context stringlengths 58 1.13k | citation_a dict | citation_b dict | case_id int64 475 12.5M | label stringclasses 2
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In contrast to these authorities, numerous courts have held that employee compensation is "subject to reduction" under SS 541.118(a) if a policy of the employer provides for deductions disallowed by the DOL regulations for salaried employees regardless of whether such deductions have been made. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "709 F.Supp. 241, 241",
"parenthetical": "letter ruling relied upon by defendant but not provided to court",
"sentence": "April 16, 1991); Knecht, 683 F.Supp. at 1311; cf. Banks, 708 F.Supp. at 1024-25 (letter ruling relied upon by defendant but not provided to court). But see H... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "707 F.Supp. 212, 215",
"parenthetical": "employer's policy under attack under FLSA and whether policy has been applied does not alter policy itself",
"sentence": "See Kinney, 994 F.2d at 11; Abshire, 908 F.2d at 487; Banks v. City of North Little Rock, 708 F.Supp. 1023, 1025 (E... | 3,830,151 | b |
In contrast to these authorities, numerous courts have held that employee compensation is "subject to reduction" under SS 541.118(a) if a policy of the employer provides for deductions disallowed by the DOL regulations for salaried employees regardless of whether such deductions have been made. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "708 F.Supp. 1024, 1024-25",
"parenthetical": "letter ruling relied upon by defendant but not provided to court",
"sentence": "April 16, 1991); Knecht, 683 F.Supp. at 1311; cf. Banks, 708 F.Supp. at 1024-25 (letter ruling relied upon by defendant but not provided to court). But ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "992 F.2d 85, 85-86",
"parenthetical": "focusing upon policy but, finding policy ambiguous, looking to application of policy",
"sentence": "See Kinney, 994 F.2d at 11; Abshire, 908 F.2d at 487; Banks v. City of North Little Rock, 708 F.Supp. 1023, 1025 (E.D.Ark.1988) (no sh... | 3,830,151 | b |
In contrast to these authorities, numerous courts have held that employee compensation is "subject to reduction" under SS 541.118(a) if a policy of the employer provides for deductions disallowed by the DOL regulations for salaried employees regardless of whether such deductions have been made. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "709 F.Supp. 241, 241",
"parenthetical": "letter ruling relied upon by defendant but not provided to court",
"sentence": "April 16, 1991); Knecht, 683 F.Supp. at 1311; cf. Banks, 708 F.Supp. at 1024-25 (letter ruling relied upon by defendant but not provided to court). But see H... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "992 F.2d 85, 85-86",
"parenthetical": "focusing upon policy but, finding policy ambiguous, looking to application of policy",
"sentence": "See Kinney, 994 F.2d at 11; Abshire, 908 F.2d at 487; Banks v. City of North Little Rock, 708 F.Supp. 1023, 1025 (E.D.Ark.1988) (no sh... | 3,830,151 | b |
To the extent the Plaintiff continues to seek to pursue this claim, the Court finds that there are no facts alleged or evidence put forth that supports a claim of gender discrimination as a result of the claimed retaliatory actions taken by the County Defendants, including Geier. In any event, the Second Circuit has ex... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "79 F.3d 318, 323",
"parenthetical": "\"[ajlthough claims of retaliation are commonly brought under the First Amendment ... and may also be brought under Title VII ... we know of no court that has recognized a claim under the equal protection clause for retaliation following... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "62 F.3d 338, 340-41",
"parenthetical": "finding no established right under the equal protection clause to be free from retaliation for complaints of gender discrimination",
"sentence": "Bernheim v. Litt, 79 F.3d 318, 323 (2d Cir.1996) (“[ajlthough claims of retaliation are... | 3,582,340 | a |
To the extent the Plaintiff continues to seek to pursue this claim, the Court finds that there are no facts alleged or evidence put forth that supports a claim of gender discrimination as a result of the claimed retaliatory actions taken by the County Defendants, including Geier. In any event, the Second Circuit has ex... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "885 F.2d 399, 414",
"parenthetical": "\"[R]ight to be free from retaliation for protesting sexual harassment and sex discrimination is a right created by Title VII, not the equal protection clause.\"",
"sentence": "Bernheim v. Litt, 79 F.3d 318, 323 (2d Cir.1996) (“[ajltho... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "79 F.3d 318, 323",
"parenthetical": "\"[ajlthough claims of retaliation are commonly brought under the First Amendment ... and may also be brought under Title VII ... we know of no court that has recognized a claim under the equal protection clause for retaliation following... | 3,582,340 | b |
To the extent the Plaintiff continues to seek to pursue this claim, the Court finds that there are no facts alleged or evidence put forth that supports a claim of gender discrimination as a result of the claimed retaliatory actions taken by the County Defendants, including Geier. In any event, the Second Circuit has ex... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "213 F.Supp.2d 411, 419",
"parenthetical": "\"defendants' alleged retaliation in response to plaintiffs sexual harassment complaints is not cognizable as an equal protection violation.\"",
"sentence": "Bernheim v. Litt, 79 F.3d 318, 323 (2d Cir.1996) (“[ajlthough claims of ... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "79 F.3d 318, 323",
"parenthetical": "\"[ajlthough claims of retaliation are commonly brought under the First Amendment ... and may also be brought under Title VII ... we know of no court that has recognized a claim under the equal protection clause for retaliation following... | 3,582,340 | b |
Leave to amend will not be granted. "Though leave to amend should be freely given in the interest of justice, Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a), the motion is committed to the district court's sound discretion." "The court may deny leave to amend, among other reasons, on the basis of the futility of the amendment." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "371 U.S. 178, 182",
"parenthetical": "other reasons include undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive, and undue prejudice to opposing party",
"sentence": "Id. (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962) (other reasons include undue delay... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "213 F.3d 113, 115",
"parenthetical": "\" 'Futility means that the complaint, as amended, would fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.\"",
"sentence": "Id. (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962) (other reasons includ... | 4,171,386 | a |
Leave to amend will not be granted. "Though leave to amend should be freely given in the interest of justice, Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a), the motion is committed to the district court's sound discretion." "The court may deny leave to amend, among other reasons, on the basis of the futility of the amendment." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "371 U.S. 178, 182",
"parenthetical": "other reasons include undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive, and undue prejudice to opposing party",
"sentence": "Id. (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962) (other reasons include undue delay... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "213 F.3d 115, 115",
"parenthetical": "\"In assessing 'futility,' the District Court applies the same standard of legal sufficiency as applies under Rule 12(b)(6",
"sentence": "Id. (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962) (other reasons ... | 4,171,386 | a |
Leave to amend will not be granted. "Though leave to amend should be freely given in the interest of justice, Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a), the motion is committed to the district court's sound discretion." "The court may deny leave to amend, among other reasons, on the basis of the futility of the amendment." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "other reasons include undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive, and undue prejudice to opposing party",
"sentence": "Id. (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962) (other reasons include undue delay, bad faith or ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "213 F.3d 113, 115",
"parenthetical": "\" 'Futility means that the complaint, as amended, would fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.\"",
"sentence": "Id. (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962) (other reasons includ... | 4,171,386 | a |
Leave to amend will not be granted. "Though leave to amend should be freely given in the interest of justice, Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a), the motion is committed to the district court's sound discretion." "The court may deny leave to amend, among other reasons, on the basis of the futility of the amendment." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "213 F.3d 115, 115",
"parenthetical": "\"In assessing 'futility,' the District Court applies the same standard of legal sufficiency as applies under Rule 12(b)(6",
"sentence": "Id. (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962) (other reasons ... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "other reasons include undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive, and undue prejudice to opposing party",
"sentence": "Id. (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962) (other reasons include undue delay, bad faith or ... | 4,171,386 | b |
Leave to amend will not be granted. "Though leave to amend should be freely given in the interest of justice, Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a), the motion is committed to the district court's sound discretion." "The court may deny leave to amend, among other reasons, on the basis of the futility of the amendment." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "213 F.3d 113, 115",
"parenthetical": "\" 'Futility means that the complaint, as amended, would fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.\"",
"sentence": "Id. (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962) (other reasons includ... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "other reasons include undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive, and undue prejudice to opposing party",
"sentence": "Id. (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962) (other reasons include undue delay, bad faith or ... | 4,171,386 | b |
Leave to amend will not be granted. "Though leave to amend should be freely given in the interest of justice, Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a), the motion is committed to the district court's sound discretion." "The court may deny leave to amend, among other reasons, on the basis of the futility of the amendment." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "213 F.3d 115, 115",
"parenthetical": "\"In assessing 'futility,' the District Court applies the same standard of legal sufficiency as applies under Rule 12(b)(6",
"sentence": "Id. (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962) (other reasons ... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "other reasons include undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive, and undue prejudice to opposing party",
