context stringlengths 58 1.13k | citation_a dict | citation_b dict | case_id int64 475 12.5M | label stringclasses 2
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An employer should not automatically be held hable for the discriminatory motivation of a subordinate employee that leads to an adverse employment action for another employee. However, if the formal deci-sionmakers choose to act in accordance with a report, decision, or recommendation of a biased subordinate without in... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that the \"cat's paw\" doctrine has been employed by lower courts to impose liability upon an employer for the discriminatory motivations of nondecisionmakers",
"sentence": "See e.g., Rios, 252 F.3d at 382 (noting that “[statements of non deci... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "252 F.3d 382, 382",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"[statements of non decision makers become relevant ... when the ultimate decision maker's action is merely a 'rubber stamp' for the subordinate's recommendation\"",
"sentence": "See e.g., Rios, 252 F.3d at 382 (noting that “[s... | 9,383,808 | b |
An employer should not automatically be held hable for the discriminatory motivation of a subordinate employee that leads to an adverse employment action for another employee. However, if the formal deci-sionmakers choose to act in accordance with a report, decision, or recommendation of a biased subordinate without in... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "524 U.S. 742, 762",
"parenthetical": "recognizing that the \"cat's paw\" doctrine has been employed by lower courts to impose liability upon an employer for the discriminatory motivations of nondecisionmakers",
"sentence": "See e.g., Rios, 252 F.3d at 382 (noting that “[stateme... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "220 F.3d 1220, 1231",
"parenthetical": "recognizing case law holding that an employer \"may be held liable if the manager who discharged the [employee] merely acted as a rubber stamp, or the 'cat's paw,' for a subordinate employee's prejudice, even if the manager lacked discrimin... | 9,383,808 | b |
An employer should not automatically be held hable for the discriminatory motivation of a subordinate employee that leads to an adverse employment action for another employee. However, if the formal deci-sionmakers choose to act in accordance with a report, decision, or recommendation of a biased subordinate without in... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that the \"cat's paw\" doctrine has been employed by lower courts to impose liability upon an employer for the discriminatory motivations of nondecisionmakers",
"sentence": "See e.g., Rios, 252 F.3d at 382 (noting that “[statements of non deci... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "220 F.3d 1220, 1231",
"parenthetical": "recognizing case law holding that an employer \"may be held liable if the manager who discharged the [employee] merely acted as a rubber stamp, or the 'cat's paw,' for a subordinate employee's prejudice, even if the manager lacked discrimin... | 9,383,808 | b |
An employer should not automatically be held hable for the discriminatory motivation of a subordinate employee that leads to an adverse employment action for another employee. However, if the formal deci-sionmakers choose to act in accordance with a report, decision, or recommendation of a biased subordinate without in... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "220 F.3d 1220, 1231",
"parenthetical": "recognizing case law holding that an employer \"may be held liable if the manager who discharged the [employee] merely acted as a rubber stamp, or the 'cat's paw,' for a subordinate employee's prejudice, even if the manager lacked discrimin... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that the \"cat's paw\" doctrine has been employed by lower courts to impose liability upon an employer for the discriminatory motivations of nondecisionmakers",
"sentence": "See e.g., Rios, 252 F.3d at 382 (noting that “[statements of non deci... | 9,383,808 | a |
An employer should not automatically be held hable for the discriminatory motivation of a subordinate employee that leads to an adverse employment action for another employee. However, if the formal deci-sionmakers choose to act in accordance with a report, decision, or recommendation of a biased subordinate without in... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "118 F.3d 542, 547",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"there can be situations in which the forbidden motive of a subordinate employee can be imputed to the employer because, under the circum stances of the case, the employer simply acted as the 'cat's paw\" of the subordinate\"",
... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "524 U.S. 742, 762",
"parenthetical": "recognizing that the \"cat's paw\" doctrine has been employed by lower courts to impose liability upon an employer for the discriminatory motivations of nondecisionmakers",
"sentence": "See e.g., Rios, 252 F.3d at 382 (noting that “[stateme... | 9,383,808 | a |
An employer should not automatically be held hable for the discriminatory motivation of a subordinate employee that leads to an adverse employment action for another employee. However, if the formal deci-sionmakers choose to act in accordance with a report, decision, or recommendation of a biased subordinate without in... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that the \"cat's paw\" doctrine has been employed by lower courts to impose liability upon an employer for the discriminatory motivations of nondecisionmakers",
"sentence": "See e.g., Rios, 252 F.3d at 382 (noting that “[statements of non deci... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "118 F.3d 542, 547",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"there can be situations in which the forbidden motive of a subordinate employee can be imputed to the employer because, under the circum stances of the case, the employer simply acted as the 'cat's paw\" of the subordinate\"",
... | 9,383,808 | b |
An employer should not automatically be held hable for the discriminatory motivation of a subordinate employee that leads to an adverse employment action for another employee. However, if the formal deci-sionmakers choose to act in accordance with a report, decision, or recommendation of a biased subordinate without in... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "118 F.3d 542, 547",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"there can be situations in which the forbidden motive of a subordinate employee can be imputed to the employer because, under the circum stances of the case, the employer simply acted as the 'cat's paw\" of the subordinate\"",
... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that the \"cat's paw\" doctrine has been employed by lower courts to impose liability upon an employer for the discriminatory motivations of nondecisionmakers",
"sentence": "See e.g., Rios, 252 F.3d at 382 (noting that “[statements of non deci... | 9,383,808 | a |
The reasonable possibility inquiry governing the district court's determination is similar to that made in determining whether a trial error of constitutional dimension is harmless: that is, whether the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "136 F.3d 986, 994",
"parenthetical": "equating reasonable possibility determination regarding extrinsic evidence in jury room to harmless error review",
"sentence": "See Coleman v. Burnett, 477 F.2d 1187, 1211 n. 158 (D.C.Cir.1973) (noting that “[i]n Chapman it was held th... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "24 F.3d 283, 287",
"parenthetical": "\"For most constitutional errors, an appellate court is to reverse if it entertains a 'reasonable doubt' about whether the error affected the outcome below.\"",
"sentence": "See Coleman v. Burnett, 477 F.2d 1187, 1211 n. 158 (D.C.Cir.1973) (... | 3,674,069 | b |
The Court need not reach the merits of defendants' qualified immunity defense with respect to plaintiffs' section 1983 claims, because they fail to state a claim under that provision. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "444 U.S. 277, 284",
"parenthetical": "Because appellants failed to show deprivation of rights under section 1983, \"it is not necessary ... to decide ... question [of] immunity\"",
"sentence": "See also Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 284, 100 S.Ct. 553, 62 L.Ed.2d 4... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "500 U.S. 233, 233",
"parenthetical": "no need to consider immunity defense where plaintiff failed to establish constitutional violation, stating that \"[t]his [is] the desirab[le] ... approach\"",
"sentence": "See Siegert, 500 U.S. at 233 (no need to consider immunity defense w... | 196,687 | b |
The Court need not reach the merits of defendants' qualified immunity defense with respect to plaintiffs' section 1983 claims, because they fail to state a claim under that provision. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "500 U.S. 233, 233",
"parenthetical": "no need to consider immunity defense where plaintiff failed to establish constitutional violation, stating that \"[t]his [is] the desirab[le] ... approach\"",
"sentence": "See Siegert, 500 U.S. at 233 (no need to consider immunity defense w... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Because appellants failed to show deprivation of rights under section 1983, \"it is not necessary ... to decide ... question [of] immunity\"",
"sentence": "See also Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 284, 100 S.Ct. 553, 62 L.Ed.2d 481 (1980) (Beca... | 196,687 | a |
The Court need not reach the merits of defendants' qualified immunity defense with respect to plaintiffs' section 1983 claims, because they fail to state a claim under that provision. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Because appellants failed to show deprivation of rights under section 1983, \"it is not necessary ... to decide ... question [of] immunity\"",
"sentence": "See also Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 284, 100 S.Ct. 553, 62 L.Ed.2d 481 (1980) (Beca... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "500 U.S. 233, 233",
"parenthetical": "no need to consider immunity defense where plaintiff failed to establish constitutional violation, stating that \"[t]his [is] the desirab[le] ... approach\"",
"sentence": "See Siegert, 500 U.S. at 233 (no need to consider immunity defense w... | 196,687 | b |
In the rare cases where we have found an abuse of discretion in a district court's refusal to grant an extension of time, our analysis has been highly fact-specific. We have granted relief when the appealing litigant was reasonably surprised by the deadline or the action of the court, or the events leading to the conte... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "145 F.3d 1, 4",
"parenthetical": "reversing grant of summary judgment where non-moving party's delay was attributable to \"an ambiguity in the Local Rules\" and a snafu in the district court clerk's office",
