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As the Tax Court observed in this case, although tax laws designed to raise revenue and simultaneously discourage lawful conduct, such as early withdrawal of retirement savings, must be understood as serving to deter, such taxes generally are not viewed as implicating the Excessive Fines Clause. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "114 S.Ct. 1937, 1947",
"parenthetical": "concluding that Montana's tax on illegal possession of marijuana imposed punishment within the meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause and distinguishing taxes that have the dual purpose of raising revenue and discouraging undesirable b... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "277 F.3d 1330, 1336",
"parenthetical": "concluding that additional tax for early withdrawal of funds in an IRA does not implicate the Excessive Fines Clause because early withdrawal is not proscribed",
"sentence": "See Kitt v. United States, 277 F.3d 1330, 1336 (Fed.Cir.2002) (... | 3,896,389 | b |
As the Tax Court observed in this case, although tax laws designed to raise revenue and simultaneously discourage lawful conduct, such as early withdrawal of retirement savings, must be understood as serving to deter, such taxes generally are not viewed as implicating the Excessive Fines Clause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "277 F.3d 1330, 1336",
"parenthetical": "concluding that additional tax for early withdrawal of funds in an IRA does not implicate the Excessive Fines Clause because early withdrawal is not proscribed",
"sentence": "See Kitt v. United States, 277 F.3d 1330, 1336 (Fed.Cir.2002) (... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "128 L.Ed.2d 767, 780",
"parenthetical": "concluding that Montana's tax on illegal possession of marijuana imposed punishment within the meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause and distinguishing taxes that have the dual purpose of raising revenue and discouraging undesirable b... | 3,896,389 | a |
In citing those decisions, Tabor focuses only on the words uttered. He fails to note that in many of those cases, the offending words were used in heated face-to-face confrontations where the speaker showered police officers with abuse. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant called the arresting officer a \"son of a bitch,\" \"mother fucker,\" \"pig,\" \"motherfucking pig\" and a \"bastard.\"",
"sentence": "Bolden v. State, 148 Ga.App. 315, 251 S.E.2d 165, 167 (1978) (defendant called the arresting officer a “... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding a conviction under the current disorderly conduct statute when an individual called an officer a \"no-good son of a bitch\" and threatened to \"kick [his] ass.\"",
"sentence": "Bolden v. State, 148 Ga.App. 315, 251 S.E.2d 165, 167 (1978) (d... | 4,141,001 | a |
In citing those decisions, Tabor focuses only on the words uttered. He fails to note that in many of those cases, the offending words were used in heated face-to-face confrontations where the speaker showered police officers with abuse. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "499 S.E.2d 717, 720",
"parenthetical": "upholding a conviction under the current disorderly conduct statute when an individual called an officer a \"no-good son of a bitch\" and threatened to \"kick [his] ass.\"",
"sentence": "Bolden v. State, 148 Ga.App. 315, 251 S.E.2d 1... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant called the arresting officer a \"son of a bitch,\" \"mother fucker,\" \"pig,\" \"motherfucking pig\" and a \"bastard.\"",
"sentence": "Bolden v. State, 148 Ga.App. 315, 251 S.E.2d 165, 167 (1978) (defendant called the arresting officer a “... | 4,141,001 | b |
In citing those decisions, Tabor focuses only on the words uttered. He fails to note that in many of those cases, the offending words were used in heated face-to-face confrontations where the speaker showered police officers with abuse. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding a conviction under the current disorderly conduct statute when an individual called an officer a \"no-good son of a bitch\" and threatened to \"kick [his] ass.\"",
"sentence": "Bolden v. State, 148 Ga.App. 315, 251 S.E.2d 165, 167 (1978) (d... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "251 S.E.2d 165, 167",
"parenthetical": "defendant called the arresting officer a \"son of a bitch,\" \"mother fucker,\" \"pig,\" \"motherfucking pig\" and a \"bastard.\"",
"sentence": "Bolden v. State, 148 Ga.App. 315, 251 S.E.2d 165, 167 (1978) (defendant called the arre... | 4,141,001 | b |
In citing those decisions, Tabor focuses only on the words uttered. He fails to note that in many of those cases, the offending words were used in heated face-to-face confrontations where the speaker showered police officers with abuse. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "499 S.E.2d 717, 720",
"parenthetical": "upholding a conviction under the current disorderly conduct statute when an individual called an officer a \"no-good son of a bitch\" and threatened to \"kick [his] ass.\"",
"sentence": "Bolden v. State, 148 Ga.App. 315, 251 S.E.2d 1... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "251 S.E.2d 165, 167",
"parenthetical": "defendant called the arresting officer a \"son of a bitch,\" \"mother fucker,\" \"pig,\" \"motherfucking pig\" and a \"bastard.\"",
"sentence": "Bolden v. State, 148 Ga.App. 315, 251 S.E.2d 165, 167 (1978) (defendant called the arre... | 4,141,001 | b |
In citing those decisions, Tabor focuses only on the words uttered. He fails to note that in many of those cases, the offending words were used in heated face-to-face confrontations where the speaker showered police officers with abuse. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding a conviction under the current disorderly conduct statute when an individual called an officer a \"no-good son of a bitch\" and threatened to \"kick [his] ass.\"",
"sentence": "Bolden v. State, 148 Ga.App. 315, 251 S.E.2d 165, 167 (1978) (d... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant called the officer a \"goddamned liar\" and told the officers at the scene to \"fuck off.\"",
"sentence": "Bolden v. State, 148 Ga.App. 315, 251 S.E.2d 165, 167 (1978) (defendant called the arresting officer a “son of a bitch,” “mother fuc... | 4,141,001 | b |
In citing those decisions, Tabor focuses only on the words uttered. He fails to note that in many of those cases, the offending words were used in heated face-to-face confrontations where the speaker showered police officers with abuse. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant called the officer a \"goddamned liar\" and told the officers at the scene to \"fuck off.\"",
"sentence": "Bolden v. State, 148 Ga.App. 315, 251 S.E.2d 165, 167 (1978) (defendant called the arresting officer a “son of a bitch,” “mother fuc... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "499 S.E.2d 717, 720",
"parenthetical": "upholding a conviction under the current disorderly conduct statute when an individual called an officer a \"no-good son of a bitch\" and threatened to \"kick [his] ass.\"",
"sentence": "Bolden v. State, 148 Ga.App. 315, 251 S.E.2d 1... | 4,141,001 | a |
In citing those decisions, Tabor focuses only on the words uttered. He fails to note that in many of those cases, the offending words were used in heated face-to-face confrontations where the speaker showered police officers with abuse. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding a conviction under the current disorderly conduct statute when an individual called an officer a \"no-good son of a bitch\" and threatened to \"kick [his] ass.\"",
"sentence": "Bolden v. State, 148 Ga.App. 315, 251 S.E.2d 165, 167 (1978) (d... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "373 S.E.2d 52, 53-54",
"parenthetical": "defendant called the officer a \"goddamned liar\" and told the officers at the scene to \"fuck off.\"",
"sentence": "Bolden v. State, 148 Ga.App. 315, 251 S.E.2d 165, 167 (1978) (defendant called the arresting officer a “son of a b... | 4,141,001 | b |
In citing those decisions, Tabor focuses only on the words uttered. He fails to note that in many of those cases, the offending words were used in heated face-to-face confrontations where the speaker showered police officers with abuse. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "499 S.E.2d 717, 720",
"parenthetical": "upholding a conviction under the current disorderly conduct statute when an individual called an officer a \"no-good son of a bitch\" and threatened to \"kick [his] ass.\"",
"sentence": "Bolden v. State, 148 Ga.App. 315, 251 S.E.2d 1... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "373 S.E.2d 52, 53-54",
"parenthetical": "defendant called the officer a \"goddamned liar\" and told the officers at the scene to \"fuck off.\"",
"sentence": "Bolden v. State, 148 Ga.App. 315, 251 S.E.2d 165, 167 (1978) (defendant called the arresting officer a “son of a b... | 4,141,001 | b |
In citing those decisions, Tabor focuses only on the words uttered. He fails to note that in many of those cases, the offending words were used in heated face-to-face confrontations where the speaker showered police officers with abuse. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding a conviction under the current disorderly conduct statute when an individual called an officer a \"no-good son of a bitch\" and threatened to \"kick [his] ass.\"",
"sentence": "Bolden v. State, 148 Ga.App. 315, 251 S.E.2d 165, 167 (1978) (d... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant \"continually kept getting up in [the officer's] face and cussing him,\" including saying he was \"not going to any goddamn jail\" and \"not wearing any mother-fucking handcuffs.\"",
"sentence": "Bolden v. State, 148 Ga.App. 315, 251 S.E.2... | 4,141,001 | b |
In citing those decisions, Tabor focuses only on the words uttered. He fails to note that in many of those cases, the offending words were used in heated face-to-face confrontations where the speaker showered police officers with abuse. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "499 S.E.2d 717, 720",
"parenthetical": "upholding a conviction under the current disorderly conduct statute when an individual called an officer a \"no-good son of a bitch\" and threatened to \"kick [his] ass.\"",
"sentence": "Bolden v. State, 148 Ga.App. 315, 251 S.E.2d 1... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant \"continually kept getting up in [the officer's] face and cussing him,\" including saying he was \"not going to any goddamn jail\" and \"not wearing any mother-fucking handcuffs.\"",
"sentence": "Bolden v. State, 148 Ga.App. 315, 251 S.E.2... | 4,141,001 | b |
In citing those decisions, Tabor focuses only on the words uttered. He fails to note that in many of those cases, the offending words were used in heated face-to-face confrontations where the speaker showered police officers with abuse. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding a conviction under the current disorderly conduct statute when an individual called an officer a \"no-good son of a bitch\" and threatened to \"kick [his] ass.\"",
"sentence": "Bolden v. State, 148 Ga.App. 315, 251 S.E.2d 165, 167 (1978) (d... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "425 S.E.2d 371, 371",
"parenthetical": "defendant \"continually kept getting up in [the officer's] face and cussing him,\" including saying he was \"not going to any goddamn jail\" and \"not wearing any mother-fucking handcuffs.\"",
