context stringlengths 58 1.13k | citation_a dict | citation_b dict | case_id int64 475 12.5M | label stringclasses 2
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Such language is inflammatory, particularly to the extent that it attributes improper motives to Appellants. Thus, we admonish counsel to refrain from needlessly inflaming the passions of the jury. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "841 A.2d 1007, 1007",
"parenthetical": "\"Strict liability focuses solely on the product ... and is divorced from the conduct of the manufacturer.\"",
"sentence": "See Young, 761 A.2d at 563 (noting that “an appeal to passion or prejudice is improper and will not be counte... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "761 A.2d 563, 563",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"an appeal to passion or prejudice is improper and will not be countenanced\" and equating a verdict obtained by such arguments to \"one obtained by false testimony\"",
"sentence": "See Young, 761 A.2d at 563 (noting that “an a... | 6,891,264 | b |
When an appellate court vacates a lower court's order, it renders the lower court's order null and void. However, a state court's factual determination may be given effect even if its order has been rendered a nullity on other grounds. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "387 F.3d 210, 236-40",
"parenthetical": "deferring to state courts' factual findings despite concluding that state courts lacked jurisdiction under Pennsylvania law",
"sentence": "Dickerson v. Vaughn, 90 F.3d 87, 90-91 (3d Cir.1996) (Weis, J.) (Superior Court’s factual det... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "90 F.3d 87, 90-91",
"parenthetical": "Superior Court's factual determination entitled to deference where reversal order by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court left factual determination undisturbed",
"sentence": "Dickerson v. Vaughn, 90 F.3d 87, 90-91 (3d Cir.1996) (Weis, J.) ... | 2,914,270 | b |
When an appellate court vacates a lower court's order, it renders the lower court's order null and void. However, a state court's factual determination may be given effect even if its order has been rendered a nullity on other grounds. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "90 F.3d 87, 90-91",
"parenthetical": "Superior Court's factual determination entitled to deference where reversal order by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court left factual determination undisturbed",
"sentence": "Dickerson v. Vaughn, 90 F.3d 87, 90-91 (3d Cir.1996) (Weis, J.) ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "187 F.Supp.2d 260, 292, 308-12",
"parenthetical": "according deference to PCRA court's factual findings where state appellate court found PCRA court lacked jurisdiction",
"sentence": "Dickerson v. Vaughn, 90 F.3d 87, 90-91 (3d Cir.1996) (Weis, J.) (Superior Court’s factual... | 2,914,270 | a |
. Because the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is "one of congressional intent ... where Congress has specifically granted jurisdiction to the federal courts, the doctrine does not apply." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding Rooker-Feld-man does not apply to disputes arising under Hague Convention because \"Congress has expressly granted the federal courts jurisdiction to vindicate rights arising under the Convention.\"",
"sentence": "Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "202 F.3d 1078, 1078-79",
"parenthetical": "Rooker-Feldman does not preclude collateral challenges to state court modification of automatic stay in bankruptcy",
"sentence": "Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067, 1085 n. 55 (9th Cir.2001) (concluding Rooker-Feld-man does not apply ... | 9,318,791 | a |
P 11 The most common examples are cases in which a trial court's findings are deemed insufficient to comply with Rule 52(a). | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "87 Ariz. 227, 234",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e feel that if an intelligent disposition is to be made and justice done the judgment must be reversed and the case sent back to the trial court for more specific findings, these to be based upon the evidence already adduced -- or the ta... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "175 Ariz. 296, 300",
"parenthetical": "\"Where possible, when a trial court in a non-jury ease fails to make or makes insufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law, a reviewing court should remand the case to the trial court for further findings.\"",
"sentence": "Se... | 3,236,341 | a |
P 11 The most common examples are cases in which a trial court's findings are deemed insufficient to comply with Rule 52(a). | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "855 P.2d 1357, 1361",
"parenthetical": "\"Where possible, when a trial court in a non-jury ease fails to make or makes insufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law, a reviewing court should remand the case to the trial court for further findings.\"",
"sentence": "S... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "87 Ariz. 227, 234",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e feel that if an intelligent disposition is to be made and justice done the judgment must be reversed and the case sent back to the trial court for more specific findings, these to be based upon the evidence already adduced -- or the ta... | 3,236,341 | b |
P 11 The most common examples are cases in which a trial court's findings are deemed insufficient to comply with Rule 52(a). | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "349 P.2d 1107, 1111",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e feel that if an intelligent disposition is to be made and justice done the judgment must be reversed and the case sent back to the trial court for more specific findings, these to be based upon the evidence already adduced -- or the ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "175 Ariz. 296, 300",
"parenthetical": "\"Where possible, when a trial court in a non-jury ease fails to make or makes insufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law, a reviewing court should remand the case to the trial court for further findings.\"",
"sentence": "Se... | 3,236,341 | a |
P 11 The most common examples are cases in which a trial court's findings are deemed insufficient to comply with Rule 52(a). | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "855 P.2d 1357, 1361",
"parenthetical": "\"Where possible, when a trial court in a non-jury ease fails to make or makes insufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law, a reviewing court should remand the case to the trial court for further findings.\"",
"sentence": "S... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "349 P.2d 1107, 1111",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e feel that if an intelligent disposition is to be made and justice done the judgment must be reversed and the case sent back to the trial court for more specific findings, these to be based upon the evidence already adduced -- or the ... | 3,236,341 | b |
P 11 The most common examples are cases in which a trial court's findings are deemed insufficient to comply with Rule 52(a). | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "175 Ariz. 296, 300",
"parenthetical": "\"Where possible, when a trial court in a non-jury ease fails to make or makes insufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law, a reviewing court should remand the case to the trial court for further findings.\"",
"sentence": "Se... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "151 Ariz. 435, 437",
"parenthetical": "reversing because the trial court failed to comply with Rule 52(a",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Fritts v. Ericson, 87 Ariz. 227, 234, 349 P.2d 1107, 1111 (1960) (“[W]e feel that if an intelligent disposition is to be made and justice done the ... | 3,236,341 | b |
P 11 The most common examples are cases in which a trial court's findings are deemed insufficient to comply with Rule 52(a). | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "151 Ariz. 435, 437",
"parenthetical": "reversing because the trial court failed to comply with Rule 52(a",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Fritts v. Ericson, 87 Ariz. 227, 234, 349 P.2d 1107, 1111 (1960) (“[W]e feel that if an intelligent disposition is to be made and justice done the ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "855 P.2d 1357, 1361",
"parenthetical": "\"Where possible, when a trial court in a non-jury ease fails to make or makes insufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law, a reviewing court should remand the case to the trial court for further findings.\"",
"sentence": "S... | 3,236,341 | a |
P 11 The most common examples are cases in which a trial court's findings are deemed insufficient to comply with Rule 52(a). | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "728 P.2d 654, 656",
"parenthetical": "reversing because the trial court failed to comply with Rule 52(a",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Fritts v. Ericson, 87 Ariz. 227, 234, 349 P.2d 1107, 1111 (1960) (“[W]e feel that if an intelligent disposition is to be made and justice done the j... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "175 Ariz. 296, 300",
"parenthetical": "\"Where possible, when a trial court in a non-jury ease fails to make or makes insufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law, a reviewing court should remand the case to the trial court for further findings.\"",
"sentence": "Se... | 3,236,341 | a |
P 11 The most common examples are cases in which a trial court's findings are deemed insufficient to comply with Rule 52(a). | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "855 P.2d 1357, 1361",
"parenthetical": "\"Where possible, when a trial court in a non-jury ease fails to make or makes insufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law, a reviewing court should remand the case to the trial court for further findings.\"",
"sentence": "S... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "728 P.2d 654, 656",
"parenthetical": "reversing because the trial court failed to comply with Rule 52(a",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Fritts v. Ericson, 87 Ariz. 227, 234, 349 P.2d 1107, 1111 (1960) (“[W]e feel that if an intelligent disposition is to be made and justice done the j... | 3,236,341 | b |
The issue raised by this case is appropriate for certification. First, since Suklji-an, the New York Court of Appeals has not had an opportunity to address a case like the hypothetical posed by Galindo. Indeed, it appears to remain an open question in New York whether strict products liability can attach to a regular s... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "81 N.Y.2d 951, 951",
"parenthetical": "leaving open question whether used goods dealers may be held strictly liable",
"sentence": "See Stiles, 81 N.Y.2d at 951, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 667, 613 N.E.2d 572 (leaving open question whether used goods dealers may be held strictly liable); b... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "881 F.Supp. 829, 836-41",
"parenthetical": "discussing cases extending strict liability to used goods dealers, including two Appellate Division cases",
"sentence": "See Stiles, 81 N.Y.2d at 951, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 667, 613 N.E.2d 572 (leaving open question whether used goods d... | 5,764,632 | a |
