context stringlengths 58 1.13k | citation_a dict | citation_b dict | case_id int64 475 12.5M | label stringclasses 2
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. While, guilty pleas of a co-defendant cannot be used to establish the guilt of the defendant on trial, we are cognizant that the Commonwealth is permitted to bring out the circumstances surrounding a witness' agreement on direct examination in order to avoid any inference by the jury that the Commonwealth is attempti... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "434 Pa. 167, 170",
"parenthetical": "where a witness is under indictment for the same crime for which the defendant is being tried, evidence of witness' indictment is relevant as bearing on the witness's interest in the immediate matter",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Ross, ... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Commonwealth agreements should be fully, fairly and honestly disclosed at trial because they have a significant bearing on a witness' motive for testifying",
"sentence": "Commonwealth v. Hartey, 424 Pa.Super. 29, 34, 621 A.2d 1023, 1026 (1993), appe... | 7,862,136 | b |
. While, guilty pleas of a co-defendant cannot be used to establish the guilt of the defendant on trial, we are cognizant that the Commonwealth is permitted to bring out the circumstances surrounding a witness' agreement on direct examination in order to avoid any inference by the jury that the Commonwealth is attempti... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Commonwealth agreements should be fully, fairly and honestly disclosed at trial because they have a significant bearing on a witness' motive for testifying",
"sentence": "Commonwealth v. Hartey, 424 Pa.Super. 29, 34, 621 A.2d 1023, 1026 (1993), appe... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "252 A.2d 661, 662",
"parenthetical": "where a witness is under indictment for the same crime for which the defendant is being tried, evidence of witness' indictment is relevant as bearing on the witness's interest in the immediate matter",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Ross,... | 7,862,136 | a |
. While, guilty pleas of a co-defendant cannot be used to establish the guilt of the defendant on trial, we are cognizant that the Commonwealth is permitted to bring out the circumstances surrounding a witness' agreement on direct examination in order to avoid any inference by the jury that the Commonwealth is attempti... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a witness who is under indictment for the same crime involved in a case in which he is testifying may be cross-examined about that indictment in order to allow the jury to evaluate whether witness testified for prosecution to gain favorable treatment in his... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Commonwealth agreements should be fully, fairly and honestly disclosed at trial because they have a significant bearing on a witness' motive for testifying",
"sentence": "Commonwealth v. Hartey, 424 Pa.Super. 29, 34, 621 A.2d 1023, 1026 (1993), appe... | 7,862,136 | b |
. While, guilty pleas of a co-defendant cannot be used to establish the guilt of the defendant on trial, we are cognizant that the Commonwealth is permitted to bring out the circumstances surrounding a witness' agreement on direct examination in order to avoid any inference by the jury that the Commonwealth is attempti... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "311 A.2d 896, 898",
"parenthetical": "a witness who is under indictment for the same crime involved in a case in which he is testifying may be cross-examined about that indictment in order to allow the jury to evaluate whether witness testified for prosecution to gain favorable t... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Commonwealth agreements should be fully, fairly and honestly disclosed at trial because they have a significant bearing on a witness' motive for testifying",
"sentence": "Commonwealth v. Hartey, 424 Pa.Super. 29, 34, 621 A.2d 1023, 1026 (1993), appe... | 7,862,136 | b |
. While, guilty pleas of a co-defendant cannot be used to establish the guilt of the defendant on trial, we are cognizant that the Commonwealth is permitted to bring out the circumstances surrounding a witness' agreement on direct examination in order to avoid any inference by the jury that the Commonwealth is attempti... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "434 Pa. 167, 170",
"parenthetical": "where a witness is under indictment for the same crime for which the defendant is being tried, evidence of witness' indictment is relevant as bearing on the witness's interest in the immediate matter",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Ross, ... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Commonwealth agreements should be fully, fairly and honestly disclosed at trial because they have a significant bearing on a witness' motive for testifying",
"sentence": "Commonwealth v. Hartey, 424 Pa.Super. 29, 34, 621 A.2d 1023, 1026 (1993), appe... | 7,862,136 | b |
. While, guilty pleas of a co-defendant cannot be used to establish the guilt of the defendant on trial, we are cognizant that the Commonwealth is permitted to bring out the circumstances surrounding a witness' agreement on direct examination in order to avoid any inference by the jury that the Commonwealth is attempti... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "252 A.2d 661, 662",
"parenthetical": "where a witness is under indictment for the same crime for which the defendant is being tried, evidence of witness' indictment is relevant as bearing on the witness's interest in the immediate matter",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Ross,... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Commonwealth agreements should be fully, fairly and honestly disclosed at trial because they have a significant bearing on a witness' motive for testifying",
"sentence": "Commonwealth v. Hartey, 424 Pa.Super. 29, 34, 621 A.2d 1023, 1026 (1993), appe... | 7,862,136 | b |
. While, guilty pleas of a co-defendant cannot be used to establish the guilt of the defendant on trial, we are cognizant that the Commonwealth is permitted to bring out the circumstances surrounding a witness' agreement on direct examination in order to avoid any inference by the jury that the Commonwealth is attempti... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a witness who is under indictment for the same crime involved in a case in which he is testifying may be cross-examined about that indictment in order to allow the jury to evaluate whether witness testified for prosecution to gain favorable treatment in his... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Commonwealth agreements should be fully, fairly and honestly disclosed at trial because they have a significant bearing on a witness' motive for testifying",
"sentence": "Commonwealth v. Hartey, 424 Pa.Super. 29, 34, 621 A.2d 1023, 1026 (1993), appe... | 7,862,136 | b |
. While, guilty pleas of a co-defendant cannot be used to establish the guilt of the defendant on trial, we are cognizant that the Commonwealth is permitted to bring out the circumstances surrounding a witness' agreement on direct examination in order to avoid any inference by the jury that the Commonwealth is attempti... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Commonwealth agreements should be fully, fairly and honestly disclosed at trial because they have a significant bearing on a witness' motive for testifying",
"sentence": "Commonwealth v. Hartey, 424 Pa.Super. 29, 34, 621 A.2d 1023, 1026 (1993), appe... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "311 A.2d 896, 898",
"parenthetical": "a witness who is under indictment for the same crime involved in a case in which he is testifying may be cross-examined about that indictment in order to allow the jury to evaluate whether witness testified for prosecution to gain favorable t... | 7,862,136 | a |
Analyzing specific tort duties in these 52 jurisdictions and then comparing them to federal labeling requirements would be onerous, and it is unnecessary. Tort law in particular jurisdictions may or may not require Defendant to change statements regarding efficacy in Lipitor's label, based on the ASCOT data. It is suff... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "727 F.3d 1273, 1286",
"parenthetical": "\"[S]tate tort law is preempted if it imposes a duty upon manufacturers to take some action that is prohibited under federal law.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Schrock v. Wyeth, Inc., 727 F.3d 1273, 1286 (10th Cir.2013) (“[S]tate tort law i... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "741 F.3d 470, 478",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"even if such claims are cognizable [under state law], they are preempted in the case of generic drug manufacturers.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Schrock v. Wyeth, Inc., 727 F.3d 1273, 1286 (10th Cir.2013) (“[S]tate tort l... | 12,133,527 | a |
Further, they admit that they did not raise their dedication claim until after trial, and simply labeled it an implied-easement claim. Although they suggest a new theory of Idaho law, they cite nothing but contrary public-dedication eases without articulating why those decisions would allow a private dedication in this... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "142 Idaho 635, 639",
"parenthetical": "reversing a fee award where some novel legal defenses were not frivolous",
"sentence": "See Partout v. Harper, 145 Idaho 683, 689, 183 P.3d 771, 777 (2008) (affirming a fee award where a party’s position on a purportedly unsettled legal is... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "145 Idaho 683, 689",
"parenthetical": "affirming a fee award where a party's position on a purportedly unsettled legal issue was against the clear weight of Idaho law",
"sentence": "See Partout v. Harper, 145 Idaho 683, 689, 183 P.3d 771, 777 (2008) (affirming a fee award where... | 4,078,409 | b |
Further, they admit that they did not raise their dedication claim until after trial, and simply labeled it an implied-easement claim. Although they suggest a new theory of Idaho law, they cite nothing but contrary public-dedication eases without articulating why those decisions would allow a private dedication in this... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "145 Idaho 683, 689",
"parenthetical": "affirming a fee award where a party's position on a purportedly unsettled legal issue was against the clear weight of Idaho law",
"sentence": "See Partout v. Harper, 145 Idaho 683, 689, 183 P.3d 771, 777 (2008) (affirming a fee award where... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "132 P.3d 392, 396",
"parenthetical": "reversing a fee award where some novel legal defenses were not frivolous",
"sentence": "See Partout v. Harper, 145 Idaho 683, 689, 183 P.3d 771, 777 (2008) (affirming a fee award where a party’s position on a purportedly unsettled legal iss... | 4,078,409 | a |
Further, they admit that they did not raise their dedication claim until after trial, and simply labeled it an implied-easement claim. Although they suggest a new theory of Idaho law, they cite nothing but contrary public-dedication eases without articulating why those decisions would allow a private dedication in this... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "142 Idaho 635, 639",
"parenthetical": "reversing a fee award where some novel legal defenses were not frivolous",
"sentence": "See Partout v. Harper, 145 Idaho 683, 689, 183 P.3d 771, 777 (2008) (affirming a fee award where a party’s position on a purportedly unsettled legal is... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "183 P.3d 771, 777",
"parenthetical": "affirming a fee award where a party's position on a purportedly unsettled legal issue was against the clear weight of Idaho law",
