| International Journal on Cloud Computing: Services and Architecture (IJCCSA) ,Vol.3, No.4, August 2013 |
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| Securing Software as a Service Model of Cloud |
| Computing: Issues and Solutions |
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| Rashmi 1, Dr.G.Sahoo2, Dr.S.Mehfuz3 |
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| 1,2Birla Institute of Technology, Mesra, Ranchi, Jharkhand, India3Jamia Milia |
| Islamia,Delhi,India |
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| ABSTRACT |
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| Cloud computing, undoubtedly, has become the buzzword in the IT industry today. Looking at the potential |
| impact it has on numerous business applications as well as in our everyday life, it can certainly be said that |
| this disruptive technology is here to stay. Many of the features that make cloud computing attractive, have |
| not just challenged the existing security system, but have also revealed new security issues. This paper |
| provides an insightful analysis of the existing status on cloud computing security issues based on a detailed |
| survey carried by the author. It also makes an attempt to describe the security challenges in Software as a |
| Service (SaaS) model of cloud computing and also endeavors to provide future security research directions. |
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| KEY WORDS: |
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| Cloud Computing, Software as a Service, Security Challenges |
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| 1.INTRODUCTION |
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| A lot has been written and spoken about Cloud Computing technology, by IT experts, industry |
| and business leaders and independent experts. While some believe it is a disruptive trend |
| representing the next stage in the evolution of the Internet, others believe it is hype, as it uses |
| earlier established computing technologies. So, what exactly is cloud computing? From a user |
| perspective, cloud computing provides a means for acquiring computing services without any |
| need for deep understanding of the underlying technology being used. From an organizational |
| perspective, cloud computing delivers services for consumer and business needs in a simplified |
| way, providing unbounded scale and differentiated quality of service to foster rapid innovation |
| and decision making. According to Gartner [1], cloud computing can be defined as ‘‘a style of |
| computing, where massively scalable IT- enabled capabilities are delivered ‘as a service’ to |
| external customers using Internet technologies. According to the Seccombe [2] and National |
| Institute of Standards & Technology [3], guidelines for cloud computing, it has four different |
| deployment models namely private, community, public and hybrid as well as three different |
| delivery models that are utilized within a particular deployment model. These delivery models are |
| the SaaS (Software as a Service), PaaS (Platform as a Service) and IaaS (Infrastructure as a |
| Service). These models form the core of the cloud and they exhibit certain key characteristics like |
| on demand self-service, broad network access, resource pooling, measured service and rapid |
| elasticity. Our main area of concern in this paper is the Software as a service (SaaS). model This |
| best-known branch of cloud computing , is a delivery model in which applications are hosted and |
| managed in a service provider's datacenter, paid for on a subscription basis and accessed via a |
| browser over an internet connection. It basically deals with licensing of an application to the |
| customers for use as a service on demand. One good example of SaaS is the Salesforce.com CRM |
| application. |
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| DOI : 10.5121/ijccsa.2013.3401 |
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| 1 |
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| International Journal on Cloud Computing: Services and Architecture (IJCCSA) ,Vol.3, No.4, August 2013 |
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| This paper focuses on the issues related to the service delivery model of cloud computing. The |
| paper describes the various security issues of cloud computing with respect to its service delivery |
| model SaaS. The organization of the paper is as follows: Section 2 describes the security issues |
| that are posed by the Software as a Service (SaaS) delivery model. Section 3 lists some of the |
| current solutions which partly target the security challenges posed by the SaaS. Section 4 |
| provides conclusions derived out of the survey undertaken. |
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| 2.SECURITY ISSUES IN SAAS |
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| In Software as a Service (SaaS) model, the client has to depend on the service provider for proper |
| security measures. The provider must ensure that the multiple users don’t get to see each other’s |
| data. So, it becomes important to the user to ensure that right security measures are in place and |
| also difficult to get an assurance that the application will be available when needed [4]. While |
| using SaaS model, the cloud customer will, by definition, be substituting new software |
| applications for old ones. Therefore, the focus is not upon portability of applications, but on |
| preserving or enhancing the security functionality provided by the legacy application and |
| achieving a successful data migration [2] The SaaS software vendor may host the application on |
| his own private server or deploy it on a cloud computing infrastructure service provided by a |
