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The element is found in almost all biomolecules that are important to (or generated by) life. Only a few common complex biomolecules, such as squalene and the carotenes, contain no oxygen. Of the organic compounds with biological relevance, carbohydrates contain the largest proportion by mass of oxygen. All fats, fatty acids, amino acids, and proteins contain oxygen (due to the presence of carbonyl groups in these acids and their ester residues). Oxygen also occurs in phosphate (PO3− 4) groups in the biologically important energy-carrying molecules ATP and ADP, in the backbone and the purines (except adenine) and pyrimidines of RNA and DNA, and in bones as calcium phosphate and hydroxylapatite.
Oxygen toxicity to the lungs and central nervous system can also occur in deep scuba diving and surface supplied diving. Prolonged breathing of an air mixture with an O 2 partial pressure more than 60 kPa can eventually lead to permanent pulmonary fibrosis. Exposure to a O 2 partial pressures greater than 160 kPa (about 1.6 atm) may lead to convulsions (normally fatal for divers). Acute oxygen toxicity (causing seizures, its most feared effect for divers) can occur by breathing an air mixture with 21% O 2 at 66 m or more of depth; the same thing can occur by breathing 100% O 2 at only 6 m.
Breathing pure O 2 in space applications, such as in some modern space suits, or in early spacecraft such as Apollo, causes no damage due to the low total pressures used. In the case of spacesuits, the O 2 partial pressure in the breathing gas is, in general, about 30 kPa (1.4 times normal), and the resulting O 2 partial pressure in the astronaut's arterial blood is only marginally more than normal sea-level O 2 partial pressure (for more information on this, see space suit and arterial blood gas).
Oxygen gas (O 2) can be toxic at elevated partial pressures, leading to convulsions and other health problems.[j] Oxygen toxicity usually begins to occur at partial pressures more than 50 kilopascals (kPa), equal to about 50% oxygen composition at standard pressure or 2.5 times the normal sea-level O 2 partial pressure of about 21 kPa. This is not a problem except for patients on mechanical ventilators, since gas supplied through oxygen masks in medical applications is typically composed of only 30%–50% O 2 by volume (about 30 kPa at standard pressure). (although this figure also is subject to wide variation, depending on type of mask).
The 1973 oil crisis began in October 1973 when the members of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC, consisting of the Arab members of OPEC plus Egypt and Syria) proclaimed an oil embargo. By the end of the embargo in March 1974, the price of oil had risen from US$3 per barrel to nearly $12 globally; US prices were significantly higher. The embargo caused an oil crisis, or "shock", with many short- and long-term effects on global politics and the global economy. It was later called the "first oil shock", followed by the 1979 oil crisis, termed the "second oil shock."
The crisis had a major impact on international relations and created a rift within NATO. Some European nations and Japan sought to disassociate themselves from United States foreign policy in the Middle East to avoid being targeted by the boycott. Arab oil producers linked any future policy changes to peace between the belligerents. To address this, the Nixon Administration began multilateral negotiations with the combatants. They arranged for Israel to pull back from the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights. By January 18, 1974, US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had negotiated an Israeli troop withdrawal from parts of the Sinai Peninsula. The promise of a negotiated settlement between Israel and Syria was enough to convince Arab oil producers to lift the embargo in March 1974.
On August 15, 1971, the United States unilaterally pulled out of the Bretton Woods Accord. The US abandoned the Gold Exchange Standard whereby the value of the dollar had been pegged to the price of gold and all other currencies were pegged to the dollar, whose value was left to "float" (rise and fall according to market demand). Shortly thereafter, Britain followed, floating the pound sterling. The other industrialized nations followed suit with their respective currencies. Anticipating that currency values would fluctuate unpredictably for a time, the industrialized nations increased their reserves (by expanding their money supplies) in amounts far greater than before. The result was a depreciation of the dollar and other industrialized nations' currencies. Because oil was priced in dollars, oil producers' real income decreased. In September 1971, OPEC issued a joint communiqué stating that, from then on, they would price oil in terms of a fixed amount of gold.
This contributed to the "Oil Shock". After 1971, OPEC was slow to readjust prices to reflect this depreciation. From 1947 to 1967, the dollar price of oil had risen by less than two percent per year. Until the oil shock, the price had also remained fairly stable versus other currencies and commodities. OPEC ministers had not developed institutional mechanisms to update prices in sync with changing market conditions, so their real incomes lagged. The substantial price increases of 1973–1974 largely returned their prices and corresponding incomes to Bretton Woods levels in terms of commodities such as gold.
On October 6, 1973, Syria and Egypt, with support from other Arab nations, launched a surprise attack on Israel, on Yom Kippur. This renewal of hostilities in the Arab–Israeli conflict released the underlying economic pressure on oil prices. At the time, Iran was the world's second-largest oil exporter and a close US ally. Weeks later, the Shah of Iran said in an interview: "Of course [the price of oil] is going to rise... Certainly! And how!... You've [Western nations] increased the price of the wheat you sell us by 300 percent, and the same for sugar and cement... You buy our crude oil and sell it back to us, refined as petrochemicals, at a hundred times the price you've paid us... It's only fair that, from now on, you should pay more for oil. Let's say ten times more."
In response to American aid to Israel, on October 16, 1973, OPEC raised the posted price of oil by 70%, to $5.11 a barrel. The following day, oil ministers agreed to the embargo, a cut in production by five percent from September's output and to continue to cut production in five percent monthly increments until their economic and political objectives were met. On October 19, Nixon requested Congress to appropriate $2.2 billion in emergency aid to Israel, including $1.5 billion in outright grants. George Lenczowski notes, "Military supplies did not exhaust Nixon's eagerness to prevent Israel's collapse...This [$2.2 billion] decision triggered a collective OPEC response." Libya immediately announced it would embargo oil shipments to the United States. Saudi Arabia and the other Arab oil-producing states joined the embargo on October 20, 1973. At their Kuwait meeting, OAPEC proclaimed the embargo that curbed exports to various countries and blocked all oil deliveries to the US as a "principal hostile country".
Some of the income was dispensed in the form of aid to other underdeveloped nations whose economies had been caught between higher oil prices and lower prices for their own export commodities, amid shrinking Western demand. Much went for arms purchases that exacerbated political tensions, particularly in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia spent over 100 billion dollars in the ensuing decades for helping spread its fundamentalist interpretation of Islam, known as Wahhabism, throughout the world, via religious charities such al-Haramain Foundation, which often also distributed funds to violent Sunni extremist groups such as Al-Qaeda and the Taliban.
In the United States, scholars argue that there already existed a negotiated settlement based on equality between both parties prior to 1973. The possibility that the Middle East could become another superpower confrontation with the USSR was of more concern to the US than oil. Further, interest groups and government agencies more worried about energy were no match for Kissinger's dominance. In the US production, distribution and price disruptions "have been held responsible for recessions, periods of excessive inflation, reduced productivity, and lower economic growth."
The embargo had a negative influence on the US economy by causing immediate demands to address the threats to U.S. energy security. On an international level, the price increases changed competitive positions in many industries, such as automobiles. Macroeconomic problems consisted of both inflationary and deflationary impacts. The embargo left oil companies searching for new ways to increase oil supplies, even in rugged terrain such as the Arctic. Finding oil and developing new fields usually required five to ten years before significant production.
The embargo was not uniform across Europe. Of the nine members of the European Economic Community (EEC), the Netherlands faced a complete embargo, the UK and France received almost uninterrupted supplies (having refused to allow America to use their airfields and embargoed arms and supplies to both the Arabs and the Israelis), while the other six faced partial cutbacks. The UK had traditionally been an ally of Israel, and Harold Wilson's government supported the Israelis during the Six-Day War. His successor, Ted Heath, reversed this policy in 1970, calling for Israel to withdraw to its pre-1967 borders.
Despite being relatively unaffected by the embargo, the UK nonetheless faced an oil crisis of its own - a series of strikes by coal miners and railroad workers over the winter of 1973–74 became a major factor in the change of government. Heath asked the British to heat only one room in their houses over the winter. The UK, Germany, Italy, Switzerland and Norway banned flying, driving and boating on Sundays. Sweden rationed gasoline and heating oil. The Netherlands imposed prison sentences for those who used more than their ration of electricity.
Price controls exacerbated the crisis in the US. The system limited the price of "old oil" (that which had already been discovered) while allowing newly discovered oil to be sold at a higher price to encourage investment. Predictably, old oil was withdrawn from the market, creating greater scarcity. The rule also discouraged development of alternative energies. The rule had been intended to promote oil exploration. Scarcity was addressed by rationing (as in many countries). Motorists faced long lines at gas stations beginning in summer 1972 and increasing by summer 1973.
In 1973, Nixon named William E. Simon as the first Administrator of the Federal Energy Office, a short-term organization created to coordinate the response to the embargo. Simon allocated states the same amount of domestic oil for 1974 that each had consumed in 1972, which worked for states whose populations were not increasing. In other states, lines at gasoline stations were common. The American Automobile Association reported that in the last week of February 1974, 20% of American gasoline stations had no fuel.
To help reduce consumption, in 1974 a national maximum speed limit of 55 mph (about 88 km/h) was imposed through the Emergency Highway Energy Conservation Act. Development of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve began in 1975, and in 1977 the cabinet-level Department of Energy was created, followed by the National Energy Act of 1978.[citation needed] On November 28, 1995, Bill Clinton signed the National Highway Designation Act, ending the federal 55 mph (89 km/h) speed limit, allowing states to restore their prior maximum speed limit.
The energy crisis led to greater interest in renewable energy, nuclear power and domestic fossil fuels. There is criticism that American energy policies since the crisis have been dominated by crisis-mentality thinking, promoting expensive quick fixes and single-shot solutions that ignore market and technology realities. Instead of providing stable rules that support basic research while leaving plenty of scope for entrepreneurship and innovation, congresses and presidents have repeatedly backed policies which promise solutions that are politically expedient, but whose prospects are doubtful.
In 2004, declassified documents revealed that the U.S. was so distraught by the rise in oil prices and being challenged by under-developed countries that they briefly considered military action to forcibly seize Middle Eastern oilfields in late 1973. Although no explicit plan was mentioned, a conversation between U.S. Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger and British Ambassador to the United States Lord Cromer revealed Schlesinger had told him that "it was no longer obvious to him that the U.S. could not use force." British Prime Minister Edward Heath was so worried by this prospect that he ordered a British intelligence estimate of U.S. intentions, which concluded America "might consider it could not tolerate a situation in which the U.S. and its allies were at the mercy of a small group of unreasonable countries," and that they would prefer a rapid operation to seize oilfields in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, and possibly Abu Dhabi in military action was decided upon. Although the Soviet response to such an act would likely not involve force, intelligence warned "the American occupation would need to last 10 years as the West developed alternative energy sources, and would result in the ‘total alienation’ of the Arabs and much of the rest of the Third World."
