context stringlengths 58 1.13k | citation_a dict | citation_b dict | case_id int64 475 12.5M | label stringclasses 2
values |
|---|---|---|---|---|
A finding of sanity does not preclude consideration of the statutory mitigating factors concerning a defendant's mental condition. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "407 So.2d 894, 902",
"parenthetical": "declining to follow Huckaby where the trial court considered mental mitigation, but found that the testimony did not compel application of mental mitigators",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Morgan v. State, 639 So.2d 6, 13 (Fla.1994) (finding err... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "343 So.2d 29, 33-34",
"parenthetical": "vacating death sentence where trial court completely ignored evidence of mental mitigation partially on the basis that the defendant understood the difference between right and wrong",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Morgan v. State, 639 So.2d 6,... | 9,202,890 | b |
"This broadbased power includes the power to supervise, administrate, discipline, and serve the needs of the public in all facets of the courts." It further includes "the authority to exercise necessary means to regulate and control the practice of law by promulgating and enforcing rules to discipline attorneys." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "472 U.S. 634, 643",
"parenthetical": "\"Courts have long recognized an inherent authority to suspend or disbar lawyers. * * * This inherent power derives from the lawyer's role as an officer of the court which granted admission.\"",
"sentence": "Howell v. State Bar of Texas, 84... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "603 A.2d 1087, 1087",
"parenthetical": "\"This court is responsible for promulgating rules regulating the practice of law and ethical standards for the conduct of attorneys admitted to the Rhode Island Bar.\"",
"sentence": "Howell v. State Bar of Texas, 843 F.2d 205, 206 (... | 6,890,379 | a |
"This broadbased power includes the power to supervise, administrate, discipline, and serve the needs of the public in all facets of the courts." It further includes "the authority to exercise necessary means to regulate and control the practice of law by promulgating and enforcing rules to discipline attorneys." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Courts have long recognized an inherent authority to suspend or disbar lawyers. * * * This inherent power derives from the lawyer's role as an officer of the court which granted admission.\"",
"sentence": "Howell v. State Bar of Texas, 843 F.2d 205, 206... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "603 A.2d 1087, 1087",
"parenthetical": "\"This court is responsible for promulgating rules regulating the practice of law and ethical standards for the conduct of attorneys admitted to the Rhode Island Bar.\"",
"sentence": "Howell v. State Bar of Texas, 843 F.2d 205, 206 (... | 6,890,379 | a |
"This broadbased power includes the power to supervise, administrate, discipline, and serve the needs of the public in all facets of the courts." It further includes "the authority to exercise necessary means to regulate and control the practice of law by promulgating and enforcing rules to discipline attorneys." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Courts have long recognized an inherent authority to suspend or disbar lawyers. * * * This inherent power derives from the lawyer's role as an officer of the court which granted admission.\"",
"sentence": "Howell v. State Bar of Texas, 843 F.2d 205, 206... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "603 A.2d 1087, 1087",
"parenthetical": "\"This court is responsible for promulgating rules regulating the practice of law and ethical standards for the conduct of attorneys admitted to the Rhode Island Bar.\"",
"sentence": "Howell v. State Bar of Texas, 843 F.2d 205, 206 (... | 6,890,379 | a |
Courts have held entire meal breaks to be compensable under the FLSA when employees continue to have job responsibilities during their breaks. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "915 F.2d 1473, 1477",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he essential consideration in determining whether a meal period is a bona fide meal period or a compensable rest period is whether the employees are in fact relieved from work for the purpose of eating a regularly scheduled meal.\"",
... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "121 F.3d 58, 64-65",
"parenthetical": "holding meal periods compensable \"work\" under FLSA if employees perform duties predominantly for the benefit of the employer",
"sentence": "See Kohlheim v. Glynn County, 915 F.2d 1473, 1477 (11th Cir.1990) (“[T]he essential consider... | 5,714,988 | a |
The government's case against Hands contained weaknesses similar to those identified in Marshall: the direct evidence consisted entirely of the testimony of wit nesses of highly questionable credibility, and the circumstantial evidence was far less convincing than the Marshall circumstantial evidence. Hands's case turn... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "23 F.3d 570, 575",
"parenthetical": "finding error not harmless and vacating conviction on grounds of prosecutorial misconduct that \"significantly interfered with the jury's ability to make an essential and liminal credibility determination\"",
"sentence": "See United Sta... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "26 F.3d 1098, 1103",
"parenthetical": "reversing conviction on grounds of prosecutorial misconduct where \"[t]he prejudicial effect of [the] misconduct cannot be disputed, as this case turned largely on the jury's credibility determinations of the several witnesses who testified\... | 11,549,672 | b |
But, as we have noted, Ms. Escobedo has not alleged that it was a vehicle to effect any discriminatory animus harbored by the nurses, let alone provide evidence of such intent or effect; to the contrary, Ms. Escobedo testified that she got along well with the nurses and they supported her in disputes with her superviso... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "185 F.3d 1098, 1098, 1102",
"parenthetical": "holding that the \"obviously sex and gender-motivated conduct\" by a supervisor -- including, inter alia, his stated belief \"that women in general were incompetent, stupid and scatterbrained\" -- \"so poisoned the entire body of cond... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "43 F.3d 545, 551",
"parenthetical": "holding that plaintiff failed to present a triable issue as to a hostile work environment where the \"derisive environment in the workshop was universal\" -- he was not \"singled out\" for abuse -- and he failed to show the derisive atmosphere... | 3,616,821 | b |
This is particularly so as to plaintiffs' claims for blacklisting which I previously found derive from a "common nucleus" of facts since the blacklisting allegedly occurred in retaliation for the action to recover wages. Judicial economy, deference to plaintiffs' choice of forum and the avoidance of unnecessary, duplic... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "528 F.2d 1261, 1261",
"parenthetical": "because plaintiff asserted valid wage claim court should retain jurisdiction over personal injury claim",
"sentence": "See Pereira, 764 F.2d at 690 (deference to plaintiff’s choice of forum); Dutta, 528 F.2d at 1261 (because plaintiff ass... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "1985 AMC 865, 871",
"parenthetical": "court retained wage claims but dismissed personal injury claim based upon absence of American contacts",
"sentence": "See Pereira, 764 F.2d at 690 (deference to plaintiff’s choice of forum); Dutta, 528 F.2d at 1261 (because plaintiff assert... | 7,390,380 | a |
This is particularly so as to plaintiffs' claims for blacklisting which I previously found derive from a "common nucleus" of facts since the blacklisting allegedly occurred in retaliation for the action to recover wages. Judicial economy, deference to plaintiffs' choice of forum and the avoidance of unnecessary, duplic... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "court retained wage claims but dismissed personal injury claim based upon absence of American contacts",
"sentence": "See Pereira, 764 F.2d at 690 (deference to plaintiff’s choice of forum); Dutta, 528 F.2d at 1261 (because plaintiff asserted valid wage c... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "528 F.2d 1261, 1261",
"parenthetical": "because plaintiff asserted valid wage claim court should retain jurisdiction over personal injury claim",
"sentence": "See Pereira, 764 F.2d at 690 (deference to plaintiff’s choice of forum); Dutta, 528 F.2d at 1261 (because plaintiff ass... | 7,390,380 | b |
Nor is Lee's appeal moot. In Frumento, we noted that "an appeal is not moot even though the appellant has been released from custody or has served his sentence if he has taken all possible steps to have the order of confinement promptly reviewed prior to his release." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "392 U.S. 40, 53",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] state may not effectively deny a convict access to its appellate courts until he has been released and then argue that his case has been mooted by his failure to do what it alone prevented him from doing.\"",
"sentence": "Id. at 5... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "372 U.S. 391, 424",
"parenthetical": "\"[Conventional notions of finality in criminal litigation cannot be permitted to defeat the manifest federal policy that federal constitutional rights of personal liberty shall not be denied without the fullest opportunity for plenary federa... | 9,057,532 | a |
Nor is Lee's appeal moot. In Frumento, we noted that "an appeal is not moot even though the appellant has been released from custody or has served his sentence if he has taken all possible steps to have the order of confinement promptly reviewed prior to his release." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[Conventional notions of finality in criminal litigation cannot be permitted to defeat the manifest federal policy that federal constitutional rights of personal liberty shall not be denied without the fullest opportunity for plenary federal judicial revi... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "392 U.S. 40, 53",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] state may not effectively deny a convict access to its appellate courts until he has been released and then argue that his case has been mooted by his failure to do what it alone prevented him from doing.\"",
"sentence": "Id. at 5... | 9,057,532 | b |
Nor is Lee's appeal moot. In Frumento, we noted that "an appeal is not moot even though the appellant has been released from custody or has served his sentence if he has taken all possible steps to have the order of confinement promptly reviewed prior to his release." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "392 U.S. 40, 53",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] state may not effectively deny a convict access to its appellate courts until he has been released and then argue that his case has been mooted by his failure to do what it alone prevented him from doing.\"",
