context stringlengths 58 1.13k | citation_a dict | citation_b dict | case_id int64 475 12.5M | label stringclasses 2
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The transfers could still have been made for "value," however, if the debtors received "property" in exchange for the transfers. The consideration for the transfers was the use of the defendants' money over a period of time. The use of money may be "property" in some contexts. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "implying that transfers were not fraudulent to the extent they did not exceed the legal rate of interest",
"sentence": "See also Larrimer v. Feeney, 411 Pa. 604, 192 A.2d 351, 354 (1963) (implying that transfers were not fraudulent to the extent they... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "104 S.Ct. 1086, 1090",
"parenthetical": "for federal gift tax purposes the use of money \"is itself a legally protectible property interest\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Dickman v. Commissioner, 465 U.S. 330, 336, 104 S.Ct. 1086, 1090, 79 L.Ed.2d 343 (1984) (for federal gift tax ... | 6,542,005 | b |
The transfers could still have been made for "value," however, if the debtors received "property" in exchange for the transfers. The consideration for the transfers was the use of the defendants' money over a period of time. The use of money may be "property" in some contexts. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "192 A.2d 351, 354",
"parenthetical": "implying that transfers were not fraudulent to the extent they did not exceed the legal rate of interest",
"sentence": "See also Larrimer v. Feeney, 411 Pa. 604, 192 A.2d 351, 354 (1963) (implying that transfers were not fraudulent to ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "104 S.Ct. 1086, 1090",
"parenthetical": "for federal gift tax purposes the use of money \"is itself a legally protectible property interest\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Dickman v. Commissioner, 465 U.S. 330, 336, 104 S.Ct. 1086, 1090, 79 L.Ed.2d 343 (1984) (for federal gift tax ... | 6,542,005 | b |
The transfers could still have been made for "value," however, if the debtors received "property" in exchange for the transfers. The consideration for the transfers was the use of the defendants' money over a period of time. The use of money may be "property" in some contexts. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "for federal gift tax purposes the use of money \"is itself a legally protectible property interest\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Dickman v. Commissioner, 465 U.S. 330, 336, 104 S.Ct. 1086, 1090, 79 L.Ed.2d 343 (1984) (for federal gift tax purposes the use o... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "implying that transfers were not fraudulent to the extent they did not exceed the legal rate of interest",
"sentence": "See also Larrimer v. Feeney, 411 Pa. 604, 192 A.2d 351, 354 (1963) (implying that transfers were not fraudulent to the extent they... | 6,542,005 | a |
The transfers could still have been made for "value," however, if the debtors received "property" in exchange for the transfers. The consideration for the transfers was the use of the defendants' money over a period of time. The use of money may be "property" in some contexts. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "192 A.2d 351, 354",
"parenthetical": "implying that transfers were not fraudulent to the extent they did not exceed the legal rate of interest",
"sentence": "See also Larrimer v. Feeney, 411 Pa. 604, 192 A.2d 351, 354 (1963) (implying that transfers were not fraudulent to ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "for federal gift tax purposes the use of money \"is itself a legally protectible property interest\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Dickman v. Commissioner, 465 U.S. 330, 336, 104 S.Ct. 1086, 1090, 79 L.Ed.2d 343 (1984) (for federal gift tax purposes the use o... | 6,542,005 | b |
Additionally, after Lugo requested identification and bus and claim tickets, the items were passed to Rote and another officer. Tr. 360-61. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "37 F.3d 510, 515",
"parenthetical": "in finding consent to search vehicle voluntary, court noted that officer was not in possession of driver's belongings",
"sentence": "See United States v. Perez, 37 F.3d 510, 515 (9th Cir.1994) (in finding consent to search vehicle voluntary,... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "125 F.3d 1326, 1326",
"parenthetical": "seizure when officer takes possession of identification papers longer than necessary",
"sentence": "See United States v. Perez, 37 F.3d 510, 515 (9th Cir.1994) (in finding consent to search vehicle voluntary, court noted that officer... | 11,586,019 | a |
At the outset, the Court finds that this lawsuit is governed by federal rather than state law because the Declaratory Judgment Act addresses procedural as opposed to substantive rights. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "339 U.S. 667, 671",
"parenthetical": "recognizing that the Declaratory Judgment Act is procedural in nature and not an extension of federal court jurisdiction",
"sentence": "See Haagen-Dazs Shoppe Co. v. Born, 897 F.Supp. 122, 126 & n. 2 (S.D.N.Y.1995) (holding that the De... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the Declaratory Judgment Act, as opposed to state law, governs cases removed on the basis of diversity jurisdiction under an Erie analysis",
"sentence": "See Haagen-Dazs Shoppe Co. v. Born, 897 F.Supp. 122, 126 & n. 2 (S.D.N.Y.1995) (holding ... | 7,653,772 | b |
At the outset, the Court finds that this lawsuit is governed by federal rather than state law because the Declaratory Judgment Act addresses procedural as opposed to substantive rights. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "70 S.Ct. 876, 878-79",
"parenthetical": "recognizing that the Declaratory Judgment Act is procedural in nature and not an extension of federal court jurisdiction",
"sentence": "See Haagen-Dazs Shoppe Co. v. Born, 897 F.Supp. 122, 126 & n. 2 (S.D.N.Y.1995) (holding that the... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the Declaratory Judgment Act, as opposed to state law, governs cases removed on the basis of diversity jurisdiction under an Erie analysis",
"sentence": "See Haagen-Dazs Shoppe Co. v. Born, 897 F.Supp. 122, 126 & n. 2 (S.D.N.Y.1995) (holding ... | 7,653,772 | b |
At the outset, the Court finds that this lawsuit is governed by federal rather than state law because the Declaratory Judgment Act addresses procedural as opposed to substantive rights. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that the Declaratory Judgment Act is procedural in nature and not an extension of federal court jurisdiction",
"sentence": "See Haagen-Dazs Shoppe Co. v. Born, 897 F.Supp. 122, 126 & n. 2 (S.D.N.Y.1995) (holding that the Declaratory Judgm... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the Declaratory Judgment Act, as opposed to state law, governs cases removed on the basis of diversity jurisdiction under an Erie analysis",
"sentence": "See Haagen-Dazs Shoppe Co. v. Born, 897 F.Supp. 122, 126 & n. 2 (S.D.N.Y.1995) (holding ... | 7,653,772 | b |
Gibson next argues the. district court erred by applying a five-level enhancement under. SS 4B1.5(b). He contends the two separate occasions the guideline requires to constitute a "pattern of activity" should not include activity involved in his instant offense of conviction for sex trafficking, i.e., the multiple occa... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "648 F.3d 671, 675",
"parenthetical": "\"[O]ne panel of this Court is not at liberty to overrule an -opinion filed by. another panel\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Rojas, 520 F.3d 876, 883 (8th Cir. 2008) (“We now hold that subsection (b) [of § 4B1.5] may apply where... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "520 F.3d 876, 883",
"parenthetical": "\"We now hold that subsection (b) [of SS 4B1.5] may apply where there is no prior sex offense conviction and the only 'pattern of ... .conduct' is conduct involved in the present offense of conviction\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. R... | 12,174,277 | b |
DIRECTV argues that "[b]ecause Plaintiffs are not members of the general public, Plaintiffs .are not entitled to [section] 17200 protections for fraudulent actions." DIRECTV's Mem. of P's & A's in Support of its Reply to Motion No. 2 at 21:12-13. The Court agrees. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "178 F.Supp.2d 1121, 1121",
"parenthetical": "\"it is \"necessary under the 'fraudulent' prong [of the UCL] to show deception to some members of the public, or harm to the public interest, and not merely to the direct competitor or other non-consumer party to a contract.\" \"... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "72 Cal.App.4th 861, 888",
"parenthetical": "\" 'Fraudulent,' as used in the statute, does not refer to the common law tort of fraud but only requires a showing members of the public are likely to be deceived.\"",
"sentence": "See South Bay Chevrolet v. GMAC, 72 Cal.App.4th 861,... | 9,234,285 | b |
DIRECTV argues that "[b]ecause Plaintiffs are not members of the general public, Plaintiffs .are not entitled to [section] 17200 protections for fraudulent actions." DIRECTV's Mem. of P's & A's in Support of its Reply to Motion No. 2 at 21:12-13. The Court agrees. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "178 F.Supp.2d 1121, 1121",
"parenthetical": "\"it is \"necessary under the 'fraudulent' prong [of the UCL] to show deception to some members of the public, or harm to the public interest, and not merely to the direct competitor or other non-consumer party to a contract.\" \"... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\" 'Fraudulent,' as used in the statute, does not refer to the common law tort of fraud but only requires a showing members of the public are likely to be deceived.\"",
"sentence": "See South Bay Chevrolet v. GMAC, 72 Cal.App.4th 861, 888, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d ... | 9,234,285 | b |
The letter sent to AG merely stated that there was no record of a previous NOD and that the appeal period for the 1983 decision had expired; it also provided instructions for AG to reopen his claim. The statute, however, states that the VA must provide to a claimant notice of any decision affecting the provision of ben... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "10 Vet.App. 325, 325",
"parenthetical": "failure to notify claimant that he was denied service connection for a particular condition constituted a procedural error under 38 C.F.R. SSSS 3.103(e",
"sentence": "Best v. Brown, 10 Vet.App. at 325 (failure to notify claimant th... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "21 Vet.App. 537, 543",
"parenthetical": "finding that RO decision was final where it \"provided notice that compensation ... was being denied and gave [appellant] the opportunity to appeal and present any and all arguments of error, including the argument that its determinat... | 5,634,867 | a |
Our jurisdiction, like that of all federal courts other than the Supreme Court, is established solely by Congress, not the Court. As my colleagues seem to admit, the requirement in our Court for a case or controversy is an important prudential rule wisely adopted by the Court in its formative year, but it is not in our... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "1 Vet.App. 12, 15",
"parenthetical": "adopting \"as a matter of policy the jurisdictional' restrictions of the Article III case or controversy rubric\"",