| third-party provider (e.g. Amazon, Google, etc.). The use of cloud computing coupled with the |
| ‘pay-as-you-go’ approach helps the application service provider reduce the investment in |
| infrastructure services and enables it to concentrate on providing better services to the customers. |
| Enterprises today view data and business transactions as strategic and guard them with access |
| control and compliance policies. However, in the SaaS model, enterprise data is stored at the |
| SaaS provider’s data center, along with the data of other enterprises. Moreover, if the SaaS |
| provider is leveraging a public cloud computing service, the enterprise data might be stored along |
| with the data of other unrelated SaaS applications. The cloud provider might, additionally, |
| replicate the data at multiple locations across countries for the purposes of maintaining high |
| availability. Most enterprises are familiar with the traditional on- promise model, where the data |
| continues to reside within the enterprise boundary, subject to their policies. Cloud computing |
| traditional |
| providers need |
| communication systems. At the same time, they also have to deal with other issues inherently |
| introduced by the cloud computing paradigm itself. In the following section, the SaaS security |
| issues have been categorized as traditional and new cloud specific security challenges, for sake of |
| convenience. Figure 1 shows the various security issues in SaaS model which are discussed in the |
| paper. |
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| the common security challenges being faced by |
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| to solve |
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| 2.1 |
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| Traditional Security Challenges |
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| Although the security concerns in traditional communication systems also apply to the cloud, the |
| use of cloud computing introduces new attack vectors that will make attacks either possible or |
| simply easier to carry out. Some of the traditional security issues which also affect the SaaS |
| model have been described below: |
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| Authentication and authorization |
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| The authentication and authorization applications for enterprise environments may need to be |
| changed, to work with a safe cloud environment. Forensics tasks may become much more |
| difficult since the investigators may not be able to access system hardware physically. The design |
| proposed by Pratap Murukutla [5] allows user to use a single set of credentials. They have |
| proposed a solution with de-facto standards of open authorization in which there is a trust party |
| auditor which maintains all the credentials and cloud provider can uniquely distinguish one user |
| from other. The model proposed in the literature [6] verifies user authenticity using two-step |
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| International Journal on Cloud Computing: Services and Architecture (IJCCSA) ,Vol.3, No.4, August 2013 |
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| verification, which is based on password, smartcard and out of band (i.e. strong two factors) |
| authentication. In addition, the scheme also provides mutual authentication, identity management, |
| session key establishment, user privacy and security against many popular attacks; however the |
| formal security proofing hasn’t yet been formalized. |
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| Availability |
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| The availability ensures the reliable and timely access to cloud data or cloud computing resources |
| by the appropriate personnel. The availability of cloud service providers is also a big concern, |
| since if the cloud service is disrupted; it affects more customers than in the traditional model. For |
| instance, the recent disruption of the Amazon cloud service in the year 2011, took down a number |
| of websites including Reddit, Foursquare, and Quora.The SaaS application providers are required |
| to ensure that the systems are running properly when needed and enterprises are provided with |
| services around the clock. This involves making architectural changes at the application and |
| infrastructural levels to add scalability and high availability. Resiliency to hardware/software |
| failures, as well as to denial of service attacks, needs to be built from the ground up within the |
| application. At the same time, an appropriate action plan for business continuity and Disaster |
| Recovery (DR) needs to be considered for any exigencies as per the guidance provided by [2]. |
| This is essential to ensure the safety of the enterprise data while maintaining minimal downtime |
| for the enterprises. With Amazon [7] for instance, the Amazon Web Services (AWS) API end |
| points are hosted on the same Internet-scale, world-class infrastructure that supports the Amazon |
| retail site. Standard Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) mitigation techniques such as |
| synchronous cookies and connection limiting are used. To further mitigate the effect to potential |
| DDoS attacks, Amazon maintains internal bandwidth that exceeds its provider-supplied Internet |
| bandwidth. |
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| Data confidentiality |
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| Confidentiality refers to the prevention of intentional or unintentional unauthorized disclosure of |
| information. Confidentiality in cloud system is related to the areas of intellectual property rights, |
