional subspaces. But, when relating to positive metric approximation property, we characterize positively $p$-integral operators only by finite co-dimensional subspaces and latticially $p$-integral operators only by finite dimensional subspaces. As applications, we establish the duality relationships between latticially $p$-integral operators and positively $p$-integral operators. Consequently, we prove that an operator $S:E\rightarrow X$ is latticially $p$-integral precisely when $S^{**}$ is if $X^{**}$ has the positive metric approximation property (resp. an operator $T:X\rightarrow E$ is positively $p$-integral precisely when $T^{**}$ is if $X^{*}$ has the positive metric approximation property). O. I. Zhukova \cite{Zhu} proved that the class of latticially $p$-nuclear operators from $E$ to $X$ can be embedded isometrically into the class of latticially $p$-integral operators from $E$ to $X$ whenever $E^{*}$ has the metric approximation property and $X$ has the positive metric approximation property. Analogously, we prove that the class of positively $p$-nuclear operators from $X$ to $E$ can be embedded isometrically into the class of positively $p$-integral operators from $X$ to $E$ if $X^{*}$ has the positive metric approximation property and $E$ has the metric approximation property. \cite[Theorem 19.2.13]{P} stated that the adjoint operator ideal $[\prod_{p},\pi_{p}]^{*}$ of $[\prod_{p},\pi_{p}]$ is $[\mathcal{I}_{p^{*}},i_{p^{*}}]$. This formula described $\mathcal{I}_{p^{*}}(F,E^{**})$ as the dual of the $\pi_{p}$-closure of $\mathcal{F}(E,F)$ in $\prod_{p}(E,F)$ when $E^{*}$ and $F$ has the metric approximation property. Analogously, O. I. Zhukova \cite{Zhu} described $\widetilde{\mathcal{I}}_{p^{*}}(E,X^{**})$, the space of latticially $p^{*}$-integral operators from $E$ to $X^{**}$, as the dual of the $\|\cdot\|_{\Lambda_{p}}$-closure of $\mathcal{F}(X,E)$ in the space of latticially $p$-summing operators if $E^{*}$ has the metric approximation property and $X^{**}$ has the positive metric approximation property. In this section, we describe $\widetilde{\mathcal{I}}^{p^{*}}(X,E^{**})$, the space of positively $p^{*}$-integral operators from $X$ to $E^{**}$, as the dual of the $\|\cdot\|_{\Upsilon_{p}}$-closure of $\mathcal{F}(E,X)$ in the space of positive $p$-majorizing operators if $E^{**}$ has the metric approximation property, $X^{*}$ has the positive metric approximation property and $X$ is order continuous.
\noindent {\bf Notation and Preliminary.} Our notation and terminology are standard as may be found in [28,10,23]. Throughout the paper, $X,Y,Z$ will always denote real Banach lattices, whereas $E,F,G$ will denote real Banach spaces. By an operator, we always mean a bounded linear operator.
For a Banach lattice $X$, we denote by $X_{+}$ the positive cone of $X$, i.e., $X_{+}:=\{x\in X: x\geq 0\}$.
We write $LDim(X)$ for the collection of all finite dimensional sublattices of $X$.
If $M$ is a closed subspace of $E$, we denote by $i_{M}$ the canonical inclusion from $M$ into $E$ and by $Q_{M}$ the natural quotient map from $E$ onto $E/M$.
We let $M^{\perp}:=\{u^{*}\in E^{*}: \langle u^{*},u\rangle=0$ for all $u\in M\}$.
We write $FIN(E)$ for the collection of all finite-dimensional subspaces of $E$ and $COFIN(E)$ for the collection of all finite co-dimensional subspaces of $E$. An operator $T:X\rightarrow Y$ which preserves the lattice operations
is called \textit{lattice homomorphism}, that is, $T(x_{1}\vee x_{2})=Tx_{1}\vee Tx_{2}$ for all $x_{1},x_{2}\in X$.
An one-to-one, surjective lattice homomorphism is called \textit{lattice isomorphism}.
As customary, $B_{E}$ denotes the closed unit ball of $E$, $E^{*}$ its linear dual and $I_{E}$ the identity map on $E$. We denote by $\mathcal{L}(E,F)$ (resp. $\mathcal{F}(E,F)$) the space of all operators (resp. finite rank operators) from $E$ to $F$.
The classes of $p$-summing, $p$-nuclear and $p$-integral operators are denoted by $\prod_{p}, \mathcal{N}_{p}$ and $\mathcal{I}_{p}$, respectively. For Banach lattices $X$ and $Y$, $\mathcal{F}_{+}(X,Y)$ stands for the set of all positive finite rank operators from $X$ to $Y$.
The letters $p,q,r$ will designate elements of $[1,+\infty]$, and $p^{*}$ denotes the exponent conjugate to $p$ (i.e., $\frac{1}{p}+\frac{1}{p^{*}}=1$).
For a Banach space $E$, we denote by $l_{p}(E)$ and $l^{w}_{p}(E)$ the spaces of all $p$-summable and weakly $p$-summable sequences in $E$, respectively, with their usual norms
$$\|(u_{n})_{n}\| _{p}:=(\sum_{n=1}^{\infty}\|u_{n}\|^{p})^{\frac{1}{p}}, \quad \|(u_{n})_{n}\|_{p}^{w}:=\sup_{u^{*}\in B_{E^{*}}}(\sum_{n=1}^{\infty}|\langle u^{*},u_{n}\rangle|^{p})^{\frac{1}{p}}.$$
The reader is referred to [28,10,23] for any unexplained notation or terminology.
\section{Positively $p$-nuclear operators}
Recall \cite{P} that an operator $S:E\rightarrow F$ is called \textit{$p$-nuclear} if $$S=\sum_{j=1}^{\infty}u^{*}_{j}\otimes v_{j},$$
where $(u^{*}_{j})_{j}\in l_{p}(E^{*}), (v_{j})_{j}\in l^{w}_{p^{*}}(F)$.
One set $$\nu_{p}(S):=\inf \|(u^{*}_{j})_{j}\|_{p}\cdot\|(v_{j})_{j}\|_{p^{*}}^{w},$$
where the infimum is taken over all so-called \textit{$p$-nuclear representations} described above.
$1$-nuclear operators are simply called \textit{nuclear operators}. The class of all nuclear operators with nuclear norm is denoted by $[\mathcal{N},\nu].$
O. I. Zhukova \cite{Zhu} introduced the concept of latticially $p$-nuclear operators which can be considered to be partially positive analogues of $p$-nuclear operators as follows.
\begin{definition}\cite{Zhu}
An operator $S:E\rightarrow X$ is called \textit{latticially $p$-nuclear} if
\begin{align}\label{6}
S=\sum_{j=1}^{\infty}u^{*}_{j}\otimes x_{j},
\end{align}
where $(u^{*}_{j})_{j}\in l_{p}(E^{*}), (x_{j})_{j}\in l^{w}_{p^{*}}(X)_{+}$.
The representation (\ref{6}) is referred to as a \textit{latticially $p$-nuclear representation} of $S$.
Put $$\widetilde{\nu}_{p}(S):=\inf \|(u^{*}_{j})_{j}\|_{p}\cdot\|(x_{j})_{j}\|_{p^{*}}^{w},$$
where the infimum is taken over all latticially $p$-nuclear representations of $S$.
\end{definition}
The class of all latticially $p$-nuclear operators is denoted by $\widetilde{\mathcal{N}}_{p}$. O. I. Zhukova \cite{Zhu} observed that
latticially $p$-nuclear operators have the left positive ideal property, that is, if $S\in \widetilde{\mathcal{N}}_{p}(E,X), T\in \mathcal{L}(F,E)$ and $R:X\rightarrow Y$ is positive, then $RST$ is latticially $p$-nuclear and $\widetilde{\nu}_{p}(RST)\leq \|R\|\widetilde{\nu}_{p}(S)\|T\|$.
It was also pointed out in \cite{Zhu} that $[\widetilde{\mathcal{N}}_{p},\widetilde{\nu}_{p}]\subseteq [\widetilde{\mathcal{N}}_{q},\widetilde{\nu}_{q}]$ for $p<q$.
O. I. Zhukova \cite{Zhu} mentioned that an operator $S:E\rightarrow X$ is latticially $p$-nuclear if and only if
\begin{align}\label{10}
S=\sum_{j=1}^{\infty}u^{*}_{j}\otimes x_{j},
\end{align}
where $(u^{*}_{j})_{j}\in l_{p}(E^{*}), (|x_{j}|)_{j}\in l^{w}_{p^{*}}(X)$.
O. I. Zhukova set $$\widetilde{\nu}_{p}'(S):=\inf \|(u^{*}_{j})_{j}\|_{p}\cdot\|(|x_{j}|)_{j}\|_{p^{*}}^{w},$$
where the infimum is taken over all representations (\ref{10}) of $S$.
He also observed that $\widetilde{\nu}_{p}'\leq \widetilde{\nu}_{p}\leq 2\widetilde{\nu}_{p}'$ and
$[\widetilde{\mathcal{N}}_{1},\widetilde{\nu}_{1}']=[\mathcal{N},\nu].$
Recall (\cite{Per},\cite[Sec.6.2]{R}) that an operator $S:E\rightarrow F$ is called \textit{right $p$-nuclear} if $S$ can be written as
$$S=\sum_{j=1}^{\infty}u^{*}_{j}\otimes v_{j},$$
\noindent where $(u^{*}_{j})_{j}\in l^{w}_{p^{*}}(E^{*}), (v_{j})_{j}\in l_{p}(F)$.
Moreover, the right $p$-nuclear norm of $S$ is defined as
$$\nu^{p}(S):=\inf \|(u^{*}_{j})_{j}\|_{p^{*}}^{w}\cdot\|(v_{j})_{j}\|_{p},$$
where the infimum is taken all over possible representations of $S$ as above.
The class of all right $p$-nuclear operators is denoted by $\mathcal{N}^{p}$. It is easy to see that if $S:E\rightarrow F$ is $p$-nuclear, then $S^{*}$ is right $p$-nuclear and $\nu^{p}(S^{*})\leq \nu_{p}(S)$.
In this section, we introduce the notion of positively $p$-nuclear operators, inspired by the definition in the Banach space setting.
\begin{definition}
We say that an operator $T: X\rightarrow E$ is \textit{positively $p$-nuclear} if
\begin{align}\label{7}
T=\sum_{j=1}^{\infty}x^{*}_{j}\otimes u_{j},
\end{align}
where $(x^{*}_{j})_{j}\in l^{w}_{p^{*}}(X^{*})_{+}, (u_{j})_{j}\in l_{p}(E)$.
We call the representation (\ref{7}) a \textit{positively $p$-nuclear representation} of $T$. We set
$$\widetilde{\nu}^{p}(T):=\inf \|(x^{*}_{j})_{j}\|_{p^{*}}^{w}\cdot\|(u_{j})_{j}\|_{p},$$
where the infimum is taken over all positively $p$-nuclear representations of $T$.
The class of all positively $p$-nuclear operators is denoted by $\widetilde{\mathcal{N}}^{p}$.
\end{definition}
We collect some basic properties of positively $p$-nuclear operators which are immediate from the definition. These elementary properties will be used throughout the paper.
\begin{proposition}\label{1.1}
\item[(a)]If $T\in \widetilde{\mathcal{N}}^{p}(X,E), S\in \mathcal{L}(E,F)$ and $R:Y\rightarrow X$ is positive, then $STR$ is positively $p$-nuclear and $\widetilde{\nu}^{p}(STR)\leq \|S\|\widetilde{\nu}^{p}(T)\|R\|$.
\item[(b)]$[\widetilde{\mathcal{N}}^{p},\widetilde{\nu}^{p}]\subseteq [\widetilde{\mathcal{N}}^{q}, \widetilde{\nu}^{q}] $ for $p<q$.
\item[(c)]$T: X\rightarrow E$ is positively $p$-nuclear if and only if
\begin{align}\label{8}
T=\sum_{j=1}^{\infty}x^{*}_{j}\otimes u_{j},
\end{align}
where $(|x^{*}_{j}|)_{j}\in l^{w}_{p^{*}}(X^{*}), (u_{j})_{j}\in l_{p}(E)$. In this case, if we let $$|\widetilde{\nu}^{p}|(T):=\inf \|(|x^{*}_{j}|)_{j}\|_{p^{*}}^{w}\cdot\|(u_{j})_{j}\|_{p},$$
where the infimum is taken over all representations (\ref{8}) of $T$, then $$|\widetilde{\nu}^{p}|(T)\leq \widetilde{\nu}^{p}(T)\leq 2|\widetilde{\nu}^{p}|(T).$$
\item[(d)]$[\widetilde{\mathcal{N}}^{1},|\widetilde{\nu}^{1}|]=[\mathcal{N},\nu].$
\item[(e)]If $S\in \widetilde{\mathcal{N}}_{p}(E,X)$, then $S^{*}\in \widetilde{\mathcal{N}}^{p}(X^{*},E^{*})$ and $\widetilde{\nu}^{p}(S^{*})\leq
\widetilde{\nu}_{p}(S).$ The converse is true if $X$ is a dual Banach lattice and $\widetilde{\nu}^{p}(S^{*})=\widetilde{\nu}_{p}(S).$
\item[(f)]If $T\in \widetilde{\mathcal{N}}^{p}(X,E)$, then $T^{*}\in \widetilde{\mathcal{N}}_{p}(E^{*},X^{*})$ and $\widetilde{\nu}_{p}(T^{*})\leq
\widetilde{\nu}^{p}(T).$ The converse is true if $E$ is a dual Banach space and $\widetilde{\nu}_{p}(T^{*})=\widetilde{\nu}^{p}(T).$
\end{proposition}
\begin{remark}
The class $\widetilde{\mathcal{N}}^{p}$ do not coincide with $\mathcal{N}^{p}$. Indeed, O. I. Zhukova \cite{Zhu} remarked that the operator $T:L_{1}[0,1]\rightarrow L_{2}[0,1]$ defined by $$Tf=\sum\limits_{n=1}^{\infty}\frac{1}{n}(\int_{[0,1]}f(t)r_{n}(t)dt)r_{n},\quad f\in L_{1}[0,1],$$
where $(r_{n})_{n}$ is the Rademacher function sequence, being $p$-nuclear for every $p>1$, is not latticially $p$-nuclear for any $p$. Hence, $T^{*}$ is right $p$-nuclear for every $p>1$. But, by Proposition \ref{1.1} (e), $T^{*}$ is not positively $p$-nuclear for any $p$.
\end{remark}
To describe the conjugate of the space of positively $p$-nuclear operators, we need the concept of positive $p$-majorizing operators introduced in \cite{CBC}.
\begin{definition}\label{1.80}\cite{CBC}
We say that an operator $S:E\rightarrow X$ is \textit{positive $p$-majorizing} if there exists a constant $C>0$ such
\begin{equation}\label{109}
(\sum_{j=1}^{n}|\langle x^{*}_{j},Su_{j}\rangle|^{p})^{\frac{1}{p}}\leq C \|(x^{*}_{j})_{j=1}^{n}\|^{w}_{p},
\end{equation}
for all finite families $(u_{j})_{j=1}^{n}$ in $B_{E}$ and $(x^{*}_{j})_{j=1}^{n}$ in $(X^{*})_{+}$.
\end{definition}
We denote by $\Upsilon_{p}(E,X)$ the space of all positive $p$-majorizing operators from $E$ to $X$. It is easy to see that $\Upsilon_{p}(E,X)$ becomes a Banach space with the norm $\|\cdot\|_{\Upsilon_{p}}$ given by the infimum of the constants $C$ satisfying (\ref{109}). Obviously,
positive $p$-majorizing operators have the left positive ideal property, that is, if $S\in \Upsilon_{p}(E,X), T\in \mathcal{L}(F,E)$ and $R:X\rightarrow Y$ is positive, then $RST$ is positive $p$-majorizing and $\|RST\|_{\Upsilon_{p}}\leq \|R\|\|S\|_{\Upsilon_{p}}\|T\|$.
\begin{definition}\cite{B2}\label{1.9}
An operator $T:X\rightarrow E$ is said to be \textit{positive $p$-summing} if there exists a constant $C>0$ such that
\begin{equation}\label{1}
(\sum_{i=1}^{n}\|Tx_{i}\|^{p})^{\frac{1}{p}}\leq C \|(x_{i})_{i=1}^{n}\|^{w}_{p}.
\end{equation}
for any choice of finitely many vectors $x_{1}, x_{2},\cdots, x_{n}$ in $X_{+}$.
\end{definition}
The space of all positive $p$-summing operators from $X$ to $E$ is denoted by $\Lambda_{p}(X,E)$. This space becomes a Banach space with the norm $\|\cdot\|_{\Lambda_{p}}$ given by the infimum of the constants $C$ satisfying (\ref{1}).
It is easy to see that positive $p$-summing operators have the right positive ideal property, that is, if $T\in \Lambda_{p}(X,E), S\in \mathcal{L}(E,F)$ and $R:Y\rightarrow X$ is positive, then $STR$ is positive $p$-summing and $\|STR\|_{\Lambda_{p}}\leq \|S\|\|T\|_{\Lambda_{p}}\|R\|$.
In \cite{CBC}, we prove the following duality relationships between positive $p$-summing operators and positive $p$-majorizing operators which will be used later.
\begin{theorem}\label{1.6}\cite{CBC}
\item[(a)]An operator $T:X\rightarrow E$ is positive $p$-summing if and only if $T^{*}$ is positive $p$-majorizing. In this case, $\|T\|_{\Lambda_{p}}=\|T^{*}\|_{\Upsilon_{p}}$.
\item[(b)]An operator $S:F\rightarrow Y$ is positive $p$-majorizing if and only if $S^{*}$ is positive $p$-summing. In this case, $\|S\|_{\Upsilon_{p}}=\|S^{*}\|_{\Lambda_{p}}$.
\end{theorem}
Recall that a Banach space $E$ has the \textit{approximation property} ($AP$ for short) if for every $\epsilon>0$ and for every compact subset $K$ of $E$, there exists an operator $S\in \mathcal{F}(E)$ such that $\|Su-u\|<\epsilon$ for all $u\in K$. In addition, if the operator $S$ can be chosen with $\|S\|\leq 1$, $E$ is said to has the \textit{metric approximation property} ($MAP$).
A Banach lattice $X$ is said to have the \textit{positive metric approximation property} ($PMAP$) if for every $\epsilon>0$ and for every compact subset $K$ of $X$, there exists an operator $R\in \mathcal{F}_{+}(X)$ with $\|R\|\leq 1$ such that $\|Rx-x\|<\epsilon$ for all $x\in K$.
We need a result due to A. Lissitsin and E. Oja \cite{LO} which says that positive finite-rank operators between dual Banach lattices are locally conjugate.
\begin{lemma}\label{3.8}\cite{LO}
Let $X,Y$ be Banach lattices, let $F$ be a finite subset of $Y^{*}$ and let $\epsilon>0$. If $S\in \mathcal{F}_{+}(Y^{*},X^{*})$, then there exists an operator $R\in \mathcal{F}_{+}(X,Y)$ such that $\|R\|\leq (1+\epsilon)\|S\|$ and $\|R^{*}y^{*}-Sy^{*}\|<\epsilon$ for all $y^{*}\in F$.
\end{lemma}
It follows from Lemma \ref{3.8} that $X^{*}$ has the $PMAP$ if and only if for every $\epsilon>0$ and each compact subset $K$ of $X^{*}$, there exists an operator
$R\in \mathcal{F}_{+}(X)$ with $\|R\|\leq 1$ such that $\|R^{*}x^{*}-x^{*}\|<\epsilon$ for all $x^{*}\in K$.
\begin{lemma}\label{1.2}
Suppose that $E$ has the $AP$ or $X^{*}$ has the $PMAP$. Assume that $S:E\rightarrow X^{**}$ is positive $p^{*}$-majorizing. Let $(x^{*}_{n})_{n}\in (l^{w}_{p^{*}}(X^{*}))_{+}$ and $(u_{n})_{n}\in l_{p}(E)$. Then
\begin{center}
$\sum\limits_{n=1}^{\infty}x^{*}_{n}\otimes u_{n}=0$ implies $\sum\limits_{n=1}^{\infty}\langle Su_{n},x^{*}_{n}\rangle=0.$
\end{center}
\end{lemma}
\begin{proof}
It is clear that the conclusion holds true if $S$ is finite-rank. Suppose that $S:E\rightarrow X^{**}$ is positive $p^{*}$-majorizing.
\noindent Case 1. $E$ has the $AP$.
Let $\epsilon>0$. Choose $1\leq \xi_{n}\rightarrow \infty$ with $\|(\xi_{n}u_{n})_{n}\|_{p}\leq (1+\epsilon)\|(u_{n})_{n}\|_{p}$. Since $E$ has the $AP$, there exists an operator $U\in \mathcal{F}(E)$ such that $\|U(\frac{u_{n}}{\xi_{n}\|u_{n}\|})-\frac{u_{n}}{\xi_{n}\|u_{n}\|}\|<\epsilon$ for all $n$. Note that $\sum\limits_{n=1}^{\infty}\langle SUu_{n},x^{*}_{n}\rangle=0$. By Theorem \ref{1.6}, we get
\begin{align*}
|\sum\limits_{n=1}^{\infty}\langle Su_{n},x^{*}_{n}\rangle|&=|\sum\limits_{n=1}^{\infty}\langle S(u_{n}-Uu_{n}),x^{*}_{n}\rangle|\\
&=|\sum\limits_{n=1}^{\infty}\langle S^{*}J_{X^{*}}x^{*}_{n},u_{n}-Uu_{n}\rangle|\\
&\leq (\sum_{n=1}^{\infty}\|S^{*}J_{X^{*}}x^{*}_{n}\|^{p^{*}})^{\frac{1}{p^{*}}}(\sum_{n=1}^{\infty}\|u_{n}-Uu_{n}\|^{p})^{\frac{1}{p}}\\
&\leq \epsilon(1+\epsilon)\|S\|_{\Upsilon_{p^{*}}}\|(x^{*}_{n})_{n=1}^{\infty}\|_{p^{*}}^{w}\|(u_{n})_{n}\|_{p}\\
\end{align*}
Letting $\epsilon\rightarrow 0$, we get $$\sum\limits_{n=1}^{\infty}\langle Su_{n},x^{*}_{n}\rangle=0.$$
\noindent Case 2. $X^{*}$ has the $PMAP$.
We may assume that $\lim\limits_{n\rightarrow \infty}\|x^{*}_{n}\|=0$. Let $\epsilon>0$. We choose a positive integral $N$ with $(\sum\limits_{n=N+1}^{\infty}\|u_{n}\|^{p})^{\frac{1}{p}}<\epsilon.$ Let $\delta>0$ be such that
$\delta N^{\frac{1}{p^{*}}}\|S\|\|(u_{n})_{n=1}^{\infty}\|_{p}<\epsilon.$ Since $X^{*}$ has the $PMAP$, it follows from Lemma \ref{3.8} that there exists an operator $R\in \mathcal{F}_{+}(X)$ with $\|R\|\leq 1$ such that $\|R^{*}x^{*}_{n}-x^{*}_{n}\|<\delta$ for all $n$. Note that $\sum\limits_{n=1}^{\infty}\langle R^{**}Su_{n},x^{*}_{n}\rangle=0.$ By Theorem \ref{1.6}, we get
\begin{align*}
|\sum\limits_{n=1}^{\infty}\langle Su_{n},x^{*}_{n}\rangle|&=|\sum\limits_{n=1}^{\infty}\langle Su_{n},x^{*}_{n}-R^{*}x^{*}_{n}\rangle|\\
&\leq \sum\limits_{n=1}^{N}|\langle Su_{n},x^{*}_{n}-R^{*}x^{*}_{n}\rangle|+\sum\limits_{n=N+1}^{\infty}|\langle S^{*}x^{*}_{n},u_{n}\rangle|+
\sum\limits_{n=N+1}^{\infty}|\langle S^{*}R^{*}x^{*}_{n},u_{n}\rangle|\\
&\leq (\sum_{n=1}^{N}\|x^{*}_{n}-R^{*}x^{*}_{n}\|^{p^{*}})^{\frac{1}{p^{*}}}(\sum_{n=1}^{N}\|Su_{n}\|^{p})^{\frac{1}{p}}+
(\sum_{n=N+1}^{\infty}\|S^{*}x^{*}_{n}\|^{p^{*}})^{\frac{1}{p^{*}}}(\sum_{n=N+1}^{\infty}\|u_{n}\|^{p})^{\frac{1}{p}}\\
&+(\sum_{n=N+1}^{\infty}\|S^{*}R^{*}x^{*}_{n}\|^{p^{*}})^{\frac{1}{p^{*}}}(\sum_{n=N+1}^{\infty}\|u_{n}\|^{p})^{\frac{1}{p}}\\
&\leq \delta N^{\frac{1}{p^{*}}}\|S\|\|(u_{n})_{n=1}^{\infty}\|_{p}+2\epsilon\|S\|_{\Upsilon_{p^{*}}}\|(x^{*}_{n})_{n=1}^{\infty}\|_{p^{*}}^{w}\\
&\leq \epsilon+2\epsilon\|S\|_{\Upsilon_{p^{*}}}\|(x^{*}_{n})_{n=1}^{\infty}\|_{p^{*}}^{w}\\
\end{align*}
Letting $\epsilon\rightarrow 0$, we get $$\sum\limits_{n=1}^{\infty}\langle Su_{n},x^{*}_{n}\rangle=0.$$
\end{proof}
Consequently, under the hypothesis of Lemma \ref{1.2}, if $T:X\rightarrow E$ is positively $p$-nuclear and $S:E\rightarrow X^{**}$ is positive $p^{*}$-majorizing, then $\textrm{trace}(ST):=\sum\limits_{n=1}^{\infty}\langle Su_{n},x^{*}_{n}\rangle$ is independent of the choice of the positively $p$-nuclear representation $T=\sum\limits_{n=1}^{\infty}x^{*}_{n}\otimes u_{n}$. Moreover, it is easy to see that $|\textrm{trace}(ST)|\leq \|S\|_{\Upsilon_{p^{*}}}\widetilde{\nu}^{p}(T).$
To prove the main result of this section, we need a lemma due to A. Lissitsin and E. Oja \cite{LO} that demonstrates the connection between finite-dimensional subspaces and finite-dimensional sublattices in order complete Banach lattices. This lemma will be used frequently throughout this paper.
\begin{lemma}\label{1.4}\cite[Lemma 5.5]{LO}
Let $M$ be a finite-dimensional subspace of an order complete Banach lattice $X$ and let
$\epsilon > 0$. Then there exist a sublattice $Z$ of $X$ containing $M$, a finite-dimensional sublattice $G$ of $Z$, and a positive projection $P$ from $Z$ onto $G$ such that $\|Px-x\|\leq \epsilon\|x\|$ for all $x\in M$.
\end{lemma}
We also need the principle of local reflexivity in Banach lattices due to J. L. Conroy, L. C. Moore \cite{CM} and S. J. Bernau \cite{Be}, which plays a crucial role in Banach lattice theory.
\begin{theorem}\label{1.3}\cite[Theorem 2]{Be}
Let $X$ be a Banach lattice and let $M$ be a finite-dimensional sublattice of $X^{**}$.
Then for every finite-dimensional subspace $L$ of $X^{*}$ and every $\epsilon > 0$,
there exists a lattice isomorphism $R$ from $M$ into $X$ such that
\item[(i)]$\|R\|, \|R^{-1}\| \leq 1+\epsilon$;
\item[(ii)]$|\langle x^{**},x^*\rangle-\langle x^{*},Rx^{**}\rangle| \leq \epsilon\|x^{**}\|\|x^*\|$,
for all $x^{**} \in M$ and $x^{*} \in L$.
\end{theorem}
Now we are in a position to give the main result of this section.
\begin{theorem}\label{1.13}
Suppose that $E$ has the $AP$ or $X^{*}$ has the $PMAP$. Then $$\Upsilon_{p^{*}}(E,X^{**})=(\widetilde{\mathcal{N}}^{p}(X,E))^{*}.$$
\end{theorem}
\begin{proof}
Let us define an operator $$V:\Upsilon_{p^{*}}(E,X^{**})\rightarrow(\widetilde{\mathcal{N}}^{p}(X,E))^{*}$$ by $$S\mapsto V_{S}(T)=\textrm{trace}(ST), \quad S \in\Upsilon_{p^{*}}(E,X^{**}), T\in \widetilde{\mathcal{N}}^{p}(X,E).$$
Then $\|V_{S}\|\leq \|S\|_{\Upsilon_{p^{*}}}$.
Let $\varphi\in (\widetilde{\mathcal{N}}^{p}(X,E))^{*}$. We define an operator $S:E\rightarrow X^{**}$ by $\langle Su,x^{*}\rangle=\langle\varphi, x^{*}\otimes u\rangle$ for $u\in E, x^{*}\in X^{*}$.
We claim that $S$ is positive $p^{*}$-majorizing.
Given any $u_{1},u_{2},\cdots,u_{n}$ in $B_{E}$ and $x^{***}_{1},x^{***}_{2},\cdots,x^{***}_{n}$ in $(X^{***})_{+}$. Let $\epsilon>0$. We set $M=\textrm{span}\{Su_{j}:1\leq j\leq n\}$ and $L=\textrm{span}\{x^{***}_{j}:1\leq j\leq n\}$. It follows from Lemma \ref{1.4} that there exist a sublattice $Z$ of $X^{***}$ containing $L$, a finite-dimensional sublattice $G$ of $Z$ and a positive projection $P$ from $Z$ onto $G$ such that $\|Px^{***}-x^{***}\|\leq \epsilon\|x^{***}\|$ for all $x^{***}\in L$. By Theorem \ref{1.3}, we get a lattice isomorphism $R$ from $G$ into $X^{*}$ such that
$\|R\|, \|R^{-1}\| \leq 1+\epsilon$ and
\begin{align}\label{4}
|\langle x^{***},x^{**}\rangle-\langle x^{**},Rx^{***}\rangle| \leq \epsilon\|x^{***}\|\|x^{**}\|,
\end{align}
for all $x^{***} \in G, x^{**} \in M.$
Let $x^{*}_{j}=RPx^{***}_{j}\geq 0(j=1,2,\cdots,n)$. We choose $(\lambda_{j})_{j=1}^{n}$ such that $\sum\limits_{j=1}^{n}|\lambda_{j}|^{p}=1$ and
$$(\sum_{j=1}^{n}|\langle Su_{j},x^{*}_{j}\rangle|^{p^{*}})^{\frac{1}{p^{*}}}=\sum_{j=1}^{n}\lambda_{j}\langle Su_{j},x^{*}_{j}\rangle.$$
Let $T=\sum\limits_{j=1}^{n}x^{*}_{j}\otimes \lambda_{j}u_{j}\in \widetilde{\mathcal{N}}^{p}(X,E)$. Then we have
\begin{align}\label{3}
(\sum_{j=1}^{n}|\langle Su_{j},x^{*}_{j}\rangle|^{p^{*}})^{\frac{1}{p^{*}}}&=\langle \varphi,T\rangle \nonumber \\
&\leq \|\varphi\|\widetilde{\nu}^{p}(T) \nonumber \\
&\leq \|\varphi\|\|(x^{*}_{j})_{j=1}^{n}\|^{w}_{p^{*}} \nonumber \\
&\leq \|\varphi\|(1+\epsilon)^{2}\|(x^{***}_{j})_{j=1}^{n}\|^{w}_{p^{*}}
\end{align}
By (\ref{4}), we get
\begin{align}\label{5}
(\sum_{j=1}^{n}|\langle x^{***}_{j},Su_{j}\rangle-\langle Su_{j},x^{*}_{j}\rangle|^{p^{*}})^{\frac{1}{p^{*}}}&\leq
(\sum_{j=1}^{n}|\langle x^{***}_{j},Su_{j}\rangle-\langle Px^{***}_{j},Su_{j}\rangle|^{p^{*}})^{\frac{1}{p^{*}}} \nonumber \\
&+(\sum_{j=1}^{n}|\langle Px^{***}_{j},Su_{j}\rangle-\langle Su_{j},x^{*}_{j}\rangle|^{p^{*}})^{\frac{1}{p^{*}}} \nonumber \\
&\leq \epsilon \|S\|(\sum_{j=1}^{n}\|x^{***}_{j}\|^{p^{*}})^{\frac{1}{p^{*}}}+\epsilon (1+\epsilon)\|S\|(\sum_{j=1}^{n}\|x^{***}_{j}\|^{p^{*}})^{\frac{1}{p^{*}}}
\end{align}
Combining (\ref{3}) and (\ref{5}), we get
\begin{align*}
(\sum_{j=1}^{n}|\langle x^{***}_{j},Su_{j}\rangle|^{p^{*}})^{\frac{1}{p^{*}}}
&\leq (\sum_{j=1}^{n}|\langle Su_{j},x^{*}_{j}\rangle|^{p^{*}})^{\frac{1}{p^{*}}}+(\sum_{j=1}^{n}|\langle x^{***}_{j},Su_{j}\rangle-\langle Su_{j},x^{*}_{j}\rangle|^{p^{*}})^{\frac{1}{p^{*}}}\\
&\leq \|\varphi\|(1+\epsilon)^{2}\|(x^{***}_{j})_{j=1}^{n}\|^{w}_{p^{*}}+\epsilon (2+\epsilon)\|S\|(\sum_{j=1}^{n}\|x^{***}_{j}\|^{p^{*}})^{\frac{1}{p^{*}}}
\end{align*}
Letting $\epsilon\rightarrow 0$, we get $$(\sum_{j=1}^{n}|\langle x^{***}_{j},Su_{j}\rangle|^{p^{*}})^{\frac{1}{p^{*}}}\leq \|\varphi\|\|(x^{***}_{j})_{j=1}^{n}\|^{w}_{p^{*}},$$ which implies that $S$ is positive $p^{*}$-majorizing and $\|S\|_{\Upsilon_{p^{*}}}\leq \|\varphi\|$.
By the definition of the operator $S$, we see that $\langle\varphi,T\rangle=V_{S}(T)$ for all $T\in \mathcal{F}(X,E)$. Since $\mathcal{F}(X,E)$ is $\widetilde{\nu}^{p}$-dense in $\widetilde{\mathcal{N}}^{p}(X,E)$, it follows that $\varphi=V_{S}$. Hence the operator $V$ is a surjective linear isometry.
\end{proof}
\begin{corollary}
Suppose that $E^{***}$ has the $AP$ or $X^{*}$ has the $PMAP$. If the operator $T:X\rightarrow E$ has a latticially $p$-nuclear adjoint, then $T$ is positively $p$-nuclear and $\widetilde{\nu}^{p}(T)=\widetilde{\nu}_{p}(T^{*}).$
\end{corollary}
\begin{proof}
Suppose that $T$ is not positively $p$-nuclear. Since $T^{*}$ is latticially $p$-nuclear, it follows from Proposition \ref{1.1}(e) that $T^{**}$ is positively $p$-nuclear and so is $T^{**}J_{X}=J_{E}T$. Hence $J_{E}T\in \widetilde{\mathcal{N}}^{p}(X,E^{**})\setminus \widetilde{\mathcal{N}}^{p}(X,E).$
Since $E^{***}$ has the $AP$, $E^{**}$ has the $AP$.
By Theorem \ref{1.13} and the Hahn-Banach Theorem, we get an operator $S\in \Upsilon_{p^{*}}(E^{**},X^{**})$ such that $\textrm{trace}(SJ_{E}T)=1$ and $\textrm{trace}(SJ_{E}R)=0$ for all $R\in \widetilde{\mathcal{N}}^{p}(X,E).$ This yields that $SJ_{E}u=0$ for all $u\in E$. Let us take any latticially $p$-nuclear representation $T^{*}=\sum\limits_{n=1}^{\infty}u^{**}_{n}\otimes x^{*}_{n}$. Since $SJ_{E}u=0$ for all $u\in E$, we get $\sum\limits_{n=1}^{\infty}\langle x^{*}_{n},x\rangle Su^{**}_{n}=0$ for all $x\in X$. Moreover, for every $x^{*}\in X^{*}$, we have
$$0=\langle SJ_{E}u, x^{*}\rangle=\langle J^{*}_{E}S^{*}x^{*},u\rangle.$$
By Goldstine-Weston Theorem, we get
\begin{align}\label{505}
\langle J^{**}_{E}u^{**},S^{*}x^{*}\rangle=\langle u^{**},J^{*}_{E}S^{*}x^{*}\rangle=0.
\end{align}
Note that
\begin{align}\label{506}
1=\textrm{trace}(SJ_{E}T)=\textrm{trace}(ST^{**}J_{X})=\sum\limits_{n=1}^{\infty}\langle Su^{**}_{n},x^{*}_{n}\rangle.
\end{align}
It follows from Theorem \ref{1.6} that
$$\sum\limits_{n=1}^{\infty}\|u^{**}_{n}\|\|S^{*}x^{*}_{n}\|\leq \|(u^{**}_{n})_{n}\|_{p}\|S\|_{\Upsilon_{p^{*}}}\|(x^{*}_{n})_{n}\|_{p^{*}}^{w}<\infty.$$
In the case $X^{*}$ has the $PMAP$, an argument analogous to that of Lemma \ref{1.2} Case 2 shows that
$\sum\limits_{n=1}^{\infty}\langle Su^{**}_{n},x^{*}_{n}\rangle=0,$ which contradicts with (\ref{506}). It remains to prove the conclusion in the case
$E^{***}$ has the $AP$.
We define an operator
$$V:=S^{*}J_{X^{*}}T^{*}J_{E}^{*}: E^{***}\stackrel{J^{*}_{E}}{\longrightarrow}E^{*}\stackrel{T^{*}}{\longrightarrow}X^{*}\stackrel{J_{X^{*}}}{\longrightarrow}X^{***}\stackrel{S^{*}}{\longrightarrow}
E^{***}.$$
It is easy to see that $V=\sum\limits_{n=1}^{\infty}u^{**}_{n}\otimes S^{*}x^{*}_{n}$ is nuclear. Furthermore, for $u^{***}\in E^{***}, u^{**}\in E^{**}$, we get
\begin{align*}
\langle Vu^{***},u^{**}\rangle &=\langle S^{*}J_{X^{*}}T^{*}J_{E}^{*}u^{***},u^{**}\rangle\\
&=\sum\limits_{n=1}^{\infty}\langle u^{**}_{n},J^{*}_{E}u^{***}\rangle \langle S^{*}x^{*}_{n},u^{**}\rangle\\
&=\sum\limits_{n=1}^{\infty}\langle J^{**}_{E}u^{**}_{n},u^{***}\rangle \langle S^{*}x^{*}_{n},u^{**}\rangle.\\
\end{align*}
Therefore, $V=\sum\limits_{n=1}^{\infty}J^{**}_{E}u^{**}_{n}\otimes S^{*}x^{*}_{n}, \sum\limits_{n=1}^{\infty}\|J^{**}_{E}u^{**}_{n}\|\|S^{*}x^{*}_{n}\|<\infty.$
Since $E^{***}$ has the $AP$, we get, by (\ref{506}),
$$\sum\limits_{n=1}^{\infty}\langle J^{**}_{E}u^{**}_{n},S^{*}x^{*}_{n}\rangle=\sum\limits_{n=1}^{\infty}\langle S^{*}x^{*}_{n},u^{**}_{n}\rangle
=\sum\limits_{n=1}^{\infty}\langle Su^{**}_{n},x^{*}_{n}\rangle=1.$$
This contradicts with (\ref{505}).
In conclusion, we have proved in both cases that if $J_{E}T$ is positively $p$-nuclear, then so is $T$. Since $\widetilde{\mathcal{N}}^{p}(X,E)$ is a closed subspace of $\widetilde{\mathcal{N}}^{p}(X,E^{**})$ under the canonical mapping $J_{E}$, we get
$$\widetilde{\nu}^{p}(T)=\widetilde{\nu}^{p}(J_{E}T)=\widetilde{\nu}^{p}(T^{**}J_{X})\leq \widetilde{\nu}^{p}(T^{**})\leq \widetilde{\nu}_{p}(T^{*}).$$
\end{proof}
\begin{theorem}
Suppose that $E^{*}$ has the $AP$ or $X^{****}$ has the $PMAP$. If the operator $S:E\rightarrow X$ has a positively $p$-nuclear adjoint, then $S$ is latticially $p$-nuclear and $\widetilde{\nu}_{p}(S)=\widetilde{\nu}^{p}(S^{*}).$
\end{theorem}
\begin{proof}
Suppose that $S$ is not latticially $p$-nuclear. By \cite[Theorem 3]{Zhu}, there exists an operator $T\in \Lambda_{p^{*}}(X^{**},E^{**})$ such that $\textrm{trace}(TJ_{X}S)=1$ and $\textrm{trace}(TJ_{X}R)=0$ for all $R\in \widetilde{\mathcal{N}}_{p}(E,X)$. This implies that $TJ_{X}x=0$ for all $x\in X$. It follows from Goldstine-Weston Theorem that $\langle J^{**}_{X}x^{**},T^{*}u^{*}\rangle=0$ for all $u^{*}\in E^{*}, x^{**}\in X^{**}$.
Take any positively $p$-nuclear representation $S^{*}=\sum\limits_{n=1}^{\infty}x^{**}_{n}\otimes u^{*}_{n}$. Then, we have
\begin{align}\label{302}
\sum\limits_{n=1}^{\infty}\langle Tx^{**}_{n},u^{*}_{n}\rangle=\textrm{trace}(TS^{**}J_{E})=\textrm{trace}(TJ_{X}S)=1.
\end{align}
Moreover, $\sum\limits_{n=1}^{\infty}\langle u^{*}_{n}, u\rangle Tx^{**}_{n}=0$ for all $u\in E$.
If $E^{*}$ has the $AP$, then $E^{*}$ has the $AP$ with conjugate operators. We argue as in Lemma \ref{1.2} Case 1 to show that
$\sum\limits_{n=1}^{\infty}\langle Tx^{**}_{n},u^{*}_{n}\rangle=0$, which contradicts with (\ref{302}).
Now assume that $X^{****}$ has the $PMAP$.
Let $$U=(T^{*}J_{E^{*}})(S^{*}J_{X}^{*}):X^{***}\stackrel{J^{*}_{X}}{\longrightarrow}X^{*}\stackrel{S^{*}}{\longrightarrow}E^{*}\stackrel{J_{E^{*}}}{\longrightarrow}
E^{***}\stackrel{T^{*}}{\longrightarrow}X^{****}.$$
It is easy to check that $S^{*}J^{*}_{X}=\sum\limits_{n=1}^{\infty}J_{X^{**}}x^{**}_{n}\otimes u^{*}_{n}.$ Combining Lemma \ref{1.2} with Theorem \ref{1.6}, we get
$$0=\sum\limits_{n=1}^{\infty}\langle J_{X}^{**}x^{**}_{n},T^{*}u^{*}_{n}\rangle=\sum\limits_{n=1}^{\infty}\langle J_{X^{**}}x^{**}_{n},T^{*}u^{*}_{n}\rangle
=\sum\limits_{n=1}^{\infty}\langle Tx^{**}_{n},u^{*}_{n}\rangle=1.$$
This is a contradiction.
Therefore, we have proved in both cases that if $J_{X}S$ is latticially $p$-nuclear, so is $S$. Since $\widetilde{\mathcal{N}}_{p}(E,X)$ can be considered to be a closed subspace of $\widetilde{\mathcal{N}}_{p}(E,X^{**})$ under the canonical embedding $J_{X}$, we get
$$\widetilde{\nu}_{p}(S)=\widetilde{\nu}_{p}(J_{X}S)=\widetilde{\nu}_{p}(S^{**}J_{E})\leq \widetilde{\nu}_{p}(S^{**})\leq \widetilde{\nu}^{p}(S^{*}).$$
This completes the proof.
\end{proof}
At the rest of this section, we describe the space of positive $p$-majorizing operators via positively $p$-nuclear operators. First we prove a lemma which is interesting in itself.
\begin{lemma}\label{2.1}
Suppose that $T:X\rightarrow E$ is positively $p$-nuclear and $S:F\rightarrow X$ is positive $p^{*}$-majorizing. Then $TS$ is nuclear and $\nu(TS)\leq \widetilde{\nu}^{p}(T)\|S\|_{\Upsilon_{p^{*}}}$.
\end{lemma}
\begin{proof}
Let $\epsilon>0$. Then $T$ admits a positively $p$-nuclear representation $T=\sum\limits_{n=1}^{\infty}x^{*}_{n}\otimes u_{n}$ such that
$$\|(x^{*}_{n})_{n}\|_{p^{*}}^{w}\|(u_{n})_{n}\|_{p}\leq (1+\epsilon)\widetilde{\nu}^{p}(T).$$
By Theorem \ref{1.6}, we get
\begin{align*}
\sum_{n=1}^{\infty}\|S^{*}x^{*}_{n}\|\|u_{n}\|&\leq (\sum_{n=1}^{\infty}\|S^{*}x^{*}_{n}\|^{p^{*}})^{\frac{1}{p^{*}}}(\sum_{n=1}^{\infty}\|u_{n}\|
^{p})^{\frac{1}{p}}\\
&\leq \|S\|_{\Upsilon_{p^{*}}}\|(x^{*}_{n})_{n}\|_{p^{*}}^{w}\|(u_{n})_{n}\|_{p}\\
&\leq \|S\|_{\Upsilon_{p^{*}}}(1+\epsilon)\widetilde{\nu}^{p}(T).
\end{align*}
This means that $TS$ is nuclear and $\nu(TS)\leq \|S\|_{\Upsilon_{p^{*}}}(1+\epsilon)\widetilde{\nu}^{p}(T).$ Letting $\epsilon\rightarrow 0$, we get
$\nu(TS)\leq \widetilde{\nu}^{p}(T)\|S\|_{\Upsilon_{p^{*}}}$.
\end{proof}
Let $E$ be a Banach space and $X$ be a Banach lattice. We set
\begin{center}
$\mathcal{U}_{*}^{p}(E,X):=\{S\in \mathcal{L}(E,X):TS$ is nuclear for all $T\in \widetilde{\mathcal{N}}^{p}(X,E)\}.$
\end{center}
For $S\in \mathcal{U}_{*}^{p}(E,X)$, we define $$V_{S}:\widetilde{\mathcal{N}}^{p}(X,E)\rightarrow \mathcal{N}(E), T\mapsto TS.$$
It follows from the closed graph theorem that $V_{S}$ is continuous. We define a norm $\zeta^{p}$ on $\mathcal{U}_{*}^{p}(E,X)$ by
$$\zeta^{p}(S):=\|V_{S}\|, \quad S\in \mathcal{U}_{*}^{p}(E,X).$$
A routine argument shows that $[\mathcal{U}_{*}^{p}(E,X),\zeta^{p}]$ is a Banach space.
We note that if $E$ has the $AP$ and $U\in \mathcal{N}(E)$, then $\textrm{trace}(U)=\sum\limits_{n=1}^{\infty}\langle u^{*}_{n},u_{n}\rangle$ is independent of the choice of the nuclear representation $U=\sum\limits_{n=1}^{\infty}u^{*}_{n}\otimes u_{n}$. Moreover, $|\textrm{trace}(U)|\leq \nu(U)$.
\begin{theorem}
Suppose that $E$ has the $AP$. Then $$\Upsilon_{p^{*}}(E,X)=\mathcal{U}_{*}^{p}(E,X)$$ for all Banach lattices $X$.
\end{theorem}
\begin{proof}
By Lemma \ref{2.1}, we get $\Upsilon_{p^{*}}(E,X)\subseteq \mathcal{U}_{*}^{p}(E,X)$ and $\zeta^{p}\leq \|\cdot\|_{\Upsilon_{p^{*}}}$.
Conversely, for $S\in \mathcal{U}_{*}^{p}(E,X)$, we define $\varphi\in (\widetilde{\mathcal{N}}^{p}(X,E))^{*}$ by $$\langle \varphi,T\rangle=\textrm{trace}(TS), \quad T\in\widetilde{\mathcal{N}}^{p}(X,E).$$ Clearly, $\|\varphi\|\leq \zeta^{p}(S)$.
It follows from Theorem \ref{1.13} that there exists a unique operator $\widetilde{S}\in \Upsilon_{p^{*}}(E,X^{**})$ such that $\|\widetilde{S}\|_{\Upsilon_{p^{*}}}=
\|\varphi\|$ and $\textrm{trace}(\widetilde{S}T)=\langle \varphi,T\rangle$ for all $T\in \widetilde{\mathcal{N}}^{p}(X,E)$. The uniqueness of $\widetilde{S}$ implies that $J_{X}S=\widetilde{S}.$ Hence $S$ is positive $p^{*}$-majorizing and
$$\|S\|_{\Upsilon_{p^{*}}}=\|J_{X}S\|_{\Upsilon_{p^{*}}}=\|\varphi\|\leq \zeta^{p}(S).$$
The conclusion follows.
\end{proof}
\section{Positively $p$-integral operators}
Let us begin this section with recalling the definition of maximal Banach operator ideals.
\begin{definition}\cite{DF}\label{1.777}
Let $[\mathfrak{A}, \mathbf{A}]$ be a Banach operator ideal.
\item[(1)] For $T\in \mathcal{L}(E,F)$ define
$$\mathbf{A}^{\max}(T):=\sup\{\mathbf{A}(Q_{L}Ti_{M}): M\in FIN(E), L\in COFIN(F)\}$$
$$\mathfrak{A}^{\max}(E,F):=\{T\in \mathcal{L}(E,F):\mathbf{A}^{\max}(T)<\infty\}$$
and call $[\mathfrak{A},\mathbf{A}]^{\max}:=[\mathfrak{A}^{\max},\mathbf{A}^{\max}]$ the \textit{maximal hull} of $[\mathfrak{A}, \mathbf{A}]$.
\item[(2)] $[\mathfrak{A}, \mathbf{A}]$ is called \textit{maximal} if $[\mathfrak{A}, \mathbf{A}]=[\mathfrak{A}^{\max},\mathbf{A}^{\max}]$.
\end{definition}
There is another criterion for the maximal hull $(\mathfrak{A},\mathbf{A})^{\max}$.
\begin{theorem}\cite{P}\label{1.77}
Let $[\mathfrak{A}, \mathbf{A}]$ be a Banach operator ideal. An operator $T\in \mathcal{L}(E,F)$ belongs to $\mathfrak{A}^{\max}(E,F)$ if and only if there exists a constant $C>0$ such that
\begin{center}
$\mathbf{A}(RTS)\leq C\|R\|\|S\|$ for all $S\in \mathcal{F}(G,E)$ and $R\in \mathcal{F}(F,H),$
\end{center}
where $G,H$ are arbitrary Banach spaces.
In this case, $$\mathbf{A}^{\max}(T)=\inf C.$$
\end{theorem}
Recall \cite{P} that an operator $S:E\rightarrow F$ is called \textit{$p$-integral} if it belongs to $[\mathcal{N}_{p},\nu_{p}]^{\max}.$ The $p$-integral norm
of $S$ is defined by $i_{p}(S):=\nu_{p}^{\max}(S).$
It follows from Theorem \ref{1.77} that an operator $S:E\rightarrow F$ is $p$-integral if and only if there exists a constant $C>0$ such that
$\nu_{p}(RTS)\leq C\|R\|\|S\|$ for all $S\in \mathcal{F}(G,E)$ and $R\in \mathcal{F}(F,H),$
where $G,H$ are arbitrary Banach spaces. Moreover, $i_{p}(S)=\inf C.$
In an analogous way, O. I. Zhukova \cite{Zhu} introduced the notion of latticially $p$-integral operators by use of latticially $p$-nuclear operators.
\begin{definition}\cite{Zhu}\label{1.7}
An operator $S:E\rightarrow X$ is called \textit{latticially $p$-integral} if there is a number $C$ such that the inequality $\widetilde{\nu}_{p}(BSA)\leq C\|A\|\|B\|$ is valid for arbitrary $F$ and $Y$ and arbitrary operators $A\in \mathcal{F}(F,E), B\in \mathcal{F}(X,Y)_{+}$.
One set
$$\widetilde{i}_{p}(S)=\inf C.$$
\end{definition}
The class of all latticially $p$-integral operators is denoted by $\widetilde{\mathcal{I}}_{p}$. It easily follows from the left positive ideal property of latticially $p$-nuclear operators that latticially $p$-integral operators also have the left positive ideal property.
Naturally, we introduce the notion of positively $p$-integral operators by means of positively $p$-nuclear operators.
\begin{definition}\label{1.31}
We say that an operator $T: X\rightarrow E$ is \textit{positively $p$-integral} if there exists a constant $C>0$ such that
\begin{center}
$\widetilde{\nu}^{p}(RTS)\leq C\|R\|\|S\|$ for all $S\in \mathcal{F}_{+}(Y,X), R\in \mathcal{F}(E,F)$,
\end{center}
where $Y$ is arbitrary Banach lattice and $F$ is arbitrary Banach space.
We put $$\widetilde{i}^{p}(T):=\inf C.$$
\end{definition}
The class of all positively $p$-integral operators is denoted by $\widetilde{\mathcal{I}}^{p}$. It follows from Proposition \ref{1.1} that positively $p$-integral operators have the right positive ideal property.
Clearly, every positively $p$-nuclear operator is positively $p$-integral with $\widetilde{i}^{p}\leq \widetilde{\nu}^{p}$.
The definitions of latticially $p$-integral operators and positively $p$-integral operators both stem from another characterization of the maximal hull of Banach operator ideals (Theorem \ref{1.77}), not from the original definition of the maximal hull (Definition \ref{1.777}). But the following result shows that the class of positively $p$-integral operators coincides with the right positive maximal hull of positively $p$-nuclear operators under the hypothesis of order completeness.
\begin{theorem}\label{3.2}
Let $X$ be an order complete Banach lattice and $E$ be a Banach space. Let $C>0$ and $T\in \mathcal{L}(X,E)$. The following statements are equivalent:
\item[(a)]$T$ is positively $p$-integral with $\widetilde{i}^{p}(T)\leq C$;
\item[(b)]$\widetilde{\nu}^{p}(Q_{L}Ti_{G})\leq C$ for all $G\in LDim(X), L\in COFIN(E)$.
\end{theorem}
\begin{proof}
The implication $(a)\Rightarrow (b)$ is trivial.
\noindent $(b)\Rightarrow (a)$. Given any finite-rank operator $S:E\rightarrow F$ and positive finite-rank operator $R:Y\rightarrow X$. Let $M=RY$. Let $\epsilon>0$.
It follows from Lemma \ref{1.4} that there exist a sublattice $Z$ of $X$ containing $M$, a finite-dimensional sublattice $G$ of $Z$
and a positive projection $P$ from $Z$ onto $G$ such that $\|Px-x\|\leq \epsilon\|x\|$ for all $x\in M$. We define an operator $\widehat{S}:E/\textrm{Ker}(S)\rightarrow F$ by $u+\textrm{Ker}(S)\mapsto Su$. Clearly, the operator $\widehat{S}$ is one-to-one, has the same range as $S$ and $\|\widehat{S}\|=\|S\|$. Then $L:=\textrm{Ker}(S)$ is finite co-dimensional and $S=\widehat{S}Q_{L}$. By (b), we get
\begin{align*}
\widetilde{\nu}^{p}(STPR)&=\widetilde{\nu}^{p}(\widehat{S}Q_{L}Ti_{G}PR)\\
&\leq C\|\widehat{S}\|\|PR\|\\
&\leq (1+\epsilon)C\|S\|\|R\|.
\end{align*}
By Proposition \ref{1.1}, we have
\begin{align*}
\widetilde{\nu}^{p}(STR)&\leq \widetilde{\nu}^{p}(STR-STPR)+\widetilde{\nu}^{p}(STPR)\\
&\leq \widetilde{\nu}^{p}(STR-STPR)+(1+\epsilon)C\|S\|\|R\|\\
&\leq \widetilde{\nu}^{1}(STR-STPR)+(1+\epsilon)C\|S\|\|R\|\\
&\leq 2|\widetilde{\nu}^{1}|(STR-STPR)+(1+\epsilon)C\|S\|\|R\|\\
&=2\nu(STR-STPR)+(1+\epsilon)C\|S\|\|R\|\\
&=2\nu(ST)\|R-PR\|+(1+\epsilon)C\|S\|\|R\|\\
&=2\epsilon\nu(ST)\|R\|+(1+\epsilon)C\|S\|\|R\|\\
\end{align*}
Letting $\epsilon\rightarrow 0$, we get $$\widetilde{\nu}^{p}(STR)\leq C\|S\|\|R\|.$$
This completes the proof.
\end{proof}
\begin{theorem}\label{1.30}
Suppose that $X^{*}$ has the $PMAP$. Let $T\in \mathcal{L}(X,E)$ and let $C>0$. The following statements are equivalent:
\item[(i)]$T$ is positively $p$-integral with $\widetilde{i}^{p}(T)\leq C$.
\item[(ii)]$\sup\{\widetilde{\nu}^{p}(Q_{L}T):L\in COFIN(E)\}\leq C$.
\end{theorem}
\begin{proof}
$(ii)\Rightarrow (i)$ is obvious.
$(i)\Rightarrow (ii)$. Let $L\in COFIN(E)$ and let $\epsilon>0$. We write $Q_{L}T=\sum\limits_{i=1}^{n}x^{*}_{i}\otimes \phi_{i}, x^{*}_{i}\in X^{*},\phi_{i}\in E/L(i=1,2,\cdots,n)$. Choose $\delta>0$ such that $\delta\sum\limits_{i=1}^{n}\|\phi_{i}\|<\epsilon.$ Since $X^{*}$ has the $PMAP$, it follows from Lemma \ref{3.8} that there exists an operator $A\in \mathcal{F}_{+}(X)$ with $\|A\|\leq 1$ such that $\|A^{*}x^{*}_{i}-x^{*}_{i}\|<\delta$ for all $i=1,2,\cdots,n$. By $(i)$, we get
$\widetilde{\nu}^{p}(Q_{L}TA)\leq C.$
By Proposition \ref{1.1}, we get
\begin{align*}
\widetilde{\nu}^{p}(Q_{L}T)&\leq \widetilde{\nu}^{p}(Q_{L}T-Q_{L}TA)+\widetilde{\nu}^{p}(Q_{L}TA)\\
&\leq \widetilde{\nu}^{1}(Q_{L}T-Q_{L}TA)+C\\
&\leq 2|\widetilde{\nu}^{1}|(Q_{L}T-Q_{L}TA)+C\\
&=2\nu(Q_{L}T-Q_{L}TA)+C\\
&\leq 2\sum_{i=1}^{n}\|Ax^{*}_{i}-x^{*}_{i}\|\|\phi_{i}\|+C\\
&\leq 2\epsilon+C.\\
\end{align*}
Letting $\epsilon\rightarrow 0$, we get $\widetilde{\nu}^{p}(Q_{L}T)\leq C$.
\end{proof}
An analogous argument shows the following theorem.
\begin{theorem}\label{2.3}
Suppose that $X$ has the $PMAP$. Let $S\in \mathcal{L}(E,X)$ and let $C>0$. The following statements are equivalent:
\item[(i)]$S$ is latticially $p$-integral with $\widetilde{i}_{p}(S)\leq C$.
\item[(ii)]$\sup\{\widetilde{\nu}_{p}(Si_{M}):M\in FIN(E)\}\leq C$.
\end{theorem}
\begin{corollary}\label{1.20}
\item[(a)]If $S:E\rightarrow X$ is latticially $p$-integral, then $S^{*}$ is positively $p$-integral. In this case, $\widetilde{i}^{p}(S^{*})\leq \widetilde{i}_{p}(S)$.
\item[(b)]If $T:X\rightarrow E$ is positively $p$-integral and $X^{*}$ has the $PMAP$, then $T^{*}$ is latticially $p$-integral.
In this case, $\widetilde{i}_{p}(T^{*})\leq \widetilde{i}^{p}(T).$
\end{corollary}
\begin{proof}
(a). Given any $A\in \mathcal{F}_{+}(Y,X^{*}), B\in \mathcal{F}(E^{*},F)$. We may assume that $F$ is finite-dimensional. Let $\epsilon>0$. By \cite[Lemma 3.1]{JRZ},
there exists a $weak^{*}$-continuous operator $C:E^{*}\rightarrow F$ such that $\|C\|\leq (1+\epsilon)\|B\|$ and $C|_{S^{*}AY}=B|_{S^{*}AY}$. Let $D:F^{*}\rightarrow E$ be an operator such that $D^{*}=C$. Since $S$ is latticially $p$-integral, we get
$$\widetilde{\nu}_{p}(A^{*}J_{X}SD)\leq \|A^{*}J_{X}\|\widetilde{i}_{p}(S)\|D\|\leq (1+\epsilon)\|A\|\widetilde{i}_{p}(S)\|B\|.$$
Clearly, $BS^{*}A=(A^{*}J_{X}SD)^{*}J_{Y}$. By Proposition \ref{1.1} (e), we get
\begin{align*}
\widetilde{\nu}^{p}(BS^{*}A)&\leq \widetilde{\nu}^{p}((A^{*}J_{X}SD)^{*})\\
&\leq \widetilde{\nu}_{p}(A^{*}J_{X}SD)\\
&\leq (1+\epsilon)\|A\|\widetilde{i}_{p}(S)\|B\|.
\end{align*}
Letting $\epsilon\rightarrow 0$, we get $$\widetilde{\nu}^{p}(BS^{*}A)\leq \|A\|\widetilde{i}_{p}(S)\|B\|.$$
Hence, $S^{*}$ is positively $p$-integral and $\widetilde{i}^{p}(S^{*})\leq \widetilde{i}_{p}(S)$.
(b). Given $M\in FIN(E^{*})$ and $\epsilon>0$. We let $L:={}^{\perp}\!M=\{u\in E:\langle u^{*},u\rangle=0$ for all $u^{*}\in M\}$. Then $L\in COFIN(E)$. Note that
$Q_{L}^{*}:(E/L)^{*}\rightarrow E^{*}$ is an isometric embedding and the range of $Q_{L}^{*}$ is $L^{\perp}=M$. Let us define an operator $A:M\rightarrow (E/L)^{*}$ by $Au^{*}=(Q_{L}^{*})^{-1}(u^{*})(u^{*}\in M)$. Clearly, $\|A\|=1$ and $Q^{*}_{L}A=i_{M}$. By Proposition \ref{1.1} $(f)$ and Theorem \ref{1.30}, we get
\begin{align*}
\widetilde{\nu}_{p}(T^{*}i_{M})&=\widetilde{\nu}_{p}(T^{*}Q^{*}_{L}A)\\
&\leq \widetilde{\nu}_{p}(T^{*}Q^{*}_{L})\\
&\leq \widetilde{\nu}^{p}(Q_{L}T)\\
&\leq \widetilde{i}^{p}(T).
\end{align*}
By Theorem \ref{2.3}, $T^{*}$ is latticially $p$-integral and $\widetilde{i}_{p}(T^{*})\leq \widetilde{i}^{p}(T).$
\end{proof}
The following result is immediate from Definition \ref{1.7} and Definition \ref{1.31}.
\begin{lemma}\label{1.8}
\item[(a)]If $S^{**}:E^{**}\rightarrow X^{**}$ is latticially $p$-integral, then so is $S$. In this case,
$\widetilde{i}_{p}(S)\leq \widetilde{i}_{p}(S^{**}).$
\item[(b)]If $T^{**}:X^{**}\rightarrow E^{**}$ is positively $p$-integral, then so is $T$. In this case,
$\widetilde{i}^{p}(T)\leq \widetilde{i}^{p}(T^{**}).$
\end{lemma}
Combining Corollary \ref{1.20} and Lemma \ref{1.8}, we obtain the following two corollaries.
\begin{corollary}\label{1.21}
Suppose that $X^{**}$ has the $PMAP$. The following are equivalent for an operator $S:E\rightarrow X$:
\item[(1)]$S$ is latticially $p$-integral.
\item[(2)]$S^{*}$ is positively $p$-integral.
\item[(3)]$S^{**}$ is latticially $p$-integral.
\noindent In this case, $\widetilde{i}_{p}(S)=\widetilde{i}^{p}(S^{*})=\widetilde{i}_{p}(S^{**}).$
\end{corollary}
\begin{corollary}\label{1.219}
Suppose that $X^{*}$ has the $PMAP$. The following are equivalent for an operator $T:X\rightarrow E$:
\item[(1)]$T$ is positively $p$-integral.
\item[(2)]$T^{*}$ is latticially $p$-integral.
\item[(3)]$T^{**}$ is positively $p$-integral.
\noindent In this case, $\widetilde{i}^{p}(T)=\widetilde{i}_{p}(T^{*})=\widetilde{i}^{p}(T^{**}).$
\end{corollary}
Next we present an important example of positively $p$-integral operators.
\begin{theorem}\label{3.6}
Let $(\Omega, \Sigma, \mu)$ be a probability measure space and $1\leq p<\infty$. Then the inclusion map $i_{p}: L_{p^{*}}(\mu)\rightarrow L_{1}(\mu)$ is positively $p$-integral with $\widetilde{i}^{p}(i_{p})\leq 1$.
\end{theorem}
To prove Theorem \ref{3.6}, we need the following three elementary lemmas.
Let $\tau=(A_{i})_{i=1}^{n}$ be a partition of a probability measure space $(\Omega, \Sigma, \mu)$. We define an operator $$Q_{\tau}: L_{p^{*}}(\mu)\rightarrow L_{1}(\mu), \quad g\mapsto \sum_{i=1}^{n}\frac{\int_{A_{i}}gd\mu}{\mu(A_{i})}\chi_{A_{i}},$$ where $\frac{\int_{A_{i}}gd\mu}{\mu(A_{i})}=0$ if $\mu(A_{i})=0$.
It is easy to see that $\|Q_{\tau}\|=1$.
\begin{lemma}\label{3.1}
$\widetilde{\nu}^{p}(Q_{\tau})=1.$
\end{lemma}
\begin{proof}
Let $f_{i}=\frac{\chi_{A_{i}}}{\mu(A_{i})^{\frac{1}{p^{*}}}}(i=1,2,\cdots,n)$. Then $\|(f_{i})_{i=1}^{n}\|_{p}=1$. For each $i$, we define $\varphi_{i}\in (L_{p^{*}}(\mu))^{*}$ by $\langle \varphi_{i}, g\rangle=\frac{\int_{A_{i}}gd\mu}{\mu(A_{i})^{\frac{1}{p}}}(g\in L_{p^{*}}(\mu)).$ Then $Q_{\tau}=\sum\limits_{i=1}^{n}\varphi_{i}\otimes f_{i}$. Let us define an operator $T: L_{p^{*}}(\mu)\rightarrow l_{p^{*}}$ by $Tg=(\langle \varphi_{i},g\rangle)_{i=1}^{n}$ for $g\in L_{p^{*}}(\mu)$. Note that
$$|\langle\varphi_{i},g\rangle|\leq \frac{\int_{A_{i}}|g|d\mu}{\mu(A_{i})^{\frac{1}{p}}}
\leq \frac{(\int_{\Omega}|g\chi_{A_{i}}|^{p^{*}}d\mu)^{\frac{1}{p^{*}}}(\int_{\Omega}\chi_{A_{i}}d\mu)^{\frac{1}{p}}}{\mu(A_{i})^{\frac{1}{p}}}
=(\int_{A_{i}}|g|^{p^{*}}d\mu)^{\frac{1}{p^{*}}}.$$
Hence $$\sum_{i=1}^{n}|\langle\varphi_{i},g\rangle|^{p^{*}}\leq \sum_{i=1}^{n}\int_{A_{i}}|g|^{p^{*}}d\mu=\int_{\Omega}|g|^{p^{*}}d\mu.$$
This implies $$\|(\varphi_{i})_{i=1}^{n}\|^{w}_{p^{*}}=\|T\|\leq 1.$$
Consequently $$\widetilde{\nu}^{p}(Q_{\tau})\leq \|(\varphi_{i})_{i=1}^{n}\|^{w}_{p^{*}}\cdot \|(f_{i})_{i=1}^{n}\|_{p}\leq 1.$$
Since $\|Q_{\tau}\|=1$, we get $\widetilde{\nu}^{p}(Q_{\tau})=1.$
\end{proof}
The following lemma may be known. For the sake of completeness, we include the proof here.
\begin{lemma}\label{3.5}
Let $f_{1},f_{2},\cdots,f_{n}\in L_{\infty}(\mu)$. Then, for every $\epsilon>0$, there exists a partition $\tau=(A_{i})_{i=1}^{m}$ of $\Omega$ such that
$$\|f_{j}-\sum_{i=1}^{m}\frac{\int_{A_{i}}f_{j}d\mu}{\mu(A_{i})}\chi_{A_{i}}\|_{p}<\epsilon, \quad j=1,2,\cdots,n.$$
\end{lemma}
\begin{proof}
We only prove the conclusion for $n=2$. Other cases are analogous.
We may assume that $f_{1},f_{2}$ are bounded. We set
$$\alpha=\min(\min_{t\in \Omega}f_{1}(t), \min_{t\in \Omega}f_{2}(t))$$
and
$$\beta=\max(\max_{t\in \Omega}f_{1}(t), \max_{t\in \Omega}f_{2}(t)).$$
We choose $a_{0}<a_{1}<\cdots<a_{m}$ such that $$[\alpha,\beta]\subseteq \bigcup\limits_{i=1}^{m}(a_{i-1},a_{i}], \quad a_{i}-a_{i-1}<\epsilon, i=1,2,\cdots,m.$$
Let $A_{ij}=f_{1}^{-1}((a_{i-1},a_{i}])\cap f_{2}^{-1}((a_{j-1},a_{j}])(i,j=1,2,\cdots,m)$. Then $(A_{ij})_{i,j=1}^{m}$ is a partition of $\Omega$.
Note that $$a_{i-1}\mu(A_{ij})\leq \int_{A_{ij}}f_{1}d\mu\leq a_{i}\mu(A_{ij}),\quad i,j=1,2,\cdots,m$$ and hence
$$|f_{1}(t)-\frac{\int_{A_{ij}}f_{1}d\mu}{\mu(A_{ij})}|\leq \epsilon, \quad t\in A_{ij}, i,j=1,2,\cdots,m.$$
This means
$$\int_{\Omega}|f_{1}-\sum_{i,j=1}^{m}\frac{\int_{A_{ij}}f_{1}d\mu}{\mu(A_{ij})}\chi_{A_{ij}}|^{p}d\mu=\sum_{i,j=1}^{m}\int_{A_{ij}}
|f_{1}-\frac{\int_{A_{ij}}f_{1}d\mu}{\mu(A_{ij})}|^{p}d\mu\leq \epsilon^{p}.$$
That is $$\|f_{1}-\sum_{i,j=1}^{m}\frac{\int_{A_{ij}}f_{1}d\mu}{\mu(A_{ij})}\chi_{A_{ij}}\|_{p}\leq \epsilon.$$
Similarly $$\|f_{2}-\sum_{i,j=1}^{m}\frac{\int_{A_{ij}}f_{2}d\mu}{\mu(A_{ij})}\chi_{A_{ij}}\|_{p}\leq \epsilon.$$
\end{proof}
\begin{lemma}\label{3.3}
Let $E$ be a Banach space and let $T\in \mathcal{F}(L_{1}(\mu),E)$. Then, for every $\epsilon>0$, there exists a partition $\tau=(A_{i})_{i=1}^{m}$ of $\Omega$ such that $\nu(Ti_{p}-TQ_{\tau})<\epsilon.$
\end{lemma}
\begin{proof}
We write $T=\sum\limits_{j=1}^{n}f_{j}\otimes u_{j}, f_{j}\in L_{\infty}(\mu), u_{j}\in E, j=1,2,\cdots,n$.
It follows from Lemma \ref{3.5} that there exists a partition $\tau=(A_{i})_{i=1}^{m}$ of $\Omega$ such that
$$\|f_{j}-\sum_{i=1}^{m}\frac{\int_{A_{i}}f_{j}d\mu}{\mu(A_{i})}\chi_{A_{i}}\|_{p}<\frac{\epsilon}{\sum\limits_{i=1}^{n}\|u_{i}\|}, \quad j=1,2,\cdots,n.$$
Hence
\begin{align*}
\nu(Ti_{p}-TQ_{\tau})&\leq \sum\limits_{j=1}^{n}\|f_{j}-Q^{*}_{\tau}f_{j}\|\|u_{j}\|\\
&=\sum\limits_{j=1}^{n}\|f_{j}-\sum_{i=1}^{m}\frac{\int_{A_{i}}f_{j}d\mu}{\mu(A_{i})}\chi_{A_{i}}\|_{p}\|u_{j}\|\\
&<\epsilon.
\end{align*}
\end{proof}
{\em Proof of Theorem \ref{3.6}}.
Given any finite-rank operator $R: L_{1}(\mu)\rightarrow E$ and positive finite-rank operator $S: X\rightarrow L_{p^{*}}(\mu)$. Let $\epsilon>0$. According to Lemma \ref{3.3}, there exists a partition $\tau=(A_{i})_{i=1}^{m}$ of $\Omega$ such that $\nu(Ri_{p}-RQ_{\tau})<\epsilon.$
By Proposition \ref{1.1} and Lemma \ref{3.1}, we get
\begin{align*}
\widetilde{\nu}^{p}(Ri_{p}S)&\leq \widetilde{\nu}^{p}(Ri_{p}S-RQ_{\tau}S)+\widetilde{\nu}^{p}(RQ_{\tau}S)\\
&\leq \widetilde{\nu}^{p}(Ri_{p}-RQ_{\tau})\|S\|+\|R\|\widetilde{\nu}^{p}(Q_{\tau})\|S\|\\
&\leq \widetilde{\nu}^{1}(Ri_{p}-RQ_{\tau})\|S\|+\|R\|\|S\|\\
&\leq 2|\widetilde{\nu}^{1}|(Ri_{p}-RQ_{\tau})\|S\|+\|R\|\|S\|\\
&= 2\nu(Ri_{p}-RQ_{\tau})\|S\|+\|R\|\|S\|\\
&\leq 2\epsilon \|S\|+\|R\|\|S\|\\
\end{align*}
Letting $\epsilon\rightarrow 0$, we get $$\widetilde{\nu}^{p}(Ri_{p}S)\leq \|R\|\|S\|.$$
This completes the proof. \hfill $\Box$
\begin{remark}
It was known (see \cite[Example 2.9 (b), Corollary 2.8]{DJT} for instance) that the canonical map $j_{p}$ from $C(K)$ to $L_{p}(\mu)$($\mu$- regular Borel measure on compact Hausdorff space $K$) is $p$-integral. O. I. Zhukova \cite{Zhu} strengthened this result and proved that $j_{p}$ is latticially $p$-integral. Although the adjoint of $i_{p}$ is the inclusion map of $L_{\infty}(\mu)$ into $L_{p}(\mu)$, it seems that there is no implication between O. I. Zhukova's result and
Theorem \ref{3.6}, even by Corollaries \ref{1.21} and \ref{1.219}.
\end{remark}
We'll reveal a close relationship between positively $p$-nuclear operators and positively $p$-integral operators. We need two lemmas.
\begin{lemma}\label{3.7}
Suppose that $X^{*}$ has the $PMAP$ and $E$ is a Banach space. Let $T\in \widetilde{\mathcal{N}}^{p}(X,E).$ Then, for every $\epsilon>0$, there exists an operator $R\in \mathcal{F}_{+}(X)$ with $\|R\|\leq 1$ such that $\widetilde{\nu}^{p}(T-TR)<\epsilon$.
\end{lemma}
\begin{proof}
Let $\epsilon>0$. We choose $\delta>0$ with $2\delta+\delta(1+\delta)^{2}\widetilde{\nu}^{p}(T)<\epsilon.$ We choose a positively $p$-nuclear representation
$T=\sum\limits_{j=1}^{\infty}x^{*}_{j}\otimes u_{j}$
such that $$\|(x^{*}_{j})_{j=1}^{\infty}\|_{p^{*}}^{w}\|(u_{j})_{j=1}^{\infty}\|_{p}\leq (1+\delta)\widetilde{\nu}^{p}(T).$$
We may assume that $\|(x^{*}_{j})_{j}\|_{p^{*}}^{w}=1$. We choose $1\leq \xi_{j}\rightarrow \infty$ such that
$$\|(\xi_{j}u_{j})_{j=1}^{\infty}\|_{p}\leq (1+\delta)\|(u_{j})_{j=1}^{\infty}\|_{p}.$$
Choose a positive integral $N$ with $(\sum\limits_{j=N+1}^{\infty}\|u_{j}\|^{p})^{\frac{1}{p}}<\delta$ and also choose a positive real $\eta>0$ with $\eta N^{\frac{1}{p^{*}}}<\delta$. Since $X^{*}$ has the $PMAP$, it follows from Lemma \ref{3.8} that there exists an operator $R\in \mathcal{F}_{+}(X)$ with $\|R\|\leq 1$ such that $\|R^{*}(\frac{x^{*}_{j}}{\xi_{j}})-\frac{x^{*}_{j}}{\xi_{j}}\|<\eta$ for all $j$.
Note that $$T-TR=\sum_{j=1}^{N}(x^{*}_{j}-R^{*}x^{*}_{j})\otimes u_{j}+\sum_{j=N+1}^{\infty}(x^{*}_{j}-R^{*}x^{*}_{j})\otimes u_{j}.$$
Hence
\begin{align*}
\widetilde{\nu}^{p}(T-TR)&\leq \widetilde{\nu}^{p}(\sum_{j=1}^{N}(\frac{x^{*}_{j}}{\xi_{j}}-R^{*}(\frac{x^{*}_{j}}{\xi_{j}}))\otimes \xi_{j}u_{j})+
\widetilde{\nu}^{p}(\sum_{j=N+1}^{\infty}(x^{*}_{j}-R^{*}x^{*}_{j})\otimes u_{j})\\
&\leq \|(\frac{x^{*}_{j}}{\xi_{j}}-R^{*}(\frac{x^{*}_{j}}{\xi_{j}}))_{j=1}^{N}\|_{p^{*}}^{w}\|(\xi_{j}u_{j})_{j=1}^{N}\|_{p}+
\|(x^{*}_{j}-R^{*}x^{*}_{j})_{j=N+1}^{\infty}\|_{p^{*}}^{w}\|(u_{j})_{j=N+1}^{\infty}\|_{p}\\
&\leq (\sum_{j=1}^{N}\|\frac{x^{*}_{j}}{\xi_{j}}-R^{*}(\frac{x^{*}_{j}}{\xi_{j}})\|^{p^{*}})^{\frac{1}{p^{*}}}(1+\delta)\|(u_{j})_{j=1}^{\infty}\|_{p}+
2\|(x^{*}_{j})_{j=1}^{\infty}\|_{p^{*}}^{w}\|(u_{j})_{j=N+1}^{\infty}\|_{p}\\
&\leq \eta N^{\frac{1}{p^{*}}}(1+\delta)^{2}\widetilde{\nu}^{p}(T)+2\delta\\
&\leq \delta (1+\delta)^{2}\widetilde{\nu}^{p}(T)+2\delta\\
&<\epsilon,
\end{align*}
which completes the proof.
\end{proof}
\begin{lemma}\label{3.9}
Suppose that $E$ has the $MAP$ and $X$ is a Banach lattice. Let $T\in \widetilde{\mathcal{N}}^{p}(X,E).$ Then, for every $\epsilon>0$, there exists an operator $S\in \mathcal{F}(E)$ with $\|S\|\leq 1$ such that $\widetilde{\nu}^{p}(T-ST)<\epsilon$.
\end{lemma}
\begin{proof}
Let $\epsilon>0$. Let $\delta>0$ be such that $\delta(1+\delta)^{2}\widetilde{\nu}^{p}(T)<\epsilon.$ We choose a positively $p$-nuclear representation $T=\sum\limits_{j=1}^{\infty}x^{*}_{j}\otimes u_{j}$ such that $$\|(x^{*}_{j})_{j=1}^{\infty}\|_{p^{*}}^{w}\|(u_{j})_{j=1}^{\infty}\|_{p}\leq (1+\delta)\widetilde{\nu}^{p}(T).$$
Choose $1\leq \xi_{j}\rightarrow \infty$ such that
$$\|(\xi_{j}u_{j})_{j=1}^{\infty}\|_{p}\leq (1+\delta)\|(u_{j})_{j=1}^{\infty}\|_{p}.$$
Since $E$ has the $MAP$, there exists an operator $S\in \mathcal{F}(E)$ with $\|S\|\leq 1$ such that
$$\|S(\frac{u_{j}}{\xi_{j}\|u_{j}\|})-\frac{u_{j}}{\xi_{j}\|u_{j}\|}\|<\delta, \quad j=1,2,\cdots.$$
Hence
\begin{align*}
\widetilde{\nu}^{p}(T-ST)&\leq \|(x^{*}_{j})_{j=1}^{\infty}\|_{p^{*}}^{w}\|(u_{j}-Su_{j})_{j=1}^{\infty}\|_{p}\\
&\leq \|(x^{*}_{j})_{j=1}^{\infty}\|_{p^{*}}^{w}\delta(1+\delta)\|(u_{j})_{j=1}^{\infty}\|_{p}\\
&\leq \delta(1+\delta)^{2}\widetilde{\nu}^{p}(T)\\
&<\epsilon.
\end{align*}
This finishes the proof.
\end{proof}
\begin{theorem}\label{3.4}
Suppose that $X^{*}$ has the $PMAP$ and $E$ has the $MAP$. Then
\begin{center}
$\widetilde{\nu}^{p}(T)=\widetilde{i}^{p}(T)$ for all $T\in \widetilde{\mathcal{N}}^{p}(X,E).$
\end{center}
\end{theorem}
\begin{proof}
Let $T\in \widetilde{\mathcal{N}}^{p}(X,E).$ It suffices to show that $\widetilde{\nu}^{p}(T)\leq\widetilde{i}^{p}(T)$.
Let $\epsilon>0$. By Lemma \ref{3.7}, there exists an operator $R\in \mathcal{F}_{+}(X)$ with $\|R\|\leq 1$ such that $\widetilde{\nu}^{p}(T-TR)<\epsilon$. Applying Lemma \ref{3.9} to $TR$, there exists an operator $S\in \mathcal{F}(E)$ with $\|S\|\leq 1$ such that $\widetilde{\nu}^{p}(TR-STR)<\epsilon$. Thus, we get
\begin{align*}
\widetilde{\nu}^{p}(T)&\leq \widetilde{\nu}^{p}(T-TR)+\widetilde{\nu}^{p}(TR-STR)+\widetilde{\nu}^{p}(STR)\\
&\leq 2\epsilon+\widetilde{\nu}^{p}(STR)\\
&\leq 2\epsilon+\|S\|\widetilde{i}^{p}(T)\|R\|\\
&\leq 2\epsilon+\widetilde{i}^{p}(T).\\
\end{align*}
Letting $\epsilon\rightarrow 0$, we get $$\widetilde{\nu}^{p}(T)\leq\widetilde{i}^{p}(T),$$
which completes the proof.
\end{proof}
To describe the space of positively $p$-integral operators, we set $$\Upsilon_{p}^{0}(E,X):=\overline{\mathcal{F}(E,X)}^{\|\cdot\|_{\Upsilon_{p}}}.$$
\begin{lemma}\label{2.6}
Suppose that $E^{**}$ has the $MAP$ and $X^{*}$ has the $PMAP$. Let $S\in \Upsilon_{p}^{0}(E,X)$ and let $T\in \widetilde{\mathcal{I}}^{p^{*}}(X,E^{**})$. Then $TS$ is nuclear and $\nu(TS)\leq \widetilde{i}^{p^{*}}(T)\|S\|_{\Upsilon_{p}}.$
\end{lemma}
\begin{proof}
Case 1. $S$ is finite-rank.
Since $E^{**}$ has the $MAP$, $E^{*}$ also has the $MAP$.
By \cite[Proposition 10.3.1]{P}, we get $$\nu(TS)=\sup\{|\textrm{trace}(RTS)|:R\in \mathcal{L}(E^{**}),\|R\|\leq 1\}.$$
Since $E^{**}$ has the $MAP$, we get $$\sup\{|\textrm{trace}(RTS)|:R\in \mathcal{L}(E^{**}),\|R\|\leq 1\}=\sup\{|\textrm{trace}(RTS)|:R\in \mathcal{F}(E^{**}),\|R\|\leq 1\}.$$
Theorem \ref{2.1} and Theorem \ref{3.4} yield
\begin{align*}
\sup\{|\textrm{trace}(RTS)|:R\in \mathcal{F}(E^{**}),\|R\|\leq 1\}&\leq \sup\{\widetilde{\nu}^{p^{*}}(RT)\|S\|_{\Upsilon_{p}}:R\in \mathcal{F}(E^{**}),\|R\|\leq 1\}\\
&=\sup\{\widetilde{i}^{p^{*}}(RT)\|S\|_{\Upsilon_{p}}:R\in \mathcal{F}(E^{**}),\|R\|\leq 1\}\\
&\leq\sup\{\|R\|\widetilde{i}^{p^{*}}(T)\|S\|_{\Upsilon_{p}}:R\in \mathcal{F}(E^{**}),\|R\|\leq 1\}\\
&\leq \widetilde{i}^{p^{*}}(T)\|S\|_{\Upsilon_{p}}.
\end{align*}
Hence, we get $$\nu(TS)\leq \widetilde{i}^{p^{*}}(T)\|S\|_{\Upsilon_{p}}.$$
Case 2. $S\in \Upsilon_{p}^{0}(E,X)$.
Let $\epsilon>0$. Then there exists a sequence $(S_{n})_{n}$ in $\mathcal{F}(E,X)$ such that
\begin{center}
$\sum\limits_{n}S_{n}=S$ in $\|\cdot\|_{\Upsilon_{p}}$ and $\sum\limits_{n}\|S_{n}\|_{\Upsilon_{p}}\leq (1+\epsilon)\|S\|_{\Upsilon_{p}}.$
\end{center}
By Case 1,
\begin{center}
$\nu(TS_{n})\leq \widetilde{i}^{p^{*}}(T)\|S_{n}\|_{\Upsilon_{p}}$ for all $n$.
\end{center}
This implies
$$\sum_{n}\nu(TS_{n})\leq (1+\epsilon)\widetilde{i}^{p^{*}}(T)\|S\|_{\Upsilon_{p}}.$$
Hence
\begin{center}
$\sum\limits_{n}TS_{n}=U$ in $\nu$ for some $U\in \mathcal{N}(E,E^{**})$.
\end{center}
and so
\begin{center}
$\sum\limits_{n}TS_{n}=U$ in operator norm $\|\cdot\|$.
\end{center}
Note that
\begin{center}
$\sum\limits_{n}S_{n}=S$ in operator norm $\|\cdot\|$.
\end{center}
Therefore, we get $TS=U\in\mathcal{N}(E,E^{**})$. Moreover, $$\nu(TS)=\nu(U)\leq(1+\epsilon)\widetilde{i}^{p^{*}}(T)\|S\|_{\Upsilon_{p}}.$$
Letting $\epsilon\rightarrow 0$, we get $$\nu(TS)\leq\widetilde{i}^{p^{*}}(T)\|S\|_{\Upsilon_{p}}.$$
\end{proof}
\begin{lemma}\label{2.8}
Let $T\in \mathcal{F}(X,E)$.
\item[(a)]If $E$ has the $MAP$ or $X^{*}$ has the $PMAP$, then
$$\widetilde{\nu}^{p}(T)=\sup\{|\textrm{trace}(RT)|:R\in \mathcal{F}(E,X),\|R\|_{\Upsilon_{p^{*}}}\leq 1\}.$$
\item[(b)]If $E=F^{**}$ has the $MAP$, then
$$\widetilde{\nu}^{p}(T)=\sup\{|\textrm{trace}(TS)|:S\in \mathcal{F}(F,X),\|S\|_{\Upsilon_{p^{*}}}\leq 1\}.$$
\end{lemma}
\begin{proof}
(a). By Theorem \ref{1.13}, we get $$\widetilde{\nu}^{p}(T)=\sup\{|\textrm{trace}(ST)|:S\in \Upsilon_{p^{*}}(E,X^{**}),\|S\|_{\Upsilon_{p^{*}}}\leq 1\}.$$
We set $$c_{T}:=\sup\{|\textrm{trace}(RT)|:R\in \mathcal{F}(E,X),\|R\|_{\Upsilon_{p^{*}}}\leq 1\}.$$
Clearly, $c_{T}\leq \widetilde{\nu}^{p}(T).$
It remains to prove the reverse. Let $S\in \Upsilon_{p^{*}}(E,X^{**}),\|S\|_{\Upsilon_{p^{*}}}\leq 1$.
Case 1. $E$ has the $MAP$.
Let $\epsilon>0$. Then there exists an operator $A\in \mathcal{F}(E),\|A\|\leq 1+\epsilon$ such that $AT=T$. We let $R=SA$ and write
$$R=\sum_{i=1}^{n}u^{*}_{i}\otimes x^{**}_{i}, \quad u^{*}_{i}\in E^{*},x^{**}_{i}\in X^{**},i=1,2,\cdots,n.$$
and $$T=\sum_{j=1}^{m}x^{*}_{j}\otimes u_{j}, \quad x^{*}_{j}\in X^{*}, u_{j}\in E, j=1,2,\cdots,m.$$
We choose $\delta>0$ such that
\begin{center}
$\delta(2+\delta)\sum_{j=1}^{m}\sum_{i=1}^{n}\|u^{*}_{i}\|\|u_{j}\|\|x^{**}_{i}\|\|x^{*}_{j}\|<\epsilon$ and $(1+\delta)^{2}\leq 1+\epsilon.$
\end{center}
We set $M=\textrm{span}\{x^{**}_{i}:1\leq i\leq n\}$ and $L=\textrm{span}\{x^{*}_{j}:1\leq i\leq m\}.$ It follows from Lemma \ref{1.4} that there exist a sublattice $Z$ of $X^{**}$ containing $M$, a finite-dimensional sublattice $G$ of $Z$ and a positive projection $P$ from $Z$ onto $G$ such that $\|Px^{**}-x^{**}\|\leq \delta\|x^{**}\|$ for all $x^{**}\in M$. By Theorem \ref{1.3}, there exists a lattice isomorphism $B$ from $G$ into $X$ such that $\|B\|,\|B^{-1}\|\leq 1+\delta$ and
$$|\langle x^{**},x^{*}\rangle-\langle x^{*},Bx^{**}\rangle|\leq \delta \|x^{**}\|\|x^{*}\|, \quad x^{**}\in G, x^{*}\in L.$$
Let $\widetilde{R}=BPR\in \mathcal{F}(E,X)$ and then
\begin{align*}
\|\widetilde{R}\|_{\Upsilon_{p^{*}}}&=\|BPSA\|_{\Upsilon_{p^{*}}}\\
&\leq \|BP\|\|S\|_{\Upsilon_{p^{*}}}\|A\|\\
&\leq \|B\|\|P\|\|A\|\\
&\leq (1+\epsilon)^{2}\\
\end{align*}
Note that for all $i,j$, we have
\begin{align*}
|\langle x^{**}_{i},x^{*}_{j}\rangle-\langle x^{*}_{j},BPx^{**}_{i}\rangle|&\leq |\langle x^{**}_{i},x^{*}_{j}\rangle-\langle Px^{**}_{i},x^{*}_{j}\rangle|+
|\langle Px^{**}_{i},x^{*}_{j}\rangle-\langle x^{*}_{j},BPx^{**}_{i}\rangle|\\
&\leq \delta \|x^{**}_{i}\|\|x^{*}_{j}\|+\delta \|Px^{**}_{i}\|\|x^{*}_{j}\|\\
&\leq \delta \|x^{**}_{i}\|\|x^{*}_{j}\|+\delta(1+\delta)\|x^{**}_{i}\|\|x^{*}_{j}\|\\
&=\delta(2+\delta)\|\|x^{**}_{i}\|\|x^{*}_{j}\|\\
\end{align*}
This implies
\begin{align*}
|\textrm{trace}(ST)-\textrm{trace}(\widetilde{R}T)|&=|\textrm{trace}(RT)-\textrm{trace}(\widetilde{R}T)|\\
&=|\sum_{j=1}^{m}\sum_{i=1}^{n}\langle u^{*}_{i},u_{j}\rangle(\langle x^{**}_{i},x^{*}_{j}\rangle-\langle x^{*}_{j},BPx^{**}_{i}\rangle)|\\
&\leq \delta(2+\delta)\sum_{j=1}^{m}\sum_{i=1}^{n}\|u^{*}_{i}\|\|u_{j}\|\|x^{**}_{i}\|\|x^{*}_{j}\|\\
&<\epsilon.
\end{align*}
This yields
$$|\textrm{trace}(ST)|\leq \epsilon+|\textrm{trace}(\widetilde{R}T)|
\leq \epsilon+(1+\epsilon)^{2}c_{T}.$$
Hence
$$\widetilde{\nu}^{p}(T)\leq \epsilon+(1+\epsilon)^{2}c_{T}.$$
Letting $\epsilon\rightarrow 0$, we get
$\widetilde{\nu}^{p}(T)\leq c_{T}.$
Case 2. $X^{*}$ has the $PMAP$.
Let $\epsilon>0$. We write $T=\sum\limits_{i=1}^{n}x^{*}_{i}\otimes u_{i}(x^{*}_{i}\in X^{*},u_{i}\in E, i=1,2,\cdots,n).$ Choose $\delta>0$ with $\delta\sum\limits_{i=1}^{n}\|Su_{i}\|<\epsilon.$ Since $X^{*}$ has the $PAMP$, it follows from Lemma \ref{3.8} that there exists an operator $B\in \mathcal{F}_{+}(X), \|B\|\leq 1$ such that $\|B^{*}x^{*}_{i}-x^{*}_{i}\|<\delta$ for all $i=1,2,\cdots,n$. We set $R=B^{**}S\in \mathcal{F}(E,X)$. Then $
\|R\|_{\Upsilon_{p^{*}}}\leq 1$ and
\begin{align*}
|\textrm{trace}(ST)-\textrm{trace}(RT)|&=|\sum_{i=1}^{n}\langle Su_{i},x^{*}_{i}\rangle-\sum_{i=1}^{n}\langle B^{*}x^{*}_{i},Su_{i}\rangle|\\
&\leq \sum_{i=1}^{n}\|Su_{i}\|\|B^{*}x^{*}_{i}-x^{*}_{i}\|\\
&\leq \delta\sum\limits_{i=1}^{n}\|Su_{i}\|<\epsilon.
\end{align*}
Hence
$$\widetilde{\nu}^{p}(T)\leq \epsilon+c_{T}.$$
Letting $\epsilon\rightarrow 0$, we get
$\widetilde{\nu}^{p}(T)\leq c_{T}.$
This completes the proof of (a).
(b). By (a), it suffices to prove
$$\sup\{|\textrm{trace}(RT)|:R\in \mathcal{F}(E,X),\|R\|_{\Upsilon_{p^{*}}}\leq 1\}=\sup\{|\textrm{trace}(TS)|:S\in \mathcal{F}(F,X),\|S\|_{\Upsilon_{p^{*}}}\leq 1\}.$$
For the sake of convenience, we set $$\alpha:=\sup\{|\textrm{trace}(RT)|:R\in \mathcal{F}(E,X),\|R\|_{\Upsilon_{p^{*}}}\leq 1\}$$ and
$$\beta:=\sup\{|\textrm{trace}(TS)|:S\in \mathcal{F}(F,X),\|S\|_{\Upsilon_{p^{*}}}\leq 1\}.$$
Let $S\in \mathcal{F}(F,X)$ with $\|S\|_{\Upsilon_{p^{*}}}\leq 1$. By Theorem \ref{1.6}, $\|S^{**}\|_{\Upsilon_{p^{*}}}=\|S\|_{\Upsilon_{p^{*}}}\leq 1.$ It is easy to check that $\textrm{trace}(TS)=\textrm{trace}(S^{**}T)$. Hence, we get $\beta\leq \alpha.$
Conversely, let $R\in \mathcal{F}(E,X)$ with $\|R\|_{\Upsilon_{p^{*}}}\leq 1$. Let $\epsilon>0$. We write $T=\sum\limits_{i=1}^{n}x^{*}_{i}\otimes u_{i}$, where $x^{*}_{i}\in X^{*},u_{i}\in E(i=1,2,\cdots,n)$. Choose $\delta>0$ such that $\delta \|R\|\sum\limits_{i=1}^{n}\|x^{*}_{i}\|<\epsilon.$ Since $E$ has the $MAP$, there exists an operator $A\in \mathcal{F}(E)$ with $\|A\|\leq 1$ such that $\|Au_{i}-u_{i}\|<\delta$ for all $i=1,2,\cdots,n.$ Hence we get
\begin{align}\label{16}
|\textrm{trace}(RT)-\textrm{trace}(RAT)|&=|\sum\limits_{i=1}^{n}\langle x^{*}_{i},Ru_{i}\rangle-\sum\limits_{i=1}^{n}\langle x^{*}_{i},RAu_{i}\rangle| \nonumber \\
&\leq \sum\limits_{i=1}^{n}\|x^{*}_{i}\|\|R\|\|Au_{i}-u_{i}\| \nonumber \\
&<\epsilon.
\end{align}
We also write $A=\sum\limits_{j=1}^{m}u^{*}_{j}\otimes w_{j}, u^{*}_{j}\in E^{*}, w_{j}\in E(j=1,2,\cdots,m).$ We set $M=\textrm{span}\{u^{*}_{j}:1\leq j\leq m\}$ and $L=\textrm{span}\{u_{i}:1\leq i\leq n\}$. It follows from the principle of local reflexivity in Banach spaces that there exists an operator $C:M\rightarrow F^{*}$ such that
(i) $C|_{M\cap F^{*}}=I_{M\cap F^{*}}$;
(ii) $(1-\epsilon)\|u^{*}\|\leq \|Cu^{*}\|\leq (1+\epsilon)\|u^{*}\|, \quad u^{*}\in M$;
(iii) $\langle u^{*},u\rangle=\langle u, Cu^{*}\rangle, \quad u^{*}\in M, u\in L.$
We set $B=\sum\limits_{j=1}^{m}Cu^{*}_{j}\otimes w_{j}$ and $S=RB$. Clearly, $CA^{*}=B^{*}$. By (ii), we get
$$\|S\|_{\Upsilon_{p^{*}}}\leq \|R\|_{\Upsilon_{p^{*}}}\|B\|\leq \|B^{*}\|\leq 1+\epsilon.$$
By (ii), it be can verified that $\textrm{trace}(RAT)=\textrm{trace}(TS)$. Thus (\ref{16}) yields that
$$|\textrm{trace}(RT)-\textrm{trace}(TS)|<\epsilon.$$
This implies
$$|\textrm{trace}(RT)|\leq \epsilon+(1+\epsilon)\beta.$$
By the arbitrariness of $R$, we get
$$\alpha\leq \epsilon+(1+\epsilon)\beta.$$
Letting $\epsilon\rightarrow 0$, we get $\alpha\leq \beta.$ This means $\alpha=\beta.$
\end{proof}
\begin{theorem}
Suppose that $E^{**}$ has the $MAP$, $X^{*}$ has the $PMAP$ and $X$ is order continuous. Then
$$\widetilde{\mathcal{I}}^{p^{*}}(X,E^{**})=(\Upsilon_{p}^{0}(E,X))^{*}.$$
\end{theorem}
\begin{proof}
We define an operator $$U: \widetilde{\mathcal{I}}^{p^{*}}(X,E^{**})\rightarrow (\Upsilon_{p}^{0}(E,X))^{*}$$ by
$$T\mapsto U_{T}(S)=\textrm{trace}(TS), \quad T\in \widetilde{\mathcal{I}}^{p^{*}}(X,E^{**}), S\in \Upsilon_{p}^{0}(E,X).$$
By Lemma \ref{2.6}, we get $\|U_{T}\|\leq\widetilde{i}^{p^{*}}(T).$
Let $\varphi\in (\Upsilon_{p}^{0}(E,X))^{*}$. We define an operator $T:X\rightarrow E^{**}$ by $\langle Tx, u^{*}\rangle=\langle\varphi, u^{*}\otimes x\rangle$ for $x\in X, u^{*}\in E^{*}$. Obviously, $\|T\|\leq \|\varphi\|$ and $\langle \varphi,S\rangle=\textrm{trace}(TS)$ for all $S\in \mathcal{F}(E,X)$.
Claim. $T$ is positively $p^{*}$-integral.
Let $G\in LDim(X)$ and $L\in COFIN(E^{**})$. Let $\epsilon>0$. Since $X^{*}$ has the $PMAP$, $X$ also has the $PMAP$. By \cite[Theorem 2.7]{N}, there exists an operator $D\in \mathcal{F}_{+}(X)$ with $\|D\|\leq 1+\epsilon$ such that $D|_{G}=I_{G}$. By Lemma \ref{2.8}(b), we get
\begin{align*}
\widetilde{\nu}^{p^{*}}(Q_{L}Ti_{G})&=\widetilde{\nu}^{p^{*}}(Q_{L}TDi_{G})\\
&\leq\widetilde{\nu}^{p^{*}}(TD)\\
&=\sup\{|\textrm{trace}(TDV)|:V\in \mathcal{F}(E,X),\|V\|_{\Upsilon_{p^{*}}}\leq 1\}\\
&=\sup\{|\langle \varphi,DV\rangle|:V\in \mathcal{F}(E,X),\|V\|_{\Upsilon_{p^{*}}}\leq 1\}\\
&\leq \|\varphi\|\|D\|\\
&\leq (1+\epsilon)\|\varphi\|.
\end{align*}
Letting $\epsilon\rightarrow 0$, we get $\widetilde{\nu}^{p^{*}}(Q_{L}Ti_{G})\leq \|\varphi\|.$
It follows from Theorem \ref{3.2} that $T$ is positively $p^{*}$-integral and $\widetilde{i}^{p^{*}}(T)\leq \|\varphi\|.$
Finally, by the definition of $\Upsilon_{p}^{0}(E,X)$, we see that $\varphi=U_{T}$. Therefore the mapping $U$ is a surjective linear isometry.
\end{proof}
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{
"redpajama_set_name": "RedPajamaArXiv"
}
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trokoid, en kurva som beskrivs av en punkt på en radie eller dess förlängning då en cirkel rullar på en rät linje. Trokoiden har ekvationen
där a är cirkelns radie och b punktens avstånd från medelpunkten. Om a = b övergår kurvan i en cykloid.
Externa länkar
Geometri
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{
"redpajama_set_name": "RedPajamaWikipedia"
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\section{Introduction}
$L^2$-Betti numbers originated from topology, but have later unveiled an interesting connection to operator algebras. Indeed, while the original definition of $L^2$-Betti numbers for groups involved a geometric construction \cite{atiyah-l2,cheeger-gromov}, it was later shown by L\"uck (see also \cite{farber-vN-categories}) that they can also be described in terms of certain $\operatorname{Tor}$ modules --- thus using only homological algebra and modules over von Neumann algebras. This has led to several generalizations of $L^2$-Betti numbers: they have been defined for discrete measured groupoids \cite{sauer-betti-for-groupoids}, quantum groups \cite{quantum-betti} and general subalgebras of finite von Neumann algebras \cite{CS}. Similarly, $L^2$-Betti numbers were introduced in the setting of equivalence relations in \cite{gaboriau-L2-for-eq-rel} following the original geometric approach, but as shown in \cite{sauer-betti-for-groupoids} these can also be expressed in terms of homological algebra.
There are two properties which attract attention in all these situations. Firstly, in each case the definition involves certain operator algebras canonically associated with the situation at hand. Secondly, for groups, quantum groups and groupoids it is well known that the $L^2$-Betti numbers vanish in the presence of amenability. In view of this, it is natural to seek a common operator algebraic reason for this to happen. In doing so, one firstly observes that the actual reason for the vanishing of $L^2$-Betti numbers for amenable groups and quantum groups is a certain dimension-flatness property of an inclusion $\mc A\subseteq M$, where $\mc A$ is a strongly dense $\ast$-subalgebra of a finite von Neumann algebra $M$. Secondly, the key to the proof of this dimension-flatness result is a F{\o}lner condition for the notion of amenability in question.
In the present paper we introduce a F{\o}lner type condition for a general weakly dense $*$-subalgebra $\mc A$ in a tracial von Neumann algebra $(M,\tau)$ and show how this leads to dimension-flatness of the inclusion $\mc A\subseteq M$ and subsequently to the vanishing of the operator algebraic $L^2$-Betti numbers $\beta_p^{(2)}(\mc A, \tau)$.
This approach unifies the above mentioned vanishing results and furthermore provides a large class of new examples of algebras with vanishing $L^2$-Betti numbers (see Section \ref{example-section}). More precisely, we prove the following:
\begin{thm*}[see Theorem \ref{dim-flat-thm} \& Corollary \ref{CS-vanishing}]
If $\mc A \subseteq M$ satisfies the F{\o}lner condition then for any left $\mc A$-module $X$ and any $p\geqslant 1$ we have
\[
\dim_M \operatorname{Tor}_p^{\mc A}(M,X)=0,
\]
and the Connes-Shlyakhtenko $L^2$-Betti numbers of $\mc A$ vanish in positive degrees.
\end{thm*}
Secondly, we link our F{\o}lner condition to the classical operator algebraic notion of amenability by proving (a slightly more general version of) the following:
\begin{thm*}[see Theorem \ref{injectivity-thm}] If $\mc A\subseteq M$ satisfies the F{\o}lner condition $M$ is injective.
\end{thm*}
The F\o{}lner condition consists of two requirements: an almost invariance property and a trace approximation property.
The almost invariance property requires that the left action of $\mc A$ on $L^2(M)$ admits almost invariant subspaces, the almost invariance being measured by a dimension function. The naive approach would be to use the usual dimension over $\mb C$ and require these subspaces to be finite-dimensional; however, it turns out that the dimension theory over a von Neumann subalgebra $N\subseteq \mc A$ can be efficiently applied in order to allow for almost invariant subspaces which are finitely generated projective $N$-modules (thus usually having infinite dimension over $\mb C$). For this reason, parts of the paper deals with results related to dimension theory for modules over von Neumann algebras; the reader not familiar with these notions may, without loosing the essential ideas, think of the case $N={\mathbb C}$, which reduces most arguments to finite dimensional linear algebra. \\
\noindent{\emph{Structure:}}
The paper is organized as follows. In the second section we recapitulate L\"uck's dimension theory for modules over von Neumann algebras and prove a few results concerning a relative dimension function in this context. In the third section we introduce the operator-algebraic F\o{}lner condition and draw some easy consequences, preparing for the proof of the main theorem which is given in the fourth section. The fifth section is devoted to the discussion concerning the relationship between the F\o{}lner condition for an algebra and injectivity of its enveloping von Neumann algebra. In the sixth section we discuss examples and show how the F{\o}lner condition implies vanishing of $L^2$-Betti numbers in a variety of different instances. \\
\noindent{\emph{Assumptions:}} Throughout the paper, all generic von Neumann algebras are assumed to have separable predual. Our main focus will be on finite von Neumann algebras, for which separability of the predual is equivalent to separability of the von Neumann algebra itself for the strong, weak and ultra-weak topology. These topologies are furthermore all metrizable on bounded subsets of $M$. In order to be consistent with the general Hilbert $C^*$-module terminology (see below) inner products on Hilbert spaces are assumed to be linear in the second variable and conjugate linear in the first. Algebraic tensor products are denoted ``$\odot$'', tensor products of Hilbert spaces by ``$\otimes$'' and tensor products of von Neumann algebras by $``\bar{\otimes}$''. Our main setup will consist of an inclusion $N\subseteq M$ of finite von Neumann algebras with a fixed normal tracial state $\tau$ on $M$. The von Neumann algebra $N$ should be thought of as a ``coefficient algebra'' and will in many applications be equal to ${\mathbb C}$. We denote by $H$ the GNS-space $L^2(M,\tau)$, by $J\colon H\to H$ the modular conjugation arising from $\tau$ and by $E\colon M\to N$ the $\tau$-preserving conditional expectation. Note that $H$ automatically carries a normal right $N$-action given by $\xi\cdot x:= Jx^*J\xi$ which extends the natural right $N$-module structure on $M$. \\
\noindent{\emph{Acknowledgements:}} The authors would like to thank Thomas Schick for a crucial remark at an early stage in the project and Stefaan Vaes for suggesting an improvement of Theorem \ref{injectivity-thm}. Moreover, thanks are due to {\'{E}}tienne Blanchard, Henrik D.~Petersen and the anonymous referee for numerous valuable corrections and suggestions.
\section{Dimension theory}\label{dim-theory-section}
In this section we recapitulate parts of the von Neumann dimension theory for modules over a finite von Neumann algebra and introduce a relative version of this notion of dimension. The relative dimension function will play a prominent role in the definition of the F{\o}lner condition given in Section \ref{foelner-section}.\\
\subsection{Dimension of modules and the trace on endomorphisms}
Consider a finite von Neumann algebra $N$ endowed with a normal, faithful tracial state $\tau$ and denote by $L^2(N)$ the GNS-space arising from $\tau$ and by $N^{{\operatorname{{op}}}}$ the opposite von Neumann algebra. Denoting by $\Lambda$ the natural embedding of $N$ into $L^2(N)$ the inner product in $L^2(N)$ is therefore given by $\ip{\Lambda(x),\Lambda(y)}=\tau(x^*y)$ for $x,y\in N$. In what follows, we will often suppress the map $\Lambda$ and simply consider $N$ as a subspace of $L^2(N)$. A Hilbert space $F$ endowed with a normal $*$-representation of $N^{{\operatorname{{op}}}}$ is called a \emph{finitely generated normal (right) $N$-module} if there exists an isometric $N^{{\operatorname{{op}}}}$-equivariant embedding of $F$ into $L^2(N)^k$ for some finite integer $k$, where $L^2(N)^k$ is considered with the standard $N^{{\operatorname{{op}}}}$-action given by
\[
a^{{\operatorname{{op}}}}\colon(\xi_1,\dots, \xi_n)\mapsto (Ja^*J\xi_1,\dots, Ja^*J\xi_n).
\]
Thus, any finitely generated normal $N$-module $F$ is isomorphic to one of the form $pL^2(N)^k$ for a projection $p\in {\mathbb M}_k(N)$ and \emph{the von Neumann dimension} of $F$ is then defined as
\[
\dim_N F:=\sum_{i=1}^k\tau(p_{ii}).
\]
The number $\dim_N F$ is independent of the choice of $p$ and $k$ (see e.g.~\cite[Section 1.1.2]{Luck02}) and thus depends only on the isomorphism class of $F$.
\begin{Rem}
In most of the existing literature, finitely generated normal right modules over $N$ are called \emph{finitely generated Hilbert $N$-modules}, but since we are going to consider finitely generated Hilbert $C^*$-modules over $N$ (in the operator algebraic sense \cite{lance}) as well, we have chosen the term ``normal module'' in order to avoid unnecessary confusion. We advise the reader not familiar with these notions to consult the article \cite{frank-hilbertian-vs-hilbert} where a detailed comparison is carried out.
\end{Rem}
Next we recall the construction of the trace on the endomorphism von Neumann algebra $\End_N(F)$ associated with a finitely generated normal $N$-module $F$; here, and in what follows, $\End_N(F)$ denotes the von Neumann algebra of all bounded operators on $F$ commuting with the $N$-action. The trace on $\End_N(F)$ was previously considered by L{\"u}ck \cite[Section 1.1]{Luck02} and also by Farber \cite{farber-vN-categories} in the more general context of von Neumann categories.
\begin{Lemma}[{\cite[Section 1.1.3]{Luck02}}]\label{trace-lemma}
Let $F$ be a finitely generated normal $N$-mo\-dule and consider an operator $T\in \End_N(F)$. Upon choosing an isomorphism $F\simeq pL^2(N)^k$ we obtain an induced $*$-isomorphism $\End_N(F)\simeq p{\mathbb M}_k(N)p$ and we denote the matrix representing $T$ by $(T_{ij})_{i,j=1}^k$. Then the number $\Tr_{N}(T):= \sum_{i=1}^{k}\tau(T_{ii})$ does not depend on the choice of isomorphism and defines a normal, faithful, positive trace on $\End_N(F)$ with $\Tr_N(\id_F)=\dim_NF$.
\end{Lemma}
\begin{Rem}
In the case $N={\mathbb C}$ the normal $N$-module $F$ is simply a finite dimensional vector space and hence $\Tr_N(-)$ is just the standard, non-normalized trace on $B(F)$.
\end{Rem}
The first step towards extending the notion of dimension to arbitrary $N$-modules is to pass from normal modules to Hilbert $C^*$-modules over $N$.
\begin{Def}
A (right) Hilbert $C^*$-module over $N$ consists of an algebraic right $N$-module $\mc X$ together with a map $\ip{\cdot,\cdot}_N\colon \mc X\times \mc X\to N$ such that
\begin{itemize}
\item[(i)] For all $x\in \mc X$ we have ${\ip{x,x}}_N\geqslant 0$ and ${\ip{x,x}}_N=0$ only for $x=0$.
\item[(ii)] For all $x,y\in \mc X$ we have $\ip{x,y}_N=\ip{y,x}_N^*$.
\item[(iii)] For all $x,y,z\in \mc X$ and $a,b\in N$ we have $\ip{z,xa+yb}_N= \ip{z,x}_Na +\ip{z,y}_Nb$.
\item[(iv)] The space $\mc X$ is complete with respect to the norm $\|x\|:=\|\ip{x,x}\|^{\frac12}$.
\end{itemize}
A Hilbert $C^*$-module over $N$ is called \emph{finitely generated} if it is algebraically finitely generated over $N$ and \emph{projective} if it is projective as a right $N$-module. Moreover, the terms ``Hilbert module over $N$'', ``Hilbert $C^*$-module over $N$'' and ``Hilbert $N$-module'' will be used synonymously in the sequel.
\end{Def}
Note that the finitely generated free $N$-modules $N^k$ become Hilbert $N$-modules when endowed with the $N$-valued inner product $\ip{x,y}_{{\operatorname{st}}}:=\sum_{i=1}^k x_i^*y_i$; we refer to this as the \emph{standard} inner product on $N^k$. If $(\mc P, \ip{\cdot,\cdot}_N)$ is a finitely generated projective Hilbert $N$-module then $\tau\circ\ip{\cdot,\cdot}_N$ defines a positive definite ${\mathbb C}$-valued inner product on $\mc P$ and we denote the Hilbert space completion of $\mc P$ with respect to this inner product by $L^2(\mc P)$. It was shown by L\"uck that we get a finitely generated normal $N$-module in this way and that this construction yields an equivalence of categories:
\begin{Thm}[{L{\"u}ck, \cite[Lemma 6.23 \& Theorem 6.24]{Luck02}}]\label{lueck-eq-of-categories}
Every finitely generated projective $N$-module allows an $N$-valued inner product turning it into a Hilbert $N$-module and the inner product is unique up to unitary isomorphism. Furthermore, Hilbert space completion constitutes an equivalence of categories between the category of finitely generated projective Hilbert $N$-modules and the category of finitely generated normal $N$-modules.
\end{Thm}
We remark that a finitely generated projective Hilbert $N$-module $(\mc P, \ip{\cdot, \cdot}_N)$ is automatically self-dual; i.e.~${\operatorname{Hom}}_N(\mc P,N)=\{\ip{x, \cdot}_N \mid x\in \mc P\}$. This follows easily from the uniqueness of the inner product and the obvious self-duality of the finitely generated free Hilbert modules $(N^k,\ip{\cdot,\cdot}_{{\operatorname{st}}})$. Furthermore, by \cite[Lemma 2.3.7]{manuilov-troitsky} every finitely generated Hilbert submodule in $\mc P$ splits off orthogonally as a direct summand and is therefore, in particular, itself finitely generated and projective. Due to Theorem \ref{lueck-eq-of-categories}, it makes sense, for a finitely generated projective $N$-module $\mc P$, to
define the von Neumann dimension of $\mc P$ as $\dim_N \mc P=\dim_N L^2(\mc P)$ where $L^2(\mc P)$ is the Hilbert space completion relative to some choice of Hilbert $N$-module structure on $\mc P$. Moreover, for an arbitrary (algebraic) $N$-module $\mc X$ its von Neumann dimension is defined as
\[
\dim_N\mc X = \sup\{\dim_N\mc P \mid \mc P\subseteq \mc X, \mc P \ \text{finitely generated projective} \}\in [0,\infty].
\]
This dimension function is no longer faithful (i.e.~non-zero modules might be zero-dimensional) but it still has remarkably good properties; one of its prime features being additivity with respect to short exact sequences \cite[Theorem 6.7]{Luck02}. For a submodule $\mc E$ in an $N$-module $\mc F$ the \emph{algebraic closure} $ \overline{\mc E}^{{\operatorname{alg}}} $ of $\mc E$ inside $\mc F$ is defined as the intersection of the kernels of those homomorphisms in the dual module ${\operatorname{Hom}}_N(\mc F,N)$ that vanish on $\mc E$, and if $\mc F$ is finitely generated we have that
$
\dim_N \mc E = \dim_N \overline{\mc E}^{{\operatorname{alg}}}
$
\cite[Theorem 6.7]{Luck02}.
\begin{Lemma}\label{same-closure-lem}
If $\mc P$ is a finitely generated projective Hilbert $N$-module and $\mc E\subseteq \mc P$ a submodule then ${\mc E}^{\perp\perp}=\overline{\mc E}^{{\operatorname{alg}}}$
and $\mc E^{\perp\perp}$ splits off orthogonally as a direct summand in $\mc P$. Furthermore, the Hilbert space closures of $\mc E$ and $\mc E^{\perp\perp}$ in $L^2(\mc P)$ coincide.
\end{Lemma}
\begin{proof}
Since $\mc P$ is selfdual, the equality $\mc{E}^{\perp\perp}=\overline{\mc E}^{\operatorname{alg}}$ follows directly from the definition of the algebraic closure. Since $\mc P$ is finitely generated and projective it now follows from \cite[Theorem 6.7]{Luck02} that the same is true for $\mc E^{\perp\perp}$ and by \cite[Lemma 2.3.7]{manuilov-troitsky} it therefore follows that $\mc{E}^{\perp\perp}$ splits off as an orthogonal direct summand. Since $\dim_N (\mc E^{\perp\perp}/\mc E) =0$, Sauer's local criterion \cite[Theorem 2.4]{sauer-betti-for-groupoids} implies that for every $x\in \mc E^{\perp\perp}$ there exists a sequence of projections $p_i\in N$ such that $\lim_i\tau(p_i)=1$ and $xp_i \in \mc E$. Thus
\begin{align*}
\|x-xp_i \|_2^2 &= \tau\left(\ip{x(1-p_i),x(1-p_i)}_N\right)\\
&=\tau\left(\ip{x,x}_N(1-p_i)^2\right)\\
&\leqslant \tau\left(\ip{x,x}_N^2\right)^{\frac12} \tau\left(1-p_i\right)^{\frac12}\underset{i\to\infty}{\longrightarrow}0.
\end{align*}
Hence $\mc E^{\perp\perp} \subseteq \overline{\mc E}^{\|\cdot\|_2}$ and since $\mc E \subseteq \mc E^{\perp\perp}$ this proves that the two closures coincide.
\end{proof}
If $(\mc F, \ip{\cdot, \cdot}_N)$ is a finitely generated projective Hilbert $N$-module we will often identify the algebraic endomorphism ring $\End_N(\mc F)$ with $\End_N(L^2(\mc F))$ and thus also consider $\Tr_{N}(-)$ as defined on $\End_N(\mc F)$. Recall, e.g.~from \cite[Lemma 1.7]{kajiwara-watatani}, that every finitely generated projective Hilbert $N$-module $(\mc F,\ip{\cdot,\cdot}_N)$ has a \emph{basis}; that is there exist $u_1,\dots, u_n\in \mc F$ such that $x=\sum_{i=1}^n u_i\ip{u_i,x}_N$ for each $x\in \mc F$.\footnote{Note that in general the elements $u_1,\dots,u_n$ are not linearly independent over $N$ and thus not a basis in the standard sense of homological algebra.} Furthermore, the matrix $p=(\ip{u_i,u_j}_N)_{i,j=1}^n$ is a projection in ${\mathbb M}_n(N)$ and the map $\alpha\colon (\mc F,\ip{\cdot, \cdot}_N) \to (pN^{n},\ip{\cdot,\cdot}_{\operatorname{st}})$ given by $\alpha(x)=(\ip{u_i,x}_N)_{i=1}^n$ is a unitary isomorphism of Hilbert $N$-modules with $u_i=\alpha^{-1}(pe_i)$, where $e_1,\dots,e_n$ is the standard basis in $N^n$. From this we obtain the following result.
\begin{Lemma}\label{basis-lemma}
For a finitely generated projective Hilbert $N$-module $(\mc F,\ip{\cdot,\cdot}_N)$ and an endomorphism $T\in \End_{N}(\mc F)$ we have $ \Tr_N(T)= \sum_{i=1}^n \tau( \ip{u_i,Tu_i}_N)$ for any basis $u_1,\dots, u_n$ in $\mc F$.
\end{Lemma}
\subsection{The relative dimension function}
Next we consider a trace-preserving inclusion of $N$ into a bigger finite von Neumann algebra $(M,\tau)$ acting on its GNS-space $H=L^2(M,\tau)$. Note that any $N$-submodule $\mc F\subseteq M$ acquires an $N$-valued inner product arising from the trace-preserving conditional expectation $E\colon M\to N$ by setting $\ip{a,b}_N:=E(a^*b)$. Consider now a finitely generated, projective $N$-submodule $\mc F \subseteq M$ which is complete with respect to this pre-Hilbert module structure.
In other words, the relation $\ip{a, b}_N:=E(a^*b)$ defines a Hilbert $N$-module structure on $\mc F$ and hence $L^2(\mc F)$ can be obtained by completion with respect to the ${\mathbb C}$-valued inner product $\tau\circ \ip{\cdot,\cdot}_N$. Since $E$ is trace-preserving, this completion is exactly the closure of $\mc F$ in $H$.
\begin{Def}\label{complete-defi}
An $N$-submodule $\mc F \subseteq M$ which is a Hilbert $N$-module with respect to the $N$-valued inner product arising from the conditional expectation $E\colon M\to N$ is called complete.
\end{Def}
Let $\mc F\subseteq M$ be a complete, non-zero, finitely generated projective $N$-submodule and denote by $P_F\in B(H)$ the projection onto its closure $F$ in $H$. Note that $F$ is a finitely generated normal $N$-module. Any operator $T\in (JNJ)'\subseteq B(H)$ gives rise to an $N$-equivariant operator $P_F TP_F|_{F}$ on $F$ and we may therefore define a normal state $\varphi_{\mc F}$ on $(JNJ)'$ by setting
\begin{align}\label{phi-F-def}
\varphi_{\mc F}(T)=\frac{\Tr_{N}(P_FTP_F|_{F} )}{\dim_N(\mc F)}.
\end{align}
By choosing a basis $u_1,\dots, u_k\in \mc F$ for the Hilbert $N$-module structure arising from $E$, the state $\varphi_{\mc F}$ can be computed as $\varphi_{\mc F}(T)=(\dim_N\mc F)^{-1}\sum_{i=1}^k \ip{\Lambda(u_i),T\Lambda(u_i)}$ where the inner product is taken in $H$. This is due to the fact that $P_FTP_F|_{\mc F}\in \End_N(\mc F)$ and hence by Lemma \ref{basis-lemma}
\begin{align*}
\varphi_{\mc F}(T)&=\frac{\sum_{i=1}^k \tau( \ip{u_i , P_FTP_{F} u_i }_N )}{\dim_N \mc F} \\
&= \frac{\sum_{i=1}^k \tau( E( u_i^*(P_FTP_F u_i))}{\dim_N \mc F}\\
&=\frac{\sum_{i=1}^k \ip{\Lambda (u_i), P_FTP_F \Lambda (u_i) }}{\dim_N \mc F}\\
&=\frac{\sum_{i=1}^k \ip{\Lambda(u_i), T \Lambda( u_i) }}{\dim_N \mc F}.
\end{align*}
In what follows we will also consider operators acting on a $k$-fold amplification $H^k=\bigoplus_1^k H$ of the Hilbert space $H$; these amplifications are always implicitly assumed equipped with the diagonal normal right action of $N$. For a subspace $L\subseteq H$ we denote by $L^k\subseteq H^k$ its amplification.
\begin{Def}\label{rel-dim-defi}
Let $k\in {\mathbb N}$ and a complete, non-zero, finitely generated, projective right $N$-submodule $\mc F$ in $M$ be given. For an $N$-submodule $\mc E\subseteq H^k$ we define \emph{the dimension of $\mc E$ relative to $\mc F$} as
\[
\dim_{\mc F}(\mc E)=\frac{\Tr_{N}(P_{F^k}P_EP_{F^k}|_{F^k})}{\dim_N\mc F},
\]
where $F$ and $E$ are the closures in $H^k$ of $\mc F$ and $\mc E$, respectively.
\end{Def}
Note that this is well-defined since $P_E$ commutes with the right action of $N$ so that $P_{F^k}P_{E}P_{F^k}|_{ F^k}\in \End_N(F^k)$. Note also the trivial fact that if two submodules have the same closure in $H^k$ then their relative dimensions agree.
\begin{Prop}\label{rel-dim-properties-amplified}
The relative dimension function $\dim_{\mc F}(-)$ has the following pro\-perties.
\begin{itemize}
\item[(i)] If $ \mc E_1\subseteq \mc E_2\subseteq H^k$ are two $N$-submodules then $\dim_{ \mc F}(\mc E_1)\leqslant \dim_{ \mc F}(\mc E_2)$.
\item[(ii)] If $ \mc E\subseteq \mc F^k$ then $\dim_{\mc F}(\mc E)= \frac{\dim_N \mc E}{\dim_N \mc F}$. In other words, $\dim_N\mc E=\Tr_N(P_E|_{F^k})$ where $P_E$ is the projection onto the closure $E$ of $\mc E$ in $H^k$.
\end{itemize}
\end{Prop}
\begin{proof}
For the sake of notational convenience we restrict attention to the case $k=1$, but the same proof goes through in higher dimensions.
The first claim follows directly from positivity of the state $\varphi_{\mc F}$. To prove the second claim, first note that $\mc F$ splits orthogonally as $\mc E^{\perp\perp}\oplus \mc G$ for some Hilbert $N$-submodule $\mc G$. Since $\mc F$ is assumed to be complete, its $L^2$-completion coincides with its closure $F$ inside $H$ and hence
\[
F=\overline{\mc E ^{\perp\perp}}\oplus \overline{\mc G}
\]
as an orthogonal direct sum inside $H$ and $L^2(\mc E^{\perp\perp})=\overline{\mc E ^{\perp\perp}}$. Denote by $P_{\mc E^{\perp\perp}}\in \End_N(\mc F)$ the projection onto the summand ${\mc E^{\perp\perp}}$ and by $P_{\mc E^{\perp\perp}}^{(2)}\in \End_N(F)$ its extension to $F$. Then clearly $P_{\mc E^{\perp\perp}}^{(2)}$ projects onto the summand $\overline{\mc E^{\perp\perp}}$ which by Lemma \ref{same-closure-lem} coincides with $\overline{\mc E}$. Thus $P_FP_EP_F|_{F}=P_{\mc E^{\perp\perp}}^{(2)}$. By choosing a basis $u_1,\dots u_n$ for $\mc{E}^{\perp\perp}$ and a basis $v_1,\dots, v_l$ for $\mc G$ we get a basis for $\mc F$ and using this basis to compute the trace we get
\begin{align*}
\dim_{\mc F}\mc E &=\frac{\sum_{i=1}^n \ip{u_i, P_{\mc E^{\perp\perp}}^{(2)} u_i} +\sum_{j=1}^l \ip{v_j, P_{\mc E^{\perp\perp}}^{(2)}v_j} }{\dim_N \mc F}\\
&=\frac{\sum_{i=1}^n\ip{u_i, u_i}}{\dim_N\mc F}\\
&=\frac{\dim_N\mc E^{\perp\perp}}{\dim_N \mc F}\\
&=\frac{\dim_N \mc E}{\dim_N \mc F},
\end{align*}
where the last equality follows from Lemma \ref{same-closure-lem}.
\end{proof}
Relative dimension functions were originally introduced by Eckmann \cite{eckmann} in a topological setting (see also \cite{elek-zdc}) and the relative dimension function $\dim_{\mc F}(-)$ introduced above can be seen as an operator algebraic analogue of this construction. A similar construction for quantum groups was considered in \cite{kyed-thom}. We end this section with a small lemma which will turn out useful in the following.
\begin{Lemma}\label{intersection-lem}
Let $ \mc F$ be a non-zero, finitely generated, projective $N$-module and let $\mc S_1, \dots,\mc S_n$ be a family of submodules in $\mc F $. Suppose that
\beqn
\forall i\in\{1,\dots,n\}:\quad \frac{\dim_N \mc S_i }{\dim_N \mc F} > 1 - \eps_i
\eeqn
for some $\eps_1,\dots, \eps_n>0$. Then
\beqn
\frac{\dim_N \left(\bigcap_{i=1}^n\mc S_i\right) }{\dim_N \mc F} > 1 - \sum_{i=1}^n\eps_i.
\eeqn
\end{Lemma}
\begin{proof}
By induction it is sufficient to consider the case $n=2$. In this case we have an exact sequence of $N$-modules
\[
0 \longrightarrow \mc S_1\cap \mc S_2 \longrightarrow \mc S_1\oplus \mc S_2 \longrightarrow {\mc S_1+\mc S_2}\longrightarrow 0,
\]
and by \cite[Theorem 6.7]{Luck02} we have $\dim_N(\mc S_1\oplus \mc S_2)=\dim_N(\mc S_1\cap \mc S_2)+\dim_N({\mc S_1+\mc S_2})$. Thus
\beqn
\frac{\dim_N( \mc S_1 \cap \mc S_2)}{\dim_N \mc F} = \frac{\dim_N \mc S_1 + \dim_N \mc S_2 - \dim_N({ \mc S_1+ \mc S_2})}{\dim_N \mc F} > 1 - \eps_1 - \eps_2.
\eeqn
\end{proof}
Of course the whole theory has a mirror counterpart for \emph{left} modules over $N$ and we will use both theories without further specification throughout the paper. Moreover, we will not make any notational distinction between the corresponding dimension functions; so when $\mc X$ is a \emph{left} $N$-module $\dim_N\mc X$ will also denote the von Neumann dimension of $\mc X$ as a left module and similarly with the relative dimension functions.
\section{The F{\o}lner property}\label{foelner-section}
Consider again a trace-preserving inclusion of finite von Neumann algebras $N\subseteq M$ and let $\mc A$ be an intermediate $\ast$-algebra (i.e.~$N\subseteq \mc A\subseteq M$) which is strongly dense in $M$. We will keep this setup fixed throughout the present section and the symbols $N$, $\mc A$ and $M$ will therefore refer to objects specified above. Moreover, $\tau$ will denote the common trace on $N$ and $M$ and $H$ the GNS-space $L^2(M,\tau)$.
The aim of this section is to introduce a F{\o}lner type condition for $\mc A$, relative to the chain $N\subseteq \mc A\subseteq M$, and study its basic properties.
As already mentioned, the von Neumann algebra $N$ will be thought of as a ``coefficient algebra'', and we advise the reader to keep the example $N=\mb C$ in mind in order to get a more intuitive picture. Recall from Section \ref{dim-theory-section}, that an $N$-submodule $\mc F$ in $M$ is called \emph{complete} if it is a Hilbert module with respect to the $N$-valued inner product arising from the trace-preserving conditional expectation $E\colon M\to N$.
\begin{Def}\label{strong-foelner-def}
The algebra $\mc A$ is said to have the strong F{\o}lner property with respect to $N$ if for every finite set $T_1,\dots, T_r \in \mc A$ and every $\eps>0$ there exists a complete, non-zero, finitely generated projective $N$-submodule $\mc F\subseteq \mc A$ such that
\[
\frac{\dim_N(T_i^{-1}(\mc F)\cap \mc F)}{\dim_N(F)}>1-\eps \quad \text{ and } \quad \|\varphi_{\mc F}-\tau \|_{M_*}<\eps
\]
for all $i\in \{1,\dots, r\}$. Here $T_i^{-1}(\mc F)$ denotes the preimage of $\mc F$ under the left multiplication operator given by $T_i$.
\end{Def}
This definition is an operator algebraic analogue of the F\o{}lner condition for discrete groups, where the almost invariant finite subset of the group is replaced by an almost invariant ``finite-dimensional'' $N$-submodule $\mc F$ in $\mc A$. In fact, putting $N={\mathbb C}$ one can easily check that the linear span of a subset $F$ in a group $\Gamma$ which is $\eps$-invariant under the action of another set $S$ gives rise to an almost invariant submodule $\mc F$ in the above sense (see Corollary \ref{grp-cor} for details) for any set of operators in ${\mathbb C}\Gamma$ not supported outside of $S$. The condition regarding the trace approximation is trivially fulfilled in this case as $\varphi_{\mc F}(T)=\tau(T)$ for each $T\in L\Gamma$, a fact due to ${\mathbb C}\Gamma$ being spanned by a multiplicative set of orthogonal unitaries. Since this need not be the case for a general $\mc A$, we have to include the approximation property in order to compare the dimension of an $N$-submodule with the relative dimensions of its ``finite-dimensional approximations''; see Proposition \ref{matrix-approximation-prop} for the precise statement.
\begin{Rem}\label{left-right-rem}
Strictly speaking, the norm estimate in Definition \ref{strong-foelner-def} should read $\|\varphi_{\mc F}|_{M}-\tau\|_{M_*}<\eps$ but for notational convenience we will consistently suppress the restriction in the sequel. This should not lead to any confusion as the algebra on which the states are considered can always be read off the subscript on the norm. Moreover, the strong F{\o}lner property should, more precisely, be called the \emph{right} strong F{\o}lner property since we have chosen to use \emph{right} modules in the definition. However, if ${\mathcal A}$ has the right F{\o}lner property then it also has the corresponding left F{\o}lner property and vice versa. This can be seen by noting that if $T_1,\dots, T_r\in {\mathcal A}$ and $\eps>0$ are given and $\mc F\subseteq \mc A$ is a right $N$-module satisfying the conditions in Definition \ref{strong-foelner-def}, then $\mc F^*$ (the adjoint taken inside $\mc A$) is a complete, finitely generated projective \emph{left} Hilbert $N$-submodule in $M$ (the latter endowed with the inner product $\ip{x,y}_N=E(xy^*)$) which satisfies the conditions in the left version of Definition \ref{strong-foelner-def} for the set of operators $T_1^*,\dots, T_r^*$. Note, in particular, that this implies that the strong F{\o}lner property is stable under passing to opposite algebras; i.e.~if the tower $N\subseteq \mc A \subseteq M$ has the strong F{\o}lner property then the same is true for the tower $N^{\operatorname{{op}}}\subseteq \mc A^{\operatorname{{op}}} \subseteq M^{\operatorname{{op}}}$.
\end{Rem}
For our purposes the following slight reformulation of the F{\o}lner property will turn out convenient.
\begin{Prop}\label{strong-foelner-prop}
The algebra ${\mathcal A}$ has the strong F{\o}lner property with respect to $N$ iff for any finite set $T_1,\dots,T_r\in \mc A$
there exists a sequence of complete, non-zero, finitely generated, projective $N$-modules $\mc P_n\subseteq \mc A$ with submodules $\mc S_n\subseteq \mc P_n$ such that
\begin{enumerate}
\item[(i)] $T_i (\mc S_n) \subseteq \mc P_n$ for each $i\in\{1,\dots, r\}$ and each $n\in\mb N$;
\item[(ii)] $\displaystyle \lim_{n\to \infty }\frac{\dim_N\mc S_n}{\dim_N\mc P_n}=1$;
\item[(iii)] The sequence $\varphi_{\mc P_n}$ (restricted to $M$) converges uniformly to the trace $\tau$; i.e.~$\lim_{n\to \infty }\|\varphi_{\mc P_n}-\tau\|_{M_*}=0$.
\end{enumerate}
\end{Prop}
\begin{proof}
Clearly (i)-(iii) imply the F{\o}lner property. Conversely, if $\mc A$ has the F{\o}lner property and $T_1,\dots,T_r \in \mc A$ is given then
for each $n\in {\mathbb N}$ we get a complete, non-zero, finitely generated projective module $\mc F_n\subseteq \mc A $ such that
\[
\frac{\dim_N(T_i^{-1}(\mc F_n)\cap \mc F_n) }{\dim_N \mc F_n}>1-\frac{1}{rn} \quad \text{ and } \quad \|\varphi_{\mc F_n}-\tau\|_{M_*}<\frac{1}{n}.
\]
Putting $\mc P_n:=\mc F_n$ and $\mc S_n:=\cap_{i=1}^r T_i^{-1}(\mc F_n)\cap \mc F_n$ we clearly have (i) and (iii) satisfied and (ii) follows from Lemma \ref{intersection-lem}.
\end{proof}
\begin{Def}
If $\mc A$ has the strong F{\o}lner property and $\{T_1,\dots, T_r\}$ is a finite subset in $\mc A$, then we call a sequence $(\mc P_n,\mc S_n)$ with the properties
in Proposition \ref{strong-foelner-prop} a \emph{strong F{\o}lner sequence} for the given set of operators.
\end{Def}
The final result in this section shows that the von Neumann dimension can be approximated by relative dimensions in the presence of a strong F{\o}lner sequence.
\begin{Prop}\label{rel-to-vN-prop}
Let ${\mathcal A}$ have the strong F{\o}lner property relative to $N$ and let $(\mc P_n,\mc S_n)$ be a strong F{\o}lner sequence for an arbitrary finite set in $\mc A$. If $K\subseteq H^k$ is a closed subspace which is invariant under the diagonal right action of $M$ then $ \dim_{\mc P_n} K \underset{n\to \infty}{\longrightarrow} \dim_M K$.
\end{Prop}
\begin{proof}
Denote by $P_K\in {\mathbb M}_k(M)\subseteq B(H^k)$ the projection onto $K$. Fix an $n\in {\mathbb N}$ and choose a basis $u_1,\dots, u_l\in \mc P_n$. Then the set
\[
\{ u_i \otimes e_j \mid 1\leqslant i\leqslant l, 1\leqslant j\leqslant k \}
\]
is a basis for the amplification $\mc P_n^k=\mc P_n \otimes {\mathbb C}^k$; here $e_1,\dots, e_k$ denotes the standard basis in ${\mathbb C}^k$. By computing the trace in this basis one easily gets
\[
\dim_{\mc P_n}K=\sum_{j=1}^k \varphi_{\mc P_n}((P_K)_{jj}) \underset{n\to\infty}{\longrightarrow} \sum_{j=1}^k \tau((P_K)_{jj})=\dim_MK,
\]
where the convergence follows from Proposition \ref{strong-foelner-prop}.
\end{proof}
\section{Dimension flatness}
Throughout this section we consider again the setup consisting of a trace-pre\-ser\-ving inclusion $N\subseteq M$ of tracial von Neumann algebras together with an intermediate $*$-algebra $N\subseteq \mc A \subseteq M$ which is weakly dense in $M$. We will also consider a $k$-fold amplification $H^k$ of the GNS-space $H:=L^2(M,\tau)$ and the natural left action of ${\mathbb M}_k(\mc A)\subseteq {\mathbb M}_k(M)$ thereon. Our aim is Theorem \ref{dim-flat-thm} which roughly says that when $\mc A$ is strongly F{\o}lner then the ring inclusion $\mc A \subseteq M$ is flat from the point of view of dimension theory. Before reaching our goal we need a few preparatory results.
\begin{Prop}\label{matrix-approximation-prop}
Assume that $\mc A$ has the strong F{\o}lner property relative to $N$ and let $T=(T_{ij})\in {\mathbb M}_k(\mc A)$ be given. If $(\mc P_n,\mc S_n)$ is a strong F{\o}lner sequence for the set of matrix entries of $T$, then
\[
\dim_M\ker(T)=\lim_{n\to \infty} \dim_{\mc P_n}\ker(T|_{\mc S_n^k}).
\]
\end{Prop}
The proof is an extension of the corresponding argument in \cite{elek-zdc}.
\begin{proof}
By L\"uck's dimension theorem \cite[Theorem 6.7]{Luck02} we have
\[
\dim_{N} \ker(T|_{\mc S_n^k}) + \dim_{N} {\operatorname{rg\hspace{0.04cm}}}(T|_{\mc S_n^k})=\dim_{N}\mc S_n^k=k \dim_N\mc S_n.
\]
Since $T_{ij}\mc S_n \subseteq \mc P_n$ we have ${{\operatorname{rg\hspace{0.04cm}}}(T|_{\mc S_n^k})}\subseteq \mc P_n^k$ and $\ker(T|_{\mc S_n^k})\subseteq \mc P_n^k $ and by the basic properties of the relative dimension function (Proposition \ref{rel-dim-properties-amplified}) we now get
\begin{align}\label{estimate-0}
\dim_{\mc P_n} \ker(T|_{\mc S_n^k}) + \dim_{\mc P_n}{ {\operatorname{rg\hspace{0.04cm}}}(T|_{\mc S_n^k}})=k \frac{\dim_N\mc S_n}{\dim_N \mc P_n}.
\end{align}
Denote by $P$ the kernel projection of $T\colon H^k\to H^k$ and by $R$ the projection onto the closure of its range. By Proposition \ref{rel-to-vN-prop}, for any $\varepsilon>0$ we can find $n_0\in {\mb N}$ such that for all $n\geqslant n_0$ we have
\begin{align}
a_n&:=\dim_{\mc P_n}\ker(T|_{\mc S_n^k})\leqslant \dim_{\mc P_n}\ker(T) \leqslant \dim_M\ker(T)+\varepsilon; \label{estimate-1} \\
b_n&:=\dim_{\mc P_n}{{\operatorname{rg\hspace{0.04cm}}}(T|_{\mc S_n^k})} \leqslant \dim_{\mc P_n}\overline{{\operatorname{rg\hspace{0.04cm}}}(T)}\leqslant \dim_M\overline{{\operatorname{rg\hspace{0.04cm}}}(T)}+\varepsilon. \label{estimate-2}
\end{align}
By \eqref{estimate-0} we have $\lim_n(a_n+b_n)=k$ and by \cite[Theorem 1.12 (2)]{Luck02}
\[
\dim_M\ker(T)+\dim_M\overline{{\operatorname{rg\hspace{0.04cm}}}(T)}=k.
\]
Our task is to prove that $a_n$ converges to $\dim_M\ker(T)$. If this were not the case, by passing to a subsequence we can assume that there exists $\varepsilon_0>0$ and an $n_1\in {\mathbb N}$ such that $a_n\notin [\dim_M\ker(T)-\varepsilon_0,\dim_M\ker(T)+\varepsilon_0]$ for $n\geqslant n_1$. The estimates \eqref{estimate-1} and \eqref{estimate-2} imply the existence of an $n_2\in {\mathbb N} $ such that
\begin{align*}
a_n\leqslant \dim_M\ker(T)+\frac{\varepsilon_0}{2} \quad \text{ and } \quad b_n\leqslant \dim_M \overline{{\operatorname{rg\hspace{0.04cm}}}(T)} + \frac{\varepsilon_0}{2}
\end{align*}
for $n\geqslant n_2$; hence we must have $a_n\leqslant \dim_M\ker(T)-\varepsilon_0$ for $n\geqslant\max\{n_1,n_2\}$. But then from this point on
\[
a_n+b_n\leqslant \dim_M\ker(T)- \varepsilon_0 + \dim_M\overline{{\operatorname{rg\hspace{0.04cm}}}(T)}+ \frac{\varepsilon_0}{2} = k-\frac{\varepsilon_0}{2},
\]
contradicting the fact that $\lim_n(a_n+b_n)=k$.
\end{proof}
Consider again the operator $T\in {\mathbb M}_k(\mc A) \subseteq B(H^k)$ as well as its restriction $T_0\colon \mc A^k\to \mc A^k$.
\begin{Lemma}\label{closure-lem}
If $\mc A$ has the strong F{\o}lner property relative to $N$ then the closure of ${\ker(T_0)}$ in $H^k$ coincides with $\ker(T)$.
\end{Lemma}
\begin{proof}
Let $(\mc P_n,\mc S_n)$ be a strong F{\o}lner sequence for the matrix coefficients of $T$. Denote by $P$ the kernel projection of $T$ and let $Q$ be the projection onto ${\overline{\ker(T_0)}}^\perp \cap \ker(T)$. We need to prove that $Q=0$. One easily checks that ${\operatorname{rg\hspace{0.04cm}}}(Q)$ is a finitely generated, normal, right $M$-module
and it is therefore enough to prove that $\dim_M{\operatorname{rg\hspace{0.04cm}}}(Q)=0$. Denote by $R$ the projection onto the space $\overline{\ker(T_0)}$. Given $\varepsilon>0$, Proposition \ref{matrix-approximation-prop} provides an $n_0\in {\mathbb N}$ such that for $n\geqslant n_0$ we have
\[
\dim_M{\operatorname{rg\hspace{0.04cm}}}(P)=\dim_M\ker(T)\leqslant \dim_{\mc P_n}\ker(T|_{\mc S_n^k})+\varepsilon \leqslant \dim_{\mc P_n}{\operatorname{rg\hspace{0.04cm}}}(R)+\varepsilon,
\]
simply because $\ker(T|_{\mc S_n^k})\subseteq \ker(T_0)\subseteq \overline{\ker(T_0)}={\operatorname{rg\hspace{0.04cm}}}(R)$. Since $P=R+Q$, Proposition \ref{rel-to-vN-prop} implies that we eventually have
\begin{align*}
\dim_{\mc P_n}{\operatorname{rg\hspace{0.04cm}}}(R)+\dim_{\mc P_n} {\operatorname{rg\hspace{0.04cm}}}(Q) &=\dim_{\mc P_n}{\operatorname{rg\hspace{0.04cm}}}(P)\\\
&\leqslant \dim_M{\operatorname{rg\hspace{0.04cm}}}(P)+\varepsilon\\
& \leqslant \dim_{\mc P_n}{\operatorname{rg\hspace{0.04cm}}}(R)+2\varepsilon
\end{align*}
and hence $\dim_{\mc P_n}{\operatorname{rg\hspace{0.04cm}}}(Q)\leqslant 2\varepsilon$ from a certain point on. Thus $\dim_M{\operatorname{rg\hspace{0.04cm}}}(Q)=\lim_n \dim_{\mc P_n}{\operatorname{rg\hspace{0.04cm}}}(Q)=0$.
\end{proof}
\begin{Rem}\label{left-right-rem-2}
If instead $T_0$ is given by \emph{right} multiplication with a matrix from ${\mathbb M}_k(\mc A)$ then $T\in \diag(M)'={\mathbb M}_k(M')$ and hence commutes with the diagonal action of $N$ from the left. By using the obvious variations of the above results for left modules we therefore also obtain $\overline{\ker(T_0)}=\ker(T)$ if $\mc A$ has the F{\o}lner property (see e.g.~Remark \ref{left-right-rem}). We will use this variant of the result in the proof of Theorem \ref{dim-flat-thm} which is formulated using dimension-theory for \emph{left} modules over $M$; this is done in order be consistent with the majority of the references (e.g.~\cite{Luck02, CS, sauer-betti-for-groupoids}) on $L^2$-Betti numbers in the homological algebraic context.
\end{Rem}
We are now ready to state and prove the main theorem of this section. Recall, that $N\subseteq M$ is a trace-preserving inclusion of finite von Neumann algebras and that $\mc A$ denotes an intermediate $*$-algebra which is weakly dense in $M$.
\begin{Thm}[Dimension flatness]\label{dim-flat-thm}
If $\mc A$ has the strong F{\o}lner property relative to $N$ then the inclusion $\mc A \subseteq M$ is dimension flat; that is
\[
\dim_M \operatorname{Tor}_p^{\mc A} (M, X)=0
\]
for any $p\geqslant 1$ and any left $\mc A$-module $X$.
\end{Thm}
Note that if the ring inclusion $\mc A \subseteq M$ actually were flat (in the standard sense of homological algebra) then we would have $\operatorname{Tor}_p^{\mc A}(M,X)=0$ for every left $\mc A$-module $X$ and every $p\geqslant 1$. This need not be the case in our setup\footnote{For example, the tower ${\mathbb C}\subseteq {\mathbb C}[{\mathbb Z}\times {\mathbb Z}]\subseteq L({\mathbb Z}\times {\mathbb Z})$ has the strong F{\o}lner property (Corollary \ref{grp-cor}) but is not flat as $\operatorname{Tor}_1^{{\mathbb C}[{\mathbb Z}\times {\mathbb Z}]}(L({\mathbb Z}\times {\mathbb Z}),{\mathbb C})\neq \{0\}$. See e.g. \cite[Theorem 3.7]{LRS}.}, but from the point of view of the dimension function it looks as if it were the case --- hence the name ``dimension-flatness''. The first part of the proof of Theorem \ref{dim-flat-thm} consists of a reduction to the case when $X$ is finitely presented. This part is verbatim identical to the corresponding proof for groups due to L{\"u}ck (see \cite[Theorem 6.37]{Luck02}), but we include it here for the sake of completeness.
\begin{proof}
Let an arbitrary left $\mc A$-module $X$ be given and choose a short exact sequence $0\to Y \to F \to X \to 0$ of $\mc A$-modules in which $F$ is free. Then the corresponding long exact $\operatorname{Tor}$-sequence gives
\[
\operatorname{Tor}_{p+1}^{\mc A}(M, X)\simeq \operatorname{Tor}_{p}^{\mc A}(M,Y),
\]
and hence it suffices to prove that $\dim_M \operatorname{Tor}_1^{\mc A} (M, X)=0$ for arbitrary $X$. Recall that $\operatorname{Tor}$ commutes with direct limits and that the dimension function $\dim_M(-)$ is also well behaved with respect to direct limits \cite[Theorem 6.13]{Luck02}); seeing that an arbitrary module is the directed union of its finitely generated submodules we may therefore assume $X$ to be finitely generated. Hence we can find a short exact sequence $0\to Y\to F\to X\to 0$ with $F$ finitely generated and free. The module $Y$ is the directed union of its system of finitely generated submodules $(Y_j)_{j\in J}$ and therefore $X$ can be realized as the direct limit $\varinjlim_j F/Y_j$. Since each of the modules $F/Y_j$ is finitely presented by construction this shows that it suffices to treat the case where $X$ is a finitely presented module. In this case we may therefore choose a presentation of the form
\[
\mc A^k \overset{T_0}{\longrightarrow} \mc A^l \longrightarrow X\longrightarrow 0.
\]
This presentation can be continued to a free resolution
\[
\cdots\overset{S_0}{\longrightarrow}\mc A^k \overset{T_0}{\longrightarrow} \mc A^l \longrightarrow X\longrightarrow 0
\]
of $X$ that can be used to compute the $\operatorname{Tor}$ functor; in particular we get
\[
\operatorname{Tor}_1^{\mc A}(M, X)\simeq \frac{\ker(\id_M\otimes_{\mc A} T_0)}{{\operatorname{rg\hspace{0.04cm}}}(\id_M\otimes_{\mc A} S_0)}.
\]
Denote by $T_0^{\operatorname{vN}}\colon M^k\to M^l$ the map induced by $\id_M\otimes_{\mc A} T_0$ under the natural identification $M\odot_{\mc A} \mc A^i=M^i$ ($i=k,l$) and
by $T\colon H^k \to H^l$ its continuous extension\footnote{Recall that ``$\odot$'' denotes the algebraic tensor product and $H$ the GNS-space $L^2(M,\tau)$.}.
Since $M\odot_{\mc A} -$ is right exact and $S_0$ surjects onto $\ker(T_0)$,
we see that ${\operatorname{rg\hspace{0.04cm}}}(\id_M\otimes_{\mc A} S_0)\subseteq M\odot_{\mc A} \mc A^k$ is identified with the $M$-submodule $M\ker(T_0)$ in $M^k$ generated by $\ker(T_0)$; thus
\begin{align}\label{dim-Tor}
\dim_M \operatorname{Tor}_1^{\mc A}(M, X)=\dim_M \ker(T_0^{\operatorname{vN}}) - \dim_M (M\ker(T_0)).
\end{align}
We now claim that
\begin{align}\label{closure-eqs}
\dim_M \ker T_0^{\operatorname{vN}} =\dim_M \ker(T) \quad \text{ and } \quad \dim_M(M\ker(T_0))=\dim_M \overline{\ker(T_0)},
\end{align}
where the closure is taken in the Hilbert space $H^k$. The first equality follows from the fact that the $L^2$-completion functor has an exact and dimension preserving inverse \cite[Theorem 6.24]{Luck02}.
By Lemma \ref{same-closure-lem}, the dimension of a submodule in $M^k$ coincides with the dimension of its closure in $H^k$, so to prove the the second equality it suffices to prove that $M\ker(T_0)$ and $\ker(T_0)$ have the same closure in $H^k$. But this follows from the following simple approximation argument:
Take $x\in M$ and $a\in \ker(T_0)$ and consider $xa\in M\ker(T_0)$. By picking a net $x_\alpha\in \mc A$ converging in the strong operator topology to $x$ we obtain that $\|xa-x_\alpha a\|_2\to 0$ and $x_\alpha a\in \ker(T_0)$; hence $M\ker(T_0)\subseteq \overline{\ker(T_0)}$ and the proof of \eqref{closure-eqs} is complete. By \eqref{dim-Tor} and \eqref{closure-eqs} it is therefore sufficient to prove that $\overline{\ker(T_0)}=\ker(T)$. The adjoint operator $T^*\colon H^l \to H^k$ is the extension of the operator $T_0^*\colon\mc A^l \to \mc A^k$ which multiplies from the right with the adjoint of the matrix defining $T_0$. From this we obtain $\ker(T_0^*T_0^{\phantom{*}})=\ker(T_0)$ and since $\ker(T^*T)=\ker(T)$ it is equivalent to prove that
\[
\overline{\ker(T_0^*T_0^{\phantom{*}})}=\ker(T^* T),
\]
but this follows from Lemma \ref{closure-lem} and Remark \ref{left-right-rem-2}.
\end{proof}
\begin{Rem}
A careful examination of the results in this section reveals that the dimension-flatness theorem can actually be obtained under slightly less restrictive assumptions. Namely, the proof goes through as long as $N\subseteq \mc A \subseteq M$ satisfies the requirements (i)-(iii) from Proposition \ref{strong-foelner-prop}, but with the uniform convergence in (iii) replaced by weak$^*$ convergence.
However, for the results in the following section the uniform convergence will be of importance which is the reason for it being included in the definition of the strong F{\o}lner property.
\end{Rem}
\section{Operator algebraic amenability}
In this section we explore the connection between the strong F{\o}lner property and the existing operator algebraic notions of amenability. Consider therefore again a trace-preserving inclusion $N\subseteq M$ of finite von Neumann algebras and an intermediate $*$-algebra $\mc A$ which is weakly dense in $M$. The main goal is to prove the following result:
\begin{Thm}\label{injectivity-thm}
If $\mc A$ has the strong F{\o}lner property relative to $N$ then $M$ is amena\-ble relative to $N$. In particular, $M$ is injective if $\mc A$ has the strong F{\o}lner property and $N$ is injective.
\end{Thm}
The notion of relative amenability for von Neumann algebras dates back to Popa's work in \cite{popa-correspondences}; we briefly recall the basics here following the exposition in \cite{ozawa-popa-on-a-class}. Consider again the trace-preserving inclusion $N\subseteq M$ of finite von Neumann algebras and denote by $Q:=\langle M,e_N\rangle = (JNJ)'\cap B(L^2(M))$ the basic construction. Recall that $Q$ has a unique normal, semifinite tracial weight $\Psi\colon Q_+\to [0,\infty]$ with the property that
\[
\Psi(ae_N b)=\tau(ab) \text{ for all } a,b\in N.
\]
One way to construct the trace $\Psi$ is as follows: Since any normal representation of $N^{\operatorname{{op}}}$ is an amplification followed by a reduction, there exists a projection $q\in B(\ell^2({\mathbb N})\otimes L^2(N)) $ and a right $N$-equivariant unitary identification
\[
L^2(M)=q(\ell^2({\mathbb N})\otimes L^2(N)),
\]
where the right hand side is endowed with the diagonal right $N$-action. This induces an identification $Q:=(JNJ)'\cap B(L^2(M))=q (B(\ell^2({\mathbb N})\otimes N ))q$ and the trace $\Psi$ is simply the pull back of the restriction of $\Tr\otimes \tau$ under this identification.
\begin{Thm}[{\cite[Theorem 2.1]{ozawa-popa-on-a-class}}]\label{popa-ozawa-thm}
The following conditions are equivalent:
\begin{itemize}
\item[(i)] There exists a state $\varphi\colon Q\to {\mathbb C}$ such that $\varphi |_M=\tau$ and $\varphi(xT)=\varphi(Tx)$ for all $x\in M$ and $T\in Q$.
\item[(ii)] There exists a conditional expectation $E\colon Q\to M$.
\item[(iii)] There exists a net $\xi_n \in L^2(Q,\Psi)$ such that $\lim_n \ip{\xi_n,x\xi_n}_{L^2(Q,\Psi)}=\tau(x)$ and $\lim_n\|[x,\xi_n]\|_{2,\Psi}=0$ for every $x\in M$.
\end{itemize}
If $N\subseteq M$ satisfies one, and hence all, of these conditions then $M$ is said to be amenable relative to $N$ (or $N$ to be coamenable in $M$).
\end{Thm}
Note that (ii) in the above theorem gives that amenability of $M$ relative to ${\mathbb C}$ is equivalent to amenability (a.k.a.~injectivity) of $M$. Note also that if $\mc F\subseteq M$ is a complete, finitely generated, projective right $N$-module then the projection $P_F$ onto its closure $F$ in $L^2(M)$ is an element in $Q$ and
\[
\dim_N(\mc F)=\Psi(P_F).
\]
This follows from the construction of $\Psi$, the equality $\dim_N(\mc F)=\dim_N(F)$ and the definition of the von Neumann dimension for normal $N$-modules; see \cite[Definition 1.8]{Luck02} and the comments following it. More generally, for any operator $T\in Q$ we have $\Psi(P_FTP_F)=\Tr_N(P_FTP_F)$ where $\Tr_N$ is the trace on $\End_N(F)$ considered in Section \ref{dim-theory-section} (see also Lemma \ref{trace-lemma}).
We are now ready to give the proof of Theorem \ref{injectivity-thm}
\begin{proof}[Proof of Theorem \ref{injectivity-thm}.]
Assume that $N\subseteq \mc A\subseteq M$ has the F{\o}lner property. Since $M_*$ is assumed separable the unit ball $(M)_1$ is separable and metrizable
for the strong operator topology and by Kaplansky's density theorem the unit ball $(\mc A)_1$ is strongly dense in $(M)_1$. We may therefore choose a sequence $\{T_i\}_{i=1}^\infty$ in $(\mc A)_1$ which is strongly dense in $(M)_1$ and upon adding further operators to this sequence we may assume that $\{T_i\}_{i=1}^\infty$ is $*$-stable.
Since $\mc A$ satisfies the strong F{\o}lner condition we can, for each $T_1,\dots, T_n$, find a complete, finitely generated, projective $N$-submodule $\mc P_n \subseteq \mc A$ and a submodule $\mc S_n \subseteq \mc P_n$ such that
\begin{itemize}
\item $T_i(\mc S_n)\subseteq \mc P_n$ for all $i\in \{1,\dots, n\}$,
\item $\frac{\dim_N \mc S_n}{\dim_N\mc P_n}\geqslant 1-\frac{1}{n}$,
\item$ \|\varphi_{\mc P_n}- \tau \|_{M_*}\leqslant \frac{1}{n}$.
\end{itemize}
In what follows we denote by $P_n\in B(H)$ the orthogonal projection onto the closure (in $H$) of $\mc P_n$, by $S_n$ the orthogonal projection onto the closure of $\mc S_n$ and by $S_n^{\perp}$ the difference $P_n-S_n$. Since $\mc P_n$ is complete and finitely generated projective, the discussion preceding the proof implies that $\Psi(P_n)=\dim_N\mc P_N$; in particular $P_n\in L^2(Q,\Psi)$. We aim at proving that the unit vectors
\[
\xi_n :=\frac{1}{\sqrt{\dim_N\mc P_n}}P_n \in L^2(Q,\Psi)
\]
satisfy condition (iii) of Theorem \ref{popa-ozawa-thm}. The trace approximation is automatic since
\[
\ip{\xi_n,x\xi_n}_{L^2(Q,\Psi)}=\frac{\Psi(P_nx P_n)}{\dim_N\mc P_n}=\frac{\Tr_N(P_nx P_n)}{\dim_N\mc P_n}=\varphi_{\mc P_n}(x)\underset{n\to\infty}{\longrightarrow} \tau(x)
\]
for any $x\in M$. To prove the asymptotic commutation property, consider first $x=T_{i_1}\in \{T_i\}_{i=1}^\infty$. Then $x^*=T_{i_2}$ for some $i_2\in {\mathbb N}$
so for for $n\geqslant \max\{i_1,i_2\}$ we have $P_nxS_n=xS_n$ and $P_nx^*S_n=x^*S_n$. Hence
\begin{align*}
\|xP_n - P_n x\|_{2,\Psi}^2 &=\Psi((xP_n-P_nx)^*(xP_n-P_nx))\\
&= \Psi(P_nx^*xP_n-P_nx^*P_n x -x^*P_nxP_n + x^*P_nx ) \\
&=\Psi(P_nx^*x P_n- P_n x^* P_n xP_n -P_nxP_n x^*P_n + P_nxx^*P_n)\\
&=\Psi\left((P_nx^*x P_n- P_n x^* P_n xP_n -P_nxP_n x^*P_n + P_nxx^*P_n)S_n^\perp\right)\\
&=\Psi\left(S_n^\perp(P_nx^*x P_n- P_n x^* P_n xP_n -P_nxP_n x^*P_n + P_nxx^*P_n)S_n^\perp\right)\\
&=\left| \ip{S_n^\perp, (P_nx^*x P_n- P_n x^* P_n xP_n -P_nxP_n x^*P_n + P_nxx^*P_n)S_n^\perp }_{L^2(Q,\Psi)} \right|\\
&\leqslant \|S_n^\perp\|_{2,\Psi}\|(P_nx^*x P_n- P_n x^* P_n xP_n -P_nxP_n x^*P_n + P_nxx^*P_n)S_n^\perp\|_{2,\Psi}\\
&\leqslant \|S_n^\perp\|_{2,\Psi}^2\|P_nx^*x P_n- P_n x^* P_n xP_n -P_nxP_n x^*P_n + P_nxx^*P_n\|_{\infty}\\
&\leqslant 4 \Psi(S_n^{\perp})\\
&= 4(\dim_N\mc P_n-\dim_N\mc S_n).
\end{align*}
Hence
\[
\|[x,\xi_n]\|_{2,\Psi}=\frac{\|xP_n-P_nx\|_{2,\Psi}}{\sqrt{\dim_N \mc P_n}}\leqslant 2\sqrt{\frac{\dim_N \mc P_n-\dim_N\mc S_n}{\dim_N \mc S_n}}\underset{n\to\infty}{\longrightarrow} 0.
\]
Now the general case follows from this and an approximation argument: let $x\in M$ and ${\varepsilon}>0$ be given and assume without loss of generality that $\|x\|_\infty\leqslant 1$. Choose a net $x_\alpha \in \{T_i\}_{i=1}^\infty$ converging strongly to $x$. Then $x_\alpha$ also converges to $x$ in $L^2(M,\tau)$ and we may therefore choose an $\alpha$ such that
\[
\|x-x_\alpha\|_{2,\tau}<\eps.
\]
We now have
\[
\|x\xi_n-\xi_n x\|_{2,\Psi}\leqslant \|(x-x_\alpha)\xi_n \|_{2,\Psi} + \|x_\alpha \xi_n -\xi_n x_\alpha \|_{2,\Psi} +\| \xi_n(x_\alpha -x) \|_{2,\Psi}
\]
Considering the first term we get
\begin{align*}
\|(x-x_\alpha)\xi_n \|_{2,\Psi}^2 &= \frac{\Psi(P_n (x-x_\alpha)^*(x-x_\alpha)P_n )}{\dim_N\mc P_n}\\
&=\varphi_{\mc P_n}((x-x_\alpha)^*(x-x_\alpha))\\
&\leqslant |(\varphi_{\mc P_n}-\tau)((x-x_\alpha)^*(x-x_\alpha)) | +\tau((x-x_\alpha)^*(x-x_\alpha)) \\
&\leqslant \|\varphi_{\mc P_n}-\tau \|_{M_*} \|x-x_{\alpha}\|_\infty^2 +\|x-x_\alpha\|_{2,\tau}^2\\
&\leqslant \frac{2}{n} +\eps^2.
\end{align*}
Thus, for a suitably chosen $n_1\in {\mathbb N}$ we have $\|(x-x_\alpha)\xi_n \|_{2,\Psi}^2\leqslant 2{\varepsilon}$ for all $n\geqslant n_1$. Considering the third term we get, in a completely similar manner, an $n_3\in {\mathbb N}$ such that $\| \xi_n(x_\alpha -x) \|_{2,\Psi}\leqslant 2\eps$ for $n\geqslant n_3$. Since $x_\alpha \in \{T_i\}_{i=1}^\infty$, the second term converges to zero by what was shown in the first part of the proof, and hence there exists an $n_2\in {\mathbb N}$ such that $\|x_\alpha \xi_n -\xi_n x_\alpha \|_{2,\Psi}\leqslant \eps$ for $n\geqslant n_2$. Thus, for $n\geqslant \max\{n_1,n_2,n_3\}$ we have $\|x\xi_n-\xi_n x \|_{2,\Psi}\leqslant 5\eps$ and since $\eps>0$ was arbitrary this completes the proof of the amenability of $M$ relative to $N$.\\
We now just have to prove the final claim regarding the injectivity of $M$. So assume that $N$ is injective and, as before, that $\mc A\subseteq M$ satisfies the F{\o}lner condition relative to $N$. Injectivity of $N$ simply means that $N$ is amenable relative to the subalgebra ${\mathbb C}\subseteq N $ and by what was just proven $M$ is amenable relative to $N$ as well. By \cite[Theorem 3.2.4]{popa-correspondences} this means that $M$ is also amenable relative to ${\mathbb C}$; i.e~$M$ is injective.
\end{proof}
\section{\texorpdfstring{Examples and applications to $L^2$-Betti numbers}{Examples and applications to L2-Betti numbers}}\label{example-section}
The first goal in this section is to show how our techniques can be used to unify the dimension-flatness results known for amenable groups and quantum groups and, more generally, to provide a vanishing result in the context of operator algebraic $L^2$-Betti numbers.
Secondly, in order to convince the reader that the class of algebras with the strong F{\o}lner property is rich and extends beyond the ones arising from amenable groups an quantum groups, we give a number of such examples and show how they yield results about vanishing of $L^2$-Betti numbers in various situations. As a first application we re-obtain the original dimension flatness result of L{\"u}ck \cite[Theorem 6.37]{Luck02}.
\begin{Cor}[$L^2$-Betti numbers of amenable groups]\label{grp-cor}
If $\Gamma$ is a countable, discrete, amenable group then ${\mathbb C}\Gamma$ has the strong F{\o}lner property with respect to the tower ${\mathbb C}\subseteq {\mathbb C}\Gamma \subseteq L\Gamma$. In particular, the inclusion ${\mathbb C}\Gamma \subseteq L\Gamma$ is dimension flat and $\beta_p^{(2)}(\Gamma)=0$ for $p\geqslant 1$.
\end{Cor}
\begin{proof}
Let $T_1,\dots, T_r\in {\mathbb C}\Gamma$ be given and put $S=\bigcup_{i=1}^r \supp(T_i)\subseteq \Gamma$. Since $\Gamma$ is amenable, we can find (see e.g.~\cite[F.6.8]{benedetti}) a sequence of finite subset $F_n\subseteq \Gamma$ such that
\[
\frac{\card(\partial_S(F_n))}{\card(F_n)}\underset{n\to \infty}{\longrightarrow} 0,
\]
where $
\partial_S(F):=\{ \gamma \in F \mid \exists s\in S: s\gamma \notin F \}.$
Then putting $\mc P_n={\mathbb C} [F_n]\subseteq {\mathbb C}\Gamma$ and $\mc S_n={\mathbb C}[F_n\setminus \partial_S(F_n)]$ we clearly have $T_i(\mc S_n)\subseteq \mc P_n$ for all $i\in \{1,\dots, r\}$ and
\[
\frac{\dim_{{\mathbb C}} \mc S_n }{\dim_{\mathbb C} \mc P_n}= \frac{ \card(F_n) - \card(\partial_S(F)) }{\card(F_n)}\underset{n\to \infty}{\longrightarrow} 1.
\]
Denoting by $\rho$ the right regular representation of $\Gamma$ we get for $T\in L\Gamma$
\begin{align*}
\varphi_{\mc F}(T)=\frac{\sum_{\gamma\in F} \ip{\delta_\gamma, T\delta_\gamma}}{\card(F)}=\frac{\sum_{\gamma\in F} \ip{\delta_e, \rho_{\gamma}^*T\rho_\gamma\delta_e}}{\card(F)} = \frac{\sum_{\gamma\in F} \ip{\delta_e,T\delta_e}}{\card(F)}=\tau(T).
\end{align*}
Hence ${\mathbb C}\Gamma$ has the strong F{\o}lner property and dimension flatness therefore follows from Theorem \ref{dim-flat-thm}. The fact that the $L^2$-Betti numbers vanish in positive degrees follows from this since
\[
\beta_p^{(2)}(\Gamma)=\dim_{L\Gamma}\operatorname{Tor}_p^{{\mathbb C}\Gamma}(L\Gamma,{\mathbb C})=0. \qedhere
\]
\end{proof}
Next we turn our attention to the class of compact/discrete quantum groups. Since this is a bit of an aside we shall not elaborate on the basics of quantum group theory; for back ground material the reader is referred to the detailed survey articles \cite{wor-cp-qgrps}, \cite{kustermans-tuset} and \cite{van-daele}. In what follows, we denote by $\widehat{{\mathbb G}}$ a discrete quantum group of Kac type and by ${\mathbb G}=(C({\mathbb G}),\Delta_{\mathbb G})$ its compact dual. Associated with ${\mathbb G}$ is a Hopf $*$-algebra ${\operatorname{Pol}}({\mathbb G})$ which is naturally included into a finite von Neumann algebra $L^\infty({\mathbb G})$. Furthermore, the von Neumann algebra $L^\infty({\mathbb G})$ carries a natural trace $\tau$, namely the Haar state associated with ${\mathbb G}$.
In \cite{coamenable-betti} and \cite{quantum-betti} $L^2$-Betti numbers were studied in the context of discrete quantum groups of Kac type and we re-obtain \cite[Theorem 6.1]{coamenable-betti} by setting $N={\mathbb C}$, $\mc A= {\operatorname{Pol}}({\mathbb G})$ and $M=L^\infty({\mathbb G})$:
\begin{Cor}[$L^2$-Betti numbers of amenable quantum groups]\label{qgrp-cor}
If $\widehat{{\mathbb G}}$ is a dis\-cre\-te amenable quantum group of Kac type and ${\mathbb G}$ is its compact dual then ${\operatorname{Pol}}({\mathbb G})$ has the strong F{\o}lner property with respect to the tower ${\mathbb C}\subseteq {\operatorname{Pol}}({\mathbb G})\subseteq L^\infty({\mathbb G})$. In particular, the inclusion ${\operatorname{Pol}}({\mathbb G})\subseteq L^\infty ({\mathbb G})$ is dimension flat and $\beta_p^{(2)}(\widehat{{\mathbb G}})=0$ for $p\geqslant 1$.
\end{Cor}
\begin{proof}
Choose a complete set $(u^\alpha)_{\alpha\in I}$ of representatives for the set of equivalence classes of irreducible unitary corepresentations of ${\mathbb G}$ and denote by $n_\alpha$ the matrix size of $u^\alpha$. Recall that the corresponding matrix coefficients $u_{ij}^\alpha$ constitute a linear basis for ${\operatorname{Pol}}({\mathbb G})$ and that the normalized matrix coefficients $\sqrt{n_\alpha}u_{ij}^\alpha$ constitute an orthonormal basis in $L^2({\mathbb G}):=L^2({\operatorname{Pol}}({\mathbb G}),\tau)$. Let $T_1,\dots, T_r\in {\operatorname{Pol}}({\mathbb G})$ and $\eps>0$ be given and denote by $S$ the joint support of $T_1,\dots, T_r$; that is
\[
S=\{ u^\gamma \mid \exists l\in \{1,\dots, r \} \exists p,q\in \{1,\dots, n_\gamma\} : \tau(u_{pq}^{\gamma *}T_l)\neq 0 \}.
\]
In other words, $S$ consists of all the irreducible corepresentations that has at least one of its matrix coefficients entering in the linear expansion of one of the operators in question. According to the quantum F{\o}lner condition \cite[Corollary 4.10]{coamenable-betti} we can find a sequence of finite subset $F_k\subseteq (u^\alpha)_{\alpha\in I}$ such that
\[
\sum_{u^\alpha \in \partial_S(F_k)}n_\alpha^2 < \frac{1}{k} \sum_{u^\alpha \in F_k}n_\alpha^2,
\]
where the boundary $\partial_S(F)$ is as in \cite[Definition 3.2]{coamenable-betti}. Define
\begin{align*}
\mc P_k&:={\operatorname{span}}_{\mathbb C}\{u_{ij}^\alpha \mid u^\alpha\in F, 1\leqslant i,j\leqslant n_\alpha\}; \\
\mc S_k&:={\operatorname{span}}_{\mathbb C}\{u_{ij}^\alpha \mid u^\alpha \in F\setminus \partial_S(F), 1\leqslant i,j\leqslant n_\alpha\} .
\end{align*}
By construction we now have $T_l(\mc S_k)\subseteq \mc P_k$ for every $l\in \{1,\dots, r\}$ and that
\[
\frac{\dim_{\mathbb C} \mc S_k}{\dim_{\mathbb C} \mc P_k}= \frac{\sum_{u^\alpha \in F_k\setminus \partial_S(F_k)} n_\alpha^2 }{\sum_{\alpha\in F_k}n_\alpha^2} \underset{n\to\infty}{\longrightarrow} 1.
\]
Furthermore, denoting by $P_{\mc P_n}\in B(L^2({\mathbb G}))$ the projection onto the closed subspace $\mc P_n\subseteq L^2({\mathbb G})$ we get
\begin{align*}
\Tr_{\mathbb C}(P_{\mc P_n} T P_{\mc P_n} ) &= \sum_{\alpha \in F}\sum_{i,j=1}^{n_\alpha}\ip{\sqrt{n_\alpha}u_{ij}^\alpha, T\sqrt{n_\alpha}u_{ij}^\alpha}\\
&= \sum_{\alpha \in F}\sum_{i,j=1}^{n_\alpha} n_\alpha\tau(u_{ij}^{\alpha*}Tu_{ij}^\alpha)\\
&=\sum_{\alpha \in F} n_\alpha \tau\left(\left(\sum_{i,j=1}^{n_{\alpha}}u_{ij}^{\alpha}u_{ij}^{\alpha*}\right)T\right)\\
&=\tau(T)\sum_{\alpha \in F}n_{\alpha}^2\\
&=\tau(T)\dim_{{\mathbb C}}\mc P_n,
\end{align*}
for every $T\in L^\infty({\mathbb G})$; hence $\varphi_{\mc P_n}(T)=\tau(T)$. Thus ${\operatorname{Pol}}({\mathbb G})$ has the strong F{\o}lner property and dimension flatness follows from Theorem \ref{dim-flat-thm}. The vanishing of the $L^2$-Betti numbers follows from dimension flatness since
\[
\beta_p^{(2)}(\widehat{{\mathbb G}}):=\dim_{L^\infty({\mathbb G})}\operatorname{Tor}_p^{{\operatorname{Pol}}({\mathbb G})}(L^\infty({\mathbb G}),{\mathbb C})=0. \qedhere
\]
\end{proof}
Note that Corollary \ref{grp-cor} is actually just a special case of Corollary \ref{qgrp-cor}, but since we expect most readers to be more familiar with groups than quantum groups we singled out this case in form of Corollary \ref{grp-cor} and its proof. \\
\begin{Rem}
From Theorem \ref{injectivity-thm} and Corollary \ref{grp-cor} we re-obtain the classical fact that the group von Neumann algebra $L\Gamma$ is hyperfinite when $\Gamma$ is an amenable discrete group. Furthermore, we see that the group algebra ${\mathbb C}\Gamma$ associated with a discrete group $\Gamma$ has the strong F{\o}lner property (relative to the chain ${\mathbb C}\subseteq {\mathbb C}\Gamma \subseteq L\Gamma$) if and only if $\Gamma$ is amenable: We already saw in Corollary \ref{grp-cor} that amenability implies the strong F{\o}lner property. Conversely, if ${\mathbb C}\Gamma$ has the strong F{\o}lner property then $L\Gamma$ is hyperfinite by Theorem \ref{injectivity-thm} and thus $\Gamma$ is amenable (see e.g.~\cite[Theorem 2.6.8 and 9.3.3]{brown-ozawa}). By a similar argument, using \cite[Theorem 4.5]{ruan-amenability} and Corollary \ref{qgrp-cor}, we obtain that a discrete quantum group $\widehat{{\mathbb G}}$ of Kac type is amenable if and only if the dual Hopf $*$-algebra ${\operatorname{Pol}}({\mathbb G})$ has the strong F{\o}lner property relative to the chain ${\mathbb C}\subseteq {\operatorname{Pol}}({\mathbb G}) \subseteq L^\infty({\mathbb G})$. Thus, for algebras arising from groups and quantum groups the strong F{\o}lner condition coincides exactly with the notion of amenability of the underlying object.
\end{Rem}
Next we take a step up in generality by considering $L^2$-Betti numbers in a purely operator algebraic context.
In \cite{CS}, Connes and Shlyakhtenko introduce a notion of $L^2$-homology and $L^2$-Betti numbers for a dense $*$-subalgebra in a tracial von Neumann algebra $(M,\tau)$. More precisely, if $\mc A \subseteq M$ is a weakly dense unital $*$-subalgebra its $L^2$-homology and $L^2$-Betti numbers are defined, respectively, as
\[
H_p^{(2)}(\mc A)=\operatorname{Tor}_p^{\mc A \odot \mc A^{\operatorname{{op}}}}(M\bar{\otimes}M^{{\operatorname{{op}}}}, \mc A ) \ \text{ and } \ \beta_p^{(2)}(\mc A,\tau)=\dim_{M\bar{\otimes}M^{{\operatorname{{op}}}}}H^{(2)}_p(\mc A).
\]
This definition extends the definition for groups \cite[Proposition 2.3]{CS} by means of the formula $\beta_p^{(2)}({\mathbb C}\Gamma,\tau)=\beta_p^{(2)}(\Gamma)$ and it also fits with the notion for quantum groups studied above \cite[Theorem 4.1]{quantum-betti}. In order to apply our techniques in the Connes-Shlyakhtenko setting we first need to prove that the strong F{\o}lner property is preserved under forming algebraic tensor products.
\begin{Prop}\label{tensor-foelner}
Let $\mc A$ and $\mc B$ be dense $*$-subalgebras in the tracial von Neumann algebras $(M,\tau)$ and $(N,\rho)$, respectively.
If $\mc A$ and $\mc B$ have the strong F{\o}lner property with respect to the towers ${\mathbb C}\subseteq \mc A \subseteq M$ and ${\mathbb C}\subseteq \mc B \subseteq N$ then so does $\mc A \odot \mc B$ with respect to the tower ${\mathbb C}\subseteq \mc A \odot \mc B \subseteq M\bar{\otimes} N$.
\end{Prop}
\begin{proof}
Let $T_1,\dots, T_r \in \mc A \odot \mc B$ be given and write each $T_i$ as $\sum_{k=1}^{N_i} a_k^{(i)}\otimes b_{k}^{(i)}$. Choose a strong F{\o}lner sequence $\mc P_n'\subseteq \mc A$, with associated subspaces $\mc S_n'$, for the $a_k^{(i)}$'s and a strong F{\o}lner sequence $\mc P_n''\subseteq \mc B$, with associated subspaces $\mc S_n''$, for the $b_k^{(i)}$'s . Putting $\mc P_n:= \mc P_n'\odot \mc P_n'' $ and $\mc S_n:=\mc S_n'\otimes \mc S_n'' $ we clearly
have that the sequence $(\mc P_n, \mc S_n)$ satisfies the first to requirements in Proposition \ref{strong-foelner-prop}, and since $\varphi_{\mc P_n}=\varphi_{\mc P_n'}\otimes \varphi_{\mc P_n''}$ we get
\begin{align*}
\|\varphi_{\mc P_n} -\tau\otimes \rho\|_{(M\bar{\otimes} N)_*} &= \|\varphi_{\mc P_n'}\otimes \varphi_{\mc P_n''} - \tau\otimes \varphi_{\mc P_n''} + \tau\otimes\varphi_{\mc P_n''} -\tau\otimes \rho \|_{(M\bar{\otimes} N)_*} \\
&\leqslant \| \varphi_{\mc P_n'}- \tau \|_{M_*} + \|\rho-\varphi_{\mc P_n''}\|_{N_*} \underset{n\to \infty}{\longrightarrow} 0.
\end{align*}
Thus, $(\mc P_n, \mc S_n)$ is a strong F{\o}lner sequence for $T_1,\dots, T_r$.
\end{proof}
\begin{Cor}\label{CS-vanishing}
If $\mc A$ has the strong F{\o}lner property with respect to the tower ${\mathbb C}\subseteq \mc A \subseteq M$ then the Connes-Shlyakhtenko $L^2$-Betti numbers of $(\mc A,\tau)$ vanish in positive degrees.
\end{Cor}
\begin{proof}
Since $\mc A$ is strongly F{\o}lner so is the opposite algebra $\mc A^{\operatorname{{op}}}$ (see e.g.~Remark \ref{left-right-rem}) and by Proposition \ref{tensor-foelner} the same is true for $\mc A \odot \mc A^{\operatorname{{op}}}$. Hence by Theorem \ref{dim-flat-thm} the inclusion $\mc A\odot \mc A^{\operatorname{{op}}} \subseteq M\bar{\otimes} M^{\operatorname{{op}}}$ is dimension flat so in particular
\[
\beta^{(2)}_p(\mc A, \tau)= \dim_{M\bar{\otimes} M^{\operatorname{{op}}}}\operatorname{Tor}_p^{\mc A \otimes \mc A^{\operatorname{{op}}}}(M\bar{\otimes} M^{\operatorname{{op}}}, \mc A)=0
\]
for all $p\geqslant 1$.
\end{proof}
\begin{Cor}[Actions of amenable groups on probability spaces]\label{action-cor}
Let $\Gamma$ be a discrete, countable amenable group acting on a probability space $(X,\mu)$ in a probability measure-pre\-ser\-ving way and denote by $\alpha$ the induced action $ \Gamma \to \Aut(L^\infty(X))$. Consider the crossed product von Neumann algebra $M=L^\infty(X)\rtimes \Gamma$ and its subalgebras $N=L^\infty(X)$ and $\mc A = L^\infty(X)\rtimes_{\mathrm{alg}}\Gamma$. Then $\mc A$ has the strong F{\o}lner property relative to $N$ and hence the inclusion $L^\infty(X)\rtimes_{\mathrm{alg}}\Gamma \subseteq L^\infty(X)\rtimes\Gamma$ is dimension-flat. Moreover, if the action of $\Gamma$ is essentially free, then the $L^2$-Betti numbers (in the sense of Sauer \cite{sauer-betti-for-groupoids}) of the groupoid defined by the action vanish in positive degrees.
\end{Cor}
We denote by $(u_g)_{g\in \Gamma}$ the natural unitaries on $L^2(X)$ implementing the action; i.e.~$\alpha_g(a)=u_g^{\phantom{*}}au_g^*$ for all $g\in \Gamma$ and all $a\in L^\infty(X)$.
\begin{proof}
For any finite set $F\subseteq \Gamma$, the right $L^\infty(X)$-module
\beqn
\mc F = \left.\left\{\sum_{g\in F} a_g u_g\,\right|\, a_g \in L^\infty(X)\right\}
\eeqn
is free of dimension $\card(F)$ and the inner product on $\mc F$ arising from the conditional expectation $E\colon M\to N$ is given by
\[
\ip{\sum_{g\in F}a_gu_g, \sum_{g\in F} b_g u_g}_N=\sum_{g\in F} \alpha_{g^{-1}}(a_g^*b_g^{\phantom{*}}).
\]
From this it follows that the map $(L^\infty(X)^{\card(F)},\ip{\cdot, \cdot}_{\operatorname{st}})\to (\mc F, \ip{\cdot, \cdot}_N)$ given by $(a_g)_{g\in F}\mapsto \sum_{g\in F}a_g u_g$ is a unitary isomorphism and that $u_1,\dots, u_n$ is a basis for $\mc F$. In particular, $\mc F$ is complete and finitely generated projective. The trace-approximation condition is automatic, because for $T\in M$ we have
\[
\varphi_{\mc F}(T)=\frac{\sum_{g\in F} \ip{u_g, Tu_g} }{\dim_N \mc F}= \frac{\sum_{g\in F} \tau(u_g^*Tu_g^{\phantom{*}}) }{\card(F)}=\tau(T).
\]
Hence the strong F{\o}lner condition for $\mc A$ relative to $N$ follows from the classical F{\o}lner condition for $\Gamma$ and the inclusion $L^\infty(X)\rtimes_{\mathrm{alg}}\Gamma \subseteq L^\infty(X)\rtimes\Gamma$ is therefore dimension-flat. In the case of an essentially free action we combine this with \cite[Lemma 5.4]{sauer-betti-for-groupoids} and get that the $L^2$-Betti numbers of the groupoid defined by an action of an amenable group vanish.
\end{proof}
\begin{Rem}
Note that the last part of the statement in Corollary \ref{action-cor} is a well known result which, for instance, follows from combining \cite[Theorem 5.5]{sauer-betti-for-groupoids} and \cite[Theorem 0.2]{cheeger-gromov}.
\end{Rem}
Next we generalize the above result to the setting of amenable discrete measured groupoids; $L^2$-Betti numbers for discrete measured groupoids were introduced by Sauer \cite{sauer-betti-for-groupoids} and generalize the notion for equivalence relations \cite{gaboriau-L2-for-eq-rel}. We recall only the basic definitions and notation here referring to \cite{sauer-betti-for-groupoids, renault-delaroche-amenable-groupoids-article} for the general theory of discrete measured groupoids. Recall that the object set $\ms G^0$ of a discrete measured groupoid $\ms G$ comes equipped with a $\ms G$-invariant measure $\mu$ which gives rise to a measure $\mu_{\ms G}$ on $\ms G$ defined on a Borel subset $A\subseteq \ms G$ as
\beqn
\mu_{\ms G}(A):= \int_{\ms G^0} \card(s^{-1}(x)\cap A)\, d\mu(x).
\eeqn
Here $s\colon \ms G \to \ms G^0$ denotes the source map of the groupoid.
A measurable subset $K\subseteq \ms G$ is called \emph{bounded} if there exists an $M>0$ such that for almost every $x\in\ms G^0$ both $\card (s^{-1}(x) \cap K) < M$ and $\card (s^{-1}(x) \cap K^{-1}) < M$. Let $\mb C\ms G$ be the groupoid ring of $\ms G$, defined as
\beqn
\mb C\ms G:=\{f\in L^\infty(\ms G,\mu_{\ms G})\,|\, \supp(f)\text{ is a bounded subset of }\ms G\}.
\eeqn
(this is well-defined independently of the choice of the representative of $f$). The convolution and involution on $\mb C\ms G$ are defined as
\beqn
(f\ast g)(\gamma) := \sum_{\substack{\gamma',\gamma''\in \ms G,\\\gamma'\gamma''=\gamma}} f(\gamma')g(\gamma''),
\eeqn
\beqn
f^*(\gamma) := \overline{f(\gamma^{-1})}.
\eeqn
This gives $\mb C\ms G$ the structure of a $\ast$-algebra which forms a strongly dense $\ast$-subalge\-bra in the groupoid von Neumann algebra $L\ms G$ \cite{renault-delaroche-amenable-groupoids-book}. For arbitrary subsets $K\subseteq \ms G$, $A\subseteq \ms G^0$, $B\subseteq \ms G^0$ we denote by $K_A^B$ the set $K\cap s^{-1}(A)\cap r^{-1}(B)$. Notice in particular that for every $x\in \ms G^{0}$ the set $\ms G^x_x$ is a group with respect to the composition. It is called the stabilizer group of $x$.
A discrete measured groupoid is called ergodic if for every set $A\subseteq \ms G^{0}$ of positive measure $r(s^{-1}(A))=\ms G^{0}$, and every discrete measured groupoid admits an ergodic decomposition into a direct integral of ergodic groupoids.
If $K\subseteq\ms G$ is a bounded measurable subset, then
\[
\mc F_K := \{f\in \mb C\ms G\,|\, \supp f \subseteq K\}
\]
is a finitely generated projective right Hilbert $L^\infty(\ms G^{0})$-module when equipped with the $L^\infty(\ms G^{0})$-valued inner product arising from the conditional expectation $E\colon L\ms{G}\to L^\infty(\ms{G}^0)$. This can be easily seen as follows: take an $n\in\mb N$ such that almost every $x\in \ms G^0$ has at most $n$ preimages from $K$ with respect to $s$ and decompose $K$ as $K=K_1\sqcup K_2 \sqcup \dots\sqcup K_n$ in such a way that the map $s|_{K_i}$ is a measurable isomorphism onto its image $X_i\subseteq \ms G^0$ \cite[Lemma 3.1]{sauer-betti-for-groupoids}. Then $\mc F_K$ is isomorphic as a (pre\nobreakdash-)Hilbert \Cs-module over $L^\infty(\ms G^{0})$ to the direct sum $\oplus_{i=1}^n \mf{1}_{X_i} L^\infty(\ms G^{0})$ endowed with the standard inner product. This follows from the fact that for $f \in \mc F_{K_i}$ and $x\in X_i$ we have
\beqn
E(f^*f)(x) = (f^*\ast f)({\id}_x) = \sum_{\substack{\gamma',\gamma \in K_i,\\ \gamma'\circ \gamma = {\id}_x}} \overline{f\left({\gamma'}^{-1}\right)} f(\gamma) = |f(\gamma(x))|^2,
\eeqn
where $\gamma(x)\in K_i$ is uniquely determined by the property $s(\gamma(x))=x$. Note in particular that $\dim_{L^\infty(\ms G^{0})}\mc F_K=\mu_{\ms G}(K)$. Moreover, a direct computation gives the following formula for $\varphi_{\mc F_K}$:
\beq\label{eq:rel-dim-for-groupoids}
\varphi_{\mc F_K}(T) = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n \int_{X_i} E(T)\,d\mu}{\mu_{\ms G} (K)}= \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n \int_{X_i} E(T)\,d\mu}{\sum_{i=1}^n \mu(X_i)},\quad T\in L\ms G.
\eeq
The result now is as follows.
\begin{Cor}[Discrete measured amenable groupoids]\label{groupoid-example}
Let $\ms{G}$ be an ame\-na\-ble dis\-crete measured groupoid for which the stabilizers $\ms G_x^x$ are finite for almost every $x\in \ms G^{0}$. Then the $L^2$-Betti numbers of $\ms G$ vanish in positive degrees:
\beqn
\beta_p^{(2)}(\ms G) := \dim_{L\ms{G}} \operatorname{Tor}_p^{\mb C\ms{G}}(L\ms{G},L^\infty(\ms G^0))=0.
\eeqn
In particular, the $L^2$-Betti numbers of an amenable equivalence relation vanish.
\end{Cor}
Note that Corollary \ref{groupoid-example} is just a special case of \cite[Theorem 1.1]{sauer-thom}. In particular, the assumption that the stabilizers are finite is not important for the validity of the statement in Corollary \ref{groupoid-example}, but only needed in order for our methods to apply.
\begin{proof}
First of all, we observe that by \cite[Remark 1.7]{sauer-thom} it is sufficient to prove the statement for ergodic groupoids, and we will restrict ourselves to this case for the rest of the proof. Let $\ms R$ be the equivalence relation on $\ms G^{0}$ induced by $\ms G$; it can be considered as a quotient groupoid of $\ms G$ after dividing out all stabilizers and is known as the derived groupoid of $\ms G$. Since $\ms G$ is ergodic the same is true for $\ms R$. By amenability of $\ms G$, the quotient $\ms R$ is an amenable equivalence relation \cite[Theorem 2.11]{renault-delaroche-amenable-groupoids-article}, which is therefore hyperfinite \cite[Theorem XIII.4.10]{takesaki-3}. That is, there exists an increasing sequence of subrelations $\ms R_n$ each of which has finite orbits of cardinality $k_n$ and such that $\ms R\setminus \bigcup _n \ms R_n$ is a zero set.
Let $\ms G_n$ be the subgroupoid of $\ms G$ generated by the stabilizers $\ms G_x^x$ and the lifts of the morphisms from $\ms R_n$ to $\ms G$. This subgroupoid is well-defined because two lifts of a morphism from $\ms R_n$ differ by an element in the stabilizer. Let $\mc A:= \varinjlim \mb C\ms G_n$ be the algebraic direct limit of the corresponding groupoid algebras. By construction of $\ms G_n$, $\ms G \setminus \bigcup_n \ms G_n$ is a measure zero subset of $\ms G$ and therefore $\mc A$ is an \emph{$L^\infty(\ms G^{0})$-rank dense} subalgebra of $\mb C\ms G$; i.e.~for each $f\in \mb C \ms G$ and for each $\eps >0$ there exists a projection $p\in L^\infty(\ms G^{(0)})$ with $\tau(p) > 1 - \eps$ such that $pf\in \mc A$. (for instance, one can take the characteristic function of a subset $X_f$ in $\ms G^{0}$ of measure bigger than $1-\eps$ with the property that $f$ is non-zero only on those morphisms from $\ms G \setminus \ms G_n$ whose target is in the complement of $X_f$). Furthermore, as $\mb C\ms G$ is dimension-compatible as an $L^{\infty}(\ms G^{0})$-bimodule \cite[Lemma 4.8]{sauer-betti-for-groupoids} the rank-density together with \cite[Theorem 4.11]{sauer-betti-for-groupoids} implies that
\beq\label{eq:l2-betti-numbers-hyperf-approx}
\beta_p^{(2)}(\ms G) := \dim_{L\ms G} \operatorname{Tor}^{\mb C\ms G}_p (L\ms G,L^\infty(\ms G^{0})) =\dim_{L\ms G} \operatorname{Tor}^{\mc A}_p (L\ms G,L^\infty(\ms G^{0})).
\eeq
Let us now consider $\mb C\ms G_n$ as a right $L^\infty(\ms G^{0})$-module. By construction, it is equal to $\mc F_{\ms G_n}$, where $\ms G_n$ is considered as a bounded subset of $\ms G$. Its dimension can be easily computed as
$$\dim_{L^\infty(\ms G^{0})} \mb C \ms G_n = k_n\cdot \card \ms G_x^x,$$
where $\card \ms G_x^x$ is the cardinality of the stabilizer at $x \in \ms G^{0}$; it is an essentially constant function on $\ms G^{0}$ because of the ergodicity hypothesis. Moreover, \eqref{eq:rel-dim-for-groupoids} gives that
$$
\varphi_{\ms G_n}(T) = \tau(T),\quad T\in L\ms G.
$$
Now, putting $M:=L(\ms G)$ and considering $N:=L^\infty(\ms G^0)$ as a subalgebra of $\mc A$ via the inclusion $\ms G^0 \subseteq \ms G_n$, we infer that the subalgebra $\mc A$ has the strong F\o{}lner property. Therefore the inclusion $\mc A\subseteq M$ is dimension-flat and formula \eqref{eq:l2-betti-numbers-hyperf-approx} gives us the vanishing result for the positive degree $L^2$-Betti numbers of $\ms G$.
\end{proof}
\begin{Ex}[The irrational rotation algebra]\label{irrational-rotation}
Let $\theta \in ]0,1[$ be an irrational number and recall that the irrational rotation algebra $A_\theta$ is the universal $C^*$-algebra generated by two unitaries $u$ and $v$ subject to the relation $uv=e^{2\pi i\theta}vu$.
The set
\[
\mc A_\theta:=\left.\left\{ \sum_{p,q \in {\mathbb Z} } z_{p,q}u^{p}v^{q}\,\right|\, z_{p,q}\in {\mathbb C}, z_{p,q}= 0 \text{ for all but finitely many } (p,q)\in {\mathbb Z}^2 \right\}
\]
forms a dense subalgebra in $A_\theta$ and carries a natural filtering sequence of subspaces
\[
\mc F_n:= \left.\left\{ \sum_{-n\leqslant p +q\leqslant n} z_{p,q}u^{p}v^{q} \,\right|\, z_{p,q}\in {\mathbb C}\right\}.
\]
Recall that $A_\theta$ has a unique trace which on $\mc A_\theta$ is given by $\tau\left(\sum_{p,q \in {\mathbb Z} } z_{p,q}u^{p}v^{q}\right)=z_{0,0}$.
We aim at proving that $\mc A_\theta $ has the strong F{\o}lner property relative to $N:={\mathbb C}$ and the enveloping von Neumann algebra $M_\theta:=A_{\theta}''\subseteq B(L^2(A_\theta,\tau))$. Let ${\varepsilon}>0$ and $T_1,\dots, T_r\in \mc A_\theta$ be given. Then there exists an $m_0\in {\mathbb N}$ such that $T_i(\mc F_n)\subseteq \mc F_{n+m_0}$ for each $i\in\{1,\dots, r\}$ and $n\in {\mathbb N}$, and we now define $\mc P_n := \mc F_{nm_0}$ and $\mc S_n:=\mc F_{(n-1)m_0}$. Using the fact that $H=L^2(A_\theta,\tau)$ has an orthonormal basis consisting of the unitaries
\[
\{ u^{p}v^{q}\mid p,q\in {\mathbb Z} \}
\]
it is not difficult to see that $\varphi_{\mc P_n}(T)=\tau(T)$ for every $T\in M_{\theta}$ and furthermore it implies that $\dim_{\mathbb C}{\mc P_n}=2(nm_0)^2+2nm_0+1$ from which it follows that $\frac{\dim_{\mathbb C} \mc S_n}{\dim_{\mathbb C} \mc P_n}\longrightarrow 1$. Thus $(\mc P_n,\mc S_n)$ is a strong F{\o}lner sequence for $T_1,\dots,T_r$. From our results we therefore obtain that the Connes-Shlyakhtenko $L^2$-Betti numbers $\beta^{(2)}_p(\mc A_\theta,\tau)$ vanish for $p\geqslant 1$ as well as the well-known fact that the enveloping von Neumann algebra $M_\theta$ is hyperfinite.
\end{Ex}
\begin{Ex}
[UHF-algebras]\label{uhf-example}
Let $A$ be a UHF-algebra; i.e.~$A$ is a $C^*$-algebraic direct limit of a sequence $({\mathbb M}_{k(n)}({\mathbb C}),\alpha_n)$ of full matrix algebras. Denoting by $\mc A$ the algebraic direct limit we get a natural dense $\ast$-subalgebra in $A$ and the tracial states on the matrix algebras ${\mathbb M}_{k(n)}({\mathbb C})$ give rise to a unique tracial state $\tau$ on $A$, for which the enveloping von Neumann algebra $M:=A''\subseteq B(L^2(A,\tau))$ is the hyperfinite II$_1$-factor. Denote by $\mc F_n$ the image of ${\mathbb M}_{k(n)}({\mathbb C})$ in $\mc A$. Then for given $T_1,\dots, T_r \in \mc A$ there exists an $n_0$ such that they are all in $\mc F_{n_0}$ and thus $T_i(\mc F_{n})\subseteq \mc F_{n}$ for all $i\in \{1,\dots, r\}$ and $n\geqslant n_0$. Putting $\mc P_n= \mc S_n:=\mc F_{n_0+n}$ we get a strong F{\o}lner sequence (relative to ${\mathbb C}\subseteq \mc A\subseteq M)$ for $T_1,\dots, T_r$: the two first conditions in Proposition \ref{strong-foelner-prop} are obviously fulfilled and the a direct computation\footnote{This can be seen either using matrix units or a collection of unitaries matrices forming an orthonormal basis for the Hilbert-Schmidt inner product.}
shows that $\varphi_{\mc P_n}(T)=\tau(T)$. Thus the Connes-Shlyakhtenko $L^2$-Betti numbers of $(\mc A, \tau)$ vanish in positive degrees.
\end{Ex}
\begin{Rem}
Note that by \cite[Corollary 3.2 \& Theorem 3.3]{piotr} neither the UHF-algebra nor the irrational rotation algebra is the algebra associated with a discrete group or quantum group; hence Example \ref{uhf-example} and Example \ref{irrational-rotation} provide honest new examples of dimension flat inclusions.
\end{Rem}
\begin{Rem} Generalizing Example \ref{uhf-example}, we may consider an arbitrary finite factor $N$ and an inductive system of the form $({\mathbb M}_{k(n)}(N),\alpha_n)$ and the inclusion of the algebraic direct limit $\mc A$ in the von Neumann algebraic direct limit $M$. Then, by exactly the same reasoning as in Example \ref{uhf-example}, $\mc A$ has the strong F{\o}lner property relative to the chain $N\subseteq \mc A\subseteq M$. Hence the inclusion $\mc A\subseteq M$ is dimension flat even though $\mc A$ can be ``far from amenable'' ($N$ might for instance be a II$_1$-factor with property (T)). Compare e.g.~with \cite[Conjecture 6.48]{Luck02} where it is conjectured that for $N={\mathbb C}$ and $\Gamma$ a discrete group, dimension flatness of the inclusion ${\mathbb C}\Gamma\subseteq L\Gamma$ is equivalent to amenability of $\Gamma$.
\end{Rem}
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Arts Visalia Visual Arts Center / Exhibitions - Past / The Printed Narrative: Works by Five Contemporary Printmakers
The Printed Narrative: Works by Five Contemporary Printmakers
Exhibitions - Past
October 5 – October 28, 2011
Reception: October 7, 6-8PM
Opening this month at Arts Visalia is a new exhibition titled Printed Narratives, featuring works by five contemporary printmakers of growing national reputations. Prints by Brett Anderson, Matthew Hopson-Walker, Andrew Kosten, Brandon Sanderson, and Nick Spohrer will be on display through October 29th with an opening reception where the public can meet the artists on Friday, October 7th from 6 to 8 p.m.
As the name of the exhibition suggests, each of the artists utilize the various methods of printing as their primary means of creative expression. Further, the works on display share a common thread in the fact that they each produce art that is rooted drawing as a means of narration, storytelling, social commentary and personal introspection.
Numerous historically important artists, including such giants in the field as Albrecht Durer, William Hogarth, and Francisco Goya found the print to be a fertile ground for the broad distribution of ideas as well as a versatile platform from which to raise questions pertinent to the major cultural issues of their time. Similarly, many modern artists have utilized the print as an important means of expression, notably early Twentieth century figures associated with the German Expressionist movement, as well as many, more contemporary artists such as Thomas Hart Benton, Antonio Frasconi, Warrington Colescott or William T. Wiley.
In the works of each of the participating artists, one sees a broad range of historical and contemporary creative influences and references, clearly selected for the purposes of each new tale being told. For example, Kosten invokes Colonial era American folk art and illustration in images of biting social satire while Hopson-Walker's images are laden with pop culture references intermingled in landscapes where one encounters the results of urban sprawl and material waste.
Printmaking as a mode of creative expression is a somewhat rare field and because the mechanics behind the individual processes can be rather complex, there is often considerable confusion as to what a "print" is. Many print methods date back hundreds of years and the techniques employed in their creation were at one time the most cutting-edge of technologies and, for the most part, many of these technologies have long since been abandoned by commercial industry as ever newer methods of printing are developed. Still, these old print processes continue to be compelling for many artists today and have been kept alive almost solely by artists because of the unique aesthetic appeal of each special printing process.
All five artists have roots to the Central Valley, though they live and work throughout the United States today. Matt Hopson-Walker teaches at both Fresno State and College of the Sequoias while Nick Spohrer is a member of the faculty at Fresno City College. As for Anderson, Sanderson and Kosten, each are former instructors at College of the Sequoias, having since moved on to other opportunities. Brett Anderson lives and works in Portland, Oregon, Brandon Sanderson teaches at the University of North Carolina at Pembroke, and Andrew Kosten teaches printmaking at the University of Southern Indiana. Each of them have exhibited their works throughout the United States and abroad, with many, many awards and recognitions amongst them.
While the five artists are featured in this exhibition do not comprise an exhaustive list of artists working today whose works embody this tendency towards storytelling and social commentary, they certainly represent a strong sampling of fresh voices of the long-standing narrative tradition of printmaking.
This exhibition was made possible through the generous support of the following business partners:
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Offering a ski school and ski storage space, Elitniy is set in Slavske in the Lviv Region Region, 49 km from Truskavets. Skhidnitsa is 43 km from the property. Free private parking is available on site. Property features mountain views. There is also a kitchen, equipped with a fridge. A stovetop and kettle are also provided. Elitniy features free WiFi throughout the property. Bed linen is offered. Ski equipment hire is available at the property and the area is popular for skiing and fishing. Polyana is 43 km from Elitniy, while Pylypets is 21 km away.
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Sadyba Kukulka offers simply furnished rooms and it is tranquilly located in Slavske. Free WiFi access is available. At Sadyba Kukulka you will find a garden and a shared kitchen, where you can prepare small meals. Children can spend their time on the playground and ski storage is also available. Ivano-Frankivsk Airport is 90 km away. Free private parking is possible on site.
Offering a sauna and outdoor swimming pool, Complex Karpatskiy Zatyshok is located in Slavske. It offers comfortable accommodation with free private parking. Rooms feature rustic décor and cable TV. The private bathrooms offer a shower and free toiletries. Complex Karpatskiy Zatyshok has a café serving local cuisine. It offers a garden with BBQ facilities. Slavske Train Station is 2.5 km away. Lviv Airport is 135 km away.
Offering ski equipment and storage, Hotel Boykivska Hata is located in the Carpathian Mountains in Slavske. A ski loft is a 5-minute walk away. Free private parking is available. The comfortable rooms feature rustic décor and a flat-screen cable TV. The private bathrooms come with a shower, hairdryer and free toiletries. Rooms also have a terrace. Hotel Boykivska Hata has a garden with BBQ facilities. It offers a sauna and a hot tub. The hotel has a shared kitchen and lounge area. Slavske Train and Bus Stations are 1 km from the hotel. Lviv Airport is 150 km away.
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Featuring eco-friendly cottages built of oak and a seasonal outdoor swimming pool, Tsarynka Holiday Park is located in Nizhnya Rozhanka village. You can also find a well with fresh water on site. Each room at Tsarynka includes country-style décor with wooden furnishings and a kettle. A hairdryer is provided in the bathroom. Ukrainian cuisine, as well as local dishes, are served in the on-site restaurant. You can enjoy your meals on the terrace overlooking green surroundings. Guests can relax in the sauna or take a dip into the swimming pool, while fishing facilities can also be found on site. Slavske village is 4 km from Tsarynka Holiday Park, and Lviv City is 130 km away.
Located near the foothills of the Carpathian Mountains in Slavske, Laguna offers guests a relaxing stay with an outdoor pool, a sauna, an on-site restaurant serving Ukrainian and European cuisine, free Wi-Fi and free private parking. Rooms here provide a refrigerator, a TV with cable channels, and a private bathroom with a shower. Other property facilities include a 24-hour front desk, BBQ facilities, a children's playground, a bar, a billiards table, and a bicycle rental. A number of outdoor activities can be enjoyed within 5 km, such as hiking, fishing, horse riding, and skiing. Laguna is a 10-minute walk from Slavske Train Station, and 145 km from Ivano – Frankivsk Airport.
Located in Slavske, a 2-minute walk from the nearest ski lift, Drin-lux features a number of facilities to help guests relax, including outdoor swimming pool, a hot tub, and a sauna. The rustically designed rooms here provide a flat-screen TV, a mountain view, and a wardrobe. Other facilities include BBQ facilities, a terrace, ski storage, and an airport shuttle. Slavske Train Station is 1.5 km away, and Lviv Airport is 135 km from the property.
Set within the mountains, Kazkova Sadyba is located just 8 km from Slavs'ke Ski Resort. It offers a sauna, a fireplace and a furnished balcony with view of the surrounding woods. With wooden paneling and parquet flooring, this 2-bedroom cottage features a living room with a satellite TV and sofas. The private bathrooms come with a bathtub or a shower. There is also a kitchenette with a microwave, hotplates and a refrigerator. An array of activities can be enjoyed on site or in the surroundings, including hiking and skiing. The property offers free private parking on site.
Located in Slavske, a 3-minute walk from Politech ski lift, Liliana hotel features an indoor pool, a sauna, an on-site café, and free Wi-Fi. Rooms here provide a TV, a seating area with a sofa, a safety deposit box, and a private bathroom with a shower. Other hotel facilities include a bar, a children's playground, billiards, table tennis, and an on-site mini-market. Slavske Train Station is 2 km away, Ivano-Frankovsk Airport is 140 km, and the city centre of Lviv is a 2-hour drive from the property.
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|
{
"redpajama_set_name": "RedPajamaC4"
}
| 2,794
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Corallimorphus niwa is een Corallimorphariasoort uit de familie van de Corallimorphidae. De wetenschappelijke naam van de soort is voor het eerst geldig gepubliceerd in 2011 door Fautin.
Corallimorpharia
|
{
"redpajama_set_name": "RedPajamaWikipedia"
}
| 5,856
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Philygria nubeculosa är en tvåvingeart som beskrevs av Gabriel Strobl 1909. Philygria nubeculosa ingår i släktet Philygria och familjen vattenflugor.
Artens utbredningsområde är Österrike. Inga underarter finns listade i Catalogue of Life.