The issue raised by this case is appropriate for certification. First, since Suklji-an, the New York Court of Appeals has not had an opportunity to address a case like the hypothetical posed by Galindo. Indeed, it appears to remain an open question in New York whether strict products liability can attach to a regular s... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "881 F.Supp. 829, 836-41",
"parenthetical": "discussing cases extending strict liability to used goods dealers, including two Appellate Division cases",
"sentence": "See Stiles, 81 N.Y.2d at 951, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 667, 613 N.E.2d 572 (leaving open question whether used goods d... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "597 N.Y.S.2d 667, 667",
"parenthetical": "leaving open question whether used goods dealers may be held strictly liable",
"sentence": "See Stiles, 81 N.Y.2d at 951, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 667, 613 N.E.2d 572 (leaving open question whether used goods dealers may be held strictly liable)... | 5,764,632 | b |
The issue raised by this case is appropriate for certification. First, since Suklji-an, the New York Court of Appeals has not had an opportunity to address a case like the hypothetical posed by Galindo. Indeed, it appears to remain an open question in New York whether strict products liability can attach to a regular s... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "leaving open question whether used goods dealers may be held strictly liable",
"sentence": "See Stiles, 81 N.Y.2d at 951, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 667, 613 N.E.2d 572 (leaving open question whether used goods dealers may be held strictly liable); but see Gonzalez ... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "881 F.Supp. 829, 836-41",
"parenthetical": "discussing cases extending strict liability to used goods dealers, including two Appellate Division cases",
"sentence": "See Stiles, 81 N.Y.2d at 951, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 667, 613 N.E.2d 572 (leaving open question whether used goods d... | 5,764,632 | a |
In his report and recommendation, Judge Jarvey thoroughly discussed Davis, Bell and O'Neal. Although he acknowledged Davis represents contrary authority, Judge Jarvey noted a majority of courts "hold a conviction under a statute forbidding possession of a firearm by a person convicted of a felony does not violate the [... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "820 F.2d 1524, 1527",
"parenthetical": "holding no ex post facto violation because enhancement provision was already on the books when the defendant committed the 1985 firearm offense",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Etheridge, 932 F.2d 318, 321-23 (4th Cir.1991) (... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "26 F.3d 282, 291",
"parenthetical": "holding the use of a 1951 felony conviction as a predicate for a violation of 18 U.S.C. SS 922(g",
"sentence": "See United States v. Brady, 26 F.3d 282, 291 (2d Cir.1994) (holding the use of a 1951 felony conviction as a predicate for a viol... | 9,299,476 | b |
In his report and recommendation, Judge Jarvey thoroughly discussed Davis, Bell and O'Neal. Although he acknowledged Davis represents contrary authority, Judge Jarvey noted a majority of courts "hold a conviction under a statute forbidding possession of a firearm by a person convicted of a felony does not violate the [... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "131 F.2d 916, 921",
"parenthetical": "finding, if a statute \"is a bona fide regulation of conduct which the legislature has power to regulate, it is not bad as an ex post facto law even though the right to engage in the conduct is made to depend on past behavi-our, even behaviou... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "820 F.2d 1524, 1527",
"parenthetical": "holding no ex post facto violation because enhancement provision was already on the books when the defendant committed the 1985 firearm offense",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Etheridge, 932 F.2d 318, 321-23 (4th Cir.1991) (... | 9,299,476 | a |
Here the trial court properly awarded prejudgment interest from the date of the original verdict. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "294 Minn. 406, 408",
"parenthetical": "\"interest should be calculated from the date the liability is established by the rendition of the verdict\"",
"sentence": "See McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 281 Minn. 571, 161 N.W.2d 523 (1968) (when jury verdict is erroneously overtu... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "when jury verdict is erroneously overturned by grant of post-trial motion, but later reinstated on appeal, prejudgment interest is awarded from date of original verdict",
"sentence": "See McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 281 Minn. 571, 161 N.W.2d 523 (1968) (... | 10,658,715 | b |
Here the trial court properly awarded prejudgment interest from the date of the original verdict. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "when jury verdict is erroneously overturned by grant of post-trial motion, but later reinstated on appeal, prejudgment interest is awarded from date of original verdict",
"sentence": "See McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 281 Minn. 571, 161 N.W.2d 523 (1968) (... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "202 N.W.2d 667, 668",
"parenthetical": "\"interest should be calculated from the date the liability is established by the rendition of the verdict\"",
"sentence": "See McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 281 Minn. 571, 161 N.W.2d 523 (1968) (when jury verdict is erroneously overt... | 10,658,715 | a |
Here the trial court properly awarded prejudgment interest from the date of the original verdict. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "294 Minn. 406, 408",
"parenthetical": "\"interest should be calculated from the date the liability is established by the rendition of the verdict\"",
"sentence": "See McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 281 Minn. 571, 161 N.W.2d 523 (1968) (when jury verdict is erroneously overtu... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "when jury verdict is erroneously overturned by grant of post-trial motion, but later reinstated on appeal, prejudgment interest is awarded from date of original verdict",
"sentence": "See McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 281 Minn. 571, 161 N.W.2d 523 (1968) (... | 10,658,715 | b |
Here the trial court properly awarded prejudgment interest from the date of the original verdict. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "202 N.W.2d 667, 668",
"parenthetical": "\"interest should be calculated from the date the liability is established by the rendition of the verdict\"",
"sentence": "See McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 281 Minn. 571, 161 N.W.2d 523 (1968) (when jury verdict is erroneously overt... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "when jury verdict is erroneously overturned by grant of post-trial motion, but later reinstated on appeal, prejudgment interest is awarded from date of original verdict",
"sentence": "See McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 281 Minn. 571, 161 N.W.2d 523 (1968) (... | 10,658,715 | b |
Although appellants at all times treated the May 24 "Memorandum and Order" as an appealable order, the "separate document" rule is to be strictly applied as concerns the commencement of the appeal period. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "960 F.2d 237, 237",
"parenthetical": "emphasizing that the \"separate document\" requirement \"should always be interpreted 'to prevent loss of the right to appeal, not to facilitate loss' \"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Indrelunas, 411 U.S. 216, 221-22, 93 S.Ct. 15... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "585 F.2d 683, 688-90",
"parenthetical": "\"nor are we free to penalize plaintiffs ... by binding them to their erroneous assertion that judgments\" had been entered",
"sentence": "See United States v. Indrelunas, 411 U.S. 216, 221-22, 93 S.Ct. 1562, 1565, 36 L.Ed.2d 202 (1973) ... | 1,871,505 | b |
That evidence included the plaintiffs own testimony, which the trial court credited, that, prior to the defendant's construction of the pillars, no one ever had objected to her use of the right-of-way, and she had never sought permission from anyone to use it. It is well established that evidence that the party claimin... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "78 Conn. App. 288, 296",
"parenthetical": "plaintiffs testimony that \"she never asked for permission to use\" property at issue supported trial court's determination that use was adverse",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Gallow-Mure v. Tomchik, 78 Conn. App. 699, 708, 829 A.2d 8 ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "78 Conn. App. 699, 708",
"parenthetical": "\"[t]he essence of the determination of whether the claim to the property was made 'as of right' is . . . whether the individual claiming the prescriptive easement acknowledged the ownership rights of the landowner in any way\"",
"sent... | 5,767,752 | b |
That evidence included the plaintiffs own testimony, which the trial court credited, that, prior to the defendant's construction of the pillars, no one ever had objected to her use of the right-of-way, and she had never sought permission from anyone to use it. It is well established that evidence that the party claimin... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "78 Conn. App. 699, 708",
"parenthetical": "\"[t]he essence of the determination of whether the claim to the property was made 'as of right' is . . . whether the individual claiming the prescriptive easement acknowledged the ownership rights of the landowner in any way\"",
"sent... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "plaintiffs testimony that \"she never asked for permission to use\" property at issue supported trial court's determination that use was adverse",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Gallow-Mure v. Tomchik, 78 Conn. App. 699, 708, 829 A.2d 8 (2003) (“[t]he essen... | 5,767,752 | a |
That evidence included the plaintiffs own testimony, which the trial court credited, that, prior to the defendant's construction of the pillars, no one ever had objected to her use of the right-of-way, and she had never sought permission from anyone to use it. It is well established that evidence that the party claimin... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "testimony that \"permission [to use driveway] was never granted\" supported determination that use was adverse",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Gallow-Mure v. Tomchik, 78 Conn. App. 699, 708, 829 A.2d 8 (2003) (“[t]he essence of the determination of whether... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "78 Conn. App. 699, 708",
"parenthetical": "\"[t]he essence of the determination of whether the claim to the property was made 'as of right' is . . . whether the individual claiming the prescriptive easement acknowledged the ownership rights of the landowner in any way\"",
"sent... | 5,767,752 | b |
That evidence included the plaintiffs own testimony, which the trial court credited, that, prior to the defendant's construction of the pillars, no one ever had objected to her use of the right-of-way, and she had never sought permission from anyone to use it. It is well established that evidence that the party claimin... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "78 Conn. App. 699, 708",