"sentence": "See Mokal v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 12, 15 (1990) (adopting “as a matter of policy the jurisdictional' restricti... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "473 F.3d 1364, 1370",
"parenthetical": "noting that this Court is \"not formally bound by\" the case or controversy requirement but \"nevertheless, adheres to it\"",
"sentence": "See Mokal v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 12, 15 (1990) (adopting “as a matter of policy the jurisdic... | 4,153,789 | a |
Our jurisdiction, like that of all federal courts other than the Supreme Court, is established solely by Congress, not the Court. As my colleagues seem to admit, the requirement in our Court for a case or controversy is an important prudential rule wisely adopted by the Court in its formative year, but it is not in our... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2 Vet.App. 252, 254",
"parenthetical": "noting that this Court is \"not formally bound by\" the case or controversy requirement but \"nevertheless, adheres to it\"",
"sentence": "See Mokal v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 12, 15 (1990) (adopting “as a matter of policy the jurisdic... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "1 Vet.App. 12, 15",
"parenthetical": "adopting \"as a matter of policy the jurisdictional' restrictions of the Article III case or controversy rubric\"",
"sentence": "See Mokal v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 12, 15 (1990) (adopting “as a matter of policy the jurisdictional' restricti... | 4,153,789 | b |
Our jurisdiction, like that of all federal courts other than the Supreme Court, is established solely by Congress, not the Court. As my colleagues seem to admit, the requirement in our Court for a case or controversy is an important prudential rule wisely adopted by the Court in its formative year, but it is not in our... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "49 U.S. 449, 449",
"parenthetical": "noting that this Court is \"not formally bound by\" the case or controversy requirement but \"nevertheless, adheres to it\"",
"sentence": "See Mokal v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 12, 15 (1990) (adopting “as a matter of policy the jurisdictio... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "1 Vet.App. 12, 15",
"parenthetical": "adopting \"as a matter of policy the jurisdictional' restrictions of the Article III case or controversy rubric\"",
"sentence": "See Mokal v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 12, 15 (1990) (adopting “as a matter of policy the jurisdictional' restricti... | 4,153,789 | b |
Our jurisdiction, like that of all federal courts other than the Supreme Court, is established solely by Congress, not the Court. As my colleagues seem to admit, the requirement in our Court for a case or controversy is an important prudential rule wisely adopted by the Court in its formative year, but it is not in our... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "1 Vet.App. 12, 15",
"parenthetical": "adopting \"as a matter of policy the jurisdictional' restrictions of the Article III case or controversy rubric\"",
"sentence": "See Mokal v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 12, 15 (1990) (adopting “as a matter of policy the jurisdictional' restricti... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "131 S.Ct. 1197, 1206",
"parenthetical": "finding that 38 U.S.C. SS 7266(a) was an \"important procedural rule\" but not jurisdictional",
"sentence": "See Mokal v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 12, 15 (1990) (adopting “as a matter of policy the jurisdictional' restrictions of the Articl... | 4,153,789 | a |
Our jurisdiction, like that of all federal courts other than the Supreme Court, is established solely by Congress, not the Court. As my colleagues seem to admit, the requirement in our Court for a case or controversy is an important prudential rule wisely adopted by the Court in its formative year, but it is not in our... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "1 Vet.App. 12, 15",
"parenthetical": "adopting \"as a matter of policy the jurisdictional' restrictions of the Article III case or controversy rubric\"",
"sentence": "See Mokal v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 12, 15 (1990) (adopting “as a matter of policy the jurisdictional' restricti... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that 38 U.S.C. SS 7266(a) was an \"important procedural rule\" but not jurisdictional",
"sentence": "See Mokal v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 12, 15 (1990) (adopting “as a matter of policy the jurisdictional' restrictions of the Article III case or cont... | 4,153,789 | a |
Our jurisdiction, like that of all federal courts other than the Supreme Court, is established solely by Congress, not the Court. As my colleagues seem to admit, the requirement in our Court for a case or controversy is an important prudential rule wisely adopted by the Court in its formative year, but it is not in our... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "131 S.Ct. 1197, 1206",
"parenthetical": "finding that 38 U.S.C. SS 7266(a) was an \"important procedural rule\" but not jurisdictional",
"sentence": "See Mokal v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 12, 15 (1990) (adopting “as a matter of policy the jurisdictional' restrictions of the Articl... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "473 F.3d 1364, 1370",
"parenthetical": "noting that this Court is \"not formally bound by\" the case or controversy requirement but \"nevertheless, adheres to it\"",
"sentence": "See Mokal v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 12, 15 (1990) (adopting “as a matter of policy the jurisdic... | 4,153,789 | b |
Our jurisdiction, like that of all federal courts other than the Supreme Court, is established solely by Congress, not the Court. As my colleagues seem to admit, the requirement in our Court for a case or controversy is an important prudential rule wisely adopted by the Court in its formative year, but it is not in our... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that 38 U.S.C. SS 7266(a) was an \"important procedural rule\" but not jurisdictional",
"sentence": "See Mokal v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 12, 15 (1990) (adopting “as a matter of policy the jurisdictional' restrictions of the Article III case or cont... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "473 F.3d 1364, 1370",
"parenthetical": "noting that this Court is \"not formally bound by\" the case or controversy requirement but \"nevertheless, adheres to it\"",
"sentence": "See Mokal v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 12, 15 (1990) (adopting “as a matter of policy the jurisdic... | 4,153,789 | b |
Our jurisdiction, like that of all federal courts other than the Supreme Court, is established solely by Congress, not the Court. As my colleagues seem to admit, the requirement in our Court for a case or controversy is an important prudential rule wisely adopted by the Court in its formative year, but it is not in our... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "131 S.Ct. 1197, 1206",
"parenthetical": "finding that 38 U.S.C. SS 7266(a) was an \"important procedural rule\" but not jurisdictional",
"sentence": "See Mokal v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 12, 15 (1990) (adopting “as a matter of policy the jurisdictional' restrictions of the Articl... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2 Vet.App. 252, 254",
"parenthetical": "noting that this Court is \"not formally bound by\" the case or controversy requirement but \"nevertheless, adheres to it\"",
"sentence": "See Mokal v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 12, 15 (1990) (adopting “as a matter of policy the jurisdic... | 4,153,789 | b |
Our jurisdiction, like that of all federal courts other than the Supreme Court, is established solely by Congress, not the Court. As my colleagues seem to admit, the requirement in our Court for a case or controversy is an important prudential rule wisely adopted by the Court in its formative year, but it is not in our... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2 Vet.App. 252, 254",
"parenthetical": "noting that this Court is \"not formally bound by\" the case or controversy requirement but \"nevertheless, adheres to it\"",
"sentence": "See Mokal v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 12, 15 (1990) (adopting “as a matter of policy the jurisdic... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that 38 U.S.C. SS 7266(a) was an \"important procedural rule\" but not jurisdictional",
"sentence": "See Mokal v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 12, 15 (1990) (adopting “as a matter of policy the jurisdictional' restrictions of the Article III case or cont... | 4,153,789 | a |
Our jurisdiction, like that of all federal courts other than the Supreme Court, is established solely by Congress, not the Court. As my colleagues seem to admit, the requirement in our Court for a case or controversy is an important prudential rule wisely adopted by the Court in its formative year, but it is not in our... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "49 U.S. 449, 449",
"parenthetical": "noting that this Court is \"not formally bound by\" the case or controversy requirement but \"nevertheless, adheres to it\"",
"sentence": "See Mokal v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 12, 15 (1990) (adopting “as a matter of policy the jurisdictio... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "131 S.Ct. 1197, 1206",
"parenthetical": "finding that 38 U.S.C. SS 7266(a) was an \"important procedural rule\" but not jurisdictional",
"sentence": "See Mokal v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 12, 15 (1990) (adopting “as a matter of policy the jurisdictional' restrictions of the Articl... | 4,153,789 | a |
Our jurisdiction, like that of all federal courts other than the Supreme Court, is established solely by Congress, not the Court. As my colleagues seem to admit, the requirement in our Court for a case or controversy is an important prudential rule wisely adopted by the Court in its formative year, but it is not in our... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that 38 U.S.C. SS 7266(a) was an \"important procedural rule\" but not jurisdictional",
"sentence": "See Mokal v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 12, 15 (1990) (adopting “as a matter of policy the jurisdictional' restrictions of the Article III case or cont... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "49 U.S. 449, 449",
"parenthetical": "noting that this Court is \"not formally bound by\" the case or controversy requirement but \"nevertheless, adheres to it\"",
"sentence": "See Mokal v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 12, 15 (1990) (adopting “as a matter of policy the jurisdictio... | 4,153,789 | b |
Despite plaintiffs assertion that her performance was satisfactory, "[i]t is the manager's perception of the employee's performance that is relevant, not plaintiffs subjective evaluation of [her] own relative performance." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "82 F.3d 980, 987",
"parenthetical": "granting JMOL in favor of defendant because ADEA plaintiff failed to show reduction in force was pretextual",
"sentence": "Furr v. Seagate Technology, Inc., 82 F.3d 980, 987 (10th Cir.1996) (granting JMOL in favor of defendant because ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "944 F.2d 743, 747",