Källor
Vattenflugor
nubeculosa
|
{
"redpajama_set_name": "RedPajamaWikipedia"
}
| 487
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{"url":"https:\/\/en.wikibooks.org\/wiki\/Ordinary_Differential_Equations\/One-dimensional_first-order_linear_equations","text":"# Ordinary Differential Equations\/One-dimensional first-order linear equations\n\n## Definition\n\nOne-dimensional first-order inhomogenous linear ODEs are ODEs of the form\n\n${\\displaystyle x'(t)+f(t)x(t)=g(t)}$\n\nfor suitable (that is, mostly, continuous) functions ${\\displaystyle f,g:\\mathbb {R} \\to \\mathbb {R} }$; note that when ${\\displaystyle g\\equiv 0}$, we have a homogenous equation instead.\n\n## General solution\n\nFirst we note that we have the following superposition principle: If we have a solution ${\\displaystyle x_{h}}$ (\"${\\displaystyle h}$\" standing for \"homogenous\") of the problem\n\n${\\displaystyle x_{h}'(t)+f(t)x_{h}(t)=0}$\n\n(which is nothing but the homogenous problem associated to the above ODE) and a solution to the actual problem ${\\displaystyle x_{p}}$; that is a function ${\\displaystyle x_{p}}$ such that\n\n${\\displaystyle x_{p}'(t)+f(t)x_{p}(t)=g(t)}$\n\n(\"${\\displaystyle p}$\" standing for \"particular solution\", indicating that this is only one of the many possible solutions), then the function\n\n${\\displaystyle x(t):=ax_{h}(t)+x_{p}(t)}$ (${\\displaystyle a\\in \\mathbb {R} }$ arbitrary)\n\nstill solves ${\\displaystyle x'(t)+f(t)x(t)=g(t)}$, just like the particular solution ${\\displaystyle x_{p}}$ does. This is proved by computing the derivative of ${\\displaystyle x}$ directly.\n\nIn order to obtain the solutions to the ODE under consideration, we first solve the related homogenous problem; that is, first we look for ${\\displaystyle x_{h}}$ such that\n\n${\\displaystyle x_{h}'(t)+f(t)x_{h}(t)=0\\Leftrightarrow x_{h}'=-f(t)x_{h}}$.\n\nIt may seem surprising, but this gives actually a very quick path to the general solution, which goes as follows. Separation of variables (and using ${\\displaystyle \\ln ^{-1}=\\exp }$) gives\n\n${\\displaystyle x_{h}(t)=\\exp \\left(-\\int _{t_{0}}^{t}f(s)ds\\right)}$,\n\nsince the function\n\n${\\displaystyle G(t):=-\\int _{t_{0}}^{t}f(s)ds}$\n\nis an antiderivative of ${\\displaystyle t\\mapsto -f(t)}$. Thus we have found the solution to the related homogenous problem.\n\nFor the determination of a solution ${\\displaystyle x_{p}}$ to the actual equation, we now use an Ansatz: Namely we assume\n\n${\\displaystyle x_{p}(t)=c(t)x_{h}(t)}$,\n\nwhere ${\\displaystyle c:\\mathbb {R} \\to \\mathbb {R} }$ is a function. This Ansatz is called variation of the constant and is due to Leonhard Euler. If this equation holds for ${\\displaystyle x_{p}}$, let's see what condition on ${\\displaystyle c}$ we get for ${\\displaystyle x_{p}}$ to be a solution. We want\n\n${\\displaystyle x_{p}'(t)+f(t)x_{p}(t)=g(t)}$, that is (by the product rule and inserting ${\\displaystyle x_{h}}$):\n${\\displaystyle c'(t)\\exp \\left(-\\int _{t_{0}}^{t}f(s)ds\\right)=c'(t)\\exp \\left(-\\int _{t_{0}}^{t}f(s)ds\\right)+c(t)(-1)\\exp \\left(-\\int _{t_{0}}^{t}f(s)ds\\right)f(t)+f(t)c(t)\\exp \\left(-\\int _{t_{0}}^{t}f(s)ds\\right)=g(t)}$.\n\nPutting the exponential on the other side, that is\n\n${\\displaystyle c'(t)=g(t)\\exp \\left(\\int _{t_{0}}^{t}f(s)ds\\right)}$\n\nor\n\n${\\displaystyle c(t)=\\int _{t_{0}}^{t}g(r)\\exp \\left(\\int _{t_{0}}^{r}f(s)ds\\right)dr+C_{1}}$.\n\nSince all the manipulations we did are reversible, all functions of the form\n\n${\\displaystyle C_{2}\\exp \\left(-\\int _{t_{0}}^{t}f(s)ds\\right)+\\left(\\int _{t_{0}}^{t}g(r)\\exp \\left(\\int _{t_{0}}^{r}f(s)ds\\right)dr+C_{1}\\right)\\exp \\left(-\\int _{t_{0}}^{t}f(s)ds\\right)}$ (${\\displaystyle C_{1},C_{2}\\in \\mathbb {R} }$ arbitrary)\n\nare solutions. If we set ${\\displaystyle C:=C_{2}+C_{1}}$, we get the general solution form\n\n${\\displaystyle C\\exp \\left(-\\int _{t_{0}}^{t}f(s)ds\\right)+\\left(\\int _{t_{0}}^{t}g(r)\\exp \\left(\\int _{t_{0}}^{r}f(s)ds\\right)dr\\right)\\exp \\left(-\\int _{t_{0}}^{t}f(s)ds\\right)}$.\n\nWe want now to prove that these constitute all the solutions to the equation under consideration. Thus, set\n\n${\\displaystyle x_{C}(t):=C\\exp \\left(-\\int _{t_{0}}^{t}f(s)ds\\right)+\\left(\\int _{t_{0}}^{t}g(r)\\exp \\left(\\int _{t_{0}}^{r}f(s)ds\\right)dr\\right)\\exp \\left(-\\int _{t_{0}}^{t}f(s)ds\\right)}$\n\nand let ${\\displaystyle x_{2}(t)}$ be any other solution to the inhomogenous problem under consideration. Then ${\\displaystyle x_{C}-x_{2}}$ solves the homogenous problem, for\n\n${\\displaystyle x_{C}'(t)-x_{2}'(t)-f(t)(x_{C}(t)-x_{2}(t))=x_{C}'(t)-f(t)x_{C}(t)-(x_{2}'(t)-f(t)x_{2}(t))=g(t)-g(t)=0}$.\n\nThus, if we prove that all the homogenous solutions (and in particular the difference ${\\displaystyle x_{C}-x_{2}}$) are of the form\n\n${\\displaystyle C\\exp \\left(-\\int _{t_{0}}^{t}f(s)ds\\right)}$,\n\nthen we may subtract\n\n${\\displaystyle D\\exp \\left(-\\int _{t_{0}}^{t}f(s)ds\\right)}$\n\nfrom ${\\displaystyle x_{C}-x_{2}}$ for an appropriate ${\\displaystyle D\\in \\mathbb {R} }$ to obtain zero, which is why ${\\displaystyle x_{2}}$ is then of the desired form.\n\nThus, let ${\\displaystyle x_{h}}$ be any solution to the homogenous problem. Consider the function\n\n${\\displaystyle t\\mapsto x_{h}(t)\\cdot \\exp \\left(\\int _{t_{0}}^{t}f(s)ds\\right)}$.\n\nWe differentiate this function and obtain by the product rule\n\n${\\displaystyle x_{h}'(t)\\exp \\left(\\int _{t_{0}}^{t}f(s)ds\\right)+f(t)\\exp \\left(\\int _{t_{0}}^{t}f(s)ds\\right)x_{h}(t)=-f(t)x_{h}(t)\\exp \\left(\\int _{t_{0}}^{t}f(s)ds\\right)+f(t)\\exp \\left(\\int _{t_{0}}^{t}f(s)ds\\right)x_{h}(t)=0}$\n\nsince ${\\displaystyle x_{h}}$ is a solution to the homogenous problem. Hence, the function is constant (that is, equal to a constant ${\\displaystyle C\\in \\mathbb {R} }$), and solving\n\n${\\displaystyle x_{h}(t)\\cdot \\exp \\left(\\int _{t_{0}}^{t}f(s)ds\\right)=C}$\n\nfor ${\\displaystyle x_{h}}$ gives the claim.\n\nWe have thus arrived at:\n\nTheorem 3.1:\n\nFor continuous ${\\displaystyle f,g:\\mathbb {R} \\to \\mathbb {R} }$, the solutions to the ODE\n\n${\\displaystyle x'(t)+f(t)x(t)=g(t)}$\n\nare precisely the functions\n\n${\\displaystyle x(t)=C\\exp \\left(-\\int _{t_{0}}^{t}f(s)ds\\right)+\\left(\\int _{t_{0}}^{t}g(r)\\exp \\left(\\int _{t_{0}}^{r}f(s)ds\\right)dr\\right)\\exp \\left(-\\int _{t_{0}}^{t}f(s)ds\\right)}$ (${\\displaystyle C\\in \\mathbb {R} }$ arbitrary).\n\nNote that imposing an inital condition ${\\displaystyle x(t_{0})=x_{0}}$ for some ${\\displaystyle x_{0}\\in \\mathbb {R} }$ enforces ${\\displaystyle C=x_{0}}$, whence we got a unique solution for each initial condition.\n\n### Exercises\n\n\u2022 Exercise 3.2.1: First prove that ${\\displaystyle {\\frac {d}{dt}}\\ln(t^{2})={\\frac {2}{t}}}$. Then solve the ODE ${\\displaystyle x'(t)+{\\frac {2}{t}}x(t)={\\frac {1}{t^{2}}}}$ for a function existent on ${\\displaystyle [1,\\infty )}$ such that ${\\displaystyle x(1)=c}$ for ${\\displaystyle c\\in \\mathbb {R} }$ arbitrary. Use that a similar version of theorem 3.1 holds when ${\\displaystyle f,g}$ are only defined on a proper part of ${\\displaystyle \\mathbb {R} }$; this is because the proof carries over.\n\n## Clever Ansatz for polynomial RHS\n\nFirst note that RHS means \"Right Hand Side\". Let's consider the special case of a 1-dim. first-order linear ODE\n\n${\\displaystyle x'(t)+cx(t)=a_{i}t^{i}}$ (${\\displaystyle c\\in \\mathbb {R} }$ arbitrary),\n\nwhere we used Einstein summation convention; that is, ${\\displaystyle a_{i}x^{i}}$ stands for ${\\displaystyle \\sum _{i=0}^{m}a_{i}t^{i}}$ for some ${\\displaystyle m\\in \\mathbb {N} }$. In the notation of above, we have ${\\displaystyle f(t)\\equiv c}$ and ${\\displaystyle g(t)=a_{i}t^{i}}$.\n\nUsing separation of variables, the solution to the corresponding homogenous problem ${\\displaystyle g\\equiv 0}$ is easily seen to equal ${\\displaystyle x_{h}(t)=C\\exp(-ct)}$ for some capital ${\\displaystyle C\\in \\mathbb {R} }$.\n\nTo find a particular solution ${\\displaystyle x_{p}}$, we proceed as follows. We pick the Ansatz to assume that ${\\displaystyle x_{p}}$ is simply a polynomial; that is\n\n${\\displaystyle x_{p}(t)=b_{i}t^{i}}$\n\nfor certain coefficients ${\\displaystyle b_{i}}$.\n\n### Exercises\n\n\u2022 Exercise 3.3.1: Find all solutions to the ODE ${\\displaystyle x'(t)+2x(t)=2t^{2}+4t+3}$. (Hint: What does theorem 3.1 say about the number of solutions to that problem with a given fixed initial condition?)\n\nExample 3.2:","date":"2019-02-17 14:27:39","metadata":"{\"extraction_info\": {\"found_math\": true, \"script_math_tex\": 0, \"script_math_asciimath\": 0, \"math_annotations\": 82, \"math_alttext\": 0, \"mathml\": 0, \"mathjax_tag\": 0, \"mathjax_inline_tex\": 0, \"mathjax_display_tex\": 0, \"mathjax_asciimath\": 0, \"img_math\": 0, \"codecogs_latex\": 0, \"wp_latex\": 0, \"mimetex.cgi\": 0, \"\/images\/math\/codecogs\": 0, \"mathtex.cgi\": 0, \"katex\": 0, \"math-container\": 0, \"wp-katex-eq\": 0, \"align\": 0, \"equation\": 0, \"x-ck12\": 0, \"texerror\": 0, \"math_score\": 0.9814501404762268, \"perplexity\": 289.6823311855905}, \"config\": {\"markdown_headings\": true, \"markdown_code\": true, \"boilerplate_config\": {\"ratio_threshold\": 0.18, \"absolute_threshold\": 20, \"end_threshold\": 15, \"enable\": true}, \"remove_buttons\": true, \"remove_image_figures\": true, \"remove_link_clusters\": true, \"table_config\": {\"min_rows\": 2, \"min_cols\": 3, \"format\": \"plain\"}, \"remove_chinese\": true, \"remove_edit_buttons\": true, \"extract_latex\": true}, \"warc_path\": \"s3:\/\/commoncrawl\/crawl-data\/CC-MAIN-2019-09\/segments\/1550247481994.42\/warc\/CC-MAIN-20190217132048-20190217154048-00074.warc.gz\"}"}
| null | null |
\section*{Declarations}
\vspace{-2mm}
\noindent Funding:
The research of the first author is supported in part by JSPS KAKENHI Grants No.19H04069.
The research
of the second author is supported in part by JSPS KAKENHI Grants No. 17H01699 and 19H04069.\\
\vspace{-2mm}
\noindent{Conflicts of interest/competing interests, availability of data and material, and code
availability:}
Not applicable.
\section{Introduction}
\label{int}
In this work we are interested in constrained minimization problems,
\begin{alignat}{6}\label{eq:1}
&&\min\limits_{x\in\RR^d}\text{ }&f(x)\\
&&\st\text{ }&f_i(x)\leq 0 \quad i=1,...,n\nonumber\\
&&&h_i(x)= 0 \quad i=1,...,p,\nonumber
\end{alignat}
where $f(x)$ and all $f_i(x)$ are convex functions and all $h_i(x)$ are affine functions from $\RR^d$
to $\RR$.
Our goal is to develop an algorithm with a proven convergence rate to the constrained minimum of
$f(x)$ without
any further assumptions besides standard regularity conditions. In
particular, we do not assume that $f(x)$ or the functions $\{f_i(x)\}$ are
differentiable nor Lipschitz continuous, and we do not assume a priori that algorithm iterates are
constrained to any bounded set. All that is required is that an optimal primal and dual
solution exist and that strong duality holds.
Convex functions which are neither differentiable nor Lipschitz continuous arise naturally in
optimization problems, such as the maximum of a set of quadratic functions and the unconstrained
soft-margin SVM formulation \cite[Ch. 15]{shalev2014}. Our
work's main motivation though is in finding a general algorithm which can be applied to a wide
range of applications without the need for detailed function properties or problem specific
parameter tuning.
In terms of non-asymptotic convergence guarantees for constrained non-smooth convex
optimization problems, there are deterministic algorithms, such as the subgradient method
\cite[Theorem 3.2.3]{nesterovintro} and its extension using mirror descent \cite{beck2010}, as
well as algorithms for stochastic optimization settings such as the cooperative stochastic
approximation algorithm \cite{lan2016}, which can be seen as a stochastic extension of the
subgradient method, and the primal-dual stochastic gradient method \cite{xu2020}, which is based
on the analysis of the augmented Lagrangian. After $K$ iterations, all of
the algorithms discussed have a proven rate of convergence of $O(\frac{1}{\sqrt{K}})$ towards an
optimal solution, which is the best rate achievable using a first-order method, in the sense of
matching the lower complexity
bound for the unconstrained version of our problem setting \cite[Section
3.2.1]{nesterovintro}.
All of these algorithms' convergence results rely on some combination of a compact feasible region,
bounds on the subgradients, or bounds on the constraint functions though.
If we consider the unconstrained
problem with $n=p=0$, recent works include \cite{grimmer2019}, which proved that the
convergence rate of the subgradient method holds under the more relaxed assumption compared to
Lipschitz continuity, that
$f(x)-f(x^*)\leq D(\norm{x-x^*}_2)$ holds where $x^*$ is an optimal solution and $D(\cdot)$ is a
non-negative non-decreasing function. The convergence rate of $O(\frac{1}{\sqrt{K}})$ for the general
unconstrained convex optimization problem was solved earlier though in \cite{nesterov2009}, with
the method of weighted dual averages. The iterates of the algorithm can be shown to be bounded for
a range of convex optimization problems, including unconstrained minimization without the
assumption of a global Lipschitz parameter. The path taken in this paper is to apply the method of
weighted dual averages, presented as Algorithm \ref{alg:sgd}, to the general convex constrained
problem \eqref{eq:1} and establish the same rate of convergence as previous works under our more
relaxed
assumptions.
\section{Preliminaries}
We define the Lagrangian function as
\begin{alignat}{6}
L(x,\mu,\theta):=&f(x)+\sum_{i=1}^n\mu_if_i(x)+\sum_{i=1}^p\theta_ih_i(x),\nonumber
\end{alignat}
and the dual problem as
\begin{alignat}{6}
&&\max\limits_{\substack{\mu\geq \RR^n_+\\\theta\in\RR^p}}\min\limits_{x\in\RR^d}\text{
}&L(x,\mu,\theta).\nonumber
\end{alignat}
The following assumptions are sufficient for \eqref{eq:1} to be a convex optimization problem with an
optimal primal and dual solution with strong duality.
\begin{assumption}
\label{assump}
\text{ }
\begin{enumerate}
\item $f(x)$ and $f_i(x)$ for $i=1,...,n$ are real-valued convex functions, and $h_i(x)$
for $i=1,...,p$
are affine functions, all over $\RR^d$.
\item Slater's condition holds: there exists an $\hat{x}\in \RR^d$ such that $f_i(\hat{x})<0$
for $i=1,...,n$ and $h_i(\hat{x})=0$ for $i=1,...,p$.
\item There exists an optimal solution, denoted $x^*$.
\end{enumerate}
\end{assumption}
These assumptions are sufficient since by the finiteness of $f(x^*)$ and Slater's condition, strong
duality holds and there exists at least one dual optimal
solution $(\mu^*,\theta^*)$ \cite[Prop. 5.3.5]{bertsekas2009}.
Strong duality holds if and only if $(x^*,\mu^*,\theta^*)$ is a saddle point of $L(x,\mu,\theta)$
\cite[Prop. 3.4.1]{bertsekas2009}, i.e. $\forall x\in\RR^d,\mu\geq \RR^n_+$, and $\theta\in\RR^p$,
\begin{alignat}{6}\label{eq:2-7}
&L(x^*,\mu,\theta)\leq L(x^*,\mu^*,\theta^*)
\leq L(x,\mu^*,\theta^*).
\end{alignat}
We will work with an unconstrained version of \eqref{eq:1}, written as
\begin{alignat}{6}
&&\min\limits_{x\in\RR^d}\max_{\lambda\geq 0}\text{ }&F(x,\lambda):=f(x)+\lambda
\overline{f}(x),\nonumber
\end{alignat}
where
\begin{alignat}{6}
&&\overline{f}(x):=\max(f_1(x),f_2(x),...,f_n(x),|h_1(x)|,|h_2(x)|,...,|h_p(x)|).\nonumber
\end{alignat}
Let
$\lambda^*=\sum_{i=1}^n\mu^*_i+\sum_{i=1}^p|\theta^*_i|$. By the fact that $\overline{f}(x^*)=0$
and complementary slackness, $\sum_{i=1}^n\mu^*_if_i(x^*)=0$,
\begin{alignat}{6}
&&F(x^*,\lambda)=f(x^*)=L(x^*,\mu^*,\theta^*)\text{ }\forall \lambda,\nonumber
\end{alignat}
and
\begin{alignat}{6}
&&L(x,\mu^*,\theta^*)=&f(x)+\sum_{i=1}^n\mu^*_if_i(x)+\sum_{i=1}^p\theta^*_ih_i(x)\nonumber\\
&&\leq&f(x)+\sum_{i=1}^n\mu^*_if_i(x)+\sum_{i=1}^p|\theta^*_i||h_i(x)|\nonumber\\
&&\leq&f(x)+\lambda^*\overline{f}(x)\nonumber\\
&&=&F(x,\lambda^*),\nonumber
\end{alignat}
hence from \eqref{eq:2-7}, for all $(x,\lambda)\in\RR^{d+1}$,
\begin{alignat}{6}\label{eq:2-8}
&F(x^*,\lambda)\leq F(x,\lambda^*).
\end{alignat}
We will use the following notation for the subgradients needed of $F(x,\lambda)$,
\begin{alignat}{6}
&&g(x)\in&\partial f(x)\nonumber\\
&&g_i(x)\in&\partial f_i(x)\nonumber\\
&&\overline{g}(x)\in& \partial\overline{f}(x)=\conv(\{\partial f_i(x):
f_i(x)=\overline{f}(x)\}\cup\{\partial|h_i(x)|:|h_i(x)|=\overline{f}(x)\})\nonumber\\
&&G_x(x,\lambda)\in&\partial_x F(x,\lambda)=\partial f(x)+\lambda\partial \overline{f}(x)\nonumber\\
&&G_{\lambda}(x,\lambda)=&\frac{\partial}{\partial \lambda}F(x,\lambda)=\overline{f}(x)\nonumber\\
&&G(x,\lambda)\in&\partial F(x,\lambda),\nonumber
\end{alignat}
where for subdifferential of $\partial \overline{f}(x)$, see for example \cite[Lemma
3.1.10]{nesterovintro}. From a practical perspective, $\overline{g}(x)$ can be taken as an element
$\overline{g}(x)\in \partial H(x)$, where
$H(x)\in \{f_1(x),f_2(x),...,f_n(x),|h_1(x)|,|h_2(x)|,...,|h_p(x)|\}$ and $H(x)=\overline{f}(x)$.
Following the
standard measure of
convergence to a primal solution, given an optimal solution $x^*$, we
define an algorithm's output $\bar{x}$ as an $(\epsilon_1,\epsilon_2)$-optimal solution if
\begin{alignat}{6}
f(\bar{x})-f(x^*)\leq \epsilon_1\quad\text{and}\quad\overline{f}(\bar{x})\leq \epsilon_2.\nonumber
\end{alignat}
\section{Weighted dual method}
Convergence to an optimal solution is proven using the
method of weighted dual averages of \cite{nesterov2009} presented as Algorithm \ref{alg:sgd}. When
convenient we will use the column vector $w:=[x;\lambda]:=[x^T,\lambda^T]^T$, and the notation
$\overline{G}_k:=\frac{[G_x(w_k);-G_{\lambda}(w_k)]}{\norm{G(w_k)}_2}$ (note that
$\norm{\overline{G}_k}_2=1$).
\begin{algorithm}[H]
\caption{Method of weighted dual averages}
\label{alg:sgd}
\begin{algorithmic}
\STATE {\bfseries Input:} $w_0=[x_{0}\in \RR^d;\lambda_0\geq0]$;
$s_0=\hat{s}_0=\hat{x}_{0}=0$; $\beta_0=1$
\FOR{$k=0,1,...,K-1$}
\STATE Compute $G(w_k)\in \partial F(w_k)$
\STATE $s_{k+1}=s_k+\frac{[G_x(w_k);-G_{\lambda}(w_k)]}{\norm{G(w_k)}_2}$
\STATE $w_{k+1}=w_{0}-\frac{s_{k+1}}{\beta_{k}}$
\STATE $\beta_{k+1}=\beta_k+\frac{1}{\beta_k}$
\STATE $\hat{s}_{k+1}=\hat{s}_k+\frac{1}{\norm{G(w_k)}_2}$
\STATE $\hat{x}_{k+1}=\hat{x}_{k}+\frac{x_k}{\norm{G(w_k)}_2}$
\ENDFOR
\STATE Compute $G(w_K)\in \partial F(w_K)$
\STATE $\hat{s}_{K+1}=\hat{s}_K+\frac{1}{\norm{G(w_K)}_2}$
\STATE $\hat{x}_{K+1}=\hat{x}_K+\frac{x_K}{\norm{G(w_K)}_2}$
\RETURN $\overline{x}_{K+1}=\hat{s}_{K+1}^{-1}\hat{x}_{K+1}$
\end{algorithmic}
\end{algorithm}
\noindent In each iteration $w_{k+1}=w_{0}-\frac{s_{k+1}}{\beta_{k}}$ is the maximizer of
\begin{alignat}{6}\label{ufunc}
U^s_{\beta}(w):=-\langle s,w-w_0\rangle-\frac{\beta}{2}\norm{w-w_0}^2_2
\end{alignat}
for $s=s_{k+1}$ and $\beta=\beta_k$, with
\begin{alignat}{6}\label{eq:optval}
U_{\beta_k}^{s_{k+1}}(w_{k+1})=\frac{\norm{s_{k+1}}^2_2}{2\beta_k}.
\end{alignat}
In addition, $U^s_{\beta}(w)$ is strongly concave in $w$ with parameter $\beta$,
\begin{alignat}{6}\label{strcave}
U_{\beta}^s(w)\leq U_{\beta}^s(w')+\langle \nabla U_{\beta}^s(w'),w-w'\rangle
-\frac{\beta}{2}\norm{w-w'}^2_2.
\end{alignat}
Given that $G_{\lambda}(w_k)\geq 0$, it holds that $\lambda_{k+1}\geq \lambda_k$, with the $\lambda_k$
iterates always remaining feasible. The
following property examines the case Algorithm \ref{alg:sgd} crashes due to $\norm{G(w_k)}_2=0$.
\begin{propertyy}
\label{crash}
If $\norm{G(w_k)}_2=0$, then $x_k$ is an optimal solution of \eqref{eq:1}.
\end{propertyy}
\begin{proof}
If $\norm{G(w_k)}_2=0$, this implies that $G_{\lambda}(w_k)=\overline{f}(x_k)=0$ and hence $x_k$
is a
feasible solution. From $\norm{G_{x}(w_k)}_2=0$, $0\in
\partial_x
F(x_k,\lambda_k)$, and as $F(x,\lambda_k)$ is convex in $x$, $x_k$ is a minimizer
of
$F(x,\lambda_k)$. It follows that for all $x\in\RR^d$ feasible in \eqref{eq:1},
\begin{alignat}{6}
f(x_k)=f(x_k)+\lambda_k\overline{f}(x_k)\leq f(x)+\lambda_k\overline{f}(x)=f(x).\nonumber
\end{alignat}\qed
\end{proof}
A key property of Algorithm \ref{alg:sgd} is that by redefining $G(w_k)$ appropriately, the iterates
are bounded for quite general convex optimization problems. In particular, all that is required is
that \eqref{conineq} in the proof below holds for the iterates to be bounded using
\cite[Theorem 3]{nesterov2009}. For the sake of completeness we present the full proof for our
application in Property \ref{bounded}. It is convenient to first prove a preliminary property which
will be used in Property
\ref{bounded} and Theorem~\ref{convergence}.
\begin{propertyy}
\label{prelim}
For any iterate $\bar{k}\in\{1,2,...,K\}$ of Algorithm \ref{alg:sgd}, it holds that
\begin{alignat}{6}\label{constart}
\sum_{k=1}^{\bar{k}}\langle
w_k-w_0,\overline{G}_k\rangle&\leq
-U_{\beta_{\bar{k}}}^{s_{\bar{k}+1}}(w_{\bar{k}+1})+\frac{\beta_{\bar{k}}}{2}.
\end{alignat}
\end{propertyy}
\begin{proof}
From \eqref{eq:optval},
\begin{alignat}{6}
U_{\beta_k}^{s_{k+1}}(w_{k+1})&=\frac{\beta_{k-1}}{\beta_k}\frac{\norm{s_{k+1}}^2_2}{2\beta_{k-1}}\nonumber\\
&=\frac{\beta_{k-1}}{\beta_k}\frac{\norm{s_k+\overline{G}_k}^2_2}{2\beta_{k-1}}\nonumber\\
&=\frac{\beta_{k-1}}{\beta_k}\left(\frac{\norm{s_k}^2_2}{2\beta_{k-1}}+\frac{1}{\beta_{k-1}}\langle
s_k,\overline{G}_k\rangle+\frac{\norm{\overline{G}_k}^2_2}{2\beta_{k-1}}\right)\nonumber\\
&=\frac{\beta_{k-1}}{\beta_k}(U_{\beta_{k-1}}^{s_k}(w_k)+\frac{1}{\beta_{k-1}}\langle
s_k,\overline{G}_k\rangle+\frac{1}{2\beta_{k-1}})\nonumber\\
&=\frac{\beta_{k-1}}{\beta_k}(U_{\beta_{k-1}}^{s_k}(w_k)+\langle
w_0-w_k,\overline{G}_k\rangle+\frac{1}{2\beta_{k-1}}).\nonumber
\end{alignat}
Rearranging,
\begin{alignat}{6}
\langle
w_k-w_0,\overline{G}_k\rangle
&=U_{\beta_{k-1}}^{s_k}(w_k)-\frac{\beta_k}{\beta_{k-1}}U_{\beta_k}^{s_{k+1}}(w_{k+1})+\frac{1}{2\beta_{k-1}}\nonumber\\
&\leq U_{\beta_{k-1}}^{s_k}(w_k)-U_{\beta_k}^{s_{k+1}}(w_{k+1})+\frac{1}{2\beta_{k-1}},\nonumber
\end{alignat}
since $\beta_k$ is increasing. Telescoping these inequalities for $k=1,..,\bar{k}$,
\begin{alignat}{6}
\sum_{k=1}^{\bar{k}}\langle
w_k-w_0,\overline{G}_k\rangle&\leq
U_{\beta_{0}}^{s_1}(w_1)-U_{\beta_{\bar{k}}}^{s_{\bar{k}+1}}(w_{\bar{k}+1})+\sum_{k=1}^{\bar{k}}\frac{1}{2\beta_{k-1}}\label{kgo}\\
&=\frac{1}{2\beta_0}-U_{\beta_{\bar{k}}}^{s_{\bar{k}+1}}(w_{\bar{k}+1})+\sum_{k=0}^{\bar{k}-1}\frac{1}{2\beta_k}\nonumber\\
&=-U_{\beta_{\bar{k}}}^{s_{\bar{k}+1}}(w_{\bar{k}+1})+\frac{1}{2}(\sum_{k=0}^{\bar{k}-1}\frac{1}{\beta_k}+\beta_0),\nonumber
\end{alignat}
where $\norm{s_1}_2=1$ was used in the first equality, and $\beta_0=1$ was used in
the second equality. Expanding the recursion $\beta_k=\frac{1}{\beta_k-1}+\beta_{k-1}$,
\begin{alignat}{6}
\sum_{k=1}^{\bar{k}}\langle
w_k-w_0,\overline{G}_k\rangle&\leq
-U_{\beta_{\bar{k}}}^{s_{\bar{k}+1}}(w_{\bar{k}+1})+\frac{\beta_{\bar{k}}}{2}.\nonumber
\end{alignat}\qed
\end{proof}
\begin{propertyy}
\label{bounded}
For any iterate $\bar{k}\in\{1,2,...,K\}$ of Algorithm \ref{alg:sgd}, it holds that
\begin{alignat}{6}
\norm{w_{\bar{k}}-w^*}_2&\leq\norm{w_0-w^*}_2+1,\nonumber
\end{alignat}
with the inequality being strict when $w_0\neq w^*$.
\end{propertyy}
\begin{proof}
Given the convexity of $F(x,\lambda)$ in $x$ and linearity in $\lambda$,
\begin{alignat}{6}
&F(x^*,\lambda_k)&\geq F(x_k,\lambda_k)+ \langle G_x(x_k,\lambda_k),x^*-x_k\rangle\label{4-1}
\end{alignat}
and
\begin{alignat}{6}
&F(x_k,\lambda^*)&= F(x_k,\lambda_k)+ \langle
G_\lambda(x_k,\lambda_k),\lambda^*-\lambda_k\rangle.\label{4-2}
\end{alignat}
Subtracting \eqref{4-1} from \eqref{4-2} and using \eqref{eq:2-8},
\begin{alignat}{6}\label{conineq}
&0\leq \langle [G_x(w_k);-G_\lambda(w_k)],w_k-w^*\rangle.
\end{alignat}
For the case when $\bar{k}=1$,
\begin{alignat}{6}
\norm{w_1-w^*}^2_2=&\norm{w_0-w^*-\overline{G}_0}^2_2\nonumber\\
=&\norm{w_0-w^*}^2_2-2\langle w_0-w^*,
\overline{G}_0\rangle+1\nonumber\\
\leq&\norm{w_0-w^*}^2_2+1,\label{case1}
\end{alignat}
where the last line uses \eqref{conineq}. When $\bar{k}>1$ from \eqref{conineq},
\begin{alignat}{6}
0\leq&\sum_{k=1}^{\bar{k}-1}\langle
w_k-w^*,\overline{G}_k\rangle\nonumber\\
=&\sum_{k=1}^{\bar{k}-1}\langle
w_0-w^*,\overline{G}_k\rangle+\sum_{k=1}^{\bar{k}-1}\langle
w_k-w_0,\overline{G}_k\rangle\nonumber\\
\leq&\sum_{k=1}^{\bar{k}-1}\langle
w_0-w^*,\overline{G}_k\rangle-U_{\beta_{\bar{k}-1}}^{s_{\bar{k}}}(w_{\bar{k}})+\frac{\beta_{\bar{k}-1}}{2}\nonumber\\
=&\langle
w_0-w^*,s_{\bar{k}}\rangle-U_{\beta_{\bar{k}-1}}^{s_{\bar{k}}}(w_{\bar{k}})+\frac{\beta_{\bar{k}-1}}{2},\label{strcon}
\end{alignat}
where the second inequality uses Property \ref{prelim}, and the second equality holds since
$s_{k+1}=s_k+\overline{G}_k$. Considering inequality \eqref{strcave} with $s=s_{\bar{k}}$,
$\beta=\beta_{\bar{k}-1}$, $w=w^*$, and $w'=w_{\bar{k}}$,
\begin{alignat}{6}
U_{\beta_{\bar{k}-1}}^{s_{\bar{k}}}(w^*)&\leq
U_{\beta_{\bar{k}-1}}^{s_{\bar{k}}}(w_{\bar{k}})+\langle \nabla
U_{\beta_{\bar{k}-1}}^{s_{\bar{k}}}(w_{\bar{k}}),w^*-w_{\bar{k}}\rangle
-\frac{\beta_{\bar{k}-1}}{2}\norm{w^*-w_{\bar{k}}}^2_2\nonumber\\
&=
U_{\beta_{\bar{k}-1}}^{s_{\bar{k}}}(w_{\bar{k}})-\frac{\beta_{\bar{k}-1}}{2}\norm{w^*-w_{\bar{k}}}^2_2,\nonumber
\end{alignat}
given that $w_{\bar{k}}$ is the maximum of $U_{\beta_{\bar{k}-1}}^{s_{\bar{k}}}(w)$.
Applying this inequality in \eqref{strcon},
\begin{alignat}{6}
0\leq&\langle
w_0-w^*,s_{\bar{k}}\rangle-U_{\beta_{\bar{k}-1}}^{s_{\bar{k}}}(w^*)
-\frac{\beta_{\bar{k}-1}}{2}\norm{w^*-w_{\bar{k}}}^2_2+\frac{\beta_{\bar{k}-1}}{2}\nonumber\\
=&\langle
w_0-w^*,s_{\bar{k}}\rangle+\langle
s_{\bar{k}},w^*-w_0\rangle+\frac{\beta_{\bar{k}-1}}{2}\norm{w^*-w_0}^2_2
-\frac{\beta_{\bar{k}-1}}{2}\norm{w^*-w_{\bar{k}}}^2_2+\frac{\beta_{\bar{k}-1}}{2}\nonumber\\
=&\frac{\beta_{\bar{k}-1}}{2}\norm{w^*-w_0}^2_2
-\frac{\beta_{\bar{k}-1}}{2}\norm{w^*-w_{\bar{k}}}^2_2+\frac{\beta_{\bar{k}-1}}{2},\nonumber
\end{alignat}
where the first equality uses the definition of $U_{\beta_{\bar{k}-1}}^{s_{\bar{k}}}(w^*)$
\eqref{ufunc}.
Rearranging,
\begin{alignat}{6}
\norm{w^*-w_{\bar{k}}}^2_2\leq&\norm{w^*-w_0}^2_2+1.\label{normsq}
\end{alignat}
Now for all $\bar{k}$, from \eqref{case1} and \eqref{normsq},
\begin{alignat}{6}
(\norm{w^*-w_0}_2+1)^2=&\norm{w^*-w_0}^2_2+2\norm{w^*-w_0}+1\nonumber\\
\geq&\norm{w^*-w_{\bar{k}}}^2_2+2\norm{w^*-w_0},\nonumber
\end{alignat}
so that
\begin{alignat}{6}
\label{bound2}
\norm{w^*-w_0}_2+1\geq\norm{w^*-w_{\bar{k}}}_2,
\end{alignat}
with \eqref{bound2} being strict when $w^*\neq w_0$.\qed
\end{proof}
In order to prove the convergence result of Algorithm \ref{alg:sgd}, we require bounding
the norm of the subgradients $G(w_k)$.
\begin{propertyy}
\label{gradbound}
There exists a constant $L$ such that $\norm{g(x_k)}_2\leq L$,
$\norm{\overline{g}(x_k)}_2\leq L$, $\overline{f}(x_k)\leq L\norm{x_k-x^*}_2$, and
\begin{alignat}{6}
\norm{G(w_k)}_2\leq&L(2\norm{w_0-w^*}_2+\lambda^*+3)\nonumber
\end{alignat}
for all $k$.
\end{propertyy}
\begin{proof}
Recall that $g(x)\in \partial f(x)$ and $\overline{g}(x)\in \partial \overline{f}(x)$,
\begin{alignat}{6}
\norm{G(w_k)}_2=&\norm{[G_x(w_k);G_{\lambda}(w_k)]}_2\nonumber\\
=&\norm{[g(x_k)+\lambda_k\overline{g}(x_k);\overline{f}(x_k)]}_2\nonumber\\
\leq&\norm{g(x_k)}_2+\lambda_k\norm{\overline{g}(x_k)}_2+\overline{f}(x_k).\label{13}
\end{alignat}
Property 3 ensures that the iterates of Algorithm \ref{alg:sgd} are bounded in a convex compact
region,
$w_k\in
D:=\{w : \norm{w-w^*}_2\leq \norm{w_0-w^*}_2+1\}$. This implies that $x_k\in
D_x:=\{x : \norm{x-x^*}_2\leq \norm{w_0-w^*}_2+1\}$ and $\lambda_k\in
D_{\lambda}:=\{\lambda : |\lambda-\lambda^*|\leq \norm{w_0-w^*}_2+1\}$.
It follows that there exists an $L_1\geq 0$ such that $f(x)$ is $L_1$-Lipschitz continuous
on $D_x$
\cite[Theorem IV.3.1.2]{hiriart1996},
\begin{alignat}{6}\label{Lip}
|f(x)-f(x')|\leq L_1\norm{x-x'}_2,
\end{alignat}
for all $x,x'\in D_x$. Assuming that $w_0\neq w^*$, $x_k\in \Int D_x$. For
any $x\in \Int D_x$, taking $\theta>0$ small enough such
that $x'=x+\theta\frac{g(x)}{\norm{g(x)}_2}\in D_x$,
\begin{alignat}{6}
&\quad&\langle g(x), x'-x\rangle&\leq f(x')-f(x)\nonumber\\
\Longrightarrow&\quad&\langle g(x), x'-x\rangle&\leq L_1\norm{x'-x}_2\nonumber\\
\Longrightarrow&\quad&\langle g(x), \theta\frac{g(x)}{\norm{g(x)}_2}\rangle&\leq
L_1\theta\nonumber\\
\Longrightarrow&\quad&\norm{g(x)}_2&\leq L_1.\label{gradbound2}
\end{alignat}
If $w_0=w^*$, $x_k\in\Int D_x^\delta:=\{x : \norm{x-x^*}_2\leq \delta+1\}$ for any
$\delta>0$, and $L_1$ can be increased such that \eqref{Lip} holds over $D^{\delta}_x$ so that
\eqref{gradbound2} holds for all $x\in D_x$. Similarly, there exists an
$L_2\geq0$ such that $|\overline{f}(x)-\overline{f}(x')|\leq L_2\norm{x-x'}_2$
and $\norm{\overline{g}(x)}_2\leq L_2$ for all
$x,x'\in D_x$. In addition,
\begin{alignat}{6}
\overline{f}(x_k)&=|\overline{f}(x_k)-\overline{f}(x^*)|\nonumber\\
&\leq L_2\norm{x_k-x^*}_2\nonumber\\
&\leq L_2(\norm{w_0-w^*}_2+1),\nonumber
\end{alignat}
and $\lambda_k\leq \norm{w_0-w^*}_2+1+\lambda^*$ from the definition of $D_{\lambda}$. Combining
these bounds in \eqref{13} and
taking
$L=\max(L_1,L_2)$,
\begin{alignat}{6}
\norm{G(w_k)}_2\leq&\norm{g(x_k)}_2+\lambda_k\norm{\overline{g}(x_k)}_2+\overline{f}(x_k)\nonumber\\
\leq&L_1+(\norm{w_0-w^*}_2+1+\lambda^*)L_2+L_2(\norm{w_0-w^*}_2+1)\nonumber\\
\leq&L(2\norm{w_0-w^*}_2+\lambda^*+3).\nonumber
\end{alignat}\qed
\end{proof}
For all $k$ the value of $\beta_k$ can be bounded as follows using induction.
\begin{propertyy}{\cite[Lemma 3]{nesterov2009}}
\label{betabound}
\begin{alignat}{6}
\beta_{k}\leq \frac{1}{1+\sqrt{3}}+\sqrt{2k+1}\nonumber
\end{alignat}
\end{propertyy}
We can now prove a convergence rate of $O(\frac{1}{\sqrt{K}})$ to an optimal solution of problem
\eqref{eq:1}. We will define the bound on
$\norm{G(w_k)}_2$ from Property \eqref{gradbound} as $C:=L(2\norm{w_0-w^*}_2+\lambda^*+3)$.
\begin{theorem}
\label{convergence}
Running Algorithm \ref{alg:sgd} for $K$ iterations,
\begin{alignat}{6}
f(\bar{x}_{K+1})-f(x^*)\leq
\frac{C(\norm{w_0-w^*}^2_2+1)}{2(K+1)}\left(\frac{1}{1+\sqrt{3}}+\sqrt{2K+1}\right)\nonumber
\end{alignat}
and
\begin{alignat}{6}
\overline{f}(\bar{x}_{K+1})\leq
\frac{C(4(\norm{w_0-w^*}_2+1)^2+1)}{2(K+1)}\left(\frac{1}{1+\sqrt{3}}+\sqrt{2K+1}\right),\nonumber
\end{alignat}
where $C:=L(2\norm{w_0-w^*}_2+\lambda^*+3)$.
\end{theorem}
\begin{proof}
Applying Property \ref{prelim} with $\bar{k}=K$, and recalling that
$w_{K+1}$ maximizes
$U_{\beta_K}^{s_{K+1}}(w)$
\eqref{ufunc},
\begin{alignat}{6}
\frac{\beta_K}{2}\geq&\sum_{k=1}^K\langle
w_k-w_0,\overline{G}_k\rangle+U_{\beta_K}^{s_{K+1}}(w_{K+1})\nonumber\\
=&\sum_{k=1}^K\langle
w_k-w_0,\overline{G}_k\rangle+\max\limits_{w\in\RR^{d+1}}\lbrace-\langle
\sum_{k=0}^K\overline{G}_k,w-w_0\rangle-\frac{\beta_K}{2}\norm{w-w_0}^2_2\rbrace\nonumber\\
=&\max\limits_{w\in\RR^{d+1}}\lbrace
\sum_{k=0}^K-\langle
\overline{G}_k,w-w_k\rangle-\frac{\beta_K}{2}\norm{w-w_0}^2_2\rbrace.\label{prfin}
\end{alignat}
Like $\overline{x}_{K+1}$, let
$\overline{w}_{K+1}:=\hat{s}_{K+1}^{-1}\sum_{k=0}^K\frac{w_k}{\norm{G(w_k)}_2}$
and $\overline{\lambda}_{K+1}:=\hat{s}_{K+1}^{-1}\sum_{k=0}^K\frac{\lambda_k}{\norm{G(w_k)}_2}$.
Multiplying both sides of \eqref{prfin} by $\hat{s}_{K+1}^{-1}$,
\begin{alignat}{6}
\hat{s}_{K+1}^{-1}\frac{\beta_K}{2}\geq&\hat{s}_{K+1}^{-1}\max\limits_{w\in\RR^{d+1}}\lbrace
\sum_{k=0}^K-\langle
\overline{G}_k,w-w_k\rangle-\frac{\beta_K}{2}\norm{w-w_0}^2_2\rbrace\nonumber\\
=&\hat{s}_{K+1}^{-1}\max\limits_{w\in\RR^{d+1}}\lbrace
\sum_{k=0}^K-\langle
\frac{G_x(w_k)}{\norm{G(w_k)}_2},x-x_k\rangle+\langle
\frac{G_{\lambda}(w_k)}{\norm{G(w_k)}_2},\lambda-\lambda_k\rangle-\frac{\beta_K}{2}\norm{w-w_0}^2_2\rbrace\nonumber\\
\geq&\hat{s}_{K+1}^{-1}\max\limits_{w\in\RR^{d+1}}\lbrace
\sum_{k=0}^K
\frac{F(x_k,\lambda_k)-F(x,\lambda_k)}{\norm{G(w_k)}_2}+\frac{F(x_k,\lambda)-F(x_k,\lambda_k)}{\norm{G(w_k)}_2}-\frac{\beta_K}{2}\norm{w-w_0}^2_2\rbrace\nonumber\\
=&\hat{s}_{K+1}^{-1}\max\limits_{w\in\RR^{d+1}}\lbrace
\sum_{k=0}^K
\frac{F(x_k,\lambda)-F(x,\lambda_k)}{\norm{G(w_k)}_2}-\frac{\beta_K}{2}\norm{w-w_0}^2_2\rbrace\nonumber\\
=&\max\limits_{w\in\RR^{d+1}}\lbrace
\hat{s}_{K+1}^{-1}\sum_{k=0}^K
\frac{F(x_k,\lambda)-F(x,\lambda_k)}{\norm{G(w_k)}_2}-\hat{s}_{K+1}^{-1}\frac{\beta_K}{2}\norm{w-w_0}^2_2\rbrace\nonumber\\
\geq&\max\limits_{w\in\RR^{d+1}}\lbrace
F(\overline{x}_{K+1},\lambda)-F(x,\overline{\lambda}_{K+1})-\hat{s}_{K+1}^{-1}\frac{\beta_K}{2}\norm{w-w_0}^2_2\rbrace\nonumber\\
=&\max\limits_{w\in\RR^{d+1}}\lbrace f(\overline{x}_{K+1})+\lambda\overline{f}(\overline{x}_{K+1})
-f(x)-\overline{\lambda}_{K+1}\overline{f}(x)-\hat{s}_{K+1}^{-1}\frac{\beta_K}{2}\norm{w-w_0}^2_2\rbrace,\label{maxx}
\end{alignat}
where the second inequality follows from the convexity and linearity of $F(x,\lambda)$ in $x$ and
$\lambda$, respectively. The third inequality uses Jensen's inequality and linearity:
$\overline{x}_{K+1}=\hat{s}_{K+1}^{-1}\sum_{k=0}^K\frac{x_K}{\norm{G(w_k)}_2}$ is a convex
combination of $\{x_k\}$, so by Jensen's inequality, $$F(\overline{x}_{K+1},\lambda)\leq
\hat{s}_{K+1}^{-1}\sum_{k=0}^K \frac{F(x_k,\lambda)}{\norm{G(w_k)}_2},$$
and $\overline{\lambda}_{K+1}=\hat{s}_{K+1}^{-1}\sum_{k=0}^K\frac{\lambda_k}{\norm{G(w_k)}_2}$,
so by the linearity of of $F(x,\lambda)$ in $\lambda$,
$$\hat{s}_{K+1}^{-1}\sum_{k=0}^K
\frac{-F(x,\lambda_k)}{\norm{G(w_k)}_2}=-F(x,\overline{\lambda}_{K+1}).$$
Given the maximum function, the inequality \eqref{maxx} holds for any choice of $w$. We consider
two cases, the first being $x=\overline{x}_{K+1}$ and
$\lambda=\overline{\lambda}_{K+1}+1$. From \eqref{maxx},
\begin{alignat}{6}
\hat{s}_{K+1}^{-1}\frac{\beta_K}{2}\geq&f(\overline{x}_{K+1})+(\overline{\lambda}_{K+1}+1)\overline{f}(\overline{x}_{K+1})
-f(\overline{x}_{K+1})-\overline{\lambda}_{K+1}\overline{f}(\overline{x}_{K+1})\nonumber\\
&-\hat{s}_{K+1}^{-1}\frac{\beta_K}{2}\norm{[\overline{x}_{K+1};\overline{\lambda}_{K+1}+1]-w_0}^2_2\nonumber\\
=&\overline{f}(\overline{x}_{K+1})-\hat{s}_{K+1}^{-1}\frac{\beta_K}{2}\norm{[\overline{x}_{K+1};\overline{\lambda}_{K+1}+1]-w_0}^2_2.\label{c11}
\end{alignat}
Further,
\begin{alignat}{6}
\norm{[\overline{x}_{K+1};\overline{\lambda}_{K+1}+1]-w_0}_2\leq&\norm{\overline{w}_{K+1}-w_0}_2+1\nonumber\\
=&\norm{\overline{w}_{K+1}-w^*+w^*-w_0}_2+1\nonumber\\
\leq&\norm{\overline{w}_{K+1}-w^*}_2+\norm{w^*-w_0}_2+1\nonumber\\
\leq&\hat{s}_{K+1}^{-1}\sum_{k=0}^K\frac{\norm{w_k-w^*}_2}{\norm{G(w_k)}_2}+\norm{w^*-w_0}_2+1\nonumber\\
\leq&\hat{s}_{K+1}^{-1}\sum_{k=0}^K\frac{\norm{w_0-w^*}_2+1}{\norm{G(w_k)}_2}+\norm{w^*-w_0}_2+1\nonumber\\
=&2(\norm{w_0-w^*}_2+1),\label{c12}
\end{alignat}
where the third inequality uses Jensen's inequality:
$\overline{w}_{K+1}=\hat{s}_{K+1}^{-1}\sum_{k=0}^K\frac{w_k}{\norm{G(w_k)}_2}$ is a convex
combination of $\{w_k\}$. The fourth inequality uses Property
\ref{bounded}. Combining \eqref{c11}
and \eqref{c12},
\begin{alignat}{6}
\overline{f}(\overline{x}_{K+1})\leq
\hat{s}_{K+1}^{-1}\frac{\beta_K}{2}(4(\norm{w_0-w^*}_2+1)^2+1).\nonumber
\end{alignat}
The second case will use $w=w^*$. Starting from \eqref{maxx},
\begin{alignat}{6}
\hat{s}_{K+1}^{-1}\frac{\beta_K}{2}\geq&f(\overline{x}_{K+1})+\lambda^*\overline{f}(\overline{x}_{K+1})
-f(x^*)-\overline{\lambda}_{K+1}\overline{f}(x^*)-\hat{s}_{K+1}^{-1}\frac{\beta_K}{2}\norm{w^*-w_0}^2_2\nonumber\\
\geq&f(\overline{x}_{K+1})-f(x^*)-\hat{s}_{K+1}^{-1}\frac{\beta_K}{2}\norm{w^*-w_0}^2_2,\nonumber
\end{alignat}
since $\overline{f}(x^*)=0$ and $\lambda^*\overline{f}(\overline{x}_{K+1})\geq 0$. Rearranging,
\begin{alignat}{6}
f(\overline{x}_{K+1})-f(x^*)\leq
\hat{s}_{K+1}^{-1}\frac{\beta_K}{2}(\norm{w_0-w^*}^2_2+1).\nonumber
\end{alignat}
Using Properties \ref{gradbound} and \ref{betabound}, $\hat{s}_{K+1}^{-1}\frac{\beta_K}{2}$ can be
bounded as
follows.
\begin{alignat}{6}
\hat{s}_{K+1}^{-1}\frac{\beta_K}{2}\leq&\frac{1}{2}(\sum_{k=0}^K\frac{1}{\norm{G(w_k)}_2})^{-1}(\frac{1}{1+\sqrt{3}}+\sqrt{2k+1})\nonumber\\
\leq&\frac{1}{2}(\sum_{k=0}^K\frac{1}{C})^{-1}(\frac{1}{1+\sqrt{3}}+\sqrt{2k+1})\nonumber\\
=&\frac{C}{2(K+1)}(\frac{1}{1+\sqrt{3}}+\sqrt{2k+1}).\nonumber
\end{alignat}\qed
\end{proof}
Algorithm \ref{alg:sgd} is an optimal method as its convergence rate of $O(\frac{1}{\sqrt{K}})$ from
Theorem \ref{convergence} matches the lower complexity bound for minimizing the unconstrained version
of \eqref{eq:1} as discussed in the introduction. The following corollary establishes the
$O(\min(\epsilon_1,\epsilon_2)^{-2})$ iteration complexity required to achieve an
$(\epsilon_1,\epsilon_2)$-optimal solution.
\begin{corollary}
\label{corol}
An $(\epsilon_1,\epsilon_2)$ optimal solution is obtained after running Algorithm \ref{alg:sgd}
for
\begin{alignat}{6}
K\geq\alpha\max\left(\frac{C_1}{\epsilon_1},\frac{C_2}{\epsilon_2}\right)^2\nonumber
\end{alignat}
iterations, where $C_1=C(\norm{w_0-w^*}^2_2+1)$, $C_2=C(4(\norm{w_0-w^*}_2+1)^2+1)$, and
$\alpha=\frac{1}{2}(\frac{1}{\sqrt{8}(1+\sqrt{3})}+1)^2$.
\end{corollary}
\begin{proof}
From Theorem \ref{convergence} for $i=1,2$, we need to compute a lower bound on $K$ which
ensures that
\begin{alignat}{6}
\frac{C_i}{2(K+1)}(\frac{1}{1+\sqrt{3}}+\sqrt{2K+1})&\leq \epsilon_i.\nonumber
\end{alignat}
Since for $K\geq 1$,
\begin{alignat}{6}
&\frac{\sqrt{K}}{2(K+1)}(\frac{1}{1+\sqrt{3}}+\sqrt{2K+1})\nonumber\\
=&\frac{\sqrt{K}}{2(1+\sqrt{3})(K+1)}+\frac{\sqrt{2K^2+K}}{2(K+1)}\nonumber\\
<&\frac{1}{4(1+\sqrt{3})}+\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\nonumber\\
=&\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(\frac{1}{\sqrt{8}(1+\sqrt{3})}+1)\nonumber\\
=&\sqrt{\alpha},\nonumber
\end{alignat}
it holds that
\begin{alignat}{6}
\frac{C_i}{2(K+1)}(\frac{1}{1+\sqrt{3}}+\sqrt{2K+1}) \leq
\frac{\sqrt{\alpha}C_i}{\sqrt{K}}.\nonumber
\end{alignat}
To ensure convergence within $\epsilon_i$, it is sufficient for
$\epsilon_i\geq\frac{\sqrt{\alpha} C_i}{\sqrt{K}}$, or that
$K\geq\alpha(\frac{C_i}{\epsilon_i})^2$. Taking the maximum over $i$ gives the result.\qed
\end{proof}
\section{Conclusion}
In this paper we have established the existence of a simple first-order method for the general convex
constrained optimization problem \eqref{eq:1} without the need for differentiability nor Lipschitz
continuity. We see this as a general use algorithm for practitioners since it requires minimal
knowledge of the problem, with no parameter tuning for its implementation, while still achieving the
optimal convergence rate for first-order methods.
\bibliographystyle{spmpsci}
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The economics can be called the art of housekeeping.
This science teaches how to make optimal use of resources to, for example, some enterprise at minimal cost could reach maximum profits. Students of Economics majors actually study the mechanism of existing of any company regardless of its size (small enterprise or a large multinational corporation) and form of ownership.
Economist calculates the production costs, estimates expenditures, and determines how to make the company's business activities more efficient.
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TechWell's IT director Mike Sowers has more than twenty-five years of practical experience as a global quality and test leader of internationally distributed test teams across multiple industries. Mike is a senior consultant, skilled in working with both large and small organizations to improve their software development, testing, and delivery approaches. He has worked with companies—including Fidelity Investments, PepsiCo, FedEx, Southwest Airlines, Wells Fargo, ADP, and Lockheed—to improve software quality, reduce time to market, and decrease costs. With his passion for helping teams deliver software faster, better, and cheaper, Mike has mentored and coached senior software leaders, small teams, and direct contributors worldwide.
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Israel To Keep An Eye On Pakistan via Yemen
in World — by Haider Abbas — August 30, 2020
How many of us have had any clue about Socotra Island which had recently been in news ( on June 21, 2020) when it was reported 1 that Houthi rebels had taken over Socotra Island from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) backed Yemeni government. 'Yemeni separatists have seized control of the island of Socotra in the Arabian Sea, deposing its governor and driving out the forces of the Saudi-backed government, (and) The Southern Transitional Council (STC led by Houthi) announced it had seized government facilities and military bases on the main island of Socotra, a sparsely populated archipelago which sits at the mouth of the Gulf of Aden on one of the world's busiest shipping lanes. The Socotra governor, Ramzi Mahroos, accused coalition leaders Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) of turning a blind eye. The UAE has previously backed STC forces with airstrikes in fighting against the government in the south The coalition intervened in Yemen in March 2015 after the Iran-aligned Houthis ousted the Saudi-backed government for power in the capital, Sana'a, in late 2014. The Houthis say they are fighting a corrupt system. Socotra, a Unesco world heritage site due to its unique fauna and flora, is located in the shipping lane linking Asia to the Europe via the Red Sea and Suez canal', said the report published in The Guardian. What is ironic is this report is that UAE and KSA were at loggerheads as the former supported the Houthis and the latter opposed it, and both UAE and KSA are in alignment to the idea of support to Israel, as UAE has formalised its relation with Israel and efforts ( intimidation, coercion etc from US) for KSA and other Gulf-states are on and it would be no surprise this happens before or after US president goes to polls in November 2020.
The big question is why this sparsely populated Socotra Island become important? The answer lies, or rather as the way it is said, as to how ends justify the means, UAE has decided to make Israel establish spy base in Socotra as what has come to light on August 28, 2020. 'Israel and the Emirates are making all logistical preparations to set up intelligence bases to collect information throughout the Gulf of Eden Bay from Bab Al-Mandab on the island of Socotra, which is under the control of the Emirates, reported JForum citing Yemeni sources.
A delegation of Israeli and Emirati intelligence officers arrived on the Socotra Island very recently and examined various locations for establishing the planned intelligence bases. The purpose of such a base would be to collect intelligence across the region, particularly from Bab Al-Mandab and south of Yemen, along with the Gulf of Eden and the Horn of Africa. The report alleged that Tel Aviv's surveillance centres monitor the actions of Houthi militants in Yemen and Iranian naval movements in the region, as well as examining sea and air traffic in the southern region of the Red Sea' 2 informs The Middle East Monitor.
Is Israel to pursue only Iran? Certainly not as Pakistan, the two countries considered 'hard-nuts' as far as normalisation with Israel is considered, will also be under the scrutiny as Gwadar port of Baluchistan, Pakistan, is the end where China's most important project China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) will conclude to reach for the whole world, as China is already making out that soon US and Allies ( India very much there) will suffocate China in straits of Malacca, and hence, China will export its goods through Gwadar port, which it now intends to link from its province in Kashgar, through railways, by an investment of 7.2 billion USD 3 . The UAE-Israeli move has sent the alarm bells ringing in China as a detailed article published in South China Morning Post on August 29, 2020, is full of the fears expressed by China that 'US wants Arab-Israeli support in countering Beijing's influence over supply routes seen as life-and-death matter for Chinese economy' 4 .
No one would hazard a guess as to how much UAE will play a role in this installation, as obviously, it would be a through-and-through Israel project as 'what is officially projected' is that it will help keep an eye on Houthis rebels, from Socotra, which is around 350 kms from south of Yemen and its overall area is about 3,650 square kms . This Socotra archipelago still has many of its islands uninhabited . 'Two sites on Socotra have so far been selected for spy bases, namely the Momi region in the east of the island, where the Jamgua Center will be built and a locality in the west of the island, where Katanan Center will be established' 5. This will help Israel to directly keep a straight eye on Gwadar Port of Pakistan, which will be a great-boost to India as India is a strong ally of Israel and rival to China and Pakistan. The geo-political developments are working much to the advantage of India, for which ironically, India is haven't even done anything.
On the other side the Gulf-states are making every effort not to let Turkey exercise any influence in the region. There is now a conflict gaining momentum between Turkey and Greece inside Mediterranean sea over the findings of 'oil, gas and hydrocarbons' as Greece has announced that it would extend its territorial waters from six-to-12 nautical miles, which Turkish vice president Fuat Oktay has called as an act which would be the 'cause of war' on August 30, 2020 6 . Israel, Egypt and UAE along with France have thrown their weight for Greece and there are efforts to anyhow entangle Turkey into a war. Turkey is also eyeing for leadership inside the Muslim world, to the scourge of KSA, as a new bloc with Pakistan, Iran, Malaysia, Turkey with the help of China and Russia is also on the cards.
Israel, or for that matter US, just cannot fancy Gwadar Port developing into a business hub of future, as US would just want the entire project be drowned in the Indian ocean, thus, one conclusion which can rightly be drawn that from now onwards Socotra Island will neither be of Houthi rebels, nor of UAE or Yemen, but its complete suzerainty will belong to Israel meaning US. Very soon the world would see, real or fake news, that an attack on Socotra has happened, by Houthis, which would enable Israel to go inside Yemen to chase for Houthis, and thus, will make Israel reach just in the backyard of KSA.
This rapidly changing scenario is altering the world situation as never before, as Pakistan which means China, would now be under the Israeli radars and if any sabotage is to happen at Gwadar then Pakistan-China would blame Israel and Gulf-states equally, hence, the relations of Pakistan and Gulf-states is going to be strained forever. The US policy to isolate China internationally, to have challenged it for the super-power status, and more recently over the spread of COVID-19, is getting towards all the desired results.
Much to the advantage of India.
The writer is a former UP State Information Commissioner. He is also a lawyer based in Lucknow.
. References:
1-https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jun/21/yemen-separatists-seize-island-of-socotra-from-saudi-backed-government
2-https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20200828-uae-and-israel-to-establish-spy-base-in-yemen-island/
3- https://www.railway-technology.com/news/pakistan-approves-7-2bn-rail-project/#:~:text=This%201%2C872km%2Dlong%20rail,in%20the%20CPEC%20phase%20two.
4- https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3098838/china-americas-hidden-target-trumps-historic-israel-uae-deal
5- https://www.presstv.com/Detail/2020/08/27/632739/Israel-UAE-spy-bases-Yemeni-island-Report
6- https://ahvalnews.com/greece-turkey/greeces-12-mile-territorial-waters-expansion-plan-casus-belli-turkish-vp
"Dancing on the heads of snakes": A Glimpse into Yemen
The Yemen Civil War Arms Bonanza
Yemen – Prisoner Swap and What May be Behind it
The Palestinian Struggle Betrayed
Shaping Palestinian politics: The UAE has a leg up on Turkey
Imagine Trump or Biden In Church Praying For Yemeni Children Facing Starvation and US missiles?
The UAE-Israel deal's historicity is in the fine print
Tags: China - Saudi Arabia, Socotra Island, UAE, Yemen
Author: Haider Abbas
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Mary shifted the heaviest bag from her right hand to her left and reached to scratch her ankle. Jesus Christ, she thought, this line is endless. She had been standing in the same spot for at least twenty minutes. She leaned out to see the front of the line, saw the woman in the front gesticulating wildly at two cashiers and shouting, but she was too far away to make out what she was saying. The look on the cashiers' faces told her it wasn't Merry Christmas.
Next year, she thought. Next year I'll definitely have everything bought, and earlier. No more last-minute shopping, running red-faced and sweaty with heavy bags banging against her legs, pushing past the zombified masses, the shuffling people thronging every shop and intersection she needed to get through quickly because the shops are closing, betting is closed for the rat race.
The line inched forward, and Mary found herself in the baby goods part of the aisle. Her hand crept along the shelf for the bumper pack of nappies, squeezed the pack lightly and let go.
She hadn't wanted to be a mother growing up. When the other girls were playing with baby dolls and miniature prams, she had other interests. Card games, shoplifting and petty arson were among them. "Boys' things," the other girls would say, and then laugh, maybe pull her hair a little bit, once spitting on her, another time pushing her into the dirty puddle outside the school toilets. Such activities are also held as "boys' things", but the contradiction was lost on these otherwise nice young girls, taking part in that unintentionally cruel play children excel at.
She passed through her teenage years with less trouble, having blossomed into an attractive girl, if not quite beautiful according to the magazines she spurned at the store. Encounters with boys were fumbling, mismanaged affairs, her guiding them as well as she could with her own limited knowledge. She never became overly emotional or attached, she felt only that physical closeness. It was all she wanted, or needed. She was never quite sure which.
After school lost its grip on her, she floated away from her home town, a distant and impersonal family providing no reason to stay. It was the normal thing to do, move out and find a job in the big smoke, find independence, freedom from small town thinking. She found a small apartment and a night job, waitressing at a little bistro place not far from where she lived in a small one bedroom apartment. She went out after work most nights, having no need to wake up early any day. It was on one of these late night sessions that she met Alfredo.
The suddenness of the screeching startled her, and her body snapped up like a rope being pulled tight. The shock of the sound was like glass exploding beside her head, and the piercing volume was like said glass being poured into her ears, slicing her eardrums on the tumble down the canal. She put a hand to the side of her face, suddenly and hysterically sure she would feel the stickiness of blood. Her hand came away dry, but she could feel the sweat resting on the back of her neck, cooling in the circulated air of the supermarket.
Was that a baby screaming?
Alfredo was the type of man young, small town girls dream of being whisked away by in their daydreams. Smart, tanned, exotic, well-traveled. He had approached her at the bar and asked her to buy him a drink. The confusion at the reversal of the usual way of things showed on her face, and he smiled a smile of perfect teeth. She answered with her own smile, and called for two straight rums. He called for another four after that, and when they were all finished, they spoke of their respective lives. He told her of the places he'd been and the things he'd done, but modestly, almost dismissively, never revealing the pride he took in his obviously more interesting life. She told a little of her home life, her job in the city, trying hard to hide her lack of worldly experiences and failing, caring less and less as the rum did its job.
She stayed with him that night, and the two nights after, caught up in a mini hurricane of lust. He demanded no emotional connection with her, and she asked for none. She surrendered to him, but he gave no quarter. For Mary, it was perfect.
After the third night, she returned to her little apartment, physically drained but happy. After work that night she called the number he had given her, but the little voice on the end of the line told her that she was sorry, this number was no longer in use. Mary was upset, but later thought it was for the best. Emotional ties had a way of winding themselves about a person after time, whatever their intentions.
Mary looked back down the line to the checkout. She saw the source of the ear-splitting cries, a baby indeed. A man who looked to be in his late thirties had the child held on one hip while pushing a loaded trolley with his free hand. Under his eyes were the tell-tale smudges of late nights, early mornings and little sleep between. His pallor was in stark contrast to the bright red colour of the baby's head. Whatever was wrong, it certainly wasn't the child's breathing that was the problem.
Before she knew what she was doing, she left her basket on the ground and made her way down towards the man with the baby.
She had continued to work nights, sometimes waking up earlier than usual to enjoy the weather now that summer was creeping around the bend for real. Not that false start in May, the promising sunshine that tempted you outside without a coat only to find it's the same temperature as March, but real summer. Sometimes she would dream, sometimes she would daydream. No great choices to make yet, she would think to herself. She was young enough that this was almost true.
Then in July, she started getting sick. In the mornings and early afternoons especially.
She stood in front of the man holding the screaming baby. She could feel the people around them straining not to look, not to comment.
The man's eyes met hers. She thought she saw a haunted gratitude in them, and he nodded.
"Come on, you can take my spot in the queue," she said.
Mary slapped the basket out of her hand and pointed her finger at the woman's face. The woman backed up into the shelves, knocking bags of chocolate covered caramels onto the floor.
The woman stood with her mouth open, and Mary heard one small word in between all the gasps from the onlookers and what was now the background noise of the baby.
"Come on," Mary said to the man with the child, who looked like he hadn't even heard this exchange, "let's go." They marched up the aisle back to where Mary had been. The people on either side moved back and let them both in without even a grumble or a tut.
The doctor had looked at her over the rims of his glasses. She sat on his examining table, her face an artist's rendition of fear and anger. He sighed, and went over to look outside the door into the waiting room. She was the last patient of the day, and nobody else was there. He shut the door and came back to Mary.
Mary and the man with the child left the supermarket together. Mary carried one of his bags as well as her own.
"I can give you a lift if you need it," she said. The baby's cries had softened now to a steady wail.
"I'm parked just over here, come on." She smiled at them both, and the man smiled back, the child's cries sending up puffs of vapor between them in the cold night air.
She had arrived at the address the doctor had given her and rang the bell. As she did, the door swung open to reveal a dark hallway. Strange objects like twisted dreamcatchers and wind chimes made of bone hung from the ceiling. A smell of age and decrepitude lazily wafted out to her. She almost turned away and left, but her will pushed her into the house.
She heard a thump upstairs and she jumped a little, a squeak escaping her throat.
The door on the left where the voice had come from opened slowly. There was someone sat in a chair with its back to her in front of a fireplace where dark red embers burned among blackened wood. A mess of matted black and brown hair with beads tied in hung over the back of the chair. As Mary entered the room, the figure rose and turned to her. The face was that of an old woman, the great grooves in her flesh around the eyes and mouth going unnoticed next to her shining green eyes and blood-red lips.
"This is me, just here," the man said, pointing out the car window on their left. Mary guided the car into the driveway and shut off the engine.
"I'm okay, thanks," she said.
"Alright." He stepped out first with the child, and as he busied himself with the baby and one of his shopping bags, she slipped a knife from the glove box, hiding it up her sleeve. She got out of the car and took the rest of the bags.
They walked in step to the door. When they got in the kitchen, the man put the child in a playpen that had been set up in the corner. It immediately started wailing louder, its energy coming back somehow. Mary placed the bags on the table in the center.
"Hey, I never asked your name," she said as she started to turn around. Just then she felt a blow to the back of her head, and everything went dark.
"With child…" the old woman had said, moving towards Mary with her hands out towards Mary's stomach.
Mary started to shrink back from those gnarled old claws, but her resolve held. As the woman got near her, Mary could smell dead flowers and dust.
"Hush," said the old woman, putting a bony finger to Mary's lips, "I don't need money. A debt is much more valuable, I think. We can come up with another arrangement." The old woman laughed, a deep and dirty sound. Mary's stomach went cold, and her hands instinctively covered her belly.
When Mary came to, she was upside down. She blinked a few times to clear her vision, and saw she was hanging by her feet from the ceiling in what she guessed was the basement of the house. Her hands were tied behind her. Her hair trailed off her head and into a stone trough that she was suspended over. The baby was screaming again, and it sounded like it was in the basement with her.
"You were going to do the same to me," he said.
Mary gasped. How could he know? she thought. Her arrangement with Madame Lamia had been her terrible secret. A blood debt, for freedom from her burden. She shook her head violently, her hair whipping back and forth.
Mary felt the blade on her throat, then the tearing as he opened it up. As her blood gushed out into the trough, she could hear as the baby's cries softened to a whimper, replaced by the laughter of the old woman. The laughter surrounded her as she went down into the darkness.
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Q: Rename columns with multiple value dictionary I have a dataframe and would like to rename the columns based on a dictionary with multiple values per key. The dictionary key has the desired column name, and the values hold possible old column names. The column names have no pattern.
import pandas as pd
column_dict = {'a':['col_a','col_1'], 'b':['col_b','col_2'], 'c':'col_c','col_3']}
df = pd.DataFrame([(1,2.,'Hello'), (2,3.,"World")], columns=['col_1', 'col_2', 'col_3'])
Function to replace text with key
def replace_names(text, dict):
for key in dict:
text = text.replace(dict[key],key)
return text
replace_names(df.columns.values,column_dict)
Gives an error when called on column names
AttributeError: 'numpy.ndarray' object has no attribute 'replace'
Is there another way to do this?
A: You can use df.rename(columns=...) if you supply a dict which maps old column names to new column names:
import pandas as pd
column_dict = {'a':['col_a','col_1'], 'b':['col_b','col_2'], 'c':['col_c','col_3']}
df = pd.DataFrame([(1,2.,'Hello'), (2,3.,"World")], columns=['col_1', 'col_2', 'col_3'])
col_map = {col:key for key, cols in column_dict.items() for col in cols}
df = df.rename(columns=col_map)
yields
a b c
0 1 2.0 Hello
1 2 3.0 World
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Home » McCormick divests broth business as Q3 earnings dip
McCormick divests broth business as Q3 earnings dip
Photo: McCormick & Co.
By Lisa Berry
HUNT VALLEY, MD. — As McCormick & Co. worked to steady its footing in the third quarter, earnings dipped despite aggressive pricing actions and the divestiture of its Kitchen Basics line of ready-to-use stocks and broths. Last quarter, the food and flavor company's earnings took a hit amid COVID-19 related lockdowns in China.
McCormick executives discussed third-quarter financial results on Oct. 6 in a conference call with industry analysts. Lawrence Kurzius, chief executive officer of McCormick, said the company's pricing measures have matched pace with inflation and now the focus is on increasing capacity in the United States and UK for the Flavor Solutions segment.
"Inflation is a reality, and our pricing has caught up with it," Mr. Kurzius said. "We're seeing that come through in the margins now.
"And from a cost perspective, as we responded to demand volatility over the past several years, we have incurred additional costs above inflation to service our customers and have seen inefficiencies develop in our supply chain.
"These are costs we have absorbed. We have not passed on to customers on our pricing actions. We are targeting to eliminate at least $100 million of these costs with a significant benefit in 2023."
Net income in the quarter ended Aug. 31 was $222.9 million, up 5% from $212.4 million in the third quarter of 2021. Adjusted net income was $187.6 million, down 14% from $216.9 million in the year-ago quarter.
Earnings per share were 82¢ in the third quarter, up 4% from 79¢ in the year-ago period. Adjusted earnings per share were 69¢ in the third quarter, down 14% from 80¢ in the year-ago period. The decrease in adjusted earnings was driven by lower adjusted operating income, McCormick said. The net favorable impact of the gain on the sale of the Kitchen Basics business and special charges increased earnings per share by 13¢ in the quarter.
Third-quarter net sales for the company overall reached $1.6 billion, up 3% from $1.55 billion in the year-ago quarter. Adjusting for inflation, sales increased 6%, including a 1% unfavorable impact from the divestiture of the Kitchen Basics business.
Mr. Kurzius said McCormick is "moving aggressively" to eliminate inefficiencies and to normalize inventory levels.
"Some of our actions include investing to increase both manufacturing capacity and reliability in bottleneck areas to enable better customer service and repatriation of production from excessive use of co-packers," he said. "We're returning to more normal ship schedules and reducing our spend on expensive surge capacity. We are already seeing the benefit of lower overtime and temporary labor reductions."
In the Consumer segment, net sales in the third quarter were nearly flat at $927.9 million, compared with $921.9 million a year ago. Segment results included a 1% unfavorable impact from the Kitchen Basics divestiture. Growth was driven by the Americas and Asia/Pacific regions with pricing actions increasing sales in all three regions, the company said.
In the Flavor Solutions segment net sales were $667.7 million, up 6% from $627.5 million in the year-ago quarter. Sales were driven by pricing actions, according to the company.
Mr. Kurzius said some of the challenges in the Flavor Solutions segment were related to capacity constraints.
"We could have sold more," he said. "We could have had higher volumes … more capacity will help, but the demand is very strong."
McCormick is investing in additional Flavor Solutions seasoning capacity, which is expected to be online in early 2023, Mr. Kurzius said.
"We're expanding our footprint to support our flavor growth," he said. "We recently opened our new U.K. Peterborough Flavor Solutions manufacturing facility to support our strong growth momentum with quick-service restaurants. And just earlier this week, the first pallet was shipped from our new Maryland logistics center."
Updating guidance for the fiscal year, the company said it projects 2022 adjusted earnings per share to be in the range of $2.63 to $2.68 compared with adjusted earnings per share of $3.05 in 2021. This projection includes a 2¢ unfavorable impact from the divestiture of the Kitchen Basics business.
Companies McCormick & Co. Financial Performance
Pizza recall hurts Annie's sales, earnings in Q3
Tyson delivers strong earnings, sales growth in Q3
Ingredion earnings dip amid struggles in South America
Hostess second-quarter earnings dip under pressure
Aryzta sees first-half sales dip in North America business
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# ALSO BY JOHN NEWMAN
JFK and Vietnam
# Oswald And The CIA
# The Documented Truth About the Unknown Relationship Between the U.S. Government and the Alleged Killer of JFK
# John Newman
Copyright © 2008 by John Newman
All Rights Reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any manner without the express written consent of the publisher, except in the case of brief excerpts in critical reviews or articles. All inquiries should be addressed to Skyhorse Publishing, 555 Eighth Avenue, Suite 903, New York, NY 10018.
Skyhorse Publishing books may be purchased in bulk at special discounts for sales promotion, corporate gifts, fund raising, or educational purposes. Special editions can also be created to specifications. For details, contact Special Sales Department, Skyhorse Publishing, 555 Eighth Avenue, Suite 903, New York, NY 10018 or info@skyhorsepublishing.com.
www.skyhorsepublishing.com
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Newman, John M.
Oswald and the CIA : the documented truth about the unknown relationship between the U.S. government and the alleged killer of JFK / John Newman.
p. cm.
Originally published: New York : Carroll & Graf, 1995.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
9781602392533
1. Kennedy, John F. (John Fitzgerald), 1917—1963—Assassination. 2. Oswald, Lee Harvey. 3. United States. Central Intelligence Agency—History—20th century. 4. Intelligence service—United States—History—20th century. I. Title.
E842.9.N47 2008
364.152'4092—dc22
2007050491
Printed in Canada
To the men and women who served the CIA with distinction and made possible the Agency's greatest accomplishments; and to the courageous citizens who dared to investigate the Agency's greatest failures.
# Acknowledgements
I would like to thank the JFK Assassination Records Review Board, especially the staff, which went out of their way to ensure that I was informed of the latest releases, no matter how small. I enjoyed meeting and speaking with some of the staff as they set about the daunting task of studying the large bureaucracies whose documents they would be working with. My manuscript and all my files have been available to the staff from early on. I hope this work will assist the board in the difficult choices it faces in prioritizing its work.
How is it that we suddenly have so much to study? The reason that the case has survived so long is the same reason that Congress finally decided to declassify it: lack of trust. American citizens have worked tirelessly to free the documents in the government's possession. Erroneously ridiculed by the national media as the lunatic fringe, most of these people are mainstream Americans who have always understood the wisdom of working within the system. Many of them spent years using the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) to pry loose documents. Harold Weisberg, Mark Allen, Gary Shaw, Paul Hoch, Bernard Fensterwald, Jr., James Lesar, Gordon Winslow, and Bill Adams are a few among many who have worked within the lethargic constraints of the FOIA over the past several decades. Eventually their efforts and the efforts of many more people resulted in the bipartisan passage of the 1992 JFK Records Act.
Some thanks to specific researchers are in order. First of all to Mary Ferrell. I sent her many thousands of pages of new documents which she added to her database, which I then used as the cross-grid between the new releases and prior government investigations. Mary has always been a tireless and selfless research assistant for everyone who has asked her help. A special thanks also to Scott Malone, whose contacts and comments aided greatly in the early phases of this work. Scott also made his documents and interview notes available, materials I found useful further down the line. A special thanks is also due to David Lifton. I had the benefit of David's early thinking on several issues important to this book—as he did to my early views and documents. For the most part, however, our two projects have been conducted separately, and it will be interesting to see the result. Norman Mailer and I spoke twice briefly as his book was finished and this book entered the final chapters. Norman suggested then that we were staking out "base camps on opposite sides of the mountain."
Thanks also go to Larry Haapanen, who has been a "reliable and highly sensitive source" in Idaho. Larry helped on several points and made available his valuable .documentary collection. Paul Hoch also made his documents available, along with his prolific notes and correspondence. Bill Adams, Peter Vea, Bill Davy, Jim Di Eugenio, Steve Vetter, Lamar Waldron, and Mike Willman made available hundreds of documents, rare manuscripts, and other materials that were used in this book.
Peter Dale Scott gave generous amounts of time and energy to document acquisition, processing, cross-referencing, and analysis and discussion. I am especially grateful to Anthony and Robbyn Summers for the generous assistance they gave on several occasions, including the interview with Silvia Duran. Several volunteers from the community and interns from the University of Maryland helped in the long and tedious assembling and cross-filing of data necessary for a work like this. Debbie Drucker, Suzanne Adamko, Nassir Khan, David Vivian, Tracy Vaughn, and Adrienne Freda permitted far more ground to be covered than would otherwise have been possible. John Taylor and John Harvey, in particular, spent many nights copying and filing documents. Without their efforts this book would not have been possible. Melissa Burneston was particularly helpful in the preparation of the footnotes.
To Richard Helms, Jane Roman, June Cobb, Ray Rocca, Scotty Miler, Russell Holmes, Robert Bannerman, Paul Garbler, Otto Otepka, Richard Snyder, John McVickar, Priscilla Johnson, Ned Kenan, Silvia Duran, Gerry Hemming, James Hosty, Larry Keenan, Nicholas Anikeeff, and the many others with whom I conducted formal interviews or background discussion, I thank you for taking the time to run yet another gauntlet of questions.
A special thanks to Ed Jeunovitch, whose many decades of experience in the CIA's Clandestine Services made him uniquely qualified to discuss some of the tougher issues these documents raise. Ed earned my admiration for his openness, honesty, and willingness to engage in genuine give-and-take discussion. I do not mean to imply that anything in this book has Ed's approval or reflects his views, but his persuasiveness and his willingness to give credit where it is due went a long way in convincing me that many among the Agency's mainstream have no desire to stand in the way of the truth.
To all of the dedicated National Archives employees who put up with the researchers and the national media, I take my hat off. Especially to Steve Tilley, who took time from the heavy demands of his schedule to go the extra mile in giving support to this project. Two of the largest logistical problems recently faced by the Archives occurred back to back: the quick processing of an enormous volume of new JFK documents and then the move of the entire collection to the new Archives II location in College Park, Maryland. The discipline and organization of the Archives staff made it possible to keep the records open nearly the entire time before and after the move.
During the work on this, my second book, my family once again made great sacrifices. Ally, my daughter, a science student at the University of Maryland, did several independent research projects in support of this work. My wife, Sue, filled in on all sorts of tasks, from typing to proofreading and editing, and endless discussions about the content. She was a constant source of strength. I want to acknowledge the care and support of my parents, who have always been an inspiration for my work. Thanks also to my children, Mary and John, who pitched in wherever they could. I would also like to thank my friend and colleague Dick Thornton, whose incisive writings on American foreign policy have for years served as my guideposts.
To Jennifer Prior, Henry Lincoln, Janet, Failey, and others at my publisher, Carroll & Graf, thanks for bearing with me. Thanks to Herman Graf, who managed to keep me (more or less) on schedule, and especially to Kent Carroll, from whom I learned more about direct writing and active voice than I did when I was in the Army. Kent's contribution to this text was invaluable. Thanks also to Abby Bardi, who gave up many evenings and weekends to edit much of this book. To Rich, Lou, and Krystal, thanks for being good listeners.
To my many friends and former colleagues in the National Security Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Army Intelligence and Security Command, and you know who you are: Thanks for your words of encouragment or constructive criticism, whatever they happened to be. Buck, Tom, and Bill, I wish I could put your comments in a book and ship it to everyone in the research community so that they might see the wide range of opinions but nevertheless intense interest in these matters that exists in the federal workforce—especially in the intelligence agencies. To Pete, Ray, and Cookie from the "keyhole," who spent many lunches working over specific problems: Some of those points turned out to be key indicators, such as the espionage element in Oswald's defection and the anomalous aspects of his Cuban activities.
To the faculty and students at the University of Maryland—College Park and University College—I hope this work will stimulate greater use of the amazing resource that has moved to our campus: the National Archives. There can be no greater acknowledgment than that to the American tradition which produced these archives. It is up to us to use them.
The mistakes in this book are mine alone.
# Table of Contents
ALSO BY JOHN NEWMAN
Title Page
Copyright Page
Dedication
Acknowledgements
Preface
FOREWORD \- A Crisis of Confidence
Introduction
CHAPTER ONE \- Defection in Moscow
CHAPTER TWO \- Paper Trail in Washington
CHAPTER THREE \- Top Secret Eider Chess
CHAPTER FOUR \- "I Am Amazed"
CHAPTER FIVE \- The American Girls in Moscow
CHAPTER SIX \- The Thin Line of Duty
CHAPTER SEVEN \- Early Cuban Connections
CHAPTER EIGHT \- Nixon, Dulles, and American Policy in Cuba in 1960
CHAPTER NINE \- Lost in Minsk
CHAPTER TEN \- Journey into the Labyrinth
CHAPTER ELEVEN \- The Riddle of Oswald's 201 File
CHAPTER TWELVE \- Turning Point
CHAPTER THIRTEEN \- "Operational Intelligence Interest"
CHAPTER FOURTEEN \- Oswald Returns
CHAPTER FIFTEEN \- The Unworthy Oswald
CHAPTER SIXTEEN \- Undercover in New Orleans
CHAPTER SEVENTEEN \- Oswald and AMSPELL
CHAPTER EIGHTEEN \- Mexican Maze
CHAPTER NINETEEN \- The Smoking File
CHAPTER TWENTY \- Conclusion: Beginning
Documents
Notes
EPILOGUE, 2008 \- The Plot to Murder President Kennedy: A New Interpretation
Appendix to the 2008 Edition
# Preface
The controversy sparked by the release of Oliver Stone's film JFK led to the bipartisan congressional passage of the JFK Assassination Records Act in 1993. That act created the JFK Assassination Records Review Board and led to the release of nearly six million JFK assassination records. The Board also met and held public hearings with researchers and previous government investigation participants. I was fortunate to be invited to the very first such meeting along with two other researchers and Robert Blakey, who headed up the House Select Committee on Assassinations in the 1970s, and David Slawson, one of the lawyers who had worked on the Warren Commission in 1964.
Something I saw happen at that meeting has been on my mind ever since. My book, Oswald and the CIA, was already at the printing press and I had given an advance copy to the Review Board. I had heard, as many who had worked on the case had, the rumor about Slawson's colleague, William Coleman, another Warren Commission attorney. The rumor was that Coleman had, at his poolside, told a British researcher that the two attorneys, Coleman and Slawson, had traveled to Mexico City in the spring of 1964 and listened to the tape-recorded intercept of a phone call allegedly made by Lee Harvey Oswald in Mexico City in the fall of 1963.
In view of the CIA's claim that the tapes had all been erased several weeks before the assassination, this second-hand hearsay was interesting. The rumor about Coleman's remark was nevertheless useless in terms of its credibility. That first Review Board "Experts Conference" changed the landscape around that rumor, however. Slawson was sitting across the table from me when one of the Board members asked him directly if he had listened to the Mexico City tapes. With cool composure he sat back in his chair and said, "I'm sorry, but I'm not at liberty to discuss that." Suddenly, the room was full of energy.
Another Board member explained the facts to Slawson: the Review Board was now, by statute, the governing authority on the withholding of any information concerning the JFK case. Slawson was asked a second time: "Did you listen to the Mexico City tapes?" Again, he replied with the exact same words, "I'm sorry, but I'm not at liberty to discuss that." It was not my place to say anything to him but I wanted to, for I knew what was at stake. On the table was an advance copy of Oswald and the CIA, and in that book I had made the argument that Oswald's voice was not on the Mexico City tapes.
I had advanced that argument solely on the content of the tapes. It was evident to me that whoever was speaking into the phone had not understood all of the details of Oswald's experiences inside the Cuban Consulate and the Soviet Embassy—the diplomatic posts from which the CIA had intercepted the phone calls. I knew that a case could be made that one or more of the tapes of the alleged Oswald calls had survived because Hoover had said so to President Johnson on Saturday morning, just twenty-two hours after the assassination.
What Hoover told Johnson, moreover, is that the voice on the tape was not Oswald's. I was both disappointed and annoyed by Slawson's casual rebuff of the Review Board. If he and his Warren Commission partner on that trip had listened to the tape and it was not Oswald's voice, then the very underpinning of the national security cover-up of the president's murder would be exposed as a fabrication. This is what was at stake when Hoover gave LBJ the news.
When I wrote Oswald and the CIA, the "Lopez Report"—the investigation of Oswald, the CIA, and Mexico City by Eddie Lopez and Dan Hardaway of the House Select Committee on Assassinations—had not been declassified. So I was unaware of the extent to which the story about the voice on the tapes had travelled on Saturday morning. As the months gave way to years, I made presentations at conferences and wrote several articles for PBS's Frontline and other venues. As my research on the case progressed during the thirteen years after my book, the story in the Mexico City tapes and the story about the voice on them were always the fulcrum of my work.
In November of 1999, Deborah Reichman of the Associated Press was able, based upon all of the new evidence I had collected, to break the story of the tapes nationally. The fact that this evidence contradicted the CIA's official story on the tapes was carried on all the main network evening news broadcasts and again at 11:00 P.M. The story received a solid 80% coverage rate the following day in the print media. Most of us in the research community—used to being marginalized by the mainstream media—were surprised at this positive media coverage. I suppose, in retrospect, that one reason we did so well is that the news story did not utter a word about a conspiracy in the president's murder. To me, that did not matter. I knew that the story about the voice on the tapes would one day expose the lone nut theory propagated by Johnson and his commission of inquiry for what it was.
Mum was the word at the CIA, and it still is today. I am resigned to this now. We all are. President Kennedy did not die as the result of the acts of a single individual. There is a lot that we now know about the nature of the plot and the cover-up that followed the murder. I have left the original Oswald and the CIA intact, not because it was perfect, but because it is as good a snapshot as any of where, in my view, matters stood in 1995. For now, I have condensed my views as they have evolved in the last thirteen years into a new ending chapter for the 2008 edition.
I would like to thank Jefferson Morley, Rex Bradford, and Malcolm Blunt for their suggestions and observations on this new chapter.
John Newman, March 2008
# FOREWORD
# A Crisis of Confidence
We no longer question whether there have been government excesses, lies, and cover-ups. Rather, the issue is what to do about them. The key question is this: Can citizens work within the system to root out corruption and, when necessary, reform the government? The answer to that is yes, with a big "if." Yes, if those in power are courageous enough to let the people have all the facts. Upon that "if" hangs the essence of our democracy.
The steady decline of faith in government has intensified political conflict. What has caused this decline? The controversy surrounding the Kennedy assassination has played its part. Along with the Vietnam War, the Watergate scandal, and the ascension of the politics of hate, the JFK case has fed the public's disaffection with their government. The purpose of the JFK Assassination Records Act was to take a step in the direction of restoring faith. The premise underlying this step is simple: Opening up all the government's files will demonstrate that our institutions work today.
The bureaucratic urge to protect sources and methods still moves intelligence agencies to ask that not everything be released. Here the government is its own worst enemy. The failure to open all the files will undermine the promise of Congress. It is inevitable that there will be debate about this. The Assassination Records Review Board has the power to fulfill the spirit and the letter of the Records Act. These five American citizens have been invested with a sacred mission: Open up the government's secrets. Only the president may overrule their decisions. If he has to face such a decision, the purpose of the Records Act will already be in jeopardy. The stakes are high not only because of the crisis of confidence but also because the mandate of the Records Act is so clear. Rarely has a government had to pass a law to force itself to tell the truth and appoint private citizens as guardians of that process.
Such full-scale disclosure will inevitably threaten the well-being of some people and the reputations of others. For these people we feel sympathetic, but they are far from alone. Their sacrifice will be added to the suffering of the hundreds of others who have been drawn into the vortex of this case. What the country gains from full disclosure, however, is incomparably greater. In order for the Act to work, there can be no compromise on the fundamental requirement: the whole truth.
In opening all the files related to the Kennedy assassination Americans should seek not to destroy the government or the intelligence agencies but to reform them. In the course of researching this work, I have learned about the people who work in CIA operations. Most of the men and women who have served the Agency in the past and do so today are decent, honorable Americans. When laying out the Agency's mistakes, we should not lose sight of the integrity with which most served. If I have been critical in the pages that follow, it was not with malice.
The CIA has had its bad apples, and has made mistakes—sometimes terrible ones. All large bureaucracies have such problems, but the secrecy that protects intelligence organizations from external threats is itself the main obstacle to healthy change and reform. I know a former Agency employee whose conscience so troubled him about something secret he had learned that he resigned. Today he is a respected officer in another large intelligence organization, where he does superb intelligence work. I also know a man—who became famous for his analytic skills and accomplishments—who left the Defense Intelligence Agency because of principled dissent. He took a lower-paying position with the CIA. Today he teaches ethics in intelligence work.
The thread that ties these two Americans together is that neither was willing to live a lie. That one joined the CIA and one left the CIA to escape that fate seems noteworthy. Both felt compelled to leave their organizations, but neither opted out of the system. They continued to work for their country. We have the same responsibility, and opportunity.
April 19, 1995
# Introduction
The thesis of this work holds that the CIA had a keen operational interest in Lee Harvey Oswald from the day he defected to the Soviet Union in 1959 until the day he was murdered in the basement of the Dallas city jail. From this thesis flow two conclusions: first, that the Agency used sensitive sources and methods to acquire intelligence on Oswald. Secondly, whether witting or not, Oswald became involved in CIA operations.
The scope of this project is as follows: We will follow the trails in Oswald's CIA, FBI, DOD, Navy, Army, and American Embassy files from the time of his defection up to the assassination; and we will follow segments of his files from the State Department, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and selected Navy and FBI field offices. This work also seeks to address that part of American Cuban policy and covert operations that are either fundamentally or reasonably relevant to the Oswald who emerges in these files. We will not address the assassination of President Kennedy. We will not discuss Dealey Plaza. This book is content to explore the subject of Oswald and the CIA without regard to who is right and who is wrong in the larger debate about the Kennedy assassination.
We will employ a two-track methodology. On one line we will tell the story through a chronological arrangement of evidence and findings. There are self-imposed limitations on this track: First, we will not attempt to describe Lee Harvey Oswald "the man," but concern ourselves instead with Oswald "the file"—the subject of records maintained by intelligence agencies. On the other line we will develop continuity in several historical areas. These areas emerge and clarify through the disclosure of what the government knew about Oswald.
Oswald's was a ponderous case from the beginning. This book is about the people and organizations who had access to and contributed to Oswald's intelligence files before the Kennedy assassination. What was the nature of their interest in Oswald? Who in the CIA had access to Oswald's files? What were their operations?
The official CIA position on its relationship with Oswald has always been that there was no relationship of "any kind." That is what the Agency told the Warren Commission in 1964, and it is what they told the House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) in 1978. CIA director John A. McCone stated this in his 1964 testimony to the Warren Commission:
Oswald was not an agent, employee, or informant of the Central Intelligence Agency. The Agency never contacted him, interviewed him, talked with him, or solicited any reports or information from him, or communicated with him indirectly or in any other manner. Oswald was never associated or connected directly or indirectly in any way whatsoever with the Agency.
According to the HSCA Report, "The record reflects that once these assurances had been received, no further efforts were made by the Warren Commission to pursue the matter."
A diametrically opposing view of Oswald and the CIA came from James Wilcott, who served as a CIA finance officer in Japan at the time Oswald served there in the Marines. Wilcott claimed that a CIA case officer told him—the day after Kennedy was assassinated—that Oswald was an agent. In 1978 Wilcott told the HSCA that "Oswald was a CIA agent who had received financial disbursements under an assigned cryptonym." Wilcott could only cite informal conversations as evidence, and after talking with Wilcott's coworkers, the HSCA "concluded that Wilcott's allegation was not worthy of belief."
The record suggests that neither the Agency's official story nor Wilcott's characterization is accurate. The truth lies in between. The Agency appears to have had serious operational interest in Oswald and there probably was a relationship, though not that of an "agent" or "informant." While Oswald wasn't James Bond, it is increasingly apparent that the Agency's operational interest may have led to his use or manipulation. For its part, the HSCA Report accepted the CIA official position:
There was no indication in Oswald's CIA file that he had ever had contact with the Agency. . . . This finding, however, must be placed in context, for the institutional characteristics—in terms of the Agency's strict compartmentalization and the complexity of its enormous filing system—that are designed to prevent penetration by foreign powers have the simultaneous effect of making congressional inquiry difficult.
The HSCA said they tried to overcome "the Agency's security-oriented institutional obstacles that potentially impede effective scrutiny of the CIA." But the CIA withheld an important key to Oswald's CIA files: the internal dissemination records for those files. In the absence of those records, the HSCA was unable to resolve the most glaring deficiencies in the Agency's account of the Oswald files.
We have those internal dissemination records and other information not shared with the Warren Commission, Church Committee, or HSCA investigations. This information indicates, at the least, that Oswald was probably involved in CIA operations. No attempt is made in this book to evaluate this material with respect to any conspiracy theory. Beyond the scope of this book, that discussion is already under way with several new works, such as Norman Mailer's Oswald's Tale: An American Mystery (New York: Random House, 1995); Ray and Mary La Fontaine's Oswald Talked: The New Evidence in the JFK Assassination (New Orleans: Pelican, scheduled for publication in 1995); and David Lifton's Oswald (New York: Dutton, scheduled for publication in 1995).
Some useful information has been drawn from previous government investigations, but the vast majority of research for this work was conducted in the newly released files, especially those made available in 1993 through 1995. The two million pages that have been added to the National Archives will take years to process, and the references to these materials in the footnotes reflect the shape and size of the "chunks" of records as they were initially released from contributing agencies. For example, if the footnote states "CIA January 1994 (5 brown boxes) release," researchers will know to go to the five large brown boxes that became available on that date. The Record Identification Form (RIF) numbering system used by the Archives was used in this book whenever possible, but some of the early RIF numbers may no longer be valid. With few exceptions, however, all of the CIA and FBI documents referred to in this book should be easily retrievable at the Archives.
There is something to be said for going first. It is humbling to look at two million pieces of paper. Several disciplines in the social sciences will have enough case study material to last for decades. Pulled forward by our curiosity for the unknown, yet unsettled by the fear of what we might find, we can enter these boxes and finally discover for ourselves. No matter our convictions about the case, to finally look inside those boxes in pursuit of the truth is a liberating experience.
# CHAPTER ONE
# Defection in Moscow
"There's a man here and he wants to renounce his citizenship," Jean Hallett announced to American Consul Richard Snyder. Jean, the receptionist for the American Embassy in Moscow on this particular Saturday morning in October 1959, then produced the man's passport and laid it down on Snyder's brown wooden desk. Snyder looked up; it was a little after eleven A.M., and on Saturdays the embassy always closed at noon. "Well, send him on in, then," Snyder replied.
Meanwhile, out in the lobby, an interesting group of people bumped into each other. The lobby at the entrance to the building was the only way to the elevator that ascended to the other sections of the embassy and the living quarters for the Americans working there. Twelve-year-old Carolyn Hallett had come out of the elevator and down the three steps into the lobby after her mother had disappeared into Snyder's office to announce Oswald's arrival. Carolyn found her mother's chair empty, but not so the couch—two young men were sitting on it. The one that fascinated twelve-year-old Carolyn was Lee Harvey Oswald. His countenance seemed to be anything but normal, and a curious little girl was probably the last thing he wanted to see before carrying out his plan to defect. At this particular moment he was working himself up for what he later referred to as a "showdown" with the American consul.
Sitting on the couch next to Oswald was Ned Keenan, an American graduate student based in Leningrad who was there that day seeking the embassy's assistance on visa matters. "I saw him sitting on the sofa when I arrived," Keenan recalls, "and I sat down next to him." Like Carolyn, Keenan also thought Oswald looked odd. "He was a memorable character," Keenan says. "He was strangely dressed—I remember him being lightly dressed above [i.e. on top]." Jean Hallett came back out from Snyder's office and found there were now two visitors on the couch as well as her daughter staring at Oswald, who was undoubtedly happy to be extricated from this scene.
As Lee Harvey Oswald confidently strode across the old wooden office floor behind Jean, he passed the other American consul, John McVickar, on his way to Snyder's desk. Oswald was dressed immaculately, in a dark suit with a white shirt and tie—"very businessman-looking," Snyder later recalled. But Snyder soon noticed odd things, like the fact that the man had no coat or hat on this brisk October thirty-first morning in Moscow. And then there were those thin, dressy white gloves that he wore into the room and removed rather deliberately as he came to a halt in front of Snyder's desk. Snyder, who was typing a report, was struck by the "humorless and robotic" quality of Oswald's demeanor. "Please sit down," Snyder said, still typing.
Oswald, perhaps annoyed at being put off, complied with this invitation to sit. He later wrote a one-page essay about the visit which contains this recollection:
I do so, selecting an armchair to the front left side of Snyder's desk. . . . I wait, crossing my legs and laying my gloves in my lap. He finishes typing, removes the letter from his typewriter, and adjusting his glasses looks at me. "What can I do for you," he asks, leafing through my passport.
This passage is nearly identical to Snyder's account of this scene. Of course, Oswald's perspective of himself was quite different from Snyder's, whose attention was distracted by those little white gloves.
Jean returned to her reception desk to find her daughter bursting with curiosity. "Mommy, who was that weird man at your desk?" Jean replied, "I got rid of him."
Richard Snyder studied the scrawny, nervous young man sitting next to him as he posed the question, "What can I do for you?" Oswald responded with what appeared to be a carefully prepared statement: "I've come to give up my American passport and renounce my citizenship," he said firmly but without emotion. With a dignified hand movement, he then gave Snyder a note which formally announced his intention to defect to the Soviet Union.
Oswald continued talking. "I've thought this thing over very carefully and I know what I'm doing. I was just discharged from the Marine Corps on September eleventh," he said, "and I have been planning to do this for two years." That remark really caught Snyder's attention. Even McVickar, the other consular official, who was across the room, began to listen more closely, and Oswald later remembered noticing McVickar look up from his work. "I know what you're going to say," Oswald said matter-of-factly to Snyder, "but I don't want any lectures or advice. So let's save my time and yours, and you just give me the papers to sign and I'll leave." By "papers" Oswald meant the forms to formally renounce his American citizenship. Snyder was struck by Oswald's "cocksure" and even arrogant attitude, and remarked later, "This was part of a scene he had rehearsed before coming into the embassy. It was a preplanned speech."
Indeed, Oswald had planned well—exceptionally well. "Since he arrived in Moscow in mid-October 1959 and was discharged from the Marine Corps in September 1959," McVickar told the State Department in 1964, "he would have to have made a direct and completely arranged trip." In addition, Oswald had entered the Soviet Union through Helsinki, not the customary route for Americans, but an ideal place to apply for an exception to the rules and get a quick entry visa. "It [Helsinki as an entry point] is a well enough known fact among people who are working in the Soviet Union and undoubtedly people who are associated with Soviet matters," McVickar later told the Warren Commission, "but I would say it was not a commonly known fact among the ordinary run of people in the United States." In fact, even in Helsinki, the average turnaround time for a visa was still seven to fourteen days at that time, something which the Warren Commission checked into carefully after the Kennedy assassination. However, the point is that exceptions were often made—perhaps more often than anyplace else—in Helsinki. That Oswald had managed to go from the U.S. straight to the ideal site where such exceptions were sometimes made—and succeeded in becoming just such an exception—suggests that his defection had been well planned and was intended to be speedy.
Oswald tried to remain calm during the scene in the embassy, "but he was wound up inside tighter than a clockspring," Snyder said later, "hoping he could keep control of the conversation." Oswald's diary corroborates this, describing the meeting as a "showdown." Oswald told Snyder he had not applied for a Soviet tourist visa until he reached Helsinki on October 14, and that in doing so he had purposely not told the Soviet Embassy of his plan to remain in the Soviet Union. Oswald then described how he had implemented the next phase of his game plan upon reaching Moscow: On October 16 he had applied for Soviet citizenship by letter to the Supreme Soviet.
Oswald paused here for Snyder's reaction. The consul searched for a way to knock the young man off his prepared script. Snyder recalls that there was a brief moment of silence while Oswald, still clutching those little white gloves in one hand, calculated his next move. The sunlight shone through the wall of glass to Snyder's left, painted opaque so that the Soviets could not see the classified work that went on in the office.
Snyder, a seasoned diplomat, was drawn to the olive-green passport that lay on the desk between the two of them. Picking it up and examining it carefully, he was immediately able to deduce that he was speaking with a minor, a twenty-year-old young ex-marine. Snyder noticed that Oswald had deliberately scratched out his address. That gave the consul some leverage. "Well, I'm afraid that to complete the papers for renunciation I will need some basic information," Snyder said at last, "including an address in the U.S. and an address of your closest living relative." Oswald, upset at the prospect of involving his mother, Marguerite, in the extraordinary move he was undertaking, was suddenly out of his game plan. He began to protest, but Snyder would not budge: no address, no papers. Finally, Oswald gave Snyder Marguerite Oswald's address in Forth Worth.
Snyder knew that Oswald had lost control of the exchange, and the consul therefore decided to press his advantage. "Why do you want to defect to the Soviet Union?" Snyder probed. The "principal reason," Oswald said, thinking on his feet, was because he was a "Marxist." Of course, this answer left open the possibility that he might have other reasons for defecting, too. Snyder then tested Oswald with a barb that was subtle but aggressive: "Life will be lonely as a Marxist." However, this cleverly worded inference that the Soviet Union was anything but Marxist seemed to go right over Oswald's head. He had no pat answer, and was clearly unprepared for a verbal duel about Marxism with Snyder. The consul was not as easy to bamboozle with Marxist quips as his marine colleagues had been in Japan, where he had been assigned. There, Private Oswald had especially enjoyed outwitting officers on political, especially left wing, subjects.
Now, however, Oswald was clearly out of his depth, and so he returned to what he had come prepared to say. Oswald declared he wanted the matter to conclude "quickly," Snyder recalls. In a feeble attempt to stop Snyder's questions, Oswald made what appears to be a slip-up. Snyder recalls that Oswald then blurted out, "I was warned you would try to talk me out of defecting."
The significance of Oswald's remark is worth considering. Who could have forewarned Oswald about what the American consul in Moscow would say or try to do? It stands to reason—unless Oswald was lying—that someone had helped Oswald plan his defection. But who could that have been? This possibility was so startling that it would later occupy the attention of many people—including Snyder. As it turned out, Oswald had an even bigger surprise in store that morning.
The most extraordinary development during the defection occurred when Snyder—on a roll—asked Oswald if he was willing to serve the Soviet state. Whether or not Oswald had prepared for this question is intriguing, for his answer could not have been worse from the standpoint of eliciting Snyder's cooperation in getting his defection papers. Oswald's reply, McVickar later wrote, "tended to extinguish any sympathy one may have felt for a confused and unhappy young man." It also led to an interesting start to the paper trail on Oswald back in Washington, especially at the CIA, a subject to which we will shortly return. Snyder's contemporaneous written account of the duel with Oswald contains this passage:
Oswald offered the information that he had been a radar operator in the Marine Corps and that he had voluntarily stated to unnamed Soviet officials that as a Soviet citizen he would make known to them such information concerning the Marine Corps and his specialty as he possessed. He intimated that he might know something of special interest.
Here again Oswald's remarks seem laden by significance. Special interest? What "special interest" information did Oswald know beyond what he had learned as a radar operator? Perhaps Oswald had in mind something he had learned because of his assignment to Atsugi Naval Air Station, Japan, where an extremely sensitive CIA program had been—and still was—ongoing.
McVickar also recalls that Oswald said he was going to turn over "classified things" to "Soviet authorities." Snyder later theorized that what Oswald may have had in mind by using the words "something of special interest" was the supersecret American U-2 spy plane that was based at Atsugi. If so, this question then arises: Why drop the hint in the American Embassy? After all, was not Oswald's purpose simply to obtain the defection papers? Snyder's hypothesis was that Oswald assumed the KGB had bugged the American Embassy, and "was speaking for Russian ears in my office."
By this time it was after noontime. "We are closed now," Snyder said, "and I can't get all the papers typed up right now. If you want, you can come back in a couple days when we are open and get them." At this point, Oswald simply turned around and left. "He came storming out," Keenan—who was still sitting on the couch outside Snyder's office—recalls. "It was enough to catch my attention."
In spite of this ending to the defection scene, however, Oswald followed up Snyder's stalling tactics in a curious way. He complained bitterly about Snyder's treatment during an interview with a news reporter in his hotel room but never returned to the embassy to sign the papers. "Perhaps he heard a little voice," Snyder now muses, "[which said] don't burn that bridge." By not executing the renunciation papers, Oswald had, in effect, left open a way to return to America.
# Room 233, the Metropole
Oswald left the American Embassy interpreting the outcome not as a defeat but as a victory. This seems strange given that he had failed to get the paperwork for renunciation of U.S. citizenship, the ostensible purpose for his visit that morning. But not if his real objective, as Snyder had guessed, was to impress the KGB, whom he had to assume was bugging the American Embassy. Support for this interpretation comes from Oswald's diary, which records his exuberance after his return to his hotel room:
I leave Embassy, elated at this showdown, returning to my hotel I feel now my enorgies [sic] are not spent in vain. I'm sure Russians will except [sic] me after this sign of my faith in them.
Still wrapped up in his thoughts about his encounter with Snyder, Oswald returned to his hotel room. He had not had time to sort much out, when he was surprised by a knock on his door.
The hand knocking on Oswald's door belonged to the Moscow bureau chief of United Press International (UPI), Robert J. Korengold, whom Snyder had immediately notified by telephone after alerting Washington—in his cable 1304—about the defection request. "I called on Korengold fairly quickly," Snyder explains, "to try and get another line on Oswald." Snyder encouraged Korengold by telling him that an interview with Oswald might prove "interesting" for the UPI. Snyder may even have told Korengold the room in which Oswald was staying at the Metropole. Korengold wasted no time in following up Snyder's lead, and arrived at the door of Room 233 at two P.M.
When Oswald opened his door, Korengold requested an interview. "How did you find out?" Oswald asked in response, flabbergasted at the speed with which events were unfolding. (Korengold might even have beaten Oswald back to his room, a possibility suggested by Korengold's recollection that his contact with Oswald came "after several unsuccessful attempts.") It was rare that a chance to interview a defector came around, and it began to look as though his persistence had paid off. "The embassy called us," Korengold replied hopefully. Caught off guard, Oswald flatly refused to give Korengold an interview. Korengold recalled, "Oswald stated he knew what he was doing and insisted he did not wish to talk to anyone."
After ten minutes of getting nowhere with Oswald, the intrepid UPI bureau chief left the Metropole, disappointed but not about to give up. When Oswald shut the door, he felt Korengold was part of a plot. Oswald later wrote of his feelings: "This is one way to bring pressure on me. By notifing [sic] my relations in U.S. through the newspapers." Meanwhile, Korengold went back to his office and spoke with a correspondent for the UPI, Aline Mosby. As we will discuss in a later chapter, Mosby led a colorful life in the Soviet Union, including being "drugged" in a Moscow restaurant and victimized in the Soviet press for her "drink and debauchery."
Within minutes of talking to her bureau chief, Mosby was on her way to Room 233 in the Metropole. She told the FBI in 1964 that she had learned of Oswald in the fall of 1959 "from a source she can no longer recall," but the source was probably Korengold. Mosby recounts her journey to Oswald this way:
I went up in the creaky elevator to the second floor and down the hall, past the life-sized nude in white marble, the gigantic painting of Lenin and Stalin and the usual watchful clerk in her prim navy blue dress with brown braids around her head. An attractive fellow answered my knock on the door of Room 233.
For Oswald, life was getting more interesting by the moment. Oswald was surprised at the attention he was getting: two American reporters in less than half an hour.
"I am Lee Oswald," he said with a "hesitant smile" to Aline, who recalls that she then "murmured some pleasantry" in reply. Oswald, still off guard and unsure, refused her a formal interview, but Mosby, it seems, was far more successful than Korengold in loosening Oswald's tongue. "I think you may understand and be friendly because you're a woman," Oswald told her. He then agreed to answer Mosby's questions.
Oswald informed Mosby that he had applied to renounce his American citizenship and become a Soviet citizen. He did so, he said, "for purely political reasons." Mosby successfully elicited enough personal details from Oswald to rush back to her office and put all of this into a report for the wires, adding, "The slender, unsmiling Oswald refused to give any other reasons for his decision to give up his American citizenship and live in the Soviet Union. He would not say what he is planning to do here."
There was, of course, someone else who was listening to what Oswald said to Mosby. An internal 1964 CIA memorandum that commented on a draft paper entitled "KGB operations against foreign tourists" contained the following useful entry: "Rm 233, Hotel Metropole, Moscow—equipped with infra-red camera for observation of occupants." Thus the Soviet KGB office in Moscow was presumably busy writing a report of the conversation between Aline Mosby and Lee Oswald, as Mosby's UPI ticker of the same event burned across the wires of the U.S., including those in Texas.
The reporters of the Star Telegram in Forth Worth were probably still drinking their first cup of coffee when Mosby's UPI report popped out of their ticker. The second line read, "Lee Harvey Oswald, of Fort Worth, Tex., told United Press International in his room at the Metropole Hotel, 'I will never return to the United States for any reason.' "
# Halloween in Fort Worth
"The first time I was aware he was in Russia," Robert Oswald testified in 1964 about his brother Lee Harvey Oswald, "was on Halloween Day 1959, October 31." Within hours after Oswald's defection, three or four Forth Worth reporters were at the home of Robert Oswald, pestering him for information about his brother. Robert Oswald initially resisted but then yielded to the pressure tactics of the reporters, who suggested that he cooperate because he might be "the only source of information" about what brother Lee was doing in Russia.
When the interview was over, another man appeared at Robert Oswald's house. Robert does not recall who he was other than that he identified himself as a reporter for the Fort Worth Star Telegram. This man not only asked questions but had suggestions as well. He told Robert Oswald he should send two telegrams, one to Secretary of State Christian Herter, and the other to Lee Oswald in Russia. With the man still in his home, Robert immediately called Western Union and sent both telegrams, and then advised the reporter of the contents. Even though Robert "did not receive confirmation of these telegrams from Western Union" while the reporter was still present, they both appeared in full in the Sunday, November 1, edition of the Star Telegram.
Thus Robert Oswald sent two messages to his brother, one directly and the other through the U.S. State Department. The first one to arrive in Moscow was the latter, a State cable arriving at 6:34 P.M. Sunday evening at the American Embassy in Moscow. The embassy was requested to "pass following message if possible." The message read, "For Lee Harvey Oswald from Robert Lee Oswald. QUOTE Contact me as soon as possible through the fastest means available. UNQUOTE." The photostatic copy of this cable extant in the National Archives today bears the signature of then Secretary of State Christian Herter, who had either come into his office at the State Department or received the cable via an aide early that Sunday morning. In any event, arriving at the embassy communications center at 6:34 P.M., the cable would have to wait until Monday morning for someone to attempt to deliver it to Oswald.
That same Sunday, Oswald's mother attempted to call him at his hotel room. Kent Biffle, a Fort Worth newspaper reporter, had arranged a three-way telephone conversation between his office, Marguerite Oswald, and her son at the Metropole hotel. Seth Kantor, another Fort Worth newspaperman at the time, recalls what happened:
[I]t took several hours to arrange the call trans-Atlantically and trans-continentally and get the call into Russia to where Oswald was. At times it seemed it would be impossible to get the call through, but at last the call was ready and Mrs. Oswald was on her line in her home and Kent Biffle, sitting right across from me at the Press city desk, was on his phone, and here came Oswald on the phone from Russia. As soon as Oswald found out that it was his mother on the phone in Fort Worth and it was a newspaperman who had set this thing up, so she could talk to her son, Oswald hung up. All those hours down the drain.
Oswald was evidently offended at the thought that newspaper reporters would use his mother as a means of getting the story on his defection.
On Monday, Richard Snyder asked his secretary, Marie Cheatham, who also served as the administrative assistant for the consular section, to telephone Oswald, tell him that the embassy had received a telegram from his brother, and ask him to stop by the office to pick it up. When he took Cheatham's call at 9:30 A.M., Oswald, not keen on the idea of returning to the embassy, refused Cheatham's request. Snyder told his secretary to try a different approach. She wrote a memo to Snyder afterward to explain what happened:
I again called Mr. Oswald immediately thereafter, as instructed by you, to ask him if I could read the message to him over the telephone. His room did not answer. At 11:05 I contacted Mr. Oswald at his hotel and asked him if I could read the message from his brother, that I now had two telegrams for him. Mr. Oswald replied, "No, not at the present time," and hung up.
This passage makes it clear that the second of the two Robert Oswald telegrams arrived in the consular office between the second and third of Marie Cheatham's phone calls to Oswald's hotel room—that is, between 9:30 and 11:05 A.M. that Monday morning in Moscow.
The situation of the Oswalds in Dallas was unenviable. All immediate efforts to reach Lee in Russia had failed, and the local press in Texas did not look favorably upon defectors. There had been one press report in the Corpus Christi Times a week earlier profiling a string of defections to the Soviet Union. The article said:
As far as we are concerned, any American citizen, male or female, who renounces his citizenship in favor of the Soviet Union, is entitled to the protection of this government in two particulars only. The State Department should ask him two questions: Was he drunk or sober when he did it? Did he seem to have all his marbles with him at the time?
Having settled these questions to its own satisfaction, the government and people of the United States should wave him goodbye and see to it that his name is wiped off our national books forever, and he never be allowed to set foot in this country again, dead or alive.
This newspaper clipping, which had been sparked by the recent defection of other Americans, would, by mid-November 1959, become the first official record in Oswald's FBI headquarters file—105-82555. By that time there would be more than the Corpus Christi Times complaint to put in Oswald's file.
# An "Intelligence Matter"
Snyder recorded the details of Oswald's defection, fully documenting his bizarre performance in the embassy that day. Snyder's complete account was typed by his secretary, Vera Brown, and sent to the State Department in a lengthy dispatch two days later, Monday, November 2. It included this assessment:
Throughout the interview Oswald's manner was aggressive, arrogant, and uncooperative. He appeared to be competent. . . . He was contemptuous of any efforts by the interviewing officer in his interest, made clear that he wanted no advice from the embassy. He stated that he knew the provisions of U.S. law on loss of citizenship and declined to have them reviewed by the interviewing officer. In short, he displayed all the airs of a new sophomore party-liner.
These observations weighed heavily in Snyder's abiding impression that Oswald's defection had been carefully planned.
In a November 1963 memorandum, Snyder's colleague McVickar said it was possible that Oswald had read books he did not understand. Nevertheless, McVickar argued,
. . . it seemed that it could also have been that he had been taught to say things which he did not really understand. In short, it seemed to me that there was a possibility that he had been in contact with others before or during his Marine Corps tour who had guided him and encouraged him in his actions.
McVickar argued that there seemed the possibility that Oswald "was following a pattern of behavior in which he had been tutored by person or persons unknown."
Who were these "persons unknown," and how did they know what Snyder would or would not do? Something about the way Oswald was using pat phrases about Marxism along with his reference to "papers to sign" led Snyder and McVickar to conclude that Oswald had only incomplete knowledge of such intellectual and legal matters. Snyder says he retains a "strong impression" that Oswald "used simple Marxist stereotypes without sophistication or independent formulation."
Both Snyder and McVickar thought at the time that Oswald might have been "tutored" before appearing at the consulate, and both today continue to believe that Oswald's performance that October Saturday in 1959 was carefully planned. Oswald's stated intent to turn over military secrets should be considered in this context. If someone did help Oswald plan his defection, this someone might also have told Oswald to threaten to reveal military secrets.
Oswald's statements about radar secrets and "something special" were the most significant part of the defection event. Such behavior is difficult to imagine of an ex-marine. "I certainly did not expect anyone in his position to make a statement that he was disloyal to the U.S.," Snyder explained. McVickar told Oswald biographer Edward J. Epstein that it was the part of the conversation where Oswald said he was going to turn over classified radar information that "raised hackles." McVickar summed up his recollection for the Warren Commission in this way:
He [Oswald] mentioned that he knew certain classified things in connection with having been, I think, a radar operator in the Marine Corps, and that he was going to turn this information over to the Soviet authorities. And, of course, we didn't know how much he knew or anything like that, but this obviously provoked a rather negative reaction among us Americans in the consulate section.
Again, both witnesses to this performance by Oswald emphasize its unusual nature, especially with regard to military secrets.
Part of what made Oswald's stated intent to reveal state secrets so remarkable is that it had not been solicited. Snyder had made no attempt to probe for intelligence or espionage-related information. "He volunteered this statement," Snyder testified before the Warren Commission in 1964. "It was rather peculiar." Peculiar indeed—to walk into an American Embassy anywhere in the world, let alone Moscow at the height of the Cold War, and to announce, in the presence of American consular officials, one's intent to commit a deliberate act of espionage is an extraordinary act. However, perhaps because Oswald did not specifically "claim to possess knowledge or information of [a] highly classified nature," Snyder was content to get out of the embassy that Saturday afternoon and deal with the mess the following week. Nevertheless, Snyder knew without question that, at the very least, Oswald was "declaring [his] intention [to] commit a disloyal act." Before going home that same Saturday afternoon, Snyder cabled this news to Washington.
The serious nature of Oswald's threats and their consequences may be the reason he chose not to return for his renunciation papers after that Saturday morning. If his speech was for the Soviets, it had served its purpose, and Oswald could not be sure how the Americans would react. If he had thought this part of it through, he would have to have realized that the Defense Department and the CIA would treat his situation not as a simple defection but as a security matter requiring a careful investigation. Oswald could not rule out the possibility that if he returned, the marine guard on duty, rather than ushering him in to see Snyder, might instead take him into custody for questioning.
On Tuesday, November 3, Oswald wrote a letter to the U.S. embassy protesting his treatment in Snyder's office the previous Saturday. "I appeared in person, at the consulate office of the United States embassy, Moscow, on Oct. 31st, for the purpose of signing the formal papers" for the revocation of his American citizenship. "This legal right I was refused at that time." He protested this and the "conduct of the official," i.e., Richard Snyder. The letter arrived at the embassy on Friday, November 6, and Snyder sent a reply on the following Monday, November 9, having informed the State Department about it in the meantime. In his reply to Oswald, Snyder invited him to come back "anytime during normal business hours."
Snyder was not the only person in Moscow sending cables to Washington about Oswald's espionage intentions. While Oswald sat in his hotel room writing his letter of protest to the embassy, the naval attaché in the embassy was also writing a confidential cable, in this case to the chief of Naval Operations in the Pentagon. The determination that this ex-marine was no simple defector but in truth a self-declared saboteur arrived at the Navy Department the next morning, November 3, 1963. Like Snyder's October 31 cable, the navy attaché's cable was very short. It invited attention to the embassy's reporting on the defections of Oswald and another ex-navy man, and added only one thing: that Oswald had offered to furnish the Soviets information on U.S. radar.
Whatever Oswald's thinking might or might not have been, there is little question about the thinking in Washington, D.C. It did not take long for the naval attaché's message from Moscow to set off alarm bells at the Navy Department. There the cable was routed by a person named Hamner in the Navy Department and checked by "RE/Hediger." The meaning of the letters "RE" is not clear, but it is interesting—as we will discuss in a later chapter—that they also belong to a person connected to a very sensitive CIA monitoring operation. Just twenty-seven hours after being notified that an ex-marine had stated his intent to give up radar secrets, Navy Headquarters replied to Moscow. The final sentence of the navy cable underlines the importance that Washington attached to the news of Oswald's defection. The cable requested updates of developments on Oswald because of "CONTINUING INTEREST OF HQ, MARINE CORPS, AND US INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES." Centered underneath the bottom of these words were two more: "INTELLIGENCE MATTER."
# CHAPTER TWO
# Paper Trail in Washington
At 7:59 A.M., October 31, 1959, a teletype printer at the State Department began its thumping clackety-clack, typing out Snyder's Confidential cable 1304 from the embassy in Moscow. The news that Oswald's defection included an intent to commit espionage was now in the nation's capital, but it was Saturday morning, so official Washington was asleep or perhaps just getting up to go shopping or work in their gardens. The children were probably thinking about their costumes for an American pastime—it was Halloween. At the State Department message center, the personnel were probably changing over from the mid[night] shift to the day shift as Moscow cable 1304 was copied and assigned an initial internal distribution. It would have to wait until Monday for anyone to look at it.
At 9:20 A.M., Aline Mosby's UPI report flashed across the Washington news tickers, indicating that Oswald had spoken publicly about his defection in his Metropole hotel room a few hours earlier. Oswald had not told Mosby of his intention to hand over military secrets to the Soviets. That part of the story was classified, and was still sitting in a distribution box over in the State Department. The UPI story told only of Oswald's attempt to renounce his American citizenship and become a Soviet citizen.
It was the unclassified version of the defection that set off the alarm bell at the FBI. At 10:19 A.M., the stamp "RECEIVED DIRECTOR FBI" was placed on the back side of the Mosby UPI ticker and her story was handed to E. B. Reddy, who was on duty that morning. Perhaps the ex-marine's announcement, "I will never return to the United States for any reason" grabbed Reddy's attention, or perhaps his FBI training led his eyes to rest on the sentence that stated that Oswald "would not say what he was planning to do here." The way the UPI ticker was worded led Reddy to conclude incorrectly that Oswald had held a "press conference" in his hotel room. Reddy immediately decided to check out just who this defector was.
Reddy grabbed a standard FBI questionnaire for the records branch of the Identification Division and filled it out. In the "subject" box he wrote "Lee Harvey Oswald," placing a check in the block requesting "all references (subversive and nonsubversive)" and another check in the block "return to," where he added "Reddy [room] 1742." By lunchtime Paul Kupferschmidt of the records branch had managed to locate only Oswald's fingerprints. They had been taken when he entered the Marine Corps, a standard procedure for everyone entering the military, and the prints are always sent to the FBI. These fingerprints did not lead to much in the FBI's files. Kupferschmidt was able to advise Reddy only that "Oswald, a white male, born on October 18, 1939, at New Orleans, Louisiana, enlisted in the U.S. Marine Corps on October 24, 1956, at Dallas, Texas, and holds U.S. Marine Corps Number 1653230."
Using this information and the details of Mosby's UPI ticker, Reddy prepared a memorandum and attached a copy of the UPI report to his memo. He addressed this memo to Alan H. Belmont, head of the FBI's Intelligence Division. Either Belmont or, more likely, someone from his office came into the FBI that Saturday afternoon, because the back of the ticker also bears the stamp "REC'D BELMONT FBI-JUSTICE Oct 31 3:18 PM '59."
# Moscow: Sunday, November 1
On Sunday, the American press began to report a few more details about the defection in Moscow. Based on Saturday's UPI story, the New York office of the Associated Press (AP) called its Moscow correspondent, A. I. Goldberg, and asked him to verify the story. It was still Sunday in Moscow when Goldberg made the by then welltraveled journey to Oswald's hotel room, whereupon Oswald identified himself but refused to grant an interview. Goldberg pressed for something, asking Oswald why he was going to remain in Russia. "I've got my reasons," Oswald responded, but refused to elaborate further. Goldberg then tried to dissuade Oswald from staying, and inquired whether Oswald knew Russian or had any particular skill he could use in the Soviet Union. According to Goldberg, Oswald replied that he did not know Russian, but that he could learn and that he could "make out."
Goldberg apparently contacted someone in the American Embassy, for when he sent his story back to AP headquarters in New York on Sunday, it included the sentence, "The embassy urged him [Oswald] not to sign papers renouncing his American citizenship until he was sure the Soviet Union would accept him." Meanwhile, by Sunday, UPI bureau chief Bob Korengold had done some more calling as well, both to Oswald and to the American Embassy. The Sunday UPI story out of Moscow contained this new sentence attributed to Oswald: "I cannot make any statement until after I receive my Soviet citizenship. It might jeopardize my position—I mean the Soviet authorities might not want me to say anything."
Korengold also was successful in reaching Richard Snyder and gleaning from him some of the details of what had occurred inside the embassy on Saturday morning. The Sunday UPI story also contained this paragraph:
The U.S. Embassy official [Snyder] said that he had advised Oswald to wait for the Soviet reply to his application for citizenship before giving up his American passport. He said Oswald would retain his full U.S. citizenship until he formally signed a document of renunciation and before he officially accepted Soviet citizenship.
The UPI Sunday story also contained one other interesting item buried in between parentheses: "His [Oswald's] sister-in-law in Fort Worth said: 'He said he wanted to travel a lot and talked about going to Cuba.' "
Oswald had often talked about Cuba when he served in the marines at Atsugi. "I know that Cuba interested him more than most other situations," Oswald's marine commander from Atsugi Naval Air Station later told the Warren Commission. While at Atsugi, Oswald used to "dream" about joining Castro's forces with his fellow marine Nelson Delgado. Four years later Oswald would try—and fail—to go to Cuba.
# Washington: Monday, November 2
"A file concerning Oswald was opened," FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover wrote to the Warren Commission in 1964, "at the time newspapers reported his defection to Russia in 1959, for the purpose of correlating information inasmuch as he was considered a possible security risk in the event he returned to this country." Hoover explained that the Bureau's "first interest" was a direct result of the October 31 UPI story, the story that E. B. Reddy had checked into that same day and prepared a memorandum about. Mosby's UPI news ticker was attached to Reddy's memo and waiting at FBI headquarters Monday morning, when the brass arrived for work.
At 10:07 A.M. on Monday, November 2, the second most powerful man in the FBI and close friend of Director Hoover's, Clyde Anderson Tolsen, looked over Reddy's Saturday November 1 memorandum and UPI attachment. Not a skilled FBI investigator, Tolsen had been hired by Hoover in 1928 on the recommendation of then Secretary of War Dwight F. Davis, and within three years Hoover had promoted Tolsen from rookie agent to assistant director. There is little reason to conclude that Tolsen's immediate concern would have been much more than to make sure Hoover was aware of the Reddy memo and then pass it on. Tolsen initialed Reddy's memo and quickly sent it to the next most powerful man in the FBI—Cartha De Loach.
It is likely that Hoover and Tolsen had already seen the expanded UPI coverage that had appeared in the Sunday edition of the Washington Post. That expanded coverage included the results of UPI Bureau Chief Korengold's calls to Oswald and Snyder: Oswald saying he feared the Soviets wanted him to remain silent, and Snyder saying he had advised Oswald to get his Soviet citizenship before renouncing his American citizenship. The UPI ticker attached to Reddy's memo was, of course, from the Saturday wires, and Reddy's memo added a few more odds and ends such as Oswald's birth date, his New Orleans roots, and his entrance into the marines.
Mosby's UPI ticker became the second item in Oswald's FBI file numbered 105-82555, and the Reddy memo became the third document. The honor of being the first item in the Oswald FBI file was reserved for a document that was not about Oswald. It was the Corpus Christi Times article (mentioned in Chapter One) of October 13, 1959. Whoever put it in Oswald's file may have sardonically thought that such an article, with its title "Goodbye," and its broadside attack against Americans who defected to the Soviet Union, was the most fitting capstone for Oswald's headquarters file anyway. The first part of Oswald's file number—the "105" serial—was used exclusively for files on "Foreign Counterintelligence Matters."
At 10:36 A.M., the assistant director for Crime Records, Cartha "Deke" De Loach, began reading about the Halloween defection in Moscow. De Loach had far more experience working in the FBI bureaucracy than Tolsen, who was purely a creature of Hoover's. DeLoach, who would shortly become Lyndon Johnson's favorite man in the FBI, had previously worked in the group that handled liaison with the CIA and Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI). Such liaison duties were sensitive given Hoover's suspicion of other intelligence agencies.
The FBI man who handled liaison with the CIA in November 1959 was Sam Papich. At some point during the workday on that Monday, someone at the FBI notified Papich about the Bureau's interest in the Oswald defection. If the date-time stamps on the back of Reddy's memo are an indicator, DeLoach was probably the person in FBI headquarters who had the memo most of the day and who, therefore, either contacted Papich or gave the order to do so—perhaps to Alan Belmont. Papich liked Belmont and disliked DeLoach, especially with respect to their views on CIA-FBI liaison on surveillance matters. Extant CIA and FBI records indicate that Sam Papich telephoned just one CIA element that Monday, and it was not the Office of Security, the Records Integration Division, the Contacts Division, or the Soviet Russia Division. He phoned someone on the liaison staff of the CIA counterintelligence czar, James Jesus Angleton.
"Mr. Papich would like to know about this ex-marine who recently defected in the U.S.S.R.," wrote someone in Angleton's Counterintelligence Liaison (CI/LI) Office—probably Jane Roman, whose handwritten initials often appear on CIA cover sheets for documents concerning Lee Harvey Oswald. As it happened, the CI/LI Office had no quick answer for Papich, and would not get back to him until midweek. Meanwhile, back at FBI headquarters, at 3:32 P.M., the Reddy memo wound up in the office of Alan Belmont. Belmont, like Tolsen and De Loach, was an assistant director to Hoover, and head of the Bureau's Intelligence Division. (Belmont will probably long be remembered for his 1953 internal memo in which he argued that existence of the Mafia in the U.S. was "doubtful.")
At some point on November 2, there was contact between the FBI and the Office of Naval Intelligence about the Oswald defection. J. M. Barron of ONI authored a memo on Oswald that same day and directed that it be transmitted "by hand" to Mr. Wells at the FBI. Barron's memo begins by noting Saturday's Mosby UPI story and then stating that ONI files "contain no record" of Oswald. Two days later, a subordinate of Belmont's, W. A. Brannigan, wrote, "On 11/12/59, it was determined through Liaison with the Navy Department that the files of ONI contained no record of the subject [Oswald]." On the other hand, Barron observed that Oswald's file at Marine Corps Headquarters did have information, including the fact that his address upon entering the Marine Corps was 4936 Collinswood Street, Fort Worth, Texas. Handwriting, now faint, on Reddy's memo appears to say "4936 Collinswood St. Fort Worth, Texas," information not available at the FBI (at that time) except from the Barron ONI memo or from Marine headquarters by telephone.
Barron's ONI memo ended with the comment "No action contemplated by this office." The Reddy memo on Monday, November 2 appeared headed toward the same dead end. Reddy's original memo was returned again to De Loach at 4:58 P.M., and then traveled yet again back to Belmont, at 6:31 P.M. At the bottom of this popular memo, Reddy entered this notation: "ACTION: None. For Information."
Someone, however, possibly Belmont, was not finished with Reddy's memo. The next morning, Reddy's memo was on its way again, this time to the FBI's Counterintelligence Branch. More specifically, it went to the Espionage Section in that Branch. Before proceeding to Counterintelligence, however, it is safe to say that Aline Mosby's little fragment of a story, along with Reddy's unspectacular and rather empty memo, had made the rounds of the entire upper echelon of the FBI. The more sinister and classified part of the Oswald story—that he had offered to give the Soviets radar secrets and "something of special interest"—was still inside the State Department, and would remain classified until after the Kennedy assassination. It was, however, about to wind its way through the most sensitive elements of the American intelligence community.
# Washington: Tuesday, November 3
By Tuesday morning, November 3, counterintelligence officers in both the CIA and FBI were examining the Oswald defection. Their interest had been sparked almost entirely by the few words Aline Mosby had pried from Oswald's lips at the door to his hotel room in the Moscow Metropole. No one in the FBI or CIA yet knew the darker details of Oswald's Halloween performance in the American Embassy in Moscow. No one in the FBI, CIA, or Navy Department yet knew that Snyder's classified cable alerting Washington to this part of the Oswald story was still trapped somewhere on a State Department desk in Foggy Bottom. No one in official Washington outside the State Department was yet aware that the "confidential" aspect of Snyder's cable was a piece of news so startling that any newspaper would properly have led with it: Ex-marine Lee Harvey Oswald intended to turn over classified material to the Soviet Union.
At four minutes past noon on November 3, a teletype at the Navy Department in the Pentagon began to print out a troublesome message from Moscow. The words "Attention invited to AMEMB Moscow dispatches 234 DTD 2 November and 224 DTD 26 October" began the cable from the U.S. naval attaché in Moscow, Captain John Jarret Munsen. The dispatches Munsen referred to concerned the defections of Lee Harvey Oswald and Robert Edward Webster, another ex-navy man. Webster had defected in Moscow while working for an American company, the Rand Development Corporation, on July 11, 1959. Dispatch 234 on Oswald was in a diplomatic pouch in an aircraft somewhere between Moscow and Washington and would not arrive at the State Department until Thursday, November 5. Munsen's cable, therefore, was alerting the navy to ask for it as soon as it arrived. Munsen concluded: "OSWALD STATED HE WAS [A] RADAR OPERATOR IN MARCORPS AND HAS OFFERED TO FURNISH SOVIETS INFO HE POSSESSES ON US RADAR."
At 3:37 P.M., the FBI Reddy memo was date-stamped into the Espionage Section of the FBI's Counterintelligence Branch. By this time, it is virtually certain that Wells had delivered Barron's brief ONI memo on Oswald's headquarters Marine Corps file, and that it was now attached to the Reddy memo along with the Mosby UPI story. The Navy Liaison cable from Moscow was still in the Pentagon and would not arrive at the FBI until the next day, and there was still no word from the CIA's Counterintelligence Liaison on what, if anything, they knew about Oswald.
It was at this point, late on Wednesday afternoon, November 6, 1959, that the official paper trail in Washington on Lee Harvey Oswald took on a completely different character. At this moment the classified cables out of Moscow—Snyder's to the State Department and Munsen's to the Navy Department—began to wind their way into the espionage and counterintelligence worlds of the FBI and CIA.
At 6:40 P.M., FBI Assistant Director Belmont got his first look at what was to become the fourth item in the FBI file on Lee Harvey Oswald: the confidential Snyder cable from Moscow. To be sure, this cable, like most cables, was brief. It mentioned Oswald's appearance at the embassy to defect, his arrogant and aggressive attitude, and his recent discharge from the Marine Corps. Then came the bottom line: It told of Oswald's stated intention to give military secrets to the Soviet Union. Snyder closed by asking the State Department for permission to delay allowing Oswald's formal renunciation until word was received on what action the Soviets were prepared to take.
That evening, someone in the FBI who read the Snyder cable took his pen and made double hash marks in both margins next to the words "SAYS HAS OFFERED SOVIETS ANY INFORMATION HE HAS ACQUIRED AS ENLISTED RADAR OPERATOR." Someone, probably the same individual, then underlined those same words. Meanwhile, across the Potomac River in the CIA, someone was reading a copy of the Snyder cable there too. The CIA reader focused on precisely the same words as the anonymous FBI reader. On the extant CIA copy of the Snyder cable are handwritten markings. These markings circle the words "LEE HARVEY OSWALD" and underline the words "SAYS HAS OFFERED SOVIETS ANY INFORMATION HE HAS ACQUIRED AS ENLISTED RADAR OPERATOR."
The State Department almost certainly sent Snyder's cable to the CIA at the same time they sent it to the FBI. Today, the exact date of the cable's entry to the CIA still cannot be confirmed, and is a matter that deserves close attention. The Agency itself cannot account for the details of its receipt and handling of Snyder's cable. In 1964 the Warren Commission asked then-CIA Director Richard Helms to account for a number of crucial Oswald documents. Helms could not explain when the Agency had received several of the 1959-1960 files on Oswald. Incredible though it may seem in view of the amount of press coverage of Oswald's defection, the beginning of the Oswald file in the CIA is the story of a hidden file inside a black hole. It was a file so sensitive that almost no one in the Agency knew of its existence.
# The "Black Hole" in Oswald's CIA Files
"The Commission would appreciate a letter or memorandum from the Central Intelligence Agency," wrote Warren Commission chief counsel J. Lee Rankin to CIA Director Helms in 1964, "acknowledging that it received the following communications from the Department of State." Rankin listed several communications, including Snyder's cable 1304 of October 31. Helms replied that the date of receipt "cannot be determined," but that this cable was in the CIA's possession four years later. That the CIA had no idea when it received one of the most important documents pertaining to Lee Harvey Oswald seems incredible. Yet the fact is that after the Kennedy assassination, the CIA was unable to find out when and to whom these first State Department cables on Oswald were sent in the Agency.
At the time of Oswald's defection, however, someone in the CIA did have those Oswald documents. Since the 1992 passage of the JFK Records Act, a public law mandating the release of all assassination-related records, Oswald's CIA files at the time of his defection have been coming to light, as well as later Agency reviews of Oswald's records for official investigations of the JFK assassination. In two lists of files on Oswald that the CIA prepared in response to the HSCA in 1978 and released to the public in 1993, one gives no date of receipt for the Snyder cable at all, while the other acknowledges only that it was in the Agency's possession by February 20, 1964. By 1978, then, the CIA could not even confirm Helms's inadequate 1964 answer that the Agency had possessed it by the time Kennedy was assassinated. In other words, instead of straightening out what was obviously an embarrassing problem for the CIA in 1964, the Agency has let the problem of its first paperwork on Oswald fester over time. Even the most casual observer would be justified in wondering whether the CIA is wholly incompetent in its paperwork or whether dark secrets remain about Oswald's CIA file.
On November 4, the Navy Department sent a copy of the November 3 Moscow Naval Attaché cable to both the FBI and the CIA. Again, this cable, like Snyder's cable 1304, contained the disturbing news about Oswald's stated intent to give up radar secrets. And again, this confidential cable, like Snyder's, also disappeared into the CIA black hole on Oswald, and did not show up again until after the assassination. It is therefore not surprising that the CIA element originally contacted by the FBI's liaison, Sam Papich—the counterintelligence staff liaison element—replied two days later that they had no information on Oswald.
The FBI had already heard from the ONI that it was contemplating no action when the negative trace—spy jargon for having no information—on Oswald from the CIA came in. Perhaps this combination seemed justification enough to shut off the alarm bell in the Bureau that Mosby's story had set off the previous Saturday. On November 4, W. A. Brannigan wrote a memo to Belmont, noting the ONI decision not to act and also arguing, "Since subject's defection is known to Department of the Navy, and since subject apparently has no knowledge of any strategic information which would be of benefit to the Soviets, it does not appear that any action is warranted by the Bureau in this matter." Brannigan recommended, however, that "a stop be placed against the [finger]prints to prevent subject's [Oswald's] entering the U.S. under any name." Brannigan advised that the FBI's Espionage Section stay on the lookout for Oswald's reentry to the U.S. Brannigan's recommendation was approved, possibly by Belmont, and on November 4 the FBI issued a "FLASH" against Oswald's fingerprints, asking that "Any information or inquiry received [please] notify Espionage Section, Div 5, Bu[reau]."
Brannigan's analysis of the navy's position—that Oswald knew nothing important and therefore no action was necessary—was flawed. The fact that ONI had decided against action did not mean that such a decision had been made at the chief of Naval Operations level. Similarly, the CIA Counterintelligence Liaison section's claim that they knew nothing about Oswald did not necessarily mean that this was true for the CIA as a whole. In fact, the wording of Brannigan's memo seems to invite questions. His contention that Oswald "apparently has no knowledge of any strategic information" still leaves open the possibility he might have had other useful information. Moreover, the word "apparently" did not foreclose the possibility that Oswald might have indeed possessed strategic information of value to the Soviets.
It is obvious that the navy was very concerned about Oswald. We know this from the record of the same day that the FBI was deciding against taking any further action. At 11:59 A.M. Lieutenant D. E. Sigsworth of ONI drafted, and Captain F. A. Klaveness released—for the chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Arleigh Burke—a cable to Moscow asking to be kept abreast of new developments on Oswald. The Sigsworth cable said "no record" of Oswald's clearance at Marine Corps headquarters had been found, but that Oswald had been an aviation electronics operator and "may have had access to confidential info." Actually, Oswald had access, at a minimum, to secret information while stationed at Atsugi as a consequence of his radar duties there. This much could have been ascertained by no more than a simple phone call to Oswald's former commander at Atsugi, John E. Donovan. "He [Oswald] must have had [a] secret clearance to work in the radar center," Donovan testified to the Warren Commission in 1964, "because that was a minimum requirement for all of us."
The November 4 cable from the chief of Naval Operations to Moscow makes it abundantly clear that the navy, at a high level, far from putting the matter to bed, wanted to know more. The cable concluded: "REQUEST SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS IN VIEW OF CONTINUING INTEREST OF HQ, MARINE CORPS AND U.S. INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES. 'INTELLIGENCE MATTER.' " Besides being routed to Moscow and many other navy addresses, the cable was also sent to army and air force intelligence, and to the FBI and the CIA. At the same time there were some curious details missing from the initial navy report on Oswald, details to which we will shortly turn.
Setting aside the defects in the November 4 chief of Naval Operations cable, what happened to the CIA copy of it after it entered the Agency? Again, the answer is that Oswald's early CIA files were sensitive security and counterintelligence matters. We know from the CIA's Oswald document lists prepared for the HSCA that the navy cable arrived in the Special Investigation Group (SIG) of Angleton's counterintelligence staff on December 6. The question is: In whose possession in the CIA had that cable been for the previous thirty-one days? The answer is that for those thirty-one days—November 4 through December 6—the CNO cable had crawled into the same dark corner of the Agency that the Snyder and Navy Liaison cables from Moscow had. This same fate befell the newspaper clippings as well. These clippings, three of them, along with a cable from Tokyo concerning Oswald's half brother, John Pic, and Snyder's first cable on Oswald, were buried in a Security Office file and did not circulate to the Soviet Russia division where, presumably, they should have been looked at by a wide array of the branches.
The date that Moscow cable 1304, the new stories, and Tokyo cable 1448 entered the Security Office file is uncertain, for the documents lists released in 1993 contain nothing that would help us to pin down the precise dates. It is possible these documents were in the CI/SIG file first and then later moved to the security office. We will return to these arcane early CIA files on Oswald in Chapter Four, but here it is sufficient to point out that some hungry black hole in the CIA seemed to be consuming every scrap of paper on Oswald in the days immediately following his defection, a black hole that kept the Oswald files away from the spot we would expect them to go—the Soviet Russia division. At the end of the black hole stands the date December 6 and a place: the Counterintelligence Special Investigation Group—CI/SIG—where, according to the information released by the CIA in 1993, the CNO memo and two Washington Star newspaper articles were originally located.
Is it possible the documents described above, whether in the CI/ SIG files or the Office of Security, were shown to the Soviet Russia Division until after the Kennedy assassination? It seems unlikely that a newspaper article that mentioned that the Russians were considering sending Oswald to a Soviet "institute" would not be shared with the appropriate analysts in the Soviet Russia Division unless the entire body of material on Oswald was considered too sensitive to share outside of OS and CI. It is conceivable that the Oswald black hole in the CIA was caused by a very sensitive Agency program, a program imperiled by Oswald's defection. Unless the CIA was wholly incompetent, it would have to have been in the throes of an investigation of Oswald's defection at this time. Moreover, that investigation, like the program Oswald's defection endangered, would have been known by only a handful of people in the CIA.
Finally, as mentioned above, the navy's apparent check into Oswald's past had some curious omissions. There is only one early document that qualifies as a sketch of what the navy knew about Oswald's past, and even this document is most noteworthy for what it leaves out—the sensitive part. We might do well to remember that this document was the November 4 CNO cable to Moscow. It is reasonable to assume that if the navy had found something troubling, they might not have wanted to send it via cable to Moscow. If the navy had looked carefully into Oswald's past, what sensitive nuggets would they have seen?
The answer is shocking, and all the more so if navy intelligence missed it. Oswald and his marine companions had walked patrol to guard a supersecret espionage weapon hidden in an airplane hanger. As a radar operator, he had also tracked this dark object with advanced height-finding radar equipment. This particular espionage weapon was then the single most important intelligence asset available to the United States. It was the one that produced the most critical intelligence on the Soviet ballistic missile program at the height of the missile bluff (1957-1960) crisis with Khrushchev: the U-2.
# CHAPTER THREE
# Top Secret Eider Chess
"It was a beautiful sight to watch," recalls Sam Berry, "when the U-2s would land—their final approach to the runway would sometimes be at less than fifty miles an hour." Sam was a coworker of Lee Harvey Oswald's at Atsugi, and remembers how the sleek U-2s made their effortless landings and how, when the pilots would disembark, "a crew would rush to throw a black sheet over their heads" to conceal who they were. "We had sometimes bumped noses with them," Berry says of the U-2 pilots. "We couldn't avoid it. And we'd talk to the guys from the U-2 squadron and they'd say it was just local recon, but we knew better." Indeed, everyone in Oswald's radar squadron knew better. They saw these incredible planes being fueled for hours, then departing early in the morning and not returning until late afternoon or evening.
"We were in a controlled squadron, and our barracks were right there adjacent to the airstrip at Atsugi," Donald Athey recalls of his stay at Atsugi Naval Air Station. He was a lieutenant in Oswald's marine unit, Marine Air Corps Station-1 (MACS-1), of Marine Air Group-11 (MAG-11), 1st Marine Air Wing (MAW). Athey, too, remembers how the U-2s "would take off and land right there, usually in the daytime. Our compound was adjacent to the airstrip, and the control center too." While the U-2 program had its own CIA control center, the marines that worked in the marine control center often watched these planes using their height-finding radar. "We could track the U-2, sometimes up to 100,000 feet," recalls Berry, "and then we lost them." Berry remembers hearing the U-2 pilots speak to the control tower. Athey recalled that on rare occasions the pilots "would check in with us at 60,000 feet and then check out as they reached 80,000 and kept climbing."
The U-2 program was TOP SECRET and more, but it was no secret to the marines in Oswald's unit. They saw the planes, they tracked them, and they even communicated with them. That is, until Oswald defected to the Soviet Union, which was the target of the U-2s' espionage mission. The ballistic missile information these dark planes from Atsugi collected as they overflew the Communist giant was vital intelligence for U.S. estimates of the Soviet Union's ability to wage nuclear war. What Oswald knew of the U-2 program before his defection is therefore a matter that deserves close attention.
# Detachment C
The newly released JFK files contain a small set of documents on the U-2 program. What the Agency has not blacked out are some of the details on the history of a U-2 operation called "Detachment C." The reason we have these documents is that someone from the House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) asked questions about it. The CIA's deputy director for science and technology (DDS&T) answered them. Even what little we have in these new documents is revealing.
"Detachment C advance party of security and communication personnel," a 1978 CIA memo to the HSCA began, "departed the U.S. for Atsugi, Japan, on 20 February 1957, the second echelon of administrative personnel departed on 4 March, and the main body of the detachment with two U-2 aircraft and equipment began deployment on 15 March." Detachment C was operational by the week of April 8, 1957, and "operating procedures and liaison" had been accomplished with the Atsugi Naval Air Station.
Detachment C was a CIA U-2 operation producing data vital to U.S. strategic intelligence, and Oswald, a trained radar operator, had a bird's-eye view of the operation from the runway to his radar bubble. The classification level of the U-2's intelligence information was very high. The CIA's (DS&T) answers to U-2 questions posed by the HSCA in 1978 were top secret with a further restrictive caveat. The top secret classification remains on all the pages of these documents, but the additional caveat for the intelligence associated with the program has been excised—almost.
In an apparent attempt to prevent the public from knowing the name of this intelligence "compartment" (intelligence jargon for a category of information, usually tied to a particular technical system), the CIA removed this part of the classification from the top and bottom of every page of the two separate but nearly identical documents which the Agency released in January 1994—except for one page. Just one slipped by. There, on the top and bottom of the page is the rest of the classification: "EIDER CHESS." How much did Oswald know about Detachment C? What did he know that could betray what the Americans had learned through EIDER CHESS intelligence channels?
# ". . . It's Moving over China!"
Atsugi was a "closed base," Special Agent Berlin noted in his March 10, 1964, Naval Investigative Service report, and "at the time, was the base for the Joint Technical Advisory Group, which maintained and flew recon[naissance] U-2 flights." Berlin had located and interviewed Eugene J. Hobbs, a marine hospital corpsman who had been stationed at Atsugi Naval Air Station while Oswald was there. During the interview, Corpsman Hobbs stated that it was "gossip around the base that the U-2s were taking recon flights over Russia." He also described a series of conversations he overheard about the U-2s flying over China, and stated that a naval commander had said "the flights would be the same as the ones the U-2s were making over Russia." Hobbs told Berlin that the U-2 missions over the Soviet Union were "common knowledge around the [Atsugi] base."
From November 20, 1957, through March 6, 1958, Oswald's unit, MACS-1, joined other marine units for maneuvers—code-named OPERATION STRONGBACK—in the South China Sea and the Philippines. MACS-1 left for the Philippines aboard the Terrell County, LST 1157, on November 20, 1957. The purpose of this operation was to prepare for American intervention in the Indonesian crisis in late 1957. This planned action in the Far East was paralleled by a crisis in the Middle East that featured a U.S.-backed force of 50,000 Turkish soldiers set to invade Iraq. Overlaying both situations was the larger context of the Soviet launch of a satellite— Sputnik—in October 1957, on the top of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). This event publicly dramatized the ongoing race to deploy ICBMs tipped with nuclear warheads, and Sputnik's success sparked U.S. fears that the Soviet Union was well ahead in this lethal new arms race.
MACS-1 landed and stayed a week on an island at the northern end of the Philippine archipelago, reboarded only to sail to Subic Bay, where they waited for another week, then returned to sea to join an invasion flotilla off Indonesia for a month. They returned to the Philippines, landing at Cubi Point just before January 1, 1958. They set up their radar bubble at Cubi Point Air Base, next to a special hangar. Inside it, the CIA often stored a U-2 reconnaissance plane. "I saw it take off, saw it on radar, and saw it land," recalls Oswald's commander, John Donovan, "and I saw it hand-pushed into the hanger." On this assignment, Oswald's unit had an additional mission with a direct connection to the U-2: sentry duty to guard the U-2 hangar.
That rather inglorious task which Oswald, like the other enlisted men, performed, did not curtail his interest in the U-2 when he was at his favorite place—drawing traces of aircraft trails with his grease pencil on the plotting board inside the radar bubble. Oswald's unit had not been operational very long before he noticed something interesting. Donovan describes what happened:
One time we were watching the radar there at Cubi Point and Oswald said, "Look at this thing." He had a trail in grease mark and he said, "This thing just took off from Clark and it's moving over China!" And I said, "You can't be right," and he agreed. A week later he saw it again, so several of us began looking hard and we saw it. Oswald was right, and we saw it so regularly that we started clocking them. I even called the duty officer about them and he said, "Look, fella, there's no planes flying over China." We knew better. We saw them all the time, mostly flying out of Cubi Point, but sometimes they flew out of Clark.
This story confirms what Hospital Corpsman Hobbs told the ONI in 1964 about the gossip at Atsugi in 1958. The CIA was flying U-2s over China as well as over the Soviet Union.
Oswald's unit later deployed (September 14 through October 6, 1958) to Ping Tong on the north side of Taiwan, and Donovan was his commander there too. Donovan recalls: "In Formosa [Taiwan] we were near the U-2 as well." There, Oswald spent many hours drawing traces of the U-2's tracks over the People's Republic of China.
The deployment of Oswald's unit occurred as a series of international crises escalated the U.S.-Soviet Cold War toward the brink of confrontation. The Chinese Communists, perhaps to embarrass Khrushchev, provoked a crisis by shelling Nationalist islands in the Taiwan Straits, taking advantage of an already simmering crisis in the Middle East. Eisenhower intervened in Lebanon and brushed aside the Chinese provocation. Khrushchev upped the ante by threatening Berlin, demanding an end to Western control of that encircled German city. Eisenhower forced Khrushchev to back down. Throughout this sequence, Eisenhower's toughness was more than bravado. He knew something—as we will shortly discuss in more detail—that made these decisions easier: The Soviet ballistic missile testing program had ground to a halt. The president knew this, in part, because of intelligence collected by the very U-2s Oswald was watching. It is reasonable, therefore, to try to determine if the CIA ever investigated what Oswald knew about the U-2 program.
# Claims of an Investigation at EI Toro
One day in November 1959—shortly after Oswald's defection—a group of strangers are alleged to have visited Oswald's former unit at the El Toro Marine Base. One of Oswald's marine coworkers, Nelson Delgado, recalled the experience to Oswald biographer Edward J. Epstein. Delgado told Epstein he "remembers a group of civilians in dark suits arriving in November with stenographers and literally taking over their headquarters company to question marines about Oswald." Delgado explained that "one by one" Oswald's marine associates "were ushered into their captain's office." According to Delgado, none of the marines were told who their interrogators were. That was and is most unusual. El Toro was a marine base, and it would have been natural for Naval Investigative Service (NIS) agents to come and ask questions, but such agents must—and always do—identify themselves when questioning military personnel in any official capacity.
Epstein recorded Delgado's vivid account of how the interrogation at El Toro proceeded:
When his turn came, Delgado recalls, he was asked his name, rank and serial number. Then one of the civilians shot quick questions at him concerning his job in the radar bubble, his knowledge of Oswald's activities and especially his opinion of the sorts of classified information to which Oswald had had access. A number of other marines in the unit recalled being asked the same questions as a stenographer typed away at her machine.
Researchers have been unable to identify the origin of this interrogation unit. Neither the FBI nor the Marine Corps has any record of this investigation, and both the OSI and the CIA have denied ever conducting it. The ONI and the NIS response to Epstein's Freedom of Information Act request was similarly uneventful: They told Epstein that "the report of the investigation was not in their files."
If Delgado's account of this investigation is true, who were these men in dark suits? It is not unreasonable to assume they were from the intelligence agency that had the most at risk with respect to U-2 operations when Oswald defected: the CIA. It would not have been abnormal for the Office of Security, which was the most likely element to be charged with protecting the overall security of the U-2 program, to have been conducting what, in military intelligence parlance, could be called a quiet "damage control" assessment. Oswald had worked at three locations in Asia, where one of the most sensitive CIA programs in the world was in progress, and he had then traveled directly to the very country against which this supersecret program was targeted. American intelligence methods and the lives of American U-2 pilots were potentially at stake.
Whether or not such an investigation—perhaps at a much higher level of classification than the confidential Navy and State Department cables on Oswald—was conducted, it should have been. The situation called for quick and accurate answers to the questions. Who was Oswald? What did he know? What damage could he do to the program? If such an investigation did not exist, it is reasonable to begin wondering why not. In this vein, one would be justified in asking if there had been some terrible lapse in U.S. counterintelligence or if Oswald's defection may have been planned by American intelligence. We know little about the November 1959 El Toro interrogation Delgado claims to have been part of. If it did occur, it fell into the same black hole that the confidential Navy and State Department cables from Moscow fell into at the CIA. The possibility that those cables—which described Oswald's stated intent to disclose secrets to the Soviets—were somehow lost in the CIA is close to zero. The State and Navy cables eventually surfaced, but no documents on an Agency damage assessment of Oswald's defection have yet emerged. Nevertheless, Donovan argues that Delgado would not tell a lie about an investigation such as this. Donovan is more cautious in the way he recalls the event. He recalls that there might have been a "light investigation." Interviews, such as they were, were conducted at Santa Ana, California, he says today.
The couple-of-civilians-snoop-around scenario led investigator-lawyer Mark Lane to argue that this investigation "was a cover investigation so it could be said there had been an investigation." This is but one of many possibilities. Given the sensitive nature of the U-2 program, one might advance the counterargument that resources would more likely be used in covering up an embarrassing internal investigation than leaving a deliberate trail to advertise it. For our purposes, however, we may proceed by observing that given Oswald's extensive knowledge of U-2 operations in Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines, the Soviets could be expected to be interested in him. Therefore, any American files on Oswald after his defection should have been carefully examined, stored, and controlled. As we shall see, they were.
Whether we look at Oswald as a "lone nut" or a "fall guy" in the assassination of John Kennedy, we know that he knew a lot about the CIA's U-2 program. Thus, it would have been odd for the CIA not to have pursued an investigation into the possible consequences of his defection to the Soviet Union. It would not have been unusual for a U-2 damage assessment to have been so highly classified that only a few people in the Agency knew about it. The program itself was restricted to those few people who had a legitimate "need to know," and these same restrictions would have applied to any security investigation of the program. The disclosure of information relating to the location of the U-2s, their personnel, logistical and security support, the frequency of their missions, and the countries against which they were targeted—all subjects upon which Oswald could offer the Soviets information—would reasonably be considered damaging to the national security.
Moreover, an assessment of the potentialities in the Oswald case would have been a security embarrassment to the CIA, whose U-2 program was facing stiffening competition from other technological innovations. The U-2 gave the Agency a major voice in the strategic debate at a seminal moment of the arms race. We still lack, however, hard evidence of any Oswald damage assessment—and this will likely remain the case. Even a "light" investigation into the potential damage if it fell into the KGB's hands would have been alarming enough to prompt a quick and quiet burial of the matter.
It seems prudent for the sake of analysis, however, that we should not proceed without at least examining what it was that the CIA would have discovered and likely concluded had it looked into the U-2 information in Oswald's past. These questions naturally arise: First, who would have been concerned about this in the CIA? And second, just how sensitive was Oswald's knowledge of the U-2 program?
# Who Should Have Examined Oswald's U-2 Background?
Even though the U-2 operations at Atsugi, Cubi Point, and Taiwan were very "closely held" (intelligence jargon meaning very limited distribution), Oswald obviously knew a great deal about the program. Thus it is only natural to wonder if the CIA was, as it properly should have been, aghast at the dangers presented by Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union. It seems probable that the CIA counterintelligence vacuum cleaner—which sucked in many of Oswald's early documents—was also the resting place for any Security Office files generated by the defection, including any assessment of the damage to EIDER CHESS.
The CIA could reasonably expect the KGB to be interested in Oswald, and the counterintelligence staff would have been a natural collection point in the Agency for his files at that time. The counterintelligence implications of the Oswald case were there from the very beginning and, as we will discover, would grow more acute right until the murders of Kennedy and Oswald. Quite apart from the U-2 considerations of Oswald's defection in 1959, the CI staff and its controversial leader, James Jesus Angleton, should have had many concerns. For example, they should have wanted to know about the defection's implications for the KGB's capability against CIA operations in Japan and every other place Oswald had been stationed. If Angleton and his staff were to get involved in a secret damage investigation in the wake of any defection to the Soviet Union, the logical person for him to call upon would be the chief of his own mole-hunting section, the Counterintelligence Special Investigation Group. That person at the time was Birch D. O'Neal. Therefore we should ask the question: Is there any evidence of O'Neal's interest in Oswald during the initial "black hole" period in November 1959?
The answer is yes. On Friday, November 6, 1959, Snyder's lengthier dispatch on Oswald's defection arrived at State Department headquarters in Washington. This document was in the possession of the FBI no later than the following Thursday, November 12, and was at the CIA, where fifteen copies were sent, no later than Friday, November 13. We can confirm that it was physically located at the CIA by this date because of a parenthetical entry on the CIA's document lists on Oswald prepared for the HSCA. The original CIA cover sheet is missing, which still prevents an authoritative determination on the precise office and person to whom it first went in the CIA.
We at least know, however, that this document was in fact in the CIA during the mysterious, or "black hole," period of November 3 through December 6. In fact, it falls nearly in the middle of this period. A kind soul to whom historians shall forever be indebted typed a bracketed note about this document on a CIA document list, which reads "[Received in CIA on 13 Nov 59]." Moreover, upon close examination there is some handwriting in the upper right-hand corner of the copy in the National Archives. We can easily read it because it was written so neatly. It says "O'Neal," almost certainly the very man we are looking for—chief of CI/SIG. That writing appears to be identical to O'Neal's writing elsewhere in the collection, and is thus hard evidence that Angleton's mole-hunting chief was scrutinizing these earliest of materials on Oswald.
The disheveled nature of Oswald's early CIA files makes it impossible to understand as much as we might otherwise, but the foregoing is clear evidence of CI/SIG receipt of several Oswald documents on December 6, 1959. This information was not publicly available until 1993, and much additional research will be necessary just to ensure all related records have been located. We now know that somebody in the CIA was examining a key Oswald document on November 13, and so we should consider whether the content of that document could help illuminate the threat posed to the U-2 program by Oswald's defection. The contents of Snyder's November 2 dispatch confirmed what those in the Agency who knew of the U-2 program should have feared the most—that Oswald had threatened to talk about more than radar. As previously discussed, in this dispatch Snyder offered a more complete version of the threat Oswald made in the American Embassy on October 31:
Oswald offered the information that he had been a radar operator in the Marine Corps and that he had voluntarily stated to unnamed Soviet officials that as a Soviet citizen he would make known to them such information concerning the Marine Corps and his specialty as he possessed. He intimated that he might know something of special interest [emphasis added].
Snyder's later theory that by "something of special interest" Oswald may have meant the U-2 program seems reasonable. The question is, how could the CIA possibly avoid drawing the same conclusion?
Among the concerns the Agency might have had about Oswald's intentions would certainly be the possibility of revelations about the U-2 in the media. Fortunately, from the Agency's perspective, this did not happen even after a U-2 was shot down in May 1960 in the Soviet Union. The American Embassy in Moscow had not notified the press of Oswald's threats at the time of his defection. Moreover, the only reporter who knew about it did not, for reasons we will examine in Chapter Five, use it. Oswald's threat to give up secrets to the Soviets remained classified until after the Kennedy assassination.
We may not find out any time soon—at least as far as hard documentary evidence is concerned—what the CIA concluded about Oswald's possible role in the May 1960 U-2 shootdown and about the related question of what else he might have compromised about American U-2 operations. In one sense, however, we don't have to. Something that Captain Donovan said right after the Kennedy assassination goes straight to the heart of the matter. Donovan explained that he "did not know whether Oswald actually turned over secrets to the Russians. But for security's sake it had to be assumed that he did." What Donovan said then is still the standard operating procedure for any intelligence organization today, and it was certainly true with respect to the U-2 program in 1959. Corpsman Hobbs pointed out to the ONI in 1964 that "one year after Oswald visited Russia, J. F. Powers [sic] was captured." ONI Agent Berlin's report concluded: "Since it was common knowledge around the base that the U-2s were being utilized for recon flights, Hobbs now believes that Oswald could have given that information to Russia."
It is reasonable to assume that someone at the CIA might have concluded the same thing that Corpsman Hobbs did. From the newly released files come fresh hints that someone took a hard look at what damage Oswald might have done to the U-2 program after he defected. This new detail has emerged: By August 19, 1960—three and a half months after U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers was shot down in the Soviet Union—all CIA personnel and every piece of their equipment at Atsugi had "cleared the base and turned the facilities back to the Navy." The Oswald defection in October 1959 must be considered in the context of his knowledge of the U-2 program. That this is so can readily be seen from examining how sensitive the U-2 program and Oswald's knowledge really were.
# Oswald and the U-2: How Sensitive?
The Soviet ballistic missile program began in spring 1957. Detachment C, the CIA U-2 spy mission at Atsugi Naval Air Station, Japan, was operational by the week of April 8, 1957. By March 1958, ten to fifteen Soviet ICBMs had been launched to distances of up to 3700 miles. Thus, Atsugi was an ideal location from which to launch espionage flights to collect the Far East end—presumably impact areas—of the evidence of these test launches. The first American intelligence report on a successful Soviet test launch of an ICBM landed on President Eisenhower's desk in late August 1957. Lee Harvey Oswald arrived at the Atsugi Naval Air Station on September 12, 1957. Twenty-two days later, the Soviet Union launched the Soviet satellite Sputnik on the tip of an intercontinental ballistic missile.
The Soviets followed with more launches, and an American attempt failed. This series of events jolted America's sense of its own preeminence in science and technology, and a top secret report by the Gaither Committee recommended that the United States engage in an all-out effort to close the "missile gap." Khrushchev fed these American fears by hinting at an intercontinental capability and his willingness to use it. The missile gap, however, was not—nor would it ever be—concrete. The deployments were anticipated, and CIA intelligence estimates in 1958 and 1959 projected the early prospects for Soviet ICBMs in the hundreds. Senator Stuart Symington predicted that the Soviets would have 3000 ICBMs by 1959.
The only reassuring factor in the rising hysteria about the perceived imminent missile gap was the U-2 program. Given the size of the Soviet Union, an assessment of the missile program required a global strategy. Allen Dulles, writing in 1963, recalled how it was in 1957 to 1958: "When the Soviets started testing their missiles, they chose launching sites in their most remote and unapproachable wastelands." The location of the U-2s at Atsugi was crucial in getting at these remote areas.
The U-2 was destined to lie at the heart of the U.S. intelligence debate over the nature and extent of the Soviet strategic threat. Difficulties developed in the Soviet test program, difficulties identified by the U-2 that led to an interruption of their missile testing program between April 1958 and March 1959. This negative intelligence provided by U-2 coverage vitiated against the doomsday predictions of Soviet ICBM deployments, allowing President Eisenhower to privately discount the missile gap threat. Publicly, however, Eisenhower faced newspaper journalists like the Alsop brothers, who wrote articles under such titles as "After Ike, the Deluge" and "Our Gamble with Destiny." Khrushchev attempted to cover for the slippage in the Soviet test program with threatening nuclear signals during the Lebanese and Berlin crises of 1958.
To counter Khrushchev's bullying tactics, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles proposed to make the U-2 program public after the launch of Sputnik, but Eisenhower declined to publicize the most important means of verification he had. Eisenhower, not wanting to give the Russians—who had been vigorously protesting the U-2 violations of their airspace—any diplomatic leverage, refused to declassify the program. So the U-2 program continued under tight security, and its missions in 1958 and 1959 were increasingly influential in steering the intelligence community toward a more realistic assessment of the Soviet threat. Based on U-2 coverage, U.S. intelligence had concluded that the expected Soviet ICBM deployments would take place in late 1959 instead of early 1959. By early 1960 a national intelligence estimate predicted that the Soviet Union would deploy thirty-five ICBMs by mid-1960, and 140 to 200 by 1961. In the end they deployed only four by 1961.
The critical intelligence provided by the U-2 program influenced the U.S. strategic calculus in the major crisis of 1957 to 1959. U.S. behavior changed from constrained to emboldened—notwithstanding the highly publicized missile gap myth—as the truth about the Soviet missile program emerged at the top secret level. An Americanbacked Turkish invasion of Syria to topple the pro-Soviet leadership was preempted by Sputnik and its aftermath, and the American invasion force poised to invade Indonesia in December 1957 was never sent in. Then, at this important junction, the Soviet launch program hit the rocks. Publicly, Khrushchev continued to brandish his missiles during the ensuing Middle East crisis of May to August 1958. For his part, Eisenhower, in a speech to the U.N. charged Khrushchev with "ballistic blackmail," but gave the order to intervene in Lebanon with American ground forces.
The Soviet reaction to the American and British troop landings in Lebanon was muted, but the unfolding crisis soon widened to the Far East. With the Americans in Lebanon, Chinese leader Mao Zedong, in a struggle with Khrushchev and wanting to embarrass him, saw an opportunity. He provoked a crisis of his own by shelling Chinese Nationalist islands in the Taiwan Straits in August. With the geopolitical initiative slipping away, Khrushchev launched an aggressive strategy by triggering a major crisis over Berlin. This crisis, in turn, created favorable conditions for a revolutionary success in Cuba. In the protracted Berlin crisis that ensued during the winter of 1958 to 1959, Khrushchev's renewed claims to strategic supremacy were the crucial linchpin in his attempt to deter the West while making demands.
The terms of Khrushchev's Berlin ultimatum included the demand that the city be internationalized and its ties severed with Bonn and the West. Distracted by the Berlin crisis, Washington did not effectively counter the unfolding situation in Cuba, a subject to which we will return in a later chapter because of its importance to Oswald. The Eisenhower administration's stand in the Berlin crisis, however, was resolute. This firmness surprised Khrushchev, who, in the end, backed down. The U-2 flights provided consistent evidence that Khrushchev's missile claims were a bluff, a crucial factor in Eisenhower's calculus in not letting the perceived missile gap soften his resistance to Khrushchev's pressures.
In short, the intelligence provided by this high-flying spy plane was the most important single source in the U.S. perception of the Soviet threat. This makes Lee Harvey Oswald's movements in the Far East all the more important, since they dovetail with the salient points of the U-2's contribution to the strategic debate in Washington. Oswald was at Atsugi from early September through late November 1957, a period that precisely overlays the launching of Sputnik and the early active phase of the Soviet ICBM test program. His participation in Operation Strongback maneuvers (November 1957 to March 1958) were part of the abortive U.S. invasion of Indonesia. During his short shore deployment at Cubi Point during the early weeks of 1958, he tracked U-2 overflights of China.
The "tracks" (routes) of these Chinese overflights, which Oswald personally plotted with his grease pencil, would have given the U.S. useful intelligence on Chinese military intentions, Sino-Soviet relations, and the unfolding politicomilitary struggle in the Chinese leadership. Similarly, Oswald's stationing in Taiwan paralleled the Taiwan Straits crisis in the fall of 1958, and Oswald's knowledge of U.S. military reactions would have been helpful to the KGB. In between the Cubi Point and Taiwan deployments Oswald was back at Atsugi. This period, from March to August 1958, was when the Soviet ballistic missile testing program ground to a halt, and the U-2 missions flown from Atsugi provided critical intelligence on this significant development in U.S.-Soviet strategic relations. After Taiwan, Oswald was back in Atsugi again, in October to November 1958, in the months leading up to Khrushchev's ultimatum over Berlin, when, again, flights from Atsugi could show only one thing: that Moscow had not resumed its testing program.
Unless the CIA never varied its flight activity, Oswald's general knowledge of the frequency of missions would have been useful to the KGB. The KGB would want to know what the Americans had learned of Soviet capabilities. Oswald also possessed knowledge of the U-2 flights over China—territory out of the range of Soviet radar—knowledge that would have been very valuable to the KGB.
There is circumstantial evidence that Oswald gave away something the Soviets used. The U-2 flew thirty penetration flights over Soviet territory between June 1956 and May 1960. Twenty-eight flights occurred prior to Oswald's defection in October 1959. After his defection, the next U-2 flight, on April 9, 1960, was successful, but the one after that, on May 1, was shot down. The pilot, Francis Gary Powers, survived, and his own analysis suggests that Oswald betrayed the height at which the U-2 flew. In Powers's view, Oswald's work with the new MPS 16 height-finding radar looms large. If the pilot reached this conclusion, the CIA should have, at the very least, considered it. Whether or not the CIA looked into the U-2 background of Lee Harvey Oswald, the Warren Commission should have as a routine part of their investigation. They did not, an omission that deserves closer attention.
# A Warren Omission: Oswald and the U-2
The Kennedy assassination led newspaper reporters to ask where the accused assassin had been stationed. It was not hard to find out that Oswald had served with the marines in Japan, the Philippines, and Taiwan, and that his former commander, John E. Donovan, was living at 2009 Belmont Road, N.W., in Washington, D.C. It is not surprising, then, that within a week of the Kennedy assassination, reporters had located Donovan. The possibility that the alleged assassin of Kennedy might also have been a traitor or saboteur was a story newspapers could hardly resist. What is surprising is that when called to testify at the Warren Commission hearings, Oswald's marine colleages were not questioned about the U-2.
"Oswald was a very unpopular man that month [November 1959]," Donovan told the Washington Evening Star in December 1963. As the former commander of Oswald's radar unit, Donovan knew Oswald's ability to handle radar equipment and radar-related information. "Clearly, for dealing with aircraft going from 500 to 2,000 miles an hour, you don't fool with nitwits," Donovan said on December 3. "He [Oswald] was a good man on radar, there's no denying it." According to Donovan, Oswald's defection "compromised all our secret radio frequencies, call signs, and authentication codes." Oswald "knew the location of every unit on the West Coast and the radar capability of every installation. We had to spend thousands of man-hours changing everything, all the tactical frequencies, and verify the destruction of the codes."
On May 5, 1964, Donovan told the Warren Commission the same story about how the military codes, call signs, and authentication procedures had to be changed once "we received word that he [Oswald] had showed up in Moscow." Donovan added,
He had the access to the location of all the bases in the west coast area, all radio frequencies for all squadrons, all tactical call signs, and the relative strength of all squadrons, number and type of aircraft in a squadron, who was the commanding officer, the authentication code of entering and exiting the ADIZ, which stands for Air Force [Defense] Identification Zone. He knew the range of our radar. He knew the range of our radio. And he knew the range of the surrounding units' radio and radar. . . . There are some things he knew on which he received instruction that there is no way of changing, such as the MPS 16 height-finder radar gear. That had recently been integrated into the Marine Corps system. It had a height-finding range far in excess of our previous equipment, and it has certain limitations. He had been schooled on those limitations. . . . He had been schooled on a piece of machinery called the TPX-1, which is used to transfer radio—radar and radio signals over a great distance. Radar is very susceptible to homing missiles, and this piece of equipment is used to put your radar antenna several miles away, and relay the information back to your site which you hope is relatively safe. He had been schooled on this.
All of Oswald's knowledge would have been valuable to the KGB and the Soviet military. It is interesting that this level of detail was not routinely available at Marine Corps headquarters or at the ONI and thus had not been provided to the FBI in the immediate wake of Oswald's defection in 1959.
In view of the public knowledge of the 1960 U-2 shootdown and the fact that President Eisenhower had lied about the program, it is noteworthy that there is not one reference to the U-2 in Donovan's testimony to the Warren Commission. Asked about this now, Donovan recalls:
I was briefed by the Warren Commission attorneys, and they were very hospitable, but they said, don't wander off the topic. These investigators know what you know and just need to fill in a couple of points. So I went in there and it was over so fast you wouldn't believe it. And when I came out there was one thing on my mind, and I said to one of them, "Don't you want to know anything about the U-2?" And he said, "We asked you exactly what we wanted to know from you and we asked you everything we wanted for now and that is all. And if there is anything else we want to ask you, we will." And I asked another friend of mine who had testified, "Did they ask you about the U-2?" And he said, "No, not a thing."
At least one member of the Warren Commission knew all about the U-2 program, as he might also have known what steps, if any, the agency took after Oswald's defection. Allen Dulles had been CIA director at the time of Oswald's marine service, and he remained director until Kennedy fired him at the end of 1961.
Shortly after the Kennedy assassination, Donovan made a phone call to the CIA. An internal CIA "incident report" written on December 1, 1963—eight days after the Kennedy assassination and the day before Donovan's interviews with the newspapers—recorded this call. This would suggest that before he talked to the media, Donovan told the CIA that he had known and worked with Oswald in 1959, and that he could provide "names and etc., of Oswald's intimate acquaintances during this period." Furthermore, Donovan told the CIA he had not previously related this information to the FBI or the Secret Service.
Donovan recalls how he came to talk with the CIA and the FBI just after the assassination. "A guy who had been in our unit was [then] a CIA agent," Donovan explains, "and I spoke with him and he said, 'You should call the Agency,' which I did, and I called the FBI too." On December 2 Jerome Vacek of the U.S. Marine Corps telephoned the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) to pass along that John Donovan "may be able to furnish information" on Oswald. An internal ONI memo of the following date noted, "The Federal Bureau of Investigation and the United States Secret Service were made cognizant of the foregoing on 2 December 1963."
"The thing that interested me," Donovan recalls, "was that all of these agencies asked a lot of questions, but only the CIA was interested in the U-2." Asked specifically if the CIA had posed questions to him about the U-2 program, Donovan responded, "You bet." Asked when the Agency posed these questions, he replied, "The CIA asked me questions about the U-2 seven to ten days after the Washington Star article, but no one else was interested." It is not surprising that the CIA was asking questions about Oswald and the U-2 in 1963—no more surprising than was their decision to close down U-2 operations at Atsugi after Gary Powers was shot down. Powers did not fly out of Atsugi. The only link between Atsugi and the shootdown of Powers was Lee Harvey Oswald.
Whether or not the CIA investigated the damage that Oswald could have done to the U-2 program, the point is that the Agency could presume that the KGB would be interested in Oswald's U-2 knowledge. Clearly, Oswald thought he had something of "special interest." According to information from the Soviets, Oswald said he was "prepared to offer something of interest. He knew about airplanes; he mentioned something about devices."
# CHAPTER FOUR
# "I Am Amazed"
"Why the delay in opening Oswald's 201 file?" the House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) asked the CIA in 1978. This was a valid and penetrating question. According to the February 1960 Agency Clandestine Services Handbook, 201 files were then opened on persons "of active operational interest at any given point in time." Operational interest is a broad phrase, and the Handbook spelled out three specific types it intended for 201 files: "subjects of extensive reporting and CI [counterintelligence] investigation, prospective agents and sources, and members of groups and organizations of continuing interest." In addition, the Handbook added a fourth category of individual:
It has become apparent that the 201 machine listings should include the identities of persons of operational interest because of their connection with a target group or organization even though there may not be sufficient information or specific interest to warrant opening a file.
Oswald fit these criteria, but the fact is that Oswald's CIA 201 file was not opened for over a year after his defection. The delay was not noticed by the Warren Commission, which paid scant attention to Oswald's CIA files. The HSCA, however, tried to find out why this delay occurred.
In order to study the early portion of Oswald's CIA records, we must understand why Oswald would have a 201 file at all; this perspective is necessary to appreciate the implications of his not having one. Oswald's 201 file was not opened until December 8, 1960, but its shadow reaches back into the events of October to December 1959 and presents us with one of the great quandaries of the Oswald case. The Agency's explicit reason for opening Oswald's 201 file in December 1960 was that he was a defector, a condition that had been clear from October 1959. Because no 201 file followed Oswald's defection, it seems reasonable to wonder how the Agency interpreted his defection. Abnormalities in Oswald's files like this one raise questions about his possible role in U.S. intelligence operations.
# The Late Opening of Oswald's 201 File: Part I
The HSCA investigators justifiably felt they had discovered something important when they learned that there was no proximate postdefection 201 file in the CIA on Lee Harvey Oswald. The HSCA began by searching for the person who finally opened the 201 at the end of 1960. HSCA investigator Dan Hardaway located and spoke with the enigmatic Ann Egerter, who had the fortune of having first Birch D. O'Neal, and second James Jesus Angleton, in her immediate chain of command. She was inside the most sensitive counterintelligence operation in the Agency: the mole-hunting CI/ SIG. Hardaway's notes of that encounter are more memorable than most such HSCA contact reports:
I contacted Ms. Egerter for an interview. Ms. Egerter said she had no knowledge of the assassination of John Kennedy and that she did not wish to submit to an interview. I told her we wished to talk about her knowledge of Lee Oswald. She said that she did not know anything about Oswald that was not in the papers, and really had nothing to tell us and would not talk to us. I informed Ms. Egerter that if she did not submit to an interview that I was afraid we would have to subpoena her.
Ann Egerter handled Oswald's files for the last three years of his life. For most of that time, nothing could go in or out of his file and no one could see it without Ann Egerter's permission. Hardaway was therefore justified in threatening to subpoena her testimony. Though she is no longer alive today, Ann Egerter changed her mind and eventually testified before the HSCA. The verbatum record of her testimony is still classified.
Fortunately, the HSCA did paraphrase a few important items from her testimony and put them into their final report. We know that on June 27, 1978, the doors in a room in the Rayburn Building of the House of Representatives were closed to the public so that the HSCA could take the "classified deposition of a CIA employee." The Agency's "201 files are opened when a person is considered to be of potential intelligence or counterintelligence significance," the anonymous "employee" testified, and the Oswald file was opened "because, as an American defector, he was considered to be of continuing intelligence interest."
We know that the "employee" doing the talking is Egerter because the Final Report read: "The Committee was able to determine the basis for opening Oswald's file on December 9, 1960, by interviewing and deposing the Agency employee who was directly responsible for initiating the opening action." Because of the CIA's 1992-1994 files release, we can be certain that person was Ann Egerter. All the House Select Committee could get out of Egerter was that she had opened the file after she saw Oswald's name on a list of defectors received from the State Department. This reply, while perhaps technically correct, is only remotely helpful. It begs this troubling question: If the CIA was willing to open a 201 file on Oswald for this reason in December 1960, why not open it in October 1959, when he actually defected?
In the end, and after much testimony, the HSCA resorted to a statistical analysis and found that for the period 1958 to 1963, a 201 was opened on a person immediately after that person's defection only twenty-five percent of the time. In the other seventy-five percent of the cases, the HSCA noted, the 201 opening was "triggered by some event independent of the defection." Based on this superficial analysis, the committee concluded that such a delay in 201 openings on defectors "was not uncommon." However, this analysis only confounded the issue, because it did not state if those seventy-five percent were cases like Oswald's, where the defection was known when it occurred. Put another way, in a quarter of all cases, defection led to a 201 opening, and might well have in the other cases were it not that other events came to light first. This statistical study did not consider whether the defectors without 201s were known defectors, and thus the study ignored the main question: Would a defection—once known and verified by the Agency—lead to a 201 file opening?
The committee's reasoning also seems flawed because defection itself is a "trigger" event—all the more so when supplemented with cable traffic from American Embassies in Moscow and Tokyo, military and civilian intelligence cables and memoranda, and considerable national and international press reporting. All of this and a lot more were loaded into the same shell when the Oswald "trigger" was pulled in November 1959. Much, much more.
There was a far deeper omission in the HSCA's analysis of the late 201 opening. Defection is a legal act, but espionage is illegal. It defies reason that a known defector who had threatened—in front of a U.S. Embassy official—to commit espionage would be the object of a 201 opening a year later just because his name appeared on a list of defectors. This is simply too great a flaw in the landscape of Oswald's CIA files to dismiss. It prompts suspicion that his files were deliberately handled in some special way. Otherwise, one would have to say that CIA was derelict.
In the 201 opening form filled out by Egerter, Oswald's defection is mentioned but not his threat to give up military secrets. Actually, Oswald's CIA 831A [Field Personality (201) Request] looks pretty threatening without the espionage information, with comments such as "Defected to USSR" and "Radar operator," and a check mark in the box for "Restricted File." But the failure to mention his threat to talk about radar to the Soviets is extraordinary. Thus, unless there is more to the CIA's relationship with Oswald than we are being told, one can argue that the failure of the CIA's mole-hunting experts to open a 201 file in 1959—when they knew that Oswald had defected and offered to give up radar secrets along with "something of special interest"—was a conspicuous breakdown of the Agency's security and counterintelligence functions.
So that there should be no question about the paramount importance of the timing and circumstances of Oswald's 201 file opening, it is worth revisiting what happened in 1978, when the HSCA deposed the director of Central Intelligence, Richard Helms, specifically on the question of the delay in the opening of Oswald's 201 file. The following exchange between HSCA questioner Michael Goldsmith and Mr. Helms took place:
MR. GOLDSMITH: . . . Why did it take more than one year to open a 201 file on Oswald? I might add, this is an issue which is somewhat controversial in the case.
MR. HELMS: I can't imagine why it would have taken an entire year. I am amazed. Defect to the USSR [in] October 1959. This [201 opening] is December 1960. There wasn't a 201 file already in existence, I am amazed. Are you sure there wasn't?
MR. GOLDSMITH: The opening of the file, according to the record, is 9 December 1960.
MR. HELMS: Yes, [approximately 1/2 a line still classified] but [2-4 words still classified] had they not opened a file a lot earlier?
MR. GOLDSMITH: According to the record that the committee has seen, the first opening of any file on Oswald was 9 December 1960.
MR. HELMS: I can't explain that.
Indeed he could not explain it, because it makes no sense at all. We will return shortly to the clue in Helms's statement—the section still partially censored—because it fits with other evidence of pre-201 file activity at the CIA on Oswald.
There is more to the HSCA probe, which refused to let this important question die. The HSCA insisted that the CIA indicate "where documents pertaining to Oswald had been disseminated internally and stored prior to the opening of his 201 file." The answer is disturbing. The CIA argued that "none of these documents were classified higher than confidential," and, further, that "because document dissemination records of a relatively low national security interest are retained for only a 5-year period, they were no longer in existence for the years 1959 to 63." None of this was close to the truth. The HSCA threw its hands up and resigned with the statement that "in the absence of dissemination records, the [late 201] issue could not be resolved."
It is unfortunate the CIA made such misleading statements to a congressional investigation. We have most of those records today, along with the internal dissemination documents the HSCA asked for—but did not get—back in 1978. What these documents show is eye-opening. The old argument that Oswald's pre-201 files were not important enough to keep turned out to be untrue in a particularly embarrassing way. The truth is that part of Oswald's pre-201 CIA files were classified SECRET EYES ONLY. This sort of mischief compromises not just the Agency's integrity on this issue, but also on the entire gamut of surrounding issues. Not surprisingly, there are more problems with the Agency's story about Oswald's pre-201 files, especially the claim that Confidential files had been destroyed. This, too, turns out to be wrong. The truth is that the CIA kept Oswald's Confidential files. We have them today. These files were stored in some sensitive and revealing places, places we will visit at the end of this chapter.
So why the bogus story about missing documents? Perhaps we should have a whole new subdiscipline for contemporary historians who try to wade through the deceitful maze of Cold War counterintelligence. In practice, this story functioned as a smoke screen preventing further disclosure of Oswald's CIA files—especially the early ones. The idea is this: We have nothing because we destroyed what we had. At the same time, this story reinforced the fictitious notion that the Agency's preassassination interest in Lee Harvey Oswald was superficial: We got rid of his files because we were not interested in him. Problems with this begin, however, the moment you think about it.
The story that a marine who defected and threatened to give military secrets to the enemy was judged to be of only "relatively low national security interest" is dubious. The fact that the HSCA was misled to adds a dramatic and tragic perspective to this coverup, and impresses one with the lengths to which the CIA was prepared to go to protect the secrets that lay in Oswald's files. Spinning tales is not done for sport, but rather to protect secrets. Oswald's early files are astonishing to read. They establish beyond any doubt that the CIA had a keen interest in him from the very day of his defection.
# CI/PROJECT/RE
CIA Director Helms's testimony contained this partial—because some words were redacted—question: "Had they not opened a file a lot earlier?" This question is worth exploring based upon the internal record now available to us. Let us revisit the paper trail inside the CIA in the immediate wake of Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union.
We must begin with what we have previously labeled the documentary "black hole" in the CIA's Oswald files, the period from November 4 to December 6, 1959. During this time, the arrival and movement of all incoming documents on Oswald—even news clippings—are seemingly impossible to trace. To this day, the Agency has not properly accounted for the internal distribution of these documents. We now know that these documents entered the CIA, and we have fragmentary but growing evidence of early files that were both substantial and intriguing. At the end of this chapter we will offer additional specific examples of these files. Now we will focus on one such file and pick up the trail where three documents told a troublesome story about Oswald, a story the public would not learn about until after JFK's death.
These three documents are the two Moscow cables, one from Snyder on October 31 and one from the Navy Liaison on November 2, which told of Oswald's intent to reveal radar secrets. The third is the November 2 dispatch from Snyder that included the additional detail about "something of special interest." How can we find out how the Agency reacted to these startling cables? Remarkably, answers are in the newly released JFK files. In spite of the obstacles presented by the CIA's record-keeping on Oswald, we can now reconstruct the path these crucial documents took inside the Agency. Moreover, what we find in these documents is not only the classified story of Oswald's threat to commit espionage, but also what the CIA decided to do about it.
Here is the sequence from the time of the defection. The CIA acknowledged it received the Snyder cable, probably on Wednesday, November 4, because that is when the State Department also sent it to the FBI. The CIA acknowledges it received the Navy Liaison cable, and it is likely this also happened on November 4, because we know from Navy records that is the date the Navy sent it. The CIA's records show it received the "something of special interest" dispatch and we know that it was received on Friday, November 13 probably by chief mole-hunter Birch O'Neal, whose signature is on the dispatch. These documents must therefore have formed a file with identifying numbers or letters, at least in CI/SIG. Evidence of these files is still accumulating, and we will return to them in a later section of this chapter, where we will examine some of Oswald's early Security and Counterintelligence records.
For the moment, we need to focus on what the CIA actually did after Oswald defected and threatened to commit espionage. What the documents show is hard evidence of keen CIA interest in Oswald during the November 4 to December 6 "black hole" period. A single document which has emerged is significant. The CIA did not share this document with the Warren Commission in 1964, possibly because its existence suggests that the Agency's projection of only trivial preassassination interest was misleading. This document shows that on Monday, November 9, 1959, someone in the CIA put Lee Harvey Oswald on the "Watch List:" meaning that as of that date the CIA authorized the illegal opening of his mail.
"SECRET EYES ONLY," someone in a supersecret compartment of James Angleton's counterintelligence staff wrote on the notecard which put Oswald on the Watch List. In 1975, the CIA explained to the Senate the criteria for putting someone on this list:
Individuals or organizations of particular intelligence interest [one should also add counter-intelligence] interest [sic] were specified in Watch Lists provided to the mail project by the Counter-intelligence Staff, by other CIA components, and the FBI. The total number of names on the Watch List varied, from time to time, but on the average, the list included approximately 300 names including about 100 furnished by the FBI. The Watch List included the names of foreigners and of United States citizens. [First brackets and underline in original]
Thus, this SECRET EYES ONLY document proves that in November 1959 Lee Harvey Oswald joined a select set of 300 people whose mail was opened by a highly sensitive, and very illegal, CIA program: HT/LINGUAL
What is more, this piece of evidence proves Oswald's status and makes the late 201 issue all the more controversial. The talk about needing a "trigger" for a 201 on Oswald is silly because of his presence on the Watch List. The absence of a 201 file was a deliberate act, not an oversight. Moreover, this particular configuration of being on the Watch List without a 201 is another anomaly that encourages speculation about whether Lee Harvey Oswald's defection could have been designed as part of a U.S. operation from the beginning, or if an operation was built around his defection after the fact.
While the Warren Commission never knew about the mail intercept program or Oswald's entry on the HI/Lingual list, the House Select Committee on Assassinations did find out. Naturally, the HSCA wanted to know who put Oswald on it. On August 15, 1978, the CIA responded to the HSCA's request.
The CIA had much to explain. To begin with, on the top right-hand corner of the notecard is typed "CI/PROJECT/RE." Under this is a date—November 9, 1959—which is also typed, and underneath the date is handwritten "7-305." Finally, underneath that number is handwritten "N/R-RI 20 Nov. 59." The CIA explained these notations in this way:
The office within the CIA staff responsible for the exploitation of the material produced by mail intercept in New York was known as the "CI/Project," a cover title to hide the true nature of its functions. . . .
"RE" represents the initials of a CIA employee now retired under cover. The presence of the initials indicates that on 9 November 1959, RE placed Oswald's name on the "Watch List" for the reason given on the card, to wit, "Recent defector to the USSR—Former Marine."
The number 7-305 indicates the communication (not necessarily written) to the Office of Security informing the latter of the Staffs interest in seeing any mail either coming from or going to Lee Harvey Oswald in the Soviet Union.
N/R-RI, 20 Nov. 59—this notation indicates that a name trace run in central files resulted in a no record on 20 November 1959.
This response, in the CIA's view, was sufficient to explain both the significance of "CI/PROJECT/RE" and the handwritten notations on the November 9, 1959, Watch List card.
A closer analysis of the two handwritten entries is fascinating. The "N/R-RI," upon further reflection, would appear to mean "No Record, Records Integration Division." This is suitably close to the Agency's explanation, and so there seems no need to focus on semantic differences between "central files" and "Records Integration Division." The number 7-305, however, is worth a closer pass. The Agency says it is only a reference to a communication between the counterintelligence staff and the Office of Security.
According to the Agency's 1978 explanation of how the HTLINGUAL program worked, the Office of Security played an important role:
From the beginning until its end, the Agency's Office of Security controlled and operated the mechanics of procurement with members of the Post Office. The Counterintelligence Staff assumed the responsibility for the translation and analysis of the material both as consumer and for dissemination to selected officers in the Agency.
Thus, it would make sense for the person working in CI/PROJECT who filled out the opening Lingual index card to enter some number or designator—such as 7-305—right on the card which referred to a communication with the Office of Security.
What is fascinating about the number 7-305 is what the Agency did not say about it. It would appear that this number has two parts. Moreover, it is possible that the number "7" refers to the communication, perhaps a request, written or verbal, while the number "305" is the date. It is not uncommon in intelligence work to refer to dates by their ordinal number on the Julian calendar. If this is true, the number "305" would be the same as saying November 1, which is the 305th day of the year 1959.
It seems more than a coincidence that a number possibly referring to the day after Oswald's defection appears on his first HT-LINGUAL index card. Oswald has one other HT-LINGUAL index card, dated August 7, 1961, which has three similar handwritten references to communications with the Office of Security. The first is illegible, but can be partially read as 9-2?0, while the other two are clearly 10-288 and 11-323. All these numbers could refer to days in 1961. There are still difficulties with this analysis, and there may be another explanation for these numbers. For the time being we will note that someone in the CI/PROJECT office called or sent a note to the Office of Security very soon after Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union.
# Oswald's Early CIA Files: OS-351-164, "CI/SI," and 74-500
The large new release of documents directed by the JFK Assassination Records Act allows us to fill in considerable detail about Oswald's early CIA files. One of the earliest files associated with Oswald is OS-351-164, the "OS" being an acronym for the Agency's Office of Security. Cables and news clippings on Oswald that were put into the file beginning as far back as Oswald's defection in 1959 were in this file. The first document is Snyder's cable from Moscow reporting Oswald's defection and his threat to give up radar secrets. The second is a Washington Post clipping entitled "Ex-Marine Asks Soviet Citizenship."
Documents were also put into Oswald's counterintelligence file, now referred to variously in CIA documents as Oswald's "CI/SI" file or CI "soft file." What these letters tell us is that the CI/SIG mole-hunting unit, like the Security Office, had an early file on Oswald. Newspaper articles about Oswald's defection that first weekend were placed in both these files in an interesting way. The Star coverage (two articles) was put in his CI/SI file and the Post coverage (one article) was put in OS-351-164. Beyond who read which newspaper, that distinction tells us little. The prudent way to look at these documents registers is as incomplete records. We cannot even be sure that 351-164 was a security number exclusively for Oswald. It has yet to appear on a document under Oswald's name on the subject line. While it would be startling, it is not impossible that 351-164 belonged to another person. For our purposes, however, it appears to function as a security number for Oswald, as documents are periodically added to this file up to the time of the assassination.
Robert L. Bannerman was the Deputy Director of Security in 1959. In a recent interview he responded to this question: How did the Office of Security react to Oswald's defection? "Jim Angleton was in on this," Bannerman replied, and he emphasized how OS cooperated with Angleton's Counterintelligence Staff and others after the news of the defection arrived. "We were calling in all the people in all the areas," Bannerman recalled, "who might have something." As to who in OS was privy to this effort, Bannerman stated, "We had a certain amount—most of my staff—Paul Gaynor, on my staff, was one who was very active in handling that end of the business, along with Bruce Solie."
Bannerman recalls nothing else about Oswald's defection. It is fair to point out that the event was over thirty-five years ago and that, as the number-two person in the Office of Security, he may have been too senior to have been absorbed in the details of whatever the "business" was. At least Bannerman remembered who was in on it. We would be even more fortunate if Angleton's mole-hunting lieutenant, Birch O'Neal, would tell us what he remembers. O'Neal is possibly the person most knowledgeable about Oswald's CIA files alive today. Now in his eighties, O'Neal has so far refused to comment.
A key document is conspicuously absent from the OS-351-164 and CI/SI files as described in the 1978 lists provided to the HSCA. It is Snyder's dispatch #234. What a strange coincidence that the document with the most foreboding piece of information—Oswald's threat to give the Soviets "something of special interest"—is one whose initial resting place in the CIA cannot be determined. This does not inspire confidence in the Agency's capability to monitor, let alone control itself. The 1978 CIA Oswald document lists have a column titled "Location of Original," and for Snyder's #234 it says "201-0748009," which is not an Oswald file at all. It is the 201 number for the American Consul in Moscow, Richard Snyder. Moreover, a close look at the copy in the National Archives suggests that it is possible that the original number might have been excised and Snyder's 201 number typed in over it at some later point.
Snyder's 201 number did not exist at the time the original document was created. Not even close to it. Snyder earned the honor of a CIA 201 file after the Kennedy assassination when Angleton's mole-hunting activities intensified. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the original location designator was Oswald's. A bracketed comment under the entry for this document (Moscow dispatch 234) in a CIA document register states, "Received in CIA on 13 Nov 59." The document was there all along, right from the beginning. The lack of the correct file number invites attention. This means the loss of the chain of possession and therefore our ability to determine responsibility. Nevertheless, it would make sense if it were either OS or CI—or both, because there is no doubt that the document describes Oswald's threat to commit espionage, and that this threat should have been taken seriously.
So far we have said nothing about the Soviet Russia (SR) Division. Oswald had defected to Russia. Was SR informed? If not, why not? Wouldn't SR have had a keen interest in the Oswald defection? We are still acquiring the information with which to begin answering these questions. Another early number associated with Oswald was "74-500," a number that would be put on an FBI report in May 1960, which we will discuss in Chapter Ten. This number, however, meant "Russia-miscellaneous," and was maintained by the Soviet Russia Division.
If Oswald was just a normal tourist or legitimate traveler to the Soviet Union, the SR/10 branch, known as the "Legal Travelers" branch, would have been interested in him. "We would piggy-back on their perfectly legal reasons for going there," Paul Garbler explained, "tourists, visiting professor, etc." Garbler was chief of SR/10 in 1959. "We would brief them to be passively aware," he states. "They were not supposed to take specific actions, but sometimes this rule was violated." Garbler has no recollection of Oswald, however, until much later. Garbler does not recall seeing Snyder's cable or the Navy Liaison cable from Moscow. This seems unusual.
Even more unusual is this: When a major FBI report on Oswald arrived in May 1960, it was routed to SR/10, but Garbler says it was not sent to him. Garbler's memory could be faulty, but if he is correct, then the first FBI report on Oswald passed through SR/ 10 without coming to the attention of the branch chief. "I do not recall having heard about Oswald," Garbler maintains, "until after I had been in the Soviet Union" two years later.
The 74-500 number was not put on any other Oswald documents, although "74" would turn up on his 201 opening sheet because it is the CIA country code for Russia. A branch chief in the Soviet Russia Division who was watching Oswald worked in SR/6, the "Soviet Realities" branch. In that branch someone was keeping a "soft file" on Oswald, a subject to which we will return in Chapter Eleven.
Meanwhile, we still have some loose ends to cover in Moscow, where Oswald's defection was still in progress.
# CHAPTER FIVE
# The American Girls in Moscow
"She was quite a good-looking woman," Snyder remembers of Aline Mosby. "I saw her naked once." That moment had been innocent on Snyder's part, for he had really had no choice in the matter. Under the circumstances, Mosby had probably been extremely happy to see Snyder. The attractive UPI reporter had made the mistake of getting involved with a young Soviet man who, Snyder believes, "was either KGB or had come under KGB control." The KGB was ever present in the lives of the American journalists in Moscow, always lurking in the background and constantly devising schemes to entrap and recruit them.
"Aline had met him downtown," Snyder recalls, "at the Aragvi Restaurant," a popular Georgian restaurant and hangout in Moscow. "He put a pill in her champagne, and the drink went to her head. She went outside to get air, and that is the last thing she remembers. She passed out right there on the curb." Snyder was in his office when the Soviet Foreign Ministry called on the telephone. They explained there was an American who had gotten into trouble, and that the Moscow police had taken her to a vytrezvitel, which is Russian for a "sobering-up station."
"I went down there," Snyder says, "and they took me up to the women's ward. Aline was lying on a cot, and a big Soviet woman was standing there who looked more imposing than a German soldier from a World War Two movie." The large woman glared at Snyder and yanked away the blanket that had been covering Aline. "She had been stripped naked," Snyder recalls, and was still woozy from being drugged. The Soviet woman jerked Aline off the cot like a rag doll and shoved her into Snyder's arms. "You hold her," the woman ordered Snyder, who put one hand under each arm to balance Aline.
So there the American consul was, holding the naked Mosby in his arms. It was an unusual role for a diplomat, but he had no choice but to help as the Soviet woman, piece by piece, dressed the drugged American reporter. Mosby could not be accused of leading a dull life in Moscow. While she enjoyed the diplomats, defectors, and tourists she moved among in Moscow, Aline Mosby was not a CIA informant and had never applied to work for the Agency. The same was not true for another woman, Priscilla Johnson, the only journalist besides Aline Mosby who succeeded in getting an interview with Lee Harvey Oswald.
# The Case of the Two Priscillas
"Screwball," said a CIA employee who had known Priscilla Johnson at Harvard. "Goofy," and "mixed up," said an April 1958 CIA message characterizing Johnson at the time she had applied for CIA employment in 1952. These unkind, condescending words were accompanied, however, by "excellent scholastic rating" and "thought [to be] liberal, international-minded, and anti-Communist."
Priscilla Johnson came from a wealthy Long Island family and had a master's degree from Radcliffe College. Perhaps the general political inquisitiveness of this intelligent girl rendered her insufficiently malleable for work with the CIA, but it was her associations with left wing organizations like the United World Federalists (UFW) which, in the end, became the red flag that made her unattractive to the CIA.
"Security disapproved," wrote Sheffield Edwards, CIA security officer in 1953, at the end of an investigative process that lasted more than six months. By this time—April 13—the point was moot because Priscilla had withdrawn her application. In fact, in April 1953 she was working for Senator John Kennedy.
While membership in organizations like the UFW were an obstacle to Priscilla Johnson's application for CIA employment, the same was not true for someone else she met in the UFW. He was Cord Meyer, a man whom Johnson says eventually went on to become "the brains behind the CIA program to fund left wing publications." The umbrella organization for these publications, according to Johnson, was the Congress for Cultural Freedom, and the CIA was the "covert" source for its funds. Its publications were "respected Cold War liberal" journals, she recalls, like Encounter and Survey, which I did some writing for."
CIA interest in Priscilla Johnson was reopened in 1956. On August 8, Chief, CI/Operational Approval and Support Division (CI/ OA) submitted a new request to a Mr. Rice in the deputy director for security's office. This was a standard CIA form asking for approval of operational use of Johnson, and it was accompanied by a CIA standard form 1050, Personal Record Questionnaire. The questionnaire listed Priscilla's previous work in 1955 and 1956 as a translator for the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, and also her "freelance" writing for several publications, including the New York Times and the North American Newspaper Alliance.
On August 23—and in spite of the 1953 security disapproval-a CIA Security Office and FBI records check was completed without adverse comment. This information was passed in a Security Office memo from Robert Cunningham back to the requesting counterintelligence element, CI/OA. The Cunningham memo partially illuminates the original CI/OA request. For example, it said, "Pursuant to your request, no other action is being taken at this time." In other words, the chief of CI/OA had specifically requested that no further action, which presumably included further investigation, about Johnson be carried out. It also said this about Johnson: "who is of potential interest [approximately four to five words redacted]." The redacted words were probably a name or element in the CIA's Soviet Russia Division, most likely SR/10, the branch that handled "legal travelers" to the Soviet Union.
We may surmise that SR/10 was behind the request for operational approval because of a CIA document five months later. On January 25, 1957, SR/10 sent a standard form to Chief CI/OA asking for cancellation of the approval for Johnson's operation use. In Form 937's box "Reason for Cancellation" was this typed note: "SR/10 has no further operational interest in subject [Johnson]. Please cancel."
To understand the significance of this form, we must return to the 1956 Cunningham memo of August 23. There is something terribly wrong about the contents of this CIA document. It said that Security Office files showed Priscilla's middle initial was "L for Livingston and is not R." That the Security Office had uncovered this kind of error is perhaps understandable, but the next sentence was extraordinary: "She was apparently born 23 September 1922 in Stockholm, Sweden, rather than 19 July 1928 at Glen Cove, New York." The Cunningham memo made no attempt to explain this transformation. Instead, the memo rather matter-of-factly proceeded to explain the new history of Priscilla this way:
She was utilized by OSO in 1943 and 1944. Clearance was based on Civil Service Commission rating of eligibility which in turn was based on a favorable investigation and record checks. An FBI record check completed 21 August 1956 was returned NIS [Naval Investigative Service].
The 1928 birth date carried in Priscilla Johnson's CIA records for the preceding four years could not be reconciled with this new data unless a fifteen-year-old girl, not yet out of high school, had been working for the Office of Special Operations during World War Two.
The Cunningham memo is all the more incredible because it makes no attempt whatsoever to reconcile the incongruity between these two seemingly different Priscilla Johnsons, one an OSO veteran at the time the other was a child. Moreover, this time there was no mention of adverse information about Priscilla's left wing activities. There appears to be too many egregious errors by the Office of Security, and therefore this story does not sound believable.
The bizarre story of the CIA's 1956 renewed scrutiny of Priscilla Johnson does not end with the Cunningham memo. If we back up one step for a closer look at the August 8 request for operational approval, we notice something weird about the CIA standard form 1050, Personal Record Questionnaire, which accompanied it. The questionnaire's contents purport to be about the Priscilla born in New York on July 19, 1928. Yet it is strange that Priscilla's memberships in professional and social organizations, her political affiliations, contacts, acquaintances, brothers, sisters, and relatives, were all listed as unknown. The form did manage to correctly name her parents, Stuart and Eunice Johnson. Priscilla's alleged signature, however, is now too faint to read, as are the date and the city and state where she supposedly signed it. Moreover, it was witnessed by someone who lived in Somerville, Massachusetts. Priscilla was in New York during August 1956.
Perhaps the Office of Security has an excuse for why it failed in 1956 to furnish CI/OA with the same "derogatory" information on Priscilla that it furnished in 1953. That excuse might be that the second, Swedish-born, Priscilla Johnson—whether she was a real person or a cover story—had a good security record. Historians now have the unenviable task of trying to figure out whether the CIA was inventing a false Priscilla Johnson or whether it was incapable of telling the difference between two people born five years and three thousand miles apart—not to mention possessing different middle names. The Central Intelligence Agency owes the American public an explanation for the case of the two Priscillas, if for no other reason than because a Priscilla Johnson—whom we know to be real—did in fact conduct the longest interview on record with the accused assassin of President Kennedy.
The most important question is this: What was the real Priscilla Johnson doing that led the CIA to reopen its interest in her in 1956? The answer might lie in an Agency interest about her 1955 to 1956 sojourn in the Soviet Union. It would not be unusual for the Agency to want to debrief someone who had recently returned from there. But why do two Priscillas then appear in the CIA's files? To proceed logically here, from Priscilla's return from Russia in April 1956 to the emergence in August of the CIA two-Priscillas problem requires more information than we have in the files. One new lead comes from a heretofore unconnected recollection of Priscilla's. It concerns a neighbor, who was a close friend and regular tennis partner of Stuart Johnson's, Priscilla's father. Sometime soon after her return from the Soviet Union, this friend asked Stuart if he might speak with Priscilla about her experiences in Moscow. The meeting took place, and Priscilla told the man what she could remember about her stay in Moscow. That man, who had known her since she was a small child, was F. Trubee Davidson. He worked for the CIA.
Looking back on her experience now, Priscilla believes it is possible that Davidson "was waiting for me to grow up to recruit me." It is an intriguing thought, and one that she has had about one other person too. "The other person who was waiting for me to grow up," she recalls, "was Cord Meyer." While we do not know the extent of Cord Meyer's knowledge or interest in Johnson up to the time that the CIA closed out its interest in her in January 1957, he does show up the next time they become interested.
More than a year after this close-out, the CIA again reopened its interest in Priscilla Johnson. On April 10, 1958, CIA headquarters sent a cable to a place that is still classified but which, from all indications, was one of its stations in Western Europe. It contained this detailed and condescending description of Johnson referred to earlier. It is worth repeating in full:
Subj DOB July 1928. MA Radcliffe 1952. From wealthy Long Island Famil[y]. Excellent scholastic rating. Application [for] KUBARK [CIA] employment 1952 rejected because some associates and memberships would have required more investigation than thought worthwhile. Once [a] member of United World Federalists ; thought liberal, international-minded, anti-communist. Translator, current Digest of Soviet Press, New York, 1954. Considered by present KUBARK employee [who] knew her [at] Harvard to have been "screwball" then; considered "goofy, mixed up" when applied KUBARK employment. No recent data. No Headquarters record [of] prior KUBARK use.
The releasing official listed on the bottom left of this cable was then the CIA's chief of Investigations and Operational Support. His name was Cord Meyer, Jr.
Again the question is: Why the renewed CIA interest in Priscilla? The answer: Because she was planning to return to the Soviet Union. Cord Meyer's cable in April occurred after her visa application, during the period she was waiting for it to be approved. "I went to Cairo in February 1958," Priscilla remembers, "to see a boyfriend. Then in March of 1958 I went to Paris, and did a little translating in a building on Haussmann Boulevard." There she worked for "someone I knew either for Radio Liberty or the Congress for Cultural Freedom." While in Paris she applied to the Soviet consulate to go to the U.S.S.R. It "took a couple of months" for the Soviets to approve it, and Priscilla arrived in Moscow for the third time on July 4, 1958.
On May 6, 1958—again, possibly on behalf of SR/10-Chief, CI/ OA submitted a request for an operational approval on Johnson. The operation for which she was being considered is still classified, but we may presume that SR/10 wished to take advantage of her as a "legal traveler" to the Soviet Union in some sort of passive collection role. This time the Security Office furnished a "summary of derogatory information." Whereas in 1956 the Office of Security failed to furnish CI/OA the 1953 "derogatory" information on Priscilla, there was no problem finding this information in 1958. The April 10 Cord Meyer cable, for example, made clear reference to her earlier security rejection.
The story after the Cord Meyer "screwball" cable is intriguing. There is evidence to suggest that the CIA, in June 1958, discovered the problem of the two Priscilla Johnsons. A June 6, 1958, internal CIA handwritten note "for the record" on SO 71589, which is definitely one of the real Priscilla's CIA numbers, reads:
SO stated this date that which had been previously written was being revised and should be coming down today. In addition [name redacted] stated that [name or office redacted], who is handling the memo, doubted if subject would be utilized because of the record.