"sentence": "Id. at 5... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[Conventional notions of finality in criminal litigation cannot be permitted to defeat the manifest federal policy that federal constitutional rights of personal liberty shall not be denied without the fullest opportunity for plenary federal judicial revi... | 9,057,532 | a |
Nor is Lee's appeal moot. In Frumento, we noted that "an appeal is not moot even though the appellant has been released from custody or has served his sentence if he has taken all possible steps to have the order of confinement promptly reviewed prior to his release." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] state may not effectively deny a convict access to its appellate courts until he has been released and then argue that his case has been mooted by his failure to do what it alone prevented him from doing.\"",
"sentence": "Id. at 537, citing Si... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "372 U.S. 391, 424",
"parenthetical": "\"[Conventional notions of finality in criminal litigation cannot be permitted to defeat the manifest federal policy that federal constitutional rights of personal liberty shall not be denied without the fullest opportunity for plenary federa... | 9,057,532 | a |
Nor is Lee's appeal moot. In Frumento, we noted that "an appeal is not moot even though the appellant has been released from custody or has served his sentence if he has taken all possible steps to have the order of confinement promptly reviewed prior to his release." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] state may not effectively deny a convict access to its appellate courts until he has been released and then argue that his case has been mooted by his failure to do what it alone prevented him from doing.\"",
"sentence": "Id. at 537, citing Si... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[Conventional notions of finality in criminal litigation cannot be permitted to defeat the manifest federal policy that federal constitutional rights of personal liberty shall not be denied without the fullest opportunity for plenary federal judicial revi... | 9,057,532 | a |
Nor is Lee's appeal moot. In Frumento, we noted that "an appeal is not moot even though the appellant has been released from custody or has served his sentence if he has taken all possible steps to have the order of confinement promptly reviewed prior to his release." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] state may not effectively deny a convict access to its appellate courts until he has been released and then argue that his case has been mooted by his failure to do what it alone prevented him from doing.\"",
"sentence": "Id. at 537, citing Si... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[Conventional notions of finality in criminal litigation cannot be permitted to defeat the manifest federal policy that federal constitutional rights of personal liberty shall not be denied without the fullest opportunity for plenary federal judicial revi... | 9,057,532 | a |
Nor is Lee's appeal moot. In Frumento, we noted that "an appeal is not moot even though the appellant has been released from custody or has served his sentence if he has taken all possible steps to have the order of confinement promptly reviewed prior to his release." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "372 U.S. 391, 424",
"parenthetical": "\"[Conventional notions of finality in criminal litigation cannot be permitted to defeat the manifest federal policy that federal constitutional rights of personal liberty shall not be denied without the fullest opportunity for plenary federa... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] state may not effectively deny a convict access to its appellate courts until he has been released and then argue that his case has been mooted by his failure to do what it alone prevented him from doing.\"",
"sentence": "Id. at 537, citing Si... | 9,057,532 | b |
Nor is Lee's appeal moot. In Frumento, we noted that "an appeal is not moot even though the appellant has been released from custody or has served his sentence if he has taken all possible steps to have the order of confinement promptly reviewed prior to his release." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] state may not effectively deny a convict access to its appellate courts until he has been released and then argue that his case has been mooted by his failure to do what it alone prevented him from doing.\"",
"sentence": "Id. at 537, citing Si... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[Conventional notions of finality in criminal litigation cannot be permitted to defeat the manifest federal policy that federal constitutional rights of personal liberty shall not be denied without the fullest opportunity for plenary federal judicial revi... | 9,057,532 | a |
Nor is Lee's appeal moot. In Frumento, we noted that "an appeal is not moot even though the appellant has been released from custody or has served his sentence if he has taken all possible steps to have the order of confinement promptly reviewed prior to his release." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] state may not effectively deny a convict access to its appellate courts until he has been released and then argue that his case has been mooted by his failure to do what it alone prevented him from doing.\"",
"sentence": "Id. at 537, citing Si... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[Conventional notions of finality in criminal litigation cannot be permitted to defeat the manifest federal policy that federal constitutional rights of personal liberty shall not be denied without the fullest opportunity for plenary federal judicial revi... | 9,057,532 | a |
Nor does the later introduction of the tape in evidence at the hearing transform the preparation of the tape into a prosecu-torial activity. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "55 F.3d 26, 29",
"parenthetical": "\"The prosecutorial nature of an act does not spread backwards like an inkblot, immunizing everything it touches.\"",
"sentence": "See Guzman-Rivera v. Rivera-Cruz, 55 F.3d 26, 29 (1st Cir.1995) (“The prosecutorial nature of an act does not sp... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "509 U.S. 275, 275-76",
"parenthetical": "\"That the prosecutors later called a grand jury to consider the evidence this work produced does not retroactively transform that work from administrative into the prosecutorial.\"",
"sentence": "See Guzman-Rivera v. Rivera-Cruz, 5... | 11,529,769 | a |
Nor does the later introduction of the tape in evidence at the hearing transform the preparation of the tape into a prosecu-torial activity. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "55 F.3d 26, 29",
"parenthetical": "\"The prosecutorial nature of an act does not spread backwards like an inkblot, immunizing everything it touches.\"",
"sentence": "See Guzman-Rivera v. Rivera-Cruz, 55 F.3d 26, 29 (1st Cir.1995) (“The prosecutorial nature of an act does not sp... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"That the prosecutors later called a grand jury to consider the evidence this work produced does not retroactively transform that work from administrative into the prosecutorial.\"",
"sentence": "See Guzman-Rivera v. Rivera-Cruz, 55 F.3d 26, 29 (1st... | 11,529,769 | a |
Mocek argues that forum analysis and time, place; and man ner analysis do not apply in determining whether his conduct was "protected speech" for purposes of a retaliation claim, such that any government conduct intended to stop activity that is sometimes protected by the First Amendment is unconstitutional retaliation... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "753 F.3d 7, 7-8",
"parenthetical": "holding, for purposes of a retaliation claim, \"[Reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right to film may be imposed when the circumstances justify them,\" including \"[t]he circumstances of some traffic stops\"",
"sentence": "See Ger... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "395 F.3d 786, 796-97",
"parenthetical": "rejecting, in an employment-termination context, a retaliation claim premised on freedom of association where restrictions on association were reasonable in a nonpublic forum",
"sentence": "See Gericke, 753 F.3d at 7-8 (holding, for purp... | 4,087,411 | a |
Mocek argues that forum analysis and time, place; and man ner analysis do not apply in determining whether his conduct was "protected speech" for purposes of a retaliation claim, such that any government conduct intended to stop activity that is sometimes protected by the First Amendment is unconstitutional retaliation... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "395 F.3d 786, 796-97",
"parenthetical": "rejecting, in an employment-termination context, a retaliation claim premised on freedom of association where restrictions on association were reasonable in a nonpublic forum",
"sentence": "See Gericke, 753 F.3d at 7-8 (holding, for purp... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "354 F.3d 540, 552",
"parenthetical": "holding, for purposes of a retaliation claim, \"[b]ecause Michigan has not passed an applicable time, place, or manner restriction, Dean had a constitutionally protected right to engage in peaceful targeted picketing in front of Byerley's res... | 4,087,411 | b |
Mocek argues that forum analysis and time, place; and man ner analysis do not apply in determining whether his conduct was "protected speech" for purposes of a retaliation claim, such that any government conduct intended to stop activity that is sometimes protected by the First Amendment is unconstitutional retaliation... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "307 F.3d 650, 654",
"parenthetical": "rejecting argument that sometimes-protected speech can always support a retaliation claim",
"sentence": "See Gericke, 753 F.3d at 7-8 (holding, for purposes of a retaliation claim, “[Reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right to f... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "395 F.3d 786, 796-97",
"parenthetical": "rejecting, in an employment-termination context, a retaliation claim premised on freedom of association where restrictions on association were reasonable in a nonpublic forum",
"sentence": "See Gericke, 753 F.3d at 7-8 (holding, for purp... | 4,087,411 | a |
Mocek argues that forum analysis and time, place; and man ner analysis do not apply in determining whether his conduct was "protected speech" for purposes of a retaliation claim, such that any government conduct intended to stop activity that is sometimes protected by the First Amendment is unconstitutional retaliation... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "395 F.3d 786, 796-97",
"parenthetical": "rejecting, in an employment-termination context, a retaliation claim premised on freedom of association where restrictions on association were reasonable in a nonpublic forum",
"sentence": "See Gericke, 753 F.3d at 7-8 (holding, for purp... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting argument that sometimes-protected speech can always support a retaliation claim",
"sentence": "See Gericke, 753 F.3d at 7-8 (holding, for purposes of a retaliation claim, “[Reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right to film may be impo... | 4,087,411 | b |
Mocek argues that forum analysis and time, place; and man ner analysis do not apply in determining whether his conduct was "protected speech" for purposes of a retaliation claim, such that any government conduct intended to stop activity that is sometimes protected by the First Amendment is unconstitutional retaliation... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "501 Fed.Appx. 657, 659",
