| Youth in Middle East |
| and North Africa |
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| August 2019 |
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| Daniella Raz |
| University of Michigan |
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| JULY 2018Arab Barometer – Wave V |
| Topic Report – Youth |
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| Executive Summary |
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| Individuals between the ages of 15 and 29 account for roughly 30 percent of the |
| population of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA).1 The beliefs, attitudes, |
| and preferences of this large and growing segment of the population has the po- |
| tential to shape and drive the region’s future. Yet, widespread youth discontent |
| about their economic prospects poses a significant challenge. Youth unemploy- |
| ment rates across the region remain high and there is broad frustration with |
| government efforts to create employment opportunities.2 Though satisfaction |
| with the state education system varies greatly across countries, youth are less |
| satisfied than are older generations. |
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| Youth also question if they have the ability to voice their frustrations to the gov- |
| ernment. In nearly all countries, less than half say the right to freedom of ex- |
| pression is guaranteed while half or less say they have the right to demonstrate |
| peacefully in all countries. This combination creates conditions where youth |
| across the MENA region, far more than older age cohorts, are considering emi- |
| grating from their country, primarily to Europe, North America, or GCC countries. |
| Unsurprisingly, many cite economic reasons as the main impetus for leaving. |
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| However, youth differ from their older counterparts not only in terms of greater |
| frustration with the existing system. Relative to older generations youth also |
| tend to be less religious, less interested in politics, and more likely to be engaged |
| in social media. Generational differences are particularly stark in Morocco where |
| youth attitudes diverge substantially and dissatisfaction with the overall state of |
| affairs is quite salient. |
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| Meanwhile, on gender issues, most youth tend to be supportive of equal rights |
| for women. Majorities say women have the right to be the head of government |
| and to receive an education. Yet, the same does not hold true for equal inher- |
| itance rights with minorities saying women should receive the same as men |
| in most countries. Additionally, this generation cites low levels of support for |
| women playing equal roles in society, with most saying that men make better |
| political leaders and stating that husbands should have the final say in family |
| matters. |
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| Youth in MENA appear to be particularly inclined toward China relative to other |
| global powers. Majorities favor closer economic relations with China in most |
| countries surveyed, while less than half say the same about relations with the |
| U.S. in most countries. |
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| 1https://www.undp.org/content/dam/rbas/report/AHDR%20Reports/AHDR%202016/AHDR%20Final% |
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| 202016/AHDR2016En.pdf, pg. 7 |
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| 2https://www.imf.org/external/np/vc/2012/061312.htm?id=186569 |
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| www.arabbarometer.org |
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| 2 |
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| Arab Barometer – Wave V |
| Topic Report – Youth |
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| These are among the key findings from 11 nationally representative public opin- |
| ion surveys conducted across the Middle East and North Africa by the Arab |
| Barometer from September 2018 - April 2019. The surveys included more than |
| 25,000 face-to-face interviews in the respondent’s place of residence and have |
| a margin of error of ±2 percent in most countries.3 |
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| Religiosity |
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| Across the region, youth are less religious than their older counterparts. In fact, in |
| every country surveyed less than half of youth identify as religious. More specif- |
| ically, fewer than one-fifth of youth in Algeria (15 percent), Tunisia (16 percent), |
| and Libya (18 percent), and fewer than one-quarter of youth in Jordan (22 per- |
| cent), Lebanon (23 percent), and Morocco (24 percent) consider themselves reli- |
| gious. Higher rates of youth religiosity are found in Palestine (28 percent), Sudan |
| (32 percent), Yemen (33 percent) Egypt (36 percent), and Iraq (42 percent). |
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| However, trends over time paint a more complicated picture throughout the |
| region. While indeed less than half of MENA youth identify as religious, in some |
| countries these rates represent an increase from the last Arab Barometer wave |