This may indicate that the Stockholm Priscilla, whose Security Of fice and FBI records checks had been favorable, was being revised to reflect the real Glen Cove, New York, Priscilla. The author of this June 6 memo and office from which it came are still classified, but it is clear that the author, whoever it was, felt that a request to use Johnson in an operational role in the summer of 1958 had been or was about to be killed.
The ax came three weeks later, on June 27, as the result of a memorandum from an office whose identity is still classified. In fact, the June 27 memo itself is still entirely classified, and we know of its existence only because of a passing reference to it in another CIA memorandum almost six years later. The possibility exists that while SR/10 had again initiated a request to use Johnson, it was a different office that killed the plan. This is at least suggested by the fact that SR/10 did not submit a Form 937 canceling their interest until August 28.
Fourteen and a half months later, Priscilla Johnson was on her way back to Moscow again, as a reporter for the North American News Alliance (NANA). While she was in an airplane somewhere over the Atlantic, another reporter, Aline Mosby, managed to land the first formal interview with Lee Harvey Oswald.
# "We Never Got Together for Dinner"
The day Oswald defected, many reporters tried to pry his story loose from him. However, it was not until the attractive Aline Mosby "murmured some pleasantry" to Oswald that he not only spoke more than two sentences to a reporter but also flattered her because she was "a woman." UPI Bureau Chief Bob Korengold probably sent Mosby to Oswald's room with that very thought in mind. After Mosby's brief but successful encounter that Saturday, Korengold explained that "I subsequently telephoned Mr. Oswald, who finally agreed to give an interview with Miss Mosby." (Mosby recalls that it was she who arranged over the telephone for the interview.) Newsweek war correspondent Albert Newman interviewed Mosby in Paris in 1964, and fixed the date of her two-hour interview with Oswald as Friday, November 13, 1959.
"I speculated whether he was flattering me," Mosby later wrote, "because he was eager for publicity, or if he preferred to talk to women because he resented men and the authority they stood for." For her part, Mosby said she found Oswald "attractive," and noted how he was "neatly dressed in a suit, white shirt and tie, that had the air of his 'Sunday best.' " Aline Mosby noticed a lot more about defectors than their politics. She classified them into different categories, tried to psychoanalyze them, and seemed to enjoy the personal interaction with them more than their stories.
Mosby triumphantly entered Oswald's room that Friday, the first reporter to succeed in doing so. "I selected a red plus[h] chair by the window," Mosby later wrote, and "he sat opposite me in another chair in the baroque room resplendent with gilt clocks and chandeliers." Mosby was soon disappointed, however. "He talked almost nonstop," she complained. "He sounded smug and self-important. And so often was that small smile, more like a smirk . . ."
Oswald's self-absorption was frustrating for Mosby. "I felt we were not carrying out a conversation," she said, and remarked how she had difficulty getting "a word in edgewise." Oswald droned on and on about his ideology and the Soviet Union, while Mosby "tried to steer his conversation back to his mother and his early childhood." Oswald, only too happy to talk about himself, disclosed information freely about his past, until Mosby asked him what his mother thought about his decision to defect. Mosby recalls this anxious response:
"She doesn't know," he said. "She's rather old. I couldn't expect her to understand. I guess it wasn't quite fair of me not to say anything, but it's better that way. I don't want to involve my family in this. I think it would be better if they would forget about me. My brother might lose his job because of this."
Clearly, Oswald was sensitive about his family, and especially about his mother, Marguerite Oswald, whose address he only reluctantly gave to Snyder the day of the defection.
Other aspects of Oswald's behavior similar to what both Snyder and McVickar noticed during the defection scene in the embassy caught Mosby's attention. When Oswald spoke about his plans for the Soviet Union, it "sounded to me as if he had rehearsed these sentences," Mosby said. As Oswald's monologue progressed, her attention drifted from listening to the words he was saying to analyzing the person behind them. Her 1964 retrospective essay of the interview contains this passage:
As he spoke he held his mouth stiffly and nearly closed. His jaw was rigid. Behind his brown eyes I felt a certain coldness. He displayed neither the impassioned fever of a devout American Communist who at last had reached the land of his dreams, nor the wise-cracking informality and friendliness of the average American.
This description fit nicely with Snyder's dispatch, in which he said Oswald put on the "airs of a new sophomore party-liner.
There was one very big difference between what Oswald told Snyder and Mosby. When, in his discourse with Mosby, Oswald spoke about what he had done in the Marine Corps, he mentioned he had been a "radar operator" but said nothing of his intention to give radar data to the Soviets. Mosby did not find out this crucial detail until more than four years later. Her essay, written in Paris well after the assassination, makes clear the fact that she learned about this from what "American embassy officials" had said of the defection.
One is struck by a peculiar irony of that Friday the thirteenth in November 1959. On one side of the planet Oswald spoke for hours with Mosby, and not once did he let slip the darkest detail of his defection. After the sun rose on the other side of the planet, Birch O'Neal, chief of the mole-hunting CI/SIG unit in the CIA, got an eyeful of that dark detail when he read Snyder's dispatch. That was the first official document that fully described Oswald's threat to turn over both radar secrets and something "special" to the Soviets.
Unlike Snyder, who had engaged Oswald in verbal combat, Mosby wanted Oswald to like her. Her failure to bring Oswald out of his defector role frustrated her. When, after what had seemed an eternity of monologue, he once again launched into the "ebb and flow of communism," Mosby decided it was time to leave. "I was tired of listening," she wrote later, "to what sounded like recitations from Pravda."
Oswald had been sitting with Mosby for more than two hours and, although he sometimes looked at her, had not once given her a signal that he might be interested in her. Mosby got up to leave. "As I put on my coat," she wrote, "I thought about how Oswald had appeared totally disinterested in anything but himself." When reading Mosby's essay, one detects the possibility that this might have hurt her feelings. "He never once asked what I was doing in Moscow," she complained.
Yet the resourceful Mosby had not given up. As she moved toward the door she was struck by the idea that she might still get to Oswald through his stomach. Mosby asked Oswald to come to her apartment for dinner. Oswald did not say yes or give her an opening to set a date. He simply said, "Thank you." Mosby interpreted this as a polite rebuff. "It was obvious," she said, "he had no intention of seeing me again."
One senses in Aline Mosby's essay a lingering disappointment—perhaps even bitterness-at having been rejected by Oswald. "I had known other men of Oswald's type," she wrote, "they worked as cowhands . . . married casually or not at all, got drunk and into fights, always seeking recognition and some way of expressing their frustrations." Oswald added insult to injury when, after reading Mosby's coverage of the interview, he called her up. "The defector immediately telephoned me," she wrote derisively, "not to suggest dinner, but to complain." Oswald was angry with Mosby because she had "stressed that he was affected by his mother's plight."
"We never got together for dinner," Mosby lamented. Indeed, for Mosby, that little detail, which she recorded almost as if it were a statistic, seemed to be the bottom line of the entire episode.
# A Monday Meeting at Mail Call
It was Monday, November 16, and Priscilla Johnson, probably still feeling the effects of jet lag from arrival the day before from America, got up late. It was already dark by the time she made it to the mail room at the American Embassy. It was about four thirty P.M., but that was still half an hour before closing—plenty of time to get her mail. She walked through the lobby past Jean Hallett's s desk to the corridor where the mail was kept. This path took Priscilla past the door to the consul's office, where Snyder and John McVickar were working. McVickar, whose desk was closer to the door, noticed Priscilla when she walked by.
Priscilla was busy looking through several days of mail. "Hello," John said with genuine enthusiasm, "I'm glad you're back." The two were good friends, and John had undoubtedly missed her in the oppressive and hermetic environment of the Moscow Mission. At this particular moment, however, McVickar's attention was focused on a serious bit of business, and he wasted no time in getting straight to the point. "Oh, by the way," he added as if it were an afterthought, "there's a guy in your hotel who wants to defect, and he won't talk to any of us here. He might talk to you because you're a woman."
Priscilla thought McVickar was giving her a break. She had not done stories on the other big defector cases because she was with the North American News Agency, a shoestring operation consisting of her and her hotel room at the Metropole. "I couldn't compete with the [other press] agencies," she later told the Warren Commission, but she was immediately interested in Oswald. "John McVickar said he was refusing to talk to journalists. So I thought that it might be an exclusive, for one thing, and he was right in my hotel, for another."
By this time McVickar probably knew that Mosby had interviewed Oswald but, at the same time, felt constrained in passing the details of a rival reporter's interview to Priscilla. So he gave her a clue instead, dropping the name of Bob Korengold, the UP bureau chief. The following extract from her 1964 testimony to the Warren Commission clarifies this part of Priscilla's encounter with McVickar in the embassy that day;
MISS JOHNSON: I had been told he wasn't talking to people, and I hoped that he hadn't talked to anyone else.
MR. SLAWSON: Did you ever learn from Oswald that he had spoken to Miss Mosby earlier?
MISS JOHNSON: No; I never heard from anyone until November the 22nd, 1963, although Mr. McVickar had said I could ask Mr. Korengold about him [Oswald]. That was a tip that perhaps he had talked to somebody at UPI, but I didn't want to tip the UPI that I was on to it because I thought that would reinvigorate their efforts.
"John may have been doing me a favor," Priscilla recalls. "However, John also had in mind it was not in the U.S. interest for Oswald to defect." McVickar wanted Priscilla to handle Oswald in a special way, one that she might not have used if she were treating the situation as if she were purely a journalist. "John wanted me to 'cool off Oswald so he would not defect," Priscilla remembers of her coaching session in the hall that afternoon. "He felt that Snyder had mishandled Oswald and that Oswald was heated up and angry. John's concern was that Dick need not have responded in such an ascerbic way to Oswald's ugly remarks."
Snyder was the senior man in the consular office and Oswald was, after all, his case. McVickar, for reasons which we will have cause to examine further, was taking events into his own hands when he sent Priscilla on this mission of mercy to Oswald. McVickar was very insistent with Priscilla that day. In her 1978 testimony in executive session of the HSCA, "she recalled that as she was leaving, McVickar told her to remember that she was an American."
We now know even more about this last remark. McVickar told Priscilla that "there was a thin line somewhere between her duty as a correspondent and as an American," and "mentioned Mr. Korengold as a man who seemed to have known this difference pretty well." There was also a thin line between taking actions approved by the responsible consular official and taking matters into one's own hands, and McVickar was stepping over this line. We will return to this "thin line" remark and how it applied to Korengold shortly. For the moment, we will leave this scene with a comment by Richard Snyder. "I have a recollection of being annoyed at John McVickar," Snyder recalls, "for having told Priscilla to interview Oswald without having asked if I had any objection to it."
# Room 319, the Metropole
"So I went back to the hotel, mail in hand, and I asked the lady at the end of the hall on the second floor if there was an Oswald there," Priscilla recalls. "Yes, he is in Room 233," the lady answered. "And I went to his room and knocked on his door, and there he was." It was about five-twenty P.M. Priscilla describes what happened next this way:
So the door opens and Oswald came out, and he stood in the door, not letting me in his room but talking to me. I said, "My name is Priscilla Johnson and I work for the North American News Alliance. I am a reporter here and I live in your hotel, and I wonder if I could talk with you. He said "Yes," and I said, "Well, when can I come and see you?" He said, "Nine tonight. I'll come to your room."
Oswald showed up on time. He talked with Priscilla until one or two in the morning.
In December 1963 Priscilla wrote her recollections of the interview. Oswald began, she recalled, by saying he had dissolved his American citizenship, "as much as they would let me at that time," and he then complained that "they refused to allow me to take the oath at that time." Priscilla says she next put a question to him about "the official Soviet attitude," and he responded that the Russians had "confirmed" that he would not have to leave the country. Oswald then added, "They have said they are investigating the possibilities of my continuing my education at a Soviet institute." This 1963 description of the way the interview opened matches almost precisely her 1959 notes written during the interview with Oswald.
Oswald explained that since the embassy had "released" the story of his defection, he was granting this interview "to give my side of the story—I would like to give people in the United States something to think about." He continued. "Once having been assured by the Russians that I would not have to return to the United States, come what may, I assumed it would be safe for me to give my side of the story" [the underline was in Priscilla's contemporaneous notes and may have been Oswald's emphasis]. Again, Priscilla's 1963 account matched her 1959 notes, but what did Oswald mean by "safe"?
The answer is in Oswald's diary, and it concerns a visit he received over the weekend. His diary records that the day after his interview with Mosby, "A Russian official comes to my room [and] asks how I am. [He] notifies me I can stay in the U.S.S.R. till some solution is found with what to do with me." This visit occurred on Saturday, November 14, twenty-four hours after his interview with Mosby and a little more than forty-eight hours before his "safe" remark to Johnson. This sequence is crucial, and it provokes a new question: What was it in Oswald's "side of the story" about his episode in the embassy that was not safe to tell Mosby on Friday?
Indeed, there was a detail that Oswald withheld from Mosby: his brazen declaration to tell the Russians about radar and something "special." It would have been reasonable for Oswald to think it was not "safe" to tell this to a reporter before receiving the assurance he could stay. There is no escaping the question that this leads to: Did Oswald feel it was "safe" for him to unburden himself about this with Priscilla after he received Soviet assurance? This overriding question strikes at the very heart of the entire story of Oswald's defection in Moscow.
Neither Priscilla Johnson's 1959 contemporaneous notes nor her 1963 written recollection mentions that Oswald told her he had threatened to reveal radar secrets. Her book Marina and Lee makes no mention of radar secrets. Her newspaper articles then and since make no mention of radar secrets. Under oath, however, she told a very different story. Here is the bombshell she dropped during her sworn testimony to the Warren Commission:
MR. SLAWSON: Miss Johnson, I wonder if you would search your memory with the help of your notes and make any comments you could on what contacts Lee Oswald had had with Soviet officials before you saw him, any remarks he made or things you could read between the lines, and so on.
MISS JOHNSON: I had the impression, in fact he said, he hoped his experience as a radar operator would make him more desirable to them [the Soviets]. That was the only thing that really showed any lack of integrity in a way about him, a negative thing. That is, he felt he had something he could give them, something that would hurt his country in a way, or could, and that was the one thing that was quite negative, that he was holding out some kind of bait. [Emphasis added]
In a 1994 interview with the author, Priscilla McMillan found the contradiction between her Warren Commission testimony and other writings troubling.
How could Priscilla not have written about such a startling part of her interview with Oswald? "I know, that it is terrible," she remarked in 1994, "that is so unprofessional." Her recollection was at first indecisive, and she wondered if it had not been "wrong to tell the Warren Commission that." At length, however, she stuck with her testimony. Not surprisingly, Priscilla's revelation about radar secrets startled her Warren Commission interrogator, W. David Slawson. This is what happened next:
MR. SLAWSON: Could you elaborate a little bit on that radar point. Had you been informed by the American Embassy at the time that he had told Richard Snyder that he had already volunteered to the Soviet officials that he had been a radar operator in the Marine Corps, and would give the Russian government any secrets he had possessed?
MISS JOHNSON: I had no idea that he had told Snyder that, but he did tell me—I got the impression, I am not sure that it is in the notes or not, I certainly got the impression that he was using his radar training as a come-on to them, hoped that that would make him of some value to them, and I—
MR. SLAWSON: This was something then that he must have volunteered to you, because you would not have known to ask about it?
MISS JOHNSON: Well, again I am not very military minded, and I couldn't have cared less, you know. But somehow along the line, if it is not in my notes then it is a memory, then it is one of the things I didn't write—well, one thing is you know I tend to write what I thought I might use in the story. But I wasn't going to write a particularly negative story about him. I wasn't going to write that he was using it as a come-on so I might not have transcribed it simply for that reason, that it wasn't a part of my story.
But it definitely was an impression that he—and it was from him, certainly not from the embassy, that he was using that as a come-on, and I sure didn't like that. But it didn't occur to me he might have military secrets. I just felt, well hell, he didn't have much as a radar operator that they need, although even there I didn't know. Maybe there was some little twist in our radar technique that he might know. It showed a lack of integrity in his personality, and that I remembered. What he might or might not have to offer them I didn't know [emphasis added].
What emerges from this testimony is that Priscilla was predisposed against doing a critical story on Oswald, so much so that contrary to a reporter's instincts to get the most dramatic story, she deliberately ignored Oswald's stated intent to commit a disloyal act.
"I felt very sorry for him," Priscilla says now. "We were both comparatively young and up against it alone." In a 1994 interview with the author, Priscilla elaborated on this feeling in the following words:
Oswald was the only believer I met and I respected him for it. Also he and I were in the same boat: I was the least credentialed reporter in Moscow—lowest on the totem pole. So we were sort of alone together. I was interested in the Soviet Union, and he was there because he believed in it.
Again we have to believe that this "same boat" psychology would override good journalistic sense. This Priscilla herself admits, but insists she wanted to be Oswald's friend:
There again I was not very professional; I wanted him to know that he had somebody there, because I thought he was going to get stuck out in the provinces and have a hard time. So I said to him . . . let me know before you leave Moscow." He said, "Yes I will." I said, "I will be writing my story tomorrow, and would be glad to show it to you for mistakes, and he said, "No. I trust you."
Perhaps it is helpful to think—as Priscilla might have then—what the impact might have been had she printed the story about radar secrets. It might well have angered Oswald and would have led to no more interviews.
This exercise quickly becomes too speculative, for we must begin making assumptions about why Oswald told Johnson about radar secrets in the first place. There is, however, another dimension to Priscilla's interview with Oswald that needs to be further explored. That dimension concerns someone who was her friend and whose story was as mysterious then as it is now. That person was John McVickar.
# CHAPTER SIX
# The Thin Line of Duty
"I took a typed copy of the message from Pic," John McVickar wrote in a memo on November 9, 1959, "down to the Metropole Hotel today to deliver to Oswald." John Edward Pic was a twenty-eight-year-old staff sergeant in the U.S. Air Force, stationed at Tachigawa Air Base, Japan. He was also the son of Marguerite Oswald from her first marriage to Edward J. Pic, Jr., and thus a half brother to Oswald. Sergeant Pic's message read, "Please reconsider your intentions. Contact me if possible. Love. John." The message arrived early Monday morning in Moscow, and Snyder asked McVickar to "contact Oswald" and deliver it. "I went directly to the room (233) and knocked several times," McVickar said in his memo afterward, "but no one answered." McVickar checked with the hotel staff on the second floor, only to find conflicting stories about whether or not Oswald was in the room. "On the way out I phoned from downstairs," McVickar said, "but no answer."
"He might talk to you because you're a woman," McVickar told Priscilla Johnson the following Monday. "I did ask John to go over," Richard Snyder later recalled regarding McVickar's November 9 trip to Oswald's hotel room, "but I didn't ask him to talk to Priscilla." When McVickar approached Priscilla as she collected her mail on November 16, he was distinctly out of bounds. "I definitely remember being upset with John," Snyder says. "I was annoyed, particularly because it was at the beginning of the case when I was sort of feeling my way along." Oswald was Snyder's case, and Snyder was naturally upset that McVickar had decided—without permission or consultation—to take matters into his own hands.
McVickar's contemporaneous accounts of his actions are as troubling as the actions themselves. "I also pointed out to Miss Johnson that there was a thin line somewhere between her duty as a correspondent and as an American," he wrote of his November 17 dinner conversation with Priscilla. But that was the day after her interview with Oswald, and the truth is that he had issued this "reminder" four hours before the interview. Today McVickar claims he does not remember what he meant by this "thin line" of duty. One can reasonably excuse a memory lapse thirty-five years after an event. But we may be justifiably skeptical of such a convenient loss of memory about the timing of this patriotic exhortation just twenty-four hours after it was given. Such an oddity in the written record—made at the time of the events themselves—invites one to compare Priscilla's account of the November 17 dinner with the McVickar memo which followed it.
# Dinner at a shashlichnaya
"I wrote up the story of my interview the next day," Priscilla recalls, "and I called Snyder because I wanted to get his version too, because Oswald was so critical of him. I probably talked to Snyder between 12:00 and 1:00 p.m. on Tuesday, the 17th." She finished the piece "and then took it to the Central Telegraph at 2:00 or 3:00. The Soviet censor did not cut a word from my story. I took it there, to the Central Telegraph, on the afternoon of the 17th—it was on Gorky Street."
"I probably went to a store on the ground floor of the Moscow Hotel and bought some cheese or milk and took it back to my room." Sometime that afternoon after she returned, John McVickar called, "probably around 2:30 to 3," she thinks. "It would surprise me if Snyder hadn't reported on my talk with him at lunchtime.
"McVickar invited me out. He had known my brother and sister in the past, in Cold Spring Harbor, New York. John remembered dancing with my sister, and my brother's manner on the dance floor." Sometime between 6 and 7 p.m. on November 17, Johnson and McVickar met for the second time in as many days. "I had supper with John that evening, and we went to an ordinary restaurant. Not a fancy one. It was also in keeping with our pocketbooks. It was a shashlichnaya—lamb-on-a-skewer type restaurant—sort of cafeteria style. No waiter. It was very informal. It was a kind of eating that had just started in Moscow under Khrushchev.
If it had not been for Khrushchev, the two of them would not have been eating dinner together at the shashlichnaya that night. In fact, Priscilla would not have been allowed to return to the Soviet Union. She had been the victim of a familiar Soviet technique, which involved giving her visa extensions for only a thirty-to-ninetyday period, at the end of which the KGB would attempt to recruit her. But Cord Meyer's "mixed up" girl from Long Island refused to cave in, and her reward at the end of a year was expulsion by fiat—Soviet officials told her in the summer of 1959 that her visa would no longer be renewed. Her friends in the Moscow press corps complained to Mikoyan, the Soviet foreign minister, at American Ambassador Thompson's Fourth of July reception. They asked the minister to let Johnson stay to cover the upcoming Nixon visit.
"With a snap of the fingers," Mikoyan ordered it done, but when the Nixon visit was over and Priscilla left for America to cover Khrushchev's return visit, she went with the idea that she might not be coming back anytime soon. Ambassador Thompson accompanied Khrushchev on his American journey, and during the trip confronted Khrushchev about the harassment of Priscilla Johnson and another American journalist in Moscow, McGraw Hill. Khrushchev said he "didn't believe in that kind of thing and sent a message back to Moscow ordering it stopped." Priscilla later heard from Soviet journalists in Moscow: "We knew you'd be back." It took two months for her visa to be processed by the Soviet Consulate in Washington, D.C., but she returned on November 15, and forty-eight hours later was able to share lamb-on-a-skewer with McVickar at the shashlichnaya.
"We had a lot to catch up on," Priscilla says of her dinner engagement. Indeed they did. "He took me there because he figured it wasn't bugged," she remembers. There was so much to talk about, and none of it fit for KGB ears. "There was the embassy gossip, who was doing what to who," and "we bitched about Snyder, who was giving him a hard time, the usual." Then there was the incredible saga of the Khrushchev trip, how she had managed to get into his hotel room in Iowa and how surprised .she was that she had gotten a Soviet reentry visa. And there was also the problem of Lee Harvey Oswald.
"We talked about Oswald's personality and how the Embassy had handled him. John and I, out of sympathy for Oswald, were talking about how Snyder goaded Oswald. To tell you the truth," Priscilla says of Snyder, "I did not like him at the time—he could be very snide. I like him very well now," she says today. As that evening with McVickar progressed, the two of them sat there in the little cafeteria-style restaurant, with its damp cement floor, no waiters to bother them, and relaxed with the comforting thought that they were alone and free to speak candidly.
"We felt that Snyder had mishandled Oswald," Priscilla recalls, "and this got Oswald heated up and angry. John's concern was that Dick need not have responded in such an ascerbic way to Oswald's ugly remarks." For his part, Snyder says he "was told at some point that John had criticized my handling of the case." Snyder recalls that McVickar's actions with Priscilla were "very unprofessional," and that this kind of information "should not have been given to the press." In a recent interview Snyder further elaborated:
It you give out specific information of this kind it does help the [Soviet] decryptors if you give a clue to the content, the name, or especially something really specific, it helps a lot for the decoders. So that's one reason alone you're not going to give out any hard specifics; it's part of your security briefing before you go there.
Security considerations aside, Snyder also thinks that the reason John told Priscilla about Oswald was largely because of their "relationship." That may be true. It was also true that, like it or not, Priscilla's relationship with Oswald had become a part of the official story.
That part of the story is an important document written by McVickar after the dinner with Johnson. This document deserves our close attention because it is one of the first major stumbling blocks in the Oswald files.
# A "Memo for the Files"
It was after 9:30, when Priscilla Johnson returned to her room in the Metropole, now fully caught up on the Oswald affair and the rest of the embassy gossip. John McVickar, however, still had work to do. He went back to the embassy to find a typewriter. Unless he postdated what he typed that evening and used the word "today" when it was "yesterday" or before, John McVickar had to have worked late that night on November 17, for he could not have begun much before 10:30. Whatever the time, McVickar wrote "A Memo for the Files."
There would, over the next four years, be memos for the files written by various CIA and FBI observers, many of them interesting because of the element of intrigue they add. The McVickar memo is no exception. "Priscilla Johnson of NANA asked me today," McVickar's opening sentence began, "about Oswald." This was misleading, because it gave the impression that the subject of Oswald came up because Johnson initiated it. Which of the two mentioned it first during dinner is less important than the fact that McVickar had, the day before, approached Johnson about Oswald. The dinner only provided an opportunity for McVickar to learn about the outcome of her interview.
The second sentence of McVickar's memo was equally misleading. It read:
I gave her a general rundown of the outlines of the case, as I knew they were known to the public, suggesting that she also check with Korengold for any factual details I might have omitted and which were already generally known.
If McVickar did make these comments at dinner, they were not helpful since Johnson's story was already filed. This sentence fits perfectly with the information—as recalled by Johnson—that McVickar had passed on to her the previous afternoon. That encounter in the embassy was on Monday, November 16.
The third sentence contained an error which is inexplicable under the circumstances. The sentence states: "She told me that on Sunday, November 15, she had spent several hours talking with Oswald and that she had left it with him that she was available if he wanted somebody to talk to again." This, of course, is impossible, since she arrived back in Moscow on Sunday, November 15, and learned about Oswald from McVickar only on the sixteenth. Because McVickar specified the day of the week as well as the numeric day of the month, a typographical mistake is out of the question. For whatever reason, McVickar placed Johnson's interview with Oswald before his meeting with her in the embassy.
The next two paragraphs contain the sort of information we would expect Johnson to have passed on to McVickar at their dinner. She told him of her impression of Oswald as naive, and how this impression agreed with "ours," presumably an impression from their discussion in the embassy before Priscilla's interview. McVickar's report after the dinner with Priscilla included these two sentences:
He [Oswald] told her [Johnson] that his Soviet citizenship was still under consideration, but that the Soviets had already assured him that he could stay here as a resident alien if he so desired. They are also looking into the possibility of getting him into a school.
This was all true, and tracks well with the notes Johnson made during her interview with Oswald. McVickar wrote that Oswald "had also told her that he did not intend to come back to the embassy, yet he seemed very much annoyed at the embassy for having prevented him from formally giving up his citizenship." This should have been good news, for it meant Oswald would not renounce his citizenship and, therefore, that Snyder's handling of Oswald might not have been so bad after all.
Then McVickar's memo again superimposes events and dialogue from Monday afternoon on to the Tuesday evening dinner conversation. The memo states this:
I also pointed out to Miss Johnson that there was a thin line somewhere between her duty as a correspondent and as an American. I mentioned Mr. Korengold as a man who seemed to have known this difference pretty well. I asked that if someone could persuade Oswald at least to delay before taking the final plunge on his American citizenship, or for that matter Soviet citship [citizenship], they would be doing him a favor and doubtless the USA as well. She seemed to understand this point. I beleive [sic] that she is going to try and write a story on what prompts a man to do such a thing.
We have discussed these lines previously, but they are reprinted here in full and we reexamine them because there is something very wrong about McVickar's memo: He presents his adjuration to Johnson as if he did it after her interview with Oswald. Of course, this was not true. At the time McVickar gave her this charge, she had never met Oswald; indeed, she was learning of Oswald for the first time from McVickar himself. Moreover, it makes no sense for McVickar to say such a thing to Johnson after the interview. It does make sense, however, if, as Johnson recalls, they spoke on Monday afternoon before the interview when the suggestion that Oswald might open up to her because she was a woman had some value.
The November 17 McVickar memo was not finished. Two days later, he added the following OFFICIAL USE ONLY postscript to the bottom of the second page:
PS (11/19/59) Priscilla J. told me since: that O. has been told he will be leaving the hotel at the end of this week; that he will be trained in electronics; that she has asked him to keep in touch with her; that he has showed some slight signs of disillusionment with the USSR, but that his "hate" for the US remains strong although she cannot fathom the reason.
The last three items of the five contained in this postscript—that she asked him to keep in touch, that he showed signs of disillusionment, and that she could not fathom his "hate" for the U.S.—were fully consistent with Johnson's notes and recollections. The first two, however, probably did not happen.
Oswald had not told her he was "leaving the hotel at the end of the week," and there was no reason she would make up a story about this. As previously discussed, all Oswald had said in the interview was that he felt "safe in the knowledge that I can have a prolonged stay." Johnson does recall, however, that a few days after the interview she asked the dezhurnaya, the lady on duty on Oswald's floor, "and what about number 233, is he there?" "No, he's gone," the hall monitor replied. "I thought she meant he had left for good," Johnson explains, "but he hadn't." This is hardly a clean fit with McVickar's claim in the postscript that Oswald had been told anything, let alone when he would be leaving the hotel. McVickar's memo leaves the reader with the impression that Johnson had met again with Oswald. She had not.
We need not parse the hotel departure issue further, as there is something far more enigmatic—and troubling—about the McVickar postscript. That is his claim that Johnson said Oswald "would be trained in electronics." Oswald did not say this to Johnson, and she has no recollection of saying this or anything like it to McVickar. Oswald had mentioned "studying" and "education," but not "training" or "electronics." Johnson's notes recorded his remarks that the Soviets were investigating the possibility of his studying in the U.S.S.R. and that "they have said they are investigating [the] possibilities of my continuing my education at [an] Institute." Johnson combined the two notes in her statement after the Kennedy assassination into this: "And he [Oswald] repeated 'they are investigating the possibility of my studying.' "
What is absorbing is that Oswald did go to work in an electronics factory. How could McVickar have known about that beforehand? At the time of Johnson's interview, Oswald did not yet know he would be going to Minsk, let alone receive any specific "training" or do any work in "electronics." Oswald had not so much as mentioned the word "electronics" in his interview with Johnson. All he said was that he had been a radar operator in the Marines. For McVickar's postscript to be true, Johnson would have to have imagined this intriguing detail all on her own, and then told McVickar at dinner, and then forgot all about it in all of her subsequent testimony.
The references in McVickar's November 19 postscript to Oswald's departure date from the hotel and his upcoming assignment in an electronics capacity are crucial evidence that raise the possibility that information from Oswald or from a Soviet source had come into McVickar's possession. After studying the postscript again today, Snyder finds it "fascinating," and has this to say: "How did McVickar find it out? It wasn't known to me. Since he purported to get it from Priscilla, where did she get it from? And if she didn't tell him, where the hell did John get it from?" All are important questions.
It is interesting to observe how, during the Warren Commission investigation, it appeared that Snyder's career, not McVickar's, might suffer because of the entire episode. Johnson recalls that "behind the scenes" the Warren Commission didn't want McVickar to be too critical of Snyder. "The Warren Commission lawyers seemed to know," she adds, "and they did not put me on the record to say something that might have been damaging to his career, they made it clear to me that they knew." By this she meant that McVickar's view that Snyder had mishandled the Oswald case would be damaging to Snyder.
The same pattern occurred when Johnson testified to the HSCA, whose Final Report included this passage:
She believed that McVickar called her on November 17, the day after the interview, and asked her to supper. That evening they discussed the interview. McVickar indicated a general concern about Oswald and believed that the attitude of another American consular official might have pushed Oswald further in the direction of defection.
The reference is unmistakably to Richard Snyder, whose anonymity in this passage supports Johnson's recollection that the Warren Commission and HSCA agreed that McVickar's views might damage Snyder's career.
It is now apparent that more attention need be paid to McVickar's s role in the story. In the previous chapter we discussed Johnson's testimony to the Warren Commission that she knew—and had not written about—Oswald's threat to give up radar secrets. When asked directly if she told this story to McVickar at their dinner, this was her spontaneous response:
I can't remember. If he knew it and I knew it then I know we discussed it. My guess is that I was wrong to tell the Warren Commission that. With what I now know and thinking back on it, my guess would be that Oswald did not tell me and that I learned it from John McVickar.
If true, that would explain how she could have learned of Oswald's threat without it appearing in her story. She had already filed her story by the time she had dinner with McVickar.
When and how Johnson found out about the radar story is important, but speculative. What is a fact is McVickar's knowledge—before he should have known—that Oswald was to leave Moscow for electronics training. That he attributed it to information obtained from Johnson troubles her, as does the fact that he wrote this report at all: "If I thought he was going to write it up I would not have said anything to him about the interview. I would not have liked the idea that it was going out as a report from me."
"I definitely remember being upset with John," Snyder says today. "I was annoyed, particularly because it was at the beginning of the case when I was sort of feeling my way along." Snyder's inference here is that McVickar had no business interfering in Snyder's handling of the case. Indeed, by getting Johnson to do the interview, then inviting her to dinner to talk about it, and then writing it in a memo as if Oswald had continued to speak with Johnson, McVickar had muscled his way into the case. His actions affected the official record beyond his own "memo for the files."
On December 1, Snyder sent a cable to the State Department to update them on Oswald, who, Snyder said, was "believed departed from the Metropole Hotel within the last few days." This may not have been true, but the source was McVickar's November 17 postscript. Snyder said an American "correspondent" had "maintained contact" with Oswald. This was not true either, and was also based on the McVickar postscript. "Correspondent states that Oswald appeared in last conversation last week" not to have changed his position, said the cable, leaving the impression that a second Johnson-Oswald discussion had been the source of this information. This was again not true. The source was the November 19 postscript.
Johnson was recently asked whether she had ever knowingly discussed Oswald with the CIA. "No, I did not," she responded. The McVickar postscript raised the possibility that someone else had access to Oswald in Moscow. Could that someone have been working for U.S. intelligence? We will return to this question in Chapter Eleven. But before leaving Oswald's defection in Moscow, it is pertinent to recall that the CIA's Counterintelligence Staff and, in particular, the mole-hunting CI/SIG office, was interested in Oswald at this point. Therefore, we need to ask: What about the Counterintelligence Chief himself? What might James Angleton's interest in Oswald have been?
# Angleton's Molehunt in the Soviet Russia Division
By the time of Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union, Angleton was obsessed by a traitor, a mole who might have penetrated deep enough to have acquired and betrayed secrets about the U-2 program to the Soviet Union. James Jesus Angleton was the chief of the Agency's Counterintelligence Staff, and he had created the Special Investigations Group, SIG, principally for finding double agents inside the CIA. The origin of Angleton's molehunt goes back to an event in 1958, but the hunt focused on and narrowed to the Soviet Russia Division in October 1959. Both events intersect with the Oswald story and so it is safe to say that Angleton noticed the confluence.
The first revelation of a possible KGB mole came from the Agency's top defector-in-placea in the Soviet Union, Petr Popov. Code-named ATTIC, Popov had been silently funneling high-quality intelligence to the CIA since 1952, including the Soviet Field Army Table of Organization, and Soviet battlefield tactics developed during nuclear tests with live troops . This time, however, Popov's news was about an American espionage asset: the CIA's sensitive U-2 program. According to a study of FBI-CIA rivalry by Mark Riebling:
In April 1958, Popov had reported hearing a drunken colonel boast that the KGB had many technical details on a new high-altitude spycraft America was routing over the Soviet Union. Details of this revolutionary plane had been tightly held within the U.S. government; the leak could only have come from somewhere within the project itself.
As discussed in Chapter Three, Oswald had been posted at several U-2 sites and knew quite a bit about the program. The Soviet reaction to Oswald could help confirm or deny Popov's intelligence tip. For example, if the Soviets showed no interest whatsoever in Oswald, it would help to confirm Popov's tip that they already had a high-level source on the project.
Popov had been in Berlin when he passed the U-2 leak to the CIA. He returned to Moscow for duty in November 1958. Then, on the very day that Oswald set foot in Moscow, October 16, 1959, Popov was arrested while riding on a bus and attempting to receive a note from his CIA contact, Russell Langelle. According to Angleton biographer Tom Mangold, this event accelerated Angleton's molehunt for an incorrect reason.
Popov could only have been betrayed by a mole buried deep within Soviet Division. . . . "The betrayal of Popov was the key—the key to our belief that we had been penetrated." . . . Popov was actually lost to the Soviets because of a slipshod CIA operation; there was no treachery.
Angleton thus erroneously believed that Popov—who was later executed—had been betrayed by a mole, an impression in which Golitsin, another Soviet who defected a year later, indulged the Counterintelligence Chief. Angleton's belief was reinforced in 1964, when another Soviet defector, Yuriy Nosenko, came over to the CIA.
When he did defect, Golitsin told Angleton that back in May 1959 he and two thousand other Soviet intelligence officers attended a conference in Moscow, convened by the new KGB chief, Alexander Shelepin. Shelepin presented the KGB plan to "affect the fundamental reasoning power" of the U.S. government. According to Kim Philby—a British intelligence officer who became a mole for the KGB-biographer Anthony Brown:
As evidence that such a grand plan was already in effect, that the monster plot had begun, Golitsin stated that the split between Russia and China was a fake, meant in part to cause the United States to miscalculate militarily and politically. In due course he revealed more: to effect Shelepin's grand scheme, the KGB had placed a mole inside the Soviet Division of the CIA—an assertion that touched upon Angleton's greatest nightmare, that there was a Philby in the CIA.
Golitsin reportedly had documents to back up his claims, among which was one describing Department D, a new KGB organization for disinformation, which was to implement the Soviet grand strategy for winning without fighting. The Sino-Soviet split, however, was no fake. By 1961, relations between the two nation's leaders, Mao Zedong and Nikita Khrushchev, had deteriorated beyond repair.
Yet a third series of events was in motion which suggested a mole in the CIA: a series of letters to the CIA written by another Soviet informant, Michal Goleniewski, beginning in 1959, under the name "Sniper." According to another of Angleton's molehunters, Clare Petty, this is why some people in the CIA began to suspect there was a mole:
This case was extremely closely held, as much as anything I can remember. Yet, within a matter of just a few weeks, the Soviets were aware that somebody had come to us with valuable information—and they knew the nature of it. This is an indicator, if you adopt my solution, as to where the penetration was. Eliminate everyone who didn't know about Goleniewski, and you end up with the fingers of one hand.
Angleton was said to be suspicious of Goleniewski from the beginning, but he could not casually dismiss the argument that Goleniewski might have been manipulated by the KGB after being blown by the same alleged mole in the CIA he apparently warned against. Lewis Carroll would have appreciated this.
It was the Goleniewski episode that gave credence within the Agency to the idea of a mole, an idea Angleton would shortly turn into a crusade. David Martin's CIA chronicle, Wilderness of Mirrors, has this incisive comment:
Goleniewski, with or without the knowledge of the KGB, had planted a germ within the body of the CIA that would become a debilitating disease, all but paralyzing the Agency's clandestine operations against the Soviet Union. The germ was the suspicion that the CIA itself had been penetrated by the KGB, that a Soviet mole had burrowed to the Agency's core. "Goleniewski was the first and primary source on a mole," a CIA officer said.
Could that germ from 1959, along with the U-2 compromise of the previous year, have led to a counterintelligence "dangle" of Oswald in the Soviet Union? We will return to this question in Chapter Eleven, when we examine Oswald's decision to return to America.
# CHAPTER SEVEN
# Early Cuban Connections
"Cuba interested him more than most other situations," said Oswald's former marine commander, John Donovan. In his 1964 testimony before the Warren Commission, Donovan explained that Oswald "was fairly well informed about Batista." When speaking of Batista, Oswald talked about how he was opposed to atrocities in general and how he was opposed to Batista's sort of "dictatorship" in particular. Fulgencio Batista y Zaldivar had been president of Cuba until January 1, 1959, when Castro seized power. Oswald's expressed support for Castro and his comment that "it was a godsend that somebody had overthrown Batista," did not alarm Donovan at the time because such sympathetic views of Castro were common in Time magazine and at Harvard.
Oswald's apparent interest in Castro began while he was still in the armed forces and continued during the two and a half years he was in Russia. By this time, the United States had launched a covert war against Cuba and, in particular, against Castro. Shortly after Oswald left the marines, the CIA began to seriously consider how to assassinate Castro. By the time Oswald returned from Russia, the CIA had hired Mafia boss Sam Giancana to do the deed.
Oswald's Cuban capers in New Orleans and Mexico City in the summer of 1963 occurred during a particularly dangerous episode of the Cold War. The Lee Harvey Oswald who emerges in these newly released files was under FBI and CIA surveillance as he walked into a deadly web of deceit, woven from the anti-Castro Cuban underworld, organized crime interests, and the clandestine side of the CIA. It behooves us, therefore, to retrace the Cuban trails along which Oswald and the CIA traveled to their inevitable collision in the weeks before the Kennedy assassination. These trails take us back to the very time we have been considering: 1959 to 1960. What evidence is there of Oswald's interest in Cuba and Castro then, and what was the nature of the CIA's Cuban operations at that time?
The Warren Commission's 1964 investigation into the Kennedy assassination failed to consider the CIA's anti-Castro operations in any capacity at all. In the many controversies surrounding other shortcomings of the Warren Commission's work, this particular failure is often overlooked. There could be no more profound omission to any study of Oswald's activities in the months before the murder of Kennedy than that of the CIA's anti-Cuban operations.
The Warren Commission's aversion to examining espionage leads in Oswald's past was alluded to in a 1975 secret CIA report. Written by Angleton subordinate Ray Rocca, the report focused on the testimony of a marine associate of Oswald's, Nelson Delgado. Delgado had told the Warren Commission that Oswald had been in contact with Cuban diplomats while he was still in the Marine Corps and stationed at El Toro. The commission was not interested. The "implications do not appear to have been run down or developed by investigation," Rocca's report said. This was more than a veiled criticism of the Warren Commission; Rocca is pointing the finger of blame in the Kennedy assassination at Fidel Castro. "The beginning of Oswald's relationship with the Cubans," Rocca's report declared darkly, "starts with a question mark."
There were many Cuban question marks in 1959 and 1960 from Havana to Miami and the White House.
# In Fort Worth and Minsk
Oswald's interest in Cuba was well documented in his early FBI and CIA files. Reporting on Oswald that contained information about statements by Oswald hinting at this interest reached the CIA as early as May 1960. When he visited his mother, Marguerite, on his way to the Soviet Union, Oswald reportedly said he wanted to go to Cuba. Six months later Marguerite told an FBI agent that Lee "had mentioned something about his desire to travel and said something about the fact that he might go to Cuba." The FBI man, Dallas special agent John Fain, put the details of this and more in a report. Fain also said, "Mrs. Oswald stated she would not have been surprised to learn that Lee had gone to say South America or Cuba, but that it never crossed her mind that he might go to Russia or that he might try to become a citizen there."
The Oswald we see in the newspapers behaves the same way as the Oswald that develops in the CIA's files. Oswald's 1959 comments to his relatives about his interest in the Cuban revolution were well documented in the press at the time. Wire service coverage the day after Oswald's October 31, 1959, defection reported that "His [Oswald's] sister-in-law in Fort Worth said: 'He said he wanted to travel a lot and talked about going to Cuba.' " Over two and a half years later, after Oswald returned to America, his 1959 comments again surfaced. "When he visited his family shortly after his release from the marines," a 1962 Fort Worth newspaper recalled of Oswald's 1959 visit with his family, "he talked optimistically about the future. Some of his plans had included going to college, writing a book, or joining Castro's Cuban army."
Oswald's oral and written remarks refer to interest in Cuba and Cubans during his stay in Minsk. In his diary, Oswald wrote that Anita Ziger had a "Hungarian chap for a boyfriend named 'Alferd.' (Alfred)" Oswald had met him, but Alfred might have been a Cuban. Anita did know a Hungarian chap, but his name was Frederick. After Oswald returned to America, Anita wrote a letter to him about how the relationship ended. "Concerning my love life," Anita said disappointedly, "nothing nice is happening. I was telling you about Alfred from Cuba. They sent him to Moscow to study." Anita recalled the "very nice" time she had spent vacationing with Alfred in Odessa, but lamented, "happiness cannot be extended for as long as one likes." Anita also mentioned she had told Alfred about her friend named Frederick, but added that "it doesn't affect him."
Marina knew about Frederick and Alfred. She described the latter to the FBI as "a young man from Cuba who is apparently an admirer of Anita Ziger, who is a member of the Ziger family from Argentina who were friends of the Oswalds in Minsk." Alfred and Anita, Marina recalled, "both spoke Spanish." On another occasion Marina provided the FBI with additional details about Alfred. Dallas FBI Special Agent Wallace B. Heitman wrote this afterward:
Marina stated "Alfred," whose last name she did not know, is a Cuban citizen and a resident of Cuba who for some time has been studying in Russia. He studied at the University of Minsk for about six months and later studied at the University of Moscow, where he is believed to presently be studying. Marina said "Alfred's" parents have visited him in Russia both in Minsk and Moscow. She said although she did not personally know "Alfred," Lee Harvey Oswald had known him as he had met "Alfred" at Minsk through Anita Ziger on one occasion when they visited at the University of Minsk to attend some social or scholastic affair. Marina also related "Alfred" had wanted to marry Anita but the latter had not wanted to marry him.
"Frederick," Marina told Special Agent Heitman, was a young man whom Oswald had met in the radio factory where they both worked. "Frederick," Marina added, "is a Hungarian."
When he was serving as a member of the Warren Commission, former CIA Director Allen Dulles felt it was noteworthy that Oswald and Marina had "Cuban friends" in Minsk. "Marina told me about them," Dulles said. "They played the guitar." In her testimony to the commission, Marina said that there were Cuban students studying in Minsk, and mentioned that one was a boyfriend of "this Argentinean girl," meaning Anita Ziger. "Do you know where the Cuban students were studying, what particular school?" Dulles asked Marina. "They study in various educational institutions in Minsk" and elsewhere, Marina replied. Marina then added this comment:
From what I could tell from what Lee said, many of these Cuban students were not satisfied with life in the Soviet Union, and this Argentinean girl told me the same thing. Many of them thought that, they were not satisfied with the conditions in the Soviet Union and thought if Castro were to be in power that the conditions in Cuba would become similar to those in the Soviet Union and they were not satisfied with this. They said it wasn't worthwhile carrying out a revolution just to have the kind of life that these people in the Soviet Union had.
Representative Ford asked Marina how many Cubans were in school in Minsk. "I heard the figure of 300," Marina replied, "but I never knew even a single one."
Whether Alfred was a Cuban or Soviet national, it is noteworthy that Allan Dulles, and probably the CIA, thought Alfred was a Cuban. In that view, Alfred might easily have been the son of a Cuban diplomat serving in the Soviet Union. On the other hand, after FBI reports and Warren Commission testimony had decided that Frederick, not Alfred, was the Hungarian, the Warren Report published a photo of Oswald and Alfred with the caption describing Alfred as "a Hungarian friend" of Anita Ziger's. At a minimum, this is sloppiness. At the same time, such mistakes often serve as guideposts, especially where they concern Oswald's contacts with Cubans. Marina had said Oswald knew a "Cuban family" in the Soviet Union. Is it possible that Alfred, or Frederick may have been the son of Carlos Olivares or Faure Chomon? Both had been Cuban diplomats in the Soviet Union during the period when Oswald knew Alfred in Minsk. An anti-Castro Cuban academic, Dr. Herminio Portell-Vila, told the FBI that he had heard through the Cuban underground that these Cuban diplomats had a file on Oswald in Moscow which they turned over to the "Castro brothers" two days after the Kennedy assassination.
From one of the most dramatic moments of Oswald's FBI and CIA files in the summer of 1963 comes information that refers to the time Oswald was in Minsk, and is suggestive of his continuing interest in Cuba and Castro. The 1963 event was an important propaganda event, a live radio debate featuring Oswald and Cubans, staged by a CIA-backed exile group, the Cuban Student Directorate (DRE). The part of the debate that concerns us now is a segment in which Oswald comments on Cuban matters during his Russian sojourn, including his views in 1960:
STUCKEY: What particular event in your life made you decide that the Fair Play for Cuba Committee had the correct answers about Cuban-United States relations?
OSWALD: Well, of course, I have only begun to notice Cuba since the Cuban revolution, that is true of everyone, I think. I became acquainted with it about the same time as everybody else, in 1960. In the beginning of 1960. I always felt that the Cubans were being pushed into the Soviet bloc by American policy [emphasis added].
Oswald's marine associates and his family in Texas knew the truth about the origin of Oswald's ideas. He had noticed Cuba before his early days in Minsk in the beginning of 1960. His "notice" started when he was stationed in Japan and might have included contact with Cuban officials at his following assignment at El Toro, California. When he applied for travel to the Soviet Union in the summer of 1959, Oswald listed several countries he wanted to travel to, including the Soviet Union. The country he listed first was Cuba.
When he defected to the Soviet Union in October 1959, and again, when he returned to the United States in June 1962, his pre-defection interest in going to Cuba was discussed in newspaper articles. The November 1, 1959, Washington Post article entitled "Ex-Marine Asks Soviet Citizenship" was placed in Oswald's CIA security file, OS-351-164. Early 1960 was when FBI special agent Fain's interview. of Marguerite took place, during which she told of Oswald's early (pre-defection) interest in going to Cuba. On May 25, 1960, the FBI transmitted Fain's report of that interview over to the CIA. Oswald's murder foreclosed any chance of knowing for sure why he would have neglected to mention in the debate his interest in Cuba during his last year in the marines.
Also significant is the fact that early 1960 was the time when the Fair Play for Cuba Committee (FPCC) was created—a pro-Castro organization destined to be destroyed by its association with Oswald. The April 6, 1960, New York Times carried a full-page ad announcing the formation of the FPCC, an ad paid for by Castro. Until its demise on December 31, 1963, the FPCC was a pawn in a power struggle between the Communist Party USA and the Socialist Workers Party, both of which were considered by the FBI as subversive. With headquarters at 1799 Broadway in New York City, by November 20, 1960, the FPCC claimed 5,000 members. The CIA's Security Office then launched—under the orders of James McCord—a counterintelligence operation in the United States against the FPCC without the FBI's permission. That is a subject to which we will return later.
# Oswald's Cuban Question Mark
"We had quite many [sic] discussions regarding Castro," said a marine who had befriended Oswald at Atsugi, Japan, and returned with him to El Toro, California. In his 1964 testimony to the Warren Commission, Nelson Delgado explained that it was their views on Cuba that had solidified their friendship in the first place. Delgado explained,
At the time I was in favor of Castro, I wholeheartedly supported him, and made it known that I thought he was a pretty good fellow, and that was one of the main things [reasons why] Oswald and I hit it off so well, we were along the same lines of thought. Castro at the time showed all possibilities of being a freedomloving man, a democratic sort of person that was going to do away with all tyranny and finally give the Cuban people a break.
Delgado was referring to the period just after Castro had seized power in Cuba, a time when Castro's plans for a communist Cuba were not widely known or understood. Even so, the idea of two marine privates discussing the Cuban revolution in these terms is, at the very least, unusual. Angleton's deputy, Ray Rocca, felt that Delgado's assertions were "of germinal significance to any review of the background of Lee Harvey Oswald's feeling toward and relations with Castro's Cuba." Delgado, in Rocca's view, "was probably the closest peer group member to Oswald during his specialist training period at El Toro Marine Corps Base December 1958 to September 1959."
The Warren Commission Report noted that "Oswald told Delgado that he was in touch with Cuban diplomatic officials in this country, which Delgado at first took to be 'one of his lies, but later believed.' " The question is this: Did the commission believe Delgado? The report leaves us without an answer to this essential question. Something Delgado said during his testimony about Oswald's plans gave Warren Commission lawyer Wesley Liebeler quite a surprise. This is what happened:
MR. DELGADO: . . . And we talked [about] how we would like to go to Cuba and—
MR. LIEBELER: You and Oswald did?
MR. DELGADO: Right. We were going to beome officers, you know, enlisted men. We are dreaming now, right? So we were going to become officers. So we had a head start, you see. We were getting honorable discharges. . . . So we were all thinking, well, honorable discharge, and I speak Spanish and he's [Oswald] got his ideas of how a government should be run, you know, the same line as Castro did at that time.
MR. LIEBELER: Oswald?
MR. DELGADO: Right. So we could go over there and become officers and lead an expedition to some of these other islands and free them too, you know, from—this was really weird, you know, but—
MR. LIEBELER: That is what you and Oswald talked about?
MR. DELGADO: Right, things like that; and how we would go to take over, to make a republic. . . . And we would talk about how we would do away with Trujillo, and things like that, but never got no farther than the speaking stage.
Generalissimo Rafael B. Trujillo was commander-in-chief of the Dominican Republic Armed Forces, and dictator of that tiny Caribbean country for more than thirty years when he was finally assassinated in May 1961. Latin American nations were pressing the U.S. to take action against Trujillo, whose harsh dictatorial methods were unpopular but whose obedience to Washington had long since assured his survival. At the time Oswald and Delgado discussed Trujillo, Washington could count on the unpopular dictator not to follow Castro's lead.
There came a time, however, when things began to progress beyond the "speaking stage," things that put distance between Delgado and Oswald. Delgado recounted that part of the story for the Warren Commission in these words:
But then when he started, you know, going along with this, he started actually making plans, he wanted to know, you know, how to get to Cuba and things like that. I was shying away from him. He kept asking me questions like "how can a person in his category, an English [speaking] person, get with a Cuban, you know, people, be part of that revolution movement?"
Oswald's dream of joining Castro's forces with his fellow marine Nelson Delgado was never realized. However, another ex-marine, Gerry Patrick Hemming, did manage to get into Castro's army, a story we will shortly turn to.
By far the most provocative detail in Delgado's recollection concerned Oswald's contact with Cuban diplomats.
MR. DELGADO: Oh, yes, then he kept on asking me about how about—how he could go helping the Castro government. I didn't know what to tell him, so I told him the best thing that I know was to get in touch with a Cuban Embassy, you know. But at that time that I told him this we were on friendly terms with Cuba, you know, so this wasn't no subversive or malintent [sic], you know. I didn't know what to answer him. I told him go see them.
MR. LIEBELER: With the Cuban Embassy?
MR. DELGADO: Right. And I took it to be just a—one of his, you know, lies, you know, saying he was in contact with them, until one time I had the opportunity to go into his room, I was looking for—I was going over for the weekend, I needed a tie, he lent me the tie, and I seen this envelope in his footlocker, and as far as I could recollect that was mail from Los Angeles, and he was telling me there was a Cuban Consul. And just after he started receiving these letters—you see, he would never go out, he'd stay near the post all the time. He always had money. That's why.
"Delgado's testimony has the cast of credibility," Ray Rocca wrote in his 1975 report. Whether or not Rocca is right, it is difficult to believe that the Warren Commission accidentally overlooked this or forgot to follow it up. This failure casts suspicion on the integrity of the commission's work.
Just how glaring their failure was can be seen from Liebeler's s amazement as he took Delgado's testimony. When Delgado mentioned Oswald's comment about the Cuban Consul, this is what took place:
MR. LIEBELER: What did you just say?
MR. DELGADO: He always had money, you know, he never spent it. He was pretty tight. So then one particular instance, I was in the train station in Santa Ana, California, and Oswald comes in, on a Friday night. I usually make it every Friday night to Los Angeles and spend the weekend. And he is on the same platform, so we talked, and he told me he had to see some people in Los Angeles. I didn't bother questioning him. We rode into Los Angeles, nothing eventful happened, just small chatter, and once we got to Los Angeles I went my way and he went his. I came to find out later on he had come back Saturday. He didn't stay like we did, you know, come back Sunday night, the last train. Very seldom did he go out. At one time he went with us to Tijuana, Mexico.
Liebeler knew better than to let Delgado wander before finishing his account of Oswald's Cuban contacts. So Liebeler interrupted Delgado and the following exchange occurred:
MR. LIEBELER: Before we get into that, tell me all you can remember about Oswald's contact with the Cuban Consulate.
MR. DELGADO: Well, like I stated to these FBI men, he had one visitor; after he started receiving letters he had one visitor. It was a man, because I got the call from the MP guard shack, and they gave me a call that Oswald had a visitor at the front gate. This man had to be a civilian, otherwise they would have let him in. So I had to find somebody to relieve Oswald, who was on guard, to go down there to visit with this fellow, and they spent about an hour and a half, two hours talking, I guess, and he came back. I don't know who the man was or what they talked about, but he looked nonchalant about the whole thing when he came back. He never mentioned who he was, nothing.
Liebeler asked Delgado if he connected the stranger's visit with the Cuban Consulate and Delgado replied that he had because of the lateness of the visit—around nine P.M., and also because Oswald hardly ever received mail. Mail to Oswald, Delgado recalled, began "after he started to get in contact with these Cuban people."
"Actually," wrote the CIA's Ray Rocca in his 1975 report, "Delgado's testimony says a lot more of possible operational significance than is reflected by the language of the [Warren] report, and its implications do not appear to have been run down or developed by investigation [emphasis his]." Rocca explained the importance of the man at the gate at El Toro in this way:
. . . It is of basic importance to focus attention on the male visitor who contacted Oswald at El Toro Camp and talked with him for between one and a half to two hours. The event was unique in Delgado's recollections, and actually there is nothing like it—on the record—in everything else we know about Oswald's activity before or after his return to the United States. The record reflects no identification of the El Toro contact. Delgado's presumption is that he was from the Cuban Consulate in Los Angeles. Assuming that, the questions are: Who was it, and was there reporting from Los Angeles to Washington and Havana that could, in effect, represent the opening of a Cuban file on Oswald?
In the decades since, the mysterious visitor has never been identified. Did the CIA know of anyone else who visited the Cuban Consulate in Los Angeles in 1959? Indeed they did, but his story is as murky and intriguing as Oswald's. If, as Ray Rocca put it, Cuba was an early "question mark" for Oswald, the same can be said of another ex-marine who did manage to get into Castro's army. His name was Gerry Patrick Hemming.
# Hemming's Cuban Question Mark
One ex-marine who did manage to get into Castro's army was Gerry Patrick Hemming. That his marine service is less well known than Oswald's may be a reflection of the fact that Hemming was not investigated for the murder of President Kennedy. The shadowy nature of Hemming's marine past may also be the result of his association with the CIA. Hemming's CIA files tell us that he, like Oswald, became interested in Cuba during his service in the marines. A 1963 Hemming letter contains the following description of his marine service and interest in Cuba:
While attending the U.S. Navy Academy Prep School, I became interested in the Cuban situation and upon graduation I decided to separate from the service and travel to Cuba. I received my Honorable Discharge at the U.S. Naval Academy in October, 1958. Total service time was 4½ years (active).
CIA files show that Hemming's background was remarkably similar to Oswald's. His security file, OS-429-229, appears to have been generated after Oswald's OS-351-164. It is possible that these two numbers reflect the November 1959 and October 1960 time frames, respectively, for Oswald's defection and Hemming's debriefing by the CIA in Los Angeles.
On the other hand, what if Hemming's OS number was created at the time of an earlier, February 1959 CIA debriefing in Costa Rica? This might indicate an earlier date for Oswald's OS file number. It is possible, though less likely, that both numbers go as far back as early 1959. A 1977 document in Hemming's CIA Office of Security file has this revealing observation:
[The] Hemming file reflects that he served in the U.S. Marine Corps from 19 April 1954 to 17 October 1958. (The 201 File concerning Hemming reflects that he served in Japan with a U.S. Marine Air Wing.) He then returned to the Los Angeles area for discharge and then left for Cuba circa 18 February 1959 and joined Castro's forces.
In view of the sparseness of information in CIA documents on Hemming's Marine Corps history, the above document is intriguing in its claim that Hemming, too, had served in a Marine Air Wing in Japan. This would open the possibility that both men were assigned together to Marine Air Squadron One (MACS-1) at Atsugi. However, this did not happen, according to Hemming, who should be familiar with his own service record. If he is right, when the Marine Corps and Navy release his entire service record, we will find he served with the Third Marine Air Wing in Hawaii, not the First Marine Air Wing, which was the only air wing in Japan.
This particular piece of incorrect information on Hemming—that Hemming had been assigned to Oswald's air wing in Japan—is arresting. It moves us to ask this question: What other incorrect information was in CIA files about Hemming? The answer is best illustrated by this 1976 CIA internal memo describing Hemming in this way:
Gerald Patrick Hemming is well known to this Agency, the Office of Security Miami Field Office, and JMWAVE. On numerous occasions since at least the early 1960's, Hemming had claimed Agency affiliation when in fact there had been none. The most recent incident wherein Hemming claimed such affiliation was in May 1975 when he volunteered his services to the Drug Enforcement Administration. Gerald Patrick Hemming is a long-time cohort of Frank Anthony Sturgis (SF#353459), aka Frank Fiorini, of Watergate notoriety who also has a long-time record of falsely claiming Agency affiliation. In the late 1950's Hemming and Sturgis, both former U.S. Marines, joined Fidel Castro in Cuba but returned shortly thereafter, claiming disillusionment with the Castro cause.
The problem with this is that Hemming had long been associated with the CIA, from Los Angeles to Costa Rica, Guantanamo, Cuba, and eventually Miami and New Orleans. "We do wish to call to your attention," said a 1967 CIA report, "that statement in the chart that there was no relationship between Subject [Hemming] and the Agency. This statement is not correct." Traces from a "review of Hemming's file," the Report said, "indicate that Gerald Patrick Hemming Jr. was probably telling the truth about furnishing reports to the Los Angeles office." While we do not have this chart, we do have the 1967 Report. It describes "other memoranda" in Hemming's CIA 201 file which discuss Hemming's early contact with the CIA and his move to Miami. According to the Report, the October 1960 "contact" alone produced "14 reports on Cuba."
These extensive CIA debriefings of Hemming after his sojourn in Castro'a army and return to the U.S. included details of his February 1959 visit to the Cuban Consulate in Los Angeles. A 1977 memo by the CIA's Security Office which described the October 11-21, 1960, debriefing sessions by the "Contact Division/Los Angeles Office," included this information:
Henning [Hemming] returned to California in October 1958. . . . He left for Cuba by air via Miami on or about 18 February 1959, arriving in Havana on 19 February 1959. He claimed to have contacted the officials in the Cuban Consul's office in Los Angeles prior to his departure.
The 1977 CIA memo suggested that the importance of this and other escapades by Hemming was their possible relevance to Oswald's files. The memo described the intersection between Oswald's and Hemming's files in this way:
The pertinence of the foregoing is that Lee Harvey Oswald served with a U.S. Marine Air Wing in Japan, and when Oswald returned to the United States, he was assigned to Santa Ana, California (Los Angeles area). Extensive testimony contained in the Warren Commission hearings by Oswald's fellow Marines at Santa Ana contain the theme that Oswald was interested in going to Cuba to join Castro (upon his discharge) in early 1959 and that in early 1959 Oswald allegedly made some contact with the Cuban Consul's Office in Los Angeles.
This document is strangely silent on a key question: Did Hemming corroborate Delgado's story about Oswald's contacts with the Cuban Consulate?
This question really separated into two: Did Hemming meet Oswald ? If so, what, if anything, did he tell the CIA about it in October 1960? If Hemming did speak about such a meeting with Oswald, the implications are quite interesting. For example, that might help us understand the sudden interest in defectors in October 1960, a subject to which we will return in Chapter Eleven. As we have seen, in the 1970s the CIA had some trouble coming to grips with Hemming's claims of association with the CIA, let alone his claims of having met Oswald. A 1977 routing sheet on Hemming said, "From a perusal of Agency files, which are meager, I have been unable to corroborate a possible relationship between Oswald and Hemming. A comparison of their (limited) records did not produce any matches."
# The Man at the Gate
Hemming's Agency association in early 1959 casts a shadow over the entire issue of whether he met with Oswald at that time. From elsewhere in the CIA's files come hints of links between Hemming and Oswald, such as in this sentence from a 1977 CIA Security Office memo:
[The] Office of Security file concerning Hemming which is replete with information possibly linking Hemming and his cohorts to Oswald was brought to the attention of Mr. John Leader and Mr. Scott Breckinridge, Inspector General, on 6 April 1977. Mr. Leader advised he would pursue the matter.
This passage suggests there was more in Hemming's CIA files "possibly linking" him to Oswald than the 1959 story. As we will see in later chapters, this is indeed the case.
The story of an Oswald-Hemming meeting in the Cuban Consulate took a new turn in April 1976. An interview with Hemming, published that month in the magazine Argosy, contained the following account by Hemming of his encounter with Oswald:
ARGOSY: You've said you believe Oswald was a patsy. Did you ever have contact with Oswald?
HEMMING: I ran into Oswald in Los Angeles in 1959, when he showed up at the Cuban Consulate. The coordinator of the 26th of July Movement [a Cuban organization] called me aside and said a Marine officer had showed up, intimating that he was prepared to desert and go to Cuba to become a revolutionary. I met with the Marine and he told me he was a noncommissioned officer. He talked about being a radar operator and helping the Cubans out with everything he knew. He turned out to be Oswald.
ARGOSY: What was your impression of him? Was he sincere?
HEMMING: I thought he was a penetrator (of pro-Castro forces). I told the 26th of July leadership to get rid of him. I thought he was on the Naval Intelligence payroll at the time.
Hemming should have been good at spotting penetrators because he was a penetrator himself. When he formed his own group in Miami in 1961, he named it Intercontinental Penetration Forces. "Hemming maintains that the U.S. should utilize a number of Special Forces types," said a CIA biographic summary of Hemming, who could "penetrate" revolutionary movements "at an early stage," gain influential positions, and then "channel" them into more "favorable areas."
That was what Hemming had been doing in Cuba and in Miami. Moreover, he did so at a time when the Cuban problem became a crisis in the White House. Just before he left to penetrate Castro's army in February 1959, Hemming entered the Cuban Consulate in Los Angeles. In a 1995 interview Hemming made an extraordinary claim which will be interesting to watch stand the test of time. This is the pertinent part of the exchange:
NEWMAN: Did you tell CIA in October 1960 about seeing Oswald in the Cuban Consulate?
HEMMING: Sure I did.
NEWMAN: Did you bring it up or did they?
HEMMING: I brought it up.
NEWMAN: Did they want to know other information about the consulate?
HEMMING: Yes. But when I saw Oswald in the Consulate I called up Jim Angleton and he passed me on to his number one guy. I was angry, I was mad at being stuck with him, wanted to know whether it was ONI or whoever put him on me. Oswald was like a rabbit. I figured these guys were putting snitches on me.
Directly afterward, Hemming left for Cuba via Washington, D.C., he says, and departed from the airfield at El Toro. Oswald was stationed at El Toro at that time. In the same interview, Hemming explained what happened while he waited a few days to catch a military plane to Washington:
I was raising hell that I needed to get back into Cuba. I got back into my uniform, and packed up to go. The night before I went down to look for Oswald and told the guard, "I have some documents for PFC Oswald." It was really bothering me. In the Consulate Oswald had known who I was. He knew I was a marine, and he knew I had been in an air wing. So naturally I figured they had put a snitch on me or something. But I had just heard back from Washington there was no one that had been inserted on me, no backstop had been assigned or anything like that. So I had to straighten this thing out with Oswald. I thought maybe he was trying to set me up. I wanted to clear things up with him. Afterward, I went to the other side of El Toro that night and put my name on the list for a hop. I was there staying on fourth floor of the control tower for a couple of days waiting for the hop. Sam Bass, an old friend of mine, woke me up around four A.M. and said, "An R-4Y [2-star general's plane] is here to pick you up and take you back to Anacostia. What are you into?" This was a flight from El Toro to NAX Anacostia [Maryland], at the end of the first week of February 1959.
In other words, Hemming now claims that he met Oswald in the Cuban Consulate in Los Angeles and then confronted him about it outside the gate at El Toro. Hemming says he is the man at the gate to whom Delgado referred in his Warren Commission testimony.
Hemming says he told his 1960 CIA debriefers in Los Angeles that he had met Oswald in the Cuban Consulate. When Ray Rocca wrote his 1975 memo about Oswald's Cuban question mark, presumably he had access to Hemming's debriefs.
We have taken time to acquaint ourselves with Oswald's interest in Castro and the Cuban Revolution because we know that he is destined to be swallowed up in their politics during the eight months before President Kennedy's death. During the HSCA investigation, information surfaced about this involvement, some of which concerned an intriguing informant: June Cobb. Because her path crosses the Oswald paper trail, we get to look into her CIA files. The result is extraordinary because of who June Cobb was, and because it illuminates a section or two of our journey along the Oswald trail.
# June Cobb, Castro, and the CIA
"On May 24, 25, and 26, the undersigned located and met June Cobb," wrote Harry Hermsdorf, "an American woman employed at the Ministry Office of Fidel Castro in Havana, Cuba." In 1960 Hermsdorf worked in WH/4, which handled Cuban matters, and he was writing about the biggest catch of his CIA career:
On 3 June Miss June Cobb, Aide to Fidel Castro in the Prime Minister's office, will arrive in New York City ostensibly for medical treatment. Money for her trip was given to her by the undersigned in Havana on 27 May 1960. No mention of [2-3 words redacted] intelligence implication was made to her, although I have felt that she is probably aware that my purpose for talking with her in New York goes a little beyond normal routine employment.
It was rare that the CIA was able to arrange a meeting with someone who worked directly for Castro. And, at this time, the CIA department in which Hermsdorf worked was involved in plans to invade Cuba and assassinate Castro.
In one of his Cuban trip reports, Hermsdorf boasted how he had flattered and bribed the bell captain at the Havana Hilton Hotel into giving up June Cobb's address, how he then visited and "aroused her curiosity in me" by mentioning the names of her friends in New York, and how he then pitched her with the line that "she had been highly recommended to me by a person in New York and I was giving thought to the use of her services for an interesting, long-range employment project that I had in mind." Cobb had accepted his offer for a talk outside of Cuba. They settled on New York, where she had a legitimate excuse to go for medical treatment. "I will hold a series of meetings with her in New York," Hermsdorf announced, "and [2-3 words redacted] I will evaluate her motivations and potential usefulness in a little greater detail." Hermsdorf also commented that Cobb needed "a little more indoctrination." She needed convincing that Castro was involved in "Communist intrigue."
June Cobb went to New York via Washington, D.C. On June 6, 1960, a CIA officer—whose identity is still classified—working in the counterintelligence staff, arranged for the surveillance of her hotel room. The surveillance was thorough, as the following CIA memo makes clear:
[redacted material] surveillance was established in three rooms of the Raleigh Hotel in Washington D.C., on 6 June 1960 and also included monitoring of a polygraph of subject[Cobb]. From 21 to 29 September [redacted material] coverage was maintained on Subject at her hotel in New York City. This coverage included a [redacted]. Also at least one surreptitious entry into Subject's hotel room was conducted during this time. Physical surveillance was conducted on Subject during the period 10 to 13 October 1960 when she was in Boston, Massachusetts, as well as [redacted] coverage of a second polygraph in Boston.
From another memo we know the name of the counterintelligence officer who requested this surveillance: William P. Curtin, and also that he made the request on behalf of Joseph P. Langan, security officer for WH/4.
Curtin's memo indicated that WH/4 had a keen operational interest in Cobb:
At first Mr. Langan requested that we determine our potential for conducting a "black bag" job on the Subject's hotel room at the Blackstone during the time that she was to be FLUTTERED [given a lie detector test]. This was explored with the SAC/WFO [special agent in charge/Washington field office] who indicated that he could accomplish this task but that the operation would have to be completed by 4 p.m. since his contact left the hotel at that time.
This "black bag job" (generic term for illegal operations) was canceled, but, as previously mentioned, Cobb was subjected to such "a job" in September in New York. Obviously the Agency was going to do whatever it felt necessary to get the information it wanted.
CIA documents indicate interest in Cobb by both CI/OPS and CI/ SIG, the operations and molehunting elements of counterintelligence. These are the same two elements that appear on many of Oswald's CIA documents. And there is another document that reveals high-level interest in Cobb. Dated June 6, 1960—less than a week after she left Cuba—it is from the office of the vice president. It was placed in Cobb's 201 file, with the name "R. E. Cushman" handwritten on it. Lieutenant Colonel Cushman, U.S. Marine Corps, was Richard Nixon's national security assistant. As we will see in Chapter Eight, Cushman was "hands on" when it came to the Agency's Cuban operations.
Cobb did not know there was a CIA technician on the other side of the wall in her various hotel rooms. These eavesdroppers kept logs of the activities taking place in her room, such as this one from October 23, 1960:
8:03 P.M. Radio turned up. Announcement of Nixon's acceptance of 5th debate with Kennedy.
8:13 P.M. Other woman on phone. "Wanna say hello to June." June on phone, in Spanish.
"One would have thought that the CIA could have found someone who could speak Spanish in New York," Cobb remarks wryly today. She has a point: In this and other logs, it is apparent that the snoopers did not speak Spanish. With White House-backed plots to assassinate Castro afoot, and a subject who had access to his inner sanctum, it seems odd to go to the expense of this elaborate surveillance without the benefit of an on-site linguist.
A surveillance log turned in on October 25 said that among the phone calls of the previous six days, one had been to "AC 2-7190; Alexander I. Rorke, Jr., 7 West 96 Street, Apt. 2-A. Rorke was another Hemming, a soldier of fortune caught up in the Cuban vortex. Unlike Hemming, however, Rorke did not survive to tell his war stories. On September 24, 1963, he and a colleague, Geoffrey Sullivan, disappeared on a flight somewhere in the Caribbean. Rorke's right wing politics did not mix with Cobb's liberalism, and his call was not as a friend but in connection with one Marita Lorenz. "Marita and he had called me," Cobb recalls, "and I called him back, it it would have been to politely end the conversation." The name Marita Lorenz is well known to students of the Kennedy assassination case. For example, in his book Plausible Denial, investigator-lawyer Mark Lane narrates her remarkable claim to have been recruited by the CIA to assassinate Castro, and to have met with Howard Hunt and Jack Ruby in Dallas just before the assassination.
After the disappearance of Rorke and Sullivan, Rorke's in-laws became involved. Sherman Billingsley's daughter Jackie was married to Rorke. Hoover was a regular at Billingsley's famous restaurant, the Stork Club. Billingsley's hopes were fueled by persistent but unproven rumors of Rorke's capture and imprisonment. Billingsley became angry with the administration and the CIA for ransoming Cubans and not doing the same for Rorke. He collected documents he thought embarrassing to JFK and the CIA and stored them in bank vaults. There was a second Billingsley daughter who had handled some of the material. She disclosed their content to her boyfriend, Douglas K. Gentzkow, a West Point cadet.
Gentzkow skipped his chain of command and Army security, went straight to the New York office of the CIA's Domestic Contacts Division (DCD), and turned over the documents in his possession. Mayo Stuntz, chief of support for DCD, wrote this on Gentzkow's file: "We wondered why a [West Point cadet] would risk his career on such a deal." The person from Cuban operations who handled the file, someone named "Ladner," recommended turning over the information to Army security. Decades later, Gentzkow was surprised to learn this.
In one of the New York DCD reports on Gentzkow, the story of June Cobb and Marita Lorenz surfaced:
The name of June Cobb as a double agent appears in the Rorke papers. . . . According to the Rorke notes, June Cobb forced, in the fall of 1960, a cousin of Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge to have an abortion when "Lodge's" cousin was six months pregnant with Fidel Castro's child. [About three years ago, we saw a copy of Confidential magazine giving details about this alleged abortion.)
Gentzkow's papers also surfaced in William Pawley's files, a part of the JFK records long withheld by the CIA. Pawley had helped organize the Flying Tigers with Claire Chennault in 1940, had served as U.S. ambassador to Brazil and Peru under Eisenhower, was appointed to the Doolittle Commission to investigate covert operations, engaged in petroleum and mining activites in the Dominican Republic, and owned transportation and sugar assets in Cuba which he lost as a result of Castro's revolution. He was wealthy, and raised money for the Eisenhower and Nixon campaigns of 1956 and 1960. Pawley had been used by the CIA in 1952-1954, and was used again, beginning in 1959, in Miami for gathering intelligence on Cuba. Why Gentzkow's papers were mixed in with Pawley's is unclear, unless some of the Cubans whose names were in the documents were associated with Pawley.
The appearance of the story about Cobb forcing Lorenz to abort Castro's child may seem to confirm at least part of the Confidential article. Cobb insists, however, that the father was Captain Jesus Yanez Pelletier, military aide to Castro. Yanez's enemies later succeeded in jailing him when his friendship with Castro—and therefore Castro's protection—was destroyed in the wake of the scandal surrounding the Marita Lorenz case. The CIA became interested in the Lorenz story and June Cobb as the result of earlier FBI reporting. This reporting concerned an alleged rape of Marita by Castro. That story ended up in a CIA memorandum that quoted Cobb as saying "she would hardly call it rape." This report, apparently based on FBI intelligence, also said, "The girl involved was amorous with several of the entourage and willingly submitted to their attentions." Cobb is adamant that this accusation a lie. The CIA did question Cobb during one of her 1960 trips to New York "in connection with one Marita Lorenz case."
Here is the story of Marita's abortion in June Cobb's own words today:
Raul Castro had been trying to distance Yanez from Fidel—for example, by sending him on a mission to Italy. Marita became pregnant and that was a big problem. She was looking forward to having the baby. Yanez was separated but not divorced from his wife. Yanez wanted Marita to have an abortion. I suggested that she didn't have to have an abortion—we could just hide her. Unfortunately, before I could discuss this with Yanez, the abortion was performed. I learned of it when she called me from a room in the Hilton where Yanez had brought her after the operation.
When she was living in New York, Castro arranged for her to travel to Cuba. To save money she cashed the Cubana Airlines ticket and went by bus to Florida and cheap flight on over to Havana. When she got there she could not get a call through to Fidel. So she went to an inexpensive hotel in old Havana and, after a few days, was about to give up and go home. She was in her hotel room with the top half of the door open for ventilation when, suddenly, the head of this tall handsome Captain appeared. He took her to the Havana Riviera, where Fidel did visit her several times. She said that Fidel lay on the bed with her and talked a blue streak, but he never made love to her.
Fidel asked Yanez to take her out and show her around so that she could see Cuba; on a trip to one of the two beautiful beaches in Havana, she said he became her first love. She went home to New York. At the time of Fidel's April [1959] visit, she said, she was able to spend some time alone with Yanez in her mother's apartment on the Upper West Side of Manhattan. Unbeknownst to Fidel, she and Yanez arranged for her return to Havana. Yanez had limited funds, so he put her up at a little hotel, the Hotel de la Colina near the university; that's where she was staying when I met her in August; Fidel didn't even know she was back in Cuba.
We considered the possibility that she would need to go to a doctor after she got home to New York. She did not want to go to her mother's doctor because her mother would find out about the abortion; so I recommended an excellent physician who, I was sure, would treat her. After she returned to the States, at some time in the winter, Castro's Executive Secretary, Conchita Fernandez, and I both began receiving calls from Marita's mother threatening scandal.
Thus Cobb opposed the abortion and had planned to intercede with Yanez to prevent it. The effect of the Confidential story undermined the bond between Castro and his aide and friend, Yanez. Yanez was arrested by the FBI in New York when he went there to ask Marita to marry him. Released, he returned to Cuba, where he was arrested a few days later under suspicion of being involved in mob-CIA plots against Castro. Yanez served eleven years in prison, and is a human rights activist in Cuba today.
Meanwhile, back in 1960, a call from Cobb to Rorke was not all that the eavesdroppers recorded in their logs. This passage is from November 3:
5:10 P.M. Outgoing Call—talking to Joan? Subject telling someone to look someone up in Cuba. Subject asking person if they read something. Subject thought it was very good. Believe Subject was referring to Drew Pearson's column. Subject is reading excerpts from the column. Subject mentions Senator [John] Kennedy and his "get tough" with the Cubans policy. Subject mentions a woman named Taylor (phonetic). Subject also mentions going back to Cuba.
6:25 P.M. Subject turns on television. Governor Dewey talking for Nixon-Lodge, Channel #4.
During this stay in Boston, Cobb recalls being interviewed by a CIA man who asked her this direct question: "Would you consider going to bed with a man for the good of your country?" June Cobb's response is worth noting. "Not if Nixon gets elected," she said.
# CHAPTER EIGHT
# Nixon, Dulles, and American Policy in Cuba in 1960
The Eisenhower administration had not paid close enough attention to Cuba. Preoccupied with Khrushchev's secret speech, the missile gap, and crises in Hungary, Suez, Syria, Lebanon, Indonesia, China, and Berlin in the years 1956 to 1958, the United States was caught off guard when the insurgency in Cuba, having quietly grown beyond the capability of President Batista to control it, exploded with Castro's sudden seizure of power in January 1959.
While U.S.-Cuban relations deteriorated and the CIA began to consider "eliminating" Castro, Soviet-Cuban relations improved dramatically, culminating in a visit to Cuba, from February 2 to 13, 1960, by Soviet Foreign Minister Anastas Mikoyan. Mikoyan signed trade agreements covering sugar, oil, loans, and Soviet technical experts. The Soviet loan extended to the Cubans was $100 million in trade credits. The visit sparked grave concerns in Washington over Soviet intentions. Secretary of State Christian Herter said this about the Mikoyan visit:
Within Cuba he [Herter] found a change in attitude at the time of the Mikoyan visit. Prior to that time the Cubans had made offers of settlement [with respect to foreign assets in Cuba]. We have information that he [Mikoyan] advised them to confiscate the holdings of U.S. business people, adding that Russia would stand behind them.
This trend continued on May 7, 1960, when Cuba resumed diplomatic relations with Russia. On May 18, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Roy R. Rubottom was brooding over a memo stating that "there is considerable anxiety in the Pentagon lest the U.S.S.R. openly or secretly install an electronic tracking station in Cuba." During early summer of 1960, the Soviet-Cuban connection began to take on an ominous character: the first Soviet arms arrived in Cuba.
The summer of 1960 was the point of no return in Soviet-Cuban and U.S.-Cuban relations. In a month Castro seized U.S. oil assets. By September 1960, Castro and Khrushchev were able to laugh about this together in New York City, where both men were attending a U.N. meeting. This passage by E. Howard Hunt, a veteran of the CIA's anti-Cuban operations, illustrates the developing Soviet military intelligence threat in Cuba:
On July 6 [1960] no less a personage than Sergei M. Kudryavtsev arrived in Havana as the Soviet Union's first ambassador to Castro's Cuba. As Embassy First Secretary in Ottawa in 1946, Kudryavtsev had left hurriedly following the disclosures of Igor Gouzenko that resulted in rounding up Canada's atom spy ring. Gouzenko had been military intelligence code clerk and identified Kudryavtsev as chief of the GRU rezidentura. Though personally unprepossessing, Kudryavtsev had a keen mind and was an accomplished linguist. Following departure from Canada, the Soviet appeared in Vienna as Deputy High Commissioner, then in Paris as Minister-Counselor. Cuba was Kudryavtsev's first ambassadorial post, and he filled it as representative of the international section of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. This high-echelon sponsorship indicated profound political interest in Cuba, the nature of which did not become apparent until two years later, when the installation of Soviet missiles in Cuba became chillingly known to the world.
By the end of 1959 the Cuban problem had reached the crisis stage in Washington. As the Republican Party prepared to nominate Richard Nixon for president at the end of July 1960, Eisenhower wrote to British Prime Minister Macmillan, "As it appears to us, the Castro government is now fully committed to the bloc." The same day, July 11, Secretary of State Herter sent this word to selected U.S. diplomatic posts: "Developments of last several days, especially Khrushchev's threat missiles can reach U.S. in event 'aggression' against Cuba, have placed early solution Cuban problem among imperatives of U.S. foreign policy and offers most fundamental challenge to date to Inter-American System." The solution, however, was out of Herter's hands. The man who grasped the reins of Cuban policy was Vice President Nixon. The centerpiece of the policy he implemented was a covert operation to overthrow Castro. That plan was put together by Allen Dulles and his team at the CIA.
# "We regard the situation in Cuba as a crisis . . . "
As Oswald waited in his Moscow hotel room in December 1959 for his Russian saga in Minsk to begin, Cuba had become a critical issue in the White House. The Cuban story was sensitive because the measures adopted to handle the problem were covert ways to overthrow Castro, including plans to "eliminate" him. This dark aspect to the Cuban problem led Vice President Nixon to suggest to his colleagues at a National Security Council in that same December that they should keep quiet about the fact that the situation with Cuba had reached the crisis stage.
In the White House, Vice President Nixon actively participated in many of the important policy discussions. On December 10, 1959, during the discussion on Cuba at the 428th Meeting of the National Security Council (NSC), Vice President Nixon asked, "What was the Communist line toward Cuba? He gathered that the Russians did not object to a tough line on the part of Cuba." Richard Bissell, the CIA's Deputy Director of Plans, replied that "the Soviets encouraged a tough anti-U.S. line in Cuba under the guise of nationalism." In other words, the Cuban problem was, from its inception, fundamentally linked to the larger U.S.-Soviet power struggle in the minds of U.S. decisionmakers. At the following 429th meeting of the NSC on December 16, Nixon told those present he "did not believe that Cuba should be handled in a routine fashion through normal diplomatic channels."
The Soviet dimension of the Cuban situation raised the stakes to what was already a serious problem. Just how serious is evident from what followed the day after the 428th NSC meeting. On December 11, 1959, Allen Dulles approved a recommendation that "thorough consideration be given to the elimination of Fidel Castro." Over the years we have learned much about the Castro assassination planning that Dulles approved on that December day, including this detail from the 1975 final report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities United States Senate (SSCIA—known as the "Church Committee."):
On December 11, 1959, J. C. King, head of CIA's Western Hemisphere Division, wrote a memorandum to Dulles observing that a "far left" dictatorship now existed in Cuba which, "if" permitted to stand, will encourage similar actions against U.S. holdings in other Latin American countries. One of King's four "Recommended Actions" was: "Thorough consideration be given to the elimination of Fidel Castro."
J. C. King was not alone in believing that Castro's leadership was a cancer so malignant as to warrant assassination. His mindset was no less ethical than that of many of the Cold Warrior cowboys who set aside morality in pursuit of a "higher good." Richard M. Bissell agreed with King's recommendation to consider assassinating Castro. Bissell was a powerful man in the CIA's covert world: He was in charge of all the Agency's clandestine services, then called the "Directorate of Plans."
Over the years, we have gradually learned of Bissell's role in the CIA's original planning to assassinate Castro. First, there is the CIA's own Inspector General's Report, written in 1967 after a Jack Anderson broadcast leaking details of the CIA's links to the Mafia and assassination plots.The IG Report contains this sentence:
Bissell recalls that the idea originated with J. C. King, then Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, although King now recalls having only had limited knowledge of such a plan and at a much later date—about mid-1962.
Obviously Bissell was right and King was wrong, but this sentence is fascinating to reflect upon. It was written for a secret internal CIA investigation, and its creators had not envisaged their work being released to the public. When Director Helms saw the report, he ordered all copies except his own destroyed.
A better source of information about Bissell's role in the development of the CIA's plans to assassinate Castro is a report written by the SSCIA, also known as the Church Committee. Its November 20, 1975 "interim report," entitled Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, is still one of the best and most thorough reports on the history of these plans. Bissell's testimony to the Church Committee contains details such as this:
I remember a conversation which I would have put in early autumn or late summer between myself and Colonel Edwards [director of the Office of Security], and I have some dim recollection of some earlier conversation I had had with Colonel J. C. King, chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, and the subject matter of both these conversations was a capability to eliminate Castro if such action should be decided upon.
During the summer of 1960, apparently, coincident with the Bissell-Edwards conversations, such action was decided on. J. C. King's name appeared as the directing officer on a cable authorizing the CIA station in Havana to arrange for Castro's brother, Raul Castro, to have an "accident." We will return to that matter shortly. The revealing detail in the above passage from Bissell's testimony to the Church Committee is this: He refers to two distinct time periods during which discussions with King about assassinating Castro took place.
We can date both of these moments with some degree of confidence. The first conversation likely took place just before Dulles approved King's recommendation to study killing Castro, on December 11, 1959. The first Bissell-King conversation may have contained ideas similar to the one below, which was in the memorandum by King:
None of those close to Fidel, such as his brother Raul or his companion Che Guevera, have the same mesmeric appeal to the masses. Many informed people believe that the disappearance of Fidel would greatly accelerate the fall of the present government.
King's reasoning was based on the "belief" of "informed people" rather than hard evidence. In retrospect, the logic of singling out Castro's "mesmeric appeal" as the factor that added a high value to him as a target for assassination seems dubious. However, King's CIA chain of command never questioned this logic. Bissell's concurrence and Dulles's approval are recorded in the handwritten note that accompanied J. C. King's extraordinary document.
Bissell states that the second conversation with King was in the "late summer or early autumn" of 1960. It likely occurred as a result of King's work in support of the Cuban project Allen Dulles had assigned to Bissell. According to Dulles biographer Peter Grose, Dulles had a plan to replace Castro with a moderate leadership. The CIA director is reported to have told his "closest associates" that the Agency had to "start working with the left." Dulles then set up a special Cuban task force outside of J. C. King's Western Hemisphere Division. Leading that task force were Richard Bissell, and Tracy Barnes, a veteran of CIA covert operations in Guatemala. King, functioning in a support role, told the task force that failure to eliminate Raul Castro and Che Guevera along with Castro would only draw out the "affair." As we will see, King thought it would be better to get rid of all three leaders "in one package."
# Nixon: "We need . . . a few dramatic things"
In 1959, Nixon and Dulles had cooperated to defeat the State Department recommendations to recognize the Castro regime. "Castro's actions when he returned to Cuba," Nixon wrote twenty years later, "convinced me he was indeed a Communist, and I sided strongly with Allen Dulles in presenting this view in NSC and other meetings." The Vice President's performance at the next NSC meeting was memorable, even though it did not mention the ongoing discussion about assassinating Castro. As we have seen, Nixon chose this moment to articulate a new American policy toward Cuba, as recorded in the minutes of the December 16, 1959, NSC meeting:
The Vice President did not believe that Cuba should be handled in a routine fashion through normal diplomatic channels. Congress was an important element in the situation. The Administration must try to guide Congress and not simply react to proposals which may be made in Congress. He urged that between now and January 6 supplementary studies of U.S. strategy toward Cuba must be taken.
This was an important new policy statement coming from Vice President Nixon, who was expected soon to be President Nixon. It was also an attack on the current Cuban policy which, up to that point, had been largely under the control of the State Department. Nixon was openly challenging the State Department's way of "handling" Cuban matters.
Nixon defined the Cuban problem in such a way as to take the initiative away from the State Department. The NSC minutes under the signature of Marion W. Boggs, the deputy executive secretary of the National Security Council, contain a verbatim transcript of a lengthy admonition of the State Department by Nixon, excoriating the department for the political cost of its failure in Cuba. Here are some pertinent parts of the minutes:
The Vice President said that when Congress reconvened there would be a great assault on the Administration's Latin American policy. Heavy criticism of that policy was coming from the Republican and Democratic members of Congress. In his view, a discussion of Cuba could not be avoided. The problem would soon have far-flung implications beyond the control of the Department of State; and any tendency of State Department officials to attempt to delay action would not be appropriate. . . . The Vice President recalled that some State Department officials had earlier taken the position that we would be able to live with Castro.
This was a particularly damning assessment for the State Department officials who, like Assistant Secretary of State for Latin-American Affairs Roy C. Rubottom, had held to a softer line toward Cuba.
Nixon had a large personal stake in the unfolding events in Cuba because the next presidential election, which it seemed likely he would win, was less than eleven months away. Those listening to the vice president might also have been thinking about how to keep their positions if he became the president. It did not appear that things were going to work out very well for Assistant Secretary Rubottom. On July 27, Nixon received the Republican nomination for president, and in August 1960 Rubottom found himself promoted out of the way into the post of ambassador to Argentina.
At the December 16, 1959, NSC meeting, Nixon gave some hints about what changes he foresaw in Cuban policy:
No doubt that radical steps with respect to Cuba would create an adverse reaction through Latin America, but we need to find a few dramatic things to do with respect to the Cuban situation in order to indicate that we would not allow ourselves to be kicked around completely. . . . He repeated his fear that the problem was getting beyond the normal diplomatic province.
The use of the words "dramatic things" to solve the problem "beyond the normal diplomatic province" goes hand in hand with Dulles's approval five days earlier of the King memo planning Castro's elimination. The imagery evoked by Nixon's choice of words—being "kicked around" by Cuba—was a clear indication that Nixon had something major in mind for Castro. Nixon and Dulles's capture of Cuban policy after that December 16, 1959, NSC meeting is evident from the "dramatic things" that followed: the Bay of Pigs invasion and attempts to assassinate Castro and other Cuban leaders. The original plan was for both things to happen together, culminating in the first week of November 1960, to give Nixon a boost in the presidential election.
The vice president's remarks, as we have seen, to the same December 1959 NSC meeting included his announcement that "we should not advertise the fact that we regard the situation in Cuba as a crisis situation." The reason for this reticence was the covert nature of the measures being planned. CIA Director Dulles was at the same NSC meeting, and he responded to Nixon's comment this way:
Mr. Dulles felt the question of whether anti-Castro activities should be permitted to continue or should be stopped depended on what the anti-Castro forces were planning. We could not, for example, let the Batista-type elements do whatever they wanted to do. However, a number of things in the covert field could be done which might help the situation in Cuba [emphasis added].
A number of things were indeed under way: "In early 1960 Eisenhower became convinced that we were right," Nixon later wrote of his and Dulles's struggle with the State Department over Cuban policy, "and that steps should be taken to support the anti-Castro forces inside and outside of Cuba."
# Dulles, the Special Group, and the "Package Deal"
Allen Dulles lost no time in orchestrating the new covert Cuban policy within the Special Group. The first discussion at a Special Group meeting about a plan to overthrow Fidel Castro took place on January 13, 1960. This was a landmark meeting, in which CIA Director Allen Dulles laid down a chain of command that excluded the State Department for how the new covert war would be waged. That chain ran directly from the White House to the Special Group. The record of their meetings contains this entry:
Mr. Dulles notes the possibility that over the long run the U.S. will not be able to tolerate the Castro regime in Cuba, and suggested that covert contingency planning to accomplish the fall of the Castro government might be in order. He emphasized that details of plans of this kind would be properly aired at the Special Group meetings and with the President but not necessarily with the NSC.
A chain of command running from the president to a committee outside the regular institutions of government was unusual—even novel. It was also a power move to exclude the State Department from U.S. Cuban policy in Cuba. That policy was now the "elimination" of Castro and the overthrow of the Cuban government.
Declassified portions of the minutes of the January 13 Special Group meeting suggest that Livingston T. Merchant, who had just been promoted the month before to Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, disagreed with Dulles. When the CIA director "suggested that covert contingency planning to accomplish the fall of the Castro government might be in order," Merchant injected his view that timing was important to permit a solid opposition base to develop. He feared that "Raol [Raul] Castro and Che Guevara would succeed Fidel and this could be worse."
What happened next was vintage Allen Dulles, whose domain of covert operations made him sensitive to any implication that the Agency might have overlooked something important. His smooth reply left the impression that the CIA's covert plans had taken Merchant's concern into account. Dulles "emphasized that we do not have in mind a quick elimination of Castro, but rather actions designed to enable responsible opposition leaders to get a foothold." Notes from minutes preserved by the Church Committee show that Dulles then added this finishing touch:
Mr. Dulles said that the CIA would pull together the threads of this problem and would inventory and assess all possible assets, and that this might take several months. He said that this is all the action in this connection that he plans for the immediate future.
The threads were pulled together by March in a report entitled "A Program of Covert Action Against the Castro Regime," a document to which we will return shortly.
Dulles's remarks to Merchant at the January 13 Special Group meeting have given rise to the notion that Dulles "specifically rejected" King's proposal on "the assassination of Fidel." This interpretation is wrong. Dulles's comment that the CIA did not have Castro's "quick elimination" in mind left unsaid the fact that the CIA was planning to develop this capability for use several months down the road, in conjunction with a guerrilla-instigated uprising. In barring Castro's "quick elimination," Dulles had not rejected King's proposal "specifically" or in any other way. We know this because the fact that the Agency was planning Castro's elimination and the fact that Dulles had approved this planning in December 1959 have both long been in the public record.
At an NSC meeting the next day, January 14, Undersecretary Merchant said he viewed "the Cuban problem as the most difficult and dangerous in all the history of our relations with Latin America, possibly in all our foreign relations." That comment set off this exchange between President Eisenhower, his assistant Mr. Gray, and CIA Director Dulles:
Mr. Gray said the Attorney General had frequently wondered what our policy was with respect to stopping anti-Castro elements preparing some action against Cuba from American territory. The President said it was perhaps better not to discuss this subject. The anti-Castro agents who should be left alone were being indicated.
Mr. Dulles felt we should not stop any measures we might wish to take in Cuba because of what the Soviets might do. From our point of view, it would be desirable for the U.S.S.R. to show its hand in Cuba; if Soviet activity in Cuba becomes evident, then we will have a weapon against Castro.
Mr. Gray asked whether discussion of this subject should not be treated with the utmost secrecy. At the suggestion of the Vice President, it was agreed that the Planning Board would not be debriefed on the foregoing discussion.
This passage makes clear the importance the administration attached to the secrecy of its mission to topple Castro. The NSC was no longer the place to discuss Cuban operations.
Dulles's remarks suggest that he anticipated—even hoped—that Soviet Premier Khrushchev would cut a deal with Castro. Such a move by the Kremlin would only provide stronger justification for the assassination and insurrection his operatives were planning for Cuba. On March 9, 1960, J. C. King, chief of CIA's Western Hemisphere Division, attended a meeting of Bissell's new Cuban task force. The Church Committee released this part of a memorandum describing the meeting:
That the DCI is presenting a special policy paper to the NSC 5412 [Special Group] representatives. He mentioned growing evidence that certain of the "Heads" in the Castro government have been pushing for an attack on the U.S. Navy installation at Guantanamo Bay and said that an attack on the installation is in fact possible.
3. Col. King stated *** that unless Fidel and Raul Castro and Che Guevara could be eliminated in one package—which is highly unlikely—this operation can be a long, drawn-out affair and the present government will only be overthrown by the use of force" [emphasis added].
Thus the idea of assassinating Castro was broadened to include eliminating other Cuban leaders as well. Once assassination is considered an acceptable tool of policy, the list of targets ultimately becomes impossible to control.
A lengthy meeting of the National Security Council on March 10 involved a discussion of American policy to "bring another government to power in Cuba." The minutes of that meeting report that:
Admiral Burke thought we needed a Cuban leader around whom anti-Castro elements could rally. Mr. Dulles said some anti-Castro leaders existed, but they are not in Cuba at present. The President said we might have another Black Hole of Calcutta in Cuba, and he wondered what we could do about such a situation *** Mr. Dulles reported that a plan to effect the situation in Cuba was being worked on. Admiral Burke suggested that any plan for the removal of Cuban leaders should be a package deal, since many of the leaders around Castro were even worse than Castro [emphasis added).
It seems that the "package" concept was contagious, Admiral Burke using it in an NSC meeting only a day after King used it in a CIA Cuban task force meeting.
By mid-March all the threads, as Dulles had promised, had been pulled together and were ready for the Special Group. It met on March 15, 1960, and Cuba was the exclusive subject of the gathering. All present read a paper entitled "General Covert Action Plan for Cuba." The President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, Gordon Gray, "expressed concern over the time stipulated in the paper before trained Cubans would be ready for action, and asked what were the capabilities for a crash program."
The Program document has been released with some deletions, but Gray's concern over the timetable was likely a reference to this subparagraph of the Summary Outline, which said:
b. Preparations have already been made for the development of an adequate paramilitary force outside Cuba together with mechanisms for the necessary logistic support of covert military operations on the island. Initially a cadre of leaders will be recruited after careful screening and trained as paramilitary instructors. In a second phase a number of paramilitary cadres will be trained at secure locations outside of the U.S. so as to be available for immediate deployment into Cuba to organize, train and lead resistance forces recruited there both before and after the establishment of one or more active centers of resistance. The creation of this capability will require a minimum of six months and probably closer to eight.
The six-to-eight-month time projection fell conveniently just before the election, obviously timed to give the Republicans a boost at the polls.
The minutes of the March 15 Special Group meeting preserved in the Church Committee index include this passage:
2. "There was a general discussion as to what would be the effect on the Cuban scene if Fidel and Raol Castro and Che Guieverra should disappear simultaneously [sic]." Admiral Burke feared that since the Communists were the only organized group in Cuba "there was therefore the danger that they might move into control. Mr. Dulles felt this might not be disadvantageous because it would facilitate a multilateral action by OAS [emphasis added].
On January 14 Dulles had opined that it would be helpful if the Soviets showed their hand in Cuba. Now, on March 15, he felt that Communist control would provide a pretext to justify intervention.
Gordon Gray ended the March 15 Special Group meeting by remarking that he would "like to submit later this week to his associate (apparently the president) the paper entitled General Covert Action Plan for Cuba but modified on the basis of [the Special Group meeting's] discussion." Two days later, on March 17, Eisenhower saw the Covert Program, and he assembled those advisers he wanted for a special meeting in the White House. After a brief opening by Secretary of State Herter, CIA Director Dulles briefed the president on the Special Group's plan for "covert operations to effect a change in Cuba." The first steps, Dulles said, would be to form a "moderate opposition group" in exile whose slogan would be to "restore the revolution" betrayed by Castro, to begin operating a radio station on Swan Island for "gray or black broadcasts into Cuba," and to establish a "network of disaffected elements within Cuba." Dulles said it would take "something like eight months" to train a paramilitary force outside of Cuba.
The minutes of the White House meeting, prepared by White House Staff Secretary Brigadier General Andrew J. Goodpasture, show that Eisenhower had this exchange with Dulles and Bissell:
The President said that he knows of no better plan for dealing with this situation. The great problem is leakage and breach of security. Everyone must be prepared to swear that he had not heard of it. He said we should limit American contacts with the groups involved to two or three people, getting Cubans to do most of what must be done. Mr. Allen Dulles said [1½ lines not declassified]. The President indicated some question about this, and reiterated that there should be only two or three governmental people connected with this in any way. He understood that the effort will be to undermine Castro's position and prestige. Mr. Bissell commented that the opposition group would undertake a money-raising campaign to obtain funds on their own—in the United States, Cuba and elsewhere.
After some discussion of the danger to Americans in Cuba, Eisenhower approved the plan: "The president told Mr. Dulles he thought he should go ahead with the plan and the operations." Eisenhower also directed that the CIA and other agencies involved "take account of all likely Cuban reactions and prepare the actions that we would take in response to these."
When Dulles returned to the point that American businessmen in Cuba wanted guidance, the president said "we should be very careful about giving this. Essentially they will have to make their own decisions." Nixon took exception to this, and flatly contradicted the president. The vice president boldly announced what he thought: "We should encourage them to come out. Particularly if they think they should get out and are simply staying there to help the U.S. Government, we should disillusion them on that score immediately. " Bissell ended the meeting by saying it was his "sense of the meeting" that work could get under way. Indeed it did, on its path toward the eventual disaster that would befall the Kennedy administration in its first weeks.
# Marine Lieutenant Colonel Cushman, Jacob "Jake," Engler, and E. Howard Hunt
Though the president's approval had never really been in doubt, such formalities permitted the final go-ahead on commitment of funds and personnel to begin implementation of the new measures against Cuba. E. Howard Hunt, working at the CIA station in Guatemala in March 1960, was urgently recalled to headquarters to "discuss a priority assignment" by a cable that had been signed by Bissell and his new assistant on the Cuban task force, Tracy Barnes Hunt had worked before with Barnes on the CIA team which had successfully overthrown Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954.
When Hunt arrived, Barnes told him he would be "Chief of Political Action in a project just approved by President Eisenhower: to assist Cuban exiles in overthrowing Castro." In his book Give Us This Day, Hunt recalls that things were well under way by the time he arrived:
The nucleus of the project was already in being—a cadre of officers I had worked with against Arbenz. This time, however, all trace of U.S. official involvement must be avoided, and so I was to be located not in the Miami area, but in Costa Rica. . . . We shook hands on it, and Tracy directed me to the project offices which were in Quarters Eye, a wartime WAVE barracks facing Ohio Drive and the Potomac River.
Once in Quarters Eye, Hunt was escorted into the office of the "project chief, a burly ex-ballplayer named Jake whom I had not seen for several years." "Jake" and "Jake Engler" were pseudonyms used by Jack Esterline, who had just taken over Branch 4 in Western Hemisphere (WH) Division. WH/4 handled Cuba.
Hunt met with Esterline and another man involved in Cuban operations, Gerry Droller. Droller used the pseudonyms "Bender" and "Drecher." Hunt later recalled these details:
As we discussed the project in his office, he outlined the project organization and timetable . . . "Now go around and see Drecher. He'll back you up at Headquarters." . . . Drecher greeted me effusively, said things were rolling at a great rate and I was needed urgently to take over field management of the Cuban group. We discussed my cover in Costa Rica. . . . Drecher then told me he had adopted the operational alias of Frank Bender in his dealings with the Cubans whom he told he was the representative of a private American group made up of wealthy industrialists who were determined not to let communism gain a foothold in Cuba. . . . As we talked, secretaries entered and left, Bender dictated cables, read incoming messages, and informed me that our project enjoyed its own communications center, enabling us to communicate rapidly with any part of the world while by-passing the rest of the Agency. I also learned from him that the project's chain of command began with Bissell and descended through Tracy Barnes to Jake. Colonel King, the division chief, was somewhere on the sidelines, and so far as Bender knew, Richard Helms, then Chief of Operations for Clandestine Services, had not been cut in.
"This was a radical departure from standard Agency procedure," Hunt observed, "but the system had been foreshadowed by the semi-autonomous status of our Guatemalan operation." The entire covert side of the CIA was becoming a semi-autonomous operation.
Droller sketched out the project organization for Hunt, dividing it into three basic functions: political action, propaganda, and paramilitary action. Hunt was put in charge of political action, and he met the other two chiefs. First he met "Knight," who handled the propaganda component. Knight was probably David Atlee Phillips. Next he met "Ned," a retired marine officer, who handled the paramilitary component. Hunt recalls:
He eyed me with suspicion and distaste, and muttered that he was going to lead the boys ashore himself, and that the troops, not the politicians, would decide who Cuba's next president would be. Substantively he told me that a recruiting program was getting underway among Cuban refugees who would be polygraphed and checked at Useppa Island, off Fort Myer[s], Florida. At the same time, a training area was being hacked out the mountain coffee finca owned by Roberto ("Bobby") Alejos, brother of Carlos Alejos, Guatemalan ambassador to Washington. All this had the consent of President Idigoras Fuentes. A semi-abandoned airstrip at Retalhulehu in southern Guatemala was being refurbished at considerable expense to handle our heavy C-46 troop and cargocarrying aircraft. Procurement teams were scouting the U.S. and elsewhere for World War II B-25 and B-26 aircraft that would compose the exile Air Force. Small arms and machine guns were enroute from European ordnance dumps and dealers. If all went according to schedule, Ned said, we could expect to be in Havana by next Christmas.
As Ned briefed the invasion plans, Hunt thought the ex-marine was crazy. Ned had not spent enough time with real troops, a perennial problem with the Agency's paramilitary operations, according to Hunt.
As March turned into April, "there were numerous cable exchanges with project headquarters having to do with my cover and activities," Hunt recalls, and then "came a message telling me that Costa Rica was out; Figueres had been unable to secure government assent, and so my Cuban government-in-exile group would be based in Mexico City." Hunt resigned his cover position in the foreign service and told his friends he was quitting the State Department and moving to Mexico "where I could live relatively well on a recent inheritance." After a detour of several days in Spain, Hunt delivered his recommendations to the Cuban task force in April. He listed four:
1. Assassinate Castro before or coincident with the invasion (a task for Cuban patriots);
2. Destroy the Cuban radio and television transmitters before or coincident with the invasion;
3. Destroy the island's microwave relay system just before the invasion begins;
4. Discard any thought of a popular uprising against Castro until the issue has already been militarily decided.
Hunt believed that, without Castro, the Cuban army would "collapse in leaderless confusion." Barnes and Bissell read Hunt's report and told him it "would weigh in the final planning."
It was not long until a plot was hatched to assassinate, not Castro, but his brother Raul. This happened in July 1960, but the level at which it was approved is still murky. The CIA's 1967 Inspector General's Report concluded it could "find no evidence that any of the schemes were approved at any level higher than division, if that." The outlines of how the plot unfolded for Raul Castro to have an "accident" were reconstructed by the Church Committee investigation. According to its report, Alleged Assassination Plots, the first CIA-sanctioned attempt on the life of a Cuban leader took place in July 1960. A Cuban informant working for the CIA case officer in Havana had said he might be able to meet with Castro's brother, Raul. On July 20, the CIA Havana station issued a cable requesting intelligence requirements that the Cuban might fulfill Summoned to headquarters from his home, the duty officer contacted the director of plans, Bissell, his deputy, Barnes, and the chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, J. C. King.
Bissell and Barnes gave King "their instructions," which King relayed in a cable to the Havana station the next day, July 21, which said: "Possible removal top three leaders is receiving serious consideration at HQS." If that sentence did not wake up the case officer, the rest of the cable did. The Church Committee investigation summarized the cable's contents:
The cable inquired whether the Cuban was sufficiently motivated to risk "arranging an accident" involving Raul Castro and advised that the station could "at discretion contact subject to determine willingness to cooperate and his suggestions on details." Ten thousand dollars was authorized as payment "after successful completion," but no advance payment was permitted because of the possibility that the Cuban was a double agent.
The case officer told the Church Committee in 1975 that this cable represented "quite a departure from the conventional activities" of the station, but he dutifully sought out the Cuban and told him that the CIA contemplated an "accident to neutralize this leader's [Raul's] influence." The Cuban demanded, in the event of his own death, a college education for his sons in return for taking a "calculated risk" in arranging the apparent accidental death of Raul Castro.
When the Havana case officer returned to the station on July 22, he received a shocking piece of news. Another cable from CIA headquarters had just arrived. This one, signed by Tracy Barnes, said: "Do not pursue ref [i.e. previous cable authorizing the elimination of Raul]. Would like to drop matter." It was, however, too late to "drop the matter" since the Cuban had already left to contact Raul Castro, who at that time was probably returning from the Soviet Union via Egypt. Fortunately, the Cuban was unable to establish quick contact with Raul, and the matter was finally dropped.
It is interesting, in retrospect, to ask: Who authorized the elimination of Raul Castro? The documentary trail leads no higher than a division chief, J. C. King, who says his instructions came from Bissell, head of the Clandestine Services. The authorizing cable from CIA headquarters was sent on July 21, just days before Nixon's nomination as the Republican candidate for president. Is there any evidence that Nixon might have known about the "accident plot"? As it turns out, there is one intriguing piece of evidence from July 1960, and it concerns a meeting someone from Nixon's office had with Hunt.
In July, Esterline invited Howard Hunt to lunch with the vice president's assistant for National Security Affairs (and chief of Nixon's personal staff), Robert E. Cushman, Jr. Hunt described what transpired:
I reviewed for Cushman my impressions of Cuba under Castro and my principal operational recommendations, then went into the specifics of my mission: form and guide the Cuban government-in-exile, accompany its members to a liberated Havana, and stay on as a friendly adviser until after the first post-Castro elections. In Mexico I was to work independently of the station, though drawing on it for communications and logistical support. Policy was to be transmitted to me by Tracy Barnes, who was at once in touch with Bissell and Allen Dulles, the higher echelons at State, and the Project Chief. Cushman's reaction was to tell me that the Vice President was the project's action officer within the White House, and that Nixon wanted nothing to go wrong. To that end, Cushman was responsible for clearing bottlenecks and resolving differences that might arise among State, CIA, and the National Security Council. He gave me his private telephone numbers and asked that I call him night or day whenever his services might be needed.
While this does not prove that Nixon knew of the accident plot, it does demonstrate that his chief lieutenant, Cushman, was in close contact with the CIA operational elements involved at approximately the same time. Did Cushman also meet the other component chiefs on Bissell's task force? The idea is intriguing, but the evidence is so far lacking.
Of course Nixon and Cushman would not be around when their services were needed for the invasion of Cuba. The planned invasion did not occur before the election, which Nixon lost to Kennedy. Hunt says this about Cushman's generous offer of twenty-four-hour assistance from the vice president's office:
I found general's [colonel's] confirmation of high-level interest and good will reassuring. Unfortunately, when I was later to need them, Nixon and Cushman had been supplanted by a new administration.
Cushman was thus unable to help in 1960. Hunt would meet Colonel Cushman again a decade later, however, this time as General Cushman, whom Nixon installed as the deputy director of the CIA. This time Hunt was after materials for the break-in to the Watergate complex in Washington, D.C.
# CHAPTER NINE
# Lost in Minsk
"Dear Robert," Lee Oswald wrote to his brother at the end of 1959, "I will be moving from this hotel, so you need not write me here." In fact, he did not want any letters at all. Lee said good-bye to Robert in these three sentences:
I have chosen to remove all ties with my past, and so I will not write again, nor do I wish you to try and contact me, I'm sure you understand that I would not like to receive correspondence from people in the country which I have fled. I am starting a new life and I do not wish to have anything to do with the old life.
I hope you and your family will always be in good health. Lee
Besides this terse farewell, the only other thing Marguerite and Robert received from Lee was a note on a scrap of paper asking for cash instead of checks. The "dear Robert" note arrived in late December and the scrap of paper arrived on January 5. They did not hear a word after that.
While Lee Harvey Oswald vanished into Russia, what happened next at home was itself a lost chapter in his history, a chapter in which his mother, worried about his fate, was a central figure. In the events that unfolded in 1960, the actions of Marguerite Oswald loom large. Except for an action by the marine reserves to process Oswald for an undesirable discharge, virtually everything in the 1960 Oswald files is directly attributable to the actions of his mother.
"When did you first hear from Lee?" U.S. Secret Service Special Agent John M. Howard asked Marguerite after the Kennedy assassination. "Did you hear from him while he was in Russia?" It was just three days after the assassination and one day after Ruby murdered Oswald, and the Secret Service had hidden Marguerite and Robert in the Six Flags Inn Motel in Arlington, Texas. "Now we will get to the very important part of the story," Marguerite replied to Howard. Indeed, what Marguerite was getting ready to tell the Secret Service about the FBI has never been acknowledged by the Bureau. On the contrary, the FBI has no record of this "important part of the story."
# Mr. "Fannan": FBI Mystery Man
"Mrs. Oswald, it looks like he wanted to go there [to Russia]," the FBI man said grimly to Marguerite in February 1960. This is just one of the details Marguerite remembers from their meeting. She recalled the entire story of how the FBI contacted her just after Oswald's disappearance inside Russia in January 1960. "I had no contact with Lee at all," Marguerite told the Secret Service in the November 25, 1963, tape-recorded interview, referring to her son's disappearance from Moscow and the fact that, other than the December scrap of paper with his request for cash, she had heard nothing from him. Marguerite explained that she had gathered, by "reading the [news] stories again," that there was an investigation of "the family background as in the service." From this is it would seem that someone was looking into the military service background of Lee Oswald and possibly that of other family members. We do know that the Air Force Office of Special Investigation (OSI) conducted an interview of Oswald's half brother, John Pic, who was an air force staff sergeant in Japan.
In the transcript of this taped interview, Marguerite claimed to have read about the background investigation in the papers. She added this confusing but engaging detail: "But it was the State Department that they had said was investigating his background, so I called the FBI in Fort Worth and wanted to know" [emphasis added]. It would be helpful if these words were specific, for this statement leaves open the possibility that Marguerite had checked with the newspapers about the investigation story. What is certain is that she claims to have called the FBI, whether or not there was earlier contact with someone else.
"Mr. Fannan (phonetic) [sic] is the FBI agent I talked to," Marguerite told the Secret Service about the call to the FBI. "What did he tell you?" Secret Service Agent Howard asked next. The transcript of the Secret Service interview shows how Marguerite responded:
Mr. Fannan (phonetic) came out to the house, and I had all these newspaper clippings and everything. He said, "Mrs. Oswald, it looks like the boy wanted to go there [to Russia]," and since I had no contact, he recommended that I get in touch with some senators and congressmen and people who could help me because we had extenuating circumstances in the case by now.
Who was this Agent "Fannan" who visited Marguerite at her home? And what was the FBI's purpose in suggesting she ask for high-level help?
Even more curious than the identity of Mr. "Fannan" was the date of this contact: "This was February," Marguerite said about the visit to her house. The FBI has never acknowledged any contact with Marguerite Oswald prior to April 28, 1960, when Special Agent Fain of the Dallas FBI office interviewed her. There was no Fannan in Texas or anywhere else, and the phonetic resemblance of "Fannan" to Fain makes it likely that Fain was the FBI agent who visited Marguerite in February. The possibility that the letters Marguerite Oswald wrote in search of her son were actually prompted by the FBI is interesting. An element of intrigue is added by the FBI's failure to acknowledge this lost chapter in its own investigation of Oswald.
# Marguerite's Search for Her Son
"Mrs. Oswald," Special Agent Fain said to her, "things do not look right." The intent of this dark prognosis was evidently to cause Marguerite to worry about her son. "I recommend that you get in touch with someone," Fain offered as a solution. "Would you help me there please?" Marguerite predictably replied. Fain suggested Congressmen Jim Wright and Sam Rayburn, as well as Secretary of State Christian Herter.
"I am very much concerned," Marguerite wrote to Herter, "because I have no contact with him now." Some researchers have noted how the Oswalds had a penchant for going straight to the top with a complaint or a request. In this case, Marguerite was doing exactly what FBI Special Agent Fain had suggested she do, and the result sparked a spectacular amount of paper for the rest of the year. Marguerite was justifiably worried because Lee had tried to renounce his American citizenship while the Soviets had refused his request for citizenship. She summed up her concerns in a March 7 letter to the State Department:
I am writing to you because I am under the impression that Lee is probably stranded and even if he now realizes that he has made a mistake he would have no way of financing his way home. He probably needs help.
I also realize that he might like Russia. That he might be working and be quite content. In that case, feeling very strongly that he has a right as an individual to make his own decisions I would in no way want to hinder or influence him in any way.
If it is at all possible to give me any information concerning my son I would indeed be very grateful.
Marguerite did not include the fact that she had written the previous day to Congressman Jim Wright to appeal for his help as well.
The involvement of a congressman made prompt action a must. On March 21, the State Department sent copies of Marguerite's letter and Congressman Wright's follow-up letter to the American Embassy in Moscow. The operations memorandum to which these letters were attached asked the embassy to report back on Oswald's "circumstances" so that "the Department may reply to Congressman Wright." No concern was expressed about a reply to the worried mother, but the memorandum did authorize, "If feasible, the substance of Mrs. Oswald's letter should be made available to her son." The same day, the department wrote to Congressman Wright, telling him about the cable to Moscow. It was signed by Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, William Macomber.
Having disposed of Congressman Wright's inquiry, the bureaucracy at the State Department was free to return to its lethargy. Oswald's file landed on Henry Kupiec's desk in the passport office. Kupiec passed it to the head of the adjudication section, G. W. Masterton, who passed it, with a quickly scrawled note, to his subordinate, Bernice Waterman. In classic bureaucratese, the note said, "Miss Waterman—I think [the] Embassy should not take any action in the case at this time. If you agree, please draft something for clearance through [the] PT/F [Passport Office]." Masterson evidently thought that Oswald's brazen actions precluded any routine reentry to the U.S. and, further, that the embassy should not go out of its way to help him. Waterman, the most experienced adjudicator in the section, prepared a red refusal sheet requesting a lookout card for Oswald and put it on top of his file. By taking this action, Waterman intended to "avoid the issuance of a passport routinely in the event Oswald should apply in the future."
Marguerite's letter had raised the possibility that Oswald "might want to return to the United States," Waterman later testified, and "it was customary to make this red refusal sheet in our office. . . . In the adjudication part of the office, to put a flag on the case for future reference." The refusal sheet would normally have been indexed by another person and a red "lookout" card put in a file so that Oswald could not come back into the United States without the State Department's Passport Office knowing about it. But a lookout card was not filled out on Oswald. "Someone else was looking at it," Bernice Waterman later testified about the Oswald file's status in late March 1960. "It looks to me as if someone started to handle this for the refusal card, or lookout card as you call it," she explained. What Waterman was not saying was that she too had handled her part of the processing in an unusual way: She had failed to put the standard "disregard" mark on the red refusal sheet, a mark that would have given the authority to remove the lookout card if someone else decided that Oswald had not expatriated himself.
# A "Very Surprising" Case
"All I could say is it is very surprising," Waterman testified, looking back on the Oswald case. Indeed, it was an unusual case from the start. She explained, "We had been requested not to forward any kind of classified files to the usual place for having these cards made—we should forward them to the Classified Files Section, which would take it up from there, and give them to the proper person to handle." Of course the Oswald file was classified and, when it went to Classified Files Section, the normal procedure for indexing the refusal sheet—typing the person's name along the right-hand margin preceded by the number 130—was not followed. Instead, Oswald's name was handwritten and the number 130 was not entered. Six people were questioned about this, and the person who recognizes the handwriting as hers, Dorothy Carter, said that "it could safely be concluded that a lookout card was prepared and filed" [emphasis added]. But the trouble with Carter's story is that she does not remember writing the notation she claims is in her own handwriting. A 1964 internal State Department investigation of this episode illustrates the problem:
Carter had no personal recollection of preparing or filing a lookout card in the Oswald case nor had she any recollection of removing the Oswald card from the file. With regard to the fact that the number 130 did not precede Oswald's name, Carter could offer no explanation other than the possibility the refusal sheet may have been indexed when the number 130 was dropped by the Passport Office. In interviewing the various Passport Office personnel, none could offer any explanation as to what may have happened to the lookout card had one been prepared. The majority of the persons interviewed were of the opinion that a card was never prepared because, among other reasons, the refusal sheet was not indexed. Mrs. Waterman, among others, offered the possible explanation that the refusal sheet was buried under subsequent correspondence and, as a result, missed when the file reached the Passport files.
Thus we do not know for sure whether a lookout card was prepared on Oswald in March 1960. However, contemporaneous State Department cables suggest that something like a lookout card—or a flag which functioned in much the same manner—had been prepared. Take, for example, this passage in a March 28 operations memorandum from the State Department to the embassy in Moscow:
Unless and until the Embassy comes into possession of information or evidence upon which to base the preparation of a certificate or loss of nationality in the case of Lee Harvey Oswald, there appears to be no further action possible in this case.
An appropriate notice has been placed in the lookout card section of the Passport Office in the event that Mr. Oswald should apply for documentation at a post outside the Soviet Union.
This communication crossed in the mail with an operations memorandum from the embassy in Moscow which was also written on March 28. Both messages arrived at their respective destinations on April 5.
A close look at these two operations memorandums in the light of Waterman's 1964 testimony suggests an unusual journey for Oswald's file in the Adjudication Section and Classified Files Section of the State Department's Passport Office. It appears that the final leg of that journey—the filling out of the lookout card itself—was interrupted by this "new communication coming in from our Embassy in Moscow." This March 28 Moscow operations memorandum stated, "The Embassy has no evidence that Oswald had expatriated himself other than his announced intention to do so," a technicality which the embassy felt left its options open. In essence, they felt free to give Oswald his passport back at their own discretion. That same logic—that Oswald was still technically an American citizen—might also explain why the final step of creating a lookout card was never completed back at the State Department in Washington.
Far from setting up roadblocks to Oswald's routine access to his passport should he want to reclaim it, the American Embassy in Moscow was thinking of ways to locate him. The March 28 memorandum from Moscow floated a plan for the State Department's consideration, a plan which they said had been "effective" in previous cases. The plan was to have Marguerite Oswald write a personal letter to her son which the embassy would then forward to the Soviet Foreign Ministry on her behalf. Such a tactic would almost certainly have led the Soviets to provide a mailing address for Oswald. But the State Department did not respond to the plan until May 10, at which time they rejected it. They changed their minds a year later when Marguerite flew to Washington, but during all of the intervening months of her dealings with the FBI, the Marine Corps, and the State Department, Marguerite had no idea what fate had befallen her son.
# "No Clew as to His Present Whereabouts"
The State Department finally sent a short letter to Marguerite, who was, after all, the distraught mother who had started all of the paperwork in the first place. George Haselton, the chief of the Protection and Representation Division, explained to Marguerite that her March 7 letter had been forwarded to the embassy in Moscow with a request that they "endeavor to obtain a report concerning your son's present welfare and inform him of your continuing desire to help him." Haselton's letter was mailed to Mrs. Oswald on March 30. To confound matters, Marguerite also received a strange letter about her son from, of all places, Switzerland. A Professor Hans Casparis had written Oswald on March 22, asking him to make an adjustment to his "travel plans." Professor Casparis was an administrator at the Albert Schweitzer College in Churwalden, Switzerland, and his letter indicated that Oswald was due to attend the college from April 19 through July 20. Marguerite, relieved to know something about Lee's plans, immediately sent an inquiry to Professor Casparis to find out more. She sent the letter on April 6 and, not knowing if Lee wanted this trip kept secret, did not tell the State Department what she had discovered.
Meanwhile, the State Department had learned nothing in its rather lackluster search for Oswald. When the operations memorandum from Moscow arrived at the Department on April 5, it said, "The Embassy has had no contact with Oswald since his departure from the Metropole Hotel in Moscow in November 1959, and has no clew as to his present whereabouts." The State Department did not pass on this disappointing detail to Mrs. Oswald, nor did they inform her of the embassy's suggestion that she write a letter to Lee which the embassy could use as a lever with the Soviet Foreign Ministry. For her part, Marguerite's attention was trained on her mailbox, but not for a new plan of attack from the State Department. She was eagerly awaiting a response from the Albert Schweitzer College. However, the next person who contacted her was not from Switzerland or the State Department. He was Special Agent John W. Fain of the FBI's field office in Dallas. He had just finished interviewing Robert Oswald the day before, and had tracked Marguerite down to ask her some questions about that $25 money order she had sent Lee in January.
When Fain interviewed Marguerite on April 28, three weeks had passed since her letter to the Schweitzer College. She told Fain more than the details of the money order. She told him all about Lee Harvey Oswald's family background, his service in the marines, and his recent defection to the Soviet Union. She told Fain she had written her congressman and the State Department because she was "very much alarmed for fear that something might have happened to Lee." Marguerite told Fain about the letter from the Albert Schweitzer College, and how "the receipt of this letter had raised her hopes to cause her to feel that he might actually be en route to this college in Switzerland and that she intends to write this college to see if they have received any word from Lee."
Marguerite avoided mentioning the fact that she had written that letter several weeks before. After all, the April 20 date for Oswald's arrival at the college had come and gone, and still there was no word from Professor Casparis. Fain asked Marguerite if she had been asked to send "any items of personal identification" to Oswald in Russia. The answer was no, but she added that Oswald had taken his birth certificate with him when he left Fort Worth. Ironically, the very day that Fain interviewed Marguerite, Professor Casparis mailed a letter to her with bad news. While that letter was on an airplane over the Atlantic, another government organization with bad news intruded into Marguerite's life. A letter would arrive shortly in her mail, and it would not be from the Schweitzer College, the State Department, or the FBI. It was from the Marines Corps Reserve, in which Lee Harvey Oswald was still a private with obligated duty.
"Due to your recent activities," Oswald's Marine Reserve commander wrote on April 26, "this headquarters will convene a board of officers, to determine your fitness for retention in the U.S. Marine Corps Reserve." The notification said there were just two options to choose from: retention in the reserves or "undesirable discharge." Oswald was invited to appear at the board or have someone appear for him within forty-five days. Marguerite, with no way of contacting Oswald, did not know how to respond, and so she did not react immediately. She had until June 10 to decide what to do about this threat, and in any case had still not heard back from Switzerland, where she had a reason—albeit a long shot—to hope that Oswald might be at that very moment. There was also the possibility that the embassy might locate him in time for the board. It must have been an awful moment for Marguerite, who had been embarrassed to ask the government for help and now learned that the marines were holding a board to give him the boot.
While Marguerite was holding out for the news from Switzerland, the State Department sent a new operations memorandum to Moscow saying they were not going to do anything at all unless they received something "specific" from Oswald's family. Therefore, the department said on May 10 that Moscow's suggested plan to prompt Mrs. Oswald to write a personal letter to her son would not be "pursued further." This foreclosed any real possibility of finding Oswald in Russia unless he broke his own silence by writing. The State Department search was thus effectively over unless Marguerite forced a new move by some action of her own. With the days ticking away toward the imminent convening of the Marine Corps board on Oswald's undesirable discharge, news finally arrived from the Albert Schweitzer College in Switzerland.
"It is with great regret that we have to tell you," Professor Casparis wrote Marguerite, "that we have not had any word from your son Lee since his application for the third term of a few months ago." This could mean only that Lee had, for his own reasons, decided to excommunicate himself from his family. With no way of contacting Oswald before the Marine Corps hearing, Marguerite had to handle the matter alone. She decided to act, but elected to wait until the very last moment to do so. "I am writing you on behalf of my son Lee Harvey Oswald," she wrote to the Marine Corps on June 10. "He is out of the country at present and since I have no contact with him I wish to request a stay of action concerning his discharge. Also I desire to be informed of the charges against him." At the same time, she wrote a letter to the State Department on June 8, asking for a determination as to whether Lee had in fact "signed the necessary papers renouncing his citizenship," and adding her own analysis that he had not and that he was in Russia as a "resident alien." This was an excellent question that had bearing on the circumstances under which he might return to the U.S., but it would be of little use in preventing an unfavorable decision by the marine board.
The Marine Corps responded first, with a letter on June 17 saying that the investigation into Oswald "was prompted by his request for Soviet citizenship." This letter said that sending a certified letter to Oswald's last known address announcing the date of the board was all the marines needed to do, and added, "It is regretted that action of this nature must be taken in your son's case." The Marine Corps did not tell Marguerite that they had already read the FBI report of her April 28 interview with Special Agent Fain. The June 17 Marine Corps letter to Marguerite also did not tell her what else they had learned from the FBI. It was an FBI suspicion which would have added considerably to Marguerite's anxiety about her son had she known about it. The FBI had concluded—based on Fain's interview with Marguerite and a general analysis of the situation—that there might be an impostor using Oswald's birth certificate.
The Oswald-impostor idea began in the New York field office of the FBI when they read the report of Fain's April 28 interview with Marguerite. In its May 23 air telegram to Bureau headquarters, the New York field office said this:
She [Marguerite] stated that Lee Oswald had taken his birth certificate with him when he left home. The fact that she had sent three letters to her son in Moscow since 1/22/60, which were returned undelivered, has caused her to fear for his safety.
There appears to be a possibility of locating Lee Oswald outside the USSR at the Albert Schweitzer College in Switzerland.
Furthermore, since Oswald had his birth certificate in his possession, another individual may have assumed his identity.
The info furnished by Mrs. Oswald may be of interest to the US State Department and it is suggested for the consideration of the Bureau, that a copy of her interview be furnished to the State Department for any action they deem appropriate.
A handwritten entry on the Bureau copy of the New York telegram indicates that the FBI relayed Fain's report to the State Department on May 24.
The Oswald-impostor thesis led the Bureau to go beyond the advice of its New York field office. On June 3, J. Edgar Hoover sent a letter to the State Department's Office of Security, asking them to look into the matter. "Since there is the possibility that an impostor is using Oswald's birth certificate," Hoover said, "any current information the Department of State has concerning subject [Oswald] will be appreciated." Emery J. Adams of the Security Office, presumably after checking with the Passport Office, checked with the Soviet Desk on June 6. "SOV has received no information concerning a possible trip by Subject to Switzerland or the possible use by Subject of his birth certificate," replied D. Anderson of the Soviet Desk.
Meanwhile, the State Department had sent a short operations memorandum to the American Embassy in Moscow on June 22, saying, "Please inform the Department whether the Embassy has been successful in communicating with Mr. Oswald as requested" in its previous memorandums. This seems a bit disingenuous, since we know that the department had already decided against the plan the embassy had proposed, namely, to present letters from Marguerite to her son at the Soviet Foreign Ministry. The same day, V. Hardwood Blocker, deputy director of the Office of Special Consular Services, wrote a perfunctory letter to Mrs. Oswald saying the department had again asked the embassy to send notice "as soon as further information is available." Blocker also said, "With regard to your questions about your son's citizenship it will be necessary that they be answered by another office in the Department. Your questions have been referred to the Passport Office for appropriate reply." Like a good little bureaucrat, Blocker had covered all the bases and, at the same time, had accomplished exactly nothing.
On July 6, the embassy in Moscow reminded the State Department of the obvious: that the department had ruled—back on May 10—against the embassy's proposed plan to ask the Soviet Foreign Ministry to help find Oswald. Therefore, the new operations memorandum from Moscow said, "No further action has been taken on this matter by the Embassy, nor has the Embassy received any other communication in the case from the subject [Oswald] or from persons in the United States. The next day, John T. White, chief of the Foreign Operations Division in the State Department's Passport Office, responded to Marguerite's question on Oswald's status as a U.S. citizen. "The Department presently has no information that the Embassy at Moscow has evidence or record," White said after a long explanation of procedures, "upon which to base the preparation of a certificate of loss of United States nationality in the case of your son under any section of the expatriation laws of the United States." It seems heartless of the State Department to send Marguerite so many letters saying that they had asked this or that of the embassy in Moscow but to repeatedly fail to tell her the results. Neither Mr. Blocker nor anyone else in the State Department told Marguerite that the embassy had found nothing in response to its latest request.
Marguerite wrote back to White on July 16, thanking him for his information. Now she posed this question about Lee's U.S. passport: "Would you possibly have information as to what date he applied for his passport and from what city and state?" White looked into the matter simply by acquiring back copies of the memos from Moscow and those from the State Department. "Your son, Lee Harvey Oswald, was issued a passport on September 10, 1959," White wrote to Marguerite on July 21, "at the Passport Agency at Los Angeles, California, upon an application which he executed on September 4, 1959, before a designated officer of the Superior Court at Santa Ana, California."
There was really nothing more to ask, and this brought to an end the cheerless and unfruitful 1960 string of letters between Marguerite and the State Department on the whereabouts of Lee Harvey Oswald. In fact, all doors seemed to close at once. The marines did their part on August 17, 1960, when Oswald was given an undesirable discharge from the USMC Reserves. Professor Casparis in Switzerland closed his part of the story too, sending Marguerite a letter on September 3. Casparis said they had not heard from Oswald and that they were sorry they could not refund his $25 deposit. "We hope that by now you have heard from your son," Professor Casparis closed, "for we can certainly understand your concern about him."
The impostor issue languished a little longer in the bureaucracy. The FBI's legal attaché in Paris was directed to investigate in Switzerland, and the Washington field office opened a file based on the interaction with the State Department Office of Security. The Washington office closed its file a month later, arguing that it was sufficient that the Dallas office and the Bureau had the case fully covered. The FBI Paris legal attaché issued interim reports on September 27 and October 12, and the question finally met its bureaucratic death with a final report from Paris on November 3, 1960, saying, "If any news should be received by the Albert Schweitzer College in Churwalden [Switzerland] about Lee Harvey Oswald, you will be duly informed."
Upset about all that had transpired and still without word about the welfare of her son, Marguerite Oswald boarded an airplane for Washington, D.C., on January 26, 1961. There she made a personal trip to the State Department. A 1961 FBI report described the visit this way:
She [Marguerite] advised that she had come to Washington to see what could be done to help her son, the subject. She expressed the thought that perhaps her son had gone to the Soviet Union as a "secret agent" and that the State Department was not doing enough to help him. She was advised that such was not the case and that efforts were being made to help her son.
"Mrs. Oswald called at the Department," said a Department of State "instruction" airgram to the American Embassy in Moscow on February 1, 1961. "The Embassy is requested to inform the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that Mr. Oswald's mother is worried as to his personal safety, and is anxious to hear from him."
It had taken Marguerite's efforts for an entire year capped by a plane trip to the nation's capital to move the State Department to ask the Soviet Foreign Ministry about Lee Harvey Oswald's whereabouts in Russia. After meetings with Gene Boster, officer in charge of Soviet Affairs, Denman Stanfield of the Office of Consular Service, and Ed Hickey, deputy director of the Passport Department, Marguerite returned to Texas emptyhanded. Ironically, during this time Oswald had written to the American Embassy in December, asking to return to America, as we will establish in Chapter 10. However, the KGB intercepted that letter and Oswald wrote the embassy again on February 5, 1961, asking why there had been no response to his first letter. His second letter arrived on Richard Snyder's desk on February 13, 1961, two weeks after Marguerite's visit to Washington.
A week later, the department sent Oswald's address to his mother. Lee had been in Minsk the entire time. He had a boring job in a radio factory but, for the most part, was having a good time falling in and out of love with Russian girls.
# In Russia with Love
On January 7, 1960, the Soviet "Red Cross" greeted Lee Harvey Oswald as he arrived at the train station in Minsk, the capital of Belorus, also known as White Russia. The Red Cross greeting party for Oswald in Minsk was most likely one more means of keeping a close watch on his activities. Two days earlier, the Red Cross had given Oswald 5,000 rubles, enough to retire his 2,200-ruble hotel debt in Moscow with spending money to spare. At the Hotel Minsk, "Rosa and Stellina," two Intourist employees who spoke excellent English, welcomed Oswald. Stellina was in her forties and married with children, but Rosa was "twenty-three, blond, attractive," Oswald wrote in his diary, "we attract each other at once " On January 8, the mayor of Minsk, a "comrade Shrapof," welcomed Oswald to his city, a recognition of special status which undoubtedly pleased the twenty-year-old boy from Texas. Shrapof promised Oswald a rent-free apartment and warned him about " 'uncultured persons' who sometimes insuit foriengers [sic]."
On January 11, Oswald visited the Belorussian radio and television factory, where he met Alexander Ziger, a Polish Jew from Argentina who had arrived in Russia in 1955. For many reasons, not the least of which was his job as a department head at the factory and his command of English, Ziger would become an important influence in Oswald's life. Oswald reported for work at the factory on January 13, after which Ziger and his family became good friends of the American defector.
His assignment to the factory, a major producer of electronic parts and systems with 5,000 employees, disappointed Oswald, who had hoped to continue his "education" in Russia. He was employed in the "experimental shop" as a lowly "metal worker" fashioning parts on a lathe. On the other hand, his income allowed for a relatively luxurious lifestyle. His salary probably varied from 70 to 90 (new) rubles per month ($70-$90), normal for factory workers and better than the salaries of many professionals. The Red Cross, however, again added their magic touch, by supplementing his income with an additional 70 (new) rubles per month, bringing his total income up to a level equal to that of the director of the factory.
Oswald enjoyed his first months in Minsk, especially after work, when he studied Russian under the tutelage of the attractive blond Intourist guide, Rosa. Oswald did not like the big picture of Lenin looking down at him at work, and was less than enthusiastic about "compulsory" physical training every morning—"shades of H. G. Wells!!" he wrote in his diary. On the other hand, there was Rosa. "At night I take Rosa to theater, movie, or operor [opera] almost every day," he wrote, "I'm living very big and am very satisfied." Oswald soon had Russian friends his own age, like Pavil Golovachov, and lost interest in Rosa when he noticed one of Ziger's two daughters, Anita, about whom he put this entry in his diary: "20, very gay, not so attractive, but we hit it off."
Oswald's relationship with Anita Ziger did not develop because she already had a Hungarian boyfriend named Alfred, and Oswald found Anita's twenty-six-year-old sister, Leonara, "too old." During the spring and summer of 1960, however, more than Oswald's love life began to stall. After a May Day party at the Ziger's house, he wrote this in his diary: "Ziger advises me to go back to USA. Its the first voice of opposition I have heard. I respect Ziger, he has seen the world. He says many things, and relat[e]s many things I do not know about the USSR. I begin to feel uneasy inside, its true!"
In June he met an attractive girl named Ella German who encouraged his interest but refused his sexual advances. Oswald obtained a hunting license in June, and in July, permission to have a 16-gauge shotgun, both privileges not usually accorded to foreigners. However, his hunting hobby and his interest in Ella did little to reverse his growing pessimism about life in Russia. His diary entry for "Aug-Sept" 1960 has this note:
As my Russian improves I become increasingly con[s]cious of just what sort of a sociaty [society] I live in. Mass gymnastics, compulsory after work meeting[s], usually political information meeting[s]. Compulsory attendance at lectures and the sending of the entire shop collective (except me) to pick potatoes on a Sunday, at a State collective farm. A "patriotic duty" to bring in the harvest. The opions [opinions] of the workers (unvoiced) are that its a real pain in the neck. They don't seem to be especially enthusiastic about any of the "collective" duties [—] a natural feeling.
As his early enthusiasm for Russia diminished, his attention focused on Ella German. Ella was a coworker at the factory and, as the weeks rolled by, Oswald became increasingly interested in her. "I noticed her," Oswald later wrote, "and perhaps fell in love with her, the first minute I saw her."
Oswald was not a bad catch—from a young Russian girl's point of view. More noteworthy than his extra income was his apartment with a balcony overlooking the river for which he paid just 60 rubles a month. He describes it in his diary as "a Russian dream." Russian workers typically had to wait for several years for similar accommodations. But Oswald's relationship with Ella did not culminate in sex, as had those with other Russian girls. It is possible that this made Ella more of a challenge to Oswald, who spent New Year's Day at Ella's home with her family.
A crucial moment had arrived. After an appropriate amount of eating and drinking—to the point that Oswald says he was "drunk and happy"—Ella accompanied him back to his apartment. During the walk back Oswald proposed to Ella, but she did not respond. The following night on the way back to her home from the movies Oswald again proposed marriage, this time on Ella's front doorstep. She turned him down cold this time. She did not love him, she said, and was afraid to marry an American. Oswald was angry—"too stunned to think," he wrote later. He decided that Ella had been primarily interested in arousing the envy of other girls at her having an American as an escort. It was nevertheless a blow to Oswald's ego, and his disenchantment with Russia became linked to Ella's failure to love him.
A certain detail about the Oswald-Ella German relationship warrants our attention, for entirely different reasons. To understand its importance, we must first return to the continuing story of Oswald's files in Washington, D.C.
# CHAPTER TEN
# Journey into the Labyrinth
By the end of 1959, Marguerite Oswald was deeply concerned about the fate of her son. She had repeatedly and unsuccessfully tried to send him money. Her third—and last—such attempt, although an isolated and obscure event at the time, would eventually open a window through which we may now peer into the secret world of FBI and CIA operations. Her efforts to make sure that the money she sent reached her son set off an alarm in the FBI which, in turn, led to FBI interviews of herself and her son Robert in April 1960. These interviews culminated in a report on Oswald which the FBI sent to the CIA in May 1960.
This report, unlike the Oswald documents consumed by the "black hole" at the CIA immediately following Oswald's defection in 1959, took a lengthy and interesting ride through the Agency's Directorate of Operations. This journey through the "spook," or so-called "dark side" of the CIA included stops at several points in James Angleton's counterintelligence staff and at nearly half the branches and offices in David Murphy's Soviet Russia division.
This episode in Oswald's CIA files, however, ended just the way it had begun—in Angleton's CI/SIG unit. When the mole-hunting unit did open a 201 file on Oswald at the end of the year, it told a story about Oswald's defection in Moscow which it knew to be false. To find out why, we must first solve the riddle of the late 201 opening on Oswald.
# A High-Interest Money Order
On January 22, 1960, Mrs. Marguerite Oswald went to the First National Bank of Fort Worth, Texas, where she purchased a $25 money order which she posted via air mail that day to "Lee Harvey Oswald in care of Hotel Metropole, Moscow, Russia." That was a Friday. "We determined on January 25, 1960," the FBI later explained to the Warren Commission, "that Mrs. Marguerite C. Oswald had transmitted the sum of $25 to 'Lee Harvey Oswald in care of the Hotel Metropole, Moscow.'" How could the FBI have known by Monday what was inside the envelope Marguerite had put in the U.S. mail the previous Friday?
There is no way to avoid posing the question this way because Marguerite had tried to send money to her son only twice before: a $20 check on December 18, and a $20 bill on January 5. The $25 money order nails down the sending date of her third communication to January 22, and the FBI's own record of the date they knew about it suggests the FBI had immediate access to this information. It seems reasonable to accept Marguerite's claim that the transaction was processed entirely through her bank; in a letter she wrote about it to Secretary of State Herter on March 7, 1960, she said, "I also sent a Foreign Money Transfer in the amount of $25. This draft was sent to him [Lee Oswald] thru my bank (against his receipt to be forwarded to my bank) but the receipt has not been received so I am paternally [sic] concerned about him." The failure of this particular transaction led Marguerite to make high-level inquiries about her son. It would also lead the FBI to make inquiries too.
It was ten days after his defection when the FBI entered a passive collection mode on Oswald. As of that date, this is how the FBI later described its interest in him:
A stop was placed in the files of the Identification Division of the FBI on November 10, 1959, so as to alert us in the event he [Oswald] returned to the United States under a different identity and his fingerprints were received. A file concerning Oswald was prepared and, as communications were received from other United States Government agencies, those communications were placed in his file. Our basic interest was to correlate information concerning him and to evaluate him as a security risk in the event he returned, in view of the possibility of his recruitment by the Soviet intelligence services.
In other words, the FBI had opened a case file on Oswald because he presented a potential espionage threat. Notice also the FBI's statement that Oswald as a "security risk" was something to be evaluated only "in the event he returned" to the U.S., an interesting declaration to which we will return after Oswald's decision to come home. For our present purposes, however, Marguerite's January 1960 $25 money order to the U.S.S.R. hit a sensitive trip wire in the FBI which led to a new active phase in the FBI's investigation of Oswald.
The FBI has never explained exactly how it came into possession of the $25 money order information on January 25, 1960. An obvious question is this: Are there any clues about this in the documentary record? The answer is yes. The details are complicated, but they deserve our careful consideration.
Four days after the FBI learned of the funds transaction, on January 29, its New York field office sent a letter to headquarters about it and related matters. This letter and another sent by the New York field office on January 18, 1960, along with a third headquarters document (a letter dated February 2, 1960), were all referenced in a thirty-two-page New York field office memorandum sent to headquarters on February 26, 1960. Only the first and last page of this memo have been released—the other thirty pages are still classified. The last page of this memo discussed "details of receipts and disbursements set out in aforementioned bank accounts," provided to Special Agents Robert S. Barnhart and Harold F. Good by a source whose identity is still withheld. "It is noted that the above information was furnished on a strictly confidential basis," the memo said, "and cannot be made public except upon the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum."
Even though the American public has been allowed to see only fragments of this lengthy February 26 memo, we do know that it was filed in a special way in both Washington and New York. At Bureau headquarters, it was not placed in Oswald's counterintelligence file, 105-82555, although it might have been placed there unofficially with an "unrecorded" notation on it. The first page of the February 26 memo is almost entirely blacked out, but some of the serial numbers under which it was filed can be seen: 65-6315 for the New York field office and 65-28939 for headquarters. The FBI 65- serial is used exclusively for espionage cases. The available data is insufficient to warrant any firm conclusion, but it is extraordinary news that the FBI was filing information on Lee Harvey Oswald at this point under espionage serial numbers. (All of these documents should be shown to the JFK Assassination Records Review Board so a determination on their relevance to this case can be made independent of the FBI.)
Strange things happened to the February 26 memo in the FBI. In the New York field office it was cross-filed into a counterintelligence file for Oswald, 105-6103, presumably because it contained information about Oswald deemed to be of a counterintelligence nature. On page thirty-two of the February 26 New York field office memo, a page that discusses bank accounts, we can still see the New York field office counterintelligence file number on Oswald, 105-6103, in the upper-left-hand corner. At Bureau headquarters it was not placed in Oswald's counterintelligence file, the file that had been open since his defection in October 1959. Instead, someone at headquarters opened a second file on Oswald, only this time it was a domestic security file: 100-353496. Today, Oswald's 105 New York file and his 100 Bureau file are not even listed in the National Archives. The information that was stored in these files was also stored in a similar file in the Dallas field office of the FBI. Today, with the exception of one document, this Dallas file is also missing.
# Oswald's Missing FBI Files
When the FBI sent a list of Oswald documents—purporting to be its entire preassassination holdings—to the Warren Commission, the February 26, 1960, memo was missing. So was the entire story of what was in the FBI's 1960 Dallas field office files on Oswald. During 1960, the same Oswald information flowing into the nowmissing Bureau and New York files was also filed in the FBI field office in Dallas. There, the information was placed in Oswald's Dallas counterintelligence file: 105-976. This information included the record of Fain's April 1960 interview with Marguerite, one of the most extensive preassassination reports ever written on Oswald. Yet the Fain report was not in the FBI's list to the Warren Commission.
Even more intriguing is the fact this report was handed over to the Warren Commission near the end of the commission's deliberations. The Warren Commission dutifully published the Fain report, where it will stand for all time like a giant beacon, reminding us of the commission's failure to examine entire groups of FBI files containing preassassination information on the alleged assassin.
The FBI might be tempted to plead that these are special files and are not "Oswald" documents because the name "Oswald" does not appear in the subject line of the documents they contain. This argument would not look good in light of the fact that some of these documents were released by the FBI in 1978 in response to a JFK researcher's request. Until the FBI simply hands over the rest of these files, we can only look with wonder at what little they did let us see in 1978. What has not been blacked out of the few documents we have from these missing files leaves no question about the fact that they are relevant to the Oswald case.
This fact was tacitly acknowledged by the FBI when it belatedly turned over Dallas FBI Special Agent John Fain's lengthy report—the Dallas 105 file—to the Warren Commission. This document was published in the Warren Commission volumes with the Dallas 105-976 file number still visible. The current release of JFK files has done little to diminish the curiosity aroused by these separate stashes of Oswald information in the dark recesses of FBI safes. It seems reasonable to ask this question: If these documents were released as JFK documents in 1978, why are they not still JFK documents in 1994?
What are we to make of the few fragments we have seen from these missing files? A preliminary analysis of the FBI's numbers that we do find on the documents the FBI released to researcher Paul Hoch in 1978, which are still not in the National Archives, is tantalizing. Moving back in time from the February 26, 1960 memo, we find another FBI document that has the identical 65 [espionage]-series file numbers that are on the February 26 memo. This document is also from the FBI's New York field office. It is dated October 13, 1959, and is almost completely blacked out, except for the espionage file numbers, a reference to a September 11, 1959, letter from the New York office to headquarters, and one sentence: "WFO [Washington Field Office] is being furnished one copy since that office is currently conducting [an] investigation under subject caption."
While the September 11 and October 13 New York disseminations may not relate to Oswald, these dates are provocative for veteran researchers of the Oswald case. In both instances these dates fall on the days immediately following the passport and visa actions Oswald had to undergo in order to gain entry to the Soviet Union. September 11 just happens to be the day after Oswald's passport was issued in California (he had included travel plans to Russia in his application). October 13 just happens to be the day after Oswald applied for a Soviet visa in Helsinki, Finland.
These dates in the October 1959 memo may be a coincidence unrelated to Oswald. Yet, strangely, while this memo was sent to the CIA, the related February 26, 1960, memo—which contained the cross-referenced file numbers to Oswald—was not. Thus, the February 26 memo linking Oswald to an espionage investigation in the FBI is missing in the National Archives today and was missing from the material the FBI sent to the CIA in 1960. Wherever the tantalizing paths—if we ever will be allowed to see them—lead backward in time, there can be no doubt about where the February 26 memo leads. It takes us to a March 9, 1960, FBI document asking that Marguerite Oswald be interviewed about the money she was sending to her son. "Your office is requested to identify and interview the remitters in your area," the FBI's New York field office asked the field office in Dallas, "in accordance with Bureau instructions set forth below."
# "Funds Transmitted to Residents of Russia"
The February 26 New York memo was not the only item missing from the list of Oswald-related documents which the FBI sent to the Warren Commission. The March 9 request for an interview with Marguerite is missing too. These documents, along with Fain's report on the interview with Oswald's mother and brother Robert, which followed, were all absent from the list of Oswald documents that the FBI sent to the Warren Commission. Fain's interviews with Oswald's family produced a seven-page document (not including cover sheets) on the life and times of Lee Harvey Oswald.
The March 9 FBI instructions to Dallas on how to handle the interview with Marguerite Oswald included at least six, and possibly eight, guidelines or "points." Only four were declassified in the FBI's heavily redacted version of the memo released to researcher Paul Hoch. The instructions from headquarters, which were relayed through the New York field office to the Dallas field office, were as follows:
The Bureau has furnished the following instructions to be observed in this program:
It is desired that the following points be specifically covered when conducting interviews in captioned matter.
1. Reasons for transmittal of funds.
2. Identity and relationship, if any, between the purchaser of the remittance order and the payee.
[3.] [paragraph completely redacted]
[4.] [paragraph completely redacted]
5. Interviews should be designed to obtain cooperation of these individuals, and the impression should not be created that the Bureau is investigating the persons being interviewed, or that their action is, in itself, derogatory as in regard to their loyalty to the US.
6. The individuals interviewed should be questioned as to whether or not they have been requested to furnish items of personal identification to their relatives abroad.
[paragraph completely redacted]
[paragraph completely redacted]
The instructions we are able to see appear to be general rules applicable to any interviews conducted pursuant to what was apparently an FBI program for siphoning information from people's bank accounts. There is no record so far released which indicates the March 9 instructions were filed at Bureau headquarters.
As the official story goes, Dallas FBI Special Agent John W. Fain located Oswald's brother, Robert, on April 27, 1960. Robert Oswald told Fain that Marguerite Oswald had attempted to send $25 to Lee Harvey Oswald in January and that she could be found at 1111 Herring Avenue, Waco, Texas. Robert Oswald told his mother the FBI wished to interview her, whereupon she "volunteered" for an interview, presumably by phoning Fain. Fain interviewed Marguerite on April 28, during which she confirmed the story of her attempt to send the $25 money order to Lee Oswald in Russia.
Special Agent Fain put this information and much more about Lee Harvey Oswald into an FBI Dallas field office report on May 12, 1960. Fain wrote this report under the case title "Funds Transmitted to Residents of Russia," and filed it under the Bureau's domestic security serial 105, file 353496 for "Internal Security—Russia." The FBI Dallas field office chose to open their first Oswald file under the Foreign Counterintelligence Matters serial 105, file 976 for Lee Harvey Oswald. In choosing the counterintelligence serial for their file, the Dallas office was in step with the New York field office request for the interview, which came under a 105 designation.
That both the New York and Dallas field offices used a 105 serial for Oswald was to be expected, as it simply followed what the Bureau had done by opening a 105 file on Oswald. At this point, however, something strange happened. A new, separate file was opened at headquarters with the original Oswald file still open. The seven-page Fain report was put in a new domestic security file, 100-353496, instead of Oswald's counterintelligence file, 105-82555. What did this mean? Did these serials and file numbers really matter?
They mattered a great deal. The new 100 file at headquarters, like the 105 files at Dallas and New York, would never make it to the National Archives. Except, of course, for the solitary Fain report from Dallas. The opening and disappearance of these special files at the Bureau and its various field offices were part of a trend in which Oswald-related information and documents were buried in places from which they would be difficult to retrieve by investigators. In the case of the Warren Commission, such investigation was arbitrary because President Johnson put the FBI in charge of it. The Senate Select and House Select Committees, however, would not know about these special files through intuition, and so this important information from the beginning of the Oswald case never did see the light of day—that is, until now. The current JFK Assassination Records Review Board can change all of that.
Whether by accident or by design, the way information on Oswald was filed in early 1960 was misleading and inaccurate. The FBI told the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities in 1979 that the FBI case on Oswald was first opened by its Dallas field office on January 13, 1961. In making this assertion, the FBI was referring not to the file that contained the May 1960 Fain report (105-976), but was referring instead to the second file opened at Dallas—a domestic security file (100-10461). This story begins to stretch under the weight of the known facts: The FBI told the Warren Commission it had "opened a file" on Oswald in October 1959, and told the Church Committee "the case on Lee Harvey Oswald was initially opened in the Dallas Field Division" in January 1961.
One hopes we would be wrong in asserting that the FBI deliberately misled the Church Committee, which could conclude from the above only that the Dallas office began tracking Oswald a year after it had, in truth, begun its investigation. Technically, since the 1960 Dallas 105-976 case was "Funds Transmitted to Residents of Russia," the FBI could say that this was not a case on "Oswald." However, the FBI had opened a counterintelligence case—105-82555—on Oswald in October 1959, which had more than a dozen documents in it by the time Dallas opened its 105 file. Moreover, the "Funds Transmitted" case (105-976) in Dallas contained the most detailed information yet about Oswald because the interviews with his family were stored there. Meanwhile, at headquarters, from the very moment the FBI intercepted the information about the transfer from Marguerite's bank account, all ensuing reports and information from this source had either been unofficially entered in Oswald's counterintelligence file as "unrecorded" or entered under a separate "Internal Security—Russia" serial and file number.
While all of these file numbers seem complicated to the untrained eye, there can be no mistake about the pattern we can now discern: Much of the early information on Oswald developed by the FBI's field investigators was deliberately withheld from Oswald's headquarters counterintelligence (105) file and was instead put into an internal security (100) file which was then suppressed. Meanwhile his Dallas (105) counterintelligence file was also suppressed and a new Dallas internal security (100) file was opened on January 13, 1961—well after the original leads generated by the funds transfer had played themselves out. The FBI provided only subsequent official government inquiries with documents from Oswald's 105 Bureau file and his 100 file from Dallas. In the case of the New York field office, two files were also used, only these were counterintelligence (105) files. The New York field office suppressed the first file, 105-6103, which contained the same information that was in the suppressed headquarters file (100-353496) and the suppressed Dallas file, 105-976.
All of these special handling procedures may have been carried out to protect the FBI's bank peeping project, but we cannot be sure until the FBI comes clean—with the complete files and an honest explanation. Whatever the reason, the result was obfuscation and secrecy, with the sensitive information stored under the 105 serial in Dallas, the 100 serial at Headquarters, and in one of the two 105 serials in New York. Fortunately for history, Fain did not identify New York as the source of the information that Marguerite had sent money to Russia, and the FBI released his report to the Warren Commission. Moreover, when the FBI inadvertently released a few documents years ago to researcher Paul Hoch, these documents provided a roadmap to the rest of the file numbers pertaining to Oswald—including the 65 serial for espionage—for both headquarters and Dallas.
# An Oswald Journey Through the CIA
Sometime on Friday, May 27, 1960, the Fain report on Oswald was date-stamped into the CIA's Records Integration Division, which assigned the May 12 report a CIA number, DBF-49478. Strangely, Oswald had not yet been assigned a counterintelligence file number and so this document was filed under the number 74-500. The 74 was almost certainly the number for the U.S.S.R. The 500 was a generic number. The following Tuesday, May 31, Fain's seven-page account of Oswald was signed into the counterintelligence staff (CI/Staff) by a person with the initials "bar." From there the file moved to Joseph E. Evans in the operations section of counterintelligence (CI/OPS). Given that the mole-hunting group (CI/SIG) in the counterintelligence staff played such a central role in the November-December 1959 chapter of Oswald's CIA files, it seems strange that CI/SIG was not included among the CI elements to which this document was routed. Perhaps this omission is the reason this Oswald document, unlike the previous Oswald documents, managed to travel on to the Soviet Russia Division the following day.
On Wednesday, June 1, the Fain report rolled into the Counterespionage Branch (SR/CE) of the Soviet Russia Division. In the CE branch it was seen by the chief, Bill Bright, after which it came to rest at the desk of someone whose initials were "IEL," and whose duty section was represented by the letter P. IEL was directed to page six of the report, where the CIA copy of this Fain report has double hash marks in the left column next to these two sentences:
Mrs. Oswald stated that she has not been requested to furnish any items of personal identification to LEE HARVEY OSWALD in Russia. She volunteered the information that LEE HARVEY OSWALD took his birth certificate with him when he left Fort Worth, Texas [underlined by CIA].
Whoever IEL was, this person apparently had the responsibility to track the birth certificate issue as a possible espionage matter—in other words, to watch for the possibility that an impostor might get hold of this document. Actually, the FBI did investigate this issue over the summer of 1960 because of a related issue centering on whether Oswald had gone to Switzerland instead of Moscow. In the end, the impostor issue, along with concern over the birth certificate, was dropped due to the lack of substantive information.
On Thursday, June 2, the Fain memo was on the move again inside the CIA, this time to SR/9, the Soviet Russia branch that provided support to CIA operations in Moscow. In 1959 there was no CIA "station" in Moscow. CIA personnel in the Moscow Embassy operated alone as "singletons." Russell Langelle had been compromised when the Soviet spy Popov had been discovered and was expelled on October 16, 1959, the very day that Oswald arrived in Moscow. This left at least one other singleton agent, George Winters. What might have been SR/9's interest in Fain's report on Oswald? In the first place, SR/9 was probably still interested in how Popov had been discovered, and was certainly interested in whether a crucial piece of intelligence Popov had provided to his CIA handlers was true.
That piece of intelligence was provocative, and suggested there might be a mole in the CIA with access to information about the supersensitive U-2 program. Popov had indicated in April 1958 that there was a leak in this top secret spy plane program. Popov's reporting indicated that a Soviet colonel, apparently during a drunken boast, had said the KGB had learned the technical details about the new high-altitude American spy plane overflying the Soviet Union. Such details had been so tightly held that the leak might have come from a highly placed mole, and the CIA could not be sure whether the Soviets knew enough about the aircraft's cruising altitude to shoot it down with a missile. The navy message to Moscow after Oswald's defection mentioned Oswald's duty in "Air Control Squadrons in Japan and Taiwan," which should have been enough to raise hairs in the CIA. People who were involved in the U-2 program knew that the only Marine Air Wing in that entire geographic region was at Atsugi, a CIA U-2 base. A former senior officer of the Directorate of Operations, Ed Jeunovitch, recalled this detail:
For security during U-2 program: there was a special detachment of OS people controlled out of Tokyo. They had total responsibility for the security of the U-2 program. When I was assigned to Tokyo I initially wondered why the guy in charge of this detachment was so high in rank—a [GS] 16, while the [CIA] Station chief was only a 17 or 18. Emil Geisse was chief of the detachment during Oswald's time in Tokyo.
Unfortunately, we know only that Angleton's CI/SIG unit read the navy report about Oswald's Far East Marine Air Control Squadron, and we thus cannot be sure if SR/9 had access to it. In either case, SR/9 had to be interested in Oswald's presence in Moscow simply because it occurred in the wake of the arrest of their chief asset there: Popov.
We know the Fain report circulated through the various offices of the SR Division, including some we have not yet mentioned, such as SR/4, SR/6, and SR/10. We will return to the dimmer recesses of the Soviet Russia Division in Chapters 11 and 12. For now, let us consider the bottom line of the very first report the FBI sent to the CIA about Oswald: "According to Mrs. Oswald, she was subsequently shocked to learn that he had gone to Moscow, Russia, where he is reported to have renounced his U.S. citizenship and where he sought Soviet citizenship."
The question of whether Oswald renounced his citizenship is a fundamental one and bears directly on other issues surrounding his departure from the Soviet Union. The paper trail on the renunciation issue illustrates both the bureaucratic intrigue and lethagy that have long been the facts of life in Washington, D.C.
# The "Renunciation" Paper Trail
On November 18, 1960, Angleton's deputy chief of CI, S. H. Horton, relayed a draft reply to a State Department query on defectors for Bissell to look at. Bissell signed it on November 21. Attached to this letter was a list of defectors which, like the letter, had been assembled and drafted by Angleton's mole-hunting chief in CI/SIG, Birch D. O'Neal. The tenth name on the defector's list was Oswald, and the "secret" description of Oswald is noteworthy because it contains something which is not true. It said, "He appeared at the United States Embassy in Moscow and renounced his U.S. citizenship," a statement which was false.
The truth was that Oswald had tried but failed to renounce his citizenship. What is more, this technical distinction—between Oswald's request for the papers to renounce his U.S. citizenship and his failure to return to the embassy and actually execute the renunciation—mattered a great deal. For one thing, it was directly relevant to the ease with which Oswald could retrieve his passport and, therefore, return to America. In addition, and perhaps more important for our purposes, the fact is that the CIA was in possession of the facts concerning Oswald's failure to complete the renunciation as well as the State Department's reexamination of this very issue. CI/SIG's November 18 flat assertion that Oswald had renounced his U.S. citizenship permits us to question—at the very least—the credibility of the way in which CI was handling the Oswald file at this early date.
Lee Harvey Oswald appeared at the embassy "to renounce [his] American citizenship," said Snyder's October 31, 1959, cable 1304, but added, "we propose delay [in] execution [of] renunciation until Soviet action known or [State] Dept advises." On November 2, Snyder wrote in dispatch 234 that "Oswald is presently residing in non-tourist status at the Metropole Hotel in Moscow awaiting the Soviet response to his application for citizenship" and that "the Embassy proposes to delay action on Oswald's request to execute an oath of renunciation. . . ." Both cable 1304 and dispatch 234 were sent to the CIA. A week later, November 9, 1959, Snyder sent the State Department an update, saying, "Lee Oswald seems determined [to] carry out purpose of seeking Soviet citizenship and renouncing American citizenship, but so far as known Soviet citizenship not granted and formal renunciation not yet made at this office." This cable was not made available to the CIA until after the Kennedy assassination.
The next day, November 10, the Navy Liaison Office at the American Embassy made a mistake, inviting the chief of Naval Operations to look at embassy dispatch "184 DTD 7 Nov X SUBJ Oswald ltr concerning renunciation of US citizenship." Dispatch 184 "contains no mention of Oswald," someone wrote by hand on a copy of the Navy Liaison message from Moscow—it was about Khrushchev. The Navy Liaison message may have been referring to Snyder's November 2 dispatch. It was a harbinger of things to come that the first navy message to mention the renunciation issue would be spurious. The Washington Post did no better on November 16, saying, "Lee Harvey Oswald's dream of achieving Soviet citizenship in exchange for the United States citizenship he renounced appears to be unattainable." The fact is that Oswald failed to return to the embassy to carry out his stated intent to renounce his U.S. citizenship.
The Air Force's Office of Special Investigations (OSI), which began investigating Oswald's half brother Edward in January 1960 did somewhat better. A January 27 OSI document stated that Oswald had "contemplated" renunciation, "stating his intention of renouncing his U.S. citizenship." Marguerite Oswald seemed a bit confused on March 6, when she wrote to Congressman Wright, "According to the UPI Moscow Press, he appeared at the U.S. Embassy renouncing his U.S. citizenship." The next day, however, she summed it up nicely in her March 7, 1960, letter to Secretary of State Herter:
All I know is what I read in the newspapers. He went to the U.S. Embassy there and wanted to turn in his U.S. citizenship and had applied for Soviet citizenship. However, the Russians refused his request but said he could remain in their country as a Resident Alien. As far as I know, he is still a U.S. citizen.
It is interesting how in just twenty-four hours Marguerite's understanding progressed from a misleading use of the wording "renouncing" to the more accurate "wanted to turn in his citizenship."
If Oswald had gone through with the renunciation and signed the required papers, this would, in turn, have led to an official record of his loss of U.S. citizenship. Precisely because Oswald had not gone through with it, the State Department sent an operations memorandum to the Moscow Embassy on March 28, 1960, saying, "Unless and until the Embassy comes into possession of information or evidence upon which to base the preparation of a certificate of loss of nationality in the case of Lee Harvey Oswald, there appears to be no further action possible in this case." By coincidence, the very same day, the American Embassy in Moscow sent an operations memorandum to the department, saying, "The Embassy has no evidence that Oswald has expatriated himself other than his announced intention to do so. . . ."
The next episode in the renunciation story is FBI Special Agent John W. Fain's interview with Marguerite on April 28, 1960. Fain's report said Marguerite had expressed "shock" when she had learned her son "is reported to have renounced his U.S. citizenship," and again that it was "much to her surprise" that he "had renounced" his U.S. citizenship. This report was sent to the CIA on May 25, whereupon a CIA file clerk wrote these words on the final page of the report: "Ex-marine, who upon his discharge from Marine Corps, Sept 59, traveled to USSR and renounced his U.S. citizenship."
This false handwritten statement was placed on the Fain report for a CIA keypunch operator to type in on an IBM index card on Oswald. The clerk who typed the index card, however, was either a different individual from the person who had written "renounced" on the Fain report or had learned something new before actually typing the index card. The typed card reads, "Traveled to USSR to renounce his U.S. citizenship," which was a factual statement, the key being that Oswald had not followed through on his intent. What the CIA copy of the Fain report and the index card prepared from it show is that the CIA understood—in May 1960—that Oswald had intended to renounce his citizenship but in fact had not. It also shows that the incorrect statement—that Oswald had "renounced"—came from the FBI, and that the CIA corrected this mistake before typing the index card on Oswald.
The FBI, however, proceeded to perpetuate the myth of Oswald's renunciation, as shown by an air telegram from the New York field office to Bureau headquarters on May 23: "Interview of Mrs. Marguerite C. Oswald reveals that her son, Lee Harvey Oswald, had gone to Moscow, Russia, had renounced his citizenship and had apparently sought Soviet citizenship." The New York field office was thus repeating what was in the Fain report: that, according to Marguerite, Oswald had renounced. The Fain report also was transmitted to the Navy's Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) on May 26, where Marguerite's misstatement influenced the Marine Board decision on her son's undesirable discharge.
It is noteworthy that neither the Fain report nor the New York air telegram contained an FBI corroboration of Marguerite's misrepresentation of the renunciation issue. In twice paraphrasing Marguerite's distortion without commenting on its correctness, these FBI reports add a strange tinge to the FBI's 1960 reporting on Oswald. Similarly, the June 3 Hoover letter to the State Department, the one containing the Oswald "impostor" thesis, contained this passage relevant to the renunciation issue:
Reference is made to Foreign Service Dispatch Number 234 dated November 2, 1959, concerning subject's renunciation of his American citizenship at the United States Embassy, Moscow, Russia, on October 31, 1959.
An interpretation of this language as Machiavellian double-speak is indicated by a close legal reading of the wording, which semantically allows for the possibility that Oswald might not have renounced and that the Hoover letter was simply "concerning" the issue. Such wording is all the more artful because the Moscow Embassy's dispatch 234 made clear that the embassy did not act on Oswald's request to renounce his citizenship on October 31 and, further, that the embassy was stalling him and proposed to continue stalling him to the extent the department would allow.
By June 8 Marguerite had asked Mr. Haselton of the State Department outright for a judgment of the renunciation issue, and on June 22 State's deputy director of the Office of Special Consular Services, V. Harwood Blocker, responded, "With regard to your questions about your son's citizenship it will be necessary that they be answered by another office in the [State] Department. Your questions have been referred to the Passport Office for appropriate reply." That judgment came from the chief of the State Department's Foreign Operations Division, John T. White, on July 7. He wrote this to Marguerite:
The Department presently has no information that the Embassy at Moscow has evidence of record upon which to base the preparation of a certificate of loss of United States nationality in the case of your son under any section of the expatriation laws of the United States.
On August 9, Verde Buckler of the State Department's Passport Office showed the file on Oswald to the FBI. Special Agent Haser of the Washington field office was the reviewer. After looking at the file, Haser wrote that Oswald had "publicly sought to renounce his American citizenship," but gone was the word "renounced" or any inference that a renunciation had taken place. The same language appeared in an FBI report by Special Agent Dana Carson, also of the Washington field office, after he reviewed Oswald's passport file on September 9. Carson's September 12 report said only that Oswald "sought" to renounce his citizenship, but did not state that he had followed through on it.
This brings us full circle to the State Department's October request to the CIA for data on defectors, and the Agency's response which said that Oswald had in fact renounced his citizenship at the embassy in Moscow. As we will shortly see, the special research staff of the Office of Security was not asked to look into Oswald, and this November 18 write-up was done by Birch O'Neal's CI/SIG mole-hunting branch. The only piece of paper the CIA had ever received which had the FBI replay of Marguerite's misstatement on renunciation—the Fain report—was apparently not received by CI/SIG. The original documents from October-November 1959, which told the true story of how Oswald had tried and failed to renounce his citizenship, were already in the possession of CI/SIG.
When the CIA's Records Integration Division (RID) first saw the Fain report, the person preparing the words for abstraction into the data file made the mistake of repeating Marguerite's use of the word "renounced." But RID managed to straighten the problem out before typing it into the permanent card file index. Similarly, the FBI, once confronted with Oswald's official State Department passport file, dropped the term "renunciation." The same was not true for CI/SIG, however, where someone apparently wanted the Oswald script to read as if he had renounced his citizenship. Why this was so was part of the riddle of the late 201 opening on Oswald, a subject to which we must now return.
# CHAPTER ELEVEN
# The Riddle of Oswald's 201 File
Of all the events that occurred during the period of time that Oswald was "lost" in the Soviet Union, the most important was the late opening of his CIA 201 file in December 1960. No single page in all the quarter-million pages of Oswald-related JFK documents so far released by the CIA can compare in significance to the piece of paper that opened his 201 file. This paper reveals a wealth of important information: the document's 201 number, 201-289248; the name of the person who opened the file, Ann Egerter; the office symbol, "CI/SIG," for the Counterintelligence Special Investigation Group in which she worked; the date that the file was opened, December 9, 1960; the CIA's U.S.S.R. country code, "074"; and the wrong middle name for Oswald—"Henry" instead of Harvey. These and other integral aspects of Oswald's 201 file are dealt with throughout the chapters of this book.
This chapter deals with the basic question: Why was Oswald's 201 file opened? The apparent incongruity between the CIA's claim that the file was opened because Oswald was a defector and the reality that the file was opened a year after the CIA knew about his defection stands crooked in the landscape—like the Leaning Tower of Pisa, destined to fall down sooner or later. The public should be as "amazed" about this as was former director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms.
Between 1958 and 1960, more than a dozen American defectors made their way to the Soviet Union, many of them from the U.S. military, and some of whom had been privy to classified information. The CIA ascertained that nearly half of this group were "KGB agents," some recruited well before their defections. Several of these defectors decided to return to America between 1962 and 1963. The official story has long been that Oswald's 201 file was opened after this series of defections led to questions in the Eisenhower White House and a State Department request to the CIA for information on a list of defectors. This list had Oswald's name on it. The CIA's overt story has been that this alone was the reason they opened a 201 file on Oswald.
From the CIA's files, however, comes hard evidence that more than Oswald's defector status was involved in the 201 opening—much more. In 1975, the head of the CIA's Counterintelligence Staff, George Kalaris, wrote a memo saying the file had been opened because of Oswald's "queries" about coming home. This sets up a time dilemma because, when the 201 was opened on December 9, 1960, the CIA was not supposed to know where Oswald was, let alone what he might be asking about. The House Select Committee on Assassinations, which investigated the issue of the late opening, saw the Kalaris memo and dismissed this statement because, like the Warren Commission before it, the HSCA believed no one knew where Oswald was until February 13, 1963. That was the day the U.S. Embassy in Moscow found out that Oswald was in Minsk and wanted to return to America. Evidence has been accumulating, however, that Oswald's whereabouts were known to someone outside of the Soviet Union, perhaps including the CIA.
The Warren Commission's Final Report and its additional twenty-six volumes of materials, dominated by the guiding hand of former CIA director and commission member Allen Dulles, are suspiciously mute on the subject of Oswald's CIA files. The HSCA, however, did look into his Agency files, and probed the 201 issue vigorously but, in the end, unsuccessfully. One factor that contributed to this dead end in the HSCA investigation was the CIA's decision not to allow the HSCA investigators access to the Agency's internal routing sheets indicating who had handled Oswald's files on specific dates—records the HSCA was sensible enough to ask for.
The most important contributor was a flawed assumption underlying the HSCA's own analysis. By assuming that the CIA had not known where Oswald was in December 1960, the HSCA disconnected his 201 from the event which might have opened it, Oswald's request to the U.S. government to let him come home. Oswald had put this request in a letter to the embassy that was pinched by the KGB. The KGB never put the letter back in the mail to the U.S. Embassy and did not reveal its existence until 1991, after the fall of communism in the Soviet Union.
When viewed in the context of Oswald's query about returning to the U.S., the 201 opening in December 1960 invites the question: Did the CIA have access to sources in the Soviet Union that permitted them to monitor American defectors? Some useful answers can be found in the JFK files, especially those released in October 1994. According to a July 1960 CIA information report, the CIA had an informant who was a touring "clergyman" in the Soviet Union. His timely reporting provided intelligence on one of the American defectors—Joseph Dutkanicz. Clearly, the CIA was keenly interested in these defectors, so interested that some of what it learned about them sometimes came from its most sensitive and valuable sources. Protection of these sources was necessary for their continued usefulness. When significant information was not put in a 201 file but in a separate file, as was sometimes done, it was to protect the valuable sources through which it was acquired. The Agency's attempt to protect a sensitive source is the key to the riddle of Oswald's 201 opening.
In this chapter we will explore one possible hypothesis: When the CIA opened Oswald's 201 file on December 9, 1960, they had already learned, probably from a sensitive source, about Oswald's request to come home. In this case, the true reason for the opening of Oswald's 201 file might have been too sensitive to include in that file. Their defector-status explanation did not betray the sensitive source, possibly a KGB source, permitting the exclusion of the true trigger event from the file it brought into being.
# Americans Who Might Be Called "Defectors"
"Dear Dick," Hugh Cumming began a letter to the CIA on October 25, 1960. Hugh S. Cumming, Jr., was the director of the State Department's Intelligence and Research Bureau (INR), and the Dick to whom he was writing was Richard M. Bissell, Jr., Deputy Director of Plans, CIA. Cumming began his letter by noting informal yet high-level—including the White House—interest in a special kind of defectors. This is how he described them:
Our efforts to answer recent informal inquiries, including some from the White House Staff, have revealed that, though the CIA and the FBI have detailed records concerning Americans who have been recruited as intelligence agents by [Soviet] Bloc countries, there does not appear to be a complete listing of those Americans now living in Bloc countries who might be called "defectors." . . . These persons might be described as those persons who have either been capable of providing useful intelligence to the Bloc or those whose desire to resettle in Bloc countries has been significantly exploited for communist propaganda purposes.
Cumming enclosed a list of eighteen such individuals and asked Bissell to "verify and possibly expand" it. Number eight on the list was Lee Harvey Oswald, who was described only as a "tourist."
At the CIA, Bissell turned the matter over to Angleton's Counterintelligence (CI) Staff and Sheffield Edwards's Office of Security (OS), but CI took the lead. Asked for his recollection of the OS role in the opening of Oswald's 201 file, Robert L. Bannerman said, "It would have all gone through Angleton." Bannerman was in a good position to know. At the time—November 1960—Bannerman was the deputy director of the Office of Security. The 201 opening was something on which "we worked very closely with Angleton and his staff," Bannerman recalls.
Bannerman had been the OS Deputy Chief for a decade under Sheffield Edwards. Bannerman had a close working relationship with Otto Otepka of the State Department Security Office (SY). When Bissell's request for information about the defectors list came in, Bannerman made a check with SY to see what they had and told his staff to support CI. "Working directly with Bissell's people on this, sending memos back and forth, would have been too formal," Bannerman remembers, "and we didn't bother with the usual formalities in this instance. I just put our people in touch with the people at CI. That was Paul Gaynor, Bruce Solie, and Morse Allen from my staff."
Paul Gaynor was Chief of OS's Security Research Staff (SRS), and he assigned Marguerite Stevens to send information over to CI. A Stevens memo at the time shows that Bannerman verbally requested Gaynor to assemble information on American defectors. The request, as Gaynor relayed it to Stevens, however, was worded in a peculiar way, as if to dissuade her from doing research on seven people. Bannerman specified that he wanted information on American defectors "other than Bernon F. Mitchell and William H. Martin, and five other defectors regarding whom Mr. Otepka of the State Department Security Office already has information" on in his files [emphasis added]. One of the "five other defectors" that Stevens was not supposed to look into was Lee Harvey Oswald. In her response, however, Stevens said a few things about him and some of the others anyway, including the fact that they already had files with numbers. We will return to those numbers, briefly introduced in Chapter Four, later in this chapter.
Someone else in the CIA, however, was putting together information on these five defectors and planning to send something on each of them back to the State Department. That person was probably working for Angleton. Among the various sketches written on this select group can be found the inscription "Prepared by CI Staff for State-Nov. 60," In addition to Oswald, the other five defectors were Army Sergeant Joseph Dutkanicz, Libero Ricciardelli, a "tourist," Army Private Vladimir Sloboda, Robert E. Webster of the Rand Development Corporation, and Bruce Davis, also U.S. Army.
"Dear Hugh," began a November 3 interim response from Bissell to Cummings, "I have your letter of 25 October 1960 requesting certain information concerning Americans living in Bloc countries who might be called 'defectors.' Our files are being searched for the information you desire, and you will be hearing further from me in a few days." Fifteen days later, November 18, Angleton's Deputy Chief of CI, S. H. Horton, sent the proposed reply for State to Bissell to look at. On November 21, Bissell signed this letter with the defectors list attached, both assembled and drafted by Angleton's mole-hunting chief (CI/SIG), Birch D. O'Neal. The Oswald entry, the tenth on the CIA's version of the defectors list, was classified SECRET.
This description of Oswald is noteworthy because it contains something which is not true. It said "he appeared at the United States Embassy in Moscow and renounced his U.S. citizenship," a statement which was false. The truth was that Oswald had tried but failed to renounce his citizenship. As we have seen in Chapters Two and Four, the CIA was in possession of the relevant facts concerning Oswald's incomplete attempt at renunciation, including what the State Department had learned from its reexamination of this very issue.
These points draw attention to the November 18, 1960, flat assertion by CI/SIG that Oswald had renounced his U.S. citizenship. What was the point of this assertion? Was CI/SIG truly incompetent or spinning some counterintelligence yarn? The State Department had long since determined that Oswald had not renounced his citizenship. And what are we to make now of the story Ann Egerter of CI/SIG told to the HSCA about CI/SIG's opening Oswald's 201 file? She said she opened it simply because Oswald was a defector, but we know that the dark details about Oswald's defection had been familiar to Angleton's CI Staff since November 1959.
The five defectors that OS/SRS was asked not to research were in fact investigated by the "CI staff." Two of them had 201 numbers which were opened almost at the same moment: Dutkanicz was 289236 and Oswald was 289248. Egerter opened Oswald's 201 on December 9, 1960, and the proximity of Dutkanicz's 201 number to Oswald's suggests that Dutkanicz's was opened closer to the date that the CIA responded to the State Department: November 21. Dutkanicz's 201 could not have been opened much earlier, and probably not as early as the Soviet press announcement of his defection—a Tass (Soviet) blurb on July 27 or 28, 1960. The Tass report was originally held in "CI/SIG files."
The CIA probably already knew about Dutkanicz's defection—from an unusual and sensitive source whose reporting ended up in a file being kept by yet another component of the CIA which was interested in this group of defectors. Their files were "set up" in a soft file by Branch 6 ("Soviet Realities") of the Soviet Russia Division. This soft file was entitled "American Defectors to the USSR." Oswald's name appears to be missing from this file, but clues to its probable earlier presence remain, a subject to which we will return shortly. First we need to establish what we know about this question: When did Oswald first inquire about coming home?
# The HSCA Failure to Investigate
The Warren Commission's failure to investigate Oswald's CIA files leaves an indelible blemish on its credibility. Many aspects of the HSCA investigation deserve credit, and we are indebted to it for the work it did trying to decipher the CIA's files. However, the HSCA investigation mishandled a fundamental question about the opening of Oswald's 201 file: When did Oswald first write to the U.S. Embassy about his wish to return to America? On this crucial question the HSCA failed to take seriously the most important piece of all—Oswald's December 1960 request to come home. Oswald put his request in a letter, and that letter's history was excluded from any examination of the issues surrounding Oswald's 201 file.
The Warren Commission's failure to look at Oswald's 201 file renders, by default, the HSCA's interpretation as the principal official one on this subject. It behooves us, therefore, to look at the details of the HSCA report on the subject of why Oswald's 201 file was opened and why it took a year to open it. The HSCA report connected the two in this question:
Why the delay in opening Oswald's 201 file?
A confidential State Department telegram dated October 31, 1959, sent from Moscow to Washington and forwarded to the CIA, reported that Oswald, a recently discharged Marine, had appeared at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow to renounce his American citizenship and "has offered Soviets any information he has acquired as [an] enlisted radar operator." At least three other communications of a confidential nature that gave more detail on the Oswald case were sent to the CIA in about the same time period. Agency officials questioned by the committee testified that the substance of the October 21, 1959, cable was sufficiently important to warrant the opening of a 201 file. Oswald's file was not, however, opened until December 9, 1960.
The HSCA rightfully felt that it had to know where documents about Oswald had been disseminated inside the CIA prior to the opening of his 201 file. When the HSCA asked for these records, the "Agency advised the committee that because document dissemination records of relatively low national security significance are retained for only a 5-year period, they were no longer in existence for the years 1959-63."
As previously discussed, this was not true, and these internal dissemination records were released to the public in 1993. In 1978, however, the HSCA's probe of Oswald's 201 file ground to a halt due to factual errors and faulty analysis. For example, the HSCA report contained this untrue statement about why the 201 was opened:
An Agency memorandum, dated September 18, 1975, indicates that Oswald's file was opened on December 9, 1960, in response to the receipt of five documents: two from the FBI, two from the State Department and one from the Navy. This explanation, however, is inconsistent with the presence in Oswald's file of four State Department documents dated in 1959 and a fifth dated May 25, 1960. It is, of course, possible that the September 18, 1975, memorandum is referring to State Department documents that were received by the Directorate for Plans in October and November of 1960 and that the earlier State Department communications had been received by the CIA's Office of Security but not the Directorate for Plans.
First of all, the CIA memorandum had not said the 201 had been opened "in response to the receipt of five documents." Secondly, it was the HSCA—not the CIA—that offered the rationalization that perhaps the Agency's Office of Security received those documents and did not pass them on to the Directorate of Plans until December 1960. Since the 201 was opened by CI/SIG in the Directorate of Plans, this argument would explain the one-year delay. However, we now know what the HSCA did not: the same element in the DDP that opened the 201, CI/SIG, was itself in possession of most of those same Oswald files all along.
Perhaps the most significant problem for the HSCA is the way it handled the most obvious clue of all—a CIA memo that mentioned another reason Oswald's 201 file was opened. This reason was cited in the very first sentence of a September 18, 1975, memo written by Angleton's successor as Chief of Counterintelligence, George T. Kalaris, which the HSCA even quoted it in its report. Here is what Kalaris said:
Lee Harvey Oswald's 201 file was first opened under the name of Lee Henry Oswald on 9 December 1960 as a result of his "defection" to the USSR on 31 October 1959 and renewed interest in Oswald brought about by his queries concerning possible reentry into the United States.
This is an amazing statement because no one was supposed to know where Oswald was at that time, let alone what he wanted to do. What did the HSCA make of this sentence? The answer is disappointing and cavalier. Here is the pertinent passage from the HSCA report:
The September 18, 1975, memorandum also states that Oswald's file was opened on December 9, 1960, as a result of this "defection" to the U.S.S.R. on October 31, 1969, and renewed interest in Oswald brought about by his queries concerning possible reentry into the United States. There is no indication, however, that Oswald expressed to any U.S. Government official an intention to return to the United States until mid-February 1961.
The HSCA assumed that the "U.S. Government" did not know where Oswald was until his letter arrived on Snyder's desk on February 13, 1961. And so the committee failed to follow up on Kalaris's remark, and relied totally on the testimony of "the Agency employee who was directly responsible for initiating the opening action."
Again, that person was Ann Egerter, and she had testified that the trigger event for the opening was the State Department defector list:
This individual explained that the CIA had received a request from the State Department for information concerning American defectors. After compiling the requested information, she responded to the inquiry and then opened a 201 file on each defector involved. Even so, this analysis only explained why a file on Oswald was finally opened; it did not explain the seemingly long delay in opening of the file.
Egerter's testimony led the HSCA to review other 201 files where there were delays. However, as discussed in Chapter Four, their review was flawed because it failed to specifically address whether or not these delays persisted, as in Oswald's case, long after the defections were known to the Agency.
The HSCA was unwilling to draw a firm conclusion. In the end, they abandoned the issue, insinuating that it was because of the CIA's refusal to turn over the internal routing sheets. "In the absence of dissemination records," the HSCA noted, "the issue could not be resolved." That comment was wise; what was not wise was to glibly dismiss a memorandum by the chief of the CIA's Counterintelligence Staff. The two questions the HSCA should have asked are: Did Oswald, in December 1960, express an interest in coming home? If so, did the CIA learn of it? The answer to both questions appears to be yes.
# The Missing Letter
The HSCA did have another crucial piece of evidence that fit perfectly with the Kalaris memorandum's statement that Oswald had made "queries" in 1960 about coming home. The committee failed to consider that these two pieces fit together. This second piece was not obscure: It was published in the Warren Commission volumes as Commission Exhibit number 245, the first letter American Consul Snyder received from Oswald—after more than a year of not knowing where he was. Snyder received the letter on February 13, 1961. The first sentence of this letter contains a key piece of evidence: In that sentence Oswald wrote, "Since I have not received a reply to my letter of December 1960, I am writing again asking that you consider my request for the return of my American passport" [emphasis added].
The February 1961 letter was itself a momentous communication from Oswald to a U.S. government official. Coming at the end of a fourteen-month silence, this letter serves as the documentary turning point of Oswald's stay in Russia: It placed him in Minsk and began the eighteen-month saga of his return to America. The reference in the first sentence to an earlier letter presents historical inquiry with an interesting fork in the road, for it seems to contradict an entry in his diary. Traveling down one path, we accept the diary entry as true, which then requires us to accept that Oswald's February 1961 letter and the Kalaris 1975 memorandum are not. The other path at the fork leads us deep into the CIA labyrinth again. Kalaris's memo indicating the CIA had learned of Oswald's queries by December 9, 1960, raises the question of the source of this information. This path becomes even darker when we discover the true fate of the missing letter.
First, the Warren Commission's handling of Oswald's February 1961 letter deserves our attention. The Warren Report said Oswald "asked for the return of his passport," initially screening the other part of Oswald's sentence, which said, "I am writing again" to ask for the passport. Similarly, the Warren Report went on to discuss nearly every detail of Oswald's letter, leaving the first sentence—the one explaining that he had written before—for last. "In this letter," the Warren Report added, almost as an afterthought, "Oswald referred to a previous letter which he said had gone unanswered; there is evidence that such a letter was never sent."
The "evidence" that Oswald's December letter was "never sent," does not hold up well under close scrutiny. Just two pieces of evidence were offered by the Warren Commission. First, Oswald's diary entry for February 1, 1961: "Make my first request to American Embassy, Moscow for reconsidering my position," [emphasis added] Oswald had written. This was hardly conclusive since, by his own hand, Oswald had also informed the embassy about the request in December.
The other piece of evidence the Commission offered to show that there had been no earlier letter was Richard Snyder's testimony. The former Moscow Embassy Consul had this exchange with Allen Dulles and William Coleman:
MR. COLEMAN: Had you received a letter from Mr. Oswald at a date of December 1960, the way he mentioned in the first paragraph of this letter?
MR. SNYDER: No, sir; we did not.
MR. COLEMAN: This [February 1961 letter] is the first letter you received?
MR. SNYDER: This is the first communication since he left Moscow.
MR. DULLES: When you say he left Moscow, that was in—
MR. SNYDER: November 1959, sir.
MR. DULLES: November 1959?
MR. SNYDER: That is what we presume was the date.
MR. COLEMAN: Mr. Dulles, we have other evidence that he didn't leave until January 7, 1960.
MR. DULLES: The last the embassy heard from him was in November 1959?
MR. SNYDER: Yes, sir.
The fact that Snyder had not received the letter is not hard evidence that it was not sent. Reading this part of Snyder's testimony does little to inspire confidence in the Warren Commission's analysis of this point. On the other hand, it does conjure up an image of Allen Dulles puffing on his pipe as he pondered the implications of this lengthy period where Oswald was out of touch.
During the Warren Commission's investigation of Oswald's foreign activities, William T. Coleman, Jr., and W. David Slawson wrote a report (dated March 6, 1964) about Oswald's life in Russia. In a short paragraph blemished by a typographical error about the date of Oswald's second letter, the report contained this solitary sentence on the missing letter: "In the letter received February 13, 1961, he [Oswald] said that he had written an earlier letter but apparently the embassy never received the earlier letter." The implied acceptance of the letter in this sentence does not fit with the final report's suggestion that it never existed in the first place.
An idea that supported the "never-existed" hypothesis was sent to the Warren Commission during its investigation but was not used in the final report. This idea came, not surprisingly, from the CIA, where it was formulated by Lee Wigren, Chief of Research and Analysis for the Counterintelligence Office in the Soviet Russia Division and put in a January 1964 report for the commission. Wigren wrote: "One possible explanation for reference to a spurious letter may be that Oswald wished to give the Embassy the impression that he had initiated correspondence regarding repatriation before having renewed his identity document on 4 January 1961." Although this fit the commission's notion that the missing letter was fictitious, the final report did not use Wigren's theory or make any reference to it at all.
The State Department's own analysis of this problem after the Kennedy assassination went only as far as to state that the letter "was never received." This is a far cry from the Warren Commission's suggestion that it was "never sent." In sum, the embassy's nonreceipt of an earlier Oswald letter and the contradiction between Oswald's diary and his February letter were all the evidence the commission could muster for the proposition that Oswald had not sent an earlier letter. Ironically, just twelve lines later on the same page, the Warren Report acknowledged that "the Soviet authorities had undoubtedly intercepted and read the correspondence between Oswald and the Embassy and knew of his plans." Yet the report failed to consider whether the KGB might have intercepted and held on to Oswald's first letter.
In a December 9, 1963, FBI interview, Marina said Oswald had talked with her—prior to their marriage on April 30, 1961—about his unanswered mail. The FBI special agents who interviewed her, Anatole A. Boguslav and Wallace R. Heitman, described that part of Marina's interview in their report:
Marina said again that he had met Oswald in March and they had been married on April 30, 1961. At the time she met him and at the time she married him, she was of the impression that Oswald did not want to return to the United States. She said Oswald had prior to their marriage told her that he thought he could not return to the United States. He had told her he had written the American Embassy letters about returning to the United States, and they had not answered the letters. She said Oswald was therefore of the impression that he could not return. Marina said that if she had known of any desire on the part of Oswald to return to the United States at the time of their marriage, she probably would not have married him.
At this point, Oswald wrongly suspected that it was the American Embassy, not the KGB, that was responsible for his letter's disappearance.
On February 28, 1961, the American Embassy in Moscow responded to Oswald's second letter, specifically mentioning his story about the December letter. Snyder wrote: "We have received your recent letter concerning your desire to return to the United States. Your earlier letter of December 1960 which you mentioned in your present letter does not appear to have been received at the Embassy " [emphasis added]. This passage reflects Snyder's reaction to the story at the time, and makes it clear that Snyder had allowed for the possibility that it might have been sent.
This issue moved closer to resolution after the fall of communism in the Soviet Union. For a moment, the remnants of the former KGB apparatus opened up, a process which allowed glimpses into the KBG's Narim file on Oswald. "Narim" is a Russian word for turbot, a river fish. The event that concerns our present discussion was an American television news broadcast. ABC aired a show on November 22, 1991, entitled "An ABC News Nightline Investigation: The KGB Oswald Files." During this program, hosted by Ted Koppel, the subject of Oswald's December 1960 letter to the American Embassy came up. Here is the pertinent portion of the transcript:
SAWYER: On February 13th, 1961, the U.S. embassy received a letter from Oswald that read, "Since I have not received a reply to my letter of December 1960, I am writing again." What letter was he referring to? Theorists have speculated he never did write it, that he was simply unstable, or lying. In fact, the KGB intercepted Oswald's missing first letter, and the original still exists inside the Oswald file. In subsequent correspondence, Oswald blustered, reminding Richard Snyder of U.S. obligations to an American citizen [emphasis added].
Although there is still no copy of this letter in the U.S. National Archives, ABC claims to have verified its existence with the KGB. Thus it appeared that Oswald's story was true after all, and the Warren Commission's theory that Oswald had never sent such a letter was not.
As discussed in a previous section of this chapter, the HSCA's probe into Oswald's 201 opening repeated the Warren Commission's erroneous rejection of the December letter story. In so doing, however, the HSCA had to rebut not just Oswald's statement in his second letter, but also the memorandum written by the CIA's Chief of Counterintelligence, George Kalaris. Both government investigations thus dismissed the authenticity of Oswald's original query about coming home. It is more logical to conclude that Oswald did send the letter and that it was permanently impounded by the KGB.
The next question is: Did the CIA indeed find out about Oswald's December query? In order to answer this question, it might be useful to discuss how closely the CIA was able to monitor American defectors in Russia. We turn now to the Agency's level of interest in this unusual group of people.
# American Defectors to the U.S.S.R.
For SR/6, American defectors in the Soviet Union were potentially rich repositories of information useful to the Agency's operations in the Soviet Union. From SR/6's point of view, each defector was a walking encyclopedia of his own "reality" in Russia. "Soviet Realities" was another way of referring to SR/6, because building retrievable encyclopedic descriptions of real places in Russia—down to the lampposts, buildings, mailboxes, street signs, and matchbooks—was one of its principal missions."
Sometime in 1960, SR/6 set up a "soft file" on the Americans who had defected to the Soviet Union during the previous eighteen or so months. A "soft file" is an informal file that can be maintained just about anywhere, as opposed to a formal file bearing the name of the originating element, such as a Security (OS) file, which could be maintained only by the Office of Security. In 1960 SR/6 set up just such an informal file on these American defectors. In a 1966 memorandum for record, a CIA person, whose name is still classified," wrote this about the SR/6 soft file:
The attached material was part of a soft file entitled "American Defectors to the USSR," which was set up by SR/6 (Support) around 1960 and maintained by various SR components until ca. 1963. The compilations were derived from a variety of sources, and contain both classified and overt data.
"Attached material" meant the informal chronologies of each of the defectors, typed entries in chronological order with handwritten notes around them. The time period covered in this SR/6 soft file, "around" 1960 to "ca. 1963," overlaps perfectly the time between this group's defection and their return to the United States. All of this particular group of defectors redefected to the United States by 1963, except Dutkanicz, the most intriguing of the group, who died in the Soviet Union.
The 1966 memo about the 1960 SR/6 defectors file has other important clues in it. For example, this paragraph:
In the fall of 1966, the files were turned over to CIA Staff. In most instances, basic information was then extracted for the US Defector Machine Program. In all instances in which the material was unique, or represented a valuable collation effort, it has been incorporated into the appropriate 201 file, along with a copy of this memorandum.
This memo indicates that there were instances where the CIA had information about these defectors between 1960 and 1963 that was not in their 201 files at the time and was not added to them until late 1966.
This filing system is an example of what is referred to in the intelligence community as "compartmentation." The whole picture is not kept in one place. Instead, pieces are kept in separate compartments because of the sensitive sources used to get those pieces of information. This presented a quandary for the CIA when the Kennedy assassination required a review of this kind of information. The 1966 memo about the SR/6 file complained about this problem in this way:
It is suggested that any dissemination of this data should be coordinated with SB [Soviet Bloc] Division and with CI staff (CI/ MRO), in view of the frequently inadequate sourcing and of the fact that disseminations have already been made through the US Defector Machine Program [emphasis added].
This pattern of inadequate source material in the 201 files of certain defectors would also befall Oswald's 201 file from the time of its opening and beyond.
We know that Oswald was in this group at the time the soft file was set up in 1960. He probably still was when the State Department passed the results of its own status check on this special group of defectors to the FBI and CIA on May 17, 1962, the time at which Oswald was preparing to depart for the U.S. In Oswald's case, the probable event triggering his 201 opening—his December queries about returning home—would likely not have been included in his 201 file in order to protect the Soviet source. On the other hand, the news of Oswald's decision to return to the U.S.—as reflected in his second letter to Snyder and routinely passed to the CIA by the State Department at the CONFIDENTIAL level—was placed in his 201 file.
We have evidence that suggests the SR/6 soft file was already open by the time of the State Department's defector inquiry of October 25, 1960. It comes from the October 31, 1960, OS/SRS (Office of Security/Security Research Staff) memo on American defectors, written by Marguerite D. Stevens. This was the memo in which Stevens had indicated that the Deputy Chief of Security, Bannerman, had asked SRS for information on individuals other than Webster, Oswald, Ricciardelli, Sloboda, and Dutkanicz—the very defectors who were the subjects of the SR/6 soft file. In spite of these directions, Stevens's memo did mention a few things on some of these defectors, and gave file numbers belonging to five of them: "Robert Edward Webster, EE-18854; Lee Harvey Oswald, MS-11165; Libero Ricciardelli, MS-8295; Vladimir Sloboda, MS-10565; and Joseph Dutkanicz, MS-10724."
These file numbers are intriguing. Oswald's MS-11165 has so far appeared only on Stevens's memo. Why did four of the defectors have "MS" numbers and Webster have an "EE" number? Several former employees were unable to recall what "MS" or "EE" meant, although Ray Rocca, of Counterintelligence Research and Analysis, suggested (before he died in 1994) that MS might have been "miscellaneous security." This seems redundant because Oswald already had a security file—OS-351-164. A former Soviet Russia Division employee suggested Rocca might have been wrong about this because such important defectors as Ricciardelli, Dutkanicz, Sloboda, and Oswald were hardly miscellaneous cases. Another possibility is that the MS reflected the military service status of these other four men, while the EE might have reflected Webster's civilian status. On the other hand, EE-29229 was a CIA file number for Gerry Patrick Hemming, an ex-Marine. The CIA should explain to the public what these file designators meant.
Several of these defectors "have been of interest to CIA," Stevens said in the October 31, 1960, Security Research Staff memo, and she then listed each of them with a remark. Part of Stevens's memo is still classified, but one person on her list was Sloboda, another American serviceman who defected a month after Dutkanicz. "Sloboda is currently of interest to Security," she wrote, "in view of his assignment prior to his defection to the Soviet Union, via East Germany, on 3 August [1960]." Like Dutkanicz, Sloboda had been in Army Military Intelligence (MI) at the time he defected. Sloboda's rank had been specialist five, and he had worked as a translator-interrogator and document clerk with the Army's 513th MI Group, in Frankfurt, Germany.
"He had contact with at least one representative of CIA," Stevens wrote of Sloboda's Army work in her 1960 memo, "and was in a position to [have] learned the identities of CIA personnel at the EGIS Center," presumably an intelligence center associated with Sloboda's Army unit." Again, like Dutkanicz, Sloboda had been recruited by the KGB prior to his defection. Here is what one CIA report said about it:
Sloboda's prior KGB involvement was confirmed by [redacted] as reported in [redacted]. See attached memorandum of 28 March 1962 in regard to passage of this information to the Army. Further indications are the facts that Sloboda was a KGB resettlement case and that he later told an American Embassy Moscow official that he had been blackmailed and framed into going to the USSR. See Moscow Emb. tels A-572, 23 October 1962, and 851, 23 March 1962.
The similarities between Dutkanicz and Sloboda were stunning. Both had been in Germany, in the Army, in Military Intelligence Branch, had defected within days of each other, and had been recruited by the KGB prior to their defections. The CIA's counterintelligence analysts even concluded that both defections were "precipitated" by the same circumstance: increased Army security measures.
The Sloboda case was nastier because his true past had been concealed from the U.S. intelligence and security checks that were conducted on him. Just how serious the case was can be seen from an October 12, 1960, memorandum from Scotty Miler, a deputy to Angleton on the CI staff. Miler's memo contained this revelation:
1. On basis of report from Berlin [redacted] orally asked the Army for any information substantiating allegations that subject, prior to escaping to West and enlisting in the U.S. Army, had been a Staff Officer in Polish Intelligence. CI/F records were negative. A copy of the ACSI [Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U.S. Army] report concerning subject, dated 15 September 1960, was provided us through CI/Liaison but not formally transmitted to the Agency.
2. The attached report appears to answer the question concerning Polish Intelligence, but, of course, raises additional questions concerning Soviet Intelligence not answered in the memorandum. Specifically, there was also an interest in attempting to determine if subject could have had any knowledge of the [redacted] case and, again, except by inference in para 7 [redacted], there is no positive answer. On the larger question of general knowledge of this Agency and Agency activities we presume [redacted] will provide answers.
3. We do not plan an immediate follow-up inquiry to ACSI about the attached, but if you have any questions you believe might be answered by ACSI, please let us know and we can arrange to have them forwarded.
When we combine the fact that Sloboda was a Polish or Soviet agent while he was working for the Army with the fact that Sloboda defected immediately after Dutkanicz, who was in the Army, it is natural to wonder whether the two cases were tied together in some sinister way. For example: Could Sloboda have been a spotter or Dutkanicz's control? How sure can we be about Sloboda's loyalties?
One of the last of the original group of defectors to return to the U.S. was Libero Ricciardelli. He came back in 1963, and was debriefed by the CIA on July 18, 1963, as this passage from a CIA Domestic Contacts Division memo makes clear:
1. This Division has no objection to your revealing to the FBI that Subject is a source of this Agency, provided the FBI does not disclose the source's identity outside the Bureau.
2. Subject, a former US citizen, who in 1958 defected to the USSR, and acquired Soviet citizenship in 1959, was interviewed by our field representative on 18 July 1963, at the house of Subject's father in Needham, Massachussetts. The results of our representative's first debriefing session with Subject are contained in the attached report, 00-A-3,269,779.
It is hard not to wonder why these defectors seem to change their minds about the Soviet Union quickly and to such an extent that most were able and willing to provide the CIA with all the military and economic information they had learned while in the Communist superpower. Obviously these American defectors would be full of useful information to the CIA if they returned to the U.S.
We will later examine the possibility that Oswald might have been deliberately sent into Russia or manipulated into going there. For now, it is interesting to observe that SR/6 began files on these men at the time of their defections. Their own, even if somewhat limited, military backgrounds would facilitate observation of things military that civilian tourists might not notice. We should also observe that CI/SIG opened their 201 files later than was customary. In the intervening months, CI/OPS [Operations] displayed an interest in information on Oswald. And finally, we should note that the head of CI, James Angleton, had begun his hunt for a mole in the Soviet Russia (SR) Division before Oswald's release from the Marines in September 1959.
Before considering what the CIA might have been able to learn about Oswald in Russia during the period he was lost in Minsk, we would be well served to ask this question: Is there any hard evidence that the CIA had roving human assets in the Soviet Union at this time? Not surprisingly, the answer is yes.
# The "Clergyman" In Lvov
On July 28, 1960, the Soviet news agency Tass reported that "John Joseph Dutkanicz" had requested asylum in the U.S.S.R. On August 25, 1960, U.S. military authorities in West Berlin announced that Dutkanicz had been absent without leave since July 6, 1960, and added that "the Army had no confirmation of the report that he had defected to the Soviets, or that he was in Moscow." The CIA did know that Dutkanicz had defected, and they knew that he was not in Moscow, but in Lvov. This information, as well as much more about Dutkanicz and what the CIA really knew about him, was described in a memorandum responding to "questions" in late 1964, right after the publication of the Warren Report.
The subject of this memorandum, written on October 2, 1964, by Lee Wigren, Chief of "R" [research and analysis] in the Counterintelligence Branch of the Soviet Russia Division, was "Questions Concerning Defectors Joseph J. Dutkanicz (201-289236) and Vladimir O. Sloboda (201-287527)." With respect to Dutkanicz's Army assignment at time of his defection in July 1960, Wigren's memo said that although the Army Case Summary showed Dutkanicz was assigned to the 32nd Signal Battalion in Darmstadt, "his wife indicated that he had CIC [Counterintelligence Corps] connections." Mrs. Dutkanicz told State Department officials some intriguing details about her husband:
In an interview at the American Embassy Moscow on 5 December 1961 (cited in DBA-288, 24 January 1962), she indicated that their trip behind the iron curtain "had been made possible because her husband worked for the CIC [Counterintelligence Corps] and was allowed to do things an ordinary 'GI' could not do."
As previously discussed, Dutkanicz's 201 file was 201-289236, just twelve numbers away from Oswald's—201-289248. The CIA personnel who had been handling Dutkanicz's 201 had left handwritten clues indicating that Mrs. Dutkanicz was right. "There are also penciled notations in the [Dutkanicz] 201 file," Wigren said, "suggesting that his Army assignment may have included intelligence functions of some kind."
The CI Staff summary for the State Department in November 1960, marked "secret," said, "We are informed that Dutkanicz has had difficulties with his wife and that she reported that he had relatives in the USSR and that he admitted that he was a Communist and that he had associated with German Nationals who were Communists."
As Wigren looked deeper into the files of these two U.S. Army defectors, he noticed that both men had had connections to the KGB. Again, the Army Case Summary was Wigren's source document:
Dutkanicz himself told American Embassy officials in Moscow that he had been approached by KGB representatives in a bar near Darmstadt in 1958 and had accepted recruitment as a result of their threats and inducements. He claimed to have given them minimum cooperation from then until his defection, although the Army considered it probable that he had done more than he admitted. A further indication of his KGB involvement before defection is the fact that the special decree granting him Soviet citizenship was enacted three months before his arrival in the U.S.S.R.
The cause of Dutkanicz's defection had been the Army's security investigations itself. He "told American Embassy Moscow officials that he had informed his KGB handler that he was under investigation for security reasons. He defected soon after, in accord with a KGB suggestion that he do so."
No sooner than he had defected, however, Dutkanicz was talking with a CIA informant inside the Soviet Union. From the JFK files released by the CIA in 1994 comes the startling news that on July 10, 1960, Dutkanicz met a "clergyman" in the lobby of the Intourist Hotel in Lvov. The "clergyman" submitted this account of his encounter with Dutkanicz to the CIA that same July:
1. On the morning of Monday, 10 July 1960, at about 0930-1000 hours I chanced to meet one Joseph Dutkanych, [sic] allegedly a defected US citizen, in the lobby of the Intourist Hotel in the city of Lvov, USSR.
2. I was recognized and approached by Mr. Dutkanych while making my way up the hotel stairway toward my hotel room. After the customary greetings, I suggested he accompany me to my room where we remained for not more than ten minutes. Since I had arranged that morning for a private conducted tour of Lvov our conversation dealt primarily with the points of interest I was scheduled to see.
The two men arranged to have dinner together that evening, but the clergyman in Lvov said, "I never saw him again as he failed to keep his appointment." Thus the CIA did have at least one interesting and capable informant in the Soviet Union whose timely reporting concerned the American defector in Lvov. Which brings us to Oswald, who was supposed to be lost in Minsk. Indeed, he was in Minsk, but was he lost?
# A Clandestine Soviet Source on Oswald?
The CIA has overtly maintained that Oswald's 201 file was opened as a result of his name appearing on a list of defectors from the State Department. Yet that list was sent to the CIA on October 25, 1960, more than six weeks before Ann Egerter opened the 201 file on December 9. Is there a possibility that Oswald's desire to return home was known by December 1960: As we have seen, fragmentary but solid evidence has slowly accumulated over the years that suggests the Agency might have had ways of finding out about Oswald's activities in Russia.
In the present chapter we have already taken some tentative steps to explore the hypothesis that Oswald's 201 file was opened, at least in part, due to his query about coming home. When did Oswald actually begin to talk about coming home? The first signs of his disillusionment with life in Russia appeared as early as May 1960, but grew in the fall. In an entry for May 1, 1960, in his diary, Oswald wrote that he felt "uneasy inside" after his friend Ziger advised him to return to the United States. In a diary entry for "August-September" 1960, Oswald wrote that he was becoming "increasingly conscious" of the "sort" of a society he lived in.