| covert channels, traffic analysis, encryption, and inference [10]. Cloud computing involves the |
| sharing or storage of information on remote servers owned or operated by others, while accessing |
| through the Internet or any other connections. Cloud computing services exist in many variations, |
| including data storage sites, video sites, tax preparation sites, personal health record websites and |
| many more. The entire contents of a user’s storage device may be stored with a single cloud |
| provider or with multiple cloud providers. Whenever an individual, a business, a government |
| agency, or any other entity shares information in the cloud, privacy or confidentiality questions |
| arise. |
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| Virtual Machine Security |
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| Although the global adoption of virtualization is a relatively a recent phenomena, threats to the |
| virtualized infrastructure are evolving just as quickly [8]. The hypervisor and virtual machines |
| used in cloud providers may also have vulnerabilities, as exemplified by [14]. Such |
| vulnerabilities represent an even more serious problem in multi-tenant environments, where |
| compromise of even a single virtual machine can affect all users on the same physical server. |
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| Virtualization is one of the main components of a cloud. But this poses major security risks. |
| Ensuring that different instances running on the same physical machine are isolated from each |
| other is a major task of virtualization which is not met completely in today’s scenario. The other issue |
| is the control of administrator on host and guest operating systems. Current Virtual Machine |
| Monitor (VMMs do not offer perfect isolation. Many bugs have been found in all popular VMMs |
| that allow escaping from VM. Virtual machine monitor should be ‘root secure’, meaning that no |
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| International Journal on Cloud Computing: Services and Architecture (IJCCSA) ,Vol.3, No.4, August 2013 |
| International Journal on Cloud Computing: Services and Architecture (IJCCSA) ,Vol.3, No.4, August 2013 |
| International Journal on Cloud Computing: Services and Architecture (IJCCSA) ,Vol.3, No.4, August 2013 |
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| privilege within the virtualized guest environment permits interference with the host system. |
| privilege within the virtualized guest environment permits interference with the host system. |
| privilege within the virtualized guest environment permits interference with the host system. |
| Some vulnerability has been found in all virtualization software which can be exploited by |
| Some vulnerability has been found in all virtualization software which can be exploited by |
| Some vulnerability has been found in all virtualization software which can be exploited by |
| malicious, local users to bypass certain security restrictions or gain privileges. For example, the |
| malicious, local users to bypass certain security restrictions or gain privileges. For example, the |
| malicious, local users to bypass certain security restrictions or gain privileges. For example, the |
| vulnerability of Microsoft Virtual PC and Microsoft Virtual Server could allow a guest operating |
| vulnerability of Microsoft Virtual PC and Microsoft Virtual Server could allow a guest operating |
| vulnerability of Microsoft Virtual PC and Microsoft Virtual Server could allow a guest operating |
| system user to run code on the host or another guest operating system. Vulnerability in Virtual PC |
| system user to run code on the host or another guest operating system. Vulnerability in Virtual PC |
| system user to run code on the host or another guest operating system. Vulnerability in Virtual PC |
| and Virtual Server could allow elevation of privilege. Cloud providers, therefore, might need to |
| and Virtual Server could allow elevation of privilege. Cloud providers, therefore, might need to |
| and Virtual Server could allow elevation of privilege. Cloud providers, therefore, might need to |
| reconsider traditional security concerns from different angles. |
| reconsider traditional security concerns from different angles. |
| reconsider traditional security concerns from different angles. |
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| Figure 1: Security Issues in SaaS |
| Figure 1: Security Issues in SaaS |
| Figure 1: Security Issues in SaaS |
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| 2.2 |
| 2.2 |
| 2.2 |
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| Cloud Specific Security Challenges |
| Cloud Specific Security Challenges |
| Cloud Specific Security Challenges |
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| Information Security |
| Information Security |
| Information Security |
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| ] |
| ] |
| ] |
| In a traditional on-premise application deployment model, the sensitive data of each enterprise |
| In a traditional on-premise application deployment model, the sensitive data of each enterprise |
| In a traditional on-premise application deployment model, the sensitive data of each enterprise |
| continues to reside within the enterprise boundary and is subject to its physical, logical and |
| continues to reside within the enterprise boundary and is subject to its physical, logical and |
| continues to reside within the enterprise boundary and is subject to its physical, logical and |
| personnel security and access control policies. However, in the SaaS model, the enterprise data is |
| personnel security and access control policies. However, in the SaaS model, the enterprise data is |
| personnel security and access control policies. However, in the SaaS model, the enterprise data is |