"parenthetical": "holding plaintiffs could not maintain a retaliation claim where they \"lacked a First Amendment right to picket or otherwise occupy\" a nonpublic forum",
"sentence": "See Gericke, 753 F.3d at 7-8 (holding, for purposes of a retaliation... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "395 F.3d 786, 796-97",
"parenthetical": "rejecting, in an employment-termination context, a retaliation claim premised on freedom of association where restrictions on association were reasonable in a nonpublic forum",
"sentence": "See Gericke, 753 F.3d at 7-8 (holding, for purp... | 4,087,411 | a |
Mocek argues that forum analysis and time, place; and man ner analysis do not apply in determining whether his conduct was "protected speech" for purposes of a retaliation claim, such that any government conduct intended to stop activity that is sometimes protected by the First Amendment is unconstitutional retaliation... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "395 F.3d 786, 796-97",
"parenthetical": "rejecting, in an employment-termination context, a retaliation claim premised on freedom of association where restrictions on association were reasonable in a nonpublic forum",
"sentence": "See Gericke, 753 F.3d at 7-8 (holding, for purp... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "301 Fed.Appx. 142, 146",
"parenthetical": "holding, for purposes of a retaliation claim, \"restricting ... disruptive behavior constitutes the type of time, place, and manner regulation that survives even the most stringent scrutiny for a public forum\"",
"sentence": "See Geric... | 4,087,411 | b |
Whatever the perceived inadequacy of the district court's recitation of its reasons, the district court's sentencing decision was amply supported by evidence the government proffered at sentencing -- evidence that was neither contested nor countered by the defense. The defendant thus received a sentence merited by the ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "405 F.3d 814, 819",
"parenthetical": "stating defendant can meet his burden on prong three \"by demonstrating a reasonable probability that had the district court ap plied the [proper] sentencing framework, he would have received a lesser sentence\"",
"sentence": "See id. ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "298 F.3d 322, 325",
"parenthetical": "\"If the defendant does not object and there is evidence to sustain the enhancement, the error [under SS 3553's open court provision] is not reversible under the plain error standard.\"",
"sentence": "See id. at 1298 (defendant could not me... | 5,894,013 | b |
Whatever the perceived inadequacy of the district court's recitation of its reasons, the district court's sentencing decision was amply supported by evidence the government proffered at sentencing -- evidence that was neither contested nor countered by the defense. The defendant thus received a sentence merited by the ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "405 F.3d 814, 819",
"parenthetical": "stating defendant can meet his burden on prong three \"by demonstrating a reasonable probability that had the district court ap plied the [proper] sentencing framework, he would have received a lesser sentence\"",
"sentence": "See id. ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no plain error in failure to make adequate findings in support of enhancement under SS 3B1.1 because \"there is evidence to sustain the enhancement\"",
"sentence": "See id. at 1298 (defendant could not meet the third prong of plain error in his challenge ... | 5,894,013 | b |
The formulation of the Speech or Debate privilege implies that the judiciary cannot avoid determining what are the outer limits of # legitimate legislative process. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "418 U.S. 706, 706",
"parenthetical": "Absent a claim of need to protect [national security], we find it difficult to accept the argument that even the very important interest in confidentiality of Presidential communications is significantly diminished by production of such mater... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "ordering in camera hearing to determine whether subpoenaed documents were covered by the legislative privilege at which Government was allowed to be present and to contest the claims of privilege",
"sentence": "See In re Possible Violations of 18 U.S.C. §... | 3,153,333 | b |
The formulation of the Speech or Debate privilege implies that the judiciary cannot avoid determining what are the outer limits of # legitimate legislative process. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "ordering in camera hearing to determine whether subpoenaed documents were covered by the legislative privilege at which Government was allowed to be present and to contest the claims of privilege",
"sentence": "See In re Possible Violations of 18 U.S.C. §... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Absent a claim of need to protect [national security], we find it difficult to accept the argument that even the very important interest in confidentiality of Presidential communications is significantly diminished by production of such material for in came... | 3,153,333 | a |
The formulation of the Speech or Debate privilege implies that the judiciary cannot avoid determining what are the outer limits of # legitimate legislative process. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "ordering in camera hearing to determine whether subpoenaed documents were covered by the legislative privilege at which Government was allowed to be present and to contest the claims of privilege",
"sentence": "See In re Possible Violations of 18 U.S.C. §... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "98 F.R.D. 45, 45",
"parenthetical": "Absent a claim of need to protect [national security], we find it difficult to accept the argument that even the very important interest in confidentiality of Presidential communications is significantly diminished by production of such materi... | 3,153,333 | a |
The formulation of the Speech or Debate privilege implies that the judiciary cannot avoid determining what are the outer limits of # legitimate legislative process. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "418 U.S. 706, 706",
"parenthetical": "Absent a claim of need to protect [national security], we find it difficult to accept the argument that even the very important interest in confidentiality of Presidential communications is significantly diminished by production of such mater... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "requiring detailed index of potentially privileged documents under Speech or Debate Clause to be submitted for judicial review and suggesting the need for in camera review of certain relevant documents to determine whether the congressional defendants have ... | 3,153,333 | b |
The formulation of the Speech or Debate privilege implies that the judiciary cannot avoid determining what are the outer limits of # legitimate legislative process. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Absent a claim of need to protect [national security], we find it difficult to accept the argument that even the very important interest in confidentiality of Presidential communications is significantly diminished by production of such material for in came... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "requiring detailed index of potentially privileged documents under Speech or Debate Clause to be submitted for judicial review and suggesting the need for in camera review of certain relevant documents to determine whether the congressional defendants have ... | 3,153,333 | b |
The formulation of the Speech or Debate privilege implies that the judiciary cannot avoid determining what are the outer limits of # legitimate legislative process. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "98 F.R.D. 45, 45",
"parenthetical": "Absent a claim of need to protect [national security], we find it difficult to accept the argument that even the very important interest in confidentiality of Presidential communications is significantly diminished by production of such materi... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "requiring detailed index of potentially privileged documents under Speech or Debate Clause to be submitted for judicial review and suggesting the need for in camera review of certain relevant documents to determine whether the congressional defendants have ... | 3,153,333 | b |
The first canon is the strong presumption against implied repeals. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "75 F.3d 789, 789",
"parenthetical": "\"[Cjourts must recognize that Congress does not legislate in a vacuum\" and \"take into account the tacit assumptions that underlie a legislative enactment, including ... preexisting statutory provisions.\"",
"sentence": "Miles v. Apex... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "75 F.3d 790, 790",
"parenthetical": "\"We are unequivocally committed to 'the bedrock principle that implied repeals of federal statutes are disfavored.' \" (quoting Narragansett, 19 F.3d at 703",
"sentence": "See Passamaquoddy, 75 F.3d at 790 (“We are unequivocally committed t... | 4,262,324 | b |
The first canon is the strong presumption against implied repeals. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "75 F.3d 789, 789",
"parenthetical": "\"[Cjourts must recognize that Congress does not legislate in a vacuum\" and \"take into account the tacit assumptions that underlie a legislative enactment, including ... preexisting statutory provisions.\"",
"sentence": "Miles v. Apex... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "19 F.3d 703, 703",
"parenthetical": "\"We are unequivocally committed to 'the bedrock principle that implied repeals of federal statutes are disfavored.' \" (quoting Narragansett, 19 F.3d at 703",
"sentence": "See Passamaquoddy, 75 F.3d at 790 (“We are unequivocally committed t... | 4,262,324 | b |
T41 Furthermore, the prosecutor made the comment only at the outset of his closing argument and did not repeat it at any other point during the trial, including the rebuttal closing. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "888 P.2d 259, 268",
"parenthetical": "reversal required where improper comments repeated over the course of the entire closing argument",
"sentence": "See Munsey, 232 P.3d at 124 (where there are no other allegations of prosecutorial misconduct during closing, it is unlikely th... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "232 P.3d 124, 124",
"parenthetical": "where there are no other allegations of prosecutorial misconduct during closing, it is unlikely that isolated portion of closing argument substantially influenced the verdict",
"sentence": "See Munsey, 232 P.3d at 124 (where there are no ot... | 6,973,316 | b |
The district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the parties to file additional motions for summary judgment after the applicable law changed. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "124 F.3d 1103, 1105-06",
"parenthetical": "rejecting contention that successive motions for summary judgment were impermissible",