"parenthetical": "\"plaintiffs general dispute concerning [] job performance, in the absence of any other evidence of age discrimination, does not provide a sufficient basis for a jury to infer that [defendant] terminated plaintiff on the basis of [ ] age... | 1,626,189 | a |
In addition, several of our sister circuits have found expressly that the term "interstate or foreign commerce" is a single unitary concept rather than two separate bases for jurisdiction. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "981 F.2d 645, 648",
"parenthetical": "defendant was on notice that the pistol he possessed had travelled to Vermont via interstate commerce because the pistol was imprinted with the words \"Made in West Germany\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Alvarez, 972 F.2d 1000, 1003-... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "665 F.2d 674, 678",
"parenthetical": "\"The word 'commerce' is consistently preceded in the statute by 'interstate or foreign' without any hint that 'commerce' should have separate meanings for each.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Alvarez, 972 F.2d 1000, 1003-04 (9th Cir... | 11,323,660 | b |
In addition, several of our sister circuits have found expressly that the term "interstate or foreign commerce" is a single unitary concept rather than two separate bases for jurisdiction. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "665 F.2d 674, 678",
"parenthetical": "\"The word 'commerce' is consistently preceded in the statute by 'interstate or foreign' without any hint that 'commerce' should have separate meanings for each.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Alvarez, 972 F.2d 1000, 1003-04 (9th Cir... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant was on notice that the pistol he possessed had travelled to Vermont via interstate commerce because the pistol was imprinted with the words \"Made in West Germany\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Alvarez, 972 F.2d 1000, 1003-04 (9th Cir.199... | 11,323,660 | a |
In addition, several of our sister circuits have found expressly that the term "interstate or foreign commerce" is a single unitary concept rather than two separate bases for jurisdiction. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "665 F.2d 674, 678",
"parenthetical": "\"The word 'commerce' is consistently preceded in the statute by 'interstate or foreign' without any hint that 'commerce' should have separate meanings for each.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Alvarez, 972 F.2d 1000, 1003-04 (9th Cir... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant was on notice that the pistol he possessed had travelled to Vermont via interstate commerce because the pistol was imprinted with the words \"Made in West Germany\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Alvarez, 972 F.2d 1000, 1003-04 (9th Cir.199... | 11,323,660 | a |
In addition, several of our sister circuits have found expressly that the term "interstate or foreign commerce" is a single unitary concept rather than two separate bases for jurisdiction. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant was on notice that the pistol he possessed had travelled to Vermont via interstate commerce because the pistol was imprinted with the words \"Made in West Germany\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Alvarez, 972 F.2d 1000, 1003-04 (9th Cir.199... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "665 F.2d 674, 678",
"parenthetical": "\"The word 'commerce' is consistently preceded in the statute by 'interstate or foreign' without any hint that 'commerce' should have separate meanings for each.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Alvarez, 972 F.2d 1000, 1003-04 (9th Cir... | 11,323,660 | b |
In addition, several of our sister circuits have found expressly that the term "interstate or foreign commerce" is a single unitary concept rather than two separate bases for jurisdiction. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "981 F.2d 645, 648",
"parenthetical": "defendant was on notice that the pistol he possessed had travelled to Vermont via interstate commerce because the pistol was imprinted with the words \"Made in West Germany\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Alvarez, 972 F.2d 1000, 1003-... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The word 'commerce' is consistently preceded in the statute by 'interstate or foreign' without any hint that 'commerce' should have separate meanings for each.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Alvarez, 972 F.2d 1000, 1003-04 (9th Cir.1992), cert. d... | 11,323,660 | b |
In addition, several of our sister circuits have found expressly that the term "interstate or foreign commerce" is a single unitary concept rather than two separate bases for jurisdiction. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The word 'commerce' is consistently preceded in the statute by 'interstate or foreign' without any hint that 'commerce' should have separate meanings for each.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Alvarez, 972 F.2d 1000, 1003-04 (9th Cir.1992), cert. d... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant was on notice that the pistol he possessed had travelled to Vermont via interstate commerce because the pistol was imprinted with the words \"Made in West Germany\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Alvarez, 972 F.2d 1000, 1003-04 (9th Cir.199... | 11,323,660 | a |
In addition, several of our sister circuits have found expressly that the term "interstate or foreign commerce" is a single unitary concept rather than two separate bases for jurisdiction. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The word 'commerce' is consistently preceded in the statute by 'interstate or foreign' without any hint that 'commerce' should have separate meanings for each.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Alvarez, 972 F.2d 1000, 1003-04 (9th Cir.1992), cert. d... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant was on notice that the pistol he possessed had travelled to Vermont via interstate commerce because the pistol was imprinted with the words \"Made in West Germany\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Alvarez, 972 F.2d 1000, 1003-04 (9th Cir.199... | 11,323,660 | a |
In addition, several of our sister circuits have found expressly that the term "interstate or foreign commerce" is a single unitary concept rather than two separate bases for jurisdiction. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant was on notice that the pistol he possessed had travelled to Vermont via interstate commerce because the pistol was imprinted with the words \"Made in West Germany\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Alvarez, 972 F.2d 1000, 1003-04 (9th Cir.199... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The word 'commerce' is consistently preceded in the statute by 'interstate or foreign' without any hint that 'commerce' should have separate meanings for each.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Alvarez, 972 F.2d 1000, 1003-04 (9th Cir.1992), cert. d... | 11,323,660 | b |
In addition, several of our sister circuits have found expressly that the term "interstate or foreign commerce" is a single unitary concept rather than two separate bases for jurisdiction. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The word 'commerce' is consistently preceded in the statute by 'interstate or foreign' without any hint that 'commerce' should have separate meanings for each.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Alvarez, 972 F.2d 1000, 1003-04 (9th Cir.1992), cert. d... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "981 F.2d 645, 648",
"parenthetical": "defendant was on notice that the pistol he possessed had travelled to Vermont via interstate commerce because the pistol was imprinted with the words \"Made in West Germany\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Alvarez, 972 F.2d 1000, 1003-... | 11,323,660 | a |
In addition, several of our sister circuits have found expressly that the term "interstate or foreign commerce" is a single unitary concept rather than two separate bases for jurisdiction. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The word 'commerce' is consistently preceded in the statute by 'interstate or foreign' without any hint that 'commerce' should have separate meanings for each.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Alvarez, 972 F.2d 1000, 1003-04 (9th Cir.1992), cert. d... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant was on notice that the pistol he possessed had travelled to Vermont via interstate commerce because the pistol was imprinted with the words \"Made in West Germany\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Alvarez, 972 F.2d 1000, 1003-04 (9th Cir.199... | 11,323,660 | a |
In addition, several of our sister circuits have found expressly that the term "interstate or foreign commerce" is a single unitary concept rather than two separate bases for jurisdiction. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The word 'commerce' is consistently preceded in the statute by 'interstate or foreign' without any hint that 'commerce' should have separate meanings for each.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Alvarez, 972 F.2d 1000, 1003-04 (9th Cir.1992), cert. d... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant was on notice that the pistol he possessed had travelled to Vermont via interstate commerce because the pistol was imprinted with the words \"Made in West Germany\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Alvarez, 972 F.2d 1000, 1003-04 (9th Cir.199... | 11,323,660 | a |
In addition, several of our sister circuits have found expressly that the term "interstate or foreign commerce" is a single unitary concept rather than two separate bases for jurisdiction. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The word 'commerce' is consistently preceded in the statute by 'interstate or foreign' without any hint that 'commerce' should have separate meanings for each.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Alvarez, 972 F.2d 1000, 1003-04 (9th Cir.1992), cert. d... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant was on notice that the pistol he possessed had travelled to Vermont via interstate commerce because the pistol was imprinted with the words \"Made in West Germany\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Alvarez, 972 F.2d 1000, 1003-04 (9th Cir.199... | 11,323,660 | a |
In addition, several of our sister circuits have found expressly that the term "interstate or foreign commerce" is a single unitary concept rather than two separate bases for jurisdiction. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "981 F.2d 645, 648",
"parenthetical": "defendant was on notice that the pistol he possessed had travelled to Vermont via interstate commerce because the pistol was imprinted with the words \"Made in West Germany\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Alvarez, 972 F.2d 1000, 1003-... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The word 'commerce' is consistently preceded in the statute by 'interstate or foreign' without any hint that 'commerce' should have separate meanings for each.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Alvarez, 972 F.2d 1000, 1003-04 (9th Cir.1992), cert. d... | 11,323,660 | b |