"sentence": "See United States v. Fraya, 145 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.1998) ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "360 F.3d 286, 290-91",
"parenthetical": "holding that it was \"simply unfair-- and an abuse of discretion\" for district court to deny non-moving party's motion for reconsideration of summary judgment after the court had \"switched the basic issue without giving the parties ... | 82,006 | a |
In the rare cases where we have found an abuse of discretion in a district court's refusal to grant an extension of time, our analysis has been highly fact-specific. We have granted relief when the appealing litigant was reasonably surprised by the deadline or the action of the court, or the events leading to the conte... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "145 F.3d 1, 4",
"parenthetical": "reversing grant of summary judgment where non-moving party's delay was attributable to \"an ambiguity in the Local Rules\" and a snafu in the district court clerk's office",
"sentence": "See United States v. Fraya, 145 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.1998) ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "22 F.3d 1198, 1200, 1209",
"parenthetical": "reversing grant of summary judgment when non-moving party was \"laid low\" by the moving party's \"rabbit punch,\" and \"the district court should not have countenanced, much less rewarded, such dubious conduct\"",
"sentence": "... | 82,006 | a |
In the rare cases where we have found an abuse of discretion in a district court's refusal to grant an extension of time, our analysis has been highly fact-specific. We have granted relief when the appealing litigant was reasonably surprised by the deadline or the action of the court, or the events leading to the conte... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "900 F.2d 7, 7",
"parenthetical": "declining to overrule district court's refusal to extend time in part because \"the lawyer had no valid basis to claim he was surprised\" by the filing deadline",
"sentence": "See United States v. Fraya, 145 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.1998) (rever... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "145 F.3d 1, 4",
"parenthetical": "reversing grant of summary judgment where non-moving party's delay was attributable to \"an ambiguity in the Local Rules\" and a snafu in the district court clerk's office",
"sentence": "See United States v. Fraya, 145 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.1998) ... | 82,006 | b |
In the rare cases where we have found an abuse of discretion in a district court's refusal to grant an extension of time, our analysis has been highly fact-specific. We have granted relief when the appealing litigant was reasonably surprised by the deadline or the action of the court, or the events leading to the conte... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "360 F.3d 286, 290-91",
"parenthetical": "holding that it was \"simply unfair-- and an abuse of discretion\" for district court to deny non-moving party's motion for reconsideration of summary judgment after the court had \"switched the basic issue without giving the parties ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "978 F.2d 17, 20-21",
"parenthetical": "overturning grant of motion to suppress when government's failure to respond was due to \"interlocking rules ... freighted with ambiguity\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Fraya, 145 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.1998) (reversing grant of summary... | 82,006 | b |
In the rare cases where we have found an abuse of discretion in a district court's refusal to grant an extension of time, our analysis has been highly fact-specific. We have granted relief when the appealing litigant was reasonably surprised by the deadline or the action of the court, or the events leading to the conte... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "22 F.3d 1198, 1200, 1209",
"parenthetical": "reversing grant of summary judgment when non-moving party was \"laid low\" by the moving party's \"rabbit punch,\" and \"the district court should not have countenanced, much less rewarded, such dubious conduct\"",
"sentence": "... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "978 F.2d 17, 20-21",
"parenthetical": "overturning grant of motion to suppress when government's failure to respond was due to \"interlocking rules ... freighted with ambiguity\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Fraya, 145 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.1998) (reversing grant of summary... | 82,006 | b |
In the rare cases where we have found an abuse of discretion in a district court's refusal to grant an extension of time, our analysis has been highly fact-specific. We have granted relief when the appealing litigant was reasonably surprised by the deadline or the action of the court, or the events leading to the conte... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "900 F.2d 7, 7",
"parenthetical": "declining to overrule district court's refusal to extend time in part because \"the lawyer had no valid basis to claim he was surprised\" by the filing deadline",
"sentence": "See United States v. Fraya, 145 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.1998) (rever... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "978 F.2d 17, 20-21",
"parenthetical": "overturning grant of motion to suppress when government's failure to respond was due to \"interlocking rules ... freighted with ambiguity\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Fraya, 145 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.1998) (reversing grant of summary... | 82,006 | b |
We note that our decision is consistent with the law in at least three other circuits. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "823 F.2d 1209, 1211",
"parenthetical": "prosecutor's obtaining of more severe indictment after defendant refused to cooperate with police did not arise out of prosecutorial vindictiveness because a defendant does not have a right to refuse to cooperate with authorities",
"sente... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "611 F.2d 770, 773",
"parenthetical": "government's decision to seek more severe indictment after defendant rejected offer to plead guilty to initial charges and to cooperate with police did not amount to vindictiveness because defendant was free to accept or reject the propo... | 7,410,795 | a |
We note that our decision is consistent with the law in at least three other circuits. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "611 F.2d 770, 773",
"parenthetical": "government's decision to seek more severe indictment after defendant rejected offer to plead guilty to initial charges and to cooperate with police did not amount to vindictiveness because defendant was free to accept or reject the propo... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "787 F.2d 124, 125-26",
"parenthetical": "no prosecutorial vindictiveness where federal charges were brought because defendant failed to cooperate satisfactorily with local authorities",
"sentence": "See United States v. Long, 823 F.2d 1209, 1211 (7th Cir.1987) (prosecutor’s obt... | 7,410,795 | b |
Unless the statutes fall under one of those circumstances, courts must apply the presumption against reading an implied repeal into the second statute. The presumption against implied repeals is even stronger when the two laws are passed during the same legislative session. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "485 U.S. 547, 547",
"parenthetical": "rejecting an implied repeal where \"the same Congress\" had \"not affirmatively evince[d] any intent to repeal or amend\" the original statute, and enacted a second statute only one year later",
"sentence": "See Traynor, 485 U.S. at 547, 10... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "73 F.2d 281, 283",
"parenthetical": "\"Where both laws are passed at the same session, the presumption against implied repeal is all the stronger.\"",
"sentence": "See Traynor, 485 U.S. at 547, 108 S.Ct. 1372 (rejecting an implied repeal where “the same Congress” had “not ... | 4,262,324 | a |
Unless the statutes fall under one of those circumstances, courts must apply the presumption against reading an implied repeal into the second statute. The presumption against implied repeals is even stronger when the two laws are passed during the same legislative session. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting an implied repeal where \"the same Congress\" had \"not affirmatively evince[d] any intent to repeal or amend\" the original statute, and enacted a second statute only one year later",
"sentence": "See Traynor, 485 U.S. at 547, 108 S.Ct. 1372 (r... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "73 F.2d 281, 283",
"parenthetical": "\"Where both laws are passed at the same session, the presumption against implied repeal is all the stronger.\"",
"sentence": "See Traynor, 485 U.S. at 547, 108 S.Ct. 1372 (rejecting an implied repeal where “the same Congress” had “not ... | 4,262,324 | a |
The contemporaneous objection rule, that the failure contemporaneously to assert a right constitutes a waiver of that right, applies to a criminal defendant's right to be present under Rule 43. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "892 F.2d 305, 309",
"parenthetical": "under contemporaneous objection rule, a party must object contemporaneously \"to any matter believed to be erroneous, at peril of relinquishing the opportunity to challenge that matter on appeal\"",
"sentence": "Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 529, 105... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "964 F.2d 157, 159",
"parenthetical": "\"waiver by counsel of a defendant's right to be present during the proceedings is valid when made in the presence of the defendant\"",
"sentence": "Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 529, 105 S.Ct. at 1486; United States v. Brown, 923 F.2d at 112 (... | 10,532,128 | b |
The contemporaneous objection rule, that the failure contemporaneously to assert a right constitutes a waiver of that right, applies to a criminal defendant's right to be present under Rule 43. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "under contemporaneous objection rule, a party must object contemporaneously \"to any matter believed to be erroneous, at peril of relinquishing the opportunity to challenge that matter on appeal\"",
"sentence": "Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 529, 105 S.Ct. at 1486;... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "964 F.2d 157, 159",
"parenthetical": "\"waiver by counsel of a defendant's right to be present during the proceedings is valid when made in the presence of the defendant\"",
"sentence": "Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 529, 105 S.Ct. at 1486; United States v. Brown, 923 F.2d at 112 (... | 10,532,128 | b |
The contemporaneous objection rule, that the failure contemporaneously to assert a right constitutes a waiver of that right, applies to a criminal defendant's right to be present under Rule 43. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "964 F.2d 157, 159",