After returning to the United States, Oswald often commented on life in Russia. On the positive side, he would point to the Soviet systems of public education and medical care, the fact that everyone "was trained to do something," and the system of regular wage and salary increases. His negative comments focused on the general low quality of life, the lack of freedom, and the scarcity of food products. In this regard, he was especially critical of the contrast between ordinary workers and Communist Party members.
Oswald came to view the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as corrupt. Only party members could afford luxuries, he said, while common workers could afford only food and clothing. Party members were all "opportunists," Oswald said, who "shouted the loudest" but were interested only in their own welfare. Oswald expressed similar views in a manuscript which he worked on in Russian. The "spontaneous" demonstrations for Soviet holidays or distinguished visitors were "organized," he said, and elections were "supervised" to ensure a high turnout and continued Communist Party control.
On January 4, 1961, one year after he had been issued his "stateless" residence permit, Oswald was summoned to the passport office in Minsk and asked if he still wanted to become a Soviet citizen. He replied that he did not, but asked that his residence permit be extended for another year. The entry in his diary for January 4-1 reads: "I am starting to reconsider my desire about staying. The work is drab. The money I get has nowhere to be spent. No nightclubs or bowling alleys, no places of recreation accept [sic] the trade union dances. I have had enough."
Because the opening of Oswald's 201 file on December 9, 1960, was after his decision to return home but before the embassy knew of his whereabouts, it is reasonable to think seriously about the possibility that someone in America knew how to communicate with Oswald or to learn what the Soviets were saying about him. Is there any evidence that Oswald was in communication with someone outside of Minsk or Russia during the "lost" period? The answer might be yes to both. It is possible, but by no means firm, that Oswald had contact with someone in Moscow or outside of the Soviet Union.
There was a person in Moscow that Oswald could have telephoned if he had wanted to. This person slips through relatively unnoticed during the period of Oswald's defection, but it appears Oswald did try to contact him in 1961. When Oswald, accompanied this time by Marina, visited the U.S. Embassy in Moscow in July, he looked up the name of this individual in his address book. According to an FBI report by Special Agents Heitman and Griffin about their interview with Marina, that is what occurred in 1961:
At the time of Marina's first visit to Moscow with Oswald, he referred to his address book to find the name of an individual. It was Oswald's intention to call this person on the telephone. He showed the name to Marina. This name she has identified from a photograph of one page of Oswald's address book which contains the name written in the Latin alphabet, "Leo Setyaev."
Marina said the written name and associated writing in the address book were not hers or Oswald's. The leading candidate would appear to be Leo Setyaev himself.
Whether this handwriting in Oswald's address book was Setyaev's or someone else's, Oswald behaved as if Setyaev were a person he might call on for help. The Heitman-Griffin FBI report explains:
Marina said Oswald tried to contact this person, but had been unsuccessful. Marina asked Oswald who this individual Leo Setyaev was. Oswald replied he was a man who had helped him make some money after his arrival in Moscow by assisting him in a broadcast for Radio Moscow. Marina asked Oswald what he had said, and he told her he had criticized the United States and said Russia was a better place in which to live. Marina asked him why he said this, and Oswald replied it was necessary to make this propaganda because at the time he had wanted to live in Russia.
This apparent connection to Setyaev was interesting indeed, as was this additional detail provided by Marina: Oswald said Setyaev had visited him at the "Hotel Metropole in Moscow." There has been a great deal of misunderstanding about the date of Setyaev's visit to Oswald, most notably, that the visit was on October 19 at the Berlin Hotel. Setyaev, however, has been interviewed and described the room in which he made the visit with Oswald. The room he describes appears to be the one described by Aline Mosby.
In the FBI interview with Heitman and Griffin, Marina recalled other relevant information about Setyaev's visit to the Hotel Metropole, including a photograph of Oswald:
She advised further Setyaev had taken a photograph of Oswald during his visit to the latter at the Hotel Metropole. This photograph is one of the photographs of Oswald presently in possession of investigators of the assassination as Marina recalls seeing it. It is the photograph of Oswald standing in a room, in which he wears a black suit, a white shirt, and a tie. Marina said Oswald looks quite serious in the photograph. The photograph is about 5" by 7" in size. Marina said it was obvious to her Oswald was quite worried in this photograph because she noticed that a vein was standing out very noticeably on the right side of his face.
This attire sounds almost identical to what Snyder said Oswald was wearing during the October 31 defection at the Embassy, only this time the oddity was not the pair of white gloves, but a vein on his face. Heitman and Griffin just happened to have on hand for the interview with Marina ten photographs of Leo and Anita Setyaev.
It appears that Setyaev was known to both the CIA and the FBI. A sensitive June 24, 1960, LINGUAL intercept, "60F24," was addressed to Leo Setyaev by Charles John Pagenhardt, and a May 1964 CIA report on LINGUAL intercepts related to the "Oswald case" explained that the Agency's interest in this letter was based on the fact that Setyaev was listed in Oswald's address book and also because Pagenhardt was known to have "contemplated defecting to the USSR." The CIA document also states: "Setyaev and Pagenhardt are known to the FBI." This sidesteps, however, the issue of what the interest in Setyaev was at the time this letter was intercepted—June 24, 1960.
The Warren Commission appears not to have bothered to consider whether Setyaev had was an informant for the CIA. This was the commission's assessment:
On October 19, Oswald was probably interviewed in his hotel room by a man named Leo Setyaev, who said that he was a reporter for Radio Moscow seeking statements from American tourists about their impressions of Moscow, but who was probably also acting for the KGB. Two years later, Oswald told officials at the American Embassy that he had made a few routine comments to Setyaev of no political significance. The interview with Setyaev may, however, have been the occasion of an attempt by the KGB, in accordance with regular practice, to assess Oswald or even to elicit compromising statements from him; the interview was apparently never broadcast.
The CIA checked Setyaev's name with a KGB informant of their own, who said he had "never heard the name." Setyaev claimed to have made a tape recording of the interview with Oswald in his room in the Metropole Hotel, but "erased it immediately because Oswald's remarks were too political for the light tourist chatter that he needed for his show."
More important is the circumstantial but credible evidence that Oswald had a contact outside the Soviet Union. It comes from his friends in Minsk, especially the girlfriend he originally wanted to marry, Ella German. During his research into Oswald's stay in Minsk, investigative journalist Peter Wronski interviewed Oswald's first flame in Russia—Ella German. This passage is from Wronski's 1991 interview with Ella:
PETER WRONSKI: Did he tell you about his relatives?
ELLA GERMAN: No. You know . . . I was surprised. He didn't tell me he had a mother. He only used to speak about a cousin. . . .
PETER WRONSKI: Did he correspond with America?
ELLA GERMAN: He only said that he used to get some letters from his cousin. He received a package of books, he told me once. I said, "why not with things?" He said, "no, the customs duty is very expensive here. And on books there is no customs duty." . . .
PETER WRONSKI: And from whom did he get these books?
ELLA GERMAN: From his cousin.
PETER WRONSKI: Did he name him?
ELLA GERMAN: No, he didn't name him. . . .. He just said a cousin.
His cousins had no idea where Oswald was and sent no packages, let alone letters, to Russia. Yet this passage suggests that Oswald was receiving mail from someone outside Russia, and that somebody might have been from the United States. Whoever it was, Oswald evidently decided to lie about it. In addition, Oswald gave his friend Titovitz a book—possibly during the "lost in Minsk" period—but then momentarily pulled back the book to razor out a dedication on the corner of the first page.
Did Oswald go to the trial of Francis Powers? Dr. Lawrence Haapanen framed the case for such a visit about as incisively as it has been recently. With the understanding that the following is circumstantial and speculative, here is the "base case" for Oswald's presence at the Powers U-2 trial August 17-18, 1960. There are three pre- and one post-assassination pieces of evidence. First, that in a room full of distinguished observers from around the world, virtually all of whom are dressed in suits, we have one young man sitting, coatless, in a shirt that looks a great deal like the one Oswald was wearing when photographed in Minsk in 1961. Second, in a now-well-known letter written to his brother dated February 15, 1961, Oswald said that Francis Gary Powers "seemed to be a nice, bright American-type fellow, when I saw him in Moscow." The CIA took this seriously enough to pin down the dates Powers spent in Moscow. And third, several of the words highlighted in Oswald's English-Russian dictionary could have been related to an interest in the U-2, e.g., "radar," "range," and "eject," as well as a phrase he wrote in himself, "radar locator." The U-2 carried a radar locator that could determine "the location of . . . radar installations."
Finally, after the assassination, Allen Dulles sent Lee Rankin a memo and a brief article from the Saturday Review of May 9, 1964. Dulles's July 23, 1964, memo and associated documents became Warren Commission CD 1345. In the SR article, the writer (Henry Brandon) said that he talked to one of the Intourist guides who had met Oswald when he first came to Moscow in the fall of 1959. This guide said that several Intourist guides felt sorry for Oswald and, when winter came, brought him a fur cap. "But when they saw him again in Moscow several months later, he completely ignored them—didn't even speak to them." Incredibly, the WC seems to have never followed up on this.
According to the Warren Commission's findings, Oswald was in Moscow from October 1959 to early January 1960. While there is no "official" indication that Oswald was back in Moscow in August 1960, his reappearance at that time clearly could have been within the time frame mentioned in the SR article—"several months later"—when the Intourist guides found Oswald back in Moscow and strangely aloof. If it was Oswald, he would have had opportunities to contact someone, like Setyaev. However, there is no mention of an August 1960 visit with Setyaev, either in Oswald's accounts or Marina's.
If the hypothesis in this chapter is true, then the 1975 CIA memorandum stating that Oswald's 201 file had been opened because of his "queries" could have been considered a breach of security, revealing that the CIA had knowledge of Oswald's queries. This mistake might have resulted from Angleton's sudden firing due to public disclosure of the HT-LINGUAL mail intercept program. Indeed, there are hints in a heavily redacted part of an old register of the CIA's files of a security violation at the very moment the September 18, 1975, document was released to an official investigation. Other information in this Kalaris memo is worthy of consideration as a security violation, information we will discuss in Chapter Nineteen. It is more likely that other information, concerning the Cuban Consulate, was the reason for the security violation. Nevertheless, the possible connection of the security compromise to a Soviet source should not be overlooked.
From the above, it appears that Oswald may have had a contact outside Minsk and perhaps outside the Soviet Union, and also that the CIA had some way of knowing about Oswald's desire to come home by the time they opened his 201 file in December 1960. These observations are highly speculative and, even if true, do not, in and of themselves, indicate Oswald was a CIA agent. There are other possibilities, however, and as promised, we will now address the question: Was Oswald manipulated into going to Russia? Again, our answer here flows from the perspective that develops in his files, which may not necessarily correspond to reality or to what was inside Oswald's head. The evidence is not firm or even particularly convincing, but that is hardly surprising. Nevertheless, enough information has accumulated where a crude case can be advanced.
To begin with, those who observed him at the time of the defection reported their judgment that Oswald had obtained some sort of help, at a minimum, to prepare for the defection. This piece is convincing, only it seems impossible to take it anywhere with any certainty. In Chapter Six we explored three salient points in the unfolding mole-hunt in the Soviet Russia Division. Goleniewski's letters—which were suggestive of a mole—may not have been written soon enough to relate to an Oswald dangle in the Soviet Union, though perhaps one or two might have been early enough. The KGB's arrest of Popov—a CIA mole—occurred on the day Oswald arrived in Moscow (October 16, 1959), and thus was too late to provide a motive for dangling Oswald. Thus, the character of the mole-hunt which was in existence as Oswald prepared for and traveled to the Soviet Union was the Popov information from 1958: that the U-2 had been betrayed in some way.
From the above, we can build a rather weak case for a dangle, an operation in which the Soviets might be tested to see how much interest there was in Oswald's U-2 past. The FBI liaison to the CIA, Sam Papich, remembers "discussions of a plan to have a CIA or FBI man defect to Moscow," but he states that the plan was not implemented "to his knowledge." As we will see, throughout Oswald's stay in the Soviet Union, an Agency element which appears regularly on cover sheets for Oswald documents is CI/OPS, which means "Counterintelligence Operations." If Oswald was a dangle, this might suggest that it was a counterintelligence operation run by Angleton.
Again, the evidence for this is hardly overwhelming. At the same time, however, whether or not the Agency ever considered seriously the damage that Oswald's knowledge might have had on the U-2 program if fully exploited, they could presume some level of Soviet interest. The existence of Oswald's SR/6 soft file—which had a page and a quarter worth of entries before the opening of Oswald's 201 file—confirms that Oswald was considered among a high-interest group of American military defectors to the Soviet Union.
Oswald's Communist credentials come across in the files as superficial, and his decision to return to the U.S. after just one year seems transparent, underlining all the more the superficiality of Oswald's entire Soviet sojourn. The evidence that he had a contact outside the Soviet Union is sufficient that we should, at least, take the possibility seriously, although—as in the case of the missing letter—a document or good copy of one would constitute more convincing evidence. Attention is drawn to Oswald's anomolous behavior in connection with this murky contact, especially the high probability that he was lying about who this person was, and also his action of slicing out a dedication page in a book as he gave it to Titovits. Both the credibility of these witnesses and Oswald's evasiveness establish this as a lead to be followed to its outcome. Presumably the KGB, itself a regular reader of the mails, had some answers at one time, and the present Russian government might be disposed to assist the American effort to open up all files related to the case.
Our study of Leo Setyaev, who was known to U.S. intelligence and being watched by them, is also a weak but still intriguing potential piece of the puzzle. Setyaev, by the Agency's own reasoning, was of interest to the CIA because his name appeared in Oswald's address book, but that statement does not say why they would be opening his mail in 1960. The LINGUAL documents released prove that the CIA was interested in Setyaev while Oswald was in Minsk. Setyaev would not raise suspicions by walking around corridors of hotels. After all, his job as a Radio Moscow correspondent was to seek out and interview westerners. The only question is: For whom was Setyaev really working?
The Setyaev story grows more interesting as time goes by. In his 1991 interview with Peter Wronski, Setyaev said Oswald "asked him to help write a letter to the Presidium, asking to be granted citizenship, and that he [Setyaev] refused." The June 1960 CIA HT/LINGUAL intercept on Setyaev indicated he was involved in the translation and dissemination of documents which foreigners needed to become Soviet citizens. Could it have been Setyaev or someone like him who coached Oswald during his defection?
In Chapter Six, we encountered a "Memo for the Files" by an American Consulate official, John McVickar, which contained information on Soviet plans for Oswald for which we have no source. Peter Wronski's analysis of his interview with Setyaev contains this comment: "Setyaev at first claimed he did not see Oswald again and that he gave Oswald his home address over the telephone when Oswald called him to tell him he was moving to Minsk." Setyaev did see Oswald again. And it seems that Setyaev was the person to talk to about Oswald.
All of this said, however, the process of releasing new documents is still not complete, and likely will continue through 1997 and beyond. The hypothesis advanced in the chapter is an early impression that may change radically or remain nearly the same. Time will tell.
# CHAPTER TWELVE
# Turning Point
We have been watching three threads. First and foremost, we have been following the trails and intersections of Oswald's labyrinthine CIA, FBI, State Department, and ONI files. In addition, we have kept up with the general outlines of his activities in the Soviet Union, as this is the context in which these files were developed. Finally, we have observed Cuban matters in order to set the stage for the drama we know will unfold upon Oswald's return. In this regard, Oswald's preparation for his return to America took place while the Agency was planning for the Bay of Pigs invasion and the assassination of Castro. His first three months back in the U.S. would unfold against the backdrop of the Cuban Missile Crisis.
The pieces and pathways in Oswald's intelligence files become more complex in 1961 simply because they continue. While much of the meaning of these files is as arcane as the intelligence world in which they were created, at the simplest level of analysis we are struck by the sheer amount of paper the intelligence agencies created on Oswald. This quantity of documents indicates a significant level of interest in him. When viewed together, the number of intelligence offices that watched Oswald, and the degree of field-level action on him, take on a meaning not available when these events are viewed in isolation.
Stimulated by Oswald's decision to return to America, the activity among the low-level FBI, Navy, and State Department offices picked up in the first half of 1961. An act of Oswald's during this period would provide an additional stimulus to the interest in him when discovered by the intelligence community. That was his marriage to a Soviet woman, Marina Prusakova. Oswald's decision to bring a Soviet citizen back to America led to a new level of interest in the CIA, a subject to which we will return in Chapter Thirteen.
# Hiring the Mob for the Job
The Eisenhower administration's last key policy meeting on Cuba occurred in the White House on August 18, 1960. In that meeting, CIA director Dulles reported on the progress of organizing the Cuban exiles for the overthrow of Castro. President Eisenhower, present at the meeting, authorized the invasion planning to proceed. The minutes show that Dulles described the situation in this way:
There has been developed a unified Cuban opposition outside of the country. This has been successful up to a point but the problem is that there is no real leader and 11 [sic] of the individuals are prima donnas. This unified opposition is known as the FRD [Frente Revolucionario Democratico] and has six prominent members, five of them representing groups in Cuba with the greatest potential. In response to a question from the President, Mr. Dulles said that all the names were favorably known in Cuba; that there were no Batista-ites among them and 11 of the names had been published except a recent joiner, Cardona. Their theme is to restore the revolution to its original concepts, recognizing that it is impossible to change all of the revolutionary trends.
Dulles added, in response to a question from Eisenhower, that these Cuban leaders had all been identified with Castro since he assumed power. Dulles judged the CIA's work with these leaders since May as "very satisfactory."
The CIA training of the Cubans was discussed in some detail in this meeting. Dulles explained that while the FRD preferred being in the U.S., they had been persuaded to set up headquarters in Mexico. It was understood, Dulles added, "that there will be no ostensible military action directed from Mexico." Eisenhower wanted to know why Mexico had been chosen. Mexico's communications and travel facilities were part of the reason, but the fact was that some of the other Latin American countries would not agree to the FRD's presence on their soil. Guatemala, however, did not present such a problem, and was already being used for training Cuban exiles.
The minutes of the White House meeting indicate that the Joint Chiefs "saw no problem" with Bissell's request for American troops to train the Cubans. Dulles said that he hoped five hundred Cubans could be finished with their training by "the beginning of November," a prediction possibly meant to fit with Nixon's election schedule. Dulles then added this:
The FRD is acquiring some B-26s. The aircrews for these would be all Cubans. Mr. Bissell then said that it is possible that the initial para-military operations could be successful without any outside help. He pointed out that the first phase would be that of contacting local groups over a period of perhaps several months and in this period no air strikes would be undertaken. The plan would be to supply the local groups by air and also to infiltrate certain Cubans to stiffen local resistance.
If local resistance is unable to accomplish the mission and the operation should expand, then there may be a requirement for air action. The plan would be to take the Isle of Pines or another small island for an ostensible base for operations of the [less than 1 line not declassified] forces. It is hoped that this may not be needed but we must be prepared for it.
Bissell added that eleven groups that had potential had been identified in Cuba. "We are in the process of sending radio communications to them at this time," he said. The air attacks were a significant escalation of the U.S. role. At the meeting, no one asked what the military impact of such CIA-backed air attacks would have in Cuba, and what the cost would be if this were discovered by the press.
In a historic decision remarkably like the one Kennedy would make after his inauguration, Eisenhower gave the go-ahead to proceed in Cuba, with a key condition attached. Eisenhower's decision and his reasoning are preserved in this passage of the minutes:
The President said that he would go along so long as the Joint Chiefs, Defense, State and the CIA think we have a good chance of being successful. He wouldn't care much about this kind of cost; indeed, he said he would defend this kind of action against all comers and that if we could be sure of freeing the Cubans from this incubus [less than 1 line not declassified] might be a small price to pay. The President concluded the meeting by saying that he would like to urge caution with respect to the danger of making false moves, with the result of starting something before we were ready for it.
There can be no argument, then, that like Kennedy later, Eisenhower would approve the invasion plan only if the top U.S. military and civilian leaders would vouch for the plan's chance of success. And so, as of August 18, 1960, the Bay of Pigs plan was set firmly into motion.
The other unspeakable part of the plan—the assassination of Castro—had taken a turn since the abortive CIA plot to arrange an accident for Castro's brother in July. Nixon, having secured the Republican nomination for president, had sent his chief lieutenant, General Robert E. Cushman, into the working levels of the CIA that were concerned with Cuban operations. It is thus likely that Nixon knew some of the details about the CIA's cooperation with the Mafia. Regarding the summer-autumn 1960 Bissell-Edwards conversation about assassinating Castro, the Church Committee report states: "Edwards recalled that Bissell asked him to locate someone who could assassinate Castro. Bissell confirmed that he requested Edwards to find someone to assassinate Castro and believed that Edwards raised the idea of contacting members of a gambling syndicate in Cuba." As the Church Committee discovered, once again the Office of Security was at the center of operations, this time in the covert operations of Bissell's Cuban task force.
The Church Committee report states how the idea of using the mob to kill Castro grew from Edwards's idea of "contacting members of a gambling syndicate operating in Cuba." The report explains:
Edwards assigned the mission to the Chief of the Operational Support Division of the Office of Security. The Support Chief [O'Connell] recalled that Edwards had said that he and Bissell were looking for someone to "eliminate" or "assassinate" Castro. Edwards and the Support Chief decided to rely on Robert A. Maheu to recruit someone "tough enough" to handle the job.
At the time Maheu was a lawyer associated with billionaire Howard Hughes, and what followed was a story that mired the Agency in the swamp of organized crime. "Sometime in late August or early September 1960," the report noted, O'Connell "approached Maheu about the proposed operation." Former CIA Director William Colby testified to the Church Committee that CIA documents indicated that in August 1960, "Bissell asked Edwards to locate [an] asset to perform [a] gangster-type operation. Edwards contacted Maheu who contacted John Roselli on 9/14/60."
On the issue of who had thought of Roselli first, Maheu and O'Connell pointed the finger at each other. Maheu's recollection was that O'Connell asked him to contact the underworld figure to ask if he would take part in a plan to "dispose" of Castro. O'Connell's recollection is that it was Maheu that raised the idea of using Roselli. The CIA's 1967 Inspector General's Report struck this compromise: "Edwards and Maheu agreed that Maheu would approach Roselli as the representative of businessmen with interests in Cuba who saw the elimination of Castro as the first essential step to the recovery of their investments."
O'Connell testified that Maheu was told to offer money, probably $150,000, for Castro's assassination. What happened next found its way into a memo by FBI Director Hoover, addressed to Plans Director Bissell in the CIA—the person supervising the assassination plan. The October 18, 1960, Hoover memorandum citing "a source whose reliability has not been tested," reported this:
[D]uring recent conversations with several friends, [Sam] Giancana stated that Fidel Castro was to be done away with very shortly. When doubt was expressed regarding this statement, Giancana reportedly assured those present that Castro's assassination would occur in November. Moreover, he allegedly indicated that he had already met with the assassin-to-be on three occasions. Giancana claimed that everything had been perfected for the killing of Castro, and that the "assassin" had arranged with a girl, not further described, to drop a "pill" in some drink or food of Castro's. Memo, Hoover to DCI (Att: DDP, 10/18/60)
The Church Committee showed this Hoover memorandum, on August 22, 1975, to Sam Papich, who was the FBI liaison to the CIA in 1960. Papich said, "anyone in the Bureau would know the significance of the mention of Giancana." Papich did not further elaborate on this other than to say he would have discussed the matter with his FBI superior, Belmont, and with Edwards and Bannerman of the CIA's Office of Security.
Like all of the CIA-backed schemes to assassinate Castro, the mob's poison-pill plot failed. This was right about the time Oswald changed his mind about staying in Russia. As Oswald began his eighteen-month quest to return to America, January 1961 ushered in a new twist to the CIA's assassination plans for Castro: use of the Agency's ZR/RIFLE project for a program to give the CIA an "executive action" (assassination) capability. When pressed by the Church Committee, William Harvey stated that Bissell had been pushed along on the Castro assassination plan, possibly by the Eisenhower White House.
January 1961 also began in a deep freeze in U.S.-Cuban relations. Havana formally severed diplomatic relations with Washington on January 3. On January 20, 1961, John F. Kennedy was inaugurated as the thirty-fifth president of the United States, and tensions immediately erupted over general Cold War strategy and ongoing planning for U.S. military intervention in Laos and Cuba, both set to occur at roughly the same time. President Kennedy found himself in a situation not unlike President Clinton's first year: a young Democratic president, after more than a decade of Repubican rule, perceived as too naive to handle the Communists.
Kennedy let stand the Cuban plan that Eisenhower had put in motion. On April 4, 1961, a major pre-invasion meeting took place in a State Department conference room. Kennedy, with his closest advisers attending, gave the go-ahead. The ill-fated confrontation on the beaches of Cuba erupted on April 16-17, 1961. The American-trained and sponsored brigade of Cuban exiles were humiliated at Playa Giron, a tragically appropriate Cuban name.
# "The Dropping of Legal Proceedings Against Me"
As 1961 opened, Oswald was in Minsk trying to close the Russian chapter in his life. The KGB had the only copy of his December 1960 query about returning to the U.S. On January 4, the Soviet passport office in Minsk "summoned" Oswald and forced the issue. Oswald was asked point-blank if he still wanted to become a Soviet citizen, and this time his answer was no. Oswald asked instead that his identity card be extended for an additional year.
As discussed in Chapter Nine, on January 26, 1961, Marguerite Oswald, having failed for a year to find her son by writing letters to the U.S. government, traveled to the nation's capital and personally appeared at the State Department to demand that they do more to find him. When the CIA received its copy of the department's notes of her appearance, someone placed it in Oswald's 201 file and underlined parts of these two sentences in the notes:
She [Marguerite] also said that there was some possibility that her son had in fact gone to the Soviet Union as a US secret agent, and if this were true she wished the appropriate authorities to know that she was destitute and should receive some compensation.
Whether she believed this or not, this tactic did not work, and Marguerite returned to Texas without compensation or information about Oswald's location in Russia. The State Department did send a cable to the embassy in Moscow on the "welfare-whereabouts" of Oswald on February 1, 1961. The cable told the embassy about Marguerite's visit and her concerns for her son's "personal safety," and asked that this be passed to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As it turned out, this diplomatic maneuver would not be necessary.
Oswald finally tired of waiting for the American Embassy to respond to his first letter, and on February 5 he decided to write again. We have discussed the first sentence of this letter in Chapter Eleven. Here is the rest of the text:
I am writing again asking that you consider my request for the return of my American passport. I desire to return to the United States, that is if we could come to some agreement concerning the dropping of any legal proceedings against me. If so, then I would be free to ask the Russian authorities to allow me to leave. If I could show them my American passport, I am of the opinion they would give me an exit visa. They have at no time insisted that I take Russian citizenship. I am living here with non-permanent type papers for a foreigner. I cannot leave Minsk without permission, therefore I am writing rather than calling in person.
Oswald's insistence about an "agreement" to drop "legal proceedings" was obviously his way of asking that he not be prosecuted for espionage. It shows he fully understood the nature of the threats he had made during his October 1959 meeting with Snyder. "I hope that in recalling the responsibility I have to America," Oswald added, "that you remember yours in doing everything you can to help me since I am an American citizen. This sentence seems odd because it suggests that in returning to the U.S., Oswald considered his "responsibility" to America. Moreover, his use of the verb "recall" is strange: Had Oswald suddenly remembered his duty to America or had someone recalled him?
Snyder received Oswald's second letter on February 13, and responded to it on February 28. After acknowledging Oswald's request to go home and informing him that his December 1960 letter "does not appear to have been received at the Embassy," Snyder offered this advice:
Inasmuch as the question of your present American citizenship status can be finally determined only on the basis of a personal interview, we suggest that you plan to appear at the Embassy at your convenience. The consular section of the Embassy is open from 9:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. The Embassy was recently informed by the Department of State that it had received an inquiry from your mother in which she said that she had not heard from you since December, 1959 and was concerned about your whereabouts and welfare.
Getting Oswald to come to the embassy was obviously Snyder's objective, an idea repeated the same day in Snyder's cable to the State Department. In that cable Snyder repeated the entire text of Oswald's February 5 letter, and then added this:
The Embassy is writing to Oswald and suggesting that he come personally to the Embassy for an interview on which to base a decision concerning the status of his American citizenship. Oswald's reference in his letter to his being unable to leave Minsk without permission may indicate that he desires to come to the Embassy, in which an invitation from the Embassy may facilitate his traveling to Moscow.
Snyder said that he was prepared to give back Oswald his passport by mail, providing 1) that this was "a last resort"; 2) the State Department did not object; and 3) the embassy was "reasonably sure" that Oswald had not "committed an act" resulting in the loss of his American citizenship. Snyder also asked the department's position on "whether Oswald is subject to prosecution on any grounds should he enter the jurisdiction of the United States and, if so, whether there is any objection in communicating this to him."
Oswald received the embassy's February 28 letter by March 5, 1961, and wrote back that day. "I see no reason for any preliminary inquiries," he protested, "not to be put in the form of a questionnaire and sent to me." He said he found it "inconvenient to come to Moscow for the sole purpose of an interview." He asked that the embassy mail the questionnaire to him, as it is difficult for him to travel. Oswald's diary entry for this period says this: "I now live in a state of expectation about going back to the U.S. I confided with Zeger [sic] he supports my judgment but warns me not to tell any Russians about my desire to reture [sic]. I understade [sic] now why." Not long after Oswald began corresponding with the embassy, his monthly payments from the "Red Cross" were cut off; Snyder testified that the Soviet authorities had undoubtedly intercepted and read the correspondence between Oswald and the embassy and knew of his plans.
The State Department took its time telling Oswald's mother that they had found him. A copy of the letter they sent her is no longer extant, but her March 27, 1961, response was published in the Warren Commission's twenty-six volumes, and it indicates that around the 27th she received this "most welcome news" about her son's wish to come home.
As more letters between Oswald and the embassy followed, the position of the embassy and the State Department remained firm: Oswald had to come to Moscow. Then, on April 13 came the answer to Oswald's request for an "agreement" about dropping "legal proceedings" against him. The department refused to guarantee that Oswald would not be prosecuted. If Lee Harvey Oswald wanted to come back to America, he would have to take his chances.
# Lee and Marina
It was at this time that Oswald met his wife-to-be, Marina Nikolayevna Prusakova. Although accounts vary slightly on the exact date and circumstances, they evidently met at a dance in early March 1961. When they first met, Oswald thought Marina was a dental technician—she was a pharmacist, and Marina thought Oswald was from the Baltics ("because of his accent"). Marina later explained that she and his other Russian friends called Oswald "Alex" because "Lee" was recognized as a Chinese name. Marina says she had not heard of Oswald before she met him, in spite of the fact that he was the only American living in Minsk.
At the dance, Oswald noticed Marina and asked Yuriy Merazhinskiy, a friend of his and Marina's, to introduce him to her. This accomplished, Oswald asked her to dance. Oswald wrote in his diary that they liked each other right away and that he got her phone number before she left the dance. The two met again at another dance a week later, at which they danced together for most of the evening. This time Oswald walked her home, and the two made another date, which Oswald missed due to an illness that required hospitalization.
The hospital records indicate that Oswald was admitted to its ear, nose, and throat division, and stayed from March 30 until April 11, 1961, seemingly a long time to be in the hospital for an ear infection. Oswald called Marina from the hospital and asked her to visit him there, which she did nearly every day until his release. Marina even wore her uniform in order to see him on Sundays—outside of the regular visiting hours. The first time she did this was on Easter Sunday, when she brought Oswald an Easter egg.
During one of Marina's visits to the hospital, he proposed that they become engaged, which she agreed to consider, and he continued to ask until she accepted his proposal on April 15. Marina lived with her aunt and uncle, who knew Oswald was an American and did not disapprove of his many visits to their apartment. On April 20, 1961, Oswald and Marina applied to get married. It normally took about a week for Soviet citizens to get permission to marry foreigners. In this case it took ten days, and they were married on April 30 in Minsk.
For her part, Marina later testified that she clearly had not married Oswald as a way of getting to the U.S. because it was her understanding that he could not return. Oswald wrote in his diary that he married Marina in order to hurt Ella German, the girl who had refused his marriage proposals, but that in the end, "I find myself in love with Marina." The May 1 entry in Oswald's diary includes this passage:
The transition of changing full love from Ella to Marina was very painful esp. as I saw Ella almost every day at the factory but as the days & weeks went by I adjusted more and more [to] my wife mentally * * * She is madly in love with me from the very start. Boat rides on Lake walks through the park evening at home or at Aunt Valia's place mark May.
Oswald's attachment to Marina grew quickly. A diary entry for June reads "A continuence of May, except that; we draw closer and closer, and I think very little now of Ella."
Oswald had been holding out on Marina. He had decided, probably in late 1960, and certainly no later than January 1961, to return to America, but he did not tell Marina. It was not until sometime in June that Oswald told Marina that he wanted to return home. An entry in his diary says that she was "startled" when he told her "in the last days" of June. On May 16, 1961, Oswald sent notification to the U.S. Embassy (which it received on May 25) of his marriage to Marina. He explained that they both intended to go to the United States. During June, the Oswalds made inquiries with the appropriate Soviet authorities about obtaining the proper exit visas. On June 1, 1961, Oswald wrote to his mother about his marriage "last month." Oswald's first daughter, June, was conceived in May 1961.
# Labyrinth II: Navy Intelligence and the FBI
When last we entered the labyrinth of the FBI and CIA files on Oswald, the FBI was bifurcating its Oswald material at the Bureau and in Dallas into two compartments at each locations. The material collected under the caption "Funds Transmitted to Russia" went into the 100 file at the Bureau and into the 105 file at Dallas; the rest of the Oswald material went into the 105 file at the Bureau and into the 100 file at Dallas. It is important to keep this detail in mind because this pattern, begun in 1960, persisted into 1961. With respect to his CIA files, 1960 witnessed the incremental involvement of the Soviet Russia Division, a trend that continued into 1961.
Stimulated by Oswald's decision to come home, his paper trail during the first half of 1961 takes us down several paths, some familiar and some new. A channel opened between the Navy Intelligence field office at Algiers, Louisiana (near New Orleans), and the Dallas FBI field office. Lateral activity picked up between the FBI field offices in Dallas and New Orleans, and after an internal struggle, the Washington, D.C., FBI field office also got involved. These connections produced more intelligence on Oswald, culminating in important FBI and CIA actions in the summer of 1961, events we will discuss in the next chapter.
The FBI's investigation of Oswald in 1959 and early 1960 had "involved the development of background information" concerning him, "and the taking of appropriate steps to insure our being advised of his return" the Bureau told the Warren Commission. "Our basic interest," the FBI explained, "was to correlate information concerning him and to evaluate him as a security risk in the event he returned, in view of the possibility of his recruitment by the Soviet intelligence services." Given this, Special Agent Kenneth J. Haser appeared overly eager when he tried to open a new file on Oswald at the Washington, D.C. field office (WFO) of the FBI in August 1960.
On August 9, Haser wrote a memorandum to the special agent in charge (SAC) of the FBI WFO on the subject of "Lee Harvey Oswald, Internal Security-Russia." In the memo, Haser said he had gone over to the State Department passport office that day, where he had contacted Mrs. Verde Buckler, who gave him Oswald's passport file "for appropriate review." The Bureau had asked the State Department to provide "any current information available" on Oswald, Haser said, and "it is, therefore, recommended that a case be opened for the purpose of furnishing the Bureau and office of origin a summary of information in the passport file."
The file number of the Haser memo was written by hand: "100-16597 SubL - 676 Newspaper Clipping." The person writing it was probably named Carson and probably filed this memo at the Bureau. Carson crossed out the "OO - Dallas" indicator below the subject line. In the CIA "OO" was a symbol for the Contacts Division, but in the FBI "OO" was an acronym for "Office of Origin," meaning the office responsible for a particular case. On September 12, 1960, Special Agent Dana Carson, following up on Haser's August 9 memorandum on Oswald, wrote a new memorandum to the special agent in charge of the Washington, D.C., field office. Someone, probably Carson, had gone back over to the State Department passport office on September 9 and looked at Oswald's file again.
Carson's memo threw cold water on Haser's hopes of opening a file for a State Department conduit to the FBI via his desk. Carson, starting from the defection, went down the list of pertinent memos and cables and then remarked: "From a review of this file, it would appear that the Bureau has been furnished all available information by State." Carson recommended that WFO take no further action. Carson carried the day, but Haser would soon be back again asking to open a case file. Newspaper accounts and White House questions about American servicemen defecting to the Soviet Union breathed new life into FBI activity on Oswald. What happened inside the FBI became inextricably linked with the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI).
On November 10, 1960, a week after the CIA answered a State Department request on a list of these defectors, including Oswald, someone in the Office of Naval Intelligence signed out the May 1960 FBI report by Fain on "Funds Transmitted to Residents of Russia." On the routing slip sending the report, a person whose initials look like "WB" commented on the previous transmittal of the Fain report to the Defense Intelligence Officer (DIO), Ninth Naval District (9ND). It is worth adding that the Marine Corps commandant had requested that the 9ND commander "be apprised of the intelligence documentation on Oswald on a priority basis."
When "WB" of 921E2 (the Programs section of the Counterintelligence Branch) signed out the Fain report on November 10, however, he had a different Naval District (ND)—the Eighth—in mind. Throughout 1960, the 9ND DIO had been involved in the Navy's handling of the Oswald case to provide support to the commander of the Marine Air Reserve Training Command, U.S. Naval Air Station, Glenview, Illinois, who processed Oswald's Undesirable Discharge. The 8ND District Intelligence Office was a long way away—in Building 255 of U.S. Naval Station, New Orleans, Louisiana. 8ND intelligence records were also kept at U.S. Naval Station, Algiers, Louisiana, which was probably also the location for one of the CIA's covert training bases near New Orleans, specifically the base referred to within the CIA as the "Old Algiers Ammo Dump." On November 15, 1960, five days after "WB" checked out the Fain report, someone from that same ONI office, 921E2, sent a confidential letter to the "Officer in Charge, District Intelligence Office, Eight Naval District."
ONI also sent a copy of the November 15, 921E2 letter to the 9ND, to whom these instructions in the last paragraph applied: "By copy of this letter, the District Intelligence Office of the Ninth Naval District is requested to forward the intelligence documentation concerning Oswald to the District Intelligence Office, Eighth Naval District." This information was forwarded by DIO 9ND two weeks later, comprising fourteen documents "which represent subject's intelligence file" to DIO 8ND on November 30, 1960. As of that date, about one week before the CIA opened its 201 file on Oswald, the ONI changed the Navy field intelligence unit watching the case from Glenview, Illinois, to Algiers, Louisiana.
The officer in charge of the DIO 8ND was Navy captain F.O.C. Fletcher, and on January 11, 1961, he sent a letter to the Dallas field office of the FBI, opening up a potentially important lateral interagency channel on Oswald. The Dallas FBI field office copy of this letter has a handwritten number after Oswald's name: 105-976—the Dallas Oswald file which ensued from Fain's "Funds Transmitted to Residents of Russia" report of May 1960. This handwritten file number also included the extension "-1, p. 17," meaning page 17 of document number one in that file. This is strange because Fain's report, which was supposedly document number one, was just seven pages long. On the bottom of the letter is Fain's writing, and a new Dallas file number for Oswald: 100-10461. This 8ND letter to the Dallas FBI field office became the first document in Oswald's Dallas 100 file.
In the letter Fletcher reported that Oswald, who had been a member of the U.S. Marine Corps Reserve, had been given an undesirable discharge on August 17, 1960. Fletcher also pointed out that Oswald's last known home of record (as of July 20, 1959) was 3124 West 5th Street, Fort Worth, Texas. An information copy was sent to the director of Naval Intelligence (DNI), OP921 section D, where it was received on January 16, 1961, and to 921E (counterintelligence) on January 17.
On February 27, 1961, FBI director Hoover sent a letter to the State Department Office of Security about Oswald, announcing a dead end in its search for an Oswald impostor in Europe. There was no impostor there, as the FBI's sources in Switzerland found out for themselves: no one calling himself Oswald had shown up at the Albert Schweitzer College. The February 27 Hoover letter mentioned Oswald's August 17, 1960, undesirable discharge from the Marines, his old Fort Worth address, and asked "that any additional information contained in the files of the Department of State regarding subject be furnished to this Bureau."
On February 28, 1961, the special agent in charge at FBI-Dallas wrote a memorandum to the special agent in charge at FBI-New Orleans on the subject of Lee Harvey Oswald, to follow up on the January 11 DIO 8ND letter from New Orleans. Fain's memo discussed the largely unproductive checks he had made since Captain Fletcher's January 11 letter which had mentioned Oswald's old Fort Worth address. A February 2, 1960, check with the Retail Merchants Association netted only Marguerite C. Oswald's 1957 address at 3830 West Sixth Street, Fort Worth, along with the address of Oswald's brother, Robert, at 7300 Davenport Street, Fort Worth. There was "no record" on Oswald. A February 25 check with "Dallas Confidential Informants" showed only that Oswald had never been known to be a member of the Communist Party at Fort Worth.
Fain then asked the New Orleans FBI office to review the files of 8ND District Intelligence Office of the Eighth Naval District, "for background information available on subject [Oswald] and any information available concerning CP [Communist Party] activities and attempted defection to Russia, and forward same to Dallas Office." It is worth noting that while adding this as the third document in Oswald's new Dallas file, 100-10461, Fain still filed a copy of his memo in the old Dallas 105-976.
Meanwhile, on March 2, 1961, Emery J. Adams of the State Security Office (SY/E) requested several offices to "advise if the FBI is receiving information about Harvey [Oswald] on a continuing basis. If not, please furnish this Office with the information which has not been provided the FBI so that it may be forwarded to them." Presumably, Adams meant that these offices should look at the attached February 27, 1961, FBI memo and then determine if anything was missing. On the bottom of this document is a handwritten note of March 20 from the Soviet Desk which advised that no information had been sent to date, but added, "all future [information] will be forwarded to SY [Security Office] for transmittal."
On March 31, 1961, Edward J. Hickey sent a memorandum to John T. White, both of the State Department's passport office. This memo addressed the question of giving back Oswald his passport, and Hickey's point was that the mails could not be trusted. He said:
In view of the fact that this file contains information first, which indicates that mail from the mother of this boy is not being delivered to him and second, that it has been stated that there is an impostor using Oswald's identification data and that no doubt the Soviets would love to get hold of his valid passport, it is my opinion that the passport should be delivered to him only on a personal basis and after the Embassy is assured, to its complete satisfaction, that he is returning to the United States.
No one had definitely said there was an Oswald impostor—it had merely been suggested because of the confusion surrounding Oswald's application to the Albert Schweitzer College in Switzerland. By the time of Hickey's memo, the impostor issue was dead. Very much alive were the surreptitious readers of Oswald's mail. "It's hard for me to know whether you get all my letters," Oswald wrote to his brother later that year, "they have a lot of censorship here." The KGB was not the only clandestine reader of Oswald's mail. As we will shortly see, the CIA was too.
On April 13, 1961, the State Department sent a strongly worded set of instructions to the embassy in Moscow on how to deal with Oswald. The instructions boiled down to three things: Thoroughly interrogate Oswald, make no promises about legal proceedings, and report all developments promptly to Washington. With respect to Oswald's demand that he receive guarantees that all "legal proceedings" be dropped, the State Department had this to say:
The Department is not in a position to advise Mr. Oswald whether upon his desired return to the United States he may be amenable to prosecution for any possible offenses committed in violation of the laws of the United States [or] of the laws of any of its States. The developments in the case of Mr. Oswald should be promptly reported. In particular, a report of his travel data should be submitted when the Embassy receives confirmation of his travel plans.
The seriousness of this rebuff was mitigated somewhat by the afterthought at the end of the cable. "It may be added that Mrs. Marguerite Oswald has been informed of the address given by Mr. Oswald," the State Department said. On the other hand, there was a by-now-familiar handwritten inscription on the bottom right-hand corner of the page: "U.S. Defector."
The January 11 letter from the 8th Naval District to Dallas FBI office, Hoover's February 27 request to the State Department, and new activity between the State Department and the Moscow Embassy concerning Oswald's decision to return to America were new ammunition for FBI Special Agent Haser, of the Washington, D.C. field office. His plan to open a WFO case on Oswald had been shot down the previous September by his colleague, Special Agent Carson. On April 20, 1961, Haser wrote a new memorandum to the WFO SAC, reporting his visit that day to the State Department passport office:
This passport file of captioned subject was made available to the writer on this date by Mr. Henry Kupiec, Foreign Adjudications Division, Passport Office, Department of State, inasmuch as the file contains information subsequent to the date on which the file was last reviewed by WFO. It appears that the subject is still in the Soviet Union.
It is, therefore, recommended that this case be reopened to bring up to date a review of subject's file for notification to the Bureau and interested offices. No flimsy [a sheet that enables mimeograph copies of a document to be made] is required.
Within a month, Haser's recommendation was put into effect, and a channel of Oswald information between WFO and the Dallas FBI field office opened.
Meanwhile, the Dallas FBI request that the New Orleans FBI office read 8ND Navy records had borne fruit. "I had, as a result of a request of the Dallas office," New Orleans FBI Special Agent John L. Quigley recalled, "checked the Office of Naval Intelligence records at the U.S. Naval Station at Algiers." Quigley had reviewed Oswald's file at Algiers on April 18, and the results were forwarded to the Dallas FBI office on April 27, 1961. On that date the special agent in charge of the New Orleans FBI office responded formally with a memorandum to the SAC in Dallas detailing SA Quigley's review of the "ONI 8th Naval District Records United States Naval Station, Algiers, Louisiana, on April 18, 1961."
The Oswald Navy file at Algiers was comprehensive, covering most of the salient points of his history since his defection. For example, it included the January 27, 1960, report on Oswald's brother, John Edward Pic by Special Agent John T. Cox of the Air Force's Office of Special Investigations (OSI). The New Orleans FBI memorandum, probably written by Special Agent John L. Quigley, erroneously referred to Cox's OSI report as an "ONI" report. Otherwise, Quigley was meticulous, noting such tiny details as a "Control Number 20261"—apparently assigned by ONI—for the first embassy cable from Moscow (#1304) which reported Oswald's defection and his threat to give up radar secrets.
"In reviewing this file," SA Quigley said, "it appears that much of the above material has been furnished to ONI 8th Naval District by ONI 9th Naval District." He ended the memo with a suggestion:
Since New Orleans does not have any background information with regards to this investigation, nor is aware of what investigation is contemplated, no leads are being set forth in this communication, other than it is suggested that Dallas and Fort Worth may desire to review ONI's files at Carswell Air Force Base concerning subject.
Quigley's review of the ONI's 8th Naval District file considerably broadened the database on Oswald at both the Dallas and New Orleans FBI offices. For example, these field offices now had the October 26, 1959, ONI memorandum on Robert Edward Webster who, Quigley said, "appears to have defected to the Russians at about the same time as Oswald." The 1959 Webster memo was assigned ONI "Control Number 1178."
On April 28, 1961, SAC Dallas sent a memorandum to SAC New Orleans relaying the information acquired since the previous Dallas memorandum on February 28. This new information came from a phone call to Special Agent Fain made by Oswald's mother. Marguerite told Fain her son wanted to come home.
On 4/10/61 [10 April], Mrs. Marguerite C. Oswald, aka Mrs. Edward Lee Oswald, telephonically contacted SA John W. Fain at the Fort Worth RA and stated that she is currently residing at 1612 Hurley Street, Fort Worth. She advised that she had returned to Fort Worth about the first of April 1961 to live . . . Mrs. Oswald also volunteered the information that she made a trip to Washington, D.C., during January 1961, for the purpose of contacting the Secretary of State's office for information concerning her son, Lee Harvey Oswald. . . . She stated that during the following month or after a lapse of about four weeks, she had learned that subject [Oswald] was at Minsk, Russia.
SAC Dallas noted that when Fain had interviewed Marguerite on April 28, 1960, she had given him a photograph of Oswald with the description: "Race: White; Sex: Male; Age: 20; Birth data: 10/18/39, New Orleans, Louisiana; Height: 5'10"; Weight: 165 lbs.; Eyes: Blue; Hair: Light brown, wavy." SAC Dallas asked SAC New Orleans "to expedite [the] investigation so that this matter can be brought to a successful conclusion." In New Orleans, Special Agent Quigley filed this memo as the third in Oswald's file there: 100-16601.
The FBI had been waiting for the day that Oswald might try to return. On May 23, 1961, the special agent in charge of the FBI Washington field office sent a memorandum to the director of the FBI, summarizing the contacts made by the Oswalds (Marguerite and Lee Harvey) to government agencies since January 1961. Special Agent Vincent P. Dunn had visited the State Department passport office on May 9, where he was able to read various memoranda and cables about Marguerite's January visit, Oswald's decision to come home, and his wish "to come to some agreement concerning the dropping of any legal proceedings against me."
The SAC WFO said he was passing his memorandum to "the Dallas Division for information as they are the division covering the subject's permanent residence." When the memo arrived at the Bureau, someone with the initials F.L.J. wrote this on the right margin: "put cc in 100-353496." That was the special file at headquarters into which Fain's 1960 handiwork on Oswald had been placed.
On May 25, 1961, Emery J. Adams of the State Department's Office of Security replied to Hoover's February 27 request for information on Lee Harvey Oswald. The State Department relayed information provided by its passport office regarding the status of his passport and his contact with the American Embassy at Moscow. Adams reported this:
The Passport Office (PPT) of the Department has advised that Mr. Oswald has been in communication with the American Embassy at Moscow, and, at this time, there is no information that he has renounced his nationality of the United States. If Mr. Oswald has not expatriated himself in any way, and when he makes satisfactory arrangements to depart from the USSR, the Embassy is prepared to furnish him with the necessary passport facilities for travel to the United States. PPT further advises that the Subject's passport file is being periodically reviewed by a representative of your Bureau.
The FBI and several of its field offices were now engaged in collecting what they could on Oswald, and preparing for his return home. At this point, the paper trail on Oswald leads us back into the CIA, to which we must now turn our attention.
The details are an intelligence geography lesson. It provides the map that guides us through an intersection which is a major turning point in our story.
# CHAPTER THIRTEEN
# "Operational Intelligence Interest"
Along the dimly lit, mute paths that run through Oswald's CIA files we occasionally encounter surprises, like the flat statement by the Chief of SR/6, the "Soviet Realities" branch in the Soviet Russia Division, that "we showed operational intelligence interest" in Oswald. This claim stands against the official position whereby the Agency denies ever having used Oswald for any reason. In addition to the possibility, discussed in Chapter Eleven, of an Oswald dangle in the Soviet Union, we can conclude—based on other circumstances explored in Chapters Eighteen and Nineteen—that the Agency has not been forthcoming about the information it possessed on Oswald before the assassination.
By 1961 there were already two reasons for the Agency's interest in Oswald: his decision to marry a Soviet citizen and his cumulative experience in the Soviet Union. Either of these facts alone was enough to have guaranteed an operational interest in Oswald. We will revisit the CIA's sensitive mail-intercept program and the way it was used on Oswald in 1961, for it provides tantalizing clues on the issue of counterintelligence interest in Oswald.
We will cover Oswald's efforts to return to the U.S., and update developments in the Cuban exile world, through the vehicle of Gerry Hemming, a CIA informant, back in the U.S. from a stint in Castro's army, fully debriefed by the CIA, who begins infiltrating every anti-Castro exile group he can find.
# Labyrinth III: Hunter and Project
"Hunter is the CIA's sensitive project involving the review of mail," said a March 10, 1961, FBI memorandum written by D. E. Moore, and the "CIA makes available to us results of their analysis to this project." Moore's memo reported important news from a meeting the day before with CIA's Counterintelligence Chief, James Angleton, concerning "illegal espionage activities":
. . . We were advised that CIA has now established a laboratory in New York in connection with this project which can examine correspondence for secret writing, micro dots and possibly codes. He said the laboratory is fully equipped and they would be glad to make its facilities available to us if at any time we desire an examination of this nature to be made in NYC and time was of the essence and would not permit the material to be brought to our Laboratory in Washington, D. C. We expressed our appreciation for the offer and said that in the event we desired to utilize their laboratory, we would contact them.
Beneath this Hoover inscribed this happy comment: "Another inroad!" Beneath his writing, still another note said optimistically that "Hunter material will increase about 20% since NY lab now established. 4/21/61."
"Hunter" was the FBI term for the CIA's HT/LINGUAL project which, as discussed in Chapter Two, was used to monitor Lee Harvey Oswald. The expansion of the HT/LINGUAL program in April 1961 came as the FBI entered a new active phase of intelligence gathering on Oswald triggered by his decision to return to America. The CIA has officially maintained that among the millions of letters it intercepted, only one directly pertained to Oswald. That letter was written by his mother in Fort Worth on July 6 and opened by the CIA in New York on July 8, 1961.
The timing was perfect: On July 3 the FBI's Dallas field office had just finished sending out the largest report it had ever compiled on Oswald. The main body of the report was ten pages, written by Special Agent Fain. According to the CIA's public statements, the secret opening of Marguerite's letter to Oswald five days later was curiously overlooked. In 1975 the Agency said the letter was "dated 8 July 1961 but discovered only on review triggered by press publicity following the Oswalds' return to the U.S. in June 1962." On the surface, this story seems ridiculous: The only Oswald letter the CIA ever intercepted had been lost for a year and found after a newspaper drew attention to Oswald's return.
"Since Oswald was known to have sent or received more than 50 communications during his stay in the Soviet Union," the House Select Committee on Assassinations said in its 1978 report, "the committee also questioned why the Agency ostensibly had just one letter in its possession directly related to Oswald." The Agency's response to the committee's question and use of the word "ostensibly" was defensive. "HT/LINGUAL only operated 4 days a week," was the reply, "even then, proceeded on a sampling basis." We will troll the CIA's files shortly for evidence contrary to this story of the one-letter LINGUAL file on Oswald. First, however, we will inspect the documents connected to the letter the CIA says it "discovered" a year after opening it, and then examine the documents and reports surrounding the letter in Oswald's secret files.
The word "discovered" in the Agency's statement was misleading. "Rediscovered" would have been more appropriate. A June 22, 1962, CIA memo mentioning Washington Post coverage of Oswald's return to the U.S. said this: "A search of the Project [HT/ LINGUAL] files revealed that the attached subject item was sent to subject by his mother on 8 July 1961." This memo does not say, let alone prove, that Marguerite's letter was discovered for the first time in June 1962. In view of the fact that the person using the steam iron that opened her letter was working for the CIA, their story justifiably prompts this joke: How many CIA agents does it take to read a letter? The answer: That depends on their security clearances.
There has been a startling new development in the story of Marguerite's letter since the new release of JFK documents in 1993 to 1994. A better copy of a mail intercept index card on Oswald offers, for the first time, a clear view of a handwritten note heretofore too faded to read. The note "Delete 15/3/60" indicates that Oswald had been deleted from HT/LINGUAL coverage on March 15, 1960. This means Oswald's name was not on the Watch List when the CIA opened Marguerite's letter to him. Worse still, CI/SIG's Ann Egerter put Oswald's name back on the list on August 7, 1961. Thus, the CIA opened Oswald's mail when he was not on the list and then couldn't find the letter after putting him back on the list.
More than Marguerite's letter was missing from Oswald's CIA files. On May 25, the embassy had received a letter mailed in Minsk about ten days before, in which Oswald asked for assurances that he would not be prosecuted and divulged a new dimension to his travel plans. On May 26, Snyder sent a dispatch to the State Department containing this description of the events:
The Embassy received on May 25, 1961, an undated letter from Lee Harvey Oswald postmarked Minsk, May 16, 1961, in which he states in part that he is asking "full guarantees that I shall not, under any circumstances, he persecuted for any act pertaining to this case" should he return to the United States, that if this "condition" cannot be met he will "endeavor to use relatives in the United States to see about getting something done in Washington." According to the letter, Oswald is married to a Russian woman who would want to accompany him to the United States.
The embassy sent this dispatch, Number 806, via "air pouch" to the State Department where, on June 3, the distribution center sent fifteen copies to the CIA. On a CIA copy of this dispatch is a somewhat indistinct list of fifteen organizational elements, including parts of TSD (Technical Services Division), OO/C (Domestic Contacts Division), ORR (Office of Research in the Intelligence Directorate) and SR (Soviet Russia) division, all clearly CIA offices, and constituting a peculiar combination which might be associated with the mail intercept program. For example, ORR regularly received HT/LINGUAL reports, and the laboratory at the mail intercept site was run by TSD. Whether these observations are correct or not, this crude hand-drawn distribution list was unlike any that appears in all of the CIA cover sheets on Oswald. Missing from this list were any of the counterintelligence sections normally included on Oswald documents, such as CI/STAFF, CI/OPS, and CI/SIG.
The 610a CIA routing and record sheet attached to the publicly released copy of Moscow Embassy dispatch 806 only further adds to this mystery: It is from November 1961, five months after the fact. This routing sheet probably does not reflect the original internal CIA distribution for this Foreign Service dispatch. Was there something special about it? Indeed there was: It was the first document the CIA received that revealed that Oswald was planning to bring a Soviet citizen home as his wife.
A check of the calendar suggests that the circulation of dispatch 806—with its original routing sheet—was in progress at the precise time the Agency opened but did not "discover" the letter to Oswald. Where was dispatch 806 inside the CIA at this time? Can we determine who might have seen it? The answer is yes. It probably circulated among the same CIA offices that examined the next Oswald document received at the CIA: The July 3, 1961, Fain report on Oswald. We have the original cover sheet for the Fain report, and it shows that the Fain report went to nine offices in the Soviet Russia Division and four offices in counterintelligence, including Ann Egerter in CI/SIG. The Fain report circulated among these fourteen offices between July 24 and August 14. Dispatch 806 began its rounds—probably to these same fourteen offices—on or about June 3, and on July 8, Marguerite's letter was steamed open at LaGuardia Airport in New York City.
Was there an important event which might have been connected to or have caused the July 8 secret opening of Marguerite's letter? Again, the answer is yes. An obvious place to look for clues is the Soviet Union, where, indeed, a portentous sequence of events began on July 8. Oswald suddenly surfaced in Moscow on July 8 and phoned Marina in Minsk, instructing her to proceed immediately to Moscow. More important, on that date Oswald, for the first time since his defection in 1959, entered the U.S. Embassy. Inside he used the telephone.
Impatient because he had not heard anything since March about the return of his passport, Oswald had taken decisive action by traveling to Moscow and showing up without warning at the American Embassy. The offices were closed, prompting Oswald's use of the house telephone to reach Snyder. The two men met, talked briefly, and agreed to meet the following Monday. By this time the Oswald "Banjo" (a term the CIA used for pieces of mail they opened) was back in its envelope and on its way to Russia.
# The Meaning of Freedom
When Oswald first visited the embassy on a Saturday in 1959, he declined Snyder's invitation to return the following Monday. Oswald did things differently this time. On July 10, he and Snyder initiated the application for return to America while Marina waited outside. Snyder, meanwhile, asked Oswald questions about the details of his life in Russia and asked for his Soviet papers.
The American consul had to make a far-reaching determination: Had Oswald expatriated himself? Had he become a Soviet citizen? This is Snyder's account of the discussion right after it happened:
Oswald stated that he was not a citizen of the Soviet Union and had never formally applied for citizenship, that he had never taken an oath of allegiance to the Soviet Union, and that he was not a member of the factory trade union organization. He said that he had never given Soviet officials any confidential information that he had learned in the Marines, had never been asked to give such information, and "doubted" that he would have done so had he been asked.
The Warren Commission later rightly concluded that some of Oswald's statements during the interview were "undoubtedly false." The Warren Report pointed out that Oswald "had almost certainly applied for citizenship in the Soviet Union," and had been disappointed when he was turned down. "He possessed a membership card in the union organization," the report noted, and then declared that Oswald's "assertion to Snyder that he had never been questioned by Soviet authorities concerning his life in the United States is simply unbelievable."
Oswald's greatest concern was whether he would be prosecuted and imprisoned after returning to the U.S., and he engaged Snyder openly about it. The most Snyder was willing to say was that although he could make no promises, he did not know of any grounds on which Oswald would be prosecuted. Unlike his 1959 meeting with Snyder, Oswald did not get angry. This time he groveled before Snyder with uncharacteristic humility, pleading that he had "learned a hard lesson a hard way" and acquired "a new appreciation of the United States and the meaning of freedom." Oswald filled out his passport renewal form as an American national. The "bravado and arrogance" of his 1959 defection performance were ancient history. Oswald, Snyder testified to the Warren Commission, "seemed to have matured."
Time was short: Oswald's passport was due to expire on September 10, 1961, and it appeared unlikely the Soviets would issue his exit papers before then. On the basis of his "written and oral statements," Snyder concluded that Oswald had not expatriated himself, and therefore gave him back his passport—stamped valid only for travel to the United States. Marina joined Oswald in the embassy on the following day, July 11, to initiate the paperwork for her immigration to the United States. Both Oswalds had a routine interview with McVickar, Snyder's assistant (who had also been present during Oswald's defection in 1959). Oswald signed Marina's visa application, and said he had saved about two hundred rubles for the return trip and that they would try to save some more.
On July 11, 1961, cables between the American Embassy in Moscow and the State Department in Washington crossed on their respective journeys. On the same day, both sent cables addressing the issue of Oswald's citizenship. The State Department was responding to the embassy's earlier cables on this and other passport and immigration issues, and the department now authorized the embassy to use its own discretion within the narrow realm of whether Oswald was "entitled to the protection of the United States should an emergency situation arise." If there was no emergency, the embassy was expected to ask Washington before making a final decision on granting Oswald documentation of United States citizenship. The embassy cable the same day reiterated its view that Oswald had not committed any expatriating acts, and that his American passport should be returned so that he could begin the application process for a Soviet exit visa. The embassy also asked the department to "approve or disapprove" Oswald's renewal application.
On July 14, Lee and Marina returned to Minsk, and Oswald chose that day to reopen contact with his brother Robert, telling him he had his passport back and describing what a "test" he had endured to get it. "I could write a book," Oswald said, "about how many feelings have come and gone since that day." The letter was unusually affectionate toward his family. "The letter's tone of firm purpose to return to the United States in the face of heavy odds," the Warren Commission observed, "reflected Oswald's attitude thereafter." In spite of these odds, Lee and Marina began the procedures with local authorities to acquire permission to leave the Soviet Union.
On July 15, 1961, Oswald reported their progress to the embassy, and offered to keep them informed "as to the overall picture." Marina was having difficulties at work because of her decision to go to the United States with her husband, Oswald said, but added that such "tactics" were "quite useless" and that Marina had "stood up well, without getting into trouble." For August 21 through September 1, Oswald's diary has this entry: "I make repeated trips to the passport & visa office, also to Ministry of For. Affairs in Minsk, also Min. of Internal Affairs, all of which have a say in the granting of a visa. I extracted promises of quick attention to us. For September through October 18, Oswald wrote, "No word from Min. ('They'll call us.')."
For a time, events seemed to be moving more quickly than they actually were. On July 17, Oswald guaranteed to support Marina if she was allowed to enter the U.S., and the next day Marina filled out Oswald's application for a Soviet exit permit. On July 24, the embassy wrote to Oswald asking him to send copies of his marriage certificate, which he managed to send, along with Marina's birth certificate, to the embassy in August. By August 8 Oswald was already planning the trip itself. He wrote to the embassy to ask if they could travel by train through Poland and then catch a military hop from Berlin. On August 21, Marina put in a request for her own Soviet exit visa, and had it and her Soviet passport in hand by December 1, 1961.
Oswald's decision to bring Marina to America presented a different sort of problem for the CIA. One of the Soviet Russia Division elements in SR/6, the section handling biographic research work—SR/6/BIO—had been included in the internal routing of the July 3 Fain report. The chief of SR/6 at the time, known only by the initials T.B.C., described the problem in this way:
I was becoming increasingly interested in watching develop a pattern that we had discovered in the course of our bio and research work in [SR/]6: the number of Soviet women marrying foreigners, being permitted to leave the USSR, then eventually divorcing their spouses and settling down abroad without returning "home." The [redacted] case was among the first of these, and we eventually turned up something like two dozen similar cases. We established links between these women and the KGB. [redacted] became interested in the developing trend we had come across. It was partly out of curiosity to learn if Oswald's wife would actually accompany him to our country, partly out of interest in Oswald's own experiences in the USSR, that we showed operational intelligence interest in the Harvey [Oswald] story [emphasis added].
"Per your request for any info on Oswald," said a September 28, 1961, internal CIA memo, "pls[please] note: Marina . . . has apparently applied for a visa to the U.S., as reflected in Dept. of State, Visa Office notice received in CIA, which is dated 9/21/61." The memo added that this notation "is being placed in Oswald['s] 201."
On October 4, 1961, Oswald wrote to the embassy asking for help in securing Soviet exit visas, and on October 9 Marina's petition to the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service was filed. On October 13, the embassy sent dispatch number 317 to the State Department, stating that "Oswald is having difficulty in obtaining exit visas for himself and his wife, and they are subject to increasing harassment in Minsk." The records office noted on the attached CIA routing sheet that this dispatch "has not been integrated into the CS [clandestine services] Record System." The only person who signed for it outside of the records office was CI/SIG's Ann Egerter. On December 1, 1961, the Soviets notified the embassy that Marina had her Russian passport and exit visa, which would be good until December 1, 1962. Marina said she was surprised to get an exit visa. So was U.S. Ambassador Thompson in Moscow. He testified to the Warren Commission that it was "unusual" for Marina to have been given her exit visa so quickly.
It was also unusual, as the HSCA noted, that out of all the mail to and from Oswald in Russia, the CIA intercepted just one letter. From a 1962—1963 LINGUAL "Progress Report" dated April 1964, located in an obscure box of CIA records in the National Archives, however, comes this suggestive comment:
The [HT/LINGUAL] Project has produced many items over the years concerning defectors and repatriates from the United States now living in the USSR. Among these have been numerous redefectors who have returned to the United States, the most interesting among whom, during the past year, has been Lee Harvey Oswald. The Project's files contain several items to and from Oswald and his wife, and these were the source of the information that Oswald's pseudonym was used in the USSR as well as when he ordered the murder weapon from the gun store in Chicago.
This was written by John Mertz, who should have known what was most interesting in Oswald's HT/LINGUAL file because he was the chief of the program at the time. His comment about "several" letters to and from Oswald and Marina leaves open the possibility that the Agency saw more of Oswald's mail than it has publicly acknowledged. We will return to the pseudonym and the rifle mail order later. Now, however, we return to the story of Gerry Patrick Hemming.
# Hemming II: 1961
"After a period of weeks with no orders from the CIA," Hemming later wrote of his time in Los Angeles after his debriefing sessions of October 1960, "I decided to drop my cover and proceed to the Miami area to aid former Cuban associates that needed instructors for their personnel." Hemming had become impatient for more action, and Miami was where the Cuban action was. Naturally, it was also the location of the CIA's JMWAVE station, from which much of its Cuban operations were run. "After arrival in Miami [March 1961]," he said, "I then helped organize a group of volunteer U.S. and foreign Guerrilla Warfare Instructors. He named the group "Intercontinental Penetration Forces," or "Interpen" for short. A 1976 CIA memo states Hemming was a "long-time cohort" of Frank Anthony Sturgis, of Watergate fame, and who organized a group of mercenaries for Caribbean and Central American activities which he named the International Anti-Communist Brigade. This memo said that the "backers of Sturgis' group have never been fully established," and added that a reported "sub-unit" of this brigade was Hemming's Interpen.
Hemming's planned move to Miami was the cause of considerable security activity at the CIA as early as January 1961. On January 3 the chief of CI/Operational Approval and Support Division initiated a CIA Form 693 on Hemming. This form was used to get approval for contact with informants like Hemming and, in this case, listed the "Use of Subject" as "Contact and Assessment." The previous day, an internal CIA memo asking for National Agency Checks (NACs) on Hemming said he was "now engaged in revolutionary activities in Nicaragua." The memo added that Hemming "will be debriefed with OCI requirements requesting all possible information concerning current military, economic and political developments in various Latin American countries."
The CIA assessment of Hemming continued into March 1961. On the final day of March, a CIA report on "[EE-]29229, Subject: Gerald P. Hemming, Jr., Moves to Miami to Engage in Anti-Castro Operations" was submitted internally, along with a list of numbered reports based on "several debriefing sessions" with him. The purpose of this unsigned but highly significant CIA document was to "give a better idea of whether or not Hemming might prove useful." According to the report, Hemming revealed his new plans to CIA Los Angeles Field Office Agent Hendrickson, who reported that Hemming had said he was "moving to Miami" to train Cubans, and planned to arrive on Monday, March 20, 1961. The March 31 CIA report provided these details:
Hemming stated that he was going to contact Jimmy Gentry, 953 SW Penn St., Apt. 8, Miami, Florida (Telephone: Franklin 4-3265) and that these two men were then going to proceed with a plan of action aimed at organizing a small group of "professionals" (experienced revolutionaries) who would attempt to conduct certain reconnaissance operations on the mainland of Cuba via parachute drops and either light plane or water pick-ups. Hemming also stated that he wanted to do what he could in Miami to attempt to unite the anti-Castro forces there and also to lessen the influence of a number of "mercenaries" who had joined various of these movements and were doing it more harm than good while bleeding off much of the available money.
The CIA report added that Hemming had been honing his parachuting skills "during his recent stay in Los Angeles (September 1960—March 1961), and claimed to have jumped at least once a month with one of the local parachute and skydiving clubs."
Hemming's future plans made it necessary, in the view of the anonymous author of the March 31 CIA report, to evaluate him, a feasible task given the large body of recent debriefing material in his files. The report predicted "it appears likely that the Agency may wish either (1) to make certain that no amateur reconnaissance operations directed at Cuba are undertaken, or (2) in one way or another to guide such activities to maximize their usefulness." Hendrickson, the report concluded, "is inclined to believe that Hemming is both sincere and serious in his desire to assist the U.S. government, provided that this can be accomplished through his continuing to act as a soldier of fortune.
These CIA documents, then, set the dates for Hemming's stay in Los Angles as September 1960 through the end of March 1961, and the date of his time of arrival in Florida as sometime soon after that. Some of the CIA's checking into Hemming involved odd places like Dallas where, on May 10, 1961, the special agent in charge of the CIA field office in Dallas, Texas, sent a cable to the "Chief Invest Div." This was possibly the investigations branch chief of the Security Support Division (SSD) of the CIA's Security Office. From the "Open Desk" at SSD, the check was passed to the "Clearance Branch, PSD," probably the Personnel Support Division.
The content of the cable is vague but fascinating. The first line was "SUBJ G P H JR EE 29229," undoubtedly meaning "Subject: Gerald P. Hemming Jr., EE-29229." The second line, "Agency Results," is unclear, and could have been meant a Dallas request for information from the Agency, or the results of an Agency check in Dallas. The third line was "FBI NIC," possibly meaning Federal Bureau of Investigation: nothing of intelligence concern." The last line was revealing: "5 others NR," meaning "no records on the other five people." Apparently, the CIA already had information that connected Hemming to five other people.
By July 25, 1961, the CIA investigation had run its course. On that date, M. D. Stevens of the Security Office's Security Research Staff (SRS) wrote a memorandum for the file on Hemming, wrapping up the year's events with this remark: "Hemming prefers to use the name Jerry Patrick when commanding Interpen. He was approved as a CIA contact on 6 March 1961 and as of 2 June 1961 a security check turned up no derogatory information." By this time the FBI and the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) began asking questions about Hemming. On May 25, ONI section 921E2 called in a "Status Check" to the "ABN" section of the Marine Corps Commandant's Office on Hemming, "Alleged ex-Marine." The next day, Navy YN1 Pierce, of the same ONI section, prepared an ONI cross-reference sheet for information from a May 19 FBI report. The subject of the FBI report was "Anti-Communist Legionnaires and Neutrality Matters," and it contained information on Gerald Patrick Hemming, Robert Wills aka Robert Willis, and Dick Watley. A May 23 Miami FBI report, also on anti-Communist legionnaires, was used by a person with the initials "mlb" to prepare another ONI cross-reference sheet. On this sheet, dated June 16, 1961, "mlb" typed the following data:
MM T-1, who has been connected with Cuban revolutionary activities for the past three years, and who has furnished reliable information in the past, on May 12, 1961, advised that between 30 and 40 Americans arrived in Miami from Texas on May 11, 1961. They were recruited by Allen Lushane, who temporarily resides at the Cuban Hotel, 35 Northwest 17th Court, Miami, Fla., and who previously made a trip to Texas to recruit Americans for some future military action against the Government of Cuba. The first training camp was established by Gerald Patrick Hemming with Dick Watley and Ed Colby running the camp.
MM T-1 was a Miami FBI source whom Hemming believes might have been Justin Joseph "Steve" Wilson. "He had been an agent for Batista and Papa Doc," Hemming states, reporting "through Clode in the Intelligence Division of the Dade County Sheriffs Department (now it is Metro Dade Police)." This source, whoever it was, would continue to provide informative reports on Hemming for years.
"Jesse Smith and Joe Murphy, owners of the Congress Inn Hotel, Lejeune Road, Miami, Fla., have donated three rooms in the hotel for the use of Henning [Hemming]'s group," the May 23 report continued, "and stated they will try to get political and financial backing for this group." The next day the same informant offered this additional note:
On May 13, 1961, MM T-1 advised that C. F. Riker, 2610 MacGregor #2, Houston, Texas, phone number RI 7-6666, was in Miami and claimed to represent a group of assassins that operate exclusively against Communists. Riker is described as being well educated, and claims to have attended a number of Government schools having to do with arms, demolitions and languages. Riker claims he lived in Mexico during his youth, and speaks Spanish.
The "Riker" story underlined the perilous nature of the Cuban exile community in Miami that Hemming was mixed up in. It also illustrated the usefulness of the FBI's Miami sources in keeping track of Cuban exile activities.
Meanwhile, documentation of Hemming's activities continued to build in the ONI's offices in the Pentagon and the Marine Corps G-2 [intelligence] offices in the Arlington Annex in Washington, D.C. on July 5, 1961, the ONI asked USMC Headquarters for information on Hemming, and on July 6 "ajd" in ONI's 921E office asked the FBI for information on Hemming. After a minor clarification sent on September 19, 1961 that they had nothing on "Hemming." the Marine Corps came up with Hemming's old Los Angeles address, which "cn" of 921E then passed along to the FBI on October 23. "Any information which may become available concerning Hemming," ONI said, "will be of interest to this office in view of his membership in the U.S. Marine Corps Reserve." The analysts at ONI were beginning to have doubts about the Hemming's Marine Corps association. The same day, ONI wrote a letter to the Officer in Charge, District Intelligence Office (DIO), Sixth Naval District (6ND), asking for information on Hemming, "who allegedly has had U.S. Marine Corps status." This time the ONI had Hemming's "latest" address—the Blue Bay Motel in Miami Beach, Florida.
On November 3, 1961, DIO 6ND broadened its Hemming coverage by writing to the Director, Sixth Marine Corps Reserve and Recruitment District, in Atlanta, Georgia, and on December 5 sent these intriguing remarks to the DIO 11ND:
2. The Director SIXTH Marine Corps Reserve and Recruitment District upon being informed of the foregoing advised DIO-6ND as follows: "There is no record of the subject named man having been nor is he now carried on the rolls of this District."
3. Obvious sources in Miami, Florida area were checked with negative results as to the Subject's present whereabouts.
4. In view of the above facts, no further action is contemplated in regard to reference (a), unless future developments warrant it.
This was extraordinary news: The Marine Corps could not find any information on Hemming's reserve status. This only fueled ONI interest in Hemming's activities.
Hemming's old contacts in the Los Angeles field office of the CIA had no problem keeping informed about his Miami activities. Hemming took care of that by writing letters to an informant of that Agency field office. Analysts at the Office of Naval Intelligence spent their time preparing FBI reports for Navy files on Hemming. On August 8, 1961, a person named Carter in the 921E office of ONI prepared a July 12, 1961, FBI report, "Cuban Rebel Activities in Cuba," for eventual filing in M5 files. In filling out the accompanying Cross-Reference Sheet, Carter mentioned a few details in the "identifying data" space:
Damon also stated that one Jerry [Gerry] Patrick Hemming is now in Cuba and has as his mission the demolition of generator stations. Patrick at the present time is setting off about a pound of TNT nightly to create terror and confusion. When Patrick's mission is completed, he will receive $10,000.
On August 10, 1961, the person with the initials "mlb" processed another FBI report for filing in "M-5 FF" (Finished Files), this providing the details of parachute jumps from a Cessna and Piper Colt by Hemming and three friends: Dick Watley, Frank Little, and Orlando Garcia.
On August 25, 1961, a person by the name of Pierce in 921E processed a July 31, 1961, FBI report but his comment, "see report for details," was not as thoughtful as Carter and "mlb" had been on previous reports. This was unfortunate, for the subject of this FBI report was Gerald Hemming and his Interpen organization. Just what Interpen was up to became apparent from a few clues Hemming put in a letter he sent to a CIA Los Angeles field office (LAFO) source, Dave Burt, who turned the letter over to the LAFO on October 4. Hemming said he needed parachutes and that his group was "really overworked with the Cuban problem." He said that "CBS and NBC have been bothering the hell out of us to go along" on their runs, but he could not allow this in order to "comply with security."
"Did you get my letter last week?" Hemming wrote in a follow-up letter to Burt which was passed to the Agency LAFO on October 16. This time Hemming gave a lot more of the picture:
At present "InterPen" boys are working their fingers to the bone. We are working as the military coordinators for Major Evelio Duque (Escambray mountains), Major Eloy Menoya (Escambray), Major Nino Diam (Oriente & Camagney Provinces), and other Captains that were leaders of guerrilla units in the mountains in Cuba up to about a month ago. As you probably read, there are three guerrilla units operating in the Escambray right now, they are being commanded by Majors Thorndyke, Ramires, and Campito.
Hemming added that he might travel to the West Coast in the "near future," and enclosed a brochure published by the "Beachhead Brigade."
The fall of 1961 saw more interesting Hemming material. On September 5, 1961, MM T-1, who had been involved in Cuban revolutionary activities during the past four years and who had furnished reliable information in the past, advised that Saul Sage, an American, had been seen frequenting the hangouts of Cuban revolutionists in Miami. MM T-1 said that Sage belonged to the would-be organization of Gerald Patrick Hemming, an American soldier of fortune who was previously a member of the Cuban Revolutionary Air Force.
# "This Individual Looks Odd"
During the year following Oswald's decision to return home, some of the trails we have been following since his defection suddenly take peculiar turns. Oswald "the file" becomes a supplicatory pro-American character who has "matured." As discussed in Chapter Eleven, Oswald offered a revealing explanation for his earlier anti-American remarks: "it was necessary to make this propaganda because at the time he had wanted to live in Russia." He had begged the American Consulate in Moscow to let him out of the Soviet Union. In much the same way he would later beg the Soviet Consulate in Mexico City to let him back in.
We encounter another curve in the Agency's disingenuous discourse about how Oswald's HT/LINGUAL file was insignificant. The record, as released, presents a puzzle: They did not open any of his letters when he was on the Watch List but did open one after he had been taken off it. Two clues suggest an answer. One comes from the memo mentioned in the introduction to this chapter in which the Soviet Realities Branch Chief explained that the pattern that existed of Russian women entering America through marriage and then working for the KGB was one of the reasons for operational interest in Oswald. To that piece we add this one: The date the single letter was opened in New York was July 8, 1961. Earlier that same day in Moscow, Oswald surfaced out of the blue, entered the embassy, and called Snyder on the house phone and then used a public phone to call Marina in Minsk with instructions to join him. The events in Moscow may well have triggered the intercept in New York.
"I remember that Oswald's unusual behavior in the U.S.S.R. had struck me from the moment I had read the first State dispatch on him," wrote a CIA employee whose initials were T.B.C. on November 25, 1963. T.B.C.'s full name is still classified, even though the Agency has released his initials. The fact that he remembered the first Snyder dispatch and its shocking impact is significant. Oswald "the file" as he looked to the author of this memo, was summed up with this phrase: "this individual looks odd."
# CHAPTER FOURTEEN
# Oswald Returns
While Oswald prepared to return to the U.S., distant groups were at work in the CIA and in New Orleans shaping the context of the forces that would engulf and eventually destroy him. In New Orleans, currents shifted among the anti-Castro Cuban exiles. This movement provides a useful contextual background against which we watch Oswald extricate himself, and his family, from the Soviet Union. That backdrop also brings to our story key characters whose paths would cross and double-cross Oswald's, including the irrepressible Gerald Hemming.
Meanwhile, CIA security and propaganda elements were at work. Oswald was destined to collide with CIA operations against Cuba, especially those against the Fair Play for Cuba Committee (FPCC) which produced a long and tantalizing Agency security-propaganda thread involving two important CIA officers: James McCord and David Phillips. This thread begins when McCord and Phillips launched a domestic operation against the FPCC—outside the Agency's jurisdiction. At the other end of this thread—in fall 1963—we find Phillips again, this time running the CIA's anti-Cuban operations in Mexico. Mexico City is a subject to which we will return in the final chapters. Now we will turn our attention to the events that unfolded during Oswald's return from the Soviet Union.
# McCord, Phillips, and CIA-FBI Operations Against the FPCC, 1961
The Fair Play for Cuba Committee (FPCC) emerged at the same time that the Agency began serious operations against Castro. A July 15, 1960, Hoover memo to the State Department Office of Security tied—with the help of a fertile imagination—the pamphleting activities of the FPCC at the Los Angeles Sports Arena to a Cuban government radio broadcast that "announced that Mexico should join Cuba in a revolution and reclaim Texas and New Mexico which rightfully belonged to Mexico." CIA interest in the FPCC and the chief of its New York chapter, Richard Gibson, was underscored by Gibson's active involvement with Patrice Lumumba, the premier of newly independent Congo. Lumumba was "viewed with alarm by United States policymakers because of what they perceived as his magnetic public appeal and his leanings toward the Soviet Union." Gibson's support of Castro and Lumumba put him in a special category at the CIA: Both of these leaders had been targeted for assassination.
Gibson spoke to June Cobb about the work "his group" was doing for Lumumba, according to the notes she wrote the morning after their conversation. The previous evening, Gibson had paid a visit to Cobb's hotel room for a chat. Before long, he had consumed half a bottle of scotch, and their dialogue reflected it. Cobb's notes contain this entry:
At every possible opportunity he sought to turn the conversation to sex, particularly involving sex between Negroes and whites, for example: that Swedish girls are not kept satisfied by Swedish men since Swedish men are so often homosexual and that therefore there is a colony of Negroes and Italian[s] in Sweden to satisfy the erotic craving of the Swedish girls.
But Gibson talked about more than Swedish cravings. He spoke about FPCC leaders, such as Bob Taber, and about the FPCC's relationship with American Communists. Presumably, Gibson did not know that June Cobb's hotel room was part of a carefully prepared CIA surveillance operation, with CIA technicians in the next room, eavesdropping. Cobb's notes of this encounter, preserved in her CIA 201 file, undoubtedly were not the only material produced, and must have supplemented tapes, transcripts, and surveillance logs filled out by the surveillance team.
The CIA's analysis of these materials is often entertaining reading, but for the individuals involved—Gibson, Cobb, and the surveillance technician on the other side of the wall—these were serious moments. Cuba had become part of the Cold War. A great deal was at stake. It was in the wake of Castro's and Lumumba's sudden emergence that Vice President Nixon had declared a crisis. It is not surprising that the CIA was interested in the FPCC and Richard Gibson. Ironically, their connection was destined to change: a few years after the Kennedy assassination, Gibson became an informant for the CIA. In 1960 and 1961, however, the CIA had its eyes on Gibson. Take, for example, this passage from a CIA report:
On the 27th [October 1960], Richard Gibson of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee (FPCC), spent the evening with Cobb (drank half bottle of scotch), and talked rather freely about the [FPCC] Committee. Said they "want to destroy the world." In the beginning they received $15,000 from the Cuban government. Their expenses amounted to about $1500 per month—always feast or famine—trying to get money from Cuba. Once had to sit down with Dorticos and Fidel Castro to get $5000 the Committee needed. Gibson works closely with Raul Roa and little Raul—wanted Gibson to be Public Relations Officer for the Cuban Mission to the UN.
Cobb was a valuable asset to the CIA because of her extensive knowledge about Latin American affairs and her personal relationships with many of the players and leaders. In this case, Gibson, already an intelligence target, seemed personally interested in Cobb, a weakness that had been turned to the advantage of the Agency. "As far as I'm concerned," Gibson said to Cobb on the telephone the day after his visit, "I'm always awkward around pretty girls." Cobb filed this remark on October 26, 1960.
Through Gibson, the CIA learned important details of the policy, personnel, and Cuban financial backing of the FPCC. The CIA had carefully evaluated his background and his activities, as this extract from an Agency report demonstrates:
Gibson apparently received a Columbia University fellowship from Columbia Broadcasting Company before he was ousted. Now they will not take it away from him because it would cause a scandal—he uses it as a cover for his work. FPCC is working in Africa and particularly with the Lamumba faction. Roa wants to send Gibson to Africa since money from Cuba promotes "the thing" in Africa. FPCC is also involved in the Algerian situation. Gibson and his French wife were in Paris after the war and also in Algeria. He has been to Russia and to Ghana. Robert F. Williams is also apparently instrumental in stirring up trouble (in the US over racial issues?). Gibson has no love in his heart for the US. The FPCC is stirring up the Negroes in the South—says their plans have lots of loopholes and they expect to be arrested but they intend to carry on war against the US.
Remarkably, the CIA saw the FPCC and Gibson as the instruments for a Castro-financed effort to foment insurrection in America. This was as menacing a thought as Hoover's July 15, 1960, allusion to a Cuban-inspired Mexican attack on Texas. While these threats were obviously exaggerated, knowledge about the FPCC and its activities was a matter of some urgency in the CIA in view of ongoing assassination planning for Lamumba and Castro. A counterintelligence officer in Phillips' WH/4 Branch wrote this in a memo to Jane Roman (liaison for Angleton's counterintelligence staff): "As you know, the FBI has expressed an interest in such information that Subject [Cobb] can provide concerning the Fair Play Committee [sic]."
Not everybody at the CIA was happy about June Cobb's association with the Agency. In particular, Birch O'Neal of Angleton's mole-hunting unit, CI/SIG, did some sniping with his pen. On November 22, 1960, O'Neal wrote a memorandum critical of the "liberal press" in general and of June Cobb in particular for promoting an English-language edition of an old Castro speech "to show that Castro is not a Communist." O'Neal's memo said:
The first edition was paid for by Miss Cobb and the second edition was paid for by the Cuban Consulate in New York. As far as we know, Miss Cobb is a rather flighty character. She comes in and out and we have not been able to find out where she lives or where she is now. Perhaps she is tied up with the so-called Fair Play for Cuba Committee.
The innuendo radiating from this last sentence illuminates O'Neal's hostility toward Cobb, a view that may have had other adherents within the Agency's counterintelligence staff. From their perspective, Cobb's connections seemed to carry with them as many potential risks as awards.
In any event, the combination of Agency elements most closely associated with the "take" from Cobb at that time was O'Neal's CI/SIG, CI/OPS/WH (Counterintelligence/Operations/Western Hemisphere), and WH/4/CI. As CI/Liaison, Jane Roman also had access to the results of the Cobb debriefs and surveillance operations.
In early 1961, eleven weeks before the Bay of Pigs invasion, the CIA seized an opportunity to become more actively involved in running operations against the FPCC. CIA Security Office and Western Hemisphere elements had identified an Agency employee who knew Court Wood, an American student just returned from Cuba under the sponsorship of the FPCC. This opportunity to surveil Court Wood, which developed at the end of January, was irresistible in the judgment of the person in the CIA's Security Research Service (SRS) of the Security Office who conceived and authorized the operation. That person was James McCord, the same James McCord who would later become embroiled in the scandal during the Nixon Presidency.
On February 1, 1961, McCord met with people from Western Hemisphere Division to discuss the "case" of an Agency employee who happened to be Court Wood's neighbor and former high school classmate. At issue was whether to use this employee operationally to extract intelligence information from Wood. The employee, conveniently, worked in WH/4, the very branch that McCord wanted to run the illegal domestic operation he had in mind. The memo of record for this meeting states the following:
1. On this date Subject's case was coordinated with Mr. McCord of SRS in connection with Subject's operational use within the US by WH/4/Propaganda. The implications of a CI operation with[in] the US by this Agency and the possibility Subject might come to the attention of the FBI through association with Court Wood were discussed.
2. Mr. McCord expressed the opinion that it was not necessary to advise the FBI of the operation at this time. However, he wishes to review the case in a month. The file of the Subject, along with that of the WH man who is supervising the operation (David Atlee Phillips #40695) will be pended [suspended] for the attention of Mr. McCord on 1 March 1961.
It is fitting that one of the Agency's legendary disinformation artists, David Atlee Phillips, should have been in charge of the CIA's CI and propaganda effort against the FPCC. Phillips would reappear in Mexico City at the time Oswald visited there, taking over the anti-Cuban operations of the CIA station in Mexico during the very days that CIA headquarters and the CIA Mexico City station exchanged cables on Oswald's visit to the Mexican capital.
"At the request of Mr. Dave Phillips, C/WH/4/Propaganda," wrote the fortunate CIA employee picked to spy on his neighbor, "I spent the evening of January 6 with Court Wood, a student who has recently returned from a three-week stay in Cuba under the sponsorship of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee." The employee said that Court and his father both were pro-Castro and "extremely critical" of American foreign policy. "I've been advised by Mr. Phillips," the employee wrote, "to continue my relationship with Mr. Wood and I will keep your office informed of each subsequent visit."
Indeed, the employee did keep Jack Kennedy, Chief of Security for Western Hemisphere Branch 4 (C/WH/4/Security), apprised. The next occasion occurred on March 3, 1961, after which the employee had new information, as reported March 8:
Several months ago I wrote you a letter concerning the pro-Castro sentiments of Court Wood, son of Foster Wood, a local attorney. Since that time I've seen Court only once, on March 3, 1961, and he appears to be actively engaged in the organization of a local chapter of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee.
Little did Court Wood know that he was organizing his new chapter under the watchful eye of the CIA.
Our budding spy was beginning to blossom in his new assignment for David Phillips. Wood's neighbor also had this to say in his March 8 report:
Complete with beard, Court has been meeting with "interested groups" and lecturing to students in several eastern cities. He specifically mentioned Baltimore, Philadelphia, and New York. Apparently there are a number of students envolved [sic] in this activity; I met David Lactterman from George Mason High School in Falls Church, Va. and Walt MacDonwald, a fellow student of Court's, and both are obviously active. What action, if any, should I take in regard to my relationship with Court and his father?
It seems comical, that a group of high school students, led by a college student who had grown a beard to emulate Castro's appearance were the subjects of such CIA reporting. But it is actually sad.
Our spy now wanted more time to get additional intelligence. "Court Wood seems to be extremely naive about my position with the Agency," said the neighbor's next bulletin. Dated March 18, 1961, and, again, addressed to Mr. Jack Kennedy, the memo boasted that Wood "is very open and frank with me in all areas." Phillip's spy had spent "hours" with Court Wood and was sure his naivete could be further exploited. "I am certain that if given enough time," the spy wrote, "I can obtain a great deal of information on the backgrounds and activities of many of his associates." The report also contained this passage:
While visiting his apartment I observed that both Court and hisfather are interested in a large number of Communist publications. These included "USSR," "The Worker," and many prop. pamphlets that were obviously published in England. Court is an extreme Leftist in his political views and he believes fanatically in Castro's Cuba.
Mr. Wood mentioned to me that he and several of his friends are making plans to enter Cuba in June; illegally if necessary. He apparently wants to become a teacher for the Castro government and to make his permanent home there. Members of the "26th of July Movement" are in close contact with Court and they are involved in this proposed move to Cuba. Court does have some money and he seems to be very serious about this thing. Within the next few days I have to be able to get some names and specific facts concerning their plans.
Not a bad bit of work for three weeks, especially considering that this kind of assignment was not in the fellow's job description.
Ironically, just when our fledgling spy was about to acquire more intelligence, the matter came to the attention of the FBI, and his mission came to an abrupt end. In an October 7, 1961, memo to FBI Liaison Sam J. Papich, CIA Acting Director of Security, R. F. Bannerman wrote this about the case of Court Wood:
Reference is made to a 25 March 1961 and a 6 July 1961 investigative report on captioned Subject which have previously been furnished to this Agency.
[redacted] who is a current Agency employee, has recently been interviewed concerning his knowledge of Court Foster Wood whom [redacted] had known since mutual attendance in high school. Attached is a detailed report of the information furnished by [redacted] concerning his knowledge of Wood.
Since [redacted] personally has sufficient reason to question the activities of Wood and the activities of the associates of Wood, [redacted] has been advised to discontinue any further contact with Wood.
It would be appreciated if your Bureau would furnish this Agency any additional information brought to your attention concerning Court Foster Wood and of particular interest would be any information received by your Bureau concerning past association of Court Foster Wood with N-[redacted].
Thus it would appear that the FBI had learned of Court Wood's activities in March and again in July 1961, and had reported them to the Agency. The CIA then pulled its employee out of David Phillips's CI operation against the FPCC.
What the operation tells us is that the Agency was sufficiently interested in countering the FPCC to engage in an illegal domestic operation. The fact that controversy would follow the two men in charge, McCord in connection with Watergate and Phillips in connection with the Kennedy assassination, causes this page in the Agency's anti-Cuban operations to stand out in hindsight.
While the Court Wood operation was grinding to a halt at the CIA, the FBI was gearing up for its own operation against the FPCC. Fragments of an FBI document released by the Church Committee suggest that Cartha DeLoach, assistant director of the FBI, was in charge of a Bureau operation to compile "adverse" data on FPCC leaders. A handwritten note at the bottom of the FBI headquarters copy of the document includes this detail: "During May 1961, a field survey was completed wherein available public source data of adverse nature regarding officers and leaders of FPCC was compiled and furnished Mr. DeLoach for use in contacting his sources."
The fact that an assistant director of the FBI was collecting dirt on FPCC leaders underlines the extent of the Bureau's interest. The "adverse" data in the FPCC files kept by DeLoach probably grew considerably as a result of another CIA operation in October 1961. As we have seen, this operation netted significant intelligence on the FPCC from the Gibson material collected in June Cobb's room. This material included certain derogatory statements by Gibson which appear to be the sort of "data" DeLoach was looking for.
In December 1961, the FBI launched another operation, using the incendiary tactic of planting disinformation. The handwritten note discussed above contains this account:
We have in the past utilized techniques with respect to countering activities of mentioned [FPCC] organization in the U.S. During December 1961, New York prepared an anonymous leaflet which was mailed to selected FPCC members throughout the country for the purpose of disrupting FPCC and causing split between FPCC and Socialist Workers Party (SWP) supporters, which technique was very effective.
These tactics dramatize the lengths to which the FBI was willing to go to discredit the FPCC, whose chapters in Chicago, Newark, and Miami were infiltrated early on by the Bureau. As we will see in Chapter Sixteen, during Oswald's tenure with the FPCC, FBI break-ins to their offices were a regular occurrence.
Oddly, the day Patrice Lumumba's death was announced, February 13, 1961, was the same day Snyder received Oswald's letter about returning to America. As the FBI and CIA became engaged in a campaign to discredit the FPCC, Oswald was nearing his goal of having obtained all the necessary authorizations to return with his family.
# Oswald Returns
Oswald wrote to his mother on January 2, 1962, telling her that he and Marina would arrive in the United States sometime around March and asking her to have the local Red Cross request that the International Rescue Committee (IRC) assist them.. It would take longer than Oswald anticipated. Letters from Oswald and the American Embassy, both dated January 5, crossed in the mail. Oswald's letter was a request that the U.S. government pay for his and Marina's return to America, while the embassy's letter said that because of "difficulties" in obtaining an American visa for Marina, he might want to leave by himself and bring his wife later. The replies also crossed in the mail. Oswald insisted (on January 16) that he would not leave alone, while the embassy (January 15) noted that Marina had no American visa, and suggested that a relative file an affidavit of support for her.
Both responses were interesting. Oswald's January 16 letter revealed more than he may have intended, "Since I signed and paid for an immigration petition for my wife in July 1961," Oswald said with exasperation, "I think it is about time to get it approved or refused." The most intriguing aspect of the letter was this declaration: "I certainly will not consider going to the U.S. alone for any reason, particularly since it appears my passport will be confiscated upon my arrival in the United States." It is difficult to know his precise thinking; perhaps he was afraid he'd never see her again, or perhaps he viewed Marina as some form of protection when he returned to the U.S.
On January 23, 1962, Oswald responded with characteristic dualism to the embassy suggestion. He complained about their January 15, 1962, request for a support affidavit for Marina, arguing that his two-year absence from the U.S. made this difficult. On the same day Oswald wrote to his mother asking that she file such an affidavit with the Immigration and Naturalization Service.
The letter suggesting that Oswald leave without Marina had another noteworthy feature: It appeared to use Oswald's request for a loan as a lure to get him to the embassy. "The question which you raise of a loan to defray part of your travel expenses to the United States," the letter said, "can be discussed when you come to the Embassy." By February 6, however, the embassy had a change of heart. On this day, American Consul Joseph B. Norbury sent Oswald a letter saying, "We are prepared to take your application for a loan." Norbury instructed Oswald to provide twelve items of information, in triplicate copy.
On February 1, 1962, Oswald again wrote to his mother. The State Department had notified her that it would need $900 to make the travel arrangements for Lee and Marina. Oswald dismissed his mother's suggestion that she raise money by telling his sad financial story to the newspapers. In his February 9 letter to his mother, he reminded her to file the affidavit for Marina and to send him clippings from the Fort Worth newspapers about his defection to Russia. Oswald gave the same assignment to his brother Robert. Oswald told his mother that he wanted these clippings so that he could be "forewarned." His January 30 letter to Robert included this passage: "You once said that you asked around about whether or not the U.S. government had any charges against me, you said at that time 'no.' Maybe you should check around again, its possible now that the government knows I'm coming they'll have something waiting."
On the morning of February 15, 1962, Oswald took Marina to the hospital in Minsk, where she gave birth to their first daughter, June Lee, at ten A.M. That same day, Oswald wrote to his mother, and to his brother. On February 23, the Oswalds brought their baby home from the hospital. After the birth of June Lee, the health of the mother and baby obviated any sense of urgency over the date of departure for the U.S. Oswald wrote to his mother on February 24 and his brother on February 27 that he did not expect to arrive for several months. His return was just over three months away.
There were a few setbacks, however. Oswald did not get as much money as he asked for. On February 24, 1962, he wrote to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow asking for his loan. The embassy received his letter on March 3. Oswald wanted $800. The embassy wrote back that they would lend him only $500. On February 26, Senator John Tower received an undated letter from Oswald asking for help in returning to the U.S. The same day, Senator Tower forwarded Oswald's letter to the State Department. What happened there is hard to explain. In spite of the confusion that existed in the State Department in early 1961 over the legal question of whether Oswald had renounced his citizenship, it was no longer an issue by early 1962. Oswald had never signed the papers, a fact duly noted by U.S. officials in Moscow and Washington. Now, in February 1962, the U.S. State Department decided that Oswald had never attained Russian citizenship. Therefore the State Department might have some difficulty explaining why a November 25, 1963, New York Times story reported that the department had told Senator John Tower (in February 1962) that Oswald had renounced his citizenship. According to the article, Senator Tower then closed his Oswald file.
Oswald's correspondence with Texas picked up noticeably as he prepared for his return to America. On January 20, 1962, Oswald had written to his mother, and three days later wrote to her again. Marguerite responded, and it was from this correspondence that Oswald learned that the Marines had given him a dishonorable discharge from the reserves. This again provoked fears of prosecution, prompting Oswald to write his brother Robert asking for more information. On that day, Oswald also wrote to former Secretary of the navy John Connally to protest his undesirable discharge from the U.S. Marine Corps Reserves. "I ask that you look into this case," Oswald's letter said, and then added presumptuously, "and take the necessary steps to repair the damage done to me and my family." Connally referred the letter to the Department of the Navy, and on February 23, 1962, Connally politely wrote to Oswald that his letter of January 30, 1962, had been turned over to the secretary of the navy, Fred Korth. The Navy sent Oswald a letter stating that the Navy decided "that no change, correction or modification is warranted in your discharge."
In a March 3, 1962, cable, four days before the Marine Corps mailed Oswald his undesirable discharge, the 921E2 section of the Office of Naval Intelligence sent a strongly worded message to the Navy Liaison officer in Moscow. Written by LTJG P. C. LeSourde (who also helped manage the Gerry Patrick Hemming case at this ONI office), the cable recalled Oswald's acts during his defection, including his offer to share his military knowledge with the Soviets. The cable's ominous tone was indicative of what was to follow: On March 7, 1962, the USMC sent Oswald his certificate of undesirable discharge. Oswald was incensed, and on March 22, 1962, he wrote back protesting their decision and insisting that his discharge be given a full review. The department promptly replied that it had no authority to hear and review petitions of this sort and referred Oswald to the Navy Discharge Review Board. Oswald filled out an enclosed application for review while in Minsk but did not mail it until he returned to the United States. More letters were exchanged—on April 2 from the USMC to Oswald and on April 28 from Oswald to the USMC—but nothing was accomplished.
Then Oswald's situation improved. By February 28, the San Antonio office of the Immigration and Naturalization Service sent word to him that Marina's visa petition had been approved. By March 28, he had received an affidavit of support on Marina's behalf from his mother's employer, Byron Phillips (a Texas landowner from Vernon, Texas), which Oswald filed even though it was no longer necessary to do so. In March 1962, Phillips had agreed to sponsor Marina as a U.S. immigrant. There followed several communications to Texas: letters to Marguerite on March 28 and April 21, a card to Mrs. Robert Oswald on April 10, and a letter to Robert on April 12, in which Oswald wrote that only "the American side" was holding up their departure. Oswald added, however, that since the winter was over, he didn't "really want to leave until the beginning of fall, since the spring and summer [in Russia] are so nice."
In fact, Oswald had nothing to complain about. From the available documents, a strong case could have been made—and Oswald knew and feared it—to prosecute him under military or civilian espionage laws. As things stood in the spring of 1962, he was lucky to be coming home without facing the consequences of his actions, and to have had all the U.S. bureaucratic obstacles removed, possibly too easily, so that he could be accompanied by his wife and child. Discussions with the embassy to complete financial and travel arrangements continued in April and May, and finally, on May 10, the embassy wrote to Oswald saying that everything was in order, inviting him to bring his family to the embassy to sign the official paperwork.
At his request, Oswald was discharged from his job at the radio factory on or about May 18, an event he recorded in his workbook. The final resolution of his trip plans led to a new round of mail. On May 21, Oswald wrote to his brother again, telling Robert that he and his family would leave for Moscow on May 22 and depart for England ten to fourteen days later, then cross the Atlantic by ship. Repeating a point he had made in an earlier letter to his mother, Oswald said that he knew from the newspaper clippings what Robert had said about his defection to Russia, and suggested that Robert had talked too much. Oswald now asked him not to offer comments to the newspapers.
The Oswalds spent their last night in Minsk with Pavel Golovachev. A "Minsk" exit visa was stamped in Oswald's passport on May 22, 1962. His clearance procedures for departure included an interview with an official of the MVD. On May 24, 1962, the embassy in Moscow renewed Oswald's U.S. passport, amending it to reflect June Lee's birth. All three arrived in Moscow on May 24 and, after filling out various documents at the embassy, Marina was given her American visa. The rest was up to the Soviets. On May 26, Marina's passport was stamped in Moscow, and on May 30, Oswald wrote to his mother from Moscow, "We shall leave Holland for the USA on June 4."
On June 1, 1962, Oswald borrowed $435.71 from the U.S. State Department for his return trip, and on June 2 the Oswalds boarded a train for Holland, which passed through Minsk that night, crossed the Russian border at Brest, and transited Poland and Germany. On June 3, Oswald's passport was stamped at the Oldenzaal Station, in the Netherlands. Marina recalled having spent two or three days in Amsterdam. On June 4, 1962, the Oswalds' steamship tickets were delivered to them in Rotterdam. On June 6, they departed on the Maasdam, a Holland-American Line ship, bound for New York. On board the ship, the Oswalds stayed by themselves; Marina later testified that she did not often go on deck because she was poorly dressed and her husband was ashamed of her. On the Maasdam, Oswald wrote some notes on ship stationery that appear to be a summary of what he thought he had learned by living under both the capitalist and Communist systems.
On June 5, 1962, the New York Department of Health, Education and Welfare notified the New York Travelers Aid Society that the Oswalds were coming. The Maasdam landed at Hoboken, N.J., at one P.M. on June 13. The Oswalds were met by Spas T. Raikin, a representative of the Travelers Aid Society, which had also been contacted by the Department of State. Raikin said he had to chase Oswald, who tried to "dodge" him. Raikin had the definite impression that Oswald wanted to "avoid meeting anyone." When they talked, Oswald told Raikin that he had only $63 and no plans for that night or for travel to Fort Worth. Oswald, says Raikin, accepted the society's help "with confidence and appreciation." They passed through customs and immigration, with Raikin's help, without incident.
The Travelers Aid Society handed the Oswalds over to the New York City Department of Welfare, which found the family a room at the Times Square Hotel. In one of the many different versions of his Soviet story, Oswald told both Raikin and the welfare department representatives that he had been a marine stationed at the American Embassy in Moscow, had married a Russian girl, renounced his citizenship, and worked in Minsk; soon he found out, he said, that Russian propaganda was inaccurate, but he had been unable to obtain an exit visa for Marina for more than two years. He also said that he had paid the travel expense himself. Of course, Oswald had not been a marine stationed at the embassy, had not renounced his citizenship, had not worked for two-plus years on Marina's visa, and had not paid for his or their travel himself. Oswald's motives for telling these needless lies are obscure.
When the New York City Welfare Department called Robert Oswald's home in Fort Worth, his wife answered and offered to help. She contacted her husband, who sent $200 immediately. At first Oswald refused to accept the money. He insisted that the welfare department should pay his family's fare to Texas, and threatened, apparently thinking the welfare department would suffer from the publicity, that they would go as far as they could on his $63 and then rely on "local authorities" to get them to Fort Worth. The welfare department was not intimidated by such tactics and Oswald had no choice but to accept his brother's money. On the afternoon of June 14, the Oswalds flew from New York to Fort Worth.
Meanwhile, across the Mississippi River in Louisiana, events were unfolding in the underworld of Cuban exiles and CIA Cuban operations, the focal point of which was the port city of New Orleans. Oswald's entanglement with this world was just months away. Eleven days after Oswald stepped off the plane in Fort Worth, an anti-Castro group from the Florida Everglades, including Gerry Hemming, came to New Orleans with the help of Frank Bartes, the AMBUD delegate there. AMBUD was the Agency cryptonym for the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC), a CIA-funded and controlled organization that had extensive operations in New Orleans. It is to Gerald Hemming's story that we now turn.
# Hemming III: The Los Angeles Gun Incident
On January 30, 1962, an event took place that created a new batch of paperwork on Hemming, and something even more interesting. The trigger event occurred in Los Angeles, where the Sheriffs Office reported picking up a .45-caliber U.S. government pistol, serial number 1504981-SA, at 0200 A.M. Based on an anonymous tip, the police located and removed the pistol from a parked car. Thirty minutes later, Hemming walked into the police station. The resulting police report described the event this way:
At 2:30 AM, 1-30-62, a Gerald P. Hemming Jr. of 3843 East Blanche St., Pasadena entered Temple Station and informed us that the .45 automatic was his. Mr. Hemming stated the automatic was issued to him by the US Government Central Intelligence Agency in Miami, Florida approximately nine months ago and that he, Mr. Hemming, has been in training for a free-lance organization regarding Cuban invasion. Mr. Hemming stated he was a friend of Dodd's and that he had left the pistol at Dodd's Barber Shop and that it had disappeared from there. This detail contacted Central Intelligence Agency, a Mr. DeVanon, who said he could neither confirm nor deny the issuance of this pistol to Mr. Hemming; that he would appreciate no publicity be given the incident and that he would contact Lt. Wilber of this detail tomorrow morning with further information.
Shortly thereafter, the Agency field office in Los Angeles notified CIA headquarters of the Sheriffs Office report containing Hemming's claim that he was a "CIA agent," and that he "was training people in Florida for another invasion."
This Los Angeles CIA cable drew attention to the remark by Hemming that the pistol had been "issued" to him by the CIA in Miami. The cable provided headquarters with this, possibly related, detail:
Meanwhile, Sixth Army-CID got in Act, but CIC got them out again. However, if weapon is not property of some other agency they want to recover on presumption it is Army property. We have prevailed on sheriffs office to keep it off blotter and away from press, denying all the time that we ever heard of a Hemming. Hemming called this office later in day to report pistol stolen but recovered by sheriffs office. Did not mention having previously claimed association with the agency.
The Army's stake in the matter was noted in the February 7 CIA headquarters response to the Los Angeles field office. "You were also informed that the local Army CID office had expressed an interest in the case on the presumption that said weapon may be Army property." What was missing from the headquarters response was this question: For what reason and under whose authority did Army Counterintelligence get the 6th Army's Criminal Investigation Division to back out of the case?
An internal CIA Headquarters memo of February 2, 1962, indicated that the culprit claiming the pistol was probably Hemming, "identical with the Subject of Security File # EE-29229," but that he was not and had not been in the past of interest to Western Hemisphere Division, which maintained "information" on Hemming anyway. This internal memo, however, contained a slightly different variation of the incident. Written in the Operational Support Division of the Security Office, the memo contained this paragraph:
The sheriffs office contacted the OO/C [Domestic Contacts] Los Angeles office who, in turn, requested the sheriffs office to attempt to keep the matter out of the newspapers and that they would attempt to trace the identity of the individual. The local CID office of the U.S. Army also became interested in this matter; however, they also were requested to suspend any active investigation of this matter.
Putting this together with information from the Los Angeles field office, we now have this picture: The Army Counterintelligence Corps requested the 6th Army Criminal Investigation Division to suspend any active investigation into the Hemming gun incident. Was the U.S. Army issuing, in Miami or elsewhere, sidearms to Cuban training groups subordinate to or associated with the Cuban Revolutionary Council? We know the Army was involved in training Cuban rebels. Was Hemming's Interpen connected to the Army or to an Agency project to which the Army provided support?
The CIA response to the Los Angeles field office also mentioned Hemming's statement "that he was a GOLIATH agent who was on a training mission in connection with an assignment aimed at Cuba. . . . Subsequently, this matter was brought to the attention of the overt GOLIATH field office in your area." GOLIATHb was another way of referring to the CIA. GOLIATH headquarters, however, forgot to ask GOLIATH Los Angeles how Hemming got to the police station so fast. There is no record of the police having traced the gun's serial number or having called Hemming. Who was the "anonymous" caller? Could the call and Hemming's appearance shortly thereafter to lay claim to his weapon be connected? Did Hemming make that call?
Ernst Liebacher was chief of Operations at the CIA Los Angeles field office (LAFO) at the time, and he interviewed Hemming after the gun incident in Hemming's office on 403 West 8th Street. Liebacher submitted his report of the details on February 15. In the report, Liebacher explained that Hemming had been known to the LAFO "since approximately October 1960 when he voluntarily contacted the office and furnished certain information concerning activities in Cuba." The report added that, "from time to time," Hemming had "furnished additional information which has been forwarded to Washington, DC in the form of reports of interest to the agency."
Liebacher's report also revealed who in the CIA LAFO had been Hemming's point of contact. Liebacher said that for a long time it had been Paul R. Hendrickson, who "had many contacts," and later, after Hendrickson was transferred to the Seattle office, Sergeant W. D. Pangburn had been "designated for contact." Liebacher's February 15 memo added this note:
Within the past two weeks, Subject furnished Pangburn with a large envelope marked "Cubana Revolucion," or some such legend on it, and it contained all sorts of plans for training Cuban guerrillas. Subject claimed to have been working with the Office of Naval Intelligence and said that he had also been in contact with the Federal Bureau of Investigation in Miami, Florida.
According to Liebacher, Hemming never claimed to have worked for the Central Intelligence Agency. This is correct. Hemming claimed only to be an informant, "a snitch," as he said, for the Agency, and sometimes as a "singleton" for Angleton. The point here, however, is that the gun story led to other trails, to Cuban exiles and the counterrevolution against Castro.
We know that the gun incident illuminates only a portion of Hemming's CIA activity which went back well before his October 1960 debriefing by the LAFO. What concerns us now are his corresponding ONI files in the first half of 1962. It is from those files that we catch a glimpse of Hemming's associates and of who was processing his files in ONI. The above CIA documents and the ONI documents below are most valuable when viewed together, a combination that provides insights into otherwise shadowy parts of the Cuban exile underworld. From the time of the L.A. handgun incident in January 1962 to Hemming's trip to New Orleans in June 1962, his ONI and FBI files cross-reference into an interesting tangle of names: Menoyo, Quesada, Seymour, Sosa, Bartes, and Wesley.
Three of these names, Seymour, Bartes, and, possibly Wesley too, would become involved with the Oswald story in important ways.
# Hemming IV: A Trail of Names
The CIA February 15 summary of events discussed above also noted the Pangburn interview of Hemming on February 6, 1962. Pangburn had obtained the following information from Hemming:
Subject claimed that he was issued the .45-caliber automatic pistol about 1½ months ago by a Cuban named Captain Sosa, who had obtained permission from one Arturo Gonzales Gonzales. Sosa was reported to have been with the "30th of November group" and to have spent considerable time in the mountains. It was Subject's understanding that Sosa was known to the Central Intelligence Agency.
Two (or possibly three) guns were issued to Subject and his cohorts, one of them a former OSS-type, named Davis, who was also said to be connected with the "30th of November group." Subject stated that these weapons had been issued to them because other underground Cuban groups in Miami had been "giving them trouble" by putting sugar in gas tanks and tossing small grenades in their quarters.
The Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) file contained intelligence on the members and leaders of the 30th of November Group. Some, possibly much, of this intelligence was gained through an FBI informant in Hemming's circle. The FBI, in turn, shared this information with ONI.
On April 24, 1962, P. Carter, an ONI clerk working in Op-921E (Security, Espionage, and Counterintelligence Branch), prepared, as an enclosure to a cross-reference sheet, information on Hemming. This report contains a tiny detail on the final destination of the Robert James Dwyer file which seems worth making a note of—the appearance of the organizational designator "F5"—a detail we will return to when it crops up again. The other information entered into Hemming's ONI files on June 11 said that, as of April 19, the 30th of November Group had "about" twenty-seven members, and its leaders included such former prominent Cubans as Jesus Fernandez, formerly Havana Province financial coordinator; Orlando Rodriguez, "who had no position in the movement in Cuba"; Guido De La Vega, transportation coordinator and known to Rodriguez as "anti-U.S."; Joaquin Torres, formerly Matanzas Province coordinator; Osvaldo Betancourt, formerly Havana Province general coordinator; Manuel Cruz, Havana Province financial coordinator (succeeded Jesus Fernandez); and Horiberto Sanchez, brother-in-law to the founder of the 30th of November Group, David Salvidor. The leader at the time was named Carlos Rodriguez Quesada.
This information, placed on Hemming's cross-reference sheet on June 11 by "jgr" in ONI's 921E office, had apparently been picked up from Quesada by an FBI informant on April 19. The cross-reference sheet contains this useful passage:
Carlos Rodriquez Quesada, head of group, advised 4/10/62 he just returned from Washington, DC where he was gratified to find that a number of military leaders and some Senators disagreed with State Department policy with regard to Cuba, and that aid for Cuban exiles may be forthcoming. [Informant] MM T-2 advised a part of the 30th of November under Jesus Fernandez is still connected to CRC. . . . On March 26, 1962 [informant] MM T-1, an individual who has been active in revolutionary activity in the Miami area for the past 4 years, advised that 5 men from the 30th of November Movement went into the Everglades west of Miami on the previous weekend, where they practiced shooting M-1 carbines. An American adventurer named Jerry Hemming accompanied this group.
As we will see, heat from summer fires would soon force Hemming and his friends out of the Everglades. For now it is important to note that Quesada led the 30th November Group when it joined other factions in the spring of 1963 to form a Cuban government-in-exile.
Another anti-Castro leader we meet in Hemming's early 1962 ONI files is Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo. A cross-reference sheet prepared on January 16, 1962, by P. Carter, the same clerk in the Programs section of the Espionage and Counterintelligence (SEC) branch of ONI (OP921E2), had the following story typed under the optional space on the form "Identifying Data":
On 10/30/61, Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo said that 2 of his men made a trip to Cuba in a small boat and an American went along. On 11/13/61, Roger Redondo Gonzalez said that in the middle of 8/61, he, Gerald Patrick Hemming, and others, went to Cay Guillermo, Cuba, on a fishing boat. The boat captain contacted an underground member and delivered a message. On 11/13/61, Rafael Huget Del Valle said that in the middle of 8/61, he, Hemming, and others left in a fishing boat for Cuba, and arrived five days later in Cay Guillermo, Cuba. They remained there for 3 days and then returned to Miami. Redondo said Hemming previously claimed to know the location of an arms cache located in British Bahama Islands, but when they were at sea, Hemming said he did not know where the arms were.
This material was derived from an FBI report, the subject of which was Hemming's Interpen.
On September 10, 1962, another interesting Hemming cross-reference sheet was prepared by the clerk "jgr", in which we encounter William Seymour and Jose Rodriguez Sosa. The cross-reference sheet contains this story:
[Informant] MM T-1, who has been actively engaged in Cuban revolutionary activities for the past four years and who has furnished reliable information in the past, on June 11, 1962, advised that Larry J. Laborde called Miami, Florida the previous evening and said he expected the 67-foot schooner "Elsie Reichart" to arrive in Miami on or about July 14, 1962, Laborde said the boat would have four Americans and three Cubans aboard as crewmen.
[Informant] MM T-1 advised that the schooner "The Mariner" is still located in Ft. Myers, Florida, needs an anchor and other repairs. Both of these boats are reportedly being operated by their owners and crews without monetary remuneration from Laborde.
Bill Seymour, an American citizen who had previously been trained as a mechanic while serving in the United States Navy, has been residing in Miami and is closely connected with Gerald Patrick Hemming, an American soldier of fortune who is closely associated with persons in Cuban revolutionary activities in the Miami, Florida area. Hemming, who is a close friend and associate of Laborde, planned to send Seymour to St. Petersburg to work on the boat's engine.
Captain Jose Rodriguez Sosa, a Cuban national residing in Miami and a member of the Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil, a Cuban revolutionary organization, has been in close contact with Laborde and plans on sending another Cuban from Miami to join the "Elsie Reichart" which recently sprung a leak in the hull, and whose engine is still inoperative.
Here, Hemming is connected to the DRE in Miami through Sosa. As we will see, Hemming was about to make his way to New Orleans. William Seymour is of special interest because his name later turns up in a bogus FBI story swallowed hook, line, and sinker by the Warren Commission. That story had Seymour as one of the three men who visited Silvia Odio on September 25, 1963, two days before Oswald arrived in Mexico City. These are subjects we will cover in Chapters Seventeen and Eighteen.
It is remarkable how many threads of information eventually weave themselves into a part of the Oswald story. The FBI had an informant in Hemming's Interpen group, and much of his reporting was naturally cross-filed into Hemming's ONI files. An example of this was the obscure but engaging piece of filing information we set aside earlier in this chapter—that an April 24, 1962, FBI report on Robert James Dwyer in Hemming's file showed that the final ONI destination for this document was "F5." Perhaps this was routine in the Navy, but it rarely appears elsewhere in the JFK collection.
This office might have been in 923F, the Personnel Branch of ONI's Administrative Division (923), but if so, it was not listed in the documents consulted for this study. It was probably an F5 branch in the same general part of ONI—Administration and Security (921)—that was handling the job of excerpting the Hemming material for final filing. This would make the full designation "921F5," which is worth mentioning because the only other document in the JFK files from 921F5 has an intriguing person's name on it. The document makes a brief reference to a discussion by "M. Wesley" of a "complete file" and "case history" on Interpen. Even though it may be only a coincidence, it is an intriguing fact that there is a mysterious person by the name of "Wesley" who shows up in Mexico City after (or perhaps during) Oswald's visit there and makes his way into Oswald's FBI file.
# Hemming and Bartes in New Orleans
In June 1962, Hemming connected with another anti-Castro Cuban leader: Frank Bartes. According to a July 2, 1962, CIA memorandum from the Agency's New Orleans office of the Domestic Contacts Division, Frank Bartes provided the CIA with this information:
On 25 June 1962 Laurence Joseph Laborde and two other men had called on him [Bartes]. He had met Laborde earlier in Miami. The men said that they wanted to train Cuban refugees as guerrilla fighters and demolition experts who would then go to Cuba. The other men were Gerald P. Hemming, Jr. and Howard Kenneth Davis.
Bartes added that Laborde was "anti-CIA," which the New Orleans office said it had "confirmed." Bartes reported that he had "reached an agreement" with Laborde. Possibly related to such an agreement were documents that Laborde gave to Bartes, one of them a letter of recommendation from 30th of November leader Carlos Rodriguez Quesada.
There is further documentary corroboration of the assistance Bartes provided in getting Hemming, Laborde, and Davis into a training camp near New Orleans. According to a CIA "internal component" (presumably Task Force W or Branch 3 or 4 of the Western Hemisphere Division), a proposal had been made to a New Orleans "Cuban refugee group," probably the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC), for military training of another Cuban refugee group, possibly the 30th of November Group. This the Agency learned on June 28, 1962, when Bartes, "one of our sources among the Cuban refugees," the CIA memo said, "asked for an appointment so that he could give us some interesting information."
Bartes explained how it was that his activities in New Orleans became known to Laborde. Bartes and the other "Cuban refugee from New Orleans" had been in Miami "a month or so ago" and met Laborde. At that time Laborde had told them of his interest in working with the Cuban refugees. Laborde lamented that "he had previously been connected with a training camp in the Everglades in Florida, but that that camp had to be abandoned because of fires in the Everglades." The CIA memo explains what happened then:
When Bartes returned to New Orleans, according to him, he contacted the local office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and asked them if they could, in his words, "clear" Laric Laborde. The Bureau told him that while they could not give him an official clearance, they would look into the situation and would contact Bartes and Mr. Ravel, who is the nominal head of the Cuban refugee movement in New Orleans.
Bartes says that sometime later the Federal Bureau of Investigation did contact Ravel and told him that as far as Laborde was concerned it was "hands off." Curiously enough, both "source" [Bartes] and Ravel took this to mean that this was a clearance of Laborde by the FBI, so that when Laborde and the other two US citizens contacted Ravel and Bartes in New Orleans they had no hesitancy in dealing with them.
The CIA memo said that the Agency Domestic Contacts office in New Orleans had told Bartes that "all of this" was out of their jurisdiction, that the CIA "had absolutely nothing to do with such matters," and that they "could not give him any advice" about what "he seemed to be seeking."
Bartes countered with the remark that the reason he was providing the CIA with this information was that "these three men hate CIA and they said that CIA is doing nothing and is preventing other people from doing anything and they are anxious to do something to help the Cubans without the help of CIA." Bartes added, defensively, that since he had furnished the CIA information in the past, "he thought that we should know about the present situation."
The documents that Hemming, Laborde, and Hall gave to Bartes were turned over to the CIA by the latter. They were a "clipping" from the June 3 Denver Post castigating the CIA and CRC leader Miro Cardona, and an undated document. The second (undated) document was signed by Luis del Nodal Vega, "who styles himself Military Coordinator" of the 30th of November Group, and Hemming and Davis, both instructors for Interpen. The document was "approved" by Quesada. Hemming told Bartes that this document "had been presented to CIA in Miami last year but that nothing had come of it." When Bartes passed this on to the Agency, they said they would be glad to "have copies of any of the documents which he had," but reiterated that they "could not and would not advise him in any manner, shape, or form in connection with any such operation."
"He seemed to understand that we could not help him," the CIA memo said of Bartes, "and when he left he said that he thought he would tell the three men, Laborde, Hemming, and Davis, that he could not go along with them." The CIA memo went on to disclose that they had learned from another source who was a "close friend" of Bartes's, that he had seen Bartes with Hemming, Laborde, and Davis and that "they looked like a bunch of thugs." The friend also said that Bartes had said, "confidentially," that he was dealing with the three men "as a representative of the New Orleans Cuban Refugee Organization," meaning the CIA-backed CRC. Bartes added, said the friend, "that these three men were armed and therefore potentially dangerous."
CIA files on Bartes show that on January 4, 1961, the Operational Approval and Support Division asked the Security Office for a check on Bartes for use in a "contact and assessment" role in the area "WH [Western Hemisphere] Cuba." By September 1965, Bartes was working for the CIA's Special Operations Division. In between, he had a date on television with Oswald. That event, however, would not transpire until August 1963, and will be discussed in Chapter Seventeen. Before his Cuban escapades in New Orleans, however, Oswald spent almost ten months in Dallas. It is to that part of the story that we now turn.
# CHAPTER FIFTEEN
# The Unworthy Oswald
The outward appearance of the documentary record covering Oswald's ten months in Fort Worth and Dallas, from June 1962 to April 1963, is dominated by a gaping hole. The story that goes with that record is about how the FBI closed its file on Oswald in October 1962, became interested in him again six months later because he wrote a letter to a communist newspaper, and then lost track of him in April 1963 only a month after reopening his file.
There are several problems with this activity, especially at the points when the Oswald FBI file is opened and closed. First of all, why was it that the FBI, which had been primed for Oswald's return from Russia, calmly closed the book on him in spite of his uncooperative and obstreperous attitude, refusal to take a lie detector test, and immediate mail activities with just about any communist or left wing organizations he could think of. For his performance, Oswald was deemed "unworthy" of further attention, so unworthy that when, on a Dallas spring day in 1963, when someone from the FBI went looking for Oswald and found he had gone, nobody cared. Oswald was just routine.
As we will see, the first intercepted FPCC letter to land in Oswald's file was discounted by the FBI agent in charge of the file. Dallas Special Agent James Hosty claims he did not believe Oswald's remark that he had handed out FPCC literature in Dallas. Perhaps, but the inconsistency is the FBI's claim that Oswald's file was reopened in March because of a letter to the Worker. The file had been closed in October 1962, just after learning—on 28 September—of a similar letter to the Worker. The circumstances surrounding the closure of Oswald's file directly contradict the stated rationale for its reopening.
During the documentary dark zone covered in this chapter, Oswald wrote to—and received mail from—the Soviet Embassy, the American Communist Party, the Socialist Workers Party, and an assortment of other far left periodicals and organizations. FBI Director Kelley's book admits that the FBI knew about this all along. The story the FBI told the Warren Commission about its interest in Oswald was, at best, fictionalized to cover sensitive programs such as the opening of mail to and from the Soviet Embassy in Washington D.C. As we will see, this problem persisted and was related to Oswald's move to New Orleans.
New Orleans is the subject of Chapters Sixteen and Seventeen. They begin a new phase in Oswald's about-to-be-shortened life: his venture into the shadowy world of the Cuban exiles there, handing out leaflets on the streets, and appearing in courtroom scenes and debates covered by radio and television. Oswald's transition into his Cuban role begins in Dallas, just before the end of the period to which we now turn.
# Labyrinth V: Closing the Oswald File
"You should be alert for subject's [Oswald] return to the United States," FBI headquarters directed the Dallas FBI office on May 31, 1962, "and immediately upon his arrival you should thoroughly interview him to determine whether he was recruited by Soviet intelligence or made any deals with Soviets in order to obtain permission to return to the United States." The Bureau memorandum further directed the following:
In your interview with subject, you should attempt to ascertain exactly what information he furnished to the Soviets. If any doubt exists as to subject's truthfulness during such interview, you should consider requesting his consent to a polygraph examination and, thereafter, obtain Bureau authority for such an examination. Results of interview with subject should be submitted in form suitable for dissemination.
By the end of May 1962, the Bureau had already decided it wanted Oswald grilled. On June 14, FBI headquarters sent an air telegram to the New York FBI office relaying to them that "Bureau liaison was informed by ONI [Office of Naval Intelligence] on 6/14/62 that ONI is aware of subject's [Oswald's] scheduled arrival in US but has no confirmation of his actual arrival." The air telegram also indicated that ONI contemplated taking no action against Oswald but "requested to be advised of results of our interview."
The point of adding the ONI's expressed interest in this telegram to New York was to underline the importance of monitoring Oswald's movements when he returned so that he could be immediately interviewed. The telegram then repeated all the instructions previously sent to Dallas about "thoroughly interviewing" Oswald, and added these additional orders: "New York should contact INS to verify subject's arrival, determine his destination in US, and advise Bureau, Dallas, and WFO." The New York FBI office verified Oswald's June 13 arrival and, as ordered, furnished Oswald's destination: Fort Worth, Texas.
It was perhaps fitting that on the day the FBI interviewed Oswald, June 26, 1962, he walked into the Commercial Employment Agency and applied for a job saying he had been in Moscow working for the State Department. The unsuspecting clerk probably failed to see the comedy in this. The FBI did not fare much better when Special Agent John Fain interviewed him in Fort Worth, Texas at one P.M. on June 26. Oswald reportedly went with Fain to the FBI office but refused to take a lie detector test. But according to former FBI Director Kelley, the interview did not exactly begin this way. Kelley says Fain was trying to schedule a "fact-finding meeting" with Oswald when he burst into the Dallas FBI office unannounced, and said, "Here I am, what do you want me to talk about?"
Before discussing the interview with Oswald, it is useful to know that, amazingly, the CIA was not furnished with a report of this interview. The moment that the FBI, ONI, INS, and the State Department had all been waiting for arrived the handwritten dissemination list neglected to add CIA, and there is no surviving routing sheet from 1962 associated with the report. The State Department, INS, and the ONI all got their copies.
What did the CIA miss? Quite a show, from what the FBI says. Oswald was arrogant, intemperate, and impatient, often declining to answer questions. The agents' standing instructions when meeting such resistance were to request the subject to submit to a polygraph. They asked and he refused. Oswald said he had borrowed $435 from the American Embassy with which to come home, but then refused to answer Fain's question as to why he had gone to the Soviet Union in the first place. Oswald then made an angry "show of temper" stating that he did not want to "relive the past." Oswald reportedly shouted this last remark at Fain, after which "Fain and Oswald nearly squared off right there in Fain's office."
"From the very beginning," said Director Kelley in his 1987 autobiography, "dealing with Lee Harvey Oswald was no picnic for the FBI." It was certainly no picnic for John Fain. This recollection includes this passage:
During most of the interview, Oswald exhibited an impatient and arrogant attitude. Oswald finally stated that Soviet officials had asked him upon his arrival why he had come to Russia. Oswald stated that he told them, "I came because I wanted to." Oswald added that he went to Russia to "see the country."
Oswald advised that newspaper reports which have appeared in the public press from time to time are highly exaggerated and untrue. He stated that the newspaper reports had pictured him as out of sympathy with the United States and had made him look attractive to the Russians. Oswald stated that by reason of such newspaper reports he had received better treatment by the Soviets than he otherwise would have received.
Oswald might have thought his remarks were clever, but Fain obviously did not. In addition, the interview highlighted Oswald's deep dislike for journalism.
Significantly, the interview did explore what Oswald had done in the Soviet Union, how he had had spent his time as a metal worker in a "television factory" [wrong, it was a radio factory], and had been permitted to live in Minsk as a "resident alien." Oswald said he had learned Russian by "self instruction" while in the Marines, but denied ever having been in the American Communist Party. According to Fain's recapitulation:
He denied that he went to Russia because of his lack of sympathy for the institutions of the United States or because of an admiration for the Russian system. He admitted that he had read books by Karl Marx while a resident of New Orleans, Louisiana, but he stated that he was merely interested in the economic theories.
Oswald declined to explain what he meant when he wrote his mother while en route to Russia that his "values" and those of his mother and brother were different.
Oswald stated he does not know where his birth certificate is and he denied that he took same to Russia with him.
On April 10, 1961, Marguerite Oswald said that Oswald took his birth certificate with him when he left Fort Worth. In the interview, Oswald denies knowledge of the location of his birth certificate. Yet, as soon as September 17, Oswald presented his birth certificate in New Orleans to get a Mexican tourist card. On November 22, 1963, a negative of Oswald's birth certificate was found and became Exhibit 800 in the Warren Report.
Oswald was evidently willing to alter any truth that suited his advantage in the conversation. Here is a portion of the interview with a point-by-point critical analysis:
1. "Oswald denied that he had renounced his United States citizenship and stated that he did not seek Soviet citizenship while in Russia." False. He had sought Soviet citizenship while in the Soviet Union.
2. "Oswald stated that he was never approached by the Soviet officials in an attempt to pull information from him concerning his experiences while a member of the US Marine Corps." Possibly true, but it is likely that the circle around him in Minsk was used for such a purpose. It would not be surprising if he had been approached for his information. After all, he had offered it, with KGB ears listening, inside the American Embassy in Moscow.
3. "Oswald also stated that he was not recruited at any time while in Russia by the Soviet intelligence." Probably true.
4. "He stated that he made no deal with the Soviets in order to obtain permission to return to the United States." Possibly true, but it would not be surprising if the reverse were true.
5. "He stated that the Soviets made it very difficult for him to obtain permission for his wife to leave Russia, and that the process of obtaining permission for her to leave was a long difficult course requiring much paper work." Mostly accurate.
6. "He stated that no attempt was made by the Soviets at any time to "brainwash" him." Possibly true, but it is difficult to be certain.
7. "Oswald stated that he never at any time gave the Soviets any information which would be used in a detrimental way against the United States." This is doubtful. It certainly appeared to be his intention to do so. A pat denial afterward is difficult to accept in the face of his earlier eagerness.
8. "He stated that the Soviets never sought any such information from him. Oswald denied that he at any time while in Russia had offered to reveal to the Soviets any information he had acquired as a radar operator in the US marines." False. He made precisely such an offer in front of American officials.
Oswald provided Marina's Soviet passport number, Ky37790, and explained she was required to keep the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C. informed of her address and her periodic "whereabouts" while she was in the United States. Oswald mentioned that he was thinking of contacting the Soviet Embassy in "a few days" to tell them what Marina's current address was. But Oswald went a little further than that. Soon, in July, according to FBI director Kelley, the FBI found out that Oswald "had sought information from the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C., about Russian newspapers and periodicals." Of course, Fain's report included this passage:
Oswald stated that in the event he is contacted by Soviet Intelligence under suspicious circumstances or otherwise, he will promptly communicate with the FBI. He stated that he holds no brief for the Russians or the Russian system.
Oswald neglected to say that he would tell the FBI if he contacted the "Russians or the Russian system." He did not have to tell them. Oswald's mail was a kaleidoscope of communist literature and organizations, and, as we will see, the FBI knew it.
On July 16, 1962, Oswald went to work as a metal worker for $1.25 per hour at Leslie Welding Company. Oswald then rented a house, 2703 Mercedes, Fort Worth, for $59.50 a month from Chester Allen Riggs, Jr. On August 17, Oswald filed a change of address notice from 7313 Davenport to 2703 Mercedes, Fort Worth. At this time, Oswald started bugging the Navy yet again: On August 1 he wrote, using his 2703 Mercedes address, complaining about his undesirable discharge. On August 6, the U.S. Navy Review Board responded. He lost his job at Leslie Welding on October 9, which is not surprising, as it seems Oswald's primary interest was his pursuit of communist literature and organizations. Chester Riggs knew that something about Oswald's mail was out of the ordinary. Riggs told the Secret Service after the assassination that the U.S. Postal Inspection Service had investigated Oswald for receiving subversive mail while he was living at 2703 Mercedes.
Oswald lived at the Mercedes address between August 17 and October 7, 1962. The mail to and from that address during this period was so unusual for Texas that Oswald was probably watched closely. He began with a two-dollar subscription to the Worker on August 5, and an August 12 inquiry to the Socialist Workers Party, both using 2703 Mercedes as the return address. The Socialist Workers Party was, of course, on the list of subversive organizations, and FBI agent Hosty later testified he considered it a "Trotskyite" type of political party. On August 23, 1962, the Socialist Workers Party answered Oswald's inquiry, and Oswald was at it again on August 26, sending $.25 for material on Trotsky. On September 29, Pioneer Publishers wrote to Oswald telling him that the Trotsky pamphlet he had ordered was not available. In September, Oswald sent another $2.20 for a one-year subscription to the Russian periodical Krokodil.
Meanwhile, Fain admitted the first interview had been a failure. "Agent Fain reported to the special agent-in-charge of the Dallas office," says Director Kelley, "that the interview had been most unsatisfactory, that he was less than trusting of Oswald's answers, and that he would attempt another interview with Oswald." On August 14, 1962, FBI agent Fain called Robert Oswald to find out where his brother was working. Fain got his opportunity on August 16, 1962, when he and Agent Arnold Brown pulled up in front of Oswald's house on Mercedes. All three sat in the FBI agents' car during the interview.
Because in this, the second interview, Fain claimed relative success, we must carefully compare it to the first interview to see where he makes progress. Unlike the June 26 interview, the FBI report on this interview was sent to the CIA. We will return to that point shortly. For convenience we will reconstruct the second interview, beginning with what was similar to the first one.
Oswald repeated the requirement to keep the Soviet Embassy informed about Marina's address, lied about his attempt to renounce his U.S. citizenship and affirm allegiance to the Soviet Union, lied about his offer of military information to the Soviets, complained about his travails in returning home with his family, refused to answer why he had gone to the Soviet Union in the first place, and then added:
He stated he considers it "nobody's business" why he wanted to go to the Soviet Union. Oswald finally stated he went over to Russia for his "own personal reasons." He said it was a "personal matter" to him. He said, "I went, and I came back!" He also said "it was something that I did."
This hostile rhetoric added little new to the equation. But this had a crucial bearing on several other questions that Oswald glibly dismissed, such as the question of possible KGB recruitment or attempted recruitment. He acknowledged but did not answer the question about having different values from those of his mother, still declined to give names of relatives in the U.S.S.R., still denied making any "deals," discounted the idea of Soviet intelligence interest in his activities, and said no one ever attempted to recruit him or elicit any secret information.
After complaining about the Marine Corps and a few comments about his new address and job, along with assurances that no Soviet intelligence agents were in contact with him, Oswald said this:
Oswald advised when he first arrived in the Soviet Union, and also when he started to leave, he was interviewed by representatives of the MVD, which he characterized as being the secret police, who, for the most part handle criminal matters among the population generally. He stated their operation is widespread.
In addition, Oswald stated he might have to return to the Soviet Union in about five years in order to take his wife back home to see her relatives. No definite plans had been made. A useful piece of news was Oswald's clarification that he had not taken his birth certificate to the Soviet Union; he said he thought it had been "packed in a trunk at his mother's home."
Director Kelley described the second interview with Oswald this way: "Oswald, though much more placid this time, still evaded as many questions as he could." But, strangely, the Dallas office decided to close Oswald's file. Kelley's account picks up the story:
Agent Fain and officials at FBI headquarters, however, were apparently satisfied that Oswald was not a security risk, that he was not violent, and that, as a sheet metal worker in Fort Worth, he was not working in a sensitive industry in this country. They, therefore, recommended that his file be placed in an inactive status, a decision routinely made by officials within the FBI's Soviet espionage section.
The inactive status lasted from late August through October. In that later month John Fain retired and Oswald's file was officially closed instead of being reassigned to Hosty. We will return to this closing shortly.
Why did the FBI send only the second Oswald interview to the CIA? Of the two, the first would have been more interesting to the Agency. That interview contained more information about Oswald's activities in the Soviet Union and therefore would have been more useful from a "Soviet Realities" SR/6 perspective. Obviously, the FBI should have sent them both, just as both were sent to the State Department. Therefore, we should not overlook the possibility that the FBI did send a copy to the CIA, and that it is the Agency that is responsible for the missing document. Whatever the explanation, the incident is worth noting, because it appears to be part of a pattern in Oswald's CIA and FBI files, a pattern that continued through 1963.
# Unworthy of Any Further Consideration
When Oswald left his job at Leslie Welding, his time card for that day is marked with the word "quit." Oswald asked Leslie Welding to forward his pay to P. O. Box 2915, Dallas. He had rented that post office box that same day for $4.50 at the main post office, where he received two keys. This post office box would be used to order the alleged murder weapon of President Kennedy. Then there was the baby baptism flap. Mrs. Elena Hall brought Marina to St. Seraphim Eastern Orthodox Church, Dallas, where Father Dimitri Royster baptized June Lee Oswald. Mrs. Hall was named as the godparent. Marina claimed Oswald knew about the baptism. But on October 19, Oswald asked Marina's friend, Mrs. Taylor, why Marina had not told him about It.
Oswald and Marina had been having marital difficulties, but Oswald tried to put on a good performance at a Thanksgiving gathering at Robert Oswald's house. On November 17, Oswald had written to Robert accepting the invitation to come, and on November 22, Thanksgiving Day, the Oswalds went by bus to Fort Worth, where brothers John Pic and Robert met them. Marguerite, oddly, was not invited. The families enjoyed a pleasant day. John Pic reportedly said Oswald could not get a driver's license with his undesirable discharge, and Oswald spoke about getting his discharge changed. Later, at the bus station, the Oswalds bought a recording of the theme music from Exodus and had snapshots made.
The Thanksgiving Day event obscures what the baby baptism flap demonstrated: that Oswald was often in his own sphere, unconnected to ordinary events. Oswald was far from idle, however, at least where the U.S. mail was concerned. His mail was so radically left wing that he could have expected to be the subject of FBI scrutiny. The date September 28 is a benchmark, for on that day the FBI learned that Oswald subscribed to the Worker. Oswald now looked like a Communist. An FBI source in New York, NY 2354-S*, had turned over photographs that included Oswald's subscription sent on August 5. This led to a memorandum from New York to Dallas, on October 17, with an enclosed photograph of Oswald's name and address—taken from a subscriber list for the Worker, obtained from inside the newspaper's premises.
Strangely, these new additions to Oswald's FBI files did not find a receptive audience. Stranger still is what the FBI says it did with Oswald's file at this point: They closed it down. Kelley acknowledges that the FBI knew in July 1962 that Oswald had sought information about Russian newspapers and periodicals from the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C., and knew in October that Oswald had "renewed his subscription to the Worker, the U.S. Communist Party newspaper." Then the FBI closed its file on Oswald in October 1962, when Fain retired. Kelley says that at that time the Oswald case "was regarded as merely routine, unworthy of any further consideration."
As odious and deplorable as the tracking of private American citizens is, we know that many people with a far more benign history than Oswald were closely watched. Oswald was a known redefector married to a Soviet citizen. Headquarters had ordered Oswald thoroughly interviewed, but Oswald proved contentious as well as untruthful, and the FBI agents did not believe his story. The second interview was at best inconclusive, and Fain's reasons for not considering Oswald a threat—as described by FBI director Kelley—took no account of what the FBI had already learned about his mail activities. These activities had taken place since the first interview, and Oswald had hidden them from the FBI during the second interview. At this point, Fain could just as easily have argued for aggressively pursuing the case. Oswald's behavior was not "routine," even if closing his file was.
To add a twist of irony, in October 1962, according to Kelley, "Agent Hosty was given the assignment of reopening Marina Oswald's file. His instructions were to interview her in six months, which meant the FBI agent was to contact her in March of 1963." So it was against the backdrop of Marina's open case and Oswald's closed case that the following sequence of left wing mail activity took place: on October 27, Oswald notified the Washington Book Store, through which he ordered Soviet magazines from Washington, D.C., of his change of address to Box 2915, Dallas; on October 30, Oswald applied for membership in the Socialist Workers Party; on November 5, 1962, the Socialist Workers Party responded that "as there is no Dallas chapter there can be no memberships in this area"; on November 10, Oswald sent $.25 with a self-addressed envelope to New York Labor News; on December 6 Oswald sent examples of his photographic work to the Socialist Workers Party and they answered him on December 9; in early December, Oswald sent examples of his photographic work to the Hall-Davis Defense Committee, a communist front, in New York; on December 13, the Hall-Davis Committee answered; on December 15, Oswald sent one dollar for a subscription to the Militant; on December 19, Louis Weinstock of the Worker wrote to Oswald; on January 1, 1963, Oswald contacted Pioneer Press for speeches by Castro; in January, Oswald wrote to the Washington Book Store, which was probably recommended to him by the Soviet Embassy, and enclosed $13.20 for a subscription to Ogonek, The Agitator, and Krokodil, or Sovetakaya Belorussia, and also requested that these subscriptions end in December 1963; in September 1962, Oswald sent two dollars for a subscription to Krokodil; on January 2, 1963, Oswald sent $.35 for some communist literature, including the English words for the "Internationale." In this various correspondence, Oswald used Box 2915, Dallas, as his address.
The above was not all of Oswald's mail activity. But it led to actions by the post office which Oswald protested. He had to execute a post office Form 2153-X, instructing them to "always" deliver foreign propaganda mailings. He added this comment to the form: "I protest this intimidation." Oswald had more than paper delivered to his P.O. box. In January 1963, the February issue of American Rifleman had a coupon that Oswald used to order the alleged assassination rifle. He filled it out using the name of "A.J. Hidell," and Post Office Box 2915, Dallas. He also ordered the pistol that was allegedly used to murder Dallas policeman J. D. Tippit. He originally indicated he wanted to order a holster and ammunition, but he scratched out this part before mailing the coupon.
By March it was time for Hosty's first talk with Marina. Hosty had only just learned on March 4 of Oswald's apartment at 602 Elsbeth, Dallas. On March 10, Hosty visited Mrs. M. F. Tobias, the apartment manager. Oswald had moved to 214 West Neeley Street on March 3, Tobias told the FBI. This was only a week after Oswald had made the move, so Hosty had not wasted time finding out they had moved. Hosty then recommended that Oswald's case be reopened, which it was on March 26. The reason for reopening the file was because "of Oswald's newly opened subscription to the Communist newspaper," the Worker.
On the previous occasion that the Dallas FBI office had learned of Oswald's subscription to the Worker (October 1962), they had closed his file. Now the same event was the stated reason for opening it again. This makes little sense. In fact, this reopening had a caveat. "Agent Hosty, deciding that the apparently tense Oswald domestic situation would not be conducive to a proper interview," Kelley explained, "jotted a note in his file to come back in forty-five to sixty days." By that time, Oswald had skipped town.
# A Castro Placard Around Oswald's Neck
In the first three months of 1963, Oswald's mail activity remained steady and his particular diet of literature resembled that of the previous fall. Oswald received the January 21, 1963, issue of The Militant by January 24,. Oswald received the March 11 issue of The Militant by March 14. On March 27 or 28, 1963, Oswald received the March 24 issue of The Daily Worker. On February 20, 1963, Oswald wrote to the Communist Party headquarters, New York, requesting information and asking to subscribe to two newspapers, the Worker and The Militant.
On March 24, 1963, Oswald wrote to the Socialist Workers Party. Their copy of the letter and an enclosed newspaper clipping Oswald sent have been lost. On March 27, 1963, the Socialist Workers Party wrote back to Oswald, at his P.O. Box 2915 address. The Socialist Workers Party cannot find this correspondence either. According to the FBI, by this time the FBI Dallas office had finally decided to look into Oswald again, reopening his file on March 26. It was too late, however, as Oswald had less than a month left in Dallas. On March 31, 1963, Marina took photographs of Oswald in their backyard. He was holding a copy of The Militant and the Worker in one hand, and the rifle alleged to have later killed the president in the other.
Meanwhile, Oswald had one more important composition to mail, one that was destined to become a catalyst in Oswald's CIA files. On April 18, 1963, Oswald wrote to the Fair Play for Cuba Committee New York office. At the end of the summer, the contents of this letter would finally land in Oswald's CIA files. In the April 18 letter, Oswald said that he had passed out FPCC literature on the street the day before, and he asked for more copies. The fact that Oswald used his Dallas address raises the possibility he may not have made final plans to move to New Orleans until the end: he left on April 24. On April 19, 1963, the Fair Play for Cuba Committee New York office sent Oswald more literature.
Like the CIA, the FBI had a mail-reading capability of its own, and Oswald's correspondence would shortly generate a flurry of reporting on his activities by the New York office of the FBI. On April 6, 1963, Oswald lost his job at Jaggers-Chiles-Stoval because he could not do the work or get along with his coworkers. It is difficult to judge when Oswald began planning to move to New Orleans. Three days before his departure, the FBI intercepted Oswald's letter to the FPCC describing his public FPCC activities. The letter, which Oswald sent via air mail, was postmarked April 18. According to FBI records, on April 21, 1963, Dallas confidential informant "T-2" reported this letter to the FPCC, in which Oswald said he had passed out FPCC pamphlets in Dallas with a placard around his neck reading HANDS OFF CUBA, VIVA FIDEL. Actually, this Dallas T-2 source on Oswald was really a New York FBI source—NY-3245-S—as can be seen from newly released JFK files. Similarly, an earlier Dallas T-1 source who had spied on Oswald's letters to the Worker also turned out to be a New York source, NY-2354-S.
The Warren Commission questioned the FBI about the April letter and its contents, asking, "Is this information correct as the date indicated and does it describe activities before Oswald's move to New Orleans?" The FBI's answer was vague, slippery, and paltry: "Our informant did not know Oswald personally and could furnish no further information. Our investigation had not disclosed such activity on Oswald's part prior to this type of activity in New Orleans."
Special Agent Hosty, who barely expanded on this in his testimony to the commission on the Oswald placard-around-his-neck letter, added his disbelief of the story. Hosty explained: "We had received no information to the effect that anyone had been in the downtown streets of Dallas or anywhere in Dallas with a sign around their neck saying 'hands off Cuba, viva Fidel.' " Thus Hosty links his belief to negative intelligence, i.e., no reports had come to their attention on Oswald, and Hosty was confident that the Dallas FBI had adequate surveillance and reporting mechanisms tight enough to catch any activity as flagrant and provocative as this. "It appeared highly unlikely to me," Hosty testified, "that such an occurrence could have happened in Dallas without having been brought to our attention."
Hosty's argument suggests that Oswald made a false claim—apparently to impress the FPCC—that failed to fool the Dallas office of the FBI. If Hosty is correct, we should be impressed, not only with the Dallas FBI office's knowledge of what Oswald was doing, but also with their ability to figure out what he was not doing. As we have already seen, however, the performance of the Dallas FBI office was lackluster at best, where keeping track of Oswald was concerned.
Whether Oswald had stood on a street corner or not, important undercover FBI assets in New York were in motion against the FPCC during the time or shortly after Oswald wrote the letter. As we already know, the Fair Play for Cuba Committee was the subject for intense FBI and CIA interest and counterintelligence operations. A major FBI Chicago office investigation of the FPCC appeared on March 8, four days before Oswald ordered the rifle from Chicago. This study was transmitted to the CIA. By picking such an organization to correspond with and carrying out actions on its behalf, Oswald—by default or by design—had insinuated himself into the gray world of the watchers and the watched.
# George deMohrenschildt and the CIA
In any discussion of Oswald in Dallas the name George deMohrenschildt arises because of the help he gave the Oswald family and his likely contacts with the CIA. DeMohrenschildt, to whose Dallas home the Oswalds made many visits, was a petroleum geologist. His travels overseas made him knowledgeable about the affairs of countries in which the CIA was interested. When introduced to Oswald in the fall of 1962 by a friend, deMohrenschildt asked, "Do you think it is safe for us to help Oswald?" DeMohrenschildt told the Warren Commission he worried that "Oswald could be anything" because he had been to the Soviet Union, and that another Dallas resident had refused to meet the Oswalds. After checking with FBI contacts, deMohrenschildt says he concluded, "Well, this guy seems to be OK."
One of the people deMohrenschildt checked with was J. Walton Moore. Moore was not in the FBI. He was the Dallas CIA Domestic Contacts Service chief at the time. In his testimony to the Warren Commission, deMohrenschildt described Moore in these words:
Walter [sic] Moore is the man who interviewed me on behalf of the Government after I came back from Yugoslavia. . . . He is a Government man—either FBI or Central Intelligence. A very nice fellow, exceedingly intelligent who is, as far as I know—was some sort of an FBI man in Dallas. Many people consider him the head of the FBI in Dallas. Now, I don't know. Who does—you see. But he is a government man in some capacity. He interviewed me and took my deposition on my stay in Yugoslavia, what I thought about the political situation there. And we became quite friendly after that. We saw each other from time to time, had lunch. There was a mutual interest there, because I think he was born in China and my wife was born in China. They had been to our house once or twice. I just found him a very interesting person.
J. Gordon Shanklin was the head of the Dallas FBI office, and it is likely that deMohrenschildt knew that Moore was CIA. The point is that the Agency's Domestic Contacts person in Dallas was in frequent contact with deMohrenschildt during the period that he was helping Oswald.
Could deMohrenschildt have been a CIA "control" for Oswald, with Moore as the reporting channel? Almost certainly not in the traditional sense, unless Moore worked in more than the Domestic Contacts division, whose mission was routine contacts and debriefings. For his part, deMohrenschildt explicitly denied that Oswald would have been suited for intelligence work. "I never would believe that any government would be stupid enough to trust Lee with anything important," deMohrenschildt testified, "even the government of Ghana would not give him any job of any type." Of course this judgment would be untrustworthy if Moore and deMohrenschildt were pawns in a plot to murder the president, a highly circumstantial and speculative possibility at best.
Most of the deMohrenschildt's contact with Oswald took place during the six-month period when the FBI closed its books on him—from October 1962 through March 1963. Wading through the morass of Oswald's personal relationships in Dallas in search of the deMohrenschildt story is outside the scope of this work. Several new works on Oswald presumably will add much to what we already know about this story. As previously stated, ours is a study focused not on Oswald "the person" but on Oswald "the file"—especially his CIA files. In that regard, looking for an operational CIA channel for deMohrenschildt is clearly in order. Before moving on, therefore, we must pose this question: Did deMohrenschildt have other contacts with the CIA?
"Yes, I knew George," says Nicholas M. Anikeeff. "From young manhood before World War II, back in the 30s, we were close friends." In a recent interview, Mr. Anikeeff acknowledged not only his close and continuous friendship with deMohrenschildt, but also his former employment with the CIA. Anikeeff, however, stubbornly refused to disclose what part of the Agency he had worked for, even when told it is publicly known. His reticence may be explainable by the traditional Agency intransigeance to reveal anything about its internal structure. But such resistence today simply raises our antennae.
"Yes, I believe I saw him," Anikeeff says of deMohrenschildt, "in the spring of 1963." That would have been during deMohrenschildt's travel to Washington, D.C., a stopover on his way to relocation in Haiti, where prospective business deals awaited him. Researchers have often wondered if deMohrenschildt called on someone from the Agency during this visit to Washington, and now we know that he did. Anikeeff, however, maintains that Oswald's name did not come up in the discussions. "I don't recall any specific instance of speaking with deMohrenschildt about Oswald prior to the assassination," Anikeeff insists. "Yes, I talked with deMohrenschildt," he concedes, "and may have spoken with him about Oswald." However, Anikeeff is adamant that he "never had said anything to the Agency" about these discussions.
Who was Nicholas Anikeeff? During the early 1950s, when the CIA dispatched two groups of Lithuanian infiltrators into Poland, Anikeeff was intimately involved. Tom Bower's study of the KGB and British intelligence, The Red Web, contains this interesting detail:
In preparing both operations, the CIA case officer Mike Anikeeff had liased in detail with the Reinhard Gehlen group which would become West Germany's foreign intelligence service and was sure that security was perfect. Yet the landings ended in swift disaster.
Similarly, David Wise's Invisible Government names the chain of command for a CIA employee, John Torpats, who had become embroiled in a controversy after being fired by Allen Dulles. From the top down: Frank Wisner (the DDP), Richard Helms (the A/DDP), John Maury (chief of the Soviet Russia Division), and "N. M. Anikeeff." It would appear that Anikeeff was a branch chief in the Soviet Russia Division.
That deMohrenschildt had a close contact in the Soviet Russia Division of 1962—1963 is newsworthy. It does not, however, prove that Oswald or deMohrenschildt worked for the Agency or that deMohrenschildt was reporting to Anikeeff about Oswald's activities. For the time being, we will add this to the already large and growing pile of interesting coincidences in this case.
# The Duran—Lechuga Affair
In the fall of 1962, a scandalous affair took place in Mexico City that bears on Oswald's visit there in September—October 1963. That visit, including the allegation that Oswald had sex with a married Mexican woman, is the subject of Chapter Eighteen. For now we consider what happened after the Cuban ambassador's wife decided not to return to Cuba in 1962. Intelligence acquired through very sensitive channels suggests that the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City resorted to an unusual measure to keep the ambassador "on the revolutionary path." The embassy used the sexual services of two young women to turn the ambassador against his wife. One of these women, Silvia Duran, is the same woman Oswald was later alleged to have had an affair with.
The documentary trail began on February 18, 1963, when a sensitive CIA source reported on the volatile marriage and extramarital affairs of Carlos Lechuga, the Cuban ambassador to the U.N., who had previously served as the Cuban ambassador to Mexico. According to the CIA information report, classified "Secret No Foreign DISSEM," this is what their Cuban source said:
In late December 1962, Carlos Lechuga Hevia, described as an ambitious, evasive, and not overly intelligent man, was unhappy in New York, as Cuban Ambassador to the UN, because neither the United States nor the USSR paid any attention to him. In spite of being in love with his wife, Lechuga had denounced her to Raul Roa and Osvaldo Dorticos Torrado, President of Cuba, as being a passive enemy of the revolution.
The Cuban source to which this less-than-flattering portrait of Lechuga was attributed was described in the CIA report's subject line as "a Former Cuban Government Official." Whoever it was knew a lot about what was happening inside the Cuban missions in New York and Mexico City.
How Lechuga's denunciation of his wife had come about was an interesting story. According to the CIA information report, the "former Cuban official described it this way:
The denunciation was allegedly made under pressure by certain members of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico, who, in their attempts to persuade Lechuga, had employed the influences of Ana Maria Blanco, then First Secretary at the Embassy, and Silvia Duran, a Mexican married woman employed at the Cuban-Mexican Cultural Institute. Lechuga had offered to marry Duran after divorcing his wife, since she was ready to accompany him to Cuba, and Lechuga considered this a requisite indispensable to his revolutionary spirit. In addition, at that time his wife was emphatically refusing to return to Cuba so long as the Castro regime continued in power, and especially after learning that she had been denounced.
The Cuban source pointed out that when Lechuga and his wife had arrived in Mexico City in May 1962, he had promised her that he would renounce his job as soon as he could find an opportunity, because he was "not a Communist" and did not want to lose her. "Far from doing that," the Cuban source lamented, "as of late December 1962, Lechuga seemed to have surrendered more and more to the revolution."
The next piece to this story occurred on November 24, 1963, two days after the Kennedy assassination, in a memo on Oswald prepared for FBI Counterintelligence chief W. C. Sullivan. The memo mentioned CIA information from the "Liaison Agent," possibly Sam Papich, about the arrest of Silvia Duran in Mexico City and "that she had allegedly been in contact" with Oswald. The CIA told the FBI liaison that they were following the story and would report any developments of significance. The memo then mentioned this:
Bureau files indicate that Duran may be identical with Silvia T. DeDuran, who was described by CIA on November 30, 1962, as a Mexican national who had been the mistress of Carlos Lechuga, former Cuban Ambassador to Mexico and now his country's Ambassador to the United Nations. CIA further indicated that the aforementioned woman had served as a director of the Mexican-Cuban Cultural Institute and that her husband was Horacio Duran, a well-known Mexican decorator (105-77113-57). Raichhardt stated that this information was also being furnished to our Legal Attaché, Mexico City. Legal Attaché will be kept apprised of information coming to the attention of CIA in Mexico City.
If accurate, this would indicate that at least one more CIA document on the Duran-Lechuga affair exists, and bears the date November 30, 1962. By the end of 1962, the information on Duran in CIA and FBI files was substantial and growing.
Up to now, Duran's alleged affairs in Mexico City have been shrouded in controversy. In an interview conducted for this book by British journalist Anthony Summers, Mrs. Duran admitted to the affair with Lechuga. Here is the pertinent passage from the interview transcript:
SUMMERS: [After explaining to Duran there are new documents released mentioning she supposedly had an affair with Carlos Lechuga.] Is this true?
DURAN: Yes, but it's—that's top secret.
SUMMERS: It is all over the documents, clearly the Americans knew about it in '62. Is it possible that you were being used by anyone, or was it entirely a spontaneous thing? Or were you perhaps pointed in Lechuga's direction?
DURAN: No. No. It was completely accidental, I mean it was not . . . No, I don't think so. Because, no, no. I had problems in my marriage, and you know what happens in these things, no? And I didn't divorce because my husband didn't let my child come to Cuba. So that's why I didn't divorce. I divorced later, but not in that moment.
SUMMERS: Was the Lechuga affair over by '63? The time of the assassination?
DURAN: Yes.
SUMMERS: You see no connection?
DURAN: No. This is the first time I've talked about that. But no, of course not. He even went to New York, so I could get a divorce and—he was named Ambassador at the United Nations. He asked Fidel for that, so we can get married. But, no, we couldn't. It was impossible. Very complicated. It was going to mean problems. People were going to use that for, oh, you know . . .
For whom was this affair "top secret"? Probably the Cubans, but Duran's insistence that it was "accidental" seems problematical, for the story intercepted by the CIA explained the affair as a device to separate Lechuga from his wife and keep him on the revolutionary path.
Whether or not the affair was orchestrated by the Cuban Embassy, it made the rounds of both the CIA and FBI in the U.S., and therefore became relevant two years later when the story of an affair between Oswald and Duran surfaced. That is a subject to which we will return in Chapter Nineteen. For now, we turn out attention to events taking place in the anti-Castro segments of the Cuban underworld in Miami and New Orleans.
# Hemming IV: WQAM Radio Show, Miami
Oswald's participation in a live debate on WDSU Radio in New Orleans in August 1963 is covered in Chapter Seventeen. There was a lesser-known call to a local radio show, the Alan Courtney Show, on WQAM, Miami. We do not know the precise date of the program, but surviving FBI records suggest it was in November 1962. A November 27, 1963, FBI report by Miami Special Agent Vincent K. Antle summarized an interview on that date with Alan Courtney, including this segment:
Approximately one year ago, Alan Courtney had Jerry Patrick and three other individuals on his night program on WQAM Radio. These individuals were involved with the training of anti-Castro troops. At the conclusion of the program, Courtney received a telephone call from an individual who had a very young voice. This young man said he would like to talk to one of the persons that had been on the show. He explained that he was from New Orleans and a former Marine and that he wanted to volunteer his services to be of assistance to them.
The person who called in, according to Courtney, "gave the name of Lee Oswald or something like that, such as Harvey Lee or Oswald Harvey or Oswald Lee." Courtney said he gave the phone to one of the guests named "Davey." A December 2, 1963, FBI report by Special Agent James Dwyer identified the man as Howard Kenneth Davis, who, in his own words, was "associated with American mercenaries involved in Cuban revolutionary activities for the past six years."
Once again, Hemming's path crosses Oswald's—providing that the caller was Oswald. Antle's report continues:
Courtney could not recall his last name nor did he recall the names of any of the other individuals except Jerry Patrick whom he described as 6'4" in height. Courtney said that Davey and Oswald did talk on the phone but he does not know if they agreed to an appointment date subsequently. Courtney said he knew that the caller said he stayed up to hear the program so that he could call and attempt an appointment with the participants on the radio show.
While it is not impossible for this caller to have been Oswald, we need harder evidence that he was in Miami in November 1962. The FBI report also states that John Martino alleged that "during the last year" Oswald had been in a "fracas in Bayfront Park" in Miami. After the Kennedy assassination, Martino reportedly claimed advance knowledge of plans for the assassination.
# More Oswald Banjos: Alex in Minsk and Chicago
The most sensitive part of Oswald's mail was to and from the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C. and to and from the Soviet Union. The Soviet Embassy "take" was handled by the Washington field office of the FBI, and the amount was not insubstantial, as the last five months of 1962 indicate: On August 5, 1962, Marina wrote to the Soviet Embassy regarding the return of her passport; on July 20 Oswald wrote to the Soviet Embassy, asking for information on how to subscribe to Russian periodicals; the embassy may have told Oswald of the Washington Book Store, Washington, D.C., where Oswald does place an order; on August 17, Oswald filed a change-of-address notice (from 7313 Davenport to 2703 Mercedes, Fort Worth; on September 6, 1962 Marina's passport is returned by the Soviet Embassy, Washington; and on December 31, Marina wrote New Year's greetings to the Soviet Embassy. The FBI opened all mail going into and out of the Soviet Embassy. The above demonstrates that the FBI had a very good handle on Oswald's whereabouts.
In the first half of 1963, the CIA's HT/LINGUAL project produced fascinating material on Oswald. The postassassination context of the intercepted material is the link between Oswald and the alleged murder weapon. This was relevant to one of the most important aspects of the case. The HT/LINGUAL "take" on the Oswalds, however, contains several anomalies. For example, it was a distinction to be put on the CIA's illegal mail intercept program once, let alone twice, like Oswald had been. But then, Oswald's mail was opened even after he was taken off the list.
Just as anomolous was having mail opened before one is even on the list. This is what happened to Marina. According to the records released by the CIA, Marina was not listed until four days after the assassination, November 26, 1963. But two letters to Marina from the Soviet Union were opened by the CIA in January and May 1963. They prove that the CIA's HT/LINGUAL program did produce important evidence that bears directly upon fundamental aspects of the case and links the disparate ends of Oswald's official files.
Unfortunately, over the years the CIA has made misleading statements about the Oswald letters they opened. Take, for example, this CIA memo—prepared during the Warren Commission investigation—about the 1961 opening of a Marguerite letter: "The letter contains no information of real significance." How strange then, that a SECRET EYES ONLY, June 22, 1962, CIA memorandum from the deputy chief of the mail intercept program to the deputy chief of Counterintelligence said this about the same missive: "This item will be of interest to Mrs. Egerter, CI/SIG, and also to the FBI." Years later, in a response to an FOIA request by researcher Paul Hoch, the CIA stated that "a copy of the document [Marguerite's letter] was forwarded to the FBI immediately upon discovery." Why would the CIA and the FBI be interested in items of no significance?
We don't know whether the CIA told the Warren Commission about Marguerite's letter. The timing of the comment about the letter's insignificance leaves a bad taste, especially because we know the deputy chief of the mail intercept program at the Agency thought it was significant before the assassination. We know more about what the CIA told the HSCA, which probed this intercept program. The HSCA report contains this revealing comment:
Although the Agency had only one Oswald letter in its possession, the HT/LINGUAL files were combed after the assassination for additional materials potentially related to him. Approximately 30 pieces of correspondence that were considered potentially related to the investigation of Oswald's case (even though not necessarily directly to Oswald) were discovered. None of these was ultimately judged by the CIA to be of any significance. These materials, however, were stored in a separate Oswald HT/LINGUAL file.
We know that this story is not true. The CIA's claim that they judged none of these materials to be of "any significance" appears to be a cover story. Any other explanation requires an unbelievable level of incompetence.
From the newly released files, we have begun to learn much more about the value the CIA attached to the Oswald HT/LINGUAL file. During the course of Oswald's return from Russia, this program was expanding. "During 1962 the number of disseminations stemming from project HT/LINGUAL increased," said an April 1964 internal CIA assessment, "as it has each year since the inception of the project. The total number of disseminations in 1963 was 10,999 as compared to the total in 1962 of 8,391." As preciously discussed in Chapter Thirteen, the mail intercept chief, John Mertz, concluded in early 1964 that some of "the most interesting" items intercepted from "ie-defectors" were the "several items" to and from Oswald and Marina.
Mertz singled out one of those particular "banjos" (intercepted pieces of mail) that showed that Oswald's Russian nickname, "Alik," was similar to the "Alex Hidell" pseudonym. Mertz, however, did not indicate when the CIA came into possession of these banjos. From the available record, it would appear the CIA did not show the Mertz memo to the Warren Commission. They should have. Presumably, the Warren Commission would have been interested in this.
Still more clues to what the senior Agency leadership felt about the Oswald HT/LINGUAL materials can be found in the newly released files, including this comment to FBI director Hoover by CIA Counterintelligence chief James Angleton, four days after the assassination:
Your representatives in Mexico advised our representative there that it had not been determined whether Hidell is a person, or an alias used by Oswald. In this connection we refer you to the attached HUNTER items—63 E 22 U and 63 A 24 W. These items indicate that Oswald was known to his wife's friends as "Alik" (also spelled "Alick"). While we have no items in which the name Hidell (or Hydell) appears, it is believed that the fact Oswald was known to his Russian friends as "Alik" may be significant."
The importance that the head of CIA Counterintelligence attached to these two letters was lost when the Agency told the HSCA none of the HT/LINGUAL items was "of any significance." Although Angleton apparently did not know it, Oswald also went by the name Alex while he was in the Soviet Union.
This Angleton memo is also helpful to researchers because it specifies the HT/LINGUAL numbers for two letters in which Oswald's Russian name "Alik" appears. A simple analysis of 63 A 24 W and 63 E 22 U indicates that these must mean letters of January 24, 1963 (item "W" for that day), and May 22, 1963 respectively. Thus these letters in Oswald's HT/LINGUAL file which connect to the alias spanned both the March 4 rifle order and Oswald's April 24 move to New Orleans. The two 1963 "Alik" letters, both to Marina, were listed in the 1964 summary of the Oswald LINGUAL file, but the descriptions for both of them lacked the insight that the Counterintelligence chief had passed on to Hoover in the wake of the assassination.
When Oswald ordered the weapon he used an alias that was similar to a nickname already in his HT/LINGUAL file. The CIA claims it intercepted no Oswald mail of importance., This obviously false claim raises the suspicion that another claim—that Oswald was not the subject of the mail program after May 1962—is also dubious. We know for a fact that three letters, one to Oswald and two to Marina, were opened when neither was on the Watch List. Maybe someone else with a steam iron had a different list.
Until the early 1990s release of documents, the public had no idea that a continuity between Oswald's Russian sojourn and the alleged murder weapon existed—or that the Agency's Counterintelligence chief would write about it, and that the project officer would use it as a showcase example. The Hidell alias story is fraught with problems. One such problem surfaced on the day of the assassination, when the U.S. Army knew, apparently too early, about an identification card in Oswald's possession with the infamous alias on it. We will return to the Hidell problem later.
# CHAPTER SIXTEEN
# Undercover in New Orleans
Up to April 1963, the FBI had little trouble tracking Oswald's footsteps. His return to Texas in June 1962 had made things easier because the Dallas FBI office had begun investigating him soon after his defection in 1959. After Oswald's return, FBI field activity on him had been conducted by several offices, but principally by those in Dallas and New York, the former in whose district he lived and the latter where the FBI office spied on his mail to the Communist Party, the Worker, and the Fair Play for Cuba Committee (FPCC). Then something strange happened: The FBI lost track of Oswald for two months, from April 24, through June 26. These dates cover Oswald's move to New Orleans and his first month of FPCC activity there. The FBI maintains it did not discover that Oswald was in New Orleans until June 26. Moreover, the Bureau left the Warren Commission with the impression that Oswald's place of residence in New Orleans had not been "verified" until August 5. Five days later, from a cell in the jail of the First District Police Department of New Orleans, Oswald asked to speak with someone from the FBI.
Oswald's August 9 arrest on Canal Street and the events that followed are the subject of Chapter Seventeen. The present chapter is a study of the period between his move to New Orleans and the time the FBI says that it confirmed his residence on Magazine Street. We open with an obvious question: Why couldn't the FBI find Oswald? As we will see, the FBI should have known about the move and the Magazine Street address by mid-May, not June 26 and August 5 respectively, as they assert. This prompts the question: What was Oswald doing during the period that the FBI files went blind? The answer is intriguing: He was organizing a chapter of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee in New Orleans.
Using his real name, Oswald wrote often about his plans and activities to FPCC national director Vincent Lee, who encouraged him to undertake organizational work in New Orleans. Lee advised Oswald not to open an office, advice that Oswald ignored. Lee lost interest in Oswald when he violated the bylaws of the FPCC by claiming charter status for his New Orleans "branch." While the FBI remained in the dark and Vincent Lee's interest in Oswald waned, curiosity about FPCC developments in New Orleans was growing in Army counterintelligence, whose agents began following the paper trail in New Orleans left by "A. J. Hidell." Unlike his letters to Vincent Lee, Oswald did not use his real name in the initial—undercover—stage of his FPCC activities in New Orleans. Oswald disappeared from the sights of the FBI Dallas office as A. J. Hidell entered the cross-hairs of Army surveillance, using a false New Orleans post office box and the address of 544 Camp Street.
The 544 Camp Street address deepens the mystery, for this was the location where Guy Banister and the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) maintained their offices. The CRC was the successor to the Frente Revolutionario Democratico (FRD), set up by the CIA in Mexico during the last year of the Eisenhower administration to overthrow Castro by military force. As discussed in Chapter Eight, most of the FRD's military forces—Brigade 2506—had been trained by the U.S. Army at sites in southern Guatemala. In the early months of the Kennedy administration, the CRC was formed to coordinate FRD activities for the U.S. government. The Bay of Pigs fiasco resulted in centrifugal tendencies in the Cuban exile community, but the CRC remained the stable core among the various exile factions. Kennedy's support for the CRC was drastically reduced in the wake of the Cuban missile crisis, and all government funding for the CRC was terminated on May 1, 1963.
Born in a Louisiana log cabin in 1901, Guy Banister had done work with Navy intelligence in World War II, and had developed deep associations within the FBI. He worked for the FBI for twenty years, rising to the position of special agent in charge of the Bureau's Chicago office. In 1955 he moved to New Orleans, where he left the FBI to serve as assistant superintendent of the New Orleans Police Department. His mission was to investigate police corruption, but Banister was forced into retirement in 1957 after threatening a waiter with a pistol in the Old Absinthe House. He then formed his own detective agency, Guy Banister Associates, which he threw into a crusade to root out Communists in New Orleans. In 1961 Banister played a role in the CRC activities associated with the Bay of Pigs Invasion, and he helped organize the Friends of Democratic Cuba, a fund-raising organ for the New Orleans branch of the CRC under Sergio Arcacha Smith. Banister continued to work for the CRC—or "AMBUD" as it was known in the Agency. He ran background investigations of local Cuban students who wanted to join Smith's group, in order to weed out potential pro-Castro sympathizers who might be infiltrators. It was Banister who arranged for the CRC's office space at 544 Camp Street. While hard evidence is lacking, Oswald's undercover pro-Castro activities may have been—whether Oswald was witting or not—associated with a CRC recruiting operation in New Orleans.
Oswald chose a propitious moment to enter the dark world of Guy Banister and the Cuban underground. The day—June 5—that Oswald picked up the FPCC application forms he would distribute in New Orleans, President Kennedy's trip to Dallas was announced in the newspapers.
# "How and When Did the FBI Learn of Oswald's Move to New Orleans?"
A hefty slice of the FBI—including headquarters, and the Dallas, New Orleans, Chicago, Miami, and Washington field offices—had been watching Oswald. Add to this a wide array of the CIA's clandestine services, including the Soviet Russia Division, the Security Office, and the counterintelligence staff, then mix in the State Department's intelligence, security, passport, and Russian components, and then top it off with Navy intelligence, Marine Corps intelligence, Air Force intelligence, and possibly even Army intelligence. Given this level of watchfulness, one would be tempted to think that the FBI, which was actively investigating Oswald, would have known when he moved. This is reasonable because, immediately upon finding his place at Magazine Street, Oswald sent written notification to the Communist Party, the FPCC, the Soviet Embassy, and, most important, the Dallas post office. Much of Oswald's mail to these same organizations was being read surreptitiously by the FBI.
One thing readers of FBI documents quickly encounter is the Bureau's commendable precision about names, dates, and places—especially the "hows" and "whens" with respect to the information it collects and reports. This precision vanishes on a crucial subject: the FBI's knowledge of Oswald's move to New Orleans. The lingering mystery surrounding the Bureau's ignorance of Oswald's move, as well as his early activities there, stands out as one of the Bureau's great failures—if their tale of neglect can be believed. This problem became apparent early during the Warren Commission inquest, when the FBI was asked to clarify the record. On April 6, 1964, the FBI responded to a series of questions concerning its investigation of Oswald. Question Number 9 on this list was answered as follows:
QUESTION: How and when did the FBI learn of Oswald's move to New Orleans?
ANSWER: A confidential source advised our New York Office on June 26, 1963, that one Lee H. Oswald, Post Office Box 30061, New Orleans, Louisiana, had directed a letter to "The Worker," New York City. Our New Orleans Office checked this post office box and determined it was rented to L. H. Oswald on June 3, 1963, residence 657 French Street, New Orleans. This was an incorrect address and further inquiries showed Oswald was residing at 4905 Magazine Street, New Orleans. Oswald's residence in New Orleans was verified on August 5, 1963, by Mrs. Jesse James Garner, 4909 Magazine Street, New Orleans. On the same date his employment at the William B. Reilly Coffee Company, 640 Magazine Street, New Orleans, was determined.
This answer is not satisfactory. It does not explain when the New Orleans FBI office "determined" that on June 3 Oswald had rented P.O. Box 30061. Similarly, it fails to explain when the "further inquiries" were made that came up with 4909 Magazine, a wrong address. Most important, it fails to disclose the truth known to the FBI at the time of this response to the Warren Commission.
A broad view of FBI operations suggests that the FBI learned that Oswald had moved to Magazine Street no later than a few days after the move took place. The Washington and New York field offices played key roles not accounted for in the FBI response to the Warren Commission. On July 5, 1963, SAC (Special Agent in Charge) New York sent SAC New Orleans a copy of Oswald's June 10, letter to the Worker, along with the envelope bearing Oswald's P.O. address in New Orleans. Three days later the New York office discovered something better: Oswald was on 4907 Magazine Street in New Orleans. New York source "48 S" had intercepted a change-of-address card Oswald mailed to the Worker, revising his mailing address from Magazine Street to P.O. Box 30061.
It seems likely that New York informed the Bureau soon after, but an administrative glitch prevents an authoritative statement about the date this card was placed in Oswald's headquarters file. At the same time, it is likely that the FBI's Washington field office had already reported Oswald's Magazine Street address to headquarters, probably May 17-18, after intercepting Oswald's May 16 change-of-address card to the Soviet Embassy. We will return to this card and the Washington field office intercept program shortly. There are no FBI interoffice memoranda showing that the New York office or headquarters told the New Orleans or Dallas offices about the change-of-address card intercepted on July 8 in New York. The record shows that not until July 17 did New York share this card with New Orleans. Could New Orleans already have known?
A missing piece from New Orleans was provided in an October 31, 1963 New Orleans FBI report that disclosed that when Oswald sent his July 8 change-of-address card to the Worker, New Orleans informant T-1 reported it. The surviving New Orleans documents are missing the paperwork for this claim, but it likely was informant T-1 in the New Orleans post office. If true, this would mean that Oswald's Magazine Street address was known on or shortly after July 8 in the New Orleans, New York, and Washington field offices, and at FBI headquarters, and that none of them informed Dallas. Perhaps Dallas was informed by telephone, but there is no record of Oswald's Magazine Street address being shared with Dallas. The record looks odd: It shows it was not until July 17 that New Orleans informed Dallas of Oswald's new post office box.
The foregoing makes it appear that much of the FBI system was derelict for not reporting Oswald's locations to the agent responsible for keeping track of him, James P. Hosty. Could it be that they presumed Hosty knew of Oswald's various addresses in New Orleans? Since Oswald had sent change-of-address cards to virtually everyone else, New York and Washington might have assumed that he had obtained the address from the Dallas post office. The July 17 New Orleans memo to Dallas exudes a hint of exasperation with the state of affairs. After pointing out an obsolete letter concerning Oswald, the memo continued:
By letter dated 7/5/63 the New York Office furnished information to the effect that one Lee H. Oswald has an address of P.O. Box 30061, New Orleans, Louisiana.
It is believed possible this person is identical with Lee Harvey Oswald, subject in captioned case.
Since New Orleans has received no information subsequent to referenced letter, Dallas is requested to advise New Orleans of the status of Dallas case captioned above.
New Orleans is instituting inquiries to determine residence address of holder of P.O. Box 30061, New Orleans, Louisiana.
If we accept the October 31 FBI claim that New Orleans knew of the change-of-address card on July 8, then the above July 17 memo is evidence that New Orleans withheld Oswald's Magazine Street address from Dallas.
While New Orleans was passing Oswald's post office box number to Dallas, the New York office was discussing Oswald's Magazine Street address in a letter to the New Orleans office. It appears that New Orleans received a copy of the card from New York on July 20, and that Dallas was not informed at the time. The knowledge levels of the various FBI offices are important to compare. New York appeared to be in possession of all the pieces except the May 16 Oswald letter to the Soviet Embassy. On July 1 New York sent Dallas an Oswald letter with the Dallas post office box address; on July 5 New York sent New Orleans the letter to the Worker with the New Orleans post office box address; and on July 8 New Orleans and New York learned of Oswald's Magazine Street residence and said nothing about it to the Dallas office. Dallas appears to have been fast asleep, and was startled on July 17 by the news from New Orleans that Oswald had a post office box there. Still sluggish, it took Dallas twelve days just to say the case on Oswald and Marina was "pending," that Dallas was looking for them, and that the last residence they knew about was the Neely Street address which the Oswalds "left, giving no forwarding address."
# Hosty Checks the "Postmaster"
The vagaries in the FBI's story of how and when it learned of Oswald's move to Magazine Street beckon us to look again at this central subject. Is it possible that after three months Dallas had still not learned of Oswald's forwarding address? What is the documentary evidence for the FBI's claim to the Warren Commission that it did not know about Oswald's move to New Orleans until two months after his arrival there? There are just two FBI documents—both from Dallas—that buttress this proposition. One was a July 29, 1963, Dallas office memo stating that Oswald had left Neely Street without leaving a forwarding address. This was based on an earlier, May 28, internal memo from Special Agent Hosty to SAC Shanklin. Thus, the evidence boils down to one sentence in a memo written by Hosty: He said a "check with the Postmaster" showed that Oswald had moved without leaving a forwarding address.
As discussed in Chapter Fifteen, the Dallas FBI office had closed the Oswald case in October 1962 and reopened it in March 1963. A file on Marina had been opened in the interim, but no attempt to interview her had been made until March 11, 1963, when Hosty had learned from the apartment manager for Oswald's 602 Elsbeth apartment, Mrs. M. F. Tobias, that the Oswald family had moved on March 3. What did Hosty do to find out where Oswald had gone? He had a dependable source: the U.S. post office. Hosty wasted no time, and contacted an FBI informant there, Mrs. Dorthea Myers. She told Hosty that the Oswalds had moved into 214 West Neely in Dallas. That was the address at which Oswald remained until he moved to New Orleans on April 24. The question is: When did Hosty find out Oswald was no longer on Neely Street?
On May 27, 1963, someone from the Dallas office of the FBI (probably Hosty) attempted to interview Oswald and Marina "under pretext." A pretext interview is a subterfuge in which the true purpose and often the true identity of the interviewer are disguised. The FBI person doing the checking discovered the Oswalds were gone, and the next day, May 28, Hosty wrote this memo to Shanklin, the special agent in charge in Dallas:
On 5/27/63 an attempt to interview subjects at 214 Neely, Dallas under pretext reflected that they had moved from their residence. A check with the Postmaster reflects that the subjects have moved and left no forwarding address.
The owner of subjects['] former residence at 214 Neely Dallas, M.W. George TA 3 9729 and LA6 7268 will be interviewed for information re subjects as will subject[']s Brother in Fort Worth.
This memo deserves our close attention. FBI director Clarence Kelly's account—much of it perhaps written by Hosty—claims that Hosty actually discovered the Oswalds had vacated the Neely Street apartment twelve days earlier, on May 15. Researchers have been unable to see this contradiction because the first paragraph of the above Hosty memo remained classified until 1994.
The release of the full memo in 1994 exposes more than the conflict between dates (May 15 and 27) for the attempted pretext interview at Neely Street. The unredacted version of this memo points to some glaring deficiencies in Hosty's account to Shanklin and the FBI's account to the Warren Commission. The second sentence contains three claims: 1) Hosty or a colleague checked with "the Postmaster," 2) this check showed that the Oswalds had moved, and 3) this check showed that the Oswalds "left no forwarding address." It was strange that Hosty, normally so precise in the "who what when where, and how" department, neglected to give the name of the "Postmaster." The standard operating procedure for these internal memos was to name the informant and specify "(protect identity)" if the name was considered sensitive. For external memos an informant number was always used (such as "T-1" or "NO-6") and the names supplied in a detachable administrative cover sheet. The second point, that the "Postmaster" check showed the Oswalds had moved, is suspicious because it is logically incongruous with the third point, namely, that they had left no forwarding address. If the Oswalds had not provided a forwarding address, how did this "Postmaster" know that they had moved? Would Oswald have contacted the "Postmaster" just to say "we're moving"?
The third point—that Oswald had left no forwarding address—is the most startling error. Oswald did leave a forwarding address. Tucked away in the twenty-six volumes of Warren Commission materials is Commission Exhibit 793, which is a change-of-address card that Oswald sent to the Dallas post office after his arrival in New Orleans. Oswald listed May 12 as the effective date, which is probably the date he mailed it. The card is stamped "May 14, 1963," indicating this was the date when the post office received it, which is either one day or thirteen days before Hosty checked with the "Postmaster," depending on which version of his story we are dealing with. The FBI's top handwriting expert, James C. Cadigan, who had more than twenty-three years of experience, testified that the handwriting was Oswald's. Cadigan's handiwork—a marked-up copy of the card—can be found in another location of the Warren Commission's published materials.
Within hours of the Kennedy assassination, the Dallas office of the FBI sent an "urgent" cable to Bureau headquarters and the New Orleans FBI office. That cable included this information:
Inspector Harry Holmes, US Post Office, Dallas, advised tonight [a] check of postal records at Dallas rep(f)lects following info.
On May ten last [10 May 1963], USPO, main branch, Dallas, received forwarding order for any mail for Mrs. Lee H. Oswald to be forwarded from box two nine one five, located main PO, Dallas, to two five one five West Fifth St., Irving, Texas. On May fourteen last [14 May 1963], PO received forwarding order again for mail in box two nine one five, Dallas, for Mr. Lee H. Oswald to be forwarded to four nine zero seven Magazine, New Orleans, La. Post Office subsequently had forwarding order from Mrs. Lee H. Oswald, date unknown, to forward all mail for Mrs. Lee H. Oswald to box three zero zero six one New Orleans.
Hosty's claim to have queried the "Postmaster" was dubious. Hosty's claim that such a check showed the Oswalds had moved without leaving a forwarding address is baseless. Hosty's claims provide the only documentary evidence buttressing the FBI's story that it did not learn of Oswald's move to New Orleans until June 26. This story is headed for a new conclusion.
# More Than the Postmaster Knew
The idea that the FBI did not know where Oswald lived from April 24 until June 26 is incredulous, especially so in view of all the sources to whom Oswald had immediately mailed his Magazine Street address. This is the key point: For thirty years the first paragraph of Hosty's May 28 memo to Shanklin has been classified. Underneath that redaction has been the solitary sentence that is the documentary basis for the FBI's response to the Warren Commission on when and how the FBI learned of Oswald's move to New Orleans. The withholding of this evidence, which turned out to be false, did significant damage to the public's ability to understand the facts.
The list of problems that surround Hosty's suspicious May 28 story about a "check with the Postmaster" underlines the need to examine the facts to which the FBI had access indicating that on May 10, 1963, Oswald had moved into an apartment at 4907 Magazine Street. From the documents available, there were at least seven occasions when the FBI might have learned about Oswald's Magazine Street address prior to June 26—the date it claimed it learned of Oswald's post office box in New Orleans. Four of these opportunities occurred before Hosty's May 28 note to Shanklin, and all were well before June 26.
The first communication containing Oswald's Magazine Street address was the change-of-address card he sent on May 9, 1963, effective May 12, and received at the Dallas post office on May 14. Presumably the Irving change-of-address card that Marina sent to the Dallas post office on May 10 would have been available with Oswald's card. The second opportune communication with the Magazine Street address was the notice Oswald mailed to the Dallas post office on May 12, 1963, asking them to close his old box, 2915. Given the close cooperation between the Dallas post office and the FBI on Oswald's mail activities, the Bureau should have learned about this address card and the box closure soon after these events occurred.
The third communication that should have tipped off the FBI happened on May 14, 1963, when Oswald sent a change-of-address card—with the new 4907 Magazine Street address—to the FPCC. Given that the FBI gained access to Oswald's letters to the FPCC through an informant for the New York FBI office, the Bureau should have learned about this letter sometime in May. Skipping out of order, the fifth and sixth communications occurred on May 22, when FPCC national director V. T. Lee wrote to Oswald at 4907 Magazine, and on May 29, when the FPCC sent Oswald a membership card and told him it was all right to form a New Orleans chapter. Because access to FPCC offices probably required a break-in, we cannot be sure the FBI had access to these three letters.
The fourth and seventh events that should have enabled the FBI to learn of Oswald's whereabouts are more intriguing. They were the May 17 change-of-address card Oswald sent to the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C., alerting them to his new Magazine Street address, and a June 4 letter to Marina—mailed to 4907 Magazine Street—from the embassy, asking her why she wished to return to the Soviet Union. The early 1960s were tense years in the U.S.-Soviet Cold War, and the Soviet Embassy in Washington was enemy territory as far as the FBI and CIA were concerned. That embassy would have been among the highest priority targets of the American intelligence community, and the embassy's mail would have been carefully watched—especially mail to and from Soviet citizens in America.
We know from FBI files that "the highly confidential mail coverage of the Embassy" was handled by agents from the FBI's Washington field office. The day after the Kennedy assassination, FBI director Hoover, in a telephone conversation with President Johnson, explained:
Now, of course, that letter information, we process all mail that goes to the Soviet Embassy—it's a very secret operation. No mail is delivered to the Embassy without being examined and opened by us, so that we know what they receive.
Based on this statement, it is reasonable to believe that at least the May 17 Oswald change-of-address card and the June 4 embassy letter to Marina were known to the FBI.
We can now return to the FBI's incredible claim that it did not know about Oswald's move to New Orleans until June 26, and recall that it was on this date that a New York informant mentioned seeing P.O. Box 30061 on Oswald's June 10 letter from New Orleans to the Worker. Since New York was being credited as the source for this story, the purpose of feigning ignorance of any of the above seven events could not have been to hide the Bureau's sources in New York—as sensitive and valuable as those sources were. No, the purpose would more likely have been to cover something even more sensitive. Perhaps it was to cover the FBI's interception of the letter to the Soviet Embassy, or perhaps even to cover the CIA's interception, on May 22, of the Titovitz letter to Marina by its super-secret HT/LINGUAL program (this letter opening was discussed in Chapter Fifteen). On the other hand, there does not appear to have been enough time for Marina to have notified Titovitz of the Magazine Street address and receive his reply between May 10 and 22.
The FBI's operation to open the Soviet Embassy's mail might have required a false cover story to hide it, but this would still not explain why Hosty would not have learned from any of Oswald's three communications to the Dallas post office about his relocation to Magazine Street in New Orleans. Furthermore, Special Agent Hosty's May 28 memo said that Oswald's brother and the owner of Oswald's old West Neely address would be "interviewed for information re subjects [Oswald and Marina]." There is no indication that Hosty followed up anytime soon. If Hosty really wanted to find out, all he had to do was go to the post office, just as he had done when he had learned of Oswald's previous move, from Elsbeth to Neely Street.
It is possible but unlikely that the FBI did not intercept mail between Oswald and the FPCC on May 14, 22, and 29, and June 5. We do know that the FBI had access to Oswald's mail to the FPCC. In addition, we also know that the FBI had productive sources in the FPCC.
TABLE A: FBI Sources on the FPCC and Oswald-FPCC Correspondence: May 14—June 5, 1963
Date | Coverage | Activity or Event
---|---|---
May 14 | No report: | Oswald change-of-address card to the FPCC.
May 16 | Report: | FBI FPCC source on Communist Party (CP) power struggle with Social Workers Party (SWP) over influence in the FPCC.
May 20 | Report: | FBI FPCC source on FPCC relations with CP and SWP: Hosty report September 10, 1963.
May 22 | No Report: | FPCC director V. T. Lee, letter to Oswald.
May 28 | Memorandum: | SA Hosty somehow knows Oswald has moved
May 29 | No Report: | FPCC issues card to Oswald and authorizes him to start FPCC New Orleans chapter
June 5 | No Report: | Oswald letter to FPCC re: his New Orleans activities
Information exists that was inserted in Oswald's FBI and CIA files in August and September 1963, the source of which was informants reporting on the FPCC to the FBI's Chicago office. An appendix prepared by the Chicago office contains this passage:
On May 16, 1963, a source advised that during the first two years of the FPCC's existence there was a struggle between Communist Party (CP) and Socialist Workers Party (SWP) elements to exert their power within the FPCC and thereby influence FPCC policy. However, during the past year this source observed there has been a successful effort by FPCC leadership to minimize the role of these and other organizations in the FPCC so that today their influence is negligible.
On May 20, 1963, a second source advised that the National Headquarters of the FPCC is located in Room 329 at 799 Broadway, New York City. According to this source, the position of National Office Director was created in the Fall of 1962 and was filled by Vincent "Ted" Lee, who now formulates FPCC policy. This source, observed Lee, has followed a course of entertaining and accepting the cooperation of many other organizations including the CP and SWP when he has felt it would be to his personal benefit as well as the FPCC's. However, Lee has indicated to this source he has no intention of permitting FPCC policy to be determined by any other organization. Lee feels the FPCC should advocate resumption of diplomatic relations between Cuba and the United States and support the right of Cubans to manage their revolution without interference from other nationals, but not support the Cuban revolution per se.
The FBI had effective sources inside the FPCC, obviously in Chicago, but probably in New York as well, where the CIA acquired intelligence on the head of the FPCC chapter there, Richard Gibson. As previously discussed, the Agency had tape-recorded him in June Cobb's hotel room in 1960, a time when Gibson was actively supporting Castro and Lumumba, both targets of ongoing assassination planning in the CIA.
Over the course of 1961, Richard Gibson wrote many letters to June Cobb, letters that ended up in the hands of the CIA. His letters revealed much about FPCC policies, personnel and financial matters, and, of course, friends and lovers. It is not clear when Gibson learned of Cobb's intelligence connections, but if the apparent tapering off of his letters after 1961 reflects what happened, it seems that the media-fueled speculation about Cobb (discussed in Chapter Seven) put a damper on Gibson's flame. During interrogation after the Kennedy assassination Gibson signaled interest in cooperation, and later provided some services for the CIA.
A short update on Cobb's activities are an appropriate digression here. Since last we visited her in 1960—1961, her first round of work with the CIA had ended. She traveled to Guatemala and managed to get expelled with much media fanfare. She became the subject of an article, "She's a Soldier of Fortune," by Jack Anderson in the Washington Post Parade, on August 12, 1962, a copy of which went straight into her CIA 201 file, 201-27884. Today we can also read the lengthier original essay, written by Cobb herself, which Anderson used for his Post story and which was also read by the propaganda section of the CIA's Task Force W, which handled Cuban matters.
In June 1963, June Cobb was reapproved by security for her new role "as an informant" for "WH/3-Mexico, D.F." The previous October, a CIA security memo to chief of Counterintelligence/Operational Approvals (CI/OA) had warned:
As we advised on 1 October 1962 a search of our Indices on Subject disclosed note-worthy and derogatory information which is available for review by your office. . . . In view of the note-worthy and questionable information reflected above, it is recommended that no contact beyond assessment be permitted at this time. In view of the voluminous information available on the Subject and Subject's controversial background, this office will not conduct any additional investigation on the Subject until the available note-worthy and derogatory information has been reviewed thoroughly.
By June 17, 1963, however, it is clear that CI/OA had certified the use of Cobb to Security, which went along, reluctantly, and "only for the proposed assignment."
While the CIA was securing approval to keep Cobb on assignment as an informant for WH/3/Mexico, the Dallas office of the FBI was in the process of "losing" Oswald. In his 1964 testimony to the Warren Commission, Hosty said he checked on Oswald in mid-May, but did not say why he chose that date. This would corroborate the statement in FBI director Kelly's book, discussed previously, that Hosty had checked the Neely Street apartment on May 15 and found that Oswald had left. This means that by the time Hosty wrote his May 28 memo to Shanklin about the "check with the Postmaster," he had two full weeks to discover Oswald's New Orleans Magazine Street address. This seeming incompetence may well have been purposeful, to create plausible deniability for what Oswald was up to in New Orleans before June 26.
We will shortly discuss Oswald's activities—especially those of "A.J. Hidell" at the aircraft carrier Wasp on June 16—and wonder at how strange it is that the very next day, according to Special Agent Hosty's testimony to the Warren Commission, "New Orleans contacted our office, and advised that they had information that the Oswalds were in New Orleans." There is no written record of this contact. It appears Hosty confused June 17 and July 17, when New Orleans in fact sent word to Dallas that the Oswalds were in New Orleans. Again, the seeming incompetence of Hosty becomes an issue. In his defense, the Bureau's policy was not to let agents review documents before they testified. Perhaps the further release of documents will better illuminate motives and distinguish plans from accidents. In the meantime, it is reasonable to suspect there was something crucial about this strange period between April 24 and June 26. What did Oswald do during the time he was "lost" in New Orleans?
# Oswald's New Orleans "Branch" of the FPCC
A good deal of Oswald's energy in May, June, and July centered on the FPCC. On April 19, 1963, just five days before he left Dallas, Oswald wrote to FPCC national headquarters in New York. We have elsewhere mentioned this letter, quoted here in full:
Dear Sirs, I do not like to ask for something for nothing but I am unemployed. Since I am unemployed, I stood yesterday for the first time in my life, with a placard around my neck, passing out fair play for Cuba pamplets, etc. [sic] I only had fifteen or so. In 40 minutes they were all gone. I was cursed as well as praised by some. My home-made placard said: HANDS OFF CUBA! VIVA FIDEL! I now ask for 40 or 50 more of the fine [five?], basic pamplets [sic]. Sincerely, Lee H. Oswald.
As stated previously, this letter was intercepted by the FBI. It was postmarked April 21, and a photograph of it provided by source "3245-S*" was in the hands of the FBI's New York office that same day. It took the New York office until June 27, over two months, to mail the photographs to the Dallas FBI office. The negatives were retained in New York.
A possible explanation for the delay in transmitting the images of the letter to Dallas might have been that the FBI broke into FPCC headquarters, photographed a large number of documents, and took several weeks to develop the negatives, so that a print of Oswald's letter became available only in late June. If this explanation is true, the FBI would have coincidentally broken into the FPCC nearly on the day that Oswald's letter arrived in New York. This is so because the negatives were in hand by April 21. Hosty, however, claimed that the source "advised" of the letter's existence on April 21, which means Oswald's letter had to have been among the very first film to be developed, and even opens the possibility that the break-in was done to get Oswald's letter. This would have required knowing when the letter was sent, information that might have been acquired from someone besides Oswald. For example, someone in the Dallas post office might have spotted the letter on its way out and, based on this tip, the FBI's New York office broke in to retrieve the letter.
According to Hoover biographers Dr. Anthan G. Theoaris and John Stuart Cox, the New York office's "Surreptitious Entries" file indicates that "no radical or left-liberal organizations escaped the Director's surveillance interest, and when it came to the American left, the bureau's illegal break-ins were not used with restraint." According to these sensitive files, maintained "informally" in the special agent in charge's "personal" folder, the FBI did break into the FPCC offices during April 1963. As previously discussed, FBI informant reports on May 16 and 20, 1963 indicate that the FBI also had access to the FPCC by means other than breaking in.
By May 26, Oswald had been in New Orleans more than a month. On that date he sent another letter to the FPCC, requesting "formal membership" in the organization. Oswald said he had received their pamphlets, some of which he paid for. "Now that I live in New Orleans," Oswald wrote, "I have been thinking about renting a small office at my own expense for the purpose of forming a F.P.C.C. branch here in New Orleans." Then Oswald asked, "Could you grant me a charter?" Oswald also requested more information about buying large quantities of pamphlets, blank FPCC application forms, and added presumptiously, "also a picture of Fidel suitable for framing would be a welcome touch." Oswald confessed he could not "supervise the office" all of the time but that he could get volunteers to man it. "I am not saying this project would be a roaring success," he cautioned, "but I am willing to try." Oswald said that providing he had "a steady flow of literature," he would gladly pay for the office rent, which would be $30 a month.
FPCC national director Vincent Lee responded to Oswald on May 29, enclosing Oswald's FPCC membership card. Lee encouraged Oswald's plan to form a chapter in New Orleans but suggested, "It would be hard to conceive of a chapter with as few members as seem to exist in the New Orleans area." Lee said he was not "adverse" to a small chapter, providing Oswald could get twice the number of members needed to convene a "legal" executive board. Lee advised against renting an office in New Orleans:
I definitely would not recommend an office, at least not one that will be easily identifyable[sic] to the lunatic fringe in your community. Certainly, I would not recommend that you engage in one at the very beginning but wait and see how you can operate in the community through several public experiences.
A post office box was a "must," Lee added. The FPCC national director might have been concerned, however, if he had known that while he was composing this go-ahead letter in New York, Oswald was taking matters into his own hands in New Orleans.
On May 29, Oswald went to the Jones Printing Company at 422 Girod Street, where he ordered 1000 FPCC handbills, using the name "Osborne." This printing company was opposite the Reily Coffee Company, where Oswald worked as a machinist. Myra Silver, the secretary at Jones Printing, told him the handbills would be ready on June 4. On June 1 Oswald dropped off a down payment of $4.00. On June 3, Oswald entered the offices of Mailers Service Company, where he "ordered 500 offset printed copies of an application form" from John I. Anderson. Anderson later told the FBI that the name he wrote on the bill was "Lee Osborne." Oswald picked up his FPCC application forms "within a couple of days" from Mailers Service.
On June 3, Oswald opened a post office box—30061—in the Lafayette Square Station, located on the first floor of the Federal Building at 600 South Street. According to New Orleans postal inspector J. J. Zarza, "the persons designated by Oswald [besides himself] to receive mail in this Post Office box were: A. J. Hidell and Marina Oswald." On or about June 12, Oswald notified both The Militant and the Worker to use this post office box. However, the only box number that appeared on any of Oswald's FPCC and socialist literature was a false variant of Oswald's, 30016. This creates another Oswald riddle: Why did he always—without mistake—put 30061 on his letters and his change-of-address cards and, at the same time, always—and therefore without mistake—use 30016 on his FPCC handbills? He bought a stamp kit that permitted the user to manipulate the letters and numbers, meaning Oswald could easily have corrected the stamp to 30061 if he had wanted to do so. We will return to the post office box riddle shortly.
On June 4 Oswald returned to Jones Printing, where he paid off the balance of $5.89 and picked up his FPCC handbills. The handbills contained the words "New Orleans Charter Member Branch," something Oswald had not been authorized to print, as he found out when he received Lee's May 29 letter. After picking up the handbills from Jones Printing, Oswald wrote this to Lee:
I see from the circular [handbill] I had jumped the gun on that charter business but I don't think its [sic] too important, you may think the circular is too provocative, but I want it too [sic] attract attention, even if its [sic] the attention of the lunatic fringe. I had 2000 of them run off.
Oswald wrote this letter between June 5 and 14. His exaggeration of the number of handbills he ordered—the true number was 1000—seems less noteworthy than the fact that he had proclaimed the existence of a "charter" FPCC branch in New Orleans.
Two other details in Oswald's early June letter to Vincent Lee merit our close attention. "As per your advice," Oswald told Lee, he had rented New Orleans P.O. Box 30061.
Against your advice, I have decided to take an office from the very beginning. . . . In any event I will keep you posted, even if the office stays open for only 1 month more people will find out about the F.P.C.C. than if there had never been any office at all, don't you agree?
Lee did not agree. It was the end of the line for Oswald from Vincent Lee's point of view. He testified to the Warren Commission that he had considered Oswald's act a fundamental transgression of the FPCC bylaws and procedures. (Lee had taken the trouble to send these rules to Oswald.)
On June 8, 1963, Oswald was trying out his new stamp kit. It was a ninety-eight-cent Warrior Rubber Stamping Kit, a picture of which was published in volume XVI of the Warren Commission exhibits. This exhibit includes a piece of paper on which Oswald practiced stamping. Neither the Hidell alias nor the false (30016) post office box appears on this document.
On June 10, Oswald showed off his new wares—by sending an FPCC handbill and application card—to the Worker. "I ask that you give me as much literature as you judge possible," Oswald said, "since I think it would be very nice to have your literature among the 'Fair Play' leaflets (like the one enclosed) and phamplets [sic] in my office." On these materials Oswald did not use his stamp kit. On June 12, Oswald sent letters to the FPCC. and the U.S. Navy. He sent a change-of-address card to the FPCC newspaper The Militant, changing from 4907 Magazine Street to P. O. Box 30061. He also sent a change-of-address card to the Naval Discharge Review Board, changing his address from 2703 Mercedes, Fort Worth (Oswald had moved from there on October 8, 1962), to New Orleans P. O. Box 30061. On none of this correspondence, and on none of his letters to Vincent Lee, did Oswald ever use the name Hidell.
From the available evidence, including evidence that was deliberately falsified at the Government Printing Office during the publication of the Warren Commission exhibits, there are two stamp configurations on the early handbills and pamphlets. Leaving aside the New Orleans and Louisiana part of the stamp, these two variants were "FPCC-A J Hidell P. O. Box 30016" and "FPCC 544 Camp Street." These stamps—while not conclusive—are nevertheless documentary evidence suggestive that Oswald had or pretended to have had an office for the FPCC at 544 Camp Street. What other evidence is there for this possibility?
In early June, Oswald had written to the FPCC saying that he had, against Vincent Lee's advice, rented an office in New Orleans. The building numbered 544 Camp Street is also numbered 531 Lafayette around the corner. On the second floor were the offices of W. Guy Banister. Sam Newman, the owner of the "Newman Building" at the corner of Lafayette and Camp streets, remembers that a white male, aged thirty-seven to thirty-eight, 5 feet 11 inches tall, with a medium build, light olive complexion, dark eyes, and dark brown hair rented one of his offices at 544 Camp Street for thirty dollars. This man said he wanted to use the office as a night school classroom for students of Spanish. The description rules out Oswald, unless this person was working with Oswald. Newman recalls, however, that this happened in July or August, much too late to correspond to Oswald's June letter to Vincent Lee. If this event was connected to Oswald and an office at 544 Camp Street, Newman would have to be wrong about the time. Thus, the statements of the building owner, Sam Newman, do not resolve the issue one way or the other. What about others who worked in and around 544 Camp Street?
Witnesses interviewed by the HSCA, such as Banister's brother, Ross, said that Banister had become "aware" of Oswald before the assassination. The HSCA found no proof that Banister had an Oswald file and could not find "credible witnesses" who had seen Oswald and Banister together. The HSCA observed, however, "that Banister at least knew of Oswald's leafletting activities and probably maintained a file on him." A search of Banister's files after his death by the Louisiana State Police indicated "Oswald's name was included among the main subjects of the file on the Fair Play for Cuba Committee." A partial index of Banister's file compiled by New Orleans district attorney Jim Garrison's investigators did not include Oswald or the FPCC.
The HSCA's comment that it could not find credible witnesses to a Banister-Oswald contact is troubling. Presumably, this comment refers to the committee's inability to verify Delphine Roberts's claims that Oswald had come into the building looking for a job and had, on one occasion, brought Marina with him. Roberts was Banister's longtime friend and secretary. She also told the HSCA that Banister "had become angry" with building owner Newman for Oswald's use of the 544 Camp Street stamp on his handbills. There were, however, other witnesses who were deemed credible. Ross Banister said he did not know of a direct association between his brother and Oswald, but "did confirm Guy's interest in the assassination and Oswald," and said his brother "had mentioned seeing Oswald hand out Fair Play for Cuba literature on one occasion."
Moreover, there was William George Gaudet, a CIA asset in New Orleans of many years, who testified to the HSCA that he knew about Oswald's distribution of literature before the assassination and that "on one occasion, he observed Oswald on a street corner speaking with Guy Banister." Gaudet's file with the Agency's Domestic Contacts Division (DCD) shows he was a "casual contact" for the New Orleans office from 1956 through 1961. At one point Gaudet claimed he "had once been employed by the CIA." Gaudet went to Mexico at the same time in the fall of 1963 that Oswald did, a subject to which we will return in Chapter Seventeen. This information appears in the HSCA's final report but, strangely, not in its 544 Camp Street analysis, which appears in Volume X of the committee's work. There, the Gaudet piece is missing.
There was also Ivan E. Nitschke, who had served in the FBI with Banister and had "for a short time worked for Banister in the office [of] the Newman Building." Nitschke told the HSCA that Oswald's distribution of handbills had led to Banister's interest in him during the summer of 1963. Nitschke's HSCA deposition claimed that "Banister had some of these handbills in his office or made reference to them. From the context of the conversation, however, he [Banister] was not pleased."
What might Banister have used Oswald for? Banister and the extreme right wing in New Orleans had targeted leftwing professors at Tulane like La Violette and Reissman and organizations like the New Orleans Council on Peaceful Alternatives (NOCPA), of which Professor Reissman was a member. Members of the NOCPA reportedly met at Tulane University. After the Kennedy assassination someone else "had a dim recollection that sometime in 1962, date not recalled, some Fair Play for Cuba literature had been found in the street in the 1200 or 1300 block of Pine Street in New Orleans." The person with this "dim recollection" was J. D. Vinson, a private eye from the Isaac Detective Agency, hired by Jack N. Rogers, the legal counsel for the Joint Legislative Committee on Un-American Activities for the State of Louisiana. It is possible that Banister was using Oswald to smoke out pro-Castro Cuban students in local universities and to discredit local leftwing or communist academics.
The above evidence of an Oswald-Banister association is far from conclusive, but it is enough to take this possibility seriously. Another tantalizing piece of evidence comes from the newly released files. Not long after the assassination, New Orleans FBI special agent in charge Harry Maynor drafted a message that was changed before it was sent to the Bureau. Two pieces of information, apparently in Maynor's handwriting, for insertion into the text of the message were scratched out, but the handwriting is still visible. The first deletion concerned the fact that Bartes had been a reliable FBI informant "whose identity must be protected." The other deletion were these words: "Several Fair Play for Cuba pamphlets contained address 544 Camp Street" [emphasis added].
# "FPCC-A J Hidell"
"About May" 1963, Hugh T. Murray, a graduate student at Tulane, noticed a pile of handbills lying in the foyer of the university library. Murray picked one up and saw that it was captioned "Hands off Cuba," and that the handbill was "under the sponsorship" of the FPCC. Murray recalled that the handbill had a name and post office box stamped on it, but he could remember neither the address nor the name. If these handbills were Oswald's, the earliest they could have been at Tulane would have been about June 10. Oswald had not picked up the handbills until June 4, and did not purchase the stamp kit until June 9.
We know what name was stamped on the handbill from another graduate student at Tulane University, Harold Gordon Alderman. Murray mentioned the handbill to Alderman, who wanted to see it. Murray, "shortly thereafter," gave it to him. Alderman had collected FPCC literature from the FPCC office in New York at the time of the Bay of Pigs and during the same period had participated in an FPCC picket of the CIA in Washington, D.C. Later, he joined another FPCC action directed at President Kennedy in Seattle, Washington. In October 1962 Alderman debated anti-Castro writer and adventurer Alexander Rorke at Tulane University.
Alderman recalled that Murray handed over the Tulane FPCC handbill "in the summer of 1963, possibly in July, 1963." Alderman tacked the handbill on a door in his apartment on Delord Street, and there it stayed until President Kennedy was assassinated in November. As Alderman read the local newspaper accounts of the assassination, he learned that the alleged murderer had used an alias—A. J. Hidell. Alderman knew this name because it was on the handbill in his apartment. He called the New Orleans office of the FBI and offered to turn over his "Tulane" handbill to them. Whoever he spoke with "advised that the FBI Office already had this handbill and did not want his copy." This was strange, especially in view of the fact that collecting these FPCC handbills was an important part of the FBI's investigation of Oswald's activities.