"sentence": "See Christian v. Mattel, Inc., 286 F.3d 1118, 1129 (9th Cir.2002) (“The district court has considerable latitude in managing the p... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "286 F.3d 1118, 1129",
"parenthetical": "\"The district court has considerable latitude in managing the parties' motion practice[.]\"",
"sentence": "See Christian v. Mattel, Inc., 286 F.3d 1118, 1129 (9th Cir.2002) (“The district court has considerable latitude in managing the p... | 3,903,385 | b |
Most states to have confronted the question have upheld the validity of parole agreements in which the parolee consents in advance to warrantless searches. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e have held that a parolee's advance consent is valid because the parolee remains in the custody of the penal institution from which he is released .... \"",
"sentence": "See McFerrin v. State, 344 Ark. 671, 42 S.W.3d 529, 534-35 (2001) (“[W]e have h... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "570 P.2d 1235, 1241-42",
"parenthetical": "\"Depending on the nature of the crime involved, a condition of release granting authorities the right to search premises and persons at reasonable times could stand muster under both the Alaska and federal Constitutions.\"",
"sen... | 7,068,387 | a |
Most states to have confronted the question have upheld the validity of parole agreements in which the parolee consents in advance to warrantless searches. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "42 S.W.3d 529, 534-35",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e have held that a parolee's advance consent is valid because the parolee remains in the custody of the penal institution from which he is released .... \"",
"sentence": "See McFerrin v. State, 344 Ark. 671, 42 S.W.3d 529, 534-35 (... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "570 P.2d 1235, 1241-42",
"parenthetical": "\"Depending on the nature of the crime involved, a condition of release granting authorities the right to search premises and persons at reasonable times could stand muster under both the Alaska and federal Constitutions.\"",
"sen... | 7,068,387 | a |
Most states to have confronted the question have upheld the validity of parole agreements in which the parolee consents in advance to warrantless searches. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "570 P.2d 1235, 1241-42",
"parenthetical": "\"Depending on the nature of the crime involved, a condition of release granting authorities the right to search premises and persons at reasonable times could stand muster under both the Alaska and federal Constitutions.\"",
"sen... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The 'reasonable grounds' requirement for warrantless searches by probation or parole officers does not apply when the subject of the search has entered into a probation or parole agreement that includes a consent to warrantless searches.\"",
"sentence":... | 7,068,387 | b |
Most states to have confronted the question have upheld the validity of parole agreements in which the parolee consents in advance to warrantless searches. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "570 P.2d 1235, 1241-42",
"parenthetical": "\"Depending on the nature of the crime involved, a condition of release granting authorities the right to search premises and persons at reasonable times could stand muster under both the Alaska and federal Constitutions.\"",
"sen... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2 P.3d 153, 156",
"parenthetical": "\"The 'reasonable grounds' requirement for warrantless searches by probation or parole officers does not apply when the subject of the search has entered into a probation or parole agreement that includes a consent to warrantless searches.\"",
... | 7,068,387 | b |
Most states to have confronted the question have upheld the validity of parole agreements in which the parolee consents in advance to warrantless searches. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding an agreement where the parolee consents in advance to warrantless searches",
"sentence": "See McFerrin v. State, 344 Ark. 671, 42 S.W.3d 529, 534-35 (2001) (“[W]e have held that a parolee’s advance consent is valid because the parolee remains in... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "570 P.2d 1235, 1241-42",
"parenthetical": "\"Depending on the nature of the crime involved, a condition of release granting authorities the right to search premises and persons at reasonable times could stand muster under both the Alaska and federal Constitutions.\"",
"sen... | 7,068,387 | a |
Most states to have confronted the question have upheld the validity of parole agreements in which the parolee consents in advance to warrantless searches. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "570 P.2d 1235, 1241-42",
"parenthetical": "\"Depending on the nature of the crime involved, a condition of release granting authorities the right to search premises and persons at reasonable times could stand muster under both the Alaska and federal Constitutions.\"",
"sen... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding an agreement where the parolee consents in advance to warrantless searches",
"sentence": "See McFerrin v. State, 344 Ark. 671, 42 S.W.3d 529, 534-35 (2001) (“[W]e have held that a parolee’s advance consent is valid because the parolee remains in... | 7,068,387 | b |
Most states to have confronted the question have upheld the validity of parole agreements in which the parolee consents in advance to warrantless searches. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "570 P.2d 1235, 1241-42",
"parenthetical": "\"Depending on the nature of the crime involved, a condition of release granting authorities the right to search premises and persons at reasonable times could stand muster under both the Alaska and federal Constitutions.\"",
"sen... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "885 N.E.2d 1033, 1042",
"parenthetical": "upholding an agreement where the parolee consents in advance to warrantless searches",
"sentence": "See McFerrin v. State, 344 Ark. 671, 42 S.W.3d 529, 534-35 (2001) (“[W]e have held that a parolee’s advance consent is valid because the... | 7,068,387 | b |
. There is no question that Texas law governs whether the State Court Claims are derivative or direct claims. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "826 F.2d 347, 349",
"parenthetical": "\"State law determines whether a shareholder may maintain a nonderivative action.\"",
"sentence": "Crocker v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 826 F.2d 347, 349 (5th Cir.1987) (“State law determines whether a shareholder may maintain a non... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "105 B.R. 811, 821",
"parenthetical": "holding that where the entity was incorporated in Texas, and the shareholders reside in Texas and the bankruptcy case is pending in Texas, Texas law -- not Arizona law -- should be applied",
"sentence": "Crocker v. Federal Deposit Ins.... | 4,319,370 | a |
Under this section, registration is a jurisdictional prerequisite to the initiation of an infringement action in federal court. E.g., M.G.B. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "683 F.Supp. 1234, 1242",
"parenthetical": "accepting jurisdiction over infringement claim where plaintiff amended complaint to reference certificates of registration obtained after suit was filed",
"sentence": "Homes, Inc. v. Ameron Homes, Inc., 903 F.2d 1486, 1488 (11th Cir.19... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "553 F.Supp. 402, 403",
"parenthetical": "\"A suit for copyright infringement is conditioned on obtaining (or being denied) a certificate of registration\"",
"sentence": "Homes, Inc. v. Ameron Homes, Inc., 903 F.2d 1486, 1488 (11th Cir.1990); Dodd v. Fort Smith Special School Di... | 7,847,055 | b |
. The parties agree that statutes of limitations are classified as procedural rather than substantive. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "278 F.Supp.2d 945, 953",
"parenthetical": "observing that in breach of contract action statutes of limitations are treated as procedural",
"sentence": "See Horvath v. Davidson, 148 Ind.App. 203, 209, 264 N.E.2d 328, 332 (1970) (“Without exception the statute of limitations... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "148 Ind.App. 203, 209",
"parenthetical": "\"Without exception the statute of limitations has been considered procedural in Indiana.''",
"sentence": "See Horvath v. Davidson, 148 Ind.App. 203, 209, 264 N.E.2d 328, 332 (1970) (“Without exception the statute of limitations has bee... | 6,925,590 | b |
. The parties agree that statutes of limitations are classified as procedural rather than substantive. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "264 N.E.2d 328, 332",
"parenthetical": "\"Without exception the statute of limitations has been considered procedural in Indiana.''",
"sentence": "See Horvath v. Davidson, 148 Ind.App. 203, 209, 264 N.E.2d 328, 332 (1970) (“Without exception the statute of limitations has been ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "278 F.Supp.2d 945, 953",
"parenthetical": "observing that in breach of contract action statutes of limitations are treated as procedural",
"sentence": "See Horvath v. Davidson, 148 Ind.App. 203, 209, 264 N.E.2d 328, 332 (1970) (“Without exception the statute of limitations... | 6,925,590 | a |
For the larceny to be "from the person," it is sufficient that property is taken that was in the possession and immediate presence of the victim. Michigan case law since the opinion in Gould makes clear that the property must be in the possession or immediate presence of the victim. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that larceny from the person is in the robbery crime-group category for purposes of sentencing in Michigan",
"sentence": "See also People v. Eberhardt, 205 Mich.App. 587, 518 N.W.2d 511, 513 (1994) (recognizing that larceny from the perso... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that taking money from a victim offering the money out of fear of violence can be larceny from the person because there is no consent and the money was \"removed from the actual possession or custody of the person or his immediate pres ence, Viz., t... | 11,779,348 | b |
For the larceny to be "from the person," it is sufficient that property is taken that was in the possession and immediate presence of the victim. Michigan case law since the opinion in Gould makes clear that the property must be in the possession or immediate presence of the victim. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "518 N.W.2d 511, 513",
"parenthetical": "recognizing that larceny from the person is in the robbery crime-group category for purposes of sentencing in Michigan",
"sentence": "See also People v. Eberhardt, 205 Mich.App. 587, 518 N.W.2d 511, 513 (1994) (recognizing that larce... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that taking money from a victim offering the money out of fear of violence can be larceny from the person because there is no consent and the money was \"removed from the actual possession or custody of the person or his immediate pres ence, Viz., t... | 11,779,348 | b |
For the larceny to be "from the person," it is sufficient that property is taken that was in the possession and immediate presence of the victim. Michigan case law since the opinion in Gould makes clear that the property must be in the possession or immediate presence of the victim. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that larceny from the person is in the robbery crime-group category for purposes of sentencing in Michigan",