| stored outside the enterprise boundary, at the SaaS vendor end. Consequently, the SaaS vendor |
| stored outside the enterprise boundary, at the SaaS vendor end. Consequently, the SaaS vendor |
| stored outside the enterprise boundary, at the SaaS vendor end. Consequently, the SaaS vendor |
| must adopt additional security checks to ensure data security and prevent breaches due to security |
| must adopt additional security checks to ensure data security and prevent breaches due to security |
| must adopt additional security checks to ensure data security and prevent breaches due to security |
| vulnerabilities in the application or through malicious employees. This involves the use of strong |
| vulnerabilities in the application or through malicious employees. This involves the use of strong |
| vulnerabilities in the application or through malicious employees. This involves the use of strong |
| encryption techniques for data security and fine-grained authorization to control access to data. |
| encryption techniques for data security and fine-grained authorization to control access to data. |
| encryption techniques for data security and fine-grained authorization to control access to data. |
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| International Journal on Cloud Computing: Services and Architecture (IJCCSA) ,Vol.3, No.4, August 2013 |
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| In cloud vendors such as Amazon, the Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) administrators do not have |
| access to customer instances and cannot log into the Guest OS. EC2 Administrators with a |
| business need are required to use their individual cryptographically Strong Secure Shell (SSH) |
| keys to gain access to a host [8]. All such accesses are logged and routinely audited. While the |
| data at rest in Simple Storage Service (S3) is not encrypted by default, users can encrypt their |
| data before it is uploaded to Amazon S3, so that it is not accessed or tampered with by any |
| unauthorized party. Malicious users can exploit weaknesses in the data security model to gain |
| unauthorized access to data. |
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| Network Security |
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| In a SaaS deployment model, sensitive data is obtained from the enterprises, processed by the |
| SaaS application and stored at the SaaS vendor end. All data flow over the network needs to be |
| secured in order to prevent leakage of sensitive information. This involves the use of strong |
| network traffic encryption techniques such as Secure Socket Layer (SSL) and the Transport Layer |
| Security (TLS) for security. |
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| In case of Amazon Web Services (AWS), the network layer provides significant protection |
| against traditional network security issues, such as MITM (Man-In-The-Middle) attacks, IP |
| spoofing, port scanning, packet sniffing, etc. For maximum security, Amazon S3 is accessible via |
| SSL encrypted endpoints. The encrypted end points are accessible from both the Internet and |
| from within AmazonEC2, ensuring that data is transferred securely both within AWS and to and |
| from sources outside of AWS [9]. However, malicious users can exploit weaknesses in network |
| security configuration to sniff network packets. |
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| Resource Localty |
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| In a SaaS model of a cloud environment, the end-users use the services provided by the cloud |
| providers without knowing exactly where the resources for such services are located, possibly in |
| other legislative domains. This poses a potential problem when disputes happen, which is |
| sometimes beyond the control of cloud providers. Due to compliance and data privacy laws in |
| various countries, locality of data is of utmost importance in much enterprise architecture [15]. |
| The European Union has issued a Directive 95/46/EC to protect the user privacy at all costs [16]. |
| The directive prohibits transfers of personal data to countries which do not ensure an adequate |
| level of protection. For example, the recent Dropbox users have to agree to the ‘‘Terms of |
| Service’’ which grant the providers the right to disclose user information in compliance with laws |
| and law enforcement requests [17]. In addition to the issue of local laws, there’s also the question |
| of under whose jurisdiction the data falls, when an investigation occurs. A secure SaaS model |
| must be capable of providing reliability to the customer on the location of the data of the |
| consumer. |
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| Cloud standards |
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| To achieve interoperability among clouds and to increase their stability and security, cloud |
| standards are needed across different standard developing organizations. For example, the current |
| storage services by a cloud provider may be incompatible with those of other provider. In order to |
| keep their customers, cloud providers may introduce so called ‘‘sticky services’’ which create |
| difficulty for the users if they want to migrate from one provider to the other, e.g., Amazon’s S3 |
| is incompatible with IBM’s Blue Cloud or Google storage. There are currently a large number of |
| standards bodies with different interests, e.g. IEEE Cloud Computing Standard Study Group [18], |
| ITU Cloud Computing Focus Group [19], Cloud Security Alliance (CSA), Distributed |
| Management Task Force [20], Storage Networking Industry Association [21], Open Grid Forum |
| [22], Open Cloud Consortium [23] and Organization for the Advancement of Structured |