More than students at Tulane picked up these FPCC handbills. Four days after the assassination, U.S. Army Major Robert H. Erdrich of the 112th Intelligence Corps Group in New Orleans walked into the New Orleans office of the FBI. Major Erdrich said he had heard they "were interested in the Fair Play for Cuba Committee in connection with the investigation of this [Kennedy assassination] case," and offered some interesting information. The resulting New Orleans FBI report contains this passage:
He [Major Erdrich] advised that one of the 112th Agents sometime during the last week in May or the first week in June, 1963, picked up a handbill of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee which was attached to a wall on the campus of Tulane University. This handbill was approximately 8" × 11" and was faded green in color.
The stamp on the handbill read, "FPCC - A.J. Hidell P.O. Box 30016 New Orleans, Louisiana." Erdrich delivered two copies of the handbill to the New Orleans FBI office later that same afternoon.
Erdrich also told the FBI that the Army had found copies of this handbill at other locations. One was "laying on the grounds of the Port of Embarkation, New Orleans." Major Erdrich returned later the same November afternoon with copies of the handbill. The stamp read, "FPCC-A J Hidell P.O. Box 30016." The subsequent FBI investigation gathered more information about what had happened at the port. On July 14, 1964, ONI received a request from a Mr. Morrissey of the FBI, asking if ONI records could substantiate a story about Oswald's activities during June 1963 in New Orleans: "Oswald distributed Fair Play for Cuba Committee leaflets to sailors on street; aircraft carrier was in port. Oswald apparently impressed with number of officers in Navy who appeared sympathetic to his leaflets."
We know where Morrissey got some of this story. On August 1, 1963, Oswald had written this to FPCC national director Vincent Lee: "We also managed to picket the fleet when it came in and I was surprised at the number of officers who were interested in our literature." Oswald's letter had not mentioned an aircraft carrier or "sailors on street," details which Morrissey had to have learned elsewhere in the summer of 1964. Indeed there had been an aircraft carrier, the USS Wasp, in port from June 13 to June 20, 1963, berthed at the Dumaine Street wharf. Moreover, Patrolman Girod Ray of the harbor police had written a memorandum on June 16, 1963, entitled "Distribution of Propaganda Literature" describing a man passing out pamphlets. According to his memo, Patrolman Ray had apprehended and ejected the man from the wharf on June 15 or 16, 1963. The man was Oswald.
In June 1963, the harbor police did not—as far as can be determined from the available records—notify the New Orleans Police or the FBI about this incident. The Army counterintelligence unit, which had scarfed up copies of the handbills from the ground, apparently did not notify the Navy, the New Orleans Police, or the FBI. We know from Major Erdrich's report, however, that the New Orleans 112th INCT did send a copy of the handbill to "headquarters at Washington D.C.," meaning the national headquarters of military intelligence for the U.S. Army. According to Major Erdrich, they sent the handbill to Washington on June 18, 1963.
A copy of Patrolman Ray's June 16, 1963, report surfaced in the Church Committee files a decade later with two pieces of paper attached to it: a handbill and a flyer under the headline "The Truth About Cuba Is in Cuba!" The address stamped on this handbill is different from the one Army counterintelligence recovered from the wharf. The Church Committee handbill associated with Ray's report bears the stamp "A J Hidell P.O. Box 30016," while the FBI described the Army handbill as bearing the stamp "FPCC - A. J. Hidell P.O. Box 30016." The periods after the letters "A" and "J" may have been inattentiveness on the part of Major Erdrich or the FBI, but the addition of "FPCC" to the Army handbill appears to be a more substantive conflict.
Frustrating our efforts to reconcile this conflict is an act that the U.S. Army should publicly admit was a serious mistake: the "routine" destruction of Oswald's Army files. If it is true, as the Army claims, that they destroyed the files of the alleged assassin of President Kennedy, we will never be sure what stamp was on the Wasp handbill the 112th INCT sent to Washington on June 18, 1963. Most mysterious is the fact that by the time the Warren Commission published its version of the handbill from the Domaine Street wharf, the stamp had disappeared entirely! We need to retrace the path traveled by this magical handbill from the time it left Oswald's hands—if indeed it was Oswald—to its final official destination on page 807 of Warren Commission volume XXII. Something is fishy about the handbills from the wharf.
# The Great Handbill Caper
On a Sunday afternoon, June 16, 1963, harbor police Patrolman Girod Ray was between the Toulouse and Domaine Street wharves when an "enlisted man" approached and said that "the Officer of the Deck of the 'USS Wasp' desired Patrolman Ray seek out an individual who was passing out leaflets regarding Cuba and to request this individual to stop passing out these leaflets." Ray went immediately to the Domaine Street wharf, where he found a man handing out white and yellow-colored leaflets. (As previously discussed, Major Erdrich described a faded green handbill as well.) According to Ray, the man was a white male in his late twenties who was 5 feet 9 inches tall, weighed 150 pounds, and had a slender build. This description is consistent with the appearance of Oswald.
The man at the wharf was distributing leaflets to "Navy personnel" and also to "civilians" who were leaving the Wasp. Patrolman Ray asked the man if he had permission from the Dock Board to issue these leaflets, to which the man responded "that he thought as an American citizen he did not need anyone's permission." Ray told the man that the wharfs and buildings along the Mississippi River encompassing the Port of New Orleans were operated by the Board of Commissioners and that if they gave their permission, he could hand out the leaflets. The man "kept insisting that he did not see why he would need anyone's permission," whereupon Ray told him that "if he did not leave the Domaine Street wharf, Patrolman Ray would arrest him." The man left. In a 1964 interview with the FBI, Patrolman Ray identified the man handing out the leaflets as Oswald.
The same day that Patrolman Ray ejected the man from the wharf, he wrote a memo to harbor police chief L. Deutchman, and enclosed the "pamphlets" that had been distributed. Those copies remained unnoticed in the harbor police files for a year. They were not the only copies preserved from that day. As previously discussed, U.S. Army counterintelligence agents were at the wharf too, where they picked up dopies "laying on the ground," sending one to Washington on June 17, 1963, and providing the New Orleans FBI office with two copies on November 26, 1963. Yet another agency of the U.S. government obtained a copy of the Wasp handbills that June summer—the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) security office in Houston.
An employee of Lockheed Aircraft Corporation on special assignment at the NASA Houston Manned Spacecraft Center, Martin Samuel Abelow, was vacationing in New Orleans in the summer of 1963 and just happened to be walking along side the aircraft carrier Wasp on that particular Sunday. There Abelow saw "a young man" handing out FPCC leaflets. An FBI "confidential source"—apparently a coworker of Abelow's—told the FBI that Abelow had "several items" of FPCC literature he had obtained from his visit to the wharf. According to the FBI informant, Abelow had said "he should probably furnish these items to the Federal Bureau of Investigation." Abelow decided, however, to turn them over to the security office of the Space Center, which he did on June 21, 1963. The stamp on the FPCC handbill was "FPCC-A J Hidell P.O. Box 30016," the same as the stamp on the handbill sent to Army intelligence in Washington, D.C., on June 18, 1963, and provided to the FBI on November 26, 1963.
On November 25, 1963, the day before Major Erdrich dropped off the Army copies of the Wasp handbills, a matching handbill—stamped "FPCC-A J. Hidell P.O. Box 30016"—turned up in the New Orleans office of the FBI. There it was mixed up with handbills from Oswald's August 8 Canal Street activity (stamped "A J Hidell P.O. Box 30016"), and August 16 Trade Mart activity (stamped "L.H. Oswald 4907 Magazine St"), events we will discuss in the next chapter. Together these three handbills formed FBI Exhibit D-25, furnished to the Warren Commission. There is no indication where the "FPCC A J Hidell P.O. Box 30016" handbill came from, but if this three-handbill set was to give an example from each leafleting event, then this handbill would have been from the Wasp event. The next episode, which occurred on February 4, 1964, seems to corroborate this possibility. In response to a Warren Commission routine request for information from all government agencies, Lloyd W. Blankenbaker, director of security, NASA, sent the Commission a copy of the Abelow handbill from the Wasp incident. The stamp read, "FPCC-A J Hidell P.O. Box 30016."
The next episodes in the unfolding mystery of the Wasp handbills were the May 25, 1964, FBI interview with the NASA FBI informant and the May 28, 1964, FBI interview with Martin "Marty" Abelow, both discussed previously. Neither interview added any new information about the stamp on the handbills. Next was a July 14, 1964, request from the FBI agent Morrissey to the ONI about the Wasp leafleting, also discussed previously. The same day Wilbur Sartwell, ONI, Potomac River Naval Command, informed the FBI that his office had no record of the Wasp leafleting incident and added that "any such record would be at Headquarters, ONI." The next day, July 15, Don Gorham, acting chief of NCISC (Naval Counter Intelligence Support Center)-3, "made available to a representative of the FBI, the Headquarters, ONI files pertaining to the subject." No information has been found in these files either.
On July 21, 1964, two leaflets "were obtained from Lieutenant Roy Alleman of the New Orleans Harbor Police." It is at this point that trouble begins in the official record. The Church Committee records contain a copy of the June 16, 1963, Patrolman Ray report with the attached handbill and "Truth about Cuba" flyer, presumably the ones enclosed by Ray. The handbill bears the stamp, "AJ Hidell P.O. Box 30016." The two documents turned over to the FBI by Alleman—presumably from the harbor police files—were likewise a handbill and a "Truth about Cuba" flyer, the former designated FBI exhibit D-234, and the latter D-235. These exhibits are in the National Archives today. The handbill has no stamp on it at all. This seems odd: What would be the purpose of enticing people to join the FPCC with a handbill with no address? FBI exhibits D-234 and D-235 were tested for fingerprints on July 21, 1964. Two latent fingerprints were found, neither of which belonged to Oswald.
The Church Committee's copy of the Ray report has handwriting on it: "Sunday - 1 pm - 4 pm. 5'6" x 5'7"." This writing does not appear on the version printed in CE 1412 of Warren Commission volume XXII. This contradiction is only the tip of the iceberg. An August 4, 1964, Hoover memo to the commission, with attached FBI memos of July 16 and 22, 1964, and Patrolman Ray's June 16, 1963, report with the attached handbill and "Truth about Cuba" flyer, were combined as an eleven-page document, Commission Document 1370. At this stage, the stampless handbill has developed a faint diagonal line in the area where the address stamp would normally have appeared. This handbill was attached, using Scotch tape, to the contact sheet in preparation for the publication of the Warren Commission's twenty-six volumes. (The contact sheets were large blank sheets of paper upon which each prospective page was placed before final publication.)
At this point, while the contact sheet was still in the Government Printing Office and nearing publication, someone took a photograph of CE 2966A, a handbill that Oswald handed out on August 8, 1963, on Canal Street. This handbill had the stamp "L.H. Oswald 4907 Magazine St," next to which were the initials "JLF" (presumably Special Agent Joseph L. Flemming, New Orleans FBI office), another illegible notation, and a date, November 23, 1963. After the photograph of CE 2966A was developed, a white paste was applied to the stamp and the adjacent handwritten notations. The doctored picture of 2966A was then enlarged and printed as if it were the handbill in CD 1370!
If the "great handbill caper" tells us anything, it is that someone in the Government Printing Office was willing to take a considerable risk in connection with the Wasp handbills. This brings us back to the question asked at the beginning of this chapter, namely, what was Oswald up to during the period that the FBI claims to have lost track of him. Our suspicions are justifiably aroused by the skullduggery in the published Warren Commission materials connected to a crucial event during this period, which lasted from April 24 to June 26.
Two other events stand out toward the end of this "lost" period in New Orleans: On June 24 Oswald applied for a passport, and on July 1 Marina, reportedly at Oswald's request, wrote to the Soviet Embassy asking to return to the Soviet Union. Marina testified that Oswald "planned to go to Cuba," but on his passport application form Oswald indicated his desire to travel to England, France, Germany, Holland, U.S.S.R., Finland, Italy, and Poland. Cuba was missing. Moreover, on June 25, when he received his passport, it was stamped with a warning that a person traveling to Cuba would be liable for prosecution. Accompanying Marina's request to the Soviet Embassy was a letter by Oswald requesting that Marina's visa be approved on a rush basis. "As for my return entrance visa," he wrote, "please consider it separately" [underline in original]. Thus, while engaging in an undercover game of Alex Hidell, FPCC New Orleans branch chief, Oswald was making plans to travel to the Soviet Union, Cuba, or both.
Although the FBI claims to have discovered Oswald's presence in New Orleans on June 26, the Bureau, as previously discussed, claims it still was not aware of Oswald's street address. On July 29, 1963, the Dallas FBI office had asked the New Orleans FBI office to "verify" both Lee and Marina's presence in New Orleans:
For the information of New Orleans, the case on both subjects is in a pending status. The Dallas Office is attempting to locate the subjects. Their last known place of residence was 214 Neely Street, Dallas, Texas, and they left giving no forwarding address. New Orleans is requested to verify the presence of the two subjects in New Orleans and advise the Dallas Office.
Finally, on August 5, the FBI says it "verified" where Oswald was living in New Orleans. On that date Jessie James Garner, a neighbor of Oswald's, told the New Orleans FBI office that Oswald was living in an apartment at 4905 Magazine Street, New Orleans, and had been living there since 'about" June.
It was fitting that the FBI "found" Oswald on August 5. That same day Oswald broke cover and contacted some Cuban exiles, using his real name. In other words, the FBI's alleged blind period covers—to the day—the precise period of Oswald's undercover activity in New Orleans. Again, while the evidence is circumstantial and speculative, his activity may have served, whether he realized it or not, the local CRC recruiting program by flushing pro-Castro students out into the open, where Banister could identify them. Presumably, Banister's background checks were designed to insulate the local CRC from obvious infiltrators. Oswald, moreover, was preparing to launch an infiltration game of his own.
# CHAPTER SEVENTEEN
# Oswald and AMSPELL
By the end of July 1963, there was no longer any ambiguity about Oswald's address: The FBI knew he was living at 4907 Magazine, New Orleans. He had been working at the Reily Coffee Company, also on Magazine, until he was fired on July 19. The records indicate that at about this time, Oswald decided to stamp his real name and address, "L. H. Oswald 4907 Magazine St," on his FPCC handbills. At the earlier Tulane and Wasp leafleting events the stamp read: "A J Hidell P.O. Box 30016." As discussed in the previous chapter, during the first half of his sojourn in New Orleans Oswald apparently played an undercover pro-Castro role, possibly associated with a Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) recruiting operation.
Beginning with his August 5 visit to Carlos Bringuier, Oswald's role changed to that of an apparent double agent. This period lasted for the rest of his stay in New Orleans and included Oswald's September 25 meeting with Silvia Odio. In contacting both Bringuier and Odio, Oswald feigned anti-Castro sympathies. In between these Odio-Bringuier bookends, Oswald played out his pro-Castro FPCC role overtly, using his real name on radio, television, and streets corners—and even from inside a jail cell. At all of the salient points of his pro-Castro performance, he became involved with the Cuban Student Directorate (DRE). Unlike the CRC which, as of April, had lost its CIA funding, the DRE was still partially funded by the CIA. AMBUD was the CIA cryptonym for the CRC, and AMSPELL was the cryptonym for the DRE. The CIA AMSPELL mission during the summer of 1963 was for propaganda, instead of military, operations. Oswald's activities in New Orleans proved to be a bonanza for AMSPELL's mission.
The Oswald we watch through the eyes of the FBI agents who tracked him down—and through the eyes of the CIA personnel who read the FBI reports—looks like a would-be double agent caught in a web of intrigue far stickier than he had anticipated. Again, whether Oswald's actions were his own or the result of direction or manipulation, by carrying out both pro-Castro and anti-Castro activities in New Orleans, Oswald was playing a dangerous game. During this spectacle Oswald actually insisted on seeing an FBI agent while in jail, to supply him, Oswald said, with information on his FPCC activities. It was a strange place to play the part of informant, an oddity underlined by a strange FBI act: They withheld the fact—for quite some time—that Special Agent Quigley had interviewed Oswald in jail.
When the FBI reported Oswald's FPCC activities to the CIA in September, the Quigley interview was missing. At that point, incoming material on Oswald was no longer placed in Oswald's 201 file, but in a new, active file—a subject we will deal with in Chapter Nineteen. For now we will focus on Oswald's virtuoso August performance in New Orleans. This performance appeared designed to maximize media and FBI coverage. It culminated in his "exposure" as a Marxist defector to the Soviet Union, which, in the short run, left a stain on the FPCC. In the long run it was the kiss of death.
# Bust at Lake Ponchartrain, Louisiana
"The Lake Ponchartrain activity," said a February 1, 1977, CIA Security Office (OS) memo, "was run by Gerald Patrick Hemming as part of his Intercontinental Penetration Force (Interpen)." A CIA training camp had been located near the Algiers Naval Station, but the OS memo explained that this camp "should not be confused with the infamous training activity" at Lake Ponchartrain. "Frank Sturgis (aka Frank Fiorini) of Watergate fame," said the memo, "was also connected with the activities of Interpen." In the present chapter we are concerned with the Ponchartrain camp, not the Algiers camp. The CIA knew about Hemming's activities at Ponchartrain from the moment he arrived in June 1962, because the person who helped Hemming was an informant for the CIA office in New Orleans. As discussed in Chapter Fourteen, that informant was Frank Bartes. On June 20, 1963, the FBI sent a report concerning Bartes— which has not been publicly released—and on July 31 the FBI raided a house where arms were kept for the group that was training at the Ponchartrain camp.
On July 30, the day before the raid, the FBI had received a tip from Elise Cerniglia, an informant in the Catholic Cuban Center in New Orleans. Mrs. Cerniglia told the FBI that "approximately ten Cuban refugees arrived in New Orleans from Miami on the night of 7/24/63 for the purpose of attending a training camp some two hours from New Orleans after which they were to be transferred to a training camp in Guatemala." As the FBI later learned, nineteen Cubans had been sent to the Ponchartrain camp by Laureano Batista, a Cuban leader of the Movimento Democratica Cristiano (MDC) in Miami. This camp was not two hours from New Orleans, but was instead just ten to fifteen miles away. The FBI learned later that the house where these Cubans had been staying "was located in St. Tammany Parish in Lacombe, La. about a mile from Highway 190 West on a secondary road." Lacombe was the location for the Ponchartrain training camp.
The Cuban Student Directorate (DRE) was probably active at the Ponchartrain camp in July 1963. At least John Koch, a member of the DRE Military Section, was among those arrested during the arms raid. Although the CIA denied any connection to this camp, the DRE was linked to the Agency, as was another person locked up during the July bust. His name was John Noon, and he had been a CIA asset in Project JMATE—an anti-Castro program—in 1960 to 1961. A CIA request for operational use of Noon specified that he was to be used for "across the board training" by PA/PROP (Paramilitary and Propaganda).
A CIA report apparently written during the Garrison investigation (Jim Garrison was the district attorney for New Orleans Parish who tried—unsuccessfully—a local business leader and CIA informant, Clay Shaw, for conspiring to assassinate Kennedy) in 1967 contains this fragment about the Ponchartrain site from a July 1963 report:
. . . The camp was located about 15 miles from New Orleans, right after crossing very long bridge right at entrance of state of Louisiana. Source of Report did not know name of ranch which belonged to some American millionaires who were defraying expenses for maintenance of men in training and providing equipment. Approx 30 men were in training there. Source also stated that on 24 July 63 two automobiles left for Louisiana with Commandante Diego. (Note Diego is [also known as] Victor Manuel (Paneque) Batistia. . . .
Victor Batista was an assistant to Laureano Batista, military coordinator of MDC.
On August 3, 1963, Victor Batista was interviewed by the FBI. He said that a man named Fernando Fernandez had tried to ingratiate himself with the MDC Miami office in June. Apparently he tried too hard, and the MDC assigned Henry Ledea the task of gaining Fernandez's confidence to determine the reasons for Fernandez's "unusual interest" in the MDC. Ledea succeeded in this task, and Fernandez entrusted Ledea to mail some letters. Ledea promptly opened the letters, which exposed Fernandez as an infiltrator. In one letter, written on August 1 to the Cuban ambassador in Mexico, Fernandez said that he had "had infiltrated a commando group who was preparing to engage in an operation in Cuba." Fernandez stated he had "detailed reports" about this operation and asked for diplomatic asylum so that he could return to Cuba "in order to serve the revolution" under Castro. Not surprisingly, Ledea did not mail the letter.
In spite of the fact that at least one person at the Ponchartrain camp was a member of the DRE, the New Orleans DRE delegate, Carlos Bringuier, professed only slight awareness of the camp. When the Church Committee interviewed him in 1976, Bringuier said he "was vaguely familiar with anti-Castro training camps on the north side of Lake Ponchartrain. He remembered that one Cuban named Fernando Fernandez Barcena (the same Fernandez mentioned above) was identified as a Castro agent." In 1963, Bringuier was anxious about the FBI's surveillance of DRE activities, a concern that had roots back into 1962. In April 1964 Bringuier told this to the Warren Commission:
And you see, in August 24, 1962, my organization, the Cuban Student Directorate, carry on a shelling of Havana, and a few days later when person from the FBI contacted me here in New Orleans—his name was Warren C. de Brueys. Mr. de Brueys was talking to me in the Thompson Cafeteria. At that moment I was the only one from the Cuban Student Directorate here in the city, and he was asking me about my activities here in the city, and when I told him that I was the only one, he didn't believe that, and he advised me—and I quote, "We could infiltrate your organization and find out what you are doing here." My answer to him was, "Well, you will have to infiltrate myself, because I am the only one."
After that conversation with de Brueys, Bringuier explained, "I always was waiting that maybe someone will come to infiltrate my organization from the FBI, because I already was told by one of the FBI agent that they will try to infiltrate my organization."
On August 2, 1963, a series of events unfolded that aroused Bringuier's concern. On that day two Cubans showed up in his haberdashery, saying they had deserted the "training camp that was across Lake Ponchartrain here in New Orleans." This was the first he had heard of the camp. The two Cubans said the camp was a branch of the MDC and told Bringuier that they feared "there was a Castro agent inside that training camp." A few days earlier, Bringuier recalled, the New Orleans police had found "a lot of ammunition and weapons" a mile from the camp.
# Oswald and Bringuier
In the same breath that Bringuier told the Warren Commission about the arms bust at Ponchartrain, he added, "And when Oswald came to me on August 5 I had inside myself the feeling, well, maybe this is from the FBI, or maybe this is a Communist, because the FBI already had told me that maybe they will infiltrate my organization . . . . Bringuier also testified that just "4 days later I was convinced that Oswald was not an FBI agent and that he was a Pro-Castro agent." This noteworthy testimony cuts to the heart of the double-agent role Oswald was apparently undertaking during August and September 1963.
Bringuier's disparate impressions of Oswald deserve close scrutiny. As previously discussed, Bringuier was the local delegate for the DRE, one of whose members had been caught in the FBI arms bust near Lake Ponchartrain. Bringuier had good reason to be guarded when, five days after the raid, Oswald sauntered into the Casa Roca, Bringuier's retail clothing store at 107 Decatur Street, and began talking about guerrilla warfare. According to Bringuier's testimony, this is what happened:
Now that day, on August 5, I was talking in the store with one young American—the name of him is Philip Geraci—and 5 minutes later Mr. Oswald came inside the store. He start to look around, several articles, and he show interest in my conversation with Geraci. I was explaining to Geraci that our fight is a fight of Cubans and that he was too young, that if he want to distribute literature against Castro, I would give him the literature but not admit him to the fight.
At that moment also he start to agree with I, Oswald start to agree with my point of view and he show real interest in the fight against Castro. He told me that he was against Castro and that he was against communism. He told me—he asked me first for some English literature against Castro, and I gave him some copies of the Cuban report printed by the Cuban Student Directorate.
After that, Oswald told me that he had been in the Marine Corps and that he had training in guerrilla warfare and that he was willing to train Cubans to fight against Castro. Even more, he told me that he was willing to go himself to fight Castro. That was on August 5.
Bringuier says he "turned down" Oswald's offer, explaining that his duties were propaganda and information, not military activities. "Oswald insisted," Bringuier says, "and he told me that he will bring to me next day one book as a present, as a gift to me, to train Cubans to fight against Castro."
Oswald was not finished. He offered money to Bringuier too, whose recollection led to this exchange with Warren Commission lawyer Wesley Liebler:
MR. BRINGUIER: . . . Before he left the store, he put his hand in the pocket and he offered me money.
MR. LIEBELER: Oswald did?
MR. BRINGUIER: Yes.
MR. LIEBELER: How much did he offer you?
MR. BRINGUIER: Well, I don't know. As soon as he put the hand in the pocket and he told me, "Well, at least let me contribute to your group with some money," at that moment I didn't have the permit from the city hall here in New Orleans to collect money in the city, and I told him that I could not accept his money, and I told him that if he want to contribute to our group, he could send the money directly to the headquarters in Miami, because they had the authorization over there in Miami, and I gave him the number of the post office box of the organization in Miami.
Oswald gave Bringuier his correct name and Magazine Street address. Bringuier then left the store to go to the bank. Oswald remained talking to Rolando Pelaez, Bringuier's brother-in-law, for about a half an hour.
When Bringuier returned to the Casa Roca, Pelaez told Bringuier that Oswald "looked like really a smart person and really interested in the fight against communism," but Bringuier claims he warned his brother-in-law that he did not trust Oswald, "because—I didn't know what was inside of me, but I had some feeling that I could not trust him. I told that to my brother that day." For the Oswald who had written the FPCC in April that he had stood in Dallas with a pro-Castro sign around his neck, this visit to the Casa Roca was a remarkable twist. It was all the more interesting because Oswald would shortly hand out his pro-Castro literature not far from the store. What Oswald was getting ready to spring on Bringuier was a deliberate provocation.
It is curious how the Warren Commission Report finessed the two-faced role demonstrated by Oswald's approach to Bringuier:
On August 5, he visited a store managed by Carlos Bringuier, a Cuban refugee and avid opponent of Castro and the New Orleans delegate of the Cuban Student Directorate. Oswald indicated an interest in joining the struggle against Castro. He told Bringuier that he had been a Marine and was trained in guerrilla warfare, and that he was willing not only to fight Castro but also to join the fight himself. The next day Oswald returned and left his "Guidebook for Marines" for Bringuier."
The Warren Report then leaps right into Oswald's pro-Castro leafleting, which angers Bringuier and causes a scene, without attempting to explain Oswald's contradictory behavior. The Warren Report also neglected to mention that Bringuier's organization had for years been covertly funded by the CIA. Did Commission member and former CIA director Allen Dulles realize that Bringuier might have been involved in a CIA program at the time of Oswald's visit?
A June 1, 1967, CIA memorandum by Counterintelligence Research and Analysis (CI/R&A) said Bringuier had no "direct association with the Agency. But see enclosure one in respect to the Student Revolutionary Directorate (DRE), the New Orleans branch of which was once headed by Bringuier. The DRE was conceived, created, and funded by CIA." Whether or not Allen Dulles knew about AMSPELL and Bringuier's connection to this program, important Agency memoranda describing this connection have emerged over the years. A memo written for the record by CI/R&A, dated April 3, 1967, pointed out that Bringuier considered Oswald "either an FBI informant or a Communist penetration agent" and for this reason rejected his offer to train anti-Castro Cubans. The memorandum also said this:
The Student Revolutionary Directorate (DRE) was undoubtedly the group to which the Warren Commission referred. It was funded covertly by CIA. It was penetrated by the DGI [Cuban intelligence] and, in the fall of 1962, rolled up. We continued nominal support until September 1966 and terminated the relationship on 1 January 1967.
This language avoids the ticklish question of what Bringuier's "indirect" association with the CIA in 1963 might have been. The same goes for Bringuier's associates Bartes, Quiroga, and Butler, all of whom had "indirect" links to the CIA and, together with Bringuier, were about to enter a three-week propaganda extravaganza with Oswald, which would be covered by local radio, television, and newspapers.
The same April memo complained about how writer-attorney Mark Lane was "trying to use" New Orleans district attorney Jim Garrison's investigation to implicate anti-Castro Cubans in a "rightist plot" to assassinate Kennedy. The memo then contains this illuminating passage:
Bringuier is a leader of a New Orleans anti-Castro group. He was summoned to Garrison's office [date not reported] and asked to take a polygraph test. He agreed. During the test he was asked whether he had been contacted by the CIA. He said no and feels that deception reactions did not result because it was the other way around; he contacted CIA [emphasis added].
The questioner failed to ask the right question and Bringuier's answer did not give away his links to the Agency.
A similar failure marks the end of the FBI's inadequate answer to the Warren Commission on how it established Oswald's whereabouts and activities in New Orleans. It was August 5 that the FBI checked with the William B. Reily Coffee Company about when Oswald began employment there. By this time the FBI should have asked if Oswald was still working there, but they neglected to ask about his termination. "Mrs. Mary Berttucci, personal Secretary, William Reily Coffee Company, 640 Magazine St., advised on 8/5/ 63," said the FBI, "that Lee Harvey Oswald has been employed as a maintenance man since 5/15/63. His address at the time of his employment was 757 French St." Someone should have added that Oswald had been fired back on July 19. A New Orleans FBI cable to Dallas on August 13 said, "Mr. Jesse James Garner, 4909 Magazine St., New Orleans, advised on 8/5/63 that the subjects [Oswalds] have occupied the apartment at 4905 Magazine St. since about 6/63." As we have shown, however, the FBI had probably known since mid-May that Oswald had been residing on Magazine Street.
On August. 6, 1963, Oswald returned to the Casa Roca and, as he had promised the previous day, left his U.S. Marine Corps manual. He had underlined something on page 189: "Sight setting: 1 minute of angle or approximately 1 inch on target for each 100 yards." Bringuier recalled Oswald's second visit to the Casa Roca in this way:
Next day, on August 6, Oswald came back to the store, but I was not in the store at that moment, and he left with my brother-in-law a Guidebook for Marines. I was looking in the Guidebook for marines. I found interest in it and I keep it, and later—I forgot about that just for 3 days more—on August 9 I was coming back to the store at 2 o'clock in the afternoon, and one friend of mine with the name of Celso Hernandez came to me and told me that in Canal Street there was a young man carrying a sign telling "Viva Fidel" in Spanish, and some other thing about Cuba, but my friend don't speak nothing in English, and the only thing that he understood was the "Viva Fidel" in Spanish. He told me that he was blaming the person in Spanish, but that the person maybe didn't understood what he was telling to him and he came to me to let me know what was going on over there.
Bringuier's account of the second Oswald visit is corroborated by a secret service report written after the assassination by New Orleans Special Agent in Charge John Rice. On November 27, 1963, Rice called special agent in charge Robert I. Bouck to tell him Bringuier had turned over the "Guidebook for Marines" given to him by Oswald. "At the time Oswald pretended to be against Castro," Rice said, "and told Bringuier that he would be willing to assist in training Cubans with a view to overthrowing Castro."
It seems appropriate to review the two-sided role that Oswald had begun to play. The timing, flow, and changes of direction were not aimless. They seem intelligently related to the larger structure of Oswald's life and possibly to a great deal more. The Oswald character who emerges in FBI files and from there into CIA files begins in New Orleans by doing two things: infiltrating the FPCC as "Lee Harvey Oswald" while simultaneously forging an undercover identity. In this undercover role, his character, "A.J. Hidell," a pro-Castro activist, hands out FPCC literature under a false organizational title, "Fair Play for Cuba Committee, New Orleans Charter Member Branch," with a false post office box (30016), and a false office address (544 Camp Street).
Those roles lasted throughout June and July. In August, Oswald switched to an overt pro-Castro role, but not before cashing in on his false identity. This he did by deliberately baiting Carlos Bringuier on August 5 and 6. Why Bringuier? Oswald had managed to pick the Cuban with the best connections to the CIA in New Orleans. When Bringuier rushed to interfere with Oswald's pro-Castro leaflet operation, Oswald was waiting for him.
# The Canal Street Caper, August 9
Around one P.M. on a Friday afternoon, Oswald casually walked to the 700 block of Canal Street, not far from Bringuier's store, and began distributing FPCC literature. Upon receiving this news, Bringuier and two associates, Celso Macario Hernandez and Miguel Mariano Cruz, moved quickly to the scene. There was an argument and some shouting, and an altercation ensued. Bringuier prepared to punch Oswald when the latter, as if expecting this, dropped his hands and invited "Carlos" to throw the punch. The Cubans then decided to trash Oswald's leaflets, scattering them over the ground. A few moments later, the police arrived and all four men were arrested.
The above brief sketch is comprehensive compared to the threesentence treatment of the Canal Street episode by the Warren Report: "On August 9, Bringuier saw Oswald passing out Fair Play for Cuba leaflets. Bringuier and his companions became angry and a dispute resulted. Oswald and the three Cuban exiles were arrested for disturbing the peace." The Warren Commission was happy to let the American public fill in the details, and to ask obvious questions such as, why did Oswald want an altercation? and why did he pick Bringuier to have it with? The Warren Report did not think it useful to point out to readers that there was a pertinent sentence from New Orleans police lieutenant Frances Martello's testimony about the clash. Martello had said that Oswald "seemed to have set them up, so to speak, to create an incident, but when the incident occurred he remained absolutely peaceful and gentle."
Martello's incisive account had little impression on the Warren Commission. The same was true for an even more extraordinary event that occurred in the police station—which earned a grand total of nine words in the Warren Report: "At Oswald's request, an FBI agent also interviewed him." We will return to that shortly. On the day of the Canal Street caper, a New Orleans FBI report written by Special Agent Stephen M. Callender reported the arrest of Oswald and the three Cubans at 4:20 P.M. by Lieutenant William Galliot. Callender's brief description of the four men, based upon Galliot's report and information provided by an informant who witnessed the leafleting incident did little to explain the nature of the disturbance. Another person who saw Oswald passing out his handbills was New Orleans attorney Dean Andrews, who recalled that Oswald told him he was being "paid $25.00 per day for the job."
Habana Bar owner Orestes Pena posted bond for Carlos Bringuier's release. One or two days before Oswald's clash with Bringuier on August 9, Oswald and another man reportedly met at the Habana Bar, 117 Decatur, just a few doors from Bringuier's store (at 107 Decatur). Pena was present. He recalled that Oswald's companion was a Cuban. Previously, Pena overheard two Cubans in his bar, posing as Mexicans, making anti-American remarks. He reported them to the FBI. Bringuier claimed he was told that one of these men was not only Oswald's companion but also a Mexican Communist wanted by the FBI. Another Cuban exile, a waiter at the Habana Bar by the name of Evaristo Gilberto Rodriguez, also recalls seeing Oswald and a Latino male in the bar around the second week of August.
After spending the night in jail, Oswald found himself speaking with Lieutenant Martello. Martello had previously been assigned to the department's intelligence unit. After he found out that Oswald had been handing out FPCC literature, Martello said he decided to interrogate him to see if this would produce "any information which would be of value and to ascertain if all interested parties had been notified." Martello directed that Oswald be brought into the interview room. Martello introduced himself and asked Oswald for identification papers. Oswald pulled out his wallet and gave Martello a social security card and a selective service card, both in the name of Lee Harvey Oswald, and two FPCC membership cards in the name Lee Harvey Oswald, one signed by V. T. Lee, and one signed by "A. J. Hidell, Chapter President, issued June 6, 1963."
Oswald had told the arresting officers that he was born in Cuba, a lie which he did not repeat to Lieutenant Martello. Oswald told him he had been born in New Orleans, which was the truth, but then Oswald immediately lied about his date of birth, which he claimed was October 18, 1938. Oswald said that he had served three years in the Marine Corps and that he was discharged on July 17, 1959, at El Toro. In fact, Oswald had been discharged on September 11, 1959. Oswald said he had lived at 4907 Magazine for four months, but he had lived there for three months to the day. Several other pieces of information Oswald furnished were inaccurate or outright lies.
Martello's contemporaneous account of this important interview is preserved only in his handwriting, which he set down at three A.M. on the morning after the Kennedy assassination. That day, the Secret Service took his original report and associated papers and documents from his office. His account described their considerable discussion of the FPCC. This is how this part of the interview started:
When questioned about the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, Oswald stated that he had been a member for three months. I asked how he had become affiliated with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee and he stated he became interested in that Committee in Los Angeles, California in 1958 while in the U. S. Marines Corps. The facts as to just how he first became interested in the Fair Play for Cuba Committee while in the Marine Corps are vague, however I recall that he said he had obtained some Fair Play for Cuba Committee literature and had gotten into some difficulty in the Marine Corps for having this literature.
This tale was completely false. The Fair Play for Cuba Committee did not exist until seven months after Oswald left the Marines, by which time Oswald was deep in the Soviet Union. Oswald probably did not receive his first FPCC material until the spring of 1963.
Martello wanted to know how many members there were in the New Orleans chapter. Oswald lied again when he said there were thirty-five. Martello's handwritten account, entered into his Warren Commission testimony, describes how he then proceeded to grill Oswald on the FPCC:
I asked him to identify the members of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee in New Orleans and he refused to give names of the members or any identifying data regarding them. Oswald was asked why he refused and he said that this was a minority group holding unpopular views at this time and it would not be beneficial to them if he gave their names. Oswald was asked approximately how many people attended meetings of the New Orleans Chapter of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee and he said approximately five attended the meetings, which were held once a month. He was asked where and he said at various places in the city. He was asked specifically at what addresses or locations were the meetings held and stated that the meetings were held on Pine Street. He was asked at whose residence the meetings were held and he refused to give any further information.
Perhaps Martello thought he had reached what Oswald was hiding. At this point Martello digresses, explaining how a "prior investigation" that he conducted while a member of the intelligence unit had discovered FPCC literature in the 1000 block of Pine Street, "near" the residence of Dr. Leonard Reissman, who, as discussed in Chapter Sixteen, was a leftwing professor at Tulane University.
Martello was looking for a connection between Oswald and Reissman, who probably never met. Martello's report went on about how Dr. Reissman was a "reported" member of the New Orleans Council of Peaceful Alternatives (NOCPA), which Martello described as a "ban the bomb" group. This group had conducted meetings and demonstrations in New Orleans. He is less than convincing, however, when it comes to explaining their relevance to Oswald:
Knowing that Dr. Reissman was reportedly a member of the New Orleans Council of Peaceful Alternatives I thought there might be a tie between this organization and the Fair Play for Cuba Committee. When Oswald stated that meetings of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee had been held on Pine Street, the name of Dr. Reissman came to mind. I asked Oswald if he knew Dr. Reissman or if he held meetings at Dr. Reissman's house. Oswald did not give me a direct answer to this question, however I gathered from the expression on his face and what appeared to be an immediate nervous reaction that there was possibly a connection between Dr. Reissman and Oswald; this, however, is purely an assumption on my own part and I have nothing on which to base this.
One cannot help but wonder what "expression" Oswald made that permitted such an interpretation. Martello seemed to have obtained a small victory, i.e., that Reissman and Oswald were connected, even though Oswald had actually said nothing. What Martello apparently did not know was that Ruth Kloebfer, a New Orleans resident who was on the NOCPA mailing list, had been recommended to Oswald by a relative in Dallas, Ruth Paine. Also, Carlos Bringuier knew "a Bruce Walthzer who was somehow associated with Kloepfer and Reissman." Presumably, if he had known of Oswald's tie-in to Kloepfer, Martello would have made much ado about it too.
In any event, Martello evidently felt he had enough on Reissman, and was ready to move to his next target, another leftwing political figure that was dimly connected to the FPCC in Martello's mind: Dr. Forrest E. La Violette, also, as previously discussed, a professor at Tulane University. Martello asked Oswald about La Violette "because I remembered that La Violette allegedly had possession of Fair Play for Cuba literature during the year 1962."
I cannot remember any further details about this or do I have any information that he is or was connected with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee in New Orleans. Oswald became very evasive in his answers and would not divulge any information concerning the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, where the group met, or the identities of the members. . . . I asked him again about the members of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee in New Orleans and why the information was such a big secret; that if [he] had nothing to hide, he would give me the information. Oswald said one of the members of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee in New Orleans was named "John" and that this individual went to Tulane University. He refused to give any more information concerning the Fair Play for Cuba Committee in New Orleans.
"John" might have. existed, but he probably did not. Oswald was treading on dangerous ground—if indeed he was a genuine pro-Castro activist. He had engaged a rabid anti-Castro organization and their CIA masters.
In one sense, it does not matter whether Oswald himself picked the DRE or whether he was steered to them. From their perspective, Oswald was a propitious propaganda opportunity. After the assassination, this was all the more true. Then, the Joint Legislative Committee on Un-American Activities for the State of Louisiana hired J. D. Vinson of the Isaac Detective Agency to research Oswald. FBI special agent Quigley interviewed Vinson on November 27, 1963, who said he had checked on Forrest E. La Violette and Leonard Reissman, since "he had a dim recollection that sometime in 1962," FPCC literature had been found in the 1200 or 1300 block of Pine Street. It is striking how similar were Martello's and Vinson's "dim" memories of FPCC literature near the 1200 block of Pine Street in 1962.
When arrested, Oswald had the booklet "The Crime Against Cuba," stamped with the address "FPCC 544 Camp Street, New Orleans, La." By this time, however, the 544 Camp Street address was an anachronism: Oswald had begun stamping his real name and 4907 Magazine Street on his FPCC handbills. As we have seen, from the moment he walked into Bringuier's store on August 5, Oswald had entered the overt phase of his FPCC activities in New Orleans. The Camp Street address was not the only anachronism among Oswald's possessions when he was arrested. When Lieutenant Martello turned over his file on Oswald to Agent A. G. Vial from Secret Service at three A.M. on November 23, 1963, Martello noticed "a small white piece of paper containing handwritten notes." In response to the Warren Commission's question on how this piece of paper was "taken from Oswald," Martello answered that "it wasn't actually taken from him . . . it was left—it was inadvertently picked up with the [FPCC] literature, and I put it in a file folder and it remained there." Martello's testimony to the Warren Commission included this remark:
This piece of paper, which was folded over twice and was about 2" by 3" in size, contained some English writing and some writing which appeared to me to be in a foreign language which I could not identify. Before I gave this paper to Mr. Vial, I made a copy of the information. . . .
On one side of this piece of paper were street addresses for relatives in Dallas and New Orleans, but on the reverse side was handwriting in Russian, including the name "Leo Setyaev." Setyaev, of course, was the Radio Moscow man who had interviewed Oswald at the time of his defection. Oswald had also tried—on at least one occasion—to contact Setyaev during his stay in the Soviet Union.
Why Oswald would have a name from his Russian past, let alone Setyaev's on a piece of paper in his pocket in the summer of 1963 is a mystery. So was his request to be interviewed in jail by the FBI. The FBI man who did the interview knew about Oswald's Russian past, because it was the same man who looked over the ONI file on Oswald at the Algiers station in 1961.
# The Quigley Jailhouse Interview
On August 10, 1963, Lieutenant Martello notified the New Orleans FBI that Oswald had been picked up the day before and charged with disturbing the peace. Martello told them that Oswald had been handing out FPCC literature in the 700 block of Canal Street. But Martello had a special reason for contacting the FBI that day. According to Agent John Quigley, Martello "said that Oswald was desirous of seeing an Agent and supplying to him information with regard to his activities with the 'Fair Play for Cuba Committee' in New Orleans."
Oswald had been evasive about the FPCC with Martello, so asking to be interviewed by the FBI appears stranger still, unless, as in the Canal Street caper, Oswald wanted to attract attention to himself. As if on cue, Quigley quietly slipped into the First District jail to interview Oswald. The interview was "at his request," Quigley wrote in his recapitulation of the August 10 encounter. Quigley reported that Oswald did not answer all the questions put to him. Moreover, Quigley's report was suppressed until after Oswald's trip to Mexico City in October.
When going over his background, Oswald told Quigley that "about four months ago he and his wife, Marina Oswald nee Prossa, whom he met and married in Fort Worth, moved to New Orleans." Oswald must have known the FBI was knowledgeable about his marriage to Marina, and so this fabrication seems pointless. Quigley's August memo on the interview recalls the following:
After coming to New Orleans he said he began reading various pieces of literature distributed by the "Fair Play for Cuba Committee", and it was his understanding from reading this material that the main goal and theme of the committee is to prevent the United States from invading or attacking Cuba or interfering in the political affairs of that country. . . . Oswald said that inquiry in New Orleans developed the fact that there apparently was a chapter of the "Fair Play for Cuba Committee" in New Orleans, but he did not know any of the members or where their offices were located.
Oswald was lying when he suggested there was an existing New Orleans FPCC chapter. Oswald had, of course, been corresponding with the FPCC while in Dallas, and now was attempting to give Quigley the impression that it was his reading of FPCC materials in New Orleans that had stimulated his interest in joining the organization.
Oswald told Quigley he had sent a letter to the FPCC in New York City, asking if he could join the committee, and added that in "the latter part of May" 1963 he had received a membership card dated May 28, 1963, made out in the name of "Lee H. Oswald" and signed by "V. L. Lee." All of this was true, but the same cannot be said for what Oswald said next:
A short time thereafter he said he received in the mail a white card which showed that he was made a member of the New Orleans Chapter of Fair Play for Cuba Committee. This card was dated June 6, 1963. It was signed by A.J. Hidell, and it bore in the lower right hand corner the number 33 which he said indicated membership number. Oswald had in his possession both cards and exhibited both of them.
Marina later testified that she signed the name "A. J. Hidell" on this FPCC card. Oswald's alias, of course, would assume a terrible significance after the assassination: The alleged murder weapon in the Kennedy assassination, a Manlicher-Carcano rifle, had been ordered in February from Klein's in Chicago under the name Hidell.
The Hidell story continued to grow, as can be seen from this passage in Quigley's jailhouse interview:
Since receiving his membership card in the New Orleans chapter of the committee he said that he had spoken with Hidell on the telephone on several occasions. On these occasions, Hidell would discuss general matters of mutual interest in connection with committee business, and on other occasions he would inform him of a scheduled meeting. He said he has never personally met Hidell, and Hidell did have a telephone, but it has now been discontinued. He claimed that he could not recall what the number was.
Oswald said the committee held meetings in residences of "various members, and at each meeting there were "about five different individuals" who "were different" at each of these meetings. Not that any of this mattered, because Oswald said he had not been introduced to them by their last names and he could not recall any of their first names.
After more fairy tales, Oswald got around to the events on Canal Street:
Last Wednesday, August 7, 1963, Oswald said he received a note through the mail from Hidell. The note asked him if he had time would he mind distributing some Fair Play literature in the downtown area of New Orleans. He said Hidell knew that he was not working and probably had time. Hidell also knew that he had considerable literature on the committee which had been furnished to him by the national committee in New York. Since he did not have anything to do, Oswald said he decided he would go down to Canal Street and distribute some literature. He denied that he was being paid for his services, but that he was doing it as a patriotic duty.
Oswald said that about one P.M. on August 9, 1963, he went to Canal Street by himself and began distributing literature, including FPCC handbills. Quigley saw a handbill with the stamp "A J Hidell, P.O. Box 30016." In addition, Oswald said he had FPCC membership applications and several copies of a thirty-nine-page pamphlet entitled "The Crime Against Cuba" by Corliss Lamont, "which he carried with him as it contained all of the information regarding the committee, and he would be in a position to refer to it for proper answers in the event someone questioned him regarding the aims and purposes of the committee." Oswald gave a handbill, an application form, and a pamphlet to Quigley.
At no point did Quigley indicate he knew the details of Oswald's Russian past, details that had been in Oswald's ONI records at nearby Algiers Naval Station and, thanks to Quigley's 1961 report, also in Oswald's FBI file in New Orleans. Whether or not Quigley remembered these details, his questioning during the interview did not show any awareness of where Oswald's story strayed from the facts.
Toward the end of the interview, Oswald said he understood that on August 12 he was to be taken into court and charged with disturbing the peace. When he showed up, the Cuban exiles, and the television cameras, were waiting.
# Bartes, Quiroga, and Oswald on Television
The courtroom fracas on August 12 was well attended by local television and newspaper reporters. Presiding at the hearing was second municipal court judge Edwin A. Babylon. Alongside Carlos Bringuier was Frank Bartes who, although not a member of Bringuier's DRE group, "respected" Bringuier and came to the hearing as a "show of support." According to the clerk's office, Oswald entered a plea of guilty to the charge of disturbing the peace. Oswald was sentenced to pay a fine of ten dollars or serve ten days in jail. He elected to pay the fine.
Bringuier and the Cubans pleaded innocent. The charges against them for disturbing the peace "were dropped by the court." Bartes, however, was not yet finished. After the hearing, when the news media surrounded Oswald for a statement, Bartes said he "got into an argument with the media and Oswald because the Cubans were not being given an opportunity to present their views."
Bartes also said that he spoke to an FBI agent that day, warning that Oswald was a dangerous man. Bartes made this statement to the HSCA, but he refused to reveal the agent's name. Bartes would say only that he had frequent contact with this agent. Corroborative evidence comes from the FBI's files. We know from an early draft of a New Orleans FBI document that Bartes was an informant for the FBI, and that his identity was considered sensitive. Bartes told the HSCA that after the court scene he had no further contact with Oswald.
There is irony in how this court scene unleashed the sequence of events that followed. Bartes's argument with Oswald and warning to the FBI about him occurred at the very sentencing that led to the Times-Picayune article which, in turn, led the Bureau to direct an inquiry by the New Orleans FBI office during which Bartes denied knowing Oswald. Thus, during this sequence, which lasted less than a month, Bartes did a flipflop on Oswald: from warning the FBI about Oswald in August to telling the FBI in September "that Oswald was unknown to him."
Oswald's arrest and sentencing caused a fresh review of events taking place in New Orleans that would be disseminated from that city's FBI office to the CIA. On August 21 Hoover sent a directive to New Orleans and Dallas, reminding Dallas that they had been on the hook since March to find out what Oswald's job was and to determine whether or not to interview Marina. Hoover pointed out to the New Orleans office that the man arrested there had an FBI identification record number—327-925-D—the record containing Oswald's fingerprints.
The Hoover directive repeated every detail of the arrest and sentencing from the Times-Picayune, and then told Dallas to "promptly" get its information in order. For New Orleans, Hoover had these instructions:
New Orleans ascertain facts concerning subject's distribution of above-mentioned pamphlet including nature of pamphlet following which contact should be made with established sources familiar with Cuban activities in the New Orleans area to determine whether subject involved in activities inimical to the internal security of the U.S. Submit results in letterhead memorandum form suitable for dissemination with appropriate recommendation as to further action.
The resulting letterhead memorandum was dynamite when it landed in Oswald's CIA files in early October. Oswald's activities from the time of his arrest on August 9 until the release of the letterhead memorandum on September 24 would be encapsulated in this FBI report. The fate of this report at the CIA will be covered in Chapter Nineteen.
On August 16, 1963, at about 12:30 P.M., Oswald and a companion, a white male (about nineteen to twenty years old and approximately six feet tall, with a slender build, dark hair, and olive complexion) arrived at the International Trade Mart at Camp and Gravier streets (124 Camp). Oswald hired three or four additional men at two dollars apiece to help distribute his FPCC literature. The leaflets were stamped with Oswald's real name and his 4907 Magazine Street address. Oswald told one of the men helping him, Charles Steele, that Tulane University was sponsoring the leaflet distribution. A local television station, WDSU-TV, filmed the event.
Bringuier went to the Trade Mart in an attempt to find Oswald but was not successful. Afterward, Quiroga showed Bringuier one of the leaflets. Bringuier recalls that these leaflets were different from those Oswald handed out on Canal Street. When asked by the Warren Commission to explain the difference, Bringuier gave this answer:
The leaflet he was handing out on Canal Street August 9 didn't have his name of Oswald, at least the ones that I saw. They have the name A.J. Hidell, and one post office box here in New Orleans and the address, and the leaflets that he was handing out on August 16 have the name L.H. Oswald, 4907 Magazine Street. . . . My friend asked to me if I think that it would be good that he will go to Oswald's house posing as a pro-Castro and try to get as much information as possible from Oswald. I told him yes; and that night he went to Oswald's house with the leaflets. . . . My friend went to Oswald's house and he was talking to Oswald for about 1 hour inside his house, in the porch of the house, and there was when we found that Oswald had some connection with Russia, or something like that, because the daughter came to the porch and Oswald spoke to her in Russian, and my friend heard that language and he asked Oswald if that was Russian, and Oswald told him yes, that he was attending Tulane University and that he was studying language, that that was the reason why he speak Russian. He give to my friend an application to become a member of the New Orleans Chapter of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee.
Quite aside from the leafleting event at the Trade Mart, August 16 was a busy day for Oswald. Around two P.M., he went to both New Orleans newspapers in hope of getting pro-Castro material printed. He also claims to have applied for a job at the Times-Picayune and the States-Item, though both papers maintain he did not. By late in the afternoon he was back home on 4907 Magazine, when a stranger knocked at the door.
"Well, there was that Cuban- or Spanish-looking guy one time rang my bell in the late afternoon," Mrs. Garner, Oswald's landlady, told the Warren Commission, "kind of short, very dark black curly hair, and he had a stack of these same pamphlets in his hand he was spreading out on Canal Street there on the porch," she recalled, assuming that her visitor had been passing out FPCC leaflets. That assumption was wrong. Mrs. Garner was outspoken, as she explained to the commission:
. . . And he had a stack of them in his hand and he asked me about Oswald, and I said he was living around on that side where the screen porch is, and I saw those things in his hand and I said, "You are not going to spread those things on my porch," and that was all, and I closed the door and went on about my business. I don't know, but I guess he went over there.
Commission lawyer Liebeler asked Garner, "How many pamphlets did this man have in his hand?" Mrs. Garner groped for words and said, "a stack about that high." "About five to six inches?" asked Liebeler. "About that high," Garner replied. "About the width of your hand?" Liebeler persisted. "Yes," Mrs. Garner agreed. And what did Mrs. Garner remember of the date for the stranger's visit with the fistful of handbills? "That I don't remember," she says, but adds, "I know it was around that time, just right after he was picked up on Canal Street for disturbing them. It was a few days after that."
On November 30, 1963, Quiroga told the Secret Service that after Oswald's arrest, Carlos Bringuier ordered him "to infiltrate Oswald's organization if he could." It therefore seems certain that the individual Mrs. Garner saw was Quiroga. The December 3 Secret Service report preserves Quiroga's recollection of his encounter with Oswald:
He said he went to Oswald's home at 4907 Magazine St. . . . He said he spent about an hour talking to Oswald who told him he learned to speak Russian at Tulane University, New Orleans. . . . He said Oswald had not mentioned to him that he had defected to Russia. He said Oswald asked him to join the Fair Play for Cuba group and had given him an application form. Oswald told him he could join for $1. He said that during the conversation, Oswald stated that if the United States should invade Cuba, he, Oswald, would fight on the side of the Castro Government. He said Oswald never did mention any of the names of the members of the Fair Play for Cuba group. He did say that meetings were held at various private homes in New Orleans.
Carlos said he had been willing to join the Fair Play for Cuba group provided it was done with the backing of the FBI or the local police force. He said he had made this known to Lt. Martello, NOPD, who apparently forgot about it. He said he did not contact the FBI for the reason on a previous occasion he had notified their office that Oswald was handing out what he assumed to be procommunist literature in front of the International Trade Mart, New Orleans, and the FBI had given him the cold shoulder.
According to the December 3 Secret Service report, Quiroga had been associated with Arcacha Smith, former head of the CRC in New Orleans. Another CRC member, a Mr. Rodriguez, Sr., told the Secret Service agents that Quiroga "knew Arcacha well and was with him frequently (very close connection) at 544 Camp Street."
Although Quiroga has been viewed as a CRC member or an "associate" of DRE delegate Bringuier, the newly released files show that he was an intriguing fellow in his own right. He had come to the attention of the CIA for his previous pro-Castro leanings (he was now anti-Castro), which resulted in his consideration for operational use in a dangerous role. According to a 1967 CIA memorandum, Quiroga had been designated for recruitment into an important project while he had been attending classes at Louisiana State University. Quiroga, stated the report, was "a candidate for the CIA Student Recruitment Program, designed to recruit Cuban students to return to Cuba as agents in place." Quiroga had the perfect pedigree: Until mid-1961 he had been pegged as "an ardent Castro supporter" who made anti-U.S. statements.
Quiroga had been attractive to the CIA as someone who might be enticed to take advantage of his pro-Castro pedigree to spy in Cuba. None of this meant, as the Counterintelligence/Research and Analysis report was quick to point out, that Quiroga had been "employed" by the Agency. Quiroga, however, had vices: "He reportedly had homosexual tendencies," the report added, "and low morals." These tendencies may have made him more vulnerable as a target for recruitment.
Quiroga's visit was not the end of Oswald's contacts with individuals who were associated with the AMSPELL propaganda being wrapped around Oswald. Oswald was about to meet Ed Butler.
# Butler, Oswald, and the WDSU Radio Debate
"Dear General," an old friend of U.S. Air Force Major General Edward Lansdale wrote on August 1, 1963, "here is the letter I mentioned to you concerning the anti-communist student operation in the Dominican Republic, where Father Barrenechea operates, though his mail address is Miami." Lansdale had served as the operations officer for Kennedy's anti-Cuban operations in 1962, and Lansdale's friend happened to be a respected editor for the Reader's Digest, Gene Methvin. Methvin told Lansdale this about the letter:
This is the first "nuts-and-bolts how to do it" approach I've seen to organizational warfare. The author, Ed Butler, has an organization going in New Orleans called "The Information Council of the Americas" (INCA), which is sending "Truth Tapes," dramatic interviews with Cuban refugees and other anti-Communist programs, to more than 100 radio stations in 16 Latin countries.
Lansdale read Methvin's letter and knew just what to do. He wrote a note on August 2 to his assistant, Colonel Jackson: "Discuss this with Frank Hand. Is this something for us to help, to stay away from, what? The Methvin article attracts me. The letter to the padre says whoa, caution. There is tricky background, which is where Frank Hand comes in." Tricky background about Ed Butler's letter? What did Lansdale mean by this? Frank Hand was detailed to Lansdale's office from the CIA. Lansdale must have been referring to Butler's connections to the Agency when he said "where Frank Hand comes in." On August 6, Colonel Jackson wrote back to Lansdale, "Based on comments by Frank Hand recommend the Orlando Group be left alone."
That was probably just as well for Lansdale, given the level of post-assassination interest that developed in Oswald's activities over the summer and fall of 1963. Lansdale already knew some of the background story on Butler, and deftly dodged entanglement with his operations. In all the interviews with Lansdale during the seventies and eighties, no one asked him for his views on Butler's debate with Oswald, an event that took place within days of Lansdale's decision to steer clear of Butler. This point may seem obscure, but its value may become apparent as we learn more about Lansdale. The general impression gleaned—after two separate investigations by two different research teams—from the voluminous Lansdale papers at the Hoover Institution is that Lansdale would ordinarily have been interested in the sort of propaganda opportunities Butler was working to open up for the Agency. Lansdale was one of the creators of modern psychological warfare, and he patronized the efforts of many people like Butler. Who was Ed Butler? The answer to that question became apparent during the last week of August 1963, when he and a radio host in New Orleans managed to get Oswald into a live radio debate.
At ten A.M. on August 21, 1963, the phone rang in the New Orleans office of the FBI, and SAC Harry Maynor took the call. The caller said he was with the"Ross Agency," an advertising business, but added he also had a Latin American program on WDSU radio, a local station in New Orleans. His name was "Bill" Stuckey. He had a thirty-two-minute tape of an interview with Oswald made the previous evening in Oswald's home. Stuckey said he had spoken with Oswald because of Oswald's claim to be an officer of the local Fair Play for Cuba Committee, and had been arrested by the NOPD.
Was the FPCC cited as a "subversive" organization? Stuckey asked. Maynor replied he was not authorized to comment, and advised Stuckey to call the U.S. Department of Justice. Before hanging up, Stuckey mentioned that at 6:05 P.M. that evening Oswald and Edward Butler would debate for thirty minutes on his radio program, Carte Blanche. Stuckey suggested to Maynor, "that I might like to hear this program." Stuckey also offered him the thirty-two-minute tape. Maynor passed all of this on to SA Milton Kaack, to whom the Oswald case had been assigned. The New Orleans office did get a copy of the taped interview, but not from Stuckey. Kaack got it from Butler on August 26, and returned it to Butler—presumably after making a duplicate—on August 30.
When Oswald showed up for the debate, Stuckey and his co-host, Slatter, as well as Butler and Bringuier, were already there. The program began, and after some sparring back and forth, Stuckey dropped this bomb on Oswald:
STUCKEY: Mr. Oswald, if I may break in now a moment, I believe it was mentioned that you at one time asked to renounce your American citizenship and become a Soviet citizen, is that correct?
OSWALD: Well, I don't think that has particular import to this discussion. We are discussing Cuban-American relations.
STUCKEY: Well, I think it has a bearing to this extent. Mr. Oswald, you say apparently that Cuba is not dominated by Russia and yet you apparently, by your own past actions, have shown that you have an affinity for Russia and perhaps communism, although I don't know that you admit that you either are a Communist or have been, could you straighten out that part? Are you or have you been a Communist? O
SWALD: Well, I answered that prior to this program, on another radio program.
STUCKEY: Are you a Marxist?
OSWALD: Yes, I am a Marxist.
Oswald was suddenly on the defensive, and his hesitation suggests that he wanted to hide his connections to the Soviet Union.
If Oswald had set up Bringuier for the Canal Street caper, Oswald was the target on this evening. Back on the air from a commercial break, host Slatter said, "Mr. Oswald, as you might have imagined, is on the hot seat tonight." With that, Slatter gave the floor to Stuckey, who continued skewering Oswald. The transcript has this passage:
STUCKEY: Mr. Oswald . . . so you are the face of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee in New Orleans. Therefore anybody who might be interested in this organization ought to know more about you. For this reason I'm curious to know just how you supported yourself during the three years that you lived in the Soviet Union. Did you have a government subsidsy [subsidy]?
OSWALD: Well, as I er, well—I will answer that question directly then as you will not rest until you get your answer. I worked in Russia. I was not under the protection of the—that is to say, I was not under protection of the American government, but as I was at all times considered an American citizen I did not lose my American citizenship.
SLATTER: Did you say that you wanted to at one time though? What happened?
OSWALD: Well, it's a long-drawn-out situation in which permission to live in the Soviet Union being granted to a foreign resident is rarely given. This calls for a certain amount of technicality, technical papers and so forth. At no time, as I say, did I renounce my citizenship or attempt to renounce my citizenship, and no time was I out of contact with the American Embassy.
Here Oswald, caught off guard by his opponents' knowledge of his Soviet background, lost control of the debate. To his credit, he maintained his composure, but this attack by Stuckey and Butler clearly directed the discussion.
Butler pressed his advantage, further drawing out Oswald on the sticky subject of whether he had renounced his U.S. citizenship. The argument was not a useful subject from Oswald's point of view:
OSWALD: As I have already stated, of course, this whole conversation, and we don't have too much time left, is getting away from the Cuban-American problem. However, I am quite willing to discuss myself for the remainder of this program. As I stated, it is very difficult for a resident alien, for a foreigner, to get permission to reside in the Soviet Union. During those two weeks and during the dates you mentioned I was of course with the knowledge of the American Embassy, getting this permission.
BUTLER: Were you ever at a building at 11 Kuznyetskoya St. in Moscow?
OSWALD: Kuznyetskoya? Kuznyetskoya is—well, that would probably be in the Foreign Ministry, I assume. No, I was never in that place, although I know Moscow, having lived there.
SLATTER: Excuse me. Let me interrupt here. I think Mr. Oswald is right to this extent. We shouldn't get to lose sight of the organization of which he is the head in New Orleans, the Fair Play for Cuba.
The damage was done, however, and Oswald appeared compromised as a closet Communist and suspect tool of Moscow. His usefulness for any purpose in New Orleans, including pro-Castro leafleting, was finished.
"Our opponents could use my background of residence in the U.S.S.R. against any case which I join," Oswald lamented in a letter to the American Communist Party a week later. Oswald said that "by association, they could say the organization of which I am a member, is Russian controled, ect [sic]. I am sure you see my point."
The WDSU radio debate brought to an end Oswald's odyssey into the world of AMSPELL in New Orleans. Did AMSPELL report these contacts with Oswald to the CIA at the time? The answer is yes, according to this passage from the HSCA:
Isidor "Chilo" Borja, another leader of the DRE, was interviewed by the committee on February 21, 1978. Borja said he knew Clare Booth Luce was supportive of the DRE, but said he did not know the extent of her financial involvement. He also recalled Bringuier's contact with Oswald and the fact that the DRE relayed that information to the CIA at the time [emphasis added].
Who in the CIA learned of these events in August 1963? That answer remains elusive. Most likely the information was passed from Bringuier to the AMSPELL control in the CIA's JMWAVE station in Miami, which managed much of the Agency's anti-Cuban operations. We can be less certain, however, if this information was passed to headquarters. The FBI did pass the story to the Agency in September, a subject to which we will return in the remaining chapters. Now we address another vital episode in Oswald's saga: his preparations to travel to Mexico City.
# The Man in the Mexican Tourist Line
On September 17, Oswald went to the New Orleans Mexican Consulate where he obtained a fifteen-day tourist permit, number 24085. The three-dollar permit was valid for ninety days but only for fifteen days inside Mexico. After the assassination, the FBI laboratory typed an erroneous number—24084—for Oswald's tourist card, and then scratched it out and replaced it with the right number, 24085. In October 1976 the CIA released a document which was an English translation of a Mexican government study of Oswald's tourist permit. The numbers 24082, 24083, 24085, 24086, and 24087 were accounted for, but, strangely, there was no mention of 24084. Why all the mystery about permit 24084?
That number belonged to the man in front of Oswald in line at the Mexican Consulate. Not surprisingly, that person was someone with lengthy connections to the CIA. It happened to be William Gaudet, who, as discussed in Chapter Sixteen, testified that he had seen Oswald speaking with Banister on a street corner. Again, Gaudet's CIA files indicated he had been a "contact" for the New Orleans office, while Gaudet himself preferred to boast that he had "once been employed by the CIA."
According to the HSCA, "Gaudet said he could not recall whether his trip to Mexico and other Latin American countries in 1963 involved any intelligence-related activity." Gaudet testified that he had never met Oswald and had not seen him on the trip to Mexico. Gaudet did, however, testify that he knew about Oswald in the summer of 1963 because of his leafleting activity near Gaudet's office in the Trade Mart. Gaudet also testified that he had seen Oswald speaking with Banister on a street corner.
A study of the United Fruit Company, headquartered in New Orleans, contained this passage about Gaudet:
The company founded newspapers for employees in Guatemala, Panama, Costa Rica and Honduras. A weekly "Latin American Report" for journalists and businessmen was spun off, written by William Gaudet, who was one of several actors in the unfolding Guatemalan drama said to have had simultaneous connections with both United Fruit and the Central Intelligence Agency.
"Mr. William G. Gaudet publishes the 'Latin American Reports,' " said an internal CIA request to fund his activities. "His reports have been made available to OO [Domestic Contacts Division]," said the description of the project, "and he has supplied other information of value. OO believes that specific requirements of ORE (Office of Research) can be met by requesting Mr. Gaudet to get special reports from his correspondents" [emphasis added].
Now that we know about Gaudet, the question arises: What was he doing standing in line in front of Oswald? Was this one more of the incredible coincidences that pepper this story? Gaudet stated that he was unaware his Mexican tourist card immediately preceded Oswald's, and he could not recall having seen Oswald on that day. However, Gaudet's presence reinforces the question: Why did Oswald come into contact with so many people with CIA connections in August and September 1963? Besides Gaudet, the list included Bartes, Bringuier, Butler, and Quiroga.
# Oswald's Escalating CIA Profile
On September 10, 1963, Special Agent Hosty sent a report on Oswald to the Bureau and to New Orleans. It was the first FBI document to make it into Oswald's CIA files since the Fain report of August 30, 1962. Hosty began by acknowledging Oswald's Magazine Street address, an address everyone else in the FBI had known about for a month. Hosty then said Oswald had been working at the William Reily Coffee Company on August 5. He apparently did not know that Oswald had been fired from his job at Reily Coffee on July 19. Hosty did mention the April 21 Oswald letter to the FPCC from Dallas. It would appear, however, that he did not know about Oswald's arrest in New Orleans or chose for some reason not to say anything about it. Hosty did not know about the Quigley jailhouse interview.
On Monday, September 23, the employees at CIA headquarters were still catching up on the weekend's traffic when Hosty's report arrived under FBI director Hoover's signature. It was 1:24 in the afternoon when someone named Annette in the CIA's Records Integration Division attached a CIA routing and record sheet to the report and sent it along to the liaison office of the counterintelligence staff, where Jane Roman was still working. As discussed in Chapter Two, Roman received the first phone call from the FBI about Oswald on November 2, 1959.
When Jane Roman got the Hosty report, she signed for it and, presumably after having read it, determined the next CIA organizational element to whom it should be sent. The office she chose was Counterintelligence Operations, CI/OPS. The telltale "P" of William ("Will") Potocci, who worked in Counterintelligence Operations, appears next to the CI/OPS entry, along with the date that Roman passed the report on to him—September 25. Potocci presumably worked in this office, although something on the routing sheet—probably Potocci's name or some activity indicator in CI/ OPS—is still being withheld by the CIA.
CIA readers of the Hosty report were treated to the outlines of the story we have followed in this and the previous three chapters: how Oswald had returned from Russia to Fort Worth, Texas, where he subscribed to the communist newspaper the Worker, and then moved to New Orleans, where he took a job in the Reily Coffee Company; most important, the CIA learned that on April 21 Oswald, having moved from Fort Worth to Dallas, contacted the Fair Play for Cuba Committee in New York City. The report also recounted Oswald's claim to have stood on a Dallas street with a placard around his neck that read "Hands Off Cuba-Viva Fidel."
The CIA did not put this report into Oswald's 201 file, but instead into a new file with a different number: 100-300-11. We will return to that file in Chapter Nineteen. Even as the Hosty report made its way from Jane Roman to Will Potocci, an FBI agent in New Orleans was preparing yet another report on Oswald that would arrive at the CIA on October 2. This, as we will see, was the very day that Oswald, having spent five nights in Mexico City, departed from the Mexican capital.
On his way from New Orleans to Mexico City, Oswald is reported to have visited the home of Silia Odio in Dallas. The Odio "incident," as it has become known with the passage of time, was labeled by researcher Sylvia Meagher as the "proof of the plot," because the Warren Commission accepted that Odio was visited by three men—one of whom was "Oswald." Meagher's point was that whether it was an impostor or Oswald himself, as Odio believes, the group that visited her apartment and phoned her afterward, and their preassassination discussion of killing Kennedy, is awkward, if not antithetical, for the lone-nut hypothesis. The Warren Commission accepted that the event occurred, but dismissed Odio's version of it. First, the commission found that a September 26 or 27 visit was not possible given Oswald's time requirements for arriving in Mexico City at ten A.M. on September 27. Second, the Warren Commission believed it had identified the three men who visited Odio: Loran Eugene Hall, Larry Howard, and William Seymour, who was "similar in appearance to Lee Harvey Oswald." All three were soldiers of fortune involved with the Cuban exiles. Hall was a self-described gun runner. As discussed in Chapter Fourteen, Seymour was an associate of Hemming's.
Both of these Warren Commission contributions damaged the public's understanding of the facts in the case and the public's confidence in the integrity and objectivity of the Commission's work. The Hall-Howard-Seymour story, supplied by the FBI just in time to save the Warren Report—on its way to press—the embarrassment of not having discredited Odio's version of the incident, later turned out to be wholy fraudulent. No official connected to the Warren Report has ever apologized to the public or Silvia Odio for their shabby treatment of her and their acceptance of a concocted story, an egregious error given what was at stake.
In spite of this, strong feelings about the Odio incident remain. Silvia Odio is "full of hot air," FBI special agent Hosty said in a recent interview. Hosty did not elaborate further about the meaning of this remark, but he offered an interesting variation of the Hall and Seymour part of the story: "Hall told us [the FBI] that it was he who had been by Odio's. When the police arrested Hall they talked to Heitman." Special Agent Heitman, Hosty says, was the FBI agent "who worked among the Cubans. I was working the right wing extremists, like General [Edwin] Walker, etc." After Hall told the authorities he had visited Odio, Hosty claims, "Seymour threatened him and so he changed his story." Hosty's account also raises the possibility that William Pawley might have been involved.
"I knew of him," Hosty said of William Pawley in a recent interview. As discussed in Chapter Seven, Pawley was working for the CIA in Miami, reporting on the Cuban situation through an extensive network of contacts. Hosty told researcher Dr. Larry Haapanan in 1983 that he thought the men who visited Odio might have been agents working for Pawley. In 1995 Hosty contacted the author, and in a follow-up interview he said,
It could be Pawley. H. L. Hunt was backing Pawley's people, and they were also getting support from Henry Luce. It could be that Pawley's guys spying on JURE [Junta Revolucionaria Cubana, led by Amador Odio]. They could have been working for Pawley or one of the other splinter groups.
The possibility that on September 25, Pawley and his right wing anti-Castro allies were using Oswald and his cohorts to collect information on the left wing JURE faction led by Silvia's father (then in one of Castro's prisons) is intriguing. It only further magnifies what the Warren Commission feared about the rest of the Odio story: It fits into the lone-nut hypothesis like a two-by-four in a Cuisinart.
We need to discuss one more document before turning our attention to Oswald's trip to Mexico City. On September 16, 1963, the CIA "informed" the FBI that the "Agency is giving some consideration to countering the activities of [the FPCC] in foreign countries." In one of the many suspicious coincidences of this case, the next day Oswald was standing in a line to get his Mexican tourist visa. He would take his FPCC literature and news clippings of his FPCC activities with him. In the CIA's memo to the FBI, they said they were interested in "planting deceptive information which might embarrass the [FPCC] Committee in areas where it does have some support." A week later Oswald boarded a bus for Mexico City, where he would represent himself as an officer of the FPCC and use his FPCC card as identification in an attempt to obtain a visa to get to Cuba. This raises the possibility that Oswald's trip was part of a CIA operation or an FBI operation linked to the CIA's request. We will return to that subject in Chapter Nineteen, after a detailed analysis of Oswald in the Mexican capital.
# CHAPTER EIGHTEEN
# Mexican Maze
Mexico City, during Oswald's visit there in September to October 1963, was one of the most intensely surveilled spots on the planet. After the Kennedy assassination, the events that took place during that visit became the subject of close examination by several government investigations and numerous researchers. Yet, in spite of all the surveillance data and cumulative man-years of scrutiny, what really happened during Oswald's trip to Mexico City has, for more than thirty years, remained an unsolved mystery. There have been too many pieces to fit into the puzzle. In this chapter we will examine the possibility that there are two puzzles into which these pieces fit.
The 1964 investigation into the Mexican maze by the Warren Commission produced a story along these general lines: First, although Oswald visited both the Cuban and Soviet consulates and said he wanted to travel to the Soviet Union via Cuba, "the evidence makes it more likely he intended to remain in Cuba"; second, Oswald was informed he could not get a Cuban visa without a Soviet visa and that getting a Soviet visa would take four months; third, Oswald pestered the Cubans, resulting in "a sharp argument" with the consul, Eusebio Azcue, and "failed to obtain visas at both Embassies"; and, fourth, until his departure "Oswald spent considerable time making his travel arrangements, sightseeing and checking again with the Soviet Embassy to learn whether anything had happened on his visa application." As we will see, the problem with this story is that once he learned of the four-month wait, Oswald gave up and never made an application for a Soviet visa, a fact apparently not known by the Warren Commission. At a minimum, this raises the question, why Oswald would check on a visa application he did not make?
The Mexican mystery deepened as a result of the 1978 congressional investigation into the Kennedy assassination. The HSCA inquiry presented the startling possibility that someone might have impersonated Oswald in the Mexican capital. However, the HSCA determined that there was not sufficient evidence to "firmly" conclude that such a deception took place. The report added, however, that "the evidence is of such a nature that the possibility cannot be dismissed." This grim uncertainty looms large in what has become known as the Lopez Report, the HSCA's long-secret studyc of "Oswald, the CIA, and Mexico City." Parts of the Lopez Report, a few of them large and several of them small, are still classified. During the three decades that have come and gone since Oswald's visit to Mexico, suspicions have grown among the American public about possible CIA involvement in the assassination. The JFK Records Act mandated that the government's files be opened. Yet, the CIA continues to resist, just as they resisted Eddie Lopez and Dan Hardaway, all attempts to find the whole truth about Oswald's trip to Mexico City.
The possibility of an impostor has drastic consequences for how we view Oswald, and therefore is relevant to the investigation of the president's murder in Dallas. We will return to these consequences in the next two chapters. For now, we must focus first on what we know happened in Mexico. We have new information with which to test the Lopez Report's suggestion about an Oswald impostor. Namely, a major Russian contribution: the published recollections of Paval Yatskov, Valery Kostikov, and Oleg Nechiporenko in the latter's 1993 work, Passport to Assassination. Yatskov was the head of the Soviet consular office in Mexico City and, with Vice Consul Nechiporenko, worked for the foreign counterintelligence subdivision of the KGB. Kostikov was part of the KGB's notorious Department Thirteen, which handled assassinations.
We also have a great many new documents released since the passage of the JFK Records Act in 1992. Among these are transcripts of telephone conversations between J. Edgar Hoover and President Johnson, including this exchange:
JOHNSON: Have you established any more about the [Oswald] visit to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico in September?
HOOVER: No, that's one angle that's very confusing for this reason. We have up here the tape and the photograph of the man who was at the Soviet Embassy, using Oswald's name. That picture and the tape do not correspond to this man's voice, nor to his appearance. In other words, it appears that there is a second person who was at the Soviet Embassy [emphasis added].
Hoover indicated an interest in identifying "this man." Unfortunately, the tape Hoover mentioned has since disappeared. The issue of an Oswald impostor, however, remains.
# Oswald in Mexico City
The Soviet Embassy, which also housed the Soviet Consulate, is just two blocks from the Cuban Consulate and Cuban Embassy which, although in different buildings, are inside the same compound. Thus, it would have taken Oswald more time to leave one consulate, find a phone, and call the other consulate than it would have to simply walk there. As we will see, this detail is crucial in sorting out which of the six or seven visits and as many phone calls were Oswald's and which were not. Oswald's bus arrived in Mexico City at 10 A.M. Friday, September 27, 1963, and departed for Texas at 8:30 the following Wednesday morning, October 3. This establishes the time available for his visits and calls.
The first three telephone calls reportedly occurred shortly after Oswald's arrival on September 27. These calls, initially thought to have been made by Oswald, "may have been by an impostor," according to Lopez. These calls were placed at 10:30 A.M. [see table X, below], 10:37 A.M., and 1:25 P.M., all to the Soviet military attachè or the Soviet Consulate. This is the CIA transcript of the 10:37, or second, call:
CALLER: May I speak to the Counsel?
SOVIET: He is not in.
CALLER: I need some visas in order to go to Odessa. [A city in southern Ukraine on the shore of the Black Sea]
SOVIET: Please call at 11:30.
CALLER: Until when?
SOVIET: [hangs up the phone.]
This call was recorded by the CIA's Mexico City station. A week or two later they identified it having been from Oswald. It was in Spanish, which poses a serious problem. The transcriber did not indicate the speaker was less than fluent, whereas in later calls, where Oswald supposedly spoke in Russian, the transcriber characterized the usage as "terrible" and "hardly recognizable."
Oswald's Marine friend Nelson Delgado claimed to have taught him a modicum of Spanish in 1959, but there is no evidence Oswald could have handled the above script without an accent. In 1978, Lopez concluded that "either the above detailed calls were not made by Oswald or Oswald could speak Spanish." It seems odd that his Spanish would have been better than his Russian. Thirty years later came the Russian addition to the story. Valery Kostikov met and spoke with Oswald in the Soviet Consulate. "When I asked him if he spoke Spanish," Kostikov recalled, "he shook his head no."
The first and third calls were not even included in copies of Oswald's "conversations" passed from the Mexico City CIA station to the U.S. Embassy legal attaché four days after the assassination. The HSCA stated it had "not been able to determine why the 9/27 10:30 and 9/27 1:25 calls were not included in this memorandum." The Lopez Report was probably right to question whether Oswald had made these three calls. In addition to the impostor explanation is the possibility that they were not connected to either Oswald or an Oswald impostor. Oswald's name was never used in them, and the third call, made to the Soviet Consulate, may have been made when Oswald was already inside the building. After the publication of the Lopez Report, an internal CIA analysis rejected these three calls as having had any connection to Oswald.
For our purposes, it does not matter whether these first three calls were from Oswald or not. If it was Oswald, there is no real problem, because Oswald's focus was on the Cuban instead of the Soviet Consulate. On the other hand, if these calls were not made by Oswald, it does not necessarily mean the caller had to be an impostor. The most prudent interpretation is, therefore, that these calls were not made by Oswald or an impostor.
TABLE B: Sequence of Mexico City Oswald-Related Events
Friday, September 27
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[LE1] 10:30 A.M. (Spanish-speaking male caller to Soviet Consulate)
[LE2] 10:37 A.M. (Spanish-speaking male caller to Soviet Consulate)
[DE1] 11:00 A.M. (Oswald visit to Cuban Consulate)
[DE2] 1:00 P.M. "approximately" (12:15 Oswald visit to Cuban Consulate)
[NE1] 12:30 to 1:20-1:30 P.M. (Oswald visit to Soviet Consulate)
[LE3] 1:25 P.M. (Spanish-speaking male caller to Soviet Consulate)
[DE3] late afternoon (Oswald third visit to Cuban Consulate)
[LE4] 4:05 P.M. (Duran call to Soviet Consulate)
[LE5] 4:26 P.M. (Soviet Consulate call to Duran)
[NE2] evening (Nechiporenko and Kostikov discuss LE5)
Saturday, September 28
[NE3] 9:00 A.M. to 10:15-10:30 A.M. (Oswald visit to Soviet Consulate)
[LE6] 11:51 A.M. (woman and man call the Soviet Consulate)
Monday, September 30
[LE*] The missing Mrs. T transcript
Tuesday, 1 October
[LE7] 10:31 A.M. (man, in poor Russian, calls Soviet Consulate)
[LE8] 10:45 A.M. (man, in poor Russian, using name Oswald, calls Soviet Consulate)
Legend: LE expands to Lopez Event, events based on CIA transcripts
| (see Lopez Report, p. 117); DE expands to Duran Event—Duran was the secretary working in the Cuban Consulate at the time of Oswald's visit to Mexico City, and these events are based on her various testimonies and interviews; NE expands to Nechiporenko Event, and these events are based on the accounts of Yatskov, Nechiporenko, and Kostokov, the consul and two vice consuls working in the Soviet Consulate at the time of Oswald's visit to Mexico City. The above table combines all three lenses: the Cuban Consulate, Soviet Consulate, and CIA surveillance.
Oswald's first in-person contact was with the Cuban Consulate [DE1], which he entered at around 11 A.M., requesting an in-transit visa for travel through Cuba to the Soviet Union. Oswald reportedly showed Silvia Duran several documents, but apparently had no passport-style pictures of himself necessary for the visa. He left and returned [DE2], not at one P.M., as Duran recalls, but probably earlier—around 12:15 P.M., this time with the photos. This conclusion—that Duran's time was off by forty-five minutes—is necessary in order not to violate the logical sequence of events. Once Oswald gave Duran the photos, she filled out duplicate visa application forms for him and then explained he would have to get his Soviet visa before she could issue his Cuban visa. Thereupon Oswald went immediately to the Soviet Consulate [NE1], where he arrived at 12:30.
When Duran filled out Oswald's application, which he signed in her presence, he showed, among other things, his FPCC membership card for identification. Duran, however, was suspicious because Oswald had not been sent by the American Communist Party, which had a deal with the Cuban Communist Party allowing approved Americans to get visas immediately. Oswald's first visit to the Soviet Consulate lasted for about one hour, raising a time conflict with the third call to the Soviet Embassy [LE3] at 1:25 P.M., in which a "Man calls Soviet Consulate asks for the consul." Clearly Oswald could not be outside calling in to the consulate if he was already inside talking to Vice Consul Nechiporenko. As previously discussed, this call, like the first two, raises the issue of Oswald's Spanish-speaking abilities.
At 12:30 P.M. Oswald rang the buzzer at the Soviet Embassy [NE1]. The sentry alerted Kostikov, who met Oswald inside, spoke with him, and then turned him over to Nechiporenko. According to Nechiporenko, this is what happened next:
Even though I had seen the letter to our embassy in the United States, I nevertheless asked him if he had appealed to the Soviet embassy in Washington. Oswald said he had already sent a letter there and had been turned down. He later mentioned his fear that the FBI would arrest him for establishing contact with our Washington embassy. So as not to give the FBI additional cause to seize him, he decided to come to Mexico to follow through on his plan. I explained to Oswald that, in accordance with our rules, all matters dealing with travel to the USSR were handled by the embassies or consulates in the country in which a person lived. As far as his case was concerned, we could make an exception and give him the necessary papers to fill out, which we would then send on to Moscow, but the answer would still be sent to his permanent residence, and it would take, at the very least, four months.
Oswald, upset at this response, shouted, "This won't do for me! This is not my case! For me, it's all going to end in tragedy." Nechiporenko decided to end the meeting. He led Oswald out of the compound and told the sentry to tell Kostikov "that I had not promised our visitor anything."
Rejected by the Soviets, Oswald returned to the Cuban Consulate again between four P.M. and five P.M. [DE3], during which the fourth and fifth telephone calls occurred. Duran recalled that Oswald came between five P.M. and six P.M., but, again, this was too late by about an hour. This conclusion is supported by the corresponding Duran phone transcript of this event and Nechiporenko's account, which corroborates the Duran call. Normal working hours had ended at two P.M., so the guard had to call Duran. The guard then escorted Oswald into Duran's office, where Oswald proceeded to lie to her, claiming that the Soviets had said there were no problems with his visa application. Suspicious, Duran called the Soviet Consulate at 4:05 P.M. [LE4] for confirmation. The CIA transcript of the intercepted call has this:
There is an American here who has requested an in-transit visa because he is going to Russia. I sent him to you thinking if he got a Russian visa that I could then issue him a Cuban visa without any more processing. Who did he speak to? He claims he was told there were no more problems.
The unidentified Soviet asked Duran to wait and then could be heard in the background explaining to someone that Silvia Duran was calling about an American who said he had been to the Soviet Embassy. "Please leave the name and number," the voice from the Soviet Embassy instructed, "and we will call you back." As requested, Duran left her name and phone number.
At 4:26 P.M. [LE5], the Soviet Consulate called back. Kostikov came on the line and told Duran that Oswald's visa had not been approved. The CIA transcript has this exchange:
RUSSIAN EMBASSY: Has the American been there?
SILVIA DURAN: Yes, he is here now.
RUSSIAN EMBASSY: According to the letter that he showed from the Consulate in Washington, he wants to go to Russia to stay for a long time with his wife who is Russian. But we have received no answer from Washington, and it will probably take four to five months. We cannot give a visa here without asking Washington. He says he belongs to a pro-Cuban organization and the Cubans cannot give him a visa without his first getting a Russian visa. I do not know what to do with him. I have to wait for an answer from Washington.
SILVIA DURAN: We have to wait too, because he knows no one in Cuba and therefore it's difficult to give him a visa. He says he knew it would take a long time to process the Soviet visa but hoped to await that in Cuba.
RUSSIAN EMBASSY: The thing is that if his wife [Marina was actually in Texas] is now in Washington she will receive the visa for return to Russia. She will receive it and then can send it any place but right now she does not have it.
SILVIA DURAN: Naturally, and we can't give him a visa here because we do not know if his Russian visa will be approved.
RUSSIAN EMBASSY: We can issue a visa only according to instructions.
SILVIA DURAN: That is what I will put in my plans.
RUSSIAN EMBASSY: We can't give him a letter of recommendation either, because we do not know him. Please pardon the bother.
SILVIA DURAN: No bother. Thank you very much.
The CIA Spanish transcript is appended with an English note stating the man in the Soviet Embassy was "unidentified." More important, the transcriber wrote that "the person answering the phone is Silvia Duran. [emphasis added]" As we will shortly see, this notation was important, as was the fact that Duran had verified that Oswald had been in the Soviet Consulate that same day. Also noteworthy is how well this transcript fits with the recollections of the people in both consulates involved in the conversation. Finally, it is noteworthy that neither Duran nor Kostikov mentioned Oswald's name, a fact whose crucial importance will shortly become apparent.
Duran's check with Kostikov exposed Oswald's ploy. He became "excited" and quarreled with the Cuban consul, Eusebio Azcue. Oswald never went back to or contacted the Cuban Consulate again. However, he may have had further contact with Duran and other Cubans outside the consulate, a subject to which we will return later in this chapter. Duran, a Mexican citizen, was in the section known as the Mexican-Cuban Institute of Cultural Affairs, headed by Augustin Canovas. Duran worked closely with Luisa Calderon and Luis Alberu, the cultural attaches in the embassy. Alberu had been recruited as an agent of the CIA. Duran was an attractive twenty-six-year-old woman, married with a daughter, who since 1962 had been the object of rumors of extramarital sexual liaisons, rumors that would come to include Oswald.
The 4:26 P.M, transcript suggests that a phone call was made or a cable was sent from the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City to the Soviet Embassy in Washington. Oswald's presence had lit up Soviet and Cuban intelligence channels in all three national capitals. The Cubans sent a cable to Havana on September 27, and the Soviets sent a cable to Moscow on September 28. The response from Havana came on October 15, nearly two weeks after Oswald's departure. We can only wonder how the contents of the cable to Moscow mixed with what was already in Oswald's files in the Soviet Union.
That Friday evening Kostikov joined Nechiporenko for a mug of beer [NE2] in a noisy cantina that was a "favorite spot among the local blue-collar crowd," and the day's events were discussed. According to Nechiporenko, Kostikov reported this to him:
As soon as I came back from lunch and the sentry passed on your message to me, I got a call from the Cubans. It was Sylvia Duran from the consulate. It turns out that our "friend" had been to see them after us and supposedly told them that we had promised him a visa, so she decided to call and double check. She asked specifically for me because this guy had given her a name that sounded like mine. I'd shown him my ID when he doubted I was a Soviet. I told her we hadn't promised him anything and that even if we did begin processing his visa, it would take at least four months. She thanked me and that's it.
We should be careful to note that in this conversation, Kostikov had confirmed for Duran the fact that Oswald had been inside the Soviet Consulate.
When Kostikov arrived at the Soviet Consulate at 9:30 A.M. on Saturday morning to meet his colleagues for their regular volleyball game, Oswald was already sitting with Soviet consul Pavel Yatskov [NE3]. Oswald tried again to convince the Soviets to grant him a visa. Again they refused. Kostikov's account (as it appears in Nechiporenko's book) of the discussion includes this:
Throughout his story, Oswald was extremely agitated and clearly nervous, especially whenever he mentioned the FBI, but he suddenly became hysterical, began to sob, and through his tears cried, "I am afraid . . . they'll kill me. Let me in." Repeating over and over that he was being persecuted and that he was being followed even here in Mexico, he stuck his right hand into the left pocket of his jacket and pulled out a revolver, saying, "See? This is what I must now carry to protect my life," and placed the revolver on the desk where we were sitting opposite one another.
Nechiporenko then "flew into the room" with his gym bag for the volleyball game at "a little after ten o'clock," as Yatskov was unloading the revolver. Eventually, Oswald "calmed down, evidently after having understood and reconciled himself to the fact that he was not about to get a quick visa."
Most important, Kostikov states that Oswald "did not take the [visa application] forms we offered him." Nechiporenko escorted Oswald from the premises and they never heard from him again. As Oswald left the compound, he pulled his coat over his head to conceal his face from photographic coverage. Yatskov, Kostikov, and Nechiporenko then conferred, and decided that Yatskov and Kostikov immediately report the Oswald events in a coded cable to Moscow [KGB] Center. As a result, their team lost the volleyball game. At the time this might have seemed a high price to pay for the nutty performance they had just witnessed, but after the Kennedy assassination, they would come to refer to this telegram as their "life preserver."
This was the end of the line for Oswald's attempts to get a visa in Mexico City. He had not even bothered to fill out the application forms offered by the Soviet Consulate. None of the Mexican, Cuban, or Soviet officials again saw Oswald enter any of the consulates or embassies. Nor did they receive or hear about any calls made by him. Oswald's name did not appear in any of the CIA transcripts of calls intercepted from the time of his arrival Friday morning through the time that he left the Soviet Consulate at 10:30 A.M. on Saturday. That was about to change. The next set of transcripts bears no resemblance to the reality recalled by those who experienced the events firsthand. Something amazing was about to happen to "reality" in Mexico City. We will return to Duran's testimony on this subject in Chapter Nineteen when we deal with cover stories created after the assassination.
# Mexican Realities
Eldon Hensen was a cattleman from Athens, Texas. On July 19, he tried—for the second time in a week—to make contact with the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. He spoke by telephone with Maria Luisa Calderon, but did not state his business and refused to go to the Cuban Embassy because of the possibility that an "American spy might see him." At 6 feet 4 inches and over 200 pounds with a "powerful build" and a "Bob Hope ski nose," he probably had a point. Hensen did state that he was staying in Room 1402 at the Alameda Hotel and was leaving for Dallas the next morning on American Airlines.
Hensen was in luck—or so it seemed. Miraculously, that same afternoon Hensen received a telephone call from a man who identified himself as a Cuban Embassy officer who suggested a meeting in a restaurant. Happy to have avoided American intelligence, Hensen agreed. When the two met, Hensen gave his Athens, Texas, phone number as OR-5-4787, and offered to "help" the Castro government "in the U.S.," traveling, providing"good contacts," and moving "things from one place to another." Hensen said he wanted money in exchange for his cooperation and said that he was under "financial pressure." The Cuban "played cagey," made no commitments, told Hensen he would check him out, said that some delay was inevitable, and warned Hensen "never again" to phone the Cuban Embassy because it was "too dangerous."
The reason it was too dangerous was that the CIA was always listening in, as they had been to Hensen's calls. Unfortunately for Hensen, the Cuban, while possibly from the Cuban Embassy, was not representing the Cubans at all. His loyalties were to the CIA, and he was probably a defector in place or double agent. Hensen walked straight into a web of deceit. The station's cable to headquarters afterward explained how they had pulled off this sleight of hand:
At Station request [redacted] posing as Cubemb [Cuban Embassy] officer made contact on house phone afternoon 19 July, alluded to call to Embassy, lured Subj [Hensen] to Hotel restaurant. . . . Subj [Hensen] family not aware of his trip to Mexi. Said this his second trip Mexi specifically to establish contact with Cubemb. Agreed accept phone call with key word "Laredo" as call from [redacted] contact. . . . [Redacted] believes [Hensen] had been drinking. [Redacted] witnessed meeting from nearby table. . . . [Redacted] (probably ODENVY, i.e., the FBI) informed 20 July, will pick up hotel registration card and handle stateside investigation.
The Mexico City CIA station said that the Cuban was available for further contact with Hensen in Mexico City if headquarters wanted the game to continue.
What the CIA station in Mexico City did to Eldon Hensen in July 1963 was to "step into" his reality and direct it a way designed to achieve the Agency's objectives—in this instance, to see what he was up to. This CIA capability, to enter surreptitiously into someone's life to control or manipulate it, was made possible in this case by the telephone taps. In other cases it might have been photo surveillance, bugs, or agents and informants who provided the data necessary to play the game. The Hensen case makes it clear that this capability existed and was used in Mexico City in July 1963. It would be used again in September and October of that fateful year.
At approximately 10:30 to 10:45 A.M., Oswald, his revolver back in his pocket, left the Soviet Consulate. Kostikov and Yatskov, instead of going to the volleyball game, stayed to write the cable to KGB Central in Moscow. An hour later, 11:51 A.M., the CIA intercepted a telephone call [LE6] purporting to be from the Cuban Consulate. This was strange: The Cuban Consulate was always closed on Saturdays. Moreover, the woman doing the calling was not identifiable to the transcriber of the tape made from the call. It was not until "later" that she was identified as "Silvia Duran," although just how much later is not revealed. Stranger still is the CIA transcript, which the Lopez Report describes as "incoherent."
Here is the full CIA transcript of the September 28, 11:51 A.M., telephone call:
SILVIA DURAN: There is an American here who says he has been to the Russian consulate.
RUSSIAN CONSULATE: Wait a minute.
Silvia Duran is then heard to speak in English to someone apparently sitting at her side. This conversation goes as follows:
DURAN: He said wait. Do you speak Russian?
[OSWALD]: Yes.
DURAN: Why don't you speak with him then?
[OSWALD]: I don't know. . . .
The person who was at the side of Silvia Duran and who admitted to speaking some Russian then gets on the line and speaks what is described as "terrible, hardly recognizable Russian." This person is later identified as Lee Harvey Oswald.
OSWALD: I was in your Embassy and spoke to your Consul.
RUSSIAN EMBASSY: What else do you want?
OSWALD: I was just now at your Embassy and they took my address.
RUSSIAN EMBASSY: I know that.
OSWALD: I did not know it then. I went to the Cuban Embassy to ask them for my address, because they have it.
RUSSIAN EMBASSY: Why don't you come by and leave it then, we're not far.
OSWALD: Well, I'll be there right away.
Prior to proceeding with an analysis, it should be pointed out that Mr."T" (for 'transcriber"), who transcribed this intercept, claims the male speaker is identical with the man who would, in a telephone call three days later, state, "My name is Oswald."
We know from the Hensen story that the CIA station routinely and successfully impersonated people. The September 28 transcript should therefore be examined from two possible perspectives. From the first perspective, the call was both Oswald and Duran calling the Soviet Consulate. In this scenario, the Soviets were incorrect in their earlier conclusion that Oswald had "reconciled himself to the fact that he was not about to get a quick visa." Between the time of Oswald's visit to the Soviet Consulate and Duran's call an hour later, he had regained hope and had managed to get the Cubans to call in Silvia Duran on her day off and admit him into the consular offices, and then persuaded her to call the Soviet Consulate with whom she had, just eighteen hours earlier, reached the mutual conclusion that Oswald could not receive a visa inside of four months. From the second perspective, the speakers were not Oswald and Duran, but two impostors who had stepped into Oswald's "reality" and were trying to acquire intelligence information.
Let us examine the first sentence spoken by the Duran character: "There is an American here who says he has been to the Russian consulate." Less than twenty-four hours previously Duran had sent Oswald to the Soviet Consulate to get a Soviet visa and, when he had returned with his phony claim that it had been approved, Duran had telephoned the Soviets. Kostikov had confirmed Oswald's visit there. Why would the real Duran state the following day that Oswald "says he has been" if she already knew it to be a fact? On the other hand, if this "Duran" character had not yet seen any transcripts or listened to tapes of the previous day, she might not know that the real Duran had already verified Oswald's September 27 visit.
Upon closer analysis, the possibility emerges that her exact words were carefully chosen to reflect only what was known—possibly from direct observation. The Duran impostor would have known that Oswald had been in the Soviet Consulate but not necessarily whether the real Duran knew this. Thus, the wording suggests that this call was not made by the real Duran because she would have chosen words that were consistent with her information (from Kostikov) that Oswald had made the visit. We will set aside the problem of who actually received this telephone call, and emphasize that, of the two perspectives we are examining, Duran's opening line is more consistent with an impostor than with the real Silvia Duran.
After the Soviet said "Wait a minute," the Duran character put the Oswald character on the line. He said, "I was in your Embassy and spoke to your Consul." This was true, Oswald had just spent over an hour with the consul, Yatskov. Since Yatskov had, in all likelihood, entered the consulate overtly, an impostor could have had this information. This sentence, along with the Soviet reply, "What else do you want?" is consistent with what either the real Oswald or an impostor knew. Since Oswald's business was finished and because he had not even bothered to fill out the paperwork for a visa, it made no sense for Oswald to call back. But in a wraparound operation, the impostor would have had no way of knowing that Oswald had decided against submitting the application forms. Certainly, Oswald would not drag the Cubans in to work on a Saturday just to phone the Soviet Consulate and tell them that he had been there a few minutes earlier.
When the Soviet asked the Oswald character "what else" he wanted, his answer was not responsive. He said, "I was just now at your Embassy and they took my address." The first part of this sentence adds little except that the words "just now" identify the visit referred to as the Saturday morning session. The second part, that the Soviets had taken his address, seems too trivial to warrant the Cubans working on their day off. No wonder the Soviet reply was, "I know that." It is pertinent to point out that neither part of this sentence by the Oswald character is consistent with the fact that Oswald had not filled out a visa application form. They are, however, consistent with the perspective that the male voice belonged to an imposter who, with limited information, was winging his way, trying to keep the conversation going for some unknown (to us) purpose. It should also be pointed out that an impostor might well have assumed that the real Oswald had given an address, as would the Soviet speaker because he, too, presumably, had no personal knowledge of what Oswald and Yatskov had done. Apparently, the impostor presumed that it was safe to say that the Soviets had taken an address for Oswald. It was an educated guess that was wrong.
The Soviet's acknowledgment was perfunctory. At this point the Oswald character had to come up with something more substantive to justify his apparent presence in the Cuban Consulate and this telephone call. Here is what the Oswald character devised: "I did not know it then. I went to the Cuban Embassy to ask them for my address, because they have it." This is possibly what the Lopez Report was referring to with the remark that this transcript was "incoherent." How had the Soviet Consul managed to take Oswald's address without him knowing it? This is not consistent with what we might anticipate from Oswald, who should have been asking the Soviets to reconsider their refusal. It does, however, make sense if we think of the male voice as that of an impostor trying to keep the conversation going.
The Oswald character's tap dance was beginning to falter since Oswald could not have forgotten his addresses in the U.S., and would not have succeeded in getting the Cubans into the consulate on their day off just to ascertain his address at the Commercial Hotel and then call the Soviet Consulate to tell them that they had it. This line makes no sense at all from the real Oswald's perspective. "Why don't you come by and leave it then," said the Soviet, "we're not far." The Soviet must have hoped this would put an end to this seemingly aimless and pointless conversation. Indeed, the Oswald character was out of things to say, except, "Well, I'll be there right away."
The CIA later paraphrased the end of this call in a misleading manner: "The American then acceded to the Soviet official's invitation to come by and give the address." There is no evidence that Oswald or an impostor returned to the Soviet Consulate that day. Obviously the real Oswald had no reason to take an address to the Soviet Consulate if he was not going to fill out the visa application forms. To its credit, the HSCA probed further. According to the Lopez Report, another employee at the station had this to say about that call:
When [redacted] was asked why she had stated that it had been "determined" that Oswald had been in contact with the Soviet Embassy on 28 September she said that it must have been because she had rechecked the [telephone] transcripts by this time as otherwise she would not have used such certain language. When asked why the memo said that there was no clarifying information on Oswald's "request" when it was known by this time that he was seeking a visa, [redacted] said that "They [the HSCA investigators] had no need to know all those other details."
How presumptuous it seems now that this CIA employee felt she had the power to decide what Congress had a need to know. This attitude and these tactics no longer serve the public interest. Hopefully, the recent passage of a law by Congress mandating the release of all information relevant to the case can overcome this kind of institutional arrogance and obstructionism.
Clearly, these "other details" are relevant to whether or not an impostor was doing the talking, and the impostor issue is fundamental to the larger question of whether the Agency ever used Oswald—with or without his knowledge. An impostor might not have known for sure at the time of this call that Oswald was seeking a visa. Duran remains adamant to this day that this Oswald visit, and, therefore, this call, did not take place. Nechiporenko specifically denies that this call took place, and claims that call could not have gone through because the switchboard was closed. We could subject the remarks of the man who is supposed to be talking in the Soviet Consulate to a similar analysis, and suggest that he was also an impostor. Why didn't he ask for the address over the phone? Here, however, an already bizarre story becomes more so: The entire conversation becomes false and the deception target becomes the CIA station. While this is possible, it seems improbable.
The Lopez Report, written in 1978, was not constructed with the benefit of the third corner of the triangle: the Soviet angle. There is no question but that their records and recollections of details such as times and places are invaluable. Now we have the recollections of Yatskov, Kostikov, and Nechiporenko. Moreover, what they say buttresses Silvia Duran's testimony that neither she nor Oswald made this call. The man in this conversation later uses Oswald's name after Oswald has departed Mexico City. Therefore the man in this September 28 call cannot be Oswald. It is also interesting to ask this question: Was the Silvia Duran in this phone call real or an impostor?
On this question we find the CIA transcriber's notes useful. The transcriber of the Saturday phone call did not identify the woman speaking as Duran at the time of the transcription. The female speaker was described as "someone at the Cuban Consulate later identified as Sylvia Duran," which contrasts sharply with the September 27 transcript in which Silvia Duran is definitely and immediately identified. Again, the ostensible subject—an address—about which the person claiming to be Oswald was calling was not a legitimate issue with the embassy. The idea that the staffs of both consulates were engaged with Oswald and each other over an address on their off-duty time seems ridiculous. As previously stated, we will return in Chapter Nineteen to Duran's insistence that Oswald did not return on Saturday. For now we will note that it appears that as of Saturday morning, the impostors were proceeding without knowing what had happened to Oswald while he was inside the Soviet Embassy.
The CIA has not officially acknowledged any calls on Monday, September 30. Does the lack of activity on Monday make sense? The answer is yes if Oswald had—as the Soviets maintain he had—accepted the fact that he would not get a visa. The answer is no if he changed his mind and decided that it was still worth pursuing a visa in Mexico City. The answer is also no if the impostors still had their own reasons for keeping the Oswald reality in play. Monday would have provided an opportunity to keep the game going. It was a business day. Is there evidence of additional intercepted phone calls? Not surprisingly, there is, and it comes from credible CIA sources.
# Mrs. T's Missing Transcript
There is substantial anecdotal evidence that other Oswald-related telephone calls were intercepted and transcribed by the CIA in Mexico City. Consider, for example, Winston Scott's manuscript, Foul Foe, which claims that Oswald contacted the Soviet Embassy four times. Win Scott was the longtime chief of the CIA Mexico City station, and close friend of CIA counterintelligence chief James Angleton. After Scott's death in April, 1971, Angleton flew to Mexico City, removed the contents of Scott's safe, and demanded that the family turn over Scott's papers to him. Angleton returned to Washington with, among other things, a manuscript. The manuscript, which has never been published, contains this passage:
Oswald told a high-ranking officer of the Soviet Embassy that that officer should have had word from the Soviet Embassy in Washington about his visit and its purpose, after he had spelled out his full name, slowly and carefully, for this Soviet. He further told this Soviet that he should know that Oswald, his wife and child wanted to go to the Crimea, urgently, and that he (Oswald) had learned that he would have to go by way of Cuba. Oswald was then directed to the Cuban Embassy by the Soviet, who told Oswald that he would need a Cuban transit visa.
This became important, says Scott, after the Warren Commission Report was published, because, "on page 777 of that report the erroneous statement was made that it was not known that Oswald had visited the Cuban Embassy until after the assassination!" We will return to that statement and its true origin in Chapter Nineteen.
What Scott is describing, however, appears to be a conversation not in any of the extant transcripts. In none of them does Oswald spell his name, let alone enunciate it slowly. Moreover, the name Oswald does not appear in any of the transcripts until the October 1, 10:45 A.M. call. HSCA investigator Eddie Lopez noticed Scott's remark about Oswald spelling "his name very slowly and carefully," and remarked that "although the transcripts available do not bear out Scott's recollections, there are interesting parallels with the testimony of [redacted] and David Phillips.
We will shortly return to Phillips's offerings on this subject, but there was more in Win Scott's manuscript suggestive of other intercepted phone calls. Take, for example, this passage:
Lee Harvey Oswald, having just arrived in Mexico City, made his first contact with the Soviet Embassy in Mexico, giving them his name very slowly and carefully, and saying that the Soviet Embassy in Mexico should have received word from the Soviet Embassy in Washington that he (Oswald) would contact them about a visa for himself, his wife, who he said was a Soviet citizen, and their child.
This is the same missing call on Friday, only here Scott provides the additional detail that word was expected from the Soviet Embassy in Washington. A question about a telegram from Washington was asked in the October 1 call at 10:45 A.M. Finally, Scott's manuscript also states that while Oswald was in Duran's office, Oswald "decided to ask the help of a Soviet Embassy official in convincing the Cubans that they should give Oswald the transit visa through Cuba, even before he had his Soviet visa. This, he did." While this appears similar to the (probably fictitious) Saturday morning (11:51 A.M.) call, the Oswald character said nothing about visas in the transcript that survives.
More than Win Scott's manuscript suggests there were other calls. Convincing evidence comes from a person who actually remembers typing a transcript that bears no resemblance to those that exist today. The Lopez Report probed the possibility that additional phone calls were intercepted by the surveillance team, and discovered credible evidence that this had been the case. Mrs. T, who assisted her husband, Mr. T, in transcribing tapes from the Soviet Embassy, testified before the HSCA on April 12, 1978. Mrs. T recognized as her husband's work the transcripts from the conversations intercepted on 9/28/63, at 11:51 A.M.; on 10/1/63, at 10:31 A.M. and 10:45 A.M.; and on 10/3/63. Her recognition of these transcripts as her husband's was based on "the style of his writing or typing and the use of slash marks."
In addition to her husband's work, Mrs. T testified that she, too, transcribed tapes, at least one [LE*] of which "involved" Oswald. According to the Lopez Report, this is what she said:
According to my recollection, I myself, have made a transcript, an English transcript, of Lee Oswald talking to the Russian Consulate or whoever he was at that time, asking for financial aid. Now, that particular transcript does not appear here and whatever happened to it, I do not know, but it was a lengthy transcript and I personally did that transcript. It was a lengthy conversation between him and someone at the Russian Embassy.
This transcript was "approximately two pages long," Mrs. T testified, and "the caller identified himself as Lee Oswald" [emphasis added]. To test her claim, the HSCA tried to see if she was actually referring to the 10/1/63 call, but her story appears unshakable.
Mr. T testified that he recognized the 10/1/63 conversation as his work because the name Lee Oswald was underlined. Mr. T then added this important detail:
We got a request from the station to see if we can pick up the name of this person because sometimes we had a so-called "defector" from the United States that wanted to go to Russia and we had to keep an eye on them. Not I—the Station. Consequently they were very hot about the whole thing. They said, "If you can get the name because I put them in capitals. In this case I did because it was so important to them."
Mr. T said he had no idea how "Oswald had come to the Station's attention prior to this conversation or what led to the request to get his name." In his testimony, he "speculated that it was possible that Oswald first came to the Station's attention through Oswald's contacts with the Cuban Embassy [emphasis added].
Could she have confused her call with the 10/1/63, 10:45 A.M. conversation? the HSCA asked. Mrs. T stuck to her guns and then added a crucial detail:
This would not be the conversation that I would be recalling for the simple reason that this is my husband's work and at that time probably the name didn't mean much of anything. But this particular piece of work that I am talking about is something that came in and it was marked as urgent [emphasis added].
Mrs. T explained the procedure for "urgent tapes" and the HSCA confirmed this procedure through its own review of the files. She said a piece of paper would be enclosed with the reel indicating the footage number locating the conversation that had been requested for "priority handling over the other conversations on the reel." After transcription, the translators would "immediately notify their contact and then turn the transcript over to him on the same day that it had been delivered."
If Mrs. T is telling the truth, there is a missing transcript. If it was the only one marked urgent, then the missing transcript was probably the most important call of the lot. Naturally, the HSCA wanted to know what was on the transcript:
[Mrs. T] was questioned about the details of the conversation which she remembered. She stated that Oswald definitely identified himself and that he was seeking financial aid from the Russians. (H)e was persistent in asking for financial aid in order to leave the country. They were not about to give him any financial aid whatsoever. He had also mentioned that he tried the Cuban Embassy and they had also refused financial aid.
Oswald spoke only English, Mrs. T explained, and the 10/1/63, 10:45 A.M. conversation could not be the call that she remembered for four reasons. First, because that transcript indicates that Oswald spoke in broken Russian; second, because that transcript is shorter than the one she remembers; third, that transcript is in her husband's style as opposed to her own; and fourth, there is no mention of Oswald's finances in the transcript.
It is also possible that the missing transcript was from a call made on Tuesday. The CIA transcripts indicate two more calls [LE7 and LE8] were made on Tuesday, October 1, but neither transcript resembles Mrs. T's description of the offer of information for money. The two calls acknowledged by the CIA transcripts were made by the same man and, in the second of these calls, he said, "My name is Oswald." The caller asked the Soviets to check on the status of the telegram to the Soviet Embassy in Washington. This request raises the same problem as the Saturday morning call: It does not logically follow from the events as known from other source material. If Oswald had been eager to learn about a response from the Soviet Embassy in Washington, he would have done so on Monday. Moreover, what sense does it make for the real Oswald to be checking on his visa application after he had decided not to fill out the application? This request for a check with Washington adds up only in this scenario: The impostors knew that Oswald was seeking a visa and that the Soviet Consulate had sent a telegram to Washington, but they did not know that Oswald had, inside the Soviet Consulate on Saturday, declined to fill out the application.
Of the eight calls attributed to or involving Oswald, his name appeared in only one of them: the last call at 10:45 A.M. on Tuesday. This too seems odd. There must be something more going on here. It seems likely that the impostors who made the Saturday call knew of an American's presence in the consulates but did not yet know his name. In order to make sense of this, we need to know when the transcripts from the Friday (legitimate) and Saturday (impostor) calls circulated inside the CIA station. Not surprisingly, here too we face a dubious account. The CIA station personnel told the HSCA that the Saturday transcripts was available on Monday and that the Friday transcripts were available on Tuesday. Is this credible? Why would the Saturday transcript take forty-eight hours to show up in the CIA station and the Friday transcripts take ninety-six hours?
The key question is, why did it take so long for the Friday Duran-Kostikov conversation to become available? According to the Lopez Report, "Ms. Goodpasture brought these transcripts into the Station on that [Tuesday] morning and put them on [redacted] desk." Now the importance of Mrs. T's claim that Oswald identified himself in the missing transcript becomes apparent. If our impostor scenario is correct, it means the impostors had discovered Oswald's name by the time of that call: If the missing transcript was from Monday, then Oswald's name was known as of Monday; if the transcript was from Tuesday, then Oswald's name was not known until then. This leads us to the most important question of all: How did the impostors learn of Oswald's name in the first place?
In this connection we are drawn back to Mr. T's speculation, mentioned above, that Oswald's name first came to the station's attention through his contacts with the Cuban Embassy. If he is right, then the CIA's knowledge of what happened inside the Cuban Consulate is the key to the puzzle. Did the CIA station learn Oswald's name through an informant inside the Cuban Consulate? From a bug in the wall? From photographic coverage of the entrance? For thirty years the CIA has claimed they did not know that Oswald was inside the consulate until after the Kennedy assassination. In the next chapter we will demonstrate that this is a lie—a cover story to protect CIA sources inside. For now it is sufficient to stay focused on the fact that it was Goodpasture who walked into the CIA station with the Cuban Consulate transcripts in her hands on Tuesday.
Who in the CIA station figured out that Oswald had visited the Cuban Consulate? At the end of Goodpasture's career, David Phillips, not Win Scott, wrote up her retirement award in 1973. It contained this passage: "She was the case officer who was responsible for the identification of Lee Harvey Oswald in his dealings with the Cuban Embassy in Mexico." Besides her role "in support of the successful coup against the communist government in Guatemala in 1954," her identification of Oswald in the Cuban Consulate was the only specific action in her entire career singled out by Phillips in her award.
There is something strange about Ann Goodpasture's role in the CIA Mexico City station. She may have been functioning in a special capacity outside the control of the station chief, Win Scott, her nominal supervisor there. A key clue is this: Scott gave her a lukewarm fitness report for 1963, whereas Phillips singled out this same performance as the jewel in her tiara. From the fitness report and award recommendation we know something else about Goodpasture: She was connected to a super-secret element at headquarters: Staff D. According to David Martin's CIA study Wilderness of Mirrors, Staff D "was a small Agency component responsible for communications intercepts." In addition, within Staff D was hidden the ZR/ RIFLE project, the Agency's program to develop a capability for assassination. According to the 1967 CIA inspector general's report, it was the Staff D "workshop" that throughout the night of November 20, 1963, fashioned the poison-pen device with which AM/ LASH (Rolando Cuebela) was to murder Castro. "D was the perfect cranny," according to Martin, "in which to tuck a particularly nasty piece of of business" like ZR/RIFLE.
Thus there is no doubt that it was Goodpasture who pinned the tail on the donkey in Mexico City. The question is: When did she manage the feat for which she was regaled ten years later? Is it possible that it was her identification of Oswald that permitted the impostors to use his name in Mrs. T's missing transcript and the Tuesday call to the Soviet Consulate asking about the telegram to Washington?
# Phillips's Recollections: Evidence of an Oswald "Dangle"?
Mrs. T's claim that Oswald offered information for money to the Soviet Consulate raises the question, was Oswald part of a dangle to the Soviets in Mexico City? Is there other evidence relevant to this question? Indeed there is, and it comes from David Phillips. However, the problem with Phillips' story about this is that it changed—in the space of twenty-four hours. It was a story which, in one place, was about an "information offer" and in another place was about an "assistance request." In the second instance Phillips was testifying under oath to the HSCA.
In November 1976, David Phillips, who had been chief of Cuban Operations in the CIA Mexico City station in 1963, told the Washington Post that Oswald offered "information" to the Soviet Embassy in exchange for money. If true, this might have been a "counter-intelligence dangle" similar to the Sigler dangle operation in 1966, when an apparently disgruntled U.S. Army sergeant entered the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City and offered them information in exchange for money, and proceeded to feed disinformation to the Soviets for ten years. Sigler's success led to an award from CIA director William Colby at the same time he was being promoted to the rank of colonel in the KGB by Leonid Brezhnev. Sigler died under mysterious circumstances in 1976.
Is it possible that Oswald was an integral part of—or had stumbled into—a plan to deceive the KGB and the Cuban DGI? The Phillips story about information for money has some complications—which is typical Phillips. According to the Lopez Report, Phillips testified to the HSCA that "Oswald indicated in his discussions with the Soviet Embassy that he hoped to receive assistance with the expenses of his trip." This account, however, misses the Oswald half of the story.
Phillips told the Washington Post that Oswald had been overheard saying words "to the effect, 'I have information you would be interested in, and I know you can pay my way [to Russia].' " Ron Kessler, the Post reporter, wrote that Phillips's claim was corroborated by other CIA sources, such as the "translator" and "typist" of the intercepted call. " 'He said he had some information to tell them,' the 'typist' said in an interview in Mexico. 'His main concern was in getting to one of the two countries [Russia or Cuba] and he wanted them to pay for it.' "
Phillips failed to tell the Post the version of this story that would appear in his book Night Watch written the same year. There, Phillips categorically stated that "I know of no evidence to suggest that . . . any aspect of the Mexico City trip was any more ominous than reported by the Warren Commission." Phillips's book is also at odds with his accounts elsewhere about Oswald's Mexican adventure. For example, his book identifies the authors of the October 8 cable on Oswald, discussed below, as the husband-and-wife team headed by "'Craig,' the case officer in charge of Soviet operations." In his HSCA testimony Phillips claimed that the cable "did come to me, also to sign off, because it spoke about Cuban matters." Phillips was not even in Mexico when the cable was sent He was on a trip to Washington and Miami, and did not return until October 9.
Underlining the contradiction between Phillips's remarks to the Washington Post and his testimony to the HSCA is the short amount of time between the two versions. The Washington Post story appeared on November 26, 1976. The very next day, when testifying under oath to the HSCA, Phillips again stated that Oswald had asked for money, but this time he did not mention the offer of information. On Phillips's key allegation that Oswald offered information for money, FBI director Kelley confirms this happened, and was known, not just from the wiretaps, and cameras, but also from informants and other types of foreign intelligence techniques."
The HSCA later found out that the story of Oswald's request for assistance had also been told by Win Scott (after his retirement) in a 1970 letter:
. . . his activities from the moment he arrived in Mexico, his contacts by telephone and his visits to both the Soviet and Cuban Embassies and his requests for assistance from these two Embassies in trying to get to the Crimea with his wife and baby [emphasis added]. During his conversations he cited a promise from the Soviet Embassy in Washington that they would notify their Embassy in Mexico of Oswald's plan to ask them for assistance.
This letter, along with Scott's manuscript, was one of the items James Angleton removed from Scott's personal safe immediately after his death.
# June Cobb, Elena Garro De Paz, and the Oswald-Duran "Affair"
By 1978, when the HSCA conducted its investigation into the Kennedy assassination, startling information had come to light concerning Oswald's social activities in Mexico City. "The Committee believes that there is a possibility," states the Lopez report, that "a U.S. Government agency requested the Mexican government to refrain from aiding the Committee with this aspect of its work." This was especially so when the HSCA tried to dig into the sources of the persistent story about an Oswald affair with Silvia Duran. The relevance of this story is clear: American intelligence contained reports that Duran's sexual services had already been used by the Cuban government. Sexual entrapment was then a commonly employed and highly successful espionage technique. Thus, on the surface the story implicates the Castro regime in the Kennedy assassination.
The story began, after the assassination, at a twist (i.e. dance) party at the home of Silvia's brother, Ruben Duran. The source of the story was Elena Garro de Paz, a popular playwright and wife of famed Mexican poet Octavio Paz. Two years later the source was the same but the story had grown to include Elena's allegation of an affair between Oswald and Duran. It was the CIA's spy in the Cuban Embassy, Luis Alberu, who finally convinced the station chief Win Scott that the affair was a fact. The documentary trail on the twist party, however, began with a June Cobb memo. She had been working as an informant for the CIA in Mexico City since 1961.
"June Cobb is promiscuous and sleeps with a large number of men," wrote Scott in 1964, and "sometimes spends several nights (consecutively) with a man in his apartment." Actually, Win Scott was passing this along from the legal attaché, Clark Anderson, and neither was in a position to know about Cobb's love life which, as rich and tragic as it had been, did not include sleeping with "a large number of men." The name of the asset who passed this information to Anderson is still protected, but the choice of words—"promiscuous," "large number of men," and "several nights consecutively," were not only excessive, but border on character assassination. June was both an attractive and highly knowledgeable young woman, and was discriminating in her relationships.
We applaud full disclosure, but a comment seems in order here. Since the CIA has seen fit to release scurrilous, unsubstantiated allegations about their former informants while they are alive, the continued withholding of other documents such as their own memo to the FBI (just before Oswald's visit) on running an operation against the FPCC in Mexico, seems unconscionable.
The CIA claims that it did not learn of the stories about the twist party and the affair until after the publication of the Warren Report. The FBI, according to a 1979 CIA report, had conducted an investigation in Mexico after the assassination and had concluded that the Garro allegations were "without substantiation." This investigation, however, was a little late. "On October 5, 1964, eleven days after the publication of the Warren Commission Report," the Lopez Report observed, "Elena Garro de Paz's story alleging Lee Harvey Oswald's presence at a party in Mexico City attended by Cuban government personnel came to the attention of the Central Intelligence Agency."
The allegations of Duran-Oswald social contacts outside the Cuban Consulate have relevance to other issues, such as possible Cuban government involvement in the assassination and whether or not Duran had Cuban, Mexican, or American intelligence ties. The Lopez Report identified the author of the October 5 report as June Cobb:
The source of the memo was [several lines redacted] whom the Committee identified as June Cobb Sharp while reviewing the [redacted] file. According to Elena, Ms. Cobb was sent to her house shortly after the assassination for a few days, by a mutual friend, a Costa Rican writer named Eunice Odio. Ms. Garro asserted that while at her house, Ms. Cobb expressed interest in the Kennedy assassination. One night, Elena's sister Deva, who was visiting, got drunk and told the whole story.
The words "whole story" are vague, but probably refer only to the twist party at Ruben Duran's. Eddie Lopez and Dan Hardaway tried and were unable to locate a number of witnesses, including June Cobb. "The committee attempted to obtain an interview with Ms. Cobb," said the Lopez Report, "but was once again frustrated." If they had located Cobb, they doubtless would have realized that Elena's recollection as to the date of Cobb's visit was a mistake.
First, if Elena's dates were right, then Cobb would have learned about the twist party in the first days after the assassination and not reported it for an entire year. This would have been strange had it happened, but it did not. Elena had been whisked away to a safe house in the wake of the assassination, supposedly because of her knowledge of Oswald's extracurricular activities in Mexico City, but Cobb did not visit Elena at the Hotel Vermont safe house. Cobb moved into Elena's real home ten months later.
The question is this: Did Elena really tell Cobb "the whole story" as described in the Lopez Report? Or was it an early scalded-down version of a story that would later grow in imaginative ways? As we shall see, what eventually unfolded was a tale better suited for James Bond than Lee Oswald. So far, the Lopez Report attributes coverage of the twist party only to June Cobb's still-classified October 5 memo. Elena and her sister were first cousins to the Duran brothers, Horatio, who was married to the Silvia Duran from the Cuban Consulate, and Ruben, who held the twist party at his home in the fall of 1963. The interesting, if fragmentary, recapitulation of Cobb's memo in the Lopez Report contains this segment:
Lee Harvey Oswald was alleged to have been at this party in the company of "two other beatnik-looking boys." The Americans remained together the entire evening and did not dance. When Elena [her daughter] tried to speak with the Americans, she was "shifted" to another room by one of her cousins. The [Cobb] memo does not state whether Elena had mentioned which cousin had not allowed her to speak to the Americans. One of Elena's cousins told her at that time that (he or she) did not know who the Americans were except that Silvia Duran . . . had brought them to the party.
Not much else of significance about Cobb's memo is described in the Lopez Report, except for Elena's claim that the day after the party she and her sister saw Oswald and his two companions on the Avenida Insurgentes, one of the main avenues in the Mexican capital, and that they recognized Oswald's photograph after the assassination. Silvia Duran's arrest after the Kennedy assassination "underlined the Garros' certainty" that the man at the twist party had been Lee Harvey Oswald.
June Cobb remembers Elena telling her story, but the description of Cobb's handling of this story in the Lopez Report seems unfamiliar to her today. From a recent interview, here is Cobb's recollection of Elena's story as told in September 1964:
A quick social gathering had been slapped together for a purpose. When Elena and her sister got to this unlikely party there were these American guys there. And after the assassination they recognized Oswald as one of them. Elena had concluded that the Cubans were in on the assassination, and that the party must have been set up by those Cuban individuals involved, and some of their Mexican friends, so that they could provide an underground for Oswald after the assassination, in which there would be people available who would recognize him and assist in his escape.
It seems prudent to be sceptical of Elena's story, which, if true, would raise suspicions of Cuban government involvement in the assassination. Elena was not entirely objective. While a champion of the peasant cause in Mexico, Elena detested Communists, and thus Cobb's comment about the Garros going to an "unlikely" gathering of communist sympathizers. Elena had concluded that she and her sister were asked to the party as a sort of "camouflage to alter the appearance of the meeting." That is the way Cobb remembers hearing and reporting the story in 1964. In March 1995 she initiated inquiries with the CIA for the release of this document.
Cobb had been living with Elena for only about a month when the story of the twist party came up. Cobb does not recall, however, the actions attributed to her in the Lopez Report:
Claiming to be a CIA agent, Cobb suggested that Elena and Deba go to Texas to tell their story. Elena stated that when Cobb's suggestion was rejected, Cobb stated that she would arrange a meeting with the Chief of the CIA in Mexico. The meeting did not occur because Ms. Cobb was asked to leave the Garro house evidently because she kicked Elena's cat. A notation on the memo says that [redacted, but possibly LI/COOKY-1, Cobb's cryptonym] never regained contact with Elena Garro de Paz.
The trail of evidence on this report by Cobb is as intriguing as this—probably false—story itself. The memo was apparently "lost" in the files, perhaps because it had not been placed in either the Elena Garro or Oswald "P" (personality) files at the CIA Mexico City station. Instead, it was put into a "local leftist and Cuban project file." The HSCA found out about it from another source—a chronological history of the Oswald case designated Wx-7241, prepared by Raymond Rocca for the CIA in 1967. According to Rocca, the Cobb memo was first found in December 1965 by an employee whose name is still withheld. A marginal notation on the Wx-7241 history asked, "Why was this not sent to headquarters?" That is a good question. The HSCA admitted they did not have the answer.
Cobb does remember how the story with Elena turned out. It all ended abruptly one night in late September or early October 1964, when Bobby Kennedy arrived in Mexico City, possibly in connection with his own investigation of his brother's murder.
Robert Kennedy came to Mexico that night. And the Garros had a crush on Kennedy, and so they went out to the airport to see him arrive. The word got around that he was coming, but I was sick and did not go to the airport. I stayed home in my bed with my humidifier, but they went to the airport. They had some yellow roses they wanted to give to Kennedy.
This trip to Mexico City by Bobby Kennedy is not widely known, but there is documentary evidence that supports Cobb's recollection. On November 25, 1964, CIA station chief Win Scott wrote under his pseudonym Willard C. Curtis a "memo for the files." "Paz tried to talk to Robert Kennedy when he was here," Scott wrote, and added, "She wanted to tell him she had personally met Lee Harvey Oswald when he was here in Mexico City. She said she met him and two friends (Cubans) at the home of Horacio (and Silvia) Duran."
In a recent interview, Dallas FBI agent Hosty recalled that the CIA assistant deputy director for Plans, Thomas Karamessines, went down to Mexico City to "call off the investigation," and that Ambassador Mann obliged by halting it. "When the CIA agents in Mexico City heard that Bobby Kennedy wanted the probe to stop," says Hosty, "they in fact stopped it." If Hosty is correct, it is possible that Bobby Kennedy's trip may have been an attempt to lay the matter to rest. If so, he did not succeed.
"Suddenly Elena and her daughter came home from the airport," Cobb remembers, "and soon there was a lot of raised voices about her cat and what had happened to it." Cobb could not understand how harm had come to the poor cat. "They stayed up all night long," Cobb says, "and decided I had broken the cat's legs. By the time I woke up it was over. I moved out to a hotel the next day." By the time this story made it into Win Scott's memo, Cobb had also "smashed the ribs" of the cat. Another memo or two and the cat would not have had any bones left to break.
After Cobb's infamous but still secret report, the next piece in this documentary trail is an October 12, 1964, CIA memo for the record from the Mexico City station's chief of covert action Jim Flannery. The Flannery memo states that Elena had told her story to Eunice Odio; the HSCA investigation was unable "to determine if Elena Garro told Ms. Odio the story personally or if Ms. Cobb related the story to Ms. Odio who relayed it to [redacted.]" Cobb says that Elena probably told her own story to Eunice. According to the Lopez Report, the next piece of the story came on November 24, 1964, when a CIA agent reported information derived from an "asset." This was the slanderous memo about Cobb, previously discussed. The agent erroneously characterized Cobb as a "American Communist" who had rented a room from Garro, and that Garro had also told her story to a U.S. Embassy official "who claimed to represent the Warren Commission." June Cobb was not a Communist.
Charles Thomas's first discussion with Elena Garro de Paz about Oswald occurred on December 10, 1965, more than two years after the assassination. Charles Thomas, a career Foreign Service officer, was the political officer at the American Embassy at the time. There was something odd about him which we will return to at the end of this chapter. He wrote a memorandum about his conversation with Elena that, according to the Lopez Report, had "more details" than the story as told to Cobb more than a year earlier. Elena repeated the story of the twist party, but according to Thomas's memo, one of the new "details" was Elena's charge that Silvia Duran "was Oswald's mistress while he was there." According to the Lopez Report, this Thomas memo was also filed in the Oswald chronological file Wx-7241:
A note by this entry in Wx-7241 says, "How did Elena Garro know about Silvia being the mistress of Oswald? This is 1965." The Mexico City Station did not hear about the Oswald-Duran "affair" until July 1967 when a CIA asset, [redacted] reported it.
This almost certainly indicates that the October 5 Cobb report did not contain the story of the Oswald-Duran affair. It would also mean that Charles Thomas did not pass this information to the CIA station in Mexico City when he learned it in 1965. However, the Lopez Report also notes that Thomas circulated his memorandum in the embassy and the CIA's Mexico City station.
Clearly, these claims cannot all be true: If the CIA "asset" did not bring the story to the station's attention until 1967, Charles Thomas could not have circulated the story in 1965. This issue is resolved by Win Scott's marginalia on the Thomas memo:
The COS wrote a note on the memo: "What an imagination she [Elena] has!?! Should we send to Headquarters?" The Officer replied, on the memo, "Suggest sending. There have been stories around town about all this, and Thomas is not the only person she has talked to . . . If memory serves me, didn't [redacted] refer to Oswald and the local leftists and Cubans in one of her Squibs?"
The name behind the redaction is probably Cobb. The CIA station cabled the information in Thomas's memo to CIA headquarters, and Win Scott wrote on the cable, "Please ask Charles Thomas if he'll 'follow up.' Get questions from Ann G[oodpasture]. Please let's discuss. Thanks." Scott called a meeting with Thomas and asked him "to get a more detailed account of Ms. Garro's story."
Thomas obliged, and met again with Garro on December 25, 1965, after which he wrote a new memo about the Garro allegations. This time Elena's story about the twist party was "much more detailed," and she explained that she had earlier held back part of her story because "the Embassy officers did not give much credence to anything she and Elenita said." According to Thomas's December 25, 1965, memo,
Elena stated that it was "common knowledge" that Silvia had been Oswald's mistress. When asked who could verify the allegation, she could only remember one person who had told her this. Elena claimed that person was Victor Rica Galan, a "pro-Castro journalist."
Clearly, Elena wasn't holding back any longer. Thomas gave his memo to the CIA station "to aid in its investigation" of the assassination. On the first page of the memo Scott wrote: "Shouldn't we send to Headquarters?" Someone responded: "Of course." The Mexico City station did send a cable to headquarters on December 12, 1965, reporting that it was "following up" the story and would send the results in another cable.
On December 27, 1965, the embassy legal attaché, Nathan Ferris, wrote a memo to the ambassador reporting the results of his interviews on November 17 and 24 with Elena and her daughter. According to Ferris, Elena told substantially the same story as she had to Thomas. The Ferris memo further stated this:
. . . Inquiries conducted at that time (November 1964), however, failed to substantiate the allegations made by Mrs. Garro de Paz and her daughter. In view of the fact that Mrs. Garro de Paz' allegations have been previously checked out without substantiation, no further action is being taken concerning her recent repetition of those allegations.
Ferris, obviously not interested in Elena's allegations, sent a copy of the memorandum to the CIA station. Goodpasture summarized the interview, including Ferris's "failure to substantiate Elena's story," in a cable to headquarters on December 29.
The cable promised to keep Headquarters advised if any further information was to [be] developed. . . . A note stapled to this cable by [redacted] stated, "I don't know what FBI did in November 1964, but the Garros have been talking about this for a long time and she is said to be extremely bright." Anne Goodpasture wrote that the FBI had found Elena's allegations unsubstantiated but that "we will try to confirm or refute Ms. Garro de Paz' information and follow up." Win Scott wrote, "She is also nuts."
In the Duran interview with Summers for this work she again adamantly denied having had a sexual relationship with Oswald: "No, no, no. Of course not. I had a relation with someone in the embassy, but not with Oswald . . . he was somebody you couldn't pay attention to." As we saw in Chapter Fourteen, Duran admitted having had the affair with Lechuga, and was willing to discuss these important, if embarrassing, contacts. While her candor about Lechuga and "someone in the embassy" does not make her denial about Oswald true, it does add to her credibility.
On June 18, 1967, the CIA station in Mexico City sent a dispatch to the chief, Western Hemisphere Division, J. C. King. It included this passage:
Headquarters attention is called to paragraphs 3 through 5 of [redacted] report dated 26 May. The fact that Silvia Duran had sexual intercourse with Lee Harvey Oswald on several occasions when the latter was in Mexico City is probably new, but adds little to the Oswald case. The Mexican police did not report the extent of the Duran-Oswald relationship to this Station.
Duran owed her job in the Cultural Institute to the Cuban cultural attaché, Teresa Proenza. The above report was from an agent familiar with Silvia Duran and Teresa Proenza, a telltale sign that it was the handiwork of Luis Alberu, whose name fits perfectly in the corresponding redacted space in the Lopez Report which also describes the contents of the May 26, 1967, report. The news from Alberu represented, for the first time, independent corroboration of Elena's 1965 version of the story to Charles Thomas, in which the Oswald-Duran affair had been added to what had been a twist party in her earlier version to Cobb.
For the CIA station chief Win Scott, Alberu's report had established the Oswald-Duran affair as a "fact." HSCA investigator Ed Lopez agreed that the Alberu report "confirmed" Elena Garro's story that "Silvia Duran had been Oswald's mistress while he was in Mexico City." According to the May 26 report, Alberu had explained to his case officer that "he was doing his best to keep active certain contacts he had had in the past that were on the periphery of the official Cuban circle." This suggests that Alberu had been away from Mexico, perhaps for as long as three years, and had recently returned to the embassy in Mexico City. Alberu's case officer explained:
He [Alberu] mentioned specifically the case of Silvia and Horacio Duran that then explained the background of the relationship with them. He related that Silvia Duran worked as a receptionist at the Consulate in 1959-64 and was on duty when Lee Harvey Oswald applied for a visa. She had been recommended to the Cubans by Teresa Proenza, the Press Attaché from 1959 until 1962. [Redacted] described Teresa Proenza as a Cuban woman aged about 52, a lesbian, and a member of the Communist Party of Cuba, who was currently in jail in Cuba as a result of a conviction for espionage on behalf of CIA.
The CIA station in Mexico City knew the real reason that Proenza had been jailed. Proenza had been used in a pernicious and successful CIA "political action" deception of which she and her longtime friend, the Cuban vice minister of defense, were the targets.
We need to briefly summarize this story of Proenza's arrest because it illuminates the nature and success of the Agency's anti-Cuban operations that were connected with the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City. This helps us to understand how sensitive the Oswald Mexico City story is, and the Agency's dogged resistance to our efforts to find out more.
The CIA saw to it that false papers had been planted on Proenza, documents that made the vice minister of defense look like a CIA agent who had betrayed the Soviet missile buildup in Cuba to the Americans. Actually, this official was a highly placed and extreme pro-Moscow Communist—and was probably the KGB's chief agent in the Cuban government. The CIA hoped that Moscow would jump to the vice minister's defense and that a collision would result between Moscow and Havana. The Proenza deception was associated with the Agency's AMTRUNK and AMROD anti-Cuban operations, part of a general CIA strategy to "split the Castro regime" and sour relations between Moscow and Havana. Proenza, the vice minister, the vice minister's wife, and a subordinate of the vice minister were all arrested, tried for treason, and jailed for various terms. They were all innocent.
The CIA refused to turn over the Proenza file to the House Select Committee on Assassinations, arguing that
The story would make dramatic headlines if it became publicly known, especially in the present moralistic environment. The fact that several persons were deprived of their freedom as a result of the operation would attract further attention. Furthermore, this operation laid the basis for other operations of a similar nature that were successfully mounted against Cuban and other hostile targets. In short, this file is a Pandora's box the opening of which would not only expose the cryptonyms of other operations of this type but would attract unfavorable publicity for the Agency in certain quarters and would expose hitherto secret techniques and assets.
From the records so far released we cannot determine whether Alberu knew the full truth behind Proenza's fate. He did tell his case officer that while in Havana the person from whom he had learned the story of her arrest also told Alberu that "in the event he was asked, he deny that he had known Teresa Proenza or had had anything to do with her."
As previously discussed, Alberu was the key to the Oswald-Duran sex story. Elena Garro was anti-Communist and had an ax to grind with her cousin's wife, Silvia Duran. These factors reduce her credibility, while Alberu's position inside the Cuban Embassy presumably makes his account more authoritative. After his return to Mexico City in 1967, Alberu reestablished his relationship with Silvia Duran. Some of what he learned from or about Duran is still classified, including one-third of a page in the May 26 report written by his case officer. The Agency has decided, however, that this passage from that report may now be revealed:
[Alberu] continued that Silvia Duran [redacted] had first met Oswald when he applied for a visa and had gone out with him several times since she liked him from the start. She admitted that she had sexual relations with him but insisted that she had no idea of his plans. When the news of the assassination broke she stated that she was immediately taken into custody by the Mexican police and interrogated thoroughly and beaten until she admitted that she had had an affair with Oswald.
Setting aside the torture tactics, it was no wonder, given Alberu's apparent trustworthiness, that the CIA station chief Win Scott believed him and sent a message the following day saying the affair was "fact." Unless Alberu or his source was lying, it had to be a fact because Duran herself had "admitted" it. We will return to Duran's treatment later.
Because of the large redeaction preceding this part of the May 26 report, we do not know whether Duran was talking to a third person or to Alberu, and, if she was talking to Alberu, whether she knew he was a CIA agent. The FBI special agent sent to Mexico City in the wake of the assassination, Larry Keenan, reports that he heard from the FBI legal attaché, Clark Anderson, that "Silvia Duran was possibly a source of information for Agency or the Bureau." The HSCA learned that the CIA had at least considered recruiting Duran. HSCA investigator Edwin Lopez recalls: "We saw an interesting file on Duran. It said that the CIA was considering using her affair with Carlos Lechuga [Cuban Ambassador to the U.N.] to recruit her." Nevertheless, the Lopez Report was inconclusive on the subject of Duran's alleged intelligence ties.
Mexico City station chief Winston Scott wrote about the Lechuga-Duran affair in the manuscript that CIA counterintelligence chief Angleton scarfed up after Scott's death. Strangely, the CIA has redacted Lechuga's name from the spot in the Lopez Report that discusses this, even though the Agency released Proenza's statement that the Cubans had "employed" Duran's sexual services to entrap Lechuga (discussed in Chapter Fourteen). It is unclear what the CIA is hiding under this redaction. When this hidden text was shown to David Phillips, he professed surprise and added, "No one let me in on this operation."
Besides Charles Thomas and Luis Alberu, Phillips provides another intriguing episode in the Oswald-Duran sex story. During his interview with the HSCA, Phillips at first claimed ignorance with respect to any CIA interest in Duran. After being surprised by the "operation," Phillips still said he doubted that the station would have "pitched" [tried to recruit] Duran "because the Station could not identify her weaknesses." The Lopez Report then indicates this occurred:
The Committee staff members then told Mr. Phillips about the reporting on file concerning Ms. Duran from one of the Station's [1 entire line redacted]. At one point [name redacted] had reported to his case officer that all that would have to be done to recruit Ms. Duran was to get a blonde, blue-eyed American in bed with her. With this, Mr. Phillips said that it did indeed sound as if the Station had targeted Ms. Duran for recruitment, that the Station's interest had been substantial, and that the weaknesses and means had been identified.
This sequence of denial, professed ignorance, surprise, and then agreement appears contrived. Phillips had served as chief of Cuban operations at the CIA Mexico City station right after Oswald's visit. It strains credibility to think that Phillips would have been unaware of any operation involving Duran or the Cuban Consulate.
The CIA station's chief of Cuban operations, the Agency's ace spy inside the Cuban Embassy, and the embassy's political officer is nevertheless a powerful combination for any story, let alone this one. Alberu's report also included other contextual—and apparently supporting—details. He reported that Duran declared she had cut off all contact with the Cubans since her arrest and interrogation, and that she suspected her phone was tapped by the Mexican police or the CIA. Then something odd occurred at the end of the May 26 report:
[Redacted] counseled [Alberu] against any further contact with the Durans on the grounds that it might put him under some sort of suspicion either in the eyes of the Mexican police or the Cubans. He pointed out that little or nothing was to be gained from such a contact.
If Alberu had not understood that the truth about Oswald's affair with Duran was not something the CIA wished to hear more about, this directive from Alberu's case officer made that point. But why not look into this matter further?
The HSCA had been given just enough material to suggest that the affair was real. Again, the fact that Duran was working for the Cuban Consulate, when combined with the intelligence reporting that alleged that her sexual services had been used for the Cuban government on a previous occasion, was dynamite. It made it look as if the Cuban government might have been involved in the assassination. In the next chapter we will add to this the story that Oswald threatened to kill Kennedy when he visited the consulate. For now we need to finish placing the pieces we have discussed in this chapter.
In view of the above, the HSCA naturally wanted to look closely at Duran's personality file in the Mexico City station. "This Committee has asked the CIA to make Mrs. Duran's Mexican "P" (personality) file available for review," the Lopez Report explained. "The CIA informed the Committee," the report stated, "that there was no "P" file available on Mrs. Duran." This might have been a lie, if the newly released CIA documents are genuine. On one of the documents associated with Charles Thomas is a "P" file number that appears to belong to Silvia Duran.
Finally, we return to Charles Thomas, who upon retiring from the State Department in 1969, again stirred up the Oswald-Duran sex story, this time with Secretary of State William Rogers. "I believe the story merits your attention," Thomas wrote to the secretary. "Since I was the Embassy officer in Mexico who acquired this intelligence information," Thomas wrote, "I feel a responsibility for seeing it through to its final evaluation." Were Thomas's motives pure? Perhaps. But from the newly released CIA files a new twist has emerged in his story. This particular career Foreign Service officer had been working for the CIA all along—for Branch 4 of the Covert Action Staff.
The anomalies in the story about Oswald's activities in Mexico City that proliferated in CIA channels do seem to fall into a pattern suggesting an extraordinary possibility: The story was invented after the Warren Commission investigation to falsely implicate the Cuban government in the Kennedy assassination. In this regard, the ease with which Lopez convinced Phillips about the sex story now stands out like a beacon. But who was the spider and who was the fly.
And what about Charles Thomas? His previous assignment had been to Haiti, from January 8, 1961 until the "summer" of 1963. DeMohrenschildt arrived there on June 2, 1963, and it seems likely that both men were there at the same time. In another interesting coincidence, in the fall of 1969, Thomas became involved in deMohrenschildt's business deals with the Haitian government. This involvement continued after Thomas's retirement. "I would . . . be interested in knowing," Thomas's lawyer wrote in 1970, "whether you have found a solution to the problem of helping Mr. deMohrenschildt."
In Mexico City in 1965, however, Charles Thomas was a CIA covert action operative, and a key player in the development of the Oswald-Duran sex story. That story gained credibility in CIA channels in a way that leaves open an unsavory possibility: the story may have been invented after the Warren Commission investigation to falsely implicate the Cuban government in the Kennedy assassination.
# CHAPTER NINETEEN
# The Smoking File
Within the labyrinth of Oswald's intelligence files at CIA headquarters is a set of papers which, together, demonstrate that the Agency had a keen operational interest in Oswald's activities during the eight weeks before the murder of President Kennedy. The story contained in these documents comes from sources in two different locations: FBI sources in New Orleans and CIA sources in Mexico City. These documents include cable traffic between the CIA and its Mexico City station concerning Oswald's visit there, Agency copies of FBI reports on Oswald received in the fall of 1963, and the CIA's reports to the FBI, State, and Navy.
The extent of interest in Oswald during those fateful final two months was inextricably intertwined with details about Oswald known to the Agency and its Mexico City station at the time. The CIA has doggedly withheld some of these details from public view. A few documents released years ago were suggestive, such as the Kalaris memo discussed in Chapter Eleven. It had mentioned—possibly in violation of this security blanket—October 1963 cables about Oswald's activities in the Cuban Consulate. The Agency has long claimed, falsely, that it did not know of his visits there until after the assassination. As we will see, this story was concocted as a cover to protect the Agency's sources in Mexico City. In addition, newly released documents prove that the CIA was spinning a false yarn about Oswald before the assassination. The Oswald deception cooked up at CIA headquarters began on October, 10, 1963, the day after the CIA station reported his presence in Mexico City.
The interlocking cables, cover sheets, and reports on Oswald that collectively formed his CIA file—from late September to late November 1963—revealed a remarkable change in Oswald's internal record. As Oswald made his way to Mexico, a new data stream collided with his 201 file. That information was the FBI's reporting on Oswald's FPCC activities, a story we dealt with in detail in Chapters Sixteen and Seventeen. It "collided" in the sense that it did not merge with his 201. Instead, the FPCC material effectively knocked aside the 201 file in favor of a new, operational file.
A week after Oswald's departure from Mexico, another data stream on Oswald surfaced in the CIA, this one from the Agency's own surveillance net in Mexico City. Strangely devoid of anything about Cuba or the FPCC, this information was merged with Oswald's 201 file. Thus, the two streams were kept in separate compartments—the 201 and 100-300-11 files—and not permitted to touch until the assassination of the president. It is the thesis of this chapter that the connection between these two compartments was known before the assassination, a connection closely held on a "need-to-know" basis. Together they formed the real Oswald file, a set of records that might appropriately be referred to as a "smoking file." On November 22 this file was smoldering in the safes at headquarters: The accused assassin of the president had been involved in very sensitive CIA operations.
# The Hidden Compartments in Oswald's CIA Files
Prior to Oswald's trip to Mexico City, information on his activities reached the CIA via FBI, State, and Navy reports. Again, the "routing and record" sheets attached to these reports tell us who read them and when they read them. They show how the collision between Oswald's 201 and his FPCC story altered the destination of incoming FBI reports to a new file with the number 100-300-11.
What did this new number signify? On August 24, 1978, the CIA responded to an HSCA inquiry about Oswald's various CIA file numbers. That response contained this paragraph:
The file 100-300-011 is entitled "Fair Play for Cuba Committee." It consists of 987 documents dated from 1958 through 1973. All but approximately 20 are third agency (FBI, State, etc.) documents.
(Note: FPCC portion of the above quote classified until 1995).
CIA documents lists show that Hosty's September 10, 1963, report—the first piece of paper associating Oswald with the FPCC—was the catalyst for the diversion of the FBI data stream into 100-300-11. The routing and record sheet attached to this report shows this redirection occurred on the afternoon of September 23. The documents lists show that Hosty's report was also filed in Oswald's CI/SIG soft file and in his security file, OS 351-164, a point to which we will return momentarily.
By traveling to Mexico City and contacting both the Soviet and Cuban consulates there, Oswald inserted himself into the middle of an elaborate complex of espionage and counterespionage. This resulted in message traffic from the Mexico City station that was entered into his 201 file. The bifurcation of the New Orleans and Mexico City data streams into separate locations is fascinating. This is all the more so because the mechanism for this separation, the 100-300-11 file, was set into motion in the hours before Oswald departed for Mexico City, when Hosty's report from Dallas arrived. That seminal report contained the opening move of Oswald's FPCC game, but the routing and record sheet is strangely devoid of any indication that a Cuban affairs (SAS) office read it. The document was read primarily by counterintelligence elements. After this report, three major FBI reports on Oswald, all of them from the New Orleans office, were placed in the 100-300-11 file. After the Kennedy assassination, all four FBI reports reverted into Oswald's 201 file.
What was the purpose behind the separation of the New Orleans and Mexico City data streams? It might have been sloppy CIA accounting. But it might have been more: Could Oswald's trip have been part of a CIA effort at countering the FPCC in foreign countries and "planting deceptive information which might embarrass" the FPCC? The still-classified September 16 CIA memo to the FBI discussing such efforts is the beginning of a suggestive sequence of events. Was it just a coincidence that the next day Oswald and a CIA informant stood next to each other in a line to get Mexican tourist cards? Was the compartmentation of the FBI reporting on Oswald's FPCC activities—which began six days later—related? Were these all random events or were they connected:
TABLE C: Selected Chronology of Events
September 10: | Hosty report [Oswald letter to FPCC]
---|---
September 16: | CIA to FBI re "countering" FPCC in "foreign countries"
September 17: | Oswald gets tourist card
September 23: | Hosty report arrives, placed in CIA 100-300-11
September 24: | New Orleans FBI memo [Oswald's FPCC activities]
September 25: | Oswald at Odio's
September 26: | FBI HDQS to New York office re CIA request on FPCC
September 27-October 3: | Oswald in Mexico City
October 2: | The September 24 FBI memo arrives at CIA
October 4: | New York FBI office airtel on upcoming 10/27 "contact"
October 9: | Mexico City station cable
October 10: | 2 headquarters cables
If Oswald's trip was related to an operation, what was the role of the Oswald impostor in Mexico? Was he part of a headquarters operation or part of an unconnected local operation against the Cuban and Soviet consulates? Answers to these questions await the full release of the pertinent documents. In their absence, we can still reconstruct some of this intricate puzzle. In assembling the pieces, it is crucial to properly place the cables between the CIA and its station in Mexico City and the Agency's reporting to the FBI, State, and Navy.
Where were the cables between headquarters and the Mexico City station filed before the assassination? During the 1975 Church Committee investigation, investigators Dan Dwyer and Ed Greissing visited the CIA on November 3 and examined Oswald's 201 file. Their report contained this passage on the comments of Mr. Wall, a member of the CIA's counterintelligence staff:
Mr. Wall explained that some of the documents now filed in the Oswald 201 were not filed there at the time of the President's assassination. Some were located in file 200 (miscellaneous international file); others in file 100 (miscellaneous domestic file); others in the WH Division files (those generated by the Mexico City station); and, others in the files reserved for documents with sensitivity indicators [emphasis added].
According to the documents lists, the cables to and from the CIA station in Mexico City, as well as the CIA reports to the FBI and other governmental departments, were also placed in Oswald's 201 file.
From the above, it is apparent that Oswald documents were going to several different locations. Was there anyone who had access to all of them? Again, the 100-300-11 location seems to be the latchkey. Besides those directly involved in Cuban operations, such as the SAS and the Mexico City desk, other CIA elements had been involved with FPCC operations. As previously discussed, Birch O'Neal had written reports about the FPCC for CI/SIG, and in the Security Office James McCord had been connected to counterintelligence operations against the FPCC since at least early 1961. Were either of these offices associated with the special handling of the New Orleans FBI reporting on Oswald?
The answer is yes. One of the two documents lists contains an interesting note in the "Formerly Filed" column for the September 10 Hosty report. It states, "Copy CI/SIG [351 164] 100-300-11." The other documents list has a column with the heading "Location of Original," that has this entry: "CI/SI File 100-300-11." CI/SI was short for CI/SIG, and it appears that the mole-hunting unit was again connected with a key change in Oswald's CIA file designators. Moreover, the association of Oswald's security number (351-164) with the 100-300-11 file denotes a security office tie-in. They had been tracking Oswald all along and now had access to this file too. Thus it appears that it was Angleton's CI/SIG which, in conjunction with the Security Office, had all the pieces to the Oswald puzzle.
Piecing together the story of the government's operations against the FPCC is a puzzle in its own right. The considerable CIA-FBI cooperation at the time of Oswald's trip is noteworthy. On October 2, while Oswald was in Mexico City, FBI agents were searching for him in New Orleans. Six days earlier, FBI headquarters had informed its New York office of the CIA's request for the FPCC's mailing list and "other documents," and directed that office to find out if these materials were "obtainable." Remarkably, on October 4, the New York office responded that an "informant" might be able to provide "both of the above-mentioned items" on October 27. This means that while Oswald was in Mexico City, the FBI—on behalf of the CIA—was planning another break-in into the FPCC offices in New York.
The CIA has not been forthcoming about these operations over the years. The Agency knew about Oswald's FPCC activities before his trip to Mexico and the exchange of information with their station there, yet the Agency blocked an attempt by the Church Committee in 1975 to find out if and to whom such information had been circulated. At the urging of researcher Paul Hoch, the committee asked the CIA whether any information about the FPCC "other than" an October 25, 1963, report (which we will shortly discuss) had been disseminated to "any CIA employees or informants." The Agency's response was misleading at best. "Prior to the assassination," stated the reply, "CIA had no information concerning Oswald's activities in New Orleans beyond this report." This was not true. Perhaps this was another Agency attempt at a technically accurate but tricky and evasive response. If so, the CIA outwitted itself and became vulnerable to the charge of misleading Congress. Earlier New Orleans FBI reports on Oswald's FPCC activities did constitute other information. The record and routing sheets attached to these earlier reports show that they were examined by a variety of CIA counterintelligence, Soviet, and Cuban operations offices.
As we have seen, the real CIA paper trail on Oswald and the FPCC began with the arrival of Hosty's report on September 23. The next report, written on September 24, arrived on October 2, five days before the Mexico City station notified headquarters of Oswald's visit. This FBI report contained the details of most of Oswald's New Orleans FPCC activities—minus the Quigley jailhouse interview. It was in the hands of the SAS counterintelligence office during the crucial exchange of cables between the station and headquarters on October 9-10. It is to those cables that we now turn.
# Smoke I: The Six-Foot Balding Oswald
When the Mexico City station did finally decide to inform headquarters about Oswald's presence, it referred to the transcript of an intercepted telephone call. As discussed in Chapter Eighteen, this September 28 call was probably made by an impostor. This is the full text of the Mexico City station cable 6453, sent on October 9:
1. Acc [redacted] 1 Oct 63, American Male who spoke broken Russian said his name Lee Oswald (phonetic), stated he at Sovemb on 28 Sept when spoke with consul whom he believed be Valeriy Vladimirovich Kostikov. Subj asked Sov Guard Ivan Obyedkov who answered, if there anything new re telegram to Washington. Obyedkov upon checking said nothing received yet, but request had been sent. 2. Have photos male appears be American entering Sovemb 1216 hours, leaving 1222 on 1 Oct. apparent age 35, athletic build, circa 6 feet, receding hairline, balding top. Wore khakis and sport shirt. Source [redacted]. 3. No local dissem.
The station's description of this man was based on photographic surveillance of his entry and exit from the embassy. He has earned the appellative "mystery man" because his true identity has never been established. Obviously this physical description did not fit Oswald. Most important, the station did not state that the man in the photograph was the man who used Oswald's name. The cable reports only two facts: A man used Oswald's name on the phone, and a six-foot balding man entered the building 12:15 P.M.
It is reasonable to assume that the station thought the photograph might have been of the man using Oswald's name, but the cable deserves credit for not making this connection explicit and for reporting only the facts. The station could not be expected to know whether Oswald was thirty-five, six feet tall, and balding. At headquarters, however, they knew better.
The following day, October 10, at 5:12 P.M., the CIA did something strange. They sent a cable to the FBI, State, and Navy, which did connect the call to the photograph:
On 1 October 1963 a reliable and sensitive source in Mexico reported that an American male, who identified himself as Lee Oswald, contacted the Soviet embassy in Mexico City inquiring whether the embassy had received any news concerning a telegram which had been sent to Washington. The American was described as approximately 35 years old, with an athletic build, about six feet tall, with receding hairline [emphasis added].
Moreover, the CIA went on to state that it "believed that Oswald may be identical to Lee Henry Oswald," a statement which suggests that the drafter had Oswald's 201 opening sheet close by. On that 1960 document Oswald's name was incorrectly given as "Lee Henry Oswald."
"As I recall," a CIA employee later wrote in the margin of the cable, "this description was of the individual in Helms's affidavit of 7 Aug [1964]. Not Oswald! WRONG!" [emphasis on original]. Indeed. But this headquarters cable is more than just wrong. They knew it was wrong when they sent it at 5:12 P.M. The evidence that it was deliberate is rock solid. Just two hours later (7:29 P.M.) the Agency said this in a cable to the station in Mexico: "Oswald is five feet ten inches, one hundred sixty-five pounds, light brown wavy hair, [and] blue eyes." This description proves that the CIA knew Oswald's true physical characteristics and therefore that the cable to the FBI, State, and Navy was deliberately misleading.
It is noteworthy that the headquarters cable to the FBI, State, and Navy slightly edited the bogus Oswald description. It dropped the station's description "balding," but was nevertheless content to report to official Washington that a six-foot man believed to be Lee Henry Oswald had been walking around the Soviet Embassy. Who was responsible for this?
The CIA isn't telling. The drafter's name is still classified. So is the name of the "authenticating officer," who is identified only as CH/WH/R, possibly meaning Chief, Western Hemisphere, Research. The names of the two people with whom it was coordinated are also redacted, but their offices, CI/SIG and SR/CI, along with the fact that their names have been released as coordinators for the associated cable to Mexico, permits us to identify them as Ann Egerter and Stephan Roll respectively. The only CIA name the Agency let remain on the cable was that belonging to the 'releasing officer," Jane Roman. We will return to her comments about these cables.
"She took the routine steps of requesting a name trace," the Lopez Report says of the Mexico City desk person to whom the station's cable was assigned after its arrival in headquarters. Indeed, she considered the cable itself to be "routine." But not for long. The name trace led her to Oswald's 201 file, and the fact that it was restricted to Ann Egerter in Angleton's mole-hunting unit, CI/SIG. Egerter acceded to a request by our nameless Mexico City desk "person" for access to the 201 file. CI/SIG lent the Oswald 201 to the Mexico City desk (WH/3/Mexico) until the Kennedy assassination. So we know that this desk had the 201 files and the cables. What is not clear is whether they had access to the 100-300-11 file.
After examining the 201 file, the nameless woman at the Mexico City desk concluded that the station cable was "very significant." When asked by the HSCA why she changed her mind, this is what she said:
Any American who had tried to renounce his U.S. citizenship in the Soviet Union now having again a relationship with the Soviet Embassy would lead one to wonder why he had tried to renounce his citizenship in the first place, and why he was still in contact with the Soviets, whether there was a possibility he really was working for the Soviets or what.
Egerter recalled the station cable "caused a lot of excitement" because of "the contact with Kostikov." The CIA denies that they figured out Kostikov's connection to Department 13—which handled assassination for the KGB—until after Kennedy's murder. Perhaps. But at the very least the Agency knew he was KGB. When asked what significance the Agency attached to Kostikov at the time the cable arrived, she responded, "I think we considered him a KGB man." Was there any other reason, the HSCA asked? "He had to be up to something bad," Egerter replied, "to be so anxious to go back to the Soviet Union. At least that is the way I felt."
According to the Lopez Report, the "six-foot Oswald" cable to the FBI, State, and Navy and the "five-foot-ten-inch Oswald" cable to Mexico were drafted at the same time. The excitement over the cable from Mexico and the idea that Oswald was up to something bad and in contact with the KGB makes implausible any explanation that this contradiction was inadvertent or trivial. It is reasonable to conclude that the false description of Oswald was a deliberate act. The HSCA wanted to know why. The answers they got were less than convincing. One was the so-called third agency rule, under which the Agency could not disseminate any information obtained from a third agency of the government. However, this did not square with the instruction in the cable to Mexico to disseminate the true description of Oswald to the Navy and FBI. Clearly, if the third agency rule applied to headquarters disseminations to the FBI and State, it also applied to Mexico Station disseminations to the FBI and State.
Another CIA employee tried this: "they had not been sure" that the Oswald reported by Mexico was the same Oswald "on whom they [headquarters] had a file." If so, then why state in the cable that he "probably" was the same Oswald? The person most knowledgeable about Oswald's CIA file, Ann Egerter, signed off on both cables for accuracy. When she was asked to explain the contradiction, Egerter would say only that "she could not say why the description discrepancies occurred." We will return to this issue after examining the cable to Mexico City.
# Smoke II: The "Latest HDQS Info" on Oswald
More than Oswald's physical description was different in the two cables. Other distinctions included the content and coordination process. For the cable to the FBI, State, and Navy, Jane Roman was the releasing officer, while for the cable to the station in Mexico, Thomas Karamessines was the releasing officer. Roman worked for the liaison section of Angleton's counterintelligence staff, while Karamessines was the assistant deputy director for Plans (A/DDP), the man next in line after the DDP himself, Richard Helms. Why these differences?
A clue lies in the larger number of organizations that were involved in the coordination of the cable to Mexico. In the space reserved for the authenticating officer, William Hood (a WH division deputy) signed in place of J. C. King, chief of Western Hemisphere Division. Three people were involved in the draft coordination process: Stephan Roll for SR/CI/A (Analysis, Counter-intelligence, Soviet Russia Division); Jane Roman for CI Liaison, and Ann Egerter. After their names, John Scelso (possibly a pseudonym), Chief/WH/3, signed on the line at the bottom of the cable.
From the above it is obvious that the coordination process was more extensive for the cable to Mexico than the cable to the FBI, State, and Navy. Why was it necessary to go so high for the releasing authority? The HSCA interviewed several of those involved, and in the Lopez Report reported that the "request for further investigation and dissemination" was the reason the Mexico cable was sent to the A/DDP for release. The HSCA based this conclusion on a report written a month after the Kennedy assassination from John Scelso to James Angleton. But during the HSCA's interview with Scelso, he said that the directive to the station to report "follow-up" evidence on an American citizen was the reason for high-level coordination. On the other hand, Scelso also said this to the HSCA: "We could just as well have sent this cable out without Mr. Karamessines releasing it. I do not know why we did it."
Scelso was the first line supervisor above the Mexico City desk responsible for both the cables. He might even have been the drafter. His confusion about the reasons and the necessity (or lack of it) for such high-level coordination strikes one as implausible. According to the Lopez Report, the nameless person from the Mexico City desk (referred to above) recalled an entirely different reason for the Karamessines signoff. She said it was sent to the A/DDP because Oswald was important enough to "merit" the A/DDP's attention:
I can only surmise now that I might have thought or what several of us might have thought at the time, [was] that since it involved somebody of this nature who had tried to renounce his citizenship, who was in the Soviet Union, married to a Soviet, got out with a Soviet wife presumably, which is very strange, and now the contact with the Soviets, we could have a security, a major security problem. This was one way of informing him and getting attention at the higher level.
This woman agreed, however, with Scelso about one thing: It was not necessary to bring the cable to Karamessines's attention in the first place.
To recapitulate, we have heard four possible answers as to why the A/DDP had to sign off on the cable: 1) because of the third agency rule on dissemination, 2) because Oswald was an American citizen, 3) because Oswald presented a major security problem, and 4) it actually was not necessary. Of these four possibilities, the potential security risk posed by Oswald seems the most plausible for going as high as Helms's assistant.
There was an even greater discrepancy between the two October 10 cables. The cable to Mexico City gave a cut-off date for the latest information on Oswald held at headquarters. No such cut-off date was furnished in the cable to the FBI, State, and Navy two hours earlier. The cable to Mexico stated that the "latest HDQS info" was a State Department report dated May 1962. This statement was false. Why was it made?
"CIA Headquarters sent a lengthy cable summary to the Mexico City Station," the Agency reported to the Warren Commission, "of the background information held in the Headquarters' file on Oswald" That statement, too, was false. The cable did not contain a "summary" of the information held at headquarters; rather, it was a summary of information for the thirty-one months leading up to May 1962. No information was included for the eighteen-month period since Oswald's return to America. This period, including FBI interrogations in 1962, Oswald's life in Dallas, and correspondence with the Soviet Embassy and various communist organizations, his move to New Orleans, attempts to found a New Orleans chapter of the FPCC, his altercation with the DRE, his arrest, jailing, and sentencing, were all spelled out in FBI reports that were held in the headquarters file. Yet none of this information was included in the "summary."
From our perspective, there are two problems here. First, it is reasonable to expect that current information should have been included in any summary on Oswald, especially because this cable ordered the station to "keep HDQS advised on any further contacts or positive identification of Oswald." How was the station supposed to investigate further with intelligence a year and a half out of date? The second problem, of course, is that headquarters were all aware of the eighteen months of Oswald's activities since his return.
As previously discussed, Egerter admitted she felt Oswald was up to something "bad" and that she knew he was in contact with a KGB officer in the embassy in Mexico. The reports held at headquarters since Oswald's return to America showed he had been in contact with communist organizations, information that would have been both relevant and useful to any follow-up investigation by the station. Moreover, one of the reports at headquarters concerned Oswald's "contact with the Soviet Embassy since [his] return." Thus there is no question but that the post-May 1962 reports at headquarters contained new and important information that should have accompanied the order to conduct further investigation. Thus the transmission to Mexico stating that the latest information at headquarters was a May 1962 State cable remains a mystery.
In February 1995, Washington Post editor Jefferson Morley sent a letter to the CIA in which he asked this question:
Does the Agency know why Mr. Karamessines told the Mexico City station on October 10, 1963 that the CIA had no information on Oswald since May 1962 when the Agency's records show that it had received three FBI reports on Oswald between May 1962 and October 1963?
The letter notified the CIA that their answer would be used in an article and added that the Post wanted to give the CIA "the opportunity to comment on these records." The CIA Public Affairs Office replied the following day:
The cable referred to in your letter appears to focus only on the status of Oswald's citizenship. As such, it draws on information available from the State Department that bears on the question of citizenship. The cable is not regarded as an attempt to summarize all the information in CIA files on Oswald at the time.
This response seems fatuous in view of the Agency's explanation to the Warren Commission: "a lengthy cable summary . . . of the background information held in the headquarters' file on Oswald."
The Agency's 1995 response to the Post is troubling. Such cavalier retorts further undermine public trust and confidence. Of course the cable did not summarize all the information held at headquarters. That was the reason for asking the question in the first place. The Agency's explanation is tricky, legalistic, and evasive. It failed to answer the question asked: Why did headquarters state its latest information was a May 1962 report?
An analogy is useful here. There would be little sense in asking a biologist to write an update on the human fossil record while giving him data only on Homo erectus fossils and leaving out fossils of Homo sapiens. Furthermore, imagine that knowing we had several specimens from the last 100,000 years, we told our biologist that the youngest specimen in our laboratory was over two million years old.
On October 4, Jane Roman read the latest FBI report on Oswald's FPCC activities in New Orleans, an event that was impossible if the October 10 cable to Mexico City—which she coordinated on behalf of CI/Liaison—was true. When recently shown both the cable and the FBI report with her initials, Roman said this: "I'm signing off on something that I know isn't true." Roman's straightforward answer is as noteworthy as the fact that the CIA has released her name on these reports while redacting the names of others. One explanation might be that she was not in on the operation and therefore not in a position to question why the two cables were being drafted with such ridiculous sentences. "The only interpretation I could put on this," Roman says now, "would be that this SAS group would have held all the information on Oswald under their tight control, so if you did a routine check, it wouldn't show up in his 201 file." Roman made this incisive comment without being shown the documents lists that demonstrate that she was right. "I wasn't in on any particular goings-on or hanky-panky as far as the Cuban situation," Roman states. Asked about the significance of the untrue sentence on the "latest headquarters" information, Roman replied: "Well, to me, it's indicative of a keen interest in Oswald, held very closely on a need-to-know basis."
# Smoke III: Duran's Damaging Testimony
On December 11, 1963, John Scelso, chief of Western Hemisphere Branch 3, wrote an alarming memo to Richard Helms, deputy director of Plans. In bold handwriting at the top of the memo are the words "not sent." Below this is written "Questions put orally to Mr. Helms. 11 Nov. 63." In smaller handwriting under this are the words "Dec. presumably," reflecting the obvious fact that the Helms oral briefing was December 11, not November 11. Scelso wasted no time in throwing this stone into the pond:
It looks like the FBI report may even be released to the public. This would compromise our [13 spaces redacted] operations in Mexico, because the Soviets would see that the FBI had advance information on the reason for Oswald's visit to the Soviet Embassy.
How could the FBI have known Oswald's reason in advance? Next to this piece of text was a handwritten clue: "Mr. Helms phoned Mr. Angleton this warning." Perhaps "this morning" was meant, but in either case this may mean that CIA counterintelligence operations were involved.
It is intriguing that anyone in U.S. intelligence would have had advance notice of Oswald's visit to the Soviet Embassy. Evidently the FBI report that was mentioned was worded so that its readers might conclude that the FBI had been the source of information, but from Scelso's report, it is not hard to guess that it was the CIA's operations in Mexico that had yielded "advance information on the reason for Oswald's visit to the Soviet Embassy." But just what exactly does this phrase mean?
Oswald had told the Soviet Consulate in Mexico City that he corresponded with the Soviet Embassy in Washington about returning to the U.S.S.R. As previously discussed, the FBI would have learned of the contents of this correspondence. But this would not have compromised CIA operations in Mexico City. The CIA station monthly operational report for October 1963 did mention Oswald's visit to the Soviet Consulate, and did so under the subtitle "Exploitation of [7 letters redacted] Information." The same seven-letter cryptonym is redacted in the line beneath this subtitle, but the last letter is partially visible, enough to see that it is the letter Y. In another CIA document from the Mexico City station the cryptonym LIENVOY has been left in the clear, and it was apparently used for the photo surveillance operation against the Soviet Embassy and Consulate. If this is true, the point of the Scelso memo above might have been this: Publication of the October 9-10 cables would show the telephone intercept had been linked to the photo surveillance, and that since the phone call came first, the cable showed the Agency had advance knowledge of the reason for Oswald's (the impostor) visit to the Soviet Consulate.
It appears that the CIA had advance knowledge about more than Oswald's October 1 visit to the Soviet Embassy. There is circumstantial evidence that the CIA Mexico City station might have been watching Oswald since his arrival on September 27. This evidence, according to the Lonez Report, was the Agency's decision to investigate the transcripts back to September 27, before they had learned of that date througl post-assassination investigation:
This Committee has not been able to determine how the CIA Headquarters knew, on 23 November 1963, that a review of the [redacted] material should begin with the production from 27 September, the day Oswald first appeared at the Soviet and Cuban Embassies [emphasis added].
This was an incisive point. So was the direction in which the Lopez Report then headed: what headquarters knew about Oswald's visits to the Cuban Consulate.
The CIA had more to worry about than the LIENVOY operation if the October 9-10 cables were published. These cables discussed a transcript from October 1. As we saw in Chapter Eighteen, the Oswald in this conversation was probably an impostor. The real Oswald had decided to abandon his visa request on Saturday and had no reason to call about a response to his request from Washington. As previously discussed, the impostors were apparently unaware of the fact that Oswald had declined to fill out the Soviet visa application. By November 24 the real Oswald was dead and therefore not able to debunk the false transcript. But this transcript was linked to the Saturday transcript by the transcriber himself (Mr. T). That transcript included not only an Oswald impostor but also a Duran impostor. The problem was that Duran was very much alive.
The day after the assassination, the CIA's station in Mexico City sent a note to the Mexican government containing the addresses of Duran, her mother, and her brother, her phone number, place of work, and license plate number, and a request that she be "arrested as soon as possible by Mexican authorities and held incommunicado until she can be questioned on the matter." The Cuban government protested that Duran was "physically mistreated." According to the transcript of the interrogation, Duran told the story about Oswald's visits on Friday, September 27, and stated flatly, "he never called again." Her statement undermined the Saturday transcript wherein she and Oswald were supposed to have placed a call to the Soviet Consulate. Her statement was not repeated in the Warren Report, which stated that after the Friday altercation, "Oswald contacted the Russian and Cuban Embassies again during his stay in Mexico." The evidence given for this false statement in the Warren Report is "confidential information."
Where did the Warren Commission get this idea? Was it from the September 28 transcript, or was there more? The answer is: The CIA and the Mexican government were the source of this bogus story. The Agency told the Warren Commission that "we deduce" that Oswald visited the Cuban Consulate on September 28, but added, "we cannot be certain of this conclusion." Moreover, among the exhibits of the Warren Commission twenty-six volumes is a report from the Mexican government. It stated that Duran "could not recall whether or not Oswald later telephoned her" at the Consulate.
The contradiction between what Duran actually said—that Oswald never called back—and the above CIA-Mexican government explanation is striking. The Warren Commission did have access to both pieces of information but followed the CIA's "deduction" about the events on Saturday. Again we encounter another example of the Warren Commission missing basic pieces, in this case the FBI's record. That version was reflected in a December 3, 1963, FBI memo to A. H. Belmont from W. C. Sullivan. That memo contains this extraordinary passage:
Duran stated that Oswald returned to the Cuban Consulate at approximately 11:30 a.m. on 9/28/63 [Saturday] and again inquired about obtaining a Cuban transit visa to Russia. Again, Duran stated, Oswald was advised that the issuance of Cuban transit visa to him was contingent upon his first acquiring a Soviet visa. She stated she again on behalf of Oswald telephoned the Soviet establishment, at which time Oswald was requested to present himself in person at the Soviet establishment.
This is a whole-cloth fabrication. Either the FBI crafted it or the Mexicans did. The latter is the more likely of the two, possibly at U.S. insistence. The key evidence, as previously discussed, is the original transcript of the November 23 Duran interrogation.
The very existence of the December 3 FBI document is damaging. Like the Warren Commission, the FBI had access to the real story. The evidence for this is an FBI report from it own representative in Mexico City on the "Activities of Oswald in Mexico City." It is undated, but we can guess the time span because it displays awareness of only the first interrogation. Thus this intricate fabrication dates between November 23 and November 27, when Duran was rearrested and interrogated a second time. FBI records reflect that Belmont sent a memo to Deputy Director Tolson the day of the second arrest. That memo said this:
Assistant Director Sullivan called to advise that CIA has informed us that Mexican authorities have arrested Sylvia [sic] Duran, just as she was about to leave for Cuba. CIA wanted to know if we objected to Mexican authorities interrogating Duran vigorously and exhaustively. We agreed to this interrogation. They will give us the results of the interrogation promptly.
Besides this brutal passage, the memo also repeated the elaborate fabrication made of Duran's first interrogation, in which she talked in detail about Oswald visits after Friday. This sequence of events raises the possibility that this was a cover story, created between the two interrogations, to cover up the penetration operation in Mexico City. The Mexicans had no reason to make up stories about Duran's interrogation. The same was not true for the CIA, whose "Oswald" transcripts were threatened by what she was saying.
Duran's testimony to the HSCA was devastating to the authenticity of the Saturday telephone call. (Duran's full name was Silvia Tirado de Duran, and she was addressed as Tirado by the committee.) This is the pertinent part:
CORNWELL: Let's just talk hypothetically for a moment. Is there any chance that he was at the Consulate on more than one day?
TIRADO [Duran]: No. I read yesterday, an article in the Reader's Digest, and they say he was at the Consulate on three occasions. He was in Friday, Saturday, and Monday . . . That's not true, that's false.
CORNWELL: All right. Let's try a different hypothetical. If the one in the Reader's Digest is definitely wrong, is it possible that he first came in like a Thursday, and then came back on a Friday?
TIRADO: No, because I am positively sure about it. That he came in the same day.
An interesting aspect of Duran's account is how well it does fit with the September 27 calls between the Cuban and Soviet consulates. As discussed in Chapter Eighteen, these two transcripts appear authentic given the recollections of the Soviets, so Duran's statement to the HSCA provides further corroboration for these transcripts.
During the HSCA questioning of Duran by Gary Cornwall, the following exchange took place:
CORNWELL: Is it possible that, in addition to his visits on Friday, he also came back the following day on Saturday morning?
TIRADO [Duran]: No.
CORNWELL: How can you be sure of that?
TIRADO: Because, uh, I told you before, that it was easy to remember, because not all the Americans that came there were married with a Russian woman, they have lived(d) in Russian and uh, we didn't used to fight with those people because of you, they came for going to Cuba, so apparently they were friends, no? So we were nice to them with this man we fight, I mean we had a hard discussion so we didn't want to have anything to do with him.
CORNWELL: Okay. I understand that but I don't understand how that really answers the question. In other words, the question is, what is it about the events that makes you sure that he did not come back on Saturday, and have another conversation with you?
TIRADO: Because I remember the fight. So if he (come) back, I would have remembered.
CORNWELL: Did Azcue work on Saturdays?
TIRADO: Yes, we used to work in the office, but not for public.
CORNWELL: Was there a guard, was there a guard out here at the corner near number seven on your diagram on Saturdays?
TIRADO: Excuse me?
CORNWELL: Was there a doorman out near the area that you marked as number seven, on the diagram?
TIRADO: Yes, but on Saturday he never let people . . .
CORNWELL: Never let people in.
TIRADO: No.
CORNWELL: Not even if they came up to the doorman and didn't speak Spanish? And were very insistent?
TIRADO: No, because they could answer or something. They could ask me for instance, no? by the inter-phone.
CORNWELL: They could do that on a Friday, though.
TIRADO: But what I remember is that Oswald has my telephone number and my name and perhaps he show to the doorman (Spanish).
CORNWELL: When did you give him the telephone number and name?
TIRADO: In the second visit, perhaps.
CORNWELL: Okay.
TIRADO: I used to do that to all the people, so they don't have to come and to bother me. So I used to give the telephone number and my name and say "give me a call next week to see if your visa arrived."
CORNWELL: Well. Are you saying that based on your memory the guard was allowed to bring people in during the five till eight o'clock at night uh, sessions during the week but not on Saturdays?
TIRADO: No.
CORNWELL: Is that correct?
TIRADO: Yes.
CORNWELL: Do you have a distinct recollection with respect to telephone calls to the Russian Consulate, was it just one call or was it more than one call?
TIRADO: Only one.
CORNWELL: Just one.
This was very powerful testimony, which confirmed the story in the September 27 transcripts and raises fatal complications for the September 28 call. As discussed earlier in this chapter, the Warren Commission would say only that it had "confidential information" to back up the extra calls and visits, and published Commission Exhibit 2021, the false version of Duran's Mexican interrogation provided by the Mexican government.
It is noteworthy how such important information known to Duran was apparently not known to the Warren Commission. The CIA did, however, inform the Warren Commission of Duran's claim that Oswald never called back. The Warren Commission chose to ignore it. The HSCA did notice, and Cornwell surfaced the issue for yet a third time with Duran. This is what happened:
CORNWELL: Did you ever see him again, after the argument with Azcue?
TIRADO: No.
CORNWELL: Did you ever talk to him again?
TIRADO: No.
CORNWELL: Not in person nor by telephone.
TIRADO: No, he never call. He could have called when I wasn't there, but I used to get the message, if somebody answer, I used to get a message.
It is difficult not to observe the irony in how an interrogation arranged by the CIA helped blow the cover off one of its operations. In retrospect, Duran's arrest does not appear to have been a smart move.
Not everybody in the CIA thought it was a good idea to arrest Duran. A CIA memo for the record the day after the Kennedy assassination reflects the panic that ensued at headquarters upon Duran's arrest, Written by John Scelso, it states this:
After receipt of MEXI 7029 at about 1715 on 23 Nov 1963, saying that Mexi was having the Mexicans arrest Silvia Duran, Mr. Karamessines, A/DDP ordered us to phone Mexi and tell them not to do it. We phoned as ordered, against my wishes, and also wrote a FLASH cable which we did not then send. [Win Scott] answered and said it was too late to call off the arrest. He emphasized that the Mexicans had known of the Oswald involvement with Silvia Duran through the same information. He agreed with our request that the arrest be kept secret and that no information be leaked.
According to the Lopez Report, after his conversation with Scelso, Scott asked the Mexicans to pass all information from Duran to the Mexico City station and not to inform "any leftist groups." The draft flash cable ordered by Karamessines stated, "Arrest of Silvia Duran is extremely serious matter which could prejudice U.S. freedom of action on entire question of Cuban responsibility."
After Duran's rearrest on November 27 and the Agency's request that Duran be "vigorously and exhaustively" interrogated, the following day headquarters sent a "clarification" to the Mexico City station, "seeking to insure that neither Silvia Duran nor the Cubans would have any basis for believing that the Americans were behind her rearrest. The cable stated: 'We want the Mexican authorities to take the responsibility for the whole affair.' "
There were other changes made to Duran's original interrogation besides the addition of visits after Friday. Her description of Oswald as blond and short was mysteriously ignored by the Warren Report. Likewise for Duran's statement that "the only aid she could give Oswald was advising that he see the Soviet Consul." Perhaps this was changed because it alluded to Oswald asking for some type of aid, a possibility raised by David Phillips discussed in Chapter Eighteen. Had Duran's real statements been included, the Lopez Report concludes, "the Warren Commission's conclusions would not have seemed as strong."
# Smoke IV: CIA Knowledge of Oswald's Cuban Consulate Visit
Where Oswald's contacts with the Cuban Consulate are concerned, we encounter still more suspect explanations. One of the most interesting details is when the Agency discovered these contacts. "After the assassination of President Kennedy and the arrest of Lee Harvey Oswald, an intensive review of all available sources was undertaken in Mexico City," said the CIA in January 1964, "to determine the purpose of Oswald's visit." It was during this review, the Agency claims, that "it was learned that Oswald had visited the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City" and had spoken with Duran. The documentary underpinning for this claim is the Mexico City cable on October 9 and the October 10 headquarters response. Neither cable mentions an Oswald visit to the Cuban Consulate.
Because the September 27 and 28 calls all involved the Cuban Consulate, the above explanation requires a surprising condition: Headquarters could not have had knowledge of those calls until after the assassination. Ann Goodpasture told the HSCA that Mexico City did not inform headquarters about this visit. The Lopez Report, however, contains an interview with yet another "unidentified" CIA person from the CIA Mexico City station. In this case it was a woman, and this is what took place in her question and answer session with the HSCA:
A: I did not send another cable but I know another cable was sent. I didn't send it.
Q: Another cable concerning Oswald was sent?
A: I think so. Where is the whole file? Wasn't there a cable saying he was in touch with the Cuban Embassy?
Q: We have not seen one.
A: I am pretty such [sure] there was.
Q: Did you send that cable?
A: No, I did not send the cable. When I found out about it I remember this, I said how come?
Q: Who did? Do you know?
A: I don't know who sent it. I think Ann (Goodpasture) might have. She might have sent a follow-up one with this information.
If Goodpasture did send such a cable, her statement to Lopez would have had to have been false. Still, the anecdotal evidence is mixed: Some people remembered that headquarters was notified of the Cuban Consulate angle and others remembered that it was not.
Outwardly the Agency has doggedly stuck to its story, staunchly denying any preassassination knowledge of Oswald's visit to the Cuban Consulate. There is a convincing and growing body of evidence that suggests this is a false denial to protect the Agency's sources in Mexico City. We will comment in the final chapter about what is at stake in this strategy. For now we look at the documentary evidence, which is impressive. The Agency personnel with whom these documents are associated are authoritative with respect to the issue at hand: the CIA deputy director for Plans (DDP), the CIA counterintelligence chief, and the CIA Mexico City station chief.
Let us begin with Richard Helms, who was the DDP when he and his subordinates met formally with Lee Rankin and other Warren Commission attorneys on March 12, 1964. The SECRET EYES ONLY Memorandum for the Record of the meeting contains this telltale passage:
Mr. Helms pointed out that the information on Oswald's visit to the Cuban and Soviet embassies in Mexico City came from [three lines redacted]. Such information is routinely passed to other agencies and entered in CIA files. [two lines redacted]. Thus the information on Oswald was similar to that provided on the other American citizens who might have made contacts of this type. In Oswald's case, it was the combination of visits to both Cuban and Soviet Embassies which caused the Mexico City Station to report this to Headquarters and Oswald's record of defection to the Soviet Union which prompted the Headquarters dissemination.
In Helms's view, it was Oswald's presence in both consulates that caused the event to be reported. Moreover, Helms did not make this statement lightly. He warned Rankin that this information "was extremely sensitive" and the very existence of these [ 2 to 3 words redacted] had to be very carefully protected.
New documentary evidence emerged on September 18, 1975, when George T. Kalaris, who had replaced Angleton as chief of Counterintelligence, wrote a memo to the executive assistant to the deputy director of Operations (DDO) [formerly DDP] of the CIA, describing the contents of Oswald's 201 file. This is the same memo discussed in Chapter Eleven, in which Kalaris claimed that Oswald's 201 file had been opened, in part, by the Agency's "renewed interest in Oswald brought about by his queries concerning possible reentry into the United States." Kalaris's memo also had this:
There is also a memorandum dated 16 October 1963 from [redacted, but likely "Win Scott"] COS Mexico City to the United States Ambassador there concerning Oswald's visit to Mexico City and to the Soviet Embassy there in late September-early October 1963. Subsequently there were several Mexico City cables in October 1963 also concerned with Oswald's visit to Mexico City, as well as his visits to the Soviet and Cuban Embassies
In this case the significance of the Kalaris memo is that it disclosed the existence of preassassination knowledge of Oswald's activities in the Cuban Consulate, and that this had been put into cables in October 1963
Win Scott's unpublished manuscript backs up the Kalaris memo on Oswald and the Cuban Consulate—and then some. Scott wrote this passage:
In fact, Lee Harvey Oswald became a person of great interest to us during this 27 September to 2 October, 1963 period. He contacted the Soviet Embassy on at least four occasions, and once went directly from the office of Sra. Sylvia Tirado de Duran, a Mexican employee of the Cuban Consulate, to his friends, the Soviets. During the conversation with the Soviet official, he said, "I was in the Cuban Embassy—and they will not give me a transit visa through Cuba until after I have my Soviet visa."
Literally taken, this would have to be from a transcript the Agency has never released, from an informant inside the Soviet Consulate, or bogus. Scott may have been referring to the Saturday, September 28 call in which the Duran character puts the Oswald character on the line. However, Scott has added the remark about the Cuban visa refusal, whereas the transcript recently released to the public has the memorable discussion about an address.
On the larger issue of when the Agency knew Oswald had been in the Cuban Consulate, Scott's manuscript, Foul Foe, contained this indictment of the Warren Commission:
This contact became important after the Warren Commission Report on the assassination of President Kennedy was published; for on page 777 of that report the erroneous statement was made that it was not known that Oswald had visited the Cuban Embassy until after the assassination!
Every piece of information concerning Lee Harvey Oswald was reported immediately after it was received to: U.S. Ambassador Thomas C. Mann, by memorandum; the FBI Chief in Mexico, by memorandum; and to my headquarters by cable; and included in each and every one of these reports was the conversation Oswald had, so far as it was known. These reports were made on all his contacts with both the Cuban Consulate and with the Soviets.
While Scott pokes fun at the Warren Commission's error, he fails to address whether the CIA withheld this information from the commission. Moreover, neither the Church Committee nor the HSCA was able to get to the bottom of this issue.
For example, the Lopez Report turned up data that was suggestive but was unable to use it. Critical of the Mexico City station for rechecking the transcripts and discovering the substantive ones that concerned Oswald and reporting them "in a misleading manner," the Lopez Report concluded that Oswald's visit to the Cuban Consulate had been recognized by the Mexico City station shortly after they received the headquarters cable on October 11. Nevertheless, Goodpasture's contention that it was not passed on to headquarters remained a problem:
Q: In fact, headquarters did not know that he had also been to the Cuban Embassy?
A: At that point, no.
Q: At least, according to your recollection, it was not until after the assassination that Headquarters was informed of that fact?
A: That is probably right.
Why was this information not passed along? The answer remains elusive.
"If the cable was sent," Lopez concluded, "it is not in the files made available to the HSCA by the CIA." Still, Lopez did not take this to mean that headquarters did not have other means of learning this information. His report contained this thought:
There is no record that Headquarters had been informed of the 9/27 visits prior to this cable having been sent. It is possible, as some witnesses have suggested, that his information was provided to CIA Headquarters by the FBI in Washington. If that is the case then it merely shifts the question. This may indicate that CIA Headquarters was aware of the 9/27 visits prior to the assassination [emphasis added].
However, as discussed above, there are indications that there was another cable from the Mexico City station, probably more than one, which discussed the Cuban Consulate visit.
When shown all of these documents today, former CIA officials are reluctant to defend the old story of no preassassination knowledge of Oswald in the Cuban Consulate. When pressed on this point in a recent interview, former director of Central Intelligence Helms had this to say: [shows Helms the minutes of meeting with Rankin and the Kalaris memo]
NEWMAN: You make the statement in Oswald's case that it was the combination of visits to both places, the Cuban and Soviet Embassy, that caused the station to report it in the first place to headquarters. So the point of asking you to look at both of these documents together is to make clear that there is no mistake here, that they reported this in October because he was in both the Soviet and Cuban places and there were several cables about it afterwards. This is what I would conclude from this.
HELMS : Yes.
NEWMAN: Would you say that's a fair characterization?
HELMS: Sure.
NEWMAN: Again, this is a problem.
HELMS: I don't quite understand. What is your problem?
NEWMAN: The problem is that the Agency never admitted to knowing that he was in the Cuban Consulate until after the assassination, after 22 November. That is the problem, sir.
HELMS: I think probably the answer is that they didn't want to blow their source.
NEWMAN: Well, that may be and I appreciate candor in this matter.
HELMS: Sure.
Clearly we have a deepening chasm under the Agency's denial that it knew of Oswald's visit to the Cuban Consulate. Denials of preassassination knowledge about Oswald fit the general pattern of missing pieces in the CIA October 9 and 10 cables. There have been some disturbing reports about the lengths to which the Agency went in order to pretend it did not know this information until after the assassination.
"CIA Withheld Data on Oswald, Assassination Panel Report," said a Los Angeles Times headline over a story by reporter Norman Kempster. The article contained this passage:
Chief Counsel Richard A. Sprague said that the committee staff had learned that a CIA message describing Oswald's activities in Mexico to federal agencies such as the FBI had been rewritten to eliminate any mention of his request for Cuban and Soviet visas. The message was sent in October, more than a month before the assassination.
Sprague added, in a press conference, that "it was impossible without more information to know why the CIA had censored its own message." The name of the internal CIA component that drafted this cable to the State, FBI and Navy is still classified.
If Sprague's claims are right, there is no telling how many more levels there are in the story of Oswald and the CIA. This alteration of the cable, if it occurred, would be just one more example to add to those we have already discussed, of how the Cuban details about Oswald's escapades were deliberately excised from key places in the CIA cables while being simultaneously entered into the Agency's "smoking file" on Oswald: 100-300-11. The CIA has released to the public a list of documents from their 100-300-11 file. It has been stripped clean of the Oswald reports that were maintained in it during the eight weeks before the president's murder.
As previously mentioned, one other thing the CIA denies knowing about before the assassination was that Kostikov was KGB department thirteen (assassination). It would be an incredible travesty if the CIA knew that Oswald had been linked to a KGB assassination officer and had failed to inform the FBI, which had been sending the Agency reports on Oswald since 1960. But the fact is that the CIA was withholding its anti-Cuban operations in Mexico City from the FBI. Had the CIA shared all it knew about Oswald in Mexico City with the FBI, John Kennedy might be alive today. That, tragically, was part of the smoke rising from the Oswald files on November 22, 1963.
# CHAPTER TWENTY
# Conclusion: Beginning
The JFK murder case cannot be truly closed before it has been genuinely opened. It was a tribute to the insanity that has surrounded this subject when, in the fall of 1993, the American national media leveled inordinate praise on a book whose author was attempting to close the case just as the government's files were being opened. That opening was created by the passage of the JFK Records Act in 1992, a law that mandates that the American government must make available all its information on this case.
Three years and two million pages later, there is much that remains closed. Like a huge oil spill, a glut of black "redactions" is still strewn across the pages that have been released. The real opening of this case is in its early stages. But we have finally arrived at the beginning.
For more than three decades the rules for how the case has been presented in the national media were these: The government has the facts, citizens who do not believe the official version of events guess and make mistakes, and the apologists for the official version poke fun at the people who venture their guesses. That game is finished. The rules have changed. The law is now on the side of our right to know as much of the truth about this case as does the government. The only guessing-game left is how much damage to the national psyche has been inflicted in the futile attempt to keep the truth hidden.
The threat to the Constitution posed by the post—World War II evolution of the unbridled power and sometimes lawless conduct of the intelligence agencies is grave. The level of public confidence in American government is now at a crisis stage. The moment that the JFK Records Act was passed in 1992, the Kennedy case became a test for American democracy. It is no longer a matter of whether American institutions were subverted in 1963 and 1964, but whether they can function today.
For this reason, adherents on both sides of the Kennedy assassination debate would do well to keep their eyes on the work of the intelligence agencies and the Review Board. If excuses begin to build, and the exceptions game begins anew, a golden opportunity to reverse this country's slide into cynicism will be lost. The interests of neither side in the debate are served by that outcome. No intelligence source or method can be weighed on the same scale as the trust of the people in their institutions. That this state of distrust has persisted and has been allowed to fester is as tragic as the assassination. It is an unhealed wound on the American body politic.
The purpose of this book is to carry out an examination of the internal records on Oswald in light of the newly released materials. The attempts to resolve the continuing riddles and mysteries of the Oswald files offered here are first impressions. They may change as new information comes to light. It is safe to state now, however, that American intelligence agencies were far more interested in Oswald than the public has been led to believe. Let us review the broad outlines that emerge from our journey through the labyrinth of Oswald's files.
# Oswald's Defection to the Soviet Union
Our story has a strange beginning: Oswald's defection, which may have been rehearsed with the help of "unknown" parties, included an explicit threat to give up radar data to the Soviet Union. The dogs did not bark, however, in the United States. Especially at the CIA, where a personality file at headquarters—called a "201" file—should have been opened as a counterintelligence measure, but was not. Fourteen months later, when a 201 was finally opened on Oswald, the Agency's explicit reason for doing so was that he was a defector, a condition that had been explicit from the beginning. Oswald's 1959 defection tripped, not the 201, but the HT/LINGUAL alarm. The CIA's mole-hunters placed Oswald on the supersensitive Lingual Watch List of three hundred persons whose mail was to be secretly opened. Thus the evidence proves that Oswald was of "particular interest" to the CIA a year before his 201 file was opened, rendering the concomitant absence of a 201 file a deliberate act, and not an oversight.
This combination of being on the Watch List without a 201 file makes Oswald special. Perhaps not unique, but certainly peculiar. It was as if someone wanted Oswald watched quietly. The Agency component most likely to have an interest in Oswald, the Soviet Russia Division, was not shown any of the State Department, Navy, or other documents pertaining to Oswald in the first half year after his defection. The incoming material went to either Oswald's soft file at CI/SIG, the mole-hunting unit, or into his file 351-164 in the Security Office. The backdrop for this configuration of Oswald's files was the hunt that had been launched as a result of Popov's 1958 tip that the U-2 program had been betrayed by a mole. Popov's subsequent betrayal, and his arrest—ironically, on the day that Oswald arrived in Moscow—was taken as an indication that the mole was inside the Soviet Russia Division.
Even without knowing what we now do about the chronology of Angleton's mole-hunt, the anomalies surrounding Oswald's early CIA files encourage speculation about whether or not U.S. intelligence had a hand in Oswald's defection. In the Lingual files we encounter evidence that a Soviet man in contact with Oswald at the time of his defection, Leo Setyaev, was translating forms concerning defection to the Soviet Union. At the very least, the way in which Oswald-related information was handled was part of an operation to search out the suspect mole. There is limited evidence that suggests that an Agency counterintelligence operation made use of Oswald's defection.
In the FBI, where a conscious decision was made to open a counterintelligence file, something equally strange happened. Oswald's mother tried to wire Oswald money, tripping a "funds transmitted to Russia" buzzer in the New York FBI office which triggered an FBI investigation into Oswald in Dallas. Yet the information developed by this probe was not filed in Oswald's counterintelligence file at FBI headquarters, but put into a separate location under a domestic security file. This file cross-references into some earlier espionage files at headquarters, at the Washington field office, and at the New York FBI office.
The "funds transmitted" file that produced a major report by Special Agent Fain in May 1960 was to become the first external document circulated within the Soviet Russia Division at the CIA. This event may have triggered the opening of the Oswald soft file which was maintained in the Soviet Realities section of the Soviet Russia Division. The FBI belatedly turned over the Fain report to the Warren Commission, which published it with the Dallas file number still visible. The current release of FBI files on Oswald thus arouses our curiosity. The 105-976 (Dallas), 100-353496 and 65-28939 (Bureau), 105-6103 and 65-6315 (New York), and 65-1762 (Washington field office) files have not been released to the public. This is not satisfactory. Again, if these documents were released (in almost completely redacted form) as JFK documents in 1978, why are they not still JFK documents in 1994? All of the pertinent sections of these files must be opened. Without them we do not have the full FBI story on Oswald.
# Coming Home
If we have learned nothing else about the files on Oswald maintained by the FBI and CIA in the year after his defection, it is how scattered the pieces were. The bifurcation of early Oswald material within the FBI continued into 1961, and there are hints of it up to the spring of 1963. A 201 file at the CIA from the beginning would have united many of the disparate threads on Oswald. Within the Agency, 1960 witnessed the incremental involvement of the Soviet Russia Division, a trend that continued into 1961 and 1962.
Oswald's decision to come home stimulated the paper trail on his activities during the first half of 1961. This trail takes us down several paths at once—some familiar and some new. A channel opened between the Navy Intelligence field office at Algiers, Louisiana, and the Dallas FBI field office. Lateral activity picked up between the FBI field offices in Dallas and New Orleans, and, after an internal struggle, the Washington field office as well.
During the eighteen-month lag between Oswald's decision to return home and his arrival in June 1962, the most sensitive CIA program used to collect information on Oswald, the HT/LINGUAL program, produced the most enigmatic results. The new release of JFK documents in 1993 and 1994 has turned up a better copy of HT/LINGUAL index card that offers, for the first time, a clear view of a handwritten note that reads: "Delete 15/3/60." This means Oswald was deleted from HT/LINGUAL coverage on March 15, 1960. Oswald's name was thus not on the Watch List when his mother's letter to him was opened by the CIA in July 1961. Stranger still are these two facts: 1) CI/SIG's Ann Egerter put Oswald's name back on the list on August 7, 1961, and 2) the Agency claims it did not discover the July 1961 mail intercept for another year. Putting these pieces together, we have a situation in which the CIA opened Oswald's mail when he was not on the list and then couldn't find the letter after they put him back on the list.
All these apparent anomalies leave one wondering about the competence of the CIA. But more important, we have to start asking where the incompetence factor is a cover to protect sensitive sources.
The FBI was prepared to grill Oswald upon his return to the United States. FBI headquarters directed the Dallas office to "thoroughly" interview Oswald "immediately upon his arrival," to find out if he had been recruited by the KGB or had made any deals with the Soviets in order to obtain their permission to return to the U.S. with his wife and child. Amazingly, the report of the FBI interview with Oswald, after it occurred on June 26, 1962, was not sent to the CIA. This was the moment that the FBI, the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), and the State Department had all been waiting for, and all got their copies of the interview by special agents Tom Carter and John Fain. The handwritten dissemination list neglected to add CIA.
The CIA missed an important interview. Oswald was arrogant, intemperate, and impatient, and declined to answer many of the questions. The FBI's standing instructions to the interviewing agents covered this possibility: They were to request that Oswald submit to a polygraph, which they did. Oswald refused. Oswald was particularly evasive about his reasons for having defected to the Soviet Union in the first place. In the FBI accounts of the interview he made an angry "show of temper" and engaged in a shouting match with Special Agent Fain, at which point "Fain and Oswald nearly squared off right there in Fain's office."
A second interview in August 1962, Fain claimed, was relatively successful. Significantly, unlike the first interview, this one was sent to the CIA. In the second interview, Oswald lied about his attempt to renounce his U.S. citizenship and affirm allegiance to the Soviet Union, lied about his offer of military information to the Soviets, complained about his travails in returning home with his family, refused to answer why he had gone to the Soviet Union in the first place. He said it was "nobody's business" and that it was for his "own personal reasons." He said, "I went, and I came back!" Thus Oswald provided little new to enable the FBI to determine his motives. He acknowledged but did not answer the question about having different values from those of his mother, still declined to give names of relatives in the U.S.S.R., still denied making any "deals," discounted the idea of Soviet intelligence interest in his activities, and said no one ever attempted to recruit him or elicit any secret information.
Oswald did admit to having been interviewed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, but nothing in the FBI report of this interview could be considered sufficient to rule out his potential recruitment by the KGB. If we are to believe that the FBI was then or is now satisfied that this interview produced enough data to obviate a possible hostile intelligence connection, the appropriate committees on Capitol Hill may want to ask a few questions. In light of the Aldrich Ames spy case, the CIA might have some friendly advice for the FBI.
FBI director Kelley said this of the second interview: "Oswald, though much more placid this time, still evaded as many questions as he could." But, strangely, Agent Fain and "officials at FBI headquarters" were satisfied that Oswald was not a security risk and, therefore, "recommended that his file be placed in an inactive status." The inactive status lasted from late August through October, when Special Agent John Fain retired and Oswald's file was officially closed, even though information on Oswald's communist mail activities had already begun flowing into it. Strangely, these new additions to Oswald's FBI files did not find a receptive audience, and the FBI simply closed the file. Kelley acknowledges that the FBI knew in July 1962 that Oswald had sought information about Russian newspapers and periodicals from the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C., and knew in October that Oswald had "renewed his subscription to the Worker, the U.S. Communist Party newspaper." The Oswald case as of October 1962, Kelley says, "was regarded as merely routine, unworthy of any further consideration."
Oswald, a known redefector married to a Soviet citizen, proved contentious and untruthful in a "thorough" interview ordered by FBI headquarters. The FBI agents who conducted the interviews did not believe Oswald's story. The second interview was, at best, inconclusive, and Fain's reasons for not considering Oswald a threat—as described by FBI Director Kelley—took no account of what the FBI had already learned about his mail activities. Moreover, these activities were new, and had taken place since the first interview. Oswald had hidden them during the second interview. At this point Fain could more easily have argued for aggressively pursuing the case. Oswald's performance during the interviews and in the U.S. mail were not "routine." Neither was closing his file.
In October 1962 Hosty was given the assignment of reopening Marina Oswald's file, but his instructions did not allow him to interview her for six months, which meant he was not to contact her until March 1963. So, with Marina's case open and Oswald's case closed, Oswald corresponded with a cavalcade of left wing and communist organizations, while Marina stayed in the house. March 1963 arrived and it was time for Hosty's talk. He had just learned of Oswald's address, but when he arrived, the apartment manager said that the wife-beating Oswald had moved. Hosty now recommended that Oswald's case be reopened. It was, on March 26.
The reason Hosty gave for reopening the file was that Oswald subscribed to a communist newspaper. This is extremely odd. When the Dallas FBI office had previously learned of Oswald's subscription to the same paper, they had closed his file. Moreover, in an act that was beginning to look like a pattern, Hosty decided that the violent Oswald might have caused a situation not conducive to an interview. Therefore, Hosty, "jotted a note in his file to come back in forty-five to sixty days." As we know, by that time Oswald had skipped town to embark upon the perilous journey that would end in his murder as well as the president's seven months later.
# Oswald's Cuban Escapades
It was Oswald's Fair Play for Cuba Committee that led to the "smoking file" described in Chapter Nineteen. His FPCC activities set off alarm bells at the FBI and its field offices in Washington, New York, New Orleans, and Dallas, and at the CIA. Both organizations had long been actively involved in operations against the FPCC. Just as the Soviet Realities Branch at the CIA had earlier developed an operational interest in Oswald. It is difficult to proceed with certainty because the public record contains cover stories. All we can say for sure is that the Special Affairs Staff, the location for anti-Cuban operations, was discussing (with the FBI) an operation to discredit the FPCC in a foreign country at the time of Oswald's visit to Mexico, and that the CIA has been denying what it knew about Oswald's Cuban activities ever since.
The record of Oswald's stay in New Orleans, May to September 1963, is replete with mistakes, coincidences, and other anomalies. As Oswald engaged in pro-Castro and anti-Castro activities, the FBI says they lost track of him. The Army was monitoring his activities and says it destroyed their reports. The record of his propaganda operations in New Orleans published by the Warren Commission turned out to have been deliberately falsified. A surprising number the characters in Oswald's New Orleans episode turned out to be informants or contract agents of the CIA. The FBI jailhouse interview with Oswald, which focused on the FPCC, was suppressed until after Oswald returned from Mexico.
The story after Oswald's return from Mexico becomes even murkier. The CIA claims it did not know Oswald had visited the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City until after the assassination. Something else they also claim not to have known until after the assassination was the fact that Kostikov, a Soviet official with whom Oswald spoke during his visit, worked for the KGB assassination department. In pursuing the Cuban Consulate and Kostikov questions, the Review Board may consider using its powers, including its power to subpoena records and witnesses and, if necessary, to grant them immunity (section 7-J of the Records Act). If the CIA did know Kostikov's connection to assassination before November 22, the public needs to know the details. All of them.
What about the Cuban Consulate cover story? Why was it considered so sensitive if the CIA knew, before November 22, that Oswald had visited the consulate in Mexico City? We noted Helms's explanation that it was to cover the Agency's sources there. Was it erected to cover something more troubling that the CIA knew about Oswald? There have long been rumors in the media that during his Cuban Consulate visit Oswald had threatened to kill Kennedy. FBI director Hoover informed the Warren Commission that Castro told this privately to the Bureau's "Solo" source, but this was withheld from the public. Solo's file was released in early 1995 by the National Archives, and there are enough clues in the release to suggest what the research community has long suspected: The Solo source was probably Morris Childs.
The files show that Childs repeated Castro's statement about the Oswald threat to the FBI. Hoover's replacement as FBI director, Clarence Kelley, believed that Oswald made such a threat. In 1987, Kelley wrote about it in his book, in effect declassifying the substance of the Hoover letter. Cuban Consulate employees such as Azcue and Duran claim they heard no such threat, and so it remains a mystery. The question is this: Did the CIA know of an Oswald threat against Kennedy? Castro told Childs that he had received the story from "our diplomats." When was this? Which diplomats? How was it communicated to Havana?
The answers to these questions would help us to find out if, before the assassination, the CIA learned of a threat to the president made by Oswald which it did not pass on to the FBI. This point has to be resolved. It is too important to put off for ten or twenty more years to protect sources and methods. It is also the kind of question that in order for the answers to be believable requires all the documents and all the details. Without exception.
Consider the following claim made by FBI director Kelley:
It was known at the time by members of the United States intelligence community, including the Central Intelligence Agency headquarters, and the FBI's Soviet espionage section—but not by the Dallas or New Orleans field offices (thus not by Agent Hosty)—that Oswald spoke with Valery Vladimirovitch Kostikov at the Russian Embassy in Mexico City.
The importance of Kostikov cannot be overstated. As Jim Hosty wrote later: "Kostikov was the officer-in-charge for Western Hemisphere terrorist activities—including and especially assassination. In military ranking he would have been a one-star general. As the Russians would say, he was their Line V man—the most dangerous KGB terrorist assigned to this hemisphere!"
And yet, due to "the tangle of red tape," says Kelley, Hosty did not learn about the Oswald-Kostikov contact until the end of October. Even then Kostikov was identified only as a vice-consul. "No mention was made of Oswald's visit to the Cuban Embassy. Worse yet, no identification of Kostikov as a high-ranking assassination specialist was given to New Orleans. Or to Agent Hosty."
Kelley is convinced that during his visit to the Cuban Consulate, Oswald "definitely offered to kill President Kennedy." Although he does not say it explicitly, Kelley seems to be hinting that the CIA knew this and did not inform the FBI. He said the "Solo" source on Castro "verified that Oswald had offered to kill the American President," language that suggests that there was another source before Castro's comments. It is time to remove the ambiguity from this discussion. The question is: Did the CIA learn in October 1963 and fail to share with the FBI information indicating that Oswald had met with a KGB assassination specialist and may have threatened to assassinate Kennedy?
That question needs to be answered. We know that when the Protective Research Section of the Secret Service put together their list of dangerous persons in the Dallas—Fort Worth area, Oswald's name was not on it. We need a fuller discussion of why it was not, but such a discussion seems pointless without first putting all the facts on the table. The potential magnitude of the problem and the possible corrective measures that may be indicated are too important to put off until the next century.
The foregoing is only a first look at the internal record of Oswald since the government began releasing files in accordance with the JFK Assassination Records Act. Of the many riddles we have attempted to solve in this book, the Dealey Plaza puzzle is not among them. The author lacks the requisite skills in ballistics, forensic pathology, photo and imagery interpretation, and criminal psychology, to name but a few. We need fewer studies that claim to have all the answers and more that focus on specific areas and are built on firm robust evidentiary foundations. The fact that the public has made several inaccurate guesses does not mean that their suspicions about the Warren Commission conclusions are not justified.
# What Does This Do for the Case?
The CIA was far more interested in Oswald than they have ever admitted to publicly. At some time before the Kennedy assassination, the Cuban affairs offices at the CIA developed a keen operational interest in him. Oswald's visit to Mexico City may have had some connection to the CIA or FBI. It appears that the Mexico City station wrapped its own operation around Oswald's consular visits there. Whether or not Oswald understood what was going on is less clear than the probability that something operational was happening in conjunction with his visit.
While we are unclear on the precise reasons for the CIA's pre-assassination withholding of information on Oswald, we have yet to find documentary evidence for an institutional plot in the CIA to murder the president. The facts do not compel such a conclusion. If there had been such a plot, many of the documents we are reading—such as the CIA cables to Mexico City, the FBI, State, and Navy—would never have been created. However, the facts may well fit into other scenarios, such as the "renegade faction" hypothesis. Oswald appears—from the perspective of a potential conspirator with access—to have been a tempting target for involvement because of the sensitivity of his files. It is prudent to remember when speculating about where the argument goes from here that the government and the Review Board have yet to deliver what the Records Act promised: full disclosure.