Although lacking historical connections to the Middle East, Japan was the country most dependent on Arab oil. 71% of its imported oil came from the Middle East in 1970. On November 7, 1973, the Saudi and Kuwaiti governments declared Japan a "nonfriendly" country to encourage it to change its noninvolvement policy. It received a 5% production cut in December, causing a panic. On November 22, Japan issued a statement "asserting that Israel should withdraw from all of the 1967 territories, advocating Palestinian self-determination, and threatening to reconsider its policy toward Israel if Israel refused to accept these preconditions". By December 25, Japan was considered an Arab-friendly state.
The USSR's invasion of Afghanistan was only one sign of insecurity in the region, also marked by increased American weapons sales, technology, and outright military presence. Saudi Arabia and Iran became increasingly dependent on American security assurances to manage both external and internal threats, including increased military competition between them over increased oil revenues. Both states were competing for preeminence in the Persian Gulf and using increased revenues to fund expanded militaries. By 1979, Saudi arms purchases from the US exceeded five times Israel's. Another motive for the large scale purchase of arms from the US by Saudi Arabia was the failure of the Shah during January 1979 to maintain control of Iran, a non-Arabic but largely Shiite Muslim nation, which fell to a theocratic Islamist government under the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in the wake of the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, is an Arab, largely Sunni Muslim nation headed by a near absolutist monarchy. In the wake of the Iranian revolution the Saudis were forced to deal with the prospect of internal destabilization via the radicalism of Islamism, a reality which would quickly be revealed in the seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca by Wahhabi extremists during November 1979 and a Shiite revolt in the oil rich Al-Hasa region of Saudi Arabia in December of the same year. In November 2010, Wikileaks leaked confidential diplomatic cables pertaining to the United States and its allies which revealed that the late Saudi King Abdullah urged the United States to attack Iran in order to destroy its potential nuclear weapons program, describing Iran as "a snake whose head should be cut off without any procrastination."
The crisis reduced the demand for large cars. Japanese imports, primarily the Toyota Corona, the Toyota Corolla, the Datsun B210, the Datsun 510, the Honda Civic, the Mitsubishi Galant (a captive import from Chrysler sold as the Dodge Colt), the Subaru DL, and later the Honda Accord all had four cylinder engines that were more fuel efficient than the typical American V8 and six cylinder engines. Japanese imports became mass-market leaders with unibody construction and front-wheel drive, which became de facto standards.
Some buyers lamented the small size of the first Japanese compacts, and both Toyota and Nissan (then known as Datsun) introduced larger cars such as the Toyota Corona Mark II, the Toyota Cressida, the Mazda 616 and Datsun 810, which added passenger space and amenities such as air conditioning, power steering, AM-FM radios, and even power windows and central locking without increasing the price of the vehicle. A decade after the 1973 oil crisis, Honda, Toyota and Nissan, affected by the 1981 voluntary export restraints, opened US assembly plants and established their luxury divisions (Acura, Lexus and Infiniti, respectively) to distinguish themselves from their mass-market brands.
Compact trucks were introduced, such as the Toyota Hilux and the Datsun Truck, followed by the Mazda Truck (sold as the Ford Courier), and the Isuzu-built Chevrolet LUV. Mitsubishi rebranded its Forte as the Dodge D-50 a few years after the oil crisis. Mazda, Mitsubishi and Isuzu had joint partnerships with Ford, Chrysler, and GM, respectively. Later the American makers introduced their domestic replacements (Ford Ranger, Dodge Dakota and the Chevrolet S10/GMC S-15), ending their captive import policy.
An increase in imported cars into North America forced General Motors, Ford and Chrysler to introduce smaller and fuel-efficient models for domestic sales. The Dodge Omni / Plymouth Horizon from Chrysler, the Ford Fiesta and the Chevrolet Chevette all had four-cylinder engines and room for at least four passengers by the late 1970s. By 1985, the average American vehicle moved 17.4 miles per gallon, compared to 13.5 in 1970. The improvements stayed even though the price of a barrel of oil remained constant at $12 from 1974 to 1979. Sales of large sedans for most makes (except Chrysler products) recovered within two model years of the 1973 crisis. The Cadillac DeVille and Fleetwood, Buick Electra, Oldsmobile 98, Lincoln Continental, Mercury Marquis, and various other luxury oriented sedans became popular again in the mid-1970s. The only full-size models that did not recover were lower price models such as the Chevrolet Bel Air, and Ford Galaxie 500. Slightly smaller, mid-size models such as the Oldsmobile Cutlass, Chevrolet Monte Carlo, Ford Thunderbird and various other models sold well.
Federal safety standards, such as NHTSA Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 215 (pertaining to safety bumpers), and compacts like the 1974 Mustang I were a prelude to the DOT "downsize" revision of vehicle categories. By 1977, GM's full-sized cars reflected the crisis. By 1979, virtually all "full-size" American cars had shrunk, featuring smaller engines and smaller outside dimensions. Chrysler ended production of their full-sized luxury sedans at the end of the 1981 model year, moving instead to a full front-wheel drive lineup for 1982 (except for the M-body Dodge Diplomat/Plymouth Gran Fury and Chrysler New Yorker Fifth Avenue sedans).
OPEC soon lost its preeminent position, and in 1981, its production was surpassed by that of other countries. Additionally, its own member nations were divided. Saudi Arabia, trying to recover market share, increased production, pushing prices down, shrinking or eliminating profits for high-cost producers. The world price, which had peaked during the 1979 energy crisis at nearly $40 per barrel, decreased during the 1980s to less than $10 per barrel. Adjusted for inflation, oil briefly fell back to pre-1973 levels. This "sale" price was a windfall for oil-importing nations, both developing and developed.
European Union law is a body of treaties and legislation, such as Regulations and Directives, which have direct effect or indirect effect on the laws of European Union member states. The three sources of European Union law are primary law, secondary law and supplementary law. The main sources of primary law are the Treaties establishing the European Union. Secondary sources include regulations and directives which are based on the Treaties. The legislature of the European Union is principally composed of the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, which under the Treaties may establish secondary law to pursue the objective set out in the Treaties.
European Union law is applied by the courts of member states and the Court of Justice of the European Union. Where the laws of member states provide for lesser rights European Union law can be enforced by the courts of member states. In case of European Union law which should have been transposed into the laws of member states, such as Directives, the European Commission can take proceedings against the member state under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The European Court of Justice is the highest court able to interpret European Union law. Supplementary sources of European Union law include case law by the Court of Justice, international law and general principles of European Union law.
Although the European Union does not have a codified constitution, like every political body it has laws which "constitute" its basic governance structure. The EU's primary constitutional sources are the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which have been agreed or adhered to among the governments of all 28 member states. The Treaties establish the EU's institutions, list their powers and responsibilities, and explain the areas in which the EU can legislate with Directives or Regulations. The European Commission has the initiative to propose legislation. During the ordinary legislative procedure, the Council (which are ministers from member state governments) and the European Parliament (elected by citizens) can make amendments and must give their consent for laws to pass. The Commission oversees departments and various agencies that execute or enforce EU law. The "European Council" (rather than the Council, made up of different government Ministers) is composed of the Prime Ministers or executive Presidents of the member states. It appoints the Commissioners and the board of the European Central Bank. The European Court of Justice is the supreme judicial body which interprets EU law, and develops it through precedent. The Court can review the legality of the EU institutions' actions, in compliance with the Treaties. It can also decide upon claims for breach of EU laws from member states and citizens.
The primary law of the EU consists mainly of the founding treaties, the "core" treaties being the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The Treaties contain formal and substantive provisions, which frame policies of the European Union institutions and determine the division of competences between the European Union and its member states. The TEU establishes that European Union law applies to the metropolitan territories of the member states, as well as certain islands and overseas territories, including Madeira, the Canary Islands and the French overseas departments. European Union law also applies in territories where a member state is responsible for external relations, for example Gibraltar and the Åland islands. The TEU allows the European Council to make specific provisions for regions, as for example done for customs matters in Gibraltar and Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon. The TEU specifically excludes certain regions, for example the Faroe Islands, from the jurisdiction of European Union law. Treaties apply as soon as they enter into force, unless stated otherwise, and are generally concluded for an unlimited period. The TEU provides that commitments entered into by the member states between themselves before the treaty was signed no longer apply.[vague] All EU member states are regarded as subject to the general obligation of the principle of cooperation, as stated in the TEU, whereby member states are obliged not to take measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the TEU objectives. The Court of Justice of the European Union can interpret the Treaties, but it cannot rule on their validity, which is subject to international law. Individuals may rely on primary law in the Court of Justice of the European Union if the Treaty provisions have a direct effect and they are sufficiently clear, precise and unconditional.
The principal Treaties that form the European Union began with common rules for coal and steel, and then atomic energy, but more complete and formal institutions were established through the Treaty of Rome 1957 and the Maastricht Treaty 1992 (now: TFEU). Minor amendments were made during the 1960s and 1970s. Major amending treaties were signed to complete the development of a single, internal market in the Single European Act 1986, to further the development of a more social Europe in the Treaty of Amsterdam 1997, and to make minor amendments to the relative power of member states in the EU institutions in the Treaty of Nice 2001 and the Treaty of Lisbon 2007. Since its establishment, more member states have joined through a series of accession treaties, from the UK, Ireland, Denmark and Norway in 1972 (though Norway did not end up joining), Greece in 1979, Spain and Portugal 1985, Austria, Finland, Norway and Sweden in 1994 (though again Norway failed to join, because of lack of support in the referendum), the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia in 2004, Romania and Bulgaria in 2007 and Croatia in 2013. Greenland signed a Treaty in 1985 giving it a special status.
Following the Nice Treaty, there was an attempt to reform the constitutional law of the European Union and make it more transparent; this would have also produced a single constitutional document. However, as a result of the referendum in France and the referendum in the Netherlands, the 2004 Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe never came into force. Instead, the Lisbon Treaty was enacted. Its substance was very similar to the proposed constitutional treaty, but it was formally an amending treaty, and – though it significantly altered the existing treaties – it did not completely replace them.