"sentence": "See also People v. Eberhardt, 205 Mich.App. 587, 518 N.W.2d 511, 513 (1994) (recognizing that larceny from the perso... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "243 N.W.2d 681, 683",
"parenthetical": "holding that taking money from a victim offering the money out of fear of violence can be larceny from the person because there is no consent and the money was \"removed from the actual possession or custody of the person or his immediate p... | 11,779,348 | b |
For the larceny to be "from the person," it is sufficient that property is taken that was in the possession and immediate presence of the victim. Michigan case law since the opinion in Gould makes clear that the property must be in the possession or immediate presence of the victim. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "518 N.W.2d 511, 513",
"parenthetical": "recognizing that larceny from the person is in the robbery crime-group category for purposes of sentencing in Michigan",
"sentence": "See also People v. Eberhardt, 205 Mich.App. 587, 518 N.W.2d 511, 513 (1994) (recognizing that larce... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "243 N.W.2d 681, 683",
"parenthetical": "holding that taking money from a victim offering the money out of fear of violence can be larceny from the person because there is no consent and the money was \"removed from the actual possession or custody of the person or his immediate p... | 11,779,348 | b |
For the larceny to be "from the person," it is sufficient that property is taken that was in the possession and immediate presence of the victim. Michigan case law since the opinion in Gould makes clear that the property must be in the possession or immediate presence of the victim. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding no larceny from the person if the victim is in another room",
"sentence": "See, e.g., People v. Wallace, 173 Mich.App. 420, 434 N.W.2d 422, 426 (1988) (quoting Criminal Jury Instruction 23:2:01 which says “the property must have been taken from th... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that larceny from the person is in the robbery crime-group category for purposes of sentencing in Michigan",
"sentence": "See also People v. Eberhardt, 205 Mich.App. 587, 518 N.W.2d 511, 513 (1994) (recognizing that larceny from the perso... | 11,779,348 | a |
For the larceny to be "from the person," it is sufficient that property is taken that was in the possession and immediate presence of the victim. Michigan case law since the opinion in Gould makes clear that the property must be in the possession or immediate presence of the victim. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding no larceny from the person if the victim is in another room",
"sentence": "See, e.g., People v. Wallace, 173 Mich.App. 420, 434 N.W.2d 422, 426 (1988) (quoting Criminal Jury Instruction 23:2:01 which says “the property must have been taken from th... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "518 N.W.2d 511, 513",
"parenthetical": "recognizing that larceny from the person is in the robbery crime-group category for purposes of sentencing in Michigan",
"sentence": "See also People v. Eberhardt, 205 Mich.App. 587, 518 N.W.2d 511, 513 (1994) (recognizing that larce... | 11,779,348 | a |
For the larceny to be "from the person," it is sufficient that property is taken that was in the possession and immediate presence of the victim. Michigan case law since the opinion in Gould makes clear that the property must be in the possession or immediate presence of the victim. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that larceny from the person is in the robbery crime-group category for purposes of sentencing in Michigan",
"sentence": "See also People v. Eberhardt, 205 Mich.App. 587, 518 N.W.2d 511, 513 (1994) (recognizing that larceny from the perso... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "181 N.W.2d 425, 428",
"parenthetical": "finding no larceny from the person if the victim is in another room",
"sentence": "See, e.g., People v. Wallace, 173 Mich.App. 420, 434 N.W.2d 422, 426 (1988) (quoting Criminal Jury Instruction 23:2:01 which says “the property must have b... | 11,779,348 | b |
For the larceny to be "from the person," it is sufficient that property is taken that was in the possession and immediate presence of the victim. Michigan case law since the opinion in Gould makes clear that the property must be in the possession or immediate presence of the victim. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "181 N.W.2d 425, 428",
"parenthetical": "finding no larceny from the person if the victim is in another room",
"sentence": "See, e.g., People v. Wallace, 173 Mich.App. 420, 434 N.W.2d 422, 426 (1988) (quoting Criminal Jury Instruction 23:2:01 which says “the property must have b... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "518 N.W.2d 511, 513",
"parenthetical": "recognizing that larceny from the person is in the robbery crime-group category for purposes of sentencing in Michigan",
"sentence": "See also People v. Eberhardt, 205 Mich.App. 587, 518 N.W.2d 511, 513 (1994) (recognizing that larce... | 11,779,348 | a |
. The Government argues that even if the execution of the search warrant impermissi-bly intruded on legislative activity, the careful procedures established by the Government here are sufficient to protect Congressman Jefferson from suffering any prejudice. The Court finds that a harmless-error analysis is not appropri... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "62 F.3d 419, 419",
"parenthetical": "The degree of disruption [of the legislative process] is immaterial .... any probing of legislative acts is sufficient to trigger the immunity.",
"sentence": "See United States v. Swindall, 971 F.2d 1531, 1548 n. 21 (11th Cir.1992) (a harmle... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a harmless-error analysis will not excuse a violation [of the Speech or Debate Clause]",
"sentence": "See United States v. Swindall, 971 F.2d 1531, 1548 n. 21 (11th Cir.1992) (a harmless-error analysis will not excuse a violation [of the Speech or Debate ... | 3,153,333 | b |
Not only do the above-cited eases show that the jury award of $1 million for pain and suffering in this case was not excessive as a whole, but most of that award (70%) was for Mr. Carmody's past pain and suffering, which was unquestionably severe, and which ProNav barely challenges. Further, Mr. Carmody's injuries were... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "925 F.Supp. 1025, 1025",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]his case is set apart by the magnitude of the physical injuries suffered by the plaintiff.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Shea, 925 F.Supp. at 1025 (“[T]his case is set apart by the magnitude of the physical injuries suffered by the ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "290 F.Supp.2d 478, 478",
"parenthetical": "although the jury verdict for pain and suffering was on the \"high end of the spectrum ..., given the severity and debilitating nature of plaintiffs ... injuries, the award [was] solidly within that spectrum and fairly reflected] th... | 1,496,950 | a |
On the one hand, we might consider disqualification to be a kind of additional punishment and then allow a judge (perhaps at the original trial) to find the necessary factual predicate by a preponderance of the evidence. | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "458 F.Supp. 388, 408",
"parenthetical": "applying \"clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence\" standard where factual finding \"will result in a much longer and harsher sentence\"",
"sentence": "Cf. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, — U.S.-, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986) (... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "factual finding requiring imposition of mandatory minimum sentence may be made by trial judge on a preponderance of the evidence",
"sentence": "Cf. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, — U.S.-, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986) (factual finding requiring impositi... | 1,736,270 | b |
On the one hand, we might consider disqualification to be a kind of additional punishment and then allow a judge (perhaps at the original trial) to find the necessary factual predicate by a preponderance of the evidence. | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "applying \"clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence\" standard where factual finding \"will result in a much longer and harsher sentence\"",
"sentence": "Cf. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, — U.S.-, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986) (factual finding re... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "factual finding requiring imposition of mandatory minimum sentence may be made by trial judge on a preponderance of the evidence",
"sentence": "Cf. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, — U.S.-, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986) (factual finding requiring impositi... | 1,736,270 | b |
On the one hand, we might consider disqualification to be a kind of additional punishment and then allow a judge (perhaps at the original trial) to find the necessary factual predicate by a preponderance of the evidence. | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "applying \"clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence\" standard where factual finding \"will result in a much longer and harsher sentence\"",
"sentence": "Cf. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, — U.S.-, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986) (factual finding re... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "factual finding requiring imposition of mandatory minimum sentence may be made by trial judge on a preponderance of the evidence",
"sentence": "Cf. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, — U.S.-, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986) (factual finding requiring impositi... | 1,736,270 | b |
On the one hand, we might consider disqualification to be a kind of additional punishment and then allow a judge (perhaps at the original trial) to find the necessary factual predicate by a preponderance of the evidence. | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "applying \"clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence\" standard where factual finding \"will result in a much longer and harsher sentence\"",
"sentence": "Cf. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, — U.S.-, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986) (factual finding re... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "factual finding requiring imposition of mandatory minimum sentence may be made by trial judge on a preponderance of the evidence",
"sentence": "Cf. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, — U.S.-, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986) (factual finding requiring impositi... | 1,736,270 | b |