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| 3For details about each survey, please visit: |
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| https://www.arabbarometer.org/waves/ |
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| arab-barometer-wave-v/ |
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| www.arabbarometer.org |
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| Arab Barometer – Wave V |
| Topic Report – Youth |
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| while in others a decrease. For instance, rates of religiosity have increased in |
| Egypt (+12), Yemen (+7), Tunisia (+6), Iraq (+6), Morocco (+2), and Libya (+2). In |
| contrast, youth identify as religious at lower rates in Sudan (-12), Palestine (-9), |
| Jordan (-7), Algeria (-3) and Lebanon (-2). |
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| Views on Politics |
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| In addition to generally low levels of religiosity, youth appear disinterested in |
| politics, both overall and when compared to older generations. Only three-in- |
| ten youth in Lebanon (31 percent), Yemen (29 percent), Palestine (29 percent), |
| Sudan (28 percent), and Egypt (27 percent) say they are interested or very inter- |
| ested in politics, while no more than a quarter say the same in Jordan (25 per- |
| cent), Morocco (23 percent), Iraq (21 percent), and Libya (21 percent). Tunisian |
| and Algerian youth are least politically interested with fewer than two-in-ten |
| citing interest in politics (17 percent and 15 percent, respectively). |
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| With the exception of Egypt and Lebanon, youth in the region are less interested |
| in politics than are older citizens. The difference between age cohorts is widest |
| in Tunisia and Palestine (10 percentage points). Elsewhere, though differences |
| are smaller, older citizens nonetheless report greater interest in politics than do |
| youth. |
| In Lebanon youth have only marginally greater interest (1 percentage |
| point), while in Egypt youth are 6 percentage points more likely than older citi- |
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| Arab Barometer – Wave V |
| Topic Report – Youth |
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| zens to say they are interested or very interested in politics. |
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| Youth disinterest in the political system could be in part due to their outlook |
| If young people perceive the most |
| on the fairness of parliamentary elections. |
| recent parliamentary elections as unfair, regardless of whether they voted or |
| were even eligible to vote in them, then their disinterest could perhaps reflect |
| disillusionment with their country’s political process. With the exception of the |
| Levant, youth are more likely than older age cohorts to evaluate the last par- |
| liamentary elections held in their respective country as being neither free nor |
| fair. In some countries surveyed this difference is stark. For instance, in Morocco |
| four-in-ten youth characterized the last parliamentary elections as such, com- |
| pared to fewer than a quarter of older Moroccans (23 percent). In Tunisia, youth |
| were 12 percentage points more likely than older citizens to characterize the |
| last parliamentary elections as being neither free nor fair (40 percent versus 28 |
| percent). |
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| Internet and Social Media |
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| Across the region, internet use, defined as going online at least once-in-a-few- |
| weeks, is substantially greater among youth than older generations. In fact, in |
| most of the surveyed countries (with the exception of Yemen), more than 90 |
| percent of youth use the internet, whereas among the older generation internet |
| usage does not approach such a rate. The highest rates of internet usage are |
| found in Lebanon (99 percent), followed by Jordan (96 percent), Palestine (95 |
| percent), Algeria (93 percent), Morocco (93 percent), Tunisia (91 percent), Egypt |
| (90 percent), Sudan (90 percent), Iraq (89 percent), and Libya (88 percent). The |
| lowest rate of internet usage among youth is seen in Yemen, where fewer than |
| eight-in-ten youth say they use the internet at least once every few weeks (77 |
| percent). The most striking generational differences in internet usage are seen in |
| Yemen and North Africa (excluding Libya), where internet use among youth ex- |
| ceeds that of older age cohorts by at least 30 percentage points. In contrast, the |
| intergenerational gap in internet use is less pronounced in the Levant (Lebanon, |
| Jordan, Palestine), where it does not exceed 20 percentage points. |
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| Interestingly, among internet users, social media usage is very high across all |
| demographics. In fact, youth are not so different from their older counterparts |
| in this regard. Though Yemeni youth report the lowest rates of internet usage in |
| the region, those online are also the most likely to engage in social media. Nearly |
| all Yemeni youth who are online (99 percent) use social media on a typical day. |