The European Commission is the main executive body of the European Union. Article 17(1) of the Treaty on European Union states the Commission should "promote the general interest of the Union" while Article 17(3) adds that Commissioners should be "completely independent" and not "take instructions from any Government". Under article 17(2), "Union legislative acts may only be adopted on the basis of a Commission proposal, except where the Treaties provide otherwise." This means that the Commission has a monopoly on initiating the legislative procedure, although the Council is the "de facto catalyst of many legislative initiatives". The Parliament can also formally request the Commission to submit a legislative proposal but the Commission can reject such a suggestion, giving reasons. The Commission's President (currently an ex-Luxembourg Prime Minister, Jean-Claude Juncker) sets the agenda for the EU's work. Decisions are taken by a simple majority vote, usually through a "written procedure" of circulating the proposals and adopting if there are no objections.[citation needed] Since Ireland refused to consent to changes in the Treaty of Lisbon 2007, there remains one Commissioner for each of the 28 member states, including the President and the High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy (currently Federica Mogherini). The Commissioners (and most importantly, the portfolios they will hold) are bargained over intensively by the member states. The Commissioners, as a block, are then subject to a qualified majority vote of the Council to approve, and majority approval of the Parliament. The proposal to make the Commissioners be drawn from the elected Parliament, was not adopted in the Treaty of Lisbon. This means Commissioners are, through the appointment process, the unelected subordinates of member state governments.
Commissioners have various privileges, such as being exempt from member state taxes (but not EU taxes), and having immunity from prosecution for doing official acts. Commissioners have sometimes been found to have abused their offices, particularly since the Santer Commission was censured by Parliament in 1999, and it eventually resigned due to corruption allegations. This resulted in one main case, Commission v Edith Cresson where the European Court of Justice held that a Commissioner giving her dentist a job, for which he was clearly unqualified, did in fact not break any law. By contrast to the ECJ's relaxed approach, a Committee of Independent Experts found that a culture had developed where few Commissioners had ‘even the slightest sense of responsibility’. This led to the creation of the European Anti-fraud Office. In 2012 it investigated the Maltese Commissioner for Health, John Dalli, who quickly resigned after allegations that he received a €60m bribe in connection with a Tobacco Products Directive. Beyond the Commission, the European Central Bank has relative executive autonomy in its conduct of monetary policy for the purpose of managing the euro. It has a six-person board appointed by the European Council, on the Council's recommendation. The President of the Council and a Commissioner can sit in on ECB meetings, but do not have voting rights.
The second main legislative body is the Council, which is composed of different ministers of the member states. The heads of government of member states also convene a "European Council" (a distinct body) that the TEU article 15 defines as providing the 'necessary impetus for its development and shall define the general political directions and priorities'. It meets each six months and its President (currently former Poland Prime Minister Donald Tusk) is meant to 'drive forward its work', but it does not itself 'legislative functions'. The Council does this: in effect this is the governments of the member states, but there will be a different minister at each meeting, depending on the topic discussed (e.g. for environmental issues, the member states' environment ministers attend and vote; for foreign affairs, the foreign ministers, etc.). The minister must have the authority to represent and bin the member states in decisions. When voting takes place it is weighted inversely to member state size, so smaller member states are not dominated by larger member states. In total there are 352 votes, but for most acts there must be a qualified majority vote, if not consensus. TEU article 16(4) and TFEU article 238(3) define this to mean at least 55 per cent of the Council members (not votes) representing 65 per cent of the population of the EU: currently this means around 74 per cent, or 260 of the 352 votes. This is critical during the legislative process.
To make new legislation, TFEU article 294 defines the "ordinary legislative procedure" that applies for most EU acts. The essence is there are three readings, starting with a Commission proposal, where the Parliament must vote by a majority of all MEPs (not just those present) to block or suggest changes, and the Council must vote by qualified majority to approve changes, but by unanimity to block Commission amendment. Where the different institutions cannot agree at any stage, a "Conciliation Committee" is convened, representing MEPs, ministers and the Commission to try and get agreement on a joint text: if this works, it will be sent back to the Parliament and Council to approve by absolute and qualified majority. This means, legislation can be blocked by a majority in Parliament, a minority in the Council, and a majority in the Commission: it is harder to change EU law than stay the same. A different procedure exists for budgets. For "enhanced cooperation" among a sub-set of at least member states, authorisation must be given by the Council. Member state governments should be informed by the Commission at the outset before any proposals start the legislative procedure. The EU as a whole can only act within its power set out in the Treaties. TEU articles 4 and 5 state that powers remain with the member states unless they have been conferred, although there is a debate about the Kompetenz-Kompetenz question: who ultimately has the "competence" to define the EU's "competence". Many member state courts believe they decide, other member state Parliaments believe they decide, while within the EU, the Court of Justice believes it has the final say.
The judicial branch of the EU has played an important role in the development of EU law, by assuming the task of interpreting the treaties, and accelerating economic and political integration. Today the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) is the main judicial body, within which there is a higher European Court of Justice (commonly abbreviated as ECJ) that deals with cases that contain more public importance, and a General Court that deals with issues of detail but without general importance. There is also a Civil Service Tribunal to deal with EU staff issues, and then a separate Court of Auditors. Under the Treaty on European Union article 19(2) there is one judge from each member state, 28 at present, who are supposed to "possess the qualifications required for appointment to the highest judicial offices" (or for the General Court, the "ability required for appointment to high judicial office"). A president is elected by the judges for three years. Under TEU article 19(3) is to be the ultimate court to interpret questions of EU law. In fact, most EU law is applied by member state courts (the English Court of Appeal, the German Bundesgerichtshof, the Belgian Cour du travail, etc.) but they can refer questions to the EU court for a preliminary ruling. The CJEU's duty is to "ensure that in the interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is observed", although realistically it has the ability to expand and develop the law according to the principles it deems to be appropriate. Arguably this has been done through both seminal and controversial judgments, including Van Gend en Loos, Mangold v Helm, and Kadi v Commission.
Since its founding, the EU has operated among an increasing plurality of national and globalising legal systems. This has meant both the European Court of Justice and the highest national courts have had to develop principles to resolve conflicts of laws between different systems. Within the EU itself, the Court of Justice's view is that if EU law conflicts with a provision of national law, then EU law has primacy. In the first major case in 1964, Costa v ENEL, a Milanese lawyer, and former shareholder of an energy company, named Mr Costa refused to pay his electricity bill to Enel, as a protest against the nationalisation of the Italian energy corporations. He claimed the Italian nationalisation law conflicted with the Treaty of Rome, and requested a reference be made to both the Italian Constitutional Court and the Court of Justice under TFEU article 267. The Italian Constitutional Court gave an opinion that because the nationalisation law was from 1962, and the treaty was in force from 1958, Costa had no claim. By contrast, the Court of Justice held that ultimately the Treaty of Rome in no way prevented energy nationalisation, and in any case under the Treaty provisions only the Commission could have brought a claim, not Mr Costa. However, in principle, Mr Costa was entitled to plead that the Treaty conflicted with national law, and the court would have a duty to consider his claim to make a reference if there would be no appeal against its decision. The Court of Justice, repeating its view in Van Gend en Loos, said member states "albeit within limited spheres, have restricted their sovereign rights and created a body of law applicable both to their nationals and to themselves" on the "basis of reciprocity". EU law would not "be overridden by domestic legal provisions, however framed... without the legal basis of the community itself being called into question." This meant any "subsequent unilateral act" of the member state inapplicable. Similarly, in Amministrazione delle Finanze v Simmenthal SpA, a company, Simmenthal SpA, claimed that a public health inspection fee under an Italian law of 1970 for importing beef from France to Italy was contrary to two Regulations from 1964 and 1968. In "accordance with the principle of the precedence of Community law," said the Court of Justice, the "directly applicable measures of the institutions" (such as the Regulations in the case) "render automatically inapplicable any conflicting provision of current national law". This was necessary to prevent a "corresponding denial" of Treaty "obligations undertaken unconditionally and irrevocably by member states", that could "imperil the very foundations of the" EU. But despite the views of the Court of Justice, the national courts of member states have not accepted the same analysis.
Generally speaking, while all member states recognise that EU law takes primacy over national law where this agreed in the Treaties, they do not accept that the Court of Justice has the final say on foundational constitutional questions affecting democracy and human rights. In the United Kingdom, the basic principle is that Parliament, as the sovereign expression of democratic legitimacy, can decide whether it wishes to expressly legislate against EU law. This, however, would only happen in the case of an express wish of the people to withdraw from the EU. It was held in R (Factortame Ltd) v Secretary of State for Transport that "whatever limitation of its sovereignty Parliament accepted when it enacted the European Communities Act 1972 was entirely voluntary" and so "it has always been clear" that UK courts have a duty "to override any rule of national law found to be in conflict with any directly enforceable rule of Community law." More recently the UK Supreme Court noted that in R (HS2 Action Alliance Ltd) v Secretary of State for Transport, although the UK constitution is uncodified, there could be "fundamental principles" of common law, and Parliament "did not either contemplate or authorise the abrogation" of those principles when it enacted the European Communities Act 1972. The view of the German Constitutional Court from the Solange I and Solange II decisions is that if the EU does not comply with its basic constitutional rights and principles (particularly democracy, the rule of law and the social state principles) then it cannot override German law. However, as the nicknames of the judgments go, "so long as" the EU works towards the democratisation of its institutions, and has a framework that protects fundamental human rights, it would not review EU legislation for compatibility with German constitutional principles. Most other member states have expressed similar reservations. This suggests the EU's legitimacy rests on the ultimate authority of member states, its factual commitment to human rights, and the democratic will of the people.
While constitutional law concerns the European Union's governance structure, administrative law binds EU institutions and member states to follow the law. Both member states and the Commission have a general legal right or "standing" (locus standi) to bring claims against EU institutions and other member states for breach of the treaties. From the EU's foundation, the Court of Justice also held that the Treaties allowed citizens or corporations to bring claims against EU and member state institutions for violation of the Treaties and Regulations, if they were properly interpreted as creating rights and obligations. However, under Directives, citizens or corporations were said in 1986 to not be allowed to bring claims against other non-state parties. This meant courts of member states were not bound to apply an EU law where a national rule conflicted, even though the member state government could be sued, if it would impose an obligation on another citizen or corporation. These rules on "direct effect" limit the extent to which member state courts are bound to administer EU law. All actions by EU institutions can be subject to judicial review, and judged by standards of proportionality, particularly where general principles of law, or fundamental rights are engaged. The remedy for a claimant where there has been a breach of the law is often monetary damages, but courts can also require specific performance or will grant an injunction, in order to ensure the law is effective as possible.