"sentence": "See Partout v. Harper, 145 Idaho 683, 689, 183 P.3d 771, 777 (2008) (affirming a fee award where ... | 4,078,409 | b |
Further, they admit that they did not raise their dedication claim until after trial, and simply labeled it an implied-easement claim. Although they suggest a new theory of Idaho law, they cite nothing but contrary public-dedication eases without articulating why those decisions would allow a private dedication in this... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "183 P.3d 771, 777",
"parenthetical": "affirming a fee award where a party's position on a purportedly unsettled legal issue was against the clear weight of Idaho law",
"sentence": "See Partout v. Harper, 145 Idaho 683, 689, 183 P.3d 771, 777 (2008) (affirming a fee award where ... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "132 P.3d 392, 396",
"parenthetical": "reversing a fee award where some novel legal defenses were not frivolous",
"sentence": "See Partout v. Harper, 145 Idaho 683, 689, 183 P.3d 771, 777 (2008) (affirming a fee award where a party’s position on a purportedly unsettled legal iss... | 4,078,409 | a |
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Nevertheless, companies may be held liable for discrimination even where the decision-making official did not intentionally discriminate if the information used by that official in deciding to terminate a worker's employment was filtered through another employee who had a discriminat... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "944 F.2d 409, 413-14",
"parenthetical": "discriminatory intent of employer's agents sufficient proof to hold employer responsible for discriminatory termination without intentional discrimination by final decision maker",
"sentence": "See Jiles v. Ingram, 944 F.2d 409, 413-14 (... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "990 F.2d 1051, 1057",
"parenthetical": "\"when a committee has 'acted as the conduit of [a supervisor's] prejudice -- his cat's paw -- the innocence of its members would not spare the company from liability' \"",
"sentence": "See Jiles v. Ingram, 944 F.2d 409, 413-14 (8th ... | 2,219,071 | a |
The facts to be considered are derived from the complaint, as well as documents properly before the court of which both parties have notice. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "282 F.3d 147, 153",
"parenthetical": "on motion to dismiss court may consider pleadings as well as all documents incorporated therein by reference",
"sentence": "Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir.2002) (on motion to dismiss court may consider pleadi... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "458 F.3d 150, 156",
"parenthetical": "court considers documents if they \"are integral to the pleading or subject to judicial notice\"",
"sentence": "Roth v. Jennings, 489 F.3d 499, 509 (2d Cir.2007); see Global Network Commc’ns Inc. v. City of New York, 458 F.3d 150, 156 (2d C... | 4,225,024 | a |
At trial, Harris was a forty-three-year-old high school graduate. The district court found the former CSHC CEO to be "a very bright man" who had been responsible for his company's SEC filings. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "291 F.3d 726, 731",
"parenthetical": "finding waiver from a defendant with an eleventh-grade education to be valid when he was a \"sophisticated businessman\"",
"sentence": "See Fitzpatrick, 800 F.2d at 1066 (“Especially relevant to [Defendant’s] understanding of the risks... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "800 F.2d 1066, 1066",
"parenthetical": "\"Especially relevant to [Defendant's] understanding of the risks of self-representation with respect to the securities charges is the fact that he is an experienced stockbroker.\"",
"sentence": "See Fitzpatrick, 800 F.2d at 1066 (“Especi... | 4,084,648 | b |
In arguing that those words did not clearly convey any intent to invoke the right against compelled self-incrimination, the state accurately describes contrasting wording from other cases in which this court concluded that unequivocal invocations had occurred. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "356 Or 451, 451-52,456",
"parenthetical": "defendant's first two invocations--\"I don't want to talk anymore\" and \"I don't want to talk no more\"--unambiguously communicated her desire to no longer speak with detectives",
"sentence": "See id. at 603, 617 (defendant who stated... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "338 Or 302, 322",
"parenthetical": "defendant's statement--\"I think that I do need a lawyer!,] I do\"--unambiguously expressed his desire to consult with counsel before speaking with detectives",
"sentence": "See id. at 603, 617 (defendant who stated, “I won’t answer any ... | 12,414,805 | a |
In arguing that those words did not clearly convey any intent to invoke the right against compelled self-incrimination, the state accurately describes contrasting wording from other cases in which this court concluded that unequivocal invocations had occurred. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant's statement--\"I think that I do need a lawyer!,] I do\"--unambiguously expressed his desire to consult with counsel before speaking with detectives",
"sentence": "See id. at 603, 617 (defendant who stated, “I won’t answer any questions,” u... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "356 Or 451, 451-52,456",
"parenthetical": "defendant's first two invocations--\"I don't want to talk anymore\" and \"I don't want to talk no more\"--unambiguously communicated her desire to no longer speak with detectives",
"sentence": "See id. at 603, 617 (defendant who stated... | 12,414,805 | b |
The district court also found that Olsen had instructed a co-conspirator not to provide information to law enforcement and told a co-defendant to "keep his mouth shut" while that codefendant was in prison. Each of these actions, as well as Olsen's decision to order a coconspirator to prevent a cooperating witness from ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "414 F.3d 845, 351-52",
"parenthetical": "upholding application of the obstruction of justice enhancement where defendant threatened to frame a co-conspirator for kidnapping if he testified",
"sentence": "See United States v. Agudelo, 414 F.3d 845, 351-52 (2d Cir.2005) (upholdin... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "364 F.3d 438, 465-66",
"parenthetical": "sustaining application of the obstruction of justice enhancement where defendant told a potential witness that he planned to kill another potential witness, and the district court determined that this statement was intended to ensure ... | 3,772,649 | a |
Taking the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the absence of any policy regarding whether the use of pepper spray is appropriate on an individual who is fully restrained created an "obvious" constitutional violation. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "536 U.S. 738, 738",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he Eighth Amendment violation is obvious\" when prisoner was subdued then handcuffed to hitching post for seven hours.",
"sentence": "See Hope, 536 U.S. at 738, 122 S.Ct. 2508 (“[T]he Eighth Amendment violation is obvious” when prisone... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "422 F.3d 1265, 1272",
"parenthetical": "\"[O]ne could draw a reasonable inference\" that continued use of force after detainee was subdued or restrained \"was for the very purpose of causing harm: excessive force.\"",
"sentence": "See Hope, 536 U.S. at 738, 122 S.Ct. 2508 ... | 4,326,497 | a |
Taking the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the absence of any policy regarding whether the use of pepper spray is appropriate on an individual who is fully restrained created an "obvious" constitutional violation. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he Eighth Amendment violation is obvious\" when prisoner was subdued then handcuffed to hitching post for seven hours.",
"sentence": "See Hope, 536 U.S. at 738, 122 S.Ct. 2508 (“[T]he Eighth Amendment violation is obvious” when prisoner was subdued t... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "422 F.3d 1265, 1272",
"parenthetical": "\"[O]ne could draw a reasonable inference\" that continued use of force after detainee was subdued or restrained \"was for the very purpose of causing harm: excessive force.\"",
"sentence": "See Hope, 536 U.S. at 738, 122 S.Ct. 2508 ... | 4,326,497 | a |
Because the record amply supports the determination that Coleman was unavailable, we are hard-pressed to find that the outcome of Reed's trial would have been different had Luka investigated Coleman. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "823 F.2d 1439, 1446",
"parenthetical": "holding that for a habeas petitioner \"[t]o prove that he was prejudiced by counsel's failure to investigate and to produce a certain type of expert witness,\" he- \"must demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that an ordinarily competent atto... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "875 So.2d 579, 583",
"parenthetical": "concluding that a defendant must identify the testimony that would have been provided and allege that the witness was available to testify to establish prejudice under Strickland",
"sentence": "See Elledge v. Dugger, 823 F.2d 1439, 14... | 4,203,547 | a |
Because the record amply supports the determination that Coleman was unavailable, we are hard-pressed to find that the outcome of Reed's trial would have been different had Luka investigated Coleman. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that for a habeas petitioner \"[t]o prove that he was prejudiced by counsel's failure to investigate and to produce a certain type of expert witness,\" he- \"must demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that an ordinarily competent attorney conducting a... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "875 So.2d 579, 583",
"parenthetical": "concluding that a defendant must identify the testimony that would have been provided and allege that the witness was available to testify to establish prejudice under Strickland",
"sentence": "See Elledge v. Dugger, 823 F.2d 1439, 14... | 4,203,547 | a |
Because the record amply supports the determination that Coleman was unavailable, we are hard-pressed to find that the outcome of Reed's trial would have been different had Luka investigated Coleman. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "559 Fed.Appx. 863, 868",
"parenthetical": "concluding that for the petitioner to show that he was prejudiced by counsel's alleged deficiency to investigate the witness, he had to rebut by clear and convincing evidence the state postconviction court's finding that the witness was ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "875 So.2d 579, 583",
"parenthetical": "concluding that a defendant must identify the testimony that would have been provided and allege that the witness was available to testify to establish prejudice under Strickland",
"sentence": "See Elledge v. Dugger, 823 F.2d 1439, 14... | 4,203,547 | a |
Because the record amply supports the determination that Coleman was unavailable, we are hard-pressed to find that the outcome of Reed's trial would have been different had Luka investigated Coleman. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "875 So.2d 579, 583",
"parenthetical": "concluding that a defendant must identify the testimony that would have been provided and allege that the witness was available to testify to establish prejudice under Strickland",
"sentence": "See Elledge v. Dugger, 823 F.2d 1439, 14... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "295 Fed.Appx. 988, 990",