"sentence": "Bolden v. State, 148 Ga.Ap... | 4,141,001 | b |
In citing those decisions, Tabor focuses only on the words uttered. He fails to note that in many of those cases, the offending words were used in heated face-to-face confrontations where the speaker showered police officers with abuse. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "425 S.E.2d 371, 371",
"parenthetical": "defendant \"continually kept getting up in [the officer's] face and cussing him,\" including saying he was \"not going to any goddamn jail\" and \"not wearing any mother-fucking handcuffs.\"",
"sentence": "Bolden v. State, 148 Ga.Ap... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "499 S.E.2d 717, 720",
"parenthetical": "upholding a conviction under the current disorderly conduct statute when an individual called an officer a \"no-good son of a bitch\" and threatened to \"kick [his] ass.\"",
"sentence": "Bolden v. State, 148 Ga.App. 315, 251 S.E.2d 1... | 4,141,001 | a |
A majority of the circuits that have addressed the issue have concluded that the FCIA should apply only to judgments entered after the effective date. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "757 F.2d 734, 741-43",
"parenthetical": "holding that the FCIA does not apply to a September 1981 judgment against the United States for interest accruing after the act's effective date",
"sentence": "See Brooks v. United States, 757 F.2d 734, 741-43 (5th Cir.1985) (holding tha... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "734 F.2d 463, 467",
"parenthetical": "applying the state rate under former SS 1961 to an April 1982 judgment when the parties agreed that the state rate should be applied",
"sentence": "See Brooks v. United States, 757 F.2d 734, 741-43 (5th Cir.1985) (holding that the FCIA... | 1,643,336 | a |
A majority of the circuits that have addressed the issue have concluded that the FCIA should apply only to judgments entered after the effective date. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "observing that \"[tjhere is no indication that the statute was intended to have retroactive effect,\" but noting that the parties had not raised the issue",
"sentence": "See Brooks v. United States, 757 F.2d 734, 741-43 (5th Cir.1985) (holding that t... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "757 F.2d 734, 741-43",
"parenthetical": "holding that the FCIA does not apply to a September 1981 judgment against the United States for interest accruing after the act's effective date",
"sentence": "See Brooks v. United States, 757 F.2d 734, 741-43 (5th Cir.1985) (holding tha... | 1,643,336 | b |
A majority of the circuits that have addressed the issue have concluded that the FCIA should apply only to judgments entered after the effective date. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "757 F.2d 734, 741-43",
"parenthetical": "holding that the FCIA does not apply to a September 1981 judgment against the United States for interest accruing after the act's effective date",
"sentence": "See Brooks v. United States, 757 F.2d 734, 741-43 (5th Cir.1985) (holding tha... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "557 F.Supp. 514, 516-17",
"parenthetical": "holding that the FCIA does not apply to a July 1981 judgment against a private party for inter est accruing after the judgment",
"sentence": "See Brooks v. United States, 757 F.2d 734, 741-43 (5th Cir.1985) (holding that the FCIA... | 1,643,336 | a |
A majority of the circuits that have addressed the issue have concluded that the FCIA should apply only to judgments entered after the effective date. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the FCIA does not apply to a July 1981 judgment against a private party for inter est accruing after the judgment",
"sentence": "See Brooks v. United States, 757 F.2d 734, 741-43 (5th Cir.1985) (holding that the FCIA does not apply to a ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "757 F.2d 734, 741-43",
"parenthetical": "holding that the FCIA does not apply to a September 1981 judgment against the United States for interest accruing after the act's effective date",
"sentence": "See Brooks v. United States, 757 F.2d 734, 741-43 (5th Cir.1985) (holding tha... | 1,643,336 | b |
A majority of the circuits that have addressed the issue have concluded that the FCIA should apply only to judgments entered after the effective date. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "734 F.2d 463, 467",
"parenthetical": "applying the state rate under former SS 1961 to an April 1982 judgment when the parties agreed that the state rate should be applied",
"sentence": "See Brooks v. United States, 757 F.2d 734, 741-43 (5th Cir.1985) (holding that the FCIA... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "746 F.2d 168, 174-76",
"parenthetical": "holding that the FCIA does not apply to a June 1981 judgment against a private party for interest accruing either after the judgment or after the effective date",
"sentence": "See Brooks v. United States, 757 F.2d 734, 741-43 (5th Cir.19... | 1,643,336 | b |
A majority of the circuits that have addressed the issue have concluded that the FCIA should apply only to judgments entered after the effective date. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "746 F.2d 168, 174-76",
"parenthetical": "holding that the FCIA does not apply to a June 1981 judgment against a private party for interest accruing either after the judgment or after the effective date",
"sentence": "See Brooks v. United States, 757 F.2d 734, 741-43 (5th Cir.19... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "observing that \"[tjhere is no indication that the statute was intended to have retroactive effect,\" but noting that the parties had not raised the issue",
"sentence": "See Brooks v. United States, 757 F.2d 734, 741-43 (5th Cir.1985) (holding that t... | 1,643,336 | a |
A majority of the circuits that have addressed the issue have concluded that the FCIA should apply only to judgments entered after the effective date. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "746 F.2d 168, 174-76",
"parenthetical": "holding that the FCIA does not apply to a June 1981 judgment against a private party for interest accruing either after the judgment or after the effective date",
"sentence": "See Brooks v. United States, 757 F.2d 734, 741-43 (5th Cir.19... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "557 F.Supp. 514, 516-17",
"parenthetical": "holding that the FCIA does not apply to a July 1981 judgment against a private party for inter est accruing after the judgment",
"sentence": "See Brooks v. United States, 757 F.2d 734, 741-43 (5th Cir.1985) (holding that the FCIA... | 1,643,336 | a |
A majority of the circuits that have addressed the issue have concluded that the FCIA should apply only to judgments entered after the effective date. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the FCIA does not apply to a July 1981 judgment against a private party for inter est accruing after the judgment",
"sentence": "See Brooks v. United States, 757 F.2d 734, 741-43 (5th Cir.1985) (holding that the FCIA does not apply to a ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "746 F.2d 168, 174-76",
"parenthetical": "holding that the FCIA does not apply to a June 1981 judgment against a private party for interest accruing either after the judgment or after the effective date",
"sentence": "See Brooks v. United States, 757 F.2d 734, 741-43 (5th Cir.19... | 1,643,336 | b |
A majority of the circuits that have addressed the issue have concluded that the FCIA should apply only to judgments entered after the effective date. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "728 F.2d 943, 944",
"parenthetical": "rejecting without discussion the argument that the FCIA should apply to a November 1981 judgment for interest accruing after the judgment",
"sentence": "See Brooks v. United States, 757 F.2d 734, 741-43 (5th Cir.1985) (holding that the FCIA... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "734 F.2d 463, 467",
"parenthetical": "applying the state rate under former SS 1961 to an April 1982 judgment when the parties agreed that the state rate should be applied",
"sentence": "See Brooks v. United States, 757 F.2d 734, 741-43 (5th Cir.1985) (holding that the FCIA... | 1,643,336 | a |
A majority of the circuits that have addressed the issue have concluded that the FCIA should apply only to judgments entered after the effective date. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "observing that \"[tjhere is no indication that the statute was intended to have retroactive effect,\" but noting that the parties had not raised the issue",
"sentence": "See Brooks v. United States, 757 F.2d 734, 741-43 (5th Cir.1985) (holding that t... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "728 F.2d 943, 944",
"parenthetical": "rejecting without discussion the argument that the FCIA should apply to a November 1981 judgment for interest accruing after the judgment",
"sentence": "See Brooks v. United States, 757 F.2d 734, 741-43 (5th Cir.1985) (holding that the FCIA... | 1,643,336 | b |
A majority of the circuits that have addressed the issue have concluded that the FCIA should apply only to judgments entered after the effective date. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "728 F.2d 943, 944",
"parenthetical": "rejecting without discussion the argument that the FCIA should apply to a November 1981 judgment for interest accruing after the judgment",
"sentence": "See Brooks v. United States, 757 F.2d 734, 741-43 (5th Cir.1985) (holding that the FCIA... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "557 F.Supp. 514, 516-17",
"parenthetical": "holding that the FCIA does not apply to a July 1981 judgment against a private party for inter est accruing after the judgment",
"sentence": "See Brooks v. United States, 757 F.2d 734, 741-43 (5th Cir.1985) (holding that the FCIA... | 1,643,336 | a |
A majority of the circuits that have addressed the issue have concluded that the FCIA should apply only to judgments entered after the effective date. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "728 F.2d 943, 944",
"parenthetical": "rejecting without discussion the argument that the FCIA should apply to a November 1981 judgment for interest accruing after the judgment",
"sentence": "See Brooks v. United States, 757 F.2d 734, 741-43 (5th Cir.1985) (holding that the FCIA... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the FCIA does not apply to a July 1981 judgment against a private party for inter est accruing after the judgment",
"sentence": "See Brooks v. United States, 757 F.2d 734, 741-43 (5th Cir.1985) (holding that the FCIA does not apply to a ... | 1,643,336 | a |
Plaintiff has not shown sufficient evidence that could lead a reasonable jury to conclude that Defendants agreed to "act in concert to inflict an unconstitutional injury," and thus cannot hold Fire District Defendants liable under a theory of conspiracy liability. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "143 F.3d 105, 114-15",
"parenthetical": "finding allegations that a communications took place insufficient to show conspiracy, noting that \"the non-moving party may not rely on conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated speculation\"",
"sentence": "See Scotto v. Almenas, 143 F.... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "642 F.3d 364, 369",
