context stringlengths 58 1.13k | citation_a dict | citation_b dict | case_id int64 475 12.5M | label stringclasses 2
values |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Under the Blum test, even heavily-regulated private entities generally are held not to be state actors. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "191 F.3d 206, 206",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he fact that a business entity is subject to 'extensive and detailed' state regulation does not convert that organization's actions into those of the state.\"",
"sentence": "Desiderio, 191 F.3d, at 206 (“[T]he fact that a busines... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that extensively regulated public utilities are not state actors",
"sentence": "Desiderio, 191 F.3d, at 206 (“[T]he fact that a business entity is subject to ‘extensive and detailed’ state regulation does not convert that organization’s actio... | 9,393,599 | a |
Rather, we find that the district judge's evaluation of this ease supported employing physical restraints to further an essential state interest. Notably, the district judge identified this interest on the record at both the March 27, 2012, status conference and the jury-selection proceeding, explaining that the measur... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "544 U.S. 628, 628",
"parenthetical": "stating that an essential state interest may include ensuring physical security, preventing escape, or maintaining courtroom decorum",
"sentence": "See Deck, 544 U.S. at 628, 125 S.Ct. at 2012 (stating that an essential state interest may i... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "158 F.3d 1225, 1225",
"parenthetical": "\"Courtroom security is a competing interest that may, at times, 'outweigh[] a defendant's right to stand trial before the jury untainted by physical reminders of his status as an accused.'\" (alteration in original",
"sentence": "Se... | 4,194,922 | a |
Rather, we find that the district judge's evaluation of this ease supported employing physical restraints to further an essential state interest. Notably, the district judge identified this interest on the record at both the March 27, 2012, status conference and the jury-selection proceeding, explaining that the measur... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "158 F.3d 1225, 1225",
"parenthetical": "\"Courtroom security is a competing interest that may, at times, 'outweigh[] a defendant's right to stand trial before the jury untainted by physical reminders of his status as an accused.'\" (alteration in original",
"sentence": "Se... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "125 S.Ct. 2012, 2012",
"parenthetical": "stating that an essential state interest may include ensuring physical security, preventing escape, or maintaining courtroom decorum",
"sentence": "See Deck, 544 U.S. at 628, 125 S.Ct. at 2012 (stating that an essential state interest ma... | 4,194,922 | b |
Whether a debtor may reopen a closed bankruptcy ease when the prejudice to a creditor is cured has been handled on a case by case basis. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "64 B.R. 402, 404",
"parenthetical": "debtor may reopen case as long as creditor is reimbursed for expenses incurred to enforce liens",
"sentence": "See In re Parker, 64 B.R. 402, 404 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1986) (debtor may reopen case as long as creditor is reimbursed for expenses inc... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "4 F.3d 528, 528",
"parenthetical": "court refused to reopen case when case had been closed for two years and creditor had incurred expenses to revive its judgment",
"sentence": "See In re Parker, 64 B.R. 402, 404 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1986) (debtor may reopen case as long as credi... | 6,103,748 | a |
Whether a debtor may reopen a closed bankruptcy ease when the prejudice to a creditor is cured has been handled on a case by case basis. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "64 B.R. 402, 404",
"parenthetical": "debtor may reopen case as long as creditor is reimbursed for expenses incurred to enforce liens",
"sentence": "See In re Parker, 64 B.R. 402, 404 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1986) (debtor may reopen case as long as creditor is reimbursed for expenses inc... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "court refused to reopen case as eight months had elapsed since it was closed and creditor incurred court costs and attorney fees in commencing foreclosure",
"sentence": "See In re Parker, 64 B.R. 402, 404 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1986) (debtor may reopen case a... | 6,103,748 | a |
P79 If, conversely, the direct liability claims against the cab company are dismissed and those claims are permitted to "collapse into" the claims against the driver, then it appeal's that the jury would effectively weigh only Ferrer's fault, on the one hand, and the driver's fault, on the other. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that in the context of imputed or vicarious liability, \"negligence of two or more tortfeasors is treated as a unit, so that so far as the comparative negligence doctrine is concerned it is the same as if only one defendant is involved\"",
"se... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "762 P.2d 133, 139-40",
"parenthetical": "noting that the doctrine of vicarious liability stems from considerations other than the defendant's individual fault and thus rejecting a rule of imputed comparative negligence",
"sentence": "See Watson v. Reg'l Transp. Dist., 762 P.2d ... | 12,341,096 | b |
This does not mean, however, that the HCT Release has no force and effect if the Mitchells characterize an inherent risk of snowmobiling as a negligence claim. It will be for a jury to decide whether the collision occurred because of the inherent risks of snowmobiling or whether it was caused by negligence, including M... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[P]roximate cause is a question of fact for the finder of fact to determine.\"",
"sentence": "See Wells v. Vill. of Orleans, Inc., 132 Vt. 216, 315 A.2d 463, 467 (1974) (“[P]roximate cause is a question of fact for the finder of fact to determine.”); se... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "ruling that what constitutes an \"obvious or necessary risk\" of a sport covered by Vermont's sports injury statute, is a question of fact to be decided by a jury",
"sentence": "See Wells v. Vill. of Orleans, Inc., 132 Vt. 216, 315 A.2d 463, 467 (197... | 4,284,065 | a |
This does not mean, however, that the HCT Release has no force and effect if the Mitchells characterize an inherent risk of snowmobiling as a negligence claim. It will be for a jury to decide whether the collision occurred because of the inherent risks of snowmobiling or whether it was caused by negligence, including M... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "641 A.2d 765, 771",
"parenthetical": "ruling that what constitutes an \"obvious or necessary risk\" of a sport covered by Vermont's sports injury statute, is a question of fact to be decided by a jury",
"sentence": "See Wells v. Vill. of Orleans, Inc., 132 Vt. 216, 315 A.2... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[P]roximate cause is a question of fact for the finder of fact to determine.\"",
"sentence": "See Wells v. Vill. of Orleans, Inc., 132 Vt. 216, 315 A.2d 463, 467 (1974) (“[P]roximate cause is a question of fact for the finder of fact to determine.”); se... | 4,284,065 | b |
This does not mean, however, that the HCT Release has no force and effect if the Mitchells characterize an inherent risk of snowmobiling as a negligence claim. It will be for a jury to decide whether the collision occurred because of the inherent risks of snowmobiling or whether it was caused by negligence, including M... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[P]roximate cause is a question of fact for the finder of fact to determine.\"",
"sentence": "See Wells v. Vill. of Orleans, Inc., 132 Vt. 216, 315 A.2d 463, 467 (1974) (“[P]roximate cause is a question of fact for the finder of fact to determine.”); se... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "818 F.Supp. 80, 83",
"parenthetical": "\"The question of what dangers are obvious and necessary and therefore inhere in a sport is generally one for a jury to decide.\"",
"sentence": "See Wells v. Vill. of Orleans, Inc., 132 Vt. 216, 315 A.2d 463, 467 (1974) (“[P]roximate ... | 4,284,065 | a |
This does not mean, however, that the HCT Release has no force and effect if the Mitchells characterize an inherent risk of snowmobiling as a negligence claim. It will be for a jury to decide whether the collision occurred because of the inherent risks of snowmobiling or whether it was caused by negligence, including M... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "315 A.2d 463, 467",
"parenthetical": "\"[P]roximate cause is a question of fact for the finder of fact to determine.\"",
"sentence": "See Wells v. Vill. of Orleans, Inc., 132 Vt. 216, 315 A.2d 463, 467 (1974) (“[P]roximate cause is a question of fact for the finder of fact to d... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "ruling that what constitutes an \"obvious or necessary risk\" of a sport covered by Vermont's sports injury statute, is a question of fact to be decided by a jury",
"sentence": "See Wells v. Vill. of Orleans, Inc., 132 Vt. 216, 315 A.2d 463, 467 (197... | 4,284,065 | a |
This does not mean, however, that the HCT Release has no force and effect if the Mitchells characterize an inherent risk of snowmobiling as a negligence claim. It will be for a jury to decide whether the collision occurred because of the inherent risks of snowmobiling or whether it was caused by negligence, including M... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "315 A.2d 463, 467",
"parenthetical": "\"[P]roximate cause is a question of fact for the finder of fact to determine.\"",
"sentence": "See Wells v. Vill. of Orleans, Inc., 132 Vt. 216, 315 A.2d 463, 467 (1974) (“[P]roximate cause is a question of fact for the finder of fact to d... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "641 A.2d 765, 771",
"parenthetical": "ruling that what constitutes an \"obvious or necessary risk\" of a sport covered by Vermont's sports injury statute, is a question of fact to be decided by a jury",
"sentence": "See Wells v. Vill. of Orleans, Inc., 132 Vt. 216, 315 A.2... | 4,284,065 | a |
This does not mean, however, that the HCT Release has no force and effect if the Mitchells characterize an inherent risk of snowmobiling as a negligence claim. It will be for a jury to decide whether the collision occurred because of the inherent risks of snowmobiling or whether it was caused by negligence, including M... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "315 A.2d 463, 467",
"parenthetical": "\"[P]roximate cause is a question of fact for the finder of fact to determine.\"",
"sentence": "See Wells v. Vill. of Orleans, Inc., 132 Vt. 216, 315 A.2d 463, 467 (1974) (“[P]roximate cause is a question of fact for the finder of fact to d... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "818 F.Supp. 80, 83",
"parenthetical": "\"The question of what dangers are obvious and necessary and therefore inhere in a sport is generally one for a jury to decide.\"",
"sentence": "See Wells v. Vill. of Orleans, Inc., 132 Vt. 216, 315 A.2d 463, 467 (1974) (“[P]roximate ... | 4,284,065 | a |
