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Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "919 P.2d 7, 22",
"parenthetical": "in capital case, court concluded that \"there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel\"",
"sentence": ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to ... | 3,593,641 | a |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "919 P.2d 7, 22",
"parenthetical": "in capital case, court concluded that \"there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel\"",
"sentence": ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to ... | 3,593,641 | a |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to ... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "919 P.2d 7, 22",
"parenthetical": "in capital case, court concluded that \"there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel\"",
"sentence": ... | 3,593,641 | b |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "919 P.2d 7, 22",
"parenthetical": "in capital case, court concluded that \"there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel\"",
"sentence": ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "837 S.W.2d 503, 514",
"parenthetical": "\"the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury\"",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn state... | 3,593,641 | a |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "919 P.2d 7, 22",
"parenthetical": "in capital case, court concluded that \"there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel\"",
"sentence": ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "521 Pa. 188, 212-13",
"parenthetical": "concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding \"no reason in law or logic\" why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in ... | 3,593,641 | a |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "919 P.2d 7, 22",
"parenthetical": "in capital case, court concluded that \"there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel\"",
"sentence": ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding \"no reason in law or logic\" why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencin... | 3,593,641 | a |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding \"no reason in law or logic\" why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencin... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "919 P.2d 7, 22",
"parenthetical": "in capital case, court concluded that \"there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel\"",
"sentence": ... | 3,593,641 | b |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding \"no reason in law or logic\" why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencin... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "919 P.2d 7, 22",
"parenthetical": "in capital case, court concluded that \"there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel\"",
"sentence": ... | 3,593,641 | b |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding \"no reason in law or logic\" why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencin... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "919 P.2d 7, 22",
"parenthetical": "in capital case, court concluded that \"there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel\"",
"sentence": ... | 3,593,641 | b |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "152 F.3d 381, 392-93",
"parenthetical": "concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to mak... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in capital case, court concluded that \"there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel\"",
"sentence": "State v. Pe... | 3,593,641 | b |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to ... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in capital case, court concluded that \"there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel\"",
"sentence": "State v. Pe... | 3,593,641 | b |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to ... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in capital case, court concluded that \"there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel\"",
"sentence": "State v. Pe... | 3,593,641 | b |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to ... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in capital case, court concluded that \"there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel\"",
"sentence": "State v. Pe... | 3,593,641 | b |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "837 S.W.2d 503, 514",
"parenthetical": "\"the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury\"",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn state... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in capital case, court concluded that \"there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel\"",
"sentence": "State v. Pe... | 3,593,641 | b |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "521 Pa. 188, 212-13",
"parenthetical": "concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding \"no reason in law or logic\" why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in ... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in capital case, court concluded that \"there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel\"",
"sentence": "State v. Pe... | 3,593,641 | b |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in capital case, court concluded that \"there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel\"",
"sentence": "State v. Pe... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding \"no reason in law or logic\" why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencin... | 3,593,641 | a |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in capital case, court concluded that \"there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel\"",
"sentence": "State v. Pe... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding \"no reason in law or logic\" why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencin... | 3,593,641 | a |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in capital case, court concluded that \"there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel\"",
"sentence": "State v. Pe... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding \"no reason in law or logic\" why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencin... | 3,593,641 | a |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in capital case, court concluded that \"there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel\"",
"sentence": "State v. Pe... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding \"no reason in law or logic\" why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencin... | 3,593,641 | a |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "152 F.3d 381, 392-93",
"parenthetical": "concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to mak... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in capital case, court concluded that \"there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel\"",
"sentence": "State v. Pe... | 3,593,641 | b |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to ... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in capital case, court concluded that \"there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel\"",
"sentence": "State v. Pe... | 3,593,641 | b |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in capital case, court concluded that \"there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel\"",
"sentence": "State v. Pe... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to ... | 3,593,641 | a |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in capital case, court concluded that \"there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel\"",
"sentence": "State v. Pe... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to ... | 3,593,641 | a |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in capital case, court concluded that \"there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel\"",