"parenthetical": "upholding dismissal of complaint that contained only \"conclusory, vague, or general allegations of conspiracy to deprive a person of constitutional rights\" noting it \"fail[ed] to plausibly allege the existence of a conspiracy among th... | 4,331,995 | a |
The first and often the last step in any effort to interpret a piece of legislation is to examine the language of the statute. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "201 Ind. 667, 676",
"parenthetical": "the Commission must \"determine the question of its jurisdiction ... by giving [the statutes] what is known as a 'practical construction' \"",
"sentence": "See Collier v. Collier, 702 N.E.2d 351, 354 (Ind.1998); Indiana Dep’t of State ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "644 N.E.2d 870, 872",
"parenthetical": "\"nothing may be read into a statute which is not within the manifest intention of the legislature\" as ascertained from \"the plain and obvious meaning\" of the words of the statute",
"sentence": "See Collier v. Collier, 702 N.E.2d 351, ... | 11,581,676 | b |
The first and often the last step in any effort to interpret a piece of legislation is to examine the language of the statute. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "644 N.E.2d 870, 872",
"parenthetical": "\"nothing may be read into a statute which is not within the manifest intention of the legislature\" as ascertained from \"the plain and obvious meaning\" of the words of the statute",
"sentence": "See Collier v. Collier, 702 N.E.2d 351, ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "171 N.E. 65, 68",
"parenthetical": "the Commission must \"determine the question of its jurisdiction ... by giving [the statutes] what is known as a 'practical construction' \"",
"sentence": "See Collier v. Collier, 702 N.E.2d 351, 354 (Ind.1998); Indiana Dep’t of State Re... | 11,581,676 | a |
We cannot say, on the record presented to us, that either of these statements show extrinsic influence on Juror Hart or any other juror. Porter's Affidavit does not allege that Hart was influenced by these external communications, and neither William nor Chantal offer any other evidence to show that juror Hart was infl... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "761 F.2d 1459, 1465",
"parenthetical": "recognizing, that \"failure to hold a hearing constitutes ah abuse of discretion only where there is evidence that the jury was subjected to influence by outside sources.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Watchmaker, 761 F.2d 1459, 14... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "733 F.2d 842, 851",
"parenthetical": "recognizing that trial court is obligated to conduct evidentiary hearing only when defendant makes \"a colorable showing of extrinsic influence.... \"",
"sentence": "Cf. United States v. Barshov, 733 F.2d 842, 851 (11th Cir.1984) (recognizi... | 9,407,225 | a |
It failed to remind the jury that racially discriminatory motivation is a critical element of a section 1981 case. If a jury consults an external source and treats that source as complete, omissions in the information contained therein can be just as prejudicial as an affirmative misstatement. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "846 F.2d 1148, 1150-51",
"parenthetical": "in medical malpractice action, prejudicial error occurred when district court read jury a misleading dictionary definition of \"differentiated\" in response to its question regarding the meaning of \"poorly differentiated tumor\"",
"se... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "812 F.2d 499, 505",
"parenthetical": "the Ninth Circuit found prejudicial error when a juror consulted a dictionary and considered an incomplete definition of \"malice\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Marino v. Vasquez, 812 F.2d 499, 505 (9th Cir.1987) (the Ninth Circuit found preju... | 10,518,523 | b |
A petitioner must satisfy both prongs to obtain relief, but the Supreme Court has stated that "there is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim ... to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one. ..." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "466 U.S. 697, 697",
"parenthetical": "\"If it is easier to dispose of an effectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed.\"",
"sentence": "Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (“If ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "124 F.3d 73, 80",
"parenthetical": "declining to address the first prong of Strickland on the ground that the defendant could not satisfy the prejudice prong",
"sentence": "Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (“If it is easier to dispose of an effectiveness claim o... | 12,265,274 | a |
A petitioner must satisfy both prongs to obtain relief, but the Supreme Court has stated that "there is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim ... to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one. ..." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "124 F.3d 73, 80",
"parenthetical": "declining to address the first prong of Strickland on the ground that the defendant could not satisfy the prejudice prong",
"sentence": "Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (“If it is easier to dispose of an effectiveness claim o... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"If it is easier to dispose of an effectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed.\"",
"sentence": "Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (“If it is easier to... | 12,265,274 | b |
Joint Appx 290-91. It balanced those considerations against the fact that we vacated two out of the three Rule 11 violations it originally relied on, and the fact that StreetEasy devoted less than one third of its submissions to the affirmed Rule 11 violation. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that the distr... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "28 F.3d 259, 266",
"parenthetical": "recognizing court discretion in determining reasonable fee under Rule 11",
"sentence": "See Eastway Constr. Corp., 821 F.2d at 128 (recognizing district court’s wide range of discretion in setting amount of Rule 11 sanctions); see also ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "821 F.2d 128, 128",
"parenthetical": "recognizing district court's wide range of discretion in setting amount of Rule 11 sanctions",
"sentence": "See Eastway Constr. Corp., 821 F.2d at 128 (recognizing district court’s wide range of discretion in setting amount of Rule 11 sanct... | 4,347,650 | b |
. One thing unusual about the procedural posture of this case is that dispositive motions were filed early (before this Court could schedule any hearing or briefing on class certification) and that the request for certification was then made (in addition to the Complaint) in Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgmen... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "565 F.2d 1364, 1372",
"parenthetical": "affirming post-judgment certification where there was a lack of prejudice",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Larionoff v. United States, 533 F.2d 1167, 1183 (D.C.Cir.1976) (approving simultaneous entry of judgment and class certification); Ji... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "523 F.2d 689, 697",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"in some cases the final certification need not be made until the moment the merits are decided\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Larionoff v. United States, 533 F.2d 1167, 1183 (D.C.Cir.1976) (approving simultaneous entry of judgme... | 985,426 | b |
"If an average person off the street does not possess the skill, then the skill is considered special for the purposes of applying the enhancement." A special skill requires neither licensing nor formal education. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "155 F.3d 1329, 1332",
"parenthetical": "hold-ing that \"[although printing does not require licensing or formal education, it is a unique technical skill that clearly requires special training\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Foster, 155 F.3d 1329, 1332 (11th Cir. 1998)(... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2 F.3d 1107, 1111",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"[although not every instance of radio operation requires skills not possessed by members of the general public, it is possible to develop expertise in that field that rises to the level of a-special skill\"",
"sentence":... | 12,409,146 | a |
As an initial matter, the incongruent social security matter had no relevance whatsoever to the disability-discrimination claim or to finding a reasonable accommodation for Lavalle. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "364 F.3d 1065, 1065",
"parenthetical": "court noted that' in certain cases, \"inquiry] into workers' immigration status ... allow[s] [employers] to raise implicitly the threat' of deportation and criminal prosecution every time a worker, documented or undocumented, reports i... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "364 F.3d 1057, 1074",
"parenthetical": "discovery of immigration status denied because employer \"had the opportunity to examine [that status] upon hiring and that [status was] irrelevant to the question of liability\"",
"sentence": "See Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 10... | 12,266,757 | b |
As an initial matter, the incongruent social security matter had no relevance whatsoever to the disability-discrimination claim or to finding a reasonable accommodation for Lavalle. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "103 F.Supp.2d 1185, 1185",
"parenthetical": "discovery of immigration status denied because employer \"had the opportunity to examine [that status] upon hiring and that [status was] irrelevant to the question of liability\"",
"sentence": "See Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 105... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "364 F.3d 1065, 1065",
"parenthetical": "court noted that' in certain cases, \"inquiry] into workers' immigration status ... allow[s] [employers] to raise implicitly the threat' of deportation and criminal prosecution every time a worker, documented or undocumented, reports i... | 12,266,757 | a |
Given these circumstances, there is no reasonable probability that trial counsel's failure to object to the admission of the sentencing sheets had any impact on the jury's verdict. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "292 Ga. 537, 540",
"parenthetical": "admission of prior conviction to impeach witness was harmless, where witness \"made an unsolicited reference to his 'rap sheet' \" during his testimony and thus there was \"other evidence before the jury of [the witness's] criminal record... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "292 Ga. App. 560, 563-564",
"parenthetical": "trial counsel's failure to object to admission on cross-examination of sentencing sheets as part of prior convictions was not prejudicial, where defendant already admitted to the prior convictions on direct examination",
"sentence":... | 4,112,962 | b |
Given these circumstances, there is no reasonable probability that trial counsel's failure to object to the admission of the sentencing sheets had any impact on the jury's verdict. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "279 Ga. 522, 527",
"parenthetical": "admission of defendant's prior convictions was harmless in light of defendant's admissions during his testimony before the State brought up his convictions",