"parenthetical": "\"waiver by counsel of a defendant's right to be present during the proceedings is valid when made in the presence of the defendant\"",
"sentence": "Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 529, 105 S.Ct. at 1486; United States v. Brown, 923 F.2d at 112 (... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "under contemporaneous objection rule, a party must object contemporaneously \"to any matter believed to be erroneous, at peril of relinquishing the opportunity to challenge that matter on appeal\"",
"sentence": "Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 529, 105 S.Ct. at 1486;... | 10,532,128 | a |
The contemporaneous objection rule, that the failure contemporaneously to assert a right constitutes a waiver of that right, applies to a criminal defendant's right to be present under Rule 43. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "under contemporaneous objection rule, a party must object contemporaneously \"to any matter believed to be erroneous, at peril of relinquishing the opportunity to challenge that matter on appeal\"",
"sentence": "Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 529, 105 S.Ct. at 1486;... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "964 F.2d 157, 159",
"parenthetical": "\"waiver by counsel of a defendant's right to be present during the proceedings is valid when made in the presence of the defendant\"",
"sentence": "Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 529, 105 S.Ct. at 1486; United States v. Brown, 923 F.2d at 112 (... | 10,532,128 | b |
The contemporaneous objection rule, that the failure contemporaneously to assert a right constitutes a waiver of that right, applies to a criminal defendant's right to be present under Rule 43. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "892 F.2d 305, 309",
"parenthetical": "under contemporaneous objection rule, a party must object contemporaneously \"to any matter believed to be erroneous, at peril of relinquishing the opportunity to challenge that matter on appeal\"",
"sentence": "Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 529, 105... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"waiver by counsel of a defendant's right to be present during the proceedings is valid when made in the presence of the defendant\"",
"sentence": "Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 529, 105 S.Ct. at 1486; United States v. Brown, 923 F.2d at 112 (failure to asse... | 10,532,128 | b |
The contemporaneous objection rule, that the failure contemporaneously to assert a right constitutes a waiver of that right, applies to a criminal defendant's right to be present under Rule 43. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "under contemporaneous objection rule, a party must object contemporaneously \"to any matter believed to be erroneous, at peril of relinquishing the opportunity to challenge that matter on appeal\"",
"sentence": "Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 529, 105 S.Ct. at 1486;... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"waiver by counsel of a defendant's right to be present during the proceedings is valid when made in the presence of the defendant\"",
"sentence": "Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 529, 105 S.Ct. at 1486; United States v. Brown, 923 F.2d at 112 (failure to asse... | 10,532,128 | b |
The contemporaneous objection rule, that the failure contemporaneously to assert a right constitutes a waiver of that right, applies to a criminal defendant's right to be present under Rule 43. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"waiver by counsel of a defendant's right to be present during the proceedings is valid when made in the presence of the defendant\"",
"sentence": "Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 529, 105 S.Ct. at 1486; United States v. Brown, 923 F.2d at 112 (failure to asse... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "under contemporaneous objection rule, a party must object contemporaneously \"to any matter believed to be erroneous, at peril of relinquishing the opportunity to challenge that matter on appeal\"",
"sentence": "Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 529, 105 S.Ct. at 1486;... | 10,532,128 | a |
The contemporaneous objection rule, that the failure contemporaneously to assert a right constitutes a waiver of that right, applies to a criminal defendant's right to be present under Rule 43. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"waiver by counsel of a defendant's right to be present during the proceedings is valid when made in the presence of the defendant\"",
"sentence": "Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 529, 105 S.Ct. at 1486; United States v. Brown, 923 F.2d at 112 (failure to asse... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "under contemporaneous objection rule, a party must object contemporaneously \"to any matter believed to be erroneous, at peril of relinquishing the opportunity to challenge that matter on appeal\"",
"sentence": "Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 529, 105 S.Ct. at 1486;... | 10,532,128 | a |
The contemporaneous objection rule, that the failure contemporaneously to assert a right constitutes a waiver of that right, applies to a criminal defendant's right to be present under Rule 43. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "892 F.2d 305, 309",
"parenthetical": "under contemporaneous objection rule, a party must object contemporaneously \"to any matter believed to be erroneous, at peril of relinquishing the opportunity to challenge that matter on appeal\"",
"sentence": "Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 529, 105... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"waiver by counsel of a defendant's right to be present during the proceedings is valid when made in the presence of the defendant\"",
"sentence": "Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 529, 105 S.Ct. at 1486; United States v. Brown, 923 F.2d at 112 (failure to asse... | 10,532,128 | b |
The contemporaneous objection rule, that the failure contemporaneously to assert a right constitutes a waiver of that right, applies to a criminal defendant's right to be present under Rule 43. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "under contemporaneous objection rule, a party must object contemporaneously \"to any matter believed to be erroneous, at peril of relinquishing the opportunity to challenge that matter on appeal\"",
"sentence": "Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 529, 105 S.Ct. at 1486;... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"waiver by counsel of a defendant's right to be present during the proceedings is valid when made in the presence of the defendant\"",
"sentence": "Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 529, 105 S.Ct. at 1486; United States v. Brown, 923 F.2d at 112 (failure to asse... | 10,532,128 | b |
The contemporaneous objection rule, that the failure contemporaneously to assert a right constitutes a waiver of that right, applies to a criminal defendant's right to be present under Rule 43. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"waiver by counsel of a defendant's right to be present during the proceedings is valid when made in the presence of the defendant\"",
"sentence": "Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 529, 105 S.Ct. at 1486; United States v. Brown, 923 F.2d at 112 (failure to asse... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "under contemporaneous objection rule, a party must object contemporaneously \"to any matter believed to be erroneous, at peril of relinquishing the opportunity to challenge that matter on appeal\"",
"sentence": "Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 529, 105 S.Ct. at 1486;... | 10,532,128 | a |
The contemporaneous objection rule, that the failure contemporaneously to assert a right constitutes a waiver of that right, applies to a criminal defendant's right to be present under Rule 43. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"waiver by counsel of a defendant's right to be present during the proceedings is valid when made in the presence of the defendant\"",
"sentence": "Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 529, 105 S.Ct. at 1486; United States v. Brown, 923 F.2d at 112 (failure to asse... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "under contemporaneous objection rule, a party must object contemporaneously \"to any matter believed to be erroneous, at peril of relinquishing the opportunity to challenge that matter on appeal\"",
"sentence": "Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 529, 105 S.Ct. at 1486;... | 10,532,128 | a |
Obligations arising under output and requirements contracts are also routinely subjected to good faith limitations because the buyer and seller have "some discretion" to determine their requirements and outputs. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "740 F.2d 780, 789",
"parenthetical": "\"courts will imply a promise that the buyer's requirements be in good faith\"",
"sentence": "E. Farnsworth, Contracts § 7.17, at 528 (1982); see Kansas Power & Light Co. v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., 740 F.2d 780, 789 (10th Cir.1984), c... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "575 F.2d 132, 137-38",
"parenthetical": "provision that buyer agreed to \"pay as used\" for seller's inventory did not require buyer to use all inventory, but it did imply an obligation of good faith to use inventory amounts dictated by \"business judgment\" and not merely \... | 1,816,438 | a |
Obligations arising under output and requirements contracts are also routinely subjected to good faith limitations because the buyer and seller have "some discretion" to determine their requirements and outputs. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "740 F.2d 780, 789",
"parenthetical": "\"courts will imply a promise that the buyer's requirements be in good faith\"",
"sentence": "E. Farnsworth, Contracts § 7.17, at 528 (1982); see Kansas Power & Light Co. v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., 740 F.2d 780, 789 (10th Cir.1984), c... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "365 F.2d 77, 81",
"parenthetical": "\"buyer in a requirements contract is required merely to exercise good faith in determining his requir ements\"",
"sentence": "E. Farnsworth, Contracts § 7.17, at 528 (1982); see Kansas Power & Light Co. v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., ... | 1,816,438 | a |
Obligations arising under output and requirements contracts are also routinely subjected to good faith limitations because the buyer and seller have "some discretion" to determine their requirements and outputs. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "575 F.2d 132, 137-38",
"parenthetical": "provision that buyer agreed to \"pay as used\" for seller's inventory did not require buyer to use all inventory, but it did imply an obligation of good faith to use inventory amounts dictated by \"business judgment\" and not merely \... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"courts will imply a promise that the buyer's requirements be in good faith\"",