On the one hand, we might consider disqualification to be a kind of additional punishment and then allow a judge (perhaps at the original trial) to find the necessary factual predicate by a preponderance of the evidence. | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "applying \"clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence\" standard where factual finding \"will result in a much longer and harsher sentence\"",
"sentence": "Cf. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, — U.S.-, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986) (factual finding re... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "factual finding requiring imposition of mandatory minimum sentence may be made by trial judge on a preponderance of the evidence",
"sentence": "Cf. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, — U.S.-, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986) (factual finding requiring impositi... | 1,736,270 | b |
On the one hand, we might consider disqualification to be a kind of additional punishment and then allow a judge (perhaps at the original trial) to find the necessary factual predicate by a preponderance of the evidence. | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "458 F.Supp. 388, 408",
"parenthetical": "applying \"clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence\" standard where factual finding \"will result in a much longer and harsher sentence\"",
"sentence": "Cf. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, — U.S.-, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986) (... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "factual finding requiring imposition of mandatory minimum sentence may be made by trial judge on a preponderance of the evidence",
"sentence": "Cf. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, — U.S.-, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986) (factual finding requiring impositi... | 1,736,270 | b |
On the one hand, we might consider disqualification to be a kind of additional punishment and then allow a judge (perhaps at the original trial) to find the necessary factual predicate by a preponderance of the evidence. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "factual finding requiring imposition of mandatory minimum sentence may be made by trial judge on a preponderance of the evidence",
"sentence": "Cf. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, — U.S.-, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986) (factual finding requiring impositi... | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "applying \"clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence\" standard where factual finding \"will result in a much longer and harsher sentence\"",
"sentence": "Cf. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, — U.S.-, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986) (factual finding re... | 1,736,270 | a |
On the one hand, we might consider disqualification to be a kind of additional punishment and then allow a judge (perhaps at the original trial) to find the necessary factual predicate by a preponderance of the evidence. | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "applying \"clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence\" standard where factual finding \"will result in a much longer and harsher sentence\"",
"sentence": "Cf. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, — U.S.-, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986) (factual finding re... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "factual finding requiring imposition of mandatory minimum sentence may be made by trial judge on a preponderance of the evidence",
"sentence": "Cf. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, — U.S.-, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986) (factual finding requiring impositi... | 1,736,270 | b |
On the one hand, we might consider disqualification to be a kind of additional punishment and then allow a judge (perhaps at the original trial) to find the necessary factual predicate by a preponderance of the evidence. | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "applying \"clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence\" standard where factual finding \"will result in a much longer and harsher sentence\"",
"sentence": "Cf. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, — U.S.-, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986) (factual finding re... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "factual finding requiring imposition of mandatory minimum sentence may be made by trial judge on a preponderance of the evidence",
"sentence": "Cf. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, — U.S.-, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986) (factual finding requiring impositi... | 1,736,270 | b |
On the one hand, we might consider disqualification to be a kind of additional punishment and then allow a judge (perhaps at the original trial) to find the necessary factual predicate by a preponderance of the evidence. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "factual finding requiring imposition of mandatory minimum sentence may be made by trial judge on a preponderance of the evidence",
"sentence": "Cf. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, — U.S.-, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986) (factual finding requiring impositi... | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "applying \"clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence\" standard where factual finding \"will result in a much longer and harsher sentence\"",
"sentence": "Cf. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, — U.S.-, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986) (factual finding re... | 1,736,270 | a |
In reviewing the district court's judgment of this issue, we must refrain from second-guessing the district court's assessment, unless we find that the court abused its discretion. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "418 F.3d 46, 46",
"parenthetical": "\"[J]udgment calls and issues that demand the balancing of conflicting factors are reviewed deferentially.\"",
"sentence": "See George Weston Bakeries, 570 F.3d at 8 (“[W]e afford considerable deference to the trial court’s balancing of ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "570 F.3d 8, 8",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e afford considerable deference to the trial court's balancing of equities.\"",
"sentence": "See George Weston Bakeries, 570 F.3d at 8 (“[W]e afford considerable deference to the trial court’s balancing of equities.”); see also Wine & Spir... | 5,682,193 | b |
However, it has been well-established that Bivens is not applicable for the purposes of asserting a constitutional claim against a private corporate entity. See Corr. Servs. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "foreclosing the extension of a Bivens remedy to the context of employer liability",
"sentence": "Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 122 S.Ct. 515, 151 L.Ed.2d 456 (2001) (foreclosing the extension of a Bivens remedy to the context of employer liability)... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "320 F.3d 26, 33",
"parenthetical": "holding that no Bivens claim existed against a defendant bank that supplied information required by law to the Federal Bureau of Investigations",
"sentence": "Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 122 S.Ct. 515, 151 L.Ed.2d 456 (2001) (foreclos... | 3,767,968 | a |
However, it has been well-established that Bivens is not applicable for the purposes of asserting a constitutional claim against a private corporate entity. See Corr. Servs. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "320 F.3d 26, 33",
"parenthetical": "holding that no Bivens claim existed against a defendant bank that supplied information required by law to the Federal Bureau of Investigations",
"sentence": "Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 122 S.Ct. 515, 151 L.Ed.2d 456 (2001) (foreclos... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "foreclosing the extension of a Bivens remedy to the context of employer liability",
"sentence": "Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 122 S.Ct. 515, 151 L.Ed.2d 456 (2001) (foreclosing the extension of a Bivens remedy to the context of employer liability)... | 3,767,968 | b |
However, it has been well-established that Bivens is not applicable for the purposes of asserting a constitutional claim against a private corporate entity. See Corr. Servs. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "foreclosing the extension of a Bivens remedy to the context of employer liability",
"sentence": "Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 122 S.Ct. 515, 151 L.Ed.2d 456 (2001) (foreclosing the extension of a Bivens remedy to the context of employer liability)... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "320 F.3d 26, 33",
"parenthetical": "holding that no Bivens claim existed against a defendant bank that supplied information required by law to the Federal Bureau of Investigations",
"sentence": "Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 122 S.Ct. 515, 151 L.Ed.2d 456 (2001) (foreclos... | 3,767,968 | a |
(Compl. P 33.) Indeed, Plaintiffs rely on this fact to counter Defendants' argument for dismissal under Morrison. (Doc. No. 175, at 4.) Despite this clear definition, Plaintiffs urge the Court to look to the subsection heading of the statute, which refers to the "Exclusive Federal regulation of nationally traded securi... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "636 F.3d 677, 681",
"parenthetical": "finding reference to a subtitle \"unnecessary and inappropriate\" where there was no ambiguity in the subsection",
"sentence": "Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 212, 118 S.Ct. 1952, 141 L.Ed.2d 215 (1998) (“[T]he title of a stat... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "524 U.S. 206, 212",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he title of a statute ... cannot limit the plain meaning of the text\" and is \"of use only when [it] shed[s] light on some ambiguous word or phrase.\"",
"sentence": "Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 212, 118 S.Ct. 1952, 1... | 3,776,071 | b |
(Compl. P 33.) Indeed, Plaintiffs rely on this fact to counter Defendants' argument for dismissal under Morrison. (Doc. No. 175, at 4.) Despite this clear definition, Plaintiffs urge the Court to look to the subsection heading of the statute, which refers to the "Exclusive Federal regulation of nationally traded securi... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he title of a statute ... cannot limit the plain meaning of the text\" and is \"of use only when [it] shed[s] light on some ambiguous word or phrase.\"",
"sentence": "Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 212, 118 S.Ct. 1952, 141 L.Ed.2d 215 ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "636 F.3d 677, 681",
"parenthetical": "finding reference to a subtitle \"unnecessary and inappropriate\" where there was no ambiguity in the subsection",
"sentence": "Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 212, 118 S.Ct. 1952, 141 L.Ed.2d 215 (1998) (“[T]he title of a stat... | 3,776,071 | a |
(Compl. P 33.) Indeed, Plaintiffs rely on this fact to counter Defendants' argument for dismissal under Morrison. (Doc. No. 175, at 4.) Despite this clear definition, Plaintiffs urge the Court to look to the subsection heading of the statute, which refers to the "Exclusive Federal regulation of nationally traded securi... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "636 F.3d 677, 681",