"parenthetical": "holding that the state court's determination that the petitioner \"could not show prejudice because he did not allege that [the witness] was available to testify, was a reasonable application of federal law to the facts of the case\"",
... | 4,203,547 | b |
. A finding of willful infringement, by itself, is not sufficient to be res judicata on the issue of fraudulent intent. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "350 F.3d 1327, 1343",
"parenthetical": "ruling that willful infringement \"does not equate to fraud\" and is therefore not subject to the more stringent 9(b",
"sentence": "See In re SeaChange, 2004 WL 240317, at *8 (\"Willfulness in the context of patent infringement is no... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2004 WL 240317, at *8",
"parenthetical": "\"Willfulness in the context of patent infringement is not equivalent to actual knowledge.\"",
"sentence": "See In re SeaChange, 2004 WL 240317, at *8 (\"Willfulness in the context of patent infringement is not equivalent to actual know... | 3,702,028 | b |
Here, the evidence supporting the officers' reasonable suspicion that Mr. Hishaw was distributing drugs (i.e. his coming and going from the apartment named in the search warrant and the hand-to-hand contact observed outside the apartment) also indicated that he might be armed and dangerous. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "100 F.3d 1491, 1502",
"parenthetical": "holding that, during an investigatory detention, officers are authorized to take such steps as are reasonably necessary to protect their personal safety and to maintain the status quo",
"sentence": "See United States v. Shareef, 100 F.3d ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "160 F.3d 164, 169",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"when the officer has a reasonable suspicion that illegal drugs are in the vehicle, the officer may, in the absence of factors allaying his safety concerns, order the occupants out of the vehicle and pat them down briefly f... | 11,170,977 | a |
Here, the evidence supporting the officers' reasonable suspicion that Mr. Hishaw was distributing drugs (i.e. his coming and going from the apartment named in the search warrant and the hand-to-hand contact observed outside the apartment) also indicated that he might be armed and dangerous. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "45 F.3d 869, 873",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"it is certainly reasonable for an officer to believe that a person engaged in the selling of crack cocaine may be carrying a weapon for protection\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Shareef, 100 F.3d 1491, 1502 (10th Ci... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "100 F.3d 1491, 1502",
"parenthetical": "holding that, during an investigatory detention, officers are authorized to take such steps as are reasonably necessary to protect their personal safety and to maintain the status quo",
"sentence": "See United States v. Shareef, 100 F.3d ... | 11,170,977 | b |
Here, the evidence supporting the officers' reasonable suspicion that Mr. Hishaw was distributing drugs (i.e. his coming and going from the apartment named in the search warrant and the hand-to-hand contact observed outside the apartment) also indicated that he might be armed and dangerous. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "100 F.3d 1491, 1502",
"parenthetical": "holding that, during an investigatory detention, officers are authorized to take such steps as are reasonably necessary to protect their personal safety and to maintain the status quo",
"sentence": "See United States v. Shareef, 100 F.3d ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "859 F.2d 1171, 1177",
"parenthetical": "concluding that an officer's pat-down search of the occupants of a car was reasonable after the officer observed large amounts of money on the front seat, became suspicious that it might' be drug money, and was concerned for his safety... | 11,170,977 | a |
After the OHA issued its decision in 1996, a group of private parties, who stood to recover additional funds as individual claimants under the FSA, directly challenged the ruling in the District of Columbia District Court. That claim, however, was rejected by the Federal Circuit. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "dismissing claims for lack of a private right of action and because the OHA's decision was not justiciable",
"sentence": "See Consolidated Edison v. O’Leary, 131 F.3d 1475 (Fed.Cir.1997) (dismissing plaintiffs’ claim because the OHA’s decision was not rev... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "dismissing plaintiffs' claim because the OHA's decision was not reviewable",
"sentence": "See Consolidated Edison v. O’Leary, 131 F.3d 1475 (Fed.Cir.1997) (dismissing plaintiffs’ claim because the OHA’s decision was not reviewable); cf. Consolidated Ediso... | 11,458,930 | b |
We cannot say of any future case what emphasis will be placed on the State Department's advisory opinion or what emphasis would be proper. For that reason, the injury or threatened injury is too speculative to confer standing. We think it impossible to conclude there is a real and immediate threat that any particular a... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "553 F.2d 190, 208-09",
"parenthetical": "denying standing to appellant Congressman to challenge alleged illegal use of funds by the CIA in part because the alleged harm \"would take place, if at all, at some undetermined time in the future when Congress exercised\" a power relate... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting for failure to present a case or controversy a union's attempt to obtain an injunction prohibiting the INS from applying a statute in a situation that had not arisen at the time of suit",
"sentence": "See Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190, 2... | 5,657,323 | a |
We cannot say of any future case what emphasis will be placed on the State Department's advisory opinion or what emphasis would be proper. For that reason, the injury or threatened injury is too speculative to confer standing. We think it impossible to conclude there is a real and immediate threat that any particular a... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "553 F.2d 190, 208-09",
"parenthetical": "denying standing to appellant Congressman to challenge alleged illegal use of funds by the CIA in part because the alleged harm \"would take place, if at all, at some undetermined time in the future when Congress exercised\" a power relate... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting for failure to present a case or controversy a union's attempt to obtain an injunction prohibiting the INS from applying a statute in a situation that had not arisen at the time of suit",
"sentence": "See Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190, 2... | 5,657,323 | a |
We cannot say of any future case what emphasis will be placed on the State Department's advisory opinion or what emphasis would be proper. For that reason, the injury or threatened injury is too speculative to confer standing. We think it impossible to conclude there is a real and immediate threat that any particular a... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting for failure to present a case or controversy a union's attempt to obtain an injunction prohibiting the INS from applying a statute in a situation that had not arisen at the time of suit",
"sentence": "See Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190, 2... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "553 F.2d 190, 208-09",
"parenthetical": "denying standing to appellant Congressman to challenge alleged illegal use of funds by the CIA in part because the alleged harm \"would take place, if at all, at some undetermined time in the future when Congress exercised\" a power relate... | 5,657,323 | b |
A court is permitted to use general points of reference as a starting point for calculating the losses or gains from fraudulent transactions and may make reasonable extrapolations from the evidence established by a preponderance of the evidence at the sentencing proceeding." In other words, as a general principle, extr... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "128 F.3d 74, 76",
"parenthetical": "\"it is permissible for the sentencing court, in calculating a defendant's offense level, to estimate the loss resulting from his offenses by extrapolating the average amount of loss from known data and applying that average to transactions whe... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "551 F.3d 176, 180",
"parenthetical": "forfeiture order in food stamp fraud case properly entered in amount equal to loss amount that was calculated based upon extrapolation",
"sentence": "United States v. Uddin, 551 F.3d 176, 180 (2d Cir.2009) (forfeiture order in food st... | 4,293,528 | b |
A court is permitted to use general points of reference as a starting point for calculating the losses or gains from fraudulent transactions and may make reasonable extrapolations from the evidence established by a preponderance of the evidence at the sentencing proceeding." In other words, as a general principle, extr... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "553 Fed.Appx. 73, 76-77",
"parenthetical": "affirming district court's loss calculation of $4.17 million in bank fraud case even though it was \"far above the loss amount documented at trial\" where it was based upon extrapolating from the trial testimony the assumption that the ... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "551 F.3d 176, 180",
"parenthetical": "forfeiture order in food stamp fraud case properly entered in amount equal to loss amount that was calculated based upon extrapolation",
"sentence": "United States v. Uddin, 551 F.3d 176, 180 (2d Cir.2009) (forfeiture order in food st... | 4,293,528 | b |
A court is permitted to use general points of reference as a starting point for calculating the losses or gains from fraudulent transactions and may make reasonable extrapolations from the evidence established by a preponderance of the evidence at the sentencing proceeding." In other words, as a general principle, extr... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "361 Fed.Appx. 252, 254",
"parenthetical": "affirming loss calculation for sentencing purposes in excess of $200,000, in health care fraud conviction, where government proved at trial false claims reflecting $107,000 loss and court calculated loss in excess of $200,000 based upon ... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "551 F.3d 176, 180",
"parenthetical": "forfeiture order in food stamp fraud case properly entered in amount equal to loss amount that was calculated based upon extrapolation",
"sentence": "United States v. Uddin, 551 F.3d 176, 180 (2d Cir.2009) (forfeiture order in food st... | 4,293,528 | b |
This Circuit has similarly interpreted the Doehr majority to have rested its due process holding on the application of Connecticut's statute to an intentional tortfeasor, as opposed to a creditor with an existing interest in the property. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "987 F.2d 122, 126-27",
"parenthetical": "upholding the same Connecticut statute as applied to contractor's claim for payment of \"an outstanding sum certain\" for completed repairs to attached property",
"sentence": "See Shaumyan v. O’Neill, 987 F.2d 122, 126-27 (2d Cir.1993) (... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating in dicta that a claim for a contractually-defined sum \"appears to fall into the category of cases cited in Doehr as 'lending] themselves to accurate ex parte assessments of the merits' \" (quoting Doehr, 501 U.S. at 17, 111 S.Ct. 2105",
"sentence... | 6,050,837 | a |