Contrary to appellant's assertions, there is no requirement that an affidavit in support of an arrest warrant supply the probable cause. That some of the information reflected in the affidavits may have been based on hearsay statements given to officers during their investigation does not render the affidavits invalid. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "287 Ga. 770, 773",
"parenthetical": "rejecting claim that arrest warrant was illegal because supporting affidavit contained inaccurate and incomplete information where evidence did \"not suggest an intentional or reckless falsehood on the part of the affiant and was not nece... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "224 Ga. 859, 864-865",
"parenthetical": "finding it well settled that probable cause to arrest may be established by hearsay evidence",
"sentence": "See Jones v. United States, 362 U. S. 257, 271 (80 SCt 725, 4 LE2d 697) (1960) (fact that affidavit submitted in support of searc... | 6,780,987 | b |
See McAllister, 29 F.3d at 118A-85 ("[W]hile interpreting federal statutes is a question of federal law, Congress can make the meaning of a statute dependent on state law."). The decisions in Dickerson and Bustamante still stand for the proposition that, absent legislative indication to the contrary, the meaning of "co... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "998 F.2d 231, 236",
"parenthetical": "\"[Dickerson ] still stands for the general proposition that federal law governs the application of Congressional statutes in the absence of a plain language to the contrary.\"",
"sentence": "See Yanez-Popp v. INS, 998 F.2d 231, 236 (4th Ci... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "29 F.3d 1185, 1185",
"parenthetical": "treating Dickerson as still authoritative, outside context of gun laws, for principle that guilty plea plus probation equals conviction under federal law",
"sentence": "See Yanez-Popp v. INS, 998 F.2d 231, 236 (4th Cir.1993) (“[Dickerson ]... | 748 | a |
Therefore, Harris contends, the case must be remanded for the district court to make this Rule 403 determination. We disagree. Under the circumstances, the interest in judicial economy, combined with the fact that this is not a close question, lead us to conduct the Rule 403 balancing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "612 F.2d 73, 80",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e have viewed the evidence ... with our own eyes, and can judge the likely prejudice resulting from it as well as the trial judge.\"",
"sentence": "See US v. Schiff, 612 F.2d 73, 80 (2d Cir.1979) (“[W]e have viewed the evidence ... with ... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e must make this determination in the first instance as the district court record is devoid of any references to a Rule 403 analysis.\"",
"sentence": "See US v. Schiff, 612 F.2d 73, 80 (2d Cir.1979) (“[W]e have viewed the evidence ... with our own ey... | 5,238,416 | a |
Concerns as to whether a proposed plan is abusive of the bankruptcy process can be addressed through the good faith requirement of SS 1129(a)(3). Kenneth N. Klee, Adjusting Chapter 11: Fine Tuning the Plan Process (hereafter "Adjusting Chapter 11 ") 69 Am. Bankr. L.J. 551, 562-63 (Fall, 1995); Markell, Clueless, 11 Ban... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "485 U.S. 197, 206",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"whatever equitable powers remain in the bankruptcy courts must and can only be exercised within the confines of the Bankruptcy Code\"",
"sentence": "See ZRM-Oklahoma, 156 B.R. at 71 (observing that concerns expressed by ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "156 B.R. 71, 71",
"parenthetical": "observing that concerns expressed by Greystone III and its progeny are adequately addressed through other provisions of the Code such as SSSS 1129(a",
"sentence": "See ZRM-Oklahoma, 156 B.R. at 71 (observing that concerns expressed by Greysto... | 11,490,566 | b |
Concerns as to whether a proposed plan is abusive of the bankruptcy process can be addressed through the good faith requirement of SS 1129(a)(3). Kenneth N. Klee, Adjusting Chapter 11: Fine Tuning the Plan Process (hereafter "Adjusting Chapter 11 ") 69 Am. Bankr. L.J. 551, 562-63 (Fall, 1995); Markell, Clueless, 11 Ban... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "156 B.R. 71, 71",
"parenthetical": "observing that concerns expressed by Greystone III and its progeny are adequately addressed through other provisions of the Code such as SSSS 1129(a",
"sentence": "See ZRM-Oklahoma, 156 B.R. at 71 (observing that concerns expressed by Greysto... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that \"whatever equitable powers remain in the bankruptcy courts must and can only be exercised within the confines of the Bankruptcy Code\"",
"sentence": "See ZRM-Oklahoma, 156 B.R. at 71 (observing that concerns expressed by Greystone III a... | 11,490,566 | a |
Concerns as to whether a proposed plan is abusive of the bankruptcy process can be addressed through the good faith requirement of SS 1129(a)(3). Kenneth N. Klee, Adjusting Chapter 11: Fine Tuning the Plan Process (hereafter "Adjusting Chapter 11 ") 69 Am. Bankr. L.J. 551, 562-63 (Fall, 1995); Markell, Clueless, 11 Ban... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that \"whatever equitable powers remain in the bankruptcy courts must and can only be exercised within the confines of the Bankruptcy Code\"",
"sentence": "See ZRM-Oklahoma, 156 B.R. at 71 (observing that concerns expressed by Greystone III a... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "156 B.R. 71, 71",
"parenthetical": "observing that concerns expressed by Greystone III and its progeny are adequately addressed through other provisions of the Code such as SSSS 1129(a",
"sentence": "See ZRM-Oklahoma, 156 B.R. at 71 (observing that concerns expressed by Greysto... | 11,490,566 | b |
In the absence of any physical evidence to determine the medical effects of the accident on Mr. Parra, his list of illnesses is too long to attribute causation to the accident. To support her case for benefits, it is the plaintiffs burden to establish that the accident caused her husband's death, or at least was an ext... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "198 F.Supp.2d 1157, 1162",
"parenthetical": "defining \"accidental death\" as caused by some event or occurrence unforeseen and external to the deceased that is the proximate or sole cause of death",
"sentence": "See Ells, 20 Cal.2d at 304, 125 P.2d 457 (holding that the b... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "27 Cal.2d 309, 309-10",
"parenthetical": "finding a preexisting illness is no bar to recovery if it sets in motion a chain of events resulting in death",
"sentence": "See Ells, 20 Cal.2d at 304, 125 P.2d 457 (holding that the burden is on the plaintiff); see Brooks, 27 Cal.2d a... | 9,123,645 | b |
In the absence of any physical evidence to determine the medical effects of the accident on Mr. Parra, his list of illnesses is too long to attribute causation to the accident. To support her case for benefits, it is the plaintiffs burden to establish that the accident caused her husband's death, or at least was an ext... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding a preexisting illness is no bar to recovery if it sets in motion a chain of events resulting in death",
"sentence": "See Ells, 20 Cal.2d at 304, 125 P.2d 457 (holding that the burden is on the plaintiff); see Brooks, 27 Cal.2d at 309-10, 163 P.2d ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "198 F.Supp.2d 1157, 1162",
"parenthetical": "defining \"accidental death\" as caused by some event or occurrence unforeseen and external to the deceased that is the proximate or sole cause of death",
"sentence": "See Ells, 20 Cal.2d at 304, 125 P.2d 457 (holding that the b... | 9,123,645 | a |
Once we conclude (as we must here) that the employer's asserted reason for the decision involves legislative activity protected by the Speech or Debate Clause, I believe (unlike the majority opinion) that the case must come to an end. I do not see how a plaintiff employee such as Howard can attempt to prove either that... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "971 F.2d 1531, 1546",
"parenthetical": "permissive inference violated Speech or Debate Clause where it \"virtually compelled] Swindall to justify his legislative actions\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Rostenkowski, 59 F.3d 1291, 1303 (D.C.Cir.1995) (distinguishing v... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "59 F.3d 1291, 1303",
"parenthetical": "distinguishing voluntary production of protected evidence from production that \"is necessary\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Rostenkowski, 59 F.3d 1291, 1303 (D.C.Cir.1995) (distinguishing voluntary production of protected evidence ... | 3,664,820 | b |
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it found that the Commission could not prove its case as pleaded. As the Supreme Court explained in Christiansburg, a prevailing defendant in a Title VII action may be awarded attorney fees if the plaintiffs claim was "frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or ... t... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "189 Fed.Appx. 106, 111",
"parenthetical": "requiring in an ADEA case that the plaintiffs plead a specific employment practice to be challenged when alleging a disparate-impact claim",
"sentence": "See Johnson, 30 F.3d at 48; see also Josey v. John R. Hollingsworth Corp., 996 F.... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2002 WL 1315596, at *2",
"parenthetical": "\"Swierkiewicz does not, however, relieve plaintiff of the obligation to identify in his pleadings a specific employment practice that is the cause of the disparate impact.\"",
"sentence": "See Johnson, 30 F.3d at 48; see also Jos... | 3,710,562 | b |
. Plaintiff's argument regarding an alleged waiver of defendants' right to bring this motion is unavailing. Essentially, plaintiff urges this Court to consider defense counsel's representation to the Court during a pre-trial conference, that he would not bring this motion as a stumbling block to his right to bring the ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "204 F.3d 393, 397",
"parenthetical": "\"Although we have recognized that it is within the judge's discretion to hold a pre-motion conference for the purpose of persuading a party not to file a perceived meritless motion, we have made it clear that the judge may not require that t... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "825 F.2d 647, 652",
"parenthetical": "\"Absent extraordinary circumstances, ... a court has no power to prevent a party from filing pleadings, motions or appeals authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.\"",
"sentence": "See Eisemann v. Greene, 204 F.3d 393, 397 ... | 9,432,789 | a |
Plaintiff argues that the core function of the IRGC is commercial, and therefore it is merely an agency or instrumentality of the state and is subject to punitive damages. In previous actions, this Court has repeatedly declined to award punitive damages against the IRGC finding that, under Roeder, the IRGC is governmen... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "466 F.Supp.2d 270, 270-71",
"parenthetical": "concluding that there was insufficient evidence to determine that the IRGC is commercial",
