| # Solfunmeme Dioxus Plugin Security Policy |
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| ## Threat Model |
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| Each plugin runs as WASM in the browser. Risks: |
| 1. **Data exfiltration** — plugin reads wallet keys or token balances |
| 2. **UI spoofing** — plugin renders fake wallet connect dialogs |
| 3. **Resource exhaustion** — plugin consumes CPU/memory, freezes browser |
| 4. **Network abuse** — plugin makes unauthorized RPC calls |
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|
| ## Security Boundaries |
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|
| ### Tier 1: DAO (🏛️) — HIGH trust |
| Plugins that handle governance votes and token data. |
| - **Allowed**: Read wallet pubkey, read token balances, POST to /solfunmeme/paste |
| - **Denied**: Private key access, arbitrary network, localStorage write |
| - **Constraint**: max_render_ms = 500, max_fetch = 10/min |
| |
| ### Tier 2: Data (📊) — MEDIUM trust |
| Plugins that display/submit data. |
| - **Allowed**: Read-only RPC, POST to pastebin, read erdfa types |
| - **Denied**: Wallet signing, private key access, WebSocket |
| - **Constraint**: max_render_ms = 1000, max_fetch = 30/min |
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|
| ### Tier 3: Analysis (🔬) — MEDIUM trust |
| Plugins that parse/analyze code. |
| - **Allowed**: CPU computation, read source files, render charts |
| - **Denied**: Network access, wallet access, storage write |
| - **Constraint**: max_render_ms = 2000 (heavy computation allowed) |
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|
| ### Tier 4: Meta (🧬) — LOW trust |
| Experimental ontology/MCP modules. |
| - **Allowed**: Pure computation, render UI |
| - **Denied**: All network, all storage, all wallet |
| - **Constraint**: max_render_ms = 5000 |
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|
| ### Tier 5: Test (🧪) — SANDBOXED |
| Test harnesses, no production access. |
| - **Allowed**: Render only |
| - **Denied**: Everything else |
| - **Constraint**: max_render_ms = 10000 |
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| ## Verification |
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| Each plugin must provide: |
| 1. **Source hash** — SHA256 of source code at build time |
| 2. **zkperf witness** — proves render time ≤ max_render_ms |
| 3. **Capability declaration** — what APIs it claims to use |
| 4. **Audit trail** — git commit + reviewer signature |
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| ## Enforcement |
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| - `inventory` collects plugin metadata at compile time |
| - Runtime: measure actual render time, compare to max_render_ms |
| - Violation → plugin disabled + alert to DAO senate |
| - Quarterly audit: all plugins re-verified against source hash |
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| ## Plugin Capability Matrix |
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|
| | Plugin | Network | Wallet | Storage | Compute | Max ms | |
| |--------|---------|--------|---------|---------|--------| |
| | dao_governance | POST paste | read pubkey | — | low | 500 | |
| | pastebin | POST paste | — | — | low | 500 | |
| | p2p_sharing | POST paste | read pubkey | — | low | 500 | |
| | embedding | — | — | — | low | 1000 | |
| | wikidata | GET wikidata | — | — | low | 1000 | |
| | doc_cleaner | — | — | — | low | 1000 | |
| | markdown | — | — | — | low | 1000 | |
| | rust_parser | — | — | — | high | 2000 | |
| | coverage | — | — | — | high | 2000 | |
| | bert_test | — | — | — | high | 2000 | |
| | monster_meme | — | — | — | med | 5000 | |
| | mcp | — | — | — | med | 5000 | |
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| ## Incident Response |
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| 1. Plugin exceeds constraint → auto-disable, log to journal |
| 2. Senate votes to re-enable or permanently remove |
| 3. Source audit required before re-enable |
| 4. All incidents posted to pastebin for transparency |
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