"sentence": "State v. Pe... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "837 S.W.2d 503, 514",
"parenthetical": "\"the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury\"",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn state... | 3,593,641 | a |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in capital case, court concluded that \"there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel\"",
"sentence": "State v. Pe... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "521 Pa. 188, 212-13",
"parenthetical": "concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding \"no reason in law or logic\" why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in ... | 3,593,641 | a |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in capital case, court concluded that \"there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel\"",
"sentence": "State v. Pe... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding \"no reason in law or logic\" why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencin... | 3,593,641 | a |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding \"no reason in law or logic\" why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencin... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in capital case, court concluded that \"there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel\"",
"sentence": "State v. Pe... | 3,593,641 | b |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in capital case, court concluded that \"there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel\"",
"sentence": "State v. Pe... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding \"no reason in law or logic\" why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencin... | 3,593,641 | a |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding \"no reason in law or logic\" why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencin... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in capital case, court concluded that \"there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel\"",
"sentence": "State v. Pe... | 3,593,641 | b |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "152 F.3d 381, 392-93",
"parenthetical": "concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to mak... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in capital case, court concluded that \"there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel\"",
"sentence": "State v. Pe... | 3,593,641 | b |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to ... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in capital case, court concluded that \"there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel\"",
"sentence": "State v. Pe... | 3,593,641 | b |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in capital case, court concluded that \"there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel\"",
"sentence": "State v. Pe... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to ... | 3,593,641 | a |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in capital case, court concluded that \"there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel\"",
"sentence": "State v. Pe... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to ... | 3,593,641 | a |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in capital case, court concluded that \"there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel\"",
"sentence": "State v. Pe... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "837 S.W.2d 503, 514",
"parenthetical": "\"the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury\"",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn state... | 3,593,641 | a |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "521 Pa. 188, 212-13",
"parenthetical": "concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding \"no reason in law or logic\" why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in ... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in capital case, court concluded that \"there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel\"",
"sentence": "State v. Pe... | 3,593,641 | b |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding \"no reason in law or logic\" why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencin... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in capital case, court concluded that \"there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel\"",
"sentence": "State v. Pe... | 3,593,641 | b |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in capital case, court concluded that \"there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel\"",
"sentence": "State v. Pe... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding \"no reason in law or logic\" why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencin... | 3,593,641 | a |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in capital case, court concluded that \"there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel\"",
"sentence": "State v. Pe... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding \"no reason in law or logic\" why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencin... | 3,593,641 | a |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding \"no reason in law or logic\" why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencin... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in capital case, court concluded that \"there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel\"",
"sentence": "State v. Pe... | 3,593,641 | b |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "878 S.W.2d 530, 552",
"parenthetical": "\"there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case\"",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "152 F.3d 381, 392-93",
"parenthetical": "concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to mak... | 3,593,641 | a |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to ... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "878 S.W.2d 530, 552",
"parenthetical": "\"there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case\"",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to... | 3,593,641 | b |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to ... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "878 S.W.2d 530, 552",
"parenthetical": "\"there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case\"",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to... | 3,593,641 | b |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "878 S.W.2d 530, 552",
"parenthetical": "\"there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case\"",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to ... | 3,593,641 | a |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "837 S.W.2d 503, 514",
"parenthetical": "\"the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury\"",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn state... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "878 S.W.2d 530, 552",
"parenthetical": "\"there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case\"",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to... | 3,593,641 | b |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "878 S.W.2d 530, 552",
"parenthetical": "\"there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case\"",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "521 Pa. 188, 212-13",
"parenthetical": "concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding \"no reason in law or logic\" why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in ... | 3,593,641 | a |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "878 S.W.2d 530, 552",