"sentence": "See Heiser, 466 F.Supp.2d at 270-71 (concluding that there was insufficient evidence to determine that the IRGC is commercial); ... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "530 F.Supp.2d 40, 46",
"parenthetical": "awarding punitive damages against the IRGC in the amount of $400 million",
"sentence": "See Heiser, 466 F.Supp.2d at 270-71 (concluding that there was insufficient evidence to determine that the IRGC is commercial); Blais, 459 F.Supp... | 3,834,803 | a |
Plaintiff argues that the core function of the IRGC is commercial, and therefore it is merely an agency or instrumentality of the state and is subject to punitive damages. In previous actions, this Court has repeatedly declined to award punitive damages against the IRGC finding that, under Roeder, the IRGC is governmen... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "530 F.Supp.2d 40, 46",
"parenthetical": "awarding punitive damages against the IRGC in the amount of $400 million",
"sentence": "See Heiser, 466 F.Supp.2d at 270-71 (concluding that there was insufficient evidence to determine that the IRGC is commercial); Blais, 459 F.Supp... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "421 F.Supp.2d 152, 162",
"parenthetical": "finding no evidence that the IRGC's functions are commercial rather than governmental",
"sentence": "See Heiser, 466 F.Supp.2d at 270-71 (concluding that there was insufficient evidence to determine that the IRGC is commercial); Blais,... | 3,834,803 | b |
Plaintiff argues that the core function of the IRGC is commercial, and therefore it is merely an agency or instrumentality of the state and is subject to punitive damages. In previous actions, this Court has repeatedly declined to award punitive damages against the IRGC finding that, under Roeder, the IRGC is governmen... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "496 F.Supp.2d 1, 32-33",
"parenthetical": "declining to award punitive damages but acknowledging that the IRGC \"appears to be a true 'instrumentality' of the dominant party of the state, used by the government and its officials in largely 'illegal,' paramilitary, and sub rosa ac... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "530 F.Supp.2d 40, 46",
"parenthetical": "awarding punitive damages against the IRGC in the amount of $400 million",
"sentence": "See Heiser, 466 F.Supp.2d at 270-71 (concluding that there was insufficient evidence to determine that the IRGC is commercial); Blais, 459 F.Supp... | 3,834,803 | a |
Plaintiff argues that the core function of the IRGC is commercial, and therefore it is merely an agency or instrumentality of the state and is subject to punitive damages. In previous actions, this Court has repeatedly declined to award punitive damages against the IRGC finding that, under Roeder, the IRGC is governmen... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "370 F.Supp.2d 105, 116",
"parenthetical": "recognizing that \"the IRGC does not easily fit into Roeder's dichotomy\" but determining that the IRGC is more like an \"armed force\" than a commercial agency or instrumentality of the state",
"sentence": "See Heiser, 466 F.Supp.2d a... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "530 F.Supp.2d 40, 46",
"parenthetical": "awarding punitive damages against the IRGC in the amount of $400 million",
"sentence": "See Heiser, 466 F.Supp.2d at 270-71 (concluding that there was insufficient evidence to determine that the IRGC is commercial); Blais, 459 F.Supp... | 3,834,803 | a |
The two defense experts essentially testified that the most logical theory was that Mansur stood as he was shot, with his right arm out of the way, as if he were reaching for something, but they agreed this was not the only theory that could explain the forensic evidence. Dr. MacDonell would have agreed that the defens... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "427 U.S. 97, 114",
"parenthetical": "noting that the alleged Brady material did not contradict any evidence already admitted and was similar to other evidence in the record in holding that there was no Brady violation",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gonzalez, 62 M.J. 3... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "62 M.J. 303, 307",
"parenthetical": "noting that the overlapping nature of the evidence undercuts an argument that the failure to disclose pursuant to Brady was prejudicial",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gonzalez, 62 M.J. 303, 307 (C.A.A.F.2006) (noting that the overlappin... | 3,982,978 | b |
The two defense experts essentially testified that the most logical theory was that Mansur stood as he was shot, with his right arm out of the way, as if he were reaching for something, but they agreed this was not the only theory that could explain the forensic evidence. Dr. MacDonell would have agreed that the defens... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that the alleged Brady material did not contradict any evidence already admitted and was similar to other evidence in the record in holding that there was no Brady violation",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gonzalez, 62 M.J. 303, 307 (C.A.A... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "62 M.J. 303, 307",
"parenthetical": "noting that the overlapping nature of the evidence undercuts an argument that the failure to disclose pursuant to Brady was prejudicial",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gonzalez, 62 M.J. 303, 307 (C.A.A.F.2006) (noting that the overlappin... | 3,982,978 | b |
The two defense experts essentially testified that the most logical theory was that Mansur stood as he was shot, with his right arm out of the way, as if he were reaching for something, but they agreed this was not the only theory that could explain the forensic evidence. Dr. MacDonell would have agreed that the defens... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that the alleged Brady material did not contradict any evidence already admitted and was similar to other evidence in the record in holding that there was no Brady violation",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gonzalez, 62 M.J. 303, 307 (C.A.A... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "62 M.J. 303, 307",
"parenthetical": "noting that the overlapping nature of the evidence undercuts an argument that the failure to disclose pursuant to Brady was prejudicial",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gonzalez, 62 M.J. 303, 307 (C.A.A.F.2006) (noting that the overlappin... | 3,982,978 | b |
The district court properly granted summary judgment because the complaint, filed more than eleven years after St. Amand's claims accrued, was barred by the applicable one-year statute of limitations, and St. Amand failed to establish circumstances warranting equitable tolling. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "292 F.3d 1063, 1066",
"parenthetical": "equitable tolling is unavailable in most cases and is appropriate only if there are extraordinary circumstances beyond a plaintiffs control making it impossible to timely file",
"sentence": "See Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "393 F.3d 918, 927",
"parenthetical": "for SS 1983 actions, \"courts apply the forum state's statute of limitations for personal injury actions, along with the forum state's law regarding tolling\"",
"sentence": "See Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir.2004) (for § 1983 ... | 3,942,130 | b |
The district court properly granted summary judgment because the complaint, filed more than eleven years after St. Amand's claims accrued, was barred by the applicable one-year statute of limitations, and St. Amand failed to establish circumstances warranting equitable tolling. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "California personal injury statute of limitations is applicable to ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims",
"sentence": "See Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir.2004) (for § 1983 actions, “courts apply the forum state’s statute of limitations for perso... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "292 F.3d 1063, 1066",
"parenthetical": "equitable tolling is unavailable in most cases and is appropriate only if there are extraordinary circumstances beyond a plaintiffs control making it impossible to timely file",
"sentence": "See Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir... | 3,942,130 | a |
All three individuals timely filed their own administrative charges, and in this lawsuit are pressing claims brought in those charges. It follows that Dancy, Shumaker, and Russell may not rely on McQueen's charge or any of its claims, including the disparate impact claim, in an effort to satisfy the exhaustion requirem... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "440 F.3d 564, 564-65",
"parenthetical": "\"allowing an individual who has previously filed a charge to abandon that charge and piggyback onto the charge of another individual would too often frustrate the EEOC's statutorily-mandated efforts to resolve an individual charge through... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "163 F.Supp.2d 19, 25",
"parenthetical": "\"The single-file rule allows an individual plaintiff, who has not filed an EEOC charge, to satisfy the administrative exhaustion requirements under Title VII by relying on a charge filed by another plaintiff.\"",
"sentence": "See H... | 4,162,707 | a |
All three individuals timely filed their own administrative charges, and in this lawsuit are pressing claims brought in those charges. It follows that Dancy, Shumaker, and Russell may not rely on McQueen's charge or any of its claims, including the disparate impact claim, in an effort to satisfy the exhaustion requirem... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "163 F.Supp.2d 19, 25",
"parenthetical": "\"The single-file rule allows an individual plaintiff, who has not filed an EEOC charge, to satisfy the administrative exhaustion requirements under Title VII by relying on a charge filed by another plaintiff.\"",
"sentence": "See H... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "129 F.3d 554, 558",
"parenthetical": "\"such a plaintiff should be required to rely upon his or her own ... charge, and cannot reasonably rely upon [an]other claimant's charge\"",
"sentence": "See Holowecki, 440 F.3d at 564-65 (“allowing an individual who has previously filed a... | 4,162,707 | b |
All three individuals timely filed their own administrative charges, and in this lawsuit are pressing claims brought in those charges. It follows that Dancy, Shumaker, and Russell may not rely on McQueen's charge or any of its claims, including the disparate impact claim, in an effort to satisfy the exhaustion requirem... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "47 F.3d 302, 309",
"parenthetical": "\"once they file separate administrative charges, they cannot rely any further on the other claimant's actions and must timely file suit after receiving their right-to-sue letters\"",
"sentence": "See Holowecki, 440 F.3d at 564-65 (“allowing... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "163 F.Supp.2d 19, 25",
"parenthetical": "\"The single-file rule allows an individual plaintiff, who has not filed an EEOC charge, to satisfy the administrative exhaustion requirements under Title VII by relying on a charge filed by another plaintiff.\"",
"sentence": "See H... | 4,162,707 | a |