This Circuit has similarly interpreted the Doehr majority to have rested its due process holding on the application of Connecticut's statute to an intentional tortfeasor, as opposed to a creditor with an existing interest in the property. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "987 F.2d 122, 126-27",
"parenthetical": "upholding the same Connecticut statute as applied to contractor's claim for payment of \"an outstanding sum certain\" for completed repairs to attached property",
"sentence": "See Shaumyan v. O’Neill, 987 F.2d 122, 126-27 (2d Cir.1993) (... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "501 U.S. 17, 17",
"parenthetical": "stating in dicta that a claim for a contractually-defined sum \"appears to fall into the category of cases cited in Doehr as 'lending] themselves to accurate ex parte assessments of the merits' \" (quoting Doehr, 501 U.S. at 17, 111 S.Ct. 2105"... | 6,050,837 | a |
This Circuit has similarly interpreted the Doehr majority to have rested its due process holding on the application of Connecticut's statute to an intentional tortfeasor, as opposed to a creditor with an existing interest in the property. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating in dicta that a claim for a contractually-defined sum \"appears to fall into the category of cases cited in Doehr as 'lending] themselves to accurate ex parte assessments of the merits' \" (quoting Doehr, 501 U.S. at 17, 111 S.Ct. 2105",
"sentence... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "987 F.2d 122, 126-27",
"parenthetical": "upholding the same Connecticut statute as applied to contractor's claim for payment of \"an outstanding sum certain\" for completed repairs to attached property",
"sentence": "See Shaumyan v. O’Neill, 987 F.2d 122, 126-27 (2d Cir.1993) (... | 6,050,837 | b |
A district court typically has broad discretion to refer evidentiary hearings to a magistrate judge. However, as the magistrate judge explicitly recognized in this case, his authority during the bond revocation hearing was limited to a determination of whether probable cause supported a finding that Schlosser violated ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "453 F.3d 1024, 1026",
"parenthetical": "explaining that the standard of proof at sentencing is preponderance of the evidence",
"sentence": "See 18 U.S.C. § 3148(b). Thus, had the district court relied on the magistrate judge’s findings of fact as proof by a preponderance of the... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "490 U.S. 858, 876",
"parenthetical": "explaining that a basic fair trial right \"is a defendant's right to have all critical stages of a criminal trial conducted by a person with jurisdiction to preside\"",
"sentence": "See 18 U.S.C. § 3148(b). Thus, had the district court... | 3,362,229 | a |
A district court typically has broad discretion to refer evidentiary hearings to a magistrate judge. However, as the magistrate judge explicitly recognized in this case, his authority during the bond revocation hearing was limited to a determination of whether probable cause supported a finding that Schlosser violated ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "explaining that a basic fair trial right \"is a defendant's right to have all critical stages of a criminal trial conducted by a person with jurisdiction to preside\"",
"sentence": "See 18 U.S.C. § 3148(b). Thus, had the district court relied on the ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "453 F.3d 1024, 1026",
"parenthetical": "explaining that the standard of proof at sentencing is preponderance of the evidence",
"sentence": "See 18 U.S.C. § 3148(b). Thus, had the district court relied on the magistrate judge’s findings of fact as proof by a preponderance of the... | 3,362,229 | b |
A district court typically has broad discretion to refer evidentiary hearings to a magistrate judge. However, as the magistrate judge explicitly recognized in this case, his authority during the bond revocation hearing was limited to a determination of whether probable cause supported a finding that Schlosser violated ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "453 F.3d 1024, 1026",
"parenthetical": "explaining that the standard of proof at sentencing is preponderance of the evidence",
"sentence": "See 18 U.S.C. § 3148(b). Thus, had the district court relied on the magistrate judge’s findings of fact as proof by a preponderance of the... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "explaining that a basic fair trial right \"is a defendant's right to have all critical stages of a criminal trial conducted by a person with jurisdiction to preside\"",
"sentence": "See 18 U.S.C. § 3148(b). Thus, had the district court relied on the ... | 3,362,229 | a |
In accordance with these precedents, the First Circuit Court of Appeals has. recognized the proposition that an official's single act can serve as a policy and thus establish a basis for municipal liability. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "288 F.3d 1, 9",
"parenthetical": "holding that a \"policy\" for purposes of municipal liability may be established by an official's single decision",
"sentence": "Kelley v. LaForce, 288 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir.2002) (holding that a “policy” for purposes of municipal liability ... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "871 F.2d 1156, 1156-57",
"parenthetical": "holding that evidence of a single event alone cannot establish a municipal policy",
"sentence": "Kelley v. LaForce, 288 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir.2002) (holding that a “policy” for purposes of municipal liability may be established by an ... | 9,008,492 | a |
In accordance with these precedents, the First Circuit Court of Appeals has. recognized the proposition that an official's single act can serve as a policy and thus establish a basis for municipal liability. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "96 F.3d 566, 576",
"parenthetical": "holding that an unconstitutional policy may be inferred from an official's single decision or act",
"sentence": "Kelley v. LaForce, 288 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir.2002) (holding that a “policy” for purposes of municipal liability may be establ... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "871 F.2d 1156, 1156-57",
"parenthetical": "holding that evidence of a single event alone cannot establish a municipal policy",
"sentence": "Kelley v. LaForce, 288 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir.2002) (holding that a “policy” for purposes of municipal liability may be established by an ... | 9,008,492 | a |
In accordance with these precedents, the First Circuit Court of Appeals has. recognized the proposition that an official's single act can serve as a policy and thus establish a basis for municipal liability. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "871 F.2d 1156, 1156-57",
"parenthetical": "holding that evidence of a single event alone cannot establish a municipal policy",
"sentence": "Kelley v. LaForce, 288 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir.2002) (holding that a “policy” for purposes of municipal liability may be established by an ... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "796 F.2d 544, 553",
"parenthetical": "holding that city manager's single unconstitutional action was sufficient for the imposition of municipal liability",
"sentence": "Kelley v. LaForce, 288 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir.2002) (holding that a “policy” for purposes of municipal liab... | 9,008,492 | b |
We have also considered the various bases for Chernov's claim that the immigration judge's conduct at the merits hearing violated his due process rights. On this record, we, like the Board, are not persuaded that there was a defect that rendered the hearing fundamentally unfair or that, if there was, any prejudice resu... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "granting petition for review and holding the immigration judge violated due process in his conduct at the merits hearing, which included, among other things, \"continually abus[ing] an increasingly distraught petitioner, rendering him unable to coherently r... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "127 F.3d 638, 643",
"parenthetical": "explaining that the immigration judge \"has broad discretion to control the manner of interrogation in order to ascertain the truth\"",
"sentence": "See Anim v. Mukasey, 535 F.3d 243, 256 (4th Cir.2008); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(1)... | 4,252,444 | b |
The district court properly dismissed Cornellier's access to courts claims because he did not complete the prison grievance process prior to filing suit, and failed to demonstrate that he was obstructed from doing so. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "548 U.S. 81, 93-95",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"proper exhaustion\" under SS 1997e(a) is mandatory and requires adherence to administrative procedural rules",
"sentence": "See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93-95, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006) (holding that “prope... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "311 F.3d 1198, 1199",
"parenthetical": "requiring inmates to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing suit in federal court",
"sentence": "See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93-95, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006) (holding that “proper exhaustion” under § 1997e... | 3,971,044 | a |
The district court properly dismissed Cornellier's access to courts claims because he did not complete the prison grievance process prior to filing suit, and failed to demonstrate that he was obstructed from doing so. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that \"proper exhaustion\" under SS 1997e(a) is mandatory and requires adherence to administrative procedural rules",
"sentence": "See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93-95, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006) (holding that “proper exhaustion” un... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "311 F.3d 1198, 1199",
"parenthetical": "requiring inmates to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing suit in federal court",
"sentence": "See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93-95, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006) (holding that “proper exhaustion” under § 1997e... | 3,971,044 | a |
The district court properly dismissed Cornellier's access to courts claims because he did not complete the prison grievance process prior to filing suit, and failed to demonstrate that he was obstructed from doing so. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that \"proper exhaustion\" under SS 1997e(a) is mandatory and requires adherence to administrative procedural rules",
"sentence": "See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93-95, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006) (holding that “proper exhaustion” un... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "311 F.3d 1198, 1199",
"parenthetical": "requiring inmates to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing suit in federal court",
"sentence": "See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93-95, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006) (holding that “proper exhaustion” under § 1997e... | 3,971,044 | a |
Strictly speaking, the Town's restitution claim may not be moot, unlike its claims for injunctive or declaratory relief. It is settled law that a claim for monetary relief, including restitution, may survive events that moot injunctive or declaratory relief. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "732 F.2d 689, 691",
"parenthetical": "holding that claim for cost reimbursement and making employees whole is not moot, despite the defendant having ceased the challenged practice",