"parenthetical": "\"[t]he essence of the determination of whether the claim to the property was made 'as of right' is . . . whether the individual claiming the prescriptive easement acknowledged the ownership rights of the landowner in any way\"",
"sent... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "8 Conn. App. 203, 206",
"parenthetical": "testimony by plaintiffs husband that he used defendant's driveway \"whenever he wanted to and that he never sought permission to use [it]\" supported determination of adverse possession",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Gallow-Mure v. Tomc... | 5,767,752 | a |
That evidence included the plaintiffs own testimony, which the trial court credited, that, prior to the defendant's construction of the pillars, no one ever had objected to her use of the right-of-way, and she had never sought permission from anyone to use it. It is well established that evidence that the party claimin... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "testimony by plaintiffs husband that he used defendant's driveway \"whenever he wanted to and that he never sought permission to use [it]\" supported determination of adverse possession",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Gallow-Mure v. Tomchik, 78 Conn. App. ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "78 Conn. App. 699, 708",
"parenthetical": "\"[t]he essence of the determination of whether the claim to the property was made 'as of right' is . . . whether the individual claiming the prescriptive easement acknowledged the ownership rights of the landowner in any way\"",
"sent... | 5,767,752 | b |
That evidence included the plaintiffs own testimony, which the trial court credited, that, prior to the defendant's construction of the pillars, no one ever had objected to her use of the right-of-way, and she had never sought permission from anyone to use it. It is well established that evidence that the party claimin... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[t]he essence of the determination of whether the claim to the property was made 'as of right' is . . . whether the individual claiming the prescriptive easement acknowledged the ownership rights of the landowner in any way\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., G... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "78 Conn. App. 288, 296",
"parenthetical": "plaintiffs testimony that \"she never asked for permission to use\" property at issue supported trial court's determination that use was adverse",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Gallow-Mure v. Tomchik, 78 Conn. App. 699, 708, 829 A.2d 8 ... | 5,767,752 | a |
That evidence included the plaintiffs own testimony, which the trial court credited, that, prior to the defendant's construction of the pillars, no one ever had objected to her use of the right-of-way, and she had never sought permission from anyone to use it. It is well established that evidence that the party claimin... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "plaintiffs testimony that \"she never asked for permission to use\" property at issue supported trial court's determination that use was adverse",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Gallow-Mure v. Tomchik, 78 Conn. App. 699, 708, 829 A.2d 8 (2003) (“[t]he essen... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[t]he essence of the determination of whether the claim to the property was made 'as of right' is . . . whether the individual claiming the prescriptive easement acknowledged the ownership rights of the landowner in any way\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., G... | 5,767,752 | b |
That evidence included the plaintiffs own testimony, which the trial court credited, that, prior to the defendant's construction of the pillars, no one ever had objected to her use of the right-of-way, and she had never sought permission from anyone to use it. It is well established that evidence that the party claimin... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[t]he essence of the determination of whether the claim to the property was made 'as of right' is . . . whether the individual claiming the prescriptive easement acknowledged the ownership rights of the landowner in any way\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., G... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "testimony that \"permission [to use driveway] was never granted\" supported determination that use was adverse",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Gallow-Mure v. Tomchik, 78 Conn. App. 699, 708, 829 A.2d 8 (2003) (“[t]he essence of the determination of whether... | 5,767,752 | a |
That evidence included the plaintiffs own testimony, which the trial court credited, that, prior to the defendant's construction of the pillars, no one ever had objected to her use of the right-of-way, and she had never sought permission from anyone to use it. It is well established that evidence that the party claimin... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[t]he essence of the determination of whether the claim to the property was made 'as of right' is . . . whether the individual claiming the prescriptive easement acknowledged the ownership rights of the landowner in any way\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., G... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "8 Conn. App. 203, 206",
"parenthetical": "testimony by plaintiffs husband that he used defendant's driveway \"whenever he wanted to and that he never sought permission to use [it]\" supported determination of adverse possession",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Gallow-Mure v. Tomc... | 5,767,752 | a |
That evidence included the plaintiffs own testimony, which the trial court credited, that, prior to the defendant's construction of the pillars, no one ever had objected to her use of the right-of-way, and she had never sought permission from anyone to use it. It is well established that evidence that the party claimin... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "testimony by plaintiffs husband that he used defendant's driveway \"whenever he wanted to and that he never sought permission to use [it]\" supported determination of adverse possession",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Gallow-Mure v. Tomchik, 78 Conn. App. ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[t]he essence of the determination of whether the claim to the property was made 'as of right' is . . . whether the individual claiming the prescriptive easement acknowledged the ownership rights of the landowner in any way\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., G... | 5,767,752 | b |
This court previously has stated that the failure to provide notice to all interested parties in a declaratory judgment action deprives the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction of the action. In recent years, however, the court has been willing to remand such cases to allow the defect to be cured, signaling a shi... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "211 Conn. 51, 56",
"parenthetical": "because no notice of declaratory judgment action provided to interested persons, reframing questions on appeal to affect only parties",
"sentence": "See Serrani v. Board of Ethics, 225 Conn. 305, 309 n.5, 622 A.2d 1009 (1993) (“[u]nlike othe... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[u]nlike other jurisdictional defects implicating the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction,\" failure to comply with notice requirement can be cured",
"sentence": "See Serrani v. Board of Ethics, 225 Conn. 305, 309 n.5, 622 A.2d 1009 (1993) (“[u]nl... | 3,950,402 | b |
This court previously has stated that the failure to provide notice to all interested parties in a declaratory judgment action deprives the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction of the action. In recent years, however, the court has been willing to remand such cases to allow the defect to be cured, signaling a shi... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[u]nlike other jurisdictional defects implicating the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction,\" failure to comply with notice requirement can be cured",
"sentence": "See Serrani v. Board of Ethics, 225 Conn. 305, 309 n.5, 622 A.2d 1009 (1993) (“[u]nl... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "because no notice of declaratory judgment action provided to interested persons, reframing questions on appeal to affect only parties",
"sentence": "See Serrani v. Board of Ethics, 225 Conn. 305, 309 n.5, 622 A.2d 1009 (1993) (“[u]nlike other jurisdiction... | 3,950,402 | a |
This court previously has stated that the failure to provide notice to all interested parties in a declaratory judgment action deprives the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction of the action. In recent years, however, the court has been willing to remand such cases to allow the defect to be cured, signaling a shi... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "211 Conn. 51, 56",
"parenthetical": "because no notice of declaratory judgment action provided to interested persons, reframing questions on appeal to affect only parties",
"sentence": "See Serrani v. Board of Ethics, 225 Conn. 305, 309 n.5, 622 A.2d 1009 (1993) (“[u]nlike othe... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[u]nlike other jurisdictional defects implicating the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction,\" failure to comply with notice requirement can be cured",
"sentence": "See Serrani v. Board of Ethics, 225 Conn. 305, 309 n.5, 622 A.2d 1009 (1993) (“[u]nl... | 3,950,402 | b |
This court previously has stated that the failure to provide notice to all interested parties in a declaratory judgment action deprives the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction of the action. In recent years, however, the court has been willing to remand such cases to allow the defect to be cured, signaling a shi... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[u]nlike other jurisdictional defects implicating the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction,\" failure to comply with notice requirement can be cured",
"sentence": "See Serrani v. Board of Ethics, 225 Conn. 305, 309 n.5, 622 A.2d 1009 (1993) (“[u]nl... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "because no notice of declaratory judgment action provided to interested persons, reframing questions on appeal to affect only parties",
"sentence": "See Serrani v. Board of Ethics, 225 Conn. 305, 309 n.5, 622 A.2d 1009 (1993) (“[u]nlike other jurisdiction... | 3,950,402 | a |
This court previously has stated that the failure to provide notice to all interested parties in a declaratory judgment action deprives the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction of the action. In recent years, however, the court has been willing to remand such cases to allow the defect to be cured, signaling a shi... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "211 Conn. 51, 56",
"parenthetical": "because no notice of declaratory judgment action provided to interested persons, reframing questions on appeal to affect only parties",
"sentence": "See Serrani v. Board of Ethics, 225 Conn. 305, 309 n.5, 622 A.2d 1009 (1993) (“[u]nlike othe... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "215 Conn. 224, 230",