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| International Journal on Cloud Computing: Services and Architecture (IJCCSA) ,Vol.3, No.4, August 2013 |
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| Information Standards [24], and so forth. To promote the wide use of cloud computing, these |
| standards bodies need to sit down and work together to establish common standards. Possible |
| ‘‘Inter-cloud’’ standards in the following domains are needed to increase cloud interoperability |
| and free data movement among clouds: |
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| – Network architecture, |
| – Data format, |
| – Metering and billing, |
| – Quality of Service, |
| – Resource provisioning, |
| – Security, identity management and privacy. |
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| As stated, there are many general computing standards that may be reused in the cloud, but for |
| the moment, there are to our knowledge no dedicated cloud standards. This may add to the |
| confusion for cloud users [25], and is something which must be addressed in the future. |
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| Data Segregation |
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| Multi-tenancy is one of the major characteristics of cloud computing. As a result of multi- |
| tenancy, multiple users can store their data using the applications provided by SaaS. In such a |
| situation, data of various users will reside at the same location. Intrusion of data of one user by |
| another becomes possible in this environment. This intrusion can be done either by hacking |
| through the loop holes in the application or by injecting client code into the SaaS system. A client |
| can write a masked code and inject into the application. If the application executes this code |
| without verification, then there is a high potential of intrusion into other’s data. A SaaS model |
| should therefore ensure a clear boundary for each user’s data. The boundary must be ensured not |
| only at the physical level but also at the application level. The service should be intelligent |
| enough to segregate the data from different users. A malicious user can use application |
| vulnerabilities to hand- craft parameters that bypass security checks and access sensitive data of |
| other tenants. |
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| Data Access |
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| Data access issue is mainly related to security policies provided to the users while accessing the |
| data. In a typical scenario, a small business organization can use a cloud provided by some other |
| provider for carrying out its business processes. This organization will have its own security |
| policies based on which each employee can have access to a particular set of data. The security |
| policies may entitle some considerations, wherein, some of the employees are not given access to |
| certain amount of data [26]. These security policies must be adhered by the cloud to avoid |
| intrusion of data by unauthorized users [27].The SaaS model must be flexible enough to |
| incorporate the specific policies put forward by the organization. The model must also be able to |
| provide organizational boundary within the cloud because multiple organization will be |
| deploying their business processes within a single cloud environment. |
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| Web application security |
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| SaaS is software deployed over the internet and/or is deployed to run behind a firewall in local |
| area network or personal computer. The key characteristics include Network-based access to, and |
| management of, commercially available software and managing activities from central locations |
| rather than at each customer’s site, enabling customers to access application remotely via the |
| Web. SaaS application development may use various types of software components and |
| frameworks. These tools can reduce time-to-market and the cost of converting a traditional on- |
| premise software product or building and deploying a new SaaS solution. Examples include |
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| International Journal on Cloud Computing: Services and Architecture (IJCCSA) ,Vol.3, No.4, August 2013 |
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| components for subscription management, grid computing software, web application frameworks |
| and complete SaaS platform products. One of the ‘‘must-have’’ requirements for a SaaS |
| application is that it has to be used and managed over the web [28]. The software which is |
| provided as a service resides in the cloud without tying up with the actual users. This allows |
| improvising the software without inconveniencing the user. Security holes in the web applications |
| thus create a vulnerability to the SaaS application [29]. In this scenario, the vulnerability can |
| potentially have detrimental impact on all of the customers using the cloud. The challenge with |
| SaaS security is not any different than with that of any other web application technology. |
| However one of the problems is that traditional network security solutions such as network |
| firewalls, network intrusion detection and prevention systems (IDS & IPS), do not adequately |
| address this problem. Web applications introduce new security risks that cannot effectively be |
| defended against at the network level, and do require application level defenses. The Open Web |
| Application Security Project [30] has provided the ten most critical web applications security |
| threats. |
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| Data breaches |