"parenthetical": "\"there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case\"",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding \"no reason in law or logic\" why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencin... | 3,593,641 | a |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding \"no reason in law or logic\" why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencin... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "878 S.W.2d 530, 552",
"parenthetical": "\"there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case\"",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to... | 3,593,641 | b |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding \"no reason in law or logic\" why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencin... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "878 S.W.2d 530, 552",
"parenthetical": "\"there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case\"",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to... | 3,593,641 | b |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding \"no reason in law or logic\" why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencin... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "878 S.W.2d 530, 552",
"parenthetical": "\"there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case\"",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to... | 3,593,641 | b |
Here, according to the testimony of the officers, which the trial court found reliable, English's tag was not in compliance with the statute. As such, the officers had the authority to conduct a traffic stop in this case. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "11 So.3d 462, 463-64",
"parenthetical": "finding that police officers who were unable to read defendant's license plate because of a trailer hitch properly attached to the vehicle lacked authority to perform a traffic stop, because matters external to the tag, such as trailer... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "471 So.2d 155, 156-57",
"parenthetical": "finding that officer charged with enforcing motor vehicle laws had the duty and authority to investigate why a vehicle that was parked in the roadway had its license tag partially obscured with a dirty rag, in violation of the law",
"se... | 6,868,744 | b |
We are convinced that self-proclaimed "professionals" offering financial planning services, like Barrett and Papetti, are not the "learned professionals" identified by the court in Neveroski who are beyond the reach of the CFA. Although competing voluntary associations issue designations to those who seek to be called ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "professional or semi-professional suggests person is subject to testing, licensing and comprehensive regulation by relevant regulatory bodies",
"sentence": "See Plemmons, supra, 387 N. J.Super. at 564, 904 A.2d 825 (professional or semi-professional sugge... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "400 N.J.Super. 494, 507",
"parenthetical": "federal depositions shorthand reporting services are not semi-professional because services are not subject to regulation under the state statute and regulations governing shorthand reporting",
"sentence": "See Plemmons, supra, 3... | 3,788,096 | a |
We are convinced that self-proclaimed "professionals" offering financial planning services, like Barrett and Papetti, are not the "learned professionals" identified by the court in Neveroski who are beyond the reach of the CFA. Although competing voluntary associations issue designations to those who seek to be called ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "professional or semi-professional suggests person is subject to testing, licensing and comprehensive regulation by relevant regulatory bodies",
"sentence": "See Plemmons, supra, 387 N. J.Super. at 564, 904 A.2d 825 (professional or semi-professional sugge... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "federal depositions shorthand reporting services are not semi-professional because services are not subject to regulation under the state statute and regulations governing shorthand reporting",
"sentence": "See Plemmons, supra, 387 N. J.Super. at 564... | 3,788,096 | a |
"The Supreme Court has applied the intelligible principle test to regulations that may be enforceable through criminal penalties." | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "784 F.3d 666, 672",
"parenthetical": "\"the Court has never expressly held that an intelligible principle alone suffices to save a putative delegation when the criminal law is involved.\"",
"sentence": "Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409, 48 S.Ct. 348, ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "896 F.Supp. 1057, 1062",
"parenthetical": "\"The Supreme Court has never rejected the intelligible principle test in the criminal context.\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Nichols, 784 F.3d 666, 672 (10th Cir.2015) (citing United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 695 n. 10, 117... | 4,365,584 | b |
Even if the rationale underlying the going and coming rule did not exclude Nichols, the third enumerated exception to that rule would. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "211 Va. 279, 282",
"parenthetical": "where the employee on his way to or from work is still charged with some duty or task in connection with his employment",
"sentence": "LeWhite Constr. Co. v. Dunn, 211 Va. 279, 282, 176 S.E.2d 809, 813 (1970) (where the employee on his... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "597 A.2d 1116, 1120",
"parenthetical": "licensed practical nurse employed by nursing agency injured in automobile accident on way to work at hospital where sent by agency",
"sentence": "LeWhite Constr. Co. v. Dunn, 211 Va. 279, 282, 176 S.E.2d 809, 813 (1970) (where the em... | 4,403,190 | a |
Even if the rationale underlying the going and coming rule did not exclude Nichols, the third enumerated exception to that rule would. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "597 A.2d 1116, 1120",
"parenthetical": "licensed practical nurse employed by nursing agency injured in automobile accident on way to work at hospital where sent by agency",
"sentence": "LeWhite Constr. Co. v. Dunn, 211 Va. 279, 282, 176 S.E.2d 809, 813 (1970) (where the em... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "176 S.E.2d 809, 813",
"parenthetical": "where the employee on his way to or from work is still charged with some duty or task in connection with his employment",
"sentence": "LeWhite Constr. Co. v. Dunn, 211 Va. 279, 282, 176 S.E.2d 809, 813 (1970) (where the employee on ... | 4,403,190 | b |
There is another deficiency in the record that also precludes a finding that Kirkpatrick's waiver was valid. 'Where courts have previously found waivers of habeas claims to be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, and therefore valid, they have done so after a hearing at which the court conducts a colloquy to assess the... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "495 U.S. 732, 732-33",
"parenthetical": "concluding that a state court waiver was valid only after that court questioned the petitioner under oath and concluded specifically that the waiver was intelligently executed",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Demosthenes, 495 U.S. at 732-33, 11... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "217 F.3d 939, 947",
"parenthetical": "finding that a waiver was not valid because no court ever had a chance to question the petitioner on the record as to his intentions and understanding",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Demosthenes, 495 U.S. at 732-33, 110 S.Ct. 2223 (concludin... | 12,266,875 | a |
There is another deficiency in the record that also precludes a finding that Kirkpatrick's waiver was valid. 'Where courts have previously found waivers of habeas claims to be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, and therefore valid, they have done so after a hearing at which the court conducts a colloquy to assess the... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "217 F.3d 939, 947",