Although it is generally accepted that EU law has primacy, not all EU laws give citizens standing to bring claims: that is, not all EU laws have "direct effect". In Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen it was held that the provisions of the Treaties (and EU Regulations) are directly effective, if they are (1) clear and unambiguous (2) unconditional, and (3) did not require EU or national authorities to take further action to implement them. Van Gend en Loos, a postal company, claimed that what is now TFEU article 30 prevented the Dutch Customs Authorities charging tariffs, when it imported urea-formaldehyde plastics from Germany to the Netherlands. After a Dutch court made a reference, the Court of Justice held that even though the Treaties did not "expressly" confer a right on citizens or companies to bring claims, they could do so. Historically, international treaties had only allowed states to have legal claims for their enforcement, but the Court of Justice proclaimed "the Community constitutes a new legal order of international law". Because article 30 clearly, unconditionally and immediately stated that no quantitative restrictions could be placed on trade, without a good justification, Van Gend en Loos could recover the money it paid for the tariff. EU Regulations are the same as Treaty provisions in this sense, because as TFEU article 288 states, they are ‘directly applicable in all Member States’. Moreover, member states comes under a duty not to replicate Regulations in their own law, in order to prevent confusion. For instance, in Commission v Italy the Court of Justice held that Italy had breached a duty under the Treaties, both by failing to operate a scheme to pay farmers a premium to slaughter cows (to reduce dairy overproduction), and by reproducing the rules in a decree with various additions. "Regulations," held the Court of Justice, "come into force solely by virtue of their publication" and implementation could have the effect of "jeopardizing their simultaneous and uniform application in the whole of the Union." On the other hand, some Regulations may themselves expressly require implementing measures, in which case those specific rules should be followed.
While the Treaties and Regulations will have direct effect (if clear, unconditional and immediate), Directives do not generally give citizens (as opposed to the member state) standing to sue other citizens. In theory, this is because TFEU article 288 says Directives are addressed to the member states and usually "leave to the national authorities the choice of form and methods" to implement. In part this reflects that directives often create minimum standards, leaving member states to apply higher standards. For example, the Working Time Directive requires that every worker has at least 4 weeks paid holidays each year, but most member states require more than 28 days in national law. However, on the current position adopted by the Court of Justice, citizens have standing to make claims based on national laws that implement Directives, but not from Directives themselves. Directives do not have so called "horizontal" direct effect (i.e. between non-state parties). This view was instantly controversial, and in the early 1990s three Advocate Generals persuasively argued that Directives should create rights and duties for all citizens. The Court of Justice refused, but there are five large exceptions.
First, if a Directive's deadline for implementation is not met, the member state cannot enforce conflicting laws, and a citizen may rely on the Directive in such an action (so called "vertical" direct effect). So, in Pubblico Ministero v Ratti because the Italian government had failed to implement a Directive 73/173/EEC on packaging and labelling solvents by the deadline, it was estopped from enforcing a conflicting national law from 1963 against Mr Ratti's solvent and varnish business. A member state could "not rely, as against individuals, on its own failure to perform the obligations which the Directive entails." Second, a citizen or company can invoke a Directive, not just in a dispute with a public authority, but in a dispute with another citizen or company. So, in CIA Security v Signalson and Securitel the Court of Justice held that a business called CIA Security could defend itself from allegations by competitors that it had not complied with a Belgian decree from 1991 about alarm systems, on the basis that it had not been notified to the Commission as a Directive required. Third, if a Directive gives expression to a "general principle" of EU law, it can be invoked between private non-state parties before its deadline for implementation. This follows from Kücükdeveci v Swedex GmbH & Co KG where the German Civil Code §622 stated that the years people worked under the age of 25 would not count towards the increasing statutory notice before dismissal. Ms Kücükdeveci worked for 10 years, from age 18 to 28, for Swedex GmbH & Co KG before her dismissal. She claimed that the law not counting her years under age 25 was unlawful age discrimination under the Employment Equality Framework Directive. The Court of Justice held that the Directive could be relied on by her because equality was also a general principle of EU law. Third, if the defendant is an emanation of the state, even if not central government, it can still be bound by Directives. In Foster v British Gas plc the Court of Justice held that Mrs Foster was entitled to bring a sex discrimination claim against her employer, British Gas plc, which made women retire at age 60 and men at 65, if (1) pursuant to a state measure, (2) it provided a public service, and (3) had special powers. This could also be true if the enterprise is privatised, as it was held with a water company that was responsible for basic water provision.
Fourth, national courts have a duty to interpret domestic law "as far as possible in the light of the wording and purpose of the directive". Textbooks (though not the Court itself) often called this "indirect effect". In Marleasing SA v La Comercial SA the Court of Justice held that a Spanish Court had to interpret its general Civil Code provisions, on contracts lacking cause or defrauding creditors, to conform with the First Company Law Directive article 11, that required incorporations would only be nullified for a fixed list of reasons. The Court of Justice quickly acknowledged that the duty of interpretation cannot contradict plain words in a national statute. But, fifth, if a member state has failed to implement a Directive, a citizen may not be able to bring claims against other non-state parties, but can sue the member state itself for failure to implement the law. So, in Francovich v Italy, the Italian government had failed to set up an insurance fund for employees to claim unpaid wages if their employers had gone insolvent, as the Insolvency Protection Directive required. Francovich, the former employee of a bankrupt Venetian firm, was therefore allowed to claim 6 million Lira from the Italian government in damages for his loss. The Court of Justice held that if a Directive would confer identifiable rights on individuals, and there is a causal link between a member state's violation of EU and a claimant's loss, damages must be paid. The fact that the incompatible law is an Act of Parliament is no defence.
The principles of European Union law are rules of law which have been developed by the European Court of Justice that constitute unwritten rules which are not expressly provided for in the treaties but which affect how European Union law is interpreted and applies. In formulating these principles, the courts have drawn on a variety of sources, including: public international law and legal doctrines and principles present in the legal systems of European Union member states and in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. Accepted general principles of European Union Law include fundamental rights (see human rights), proportionality, legal certainty, equality before the law and subsidiarity.
Proportionality is recognised one of the general principles of European Union law by the European Court of Justice since the 1950s. According to the general principle of proportionality the lawfulness of an action depends on whether it was appropriate and necessary to achieve the objectives legitimately pursued. When there is a choice between several appropriate measures the least onerous must be adopted, and any disadvantage caused must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued. The principle of proportionality is also recognised in Article 5 of the EC Treaty, stating that "any action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of this Treaty".
The concept of legal certainty is recognised one of the general principles of European Union law by the European Court of Justice since the 1960s. It is an important general principle of international law and public law, which predates European Union law. As a general principle in European Union law it means that the law must be certain, in that it is clear and precise, and its legal implications foreseeable, specially when applied to financial obligations. The adoption of laws which will have legal effect in the European Union must have a proper legal basis. Legislation in member states which implements European Union law must be worded so that it is clearly understandable by those who are subject to the law. In European Union law the general principle of legal certainty prohibits Ex post facto laws, i.e. laws should not take effect before they are published. The doctrine of legitimate expectation, which has its roots in the principles of legal certainty and good faith, is also a central element of the general principle of legal certainty in European Union law. The legitimate expectation doctrine holds that and that "those who act in good faith on the basis of law as it is or seems to be should not be frustrated in their expectations".
Fundamental rights, as in human rights, were first recognised by the European Court of Justice in the late 60s and fundamental rights are now regarded as integral part of the general principles of European Union law. As such the European Court of Justice is bound to draw inspiration from the constitutional traditions common to the member states. Therefore, the European Court of Justice cannot uphold measures which are incompatible with fundamental rights recognised and protected in the constitutions of member states. The European Court of Justice also found that "international treaties for the protection of human rights on which the member states have collaborated or of which they are signatories, can supply guidelines which should be followed within the framework of Community law."
None of the original treaties establishing the European Union mention protection for fundamental rights. It was not envisaged for European Union measures, that is legislative and administrative actions by European Union institutions, to be subject to human rights. At the time the only concern was that member states should be prevented from violating human rights, hence the establishment of the European Convention on Human Rights in 1950 and the establishment of the European Court of Human Rights. The European Court of Justice recognised fundamental rights as general principle of European Union law as the need to ensure that European Union measures are compatible with the human rights enshrined in member states' constitution became ever more apparent. In 1999 the European Council set up a body tasked with drafting a European Charter of Human Rights, which could form the constitutional basis for the European Union and as such tailored specifically to apply to the European Union and its institutions. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union draws a list of fundamental rights from the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the Declaration on Fundamental Rights produced by the European Parliament in 1989 and European Union Treaties.
The 2007 Lisbon Treaty explicitly recognised fundamental rights by providing in Article 6(1) that "The Union recognises the rights, freedoms and principles set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 7 December 2000, as adopted at Strasbourg on 12 December 2007, which shall have the same legal value as the Treaties." Therefore, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union has become an integral part of European Union law, codifying the fundamental rights which were previously considered general principles of European Union law. In effect, after the Lisbon Treaty, the Charter and the Convention now co-exist under European Union law, though the former is enforced by the European Court of Justice in relation to European Union measures, and the latter by the European Court of Human Rights in relation to measures by member states.
The Social Chapter is a chapter of the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam covering social policy issues in European Union law. The basis for the Social Chapter was developed in 1989 by the "social partners" representatives, namely UNICE, the employers' confederation, the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) and CEEP, the European Centre of Public Enterprises. A toned down version was adopted as the Social Charter at the 1989 Strasbourg European Council. The Social Charter declares 30 general principles, including on fair remuneration of employment, health and safety at work, rights of disabled and elderly, the rights of workers, on vocational training and improvements of living conditions. The Social Charter became the basis for European Community legislation on these issues in 40 pieces of legislation.
The Social Charter was subsequently adopted in 1989 by 11 of the then 12 member states. The UK refused to sign the Social Charter and was exempt from the legislation covering Social Charter issues unless it agreed to be bound by the legislation. The UK subsequently was the only member state to veto the Social Charter being included as the "Social Chapter" of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty - instead, an Agreement on Social Policy was added as a protocol. Again, the UK was exempt from legislation arising from the protocol, unless it agreed to be bound by it. The protocol was to become known as "Social Chapter", despite not actually being a chapter of the Maastricht Treaty. To achieve aims of the Agreement on Social Policy the European Union was to "support and complement" the policies of member states. The aims of the Agreement on Social Policy are:
Following the election of the UK Labour Party to government in 1997, the UK formally subscribed to the Agreement on Social Policy, which allowed it to be included with minor amendments as the Social Chapter of the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam. The UK subsequently adopted the main legislation previously agreed under the Agreement on Social Policy, the 1994 Works Council Directive, which required workforce consultation in businesses, and the 1996 Parental Leave Directive. In the 10 years following the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam and adoption of the Social Chapter the European Union has undertaken policy initiatives in various social policy areas, including labour and industry relations, equal opportunity, health and safety, public health, protection of children, the disabled and elderly, poverty, migrant workers, education, training and youth.