All three individuals timely filed their own administrative charges, and in this lawsuit are pressing claims brought in those charges. It follows that Dancy, Shumaker, and Russell may not rely on McQueen's charge or any of its claims, including the disparate impact claim, in an effort to satisfy the exhaustion requirem... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "163 F.Supp.2d 19, 25",
"parenthetical": "\"The single-file rule allows an individual plaintiff, who has not filed an EEOC charge, to satisfy the administrative exhaustion requirements under Title VII by relying on a charge filed by another plaintiff.\"",
"sentence": "See H... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2004 WL 2314962, at *2",
"parenthetical": "single-filing rule \"implies that a plaintiff who does receive a right-to-sue letter may not enjoy the benefit of piggy-backing\"",
"sentence": "See Holowecki, 440 F.3d at 564-65 (“allowing an individual who has previously filed a char... | 4,162,707 | b |
For these reasons, the in camera evidence showed that the informant, as an eyewitness to the purchase, could potentially give testimony necessary to a fair determination of appellant's guilt or innocence, specifically, appellant's entrapment defense. See Tex.R. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "807 S.W.2d 318, 318-19",
"parenthetical": "holding trial court erred in not holding in camera hearing when defendant showed that he needed to know, for possible entrapment defense, whether informant was certain individual who had been in appellant's apartment on given day",
"se... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "817 S.W.2d 72, 72",
"parenthetical": "holding defendant met initial burden under rule 508(c)(2) because showed informant was eyewitness to crime",
"sentence": "Evid. 508(c)(2); Anderson, 817 S.W.2d at 72 (holding defendant met initial burden under rule 508(c)(2) because s... | 9,355,570 | b |
This statement is plainly insufficient to show substantial prejudice. Defendant offered no specific explanation as to what his testimony would have been in the case involving J.G., nor did he explain why he could not give this testimony at a joint trial. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] particularized showing must be made concerning the testimony the defendant wishes to give and his reasons for remaining silent on the joined counts, so that the court can make an independent evaluation of whether the defendant will be prejudiced ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "401 F.2d 977, 977",
"parenthetical": "\"[N]o need for a severance exists until the defendant makes a convincing showing that he has both important testimony to give concerning one count and strong need to refrain from testifying on the other.\"",
"sentence": "See id. (basing co... | 3,587,789 | b |
We doubt that Mills's sentence was imposed in a procedurally unreasonable manner. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The sentencing judge should set forth [reasoning] enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the parties' arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decision-making authority.\"",
"sentence": "See Rita v. United St... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "502 F.3d 204, 210",
"parenthetical": "stating that although \"[n]on-frivolous arguments for a non-Guidelines sentence\" may require some discussion, \"we do not insist that the district court address every argument the defendant has made or discuss every SS 3553(a",
"sente... | 3,664,999 | a |
We doubt that Mills's sentence was imposed in a procedurally unreasonable manner. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "502 F.3d 204, 210",
"parenthetical": "stating that although \"[n]on-frivolous arguments for a non-Guidelines sentence\" may require some discussion, \"we do not insist that the district court address every argument the defendant has made or discuss every SS 3553(a",
"sente... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "127 S.Ct. 2456, 2468",
"parenthetical": "\"The sentencing judge should set forth [reasoning] enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the parties' arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decision-making authority.\"",
"sentence": "See... | 3,664,999 | b |
We doubt that Mills's sentence was imposed in a procedurally unreasonable manner. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The sentencing judge should set forth [reasoning] enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the parties' arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decision-making authority.\"",
"sentence": "See Rita v. United St... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "502 F.3d 204, 210",
"parenthetical": "stating that although \"[n]on-frivolous arguments for a non-Guidelines sentence\" may require some discussion, \"we do not insist that the district court address every argument the defendant has made or discuss every SS 3553(a",
"sente... | 3,664,999 | a |
. Although the Armstrong and Bass Courts focused on similarly situated as part of the discriminatory effect analysis, evidence of differential treatment is also probative of discriminatory intent. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "730 F.3d 1142, 1158",
"parenthetical": "indicating that, in a civil case where discrimination is alleged, preferential treatment of a similarly situated person can be evidence of discriminatory intent",
"sentence": "See United States v. Smith, 231 F.3d 800, 809 (11th Cir.2000) ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "231 F.3d 800, 809",
"parenthetical": "\"recognizing] that the nature of the two prongs of a selective prosecution showing are such that they -will often overlap to some extent\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Smith, 231 F.3d 800, 809 (11th Cir.2000) (\"recognizing] that th... | 12,135,345 | b |
A statement in the WPEA's legislative history suggests that at least' some of its provisions could apply retroactively to cover appeals pending on or after the Act's effective date. That statement, however, is insufficient, standing alone, to override the unequivocal statutory language and demonstrate a "clear intent" ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "375 F.3d 1106, 1110",
"parenthetical": "\"The language of the statute at issue in- this case is clear and unambiguous, and absent extraordinary circumstances our inquiry must end here.\"",
"sentence": "Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 272-73, 114 S.Ct. 1483 (“Requiring clear intent a... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "511 U.S. 272, 272-73",
"parenthetical": "\"Requiring clear intent assures that Congress itself has affirmatively considered the potential unfair ness of retroactive application and determined that it is an acceptable price to pay for the countervailing benefits.\"",
"sent... | 4,254,509 | b |
A statement in the WPEA's legislative history suggests that at least' some of its provisions could apply retroactively to cover appeals pending on or after the Act's effective date. That statement, however, is insufficient, standing alone, to override the unequivocal statutory language and demonstrate a "clear intent" ... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Requiring clear intent assures that Congress itself has affirmatively considered the potential unfair ness of retroactive application and determined that it is an acceptable price to pay for the countervailing benefits.\"",
"sentence": "Landgraf, ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "375 F.3d 1106, 1110",
"parenthetical": "\"The language of the statute at issue in- this case is clear and unambiguous, and absent extraordinary circumstances our inquiry must end here.\"",
"sentence": "Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 272-73, 114 S.Ct. 1483 (“Requiring clear intent a... | 4,254,509 | a |
Although the prosecutor did improperly vouch for government witnesses by mentioning during rebuttal argument that the border patrol agents were "sworn to uphold the law," the district court immediately sustained the defense attorney's objection, and instructed the jury to disregard the comment, rendering any error harm... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "677 F.3d 944, 955",
"parenthetical": "holding that the district court's swift response instructing the jury to disregard the improper comment \"prevented ... [the] improper comment from materially affecting the verdict\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Dorsey, 677 F.3d 944,... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "462 F.3d 1124, 1136",
"parenthetical": "\"A judge's prompt corrective action in response to improper comments usually is sufficient to cure any problems arising from such improper comments....\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Dorsey, 677 F.3d 944, 955 (9th Cir.2012) (... | 4,229,433 | a |
The plaintiff has pled that Caremark is a "fiduciary" because "it exercises authority and control over Plan assets and when negotiating and/or collecting rebates, discounts, interest, fees, and other pricing mechanisms with or forms of compensation from entities dealing with the Plans." (Docket No. 44 P 21.) The plaint... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2005 WL 991897, at *8",
"parenthetical": "concluding, on a motion to dismiss in a factually similar case, that defendant pharmacy benefit managers were not ERISA fiduciaries",
"sentence": "Id. at ¶ 22. Because plaintiffs have alleged that Caremark, Inc. has wide discretion... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "409 F.3d 717, 717",
"parenthetical": "finding that, because plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that the defendant had discretion to grant or deny plaintiffs' claims, plaintiffs had adequately pled ERISA fiduciary status to survive a motion to dismiss",
"sentence": "Id.... | 8,930,033 | b |
Further, even assuming that there is some mandate requiring, generally, that waist chains be used for inmates such as Ashley, C. Warren is incorrect in arguing that the misapplication of the waist chain in this instance would open the BOP up to FTCA liability. The Court considers the application of restraints to be a d... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "499 U.S. 325, 325",
"parenthetical": "\"[I]f a regulation allows the employee discretion, the very existence of the regulation creates a strong presumption that a discretionary act authorized by the regulation involves consideration of the same polices which led to the promu... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "376 F.3d 1055, at 1060-61",
"parenthetical": "\"Rather, when the relevant law leaves room for officials to exercise policy-oriented discretion in a particu lar area, that discretion will be protected even with regard to what may seem to be details of implementation.\"",
"senten... | 12,275,050 | b |
Further, even assuming that there is some mandate requiring, generally, that waist chains be used for inmates such as Ashley, C. Warren is incorrect in arguing that the misapplication of the waist chain in this instance would open the BOP up to FTCA liability. The Court considers the application of restraints to be a d... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[I]f a regulation allows the employee discretion, the very existence of the regulation creates a strong presumption that a discretionary act authorized by the regulation involves consideration of the same polices which led to the promulgation of the ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "376 F.3d 1055, at 1060-61",