On the other hand, we can finally say with some authority that the CIA was spawning a web of deception about Oswald weeks before the president's murder, a fact that may have directly contributed to the outcome in Dallas. Is it possible that when Oswald turned up with a rifle on the president's motorcade route, the CIA found itself living in an unthinkable nightmare of its own making?
# What Price Secrecy?
It is a shame that protecting sources and methods may have contributed to the president's murder. Each day these secrets are kept from the public only does more harm. Cover stories, deceptions, and penetrations are the kinds of secrets the CIA and FBI will fight hardest to protect. Yet they are clearly the kinds of secrets whose release would signal that the promise of full disclosure has been kept.
We are reading documents that were inappropriately denied to the House of Representative investigation in 1978. Congress created the CIA, and congressional oversight is not possible without access. It is especially wrong for the CIA to withhold information when it is being investigated by Congress.
The issues raised by the past conduct of our intelligence organizations must be discussed openly. Practical, effective solutions must be found. Tangible measures must be devised and implemented that will build reasonable constraints into the system and the public's confidence with them. For example, no federal agency should ever be allowed to obstruct the course of justice in order to protect a source. This issue should not be politicized. It does not belong to the right or the left. It is one of the fundamental ethical issues of the late twentieth century. Do we have any practical means of enforcing compliance with this principle? In fact we do, and it need not cost the taxpayer a penny. We need only to add one question to the polygraph exam.d If we can rationalize using these devices in order to protect intelligence, we can use them to protect the interests of the people.
The story in these pages is a story about how a redefector from the Soviet Union became increasingly embroiled with targets of the CIA and FBI, about how he was used in New Orleans and in Mexico City, and about how, after the Kennedy assassination, history was altered to obscure these links with the president's accused murderer. It raises fundamental constitutional issues. What legal term should we use to describe the action of a government agency when it lies to a presidentially appointed investigation? Obstruction of justice? Can institutions be held accountable if the people who work for them lie to a formal congressional investigation? Is this "perjury" or "misleading Congress"? These may sound like questions for lawyers, but they are also issues for citizens. What do we do when we discover lies by a government agency thirty or forty years after the act?
The secrecy in which intelligence agencies conduct their operations has the unfavorable effect of insulating abuses from detection. So much time elapses before the facts are declassified that there is little interest left in reforming the aspects of the system that led to the abuse. As early as 1976 Henry Commager observed:
The fact is that the primary function of governmental secrecy in our time has not been to protect the nation against external enemies, but to deny the American people information essential to the functioning of democracy, to the Congress information essential to the functioning of the legislative branch, and—at times—to the president himself information which he should have to conduct his office.
A different criterion for secrecy—from the perspective of the people's need to function effectively at the ballot box—is needed. That might suggest, for example, that the basic period of classification be reduced to four or eight years, to coincide with the presidential rhythm of the national security apparatus.
Many of the political and social issues that have emerged from the history of the Kennedy assassination as a conspiracy "case" will find their resolution in years to come, when less will be at stake and American academe can discuss them safely. In the short term, there are compelling realities that must be faced. The moment the JFK Records Act was passed, we passed the point of no return. Not releasing the government's files now does more harm than good.
As diverse a people are we Americans are, we are unified by the democratic concepts we share: that ultimate power belongs with the people, and that the government cannot govern without the consent of the governed. For thirty years we have watched aghast as one lie begot another and as one half-baked solution gave way to the next, and our confidence in our institutions slowly dissipated. At the heart of this situation is a relatively new development in American history: the emergence of enormously powerful national intelligence agencies. As Commager so eloquently observed twenty years ago:
The emergence of intelligence over the past quarter-century as an almost independent branch of the executive, largely immune from either political limitations or legal controls, poses constitutional questions graver than any since the Civil War and Reconstruction. The challenges of that era threatened the integrity and survival of the Union; the challenges of the present crisis threaten the integrity of the Constitution.
The unsavory truth confronting American citizens, just as it confronts the citizens of Russia and China, is this: Unbridled power cannot reform itself. The reform of the intelligence system is something the people, not the intelligence agencies, must control.
Because the Kennedy assassination is but one instance of hiding the truth, the passage of the JFK Records Act and how honestly it works have implications for the government's records in all cases where its acts are questionable in the eyes of the people. The stakes are high, and include nothing less than the credibility of our institutions today. The present generation has the responsibility to hold the government accountable.
# Documents
This work is based primarily on documents released since 1992. Some of the documents referred to in the approximately 1,500 footnotes have been included here for convenience. Most are new. Those that are not new are less redacted versions of what was previously in the public record. All are available in the National Archives.
The documents published in this annex are generally arranged in chronological order. Some, however, have been grouped according to a particular subject. There are five such subject categories: American defectors, HT/LINGUAL materials, Fair Play for Cuba Committee handbills and associated literature, CIA Routing and Record sheets, and documents associated with Oswald's September-October 1963 trip to Mexico City.
For more information on documents, photographs, and documentary working aids, write to John Newman, P.O. Box 592, Odenton, Maryland, 21113.
# Notes
# Introduction
For those interested in pursuing particular theories about the case, more information is available from two Washington-based organizations: The Assassination Archives Research Center 918 F St. Rm. 510 NW, Washington, D.C. 20004; and the Committee on Political Assassinations, P.O. Box 722, Washington D.C. 20044-0772.
See HSCA Report, p. 196.
See HSCA Report, p. 196.
The House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA), Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations, U.S. House of Representatives (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979) pp. 199-200; hereafter referred to as HSCA Report. Here is the remainder of the section on James Wilcott:
He further testified that he was told that Oswald had been assigned a cryptonym and that Wilcott himself had unknowingly disbursed payments for Oswald's project. Although Wilcott was unable to identify the specific case officer who had initially informed him of Oswald's agency relationship, he named several employees of the post abroad with whom he believed he had subsequently discussed the allegations.
Wilcott advised the committee that after learning of the alleged Oswald connection to the CIA, he never rechecked official Agency disbursement records for evidence of the Oswald project. He explained that this was because at that time he viewed the information as mere shop talk and gave it little credence. Neither did he report the allegations to any formal investigative bodies, as he considered the information hearsay. Wilcott was unable to recall the agency cryptonym for the particular project in which Oswald had been involved, nor was he familiar with the substance of that project. In this regard, however, because project funds were disbursed on a code basis, as a disbursement officer he would not have been apprised of the substantive aspects of projects.
In an attempt to investigate Wilcott's allegations, the committee interviewed several present and former CIA employees selected on the basis of the position each had held during the years 1954-64. Among the persons interviewed were individuals whose responsibilities covered a broad spectrum of areas in the post abroad, including the chief and deputy chief of station, as well as officers in finance, registry, the Soviet Branch and counterintelligence.
None of these individuals interviewed had ever seen any documents or heard any information indicating that Oswald was an agent. This allegation was not known by any of them until it was published by critics of the Warren Commission in the late 1960's. Some of the individuals, including a chief of counterintelligence in the Soviet Branch, expressed the belief that it was possible that Oswald had been recruited by the Soviet KGB during his military tour of duty overseas, as the CIA had identified a KGB program aimed at recruiting U.S. military personnel during the period Oswald was stationed there. An intelligence analyst whom Wilcott had specifically named as having been involved in a conversation about the Oswald allegation told the committee that he was not in the post abroad at the time of the assassination. A review of this individual's office of personnel file confirmed that, in fact, he had been transferred from the post abroad to the United States in 1962.
The chief of the post abroad from 1961 to 1964 stated that had Oswald been used by the Agency he certainly would have learned about it. Similarly, almost all those persons interviewed who [p. 200] worked in the Soviet Branch of that station indicated they would have known if Oswald had, in fact, been recruited by the CIA when he was overseas. These persons expressed the opinion that, had Oswald been recruited without their knowledge, it would have been a rare exception contrary to the working policy and guidelines of the post abroad.
Based on all the evidence, the committee concluded that Wilcott's allegation was not worthy of belief.
HSCA Report, p. 197.
Even though the HSCA Report went along with the CIA's official story about Oswald, that view was not entirely shared by some HSCA researchers who were closely associated with this part of the investigation. Even a closer look at the Report leaves one with some ambiguity:
For example, personnel testified to the committee that a review of Agency files would not always indicate whether an individual was affiliated with the Agency in any capacity [p. 197]. . . . Nor was there always an independent means of verifying that all materials requested from the Agency had, in fact, been provided. Accordingly, any finding that is essentially negative in nature—such as that Lee Harvey Oswald was neither associated with the CIA in any way, nor ever in contact with that institution—should explicitly acknowledge the possibility of oversight [p. 197]. . . . One officer acknowledged the remote possibility that an individual could have been run by someone as part of a "vest pocket" (private or personal) operation without other Agency officials knowing about it. But even this possibility, as it applies to Oswald, was negated by the statement of the deputy chief of the Soviet Russia clandestine activities section. He commented that in 1963 he was involved in a review of every clandestine operation ever run in the Soviet Union, and Oswald was not involved in any of these cases [p. 198, footnote 5].
# Chapter One
Richard Snyder, interview with John Newman, February 26, 1994.
Interviews with Jean Hallett, July 8, 1994, and with Carolyn Maginnis (formerly Carolyn Hallett), also July 8, 1994. For Oswald on the "showdown," see Oswald, Historic Diary, Commission Exhibit 24, Vol. XVI, p. 96.
Ned Keenan, interview with John Newman, July 21, 1994. Keenan later became dean of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Harvard University.
Richard Snyder, interview with John Newman, February 26, 1994.
Oswald, Historic Diary, CE 24, Vol. XVI, p. 96.
Oswald, "Diary Embassy Meeting," October 31, 1959, Warren Commission, CE 101, Vol. XVI, p. 440.
Interviews with Jean Hallett, July 8, 1994, and Carolyn Maginnis (formerly Carolyn Hallett), also July 8, 1994.
Richard Snyder, interview with John Newman, February 26, 1994.
CE 909, Vol. XVIII, p. 97. Undated, the note read as follows:
I, Lee Harey [sic] Oswald, do hereby request that my present citizenship in the United States of America, be revoked.
I have entered the Soviet Union for the express purpose of appling [sic] for citizenship in the Soviet Union, through the means of naturalization.
My request for citizenship is now pending before the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.
I take these steps for political reasons. My request for the revoking of my American citizenship is made only after the longest and most serious considerations. s/Lee H. Oswald
Richard Snyder, interview with John Newman, February 26, 1994.
Oswald, Historic Diary, CE 24, Vol. XVI, p. 96.
Richard Snyder, interview with John Newman, February 26, 1994.
John McVickar, memo to Thomas Ehrlich, special assistant to the legal advisor, Department of State, April 7, 1964, CE 958, Vol. XVIII, p. 332.
Testimony of John A. McVickar, WC, Vol. V, p. 303.
See WC, Vol. XXVI, p. 156, CE 2769. Three of the most commonly used Helsinki travel agencies were investigated, and the normal visa processing time was seven to fourteen days. Oswald's took just two days.
Richard Snyder, interview with John Newman, February 26, 1994.
Oswald, Historic Diary, CE 24, Vol. XVI, p. 96.
FSD-234, pp. 1-2.
Researchers will note that the address written on the picture in Oswald's passport which appears as CE 946, Vol. XVIII, p. 161, has been excised and Robert Oswald's Davenport street address written in above the excised address. In his contemporaneous reporting of the events in 1959 to the State Department (cable 1304 and FSD 234) Snyder did not mention this. I asked Snyder in 1994 why he did not mention this address in 1959. Snyder's reply was that Oswald had probably written the Davenport address in after Snyder gave Oswald his passport back in 1961 (Newman interview with Snyder, August 21, 1994).
FSD-234, p. 2
Richard Snyder, interview with John Newman, February 26, 1994.
Richard Snyder, CE 909, Vol. XVIII, p. 101, Snyder statement, cable 1623, to State Department from American Embassy in Tokyo, November 27, 1963.
McVickar, memo to Thomas Ehrlich, November 27, 1963, WC, CE 941, p. 2., Vol. XVIII, p. 154.
FSD-234, p. 2.
John A. McVickar, June 9, 1964, testimony to WC, Vol. V, p. 301.
Richard Snyder, interview with John Newman, February 26, 1994.
Richard Snyder, interview with Scott Malone and John Newman, September 1, 1993.
Richard Snyder, interview with John Newman, February 26, 1994.
Ned Kenean, interview with John Newman, July 21, 1994.
Richard Snyder, interview with John Newman, February 26, 1994.
Oswald, Historic Diary, CE 24, Vol. XVI, p. 97.
Richard Snyder, interview with John Newman, July 4, 1994.
See Edward Jay Epstein, Legend: The Secret World of Lee Harvey Oswald (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978), p. 96. Epstein is not specific enough in his use of footnotes to pin down whether Snyder gave him the room number and Snyder does not remember.
Oswald, Historic Diary, CE 24, p. 4, Vol. XVI, p. 97.
Oswald, Historic Diary, CE 24, p. 4, Vol. XVI, p. 97.
Robert Korengold affidavit taken by Consul James A. Klenstine at the American Embassy in Moscow, September 8, 1964, CE 3098, p. 2, Vol. XXVI, p. 708.
Robert Korengold affidavit taken by Consul James A. Klenstine at the American Embassy in Moscow, September 8, 1964, CE 3098, p. 2, Vol. XXVI, p. 708.
Oswald, Historic Diary, CE 24, p. 4, Vol. XVI, p. 97.
CIA document 624-823, March 26, 1964.
Aline Mosby, interviewed by FBI in Paris, September 23, 1964; see CIA document DBA82118. Mosby had a CIA 201 number—201—252591, in which her 1964 FBI interview was filed.
Aline Mosby, CE 1385, Vol. XXII, pp. 701-710; Mosby in this recollection fails to distinguish between her two visits; the entrance and walk to Oswald's room must have been the same on both occasions, but the initial introductions must have been on her shorter, first visit.
Oswald, Historic Diary, CE 24 p. 4, Vol. XVI, p. 97.
Aline Mosby, CE 1385, Vol. XXII, pp. 701.
UPI, October 31, 1959; see FBI HQ File 105-82555-2.
UPI, October 31, 1959; see FBI HQ File 105-82555-2.
CIA internal memo, Soviet Russia Division, Counterintelligence Branch, June 4, 1964; CIA document 861-374. The document is to Cordelia [nfi] from Lee [nfi].
UPI-16, October 31, 1959; see FBI HQ file 105-82555-2.
Robert Oswald, testimony to WC, February 20, 1964, Vol. I, p. 321.
See "Tries to Keep Him from Going Red," datelined Fort Worth, but obviously from a newspaper other than the Star Telegram, this from ONI/ NIS files NARA, box 1.
NARA JFK files, State, Preassassination file, State Department cable 00081 to Moscow, November 1, 1959.
Kantor Exhibit No. 4, WC, Vol. XXII, p. 412. Kantor erroneously describes this call as taking place in "1960"—no further date is given. It is obvious that Kantor's account describes what took place on November 1, 1959, the day after Oswald's defection. Otherwise, Kantor's account seems reasonable.
Marie Cheatham memo to Richard Snyder, November 2, 1959. See WC Exhibit No. 2659, Vol. XXVI, p. 13.
Marie Cheatham memo to Richard Snyder, November 2, 1959. See WC Exhibit No. 2659, Vol. XXVI, p. 13.
See Hoover memorandum to J. Lee Rankin, May 4, 1964, WC Exhibit No. 834, p. 1, Vol. XVII, p. 804.
For the FBI list of what the Bureau says it had in their files on Oswald prior to the assassination of Kennedy, see CE 834, Vol. XVII, pp. 804-813.
FSD-234, p. 2.
McVickar, memo to Thomas Ehrlich, November 27, 1963, WC Exhibit No. 941, p. 3, Vol. XVIII, p. 155.
McVickar, memo to Thomas Ehrlich, November 27, 1963, WC Exhibit No. 941, p. 3, Vol. XVIII, p. 155.
Richard Snyder, CE 909, Vol. XVIII, p. 101, Snyder statement cable 1623 to State Department from American Embassy in Tokyo, November 27, 1963.
Richard Snyder, interview with John Newman, February 26, 1994.
Epstein, Legend, p. 96.
Testimony of John A. McVickar, WC, Vol. V, p. 301.
Testimony of Richard Snyder, WC, Vol. V, p. 265.
Richard Snyder, CE 909, Vol. XVIII, p. 101, Snyder statement, cable 1623 to State Department from American Embassy in Tokyo, November 27, 1963.
Snyder cable 1304 to State Department from American Embassy in Moscow, October 31, 1959. Snyder had later to go to Acting Charge d' Affaires Freers's apartment to get the latter's authorization, and then walk the cable back to the embassy communications center (Snyder interview with John Newman July 4, 1994). The cable left the comm center sometime that same Saturday afternoon, and therefore arrived early Saturday morning in Washington—in fact at 7:59 A.M.
Lee Harvey Oswald, letter to the American Embassy, dated November 3, 1959. See WC Exhibit No. 912, Vol. XVIII, p. 108.
Snyder letter to Oswald, dated November 6, 1959, see WC Exhibit No. 919, Vol. XVIII, p. 117. The fact that it was sent "registered return receipt" on November 9 was recorded on the bottom of the letter in handwriting.
See WC Exhibit No. 920, which is the embassy account of the letter to the State Department, in Vol. XVIII, pp. 118-119.
USNLO Moscow 2090, 1704Z, November 3, 1959, to chief of Naval Operations, routed by Hamner and checked by RE/Hediger. The other defector was Robert Edward Webster.
USNLO Moscow 2090, 1704Z, November 3, 1959, to chief of Naval Operations, see Navy copy and ONI copy. The ONI copy is distinctive because it is the only copy that shows Oswald's FBI number, 105-82555. "Hamner" may be a typographical error for "Hammer," the same Lt. J.G. Hammer who was on watch in ONI the moment that Kennedy was shot.
CNO 22257 to ALUSNA MOSCOW, 041529Z NOV 59.
# Chapter Two
Moscow embassy cable 1304 to State Department, October 31, 1959.
UPI, dateline Moscow, October 31; see NARA FBI headquarters file, 105-82555-2.
UPI, dateline Moscow, October 31; see NARA FBI headquarters file 105-82555-2. Researchers note: You must turn over the original copy in the FBI HQ file in the National Archives to see the date-time and name stamps. This practice of stamping the reverse side of documents and cover sheets was also common at the CIA.
See E. B. Reddy memo to A. H. Belmont, FBI HQ file 105-82555-2.
See E. B. Reddy memo to A. H. Belmont, FBI HQ file 105-82555-2B.
UPI, dateline Moscow, 31 October; See NARA FBI headquarters file, 105-82555-2. Researchers can also locate the UPI ticker by consulting NARA JFK Identification Form number 124-10010-10003.
Goldberg interview by the FBI, August 4, 1964; WC, Vol. XXVI, pp. 99-100. Researchers should note that Goldberg thinks he got to Oswald before Mosby that weekend; this is unlikely since, by his own story, he did not go to Oswald's room until the New York AP alerted Goldberg based on a Texas newspaper story (probably the Star Telegram). Thus, the earliest Goldberg could have seen Oswald would have been Sunday, and this is borne out by the fact that the first AP story on the event was, in fact, Sunday, November 1.
AP, New York Mirror, final edition, November 1, 1959; see also FBI New York field office file 105-38431-4. Researchers should note that the Goldberg AP story of November 1, 1959, began an erroneous account of what happened in Snyder's office on Saturday, which was later picked up (probably inadvertently) and used in internal CIA postassassination analyses. The AP story read: "A 20-year-old Texan strode into the American Embassy today, slapped down his passport on the consul's desk and said: "I have made up my mind. I'm through." This story is mirrored in Coleman-Slawson memorandum (see NARA JFK RIF 157-10002-10432) of March 6, 1964, to Lee Rankin, Chief Warren Commission Counsel, p. 4, which said Oswald "threw his passport on Snyder's desk." In fact, Oswald calmly handed his passport to receptionist Jean Hallett.
Washington Post, November 1, 1959, "Ex-Marine Asks Soviet Citizenship"; see also CD 692, p. 104; and CIA document 591-252A.
Washington Post, November 1, 1959, "Ex-Marine Asks Soviet Citizenship"; see also CD 692, p. 104; and CIA document 591-252A.
John E. Donovan testimony to the Warren Commission, May 5, 1964, Vol. VIII, p. 293.
Nelson Delgado testimony to the Warren Commission, April 16, 1964, Vol. VIII, p. 240.
J. Edgar Hoover letter to J. Lee Rankin, Warren Commission, April 6, 1964; see CE 833, Vol. XVII, p. 787.
See E. B. Reddy memo to A. H. Belmont, FBI HQ file 105-82555-2. Besides Belmont, copies were also sent to Mr. Trotter, Mr. Brannigan, and Mr. Scatterday.
Washington Post, November 1, 1959, "Ex-Marine Asks Soviet Citizenship"; see also CIA document 591-252A.
For the FBI list of what the Bureau says it had in their files on Oswald prior to the assassination of Kennedy, see CE 834, Vol. XVII, pp. 804-13.
Corpus Christi Times, October 23, 1959, "Goodbye,"; FBI headquarters file 105-82555. The placement of this article in the Oswald file might also have been a mistake: someone has written, "No—not Oswald," next to a sentence which was probably referring to another American navy defector, Robert Webster.
Conducting Research in FBI Records (Washington D.C.: Research Unit, Office of Congressional and Public Affairs, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1984), p. 14.
The next stamp after De Loach's 10:36 A.M. entry is Alan Belmont's at 3:32 P.M.
John Mayly (Church Committee) interview with Sam Papich, May 25, 1975, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) Box 265-14; see also NARA JFK RIF 157-10005-10078.
The original, CIA document 592-252B, appears to have been changed, with "Mr. Papich" having been whited out and the initials "RBI" placed in the space; see NARA JFK RIF 180-10092-10380. The real document with Papich's name was released in 1993 in the CIA's 201 file. That Papich had made the "oral" request to CIA's Counterintelligence Liaison element is recorded in the CIA 1993-released documents list.
Summers, Anthony Official and Confidential (New York: Putnam, 1993), p. 229.
ONI Op-921D1/rl, November 2, 1959, memorandum for the file by J. M. Barron, see NARA JFK RIF 124-10010-10005.
Brannigan memo to Belmont, November 4, 1959, Oswald FBI headquarters file, 105-82555-3, p. 2; see also NARA JFK RIF 124-10010-10006.
It is in paragraph 3: "Birth: 18 October 1959 at New Orleans, La. Religious Preference: Lutheran. OSWALD entered the Marine Corps at Dallas, Texas, on 24 October 1956 to serve three years. He was released to inactive duty at MACS, El Toro, California, on 11 September 1959 and has obligated service until 8 December 1962. He speaks, reads and writes Russian very poorly. His next of kin, his mother, resides at 3124 West 5th Street, Fort Worth, Texas. At the time he entered service, subject gave his address as 4936 Collinswood Street, Fort Worth, Texas. While in service, he attended the Aviation Fundamental School and completed the aircraft Control and Warning Operator's Course. Subject's record has been sent to Records Facility, Glennwood, [sic] Ill."
See E. B. Reddy memo to A. H. Belmont, FBI HQ file 105-82555-2. The handwriting appears at the end of the typed text.
ONI Op-9211D1/rl, November 2, 1959, memorandum for the file by J. M. Barron, see NARA JFK RIF 124-10010-10005.
USNLO Moscow 2090, 1704Z, November 3, 1959, to chief of Naval Operations, routed by Hamner and checked by RE/Hediger.
See E. B. Reddy memo to A. H. Belmont, FBI HQ file 105-82555-2 (see back of memo for date-time stamps).
DST 1304 from American Embassy in Moscow to State Department, October 31, 1959; for the FBI copy see FBI headquarters file 105-82555; also see NARA JFK RIF 124-10010-10004. Snyder explained his stalling tactic by referring to the recent Petrulli defection case. In this case, the embassy had successfully stalled, as the Soviets had let Petrulli languish in his hotel room without a visa and then asked him to leave. Petrulli returned to the U.S. still an American citizen.
Moscow embassy cable 1304 to State Department, October 31, 1959.
The only other words underlined were "4936 Collinwood [sic] St., Fort Worth Texas," his mother's former address and the very same one which was in Barron's ONI memo of the previous day and which someone also wrote by hand on the Reddy FBI memo.
We will revisit the problem of when the CIA received these early Oswald documents, as well as their internal handling, in Chapter 4.
Rankin's request to Helms was written on September 11, 1964, and Helms's reply was on September 18, 1964. See CE 2752, Vol. XXVI, pp. 131-132.
Lists of CIA documents for release, NARA JFK Document ID No. 1993.08.04.08:00:780053; in another location in the National Archives one can find one of these lists appended to the proper memo, entitled "Response to HSCA Request of 9 March 1978, Item 1"; see document ID No. 1993.07.02.13:25:25:180530. This second location also conveniently has a Helms memorandum to the Warren Commission of March 6, 1964, "Information in CIA's Possession Regarding Lee Harvey Oswald Prior to November 22, 1963."
USNLO Moscow 2090, 1704Z, November 3, 1959, to chief of Naval Operations, routed by Hamner and checked by RE/Hediger. Besides the FBI and CIA, this cable was also rerouted to "CMC" (Commandant Marine Corps), to "09M," and to "INS" (the Immigration and Naturalization Service). This rerouting instruction was followed by the notation "11/04/59/EW/."
CIA document 592-252B. "Mr. Papich was advised that we had no info on subject. 4 Nov. 59."
ONI Op-921D1/rl, November 2, 1959, memorandum for the file by J. M. Barron; see NARA JFK RIF 124-10010-10005.
W. A. Brannigan memo to A. H. Belmont, FBI, November 4, 1959. See FBI HQ file 105-82555; see also NARA JFK RIF 124, 10010-10006.
FBI HQ file, 105-82555-6B.
CNO cable to ALUSNA Moscow, 04/1550Z, November 1959.
John E. Donovan testimony to the Warren Commission, May 5, 1964, Vol. VIII, p. 298.
List of CIA documents for release, NARA JFK Document ID No. 1993,08.04.08:00:780053. See entry number 8.
"Response to HSCA Request of 9 March 1978, Item 1," NARA JFK files, document ID No. 1993.07.02.13:25:25:180530; see entries for October 31 and November 1, 9, 16, and 26, 1959.
CNO cable to ALUSNA Moscow, 04/1550Z, November 1959.
# Chapter Three
Samuel D. Berry, interview with John Newman, July 10, 1994.
Donald L. Athey, interview with John Newman, July 10, 1994.
Samuel D. Berry, interview with John Newman, July 10, 1994.
Donald L. Athey, interview with John Newman, July 10, 1994.
The author is indebted to Richard C. Thornton, who made available his forthcoming manuscript, "Exploring the Utility of Missile Superiority, 1958."
NARA JFK records, January 1994 ("five brown boxes") release.
CIA, DDS&T interim reply to HSCA request, May 8, 1978, OLC 78-1573.
S/A Berlin interview of Eugene J. Hobbs, March 10, 1964, NARA JFK records, NIS, Box 1.
"Memorandum for the Assistant General Counsel (Manpower), Department of Defense, Subject: Information for President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy; Your Request For," May 22, 1964, p. 4. See NARA JFK files, HSCA, RG 233. Oswald's unit traveled back aboard the Wexford County, LST 1168, arriving at Atsugi on March 18, 1958.
Epstein, Legend, pp. 72-78.
John Donovan, interview with John Newman, July 19, 1994.
John Donovan, interview with John Newman, July 19, 1994. See also CD 6, p. 138.
John Donovan, interview with John Newman, July 19, 1994.
John Donovan, interview with John Newman, July 19, 1994.
Possibly to demonstrate that Khrushchev would not aid China in a confrontation with the U.S.
Epstein, Legend, p. 101.
Epstein, Legend, p. 101.
For a different interpretation, see Mark Lane "The Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: How the CIA set up Oswald" in Hustler, October 1978, p. 94.
John Donovan, interview with John Newman, July 19, 1994.
Mark Lane in "The Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: How the CIA Set up Oswald" Hustler, October 1978, p. 94.
O'Neal refused to answer any questions at all. To their credit, most all former CIA employees have at least been kind enough to grant interviews.
FSD 234, November 2, 1959; received November 6 at the State Department. We know it was in the FBI by at least November 12 because of an FBI date stamp on the ONI copy (see also FBI HQ file 105 82555-4).
Lists of CIA documents for release, NARA JFK Document ID No. 1993.08.04.08:00:780053. See entry number 8.
Lists of CIA documents for release, NARA JFK Document ID No. 1993.08.04.08:00:780053. See entry number 8.
John Donovan, quoted in "Oswald in Russia: Did He Tell Our Military Secrets?" New York Journal American, December 2, 1963. See also NARA FBI New York Field Office file 105-38431, and NARA JFK RIF 124-10160-10438.
S/A Berlin interview of Eugene J. Hobbs, March 10, 1964, NARA JFK records, NIS, Box 1.
CIA, DDS&T interim reply to HSCA request, May 8, 1978, OLC 78-1573. See NARA JFK records, January 1994 release.
Allen Dulles, The Craft of Intelligence (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), p. 58.
Richard C. Thornton, Chapter IV, "Exploring the Utility of Missile Superiority, 1958," forthcoming manuscript.
Charles J. Murphy, "The Embattled Mr. McElroy," Fortune, April 1959, p. 242.
McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York: Random House, 1988), pp. 343, 350.
Eisenhower speech to the U.N. emergency session of the General Assembly, August 13, 1958; see Eisenhower, Public Papers, 1958, p. 607.
Richard C. Thornton, Chapter IV, "Exploring the Utility of Missile Superiority, 1958," forthcoming manuscript.
Charles J. Murphy, "Khrushchev's Paper Bear," Fortune, December 1964, p. 227.
Francis G. Powers, Operation Overflight (New York: Tower, 1970, p. 364.
John Donovan, quoted in "Oswald Was a Troublemaker," Washington Evening Star, December 2, 1963. See also NARA JFK records, NIS, box 1.
John Donovan, quoted in "Oswald in Russia: Did He Tell Our Military Secrets?" New York Journal American, December 2, 1963. See also NARA FBI New York Field Office file 105-38431, and NARA JFK RIF 124-10160-10438.
John Donovan, quoted in "Oswald Was a Troublemaker," Washington Evening Star December 2, 1963. See also NARA JFK records, NIS, box 1.
Testimony of John E. Donovan to the Warren Commission, May 5, 1964, Vol. VIII, p. 297.
Testimony of John E. Donovan to the Warren Commission, May 5, 1964; Vol. VIII, p. 297.
CIA memo, name of drafter still classified, December 1, 1963, re telephone call of John E. Donovan. See NARA JFK files, 1993 release.
CIA memo, name of drafter still classified, December 1, 1963, re telephone call of John E. Donovan. See NARA JFK files, 1993 release.
John Donovan, interview with John Newman, July 19, 1994.
N. V. Schultz, ONI-921D4F, "Memorandum for the File," December 3, 1963; NARA JFK files, NIS/ONI, box 1.
John Donovan, interview with John Newman, July 19, 1994.
Norman Mailer, Oswald's Tale, extract printed in New Yorker, April 10, 1995, p. 60.
# Chapter Four
See HSCA Final Report, p. 200.
See CIA Clandestine Services Handbook, 43-1-1, February 15, 1960, Chapter III, Annex B, "PERSONALITIES—201 and IDN NUMBERS," p. 43; NARA JFK Files, January 1994 release, box 13, folder 29.
In a later chapter which deals with the end of 1960, we will revisit the 201 issue and attempt to solve the riddle of the late opening.
Dan Hardaway notes on conversation with Ann Egerter, March 21, 1978. See NARA JFK Files, RIF 180-10089-10462.
See HSCA Final Report, note 27, p. 628, and note 29, p. 629. These notes reference "JFK Classified Document 014863," pp. 5 and 48.
See HSCA Final Report, p. 201 (a propitious page number for this subject!).
See HSCA Final Report, p. 202.
Helms deposition to the HSCA, September 25, 1978. See, NARA JFK Files, 1993 release.
See HSCA Final Report, p. 200.
See HSCA Final Report, notes 29 and 35, p. 629. The HSCA refers in note 29 to a "classified staff summary re opening of Oswald's 201 file, December 15, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (Classified JFK Document 014839)." In note 35 the HSCA also refers to "HSCA requests for explanations," March 20, 1979, p. 4226 (JFK Document 015018).
See HSCA Final Report, p. 201.
The superstitious will be amused at how fitting it seems, in retrospect, that the story of Oswald's threat to give the Soviets "something of special interest" arrived at the CIA on Friday the 13th.
See HT/LINGUAL notecards on Oswald in NARA JFK Files, Oswald 201 file, preassassination folder. It is the first card, dated November 9, 1959.
CIA "Response to HSCA Request of 15 August 1978, Item 3," in NARA JFK files, January 1994 release. This document has moved about in the five big brown boxes which comprise the January 1994 release, but its approximate original location in the larger collection might have been in or near box 11, folder 10. Researchers who have trouble locating it can also obtain a copy from the Assassination Archives Research Center (AARC), 915 F. Street, N.W., Suite 510, Washington D.C., 20014.
CIA "Response to HSCA Request of 15 August 1978, Item 3," in NARA JFK Files, January 1994 release.
There is a conflict, however, with the 12-451 on Marina's November 26, 1963, HT/LINGUAL card, although the number "4" is somewhat indistinct.
Our view of that file is the result of the CIA document lists on Lee Harvey Oswald, prepared by the Agency for the 1978 House Select Committee on Assassination investigation.
October 31, 1959. It was also Saturday, and Halloween.
CIA response to HSCA, March 9, 1978; Oswald documents lists; NARA, JFK files, RIF 1993.07.02.13:25:25:180530.
Robert L. Bannerman, interview with John Newman, August 8, 1994.
CIA response to HSCA, March 9, 1978; Oswald documents lists; NARA, JFK files, RIF 1993.07.02.13:25:25:180530.
Paul Garbler, interview with John Newman January 30, 1994.
# Chapter Five
Richard Snyder, interview with John Newman, July 15, 1994.
Priscilla Johnson McMillan's (hereafter referred to as Priscilla McMillan) CIA files were released in January 1994 in what I refer to as the "five brown boxes" release. They are both at the National Archives and the AARC. For this item see CIA cable, Director Cite 16955, dated April 10, 1958, to a station whose name is blacked out but is probably its station in Paris. This we may surmise from the information line which has WE [Western Europe]/4 in it—so we know it is probably to a station in Western Europe—and also because Priscilla was in Paris at the time. The headquarters cable also references a cable, probably from Paris, number 37145.
The processing of Priscilla McMillan's application was long and convoluted, but, given the controversy surrounding her history and the JFK case, it is appropriate to set down the details chronologically here. All documents are located in the CIA January 1994 "5 brown boxes" release. On October 3, 1952, a request was submitted for a security clearance as an "Intelligence Officer, GS-7," to work in OSO, SR division. On January 21, 1953, this was changed to a request for a security clearance to work as an "Intelligence Officer, GS-7," in Operations, FDD Division, USSR Branch. A March 10, 1964, CIA document says that "Johnson was security disapproved for staff employment in 1953 based upon her questionable associates, her activities in the United World Federalists and the League for Industrial Democracy." But that is not quite the way it happened. Actually, on February 10, 1963, a "Cancellation of Applicant Processing" was put in her file because of "declination by applicant" on January 21, 1953. But the CIA continued to process her security investigation. This is evident from a February 17, 1953, memo from W. A. Osborne to Chief, Security Division, saying Johnson "is now being considered for employment in ORR, where she will need SI clearances." Osborne, who was the chief of the Security Branch, noted that "she's active politically (i.e. interested in domestic and international politics) but is not and has not been tied in with subversive groups." Osborne continued. "While a member of UWF, she does not appear to be objectionably internationalistic." Osborne concluded: "Recommend approval." One week later, on February 24, 1953, the Project and Liaison Section sent a memo on Johnson (identifying her CIA number as 71589) to Deputy Chief, Security Division, requesting that her "case be reviewed from a CE [counterespionage] aspect." On the same day, Bruce L. Solie responded that Johnson had "declined employment on 21 January 1953" and was "no longer an applicant." A formal cancellation had been put in her file on February 10, he said, and therefore "it is not believed there is any CE interest in subject case." Then, on March 23, 1953, our same W. A. Osborne evidently had a eureka experience, because he suddenly changed his mind about Johnson. In a memo to the security officer Sheffield Edwards, Osborne said:
The most serious question raised by investigation and research is that of her associates. It is felt that these associations being considered in the light of her activities in the United World Federalists, her attendance at questionable schools and her activities in the League for Industrial Democracy raise a question regarding her eligibility which should be resolved in favor of the Agency. It is, therefore, recommended that she be disapproved.
On April 13, Sheffield Edwards followed this recommendation and wrote "security disapproved" below Osborne's signature. A handwritten note by Mr. O'Rourke at the bottom of the memo said, "Advised Mr. [name redacted], PPD, X+[telephone] 3439, that subject has been disapproved. No written notice is required, as no official action is pending." O'Rourke added something that gives a clue to Osborne's reversal: "Above decision was rendered on a verbal request for it."
Priscilla McMillan, interview with John Newman, July 15, 1994.
See NARA JFK files, January 1994 "five brown boxes" set for "approval request," from Chief, CI/Operational Approval and Support Division, to the deputy director for security, Attn: Mr. Rice, August 8, 1956. Johnson's CIA number was given as 52373. In the remarks section is written: "Please withhold [two to three words redacted] pending favorable assessment. When appropriate, CSN 10-27 memo will be submitted."
See NARA JFK files, January 1994 "five brown boxes" release, memo dated August 23, 1956, for the signature of Robert A. Cunningham (someone whose initials might be VAS possibly signed for him) from the deputy director of security, Investigation and Support, to CI/Operational Approvals, referencing the August 8 request for Security Office and FBI record checks on C-52373, #P-276, Priscilla Johnson.
See NARA JFK files, January 1994 "five brown boxes" release, CIA Form 937, January 25, 1957, from SR/10, telephone extension 8352 to Chief, CI/OA on C-52373 (Priscilla Johnson).
Strangely, neither Priscilla has the middle initial R.
Priscilla McMillan, interview with John Newman, July 15, 1994.
Priscilla McMillan, interview with John Newman, July 15, 1994.
NARA JFK files, CIA January 1994 "five brown boxes" release. They are both at the National Archives and the AARC. For this item see CIA cable, Director Cite 16955, dated April 10, 1958, to a station whose name is blacked out but, as stated above (see footnote 2), this cable was probably sent to the CIA's station in Paris.
Priscilla McMillan, interview with John Newman, July 15, 1994.
See NARA JFK files, 1994 "five brown boxes" release, "Request for Cancellation of Approval," from Chief, CI/OA to deputy director for security, attn: Mr. Grignon, on C-70300. We know this was Johnson because of a later March 10, 1964, document (same location in NARA JFK files), which stated:
4. Priscilla Johnson, #71589, was proposed for clearance as [one half line redacted] on 6 May 1958. A summary of derogatory information was furnished [one to two words redacted] and the request for clearance was canceled according to [one to two words redacted] memorandum date 27 June 1958. Johnson's biographic data reflects that from December 1955 to April 1956 she worked in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow as an employee of the Joint Press Reading Service (although other sources show employment variously as "freelance" translator, U.S. Embassy; North American Newspaper Alliance; New York Times) and during 1958 to 1960 she was employed in the U.S.S.R. by the North American Newspaper Alliance (NANA). Years later, rumors would surface that NANA was associated with the CIA. NANA was run by Ernie Cuneo and Priscilla's editor was Sydney Goldberg. Priscilla had no inkling of any NANA-CIA relationship at the time. Today she too has heard such rumors.
See NARA JFK files, 1994 "five brown boxes" release, June 6, 1958, internal CIA handwritten memo on SO #71589 by unidentified author.
See NARA JFK files, 1994 "five brown boxes" release, memo dated March 10, 1964, from deputy chief, Security Research Staff, Office of Security, to deputy director of security.
See NARA JFK files, 1994 "five brown boxes" release, CIA form 937, dated August 28, 1958, on C-52373 #P-276 (Priscilla Johnson) from SR/ 10 to chief, CI/OA. In the space "Reason for Cancellation," it has: "SR/ 10 has no further interest in subject. Please cancel."
"Notes of an Interview of Lee Harvey Oswald Conducted by Aline Mosby in Moscow in November in 1959"; see CE 1385, Vol. XXII, pp. 701-710. Again, researchers must cope with Mosby's account running together the first, shorter October 31 visit, and the longer November 13 visit. My own method was to cull out that material which appears to be what would happen when two people see each other for the very first time and treat it as the October 31 visit, and to treat all the rest as pertaining to the November 13 visit.
Robert Korengold statement for the Warren Commission, taken in Moscow by Richard A. Frank, September 14, 1964; see CE 3098, Vol. XXVI, pp. 707-708.
"Notes of an Interview of Lee Harvey Oswald Conducted by Aline Mosby in Moscow in November in 1959"; see CE 1385, Vol. XXII, pp. 701-710. For a number of reasons, not the least of which is that Mosby's notes fail to distinguish between her first and second visits to Oswald's room at the Metropole, Korengold's version seems more likely to approximate what really happened.
Albert Newman, The Assassination of John F. Kennedy: the Reasons Why (New York: Clarkson N. Potter, Inc., 1970), p. 183. See also Slawson and Priscilla Johnson's comments during the latter's testimony to the Warren Commission, Vol. XI, p. 457.
FSD-234, p. 2
"Notes of an Interview of Lee Harvey Oswald Conducted by Aline Mosby in Moscow in November in 1959"; see CE 1385, Vol. XXII, pp. 701-710.
FSD-234, p. 2.
"Notes of an Interview of Lee Harvey Oswald Conducted by Aline Mosby in Moscow in November in 1959"; see CE 1385, Vol. XXII, pp. 701-710.
Priscilla McMillan, interview with John Newman, July 14, 1994.
See Priscilla McMillan testimony to the Warren Commission, July 25, 1974, Vol. XI, p. 448.
See Priscilla McMillan testimony to the Warren Commission, July 25, 1974, Vol. XI, p. 450.
Testimony of Priscilla McMillan to the HSCA. The transcript is still classified. For this comment, see the final report, p. 213.
Snyder interview with John Newman, July 15, 1994.
Priscilla McMillan interview with John Newman, July 14, 1994.
"Priscilla Johnson's Recollections of Interview with Lee Harvey Oswald in Moscow, November 1959," December 5, 1963, Warren Commission, Johnson (Priscilla) Exhibit No. 5, Vol. XX, p. 294.
"Priscilla Johnson Exhibit No. 1," Warren Commission Vol. XX, p. 277.
"Priscilla Johnson Exhibit No. 1," Warren Commission Vol. XX, p. 278; in Priscilla's 1963 recollection "released" had been changed to "told people."
"Priscilla Johnson's Recollections of Interview with Lee Harvey Oswald in Moscow, November 1959," December 5, 1963, Warren Commission, Johnson (Priscilla) Exhibit No. 5, Vol. XX, p. 294-295.
He incorrectly cites November 15, but, as explained earlier in this chapter, we know that this interview was on Friday, November 13.
Testimony of Priscilla Johnson, July 25, 1964, Warren Commission, Vol. XI, p. 453.
Priscilla McMillan, interviews with John Newman, July 14, 21, and 24, 1994.
Testimony of Priscilla Johnson, July 25, 1964, Warren Commission Vol. XI, pp. 453-454.
Priscilla McMillan, interview with John Newman, July 14, 1994.
It turns out there were no further interviews in any case.
# Chapter Six
"Note for Oswald File," John McVickar, November 9, 1959, WC, Vol. XVIII, CE 942, p. 156.
Marguerite and Ed Pic were divorced on June 28, 1933; see WC, Vol. XXIII, CE 1958, p. 780.
See Cable 1448, American Embassy Tokyo to American Embassy Moscow, November 9, 1959; see NARA JFK files, CIA 201 file on Oswald, boxes 1 and 2.
Richard Snyder, interview with John Newman, July 19, 1994.
Priscilla McMillan, interview with John Newman, July 14, 1994.
Richard Snyder, interview with John Newman, July 19, 1994.
Richard Snyder, interview with John Newman, July 19, 1994.
John McVickar, "Memo for the Files," dated November 17, 1959. See WC, Vol. XVIII, CE 911, pp. 106-107.
John McVickar, "Memo for the Files," dated November 17, 1959. See WC, Vol. XVIII, CE 911, pp. 106-107.
John McVickar, "Memo for the Files," dated November 17, 1959. See WC, Vol. XVIII, CE 911, pp. 106-107.
John McVickar, "Memo for the Files," dated November 17, 1959. See WC, Vol. XVIII, CE 911, pp. 106-107.
John McVickar, "Memo for the Files," dated November 17, 1959. See WC, Vol. XVIII, CE 911, pp. 106-107.
WC, Johnson (Priscilla) Exhibit No. 5, Vol. XX, p. 298.
Priscilla McMillan, interview with John Newman, July 14, 1994.
HSCA Final Report, p. 213.
Priscilla McMillan, interview with John Newman, July 15, 1994.
Priscilla McMillan, interview with John Newman, July 14, 1994.
Richard Snyder, interview with John Newman, July 19, 1994.
American Embassy cable to State Department, C-241, December 1, 1959; see NARA JFK files, CIA DDO 201 file on Oswald, box 1. See also WC, CE 921, Vol. XVIII, p. 120.
Priscilla McMillan, interview with John Newman, July 15, 1994.
Tom Mangold, Cold Warrior; James Jesus Angleton: the CIA's Master Spy Hunter (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), p. 250.
Mark Reibling, Wedge: The Secret War Between the FBI and CIA (New York: Knopf, 1994), p. 155.
Tom Mangold, Cold Warrior; James Angleton; the CIA's Master Spy Hunter (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), p. 250.
Tom Mangold, Cold Warrior; James Jesus Angleton: the CIA's Master Spy Hunter (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), pp. 249-250.
Anthony Cave Brown, Treason in the Blood: H. St. John Philby, Kim Philby, and the Spy Case of the Century (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1994), p. 553.
Mark Reibling, Wedge: The Secret War Between the FBI and CIA (New York: Knopf, 1994), p. 181.
Clare Petty interview with Dick Russell, in The Man Who Knew Too Much, (New York: Carroll & Graf, Richard Gallen, 1992), p. 470.
David Martin, Wilderness of Mirrors (New York: Harper & Row, 1980), p. 105.
# Chapter Seven
John E. Donovan testimony to the Warren Commission, May 5, 1964, Vol. VIII, p. 293.
See Fain report, May 12, 1960, p. 4; a copy may be found in WC Vol. XVII, p. 703.
See also FBI report: DL 100-10461, Fain 7/10/62, CE 823, Vol. XVII, p. 727.
Fort Worth Press, June 8, 1962. See also NARA JFK files, FBI Dallas FBI file, 100-10461-23.
"Historic Diary," CE 24, WC Vol. XVI, p. 100. The material in this section on "Alfred" in Minsk was brought to the author's attention by Professor Peter Dale Scott.
CE 32, WC Vol. XVI, p. 152.
CE 3140, WC Vol. XXVI, p 822; FBI (Boguslav and Heitman) interview of Marina, December 20, 1963.
CE 1824; WC Vol. XXIV, p. 484; FBI (Heitman) interview of Marina, January 31, 1964.
PLH/#DLB.37.3.
WC Vol. V, pp. 406-07 (Marina's testimony, June 11, 1964.)
Warren Report, p. 271 (photos): "Oswald and Alfred (last name unknown), a Hungarian [sic] friend of Anita Ziger [sic]" CE 2612 (same photo); WC Vol. XXV, p 884 "Lee Harvey Oswald and Alfred (last name unknown)." CE 2616 (photo with same background); WC Vol XXV, p 886: "Anita Zieger and Lee Harvey Oswald in Minsk."
CE 2955, WC Vol. XXVI, p. 434; see also May 21, 1964, FBI report, Washington Field Office file 105-37111 at NARA, JFK files, RIF 157-10002-10112.
WC Vol. XXI, pp. 631-632 [Stuckey Exhibit No. 2].
WR p. 689. For Oswald's passport application see also WC Vol. XXII, pp. 77-78.
See CIA Oswald documents lists prepared in 1978 for the HSCA, NARA, JFK Records, January (five brown boxes) release. We cannot be sure of when this Post article was placed in Oswald's security file, but it is reasonable to assume it was on November 2 or 3, 1959.
See CE 2863 in WC Vol. XXVI, pp. 304-305, and CE 825 in WC vol. XVII, p. 765. The FPCC was officially closed on December 31, 1963; see Vincent T. Lee testimony in WC Vol. X, p. 87.
WC Vol. XXVI, CE 2863, p. 304, and Vol. XXVI, CE 3081 p. 689.
WC CD 1085a3, p. 1; New York Times, November 20, 1960.
Nelson Delgado testimony to the Warren Commission, April 16, 1964, Vol. VIII, p. 240.
Ray Rocca, CIA memo reviewing Castro, Cuba, Oswald, and the Kennedy assassination, presumably May 30, 1975. See Anthony Summers, Conspiracy (1989 ed.) p. 562; also see NARA, JFK records, RIF 1993,08.12.17:47:45:370039.
Warren Commission Report, p. 687.
Nelson Delgado testimony to the Warren Commission, April 16, 1964, Vol. VIII, pp. 240-241.
For a discussion of this point, see Morris H. Morley, Imperial State and Revolution: The United States and Cuba, 1952-1986 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 115.
Nelson Delgado testimony to the Warren Commission, April 16, 1964, Vol. VIII, p. 241.
Nelson Delgado testimony to the Warren Commission, April 16, 1964, Vol. VIII, p. 241.
Ray Rocca, CIA memo reviewing Castro, Cuba, Oswald, and the Kennedy assassination, presumably May 30, 1975; NARA, JFK records, RIF 1993.08.12.17:47:45:370039.
Nelson Delgado testimony to the Warren Commission, April 16, 1964, Vol. VIII, p. 241.
Nelson Delgado testimony to the Warren Commission, April 16, 1964, Vol. VIII, p. 242.
Ray Rocca, CIA memo reviewing Castro, Cuba, Oswald, and the Kennedy assassination, presumably May 30, 1975; NARA, JFK Records, RIF 1993.08.12.17:47:45:370039.
Hemming letter to Major General C. V. Clifton, military aide to the president, February 12, 1963; NARA JFK files, CIA January 1994 (5 brown boxes) release.
Hemming's 1960 debriefings can be found in NARA JFK files, CIA January 1994 (5 brown boxes) release, and in NIS boxes 1-3.
Memorandum for chief, Security Analysis Group, from Jerry G. Brown; Subject: Hemming, April 8, 1977 (Hereafter referred to as "Brown memo"), NARA, JFK files, RIF 1993.06.28.17:12:27:150360.
CIA memorandum from Jerry Brown to chief, Security Analysis Group, June 11, 1976; NARA, JFK files, RIF 1993.06.29.15:26:50:400280.
CIA memorandum; Subject: Hemming, October 19, 1967; NARA, JFK files, CIA 1992 release.
For example, an October 31, 1960, CIA Intelligence Report said this:
Source is a twenty-three-year-old ex-Marine who spent the period from February 1959 through July 1960 serving in the Cuban Army and the Cuban Air Force. He obtained his discharge from the Cuban Air Force in June 1960 and returned to the U.S. via Mexico City on 30 Aug. 1960. According to source, he had been nominated by the Marine Corps to enroll in the Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps at a U.S. university even though he had not finished his high school education. He reportedly did not accept this offer because he was much more interested in Special Forces—type activity, and this led to his decision to leave the Marine Corps and a short time later to enlist in the Cuban Army. He appears to be a keen observer. While source's plans are indefinite, he should be available for further interview during the next few weeks (mid-October—November 1960.)
NARA, JFK files; the 1960 IRs are in several locations: See NIS boxes 1-3; see CIA 1994 (5 brown boxes) release, and see also documents located with or near RIF 1993.06.28.17:20:46:150360.
April 8, 1977, Brown memo. The memo contained this helpful explanatory note:
1. Reference is made to the attachment which is a copy of a memorandum contained in Subject file dated 7 November 1960 from Chief/Contact Division/00 to Chief/Personnel Security Division/Office of Security, captioned "Jerry P. Hemming, Jr., Ex-Marine who served in Cuban Army and Air Force 00-A-3170536," a copy of which was sent to WH Division and CI staff. It is apparent that the Henning referred to therein is identical with Gerald Patrick Hemming.
April 8, 1977, Brown memo.
April 8, 1977, Brown memo.
April 8, 1977 Brown memo.
April 1976 Argosy article.
Feb. 1959-June 1960 CIA biographical sketch of Hemming.
Gerald Patrick Hemming, January 6, 1995, interview with John Newman.
Gerald Patrick Hemming, January 6, 1995, interview with John Newman.
CIA memorandum for chief, WHD; Subject: Viola June Cobb, June 1, 1960; NARA, JFK files, CIA January 1994 (5 brown boxes) release, Cobb papers.
Attachment, "Viola June Cobb," to CIA memorandum for chief, WHD; Subject: Viola June Cobb, June 1, 1960; NARA, JFK files, CIA January 1994 (5 brown boxes) release, Cobb papers; the same attachment appears alone, i.e., without the base document, and with different redactions, in the CIA August 1994 microfilm release, reel 10, folder E, RIF 1994.03.11.13:45:14:320005.
CIA memorandum for chief, WHD; Subject: Viola June Cobb, June 1, 1960; NARA, JFK files, CIA January 1994 (5 brown boxes) release, Cobb papers.
Attachment to CIA June 1, 1960 memo on Cobb, NARA, JFK files, CIA August 1994 microfilm release, reel 10, folder E, RIF 1994.03.11.13:45:14:320005.
CIA memo for the record; Subject: June Cobb (216-264), February 21, 1975; NARA, JFK files, CIA January 1994 (5 brown boxes) release; "Box 40A."
CIA memorandum for chief, SB/1, from acting deputy chief, Support Branch, June 7, 1960; NARA, JFK files, CIA January 1994 (5 brown boxes) release, Cobb papers.
CIA memorandum for chief, SB/1, from acting deputy chief, Support Branch, June 7, 1960; NARA, JFK files, CIA January 1994 (5 brown boxes) release, Cobb papers.
CIA routing and record sheet to CSCI 3/762466, November 1, 1960, CIA 1994 microfilm release, reel 11, folder C, RIF 1994.03.08.14: 03:26:750007.
CIA operation log, New York Field Office, Case 216264, October 23, 1960, Boston Massachusetts. NARA JFK files, CIA January 1994 (5 brown boxes release) Cobb papers, see "Box 40A."
Synopsis of June Cobb's telephone calls in New York City, October 19-25, 1960, file 216264. NARA JFK files, two CIA locations: January 1994 (5 brown boxes release) Cobb papers.
Mark Lane, Plausible Denial (New York: Thunder's Mouth Press, 1991), pp. 288-302.
Doug Gentzkow, 1994 interview with John Newman.
CIA domestic contacts report to chief, Contacts Division; Attention: Support (Mayo Stunz), and chief, New York office, from Jay B. L. Reeves, 00,3,3,289,019, January 22, 1964; NARA JFK files, CIA January 1994 (5 brown boxes) release, Pawley-Gentzkow papers; see F81-0351-D0547.
The Declassified Eisenhower, p. 722.
The New York Times, January 8, 1977.
See CIA memorandum for director of Central Intelligence, July 13, 1954, NARA JFK files, CIA January 1994 (5 brown boxes) release, Pawley papers; see pages numbered 18491 and 18493.
See CIA memorandum from acting chief, Support Branch, to chief of SB/ 1; Subject: William Pawley, October 6, 1959; NARA JFK files, CIA January 1994 (5 brown boxes) release, Pawley papers; see document F81-0351-D0371.
CIA memo from [3-4 letters redacted] to chief, WH Division, April 6, 1960; NARA JFK files, CIA 1994 microfilm release, reel 10, folder E, RIF 1994.03.11.13:45:14:320005.
June Cobb, April 3, 1995 interview with John Newman.
CIA memorandum to chief, WH/4; Subject [redacted] June Cobb, aide to Juan Orta, June 3-5, 1960, from: [redacted]; NARA, JFK files, CIA January 1994 (5 brown boxes) release, Cobb papers. Filed under Cobb's 201 file (278891).
June Cobb, March 27, 1995, interview with John Newman.
CIA operation log, New York field office, Case 216264, November 3, 1960, Boston, Massachusetts. NARA JFK files: January 1994 (5 brown boxes) release Cobb papers.
# Chapter Eight
The author is indebted to Richard C. Thornton, who made available unpublished material to the author.
A speech Khrushchev delivered to the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on [date] 1956.
See Foreign Relations of the United States—Cuba (hereafter referred to as FRUSC), Vol. VI, document #456, Memorandum of Discussion of the 435th Meeting of the National Security Council, February 18, 1960, p. 792.
Secretary of State Christian Herter, telephonic remarks to President Eisenhower on August 25 1960, in FRUSC-VI, p. 1062. Herter was referring to Mikoyan's February 1960 visit to Cuba.
Memorandum from Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning (Smith), Document #519, FRUSC-VI, p. 917. The document Rubottom described, which is apparently no longer extant, was dated May 11, 1960, and was written by a "Mr. Morgan," probably George A. Morgan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning.
Mario Lazo, Dagger in the Heart, (New York, Twin Circle Publishing Co., 1968), p. 333.
A. Newman, The Assassination, p. 196. Newman states Castro attended 9/18/60.
E. Howard Hunt, Give Us This Day, p. 39.
Letter from President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Macmillan, July 11, 1960, FRUSC-VI, document #551, pp. 1000-1005; see p. 1003 for quoted material.
Secretary of State Herter, Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions in the American Republics, July 11, 1960, Document #552, FRUSC-VI, pp. 1006-1007. Cable
FRUSC-VI, document #410, Memorandum of Discussion at the 429th Meeting of the National Security Council, pp. 703-706; see especially pp. 705-706.
FRUSC-VI, Document #408, Memorandum of Discussion at the 428th Meeting of the National Security Council, December 10, 1959, pp. 698-700; see especially p. 698.
FRUSC-VI, Document #410, Memorandum of Discussion at the 429th Meeting of the National Security Council, December 16, 1959, pp. 703-706; see especially p. 704.
Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, Interim Report of U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations, 1975, pg. 92.
CIA 1329-484 C. referring to March 2, 1967 broadcast.
Report of Inspector General, CIA, May 1967.
This sentence in the I.G. Report could be summarized in this interesting way: Bissell recalled his part of the seminal Castro assassination discussion as having occurred during the Nixon White House, while King recalled it as having occurred during the Kennedy White House.
May 23, 1967 memorandum for the record from Inspector General CIA (Cover to I.G. Report)
Alleged Assassination Plots, p. 74; see also p. 92.
Alleged Assassination Plots, p. 74; see also p. 92.
Footnote 3 page 92, Alleged Assassination Plots, which points out that this document was not made available early on in their investigation. The report adds this note:
The Committee received this document on November 15, 1975, after printing of this Report had begun. As a consequence, there was no opportunity to question either King or Bissell concerning the meaning of "elimination," what consideration was in fact given to Castro's "elimination," and whether any planning resulting from this document in fact led to the actual plots. In this regard it should be noted that Bissell had a "dim recollection" of a conversation prior to early autumn or late summer 1960 with King (the author of the above memorandum) concerning a "capability to eliminate Castro if such action should be decided upon" (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 19).
Peter Grose, Gentleman Spy,: the life of Allen Dulles, Houghlin Mifflin, 1994. p. 494.
Richard Nixon RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon, (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), pp. 202-203.
FRUSC-VI, Document #410, Memorandum of Discussion at the 429th Meeting of the National Security Council, December 16, 1959, pp. 703-706; see especially pp. 704-705.
FRUSC-VI, Document #410, Memorandum of Discussion at the 429th Meeting of the National Security Council, December 16, 1959, pp. 703-706; see especially p. 705.
On August 28, 1960, Thomas C. Mann replaced Roy R. Rubottom as Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs. On the same day, Frank J. Devine was promoted from Staff Assistant, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, to Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs. See FRUSC-VI, List of Persons, pp. xxi-xxvii.
FRUSC-VI, Document #410, Memorandum of Discussion at the 429th Meeting of the National Security Council, December 16, 1959, pp. 703-706; see especially p. 705.
FRUSC-VI, Document #410, Memorandum of Discussion at the 429th Meeting of the National Security Council, December 16, 1959, pp. 703-706; see especially p. 705.
Richard Nixon, RN, p. 203. New York: Grossett, & Dunlap, 1978.
Alleged Assassination Plots, p. 93.
Church Committee files, "Minutes of Special Group Meeting, January 13, 1960."
Church Committee files, "Minutes of Special Group Meeting, January 13, 1960."
Church Committee files, "Minutes of Special Group Meeting, January 13, 1960."
Card index: Special Group Meeting January 13, 1960. Also Interim Report of the SSCIA, Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, Report 94-465, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975, p. 93.
Peter Grose, Gentleman Spy, p. 494.
FRUSC, Vol. VI, Document #423, Memorandum of Discussion at the 423d Meeting of the National Security Council, January 14, 1960, pp. 740-746. For this remark by Merchant, see p. 742. Nixon said he "believed we should look at Latin America as a single area from an investment point of view, so that anything which hurts investment in one part of Latin America hurts investment throughout the area."
Church Committee files, Memo for the Record, March 9, 1960.
Church Committee files, "Minutes of Special Group Meeting, March 10, 1960." Alleged Assassination Plots, pg 93.
For a more complete account of the minutes of the March 10, 1960, NSC meeting, see FRUSC-VI, Document #474, pp. 832-837.
Church Committee files, "Minutes of Special Group Meeting, March 15, 1960."
"A Program of Covert Action Against the Castro Regime," paper prepared by the 5412 (Special Group) Committee, March 16, 1960, FRUSC-VI, Document #481, pp. 850-854.
Church Committee files, "Minutes of Special Group Meeting, March 15, 1960.
Church Committee files, "Minutes of Special Group Meeting, March 15, 1960.
Memorandum of a Conference with the President, White House, March 17, 1960, FRUSC-VI, Document #486, pp. 861-863.
Dulles biographer Peter Grose, in his book Gentleman Spy, p. 495, has a different perspective of Eisenhower and the Covert Program. Grose writes, "Eisenhower had made clear his scorn for the gimmicks that delighted the little-boy mentality of the clandestine services, so Bissell rephrased the various subversive ploys into a formidable 'Program of Covert Action Against the Castro Regime' for approval by the 5412 [Special Group] committee."
Memorandum of a Conference with the President, White House, March 17, 1960, FRUSC-VI, Document #486, pp. 861-863.
Memorandum of a Conference with the President, White House, March 17, 1960, FRUSC-VI, Document #486, pp.861-863.
For other interesting references to President Eisenhower's March 17, 1960, authorization to begin the training of Cuban refugees, see Farewell America (Hepburn), p. 316, and Bay of Pigs (Johnson), p. 30. In his memoirs, RN, p. 203, Nixon recalls: "I was present at the meeting in which Eisenhower authorized the CIA to organize and train Cuban exiles for the eventual purpose of freeing their homeland from the Communists." The training of these exiles began in Guatemala. On June 22, 1960, the first 28 anti-Castro Cubans were taken to Guatemala from Florida (see Johnson, Bay of Pigs, p. 38). In August 1960, President Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes of Guatemala opened a CIA airstrip at CIA training base at Retalhuleu (see Ross and Wise, Invisible Government, p. 28). On October 30, 1960, a Guatemala City newspaper, La Hora printed a report on CIA Cuban exile training, describing a training camp and invasion preparations under way (see Johnson, Bay of Pigs, p. 49).
E. Howard Hunt, Give Us This Day, p. 22.
The CIA cryptonym for the project was "PB/Success." See Burton Hersh, The Old Boys, pp. 342-343.
E. Howard Hunt, Give Us This Day, pp. 22-23.
Prior to this assignment, Esterline had been serving as the CIA station chief in Caracas, a job he had held since 1957. Later, in 1964, Esterline would move from Chief WH/4 to Chief WH/OPS.
E. Howard Hunt, Give Us This Day, pp. 24-26.
E. Howard Hunt, Give Us This Day, p. 27.
E. Howard Hunt, Give Us This Day, p. 38.
See the Inspector General's Report, p. 10.
"The case officer testified that he and the Cuban contemplated only requiring intelligence information and that assassination was not proposed by them." Alleged Assassination Plots, p. 72.
According to p. 73, fn. #1, of the SSCIA report Alleged Assassination Plots:
The duty officer testified that he must have spoken with King because he would not otherwise have signed the cable "by direction, J. C. King." (Duty officer, 8/11/75, pg. 16.) He also would "very definitely" have read the cable to Barnes before sending it, because "Barnes was the man to whom we went . . . for our authority and for work connected with the [Cuban] project." (Duty officer, pp. 4, 25.) Since King at that time was giving only "nominal attention" to Cuban affairs, the officer concluded that a proposal of the gravity of an assassination could only have "come from Mr. Barnes." (Duty officer, 8/11/75, p. 24.).
Alleged Assassination Plots, p. 73.
The case officer avoided the word "assassinate."
FRUSC-VI, p. 1022.
E. Howard Hunt, Give Us This Day, pp. 39-40.
E. Howard Hunt, Give Us This Day, p. 40.
# Chapter Nine
WC Vol XVI, p. 825.
U.S. Secret Service interview with Marguerite Oswald, November 25, 1963. NARA JFK records, RIF 124-10062-10049.
See CE 206, Vol. XVI, pp. 594-95.
See CE 1138, Vol. XXII, p. 118.
State Operations Memorandum to American Embassy Moscow, March 21, 1960. See CE 922, Vol. XVIII, p. 121.
William Macomber letter to Congressman Wright, March 21, 1960. See CE 923, Vol. XVIII, p. 122.
See CE 3111, Vol. XXVI, p. 746.
Handwritten note from "GWM" to "Miss Waterman," undated. See CE 927, Vol. XVIII, p. 127.
For the refusal sheet, see CE 962, Vol. XVIII, p. 356. See also Bernice Waterman testimony to the Warren Commission, June 9, 1964. See WC Vol. V pp. 350-351.
See CE 3111, Vol. XXVI, p. 746.
See Bernice Waterman testimony to the Warren Commission, June 9, 1964. See WC Vol. V pp. 350-351.
See CE 3111, Vol. XXVI, p. 746.
Bernice Waterman testimony to the Warren Commission, June 9, 1964. See 5 H, pp. 350-351.
See CE 3111, Vol. XXVI, p. 747.
See CE 3111, Vol. XXVI, p. 747.
State to American Embassy Moscow, March 28, 1960. See CE 929, Vol. XVIII, p. 129.
American Embassy Moscow Operations Memorandum to State Department, March 28, 1960. See CE 927, Vol. XVIII, p. 126.
See CE 207, Vol. XVI, p. 596; see also CE 1138, Vol. XXII, p. 118.
Letter from Professor Casparis to Lee Harvey Oswald, March 22, 1960. See NARA JFK files, 1994 CIA release, "Five Brown Boxes." See also CE 229, Vol. XVI, p. 626.
We know of Marguerite's April 6 response from Casparis, reply of April 26. See letter from Professor Casparis to Lee Harvey Oswald, April 26, 1960. See NARA JFK files, 1994 CIA release, "Five Brown Boxes."
American Embassy Moscow Operations Memorandum to State Department, March 28, 1960. See CE 927, Vol. XVIII, p. 126.
Dallas FBI field office report of John W. Fain, Dallas serial 105-976, dated May 12, 1960. See NARA JFK files, RIF 157-10006-10213.
Commander, Marine Air Reserve Training to Private First Class Lee H. Oswald, April 26, 1960. See CE 204, Vol. XVI, p. 590.
State Department Operations memorandum to American Embassy in Moscow, May 10, 1960. See CE 928, Vol. XVIII, p. 128.
Marguerite Oswald to U.S. Marine Corps, letter of June 10, 1960. See CE 204, Vol. XVI, p. 592.
Marguerite Oswald letter to Mr. Haselton, June 8, 1960. See CE 208, Vol. XVI, p. 597.
Marine Corps letter to Marguerite Oswald, June 17, 1960. See CE 204, Vol. XVI, p. 589.
The Hoover cover note on ONI is dated May 25, 1960, and the FBI transmittal of Fain's report to ONI was recorded on ONI routing slip GG-71228, received May 26, 1960; this routing slip also records the subsequent forwarding of the Fain report to DI09ND under DNI serial 014167F92 of May 1960. The processing for discharge by the Marine Corps Reserves was being handled at 9ND (Ninth Navel District). See NARA JFK files, NIS-ONI box 1.
FBI New York field office (105-6103) to Bureau (100-353496), May 23, 1960. NARA, JFK files, RIF 124-10010-10010.
Hoover letter to Security Office, Department of State, June 3, 1960, FBI, Bureau file 105-82555, CD 1114.
Memo, Boster (typed by Anderson) to Adams, July 11, 1960. See NARA, JFK files, CIA 201 preassassination file, box 1.
State Department operations memorandum to American Embassy in Moscow, June 22, 1960. See CE 925, Vol. XVIII, p. 124.
State Department to Marguerite Oswald, June 22, 1960. See CE 209, Vol. XVI, p. 598.
American Embassy Moscow operations memorandum to State Department, July 6, 1960. See CE 926, Vol. XVIII, p. 125.
State Department letter to Marguerite Oswald, July 7, 1960. See CE 210, Vol. XVI, p. 599.
Marguerite Oswald letter to State Department, July 16, 1960. See CE 211, Vol. XVI, p. 600.
Request of Miss Vann, July 19, 1960. See CE 964, Vol. XVIII, p. 359.
George Haselton confidential note to John T. White, July 20, 1960. See CE 964, Vol. XVIII, p. 358.
State Department letter to Marguerite Oswald, July 21, 1960. See CE 212, Vol. XVI, p. 601.
See ONI "Status Check," September 6, 1960, NARA, NIS-ONI files, box 1; see also NARA, CMC notification to ONI, in FBI headquarters file 105-82555-12, November 15, 1960. CE 2751 WC, Vol. XXVI, p. 130.
See letter from Professor Casparis to Marguerite Oswald, September 3, 1960. See NARA, JFK files, 1994 CIA release, "Five Brown Boxes."
See Paris Legal attache to Hoover letter to Security Office, Department of State, June 3, 1960, FBI, bureau file 105-82555. See also the initial response (almost completely redacted) from Paris, in FBI headquarters file 105-82555-8, dated July 27, 1960.
See Special Agent Kenneth P. Haser memo to SAC, WFO file 105-37111-1, August 9, 1960.
See Special Agent W. Dana Wilson memo to SAC WFO file 105-37111-2, September 12, 1960.
Paris 105-1067 to Bureau 105-82555, September 27, 1960 (almost wholly redacted), and Paris 105-1067 to Bureau 105-82555, October 12, 1960 (also almost wholly redacted). On October 10, 1960, the FBI inquired through liaison channels at Albert Schweitzer College in Switzerland about LHO. See CE 2918 WC Vol. XXVI, p. 92.
Paris 105-1067 to Bureau 105-82555, November 3, 1960.
FBI, Dallas field office report of John W. Fain, Dallas file 100-10461, dated July 3, 1961. See also CE 1127, Vol. XXII, p. 102.
State Department A-127 to American Embassy in Moscow, February 1, 1961. See CE 930, Vol. XVIII, p. 130.
FBI report of November 20, 1963. See CE 1805, Vol. XXIII, p. 443.
Warren Commission Report, p. 697.
CE 24 WC Vol. XVI, p. 98.
See WC p. 697; on Oswald's feelings about Rosa, see CE 24, Vol. XVI, pp. 99 and 101.
CD 1, p. 51. This FBI report also reports Oswald's arrival by train in Minsk, and the date.
Historic Diary, p. 6; see CE 24, Vol. XVI, p. 99.
As Oswald later described it, the shop in which he worked, called "experimental shop 572," employed 58 workers and 5 foremen. It was located in the middle part of the factory area in a two-story building made of redbrick.
See WR p. 697; also see CE 1128, WC Vol. XXII, p. 104 and CE 1109, WC Vol. XXII, p. 67
According to Marina Oswald, he worked on a lathe. See 5 H 616 (Marina Oswald).
See WR p. 697; see also 8 H 360 (Bouhe), 8 H 385 (Anna M. Meller), 5 H 407-8 (Marina Oswald), CE 1401, Vol. XXII, p. 750, and CE 24, Vol. XVI, p. 99. Oswald said that he started work in the Minsk radio and TV factory for 90 rubles per month, and his workbook agrees; see WC Vol. XVIII, p. 137.
WR p. 698; see also CE 24, V01. XVI, p. 99.
Oswald wrote that he studied Russian with Rosa during "Jan-May 1960"; see CE 93, Oswald note, "Russian," Vol. XVI, p. 340.
Historic Diary, p. 6; see CE 24, Vol. XVI, p. 99.
In March or April, Oswald met Pavel Golovachov, a radio technician and coworker at the factory, when he described as intelligent and friendly; see CE 2609, VOL XXV p. 271.
Historic Diary, p. 7; see CE 24, Vol. XVI, p. 100.
Historic Diary, p. 7; see CE 24, Vol. XVI, p. 100.
WC Vol. I, pp. 14, 328; CE 1402 WC Vol. XXII, p. 764; CE 1964 WC Vol. XXIII, p. 805; CE 2007 WC Vol. XXIV, p. 407; CE 2770 WC Vol. XXVI, p. 156.
Historic Diary, p. 7; see CE 24, Vol. XVI, p. 100.
See CE 2759, Vol. XXVI, p. 144; for a photograph of Ella, see CE 2609, Vol. XXV, p. 883.
See 2606, Vol. XXV, p. 881.
# Chapter Ten
January 5, 1960 (Tuesday)—Marguerite Oswald received $20 check back, with note from Oswald asking for cash. (WC Vol. XXII, pp. 101, 704) CD 8, p. 7.
January (on or about Tuesday the 5th), 1960—Marguerite Oswald sent $20 bill to Oswald and it was returned 2/25/60. (WC Vol. XXII, p. 101; CD 8, p. 7): Stamped on reverse side of envelope "Retour Departe" "MOCKBAN NOYTANT, Moscow, Russia 1/18/60 MEX AYHAPOAKO."
January 18, 1960 (Monday)—This date was stamped in Moscow on the letter enclosing $20 which Oswald's mother sent to him. She received it back 2/25/60. (WC Vol. XXII, p. 101).
January 22, 1960 (Friday)—Marguerite Oswald bought $25 money order at First National Bank, Fort Worth, #142,688 (CD 8, p. 7) and sent it air mail to Oswald, Hotel Metropole, Moscow. (WC Vol. XXII, p. 101; CD 8, p. 7.).
April 27, 1960 (Wednesday)—FBI agent John Fain interviewed Oswald's brother Robert. (WC Vol. I, p. 423; WC Vol. XXVI, p. 92). On 12/4/63, Secret Services said LHO "is FBI #327 925 D." (CD 87: SS 449, p. 3; CD 87: SS 451, p. 2).
April 28, 1960 (Thursday)—FBI interviewed Marguerite Oswald (WC Vol. XXVI, p. 92) at Methodist Orphans Home, 1111 Herring, Waco, Texas. (CD 8, p. 2) LHO: 5' 10"", 165#, blue eyes, light brown, wavy hair (per his mother). (CD 8. p. 4).
NARA JFK files, FBI Dallas file 105-976, report of John W. Fain, May 12, 1960, p. 4; WC Vol. XVII, p. 703.
CE No. 833, FBI report entitled "Lee Harvey Oswald," April 6, 1964, Vol. XVII, pp. 789-90.
See CE 1127, p. 7; WC Vol. XXII p. 101, an FBI report which provides a record of all three mailings; see also Marguerite's testimony, WC Vol. I, p. 204.
Marguerite Oswald letter to Secretary of State Herter, March 7, 1960, CE Exhibit No. 206, Vol. XVI, p. 595.
CE No. 833, FBI report entitled "Lee Harvey Oswald" April 6, 1964, Vol. XVII, p. 789.
FBI New York field office 65-6315 to headquarters 65-28939, February 26, 1960; released to Dr. Paul Hoch pursuant to his FOIA request.
We have seen this practice used for other documents in Oswald's FBI files.
The serial 105 is for "counterintelligence" files, and the serial 100 is for "internal security" files.
See CE 834, Vol. XVII, pp 804-813. The Fain Report should have been item number 12 or 13. See pp. 805-806.
Oswald applied for this passport on Sept. 4 at Santa Ana one week before he was discharged from the USMC. He used a Uniformed Services Priveleges Card as identification instead of the normal birth certificate. This card was not issued until Sept. 11, the day following issuance of the passport on Sept. 10, 1959. (WC Vol V, pg 266, WC Vol XVI, pg 601)
See Warren Commission Report, p. 690.
FBI New York field office memo (105-6103) to Dallas field office, March 9, 1960; released to Dr. Paul Hoch pursuant to his FOIA request.
FBI New York field office memo (105-6103) to Dallas field office, March 9, 1960; released to Dr. Paul Hoch pursuant to his FOIA request.
See Mark Riebling, Wedge (New York: Knopf, 1994), pg 155.
See CE 918, Vol. XVIII, p. 116.
Ed Jeunovitch, 28 Dec 1994 interview with John Newman.
Horton memo to Bissell, November 18, 1960, NARA JFK files, CIA Oswald 201, Box 1.
Bissell letter to Cumming, November 21, 1960, NARA JFK files, CIA Oswald 201, Box 1.
American Embassy cable to State Department 1304, October 31, 1959, CE 2750, Vol. XXVI, p. 126. See also American Embassy dispatch to State Department 234, November 2, 1959, CE 908, Vol. XVIII, p. 87, and CE 2749, Vol. XXVI, p. 124.
American Embassy cable to State Department 1358, November 9, 1959, and CE 2683, Vol. XXVI, p. 42.
ALUSNA Moscow to CNO, November 10 1959, ONI files, ONI-139, 921ACT/922-14-N. The dispatch mentioned, i.e. 184, actually referred to Khrushchev's visit to China.
Washington Post, UPI, "Rebuffed," November 16, 1959.
OSI Report of John Cox, Subject: John Edward Pic, File 33-476, January 27, 1960.
Marguerite Oswald letter to Jim Wright, March 6, 1960. WC Vol XXII, pg 118; CD 1122
Marguerite Oswald letter to Secretary of State Herter, March 7, 1960, CE 206, Vol. XVI, p. 594; CD 1122
State Department operations memorandum to Moscow Embassy, March 28, 1960, CE 929, Vol. XVIII, p. 129.
Moscow Embassy operations memorandum to State Department, March 28, 1960, CE 927, Vol. XVIII, p. 126.
FBI, Dallas field office, 105-976, Fain report of May 12, 1960, CE 821, Vol. XVII, pp. 700-702.
FBI, Dallas field office, 105-976, Fain report of May 12, 1960, CIA copy, NARA, JFK files, Oswald 201 file, Box 1.
CIA XAAZ35612, "Index cards found in the DDO records system on Lee Harvey Oswald at the time of the assassination." See NARA JFK files, CIA Document 2-524.
FBI New York field office (105-6103) AIRTEL to Bureau headquarters (100-353496), May 23, 1960. Note that this telegram was also placed in the 105 counterintelligence headquarters file on Oswald but was "unrecorded."
ONI routing slip GG7122B, dated May 26, 1960, and referencing headquarters Bureau file 100-353496.
Hoover letter to Security Office, Department of State, June 3, 1960, FBI, Bureau file 105-82555, CD 1114.
Marguerite Oswald letter to Haselton, June 8, 1960, CE 208, Vol. XVI, p. 597; CD 1122.
Blocker letter to Marguerite Oswald, June 22, 1960, CE 209, Vol. XVI, p. 598.
White letter to Marguerite Oswald, July 7, 1960, CE 210, Vol. XVI, p. 599; Cd 1122.
Memorandum from FBI SA Kenneth J. Haser to SAC, WFO. 9 Aug 1960; Paul Hoch item 468; See also NARA JFK files FBI Records WFO 105-37111.
Memorandum from FBI SA W. Dana Carson to SAC, WFO, 12 Sept. 1960; Paul Hoch item 469; See also NARA JFK files FBI Records WFO 105-37111
# Chapter Eleven
See Chapter Four, "I Am Amazed."
See CIA response to Church Committee re questions by Paul Hoch, April 9, 1975, by E. H. Knoche, p. 11. NARA, JFK files, RIF 157-10004-10140.
CIA Memorandum for the Executive Assistant to the DDO, from Chief, CI Staff, George T. Kalans, CI 315-75, EX 10931, 18 September 1975; NARA, JFK files, RIF 1993. 07.02-13:52:25:56030.
Letter from Hugh Cumming to Richard Bissell, October 25, 1960, NARA, JFK files, CIA 201 file on Oswald, box 1.
Robert L. Bannerman, interview with John Newman, August 8, 1994.
Robert L. Bannerman, interview with John Newman, August 8, 1994. "Jim Angleton was in on this and we were calling in all the people in all the areas who might have something," Bannerman recalled in this interview.
Memorandum from Marguerite D. Stevens to Chief, Security Research Staff, October 31, 1960, NARA, JFK files, 1993 release. This document was released in the first wave of 51 CIA boxes that were sent to the National Archives in the spring of 1993, before the RIF numbering system became effective. Unfortunately, the author's handwritten reference to the box number became detached.
Marguerite Stevens's memo responded to Bannerman's request for information on American defectors to the Soviet Union, China, and Sovietsatellite countries. Bannerman had specifically asked Stevens for information covering the previous eighteen months.
The CIA stated that Martin and Mitchell, both NSA employees, were KGB agents (see CIA response to Church Committee re questions by Paul Hoch, April 9, 1975, by E. H. Knoche, p. 11. NARA, JFK files, RIF 157-10004-10140). A month after Oswald defected to the Soviet Union, Martin and Mitchell—against NSA regulations—flew to Cuba, where, NSA Chronicler James Bamford reasons, "most likely, they got in touch with Soviet officials. It would be interesting to know if the CIA had learned about the trip and also what, if anything, either of them might have known about the U-2 program. For more on these two men, see James Bamford, Puzzle Palace (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1982), pp. 133-150.
Memorandum from Marguerite D. Stevens to Chief, Security Research Staff, October 31, 1960.
NARA, JFK files, CIA 1994 microfilm release, reel 7, folders I—J, Joseph Dutkanicz.
Bissell letter to Cumming, November 3, 1960, NARA, JFK files, CIA Oswald 201, box 1.
Horton memo to Bissell, November 18, 1960, NARA, JFK files, CIA Oswald, 201, box 1.
Bissell letter to Cumming, November 21, 1960, NARA, JFK files, CIA Oswald 201, box 1.
NARA, JFK files, CIA 1994 microfilm release, reel 7, folders I—J, Joseph Dutkanicz.
NARA, JFK files, CIA 1994 microfilm release, reel 7, folders I—J, Joseph Dutkanicz, and reel 17 folder J, Vladimir Sloboda.
Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations, U.S. House of Representatives, 1979 (hereafter referred to as HSCA Report), p. 200.
HSCA Report, p. 200.
HSCA Report, p. 201.
George T. Kalaris memo, subject: "Lee Harvey Oswald," dated September 18, 1975. See NARA, JFK files, RIF 1993.07.02.13:52:25:56030. A more redacted version of this document was released earlier as CIA document # 1187-436.
The HSCA Report, p. 201, added this:
This statement was corroborated by review of a State Department letter which indicated that such a request, in fact, had been made of the CIA on October 25, 1960. Attached to the State Department letter was a list of known defectors; Oswald's name was on that list. The CIA responded to this request on November 21, 1960, by providing the requested information and adding two names to the State Department's original list.
Significantly, the committee reviewed the original State Department list and determined that files were opened in December 1960 for each of the five (including Oswald) who did not have 201 files prior to receipt of the State Department inquiry. In each case, the slot for "source document" referred to an Agency component rather than to a dated document.
CE 245, Vol. XVI, p. 685. For more on the missing Oswald letter of December 1960, see WC Vol. XVIII pp. 133, 135.
WR, p. 701.
For a complete version of Oswald's February 1961 letter to the American Embassy, see CE 245, Vol. XVI, p. 685, and CE 932, Vol. XVI, p. 133.
Snyder testimony, WC, Vol. V, p. 277.
NARA, JFK files, RIF 157-10002-10432, report by William T. Coleman, Jr., and W. David Slawson to J. Lee Rankin, subject: Oswald's trip to the Soviet Union and his contacts with the U.S. Department of State, March 6, 1964. Part A is a single 46-page document entitled "Oswald's Trip to, and Stay in, the Soviet Union (September 4, 1959 to June 1, 1962). Attached are three documents: a September 4, 1959, notice of Oswald's release from the Marine Corps signed by A. G. Ayers, Jr., 1st Lt., USMR; Oswald's September 4, 1959, passport application Form DSP 11 filled out and signed by Oswald; and the note Oswald wrote requesting revocation of his U.S. citizenship and which he handed to American Consul Richard Snyder on October 31, 1959.
This paragraph first gives the date that Snyder received Oswald's 5 February 1961 letter as "13 February 1960." This is clearly a typographical error, since, in the very next sentence the correct date of 13 February 1961 is used.
Draft "Chronology of Oswald in the USSR: October 1959-June 1962, 24 January 1964, Amended 16 April 1964." See NARA, JFK files, CIA DDO 201 file on Oswald, boxes 1 and 2, CIA document XAAZ—22409, January 25, 1964.
See "Report of the Department of State: Lee Harvey Oswald," CE 950, Vol. XVIII, p. 262.
WR, p. 701.
This report of December 10, 1963, is based on a six-page interview of Marina by FBI Special Agents Anatole A. Boguslav and Wallace R. Heitman, of the Dallas office, and they filed their report under Oswald's file 199-10461; see WC, Vol. XXII, pp. 772-775.
See WC, Vol. XVIII, pp. 133, 135.
See Journal Graphics, transcription of ABC NEWS NIGHTLINE #2740 air date: November 22, 1991, entitled "An ABC News Nightline Investigation : The KGB Oswald Files."
Interviews with former CIA employees Ed Jeunovitch (July 14, 1993), and Don Deneselya (August 13, 1993), who both worked in the Soviet Russia Division at the time, and Ray Rocca (August 11 and 20, 1993—Rocca died in October) and Scotty Miler (September 16, 1993), who both worked in Counterintelligence. Jeunovitch later rose to the position of CIA acting deputy director of Plans during the Reagan administration. From interviews by William Scott Malone and John Newman during work on the WGBH FRONTLINE documentary "Who Was Lee Harvey Oswald?"
This person probably worked in Counterintelligence—perhaps in CI/R&A.
Memo for the record December 5, 1966, from CI/MRO, subj: American defectors to the USSR. NARA, JFK files, CIA 1994 microfilm release, reel 7, folders I—J, Joseph Dutkanicz.
Dutkanicz had tried to return to the U.S. on March 22, 1962. The Russians told his wife he had been found in a drunken state and placed in a hospital in Lvov, where he died in November 1963. HSCA Vol. XII, p. 444; also CIA 976-927AV. (It is interesting that Dutkanicz died in Lvov and the other defector from Army Military Intelligence, Sloboda, was born in Lvov.)
Memo for the record December 5, 1966, from CI/MRO, subj: American defectors to the USSR. NARA, JFK files, CIA 1994 microfilm release, reel 7, folders I—J, Joseph Dutkanicz.
Memo for the record December 5, 1966, from CI/MRO, subj: American defectors to the USSR. NARA, JFK files, CIA 1994 microfilm release, reel 7, folders I—J, Joseph Dutkanicz.
Memorandum from Marguerite D. Stevens to chief, Security Research Staff, October 31, 1960.
Noonan (State Department) to Hoover, May 17, 1962, subject: American Defectors: Status of in the USSR, NARA, JFK files, Oswald's CIA DDO 201 file, boxes 1 and 2.
Memo for Chief, Security Research Staff, from M. D. Stevens, subject: American defectors, October 31, 1960.
Memorandum from Marguerite D. Stevens to Chief, Security Research Staff, October 31, 1960.
The possibility that "MS" could have been "Military Service" was first suggested to the author by Peter Dale Scott in November 1994.
Webster (this time she gave his number as EE-18852, whereas two paragraphs earlier she gave the number as EE-18854) had been the subject of a "OO/C" ("OO/C" is a partial [and thus somewhat confusing] acronym for the CIA's Domestic Contacts Division, the Agency element used to contact and/or debrief individuals who possessed information of intelligence value) request for contact on May 29, 1959, but had not been interviewed "before or after" his visit to the Soviet Union.
Memorandum from Marguerite D. Stevens to Chief, Security Research Staff, October 31, 1960.
NARA, JFK files, CIA 1994 microfilm release, reel 17, folder J. Vladimir Sloboda. See Sloboda's notecard, with these numbers on top: 380312* and 01395. There appears to be a number redacted between these two. The text on the card appears to say this:
POB: subj's statement: Orekhovchnik, Brodak District, Ternopol—Lvov, Uk[raine] SSR, then Poland, DOB: 1927. Nat. US citizen in US Army '58, served as Spec. 5/c, translator, interrogator, doc. clerk 513 MI Grp., Frankfrt., defected from Camp King, Germany 3 Aug 60 to USSR. Claims to have known "Lypsky, Komaryk, Krul and others," at Ft. Bragg. Wife and 1 child Halifax, UK, other 2 in Sov Union with subj. Identified (redacted) YT-1192, 16 Jan 62. 380291 289148 077283 US CIT.
Note also that the number 289148 contains five digits identical to Oswald's 201 number: 289248. There is also a barely legible stamp at the bottom right which may read "RIS [Russian Intelligence Service] IMPLANTED."
Memorandum from Marguerite D. Stevens to Chief, Security Research Staff, October 31, 1960.
NARA, JFK files, CIA 1994 microfilm release, reel 7, folders I—J, Joseph Dutkanicz, and reel 17 folder J, Vladimir Sloboda. October 2, 1964, memorandum from SR/CI/R to Chief, CI Liaison, subject: Questions Concerning Defectors Joseph Dutkanicz (201-289236) and Vladimir O. Sloboda (201-287527).
NARA, JFK files, CIA 1994 microfilm release, reel 7, folders I—J, Joseph Dutkanicz, and reel 17 folder J, Vladimir Sloboda. October 2, 1964, memorandum from SR/CI/R to Chief, CI Liaison, subject: Questions Concerning Defectors Joseph J. Dutkanicz (201-289236) and Vladimir O. Sloboda (201-287527).
Internal CIA memo to Scott Miler, CI/OG [illegible], October 12, 1960, NARA, JFK files, CIA 1994 microfilm release, reel folder J. Vladimir Sloboda.
NARA, JFK files, CIA 1994 microfilm release, reel 16, folders I, Libero Ricciardelli. See August 9, 1963, CIA memo to Attn: Chief, Personnel Security Division, OS, Mr. Steven Kuhn, Chief, Contact Division, 00; Subject: Ricciardelli, Libero—Permission to Reveal the Identity of a Former US Citizen (now a Soviet citizen) as a source of this Agency to the FBI; Ref: a) Our request for security checks on Subject dated July 11, 1963; b) Mr. Kuhn's oral request on July 15, 1963, regarding FBI interest in information resulting from interviews with the subject.
NARA, JFK files, CIA 1994 microfilm release, reel 7, folders I—J, Joseph Dutkanicz. Note on Dutkanicz "Prepared by CI Staff for State [Department] -Nov. 60." The note explained: "Dutkanicz, who was born in Poland around 1927, was taken to Germany during World War II. After being liberated by the American Army he immigrated to the United States and was then drafted into the Army. His address in the United States was given as Tujanes, California."
NARA, JFK files, CIA 1994 microfilm release, reel 7, folders I—J, Joseph Dutkanicz. October 2, 1964, memorandum from SR/CI/R/ to Chief, CI Liaison Subject: Questions Concerning Defectors Joseph J. Dutkanicz (201-289236) and Vladimir O. Sloboda (201-287527). On this memorandum are two penciled numbers besides Dutkanicz's 201: "SX-4617," and "200-5-41" under which it was filed. The "200" meant "miscellaneous international file"; see NARA, JFK Files, SSCI box 265-15, November 14, 1975, memo from Dan Dwyer and Ed Greissing to Paul Wallach. Attached to the Wigren memo is a buck slip with "HH-6683" and a note saying the memo "will not receive further dissemination." Elsewhere in this CIA file on Dutkanicz there is a note from Jim Harrison to Ruth Elliff, saying, "The following OCG records are attached: HH 6683. They contain information on: Joseph Dutkanicz."
NARA, JFK files, CIA 1994 microfilm release, reel 7, folders I—J, Joseph Dutkanicz. October 2, 1964, memorandum from SR/CI/R/ to Chief, CI Liaison, Subject: Questions Concerning Defectors Joseph J. Dutkanicz (201-289236) and Vladimir O. Sloboda (201-287527).
Field Personality (201) File Request for Lee Henry [sic] Oswald, opened by Ann Egerter, December 9, 1960. See NARA, JFK files, CIA DDP 201 file on Oswald, boxes 1 and 2.
NARA, JFK files, CIA 1994 microfilm release, reel 7, folders I—J, Joseph Dutkanicz. October 2, 1964. Memorandum from SR/CI/R/ to Chief, CI Liaison, Subject: Questions Concerning Defectors Joseph J. Dutkanicz (201-289236) and Vladimir O. Sloboda (201-287527).
Note on Dutkanicz "Prepared by CI Staff for State [Department]-Nov. 60," NARA, JFK files, CIA 1994 microfilm release, reel 7, folders I—J, Joseph Dutkanicz.
NARA, JFK files, CIA 1994 microfilm release, reel 7, folders I—J, Joseph Dutkanicz. October 2, 1964, memorandum from SR/CI/R/ to Chief, CI Liaison, Subject: Questions Concerning Defectors Joseph J. Dutkanicz (201-289236) and Vladimir O. Sloboda (201-287527).
NARA, JFK files, CIA 1994 microfilm release, reel 7, folders I—J, Joseph Dutkanicz. October 2, 1964, memorandum from SR/CI/R/ to Chief, CI Liaison, Subject: Questions Concerning Defectors Joseph J. Dutkanicz (201-289236) and Vladimir O. Sloboda (201-287527). The CIA's Counterintelligence chief, James Angleton, lost no time in putting all this in a November 4, 1964, memo to the assistant chief of staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, Attention: Director of Security, filed in same location at NARA.
CIA Information Report No: CO-3167710; NARA, JFK files, CIA 1994 microfilm release, reel 7, folders I—J, Joseph Dutkanicz. The informant's report also said this:
3. Dutkanych seemed to be quite familiar with the city and knowing I was a clergyman, suggested I visit a well-known Russian Orthodox church, just up the street. Looking out the window I called his attention to a billboard advertising the latest movie, "Moscow Souvenir." He suggested, however, that I take in another movie that was playing around the comer from the hotel. That afternoon I saw the recommended movie. It was an old war film, depicting the heroism of a young soldier defending his native village from the invading German armies.
WC Vol. XVI, CE 24, p. 100.
CD 1, p. 52; see also Oswald Historic Diary, CIA document XAAZ 35813, p. 10; WC Vol. XVI, CE 24, p. 100.
Warren Report p. 700. Oswald described the manuscript, which amounted to fifty typed pages, as "a look into the lives of work-a-day average Russians." After his return to the U.S., he hired a stenographer to type a draft from his notes.
FBI Dallas, report of Wallace Heitman and Hayden Griffin, September 8, 1964, Dallas 100-10461; WC, CD 1546.
The FBI report explained:
Marina exhibited the following photographs which were obtained from Lellie May Rahm at Ketchikan, Alaska, on August 4, 1964. Rahn is the mother of Anita May Setyaeva. These photographs were described as follows:
1. Wedding photo of Marina (last name unknown). At far left is head of Marina's mother, Anita May Setyaeva (Setyaev), nee Zuggef, and her son, Kostia Henkin; unknown woman, Marina (last name unknown) and Vashi (last name unknown), who is Marina's husband, unknown man, woman, man and woman.
2. Head photo of Anita May Setyaeva.
3. Full-length photo of Anita May Setyaeva in Moscow.
4. Full-length photo of Antia May Setyaeva at Moscow University.
5. Photo of Radio Moscow personnel, taken December 27, 1957, left to right—Lucy Pravdina, Anita May Satyaeva, Sergei Rudin, Joe Adarov and sitting, Nikolai Sergeyev.
6. Photo of Radio Moscow personnel, taken September 9, 1960, left to right—Joe Adakov, Anita May Setyaeva, Annabella Ducar, Sergei Rudin.
7. Photo of Radio Moscow personnel—Sergeio Rudin and Anita May Setyaeva; standing—Lucy Pravdina, Joe Adamov, Nikolai Sergeyev.
8. Photo of Radio Moscow personnel—Sergei Rudin, Anita May Setyaeva, Joe Adamov, Lucy Pravdina, Nikolai Sergeyev.
9. (First name unknown) Henkin, Anita May Renkina, now Setyaeva (Setyaev), and Kostia (Bunny) Henkin, taken June 1, 1957.
10. Photo of Radio Moscow personnel, left to right—Sergei Rudin, Lucy Pravdina, Joe Adamov, Anita May Satyaeva, Nikolai Sergeyev, taken December 28, 1958.
Marina could identify none of the individuals appearing in these photographs. When the above-described photographs were examined by Marina Oswald in the presence of interviewing Agents, no unusual reactions were noted.
HT-LINGUAL soft file, Document No. 1994.04.13.14:53:55:500005, May 1, 1994, memorandum, subject: HT-LINGUAL items relating to the Oswald case. ["Material from this Operation is handled on a need to know basis within this Agency and such of the material that is given to the FBI receives special handling and limited distribution within the the Bureau."]
WR, p. 691
NARA, JFK files, CIA box 6, folder 6, document 05806.
CIA memo to FBI, August 27, 1964; NARA, JFK files, CIA Document Number 806-351.
Peter Wronski, 1991 interview with Setyaev, in "Oswald in the USSR: A Preliminary Report from a New Investigation," Third Decade, May 1992, p. 33.
Peter Wronski, June 1991 interview with Ella German. Peter Wronski did some unique and valuable work in the former Soviet Union in 1991; it is reported in Third Decade, May 1992.
Peter Wronski, 1991 interview with Setyaev, in "Oswald in the USSR: A Preliminary Report from a New Investigation," Third Decade, May 1992, p. 34.
WC, Vol. XVI, CE 315, p. 871.
See The Trial of the U2 (Chicago: Translation World Publisher 1960), pp. 89-90.
CIA Document Disposition Index, documents 1187-436, 1189-1001, and 1190-1002, pp. 270-271.
Church Committee interview with Sam Papich, May 29, 1975, p. 13; NARA, JFK files, RIF157-10002-10152.
Peter Wronski, 1991 interview with Setyaer, "Oswald in the USSR: A Preliminary Report from a New Investigation," Third Decade, May 1992, pp. 33-34.
CIA LINGUAL item 60F240; NARA, JFK Files, CIA Document Number 1572-1115—L.
Peter Wronski, 1991 interview with Setyaer, "Oswald in the USSR: A Preliminary Report from a New Investigation," Third Decade, May 1992, p. 34.
# Chapter Twelve
August 18 White House meeting on Cuban policy FRUSC-VI, document 577, pp. 1057-1060.
Memorandum of a meeting with the president, White House, August 18, 1960, USFRC-VI, document 577, pp. 1057-1060.
August 18 White House meeting on Cuban policy FRUSC-VI, document 577, pp. 1057-1060.
Memorandum of a meeting with the president, White House, August 18, 1960, USFRC-VI, document 577, pp. 1057-1060.
Memorandum of a meeting with the president, White House, August 18, 1960, USFRC-VI, document 577, pp. 1057-1060.
Church Committee, Alleged Assassination Plots, p. 74. A footnote to this part of the text states: "Although Castro closed the gambling casinos in Cuba when he first came to power, they were reopened for use by foreign tourists in late February 1959, and remained open until late September 1961."
Church Committee, Alleged Assassination Plots, p. 74. A footnote to this part of the text states: "Although Castro closed the gambling casinos in Cuba when he first came to power, they were reopened for use by foreign tourists in late February 1959, and remained open until late September 1961."
Church Committee index card on May 23, 1975, testimony of former CIA director William Colby.
Alleged Assassination Plots, p. 75.
I.G. Report, p. 16.
Alleged Assassination Plots, p. 75; see also I.G. Report, p. 16.
Alleged Assassination Plots, p. 79.
Church Committee interview with Sam Papich, FBI liaison to the CIA, August 22, 1975; NARA, JFK files, RIF157-10005-10068.
Church Committee interview with William Harvey, September 14, 1975, pp. 7-8; NARA, JFK files, RIF157-10011-10124. There is no question, according to Harvey, that this pressure on Bissell continued under the Kennedy White House.
WC Vol. XXIII, CE 1697, p. 171.
The Kennedy Years, New York Times, p. 233. Present at this meeting were the following: President Kennedy, Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary of Defense McNamara, Secretary of the Treasury Dillon, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Lemnitzer, CIA director Allen Dulles, and CIA's Plans director, Richard Bissell, Senator Fulbright and White House aides Schlesinger and Goodwin also attended.
One significant part of the White House today stands as a monument to that tragedy. In June 1961, in a directive resulting from his investigation of the failed invasion, Kennedy ordered that a portion of the White House bowling alley be set aside and that the CIA set up a new operation center where he could keep a close eye on any given situation. The failure at the Bay of Pigs led to the creation of the now famous White House Situation Room. Stuart H. Loory in Los Angeles Times, 3/28/69, pp. 1, 10.
FBI Report, CD 1, p. 57.
WC Vol. XVIII, CE 985, p. 404.
WC Vol. XXII, CE 1127, pp. 102, 118; VOL. XXVI, CE 2681, pp. 39-40, 124.
For the CIA copy, see NARA, JFK file, CIA DDO 201 file on Oswald, boxes 1-2.
WC Vol. XXVI, CE 2681, p. 39.
WC Vol. XVI, CE 245, pp 685, 686.
WC Vol. V, p. 277 (Snyder); WC Vol. XVI, CE 24, p. 102, entry of February 1, 1961.
Oswald's letter was postmarked February 5 at Minsk, February 11 at Moscow, and finally received by the embassy on February 13; see WC Vol. XXII, CE 1138, p. 119.
See WC Vol. XVIII, CE 933, p. 135.
WC Vol. XVIII, CE 932, pp. 133-134 (dispatch from the American Embassy in Moscow to the State Department, February 28, 1961). Also see WC Vol. XVIII, CE 948, p. 186, which is part of the State Department's May 8, 1964, answers to questions from the Warren Commission.
For Snyder's letter, see WC Vol. XVIII, CE 933, p. 135.
WC Vol. XVIII, CE 940, p. 151.
WC Vol. XVI, CE 24, p. 102, Historic Diary, entry for March 1-16, 1961.
WC Vol. XVI, CE 25, pp. 121-122; Vol. V, pp. 407-408 (Marina Oswald).
WC Vol. V, p. 278 (Snyder).
WC Vol. XXVI, CE 2666, p. 23. Oswald's occasional contact with American tourists possibly increased his determination to return. Every once in a while he would make the acquaintance of one, such as the University of Michigan band member he met on March 10, 1961 (at the time the band was touring in Minsk); Vol. XI, p. 211.
On March 12, 1961, Oswald writes to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. The embassy received it. On March 20, 1961, the U.S. Embassy, Moscow, received a second letter from Oswald again stating he wanted to leave and needed permission; See WC Vol. XXII, CE 1085, p. 33. On March 22, 1961, Oswald wrote to the embassy; see Vol. XVI, CE 213, p. 602; Vol. XVIII, CE 950, p. 262; Vol. XXVI, CE 2766, p. 24.
WC Vol. V, pp. 352-354 (Bernice Waterman); Vol. XVI, CE 94, pp. 367-368; Vol. XVIII, CE 940, 970, 971, pp. 152, 367-368; Vol. XXII, CE 1074, p. 24.
State Department cable to the American Embassy in Moscow, April 13, 1961, WC Vol. XVIII, CE 971, p. 368.
Marina thought that the date was March 4. WC Vol. I, p. 90 (Marina Oswald); VOL. XVI, CE 24, p. 102, entry of March 17, 1961; Vol. XVIII, CE 904, p. 600; Vol. XXII, CE 1401, p. 748; Vol. XXIII, CE 1792, p. 407.
WC Vol. XXII, CE 1138, p. 120.
Later that same evening, Marina learned that Oswald was an American; WC Vol. XXII, CE 1401, p. 261; CE 994, p. 5. The Commission learned that it would have been unusual for Oswald to have become so proficient in Russian given the length of his stay; see WC Vol. II, p. 347; Vol. XVIII, CE 994, pp. 596, 600; Vol. XXII, CE 1041, p. 745; Life 2/21/ 64. George deMohrenschildt was reportedly amazed by Oswald's Russian proficiency; see WC Vol. IX pp. 226, 259. The Oswald who visited Mexico City in the summer of 1963, however, was not so proficient, perhaps because by that time he had lost the facility. It is more likely, as discussed in Chapter Eighteen, that person speaking Russian in Mexico City was not Oswald, but an impostor.
WC Vol. XXIII, CE 1789, p. 402.
WC Vol. XXII, CE 1041, p. 753.
WC Vol. XVI, CE 24, p. 102, entry of March 17, 1961. Marina testified that she told Oswald that she might see him at another dance, but did not give him her telephone number. WC Vol. I pp. 90-91 (Marina Oswald); Vol. XXII, CE 1401, p. 267; Vol. XVIII, CE 994, p. 7
WC Vol. I, p. 91 (Marina Oswald); Vol. XXII, CE 1401, pp. 267-268; Vol. XVIII, CE 993, p. 7.
On March 14 and 15, 1961: On November 30, 1963, Marina says that Oswald was admitted to the 4th Clinical Hospital on the outskirts of Minsk, where he stayed for eleven days; WC Vol. XXII, CE 1401, p. 749. Perhaps this hospital was special, but it does seem odd that Oswald was admitted to a hospital in the outskirts of Minsk when he lived in the central part of the city.
WC Vol. XVIII, CE 985, p. 450.
WC Vol. I, p. 91, (Marina Oswald).
WC Vol. XXII, CE 1401, p. 749.
WC Vol. XVIII, CE 994, pp. 603-604; WC Vol. II 302 (Katherine Ford).
WC Vol. XXII, CE 1401, p. 750, Vol. XVIII, CE 994, p. 9.
WC Vol. XXII, CE 1401, pp. 749-750; Oswald's diary puts the date five days earlier. WC Vol. XVI, CE 24, p. 102, entry of April 1-30, 1961.
June 1961—Mrs. Dorothy Gravitis, Dallas resident who is Ilya Mamantov's mother-in-law and Mrs. Ruth Paine's Russian teacher, says that Marina tells her that they were married in Moscow and then moved to Leningrad. WC. Vol IX, p. 135. Mrs. Thomas N. Ray, resident of Detroit, Texas, meets Marina at Glover's party in 1963 and hears Marina say that they lived in Moscow for a year. WC Vol. IX, p. 31. Paul Gregory, Fort Worth resident who meets the Oswalds in 1962, says that Oswald shows him pictures of Leningrad and Minsk. WC Vol. IX, p. 142.
WC Vol. XXII, CE 1401, p. 750.
WC Vol. XVI, CE 24, p. 102.
WC Vol. XXII, CE 1401, p. 749; but see WC Vol. II, p. 302 (K. Ford).
WC Vol. XVI, CE 24, p. 103, entry of May 1, 1961.
WC Vol. XVI, CE 24, p. 103, entry of June 1961.
Marina's recollection is that she learned of his plan between May and July.
WC Vol. XVI, CE 252, pp. 705, 707.
WC Vol. XXII, CE 1401, pp. 740-764; HSCA, Vol. II, p. 288.
New York Times, 12/9/63, p. C-38.
The date May 18, 1961, would be indicated, based on 273 calendar days until June Oswald's birth on February 15, 1962.
WC Vol. XVII, CE 833, p. 790.
Special Agent Kenneth J. Haser, memorandum to the Special Agent in Charge (SAC), Washington, D.C., field office (WFO) of the FBI, August 9, 1960; Subject: Lee Harvey Oswald, Internal Security-Russia. NARA, JFK files, FBI WFO (105-37111), box 1.
The "100" had clearly been changed from "105," which can still be observed beneath the "100." This raises the possibility of a possible connection to the FBI Headquarters and Dallas field office 100/105 file compartments for different aspects of the Oswald case.
Memorandum from Special Agent W. Dana Carson to Special Agent in Charge at Washington field office (105-37111), September 12, 1960. Subject: Lee Harvey Oswald, Internal Security-Russia.
Memorandum from Special Agent W. Dana Carson to special agent in Charge at Washington field office (105-37111), September 12, 1960. Subject: Lee Harvey Oswald, Internal Security-Russia. Carson made an error when, talking of the State Department copy of Fain's "Funds Transmitted to Residents of Russia" report, he mentioned one of its file numbers as "Dallas File 100-976." This inadvertent slip again draws our attention to Oswald field file: 105-976.
ONI routing slip GG 71228/jhl; Subject: Oswald, Lee Harvey; Funds Transmitted to Residents of Russia, originator: FBI, originator file number: BU 100-353496, date of letter: May 12, 1960, addressed to: DNI, date rec'd on: May 26, 1960, enclosures: W/O, ONI copy distribution: 921E2-cleared for FF 11/10/60 WB. NARA, JFK files, NIS 1994 release, boxes 1-3.
April 12, 1960, ONI letter to DIO 9ND, OP-921E2/jws, Ser 0236P92; ONI-119, Paul Hoch FOIA files.
Raymond M. Reardon, Security Analysis Group/OS, memo to CIA deputy inspector general, February 1, 1977; Subject: Agency Activities in New Orleans; NARA, JFK files, RIF 1993.06.29.15:18:40:030280.
Director of Naval Intelligence to officer in charge, District Intelligence Office, Eighth Naval District; Subject: Oswald, date: November 15, 1960; Paul Hoch FOIA documents, ONI-96. The copy for DIO-9ND is indicated on the bottom of this letter.
Letter from officer in charge, District Intelligence Office, Ninth Naval District, to officer in charge, District Intelligence Office, Eighth Naval District; Subject: Oswald, date: November 30, 1960; Paul Hoch FOIA documents, ONI-92.
NARA, JFK files, RIF 157-1006-10246; letter from F.O.C. Fletcher, Jr., captain, U.S. Navy, officer in charge, District Intelligence Office, Eighth Naval District, 92/922E, Serial: 053; January 11, 1961, to special agent in charge, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Dallas field office, Re: Oswald, Lee Harvey [handwritten:] 105-976-1, p. 17. For DNI (Director of Naval Intelligence) copy, see PLH item 19. According to Paul Hoch's note, this document was not in Oswald's FBI HQ file. On the other hand, it may have been filed at FBI HQ under 100-353496.
Letter from F.O.C. Fletcher, Jr., captain, U.S. Navy, officer in charge, District Intelligence Office, Eighth Naval District, 92/922E, Serial: 053, January 11, 1961, to special agent in charge, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Dallas field office, Re: Oswald, Lee Harvey [handwritten:] 105-976-1, p. 17. FBI Dallas field office file, PLH item 968.
Letter from F.O.C. Fletcher, Jr., captain, U.S. Navy, officer in charge, District Intelligence Office, Eighth Naval District, 92/922E, Serial: 053, January 11, 1961, to special agent in charge, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Dallas field office, Re: Oswald, Lee Harvey [handwritten:] 105-976-1, p. 17. For DNI (Director of Naval Intelligence) copy, see PLH item 19. According to Paul Hoch's note, this document was not in Oswald's FBI HQ file. On the other hand, it may have been filed at FBI HQ under 100-353496.
As a point of interest, in the files of the FBI field office in Dallas, this document became the second of the new file on Oswald, 100-10461. The first document in 100-10461 was Captain Fletcher's DIO 8ND letter.
NARA, JFK files, RIF 157-10006-10247. Memorandum from John Edgar Hoover, director, to Office of Security, Department of State, February 27, 1961. Subject: Lee Harvey Oswald; Internal Security-Russia. File No. 105-82555.
NARA JFK files, RIF 124-10228-10036; SAC Dallas to SAC New Orleans, Dallas FBI office to SAC New Orleans FBI office, with the slightly different subject line: "Lee Harvey Oswald, SM-C," probably "security matter, Communist" or close to it.
WC Vol. XXVI, p. 94.
Here Fain's memo said "Refer to 92/922E, Serial 051, DIO file #," which was two before Fletcher's 053. Thus far, 051 has not come to light.
PPT, March 2, 1961, from SY/E-Emery J. Adams; Subject: Oswald, Lee Harvey, REF: SY memorandum, June 10, 1960. NARA, JFK files, DOS passport file on Oswald.
HSCA Vol. III, p. 575.
Lee Oswald letter to Robert Oswald, August 21, 1961, WC Vol. XVI, CE 303, 836.
State Department to American Embassy in Moscow, A-273, April 13, 1961. NARA, JFK files, CIA August 1992 release.
The cable advised the embassy:
If and when Mr. Oswald appears at the Embassy, he should be thoroughly questioned regarding the circumstances of his residence in the Soviet Union and his possible commitment of an act or sets of expatriation and, as contemplated by the Embassy, his statements should be taken under oath. If the Embassy is fully satisfied that he has not expatriated himself in any manner and if he presents evidence that he has (appeared) to depart from the Soviet Union to travel to the United States, his passport may be delivered to him on a personal basis only, after being rendered valid for direct return to the United States. For security reasons, the Department does not consider that it would be prudent for the Embassy to forward Oswald's passport to him by mail.
State Department to American Embassy in Moscow, A-273, April 13, 1961. NARA, JFK files, CIA August 1992 release.
SA Kenneth J. Haser, memo to SAC, WFO (105-37111), April 20, 1961. A "V. Dunn" of WFO filed this document as the 3rd in Oswald's FBI WFO file, 105-37111. NARA, JFK files, FBI WFO (105-37111) box 1.
WC Vol. IV, p. 438.
NARA, JFK files, RIF 157-10006-10249; from SAC New Orleans FBI office (100-16601) to SAC Dallas FBI office (100-10461), April 27, 1961; Subject: Lee Harvey Oswald; SM-C; (00: Dallas); Re Dallas let 2/28/61.
The memo contained the following data:
File on Oswald reflected an ONI report by SA John T. Cox dated January 27, 1960, File 33-476, captioned John Edward Pic (DOB 17 Jan '32 S Sgt. AF 11313239 USAF Hospital Tachikowa, APO 323 Communist Matters). In brief this report reflected information concerning Pic's reporting to ONI that Lee Harvey Oswald was his half brother. Basis for Pic inquiry was that he heard that Oswald had turned in his United States passport to the American Embassy at Moscow with intentions of removing his American citizenship. This report contains some background information with respect to Oswald and his family. There was only one copy of this report available in the file; however, it was noted that a copy had been furnished to Carswell Air Force base, Fort Worth, Texas.
Also in this file was a photostatic copy of a telegram from the Department of State, Moscow, Russia, dated October 31, 1959 at 7:59 am carrying Control Number 20261 and another number 1304, which stated in part "Lee Harvey Oswald unmarried, age 20 PP 1733242 issued 9/10/59 appeared at Embassy to renounce his American citizenship following entry USSR from Helsinki 10:15. Mother's address and his latest address in United States 4936 Callinwood Street, Fort Worth, Texas; Says, I have contemplated last two years. Main reason "American Marxist,"; attitude—arrogant, aggressive; recently discharged Marine Corps. Says, has offered Soviets any information he has acquired as Enlisted Radio Operator." This dispatch was signed Freers and apparently directed to the State department, Washington, D.C.
The file also disclosed a photostatic copy of a memorandum report dated November 2, 1959, which was signed Edward F. Freers Charge d'Affaires, ad interim, American Embassy. This report reflected an interview with Oswald at the American Embassy at Moscow, October 31, 1959; however, the quality of the photostatic copy was so poor that it was impossible to review.
Also in ONI's files was a memorandum dated October 26, 1959, bearing a control Number 1178 concerning Robert Edward Webster. This memorandum which was a photostat furnished information concerning Webster, who appears to have defected to the Russians at about the same time as Oswald. This individual was identified as having been discharged from the United States Navy 1951, USN Serial Number 7917938. Here again the photostatic copy was impossible to review because of poor quality.
There appeared a photostatic copy of a November 3, 1959, article which appeared in a Fort Worth, Texas, newspaper, which showed it was a UPI dispatch. It related to an interview with Robert L. Oswald, brother of Lee Harvey Oswald. Also was an autostatic copy of a newspaper story from the "Washington Post," Washington, D.C., newspaper dated November 16, 1959, which indicated that subject had been informed by the Russians that he would not be granted Russian citizenship but would be allowed to live in Russia as a nonresident alien. A picture of Oswald accompanied this brief article. There was another photostatic copy of a story from the "Washington Post" dated November 1, 1959, which had been dispatched by UPI and which related to the defection of subject.
A photostatic copy of a Washington Evening Star article dated November 26, 1959, appeared in this file entitled "U.S. Defects to Reds Determined Marxist at 15." This story related to subject and had been written by Priscilla Johnson for the North American Newspaper Alliance. This article mainly reflected an interview with the subject.
There was also found in ONI's files a photostatic copy of a "Speed" letter dated March 8, 1960, to the Commander Marine Air Reserve Training Command, Naval Air Station, Glenview, Illinois, from Commandant of the Marine Corps, Washington, D.C., and signed A. Larson. It stated as follows:
"Arrangements being made with a Federal Investigation Agency to furnish you report which relates to PFC Lee Harvey Oswald, Number 1653230 USMCR inactive, CMN, a member of your Command X, upon receipt CMM. You are directed to process PFC for discharge IAWPARA.10277.2.f MACROMANX."
NARA, JFK files, RIF 157-10006-10249; from SAC New Orleans FBI office (100-16601) to SAC Dallas FBI office (100-10461), April 27, 1961; Subject: Lee Harvey Oswald; SM-C; (OO: Dallas); Re Dallas let 2/28/61.
NARA, JFK files, RIF 157-10006-10249; from SAC New Orleans FBI office (100-16601) to SAC Dallas FBI office (100-10461), April 27, 1961; Subject: Lee Harvey Oswald; SM-C; (OO: Dallas); Re Dallas let 2/28/61.
FBI Memo from SAC Dallas to SAC New Orleans; Subject: Lee Harvey Oswald, SM-C, April 28, 1961; NARA, JFK files, RIF 157-10006-10248.
WC Vol. XXII, CE 1127, p. 98.
Record number 157-10006010348. Memorandum from special agent in charge at FBI Dallas (100-10461-4) to special agent in charge at FBI New Orleans (16601-3 and 105-82555-54), April 28, 1961. Subject: Lee Harvey Oswald, SM-C, OO-Dallas.
NARA, JFK files, FBI, New Orleans (100-10461), April 28, 1961.
Memorandum from Special Agent in Charge at the FBI Washington field office (105-37111-4) to the director of the FBI (100-10,461-6), May 23, 1961. Subject: Lee Harvey Oswald.
NARA, JFK files, RIF 124-10010-10014.
Memorandum from Emery J. Adams, for the director, Office of Security to the Honorable J. Edgar Hoover, director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Washington 25, D.C. (105-82555-15). May 25, 1961. Subject: Oswald, Lee Harvey.
Memorandum from Emery J. Adams, for the director, Office of Security to the Honorable J. Edgar Hoover, director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Washington 25, D.C. (105-82555-15). May 25, 1961. Subject: Oswald, Lee Harvey.
# Chapter Thirteen
Exhibit 22, FBI memorandum from D. E. Moore to A. H. Belmont, March 10, 1961, SSCIA hearing, Volume IV, mail opening.
CIA letter to Robert Olsen, SSCIA, April 29, 1975, re: answers to questions put to the CIA by Paul Hoch; CIA document 1634-1088.
HSCA Report, p. 205.
June 22 memo from Deputy Chief, CI/Project to Deputy Chief, CI, HT/ LINGUAL-61G10AK, NARA, JFK files, RIF 1994.04.13.14.53:55:500005.
CIA HT/LINGUAL notecard on Oswald, November 9, 1959, NARA, JFK files, RIF 1994.04.13.14:53:55:500005.
CIA HT/LINGUAL notecard on Oswald, August 7, 1961, NARA, JFK files, RIF 1994.04.13.14:53:55:500005.
Embassy dispatch to State #806, date May 26, 1961; NARA JFK files, CIA DDO 201 file on Oswald, boxes 1 and 2.
Cable from American Embassy in Moscow (4495881) to the Department of State, Washington (201-298248), May 26, 1961. Subject: Citizenship and Passports: Lee Harvey Oswald.
Cable from American Embassy in Moscow (4495881) to the Department of State, Washington (201-298248), May 26, 1961. Subject: Citizenship and Passports: Lee Harvey Oswald.
"Progress Report: 1962-1963," by John Mertz, Chief, CI/Project; NARA, JFK files, CIA January 1994 (5 brown boxes) release. See p. 3 of "Progress Report."
WC Vol. XXII, p. 754 (Marina said trip was late summer 1961), p. 744 (Marina said trip was July 8,9,10, 1961).
WR, p. 705.
WC Vol. XVI p. 103, CE 24, entry of July 8, 1961.
WC Vol. XXII CE 1401 ( p. 278), p. 754.
WC Vol. XVIII, p. 137, CE 935; WR, p. 706.
WC Vol. XVI pp. 94-98; CE 24, entries of October 16, 1959, through January 4, 1960; CE 908.
WC Vol. XXII, p. 702, CE 1385, p. 4; P. Johnson DE 1, pp. 3, 6, 14; P. Johnson DE 2, pp. 1-2; 11 H 456 (P. Johnson); Vol. XI, p. 456 CE 985, document 1C-2, p. 6.
WC Vol. XXII, CE 1109, pp. 67-68; CE 1110, pp. 69-72; and CE 1128, pp. 104-109.
WR, p. 706.
WC Vol. XVIII p. 138, CE 935 p. 2.
WC Vol. XVIII p. 144, CE 938.
WR, p. 705.
WC Vol. XVIII, 139, CE 935, p. 3.
WC Vol. V, p. 284 (Snyder); WC Vol. XVIII p. 161, CE 946, pp. 2-3.
WC Vol. V, p. 284 (Snyder); CE 946, p. 6.
WC Vol. XVIII, CE 944, p. 158; Vol. V, pp. 304-306 and pp. 318-319, (McVickar); Vol. XVIII, CE 959 (p. 6), pp. 335-338.
WC Vol. XVIII, pp. 264-266, CE 950; WC Vol. XXII, p. 88; WC Vol. XXVI, p. 123.
WC Vol. XXII, p. 121.
Cable from Department of State, Washington (No. W-7) to American Embassy, Moscow, July 11, 1961. Subject: Citizenship and Passports: Lee Harvey Oswald.
Cable from American Embassy in Moscow to Department of State in Washington, July 11, 1961. Subject: Citizenship and Passports: Lee Harvey Oswald.
WC Vol. XVI p. 103, CE 24, entry of July 14, 1961; WC Vol. XVI p. 833, CE 301.
WC Vol. XVI p. 103, CE 24, entry of July 14, 1961; WC Vol. XVI p. 833, CE 301.
WR, p. 706.
WC Vol. XVIII, CE 935, p. 137; CE 985, documents 1B, 2B, 3B, 4B, in WC Vol. XVIII, pp. 403—479; see CE 1401 pp. 227—278, 280, in WC Vol. XXII, pp. 740—764.
CE 1122, pp. 2—3, in WC Vol. XXII, pp. 87—88.
WC Vol. XVI p. 104, CE 24, entry of August 24—September 1, 1961.
WC Vol. XVI p. 104, CE 24, entry of September—October 18, 1961.
WC Vol. XVIII, p. 405, CE 985.
WC Vol. XVIII pp. 405, 442, CE 985.
WC Vol. XXII, p. 9.
WC Vol. XVII, p. 720; WC Vol. XVIII, p. 266, CE 950; WC Vol. XXII, pp. 35, 87; WC Vol. XXVI, p. 122—copy.
WC Vol. XVII, p. 720; WC Vol XXII, pp. 35, 87; WC Vol. XXVI, p. 122.
WC Vol.XVII, pp. 405, 444, CE 985.
WC Vol. XXVI, p. 115. Usual procedures and times required discussed in WC Vol. XXVI, p. 102.
November 25, 1963, internal CIA memo by "T.B.C." CIA document 435-173A. NARA, JFK files, RIF 1993. 07.17.09:57:50:000150.
September 28, 1961, CIA memo, see CIA document 598-252H; see also NARA, JFK files, RIF 1993.07.02.13:25:25:180530.
WC Vol. XVII, p. 720; WC Vol. XXII, pp. 35, 88; WC Vol. XXVI, p. 123—copy.
Moscow Embassy dispatch 317 to the State Department, October 13, 1961, NARA, JFK files, CIA DDO 201 file on Oswald, boxes 1-2.
WC Vol. XXVI, p. 115.
WC Vol. V, p. 604, A comparison of the time it took Marina to get an exit visa with other cases. WC Vol. XXVI, p. 140, Marina requested the visa on August 21, 1961, and it was issued on December 1, 1961, or 101 days later. See Ambassador Thompson's statement above—December 1, 1961, that CIA said that, of 11 similar cases, the time required was from 5 months to 1 year; see WC Vol. 26, p. 157. The CIA said of 26 cases, 3—the wife accompanied the husband upon departure; 15—the husband left first; 8—uncertain. Author Isaac Don Levine said it is hard for a pharmacist to get out of the USSR; see WC Vol. II, p. 8. Oswald said USSR had made it difficult for Marina to leave; see FBI Report, CD 1, p. 32.
WC Vol. V, p. 572.
"Progress Report: 1962—1963," by John Mertz, Chief, CI/Project, April 1964; NARA, JFK files, CIA January 1994 (5 brown boxes) release.
February 12, 1963, Hemming letter to Major General C. V. Clifton, President Kennedy's military aide, February 12, 1963. NARA, JFK files, ONI-OSI boxes 1—3.
Memo from Jerry G. Brown, Deputy Chief OS/SAG, to Chief, SAG, June 11, 1976; NARA, JFK files, RIF 1993.06.029.15:26:50:400280.
NARA, JFK files, Chief CI/Operational Approval and Support Division, to Deputy Director of Security, on c.87424 [Hemming], January 3, 1961. There is a handwritten signature at the bottom: "Thomas Carroll, Jr.," underneath which are the initials "DWK."
NARA, JFK files, ONI-NIS (3 boxes) 1994 release. The associated transmittal sheet shows that on March 2, 1961, the CIA requested checks for Gerald Patrick Hemming's name (using the old "Henning" instead of Hemming) through the records of the FBI, ONI, ACSI, STATE (sy), STATE (passport) and HCUA; NARA, JFK files, ONI-NIS (3 boxes) 1994 release. On the transmittal sheet the file number used for Hemming was "EE-29229"; same location.
NARA, JFK files, ONI-NIS (3 boxes) 1994 release. CIA memorandum, March 31, 1961, subject: Gerald P. Hemming, Jr., Moves to Miami to Engage in Anti-Castro Operations.
NARA, JFK files, ONI-NIS (3 boxes) 1994 release. CIA memorandum, March 31, 1961, subject: Gerald P. Hemming, Jr., Moves to Miami to Engage in Anti-Castro Operations.
"It is always possible, on the other hand," the March 31 CIA report said, "that he is still loyal to the Cuban Government and at some future date will attempt to embarrass the US. NARA, JFK files, ONI-NIS (3 boxes) 1994 release; CIA memorandum,. March 31, 1961, subject: Gerald P. Hemming, Jr., Moves to Miami to Engage in Anti-Castro Operations.
NARA, JFK files, ONI-NIS (3 boxes) 1994 release. CIA telegram from SAC DFO to Chief Invest. Div. May 10, 1961, subject: GPH JR EE 29229 [Gerald Patrick Hemming].
NARA, JFK files, ONI-NIS (3 boxes) 1994 release. CIA telegram from SAC DFO to Chief Invest. Div. May 10, 1961, subject: GPH JR EE 29229 [Gerald Patrick Hemming].
NARA, JFK files, ONI-NIS (3 boxes) 1994 release. Memorandum from M. D. Stevens, Security Research Staff, OS to File. 25 July 1961. Subject: Hemming, Gerald Patrick, Jr. EE-29229.
NARA, JFK files, ONI-NIS (3 boxes) 1994 release, box 1. ONI status check from OP—921E2 to CMC (ABN), May 25, 1961, Subject: Hemming, Gerald Patrick.
NARA, JFK files, ONI-NIS (3 boxes) 1994 release, box 1. Cross-reference sheet prepared by OP921E2/PIERCE, YN1 on May 26, 1961 regarding Gerald Patrick Henning, Robert Wills aka Willis and Dick Watley for an FBI report of May 19, 1961 on Anti-Communist Legionnaires Neutrality Matters. ONI Routing Slip No. GG 89169.
NARA, JFK files, ONI-NIS (3 boxes) 1994 release, box 1. Cross-reference sheet prepared by OP921E2/mlb, YN1 on June 16, 1961, from an FBI report of May 23, 1961, subject: Anti-Communist Legionnaires Matters; ONI Routing Slip No. XX 138316.
Papa Doc was president of Haiti.
Gerry Patrick Hemming, January 6, 1995, interview with John Newman.
NARA, JFK files, ONI-NIS (3 boxes) 1994 release, box 1. Cross-reference sheet prepared by OP921E2/mlb, YN1 on June 16, 1961, from an FBI report of May 23, 1961, subject: Anti-Communist Legionnaires Matters; ONI Routing Slip No. XX 138316.
ONI mentioned a May 25, 1961, status check on Gerald Patrick Hemming and a May 18, 1961, FBI report on Anti-Communist Legionnaires; NARA, JFK files ONI-NIS (3 boxes). 1994 release, box 1. Memorandum from Director of Naval Intelligence, Commandant of the Marine Corps to Assistant Chief of State G-2, Headquarters USMC (AO-2A) Rm. 2117—Arlington Annex, July 5, 1961, subject: Hemming, Gerald Patrick, 1488247, USMCR, Serial Number 21252P92.
NARA, JFK files, ONI-NIS (3 boxes) 1994 release. Memorandum from William Abbott to J. Edgar Hoover, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Attn: Liaison Section, July 6, 1961, subject: Hemming, Gerald Patrick, 1488247, USMCR, Serial Number 21251P92.
NARA, JFK files, 173-10011-10063. Status check from OP-921E2 to CMC (ABN), September 19, 1961, subject: Hemming, Gerald Patrick, Jr.
NARA, JFK files, ONI-NIS (3 boxes) 1994 release, box 1. Memorandum from William Abbott to J. Edgar Hoover, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Attn: Liaison Section, October 23, 1961, subject: SGT Gerald Patrick Hemming, Jr., USMCR, 1488247 (inactive), Serial Number 28106P92.
NARA, JFK files, ONI-NIS (3 boxes) 1994 release. Memorandum from Director of Naval Intelligence to Officer in Charge, District Intelligence Office, Sixth Naval District, October 23, 1961, serial number 015807P92. The ONI letter to 6ND mentioned a Miami FBI report on Eloy Gutierrez Menoya, a Cuban exile leader with whom Hemming was associated. Menoya's Miami FBI case number was 105-2102. See also NARA, JFK files, ONI-NIS (3 boxes) 1994 release. Memorandum from Director of Naval Intelligence to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Headquarters ASMC (AO-2A), Rm. 2117—Arlington Annex, October 23, 1961, subject: Sgt. Gerald Patrick Hemming, Jr., serial number 007630P92.
NARA, JFK files, ONI-NIS (3 boxes) 1994 release, box 3. Memorandum from Officer in Charge, District Intelligence Office, Sixth Naval District to Director Sixth Marine Corps Reserve and Recruitment District, Atlanta, Georgia, November 3, 1961, subject: Hemming, Gerald Patrick, Serial Number 01895.
NARA, JFK files, 173-10011-10092. Memorandum from Officer in Charge, District Intelligence Office, Sixth Naval District to Officer in Charge, District Intelligence Office, Eleventh Naval District, December 5, 1961, subject: Hemming, Gerald Patrick, serial number: 02028.
NARA, JFK files, ONI-NIS (3 boxes) 1994 release, box 1. Cross-reference sheet prepared by "pCarter," Op-921E on August 8, 1961, for an FBI report of July 12, 1961, regarding Cuban Rebel Activities in Cuba. ONI Routing Slip No. XX 141692.
NARA, JFK files, ONI-NIS (3 boxes) 1994 release, box 1. Cross-reference sheet prepared by 921E/mlb on August 10, 1961, for an FBI report of July 3, 1961, regarding the Revolutionary Junta of National Liberation. Serial number 105-4050, ONI Routing Slip No. XX 140903.
NARA, JFK files, ONI-NIS (3 boxes) 1994 release, box 1. Cross-reference sheet prepared by OP921E2/PIERCE YN1 on August 25, 1961, regarding Gerald Patrick Hemming for an FBI report of July 31, 1961, on Intercontinental Penetration Forces (INTERPEN). ONI Routing Slip No. XX 14425.
NARA, JFK files, 1993.06.29.14:52:03:810280. Memorandum of October 4, 1961, marked OO-A-3198214. Subject: Intercontinental Penetration Force (INTERPEN)/CBS-NBC Interest in Cuban Expedition.
Origin of report: FBI; Serial number: MM 105-3514; Subject of report: James William Beck, John Clifford Nordeen, etc.; Date of report: November 14, 1961; Classification: Unclassified; ONI Routing Slip no.: XX 151346; NARA, JFK files.
FBI Dallas, report of Wallace Heitman and Hayden Griffin, September 8, 1964, Dallas 100-10461; WC, CD 1546.
One guess that comes to mind is the name Thomas W. Comier, offered as a possibility by a former CIA employee.
# Chapter Fourteen
FPCC, document 1.
Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders: An Interim Report of the Select Committee to Study Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, hereafter referred to as Alleged Assassination Plots (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975) p. 13.
Alleged Assassination Plots. pp. 13-190.
NARA, JFK files, CIA 1994 microfilm release, RIF 1994.03.08.13:30: 54:000007; reel 11, folders E-F.
CIA document, dated October 28, 1960, "LA File on Viola June Cobb as Reviewed by Ed Lopez," NARA, JFK files, RIF 1994.03.08.13:30: 54:000007; CIA 1994 microfilm release, reel 11.
CIA document, dated October 28, 1960, "LA File on Viola June Cobb as Reviewed by Ed Lopez," NARA, JFK files, RIF 1994.03.08.13:30: 54:000007; CIA 1994 microfilm release, reel 11.
CIA memo from chief, WH/4/CI [name redacted] to Jane Roman, CI Staff Liaison Group, March 1, 1961; NARA, JFK files, CIA 1994 microfilm release, reel 11, folder F; RIF 1994.03.09.09:05:37:810007.
C/CI/SIG (Birch O'Neal) memorandum, November 22, 1960; NARA, JFK files, CIA 1994 microfilm release, reel 11, folder F.
CIA routing slip to CSCI 3/762466, from Jean T. Pierson, WH/4/CI, November 1, 1960; Nara, JFK files, CIA 1994 microfilm release, reel 11, folder F.
CIA memo for the record, February 1, 1961, by Kammer, subject: [redacted] #188-74. NARA, JFK files, CIA January 1994 (five brown boxes) release.
To: C/EAB/OS; Attn: Mr. Belt; VIA: WH/4/Security; Attn: Mr. Kennedy; February 1, 1961; Subj. Fair Play for Cuba Committee. NARA, JFK files, CIA January 1994 (five brown boxes) release.
To: Mr. Jack Kennedy, WH/4/Security; March 8, 1961 "Please include this statement in my permanent record. Thank you [redacted] WH/4/Registry, phone ext. 2929. NARA, JFK files, CIA, January 1994 (5 brown boxes) release, Court Wood papers.
CIA memo to Mr. Jack Kennedy, WH/4/Security, March 18, 1961, NARA, JFK files, CIA January 1994 (5 brown boxes) release.
Memo for the director FBI; Attn: Mr. Sam J. Papich; from R. F. Bannerman, acting director of Security, CIA, October 7, 1961; subject: Court Foster Wood; Internal Security—Cuba; NARA, JFK files, CIA, January 1994 (5 brown boxes) release, Court Wood papers.
The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence Agencies; Book V, Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, hereafter referred to as Church Committee, vol. V, (Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976) book V, p. 66.
Church Committee, Book V, p. 66.
. WR, p. 709; the Warren Report continues: "He told her that he would need about $800 and that she should insist on a gift rather than a loan; he told her not to send any of her own money [for the letter, see WC, vol. XVI, CE 189, pp. 554—556]. Despite his instructions, she requested a loan from the Red Cross [see WC, vol. XXVI, CE 2731, p. 110 and CE 2660, p. 13]. Oswald wrote to the IRC himself on January 13, asking for $800 to cover the cost of travel for two from Moscow to Texas. On January 26, 1961, Oswald wrote to the IRC again, this time asking for $1000; see WR, p. 709.
WC, vol. XVI, CE 246, pp. 688-690.
WC, vol. XXII, CE 1078, p. 26.
WC, vol. XVI, CE 256, pp. 717—718.
WR, p. 709; see also WC, vol. XXII, CE 1079, p. 27. A point of interest: Before receiving this letter, Oswald wrote out such a document himself [see WC, vol. XXVI, CE 2692, p. 57] and mailed it to the embassy [see WC, vol. XVI, CE 247, pp. 691—692]. On January 31, the embassy responded that this affidavit might not satisfy the requirement; WC, vol. XXII, CE 1080, p. 28. Later, by March 16, 1962, the embassy changed this position, and decided that Oswald's own affidavit of support for Marina would be sufficient under the circumstances; see WC, vol. XXII, CE 1095, p. 46.
WC, vol. XVI, CE 256, pp. 717—718; see also WC, vol. XVIII, p. 270; and WC, vol. XXVI, p. 117.
The idea of Marina as some sort of protection for Oswald was first mentioned to the author by David Lifton in 1992.
WC vol. XVI, pp. 691—692.
WR, pp. 709—710; see also WC, vol. XVI, CE 190, pp. 558—559. On January 24, the embassy acknowledged receipt of this affidavit, but again suggested that Oswald obtain one from someone else; see WC, vol. XXII, CE 1080, p. 28, and CE 1101, p. 51.
WC, vol. XXII, CE 1058, p. 10; Dallas Morning News, 11/12/63, p. 1-5; Vol. XXII, CE 1082, p. 29.
WC, vol. XVI, CE 192, p. 562.
WC, vol. XVI, CE 222, p. 612.
WC, vol. XVI, CE 192, p. 562.
WC, vol. XVI, CE 193, p. 564—566.
WC, vol. XVI, CE 315, p. 871.
WR, p. 711; see also WC, vol. XVI, CE 193, p. 564. Researchers should note that in the retyped version of this letter, the misspelled word "forwarned" is erroneously typed as "forwarded."
WC, vol. XVI, CE 314, p. 865.
WC, vol. I, p. 95; see also WC, vol. CE 194, p. 567; WC vol. XXII, CE 1112, p. 75, CE 1401, p. 748; and Dallas Morning News 12/2/63, p. 1-5; and Life magazine, 2/21/64, p. 74B.
WC, vol. XVI, CE 194, pp. 567—569.
WC, vol. XVI, CE 315, p. 870.
WC, vol. XVIII, CE 994, p. 612. Elsewhere Oswald gives the date of their return from the hospital as February 24, see WC, vol. XVI, CE 316, p. 875.
WC, vol. XVI, CE 316, p. 875.
WC, vol.XVI, CE 195, pp. 570—571.
WC, vol. XVI, CE 316, p. 875.
WR, p. 711. WC Vol. XVI, CE 316, p. 875.
WC, vol. XVII, CE 823, p. 722; CE 950, pp. 273—274.
WC, vol. XXII, CE 1093, p. 40; WC, vol. XXVI, CE 2682, p. 41; see also WC, vol. XVI, CE 248, pp. 693—695.
WC, vol. XXII, CE 1086, p. 35, and WR, p. 711.
WC, vol. XXII, CE 1058, p. 5; see also Dallas Morning New, 11/23/63, p. 1—5.
WC, vol. XVIII, CE 950, p. 272.
Laredo Times, 11/24/63.
New York Times, 1/25/63, p. C9.
WC, vol. XVI, CE 191, p. 560.
WC, vol. XVI, CE 190, p. 558.
The discharge had actually been "undesirable," a less derogatory characterization than dishonorable.
WC, vol. XVI, CE 314, p. 865.
WC, vol. XVI, CE 314, p.865.
Then governor of Texas. It is possible that Oswald thought Connally was still Secretary of the Navy.
WC, vol. XIX, Folsom exhibit 1, p. 713.
WC, vol. XIX, Folsom exhibit 1, p. 711; WC, vol. XXVI, CE 2663, p. 19.
WC, vol. XIX, Folsom exhibit 1, p. 689.
WC, vol. XXVI, CE 2686, p. 47.
WC, vol. XIX, Folsom exhibit 1, p. 695; see also WC, vol. XVII, CE 823, p. 723—724. This letter appeared to be too polished for Oswald; see WC, vol. XIX, Folsom exhibit 1, p. 695. Oswald's letter to John Connally in January 1962 appeared to be ghost written.'; see WC, vol. XIX, Folsom exhibit 1, p. 713; there is a 12-page opinion that Oswald was dyslexic; see WC, vol. XXVI, CE 3134, pp. 812—817.
WC, vol. XXVI, CE 2658, p. 12.
WC, vol. XXVI, CE 2661, pp. 14—16; WR, pp. 710—711.
WC, vol. Folsom exhibit 1, p. 693.
WC, vol. XVII, CE 780, p. 657.
WC, vol. XXII, CE 1063, p. 13. See also CE 1103, pp. 55—57; WC, vol. XVI, CE 249, pp. 697—699 and WR, p. 711.
WC, vol. XVI, CE 196, pp. 573—574. See also WC, vol. XXVI, CE 2653, p. 3.
WR, p. 711.
WC, vol. XXVI, CE 2653, p. 3.
WC, vol. XVI, CE 196, pp. 573—574.
WC, vol. XVI, CE 197, pp. 576—577.
WC, vol. XVII, CE 823, p. 724.
WC, vol. XVI, CE 317, p. 877.
WC, vol. XVI, CE 317, p. 877; WR, p. 711.
WC, vol. XVI, CE 249, pp. 697-699; WC, vol. XXII, CE 1083, p. 30; WC, vol. XXII, CE 1088, p. 37; WC, vol. XXVI, CE 2687, p. 47; WC, vol. XXVI, CE 2688, p. 48; WR, p. 711.
WC, vol. XXII, CE 1313, p.485.
WC, vol. XVIII, CE 985, document 9A p. 435; WC, vol. XXII, CE 1108, pp. 65-66; WC, vol. XXII, CE 1314, p. 486.
WC, vol. XXII, CE 1108, pp. 65-66; WC, vol. XXII, CE 1109, pp. 67—68; WC, vol. XXII, CE 1128. p. 107; WR, p. 712.
WC, vol. XVIII, CE 985, p. 435; see also WC, vol. XXII, CE 1108, p. 66, CE 1341, p. 486.
WC, vol. XVI, CE 318, p. 880.
WC, vol. XVI, CE 318; WR, p. 172.
HSCA, Vol. II, p. 317; see also Marina and Lee, MacMillan, p. 187. The Oswalds went to Moscow and stayed at the Hotel Ostankino first and then moved to the Hotel Berlin; see WC, vol. XVIII, CE 994, p. 614.
WC, vol. XVIII, CE 946, p. 165.
WC, vol. V, pp. 617—618 (Marina Oswald); see also WC, vol. XXVI, CE 2722, p. 102; and WR, p. 712.
WC, vol. XVIII, CE 946, pp. 164, 167; see also WC vol. XXII, CE 1070, p. 22. Note entries for July (1961) 8, 9, 10. Marina was given a visa; see WC, vol. XVII, CE 823, p. 727. In spite of her firm statement that she was not a Communist (see WC, vol. XXVI, CE 2690, p. 52) U.S. Ambassador Thompson thought the Soviet treatment of Marina noteworthy, and he said that it was unusual for the Russians to allow the baby to leave; see WC, vol. V, p. 572.
WC, vol. XVIII, CE 946, pp. 160—170; and see also WC, vol. XXII, CE 1401, p. 755.
WC, vol. XXVI, CE 2654, p. 4; CE 2662, p. 18; CE 2690, pp. 49-52; CE 2704, p. 75; and CE 2656, p. 11.
WC, vol. XVI, CE 29, p. 141.
WC, vol. XVI, CE 198, p. 578; see also Life magazine, 2/21/64, and New York Times, 12/9/63, p. C38.
WC, vol. XXII, CE 1098, p. 47.
WC, vol.XXII, CE 1099, p. 48.
WC, vol. XVI, CE 57, p.198
WR, p. 712
WC, vol. XVIII, CE 946, pp. 168—169; see also HSCA, vol. II, pp. 288, 310—311. When the Oswalds crossed Poland (WC, vol. XVIII, CE 946, p. 169) they stopped in somewhere "just for a few minutes"; see HSCA, vol. XII, p. 368. For Germany, see WC, vol. XVIII, CE 946 p. 168; and WC, vol. XXII, CE 1401, p. 755. The train made one or two short stops in Germany; see HSCA, vol. XII, p. 368.
WC, vol. XVIII, CE 946, 18, p. 166.
WC, vol.I, p. 100; see also WC, vol. XVIII, CE p. 615; and HSCA, Vol. II, p. 288; and Dallas Morning News, 12/2/63, p. 1-5. The Oswalds spent one night in Rotterdam; see HSCA, vol. II, p. 289. They stayed in a boardinghouse-type place, where the landlady brought meals to their room; see HSCA, vol. II, pp. 289, 310; and HSCA, vol. XII, p. 369. Lee left Marina only once "to obtain tickets for this boat"; see HSCA, vol. XII, p. 369.
WC, vol. XVI, CE 29, pp. 137—145; WC, vol. XVIII, CE 946, pp. 161—170; WC, vol. XXII, CE 1099, p. 48.
On the Maasdam, Marina met only two people—the steward at the dining table and one gentleman whose father was Russian and mother was from Holland; see HSCA, vol. XII, p. 371. The steward was Pieter Didenko; see Legend, Epstein, p. 154
WC, vol. I, (Marina Oswald), p. 101.
WR, p. 712
WC, vol. XXVI, CE 2655, p. 8.
WC, vol. XXII, CE 1159, p. 204; see also WC, vol. XXVI, pp. 5—11; WC, vol. XVIII, CE 946, pp. 160—170.
WC, vol. XXVI, CE, 2655, p. 8. For more on Oswald's arrival, see WC, vol. I, p. 3; WC, vol. XVII, CE 823, p. 727; WC, vol. XVIII, CE 946 p. 167; WC, vol. XX, Isaacs exhibit 1, pp. 216, 225; WC, vol. XXII, CE 1159, pp. 204, CE 1401. p. 755, CE 1444, p. 860; WC, vol. XXIII, CE 1778, p. 383; WC, vol. XXIV, CE 2189, p. 866; WC, vol. XXV, CE 2213, p. 106; Dallas Morning News, 12/2/63, p. 1-5; Saturday Evening Post, 12/14/63, p. 23. On 12/14/63, Oswald said that he arrived about July 1962; see WC, vol. XXIV, CE 1988, p. 19.
WC, vol. XXVI, CE 2655, pp. 5—10.
WC, vol. XXVI, CE 2655, pp. 5—10; CE, 2657, p.12.
WC, vol. XXII, CE 1060, p. 11; WC, vol. XXVI, CE 2718, pp. 92—93.
WC, vol. XXV, CE 2213, pp. 106—107.
WC, vol. XXVI, CE 2655, p. 8, CE 2657, p. 12.
WC, vol. XXV, CE 2213, p. 107.
WC, vol. XXVI, CE 2657, p. 12.
WC, vol. XXV, CE 2213, p. 109; WR, p. 713.
NARA, JFK files, NIS (3 boxes) 1994 release. Cable from CIA field station to headquarters. January 31, 1963. No. R 311635Z ZEA. Subject: Gerald P. Hemming.
NARA, JFK files, NIS (3 boxes) 1994 release. Memorandum from Lt. R. L. Wilbar, Temple DB to Sheriff Peter J. Pitchens. January 30, 1962. File no. 3-781,031. Subject: Found gun.
NARA, JFK files, NIS (3 boxes) 1994 release. Cable from CIA field station to headquarters. January 31, 1963. No. R 311635Z ZEA. Subject: Gerald P. Hemming
NARA, JFK files, NIS (3 boxes) 1994 release. Memorandum from CIA headquarters to special agent in charge, Los Angeles Field Office, February 7, 1962. Subject: Hemming, Gerald P.
NARA, JFK files, NIS (3 boxes) 1994 release. Memorandum from deputy chief, Operational Support Division to chief, Support Branch, February 2, 1962. Subject: Hemming, Gerald Patrick.
NARA, JFK files, NIS (3 boxes) 1994 release. Memorandum from deputy chief, Operational Support Division to chief, Support Branch, February 2, 1962. Subject: Hemming, Gerald Patrick.
NARA, JFK files, NIS (3 boxes) 1994 release. Memorandum from CIA headquarters to special agent in charge, Los Angeles Field office, February 7, 1962. Subject: Hemming, Gerald P.
NARA, JFK files NIS (3 boxes) 1994 release. CIA report of February 15, 1962, on Gerald P. Hemming. File no. 29 229.
NARA, JFK files, NIS (3 boxes) 1994 release. CIA report of February 15, 1962, on Gerald P. Hemming. File no. 29 229. This report had a new fragment of the gun incident as well: Hemming "claimed that he left his .45-automatic pistol in Miami when he came to the Los Angeles area several weeks ago, but that one of his colleagues, who arrived in Los Angeles shortly before the police incident, had brought the gun with him. Subject had then left the gun in Dodd's Barber Shop on Valley Boulevard."
NARA, JFK files, 173-10011-10096. Cross-reference sheet prepared by P. Carter, Op-921E on April 24, 1962, regarding Gerald Patrick Hemming, for an FBI report of April 10, 1962, on Robert James Dwyer.
NARA, JFK files, NIS (3 boxes) 1994 release, box 1. Cross-reference sheet prepared by 921E/jgr on June 11, 1962, for an FBI report of May 28, 1962, regarding the 30th of November Revolutionary Movement, with serial number 105-92196.
HSCA, vol. X, pp. 96—97.
NARA, JFK files, RIF 173-10011-10086. Cross-reference sheet prepared by P. Carter, Op-921E on January 16, 1962 from an FBI report of December 6, 1961, Intercontinental Penetration Forces Interpen Neutrality Matters, ONI routing slip no. XX 152779.
Origin of report: FBI; serial number: 105-6010; subject of report: Larry J. Laborde (this might be Laborde's FBI number at the Miami office); see NARA, JFK files, 173-10002-10078. Cross-reference sheet prepared by 921E/jgr on September 10, 1962, for an FBI report of August 6, 1962, on Larry J. Laborde, with serial number 105-6010.
WR, p. 324.
NARA, JFK files, NIS (3 boxes) 1994 release. Cross-reference sheet prepared by 921F5 (M. Wesley) on February 6, 1962, for a case history of the Intercontinental Penetration Forces.
The author is appreciative of the help provided by Commander Steve Vetter, U.S. Navy, in procuring a declassified copy of Office of Naval Intelligence Sectional Organization, printed on April 15, 1957, and other unclassified notes on changes in 1958, 1959, 1960, and 1961.
NARA, JFK files, NIS (3 boxes) 1994 release, box 1. Cross-reference sheet prepared by 921E/jgr on June 11, 1962 for an FBI report of May 28, 1962 regarding the 30th of November Revolutionary Movement, with serial number 105-92196.
"Prior Reference: A memorandum from chief, New Orleans office of Domestic Contact Division, to chief, Domestic Contact Division, July 2, 1962, subject: Proposal Made to New Orleans Refugee Group for the Military Training of a Refugee Group in the State of Louisiana." See NARA, JFK files, NIS (3 boxes) 1994 release. Enclosure 14 to memorandum dated August 7, 1967, held in Garrison Investigation of Kennedy Assassination. Subject: Gerald Patrick Hemming, Jr.
"Prior Reference: A memorandum from chief, New Orleans office of Domestic Contact Division, to chief, Domestic Contact Division, July 2, 1962, subject: Proposal Made to New Orleans Refugee Group for the Military Training of a Refugee Group in the State of Louisiana." See NARA, JFK files, NIS (3 boxes) 1994 release. Enclosure 14 to memorandum dated August 7, 1967, held in Garrison Investigation of Kennedy Assassination. Subject: Gerald Patrick Hemming, Jr.
To: [CIA] "Internal Component"; Attn: [CIA] "Internal Component"; [source name redacted and original CIA components redacted, but were presumably Task Force W or Western Hemisphere Division Branch 3 or 4] Subject: Proposal Made to New Orleans Cuban Refugee Group for Military Training of a Refugee Group in the State of Louisiana. See NARA, JFK files, NIS (3 boxes) 1994 release.
To: [CIA] "Internal Component"; Attn: [CIA] "Internal Component"; [source name redacted and original CIA components redacted, but were presumably Task Force W or Western Hemisphere Division Branch 3 or 4] Subject: Proposal Made to New Orleans Cuban Refugee Group for Military Training of a Refugee Group in the State of Louisiana. See NARA, JFK files, NIS (3 boxes) 1994 release. At the bottom of the document it says: ["CIA Employee"] ["CIA Employee"] Encls: There is also this handwriting at the end of page 2: "Attachments filed in Laborde 201 since he is probably the leader and most important from . . . [illegible]." Bartes is the source. The reviewers blacked out his name everywhere in this memo except for paragraph 5, where the name Bartes was left in the clear, apparently by mistake.
Request for investigation or name check, from chief, CI/Operational Approval and Support Division, to deputy director for Security January 3, 1961, subject: C:87424 (Bartes); NARA, JFK files, CIA, January 1994 (5 brown boxes) release, Bartes papers.
Request for investigation or name check, from chief, CI/Operational Approval and Support Division, to deputy director for Security, September 13, 1965, subject: 201-289885, SO #225714 (both for Bartes); NARA, JFK files, CIA, January 1994 (5 brown boxes) release, Bartes papers.
# Chapter Fifteen
FBI memorandum from director (105-82555) to SAC Dallas (100-10461), May 31, 1962, NARA, JFK files, FBI, Dallas, 100-10461-20.
FBI airtel from director (105-82555) to SAC New York (105-38431), Lee Harvey Oswald, June 14, 1962; NARA, JFK files, RIF 124-10160-10405; see also New York FBI 105-38431, document 9; see also Paul Hoch item 485.
FBI memorandum from SAC New York (105-38431) to director, (105-82555), Lee Harvey Oswald, June 26, 1962; NARA, JFK files, RIF 124-10010-10032; for New York copy see RIF 124-10160-10406. The New York report, sent to the Bureau on June 26, also said that FBI special Agent William F. Martin had spoken with INS inspector Frederick J. Wiedersheim, who had talked with Oswald upon his arrival. Oswald said he had been a mechanic in the Soviet Union and had "threatened to renounce his US citizenship but never carried through with the threat," Wiedersheim reported.
He also gives his height at 5' 11", which was 2" taller than his true height; CD 571; CD 385, pp. 67, 225—226, are about CD 571.
WC, vol. XXVI, CE 2718, p. 93.
WC, vol. XVII, p. 728
Clarence Kelley, Kelley: The Story of an FBI Director, (Kansas City: Andrews, McMeel and Parker, 1987) p 259.
Fain Report, July 10, 1962; NARA, JFK files, RIF 124-10010-10033. See the FD-263 sheet, and the dissemination block in the lower left-hand comer.
Report of John W. Fain, Dallas FBI office, July 10, 1962; NARA, JFK files, RIF 124-10010-10033; see also Bureau 105-82555, document 28.
Kelley Kelley: The Story of an FBI Director, p 259.
WC, vol. XXII, CE 1127, p. 99.
CD 598, A-7, 9 and 13; WC, vol. XXIV, CE 2119, p. 549; CE 2123, p. 685; WC, vol. XXV, CE 2193, p. 17; CE 2563, p.811.
WC, vol. XVII, CE 800, pp. 685, CE 823, p. 718, CE 823, p. 728-729; WC, vol. XVIII, CE 1024, p. 792; WC, vol. XXVI, CE 2669, p. 26; Dallas Morning News, 11/29/63, p. 1-1
Clarence Kelley, Kelley: The Story of an FBI Director, p. 260.
The only remaining part of the interview not covered so far is this concluding passage:
Oswald stated that his wife, Marina, speaks no English whatsoever. By occupation she is a pharmacist. He advised that they were married April 30, 1961, at Minsk, Russia. He advised that she resided with an uncle and an aunt at Minsk, Russia. He advised that she has a half-brother and two half-sisters in Leningrad, Russia; however, Oswald declined to furnish the names of any of this wife's relatives, stated that he feared that some harm might come to them in the event he revealed their names.
WC, vol. XIX, p. 192; WC, vol. XXII, CE 1389, p. 715; WC, vol. XXIII, CE 1891, p. 694. On July 12, 1962, the Texas Employment Commission phoned Oswald about a job opening at Leslie Welding. Mrs. Virginia Hale of the Texas Employment Commission sent Oswald to Leslie Welding to apply for a job. On July 13, 1962, Oswald applied for a job at Leslie Welding Company, 200 East North Visek Street, Fort Worth, which is also known as Louv-r-pak Company, and gives the address of 1501 W. Seventh, PE 2-3245, Fort Worth.
WC, vol. XXIV, CE 2189, p. 867. Oswald had to pay for his utilities which Riggs estimated at $12 per month. The house was near Montgomery Ward's large store on Seventh, Fort Worth, about ½ mile from Oswald's work and about 10 blocks from Marguerite Oswald's apartment.
WC, vol. XXII, CE 1144, p. 156.
WC, vol. XXII, CE 780, p. 660.
WC, vol. XXII, CE 1089, p. 37.
WC, vol. XXII, CE 1144, p. 156; Fort Worth Telegram, 12/1/63.
WC, vol. XXII, CE 1144, p. 156.
WC, vol. XXII, CE 1172, p. 271—272.
WC, vol. XIX, Dobbs exhibit 9, p. 575.
WC, vol. XXV, CE 2213, p. 114.
WC, vol. IV, p. 454.
WC, vol. XIX, Dobbs exhibit 9, p. 576.
WC, vol. XIX, Dobbs exhibit 6, p. 571.
WC, vol. XIX, Dobbs exhibit 6, p. 570.
WC, vol. XXII, CE 1117, p. 84, CE 1147, p. 178.
WC, vol. I, p. 426.
"Oswald stated contact had been made by letter with the Soviet Embassy in Washington, DC to advise the Embassy of his wife's current address, saying this is something that is required by Soviet law. He stated she would continue to make reports periodically to the Soviet Embassy in instances where they moved to another address."
Oswald denied he had on October 31, 1959, or any other time, requested his U.S. citizenship be revoked. He denied he ever took any steps to apply for Soviet citizenship. He advised he never at any time affirmed allegiance to the Soviet Union, or indicated a willingness to do so. This was a lie.
Oswald denied he ever told the Soviets at any time he would make available to them information concerning his U.S. Marine Corps speciality.
Oswald advised on about May 19, 1961, he became fearful some reprisals might be taken against him for having made the trip to the Soviet Union. He stated he then inquired of the American Embassy in Moscow as to the possible legal complications. He stated the embassy assured him they were aware of no evidence that would warrant prosecution against him should he return to the United States. In this connection, Oswald said the Embassy tried to persuade him to return to the United States, without Marina. He told the embassy he could not do that. This was new, but not to the FBI.
Asked to explain a statement which he was quoted in the press as having made to his mother in a letter to the effect his and mother's (and brother's) values had been different, Oswald stated he had written something to that effect as he prepared to leave for Russia or while on the way. He admitted he might have referred to a difference in political ideologies, but he would say no more.
During the entire interview, Oswald discounted the possibility the KGB might attempt to use him. Oswald agreed to contact the FBI "if at any time any individual made any contact of any nature under suspicious circumstances with him." Further, "Oswald stated his employer has no government contracts, and is not engaged in any kind of sensitive industry or manufacturing. He stated he could see no reason why the Soviets would desire to contact him; however, he promised his cooperation in reporting to the FBI any information coming to his attention."
Clarence Kelley, Kelley: The Story of an FBI Director. p. 260.
Clarence Kelley, Kelley: The Story of an FBI Director, pp. 260—261.
WC, vol. XX, Graves exhibit 1, p. 21.
WC, vol. XXII, CE 1405, p. 789; WC, vol. IV, p. 379; WC, vol. VII, p. 295; WC, vol. XI, p. 120; WC, vol. XVII, CE 792, pp. 679, CE 820-A, p. 699; WC, vol. XIX, Burcham Exhibit 1, p. 201; WC, Vol. XXII, CE 1144, p. 161; New York Times, November 25, 1963, p. c-11; Washington Post, December 1, 1963, p. E-5; Fort Worth Star Telegram, December 1, 1963; Fort Worth Star Telegram, December 4, 1963; Time, February 14, 1964, p. 18; Life, February 21, 1964, p. 74-B
WC, vol. VII, p. 295; WC, vol. XIX, Cadigan exhibit 13, p. 286; WC, vol. XX, Holmes exhibit 4, p. 177; WC, vol. XXII, CE 1160, p. 207, CE 1390, p. 717; Dallas Times Herald, November 24, 1963, p. A-1; Fort Worth Star Telegram, November 20, 1963; Dallas Times Herald, December 1, 1963, p. A-30; New York Times, December 9, 1963, p. C-38; Life, February 21, 1964.
WC, vol. XI, p. 144; WC, vol. XXIII, CE 1957-A.
WC, vol. XXIII, CE 1957-A, p. 778.
WC, vol. XXIV, CE 2189, p. 878.
WC, vol. XI, p. 144.
WC, vol. XVI, CE 320, p. 884.
WC, vol. XI, p. 80.
WC, vol. XI, p. 387; WC, vol. II, p. 343; WC, vol. IX, p. 143; WC, vol. XI, pp. 52, 59, 62; WC, vol. XVIII, p. 625.
WC, vol. XVII, CE 834, p. 809.
WC, vol. XXII, CE 1172, p. 271.
FBI memorandum, SAC New York (97-169) to SAC Dallas, October 17, 1962; NARA, JFK files, RIF 124-10171-10124; see also Dallas 100-10461-33.
Clarence Kelley, Kelley: The Story of an FBI Director, p. 260.
Clarence Kelley, Kelley: The Story of an FBI Director, p. 261.
Clarence Kelley, Kelley: The Story of an FBI Director, p. 262.
WC, vol. XXII, CE 1117, pp. 84, CE 1147, 178.
WC, vol. XIX, Dobbs exhibit 9, p. 576.
WC, vol. XI, p. 209; WC, vol. XIX, p. 578; WC, vol. XXI, Potts exhibit A-2, pp. 142, Turner exhibit 1, 679; WC, vol. XXII, CE 1117, p. 84; WC, vol. XXIV, CE 2003, pp. 277, 350. They address their letter to Box 2915, Dallas (WC, vol. XXIV, CE 2003, p. 341).
WC, vol. XI, p. 179; WC, vol. XXI, Twiford exhibit 1, p. 681.
WC, vol. XIX, Dobbs exhibit 12, p. 579.
WC, vol. 11, p. 209; WC, vol. XIX, Dobbs exhibit 12, p. 579.
WC, vol. XXI, Tormey exhibit 1, p. 674.
Fort Worth Star Telegram, December 1, 1963; Fort Worth Star Telegram, December 4, 1963; Time, February 14, 1964, p. 18; Life, February 21, 1964, p. 74-B. 63WC, vol. VII, p. 295; WC, vol. XIX, Cadigan exhibit 13, p. 286; WC, vol. XX, Holmes exhibit 4, p. 177; WC, vol. XXII, CE 1160, p. 207, CE 1390, p. 717; Dallas Times Herald, November 24, 1963, p. A-1; Fort Worth Star Telegram, November 20, 1963; Dallas Times Herald, December 1, 1963, p. A-30; New York Times, December 9, 1963, p. C-38; Life, February 21, 1964. 6313 Days, Robert Kennedy; WC, vol. XXI, Potts exhibit 1, p. 141, Tormey exhibit 2, p. 677; WC, vol. XXIV, CE 2003, pp. 277, 341, 350.
WC, vol. XIX, Dobbs exhibit 2, p. 567.
WC, vol. IX, p. 421; WC, vol. XI, p. 207; WC, vol. XXI, Potts exhibit 1, p. 141, Turner exhibit 1, p. 678, Weinstock exhibit 1, p. 721; WC, vol. XXIV, CE 2003, p. 278, 341, 350.
(Assassination of JFK, A. Newman, pp. 196, 217) [UN speech vs. USA] [March 26, 1962—"Fidel Castro Speaks Against Bureaucracy and Sectarianism."]
WC, vol. XXII, CE 1117, p. 84.
See WC, vol. XXII, CE 1170, p. 270—Time subscription to expire December 1963.
WC, vol. XXII, CE 1147, p. 178—overlapping subscriptions January 1963. (See 11/25/62.)
WC, vol. XIX, Dobbs exhibit 7, p. 573; Assassination of JFK, A. Newman, p. 301.
New York Customs received P.O. Form 2153-X from NYC P.O. which is executed by Oswald, Box 2915; CD 60, pp. 2—3; FBI reports Oswald's writing, "I protest this intimidation"; see CD 205, p. 157.
CD 7, p. 367; WC, vol. XVII, CE 773, p. 635.
WC, vol. XVI, CE 135, p. 511; WC, vol. XXII, CE 1137, p. 116; WC, vol. XXVI, CE 3088, p. 700.
WC, vol. XXVI, CE 3088 p. 700.
FBI special agent Hosty, April 30, 1964, testimony to the Warren Commission, see WC, vol. IV, p. 444.
See FBI report by James P. Hosty, September 10, 1963; WC, vol. VII, CE 829, p. 772.
Kelley Kelley: The Story of an FBI Director, p. 263; also see FBI special agent Hosty, April 30, 1964, testimony to the Warren Commission, WC, vol. IV, p. 444. In this 1964 testimony, Hosty uses the date April 25 for when Oswald's Dallas file was reopened.
Clarence Kelley, Kelley: The Story of an FBI Director, p. 263.
Clarence Kelley, Kelley: The Story of an FBI Director, p. 263.
Assassination of JFK, A. Newman, pp. 79 and 301.
WC, vol. XXII, CE 1406, p. 789.
WC, vol. XXII, CE 1406, p. 789.
WC, vol. XXII, CE 1145, p. 163, 165.
WC, vol. XIX, Dobbs exhibit 13, p. 580.
WC, vol. XIX, Dobbs exhibit 13, p. 580; WC, vol. XX, Moore exhibit 1, p. 635; WC, vol. XXIV, CE 2003, p. 343.
Issue was dated 3/11/63, mailed on 3/7/63 and probably arrived in Dallas on 3/13 or 3/14.
Issue was dated 3/24/63, mailed on 3/21/63 and probably arrived in Dallas on 3/27 or 3/28.
WC, vol. XXI, Shaneyfelt exhibit 13, p. 454.
WC, vol. X, p. 87; WC, vol. XX, Lee exhibit 1, p. 511; New York Times, December 9, 1963, p. C-38; Life, February 21, 1964, p. 76). On November 24, 1963, Oswald says that he first became interested in the FPCC in New Orleans (WC, vol. XXIV, CE 2060, p. 479).
WC, vol. X, p. 87; WC, vol. XX, Lee exhibit 1, p. 511; Life, February 21, 1964, p. 76.
WR, p. 725.
WC, vol. IV, p. 446; vol. V, p. 9; WC, vol. XVII, CE 829, p. 773; WC, vol. XXVI, CE 2718, p. 94.
See New York FBI office transmittal of the letter to Dallas on July 1, 1963; NARA, JFK files, RIF 157-10006-10245.
FBI, Hosty report, September 10, 1963; NARA, JFK files, RIF 124-10171-10133; see also Dallas FBI file 100-10461-42. See also WC, vol. XXVI, CE 2718, p. 94, which contains these two sentences:
Information from our informant, furnished to us on April 21, 1963, was based upon Oswald's own statement contained in an undated letter to the Fair Play for Cuba Committee (FPCC) headquarters in New York City. A copy of this letter is included as exhibit 61 in our supplemental report dated January 13, 1964, entitled "Investigation of Assassination of President John F. Kennedy, November 22, 1963."
To verify this, researchers must consult the sixth document in the Mexico City field office file 105-3702. See NARA JFK files, RIF 124-10230-10422.
For an unredacted cover sheet on Hosty's September 10, 1963, report, see NARA, JFK files, RIF 124-10035-10256.
WC, vol. XXVI, CE 2718, p. 94.
FBI special agent Hosty, April 30, 1964, testimony to the Warren Commission, see WC, vol. IV, p. 444.
FBI Chicago office, report on FPCC by Paul H. Kellermeyer; located in NARA, JFK files, Church Committee records, RIF 157-10008-10145.
WC, vol. IX, p. 164.
WC, vol. VIII, p. 377; WC, vol. IX, p. 58; WC, vol. XI, pp. 125, 127.
WC, vol. IX, pp. 235—236. The other Dallas resident was Igor Voshinin.
WC, vol. X, p. 22
WC, vol. IX, pp. 235—236.
WC, vol. IX, pp. 235—236.
WC, vol. IX, p. 237.
Tom Bower, The Red Web: M16 and the KGB Master Coup (London: Aurum Press, 1989), p. 159.
CIA information report, Cuba, Report no. CS -3/537,594, 594, Subject: Comments on prominent Cubans by Teresa Proenza and a former Cuban government official, date distributed, February 18, 1963; Date of info.: Late December 1962; Place and date acq.: Mexico City, Mexico (December 28, 1962). NARA, JFK files, CIA, January 1994 (5 brown boxes) release; Proenza papers.
CIA information report, Cuba, Report no. CS -3/537, 594, Subject: Comments on prominent Cubans by Teresa Proenza and a former Cuban government official, date distributed, February 18, 1963; Date of info.: Late December 1962; Place and date acq.: Mexico City, Mexico (December 28, 1962). NARA, JFK files, CIA, January 1994 (5 brown boxes) release; Proenza papers.
CIA information report, Cuba, Report no. CS -3/537, Subject: Comments on prominent Cubans by Teresa Proenza and a former Cuban government official, date distributed, February 18, 1963; Date of info.: Late December 1962; Place and date acq.: Mexico City, Mexico (December 28, 1962). NARA, JFK files, CIA, January 1994 (5 brown boxes) release; Proenza papers.
FBI memorandum, to W. C. Sullivan, from D. J. Brennan, November 24, 1963, subject: Lee Harvey Oswald; NARA, JFK files, RIF 157-10008-10141.
Brennan's report said: "On the night of November 23, 1963, Bernard Raichhardt [possibly B. Reichardt, CH/WH/3/Mexico] CIA, furnished the following information to the Liaison Agent."
FBI memorandum, to W. C. Sullivan, from D. J. Brennan, November 24, 1963, subject: Lee Harvey Oswald; NARA JFK files, RIF 157-10008-10141.
Silvia Duran, interview with Anthony Summers, 11 January 1995; questions provided by John Newman. Many thanks are due to the unselfish work of Anthony and Robbyn Summers done in support of this project on this and other aspects of the Mexico City story for this book.
FBI memo, special agent Vincent K. Antle to SAC Miami, November 27, 1963, 105-8242, document 44; NARA, JFK files, NIS/ONI 1994 release, boxes 1—3, Hemming.
FBI report by special agent Dwyer, Miami 105-8342, December 2, 1963; NARA, JFK files, CD 59.
FBI memo, special agent Vincent K. Antle to SAC Miami, November 27, 1963, 105-8242, document 44; NARA, JFK files, NIS/ONI 1994 release, boxes 1-3, Hemming.
Earl Golz 1978 interview with Fred Claasen; AARC, John Martino file; see also Vanity Fair, December 1994, pp. 86—139.
WC, vol. XVIII, CE 986 p. 489.
Note: This letter was mentioned in Kelley's book (Kelley: Story of an FBI Director, p. 260), but not Oswald's May 1963 change-of-address to the Soviet Embassy.
WC, vol. XVIII, CE 986, p. 486.
WC, vol. XXII, CE 1117, p. 84, CE 1147, p. 178.
WC, vol. XXII, CE 1144, p. 156.
WC, vol. XVI, CE 29, p. 145; WC, vol. XVIII, CE 986, p. 493.
WC, vol. XVIII, CE 986, p. 499.
HT/LINGUAL soft file, CIA memorandum, May 1, 1964, see "Item 61G10AK" [July 10, 1961, item AK]; NARA, JFK files, RIF 1994.04.13.14.53:55:500005; this is also CIA document number 1619-1122-Y.
HSCA Report, p. 260.
"Progress Report, 1962-1963," an April 1964 internal CIA report on the HT/Lingual program, also known as "CI/Project." This document, classified, "SECRET EYES ONLY," has no author, and comes with a cover note from the chief of CI/Project, John Mertz, to a Mr. Hunt, saying, "Attached is an interesting statement which indicates the Project is oriented along operational lines. JCM." Both documents are in NARA, JFK Files, CIA, 1993 release.
Angleton memo to Hoover, Attn: Papich November 26, 1963, "SPECIAL HANDLING," Secret Eyes Only, Subject: Hunter report #10815; NARA, JFK files, RIF 1994.04.13.14:56:04:160005.
WC, CD 66, p. 91
We really need to see the intercept to verify this CIA claim. Even if Mertz was equating "Alek" to "Alex" we still need to know. This particular [presumably] classified mail intercept along with the rest of these kinds of materials should be released and even if the Agency wants to keep them classified. The Assassination Records Review Board could decide to release them anyway.
See HSCA final report pp. 205-206
See CIA HT/LINGUAL Card on Oswald, dated 7 August 1961; NARA, JFK files, RIF 1193.07.02.11;10;02;560530. Handwriting on this card states, "deleted 28 May '62.
# Chapter Sixteen
WC Vol. XXVI, pp. 95—96, CD 12, p. 5.
FBI letter, April 6, 1964, WC vol. XXVI, CE 2718, pp. 92—99; for Question Number 9, see pp. 94—95.
FBI letter from SAC New York (NY-113) to SAC New Orleans, July 5, 1963; NARA, JFK files, FBI headquarters file 105-82555, document 54; see also New Orleans files 100-16601, document 45; RIF 124-10228-10039.
It is item 54R in the Oswald FBI headquarters file 105-82555. It is stamped "Received 7.8 63 FROM CSNY 48S; Paul Hoch item #463. On January 1, 1978, Dr. Hoch added this note: "I got this from the Archives long ago. According to Jim Kostman, FBI item 105-82555-54R includes this card, with part of the FBI's notation of the source deleted." Note also that this card eventually became FBI exhibit D-21.
Someone has written the number "54" on an entire string of documents in Oswald's headquarters file (105-82555), including this card, and thus its relative position—and thus its probably date—is obscure.
WC Vol. XVIII, CE 986, pp. 516—517.
FBI memorandum from SAC New Orleans to SAC Dallas; Subject: Lee Harvey Oswald, July 17, 1963; NARA JFK files, Dallas 100-10461 file, document 36; New Orleans 100-16601 file, document 6 (it had earlier been listed as document 5); see also Paul Hoch, item 985.
FBI memorandum from SAC New Orleans to SAC Dallas; Subject: Lee Harvey Oswald, July 17, 1963; NARA JFK files, Dallas 100-10461 file, document 36; New Orleans 100-16601 file, document 6 (it had earlier been listed as document 5); see also Paul Hoch, item 985.
FBI office memorandum from SAC New York to SAC New Orleans; Subject Lee Harvey Oswald, July 17, 1963, NARA, JFK files, FBI New Orleans file 100-16601, document 8.
NARA, JFK files, FBI New Orleans file 100-16601, document 9; see also Paul Hoch, item 505.
Included in this material was a copy of Oswald's June 10 letter to the Worker in which he used his New Orleans P.O. Box (30061) as his mailing address; see July 5 FBI New York office memorandum to SAC New Orleans: TO: SAC New Orleans FROM: SAC New York SUBJECT: Lee H. Oswald, P.O. Box 30061, New Orleans, La.; Handwritten: "Lee Harvey Oswald 100-16601*" (copies 1-New Orleans (Info); (Encl. 1); (RM); JVW:rmv; (1); Handwritten: "105-82555-54" and "100-16601-45.") This letter must be different from Oswald's change-of-address card which he mailed soon thereafter to the Worker. Although the postmark for the change-of-address card is indistinct, a large stamp is over the front of the card, apparently from the FBI, which reads "RECEIVED 7 8 63 FROM CSNY 48 IS 6." Paul Hoch procured this item from the archives and he says: "I got this item from the archives long ago. According to Jim Kostman, FBI item 105-82555-54R includes this card, with part of the FBI's notation on the source deleted. Paul L. Hoch 1/1/78."
FBI memorandum from SAC New Orleans (16601) to SAC Dallas (100-10461) to SAC New Orleans (100-16601), July 17, 1963, Paul Hoch, item #985.
FBI memorandum from SAC Dallas to SAC New Orleans; Subject: Lee Harvey Oswald and Marina Nikolaevna Oswald, July 29, 1963; NARA JFK files, New Orleans file 100-16601, document 9; Dallas file 100-10461, document 38; see also Paul Hoch, item 987.
FBI memorandum from SAC Dallas to SAC New Orleans; Subject: Lee Harvey Oswald, July 29, 1963, NARA JFK files, FBI New Orleans 100-16601 file, document 9; and Dallas 100-10461 file, document 38; see also Paul Hoch, item 987.
FBI memorandum from FBI SA James P. Hosty to SAC Dallas, May 28, 1963; Subject: Lee Harvey Oswald and Marina Oswald. See NARA, JFK files, Dallas FBI file, 100-10461.
FBI memorandum from SAC Dallas to director, FBI (105-82555), March 25, 1963; NARA, JFK files, RIF 124-10035-10255.
FBI memorandum from FBI SA James P. Hosty to SAC DAllas, May 28, 1963; Subject: Lee Harvey Oswald and Marina Oswald. See NARA, JFK files, Dallas FBI file, 100-10461.
Clarence Kelly, Kelley: The Story of an FBI Director (Kansas City: Andrews, McMeel & Parker, 1987), p. 265.
WC vol. XVII, CE 793, p. 680.
WC vol. VII, pp. 418—427.
WC vol. XIX, Cardigan exhibit 14, p. 287.
Urgent FBI cable from SAC Dallas to director and SAC New Orleans, 10:37 p.m. CST, November 22, 1963; NARA, JFK files, RIF 124-10248-10078.
WC vol. VIII, p. 139; Vol. XIX, Cadigan exhibit 3, p. 266.
WC vol. IV, p. 378; WC vol. VII, p. 295; WC vol. XVII, CE 794 p. 680; WC vol. XIX, Cadigan exhibit 14, p. 287; WC vol. XXII, CE 1390, p. 717; Dallas Times Herald, 12/1/63, p. A-30; Fort Worth Star Telegram, 11/30/63.
WC vol. VII, p. 295; WC vol. XVII, CE's 791—794, pp. 679—680; WC vol. XIX, Cadigan exhibits 13 & 14, pp. 286—287.
WC vol. XX, Lee exhibit 4, p. 521; WC vol. XXI, Turner exhibit 1, p. 678.
WC vol. IX, p. 420; Vol. XX, Lee exhibit 3-A, p. 517; WC vol. XXI, Potts exhibit A-1, p. 141; WC vol. XXIV, CE 2003, p. 274.
The card was found on Oswald on November 22, 1963. WC vol. IV, p. 440; WC vol. XI, p. 208; WC vol. XXIV, CE 1986, p. 17; WC vol. XXV, CE 2483, p. 681; Life magazine, 2/21/64, p. 76.
The FPCC sent this letter to Oswald's 4907 Magazine address, which he probably received on May 30 or later. WC vol. XVI, CE 93, p. 341; WC vol. XX, Lee exhibit 3, p. 514; WC vol. XXI, Potts exhibit A-1, p. 141, Turner exhibit 1, p. 678; WC vol. XXIV, CE 2003, pp. 275, 341, 350.
WC vol. XVIII, CE 986, pp. 516—517.
WC vol. XVIII, CE 986, p. 518. On June 4, the Russian Embassy in Washington, D.C., wrote to Marina Oswald at the 4907 Magazine apartment, New Orleans, asking her reason for wanting to return to the USSR. Soviet Embassy letter to Marina Oswald, June 4, 1963; WC vol. XVI, CE 11, p. 24; WC vol. XVIII, CE 986, p. 518; and WC vol. XXIV, CE 2003, p. 335. Oswald had furnished their address on May 17. We have already dealt with the issue of Marina's desire to return to the Soviet Union. She did not want to go back to Russia. That she felt this way then is suggested by what she wrote to Mrs. Paine on May 25. Marina said that she wanted to stay in the U.S.A. even without Oswald.
See Conrad memorandum, FBI, "Re: Assassination of the President," November 23, 1963; NARA, JFK files, RIF 124-10035-10148.
Telephone conversation between the president and J. Edgar Hoover, November 23, 1963, LBJ Library.
See vol. XX, pp. 257—259 Johnson (Arnold), exhibit No. 1; CE 826, vol. XVII, p. 753, October 31, 1963, FBI report by SA Milton R. Kaack; and WC vol. XXII, CE 1145, p. 186. For the New Orleans copy, see NARA, JFK files, RIF 124-10228-10039.
WC vol. XX, Lee exhibit 3-A, p. 517, 8-A, p. 531; WC vol. XXI, Turner exhibit 1, p. 678.
FBI report by special agent Hosty, September 10, 1963; NARA, JFK files, RIF 124-10171-10133.
FBI report by special agent Hosty, September 10, 1963; NARA, JFK files, RIF 124-10171-10133.
WC vol. IX, p. 420; WC vol. XX, Lee exhibit 3-A, p. 517; WC vol. XXII, CE 1141, p. 141; WC vol. XXIV, CE 2003, pp. 274, 341, 350.
FBI report by special agent Hosty, September 10, 1963; NARA, JFK files, RIF 124-10171-10133.
June Cobb notes, October 22, 1960, on visit of Richard Gibson. CIA Cobb 201 file, 201-278841; NARA, JFK files, RIF 1994.03.08.13:30:54:000007. See also at NARA, CIA 1994 microfilm release, reel 11, folders A-F.
See Alleged Assassination Plots, pp. 13—70.
An article in the magazine Confidential in 1960 inaccurately described June Cobb's relationship with Marita Lorenz at the time she had an abortion. This was previously discussed in Chapter Seven.
See Cobb files in NARA JFK files, CIA 1994 microfilm, reel 11, folder E.
See dispatch to chief, WH division, May 21, 1963; NARA JFK files, CIA microfilm 1994 release, reel 11, folders E-F. The routing sheet shows the TFW coordination.
CIA memo from Victor White to chief, CI/OA, October 17, 1962; NARA JFK files, CIA January 1994 (5 brown boxes) release, Cobb files.
CIA memo from Victor White to chief, CI/OA, June 17, 1963; NARA JFK files, CIA January 1994 (5 brown boxes) release, Cobb files.
FBI special agent Hosty, April 30, 1964, testimony to the Warren Commission, see vol. IV, p. 444.
Clarence Kelly, Kelley: The Story of an FBI Director, p. 265.
FBI special agent Hosty, April 30, 1964, testimony to the Warren Commission, see vol. IV, p. 444.
Oswald letter to the FPCC, sent April 19, 1963; WC vol. XX, Lee exhibit 1, p. 511.
FBI memorandum from SAC New York (97-2229) to SAC Dallas; Subject: Fair Play for Cuba Committee, June 27, 1963; NARA, JFK files, RIF 124-10171-10128. More than the late date of this New York memorandum is curious. Handwriting on this document has the missing Dallas FBI serial 105-976. The writing also notes a "page 17." The Fain report of May 1960 is nowhere near this length, so the conclusion that more documents—including one 17 or more pages long—existed in the 105-976 file at some point.
Anthan G. Theoaris and John Stuart Cox, The Boss (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988) pp. 14—15, and note 49.
Oswald letter to the FPCC, dated May 26, 1963; WC vol. XX, Lee exhibit 2, pp. 512—513.
Letter to Oswald from FPCC national director V. T. Lee, May 29, 1963; WC vol. XX Lee exhibit 3, CE 2483, p. 515; WC vol. IV, p. 440; WC vol. XI, p. 208; WC vol. XXIV, CE 1986, p. 17; WC vol. XXV, CE 2483, p. 681; and Life magazine, February 21, 1964, p. 76.
Letter to Oswald from FPCC national director V. T. Lee, May 29, 1963; WC vol. XX, Lee exhibit 3, p. 515; WC vol. IV, p. 440; WC vol. XI, p. 208; WC vol. XXIV, CE 1986, p. 17; WC vol. XXV, CE 2483, p. 681; and Life magazine, February 21, 1964, p. 76.
WC vol. XXV, CE 2548, p. 773. This printing company is opposite the Reily Coffee Company, where Oswald worked; see WC vol. XXII, CE 1410, p. 796; and WC vol. XXV, CE 2543, p. 770. There is some question as to whether the person ordering these handbills was actually Oswald; the secretary, Myra Silver, at the printing company believed that the person ordering them used the name "Osborne" and not Oswald; see WC vol. XXV, CE 2195, p. 58. Jones recalled that a "husky laborer-type" ordered the handbills, not Oswald; see WC vol. XXV, CE 2541, p. 769. There is no doubt, however, that these are the handbills that Oswald later distributed. The invoice from Jones Printing Company found in Oswald's effects after the assassination was billed to a "Mr. Osborne"; see WC vol. XXIV, CE 2003, p. 341. On balance, it seems probable that it was Oswald who ordered these handbills, using the name "Osborne." This is the conclusion reached by the Dallas office of the FBI after the assassination; see WC vol. XXV, CE 2548, p. 773.
WC vol. XXV, CE 2195, p. 58.
WC vol. XXII, CE 1411, p. 800.
United States Secret Service report of special agent Anthony E. Gerret, CO-2-34, 030, December 1963; NARA, JFK files, RIF 157-10011-10133. "Confidential Informant NO T-1 advised on July 23, 1963, that Post Office Box 30061 was rented by L. H. Oswald on June 3, 1963. He furnished as his address 657 French Street, New Orleans, Louisiana." This informant was Mr. L. H. Robertson, postal inspector, 2002 Post Office Building, New Orleans; see October 31, 1963 FBI report by Kaack.
WC vol. XXV, CE 2195, p. 58.
Oswald letter to Vincent Lee, undated; see WC vol. XX, Lee exhibit 4, pp. 518—521.
The letter was obviously written after Oswald picked up the handbills, June 4, and before he leafleted the USS Wasp on June 15. Oswald said he had "picketed the fleet" in a letter to Lee dated August 1, 1963; see WC vol. XX, Lee exhibit 5, pp. 524—525.
Oswald letter to Vincent Lee, undated; see WC vol. XX, Lee exhibit 4, pp. 518—521. For a cleaner retyped version of this letter by the FBI's New York office, see NARA, JFK files, RIF 124-10160-10437. For Vincent Lee's testimony, see WC vol X, pp. 86—95.
WC vol. XVI, CE 115, p. 486; WC vol. XXVI, CE 3119, p. 770.
WC vol. XVI, CE 115, p. 486.
WC vol. XVII, CE 826, p. 753; WC vol. XX, Johnson exhibit 1, p. 257; WC vol. XXII, p. 166.
WC vol. XIX, pp. 568—569; and WC vol. XX, Lee exhibit 8-C, p. 532. On July 8, Oswald notified the Worker of his new address; see the Kaack report of October 31, 1963.
WC vol. XVII, CE 780, p. 658.
WC vol. XX, Lee exhibit 4, p. 518; New York Times 12/9/63, p. C-38.
Ramparts, January 1968, p. 47.
HSCA vol. X, pp. 128—131.
HSCA vol. X, p. 128.
HSCA Report, p. 219.
HSCA Report, p. 218.
HSCA Vol. X, p. 128.
CD 75, p. 222; WC vol. VIII, p. 170; WC vol. X, pp. 54—58; and vol. XXVI, pp. 705—791.
CD 75, p. 517.
FBI draft message from New Orleans SAC to FBI director, 89-69, document 138; NARA, JFK files, RIF 124-10248-10191.
CD 75, p. 699. FBI report, New Orleans office (NO 44-2064, NO 89-69) report, by special agents John W. Smith and Dean S. Lytle, November 26, 1963.
WC vol. XXVI, CE 3029, pp. 575—576.
WC vol. XXVI, CE 3029, pp. 575—576. The FBI report summarizing a telephone interview with Alderman claims he said the post office box was 30061. While this number was Oswald's true box number, Oswald never used it. Oswald instead used the false number 30016. All extant copies of the handbills and application forms that have a post office box number stamped on them are "P.O. Box 30016." The FBI, not Alderman, probably made the mistake of using the right box number.
It would be even stranger if the Tulane FPCC handbill had, as was alleged in the FBI report, "P.O. Box 30061" stamped on it.
FBI memorandum from supervisor Leon M. Gaskill to SAC New Orleans (89-69), November 26, 1963; NARA, JFK files, RIF 124-10261-10044; see also Paul Hoch, item 1904.
The typed version in Gaskill's memo is probably erroneous in that Gaskill added punctuation; it probably read, "FPCC - A.J. Hidell, P.O. Box 30016."
ONI document dated July 14, 1964, written by "DCG," who is not further identified. See the Church Committee documents in the National Archives; unfortunately, much of the Church Committee documents were erroneously photocopied with the HSCA record group number, 233, superimposed and, as a result, the author's copies were misfiled as HSCA documents. The National Archives is attempting to relocate the Church Committee copy of the "DCG" memo and the attached report of Patrolman Ray of June 16, 1963. Both of these documents can also be found elsewhere in the JFK files, such as in box 3 of the NIS/ONI boxes released in 1994. The problem, however, is that—so far—the Church Committee copies are the only place where there is a handbill attached.
Oswald letter to Vincent Lee, August 1, 1963, WC vol. XX, Lee exhibit 5, p. 525.
New Orleans FBI office memo on Lee Harvey Oswald, dated July 22, 1964; WC vol. XXII, CE 1412, p. 805.
FBI memorandum from supervisor Leon M. Gaskill to SAC New Orleans (89-69), November 26, 1963; NARA, JFK files, RIF 124-10261-10044; see also Paul Hoch, item 1904. Gaskill also acknowledged that Major Erdrich had dropped off two copies of the handbill on November 26, 1963.
See footnote 85, above.
FBI New Orleans office memo on Lee Harvey Oswald, July 22, 1964, WC vol. XXII, CE 1412, pp. 805—806.
Memo from Patrolman Girod Ray to Chief L. Deutchman, June 16, 1963; NARA JFK files, NIS/ONI box 3. In his 1964 interview with the FBI, Patrolman Ray gave a slightly different account; the man responded that "he did not have permission to do this and felt that he did not need anyone's permission since he was within his rights to distribute leaflets in any area ha desired to do so." See WC vol. XXII, CE 1412, p. 806.
FBI New Orleans office memo on Lee Harvey Oswald, July 22, 1964, WC vol. XXII, CE 1412, p. 806.
FBI, San Francisco office, report of SA John P. McHugh, June 17, 1964; see WC CD 1204.
FBI Houston office, report of May 25, 1964; see WC CD 1033.
Note by "DCG," subject: Lee Harvey Oswald, July 14, 1964; NARA, JFK files, RIF 173-10011-10075; see also 1994 NIS 3 boxes release.
FBI document, Washington field office 105-37111; WC CD 1484, p. 2.
An exhaustive search has so far failed to turn up the location for this copy of Patrolman Ray's report. It is authentic, as discussion with the National Archives staff confirm. This copy has handwriting on it possibly describing Oswald as being 5' 6" to 5'7" tall, 2 to 3" shorter than Oswald.
Marina's testimony to the Warren Commission, WC vol. I, p. 44.
For the application itself, se WC vol. XXIV, CE 2075, pp. 509—510; for an undated FBI report—probably from the Washington field office—on Oswald's passport his application, see WC vol. XXII, CE 1062, p. 12.
See WC vol. XXIII, CE 1969, pp. 817—823.
Oswald letter to Soviet Embassy in Washington, July 1, 1963; WC vol. XVI, CE 13, p. 30.
Dallas FBI letter to New Orleans FBI office, July 29, 1963; Paul Hoch, item 987.
FBI memorandum from SAC New Orleans (100-16601) to SAC Dallas (100-10461 and 105-1435 [Marina], August 13, 1963; Paul Hoch, item #988.
# Chapter Seventeen
WC vol. XVII, CE 826, p. 754. Emmett J. Barbe, general maintenance foreman for Reily testified that he fired Oswald; New Orleans Times-Picayune .
CIA memorandum from Raymond M. Reardon, Security Analysis Group/ OS to the CIA deputy inspector general, February 1, 1977.
CIA request for investigative check, from chief, CI/Operational Approval and Support Division to deputy director for Security IOS, June 1965; see NARA, JFK files, CIA, January 1994 (5 brown boxes) release; this document may also be associated with RIF 1993.06.29.16:23:07:500150.
FBI airtel [air telegram] from SAC, New Orleans (89-69) to director, FBI 62-109060)) March 8, 1967, Subject: Assassination of President John Fitzgerald Kennedy; NARA, JFK files, FBI New Orleans office, 89-68. This March 8, 1967, FBI air telegram from SAC New Orleans to Bureau contains information from an October 3, 1963, report of New Orleans FBI SA Warren C. DeBrueys entitled "Anti-Fidel Castro Activities." This DeBrueys report has not been released to the public.
WAVE 8611 to HQS, December 6, 1963, NARA JFK files, number files, boxes 51-53.
Noon's CIA request for operational approval, dated September 6, 1961, can be found in the CIA's January 1994 (5 brown boxes) release.
The author's copy of this CIA cable was obtained from the National Archives but the exact location is unclear. It is a "desensitized" version of WAVE cable 9537 to director CIA. The exact date is also unclear, but this handwriting appears on the bottom of p. 1: "30 Dec 67." A handwritten file number is below the date: "100-300-17."
FBI airtel [air telegram] from SAC New Orleans (89-69) to director, FBI (62-109060), March 8, 1967, Subject: Assassination of President John Fitzgerald Kennedy; NARA, JFK files, FBI New Orleans office, 89-68. This March 8, 1967, FBI air telegram from SAC New Orleans to Bureau contains information from an October 3, 1963, report of New Orleans FBI SA Warren C. DeBrueys entitled "Anti-Fidel Castro Activities." This DeBrueys report has not been released to the public.
Church Committee memorandum to files, from Dwyer and Greissing, Subject: Interview with Carlos Bringuier regarding New Orleans Cuban group and Oswald, January 12, 1976; NARA, JFK files, RIF 157-10007-10121.
Testimony of Carlos Bringuier to Warren Commission, April 7—8, 1964, WC vol. X, p. 35.
Testimony of Carlos Bringuier to Warren Commission, April 7—8, 1964, WC vol. X, p. 35.
Testimony of Carlos Bringuier to Warren Commission, April 7—8, 1964, WC vol. X, p. 35.
WC vol. XXVI, CE 3119, pp. 767, 771.
Testimony of Carlos Bringuier to Warren Commission, April 7—8, 1964, WC vol. X, p. 35—36.
WC vol. X, pp. 35, 76; WC vol. XIX, Burcham exhibit 1, p. 240; WC vol. XXV, CE 2548, p. 773; Saturday Evening Post, 12/14/63; Life, 2/21/64, p. 76.
Testimony of Carlos Bringuier to Warren Commission, April 7—8, 1964, WC vol. X, pp. 36—37.
WR, p. 728.
CIA memo, CI/R&A, Garrison and the Kennedy Assassination, June 1, 1967.
Enclosure 6 to CIA CI/R&A memorandum for the record; Subject: "Possible DRE Animus Towards President Kennedy." April 3, 1967; see NARA, JFK files, RIF 1993.06.28.15:55:39:460280.
Enclosure 6 to CIA CI/R&A memorandum for the record; Subject: "Possible DRE Animus Towards President Kennedy," April 3, 1967; see NARA, JFK files, RIF 1993.06.28.15:55:39:460280.
CD 11, p. 2; CD 928, p. 18.
WC vol. X, p. 37; WC vol. XXVI, CE 3119, p. 768.
WC vol. X, p. 37.
JFK NARA RIF 124-10062-10049. To chief, from SAIC John W. Rice, New Orleans; Subject: Assassination of John F. Kennedy.
JFK NARA RIF 124-10062-10049. To chief, from SAIC Rice, New Orleans; Subject: Assassination of John F. Kennedy.
WC vol. XXVI, CE 3119, p. 768; New Orleans Times-Picayune, 2/28/69.
WC vol. XXV, CE 2210, pp. 90, CE 2548, 773; WC vol. XXVI, CE 2888, pp. 343, CE 3032, p. 578.
WR, p. 728.
Martello testimony, WC vol. X, p. 61.
WR, p. 728.
SA Callender to SAC New Orleans August 1963; NARA, JFK files, RIF 124-10228-10044. Note: the Callender memo is cross-filed into deBrueys's FPCC file 97-74; and has a handwritten note at the bottom reading, "Indices contained no information identifiable with Hernandez or Cruz."
The report stated:
1. Lee H. Oswald, white, male, age 23, born 10/18/39, New Orleans, residence 4709 Magazine, New Orleans, lower center apt. Oswald informed arresting officer that he is a member of the New Orleans chapter of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee with headquarters at 799 Broadway, New York City. Lt. Galliot informed that Oswald was handing out yellow leaflets with inscription 'Hands Off Cuba, Viva Castro.'
2. Carlos Jose Bringuier, white, male, age 29, 501 Adele St. Apt 1, New Orleans, who informed he is the Director of the Cuban Student Directorate [DRE] for the New Orleans area. He informed he immigrated to this country on 2/8/61 INS # A125456223 and has a clothing shop at 107 Decatur St.
3. Ceflo Macario Hernandez, white, male, age 47, 519 Adele St. Apt. E. He advised he is a member of the same group as Bringuier.
4. Miguel Mariano Cruz, white, male, age, 18, 2526 Mazant, Apt. C, who advised he is also a member of the Cuban Student Directorate. According to Lt. Galliot, all four individuals were arrested for disturbing the peace when Oswald became involved in an argument with Bringuier, Hernandez, and Cruz and that a crowd developed. Lt. Galliot informed that he had no further information at this time.
August 9, 1963 (Friday at 1:15 P.M.)—NO T-6 reports to FBI that she sees Oswald distributing handbills; see CD 12, p. 4. This NO T-6 might have been a Department of Employment security employee.
WC vol. XI, p. 328; WC vol. XXVI, CE 3094, p. 705.
WC vol. XI, p. 358.
WC vol. XI, pp. 343, 356; WC vol. XXV, CE 2477, p. 671; WC vol. XXVI, CE 2902, p. 358.
Pena is a white male, DOB; 8/15/23, 5' 8", 140# POB: Colon, Cuba, brothers: Ruperto, 117 Decatur; Andrea, Las Americas Bar, 407 Decatur; see WC vol. XXVI, CE 2902, p. 359. Orestes Pena applied for a passport in New Orleans on June 24, 1963, the same day that Oswald applied. Pena's passport is #92577 and Oswald's is #92526, both issued on June 25; see WC vol. XI, pp. 349, 360; WC vol. XVI, CE 239, p. 666; WC vol. XIX, Cadigan exhibit 10, p. 283; WC vol. XXI, Pena exhibit 1, p. 43; WC vol. XXII, CE 1062, p. 12; WC vol. XXIII, CE 1969, p. 818; WC vol. XXIV, CE 2075 p. 509; WC vol. XXVI, CE 2754, p. 134, CE 2755, p. 136, CE 2787, p. 177 and CE 2902, p. 358. Orestes Pena plans to go to Spain in August 1963, but he postponed that trip and went to Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic instead (between August 13—27). Orestes Pena went to Spain in May of 1964; WC vol. XI, p. 351; CD 984h, p. 104.
Yet later, on 6/9/64, Orestes Pena cannot recall Oswald; See WC vol. XXVI, CE 2902, p. 358.
While Orestes Pena was out of the country between August 13 and 27, his brother Ruperto Pena saw the two Cubans in a car. Since Ruperto could not speak English, he told Carlos Bringuier about seeing the two men. Bringuier then reported the sighting to the FBI. Both Penas denied that either of these two Cubans was Oswald's companion at the Habana Bar; however, Bringuier says one of them was Oswald's companion: WC vol. X, p. 45; WC vol. XI, pp. 349, 351, 367.
Rodriguez said it was around 2:30 to 3:00 a.m., but he had difficulty remembering the date, variously placing it somewhere between 5 and 12 August. On 5/12/64, Rodriguez described Oswald's companion as a nattilydressed white male, 32, 5' 7", medium build, spoke Spanish well; WC Vol. XXV, CE 2477, p. 671. Carlos Bringuier, a Cuba refugee leader in the New Orleans Cuban Student Directorate, thought this event occurred between August 15 and August 30; WC Vol. X, p. 45.
A transcript of Martello's August 10, 1963, report can be found in WC vol. X, pp. 53—56.
WC vol. IV, p. 437; and vol. XVII, CE 826, p. 762.
Prior to Magazine, Oswald had lived at 4709 Mercedes in Fort Worth and worked for a sheet metal company for several months; CD 87 SS 449, p. 3. Lie. Moved from 2703 Mercedes, Fort Worth, on 10/8/62. (Newman, at page 45, stresses that Oswald wants to hide all Dallas connections.) lO.Two brothers: Robert Oswald in Fort Worth, 27, and John Oswald in Arlington, 32. Lie. Robert is in Arkansas and John Pic is in USAF in San Antonio. 11. SS# 433-54-3937; Sel. Ser. # 41-114-39532 12. Lutheran 13. Worked at Reily Coffee Co. from May until July 17. Lie. Last day was July 19. 14. Prior to Reily, worked at Jackson Brewing Company, New Orleans, for 1-1/2 months. Lie. Did not work for Jackson Brewing Company. 15. Oswald does not reveal his Russian trip; WC vol. IV, pp. 431, 435, 437; WC vol. X, p. 51; WC vol. XVII, CE 826, p. 757; Dallas Times Herald, 11/27/63; Houston Post, 11/27/63 p. 16. Oswald says that he does not want his family to learn English as he hated USA; WC vol. XXV, CE 2548, p. 773.
WC Martello testimony, WC vol. X, pp. 53—56.
WC Martello testimony, WC vol. X, pp. 53—56.
WC Martello testimony, WC vol. X, pp. 53—56.
HSCA memorandum to files, from Dwyer and Greissing, January 12, 1976; see NARA, JFK files, RIF 157-10007-10121.
WC Martello testimony, WC vol. X, pp. 53—56.
CD 75, p. 517; Quigley interview with Vinson, November 27, 1963, file NO 80-69.
WC vol. XXII, CE 1414, p. 831; WC vol. XXVI, CE 3120, p. 783.
WC, Lieutenant Martello testimony to the Warren Commission, WC vol. X, p. 56.
WC, Lieutenant Martello testimony to the Warren Commission, WC vol. X, p. 56.
WC vol. XVII, CE 827, p. 770.
On that occasion, Quigley's work became an April 27, 1961, New Orleans report to Dallas. That was before the FBI had learned Oswald had married Marina. See SAC New Orleans to SAC Dallas, April 27, 1961; NARA, JFK files, RIF 124-10228-10036.
FBI memorandum from SA John L. Quigley to SAC, August 27, 1963; NARA JFK files, RIF 100-10228-10052.
FBI New Orleans, 100-16601-13, SA John Lester Quigley, 8/15/63 summary of his 8/10/63 interview with Oswald in jail. NARA, JFK files, RIF 124-10228-10047.
Testimony of John L. Quigley, WC vol. IV, p. 435.
FBI New Orleans, 100-16601-13, SA John Lester Quigley, 8/15/63 summary of his 8/10/63 interview with Oswald in jail. NARA, JFK files, RIF 124-10228-10047.
This a fact which was apparently from a July 17, 1963, New Orleans report that had as an enclosure a copy of Oswald's April 14 letter from Dallas to the FPCC in New York. See SAC New Orleans to SAC Dallas, July 17, 1963; NARA, JFK files, RIF 124-10228-10040.
WC vol. XXVI, CE 2726, p. 105. Marina suggested that Oswald picked this name because "Hidell" sounded like "Fidel." See also WC vol. V. p. 402; WC vol. XVII, CE 826, p. 759; WC vol. XXII, CE 1401, p. 753, and CE 1413, p. 822; WC vol. XXIII, CE 1942, p. 737; WC vol. XXIV, CE 1986, p. 17; WC vol. XXV, CE 2548, p. 773; and WC vol. XXVI, CE 2726, p. 105.
FBI New Orleans, 100-16601-13, SA John Lester Quigley, 8/15/63 summary of his 8/10/63 interview with Oswald in jail. NARA, JFK files, RIF 124-10228-10047.
FBI New Orleans, 100-16601-13, SA John Lester Quigley, 8/15/63 summary of his 8/10/63 interview with Oswald in jail. NARA, JFK files, RIF 124-10228-10047.
FBI report, New Orleans office, September 24, 1963; NARA, JFK files, CIA DDP 201 file box 1; see also RIF 124-10160-10408 and RIF 124-10228-10062.
HSCA, vol. X, p. 62; from HSCA staff interview with Bartes.
FBI report, New Orleans office, September 24, 1963; NARA, JFK files, CIA DDP 201 file box 1; see also RIF 124-10160-10408 and RIF 124-10228-10062.
"Pamphlet Case Sentence Given," New Orleans Times-Picayune, August 13, 1963, p. 3.
FBI report, New Orleans office, September 24, 1963; NARA, JFK files, CIA DDP 201 file box 1; see also RIF 124-10160-10408 and RIF 124-10228-10062.
"Pamphlet Case Sentence Given," New Orleans, Times-Picayune, August 13, 1963, p. 3.
HSCA, vol. X, p. 62; from HSCA staff interview with Bartes.
HSCA, vol. X, p. 62; from HSCA staff interview with Bartes.
In this case, Bartes was being used as the source on Arcacha Smith being the previous CRC delegate (before Bartes), but it is crossed out and Bannister is used instead. The lined-out material however, makes it clear that Bartes was someone "who has furnished reliable information in the past and whose identity must be protected." SAC New Orleans to director FBI, & SAC Dallas, 89-69-138, undated but presumably in the first days after the assassination. See NARA, JFK files, RIF 124-102248-10191.
HSCA, vol. X, p. 62; from HSCA staff interview with Bartes.
FBI report, New Orleans office September 24, 1963; see also NARA, JFK files, RIF 124-10228-10062.
The Times-Picayune carried an article on page three, section one, in their 8/13/63 edition captioned "Pamphlet Case Sentence Given," indicating that Lee Oswald, aged 23, of 4907 Magazine, was sentenced to pay a fine of $10 or serve ten days in jail on a charge of disturbing the peace by creating a scene. It was indicated that Oswald was arrested by First District police in the 700 block of Canal while distributing pamphlets asking for a "fair play for Cuba." Police reportedly were called to the scene when three Cubans reportedly sought to stop Oswald from distributing the above pamphlets.
Director FBI to SAC New Orleans, August 21, 1963; NARA JFK files, RIF 124-10228-10049.
WC vol. X, p. 61; WC vol. XXV, CE 2546, p. 771.
CD 165, p. 10.
WC vol. X, pp. 41, 68; WC vol. XVI, CE 93, p. 342; WC vol. XXII, CE 1153, p. 187; WC vol. XXIV, CE 2003, p. 283.
WC vol. XXV, CE 2545, p. 771, CE 2548, p. 773.
WC vol. X, p. 41.
WC vol. XXI, Stuckey exhibit 2, p. 626; New Orleans States Item, 11/23/ 63; CD 897, p. 547 says at 2:00 P.M.
WC vol. XIX, Burcham exhibit 1, p. 236; WC vol. XXIII, CE 1191, p. 711. However, in August 1963; according to Illinois Professor Revilo P. Oliver—a political conservative—Oswald applied for a job at the Independent American, a conservative New Orleans publication whose editor was Kent Courtney; see WC vol. XV, p. 720.
WC vol. X, p. 269.
WC vol. XXVI, CE 3119, p. 762; Secret Service report, New Orleans, La., CO-2-34,030, by A. G. Vial, Anthony E. Gerrets, Roger Counts, and John W. Rice, December 3, 1963.
WC vol. X, pp. 41, and 270; WC vol. XXVI, CE 3119, p. 771.
WC vol. XXVI, CE 3119, p. 762; Secret Service, New Orleans, La., CO-2-34, 030 A. G. Vial, Anthony E. Gerrets, Roger Counts, John W. Rice date December 3, 1963.
CIA memorandum, circa May 1967; Subject: "CIA Involvement with Cubans and Cuban Groups Now or Potentially Involved in the Garrison Investigation"; see NARA, JFK files, RIF 1993.06.28.15:07:58:030280. We know about this from another location, apparently, by a quirk. A single sheet of paper, misfiled in Frank Sturgis's papers, a portion of which were in the CIA 1994 (5 brown boxes) release. It is entitled simply "Carlos Quiroga (Paragraph 7(C) of reference memorandum," and is undated. It also notes the fact that Quiroga had been a candidate for the "Agency Student Recruitment Program" while at Louisiana State University. The next sentence, however, it still redacted.
Eugene Methvin, August 1, 1963 letter to Edward Lansdale, Lansdale Papers, Hoover Institution.
FBI New Orleans SAC to file (100-16601-14), August 21, 1963, Subject: Lee Harvey Oswald; NARA, JFK files, RIF 124-10228-10048.
FBI New Orleans, 100-16601-1B2, record of property acquisition, re Stuckey interview with Oswald; NARA, JFK files, RIF 124-10228-10035.
Oswald letter to Arnold Johnson, August 28, 1963; WC vol. XX, Johnson exhibit 4, p. 263.
HSCA, vol. X, p. 85. According to the final report of the committee, Borja said his DRE responsibilities "involved only military operations and he suggested that Jose Antonio Lanusa, who handled press and public relations for the group, knew Clare Booth Luce and had been in contact with her."
WC vol. XXIV, CE 2119, p. 549, CE 2123, p. 685; and WC vol. XXV, CE 2193, p. 17, CE 2563, p. 811.
CD 598, p.a-7.
CD 1160, p. 4.
CD 205, p. 170.
NARA, JFK files, CIA document number 761-329A.
CD 75, p. 573.
CD 75, pp. 588 and 652.
HSCA Report, p. 218.
Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, Bitter Fruit: The Untold Story of the American Coup in Guatemala (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1983), p. 82.
HSCA Report, p. 219.
July 19, 1963 (Friday)—Oswald worked from 8:22 A.M. to 4:30 P.M. at Reily (WC vol. XXIII, CE 1896, p. 701) Oswald's maintenance book notes. (FBI exhibit D 66) This was Oswald's last day of employment at Reily. (WC vol. XVII, CE 826, p. 754) Emmett J. Barbe, general maintenance foreman for Reily testifies that he fired Oswald. (New Orleans Times Picayune,
CIA memo for chief, Security Analysis Group, Subject: Hall, 10 September, 1975; NARA, JFK files, RIF 1993.06.28.17:25:01:900360.
James Hosty, September 2, 1994, interview with John Newman.
James Hosty, September 2, 1994, interview with John Newman.
James Hosty, January 1983 interview with Larry Haapanen.
James Hosty, September 5, 1994, interview with John Newman.
Church Committee, vol. V, p. 65.
# Chapter Eighteen
WR, pp. 299—301.