"sentence": "See N.L.R.B. v. Me. Caterers, Inc., 732 F.2d 689, 691 (1st Cir.1984) (holding that ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "727 F.3d 117, 124-25",
"parenthetical": "claim for money damages survives despite mootness of other relief",
"sentence": "See N.L.R.B. v. Me. Caterers, Inc., 732 F.2d 689, 691 (1st Cir.1984) (holding that claim for cost reimbursement and making employees whole is not moot,... | 4,088,911 | a |
"The qualification prong must not ... be interpreted in such a way as to shift onto the plaintiff an obligation to anticipate and disprove, in his prima facie ease, the employer's proffer of a legitimate, non-discriminatory basis for its decision." A plaintiffs successful performance of a job for years can satisfy the ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Eighth Circuit found that plaintiff satisfied second element because he was employed by the company for 28 years",
"sentence": "See Riley, 518 F.3d at 1000 (Eighth Circuit found that plaintiff satisfied second element because “he had been performing ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "518 F.3d 1000, 1000",
"parenthetical": "Eighth Circuit found that plaintiff satisfied second element because \"he had been performing [his] job successfully for years[.]\"",
"sentence": "See Riley, 518 F.3d at 1000 (Eighth Circuit found that plaintiff satisfied second element b... | 4,174,564 | b |
. Under this factor, courts also look to state law for # statutes- that expressly require the State to pay the judgment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "807 F.3d 768, 776",
"parenthetical": "relying on state statute that required \"any judgment against [Wayne State University] to be paid out of the state's tax revenues''",
"sentence": "See Kreipke v. Wayne State Univ., 807 F.3d 768, 776 (6th Cir. 2015) (relying on state statute... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "427 F.3d 360, 360",
"parenthetical": "discussing state statute that required legislature to \"annually appropriate to the retirement system the amount of money needed\"",
"sentence": "See Kreipke v. Wayne State Univ., 807 F.3d 768, 776 (6th Cir. 2015) (relying on state sta... | 12,266,302 | a |
Our conclusion that courts cannot provide a remedy when the Legislature has failed to do so is also entirely consistent with the position of Florida courts in other contexts. See, e.g., Jolley v. Seamco Labs. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "633 So.2d 3, 6",
"parenthetical": "finding that if Legislature had intended penalty for a violation of a time limit to be dismissal of the administrative complaint, it would have expressly included that sanction within section 455.225, Florida Statutes (Supp.1986",
"senten... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "828 So.2d 1050, 1051",
"parenthetical": "declining to provide a remedy for a violation of Florida's Wrongful Death Act",
"sentence": "Inc., 828 So.2d 1050, 1051 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (declining to provide a remedy for a violation of Florida’s Wrongful Death Act); see also C... | 7,007,901 | b |
Merely because he earned $70,000 the year prior to the dissolution hearing does not mean the husband was voluntarily underemployed when he was forced by circumstances to open his own agency. The absence of specific findings or record evidence to support the imputation of income mandates reversal. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "634 So.2d 782, 783",
"parenthetical": "\"If the court is going to impute income not apparent from the record, it must indicate the amount and source.\"",
"sentence": "See Woodard v. Woodard, 634 So.2d 782, 783 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994) (“If the court is going to impute income not app... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "677 So.2d 918, 923",
"parenthetical": "where financial documents in record support trial court's decision to impute income to husband, court's failure to make written findings on the record does not require reversal",
"sentence": "See Woodard v. Woodard, 634 So.2d 782, 783... | 11,995,107 | a |
The law is "settled that affirmative defenses should be considered in making class certification decisions." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "84 F.3d 734, 744",
"parenthetical": "\"Going beyond the pleadings is necessary, as a court must understand [inter alia] defenses ... in order to make a meaningful determination of the certification issues.\"",
"sentence": "Waste Mgmt. Holdings v. Mowbray, 208 F.3d 288, 295... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "155 F.3d 331, 342",
"parenthetical": "certification is \"erroneous\" when affirmative defenses \"may depend on facts peculiar to each plaintiffs case\"",
"sentence": "Waste Mgmt. Holdings v. Mowbray, 208 F.3d 288, 295 (1st Cir.2000); see also Majority Op. at 138, 139 (a court m... | 9,392,655 | a |
Kinder cites no case in support of this argument. To the contrary, the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have held that expert testimony is not required to justify an enhancement under 2G2.2(b)(3). | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "99 F.3d 80, 83",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"it was within the court's discretion to conclude that the subjection of a young chdd to a sexual act that would have to be painful is excessively cruel and hence is sadistic within the meaning of 2G2.2(b",
"sentence": "Unit... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"One hardly requires a medical degree to ascertain that vaginal intercourse with an adult male would involve pain, both physical and emotional, for a young girl.\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Lyckman, 235 F.3d 234, 239 n. 22 (5th Cir.2000) (“On... | 1,533,933 | b |
Kinder cites no case in support of this argument. To the contrary, the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have held that expert testimony is not required to justify an enhancement under 2G2.2(b)(3). | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "309 F.3d 1348, 1352",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e hold that the district court erred in its interpretation that, in order to support a sadistic conduct enhancement, the government is required to present expert medical testimony.\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Lyckman, 235... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "99 F.3d 80, 83",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"it was within the court's discretion to conclude that the subjection of a young chdd to a sexual act that would have to be painful is excessively cruel and hence is sadistic within the meaning of 2G2.2(b",
"sentence": "Unit... | 1,533,933 | a |
Additionally, Defendant cites, inter alia, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in Weiss; however, that Court decided the mootness issue in the context of a class action complaint. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating, \"[bjecause defendants' Rule 68 offer included no relief for the putative class, ... we address the mootness question in that context\"",
"sentence": "(Doc. 12, p. 3), citing Weiss, 385 F.3d 337 (stating, “[bjecause defendants’ Rule 68 offe... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "239 F.R.D. 400, 403",
"parenthetical": "concluding \"that the offer of judgment must now be stricken to prevent it from undermining the use of the class action device\"",
"sentence": "(Doc. 12, p. 3), citing Weiss, 385 F.3d 337 (stating, “[bjecause defendants’ Rule 68 offe... | 4,273,776 | a |
An expert could do this by having his reanalysis published in a peer-reviewed journal or by pointing to methodological flaws in the published study and explaining how she corrected them. However, an expert cannot simply, without any explanation for rejecting a published, peer-reviewed analysis, conduct his own "reanaly... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "770 F.Supp. 1561, 1579",
"parenthetical": "\"A scientific study not subject to peer review has little probative value.\"",
"sentence": "Div. of Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 646 F.Supp. 856, 865 (D.Mass.1986) (“Even if this Court were to find the methodology of Dr. Swan’s re-a... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "897 F.2d 1159, 1162-63",
"parenthetical": "rejecting testimony of \"the plaintiffs epidemiology expert ... [who] tried to refute the validity of the published epidemiological data through her own unpublished reanalysis\"",
"sentence": "See Ealy v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 897 ... | 4,264,428 | b |
An expert could do this by having his reanalysis published in a peer-reviewed journal or by pointing to methodological flaws in the published study and explaining how she corrected them. However, an expert cannot simply, without any explanation for rejecting a published, peer-reviewed analysis, conduct his own "reanaly... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "646 F.Supp. 856, 865",
"parenthetical": "\"Even if this Court were to find the methodology of Dr. Swan's re-analysis credible, this Court still could not accept result-oriented reanalysis of epidemiological studies ..., such as that performed here by Dr. Swan, as reliable d... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "770 F.Supp. 1561, 1579",
"parenthetical": "\"A scientific study not subject to peer review has little probative value.\"",
"sentence": "Div. of Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 646 F.Supp. 856, 865 (D.Mass.1986) (“Even if this Court were to find the methodology of Dr. Swan’s re-a... | 4,264,428 | a |
An expert could do this by having his reanalysis published in a peer-reviewed journal or by pointing to methodological flaws in the published study and explaining how she corrected them. However, an expert cannot simply, without any explanation for rejecting a published, peer-reviewed analysis, conduct his own "reanaly... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "770 F.Supp. 1561, 1579",
"parenthetical": "\"A scientific study not subject to peer review has little probative value.\"",
"sentence": "Div. of Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 646 F.Supp. 856, 865 (D.Mass.1986) (“Even if this Court were to find the methodology of Dr. Swan’s re-a... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Even if this Court were to find the methodology of Dr. Swan's re-analysis credible, this Court still could not accept result-oriented reanalysis of epidemiological studies ..., such as that performed here by Dr. Swan, as reliable data upon which to ... | 4,264,428 | b |
We reverse and remand the final judgment in this case for reconsideration of the parties' equitable distribution of assets. We decline to address the issues raised by appellee (specifically the propriety of the trial court's orders on alimony and attorney's fees) because correcting the valuation of the assets and liabi... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "43 So.3d 931, 933-34",
"parenthetical": "stating that attorney's fees in a dissolution of marriage action should be awarded based on .need and ability to pay, and noting that \"[i]t is appropriate for a court to award attorney's fees to avoid an inequitable diminution of the... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "59 So.3d 163, 165",
"parenthetical": "\"As this court and Florida Statute section 61.075(9) make clear, a 'trial court is first to do the equitable distribution of assets, and once the assets have been equitably distributed, make a determination whether alimony should be awarded.... | 6,778,954 | b |
Upon careful review, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a sentence at the bottom of Reynard's applicable advisory Guidelines range, as there is no indication that the district court overlooked or misapplied a relevant section 3553(a) factor, gave significant weight to an improp... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "598 F.3d 444, 448",