"parenthetical": "\"Rather, when the relevant law leaves room for officials to exercise policy-oriented discretion in a particu lar area, that discretion will be protected even with regard to what may seem to be details of implementation.\"",
"senten... | 12,275,050 | b |
Further, even assuming that there is some mandate requiring, generally, that waist chains be used for inmates such as Ashley, C. Warren is incorrect in arguing that the misapplication of the waist chain in this instance would open the BOP up to FTCA liability. The Court considers the application of restraints to be a d... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "151 F.3d 1344, 1344",
"parenthetical": "\"Deciding how to classify prisoners and choosing the institution in which to place them are part and parcel of the inherently policy-laden endeavor of maintaining order and preserving security within our nation's prisons.\"",
"sentence":... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "376 F.3d 1055, at 1060-61",
"parenthetical": "\"Rather, when the relevant law leaves room for officials to exercise policy-oriented discretion in a particu lar area, that discretion will be protected even with regard to what may seem to be details of implementation.\"",
"senten... | 12,275,050 | b |
Further, even assuming that there is some mandate requiring, generally, that waist chains be used for inmates such as Ashley, C. Warren is incorrect in arguing that the misapplication of the waist chain in this instance would open the BOP up to FTCA liability. The Court considers the application of restraints to be a d... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "499 U.S. 325, 325",
"parenthetical": "\"[I]f a regulation allows the employee discretion, the very existence of the regulation creates a strong presumption that a discretionary act authorized by the regulation involves consideration of the same polices which led to the promu... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "151 F.3d 1344, 1344",
"parenthetical": "\"Deciding how to classify prisoners and choosing the institution in which to place them are part and parcel of the inherently policy-laden endeavor of maintaining order and preserving security within our nation's prisons.\"",
"sentence":... | 12,275,050 | a |
Further, even assuming that there is some mandate requiring, generally, that waist chains be used for inmates such as Ashley, C. Warren is incorrect in arguing that the misapplication of the waist chain in this instance would open the BOP up to FTCA liability. The Court considers the application of restraints to be a d... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "151 F.3d 1344, 1344",
"parenthetical": "\"Deciding how to classify prisoners and choosing the institution in which to place them are part and parcel of the inherently policy-laden endeavor of maintaining order and preserving security within our nation's prisons.\"",
"sentence":... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[I]f a regulation allows the employee discretion, the very existence of the regulation creates a strong presumption that a discretionary act authorized by the regulation involves consideration of the same polices which led to the promulgation of the ... | 12,275,050 | b |
Permitting material not required by the constitution or statutes arguably opens "the process to misleading information and even to mudslinging and partisan tactics." See also Columbia River Salmon & Tuna Pack. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "1 Cal.2d 468, 472",
"parenthetical": "short title made no reference whatsoever to a tax, even though the sole purpose of the measure was to raise revenue for government",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Boyd v. Jordan, 1 Cal.2d 468, 472, 35 P.2d 533, 534 (1934) (short title made no ref... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "232 Or. 230, 233",
"parenthetical": "encouraging petitioners to masquerade under misleading captions opens the initiative process to abuse",
"sentence": "Ass’n v. Appling, 232 Or. 230, 233, 375 P.2d 71, 72 (1962) (encouraging petitioners to masquerade under misleading cap... | 1,459,030 | b |
Permitting material not required by the constitution or statutes arguably opens "the process to misleading information and even to mudslinging and partisan tactics." See also Columbia River Salmon & Tuna Pack. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "232 Or. 230, 233",
"parenthetical": "encouraging petitioners to masquerade under misleading captions opens the initiative process to abuse",
"sentence": "Ass’n v. Appling, 232 Or. 230, 233, 375 P.2d 71, 72 (1962) (encouraging petitioners to masquerade under misleading cap... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "35 P.2d 533, 534",
"parenthetical": "short title made no reference whatsoever to a tax, even though the sole purpose of the measure was to raise revenue for government",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Boyd v. Jordan, 1 Cal.2d 468, 472, 35 P.2d 533, 534 (1934) (short title made no refe... | 1,459,030 | a |
Permitting material not required by the constitution or statutes arguably opens "the process to misleading information and even to mudslinging and partisan tactics." See also Columbia River Salmon & Tuna Pack. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "232 Or. 232, 232",
"parenthetical": "ballot title invited voters to restrict commercial fishing for steelhead, when in fact the measure would ban all fishing on the Columbia River",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Boyd v. Jordan, 1 Cal.2d 468, 472, 35 P.2d 533, 534 (1934) (short title ... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "232 Or. 230, 233",
"parenthetical": "encouraging petitioners to masquerade under misleading captions opens the initiative process to abuse",
"sentence": "Ass’n v. Appling, 232 Or. 230, 233, 375 P.2d 71, 72 (1962) (encouraging petitioners to masquerade under misleading cap... | 1,459,030 | b |
Permitting material not required by the constitution or statutes arguably opens "the process to misleading information and even to mudslinging and partisan tactics." See also Columbia River Salmon & Tuna Pack. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "232 Or. 230, 233",
"parenthetical": "encouraging petitioners to masquerade under misleading captions opens the initiative process to abuse",
"sentence": "Ass’n v. Appling, 232 Or. 230, 233, 375 P.2d 71, 72 (1962) (encouraging petitioners to masquerade under misleading cap... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "375 P.2d 72, 72",
"parenthetical": "ballot title invited voters to restrict commercial fishing for steelhead, when in fact the measure would ban all fishing on the Columbia River",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Boyd v. Jordan, 1 Cal.2d 468, 472, 35 P.2d 533, 534 (1934) (short title m... | 1,459,030 | a |
Permitting material not required by the constitution or statutes arguably opens "the process to misleading information and even to mudslinging and partisan tactics." See also Columbia River Salmon & Tuna Pack. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "375 P.2d 71, 72",
"parenthetical": "encouraging petitioners to masquerade under misleading captions opens the initiative process to abuse",
"sentence": "Ass’n v. Appling, 232 Or. 230, 233, 375 P.2d 71, 72 (1962) (encouraging petitioners to masquerade under misleading capt... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "1 Cal.2d 468, 472",
"parenthetical": "short title made no reference whatsoever to a tax, even though the sole purpose of the measure was to raise revenue for government",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Boyd v. Jordan, 1 Cal.2d 468, 472, 35 P.2d 533, 534 (1934) (short title made no ref... | 1,459,030 | a |
Permitting material not required by the constitution or statutes arguably opens "the process to misleading information and even to mudslinging and partisan tactics." See also Columbia River Salmon & Tuna Pack. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "35 P.2d 533, 534",
"parenthetical": "short title made no reference whatsoever to a tax, even though the sole purpose of the measure was to raise revenue for government",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Boyd v. Jordan, 1 Cal.2d 468, 472, 35 P.2d 533, 534 (1934) (short title made no refe... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "375 P.2d 71, 72",
"parenthetical": "encouraging petitioners to masquerade under misleading captions opens the initiative process to abuse",
"sentence": "Ass’n v. Appling, 232 Or. 230, 233, 375 P.2d 71, 72 (1962) (encouraging petitioners to masquerade under misleading capt... | 1,459,030 | b |
Permitting material not required by the constitution or statutes arguably opens "the process to misleading information and even to mudslinging and partisan tactics." See also Columbia River Salmon & Tuna Pack. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "232 Or. 232, 232",
"parenthetical": "ballot title invited voters to restrict commercial fishing for steelhead, when in fact the measure would ban all fishing on the Columbia River",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Boyd v. Jordan, 1 Cal.2d 468, 472, 35 P.2d 533, 534 (1934) (short title ... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "375 P.2d 71, 72",
"parenthetical": "encouraging petitioners to masquerade under misleading captions opens the initiative process to abuse",
"sentence": "Ass’n v. Appling, 232 Or. 230, 233, 375 P.2d 71, 72 (1962) (encouraging petitioners to masquerade under misleading capt... | 1,459,030 | b |
Permitting material not required by the constitution or statutes arguably opens "the process to misleading information and even to mudslinging and partisan tactics." See also Columbia River Salmon & Tuna Pack. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "375 P.2d 71, 72",
"parenthetical": "encouraging petitioners to masquerade under misleading captions opens the initiative process to abuse",
"sentence": "Ass’n v. Appling, 232 Or. 230, 233, 375 P.2d 71, 72 (1962) (encouraging petitioners to masquerade under misleading capt... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "375 P.2d 72, 72",
"parenthetical": "ballot title invited voters to restrict commercial fishing for steelhead, when in fact the measure would ban all fishing on the Columbia River",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Boyd v. Jordan, 1 Cal.2d 468, 472, 35 P.2d 533, 534 (1934) (short title m... | 1,459,030 | a |
The Court notes that an appellant who feels that the deferral of a decision in his claim was not appropriate or has delayed a final decision unreasonably is not without recourse. The appropriate action would be to file a petition with the Court challenging the Secretary's delay. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "20 Vet.App. 52, 56-57",
"parenthetical": "noting that a claimant may file a petition if Secretary refuses to process a pending claim",
"sentence": "Cf. DiCarlo v. Nicholson, 20 Vet.App. 52, 56-57 (2006) (noting that a claimant may file a petition if Secretary refuses to process... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "542 U.S. 367, 380-81",
"parenthetical": "cautioning that a petition for extraordinary relief may only be granted where: (1",
"sentence": "Cf. DiCarlo v. Nicholson, 20 Vet.App. 52, 56-57 (2006) (noting that a claimant may file a petition if Secretary refuses to process a pen... | 4,152,772 | a |