EU Competition law has its origins in the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) agreement between France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Germany in 1951 following the second World War. The agreement aimed to prevent Germany from re-establishing dominance in the production of coal and steel as members felt that its dominance had contributed to the outbreak of the war. Article 65 of the agreement banned cartels and article 66 made provisions for concentrations, or mergers, and the abuse of a dominant position by companies. This was the first time that competition law principles were included in a plurilateral regional agreement and established the trans-European model of competition law. In 1957 competition rules were included in the Treaty of Rome, also known as the EC Treaty, which established the European Economic Community (EEC). The Treaty of Rome established the enactment of competition law as one of the main aims of the EEC through the "institution of a system ensuring that competition in the common market is not distorted". The two central provisions on EU competition law on companies were established in article 85, which prohibited anti-competitive agreements, subject to some exemptions, and article 86 prohibiting the abuse of dominant position. The treaty also established principles on competition law for member states, with article 90 covering public undertakings, and article 92 making provisions on state aid. Regulations on mergers were not included as member states could not establish consensus on the issue at the time.
Today, the Treaty of Lisbon prohibits anti-competitive agreements in Article 101(1), including price fixing. According to Article 101(2) any such agreements are automatically void. Article 101(3) establishes exemptions, if the collusion is for distributional or technological innovation, gives consumers a "fair share" of the benefit and does not include unreasonable restraints that risk eliminating competition anywhere (or compliant with the general principle of European Union law of proportionality). Article 102 prohibits the abuse of dominant position, such as price discrimination and exclusive dealing. Article 102 allows the European Council to regulations to govern mergers between firms (the current regulation is the Regulation 139/2004/EC). The general test is whether a concentration (i.e. merger or acquisition) with a community dimension (i.e. affects a number of EU member states) might significantly impede effective competition. Articles 106 and 107 provide that member state's right to deliver public services may not be obstructed, but that otherwise public enterprises must adhere to the same competition principles as companies. Article 107 lays down a general rule that the state may not aid or subsidise private parties in distortion of free competition and provides exemptions for charities, regional development objectives and in the event of a natural disaster.
While the concept of a "social market economy" was only introduced into EU law in 2007, free movement and trade were central to European development since the Treaty of Rome 1957. According to the standard theory of comparative advantage, two countries can both benefit from trade even if one of them has a less productive economy in all respects. Like in other regional organisations such as the North American Free Trade Association, or the World Trade Organisation, breaking down barriers to trade, and enhancing free movement of goods, services, labour and capital, is meant to reduce consumer prices. It was originally theorised that a free trade area had a tendency to give way to a customs union, which led to a common market, then monetary union, then union of monetary and fiscal policy, political and eventually a full union characteristic of a federal state. In Europe, however, those stages were considerably mixed, and it remains unclear whether the "endgame" should be the same as a state, traditionally understood. In practice free trade, without standards to ensure fair trade, can benefit some people and groups within countries (particularly big business) much more than others, but will burden people who lack bargaining power in an expanding market, particularly workers, consumers, small business, developing industries, and communities. The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union articles 28 to 37 establish the principle of free movement of goods in the EU, while articles 45 to 66 require free movement of persons, services and capital. These so-called "four freedoms" were thought to be inhibited by physical barriers (e.g. customs), technical barriers (e.g. differing laws on safety, consumer or environmental standards) and fiscal barriers (e.g. different Value Added Tax rates). The tension in the law is that the free movement and trade is not supposed to spill over into a licence for unrestricted commercial profit. The Treaties limit free trade, to prioritise other values such as public health, consumer protection, labour rights, fair competition, and environmental improvement. Increasingly the Court of Justice has taken the view that the specific goals of free trade are underpinned by the general aims of the treaty for improvement of people's well being.
Free movement of goods within the European Union is achieved by a customs union, and the principle of non-discrimination. The EU manages imports from non-member states, duties between member states are prohibited, and imports circulate freely. In addition under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union article 34, ‘Quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent effect shall be prohibited between Member States’. In Procureur du Roi v Dassonville the Court of Justice held that this rule meant all "trading rules" that are "enacted by Member States" which could hinder trade "directly or indirectly, actually or potentially" would be caught by article 34. This meant that a Belgian law requiring Scotch whisky imports to have a certificate of origin was unlikely to be lawful. It discriminated against parallel importers like Mr Dassonville, who could not get certificates from authorities in France, where they bought the Scotch. This "wide test", to determine what could potentially be an unlawful restriction on trade, applies equally to actions by quasi-government bodies, such as the former "Buy Irish" company that had government appointees. It also means states can be responsible for private actors. For instance, in Commission v France French farmer vigilantes were continually sabotaging shipments of Spanish strawberries, and even Belgian tomato imports. France was liable for these hindrances to trade because the authorities ‘manifestly and persistently abstained' from preventing the sabotage. Generally speaking, if a member state has laws or practices that directly discriminate against imports (or exports under TFEU article 35) then it must be justified under article 36. The justifications include public morality, policy or security, "protection of health and life of humans, animals or plants", "national treasures" of "artistic, historic or archaeological value" and "industrial and commercial property." In addition, although not clearly listed, environmental protection can justify restrictions on trade as an overriding requirement derived from TFEU article 11. More generally, it has been increasingly acknowledged that fundamental human rights should take priority over all trade rules. So, in Schmidberger v Austria the Court of Justice held that Austria did not infringe article 34 by failing to ban a protest that blocked heavy traffic passing over the A13, Brenner Autobahn, en route to Italy. Although many companies, including Mr Schmidberger's German undertaking, were prevented from trading, the Court of Justice reasoned that freedom of association is one of the ‘fundamental pillars of a democratic society’, against which the free movement of goods had to be balanced, and was probably subordinate. If a member state does appeal to the article 36 justification, the measures it takes have to be applied proportionately. This means the rule must be pursue a legitimate aim and (1) be suitable to achieve the aim, (2) be necessary, so that a less restrictive measure could not achieve the same result, and (3) be reasonable in balancing the interests of free trade with interests in article 36.
Often rules apply to all goods neutrally, but may have a greater practical effect on imports than domestic products. For such "indirect" discriminatory (or "indistinctly applicable") measures the Court of Justice has developed more justifications: either those in article 36, or additional "mandatory" or "overriding" requirements such as consumer protection, improving labour standards, protecting the environment, press diversity, fairness in commerce, and more: the categories are not closed. In the most famous case Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopol für Branntwein, the Court of Justice found that a German law requiring all spirits and liqueurs (not just imported ones) to have a minimum alcohol content of 25 per cent was contrary to TFEU article 34, because it had a greater negative effect on imports. German liqueurs were over 25 per cent alcohol, but Cassis de Dijon, which Rewe-Zentrale AG wished to import from France, only had 15 to 20 per cent alcohol. The Court of Justice rejected the German government's arguments that the measure proportionately protected public health under TFEU article 36, because stronger beverages were available and adequate labelling would be enough for consumers to understand what they bought. This rule primarily applies to requirements about a product's content or packaging. In Walter Rau Lebensmittelwerke v De Smedt PVBA the Court of Justice found that a Belgian law requiring all margarine to be in cube shaped packages infringed article 34, and was not justified by the pursuit of consumer protection. The argument that Belgians would believe it was butter if it was not cube shaped was disproportionate: it would "considerably exceed the requirements of the object in view" and labelling would protect consumers "just as effectively". In a 2003 case, Commission v Italy Italian law required that cocoa products that included other vegetable fats could not be labelled as "chocolate". It had to be "chocolate substitute". All Italian chocolate was made from cocoa butter alone, but British, Danish and Irish manufacturers used other vegetable fats. They claimed the law infringed article 34. The Court of Justice held that a low content of vegetable fat did not justify a "chocolate substitute" label. This was derogatory in the consumers' eyes. A ‘neutral and objective statement’ was enough to protect consumers. If member states place considerable obstacles on the use of a product, this can also infringe article 34. So, in a 2009 case, Commission v Italy, the Court of Justice held that an Italian law prohibiting motorcycles or mopeds pulling trailers infringed article 34. Again, the law applied neutrally to everyone, but disproportionately affected importers, because Italian companies did not make trailers. This was not a product requirement, but the Court reasoned that the prohibition would deter people from buying it: it would have "a considerable influence on the behaviour of consumers" that "affects the access of that product to the market". It would require justification under article 36, or as a mandatory requirement.
In contrast to product requirements or other laws that hinder market access, the Court of Justice developed a presumption that "selling arrangements" would be presumed to not fall into TFEU article 34, if they applied equally to all sellers, and affected them in the same manner in fact. In Keck and Mithouard two importers claimed that their prosecution under a French competition law, which prevented them selling Picon beer under wholesale price, was unlawful. The aim of the law was to prevent cut throat competition, not to hinder trade. The Court of Justice held, as "in law and in fact" it was an equally applicable "selling arrangement" (not something that alters a product's content) it was outside the scope of article 34, and so did not need to be justified. Selling arrangements can be held to have an unequal effect "in fact" particularly where traders from another member state are seeking to break into the market, but there are restrictions on advertising and marketing. In Konsumentombudsmannen v De Agostini the Court of Justice reviewed Swedish bans on advertising to children under age 12, and misleading commercials for skin care products. While the bans have remained (justifiable under article 36 or as a mandatory requirement) the Court emphasised that complete marketing bans could be disproportionate if advertising were "the only effective form of promotion enabling [a trader] to penetrate" the market. In Konsumentombudsmannen v Gourmet AB the Court suggested that a total ban for advertising alcohol on the radio, TV and in magazines could fall within article 34 where advertising was the only way for sellers to overcome consumers' "traditional social practices and to local habits and customs" to buy their products, but again the national courts would decide whether it was justified under article 36 to protect public health. Under the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, the EU harmonised restrictions on restrictions on marketing and advertising, to forbid conduct that distorts average consumer behaviour, is misleading or aggressive, and sets out a list of examples that count as unfair. Increasingly, states have to give mutual recognition to each other's standards of regulation, while the EU has attempted to harmonise minimum ideals of best practice. The attempt to raise standards is hoped to avoid a regulatory "race to the bottom", while allowing consumers access to goods from around the continent.