"sentence": "Id. (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962) (other reasons include undue delay, bad faith or ... | 4,171,386 | b |
Had the court questioned Juror One regarding her ability to remain impartial, I might agree. In any event, our precedents require a meaningful opportunity to prove actual bias in an evidentiary hearing. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "347 U.S. 230, 230",
"parenthetical": "holding that the district court \"should determine the circumstances, the impact thereof upon the juror, and whether or not it was prejudicial, in a #hearing with all interested parties permitted to participate\"",
"sentence": "See Cor... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "227 F.3d 536, 536",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"district court abused its discretion by failing to conduct an adequate evidentiary hearing into the allegations of extraneous influences on the jury pursuant to the holding in Remmer \" and remanding for a hearing at which the ... | 4,143,915 | b |
Had the court questioned Juror One regarding her ability to remain impartial, I might agree. In any event, our precedents require a meaningful opportunity to prove actual bias in an evidentiary hearing. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the district court \"should determine the circumstances, the impact thereof upon the juror, and whether or not it was prejudicial, in a #hearing with all interested parties permitted to participate\"",
"sentence": "See Corrado, 227 F.3d ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "227 F.3d 536, 536",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"district court abused its discretion by failing to conduct an adequate evidentiary hearing into the allegations of extraneous influences on the jury pursuant to the holding in Remmer \" and remanding for a hearing at which the ... | 4,143,915 | b |
Had the court questioned Juror One regarding her ability to remain impartial, I might agree. In any event, our precedents require a meaningful opportunity to prove actual bias in an evidentiary hearing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "156 F.3d 637, 637",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"the district court must provide the defendant a meaningful opportunity to prove [juror bias]\"",
"sentence": "See Corrado, 227 F.3d at 536 (holding that “district court abused its discretion by failing to conduct an adequate ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "347 U.S. 230, 230",
"parenthetical": "holding that the district court \"should determine the circumstances, the impact thereof upon the juror, and whether or not it was prejudicial, in a #hearing with all interested parties permitted to participate\"",
"sentence": "See Cor... | 4,143,915 | a |
Had the court questioned Juror One regarding her ability to remain impartial, I might agree. In any event, our precedents require a meaningful opportunity to prove actual bias in an evidentiary hearing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "156 F.3d 637, 637",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"the district court must provide the defendant a meaningful opportunity to prove [juror bias]\"",
"sentence": "See Corrado, 227 F.3d at 536 (holding that “district court abused its discretion by failing to conduct an adequate ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the district court \"should determine the circumstances, the impact thereof upon the juror, and whether or not it was prejudicial, in a #hearing with all interested parties permitted to participate\"",
"sentence": "See Corrado, 227 F.3d ... | 4,143,915 | a |
Had the court questioned Juror One regarding her ability to remain impartial, I might agree. In any event, our precedents require a meaningful opportunity to prove actual bias in an evidentiary hearing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "1 F.3d 423, 431",
"parenthetical": "\"By denying the reasonable request to inquire into the jurors' states of mind, the defendants were deprived of the opportunity to meet their burden of proving actual juror bias----\"",
"sentence": "See Corrado, 227 F.3d at 536 (holding that ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "347 U.S. 230, 230",
"parenthetical": "holding that the district court \"should determine the circumstances, the impact thereof upon the juror, and whether or not it was prejudicial, in a #hearing with all interested parties permitted to participate\"",
"sentence": "See Cor... | 4,143,915 | a |
Had the court questioned Juror One regarding her ability to remain impartial, I might agree. In any event, our precedents require a meaningful opportunity to prove actual bias in an evidentiary hearing. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the district court \"should determine the circumstances, the impact thereof upon the juror, and whether or not it was prejudicial, in a #hearing with all interested parties permitted to participate\"",
"sentence": "See Corrado, 227 F.3d ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "1 F.3d 423, 431",
"parenthetical": "\"By denying the reasonable request to inquire into the jurors' states of mind, the defendants were deprived of the opportunity to meet their burden of proving actual juror bias----\"",
"sentence": "See Corrado, 227 F.3d at 536 (holding that ... | 4,143,915 | b |
However, a defendant's due process rights are not violated by a good-faith "battle of the experts." That Pandeli's experts disagreed with Dr. Bayless's diagnosis merely goes to the weight and credibility of Dr. Bayless's opinion, matters reserved for the fact-finder's consideration and determination. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "27 Ariz.App. 363, 368",
"parenthetical": "finding that disputed facts in the ease \"were either not relied upon by [the expert] in reaching his opinion, or were immaterial to his opinion, or were legitimately contested facts and evidence ... that supported [the expert's] ver... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e have recognized that a trial court's admission of disputed expert testimony leaves to the fact-finder the role of assessing its weight and credibility.\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Romero, 239 Ariz. 6, 12 ¶ 27, 365 P.3d 358, 364 (2016) (“[W]e have... | 12,310,139 | b |
However, a defendant's due process rights are not violated by a good-faith "battle of the experts." That Pandeli's experts disagreed with Dr. Bayless's diagnosis merely goes to the weight and credibility of Dr. Bayless's opinion, matters reserved for the fact-finder's consideration and determination. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "555 P.2d 120, 125",
"parenthetical": "finding that disputed facts in the ease \"were either not relied upon by [the expert] in reaching his opinion, or were immaterial to his opinion, or were legitimately contested facts and evidence ... that supported [the expert's] version... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e have recognized that a trial court's admission of disputed expert testimony leaves to the fact-finder the role of assessing its weight and credibility.\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Romero, 239 Ariz. 6, 12 ¶ 27, 365 P.3d 358, 364 (2016) (“[W]e have... | 12,310,139 | b |
However, a defendant's due process rights are not violated by a good-faith "battle of the experts." That Pandeli's experts disagreed with Dr. Bayless's diagnosis merely goes to the weight and credibility of Dr. Bayless's opinion, matters reserved for the fact-finder's consideration and determination. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "27 Ariz.App. 363, 368",
"parenthetical": "finding that disputed facts in the ease \"were either not relied upon by [the expert] in reaching his opinion, or were immaterial to his opinion, or were legitimately contested facts and evidence ... that supported [the expert's] ver... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "365 P.3d 358, 364",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e have recognized that a trial court's admission of disputed expert testimony leaves to the fact-finder the role of assessing its weight and credibility.\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Romero, 239 Ariz. 6, 12 ¶ 27, 365 P.3d 358, 364 (20... | 12,310,139 | b |
However, a defendant's due process rights are not violated by a good-faith "battle of the experts." That Pandeli's experts disagreed with Dr. Bayless's diagnosis merely goes to the weight and credibility of Dr. Bayless's opinion, matters reserved for the fact-finder's consideration and determination. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "365 P.3d 358, 364",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e have recognized that a trial court's admission of disputed expert testimony leaves to the fact-finder the role of assessing its weight and credibility.\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Romero, 239 Ariz. 6, 12 ¶ 27, 365 P.3d 358, 364 (20... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "555 P.2d 120, 125",
"parenthetical": "finding that disputed facts in the ease \"were either not relied upon by [the expert] in reaching his opinion, or were immaterial to his opinion, or were legitimately contested facts and evidence ... that supported [the expert's] version... | 12,310,139 | a |
Because Dawson produced no evidence that Samu, Adams and Estep participated or acquiesced in the alleged deprivation of his constitutional rights or inadequately trained or supervised the officers who allegedly did (Bowker and Johnson), the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to these defendants. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "977 F.2d 1892, 1400",
"parenthetical": "\"supervisor liability [under SS 1983] requires allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence\"",
"sentence": "See McKee, 703 F.2d at 483 (“defendant Heggy is liable to [plaintiff] only if Mr. Heggy partic... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "703 F.2d 483, 483",
"parenthetical": "\"defendant Heggy is liable to [plaintiff] only if Mr. Heggy participated or acquiesced in [plaintiff]'s deprivation or if he inadequately trained or supervised the officers who did\"",
"sentence": "See McKee, 703 F.2d at 483 (“defendant He... | 3,530,577 | b |
If subsection (10)(b) is read in isolation, it is rendered ambiguous and ineffective because it does not confer a right of redemption nor does it contain any of the essential terms for exercising that right i.e., fair value. Such an absurd reading was not intended and should be avoided by courts when construing a statu... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "943 F.2d 1284, 1287",
"parenthetical": "\"A basic premise of statutory construction is that a statute is to be interpreted so that no words shall be discarded as being meaningless, redundant, or mere surplusage.\"",
"sentence": "Allstate Ins. Co. v. Rush, 777 So.2d 1027, 1... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "777 So.2d 1027, 1032",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"provisions of an act are to be read as consistent with one another\"",
"sentence": "Allstate Ins. Co. v. Rush, 777 So.2d 1027, 1032 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (noting that “provisions of an act are to be read as consistent w... | 11,436,095 | b |