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| Since data from various users and business organizations lie together in a cloud environment, |
| breaching into the cloud environment will potentially attack the data of all the users. Thus, the |
| cloud becomes a high value target [31]. In the Verizon Business breach report blog it has been |
| stated that external criminals pose the greatest threat (73 percent), but achieve the least impact |
| (30,000 compromised records), resulting in a Virtualization vulnerability [32]. |
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| Backup |
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| The traditional backup methods used with earlier applications and data centers that were |
| primarily designed for web and consumer applications, are not optimally designed for the |
| applications running in the cloud. The SaaS vendor needs to ensure that all sensitive enterprise |
| data is regularly backed up to facilitate quick recovery in case of disasters. Also the use of strong |
| encryption schemes to protect the backup data is recommended to prevent accidental leakage of |
| sensitive information. In the case of cloud vendors such as Amazon, the data at rest in S3 is not |
| encrypted by default. The users need to separately encrypt their data and backups so that it cannot |
| be accessed or tampered with by unauthorized parties. |
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| Identity management and sign-on process |
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| Identity management (IdM) or ID management is an area that deals with identifying individuals |
| in a system and controlling the access to the resources in that system by placing restrictions on |
| the established identities. This area is considered as one of the biggest challenges in information |
| security. When a SaaS provider has to know how to control who has access to what systems |
| within the enterprise it becomes all the more challenging task. In such scenarios the provisioning |
| and de-provisioning of the users in the cloud becomes very crucial. |
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| 3.CURRENT SECURITY SOLUTIONS |
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| There are several research works happening in the area of cloud security. Several groups and |
| organization are interested in developing security solutions and standards for the cloud. The |
| Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) is gathering solution providers, non- profits and individuals to |
| enter into discussion about the current and future best practices for information assurance in the |
| cloud [11]. The Cloud Standards website collects and coordinates information about cloud-related |
| standards under development by the groups. The Open Web Application Security Project |
| (OWASP) maintains list of top vulnerabilities to cloud-based or SaaS models which is updated as |
| the threat landscape changes [30]. The Open Grid Forum publishes documents to containing |
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| security and infrastructural specifications and information for grid computing developers and |
| researchers [22]. The best security solution for SaaS applications is to develop a development |
| framework that has tough security architecture. Tsai W [33], put forth a four-tier framework for |
| web-based development that though seems interesting, only implies a security facet in the |
| process. In his work, Berre [34] has suggested a road map towards cloud-centric development, |
| and the X10 language is one of the ways to achieve better use of cloud capabilities of massive |
| parallel processing and concurrency [35].Another approach is resource isolation to ensure |
| security of data during processing, by isolating the processor caches in virtual machines, and |
| isolating those virtual caches from the hypervisor cache [36]. One simple solution, for UK |
| businesses is to simply use in-house ‘‘private clouds’’ [37] .Pearson highlighted that the current |
| lack of transparency is preventing many users from reaping the true benefits of the cloud [38]. |
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| For Identity and access management in the SaaS,[12] has issued an Identity and Access |
| Management Guidance which provides a list of recommended best practices to assure identities |
| and secure access management. Resource Locality and Data Segregation are the two key security |
| challenges on which not much information is available in the existing literature, which |
| necessitates that this can be further taken up for research. |
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| Table 1: Current solutions available for securing SaaS |
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| S.No. Security Areas |
| Authentication |
| 1 |
| authorization |
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| and |
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| 2 |
| 3 |
| 4 |
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| 5 |
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| 6 |
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| 7 |
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| 8 |
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| 9 |
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| 10 |
| 11 |
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| 12 |
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| Availability |
| Data confidentiality |
| Virtual |
| Security |
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| Machine |
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| Information Security |
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| Network Security |
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| Cloud standards |