"sentence": "E. Farnsworth, Contracts § 7.17, at 528 (1982); see Kansas Power & Light Co. v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., 740 F.2d 780, 789 (10th Cir.1984), cert dismissed, ... | 1,816,438 | b |
Obligations arising under output and requirements contracts are also routinely subjected to good faith limitations because the buyer and seller have "some discretion" to determine their requirements and outputs. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"courts will imply a promise that the buyer's requirements be in good faith\"",
"sentence": "E. Farnsworth, Contracts § 7.17, at 528 (1982); see Kansas Power & Light Co. v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., 740 F.2d 780, 789 (10th Cir.1984), cert dismissed, ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "365 F.2d 77, 81",
"parenthetical": "\"buyer in a requirements contract is required merely to exercise good faith in determining his requir ements\"",
"sentence": "E. Farnsworth, Contracts § 7.17, at 528 (1982); see Kansas Power & Light Co. v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., ... | 1,816,438 | a |
Obligations arising under output and requirements contracts are also routinely subjected to good faith limitations because the buyer and seller have "some discretion" to determine their requirements and outputs. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "575 F.2d 132, 137-38",
"parenthetical": "provision that buyer agreed to \"pay as used\" for seller's inventory did not require buyer to use all inventory, but it did imply an obligation of good faith to use inventory amounts dictated by \"business judgment\" and not merely \... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"courts will imply a promise that the buyer's requirements be in good faith\"",
"sentence": "E. Farnsworth, Contracts § 7.17, at 528 (1982); see Kansas Power & Light Co. v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., 740 F.2d 780, 789 (10th Cir.1984), cert dismissed, ... | 1,816,438 | b |
Obligations arising under output and requirements contracts are also routinely subjected to good faith limitations because the buyer and seller have "some discretion" to determine their requirements and outputs. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "365 F.2d 77, 81",
"parenthetical": "\"buyer in a requirements contract is required merely to exercise good faith in determining his requir ements\"",
"sentence": "E. Farnsworth, Contracts § 7.17, at 528 (1982); see Kansas Power & Light Co. v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"courts will imply a promise that the buyer's requirements be in good faith\"",
"sentence": "E. Farnsworth, Contracts § 7.17, at 528 (1982); see Kansas Power & Light Co. v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., 740 F.2d 780, 789 (10th Cir.1984), cert dismissed, ... | 1,816,438 | b |
Obligations arising under output and requirements contracts are also routinely subjected to good faith limitations because the buyer and seller have "some discretion" to determine their requirements and outputs. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "575 F.2d 132, 137-38",
"parenthetical": "provision that buyer agreed to \"pay as used\" for seller's inventory did not require buyer to use all inventory, but it did imply an obligation of good faith to use inventory amounts dictated by \"business judgment\" and not merely \... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"courts will imply a promise that the buyer's requirements be in good faith\"",
"sentence": "E. Farnsworth, Contracts § 7.17, at 528 (1982); see Kansas Power & Light Co. v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., 740 F.2d 780, 789 (10th Cir.1984), cert dismissed, ... | 1,816,438 | b |
Obligations arising under output and requirements contracts are also routinely subjected to good faith limitations because the buyer and seller have "some discretion" to determine their requirements and outputs. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"courts will imply a promise that the buyer's requirements be in good faith\"",
"sentence": "E. Farnsworth, Contracts § 7.17, at 528 (1982); see Kansas Power & Light Co. v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., 740 F.2d 780, 789 (10th Cir.1984), cert dismissed, ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "365 F.2d 77, 81",
"parenthetical": "\"buyer in a requirements contract is required merely to exercise good faith in determining his requir ements\"",
"sentence": "E. Farnsworth, Contracts § 7.17, at 528 (1982); see Kansas Power & Light Co. v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., ... | 1,816,438 | a |
Obligations arising under output and requirements contracts are also routinely subjected to good faith limitations because the buyer and seller have "some discretion" to determine their requirements and outputs. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "575 F.2d 132, 137-38",
"parenthetical": "provision that buyer agreed to \"pay as used\" for seller's inventory did not require buyer to use all inventory, but it did imply an obligation of good faith to use inventory amounts dictated by \"business judgment\" and not merely \... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "102 F.2d 630, 632-33",
"parenthetical": "\"Requirements contract imposes upon the buyer the obligation to act in good faith\"",
"sentence": "E. Farnsworth, Contracts § 7.17, at 528 (1982); see Kansas Power & Light Co. v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., 740 F.2d 780, 789 (10th Cir... | 1,816,438 | b |
Obligations arising under output and requirements contracts are also routinely subjected to good faith limitations because the buyer and seller have "some discretion" to determine their requirements and outputs. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "102 F.2d 630, 632-33",
"parenthetical": "\"Requirements contract imposes upon the buyer the obligation to act in good faith\"",
"sentence": "E. Farnsworth, Contracts § 7.17, at 528 (1982); see Kansas Power & Light Co. v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., 740 F.2d 780, 789 (10th Cir... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "365 F.2d 77, 81",
"parenthetical": "\"buyer in a requirements contract is required merely to exercise good faith in determining his requir ements\"",
"sentence": "E. Farnsworth, Contracts § 7.17, at 528 (1982); see Kansas Power & Light Co. v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., ... | 1,816,438 | a |
A party to a contract cannot tortiously interfere with her own contract. See, e.g., Cedar Hills Props. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "820 So.2d 963, 965",
"parenthetical": "\"While an agent may be held personally liable for his or her tortious acts, even if committed within the scope of the agent's employment with the principal, an agent is not liable for tortious interference with a contract of which his ... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "575 So.2d 673, 676-77",
"parenthetical": "holding that leasing agent \"acting within his capacity and scope as an agent, cannot be considered to be a separate entity outside of the contractual relationship which can tortiously interfere with that relationship\"",
"sentenc... | 9,098,202 | b |
A party to a contract cannot tortiously interfere with her own contract. See, e.g., Cedar Hills Props. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "742 So.2d 381, 386",
"parenthetical": "\"For the interference to be unjustified, the defendant must be a third party, external to the business relationship\" or an agent who \"acts solely with ulterior purposes, without an honest belief that his actions would benefit the emp... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "575 So.2d 673, 676-77",
"parenthetical": "holding that leasing agent \"acting within his capacity and scope as an agent, cannot be considered to be a separate entity outside of the contractual relationship which can tortiously interfere with that relationship\"",
"sentenc... | 9,098,202 | b |
A party to a contract cannot tortiously interfere with her own contract. See, e.g., Cedar Hills Props. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that employee of one family-owned corporation who was assigned to terminate a contract of another corporation owned by the same family could not, as a matter of law, be held liable for tortious interference with the contract",
"sentence": "Co... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "575 So.2d 673, 676-77",
"parenthetical": "holding that leasing agent \"acting within his capacity and scope as an agent, cannot be considered to be a separate entity outside of the contractual relationship which can tortiously interfere with that relationship\"",
"sentenc... | 9,098,202 | b |
Congress has unmistakably preempted certain state law claims pertaining to medical devices. Congress enacted this express preemption clause to prevent manufacturers from being subject to inconsistent laws and regulations. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "552 U.S. 326, 326",
"parenthetical": "explaining that without the FDA's central oversight, juries would \"apply the tort law of 50 States to all innovations,\" thus subjecting medical device manufacturers to the whims of juries in all 50 states",
"sentence": "See Riegel, 552 U.... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2013 WL 3791612, at *4",
"parenthetical": "noting that express preemption \"preserve[s] federal regulatory authority over medical devices and thereby enable[s] the FDA to balance various statutory objectives\"",
"sentence": "See Riegel, 552 U.S. at 326, 128 S.Ct. 999 (expl... | 4,220,477 | a |
Congress has unmistakably preempted certain state law claims pertaining to medical devices. Congress enacted this express preemption clause to prevent manufacturers from being subject to inconsistent laws and regulations. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2013 WL 3791612, at *4",
"parenthetical": "noting that express preemption \"preserve[s] federal regulatory authority over medical devices and thereby enable[s] the FDA to balance various statutory objectives\"",
"sentence": "See Riegel, 552 U.S. at 326, 128 S.Ct. 999 (expl... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "explaining that without the FDA's central oversight, juries would \"apply the tort law of 50 States to all innovations,\" thus subjecting medical device manufacturers to the whims of juries in all 50 states",
"sentence": "See Riegel, 552 U.S. at 326, 128 ... | 4,220,477 | b |
What Arsenault's argument actually amounts to is faulting the judge for "not assigning] the weight to certain factors that [he] thought appropriate" and not taking into account specific considerations -- such as the elderly-prisoner problem -- which he finds relevant. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "595 F.3d 42, 49",
"parenthetical": "concluding that the district judge's silence about a sentencing angle advocated by a party did not undercut the sentencing decision where the record \"evinc[ed] a sufficient weighing of the section 3553(a) factors\"",
"sentence": "See Un... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "780 F.3d 475, 479",