"parenthetical": "appellate role is limited to determining substantive reasonableness of specific sentence where advisory Guidelines range was determined in accordance with SS 2G2.2",
"sentence": "See United States v. Stults, 575 F.3d 834, 849 (8th Cir.... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "575 F.3d 834, 849",
"parenthetical": "absent reversible procedural error, appellate court reviews reasonableness of district court's sentence for abuse of discretion",
"sentence": "See United States v. Stults, 575 F.3d 834, 849 (8th Cir.2009) (absent reversible procedural error... | 5,887,867 | b |
Upon careful review, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a sentence at the bottom of Reynard's applicable advisory Guidelines range, as there is no indication that the district court overlooked or misapplied a relevant section 3553(a) factor, gave significant weight to an improp... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "575 F.3d 834, 849",
"parenthetical": "absent reversible procedural error, appellate court reviews reasonableness of district court's sentence for abuse of discretion",
"sentence": "See United States v. Stults, 575 F.3d 834, 849 (8th Cir.2009) (absent reversible procedural error... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "572 F.3d 455, 461",
"parenthetical": "appellate presumption of reasonableness may be applied to within-Guidelines-range sentence",
"sentence": "See United States v. Stults, 575 F.3d 834, 849 (8th Cir.2009) (absent reversible procedural error, appellate court reviews reason... | 5,887,867 | a |
See, e.g., Guardians Ass'n of N.Y. City Police Dep't, Inc. 'v. When the employment position involves public safety, we accord greater latitude to the employer's showing of job-relatedness and business necessity. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "645 F.2d 1262, 1262-63",
"parenthetical": "finding sufficient support for an employer's truck-driving experience requirements, noting that \"[a]n industry with the primary function of managing the safety of large numbers of passengers must be allowed more latitude in struct... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "475 F.2d 216, 219",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]hen the job clearly requires a high degree of skill and the economic and human risks involved in hiring an unqualified applicant are great, the employer bears a correspondingly lighter burden to show that his employment criteria are... | 4,265,938 | a |
The trial court concluded that Safety's failure to respond to Cinergy's letters that it sent prior to the filing of the lawsuit equated to a denial of Cinergy's claims, and thus, a waiver of Safety's right to arbitrate. However, "[mJere silence or inaction on the part of an insurer is not sufficient to constitute an ex... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "802 N.E.2d 910, 910",
"parenthetical": "holding that the issue of waiver requires an analysis of the specific facts in each case",
"sentence": "See, eg., Protective Ins., 428 N.E.2d at 661 (noting that \"the failure of [the insurance company] to respond to the demand to de... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "428 N.E.2d 661, 661",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"the failure of [the insurance company] to respond to the demand to defend letter is not evidence that [the insurance company] intended to waive its right to deny coverage\"",
"sentence": "See, eg., Protective Ins., 428 N.E.2... | 8,948,200 | b |
Although McWatters does not support the view that the prior kidnapping was relevant, I recognize that the prior kidnapping may be relevant under the case law relied upon by the trial court below in allowing the evidence. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "817 So.2d 741, 761",
"parenthetical": "holding that evidence that the defendant had \"stalked, threatened, and assaulted\" the victim, his ex-girlfriend, was evidence as to the nature of the defendant's relationship with the victim and that it was relevant to establish motiv... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that evidence of two prior incidents of violence by the defendant toward his wife in the months before the murder were relevant to premeditation where defendant claimed that it was a \"heat of passion\" killing",
"sentence": "See Spencer v. State,... | 7,012,513 | b |
Although McWatters does not support the view that the prior kidnapping was relevant, I recognize that the prior kidnapping may be relevant under the case law relied upon by the trial court below in allowing the evidence. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that evidence that twenty-three days before the murder, defendant had beaten the victim, with whom he was living, to the point that she became unconscious was \"proper as evidence of premeditation\"",
"sentence": "See Spencer v. State, 645 So.2d 3... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "817 So.2d 741, 761",
"parenthetical": "holding that evidence that the defendant had \"stalked, threatened, and assaulted\" the victim, his ex-girlfriend, was evidence as to the nature of the defendant's relationship with the victim and that it was relevant to establish motiv... | 7,012,513 | a |
To constitute constitutionally ineffective assistance under Strickland, the defendant must show his counsel's performance was both deficient and prejudiced the defense. Watson's argument fails the first prong of Strickland because counsel does not perform deficiently by declining to pursue a losing argument. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "373 F.3d 1350, 1354",
"parenthetical": "\"[F]ailure to renew a non-meritorious motion renders a lawyer's performance efficient, not deficient.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Kelly, 552 F.3d 824, 831 (D.C.Cir.2009) (ineffective assistance claim “plainly fails ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "552 F.3d 824, 831",
"parenthetical": "ineffective assistance claim \"plainly fails inasmuch as his counsel was not obliged to raise a meritless defense\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Kelly, 552 F.3d 824, 831 (D.C.Cir.2009) (ineffective assistance claim “plainly fa... | 3,664,234 | b |
Absent a challenge by an adversary party, on the present record and the facts found here, we discern no basis for concluding that the testator did not make the bequest with full knowledge and intent. See G. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "326 Mass. 621, 623",
"parenthetical": "improper to appoint guardian ad litem to represent interests of deceased person",
"sentence": "See also Lynde v. Vose, 326 Mass. 621, 623 (1951) (improper to appoint guardian ad litem to represent interests of deceased person)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing judge's statutory authority to order notice and appoint a guardian ad litem in certain circumstances",
"sentence": "L. c. 206, § 24; Matter of the Trusts Under the Will of Crabtree, 440 Mass. at 190-194 & n.30 (discussing judge’s statutor... | 3,769,767 | b |
"If action is taken for a fraudulent purpose or to carry out a fraudulent purpose or to carry out a fraudulent scheme, the action is void and of no force or effect." Richard A. Lord, Williston On Contracts Sec. 69.4 (4th Ed.2003). A release may be set aside if it was obtained fraudulently. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing the invalidity of releases under fraudulent conditions but granting a motion for summary judgment because party had not set forth sufficient indicia of fraud",
"sentence": "Stanley v. Holms, 293 Mont. 343, 975 P.2d 1242 (1999) (recognizi... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "acknowledging that a release is a voidable contract when a party is fraudulently induced to execute a release",
"sentence": "Stanley v. Holms, 293 Mont. 343, 975 P.2d 1242 (1999) (recognizing the invalidity of releases under fraudulent conditions but... | 9,215,969 | a |
"If action is taken for a fraudulent purpose or to carry out a fraudulent purpose or to carry out a fraudulent scheme, the action is void and of no force or effect." Richard A. Lord, Williston On Contracts Sec. 69.4 (4th Ed.2003). A release may be set aside if it was obtained fraudulently. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "acknowledging that a release is a voidable contract when a party is fraudulently induced to execute a release",
"sentence": "Stanley v. Holms, 293 Mont. 343, 975 P.2d 1242 (1999) (recognizing the invalidity of releases under fraudulent conditions but... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing the invalidity of releases under fraudulent conditions but granting a motion for summary judgment because party had not set forth sufficient indicia of fraud",
"sentence": "Stanley v. Holms, 293 Mont. 343, 975 P.2d 1242 (1999) (recognizi... | 9,215,969 | b |
"If action is taken for a fraudulent purpose or to carry out a fraudulent purpose or to carry out a fraudulent scheme, the action is void and of no force or effect." Richard A. Lord, Williston On Contracts Sec. 69.4 (4th Ed.2003). A release may be set aside if it was obtained fraudulently. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "acknowledging that a release is a voidable contract when a party is fraudulently induced to execute a release",
"sentence": "Stanley v. Holms, 293 Mont. 343, 975 P.2d 1242 (1999) (recognizing the invalidity of releases under fraudulent conditions but... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding a release invalid as it was obtained by a \"fraud in equity\"",
"sentence": "Stanley v. Holms, 293 Mont. 343, 975 P.2d 1242 (1999) (recognizing the invalidity of releases under fraudulent conditions but granting a motion for summary judgment... | 9,215,969 | b |
The district court did not consider whether defendants would be prejudiced if plaintiffs were granted leave to amend, and we see no basis for a finding of prejudice. Plaintiffs simply seek to add specificity to scienter allegations in a situation where defendants are aware of the circumstances giving rise to the action... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "178 F.3d 231, 243",
"parenthetical": "noting that merely adding specificity to allegations generally does not cause prejudice to the opposing party",
"sentence": "Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir.1999) (noting that merely adding specificity to alle... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "615 F.2d 606, 613",
"parenthetical": "\"Because defendant was from the outset made fully aware of the events giving rise to the action, an allowance of the amendment could not in any way prejudice the preparation of defendant's case.\"",
"sentence": "Edwards v. City of Gol... | 4,037,444 | a |
The IJ correctly determined that RosasLeon's 2004 conviction for violating Cal.Penal Code SS 273.5 is an aggravated felony crime of violence under 8 U.S.C. SS 1101(a)(43)(F), where he was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of one year. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "611 F.3d 1080, 1083",
"parenthetical": "a conviction under Cal.Penal Code SS 273.5 is categorically a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. SS 16(a",
"sentence": "See Banuelos-Ayon v. Holder, 611 F.3d 1080, 1083 (9th Cir.2010) (a conviction under Cal.Penal Code § 273.5 is categoric... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "551 F.3d 1076, 1083",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e do not use the categorical and modified categorical approach to determine whether a petitioner has met any sentencing requirement specified in SS 1101(a)(43).\"",
"sentence": "See Banuelos-Ayon v. Holder, 611 F.3d 1080, 1083 (... | 4,100,646 | a |