"parenthetical": "finding that a waiver was not valid because no court ever had a chance to question the petitioner on the record as to his intentions and understanding",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Demosthenes, 495 U.S. at 732-33, 110 S.Ct. 2223 (concludin... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that a state court waiver was valid only after that court questioned the petitioner under oath and concluded specifically that the waiver was intelligently executed",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Demosthenes, 495 U.S. at 732-33, 110 S.Ct. 2223 (conc... | 12,266,875 | b |
There is another deficiency in the record that also precludes a finding that Kirkpatrick's waiver was valid. 'Where courts have previously found waivers of habeas claims to be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, and therefore valid, they have done so after a hearing at which the court conducts a colloquy to assess the... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "217 F.3d 939, 947",
"parenthetical": "finding that a waiver was not valid because no court ever had a chance to question the petitioner on the record as to his intentions and understanding",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Demosthenes, 495 U.S. at 732-33, 110 S.Ct. 2223 (concludin... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "378 F.3d 884, 884",
"parenthetical": "accepting a state court waiver as valid because that court \"engaged in a comprehensive colloquy\" with the petitioner during which \"[t]he court had [petitioner] re-read his initial habeas petition ... and the court reviewed with [petitioner... | 12,266,875 | b |
There is another deficiency in the record that also precludes a finding that Kirkpatrick's waiver was valid. 'Where courts have previously found waivers of habeas claims to be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, and therefore valid, they have done so after a hearing at which the court conducts a colloquy to assess the... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "516 F.3d 183, 183-85",
"parenthetical": "holding that even though the state court did engage in a colloquy with the petitioner, that colloquy was insufficient to establish that the waiver was knowing and voluntary because the state court had refused to permit petitioner's counsel... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "217 F.3d 939, 947",
"parenthetical": "finding that a waiver was not valid because no court ever had a chance to question the petitioner on the record as to his intentions and understanding",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Demosthenes, 495 U.S. at 732-33, 110 S.Ct. 2223 (concludin... | 12,266,875 | a |
The district court properly dismissed Hayes' action because the allegations in Hayes' amended complaint demonstrate that, even if his access to the law library was deficient, he did not sustain an actual injury as a result of defendants' conduct. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "886 F.2d 1166, 1171",
"parenthetical": "holding that an \"actual injury consists of some specific instance in which an inmate was actually denied access to the courts\"",
"sentence": "See Letvis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351-53, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996) (holdin... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "518 U.S. 343, 351-53",
"parenthetical": "holding that there is no abstract freestanding right to a law library, and a prisoner must demonstrate that his efforts to pursue a non-frivolous legal claim were hindered",
"sentence": "See Letvis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351-53, 116 S.C... | 4,076,310 | b |
The district court properly dismissed Hayes' action because the allegations in Hayes' amended complaint demonstrate that, even if his access to the law library was deficient, he did not sustain an actual injury as a result of defendants' conduct. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "886 F.2d 1166, 1171",
"parenthetical": "holding that an \"actual injury consists of some specific instance in which an inmate was actually denied access to the courts\"",
"sentence": "See Letvis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351-53, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996) (holdin... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that there is no abstract freestanding right to a law library, and a prisoner must demonstrate that his efforts to pursue a non-frivolous legal claim were hindered",
"sentence": "See Letvis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351-53, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.... | 4,076,310 | b |
The district court properly dismissed Hayes' action because the allegations in Hayes' amended complaint demonstrate that, even if his access to the law library was deficient, he did not sustain an actual injury as a result of defendants' conduct. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "886 F.2d 1166, 1171",
"parenthetical": "holding that an \"actual injury consists of some specific instance in which an inmate was actually denied access to the courts\"",
"sentence": "See Letvis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351-53, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996) (holdin... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that there is no abstract freestanding right to a law library, and a prisoner must demonstrate that his efforts to pursue a non-frivolous legal claim were hindered",
"sentence": "See Letvis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351-53, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.... | 4,076,310 | b |
As a result, all that remains of either part of Marks's claim is a theory that the Company's delay in granting his requests denied him a reasonable accommodation. To be sure, an employer's "unreasonable" delay may constitute the denial of an accommodation in some circumstances. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "613 F.3d 1162, 1168",
"parenthetical": "suggesting there are situations where \"a long-delayed accommodation\" could be considered \"unreasonable\" and hence \"actionable under the ADA\"",
"sentence": "Valle-Arce v. Puerto Rico Ports Auth., 651 F.3d 190, 200 (1st Cir. 2011... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "620 F.3d 62, 68-69",
"parenthetical": "holding condominium association's delay of more than a year in deciding on request for designated handicapped parking spaces constituted a denial of accommodation request",
"sentence": "Valle-Arce v. Puerto Rico Ports Auth., 651 F.3d... | 12,273,721 | b |
We agree with Alvarado-Casas that it was error for the, district court to inform him that he faced only a ten-year maximum sentence, and that the error was clear and obvious. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "102 F.3d 118, 123",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] plain reading of Rule 11 requires the district court to inform the defendant of the ... maximum possible penalty applicable to each count to which the defendant is pleading guilty.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Still, 102 F.3d... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "229 Fed.Appx. 296, 297",
"parenthetical": "\"The parties do not dispute that the district court incorrectly admonished [the defendant] regarding the maximum term of imprisonment and that the error was clear and obvious.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Still, 102 F.3d... | 6,047,515 | a |
App., Vol. II at 343. It does not appear from the record that Dr. Todd examined claimant; even if he did, his statement is conclusory and unsupported. Dr. Todd's brief report does not discuss or reference any supporting clinical data, or provide any explanation for his assertion that claimant's symptoms are disproporti... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "816 F.2d 508, 513",