"parenthetical": "\"[t]he conclusion we have reached that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to render its declaratory judgment does not require that the action be dismissed upon remand, because the jurisdictional defect can be cured by further proc... | 3,950,402 | b |
This court previously has stated that the failure to provide notice to all interested parties in a declaratory judgment action deprives the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction of the action. In recent years, however, the court has been willing to remand such cases to allow the defect to be cured, signaling a shi... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "215 Conn. 224, 230",
"parenthetical": "\"[t]he conclusion we have reached that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to render its declaratory judgment does not require that the action be dismissed upon remand, because the jurisdictional defect can be cured by further proc... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "because no notice of declaratory judgment action provided to interested persons, reframing questions on appeal to affect only parties",
"sentence": "See Serrani v. Board of Ethics, 225 Conn. 305, 309 n.5, 622 A.2d 1009 (1993) (“[u]nlike other jurisdiction... | 3,950,402 | a |
This court previously has stated that the failure to provide notice to all interested parties in a declaratory judgment action deprives the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction of the action. In recent years, however, the court has been willing to remand such cases to allow the defect to be cured, signaling a shi... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "211 Conn. 51, 56",
"parenthetical": "because no notice of declaratory judgment action provided to interested persons, reframing questions on appeal to affect only parties",
"sentence": "See Serrani v. Board of Ethics, 225 Conn. 305, 309 n.5, 622 A.2d 1009 (1993) (“[u]nlike othe... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[t]he conclusion we have reached that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to render its declaratory judgment does not require that the action be dismissed upon remand, because the jurisdictional defect can be cured by further proceedings in the t... | 3,950,402 | b |
This court previously has stated that the failure to provide notice to all interested parties in a declaratory judgment action deprives the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction of the action. In recent years, however, the court has been willing to remand such cases to allow the defect to be cured, signaling a shi... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "because no notice of declaratory judgment action provided to interested persons, reframing questions on appeal to affect only parties",
"sentence": "See Serrani v. Board of Ethics, 225 Conn. 305, 309 n.5, 622 A.2d 1009 (1993) (“[u]nlike other jurisdiction... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[t]he conclusion we have reached that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to render its declaratory judgment does not require that the action be dismissed upon remand, because the jurisdictional defect can be cured by further proceedings in the t... | 3,950,402 | b |
No. 92-318, tit. We believe that this evidence is sufficient to support the limited action taken by Congress in its passage of the Equal Pay Act, particularly given the well-documented history of gender discrimination in this Nation, a history that is embodied in the Supreme Court's own jurisprudence. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "109 F.3d 1281, 1283",
"parenthetical": "arguing that it would be difficult \"to understand how a statute enacted specifically to combat [gender] discrimination could fall outside the authority granted to Congress by SS 5\"",
"sentence": "See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 531, 116 ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "518 U.S. 531, 531",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"skeptical scrutiny of official action denying rights or opportunities based on sex responds to volumes of history\"",
"sentence": "See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 531, 116 S.Ct. 2264 (stating that “skeptical scrutiny of official ac... | 11,234,183 | b |
No. 92-318, tit. We believe that this evidence is sufficient to support the limited action taken by Congress in its passage of the Equal Pay Act, particularly given the well-documented history of gender discrimination in this Nation, a history that is embodied in the Supreme Court's own jurisprudence. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that \"skeptical scrutiny of official action denying rights or opportunities based on sex responds to volumes of history\"",
"sentence": "See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 531, 116 S.Ct. 2264 (stating that “skeptical scrutiny of official action denying ri... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "109 F.3d 1281, 1283",
"parenthetical": "arguing that it would be difficult \"to understand how a statute enacted specifically to combat [gender] discrimination could fall outside the authority granted to Congress by SS 5\"",
"sentence": "See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 531, 116 ... | 11,234,183 | a |
The old federal rule and the present Court of Federal Claims rule are therefore identical. When interpreting the old federal rule, at least one appellate court held that state holidays were legal holidays for purposes of the federal rule. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "261 F.2d 627, 627",
"parenthetical": "allowing a motion to be filed one day after the filing deadline when the deadline fell on a Utah state holiday",
"sentence": "See, Prudential Oil, 261 F.2d at 627 (allowing a motion to be filed one day after the filing deadline when the dea... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "excluding a Puerto Rican state holiday from computation after F.R.C.P. was amended to expressly include state holidays",
"sentence": "See, Prudential Oil, 261 F.2d at 627 (allowing a motion to be filed one day after the filing deadline when the deadline f... | 777,711 | a |
The old federal rule and the present Court of Federal Claims rule are therefore identical. When interpreting the old federal rule, at least one appellate court held that state holidays were legal holidays for purposes of the federal rule. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "261 F.2d 627, 627",
"parenthetical": "allowing a motion to be filed one day after the filing deadline when the deadline fell on a Utah state holiday",
"sentence": "See, Prudential Oil, 261 F.2d at 627 (allowing a motion to be filed one day after the filing deadline when the dea... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "542 F.2d 673, 676",
"parenthetical": "excluding a Puerto Rican state holiday from computation after F.R.C.P. was amended to expressly include state holidays",
"sentence": "See, Prudential Oil, 261 F.2d at 627 (allowing a motion to be filed one day after the filing deadline when... | 777,711 | a |
The old federal rule and the present Court of Federal Claims rule are therefore identical. When interpreting the old federal rule, at least one appellate court held that state holidays were legal holidays for purposes of the federal rule. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "261 F.2d 627, 627",
"parenthetical": "allowing a motion to be filed one day after the filing deadline when the deadline fell on a Utah state holiday",
"sentence": "See, Prudential Oil, 261 F.2d at 627 (allowing a motion to be filed one day after the filing deadline when the dea... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "excluding a Puerto Rican state holiday from computation after F.R.C.P. was amended to expressly include state holidays",
"sentence": "See, Prudential Oil, 261 F.2d at 627 (allowing a motion to be filed one day after the filing deadline when the deadline f... | 777,711 | a |
The old federal rule and the present Court of Federal Claims rule are therefore identical. When interpreting the old federal rule, at least one appellate court held that state holidays were legal holidays for purposes of the federal rule. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "excluding a Puerto Rican state holiday from computation after F.R.C.P. was amended to expressly include state holidays",
"sentence": "See, Prudential Oil, 261 F.2d at 627 (allowing a motion to be filed one day after the filing deadline when the deadline f... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "261 F.2d 627, 627",
"parenthetical": "allowing a motion to be filed one day after the filing deadline when the deadline fell on a Utah state holiday",
"sentence": "See, Prudential Oil, 261 F.2d at 627 (allowing a motion to be filed one day after the filing deadline when the dea... | 777,711 | b |
The old federal rule and the present Court of Federal Claims rule are therefore identical. When interpreting the old federal rule, at least one appellate court held that state holidays were legal holidays for purposes of the federal rule. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "261 F.2d 627, 627",
"parenthetical": "allowing a motion to be filed one day after the filing deadline when the deadline fell on a Utah state holiday",
"sentence": "See, Prudential Oil, 261 F.2d at 627 (allowing a motion to be filed one day after the filing deadline when the dea... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "excluding a Puerto Rican state holiday from computation after F.R.C.P. was amended to expressly include state holidays",
"sentence": "See, Prudential Oil, 261 F.2d at 627 (allowing a motion to be filed one day after the filing deadline when the deadline f... | 777,711 | a |
An agreement between the defendants to violate the law is an essential element, which must be shown beyond a reasonable doubt. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "494 F.2d 1246, 1249",
"parenthetical": "mere knowledge of or acquiescence in the object of a conspiracy does not make one a coconspirator",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Butler, 494 F.2d 1246, 1249 (10th Cir.1974) (mere knowledge of or acquiescence in the object o... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "965 F.2d 804, 814",
"parenthetical": "holding various actions of state insurance commissioner insufficient evidence of agreement to bribe a public official",
"sentence": "United States v. Davis, 965 F.2d 804, 814 (10th Cir.1992) (holding various actions of state insurance... | 10,532,795 | b |
An agreement between the defendants to violate the law is an essential element, which must be shown beyond a reasonable doubt. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "965 F.2d 804, 814",
"parenthetical": "holding various actions of state insurance commissioner insufficient evidence of agreement to bribe a public official",
"sentence": "United States v. Davis, 965 F.2d 804, 814 (10th Cir.1992) (holding various actions of state insurance... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "949 F.2d 301, 305-06",
"parenthetical": "mere knowledge of or acquiescence in the object of a conspiracy does not make one a coconspirator",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Butler, 494 F.2d 1246, 1249 (10th Cir.1974) (mere knowledge of or acquiescence in the object ... | 10,532,795 | a |