"sentence": "See also Hoffler v. State, 292 Ga. 537, 540 (2) (739 SE2d 362) (2... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "292 Ga. App. 560, 563-564",
"parenthetical": "trial counsel's failure to object to admission on cross-examination of sentencing sheets as part of prior convictions was not prejudicial, where defendant already admitted to the prior convictions on direct examination",
"sentence":... | 4,112,962 | b |
Under this rule, a corporation is not permitted to appear pro se. Numerous cases have considered and affirmed this principle. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "dismissing a corporation's appeal because the notice of appeal was not signed by an attorney",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Plimpton v. Cooper, 141 F.Supp.2d 573, 575 (W.D.N.C.2001) (dismissing claims brought pro se on behalf of a corporation based on lac... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "141 F.Supp.2d 573, 575",
"parenthetical": "dismissing claims brought pro se on behalf of a corporation based on lack of licensed counsel",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Plimpton v. Cooper, 141 F.Supp.2d 573, 575 (W.D.N.C.2001) (dismissing claims brought pro se on behalf of a corporat... | 8,933,375 | b |
Under this rule, a corporation is not permitted to appear pro se. Numerous cases have considered and affirmed this principle. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "dismissing a corporation's appeal because the notice of appeal was not signed by an attorney",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Plimpton v. Cooper, 141 F.Supp.2d 573, 575 (W.D.N.C.2001) (dismissing claims brought pro se on behalf of a corporation based on lac... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "141 F.Supp.2d 573, 575",
"parenthetical": "dismissing claims brought pro se on behalf of a corporation based on lack of licensed counsel",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Plimpton v. Cooper, 141 F.Supp.2d 573, 575 (W.D.N.C.2001) (dismissing claims brought pro se on behalf of a corporat... | 8,933,375 | b |
Under this rule, a corporation is not permitted to appear pro se. Numerous cases have considered and affirmed this principle. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "dismissing a corporation's appeal because the notice of appeal was not signed by an attorney",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Plimpton v. Cooper, 141 F.Supp.2d 573, 575 (W.D.N.C.2001) (dismissing claims brought pro se on behalf of a corporation based on lac... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "dismissing claims brought pro se on behalf of a corporation based on lack of licensed counsel",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Plimpton v. Cooper, 141 F.Supp.2d 573, 575 (W.D.N.C.2001) (dismissing claims brought pro se on behalf of a corporation based on lack of... | 8,933,375 | b |
Under this rule, a corporation is not permitted to appear pro se. Numerous cases have considered and affirmed this principle. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "dismissing a corporation's appeal because the notice of appeal was not signed by an attorney",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Plimpton v. Cooper, 141 F.Supp.2d 573, 575 (W.D.N.C.2001) (dismissing claims brought pro se on behalf of a corporation based on lac... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "dismissing claims brought pro se on behalf of a corporation based on lack of licensed counsel",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Plimpton v. Cooper, 141 F.Supp.2d 573, 575 (W.D.N.C.2001) (dismissing claims brought pro se on behalf of a corporation based on lack of... | 8,933,375 | b |
Under this rule, a corporation is not permitted to appear pro se. Numerous cases have considered and affirmed this principle. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "dismissing a corporation's appeal because the notice of appeal was not signed by an attorney",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Plimpton v. Cooper, 141 F.Supp.2d 573, 575 (W.D.N.C.2001) (dismissing claims brought pro se on behalf of a corporation based on lac... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "114 F.Supp.2d 422, 424",
"parenthetical": "holding that a corporate plaintiffs claims must be dismissed on the ground of failure of any attorney to appear for the corporation",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Plimpton v. Cooper, 141 F.Supp.2d 573, 575 (W.D.N.C.2001) (dismissing claims ... | 8,933,375 | b |
Under this rule, a corporation is not permitted to appear pro se. Numerous cases have considered and affirmed this principle. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "114 F.Supp.2d 422, 424",
"parenthetical": "holding that a corporate plaintiffs claims must be dismissed on the ground of failure of any attorney to appear for the corporation",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Plimpton v. Cooper, 141 F.Supp.2d 573, 575 (W.D.N.C.2001) (dismissing claims ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "dismissing a corporation's appeal because the notice of appeal was not signed by an attorney",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Plimpton v. Cooper, 141 F.Supp.2d 573, 575 (W.D.N.C.2001) (dismissing claims brought pro se on behalf of a corporation based on lac... | 8,933,375 | a |
Under this rule, a corporation is not permitted to appear pro se. Numerous cases have considered and affirmed this principle. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a corporate plaintiffs claims must be dismissed on the ground of failure of any attorney to appear for the corporation",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Plimpton v. Cooper, 141 F.Supp.2d 573, 575 (W.D.N.C.2001) (dismissing claims brought pro se on be... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "dismissing a corporation's appeal because the notice of appeal was not signed by an attorney",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Plimpton v. Cooper, 141 F.Supp.2d 573, 575 (W.D.N.C.2001) (dismissing claims brought pro se on behalf of a corporation based on lac... | 8,933,375 | a |
Under this rule, a corporation is not permitted to appear pro se. Numerous cases have considered and affirmed this principle. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a corporate plaintiffs claims must be dismissed on the ground of failure of any attorney to appear for the corporation",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Plimpton v. Cooper, 141 F.Supp.2d 573, 575 (W.D.N.C.2001) (dismissing claims brought pro se on be... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "dismissing a corporation's appeal because the notice of appeal was not signed by an attorney",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Plimpton v. Cooper, 141 F.Supp.2d 573, 575 (W.D.N.C.2001) (dismissing claims brought pro se on behalf of a corporation based on lac... | 8,933,375 | a |
Under this rule, a corporation is not permitted to appear pro se. Numerous cases have considered and affirmed this principle. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "312 F.Supp.2d 779, 782",
"parenthetical": "striking a corporation's pleadings where they were signed by the corporation's president but not by an attorney",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Plimpton v. Cooper, 141 F.Supp.2d 573, 575 (W.D.N.C.2001) (dismissing claims brought pro se on be... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "dismissing a corporation's appeal because the notice of appeal was not signed by an attorney",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Plimpton v. Cooper, 141 F.Supp.2d 573, 575 (W.D.N.C.2001) (dismissing claims brought pro se on behalf of a corporation based on lac... | 8,933,375 | a |
Under this rule, a corporation is not permitted to appear pro se. Numerous cases have considered and affirmed this principle. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "dismissing a corporation's appeal because the notice of appeal was not signed by an attorney",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Plimpton v. Cooper, 141 F.Supp.2d 573, 575 (W.D.N.C.2001) (dismissing claims brought pro se on behalf of a corporation based on lac... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "312 F.Supp.2d 779, 782",
"parenthetical": "striking a corporation's pleadings where they were signed by the corporation's president but not by an attorney",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Plimpton v. Cooper, 141 F.Supp.2d 573, 575 (W.D.N.C.2001) (dismissing claims brought pro se on be... | 8,933,375 | b |
The district court here looked behind the RICO conviction and considered the underlying predicate offenses in determining whether Scott's offense qualified as a crime of violence. It was proper for the court to do so. Application Note 2 to U.S.S.G. SS 4B1.2 requires that the focus of the inquiry in making a "crime of v... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "118 F.3d 1344, 1350",
"parenthetical": "RICO conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robberies is a crime of violence under Juvenile Delinquency Act",
"sentence": "See United States v. Winter, 22 F.3d 15, 19 (1st Cir.1994) (RICO conviction will qualify as career offender predicate ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "22 F.3d 15, 19",
"parenthetical": "RICO conviction will qualify as career offender predicate offense if the activities encompassed pose a serious potential risk of violence",
"sentence": "See United States v. Winter, 22 F.3d 15, 19 (1st Cir.1994) (RICO conviction will qualify a... | 3,383,320 | b |
But established precedents, not disputed by Oakar, make it clear that SS 1001 embraces false statements made to anybody on earth if the maker "knew or should have known that the information was to be submitted to a government agency." And liability has been based on false statements to state agencies. | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "874 F.2d 638, 642-43",
"parenthetical": "finding no liability for false statements in support of unemployment claims, made to state agency whose administrative costs were federally supported, where federal monitor lacked power to modify payments on account of state's excess p... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "false statements submitted by federal prisoner to authorities of state prison in which he was held under contract",
"sentence": "See United States v. Davis, 8 F.3d 923 (2d Cir.1993) (false statements submitted by federal prisoner to authorities of state p... | 3,704,538 | b |
But established precedents, not disputed by Oakar, make it clear that SS 1001 embraces false statements made to anybody on earth if the maker "knew or should have known that the information was to be submitted to a government agency." And liability has been based on false statements to state agencies. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "false statements to a state environmental agency with primary enforcement responsibility for federal water quality standards",
"sentence": "See United States v. Davis, 8 F.3d 923 (2d Cir.1993) (false statements submitted by federal prisoner to authorities... | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "874 F.2d 638, 642-43",
"parenthetical": "finding no liability for false statements in support of unemployment claims, made to state agency whose administrative costs were federally supported, where federal monitor lacked power to modify payments on account of state's excess p... | 3,704,538 | a |