"parenthetical": "a \"physician's opinion [may] be rejected if it is brief, conclusory, and unsupported by medical evidence.\"",
"sentence": "See Frey v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 508, 513 (10th Cir.1987) (a “physician’s opinion [may] be rejected if it is brief, concl... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "966 F.2d 1371, 1374",
"parenthetical": "evidence is not substantial if it really constitutes not evidence but -mere conclusion",
"sentence": "See Frey v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 508, 513 (10th Cir.1987) (a “physician’s opinion [may] be rejected if it is brief, conclusory, and unsu... | 9,267,939 | a |
It does not "propose a commercial transaction" and is therefore not commercial speech. Because it is not commercial speech, the book is entitled to the full panoply of First Amendment protections. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "255 F.3d 1185, 1185-86",
"parenthetical": "speech at issue not \"commercial speech,\" and therefore entitled to full First Amendment protection",
"sentence": "Hoffman, 255 F.3d at 1185-86 (speech at issue not “commercial speech,” and therefore entitled to full First Amend... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Abercrombie's catalog, which used the plaintiffs photograph without permission to promote its clothing, was \"commercial in nature and, therefore, not entitled to the full First Amendment protection\"",
"sentence": "Hoffman, 255 F.3d at 1185-86 (speech at... | 9,430,283 | a |
Indeed, as counsel conceded at oral argument, Appellees have taken an oath to enforce Minnesota law. Appellants "are thus not without some reason in fearing prosecution" should they make the political expenditures that they propose. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "442 U.S. 302, 302",
"parenthetical": "holding that fear of prosecution was not imaginary or speculative, even though the challenged criminal penalty provision had never been applied to plaintiffs' proposed conduct, where statute on its face proscribed the proposed conduct a... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "146 F.3d 560, 560",
"parenthetical": "holding that plaintiffs had standing to challenge the constitutionality of various provisions in Arkansas's campaign finance law even though plaintiffs had neither violated the law nor been directly threatened with prosecution under the ... | 31,258 | a |
Indeed, as counsel conceded at oral argument, Appellees have taken an oath to enforce Minnesota law. Appellants "are thus not without some reason in fearing prosecution" should they make the political expenditures that they propose. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "442 U.S. 302, 302",
"parenthetical": "holding that fear of prosecution was not imaginary or speculative, even though the challenged criminal penalty provision had never been applied to plaintiffs' proposed conduct, where statute on its face proscribed the proposed conduct a... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "99 F.3d 8, 12-15",
"parenthetical": "determining that political action committee had standing to challenge New Hampshire campaign finance limits even though New Hampshire's Attorney General had informed plaintiff that the state would not enforce the law",
"sentence": "Babb... | 31,258 | a |
Indeed, as counsel conceded at oral argument, Appellees have taken an oath to enforce Minnesota law. Appellants "are thus not without some reason in fearing prosecution" should they make the political expenditures that they propose. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "146 F.3d 560, 560",
"parenthetical": "holding that plaintiffs had standing to challenge the constitutionality of various provisions in Arkansas's campaign finance law even though plaintiffs had neither violated the law nor been directly threatened with prosecution under the ... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that fear of prosecution was not imaginary or speculative, even though the challenged criminal penalty provision had never been applied to plaintiffs' proposed conduct, where statute on its face proscribed the proposed conduct and where \"the ... | 31,258 | b |
Indeed, as counsel conceded at oral argument, Appellees have taken an oath to enforce Minnesota law. Appellants "are thus not without some reason in fearing prosecution" should they make the political expenditures that they propose. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "99 F.3d 8, 12-15",
"parenthetical": "determining that political action committee had standing to challenge New Hampshire campaign finance limits even though New Hampshire's Attorney General had informed plaintiff that the state would not enforce the law",
"sentence": "Babb... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that fear of prosecution was not imaginary or speculative, even though the challenged criminal penalty provision had never been applied to plaintiffs' proposed conduct, where statute on its face proscribed the proposed conduct and where \"the ... | 31,258 | b |
Neither has McDonough produced evidence to support her contention that she was substantially limited in her ability to stand. It is undisputed that she could stand for one hour a day and intermittently for four hours a day. She was also able to perform all of the following activities, each of which involves standing: v... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "242 F.3d 610, 614",
"parenthetical": "holding that plaintiffs inability to stand for more than one hour did not render her disabled",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Neal, 379 Fed.Appx. at 634 (holding that plaintiffs inability to stand more than two hours was insufficient, as a m... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "379 Fed.Appx. 634, 634",
"parenthetical": "holding that plaintiffs inability to stand more than two hours was insufficient, as a matter of law, to prove that she was disabled",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Neal, 379 Fed.Appx. at 634 (holding that plaintiffs inability to stand more t... | 3,740,477 | b |
After reviewing the record, we find that Eggink's action lacks an arguable legal basis and is thus frivolous. With respect to Storm-Eggink's claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. SS 1983, it is clear that her arrest for possession of marijuana did not deprive her of a constitutional right. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "892 F.2d 453, 454",
"parenthetical": "holding that possession of marijuana is not protected by the free exercise clause of the First Amendment",
"sentence": "See United States v. Kiffer, 477 F.2d 349, 352 (2d Cir.1973); see also United States v. Fry, 787 F.2d 903, 905 (4th Cir.... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "787 F.2d 903, 905",
"parenthetical": "\"There is no fundamental right to produce or distribute marijuana commercially.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Kiffer, 477 F.2d 349, 352 (2d Cir.1973); see also United States v. Fry, 787 F.2d 903, 905 (4th Cir.1986) (“There is ... | 4,091,507 | b |
After reviewing the record, we find that Eggink's action lacks an arguable legal basis and is thus frivolous. With respect to Storm-Eggink's claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. SS 1983, it is clear that her arrest for possession of marijuana did not deprive her of a constitutional right. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "892 F.2d 453, 454",
"parenthetical": "holding that possession of marijuana is not protected by the free exercise clause of the First Amendment",
"sentence": "See United States v. Kiffer, 477 F.2d 349, 352 (2d Cir.1973); see also United States v. Fry, 787 F.2d 903, 905 (4th Cir.... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "692 F.2d 542, 547",