Thus, any further attempts to argue the merits of Rosete are deemed frivolous and an abuse of the judicial process. Furthermore, if Baylon files another document with this court and, upon review, it is determined that the arguments are frivolous, this court will consider the imposition of monetary sanctions. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "45 F.3d 14, 17",
"parenthetical": "appellate court has inherent authority to dismiss appeal as frivolous when appeal presents no arguably meritorious issue for consideration",
"sentence": "See In re Solerwitz, 848 F.2d 1573, 1575 (Fed.Cir.1988) (counsel sanctioned for fili... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "848 F.2d 1573, 1575",
"parenthetical": "counsel sanctioned for filing and maintaining frivolous appeals in air traffic controller cases that presented legal issues and fact patterns indistinguishable from those presented and decided in the precedents represented by the lead cases... | 1,006,610 | b |
It was for the court to then apply that percentage to the total damages. Plainly, the jury's finding of zero dollars in damages resulting from Knowlton's death is drastically deficient. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "907 So.2d 1213, 1215",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"where the evidence is undisputed or substantially undisputed that a plaintiff has experienced and will experience pain and suffering as a result of an accident, a zero award for pain and suffering is inadequate as a matter of... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "12 So.3d 838, 842",
"parenthetical": "holding \"the damages award of zero dollars was clearly inadequate in light of the substantial evidence at trial of economic and noneconomic damages\" resulting from husband's wrongful death",
"sentence": "See Miami-Dade Cnty. v. Merke... | 4,065,352 | a |
It was for the court to then apply that percentage to the total damages. Plainly, the jury's finding of zero dollars in damages resulting from Knowlton's death is drastically deficient. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "907 So.2d 1213, 1215",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"where the evidence is undisputed or substantially undisputed that a plaintiff has experienced and will experience pain and suffering as a result of an accident, a zero award for pain and suffering is inadequate as a matter of... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "695 So.2d 767, 768",
"parenthetical": "holding zero-damages award inadequate because \"substantial, undisputed, and un-rebutted testimony\" showed that deceased father \"had a close relationship with his children, and that [the children] suffered a great loss as a result of ... | 4,065,352 | a |
Opp'n to Furse & Covington Mot. to Dismiss at 12-17. Yet the plaintiffs entirely fail to demonstrate how the central holding of Gray -- that government attorneys enjoy absolute immunity from civil suits based on their conduct in initiating and prosecuting child neglect actions -- does not apply to their claims against ... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "65 F.3d 189, 194",
"parenthetical": "holding that prosecutors are absolutely immune from liability for their \"knowing or inadvertent\" failure to disclose materially exculpatory evidence",
"sentence": "See Gray, 243 F.3d at 575 (noting that \"[w]here absolute immunity is deeme... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "243 F.3d 575, 575",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"[w]here absolute immunity is deemed appropriate, an official is protected from all suits attacking conduct within the scope of the immunity, even if the official is alleged to have acted in bad faith\"",
"sentence": "See Gray,... | 4,026,691 | b |
Defendant is also correct that the trial court did not instruct the jury accordingly. However, assuming, without deciding, that the trial court thus committed plain error, we decline to exercise our discretion to correct the error. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "327 Or 99, 106",
"parenthetical": "instructional error \"requires reversal only if the jury instructions given by the trial court, considered as a whole, cause prejudice to the party requesting the instruction\"",
"sentence": "See Ailes, 312 Or at 382 (stating that an appe... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "312 Or 382, 382",
"parenthetical": "stating that an appellate court \"must exercise its discretion to consider or not to consider the error\"",
"sentence": "See Ailes, 312 Or at 382 (stating that an appellate court “must exercise its discretion to consider or not to consider th... | 5,768,631 | b |
We disagree. A jury's understanding of whether testimony is scientific is not based exclusively on whether the expert witness uses scientific-sounding jargon or words that are susceptible to only scientific meanings. Juries are capable of recognizing scientific substance when they hear it. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "167 Or App 496, 496-97",
"parenthetical": "explaining the scientific principles underlying DRE evidence and noting that \"it is clear that DRE draws its authority from scientific principles\"",
"sentence": "Sampson, 167 Or App at 496-97 (explaining the scientific principl... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "321 Or 296, 296-97",
"parenthetical": "holding that HGN-test evidence is \"scientific\" because such evidence \"purports to draw its convincing force from\" the scientific proposition that there is \"a causal relationship between consumption of alcohol and the type of nystag... | 12,414,372 | a |
We disagree. A jury's understanding of whether testimony is scientific is not based exclusively on whether the expert witness uses scientific-sounding jargon or words that are susceptible to only scientific meanings. Juries are capable of recognizing scientific substance when they hear it. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "167 Or App 496, 496-97",
"parenthetical": "explaining the scientific principles underlying DRE evidence and noting that \"it is clear that DRE draws its authority from scientific principles\"",
"sentence": "Sampson, 167 Or App at 496-97 (explaining the scientific principl... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "243 Or App 315, 315",
"parenthetical": "the jury will perceive distance evidence based on lidar as scientific because lidar uses a scientific principle-- the speed of light--to measure distance",
"sentence": "Sampson, 167 Or App at 496-97 (explaining the scientific princip... | 12,414,372 | a |
Although the broadest reading of the opinion might suggest a far-reaching cause of action, in fact, its impact has been relatively modest. Appellate Division decisions since LoBiondo I have not interpreted it expansively, but have instead given it limited application. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "338 N.J.Super. 282, 301-03",
"parenthetical": "concluding that effort to silence condo development objectors falls within LoBiondo I",
"sentence": "Baglini v. Lauletta, 338 N.J.Super. 282, 301-03, 768 A.2d 825 (App.Div.) (concluding that effort to silence condo developmen... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "363 N.J.Super. 186, 207-08",
"parenthetical": "extending LoBiondo I's special grievance analysis to malicious prosecution action based on racial discrimination claim",
"sentence": "Baglini v. Lauletta, 338 N.J.Super. 282, 301-03, 768 A.2d 825 (App.Div.) (concluding that effort ... | 4,141,696 | a |
Although the broadest reading of the opinion might suggest a far-reaching cause of action, in fact, its impact has been relatively modest. Appellate Division decisions since LoBiondo I have not interpreted it expansively, but have instead given it limited application. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "extending LoBiondo I's special grievance analysis to malicious prosecution action based on racial discrimination claim",
"sentence": "Baglini v. Lauletta, 338 N.J.Super. 282, 301-03, 768 A.2d 825 (App.Div.) (concluding that effort to silence condo develop... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "338 N.J.Super. 282, 301-03",
"parenthetical": "concluding that effort to silence condo development objectors falls within LoBiondo I",
"sentence": "Baglini v. Lauletta, 338 N.J.Super. 282, 301-03, 768 A.2d 825 (App.Div.) (concluding that effort to silence condo developmen... | 4,141,696 | b |
Although the broadest reading of the opinion might suggest a far-reaching cause of action, in fact, its impact has been relatively modest. Appellate Division decisions since LoBiondo I have not interpreted it expansively, but have instead given it limited application. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that effort to silence condo development objectors falls within LoBiondo I",
"sentence": "Baglini v. Lauletta, 338 N.J.Super. 282, 301-03, 768 A.2d 825 (App.Div.) (concluding that effort to silence condo development objectors falls within... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "363 N.J.Super. 186, 207-08",
"parenthetical": "extending LoBiondo I's special grievance analysis to malicious prosecution action based on racial discrimination claim",
"sentence": "Baglini v. Lauletta, 338 N.J.Super. 282, 301-03, 768 A.2d 825 (App.Div.) (concluding that effort ... | 4,141,696 | a |
Although the broadest reading of the opinion might suggest a far-reaching cause of action, in fact, its impact has been relatively modest. Appellate Division decisions since LoBiondo I have not interpreted it expansively, but have instead given it limited application. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that effort to silence condo development objectors falls within LoBiondo I",
"sentence": "Baglini v. Lauletta, 338 N.J.Super. 282, 301-03, 768 A.2d 825 (App.Div.) (concluding that effort to silence condo development objectors falls within... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "extending LoBiondo I's special grievance analysis to malicious prosecution action based on racial discrimination claim",
"sentence": "Baglini v. Lauletta, 338 N.J.Super. 282, 301-03, 768 A.2d 825 (App.Div.) (concluding that effort to silence condo develop... | 4,141,696 | a |
Although the broadest reading of the opinion might suggest a far-reaching cause of action, in fact, its impact has been relatively modest. Appellate Division decisions since LoBiondo I have not interpreted it expansively, but have instead given it limited application. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "363 N.J.Super. 186, 207-08",
"parenthetical": "extending LoBiondo I's special grievance analysis to malicious prosecution action based on racial discrimination claim",
"sentence": "Baglini v. Lauletta, 338 N.J.Super. 282, 301-03, 768 A.2d 825 (App.Div.) (concluding that effort ... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that effort to silence condo development objectors falls within LoBiondo I",
"sentence": "Baglini v. Lauletta, 338 N.J.Super. 282, 301-03, 768 A.2d 825 (App.Div.) (concluding that effort to silence condo development objectors falls within... | 4,141,696 | b |
Although the broadest reading of the opinion might suggest a far-reaching cause of action, in fact, its impact has been relatively modest. Appellate Division decisions since LoBiondo I have not interpreted it expansively, but have instead given it limited application. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "extending LoBiondo I's special grievance analysis to malicious prosecution action based on racial discrimination claim",