| However, most online youth across the region also engage in social media on a |
| typical day: Jordan (98 percent), Lebanon (97 percent), Iraq (97 percent), Pales- |
| tine (96 percent), Libya (96 percent), Egypt (96 percent), Tunisia (96 percent), |
| Morocco (96 percent), Sudan (94 percent), and Algeria (94 percent). Overall, |
| youth are consistently more likely than older generations to say they spend two |
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| hours or more on social media platforms, although the size of this difference is |
| often marginal at best. As an example, the widest generational gap is seen in |
| Morocco, where youth are 10 percentage points more likely to use social me- |
| dia. However, the difference is much smaller in Yemen (1 percentage point) and |
| Jordan (2 percentage points), and non-existent in Palestine. |
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| Though there is little generational difference in overall quantity of social media |
| usage, there exists a much larger generational discrepancy in terms of moti- |
| vations for using and trust in social media. Youth are more likely than older |
| generations to use social media as their primary source of information to fol- |
| low breaking news, and also to trust this information more than that found in |
| newspapers or TV news programs. With respect to the former, youth are most |
| likely to say social media is their primary source for breaking news in Palestine |
| (76 percent), while around two-thirds say the same in Morocco (67 percent) and |
| Jordan (63 percent). About half of youth or more in Egypt (58 percent), Tunisia |
| (55 percent), Iraq (51 percent), and Algeria (49 percent) rely primarily on so- |
| cial media for breaking news, while less than half do so in Libya (45 percent), |
| Lebanon (43 percent), Yemen (37 percent) and Sudan (32 percent). Notably, |
| youth reliance on social media to follow breaking news far exceeds that of their |
| older counterparts in every country surveyed. The greatest discrepancy between |
| youth and older generations is seen in Morocco (53 percentage points), Egypt |
| (44 percentage points), Tunisia (36 percentage points), and Palestine (32 per- |
| centage points). Elsewhere, though less stark, rates of youth reliance on social |
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| Topic Report – Youth |
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| media for breaking news still exceed that of older citizens by at least 15 per- |
| centage points or more. Such trends show that while youth and their older |
| counterparts report using social media at similar rates overall, their incentives |
| and motivations for using such platforms differ in important ways. |
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| Youth in the region vary dramatically in the level of trust in information they re- |
| ceive on social media. The highest rates of trust among youth are found in Mo- |
| rocco (77 percent) and Egypt (74 percent), followed by Lebanon (67 percent), |
| Palestine (56 percent), Iraq (53 percent), and Sudan (51 percent). In contrast, |
| less than half of youth in Algeria (49 percent), Yemen (47 percent), Tunisia (47 |
| percent), Libya (41 percent), and Jordan (36 percent) trust social media sources |
| more than newspapers and TV news. The magnitude of the differences across |
| age cohorts is also varies widely, ranging from single digit differences in Jordan |
| (2 percentage points), Libya (5 percentage points), Yemen (3 percentage points), |
| and Sudan (3 percentage points) to much larger generational gaps in Lebanon |
| (16 percentage points), Egypt (18 percentage points), and Morocco (32 percent- |
| age points). Overall, however, youth are more trusting of the information they |
| receive from social media than are older citizens in every country surveyed. |
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| Notably, the most used social media platform among youth across the region is |
| Facebook. The exception to this finding is Yemen, where youth use WhatsApp at |
| a higher rate than Facebook (46 percent versus 36 percent). Youth in Egypt (94 |
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| percent), Algeria (91 percent), Morocco (90 percent), and Lebanon (90 percent) |
| are most partial to Facebook. More than eight-in-ten youth in Sudan (85 per- |
| cent), Libya (82 percent), and Jordan (81 percent), and more than seven-in-ten |
| youth in Iraq (74 percent) and Palestine (73 percent) use Facebook. |
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| Education and Employment |
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| Education System |
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| Rates of youth satisfaction with state education systems, both overall and as they |
| compare to older generations, vary greatly throughout the region. Nearly two- |
| thirds of youth in Palestine (65 percent) and Jordan (65 percent), and over half |
| of youth in Yemen (54 percent) are satisfied or completely satisfied. However, |
| fewer than half are satisfied in Sudan (43 percent) and Lebanon (39 percent), |
| and roughly a third are satisfied in Algeria (34 percent), Libya (31 percent), Egypt |
| (30 percent), and Tunisia (30 percent). The lowest rates of satisfaction are seen |