Second, they argue it is excessive compared to other cases where the plaintiff suffered emotional distress of a magnitude comparable to Wulf s. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "plaintiff received damages totaling $113,000, a portion of which represented lost income, where her distress was so severe she was unable to work.",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Wren v. Spurlock, 798 F.2d 1313 (10th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1085, 107 ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "806 F.2d 1198, 1200-01",
"parenthetical": "no recovery for emotional distress where plaintiff testified she was \"depressed and humiliated\" by retaliatory transfer",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Wren v. Spurlock, 798 F.2d 1313 (10th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1085, 107 ... | 10,533,800 | a |
Second, they argue it is excessive compared to other cases where the plaintiff suffered emotional distress of a magnitude comparable to Wulf s. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "806 F.2d 1198, 1200-01",
"parenthetical": "no recovery for emotional distress where plaintiff testified she was \"depressed and humiliated\" by retaliatory transfer",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Wren v. Spurlock, 798 F.2d 1313 (10th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1085, 107 ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "plaintiff received damages totaling $113,000, a portion of which represented lost income, where her distress was so severe she was unable to work.",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Wren v. Spurlock, 798 F.2d 1313 (10th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1085, 107 ... | 10,533,800 | b |
Second, they argue it is excessive compared to other cases where the plaintiff suffered emotional distress of a magnitude comparable to Wulf s. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "806 F.2d 1198, 1200-01",
"parenthetical": "no recovery for emotional distress where plaintiff testified she was \"depressed and humiliated\" by retaliatory transfer",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Wren v. Spurlock, 798 F.2d 1313 (10th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1085, 107 ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "plaintiff received damages totaling $113,000, a portion of which represented lost income, where her distress was so severe she was unable to work.",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Wren v. Spurlock, 798 F.2d 1313 (10th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1085, 107 ... | 10,533,800 | b |
Second, they argue it is excessive compared to other cases where the plaintiff suffered emotional distress of a magnitude comparable to Wulf s. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "806 F.2d 1198, 1200-01",
"parenthetical": "no recovery for emotional distress where plaintiff testified she was \"depressed and humiliated\" by retaliatory transfer",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Wren v. Spurlock, 798 F.2d 1313 (10th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1085, 107 ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "plaintiff received damages totaling $113,000, a portion of which represented lost income, where her distress was so severe she was unable to work.",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Wren v. Spurlock, 798 F.2d 1313 (10th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1085, 107 ... | 10,533,800 | b |
The fact that one of Benson's (suspended) terms of imprisonment was later found to have been imposed in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause does not mean that the district court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over his trial. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[I]f a judge of a criminal court should convict a defendant of a nonexistent crime, he would merely be acting in excess of his jurisdiction [not in the clear absence thereof] and would be immune.\"",
"sentence": "See Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 80 ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[The] erroneous manner in which [the court's] jurisdiction was exercised, however it may have affected the validity of the act, did not ... render the defendant liable to answer in damages for it at the suit of the plaintiff, as though the court had proce... | 659,868 | b |
The fact that one of Benson's (suspended) terms of imprisonment was later found to have been imposed in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause does not mean that the district court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over his trial. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[The] erroneous manner in which [the court's] jurisdiction was exercised, however it may have affected the validity of the act, did not ... render the defendant liable to answer in damages for it at the suit of the plaintiff, as though the court had proce... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "211 F.3d 372, 380",
"parenthetical": "stating that laws affecting the maximum length of sentences \"are unrelated to subject-matter jurisdiction.\"",
"sentence": "See Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 80 U.S. 335, 357, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1871) (“[The] erroneous manner in which [the c... | 659,868 | a |
The fact that one of Benson's (suspended) terms of imprisonment was later found to have been imposed in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause does not mean that the district court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over his trial. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "80 U.S. 335, 357",
"parenthetical": "\"[The] erroneous manner in which [the court's] jurisdiction was exercised, however it may have affected the validity of the act, did not ... render the defendant liable to answer in damages for it at the suit of the plaintiff, as though the c... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[I]f a judge of a criminal court should convict a defendant of a nonexistent crime, he would merely be acting in excess of his jurisdiction [not in the clear absence thereof] and would be immune.\"",
"sentence": "See Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 80 ... | 659,868 | a |
The fact that one of Benson's (suspended) terms of imprisonment was later found to have been imposed in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause does not mean that the district court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over his trial. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "80 U.S. 335, 357",
"parenthetical": "\"[The] erroneous manner in which [the court's] jurisdiction was exercised, however it may have affected the validity of the act, did not ... render the defendant liable to answer in damages for it at the suit of the plaintiff, as though the c... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "211 F.3d 372, 380",
"parenthetical": "stating that laws affecting the maximum length of sentences \"are unrelated to subject-matter jurisdiction.\"",
"sentence": "See Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 80 U.S. 335, 357, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1871) (“[The] erroneous manner in which [the c... | 659,868 | a |
The fact that one of Benson's (suspended) terms of imprisonment was later found to have been imposed in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause does not mean that the district court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over his trial. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[The] erroneous manner in which [the court's] jurisdiction was exercised, however it may have affected the validity of the act, did not ... render the defendant liable to answer in damages for it at the suit of the plaintiff, as though the court had proce... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[I]f a judge of a criminal court should convict a defendant of a nonexistent crime, he would merely be acting in excess of his jurisdiction [not in the clear absence thereof] and would be immune.\"",
"sentence": "See Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 80 ... | 659,868 | a |
The fact that one of Benson's (suspended) terms of imprisonment was later found to have been imposed in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause does not mean that the district court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over his trial. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "211 F.3d 372, 380",
"parenthetical": "stating that laws affecting the maximum length of sentences \"are unrelated to subject-matter jurisdiction.\"",
"sentence": "See Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 80 U.S. 335, 357, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1871) (“[The] erroneous manner in which [the c... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[The] erroneous manner in which [the court's] jurisdiction was exercised, however it may have affected the validity of the act, did not ... render the defendant liable to answer in damages for it at the suit of the plaintiff, as though the court had proce... | 659,868 | b |
The fact that one of Benson's (suspended) terms of imprisonment was later found to have been imposed in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause does not mean that the district court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over his trial. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "435 U.S. 359, 359",
"parenthetical": "\"[The] erroneous manner in which [the court's] jurisdiction was exercised, however it may have affected the validity of the act, did not ... render the defendant liable to answer in damages for it at the suit of the plaintiff, as though the ... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[I]f a judge of a criminal court should convict a defendant of a nonexistent crime, he would merely be acting in excess of his jurisdiction [not in the clear absence thereof] and would be immune.\"",
"sentence": "See Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 80 ... | 659,868 | a |
The fact that one of Benson's (suspended) terms of imprisonment was later found to have been imposed in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause does not mean that the district court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over his trial. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "435 U.S. 359, 359",
"parenthetical": "\"[The] erroneous manner in which [the court's] jurisdiction was exercised, however it may have affected the validity of the act, did not ... render the defendant liable to answer in damages for it at the suit of the plaintiff, as though the ... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "211 F.3d 372, 380",
"parenthetical": "stating that laws affecting the maximum length of sentences \"are unrelated to subject-matter jurisdiction.\"",
"sentence": "See Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 80 U.S. 335, 357, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1871) (“[The] erroneous manner in which [the c... | 659,868 | a |
The fact that one of Benson's (suspended) terms of imprisonment was later found to have been imposed in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause does not mean that the district court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over his trial. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[The] erroneous manner in which [the court's] jurisdiction was exercised, however it may have affected the validity of the act, did not ... render the defendant liable to answer in damages for it at the suit of the plaintiff, as though the court had proce... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[I]f a judge of a criminal court should convict a defendant of a nonexistent crime, he would merely be acting in excess of his jurisdiction [not in the clear absence thereof] and would be immune.\"",