Since its foundation, the Treaties sought to enable people to pursue their life goals in any country through free movement. Reflecting the economic nature of the project, the European Community originally focused upon free movement of workers: as a "factor of production". However, from the 1970s, this focus shifted towards developing a more "social" Europe. Free movement was increasingly based on "citizenship", so that people had rights to empower them to become economically and socially active, rather than economic activity being a precondition for rights. This means the basic "worker" rights in TFEU article 45 function as a specific expression of the general rights of citizens in TFEU articles 18 to 21. According to the Court of Justice, a "worker" is anybody who is economically active, which includes everyone in an employment relationship, "under the direction of another person" for "remuneration". A job, however, need not be paid in money for someone to be protected as a worker. For example, in Steymann v Staatssecretaris van Justitie, a German man claimed the right to residence in the Netherlands, while he volunteered plumbing and household duties in the Bhagwan community, which provided for everyone's material needs irrespective of their contributions. The Court of Justice held that Mr Steymann was entitled to stay, so long as there was at least an "indirect quid pro quo" for the work he did. Having "worker" status means protection against all forms of discrimination by governments, and employers, in access to employment, tax, and social security rights. By contrast a citizen, who is "any person having the nationality of a Member State" (TFEU article 20(1)), has rights to seek work, vote in local and European elections, but more restricted rights to claim social security. In practice, free movement has become politically contentious as nationalist political parties have manipulated fears about immigrants taking away people's jobs and benefits (paradoxically at the same time). Nevertheless, practically "all available research finds little impact" of "labour mobility on wages and employment of local workers".
The Free Movement of Workers Regulation articles 1 to 7 set out the main provisions on equal treatment of workers. First, articles 1 to 4 generally require that workers can take up employment, conclude contracts, and not suffer discrimination compared to nationals of the member state. In a famous case, the Belgian Football Association v Bosman, a Belgian footballer named Jean-Marc Bosman claimed that he should be able to transfer from R.F.C. de Liège to USL Dunkerque when his contract finished, regardless of whether Dunkerque could afford to pay Liège the habitual transfer fees. The Court of Justice held "the transfer rules constitute[d] an obstacle to free movement" and were unlawful unless they could be justified in the public interest, but this was unlikely. In Groener v Minister for Education the Court of Justice accepted that a requirement to speak Gaelic to teach in a Dublin design college could be justified as part of the public policy of promoting the Irish language, but only if the measure was not disproportionate. By contrast in Angonese v Cassa di Risparmio di Bolzano SpA a bank in Bolzano, Italy, was not allowed to require Mr Angonese to have a bilingual certificate that could only be obtained in Bolzano. The Court of Justice, giving "horizontal" direct effect to TFEU article 45, reasoned that people from other countries would have little chance of acquiring the certificate, and because it was "impossible to submit proof of the required linguistic knowledge by any other means", the measure was disproportionate. Second, article 7(2) requires equal treatment in respect of tax. In Finanzamt Köln Altstadt v Schumacker the Court of Justice held that it contravened TFEU art 45 to deny tax benefits (e.g. for married couples, and social insurance expense deductions) to a man who worked in Germany, but was resident in Belgium when other German residents got the benefits. By contrast in Weigel v Finanzlandesdirektion für Vorarlberg the Court of Justice rejected Mr Weigel's claim that a re-registration charge upon bringing his car to Austria violated his right to free movement. Although the tax was "likely to have a negative bearing on the decision of migrant workers to exercise their right to freedom of movement", because the charge applied equally to Austrians, in absence of EU legislation on the matter it had to be regarded as justified. Third, people must receive equal treatment regarding "social advantages", although the Court has approved residential qualifying periods. In Hendrix v Employee Insurance Institute the Court of Justice held that a Dutch national was not entitled to continue receiving incapacity benefits when he moved to Belgium, because the benefit was "closely linked to the socio-economic situation" of the Netherlands. Conversely, in Geven v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen the Court of Justice held that a Dutch woman living in the Netherlands, but working between 3 and 14 hours a week in Germany, did not have a right to receive German child benefits, even though the wife of a man who worked full-time in Germany but was resident in Austria could. The general justifications for limiting free movement in TFEU article 45(3) are "public policy, public security or public health", and there is also a general exception in article 45(4) for "employment in the public service".
Citizenship of the EU has increasingly been seen as a "fundamental" status of member state nationals by the Court of Justice, and has accordingly increased the number of social services that people can access wherever they move. The Court has required that higher education, along with other forms of vocational training, should be more access, albeit with qualifying periods. In Commission v Austria the Court held that Austria was not entitled to restrict places in Austrian universities to Austrian students to avoid "structural, staffing and financial problems" if (mainly German) foreign students applied for places because there was little evidence of an actual problem.
As well as creating rights for "workers" who generally lack bargaining power in the market, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union also protects the "freedom of establishment" in article 49, and "freedom to provide services" in article 56. In Gebhard v Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano the Court of Justice held that to be "established" means to participate in economic life "on a stable and continuous basis", while providing "services" meant pursuing activity more "on a temporary basis". This meant that a lawyer from Stuttgart, who had set up chambers in Milan and was censured by the Milan Bar Council for not having registered, was entitled to bring a claim under for establishment freedom, rather than service freedom. However, the requirements to be registered in Milan before being able to practice would be allowed if they were non-discriminatory, "justified by imperative requirements in the general interest" and proportionately applied. All people or entities that engage in economic activity, particularly the self-employed, or "undertakings" such as companies or firms, have a right to set up an enterprise without unjustified restrictions. The Court of Justice has held that both a member state government and a private party can hinder freedom of establishment, so article 49 has both "vertical" and "horizontal" direct effect. In Reyners v Belgium the Court of Justice held that a refusal to admit a lawyer to the Belgian bar because he lacked Belgian nationality was unjustified. TFEU article 49 says states are exempt from infringing others' freedom of establishment when they exercise "official authority", but this did an advocate's work (as opposed to a court's) was not official. By contrast in Commission v Italy the Court of Justice held that a requirement for lawyers in Italy to comply with maximum tariffs unless there was an agreement with a client was not a restriction. The Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice held the Commission had not proven that this had any object or effect of limiting practitioners from entering the market. Therefore, there was no prima facie infringement freedom of establishment that needed to be justified.
In 2006, a toxic waste spill off the coast of Côte d'Ivoire, from a European ship, prompted the Commission to look into legislation against toxic waste. Environment Commissioner Stavros Dimas stated that "Such highly toxic waste should never have left the European Union". With countries such as Spain not even having a crime against shipping toxic waste, Franco Frattini, the Justice, Freedom and Security Commissioner, proposed with Dimas to create criminal sentences for "ecological crimes". The competence for the Union to do this was contested in 2005 at the Court of Justice resulting in a victory for the Commission. That ruling set a precedent that the Commission, on a supranational basis, may legislate in criminal law – something never done before. So far, the only other proposal has been the draft intellectual property rights directive. Motions were tabled in the European Parliament against that legislation on the basis that criminal law should not be an EU competence, but was rejected at vote. However, in October 2007, the Court of Justice ruled that the Commission could not propose what the criminal sanctions could be, only that there must be some.
The "freedom to provide services" under TFEU article 56 applies to people who give services "for remuneration", especially commercial or professional activity. For example, in Van Binsbergen v Bestuur van de Bedrijfvereniging voor de Metaalnijverheid a Dutch lawyer moved to Belgium while advising a client in a social security case, and was told he could not continue because Dutch law said only people established in the Netherlands could give legal advice. The Court of Justice held that the freedom to provide services applied, it was directly effective, and the rule was probably unjustified: having an address in the member state would be enough to pursue the legitimate aim of good administration of justice. The Court of Justice has held that secondary education falls outside the scope of article 56, because usually the state funds it, though higher education does not. Health care generally counts as a service. In Geraets-Smits v Stichting Ziekenfonds Mrs Geraets-Smits claimed she should be reimbursed by Dutch social insurance for costs of receiving treatment in Germany. The Dutch health authorities regarded the treatment unnecessary, so she argued this restricted the freedom (of the German health clinic) to provide services. Several governments submitted that hospital services should not be regarded as economic, and should not fall within article 56. But the Court of Justice held health was a "service" even though the government (rather than the service recipient) paid for the service. National authorities could be justified in refusing to reimburse patients for medical services abroad if the health care received at home was without undue delay, and it followed "international medical science" on which treatments counted as normal and necessary. The Court requires that the individual circumstances of a patient justify waiting lists, and this is also true in the context of the UK's National Health Service. Aside from public services, another sensitive field of services are those classified as illegal. Josemans v Burgemeester van Maastricht held that the Netherlands' regulation of cannabis consumption, including the prohibitions by some municipalities on tourists (but not Dutch nationals) going to coffee shops, fell outside article 56 altogether. The Court of Justice reasoned that narcotic drugs were controlled in all member states, and so this differed from other cases where prostitution or other quasi-legal activity was subject to restriction. If an activity does fall within article 56, a restriction can be justified under article 52 or overriding requirements developed by the Court of Justice. In Alpine Investments BV v Minister van Financiën a business that sold commodities futures (with Merrill Lynch and another banking firms) attempted to challenge a Dutch law that prohibiting cold calling customers. The Court of Justice held the Dutch prohibition pursued a legitimate aim to prevent "undesirable developments in securities trading" including protecting the consumer from aggressive sales tactics, thus maintaining confidence in the Dutch markets. In Omega Spielhallen GmbH v Bonn a "laserdrome" business was banned by the Bonn council. It bought fake laser gun services from a UK firm called Pulsar Ltd, but residents had protested against "playing at killing" entertainment. The Court of Justice held that the German constitutional value of human dignity, which underpinned the ban, did count as a justified restriction on freedom to provide services. In Liga Portuguesa de Futebol v Santa Casa da Misericórdia de Lisboa the Court of Justice also held that the state monopoly on gambling, and a penalty for a Gibraltar firm that had sold internet gambling services, was justified to prevent fraud and gambling where people's views were highly divergent. The ban was proportionate as this was an appropriate and necessary way to tackle the serious problems of fraud that arise over the internet. In the Services Directive a group of justifications were codified in article 16 that the case law has developed.