| among Iraqi youth (24 percent) and Moroccan youth (17 percent). Given this |
| wide variation, there seems to be limited regional consensus about the state |
| of education. However, one potential regional trend is that across most of the |
| countries surveyed youth are less satisfied with the education system than are |
| their older counterparts. |
| Indeed, in the majority of countries this discrepancy |
| is small, as seen in Palestine (1 percentage point), Sudan (2 percentage points), |
| Libya (2 percentage points), Algeria (3 percentage points), Yemen (3 percent- |
| age points), Iraq (4 percentage points), and Lebanon (5 percentage points). Yet |
| elsewhere, for instance in Morocco and Egypt, the intergenerational gap is more |
| sizable (22 percentage points and 10 percentage points, respectively). Excep- |
| tions to this trend are found only among Tunisian and Jordanian youth, both of |
| whom voice satisfaction at higher rates than do older citizens (30 percent versus |
| 28 percent and 65 percent versus 59 percent, respectively). |
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| Looking to perceived corruption in the education system as one potential rea- |
| son contributing to low levels of satisfaction, in many countries more than half of |
| youth believe that rashwa (bribes) is required in order to receive better access to |
| education services. This belief is most commonly held in Egypt (64 percent), fol- |
| lowed by Lebanon (62 percent), Sudan (55 percent), Morocco (54 percent), Alge- |
| ria (53 percent), Yemen (53 percent), Iraq (52 percent), and Tunisia (50 percent). |
| However, while many youth believe that paying rashwa is necessary, this trend |
| is not common to all MENA youth as no more than a third of youth in Palestine |
| (33 percent), Libya (32 percent), and Jordan (29 percent) say the same regard- |
| ing rashwa to access better educational services. Prevalence of rashwa might |
| contribute to some dissatisfaction with state education systems, but it does not |
| account for or explain it in its entirety. |
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| Employment Opportunities |
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| Similar to satisfaction rates with state education systems, levels of youth satis- |
| faction with the government’s performance on creating employment opportu- |
| nities vary. However, despite this variation, across the region youth approval is |
| overwhelmingly weak, ranging from a low of five percent in Lebanon to a high |
| In addition to Lebanon, single-digit approval of |
| of only 32 percent in Yemen. |
| government performance on creating employment opportunities is seen in Iraq |
| (6 percent) and Algeria (9 percent). Fewer than two-in-ten youth in Morocco |
| (13 percent), Palestine (14 percent), Jordan (15 percent), Tunisia (16 percent), |
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| Sudan (17 percent), and Egypt (18 percent), and less than a quarter of youth in |
| Libya (22 percent) approve. |
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| Moreover, in addition to widespread dissatisfaction with government efforts to |
| improve employment opportunities, the vast majority of young Arab citizens |
| also believe that obtaining employment requires having strong connections. |
| Roughly nine-in-ten youth in Iraq (95 percent), Lebanon (94 percent), Jordan |
| (94 percent), Tunisia (94 percent), Libya (91 percent), Algeria (91 percent), Sudan |
| (90 percent), Palestine (90 percent), Egypt (90 percent), and Morocco (88 per- |
| cent) say that based on recent experience they think that obtaining employment |
| through wasta (personal connections) happens often or sometimes. Though |
| comparatively fewer, nearly seven-in-ten Yemeni youth (69 percent) hold the |
| same perception regarding the connection between wasta and employment. |
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| Emigration |
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| Given broad youth dissatisfaction with conditions in their countries, it is perhaps |
| not surprising that youth across the MENA region have a strong desire to em- |
| igrate. In six of eleven countries surveyed, roughly half or more of youth want |
| to leave their homeland. With the exception of Libya, North African and Jorda- |
| nian youth are most eager to migrate with about half or more citing a desire |
| to leave. Youth in Morocco cite not only the greatest desire to migrate, but also |
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| show the greatest discrepancy with older generation’s desire to do so (70 per- |
| cent versus 25 percent). Meanwhile, over half of youth in Sudan (62 percent), |
| Jordan (59 percent), Tunisia (56 percent) and Algeria (56 percent) also wish to |
| leave their country. Roughly a third of Libyan (31 percent), Yemeni (33 percent), |
| and Lebanese (35 percent) youth say the same. |
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| Regional trends are evident with regard to which countries youth are most ea- |
| ger to migrate. Over two-thirds of youth in French-speaking North Africa want |
| to migrate to a European country. This is not surprising given both the proximity |