But established precedents, not disputed by Oakar, make it clear that SS 1001 embraces false statements made to anybody on earth if the maker "knew or should have known that the information was to be submitted to a government agency." And liability has been based on false statements to state agencies. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "false statement to state labor department in connection with federally funded program",
"sentence": "See United States v. Davis, 8 F.3d 923 (2d Cir.1993) (false statements submitted by federal prisoner to authorities of state prison in which he was held u... | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "874 F.2d 638, 642-43",
"parenthetical": "finding no liability for false statements in support of unemployment claims, made to state agency whose administrative costs were federally supported, where federal monitor lacked power to modify payments on account of state's excess p... | 3,704,538 | a |
We affirmed the dismissal of the complaint because we found that the plaintiffs had failed to allege sufficiently that the private defendants had acted under color of state law because the conduct of the private defendants in obtaining the relevant court orders could not be attributed to the state so as to satisfy the ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "415 F.3d 1209, 1209-10",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"[t]he involvement of the police in executing the court-ordered search, without more, does not convert [the private defendants'] abuse of state law into conduct attributable to the state for purposes of SS 1983 liability,\"... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "319 F.Supp.2d 1261, 1265",
"parenthetical": "\"Plaintiffs allege that [the private] Defendants' use of state discovery rules to obtain an order from a state court judge permitting the search of their home and the seizure of Yanaki's property satisfies the first part of the t... | 5,656,340 | a |
The "physical injury or impact" rule, however formulated, is a minority rule. Moreover, among those jurisdictions still adhering to the rule, a majority appear to require physical contact to the plaintiff--mere physical manifestations of emotional injury alone are not sufficient. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "259 Ga. 663, 665",
"parenthetical": "\"there must have been actual bodily contact with plaintiff as a result of defendant's conduct for a claim for emotional distress to lie\"",
"sentence": "See Gottshall, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 2406 (“Most jurisdictions have abandoned this ... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "242 Kan. 857, 860",
"parenthetical": "defining \"physical impact\" as actual physical injury resulting from the emotional distress, beyond generalized physi cal symptoms such as headaches and insomnia",
"sentence": "See Gottshall, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 2406 (“Most juris... | 7,816,867 | a |
The "physical injury or impact" rule, however formulated, is a minority rule. Moreover, among those jurisdictions still adhering to the rule, a majority appear to require physical contact to the plaintiff--mere physical manifestations of emotional injury alone are not sufficient. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "259 Ga. 663, 665",
"parenthetical": "\"there must have been actual bodily contact with plaintiff as a result of defendant's conduct for a claim for emotional distress to lie\"",
"sentence": "See Gottshall, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 2406 (“Most jurisdictions have abandoned this ... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defining \"physical impact\" as actual physical injury resulting from the emotional distress, beyond generalized physi cal symptoms such as headaches and insomnia",
"sentence": "See Gottshall, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 2406 (“Most jurisdictions have a... | 7,816,867 | a |
The "physical injury or impact" rule, however formulated, is a minority rule. Moreover, among those jurisdictions still adhering to the rule, a majority appear to require physical contact to the plaintiff--mere physical manifestations of emotional injury alone are not sufficient. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "242 Kan. 857, 860",
"parenthetical": "defining \"physical impact\" as actual physical injury resulting from the emotional distress, beyond generalized physi cal symptoms such as headaches and insomnia",
"sentence": "See Gottshall, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 2406 (“Most juris... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"there must have been actual bodily contact with plaintiff as a result of defendant's conduct for a claim for emotional distress to lie\"",
"sentence": "See Gottshall, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 2406 (“Most jurisdictions have abandoned this test, but at l... | 7,816,867 | b |
The "physical injury or impact" rule, however formulated, is a minority rule. Moreover, among those jurisdictions still adhering to the rule, a majority appear to require physical contact to the plaintiff--mere physical manifestations of emotional injury alone are not sufficient. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"there must have been actual bodily contact with plaintiff as a result of defendant's conduct for a claim for emotional distress to lie\"",
"sentence": "See Gottshall, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 2406 (“Most jurisdictions have abandoned this test, but at l... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defining \"physical impact\" as actual physical injury resulting from the emotional distress, beyond generalized physi cal symptoms such as headaches and insomnia",
"sentence": "See Gottshall, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 2406 (“Most jurisdictions have a... | 7,816,867 | a |
The "physical injury or impact" rule, however formulated, is a minority rule. Moreover, among those jurisdictions still adhering to the rule, a majority appear to require physical contact to the plaintiff--mere physical manifestations of emotional injury alone are not sufficient. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "579 N.E.2d 452, 454",
"parenthetical": "\"damages for mental distress or emotional trauma may be recovered only when the distress is accompanied by and results from a physical injury caused by an impact to the person seeking recovery\"",
"sentence": "See Gottshall, — U.S. at -,... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "242 Kan. 857, 860",
"parenthetical": "defining \"physical impact\" as actual physical injury resulting from the emotional distress, beyond generalized physi cal symptoms such as headaches and insomnia",
"sentence": "See Gottshall, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 2406 (“Most juris... | 7,816,867 | a |
The "physical injury or impact" rule, however formulated, is a minority rule. Moreover, among those jurisdictions still adhering to the rule, a majority appear to require physical contact to the plaintiff--mere physical manifestations of emotional injury alone are not sufficient. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defining \"physical impact\" as actual physical injury resulting from the emotional distress, beyond generalized physi cal symptoms such as headaches and insomnia",
"sentence": "See Gottshall, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 2406 (“Most jurisdictions have a... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "579 N.E.2d 452, 454",
"parenthetical": "\"damages for mental distress or emotional trauma may be recovered only when the distress is accompanied by and results from a physical injury caused by an impact to the person seeking recovery\"",
"sentence": "See Gottshall, — U.S. at -,... | 7,816,867 | b |
The "physical injury or impact" rule, however formulated, is a minority rule. Moreover, among those jurisdictions still adhering to the rule, a majority appear to require physical contact to the plaintiff--mere physical manifestations of emotional injury alone are not sufficient. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "597 S.W.2d 141, 146",
"parenthetical": "\"it is necessary that the damages for mental distress sought to be recovered be related to, and the direct and natural result of, the physical contact or injury sustained\"",
"sentence": "See Gottshall, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 2406 (“M... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "242 Kan. 857, 860",
"parenthetical": "defining \"physical impact\" as actual physical injury resulting from the emotional distress, beyond generalized physi cal symptoms such as headaches and insomnia",
"sentence": "See Gottshall, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 2406 (“Most juris... | 7,816,867 | a |
The "physical injury or impact" rule, however formulated, is a minority rule. Moreover, among those jurisdictions still adhering to the rule, a majority appear to require physical contact to the plaintiff--mere physical manifestations of emotional injury alone are not sufficient. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "597 S.W.2d 141, 146",
"parenthetical": "\"it is necessary that the damages for mental distress sought to be recovered be related to, and the direct and natural result of, the physical contact or injury sustained\"",
"sentence": "See Gottshall, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 2406 (“M... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defining \"physical impact\" as actual physical injury resulting from the emotional distress, beyond generalized physi cal symptoms such as headaches and insomnia",
"sentence": "See Gottshall, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 2406 (“Most jurisdictions have a... | 7,816,867 | a |
The "physical injury or impact" rule, however formulated, is a minority rule. Moreover, among those jurisdictions still adhering to the rule, a majority appear to require physical contact to the plaintiff--mere physical manifestations of emotional injury alone are not sufficient. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "312 Or. 17, 23",
"parenthetical": "no liability for emotional injury absent accompanying actual or threatened physical harm",
"sentence": "See Gottshall, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 2406 (“Most jurisdictions have abandoned this test, but at least five States continue to adhere to... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "242 Kan. 857, 860",
"parenthetical": "defining \"physical impact\" as actual physical injury resulting from the emotional distress, beyond generalized physi cal symptoms such as headaches and insomnia",
"sentence": "See Gottshall, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 2406 (“Most juris... | 7,816,867 | a |
The "physical injury or impact" rule, however formulated, is a minority rule. Moreover, among those jurisdictions still adhering to the rule, a majority appear to require physical contact to the plaintiff--mere physical manifestations of emotional injury alone are not sufficient. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defining \"physical impact\" as actual physical injury resulting from the emotional distress, beyond generalized physi cal symptoms such as headaches and insomnia",
"sentence": "See Gottshall, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 2406 (“Most jurisdictions have a... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "312 Or. 17, 23",
