| # Polymarket up/down crypto markets — what actually has edge (honest findings) |
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| *Companion to the `polymarket-updown-microstructure` dataset. 2026-06-25.* |
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| This is a negative-results report, written to the standard that matters on an |
| efficient venue: **every edge claim is graded against the price you could actually |
| transact at**, not win-rate. On a market where the ask already encodes P(win), |
| a high win-rate is not edge — `edge_real = realized_WR − avg_price_paid` is. |
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| ## TL;DR |
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| Across an exhaustive search of taker signals, a full physics-regional sweep of the |
| maker side, an active cancel-race simulation, and replication against two independent |
| external corpora, **no signal-based strategy clears the realizable bar** — taker or |
| maker, passive or active. The informed flow leads the settlement oracle, so even a |
| *perfect, zero-latency* oracle-based maker cancel does not help. What edge exists on |
| this venue belongs to actors racing inside the inter-trade gap on non-public signals; |
| it is not reachable from price/oracle data, at any latency we measured. |
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| ## 1. Method |
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| - **edge_real** = `(won ? 1 : 0) − price_paid`, per fill, bootstrap-CI'd. |
| - **Realizable (fillable) lens**: a backtest "fill" counts only if a *real* trade |
| print corroborates it (tape) or the quote survives our measured latency |
| (persistence). Paper-fills at the displayed quote overstate edge ~10× via |
| fill self-selection (you fill the losers, get rejected on the winners). |
| - **Ground-truth resolution** from the settlement oracle, never from spot capture. |
| - Calibration anchor: a strategy with a known live `edge_real ≈ −0.004` reproduces |
| to that value under the lens before any verdict is trusted. |
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| ## 2. Taker side — closed |
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| An exhaustive grid (5,161 configurations: entry-timing × price-band × move × |
| fade/decisive, across BTC/ETH/SOL/XRP, 5m/15m) graded on the realizable lens, then |
| an adversarial verification stage (pooled-CI + persistence-agreement + date-holdout |
| OOS): |
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| - The overfit cells evaporate under pooling (a family at +0.12 on n≈50 per cell is |
| **−0.017** pooled to n=1752). |
| - Most apparent survivors die on persistence-vs-tape disagreement (tape says +, |
| the resting book says −: the fills are phantom/adverse). |
| - Exactly one configuration survived the full gauntlet, and it was carried entirely |
| by a single coin at n=63 — a pocket, not an edge — and fires ~1×/day (economically |
| negligible even if real). |
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| Live confirmation: every directional taker we shipped died live (momentum, entropy, |
| velrider, flip), each time because the backtest measured `corr(signal, observed |
| price)` while live fills self-select into the losing side. |
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| ## 3. Maker side — no physics region |
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| The passive (post-and-rest) maker, simulated against the **real trade tape** (same |
| adverse selection a live maker eats), across 17 physics regions |
| (favorite/underdog × distance-to-strike in bps × realized-σ × seconds-to-close): |
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| | region (favorite) | bid | P(win \| fill) | gap | edge_real | |
| |---|---|---|---|---| |
| | dist <20bp, ≤60s | 0.957 | 85.4% | −10pp | −0.089 | |
| | dist <10bp, ≤60s | 0.904 | 70.8% | −20pp | −0.179 | |
| | dist <5bp, ≤60s | 0.704 | 44.2% | −26pp | −0.227 | |
| |
| **Zero of 17 regions are positive.** A resting bid always fills ~10–20pp *below* its |
| true win probability — you are filled precisely when price is moving against you. |
| The rebate (hundredths of a cent) cannot close a 10–20pp gap. This holds near and |
| far from strike, early and late. |
| |
| ## 4. The cancel race — also closed |
| |
| The passive maker is adversely selected everywhere, so the active maker's hope is to |
| **cancel an about-to-be-adverse quote before the informed taker hits it**. We simulated |
| exactly that on the microsecond book-delta firehose: post the favorite bid, fire a |
| cancel when the oracle-fair drops below the bid, and let the cancel land `L` ms later. |
| Sweeping `L` from 0 (perfect) to ∞ (never cancel): |
| |
| | cancel latency | edge_real | $ROI | |
| |---|---|---| |
| | 0 ms (perfect) | −0.1898 | −42.4% | |
| | 190 ms (ours) | −0.1897 | −42.3% | |
| | ∞ (never cancel) | −0.1894 | −42.3% | |
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| **The cancel does nothing — not even at 0 ms.** This is *not* a "we lose the latency |
| race" result; it is sharper. The cancel *signal* fires too late: the informed taker |
| hits the bid **before** the data-streams oracle reflects the move. The adverse flow |
| leads the oracle, so no oracle-based cancel can help at any latency. The only |
| untested variant is a flow-based cancel (detect the informed taker mid-arrival and |
| pull within the inter-trade gap) — which is the same sub-latency race a live attempt |
| already lost. **Maker is closed: passive (no region) and active (cancel useless).** |
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| ## 5. External replication (independent corpora) |
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| - **Academic** ("Who Wins and Who Loses in Prediction Markets", 588M trades): |
| ~70% of users lose; winners **provide liquidity with limit orders**, losers |
| **take liquidity with market orders**; only ~12% of top winners beat a coin-flip |
| benchmark and ~60% of "lucky winners" become losers out-of-sample. |
| - **Other people's bots** (a public arena of 4.77M paper trades, gamma-resolved): |
| taker `edge_real −0.031` / ROI −6.0%; maker `−0.136` / ROI −8.9%. Even the maker |
| families with positive `edge_real` still lose on realized ROI once fees and early |
| exits are counted. |
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| Both land where our own data does: the taker space is closed; the maker space only |
| opens on execution speed. |
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| ## 6. Takeaway for anyone using this dataset |
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| Grade against the transactable price. If you find a +edge in a backtest here, before |
| believing it: (1) pool across coins to kill multiple-comparison luck, (2) require |
| the persistence lens to agree with the tape lens, (3) hold out by date, (4) check it |
| isn't a once-a-day pocket. We did, on everything, and the honest answer is that the |
| signal is already in the price. |
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