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specified in (c)(1). See, e.g., United States v. Burge , 711 F.3d 803, 809 (7th Cir. 2013). None of
the other provisions within section 1512(c) contain such a catch- all. Rather, section s 1512(a), (b),
and (d) contain a finite list of proscribed ways in which to violate the statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 1512.
Section 1512(c) is structured differently. It does not itemize multiple ways to commit an offense. It identifies one way in which to commit obstruction with regard to “a record, document, or other
object,” followed by a broad prohibition on obstructive acts that affect an official proceeding.
Thus, as the court ruled, Congress meant for the word “otherwise” to “connect[] the two provisions [while] underscor[ing] that the acts prohibited by (c)(1) are ‘different’ from those prohibited by
(c)(2).” United States v. Caldwell , No. 21- cr-28 (APM), 2021 WL 6062718, at *12 n.6 (D.D.C. Case 1:21-cr-00028-APM Document 596 Filed 01/24/22 Page 3 of 5Case 1:21-cr-00078-EGS Document 66 Filed 01/24/22 Page 6 of 84
Dec. 20, 2021). Thus, the word “otherwise” is not under the court’s interpretation, as Caldwell
suggests, acting as surplusage. See Def.’s Mot. at 4 , 9.
Nor does Caldwell’s insistence that the word “otherwise” in section 1512(c)(2) is a
conjunctive adverb change the court’s understanding. Caldwell asserts that, as a conjunctive adverb, “otherwise” acts as a modifier, such that subsection (c)(2) “modif ies” subsection (c)(1).
Id. at 9. But “otherwise ” as a modifier, or conjunctive adverb, operates differently than Caldwell
posits. It looks something like this: “You need to finish your homework; otherwise, you will not make a passing grade,” or “Jaimie needs to clean her room; otherwise, she will not be allowed to have her friends come over.” How to Use Otherwise in a Sentence, Study.com,
https://study.com/academy/lesson/how- to-use-otherwise- in-a-sentence.html (last visited Jan. 21,
2022). In those examples the clause following “otherwise” modifies, or further explains, the clause
that precedes it: the failure to finish homework will result in a failing grade or not cleaning a room will lead to friends not coming over. But that is not how “otherwise” operates in section 1512(c). The verbs of (c)(2) in no sense modif y the object of (c)(1): “obstructs, influences, influences, or
impedes” in subsection (c)(2) does not supply additional meaning to “record, document or other
object” in subsection (c)(1). The far more natural reading is the one the court adopted: “otherwise”
means “in a different way or manner.” See Caldwell, 2021 WL 6062718, at *12. Understood in
that sense , section 1512(c)(2) means “that a crime will occur in a different (‘otherwise’) manner
compared to § 1512(c)(1) if the defendant ‘obstructs, influences, or impedes any official
proceeding’ without regard to whether the action relates to documents or records.” United States v. Petruk, 781 F.3d 438, 446–47 (8th Cir. 2015).
In truth, Caldwell does not read “otherwise” as a modifier. He reads it as a word of
limitation that restricts offenses under subsection (c)(2) to those “ involving the integrity and Case 1:21-cr-00028-APM Document 596 Filed 01/24/22 Page 4 of 5Case 1:21-cr-00078-EGS Document 66 Filed 01/24/22 Page 7 of 85
production of documentary evidence ,” Def.’s Mot. at 10, or “tangible evidence,” Def.’s Reply at 9.
But Caldwell points to no court that has read section 1512(c)(2) so narrowly and, in fact , courts
have rejected that reading . See, e.g., Petruk, 781 F.3d at 446 (8th Cir. 2015) (rejecting argument
that section 1512(c)(2) “is limited to obstruction involving documents or physical evidence ”);
United States v. Ring, 628 F. Supp. 2d 195, 224 (D.D.C. 2009) ( rejecting assertion that “18 U.S.C.
§ 1512(c)(2) applies only to acts involving ‘tampering with documents or physical evidence ’”).
The court leaves it to grammarians to say whether “otherwise” as it appears in section
1512(c)(2) is properly classified a s a conjunctive adverb. Whether it is or not does not alter this
court’s reading of the statute.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, the court denies Defendant Caldwell’s motion for
reconsideration.
Dated: January 24, 2022 Amit P. Mehta
United States District Court Judge
Case 1:21-cr-00028-APM Document 596 Filed 01/24/22 Page 5 of 5Case 1:21-cr-00078-EGS Document 66 Filed 01/24/22 Page 8 of 8
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v. :
: Criminal No: 21-MJ-00050 ( RMM)
:
:
JOHN SULLIVAN , :
:
Defendant. :
NOTICE OF SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL
The United States of America, by and through its attorney, the United States Attorney for the
District of Columbia, informs the Court that the above-captioned matter is now assigned to
Assistant United States Attorney (“AUSA”) Candice C. Wong. The undersigned will
substitute for Assistant United States Attorney Amanda Vaughn as counsel for the United
States. AUSA Wong may be contacted either by phone at 202-252-7849 or by e-mail at
candice.wong@usdoj.gov.
Respectfully submitted,
MICHAEL R. SHERWIN
Acting United States Attorney
New York Bar No. 4444188
By: /s/ Candice C. Wong
Candice C. Wong
Assistant United States Attorney
D.C. Bar No: 990903
United States Attorney’s Office
555 Fourth Street, N.W. #4816
Washington, D.C. 20530
Telephone: 202 -252-7849
E-mail: candice.wong@usdoj.govCase 1:21-mj-00050-RMM Document 5 Filed 02/01/21 Page 1 of 1
1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA :
:
v. : Criminal No. 1:21- cr-00078- EGS
:
JOHN EARLE SULLIVAN, :
:
Defendant. :
UNITED STATES ’ CONSE NT MOTION TO CONTINUE AND
TO EXCLUDE TIME UNDER THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT
The parties are currently scheduled for a status hearing on March 4 , 2022 . The United
States of America , with the consent of counsel for the defendant, John Sullivan, hereby move s this
Court for a n approximately 45- day continuance of that hearing, and further to exclude the time
within which the trial must commence under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq.. In
support of this consent motion, the undersigned state s as follows:
1. The parties last conven ed for a status hearing on January 4, 2022. On January 18,
2022, and February 3, 2022, the government made additional discovery productions to
counsel for the defendant. The materials include d indexes shared via filesharing of
documents produced to Relativity. The production to Relativity included numerous
audio files and other records of the U.S. Capitol Police, tens of thousands of tips and
related documentation made to the Metropolitan Police Department tipline, and FBI reports of interviews, among other materials. On February 10, 2022, the undersigned
also filed a memorandum on the docket summarizing the status of global discovery in
Capitol Breach matters for the Court.