Lee Harvey Oswald, the CIA, and Mexico City (hereafter referred to as the Lopez Report), p. 250.
Oleg Nechiporenko, Passport to Assassination: The Never-Before-Told Story of Lee Harvey Oswald by the KGB Colonel Who Knew Him (Birch Lane Press, 1993) hereafter referred to as Passport to Assassination.
LBJ Library, LBJ tapes, November 23, 1963, President Johnson, telephone conversation with FBI director Hoover.
WC vol. XXV, CE 2195, pp. 37—39, CE 2464, p. 633, and CE 2566, p. 819.
WC vol XXIV, p. 598; Vol. XXV, p, 767; and CD 905-C:11.
Lopez Report, p. 248.
9/27/63 10:30 AM Man calls Soviet Military Attache regarding a visa for Odessa." See Lopez Report, p. 117.
CIA transcript of September 27, 1963, 10:37 A.M., phone call; NARA, JFK files, CIA January 1994 (5 brown boxes release); box 15b, folder 56.
Lopez Report, p. 250.
Nechiporenko, Passport to Assassination, p. 76.
Lopez Report, p. 118, referencing footnote 471 on p. 32 of the notes, which cites a "Memo to Clark Anderson from Winston Scott, 11/27/63, with seven attachments; LR p. 32 fn. 471.
Lopez Report, p. 118.
Valery for 10 to 15 minutes and then Oleg for 40 to 45 minutes; see Nechiporenko, Passport to Assassination, p. 104.
Pavel and Valery for more than an hour and then Oleg escorts him away; see Nechiporenko, Passport to Assassination, p. 104.
The man is later identified as Oswald and the woman is later identified as Duran; the alleged Oswald comes on the line speaking in very poor Russian.
Lopez Report, p. 192.
Lopez Report, p. 192.
Lopez Report, p. 117.
Third Call: 1:25 P.M. [LE3] At 1:25 an unidentified man called the Soviet Consulate and asked for the consul. The man was told that the consul was not in. The man outside asked, "When tomorrow?" The soviet official told him that on Mondays and Fridays the consul was in between four and five. This conversation was also in Spanish. See Lopez Report, p. 74; and also p. 117.
Nechiporenko, Passport to Assassination, p. 66.
Nechiporenko, Passport to Assassination, p. 70.
Mexico City CIA transcript, September 27, 1963, 4:05 P.M.; NARA JFK files, CIA documents, Oswald box 15b, folder 56. This material was also included in the CIA January 1994 (5 brown boxes) release.
Mexico City CIA transcript, September 27, 1963, 4:05 P.M., NARA JFK files, CIA documents, Oswald box 15b, folder 56. This material was also included in the CIA January 1994 (5 brown boxes) release.
NARA, Oswald box 15b, folder 56, CIA January 1994 (5 brown boxes) release. See also Lopez Report, p. 76.
The English "Attachment C" states: A telephone call to the Cuban Embassy made at 1626 hours on September 27 by an unidentified man in the Soviet Embassy asking for Silvia Duran. They discuss the visa application for the "American" who with his Russian wife wanted to go via Cuba to the USSR. The Soviet [Embassy man's voice] says he has only no reply from [the] Washington etc. See NARA, CIA document number 133 594 ("part of"), and see also box 6, folder 5 of the CIA January 1994 (5 brown boxes) release.
NARA, CIA transcript from Mexico City, September 28, 1963, 11:51 A.M., Oswald box 15b, folder 56, CIA January 1994 (5 brown boxes) release.
Lopez Report, pp. 193-194.
NARA, CIA document number 559-243, a CIA memo to Warren Commission lawyer Lee Rankin about Duran, dated February 21, 1964. This report has an incorrect spelling for Alberu; it gives his name as Luis Alveru. His full name was Luis Alberu Suoto (or Soto). Alberu's agent status is given in a July 27, 1962, request for operational approval under the number "101331," a number cross-referenced to Alberu's Security Office number OS-279-089 in an August 20, 1962, security memo to CI/OA (Counterintelligence Operational Approval). OS-279-089 is itself cross-referenced to Alberu's CIA 201 number, 328609, in many files, such as an April 27, 1967, request for operational approval.
Winston Scott, The Foul Foe, unpublished manuscript, Chapter XXIV, p. 273. NARA, JFK files, HSCA records, Win Scott files. "Box 4" appears on the cover page.
Nechiporenko, Passport to Assassination, p. 81; see also p. 103.
Winston Scott, The Foul Foe, unpublished manuscript, Chapter XXIV, p. 273. NARA, JFK files, HSCA records, Win Scott files. "Box 4" appears on the cover page.
Nechiporenko, Passport to Assassination, p. 74.
Nechiporenko, Passport to Assassination, p. 74.
Nechiporenko, Passport to Assassination, p. 76.
Nechiporenko, Passport to Assassination, p. 77.
Nechiporenko, Passport to Assassination, p. 79.
The only exception is Azcue, who was confused and describes an event as taking place Saturday which clearly was the Friday afternoon blow-up.
Mexico City 5448, to CIA, Action: C/WH 5, July 20, 1963. NARA, JFK files, CIA, January 1994 (5 brown boxes) release; see box 1, folder 2.
NARA, CIA transcript from Mexico City, September 28, 1963, 11:51 A.M., Oswald box 15b, folder 56, CIA January 1994 (5 brown boxes) release.
Lopez Report, p. 77.
NARA, CIA transcript from Mexico City, September 28, 1963, 11:51 A.M., Oswald box 15b, folder 56, CIA January 1994 (5 brown boxes) release.
Lopez Report, p. 79, p. 136, pp. 164—165 and p. 170.
Nechiporenko, Passport to Assassination, p. 79.
There are two possibilities: Either the Soviet was genuine or he was an impostor. When added to our matrix, which is already complicated, this creates an even larger matrix of possibilities. However, we should make note of the fact that if the Soviet, too, was an impostor, then the entire call could have been fictitious, a possibility that seems pointless; for what reason would the CIA station deceive its own people or headquarters? It seems more logical to assume the Soviet was genuine, i.e., inside the Soviet Consulate, receiving the call.
Nechiporenko, Passport to Assassination, p. 79.
NARA, CIA document number 509-803, Information Developed on the Activity of Lee Harvey Oswald in Mexico City, 28 September—3 October 1963 (hereafter referred to as CIA Gist of Oswald Mexican City Sources) January 31, 1964.
Lopez Report, p. 171.
Silvia Duran, January 31, 1995, interview by Anthony Summers with questions posed by the author.
Nechiporenko, remarks in a special interview with American researchers at the 1993 Assassination Symposium on John Kennedy.
Winston Scott, Foul Foe, unpublished manuscript, p. 272.
Winston Scott, Foul Foe, unpublished manuscript, p. 268.
Lopez Report, p. 88.
Winston Scott, Foul Foe, unpublished manuscript, p. 267.
Winston Scott, Foul Foe, unpublished manuscript, p. 273.
Mr. T testified on April 12, 1978, and also recognized the four transcripts from September 28, October 1 and 3 as his work. He also testified that he recognized the 10/1/63 conversation as his work because the name Lee Oswald was underlined.
Lopez Report, p. 85.
Lopez Report, p. 85.
Lopez Report, p. 83.
October 1. [LEO: not in LR] In midmorning an unidentified individual speaking broken Russian contacted the Soviet military attaché in Mexico City. He said he had been to the embassy the previous Saturday (September 28) and had talked with a consul, who had said they would send a telegram to Washington: Had there been a reply? He was referred to the consulate for information.[CIA Gist of OSwald Mexican City Sources, p. 9.] [10/1/ 63 at 10:31 A.M., transcribed by Mr. T; LR p. 82.] [On this transcript, the translator added the notation: "the same person who phoned a day or so ago and spoke in broken Russian," links to marginal notation on 9/28 11:51 transcript: "broken Russian"; LR p. 121] There are two slightly different transcripts of this conversation, which occurred at 10:30 A.M., on October 1. This is one of them:
[LE9 contd] A person later identified as Lee Harvey Oswald, speaking in "broken Russian," telephones the Soviet Embassy.
OSWALD: Hello. I was at your place last Saturday and talked to your Consul. They said they'd send a telegram to Washington, and I wanted to ask you, is there anything new?
RUSSIAN EMBASSY: Call another number, if you will.
OSWALD: Please.
RUSSIAN EMBASSY: 15-60-55, and ask for a Consul.
OSWALD: Thank you.
RUSSIAN EMBASSY: Please.
NARA, CIA transcript from Mexico City, October 1, 1963, 10:30 A.M., Oswald box 15b, folder 56, CIA January 1994 (5 brown boxes) release. The other is not significantly different; it is in the same location at box 3, volume 1. Five minutes later, an "Oswald" calls the 15-60-55 number:
[LE10] In at 1035 hours MO/the same person who phoned a day or so ago and spoke in broken Russian/speaks to Obyedkov.
MO: Hello, this is Lee Oswald (phon) speaking. I was at your place last Saturday and spoke to a Consul, and they said that they'd send a telegram to Washington, so I wanted to find out if you have anything new? But I don't remember the name of the Consul.
OBY: Kostikov. He is dark/hair or skin?
LEE: Yes. My name is Oswald.
OBY: Just a minute I'll find out. They say that they haven't received anything yet.
LEE: Have they done anything?
OBY: Yes, they say that a request has been sent out, but nothing has been received as yet.
LEE: And what . . . ? [Oby hangs up]
[NARA, CIA transcript from Mexico City, October 1, 1963, 10:35 A.M., Oswald box 6, folder 5, CIA January 1994 (5 brown boxes) release.] No sense asking for answer from Washington because Oswald did not fill out the application forms.
Lopez Report, p. 117.
Lopez Report, p. 125.
Lopez Report, p. 125.
Copies of this award recommendation are available in the National Archives; the author is grateful to the JFK Assassination Records Review Board for providing a copy in time for use in this book.
This can be seen from her 1963 fitness report and her career award recommendation, copies of which are available in the National Archives; again, the author is grateful to the JFK Assassination Records Review Board for providing a copies in time for use in this book.
David Martin, Wilderness of Mirrors, (New York: Harper and Row, 1980), p. 121 and p. 127.
CIA inspector general's report, May 23, 1967, pp. 92—93; NARA, JFK files, RIF 1993.06.30.17:10:07:150140.
For Phillips's comment, see Washington Post, 26 November 1976. For the Sigler story, see William R. Corson and Susan B. Trento, Windows (New York: Crown, 1989), pp. 266—396. The details of the Sigler story were brought to the author's attention by Professor Peter Dale Scott.
Washington Post, November 26, 1976; Anthony Summers, Conspiracy (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1980), pp. 388—389; Gaeton Fonzi, Final Investigation (New York: Thunder's Mouth Press, 1993), p. 285.
David Phillips, Night Watch (New York: Atheneum, 1987 ed), p. 181; his book was originally published in 1977.
CIA cable to JMWAVE and Mexico City from headquarters, DIR 73214, date no longer visible, but obviously just prior to October 7, 1963.
Kelley, Kelley: The Story of an FBI Director, p. 267.
Lopez Report, p. 88.
Lopez Report, p. 232.
Memorandum for the files, from Willard C. Curtis (probably a pseudonym for Winston Scott); Subject: June Cobb [handwritten here: "Interview with Elena Paz about June Cobb], November 25, 1964. CIA document 928-927, TX-1925.
Letter from S. D. Breckinridge, CIA principal coordinator for the HSCA, to Mr. G. Robert Blakey, chief counsel and director, HSCA, OLC 79-0113/ k, March 13, 1979; NARA, JFK files, RIF 1993.07.16.16:28:40:280500.
Lopez Report, p. 207.
On another page in the Lopez Report, we see the reference to Cobb's move into Elena's home properly set in 1964. See Lopez Report, p. 231. Just prior to moving in, June had been introduced to Elena by Eunice Odio, whom Cobb had met earlier.
Lopez Report, pp. 206—207
June Cobb, March 4, and March 17, 1995 interviews with John Newman.
June Cobb, March 4, 1995, interview with John Newman.
Lopez Report, pp. 207—208; see also "Lee Harvey Oswald and Kennedy Assassination," re Memorandum of Conversation, December 10, 1965, Elena Garro de Paz and Charles Thomas; courtesy of the Assassination Archives Research Center, CIA 1995 release. By using this December 10 memo, it is easy to fill in the associated redactions in the Lopez Report.
June Cobb, February 23, 1995, interview with John Newman.
Memorandum for the files, from Willard C. Curtis (probably a pseudonym for Winston Scott); Subject: June Cobb [handwritten here: "Interview with Elena Paz about June Cobb], November 25, 1964. CIA document 928-927, TX-1925.
James Hosty, September 5, 1994, interview with John Newman.
June Cobb, February 23, 1995, interview with John Newman.
Memorandum for the files, from Willard C. Curtis (probably a pseudonym for Winston Scott); Subject: June Cobb [handwritten here: "Interview with Elena Paz about June Cobb], November 25, 1964. CIA document 928-927, TX-1925.
According to the Lopez Report:
Attached to the memo was a note from Flannery to the chief of station, Winston Scott, which read, "Do you want me to send the gist of this to Headquarters?" Scott then noted that the memo should be filed. The file indications show that the memo went into the Oswald "P" file and the Elena Garro "P" file.
The Lopez Report then has this comparison:
The story is not as detailed as the 10/5/64 version. There is no mention of Deba Garro Guerrero Galvan. The story, perhaps because it is third hand, differs from the previous story in two areas: It states that the party was at the Cuban Embassy as opposed to Ruben Duran's, and that Elena talked to a Cuban Embassy official instead of her cousins about the three Americans.
June Cobb, March 4, 1995, interview with John Newman.
Memorandum for the files, from Willard C. Curtis (probably a pseudonym for Winston Scott); Subject: June Cobb [handwritten here: "Interview with Elena Paz about June Cobb], November 25, 1964. CIA document 928-927, TX-1925.
Charles Thomas memo, December 10, 1965; CIA MArch 8, 1995, release to the Assassination Archives Research Center.
Lopez Report, p. 213.
Lopez Report, p. 215.
Charles Thomas memo, December 25, 1965; CIA March 8, 1995, release to the Assassination Archives Research Center.
Lopez Report, pp. 221—222.
Lopez Report, pp. 222—223.
Silvia Duran, interview with Anthony Summers, January 11, 1995; questions provided by John Newman.
Cable from CIA Mexico City station to chief, Western Hemisphere Division; Subject: Cuba, the [redacted] Operation, June 18, 1967; NARA JFK files, CIA document number 1125-1129B; see also CIA January 1994 (5 brown boxes) release, box 7, folder 6, and box 15, folder 55.
Lopez Report, p. 253.
Lopez Report, pp. 206—207, and especially p. 255.
Lopez Report, p. 253.
Agent report from Mexico City, May 26, 1967; Subject: [Redacted] meeting with [redacted]. This report is attached to cable from CIA Mexico City station to chief, Western Hemisphere Division; Subject: Cuba, the [redacted] operation, June 18, 1967; NARA JFK files, CIA document number 1125-1129B; see also CIA January 1994 (5 brown boxes) release, box 7, folder 6, and box 15, folder 55.
Agent report from Mexico City, May 26, 1967; Subject; [Redacted] meeting with [redacted]. This report is attached to cable from CIA Mexico City station to chief, Western Hemisphere Division; Subject: Cuba, the [redacted] operation, June 18, 1967; NARA JFK files, CIA document number 1125-1129B; see also CIA January 1994 (5 brown boxes) release, box 7, folder 6, and box 15, folder 55.
Agent report from Mexico City, May 26, 1967; Subject: [Redacted] meeting with [redacted]. This report is attached to cable from CIA Mexico City station to chief, Western Hemisphere Division; Subject: Cuba, the [redacted] operation, June 18, 1967; NARA JFK files, CIA document number 1125-1129B; see also CIA January 1994 (5 brown boxes) release, box 7, folder 6, and box 15, folder 55.
Larry Keenan January 29, 1995, interview with John Newman.
Edwin Lopez, January 29, 1995, interview with John Newman.
See Lopez Report, p. 198. Lechuga's name is redacted, but Scott's manuscript, in this case described in a memo by Warren Commission lawyer W. David Slawson, was obviously referring to that affair.
CIA information report, CS-/537,594, February 18, 1963; NARA, JFK files, CIA January 1994 (5 brown boxes) release, Proenza file.
See Lopez Report, p. 198.
See Lopez Report, p. 199.
Agent report from Mexico City, May 26, 1967; Subject: [redacted] meeting with [redacted]. This report is attached to cable from CIA Mexico City station to chief, Western Hemisphere Division; Subject: Cuba, the [redacted] operation, June 18, 1967; NARA JFK files, CIA document number 1125-1129B ; see also CIA January 1994 (5 brown boxes) release, box 7, folder 6, and box 15, folder 55.
Lopez Report, p. 200.
See Charles Thomas memorandum, December 25, 1965; Assassination Archives Research Center; there appear to be two P numbers on Duran: on page it is indistinct, but possibly 7969 or 4969.
Charles Thomas, memo to Secretary of State Rogers, July 25, 1969; NARA, JFK files, RIF 157-10005-10369.
See memo for chief, Covert Action Staff, and attached request for approval on use of Thomas dated September 20, 1963; NARA, JFK files, CIA January 1994 (5 brown boxes) release, Charles Thomas papers. It is interesting that Thomas's previous assignment had been in Haiti, from January 8, 1961, until the summer of 1963, after deMohrenschildt's arrival there.
Cable to Thomas from CARLONORB, 15 January 1970; this was possibly a Washington-based attorney, Charles Norberg, whose name and address, including the cable address, were in deMohrenschildt's address book. For this and associated materials on the Thomas-deMohrenschildt link in 1969-1970, see NARA, JFK files, RIF 180-10078-10007. Again, the author expresses appreciation to Larry Haapanen for his insightful work on this point.
# Chapter Nineteen
A possible exception to this was what was passed to the Agency via its AMSPELL (DRE) assets, mentioned in Chapter Seventeen.
DDO response to HSCA letter dated August 15, 1978 (Questions 1 & 2), August 24, 1978; NARA, JFK files, RIF 1993.07.10.11:24:36:210470.
Page 26 of "List of Documents for Release," [to HSCA]; NARA, JFK files, RIF 1993.08.04.08:21:00:780053.
This is the report previously discussed that mentioned Oswald's letter to the FPCC from Dallas, in which he said he had been passing out pamphlets with a pro-Castro placard around his neck. See FBI report by special agent James P. Hosty on Oswald, September 10, 1963; NARA, JFK files, RIF 124-10228-10058. Note also that there is one redacted organization on that routing slip. It is possible that this was an SAS or WH element. Again, we must await the full disclosure of information.
Church Committee, Vol. V, p. 65.
It is likely that when the September 16, 1963, CIA memo to the FBI is declassified, we will see that Mexico was one of the "foreign countries" the CIA had in mind.
Church Committee memorandum from Dan Dwyer and Ed Greissing to Paul Wallach on review of Oswald 201 file, November 3, 1975; NARA, JFK files, SSCI box 265-15, 10091.
Page 26 of "List of Documents for Release," [to HSCA]: NARA, JFK files, RIF 1993.08.04.08:21:00:780053.
McCord may have been reassigned by 1963.
Page 26 of "List of Documents for Release," [to HSCA]; NARA, JFK files, RIF 1993.08.04.08:21:00:780053.
Document number 40. CIA response to HSCA request of March 9, 1978; NARA, JFK: files, RIF 1993.07.02.13:25:25:180530.
CI/SIG already had Oswald's 201 restricted to Egerter. See Chapters Four and Eight.
The FBI was conducting interviews in New Orleans while Oswald was in Mexico City, on October 1, 1963. See October 1, Kaack report; NARA, JFK files, FBI 105-82555, CIA DDP 201 file.
Note: Received by CIA/RID October 2, 1963, 4:26 P.M. by AN-6; read by CI/LS Jane Roman, October 4, 1963; read by SAS/CI (Austin) Horn, October 8, 1963; read by SAS/CI/CONTROL, October 10, 1963 "CR"; read by CI/ SI, (prob) October 10, 1962, Ann Egerter; read by CI/IC, date UNK "C7"; read by REDACTED, date UNK; read by CI/STAFF, room 2B03, date UNK; also has date stamp October 3, 1963, 9:36; coded 100-300-11, later lined through and replaced by 201-289248; document number DBA 52355.
Mexico City cable 6453 to headquarters October 9, 1963; NARA, JFK files, CIA 201 file on Oswald.
CIA cable 74673 to FBI, State Department, and Navy, October 10, 1963; NARA, JFK files, CIA 201 file on Oswald.
CIA headquarters cable 74830 to Mexico station, October 10, 1963; NARA, JFK files, CIA 201 file on Oswald.
The Agency's attempt to conceal the name of the drafter seems pointless. John Scelso's (may be a pseudonym) name is all over the hundreds of newly released cables between headquarters and Mexico City [see NARA, JFK files, HSCA records, CIA segregated collection, boxes 51—53, the CIA January 1994 (5 brown boxes release) and other locations], as is a B. [probably Bob] Reichardt, and their positions as the chiefs of WH/3 and WH/3/Mexico respectively. The redacted space for both cables in the Lopez Report is 11 spaces. Anyone who works crossword puzzles could venture a decent guess at who it probably was.
Lopez Report, p. 142.
Lopez Report, p. 143.
Lopez Report, p. 143.
Lopez Report, pp. 146—150.
Egerter was identified as signing for CI/SPG. Could this stand for "Special Projects Group"?—possibly the same as CI/SIG? Ann Egerter worked in SIG.
Lopez Report, p. 151; see also footnote 588, on p. 40 of the notes.
Lopez Report, p. 155.
CD 691, p. 3; see also NARA, JFK files, CIA document number 509-803.
Might this problem be explained if the 100-300-11 file into which the FBI reports had been directed was withheld from the Mexico City desk? The answer is no. Even if the 100-300-11 file were withheld, we know that the 201 file was furnished to the drafter and that FBI agent Fain's August 8, 1962, report on Oswald was in it.
This was the August 8, 1962, Fain report: see NARA, JFK files, CIA DDP 201 file on Oswald.
The out-of-date Soviet focus of the cable is underscored by a CIA description of the October 10 cable in a later October 15, 1963, cable as "Attempts of Lee Oswald and wife to reenter U.S." This comment appeared on the bottom of the headquarters copy of a Mexico City station cable dated October 15, 1963, requesting a photo of Oswald be pouched. See NARA, JFK files, CIA 201 file on Oswald.
Copy provided courtesy of Jeff Morley.
Copy provided courtesy of Jeff Morley.
CIA document entitled "Information Developed by CIA on the Activity of Lee Harvey Oswald in Mexico City, 28 September—3 October 1963." January 31, 1964, p. 3; NARA, JFK files, CIA document 509—803, and CIA DDP Oswald 201 file. 1992 release, boxes 1-2. See also WC CD 692.
Jane Roman, November 3, 1994, interview with Jeff Morley and John Newman.
Jane Roman, November 3, 1994, interview with Jeff Morley and John Newman.
Scelso is openly identified as chief of WH/3 throughout the Lopez Report.
NARA, CIA document number 377-731: C/WH/3 memorandum for the deputy director (Plans). The subject is given as "Plans for the Oswald Investigation." The "Oswald," however, is handwritten over a redacted word, probably "GPFLOOR." GPFLOOR was a cryptonym used for Oswald.
CIA document, attachment No. 2 to [redacted] Project Renewal, forwarded in HMMA-25141; NARA, JFK files, CIA January 1994 (5 brown boxes) release; in sequence as 00787 to documents also containing material on cryptonyms AMROD and GPFLOOR (Oswald); see also CIA Monthly Operational Support for Project, October 1963, from Chief of Station Mexico City, to Chief WH Division, HMMA22452, November 7, 1963.
Lopez Report, p. 181.
See NARA, JFK files, CIA document number 64-552. See also Lopez Report, p. 185.
See NARA JFK files, Department of State airgram from Mexico City, A-631, by D. E. Boster, December 2, 1963; CIA record is DST 28350.
See CIA memo to Rankin. February 21, 1964; NARA, JFK files, CIA document XAAZ-22759.
Warren Report, p. 735.
Warren Report, footnote 1170 to Section XIII (p. 735), p. 868.
Helms memorandum to Rankin. February 19, 1964; NARA, JFK files, CIA document XAAZ-36365.
Mexican government note to the U.S. Embassy, May 14, 1964, WC Vol. XXIV, CE 2120, p. 569.
Memorandum to A. H. Belmont from W. C. Sullivan, December 3, 1963; NARA, JFK files, RIF 124-10003-10417.
FBI report from the "Mexico FBI Rep," subject: Activities of Oswald in Mexico City, undated. This document also happens to be one of the rare occasions when the National Archives RIF sheet is misdated, in this case to July 27, 1963. It was probably between November 23 and the end of December 1963. See NARA, JFK files, RIF, 1993.07.17.09:34:53:46010.
FBI memo, from A. H. Belmont to Clyde Tolson, November 27, 1963; NARA, JFK files, 157-10003-10396.
HSCA, Vol. 111, pp. 30—31.
HSCA, Vol. 111, pp. 49—51.
HSCA, Vol. III, p. 59.
CIA memo for the record, by John Scelso, November 23, 1963; NARA, JFK files, CIA document number 36-540, TX-1240. See Lopez Report, in which Scott is named along with Scelso, pp. 185—186.
Lopez Report, p. 186; for the flash cable, see DIR849-6 to Mexico City, November 23, 1963, NARA, JFK Files, CIA document number 37-529.
Lopez Report, p. 187.
Warren Report, p. 736.
Lopez Report, p. 190.
CIA document entitled "Information Developed by CIA on the Activity of Lee Harvey Oswald in Mexico City, 28 September—3 October 1963," January 31, 1964; NARA, JFK files, CIA document 509-803, and DDP Oswald 201 file 1992 release, boxes 1-2. See also WC CD 692.
Lopez Report, p. 175.
NARA, JFK files, CIA document number 603-256, XAAZ-27168, March 12, 1964, "Memo for Record on 12 March Meeting of Rankin, Willems, Helms, Murphy, Rocca, etal on CIA Contribution to Commission."
NARA JFK files, RIF 1993.07.02.13:52:25:560530. The document is stamped "CI [counterintelligence] 314-75, dated September 18, 1975, and stamped "George T. Kalaris."
Kalaris may not have been fully briefed by his predecessor, Angleton, a possibility we might consider if it turns out that this document was inadvertently released. It appears to have been written for the Church Committee investigators who were then probing the Agency's activities. (SSCI Box 265-14, 10076; from Curt Smothers to Rhett Dawson; Subject "Status of Assassination Report, " August 1, 1975; NARA, JFK files. RIF [SSCIA;] 157-0005-10076.) We know from a Church Committee document that its investigators were seeking FBI materials on "Lee Harvey Oswald (a.k.a. A. J. Hidel or O. H. Lee)" in the files of Mexico City (Church Committee memo from Paul G. Wallach to Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., November 24, 1975; NARA, JFK files, RIF 157-10003-10233). Oswald used all three names there. He used the name Oswald, Hidel was on his FPCC identification card, and he used O. H. Lee for his bus ticket back to the U.S. The Church Committee investigators were seeking CIA materials on the same three names in the Mexico City files.
In what may be a coincidence, a register of CIA documents on the Kennedy assassination is annotated with text describing withheld or partially withheld documents. The register contains two items from September 18, 1975, one of which was the Kalaris memo, and two more from September 22, both of which concerned a "compromise" of intelligence information, meaning something was inadvertently released. The first, 1189-1001, was described in the register this way:
This document was denied. The document discusses the compromise of some classified intelligence information and the possible consequences in terms of damage to foreign intelligence sources and methods. The release of this document would provide public confirmation of the validity of the information leaked and would make certain the damage which at this point is only problematical. The document is therefore properly classified and denied.
The second September 22, 1975, document listed in 1190-1002 contains this remark:
This document was denied. The document contains a continuation of the discussion of the compromise of the classified information stated in the document listed immediately above. The same consequences would be entailed should this document be released. It is therefore properly classified and denied. (CIA document register, 1189-1001, September 22, 1975.)
To recapitulate, these two denied documents describe a security compromise we are theorizing might be the Kalaris memo. A firm conclusion must await the full release of pertinent information. Following this security compromise, and possibly related to it, the "security measures" that greeted Church Committee investigators Dan Dwyer and Ed Greissing eleven days later (November 3) were tight. In their memo of November 14, 1975, they explained that the CIA had decreed that "any notes taken by members of the SSCI [Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities] will be photocopied at the end of each session's review. Second, briefcases will remain in the custody of the CI [counterintelligence] office while documents are being reviewed." (Church Committee memorandum from Dan Dwyer and Ed Greissing to Paul Wallach on review of Oswald 201 file, November 3, 1975; NARA, JFK files, SSCI BOX 265-15, 10091.)
Win Scott, Foul Foe, p. 268.
Win Scott, Foul Foe, pp. 268—269.
Lopez Report, p. 172.
Lopez Report, p. 174.
The Lopez Report found that nearly everyone thought that this information should have been passed on to headquarters, but people seemed divided on whether it actually happened. Only one person interviewed by the HSCA was certain of her recollection that a second cable had been sent. However, it was an important person—the unidentified CIA Woman who identified Goodpasture as the very person who sent such a cable.
Lopez Report, p. 181.
Former director of Central Intelligence, Richard Helms, August 23, 1994, interview with John Newman.
Norman Kempster, Los Angeles Times, January 1, 1977, p. 1.
See, for example, the October 3 headquarters cable to Mexico included in the documents republished with this book. The handwriting is the author's attempt to reconstruct this cable. It is clear that the CIA station was allowed to share some Soviet cases with the FBI, but something very sensitive is not being shared, and it is going on at the time of Oswald's visit to Mexico City. It is possible that this was the Agency's penetration of the Cuban Consulate.
# Chapter 20
Kelley, Kelley: The Story of an FBI Director, p. 268.
Kelley, Kelley: The Story of an FBI Director, p. 279.
Henry Steele Commager, "Intelligence: The Constitution Betrayed," New York Review of Books, September 30, 1976, pp. 32—39.
Henry Steele Commager, "Intelligence: The Constitution Betrayed," New York Review of Books, September 30, 1976, pp. 32—39.
# EPILOGUE, 2008
# The Plot to Murder President Kennedy: A New Interpretation
# The Plot and the National Security Cover-up
My views on the assassination of President Kennedy have evolved in the thirteen years since the publication of Oswald and the CIA. While the six million records made available as a result of the 1993 congressional passage of the JFK Records Act have not made it possible to identify those who were ultimately responsible for the Kennedy assassination, these records do shed light on the nature and design of the plot and the national security cover-up that followed.
It is now clear that most of the U.S. leaders and officials who participated in the national security cover-up had nothing to do with the plot that was hatched before the president's murder. Many of them—including leading legislators and Supreme Court Chief Justice Earl Warren—were motivated by the perceived threat of a nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union. Inside the executive branch of government, many others were motivated by the desire to protect their jobs and their institutions. Their collective actions, however, were not the result of an accident; rather, they were the forced checkmate in the endgame of an ingenious plan.
The plan was designed to force official Washington to bury a radioactive story in Oswald's files in order for America to survive. The plan worked. No matter how sloppy the performance of the shooters in Dallas was, no matter how bungled the autopsy and the handling of the evidence was, all would be trumped by the threat of WWIII and 40 million dead Americans. From the beginning, the plot was based upon the assumption that, when presented with this horrific possibility, everyone would fall into line. This assumption was correct.
# In Mexico: Linking Oswald to Castro and Khrushchev to WWIII
I do not know who directly handled Oswald in 1963, but someone involved in the murder of the president did. Many researchers think they know who this person was and perhaps they do. Some think it might have been David Atlee Phillips who, at the time of Oswald's visit to Mexico City, was head of Cuban operations at the CIA station there. Another candidate might be William Gaudet, a CIA Latin American operative who happened to be standing in line in front of Oswald the day the two men got their tourist permits from the Mexican Consulate in New Orleans.e It might have been someone else.
Whether or not Oswald's handler or handlers understood that their activities would lead to the death of the president, they were nevertheless taking cues from someone in CIA counterintelligence who was harnessed to the plot. If there were some CIA officers who saw Oswald's trip to Mexico as part of a legitimate counter-Castro operation, someone, somewhere in the Agency's ounterintelligence operations understood that what happened on that trip was designed to force a national security cover-up after the president's murder.
When asked to head a presidential commission of inquiry, Chief Justice Earl Warren turned down Robert Kennedy twice and then turned down Lyndon Johnson until the president played the Mexico City trump card. "And I just pulled out what Hoover told me," Johnson later bragged in a call with Senator Russell, "about a little incident in Mexico City." Johnson recalled how he explained to Warren that this "little incident" made it look like Castro and Khrushchev were behind the president's murder. "And I think you put on your uniform in World War I, fat as you are," Johnson claimed he had told Warren, "and would do anything to save one American life." Johnson explained that, when confronted with this, Warren started crying and agreed to take the assignment.f In a 1972 documentary for public television Warren himself told the same story—except for the tears—about how Johnson feared a "nuclear war."g
On the surface, Oswald's trip to Mexico City made no sense at all. Whoever was handling him was able to get him to do and say things that were not in his interest. The story was that he had decided to return again to the Soviet Union—this time by way of Cuba. That story was a ruse. In the summer of 1963, the State Department had approved his passport for travel to the USSR but also stamped it with a warning that a person traveling to Cuba would be liable for prosecution.h If he really intended to go back to the Soviet Union he could have gone through the same European countries he had during his first defection in 1959. Thus, to travel to the Soviet Union via Cuba made no sense.
There was a darker purpose for Oswald's visit to Mexico City. He was sent there to seek visas from the Cuban Consulate and Soviet Embassy. The Cuban transit visa could be used to get him to Cuba or to make it appear he had gone to Cuba. It is now apparent that the planners did not expect that he would get the Soviet visa, for they likely knew that U.S. citizens could only get such a visa from the Soviet Embassy in Washington. Rather, the objective was simply incidental contact between Oswald and the man who issued Soviet visas in Mexico City: Valery Kostikov. The value of this contact derived from what only a handful of counterintelligence officers in Washington knew: Kostikov was an important operative of KGB assassinations in the Americas. In my view, it is likely that among this small group of officers was a bad apple, a person involved in designing the plot to assassinate President Kennedy.
The Mexico City plan had a defect: the Cubans required a Soviet visa in order to issue the Cuban transit visa. The planners had not anticipated this and it nearly ruined the plan and all of the work that had been done to prepare Oswald's Cuban legend in 1963. By the time Oswald reached Mexico City in late September he had an impressive portfolio of pro-Castro fliers and Fair Play for Cuba literature featuring himself and his Cuban escapades in New Orleans that summer. When, on Friday, September 27, he presented them to the Cuban Consulate visa officer, Sylvia Duran, they were not enough to convince her to issue the transit visa. He must first, she said, have a Soviet visa.
That same Friday afternoon Oswald went to the Soviet Embassy in an unsuccessful attempt to get a Soviet visa from Kostikov. Then he did something unusual: he returned to the Cuban Consulate and told Duran that he had received his Soviet visa. If he really still hoped Duran would issue him a transit visa, then telling this lie was not in Oswald's interest. A possible explanation is that his handler had concluded Oswald would not get the Cuban visa and, as a result, told Oswald to tell this bald lie. The handler's likely motive was to prompt Duran to phone Kostikov to find out if Oswald's claim was true. This worked and the two visa officers both discussed why neither would give Oswald a visa. Kostikov stated, "we have received no answer from Washington, and it will probably take four to five months. We cannot give him a visa here without asking Washington."i
The handler wanted this call to occur because he knew that it would be intercepted by the CIA's LI/ENVOY program—its telephone tap operation in Mexico City. In this manner, the fact that Oswald had met a KGB assassin would end up in the CIA's records. However, while Oswald's lie led Duran to call Kostikov, neither Duran nor Kostikov used Oswald's name when they spoke about him, referring to him only as "the American." Furthermore, once Duran found out that Oswald had lied to her, it was the end of the road: she turned him down again. He then made a scene and had to be physically escorted from the premises. From the perspective of Oswald's handler on that Friday evening, the plan to firmly link Oswald to Castro and the Kremlin had not succeeded.
On Saturday morning Oswald went to the Soviet Embassy again in a final attempt to get a Soviet visa. During his second visit with Kostikov, Oswald produced a loaded revolver and explained that it was necessary to protect himself from the FBI. This antic, too, was likely something his handler told him to do. This visit again failed to produce a Soviet visa, and Oswald declined, as he had done the previous day, to fill out the papers that could be sent to the consulate in Washington, D.C., requesting a visa.j Oswald was again told that such a process would take many months to complete and so, after a teary-eyed scene, he gave up altogether and had no further contact—in person or by phone—with either diplomatic post.
This was not good news for whoever was handling Oswald in Mexico. What happened next tells us something about the relationship between Oswald and his handler(s) there. They made phone calls to the Soviet Embassy—allegedly from the Cuban Consulate and elsewhere—on Saturday, Monday, and Tuesday impersonating Oswald. As I established in Oswald and the CIA in 1995,k the script of these impersonations did a poor job of matching Oswald's experiences inside these buildings. For example, in the Tuesday call the Oswald character asks if there is anything new on the telegram sent to Washington.
While Oswald's handler knew of, and possibly watched, Oswald's trips in and out of these Cuban and Soviet diplomatic buildings, he did not know all of the details of what had happened inside. He did manage to learn—either from Oswald or from a mole in either building—that Oswald had not received a Cuban visa. The impersonator's request for news on a "cable to Washington" sheds light on the possible identity of Oswald's handler. On the date of this call (Tuesday, 1 October) Oswald had no motive to ask for news about a visa request he had twice declined to fill out the paperwork for. It is apparent that the handler—and therefore the impersonator—did not know Oswald had pushed back these forms twice. Moreover, Kostikov told Duran—not Oswald—that they had not received an answer from Washington. Kostikov had only told Oswald that it would take many months to process a visa request through the Soviet Embassy in Mexico.
What was the source of the impersonator's knowledge that Kostikov had said something about waiting for an "answer from Washington"? There were only three ways to know this: from Duran, from Kostikov, or from access to the Friday (27 September) call between Kostikov and Duran in which it was discussed. The third possibility is the most likely and it suggests that the impersonator's script was based upon access to the Friday intercept by Tuesday morning. If true, the handler was either a member of the CIA station or was working with someone in the station or at the telephone tap center.
The call from the Cuban Consulate to the Soviet Embassy on Saturday was likely done to make it look like the Cubans and Soviets were collaborating in managing Oswald. In that call, however, the impersonator did not use Oswald's name.l For that reason, during the Tuesday, 1 October call, the impersonator used Oswald's name twice. The station chief remembers that the Oswald character spelled Oswald's name slowly and succinctly into the phone. When the impersonator also said he could not remember the name of the counsel with whom he had spoken, the voice on the other end said "Kostikov," and the impersonator said "yes." In fact when Oswald did, a few weeks later, refer to him in a letter to the Soviet Embassy in Washington, the best he could do was to write that he had met with "comrade Kostin."
The handler's purpose in having both Oswald's and Kostikov's names mentioned was to place evidence into the CIA's records that, on 22 November, would link KGB assassinations to the murder of President Kennedy. The activities of this impersonator are what made it possible for President Johnson to tell Senator Russell on 29 November that those investigating the case were "testifying that Khrushchev and Castro did this." Johnson insisted that this must be prevented "from kicking us into a war that can kill forty million Americans in an hour."m
By 1 October, then, Oswald's handler had succeeded in planting the WWIII virus into the CIA station's records. Due to the unanticipated turn of events, however, Oswald had been impersonated to carry out the Mexico City plan. This last minute tactic was risky. The problem that could crop up down the road was this: the voice on the tapes would not be Oswald's. Evidently, from the handler's perspective, this risk was necessary and how to deal with the consequences would have to be decided after the assassination.
# At CIA HQS: The File That Lied
It took several days for the tape of the call linking Oswald to Kostikov to find its way to the translator at the CIA station. With the translation in hand, the station checked its photographic coverage of the Soviet Embassy and, on 8 October, reported the Tuesday Mexico City call about Oswald's contact with Kostikov to CIA headquarters. The Mexico desk at CIA HQS—in Branch 3 of the Western Hemisphere Division—handled the response to the CIA station in Mexico. John Whitten, alias John Scelso, along with his staff, drafted the cable. What was in it—and, more importantly, what was not in it—suggests that a HQS counterintelligence operation in Mexico involving Oswald was in play. It is also apparent that the Mexico station and the HQS Mexico desk had been excluded from this operation.
In order to do his job and write a response to the Mexico station, John Scelso needed access to the CIA's intelligence file on Oswald—his "201 file." What he was given to work with, however, was not the complete story. When he opened the file, Scelso saw that it had been dormant for the previous eighteen months. What he did not know was that crucial FBI reports on Oswald's activities since his return to the U.S. had either been removed from or had otherwise not been allowed to be placed in his file. Oswald's 201 file had, since his defection to the Soviet Union in 1959, been kept by Ann Egeter in the mole-hunting section (Special Investigation Unit) of James Angleton's Counterintelligence Staff. From that time, all incoming State Department, Navy, and FBI information on Oswald had been placed in this file—201-289248.
In the days leading up to the Oswald operation in Mexico this filing procedure was altered. By the time Oswald arrived in Mexico City in the fall of 1963, the August 1962 FBI report on his debriefing had been removed from his 201 file by someone. In addition, two important reports on Oswald's 1963 Cuban activities in Dallas and New Orleans had been diverted from his 201 file and placed into a different one. Like fingerprints, the office symbols, initials, and dates on Scelso's reply to Mexico and the CIA cover sheets on these two FBI reports tell us much about who was handed the incoming Oswald Cuban story at HQs. They also indicate who might have been involved in the Oswald operation in Mexico. We will return to those fingerprints momentarily.
When Scelso sat down to draft his reply to the Mexico station, he did not know about the missing FBI reports. He was clueless about Oswald's 1963 Cuban escapades. In addition, he was not privy to the even more sensitive information on the name linked to Oswald in the Mexico City phone call—Kostikov. Without this information, Scelso was in no position to comment on the Soviet consul or the possible significance of Oswald's contact with him. What Scelso's desk could reasonably suspect, as one of his subordinates told the HSCA, was that Oswald might be "working for the Soviets."
In retrospect what took place during the exchange of cables between CIA HQS and its Mexico station was ominous. As the Mexico desk drafted the response saying HQS had received no information about Oswald since May 1962, Ann Egeter and at least three other people in Cuban operations had been, in rooms not far away, reading the FBI's latest report on Oswald's Cuban activities in New Orleans. In another room, not far from Egeter, it is likely that someone in Angleton's counterintelligence staff who saw Kostikov's name in a cable from Mexico City opened the file on project TUMBLEWEED. That project was a joint agency investigation of Kostikov's involvement in KGB "wet operations"—assassinations. Thatperson—most likely ourbadapple—closed the TUMBLEWEED file, put it back in the safe, and warned no one. It would remain out of sight until November 22, 1963.
The two FBI reports that were withheld from Scelso were only seen by a few sets of eyes in Angleton's Counterintelligence Staff and the counterintelligence branch of the Cuban affairs staff. Their identities, along with the names of those who coordinated on Scelso's cable to Mexico, are the best evidence we have today to reconstruct who might have been behind the plot to engineer a national security cover-up after the president's murder. Most, perhaps all, of the people whose names, initials, and office symbols are on these three documents were not witting participants in this plot. On the other hand, their identities and actions are what make it possible to make an educated guess about who was behind the plot.
As previously indicated, the internal record of the CIA officers who handled those two FBI reports is illuminating. The report on Oswald's Cuban activities in Dallas arrived in the CIA on 23 September and was sent first to the desk of the CI liaison officer, Jane Roman. On 25 September, Roman sent it to the desk of a person with the initial "P" (possibly Will Potocci) in the operations section of the Counterintelligence Staff (CI/OPS). After that, the trail gets murky; the dates that it traveled to the desks of people working in the Soviet Russia Division are not given and these could have been post-assassination.
More importantly, this FBI report appears not to have crossed the desk of Ann Egeter. It was not placed in the file she was in charge of—Oswald's 201 file. Rather, it was diverted into a different file: 100-300-11, the file for the Fair Play for Cuba Committee (FPCC). Seven days earlier—the day before Oswald obtained his permit to go to Mexico—the CIA had sent a memo to the FBI about a proposed anti-FPCC operation. This operation and the fact that the Dallas FBI report was held in CI/OPS and filed in the FPCC file instead of Oswald's 201 file, suggests that an anti-FPCC operation involving Oswald probably originated in Angleton's counterintelligence operations staff. We will return to that operation and its description momentarily.
On October 2, while Oswald was still in Mexico City, an FBI letterhead memorandum detailing Oswald's Cuban escapades in New Orleans arrived in the CIA. On 4 October, this report found its way first—as did the previous Dallas report—to the desk of Jane Roman, the liaison officer for Angleton's Counterintelligence Staff. Four days later, Roman did not hand off this FBI report—as she had done the Dallas FBI report seven days earlier—to the counterintelligence operations section (CI/OPS). This time she handed it off to Austin Horn in the counterintelligence section of the Cuban affairs staff (SAS/CI). Among Horn's duties in SAS/CI was liaison work with the FBI. The cover sheet also indicates another person SAS/CI with the initials "LD" saw the letterhead memorandum that day—8 October. The initials of the SAS/CI chief, Harold Swenson, alias Joseph Langosch, are not on the cover sheet.
On 10 October, the day that Scelso's section drafted the reply to the station in Mexico, this FBI report made another noteworthy trip. It went first to the desk of someone with the initials "CR" in the "CONTROL" desk of the counterintelligence section of the SAS (SAS/CI/CONTROL), and from there it was sent to the custodian of Oswald's 201 file, Ann Egeter. She did not place this FBI report in Oswald's 201 file, so it was not there when Scelso's staff opened the 201 file to write the response to the Mexico station. The FBI report on Oswald's Cuban activities in Dallas was not there either and someone, possibly Egeter,n had removed the August 1962 FBI report about Oswald's FBI debrief upon arriving back in the U.S. that summer. The file given to Scelso had no information after May 1962, and that is exactly what Scelso told the CIA station in Mexico.
In May 1962, Oswald was still in the Soviet Union. The exclusion of the FBI reports on Oswald since his return to the U.S. from his 201 file made it look like the CIA had no interest in him at the very time that the counterintelligence section of the Cuban staff was running an operation in which they thought he might be involved. When John Scelso wrote to the CIA station in Mexico that Oswald's CIA files had been dormant since May 1962, the Mexico desk chief did not lie. Counterintelligence officers in the SAS and Angleton's Staff ensured that Oswald's file lied to Scelso.
# The CIA Oswald Operation in Mexico
When Scelso finished writing the HQS reply to the station in Mexico, Angleton's subordinates Jane Roman and Ann Egeter both signed off on the bottom of the cable. They had both been reading those sensitive FBI reports that, according to the cable they signed off on, did not exist. This indicates that a CIA operation in Mexico involving Oswald was likely underway. This operation was likely the same anti-FPCC operation that the CIA informed the FBI about on 17 September. This operation was probably the reason for the file switch mentioned above. It is also apparent that Angleton's staff knew that the Mexico City desk at CIA headquarters and the CIA station in Mexico were both being kept in the dark about this operation.
Directly below Scelso's name at the end of the cable is the office symbol WH/COPS—the Western Hemisphere Chief of Operations, William Hood. The authenticating officer would have been the Western Hemisphere Division Chief, J. C. King, but he was away and Hood signed off for him. The releasing officer was unusual: the Assistant Deputy Director for Plans (operations), Thomas Karamessines. The high level coordination on this cable was, as Hood later observed, irregular.o
In the presence of Washington Post editor Jefferson Morley, I interviewed Jane Roman on November 3, 1994. When shown Scelso's cable she stated, "I'm signing off on something I know isn't true." When I pressed her for why she would have done this she replied, "The only interpretation I could put on this would be that this SAS group would have held all the information on Oswald under their tight control, so if you did a routine check, it wouldn't show up in his 201 file." She explained that she "wasn't in on any particular goings-on or hanky-panky as far as the Cuban situation." Asked about the significance of the untrue statement she replied, "Well, to me, it's indicative of a keen interest in Oswald, held very closely on a need-to-know basis."
As previously noted, on 16 September—the day before Oswald obtained his tourist permit to go to Mexico—the CIA sent a memo to the FBI about a proposed counter-Fair Play for Cuba Committee (FPCC) operation. In it, the Agency said it was considering "planting deceptive information" to embarrass the organization in areas where it had support.p A counter-FPCC operation would have been the responsibility of the Cuban affairs staff (SAS). In an 18 September memo to D. J. Brennan, FBI Liaison officer Sam Papich wrote that the CIA's John Tilton had requested FBI support for this operation. Specifically, Tilton had asked the FBI to provide FPCC "stationary" and an FPCC "foreign mailing list."q
John S. Tilton had been working the Cuban target at CIA for years. When Cuban operations were called "Task Force W" (TFW) in 1962, Tilton was working for the Chief of TFW "Paramilitary Affairs—Propaganda," Seymour Bolten. At the time of the Agency's request for support from the FBI, Tilton was the Deputy Chief of the Special Affairs Staff (SAS) "Maritime Operations Branch" (MOB). Paul A. Maggio was the SAS/MOB chief at that time of Tilton's request for FBI support.
CIA-produced FPCC documents and the names of FPCC supporters in Mexico City would have been helpful to spruce up Oswald's FPCC bona fides and acquire the names of local pro-Castro people that might vouch for him with the Cuban Consulate there. The Church Committee looked into the CIA request for support and concluded that, because the current foreign mailing list was not sent to the CIA until 27 November, that "there is no reason to believe that any of this FBI and CIA activity had any connection with Oswald."r This interpretation now appears questionable. The FBI likely already had FPCC literature. Like the CIA, the FBI had been running operations against the FPCC for years—especially getting inside its headquarters office in New York. On April 21, 1963, an FBI asset in New York intercepted a letter from Oswald to the FPCC office there.s A few weeks before Tilton's request to the FBI, the Bureau had received FPCC literature directly from Oswald—a fact that was missing in their report to the CIA on 24 September. We will return to this missing piece momentarily.
Did the SAS have advance knowledge that Oswald would be paying a visit to the Cuban consulate in Mexico City? One possible source could have been William Gaudet, the CIA operative who may have been in line with—but says he does not recall seeing—Oswald when getting their Mexican tourist permits on 17 September. There was another, more likely, source. In August, Oswald had tried to infiltrate the anti-Castro Cuban Student Directorate (DRE), whose leaders in Miami were receiving $25,000 a month from the CIA at that time. A CIA undercover officer named George Joannides was guiding and monitoring the group's activities when Oswald baited the group by handing out pamphlets for the Fair Play for Cuba Committee in front of theme.t The resulting clash with them in the street and later in a courtroom was covered in the media and discussed in the FBI report that arrived at the CIA three days before Oswald reached Mexico City.
After his altercation with the anti-Castro exiles in the street, Oswald was arrested and held in the jailhouse of New Orleans Police Lieutenant Frances Martello. Oswald asked to speak with an FBI agent to "supply him with information" on his FPCC activities. FBI agent John Quigley interviewed Oswald, who gave Quigley an FPCC flier, an FPCC application form, and a pamphlet entitled "The Crime Against Cuba."u Quigley's FBI report on his jailhouse interview of Oswald was apparently suppressed until after Oswald's trip to Mexico City—it was not mentioned in the FBI report describing Oswald's fracas in New Orleans. If we can trust the CIA's records, Quigley's report was not shared with the CIA until mid-November.
It is likely that the SAS knew of Oswald's New Orleans FPCC activities before the FBI report describing them reached the CIA on 24 September, and that the source of this knowledge was George Joannides. Joannides was deeply immersed with the anti-Castro group—the DRE—that tangled with Oswald. One of the group's leaders, Isidora Borja, claimed that he was certain he had heard about Oswald's activities in New Orleans at the time. v Another person at HQS very much in the loop on the DRE was John Tilton. For example, on 6 September, a senior SAS officer, Sam Halpern, directed that news from CIA asset Richard Cain about a DRE officer, Salvat, be discussed "with Tilton of MOB, noting for his benefit that we now have contact with Cain."w
The diversion of the incoming Cuban story on Oswald into the SAS FPCC file and its simultaneous exclusion from Oswald's 201 file suggests, as Jane Roman surmised, a keen interest in Oswald held very closely by the SAS on a need-to-know basis. It now seems plausible to speculate that the SAS was anticipating Oswald's trip to Mexico City. On the other hand, as we observed earlier, when the first (Dallas) FBI report was diverted into the FPCC file, it was being held in Angleton's counterintelligence operations (CI/OPS) section by Will Potocci—beginning on 25 September. The trail began in Angleton's staff.
Sometime between that date and 8 October, it seems likely that a CI/OPS-inspired anti-FPCC operation involving Oswald was being handled or monitored in the Cuban affairs counterintelligence section (SAS/CI). Thus, there might well have been underway in Mexico City—at the time when an impersonator falsely linked Oswald to Castro and Khrushchev—an apparently legitimate anti-FPCC operation. It now appears feasible that the some or all of the SAS officers involved in that operation were unaware that an operational pretext—their own operation—was being used to get Oswald in place in Mexico City for another, more sinister, purpose. This same pretext also legitimized the compartmentalization of Oswald's Cuban story at HQS CIA which, along with the compartmentalization of Kostikov's KGB assassination portfolio, ensured that the WWIII virus would remain dormant.
The inevitable conclusion is that someone who was privy to the plot against President Kennedy had the inside knowledge and authority to use a legitimate operation of the counterintelligence section of the SAS for another purpose. That purpose was to build into the fabric of the plot to kill the president a virus that would lay dormant for six weeks and then balloon into a WWIII scenario on the day of the assassination. Moreover, the designer knew that it would appear, upon the death of the president, as if a botched CIA operation had played a key role in the president's murder. Just as WWIII would drive Earl Warren into the planned national security coverup, this botched CIA operation would bring the Agency into line as well.
There may have been still darker contours to the Oswald operation. The CIA was still involved in an ongoing effort to murder Fidel Castro. The day before Kennedy was assassinated, Nestor Sanchez, of the SAS External Operations Branch (SAS/EOB), notified the Paris CIA station that an agent had been dispatched to Paris to meet AM/LASH.x AM/LASH was the codename for Rolando Cuebela, a friend of Castro's who had been recruited by the CIA. The agent who was sent to meet with AM/LASH was carrying a deadly poison pen intended to be used to murder Castro. We may never know the full extent of the involvement of the White House in these activities. What we do know is that, while the president's body was still in the air from Dallas to Washington on the day of the murder, FBI Director Hoover told Attorney General Robert Kennedy that Oswald had succeeded in getting to Cuba "but would not tell us what he went to Cuba for."21 That was not true, but its effect on the president's brother would have been devastating if he felt that he had been involved in an operation to kill Castro that the Cuban leader had turned on his brother.
# The Disappearance of the CIA Cuban Cables from Mexico
We have discussed how Oswald's Cuban escapades in the U.S. were excluded from his HQS 201 file before his arrival in Mexico City. We now know that the original cables from the CIA station describing his Cuban activities in Mexico were destroyed after the assassination. Although we do not know exactly when this occurred, it most likely took place in the hours immediately after the assassination. Desperate to distance themselves from Oswald's Cuban activities in Mexico, officers at CIA HQS told a false story: the Agency had not known about Oswald's visits to the Cuban Consulate in Mexico until after the Kennedy assassination. To support this lie, the cables from the station to HQS reporting those visits had to be destroyed.
HSCA investigators who questioned the officers who were working in the station in 1963—including the station chief, the chief of Cuban operations, and members of his section—were able to partially reconstruct what had taken place in the Mexico station. On more than one occasion, the station reported Oswald's contact with the Cuban Consulate to HQS. In addition, two later HQS memos confirmed what the station personnel said; one was a memo concerning Deputy Director Richard Helms' discussion with the Warren Commission in 1964, and the other was a memo by Counterintelligence Chief George Kalaris to the House Select Committee on Intelligence Activities in 1975. Both men affirmed that the station knew and reported to headquarters Oswald's Cuban contacts.y The station personnel also maintained that there was an additional Oswald phone call—on Monday—not accounted for in the extant records.z
In his memoirs, station chief Win Scott mocked this cover story and said that his station had immediately cabled headquarters with "every piece of information" about Oswald's visits to the Cuban consulate.aa
If the recollections of all these people are correct, the record has been altered.ab When I showed the documents to Helms in 1994, he agreed it was obvious the CIA had known at the time, and he opined that the reason for the cover-up was to protect the Agency's sources and methods. While that may be true, there was more at stake than the Agency's sources and methods. We will return to this issue shortly when we examine what else the CIA had to cover up in the immediate wake of the president's murder.
# Lowering Oswald's Threat Profile
If the CIA station chief and his subordinates are telling the truth about the tapes they transcribed and the cables they sent to CIA HQS, then the following sequence of events is most likely what happened after the station reported the Tuesday call linking Oswald to Kostikov. It took several more days for the station to link the Tuesday tape to the tape from the previous Saturday. That tape had fabricated a call from the Cuban consulate to the Soviet Embassy, but because Oswald's name had not been used it took some time and analysis to figure out the relationship between these two calls.
The amount of time that it took the Station Chief—at least two weeks—to discover Oswald's visits to the Cuban Consulate is unusual. The check of the photographic coverage of the front door of the Soviet Embassy around the time of the Tuesday call had produced a photo of someone who was not Oswald. The official record that exists today holds that there were no photos of Oswald entering and leaving the Cuban Consulate. On the other hand, there is reason to believe this is not true and that the Station Chief, Winn Scott, was eventually able to get his hands on two surveillance photos of Oswald. Two people working under Scott, the Deputy Chief of Station Stanley Watson and another subordinate, Joe Piccolo, both independently described to HSCA investigators a rear profile shot of Oswald, face turned so that three quarters of it was visible.ac
Jefferson Morley's biography of Scott, Our Man in Mexico, lays out the case that the Cuban operations chief at the station, David Phillips, deliberately kept the station chief "out of the loop" on the Cuban story. Scott was particularly unhappy with Phillips' handling of the surveillance on Oswald—so much so that while, in April 1963, Scott had maxed out Phillips' performance evaluation and said he was one of the best intelligence officers he had ever worked with, in 1964 he knocked Phillips down in 2 of the 3 performance categories.
It is not clear when Scott found out about the photos but, before the end of October, he found out about Oswald's visits to the Cuban Consulate. Once it was established that it was the same person speaking on the call from that consulate that spelled Oswald's name on the Tuesday call, the CIA station concluded that Oswald had been inside the Cuban consulate on Saturday, 28 September. The station reported this to HQS. Later still, when the legitimate phone conversation between Kostikov and Duran about Oswald was discovered, Scott was able conclude that Oswald had been inside the Cuban consulate on Friday, 27 September, as well. This, too, was reported by the station to CIA HQS.
Another reason for concluding that Scott was not initially in the loop on the Oswald photos is that, after receiving Scelso's 10 October response, the station chief asked HQS for a photo of Oswald. He did so because the physical description of Oswald in Scelso's response did not match the person photographed entering the Soviet Embassy around the time of the Tuesday call. Naturally, Scott wanted to know what Oswald really looked like. The CIA Station Chief was doing what he was supposed to do—following up. HQS never did send the photo, and never did provide the station with anything useful—largely because the Mexico desk at HQS was shut out of the Mexican operation in which Oswald had been involved.
Did Phillips keep the photos from Scott? Was Scott correct in thinking that he was being purposefully kept in the dark by Phillips? If the answers to these questions are yes, what does all of this mean? The suppression at CIA HQS, after the assassination, of the Mexico City cables on Oswald's Cuban contacts lowered his CIA profile between his visit and the assassination and provided cover for why no alarm had been sounded. However, this was after the assassination, and those involved thought that they were protecting the country, the Agency, and their jobs. It was the deliberate and well organized lowering of his profile before the assassination—especially its Cuban dimensions—that had prevented the alarm from sounding when it might have saved Kennedy's life. If Win Scott was right about Phillips, then it is probably not a coincidence that his actions in Mexico were designed to lower Oswald's profile there.
The removal of Oswald's troubling 1962 FBI debrief, the exclusion of the Cuban story from his 201 file, and restricting the most sensitive facts about Oswald and Kostikov to a few people on Angleton's staff and the Cuban affairs staff lowered Oswald's profile to the extent that the very operational elements responsible for reacting to the cables from the Mexico station were unable to see the real picture and sound the alarm.
That is precisely what happened at the FBI at this time as well. On 8 October, the very day that the Mexico City story on Oswald arrived at FBI HQS, Marvin Gheesling took Oswald off of the espionage watch list—a list he had been on since his defection to the USSR on Halloween Day, 1959. Moreover, the person in the CIA's SAS who handled liaison with the FBI, Austin Horn, was wired into Oswald's Cuban and the operation in Mexico and thus had reason to believe that there was a legitimate counter-FPCC operation ongoing in Mexico. Horn had no reason to alert the FBI that the Oswald story in Mexico was cause for concern.
With no warning indicators from the CIA, Gheesling's removal of Oswald from the watch list at FBI ensured that Oswald would not be placed on the security index and, therefore, would be on the parade route when the president's motorcade passed the Texas School Book Depository. FBI Director Hoover censured Gheesling for his action. Why Gheesling has never been deposed and asked why he removed Oswald from the list—or who told him to do it—is one of the lingering questions in this unsolved case.
# The Oswald "Electric Effect" at the CIA
A pro-Castro, pro-Soviet, saboteur and defector, trying to defect again to the USSR, and trying to go to Cuba illegally, who had met with the top KGB assassin in the Americas, returned to Dallas Texas and took a job in the Book Depository on the president's parade route. By 22 November, several cables on all of this had come to rest on various desks in the FBI and CIA and no action had been taken. Oswald had not been put on the FBI's Security Index—a precaution that would have required his removal from the Dallas parade route. Everything was in place for the perfect storm.
Because the Mexico City story immediately took center stage at the secret level, Scelso headed up the initial internal CIA investigation of the president's murder. His report on what happened at CIA HQS in the moments after the assassination is illuminating. The Agency's operating divisions, like the rest of America, had their radios on when Oswald's name came across the airwaves as the assassin. The "effect" at CIA, Scelso wrote, "was electric." This electric effect at the CIA derived partly from the fact that so many of the Agency's sections, including several branches in the Soviet Russia Division, several in the Cuban operations staff, several in the Counterintelligence staff, and still more in the Security Office, had all been keeping files on him.
When the top officials at CIA found out that Oswald's contacts with Kostikov had been sitting—largely unnoticed—in their files for the previous six weeks, the electric effect increased to high voltage. The custodian of Oswald's 201 file, Ann Egeter, later testified to the House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA), that Oswald's "contact" with Kostikov "caused a lot of excitement" at HQS.ad By the time of the president's autopsy, the dimensions of the Agency's failure to react began to dawn on Washington. For the next 40 years, the Kostikov story became one of the CIA's most closely guarded secrets on the Oswald case. The same was true at the FBI.
At CIA, the anti-Cuban operation involving Oswald was the immediate problem. It raised the possibility that Castro had turned an Agency operation against JFK. This, along with Kostikov's role in KGB assassinations, forced the creation of a national security cover-up that weekend. While those involved in putting it together probably had no role in Oswald's murder, his death on Sunday was convenient. Writing about it shortly afterward Hoover observed, "The thing I am concerned about, and so is Mr. Katzenbach, is having something issued so we can convince the public that Oswald is the real assassin."ae On Monday, Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach prepared a memo for the White House directing that "speculation" about Oswald be "cut off" and that the thought that the assassination was a communist conspiracy or a "right-wing conspiracy to blame it on the communists" had to be rebutted. The public had to be "satisfied," the memo stated, that Oswald had acted alone and that the "evidence" would have convicted him at a trial.af
Katzenbach invited the executive branch of government to use "editorial license" in handling the Oswald case. Over at the CIA this was already in full swing. As previously noted, the CIA altered the cable record with the Mexico station to hide what the Agency had known about Oswald's role in the Cuban operation before the assassination. Those cables, however, turned out to be only the tip of the iceberg. As the CIA station in Mexico scoured its internal records in the hours after the assassination, they uncovered another huge problem.
One by one, all of the transcripts and tapes of the conversations between the consular officials and the alleged Oswald calls were gathered. A tape dub was hand carried to the Texas border in the middle of the night and from there to the Dallas Police building where Oswald was being held. In the early hours of Saturday morning, the shocking truth about the tapes emerged. At 10 A.M. Hoover relayed the news to President Johnson: the voice on the tapes was not Oswald's. "A second person," Hoover said, "was using Oswald's name."ag
# Hoover: The CIA's "False Story" About Oswald's Trip to Mexico City
The revelation that an Oswald imposter spoke about meeting a KGB assassin was inconsistent with the larger story being erected for public consumption—that there had been no conspiracy. The linking of Oswald to Kostikov by an impersonator was most likely the reason that the Katzenbach memo called for the rebuttal of any thought that the assassination was a "right-wing conspiracy to blame it on the communists." The impersonation had to be suppressed in order to maintain the lone nut façade called for in the Katzenbach directive. Because the voice on the tapes was proof of the impersonation the tapes themselves had to be suppressed.
There was a darker purpose, however, for the suppression of the tapes. As long as the tapes survived, the story in them was undermined by the fact that Oswald's voice was not on them. The cover-up of the Mexico tapes began three hours after Hoover told Johnson that the voice on them was not Oswald's. If this dark detail became widely known, LBJ would not be able to play the WWIII trump card on leaders like Senator Russell and Chief Justice Warren. It is possible that the order to concoct a cover story saying that the tapes were erased before the assassination came from the White House.
The problem was that, besides the President and the FBI Director, the truth about the voice on the tapes was known by FBI agents in Dallas and in the Bureau's crime lab; and this discomforting news was spreading fast. Hoover had already sent a memo to Secret Service Chief James Rowley about the voice on the 1 October tape; and the Dallas Special Agent in Charge, Gordon Shanklin, had already phoned the number-three man at FBI HQS, Belmont, to tell him that the voice on the tape of the 28 September call was not Oswald. Belmont had already put this information in a memo to the number two man at HQS, Clyde Tolson.
At CIA HQS, the man in charge of the Agency's investigation, John Scelso, had already learned that, while some tapes had been erased, some of "the actual tapes were also reviewed," and that another copy of the 1 October "intercept on Lee Oswald" had been "discovered after the assassination."ah Scelso was not the problem. He would soon be relieved of his duties investigating the assassination and would be—not surprisingly—replaced by the Chief of Counterintelligence, Angleton. The immediate problem was the tapes from Mexico, and the cover-up about the voice on them had to be led by the CIA. The FBI would have to fall in line. The result was awkward and sloppy.
The cover-up was apparently put in motion by Anne Goodpasture in the CIA station in Mexico City—unless someone else altered the cables she sent after the fact. Files released in the mid-1990s show she sent a cable at noon (1 P.M. EST) on 23 November stating that a voice comparison between two of the intercepted phone calls had not been made at the time of Oswald's visit because the tape of the Saturday, 28 September call had been erased before the tape of the 1 October call was received at the station.ai
This was not true, however, as tapes were kept for at least two weeks before erasure. Furthermore, Goodpasture's marginalia on a Washington Post article a year later clearly indicates that a voice comparison had been made at the station by "Finglass," an alias for the CIA translator who transcribed the tapes that October.aj This fact, and Goodpasture's changing story, raises the possibility that her cables might have been altered after the fact by someone other than her.
Besides the president's need for Oswald's voice to be on the tapes, the CIA had its own problem with them. As previously mentioned, HQS launched another cover story at this time—that the Agency had not realized that Oswald had visited the Cuban consulate. A voice comparison in October using the call from the Cuban consulate would blow this cover story. But Goodpasture's cable only ruled out a voice comparison at the time, and left unresolved the issue of what tapes had survived. For the president to effectively use the WWIII card the story had to be that no tapes had survived at all. At 2:37 EST the following day, Sunday 24 November, Goodpasture sent another cable saying all the tapes had been erased.ak
Whether these cables were inserted or altered after the fact no longer matters. They constitute the extant record and they are not true. Ms. Goodpasture's erasure cables are contradicted by her own 1995 deposition to the JFK Assassination Records Review Board in which she testified that a tape dub had been hand-carried to the Texas border the night of the assassination, and that a copy of the tape had been made at the CIA telephone tap center. She added that she was sure a copy of the tape would have been sent up to Washington as soon as it had been made.al Furthermore, the Assassination Records Review Board also verified that, in 1964, two Warren Commission attorneys, Coleman and Slawson, had traveled to the Mexico City station and listened to the tapes. Obviously, there could be no mention of this in either the Warren Commission's 26 volumes or its final report.
The tape that Coleman and Slawson listened to was locked up in Win Scott's safe—along with the photos of Oswald. Angered by the cover story that the station had missed Oswald's visits to the Cuban Consulate, Scott kept the tape and the photos in his safe as insurance to prove they had known about it. Scott did something else that is noteworthy: he made his own personal voice comparison. He purchased a copy of Oswald's August 1963 New Orleans radio debate so that he could listen to both the voice on the tape and the voice from the debate.am
The CIA's erasure story could not work without the cooperation of the FBI. FBI headquarters in Washington was still asking on the Monday after the assassination for the CIA tapes that had been sent from Mexico City to Dallas early Saturday.an The FBI office in Mexico City provided the cover on that same afternoon, sending a cable to headquarters saying that the tapes had been destroyed.ao When FBI Director Hoover learned of this lie, he was not amused. Eighteen days after the assassination, he censured, demoted, or transferred everyone in the FBI that had been touched by the Mexico City story. Hoover was still fuming about it in January 1964, when his subordinates sent him a memo on illegal CIA operations in the U.S. which stated that the CIA had promised to keep the Bureau informed. Hoover pulled out his pen and, in his characteristic large, thick handwriting scrawled, "OK, but I hope you are not being taken in. I can't forget CIA withholding the French espionage activities in U.S.A. nor the false story re Oswald's trip to Mexico City only to mention two of their instances of double dealing."ap
# Who Designed the Plot?
By Monday 25 November, Oswald was dead and the tapes—along with the voice of the impersonator—had disappeared. The cables from Mexico about Oswald's visits to the Cuban Consulate were gone too and, along with them, a CIA operation in Mexico involving the alleged assassin of the president. Johnson was now free to head off any congressional investigations with his WWIII trump card and impose a cover story on the American people saying that Oswald, alone, had pulled off the crime. Meanwhile, at the TOP SECRET level, memos were circulating about Oswald's contact with KGB assassination operations, and respected leaders like Senator Richard Russell and Chief Justice Earl Warren fell in line to prevent the assassination of JFK, as the new president put it, "from kicking us into a war that can kill forty million Americans in an hour."
So who had the means and the insight to design such a plot? Here I offer my own speculation on the answer to that question, knowing that I might be wrong, or a little wrong, or, perhaps right. I believe I have an obligation to offer my views on this and the obligation to admit that I might be wrong.
It is now apparent that the WWIII pretext for a national security cover-up was built into the fabric of the plot to assassinate President Kennedy. The plot required that Oswald be maneuvered into place in Mexico City and his activities there carefully monitored, controlled, and, if necessary, embellished and choreographed. The plot required that, prior to 22 November, Oswald's profile at CIA HQS and the Mexico station be lowered; his 201 file had to be manipulated and restricted from incoming traffic on his Cuban activities. The plot required that, when the story from Mexico City arrived at HQS, its significance would not be understood by those responsible for reacting to it. Finally, the plot required that, on 22 November, Oswald's CIA files would establish his connection to Castro and the Kremlin.
The person who designed this plot had to have access to all of the information on Oswald at CIA HQS. The person who designed this plot had to have the authority to alter how information on Oswald was kept at CIA HQS. The person who designed this plot had to have access to project TUMBLEWEED, the sensitive joint agency operation against the KGB assassin, Valery Kostikov. The person who designed this plot had the authority to instigate a counterintelligence operation in the Cuban affairs staff (SAS) at CIA HQS. In my view, there is only one person whose hands fit into these gloves: James Jesus Angleton, Chief of CIA's Counterintelligence Staff.
Angleton and his molehunters had always held Oswald's files very close to the vest—from the time of the young Marine's defection in October 1959 and his offer to provide classified radar information to the Soviets. That offer had lit up the counterintelligence circuits in Washington, D.C., like a Christmas tree. Angleton was the only person who knew—except for perhaps one of his direct subordinates—both the Cuban and Soviet parts of Oswald's story. He was the only one in the Counterintelligence Staff with enough authority to instigate a counterintelligence operation in the SAS against the FPCC.
In my view, whoever Oswald's direct handler or handlers were, we must now seriously consider the possibility that Angleton was probably their general manager. No one else in the Agency had the access, the authority, and the diabolically ingenious mind to manage this sophisticated plot. No one else had the means necessary to plant the WWIII virus in Oswald's files and keep it dormant for six weeks until the president's assassination. Whoever those who were ultimately responsible for the decision to kill Kennedy were, their reach extended into the national intelligence apparatus to such a degree that they could call upon a person who knew its inner secrets and workings so well that he could design a failsafe mechanism into the fabric of the plot. The only person who could ensure that a national security cover-up of an apparent counterintelligence nightmare was the head of counterintelligence.
Winn Scott died in April 1971. Shortly afterward, James Angleton flew to Mexico City to go through Winn Scott's records. Angleton removed three cartons and four suitcases of materials, including the contents of Win Scott's safe.aq
# Appendix to the 2008 Edition
10-1-63 Impersonation of Oswald
10/8/63 Mexico City CIA Station Cable Linking Oswald to Kostikov
1/22/63 Hoover to RFK: Oswald Went to Cuba
9/28/63 Impersonation of Oswald at Cuban Consulate
CIA Request for FBI Support on Counter-FPCC Operation
CIA Routing Sheet for 9/10/63 Dallas FBI Report on Oswald
CIA Routing Sheet for 9/24/64 New Orleans FBI Report
EXCERPTS of 11/29/63 LBJ-Russell Phone Conversation
10 AM 11/23/- Hoover Tells LBJ About Oswald Impersonation
HSCA Report: The Story of Oswald's Impersonation Spreads
The Impersonator's Use of Oswald's Name
a
A defector-in-place is an agent who not only defects, but remains in and feigns loyalty to the target country, in this instance, the former Soviet Union.
b
Another cryptonyn for the CIA was "KUBARK."
c
released with redactions in 1993
d
The polygraph—or lie detector test—is used routinely throughout the intelligence community. Employees are tested regularly (usually every five years) and on an aperiodic (surprise) basis. In addition to questions on counterintelligence, employees should also be asked if they have knowledge of illegal operations or actions which contravene the Constitution.
e
See the discussion in Oswald and the CIA, pp. 346-347.
f
Phone conversation between President Johnson and Senator Russell, November 29, 1963. LBJ Library.
g
Washington Star News, December 8, 1972, p. A—1 and p. A—10.
h
See Oswald and the CIA, pp. 316—317.
i
See Oswald and the CIA, p. 359.
j
See Oswald and the CIA, pp. 357-361.
k
See pp. 365-367.
l
See Oswald and the CIA, pp. 363-365.
m
Phone conversation between President Johnson and Senator Russell, November 29, 1963. LBJ Library.
n
If Egeter did remove it, she most likely did so because her boss, Birch D. O'Neal, or Angleton himself, told her to do it. On the other hand, if she was not the person who removed it, the most likely candidates are O'Neal or Angleton.
o
Jefferson Morley, Our Man in Mexico: Winston Scott and the Hidden History of the CIA (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2008).
p
Church Committee Report, Volume V, p. 65; see also Oswald and the CIA, p. 508.
q
FBI Memorandum from S. J. Papich to D. J. Brennan, 9/18/63; RIF: 104-10310-10151.
r
Church Committee: Book V—The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence Agencies, p. 67.
s
See Oswald and the CIA, p. 333.
t
See Jefferson Morley, "The Good Spy," Washington Monthly, December 2003 pp. 40—44.
u
See Oswald and the CIA, pp. 334-336.
v
Jefferson Morley, Our Man in Mexico: Winston Scott and the Hidden History of the CIA (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2008), p. 175.
w
CIA Record and Routing Sheet, No. WH1429, from Chief, Contact Division, Subject: Info re Directerio Estudiantil.
x
DIR 86145 to Paris, 21 November 1963. NARA RIF 104-10215-10356.
FBI Memorandum from Hoover to his staff, November 22, 19G3, 4:01 P.M.
y
For a detailed discussion of this and the supporting documents, see Oswald and the CIA, pp. 413—418, 514—515.
z
We know about a 30 September tape because of the recollection of the CIA translator who transcribed it, Mrs. Tarasoff. She remembers not only transcribing it but also the fact that the Oswald voice was the same as the 28 September voice—in other words the same Oswald impostor. Mrs. Tarasoff remembers the Oswald character asked the Soviets for money to help him defect, once again, to the Soviet Union. In addition, the CIA officer at the Mexico City station in charge of Cuban operations, David Atlee Phillips, in sworn testimony to the House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA), backed up Mrs. Tarasoff's claim about the tape and the request for money to assist in another defection to the Soviet Union. But the Phillips story has a twist. The day before his sworn testimony, Phillips told a different, more provocative version to Ron Kessler of the Washington Post. He told Kessler that on this tape Oswald asked for money in exchange for information. Why was this crucial transcript destroyed? We can only wonder at what motivated Phillips to tell two different stories about this piece in less than 24 hours.
aa
See Oswald and the CIA, p. 514.
ab
HSCA investigators including its first chief, Richard Sprague, felt there was reason to believe some cables concerning the Cuban consulate visit were either destroyed or altered. See Oswald and the CIA, p. 510.
ac
Jefferson Morley, Our Man in Mexico: Winston Scott and the Hidden History of the CIA, (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2008), see especially pp. 179—180.
ad
Oswald and the CIA, p. 400.
ae
FBI memorandum of remarks by J Edgar Hoover, 4. P.M. 11/24/63.
af
Katzenback, "Memorandum for Bill Moyers," 11/25/63.
ag
LBJ Library, transcript of phone conversation between FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover and President Johnson, 23 November, 1963, 10:00 A.M.
ah
John Scelso, CIA internal memo, 12/13/63.
ai
CIA Mexico Station cable 7023 to CIA HQS, 11/23/63, 23/1659Z.
aj
"CIA Withheld Vital Intelligence From Warren Commission," Washington Post, 10/21/64.
ak
CIA Mexico Station cable 7046 to CIA HQS, 11/24/63, 24/1837Z.
al
JFK Assassination Records Review Board, Oral Deposition of Anne Goodpasture, 12/15/95.
am
Jefferson Morley, Our Man in Mexico: Winston Scott and the Hidden History of the CIA (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2008).
an
FBI cable to LEGAT, Mexico, 7:15 P.M. 11/25/63.
ao
Mexico LEGAT to FBI HQS, 11/25/63. Dallas SAC Gordon Shanklin had already, on Saturday evening, informed Hoover of the tape erasure. Teletype 23/2220z, 7:30 P.M. CST, 11/23/63.
ap
FBI Memorandum, W. C. Sullivan to D. J. Brennan, "Central Intelligence Agency Operations in the U.S.," 1/15/64.
aq
Jefferson Morley, Our Man in Mexico: Winston Scott and the Hidden History of the CIA, (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2008), p. 7.
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{
"redpajama_set_name": "RedPajamaBook"
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Q: What data are shared between the green thread and the kernel level thread it is bound to? I understand that the user level threads or green threads are managed by some user-level threading library and have to be "linked" to some operating system thread to perform its task. I understand that threads are just an abstraction for a sequence of independent code. Threads are represented with some data structures stored in the memory. In the case of user level or green threads are present in the user space and are managed by the user-level threading library. In case of OS level or kernel level threads, they are stored and managed by the kernel or OS. What I don't understand is what actually is meant by the linking a green thread to OS thread?? I know about the 1:1, n:1, n:m schemes and that is not what my question is about. My question is what data structures are copied or shared (or something else) between the green thread and the kernel thread it is bound to?? And what does the user level threading library do to these structures when green threads have to context switched??
A: There are THREADS and there are SIMULATED THREAD. What you are calling a "green thread" is a SIMULATED THREAD.
The kernel has no knowledge whatsoever of the existence of a simulated thread.
My question is what data structures are copied or shared (or something else) between the green thread and the kernel thread it is bound to?
The answer then is NONE; at least at the operating system level. The process must keep track of the threads in the user space.
I know about the 1:1, n:1, n:m schemes and that is not what my question is about.
The 1:1, n:1 and n:M schemes are complete and total academic BullS*&T designed to confuse students. There is no such thing as an n:M in threading. It is impracticable theoretical nonsense. 1:1 just means real THREADS. n:1 means SIMULATED THREADS.
Only two models exist in real life:
In the classic model, a process consisted of an execution stream and an address space.
In the current model, a process consists of multiple execution streams and an address space.
In the classic model there are no threads. If you want threads, you have to simulate them using libraries with timers; a topic that is not fit for an operating systems course, except for historical background.
In the current model, the multiple execution streams are called threads. There is no reason whatsoever to use simulated/green/user threads in the current model. The textbooks that say simulated/green/user threads have any advantage are only fit to be used for cat box liner.
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{
"redpajama_set_name": "RedPajamaStackExchange"
}
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Q: How to send an SMS with image to handphone? I'm using the service of a web site,and I can send text message using their interface(in PHP),but when I try to send an image :
<img src="http://www.google.com/images/srpr/nav_logo27.png" />
I'm receiving exactly the same code,not an image.
Anyone has experience with SMS services?
A: "Short Messages" are intended for plain text and losing money to Telcos. If you want do to anything with multimedia (like sending images), use EMS (Enhanced Message Service) or MMS (Multimedia Messaging Service). If you want to embed stuff from the web, use e-mail - the person who receives your message has to load the image from the internet anyway, and it's free for you if you send it from a computer.
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{
"redpajama_set_name": "RedPajamaStackExchange"
}
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Philanthropy in the Age of Trump: Not Business as Usual
We are being called by these times to engage in different and new ways, even if it causes us discomfort. Business must be anything but usual going forward.
Remembering Disaster, Ready for Disaster
If you are a nonprofit leader, I encourage you to train your staff and begin planning your disaster response.
Making the Invisible Visible at Mission Asset Fund
José Quiñonez's personal story, and the story of the Mission Asset Fund's creation and ascent, present a window into the kind of leadership with which the Walter & Elise Haas Fund is honored to collaborate.
The Real Value of Job Training
Not only do job training programs help the unemployed find work, those aligned with high-growth sectors lift people and families out of poverty; they help connect people to living wage jobs and stable career paths. That's access and opportunity. That's economic security.
The Profound Impact of Children's Dreams
They weren't asking for much, just a teddy bear to hug, or a playground, or a smile.
Talking Jewish Art and Culture
Arts — like faith — can lift the human spirit, buoy us during difficult times, and open up new worlds. A vibrant arts ecosystem is vital to the health of the Jewish community; this is why the Walter & Elise Haas Fund continues to support arts and culture through its Jewish Life program.
Working Towards Wage & Wealth Equality for Women
Wages may be critical to women's daily survival, but it's the compounding gap in accrued wealth that hobbles women's long-term financial well-being.
A Call for Tax Reform is a Call for Equity
The Tax Alliance for Economic Mobility recently sent around a compelling call to action on the issue of national tax reform. As the Tax Alliance clearly and correctly points out, an important goal of our tax system—beyond funding the government—is to aid Americans in developing their financial security. In this goal the system has failed.
Responding Effectively to Disaster
On April 25, a 7.8-magnitude earthquake devastated the country of Nepal. More than 4,600 people lost their lives, thousands more were injured, and much of the nation remains at risk from disease, a lack of basic supplies, and from tremendous psychological trauma. As we've seen with other disasters elsewhere in the world, the governmental infrastructures
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{
"redpajama_set_name": "RedPajamaCommonCrawl"
}
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Q: Decode / summarise strace logs OK, so it's no secret that strace produces vast amounts of output. (I'm aware there are various options to filter the output a bit.)
Are there any tools to process a raw strace log into something more human-readable?
What kind of "decoding" am I looking for? Well, by design strace works at a very low level. I'm looking for something that can summarize the most important points. For example, FD 4 might point to different files at different instants; it would be useful to have the machine keep track of this, rather than me. Ditto for PIDs. I would like to be able to see process trees at different moments in the trace, and so forth. A GUI tool would be great, but even something text-based would be acceptable if it makes things a bit easier to follow.
A: Summary while strace runs
strace has the -c switch which will give you a summary report of the various system calls that were made.
excerpt strace man page
-c Count time, calls, and errors for each system call and report a
summary on program exit. On Linux, this attempts to show system
time (CPU time spent running in the kernel) independent of wall
clock time. If -c is used with -f or -F (below), only aggregate
totals for all traced processes are kept.
Example
$ strace -c systemctl list-unit-files --type=service
...
...
% time seconds usecs/call calls errors syscall
------ ----------- ----------- --------- --------- ----------------
51.81 0.001831 1831 1 waitid
8.15 0.000288 7 39 mmap
7.89 0.000279 19 15 read
6.11 0.000216 8 26 mprotect
4.56 0.000161 11 15 open
2.91 0.000103 103 1 connect
2.24 0.000079 79 1 clone
2.15 0.000076 38 2 statfs
2.01 0.000071 4 19 close
1.95 0.000069 5 13 poll
1.90 0.000067 5 14 2 recvmsg
1.70 0.000060 4 16 fstat
0.88 0.000031 8 4 3 stat
0.82 0.000029 29 1 socket
0.65 0.000023 8 3 munmap
0.57 0.000020 5 4 sendto
0.42 0.000015 5 3 ioctl
0.40 0.000014 7 2 lstat
0.40 0.000014 7 2 sendmsg
0.34 0.000012 4 3 brk
0.23 0.000008 8 1 pipe
0.23 0.000008 4 2 fcntl
0.20 0.000007 4 2 rt_sigaction
0.20 0.000007 7 1 1 access
0.20 0.000007 4 2 geteuid
0.17 0.000006 6 1 execve
0.14 0.000005 5 1 getsockname
0.11 0.000004 4 1 dup2
0.11 0.000004 4 1 getresuid
0.11 0.000004 4 1 getresgid
0.11 0.000004 4 1 arch_prctl
0.08 0.000003 3 1 rt_sigprocmask
0.08 0.000003 3 1 getrlimit
0.08 0.000003 3 1 set_tid_address
0.08 0.000003 3 1 set_robust_list
0.00 0.000000 0 4 write
0.00 0.000000 0 1 kill
------ ----------- ----------- --------- --------- ----------------
100.00 0.003534 207 6 total
Analyzing strace logs postmortem
I found this Perl scripts called Strace_analyzer.pl which sounds like what you're looking for.
Usage
$ ./strace_analyzer_ng_0.03.pl -help
Usage: strace-analyze [OPTION]… [FILE]
Analyzes strace output for IO functions. It creates statistics
on IO functions and performance of the read and write functions.
The strace file should have been run with 'strace -tt [PROGRAM]
There's an example of the output on the page I linked to above. It's too long to post here. I've posted here on pastebin.com as well.
*
*Strace_Analyzer.pl sample output
*IO Profiling of Applications: strace_analyzer - Linux Magazine article
Alternative to strace, ioapps
I came across this app called ioapps which can give you a more visual breakdown of what your app is doing when it's running. Perhaps this might be better for what you're trying to accomplish than processing strace logs.
Usage
$ ioprofiler-trace thunderbird
Once it loads, we just close the thunderbird window and check we have
a trace log called "ioproftrace.log" because that's the default name
of the log (one can specify another name using -o command line
option):
$ ls -l ioproftrace.log
-rw-r--r-- 1 user user 74890554 Apr 4 22:04 ioproftrace.log
It seems OK, so we can run ioprofiler over it:
$ ioprofiler ioproftrace.log
Example GUI
Another alternative to strace, strace+
NOTE: The project, strace+, is no longer being maintained, and in fact many of its features have been merged into the default strace via the -k switch. So you might want to make sure your version of strace is at least up to 4.9, which is when that switch was merged in.
excerpt strace man page
-k Print the execution stack trace of the traced processes after
each system call (experimental).
excerpt from strace+ project page
strace+ is an improved version of strace that collects stack traces
associated with each system call. Since system calls require an
expensive user-kernel context switch, they are often sources of
performance bottlenecks. strace+ allows programmers to do more
detailed system call profiling and determine, say, which call sites
led to costly syscalls and thus have potential for optimization.
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{
"redpajama_set_name": "RedPajamaStackExchange"
}
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Receive Server Density events as Twilio calls
====================
PHP script to activate phone calls using Server Density webhooks and Twilio
To install:
- Upload files to a public accessible server with PHP support
- Rename/copy `settings-example.php` to `settings.php` and update the content with correct values
- Setup a hook at Server density with your URL similar to this: http://www.example.com/?phone=123456789
- Choose your worst ringtone and never sleep through a alert again!
Links:
- Server Density: http://www.serverdensity.com/
- Twilio: https://www.twilio.com/
- About the wehook format: http://support.serverdensity.com/knowledgebase/articles/221772-webhook-format
- How to set up webhook: http://support.serverdensity.com/knowledgebase/articles/206749-setting-up-webhooks
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{
"redpajama_set_name": "RedPajamaGithub"
}
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Q: How to eliminate static from 3200 sq foot synthetic skating rink? Because of high costs, I changed from a real ice rink to a synthetic rink last winter. For the summer, instead of ice skating, I'm using the synthetic "ice" for roller skating. The skates have plastic wheels, which is creating a huge static electricity problem. I haven't found information from other rinks that have faced this situation and I'm struggling to find a solution. Can I ground 3200 sq foot of synthetic ice by attaching a grid of copper adhesive tape to the underside of the plastic "ice" panels? If the panels are grounded in that way, will skaters still shock each other and the dashers whenever they make contact? If the dashers were grounded, would skaters discharge the static every time they touch a dasher without getting shocked? I'm open to creative ideas, I just need a cost-effective solution. Thanks in advance for your help.
A: The synthetic material manufacturer has goofed big time. Synthetic materials for any sort of pedestrian traffic, including skating, must have a controlled minimum bulk conductance, so that they would be static-dissipative. This bulk conductance must be specified in the material specs, and as a customer you must hold the manufacturer accountable to meet this spec.
With the material you got, the only 100% solution will be to replace it with something manufactured by people with a clue. Because to me, a synthetic skating rink material manufacturer that doesn't know about the need for static electricity dissipation should not be in the business, for they are clueless about the basic requirements their product must fulfill.
You have every right to be angry at the manufacturer.
I'm not a lawyer, but to me a non-dissipative rink material fails to meet the basic requirement of fitness for purpose it's sold for. You should talk to a lawyer and see if this failure on the part of the manufacturer would have some remedies in the law.
Anyway, you will be replacing that material if you want to fix the problem. Everything else will be a poor-man's fix that will drive away the customers.
You should be prepared to find a vendor who knows what on Earth they are doing, buy new material from them, have a consultant EE do acceptance testing for you to ensure they didn't cheat you on bulk conductance, and finally replace the surface of your rink.
I'm afraid there are no better news I can give you. There are no bandaids here that would work all the time, and/or whose application and maintenance will be burden to deal with. Never mind that skating tends to aerosolize whatever surface treatment you'd apply to the bad material to make it static-dissipative. And people will be breathing this stuff in. Does the supplier of a static-dissipative surface treatment solution specify it as safe for use in such an environment where considerable amount of it will turn to dust and be inhaled? I'm not holding my breath that you'll find anyone willing to supply you with that material for the use you have in mind, because it's extra liability for them. In fact, you can tell if a vendor has their head on straight by how they react to the information about how their surface treatment would be used. They need to understand the dust creation potential etc.
A: Adding a copper ground plane underneath the layer of nonconductive plastic would actually increase the intensity of shocks, by raising the capacitance (the shocks would be at lower voltage, but higher current, so more noticeable).
As mentioned, there are various anti-static agents that can be applied to the rink surface and to the plastic wheels and to the boots. There are a few concerns you would have in doing so.
*
*The agent must be nontoxic and nonallergenic, not only while being applied, but on a surface where someone might fall and have a skin abrasion.
*It must, of course, be economical, particularly since it would need to be applied to an entire rink, perhaps 1,800 m2.
*It must not degrade the experience of skating, e.g., by making the surface too slippery for lateral traction. You might need to experiment to find one to meet that criterion.
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{
"redpajama_set_name": "RedPajamaStackExchange"
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\section{Introduction}
At a very basic level, physics is about propositions of the form ``the physical quantity $A$ (of some given system $S$) has a value in the set $\Delta$ of real numbers'', written shortly as ``$A\varepsilon\Delta$''. One wants to know what truth-values such propositions have in a given state of the system. It is also of interest how the truth-value changes with the state (in time).
In classical physics, this is unproblematic: there is a space of states, and in any given (pure) state
\begin{itemize}
\item[(a)] all physical quantities have a value,
\item[(b)] all propositions of the form ``$A\varepsilon\Delta$'' have a truth-value.
\end{itemize}
For a classical system, propositions are represented by subsets of the state space. Usually, one restricts attention to Borel subsets, and we will follow this convention here. A (pure) state of a classical system is a point of the state space of the system,\footnote{We avoid the notion `phase space', which seems to be a historical misnomer.} and the truth-values of propositions are \textit{true}, \textit{false}. The Borel subsets of the state space form a Boolean $\sigma$-algebra, and the logic of classical physical systems is Boolean logic. Classical physics is a \emph{realist} theory fulfilling properties (a) and (b).
As is well-known, there is no such realist formulation of quantum theory: the Kochen-Specker theorem \cite{KS67,Doe05} shows that there is no state space of a quantum system analogous to the classical state space. Hilbert space does \emph{not} play this role. In particular, Kochen and Specker required that the physical quantities are represented as real-valued functions on the (hypothetical) state space of a quantum system and then showed that such a space does not exist. In fact, they showed the even stronger result that under very natural conditions it is impossible to assign values to all physical quantities at once, and hence it is also impossible to assign \textit{true} resp. \textit{false} to all propositions.
In standard quantum logic, which goes back to the seminal paper \cite{BvN36} by Birkhoff and von Neumann, propositions like ``$\Ain\De$'' are represented by projection operators on Hilbert space (via the spectral theorem). The projections form a non-distributive lattice, which makes the interpretation of the lattice operations as logical operations very dubious. Quantum logic is lacking a proper semantics. Pure states are represented by unit vectors in Hilbert space. Let $\hat E[A\varepsilon\Delta]$ denote the projection representing the proposition ``$\Ain{\Delta}$''. In a given state $\ket\psi$, we can calculate the probability of ``$A\varepsilon\Delta$'' being true in the state $\ket\psi$:
\begin{equation}
P(\Ain{\Delta};\ket\psi):=\bra\psi\hat E[\Ain{\Delta}]\ket\psi\in[0,1].
\end{equation}
The interpretation is \emph{instrumentalist}: upon measurement of the physical quantity $A$, we will find the result to lie in $\Delta$ with probability $P(\Ain{\Delta};\ket\psi)$.
Standard quantum logic and its many generalisations \cite{DCG02} have a number of conceptual and interpretational problems. To us, non-distribuitivity and the fundamental dependence on instrumentalist notions seem the most severe. In the following, a proposal for a new form of quantum logic is sketched which overcomes these problems. This new form of quantum logic arose from the topos approach to the formulation of physical theories, initiated more than a decade ago by Butterfield and Isham \cite{IB98,IB99,IB00,IB02}. Further references are given below.
In Section 2, the basic structures of the topos approach are introduced. In Section 3, the representation of propositions and daseinisation of projections are discussed. Section 4 is concerned with pure states and how they serve to assign topos-internal truth-values to all propositions. Sections 3 and 4 are developing joint work with Chris Isham. A number of new small results is proved. In particular, it is shown that topos quantum logic `preserves' superposition. There is some emphasis on the conceptual discussion of the topos scheme. Section 5 sketches how mixed states can be treated in the topos approach and how this relates to the logical aspects. In Section 6, some related work is pointed out. Section 7 concludes.
\section{The basic structures}
In this section, some of the basic structures of the topos approach to quantum theory are introduced. We can only give a sketch and some intuitive ideas here, for a comprehensive presentation including many further aspects and results see \cite{DI(1),DI(2),DI(3),DI(4)} and \cite{DI08}. A short introduction to the topos approach in general is given in \cite{Doe07b}, and more recently in \cite{Doe10,Ish10}.
We assume that a quantum system is described by its algebra of observables. For simplicity, we assume that this algebra is $\BH$, the algebra of all bounded operators on a separable Hilbert space $\Hi$ of dimension $2$ or greater. The Hilbert space can be infinite-dimensional. To each physical quantity $A$ of the quantum system, there corresponds a self-adjoint operator $\A$ in $\BH$ and vice versa. $\BH$ is a \emph{von Neumann algebra}.
We emphasise that all our results generalise without extra effort to arbitrary von Neumann algebras.\footnote{It is no problem that physical quantities like position and momentum are described by unbounded operators, while a von Neumann algebra contains only bounded operators. An unbounded operator can be affiliated to a von Neumann algebra provided all its spectral projections lie in the algebra (see e.g. \cite{KR83a}).}
\subsection{The context category}
One central idea in the topos approach is to take \emph{contextuality} into account, as suggested by the Kochen-Specker theorem. For us, a \emph{context} is an abelian subalgebra of the non-abelian von Neumann algebra $\BH$. We consider only abelian von Neumann subalgebras, since we want enough projections in each algebra for the spectral theorem to hold. Moreover, we consider only those abelian subalgebras that contain the identity operator $\hat 1$ on $\Hi$. Let $\V{}$ denote the set of unital, abelian von Neumann subalgebras of $\BH$. $\V{}$ is a partially ordered set under the inclusion of smaller into larger algebras. If $V',V\in\V{}$ are contexts such that $V'$ is contained in $V$, we denote the inclusion as $i_{V'V}:V'\rightarrow V$. Since every poset is a category, we call $\V{}$ the \emph{context category}. Its objects are the abelian von Neumann subalgebras of $\BH$, and its arrows are the inclusions between them.
Every context $V\in\V{}$ provides a classical perspective on the quantum system, since, as in classical physics, all the physical quantities resp. the corresponding self-adjoint operators in a context commute. Of course, the perspective provided by a single context $V$ is partial, since the quantum system has non-commuting physical quantities that cannot all be contained in the context. But by taking \emph{all} contexts into account at once, and by moreover keeping track of their relations, one can hope to gain a complete picture of the quantum system.
\subsection{The topos associated to a quantum system and its internal logic} \label{Sec2.2}
Of course, it will not be enough to consider the context category $\V{}$ alone. Instead, one defines structures over $\V{}$ and relations between these structures. Concretely, one considers $\Set$-valued functors on the context category $\V{}$ and natural transformations between them.\footnote{The standard reference on category theory is \cite{McL71}.} At this point, a choice between covariant and contravariant functors must be made.
Let $V,V'\in\V{}$ such that $V'\subset V$. The step from the algebra $V$ to the smaller algebra $V'$ is a process of \emph{coarse-graining}: since $V'$ contains less self-adjoint operators and less projections than $V$, one can describe less physics from the perspective of $V'$ than from $V$. Mapping self-adjoint operators and projections from $V$ to $V'$ hence will make it necessary to approximate. If we consider a proposition ``$\Ain\De$'' about a physical quantity $A$ that is represented by a self-adjoint operator $\A$ in $V$, then there exists a projection $\hP=\hat E[\Ain\De]$ in $V$ that represents the proposition. It may happen that the smaller abelian subalgebra $V'$ does not contain the projection $\hP$. This means that the proposition ``$\Ain\De$'' cannot be stated from the perspective of $V'$. Both the projection $\hP$ and the corresponding proposition ``$\Ain\De$'' must be adapted to $V'$ by making them coarser. This leads to the idea of \emph{daseinisation}, which is discussed in detail in the following section.
On the other hand, the step from $V'$ to $V$ is trivial, since every self-adjoint operator and every projection in $V'$ is of course also contained in $V$. Going in this direction, one can merely embed the smaller algebra $V'$ into the larger one, without making use of the extra structure (more self-adjoint operators, more projections, hence more propositions) available in $V$.
This strongly suggests to use \emph{contra}variant functors on the context category $\V{}$: the arrows in $\V{}$ are the inclusions of smaller contexts $V'$ into larger ones like $V$, so if we want to incorporate coarse-graining, our functors over $\V{}$ must invert the direction of the arrows. The idea hence is to consider $\SetBHop$, the collection of $\Set$-valued contravariant functors---traditionally called \emph{presheaves}---over the base category $\V{}$. With natural transformations as arrows between the presheaves, $\SetBHop$ becomes a category. This category has all the extra structure that makes it into a \emph{topos}.\footnote{I.e., it has finite limits and colimits, exponentials as well as a subobject classifier.} Topos theory is a highly developed branch of pure mathematics, and we refer to the literature for more information \cite{Gol84,MM92,Jst02}. For us, the important aspect is that a topos is a category whose objects `behave like sets'. Each presheaf $\ps{\mc{P}}\in\SetBHop$ can be seen as kind of a generalised set, and each natural transformation $\tau:\ps{\mc{P}_1}\rightarrow\ps{\mc{P}_2}$ between presheaves is the analogue of a function between sets. Presheaves can have extra structure so as to become a group, a topological space, a ring etc. internally in the topos $\SetBHop$ (and natural transformations may or may not preserve this extra structure).
The context category $\V{}$ is the \emph{base category} of the topos $\SetBHop$, and the contexts $V\in\V{}$ are also called \emph{stages}. Each presheaf $\ps{\mc{P}}\in\SetBHop$ can be seen as a collection $(\ps{\mc{P}}_V)_{V\in\V{}}$ of sets, one for each context, together with functions $\ps{\mc{P}}(i_{V'V}):\ps{\mc{P}}_V\rightarrow\ps{\mc{P}}_{V'}$ whenever $V'\subset V$. (If $V'=V$, then the function $\ps{\mc{P}}(i_{VV})$ is the identity on $\ps{\mc{P}}_V$.)
The subobject classifier $\Omega$ in a topos is the object that generalises the set $\{0,1\}$ of truth-values (where $0$ is identified with \textit{false} and $1$ with \textit{true}) in the topos $\Set$ of sets and functions. In the topos $\SetBHop$, the subobject classifier $\Om$ is the presheaf of \emph{sieves} on $\V{}$. To each $V\in\V{}$, the set $\Om_V$ of all sieves on $V$ is assigned. A sieve $\sigma$ on $V$ is a collection of subalgebras of $V$ that is downwards closed, i.e., if $V'\in\sigma$ and $V''\subset V'$, then $V''\in\sigma$. The \emph{maximal sieve} on $V$ is just the downset $\downarrow\!\!V$ of $V$ in $\V{}$. If $V'\subset V$, then the function $\Om(i_{V'V}):\Om_V\rightarrow\Om_{V'}$ sends a sieve $\sigma\in\Om_V$ to the sieve $\sigma\cap\downarrow\!\!V'\in\Om_{V'}$.
A \emph{truth-value} in the internal logic of the topos $\SetBHop$ is a \emph{global element} $\gamma=(\gamma_V)_{V\in\V{}}$ of the subobject classifier $\Om$, i.e., we have $\gamma_V\in\Om_V$ for all $V\in\V{}$ and $\gamma_V\cap\downarrow\!\!V'=\gamma_{V'}$ whenever $V'\subset V$.
The intuitive interpretation of such a truth-value $\gamma$ simply is that for each context $V\in\V{}$, we have a local truth-value \textit{true} or \textit{false}: if $V\in\gamma_{\tilde V}$ for some $\tilde V\supseteq V$, then at $V$, we have \textit{true}, else we have \textit{false}. The fact that $\gamma$ is a global element guarantees that this is independent of the choice of $\tilde V$. Moreover, the fact that we have sieves means that if at some $V\in\V{}$ we have \textit{true}, then we have \textit{true} at all $V'\subset V$.
Physically, we interpret the contexts $V\in\V{}$ as classical perspectives on the quantum system under consideration. A truth-value $\gamma$ hence is contextual: it provides information about truth or falsity from each perspective $V$. Clearly, there is a truth-value $\gamma_1$ consisting of the maximal sieve $\downarrow\!\!V$ for each context. This is interpreted as \textit{totally true}, i.e., true from all perspectives $V\in\V{}$. The truth-value $\gamma_0$ consisting of the empty sieve for each $V$ is interpreted as \emph{totally false}. There are many other truth-values between $\gamma_0$ and $\gamma_1$. The truth-values are partially ordered under inclusion. It is well-known that they form a \emph{Heyting algebra}, the algebraic representative of \emph{intuitionistic} propositional logic. In particular, this means that conjunction and disjunction behave distributively. The main difference between an intuitionistic and a Boolean logical calculus is that the law of excluded middle need not hold in the former. If $H$ is a Heyting algebra with top element $1$, and $a\in H$ with $\neg a$ its negation, then
\begin{equation}
a\vee\neg a\leq 1.
\end{equation}
In a Boolean algebra, equality holds.
The internal logic provided by the topos $\SetBHop$ hence is distributive, multi-valued, contextual and intuitionistic. We will apply this logical structure to quantum theory.
\subsection{The spectral presheaf}
The fact that we are using Boolean logic in classical physics is closely tied to the fact that classical physics is based upon the idea of a \emph{state space} $\mc{S}$. A proposition ``$\Ain\De$'' about a physical quantity $A$ of the system is represented by a subset $S$ of the state space. This subset contains all states (i.e., elements of the state space) in which the proposition is true. Usually, one does not consider all subsets of state space, but restricts attention to measurable ones. The Borel subsets $B(\mc{S})$ form a $\sigma$-complete Boolean algebra.
In classical physics, in any given state $s\in\mc{S}$, every proposition has a truth-value. If $s$ lies in the subset of $\mc{S}$ representing the proposition, then the proposition is \textit{true}, otherwise it is \textit{false}.
The Kochen-Specker theorem \cite{KS67} shows that there is no analogous state space picture for quantum theory. The theorem is often interpreted as meaning that there are no non-contextual truth-value assignments in quantum theory. The topos approach takes this as a motivation and starting point. For each context $V\in\V{}$, there exists a state space picture similar to the classical case: each $V$ is an abelian $C^*$-algebra, so by Gel'fand duality there is an isomorphism $\mc{G}:V\rightarrow C(\Sigma_V)$ of $C^*$-algebras between $V$ and the continuous, complex-valued functions on the Gel'fand spectrum $\Sigma_V$ of $V$. Here, the Gel'fand spectrum $\Sigma_V$, which is a compact Hausdorff space, takes the r\^ole of the state space for the physical quantities described by self-adjoint operators in $V$. Each self-adjoint operator $\A\in V$ is sent to the real-valued function $\mc{G}(\A)$ on $\Sigma_V$, given by
\begin{equation}
\forall \ld\in\Sigma_V:\mc{G}(\A)(\ld)=\ld(\A.)
\end{equation}
It holds that $\rm{im}(\mc{G}(\A))=\spec{\A}$. Since $V$ is a von Neumann algebra, the Gel'fand spectrum $\Sigma_V$ is extremely disconnected.
The main idea is to define a presheaf $\Sig$ over the context category $\V{}$ from all the local state spaces $\Sigma_V,\;V\in\V{},$ by assigning to each context $V\in\V{}$ its Gel'fand spectrum $\Sig_V=\Sigma_V$. If $V'\subset V$, then there is a canonical function
\begin{eqnarray}
\Sig(i_{V'V}):\Sig_V &\longrightarrow& \Sig_{V'}\\ \nonumber
\ld &\longmapsto& \ld|_{V'}.
\end{eqnarray}
This defines the \emph{spectral presheaf} $\Sig$, which is the analogue of the state space $\mc{S}$ of a classical system. It is a generalised set in the sense discussed in section \ref{Sec2.2}.
Each context $V\in\V{}$ is determined by its lattice of projections $\PV$ (since a von Neumann algebra is generated by its projections). The projections $\Q\in\PV$ represent propositions ``$\Ain\De$'' that can be made from the perspective of $V$. Since $V$ is an abelian von Neumann algebra, the projection lattice $\PV$ is a distributive lattice. Moreover, $\PV$ is complete and orthocomplemented. There is a lattice isomorphism between $\PV$ and $\mc{C}l(\Sig_V)$, the lattice of \emph{clopen}, i.e., closed and open subsets of the Gel'fand spectrum $\Sig_V$ of $V$:
\begin{eqnarray} \label{alpha}
\alpha:\PV &\longrightarrow& \mc{C}l(\Sig_V)\\ \nonumber
\hP &\longmapsto& S_\hP:=\{\ld\in\Sig_V \mid \ld(\hP)=1\}.
\end{eqnarray}
Locally, at each $V\in\V{}$, this gives the correspondence between projections in $V$ and subsets of the Gel'fand spectrum $\Sig_V$.
\section{Representation of Propositions}
\subsection{Daseinisation of Projections}
Let $S$ be a given quantum system, and let ``$\Ain\De$'' be a proposition about the value of some physical quantity $A$ of the system. The task is to find a suitable representative of the proposition within the topos scheme.
The main idea is very simple: the spectral presheaf $\Sig$ is an analogue of the state space of a classical system. Since, in classical physics, propositions correspond to Borel subsets of the state space, we construct suitable subsets, or rather, subobjects, of the spectral presheaf that will serve as representatives of propositions.
There is a straightforward way of doing this: let ``$\Ain\De$'' be a proposition, and let $\hP=\hat E[\Ain\De]$ be the corresponding projection in $\PH$. In a first step, we `adapt' the projection $\hP$ to all contexts by defining
\begin{equation}
\forall V\in\V{}:\dastoo{V}{P}:=\bigwedge\{\Q\in\PV\mid\Q\geq\hP\}.
\end{equation}
That is, we approximate $\hP$ from above by the smallest projection in $V$ that is larger than or equal to $\hP$. On the level of local propositions\footnote{We call those propositions \emph{local (at $V$)} that are represented by projection operators in $V$ via the spectral theorem. The proposition ``$\Ain\De$'' that we want to represent is \emph{global}. For each context $V\in\V{}$, the global proposition becomes coarse-grained to give some local proposition.}, we pick the \emph{strongest} local proposition implied by ``$\Ain\De$'' that is available from the perspective of $V$. In simple cases, $\dastoo{V}{P}$ represents a local proposition ``$\Ain\Gamma$'', where $\Gamma\supseteq\De$. In general, the self-adjoint operator $\A$ representing a physical quantity $A$ need not be contained in $V$ and thus the proposition represented by $\dastoo{V}{P}$ is of the form ``$B\in\Gamma$'', where $B$ is a physical quantity such that the corresponding self-adjoint operator $\hat B$ is in $V$.\footnote{We remark that even if $\A\notin V$, we can still have $\hP=\hat E[\Ain\De]\in V$.} In any case, $\dastoo{V}{P}\geq\hP$.
The central conceptual idea in the definition of the representative of a proposition ``$\Ain\De$'' is coarse-graining. Each context $V\in\V{}$ provides a classical perspective on the quantum system, characterised by the collection $\PV$ of projection operators in $V$. The projections in $V$ correspond to local propositions about the values of physical quantities in $V$. If the global proposition ``$\Ain\De$'' that we start from is a proposition about some physical quantity $A$ that is is represented by a self-adjoint operator $\A$ in $V$, then the projection $\hP$ representing ``$\Ain\De$'' is also contained in $V$, and daseinisation will pick this projection at $\hP$ (i.e., $\dastoo{V}{P}=\hP$). If $\A\notin V$ and $\hP\notin V$, we have to adapt $\hP$ to the context $V$. It is natural to pick the strongest local proposition implied by ``$\Ain\De$'' that can be made from the perspective of $V$. On the level of projections, this means that one has to take the smallest projection in $V$ larger than $\hP$. In this case, $\dastoo{V}{P}>\hP$.
From $\hP$, we thus obtain a collection of projections, one for each context $V\in\V{}$. We then use, for each $V\in\V{}$, the isomorphism \eq{alpha} to obtain a family $(S_{\dastoo{V}{P}})_{V\in\V{}}$ of clopen subsets. It is straightforward to show that for all $V',V\in\V{}$ such that $V'\subset V$, it holds that
\begin{equation}
S_{\dastoo{V}{P}}|_{V'}=\{\ld|_{V'} \mid \ld\in S_{\dastoo{V}{P}}\}\subseteq S_{\dastoo{V'}{P}}
\end{equation}
(see Thm. 3.1 in \cite{DI(2)}. Actually, there it is shown that equality holds, which is more than we need here.) This means that the family $(S_{\dastoo{V}{P}})_{V\in\V{}}$ forms a subobject---which is nothing but a subpresheaf---of the spectral presheaf $\Sig$. This subobject will be denoted as $\ps{\das{P}}$ and is called the \emph{daseinisation of $\hP$}.
While we defined the subobject $\ps{\das{P}}$ of $\Sig$ stagewise, i.e., for each $V\in\V{}$, the subobject itself is a global object, consisting of all the subsets
\begin{equation}
\ps{\das{P}}_V=S_{\dastoo{V}{P}}
\end{equation}
for $V\in\V{}$, and the functions
\begin{equation}
\ps{\das{P}}_V\longrightarrow\ps{\das{P}}_{V'},\ \ \ \ \ \ld\longmapsto\ld|_{V'}
\end{equation}
between them (for all $V'\subseteq V$). In other words, $\ps{\das{P}}$ is a presheaf over the context category $\V{}$ and not a mere set. The whole of $\ps{\das{P}}$ represents the proposition ``$\Ain\De$'' (where $\hP$ is the projection corresponding to the proposition ``$\Ain\De$''). Many mathematical arguments concerning subobjects can be made stage by stage, yet the global character of subobjects is important both mathematically and in the physical interpretation.
A subobject $\ps S$ of $\Sig$ such that the components $\ps S_V$ are clopen sets for all $V$ is called a \emph{clopen subobject}. One can show that the clopen subobjects form a complete Heyting algebra $\Subcl{\Sig}$ (see Thm. 2.5 in \cite{DI(2)}). The subobjects obtained from daseinisation are all clopen. Compared to all subobjects of $\Sig$, the use of clopen ones has some technical advantages. We regard the Heyting algebra $\Subcl{\Sig}$ of clopen subobjects of the spectral presheaf as the algebra representing (propositional) quantum logic in the topos formulation. $\Subcl{\Sig}$ is the analogue of the Boolean $\sigma$-algebra of Borel subsets of the state space $\mc{S}$ of a classical system.
In the following, we discuss the main properties of daseinisation and of topos quantum logic in general.
\subsection{Properties of daseinisation and their physical interpretation}
The following mapping is called \emph{daseinisation of projections}:
\begin{eqnarray}
\ps\delta:\PH &\longrightarrow& \Subcl{\Sig}\\ \nonumber
\hP &\longmapsto& \ps{\das{P}}.
\end{eqnarray}
It is straightforward to show that daseinisation has the following properties:
\begin{itemize}
\item[(1)] If $\hP<\Q$, then $\ps{\delta(\hP)}<\ps{\delta(\Q)}$, i.e., daseinisation is order-preserving;
\item[(2)] the mapping $\ps{\delta}:\PH\rightarrow\Subcl{\Sig}$ is injective, that is, two inequivalent propositions\footnote{It is well-known that the mapping from propositions to projections is many-to-one. Two propositions are equivalent if they correspond to the same projection.} correspond to two different subobjects;
\item[(3)] $\ps{\delta(\hat 0)}=\ps 0$, the empty subobject, and $\ps{\delta(\hat 1)}=\Sig$. The trivially false proposition is represented by the empty subobject, the trivially true proposition is represented by the whole of $\Sig$.
\end{itemize}
Moreover, we will show that
\begin{itemize}
\item[(4)] for all $\hP,\Q\in\PH$, it holds that $\ps{\delta(\hP\vee\Q)}=\ps{\delta(\hP)}\vee\ps{\delta(\Q)}$, that is, daseinisation preserves the disjunction (Or) of propositions;
\item[(5)] for all $\hP,\Q\in\PH$, it holds that $\ps{\delta(\hP\wedge\Q)}\leq\ps{\delta(\hP)}\wedge\ps{\delta(\Q)}$, that is, daseinisation does not preserve the conjunction (And) of propositions;
\item[(6)] in general, $\ps{\delta(\hP)}\wedge\ps{\delta(\Q)}$ is not of the form $\ps{\delta(\hat R)}$ for a projection $\hat R\in\PH$, and daseinisation is not surjective.
\end{itemize}
Daseinisation can be seen as a `translation' mapping between ordinary, Birk-hoff-von Neumann quantum logic \cite{BvN36}, which is based upon the non-distributive lattice of projections $\PH$ in $\BH$, and the topos form of propositional quantum logic, which is based upon the distributive lattice $\Subcl{\Sig}$. The latter more precisely is a Heyting algebra.
The properties (1--3) clearly are physically sensible. Before discussing properties (4--6) in some more detail, we emphasise that this representation of propositions by subobjects of the spectral presheaf, an object in the topos $\SetBHop$, has a strong geometric aspect. The spectral presheaf is the object that naturally incorporates the state spaces of all abelian subalgebras $V\in\V{}$ of the algebra $\BH$ of physical quantities of the quantum system. Moreover, the local state spaces $\Sig_V$ are related by the canonical restriction functions $\Sig(i_{V'V}):\Sig_V\rightarrow\Sig_{V'},\;\ld\mapsto\ld|_{V'},$ for all $V',V\in\V{}$ such that $V'\subset V$.
The spectral presheaf can be seen as a topological space in the topos $\SetBHop$, and it is closely related to the internal Gel'fand spectrum of an abelian $C^*$-algebra $\fu{\BH}$ in the functor topos $\SetBH$ that can be defined canonically from $\BH$ as suggested in \cite{HLS09}. Details about the relation between the spectral presheaf $\Sig$ and the spectrum of $\fu{\BH}$ can be found in \cite{Doe10b}. This strong geometrical and topological character of our quantum state space $\Sig$ is very different from the usual interpretation of Hilbert space as a state space, with closed subspaces resp. the projections onto these as representatives of propositions. In particular, neither the spectral presheaf $\Sig$ nor its components $\Sig_V,\;V\in\V{},$ are linear spaces.
In order to prove property (4), we first observe that for every $V\in\V{}$, the mapping
\begin{eqnarray}
\delta^o_V:\PH &\longrightarrow& \PV\\ \nonumber
\hP &\longmapsto& \bigwedge\{\Q\in\PV \mid \Q\geq\hP\}
\end{eqnarray}
is order-preserving. Let $\hP,\Q\in\PH$, then $\dastoo{V}{P}\leq\delta^o(\hP\vee\Q)_V$ and $\dastoo{V}{Q}\leq\delta^o(\hP\vee\Q)_V$, so $\dastoo{V}{P}\vee\dastoo{V}{Q}\leq\delta^o(\hP\vee\Q)_V$. Conversely, $\dastoo{V}{P}\vee\dastoo{V}{Q}\geq\hP$ and $\dastoo{V}{P}\vee\dastoo{V}{Q}\geq\Q$, so $\dastoo{V}{P}\vee\dastoo{V}{Q}\geq\hP\vee\Q$. But since $\dastoo{V}{P}\vee\dastoo{V}{Q}\in\PV$ and $\delta^o(\hP\vee\Q)_V$ is the smallest projection in $V$ larger than or equal to $\hP\vee\Q$, we also have $\dastoo{V}{P}\vee\dastoo{V}{Q}\geq\delta^o(\hP\vee\Q)_V$. Since the join of subobjects is defined stagewise, property (4) follows.
It is easy to see that property (4), the preservation of joins, can actually be generalised to arbitrary joins,
\begin{equation}
\ps{\delta}(\bigvee_{i\in I}\hP_i)=\bigvee_{i\in I}\ps{\delta(\hP_i)}.
\end{equation}
The join of projections relates to \emph{superposition} in standard quantum logic. The following argument is from standard quantum logic: let ``$\Ain\De$'' and ``$B\varepsilon\Gamma$'' be two propositions, represented by projections $\hP$ resp. $\Q$. Any unit vector $\psi$ in the closed subspace $\hP\Hi$ of Hilbert space represents a pure state in which the proposition ``$\Ain\De$'' is true (i.e., the expectation value of $\hP$ in such a state is $1$). Similarly, every unit vector in $\Q\Hi$ is a state such that ``$B\varepsilon\Gamma$'' is true.
\paragraph{Superposition without linearity.} The join $\hP\vee\Q$ of the two projections is the projection onto the closure of the linear subspace spanned by $\hP\Hi$ and $\Q\Hi$. In general, there are unit vectors, i.e., pure states $\psi$ in the closed subspace $(\hP\vee\Q)\Hi$ that are neither in $\hP\Hi$ nor in $\Q\Hi$. Such a state $\psi$ makes the proposition ```$\Ain\De$ or $B\varepsilon\Gamma$'', represented by $\hP\vee\Q$, true, despite the fact that in the state $\psi$, neither ``$\Ain\De$'' nor ``$B\varepsilon\Gamma$'' are true. A state $\psi$ of this kind can be written as a linear combination of vectors in $\hP\Hi$ and $\Q\Hi$ and is called a superposition state. The fact that states can be superposed by linear combinations is a fundamental fact of quantum theory. Clearly, superposition relates directly to the fact that Hilbert space is a linear space.
In this argument, one uses a certain feature of standard quantum logic that has been regarded as problematic: the fact that closed subspaces or projections represent physical properties in an \emph{intensional sense} and, at the same time, are the \emph{extensions} thereof, namely the collection of states which make the proposition true. This extensional collapse has been called the ``metaphysical disaster'' of standard quantum logic by Foulis and Randall \cite{RF83}, see also the discussion in \cite{DCG02}, where the problem is stated as:
\small ``The standard structures seem to determine a kind of extensional collapse. In fact, the closed subspaces of a Hilbert space represent at the same time physical properties in an intensional sense and the extensions thereof (sets of states that certainly verify the properties in question). As happens in classical set theoretical semantics, there is no mathematical representative for physical properties in an intensional sense. Foulis and Randall have called such an extensional collapse ``the metaphysical disaster'' of the standard quantum logical approach.''
\normalsize
In our topos approach, we did not invoke states yet, nor is our quantum state object $\Sig$ a linear space. Yet, we have the remarkable fact that daseinisation `translates' the disjunction of projections into the disjunction of clopen subobjects, i.e., daseinisation is a join-semilattice morphism. Interestingly, the binary join in $\Subcl{\Sig}$ is defined componentwise by set-theoretic union: let $\ps S_1,\ps S_2$ be two clopen subobjects, then
\begin{equation}
\forall V\in\V{}:(\ps S_1\vee\ps S_2)_V=\ps S_{1;V}\cup\ps S_{2;V}.
\end{equation}
Differently from the Hilbert space situation, the linear span of linear subspaces does not play any role. The behaviour of projections under joins, which in standard quantum theory is so closely linked to superposition and the linear character of Hilbert space, is mapped by daseinisation to a lattice where joins are given by set-theoretic unions (in each component). Despite the fact that the spectral presheaf is not a linear space, daseinisation thus preserves a central aspect of standard quantum logic, namely that part which relates to superposition.
We further remark that we avoid the metaphysical disaster criticised by Foulis and Randall. Clopen subobjects represent propositions, but they are \emph{not} collections of states that make the propositions true.
\paragraph{Conjunction and coarse-graining.} Property (5) shows that conjunction of projections is not preserved. It is straightforward to construct a counterexample: let $\hP\in\PH$ be a projection, and let $V\in\V{}$ be a context that does not contain $\hP$. Then $\dastoo{V}{P}>\hP$ and $\delta^o(\hat 1-\hP)_V>\hat 1-\hP$, so $\dastoo{V}{P}\wedge\delta^o(\hat 1-\hP)_V>\hat 0$, while of course $\hP\wedge(\hat 1-\hP)=\hat 0$. Since the meet of subobjects is defined stagewise, property (5) follows. This clearly also implies property (6).
The counterexample shows that preservation of conjunction does \emph{not} fail just because of non-commutativity of the projections, which usually is interpreted as expressing incompatibility of the propositions represented by the projections. Rather, in the counterexample preservation of conjunction is not given due to coarse-graining.
Dalla Chiara and Giuntini \cite{DCG02} sum up another common criticism of the standard quantum logic formalism:
\small ``The lattice structure of the closed subspaces automatically renders the quantum proposition system closed under logical conjunction. This seems to imply some counterintuitive consequences from the physical point of view. Suppose two experimental propositions that concern two strongly incompatible quantities, like ``the spin in the $x$ direction is up'', ``the spin in the $y$ direction is down''. In such a situation, the intuition of the quantum physicist seems to suggest the following semantic requirement: the conjunction of our propositions has no definite meaning; for, they cannot be experimentally tested at the same time. As a consequence, the lattice proposition structure seems to be too strong.''
\normalsize
In the topos approach, as in standard quantum logic, the conjunction of any two propositions is defined, but there is an interesting conceptual twist: the built-in contextuality and coarse-graining take care of the fact that there are strongly incompatible propositions as the ones mentioned above. Let $\hP$ be the projection representing the proposition ``the spin in the $x$ direction is up'' (which clearly is of the form ``$\Ain\De$''), and let $\Q$ represent ``the spin in the $y$ direction is down''. Then $\hP$ and $\Q$ do not commute, so they are not both contained in any context $V\in\V{}$. If we consider a context $V$ such that $\hP\in V$, then $\Q\notin V$ and hence $\dastoo{V}{Q}>\Q$. From a perspective of such a context $V$, the proposition ``the spin in the $y$ direction is down'' becomes coarse-grained, potentially to become the trivially true proposition represented by the identity operator $\hat 1$. Similarly, if a context $V$ contains $\Q$, then $\dastoo{V}{P}>\hP$, and hence the proposition ``the spin in the $x$ direction is up'' becomes coarse-grained from the perspective of such a context. There is no single context that allows to express the conjunction between the incompatible propositions within the context. But, since the (clopen) subobjects representing propositions are global objects, it still makes sense to talk about the conjunction of incompatible propositions in the topos scheme.
When discussing states and how they assign truth-values to propositions, we will see that there are non-trivial propositions that are not totally true in \emph{any} state. This is possible because the topos approach provides us with the collection of all clopen subobjects of the spectral presheaf as representatives of propositions. Among them are many that are not of the form $\ps{\das{P}}$ for a projection $\hP$. In contrast to that, in standard quantum logic every non-trivial proposition corresponds to a non-trivial closed subspace of Hilbert space, so there always are states that make the proposition true.
\paragraph{Material implication.} Each Heyting algebra $H$ has an implication, given by
\begin{equation}
\forall x,y\in H : (x\Rightarrow y)=\bigvee\{z\in H \mid z\wedge x \leq y\}.
\end{equation}
Applied to our Heyting algebra $\Subcl{\Sig}$, whose elements represent propositions about the quantum system under consideration, this becomes
\begin{equation}
\forall \ps S_1,\ps S_2\in\Subcl{\Sig} : (\ps S_1\Rightarrow\ps S_2)=\bigvee\{\ps S\in\Subcl{\Sig} \mid \ps S\wedge\ps S_1\leq\ps S_2\}.
\end{equation}
Using the well-known form for Heyting implication in presheaf topoi (see e.g. \cite{MM92}, p56), this can be evaluated concretely for all $V\in\V{}$ as
\begin{equation}
(\ps S_1\Rightarrow\ps S_2)_V=\{\ld\in\Sig_V \mid \forall V'\subseteq V:\text{ if }\ld|_{V'}\in\ps S_{1;V'} \text{ then }\ld|_{V'}\in\ps S_{2;V'}\}.
\end{equation}
Note that this expression is not local at $V$, since a local definition would fail to give a subobject.
Hence, topos quantum logic comes with a material implication. This is another improvement compared to standard quantum logic, which is suffering from the lack of a proper implication. In particular, the Sasaki hook does not provide a material implication, as is well known.
\paragraph{Negation in topos quantum logic.} The negation is given in terms of the Heyting implication as usual:
\begin{equation}
\neg\ps S:=(\ps S\Rightarrow \ps 0),
\end{equation}
where $\ps 0$ is the minimal element in the Heyting algebra $\Subcl{\Sig}$, namely the empty subobject.
This can be evaluated concretely for all $V\in\V{}$ as
\begin{equation}
\neg\ps S_V:=\{\ld\in\Sig_V \mid \forall V'\subseteq V : \ld|_{V'}\notin \ps S_{V'}\}.
\end{equation}
\section{Pure states and truth-value assignments}
\subsection{Truth objects and pseudo-states}
Let $\psi\in\Hi$ be a unit vector. As usual, $\psi$ is identified with the \emph{vector state} it determines:
\begin{eqnarray}
w_\psi:\BH &\longrightarrow& \bbC\\ \nonumber
\A &\longmapsto& w_\psi(\A)=\bra\psi\A\ket\psi.
\end{eqnarray}
The vector state $\psi$ is a pure state on $\BH$, i.e., an extreme point of the space of states (positive linear functionals of norm $1$) on $\BH$. In the topos approach, one cannot simply pick a (global) element of the spectral presheaf $\Sig$ as the representative of a state, since $\Sig$ has no global elements at all. As Butterfield and Isham observed, this is exactly equivalent to the Kochen-Specker theorem \cite{IB98,IB99,IB00,IB02}.
Instead, one defines a presheaf $\ps\TO^\psi$ over $\V{}$ that collects all those propositions that are totally true in the state $\psi$. For each $V\in\V{}$, let
\begin{eqnarray} \label{DefTO}
\ps\TO^\psi_V &=& \{S_\hP\in\mc{C}l(\Sig_V) \mid \hP\geq\hP_\psi\}.
\end{eqnarray}
Here, $S_\hP=\alpha(\hP)$ is the clopen subset of $\Sig_V$ corresponding to $\hP$ as defined in \eq{alpha}, and $\hP_\psi$ is the projection onto the one-dimensional subspace of Hilbert space determined by $\psi$. The component $\ps\TO^\psi_V$ hence contains all those clopen subsets of $\Sig_V$ that (a) represent local propositions that can be made from the perspective of $V$ and (b) are true in the state $\psi$.
If $V'\subset V$, then there is a function
\begin{eqnarray}
\ps\TO^\psi(i_{V'V}):\ps\TO^\psi_V &\longrightarrow& \ps\TO^\psi_{V'}\\
S_\hP &\longmapsto& S_{\dastoo{V'}{P}}.
\end{eqnarray}
In this way, $\ps\TO^\psi$ becomes a presheaf. It is called the \emph{truth object associated to $\psi$}.
A global element $\ps S$ of $\ps\TO^\psi$ consists of one clopen subset $\ps S_V\in\mc{C}l(\Sig_V)$ for each $V\in\V{}$ such that $\ps S_V|_{V'}=\ps S_{V'}$. Such a global element $\ps S$ clearly is a clopen subobject of $\Sig$. The physical interpretation is that those subobjects $\ps S$ that are global elements of $\ps\TO^\psi$ (and those which are larger than a global element of $\ps\TO^\psi$) represent propositions that are totally true in the state $\psi$. The collection $\Gamma\ps\TO^\psi$ of global elements of the truth object forms a partially ordered set. It is easy to see that this poset is contained in the filter
\begin{equation}
\Gamma\ps\TO^\psi=\{\ps S\in\Subcl{\Sig} \mid \ps S\geq\ps{\delta(\hP_\psi)}\}.
\end{equation}
The clopen subobject $\ps{\delta(\hP_\psi)}$ hence plays a special r\^ole, it is the smallest subobject representing a totally true proposition. If a classical system is in a pure state $s\in\cS$, then the smallest subset representing a proposition that is true in the state $s$ is $\{s\}$. Hence, the subobject $\ps{\delta(\hP_\psi)}$ is the analogue of a one-element subset $\{s\}$ of the state space $\cS$ of a classical system.
\begin{equation}
\wpsi:=\ps{\delta(\hP_\psi)}
\end{equation}
is called the \emph{pseudo-state associated to $\psi$}.
\subsection{Truth-value assignments}
As mentioned before, in classical physics the assignment of truth-values to propositions is straightforward. Given a state $s\in\cS$ of the system, a proposition ``$\Ain\De$'' is \textit{true} if $s$ is contained in the Borel subset $S$ of the state space $\cS$ that represents the proposition, and \textit{false} otherwise.
In the topos scheme, we have a completely analogous situation: let $\ps S$ be the clopen subobject of the spectral presheaf representing a proposition constructed by conjunction, disjunction and/or negation of elementary propositions ``$\Ain\De$'', and let $\wpsi$ be the pseudo-state associated to some given state $\psi$. It is straightforward to prove that for each $V\in\V{}$,
\begin{equation}
v(\wpsi\subseteq\ps S)_V=\{V'\subseteq V \mid \wpsi_{V'}\subseteq\ps S_{V'}\}
\end{equation}
is a sieve on $V$. Moreover, if $V'\subset V$, then
\begin{equation}
v(\wpsi\subseteq\ps S)_{V'}=v(\wpsi\subseteq\ps S)_V\cap\downarrow\!\!V',
\end{equation}
so $v(\wpsi\subseteq\ps S)=(v(\wpsi\subseteq\ps S)_V)_{V\in\V{}}$ is a global element of the subobject classifier $\Om$ of $\SetBHop$, i.e., a topos-internal truth-value for the proposition ``$\Ain\De$'' in the state $\psi$. For more details, see \cite{DI08}. The truth-value $v(\wpsi\subseteq\ps S)$ can be interpreted as the answer of the question `to which degree does the pseudo-state $\wpsi$ lie in the subobject $\ps S$?'. Different from the classical case, where a point $s$ either lies in a subset or not (which determines a Boolean truth-value in the topos $\Set$), we have a truth-value in the logic given by our topos $\SetBHop$.
The simplest description of the truth-value $v(\wpsi\subseteq\ps S)$ is a more global one: $v(\wpsi\subseteq\ps S)$ is the collection of all $V\in\V{}$ such that the component $\wpsi_V$ of the pseudo-state is contained in the component $\ps S_V$ of the subobject representing a proposition. By construction, if $V$ is contained in this collection, then all $V'\subset V$ are also contained in it. A context $V$ is contained in the collection if and only if the local proposition at $V$ is true in the state $\psi$, which is the case if and only if the expectation value of the projection $\hP_{\ps S_V}=\alpha^{-1}(\ps S_V)$ in the state $\psi$ is $1$.
It also becomes clear that the smallest subobjects that can represent totally true propositions are those of the form $\wpsi=\ps{\delta(\hP_\psi)}$. There are smaller non-trivial subobjects $\ps S$, for example those given by a conjunction $\ps{\delta(\hP_{\psi_1})}\wedge\ps{\delta(\hP_{\psi_2})}$. The subobject that represents the proposition ``spin in $x$ direction is up and spin in $y$ direction is down'' is of this form. There is no state $\psi$ that makes this proposition totally true. In this sense, the topos form of quantum logic takes care of the conjunction of non-compatible propositions in a non-trivial way, different from Birkhoff-von Neumann quantum logic. We conjecture that this feature will lead to a logical formulation of the uncertainty relations.
Each pure state $\psi$ determines a truth-value assignment
\begin{eqnarray}
v_\psi:\Subcl{\Sig} &\longrightarrow& \Gamma\Om\\ \nonumber
\ps S &\longmapsto& v(\wpsi\subseteq \ps S).
\end{eqnarray}
Since both the clopen subobjects $\Subcl{\Sig}$ of the spectral presheaf and the truth-values $\Gamma\Om$ form a Heyting algebra, one might wonder if $v_\psi$ is a homomorphism of Heyting algebras. Let $\ps S_1,\ps S_2$ be two clopen subobjects. Then, for all $V\in\V{}$,
\begin{eqnarray*}
v_\psi(\ps S_1\wedge\ps S_2)_V &=& \{V'\subseteq V \mid \hP_{(\ps S_1\wedge\ps S_2)_V}\geq\hP_\psi\}\\
&=& \{V'\subseteq V \mid \hP_{\ps S_{1;V}}\wedge\hP_{\ps S_{2;V}}\geq\hP_\psi\}\\
&=& \{V'\subseteq V \mid \hP_{\ps S_{1;V}}\geq\hP_\psi\}\cap\{V'\subseteq V \mid \hP_{\ps S_{2;V}}\geq\hP_\psi\}\\
&=& v_\psi(\ps S_1)_V\wedge v_\psi(\ps S_2)_V,
\end{eqnarray*}
so we obtain
\begin{equation}
\forall \ps S_1,\ps S_2\in\Subcl{\Sig}:v_{\psi}(\ps S_1\wedge\ps S_2)=v_\psi(\ps S_1)\wedge v_\psi(\ps S_2).
\end{equation}
Truth-value assignments thus preserve conjunction. On the other hand, for all $V\in\V{}$,
\begin{eqnarray*}
v_\psi(\ps S_1\vee\ps S_2)_V &=& \{V'\subseteq V \mid \hP_{(\ps S_1\vee\ps S_2)_V}\geq\hP_\psi\}\\
&=& \{V'\subseteq V \mid \hP_{\ps S_{1;V}}\vee\hP_{\ps S_{2;V}}\geq\hP_\psi\}\\
&\supseteq& \{V'\subseteq V \mid \hP_{\ps S_{1;V}}\geq\hP_\psi\}\cup\{V'\subseteq V \mid \hP_{\ps S_{2;V}}\geq\hP_\psi\}\\
&=& v_\psi(\ps S_1)_V\vee v_\psi(\ps S_2)_V,
\end{eqnarray*}
so
\begin{equation}
\forall \ps S_1,\ps S_2\in\Subcl{\Sig}:v_{\psi}(\ps S_1\vee\ps S_2) \geq v_\psi(\ps S_1)\vee v_\psi(\ps S_2).
\end{equation}
A truth-value assignment $v_\psi$ need not preserve disjunction. In general, the truth-value of a disjunction of two propositions is larger than the disjunction of the truth-values of the propositions. Clearly, this relates to superposition. While we have used a formulation of the truth-value assignment employing projections, one could as well formulate everything just using clopen subsets of Gel'fand spectra. This shows that the topos form of quantum logic preserves that part of standard quantum logic that relates to superposition, but without the need for linear structures.
\section{Mixed states}
In this short section, we will sketch how mixed states can be treated in the topos approach and how they relate to the logical aspects.
\subsection{States as measures on the spectral presheaf}
Let $\rho$ be an arbitrary state of the quantum system under consideration. $\rho$ is a positive linear functional on $\BH$ of norm $1$. This is very different from the classical case, where an arbitrary state is a \emph{probability measure} $\mu$ on the state space $\cS$ of the system.
Interestingly, the topos approach allows the representation of arbitrary states $\rho$ of a quantum system by probability measures on the spectral presheaf, as was shown in \cite{Doe08}. We refer to this article for the proofs of the results in this section.
The \emph{measure $\mu_\rho$ associated to $\rho$} is the mapping
\begin{eqnarray} \label{Defmu_rho}
\mu_\rho:\Subcl{\Sig} &\longrightarrow& \Gamma\ps{[0,1]^\succeq}\\ \nonumber
\ps S=(\ps S_V)_{V\in\V{}} &\longmapsto& \mu_\rho(\ps S)=(\rho(\hP_{\ps S_V}))_{V\in\V{}}.
\end{eqnarray}
The codomain $\Gamma\ps{[0,1]^\succeq}$ denotes antitone functions from $\V{}$ to the unit interval $[0,1]$, i.e., if $g\in\Gamma\ps{[0,1]^\succeq}$ and $V'\subset V$, then $1\geq g(V')\geq g(V)\geq 0$. (These functions can be understood as the global elements of a certain presheaf, hence the notation.) To each clopen subobject, such a function is assigned by the measure $\mu_\rho$. It is straightforward to see that $\mu_\rho(\Sig)=1_{\V{}}$, the function that is constantly $1$.
The abstract definition of a measure is as follows: a mapping
\begin{eqnarray} \label{Defmu}
\mu:\Subcl{\Sig} &\longrightarrow& \Gamma\ps{[0,1]^\succeq}\\
\ps S=(\ps S_V)_{V\in\V{}} &\longmapsto& \mu(\ps S)=(\mu(\ps S_V))_{V\in\V{}}
\end{eqnarray}
is called a \emph{measure on the clopen subobjects of $\Sig$} if the following two conditions are fulfilled:
\begin{itemize}
\item $\mu(\Sig)=1_{\V{}}$;
\item for all $\ps S_1,\ps S_2\in\Subcl{\Sig}$, it holds that $\mu(\ps S_1\vee\ps S_2)+\mu(\ps S_1\wedge\ps S_2) =\mu(\ps S_1)+\mu(\ps S_2)$.
\end{itemize}
Somewhat surprisingly, these very weak conditions---which do not refer to non-commutativity or linearity in any direct sense---suffice to determine a unique state $\rho_\mu$ on $\BH$ provided $\rm{dim}(\Hi)\geq 3$, and every state arises that way. Measures on the spectral presheaf hence completely encode positive linear functionals on the algebra $\BH$ of physical quantities.
\subsection{The relation between measures and logical aspects}
Let $\rho=\psi$ be a pure state, and let $\mu_\psi$ be the corresponding measure. Clearly, if for some $\ps S\in\Subcl{\Sig}$ we have $\mu_\psi(\ps S)=1_{\V{}}$, i.e., the clopen subobject $\ps S$ is of measure $1_{\V{}}$, then $\ps S$ represents a proposition that is totally true in the state described by $\mu_\psi$. The smallest subobject of measure $1_{\V{}}$ with respect to the measure $\mu_\psi$, that is, the support of the measure $\mu_\psi$, is the pseudo-state $\wpsi$.
More generally, the truth-value of the proposition represented by $\ps S$ in the state represented by $\mu_\psi$ is the collection of all those $V\in\V{}$ such that $\mu_\psi(\ps S)(V)=1$, since
\begin{eqnarray*}
v_\psi(\ps S) &=& \{V\in\V{} \mid \mu_\psi(\ps S)(V)=1\}\\
&=& \{V\in\V{} \mid \bra\psi\hP_{\ps S_V}\ket\psi=1\}\\
&=& \{V\in\V{} \mid \hP_{\ps S_V}\geq\hP_\psi\},
\end{eqnarray*}
where $\hP_{\ps S_V}=\alpha^{-1}(\ps S_V)$. The measure $\mu_\psi$ corresponding to a pure state $\psi$ hence encodes the logical aspects given by the truth-value assignment $v_\psi$ determined by $\psi$.
For mixed states, there is no such simple connection between the measure-theoretical and the logical aspects. The pseudo-state $\wpsi$ corresponding to a pure state $\psi$ determines a unique measure $\mu_\psi$ that has $\wpsi$ as its support. In contrast to that, a mixed state $\rho$ is not determined uniquely by its support. One may, however, describe an arbitrary mixed state $\rho$ uniquely in terms of a family of generalised truth objects.
Instead of considering a single truth object $\ps\TO^\rho$, we define a family $(\ps\TO^\rho_r)_{r\in(0,1]}$ by
\begin{eqnarray}
\forall V\in\V{} \forall r\in(0,1]:\ps\TO^\rho_{r;V} &:=& \{S\in\mc{C}l(\Sig_V) \mid \rho(\hP_S)\geq r \}\\
&=& \{S\in\mc{C}l(\Sig_V) \mid \mu_\rho(S)\geq r \}.
\end{eqnarray}
This is a direct generalisation of the definition of a truth object (equation \eq{DefTO}), since
\begin{eqnarray*}
\ps\TO^\psi_V &=& \{S_\hP\in\mc{C}l(\Sig_V) \mid \hP\geq\hP_\psi\}\\
&=& \{S\in\mc{C}l(\Sig_V) \mid \hP_S\geq\hP_\psi\}\\
&=& \{S\in\mc{C}l(\Sig_V) \mid \bra\psi\hP_S\ket\psi=1\}\\
&=& \{S\in\mc{C}l(\Sig_V) \mid \bra\psi\hP_S\ket\psi\geq 1\}
\end{eqnarray*}
so the truth object $\ps\TO^\psi$ is equal to the element $\ps\TO^\psi_1$ of the family $(\ps\TO^\psi_r)_{r\in(0,1]}$.
It is easy to see that each $\ps\TO^\rho_r,\;r\in(0,1],$ is a presheaf over $\V{}$. The global elements of $\ps\TO^\rho_r$ are clopen subobjects that are of measure $r_{\V{}}$ or greater with respect to the measure $\mu_\rho$. Here, $r_{\V{}}$ is the function that is constantly $r$ on $\V{}$.
We saw that every measure $\mu_\rho$ determines a unique family $(\ps\TO^\rho_r)_{r\in(0,1]}$ of generalised truth objects. Conversely, the measure $\mu_\rho$ can be reconstructed from the family $(\ps\TO^\rho_r)_{r\in(0,1]}$. This and many further aspects will be treated in detail in \cite{DI09}.
\section{Related work}
Recently, Landsman et al. proposed to another scheme of topos quantum logic that is closely related to ours \cite{HLS09,CHLS09}. The main difference lies in the fact that Landsman et al. are using the topos $\SetBH$ of \emph{covariant} functors over the context category. In fact, in \cite{HLS09}, they consider an arbitrary $C^*$-algebra, not just $\BH$. Yet, in \cite{CHLS09}, where some definitions from \cite{HLS09} are made explicit, the special case of the algebra $M_n(\bbC)$ is used, which of course equals $\BH$ for an $n$-dimensional Hilbert space. The main advantage of using covariant functors is that the external algebra $\BH$ determines a canonical internal algebra $\fu\BH$ which is an \emph{abelian} $C^*$-algebra in the topos $\SetBH$. By constructive Gel'fand duality, as developed by Banaschewski and Mulvey \cite{BanMul97,BanMul00,BanMul00b,BanMul06}, this internal algebra has a Gel'fand spectrum $\Sgm$, which is a \emph{locale} in the topos $\SetBH$. (A locale is a generalised topological space, see e.g. \cite{Jst02}.) Landsman et al. suggest to use the opens in this locale as the representatives of propositions. For a detailed comparison between the contravariant and the covariant approach, see \cite{Doe10b}.
The use of a form of intuitionistic logic for quantum theory has also been suggested by Coecke in \cite{Coe02}. He uses a construction discovered by Bruns and Lakser, the so-called injective hull of meet-semilattices (see also \cite{Stu05}) to embed a meet-semilattice of propositions into a Heyting algebra by introducing new joins to the meet-semilattice. There are no further obvious connections between this approach and the topos form of quantum logic, but it would be interesting to compare both constructions with respect to the underlying geometric structures: both approaches formulate an intuitionistic form of quantum logic using Heyting algebras, and every complete Heyting algebra is a locale and hence a generalised topological space.
\section{Conclusion}
We presented the main features of the topos form of quantum logic. This new form of quantum logic is distributive, intuitionistic, multi-valued and contextual. Moreover, it has a clear underlying geometric structure. The spectral presheaf serves as an analogue of the state space of a classical system, with propositions being represented as subobjects. Interestingly, topos quantum logic preserves that part of standard quantum logic that relates to superposition. The truth-value assignments given by pure states do not depend on any notion of measurement and observers, i.e., there is no need for an instrumentalist interpretation. Mixed states can be fully described as measures on the spectral presheaf. There are interesting relations between the measure-theoretical and the logical aspects of the theory that will be further investigated in future work.
\textbf{Acknowledgements.} First of all, I want to thank Chris Isham for many discussions, constant support and his great generosity. I thank Bob Coecke, Pedro Resende, Chris Mulvey, Steve Vickers and Bas Spitters for useful discussions. I also want to thank the organisers of QPL'08 and '09 for creating a very interesting workshop.
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Home » News » Media » Retroaction #3
Retroaction #3
by wolf_ on 16-09-2009, 13:25
Topic: Media
A few days ago, the third issue of Retroaction was released. In the first two issues of this -good looking- digital magazine MSX got its fair share of attention already, and luckily this third issue again features MSX! Within the 88 pages, here's how MSX gets mentioned:
A short newspost about MSXdev'09.
A short newspost about the harvest of the first edition of the PassionMSX2 contest and the announcement of the second edition of this contest
A review of RetroWorks "Knight Lore MSX2", which receives an overall score of 85% (92% for the graphics)
A review of Karoshi's "La Corona Encantada", which receives an overall score of 84%
A review of Infinite's "Shift", which receives an overall score of 85%
As mentioned above, this free magazine really looks great, the 88 pages are crammed with text, color, images and screenshots. Recommended!
Relevant link: Retroaction magazine
Retroaction 4
Retroaction reports on MSX
La Corona Encantada featured in a national Spanish magazine
Weekly ASCII specials on MSX's 30th birthday
By MäSäXi
Makers of that magazine doesn´t seem to know that some of those games were ported to MSX too....
By wolf_
Ambassador_ (9789)
Could be. Assuming that these editors are people like you and me, do you know every port of every retro game? I wouldn't, for sure.
By lionelritchie
if you dont know and are writing an article, at least google
By JohnHassink
Ambassador (5422)
Indeed. I'd say, with the existence of internet and all its Google and the likes, there's really no excuse to not know.
Look at these guys having all their stuff right
Oh well, I've also seen serious reviews of a Ninja Gaiden game where the writer thought the series first got started on the PlayStation, so it's not only with MSX.
I knew that my words would give reaction like what wolf got..
It´s not a big thing, but the real reason why I said that, was that in the 80s, it was always sad to see game adverts that all interesting games were NOT published on msx... of course...... I had the "wrong" computer.... but what was IRRITATING then, was game adverts which didn´t mention msx when even *I* knew that their game IS available for msx too!!!! That was irritating!!!! And now, after twenty-years, same happens again.... it´s not a big thing anymore, but still it irritates, even if just a very little, but anyway.... that´s what I meant.
They have made good web-magazine, that´s not a problem.
hardcore gaming doesnt have all the info right, but at least its a very funny site and the guys fix stuff when you show them theres something wrong.
By Nreive
Hi guys, thanks for the feedback here. While we work really hard on the magazine, there are bound to be errors that creep in. I do try and cover all formats (including MSX), but if you do spot something wrong (e.g. MSX version not mentioned in an article) then do please let us know. We can only correct errors if we know about them, and we don't bite, honestly. Thanks again.
By hap
Don't worry, we love the magazine!
The nitpicking is just nerds being nerds.
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En escalade, un bicoin, coinceur à câble ou cablé, est un coin en métal, généralement de forme biseautée, monté sur un câble et utilisé pour la protection en le coinçant dans une fissure du rocher. Les bicoins sont disponibles dans de nombreux styles, tailles et marques. La plupart des bicoins sont faits en aluminium. Les bicoins les plus grands peuvent être montés sur une sangle en Dyneema à la place d'un câble, mais cela est devenu peu courant. Les bicoins sont proches des Hexcentrics, mais non interchangeables.
Les bicoins sont aussi parfois appelés sous le nom de câblés ou stoppers, Stopper étant le nom d'une gamme de coinceurs produits par Black Diamond Equipment Ltd.
Utilisation
Pour tenir en place, le bicoin est glissé dans une faille du rocher dont les bords se resserrent vers le bas. Sa taille doit être choisie de manière à ne pas pouvoir sortir de la fissure. Éventuellement, deux bicoins peuvent être jumelés, c'est-à-dire accolés, pour former un bicoin de la taille voulue. Le bicoin est maintenu en place, afin qu'il ne bouge pas avec les vibrations transmises par la corde, en tirant un coup sec sur son câble. Un petit outil, le décoinceur, en forme de lame se terminant par un crochet, permet d'aider à récupérer le bicoin lorsque la voie est déséquipée.
Les plus petits bicoins sont connus sous le nom de micro-coinceurs, et sont faits en acier, cuivre, ou d'un alliage. Ils ont généralement leur câble soudé à l'intérieur, contrairement à ceux passés en boucle par des trous dans le bicoin. Ils sont le plus souvent utilisés en escalade artificielle, et leur valeur de protection (pour arrêter une chute) est généralement considérée comme marginale en raison de leur faible résistance et de la très petite surface en contact avec le rocher. Le plus petit des micro-coinceurs peut faire moins d'un centimètre cube.
Histoire
Les grimpeurs anglais des années 1950 ont été les premiers à utiliser les bicoins comme protection. L'éthique très stricte interdisait l'utilisation des pitons, ils prirent des vieux écrous le long des rails des chemins de fer, grimpèrent avec ces derniers dans leurs poches, et les utilisèrent comme coins. Cette technique nouvelle leur donnant la possibilité d'une assurance fiable pour l'ascension de voies nouvelles difficiles en contournant l'interdiction de planter des pitons.
En 1972, quand l'escalade propre devint une préoccupation aux États-Unis, Yvon Chouinard commença à produire des coins spécialement conçus pour l'escalade, avec leur forme familière, toujours en usage. Les grimpeurs comme Henry Barber et John Stannard ont aidé à populariser leur utilisation, en particulier une fois découvert qu'un coinceur était plus léger, souvent plus facile à poser en grimpant et au moins aussi sûr, si ce n'est plus, qu'un piton bien placé.
Voir aussi
Articles connexes
Coinceur
Coinceur mécanique
Matériel d'alpinisme et d'escalade
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\section{Introduction}
A spin Seebeck device is a bilayer composed by a ferromagnetic insulator (i.e. the ferrimagnet YIG) and a metal with a strong spin Hall effect (i.e. Pt). The spin Seebeck effect is obtained by applying a temperature gradient to the YIG that generates a current of magnetic moment. Part of the magnetic moment current from YIG is injected at the interface into the side metallic layer where it is carried by electrons. The use of Pt as a metallic layer permits to detect the magnetic moment current because of the inverse spin Hall effect that laterally deflects polarized electrons and creates an electric voltage in the transverse direction \cite{Uchida-2010}. In the last decade the spin Seebeck effect has attracted attention as an alternative thermoelectric generator and as a source of a magnetic moment current for spintronic devices without involving a charge current \cite{Uchida-2016,Yu-2017c}. However, to optimize the effect, the underlying physics needs to be appropriately understood. At any finite temperature the saturation magnetization of the ferromagnet is decreased with respect to its spontaneous value because of the thermal excitation of spin waves (magnons). It is believed that the temperature gradient across the ferromagnet forces the diffusion of the thermal magnons in the direction of the gradient, therefore generating a current of magnetic moment \cite{Xiao-2010, Zhang-2012, Rezende-2014}. A crucial point is therefore to understand the transport properties of magnons and their scattering \cite{Boona-2014b}. Experiments of the temperature dependence of the spin Seebeck coefficient \cite{Kikkawa-2015, Guo-2016} revealed non obvious features: in bulk YIG single crystals a peak is observed at temperatures around 70 K. The peak is shifted at higher temperatures and partially suppressed by both decreasing the thickness \cite{Kikkawa-2015} or decreasing the grain size in polycrystalline materials \cite{Uchida-2012, Miura-2017}. The interpretation of this effect has stimulated a debate on the possible sources of the scattering of the magnons: impurities, phonons, other magnons and so on \cite{Uchida-2012, Boona-2014b, Guo-2016}. One of the problems is to disentangle the temperature dependence of the magnon scattering processes from the temperature dependence other parameters such as the conductance and the diffusion length of Pt.
Unlike the classical Seebeck effect of metals, in which the ratio voltage over temperature gives the absolute thermo-electric power coefficient, in the spin Seebeck effect the coefficient given by the ratio between the voltage gradient over the temperature gradient (in the geometry of Fig.\ref{FIG:device}) depends not only on the absolute thermomagnetic power coefficient of the YIG, $\epsilon_{\rm YIG}$, and on the spin Hall angle of the platinum, $\theta_{\rm SH}$, but also on the magnetic moment conductances, the diffusion lengths and the thicknesses of the two layers \cite{Basso-2018}. Even if certain parameters can be obtained by independent experiments, the expression of the spin Seebeck coefficient still contains at least two free parameters: $\epsilon_{\rm YIG}$ and the magnetic moment conductivity $\sigma_{\rm M,YIG}$ of the ferromagnet. To simplify the problem in this work we set $\epsilon_{\rm YIG} = -0.956$ T/K as predicted by the Boltzmann approach to the transport of magnons in the relaxation time approximation\cite{Nakata-2015b, Basso-2016b}. Then the magnetic moment conductivity can be easily deduced from the experimental data and the relaxation time $\tau_c(T)$ computed as a function of temperature. $\tau_c(T)$ is an estimate of the typical scattering time and gives insights on the evolution of the scattering processes as a function of the temperature. The main result of this paper is to show that the scattering is composed by two processes. At low temperature the active process changes with temperature as $T^{-1/2}$, a dependence that can be attributed to the scattering by defects. At high temperature it depends strongly on $T$ as $T^{-4}$ a variation that could be associated to the scattering by other magnons.
\begin{figure}[htb]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=8cm]{spin_Seebeck3.pdf}
\caption{Spin Seebeck bilayer composed by a ferromagnetic insulator (i.e. the ferrimagnet YIG) and a metal with a strong spin Hall effect (i.e. Pt). The temperature gradient along $x$ on YIG injects a current of magnetic moment into Pt where it is revealed as a voltage gradient along $y$ because of the inverse spin Hall effect.}
\label{FIG:device}
\end{figure}
\section{Spin Seebeck effect}
The spin Seebeck coefficient is given by the ratio between the voltage gradient in platinum and the temperature gradient in YIG (see Fig.\ref{FIG:device})
\begin{equation}
S_{\rm SSE} = \frac{\nabla_{y} V_{e}}{\nabla_xT}
\end{equation}
\noindent To derive a theoretical expression for the spin Seebeck coefficient one has to use a thermodynamic theory describing the transport of the magnetic moment in the ferromagnet caused by the temperature gradient and the transverse electric effect of the inverse spin Hall effect in the metal \cite{Basso-2016}. For both materials one has also to take into account that the magnetic moment is a non conserved quantity and therefore the transport of the magnetic moment is characterized by a diffusion length $l_M$ and by a typical time constant $\tau_M$. The two values and their ratio $v_M = l_M/\tau_M$, a parameter that assumes the meaning of a magnetic moment conductance, are characteristic values of each material (M = Pt, YIG) and can be temperature dependent. From the thermodynamic theory by exploiting the reciprocity of both the intrinsic thermal and magnetic transport in the ferromagnet and the spin Hall effect in the metal \cite{Sola-2019}, one derives the following expression (see appendix A for a derivation)
\begin{equation}
S_{\rm SSE} = - \theta_{\rm SH} \left(\frac{\mu_B}{e} \right) \frac{l_{\rm YIG} v_{\rm YIG}}{d_{\rm Pt} v} \epsilon_{\rm YIG}
\label{EQ:SSSE}
\end{equation}
\noindent where $ \theta_{SH}$ is the spin Hall angle of the metal (the angle for the magnetic moment is opposite with respect to the one for the spin i.e. negative for Pt and positive for W and Ta), $\epsilon_{\rm YIG}$ is the thermomagnetic power coefficient of the ferromagnet, $l_{\rm YIG}$ and $v_{\rm YIG}$ are the diffusion length and the magnetic moment conductance of the ferromagnet. The product $l_{\rm YIG} v_{\rm YIG} = \mu_0\sigma_{\rm M,YIG}$ is proportional to the magnetic moment conductivity of the ferromagnet $\sigma_{\rm M, YIG}$. $v$ is an effective conductance of the bilayer and summarizes the effects of the ratio between the thicknesses of the layers and their own intrinsic diffusion lengths and contains the sum of the effective conductances. Its expression is
\begin{equation}
\frac{1}{v} = \frac{f(d_{\rm Pt}/l_{\rm Pt}) f(d_{\rm YIG}/l_{\rm YIG})}{v_{\rm Pt}\tanh(d_{\rm Pt}/l_{\rm Pt})+v_{\rm YIG} \tanh(d_{\rm YIG}/l_{\rm YIG})}
\label{EQ:vp}
\end{equation}
\noindent where $f(x) = \tanh(x) \tanh(x/2)$. in the case of a thick YIG with $d_{\rm YIG} \gg l_{\rm YIG}$ it is simplified as
\begin{equation}
\frac{1}{v} = \frac{f(d_{\rm Pt}/l_{\rm Pt})}{v_{\rm Pt}\tanh(d_{\rm Pt}/l_{\rm Pt})+v_{\rm YIG}}
\end{equation}
\noindent and if the conductance of the metal is much larger than the one of the ferromagnet, $v_{\rm Pt}\tanh(d_{\rm Pt}/l_{\rm Pt}) \gg v_{\rm YIG}$, it is directly given by the properties of the metal $v = v_{\rm Pt}\coth(d_{\rm Pt}/(2 l_{\rm Pt}))$.
The aim of this paper is to compute $l_{\rm YIG}$ and $v_{\rm YIG}$ of YIG as a function of temperature by using Eq.(\ref{EQ:SSSE}) and the experimental data for the spin Seebeck coefficient. In Eq.(\ref{EQ:SSSE}) many parameters are known from other experiments. The missing one is the intrinsic parameter $\epsilon_{\rm YIG}$. In this work we employ the result of the transport theory of magnons which predicts a temperature independent constant $\epsilon_{\rm YIG} = -0.956$ T/K \cite{Basso-2016b}.
\begin{figure*}[htb]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=13cm]{resistivity_Pt.pdf}
\caption{Left: standard resistivity of Pt (from Platinum Metals Rev., 28 (4) 164 (1984)) and fitting function $\varrho(T) = x\varrho_{L} +(1-x) \varrho_{H}$ with $\varrho_{L} = 6 \cdot 10^{-14} T^3$, $\varrho_{H} = 4.1 \times 10^{-10} (T-32)$, $x=[1+\tanh[(T-40)/10]]/2$. Right: estimated $l_{\rm Pt} = (\mu_0 \sigma_{\rm M,Pt} \tau_{\rm Pt})^{1/2}$ and $v_{\rm Pt} = l_{\rm Pt}/\tau_{\rm Pt}$ with $\tau_{\rm Pt} = 2.1$ ns, $ \sigma_{\rm M,Pt} = ({\mu_B}/{e})^2 \sigma_{\rm e,Pt}$, $\sigma_{\rm e,Pt} = (\varrho(T) + \varrho_{0})^{-1}$ with residual resistivity $\varrho_{0} = 0.43 \times 10^{-7}$ $\Omega$ m. }
\label{FIG:Pt}
\end{figure*}
We initially simplify the problem by considering a bulk YIG single crystal at constant temperature. For a bulk YIG we have $d_{\rm YIG} \gg l_{\rm YIG}$ and, expecting $v_{\rm Pt} \gg v_{\rm YIG}$, we estimate $v \simeq v_{\rm Pt}\coth(d_{\rm Pt}/(2 l_{\rm Pt}))$. The magnetic moment conductivity of Pt is $ \sigma_{\rm M,Pt} = ({\mu_B}/{e})^2 \sigma_{\rm e,Pt}$. Then, with $\sigma_{\rm e,Pt} = 6.4\times 10^{6}$ $\Omega^{-1}$m$^{-1}$ we obtain $\mu_0 \sigma_{\rm M,Pt} = 2.6\times 10^{-8}$ m$^{2}$s$^{-1}$. As $\mu_0 \sigma_{\rm M,Pt}=l_{\rm Pt}v_{\rm Pt}$, with $l_{\rm Pt} = 7.3$ nm \cite{Wang-2014}, we get $v_{\rm Pt} = 3.5$ m/s, $\tau_{\rm Pt} = 2.1$ ns and finally $v \simeq 11.2 \,\, \mbox{m/s}$. The spin Hall angle is taken as $\theta_{\rm SH}=-0.1$ \cite{Wang-2014}. From recent experiments at room temperature with a bulk YIG single crystal ($d_{\rm YIG} = 0.5$ mm) we found $S_{\rm SSE} = - 4.8 \times 10^{-7}$ V K$^{-1}$ \cite{Sola-2019}. Then we compute the only missing parameter, the product $l_{\rm YIG} v_{\rm YIG}$, resulting $5.3 \times 10^{-9} \, \mbox{m$^2$/s}$. By estimating the time constant of the YIG as $\tau_{\rm YIG} = (\mu_0\gamma_L M_0 \alpha)^{-1}$ where $\alpha$ is the damping, we get $\tau_{\rm YIG} = 1\times 10^{-6}$ s with $\alpha = 2.5 \times 10^{-5}$ ($M_0 =1.95\times 10^{5}$ A/m is the spontaneous magnetization of YIG). Therefore, at room temperature one finds a diffusion length $l_{\rm YIG} \simeq 70 \,\, \mbox{nm}$ and a conductance $v_{\rm YIG} \simeq 0.07 \, \mbox{m/s}$. It must be remarked that the diffusion length computed in this way is very similar to the one deduced from the YIG thickness dependence in Ref.\cite{Kehlberger-2015}.
The same calculation can be performed by considering the temperature dependence of the spin Seebeck coefficient for the YIG single crystal ($d_{\rm YIG} = 1$ mm) of Ref.\cite{Kikkawa-2015} (we take from now on the $S_{\rm SSE}$ as an absolute value without the minus sign given by our choice of the reference system). For platinum, the spin Hall angle is not expected to change significantly with $T$ \cite{Isasa-2015}, therefore we assume $\theta_{SH}=-0.1$, while the temperature dependence of the diffusion length and of the conductance of Pt are estimated on the basis of the temperature dependence of the resistivity of Pt (see Fig.\ref{FIG:Pt} left) as shown in Fig.\ref{FIG:Pt} right. For YIG, $\epsilon_{\rm YIG}$ is expected from the diffusion theory to be temperature independent \cite{Basso-2016b}, while the temperature dependence of the time constant $\tau_{\rm YIG}$ is attributed to the temperature dependence of $\alpha$. In Ref.\cite{Maier-Flaig-2017} it was found that $\alpha$ is approximately linear with $T$. With these assumptions one derives $l_{\rm YIG}(T)$ and $v_{\rm YIG}(T)$ shown in Fig.\ref{FIG:SSE} right. Again here it is remarkable that, by decreasing the temperature, the diffusion length reaches a plateau at around $1 \mu$m that matches the low temperature estimate of Ref.\cite{Kehlberger-2015}.
Now, having the temperature dependence of $l_{\rm YIG}(T)$ and $v_{\rm YIG}(T)$ it is possible to employ Eq.(\ref{EQ:SSSE}) with Eq.(\ref{EQ:vp}) to compute the spin Seebeck coefficient as a function of both YIG thickness and temperature. The result is shown in Fig.\ref{FIG:Thickness} left. The set of curves fully captures the phenomenology of the experimental curves of Refs.\cite{Kikkawa-2015} and \cite{Guo-2016} but the peak starts to decrease at a YIG thickness ($\sim 2 \, \mu$m) much smaller than the one seen in experiments ($\sim 20 \, \mu$m). To understand more we have therefore to go into the details of the scattering processes.
\begin{figure*}[htb]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=13cm]{SSE.pdf}
\caption{Top left: spin Seebeck coefficient for a bulk (1 mm) YIG from Ref.\cite{Kikkawa-2015}. Top right: diffusion length $l_{\rm YIG}(T)$. Bottom right: magnetic moment conductance $v_{\rm YIG}(T)$. Bottom left: relaxation time $\tau_{c}$. Points are computed from the data of Ref.\cite{Kikkawa-2015}. Dashed lines are fitted behavior in terms of the powers of temperature marked on the graphs. Full line $\tau_{c}^{-1} = \tau_{c,L}^{-1}+\tau_{c,H}^{-1}$ with $\tau_{c,L} = 1.8 \times 10^{-9} (T/T_m)^{-1/2}$ s, $\tau_{c,H} = 3.4 \times 10^{-12} (T/T_m)^{-4}$ s. } \label{FIG:SSE}
\end{figure*}
\section{Magnon collision time}
The previous results have been obtained by fixing the thermomagnetic power coefficient of the ferromagnet $\epsilon_{\rm YIG}$ to the constant -0.956 T/K which is the result of the Boltzmann transport theory in the relaxation time approximation \cite{Nakata-2015b, Basso-2016b}. With the relaxation time approximation one assumes that the diffusing magnons relax to the equilibrium distribution with a typical time constant $\tau_{c}$. From the theory the magnetic moment conductivity is given by
\begin{equation}
\sigma_{\rm M, YIG} = \frac{(2\mu_B)^2 n_m \tau_c}{m_m^*}
\end{equation}
\noindent where $2\mu_B$ is the magnetic moment carried by the magnon, $m_m^*$ is its effective mass $m_m^* = {\hslash^2}/({2D})$, where $D$ is the spin wave exchange stiffness, $\tau_c$ is the relaxation time and $n_m$ is the number of magnons. The number of magnons is expected to change significantly with temperature and $n_m$ is given by
\begin{equation}
n_m = \frac{n}{8\pi^{3/2}}\left(\frac{T}{T_m}\right)^{3/2}
\end{equation}
\noindent where $n$ is the volume density of localized magnetic moments in the system $n= 1/a^3$, $T_m = {D}/({a^2k_B})$ and $k_B$ is the Boltzmann constant. $a$ is typical distance between localized magnetic moments and is related to the spontaneous magnetization by $M_0 = \mu_B /a^3$. For YIG one has $D = 8.6 \times 10^{-40}$ J m$^2$, $m_m^* = 2.5 \times 10^{-28}$ kg (about 280 times the electron mass) and $T_m=480$ K \cite{Stancil-2009}. As the temperature dependence of the magnetic moment conductivity $\mu_0 \sigma_{\rm M,YIG} = l_{\rm YIG} v_{\rm YIG}$ has been estimated from the spin Seebeck coefficient, we can deduce the temperature dependence of the relaxation time $\tau_c(T)$ describing the collision processes. The result is shown in Fig.\ref{FIG:SSE} bottom left. It appears that the scattering of the magnons is the superposition of two mechanisms. If we apply the Matthiessen's rule
\begin{equation}
\frac{1}{\tau_c} = \frac{1}{\tau_{c,L}}+\frac{1}{\tau_{c,H}}
\end{equation}
\noindent we can separate two different time constants. At low temperature the active process $\tau_{c,L}$ appears to change with temperature as $T^{-1/2}$ while at high temperature $\tau_{c,H}$ depends strongly on $T$ as $T^{-4}$. The low temperature process can be attributed to the scattering by defects. If we take the velocity of the magnons to vary with temperature as $v_m = \sqrt{k_B T / m^*}$ and compute a mean free path due to intrinsic defects as $\lambda = v_m \cdot \tau_{c,L}$ we get a temperature independent value of $\lambda \simeq$ 10 $\mu$m. We recall that the mean free path was obtained from the bulk data. In the case of thin films with $d_{\rm YIG} < \lambda$ therefore we have to introduce an additional extrinsic time constant $\tau_{c,L,e}$ which is thickness dependent as $\tau_{c,L,e} = d_{\rm YIG}/v_m$ in order to add the scattering at the interface. The curves calculated with this additional scattering mechanism can be seen in Fig.\ref{FIG:Thickness} right. It must be observed that the plot at the right shows the decrease of the signal at thicknesses much larger with respect to the case of the plot of the left and in better agreement with the experiments. Considering that all the parameters have been derived only from the data of the bulk, the agreement is reasonably good. The high temperature time constant $\tau_{c,H}$ decreasing as $T^{-4}$ is exactly what is expected for the magnon-magnon scattering process \cite{Erdos-1965}.
\begin{figure*}[htb]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=13cm]{FigThickness.pdf}
\caption{Spin Seebeck coefficient as a function of thickness and temperature. Lines are theoretical predictions. Left: computed by using the scattering corresponding to the bulk for all thicknesses. Right: including a an additional scattering contribution due to interfaces a bulk. In both cases the points corresponds to the data of the spin Seebeck coefficient YIG from Ref.\cite{Kikkawa-2015} (black squares: 1mm, red triangles 10 $\mu$m, blue stars 1$\mu$m, purple diamonds 0.3$\mu$m).} \label{FIG:Thickness}
\end{figure*}
\section{Conclusions}
In the paper we have performed a study of the temperature dependence of the spin Seebeck coefficient of the YIG/Pt bilayer. We have interpreted the literature data \cite{Kikkawa-2015, Guo-2016} by using the thermodynamic theory of Refs.\cite{Basso-2016, Basso-2016b} in which the magnon transport occurs by diffusion in presence of a gradient of the thermodynamic temperature and in the gradient of the potential for the magnon diffusion. The resulting temperature dependence of the relaxation time describes two sources of scattering: the scattering by defects or interfaces, changing with temperature as $T^{-1/2}$, and mainly active at low temperature and a scattering by other magnons, depending on $T^{-4}$ and active at high temperature.
The classical literature investigating the contributions of magnons to the thermal conductivity of ferromagnetic insulators, has always considered that the magnon-magnon process was very difficult to identify. This is because it is relevant only at high temperatures, a range in which the contribution of magnons to the transport of heat is irrelevant with respect to the phonon one. The spin Seebeck effect represents an case for the detailed study of magnon-magnon scattering because it reveals the transport of magnetic moment. In reference to the recent literature claiming a magnon-phonon drag effect \cite{Adachi-2010}, the results obtained in this study are indicating that the magnon-phonon process as a main source of scattering can be excluded. However it cannot be a priori excluded that, especially in materials with a strong magnetoelastic interaction, the magnon-phonon processes, by means of a phonon drag effect, could give an enhancement of the effective $\epsilon_{\rm YIG}$ \cite{Adachi-2010}. From our study it appears that such a mechanism is not necessary to explain the peak of the spin Seebeck signal of YIG. Future works could clarify the limits and possibilities of these two approaches.
A possible interesting extension of the present approach to the magnon transport is at high temperatures close to the Curie point. This extension is not straightforward because the spin wave spectrum (especially the long wavelengths) develops over a background saturation magnetization $M_s$ which is less than the spontaneous $M_0$ and such a decrease is due to the spin wave themselves (especially the short wavelengths). Possible advancements of a Boltzmann transport approach are possible in terms of a self consistent approach as suggested by Robert Brout with his random phase approximation technique \cite{Brout-1965}.
|
{
"redpajama_set_name": "RedPajamaArXiv"
}
| 1,631
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\section{Introduction}
\begin{multicols}{2}
Historically, the first attempt to generalize quantum Bose and Fermi statistics
was made by Gentile \cite{Gentile}, who proposed statistics in which up to $k$
particles are allowed to occupy a single quantum state (instead of one for
Fermi and infinitely many for Bose cases). Further generalizations were
mostly on deformations of commutation relations for
particle creation and annihilation operators
\cite{Green!Greenberg-book!Greenberg64,Govorkov,Greenberg90,Greenberg91}.
A special case (the so called ``infinite'' statistics) is rather interesting
in that the particles which obey this statistics
have nonnegative square norms \cite{Mohapatra90} for $|q|^2\le 1$,
while the observables have nonlocal properties. The commutation relations
are simply \cite{Greenberg90,Greenberg91}:
\begin{equation}
a_i^{ }a_j^\dag-qa_j^\dag a_i^{ }=\delta_{ij} ,
\label{q-comm}
\end{equation}
where $q$ is either a real or complex parameter, $a_j^\dag$ and $a_j$
are the particle creation and annihilation operators, and $\delta_{ij}$ is the
Kronecker's delta.
Stimulated by recent
experimental observation of the {\em fractional quantum Hall effect}
\cite{Stromer82!Stromer83} in a two-dimensional electron gas, various
nontraditional statistics have been proposed
\cite{Leinaas&Myrheim!Wilczek,Halperin!Laughlin83!Calogero!Sutherland,%
Murthy&Shankar,Haldane91}. Most of them are based on
generalizations of particle wave-function permutation symmetries.
The concept of anyons, which are charge carriers in the fractional quantum
Hall effect, is essentially two-dimensional \cite{Leinaas&Myrheim!Wilczek}.
However, in the strong magnetic field with fluxes antiparallel to the
ambient field and in the lowest Landau level, anyons are shown
\cite{Das!Wu} to obey the one-dimensional (though valid in any dimensions)
Haldane's exclusion principle \cite{Haldane91}.
At last, the equivalence of the anyon statistics (in the above case)
and $q$-on statistics, Eq.\ (\ref{q-comm}), with $q=e^{i\alpha\pi}$
($\alpha$ is the meassure of Haldane's/Pauli blocking and $\alpha\pi$
is exactly the wave-function phase-shift due to permutation of any two
particles) was proven \cite{Goldin&Sharp} via the properties of the
$N$-anyon permutation group.
Statistical and thermodynamical properties of systems of particles obeying
fractional statistics (i.e., complex $q$ such as $|q|^2=1$) were
extensively studied in the last several
years \cite{Murthy&Shankar,Das!Wu,Isakov!Sen&Bhaduri!Smezi}, whereas
these properties of particles with real $q$, $-1 < q < 1$,
were not investigated (with some special exceptions
\cite{Inomata,Werner}). One should mention a special case
of the infinite statistics
\cite{Greenberg90} with $q=0$ which was suggested \cite{Govorkov}
to be equivalent to the statistics of nonidentical particles
(quantum Boltzmann statistics). One should note here that it was also
recently suggested \cite{Strominger} that extremal black holes should
obey such a statistics. This issue will be discussed below.
In this work we investigate a system of particles obeying ambiguous
statistics which are (statistically) equivalent to those obeying
the $q$-deformed statistics of real $q$. The partition function of
a free gas of such particles, however, differs from that of a free
$q$-on gas. The last is shown \cite{Werner} to be independent of the deformation
parameter $q$. In fact, the second quantized approach used in
\cite{Werner} does not take into account the dynamics
of the internal degrees of freedom. Thus, the $q$-ons are always
distinguishable particles. Our model, however, is (probably) identical to
the case when the internal degrees of freedom are in the thermodynamic
equilibrium with the external degrees of freedom
(at least for $q=0$), and thus the particles are {\em not completely
distinguishable}. (Note, the particles are indistinguishable provided they
are in the same internal state, even if they have infinite number of internal
degrees of freedom.) Consequently, the quantum Boltzmann
distribution ($q=0$) is different from the classical Boltzmann.
Unlike the theories mentioned above, we admit only ``primary'' Bose-Einstein
and Fermi-Dirac statistics as existing. Assume now that a particle
is neither a pure boson or pure fermion. Let another particle, which interacts
with the first one, plays a role of an external observer.
During the interaction, it performs a measurement at the first particle
and identifies it as either a boson or a fermion with respective probabilities
$p_b$ and $p_f$. According to the result of this measurement, it interacts with
the first particle as if the last is a boson or fermion, respectively.
The first particle, of course, is the observer for the second
particle, thus the process is symmetric.
Note, that $p_b+p_f$ is not necessarily equal to one,
and if not, it means that the second particle (observer)
does not detect the first particle. The probability of this is $1-p_b-p_f$.
The ``statistical unsertainity'' introduced above may be either the intrinsic
property of a particle itself or the ``experimental unsertainity'' of the
meassurement process. This concept of ``imperfect measurement'' is similar
to that proposed in order to resolve the causality paradox
in superluminal particle (tachyon) systems \cite{Schulman}.
This model can be interpreted in another manner. Assume a particle can
oscillate between two types of statistics, then the model we propose represents
a system of such particles averaged over time-scales much larger than the
oscillation period. The probabilities $p_b$ and $p_f$, thus, are those portions
of time during which a particle resides in a Fermi- or Bose-type state. The
model of this kind is relevant to systems of elementary particles which have
mutual supersymmetrical partners (e.g., a photon and photino, etc.) when
transitions between these supersymmetrical states can occur
\cite{Kane}. With some modifications, this model can also
be applied to systems of particles with changing flavor, e.g., quarks, gluons,
neutrinos, etc.
There is a conjectured relation between the particles of the ambiguous
statistical type
and the $q$-deformed infinite statistics. Let $b_j^{ }$ and $b_j^{\dag}$
are the annihilation and creation operators for such a particle. The particle
exhibit bosonic properties with the probability $p_b$ and fernionic ones with
$p_f$. Thus, a bilinear commutation relation for $b_j^{ }$ and $b_j^{\dag}$
is of boson type with the probability $p_b^2$, of fermion type with the
probability $p_f^2$, and the two particles are nonidentical with the probability
$2p_b p_f$, that is interchange of their positions result in
another wave-function, i.e., $b_i^{ }b_j^{\dag}=\delta_{ij}$. We write
\begin{eqnarray}
(p_b^2+p_f^2+2p_b p_f)b_i^{ }b_j^{\dag}
&-&(p_b^2-p_f^2)b_j^{\dag}b_i^{ } \nonumber\\
& &{ }=(p_b^2+p_f^2+2p_b p_f)\delta_{ij} .
\end{eqnarray}
This equation coinsides with Eq.\ (\ref{q-comm}), and the deformation
parameter is $q=(p_b-p_f)/(p_b+p_f)$. In the rest of this letter
we derive statistical distributions for identical particles which
have ambiguous quantum exclusion properties and investigate some
thermodynamical properties of an ideal gas of such particles.
A grand partition function for a system of particles with properties
defined by a stochastic label with a known probability distribution is a sum
over all possible realizations (with a weight factor) of the partition functions
corresponding to each realization. In each realization, the system effectively
consists of $k$ bosons and $N-k$ fermions ($N$ is the total number of
particles), while the probability of this realization is $p_b^k p_f^{N-k}$.
The total number of states of the system is
\begin{equation}
W=\prod_j\ \sum_{k=0}^{N_j} {N_j \choose k}
{w_b}_j(k) {w_f}_j(N_j-k) p_b^k p_f^{N_j-k} ,
\label{W}
\end{equation}
where the weight factor
${N\choose k}=\frac{N!}{k!(N-k)!}$ represents the number of
ways to arrange $N$ identical particles in two groups of respectively
$k$ and $N-k$ particles each. Here $w_b(m)$ and $w_f(m)$ are the numbers
of quantum states of $m$ identical particles occupying a group of $G$ states,
respectively, for bosons and fermions,
\begin{equation}
w_b(m)=\frac{(G+m-1)!}{m!(G-1)!}\ \ \hbox{and}\ \
w_f(m)=\frac{G!}{m!(G-m)!} .
\label{b-f}
\end{equation}
The partial partition function (expression under the product sign) can
be simplified and rewritten in terms of a generalized hypergeometric function
\begin{mathletters}
\label{Wj}
\begin{eqnarray}
W_j&=&p_f^{N_j}\frac{G_j}{N_j}\sum_{k=0}^{N_j}
{N_j\choose k}^2 {G_j-1+k\choose N_j-1}
\left(\frac{p_b}{p_f}\right)^k
\label{Wja}\\
&=&p_f^{N_j}G_j\frac{G_j!}{N_j!(G_j-N_j+1)!}\ \nonumber\\
& &{ }\cdot {_3F_2}\left(-N_j,-N_j,G_j;1,G_j-N_j+1;\frac{p_b}{p_f}\right) .
\label{Wjb}
\end{eqnarray}
\end{mathletters}
To proceed further, we assume the number of particles in a system to be
very large, and use Stirling approximation for the factorials and
Laplace's approximation method to evaluate the sum.
It is enough to keep the leading term, only.
Then one can write Eq.\ (\ref{Wj}) as follows
\begin{equation}
W_j\simeq {N_j\choose {k_0}_j}^2 {G_j+{k_0}_j\choose N_j}
p_b^{{k_0}_j} p_f^{N_j-{k_0}_j} ,
\label{Wj-appr}
\end{equation}
where ${k_0}_j$ is the solution of the equation
\begin{equation}
\left(\frac{N_j-{k_0}_j}{{k_0}_j}\right)^2
\left(\frac{G_j+{k_0}_j}{G_j-N_j+{k_0}_j}\right)\frac{p_b}{p_f}=1 .
\label{condition}
\end{equation}
Thus one can infer that the partition function, although defined by all
realizations, has its major contribution from that realization in which exactly
$k_0$ bosons and $N-k_0$ fermions effectively exist, where $k_0$ is defined
by the probability ratio $p_b/p_f$ alone. (Note, it is not a mixture of species,
there is only one physically existing spesies.) The entropy of the system is,
as usual,
$S=\ln{W}$:
\begin{eqnarray}
S&\simeq&\sum_jG_j
\Bigl\{x_j\ln(p_b/p_f)+n_j\ln{p_f}+(x_j+1)\ln(x_j+1)
\nonumber\\
& &{ }+n_j\ln n_j-(1-n_j+x_j)\ln(1-n_j+x_j)
\nonumber\\
& &{ }-2\left[x_j\ln x_j+(n_j-x_j)\ln(n_j-x_j)\right]
\Bigr\} ,
\label{S}
\end{eqnarray}
where $n_j=N_j/G_j$ is the occupation number and $x_j={k_0}_j/G_j$.
Other thermodynamic functions follow straightforwardly. The most probable
distribution subject to the constraints that the total number of particles
and the total
energy of the system be conserved, is determined by the condition
\begin{equation}
\frac{\partial}{\partial N_j}\left[S-\alpha\sum_j N_j
-\beta\sum_j\epsilon_j N_j\right]=0 .
\end{equation}
From this equation and Eqs.\ (\ref{condition}), (\ref{S}), we arrive at
\begin{equation}
\frac{n_j(1-n_j+x_j)}{(n_j-x_j)^2}p_f=\rho ,
\label{extremum}
\end{equation}
where $\rho=\exp\{(\epsilon_j-\mu)/T\}$, $\mu\equiv-\alpha T$ is the
chemical potential, and $T\equiv1/\beta$ is the temperature of the gas.
Equations (\ref{condition}) and (\ref{extremum}) define the occupation
number $n(\epsilon_j)$ as a function of energy. Upon simple mathematical
manipulations, we obtain
\begin{equation}
x_j=\frac{n_j(\rho+\delta)-\delta}{2\rho+\delta}
\label{x}
\end{equation}
and
\begin{equation}
(\rho+\delta)(\rho+p_f)(\rho-p_b)n_j^2-2\rho(\rho+\delta)\sigma n_j
+\rho\delta^2=0 ,
\label{n-eq}
\end{equation}
where $\delta=p_f-p_b$ and $\sigma=p_f+p_b$. Note, the fraction
$x_j/n_j$ is the number of bosons in the system with respect to the
total number of particles, i.e., $0\le x_j/n_j\le 1$.
The last equation can be explicitly solved to obtain
\begin{equation}
n_j={\sigma\rho\over(\rho+p_f)(\rho-p_b)}\left[1+\sqrt{1-
\frac{\delta^2}{\sigma^2}\frac{(\rho+p_f)(\rho-p_b)}{\rho(\rho+\delta)}}
\ \right].
\label{n}
\end{equation}
Here we omit the negative sign of the root, because it does not satisfy
[together with Eq.\ (\ref{x})] the condition $0\le x_j/n_j\le 1$.
In order to $n_j$ be positive number for all values of $\epsilon_j$,
the chemical potential should not exceed its maximum value
$\mu_{max}=-T\ln{p_b}$.
Eq.\ (\ref{n})
is a generalized energy distribution for the class of particles obeying
the ambiguous
statistics as a function of two parameters $p_b$ and $p_f$ which define
the deviation from ``primary'' Bose or Fermi statistics. The generalized
distribution recovers Bose-Einstein and Fermi-Dirac ones in the limiting
cases
$p_b=1, p_f=0$ and $p_b=0, p_f=1$, respectively. The case
$p_b=p_f=\sigma/2$ is that of the quantum Boltzmann statistics since the
deformation parameter $q=0$. In this case
\begin{equation}
n_j=2\sigma\left(\rho-\frac{\sigma^2}{4}\frac{1}{\rho}\right)^{-1} ,
\label{gB}
\end{equation}
which is a quantum analog of the Boltzmann distribution. It is remarkable that
although particles can, in principle, be distinguished by their internal
states (they have an infinite number of internal degrees of freedom),
the occupation number of these states is also energy and temperature
dependent. Thus, the particles, in fact, are {\em not completely}
distinguishable. Hence, some trend towards the familiar statistical (and
thermodynamical) properties of identical particles may be discerned.
It is also interesting that Eq.\ (\ref{gB}) reduces to the classical Boltzmann
distribution $\sim\rho^{-1}$ for a weakly interacting gas,
$\sigma\to 0$ (remember, particles
do not ``feel'' each other with the probability $1-p_b-p_f=1-\sigma$). The
factor $2\sigma$ is not significant since it just renormalizes $\mu$.
All thermodynamic properties can be derived straightforwardly
\cite{Landafshitz}. The chemical potential $\mu$ is defined implicitly by
the equation for the total particle number
%
\begin{equation}
N=\frac{Vm^{2/3}}{\sqrt{2}\pi^2\hbar^3}\int_0^\infty\sqrt{\epsilon}\,
n(\epsilon)\,d\epsilon ,
\label{N}
\end{equation}
where $V$ is the volume of the gas, $m$ is the particle mass, $\hbar$ is the
Plank's constant. Then the equation of state can be found in a parametric form
from the thermodynamic potential $\Omega=-PV$,
\begin{equation}
\Omega=-\frac{2}{3}\frac{Vm^{2/3}}{\sqrt{2}\pi^2\hbar^3}\int_0^\infty
\epsilon^{3/2}\,n(\epsilon)\,d\epsilon ,
\label{Omega}
\end{equation}
In the classical Boltzmann limit $\exp\{\mu/T\}\ll 1$ the equation of state
\cite{Landafshitz} expanded to second order is
\end{multicols}
\begin{eqnarray}
PV&=&NT\left\{1+
\frac{\delta}{\left(\sigma+2\sqrt{p_b p_f}\right)}\frac{\pi^{3/2}}{2}
\frac{N\hbar^3}{V(mT)^{3/2}}
-\left[\frac{(\delta^2 +p_b p_f)}{\left(\sigma+2\sqrt{p_bp_f}\right)^2}
+\frac{\delta^2\sqrt{p_b p_f}}{4\left(\sigma+2\sqrt{p_bp_f}\right)^3}\,\right]
\frac{16\pi^3}{3^{5/2}}\frac{N^2\hbar^6}{V^2(mT)^3}\right\} .
\label{eq-state}
\end{eqnarray}
\begin{multicols}{2}
There is an effective attraction between particles of the gas when $p_b>p_f$
and effective repulsion when $p_b<p_f$ (the second term overcomes the last
one), as expected. In the case of the quantum Boltzmann statistics, $\delta=0$,
the second term vanishes, but a residual attraction still exists (the last
quadratic term).
As was mentioned above, extremal black holes are shown to obey the
infinite statistics with the deformation parameter $q=0$
\cite{Strominger}. Let's consider
a (``gedanken'') gas of charged, nonrotating, extremal black holes, and
assume their charges are of the same sign. Then, by definition,
$M^2=Q^2$ (with $M$ and $Q$ being the mass and charge of a black hole).
In the limit of large black hole separation (i.e., low-density, ideal gas
approximation, no relativistic effects), gravitational attraction of
``particles'' completely cancels electrostatic repulsion. Thus, the
system at hand is a gas of noninteracting particles (neutrals).
The thermodynamical properties of such a gas are governed by the
particle statistics properties, alone. According to Eq.\
(\ref{eq-state}) (with $p_b=p_f=\sigma/2, \delta=0$), the nonrotating,
extremal black holes will experience
{\em weak statistical attraction}. Hence, one may expect that black
holes will form clusters, for instance, the ultimate size of which is
controlled by the gas temperature (i.e., the velocity dispersion of black
holes) and completely independent of {\em any} black hole parameters
(e.g., their masses and charges).
To summarize, we introduced a new class of particles which may fluctuate
between Bose- and Fermi-type statistics or may have uncertainity in their
statistics. A generalized distribution function
is derived. For a particular case of the quantum Boltzmann statistics, the
distribution function (i.e., occupation numbers) is different from the classical
Boltzmann case. An equation of state in the classical Boltzmann limit is
derived. The relation of this type of statistics to the existing
generalizations of Bose and Fermi statistics has been ascertained.
The implication of these results obtained to the ensemble of extremal black
holes is discussed.
I am grateful to P.H.~Diamond for useful discussions.
This work was supported by DoE grant No. DEFG0388ER53275.
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UK employment advice and rights
Employee Rights Short Takes: Wage Discrimination, Paternity Leave, Disability Discrimination And More
2nd May 2011 Lisa Wilson Leave a comment
Originally posted on May 2, 2011 by Ellen Simon
Here are a few employee rights Short Takes worth noting:
It's A First: Major League Baseball Player Takes Paternity Leave
National Public Radio recently announced that Texas Ranger's pitcher Colby Lewis became the first major league baseball player to take paternity leave. The new MLB collective bargaining agreement allows players 24 – 72 hours off due to the birth of a child so Lewis took advantage of it. Shortly after the news, NBC Sports reported that another player, Washington National's shortstop Ian Desmond, was also preparing to take leave to be at his wife's side during the birth of their first child. It comes as no surprise that some folks aren't happy about the new rule. For more, read here.
New Rules For The Americans With Disabilities Act
New regulations were issued by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and will take effect May 24th. The new rules were mandated by the ADA Amendments Act of 2008("ADAAA"). The law made significant changes with respect to the interpretation of the term "disability" under the Americans with Disabilities Act.
Before the amendments, many employees who were discriminated against were not protected because the courts narrowly construed "disability" and determined that they were not disabled. The change in the legislation, which is spelled out in the final regulations, makes it crystal clear that the term "disability" should be broadly construed to include coverage. As legal commentator noted:
The message from Congress and the EEOC for business couldn't be any clearer. Stop focusing on whether someone is disabled and focus on the potential discrimination and reasonable accommodation.
The new regulations also list certain impairments which will almost always be considered a disability including deafness, blindness, autism, cancer, cerebral palsy, diabetes, epilepsy, and major depression. Employees with these disabilities were often excluded from coverage in cases interpreting the law before the ADA amendments. In other words, thousands of employees who had cancer, diabetes, epilepsy, etc. lost their discrimination cases because their employers argued, and the courts agreed, that they were not disabled under the ADA.
The bottom line is that thanks to the ADAA and the new regulations, ADA litigation will finally turn on whether the disabled employee was discriminated against – not whether he or she meets the definition of disabled under the Act. This is really good news and it's about time. For more, read here.
Discrimination Lawsuit Raises Issue Of Who Is A Man
I ran across this very interesting story in the NY Times about a recently filed discrimination case and it's worth talking about because it will make new law. The case is about El'Jai Devoureau, who was born a female, but identified himself as a man his whole life. In 2006, after he began taking male hormones and had a sex change operation, he adopted a new name, and received a new birth certificate from the State of Georgia which identifies him a male. His driver's license and social security records also identify him as a male.
The legal problem for Devoureau came up when he began working part time as a urine monitor at Urban Treatment Associates in Camden. His job was to make sure that people recovering from addiction did not substitute someone else's urine for their own during regular drug testing. On Devoureau's second day, his boss confronted him stating that she had heard he was transgender. She asked if he had any surgeries. He refused to answer, stating that was private, and was fired.
Devoureau sued claiming discrimination. Michael D. Silverman, executive director of the Transgender Legal Defense and Education Fund said it was the first employment case in the country to take on the question of a transgender person's sex.
New Jersey is one of 12 states that ban discrimination based on transgender status. The federal Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA), which would provide basic protections against workplace discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity nationwide was reintroduced in Congress in April.
In its defense, Urban Treatment claims that the firing was legitimate since the sex of the employee in this particular position is a bona fide occupational qualification ("BFOQ"), an exception to employment discrimination laws which permits an employer to give preference to one group over another in narrow circumstances. (for more about the BFOQ exception, see here)
This groundbreaking case will certainly be an interesting one to follow.
Fair Pay Act And Paycheck Fairness Act Reintroduced On Equal Pay Day
Data from the U.S. Census Bureau in 2009 shows that women who worked full time earned, on average, only 77 cents for every dollar men earned. The figures are even worse for women of color. African American women only earned approximately 62 cents and Latinas only 53 cents for each dollar earned by a white male.
Accordingly, Senator Tom Harkin most appropriately chose April 12, 2011 — Equal Pay Day — to reintroduce the Fair Pay Act of 2011. Harkin has introduced this bill every congress since 1996. The bill would require employers to provide equal pay for jobs that are equivalent in skills, effort, responsibility and working conditions. It would also require companies to disclose their pay scales and rates for all job categories.
Under current law a women who believes she is the victim of pay discrimination must file a lawsuit and go through what is almost always a long drawn out legal discovery process to find out whether she makes less than the man working beside her.
Many will recall that it took Lilly Ledbetter nearly 20 years before she discovered she was being paid less than men doing the same job which prompted her to file a lawsuit. After the U.S. Supreme Court ruled against her in 2007 — because it held that the case was filed too late — Congress passed the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act which helps level the playing field for victims of wage discrimination. The bill was signed in 2009 by President Obama – but it didn't go far enough.
Harkin was also an original co-sponsor of the Paycheck Fairness Act which passed the House during the 111th Congress but was filibustered in the Senate. The Paycheck Fairness Act would close loopholes in the enforcement of the current equal pay laws, prohibit retaliation against workers for sharing salary information with co-workers, and strengthen penalties against employers for violations of equal pay laws.
The Paycheck Fairness Act was reintroduced on Equal Pay Day by Senator Kristin Gillibrand and Senator Barbara Mikulski. For more about it, read here.
It's both disheartening and disturbing that women still must fight this hard for laws intended to effectively prevent wage discrimination which remains rampant in the workplace today. For more, read here.
images: blogs.orlandosentinel.com image.spreadshirt.com www.glbtq.comf
TAGS: ADA Amendments Act, Americans with Disabilities Act, BFOQ, ENDA, Paycheck Fairness Act, disability discrimination, feminism, sex discrimination, wage discrimination
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Q: Установка vue и axios в laravel У меня сайт на laravel. Помогите разобраться с установкой этих пакетов. В документации к laravel указано как устанавливать vue через npm. Но я не понимаю куда и где это устанавливается и подключается. При вводе этой команды у меня во всех шаблонах блейд автоматически подключится vue? Я, конечно же, понимаю, что такого быть не может, потому что названия этих шаблонов придуманы мной и в настройках фреймворка для установки vue вряд ли фигурируют. Я не использую app.js, так как у меня подключены свои файлы.
Еще вопрос: как подключить axios?
A: Нужно понять, что вопрос "где это настраивается" делится на две большие части: на разработку на локальной машине и на продакшн сервер.
Когда вы читаете в интернете советы по установке где фигурируют команды типа npm install vue axios - это речь идёт в типичном случае про локальный ваш компьютер.
Подразумевается, что у вас либо установлен node.js с официального сайта (включает в себя набор npm), либо есть какой-то типовой веб-сервер (например, openserver) в котором много различных утилит для удобства разработки.
Типично для этого режима запускать скрипты в режиме dev для удобства отладки.
Когда речь идёт о продакшн сервере - то как правило никто эти команды уже не даёт и подключается уже production версия скриптов (минифицированная, собранная в бандлы). И доставка этих бандлов идёт при помощи какой-либо системы сборки.
В довольно простом сценарии если у вас исходники сайта лежат в git можено сделать так. При локальной разработке подключают пакеты (npm i), пишут и проверяют работу скриптов, а потом коммитят собранные скрипты в гит. Когда на сайте происходит обновление исходников - подкачивается актуальная версия скриптов.
В принципе, установка vue через npm может вами и не применяться на начальных этапах изучения работы - если вы вручную подключаете скрипты, просто npm даёт удобство при обновлении версий пакетов, так как автоматически отслеживает десятки и сотни зависимостей между пакетами.
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{"url":"https:\/\/puzzling.stackexchange.com\/questions\/109348\/pipes-puzzle-uniqueness\/109352","text":"# Pipes Puzzle Uniqueness\n\nIn the puzzle game Pipes, a space-filling tree of pipes (which may have either one, two, or three neighboring connections each, but not four) is scrambled by a series of tile rotations, and the goal is to reconstruct the solution. To do so, you may rotate any tile, including the \"source\" tile (marked with a red circle), any multiple of 90\u00b0. (Note: \"space-filling tree\" means every tile\/square must have a pipe part on it, and no loops are allowed)\n\nMain puzzle statement: Is it possible for a Pipes puzzle to have multiple solutions (equivalently: is it possible to transform one tree into another via rotations)? What might be the smallest $$N$$ for which this can happen on an $$N \\times N$$ grid?\n\nEasier analogue: Pipes Lite is a fictional alternative in which pipes may have only one or two neighboring connections each. Is it possible for a Pipes Lite puzzle to have multiple solutions?\n\nMore difficult analogue: Is it possible for a Pipes puzzle to have no possible tile orientation deductions from the outset? That is to say, any individual tile has at least two orientations belonging to separate solutions?\n\n\u2022 I would accept either an answer to the \"more difficult analogue\" or \"main statement\"; the \"easier analogue\" is meant just to whet the appetite, although if nobody answers the other two after a while, I would accept the easier analogue's answer and then provide my own for the main statement. The answer to the more difficult analogue is currently unknown to me. \u2013\u00a0Feryll Apr 10 at 0:45\n\u2022 Is it required that the grid be square? \u2013\u00a0Deusovi Apr 10 at 3:01\n\n## Answer to the \"more difficult\" question:\n\nI claim that\n\nyes, it is possible\n\nand here's why:\n\nHere are two solutions to a Pipes puzzle where no pipe is in the same orientation in both solutions.\n\n## Easier analogue:\n\nI claim that\n\nNo, it is not possible.\n\nand here's why:\n\nThere is a single solution to any Pipes Lite, which can be found as follows:\nSay that each tile is labelled with \"straight\", \"turn\", or \"dead end\".\n\nWe're going to mark each border between two segments with \"wall\" or \"pipe\" to reconstruct the solution:\n\nMark the edges all around the border with \"wall\". Then, for any straight tile, we can copy its marking to the other side; for any turn, we can copy the other marking to the other side.\n\nHere, I've marked the walls on the left side, and then done the transfer for the first column.\nAnd here, it's done for the second:\n\nThis can be repeated starting from all four directions, not doing transfers at dead ends:\n\nAnd the solution is directly drawn out. (If the dead ends are in the same row or column, you may need to do transfers with the dead ends first - if all three sides are walls, draw a pipe in the remaining direction, otherwise draw a wall. Then you can continue as normal, and finish drawing the loop.)\n\n## Normal question:\n\nIt's possible to do with 4\u00d74:\n\nIt's not possible to do with 3\u00d73:\n- If a corner piece changes, it must be a dead end; it forces the cell next to it to be a turn...\n\n...and that forces the other corner to be a dead end. This continues around the whole board, and then the center is forced to be a +, which is disallowed.\nSo no corner pieces can change between solutions, so no edge pieces can change between solutions, so the middle cannot change between solutions.\n\n\u2022 Very well done! I am curious, how did you go about solving the more difficult analogue? Some clever candidate pruning? By hand or by machine? \u2013\u00a0Feryll Apr 10 at 20:58\n\u2022 Oh, I see; you did it via finding an example of a puzzle with piece symmetry about a 180 degree rotation, not using any straights. \u2013\u00a0Feryll Apr 10 at 21:01\n\u2022 @Feryll Yep! (And with none of the pieces matching their rotationally-symmetric counterpart.) I started by \"proving\" that an odd\u00d7odd grid wouldn't work (at least at the scales I was using), then I \"proved\" that an even\u00d7even grid wouldn't work. I then desperately tried to search for a mathematical proof that it was impossible, and failed to find anything. After that I \"proved\" that I would need at least two endpoints along an even edge (besides the forced ones in the corners), and a bit of trial and error led me to this. [...] \u2013\u00a0Deusovi Apr 11 at 0:14\n\u2022 [...] (Read all instances of \"proved\" X in the above as \"convinced myself after a lot of brute force that X probably didn't work as an option, and didn't particularly want to keep bashing.\") \u2013\u00a0Deusovi Apr 11 at 0:16\n\nHere\u2019s a solution that has only some non-unique pipes. My strategy is having that sort of outer parity loop, and filling in the middle in any way. This can be made for any odd square, and I believe the inner fill for a 5x5 is impossible using this strategy. Wouldn\u2019t be shocked if you could do something similar with a 6x6, and I will look into it some more.\n\n\u2022 incidentally the rot13(jryy xabja fjnfgvxn flzoby pna or snpvat evtug be yrsg) on a 3x3 grid except it violates the rule of no pipe having four connections. Therefore it is not surprising there does exist example grids with multiple valid solutions (for larger grids obviously) \u2013\u00a0happystar Apr 10 at 6:52","date":"2021-05-19 00:05:46","metadata":"{\"extraction_info\": {\"found_math\": true, \"script_math_tex\": 0, \"script_math_asciimath\": 0, \"math_annotations\": 0, \"math_alttext\": 0, \"mathml\": 0, \"mathjax_tag\": 0, \"mathjax_inline_tex\": 0, \"mathjax_display_tex\": 0, \"mathjax_asciimath\": 1, \"img_math\": 0, \"codecogs_latex\": 0, \"wp_latex\": 0, \"mimetex.cgi\": 0, \"\/images\/math\/codecogs\": 0, \"mathtex.cgi\": 0, \"katex\": 0, \"math-container\": 2, \"wp-katex-eq\": 0, \"align\": 0, \"equation\": 0, \"x-ck12\": 0, \"texerror\": 0, \"math_score\": 0.44900205731391907, \"perplexity\": 1095.7223329221458}, \"config\": {\"markdown_headings\": true, \"markdown_code\": true, \"boilerplate_config\": {\"ratio_threshold\": 0.18, \"absolute_threshold\": 10, \"end_threshold\": 15, \"enable\": true}, \"remove_buttons\": true, \"remove_image_figures\": true, \"remove_link_clusters\": true, \"table_config\": {\"min_rows\": 2, \"min_cols\": 3, \"format\": \"plain\"}, \"remove_chinese\": true, \"remove_edit_buttons\": true, \"extract_latex\": true}, \"warc_path\": \"s3:\/\/commoncrawl\/crawl-data\/CC-MAIN-2021-21\/segments\/1620243989874.84\/warc\/CC-MAIN-20210518222121-20210519012121-00178.warc.gz\"}"}
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Oscar Cáceres, né le à Montevideo (Uruguay) et mort le à Pervenchères (Orne), est un guitariste classique et professeur de musique uruguayen.
Biographie
Oscar Cáceres, né à Montevideo en 1928, effectue ses études musicales dans sa ville natale et commence à apprendre la guitare à l'âge de onze ans. Il progresse si rapidement que son enseignant le présente en récital seulement après 18 mois de formation, ce qui lui permet de démarrer une carrière qui devient très vite internationale.
En 1957, à la suite d'une tournée en Europe, il interprète le Concerto d'Aranjuez de Rodrigo en première audition pour l'Amérique latine et crée le Concerto pour guitare et orchestre de Heitor Villa-Lobos à Rio de Janeiro.
En 1967, il s'installe en France où il fonde en 1972 la classe de guitare à l'Université Internationale de Musique de Paris. Il donne notamment des cours au Festival international de musique d'Annecy et au Cours international d'interprétation musicale de Gérone en Espagne.
Il se produit en concert en Europe, Amérique, Afrique, Australie et Proche-Orient.
Il participe également à des festivals comme à Berlin, Coventry, Echternach, Strasbourg, Santander, Paris, entre autres.
Éditions
Oscar Cáceres a réalisé plusieurs éditions d'œuvres classiques pour son instrument, publiées chez Henry Lemoine, Max Eschig (Fernando Sor) et Salabert ainsi que des transcriptions, pour une (ou deux guitares) : des luthistes anglais (John Dowland, Francis Pilkington…), des vihuelistes espagnols (Luis de Milán, Luys de Narváez et Alonso Mudarra), de Sylvius Leopold Weiss, Domenico Scarlatti (9 sonates pour 2 guitares, 1982 chez Salabert) et Jean-Philippe Rameau.
Discographie
Vihuelistes, luthistes & guitaristes (1967, Erato)
Rodrigo, Concerto de Aranjuez - avec Turibio Santos, guitare ; Orchestre national de l'Opéra de Monte-Carlo, dir. Claudio Scimone (1978, Erato)
Œuvres pour guitare et cordes : Boccherini (Quintettes G.270, 341 et 407) et Haydn (Cassation) - avec le Quatuor Arpeggione (1987, Adda)
Anthologie de la guitare espagnole (1990, 4 CD Adda)
Oscar Cáceres interprète Astor Piazzolla, Tōru Takemitsu, Leo Brouwer, Jiří Jirmal (2004, Mandala)
Mundo Latino : Gerardo Támez ; Manuel María Ponce ; Agustín Barrios Mangoré ; Heitor Villa-Lobos (, Mandala)
Références
Liens externes
Naissance à Montevideo
Naissance en avril 1928
Guitariste classique
Décès à 93 ans
Décès en mai 2021
Décès dans l'Orne
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Q: How does make command doesnot search for Makefile in the same directory first? I am using the command make for compiling source codes. However, the command always issue this error
Makefile:10: Makefile_compiler_HOSTNAME: No such file or directory
make: *** No rule to make target `Makefile_compiler_HOSTNAME'. Stop.
where HOSTNAME is the hostname of my computer. It seems like make is defaulted to search for the file Makefile_compiler_HOSTNAME before the file Makefile.
Is there any way to set the default behaviour of make back?
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\section{Introduction}
\label{intro}
Let $\Delta$ be a discriminant of a positive definite binary quadratic form. When the discriminants $\Delta$ and $\Delta p^2$ have one form per genus, \cite{patane} gives an identity that connects the theta series associated to binary quadratic forms for each discriminant. This paper is mainly concerned with generalizing the central identity of \cite{patane} to discriminants which have multiple forms per genus. This generalized identity is stated in Theorem \ref{newthm} where the discriminants $\Delta$ and $\Delta p^2$ are not required to have one form per genus. Theorem \ref{newthm} gives an identity which connects a theta series associated to a binary quadratic form of discriminant $\Delta$ to a theta series associated to a subset of binary quadratic forms of discriminant $\Delta p^2$.
Section \ref{bmap} sets the notation and discusses some preliminary results. Section \ref{bue} considers a map of Buell which connects the class groups CL$(\Delta)$ and CL$(\Delta p^2)$. Section \ref{lemi} contains the lemmas and identities which are necessary for the proof of Theorem \ref{newthm}. Section \ref{main} combines the results of the previous sections to prove Theorem \ref{newthm}. Section \ref{conc} employs Theorem \ref{newthm} to prove a general theorem given by \cite[Theorem 5.1]{patane}. Lastly, Section \ref{examples} gives an explicit example which employs Theorem \ref{newthm} to derive a Lambert series decomposition and the corresponding product representation formula.
\section{Preliminaries and Notation}
\label{bmap}
We use $(a,b,c)$ to represent the class of binary quadratic forms which are equivalent to the binary quadratic form $ax^2 +bxy +cy^2$. Equivalence of two binary quadratic forms means the transformation matrix which connects them is in $SL(2,\mathbb{Z})$. The discriminant of $(a,b,c)$ is defined as $\Delta:= b^2-4ac$, and we only consider the case $\Delta <0$ and $a>0$. We say $(a,b,c)$ is primitive when GCD($a,b,c)=1$. The set of all classes of primitive forms of discriminant $\Delta$ comprise what is known as the class group of discriminant $\Delta$, denoted CL$(\Delta)$. We will often use the term ``form'' to mean a class of binary quadratic forms.
We use $h(\Delta):=|$CL$(\Delta)|$ to denote the class number of $\Delta$. In the 1801 work, Disquisitiones Arithmeticae, Gauss develops much of the theory of binary quadratic forms, including the below relation between $\Delta$ and $\Delta p^2$ \cite{gauss}:
\begin{equation}
\label{hrel}
h(\Delta p^2)=\dfrac{h(\Delta)\left(p-\left(\tfrac{\Delta}{p}\right)\right)}{w},
\end{equation}
where
\begin{equation}
\label{www}
w :=\left\{ \begin{array}{ll}
3& \Delta =-3,\\
2& \Delta =-4,\\
1& \Delta <-4.\\
\end{array}
\right.