As defendant points out, the IAD recognizes the detrimental effects of pending charges. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "712 P.2d 993, 997",
"parenthetical": "the primary purpose of the IAD is \"to provide a mechanism for prisoners to insist upon speedy and final disposition of untried charges that are the subjects of detainers so that prison rehabilitation programs initiated for the prisoners' ben... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "IAD procedures prevent prosecutorial abuses of the power of detainer that potentially allow a defendant to languish in the separate jurisdiction under the constant, but uncertain threat of further prosecution",
"sentence": "See § 24-60-501, art. I, C... | 11,423,390 | a |
Additionally, we conclude that Bratcher's probation conditions 21 and 23 are neither overbroad or vague and that they are reasonably related to attaining the goals of rehabilitation and protecting the public Indeed, our Court has explained that because "child molesters molest children to whom they have access[,]" condi... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "990 N.E.2d 515, 515-16",
"parenthetical": "upholding sex offender's probation condition that prohibited him from accessing websites frequented by children",
"sentence": "See, eg., Patton, 990 N.E.2d at 515-16 (upholding sex offender's probation condition that prohibited him fro... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "836 N.E.2d 267, 275",
"parenthetical": "holding that a parole condition, which restricted a parolee's access to the internet unless he had prior approval of his parole officer, was reasonably related to reintegrating the parolee into his community and protecting the general ... | 7,271,475 | a |
Additionally, we conclude that Bratcher's probation conditions 21 and 23 are neither overbroad or vague and that they are reasonably related to attaining the goals of rehabilitation and protecting the public Indeed, our Court has explained that because "child molesters molest children to whom they have access[,]" condi... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "836 N.E.2d 267, 275",
"parenthetical": "holding that a parole condition, which restricted a parolee's access to the internet unless he had prior approval of his parole officer, was reasonably related to reintegrating the parolee into his community and protecting the general ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "863 N.E.2d 450, 450",
"parenthetical": "holding that the defendant/child molester's probation condition-which restricted his internet access unless he had prior approval of his probation officer-was reasonably related to his reintegration into the community and to protecting the ... | 7,271,475 | b |
Additionally, we conclude that Bratcher's probation conditions 21 and 23 are neither overbroad or vague and that they are reasonably related to attaining the goals of rehabilitation and protecting the public Indeed, our Court has explained that because "child molesters molest children to whom they have access[,]" condi... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "836 N.E.2d 267, 275",
"parenthetical": "holding that a parole condition, which restricted a parolee's access to the internet unless he had prior approval of his parole officer, was reasonably related to reintegrating the parolee into his community and protecting the general ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "779 N.E.2d 118, 118",
"parenthetical": "holding that the trial court did not err by restricting the defendant/child molester's gaccess to computers and online computer services",
"sentence": "See, eg., Patton, 990 N.E.2d at 515-16 (upholding sex offender's probation condition t... | 7,271,475 | b |
Petitioner raised grounds one and two of the Petition on direct appeal, and the court of appeal rejected them on the merits. (Lodged Docs. K, B.) Subsequently, the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner's petition for review without comment or citation to authority. (Lodged Doc. D.) The Court therefore "looks throu... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "560 U.S. 370, 380",
"parenthetical": "when state supreme court denies discretionary review of decision on direct appeal, that decision is relevant state-court decision for pui'poses of AEDPA's standard of review",
"sentence": "See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04, ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "501 U.S. 797, 803-04",
"parenthetical": "holding that California Supreme Court, by silently denying petition for review, presumably did not intend to change court of appeal's analysis",
"sentence": "See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04, 111 S.Ct. 2590, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (... | 5,739,947 | b |
Petitioner raised grounds one and two of the Petition on direct appeal, and the court of appeal rejected them on the merits. (Lodged Docs. K, B.) Subsequently, the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner's petition for review without comment or citation to authority. (Lodged Doc. D.) The Court therefore "looks throu... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "when state supreme court denies discretionary review of decision on direct appeal, that decision is relevant state-court decision for pui'poses of AEDPA's standard of review",
"sentence": "See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04, 111 S.Ct. 2590,... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "501 U.S. 797, 803-04",
"parenthetical": "holding that California Supreme Court, by silently denying petition for review, presumably did not intend to change court of appeal's analysis",
"sentence": "See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04, 111 S.Ct. 2590, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (... | 5,739,947 | b |
Petitioner raised grounds one and two of the Petition on direct appeal, and the court of appeal rejected them on the merits. (Lodged Docs. K, B.) Subsequently, the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner's petition for review without comment or citation to authority. (Lodged Doc. D.) The Court therefore "looks throu... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "when state supreme court denies discretionary review of decision on direct appeal, that decision is relevant state-court decision for pui'poses of AEDPA's standard of review",
"sentence": "See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04, 111 S.Ct. 2590,... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "501 U.S. 797, 803-04",
"parenthetical": "holding that California Supreme Court, by silently denying petition for review, presumably did not intend to change court of appeal's analysis",
"sentence": "See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04, 111 S.Ct. 2590, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (... | 5,739,947 | b |
Petitioner raised grounds one and two of the Petition on direct appeal, and the court of appeal rejected them on the merits. (Lodged Docs. K, B.) Subsequently, the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner's petition for review without comment or citation to authority. (Lodged Doc. D.) The Court therefore "looks throu... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that California Supreme Court, by silently denying petition for review, presumably did not intend to change court of appeal's analysis",
"sentence": "See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04, 111 S.Ct. 2590, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991) (holding tha... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "560 U.S. 370, 380",
"parenthetical": "when state supreme court denies discretionary review of decision on direct appeal, that decision is relevant state-court decision for pui'poses of AEDPA's standard of review",
"sentence": "See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04, ... | 5,739,947 | a |
Petitioner raised grounds one and two of the Petition on direct appeal, and the court of appeal rejected them on the merits. (Lodged Docs. K, B.) Subsequently, the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner's petition for review without comment or citation to authority. (Lodged Doc. D.) The Court therefore "looks throu... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "when state supreme court denies discretionary review of decision on direct appeal, that decision is relevant state-court decision for pui'poses of AEDPA's standard of review",
"sentence": "See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04, 111 S.Ct. 2590,... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that California Supreme Court, by silently denying petition for review, presumably did not intend to change court of appeal's analysis",
"sentence": "See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04, 111 S.Ct. 2590, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991) (holding tha... | 5,739,947 | b |
Petitioner raised grounds one and two of the Petition on direct appeal, and the court of appeal rejected them on the merits. (Lodged Docs. K, B.) Subsequently, the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner's petition for review without comment or citation to authority. (Lodged Doc. D.) The Court therefore "looks throu... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that California Supreme Court, by silently denying petition for review, presumably did not intend to change court of appeal's analysis",
"sentence": "See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04, 111 S.Ct. 2590, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991) (holding tha... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "when state supreme court denies discretionary review of decision on direct appeal, that decision is relevant state-court decision for pui'poses of AEDPA's standard of review",
"sentence": "See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04, 111 S.Ct. 2590,... | 5,739,947 | a |
Petitioner raised grounds one and two of the Petition on direct appeal, and the court of appeal rejected them on the merits. (Lodged Docs. K, B.) Subsequently, the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner's petition for review without comment or citation to authority. (Lodged Doc. D.) The Court therefore "looks throu... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "560 U.S. 370, 380",
"parenthetical": "when state supreme court denies discretionary review of decision on direct appeal, that decision is relevant state-court decision for pui'poses of AEDPA's standard of review",
"sentence": "See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04, ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that California Supreme Court, by silently denying petition for review, presumably did not intend to change court of appeal's analysis",
"sentence": "See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04, 111 S.Ct. 2590, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991) (holding tha... | 5,739,947 | b |
Petitioner raised grounds one and two of the Petition on direct appeal, and the court of appeal rejected them on the merits. (Lodged Docs. K, B.) Subsequently, the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner's petition for review without comment or citation to authority. (Lodged Doc. D.) The Court therefore "looks throu... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that California Supreme Court, by silently denying petition for review, presumably did not intend to change court of appeal's analysis",
"sentence": "See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04, 111 S.Ct. 2590, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991) (holding tha... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "when state supreme court denies discretionary review of decision on direct appeal, that decision is relevant state-court decision for pui'poses of AEDPA's standard of review",