"sentence": "See Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 80 ... | 659,868 | a |
The fact that one of Benson's (suspended) terms of imprisonment was later found to have been imposed in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause does not mean that the district court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over his trial. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[The] erroneous manner in which [the court's] jurisdiction was exercised, however it may have affected the validity of the act, did not ... render the defendant liable to answer in damages for it at the suit of the plaintiff, as though the court had proce... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "211 F.3d 372, 380",
"parenthetical": "stating that laws affecting the maximum length of sentences \"are unrelated to subject-matter jurisdiction.\"",
"sentence": "See Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 80 U.S. 335, 357, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1871) (“[The] erroneous manner in which [the c... | 659,868 | a |
It followed a hearing at which the trial court heard evidence on whether to extend the injunctive relief sought by Morgan. See generally OCGA SS 9-11-65 (b) (setting forth procedure by which court conducts hearing to determine whether either to dissolve previously-entered ex parte temporary restraining order or to gran... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "278 Ga. 740, 741",
"parenthetical": "when determining whether order is directly appeal-able, we consider its function and substance rather than its nomenclature",
"sentence": "See Hughey v. Gwinnett County, 278 Ga. 740, 741 (1) (609 SE2d 324) (2004) (when determining whether or... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "269 Ga. 141, 142",
"parenthetical": "order granting temporary restraining order is directly appealable where it is entered after a lengthy adversary hearing and effectively grants the plaintiff all of the relief sought",
"sentence": "See Ga. Power Co. v. Hunt, 266 Ga. 331 ... | 3,807,798 | a |
It followed a hearing at which the trial court heard evidence on whether to extend the injunctive relief sought by Morgan. See generally OCGA SS 9-11-65 (b) (setting forth procedure by which court conducts hearing to determine whether either to dissolve previously-entered ex parte temporary restraining order or to gran... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "where trial court's decision effectively denied party's request for interlocutory injunctive relief, it was the equivalent to a refusal to grant an interlocutory injunction application and was therefore directly appealable under OCGA SS 5-6-34 (a",
"sente... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "269 Ga. 141, 142",
"parenthetical": "order granting temporary restraining order is directly appealable where it is entered after a lengthy adversary hearing and effectively grants the plaintiff all of the relief sought",
"sentence": "See Ga. Power Co. v. Hunt, 266 Ga. 331 ... | 3,807,798 | a |
It followed a hearing at which the trial court heard evidence on whether to extend the injunctive relief sought by Morgan. See generally OCGA SS 9-11-65 (b) (setting forth procedure by which court conducts hearing to determine whether either to dissolve previously-entered ex parte temporary restraining order or to gran... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "243 Ga. 459, 460-461",
"parenthetical": "trial court's ruling on whether to continue a restraining order was directly appealable under predecessor to OCGA SS 5-6-34 as an exception to the doctrine of finality of judgment",
"sentence": "See Ga. Power Co. v. Hunt, 266 Ga. 331 (1)... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "269 Ga. 141, 142",
"parenthetical": "order granting temporary restraining order is directly appealable where it is entered after a lengthy adversary hearing and effectively grants the plaintiff all of the relief sought",
"sentence": "See Ga. Power Co. v. Hunt, 266 Ga. 331 ... | 3,807,798 | a |
It followed a hearing at which the trial court heard evidence on whether to extend the injunctive relief sought by Morgan. See generally OCGA SS 9-11-65 (b) (setting forth procedure by which court conducts hearing to determine whether either to dissolve previously-entered ex parte temporary restraining order or to gran... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "269 Ga. 141, 142",
"parenthetical": "order granting temporary restraining order is directly appealable where it is entered after a lengthy adversary hearing and effectively grants the plaintiff all of the relief sought",
"sentence": "See Ga. Power Co. v. Hunt, 266 Ga. 331 ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "trial court's order extending temporary restraining order in effect granted directly appealable preliminary injunction",
"sentence": "See Ga. Power Co. v. Hunt, 266 Ga. 331 (1) (466 SE2d 846) (1996) (where trial court’s decision effectively denied party’s... | 3,807,798 | b |
Several other circuits have concluded that the Constitution does not require a presumption of bias in situations where jurors have been potentially prejudiced. | {
"signal": "contra",
"identifier": "551 F.2d 553, 554",
"parenthetical": "no showing of actual bias required when three jurors had been on a prior jury convicting the same defendant of a similar crime",
"sentence": "Britz v. Thieret, 940 F.2d 226, 232 (7th Cir.1991) (no per se bias when six jurors had heard ne... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "940 F.2d 226, 232",
"parenthetical": "no per se bias when six jurors had heard news accounts reporting defendant's prior conviction for the same crime and all twelve jurors had admitted some familiarity with the case",
"sentence": "Britz v. Thieret, 940 F.2d 226, 232 (7th... | 1,863,251 | b |
Several other circuits have concluded that the Constitution does not require a presumption of bias in situations where jurors have been potentially prejudiced. | {
"signal": "contra",
"identifier": "551 F.2d 553, 554",
"parenthetical": "no showing of actual bias required when three jurors had been on a prior jury convicting the same defendant of a similar crime",
"sentence": "Britz v. Thieret, 940 F.2d 226, 232 (7th Cir.1991) (no per se bias when six jurors had heard ne... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "737 F.2d 521, 534",
"parenthetical": "no per se bias when five jurors reported receiving threatening phone calls during the trial",
"sentence": "Britz v. Thieret, 940 F.2d 226, 232 (7th Cir.1991) (no per se bias when six jurors had heard news accounts reporting defendant’... | 1,863,251 | b |
Several other circuits have concluded that the Constitution does not require a presumption of bias in situations where jurors have been potentially prejudiced. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no per se bias when five jurors reported receiving threatening phone calls during the trial",
"sentence": "Britz v. Thieret, 940 F.2d 226, 232 (7th Cir.1991) (no per se bias when six jurors had heard news accounts reporting defendant’s prior convict... | {
"signal": "contra",
"identifier": "551 F.2d 553, 554",
"parenthetical": "no showing of actual bias required when three jurors had been on a prior jury convicting the same defendant of a similar crime",
"sentence": "Britz v. Thieret, 940 F.2d 226, 232 (7th Cir.1991) (no per se bias when six jurors had heard ne... | 1,863,251 | a |
Several other circuits have concluded that the Constitution does not require a presumption of bias in situations where jurors have been potentially prejudiced. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no per se bias when five jurors reported receiving threatening phone calls during the trial",
"sentence": "Britz v. Thieret, 940 F.2d 226, 232 (7th Cir.1991) (no per se bias when six jurors had heard news accounts reporting defendant’s prior convict... | {
"signal": "contra",
"identifier": "551 F.2d 553, 554",
"parenthetical": "no showing of actual bias required when three jurors had been on a prior jury convicting the same defendant of a similar crime",
"sentence": "Britz v. Thieret, 940 F.2d 226, 232 (7th Cir.1991) (no per se bias when six jurors had heard ne... | 1,863,251 | a |
Several other circuits have concluded that the Constitution does not require a presumption of bias in situations where jurors have been potentially prejudiced. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no per se bias when five jurors reported receiving threatening phone calls during the trial",
"sentence": "Britz v. Thieret, 940 F.2d 226, 232 (7th Cir.1991) (no per se bias when six jurors had heard news accounts reporting defendant’s prior convict... | {
"signal": "contra",
"identifier": "551 F.2d 553, 554",
"parenthetical": "no showing of actual bias required when three jurors had been on a prior jury convicting the same defendant of a similar crime",
"sentence": "Britz v. Thieret, 940 F.2d 226, 232 (7th Cir.1991) (no per se bias when six jurors had heard ne... | 1,863,251 | a |
Several other circuits have concluded that the Constitution does not require a presumption of bias in situations where jurors have been potentially prejudiced. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "692 F.2d 320, 325",
"parenthetical": "no per se bias when juror concealed information during voir dire about her son's affiliation with a labor union",
"sentence": "Britz v. Thieret, 940 F.2d 226, 232 (7th Cir.1991) (no per se bias when six jurors had heard news accounts ... | {
"signal": "contra",
"identifier": "551 F.2d 553, 554",
"parenthetical": "no showing of actual bias required when three jurors had been on a prior jury convicting the same defendant of a similar crime",
"sentence": "Britz v. Thieret, 940 F.2d 226, 232 (7th Cir.1991) (no per se bias when six jurors had heard ne... | 1,863,251 | a |
Several other circuits have concluded that the Constitution does not require a presumption of bias in situations where jurors have been potentially prejudiced. | {
"signal": "contra",
"identifier": "551 F.2d 553, 554",
"parenthetical": "no showing of actual bias required when three jurors had been on a prior jury convicting the same defendant of a similar crime",
"sentence": "Britz v. Thieret, 940 F.2d 226, 232 (7th Cir.1991) (no per se bias when six jurors had heard ne... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no per se bias when juror concealed information during voir dire about her son's affiliation with a labor union",
"sentence": "Britz v. Thieret, 940 F.2d 226, 232 (7th Cir.1991) (no per se bias when six jurors had heard news accounts reporting defen... | 1,863,251 | b |
Several other circuits have concluded that the Constitution does not require a presumption of bias in situations where jurors have been potentially prejudiced. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no per se bias when juror concealed information during voir dire about her son's affiliation with a labor union",
"sentence": "Britz v. Thieret, 940 F.2d 226, 232 (7th Cir.1991) (no per se bias when six jurors had heard news accounts reporting defen... | {
"signal": "contra",
"identifier": "551 F.2d 553, 554",
"parenthetical": "no showing of actual bias required when three jurors had been on a prior jury convicting the same defendant of a similar crime",