"sentence": "Baglini v. Lauletta, 338 N.J.Super. 282, 301-03, 768 A.2d 825 (App.Div.) (concluding that effort to silence condo develop... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that effort to silence condo development objectors falls within LoBiondo I",
"sentence": "Baglini v. Lauletta, 338 N.J.Super. 282, 301-03, 768 A.2d 825 (App.Div.) (concluding that effort to silence condo development objectors falls within... | 4,141,696 | b |
Although the broadest reading of the opinion might suggest a far-reaching cause of action, in fact, its impact has been relatively modest. Appellate Division decisions since LoBiondo I have not interpreted it expansively, but have instead given it limited application. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that effort to silence condo development objectors falls within LoBiondo I",
"sentence": "Baglini v. Lauletta, 338 N.J.Super. 282, 301-03, 768 A.2d 825 (App.Div.) (concluding that effort to silence condo development objectors falls within... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "363 N.J.Super. 186, 207-08",
"parenthetical": "extending LoBiondo I's special grievance analysis to malicious prosecution action based on racial discrimination claim",
"sentence": "Baglini v. Lauletta, 338 N.J.Super. 282, 301-03, 768 A.2d 825 (App.Div.) (concluding that effort ... | 4,141,696 | a |
Although the broadest reading of the opinion might suggest a far-reaching cause of action, in fact, its impact has been relatively modest. Appellate Division decisions since LoBiondo I have not interpreted it expansively, but have instead given it limited application. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that effort to silence condo development objectors falls within LoBiondo I",
"sentence": "Baglini v. Lauletta, 338 N.J.Super. 282, 301-03, 768 A.2d 825 (App.Div.) (concluding that effort to silence condo development objectors falls within... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "extending LoBiondo I's special grievance analysis to malicious prosecution action based on racial discrimination claim",
"sentence": "Baglini v. Lauletta, 338 N.J.Super. 282, 301-03, 768 A.2d 825 (App.Div.) (concluding that effort to silence condo develop... | 4,141,696 | a |
Although the broadest reading of the opinion might suggest a far-reaching cause of action, in fact, its impact has been relatively modest. Appellate Division decisions since LoBiondo I have not interpreted it expansively, but have instead given it limited application. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that effort to silence condo development objectors falls within LoBiondo I",
"sentence": "Baglini v. Lauletta, 338 N.J.Super. 282, 301-03, 768 A.2d 825 (App.Div.) (concluding that effort to silence condo development objectors falls within... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "363 N.J.Super. 186, 207-08",
"parenthetical": "extending LoBiondo I's special grievance analysis to malicious prosecution action based on racial discrimination claim",
"sentence": "Baglini v. Lauletta, 338 N.J.Super. 282, 301-03, 768 A.2d 825 (App.Div.) (concluding that effort ... | 4,141,696 | a |
Although the broadest reading of the opinion might suggest a far-reaching cause of action, in fact, its impact has been relatively modest. Appellate Division decisions since LoBiondo I have not interpreted it expansively, but have instead given it limited application. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "extending LoBiondo I's special grievance analysis to malicious prosecution action based on racial discrimination claim",
"sentence": "Baglini v. Lauletta, 338 N.J.Super. 282, 301-03, 768 A.2d 825 (App.Div.) (concluding that effort to silence condo develop... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that effort to silence condo development objectors falls within LoBiondo I",
"sentence": "Baglini v. Lauletta, 338 N.J.Super. 282, 301-03, 768 A.2d 825 (App.Div.) (concluding that effort to silence condo development objectors falls within... | 4,141,696 | b |
Although the broadest reading of the opinion might suggest a far-reaching cause of action, in fact, its impact has been relatively modest. Appellate Division decisions since LoBiondo I have not interpreted it expansively, but have instead given it limited application. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "363 N.J.Super. 186, 207-08",
"parenthetical": "extending LoBiondo I's special grievance analysis to malicious prosecution action based on racial discrimination claim",
"sentence": "Baglini v. Lauletta, 338 N.J.Super. 282, 301-03, 768 A.2d 825 (App.Div.) (concluding that effort ... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that effort to silence condo development objectors falls within LoBiondo I",
"sentence": "Baglini v. Lauletta, 338 N.J.Super. 282, 301-03, 768 A.2d 825 (App.Div.) (concluding that effort to silence condo development objectors falls within... | 4,141,696 | b |
Although the broadest reading of the opinion might suggest a far-reaching cause of action, in fact, its impact has been relatively modest. Appellate Division decisions since LoBiondo I have not interpreted it expansively, but have instead given it limited application. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "extending LoBiondo I's special grievance analysis to malicious prosecution action based on racial discrimination claim",
"sentence": "Baglini v. Lauletta, 338 N.J.Super. 282, 301-03, 768 A.2d 825 (App.Div.) (concluding that effort to silence condo develop... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that effort to silence condo development objectors falls within LoBiondo I",
"sentence": "Baglini v. Lauletta, 338 N.J.Super. 282, 301-03, 768 A.2d 825 (App.Div.) (concluding that effort to silence condo development objectors falls within... | 4,141,696 | b |
"[W]hen crimes involve 'indirect or secondary victims'," or where society at large is the victim, the crime is treated as a "victimless crime" for purposes of the grouping rules. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "56 F.3d 536, 538-42",
"parenthetical": "affirming separate grouping of firearms offenses based on differences including place, time, nature of guns, and purposes of acts",
"sentence": "United States v. Bush, 56 F.3d 536, 538-42 (3d Cir.1995) (affirming separate grouping o... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "960 F.2d 965, 967-69",
"parenthetical": "finding district court properly did not group two obstruction convictions for acts that arose out of same scheme but occurred two years apart and involved different harms-- one involved interfering with proper sentencing of another defenda... | 4,162,830 | a |
I would therefore hold that when a lawyer breaches his or her fiduciary duty to the client, the client has an absolute right to terminate the attorney-client relationship. And that right cannot be burdened by any claim from the lawyer for compensation or other damages. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "145 Minn. 281, 284",
"parenthetical": "\"[Because] the client has the right to terminate the relation of attorney and client at any time[,] ... it follows as a natural consequence that [the client] cannot be compelled to pay damages for exercising that right .... \"",
"sentence... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "345 N.W.2d 209, 212",
"parenthetical": "\"The law treats a client's right to an attorney's loyalty as a kind of 'absolute' right in the sense that if the attorney breaches his or her fiduciary duty to the client, the client is deemed injured even if no actual loss results.\"",
... | 7,081,130 | a |
I would therefore hold that when a lawyer breaches his or her fiduciary duty to the client, the client has an absolute right to terminate the attorney-client relationship. And that right cannot be burdened by any claim from the lawyer for compensation or other damages. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "320 N.W.2d 407, 411",
"parenthetical": "holding that an attorney who breaches a fiduciary duty to a client forfeits his right to compensation without any requirement that the client prove actual harm",
"sentence": "See Lawler v. Dunn, 145 Minn. 281, 284, 176 N.W. 989, 990 (1920... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "145 Minn. 281, 284",
"parenthetical": "\"[Because] the client has the right to terminate the relation of attorney and client at any time[,] ... it follows as a natural consequence that [the client] cannot be compelled to pay damages for exercising that right .... \"",
"sentence... | 7,081,130 | b |
I would therefore hold that when a lawyer breaches his or her fiduciary duty to the client, the client has an absolute right to terminate the attorney-client relationship. And that right cannot be burdened by any claim from the lawyer for compensation or other damages. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "387 N.W.2d 412, 417",
"parenthetical": "authorizing only partial forfeiture of previously earned fees when there is no bad faith involved, no actual harm to the client and \"particularly where there are multiple potential plaintiffs\"",
"sentence": "But see Gilchrist v. Per... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "145 Minn. 281, 284",
"parenthetical": "\"[Because] the client has the right to terminate the relation of attorney and client at any time[,] ... it follows as a natural consequence that [the client] cannot be compelled to pay damages for exercising that right .... \"",
"sentence... | 7,081,130 | b |
I would therefore hold that when a lawyer breaches his or her fiduciary duty to the client, the client has an absolute right to terminate the attorney-client relationship. And that right cannot be burdened by any claim from the lawyer for compensation or other damages. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "176 N.W. 989, 990",
"parenthetical": "\"[Because] the client has the right to terminate the relation of attorney and client at any time[,] ... it follows as a natural consequence that [the client] cannot be compelled to pay damages for exercising that right .... \"",
"sentence"... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "345 N.W.2d 209, 212",
"parenthetical": "\"The law treats a client's right to an attorney's loyalty as a kind of 'absolute' right in the sense that if the attorney breaches his or her fiduciary duty to the client, the client is deemed injured even if no actual loss results.\"",
... | 7,081,130 | a |
I would therefore hold that when a lawyer breaches his or her fiduciary duty to the client, the client has an absolute right to terminate the attorney-client relationship. And that right cannot be burdened by any claim from the lawyer for compensation or other damages. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "176 N.W. 989, 990",
"parenthetical": "\"[Because] the client has the right to terminate the relation of attorney and client at any time[,] ... it follows as a natural consequence that [the client] cannot be compelled to pay damages for exercising that right .... \"",
"sentence"... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "320 N.W.2d 407, 411",
"parenthetical": "holding that an attorney who breaches a fiduciary duty to a client forfeits his right to compensation without any requirement that the client prove actual harm",
"sentence": "See Lawler v. Dunn, 145 Minn. 281, 284, 176 N.W. 989, 990 (1920... | 7,081,130 | a |