The Court notes that an appellant who feels that the deferral of a decision in his claim was not appropriate or has delayed a final decision unreasonably is not without recourse. The appropriate action would be to file a petition with the Court challenging the Secretary's delay. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "20 Vet.App. 52, 56-57",
"parenthetical": "noting that a claimant may file a petition if Secretary refuses to process a pending claim",
"sentence": "Cf. DiCarlo v. Nicholson, 20 Vet.App. 52, 56-57 (2006) (noting that a claimant may file a petition if Secretary refuses to process... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "cautioning that a petition for extraordinary relief may only be granted where: (1",
"sentence": "Cf. DiCarlo v. Nicholson, 20 Vet.App. 52, 56-57 (2006) (noting that a claimant may file a petition if Secretary refuses to process a pending claim); but s... | 4,152,772 | a |
The Court notes that an appellant who feels that the deferral of a decision in his claim was not appropriate or has delayed a final decision unreasonably is not without recourse. The appropriate action would be to file a petition with the Court challenging the Secretary's delay. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "20 Vet.App. 52, 56-57",
"parenthetical": "noting that a claimant may file a petition if Secretary refuses to process a pending claim",
"sentence": "Cf. DiCarlo v. Nicholson, 20 Vet.App. 52, 56-57 (2006) (noting that a claimant may file a petition if Secretary refuses to process... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "cautioning that a petition for extraordinary relief may only be granted where: (1",
"sentence": "Cf. DiCarlo v. Nicholson, 20 Vet.App. 52, 56-57 (2006) (noting that a claimant may file a petition if Secretary refuses to process a pending claim); but s... | 4,152,772 | a |
To the extent that Dorman bases its defamation claim on statements made by Dayco that assert or imply only that Dorman's products are inferior, it has failed to state a cause of action. Allegations that another company's products are inferior are "par for the course" in business and are "the most innocuous kind of puff... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "170 Cal.App.3d 543, 550",
"parenthetical": "\"[F]alse statements simply indicating that plaintiffs business goods were of inferior quality ... do not accuse plaintiff of dishonesty, lack of integrity or incompetence nor even imply any reprehensible personal characteristic, a... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "898 F.2d 925, 925",
"parenthetical": "statement by Blue Cross-Blue Shield asserting that personal choice insurance was \"Better than HMO\" not actionable as defamation claim by U.S. Healthcare, a leading provider of HMOs",
"sentence": "U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 898 F.2d at 9... | 4,262,487 | b |
To the extent that Dorman bases its defamation claim on statements made by Dayco that assert or imply only that Dorman's products are inferior, it has failed to state a cause of action. Allegations that another company's products are inferior are "par for the course" in business and are "the most innocuous kind of puff... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "898 F.2d 925, 925",
"parenthetical": "statement by Blue Cross-Blue Shield asserting that personal choice insurance was \"Better than HMO\" not actionable as defamation claim by U.S. Healthcare, a leading provider of HMOs",
"sentence": "U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 898 F.2d at 9... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[F]alse statements simply indicating that plaintiffs business goods were of inferior quality ... do not accuse plaintiff of dishonesty, lack of integrity or incompetence nor even imply any reprehensible personal characteristic, and are therefore not ... | 4,262,487 | a |
Finally, the close proximity in both time and location between the crime and the Show-up here helped ensure its reliability. The fact that the Show-up took place approximately four blocks away from the crime, and within thirty to forty-five minutes of the event, mitigated any potential prejudice that might have resulte... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "496 F.Supp. 804, 809",
"parenthetical": "\"Such promptness of identification is recognized to be a powerful sign of its trustworthiness, for it suggests that the identification was based on a fresh mental picture of the criminal's features.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., John... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "455 F.2d 716, 716",
"parenthetical": "holding show-up to be reasonable because \"[w]hen the two suspects were brought to [be seen by the identifier], only 30 minutes had elapsed since [the identifier had] reported the crime.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Johnson v. Gilmore, 940 F... | 9,341,599 | b |
Surely, the concept cannot place on the allegedly aggrieved party the burden of demonstrating that the trier of fact would certainly have come to a different conclusion had the evidence been before it. We have also said that the exclusion of particular evidence would not require a new trial where, analyzing the facts, ... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "386 Mass. 88, 94",
"parenthetical": "the erroneous exclusion of evidence requires a new trial \"unless it can be seen that, even if it had been admitted and believed, still the verdict\" would have been the same",
"sentence": "Drake v. Goodman, 386 Mass. 88, 94 (1982). Se... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "315 Mass. 59, 65",
"parenthetical": "party showing error in exclusion of evidence must also show \"reasonable probability of harm\"",
"sentence": "But see Bendett v. Bendett, 315 Mass. 59, 65 (1943) (party showing error in exclusion of evidence must also show “reasonable pr... | 484,755 | a |
Surely, the concept cannot place on the allegedly aggrieved party the burden of demonstrating that the trier of fact would certainly have come to a different conclusion had the evidence been before it. We have also said that the exclusion of particular evidence would not require a new trial where, analyzing the facts, ... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "315 Mass. 59, 65",
"parenthetical": "party showing error in exclusion of evidence must also show \"reasonable probability of harm\"",
"sentence": "But see Bendett v. Bendett, 315 Mass. 59, 65 (1943) (party showing error in exclusion of evidence must also show “reasonable pr... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "150 Mass. 77, 81",
"parenthetical": "the erroneous exclusion of evidence requires a new trial \"unless it can be seen that, even if it had been admitted and believed, still the verdict\" would have been the same",
"sentence": "Drake v. Goodman, 386 Mass. 88, 94 (1982). Se... | 484,755 | b |
. The parties agree that, in his capacity as a law enforcement officer, Boone is a public official for purposes of this defamation action. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "joining the majority of jurisdictions in holding that a police officer is a public official for defamation actions, thereby requiring the plaintiff's proof of actual malice",
"sentence": "See McClain v. Arnold, 275 S.C. 282, 270 S.E.2d 124 (1980) (joining... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "public officials such as police officers must establish actual malice",
"sentence": "See McClain v. Arnold, 275 S.C. 282, 270 S.E.2d 124 (1980) (joining the majority of jurisdictions in holding that a police officer is a public official for defamatio... | 214,306 | a |
. The parties agree that, in his capacity as a law enforcement officer, Boone is a public official for purposes of this defamation action. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "joining the majority of jurisdictions in holding that a police officer is a public official for defamation actions, thereby requiring the plaintiff's proof of actual malice",
"sentence": "See McClain v. Arnold, 275 S.C. 282, 270 S.E.2d 124 (1980) (joining... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "public officials such as police officers must establish actual malice",
"sentence": "See McClain v. Arnold, 275 S.C. 282, 270 S.E.2d 124 (1980) (joining the majority of jurisdictions in holding that a police officer is a public official for defamatio... | 214,306 | a |
. The parties agree that, in his capacity as a law enforcement officer, Boone is a public official for purposes of this defamation action. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "joining the majority of jurisdictions in holding that a police officer is a public official for defamation actions, thereby requiring the plaintiff's proof of actual malice",
"sentence": "See McClain v. Arnold, 275 S.C. 282, 270 S.E.2d 124 (1980) (joining... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "public officials such as police officers must establish actual malice",
"sentence": "See McClain v. Arnold, 275 S.C. 282, 270 S.E.2d 124 (1980) (joining the majority of jurisdictions in holding that a police officer is a public official for defamatio... | 214,306 | a |
. The parties agree that, in his capacity as a law enforcement officer, Boone is a public official for purposes of this defamation action. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "public officials such as police officers must establish actual malice",
"sentence": "See McClain v. Arnold, 275 S.C. 282, 270 S.E.2d 124 (1980) (joining the majority of jurisdictions in holding that a police officer is a public official for defamatio... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "joining the majority of jurisdictions in holding that a police officer is a public official for defamation actions, thereby requiring the plaintiff's proof of actual malice",
"sentence": "See McClain v. Arnold, 275 S.C. 282, 270 S.E.2d 124 (1980) (joining... | 214,306 | b |
The Second Circuit, prior to Daubert, departed from a strict application of the Frye general acceptance test, though, as in Dau- bert, acceptance of the proffered evidence in the scientific community has been a considered factor. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "895 F.Supp. 582, 585",
"parenthetical": "noting that defendant's argument that Rea and Bortnovsky must be revisited in light of Daubert was tenuous, as the Second Circuit found in Williams that a determination of admissibility of scientific evidence should be made under the Feder... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "958 F.2d 1206, 1224",
"parenthetical": "referring to absence of demonstrated reliability and relevance of polygraph evidence in record, as later mandated to be considered in Daubert",
"sentence": "United States v. Bortnovsky, 879 F.2d 30, 35 (2d Cir.1989); United States v... | 7,655,785 | b |
. This court's child custody cases manifest a tension between older decisions that apply a "fitness" test and more recent ones that focus instead on the "best interests of the child." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing the two lines of child custody cases but declining to resolve conflict",
"sentence": "Compare Johnson v. Lloyd, 211 A.2d 764, 765 (D.C. 1965) (\"The established rule in this jurisdiction is that one who would withhold a child from its nat... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "211 A.2d 764, 765",
"parenthetical": "\"The established rule in this jurisdiction is that one who would withhold a child from its natural parent has the burden of proving that the natural parent is unfit to have custody and that the child's welfare compels awarding custody ... | 12,022,652 | b |