In addition, several of our sister circuits have found expressly that the term "interstate or foreign commerce" is a single unitary concept rather than two separate bases for jurisdiction. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant was on notice that the pistol he possessed had travelled to Vermont via interstate commerce because the pistol was imprinted with the words \"Made in West Germany\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Alvarez, 972 F.2d 1000, 1003-04 (9th Cir.199... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The word 'commerce' is consistently preceded in the statute by 'interstate or foreign' without any hint that 'commerce' should have separate meanings for each.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Alvarez, 972 F.2d 1000, 1003-04 (9th Cir.1992), cert. d... | 11,323,660 | b |
In addition, several of our sister circuits have found expressly that the term "interstate or foreign commerce" is a single unitary concept rather than two separate bases for jurisdiction. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The word 'commerce' is consistently preceded in the statute by 'interstate or foreign' without any hint that 'commerce' should have separate meanings for each.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Alvarez, 972 F.2d 1000, 1003-04 (9th Cir.1992), cert. d... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant was on notice that the pistol he possessed had travelled to Vermont via interstate commerce because the pistol was imprinted with the words \"Made in West Germany\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Alvarez, 972 F.2d 1000, 1003-04 (9th Cir.199... | 11,323,660 | a |
In addition, several of our sister circuits have found expressly that the term "interstate or foreign commerce" is a single unitary concept rather than two separate bases for jurisdiction. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The word 'commerce' is consistently preceded in the statute by 'interstate or foreign' without any hint that 'commerce' should have separate meanings for each.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Alvarez, 972 F.2d 1000, 1003-04 (9th Cir.1992), cert. d... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant was on notice that the pistol he possessed had travelled to Vermont via interstate commerce because the pistol was imprinted with the words \"Made in West Germany\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Alvarez, 972 F.2d 1000, 1003-04 (9th Cir.199... | 11,323,660 | a |
The Supreme Court has held that a sentencing adjustment, pursuant to SS 3582(c)(2), is not a resentencing proceeding. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "providing that SS 3582(c)(2) does not authorize a resen-tencing, but instead permits a modification by giving courts the power to reduce a sentence within the narrow bounds established by the Sentencing Commission",
"sentence": "Dillon v. United Sta... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "203 F.3d 778, 781-82",
"parenthetical": "holding that constitutional claims are \"extraneous resentencing issues\" that a court cannot address during a SS 3582(c",
"sentence": "A § 3582(c)(2) proceeding has a limited scope and purpose, is “not constitutionally compelled,” ... | 3,629,316 | a |
The Supreme Court has held that a sentencing adjustment, pursuant to SS 3582(c)(2), is not a resentencing proceeding. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "130 S.Ct. 2683, 2690-91",
"parenthetical": "providing that SS 3582(c)(2) does not authorize a resen-tencing, but instead permits a modification by giving courts the power to reduce a sentence within the narrow bounds established by the Sentencing Commission",
"sentence": ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "203 F.3d 778, 781-82",
"parenthetical": "holding that constitutional claims are \"extraneous resentencing issues\" that a court cannot address during a SS 3582(c",
"sentence": "A § 3582(c)(2) proceeding has a limited scope and purpose, is “not constitutionally compelled,” ... | 3,629,316 | a |
The Supreme Court has held that a sentencing adjustment, pursuant to SS 3582(c)(2), is not a resentencing proceeding. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "203 F.3d 778, 781-82",
"parenthetical": "holding that constitutional claims are \"extraneous resentencing issues\" that a court cannot address during a SS 3582(c",
"sentence": "A § 3582(c)(2) proceeding has a limited scope and purpose, is “not constitutionally compelled,” ... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "providing that SS 3582(c)(2) does not authorize a resen-tencing, but instead permits a modification by giving courts the power to reduce a sentence within the narrow bounds established by the Sentencing Commission",
"sentence": "Dillon v. United Sta... | 3,629,316 | b |
Even if late-filed tax documents, can sometimes qualify as returns, the BAPCPA definition also demands that a return satisfy "the requirements of applicable nonbankruptcy law." Both parties to this ease, and all courts to consider the issue, agree that the term "applicable nonb'ankruptcy law" incorporates the Beard tes... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "473 B.R. 504, 507",
"parenthetical": "declining to apply Beard test because the one-day-late rule meant that late tax filings could never be returns, and therefore declining to apply any \"applicable non-bankruptcy law\" at all",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re Martin, 500 B.R. 1... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "500 B.R. 1, 8",
"parenthetical": "holding that the Beard test \"constituted the 'applicable nonbankruptcy law1 -- pursuant to the first sentence of the hanging paragraph provided by the BAPCPA -- for purposes of determining whether a filing is a 'return' under SS 523(a",
"sente... | 6,812,077 | b |
Even if late-filed tax documents, can sometimes qualify as returns, the BAPCPA definition also demands that a return satisfy "the requirements of applicable nonbankruptcy law." Both parties to this ease, and all courts to consider the issue, agree that the term "applicable nonb'ankruptcy law" incorporates the Beard tes... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "473 B.R. 504, 507",
"parenthetical": "declining to apply Beard test because the one-day-late rule meant that late tax filings could never be returns, and therefore declining to apply any \"applicable non-bankruptcy law\" at all",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re Martin, 500 B.R. 1... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the Beard test \"constituted the 'applicable nonbankruptcy law1 -- pursuant to the first sentence of the hanging paragraph provided by the BAPCPA -- for purposes of determining whether a filing is a 'return' under SS 523(a",
"sentence": "See,... | 6,812,077 | b |
Even if late-filed tax documents, can sometimes qualify as returns, the BAPCPA definition also demands that a return satisfy "the requirements of applicable nonbankruptcy law." Both parties to this ease, and all courts to consider the issue, agree that the term "applicable nonb'ankruptcy law" incorporates the Beard tes... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "498 B.R. 357, 367",
"parenthetical": "applying Beard test \"to determine whether a later filed, post-assessment return is, in fact, a 'return' for purposes of dischargeability considerations under clause (i",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re Martin, 500 B.R. 1, 8 (D.Colo.2013) aff... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "473 B.R. 504, 507",
"parenthetical": "declining to apply Beard test because the one-day-late rule meant that late tax filings could never be returns, and therefore declining to apply any \"applicable non-bankruptcy law\" at all",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re Martin, 500 B.R. 1... | 6,812,077 | a |
. Plaintiffs have suggested that KRS 454.210(2)(a) 1.-2 may establish personal jurisdiction over Defendants. Their reasoning apparently is that operating or deriving revenue through independent distributors can establish minimum contacts with the forum. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "572 F.2d 119, 120-21",
"parenthetical": "nonresident programmer could anticipate that allegedly infringing game show might be broadcast by distributor in forum",
"sentence": "See Payne v. Kristofferson, 631 F.Supp. 39, 43 (N.D.Ga.1985) (nonresident's licensing arrangement ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "631 F.Supp. 39, 43",
"parenthetical": "nonresident's licensing arrangement with national distributor of allegedly infringing song books sufficient to establish minimum contacts with forum",
"sentence": "See Payne v. Kristofferson, 631 F.Supp. 39, 43 (N.D.Ga.1985) (nonresident's... | 208,435 | b |
Here, both of the claims at issue-- for violations of Plaintiffs Fourth Amendment rights to be free from (1) arrest without probable cause, and (2) malicious prosecution--turn on whether Defendants had probable cause. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "780 F.3d 1007, 1007",
"parenthetical": "qualified immunity analysis turned on \"whether extant clearly established law [at the time of the events at issue] would have placed a reasonable, similarly situated police officer on notice that no probable cause existed\"",
"sente... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "45 F.3d 1472, 1476",
"parenthetical": "\"A police officer may arrest a person without a warrant if he has probable cause to believe that person committed a crime.\"",
"sentence": "See Romero v. Fay, 45 F.3d 1472, 1476 (10th Cir. 1995) (“A police officer may arrest a person with... | 12,397,647 | b |
Here, both of the claims at issue-- for violations of Plaintiffs Fourth Amendment rights to be free from (1) arrest without probable cause, and (2) malicious prosecution--turn on whether Defendants had probable cause. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "780 F.3d 1007, 1007",
"parenthetical": "qualified immunity analysis turned on \"whether extant clearly established law [at the time of the events at issue] would have placed a reasonable, similarly situated police officer on notice that no probable cause existed\"",
"sente... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "528 F.3d 790, 799",
"parenthetical": "to succeed on a malicious prosecution claim, a plaintiff must show that \"no probable cause supported the original arrest, continued confinement, or prosecution\"",
"sentence": "See Romero v. Fay, 45 F.3d 1472, 1476 (10th Cir. 1995) (“A pol... | 12,397,647 | b |
Here, both of the claims at issue-- for violations of Plaintiffs Fourth Amendment rights to be free from (1) arrest without probable cause, and (2) malicious prosecution--turn on whether Defendants had probable cause. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "780 F.3d 1007, 1007",
"parenthetical": "qualified immunity analysis turned on \"whether extant clearly established law [at the time of the events at issue] would have placed a reasonable, similarly situated police officer on notice that no probable cause existed\"",
"sente... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "551 Fed.Appx. 467, 467",
"parenthetical": "to succeed on a malicious prosecution claim, a plaintiff must show that \"no probable cause supported the original arrest, continued confinement, or prosecution\"",
"sentence": "See Romero v. Fay, 45 F.3d 1472, 1476 (10th Cir. 1995) (“... | 12,397,647 | b |
Here, both of the claims at issue-- for violations of Plaintiffs Fourth Amendment rights to be free from (1) arrest without probable cause, and (2) malicious prosecution--turn on whether Defendants had probable cause. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "780 F.3d 1007, 1007",
"parenthetical": "qualified immunity analysis turned on \"whether extant clearly established law [at the time of the events at issue] would have placed a reasonable, similarly situated police officer on notice that no probable cause existed\"",