"parenthetical": "finding reference to a subtitle \"unnecessary and inappropriate\" where there was no ambiguity in the subsection",
"sentence": "Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 212, 118 S.Ct. 1952, 141 L.Ed.2d 215 (1998) (“[T]he title of a stat... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he title of a statute ... cannot limit the plain meaning of the text\" and is \"of use only when [it] shed[s] light on some ambiguous word or phrase.\"",
"sentence": "Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 212, 118 S.Ct. 1952, 141 L.Ed.2d 215 ... | 3,776,071 | b |
(Pl. Dep. 194:6-197:10.) A reasonable jury could find that no force was warranted, and that forcibly removing Plaintiff from her car and handcuffing her was excessive force. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "821 F.2d 923, 923-24",
"parenthetical": "holding that forcibly removing nonviolent plaintiff from her car could be excessive force",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Robison, 821 F.2d at 923-24 (holding that forcibly removing nonviolent plaintiff from her car could be excessive force); ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "380 F.3d 106, 109-10",
"parenthetical": "reversing the district court's entry of summary judgment against a plaintiff who had suffered only \"minor scrapes, bumps or bruises [that] potentially could occur, often unintended, during any arrest,\" pain, and post-concussive synd... | 4,331,995 | a |
(Pl. Dep. 194:6-197:10.) A reasonable jury could find that no force was warranted, and that forcibly removing Plaintiff from her car and handcuffing her was excessive force. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reversing the district court's entry of summary judgment against a plaintiff who had suffered only \"minor scrapes, bumps or bruises [that] potentially could occur, often unintended, during any arrest,\" pain, and post-concussive syndrome, as a result ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "821 F.2d 923, 923-24",
"parenthetical": "holding that forcibly removing nonviolent plaintiff from her car could be excessive force",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Robison, 821 F.2d at 923-24 (holding that forcibly removing nonviolent plaintiff from her car could be excessive force); ... | 4,331,995 | b |
(Pl. Dep. 194:6-197:10.) A reasonable jury could find that no force was warranted, and that forcibly removing Plaintiff from her car and handcuffing her was excessive force. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2011 WL 4592785, at *8",
"parenthetical": "holding that tightening \"handcuffs ... to their maximum, for apparently gratuitous reasons\" along with kneeing the plaintiff in his back could be excessive force",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Robison, 821 F.2d at 923-24 (holding that for... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "380 F.3d 106, 109-10",
"parenthetical": "reversing the district court's entry of summary judgment against a plaintiff who had suffered only \"minor scrapes, bumps or bruises [that] potentially could occur, often unintended, during any arrest,\" pain, and post-concussive synd... | 4,331,995 | a |
(Pl. Dep. 194:6-197:10.) A reasonable jury could find that no force was warranted, and that forcibly removing Plaintiff from her car and handcuffing her was excessive force. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reversing the district court's entry of summary judgment against a plaintiff who had suffered only \"minor scrapes, bumps or bruises [that] potentially could occur, often unintended, during any arrest,\" pain, and post-concussive syndrome, as a result ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2011 WL 4592785, at *8",
"parenthetical": "holding that tightening \"handcuffs ... to their maximum, for apparently gratuitous reasons\" along with kneeing the plaintiff in his back could be excessive force",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Robison, 821 F.2d at 923-24 (holding that for... | 4,331,995 | b |
(Pl. Dep. 194:6-197:10.) A reasonable jury could find that no force was warranted, and that forcibly removing Plaintiff from her car and handcuffing her was excessive force. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "380 F.3d 106, 109-10",
"parenthetical": "reversing the district court's entry of summary judgment against a plaintiff who had suffered only \"minor scrapes, bumps or bruises [that] potentially could occur, often unintended, during any arrest,\" pain, and post-concussive synd... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2009 WL 2226105, at *9",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"purposely tripp[ing] [the plaintiff] while he was being escorted, in handcuffs, ... causing him to fall to the floor and cut his face\" could be excessive force",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Robison, 821 F.2d at 923-24 (hold... | 4,331,995 | b |
(Pl. Dep. 194:6-197:10.) A reasonable jury could find that no force was warranted, and that forcibly removing Plaintiff from her car and handcuffing her was excessive force. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2009 WL 2226105, at *9",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"purposely tripp[ing] [the plaintiff] while he was being escorted, in handcuffs, ... causing him to fall to the floor and cut his face\" could be excessive force",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Robison, 821 F.2d at 923-24 (hold... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reversing the district court's entry of summary judgment against a plaintiff who had suffered only \"minor scrapes, bumps or bruises [that] potentially could occur, often unintended, during any arrest,\" pain, and post-concussive syndrome, as a result ... | 4,331,995 | a |
(Pl. Dep. 194:6-197:10.) A reasonable jury could find that no force was warranted, and that forcibly removing Plaintiff from her car and handcuffing her was excessive force. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2007 WL 608125, at *11",
"parenthetical": "holding that an officer intentionally hitting the plaintiffs head into the top of the police car as the plaintiff was being placed in the police car could be excessive force",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Robison, 821 F.2d at 923-24 (holdin... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "380 F.3d 106, 109-10",
"parenthetical": "reversing the district court's entry of summary judgment against a plaintiff who had suffered only \"minor scrapes, bumps or bruises [that] potentially could occur, often unintended, during any arrest,\" pain, and post-concussive synd... | 4,331,995 | a |
(Pl. Dep. 194:6-197:10.) A reasonable jury could find that no force was warranted, and that forcibly removing Plaintiff from her car and handcuffing her was excessive force. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2007 WL 608125, at *11",
"parenthetical": "holding that an officer intentionally hitting the plaintiffs head into the top of the police car as the plaintiff was being placed in the police car could be excessive force",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Robison, 821 F.2d at 923-24 (holdin... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reversing the district court's entry of summary judgment against a plaintiff who had suffered only \"minor scrapes, bumps or bruises [that] potentially could occur, often unintended, during any arrest,\" pain, and post-concussive syndrome, as a result ... | 4,331,995 | a |
The district court's admission of Officer Nanney's testimony violated Buffington's rights under the Confrontation Clause. Mrs. Buffington's statement was testimonial because she provided Officer Nanney with the information about the blankets and sleeping bag in the context of a police interrogation. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "506 F.3d 486, 486-87",
"parenthetical": "\"[Whether defendant] had long guns, shotguns, or rifles in his bedroom was not offered for its truth because the testimony did not bear on [his] alleged possession of the .380 Llama pistol with which he was charged.\"",
"sentence": "Uni... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "405 F.3d 399, 399",
"parenthetical": "statement of identification was testimonial where declarant could reasonably assume that the statement would be used against the suspects in either an investigation or a prosecution",
"sentence": "Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68, 124 S.Ct. 1... | 3,874,684 | b |
The district court's admission of Officer Nanney's testimony violated Buffington's rights under the Confrontation Clause. Mrs. Buffington's statement was testimonial because she provided Officer Nanney with the information about the blankets and sleeping bag in the context of a police interrogation. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "506 F.3d 486, 486-87",
"parenthetical": "\"[Whether defendant] had long guns, shotguns, or rifles in his bedroom was not offered for its truth because the testimony did not bear on [his] alleged possession of the .380 Llama pistol with which he was charged.\"",
"sentence": "Uni... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "389 F.3d 677, 677",
"parenthetical": "Cl's statement that defendant's hangout was a \"residence associated with selling drugs\" was not merely background evidence because it went to the very heart of the prosecutor's case against defendant",
"sentence": "United States v. ... | 3,874,684 | b |
Most relate to the circumstances of the stop of Wiggins' car, which the Court has determined was legal. In any event, none raises any inference of racial animus in the decision to stop, search, forcibly restrain, or arrest Wiggins. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "826 F.3d 995, 1000",
"parenthetical": "black plaintiff who claimed that white officer was in a good position to see her race from his car, and that officer did not immediately pull her car over when she broke the law, did not sufficiently establish that officer's racial animus mo... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "67 F.3d 348, 348",
"parenthetical": "officer's statement to black plaintiffs, \"You people have no rights. You better shut up your [expletive] mouth before I arrest you too,\" gave rise to an inference of racial animus making summary judgment inappropriate",
"sentence": "See Jo... | 9,216,598 | a |
Most relate to the circumstances of the stop of Wiggins' car, which the Court has determined was legal. In any event, none raises any inference of racial animus in the decision to stop, search, forcibly restrain, or arrest Wiggins. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "67 F.3d 348, 348",
"parenthetical": "officer's statement to black plaintiffs, \"You people have no rights. You better shut up your [expletive] mouth before I arrest you too,\" gave rise to an inference of racial animus making summary judgment inappropriate",
"sentence": "See Jo... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "738 F.Supp. 1293, 1301",
"parenthetical": "where the only evidence was that plaintiffs were black and that the police officers \"immediately resorted to the use of force in a situation whose objective context did not call for this force,\" plaintiffs' conjecture of racially discr... | 9,216,598 | b |