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| Data Access |
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| application |
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| Web |
| security |
| Data breaches |
| Backup |
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| Identity |
| and sign-on process |
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| management |
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| virtual |
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| distributed |
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| Current /Possible Solutions |
| • Open Authorization [5] |
| • Two Factor Authentication [6] |
| • OAuth [39] |
| • Data Dispersion[8] |
| • Attribute based Proxy Re-Encryption [40] |
| • Reconfigurable |
| machine[41] |
| • Survey on Virtual machine Security [42] |
| • Information Security Risk Management |
| Framework |
| [43] |
| • Network Security for virtual machines [44] |
| • Network Security Sandbox[45] |
| • IEEE Cloud Computing Standard Study |
| Group [18] |
| • ITU Cloud Computing Focus Group [19], |
| • Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) |
| • Multi-user access policies [46]. |
| • Data Access Management [47]. |
| • Web Application Scanners[48] |
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| • Agentless Method for data Backup and |
| Recovery [49] |
| • CSA’s Identity and Access Management |
| Guidance [12] |
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| International Journal on Cloud Computing: Services and Architecture (IJCCSA) ,Vol.3, No.4, August 2013 |
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| 4.CONCLUSION |
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| Though there are numerous advantages in using a cloud-based system, there are yet many |
| practical issues which have to be sorted. Cloud computing is a disruptive technology with |
| profound implications not only for Internet services but also for the IT sector as a whole. Still, |
| several outstanding issues exist, particularly related to service-level agreements (SLA), security |
| and privacy, and power efficiency. As described in the paper, currently security has lot of loose |
| ends which scares away several potential users. Until a proper security module is not in place, |
| potential users will not be able to leverage the true benefits of this technology. This security |
| module should cater to all the issues arising from all directions of the cloud. Every element in the |
| cloud should be analyzed at both the macro and micro level and subsequently an integrated |
| solution must be designed and deployed in the cloud to attract and retain the potential consumers. |
| Until then, cloud environment will remain cloudy. In a cloud, where there are heterogeneous |
| systems having a variation in their asset value, a single security system would be too costly for |
| certain applications and if there is less security then the vulnerability factor of some applications |
| like financial and military applications will shoot up. On the other side, if the cloud has a |
| common security methodology in place, it will be a high value asset target for hackers because of |
| the fact that hacking the security system will make the entire cloud vulnerable to attack. |
|
|
| In this paper an overview of cloud computing service delivery model, SaaS along with the |
| security challenges , including both the traditional and cloud specific security challenges |
| ,associated with the model has been presented A number of new challenges that is inherently |
| connected to the new cloud paradigm has also been deliberated in the paper. As secure data |
| storage in cloud environment is a significant concern which prevents many users from using the |
| cloud, a practical solution to provide security and privacy for user data, when it is located in a |
| public cloud, was also discussed in this paper. The need for further work on various security |
| mechanisms has also been highlighted, in order to provide transparent services that can be trusted |
| by all users. |
|
|
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| Authors |
| |
| Rashmi |
| Rashmi is a researcher at Birla Institute of Technology. Her current research focus is on Cloud Computing |
| and securing Cloud environments. She holds her B.E. degree in Information Technology from Pune |
| University, India in 2005 and M.Tech. In Computer Science in 2008.She was awarded “Gold Medal” for |
| her overall academic excellence. She has also worked as a Software Engineer in reputed IT firms before |
| joining academic career. She can be contacted at: rashmirrai@gmail.com |
| |
| Dr.G.Sahoo |
| G. Sahoo received his MSc in Mathematics from Utkal University in the year 1980 and PhD in the Area of |
| Computational Mathematics from Indian Institute of Technology, Kharagpur in the year 1987. He has been |
| associated with Birla Institute of Technology, Mesra, Ranchi, India since 1988, and currently, he is |
| working as a Professor and Head in the Department of Information Technology. His research interest |
| includes Theoretical Computer Science, Parallel and Distributed Computing, Cloud Computing, |
| Evolutionary Computing, Information Security, Image Processing and Pattern Recognition. |
| |
| Dr.Shabana Mehfuz |
| Shabana Mehfuz received her B.Tech degree in Electrical Engineering from Jamia Millia Islamia, India in |
| 1996 and M.Tech degree in Computer technology from IIT Delhi in 2003 and PhD in Computer |
| Engineering from Jamia Millia Islamia in 2008. She is currently working as Associate Professor at the |
| Department of Electrical Engineering. Her research interest includes Computational Intelligence and |
| Computer Networks. |
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