"sentence": "Britz v. Thieret, 940 F.2d 226, 232 (7th Cir.1991) (no per se bias when six jurors had heard ne... | 1,863,251 | a |
Several other circuits have concluded that the Constitution does not require a presumption of bias in situations where jurors have been potentially prejudiced. | {
"signal": "contra",
"identifier": "551 F.2d 553, 554",
"parenthetical": "no showing of actual bias required when three jurors had been on a prior jury convicting the same defendant of a similar crime",
"sentence": "Britz v. Thieret, 940 F.2d 226, 232 (7th Cir.1991) (no per se bias when six jurors had heard ne... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no per se bias when juror concealed information during voir dire about her son's affiliation with a labor union",
"sentence": "Britz v. Thieret, 940 F.2d 226, 232 (7th Cir.1991) (no per se bias when six jurors had heard news accounts reporting defen... | 1,863,251 | b |
Several other circuits have concluded that the Constitution does not require a presumption of bias in situations where jurors have been potentially prejudiced. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "673 F.2d 1185, 1190",
"parenthetical": "no per se bias when seventeen-year-old juror misstated her age during voir dire",
"sentence": "Britz v. Thieret, 940 F.2d 226, 232 (7th Cir.1991) (no per se bias when six jurors had heard news accounts reporting defendant’s prior co... | {
"signal": "contra",
"identifier": "551 F.2d 553, 554",
"parenthetical": "no showing of actual bias required when three jurors had been on a prior jury convicting the same defendant of a similar crime",
"sentence": "Britz v. Thieret, 940 F.2d 226, 232 (7th Cir.1991) (no per se bias when six jurors had heard ne... | 1,863,251 | a |
Several other circuits have concluded that the Constitution does not require a presumption of bias in situations where jurors have been potentially prejudiced. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no per se bias when seventeen-year-old juror misstated her age during voir dire",
"sentence": "Britz v. Thieret, 940 F.2d 226, 232 (7th Cir.1991) (no per se bias when six jurors had heard news accounts reporting defendant’s prior conviction for the ... | {
"signal": "contra",
"identifier": "551 F.2d 553, 554",
"parenthetical": "no showing of actual bias required when three jurors had been on a prior jury convicting the same defendant of a similar crime",
"sentence": "Britz v. Thieret, 940 F.2d 226, 232 (7th Cir.1991) (no per se bias when six jurors had heard ne... | 1,863,251 | a |
Several other circuits have concluded that the Constitution does not require a presumption of bias in situations where jurors have been potentially prejudiced. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no per se bias when seventeen-year-old juror misstated her age during voir dire",
"sentence": "Britz v. Thieret, 940 F.2d 226, 232 (7th Cir.1991) (no per se bias when six jurors had heard news accounts reporting defendant’s prior conviction for the ... | {
"signal": "contra",
"identifier": "551 F.2d 553, 554",
"parenthetical": "no showing of actual bias required when three jurors had been on a prior jury convicting the same defendant of a similar crime",
"sentence": "Britz v. Thieret, 940 F.2d 226, 232 (7th Cir.1991) (no per se bias when six jurors had heard ne... | 1,863,251 | a |
Several other circuits have concluded that the Constitution does not require a presumption of bias in situations where jurors have been potentially prejudiced. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no per se bias when seventeen-year-old juror misstated her age during voir dire",
"sentence": "Britz v. Thieret, 940 F.2d 226, 232 (7th Cir.1991) (no per se bias when six jurors had heard news accounts reporting defendant’s prior conviction for the ... | {
"signal": "contra",
"identifier": "551 F.2d 553, 554",
"parenthetical": "no showing of actual bias required when three jurors had been on a prior jury convicting the same defendant of a similar crime",
"sentence": "Britz v. Thieret, 940 F.2d 226, 232 (7th Cir.1991) (no per se bias when six jurors had heard ne... | 1,863,251 | a |
In this case, the Kays argue that the language is clear, but they further contend that the Partnership's tax sheltering purpose informs the partnership provisions and unequivocally establishes the Note partners' personal liability for calls related to the Notes. The Kays are correct in their assertion that, in order to... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "944 F.2d 747, 750",
"parenthetical": "finding that taxpayers, subchapter S shareholders, as mere guarantors of debt to corporation, were not \"at risk,\" and therefore not entitled to deductions",
"sentence": "See Pritchett v. Commissioner, 827 F.2d 644, 646^47 (9th Cir.1987) (... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that limited partner's obligation to make additional capital contributions under the partnership agreement satisfied the \"at risk\" requirement of I.R.C. SS 465",
"sentence": "See Pritchett v. Commissioner, 827 F.2d 644, 646^47 (9th Cir.1987) (fi... | 1,356,240 | b |
In this case, the Kays argue that the language is clear, but they further contend that the Partnership's tax sheltering purpose informs the partnership provisions and unequivocally establishes the Note partners' personal liability for calls related to the Notes. The Kays are correct in their assertion that, in order to... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "944 F.2d 747, 750",
"parenthetical": "finding that taxpayers, subchapter S shareholders, as mere guarantors of debt to corporation, were not \"at risk,\" and therefore not entitled to deductions",
"sentence": "See Pritchett v. Commissioner, 827 F.2d 644, 646^47 (9th Cir.1987) (... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "87 T.C. 1471, 1499-1502",
"parenthetical": "same, both under I.R.C. SS 465 and under SS 752",
"sentence": "See Pritchett v. Commissioner, 827 F.2d 644, 646^47 (9th Cir.1987) (finding that limited partner’s obligation to make additional capital contributions under the partnershi... | 1,356,240 | b |
In this case, the Kays argue that the language is clear, but they further contend that the Partnership's tax sheltering purpose informs the partnership provisions and unequivocally establishes the Note partners' personal liability for calls related to the Notes. The Kays are correct in their assertion that, in order to... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "same, both under I.R.C. SS 465 and under SS 752",
"sentence": "See Pritchett v. Commissioner, 827 F.2d 644, 646^47 (9th Cir.1987) (finding that limited partner’s obligation to make additional capital contributions under the partnership agreement satisfied... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "944 F.2d 747, 750",
"parenthetical": "finding that taxpayers, subchapter S shareholders, as mere guarantors of debt to corporation, were not \"at risk,\" and therefore not entitled to deductions",
"sentence": "See Pritchett v. Commissioner, 827 F.2d 644, 646^47 (9th Cir.1987) (... | 1,356,240 | a |
As a matter of law, we note that it is unclear whether the LRRA forbids only intended targeting of RRGs, or whether it also prohibits legislation with an unintended disparate impact. The Supreme Court has indicated that the application of disparate impact theory to a given statute's anti-discrimination provisions is a ... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "426 U.S. 229, 238-42",
"parenthetical": "finding of discrimination under Equal Protection Clause generally requires showing of invidious intent",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 292-99, 105 S.Ct. 712, 715-19, 83 L.Ed.2d 661 (1985)(considering whether ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "469 U.S. 287, 292-99",
"parenthetical": "considering whether to apply disparate impact theory to SS 504 of the Rehabilitation Act",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 292-99, 105 S.Ct. 712, 715-19, 83 L.Ed.2d 661 (1985)(considering whether to apply dispa... | 571,755 | b |
As a matter of law, we note that it is unclear whether the LRRA forbids only intended targeting of RRGs, or whether it also prohibits legislation with an unintended disparate impact. The Supreme Court has indicated that the application of disparate impact theory to a given statute's anti-discrimination provisions is a ... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "96 S.Ct. 2040, 2047-49",
"parenthetical": "finding of discrimination under Equal Protection Clause generally requires showing of invidious intent",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 292-99, 105 S.Ct. 712, 715-19, 83 L.Ed.2d 661 (1985)(considering whethe... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "469 U.S. 287, 292-99",
"parenthetical": "considering whether to apply disparate impact theory to SS 504 of the Rehabilitation Act",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 292-99, 105 S.Ct. 712, 715-19, 83 L.Ed.2d 661 (1985)(considering whether to apply dispa... | 571,755 | b |
As a matter of law, we note that it is unclear whether the LRRA forbids only intended targeting of RRGs, or whether it also prohibits legislation with an unintended disparate impact. The Supreme Court has indicated that the application of disparate impact theory to a given statute's anti-discrimination provisions is a ... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding of discrimination under Equal Protection Clause generally requires showing of invidious intent",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 292-99, 105 S.Ct. 712, 715-19, 83 L.Ed.2d 661 (1985)(considering whether to apply disparate... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "469 U.S. 287, 292-99",
"parenthetical": "considering whether to apply disparate impact theory to SS 504 of the Rehabilitation Act",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 292-99, 105 S.Ct. 712, 715-19, 83 L.Ed.2d 661 (1985)(considering whether to apply dispa... | 571,755 | b |
As a matter of law, we note that it is unclear whether the LRRA forbids only intended targeting of RRGs, or whether it also prohibits legislation with an unintended disparate impact. The Supreme Court has indicated that the application of disparate impact theory to a given statute's anti-discrimination provisions is a ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "105 S.Ct. 712, 715-19",
"parenthetical": "considering whether to apply disparate impact theory to SS 504 of the Rehabilitation Act",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 292-99, 105 S.Ct. 712, 715-19, 83 L.Ed.2d 661 (1985)(considering whether to apply disp... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "426 U.S. 229, 238-42",
"parenthetical": "finding of discrimination under Equal Protection Clause generally requires showing of invidious intent",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 292-99, 105 S.Ct. 712, 715-19, 83 L.Ed.2d 661 (1985)(considering whether ... | 571,755 | a |
As a matter of law, we note that it is unclear whether the LRRA forbids only intended targeting of RRGs, or whether it also prohibits legislation with an unintended disparate impact. The Supreme Court has indicated that the application of disparate impact theory to a given statute's anti-discrimination provisions is a ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "105 S.Ct. 712, 715-19",
"parenthetical": "considering whether to apply disparate impact theory to SS 504 of the Rehabilitation Act",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 292-99, 105 S.Ct. 712, 715-19, 83 L.Ed.2d 661 (1985)(considering whether to apply disp... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "96 S.Ct. 2040, 2047-49",