"sente... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "806 F.3d 1027, 1027",
"parenthetical": "to succeed on a malicious prosecution claim, a plaintiff must show that \"no probable cause supported the original arrest, continued confinement, or prosecution\"",
"sentence": "See Romero v. Fay, 45 F.3d 1472, 1476 (10th Cir. 1995) (“A p... | 12,397,647 | b |
Although neither the parties nor this Court has identified any circuit court of appeals precedent on this precise issue, several bankruptcy courts have rejected Musolino's argument. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "295 B.R. 562, 567-68",
"parenthetical": "declining to extend holding in Craft, holding that under Maryland law property held in tenancy by entireties estate is validly exempt from bankruptcy creditors of one spouse under SS 522(b",
"sentence": "See In re Great-house, 295 B.R. 5... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "380 F.3d 174, 182",
"parenthetical": "declining to extend Craft, holding that Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee proceeding pursuant to SS 544 of the Bankruptcy Code cannot stand in shoes of the IRS in a tax collection context in order to reach property held in tenancy by the enti... | 9,144,981 | a |
Although neither the parties nor this Court has identified any circuit court of appeals precedent on this precise issue, several bankruptcy courts have rejected Musolino's argument. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "282 B.R. 742, 750",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"Craft gives no indication that the reasoning therein should be extended beyond federal tax law\"",
"sentence": "See In re Great-house, 295 B.R. 562, 567-68 (Bankr.D.Md.2003) (declining to extend holding in Craft, holding ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "295 B.R. 562, 567-68",
"parenthetical": "declining to extend holding in Craft, holding that under Maryland law property held in tenancy by entireties estate is validly exempt from bankruptcy creditors of one spouse under SS 522(b",
"sentence": "See In re Great-house, 295 B.R. 5... | 9,144,981 | b |
Although neither the parties nor this Court has identified any circuit court of appeals precedent on this precise issue, several bankruptcy courts have rejected Musolino's argument. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "380 F.3d 174, 182",
"parenthetical": "declining to extend Craft, holding that Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee proceeding pursuant to SS 544 of the Bankruptcy Code cannot stand in shoes of the IRS in a tax collection context in order to reach property held in tenancy by the enti... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "289 B.R. 38, 45",
"parenthetical": "concluding that Craft is inapplicable, holding that \"[ujnder Delaware law and [SS 522(b",
"sentence": "See In re Great-house, 295 B.R. 562, 567-68 (Bankr.D.Md.2003) (declining to extend holding in Craft, holding that under Maryland law prope... | 9,144,981 | b |
Although neither the parties nor this Court has identified any circuit court of appeals precedent on this precise issue, several bankruptcy courts have rejected Musolino's argument. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "289 B.R. 38, 45",
"parenthetical": "concluding that Craft is inapplicable, holding that \"[ujnder Delaware law and [SS 522(b",
"sentence": "See In re Great-house, 295 B.R. 562, 567-68 (Bankr.D.Md.2003) (declining to extend holding in Craft, holding that under Maryland law prope... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "282 B.R. 742, 750",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"Craft gives no indication that the reasoning therein should be extended beyond federal tax law\"",
"sentence": "See In re Great-house, 295 B.R. 562, 567-68 (Bankr.D.Md.2003) (declining to extend holding in Craft, holding ... | 9,144,981 | a |
The district court properly granted summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds on the deliberate indifference claim because Patrick failed to raise a triable issue as to whether defendant, a correctional officer, informed other in mates that Patrick was a snitch or sent an inmate to attack Patrick. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a conclusory affidavit unsupported by facts is insufficient to raise a triable issue",
"sentence": "See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834-37, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (discussing deliberate indifference standard); Rodriguez v. Marico... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "605 F.3d 703, 711",
"parenthetical": "a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity if there is no constitutional violation",
"sentence": "See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834-37, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (discussing deliberate indifference standard); Rodrigue... | 4,075,866 | b |
Under this interpretation, bankruptcy courts will continue to have some discretion over the calculations of each individual debtor's financial situation, with the result that the debtor's "projected disposable income" will end up more closely aligning with reality. This interpretation also comports with the congression... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "338 B.R. 723, 723",
"parenthetical": "Congress must have intended \"disposable income\" to be something different than \"projected disposable income\" or it would have used the same language in both places in the statute",
"sentence": "See Gonzalez, 388 B.R. at 304-05, 308... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "388 B.R. 304, 304-05, 308-09",
"parenthetical": "rigid adherence to a debtor's historical income would produce results inconsistent with the congressional purpose of BAPC-PA and inconsistent with common sense",
"sentence": "See Gonzalez, 388 B.R. at 304-05, 308-09 (rigid adhere... | 3,860,192 | b |
While the court did not discuss the debtors' chances of obtaining a successful reorganization, such a finding was encompassed by, and implicit in, the court's focus on protecting the debtors' reorganization efforts. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "502 F.3d 1097, 1097",
"parenthetical": "stating that it is not a high burden to show reasonable likelihood of success in reorganization, but a bankruptcy court must consider the issue before granting an injunction",
"sentence": "See Eagle-Picher, 963 F.2d at 860 (“In view o... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "963 F.2d 860, 860",
"parenthetical": "\"In view of the bankruptcy court's protection of Eagle-Picher's [the debtor] reorganization efforts, it is implicit in its decision that it believed Eagle-Picher had some realistic possibility of successfully reorganizing under Chapter 11.\"... | 4,167,333 | b |
Although the two paragraphs cobble together a few details, they fail to give even one date on which an alleged misrepresentation occurred. That alone dooms ABI's ability to allege fraud with particularity. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "501 F.3d 493, 504-05",
"parenthetical": "holding that pleading was insufficient where the plaintiff failed to, among other things, set forth the dates of any fraudulent statements",
"sentence": "See Heinrich, 668 F.3d at 393 (finding that a plaintiff failed to allege fraud... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "668 F.3d 393, 393",
"parenthetical": "finding that a plaintiff failed to allege fraud with sufficient particularity because she \"d[id] not include [in her affidavit] the date she received the allegedly fraudulent email from the defendants.\"",
"sentence": "See Heinrich, 668 F.... | 12,404,957 | b |
See Hudson v. MCI Telecom. Plaintiff bore the initial burden of initiating an interactive process with OAS by proposing an accommodation and showing that the accommodation was objectively reasonable. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "180 F.3d 1171, 1171",
"parenthetical": "interactive process begins by an employee expressing a desire for reassignment if no reasonable accommodation is possible in his existing job",
"sentence": "See Woodman, 132 F.3d at 1344 (initial burden is on the employee to suggest ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "132 F.3d 1344, 1344",
"parenthetical": "initial burden is on the employee to suggest a \"plausible accommodation\"",
"sentence": "See Woodman, 132 F.3d at 1344 (initial burden is on the employee to suggest a “plausible accommodation”); see also Midland Brake, 180 F.3d at 1171 (... | 11,231,023 | b |
The Naranjos assert that reasonable reliance may constitute good cause, but have failed to demonstrate that their reliance was reasonable. In our view, it is not reasonable to rely on an opposing attorney's representation or statement of the law when both attorneys have readily accessible means to read, interpret, and ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "144 Idaho 257, 257-58",
"parenthetical": "no good cause when service was late because one attorney accepted in good faith that the other attorney would remind him to serve process",
"sentence": "See Campbell, 144 Idaho at 257-58, 159 P.3d at 894-95 (no good cause when service w... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "84 Fed.Appx. 253, 255-56",
"parenthetical": "reliance upon the clerk's advice did not constitute good cause because clerk's office has no duty to provide step-by-step guidance",
"sentence": "Cf. Veal v. United States, 84 Fed.Appx. 253, 255-56 (3d Cir.2004) (reliance upon the cl... | 4,080,697 | a |
The Naranjos assert that reasonable reliance may constitute good cause, but have failed to demonstrate that their reliance was reasonable. In our view, it is not reasonable to rely on an opposing attorney's representation or statement of the law when both attorneys have readily accessible means to read, interpret, and ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "159 P.3d 894, 894-95",
"parenthetical": "no good cause when service was late because one attorney accepted in good faith that the other attorney would remind him to serve process",
"sentence": "See Campbell, 144 Idaho at 257-58, 159 P.3d at 894-95 (no good cause when service wa... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "84 Fed.Appx. 253, 255-56",
"parenthetical": "reliance upon the clerk's advice did not constitute good cause because clerk's office has no duty to provide step-by-step guidance",
"sentence": "Cf. Veal v. United States, 84 Fed.Appx. 253, 255-56 (3d Cir.2004) (reliance upon the cl... | 4,080,697 | a |
The Naranjos assert that reasonable reliance may constitute good cause, but have failed to demonstrate that their reliance was reasonable. In our view, it is not reasonable to rely on an opposing attorney's representation or statement of the law when both attorneys have readily accessible means to read, interpret, and ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "134 Idaho 154, 157-58",
"parenthetical": "denying claim of equitable estoppel because party had readily accessible means to discover the truth, and finding no good cause on other grounds",
"sentence": "See Campbell, 144 Idaho at 257-58, 159 P.3d at 894-95 (no good cause when se... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "84 Fed.Appx. 253, 255-56",
"parenthetical": "reliance upon the clerk's advice did not constitute good cause because clerk's office has no duty to provide step-by-step guidance",
"sentence": "Cf. Veal v. United States, 84 Fed.Appx. 253, 255-56 (3d Cir.2004) (reliance upon the cl... | 4,080,697 | a |