"parenthetical": "\"That the [appellant] would prefer an alternative weighing of the circumstances does not undermine the district court's sentencing decision.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Rossignol, 780 F.3d 475, 479 (1st Cir. 2015) (“That the [app... | 4,352,245 | b |
P 10 The State contends, and Hansen concedes, that if A.R.S. SS 13-804.D is substantive, it indisputably governs. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Within constitutional limits, the legislature is vested with plenary power to change the substantive law prospectively ____\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Murray, 194 Ariz. 373, 375 ¶6, 982 P.2d 1287, 1289 (1999) (“Within constitutional limits, the legis... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"In Arizona, the legislature is endowed with the legislative power of the State, and has plenary power to consider any subject within the scope of government unless the provisions of the Constitution restrain it.\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Murray... | 3,520,620 | a |
P 10 The State contends, and Hansen concedes, that if A.R.S. SS 13-804.D is substantive, it indisputably governs. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Within constitutional limits, the legislature is vested with plenary power to change the substantive law prospectively ____\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Murray, 194 Ariz. 373, 375 ¶6, 982 P.2d 1287, 1289 (1999) (“Within constitutional limits, the legis... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "982 P.2d 817, 817",
"parenthetical": "\"In Arizona, the legislature is endowed with the legislative power of the State, and has plenary power to consider any subject within the scope of government unless the provisions of the Constitution restrain it.\"",
"sentence": "See ... | 3,520,620 | a |
P 10 The State contends, and Hansen concedes, that if A.R.S. SS 13-804.D is substantive, it indisputably governs. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"In Arizona, the legislature is endowed with the legislative power of the State, and has plenary power to consider any subject within the scope of government unless the provisions of the Constitution restrain it.\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Murray... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "982 P.2d 1287, 1289",
"parenthetical": "\"Within constitutional limits, the legislature is vested with plenary power to change the substantive law prospectively ____\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Murray, 194 Ariz. 373, 375 ¶6, 982 P.2d 1287, 1289 (1999) (“Within constitutional ... | 3,520,620 | b |
P 10 The State contends, and Hansen concedes, that if A.R.S. SS 13-804.D is substantive, it indisputably governs. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "982 P.2d 1287, 1289",
"parenthetical": "\"Within constitutional limits, the legislature is vested with plenary power to change the substantive law prospectively ____\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Murray, 194 Ariz. 373, 375 ¶6, 982 P.2d 1287, 1289 (1999) (“Within constitutional ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "982 P.2d 817, 817",
"parenthetical": "\"In Arizona, the legislature is endowed with the legislative power of the State, and has plenary power to consider any subject within the scope of government unless the provisions of the Constitution restrain it.\"",
"sentence": "See ... | 3,520,620 | a |
T 18 Plaintiffs have not alleged the type of truly extraordinary cireumstances that might allow equitable tolling. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "911 P.2d 1097, 1097",
"parenthetical": "the reasoning underlying equitable tolling decisions is \"that it is unfair to penalize the plaintiff for cireumstances outside his or her control, so long as the plaintiff makes good faith efforts to pursue the claims when possible\""... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "73 U.S. 582, 584",
"parenthetical": "extraordinary cireumstances prevent ed the plaintiff from timely filing action where courts in southern states were closed during the Civil War",
"sentence": "CJL Hanger v. Abbott, 73 U.S. 582, 584, 6 Wall. 582, 18 L.Ed. 989 (1867) (ex... | 6,964,782 | b |
T 18 Plaintiffs have not alleged the type of truly extraordinary cireumstances that might allow equitable tolling. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "extraordinary cireumstances prevent ed the plaintiff from timely filing action where courts in southern states were closed during the Civil War",
"sentence": "CJL Hanger v. Abbott, 73 U.S. 582, 584, 6 Wall. 582, 18 L.Ed. 989 (1867) (extraordinary ci... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "911 P.2d 1097, 1097",
"parenthetical": "the reasoning underlying equitable tolling decisions is \"that it is unfair to penalize the plaintiff for cireumstances outside his or her control, so long as the plaintiff makes good faith efforts to pursue the claims when possible\""... | 6,964,782 | a |
T 18 Plaintiffs have not alleged the type of truly extraordinary cireumstances that might allow equitable tolling. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "911 P.2d 1097, 1097",
"parenthetical": "the reasoning underlying equitable tolling decisions is \"that it is unfair to penalize the plaintiff for cireumstances outside his or her control, so long as the plaintiff makes good faith efforts to pursue the claims when possible\""... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "extraordinary cireumstances prevent ed the plaintiff from timely filing action where courts in southern states were closed during the Civil War",
"sentence": "CJL Hanger v. Abbott, 73 U.S. 582, 584, 6 Wall. 582, 18 L.Ed. 989 (1867) (extraordinary ci... | 6,964,782 | b |
T 18 Plaintiffs have not alleged the type of truly extraordinary cireumstances that might allow equitable tolling. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "981 F.2d 590, 596-97",
"parenthetical": "equitable tolling appropriate where district court's erroneous enforcement of an unconstitutional statute barred the plaintiff from timely filing claims",
"sentence": "CJL Hanger v. Abbott, 73 U.S. 582, 584, 6 Wall. 582, 18 L.Ed. 9... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "911 P.2d 1097, 1097",
"parenthetical": "the reasoning underlying equitable tolling decisions is \"that it is unfair to penalize the plaintiff for cireumstances outside his or her control, so long as the plaintiff makes good faith efforts to pursue the claims when possible\""... | 6,964,782 | a |
T 18 Plaintiffs have not alleged the type of truly extraordinary cireumstances that might allow equitable tolling. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "equitable tolling appropriate where district court's erroneous enforcement of an unconstitutional statute barred the plaintiff from timely filing claims",
"sentence": "CJL Hanger v. Abbott, 73 U.S. 582, 584, 6 Wall. 582, 18 L.Ed. 989 (1867) (extraor... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "911 P.2d 1097, 1097",
"parenthetical": "the reasoning underlying equitable tolling decisions is \"that it is unfair to penalize the plaintiff for cireumstances outside his or her control, so long as the plaintiff makes good faith efforts to pursue the claims when possible\""... | 6,964,782 | a |
T 18 Plaintiffs have not alleged the type of truly extraordinary cireumstances that might allow equitable tolling. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "911 P.2d 1097, 1097",
"parenthetical": "the reasoning underlying equitable tolling decisions is \"that it is unfair to penalize the plaintiff for cireumstances outside his or her control, so long as the plaintiff makes good faith efforts to pursue the claims when possible\""... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "equitable tolling appropriate where district court's erroneous enforcement of an unconstitutional statute barred the plaintiff from timely filing claims",
"sentence": "CJL Hanger v. Abbott, 73 U.S. 582, 584, 6 Wall. 582, 18 L.Ed. 989 (1867) (extraor... | 6,964,782 | b |
T 18 Plaintiffs have not alleged the type of truly extraordinary cireumstances that might allow equitable tolling. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "911 P.2d 1097, 1097",
"parenthetical": "the reasoning underlying equitable tolling decisions is \"that it is unfair to penalize the plaintiff for cireumstances outside his or her control, so long as the plaintiff makes good faith efforts to pursue the claims when possible\""... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "equitable tolling appropriate where district court's erroneous enforcement of an unconstitutional statute barred the plaintiff from timely filing claims",
"sentence": "CJL Hanger v. Abbott, 73 U.S. 582, 584, 6 Wall. 582, 18 L.Ed. 989 (1867) (extraor... | 6,964,782 | b |
T 18 Plaintiffs have not alleged the type of truly extraordinary cireumstances that might allow equitable tolling. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "911 P.2d 1097, 1097",
"parenthetical": "the reasoning underlying equitable tolling decisions is \"that it is unfair to penalize the plaintiff for cireumstances outside his or her control, so long as the plaintiff makes good faith efforts to pursue the claims when possible\""... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "164 F.2d 767, 768-69",
"parenthetical": "extraordinary circumstances found where the plaintiff could not file suit within limitations period because he was held prisoner by Japan during World War II",
"sentence": "CJL Hanger v. Abbott, 73 U.S. 582, 584, 6 Wall. 582, 18 L.... | 6,964,782 | b |
Because we conclude that section 609.74(1) does not reach appellants' conduct, we need not consider their other arguments under the U.S. Constitution. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "713 N.W.2d 350, 355",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e do not reach constitutional issues if the matter can be resolved otherwise.\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Wyatt, 361 N.W.2d 839, 840 (Minn.1985) (“Having disposed of this case on a factual basis, we need not consider the const... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "361 N.W.2d 839, 840",
"parenthetical": "\"Having disposed of this case on a factual basis, we need not consider the constitutional challenge.\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Wyatt, 361 N.W.2d 839, 840 (Minn.1985) (“Having disposed of this case on a factual basis, we need not cons... | 8,307,925 | b |
We agree with the Seventh Circuit that, "[although an employee's status as a policymaker bears considerable attention when weighing the interests of the government, the policymaking employee exception does not apply and courts must apply Pickering balancing when the speech at issue does not implicate the employee's pol... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "165 F.3d 154, 162",
"parenthetical": "\"Although it is true that, consistent with the First Amendment, a policymaking employee may be discharged on the basis of political affiliation such as membership (or lack of membership",