"parenthetical": "no liability for emotional injury absent accompanying actual or threatened physical harm",
"sentence": "See Gottshall, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 2406 (“Most jurisdictions have abandoned this test, but at least five States continue to adhere to... | 7,816,867 | b |
The "physical injury or impact" rule, however formulated, is a minority rule. Moreover, among those jurisdictions still adhering to the rule, a majority appear to require physical contact to the plaintiff--mere physical manifestations of emotional injury alone are not sufficient. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no liability for emotional injury absent accompanying actual or threatened physical harm",
"sentence": "See Gottshall, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 2406 (“Most jurisdictions have abandoned this test, but at least five States continue to adhere to it;” citing... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "242 Kan. 857, 860",
"parenthetical": "defining \"physical impact\" as actual physical injury resulting from the emotional distress, beyond generalized physi cal symptoms such as headaches and insomnia",
"sentence": "See Gottshall, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 2406 (“Most juris... | 7,816,867 | a |
The "physical injury or impact" rule, however formulated, is a minority rule. Moreover, among those jurisdictions still adhering to the rule, a majority appear to require physical contact to the plaintiff--mere physical manifestations of emotional injury alone are not sufficient. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no liability for emotional injury absent accompanying actual or threatened physical harm",
"sentence": "See Gottshall, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 2406 (“Most jurisdictions have abandoned this test, but at least five States continue to adhere to it;” citing... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defining \"physical impact\" as actual physical injury resulting from the emotional distress, beyond generalized physi cal symptoms such as headaches and insomnia",
"sentence": "See Gottshall, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 2406 (“Most jurisdictions have a... | 7,816,867 | a |
This is a logical conclusion because words or phrases should be given consistent meaning when used in related regulations unless the regulation specifically provides otherwise. Further, by adopting this interpretation and allowing personal letters to be censored only when one of the listed criteria is met, the requirem... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "regulations which lacked specificity and were not narrowly tailored found unconstitutional",
"sentence": "See also Hopkins v. Collins, 411 F.Supp. 831 (D.Md.1975) (regulations which lacked specificity and were not narrowly tailored found unconstituti... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "416 U.S. 413, 413",
"parenthetical": "discussing examples of justifiable censorship and quoting from Policy Statement 7300.1A of the Federal Bureau of Prisons",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Martinez, 416 U.S. at 413, 414 n. 14, 94 S.Ct. at 1811, 1812 n. 14 (discussing examples of ju... | 1,629,563 | b |
This is a logical conclusion because words or phrases should be given consistent meaning when used in related regulations unless the regulation specifically provides otherwise. Further, by adopting this interpretation and allowing personal letters to be censored only when one of the listed criteria is met, the requirem... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "416 U.S. 413, 413",
"parenthetical": "discussing examples of justifiable censorship and quoting from Policy Statement 7300.1A of the Federal Bureau of Prisons",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Martinez, 416 U.S. at 413, 414 n. 14, 94 S.Ct. at 1811, 1812 n. 14 (discussing examples of ju... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "regulations which lacked specificity and were not narrowly tailored found unconstitutional",
"sentence": "See also Hopkins v. Collins, 411 F.Supp. 831 (D.Md.1975) (regulations which lacked specificity and were not narrowly tailored found unconstituti... | 1,629,563 | a |
This is a logical conclusion because words or phrases should be given consistent meaning when used in related regulations unless the regulation specifically provides otherwise. Further, by adopting this interpretation and allowing personal letters to be censored only when one of the listed criteria is met, the requirem... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "regulations which lacked specificity and were not narrowly tailored found unconstitutional",
"sentence": "See also Hopkins v. Collins, 411 F.Supp. 831 (D.Md.1975) (regulations which lacked specificity and were not narrowly tailored found unconstituti... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "94 S.Ct. 1811, 1811",
"parenthetical": "discussing examples of justifiable censorship and quoting from Policy Statement 7300.1A of the Federal Bureau of Prisons",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Martinez, 416 U.S. at 413, 414 n. 14, 94 S.Ct. at 1811, 1812 n. 14 (discussing examples of ... | 1,629,563 | b |
This is a logical conclusion because words or phrases should be given consistent meaning when used in related regulations unless the regulation specifically provides otherwise. Further, by adopting this interpretation and allowing personal letters to be censored only when one of the listed criteria is met, the requirem... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "94 S.Ct. 1811, 1811",
"parenthetical": "discussing examples of justifiable censorship and quoting from Policy Statement 7300.1A of the Federal Bureau of Prisons",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Martinez, 416 U.S. at 413, 414 n. 14, 94 S.Ct. at 1811, 1812 n. 14 (discussing examples of ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "regulations which lacked specificity and were not narrowly tailored found unconstitutional",
"sentence": "See also Hopkins v. Collins, 411 F.Supp. 831 (D.Md.1975) (regulations which lacked specificity and were not narrowly tailored found unconstituti... | 1,629,563 | a |
This is a logical conclusion because words or phrases should be given consistent meaning when used in related regulations unless the regulation specifically provides otherwise. Further, by adopting this interpretation and allowing personal letters to be censored only when one of the listed criteria is met, the requirem... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "790 F.2d 1299, 1304-05",
"parenthetical": "upholding regulations which were \"well-tailored to minimize their intrusiveness\" and which provided prison officials with adequate guidance",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Martinez, 416 U.S. at 413, 414 n. 14, 94 S.Ct. at 1811, 1812 n. 14 ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "regulations which lacked specificity and were not narrowly tailored found unconstitutional",
"sentence": "See also Hopkins v. Collins, 411 F.Supp. 831 (D.Md.1975) (regulations which lacked specificity and were not narrowly tailored found unconstituti... | 1,629,563 | a |
This is a logical conclusion because words or phrases should be given consistent meaning when used in related regulations unless the regulation specifically provides otherwise. Further, by adopting this interpretation and allowing personal letters to be censored only when one of the listed criteria is met, the requirem... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "790 F.2d 1299, 1304-05",
"parenthetical": "upholding regulations which were \"well-tailored to minimize their intrusiveness\" and which provided prison officials with adequate guidance",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Martinez, 416 U.S. at 413, 414 n. 14, 94 S.Ct. at 1811, 1812 n. 14 ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "regulations which lacked specificity and were not narrowly tailored found unconstitutional",
"sentence": "See also Hopkins v. Collins, 411 F.Supp. 831 (D.Md.1975) (regulations which lacked specificity and were not narrowly tailored found unconstituti... | 1,629,563 | a |
As to the merits, we are troubled by the lack of evidence in the record regarding the authority of M.P.H. Holdings to initiate the supplemental proceedings. A plain reading of section 33-15-102(a) requires a foreign corporation to have a certificate of authority prior to initiating any action in this state. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "341 S.C. 79, 85",
"parenthetical": "\"Where the statute's language is plain and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, the rules of statutory interpretation are not needed and the court has no right to impose another meaning.\"",
"sentence": "See Hodges v. Raine... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "307 S.C. 33, 37",
"parenthetical": "holding the failure of a foreign corporation to obtain a certificate of authority prior to bringing an action to recover monies owed on an account affected the corporation's capacity to sue but did not affect the court's subject matter jur... | 3,655,943 | a |
As to the merits, we are troubled by the lack of evidence in the record regarding the authority of M.P.H. Holdings to initiate the supplemental proceedings. A plain reading of section 33-15-102(a) requires a foreign corporation to have a certificate of authority prior to initiating any action in this state. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "341 S.C. 79, 85",
"parenthetical": "\"Where the statute's language is plain and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, the rules of statutory interpretation are not needed and the court has no right to impose another meaning.\"",
"sentence": "See Hodges v. Raine... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "413 S.E.2d 827, 829",
"parenthetical": "holding the failure of a foreign corporation to obtain a certificate of authority prior to bringing an action to recover monies owed on an account affected the corporation's capacity to sue but did not affect the court's subject matter... | 3,655,943 | a |
As to the merits, we are troubled by the lack of evidence in the record regarding the authority of M.P.H. Holdings to initiate the supplemental proceedings. A plain reading of section 33-15-102(a) requires a foreign corporation to have a certificate of authority prior to initiating any action in this state. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "307 S.C. 33, 37",
"parenthetical": "holding the failure of a foreign corporation to obtain a certificate of authority prior to bringing an action to recover monies owed on an account affected the corporation's capacity to sue but did not affect the court's subject matter jur... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "533 S.E.2d 578, 581",
"parenthetical": "\"Where the statute's language is plain and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, the rules of statutory interpretation are not needed and the court has no right to impose another meaning.\"",
"sentence": "See Hodges v. R... | 3,655,943 | b |
As to the merits, we are troubled by the lack of evidence in the record regarding the authority of M.P.H. Holdings to initiate the supplemental proceedings. A plain reading of section 33-15-102(a) requires a foreign corporation to have a certificate of authority prior to initiating any action in this state. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "413 S.E.2d 827, 829",