| of their countries to Europe and, perhaps more importantly, the close linkages |
| between France and these countries. In contrast, six-in-ten youth in Egypt, and |
| roughly half of youth in Yemen (48 percent) and Sudan (45 percent), say they |
| want to emigrate to a GCC country, which is in line with historic patterns of labor |
| migration to this area. Interestingly, fewer than half of youth across the region |
| hope to migrate to North America. Jordanian youth are most likely to cite a |
| desire to migrate to North America (42 percent), whereas Yemeni, Libyan, and |
| Tunisian youth are least likely (12 percent, 13 percent, and 13 percent). |
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| The least preferred destination for youth is non-GCC MENA countries. Fewer than |
| a third of youth across the region have considered emigrating to such countries. |
| Lebanese and Tunisian youth are least eager (4 percent and 5 percent, respec- |
| tively) while Yemeni youth are most eager, though still fewer than three-in-ten |
| Yemeni youth cite an interest in emigration to a non-GCC MENA country (27 |
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| Perceived Civil Liberties |
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| Of the countries surveyed by the Arab Barometer, Tunisia is the only one cate- |
| gorized as free by Freedom House, with the remainder of countries identified as |
| partly free or not free. As such, it is unsurprising that youth in Tunisia are more |
| confident in their civil liberties like freedom of expression and right to peaceful |
| protest than are youth in other surveyed countries. However, despite being com- |
| paratively more confident in the protection of their civil liberties, Tunisian youth |
| are still quite similar to youth in the rest of the region who report generally low, |
| though varied, confidence in both freedom of speech and right to peacefully |
| protest. |
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| Looking first to freedom of speech, Tunisian youth are indeed most confident in |
| their freedom of expression with over six-in-ten saying that it is guaranteed to a |
| great or medium extent in the country (63 percent). More than half of youth in |
| Jordan (56 percent) and Lebanon (51 percent) say the same. In the rest of the |
| region fewer than half of respondents feel their freedom of expression is guar- |
| anteed. About half of youth in Yemen (49 percent), roughly four-in-ten youth |
| in Palestine (42 percent), Egypt (40 percent), and Morocco (39 percent), and |
| roughly a third of youth in Algeria (35 percent) and Iraq (33 percent) say that |
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| freedom of expression is guaranteed to a great or medium extent. Least confi- |
| dent of their freedom of expression are youth in Sudan (25 percent) and Libya |
| (24 percent). |
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| When comparing youth perceptions of their freedom of speech to the percep- |
| tions of older age cohorts, there is no clear regional trend. For instance, youth |
| in Lebanon (+10 points), Jordan (+3 points), Yemen (+4 points) and Palestine |
| (+4 points) are more confident in their freedom of expression than are older |
| citizens. Yet, the opposite trend is apparent in Morocco (-16 points), Egypt (-5 |
| points), and Tunisia (-4 points). |
| In the remainder of countries surveyed (Libya, |
| Sudan, Iraq, and Algeria) youth and older citizens do not diverge by more than |
| a point and rate their freedom of expression similarly. |
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| Youth perception of their freedom to participate in peaceful protests is also low |
| across the region, never exceeding half of youth in any country. Though nearly |
| half of youth in Tunisia (49 percent), Lebanon (49 percent), Jordan (47 percent), |
| and Yemen (46 percent) feel their freedom to peacefully demonstrate is guaran- |
| teed to a medium or great extent, fewer youth hold this belief elsewhere in the |
| region. Four-in-ten Palestinian youth, a third of Moroccan youth, and three-in- |
| ten Iraqi youth are confident of their freedom to participate in peaceful demon- |
| strations. Meanwhile, roughly a quarter of youth in Algeria (27 percent), Libya |
| (24 percent), and Egypt (24 percent) and fewer than two-in-ten in Sudan (19 |
| percent) say the same. |
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| Attitudes on Gender |
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| Arab youth are divided in their views on gender equality. On the one hand, |
| most are supportive of equal rights for women, with the exception of inheri- |
| tance. However, there is substantially less support for women enjoying equal |
| roles in society. This is particularly evident in the political sphere. |
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| Throughout the region fewer than a third of youth say that a university education |
| is more important for men than for women. Support for university education |
| for men compared with women is highest in Yemen and Sudan (27 percent, |
| each), followed by roughly two-in-ten youth in Jordan (23 percent), Egypt (22 |
| percent), Algeria (20 percent), Iraq (19 percent), Tunisia (17 percent) and Libya |