The Naranjos assert that reasonable reliance may constitute good cause, but have failed to demonstrate that their reliance was reasonable. In our view, it is not reasonable to rely on an opposing attorney's representation or statement of the law when both attorneys have readily accessible means to read, interpret, and ... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "84 Fed.Appx. 253, 255-56",
"parenthetical": "reliance upon the clerk's advice did not constitute good cause because clerk's office has no duty to provide step-by-step guidance",
"sentence": "Cf. Veal v. United States, 84 Fed.Appx. 253, 255-56 (3d Cir.2004) (reliance upon the cl... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "997 P.2d 615, 618-19",
"parenthetical": "denying claim of equitable estoppel because party had readily accessible means to discover the truth, and finding no good cause on other grounds",
"sentence": "See Campbell, 144 Idaho at 257-58, 159 P.3d at 894-95 (no good cause when ser... | 4,080,697 | b |
Ignoring the appellate waiver, we are still left with Mr. Coates's agreement stipulating to a twenty-year sentence. In light of this plea agreement, we hold that Mr. Coates's sentencing challenges necessarily must fail because any error by the district court in setting the length of the sentence at twenty years was inv... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "505 F.3d 1054, 1055",
"parenthetical": "\"[H]e has invited any error regarding the length of his sentence ... and his claims [raised] now for the first time on appeal are waived.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Mancera-Perez, 505 F.3d 1054, 1055 (10th Cir.2007) (“[H]e has... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "431 Fed. Appx. 677, 680",
"parenthetical": "\"[The appellant] received a sentence within the range she requested, so she has waived her argument that her sentence was substantively unreasonable.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Mancera-Perez, 505 F.3d 1054, 1055 (10th... | 4,130,301 | a |
Ignoring the appellate waiver, we are still left with Mr. Coates's agreement stipulating to a twenty-year sentence. In light of this plea agreement, we hold that Mr. Coates's sentencing challenges necessarily must fail because any error by the district court in setting the length of the sentence at twenty years was inv... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "404 Fed.Appx. 255, 257",
"parenthetical": "holding that because, at sentencing, the appellant had asked the district court to impose the same sentence he now claims is substantively unreasonable, \"the argument [he] seeks to make was waived\"",
"sentence": "See United Stat... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "505 F.3d 1054, 1055",
"parenthetical": "\"[H]e has invited any error regarding the length of his sentence ... and his claims [raised] now for the first time on appeal are waived.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Mancera-Perez, 505 F.3d 1054, 1055 (10th Cir.2007) (“[H]e has... | 4,130,301 | b |
Ignoring the appellate waiver, we are still left with Mr. Coates's agreement stipulating to a twenty-year sentence. In light of this plea agreement, we hold that Mr. Coates's sentencing challenges necessarily must fail because any error by the district court in setting the length of the sentence at twenty years was inv... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that because, at sentencing, the appellant had asked the district court to impose the same sentence he now claims is substantively unreasonable, \"the argument [he] seeks to make was waived\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Mancera-Perez,... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "505 F.3d 1054, 1055",
"parenthetical": "\"[H]e has invited any error regarding the length of his sentence ... and his claims [raised] now for the first time on appeal are waived.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Mancera-Perez, 505 F.3d 1054, 1055 (10th Cir.2007) (“[H]e has... | 4,130,301 | b |
Ignoring the appellate waiver, we are still left with Mr. Coates's agreement stipulating to a twenty-year sentence. In light of this plea agreement, we hold that Mr. Coates's sentencing challenges necessarily must fail because any error by the district court in setting the length of the sentence at twenty years was inv... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that because, at sentencing, the appellant had asked the district court to impose the same sentence he now claims is substantively unreasonable, \"the argument [he] seeks to make was waived\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Mancera-Perez,... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "505 F.3d 1054, 1055",
"parenthetical": "\"[H]e has invited any error regarding the length of his sentence ... and his claims [raised] now for the first time on appeal are waived.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Mancera-Perez, 505 F.3d 1054, 1055 (10th Cir.2007) (“[H]e has... | 4,130,301 | b |
Ignoring the appellate waiver, we are still left with Mr. Coates's agreement stipulating to a twenty-year sentence. In light of this plea agreement, we hold that Mr. Coates's sentencing challenges necessarily must fail because any error by the district court in setting the length of the sentence at twenty years was inv... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "390 Fed. Appx. 833, 836",
"parenthetical": "holding that by requesting a sentence at the low end of the Guidelines, \"[i]t is clear ... that [the appellant] waived any argument that he was entitled to a below-guideline sentence\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Mancera... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "505 F.3d 1054, 1055",
"parenthetical": "\"[H]e has invited any error regarding the length of his sentence ... and his claims [raised] now for the first time on appeal are waived.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Mancera-Perez, 505 F.3d 1054, 1055 (10th Cir.2007) (“[H]e has... | 4,130,301 | b |
Ignoring the appellate waiver, we are still left with Mr. Coates's agreement stipulating to a twenty-year sentence. In light of this plea agreement, we hold that Mr. Coates's sentencing challenges necessarily must fail because any error by the district court in setting the length of the sentence at twenty years was inv... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "362 Fed.Appx. 895, 897",
"parenthetical": "\"Any error as to the procedural or substantive reasonableness of the sentence was waived when counsel indicated agreement with the sentence to be imposed.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Mancera-Perez, 505 F.3d 1054, 1055 (... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "505 F.3d 1054, 1055",
"parenthetical": "\"[H]e has invited any error regarding the length of his sentence ... and his claims [raised] now for the first time on appeal are waived.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Mancera-Perez, 505 F.3d 1054, 1055 (10th Cir.2007) (“[H]e has... | 4,130,301 | b |
Relying on our case law, Snyder argues that an infamous crime is a felony, and therefore misdemeanor battery is not an infamous crime. Contrary to the State's assertions, this argument clearly is supported by the ease law. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "148 Ind. 409, 409",
"parenthetical": "holding \"that larceny, being a felony, is an infamous crime\"",
"sentence": "See Crum, 148 Ind. at 409, 47 N.E. at 835 (holding “that larceny, being a felony, is an infamous crime”); Taylor, 616 N.E.2d at 385 (holding that because “each of... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that manslaughter was an infamous crime under a divorce statute because it was a felony",
"sentence": "See Crum, 148 Ind. at 409, 47 N.E. at 835 (holding “that larceny, being a felony, is an infamous crime”); Taylor, 616 N.E.2d at 385 (holding tha... | 7,141,124 | a |
Relying on our case law, Snyder argues that an infamous crime is a felony, and therefore misdemeanor battery is not an infamous crime. Contrary to the State's assertions, this argument clearly is supported by the ease law. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "61 N.E. 206, 206",
"parenthetical": "holding that manslaughter was an infamous crime under a divorce statute because it was a felony",
"sentence": "See Crum, 148 Ind. at 409, 47 N.E. at 835 (holding “that larceny, being a felony, is an infamous crime”); Taylor, 616 N.E.2d at 38... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "148 Ind. 409, 409",
"parenthetical": "holding \"that larceny, being a felony, is an infamous crime\"",
"sentence": "See Crum, 148 Ind. at 409, 47 N.E. at 835 (holding “that larceny, being a felony, is an infamous crime”); Taylor, 616 N.E.2d at 385 (holding that because “each of... | 7,141,124 | b |
Relying on our case law, Snyder argues that an infamous crime is a felony, and therefore misdemeanor battery is not an infamous crime. Contrary to the State's assertions, this argument clearly is supported by the ease law. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "148 Ind. 409, 409",
"parenthetical": "holding \"that larceny, being a felony, is an infamous crime\"",
"sentence": "See Crum, 148 Ind. at 409, 47 N.E. at 835 (holding “that larceny, being a felony, is an infamous crime”); Taylor, 616 N.E.2d at 385 (holding that because “each of... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "139 N.E. 362, 362",
"parenthetical": "\"It is obvious that a 'sentence' exceeding six months, without any indication as to where the imprisonment is to be, is not an apt designation of an infamous crime.\"",
"sentence": "See Crum, 148 Ind. at 409, 47 N.E. at 835 (holding “that ... | 7,141,124 | a |
Relying on our case law, Snyder argues that an infamous crime is a felony, and therefore misdemeanor battery is not an infamous crime. Contrary to the State's assertions, this argument clearly is supported by the ease law. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that manslaughter was an infamous crime under a divorce statute because it was a felony",
"sentence": "See Crum, 148 Ind. at 409, 47 N.E. at 835 (holding “that larceny, being a felony, is an infamous crime”); Taylor, 616 N.E.2d at 385 (holding tha... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "47 N.E. 835, 835",
"parenthetical": "holding \"that larceny, being a felony, is an infamous crime\"",
"sentence": "See Crum, 148 Ind. at 409, 47 N.E. at 835 (holding “that larceny, being a felony, is an infamous crime”); Taylor, 616 N.E.2d at 385 (holding that because “each of ... | 7,141,124 | b |
Relying on our case law, Snyder argues that an infamous crime is a felony, and therefore misdemeanor battery is not an infamous crime. Contrary to the State's assertions, this argument clearly is supported by the ease law. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "47 N.E. 835, 835",
"parenthetical": "holding \"that larceny, being a felony, is an infamous crime\"",
"sentence": "See Crum, 148 Ind. at 409, 47 N.E. at 835 (holding “that larceny, being a felony, is an infamous crime”); Taylor, 616 N.E.2d at 385 (holding that because “each of ... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "61 N.E. 206, 206",
"parenthetical": "holding that manslaughter was an infamous crime under a divorce statute because it was a felony",
"sentence": "See Crum, 148 Ind. at 409, 47 N.E. at 835 (holding “that larceny, being a felony, is an infamous crime”); Taylor, 616 N.E.2d at 38... | 7,141,124 | a |
Relying on our case law, Snyder argues that an infamous crime is a felony, and therefore misdemeanor battery is not an infamous crime. Contrary to the State's assertions, this argument clearly is supported by the ease law. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "47 N.E. 835, 835",