In regard to companies, the Court of Justice held in R (Daily Mail and General Trust plc) v HM Treasury that member states could restrict a company moving its seat of business, without infringing TFEU article 49. This meant the Daily Mail newspaper's parent company could not evade tax by shifting its residence to the Netherlands without first settling its tax bills in the UK. The UK did not need to justify its action, as rules on company seats were not yet harmonised. By contrast, in Centros Ltd v Erhversus-og Selkabssyrelsen the Court of Justice found that a UK limited company operating in Denmark could not be required to comply with Denmark's minimum share capital rules. UK law only required £1 of capital to start a company, while Denmark's legislature took the view companies should only be started up if they had 200,000 Danish krone (around €27,000) to protect creditors if the company failed and went insolvent. The Court of Justice held that Denmark's minimum capital law infringed Centros Ltd's freedom of establishment and could not be justified, because a company in the UK could admittedly provide services in Denmark without being established there, and there were less restrictive means of achieving the aim of creditor protection. This approach was criticised as potentially opening the EU to unjustified regulatory competition, and a race to the bottom in standards, like in the US where the state Delaware attracts most companies and is often argued to have the worst standards of accountability of boards, and low corporate taxes as a result. Similarly in Überseering BV v Nordic Construction GmbH the Court of Justice held that a German court could not deny a Dutch building company the right to enforce a contract in Germany on the basis that it was not validly incorporated in Germany. Although restrictions on freedom of establishment could be justified by creditor protection, labour rights to participate in work, or the public interest in collecting taxes, denial of capacity went too far: it was an "outright negation" of the right of establishment. However, in Cartesio Oktató és Szolgáltató bt the Court of Justice affirmed again that because corporations are created by law, they are in principle subject to any rules for formation that a state of incorporation wishes to impose. This meant that the Hungarian authorities could prevent a company from shifting its central administration to Italy while it still operated and was incorporated in Hungary. Thus, the court draws a distinction between the right of establishment for foreign companies (where restrictions must be justified), and the right of the state to determine conditions for companies incorporated in its territory, although it is not entirely clear why.
The Amazon rainforest (Portuguese: Floresta Amazônica or Amazônia; Spanish: Selva Amazónica, Amazonía or usually Amazonia; French: Forêt amazonienne; Dutch: Amazoneregenwoud), also known in English as Amazonia or the Amazon Jungle, is a moist broadleaf forest that covers most of the Amazon basin of South America. This basin encompasses 7,000,000 square kilometres (2,700,000 sq mi), of which 5,500,000 square kilometres (2,100,000 sq mi) are covered by the rainforest. This region includes territory belonging to nine nations. The majority of the forest is contained within Brazil, with 60% of the rainforest, followed by Peru with 13%, Colombia with 10%, and with minor amounts in Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, Guyana, Suriname and French Guiana. States or departments in four nations contain "Amazonas" in their names. The Amazon represents over half of the planet's remaining rainforests, and comprises the largest and most biodiverse tract of tropical rainforest in the world, with an estimated 390 billion individual trees divided into 16,000 species.
Following the Cretaceous–Paleogene extinction event, the extinction of the dinosaurs and the wetter climate may have allowed the tropical rainforest to spread out across the continent. From 66–34 Mya, the rainforest extended as far south as 45°. Climate fluctuations during the last 34 million years have allowed savanna regions to expand into the tropics. During the Oligocene, for example, the rainforest spanned a relatively narrow band. It expanded again during the Middle Miocene, then retracted to a mostly inland formation at the last glacial maximum. However, the rainforest still managed to thrive during these glacial periods, allowing for the survival and evolution of a broad diversity of species.
During the mid-Eocene, it is believed that the drainage basin of the Amazon was split along the middle of the continent by the Purus Arch. Water on the eastern side flowed toward the Atlantic, while to the west water flowed toward the Pacific across the Amazonas Basin. As the Andes Mountains rose, however, a large basin was created that enclosed a lake; now known as the Solimões Basin. Within the last 5–10 million years, this accumulating water broke through the Purus Arch, joining the easterly flow toward the Atlantic.
There is evidence that there have been significant changes in Amazon rainforest vegetation over the last 21,000 years through the Last Glacial Maximum (LGM) and subsequent deglaciation. Analyses of sediment deposits from Amazon basin paleolakes and from the Amazon Fan indicate that rainfall in the basin during the LGM was lower than for the present, and this was almost certainly associated with reduced moist tropical vegetation cover in the basin. There is debate, however, over how extensive this reduction was. Some scientists argue that the rainforest was reduced to small, isolated refugia separated by open forest and grassland; other scientists argue that the rainforest remained largely intact but extended less far to the north, south, and east than is seen today. This debate has proved difficult to resolve because the practical limitations of working in the rainforest mean that data sampling is biased away from the center of the Amazon basin, and both explanations are reasonably well supported by the available data.
NASA's CALIPSO satellite has measured the amount of dust transported by wind from the Sahara to the Amazon: an average 182 million tons of dust are windblown out of the Sahara each year, at 15 degrees west longitude, across 1,600 miles (2,600 km) over the Atlantic Ocean (some dust falls into the Atlantic), then at 35 degrees West longitude at the eastern coast of South America, 27.7 million tons (15%) of dust fall over the Amazon basin, 132 million tons of dust remain in the air, 43 million tons of dust are windblown and falls on the Caribbean Sea, past 75 degrees west longitude.
For a long time, it was thought that the Amazon rainforest was only ever sparsely populated, as it was impossible to sustain a large population through agriculture given the poor soil. Archeologist Betty Meggers was a prominent proponent of this idea, as described in her book Amazonia: Man and Culture in a Counterfeit Paradise. She claimed that a population density of 0.2 inhabitants per square kilometre (0.52/sq mi) is the maximum that can be sustained in the rainforest through hunting, with agriculture needed to host a larger population. However, recent anthropological findings have suggested that the region was actually densely populated. Some 5 million people may have lived in the Amazon region in AD 1500, divided between dense coastal settlements, such as that at Marajó, and inland dwellers. By 1900 the population had fallen to 1 million and by the early 1980s it was less than 200,000.
The first European to travel the length of the Amazon River was Francisco de Orellana in 1542. The BBC's Unnatural Histories presents evidence that Orellana, rather than exaggerating his claims as previously thought, was correct in his observations that a complex civilization was flourishing along the Amazon in the 1540s. It is believed that the civilization was later devastated by the spread of diseases from Europe, such as smallpox. Since the 1970s, numerous geoglyphs have been discovered on deforested land dating between AD 0–1250, furthering claims about Pre-Columbian civilizations. Ondemar Dias is accredited with first discovering the geoglyphs in 1977 and Alceu Ranzi with furthering their discovery after flying over Acre. The BBC's Unnatural Histories presented evidence that the Amazon rainforest, rather than being a pristine wilderness, has been shaped by man for at least 11,000 years through practices such as forest gardening and terra preta.
Terra preta (black earth), which is distributed over large areas in the Amazon forest, is now widely accepted as a product of indigenous soil management. The development of this fertile soil allowed agriculture and silviculture in the previously hostile environment; meaning that large portions of the Amazon rainforest are probably the result of centuries of human management, rather than naturally occurring as has previously been supposed. In the region of the Xingu tribe, remains of some of these large settlements in the middle of the Amazon forest were found in 2003 by Michael Heckenberger and colleagues of the University of Florida. Among those were evidence of roads, bridges and large plazas.
The region is home to about 2.5 million insect species, tens of thousands of plants, and some 2,000 birds and mammals. To date, at least 40,000 plant species, 2,200 fishes, 1,294 birds, 427 mammals, 428 amphibians, and 378 reptiles have been scientifically classified in the region. One in five of all the bird species in the world live in the rainforests of the Amazon, and one in five of the fish species live in Amazonian rivers and streams. Scientists have described between 96,660 and 128,843 invertebrate species in Brazil alone.
The biodiversity of plant species is the highest on Earth with one 2001 study finding a quarter square kilometer (62 acres) of Ecuadorian rainforest supports more than 1,100 tree species. A study in 1999 found one square kilometer (247 acres) of Amazon rainforest can contain about 90,790 tonnes of living plants. The average plant biomass is estimated at 356 ± 47 tonnes per hectare. To date, an estimated 438,000 species of plants of economic and social interest have been registered in the region with many more remaining to be discovered or catalogued. The total number of tree species in the region is estimated at 16,000.
The rainforest contains several species that can pose a hazard. Among the largest predatory creatures are the black caiman, jaguar, cougar, and anaconda. In the river, electric eels can produce an electric shock that can stun or kill, while piranha are known to bite and injure humans. Various species of poison dart frogs secrete lipophilic alkaloid toxins through their flesh. There are also numerous parasites and disease vectors. Vampire bats dwell in the rainforest and can spread the rabies virus. Malaria, yellow fever and Dengue fever can also be contracted in the Amazon region.
Deforestation is the conversion of forested areas to non-forested areas. The main sources of deforestation in the Amazon are human settlement and development of the land. Prior to the early 1960s, access to the forest's interior was highly restricted, and the forest remained basically intact. Farms established during the 1960s were based on crop cultivation and the slash and burn method. However, the colonists were unable to manage their fields and the crops because of the loss of soil fertility and weed invasion. The soils in the Amazon are productive for just a short period of time, so farmers are constantly moving to new areas and clearing more land. These farming practices led to deforestation and caused extensive environmental damage. Deforestation is considerable, and areas cleared of forest are visible to the naked eye from outer space.
Between 1991 and 2000, the total area of forest lost in the Amazon rose from 415,000 to 587,000 square kilometres (160,000 to 227,000 sq mi), with most of the lost forest becoming pasture for cattle. Seventy percent of formerly forested land in the Amazon, and 91% of land deforested since 1970, is used for livestock pasture. Currently, Brazil is the second-largest global producer of soybeans after the United States. New research however, conducted by Leydimere Oliveira et al., has shown that the more rainforest is logged in the Amazon, the less precipitation reaches the area and so the lower the yield per hectare becomes. So despite the popular perception, there has been no economical advantage for Brazil from logging rainforest zones and converting these to pastoral fields.
The needs of soy farmers have been used to justify many of the controversial transportation projects that are currently developing in the Amazon. The first two highways successfully opened up the rainforest and led to increased settlement and deforestation. The mean annual deforestation rate from 2000 to 2005 (22,392 km2 or 8,646 sq mi per year) was 18% higher than in the previous five years (19,018 km2 or 7,343 sq mi per year). Although deforestation has declined significantly in the Brazilian Amazon between 2004 and 2014, there has been an increase to the present day.
Environmentalists are concerned about loss of biodiversity that will result from destruction of the forest, and also about the release of the carbon contained within the vegetation, which could accelerate global warming. Amazonian evergreen forests account for about 10% of the world's terrestrial primary productivity and 10% of the carbon stores in ecosystems—of the order of 1.1 × 1011 metric tonnes of carbon. Amazonian forests are estimated to have accumulated 0.62 ± 0.37 tons of carbon per hectare per year between 1975 and 1996.
One computer model of future climate change caused by greenhouse gas emissions shows that the Amazon rainforest could become unsustainable under conditions of severely reduced rainfall and increased temperatures, leading to an almost complete loss of rainforest cover in the basin by 2100. However, simulations of Amazon basin climate change across many different models are not consistent in their estimation of any rainfall response, ranging from weak increases to strong decreases. The result indicates that the rainforest could be threatened though the 21st century by climate change in addition to deforestation.