"sentence": "See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04, 111 S.Ct. 2590,... | 5,739,947 | a |
Petitioner raised grounds one and two of the Petition on direct appeal, and the court of appeal rejected them on the merits. (Lodged Docs. K, B.) Subsequently, the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner's petition for review without comment or citation to authority. (Lodged Doc. D.) The Court therefore "looks throu... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "when state supreme court denies discretionary review of decision on direct appeal, that decision is relevant state-court decision for pui'poses of AEDPA's standard of review",
"sentence": "See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04, 111 S.Ct. 2590,... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that California Supreme Court, by silently denying petition for review, presumably did not intend to change court of appeal's analysis",
"sentence": "See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04, 111 S.Ct. 2590, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991) (holding tha... | 5,739,947 | b |
See Mathews' Dep. at 78, 83-84, 87-88, 96, 123-127. Mathews' violation of Giant's policy indicates that his performance was not satisfactory. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "32 F.Supp.2d 249, 255",
"parenthetical": "holding that employee's performance was unsatisfactory in part because he was tardy on a regular basis",
"sentence": "See Blair v. Colonnas Shipyard Inc., 52 F.Supp.2d 687, 694 (E.D.Va.1999), aff'd mem., 203 F.3d 819 (4th Cir.2000)... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "52 F.Supp.2d 687, 694",
"parenthetical": "\"Accordingly, since [employee] violated policies that the [employer] considered 'very important,' he did not perform his job satisfactorily and cannot establish a prima facie case of race discrimination.\"",
"sentence": "See Blair v. C... | 9,509,791 | b |
See Mathews' Dep. at 78, 83-84, 87-88, 96, 123-127. Mathews' violation of Giant's policy indicates that his performance was not satisfactory. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that employee's performance was unsatisfactory in part because he was tardy on a regular basis",
"sentence": "See Blair v. Colonnas Shipyard Inc., 52 F.Supp.2d 687, 694 (E.D.Va.1999), aff'd mem., 203 F.3d 819 (4th Cir.2000) (“Accordingly, sin... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "52 F.Supp.2d 687, 694",
"parenthetical": "\"Accordingly, since [employee] violated policies that the [employer] considered 'very important,' he did not perform his job satisfactorily and cannot establish a prima facie case of race discrimination.\"",
"sentence": "See Blair v. C... | 9,509,791 | b |
See Mathews' Dep. at 78, 83-84, 87-88, 96, 123-127. Mathews' violation of Giant's policy indicates that his performance was not satisfactory. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Accordingly, since [employee] violated policies that the [employer] considered 'very important,' he did not perform his job satisfactorily and cannot establish a prima facie case of race discrimination.\"",
"sentence": "See Blair v. Colonnas Shipyard In... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "32 F.Supp.2d 249, 255",
"parenthetical": "holding that employee's performance was unsatisfactory in part because he was tardy on a regular basis",
"sentence": "See Blair v. Colonnas Shipyard Inc., 52 F.Supp.2d 687, 694 (E.D.Va.1999), aff'd mem., 203 F.3d 819 (4th Cir.2000)... | 9,509,791 | a |
See Mathews' Dep. at 78, 83-84, 87-88, 96, 123-127. Mathews' violation of Giant's policy indicates that his performance was not satisfactory. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Accordingly, since [employee] violated policies that the [employer] considered 'very important,' he did not perform his job satisfactorily and cannot establish a prima facie case of race discrimination.\"",
"sentence": "See Blair v. Colonnas Shipyard In... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that employee's performance was unsatisfactory in part because he was tardy on a regular basis",
"sentence": "See Blair v. Colonnas Shipyard Inc., 52 F.Supp.2d 687, 694 (E.D.Va.1999), aff'd mem., 203 F.3d 819 (4th Cir.2000) (“Accordingly, sin... | 9,509,791 | a |
According ly, further discovery is not necessary for the Court to construe the Agreement. Mfrs. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "1999 WL 301688, at *5",
"parenthetical": "discovery granted when extrinsic evidence was necessary to interpret contract language",
"sentence": "Hanover Trust Co. v. Jayhawk Assocs., 766 F.Supp. 124, 127 (S.D.N.Y.1991) (application for further discovery denied when the contract ... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "766 F.Supp. 124, 127",
"parenthetical": "application for further discovery denied when the contract is unambiguous",
"sentence": "Hanover Trust Co. v. Jayhawk Assocs., 766 F.Supp. 124, 127 (S.D.N.Y.1991) (application for further discovery denied when the contract is unamb... | 9,491,150 | b |
According ly, further discovery is not necessary for the Court to construe the Agreement. Mfrs. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "766 F.Supp. 124, 127",
"parenthetical": "application for further discovery denied when the contract is unambiguous",
"sentence": "Hanover Trust Co. v. Jayhawk Assocs., 766 F.Supp. 124, 127 (S.D.N.Y.1991) (application for further discovery denied when the contract is unamb... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "1989 WL 132027, at *4",
"parenthetical": "no discovery warranted when the contractual language is clear and unambiguous",
"sentence": "Hanover Trust Co. v. Jayhawk Assocs., 766 F.Supp. 124, 127 (S.D.N.Y.1991) (application for further discovery denied when the contract is unambi... | 9,491,150 | a |
The Secretary argues Woodruff does not have a disability in the technical sense of 42 U.S.C. SS 12102(2). But as noted above, this argument appeared first in the Secretary's Reply to Woodruffs Opposition, at which point Woodruff had no opportunity to develop the record in response. Therefore, we shall not consider the ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "428 U.S. 106, 121",
"parenthetical": "\"The matter of what questions may be taken up and resolved for the first time on appeal is one left primarily to the dis cretion of the courts of appeals, to be exercised on the facts of individual cases.\"",
"sentence": "See Singleton v. ... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "745 F.2d 1500, 1537",
"parenthetical": "refusing to order summary judgment prior to discovery, as it would be \"clearly unjust for the appellate court to direct the issuance of summary judgment\" unless the issue \"was clearly framed by the proceedings below so that the parties h... | 3,865,187 | a |
The Secretary argues Woodruff does not have a disability in the technical sense of 42 U.S.C. SS 12102(2). But as noted above, this argument appeared first in the Secretary's Reply to Woodruffs Opposition, at which point Woodruff had no opportunity to develop the record in response. Therefore, we shall not consider the ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "428 U.S. 106, 121",
"parenthetical": "\"The matter of what questions may be taken up and resolved for the first time on appeal is one left primarily to the dis cretion of the courts of appeals, to be exercised on the facts of individual cases.\"",
"sentence": "See Singleton v. ... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "refusing to order summary judgment prior to discovery, as it would be \"clearly unjust for the appellate court to direct the issuance of summary judgment\" unless the issue \"was clearly framed by the proceedings below so that the parties had a legitimate c... | 3,865,187 | a |
The Secretary argues Woodruff does not have a disability in the technical sense of 42 U.S.C. SS 12102(2). But as noted above, this argument appeared first in the Secretary's Reply to Woodruffs Opposition, at which point Woodruff had no opportunity to develop the record in response. Therefore, we shall not consider the ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "428 U.S. 106, 121",
"parenthetical": "\"The matter of what questions may be taken up and resolved for the first time on appeal is one left primarily to the dis cretion of the courts of appeals, to be exercised on the facts of individual cases.\"",
"sentence": "See Singleton v. ... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "refusing to order summary judgment prior to discovery, as it would be \"clearly unjust for the appellate court to direct the issuance of summary judgment\" unless the issue \"was clearly framed by the proceedings below so that the parties had a legitimate c... | 3,865,187 | a |
The Secretary argues Woodruff does not have a disability in the technical sense of 42 U.S.C. SS 12102(2). But as noted above, this argument appeared first in the Secretary's Reply to Woodruffs Opposition, at which point Woodruff had no opportunity to develop the record in response. Therefore, we shall not consider the ... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "refusing to order summary judgment prior to discovery, as it would be \"clearly unjust for the appellate court to direct the issuance of summary judgment\" unless the issue \"was clearly framed by the proceedings below so that the parties had a legitimate c... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "428 U.S. 106, 121",
"parenthetical": "\"The matter of what questions may be taken up and resolved for the first time on appeal is one left primarily to the dis cretion of the courts of appeals, to be exercised on the facts of individual cases.\"",
"sentence": "See Singleton v. ... | 3,865,187 | b |
The Secretary argues Woodruff does not have a disability in the technical sense of 42 U.S.C. SS 12102(2). But as noted above, this argument appeared first in the Secretary's Reply to Woodruffs Opposition, at which point Woodruff had no opportunity to develop the record in response. Therefore, we shall not consider the ... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "745 F.2d 1500, 1537",
"parenthetical": "refusing to order summary judgment prior to discovery, as it would be \"clearly unjust for the appellate court to direct the issuance of summary judgment\" unless the issue \"was clearly framed by the proceedings below so that the parties h... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The matter of what questions may be taken up and resolved for the first time on appeal is one left primarily to the dis cretion of the courts of appeals, to be exercised on the facts of individual cases.\"",
"sentence": "See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S.... | 3,865,187 | b |
The Secretary argues Woodruff does not have a disability in the technical sense of 42 U.S.C. SS 12102(2). But as noted above, this argument appeared first in the Secretary's Reply to Woodruffs Opposition, at which point Woodruff had no opportunity to develop the record in response. Therefore, we shall not consider the ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The matter of what questions may be taken up and resolved for the first time on appeal is one left primarily to the dis cretion of the courts of appeals, to be exercised on the facts of individual cases.\"",
"sentence": "See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S.... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "refusing to order summary judgment prior to discovery, as it would be \"clearly unjust for the appellate court to direct the issuance of summary judgment\" unless the issue \"was clearly framed by the proceedings below so that the parties had a legitimate c... | 3,865,187 | a |
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