"parenthetical": "finding of discrimination under Equal Protection Clause generally requires showing of invidious intent",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 292-99, 105 S.Ct. 712, 715-19, 83 L.Ed.2d 661 (1985)(considering whethe... | 571,755 | a |
As a matter of law, we note that it is unclear whether the LRRA forbids only intended targeting of RRGs, or whether it also prohibits legislation with an unintended disparate impact. The Supreme Court has indicated that the application of disparate impact theory to a given statute's anti-discrimination provisions is a ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "105 S.Ct. 712, 715-19",
"parenthetical": "considering whether to apply disparate impact theory to SS 504 of the Rehabilitation Act",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 292-99, 105 S.Ct. 712, 715-19, 83 L.Ed.2d 661 (1985)(considering whether to apply disp... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding of discrimination under Equal Protection Clause generally requires showing of invidious intent",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 292-99, 105 S.Ct. 712, 715-19, 83 L.Ed.2d 661 (1985)(considering whether to apply disparate... | 571,755 | a |
As a matter of law, we note that it is unclear whether the LRRA forbids only intended targeting of RRGs, or whether it also prohibits legislation with an unintended disparate impact. The Supreme Court has indicated that the application of disparate impact theory to a given statute's anti-discrimination provisions is a ... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "426 U.S. 229, 238-42",
"parenthetical": "finding of discrimination under Equal Protection Clause generally requires showing of invidious intent",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 292-99, 105 S.Ct. 712, 715-19, 83 L.Ed.2d 661 (1985)(considering whether ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "considering whether to apply disparate impact theory to SS 504 of the Rehabilitation Act",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 292-99, 105 S.Ct. 712, 715-19, 83 L.Ed.2d 661 (1985)(considering whether to apply disparate impact theory... | 571,755 | b |
As a matter of law, we note that it is unclear whether the LRRA forbids only intended targeting of RRGs, or whether it also prohibits legislation with an unintended disparate impact. The Supreme Court has indicated that the application of disparate impact theory to a given statute's anti-discrimination provisions is a ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "considering whether to apply disparate impact theory to SS 504 of the Rehabilitation Act",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 292-99, 105 S.Ct. 712, 715-19, 83 L.Ed.2d 661 (1985)(considering whether to apply disparate impact theory... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "96 S.Ct. 2040, 2047-49",
"parenthetical": "finding of discrimination under Equal Protection Clause generally requires showing of invidious intent",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 292-99, 105 S.Ct. 712, 715-19, 83 L.Ed.2d 661 (1985)(considering whethe... | 571,755 | a |
As a matter of law, we note that it is unclear whether the LRRA forbids only intended targeting of RRGs, or whether it also prohibits legislation with an unintended disparate impact. The Supreme Court has indicated that the application of disparate impact theory to a given statute's anti-discrimination provisions is a ... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding of discrimination under Equal Protection Clause generally requires showing of invidious intent",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 292-99, 105 S.Ct. 712, 715-19, 83 L.Ed.2d 661 (1985)(considering whether to apply disparate... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "considering whether to apply disparate impact theory to SS 504 of the Rehabilitation Act",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 292-99, 105 S.Ct. 712, 715-19, 83 L.Ed.2d 661 (1985)(considering whether to apply disparate impact theory... | 571,755 | b |
In light of the court's conclusion that plaintiffs showed a likelihood of success on the merits of their claim pursuant to the RFRA, the court will refrain from addressing plaintiffs' claims pursuant to the Free Exercise Clause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "where the court found that the plaintiffs had made a showing of likelihood of success on the merits under the RFRA, as well as strong showings with respect to the other preliminary injunction requirements, it only addressed the merits of the RFRA claim",
... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "acknowledging the \"ordinary rule that a federal court should not decide federal constitutional questions where a dispositive nonconstitutional ground is available\"",
"sentence": "Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 546 n. 12, 547, 94 S.Ct. 1372, 39 L.... | 4,224,672 | b |
In light of the court's conclusion that plaintiffs showed a likelihood of success on the merits of their claim pursuant to the RFRA, the court will refrain from addressing plaintiffs' claims pursuant to the Free Exercise Clause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "where the court found that the plaintiffs had made a showing of likelihood of success on the merits under the RFRA, as well as strong showings with respect to the other preliminary injunction requirements, it only addressed the merits of the RFRA claim",
... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "acknowledging the \"ordinary rule that a federal court should not decide federal constitutional questions where a dispositive nonconstitutional ground is available\"",
"sentence": "Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 546 n. 12, 547, 94 S.Ct. 1372, 39 L.... | 4,224,672 | b |
In light of the court's conclusion that plaintiffs showed a likelihood of success on the merits of their claim pursuant to the RFRA, the court will refrain from addressing plaintiffs' claims pursuant to the Free Exercise Clause. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "acknowledging the \"ordinary rule that a federal court should not decide federal constitutional questions where a dispositive nonconstitutional ground is available\"",
"sentence": "Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 546 n. 12, 547, 94 S.Ct. 1372, 39 L.... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "where the court found that the plaintiffs had made a showing of likelihood of success on the merits under the RFRA, as well as strong showings with respect to the other preliminary injunction requirements, it only addressed the merits of the RFRA claim",
... | 4,224,672 | a |
Second, the trial court compounded its error by resentencing Thompson in reliance upon the transcript from the August 26, 2016, hearing at which both Thompson and his counsel were absent. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "38 So.3d 827, 828",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]here a defendant is denied counsel during a resentencing hearing held to correct a judicial error, the trial court commits fundamental error.\"",
"sentence": "See Payne v. State, 38 So.3d 827, 828 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (“[W]here a defend... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "76 So.3d 1103, 1104",
"parenthetical": "stating that full panoply of due process considerations apply at resen-tencing, including appointment of counsel",
"sentence": "See Payne v. State, 38 So.3d 827, 828 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (“[W]here a defendant is denied counsel during ... | 12,360,888 | a |
Second, the trial court compounded its error by resentencing Thompson in reliance upon the transcript from the August 26, 2016, hearing at which both Thompson and his counsel were absent. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "997 So.2d 443, 445",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he defendant has the right to be present and have assistance of counsel at the new sentencing hearing.\"",
"sentence": "See Payne v. State, 38 So.3d 827, 828 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (“[W]here a defendant is denied counsel during a re... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "38 So.3d 827, 828",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]here a defendant is denied counsel during a resentencing hearing held to correct a judicial error, the trial court commits fundamental error.\"",
"sentence": "See Payne v. State, 38 So.3d 827, 828 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (“[W]here a defend... | 12,360,888 | b |
Also, just as in Mastrobuono, the parties here entered into an agreement in which, without the choice-of-law provision, the FAA rule would apply. Finally, also as in Mastrobuono, the clause does not unequivocally suggest an intent to displace the default federal standard. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "257 F.3d 294, 294-95",
"parenthetical": "drawing the same conclusion about the choice-of-law clause in that case based on Mastrobuono's language",
"sentence": "See id. at 62, 115 S.Ct. 1212 (“At most, the choice-of-law provision introduces an ambiguity into an arbitration ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"At most, the choice-of-law provision introduces an ambiguity into an arbitration agreement that would otherwise allow punitive damages awards.\"",
"sentence": "See id. at 62, 115 S.Ct. 1212 (“At most, the choice-of-law provision introduces an ambiguity ... | 9,174,434 | b |
1 36 Given the dynamic nature of the state law-making process, we assume, absent a contrary indication, that the legislature intends its statutes to work in tandem with our case law, and we reconcile the common law with statutory law whenever possible. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2002 UT 36, ¶ 10",
"parenthetical": "\"[The common law must necessarily give way\" to statutory law only when the two are \"in conflict\" or when the legislature intended to preempt the common law.",
"sentence": "See Olseth v. Larson, 2007 UT 29, ¶ 39, 158 P.3d 532 (\"We p... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2007 UT 29, ¶ 39",
"parenthetical": "\"We presume the Legislature is aware of our case law. ...\"",
"sentence": "See Olseth v. Larson, 2007 UT 29, ¶ 39, 158 P.3d 532 (\"We presume the Legislature is aware of our case law. ...\"); see also Bishop, 2002 UT 36, ¶ 10, 48 P.3d 218 (... | 6,971,161 | b |
1 36 Given the dynamic nature of the state law-making process, we assume, absent a contrary indication, that the legislature intends its statutes to work in tandem with our case law, and we reconcile the common law with statutory law whenever possible. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2007 UT 29, ¶ 39",
"parenthetical": "\"We presume the Legislature is aware of our case law. ...\"",
"sentence": "See Olseth v. Larson, 2007 UT 29, ¶ 39, 158 P.3d 532 (\"We presume the Legislature is aware of our case law. ...\"); see also Bishop, 2002 UT 36, ¶ 10, 48 P.3d 218 (... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[The common law must necessarily give way\" to statutory law only when the two are \"in conflict\" or when the legislature intended to preempt the common law.",
"sentence": "See Olseth v. Larson, 2007 UT 29, ¶ 39, 158 P.3d 532 (\"We presume the Leg... | 6,971,161 | a |
1 36 Given the dynamic nature of the state law-making process, we assume, absent a contrary indication, that the legislature intends its statutes to work in tandem with our case law, and we reconcile the common law with statutory law whenever possible. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2002 UT 36, ¶ 10",