"sentence": "Bonds v. Milwaukee County, 207 F.... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "125 F.3d 1328, 1334",
"parenthetical": "\"Because we hold that [plaintiffs] position ... was a policymaking one, we do not address [plaintiffs] claim that under the Pickering balancing test his interest in free speech outweighs the [employer's] interest in running an efficien... | 11,220,312 | a |
We agree with the Seventh Circuit that, "[although an employee's status as a policymaker bears considerable attention when weighing the interests of the government, the policymaking employee exception does not apply and courts must apply Pickering balancing when the speech at issue does not implicate the employee's pol... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "125 F.3d 1328, 1334",
"parenthetical": "\"Because we hold that [plaintiffs] position ... was a policymaking one, we do not address [plaintiffs] claim that under the Pickering balancing test his interest in free speech outweighs the [employer's] interest in running an efficien... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Although it is true that, consistent with the First Amendment, a policymaking employee may be discharged on the basis of political affiliation such as membership (or lack of membership",
"sentence": "Bonds v. Milwaukee County, 207 F.3d 969, 979 (7t... | 11,220,312 | b |
We agree with the Seventh Circuit that, "[although an employee's status as a policymaker bears considerable attention when weighing the interests of the government, the policymaking employee exception does not apply and courts must apply Pickering balancing when the speech at issue does not implicate the employee's pol... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Although it is true that, consistent with the First Amendment, a policymaking employee may be discharged on the basis of political affiliation such as membership (or lack of membership",
"sentence": "Bonds v. Milwaukee County, 207 F.3d 969, 979 (7t... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "125 F.3d 1328, 1334",
"parenthetical": "\"Because we hold that [plaintiffs] position ... was a policymaking one, we do not address [plaintiffs] claim that under the Pickering balancing test his interest in free speech outweighs the [employer's] interest in running an efficien... | 11,220,312 | a |
Additionally, our court has held that a transfer or reassignment can be the equivalent of a demotion, and thus constitute an adverse employment action. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "277 F.3d 757, 770",
"parenthetical": "\"A job transfer that includes a shift change that involves changes in duties or compensation or can be objectively characterized as a demotion may be an 'adverse employment action'.... \"",
"sentence": "Id. at 613 (quoting Sharp v. C... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "164 F.3d 933, 933",
"parenthetical": "\"The jury could have viewed transferring from the elite Mounted Patrol to a teaching post at the Police Academy to be, objectively, a demotion.\"",
"sentence": "Id. at 613 (quoting Sharp v. City of Hous., 164 F.3d 923, 933 (5th Cir.1999));... | 4,183,165 | a |
Additionally, our court has held that a transfer or reassignment can be the equivalent of a demotion, and thus constitute an adverse employment action. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "277 F.3d 757, 770",
"parenthetical": "\"A job transfer that includes a shift change that involves changes in duties or compensation or can be objectively characterized as a demotion may be an 'adverse employment action'.... \"",
"sentence": "Id. at 613 (quoting Sharp v. C... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "91 F.3d 769, 774",
"parenthetical": "recognizing as demotions the reassignment of two police officers from the Intelligence Unit to night patrol because the Intelligence Unit positions \"were more prestigious, had better work ing hours, and were more interesting than night patrol... | 4,183,165 | a |
Texas courts have consistently held that stock options acquired during marriage are a contingent property interest and a community asset subject to division upon divorce. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "544 S.W.2d 665, 665-66",
"parenthetical": "holding that employee spouse's accrued but un-vested retirement benefits are a contingent property interest and a community asset",
"sentence": "Kline, 17 S.W.3d at 446; Bodin, 955 S.W.2d at 381; see also Cearley, 544 S.W.2d at 66... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "755 S.W.2d 496, 498",
"parenthetical": "holding that employee spouses's interest in his company's profit sharing stock plan awarded for work done outside of marriage was spouse's separate property",
"sentence": "But see Acosta v. Acosta, 836 S.W.2d 652, 654 (Tex.App.-El Pas... | 9,394,875 | a |
I would adopt the third district's reasoning in its entirety. Thus, I would affirm the trial courts' denials of the appellants' motions for post-conviction relief. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "101 So.3d 886, 888",
"parenthetical": "agreeing with Geter, adopting its reasoning in its entirety, and holding that Miller should not be applied retroactively",
"sentence": "See Gonzalez v. State, 101 So.3d 886, 888 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (agreeing with Geter, adopting its reason... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "133 So.3d 540, 547",
"parenthetical": "concluding that Miller applies retroactively and certifying conflict with Geter and Gonzalez",
"sentence": "See Gonzalez v. State, 101 So.3d 886, 888 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (agreeing with Geter, adopting its reasoning in its entirety, and... | 6,937,630 | a |
Indeed, this testimony does not fall into either category of victim-related evidence. Troy testified regarding his thoughts at the time of the incident; he did not testify regarding the effect that the crime had had on his life or how the incident had affected him and his family. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "67 S.W.3d 918, 928",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he testimony in the present case did not involve testimony about how third persons were affected by the crime, nor was there any discussion about the character of the victim.\"",
"sentence": "See Mathis v. State, 67 S.W.3d 918, 928 (T... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "296 S.W.3d 553, 553",
"parenthetical": "characterizing, in murder case, victim-impact evidence as \"evidence of the effect the victim's death has on other people\"",
"sentence": "See Mathis v. State, 67 S.W.3d 918, 928 (Tex.Crim.App.2002) (“[T]he testimony in the present c... | 7,314,599 | a |
Indeed, this testimony does not fall into either category of victim-related evidence. Troy testified regarding his thoughts at the time of the incident; he did not testify regarding the effect that the crime had had on his life or how the incident had affected him and his family. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "194 S.W.3d 711, 711",
"parenthetical": "\"Relevant victim impact evidence may include the physical, psychological, or economic effects of a crime on the victim or the victim's family.\"",
"sentence": "See Mathis v. State, 67 S.W.3d 918, 928 (Tex.Crim.App.2002) (“[T]he test... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "67 S.W.3d 918, 928",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he testimony in the present case did not involve testimony about how third persons were affected by the crime, nor was there any discussion about the character of the victim.\"",
"sentence": "See Mathis v. State, 67 S.W.3d 918, 928 (T... | 7,314,599 | b |
New Jersey courts have held manufacturers strictly liable for products, despite another's subsequent substantial alterations, when those alterations were objectively foreseeable and likely to cause injury. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "requiring a product to be \"suitably safe after it has been ... foreseeably altered\"",
"sentence": "See Brown v. United States Stove Co., 98 N.J. 155, 484 A.2d 1234, 1239-41 (1984) (requiring a product to be “suitably safe after it has been ... foreseeab... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "imposing liability for negligent failure to reasonably foresee intentional, willful, or criminal acts of third persons that proximately cause injuries",
"sentence": "See Brown v. United States Stove Co., 98 N.J. 155, 484 A.2d 1234, 1239-41 (1984) (requiri... | 11,084,851 | a |
New Jersey courts have held manufacturers strictly liable for products, despite another's subsequent substantial alterations, when those alterations were objectively foreseeable and likely to cause injury. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "imposing liability for negligent failure to reasonably foresee intentional, willful, or criminal acts of third persons that proximately cause injuries",
"sentence": "See Brown v. United States Stove Co., 98 N.J. 155, 484 A.2d 1234, 1239-41 (1984) (requiri... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "requiring a product to be \"suitably safe after it has been ... foreseeably altered\"",
"sentence": "See Brown v. United States Stove Co., 98 N.J. 155, 484 A.2d 1234, 1239-41 (1984) (requiring a product to be “suitably safe after it has been ... foreseeab... | 11,084,851 | b |
New Jersey courts have held manufacturers strictly liable for products, despite another's subsequent substantial alterations, when those alterations were objectively foreseeable and likely to cause injury. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "484 A.2d 1234, 1239-41",
"parenthetical": "requiring a product to be \"suitably safe after it has been ... foreseeably altered\"",
"sentence": "See Brown v. United States Stove Co., 98 N.J. 155, 484 A.2d 1234, 1239-41 (1984) (requiring a product to be “suitably safe after it ha... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "imposing liability for negligent failure to reasonably foresee intentional, willful, or criminal acts of third persons that proximately cause injuries",
"sentence": "See Brown v. United States Stove Co., 98 N.J. 155, 484 A.2d 1234, 1239-41 (1984) (requiri... | 11,084,851 | a |
New Jersey courts have held manufacturers strictly liable for products, despite another's subsequent substantial alterations, when those alterations were objectively foreseeable and likely to cause injury. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "484 A.2d 1234, 1239-41",
"parenthetical": "requiring a product to be \"suitably safe after it has been ... foreseeably altered\"",
"sentence": "See Brown v. United States Stove Co., 98 N.J. 155, 484 A.2d 1234, 1239-41 (1984) (requiring a product to be “suitably safe after it ha... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "imposing liability for negligent failure to reasonably foresee intentional, willful, or criminal acts of third persons that proximately cause injuries",
"sentence": "See Brown v. United States Stove Co., 98 N.J. 155, 484 A.2d 1234, 1239-41 (1984) (requiri... | 11,084,851 | a |