"parenthetical": "holding the failure of a foreign corporation to obtain a certificate of authority prior to bringing an action to recover monies owed on an account affected the corporation's capacity to sue but did not affect the court's subject matter... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "533 S.E.2d 578, 581",
"parenthetical": "\"Where the statute's language is plain and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, the rules of statutory interpretation are not needed and the court has no right to impose another meaning.\"",
"sentence": "See Hodges v. R... | 3,655,943 | b |
Idaho Criminal Rule 7(e) authorizes the court to allow amendment of an information at any time before the prosecution rests "if no additional or different offense is charged and if substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced." The rule's reference to prejudice to substantial rights means prejudice to the def... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "147 Idaho 694, 709-10",
"parenthetical": "holding defendant not prejudiced by allowing the State to amend its indictment because he had \"more than adequate time to prepare his defense\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 709-10, 215 P.3d 414, 429-30 (2009) (h... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "145 Idaho 183, 185-86",
"parenthetical": "holding that reversal for late disclosure of a State's witness requires trial prejudice, and defendant's claim that he turned down an attractive plea offer because he thought the State could not prove its case without the witness does not... | 6,949,745 | a |
Idaho Criminal Rule 7(e) authorizes the court to allow amendment of an information at any time before the prosecution rests "if no additional or different offense is charged and if substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced." The rule's reference to prejudice to substantial rights means prejudice to the def... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "147 Idaho 694, 709-10",
"parenthetical": "holding defendant not prejudiced by allowing the State to amend its indictment because he had \"more than adequate time to prepare his defense\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 709-10, 215 P.3d 414, 429-30 (2009) (h... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "177 P.3d 397, 399-400",
"parenthetical": "holding that reversal for late disclosure of a State's witness requires trial prejudice, and defendant's claim that he turned down an attractive plea offer because he thought the State could not prove its case without the witness does not... | 6,949,745 | a |
Idaho Criminal Rule 7(e) authorizes the court to allow amendment of an information at any time before the prosecution rests "if no additional or different offense is charged and if substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced." The rule's reference to prejudice to substantial rights means prejudice to the def... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "145 Idaho 183, 185-86",
"parenthetical": "holding that reversal for late disclosure of a State's witness requires trial prejudice, and defendant's claim that he turned down an attractive plea offer because he thought the State could not prove its case without the witness does not... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "215 P.3d 414, 429-30",
"parenthetical": "holding defendant not prejudiced by allowing the State to amend its indictment because he had \"more than adequate time to prepare his defense\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 709-10, 215 P.3d 414, 429-30 (2009) (ho... | 6,949,745 | b |
Idaho Criminal Rule 7(e) authorizes the court to allow amendment of an information at any time before the prosecution rests "if no additional or different offense is charged and if substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced." The rule's reference to prejudice to substantial rights means prejudice to the def... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "177 P.3d 397, 399-400",
"parenthetical": "holding that reversal for late disclosure of a State's witness requires trial prejudice, and defendant's claim that he turned down an attractive plea offer because he thought the State could not prove its case without the witness does not... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "215 P.3d 414, 429-30",
"parenthetical": "holding defendant not prejudiced by allowing the State to amend its indictment because he had \"more than adequate time to prepare his defense\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 709-10, 215 P.3d 414, 429-30 (2009) (ho... | 6,949,745 | b |
Marizzaldi did not define "without cause." Because the trial court had not conducted an inquiry into the cause of the absence, we vacated the judgment of sentence and remanded. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "66 A.3d 794, 797-98",
"parenthetical": "finding that the appellant's absence was voluntary where he ignored directions printed on his court papers and reported to the wrong location",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Akinsanmi, 55 A.3d 539, 541 (Pa. Super. 2012) (finding t... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "814 A.2d 253, 253",
"parenthetical": "finding that the appellant may have shown good cause where, through no fault of his own, he missed a bus to court",
"sentence": "See Marizzaldi, 814 A.2d at 253 (finding that the appellant may have shown good cause where, through no fault o... | 12,349,099 | b |
Marizzaldi did not define "without cause." Because the trial court had not conducted an inquiry into the cause of the absence, we vacated the judgment of sentence and remanded. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "66 A.3d 794, 797-98",
"parenthetical": "finding that the appellant's absence was voluntary where he ignored directions printed on his court papers and reported to the wrong location",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Akinsanmi, 55 A.3d 539, 541 (Pa. Super. 2012) (finding t... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "55 A.3d 539, 541",
"parenthetical": "finding that the appellant's absence was voluntary where she was attending a research conference instead of court.and did not request a continuance",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Akinsanmi, 55 A.3d 539, 541 (Pa. Super. 2012) (finding tha... | 12,349,099 | b |
The principle behind the Cuevas-Gaspar imputation rule is to avoid separating children from their permanent resident parents with whom they have resided for a significant period of time in the United States. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "16 F.3d 1021, 1025",
"parenthetical": "holding, in the primary case on which Cuevas-Gaspar relied, imputation of a parent's residency status to a child may be justified where deportation would \"sever[] the bonds between parents and their children who had resided legally in ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "430 F.3d 1024, 1024",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e are instructed ... that our immigration statutes and regulations are replete with provisions 'giving a high priority to the relation between permanent resident parents and their children.' \"",
"sentence": "See Cuevas-Gaspar, 430 F... | 3,820,733 | b |
It is because of this significant role of notice in "claims-made" policies that numerous courts have held that excusing a delay in notice beyond the policy period should not be done, because to do so would alter a basic term of the insurance contract which expresses the parties' agreement. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "if notice is given within reasonable time, and insurer suffers no prejudice by the delay, coverage under claims-made policy exists under Michigan law",
"sentence": "But see Sherlock v. Perry, 605 F.Supp. 1001 (E.D.Mich.1985) (if notice is given within... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "allowing notice beyond the policy period would alter a basic term of the contract",
"sentence": "City of Harrisburg, supra (claims made coverage exists under Pennsylvania law only when claim is timely reported); Zuck-erman, supra (extension of notic... | 10,373,054 | b |
While employment "deprivations less harsh than dismissals" may give rise to a constitutional claim, the claimed adverse employment action must nonetheless relate to a significant aspect of the employment relationship. In addition to dismissal, adverse employment actions include "demotion, refusal to hire, refusal to pr... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "1995 WL 104113, *3",
"parenthetical": "adverse employment actions include a negative change in employment status such as discharge, suspension, or demotion or disciplinary actions such as reprimand",
"sentence": "Kaluczky v. City of White Plains, 57 F.3d 202 (2d Cir.l995)(citin... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "999 F.2d 666, 669",
"parenthetical": "transfer to town fifteen miles from home allowed to constitute retaliation in support of First Amendment claim",
"sentence": "Kaluczky v. City of White Plains, 57 F.3d 202 (2d Cir.l995)(citing Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62, 110 S.C... | 540,971 | a |
In fact, "unforeseeable" post-reorganization CERCLA claims have been allowed by some courts, either because CERCLA was not in effect at the time of reorganization (obviating any finding of a legal relationship between the claimant and debtor from which even a cognizable contingent bankruptcy claim might arise), or beca... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "139 B.R. 412, 412",
"parenthetical": "EPA's bar date extended to file claims for CERCLA response costs fairly within the contemplation of the parties at time of debtor's bankruptcy",
"sentence": "Cf. In re Nat’l Gypsum Co., 139 B.R. at 412 (EPA’s bar date extended to file claim... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "133 B.R. 653, 653",
"parenthetical": "when governmental agency has not had actual knowledge of the potential claim in time to file claim in bankruptcy proceeding, potential CERCLA liability not' discharged",
"sentence": "In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 944 F.2d 164, 167-68 ... | 6,510,758 | b |
Petitioners Alan Freeman and Carol Heise have served as Fleenor's attorneys since 1994. The petitioner-attorneys are familiar with both the facts and the procedural history regarding Fleenor's legal actions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "867 F.Supp. 494, 495",
"parenthetical": "recognizing that prisoner's former attorney had a significant relationship with the prisoner for purposes of next friend standing because attorney had acted on behalf of the prisoner in prior legal proceedings",
"sentence": "See In re Co... | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "492 F.Supp. 273, 275",
"parenthetical": "finding that neither ordained minister nor cousin of prisoner had standing to bring an action as next friend of the prisoner because of their lack of contact with the prisoner",
"sentence": "See In re Cockrum, 867 F.Supp. 494, 495 (E... | 11,501,902 | a |
Statements which "intimate that an investigation has focussed on a specific individual easily could induce a reasonable person to believe that failure to cooperate would only lead to formal detention." Thus, a seizure occurred when officer had defendant's ticket and "took [the defendant] aside and informed him that he ... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "725 F.2d 56, 57",