But the fact that a contract may be substantively or proce durally unconscionable as violative of public policy does not automatically shoehorn a party's conduct in entering into the contract with a consumer into the DTPA's definition of "unconscionable action or course of action." See Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. SS 17.... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "435 S.W.3d 222, 228",
"parenthetical": "holding that even under the UCC--as opposed to the DTPA here--court is to make a \"highly fact-specific inquiry into the circumstances of the bargain, such as the commercial atmosphere in which the agreement was made, the alternatives ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "477 S.W.3d 913, 913-14",
"parenthetical": "reversing class certification of DTPA unconseionability claim because \"determining whether Hicks'[s] actions were unconscionable requires evaluation of each member's individual circumstances\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Ryan, 477 S.W.3... | 12,386,566 | b |
The Supreme Court has not held that a state or federal trial court's denial of a motion to sever can, in itself, violate the Constitution. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "603 F.3d 1127, 1132",
"parenthetical": "holding that neither Zafiro nor Lane established a constitutional standard binding on the states",
"sentence": "See Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539, 113 S.Ct. 933, 122 L.Ed.2d 317 (1993) (discussing joinder and severance i... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "506 U.S. 534, 539",
"parenthetical": "discussing joinder and severance in the context of Rules 8 and 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure",
"sentence": "See Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539, 113 S.Ct. 933, 122 L.Ed.2d 317 (1993) (discussing joinder and severa... | 5,717,166 | b |
The Supreme Court has not held that a state or federal trial court's denial of a motion to sever can, in itself, violate the Constitution. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "506 U.S. 534, 539",
"parenthetical": "discussing joinder and severance in the context of Rules 8 and 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure",
"sentence": "See Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539, 113 S.Ct. 933, 122 L.Ed.2d 317 (1993) (discussing joinder and severa... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "686 F.3d 758, 776-77",
"parenthetical": "reiterating the holding in Collins and holding that \"[n]either decision is 'clearly established Federal law' sufficient to support a habeas challenge under SS 2254\"",
"sentence": "See Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539, 11... | 5,717,166 | a |
The Supreme Court has not held that a state or federal trial court's denial of a motion to sever can, in itself, violate the Constitution. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing joinder and severance in the context of Rules 8 and 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure",
"sentence": "See Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539, 113 S.Ct. 933, 122 L.Ed.2d 317 (1993) (discussing joinder and severance in the cont... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "603 F.3d 1127, 1132",
"parenthetical": "holding that neither Zafiro nor Lane established a constitutional standard binding on the states",
"sentence": "See Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539, 113 S.Ct. 933, 122 L.Ed.2d 317 (1993) (discussing joinder and severance i... | 5,717,166 | a |
The Supreme Court has not held that a state or federal trial court's denial of a motion to sever can, in itself, violate the Constitution. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "686 F.3d 758, 776-77",
"parenthetical": "reiterating the holding in Collins and holding that \"[n]either decision is 'clearly established Federal law' sufficient to support a habeas challenge under SS 2254\"",
"sentence": "See Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539, 11... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing joinder and severance in the context of Rules 8 and 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure",
"sentence": "See Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539, 113 S.Ct. 933, 122 L.Ed.2d 317 (1993) (discussing joinder and severance in the cont... | 5,717,166 | b |
The Supreme Court has not held that a state or federal trial court's denial of a motion to sever can, in itself, violate the Constitution. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "603 F.3d 1127, 1132",
"parenthetical": "holding that neither Zafiro nor Lane established a constitutional standard binding on the states",
"sentence": "See Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539, 113 S.Ct. 933, 122 L.Ed.2d 317 (1993) (discussing joinder and severance i... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing joinder and severance in the context of Rules 8 and 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure",
"sentence": "See Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539, 113 S.Ct. 933, 122 L.Ed.2d 317 (1993) (discussing joinder and severance in the cont... | 5,717,166 | b |
The Supreme Court has not held that a state or federal trial court's denial of a motion to sever can, in itself, violate the Constitution. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing joinder and severance in the context of Rules 8 and 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure",
"sentence": "See Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539, 113 S.Ct. 933, 122 L.Ed.2d 317 (1993) (discussing joinder and severance in the cont... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "686 F.3d 758, 776-77",
"parenthetical": "reiterating the holding in Collins and holding that \"[n]either decision is 'clearly established Federal law' sufficient to support a habeas challenge under SS 2254\"",
"sentence": "See Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539, 11... | 5,717,166 | a |
The Supreme Court has not held that a state or federal trial court's denial of a motion to sever can, in itself, violate the Constitution. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing misjoinder under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure",
"sentence": "See Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539, 113 S.Ct. 933, 122 L.Ed.2d 317 (1993) (discussing joinder and severance in the context of Rules 8 and 14 of the Fe... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "603 F.3d 1127, 1132",
"parenthetical": "holding that neither Zafiro nor Lane established a constitutional standard binding on the states",
"sentence": "See Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539, 113 S.Ct. 933, 122 L.Ed.2d 317 (1993) (discussing joinder and severance i... | 5,717,166 | a |
The Supreme Court has not held that a state or federal trial court's denial of a motion to sever can, in itself, violate the Constitution. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "686 F.3d 758, 776-77",
"parenthetical": "reiterating the holding in Collins and holding that \"[n]either decision is 'clearly established Federal law' sufficient to support a habeas challenge under SS 2254\"",
"sentence": "See Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539, 11... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing misjoinder under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure",
"sentence": "See Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539, 113 S.Ct. 933, 122 L.Ed.2d 317 (1993) (discussing joinder and severance in the context of Rules 8 and 14 of the Fe... | 5,717,166 | b |
The Supreme Court has not held that a state or federal trial court's denial of a motion to sever can, in itself, violate the Constitution. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "603 F.3d 1127, 1132",
"parenthetical": "holding that neither Zafiro nor Lane established a constitutional standard binding on the states",
"sentence": "See Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539, 113 S.Ct. 933, 122 L.Ed.2d 317 (1993) (discussing joinder and severance i... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing misjoinder under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure",
"sentence": "See Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539, 113 S.Ct. 933, 122 L.Ed.2d 317 (1993) (discussing joinder and severance in the context of Rules 8 and 14 of the Fe... | 5,717,166 | b |
The Supreme Court has not held that a state or federal trial court's denial of a motion to sever can, in itself, violate the Constitution. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing misjoinder under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure",
"sentence": "See Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539, 113 S.Ct. 933, 122 L.Ed.2d 317 (1993) (discussing joinder and severance in the context of Rules 8 and 14 of the Fe... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "686 F.3d 758, 776-77",
"parenthetical": "reiterating the holding in Collins and holding that \"[n]either decision is 'clearly established Federal law' sufficient to support a habeas challenge under SS 2254\"",
"sentence": "See Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539, 11... | 5,717,166 | a |
The Supreme Court has not held that a state or federal trial court's denial of a motion to sever can, in itself, violate the Constitution. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "603 F.3d 1127, 1132",
"parenthetical": "holding that neither Zafiro nor Lane established a constitutional standard binding on the states",
"sentence": "See Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539, 113 S.Ct. 933, 122 L.Ed.2d 317 (1993) (discussing joinder and severance i... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing misjoinder under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure",
"sentence": "See Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539, 113 S.Ct. 933, 122 L.Ed.2d 317 (1993) (discussing joinder and severance in the context of Rules 8 and 14 of the Fe... | 5,717,166 | b |
The Supreme Court has not held that a state or federal trial court's denial of a motion to sever can, in itself, violate the Constitution. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing misjoinder under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure",
"sentence": "See Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539, 113 S.Ct. 933, 122 L.Ed.2d 317 (1993) (discussing joinder and severance in the context of Rules 8 and 14 of the Fe... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "686 F.3d 758, 776-77",
"parenthetical": "reiterating the holding in Collins and holding that \"[n]either decision is 'clearly established Federal law' sufficient to support a habeas challenge under SS 2254\"",
"sentence": "See Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539, 11... | 5,717,166 | a |
Because Oncor's failure to turn off an existing energized electrical transformer was not contemporaneous with Murillo's injury, it is insufficient to create liability for general negligence. Without evidence of contemporaneous conduct, Murillo's claim against Oncor is "a nonfeasance theory, based on [Oncor's] failure t... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "493 S.W.2d 742, 748",