The district court held that, because this claim is foreclosed by clear precedent, the state court's rejection of it was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "530 U.S. 156, 169",
"parenthetical": "parole eligibility instruction required \"only ... [in] instances where, as a legal matter, there is no possibility of parole if the jury decides the appropriate sentence is life in prison\"",
"sentence": "See Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "362 F.3d 323, 332-33",
"parenthetical": "collecting cases holding that Constitution does not require Texas trial courts to instruct juries as to the meaning of life in prison because the defendant would not, if sentenced to life imprisonment, be ineligible for parole",
"se... | 2,212,714 | a |
The district court held that, because this claim is foreclosed by clear precedent, the state court's rejection of it was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "parole eligibility instruction required \"only ... [in] instances where, as a legal matter, there is no possibility of parole if the jury decides the appropriate sentence is life in prison\"",
"sentence": "See Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156, 169, 120 S... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "362 F.3d 323, 332-33",
"parenthetical": "collecting cases holding that Constitution does not require Texas trial courts to instruct juries as to the meaning of life in prison because the defendant would not, if sentenced to life imprisonment, be ineligible for parole",
"se... | 2,212,714 | a |
The district court held that, because this claim is foreclosed by clear precedent, the state court's rejection of it was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "362 F.3d 323, 332-33",
"parenthetical": "collecting cases holding that Constitution does not require Texas trial courts to instruct juries as to the meaning of life in prison because the defendant would not, if sentenced to life imprisonment, be ineligible for parole",
"se... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "parole eligibility instruction required \"only ... [in] instances where, as a legal matter, there is no possibility of parole if the jury decides the appropriate sentence is life in prison\"",
"sentence": "See Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156, 169, 120 S... | 2,212,714 | b |
To begin with, the remedies under RICO do not include setting aside a prior judgment or undermining its preclusive effect by a collateral attack. The circuits to consider the matter have rejected such relief. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "512 F.3d 742, 747, 749-50",
"parenthetical": "RICO suit was impermissible collateral attack on foreign arbitration award",
"sentence": "See Hendrick v. H.E. Avent, 891 F.2d 583, 585-87 (5th Cir.1990) (collateral attack on judgment through RICO claim is barred by res judica... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "891 F.2d 583, 585-87",
"parenthetical": "collateral attack on judgment through RICO claim is barred by res judicata",
"sentence": "See Hendrick v. H.E. Avent, 891 F.2d 583, 585-87 (5th Cir.1990) (collateral attack on judgment through RICO claim is barred by res judicata); Gekas... | 4,064,084 | b |
To begin with, the remedies under RICO do not include setting aside a prior judgment or undermining its preclusive effect by a collateral attack. The circuits to consider the matter have rejected such relief. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "891 F.2d 583, 585-87",
"parenthetical": "collateral attack on judgment through RICO claim is barred by res judicata",
"sentence": "See Hendrick v. H.E. Avent, 891 F.2d 583, 585-87 (5th Cir.1990) (collateral attack on judgment through RICO claim is barred by res judicata); Gekas... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "387 F.3d 721, 731-32",
"parenthetical": "RICO claims by nonparty to bankruptcy action were impermissible collateral attack on bankruptcy judgment that was good against the world",
"sentence": "See Hendrick v. H.E. Avent, 891 F.2d 583, 585-87 (5th Cir.1990) (collateral atta... | 4,064,084 | a |
To begin with, the remedies under RICO do not include setting aside a prior judgment or undermining its preclusive effect by a collateral attack. The circuits to consider the matter have rejected such relief. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "861 F.2d 1012, 1016",
"parenthetical": "\"RICO is many things, but it is not an exception to res judicata.\"",
"sentence": "See Hendrick v. H.E. Avent, 891 F.2d 583, 585-87 (5th Cir.1990) (collateral attack on judgment through RICO claim is barred by res judicata); Gekas v. Pip... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "512 F.3d 742, 747, 749-50",
"parenthetical": "RICO suit was impermissible collateral attack on foreign arbitration award",
"sentence": "See Hendrick v. H.E. Avent, 891 F.2d 583, 585-87 (5th Cir.1990) (collateral attack on judgment through RICO claim is barred by res judica... | 4,064,084 | a |
To begin with, the remedies under RICO do not include setting aside a prior judgment or undermining its preclusive effect by a collateral attack. The circuits to consider the matter have rejected such relief. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "861 F.2d 1012, 1016",
"parenthetical": "\"RICO is many things, but it is not an exception to res judicata.\"",
"sentence": "See Hendrick v. H.E. Avent, 891 F.2d 583, 585-87 (5th Cir.1990) (collateral attack on judgment through RICO claim is barred by res judicata); Gekas v. Pip... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "387 F.3d 721, 731-32",
"parenthetical": "RICO claims by nonparty to bankruptcy action were impermissible collateral attack on bankruptcy judgment that was good against the world",
"sentence": "See Hendrick v. H.E. Avent, 891 F.2d 583, 585-87 (5th Cir.1990) (collateral atta... | 4,064,084 | a |
We find that Defendants' convictions for conspiracy to distribute heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. SSSS 841(b)(1)(C), 846, and conspiracy to defraud the United States or commit any offense against the United States (la, provide and possess contraband in prison), in violation of 18 U.S.C. SS 371, although both stemming... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that a single conspiracy \"can give rise to distinct offenses under separate statutes without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause\"",
"sentence": "See Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 344 n. 3, 101 S.Ct. 1137, 67 L.Ed.2d 275 (1981) (r... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "128 F.3d 1254, 1257-58",
"parenthetical": "holding that convictions under SSSS 846 and 371 do not offend the Double Jeopardy Clause",
"sentence": "See Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 344 n. 3, 101 S.Ct. 1137, 67 L.Ed.2d 275 (1981) (recognizing that a single conspi... | 5,739,239 | a |
We find that Defendants' convictions for conspiracy to distribute heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. SSSS 841(b)(1)(C), 846, and conspiracy to defraud the United States or commit any offense against the United States (la, provide and possess contraband in prison), in violation of 18 U.S.C. SS 371, although both stemming... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "128 F.3d 1254, 1257-58",
"parenthetical": "holding that convictions under SSSS 846 and 371 do not offend the Double Jeopardy Clause",
"sentence": "See Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 344 n. 3, 101 S.Ct. 1137, 67 L.Ed.2d 275 (1981) (recognizing that a single conspi... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that a single conspiracy \"can give rise to distinct offenses under separate statutes without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause\"",
"sentence": "See Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 344 n. 3, 101 S.Ct. 1137, 67 L.Ed.2d 275 (1981) (r... | 5,739,239 | b |
We find that Defendants' convictions for conspiracy to distribute heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. SSSS 841(b)(1)(C), 846, and conspiracy to defraud the United States or commit any offense against the United States (la, provide and possess contraband in prison), in violation of 18 U.S.C. SS 371, although both stemming... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that a single conspiracy \"can give rise to distinct offenses under separate statutes without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause\"",
"sentence": "See Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 344 n. 3, 101 S.Ct. 1137, 67 L.Ed.2d 275 (1981) (r... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "128 F.3d 1254, 1257-58",
"parenthetical": "holding that convictions under SSSS 846 and 371 do not offend the Double Jeopardy Clause",
"sentence": "See Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 344 n. 3, 101 S.Ct. 1137, 67 L.Ed.2d 275 (1981) (recognizing that a single conspi... | 5,739,239 | a |
We cannot agree, however, that Dr. Lichtman's omission of General Assembly election data from his analysis undermines the validity of this methodology or the probativeness of his results. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "88 F.3d 1393, 1397",
"parenthetical": "based on statistical evidence from exogenous elections, court concludes that racially polarized voting exists",
"sentence": "See NAACP, 252 F.3d at 370 (“the exogenous character of elections does not render them nonpro-bative”); Solom... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "252 F.3d 370, 370",
"parenthetical": "\"the exogenous character of elections does not render them nonpro-bative\"",
"sentence": "See NAACP, 252 F.3d at 370 (“the exogenous character of elections does not render them nonpro-bative”); Solomon v. Liberty County Comm’rs, 221 F.3d 1... | 9,435,357 | b |
We cannot agree, however, that Dr. Lichtman's omission of General Assembly election data from his analysis undermines the validity of this methodology or the probativeness of his results. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "221 F.3d 1218, 1227",
"parenthetical": "district court not required to consider endogenous elections more probative",
"sentence": "See NAACP, 252 F.3d at 370 (“the exogenous character of elections does not render them nonpro-bative”); Solomon v. Liberty County Comm’rs, 221 F.3d... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "88 F.3d 1393, 1397",
"parenthetical": "based on statistical evidence from exogenous elections, court concludes that racially polarized voting exists",
"sentence": "See NAACP, 252 F.3d at 370 (“the exogenous character of elections does not render them nonpro-bative”); Solom... | 9,435,357 | a |
That the nonjusticiability of a claim may not be waived does not render justiciability a jurisdictional issue, and this court has been careful to distinguish between the two concepts. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "413 F.3d 45, 48",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e need not resolve the question of the district court's subject-matter jurisdiction ... before considering whether the complaint presents a nonjusticiable political question\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Joo v. Japan, 413 F.3d 45, 48 (2005... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding the Totten rule requiring dismissal on the ground of public policy, \"like the abstention doctrine ... or the prudential standing doctrine, represents the sort of 'threshold question' we have recognized may be resolved before addressing jurisdi... | 4,038,982 | a |