"parenthetical": "holding \"that larceny, being a felony, is an infamous crime\"",
"sentence": "See Crum, 148 Ind. at 409, 47 N.E. at 835 (holding “that larceny, being a felony, is an infamous crime”); Taylor, 616 N.E.2d at 385 (holding that because “each of ... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "139 N.E. 362, 362",
"parenthetical": "\"It is obvious that a 'sentence' exceeding six months, without any indication as to where the imprisonment is to be, is not an apt designation of an infamous crime.\"",
"sentence": "See Crum, 148 Ind. at 409, 47 N.E. at 835 (holding “that ... | 7,141,124 | a |
This Court interprets the state habeas appellate court's affirmance without an opinion to be a denial on the merits. Thus, Plasencia's claim is not proeedurally barred because the state court did not "clearly and expressly [state] that its judgment rests on a procedural bar." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "385 So.2d 1356, 1359",
"parenthetical": "holding a per curiam affirmance from a Florida District Court of Appeal is not renewable by the Florida Supreme Court",
"sentence": "See Johnson, 938 F.2d at 1173. Furthermore, Plasencia exhausted his state court remedies because he... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "938 F.2d 1173, 1173",
"parenthetical": "stating to exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must have presented the issues raised in the federal habeas petition to the state's highest court,' either on direct appeal or collateral review",
"sentence": "See Johnson, 938 F.2d at 1173.... | 5,927,043 | b |
This Court interprets the state habeas appellate court's affirmance without an opinion to be a denial on the merits. Thus, Plasencia's claim is not proeedurally barred because the state court did not "clearly and expressly [state] that its judgment rests on a procedural bar." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "592 F.3d 1144, 1156",
"parenthetical": "stating to exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must have presented the issues raised in the federal habeas petition to the state's highest court,' either on direct appeal or collateral review",
"sentence": "See Johnson, 938 F.2d at 1173.... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "385 So.2d 1356, 1359",
"parenthetical": "holding a per curiam affirmance from a Florida District Court of Appeal is not renewable by the Florida Supreme Court",
"sentence": "See Johnson, 938 F.2d at 1173. Furthermore, Plasencia exhausted his state court remedies because he... | 5,927,043 | a |
. Of particular relevance to the challenge made by Keyes here is the rule that the federal due process guarantee does not "prevent a state from prescribing a reasonable and appropriate condition precedent to the bringing of a suit of a specified kind or class so long as the basis of distinction is real and the conditio... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "256 N.W.2d 668, 668",
"parenthetical": "legislature may pass law which seeks to distinguish between different types of tort actions so long as distinctions are reasonable and grounded upon real differences inherent in those actions",
"sentence": "Jones v. Union Guano Co., ... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "264 U.S. 171, 181",
"parenthetical": "upholding state statute providing that no suit for damages to crops resulting from fertilizer use may be brought except after chemical analysis showing deficiency of ingredients",
"sentence": "Jones v. Union Guano Co., 264 U.S. 171, 1... | 11,336,212 | b |
. Of particular relevance to the challenge made by Keyes here is the rule that the federal due process guarantee does not "prevent a state from prescribing a reasonable and appropriate condition precedent to the bringing of a suit of a specified kind or class so long as the basis of distinction is real and the conditio... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "256 N.W.2d 668, 668",
"parenthetical": "legislature may pass law which seeks to distinguish between different types of tort actions so long as distinctions are reasonable and grounded upon real differences inherent in those actions",
"sentence": "Jones v. Union Guano Co., ... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "44 S.Ct. 280, 282",
"parenthetical": "upholding state statute providing that no suit for damages to crops resulting from fertilizer use may be brought except after chemical analysis showing deficiency of ingredients",
"sentence": "Jones v. Union Guano Co., 264 U.S. 171, 1... | 11,336,212 | b |
. Of particular relevance to the challenge made by Keyes here is the rule that the federal due process guarantee does not "prevent a state from prescribing a reasonable and appropriate condition precedent to the bringing of a suit of a specified kind or class so long as the basis of distinction is real and the conditio... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "256 N.W.2d 668, 668",
"parenthetical": "legislature may pass law which seeks to distinguish between different types of tort actions so long as distinctions are reasonable and grounded upon real differences inherent in those actions",
"sentence": "Jones v. Union Guano Co., ... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "68 L.Ed. 623, 628",
"parenthetical": "upholding state statute providing that no suit for damages to crops resulting from fertilizer use may be brought except after chemical analysis showing deficiency of ingredients",
"sentence": "Jones v. Union Guano Co., 264 U.S. 171, 1... | 11,336,212 | b |
It plainly did not do so here. Second, the Maine Constitution commands a presumption in favor of judicial access. See M.R.S.A. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2008 WL 4850198, at *3",
"parenthetical": "invoking similar \"presumption in favor of judicial jurisdiction\" to reject title insurer's exhaustion argument",
"sentence": "Const. Art. 1, § 19; State v. Bilynsky, 942 A.2d 1234, 1236 (Me.2008); Gibson v. Nat’l Ben Franklin In... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "387 A.2d 220, 223",
"parenthetical": "\"In view of that provision, legislation should not be deemed to preclude an injured person from having a remedy of his own for a recognized wrong in the absence of a clear manifestation of intent to that effect.\"",
"sentence": "Cons... | 4,186,959 | b |
But, as Bennett points out, at least one circuit has refused to apply the procedural default rule to claims that, though not expressly raised on direct appeal, fit into the category of claims for which a state supreme court is statutorily required to review all appeals in capital cases. In Beam, the petitioner had fail... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "62 F.3d 1024, 1039",
"parenthetical": "concluding that, under Beam analysis, challenge to trial instructions not preserved because Missouri mandatory review statute did not require review of trial errors",
"sentence": "Id. at 1307 (citing Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 105 S.Ct.... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Oklahoma statute requiring its supreme court to review for \"fundamental error\" in capital cases preserved constitutional errors for direct federal review, despite failure to raise them in state direct appeal",
"sentence": "Id. at 1307 (citing Ake ... | 7,637,785 | b |
But, as Bennett points out, at least one circuit has refused to apply the procedural default rule to claims that, though not expressly raised on direct appeal, fit into the category of claims for which a state supreme court is statutorily required to review all appeals in capital cases. In Beam, the petitioner had fail... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Oklahoma statute requiring its supreme court to review for \"fundamental error\" in capital cases preserved constitutional errors for direct federal review, despite failure to raise them in state direct appeal",
"sentence": "Id. at 1307 (citing Ake ... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "62 F.3d 1024, 1039",
"parenthetical": "concluding that, under Beam analysis, challenge to trial instructions not preserved because Missouri mandatory review statute did not require review of trial errors",
"sentence": "Id. at 1307 (citing Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 105 S.Ct.... | 7,637,785 | a |
But, as Bennett points out, at least one circuit has refused to apply the procedural default rule to claims that, though not expressly raised on direct appeal, fit into the category of claims for which a state supreme court is statutorily required to review all appeals in capital cases. In Beam, the petitioner had fail... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Oklahoma statute requiring its supreme court to review for \"fundamental error\" in capital cases preserved constitutional errors for direct federal review, despite failure to raise them in state direct appeal",
"sentence": "Id. at 1307 (citing Ake ... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "62 F.3d 1024, 1039",
"parenthetical": "concluding that, under Beam analysis, challenge to trial instructions not preserved because Missouri mandatory review statute did not require review of trial errors",
"sentence": "Id. at 1307 (citing Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 105 S.Ct.... | 7,637,785 | a |
The Supreme Court has repeatedly concluded that orders denying absolute immunity are renewable on interlocutory appeal under the collateral order doctrine. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that appellate jurisdiction over denial of President's claim to absolute immunity was proper",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 102 S.Ct. 2690, 73 L.Ed.2d 349 (1982) (concluding that appellate jurisdiction over denial ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "183 F.3d 962, 965",
"parenthetical": "concluding that the denial of a claim of absolute immunity raised in a 12(b",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 102 S.Ct. 2690, 73 L.Ed.2d 349 (1982) (concluding that appellate jurisdiction over denial of Presi... | 9,418,594 | a |
The Supreme Court has repeatedly concluded that orders denying absolute immunity are renewable on interlocutory appeal under the collateral order doctrine. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "183 F.3d 962, 965",
"parenthetical": "concluding that the denial of a claim of absolute immunity raised in a 12(b",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 102 S.Ct. 2690, 73 L.Ed.2d 349 (1982) (concluding that appellate jurisdiction over denial of Presi... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that appellate jurisdiction over denial of President's claim to absolute immunity was proper",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 102 S.Ct. 2690, 73 L.Ed.2d 349 (1982) (concluding that appellate jurisdiction over denial ... | 9,418,594 | b |
The Supreme Court has repeatedly concluded that orders denying absolute immunity are renewable on interlocutory appeal under the collateral order doctrine. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that appellate jurisdiction over denial of President's claim to absolute immunity was proper",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 102 S.Ct. 2690, 73 L.Ed.2d 349 (1982) (concluding that appellate jurisdiction over denial ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "183 F.3d 962, 965",
"parenthetical": "concluding that the denial of a claim of absolute immunity raised in a 12(b",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 102 S.Ct. 2690, 73 L.Ed.2d 349 (1982) (concluding that appellate jurisdiction over denial of Presi... | 9,418,594 | a |