I would therefore hold that when a lawyer breaches his or her fiduciary duty to the client, the client has an absolute right to terminate the attorney-client relationship. And that right cannot be burdened by any claim from the lawyer for compensation or other damages. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "176 N.W. 989, 990",
"parenthetical": "\"[Because] the client has the right to terminate the relation of attorney and client at any time[,] ... it follows as a natural consequence that [the client] cannot be compelled to pay damages for exercising that right .... \"",
"sentence"... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "387 N.W.2d 412, 417",
"parenthetical": "authorizing only partial forfeiture of previously earned fees when there is no bad faith involved, no actual harm to the client and \"particularly where there are multiple potential plaintiffs\"",
"sentence": "But see Gilchrist v. Per... | 7,081,130 | a |
I would therefore hold that when a lawyer breaches his or her fiduciary duty to the client, the client has an absolute right to terminate the attorney-client relationship. And that right cannot be burdened by any claim from the lawyer for compensation or other damages. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "345 N.W.2d 209, 212",
"parenthetical": "\"The law treats a client's right to an attorney's loyalty as a kind of 'absolute' right in the sense that if the attorney breaches his or her fiduciary duty to the client, the client is deemed injured even if no actual loss results.\"",
... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "387 N.W.2d 412, 417",
"parenthetical": "authorizing only partial forfeiture of previously earned fees when there is no bad faith involved, no actual harm to the client and \"particularly where there are multiple potential plaintiffs\"",
"sentence": "But see Gilchrist v. Per... | 7,081,130 | a |
I would therefore hold that when a lawyer breaches his or her fiduciary duty to the client, the client has an absolute right to terminate the attorney-client relationship. And that right cannot be burdened by any claim from the lawyer for compensation or other damages. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "320 N.W.2d 407, 411",
"parenthetical": "holding that an attorney who breaches a fiduciary duty to a client forfeits his right to compensation without any requirement that the client prove actual harm",
"sentence": "See Lawler v. Dunn, 145 Minn. 281, 284, 176 N.W. 989, 990 (1920... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "387 N.W.2d 412, 417",
"parenthetical": "authorizing only partial forfeiture of previously earned fees when there is no bad faith involved, no actual harm to the client and \"particularly where there are multiple potential plaintiffs\"",
"sentence": "But see Gilchrist v. Per... | 7,081,130 | a |
However, even for the non-overlapping period, all plaintiffs and movants rely on a common pattern in their allegations: that defendants' statements to the investing public misrepresented or omitted to state material facts about the financial status of IMAX. Further, these matters share a common legal question: whether ... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "182 F.R.D. 476, 478",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"[cjourts which have addressed the issue have held that differing class periods alone will not defeat consolidation or create a conflict\"",
"sentence": "In re Cendant Corp. Lit., 182 F.R.D. 476, 478 (D.N.J.1998) (notin... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2005 WL 883008, at *2",
"parenthetical": "finding consolidation of cases with \"similar or overlapping claims\" under Section 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, along with Rule 10b-5, appropriate pursuant to Rule 42(a) despite different but \"coexten... | 3,967,571 | a |
Tenant's claim under the Residential Rental Agreements Act is for breach of a warranty based on landlords' failure to keep the premises safe and clean. There is no indication that by enacting the Residential Rental Agreements Act, the Legislature intended to deny tenants the additional protections provided by the Consu... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "547 A.2d 1141, 1141",
"parenthetical": "reversing trial court, which held specific landlord-tenant statutes precluded claim under general consumer fraud law",
"sentence": "See 49 Prospect Street, 547 A.2d at 1141 (reversing trial court, which held specific landlord-tenant statu... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "434 N.E.2d 1215, 1221",
"parenthetical": "\"mere fact that these statutes contain some overlapping prohibitions and remedies does not establish a legislative intent to preclude their concurrent application\"",
"sentence": "See 49 Prospect Street, 547 A.2d at 1141 (reversin... | 4,849,013 | a |
This court has repeatedly held that a person is not entitled to be notified of her Miranda rights before an interrogation if that person is not "in custody." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "923 F.2d 1193, 1196",
"parenthetical": "warnings not required where person being interrogated was not in custody",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Peete, 919 F.2d 1168, 1176 (6th Cir.1990) (Miranda “only applies to situations involving custodial interrogations”); ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "900 F.2d 948, 950-951",
"parenthetical": "\"A person is entitled to receive Miranda warnings only if questioned while in custody.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Peete, 919 F.2d 1168, 1176 (6th Cir.1990) (Miranda “only applies to situations involving custodial inte... | 10,518,111 | b |
This court has repeatedly held that a person is not entitled to be notified of her Miranda rights before an interrogation if that person is not "in custody." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "900 F.2d 948, 950-951",
"parenthetical": "\"A person is entitled to receive Miranda warnings only if questioned while in custody.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Peete, 919 F.2d 1168, 1176 (6th Cir.1990) (Miranda “only applies to situations involving custodial inte... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "warnings not required where person being interrogated was not in custody",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Peete, 919 F.2d 1168, 1176 (6th Cir.1990) (Miranda “only applies to situations involving custodial interrogations”); United States v. ... | 10,518,111 | a |
This court has repeatedly held that a person is not entitled to be notified of her Miranda rights before an interrogation if that person is not "in custody." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "900 F.2d 948, 950-951",
"parenthetical": "\"A person is entitled to receive Miranda warnings only if questioned while in custody.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Peete, 919 F.2d 1168, 1176 (6th Cir.1990) (Miranda “only applies to situations involving custodial inte... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "warnings not required where person being interrogated was not in custody",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Peete, 919 F.2d 1168, 1176 (6th Cir.1990) (Miranda “only applies to situations involving custodial interrogations”); United States v. ... | 10,518,111 | a |
This court has repeatedly held that a person is not entitled to be notified of her Miranda rights before an interrogation if that person is not "in custody." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "923 F.2d 1193, 1196",
"parenthetical": "warnings not required where person being interrogated was not in custody",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Peete, 919 F.2d 1168, 1176 (6th Cir.1990) (Miranda “only applies to situations involving custodial interrogations”); ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"A person is entitled to receive Miranda warnings only if questioned while in custody.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Peete, 919 F.2d 1168, 1176 (6th Cir.1990) (Miranda “only applies to situations involving custodial interrogations”); Unite... | 10,518,111 | b |
This court has repeatedly held that a person is not entitled to be notified of her Miranda rights before an interrogation if that person is not "in custody." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "warnings not required where person being interrogated was not in custody",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Peete, 919 F.2d 1168, 1176 (6th Cir.1990) (Miranda “only applies to situations involving custodial interrogations”); United States v. ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"A person is entitled to receive Miranda warnings only if questioned while in custody.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Peete, 919 F.2d 1168, 1176 (6th Cir.1990) (Miranda “only applies to situations involving custodial interrogations”); Unite... | 10,518,111 | b |
This court has repeatedly held that a person is not entitled to be notified of her Miranda rights before an interrogation if that person is not "in custody." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "warnings not required where person being interrogated was not in custody",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Peete, 919 F.2d 1168, 1176 (6th Cir.1990) (Miranda “only applies to situations involving custodial interrogations”); United States v. ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"A person is entitled to receive Miranda warnings only if questioned while in custody.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Peete, 919 F.2d 1168, 1176 (6th Cir.1990) (Miranda “only applies to situations involving custodial interrogations”); Unite... | 10,518,111 | b |
This court has repeatedly held that a person is not entitled to be notified of her Miranda rights before an interrogation if that person is not "in custody." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"A person is entitled to receive Miranda warnings only if questioned while in custody.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Peete, 919 F.2d 1168, 1176 (6th Cir.1990) (Miranda “only applies to situations involving custodial interrogations”); Unite... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "923 F.2d 1193, 1196",
"parenthetical": "warnings not required where person being interrogated was not in custody",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Peete, 919 F.2d 1168, 1176 (6th Cir.1990) (Miranda “only applies to situations involving custodial interrogations”); ... | 10,518,111 | a |
This court has repeatedly held that a person is not entitled to be notified of her Miranda rights before an interrogation if that person is not "in custody." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "warnings not required where person being interrogated was not in custody",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Peete, 919 F.2d 1168, 1176 (6th Cir.1990) (Miranda “only applies to situations involving custodial interrogations”); United States v. ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"A person is entitled to receive Miranda warnings only if questioned while in custody.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Peete, 919 F.2d 1168, 1176 (6th Cir.1990) (Miranda “only applies to situations involving custodial interrogations”); Unite... | 10,518,111 | b |