"parenthetical": "\"[The common law must necessarily give way\" to statutory law only when the two are \"in conflict\" or when the legislature intended to preempt the common law.",
"sentence": "See Olseth v. Larson, 2007 UT 29, ¶ 39, 158 P.3d 532 (\"We p... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"We presume the Legislature is aware of our case law. ...\"",
"sentence": "See Olseth v. Larson, 2007 UT 29, ¶ 39, 158 P.3d 532 (\"We presume the Legislature is aware of our case law. ...\"); see also Bishop, 2002 UT 36, ¶ 10, 48 P.3d 218 (\"[The common ... | 6,971,161 | b |
1 36 Given the dynamic nature of the state law-making process, we assume, absent a contrary indication, that the legislature intends its statutes to work in tandem with our case law, and we reconcile the common law with statutory law whenever possible. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[The common law must necessarily give way\" to statutory law only when the two are \"in conflict\" or when the legislature intended to preempt the common law.",
"sentence": "See Olseth v. Larson, 2007 UT 29, ¶ 39, 158 P.3d 532 (\"We presume the Leg... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"We presume the Legislature is aware of our case law. ...\"",
"sentence": "See Olseth v. Larson, 2007 UT 29, ¶ 39, 158 P.3d 532 (\"We presume the Legislature is aware of our case law. ...\"); see also Bishop, 2002 UT 36, ¶ 10, 48 P.3d 218 (\"[The common ... | 6,971,161 | b |
Although the government argues that the "frisk" did not begin until Officer Harvey patted down the outside of Johnson's clothing, it has provided no authority to support its position, and I have found scant support. Furthermore, our prior cases suggest that the frisk began, at the latest, when Officer Harvey manipulate... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "649 A.2d 1082, 1087",
"parenthetical": "finding that factors that manifested themselves after the suspect was ordered to assume the position and after the decision to frisk had been made should not have been included in the reasonable suspicion determination",
"sentence": "See ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "187 F.3d 663, 670",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e assess a Terry search from the standpoint of the moment of the stop ... not from the subsequent period in which the officer begins to take protective measures.\"",
"sentence": "See Jackson v. United States, 805 A.2d 979, 987 (D.... | 7,268,183 | a |
As discussed above, making false or misleading statements about medical devices is prohibited by federal law. This means that Schouest's state law fraud claims based on false off-label promotion would, if proven, also amount to a violation of federal law, and thus such claims could survive preemption. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "957 F.Supp.2d 1179, 1179-80",
"parenthetical": "holding that state fraud-based claims \"are parallel or `genuinely equivalent' to federal law\"",
"sentence": "See Houston, 957 F.Supp.2d at 1179-80 (holding that state fraud-based claims \"are parallel or `genuinely equivalent' t... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "590 F.Supp.2d 1282, 1292",
"parenthetical": "observing in fraud case based on drug manufacturer's alleged misrepresentations that \"insofar as Plaintiffs can identify specific representations by Defendants that are literally false, misleading, or contain material omissions, the c... | 4,220,477 | a |
See Tex.Crim. Nevertheless, where a trial judge imposes an "invalid" condition, "the proper remedy is to reform the judgment of conviction by deleting the condition." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "842 S.W.2d 284, 285",
"parenthetical": "holding trial court lacked authority to impose electronic monitoring condition, and deleting the provision as a condition of applicant's deferred adjudication probation",
"sentence": "Ex parte Pena, 789 S.W.2d 50, 51 (Tex.Crim.App.19... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "789 S.W.2d 50, 51",
"parenthetical": "deleting condition where trial judge was without lawful authority to impose jail time as condition of probation",
"sentence": "Ex parte Pena, 789 S.W.2d 50, 51 (Tex.Crim.App.1987) (deleting condition where trial judge was without lawf... | 11,519,195 | b |
See Tex.Crim. Nevertheless, where a trial judge imposes an "invalid" condition, "the proper remedy is to reform the judgment of conviction by deleting the condition." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "789 S.W.2d 50, 51",
"parenthetical": "deleting condition where trial judge was without lawful authority to impose jail time as condition of probation",
"sentence": "Ex parte Pena, 789 S.W.2d 50, 51 (Tex.Crim.App.1987) (deleting condition where trial judge was without lawf... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "465 S.W.2d 157, 158-59",
"parenthetical": "holding that trial judge was not authorized to impose jail time as condition of probation, and deleting the 90 day jail penalty",
"sentence": "Ex parte Pena, 789 S.W.2d 50, 51 (Tex.Crim.App.1987) (deleting condition where trial ju... | 11,519,195 | a |
"A primary purpose of ERISA is to ensure the integrity and primacy of the written plans ... [so that] the plain language of an ERISA plan should be given its literal and natural meaning." Against this plain legislative purpose, if the ERISA plan expressly provides that its members are obligated to reimburse the plan fo... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "78 F.3d 127, 127",
"parenthetical": "\" 'Enrichment is not \"unjust\" where it is allowed by the express terms of the ... plan.' \"",
"sentence": "See Ryan, 78 F.3d at 127 (\" 'Enrichment is not \"unjust” where it is allowed by the express terms of the ... plan.' \") (citation ... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "139 F.3d 1072, 1072",
"parenthetical": "noting that defendant \"has not identified to this Court that application of a set-off under a[n] equitable common fund doctrine would advance any explicit statutory purpose of ERISA\"",
"sentence": "See Ryan, 78 F.3d at 127 (\" 'Enrichme... | 9,497,798 | a |
The Court will not require either of these measures. In camera review is not required where the Court is satisfied that the agency has adequately supported their exemption claims. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "999 F.2d 1311, 1311",
"parenthetical": "error to require agency to provide Vaughn index detailing documents withheld when the basis for exemption was law enforcement purposes",
"sentence": "In re DOJ, 999 F.2d at 1311 (error to require agency to provide Vaughn index detai... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "618 F.2d 1273, 1273-74",
"parenthetical": "holding that no Vaughn index would be required since the record clearly demonstrated that the FOIA requestor was subject to an ongoing law enforcement investigation",
"sentence": "In re DOJ, 999 F.2d at 1311 (error to require agen... | 4,283,204 | a |
What "fairly concrete" means is not clear. However, the district court clearly did not define "property" in general, or "indirect economic benefit" in particular, only in terms of legal or equitable rights or ownership interest. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "183 B.R. 247, 247",
"parenthetical": "noting that tithing does not give debtors enforceable property right, contract right or equitable right to attend or partake in services offered by church",
"sentence": "Compare 148 B.R. at 891 (bankruptcy court arguably limited “property” ... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "148 B.R. 891, 891",
"parenthetical": "bankruptcy court arguably limited \"property\" to legal or equitable rights and things subject to ownership",
"sentence": "Compare 148 B.R. at 891 (bankruptcy court arguably limited “property” to legal or equitable rights and things s... | 7,647,618 | b |
Service in this fashion is expressly authorized by Bankruptcy Rule 7004(b)(9). Hammer initiated these proceedings by filing his petition, and it was his responsibility to apprise the bankruptcy court of his forwarding address. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "770 F.2d 815, 815",
"parenthetical": "affirming default judgment where defendant foreign corporation failed to provide correct address to state licensing authority",
"sentence": "See Pena, 770 F.2d at 815 (affirming default judgment where defendant foreign corporation failed to... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "122 B.R. 56, 59",
"parenthetical": "holding service not defective where debtor had failed to notify court of his new address",
"sentence": "See Pena, 770 F.2d at 815 (affirming default judgment where defendant foreign corporation failed to provide correct address to state ... | 12,257,661 | a |
Even so, I do not believe that a simple statement that the court would have imposed the same sentence is sufficient, at least where the imposed sentence exceeds what would have been the Guidelines range absent the procedural error. The district court's explanation fails to distinguish its reasons for a within-Guideline... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "522 F.3d 1108, 1117",
"parenthetical": "\"Indeed, it is hard for us to imagine a case where it would be procedurally reasonable for a district court to announce that the same sentence would apply even if. correct guidelines calculations are so substantially different, withou... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "560 F.3d 660, 667",
"parenthetical": "Guidelines error harmless because district court's alternative sentence provided \"detailed explanation of the basis for the parallel result\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Zabielski, 711 F.3d 381, 389 (3d Cir.2013) (“Though probative... | 4,066,243 | b |
. Reading Brown-Forman's proscription against the "direct regulation" of "interstate" commerce in context, it is clear that the Court had in its sights the regulation of extraterrito rial conduct. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "476 U.S. 579, 579-84",
"parenthetical": "examining whether the challenged statute \"regulates commerce in other States\"",
"sentence": "See Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 579-84, 106 S.Ct. 2080 (examining whether the challenged statute \"regulates commerce in other States”); see als... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "491 U.S. 332, 332",
"parenthetical": "explaining that BrownForman \"reaffirm[ed] and elaborated] on our established view that a state law that has the 'practical effect' of regulating commerce occurring wholly outside that State's borders is invalid under the Commerce Clause... | 4,280,963 | a |
. Reading Brown-Forman's proscription against the "direct regulation" of "interstate" commerce in context, it is clear that the Court had in its sights the regulation of extraterrito rial conduct. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "explaining that BrownForman \"reaffirm[ed] and elaborated] on our established view that a state law that has the 'practical effect' of regulating commerce occurring wholly outside that State's borders is invalid under the Commerce Clause\"",
"sentenc... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "476 U.S. 579, 579-84",
"parenthetical": "examining whether the challenged statute \"regulates commerce in other States\"",
"sentence": "See Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 579-84, 106 S.Ct. 2080 (examining whether the challenged statute \"regulates commerce in other States”); see als... | 4,280,963 | b |