"parenthetical": "statement that person under suspicion may not be enough to constitute seizure",
"sentence": "United States v. Hanson, 801 F.2d 757, 761 (5th Cir.1986); United States v. Nunley, 873 F.2d 182, 184-85 (8th Cir. 1989) (consensual airport conv... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "873 F.2d 182, 184-85",
"parenthetical": "consensual airport conversation became detention when officer told traveller that officers were there to stop flow of drugs through airport",
"sentence": "United States v. Hanson, 801 F.2d 757, 761 (5th Cir.1986); United States v. ... | 3,744,812 | b |
In those cases, we require plaintiffs to make a showing in addition to the normal prima facie case because the employer's reason for discharging the plaintiff is not "otherwise unexplained." The reduction-in-force is an objective, legitimate explanation of the employer's action which the plaintiff does not call into qu... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "814 F.2d 1263, 1270",
"parenthetical": "no adverse inference can be drawn in reduction-in-force case if we apply normal prima facie standards because the employer's action is readily explained by employer's economic hardship or downturn in business",
"sentence": "See Leichihman... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "896 F.2d 1465, 1465",
"parenthetical": "in reduction-in-force ease proving the normal elements of the prima facie case is not enough because no evidence presented under such test that the workforce reductions were not the reason for the adverse employment actions",
"senten... | 10,531,442 | a |
In those cases, we require plaintiffs to make a showing in addition to the normal prima facie case because the employer's reason for discharging the plaintiff is not "otherwise unexplained." The reduction-in-force is an objective, legitimate explanation of the employer's action which the plaintiff does not call into qu... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no adverse inference can be drawn in reduction-in-force case if we apply normal prima facie standards because the employer's action is readily explained by employer's economic hardship or downturn in business",
"sentence": "See Leichihman v. Pickwick Int’... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "896 F.2d 1465, 1465",
"parenthetical": "in reduction-in-force ease proving the normal elements of the prima facie case is not enough because no evidence presented under such test that the workforce reductions were not the reason for the adverse employment actions",
"senten... | 10,531,442 | a |
In those cases, we require plaintiffs to make a showing in addition to the normal prima facie case because the employer's reason for discharging the plaintiff is not "otherwise unexplained." The reduction-in-force is an objective, legitimate explanation of the employer's action which the plaintiff does not call into qu... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no adverse inference can be drawn in reduction-in-force case if we apply normal prima facie standards because the employer's action is readily explained by employer's economic hardship or downturn in business",
"sentence": "See Leichihman v. Pickwick Int’... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "896 F.2d 1465, 1465",
"parenthetical": "in reduction-in-force ease proving the normal elements of the prima facie case is not enough because no evidence presented under such test that the workforce reductions were not the reason for the adverse employment actions",
"senten... | 10,531,442 | a |
In those cases, we require plaintiffs to make a showing in addition to the normal prima facie case because the employer's reason for discharging the plaintiff is not "otherwise unexplained." The reduction-in-force is an objective, legitimate explanation of the employer's action which the plaintiff does not call into qu... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no adverse inference can be drawn in reduction-in-force case if we apply normal prima facie standards because the employer's action is readily explained by employer's economic hardship or downturn in business",
"sentence": "See Leichihman v. Pickwick Int’... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "896 F.2d 1465, 1465",
"parenthetical": "in reduction-in-force ease proving the normal elements of the prima facie case is not enough because no evidence presented under such test that the workforce reductions were not the reason for the adverse employment actions",
"senten... | 10,531,442 | a |
With respect to Part TV, I would caution against deciding this case on the rationale utilized in the majority court opinion. "While the opinion correctly states that the individual's possession of the firearm in question need not be actually unlawful, it overlooks the fact that the defendant must have had knowledge or ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "782 F.3d 639, 643-44",
"parenthetical": "holding that the government failed to prove the defendant's actions fell under the unlawful possession prong \"[bjecause the Government failed to present any evidence that [the defendant] knew that his conduct would result in a firearm bei... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "747 F.3d 520, 525",
"parenthetical": "holding that both the unlawful possession and unlawful use prongs were met and noting that the firearm transferred to the individual \"was not registered, making [the individual's] possession of it necessarily unlawful\"",
"sentence": "... | 6,055,576 | a |
With respect to Part TV, I would caution against deciding this case on the rationale utilized in the majority court opinion. "While the opinion correctly states that the individual's possession of the firearm in question need not be actually unlawful, it overlooks the fact that the defendant must have had knowledge or ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "539 Fed.Appx. 904, 908",
"parenthetical": "holding that the defendant's actions fell under the unlawful possession prong where the defendant transferred at least one firearm to a known felon",
"sentence": "See United States v. Asante, 782 F.3d 639, 643-44 (11th Cir.2015) (holdi... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "747 F.3d 520, 525",
"parenthetical": "holding that both the unlawful possession and unlawful use prongs were met and noting that the firearm transferred to the individual \"was not registered, making [the individual's] possession of it necessarily unlawful\"",
"sentence": "... | 6,055,576 | a |
With respect to Part TV, I would caution against deciding this case on the rationale utilized in the majority court opinion. "While the opinion correctly states that the individual's possession of the firearm in question need not be actually unlawful, it overlooks the fact that the defendant must have had knowledge or ... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "747 F.3d 520, 525",
"parenthetical": "holding that both the unlawful possession and unlawful use prongs were met and noting that the firearm transferred to the individual \"was not registered, making [the individual's] possession of it necessarily unlawful\"",
"sentence": "... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "427 Fed.Appx. 522, 523-24",
"parenthetical": "holding that the district court erred because it applied the enhancement without taking into account whether the defendant knew or should have known possession would be unlawful",
"sentence": "See United States v. Asante, 782 F.3d 6... | 6,055,576 | b |
With respect to Part TV, I would caution against deciding this case on the rationale utilized in the majority court opinion. "While the opinion correctly states that the individual's possession of the firearm in question need not be actually unlawful, it overlooks the fact that the defendant must have had knowledge or ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "405 Fed.Appx. 860, 862",
"parenthetical": "vacating the sentence in light of the government's concession that there was no evidence that the individuals receiving the firearms \"had a relevant criminal conviction or [were] under a criminal justice sentence at the time of the offe... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "747 F.3d 520, 525",
"parenthetical": "holding that both the unlawful possession and unlawful use prongs were met and noting that the firearm transferred to the individual \"was not registered, making [the individual's] possession of it necessarily unlawful\"",
"sentence": "... | 6,055,576 | a |
In section A of that report, the party listed by name over seventy contributors to the party, together with the amount given by each. Thus, it seems that if one wanted to know what individuals or corporations enabled the Republican Party to make a substantial contribution to Candidate X, one could readily find out. Fin... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "518 U.S. 604, 617",
"parenthetical": "\"[A]n independent expenditure made possible by a $20,000 donation, but controlled and directed by a party rather than the donor, would seems less likely to corrupt than the same (or a much larger) independent expenditure made directly by tha... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "146 F.3d 571, 571",
"parenthetical": "\"There is ... less of a danger of quid pro quo corruption, such as the sort that one might presume from large contributions given directly to candidates, when a contribution is given to a PAC that does not itself wield legislative power.\"",... | 373,349 | b |
In section A of that report, the party listed by name over seventy contributors to the party, together with the amount given by each. Thus, it seems that if one wanted to know what individuals or corporations enabled the Republican Party to make a substantial contribution to Candidate X, one could readily find out. Fin... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "146 F.3d 571, 571",
"parenthetical": "\"There is ... less of a danger of quid pro quo corruption, such as the sort that one might presume from large contributions given directly to candidates, when a contribution is given to a PAC that does not itself wield legislative power.\"",... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A]n independent expenditure made possible by a $20,000 donation, but controlled and directed by a party rather than the donor, would seems less likely to corrupt than the same (or a much larger) independent expenditure made directly by that donor.\"",
... | 373,349 | a |
In section A of that report, the party listed by name over seventy contributors to the party, together with the amount given by each. Thus, it seems that if one wanted to know what individuals or corporations enabled the Republican Party to make a substantial contribution to Candidate X, one could readily find out. Fin... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "146 F.3d 571, 571",
"parenthetical": "\"There is ... less of a danger of quid pro quo corruption, such as the sort that one might presume from large contributions given directly to candidates, when a contribution is given to a PAC that does not itself wield legislative power.\"",... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A]n independent expenditure made possible by a $20,000 donation, but controlled and directed by a party rather than the donor, would seems less likely to corrupt than the same (or a much larger) independent expenditure made directly by that donor.\"",
... | 373,349 | a |
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