"parenthetical": "holding that premises owner had no duty to warn electrical subcontractor of potential for electric shock from condition which subcontractor was hired to repair",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Shell Chem. Co. v. Lamb, 493 S.W.2d 742, 748 (Tex.19... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that company that retained independent contractor to hoist steel beams to roof had no duty to warn contractor's employees who sustained injuries when beam made contact with live wires hanging near cable used to hoist beams",
"sentence": "See,... | 6,902,659 | a |
Because Oncor's failure to turn off an existing energized electrical transformer was not contemporaneous with Murillo's injury, it is insufficient to create liability for general negligence. Without evidence of contemporaneous conduct, Murillo's claim against Oncor is "a nonfeasance theory, based on [Oncor's] failure t... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "493 S.W.2d 742, 748",
"parenthetical": "holding that premises owner had no duty to warn electrical subcontractor of potential for electric shock from condition which subcontractor was hired to repair",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Shell Chem. Co. v. Lamb, 493 S.W.2d 742, 748 (Tex.19... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "40 A.2d 43, 47",
"parenthetical": "holding that company that retained independent contractor to hoist steel beams to roof had no duty to warn contractor's employees who sustained injuries when beam made contact with live wires hanging near cable used to hoist beams",
"sent... | 6,902,659 | a |
Because Oncor's failure to turn off an existing energized electrical transformer was not contemporaneous with Murillo's injury, it is insufficient to create liability for general negligence. Without evidence of contemporaneous conduct, Murillo's claim against Oncor is "a nonfeasance theory, based on [Oncor's] failure t... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "350 S.W.2d 869, 869",
"parenthetical": "holding that company that retained independent contractor to hoist steel beams to roof had no duty to warn contractor's employees who sustained injuries when beam made contact with live wires hanging near cable used to hoist beams",
... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "493 S.W.2d 742, 748",
"parenthetical": "holding that premises owner had no duty to warn electrical subcontractor of potential for electric shock from condition which subcontractor was hired to repair",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Shell Chem. Co. v. Lamb, 493 S.W.2d 742, 748 (Tex.19... | 6,902,659 | b |
. An example of a civil proceeding involving a related criminal proceeding is a forfeiture of an appearance bond in a criminal proceeding. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "forfeiture of an appearance bond for a felony defendant appealed to the Supreme Court",
"sentence": "Cf. State v. Torres, 2004 OK 12, 87 P.3d 572 (forfeiture of an appearance bond for a felony defendant appealed to the Supreme Court)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Appeal from order overruling motion to vacate a judgment of forfeiture upon appearance bond is civil and not criminal case, and lies to Supreme Court.",
"sentence": "Dunn v. State, 1917 OK 269, 166 P. 193 (Appeal from order overruling motion to vaca... | 6,860,463 | b |
. An example of a civil proceeding involving a related criminal proceeding is a forfeiture of an appearance bond in a criminal proceeding. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "forfeiture of an appearance bond for a felony defendant appealed to the Supreme Court",
"sentence": "Cf. State v. Torres, 2004 OK 12, 87 P.3d 572 (forfeiture of an appearance bond for a felony defendant appealed to the Supreme Court)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Appeal from order overruling motion to vacate a judgment of forfeiture upon appearance bond is civil and not criminal case, and lies to Supreme Court.",
"sentence": "Dunn v. State, 1917 OK 269, 166 P. 193 (Appeal from order overruling motion to vaca... | 6,860,463 | b |
. An example of a civil proceeding involving a related criminal proceeding is a forfeiture of an appearance bond in a criminal proceeding. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "forfeiture of an appearance bond for a felony defendant appealed to the Supreme Court",
"sentence": "Cf. State v. Torres, 2004 OK 12, 87 P.3d 572 (forfeiture of an appearance bond for a felony defendant appealed to the Supreme Court)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Appeal from order overruling motion to vacate a judgment of forfeiture upon appearance bond is civil and not criminal case, and lies to Supreme Court.",
"sentence": "Dunn v. State, 1917 OK 269, 166 P. 193 (Appeal from order overruling motion to vaca... | 6,860,463 | b |
. An example of a civil proceeding involving a related criminal proceeding is a forfeiture of an appearance bond in a criminal proceeding. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Appeal from order overruling motion to vacate a judgment of forfeiture upon appearance bond is civil and not criminal case, and lies to Supreme Court.",
"sentence": "Dunn v. State, 1917 OK 269, 166 P. 193 (Appeal from order overruling motion to vaca... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "forfeiture of an appearance bond for a felony defendant appealed to the Supreme Court",
"sentence": "Cf. State v. Torres, 2004 OK 12, 87 P.3d 572 (forfeiture of an appearance bond for a felony defendant appealed to the Supreme Court)."
} | 6,860,463 | a |
. An example of a civil proceeding involving a related criminal proceeding is a forfeiture of an appearance bond in a criminal proceeding. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "forfeiture of an appearance bond for a felony defendant appealed to the Supreme Court",
"sentence": "Cf. State v. Torres, 2004 OK 12, 87 P.3d 572 (forfeiture of an appearance bond for a felony defendant appealed to the Supreme Court)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "appearance bond forfeiture proceeding is a civil case, not a criminal case",
"sentence": "Dunn v. State, 1917 OK 269, 166 P. 193 (Appeal from order overruling motion to vacate a judgment of forfeiture upon appearance bond is civil and not criminal c... | 6,860,463 | b |
. An example of a civil proceeding involving a related criminal proceeding is a forfeiture of an appearance bond in a criminal proceeding. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "appearance bond forfeiture proceeding is a civil case, not a criminal case",
"sentence": "Dunn v. State, 1917 OK 269, 166 P. 193 (Appeal from order overruling motion to vacate a judgment of forfeiture upon appearance bond is civil and not criminal c... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "forfeiture of an appearance bond for a felony defendant appealed to the Supreme Court",
"sentence": "Cf. State v. Torres, 2004 OK 12, 87 P.3d 572 (forfeiture of an appearance bond for a felony defendant appealed to the Supreme Court)."
} | 6,860,463 | a |
. An example of a civil proceeding involving a related criminal proceeding is a forfeiture of an appearance bond in a criminal proceeding. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "396 P.2d 675, 676",
"parenthetical": "appearance bond forfeiture proceeding is a civil case, not a criminal case",
"sentence": "Dunn v. State, 1917 OK 269, 166 P. 193 (Appeal from order overruling motion to vacate a judgment of forfeiture upon appearance bond is civil and... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "forfeiture of an appearance bond for a felony defendant appealed to the Supreme Court",
"sentence": "Cf. State v. Torres, 2004 OK 12, 87 P.3d 572 (forfeiture of an appearance bond for a felony defendant appealed to the Supreme Court)."
} | 6,860,463 | a |
. An example of a civil proceeding involving a related criminal proceeding is a forfeiture of an appearance bond in a criminal proceeding. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "396 P.2d 675, 676",
"parenthetical": "appearance bond forfeiture proceeding is a civil case, not a criminal case",
"sentence": "Dunn v. State, 1917 OK 269, 166 P. 193 (Appeal from order overruling motion to vacate a judgment of forfeiture upon appearance bond is civil and... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "forfeiture of an appearance bond for a felony defendant appealed to the Supreme Court",
"sentence": "Cf. State v. Torres, 2004 OK 12, 87 P.3d 572 (forfeiture of an appearance bond for a felony defendant appealed to the Supreme Court)."
} | 6,860,463 | a |
From the evidence presented, we conclude that the jury could infer that, had the styrofoam loads been enclosed with mesh wrapping or lifted on a platform with guardrails, the incident would have more likely than not been prevented. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "24 S.W.3d 357, 361",
"parenthetical": "finding an expert's opinions would not be helpful to the jury, as the conclusions simply told the jury how to view the facts and involved matters within the average juror's common knowledge",
"sentence": "Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. John... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "179 F.2d 593, 595",
"parenthetical": "finding that company rules and common sense made it the appellant's duty to see that a pistol was loaded properly, and the jury could have found that the appellant's negligence was the sole proximate cause of an accident",
"sentence": "See ... | 4,046,555 | b |
From the evidence presented, we conclude that the jury could infer that, had the styrofoam loads been enclosed with mesh wrapping or lifted on a platform with guardrails, the incident would have more likely than not been prevented. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "24 S.W.3d 357, 361",
"parenthetical": "finding an expert's opinions would not be helpful to the jury, as the conclusions simply told the jury how to view the facts and involved matters within the average juror's common knowledge",
"sentence": "Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. John... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "807 So.2d 382, 388",
"parenthetical": "\"The general rule in Mississippi is that expert testimony is not required where the facts surrounding the alleged negligence are easily comprehensible to the jury.\"",
"sentence": "Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Johnson, 807 So.2d 382, 38... | 4,046,555 | b |
Moreover, because the language of article VIII is plain, it is improper to explore its legislative history, as the dissent would have us do. "The rule which should be applied is that laws, and especially foundational laws such as our Constitution, should be interpreted and applied according to the plain import of their... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "779 P.2d 685, 686",
"parenthetical": "\"Where statutory language is plain and unambiguous, this Court will not look beyond the same to divine legislative intent.\"",
"sentence": "State v. Phillips, 540 P.2d 936, 938 (Utah 1975), disavowed on other grounds, State v. Taylor, 664 ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "4 Utah 2d 408, 428",
"parenthetical": "holding that if constitutional provision is clear, \"then extraneous or contemporaneous construction may not be resorted to\"",
"sentence": "State v. Phillips, 540 P.2d 936, 938 (Utah 1975), disavowed on other grounds, State v. Taylor... | 10,354,345 | b |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.