\end{equation}
The relation \eqref{hrel} as well as the number $w$ in \eqref{www} appear in Section \ref{bmap}. Two binary quadratic forms of discriminant $\Delta$ are said to be in the same genus if they are equivalent over $\mathbb{Q}$ via a transformation matrix in $SL(2,\mathbb{Q})$ whose entries have denominators coprime to $2\Delta$. An equivalent definition for the genera of binary quadratic forms is given by introducing the concept of assigned characters. The assigned characters of a discriminant $\Delta$ are the functions $\left(\tfrac{r}{p}\right)$ for all odd primes $p\mid \Delta$, as well as possibly the functions $\left(\tfrac{-1}{r}\right)$, $\left(\tfrac{2}{r}\right)$, and $\left(\tfrac{-2}{r}\right)$. The details are discussed in Buell \cite{buell} and in Cox \cite{cox}.\\
The genera are of equal size and partition the class group. We say a discriminant is idoneal when each genus contains only one form. The number of genera of discriminant $\Delta p^2$ is either equal to the number of genera of discriminant $\Delta$ or double the number of genera of discriminant $\Delta$. Letting $v(\Delta)$ be the number of genera of discriminant $\Delta$ we have
\begin{equation}
\label{numgenform}
\frac{v(\Delta p^2)}{v(\Delta)} = \left\{ \begin{array}{ll}
1& 2<p, p\mid\Delta,\\
2& 2<p, p\nmid\Delta,\\
1& p=2, p\nmid\Delta,\\
1& p=2, \Delta \equiv 0,12,28 \imod{32},\\
2& p=2, \Delta \equiv 4,8,16,20,24 \imod{32}.\\
\end{array}
\right.
\end{equation}
The theta series associated to $(a,b,c)$ is
\[
(a,b,c,q):=\sum_{x,y}q^{ax^2+bxy+cy^2}=\sum_{n\geq0}(a,b,c;n)q^n,
\]
where we use $(a,b,c;n)$ to denote the total number of representations of $n$ by $(a,b,c)$. We define the projection operator $P_{m,r}$ to be
\[
P_{m,r}\sum_{n \geq 0}a(n)q^n = \sum_{n\geq 0}a(mn+r)q^{mn+r},
\]
where we take $0\leq r<m$. Informally, the operator $P_{p,0}$ applied to $(a,b,c,q)$ collects the terms of $(a,b,c,q)$ which have the exponent of $q$ congruent to $0\imod{p}$
\section{Connecting $\Delta$ to $\Delta p^2$}
\label{bue}
Let $(a,b,c)$ be a primitive form of discriminant $\Delta$. In Chapter 7 of \cite{buell}, Buell defines a map which sends $(a,b,c)$ to a set of $p+1$ not necessarily distinct and not necessarily primitive forms of discriminant $\Delta p^2$. The image of $(a,b,c)$ under this map is given by
\begin{equation}
\label{buellh}
\{(a,bp,cp^2)\} \cup \{(ap^2, pb+2ahp, ah^2 +bh+c): 0\leq h<p \}.
\end{equation}
Buell devotes Section 7.1 of his book to determine the important properties of this map \cite[Section 7.1]{buell}. Buell shows that if we cast out the nonprimitive forms of \eqref{buellh}, then the remaining forms (all primitive) are repeated $w$ times, where $w$ is half the number of automorphs of $\Delta$ and is given in \eqref{www}. We can map $(a,b,c)$ to the set of distinct primitive forms of \eqref{buellh}, and we call this set $\Psi_p(a,b,c)$.
Buell shows the images of $\Psi_p$ are distinct, of the same size, and partition CL$(\Delta p^2)$ \cite[Section 7.1]{buell}. Moreover, there are exactly $1+\left(\tfrac{\Delta}{p}\right)$ nonprimitive forms in \eqref{buellh}. Thus there are $p+1-\left(1+\left(\tfrac{\Delta}{p}\right)\right) =p-\left(\tfrac{\Delta}{p}\right) $ primitive forms in \eqref{buellh}. In other words, $|\Psi_p(a,b,c)|=\tfrac{p-\left(\tfrac{\Delta}{p}\right)}{w}$. Combining these results, Buell derives the class number of $\Delta p^2$ to be
\begin{equation}
\label{hrel2}
h(\Delta p^2)=\dfrac{h(\Delta)\left(p-\left(\tfrac{\Delta}{p}\right)\right)}{w}.
\end{equation}
We emphasize that the only time there are repeated primitive forms in \eqref{buellh} is when $\Delta=-3,-4$. As an example we take $\Delta=-3$ and $p=7$. The class group for $\Delta=-3$ consists of the single reduced form $(1,1,1)$. The class group for discriminant $\Delta p^2=-3\cdot 7^2=147$ consists of the two reduced forms $(1,1,37)$ and $(3,3,13)$. The forms in \eqref{buellh} (counting repetition) consist of $(1,1,37)$ union the forms listed in Table \ref{tt}.
\begin{table}
\caption{$\Delta =-3$, $p=7$}
\label{tt}
\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{ |l |c| }
\hline
$h$ & Corresponding form of \eqref{buellh} \\ \hline
0 & $(1,1,37)$ \\ \hline
1 & $(3,3,13)$ \\ \hline
2 & $(7,7,7)$ \\ \hline
3 & $(3,3,13)$ \\ \hline
4 & $(7,7,7)$ \\ \hline
5 & $(3,3,13)$ \\ \hline
6 & $(1,1,37)$ \\ \hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}
\end{table}
As expected, the primitive forms are repeated $w=3$ times and there are $1+\left(\tfrac{-3}{7}\right)=2$ nonprimitive forms. We have $\Psi_7(1,1,1) = \{(1,1,37), (3,3,13)\}$. The preceding example illustrates the map $\Psi_p$ when $w>1$ and when \eqref{buellh} contains nonprimitive forms. If we apply Theorem \ref{newthm} to this example we obtain identities which are discussed in \cite{patane}.
As another example we let $\Delta=-55$ and $p=3$. The genus structure along with the assigned characters for the genera for the discriminants $\Delta=-55$ and $\Delta p^2=-495$ are given below.
\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{ | l | l | l | l | }
\hline
\multicolumn{2}{|c|}{CL$(-55) \cong \mathbb{Z}_4$}& $\left(\tfrac{r}{5}\right)$ & $\left(\tfrac{r}{11}\right)$\\
\hline
$g_1$ & $(1,1,14)$, $(4,3,4)$ &$+1$ & $+1$ \\ \hline
$g_2$ & $(2,1,7)$, $(2,-1,7)$ &$-1$ & $-1$ \\ \hline
\end{tabular}
\begin{flushright}
.
\end{flushright}
\end{center}
\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{ | l | l | l | l | l| }
\hline
\multicolumn{2}{|c|}{CL$(-495) \cong \mathbb{Z}_8 \times \mathbb{Z}_2 $}& $\left(\tfrac{r}{3}\right)$ & $\left(\tfrac{r}{5}\right)$ & $\left(\tfrac{r}{11}\right)$\\
\hline
$G_1$ & $(1,1,124)$, $(9,9,16)$, $(4,1,31)$, $(4,-1,31)$, &$+1$ & $+1$ & $+1$\\ \hline
$G_2$ & $(5,5,26)$, $(11,11,14)$, $(9,3,14)$, $(9,-3,14)$, &$-1$ & $+1$ & $+1$\\ \hline
$G_3$ & $(2,1,62)$, $(2,-1,62)$, $(8,7,17)$, $(8,-7,17)$, &$-1$ & $-1$ & $-1$\\ \hline
$G_4$ & $(7,3,18)$, $(7,-3,18)$, $(10,5,13)$, $(10,-5,13)$, &$+1$ & $-1$ & $-1$\\ \hline
\end{tabular}
\begin{flushright}
.
\end{flushright}
\end{center}
We compute
\begin{equation}
\label{psihelp3}
\begin{aligned}
\Psi_{3}(1,1,14)&=\{(1,1,124), (9,9,16), (9,3,14), (9,-3,14)\},\\
\Psi_{3}(4,3,4)&=\{(5,5,26), (11,11,14), (4,1,31), (4,-1,31)\},\\
\Psi_{3}(2,1,7)&=\{(2,-1,62), (7,-3,18), (8,-7,17), (10,5,13)\},\\
\Psi_{3}(2,-1,7)&=\{(2,1,62), (7,3,18), (8,7,17), (10,-5,13)\}.\\
\end{aligned}
\end{equation}
Also we see that
\begin{equation}
\label{psihelp4}
\begin{aligned}
\Psi_{3}(g_1)&=G_1 \cup G_2,\\
\Psi_{3}(g_2)&=G_3 \cup G_4.\\
\end{aligned}
\end{equation}
As expected, the images are distinct, of equal size, and partition CL$(\Delta p^2)$. Also we see in this example that $\Psi_p(f)$ is split evenly over two genera, and doesn't necessarily contain a form and its inverse. In general, the set $\Psi_p(f)$ will either be fully contained in one genus or be split equally between two genera. This behavior corresponds to whether $\tfrac{v(\Delta p^2)}{v(\Delta)}=1,2$, respectively. We refer the reader to \eqref{numgenform} for the cases.
\section{Lemmas and Identities}
\label{lemi}
This section contains several lemmas and identities which we use to prove Theorem \ref{newthm}. Lemma \ref{nplem} shows exactly which forms in \eqref{buellh} are nonprimitive.
\begin{lemma}
\label{nplem}
Let $(a,b,c)$ be a primitive form of discriminant $\Delta$. There are exactly $1+\left(\tfrac{\Delta}{p}\right)$ nonprimitive forms in the list
\begin{equation}
\label{buellh2}
\{(a,bp,cp^2)\} \cup \{(ap^2, pb+2ahp, ah^2 +bh+c): 0\leq h<p \},
\end{equation}
and the nonprimitive forms are given by
\begin{equation}
\label{npp0}
\mbox{non-primitive forms of \eqref{buellh2}}= \left\{ \begin{array}{ll}
(a,bp,cp^2),& p\mid a,~\left(\tfrac{\Delta}{p}\right)=0,\\
f_1,& p\nmid a,~\left(\tfrac{\Delta}{p}\right)=0,\\
\emptyset,& \left(\tfrac{\Delta}{p}\right)=-1,\\
(a,pb,cp^2), f_2,& p\mid a,~\left(\tfrac{\Delta}{p}\right)=1,\\
f_3,f_4,& p\nmid a,~\left(\tfrac{\Delta}{p}\right)=1,\\
\end{array}
\right.
\end{equation}
where $f_i:=(ap^2, p(b+2ah_i), ah_{i}^2 + bh_i +c)$. For $p$ odd we take
\begin{align}
h_1 \equiv \tfrac{-b}{2a} \imod{p},\\
h_2\equiv \tfrac{-c}{b} \imod{p},\\
h_3\equiv \tfrac{-b+\sqrt{\Delta}}{2a} \imod{p},\\
h_4\equiv \tfrac{-b-\sqrt{\Delta}}{2a} \imod{p},
\end{align}
and for $p=2$ we take
$h_4\not\equiv h_3 \equiv h_2 \equiv h_1 \equiv c \imod{2}$. We always take $0\leq h_i <p$.\\
\end{lemma}
\begin{proof}
Let $(a,b,c)$ be a primitive form of discriminant $\Delta <0$. Since $(a,b,c)$ is assumed primitive, the only way for a form in \eqref{buellh2} to be nonprimitive is if $p$ divides each of its entries. Hence $(a,bp,cp^2)$ is nonprimitive if and only if $p\mid a$. This takes care of the form $(a,bp,cp^2)$, and we are left with considering the forms $(ap^2, p(b+2ah), ah^2 + bh +c)$, with $0\leq h <p$.\\
The form $(ap^2, p(b+2ah), ah^2 + bh +c)$ is nonprimitive if and only if $p\mid (ah^2 + bh +c)$, and so the remainder of the proof is devoted to determining exactly when $ah^2 + bh +c \equiv 0 \imod{p}$.\\
\noindent
\large\textbf{Case $p\mid a$:}
If $p \mid a$ and $p\mid b$, then $ah^2 + bh +c \equiv 0 \imod{p}$ has no solutions since $(a,b,c)$ is primitive. If $p \mid a$ and $p\nmid b$, then $ah^2 + bh +c \equiv 0 \imod{p}$ has the unique solution $h\equiv \tfrac{-c}{b} \imod{p}$, $0\leq h <p$. We note that when $p\mid a$ and $p \nmid b$, we have $\Delta \equiv b^2 \imod{p}$ and so $\left(\tfrac{\Delta}{p}\right)=1$. We have found the form $f_2$ in \eqref{npp0}.\\
\noindent
\large\textbf{Case $p\nmid a$, $p\neq 2$:}
Since $p\nmid a$, we see
\[
ah^2 + bh +c \equiv 0 \imod{p}
\]
is equivalent to
\[
(2ah+b)^2 \equiv \Delta \imod{p}.
\]
We find the following forms are nonprimitive:
\begin{equation}
\left\{ \begin{array}{ll}
f_1,& p\nmid a,~\left(\tfrac{\Delta}{p}\right)=0,\\
\emptyset,& p\nmid a~\left(\tfrac{\Delta}{p}\right)=-1,\\
f_3,f_4,& p\nmid a,~\left(\tfrac{\Delta}{p}\right)=1,\\
\end{array}
\right.
\end{equation}
where $f_i:=(ap^2, p(b+2ah_i), ah_{i}^2 + bh_i +c)$ with
\begin{align}
h_1 \equiv \tfrac{-b}{2a} \imod{p},\\
h_3\equiv \tfrac{-b+\sqrt{\Delta}}{2a} \imod{p},\\
h_4\equiv \tfrac{-b-\sqrt{\Delta}}{2a} \imod{p},
\end{align}
and $0\leq h_1,h_2,h_3 <p$.\\
\noindent
\large\textbf{Case $p\nmid a$, $p=2$:}
Since $2\nmid a$, we have
\[
ah^2 + bh +c \equiv h + bh +c \equiv (b+1)h+c \imod{2}.
\]
If $\left(\tfrac{\Delta}{2}\right)=0$, then $2 \mid b$ and we have
\[
(b+1)h+c \equiv 0 \imod{2}
\]
implies $h\equiv c \imod{2}$. We have arrived at the nonprimitive form $f_1$ with $h_1 \equiv c \imod{2}$.\\
If $\left(\tfrac{\Delta}{2}\right)=-1$ then $2 \nmid b$ and we have
\[
\Delta \equiv 1-4ac \equiv 5 \imod{8},
\]
and so $c$ is odd in this sub-case. Thus $a,b,c$ are all odd and we see $(4a,2b,c)$ and $(4a,6b,a+b+c)$ are primitive. In other words, $(ap^2, pb+2ahp, ah^2 +bh+c)$ with $h=0,1$ are both primitive forms. Hence we have only primitive forms in this sub-case. \\
If $\left(\tfrac{\Delta}{p}\right)=1$ then $2 \nmid b$ and we have
\[
\Delta \equiv 1-4ac \equiv 1 \imod{8}
\]
so that $c$ is even. Thus $a,b$ are odd and $c$ is even implies both $(4a,2b,c)$ and $(4a,6b,a+b+c)$ are nonprimitive. Hence $(ap^2, pb+2ahp, ah^2 +bh+c)$ with $h=0,1$ are both nonprimitive forms.\\
We now list the nonprimitve forms found in this case:
\begin{equation}
\left\{ \begin{array}{ll}
f_1,& 2\nmid a,~\left(\tfrac{\Delta}{2}\right)=0,\\
\emptyset,& 2\nmid a~\left(\tfrac{\Delta}{2}\right)=-1,\\
f_3,f_4,& 2\nmid a,~\left(\tfrac{\Delta}{2}\right)=1,\\
\end{array}
\right.
\end{equation}
where $f_i:=(ap^2, p(b+2ah_i), ah_{i}^2 + bh_i +c)$ with
\[
h_4\not\equiv h_3 \equiv h_1 \equiv c \imod{2},
\]
and $0\leq h_i<2$.\\
We have considered all possible cases and completed the proof of Lemma \ref{nplem}.
\end{proof}
Lemma \ref{nplem} is essential to finding which forms are in $\Psi_p(a,b,c)$, and we are a step closer to proving Theorem \ref{newthm}. Before proving Theorem \ref{newthm} we first consider $P_{p,0}(a,b,c,q)$ for an arbitrary primitive form $(a,b,c)$ and prime $p$.
\begin{lemma}
\label{pp0thm}
Let $(a,b,c)$ be a primitive form of discriminant $\Delta$. We have
\begin{equation}
\label{pp0}
P_{p,0}(a,b,c,q)= \left\{ \begin{array}{ll}
(a,bp,cp^2,q),& p\mid a,~\left(\tfrac{\Delta}{p}\right)=0,\\
f_1(q),& p\nmid a,~\left(\tfrac{\Delta}{p}\right)=0,\\
(a,b,c,q^{p^2}),& \left(\tfrac{\Delta}{p}\right)=-1,\\
f_2(q)+(a,pb,cp^2,q)-(a,b,c,q^{p^2}),& p\mid a,~\left(\tfrac{\Delta}{p}\right)=1,\\
f_3(q)+f_4(q)-(a,b,c,q^{p^2}),& p\nmid a,~\left(\tfrac{\Delta}{p}\right)=1,\\
\end{array}
\right.
\end{equation}
where $f_i(q):=(ap^2, p(b+2ah_i), ah_{i}^2 + bh_i +c,q)$. For $p$ odd we take
\begin{align}
h_1 \equiv \tfrac{-b}{2a} \imod{p},\\
h_2\equiv \tfrac{-c}{b} \imod{p},\\
h_3\equiv \tfrac{-b+\sqrt{\Delta}}{2a} \imod{p},\\
h_4\equiv \tfrac{-b-\sqrt{\Delta}}{2a} \imod{p},
\end{align}
and for $p=2$ we take
$h_4\not\equiv h_3 \equiv h_2 \equiv h_1 \equiv c \imod{2}$. We always take $0\leq h_i <p$.
\end{lemma}
\begin{proof}
The proof is split into cases.
\noindent
\large\textbf{Case $p \mid a$:}\\
If $p\mid a$ and $p\mid \Delta$, then $p\mid b$ and $p \nmid c$ since $(a,b,c)$ is assumed primitive. The congruence
\[
ax^2+bxy+cy^2\equiv cy^2 \equiv 0 \imod{p},
\]
implies $y \equiv 0 \imod{p}$, and we find $P_{p,0}(a,b,c,q)=(a,bp,cp^2,q)$.\\
If $p\mid a,~p\nmid\Delta$ then $\Delta \equiv b^2 \not\equiv 0 \imod{p}$ and so we must have $\left(\tfrac{\Delta}{p}\right)=1$. Then
\[
ax^2+bxy+cy^2\equiv y(bx+cy) \equiv 0 \imod{p},
\]
if and only if either $y \equiv 0 \imod{p}$ or $x \equiv \tfrac{-c}{b}y \imod{p}$. We have
\begin{align*}
P_{p,0}\sum_{x,y}q^{ax^2+bxy+cy^2}&=\sum_{\substack{x,\\y\equiv 0 \imod{p}}}q^{ax^2+bxy+cy^2}+\sum_{\substack{x\equiv \tfrac{-c}{b}y \imod{p},\\y\not\equiv 0 \imod{p}}}q^{ax^2+bxy+cy^2}\\
&=(a,pb,cp^2,q)+\sum_{x\equiv \tfrac{-c}{b}y \imod{p}}q^{ax^2+bxy+cy^2}-(a,b,c,q^{p^2})\\
&=(a,pb,cp^2,q)+(ap^2, p(b+2ah_2), ah_{2}^2 + bh_2 +c,q)-(a,b,c,q^{p^2}),
\end{align*}
where $h_2\equiv \tfrac{-c}{b} \imod{p}$ and Identity \ref{fident3} is employed in the last equality.\\
\noindent
\large\textbf{Case $p\nmid a$, $p\neq 2$:}\\
In this case, the congruence
\[
ax^2+bxy+cy^2\equiv 0 \imod{p},
\]
is equivalent to
\begin{equation}
\label{sss}
(2ax+by)^2 \equiv \Delta y^2 \imod{p}.
\end{equation}
If $\left(\tfrac{\Delta}{p}\right)=0$ then \eqref{sss} along with Identity \ref{fident3} implies
\[
P_{p,0}(a,b,c,q)=\sum_{x\equiv h_1 y \imod{p}}q^{ax^2+bxy+cy^2}=(ap^2, p(b+2ah_1), ah_{1}^2 + bh_1 +c,q),
\]
where $h_1 \equiv \tfrac{-b}{2a} \imod{p}$.\\
If $\left(\tfrac{\Delta}{p}\right)=1$ then \eqref{sss} along with Identity \ref{fident3} yields
\[
P_{p,0}(a,b,c,q)=f_3(q) +f_4(q)-(a,b,c,q^{p^2}),
\]
where
\begin{align*}
f_3(q)&=(ap^2, p(b+2ah_3), ah_{3}^2 + bh_3 +c,q)\\
f_4(q)&=(ap^2, p(b+2ah_4), ah_{4}^2 + bh_4 +c,q)\\
\end{align*}
and $h_3\equiv \tfrac{-b+\sqrt{\Delta}}{2a} \imod{p}$, $h_4\equiv \tfrac{-b-\sqrt{\Delta}}{2a} \imod{p}$.\\
Lastly we note that if $\left(\tfrac{\Delta}{p}\right)=-1$, then the only solutions to \eqref{sss} is $x\equiv y\equiv 0 \imod{p}$ and hence we have the theorem in this case. We have now finished the proof for $p$ odd.\\
\noindent
\large\textbf{Case $p\nmid a$, $p=2$:}\\
If $\left(\tfrac{\Delta}{2}\right)=0$ then $2\mid b$ and we have
\[
ax^2 +bxy +cy^2 \equiv x +cy \equiv 0 \imod{2},
\]
implies $x \equiv c y \imod{2}$ is the only solution. Employing Identity \ref{fident3} gives
\[
P_{p,0}(a,b,c,q)=\sum_{x\equiv h_1 y \imod{2}}q^{ax^2+bxy+cy^2}=(ap^2, p(b+2ah_1), ah_{1}^2 + bh_1 +c,q),
\]
where $h_1 \equiv c \imod{2}$.
If $\left(\tfrac{\Delta}{2}\right)=-1$ then $2\nmid b$ and $\Delta \equiv 1-4ac \equiv 5 \imod{8}$. Thus $c$ is odd and we have
\[
ax^2 +bxy +cy^2 \equiv x +xy+y \equiv 0 \imod{2},
\]
implies $x\equiv y \equiv 0 \imod{2}$ is the only solution, and we have finished this case.\\
If $\left(\tfrac{\Delta}{2}\right)=1$ then $2\nmid b$ and $\Delta \equiv 1-4ac \equiv 1 \imod{8}$. Thus $c$ is even and we have
\[
ax^2 +bxy +cy^2 \equiv x +xy \equiv 0 \imod{2},
\]
implies $x\equiv 0 \imod{2}$ is a solution or $y\equiv 1 \imod{2}$ is a solution. We find
\begin{align*}
P_{p,0}(a,b,c,q)&=(a,b,c,q^4) + \sum_{\substack{x\equiv 0\imod{2},\\y\not\equiv 0 \imod{2}}}q^{ax^2+bxy+cy^2}+\sum_{\substack{x\not\equiv 0\imod{2},\\y\not\equiv 0 \imod{2}}}q^{ax^2+bxy+cy^2}\\
&=(a,b,c,q^4) +\sum_{\substack{x,\\y\not\equiv 0 \imod{2}}}q^{ax^2+bxy+cy^2}.
\end{align*}
Employing Identity \ref{fident2} finishes the case, and hence the theorem.
\end{proof}
We now state and prove some identities which will be of use in our proof of Theorem \ref{newthm}.
\begin{ident}
\label{fident}
Let $(a,b,c)$ be a primitive form and $0 \leq h <p$. Then
\begin{equation}
\label{funident}
\sum_{\substack{x\equiv 0\imod{p},\\y\equiv j \imod{p}}}q^{ax^2 + (b+2ah)xy + (ah^2 +bh +c)y^2}=\sum_{\substack{x\equiv hj \imod{p},\\y\equiv j \imod{p}}}q^{ax^2 + bxy + cy^2}.
\end{equation}
\end{ident}
\begin{proof}
Use the change of variables $(x,y)\to (x-hy,y)$.
\end{proof}
\begin{ident}
\label{fident2}
Let $(a,b,c)$ be a primitive form. Then
\begin{equation}
\label{funident2}
\sum_{h=0}^{p-1}\sum_{\substack{x\equiv 0\imod{p},\\y\not\equiv 0 \imod{p}}}q^{ax^2 + (b+2ah)xy + (ah^2 +bh +c)y^2}=\sum_{\substack{x,\\y\not\equiv 0 \imod{p}}}q^{ax^2 + bxy + cy^2}.
\end{equation}
\end{ident}
\begin{proof}
Sum \eqref{funident} over $h=0,1, \ldots p-1$ and over $j=1,2,\ldots p-1$. Explicitly one gets
\begin{align}
\sum_{h=0}^{p-1}\sum_{j=1}^{p-1}\sum_{\substack{x\equiv 0\imod{p},\\y\equiv j \imod{p}}}q^{ax^2 + (b+2ah)xy + (ah^2 +bh +c)y^2}\label{a}
&=\sum_{h=0}^{p-1}\sum_{j=1}^{p-1}\sum_{\substack{x\equiv hj\imod{p},\\y\equiv j \imod{p}}}q^{ax^2 + bxy + cy^2}\\
&=\sum_{\substack{x,\\y\not\equiv 0 \imod{p}}}q^{ax^2 + bxy + cy^2}.\label{aa}
\end{align}
\end{proof}
\begin{ident}
\label{fident3}
Let $(a,b,c)$ be a primitive form and $0\leq h <p$. Then
\begin{equation}
\label{funident3}
\sum_{\substack{x\equiv 0\imod{p},\\y}}q^{ax^2 + (b+2ah)xy + (ah^2 +bh +c)y^2} = \sum_{x\equiv hy\imod{p}}q^{ax^2 + bxy + cy^2}.
\end{equation}
\end{ident}
\begin{proof}
Sum \eqref{funident} over $j=0,1,\ldots p-1$. Alternatively one may apply the change of variables $(x,y)\to (x-hy,y)$ directly.
\end{proof}
\begin{lemma}
\label{plemma}
Let $(A,B,C)\in$CL$(\Delta p^2)$. Then
\begin{equation}
\label{cold}
P_{p,0}(A,B,C,q)=(a,b,c,q^{p^{2}}),
\end{equation}
where $(a,b,c)\in$ CL$(\Delta)$ and $(A,B,C) \in \Psi_p(a,b,c)$.
\end{lemma}
\begin{proof}
By Section \ref{bue} we know $(A,B,C)\in$CL$(\Delta p^2)$ implies there exists a unique $(a,b,c)\in$ CL$(\Delta)$ with $(A,B,C) \in \Psi_p(a,b,c)$. In other words, $(A,B,C)$ is equivalent to either $(a,bp,cp^2)$ or to $(ap^2, p(b+2ah), ah^2 +bh+c)$ for some $0\leq h<p$. Applying Lemma \ref{pp0thm} along with Identity \ref{fident3} completes the proof in both cases.
\end{proof}
\section{Statement and Proof of Theorem \ref{newthm}}
\label{main}
We have arrived at the main theorem of our paper.
\begin{theorem}
\label{newthm}
Let $(a,b,c)$ be a primitive form of discriminant $\Delta <0$. For any prime $p$, we have
\begin{equation}
\label{win}
w\sum_{(A,B,C)\in \Psi_{p}(a,b,c)}(A,B,C,q)
= \left[p-\left(\tfrac{\Delta}{p}\right)\right](a,b,c,q^{p^{2}}) +(a,b,c,q)-P_{p,0}(a,b,c,q).
\end{equation}
\end{theorem}
We now prove Theorem \ref{newthm}. In all cases of the proof we start with the left hand side of \eqref{win2}
\begin{equation}
\label{win2}
w\sum_{(A,B,C)\in \Psi_{p}(a,b,c)}(A,B,C,q)- \left[p-\left(\tfrac{\Delta}{p}\right)\right](a,b,c,q^{p^{2}})= (a,b,c,q)-P_{p,0}(a,b,c,q),
\end{equation}
and using the results of the previous sections, we end with the right hand side of \eqref{win2}. The proof is split according to the sign of $\left(\frac{\Delta}{p}\right)$ and if $p\mid a$. Throughout the proof we will always take $0\leq h_i <p$.\\
\textbf{\Large Case} $p \mid \Delta, p\mid a$:\\
By Lemma \ref{nplem} we have $|\Psi_p(a,b,c)|=p$ and $(a,bp,cp^2)$ is the only nonprimitive form listed in \eqref{buellh}. Employing Identity \ref{fident} (with $j=0$), Identity \ref{fident2}, and Lemma \ref{pp0thm} we find that in this case we have
\begin{align*}
w\sum_{(A,B,C)\in \Psi_{p}(a,b,c)}(A,B,C,q)- \left[p-\left(\tfrac{\Delta}{p}\right)\right](a,b,c,q^{p^{2}})&=\sum_{h=0}^{p-1}\sum_{\substack{x\equiv 0\imod{p},\\y\not\equiv 0 \imod{p}}}q^{ax^2 + (b+2ah)xy + (ah^2 +bh +c)y^2}\\
&=\sum_{\substack{x,\\y\not\equiv 0 \imod{p}}}q^{ax^2 + bxy + cy^2}\\
&=(a,b,c,q)-P_{p,0}(a,b,c,q),
\end{align*}
as desired.\\
\textbf{\Large Case} $p \mid \Delta, p\nmid a$:\\
By Lemma \ref{nplem}, the only nonprimitive form in \eqref{buellh} is $(ap^2, p(b+2ah_1), ah_{1}^2 + bh_1 +c,q)$, where for $p$ odd we have $h_1\equiv \tfrac{-b}{2a} \imod{p}$ and for $p=2$ we have $h_1 \equiv c \imod{2}$. Employing Identity \ref{fident} (with $j=0$), the left hand side of \eqref{win2} is
\begin{equation}
\label{cry3}
\sum_{\substack{x\not\equiv 0\imod{p},\\y\equiv 0 \imod{p}}}q^{ax^2 +bxy+cy^2} + \sum_{\substack{h=0,\\h\not\equiv h_1 \imod{p}}}^{p-1}\sum_{\substack{x\equiv 0\imod{p},\\y\not\equiv 0 \imod{p}}}q^{ax^2 + (b+2ah)xy + (ah^2 +bh +c)y^2}.
\end{equation}
Employing Identity \ref{fident2}, we see \eqref{cry3} becomes
\begin{equation}
\label{rr2}
\sum_{\substack{x\not\equiv 0\imod{p},\\y\equiv 0 \imod{p}}}q^{ax^2 +bxy+cy^2}+\sum_{\substack{x,\\y\not\equiv 0 \imod{p}}}q^{ax^2 + bxy + cy^2}-\sum_{\substack{x\equiv 0\imod{p},\\y\not\equiv 0 \imod{p}}}q^{ax^2 + (b+2ah_1)xy + (ah_1^2 +bh_1 +c)y^2}.
\end{equation}
Employing Identity \ref{fident} transforms \eqref{rr2} into
\begin{equation}
\label{rl}
\sum_{\substack{x,\\y\equiv 0 \imod{p}}}q^{ax^2 +bxy+cy^2}+\sum_{\substack{x\equiv 0\imod{p},\\y\equiv 0 \imod{p}}}q^{ax^2 +bxy+cy^2}-(ap^2, p(b+2ah_1), ah_{1}^2 + bh_1 +c,q).
\end{equation}
It is clear that \eqref{rl} is
\begin{equation}
\label{cry2}
(a,b,c,q)-P_{p,0}(a,b,c,q),
\end{equation}
and we have finished this case.\\
\textbf{\Large Case} $\left(\frac{\Delta}{p}\right)=-1$:\\
By Lemma \ref{nplem} all forms of \eqref{buellh} are primitive in this case. Employing Identity \ref{fident} (with $j=0$) the left hand side of \eqref{win2} is
\begin{equation}
\label{sq}
\sum_{\substack{x\not\equiv 0\imod{p},\\y\equiv 0 \imod{p}}}q^{ax^2 +bxy+cy^2} + \sum_{h=0}^{p-1}\sum_{\substack{x\equiv 0\imod{p},\\y\not\equiv 0 \imod{p}}}q^{ax^2 + (b+2ah)xy + (ah^2 +bh +c)y^2}.
\end{equation}
Employing Identity \ref{fident2}, we see \eqref{sq} becomes
\begin{equation}
\label{sq2}
\sum_{\substack{x\not\equiv 0\imod{p},\\y\equiv 0 \imod{p}}}q^{ax^2 +bxy+cy^2} +\sum_{\substack{x,\\y\equiv 0 \imod{p}}}q^{ax^2 +bxy+cy^2}.
\end{equation}
Adding and subtracting $(a,b,c,q^{p^2})$ and using Lemma \ref{pp0thm} gives that \eqref{sq2} is
\begin{equation}
\label{sq3}
(a,b,c,q)-P_{p,0}(a,b,c,q),
\end{equation}
and we have finished this case.\\
\textbf{\Large Case} $\left(\frac{\Delta}{p}\right)=1, p\mid a$:\\
By Lemma \ref{nplem} there are two nonprimitive forms in \eqref{buellh}, and they are $(a,pb,cp^2,q),$ and $(ap^2, p(b+2ah_2), ah_{2}^2 + bh_2 +c,q)$, where $h_2\equiv \tfrac{-c}{b} \imod{p}$ (note this $h_2$ holds for $p=2$ as well). Employing Identity \ref{fident} (with $j=0$) we find the left hand side of \eqref{win2} is
\begin{equation}
\label{cry322}
\sum_{h=0}^{p-1}\sum_{\substack{x\equiv 0\imod{p},\\y\not\equiv 0 \imod{p}}}q^{ax^2 + (b+2ah)xy + (ah^2 +bh +c)y^2}-\sum_{\substack{x\equiv 0\imod{p},\\y\not\equiv 0 \imod{p}}}q^{ax^2 + (b+2ah_2)xy + (ah_2^2 +bh_2 +c)y^2}.
\end{equation}
Employing Identity \ref{fident2}, we see \eqref{cry322} becomes
\begin{equation}
\label{squ}
\sum_{\substack{x,\\y\not\equiv 0 \imod{p}}}q^{ax^2 + bxy + cy^2}-\sum_{\substack{x\equiv 0\imod{p},\\y\not\equiv 0 \imod{p}}}q^{ax^2 + (b+2ah_2)xy + (ah_2^2 +bh_2 +c)y^2}.
\end{equation}
Adding and subtracting $(a,b,c,q^{p^2})$ and employing Identity \ref{fident} (with $j=0$), we find \eqref{squ} is
\begin{equation}
\label{sque}
\sum_{\substack{x,\\y\not\equiv 0 \imod{p}}}q^{ax^2 + bxy + cy^2}+(a,b,c,q^{p^2})-\sum_{\substack{x\equiv 0\imod{p},\\y}}q^{ax^2 + (b+2ah_2)xy + (ah_2^2 +bh_2 +c)y^2}.
\end{equation}
Lastly we add and subtract $(a,bp,cp^2,q)$ in \eqref{sque} to yield
\begin{equation}
\label{cry222}
(a,b,c,q)-(a,pb,cp^2,q)-(ap^2, p(b+2ah_2), ah_{2}^2 + bh_2 +c,q)+(a,b,c,q^{p^2}),
\end{equation}
and applying Lemma \ref{pp0thm} finishes this case.\\
\textbf{\Large Case} $\left(\frac{\Delta}{p}\right)=1, p\nmid a$:\\
By Lemma \ref{nplem} there are two nonprimitive forms in \eqref{buellh}, and they are $(ap^2, p(b+2ah_3), ah_{3}^2 + bh_3 +c,q),$ and $(ap^2, p(b+2ah_4), ah_{4}^2 + bh_4 +c,q)$, where for $p$ odd we take $h_3\equiv \tfrac{-b+\sqrt{\Delta}}{2a} \imod{p}$, $h_4\equiv \tfrac{-b-\sqrt{\Delta}}{2a} \imod{p}$, and for $p=2$ we can simply take $h_3\not\equiv h_4 \imod{2}$. Employing Identity \ref{fident} (with $j=0$) along with Identity \ref{fident2} shows the left hand side of \eqref{win2} to be
\begin{equation}
\label{cry3222}
\sum_{\substack{x\not\equiv 0\imod{p},\\y\equiv 0 \imod{p}}}q^{ax^2 +bxy+cy^2} + \sum_{\substack{x,\\y\not\equiv 0 \imod{p}}}q^{ax^2 + bxy + cy^2}- \sum_{i=3}^4\sum_{\substack{x\equiv 0\imod{p},\\y\not\equiv 0 \imod{p}}}q^{ax^2 + (b+2ah_i)xy + (ah_{i}^2 +bh_i +c)y^2}.
\end{equation}
Adding and subtracting $2(a,b,c,q^{p^2})$ and employing Identity \ref{fident} (with $j=0$), \eqref{cry3222} becomes
\begin{equation}
\label{cry2222}
(a,b,c,q)-(ap^2, p(b+2ah_3), ah_{3}^2 + bh_3 +c,q)-(ap^2, p(b+2ah_4), ah_{4}^2 + bh_4 +c,q)+(a,b,c,q^{p^2}).
\end{equation}
Applying Lemma \ref{pp0thm} finishes this case, and the theorem is proven.\\
\section{Relating Theorem \ref{newthm} to \cite[Theorem 5.1]{patane} }
\label{conc}
In this section we use Theorem \ref{newthm} to prove Theorem 5.1 of \cite{patane}. First we give an example to illustrate the difference between Theorem \ref{newthm} and \cite[Theorem 5.1]{patane}. In Section \ref{bue} we discuss the map $\Psi_3$ between the class groups CL$(-55)$ and CL$(-55\cdot 3^2)$. We continue this example by examining one of the identities of Theorem \ref{newthm} with $\Delta=-55$ and $p=3$. Theorem \ref{newthm} yields
\begin{equation}
\label{thmid}
(1,1,124,q)+ (9,9,16,q)+ 2(9,3,14,q)=4(1,1,14,q^9)+P_{3,1}(1,1,14,q)+P_{3,2}(1,1,14,q).
\end{equation}
In general, Theorem \ref{newthm} yields identities which are dissections modulo $p$ of the theta series on the left hand side of \eqref{win}. Equation \eqref{thmid} is a dissection modulo 3 of $(1,1,124,q)+ (9,9,16,q)+ 2(9,3,14,q)$. Furthermore we see the forms $(1,1,124), (9,9,16)$ share a genus which is different than the genus containing $(9,3,14)$. See Section \ref{bue} for the genus structure of CL$(-55\cdot 3^2)$. The forms $(1,1,124), (9,9,16)$ are in a different genus than $(9,3,14)$ because they have different assigned character values for the character $\left(\tfrac{\bullet}{3}\right)$. In other words, if $(1,1,124;n)+ (9,9,16;n) >0$ and $3\nmid n$ then $n\equiv 1 \imod{3}$. Similarly if $(9,3,14;n) >0$ and $3\nmid n$ then $n\equiv 2 \imod{3}$. Employing Lemma \ref{plemma} along with the above discussion allows us to separate \eqref{thmid} into the two identities
\begin{equation}
\label{thmid2}
\begin{aligned}
(1,1,124,q)+ (9,9,16,q)&=2(1,1,14,q^9)+P_{3,1}(1,1,14,q),\\
2(9,3,14,q)&=2(1,1,14,q^9)+P_{3,2}(1,1,14,q).
\end{aligned}
\end{equation}
Theorem 5.1 of \cite{patane} directly claims the identities of \eqref{thmid2}. Theorem 5.1 of \cite{patane} is Theorem \ref{newthm} with the addition that we consider the congruence conditions implied by the assigned characters of the genera. An example is when the left hand side of \eqref{win} contains theta series associated to forms of two genera, we break \eqref{win} into two identities whose sum is \eqref{win}. We now state \cite[Theorem 5.1]{patane}.
\begin{theorem}
\label{newthm2}
Let $(a,b,c)$ be a primitive form of discriminant $\Delta$, and $G$ a genus of discriminant $\Delta p^2$ with $\Psi_{G,p}(a,b,c)$ nonempty. For $p$ an odd prime, we have
\begin{equation}
\label{genp}
w\sum_{(A,B,C)\in \Psi_{G,p}(a,b,c)}(A,B,C,q)
= w|\Psi_{G,p}(a,b,c)|(a,b,c,q^{p^{2}}) +\sum_{i=1}^{p-1} \tfrac{\left(\tfrac{ri}{p}\right) +1}{2}P_{p,i} (a,b,c,q)
\end{equation}
and for $p=2$,
\begin{equation}
\label{genp2}
w\sum_{(A,B,C)\in \Psi_{G,2}(a,b,c)}(A,B,C,q)
= w|\Psi_{G,2}(a,b,c)|(a,b,c,q^{4}) + P_{2^{t+1},r} (a,b,c,q)
\end{equation}
\noindent
where\\
\[
w :=\left\{ \begin{array}{ll}
3& \Delta =-3,\\
2& \Delta =-4,\\
1& \Delta <-4,\\
\end{array}
\right.
\]
$r$ is coprime to $\Delta p^2$ and is represented by any form of $\Psi_{G,p}(a,b,c)$. When $\Delta \equiv 0 \imod{16}$ we define $t=2$, and for $\Delta \not\equiv 0 \imod{16}$ we define $t=0,1$ according to whether $\Delta$ is odd or even.
\end{theorem}
Here $\Psi_{G,p}(a,b,c):= \Psi_{p}(a,b,c) \cap G$, and all other notation is consistent with our notation. We note that the coefficient $\tfrac{\left(\frac{ri}{p}\right) +1}{2}$ of $P_{p,i}(a,b,c,q)$ is simply the integer 0 or 1 depending on the congruence class of $ri$.
\begin{proof}
Our proof naturally splits according to the parity of $p$ and whether $p \mid \Delta$. In general, both \eqref{genp} and \eqref{genp2} are dissections modulo $p$ of the theta series
\[
\sum_{(A,B,C)\in \Psi_{G,p}(a,b,c)}(A,B,C,q).
\]
Lemma \ref{plemma} shows
\[
P_{p,0}\sum_{(A,B,C)\in \Psi_{G,p}(a,b,c)}(A,B,C,q)= |\Psi_{G,p}(a,b,c)|(a,b,c,q^{p^{2}}),
\]
which is the $0$ modulo $p$ dissection of \eqref{genp} and \eqref{genp2}. Our proof now breaks into cases.\\
\noindent
\large\textbf{Case $p$ odd, $p\nmid \Delta$:}\\
Theorem \ref{newthm} gives the identity
\begin{equation}
\label{er}
w\sum_{i=1}^{p-1}\sum_{(A,B,C)\in \Psi_{p}(a,b,c)}P_{p,i}(A,B,C,q)= \sum_{i=1}^{p-1} P_{p,i} (a,b,c,q).
\end{equation}
In the case when $p$ is odd and $p\nmid \Delta$ we know from Section \ref{bue} that $\Psi_{p}(a,b,c)$ is split equally over two genera which have the same assigned characters except for the character $\left(\tfrac{\bullet}{p}\right)$. Let $G_1$ be the genus with assigned character $\left(\tfrac{\bullet}{p}\right)=1$, $G_2$ the genus with assigned character $\left(\tfrac{\bullet}{p}\right)=-1$, and $\Psi_{p}(a,b,c)$ is contained in $G_1 \cup G_2$. The left hand side of \eqref{er} is
\begin{equation}
\label{er2}
w\sum_{i=1}^{p-1}\sum_{(A,B,C)\in \Psi_{G_1,p}(a,b,c)}P_{p,i}(A,B,C,q)+ w\sum_{i=1}^{p-1}\sum_{(A,B,C)\in \Psi_{G_2,p}(a,b,c)}P_{p,i}(A,B,C,q).
\end{equation}
The right hand side of \eqref{er} is
\begin{equation}
\label{er3}
\sum_{\substack{i=1\\ \left(\tfrac{i}{p}\right)=1}}^{p-1} P_{p,i} (a,b,c,q) +\sum_{\substack{i=1\\ \left(\tfrac{i}{p}\right)=-1}}^{p-1} P_{p,i} (a,b,c,q).
\end{equation}
If $(A,B,C)\in G_1$ and $(A,B,C;r)>0$ for some $r$ coprime to $\Delta p^2$, then $(A,B,C;n)=0$ for any $n$ with $\left(\tfrac{n}{p}\right)=-1$. Similarly if $(A,B,C)\in G_2$ and $(A,B,C;r)>0$ for some $r$ coprime to $\Delta p^2$, then $(A,B,C;n)=0$ for any $n$ with $\left(\tfrac{n}{p}\right)=1$. We arrive at the identities
\begin{equation}
\label{er40}
\begin{aligned}
w\sum_{i=1}^{p-1}\sum_{(A,B,C)\in \Psi_{G_1,p}(a,b,c)}P_{p,i}(A,B,C,q)&=\sum_{\substack{i=1\\ \left(\tfrac{i}{p}\right)=1}}^{p-1} P_{p,i} (a,b,c,q),\\
w\sum_{i=1}^{p-1}\sum_{(A,B,C)\in \Psi_{G_2,p}(a,b,c)}P_{p,i}(A,B,C,q)&=\sum_{\substack{i=1\\ \left(\tfrac{i}{p}\right)=-1}}^{p-1} P_{p,i} (a,b,c,q),\\
\end{aligned}
\end{equation}
which shows Theorem \ref{newthm2} when $p$ is odd and $p\nmid \Delta$.\\
\noindent
\textbf{\large Case $p$ odd, $p\mid \Delta$:}\\
We now show Theorem \ref{newthm2} when $p$ is odd and $p\mid \Delta$. In this case, $\Psi_{p}(a,b,c) \subseteq G$. Since $p$ is odd and $p\mid \Delta$, the character $\left(\tfrac{\bullet}{p}\right)$ is one of the assigned characters for the discriminant $\Delta$. If $(a,b,c)\in$CL$(\Delta)$ is in a genus $g$ which has $\left(\tfrac{\bullet}{p}\right)=1$ then $P_{p,r}(a,b,c,q)=0$ for any $r$ with $\left(\tfrac{r}{p}\right)=-1$. In this case, showing \eqref{genp} is equivalent to showing
\begin{equation}
\label{genpe}
w\sum_{(A,B,C)\in \Psi_{G,p}(a,b,c)}(A,B,C,q)
= w|\Psi_{p}(a,b,c)|(a,b,c,q^{p^{2}}) +\sum_{i=1}^{p-1} P_{p,i} (a,b,c,q),
\end{equation}
where we used $\Psi_{G,p}(a,b,c)=\Psi_{p}(a,b,c)$ and $P_{p,r}(a,b,c,q)=0$ for any $r$ with $\left(\tfrac{r}{p}\right)=-1$. Equation \eqref{genpe} is exactly \eqref{win}. The case when $(a,b,c)\in$CL$(\Delta)$ is in a genus $g$ with assigned character $\left(\tfrac{\bullet}{p}\right)=-1$ follows similarly.\\
\noindent
\textbf{\large Case $p=2$, $p\nmid \Delta$:}\\
When $p=2$ and $p\nmid \Delta$ then \eqref{genp2} becomes
\begin{equation}
w\sum_{(A,B,C)\in \Psi_{G,2}(a,b,c)}(A,B,C,q)
= w|\Psi_{G,2}(a,b,c)|(a,b,c,q^{4}) + P_{2,1} (a,b,c,q),
\end{equation}
which is equivalent to \eqref{win}.\\
\noindent
\large\textbf{Case $p=2$, $p\mid \Delta$:}\\
Lastly we have the case when $p=2$ and $\Delta$ is even. Due to the nature of the assigned characters of a genus, there are several cases to consider when $p=2$ and $\Delta$ is even. This is apparent from \eqref{numgenform} as well as examining whether the characters $\delta:=\left(\tfrac{-1}{r}\right)$, $\epsilon:=\left(\tfrac{2}{r}\right)$, and $\delta \epsilon:=\left(\tfrac{-2}{r}\right)$, are part of the assigned character list for $\Delta$ and $4\Delta$. Details regarding the congruence conditions when $\Delta$ contains the assigned characters $\delta$, $\epsilon$, and $\delta\epsilon$ are given in \cite{buell} and \cite{cox}. The assigned characters for even discriminants are given in Table 2, with $\chi_i:=\left(\tfrac{\bullet}{p_i}\right)$ and $p_i$ is an odd prime dividing $\Delta$ where $i$ runs up to the number of distinct odd primes dividing $\Delta$.
\begin{table}
\label{rrr}
\caption{}
\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{ |l |c| }
\hline
$\Delta$ & assigned characters \\ \hline
$\Delta \equiv 4 \imod{16}$ & $\chi_1,\ldots,\chi_r$ \\ \hline
$\Delta \equiv 12 \imod{16}$ & $\chi_1,\ldots,\chi_r,\delta$ \\ \hline
$\Delta \equiv 24 \imod{32}$ & $\chi_1,\ldots,\chi_r,\delta\epsilon$ \\ \hline
$\Delta \equiv 8 \imod{32}$ & $\chi_1,\ldots,\chi_r,\epsilon$ \\ \hline
$\Delta \equiv 16 \imod{32}$ & $\chi_1,\ldots,\chi_r,\delta$ \\ \hline
$\Delta \equiv 0 \imod{32}$ & $\chi_1,\ldots,\chi_r,\delta, \epsilon$ \\ \hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}
\end{table}
Our proof now splits according to whether $\tfrac{v(\Delta p^2)}{v(\Delta)}=1,2$ along with congruence conditions on $\Delta$. In all of these cases we have $|\Psi_2(a,b,c)|=2$ unless $\Delta=-4$. If $\Delta=-4$ then Theorem \ref{newthm2} directly reduces to Theorem \ref{newthm} which reduces to the main theorem of \cite{patane} since both $-4$ and $-16$ are idoneal discriminants. \\
We first consider the case when $\tfrac{v(\Delta p^2)}{v(\Delta)}=1$ which implies $\Psi_2$ maps into a single genus. Hence Theorem \ref{newthm2} reduces to Theorem \ref{newthm} if can show
\begin{equation}
\label{fbreak}
P_{2^{t+1},r} (a,b,c,q)
= P_{2,1} (a,b,c,q),
\end{equation}
where $t$ is given in Theorem \ref{newthm2} and $r$ is coprime to $2\Delta$ and represented by $(a,b,c)$. Equation \eqref{numgenform} implies that we need to consider $\Delta \equiv 0 \imod{32}$, or $\Delta \equiv 12 \imod{16}$. When $\Delta \equiv 0 \imod{32}$, \eqref{fbreak} becomes
\begin{equation}
\label{fbreak2}
P_{8,r} (a,b,c,q)
= P_{2,1} (a,b,c,q).
\end{equation}
Equation \eqref{fbreak2} is equivalent to showing $(a,b,c;s)=0$ for all odd $s$ coprime to $\Delta$ and $s\not\equiv r \imod{8}$. This congruence condition follows from the fact that when $\Delta \equiv 0 \imod{32}$, both $\Delta$ and $4\Delta$ have the same assigned characters which are $\chi_p, \delta, \epsilon$ for all odd primes $p\mid \Delta$.
Similarly when $\Delta \equiv 12 \imod{16}$ then \eqref{fbreak} becomes
\begin{equation}
\label{fbreak3}
P_{4,r} (a,b,c,q)
= P_{2,1} (a,b,c,q).
\end{equation}
Equation \eqref{fbreak3} is equivalent to showing $(a,b,c;s)=0$ for all odd $s$ coprime to $\Delta$ and $s\not\equiv r \imod{4}$. This congruence condition follows from the fact that when $\Delta \equiv 12 \imod{16}$, both $\Delta$ and $4\Delta$ have the same assigned characters which are $\chi_p, \delta$ for all odd primes $p\mid \Delta$.\\
We are now left with the cases which all have $\tfrac{v(\Delta p^2)}{v(\Delta)}=2$, and so $\Psi_2$ consists of two forms in different genera. In other words, we are left with the cases in which $\Delta p^2$ has exactly one additional character than $\Delta$. Examining Table 2, we see these are the cases when $\Delta \equiv 4 \imod{16}$ and $\Delta \equiv 8,16,24 \imod{32}$. Let us call this one additional character $\lambda$. For example, when $\Delta \equiv 4 \imod{16}$ the assigned characters of $\Delta$ are $\chi_1,\ldots,\chi_m$ and the assigned characters of $4\Delta$ are $\chi_1,\ldots,\chi_m, \delta$. In this example, $\lambda$ would be the character $\delta$. By taking $\lambda$ to be a general character we can prove the remaining cases together.\\
Fix $(a,b,c)\in$CL$(\Delta)$. Let $G_1$ be the genus of $4\Delta$ with assigned character $\lambda=1$, $G_2$ the genus of $4\Delta$ with assigned character $\lambda=-1$, and $\Psi_{2}(a,b,c)=\{(A,B,C), (D,E,F)\}$ so that $(A,B,C) \in G_1$ and $(D,E,F)\in G_2$. Theorem \ref{newthm} gives
\begin{equation}
\label{que}
(A,B,C,q)+ (D,E,F,q) = 2(a,b,c,q^4)+P_{2,1}(a,b,c,q).
\end{equation}
We can write $P_{2,1}(a,b,c,q)=P_{2^k,r_1}(a,b,c,q) + P_{2^k,r_2}(a,b,c,q)$ where $\lambda(r_1)=1$, $\lambda(r_2)=-1$, and $k$ is 2 or 3 depending on the character $\lambda$. Employing Lemma \ref{plemma} yields the identities
\begin{equation}
\label{que2}
\begin{aligned}
(A,B,C,q) = (a,b,c,q^4)+P_{2^k,r_1}(a,b,c,q),\\
(D,E,F,q) = (a,b,c,q^4)+P_{2^k,r_2}(a,b,c,q).\\
\end{aligned}
\end{equation}
The identities given in \eqref{que2} are the identities of Theorem \ref{newthm2}, and we have finished the proof of Theorem \ref{newthm2}.
\end{proof}
\section{Lambert Series and Product Representation Formulas}
\label{examples}
One of the main applications of Theorem \ref{newthm2} is that we are often able to deduce a Lambert series decomposition of the left hand side of \eqref{genp} and \eqref{genp2}, and hence a product representation formula for the associated forms. Theorem \ref{newthm2} yields a Lambert series decomposition only when the theta series on the left hand side of \eqref{genp} and \eqref{genp2} are associated to the entire genus. We illustrate this property with the example of $\Delta=-23$ and $p=3$.\\
Let $\Delta=-23$ and $p=3$. The class group and genus structure for the relevant discriminants is given by
\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{ | c | c | }
\hline
CL$(-23) \cong \mathbb{Z}_3$& $\left(\tfrac{r}{23}\right)$\\
\hline
$(1,1,6)$, $(2,1,3)$, $(2,-1,3)$ &$+1$ \\ \hline
\end{tabular}
\begin{flushright}
\end{flushright}
\end{center}
\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{ | c | c |c| }
\hline
CL$(-207) \cong \mathbb{Z}_6$& $\left(\tfrac{r}{23}\right)$& $\left(\tfrac{r}{3}\right)$ \\
\hline
$(1,1,52)$, $(4,1,13)$, $(4,-1,13)$ &$+1$ & $+1$ \\ \hline
$(8,7,8)$, $(2,1,26)$, $(2,-1,26)$ &$+1$ & $-1$ \\ \hline
\end{tabular}
\begin{flushright}
.
\end{flushright}
\end{center}
We compute
\begin{equation}
\label{psihelpp2}
\begin{aligned}
\Psi_{3}(1,1,6)&=\{(1,1,52), (8,7,8)\},\\
\Psi_{3}(2,1,3)&=\{(2,-1,26), (4,1,13)\},\\
\Psi_{3}(2,-1,3)&=\{(2,1,26), (4,-1,13)\}.\\
\end{aligned}
\end{equation}
Employing Theorem \ref{newthm} yields the identities
\begin{equation}
\label{nopenopenope}
\begin{aligned}
(1,1,52,q)+ (8,7,8,q)&=2(1,1,6,q^9)+ (P_{3,1}+P_{3,2})(1,1,6,q),\\
(2,1,26,q)+ (4,1,13,q)&=2(2,1,3,q^9)+ (P_{3,1}+P_{3,2})(2,1,3,q).\\
\end{aligned}
\end{equation}
Either by Theorem \ref{newthm2} or by employing congruences directly to \eqref{nopenopenope}, we find
\begin{equation}
\label{nopers}
\begin{aligned}
(1,1,52,q)&=(1,1,6,q^9)+ P_{3,1}(1,1,6,q),\\
(8,7,8,q)&=(1,1,6,q^9)+ P_{3,2}(1,1,6,q),\\
(4,1,13,q)&=(2,1,3,q^9)+ P_{3,1}(2,1,3,q),\\
(2,1,26,q)&=(2,1,3,q^9)+ P_{3,2}(2,1,3,q).\\
\end{aligned}
\end{equation}
The identities of \eqref{nopenopenope} and \eqref{nopers} do not directly yield Lambert series decompositions since the left hand sides are not associated with the entire genus. However we can combine the identities of \eqref{nopers} to find
\begin{equation}
\label{nopers2}
\begin{aligned}
(1,1,52,q)+2(4,1,13,q)&=f(q^9) +P_{3,1}f(q),\\
(8,7,8,q)+2(2,1,26,q)&=f(q^9) +P_{3,2}f(q),\\
\end{aligned}
\end{equation}
where $f(q)=(1,1,6,q)+2(2,1,3,q)$ is the theta series associated with the principal genus of $\Delta$. The identities of \eqref{nopers2} yield Lambert series decompositions and we demonstrate how to derive these Lambert series and product representation formulas.\\
Dirichlet's formula for quadratic forms gives $f(q)$ as a Lambert series
\begin{equation}
\label{d}
f(q):=(1,1,6,q)+2(2,1,3,q)=3+2\sum_{n=1}^{\infty}\left(\tfrac{-23}{n}\right)\tfrac{q^{n}}{1-q^{n}}.
\end{equation}
Using \eqref{d} it is not hard to show
\begin{equation}
\label{d2}
(P_{3,1}-P_{3,2})f(q)=2\sum_{n=1}^{\infty}\left(\tfrac{69}{n}\right)\tfrac{q^{n}(1-q^n)}{1-q^{3n}}.
\end{equation}
For convenience we define the Lambert series
\begin{equation}
\label{yes}
L_{1}(q)=\sum_{n=1}^{\infty}\left(\tfrac{-23}{n}\right)\tfrac{q^{n}}{1-q^{n}},
\end{equation}
and
\begin{equation}
\label{yeash}
L_2(q)=\sum_{n=1}^{\infty}\left(\tfrac{69}{n}\right)\tfrac{q^{n}(1-q^n)}{1-q^{3n}}.
\end{equation}
It is easy to show
\begin{equation}
\label{nopers5}
P_{3,0}L_1(q)=2L_1(q^3)-L_1(q^9).
\end{equation}
Adding and subtracting the identities of \eqref{nopers2} and employing \eqref{d2}, \eqref{nopers5}, gives the Lambert series decompositions for the theta series associated with the genera of discriminant $-207$
\begin{equation}
\label{nopers6}
(1,1,52,q)+2(4,1,13,q)=3+L_1(q)-2L_1(q^3)+3L_1(q^9)+L_2(q),\\
\end{equation}
and
\begin{equation}
\label{nopers7}
(8,7,8,q)+2(2,1,26,q)=3+L_1(q)-2L_1(q^3)+3L_1(q^9)-L_2(q).\\
\end{equation}
Both \eqref{nopers6} and \eqref{nopers7} yield product representation formulas as we now demonstrate. We use the notation
\[
[q^k]\sum_{n\geq 0}a(n)q^n=a(k),
\]
so that $[q^k]f(q)$ is simply the coefficient of $q^k$ in the expansion of the series $f(q)$. The coefficient of $q^n$ in $L_1(q)$ is given by
\[
A(n):=[q^n]\sum_{n=1}^{\infty}\left(\frac{-23}{n}\right) \frac{q^{n}}{1-q^{n}}=\sum_{d|n}\left(\frac{-23}{d}\right).
\]
We see that
\begin{align*}
\sum_{n=1}^{\infty}\left(\frac{69}{n}\right) \frac{q^{n}(1-q^{n})}{1-q^{3n}} &= \sum_{n=1}^{\infty}\sum_{m=0}^{\infty}\left(\frac{69}{n}\right)(q^{n(3m+1)} - q^{n(3m+2)})\\
&=\sum_{n=1}^{\infty}\sum_{m=1}^{\infty}\left(\frac{69}{n}\right)(q^{n(3m-1)} - q^{n(3m-2)})\\
&=\sum_{n=1}^{\infty}\sum_{m=1}^{\infty}\left(\frac{69}{n}\right)\left(\frac{m}{3}\right)q^{nm}\\
&=\sum_{n=1}^{\infty}\left(\sum_{d|n}\left(\frac{69}{d}\right)\left(\frac{n/d}{3}\right) \right)q^{n},
\end{align*}
and so the coefficient of $q^n$ in $L_2(q)$ is given by
\[
B(n):=[q^n]\sum_{n=1}^{\infty}\left(\frac{69}{n}\right) \frac{q^{n}(1-q^{n})}{1-q^{3n}}=\sum_{d|n}\left(\frac{69}{d}\right)\left(\frac{n/d}{3}\right).
\]
It is easy to check that for a prime $p$
\begin{equation}
\label{au}
A(p^{\alpha}) = \left\{ \begin{array}{ll}
1 & p=23, \\
1+\alpha & \left(\frac{-23}{p}\right)=1, \\
\frac{(-1)^{\alpha}+1}{2} & \left(\frac{-23}{p}\right)=-1,
\end{array}
\right.
\end{equation}
and
\begin{equation}
\label{bdub}
B(p^{\alpha}) = \left\{ \begin{array}{ll}
0 & p=3, \alpha \neq 0 \\
(-1)^{\alpha} & p=23,\\
1+\alpha & \left(\tfrac{-23}{p}\right)=1,\mbox{ and }\left(\tfrac{p}{3}\right)=1, \\
(-1)^{\alpha}(1+\alpha) & \left(\frac{-23}{p}\right)=1,\mbox{ and }\left(\frac{p}{3}\right)=-1, \\
\frac{(-1)^{\alpha}+1}{2} & \left(\tfrac{-23}{p}\right)=-1.
\end{array}
\right.
\end{equation}
Since $A(n)$ and $B(n)$ are multiplicative we can use \eqref{au} and \eqref{bdub} along with \eqref{nopers6} and \eqref{nopers7} to give formulas for the number of representations of an integer by a given genus of discriminant $-207$.
\begin{theorem}
\label{jtalk}
Let the prime factorization of $n$ be
\[
n=3^{a}\cdot 23^{b}\prod_{i=1}^{r}p_{i}^{v_{i}}\prod_{j=1}^{s}q_{j}^{w_{j}},
\]
where $p_i\neq3$ and $\left(\tfrac{-23}{p_i}\right)=1$ and $\left(\tfrac{-23}{q_j}\right)=-1$. Let
\[
\Lambda(n):=\prod_{i=1}^{r}(1+{v_{i}})\prod_{j=1}^{s}\tfrac{1+(-1)^{w_{j}}}{2}.
\]
We have
\begin{equation}
\label{h}
(1,1,52;n)+2(4,1,13;n) = \left\{ \begin{array}{ll}
(1+(-1)^{b+t})\Lambda(n)& a=0,\\
0& a=1,\\
2\Lambda(n)& a\geq2,\\
\end{array}
\right.
\end{equation}
and
\begin{equation}
\label{h2}
(8,7,8;n)+2(2,1,26;n) = \left\{ \begin{array}{ll}
(1-(-1)^{b+t})\Lambda(n)& a=0,\\
0& a=1,\\
2\Lambda(n)& a\geq2,\\
\end{array}
\right.
\end{equation}
where $t$ is the number of prime factors $p$ of $n$, counting multiplicity, with $\left(\frac{-23}{p}\right)=1$ and $\left(\frac{p}{3}\right)=-1$.
\end{theorem}
Theorem \ref{jtalk} gives the total number of representations by all forms of a given genus of discriminant $-207$. To find $(a,b,c;n)$ for any particular form of discriminant $-207$, one can employ the techniques of \cite{berpat}.
Let $A=(2,1,26)$ and $A(q)$ the associated theta series. Recall CL$(-207)\cong \mathbb{Z}_6$, and $A$ is a generator of this group. Theorem \ref{jtalk} gives representation formulas for
\begin{align}
\label{f1}
I(q)&+2A^2(q),\\
A^3(q)&+2A(q),
\end{align}
where $I$ is the principal form, and $A^k$ corresponds to Gaussian composition $k$ times. The techniques of \cite{berpat} allows us to find representation formulas for
\begin{align}
\label{f2}
I(q)&-A^2(q),\\
A(q)&-A^3(q),
\end{align}
by using the fact that
\begin{align}
\label{mult1207}
M(q):= \dfrac{I(q)-A^2(q)+\left[A(q)-A^3(q)\right]}{2},
\end{align}
is an eigenform for all Hecke operators and also employing congruences to separate $I(q)-A^2(q)$ and $A(q)-A^3(q)$. We note that one can use the formulas of Hecke \cite[p.794]{hecke} to show $M(q)$ is an eigenform for all Hecke operators. A concise formula for the action of the Hecke operators on the theta series associated to a binary quadratic form is given by \cite[(1.18)]{berpat}. It is interesting to note that $L_{2}(q)=\tfrac{I(q)+2A^2(q)-(A^3(q)+2A(q))}{2}$ is an example of a Lambert series which is an eigenform for all Hecke operators.
\cite{berpat} discusses the example CL$(-135)\cong \mathbb{Z}_6 \cong \langle A \rangle$ which is very similar to our example except that for CL$(-135)$ both $\tfrac{I(q)-A^2(q)\pm \left[A(q)-A^3(q)\right]}{2}$ are eigenforms for all Hecke operators. In our example the combination $\tfrac{I(q)-A^2(q)-\left[A(q)-A^3(q)\right]}{2}$ is not an eigenform for all Hecke operators and so congruences must be employed to derive \eqref{f2}.
We do not give explicit representation formulas for \eqref{f2} since the derivation process is similar to the example for $\Delta=-135$ in \cite{berpat}.\\
Another approach to proving Theorem \ref{jtalk} is to employ the general formula \cite[Theorem 8.1, pg. 289]{ref1} proven by Huard, Kaplan, and Williams. This formula gives the total number of representations of an integer $n$ by all the forms in a genus of discriminant $d<0$. Section 8 of \cite{ref2} discusses representations of $n$ by an individual form. We conclude this paper by deriving Theorem \ref{jtalk} from Theorem 8.1 in \cite{ref1}.
In the case that $9\mid n>0$, Theorem 8.1 of \cite{ref1} gives
\begin{align*}
(1,1,52;n)+2(4,1,13;n)&=(8,7,8;n)+2(2,1,26;n)=2\sum_{\mu\mid \tfrac{n}{9}}\left(\dfrac{-23}{\mu}\right),
\end{align*}
which is consistent with Theorem \ref{jtalk}. When $3 \mid n$ and $9\nmid n$ Theorem 8.1 of \cite{ref1} gives
\begin{align*}
(1,1,52;n)+2(4,1,13;n)&=(8,7,8;n)+2(2,1,26;n)=0.
\end{align*}
The last case to consider is when $3\nmid n$. Using the notation of \cite{ref1}, Theorem 8.1 of \cite{ref1} gives the total number of representations by the forms of genus $G$ to be
\[
R_G(n,-207)=\dfrac{1}{2}\sum_{d_1 \in \{1,-3,-23,69\}}\gamma_{d_1}(G)S(n,d_1,\tfrac{-207}{d_1}),
\]
where
\[
S(n,d_1,\tfrac{-207}{d_1})=\sum_{\mu \nu=n}\left(\dfrac{d_1}{\mu}\right)\left(\dfrac{-207/d_1}{\nu}\right),
\]
and $\gamma_{d_1}(G)=\left(\tfrac{d_1}{g}\right)$ with $g$ a positive integer coprime to $d_1$ and represented by the genus $G$. Simplifying yields
\begin{align*}
(1,1,52;n)+2(4,1,13;n)&=\sum_{\mu\mid n}\left(\dfrac{-23}{\mu}\right)+\sum_{\mu \nu=n}\left(\dfrac{-3}{\mu}\right)\left(\dfrac{69}{\nu}\right),
\end{align*}
and
\begin{align*}
(8,7,8;n)+2(2,1,26;n)&=\sum_{\mu\mid n}\left(\dfrac{-23}{\mu}\right)-\sum_{\mu \nu=n}\left(\dfrac{-3}{\mu}\right)\left(\dfrac{69}{\nu}\right),
\end{align*}
which is consistent with Theorem \ref{jtalk} in this case.
\section{Acknowledgments}
\label{ack}
The author would like to thank Alexander Berkovich for valuable discussions. Also the author is grateful to the anonymous referee for helpful comments and for bringing references \cite{ref1} and \cite{ref2} to his attention.
|
{
"redpajama_set_name": "RedPajamaArXiv"
}
| 7,496
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Q: Is PWA Studio ready for production use? Going throught the demo store https://venia.magento.com/ and installing the headless version with our production instance it seems a lot of basic features are still msissing with PWA Studio provided by Magento an Adobe company now.
They have it as a major highlight of their list of major features as well on Version 2.4.2. You'll be able to see this on this link: https://magento.com/products/new-releases
However it's very clear that the PWA implementation lacks a lot of features already present in the Luma theme. This project has been running since 2019 and it's very frustrating as an enterprise client that Magento teams asks us to go through a 3rd party agency to have a workable fully featured PWA website in production when we are paying tens of thousands of dollars a month on license fees.
Putting up my question as a open discussion on PWA Studio and it's production readines.
A: Here is the official roadmap https://github.com/magento/pwa-studio/wiki/Roadmap for venia, still a lot to cover in order to have a fully functional production ready app, IMHO.
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{
"redpajama_set_name": "RedPajamaStackExchange"
}
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Hayley M Brown (born 25 March 1998) is an English cricketer who currently plays for Northamptonshire. She plays as a right-handed batter. She previously played for Huntingdonshire, Essex and Sunrisers.
Domestic career
Brown made her county debut in 2014, for Huntingdonshire against Cambridgeshire, top-scoring for her side with 16*. The following season, she joined Northamptonshire. Brown was part of the side that won promotion in both the County Championship and Twenty20 Cup in 2017, and was her side's leading run-scorer in the Championship, with 125 runs including her maiden county half-century. In 2019, Brown was again her side's leading run-scorer in the County Championship, this time scoring 232 runs including her maiden county century, scoring 111* against Cambridgeshire and Huntingdonshire. Northamptonshire also topped their division in both competitions that season.
In 2020, Brown played for Sunrisers in the Rachael Heyhoe Flint Trophy. She played one match, scoring 16 against South East Stars.
In 2021, Brown joined Essex, and played four matches for the side in the Twenty20 Cup, scoring 42 runs. She was also included in Sunrisers' Academy squad for the season. In 2022, she returned to Northamptonshire, playing six matches for the side in the East of England Women's County Championship, where she was the fifth-highest run-scorer in the tournament, with 172 runs at an average of 34.40.
References
External links
1998 births
Living people
Place of birth missing (living people)
Huntingdonshire women cricketers
Northamptonshire women cricketers
Essex women cricketers
Sunrisers women's cricketers
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{"url":"https:\/\/www.physicsforums.com\/threads\/solve-a-strange-inequality.929033\/","text":"Solve a strange inequality\n\nHomework Statement\n\nSolving an exercise I found myself with this problem: the solution ##c## needs to verify both ##\\sum_{k=1}^c n\\lambda^k\\frac{e^{n\\lambda}}{k!}\\leq \\alpha## and ##1-\\sum_{k=1}^{c+1} n\\lambda^k\\frac{e^{n\\lambda}}{k!}\\geq \\alpha##.\n\nCan an equation like this be solved for c?\n\nThe Attempt at a Solution\n\nAn inversion of the inequality didn't work because it vanishes ##\\alpha##, I don't think there is an explicit form for the solution, but I've failed in finding an argument to explain why.\n\nLast edited by a moderator:\n\nMentor\nAssuming all parameters are positive, both sums increase with increasing c, so the inequalities will be valid from c=0 (or c=1) up to some maximal c. If you are just interested in finding any solution, test the smallest c allowed.\n\nApart from constant prefactors, your sum is ##\\displaystyle \\sum_{k=1}^{c} \\frac{\\lambda^k}{k}##, I'm not aware of closed forms for that (although some special values of ##\\lambda## might have them). Is it really ##k## in the denominator, not ##k!## ?\n\nAssuming all parameters are positive, both sums increase with increasing c, so the inequalities will be valid from c=0 (or c=1) up to some maximal c. If you are just interested in finding any solution, test the smallest c allowed.\n\nApart from constant prefactors, your sum is ##\\displaystyle \\sum_{k=1}^{c} \\frac{\\lambda^k}{k}##, I'm not aware of closed forms for that (although some special values of ##\\lambda## might have them). Is it really ##k## in the denominator, not ##k!## ?\nIt is k!. I mistyped that.\n\nThere was another error, it is\n##1-\\sum_{k=1}^{c} n^k\\lambda^k\\frac{e^{n\\lambda}}{k!}\\geq \\alpha##, NOT ##1-\\sum_{k=1}^{c+1} n\\lambda^k\\frac{e^{n\\lambda}}{k!}\\geq \\alpha##.\n\nand\n\n##\\sum_{k=1}^{c} n^k\\lambda^k\\frac{e^{n\\lambda}}{k!}\\leq \\alpha## instead of ##\\sum_{k=1}^{c} n\\lambda^k\\frac{e^{n\\lambda}}{k!}\\leq \\alpha##\n\nLast edited by a moderator:\nMentor\nOkay, so we have the standard Poisson distribution with ##n\\lambda## expectation value. I'm not aware of closed formulas for the cumulative distribution function.\n\nAs the two sums are now the same, the problem got easier: Check which inequality you have to consider for ##\\alpha## smaller or larger than 1\/2,\n\nOkay, so we have the standard Poisson distribution with ##n\\lambda## expectation value. I'm not aware of closed formulas for the cumulative distribution function.\n\nAs the two sums are now the same, the problem got easier: Check which inequality you have to consider for ##\\alpha## smaller or larger than 1\/2,\n\nI don't understand the last part. I don't have the values ##n,\\lambda,c## which I think I need to calculate the sum, and I need to calculate the sum in order too know which inequality should I use if ##\\alpha## smaller or larger than 1\/2.\n\nMentor\n2022 Award\nWithout all the constants in the sum, it is just ##\\sum_{k=1}^c \\frac{\\lambda^k}{k!} \\leq \\ldots ## which is just the exponential function ##- 1##. There are probably more approximations ##r## for ##e^x = \\sum_{k=0}^N \\frac{x^k}{k!} + r(x;N) \\text{ with } r(x;N) \\leq \\ldots ## than of any other function.\n\nHomework Helper\nDearly Missed\nIt is k!. I mistyped that.\n\nThere was another error, it is\n##1-\\sum_{k=1}^{c} n^k\\lambda^k\\frac{e^{n\\lambda}}{k!}\\geq \\alpha##, NOT ##1-\\sum_{k=1}^{c+1} n\\lambda^k\\frac{e^{n\\lambda}}{k!}\\geq \\alpha##.\n\nand\n\n##\\sum_{k=1}^{c} n^k\\lambda^k\\frac{e^{n\\lambda}}{k!}\\leq \\alpha## instead of ##\\sum_{k=1}^{c} n\\lambda^k\\frac{e^{n\\lambda}}{k!}\\leq \\alpha##\n\nDo you really mean to have ##e^{n \\lambda}## rather than ##e^{- n \\lambda}##? I ask, because if ##p_k(\\mu) = \\mu^k e^{-\\mu}\/k!## is the Poisson probability mass function for mean ##\\mu## your sum has the form ##e^{2 n \\lambda} \\sum_{k=1}^c p_k(n \\lambda)##. If you had ##e^{-n \\lambda}## instead, your sum would be ##\\sum_{k=1}^c p_k(n \\lambda)##, which is almost the cumulative distribution function; it merely lacks the ##k=0## term.\n\nGabrielN00 and fresh_42\nDo you really mean to have ##e^{n \\lambda}## rather than ##e^{- n \\lambda}##? I ask, because if ##p_k(\\mu) = \\mu^k e^{-\\mu}\/k!## is the Poisson probability mass function for mean ##\\mu## your sum has the form ##e^{2 n \\lambda} \\sum_{k=1}^c p_k(n \\lambda)##. If you had ##e^{-n \\lambda}## instead, your sum would be ##\\sum_{k=1}^c p_k(n \\lambda)##, which is almost the cumulative distribution function; it merely lacks the ##k=0## term.\n\nYou're right. It is ##e^{-n\\lambda}##.\n\nIt's supposed to be the cumulative function. This is part of a larger problem, I didn't post the whole thing because I had some parts worked out. I don't think I can edit the initial post anymore, but I will post the original problem to give some context (which I probably should have done before).\n\nThe idea of the problem consists in having ##X_1,\\dots, X_n## simple random sample of ##X\\sim \\operatorname{Poisson}(\\lambda)## and the goal is the optimal critical region ##\\alpha## for ##H_0:\\lambda =\\lambda_0## against ##H_1:\\lambda=\\lambda_1##.\n\nI applied Neyman-Pearson theorem and followed ## \\frac{\\lambda_0}{\\lambda_1} = \\frac{(\\lambda_0^{\\sum x_i} e^{-\\lambda_0}) \/ (\\prod_{i=1}^n x_i!)}{(\\lambda_1^{\\sum x_i}e^{-\\lambda_1})\/(\\prod_{i=1}^n x_i!)} = \\frac{\\lambda_0^{\\sum x_i}e^{\\lambda_1}}{\\lambda_1^{\\sum x_i}e^{\\lambda_0}}\\leq k##\n\nTaking logarithms\n\n## \\ln \\left( \\lambda_0^{\\sum x_i}e^{\\lambda_1} \\right)-\\ln \\left( \\lambda_1^{\\sum x_i}e^{\\lambda_0} \\right)\\leq \\ln(k)\\\\\n\\ln \\left( \\lambda_0^{\\sum x_i}\\right)+\\ln\\left(e^{\\lambda_1} \\right)-\\ln \\left( \\lambda_1^{\\sum x_i}\\right)-\\left(e^{\\lambda_0} \\right)\\leq \\ln(k)\\\\\n\\left(\\sum x_i\\right)\\ln (\\lambda_0)+\\lambda_1 -\\left( \\sum x_i \\right)\\ln \\left( \\lambda_1\\right)-\\lambda_0\\leq \\ln(k)\\\\\n\\left(\\sum x_i\\right)\\left(\\ln (\\lambda_0) -\\ln \\left( \\lambda_1\\right)\\right)\\leq \\ln(k)+(\\lambda_0-\\lambda_1)\\\\\n\\sum x_i\\leq \\frac{\\ln(k)+(\\lambda_0-\\lambda_1)}{\\ln (\\lambda_0) -\\ln \\left( \\lambda_1\\right)}\n##\n\nBecause of that I have to find ##c## such that\n##P\\left( \\sum_{i=1}^n X_i \\leq c |, \\lambda = \\lambda_0 \\right) \\leq \\alpha##\n\nand\n\n##P\\left( \\sum_{i=1}^{c+1} X_i \\le c \\,\\middle|\\, \\lambda = \\lambda_0 \\right) \\geq \\alpha##\n\nWhich reduced to the pair of equations you see above.\n\nLast edited by a moderator:\nHomework Helper\nDearly Missed\nYou are right, it is ##e^{-n\\lambda}##\nIn that case, you can express the sum in terms of known functions:\n$$\\sum_{k=0}^c \\frac{(n \\lambda)^k e^{-n \\lambda}}{k!} = \\frac{\\Gamma(c+1,n \\lambda)}{\\Gamma(c+1)},$$\nwhere ##\\Gamma(p,q)## is the incomplete Gamma function:\n$$\\Gamma(p,q) = \\int_q^{\\infty} t^{p-1} e^{-t} \\, dt .$$\nWhether this is of any use at all is another issue.\n\nLast edited:\nHomework Helper\nDearly Missed\nYou're right. It is ##e^{-n\\lambda}##.\n\nIt's supposed to be the cumulative function. This is part of a larger problem, I didn't post the whole thing because I had some parts worked out. I don't think I can edit the initial post anymore, but I will post the original problem to give some context (which I probably should have done before).\n\nThe idea of the problem consists in having ##X_1,\\dots, X_n## simple random sample of ##X\\sim \\operatorname{Poisson}(\\lambda)## and the goal is the optimal critical region ##\\alpha## for ##H_0:\\lambda =\\lambda_0## against ##H_1:\\lambda=\\lambda_1##.\n\nI applied Neyman-Pearson theorem and followed ## \\frac{\\lambda_0}{\\lambda_1} = \\frac{(\\lambda_0^{\\sum x_i} e^{-\\lambda_0}) \/ (\\prod_{i=1}^n x_i!)}{(\\lambda_1^{\\sum x_i}e^{-\\lambda_1})\/(\\prod_{i=1}^n x_i!)} = \\frac{\\lambda_0^{\\sum x_i}e^{\\lambda_1}}{\\lambda_1^{\\sum x_i}e^{\\lambda_0}}\\leq k##\n\nTaking logarithms\n\n## \\ln \\left( \\lambda_0^{\\sum x_i}e^{\\lambda_1} \\right)-\\ln \\left( \\lambda_1^{\\sum x_i}e^{\\lambda_0} \\right)\\leq \\ln(k)\\\\\n\\ln \\left( \\lambda_0^{\\sum x_i}\\right)+\\ln\\left(e^{\\lambda_1} \\right)-\\ln \\left( \\lambda_1^{\\sum x_i}\\right)-\\left(e^{\\lambda_0} \\right)\\leq \\ln(k)\\\\\n\\left(\\sum x_i\\right)\\ln (\\lambda_0)+\\lambda_1 -\\left( \\sum x_i \\right)\\ln \\left( \\lambda_1\\right)-\\lambda_0\\leq \\ln(k)\\\\\n\\left(\\sum x_i\\right)\\left(\\ln (\\lambda_0) -\\ln \\left( \\lambda_1\\right)\\right)\\leq \\ln(k)+(\\lambda_0-\\lambda_1)\\\\\n\\sum x_i\\leq \\frac{\\ln(k)+(\\lambda_0-\\lambda_1)}{\\ln (\\lambda_0) -\\ln \\left( \\lambda_1\\right)}\n##\n\nBecause of that I have to find ##c## such that\n##P\\left( \\sum_{i=1}^n X_i \\leq c |, \\lambda = \\lambda_0 \\right) \\leq \\alpha##\n\nand\n\n##P\\left( \\sum_{i=1}^{c+1} X_i \\le c \\,\\middle|\\, \\lambda = \\lambda_0 \\right) \\geq \\alpha##\n\nWhich reduced to the pair of equations you see above.\nI really don't \"get\" these two equations. Suppose, eg., that ##\\lambda_0 < \\lambda_1##. Say we accept the null hypothesis if ##\\sum X_i \\leq c## and reject it if ##\\sum X_i > c##. (Since the random variables are discrete we need to distinguish ## < c## from ##\\leq c##, and I have more-or-less arbitrarily chosen the ##\\leq c## version for the acceptance region.) Thus, we accept ##H_0## if ##\\sum_{I=1}^n X_i \\leq c## and reject it otherwise. So, the probability of a type-I error is ##P(I) = P(\\sum_{I=1}^n X_i > c| \\lambda = \\lambda_0)##, and we want this to be ##\\leq \\alpha.## For a given ##n## that tells you the acceptable values of ##c##.\n\nThe probability of a type-II error is ##P(II) = P(\\sum_{I=1}^n X_i \\leq c | \\lambda = \\lambda_1)##, and (presumably) we want this to be ##\\leq \\beta## for some specified value ##\\beta.## Your presentation does mention any ##\\beta##, but of course you could take ##\\beta = \\alpha.## However, if you are doing that you need to mention it!\n\nThe two conditions taken together give two inequalities involving ##(n , c)##, which we can probably solve (numerically) using a computer algebra package such as Maple or Mathematica.\n\nLast edited:","date":"2023-03-25 14:39:57","metadata":"{\"extraction_info\": {\"found_math\": true, \"script_math_tex\": 0, \"script_math_asciimath\": 0, \"math_annotations\": 0, \"math_alttext\": 0, \"mathml\": 0, \"mathjax_tag\": 0, \"mathjax_inline_tex\": 0, \"mathjax_display_tex\": 1, \"mathjax_asciimath\": 0, \"img_math\": 0, \"codecogs_latex\": 0, \"wp_latex\": 0, \"mimetex.cgi\": 0, \"\/images\/math\/codecogs\": 0, \"mathtex.cgi\": 0, \"katex\": 0, \"math-container\": 0, \"wp-katex-eq\": 0, \"align\": 0, \"equation\": 0, \"x-ck12\": 0, \"texerror\": 0, \"math_score\": 0.9928050637245178, \"perplexity\": 3950.230019546161}, \"config\": {\"markdown_headings\": false, \"markdown_code\": true, \"boilerplate_config\": {\"ratio_threshold\": 0.18, \"absolute_threshold\": 10, \"end_threshold\": 15, \"enable\": true}, \"remove_buttons\": true, \"remove_image_figures\": true, \"remove_link_clusters\": true, \"table_config\": {\"min_rows\": 2, \"min_cols\": 3, \"format\": \"plain\"}, \"remove_chinese\": true, \"remove_edit_buttons\": true, \"extract_latex\": true}, \"warc_path\": \"s3:\/\/commoncrawl\/crawl-data\/CC-MAIN-2023-14\/segments\/1679296945333.53\/warc\/CC-MAIN-20230325130029-20230325160029-00203.warc.gz\"}"}
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The purpose of the Jr. Fair Livestock Sale Committee is to promote and manage the Junior Fair Livestock Sales at the Ross County Fair. The Constitution and By-Laws of the Committee, approved, on January 10, 1983, are available by request. Although the complete details of the sales will not be listed here, the following policies are of particular importance to members selling livestock.
Sellers of market livestock will be guaranteed a packer-bid price.
A 4% commission or $4.00 per animal charge (whichever amount is greater) will be charged to sellers to cover the sale expenses.
Livestock checks will be mailed to Sellers (exhibitors) on the last Sat- urday of September for those sellers whose buyers have paid. Begin- ning in October, all other monies will be mailed to the exhibitor when their buyer(s) make payment to the Sales committee.
Only 4-H and FFA members may sell market livestock at the sales.
All Grand Champion and Reserve Grand Champion animals must sell in their respective sale and will go to harvest through the designation of the Sale Committee.
Sale order will be determined according to class placings, grade and weight. See specie information below for more details.
Goats - Market Goats sell according to placing and grade. Order for Goat Sale will be: Grand Champion & Reserve Grand Champion, Cham- pion & Reserve Champion County Raised, Champion Performance Goat, then heaviest to lightest according to class placing. Goats weighing less than 50 lbs will receive packer price. All market goats must go to harvest.
Hogs - Hog Sale order: Grand Champion & Reserve Grand Champion, Division Champions & Reserve Division Champions, Class Winners. Hogs weighing less than 220 lbs or over 290 lbs will be sold at market price prior to the sale based on arrangements made following the Tuesday Show. All market hogs must go to harvest.
Lambs - Market Lambs sell according to placing, grade and weight. Order for Lamb Sale: Grand Champion Market Lamb, Reserve GrandChampion Market Lamb, Grand Champion Pen of 2, Reserve Grand Champion Pen of 2, , Champion Single Project Lamb, Reserve Champion Single Project Lamb, Champion Performance Lamb, class winners from lightest to heaviest, remaining lambs. Pens of Two will sell according to their highest project placing. Each exhibitor may go through the sale ring one time. Lambs under 85 lbs will receive market price. All market lambs must go to harvest.
For exhibitors with 2 lambs who win either Grand Champion or Reserve Grand Champion, they will have the following choices for their second lamb: 1) Send their lamb to packer and receive market price; or 2) Take market price but sell lamb through sale ring as a Building Fund Lamb with proceeds donated to the Building Fund.
If exhibitor with 2 lambs wins either Grand Champion or Reserve Champion and Champion Pen of Two, they have the choice of selling lambs together as both Grand Champion/Champion Pen of Two or Reserve Champion/Champion Pen of Two, or only selling their highest single lamb and selecting from one of the above second lamb choices.
Poultry - Order for Market Chicken sale will be according to place and grade.
Rabbits - Rabbits will sell according to grade and average weight. Order for Rabbit Sale will be: Champion Pen of 2, Reserve Champion Pen of 2, Champion Pen of 2 Homegrown, Reserve Champion Pen of 2 Homegrown, Rate of Gain Winner, Division Champions, Class Winners, Class Placings Fryers/Broilers (Heavy to Light).
Steers - Order for the Steer Sale will be: Grand Champion & Reserve Grand Champion, Champion Calf Scramble, 3rd Overall, 4th Overall, 5th Overall, 1st place Rate of Gain Steer. Class Winners will follow from heaviest to lightest. All other steers will sell in order according to class placing, grade and weight, with the heaviest selling first (all second place steers, followed by third place steers, etc. heaviest to lightest and project grade A,B,C). Steers weighing less than 900 lbs. will receive packer price.
ALL invoices for "KEEP" animals MUST be paid the night of the respective sale.
After 60 days, all unpaid invoices will be charged a 5% Late Fee.
Credit/Debit cards (Mastercard, Visa, Discover) will be accepted for payment in the Jr. Fair Sale Office during the fair.
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Spanish traditions in UNESCO World Heritage list
Posted on 24 November 2010 in the "Culture" Category
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Well, there are many world heritage sites in Spain, but this year the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) has listed Spanish traditions: Flamenco, the Mediterranean diet, the Castell human tower, falconry and the 'Canto de Sibilia' from Majorca in its list of intangible cultural heritage.
All those latest additions in the UNESCO list are worthy of their consideration. Flamenco, a gypsy style of music and dance is very much attached to the regions of southern Spain. Its inclusion has been greeted by Andalucian Flamenco Agency and many artists in Spain.
This is the second time that the Govt. of Spain had included flamenco as a candidature for UNESCO's World Cultural Heritage. It has been declared one of the masterpieces of the Oral and Intangible Heritage of Humanity.
UNESCO: Intangible cultural heritage does not only represent inherited traditions from the past but also contemporary rural and urban practices in which diverse cultural groups take part.
Mediterranean diet among Spanish traditions
By declaring such traditions as cultural heritage the UN organisation encourages local communities to protect them. Hence, Spanish flamenco can rightly be noted as the essence of Spain, the life and soul of Andalucia! Read more about Flamenco here
A visit to Spain and more particularly the southern Spain gives you an excellent chance to savour some of the finest Mediterranean cuisines, which is an integral part of Spanish traditions. In modern times, the diet is changing throughout the Mediterranean world and so the importance to promote the traditionalistic notion of Mediterranean diet.
Mediterranean diet, which has its origin from some 9000 years ego, is not just a healthy way to eat rather, according to experts; it is in entirety an art, culture and way of life. It's inclusion in UNESCO intangible cultural assets is just another attempt to preserve yet another Spanish tradition.
Los Castells - building human castles
The next in the list of UNESCO recognition is the 'Canto de Sibilia' – the Mallorcan Christmas chant. The chant is performed in churches throughout Majorca Island and one of typical regional Spanish traditions.
As per historical records, the chant was introduced in Europe during the middle Ages and came to this part of Spain with Christian conquest in somewhere around 1229. UNESCO recognised this as a deep rooted Spanish tradition which has a strong sense of cultural identity and pride of the locals.
The last two in our list of Spanish traditions recognised by UNESCO are: the "Los Castells'- a typical Spanish tradition in many parts of Catalonia which consists of building human castles, and the other one is "falconry"- the art of training falcons to hunt and return. This practice of falconry has its historical credential and has been a part of Spanish traditions and cultural heritage.
Tags: Canto de Sibilia, Castells, Culture Spain, falconry, flamenco, Los Castells, Mediterranean diet, Spanish traditions, UNESCO cultural heritage, UNESCO world heritage
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The software iSCSI adapter is not created by default. It has to be manually created and enabled. In this recipe, we will learn how to enable the software iSCSI adapter. There can only be one software iSCSI adapter per ESXi server.
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Refusal as a weapon. There is NO unconstitutional law that Mike Bloomberg can buy that we cannot nullify with armed civil disobedience.
NOTE: If you agree with this post, please forward the link as far and wide as you can. (LATER: My thanks to Larry Pratt for the mirror on his Facebook here.)
They can jail us. They can shoot us. They can even conscript us. They can use us as cannon-fodder in the Somme. But… but, we have a weapon more powerful than any in the whole arsenal of their British Empire. And that weapon is our refusal. Our refusal to bow to any order but our own, any institutions but our own. -- Liam Neeson portraying Michael Collins, 1996.
Mike Bloomberg thought he was on a roll. In the wake of Sandy Hook, his money managed to buy unconstitutional legislation in Connecticut, Colorado, Maryland and New York. In the election just past, his money staved off defeat for two governors who did his bidding, although as Wellington said about Waterloo, it was "the nearest run thing you ever saw." Most importantly -- and the latest jewel in his anti-firearm crown -- his money and that of Bill Gates, Paul Allen and other like-minded elitists "bought the mob" (in the parlance of the Founders) with the success of I-594 in Washington state.
Yes, Bloomberg was on a roll. The so-called "mainstream" gun rights organizations, from the NRA to Alan Gottlieb's Second Amendment Foundation and all the smaller spin-offs in the affected states, had no answer to Bloomberg's millions and refused to put their own rivalries and jealousies aside to find one. This is hardly a surprise, since almost all of these groups have always been more about raising money to "fight gun control" than actually FIGHTING gun control. Each has been more obsessed with their own reputation in the collectivist-dominated press and their obsession to "win friends and influence people" in the middle. So, following their long-established patterns and refusals to think and act outside the boxes they placed themselves in, they lost. They lost in Connecticut, they lost in Maryland, they lost in New York, they lost in Colorado and now they have lost in Washington state.
In each case, Bloomberg understood his enemies, their foibles and their failures far better than they understood him. So he won and they lost.
But then something happened that Bloomberg in his arrogance never expected, something that the "mainstream gun rights organizations" for their part never expected either -- in every single state where Bloomberg had "won," it turned out that the victims of his unconstitutional laws had other ideas. And they didn't need "leaders" like Wayne LaPierre and Alan Gottlieb to lead them.
The "I Will Not Comply" movement in the various affected states began the instant Bloomberg's Intolerable Acts were passed. Individual firearm owners, led here and there by some courageous activists of the smaller rights groups who were not so worried about raising money and preserving their press image than their "betters," simply announced that they would not obey such unconstitutional laws. They refused to cooperate in their own disarmament. They refused to obey. If the government wanted to make them criminals, well, then, they would be criminals and they dared the authorities to do anything about it.
And the authorities did . . . nothing. When it became apparent that Connecticut was experiencing a stunning non-compliance rate approaching 85 percent, Mike Lawlor, the governor's appointed "gun commissar" in that state made threatening noises. But the raids did not begin. And now, almost two years later, they still haven't begun. In New York, the non-compliance rate is even higher, with county sheriffs even threatening to arrest state policemen who seek to enforce the SAFE Act in their jurisdictions. And Governor Cuomo has done . . . nothing.
In Colorado, on the day the magazine ban went into effect in July 2013, resisters gathered on the statehouse steps and broke the law. And the authorities did. . . nothing. After I announced on 20 April 2013 on the steps of the Connecticut state capitol that I had smuggled in forbidden magazines in violation of their diktat, Lawlor had the state police open a criminal investigation of me, but did . . . nothing. Since then my friends and I have smuggled in more such magazines to that state and the authorities have done . . . nothing. I even recently attended a gun show in CT simply to give the authorities a chance to arrest me if they felt froggy enough. And they did . . . nothing. The raids have not begun. The state and its newly felonized citizens have been looking at each other with firearms in their hands for almost two years now. Yet the other jackboot has not dropped. And the authorities, as with those in other states with Bloomberg Rules, don't know whether to defecate or go blind. Consequently they have done . . . nothing.
This refusal, this armed civil disobedience, reached its highest expression to date with the "I Will Not Comply" rally at the state capitol in Olympia on the 13th of this month. Two thousand armed people met, without a permit, defied I-594, held a successful rally without incident, and the authorities did . . . nothing. I was privileged to speak at this historic event as well. I will go back to Yakima in June for a planned gun show that will refuse to conduct the 594-required background checks and we will give the authorities a chance to enforce their new Bloomberg Rules.
And where are the "mainstream gun rights groups" in this national campaign of armed civil disobedience which has negated the results of Bloomberg's money, his so-called "victories"? Why, they're nowhere to be found. They have either condemned them or ignored them. In a recent interview, Alan Gottlieb, -- who was apparently vacationing in Hong Kong on the proceeds of his members' dues while the brave men and women of his state were risking arrest defying I-594 -- denied that the rally was in fact "armed civil disobedience" because, he ludicrously claimed, "most people there weren't armed."
And if you didn't get the underlying message, he went on to say "I don't think it helped us with the general public. It doesn't help us with the public or the legislators." And, he added, "I'm not a fan of armed civil disobedience."
Coming from a guy who has never risked more than a paper cut opening fundraising envelopes . . . coming from a guy who was willing to trade away national background checks in the immediate aftermath of Sandy Hook . . . this was hardly surprising. He will do what he has always done when confronted with Bloomberg Rules. If he cannot sue it, if he cannot lobby a "compromise" that gives up a little more of other people's essential liberties and property, he will do . . . nothing.
Yet such "leaders" risk exposure and irrelevance in the new shifting paradigm. Legal challenges on all these Intolerable Acts are working their way through the courts. All have, up to now, failed. Elections have been fought and lost. Lobbying has been redoubled. Indeed, in the same interview Gottlieb asserted that the emergency was so grave that they had hired another lobbyist!
But the practitioners of armed civil disobedience, the resistance behind enemy lines in Connecticut, New York, Maryland, Colorado and Washington state, have ALREADY NULLIFIED BLOOMBERG RULES. And Michael Bloomberg himself doesn't seem to know whether to defecate or go blind.
The failures of the "mainstream gun rights groups" to protect liberty and property from Bloomberg's assaults have forced the American people -- an eminently practical people -- to make their own arrangements. If this risks exposing the increasing irrelevance of such groups there is nothing we can do about it. (Although there is certainly something THEY can do about it -- thinking and acting outside the boxes of their own comfort zones would be a good start.) But the fact of the matter is that, as demonstrated now by almost two years of experiences THERE IS NO UNCONSTITUTIONAL LAW THAT MIKE BLOOMBERG CAN BUY THAT WE CANNOT NULLIFY WITH ARMED CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE.
Refusal is a weapon. It is a weapon that has been used to good effect in this country since the time of the Founders. Michael Bloomberg's Rules are negated by the Law of Unintended Consequences. And looking back on the past two years of expensive laws and craven legislators bought and sold that all of his "victories" required, Bloomberg must be wondering this Christmas why it is that someone crapped in his stocking. He should be celebrating. Instead he has been frustrated, as the Founders intended, by the refusal of the armed citizenry of the United States to bow down to him and his tyrannical kind.
Link.
Wraith said...
It's so satisfying.
After watching our so-called 'Conservative/Libertarian "leaders"' draw line after line in the sand and watch helplessly as the Thug Regime tap-dances across them...
Commies: Give up your guns!
America: No.
Commies: We're serious!
Commies: OK, we're TOTALLY SERIAL now.
America: F.U.
Commies: Really, now, we're drawing our SUPER DOUBLE SECRET PROBATION line in the sand...!!
America: (extends social digit)
God help me, the impotent ravings of a bunch of arrogant bullies really are music to my ears. Molon Labe, bitches! :D
Nightshade said...
Tyranny is never forced. It is an act of deliberate and mutual consent between ruler and subject. Refuse. Simple as that.
Alan Gottlieb is a liar and a phony. He screwed the gun owners of Washington in general and his own SAF membership in particular with his piss-poor I-591 campaign. He bilked WAC out of a considerable sum of money with the complicity of his buddies on the BoD. SAF, you guys need to find a new leader.
BTW, I was at the rally, and I can assure you that every single person there was armed.
johnnyreb said...
Me-thinks I hear the sweet sound of leftist desperation ringing through the hills. This was their big chance; seemed like all the cards were falling their way with all their collectivist schemes.
It's starting to slip away, and time is running out; people are starting to wise up, and even bath-house Barry's bullshit is not working.
Tick, tock.
TimeHasCome said...
Mike I know you were looking forward to tomorrows UN ban on firearms . So here is a link.
http://news.yahoo.com/global-arms-treaty-enters-force-wednesday-062303197.html
Ry Jones said...
Blogged, tweeted.
Bloomberg buying his way is only proving more and more that our government has been taken over by the money people .. if this can be done by the wealthy , than we no longer have a Republic or a representative government
and those states that sucked his wallet need to be sued the pants off of for infringing our rights .. we no longer should stand for this crap and make it known if it continues that were coming for restitution
EOTS
From behind enemy lines in NY: the a*&holes in state gov't can screw themselves. If that means calling me a criminal, so be it. I've been called worse. ..But I absolutely refuse to be called a coward...And mike, I received my hat today and it looks great. Thank you..
We will not comply!
Judenräte Gottlieb can make all the deals with the Nazi's he wants but we will not comply.
Hope to see you in June Mike V, look for the flag that say's;
There will be a place for you at our campfire!
Death before tyranny!
Comrade X
"I'm not a fan of armed civil disobedience." -Alan Gottlieb
Translation: I'm not a fan of this country's founding generation whose demonstration of armed civil disobedience gave birth to the world's first truly free country.
The only decission that Bloomberg and his ilk can make is to blindly defacate.
WE will know what to do when the SHTF ...
A picture of Alan making that quote, morphing into Alan Colmes saying the same thing would be, well, deeeelicious.
In a sane world, that comment would see him drummed out of SAF akin to way a particular "writer" was stunned out of a particular magazine.....
There is a real good reason Alan Gottleib does not like armed resistance. Alan Gotter is a convicted felon, for tax evasion of all things. He doesn't like it because he can't participate. How in the hell does anyone even give him the time of freakin day?
I594 was a deliberate attempt to placate the anti rights bigots, he was the brains behind feeding the alligator. Thanks, Judenrat, we here in Arizona really f***ING appreciate that, seeing how Bloomdouche wants AZ as his next prize! Not in my state you New York asshole! And Gottleib, please stop helping us!
Tom 762 III
They will not take your guns. They will wait you out. If you want a fight, you'll have to shoot first.
Of course, then you'll lose.
Rock, meet hard place.
" Of course, then you'll lose", Isn't that what the British empire said?
Armed civil disobedience?????
That is most definitely a very last resort, if at all.
Not smart to even talk about it.
Paul X said...
This works in other spheres too. On my local homeschooling list the newbies always asked how to "get right with the authorities". I always asked them, "Why bother? Whose kids are they, yours or the state's?" The lists were always monitored by the teacher's union, we are certain, but they did nothing. I suppose none of them wanted to tangle with an irate, armed father; I made it clear I would not tolerate anyone messing with my family.
We can expect Bloomberg's flunkies to try to SWAT some "ringleaders". This won't work either because some old men with nothing to lose can always take out the mayor and police chief and any local gun grabbers in relatiation. Also it looks bad to use government overkill to trample a popular rebellion; see for example what happened with Julio Buitrago:
"Somoza still was completely in control. The guerrilla actions in urban and rural zones were repelled and in 1967 a second organized move was knocked down after several combats in the northern region of the country. The remnant Sandinistas were forced to disperse in much more remote areas.
Nevertheless, the movement did not die. In 1969, a small group of battlers hidden in a house in Managua was discovered by the National Guard, and a battle took place almost as if it was a movie scene. Three hundred soldiers, tanks and planes were sent to destroy the hidden guerrillas. The battle lasted several hours until there was no more answer to the attack. When soldiers entered the house seeking for bodies they realized that the entire combat was fought by a single young man, Julio Buitrago, who stayed inside the house so that his partners could escape.
Somoza showed the battle on TV to demonstrate the FSLN's destruction, but the heroic action of a single man turned the entire situation around and the population was moved by the event and identified themselves even more with the revolutionary movement. Other unequal battles took place in several cities."
https://vianica.com/go/specials/15-sandinista-revolution-in-nicaragua.html
Texas TopCat said...
I agree with this article in the main part. However, do we really think that I-594 would have been passed if opposing view could have spend the same amount of money? The law was not passed by educated/informed voters, but by people that hard hundreds of ads claiming I-594 just closed loop holes in background checks.
It takes more than one type of organization. Some fights require money, and those that raise money cannot afford to advocate violation of the law lest the courts take their money from them. Disobedience is the realm of stealth organizations.
Michael Collins was fighting for an Irish Republic, so why does this movie repeatedly speak of the Democracy he achieved?
BHirsh said...
And thus, absolute proof of the framers' natural law concept of deterrence through armament not only survives, but THRIVES.
Don Holmes said...
I notified all of my "pro gun " organizations that I have sent my last donation and will not be re-joining. Sad Member of NRA since 1970 what a waste. Also Goa, Saf Nssf and more.
Now it's We The People, And I will not comply, not
now and not ever.
While I hold no love for the NRA, the ire directed against the SAF is unfounded and unwarranted. So they were outspent and out down by the gun grabbers. The strength of the SAF is not in campaigning and outspending elitist billionaires, but in taking the fight to the courts and winning. From Heller, to McDonald and every other win we've had at the Supreme Court knocking down restrictive gun rights right and left, every single such case has been lead by Gottlieb and the SAF legal team.
They didn't prevail in WA because that is not their battlefield. So starve them of support at great risk to us all. Supreme Court Challenges are not cheap. Just consider that when you rail against them. GOA and NRA are a different matter.
And no I'm not employed by SAF, but I do support them.
Lex Luthor said:
Enough with the "Judenratte" BS.
If Gottlieb is not your favorite person, or not effective in his role, it is not his religion or heritage that is at fault. There is no room for bigotry in the fight for freedom.
26 Ways the Media Botched Their Reporting on the L...
Comment on the SAF lawsuit by a WA state firearm r...
Opportunities abound for New Year's gun rights res...
Gun owners fear Maryland cops target them for traf...
"We're not trying to stop background checks," Gott...
If you were plotting to commit public urination in...
Crime as Politics
If you expect me to mourn over the discomfiture of...
"In military affairs, quantity has a quality all i...
Yale gun prohibitionist shows 'highly developed' a...
Bob Owens gets a little upset.
How about Maryland and Virginia in January?
Hat update.
Alabama needs no compromise on Second Amendment
Another clueless collectivist seeking self-extinct...
McCain's big purge
Looks like we've got us a pattern.
Oh, c'mon. You don't think the FBI would LIE abou...
Guess he found out the truth of Grandpa Vanderboeg...
Looks like it's time for an open carry march in No...
Gun year in review picks top stories for 2014
'Distinguished Professor of Politics' accuses NRA ...
Thanks to Ammoland for picking up my earlier post.
"The Constitution's horrible, no good, very bad ye...
Maybe the elites can really and completely destroy...
Yeah, yeah. I've heard about this "United Front"...
A generation of imbeciles.
Feldman & Pratt: Plan to merge ATF with FBI makes ...
More than a little late to the starting gate.
And who might "the enemy within" be? Why us, of c...
Surrender is not an option.
Public Notice: Itinerant seditionist/smuggler seek...
Putting a premium on hiring ignorant cops -- and k...
Two countries, divided.
Unum Necessarium. "Now was the time to squirrel aw...
An argument for applied nullification.
Projection much? Collectivist pot, accidentally l...
Overslept.
Secretive "Gun Control" Cabal Threatens Liberty by...
When in Mumbai
GOP felon Grimm shows true gun-grabber colors
"Hands up! Don't shoot!" Black, er, ah, RED live...
The rather uneven appreciation for the season of p...
Believe me, collectivists are hardly swayed by fol...
Silly me. I always thought he worshipped in the m...
The IRS: Just One of Dozens of Uncooperative Agencies
ATF used F&F "to help justify new gun control regu...
May the Lord bless and keep you all this Christmas.
A not-exactly-merry Christmas present.
An unexpected moment of judicial sanity.
The ease with which civil wars can start. Uncomfo...
Order in Dobyns case highlights government motion ...
The latest from Dr. Evil's trolls at Media Matters.
Refusal as a weapon. There is NO unconstitutional ...
A little late to the party. Britain's Sky News di...
Daily Caller takes SPLC-inspired Time magazine pie...
"Chief" Kessler. Again.
Bernard Goetz's Subway Gunshots Echo Still
DeWine reverses decision to ignore improved law en...
David Codrea on "Squatter's Rights." Sipsey Stree...
Another planet heard from. . .
Attn: Rabid cop haters whose blood dancing celebra...
Gun Control Cultist Calls For Children To Steal Pa...
Meanwhile, the GOP elites continue their campaign ...
A paradigm gone with the wind. (Harry Truman, lik...
Wash. state Rep. Matt Shea demands apology after d...
Have bow tie, will travel. Alan Gottlieb, man abo...
Attkisson: CDC Hiding Numbers of Possible Ebola Ca...
Ferguson Protesters Chant "Pigs in a Blanket" Afte...
Daily Mail Fast and Furious report repeats unsubst...
The Unintended Ironical Hypocrisy of the Collectiv...
Alan Gottlieb to surface on Armed American Radio.
Elizabeth Scott at the I-594 I Will Not Comply Rally
Successful adaptation to Zombieland Rule Number On...
"Law-breaking teen 'vigilante' causes North Caroli...
Koch money and GOP access may discourage pairing a...
Kapos for Kristallnacht: A Classic from David Codr...
Okay, I changed my password. In fact, I changed a...
Alan, ist dat du? Apparently I pissed off somebod...
A French Soldier's View of US Soldiers in Afghanistan
Rough yesterday and rougher night.
"Grand jury indicts former 'Sons of Guns' star Wil...
Glad to see that Kurt Hofmann is back in the fight.
Craven Legislators Form Gun Control Group, Are Ter...
Barack Obama's gift that keeps on killing.
Southern Preposterous Lie Center does what the "Gu...
WILL NOT COMPLY: Prosecutor, Sheriff Say The Will ...
What is old is new again. "The Rise and Fall and ...
Rainmen: Voluntary Autism. The silent squirms of ...
Why Gun-Control Advocates Lie about Guns
Those Dangerous Constitutionalists!
Gunwalker Docs: AP, CBS, NBC Reporters in ATF's Po...
Anti-gun politician convicted over teen staffer vo...
I miss Sparky the Militia Dog. Too bad Mark Pitca...
Saint Gabby booed at Olympia rally, collectivist u...
Three Percenter Hat update
Finally got hit by a hammer right between the eyes.
I was on Ben Shapiro's radio show yesterday talkin...
|
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"redpajama_set_name": "RedPajamaCommonCrawl"
}
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Coldwell Banker Residential Brokerage and its 1,490 affiliated independent sales associates are dedicated to helping make Arizona a better place for us all to call home. Our passion for our beautiful state and its people is what drives us to give back in every way we can. Through volunteering our time, donating goods and services, and making financial contributions, we support an array of local charitable organizations. Here is a brief overview of some of the events that were featured in the media throughout Arizona.
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Working to benefit the Arizona Department of Child Safety, staff and affiliated agents of our North Scottsdale office held a drive to collect child safety items to fill baskets that were donated to families in need.
Barrels of toys were collected for the United States Marine Corps Toys for Tots Program in our Northern, Central and Southern Arizona offices, which benefits underprivileged children during the holiday season.
Our Tucson offices helped sponsor Dogtoberfest, held in conjunction with Adopt-A-Pet, which drew 1,700 people and 700 dogs and helped raise money for the Handi-Dogs' service dog training programs.
Our commitment to giving back is part of our corporate culture. You can see it in the Coldwell Banker® brand's Homes for Dogs Project, created in partnership with Adopt-a-Pet.com. Using national advertising, social media and local adoption events to generate awareness and bring pets and people together, the initiative has helped more than 20,000 adoptable pets find loving homes since 2015. You can learn more at coldwellbanker.com/dogs.
And you'll find it at our parent company, Realogy. The Realogy Charitable Foundation was created to raise awareness and provide financial support for charitable causes and disaster relief in all the communities Realogy companies serve. Collectively, the foundation has raised more than $25 million.
We're proud of the work we do every day to help home buyers and sellers achieve their real estate goals. And we're even more proud to be making a positive difference in our communities, our state and our country.
|
{
"redpajama_set_name": "RedPajamaC4"
}
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\section{Introduction}
\label{sec: intro}
In scientific and engineering computation, the class of so-called inverse problems is to infer and calculate the causes according to the observations or effects, which is just the reverse of the forward inference from the causes to the effects. Specifically, the inverse problems involve determining the parameters of a system that cannot be observed directly. Since the eighties of the last century, it has become the fastest growing field, regardless of theory or algorithm, due to its wide range of applications, such as signal and image processing, statistical inference, geophysics, astrophysics, and so on~\citep{engl1996regularization}.
Perhaps the simplest and classical one is the class of linear inverse problems, e.g., the image deblurring problem. Recall we deblur the image of an elephant with the pixel $256 \times 256$ in~\citep{li2022proximal}, which is implemented by the class of iterative shrinkage-thresholding algorithms (ISTA) as
\[
y_{k+1} = y_{k} - s G_s(y_{k}),
\]
with any initial $y_{0} = x_0 \in \mathbb{R}^d$ and a fixed step size $s \in (0,1/L]$, where $G_s(\cdot)$ is the $s$-proximal subgradient operator.\footnote{The Lipschitz constant $L$ and the $s$-proximal subgradient operator $G_s(\cdot)$ are defined rigorously in~\Cref{defn: L-smooth-strongly} and~\Cref{defn: proximal-subgradient}, respectively. } We show the convergence behavior of the squared $s$-proximal subgradient norm in~\Cref{fig: ista-elephant}, where the regularization parameter is set as $\lambda = 10^{-6}$ and the step size $s = 0.5$. Based on the assumption of the convex function, we derive that the minimal squared $s$-proximal subgradient norm obeys the sublinear convergence, concretely $o(1/k^3)$, in~\citep{li2022proximal}. However, with a black dashed line as a comparison, we find the convergence rate of the squared $s$-proximal subgradient norm tends to be linear instead of logarithmic $\sim -3\log k$, approximating to be flat. In other words, the objective function is more like the $\mu$-strongly convex function rather than the convex function.
\begin{figure}[htpb!]
\centering
\includegraphics[scale=0.26]{fig/ista1.eps}
\caption{The convergence behavior of the squared $s$-proximal subgradient norm by implementing ISTA to deblur the image of an elephant, shown in~\citep[Figure 1 \& Figure 2]{li2022proximal}.}
\label{fig: ista-elephant}
\end{figure}
\paragraph{Numerical Phenomena}
Recall the linear inverse problem with sparse representation is formulated by the least square (or linear regression) model with $\ell_1$-regularization in~\citep{beck2009fast} as
\begin{equation}
\label{eqn: lasso}
\frac{1}{2} \|Ax - b \|^2 +\lambda \|x\|_1,
\end{equation}
where $A \in \mathbb{R}^{m\times d}$ is an $m\times d$ matrix, $b \in \mathbb{R}^m$ is an $m$-dimensional vector, and the regularization parameter $\lambda > 0$ is a tradeoff between fidelity to the measurements and noise sensitivity.\footnote{Throught the paper, $\|\cdot\|$ denotes the standard Euclidean norm without any special emphasization and labeling. And $\|\cdot\|_1$ denotes the $\ell_1$-norm as $\|x\|_1 = \sum_{i=1}^{d}|x_i|$ for any $x \in \mathbb{R}^d$. } Here for the least square model with $\ell_1$-regularization~\eqref{eqn: lasso}, we note $\lambda_i(A^{T}A)$, $(i=1,\ldots, d)$ as the eigenvalues for the symmetric matrix $A^TA$. Then, the parameters used for the optimization satisfy $\mu = \min_{1\leq i \leq d}\lambda_i(A^{T}A)$ and $L = \max_{1\leq i \leq d} \lambda_i(A^{T}A)$, respectively. In addition, the condition number is noted as
\[
\textbf{cond}(A^{T}A) = \frac{L}{\mu} = \frac{\max\limits_{1\leq i \leq d} \lambda_i(A^{T}A)}{\min\limits_{1\leq i \leq d}\lambda_i(A^{T}A)}.
\]
Practically, the matrix $A$ in the least square model with $\ell_1$-regularization~\eqref{eqn: lasso} is ill-conditioned for the linear inverse problems~\citep{hansen2006deblurring, figueiredo2007gradient}, that is, the condition number $\textbf{cond}(A^{T}A)$ is very large.
To further observe the phenomenon of the linear convergence discovered in~\Cref{fig: ista-elephant}, we conduct a new numerical experiment by setting the ill-conditioned matrix $A$ and the vector $b$ manually. Concretely, we set $A$ as a $500\times 500$ tridiagonal matrix with $A_{i,i} =2,\;A_{i,i+1}=1,\;A_{i+1,i}=1$ and $b$ as a $500$-dimensional vector with every entry $b_i=1$. Taking some simple computations, we obtain the optimization parameters as $\mu = \min_{1\leq i \leq d}\lambda_i(A^{T}A) = 1.5461 \times 10^{-9}$ and $L=\max_{1\leq i \leq d} \lambda_i(A^{T}A) = 15.9997$, respectively. Obviously, the matrix $A$ is ill-conditioned since the condition number is $\textbf{cond}(A^{T}A) \approx 1 \times 10^{-10}$. Meanwhile, this also manifests that setting the step size $s = 0.05 <1/L$ is reasonable. Finally, we show the numerical experiment by implementing ISTA with the same regularization parameter $\lambda = 10^{-6}$ in~\Cref{fig: ista}, where the linear convergence behavior of the squared proximal subgradient norm is more predominant after several iterations.
\begin{figure}[htpb!]
\centering
\includegraphics[scale=0.26]{fig/ista.eps}
\caption{The convergence behavior of the squared $s$-proximal subgradient norm by implementing ISTA in the least square model with $\ell_1$-regularization.}
\label{fig: ista}
\end{figure}
For the smooth case, Nesterov's accelerated gradient descent~(\texttt{NAG}) globally accelerates the convergence rate of the vanilla gradient descent for the $\mu$-strongly convex function. Naturally, we hope to investigate the proximal version of~\texttt{NAG} as
\[
\left\{\begin{aligned}
& x_{k} =y_{k-1} - sG_s(y_{k-1}), \\
& y_{k} = x_{k} + \frac{x_{k} - x_{k-1}}{1+2\sqrt{\mu s}},
\end{aligned}\right.
\]
with any initial $x_0 = y_0 \in \mathbb{R}^d$, which is also called the class of fast iterative shrinkage-thresholding algorithms, shortened as FISTA.\footnote{The FISTA here is a proximal generalization of~\texttt{NAG} for the $\mu$-strongly convex function, and different from that in~\citep{beck2009fast}, which is based on~\texttt{NAG} for the convex function. In addition, the momentum coefficient here has a little modification, which is first proposed in~\citep{chen2022revisiting} to provide a tailor-made proof.} Thus, a new numerical experiment by adding FISTA for comparison is show in~\Cref{fig: fista}. Similarly, we also add a black dashed line as a basis to characterize the worst convergence rate of the squared $s$-proximal gradient norm by implementing FISTA. By comparing the two dashed lines in~\Cref{fig: fista}, we find that the acceleration phenomenon indeed exists for the squared $s$-proximal subgradient norm of FISTA beyond ISTA.
\begin{figure}[htpb!]
\centering
\includegraphics[scale=0.26]{fig/ista_fista.eps}
\caption{The convergence behavior of the squared proximal subgradient norm by implementing ISTA and FISTA in the least square model with $\ell_1$-regularization.}
\label{fig: fista}
\end{figure}
\subsection{Main contributions}
\label{subsec: overview-contribution}
From the description above, the linear inverse problem with sparse representation is formulated as the least-square model with $\ell_1$-regularization~\eqref{eqn: lasso}. In the language of optimization, it corresponds to composite optimization
\begin{equation}
\label{eqn: composite}
\min_{x\in\mathbb{R}^d}\Phi(x) := f(x) + g(x),
\end{equation}
where $f$ is a $\mu$-strongly smooth convex function and $g$ is a continuous convex function that is possibly not smooth. For the composite optimization problem~\eqref{eqn: composite}, we make the following contributions.
\paragraph{The pivotal inequality for composite optimization} From the smooth case, the pivotal inequality for the convex function is observed in~\citep{li2022proximal} as
\begin{equation}
\label{eqn: composite-smooth-c}
f(y - s \nabla f(y)) - f(x) \leq \langle \nabla f(y), y - x\rangle - \left(s- \frac{s^2L}{2}\right) \|\nabla f(y)\|^2.
\end{equation}
And then, we generalize~\eqref{eqn: composite-smooth-c} to composite optimization to derive the $s$-proximal subgradient norm minimization of ISTA and FISTA. Similarly, it is observed here that the pivotal inequality~\eqref{eqn: composite-smooth-c} can be improved tighter to the $\mu$-strongly convex function as
\begin{equation}
\label{eqn: composite-smooth-sc}
f(y - s \nabla f(y)) - f(x) \leq \langle \nabla f(y), y - x\rangle - \frac{\mu}{2} \| y - x\|^2 - \left(s- \frac{s^2L}{2}\right) \|\nabla f(y)\|^2.
\end{equation}
We generalize the pivotal inequality~\eqref{eqn: composite-smooth-sc} to the composite objective function in~\Cref{sec: key-inequality}.
\paragraph{Linear convergence of ISTA}
Recall the squared distance as the Lyapunov function in~\citep[Theorem A.4]{shi2019acceleration} is used to derive the linear convergence.\footnote{It should be noted that~\citet[Theorem 2.1.15]{nesterov1998introductory} use the squared norm to derive the convergence rate, which is only recounted by the language of the Lyapunov function in~\citep[Theorem A.4]{shi2019acceleration}.} Based on the proximal version of the pivotal inequality~\eqref{eqn: composite-smooth-sc}, we obtain the convergence rate of ISTA for both the objective value and the $s$-proximal subgradient norm square, respectively as
\[
\Phi(y_{k}) - \Phi(x^\star) \leq O\left(\left(\frac{1-\mu s}{1 + \mu s}\right)^k\right) \quad \text{and} \quad \|G_s(y_k)\|^2 \leq O\left(\left(\frac{1-\mu s}{1 + \mu s}\right)^k\right)
\]
for any $0 < s \leq 1/L$. Moreover, the $s$-proximal subgradient norm is convenient to be used in practice, where the minimization rate is consistent with the numerical phenomena in~\Cref{fig: ista-elephant} and~\Cref{fig: ista}.
\paragraph{Accelerated linear convergence of FISTA}
Recall the Lyapunov function constructed from the implicit-velocity in~\citep{chen2022revisiting} is used to obtain the linear convergence. Here, we take a modification for the potential energy using $x_k$ instead of $y_k$. Combined with the proximal version of the pivotal inequality~\eqref{eqn: composite-smooth-sc}, we obtain the convergence rate of FISTA, respectively as:
\begin{itemize}
\item[\textbf{(1)}] For the objective value, it follows
\[
\Phi(x_{k}) - \Phi(x^\star) \leq O\left( \frac{1}{\left(1 + \frac{\sqrt{\mu s}}{4}\right)^k }\right)
\]
with any step size $0 < s \leq 1/L$;
\item[\textbf{(2)}] for the squared $s$-proximal subgradient norm, it follows
\[
\|G_s(y_k)\|^2 \leq O\left( \frac{1}{\left(1 + \frac{\sqrt{\mu s}}{4}\right)^k }\right)
\]
with any step size $0<s<1/L$.
\end{itemize}
Similarly, the minimization rate of the squared $s$-proximal subgradient norm is consistent with the numerical phenomenon observed in~\Cref{fig: fista}.
\subsection{Related works and organization}
\label{subsec: notations-organization}
Recall the history of first-order smooth optimization,~\citet{nesterov1983method} proposed~\texttt{NAG} for the convex function and the ``\textit{Estimate Sequence}'' technique to bring about the global acceleration phenomenon, which was also generalized to the $\mu$-strongly convex function in~\citep{nesterov1998introductory}. Furthermore,~\citep{nesterov2010recent} points out that the algorithmic structures are very close in both~\texttt{NAG} for the $\mu$-strongly convex function and Polyak's heavy-ball method~\citep{polyak1964some}. And then, this view is emphasized further in~\citep{jordan2018dynamical}. Finally, the veil behind the acceleration phenomenon is lifted by the discovery of gradient correction based on the high-resolution differential equation framework in~\citep{shi2022understanding}. Recently, the high-resolution differential equation framework from the implicit-velocity scheme is found to be perfect and superior to the gradient-correction scheme in~\citep{chen2022revisiting}.
The technique of Lyapunov analysis used to investigate the acceleration phenomenon dates from~\citep{su2016differential} for the convex function. Besides capturing the acceleration mechanism, the Lyapunov function based on this high-resolution differential framework leads to the gradient norm minimization in~\citep{shi2022understanding}. The tailor-made proofs and the equivalent implicit-velocity effect are shown in~\citep{chen2022gradient}. With the observation to the key inequality, the gradient norm minimization is generalized to the composite function in~\citep{li2022proximal}. It is proposed by combining the low-resolution differential equation and the continuous limit of the Newton method to design and analyze new algorithms in~\citep{attouch2020first}, where the terminology is called inertial dynamics with a Hessian-driven term. Although the inertial dynamics with a
Hessian-driven term resembles closely with the high-resolution differential equations in~\citep{shi2022understanding}, it is important to note that the Hessian-driven terms are from the second-order information of Newton's method~\citep{attouch2014dynamical}, while the gradient correction entirely relies on the first-order information of Nesterov's accelerated gradient descent method itself.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In~\Cref{sec: prelim}, we collect some basic definitions and theorems as preliminaries. We provide two key inequalities for composite functions with rigorous proofs in~\Cref{sec: key-inequality}. The convergence rate of ISTA for both the objective value and the $s$-proximal subgradient norm square is shown in~\Cref{sec: nonaccele}. And we demonstrate the convergence rate of FISTA for both the objective value and the $s$-proximal subgradient norm square from the implicit-velocity scheme in~\Cref{sec: accele}. In~\Cref{sec: discussion}, we propose a conclusion and discuss some further research works.
\section{Preliminaries}
\label{sec: prelim}
In this section, we collect some basic definitions and theorems from the classical books~\citep{nesterov1998introductory} and~\citep{rockafellar1970convex} with slight modifications for later uses in the following sections. First, some basic definitions in convex optimization are described from~\citep{nesterov1998introductory}, e.g., convex functions, subgradients, and subdifferentials.
\begin{defn
\label{defn: convex}
A continuous function $g = g(x)$ defined on $\mathbb{R}^d$ is convex if for any $\alpha \in [0,1]$, the following inequlaity holds
\[
g\left( \alpha x + (1 - \alpha)y \right) \leq \alpha g(x) + (1 - \alpha)g(y)
\]
for any $x, y \in \mathbb{R}^d$. Moreover, we note $\mathcal{F}^0(\mathbb{R}^d)$ as the class of continuous convex functions.
\end{defn}
\begin{defn
\label{defn: subgradient}
Let $g \in \mathcal{F}^0(\mathbb{R}^d)$. A vector $v$ is called a subgradient of $g$ at $x$ if for any $y \in \mathbb{R}^d$, we have
\[
g(y) \geq g(x) + \langle v, y - x\rangle.
\]
Moreover, the set of all subgradients of $g \in \mathcal{F}^0(\mathbb{R}^d)$ at $x$ is called the subdifferential of $g$ at $x$, and we note it as $\partial g(x)$.
\end{defn}
Then, we collect two theorems from~\citep{rockafellar1970convex} to characterize the basic properties of subdifferentials and subgradients.
\begin{theorem}[Theorem 23.8 in \citep{rockafellar1970convex}]
\label{thm: sum-diff}
Let $g_1, g_2 \in\mathcal{F}^0(\mathbb{R}^d)$. Then the subdifferentials satisfy
\[
\partial(g_1 + g_2)(x) = \partial g_1(x) + \partial g_2(x)
\]
for any $x \in \mathbb{R}^d$.
\end{theorem}
\begin{theorem}[Theorem 25.1 in \citep{rockafellar1970convex}]
\label{thm: subgrad-unique}
Let $g \in \mathcal{F}^0(\mathbb{R}^d)$. If $g$ is differentiable at $x$, then $\nabla g(x)$ is the unique subgradient of $g$ at $x$, so that in particular
\[
g(y) \geq g(x) + \langle \nabla g(x), y - x\rangle,
\]
for any $y \in \mathbb{R}^d$.
\end{theorem}
Next, we define the $\mu$-strongly convex function instead of the general convex function for the smooth part in the composite function to characterize the least-square model.
\begin{defn
\label{defn: L-smooth-strongly}
Let $f \in \mathcal{F}^0(\mathbb{R}^d)$. The function $f$ is $L$-smooth if $f$ is differentiable and the gradient of $f$ satisfies
\[
\|\nabla f(x) - \nabla f(y)\| \leq L \|x - y\|
\]
for any $x, y \in \mathbb{R}^d$. The function $f$ is $\mu$-strongly convex if $f$ is differentiable and satisfies
\[
f(y) \geq f(x) + \langle \nabla f(y), y - x \rangle + \frac{\mu}{2} \|y - x\|^2
\]
for any $x, y \in \mathbb{R}^d$. The subclass of $\mathcal{F}^0(\mathbb{R}^d)$ with the $L$-smoothness and $\mu$-strongly convexity is noted as $\mathcal{S}_{\mu,L}^1(\mathbb{R}^d)$.
\end{defn}
In this paper, we consider the composite function $\Phi= f + g$ with $f \in \mathcal{S}_{\mu,L}^1$ and $g \in \mathcal{F}^0$ and note $x^\star$ as its unique minimizer. Finally, we provide the definitions of both the $s$-proximal operator and the $s$-proximal subgradient operator originally shown in~\citep{beck2009fast, su2016differential} as
\begin{defn}
\label{defn: proximal-subgradient}
For any $f\in \mathcal{S}_{\mu,L}^1$ and $g \in \mathcal{F}^0$, the $s$-proximal operator is defined as
\begin{equation}
\label{eqn: proximal-operator}
P_s(x) := \mathop{\arg\min}_{y\in\mathbb{R}^d}\left\{ \frac{1}{2s}\left\| y - \left(x - s\nabla f(x)\right) \right\|^2 + g(y) \right\},
\end{equation}
for any $x \in \mathbb{R}^d$. Furthermore, the $s$-proximal subgradient operator is defined as
\begin{equation}
\label{eqn: subgradient-operator}
G_s(x): = \frac{x - P_s(x)}{s}
\end{equation}
for any $x \in \mathbb{R}^d$.
\end{defn}
When $g$ is reduced to the $\ell_1$-norm, that is, $g(x) = \lambda \|x\|_1$,\ we can derive the closed-form expression of the $s$-proximal operator~\eqref{eqn: proximal-operator} at any $x \in \mathbb{R}^d$ for the special case as
\[
P_s(x)_i = \big(\left|\left(x - s\nabla f(x)\right)_i\right| - \lambda s\big)_+ \text{sgn}\big(\left(x - s\nabla f(x)\right)_i\big),
\]
where $i=1,\ldots,d$ is the index.
\section{Two inequalities for composite optimization}
\label{sec: key-inequality}
In this section, based on the basic definitions and theorems shown in~\Cref{sec: prelim}, we generalize two basic inequalities of $f \in \mathcal{S}_{\mu,L}^1$ to the composite function $\Phi = f + g$ with $f \in \mathcal{S}_{\mu,L}^1$ and $g \in \mathcal{F}^0$.
\begin{lemma}
\label{lem: sc_proximal1}
Let $f \in \mathcal{S}_{\mu,L}^{1}(\mathbb{R}^d)$ and $g \in \mathcal{F}^0(\mathbb{R}^d)$. Then the composite function $\Phi = f + g$ satisfies
\begin{equation}
\label{eqn: sc_proximal1}
\Phi(x) - \Phi(x^\star) \geq \frac{\mu}{2} \|x - x^\star\|^2
\end{equation}
\end{lemma}
\begin{proof}[Proof of~\Cref{lem: sc_proximal1}]
With~\Cref{defn: convex} and~\Cref{defn: subgradient}, the basic convex inequality holds for any subgradient $v \in \partial\Phi(x^\star)$ as
\[
\Phi(x) \geq \Phi(x^\star) + \langle v, x - x^\star \rangle
\]
with any $x \in \mathbb{R}^d$. Since $x^\star$ is the unique global minimizer, we know that zero is a subgradient, that is, $0 \in \partial\Phi(x^\star)$. Meanwhile, due to $f \in \mathcal{S}_{\mu,L}^{1}(\mathbb{R}^d)$, we obtain the basic inequality for the $\mu$-strongly convex function as
\begin{equation}
\label{eqn:scv-1}
f(x) \geq f(x^\star) + \langle \nabla f(x^\star), x - x^\star \rangle + \frac{\mu}{2} \|x - x^\star\|^2
\end{equation}
with any $x\in \mathbb{R}^d$; and since $g \in \mathcal{F}^0(\mathbb{R}^d)$, the basic convex inequality holds for any subgradient $v'\in \partial g(x^\star)$ as
\begin{equation}
\label{eqn:cv-1}
g(x) \geq g(x^\star) + \langle v', x - x^\star \rangle
\end{equation}
with any $x \in \mathbb{R}^d$. Combined with~\eqref{eqn:scv-1} and~\eqref{eqn:cv-1}, we have
\begin{equation}
\label{eqn:scv-2}
\Phi(x) \geq \Phi(x^\star) + \langle \nabla f(x^\star) + v', x - x^\star \rangle + \frac{\mu}{2} \|x - x^\star\|^2
\end{equation}
with any $x \in \mathbb{R}^d$. Furthermore, with~\Cref{thm: sum-diff} and~\Cref{thm: subgrad-unique}, we obtain that for any $v \in \partial\Phi(x^\star)$, there exists a subgradient $v' \in \partial g(x^\star)$ such that $v = \nabla f(x^\star) + v'$. With $0 \in \partial\Phi(x^\star)$, we complete the proof.
\end{proof}
Recall the proof of the pivotal inequality for composite optimization~\citep[Lemma 3.1]{li2022proximal}. Nevertheless, the function class here is $\mathcal{S}_{\mu,L}^{1}$ instead of $\mathcal{F}_L^1$, we can make the basic convex inequality in~\citep[(3.5a)]{li2022proximal} tighter as
\[
f(x) \geq f(y) + \langle \nabla f(y), x - y \rangle + \frac{\mu}{2} \|x - y\|^2
\]
for any $x, y \in \mathbb{R}^d$, which brings about the pivotal inequality~\citep[(3.1)]{li2022proximal} to be tighter. Hence, we provide a rigorous description to conclude this section in the following theorem.
\begin{lemma}
\label{lem: sc-proximal2}
Let $\Phi = f + g$ be a composite function with $f \in \mathcal{S}_{\mu,L}^{1}(\mathbb{R}^d)$ and $g \in \mathcal{F}^0(\mathbb{R}^d)$. Then, the following inequality
\begin{equation}
\label{eqn: sc-proximal2}
\Phi(y - G_s(y)) \leq \Phi(x) + \langle G_s(y), y - x\rangle - \left(s- \frac{s^2L}{2}\right) \|G_s(y)\|^2 - \frac{\mu}{2} \| y - x\|^2
\end{equation}
holds for any $x, y \in \mathbb{R}^d$.
\end{lemma}
\section{Linear convergence of ISTA}
\label{sec: nonaccele}
In this section, we investigate the convergence rate of ISTA for composite optimization in both the objective value and the squared $s$-proximal subgradient norm. Similar to the smooth case in~\citep[Theorem A.4]{shi2019acceleration}, we construct the Lyapunov function for the composite function as the squared distance, i.e.,
\begin{equation}
\label{eqn: ly-ista}
\mathcal{E}(k) = \|y_k - x^\star\|^2.\footnote{It should be noted that~\citet[Theorem 2.1.15]{nesterov1998introductory} use the squared norm to derive the convergence rate, which is only recounted by the language of the Lyapunov function in~\citep[Theorem A.4]{shi2019acceleration}.}
\end{equation}
With the discrete Lyapunov function~\eqref{eqn: ly-ista}, we show the convergence rate in the following theorem.
\begin{theorem}
\label{thm: ista}
Let $\Phi = f+ g$ be a composite function with $f \in \mathcal{S}_{\mu,L}^{1}(\mathbb{R}^d)$ and $g \in \mathcal{F}^0(\mathbb{R}^d)$. Taking any step size $0 < s \leq 1/L$, the iterative sequence $\{y_k\}_{k=0}^{\infty}$ generated by ISTA satisfies
\begin{subequations}
\begin{empheq}[left=\empheqlbrace]{align}
\Phi(y_{k}) - \Phi(x^\star) & \leq \frac{1}{s}\left(\frac{1-\mu s}{1 + \mu s}\right)^k\|x_0 - x^\star\|^2, \label{eqn: ista_rate_obj}\\
\|G_s(y_k)\|^2 &\leq \frac{4}{s^2}\left(\frac{1-\mu s}{1 + \mu s}\right)^k\|x_0 - x^\star\|^2. \label{eqn: ista_rate_gn}
\end{empheq}
\end{subequations}
\end{theorem}
\begin{proof}[Proof of~\Cref{thm: ista}]
Putting the sequence $\{y_k\}_{k=0}^{\infty}$ generated by ISTA and the unique minimizer $x^\star$ into~\eqref{eqn: sc-proximal2}, ~\Cref{lem: sc_proximal1} brings about the following inequality as
\begin{equation}
\label{eqn: ista-1}
\Phi(y_{k+1}) - \Phi(x^\star) \leq \langle G_s(y_k), y_k - x^\star \rangle - \frac{s}{2} \|G_s(y_k)\|^2 - \frac{\mu}{2}\|y_k - x^\star\|^2.
\end{equation}
Furthermore, with the pivotal inequality~\eqref{eqn: ista-1}, we derive that the objective value satisfies the following inequality as
\begin{equation}
\label{eqn: ista-2}
\Phi(y_{k+1}) - \Phi(x^\star) \leq \frac{\|y_k - x^\star\|^2}{2s} - \frac{\|y_k - x^\star - s G_s(y_k)\|^2}{2s};
\end{equation}
and with the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, the squared $s$-proximal subgradient norm satisfies the following inequality as
\begin{equation}
\label{eqn: ista-3}
\|G_s(y_k)\|^2 \leq \frac{4\|y_k - x^\star\|^2}{s^2}.
\end{equation}
Then, we calculate the iterative difference of the Lyapunov function as
\begin{align*}
\mathcal{E}(k+1) - \mathcal{E}(k)& = \|y_{k+1} - x^\star\|^2 - \|y_{k} - x^\star\|^2 \\
& = \|y_{k} - s G_s(y_k) - x^\star\|^2 - \|y_{k} - x^\star\|^2 \\
& = - 2s \langle G_s(y_k), y_k - x^\star \rangle + s^2 \|G_s(y_k)\|^2 \\
& \leq - 2s \left( \Phi(y_{k+1}) - \Phi(x^\star) \right) - s\mu \|y_k - x^\star\|^2
\end{align*}
where the last inequality follows from~\eqref{eqn: ista-1}. With~\Cref{lem: sc_proximal1}, we can obtain further
\[
\|y_{k+1} - x^\star\|^2 \leq (1 - s\mu)\|y_{k} - x^\star\|^2 - \mu s \|y_{k+1} - x^\star\|^2,
\]
which directly leads to the linear convergence of the Lyapunov function as
\begin{equation}
\label{eqn: ista-4}
\mathcal{E}(k) = \|y_{k} - x^\star\|^2 \leq \left(\frac{1-\mu s}{1 + \mu s}\right)\|x_0 - x^\star\|^2.
\end{equation}
From~\eqref{eqn: ista-2},~\eqref{eqn: ista-3} and~\eqref{eqn: ista-4}, we derive the linear rates in~\eqref{eqn: ista_rate_obj} and~\eqref{eqn: ista_rate_gn}, conseqently the proof is complete.
\end{proof}
We conclude this section with the following corollary by setting the step size $s=1/L$.
\begin{corollary}
\label{coro: ista}
When the step size is set $s = 1/L$, the iterative sequence $\{y_k\}_{k=0}^{\infty}$ generated by ISTA satisfies
\begin{align}
\Phi(y_{k}) - \Phi(x^\star) &\leq L\left(\frac{L-\mu }{L + \mu }\right)^k\|x_0 - x^\star\|^2, \label{eqn: ista_rate_obj1}\\
\|G_s(y_k)\|^2 &\leq 4L^2\left(\frac{L-\mu }{L + \mu }\right)^k\|x_0 - x^\star\|^2. \label{eqn: ista_rate_gn1}
\end{align}
\end{corollary}
\section{Accelerated linear convergence of FISTA}
\label{sec: accele}
In this section, we investigate the convergence rate of FISTA for composite optimization in both the objective value and the squared $s$-proximal subgradient norm. Here, we choose the phase-space representation of FISTA from the implicit-velocity scheme as
\begin{equation}
\label{eqn: iv-phase}
\left\{
\begin{aligned}
& x_{k+1} - x_{k} = \sqrt{s}v_{k+1}, \\
& v_{k+1} - v_{k} = - \frac{2\sqrt{\mu s}v_{k}}{1+2\sqrt{\mu s}} - \sqrt{s}G_s(y_k),
\end{aligned}
\right.
\end{equation}
with any initial $x_0\in \mathbb{R}^d$ and $v_0 = 0$, where the iterative sequence $\{y_k\}_{k=0}^{\infty}$ satisfies
\begin{equation}
\label{eqn: iv-y-x}
y_k = x_{k} + \frac{\sqrt{s}v_{k}}{1+2\sqrt{\mu s}}.
\end{equation}
Similar to~\citep{chen2022gradient}, we move one space backward for the discrete Lyapunov function constructed in~\citep{chen2022revisiting} as
\begin{equation}
\mathcal{E}(k) = \underbrace{\Phi(x_{k}) - \Phi(x^{\star})}_{\mathcal{E}_{\textbf{pot}}(k)} + \underbrace{\frac{\|v_{k}\|^2}{4(1+2\sqrt{\mu s})^2}}_{\mathcal{E}_{\textbf{kin}}(k)} + \underbrace{\frac{\left\|v_{k} +2\sqrt{\mu}(x_{k} - x^\star)\right\|^2 }{4}}_{\mathcal{E}_{\textbf{mix}}(k)}.\label{eqn: lyapunov-iv}
\end{equation}
In~\eqref{eqn: lyapunov-iv}, we use the iterative sequence $\{x_k\}_{k=0}^{\infty}$ instead of $\{y_k\}_{k=0}^{\infty}$ for the potential energy, which is because the proof for composite optimization is essentially dependent on the pivotal inequality~\eqref{eqn: sc-proximal2}. The convergence rate is formulated rigorously in the following theorem.
\begin{theorem}
\label{thm: fista}
Let $\Phi = f+ g$ be a composite function with $f \in \mathcal{S}_{\mu,L}^{1}(\mathbb{R}^d)$ and $g \in \mathcal{F}^0(\mathbb{R}^d)$. Taking any step size $0 < s \leq 1/L$, the iterative sequence $\{x_k\}_{k=0}^{\infty}$ generated by FISTA satisfies
\begin{equation}
\label{eqn: fista_rate_obj_1}
\Phi(x_{k}) - \Phi(x^\star) \leq \frac{\Phi(x_0) - \Phi(x^\star) + \mu\|x_0 - x^\star\|^2}{\left(1 + \frac{\sqrt{\mu s}}{4}\right)^k};
\end{equation}
if the step size satisfies $0 < s < 1/L$, the iterative sequence $\{y_k\}_{k=0}^{\infty}$ satisfies
\begin{equation}
\label{eqn: fista_rate_gn_1}
\|G_s(y_k)\|^2 \leq \frac{2\left(\Phi(x_0) - \Phi(x^\star) + \mu\|x_0 - x^\star\|^2\right)}{s(1-sL)\left(1 + \frac{\sqrt{\mu s}}{4}\right)^k}.
\end{equation}
\end{theorem}
\begin{proof}[Proof of~\Cref{thm: fista}]
First, we present the calculation of the Lyapunov function's iterative difference in three steps, similarly with~\citep{chen2022revisiting}.
\begin{itemize}
\item[\textbf{(1)}] First, we start from the mixed energy $\mathcal{E}_{\textbf{mix}}(k)$. The critical point to calculating the iterative difference lies in
\[
\left[ v_{k+1} + 2\sqrt{\mu}(x_{k+1} - x^\star) \right] - \left[ v_{k} + 2\sqrt{\mu}(x_{k} - x^\star) \right] = - \sqrt{s} G_s(y_{k}),
\]
which directly follows the implicit-velocity phase-space representation~\eqref{eqn: iv-phase} and~\eqref{eqn: iv-y-x}. Then, we calculate the iterative difference of the mixed energy as
\begin{align*}
\mathcal{E}_{\textbf{mix}}(k+1) - \mathcal{E}_{\textbf{mix}}(k) = & \frac{1}{4}\left\| v_{k+1} + 2\sqrt{\mu}(x_{k+1} - x^\star) \right\|^2 - \frac{1}{4}\left\| v_{k} + 2\sqrt{\mu}(x_{k} - x^\star) \right\|^2 \\
= & \frac12 \left\langle - \sqrt{s} G_s(y_{k}), v_{k} + 2\sqrt{\mu}(x_{k} - x^\star) \right\rangle + \frac{s}{4}\| G_s(y_{k})\|^2 \\
= & \frac12 \left\langle - \sqrt{s} G_s(y_{k}), \frac{v_{k}}{1+2\sqrt{\mu s}} + 2\sqrt{\mu}(y_{k} - x^\star) \right\rangle + \frac{s}{4}\|G(y_{k})\|^2,
\end{align*}
where the last inequality also follows from~\eqref{eqn: iv-y-x}. Furthermore, with the second scheme of~\eqref{eqn: iv-phase}, we obtain the iterative difference as
\begin{equation}
\label{eqn: iv-1}
\mathcal{E}_{\textbf{mix}}(k+1) - \mathcal{E}_{\textbf{mix}}(k) = - \frac{\sqrt{s}}{2} \left\langle G_s(y_{k}), v_{k+1}\right\rangle - \sqrt{\mu s} \left\langle G_s(y_{k}), y_{k} - x^\star \right\rangle - \frac{s}{4} \|G_s(y_{k})\|^2.
\end{equation}
\item[\textbf{(2)}] Then, we consider the kinetic energy $\mathcal{E}_{\textbf{kin}}(k)$. The detailed calculation of iterative difference is shown as
\begin{align}
\mathcal{E}_{\textbf{kin}}(k+1) - \mathcal{E}_{\textbf{kin}}(k) & = \frac{\|v_{k+1}\|^2}{4(1+2\sqrt{\mu s})^2} - \frac{\|v_{k}\|^2}{4(1+2\sqrt{\mu s})^2} \nonumber \\
& = \frac{\|v_{k+1}\|^2}{4(1+2\sqrt{\mu s})^2} - \frac{\|v_{k+1} + \sqrt{s} G_s(y_{k})\|^2}{4} \nonumber \\
& = - \frac{\sqrt{s}}{2} \langle G_s(y_{k}), v_{k+1} \rangle - \frac{\sqrt{\mu s} \|v_{k+1}\|^2}{(1 + 2\sqrt{\mu s})^2} - \frac{s}{4} \| G_s(y_{k})\|^2, \label{eqn: iv-2}
\end{align}
where the second equality follows from the second scheme of~\eqref{eqn: iv-phase}.
\item[\textbf{(3)}] In the last step, we turn to the potential energy $ \mathcal{E}_{\textbf{pot}}(k)$. Recall in~\citep[Section 4.2]{chen2022revisiting}, the calculation of iterative difference is based on the basic $L$-smooth inequality. Here for the composite optimization, we plug $x_{k}$ and $x_{k+1}$ generated by FISTA into~\eqref{eqn: sc-proximal2} to derive the inequality as
\begin{equation}
\label{eqn: fista-key-inq}
\Phi(x_{k+1}) - \Phi(x_{k}) \leq \langle G_s(y_k), y_{k} - x_{k} \rangle - \left(s- \frac{s^2L}{2}\right) \|G_s(y_k)\|^2,
\end{equation}
which is the essential difference from the smooth case. Then with~\eqref{eqn: fista-key-inq}, we calculate the iterative difference as
\begin{align}
\mathcal{E}_{\textbf{pot}}(k+1) - \mathcal{E}_{\textbf{pot}}(k) & = \Phi(x_{k+1}) - \Phi(x_{k}) \nonumber\\
& \leq \langle G_s(y_{k}), y_{k} - x_{k} \rangle - \left(s- \frac{s^2L}{2}\right) \|G_s(y_k)\|^2 \nonumber \\
&= \langle G_s(y_{k}), x_{k+1} - x_{k} \rangle + s \|G_s(y_k)\|^2- \left(s- \frac{s^2L}{2}\right)\|G_s(y_k)\|^2 \nonumber \\
&= \sqrt{s}\langle G_s(y_{k}), v_{k+1}\rangle + \frac{s}{2} \|G_s(y_k)\|^2 -\frac{s (1-sL) }{2} \|G_s(y_k)\|^2 , \label{eqn: iv-3}
\end{align}
where the second equality follows from the gradient step of FISTA.
\end{itemize}
Using the three iterative differences~\eqref{eqn: iv-1},~\eqref{eqn: iv-2} and~\eqref{eqn: iv-3}, we obtain the iterative difference of the Lyapunov function as
\begin{equation}
\label{eqn: iv-id-lyapunov1}
\mathcal{E}(k+1) - \mathcal{E}(k) \leq - \sqrt{\mu s} \left\langle G_s(y_{k}), y_{k} - x^\star \right\rangle - \frac{(\sqrt{\mu s} + \mu s) \|v_{k+1}\|^2}{(1+2\sqrt{\mu s})^2} -\frac{s (1-sL) }{2} \|G_s(y_k)\|^2.
\end{equation}
Putting the sequence $x_{k+1}$ generated by FISTA and the unique minimizer $x^\star$ into~\eqref{eqn: sc-proximal2}, we can see that~\Cref{lem: sc_proximal1} brings about the following inequality as
\begin{equation}
\label{eqn: fista1}
\Phi(x_{k+1}) - \Phi(x^\star) \leq \langle G_s(y_k), y_{k} - x^\star \rangle - \left(s - \frac{sL^2}{2}\right) \|G_s(y_k)\|^2 - \frac{\mu}{2}\|y_k - x^\star\|^2.
\end{equation}
It follows from~\eqref{eqn: fista1} and~\eqref{eqn: iv-id-lyapunov1} that
\begin{multline}
\mathcal{E}(k+1) - \mathcal{E}(k) \\
\leq -\sqrt{\mu s} \left[ \Phi(x_{k+1}) - \Phi(x^\star) + \frac{(1 + \sqrt{\mu s} ) \|v_{k+1}\|^2}{(1+2\sqrt{\mu s})^2} + \frac{\mu \|y_{k} - x^\star\|^2 }{2} \right] -\frac{s (1-sL) }{2} \|G_s(y_k)\|^2. \label{eqn: iv-id-lyapunov2}
\end{multline}
With the gradient step of FISTA, we estimate the mixed energy by Cauchy-Schwarz inequality as
\begin{align*}
\|v_{k+1} +2\sqrt{\mu}(x_{k+1} - x^\star) \|^2 & = \left\| v_{k+1} +2\sqrt{\mu}(y_k - sG_s(y_k) - x^\star) \right\|^2 \\
& \leq 2 \|v_{k+1}\|^2 + 8 \mu \|y_k - sG_s(y_k) - x^\star\|^2 \\
& = 2 \|v_{k+1}\|^2 + 8 \mu \|y_k - x^\star\|^2 + 8 \mu s^2 \| G_s(y_k) \|^2 - 16 \mu s \langle G_s(y_k), y_k - x^\star \rangle \\
& \leq 2 \|v_{k+1}\|^2 + 8 \mu \|y_k - x^\star\|^2,
\end{align*}
where the last inequality follows~\eqref{eqn: fista1} and~\eqref{eqn: sc_proximal1}. Furthermore, we estimate the discrete Lyapunov function~\eqref{eqn: lyapunov-iv} as
\begin{equation}
\label{eqn: lyapunov-iv-estimate}
\mathcal{E}(k) \leq \Phi(x_{k}) - \Phi(x^{\star}) + \frac{\left(\frac{3}{4}+\sqrt{\mu s} + \mu s\right)}{(1+2\sqrt{\mu s})^2} \|v_{k}\|^2 + 2\mu \|y_{k-1} - x^\star\|^2.
\end{equation}
Comparing the coefficients of the corresponding terms in~\eqref{eqn: iv-id-lyapunov2} and~\eqref{eqn: lyapunov-iv-estimate} for $\mathcal{E}(k+1)$, we
obtain that the iterative difference of the discrete Lyapunov function satisfies
\[
\mathcal{E}(k+1) - \mathcal{E}(k) \leq -\sqrt{\mu s} \min\left\{1, \frac{1+\sqrt{\mu s}}{\frac{3}{4} + \sqrt{\mu s} + \mu s}, \frac14 \right\}\mathcal{E}(k+1) -\frac{s (1-sL) }{2} \|G_s(y_k)\|^2.
\]
We conclude here with the initial values $x_0 \in \mathbb{R}^d$ and $v_0 = 0$.
\end{proof}
If we retrogress to the smooth case, the Lyapunov function~\eqref{eqn: lyapunov-iv} constructed by using $x_k$ instead of $y_k$ becomes more perfect than~\citep[Theorem 4.2]{chen2022revisiting} in terms of the initial values. Taking a comparison between~\Cref{thm: ista} and~\Cref{thm: fista}, we can find a little difference for the constant in the convergence rate. However, different from the smooth case, we cannot use $L\|x_0 - x^\star\|^2$ to bound $\Phi(x_0) - \Phi(x^\star) + \mu \|x_0 - x^\star\|^2$ obtained in~\eqref{eqn: fista_rate_obj_1} and~\eqref{eqn: fista_rate_gn_1} for the composite function, since the $L$-smooth inequality does not work anymore. To make the constant in the convergence rate consistent with~\Cref{thm: ista}, we need to start from $\mathcal{E}(1)$ in~\eqref{eqn: lyapunov-iv} as
\begin{align}
\mathcal{E}(1) & = \Phi(x_1) - \Phi(x^\star) + \frac{\|v_1\|^2}{4(1+2\sqrt{\mu s})^2} + \frac{\|v_1 + 2\sqrt{\mu}(x_1 - x^\star)\|^2}{4} \nonumber \\
& \leq \Phi(x_1) - \Phi(x^\star) + \frac{\left(\frac{3}{4}+\sqrt{\mu s} + \mu s\right)}{(1+2\sqrt{\mu s})^2}\|v_1\|^2 + 2\mu\|x_0 - x^\star\|^2, \label{eqn: initial-fista-1}
\end{align}
where the inequality follows from~\eqref{eqn: lyapunov-iv-estimate}. Taking some basic calculations, we obtain $v_1 = \sqrt{s}G_s(x_0)$ and put it into~\eqref{eqn: initial-fista-1} as
\begin{equation}
\label{eqn: initial-fista-2}
\mathcal{E}(1) \leq \Phi(x_1) - \Phi(x^\star) + \frac{\left(\frac{3}{4}+\sqrt{\mu s} + \mu s\right)}{(1+2\sqrt{\mu s})^2}\cdot s\|G_s(x_0)\|^2 + 2\mu\|x_0 - x^\star\|^2.
\end{equation}
Similarly, putting $x_1$ generated by FISTA and the unique minimizer $x^\star$ into~\eqref{eqn: sc-proximal2}, we can see that~\Cref{lem: sc_proximal1} brings about the following inequality as
\[
\Phi(x_1) - \Phi(x^\star) \leq \langle G_s(x_0), x_0 - x^\star \rangle - \frac{s}{2} \|G_s(x_0)\|^2.
\]
Furthermore, with perfect square and Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we have the following two inequalities
\[
\Phi(x_1) - \Phi(x^\star) \leq \frac{\|x_0 - x^\star\|^2}{2s} \qquad \text{and} \qquad \|G_s(x_0)\|^2 \leq \frac{4 \|x_0 - x^\star\|^2}{s^2}
\]
holds for any $0 < s \leq 1/L$. Hence, we conclude this section with the following corollary.
\begin{corollary}
\label{coro: fista1}
Let $\Phi = f+ g$ be a composite function with $f \in \mathcal{S}_{\mu,L}^{1}(\mathbb{R}^d)$ and $g \in \mathcal{F}^0(\mathbb{R}^d)$. If the step size $0 < s \leq 1/L$, the iterative sequence $\{y_k\}_{k=0}^{\infty}$ generated by FISTA satisfies
\begin{equation}
\label{eqn: fista_obj_2}
\Phi(x_{k}) - \Phi(x^\star) \leq \frac{11\|x_0 - x^\star\|^2}{2s\left(1 + \frac{\sqrt{\mu s}}{4}\right)^k};
\end{equation}
if the step size is set $s=1/L$, we have
\begin{equation}
\label{eqn: fista_obj_2l}
\Phi(x_{k}) - \Phi(x^\star) \leq \frac{11L\|x_0 - x^\star\|^2}{2\left(1 + \frac{1}{4}\sqrt{\frac{\mu}{L}}\right)^k}.
\end{equation}
Furthermore, if $0 < s < 1/L$, the iterative sequence $\{y_k\}_{k=0}^{\infty}$ satisfies
\begin{equation}
\label{eqn: fista_rate_gn_2}
\|G_s(y_k)\| \leq \frac{11\|x_0 - x^\star\|^2}{s^2(1-sL)\left(1 + \frac{\sqrt{\mu s}}{4}\right)^k}.
\end{equation}
\end{corollary}
\section{Conclusion and discussion}
\label{sec: discussion}
In this paper, we improve the pivotal inequality for composite optimization found in~\citep[Lemma 3.1]{li2022proximal}, which becomes tighter with the convexity of the smooth part substituted by the $\mu$-strongly convexity. Then, we apply the Lyapunov analysis to obtain the linear convergence for ISTA in both the objective value and the squared $s$-proximal subgradient norm. Meanwhile, we also use the Lyapunov analysis via the phase-space representation from the implicit-velocity scheme to derive the accelerated linear convergence for FISTA in both the objective value and the squared $s$-proximal subgradient norm. Looking back to the numerical experiment of FISTA in~\Cref{fig: fista}, we can compute the constant $\mu$ to set the momentum coefficient. However, for the image deblurring problem in practice, it is so hard to compute the constant $\mu$ directly that we can set the momentum coefficient only empirically. Nevertheless, when we set the constant $\mu = 0.001$ in the numerical experiment of deblurring the image of an elephant, FISTA indeed converges faster than ISTA, which is shown in~\Cref{fig: fista1}. Therefore, how to provide an available constant $\mu$ in practice, e.g., for the blur matrix, looks very interesting.
\begin{figure}[htpb!]
\centering
\includegraphics[scale=0.26]{fig/ista_fista1.eps}
\caption{The convergence behavior of the squared $s$-proximal subgradient norm by implementing ISTA and FISTA to deblur the image of an elephant, previously shown in~\citep[Figure 1 \& Figure 2]{li2022proximal}.}
\label{fig: fista1}
\end{figure}
The $l_1$-norm is widely used in the statistics, such as the Lasso model and its variants, as the regularizer to capture the sparse structure. An interesting direction is to investigate further the theory in statistics related to Lasso based on the new discoveries of the composite optimization theory. For example, the sorted $l_1$-penalized estimation (SLOPE) is proposed to capture adaptively unknown sparsity in the asymptotic minimax problem~\citep{su2016slope}, and the Lasso path involves a strong relation to false discoveries in~\citep{su2017false}. In addition, the differential inclusion used for sparse recovery~\citep{osher2016sparse} is also worth further consideration in the future since is strongly related to composite optimization.
\subsection*{Acknowledgments}
We would like to thank Shuo Chen for his helpful discussions.
\bibliographystyle{abbrvnat}
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{
"redpajama_set_name": "RedPajamaArXiv"
}
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#ifndef TCBlockIOBuffer_H_
#define TCBlockIOBuffer_H_
#include "commonlib/testcase/TestUnit.h"
namespace IAS{
namespace TCT{
class TCBlockIOBuffer: public TestUnit{
public:
TCBlockIOBuffer(TestSuite* pTestSuite);
virtual ~TCBlockIOBuffer() throw ();
virtual void init(TestSuite* pTestSuite);
void case01();
void case02();
void case03();
void case04();
friend class ::IAS::Factory<TCBlockIOBuffer>;
::IAS::TestRunner<TCBlockIOBuffer> theTestRunner;
};
} /* namespace TCT */
} /* namespace IAS */
#endif /*TCBlockIOBuffer_H_*/
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{
"redpajama_set_name": "RedPajamaGithub"
}
| 2,036
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import { Injector, OnInit } from '@angular/core';
import { Profile } from '../model/profile';
import { Language } from '../model/language';
import { ProfileService } from '../service/profile.service';
import { LanguageService } from '../service/language.service';
import { Router } from '@angular/router';
export class AbstractComponent implements OnInit {
protected router: Router;
protected profileService: ProfileService;
protected languageService: LanguageService;
profile: Profile;
languages: Language[];
constructor(injector: Injector) {
this.router = injector.get(Router);
this.profileService = injector.get(ProfileService);
this.languageService = injector.get(LanguageService);
}
getProfile(): void {
this.profileService.getProfile().then(profile => {
this.profile = profile;
if (profile.nativeLanguage === undefined) {
profile.nativeLanguage = this.languages[0];
}
});
}
getLanguages(): void {
this.languages = this.languageService.getLanguages();
}
ngOnInit(): void {
this.getLanguages();
this.getProfile();
}
isEmpty(str: string): boolean {
if (!str || !str.trim) { return true; };
return false;
}
}
|
{
"redpajama_set_name": "RedPajamaGithub"
}
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US Open: Murray vs Nishikori, Djokovic vs Tsonga, Monfils vs Pouille and Wawrinka vs de Potro in quarters
ISN Admin
New York: Andy Murray stormed into his sixth US Open quarter-final, beating Grigor Dimitrov in their fourth-round 6-1, 6-2, 6-2, here on Monday night. The second seed dismissed the No. 22-seeded Dimitrov in two hours in Arthur Ashe Stadium.
"I played very well. Tactically I played a very good match. I don't think I made any mistakes there. I kept good concentration throughout," Murray said. "I think Grigor played his best, but I didn't really give him a chance to get into the match," he said after the match, according to atpworldtour.com.
The Rio Olympics gold medalists and World No. 2 will next tangle with Japanese Kei Nishikori, who beat Croatian Ivo Karlovic 6-3, 6-4, 7-6(4) on Monday afternoon.
Meanwhile, Stan Wawrinka will now Juan Martin del Potro in the quarters as he defeated Illya Marchenko 6-4, 6-1, 6-7(5), 6-3 at Flushing Meadows in the fourth round. The Swiss has lost his past four meetings with the Argentine, claiming his last victory eight years ago at the Wimbledon. Del Potro, meanwhile, advanced into the last eight when Dominic Thiem was forced to retire from their fourth-round clash due to a right leg injury. Del Potro was leading 6-3, 3-2 with a break in the second set.
World No. 1 Novak Djokovic moved into the quarterfinals, beating 21-year-old Kyle Edmund 6-2, 6-1, 6-4. The defending champion will now face ninth seed Jo-Wilfried Tsonga for the last four berth. Djokovic had defeated Jerzy Janowicz 6-3, 5-7, 6-2, 6-1 in the first round, while in the second round Czech left-hander Jiri Vesely withdrew because of inflammation in his left forearm. In the third round, Djokovic was leading against Mikhail Youzhny 4-2 before the Russian retired because of a back injury. Meanwhile, Tsonga beat Jack Sock to reach the quarterfinal.
Meanwhile, Gael Monfils dismissed Marcos Baghdatis 6-3, 6-2, 6-3 to reach the last eight stage. He will now meet Lucas Pouille who created an upset by beating No. 4 seed Rafael Nadal 6-1, 2-6, 6-4, 3-6, 7-6(6) in the fourth round.
US Open Novak Djokovic Kei Nishikori Andy Murray
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{
"redpajama_set_name": "RedPajamaCommonCrawl"
}
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{"url":"http:\/\/www.talkstats.com\/threads\/help-writing-what-im-doing-mathematically.28452\/?highlight=","text":"Help writing what I'm doing mathematically\n\ntrinker\n\nggplot2orBust\nI am not a mathematician and thus need major help representing my actions mathematically. First I'll explain what I'm doing and then a crack at writing a formula for it.\n\nI have time stamps for two codes that look like this (call them code x and y):\n\nCode:\n#code x\nduration start end\n5 1 184 184\n55 1 905 905\n92 3 1811 1813\n\n#code y\nduration start end\n4 2 107 108\n6 2 116 117\n8 2 131 132\n10 1 145 145\n12 4 166 169\n16 2 212 213\n22 5 293 296\n58 2 704 705\n70 2 877 878\n72 2 941 942\n109 2 1787 1788\n121 1 1982 1982\nAnd here's the structure of those two codes:\n\nCode:\nx <- structure(list(duration = c(1L, 1L, 3L), start = c(184L, 905L,\n1811L), end = c(184L, 905L, 1813L)), .Names = c(\"duration\", \"start\",\n\"end\"), class = \"data.frame\", row.names = c(\"5\", \"55\", \"92\"))\n\ny <- structure(list(duration = c(2L, 2L, 2L, 1L, 4L, 2L, 5L, 2L, 2L,\n2L, 2L, 1L), start = c(107L, 116L, 131L, 145L, 166L, 212L, 293L,\n704L, 877L, 941L, 1787L, 1982L), end = c(108L, 117L, 132L, 145L,\n169L, 213L, 296L, 705L, 878L, 942L, 1788L, 1982L)), .Names = c(\"duration\",\n\"start\", \"end\"), class = \"data.frame\", row.names = c(\"4\", \"6\",\n\"8\", \"10\", \"12\", \"16\", \"22\", \"58\", \"70\", \"72\", \"109\", \"121\"))\n\n\u2022 I take the first observation of x and calculate the distance to the closest occurrence of y from either end of x. (relational) Repeat for all x_i\n\u2022 I take the first observation of x and calculate the distance to the closest occurrence of y from the front end of x. (causal; you believe x causes y). repeat for all x_i.\n\nThese will output a vector of distances.\n\nMathematically here's a whack representing it with numbers:\n$$min(|y - x_i|)$$\n\nAs I write it out the 2 things I am struggling with is how to:\n1. Say take the minimum distance\n2. For the second calculation method I described above (take only from y values occurring after x_i) how to say only take the positive values.\n\nI can write the code and have it for R if this is useful in understanding what I'm doing though it's not really reproducible as it relies on my package I'm creating:\n\nCode:\ncm_describe <- function(code, grouping.var = NULL) {\nif (!is.null(grouping.var)) {\nif (is.list(grouping.var)) {\nm <- unlist(as.character(substitute(grouping.var))[-1])\nm <- sapply(strsplit(m, \"$\", fixed = TRUE), function(x) x[length(x)]) NAME <- paste(m, collapse = \"&\") } else { G <- as.character(substitute(grouping.var)) NAME <- G[length(G)] } cname <- strsplit(as.character(substitute(code)), \"&\") NAME <- paste0(cname[[length(cname)]], \"&\", NAME) group.var <- if (is.list(grouping.var) & length(grouping.var)>1) { apply(data.frame(grouping.var), 1, function(x){ if (any(is.na(x))){ NA } else { paste(x, collapse = \".\") } } ) } else { grouping.var } v <- do.call(data.frame, rle(paste2(list(code, group.var)))) } else { v <- do.call(data.frame, rle(code)) } v$end<- cumsum(v[, 1])\ncolnames(v)[1] <- \"duration\"\nv$start <- c(0, c(v$end+1)[-c(length(v$end))]) v$center <- (v$start + v$end)\/2\nv2 <- v[, c(\"values\", \"center\", \"duration\", \"start\", \"end\")]\nif (!is.null(grouping.var)) {\nnl <- if (is.list(grouping.var)) {\ngrouping.var\n} else {\nlist(grouping.var)\n}\nL2 <- lapply(1:(length(nl) + 1), function(i) {\nx <- strsplit(as.character(v2[, \"values\"]), \"\\\\.\")\nsapply(1:length(x), function(j)x[[j]][i])\n}\n)\nv3 <- data.frame(do.call(cbind, L2))\ncolnames(v3) <- unlist(strsplit(NAME, \"\\\\&\"))\nv2 <- data.frame(v3, v2[, -1, drop=FALSE])\n} else {\ncname <- strsplit(as.character(substitute(code)), \"&\")\ncolnames(v2)[1] <- cname[[length(cname)]]\n}\nreturn(v2)\n}\n\ncm_bidist <- function(code_x, code_y, grouping.var = NULL) {\nx <- cm_describe(code_x, grouping.var)\nx <- x[as.numeric(as.character(x[, \"code_x\"])) > 0, ]\ny <- cm_describe(code_y, grouping.var)\ny <- y[as.numeric(as.character(y[, \"code_y\"])) > 0, ]\nDnc <- sapply(1:nrow(x), function(i) min(abs(c(y[, \"start\"],\ny[, \"end\"]) - c(x[i, \"start\"], x[i, \"end\"]))))\nDc <- sapply(1:nrow(x), function(i) {\nvals <- c(y[, \"start\"], y[, \"end\"]) - c(x[i, \"start\"], x[i, \"end\"])\nif (sum(vals[vals >= 0]) == 0) {\nreturn(NA) #there should be a penalty for this\n} else {\nmin(vals[vals >= 0])\n}\n}\n)\nlist(associated_distance = Dnc, mean.sd_assoc_dist = c(mean(Dnc), sd(Dnc)),\ncausal_distance = Dc, mean.sd_causal_dist = c(mean(na.omit(Dc)), sd(na.omit(Dc))))\n}\n\nBGM\n\nTS Contributor\nLet $$\\mathcal{Y}$$ be the set of collection of the all occurrences of $$y$$ and artificially define a subset $$Y_1 = \\{y: ...\\}$$ such that\n\n$$\\min_{y \\in \\mathcal{Y}} |y - x_i|$$\n\nand $$\\min_{y \\in \\mathcal{Y}_1} |y - x_i|$$\n\ncorrespond to the two thing you want to write?\n\nDason\n\ntrinker can you give a small input example and an example of the quantities you calculate?\n\ntrinker\n\nggplot2orBust\nThanks for the feedback thus far:\n\nSo let's put it into context. Let's say I want to observe someone and record the duration in seconds of their farts and burps. I want to know if there's a relationship between farting and burping. SO this is where the idea of measuring the distance between events comes from. Let's have a visual of this data:\n\nNow the data frame that created it:\nCode:\n obs center duration start end\n[COLOR=\"red\"]1 fart 2.0 2 1 3\n2 fart 7.5 1 7 8\n3 fart 11.5 1 11 12\n4 fart 18.0 2 17 19\n5 fart 21.5 1 21 22\n6 fart 23.5 1 23 24\n7 fart 26.5 1 26 27\n8 fart 29.5 1 29 30\n9 fart 34.5 7 31 38\n10 fart 41.5 3 40 43\n11 fart 44.5 1 44 45\n12 fart 49.5 1 49 50[\/COLOR]\n[COLOR=\"#4169e1\"]13 burp 5.5 1 5 6\n14 burp 10.0 2 9 11\n15 burp 12.5 1 12 13\n16 burp 17.5 1 17 18\n17 burp 19.5 1 19 20\n18 burp 21.5 1 21 22\n19 burp 26.5 3 25 28\n20 burp 29.5 1 29 30\n21 burp 31.5 1 31 32\n22 burp 34.5 1 34 35\n23 burp 37.5 1 37 38\n24 burp 46.5 1 46 47[\/COLOR]\nAnd here's the output I created:\n\nCode:\n#============================================================\n# Looking at the distance of nearest burp to each fart\n#============================================================\n> cm_bidist(fart, burp)\n$associated_distance [1] 2 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 1 2$mean.sd_assoc_dist\n[1] 0.8333333 0.8348471\n\n$causal_distance [1] 2 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 3 1 NA$mean.sd_causal_dist\n[1] 0.8181818 0.9816498\n#==============================================================\n# Now looking at the distance of nearest fart to each burp\n#==============================================================\n> cm_bidist(burp, fart)\n$associated_distance [1] 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 0 1$mean.sd_assoc_dist\n[1] 0.500000 0.904534\n\n$causal_distance [1] 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 0 2$mean.sd_causal_dist\n[1] 0.5833333 0.9962049\nI think calling it causal is wrong but right now I'm just trying to get the math for it so I can express the distance measures in a serious way when I talk to statisticians on campus. I think BGM may have it or at least really close as a mathematician friend of mine on campus quickly listened to the problem and looked at the formula and he said that sounds about right. But I want to make sure it's right. So as Dason has suggested I provided a sampled data set and the outcomes of that. If you need more information let me know.\n\nEDIT: I made substantial edits to this post per Dason's comments below. The code has been changed to derive start end points but the mathematical means of finding the distance has not changed.\n\nDason\n\nCan you actually explain how you calculated those values though. It's just that my understanding from the first post doesn't match up with the output you provided.\n\ntrinker\n\nggplot2orBust\nMistake in programming. Didn't see it until Dason pointed it out as I was working with a more complex problem until farts and burps.\n\nI was attempting to do c(y_all) - c(x_s, x_e) and it wasn't working as expected. I'm pretty sure it is now. I edited the above response to show the new output (I think it's behaving like I explained in the original post).\n\nDason\n\nCan you still work out an example? For instance I don't see why the causal distance between the burp that starts at 27 is 1. It seems to me that if we're looking for causal then wouldn't we want to only look at farts that started after the burp started?\n\nIf you work out an example for both distances it might be easier (at least for me) to help you express it mathematically. Right now I only have what you said in the first post (which isn't entirely too clear to me) and my guessing as to how things are done based on the sample input and output.\n\nDason\n\nAnother question...\n\nYou have a fart that starts at 26, ends at 27. This gave a causal distance of 1. The only logical value I can find for this is the burp that started at 25 and ended at 28. However, it seems to me that since the burp actually starts before the fart this shouldn't happen. It also seems that if we were to calculate the distance between these intuitively we should get 0 since they occurred at the same time. Can you provide some clarification for this situation?\n\ntrinker\n\nggplot2orBust\nPer Dason's points on the function's faulty logic (or the creator of the function ) here is a revised version. I haven't looked at it myself yet but I think it adresses Dason's concerns.\n\nNow the data frame that created it:\nCode:\n obs center duration start end\n[COLOR=\"red\"]1 fart 2.0 2 1 3\n2 fart 7.5 1 7 8\n3 fart 11.5 1 11 12\n4 fart 18.0 2 17 19\n5 fart 21.5 1 21 22\n6 fart 23.5 1 23 24\n7 fart 26.5 1 26 27\n8 fart 29.5 1 29 30\n9 fart 34.5 7 31 38\n10 fart 41.5 3 40 43\n11 fart 44.5 1 44 45\n12 fart 49.5 1 49 50[\/COLOR]\n[COLOR=\"#4169e1\"]13 burp 5.5 1 5 6\n14 burp 10.0 2 9 11\n15 burp 12.5 1 12 13\n16 burp 17.5 1 17 18\n17 burp 19.5 1 19 20\n18 burp 21.5 1 21 22\n19 burp 26.5 3 25 28\n20 burp 29.5 1 29 30\n21 burp 31.5 1 31 32\n22 burp 34.5 1 34 35\n23 burp 37.5 1 37 38\n24 burp 46.5 1 46 47[\/COLOR]\nAnd here's the output I created:\n\nCode:\n#============================================================\n# Looking at the distance of nearest burp to each fart\n#============================================================\n> cm_bidist(fart, burp)\n$associated_distance [1] 2 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 1 2$mean.sd_assoc_dist\n[1] 0.8333333 0.8348471\n\n$causal_distance [1] 2 1 0 0 3 1 2 1 8 3 1 NA$mean.sd_causal_dist\n[1] 2.000000 2.236068\n#==============================================================\n# Now looking at the distance of nearest fart to each burp\n#==============================================================\n> cm_bidist(burp, fart)\n$associated_distance [1] 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 0 1$mean.sd_assoc_dist\n[1] 0.500000 0.904534\n\n$causal_distance [1] 1 0 4 3 1 1 1 1 8 5 2 2$mean.sd_causal_dist\n[1] 2.416667 2.274696\nEDIT: DAson says...\ntrinker - you have a fart that starts at 31, ends at 38, and the distance is 8. I think I see how you're getting it but I think the distance should be 0 because there is a burp from 34 to 35.\n\ntrinker\n\nggplot2orBust\nTry 4...\n\nFirst the piece of the function that calculates the causal distance:\n\nCode:\n Dc <- sapply(1:nrow(x), function(i) {\nif (sum(y[, \"start\"] > x[i, \"start\"] & y[, \"start\"] <= x[i, \"end\"]) > 0) {\nreturn(0)\n}\ninds <- y[, \"start\"] > x[i, \"end\"]\nvals <- y[inds, \"start\"] - x[i, \"end\"]\nif (sum(vals[vals >= 0]) == 0) {\nreturn(NA) #there should be a\n} else {\nmin(vals[vals > 0])\n}\n}\n)\nThis calculates the associative distance:\nCode:\n Dnc <- sapply(1:nrow(x), function(i) {\nyind <- 1:nrow(y)\nif (sum(y[, \"start\"] >= x[i, \"start\"] & y[, \"start\"] <= x[i, \"end\"]) > 0 |\nsum(y[, \"end\"] >= x[i, \"start\"] & y[, \"end\"] <= x[i, \"start\"]) > 0 |\nsum(sapply(yind, function(j) {\ny[j, \"start\"] < x[i, \"start\"] & y[j, \"end\"] > x[i, \"end\"]\n}\n)) > 0) {\nreturn(0)\n}\nsdif <- c(y[, \"start\"], y[, \"end\"]) - x[i, \"start\"]\nedif <- c(y[, \"start\"], y[, \"end\"]) - x[i, \"end\"]\nmin(abs(c(sdif, edif)))\n}\n)\nNow the results:\n\nCode:\n#============================================================\n# Looking at the distance of nearest burp to each fart\n#============================================================\n> cm_bidist(fart, burp)\n$associated_distance [1] 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 1 2$mean.sd_assoc_dist\n[1] 0.7500000 0.8660254\n\n$causal_distance [1] 2 1 0 0 3 1 2 1 0 3 1 NA$mean.sd_causal_dist\n[1] 1.272727 1.103713\n#==============================================================\n# Now looking at the distance of nearest fart to each burp\n#==============================================================\n> cm_bidist(burp, fart)\n$associated_distance [1] 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1$mean.sd_assoc_dist\n[1] 0.1666667 0.3892495\n\n$causal_distance [1] 1 0 4 3 1 1 0 1 8 5 2 2$mean.sd_causal_dist\n[1] 2.333333 2.348436\nFor causal:\nI made it that if the beginning of a y code occurs after the start (not at the same time otherwise we can't say x caused y if they co-occur) of an x code but before the end it's a distance of 0.\n\nFor associative:\nIf an x code starts or ends in the middle of a y code it's 0; and vise versa if a y code starts or ends in the middle of an x code 0; and if an x code is contained within a y code 0.\n\nEDIT: Dason says...\nf <- function(xstart, xend, ystart){max(0, min(ystart[ystart > xstart] - xend))}\n\ntrinker\n\nggplot2orBust\nI've been attempting to move forward on this idea for some time but have been stalled by two impasses:\n\n1. I want to distill Dnc in the way Dason distilled Dc (though not necessary)\n2. I still have no idea how to represent what I'm doing mathematically. It seems more complicated than when i first proposed the idea per the sticking point Dason showed\n\nAfter that I need to do some serious thought about how to apply a test of significance but I'm far from there.\n\nHere's what we have so far:\n\nData set:\nCode:\nx <- structure(list(duration = c(1L, 1L, 3L), start = c(184L, 905L,\n1811L), end = c(184L, 905L, 1813L)), .Names = c(\"duration\", \"start\",\n\"end\"), class = \"data.frame\", row.names = c(\"5\", \"55\", \"92\"))\n\ny <- structure(list(duration = c(2L, 2L, 2L, 1L, 4L, 2L, 5L, 2L, 2L,\n2L, 2L, 1L), start = c(107L, 116L, 131L, 145L, 166L, 212L, 293L,\n704L, 877L, 941L, 1787L, 1982L), end = c(108L, 117L, 132L, 145L,\n169L, 213L, 296L, 705L, 878L, 942L, 1788L, 1982L)), .Names = c(\"duration\",\n\"start\", \"end\"), class = \"data.frame\", row.names = c(\"4\", \"6\",\n\"8\", \"10\", \"12\", \"16\", \"22\", \"58\", \"70\", \"72\", \"109\", \"121\"))\nImage of Codes\n\nData view\nCode:\n obs center duration start end\n[COLOR=\"red\"]1 fart 2.0 2 1 3\n2 fart 7.5 1 7 8\n3 fart 11.5 1 11 12\n4 fart 18.0 2 17 19\n5 fart 21.5 1 21 22\n6 fart 23.5 1 23 24\n7 fart 26.5 1 26 27\n8 fart 29.5 1 29 30\n9 fart 34.5 7 31 38\n10 fart 41.5 3 40 43\n11 fart 44.5 1 44 45\n12 fart 49.5 1 49 50[\/COLOR]\n[COLOR=\"#4169e1\"]13 burp 5.5 1 5 6\n14 burp 10.0 2 9 11\n15 burp 12.5 1 12 13\n16 burp 17.5 1 17 18\n17 burp 19.5 1 19 20\n18 burp 21.5 1 21 22\n19 burp 26.5 3 25 28\n20 burp 29.5 1 29 30\n21 burp 31.5 1 31 32\n22 burp 34.5 1 34 35\n23 burp 37.5 1 37 38\n24 burp 46.5 1 46 47[\/COLOR]\nCode:\ncm_bidist <- function(code_x, code_y, grouping.var = NULL) {\nx <- cm_describe(code_x, grouping.var)\nx <- x[as.numeric(as.character(x[, \"code_x\"])) > 0, ]\ny <- cm_describe(code_y, grouping.var)\ny <- y[as.numeric(as.character(y[, \"code_y\"])) > 0, ]\nDnc <- sapply(1:nrow(x), function(i) {\nyind <- 1:nrow(y)\nif (sum(y[, \"start\"] >= x[i, \"start\"] & y[, \"start\"] <= x[i, \"end\"]) > 0 |\nsum(y[, \"end\"] >= x[i, \"start\"] & y[, \"end\"] <= x[i, \"start\"]) > 0 |\nsum(sapply(yind, function(j) {\ny[j, \"start\"] < x[i, \"start\"] & y[j, \"end\"] > x[i, \"end\"]\n}\n)) > 0) {\nreturn(0)\n}\nsdif <- c(y[, \"start\"], y[, \"end\"]) - x[i, \"start\"]\nedif <- c(y[, \"start\"], y[, \"end\"]) - x[i, \"end\"]\nmin(abs(c(sdif, edif)))\n}\n)\nDc <- sapply(1:nrow(x), function(i) {\nFUN <- function(xstart, xend, ystart){\nmax(0, min(ystart[ystart > xstart] - xend))\n}\nsuppressWarnings(FUN(x[i, \"start\"], x[i, \"end\"], y[, \"start\"]))\n}\n)\nDc[is.infinite(Dc)] <- NA\nlist(associated_distance = Dnc, mean.sd_assoc_dist = c(mean(Dnc), sd(Dnc)),\ncausal_distance = Dc, mean.sd_causal_dist = c(mean(na.omit(Dc)), sd(na.omit(Dc))))\n}","date":"2019-09-21 05:14:18","metadata":"{\"extraction_info\": {\"found_math\": true, \"script_math_tex\": 0, \"script_math_asciimath\": 0, \"math_annotations\": 0, \"math_alttext\": 0, \"mathml\": 0, \"mathjax_tag\": 0, \"mathjax_inline_tex\": 1, \"mathjax_display_tex\": 1, \"mathjax_asciimath\": 1, \"img_math\": 0, \"codecogs_latex\": 0, \"wp_latex\": 0, \"mimetex.cgi\": 0, \"\/images\/math\/codecogs\": 0, \"mathtex.cgi\": 0, \"katex\": 0, \"math-container\": 0, \"wp-katex-eq\": 0, \"align\": 0, \"equation\": 0, \"x-ck12\": 0, \"texerror\": 0, \"math_score\": 0.444947212934494, \"perplexity\": 6740.753454783259}, \"config\": {\"markdown_headings\": false, \"markdown_code\": true, \"boilerplate_config\": {\"ratio_threshold\": 0.18, \"absolute_threshold\": 10, \"end_threshold\": 15, \"enable\": true}, \"remove_buttons\": true, \"remove_image_figures\": true, \"remove_link_clusters\": true, \"table_config\": {\"min_rows\": 2, \"min_cols\": 3, \"format\": \"plain\"}, \"remove_chinese\": true, \"remove_edit_buttons\": true, \"extract_latex\": true}, \"warc_path\": \"s3:\/\/commoncrawl\/crawl-data\/CC-MAIN-2019-39\/segments\/1568514574265.76\/warc\/CC-MAIN-20190921043014-20190921065014-00375.warc.gz\"}"}
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Harunur Rashid (born 1 January 1962) is a Bangladesh Nationalist Party politician and the incumbent Jatiya Sangsad member from the Chapai Nawabganj-3 constituency since January 2019.
Career
Rashid was elected to Jatiya Sangsad from Chapai Nawabganj-3 in the June 1996 Bangladeshi general election as a candidate of Bangladesh Nationalist Party. He had received 77,929 votes while his nearest rival, Latifur Rahman of Awami League, had received 47,048 votes.
Rashid was re-elected to the same position in the 2001 Bangladeshi general election. He had received 85,489 votes while the same rival, Latifur Rahman of Awami League, had received 60,460 votes.
Rashid contested the 2008 Bangladeshi general election from Chapai Nawabganj-3 as the Bangladesh Nationalist Party candidate but lost to Abdul Odud of Awami League. He received 76,178 votes while the winner received 112,753 votes. Latifur Rahman of Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami also campaigned against him.
In November 2011, Rashid participated in a human chain protesting erosion at the Chapainawabganj Press Club.
Rashid boycotted the 2014 election as per decision of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party and Abdul Odud of Awami League was elected to parliament uncontested from Chapai Nawabganj-3.
Rashid was elected to parliament from Chapai Nawabganj-3 as a Bangladesh Nationalist Party candidate on 30 December 2018. He had received 133,661 votes while Abdul Odul of Awami League and his nearest rival received 85,938 votes. He took the oath of office 90 days after the mandated time following instructions of Tarique Rahman. The four Bangladesh Nationalist Party members of parliament initially refused to join parliament as they had deemed the election unfair.
Rashid in parliament asked the speaker to create a committee to investigate the large number of cases filed against Bangladesh Nationalist Party politicians.
Charges and convictions
Assistant director Monayem Hossain of the Anti-Corruption Commission filed a case against Rashid for tax fraud in March 2007 with Tejgaon police station and then pressed charge in July. Rashid had imported a Hummer H2 on 25 April 2005 without paying tax as per his privilege as a member of parliament but later sold the to Ishtiak Sadek, violating the rules of the duty free facility, who sold it to Enayetur Rahman Bappi. The car, imported under duty free privilege, cannot be sold under less than years of being purchased. Rapid Action Battalion-2, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Akbar Hossain, had spotted the Hummer in Panthapath and asked the men to come to their camp where they were detained.
In October 2019, Judge Shaikh Nazmul Alam of the Dhaka court sentenced Rashid to five years' imprisonment for dodging taxes while importing a luxurious car in 2007 and fined him five million taka. It also sent his co-accused former managing director of NTV and Channel 9, Enayetur Rahman Bappi, to two years imprisonment. His other co-accused proprietor of Sky Autos, Ishtiak Sadek, sentenced to jail for three years. A week later, the High Court granted him six months' bail in the case.
Justices Obaidul Hassan and AKM Zahirul Huq asked the government to explain why Rashid's parliamentary membership should not be canceled due to his conviction.
On 9 December 2021, Justice Md Selim of Bangladesh High court upheld the verdict in the tax evasion case against Rashid after hearing his appeal. The High Court commuted his sentence to time served.
Personal life
Rashid is married to Syeda Asifa Ashrafi Papia.
References
Living people
1962 births
People from Chapai Nawabganj district
University of Rajshahi alumni
Bangladesh Nationalist Party politicians
6th Jatiya Sangsad members
7th Jatiya Sangsad members
8th Jatiya Sangsad members
11th Jatiya Sangsad members
Place of birth missing (living people)
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Le qualificazioni alla Coppa del Mondo di rugby femminile 2017 si tennero tra il 14 febbraio 2015 e il 17 dicembre 2016, e videro la partecipazione di 13 squadre nazionali che si affrontarono in tornei di qualificazione su base geografica.
Alla Coppa del Mondo 2017 parteciparono 12 federazioni, 7 delle quali già qualificate automaticamente in base ai risultati ottenuti nella Coppa del Mondo 2014 (, , , , , e ).
Le altre cinque dovettero essere determinate da tornei e spareggi continentali e intercontinentali organizzati dalle varie confederazioni regionali (Rugby Europe, Oceania Rugby e Asia Rugby).
Stante la defezione del , di fatto le qualificazioni si ridussero a una zona europea che espresse 3 squadre, e un ripescaggio asiatico-oceaniano che ne espresse altre 2.
Al termine del percorso di qualificazione le squadre promosse alla competizione furono , , , e .
Criteri di qualificazione
Africa: nessuna squadra. Il era originariamente destinato a uno spareggio interzona con le due migliori asiatiche e la migliore oceaniana, ma decise altresì di non partecipare alle qualificazioni.
Americhe: nessuna squadra. e erano qualificate di diritto.
Asia e Oceania (2 qualificate): Asia Rugby organizzò un triangolare tra le migliori due del campionato asiatico 2016, che risultarono essere di diritto e (la federazione del si era disimpegnata dal gioco a 15 e non partecipò alle qualificazioni) e la vincitrice dell'edizione 2016 del campionato oceaniano.
Europa (3 qualificate): 9 squadre parteciparono alle selezioni. Qualificate d'ufficio , e , si contesero due posti diretti le altre tre squadre del Sei Nazioni femminile (, e ). Fu stabilito che le migliori due tra di queste ultime tre squadre, da determinarsi con classifica avulsa aggregata delle edizioni e , si qualificassero direttamente; la terza altresì affrontasse lo spareggio in gara doppia contro la vincitrice del campionato europeo femminile 2016, cui presero parte 6 squadre.
Situazione prima degli incontri di qualificazione
Qualificazioni Europa
Verdetto
: qualificata alla Coppa del Mondo come prima squadra europea
: qualificata alla Coppa del Mondo come seconda squadra europea
: qualificata alla Coppa del Mondo come terza squadra europea
Ripescaggi Asia — Oceania
A seguito della defezione del la cui federazione tagliò fondi per tentare la qualificazione olimpica), entrambe le squadre del campionato asiatico 2016 ( e ) passarono direttamente al ripescaggio, cui non si presentò il che decise di ritirarsi dalle qualificazioni.
Al torneo di Hong Kong per le ultime due squadre da destinare alla Coppa del Mondo si presentarono quindi le due citate asiatiche e la campione oceaniana che il 5 novembre 2016 aveva battuto 37-10 la formazione di .
Dopo le prime due partite del triangolare, in cui la squadra oceaniana fu battuta da entrambe le asiatiche, e , ormai con la qualificazione assicurata, si affrontarono nell'ultima giornata solo per stabilire quale fosse l'ordine di tabellone alla Coppa del Mondo.
Il Giappone vinse 20-8 e si qualificò come Asia 1, mentre Hong Kong affrontò i sorteggi dei gironi alla Coppa del Mondo come Asia 2.
Torneo di qualificazione Asia — Oceania
Classifica
Verdetto
: qualificata alla Coppa del Mondo come prima squadra asiatica
: qualificata alla Coppa del Mondo come seconda squadra asiatica
Quadro completo delle qualificazioni
In grassetto le squadre ammesse al turno successivo.
Note
Collegamenti esterni
Tornei per nazionali di rugby a 15 nel 2015
Tornei per nazionali di rugby a 15 nel 2016
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{"url":"https:\/\/math.stackexchange.com\/questions\/4286296\/prove-or-disprove-a-claim-regarding-irrational-numbers","text":"Prove or disprove a claim regarding irrational numbers\n\nI am trying to prove the following claim:\n\nLet $$0\\leq n \\in \\Bbb Z$$ and suppose that there exists a $$k \\in \\Bbb Z$$ such that $$n=4k+3$$. Prove or disprove: $$\\sqrt n \\notin \\Bbb Q$$ .\n\nThe problem I am having is that I am trying to assume by contradiction that $$\\sqrt n \\in \\Bbb Q$$ and then I say that there are $$a,b \\in \\Bbb Z$$ such that $$n=\\sqrt {4k+3}=\\frac ab$$. I finally get to a point where $$k=\\frac {a^2-3b^2}{4b^2}$$. Yet I can't find any $$a,b \\in \\Bbb Z$$ that will help me show that the claim is false, nor show a contradiction that will cause the claim to be true. Any help will be welcomed.\n\n\u2022 $k$ is an integer. So that, you don't need $b$. Thus, $b=1$. Oct 24 at 20:24\n\u2022 Try to solve \u201cIf $a^2-3b^2$ is divisible by $4,$ then $a,b$ are both even.\u201d Oct 24 at 20:25\n\u2022 @lonestudent What? That\u2019s a jump. Oct 24 at 20:27\n\u2022 @ThomasAndrews Am I thinking wrong?.. Oct 24 at 20:29\n\u2022 Well, $\\frac A{4b^2}$ can be an integer, without $b=1.$ The question is what about $a^2-3b^2$ let\u2019s us say this particular $b$ must be $1.$ Hence I called it \u201cquite a jump\u201d rather than \u201cwrong.\u201d @lonestudent Oct 24 at 20:39\n\nStatement:\n\nLet $$a,b,k\\in\\mathbb Z^{+}$$, where $$\\gcd (a,b)=1$$ and if $$4k+3=\\frac{a^2}{b^2}$$, then $$b^2=1$$ or $$b=1$$.\n\nThus we have,\n\n$$\\sqrt{4k+3}=a,\\thinspace a\\in\\mathbb Z^{+}$$\n\nand\n\n$$k=\\frac{a^2-4+1}{4}=\\frac{a^2+1}{4}-1$$\n\nThis immediately implies,\n\n$$a=2m-1, \\thinspace m\\in\\mathbb Z^{+}$$\n\nThis means,\n\n\\begin{align}a^2+1&=4(m^2-m)+2\\not\\equiv 0\\thinspace\\thinspace\\thinspace\\text{(mod 4)}.&\\end{align}\n\nConclusion:\n\nWe conclude that, there doesn't exist $$n=4k+3,\\thinspace k\\in\\mathbb Z^{+}$$, such that $$\\sqrt n\\in\\mathbb Q^{+}$$.\n\n\u2022 I don't understand why $k \\in \\Bbb Z$ implies that $\\sqrt {4k+3} \\in \\Bbb Z$ For example for $k=1$ we have that $a=\\sqrt 7 \\notin \\Bbb Z$ Oct 24 at 20:39\n\u2022 I understand but no one said that $\\sqrt n$ is an integer, thus I don't know why you assume that ${4k+3}$ is a perfect square. Oct 24 at 20:57\n\u2022 @Yuval I expanded my answer. Now, everything is clear. Oct 24 at 21:15\n\nThe square of an even integer is $$4k$$, the square of an odd integer is $$8k+1$$. $$4k+3$$ is never the square of an integer, neither is $$4k+2$$ nor $$8k+5$$. So the square root of $$n$$ is not an integer.\n\nNow you need to remember the well known proof that the square root of 2 is irrational; that proof can be adapted to show that the square root of any integer is either an integer or irrational.\n\nIt is given that $$n=4k+3$$, so I think you mean to say that there exist $$a,b\\in\\Bbb{Z}$$ such that $$\\sqrt{n}=\\sqrt{4k+3}=\\tfrac ab,$$ in the hopes of reaching a contradiction. Indeed some algebra then leads to $$k=\\frac{a^2-3b^2}{4b^2},$$ which means that $$4b^2$$ should divide $$a^2-3b^2$$ because $$k$$ is an integer. In particular $$4$$ should divide $$a^2-3b^2$$. This implies that $$a$$ and $$b$$ are both even [prove this!], say $$a=2A$$ and $$b=2B$$. Plugging this in then gives $$k=\\frac{(2A)^2-3(2B)^2}{4(2B)^2}=\\frac{4A^2-12B^2}{16B^2}=\\frac{A^2-3B^2}{4B^2},$$ and so by the same argument $$A$$ and $$B$$ are again both even. Can you see the contradiction from here?\n\n\u2022 I understand that this process can go on and on and reach the same point every time, but how can I reach a contradiction from here? Oct 24 at 20:43\n\u2022 There are two ways to proceed. One way is to conclude that both $a$ and $b$ are integers that can be divided by $2$ indefinitely, which implies $a=b=0$, a contradiction. The other way is to start with a reduced fraction $\\tfrac{a}{b}$, so that $a$ and $b$ are coprime. Then the conclusion that both are even is already a contradiction. Oct 24 at 20:44\n\nNote the if $$q$$ is rational but not integral then $$q^2$$ will also not be integral. So you only need to prove that $$n$$ is not a power of an integer.\n\nNote that if $$m=2l$$ then $$m^2=4l^2$$, if $$m=4l+1$$ then $$m^2=16l^2+4l+1$$ and if $$m=4l+3$$ then $$m^2 = 16l^2+12l + 8 +1$$. So for any $$m$$ we have that $$m^2$$ is either of the form $$4r$$ or of the form $$4r+1$$.\n\nIn different words: Modulo $$4$$ we have $$0^2=0,1^2=1,2^2=0,3^2=1$$.\n\nSo any number of the form $$4k+3$$ is not a square of an integer.\n\n$$\\sqrt n=\\sqrt{4k+3}$$ is a solution of the equation $$x^2 -(4k+3)=0$$\n\nNow by Rational Zeros Theorem $$\\biggr($$Which states that : $$x=p\/q$$ is a Rational Number satisfying the polynomial equation $$\\sum_{r=0}^n a_rx^r$$ then $$q(\\neq0)|a_n$$ and $$p|a_0$$ and gcd(p,q)=1 $$\\biggr)$$ , the only Rational roots of the equation are $$\u00b11,\u00b1(4k+3),\u00b1n|(4k+3) \\forall k\\in \\Bbb Z^+$$ where $$n \\in \\Bbb Z^+$$. But $$\\sqrt{4k+3}$$ is neither of them . So $$\\sqrt n=\\sqrt{4k+3}$$ is irrational.","date":"2021-11-29 11:18:52","metadata":"{\"extraction_info\": {\"found_math\": true, \"script_math_tex\": 0, \"script_math_asciimath\": 0, \"math_annotations\": 0, \"math_alttext\": 0, \"mathml\": 0, \"mathjax_tag\": 0, \"mathjax_inline_tex\": 1, \"mathjax_display_tex\": 0, \"mathjax_asciimath\": 0, \"img_math\": 0, \"codecogs_latex\": 0, \"wp_latex\": 0, \"mimetex.cgi\": 0, \"\/images\/math\/codecogs\": 0, \"mathtex.cgi\": 0, \"katex\": 0, \"math-container\": 70, \"wp-katex-eq\": 0, \"align\": 1, \"equation\": 0, \"x-ck12\": 0, \"texerror\": 0, \"math_score\": 0.8966260552406311, \"perplexity\": 91.8172499135927}, \"config\": {\"markdown_headings\": false, \"markdown_code\": true, \"boilerplate_config\": {\"ratio_threshold\": 0.18, \"absolute_threshold\": 10, \"end_threshold\": 15, \"enable\": true}, \"remove_buttons\": true, \"remove_image_figures\": true, \"remove_link_clusters\": true, \"table_config\": {\"min_rows\": 2, \"min_cols\": 3, \"format\": \"plain\"}, \"remove_chinese\": true, \"remove_edit_buttons\": true, \"extract_latex\": true}, \"warc_path\": \"s3:\/\/commoncrawl\/crawl-data\/CC-MAIN-2021-49\/segments\/1637964358705.61\/warc\/CC-MAIN-20211129104236-20211129134236-00390.warc.gz\"}"}
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Q: What is the correct way to handle the ecosystem deployment file in terms of version control and file system? I have a ecosystem.json file for PM2 that handles apps, deployment, and environment variables. very similar to the example scripts on the deployment documentation page.
I'm curious about best practices involving storing this file in version control and on the server's file system; seeing as it contains things like password and keys.
I have considered ignoring it from version control, however doing that means the deployment PM2 process won't work. Deploying without the ecosystem file in the repository means the post deploy script won't find it as it wasn't cloned to the machine.
npm install && pm2 startOrRestart ecosystem.json --env production
This means I am now using a private repository and checking in the ecosystem file. Is it possible to have a public repository and still use pm2 deployment?
Finally what are the best practices about having the ecosystem file on the file system? It seems that PM2 requires that it be there.
My understanding of env variables was that only the running processes know about them. Is this a misunderstanding? Is a file containing sensitive env variables okay to be left in the application code directory?
Should I add another line to the post-deploy script to delete the ecosystem file after running the application? Would that cause problems with things like restarting the processes or anything else?
npm install && pm2 startOrRestart ecosystem.json --env production && rm ecosystem.json
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During the 1990–91 English football season, Nottingham Forest competed in the Football League First Division.
Season summary
There was chance for more success in 1991 when Forest reached their only FA Cup final under Brian Clough and went ahead after scoring an early goal against Tottenham Hotspur at Wembley, but ended up losing 2–1 in extra time after an own goal by Des Walker. In Forest's team that day was young Irish midfielder Roy Keane, who had joined the club the previous summer.
Final league table
Results
Nottingham Forest's score comes first
Legend
Football League First Division
FA Cup
League Cup
Full Members Cup
Squad
Transfers
In
Out
Transfers in: £47,000
Transfers out: £460,000
Total spending: £413,000
Awards
Roy Keane - Fans' player of the season
References
Nottingham Forest F.C. seasons
Nottingham Forest
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Q: Trying to find the ratio of voltmeters V1/V2
I'm trying to find the ratio of voltmeters V1/V2. My attempt is shown below
Let's recall each resistors R and then we'll have V1 = (2R)(I) (since two resistors are in parallel). V2 = (3R/2)I (two resistors are in parallel and in series with remaining resistor)
Hence, we get the ratio 3/4. However, I believe that I've gone wrong somewhere. Could you assist me with that?
Regards
A: *
*Ignore V1, collapse the left three resistors into one resistor.
*Look! V2 is now measuring the potential in the middle of a voltage divider.
*Compute the voltage between the common voltmeter node and the + battery terminal.
*Now there's a voltage divider across the above nodes, V1 is measuring it.
A:
simulate this circuit – Schematic created using CircuitLab
Figure 1. Circuit redrawn.
See if Figure 1 helps. Update your question with any new calculations.
Tip: ignore V1 for now and calculate V2 first.
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{
"redpajama_set_name": "RedPajamaStackExchange"
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Q: Cloudflare and Azure integration I have an Azure web app service that I'm trying to use cloudflare to point to using a custom domain. I've following similar process to this https://www.petermorlion.com/setting-up-custom-domains-in-azure-with-cloudflare/
I registered the domain with Go Daddy 2 days ago and amended the name servers. Using online tools it's correctly going through cloudflare. However, it still comes up with GoDaddy default page even though the A record is pointing to the Azure web app service IP address.
I'm not sure if I've missing something or just being impatient.
Appreciate any guidance.
A: It seems that you have finished pointing your domain to the Cloudflare nameservers. Then you can map your custom domain DNS records to Azure app service.
First of all, you need to ensure that the web app's App Service plan must be a paid tier (Shared, Basic, Standard, Premium or Consumption for Azure Functions). Then, you can use either a CNAME record or an A record to map a custom DNS name to App Service.
Create CNAME record
Add a CNAME record to map a subdomain to the app's default domain name
(.azurewebsites.net, where is the name of your
app).
For the www.contoso.com domain example, add a CNAME record that maps
the name www to <app_name>.azurewebsites.net.
Create A record
To map an A record to an app, App Service requires two DNS records:
An A record to map to the app's IP address. A TXT record to map to the
app's default domain name <app_name>.azurewebsites.net. App Service
uses this record only at configuration time, to verify that you own
the custom domain. After your custom domain is validated and
configured in App Service, you can delete this TXT record.
After you added the relative records, you can select Add custom domain of the app service settings. Verify that your domain resolves to your app's IP address using WhatsmyDNS.net. You may wait for an amount of time. If the browser has not effected on the new custom domain, you can Clear the cache and test DNS resolution again. On a Windows machine, you clear the cache with ipconfig /flushdns.
Let me know if this works or show your records(hiding sensitive data) for further help.
|
{
"redpajama_set_name": "RedPajamaStackExchange"
}
| 7,505
|
package com.blt.talk.message.server.handler.impl;
import org.slf4j.Logger;
import org.slf4j.LoggerFactory;
import org.springframework.beans.factory.annotation.Autowired;
import org.springframework.stereotype.Component;
import org.springframework.util.concurrent.ListenableFuture;
import com.blt.talk.common.code.IMHeader;
import com.blt.talk.common.code.IMProtoMessage;
import com.blt.talk.common.code.proto.IMBaseDefine.AVCallCmdId;
import com.blt.talk.common.code.proto.IMBaseDefine.BuddyListCmdID;
import com.blt.talk.common.code.proto.IMBaseDefine.ServiceID;
import com.blt.talk.common.code.proto.IMWebRTC.IMAVCallCancelReq;
import com.blt.talk.common.code.proto.IMWebRTC.IMAVCallHungUpReq;
import com.blt.talk.common.code.proto.IMWebRTC.IMAVCallInitiateReq;
import com.blt.talk.common.code.proto.IMWebRTC.IMAVCallInitiateRes;
import com.blt.talk.message.server.cluster.MessageServerCluster;
import com.blt.talk.message.server.handler.IMWebrtcHandler;
import com.blt.talk.message.server.manager.ClientUser;
import com.blt.talk.message.server.manager.ClientUserManager;
import com.google.protobuf.MessageLite;
import io.netty.channel.ChannelHandlerContext;
/**
*
* @author 袁贵
* @version 1.3
* @since 1.3
*/
@Component
public class IMWebrtcHandlerImpl extends AbstractUserHandlerImpl implements IMWebrtcHandler {
@Autowired
private MessageServerCluster messageServerCluster;
private Logger logger = LoggerFactory.getLogger(this.getClass());
/* (non-Javadoc)
* @see com.blt.talk.message.server.handler.IMWebrtcHandler#initiateReq(com.blt.talk.common.code.IMHeader, com.google.protobuf.MessageLite, io.netty.channel.ChannelHandlerContext)
*/
@Override
public void initiateReq(IMHeader header, MessageLite body, ChannelHandlerContext ctx) {
IMAVCallInitiateReq msg = (IMAVCallInitiateReq)body;
long fromId = msg.getFromId();
long toId = msg.getToId();
// // long callId = msg.getCallId();
// // FIXME: ?sdp msg.getAttachData()
//
// // IMBaseDefine.ClientType nType = msg.getCallerClientType();
// // logger.debug("webrtc initiate request {} {} {} {}", fromId, toId, callId, nType);
//
// ClientUser toClientUser = ClientUserManager.getUserById(toId);
// if (toClientUser != null ){
// IMHeader hdRequest = header.clone();
// hdRequest.setSeqnum(0);
// IMProtoMessage<MessageLite> msgCancel = new IMProtoMessage<MessageLite>(hdRequest, body);
// toClientUser.broadcast(msgCancel, ctx);
// }
//
// messageServerCluster.send(header, body);
ListenableFuture<?> future = messageServerCluster.webrtcInitateCallReq(fromId, toId, super.getHandleId(ctx));
future.addCallback((result) -> {
messageServerCluster.sendToUser(toId, header, body);
}, (throwable) -> {
// TODO 发起失败
});
}
/* (non-Javadoc)
* @see com.blt.talk.message.server.handler.IMWebrtcHandler#initiateRes(com.blt.talk.common.code.IMHeader, com.google.protobuf.MessageLite, io.netty.channel.ChannelHandlerContext)
*/
@Override
public void initiateRes(IMHeader header, MessageLite body, ChannelHandlerContext ctx) {
IMAVCallInitiateRes msg = (IMAVCallInitiateRes)body;
long fromId = msg.getFromId();
long toId = msg.getToId();
long callId = msg.getCallId();
ListenableFuture<?> future =messageServerCluster.webrtcInitateCallRes(fromId, toId, super.getHandleId(ctx));
future.addCallback((result) -> {
// TODO 通知其他端取消
// messageServerCluster.sendToUser(toId, header, body);
}, (throwable) -> {
// TODO 接受失败
// 所有端取消
});
// IMBaseDefine.ClientType nType = msg.getCalledClientType();
// logger.debug("webrtc initiate resposne {} {} {} {}", fromId, toId, callId, nType);
// ClientUser toClientUser = ClientUserManager.getUserById(toId);
// if (toClientUser != null ){
//
// // 呼叫接起时,取消其他端的呼叫提醒
// IMHeader hdCancel = new IMHeader();
// hdCancel.setServiceId(ServiceID.SID_AVCALL_VALUE);
// hdCancel.setCommandId(AVCallCmdId.CID_AVCALL_CANCEL_REQ_VALUE);
//
// IMAVCallCancelReq msgCancelReq = IMAVCallCancelReq.newBuilder().setFromId(fromId)
// .setToId(toId).setCallId(callId).build();
//
// IMProtoMessage<MessageLite> msgCancel = new IMProtoMessage<MessageLite>(hdCancel, msgCancelReq);
// toClientUser.broadcast(msgCancel, ctx);
// }
//
// messageServerCluster.send(header, body);
}
/* (non-Javadoc)
* @see com.blt.talk.message.server.handler.IMWebrtcHandler#hungupCall(com.blt.talk.common.code.IMHeader, com.google.protobuf.MessageLite, io.netty.channel.ChannelHandlerContext)
*/
@Override
public void hungupCall(IMHeader header, MessageLite body, ChannelHandlerContext ctx) {
IMAVCallHungUpReq msg = (IMAVCallHungUpReq)body;
long fromId = msg.getFromId();
long toId = msg.getToId();
// messageServerCluster.send(header, body);
// TODO 挂断 处理
messageServerCluster.webrtcHungupReq(fromId, toId, super.getHandleId(ctx));
}
}
|
{
"redpajama_set_name": "RedPajamaGithub"
}
| 7,523
|
Private Pilot License
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100 hours of pilot-in-command flight time, which includes at least:
50 hours in airplanes
50 hours in cross-country flight of which at least 10 hours must be in airplanes
20 hours of training that includes at least:
10 hours of instrument training using a view-limiting device
5 hours of the 10 hours required on instrument training must be in a multi-engine airplane
10 hours of training in a multi-engine airplane that has a retractable landing gear, flaps, and controllable pitch propellers, or is turbine-powered
One 2-hour cross country flight in a multi-engine airplane in daytime conditions that consists of a total straight-line distance of more than 100 nautical miles from the original point of departure
One 2-hour cross country flight in a multi-engine airplane in nighttime conditions that consists of a total straight-line distance of more than 100 nautical miles from the original point of departure
3 hours in a multi-engine airplane with an authorized instructor in preparation for the practical test within the preceding 2 calendar months from the month of the test
10 hours of solo flight time in a multi-engine airplane or 10 hours of flight time performing the duties of pilot in command in a multi-engine airplane with an authorized instructor that includes at least:
One cross-country flight of not less than 300 nautical miles total distance
landings at a minimum of three points, one of which is a straight-line distance of at least 250 nautical miles from the original departure point
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© 2019 Flightgest. All Rights Reserved.
|
{
"redpajama_set_name": "RedPajamaCommonCrawl"
}
| 4,906
|
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