. Reading Brown-Forman's proscription against the "direct regulation" of "interstate" commerce in context, it is clear that the Court had in its sights the regulation of extraterrito rial conduct. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "examining whether the challenged statute \"regulates commerce in other States\"",
"sentence": "See Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 579-84, 106 S.Ct. 2080 (examining whether the challenged statute \"regulates commerce in other States”); see also Healy, 491 U.S. ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "491 U.S. 332, 332",
"parenthetical": "explaining that BrownForman \"reaffirm[ed] and elaborated] on our established view that a state law that has the 'practical effect' of regulating commerce occurring wholly outside that State's borders is invalid under the Commerce Clause... | 4,280,963 | a |
. Reading Brown-Forman's proscription against the "direct regulation" of "interstate" commerce in context, it is clear that the Court had in its sights the regulation of extraterrito rial conduct. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "examining whether the challenged statute \"regulates commerce in other States\"",
"sentence": "See Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 579-84, 106 S.Ct. 2080 (examining whether the challenged statute \"regulates commerce in other States”); see also Healy, 491 U.S. ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "explaining that BrownForman \"reaffirm[ed] and elaborated] on our established view that a state law that has the 'practical effect' of regulating commerce occurring wholly outside that State's borders is invalid under the Commerce Clause\"",
"sentenc... | 4,280,963 | a |
As stated above, the putative spouse doctrine protects "innocent parties who believe they were validly married." "[A] proper assertion of putative spouse status must rest on facts that would cause a reasonable person to harbor a good faith belief in the existence of a lawful California marriage." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "56 Cal. 4th 1126, 1126",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] finding of whether a party's belief was genuinely held in good faith will be informed, in part, by whether that party was aware of facts that were inconsistent -with a rational belief in the validity or lawfulness of a marriag... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "202 Cal. App. 3d 712, 722-23",
"parenthetical": "\"the requisite belief is in a lawful marriage, that is to say, a marriage which complies with statutory requirements\"",
"sentence": "Welch v. State, 83 Cal. App. 4th 1374, 1378, 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 430 (2000) (emphasis in ori... | 12,419,137 | b |
As stated above, the putative spouse doctrine protects "innocent parties who believe they were validly married." "[A] proper assertion of putative spouse status must rest on facts that would cause a reasonable person to harbor a good faith belief in the existence of a lawful California marriage." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] finding of whether a party's belief was genuinely held in good faith will be informed, in part, by whether that party was aware of facts that were inconsistent -with a rational belief in the validity or lawfulness of a marriage.\"",
"sentence":... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "202 Cal. App. 3d 712, 722-23",
"parenthetical": "\"the requisite belief is in a lawful marriage, that is to say, a marriage which complies with statutory requirements\"",
"sentence": "Welch v. State, 83 Cal. App. 4th 1374, 1378, 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 430 (2000) (emphasis in ori... | 12,419,137 | b |
As stated above, the putative spouse doctrine protects "innocent parties who believe they were validly married." "[A] proper assertion of putative spouse status must rest on facts that would cause a reasonable person to harbor a good faith belief in the existence of a lawful California marriage." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] finding of whether a party's belief was genuinely held in good faith will be informed, in part, by whether that party was aware of facts that were inconsistent -with a rational belief in the validity or lawfulness of a marriage.\"",
"sentence":... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "202 Cal. App. 3d 712, 722-23",
"parenthetical": "\"the requisite belief is in a lawful marriage, that is to say, a marriage which complies with statutory requirements\"",
"sentence": "Welch v. State, 83 Cal. App. 4th 1374, 1378, 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 430 (2000) (emphasis in ori... | 12,419,137 | b |
As stated above, the putative spouse doctrine protects "innocent parties who believe they were validly married." "[A] proper assertion of putative spouse status must rest on facts that would cause a reasonable person to harbor a good faith belief in the existence of a lawful California marriage." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "202 Cal. App. 3d 712, 722-23",
"parenthetical": "\"the requisite belief is in a lawful marriage, that is to say, a marriage which complies with statutory requirements\"",
"sentence": "Welch v. State, 83 Cal. App. 4th 1374, 1378, 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 430 (2000) (emphasis in ori... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] finding of whether a party's belief was genuinely held in good faith will be informed, in part, by whether that party was aware of facts that were inconsistent -with a rational belief in the validity or lawfulness of a marriage.\"",
"sentence":... | 12,419,137 | a |
As stated above, the putative spouse doctrine protects "innocent parties who believe they were validly married." "[A] proper assertion of putative spouse status must rest on facts that would cause a reasonable person to harbor a good faith belief in the existence of a lawful California marriage." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] finding of whether a party's belief was genuinely held in good faith will be informed, in part, by whether that party was aware of facts that were inconsistent -with a rational belief in the validity or lawfulness of a marriage.\"",
"sentence":... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "202 Cal. App. 3d 712, 722-23",
"parenthetical": "\"the requisite belief is in a lawful marriage, that is to say, a marriage which complies with statutory requirements\"",
"sentence": "Welch v. State, 83 Cal. App. 4th 1374, 1378, 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 430 (2000) (emphasis in ori... | 12,419,137 | b |
As stated above, the putative spouse doctrine protects "innocent parties who believe they were validly married." "[A] proper assertion of putative spouse status must rest on facts that would cause a reasonable person to harbor a good faith belief in the existence of a lawful California marriage." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "56 Cal. 4th 1126, 1126",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] finding of whether a party's belief was genuinely held in good faith will be informed, in part, by whether that party was aware of facts that were inconsistent -with a rational belief in the validity or lawfulness of a marriag... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"the requisite belief is in a lawful marriage, that is to say, a marriage which complies with statutory requirements\"",
"sentence": "Welch v. State, 83 Cal. App. 4th 1374, 1378, 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 430 (2000) (emphasis in original); In re Marriage of ... | 12,419,137 | b |
As stated above, the putative spouse doctrine protects "innocent parties who believe they were validly married." "[A] proper assertion of putative spouse status must rest on facts that would cause a reasonable person to harbor a good faith belief in the existence of a lawful California marriage." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"the requisite belief is in a lawful marriage, that is to say, a marriage which complies with statutory requirements\"",
"sentence": "Welch v. State, 83 Cal. App. 4th 1374, 1378, 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 430 (2000) (emphasis in original); In re Marriage of ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] finding of whether a party's belief was genuinely held in good faith will be informed, in part, by whether that party was aware of facts that were inconsistent -with a rational belief in the validity or lawfulness of a marriage.\"",
"sentence":... | 12,419,137 | a |
As stated above, the putative spouse doctrine protects "innocent parties who believe they were validly married." "[A] proper assertion of putative spouse status must rest on facts that would cause a reasonable person to harbor a good faith belief in the existence of a lawful California marriage." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"the requisite belief is in a lawful marriage, that is to say, a marriage which complies with statutory requirements\"",
"sentence": "Welch v. State, 83 Cal. App. 4th 1374, 1378, 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 430 (2000) (emphasis in original); In re Marriage of ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] finding of whether a party's belief was genuinely held in good faith will be informed, in part, by whether that party was aware of facts that were inconsistent -with a rational belief in the validity or lawfulness of a marriage.\"",
"sentence":... | 12,419,137 | a |
As stated above, the putative spouse doctrine protects "innocent parties who believe they were validly married." "[A] proper assertion of putative spouse status must rest on facts that would cause a reasonable person to harbor a good faith belief in the existence of a lawful California marriage." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"the requisite belief is in a lawful marriage, that is to say, a marriage which complies with statutory requirements\"",
"sentence": "Welch v. State, 83 Cal. App. 4th 1374, 1378, 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 430 (2000) (emphasis in original); In re Marriage of ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] finding of whether a party's belief was genuinely held in good faith will be informed, in part, by whether that party was aware of facts that were inconsistent -with a rational belief in the validity or lawfulness of a marriage.\"",
"sentence":... | 12,419,137 | a |
As stated above, the putative spouse doctrine protects "innocent parties who believe they were validly married." "[A] proper assertion of putative spouse status must rest on facts that would cause a reasonable person to harbor a good faith belief in the existence of a lawful California marriage." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"the requisite belief is in a lawful marriage, that is to say, a marriage which complies with statutory requirements\"",
"sentence": "Welch v. State, 83 Cal. App. 4th 1374, 1378, 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 430 (2000) (emphasis in original); In re Marriage of ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] finding of whether a party's belief was genuinely held in good faith will be informed, in part, by whether that party was aware of facts that were inconsistent -with a rational belief in the validity or lawfulness of a marriage.\"",
"sentence":... | 12,419,137 | a |
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