| (17 percent). Even lower rates of support for men’s education taking precedence |
| over that of women are found in Palestine (14 percent), Lebanon (13 percent), |
| and Morocco (12 percent). |
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| Youth also generally hold liberal views on the question of whether women should |
| have equal rights in the decision to get a divorce. The exception to this trend |
| is in Sudan, where support for women’s equal rights in deciding to divorce falls |
| below five-in-ten (46 percent). Support is highest in Lebanon (87 percent), fol- |
| lowed by Iraq (81 percent), Jordan (80 percent), Tunisia (78 percent), Morocco |
| (78 percent), Palestine (76 percent), Libya (75 percent) and Algeria (72 percent). |
| Though still greater than half, lower rates of support are seen in Egypt (64 per- |
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| cent) and Yemen (55 percent). Notably, in most countries surveyed, the views |
| held by youth about women’s right to divorce are not significantly different from |
| the views held by older citizens. |
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| In a departure from predominantly liberal views on women’s rights, surprisingly |
| few youth in the region agree that women’s share of inheritance should be equal |
| to that of men. Nonetheless, Lebanon is a clear regional outlier to this trend with |
| over six-in-ten youth saying they agree or strongly agree that inheritance should |
| be equal between the sexes (62 percent). In contrast, far fewer youth elsewhere |
| are as supportive. Roughly three-in-ten youth in Iraq (30 percent) and Egypt (28 |
| percent), and around one-fourth of youth in Morocco (26 percent) and Tunisia |
| (24 percent) support equal inheritance. Still fewer youth in Algeria (18 percent), |
| Jordan (18 percent), Libya (16 percent), Sudan (13 percent), and Palestine (8 |
| percent) say the same. |
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| A plurality of youth in the region also believe that husbands should have the |
| final say in all family decisions. Support for this sentiment is greatest in Sudan |
| (73 percent), Algeria (73 percent), and Iraq (70 percent), followed by Egypt (66 |
| percent) and Libya (66 percent). Youth across Tunisia (56 percent), Yemen (55 |
| percent) and the Levant hold similar views to each other regarding women and |
| family decision-making. |
| In Lebanon and Jordan 55 percent of youth believe |
| husbands should have the final say in all family decisions, while in Palestine 50 |
| percent say the same. Though Moroccan youth are least likely to support limiting |
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| women’s roles in family decision-making, nonetheless nearly four-in-ten say that |
| husbands should have the final say in all family decisions (38 percent). Notably, |
| though youth in Morocco are far less likely than older generations to support |
| this notion (-15), youth in Jordan (+6), Lebanon (+7), Libya (+5), and Tunisia (+2) |
| are more supportive than are their older counterparts. |
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| In every country surveyed, with the exception of Morocco, over half of youth agree |
| that, in general, men are better at political leadership than women. Roughly |
| eight-in-ten youth in Sudan (80 percent) and Jordan (78 percent), and roughly |
| three-quarters of youth in Algeria (74 percent) hold this belief. Across much of |
| the rest of the region youth hold this view at similar rates. For instance, around |
| seven-in-ten youth say men are better at political leadership in Egypt (70 per- |
| cent), Iraq (69 percent), Yemen (68 percent), Palestine (68 percent), and Libya |
| (67 percent). Meanwhile, fewer in Tunisia, Lebanon, and Morocco say that men |
| are better at political leadership than women (52 percent, 51 percent, and 31 |
| percent, respectively). |
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| Interestingly, despite unfavorably comparing female political leaders to men and |
| criticizing women’s role as decision-makers in the family, Arab youth are often |
| open both to the idea of a woman being a leader of a Muslim country and to |
| setting aside a certain percentage of elected positions for women as a means |
| of attaining fairer political representation. More than half of youth support the |
| notion of a female president or prime minister of a Muslim nation in all coun- |
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| tries surveyed, excluding Algeria (37 percent). Roughly half of youth in Sudan |
| (51 percent) and Libya (54 percent), six-in-ten youth in Yemen (57 percent), Jor- |
| dan (60 percent), and Palestine (64 percent) and roughly seven-in-ten youth in |
| Tunisia (67 percent), Egypt (68 percent) and Iraq (69 percent) affirm that women |
| can become prime ministers or presidents of Muslim countries. Moroccan and |
| Lebanese youth (77 percent and 79 percent, respectively) are the most accept- |
| ing of this right. |
|
|
| The majority of MENA youth also believe that in order to achieve fairer represen- |
| tation a certain percentage of elected positions should be set aside for women. |
| Support for this right exceeds half of all youth in all countries surveyed. Youth in |