"parenthetical": "\"[Tjhere is no fundamental constitutional right to import, sell, or possess marijuana ----\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Kiffer, 477 F.2d 349, 352 (2d Cir.1973); see also United States v. Fry, 787 F.2d 903, 905 (4th Cir.1986) ... | 4,091,507 | b |
The Board has argued that giving effect to the arbitrator's decision in this case would run afoul of the principle that waivers of employee rights must be undertaken in "clear and unmistakable" terms. | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "663 F.2d 455, 458-59",
"parenthetical": "clear and unmistakable waiver of right to strike over administration of pension fund held unnecessary where general contract term extended scope of no-strike clause beyond scope of arbitration clause",
"sentence": "But cf. Pacemaker ... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "350 U.S. 270, 281-83",
"parenthetical": "absent explicit waiver of right to strike in protest of employer's unfair labor practices, such right is not waived",
"sentence": "Cf. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 281-83, 76 S.Ct. 349, 357-358, 100 L.Ed. 309 (1956) (abse... | 1,156,542 | b |
The Board has argued that giving effect to the arbitrator's decision in this case would run afoul of the principle that waivers of employee rights must be undertaken in "clear and unmistakable" terms. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "76 S.Ct. 349, 357-358",
"parenthetical": "absent explicit waiver of right to strike in protest of employer's unfair labor practices, such right is not waived",
"sentence": "Cf. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 281-83, 76 S.Ct. 349, 357-358, 100 L.Ed. 309 (1956) (abs... | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "663 F.2d 455, 458-59",
"parenthetical": "clear and unmistakable waiver of right to strike over administration of pension fund held unnecessary where general contract term extended scope of no-strike clause beyond scope of arbitration clause",
"sentence": "But cf. Pacemaker ... | 1,156,542 | a |
The Board has argued that giving effect to the arbitrator's decision in this case would run afoul of the principle that waivers of employee rights must be undertaken in "clear and unmistakable" terms. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "absent explicit waiver of right to strike in protest of employer's unfair labor practices, such right is not waived",
"sentence": "Cf. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 281-83, 76 S.Ct. 349, 357-358, 100 L.Ed. 309 (1956) (absent explicit waiver... | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "663 F.2d 455, 458-59",
"parenthetical": "clear and unmistakable waiver of right to strike over administration of pension fund held unnecessary where general contract term extended scope of no-strike clause beyond scope of arbitration clause",
"sentence": "But cf. Pacemaker ... | 1,156,542 | a |
The Board has argued that giving effect to the arbitrator's decision in this case would run afoul of the principle that waivers of employee rights must be undertaken in "clear and unmistakable" terms. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "350 U.S. 270, 281-83",
"parenthetical": "absent explicit waiver of right to strike in protest of employer's unfair labor practices, such right is not waived",
"sentence": "Cf. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 281-83, 76 S.Ct. 349, 357-358, 100 L.Ed. 309 (1956) (abse... | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "663 F.2d 455, 458-59",
"parenthetical": "clear and unmistakable waiver of right to strike over administration of pension fund held unnecessary where general contract term extended scope of no-strike clause beyond scope of arbitration clause",
"sentence": "But cf. Pacemaker ... | 3,625,521 | a |
The Board has argued that giving effect to the arbitrator's decision in this case would run afoul of the principle that waivers of employee rights must be undertaken in "clear and unmistakable" terms. | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "663 F.2d 455, 458-59",
"parenthetical": "clear and unmistakable waiver of right to strike over administration of pension fund held unnecessary where general contract term extended scope of no-strike clause beyond scope of arbitration clause",
"sentence": "But cf. Pacemaker ... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "76 S.Ct. 349, 357-358",
"parenthetical": "absent explicit waiver of right to strike in protest of employer's unfair labor practices, such right is not waived",
"sentence": "Cf. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 281-83, 76 S.Ct. 349, 357-358, 100 L.Ed. 309 (1956) (abs... | 3,625,521 | b |
The Board has argued that giving effect to the arbitrator's decision in this case would run afoul of the principle that waivers of employee rights must be undertaken in "clear and unmistakable" terms. | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "663 F.2d 455, 458-59",
"parenthetical": "clear and unmistakable waiver of right to strike over administration of pension fund held unnecessary where general contract term extended scope of no-strike clause beyond scope of arbitration clause",
"sentence": "But cf. Pacemaker ... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "absent explicit waiver of right to strike in protest of employer's unfair labor practices, such right is not waived",
"sentence": "Cf. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 281-83, 76 S.Ct. 349, 357-358, 100 L.Ed. 309 (1956) (absent explicit waiver... | 3,625,521 | b |
Simpson, 880 So.2d at 1051 (P 14) (holding plaintiff can prove foreseeability by showing "the defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of the assailant's violent nature"). We note California's foreseeability test for spouses of child molesters is actual knowledge. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "930 S.W.2d 921, 928",
"parenthetical": "holding the test for foreseeability is whether the wife knew or should have known of her husband's proclivities",
"sentence": "But see Doe v. Franklin, 930 S.W.2d 921, 928 (Tex.Ct.App.1996) (holding the test for foreseeability is whet... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "adopting the \"particularized foreseeability\" test for spouses of child molesters, \"a standard of foreseeability ... that is based on 'particular knowledge' or 'special reason to know'\"",
"sentence": "Chaney, 46 Cal.Rptr.2d at 76 (quoting Uccello ... | 7,003,037 | b |
Simpson, 880 So.2d at 1051 (P 14) (holding plaintiff can prove foreseeability by showing "the defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of the assailant's violent nature"). We note California's foreseeability test for spouses of child molesters is actual knowledge. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "930 S.W.2d 921, 928",
"parenthetical": "holding the test for foreseeability is whether the wife knew or should have known of her husband's proclivities",
"sentence": "But see Doe v. Franklin, 930 S.W.2d 921, 928 (Tex.Ct.App.1996) (holding the test for foreseeability is whet... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "714 A.2d 924, 930",
"parenthetical": "adopting the \"particularized foreseeability\" test for spouses of child molesters, \"a standard of foreseeability ... that is based on 'particular knowledge' or 'special reason to know'\"",
"sentence": "Chaney, 46 Cal.Rptr.2d at 76 (q... | 7,003,037 | b |
Because the contested matter and the adversary proceeding were consolidated "for all purposes," the sixty-day limit governing the contested matter extends to the entire consolidated case. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "829 F.2d 1484, 1487",
"parenthetical": "finding that where the United States was a party to one case, the sixty-day rule applied to the other case if the cases were consolidated",