That the nonjusticiability of a claim may not be waived does not render justiciability a jurisdictional issue, and this court has been careful to distinguish between the two concepts. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding the Totten rule requiring dismissal on the ground of public policy, \"like the abstention doctrine ... or the prudential standing doctrine, represents the sort of 'threshold question' we have recognized may be resolved before addressing jurisdi... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "413 F.3d 45, 48",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e need not resolve the question of the district court's subject-matter jurisdiction ... before considering whether the complaint presents a nonjusticiable political question\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Joo v. Japan, 413 F.3d 45, 48 (2005... | 4,038,982 | b |
That the nonjusticiability of a claim may not be waived does not render justiciability a jurisdictional issue, and this court has been careful to distinguish between the two concepts. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "413 F.3d 45, 48",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e need not resolve the question of the district court's subject-matter jurisdiction ... before considering whether the complaint presents a nonjusticiable political question\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Joo v. Japan, 413 F.3d 45, 48 (2005... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding the Totten rule requiring dismissal on the ground of public policy, \"like the abstention doctrine ... or the prudential standing doctrine, represents the sort of 'threshold question' we have recognized may be resolved before addressing jurisdi... | 4,038,982 | a |
That the nonjusticiability of a claim may not be waived does not render justiciability a jurisdictional issue, and this court has been careful to distinguish between the two concepts. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding the Totten rule requiring dismissal on the ground of public policy, \"like the abstention doctrine ... or the prudential standing doctrine, represents the sort of 'threshold question' we have recognized may be resolved before addressing jurisdi... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "486 F.3d 1342, 1347",
"parenthetical": "noting \"a federal court may, in appropriate circumstances, dismiss a case on prudential grounds prior to establishing its jurisdiction\" and applying the enrolled bill rule",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Joo v. Japan, 413 F.3d 45, 48 (2005) (... | 4,038,982 | b |
That the nonjusticiability of a claim may not be waived does not render justiciability a jurisdictional issue, and this court has been careful to distinguish between the two concepts. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding the Totten rule requiring dismissal on the ground of public policy, \"like the abstention doctrine ... or the prudential standing doctrine, represents the sort of 'threshold question' we have recognized may be resolved before addressing jurisdi... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "486 F.3d 1342, 1347",
"parenthetical": "noting \"a federal court may, in appropriate circumstances, dismiss a case on prudential grounds prior to establishing its jurisdiction\" and applying the enrolled bill rule",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Joo v. Japan, 413 F.3d 45, 48 (2005) (... | 4,038,982 | b |
That the nonjusticiability of a claim may not be waived does not render justiciability a jurisdictional issue, and this court has been careful to distinguish between the two concepts. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding the Totten rule requiring dismissal on the ground of public policy, \"like the abstention doctrine ... or the prudential standing doctrine, represents the sort of 'threshold question' we have recognized may be resolved before addressing jurisdi... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "486 F.3d 1342, 1347",
"parenthetical": "noting \"a federal court may, in appropriate circumstances, dismiss a case on prudential grounds prior to establishing its jurisdiction\" and applying the enrolled bill rule",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Joo v. Japan, 413 F.3d 45, 48 (2005) (... | 4,038,982 | b |
That the nonjusticiability of a claim may not be waived does not render justiciability a jurisdictional issue, and this court has been careful to distinguish between the two concepts. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding the Totten rule requiring dismissal on the ground of public policy, \"like the abstention doctrine ... or the prudential standing doctrine, represents the sort of 'threshold question' we have recognized may be resolved before addressing jurisdi... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "139 F.3d 247, 255",
"parenthetical": "\"[Although subject-matter jurisdiction is special for many purposes ... a court [may instead] dismiss[ ] on other non-merits grounds such as forum non conveniens\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Joo v. Japan, 413 F.3d 45, 48 (2005) (“[W]e need ... | 4,038,982 | b |
That the nonjusticiability of a claim may not be waived does not render justiciability a jurisdictional issue, and this court has been careful to distinguish between the two concepts. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding the Totten rule requiring dismissal on the ground of public policy, \"like the abstention doctrine ... or the prudential standing doctrine, represents the sort of 'threshold question' we have recognized may be resolved before addressing jurisdi... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "139 F.3d 247, 255",
"parenthetical": "\"[Although subject-matter jurisdiction is special for many purposes ... a court [may instead] dismiss[ ] on other non-merits grounds such as forum non conveniens\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Joo v. Japan, 413 F.3d 45, 48 (2005) (“[W]e need ... | 4,038,982 | b |
That the nonjusticiability of a claim may not be waived does not render justiciability a jurisdictional issue, and this court has been careful to distinguish between the two concepts. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding the Totten rule requiring dismissal on the ground of public policy, \"like the abstention doctrine ... or the prudential standing doctrine, represents the sort of 'threshold question' we have recognized may be resolved before addressing jurisdi... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "139 F.3d 247, 255",
"parenthetical": "\"[Although subject-matter jurisdiction is special for many purposes ... a court [may instead] dismiss[ ] on other non-merits grounds such as forum non conveniens\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Joo v. Japan, 413 F.3d 45, 48 (2005) (“[W]e need ... | 4,038,982 | b |
Indeed, the importance of disclosure to the tribunal of potential mental disabilities is so central to the integrity of judicial determinations that it is well settled that even a private plaintiff has statutory and common-law obligations to come forward with information that the party against whom he seeks relief may ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "interpreting CPLR 1201 and CPLR 1203, guardian ad litem statutes, and holding that default could not be granted without appointment of guardian ad litem",
"sentence": "See Parras v. Ricciardi, 185 Misc.2d 209, 710 N.Y.S.2d 792, 795-97 (2000) (“It is ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"It is the [landlord's] obligation to bring the [tenant's] possible mental incompetency to the Court's attention .... \"",
"sentence": "See Parras v. Ricciardi, 185 Misc.2d 209, 710 N.Y.S.2d 792, 795-97 (2000) (“It is the [landlord’s] obligation to bring... | 9,179,492 | b |
Indeed, the importance of disclosure to the tribunal of potential mental disabilities is so central to the integrity of judicial determinations that it is well settled that even a private plaintiff has statutory and common-law obligations to come forward with information that the party against whom he seeks relief may ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"It is the [landlord's] obligation to bring the [tenant's] possible mental incompetency to the Court's attention .... \"",
"sentence": "See Parras v. Ricciardi, 185 Misc.2d 209, 710 N.Y.S.2d 792, 795-97 (2000) (“It is the [landlord’s] obligation to bring... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "326 N.Y.S.2d 458, 461-62",
"parenthetical": "interpreting CPLR 1201 and CPLR 1203, guardian ad litem statutes, and holding that default could not be granted without appointment of guardian ad litem",
"sentence": "See Parras v. Ricciardi, 185 Misc.2d 209, 710 N.Y.S.2d 792, ... | 9,179,492 | a |
Indeed, the importance of disclosure to the tribunal of potential mental disabilities is so central to the integrity of judicial determinations that it is well settled that even a private plaintiff has statutory and common-law obligations to come forward with information that the party against whom he seeks relief may ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "710 N.Y.S.2d 792, 795-97",
"parenthetical": "\"It is the [landlord's] obligation to bring the [tenant's] possible mental incompetency to the Court's attention .... \"",
"sentence": "See Parras v. Ricciardi, 185 Misc.2d 209, 710 N.Y.S.2d 792, 795-97 (2000) (“It is the [landlord’... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "interpreting CPLR 1201 and CPLR 1203, guardian ad litem statutes, and holding that default could not be granted without appointment of guardian ad litem",
"sentence": "See Parras v. Ricciardi, 185 Misc.2d 209, 710 N.Y.S.2d 792, 795-97 (2000) (“It is ... | 9,179,492 | a |
Indeed, the importance of disclosure to the tribunal of potential mental disabilities is so central to the integrity of judicial determinations that it is well settled that even a private plaintiff has statutory and common-law obligations to come forward with information that the party against whom he seeks relief may ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "326 N.Y.S.2d 458, 461-62",
"parenthetical": "interpreting CPLR 1201 and CPLR 1203, guardian ad litem statutes, and holding that default could not be granted without appointment of guardian ad litem",
"sentence": "See Parras v. Ricciardi, 185 Misc.2d 209, 710 N.Y.S.2d 792, ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "710 N.Y.S.2d 792, 795-97",
"parenthetical": "\"It is the [landlord's] obligation to bring the [tenant's] possible mental incompetency to the Court's attention .... \"",
"sentence": "See Parras v. Ricciardi, 185 Misc.2d 209, 710 N.Y.S.2d 792, 795-97 (2000) (“It is the [landlord’... | 9,179,492 | b |
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