As indigenous territories continue to be destroyed by deforestation and ecocide, such as in the Peruvian Amazon indigenous peoples' rainforest communities continue to disappear, while others, like the Urarina continue to struggle to fight for their cultural survival and the fate of their forested territories. Meanwhile, the relationship between non-human primates in the subsistence and symbolism of indigenous lowland South American peoples has gained increased attention, as have ethno-biology and community-based conservation efforts.
The use of remote sensing for the conservation of the Amazon is also being used by the indigenous tribes of the basin to protect their tribal lands from commercial interests. Using handheld GPS devices and programs like Google Earth, members of the Trio Tribe, who live in the rainforests of southern Suriname, map out their ancestral lands to help strengthen their territorial claims. Currently, most tribes in the Amazon do not have clearly defined boundaries, making it easier for commercial ventures to target their territories.
To accurately map the Amazon's biomass and subsequent carbon related emissions, the classification of tree growth stages within different parts of the forest is crucial. In 2006 Tatiana Kuplich organized the trees of the Amazon into four categories: (1) mature forest, (2) regenerating forest [less than three years], (3) regenerating forest [between three and five years of regrowth], and (4) regenerating forest [eleven to eighteen years of continued development]. The researcher used a combination of Synthetic aperture radar (SAR) and Thematic Mapper (TM) to accurately place the different portions of the Amazon into one of the four classifications.
In 2005, parts of the Amazon basin experienced the worst drought in one hundred years, and there were indications that 2006 could have been a second successive year of drought. A July 23, 2006 article in the UK newspaper The Independent reported Woods Hole Research Center results showing that the forest in its present form could survive only three years of drought. Scientists at the Brazilian National Institute of Amazonian Research argue in the article that this drought response, coupled with the effects of deforestation on regional climate, are pushing the rainforest towards a "tipping point" where it would irreversibly start to die. It concludes that the forest is on the brink of being turned into savanna or desert, with catastrophic consequences for the world's climate.
In 2010 the Amazon rainforest experienced another severe drought, in some ways more extreme than the 2005 drought. The affected region was approximate 1,160,000 square miles (3,000,000 km2) of rainforest, compared to 734,000 square miles (1,900,000 km2) in 2005. The 2010 drought had three epicenters where vegetation died off, whereas in 2005 the drought was focused on the southwestern part. The findings were published in the journal Science. In a typical year the Amazon absorbs 1.5 gigatons of carbon dioxide; during 2005 instead 5 gigatons were released and in 2010 8 gigatons were released.
Ctenophora (/tᵻˈnɒfərə/; singular ctenophore, /ˈtɛnəfɔːr/ or /ˈtiːnəfɔːr/; from the Greek κτείς kteis 'comb' and φέρω pherō 'carry'; commonly known as comb jellies) is a phylum of animals that live in marine waters worldwide. Their most distinctive feature is the ‘combs’ – groups of cilia which they use for swimming – they are the largest animals that swim by means of cilia. Adults of various species range from a few millimeters to 1.5 m (4 ft 11 in) in size. Like cnidarians, their bodies consist of a mass of jelly, with one layer of cells on the outside and another lining the internal cavity. In ctenophores, these layers are two cells deep, while those in cnidarians are only one cell deep. Some authors combined ctenophores and cnidarians in one phylum, Coelenterata, as both groups rely on water flow through the body cavity for both digestion and respiration. Increasing awareness of the differences persuaded more recent authors to classify them as separate phyla.
Almost all ctenophores are predators, taking prey ranging from microscopic larvae and rotifers to the adults of small crustaceans; the exceptions are juveniles of two species, which live as parasites on the salps on which adults of their species feed. In favorable circumstances, ctenophores can eat ten times their own weight in a day. Only 100–150 species have been validated, and possibly another 25 have not been fully described and named. The textbook examples are cydippids with egg-shaped bodies and a pair of retractable tentacles fringed with tentilla ("little tentacles") that are covered with colloblasts, sticky cells that capture prey. The phylum has a wide range of body forms, including the flattened, deep-sea platyctenids, in which the adults of most species lack combs, and the coastal beroids, which lack tentacles and prey on other ctenophores by using huge mouths armed with groups of large, stiffened cilia that act as teeth. These variations enable different species to build huge populations in the same area, because they specialize in different types of prey, which they capture by as wide a range of methods as spiders use.
Most species are hermaphrodites—a single animal can produce both eggs and sperm, meaning it can fertilize its own egg, not needing a mate. Some are simultaneous hermaphrodites, which can produce both eggs and sperm at the same time. Others are sequential hermaphrodites, in which the eggs and sperm mature at different times. Fertilization is generally external, although platyctenids' eggs are fertilized inside their parents' bodies and kept there until they hatch. The young are generally planktonic and in most species look like miniature cydippids, gradually changing into their adult shapes as they grow. The exceptions are the beroids, whose young are miniature beroids with large mouths and no tentacles, and the platyctenids, whose young live as cydippid-like plankton until they reach near-adult size, but then sink to the bottom and rapidly metamorphose into the adult form. In at least some species, juveniles are capable of reproduction before reaching the adult size and shape. The combination of hermaphroditism and early reproduction enables small populations to grow at an explosive rate.
Ctenophores may be abundant during the summer months in some coastal locations, but in other places they are uncommon and difficult to find. In bays where they occur in very high numbers, predation by ctenophores may control the populations of small zooplanktonic organisms such as copepods, which might otherwise wipe out the phytoplankton (planktonic plants), which are a vital part of marine food chains. One ctenophore, Mnemiopsis, has accidentally been introduced into the Black Sea, where it is blamed for causing fish stocks to collapse by eating both fish larvae and organisms that would otherwise have fed the fish. The situation was aggravated by other factors, such as over-fishing and long-term environmental changes that promoted the growth of the Mnemiopsis population. The later accidental introduction of Beroe helped to mitigate the problem, as Beroe preys on other ctenophores.
Despite their soft, gelatinous bodies, fossils thought to represent ctenophores, apparently with no tentacles but many more comb-rows than modern forms, have been found in lagerstätten as far back as the early Cambrian, about 515 million years ago. The position of the ctenophores in the evolutionary family tree of animals has long been debated, and the majority view at present, based on molecular phylogenetics, is that cnidarians and bilaterians are more closely related to each other than either is to ctenophores. A recent molecular phylogenetics analysis concluded that the common ancestor of all modern ctenophores was cydippid-like, and that all the modern groups appeared relatively recently, probably after the Cretaceous–Paleogene extinction event 66 million years ago. Evidence accumulating since the 1980s indicates that the "cydippids" are not monophyletic, in other words do not include all and only the descendants of a single common ancestor, because all the other traditional ctenophore groups are descendants of various cydippids.
Ctenophores form an animal phylum that is more complex than sponges, about as complex as cnidarians (jellyfish, sea anemones, etc.), and less complex than bilaterians (which include almost all other animals). Unlike sponges, both ctenophores and cnidarians have: cells bound by inter-cell connections and carpet-like basement membranes; muscles; nervous systems; and some have sensory organs. Ctenophores are distinguished from all other animals by having colloblasts, which are sticky and adhere to prey, although a few ctenophore species lack them.
Like sponges and cnidarians, ctenophores have two main layers of cells that sandwich a middle layer of jelly-like material, which is called the mesoglea in cnidarians and ctenophores; more complex animals have three main cell layers and no intermediate jelly-like layer. Hence ctenophores and cnidarians have traditionally been labelled diploblastic, along with sponges. Both ctenophores and cnidarians have a type of muscle that, in more complex animals, arises from the middle cell layer, and as a result some recent text books classify ctenophores as triploblastic, while others still regard them as diploblastic.
Ranging from about 1 millimeter (0.039 in) to 1.5 meters (4.9 ft) in size, ctenophores are the largest non-colonial animals that use cilia ("hairs") as their main method of locomotion. Most species have eight strips, called comb rows, that run the length of their bodies and bear comb-like bands of cilia, called "ctenes," stacked along the comb rows so that when the cilia beat, those of each comb touch the comb below. The name "ctenophora" means "comb-bearing", from the Greek κτείς (stem-form κτεν-) meaning "comb" and the Greek suffix -φορος meaning "carrying".
For a phylum with relatively few species, ctenophores have a wide range of body plans. Coastal species need to be tough enough to withstand waves and swirling sediment particles, while some oceanic species are so fragile that it is very difficult to capture them intact for study. In addition oceanic species do not preserve well, and are known mainly from photographs and from observers' notes. Hence most attention has until recently concentrated on three coastal genera – Pleurobrachia, Beroe and Mnemiopsis. At least two textbooks base their descriptions of ctenophores on the cydippid Pleurobrachia.
The internal cavity forms: a mouth that can usually be closed by muscles; a pharynx ("throat"); a wider area in the center that acts as a stomach; and a system of internal canals. These branch through the mesoglea to the most active parts of the animal: the mouth and pharynx; the roots of the tentacles, if present; all along the underside of each comb row; and four branches round the sensory complex at the far end from the mouth – two of these four branches terminate in anal pores. The inner surface of the cavity is lined with an epithelium, the gastrodermis. The mouth and pharynx have both cilia and well-developed muscles. In other parts of the canal system, the gastrodermis is different on the sides nearest to and furthest from the organ that it supplies. The nearer side is composed of tall nutritive cells that store nutrients in vacuoles (internal compartments), germ cells that produce eggs or sperm, and photocytes that produce bioluminescence. The side furthest from the organ is covered with ciliated cells that circulate water through the canals, punctuated by ciliary rosettes, pores that are surrounded by double whorls of cilia and connect to the mesoglea.
The outer surface bears usually eight comb rows, called swimming-plates, which are used for swimming. The rows are oriented to run from near the mouth (the "oral pole") to the opposite end (the "aboral pole"), and are spaced more or less evenly around the body, although spacing patterns vary by species and in most species the comb rows extend only part of the distance from the aboral pole towards the mouth. The "combs" (also called "ctenes" or "comb plates") run across each row, and each consists of thousands of unusually long cilia, up to 2 millimeters (0.079 in). Unlike conventional cilia and flagella, which has a filament structure arranged in a 9 + 2 pattern, these cilia are arranged in a 9 + 3 pattern, where the extra compact filament is suspected to have a supporting function. These normally beat so that the propulsion stroke is away from the mouth, although they can also reverse direction. Hence ctenophores usually swim in the direction in which the mouth is pointing, unlike jellyfish. When trying to escape predators, one species can accelerate to six times its normal speed; some other species reverse direction as part of their escape behavior, by reversing the power stroke of the comb plate cilia.

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