"sentence": "See In re Adams Apple, Inc., 829 F.2d 1484, 1487 (9th Cir.1987) (finding that where t... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "181 F.3d 174, 182",
"parenthetical": "holding that consolidated cases should be treated as single action for purposes of determining res judicata",
"sentence": "See In re Adams Apple, Inc., 829 F.2d 1484, 1487 (9th Cir.1987) (finding that where the United States was a party to ... | 11,447,574 | a |
The City's method with regard to the timing of sound measurements, i.e., ten seconds for source sound, thirty seconds for ambient noise level, is not so arbitrary as to be inherently inconsistent with valid time, place and manner regulations. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "491 U.S. 800, 800",
"parenthetical": "\"So long as the means chosen are not substantially broader than necessary to achieve the government's interest ..., the regulation will not be invalid simply because a court concludes that the government's interest could adequately be served... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "63 F.3d 154, 158",
"parenthetical": "government's limited discretion in regulating the use of its streets must be exercised uniformly and systematically so as not to create any unfair discrimination",
"sentence": "See Ward, 491 U.S. at 800, 109 S.Ct. 2746 (“So long as the ... | 11,469,780 | a |
The City's method with regard to the timing of sound measurements, i.e., ten seconds for source sound, thirty seconds for ambient noise level, is not so arbitrary as to be inherently inconsistent with valid time, place and manner regulations. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"So long as the means chosen are not substantially broader than necessary to achieve the government's interest ..., the regulation will not be invalid simply because a court concludes that the government's interest could adequately be served by some less-s... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "63 F.3d 154, 158",
"parenthetical": "government's limited discretion in regulating the use of its streets must be exercised uniformly and systematically so as not to create any unfair discrimination",
"sentence": "See Ward, 491 U.S. at 800, 109 S.Ct. 2746 (“So long as the ... | 11,469,780 | a |
"Successful claims have arisen from unfavorable zoning decisions, withholding of permits, and selective regulatory enforcement." The Supreme Court has held, however, that "the class-of-one theory of equal protection has no application in the public employment context." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "542 F.3d 802, 821",
"parenthetical": " \"[T]he class-of-one theory is not legally cognizable where ... a public employee claims that she has been treated differently than other employees.\"",
"sentence": "See Kelley v. City of Albuquerque, 542 F.3d 802, 821 (10th Cir.2008) ( “[... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "553 U.S. 591, 607-08",
"parenthetical": "reasoning that \"an allegation of arbitrary differential treatment could be made in nearly every instance\" of a personnel decision by the government, and \"government offices could not function if every employment decision became a ... | 5,721,893 | b |
"Successful claims have arisen from unfavorable zoning decisions, withholding of permits, and selective regulatory enforcement." The Supreme Court has held, however, that "the class-of-one theory of equal protection has no application in the public employment context." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reasoning that \"an allegation of arbitrary differential treatment could be made in nearly every instance\" of a personnel decision by the government, and \"government offices could not function if every employment decision became a constitutional mat... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "542 F.3d 802, 821",
"parenthetical": " \"[T]he class-of-one theory is not legally cognizable where ... a public employee claims that she has been treated differently than other employees.\"",
"sentence": "See Kelley v. City of Albuquerque, 542 F.3d 802, 821 (10th Cir.2008) ( “[... | 5,721,893 | a |
"Successful claims have arisen from unfavorable zoning decisions, withholding of permits, and selective regulatory enforcement." The Supreme Court has held, however, that "the class-of-one theory of equal protection has no application in the public employment context." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "542 F.3d 802, 821",
"parenthetical": " \"[T]he class-of-one theory is not legally cognizable where ... a public employee claims that she has been treated differently than other employees.\"",
"sentence": "See Kelley v. City of Albuquerque, 542 F.3d 802, 821 (10th Cir.2008) ( “[... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reasoning that \"an allegation of arbitrary differential treatment could be made in nearly every instance\" of a personnel decision by the government, and \"government offices could not function if every employment decision became a constitutional mat... | 5,721,893 | b |
. The injection of parole is more serious and plainly prejudicial if the prosecutor also speculates as to what a defendant might do if released from jail. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "523 Pa. 75, 90-91",
"parenthetical": "prosecutor remark \"give him life, so he can get paroled one day and kill somebody else ...\" was improper",
"sentence": "Commonwealth v. Clayton, 516 Pa. 263, 284, 532 A.2d 385, 396-97 (1987) (not improper statement by prosecutor sinc... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "516 Pa. 263, 284",
"parenthetical": "not improper statement by prosecutor since it did not refer to what defendant would do if released and reference to parole was in response to argument made by defendant's counsel at closing",
"sentence": "Commonwealth v. Clayton, 516 P... | 470,745 | b |
. The injection of parole is more serious and plainly prejudicial if the prosecutor also speculates as to what a defendant might do if released from jail. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "516 Pa. 263, 284",
"parenthetical": "not improper statement by prosecutor since it did not refer to what defendant would do if released and reference to parole was in response to argument made by defendant's counsel at closing",
"sentence": "Commonwealth v. Clayton, 516 P... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "565 A.2d 144, 152",
"parenthetical": "prosecutor remark \"give him life, so he can get paroled one day and kill somebody else ...\" was improper",
"sentence": "Commonwealth v. Clayton, 516 Pa. 263, 284, 532 A.2d 385, 396-97 (1987) (not improper statement by prosecutor sinc... | 470,745 | a |
. The injection of parole is more serious and plainly prejudicial if the prosecutor also speculates as to what a defendant might do if released from jail. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "improper remark by prosecutor since he explicitly referred to possible parole and that Floyd would kill again if released since he was a \"predator\"",
"sentence": "Commonwealth v. Clayton, 516 Pa. 263, 284, 532 A.2d 385, 396-97 (1987) (not improper ... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "516 Pa. 263, 284",
"parenthetical": "not improper statement by prosecutor since it did not refer to what defendant would do if released and reference to parole was in response to argument made by defendant's counsel at closing",
"sentence": "Commonwealth v. Clayton, 516 P... | 470,745 | b |
. The injection of parole is more serious and plainly prejudicial if the prosecutor also speculates as to what a defendant might do if released from jail. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "516 Pa. 263, 284",
"parenthetical": "not improper statement by prosecutor since it did not refer to what defendant would do if released and reference to parole was in response to argument made by defendant's counsel at closing",