| Iraq and Lebanon (79 percent, each) are most supportive, followed by Sudan (76 |
| percent), Palestine (75 percent), Jordan (72 percent) and Yemen (69 percent). |
| Excluding Sudan, North African youth show the least support for women’s quo- |
| tas in elected positions with less than two-thirds of youth in Egypt (66 percent), |
| Libya (65 percent), Tunisia (63 percent), Morocco (62 percent) and Algeria (53 |
| percent) saying they agree or strongly agree with this idea. |
|
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| International Relations |
|
|
| In over half of the countries surveyed, youth are most supportive of stronger ties |
| with China and least interested in stronger ties with the United States among |
| global powers. Youth in Jordan (70 percent), Tunisia (65 percent), Sudan (62 |
| percent), Libya (61 percent), Yemen (50 percent), Palestine (49 percent), and |
| Iraq (47 percent) prefer strengthening ties with China at a higher rate than they |
| do for ties with the United States, the United Kingdom, or Russia. Exceptions to |
| this include youth in Morocco, who have a slightly stronger preference for closer |
| ties with the United Kingdom (63 percent), youth in Lebanon and Algeria, who |
| are more supportive by a small margin of stronger ties with Russia (38 percent |
| and 42 percent, respectively), and Egyptian youth, who are equally supportive |
| of strengthening ties with the United States and Russia (41 percent, each). |
|
|
| In a majority of countries surveyed youth support for stronger ties with the United |
| States not only falls below 50 percent, but is also lower than youth support for |
| strengthening ties with other world powers. Exceptions to the former are Sudan |
| (60 percent), Morocco (57 percent), and Jordan (55 percent) where youth sup- |
| port exceeds half. In contrast, fewer than half of youth in Tunisia (47 percent), |
| and roughly a third of youth in Libya (36 percent), Iraq (34 percent), Palestine, |
| Lebanon, and Algeria (31 percent, each) say that relations with the United States |
| should become stronger. Of all countries surveyed Yemeni youth show not only |
| the least interest in closer ties with the United States (22 percent), but they are |
| also least interested in strengthening ties with Russia (26 percent) relative to |
| youth in other countries. |
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| www.arabbarometer.org |
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| 17 |
|
|
| Arab Barometer – Wave V |
| Topic Report – Youth |
|
|
| Looking to regional powers, one clear trend is that Arab youth are generally less |
| interested in stronger relations with Iran and more interested in improving re- |
| lations with Turkey. Though support for stronger ties with Iran never exceeds |
| four-in-ten youth in any country surveyed, support is highest in Lebanon (38 per- |
| cent), followed by Sudan (36 percent), Palestine (34 percent), Iraq (32 percent) |
| and Tunisia (31 percent). In Lebanon and Iraq, sectarian divides might explain |
| the comparatively greater support for strengthening ties with Iran, a country |
| with a strong Shi’ite majority. Roughly two-in-ten youth in Morocco (22 per- |
| cent), Jordan (21 percent), Yemen (20 percent), Algeria (20 percent), and Libya |
| (18 percent) prefer stronger relations with Iran, while only 8 percent of Egyptian |
| youth say the same. |
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| www.arabbarometer.org |
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| 18 |
|
|
| Arab Barometer – Wave V |
| Topic Report – Youth |
|
|
| In comparison to other regional powers (Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Iran), Arab |
| youth tend to prefer strengthening relations with Turkey. Youth in Jordan (82 |
| percent), Palestine (75 percent), Tunisia (64 percent), Yemen (61 percent), Mo- |
| rocco (56 percent), Algeria (53 percent), and Iraq (45 percent), are all more likely |
| to want improved relations with Turkey than to do so for relations with Saudi Ara- |
| bia, Qatar, or Iran. Youth in Sudan prefer strengthening relations with Saudi Ara- |
| bia, Turkey, and Qatar at similar rates (70 percent, 73 percent, and 74 percent, |
| respectively), as do youth in Lebanon (41 percent, 41 percent, and 42 percent, |
| respectively). In Libya and Egypt youth by far prefer improving ties with Saudi |
| Arabia (55 percent and 58 percent). |
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| www.arabbarometer.org |
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| 19 |
|
|
| About Arab Barometer |
|
|
| The Arab Barometer is a nonpartisan research network that |
| provides insights into the social, political, and economic attitudes |
| and values of ordinary citizens across the Arab world. |
|
|
| We have been conducting rigorous, and nationally representative |
| face-to-face public opinion surveys on probability samples of the |
| adult populations across the Arab world since 2006. The margin of |
| error is ±3 percent. |
|
|
| The Arab Barometer is the largest repository of publicly available |
| data on the views of men and women in the MENA region. Our |
| findings give a voice to the needs and concerns of Arab publics. |
|
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| ARABBAROMETER.ORGARABBAROMETER@ARABBAROMETER |