Because the trial court did not follow the statutory methodology when it made its custody determination, and application of that methodology on remand will require the court to make factual findings that may be dependent on the court's assessment of the parties' credibility, we decline to exercise our discretion to rev... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "248 Or App 616, 618, 623",
"parenthetical": "declining to exercise de novo review and instead vacating and remanding the trial court's custody judgment because the trial court did not afford the statutory preference to the primary caregiver",
"sentence": "See Olson and Ols... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "218 Or App 1, 16",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] trial court's *** award must reflect the exercise of discretion under the correct methodology, and it must lie within the range of legally permissible outcomes.\"",
"sentence": "See Olson and Olson, 218 Or App 1, 16, 178 P3d 272 (2008)... | 3,996,638 | b |
Rather than showing excusable neglect, then, plaintiff has demonstrated that his lawyer either made a tactical decision not to file responsive papers or was ignorant of the procedural rules governing extensions of time in the federal courts. Thus, even accepting that plaintiff failed to file responsive papers for these... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "535 F.2d 739, 739",
"parenthetical": "attorney's ignorance of proper procedure insufficient basis for relief under Rule 60(b)(1",
"sentence": "See Cirami I, 535 F.2d at 739 (attorney's ignorance of proper procedure insufficient basis for relief under Rule 60(b)(1)); see also Ne... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "793 F.2d 58, 62",
"parenthetical": "attorney's failure to evaluate or understand the legal consequences of a chosen course of action insufficient ground for relief under Rule 60(b",
"sentence": "See Cirami I, 535 F.2d at 739 (attorney's ignorance of proper procedure insuff... | 7,851,751 | a |
Rather than showing excusable neglect, then, plaintiff has demonstrated that his lawyer either made a tactical decision not to file responsive papers or was ignorant of the procedural rules governing extensions of time in the federal courts. Thus, even accepting that plaintiff failed to file responsive papers for these... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "440 F.2d 1221, 1223",
"parenthetical": "illness of lawyer and lawyer's mistake as to applicable law insufficient grounds for relief under Rule 60(b",
"sentence": "See Cirami I, 535 F.2d at 739 (attorney's ignorance of proper procedure insufficient basis for relief under Ru... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "535 F.2d 739, 739",
"parenthetical": "attorney's ignorance of proper procedure insufficient basis for relief under Rule 60(b)(1",
"sentence": "See Cirami I, 535 F.2d at 739 (attorney's ignorance of proper procedure insufficient basis for relief under Rule 60(b)(1)); see also Ne... | 7,851,751 | b |
Rather than showing excusable neglect, then, plaintiff has demonstrated that his lawyer either made a tactical decision not to file responsive papers or was ignorant of the procedural rules governing extensions of time in the federal courts. Thus, even accepting that plaintiff failed to file responsive papers for these... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "illness of lawyer and lawyer's mistake as to applicable law insufficient grounds for relief under Rule 60(b",
"sentence": "See Cirami I, 535 F.2d at 739 (attorney's ignorance of proper procedure insufficient basis for relief under Rule 60(b)(1)); see... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "535 F.2d 739, 739",
"parenthetical": "attorney's ignorance of proper procedure insufficient basis for relief under Rule 60(b)(1",
"sentence": "See Cirami I, 535 F.2d at 739 (attorney's ignorance of proper procedure insufficient basis for relief under Rule 60(b)(1)); see also Ne... | 7,851,751 | b |
Rather than showing excusable neglect, then, plaintiff has demonstrated that his lawyer either made a tactical decision not to file responsive papers or was ignorant of the procedural rules governing extensions of time in the federal courts. Thus, even accepting that plaintiff failed to file responsive papers for these... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "illness of lawyer and lawyer's mistake as to applicable law insufficient grounds for relief under Rule 60(b",
"sentence": "See Cirami I, 535 F.2d at 739 (attorney's ignorance of proper procedure insufficient basis for relief under Rule 60(b)(1)); see... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "535 F.2d 739, 739",
"parenthetical": "attorney's ignorance of proper procedure insufficient basis for relief under Rule 60(b)(1",
"sentence": "See Cirami I, 535 F.2d at 739 (attorney's ignorance of proper procedure insufficient basis for relief under Rule 60(b)(1)); see also Ne... | 7,851,751 | b |
Rather than showing excusable neglect, then, plaintiff has demonstrated that his lawyer either made a tactical decision not to file responsive papers or was ignorant of the procedural rules governing extensions of time in the federal courts. Thus, even accepting that plaintiff failed to file responsive papers for these... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "535 F.2d 739, 739",
"parenthetical": "attorney's ignorance of proper procedure insufficient basis for relief under Rule 60(b)(1",
"sentence": "See Cirami I, 535 F.2d at 739 (attorney's ignorance of proper procedure insufficient basis for relief under Rule 60(b)(1)); see also Ne... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "illness of lawyer and lawyer's mistake as to applicable law insufficient grounds for relief under Rule 60(b",
"sentence": "See Cirami I, 535 F.2d at 739 (attorney's ignorance of proper procedure insufficient basis for relief under Rule 60(b)(1)); see... | 7,851,751 | a |
Rather than showing excusable neglect, then, plaintiff has demonstrated that his lawyer either made a tactical decision not to file responsive papers or was ignorant of the procedural rules governing extensions of time in the federal courts. Thus, even accepting that plaintiff failed to file responsive papers for these... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "535 F.2d 739, 739",
"parenthetical": "attorney's ignorance of proper procedure insufficient basis for relief under Rule 60(b)(1",
"sentence": "See Cirami I, 535 F.2d at 739 (attorney's ignorance of proper procedure insufficient basis for relief under Rule 60(b)(1)); see also Ne... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "631 F.Supp. 165, 166-69",
"parenthetical": "litigant's failure to communicate effectively with counsel, and attorney's tactical decision not to file opposing motions, not grounds for relief under Rule 60(b",
"sentence": "See Cirami I, 535 F.2d at 739 (attorney's ignorance ... | 7,851,751 | a |
Specifically, it is up to this Court to determine whether Defendants' inclusion of the Ten Commandments in the displays was a "purposeful or surreptitious effort to express some kind of subtle governmental advocacy of a particular religious message." To satisfy this prong of the Lemon test, Plaintiffs must show that De... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "449 U.S. 41, 41",
"parenthetical": "examining \"pre-eminent purpose for posting the Ten Commandments on schoolroom walls\"",
"sentence": "See also Stone, 449 U.S. at 41, 101 S.Ct. 192 (examining “pre-eminent purpose for posting the Ten Commandments on schoolroom walls”); A... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "307 F.3d 480, 480",
"parenthetical": "\"Although a totally secular purpose is not required, it is clear that the secular purpose requirement is not satisfied ... by the mere existence of some secular purpose, however dominated by religious purposes.\"",
"sentence": "See Adland,... | 9,295,726 | b |
Specifically, it is up to this Court to determine whether Defendants' inclusion of the Ten Commandments in the displays was a "purposeful or surreptitious effort to express some kind of subtle governmental advocacy of a particular religious message." To satisfy this prong of the Lemon test, Plaintiffs must show that De... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "examining \"pre-eminent purpose for posting the Ten Commandments on schoolroom walls\"",
"sentence": "See also Stone, 449 U.S. at 41, 101 S.Ct. 192 (examining “pre-eminent purpose for posting the Ten Commandments on schoolroom walls”); Aguillard, 482... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "307 F.3d 480, 480",
"parenthetical": "\"Although a totally secular purpose is not required, it is clear that the secular purpose requirement is not satisfied ... by the mere existence of some secular purpose, however dominated by religious purposes.\"",
"sentence": "See Adland,... | 9,295,726 | b |
Missouri's interest in preserving public confidence in the fact and appearance of the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary was compelling and outweighed the employee's interest in publicly expressing her political preference. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "deputy probation officer may be prohibited from displaying signs expressing opinion in favor of fugitive radicals",
"sentence": "Connealy v. Walsh, supra, 412 F.Supp. at 158; see also Phillips v. Adult Probation Dep’t of San Francisco, 491 F.2d 951 (... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "judicial prohibition against institution of litigation by probation officer invalid because motivated by judge's disapproval of the litigation, not disruption of court practices",
"sentence": "But see Abbott v. Thetford, 529 F.2d 695 (5th Cir.1976) (j... | 1,359,986 | a |
We hold that JRS & G's takings claim accrued not later than February of 1994 upon the completion of the 1994 fence. The 1994 security fence ran across JRS & G's plant area, cutting off JRS & G's access to its pond and stockpile areas. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "952 F.2d 1376, 1376",
"parenthetical": "finding that groundwater monitoring wells were permanent in nature given their structure",
"sentence": "See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 422, 102 S.Ct. 3164 (finding cables attached by screws and nails and a box attached by bolts to be suffi... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "458 U.S. 422, 422",
"parenthetical": "finding cables attached by screws and nails and a box attached by bolts to be sufficiently permanent to comprise a physical taking",
"sentence": "See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 422, 102 S.Ct. 3164 (finding cables attached by screws and nails and ... | 3,789,290 | b |
We hold that JRS & G's takings claim accrued not later than February of 1994 upon the completion of the 1994 fence. The 1994 security fence ran across JRS & G's plant area, cutting off JRS & G's access to its pond and stockpile areas. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding cables attached by screws and nails and a box attached by bolts to be sufficiently permanent to comprise a physical taking",
"sentence": "See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 422, 102 S.Ct. 3164 (finding cables attached by screws and nails and a box attached ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "952 F.2d 1376, 1376",
"parenthetical": "finding that groundwater monitoring wells were permanent in nature given their structure",
"sentence": "See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 422, 102 S.Ct. 3164 (finding cables attached by screws and nails and a box attached by bolts to be suffi... | 3,789,290 | a |
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