"sentence": "Commonwealth v. Clayton, 516 P... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "improper remark by prosecutor since he explicitly referred to possible parole and that Floyd would kill again if released since he was a \"predator\"",
"sentence": "Commonwealth v. Clayton, 516 Pa. 263, 284, 532 A.2d 385, 396-97 (1987) (not improper ... | 470,745 | a |
. The injection of parole is more serious and plainly prejudicial if the prosecutor also speculates as to what a defendant might do if released from jail. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "516 Pa. 263, 284",
"parenthetical": "not improper statement by prosecutor since it did not refer to what defendant would do if released and reference to parole was in response to argument made by defendant's counsel at closing",
"sentence": "Commonwealth v. Clayton, 516 P... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "420 Pa. 198, 208-09",
"parenthetical": "improper remark where prosecutor specifically mentioned eligibility for parole and that defendant could commit crime if released",
"sentence": "Commonwealth v. Clayton, 516 Pa. 263, 284, 532 A.2d 385, 396-97 (1987) (not improper stat... | 470,745 | a |
. The injection of parole is more serious and plainly prejudicial if the prosecutor also speculates as to what a defendant might do if released from jail. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "516 Pa. 263, 284",
"parenthetical": "not improper statement by prosecutor since it did not refer to what defendant would do if released and reference to parole was in response to argument made by defendant's counsel at closing",
"sentence": "Commonwealth v. Clayton, 516 P... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "216 A.2d 50, 55-56",
"parenthetical": "improper remark where prosecutor specifically mentioned eligibility for parole and that defendant could commit crime if released",
"sentence": "Commonwealth v. Clayton, 516 Pa. 263, 284, 532 A.2d 385, 396-97 (1987) (not improper state... | 470,745 | a |
. The injection of parole is more serious and plainly prejudicial if the prosecutor also speculates as to what a defendant might do if released from jail. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "532 A.2d 385, 396-97",
"parenthetical": "not improper statement by prosecutor since it did not refer to what defendant would do if released and reference to parole was in response to argument made by defendant's counsel at closing",
"sentence": "Commonwealth v. Clayton, 5... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "523 Pa. 75, 90-91",
"parenthetical": "prosecutor remark \"give him life, so he can get paroled one day and kill somebody else ...\" was improper",
"sentence": "Commonwealth v. Clayton, 516 Pa. 263, 284, 532 A.2d 385, 396-97 (1987) (not improper statement by prosecutor sinc... | 470,745 | a |
. The injection of parole is more serious and plainly prejudicial if the prosecutor also speculates as to what a defendant might do if released from jail. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "565 A.2d 144, 152",
"parenthetical": "prosecutor remark \"give him life, so he can get paroled one day and kill somebody else ...\" was improper",
"sentence": "Commonwealth v. Clayton, 516 Pa. 263, 284, 532 A.2d 385, 396-97 (1987) (not improper statement by prosecutor sinc... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "532 A.2d 385, 396-97",
"parenthetical": "not improper statement by prosecutor since it did not refer to what defendant would do if released and reference to parole was in response to argument made by defendant's counsel at closing",
"sentence": "Commonwealth v. Clayton, 5... | 470,745 | b |
. The injection of parole is more serious and plainly prejudicial if the prosecutor also speculates as to what a defendant might do if released from jail. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "532 A.2d 385, 396-97",
"parenthetical": "not improper statement by prosecutor since it did not refer to what defendant would do if released and reference to parole was in response to argument made by defendant's counsel at closing",
"sentence": "Commonwealth v. Clayton, 5... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "improper remark by prosecutor since he explicitly referred to possible parole and that Floyd would kill again if released since he was a \"predator\"",
"sentence": "Commonwealth v. Clayton, 516 Pa. 263, 284, 532 A.2d 385, 396-97 (1987) (not improper ... | 470,745 | a |
. The injection of parole is more serious and plainly prejudicial if the prosecutor also speculates as to what a defendant might do if released from jail. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "improper remark by prosecutor since he explicitly referred to possible parole and that Floyd would kill again if released since he was a \"predator\"",
"sentence": "Commonwealth v. Clayton, 516 Pa. 263, 284, 532 A.2d 385, 396-97 (1987) (not improper ... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "532 A.2d 385, 396-97",
"parenthetical": "not improper statement by prosecutor since it did not refer to what defendant would do if released and reference to parole was in response to argument made by defendant's counsel at closing",
"sentence": "Commonwealth v. Clayton, 5... | 470,745 | b |
. The injection of parole is more serious and plainly prejudicial if the prosecutor also speculates as to what a defendant might do if released from jail. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "420 Pa. 198, 208-09",
"parenthetical": "improper remark where prosecutor specifically mentioned eligibility for parole and that defendant could commit crime if released",
"sentence": "Commonwealth v. Clayton, 516 Pa. 263, 284, 532 A.2d 385, 396-97 (1987) (not improper stat... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "532 A.2d 385, 396-97",
"parenthetical": "not improper statement by prosecutor since it did not refer to what defendant would do if released and reference to parole was in response to argument made by defendant's counsel at closing",
"sentence": "Commonwealth v. Clayton, 5... | 470,745 | b |
. The injection of parole is more serious and plainly prejudicial if the prosecutor also speculates as to what a defendant might do if released from jail. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "532 A.2d 385, 396-97",
"parenthetical": "not improper statement by prosecutor since it did not refer to what defendant would do if released and reference to parole was in response to argument made by defendant's counsel at closing",
"sentence": "Commonwealth v. Clayton, 5... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "216 A.2d 50, 55-56",
"parenthetical": "improper remark where prosecutor specifically mentioned eligibility for parole and that defendant could commit crime if released",
"sentence": "Commonwealth v. Clayton, 516 Pa. 263, 284, 532 A.2d 385, 396-97 (1987) (not improper state... | 470,745 | a |
U.S. 6,265,055 C2 col. 3 ll. 34-35. The district court construed "resin additive" to be "a substance that by its properties is not typically by itself formed into a stretch wrap film layer and that is compounded into a resin"' -- i.e., a non-resin substance. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "460 F.3d 1360, 1360",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"[a]lthough 'consisting of' is a term of restriction, the restriction is not absolute\" and may permit impurities or \"additional components or steps that are unrelated to the invention\"",
"sentence": "See Conoco, 460 F.3d a... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "363 F.3d 1331, 1331",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"while 'consisting of' limits the claimed invention, it does not limit aspects unrelated to the invention\"",
"sentence": "See Conoco, 460 F.3d at 1360 (noting that \"[a]lthough 'consisting of' is a term of restriction,... | 6,055,794 | a |
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