Other courts have sustained complaints that merely refer to the possibility that some law has been violated. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "FLSA's anti-retaliation provision protects conduct based on good faith, although mistaken belief that employer's conduct is illegal",
"sentence": "See E.E.O.C. v. Romeo Community Sch., 976 F.2d 985, 989 (6th Cir.1992) (plaintiff who told school distr... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "976 F.2d 985, 989",
"parenthetical": "plaintiff who told school district that she believed they were \"breaking some sort of law\" by paying her lower wages than previously paid to male employees had \"filed any complaint\" under the FLSA",
"sentence": "See E.E.O.C. v. Romeo Co... | 9,456,455 | b |
Though the Texas Supreme Court has impliedly frowned on the Butts/McConnell rule, it has not expressly overruled those cases. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "374 S.W.2d 871, 875",
"parenthetical": "\"After a principle, rule or proposition of law has been squarely decided by the [Texas] Supreme Court, ... the decision is accepted as a binding precedent by the same court or other courts of lower rank when the very point is again pr... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "195 S.W.3d 688, 688-89",
"parenthetical": "assuming that Butts and McConnell have \"survive[d]\" and citing several cases espousing a reasonable, but liberal, interpretation of the applicable rules so that the right of appeal is not lost due to overly technical application of rul... | 7,325,484 | b |
Though the Texas Supreme Court has impliedly frowned on the Butts/McConnell rule, it has not expressly overruled those cases. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "374 S.W.2d 871, 875",
"parenthetical": "\"After a principle, rule or proposition of law has been squarely decided by the [Texas] Supreme Court, ... the decision is accepted as a binding precedent by the same court or other courts of lower rank when the very point is again pr... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "76 S.W.3d 36, 49",
"parenthetical": "assuming that Butts and McConnell have \"survive[d]\" and citing several cases espousing a reasonable, but liberal, interpretation of the applicable rules so that the right of appeal is not lost due to overly technical application of rules",
... | 7,325,484 | b |
. In one area--work on the fee petition--the district court elected not to quantify hours reasonably spent, but assigned a flat dollar figure instead ($5000). The court offered clear, pointed findings to underbrace this determination. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "712 F.2d 1507, 1507",
"parenthetical": "\"task of organizing facts or researching and presenting legal precedents has to be more demanding than documenting what a lawyer did and why he or she did it\"",
"sentence": "MDC IV, supra, at 11. Given the fact that we have regula... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "825 F.2d 563, 563",
"parenthetical": "approving $60/hr rate for work on fee petition, as contrasted to $90/hr rate for other work by same attorney",
"sentence": "See Jacobs, 825 F.2d at 563 (approving $60/hr rate for work on fee petition, as contrasted to $90/hr rate for other ... | 1,778,289 | a |
The reasonableness of a creditor's reliance, in our view, should be judged in light of the totality of the circumstances. The bankruptcy court may consider, among other things: whether there had been previous business dealings with the debtor that gave rise to a relationship of trust; whether there were any "red flags"... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "817 F.2d 677, 679",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he reasonableness of a creditor's reliance will be evaluated according to the particular facts and circumstances present in a given case.\"",
"sentence": "See In re Ledford, 970 F.2d 1556, 1560 (6th Cir.1992) (setting forth circum... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "970 F.2d 1556, 1560",
"parenthetical": "setting forth circumstances that may be considered in context of section 523(a",
"sentence": "See In re Ledford, 970 F.2d 1556, 1560 (6th Cir.1992) (setting forth circumstances that may be considered in context of section 523(a)(2)(A) rea... | 10,510,767 | b |
The reasonableness of a creditor's reliance, in our view, should be judged in light of the totality of the circumstances. The bankruptcy court may consider, among other things: whether there had been previous business dealings with the debtor that gave rise to a relationship of trust; whether there were any "red flags"... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "817 F.2d 677, 679",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he reasonableness of a creditor's reliance will be evaluated according to the particular facts and circumstances present in a given case.\"",
"sentence": "See In re Ledford, 970 F.2d 1556, 1560 (6th Cir.1992) (setting forth circum... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "setting forth circumstances that may be considered in context of section 523(a",
"sentence": "See In re Ledford, 970 F.2d 1556, 1560 (6th Cir.1992) (setting forth circumstances that may be considered in context of section 523(a)(2)(A) reasonableness of re... | 10,510,767 | b |
The reasonableness of a creditor's reliance, in our view, should be judged in light of the totality of the circumstances. The bankruptcy court may consider, among other things: whether there had been previous business dealings with the debtor that gave rise to a relationship of trust; whether there were any "red flags"... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "817 F.2d 677, 679",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he reasonableness of a creditor's reliance will be evaluated according to the particular facts and circumstances present in a given case.\"",
"sentence": "See In re Ledford, 970 F.2d 1556, 1560 (6th Cir.1992) (setting forth circum... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "setting forth circumstances that may be considered in context of section 523(a",
"sentence": "See In re Ledford, 970 F.2d 1556, 1560 (6th Cir.1992) (setting forth circumstances that may be considered in context of section 523(a)(2)(A) reasonableness of re... | 10,510,767 | b |
In this case, however, describing the variance sentence in mathematical terms is not very helpful because the district court imposed no imprisonment when the advisory guideline range called for 63-78 months' imprisonment. Thus, the variance sentence represents a 100% decrease even though in actual months it is less tha... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "437 F.3d 432, 432",
"parenthetical": "remanding for imposition of a variance sentence no more than 120 months below the advisory guideline range",
"sentence": "See United States v. Collington, 461 F.3d 805, 809 (6th Cir.2006) (affirming as reasonable a variance sentence of 68 m... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "461 F.3d 805, 809",
"parenthetical": "affirming as reasonable a variance sentence of 68 months below the advisory guideline range of 188-235 months' imprisonment",
"sentence": "See United States v. Collington, 461 F.3d 805, 809 (6th Cir.2006) (affirming as reasonable a variance... | 3,865,218 | b |
In this case, however, describing the variance sentence in mathematical terms is not very helpful because the district court imposed no imprisonment when the advisory guideline range called for 63-78 months' imprisonment. Thus, the variance sentence represents a 100% decrease even though in actual months it is less tha... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "437 F.3d 432, 432",
"parenthetical": "remanding for imposition of a variance sentence no more than 120 months below the advisory guideline range",
"sentence": "See United States v. Collington, 461 F.3d 805, 809 (6th Cir.2006) (affirming as reasonable a variance sentence of 68 m... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "453 F.3d 876, 881",
"parenthetical": "affirming as reasonable a variance sentence of 240 months' imprisonment when the advisory guidelines called for life imprisonment",
"sentence": "See United States v. Collington, 461 F.3d 805, 809 (6th Cir.2006) (affirming as reasonable a va... | 3,865,218 | b |
In this case, however, describing the variance sentence in mathematical terms is not very helpful because the district court imposed no imprisonment when the advisory guideline range called for 63-78 months' imprisonment. Thus, the variance sentence represents a 100% decrease even though in actual months it is less tha... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "437 F.3d 432, 432",
"parenthetical": "remanding for imposition of a variance sentence no more than 120 months below the advisory guideline range",
"sentence": "See United States v. Collington, 461 F.3d 805, 809 (6th Cir.2006) (affirming as reasonable a variance sentence of 68 m... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "449 F.3d 827, 831",
"parenthetical": "affirming as reasonable a variance sentence 79 months below the advisory guideline range of 100-125 months' imprisonment",
"sentence": "See United States v. Collington, 461 F.3d 805, 809 (6th Cir.2006) (affirming as reasonable a variance se... | 3,865,218 | b |
Although Emigrant's denial of Mayers' claim was arbitrary and capricious, and done without a full and fair review, the administrative record is insufficient to determine whether Mayers was terminated "for cause." Only after a more thorough investigation of the allegations raised in Mayers' affidavit will such a determi... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "559 F.3d 140, 149",
"parenthetical": "Remand of arbitrary and capricious denial of benefits claim warranted where \"additional evidence might produce a reasonable conclusion permitting denial of [plaintiffs] claim.\"",
"sentence": "Miller v. United Welfare Fund, 72 F.3d 1066, 1... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "72 F.3d 1066, 1071",
"parenthetical": "\"Because district courts are required to limit their review to the administrative record, it follows that, if upon review a district court concludes that the [plan administrator's] decision was arbitrary and capricious, it must remand... | 4,195,015 | b |
Although Emigrant's denial of Mayers' claim was arbitrary and capricious, and done without a full and fair review, the administrative record is insufficient to determine whether Mayers was terminated "for cause." Only after a more thorough investigation of the allegations raised in Mayers' affidavit will such a determi... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "72 F.3d 1066, 1071",
"parenthetical": "\"Because district courts are required to limit their review to the administrative record, it follows that, if upon review a district court concludes that the [plan administrator's] decision was arbitrary and capricious, it must remand... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "517 F.3d 614, 630",
"parenthetical": "\"A full and fair review concerns a beneficiary's procedural rights, for which the typical remedy is remand for further administrative review.\"",
"sentence": "Miller v. United Welfare Fund, 72 F.3d 1066, 1071 (2d Cir.1995) (“Because distri... | 4,195,015 | a |
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