This court has repeatedly held that a person is not entitled to be notified of her Miranda rights before an interrogation if that person is not "in custody." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"A person is entitled to receive Miranda warnings only if questioned while in custody.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Peete, 919 F.2d 1168, 1176 (6th Cir.1990) (Miranda “only applies to situations involving custodial interrogations”); Unite... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "warnings not required where person being interrogated was not in custody",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Peete, 919 F.2d 1168, 1176 (6th Cir.1990) (Miranda “only applies to situations involving custodial interrogations”); United States v. ... | 10,518,111 | a |
The Financing Order follows the same structure as countless other orders and contracts, i.e., a more specific provision follows the more general provision. A court does not violate contract interpretation principles simply because it finds a more detailed provision to control the outcome over a general provision that h... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "3 F.3d 11, 17",
"parenthetical": "noting the rule of contract interpretation that the specific controls the general",
"sentence": "See Parkhurst v. Gibson, 133 N.H. 57, 63, 573 A.2d 454 (1990) (noting the accepted interpretive rule that a general, preliminary clause does n... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "450 F.3d 36, 36",
"parenthetical": "interpreting a stipulation allowing a chapter 11 debtor to retain a portion of one of its businesses and finding the paragraph that generally characterized the business the debtor was to retain did not control because the paragraphs that follow... | 5,673,751 | b |
The Financing Order follows the same structure as countless other orders and contracts, i.e., a more specific provision follows the more general provision. A court does not violate contract interpretation principles simply because it finds a more detailed provision to control the outcome over a general provision that h... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "3 F.3d 11, 17",
"parenthetical": "noting the rule of contract interpretation that the specific controls the general",
"sentence": "See Parkhurst v. Gibson, 133 N.H. 57, 63, 573 A.2d 454 (1990) (noting the accepted interpretive rule that a general, preliminary clause does n... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "133 N.H. 57, 63",
"parenthetical": "noting the accepted interpretive rule that a general, preliminary clause does not take priority over specific provisions of a contract",
"sentence": "See Parkhurst v. Gibson, 133 N.H. 57, 63, 573 A.2d 454 (1990) (noting the accepted interpret... | 5,673,751 | b |
The Financing Order follows the same structure as countless other orders and contracts, i.e., a more specific provision follows the more general provision. A court does not violate contract interpretation principles simply because it finds a more detailed provision to control the outcome over a general provision that h... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "3 F.3d 11, 17",
"parenthetical": "noting the rule of contract interpretation that the specific controls the general",
"sentence": "See Parkhurst v. Gibson, 133 N.H. 57, 63, 573 A.2d 454 (1990) (noting the accepted interpretive rule that a general, preliminary clause does n... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting the accepted interpretive rule that a general, preliminary clause does not take priority over specific provisions of a contract",
"sentence": "See Parkhurst v. Gibson, 133 N.H. 57, 63, 573 A.2d 454 (1990) (noting the accepted interpretive rule that... | 5,673,751 | b |
As articulated in our case law, to determine whether a person's consent was voluntarily given or coerced, the proper analytical framework is whether a person has knowingly waived his right to refuse to consent to the search. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "68 N.J. 353, 353-54",
"parenthetical": "establishing standard of voluntariness of consent under Article I, Paragraph 7, as knowing and intelligent waiver, which includes knowledge of right to refuse consent",
"sentence": "See Johnson, supra, 68 N.J. at 353-54, 346 A.2d 66 (esta... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "44 N.J. 353, 353",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"many decisions have sustained a finding that consent was voluntarily given even though the consent was obtained under the authority of the badge or after the accused had been arrested\"",
"sentence": "See Johnson, supra, 6... | 3,762,445 | a |
As articulated in our case law, to determine whether a person's consent was voluntarily given or coerced, the proper analytical framework is whether a person has knowingly waived his right to refuse to consent to the search. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that \"many decisions have sustained a finding that consent was voluntarily given even though the consent was obtained under the authority of the badge or after the accused had been arrested\"",
"sentence": "See Johnson, supra, 68 N.J. at 353-... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "68 N.J. 353, 353-54",
"parenthetical": "establishing standard of voluntariness of consent under Article I, Paragraph 7, as knowing and intelligent waiver, which includes knowledge of right to refuse consent",
"sentence": "See Johnson, supra, 68 N.J. at 353-54, 346 A.2d 66 (esta... | 3,762,445 | b |
As articulated in our case law, to determine whether a person's consent was voluntarily given or coerced, the proper analytical framework is whether a person has knowingly waived his right to refuse to consent to the search. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "establishing standard of voluntariness of consent under Article I, Paragraph 7, as knowing and intelligent waiver, which includes knowledge of right to refuse consent",
"sentence": "See Johnson, supra, 68 N.J. at 353-54, 346 A.2d 66 (establishing standard... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "44 N.J. 353, 353",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"many decisions have sustained a finding that consent was voluntarily given even though the consent was obtained under the authority of the badge or after the accused had been arrested\"",
"sentence": "See Johnson, supra, 6... | 3,762,445 | a |
As articulated in our case law, to determine whether a person's consent was voluntarily given or coerced, the proper analytical framework is whether a person has knowingly waived his right to refuse to consent to the search. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "establishing standard of voluntariness of consent under Article I, Paragraph 7, as knowing and intelligent waiver, which includes knowledge of right to refuse consent",
"sentence": "See Johnson, supra, 68 N.J. at 353-54, 346 A.2d 66 (establishing standard... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that \"many decisions have sustained a finding that consent was voluntarily given even though the consent was obtained under the authority of the badge or after the accused had been arrested\"",
"sentence": "See Johnson, supra, 68 N.J. at 353-... | 3,762,445 | a |
As articulated in our case law, to determine whether a person's consent was voluntarily given or coerced, the proper analytical framework is whether a person has knowingly waived his right to refuse to consent to the search. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "44 N.J. 353, 353",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"many decisions have sustained a finding that consent was voluntarily given even though the consent was obtained under the authority of the badge or after the accused had been arrested\"",
"sentence": "See Johnson, supra, 6... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "44 N.J. 346, 352-53",
"parenthetical": "setting forth various non-exhaustive factors supporting either voluntary or coerced nature of consent",
"sentence": "See Johnson, supra, 68 N.J. at 353-54, 346 A.2d 66 (establishing standard of voluntariness of consent under Article I, Pa... | 3,762,445 | b |
As articulated in our case law, to determine whether a person's consent was voluntarily given or coerced, the proper analytical framework is whether a person has knowingly waived his right to refuse to consent to the search. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "44 N.J. 346, 352-53",
"parenthetical": "setting forth various non-exhaustive factors supporting either voluntary or coerced nature of consent",
"sentence": "See Johnson, supra, 68 N.J. at 353-54, 346 A.2d 66 (establishing standard of voluntariness of consent under Article I, Pa... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that \"many decisions have sustained a finding that consent was voluntarily given even though the consent was obtained under the authority of the badge or after the accused had been arrested\"",
"sentence": "See Johnson, supra, 68 N.J. at 353-... | 3,762,445 | a |
As articulated in our case law, to determine whether a person's consent was voluntarily given or coerced, the proper analytical framework is whether a person has knowingly waived his right to refuse to consent to the search. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "setting forth various non-exhaustive factors supporting either voluntary or coerced nature of consent",
"sentence": "See Johnson, supra, 68 N.J. at 353-54, 346 A.2d 66 (establishing standard of voluntariness of consent under Article I, Paragraph 7, as kno... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "44 N.J. 353, 353",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"many decisions have sustained a finding that consent was voluntarily given even though the consent was obtained under the authority of the badge or after the accused had been arrested\"",
"sentence": "See Johnson, supra, 6... | 3,762,445 | a |
As articulated in our case law, to determine whether a person's consent was voluntarily given or coerced, the proper analytical framework is whether a person has knowingly waived his right to refuse to consent to the search. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "setting forth various non-exhaustive factors supporting either voluntary or coerced nature of consent",
"sentence": "See Johnson, supra, 68 N.J. at 353-54, 346 A.2d 66 (establishing standard of voluntariness of consent under Article I, Paragraph 7, as kno... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that \"many decisions have sustained a finding that consent was voluntarily given even though the consent was obtained under the authority of the badge or after the accused had been arrested\"",
"sentence": "See Johnson, supra, 68 N.J. at 353-... | 3,762,445 | a |
As articulated in our case law, to determine whether a person's consent was voluntarily given or coerced, the proper analytical framework is whether a person has knowingly waived his right to refuse to consent to the search. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "384 U.S. 436, 444",
"parenthetical": "setting forth various non-exhaustive factors supporting either voluntary or coerced nature of consent",
"sentence": "See Johnson, supra, 68 N.J. at 353-54, 346 A.2d 66 (establishing standard of voluntariness of consent under Article I, Para... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "44 N.J. 353, 353",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"many decisions have sustained a finding that consent was voluntarily given even though the consent was obtained under the authority of the badge or after the accused had been arrested\"",
"sentence": "See Johnson, supra, 6... | 3,762,445 | a |
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