| DOI: 10.1111/polp.12517 |
|
|
| O R I G I N A L A R T I C L E |
|
|
| The fluid voter: Exploring independent voting patterns |
| over time |
|
|
| Thom Reilly1 |
|
|
| | Dan Hunting2 |
|
|
| 1School of Public Affairs, Arizona State |
| University, Phoenix, Arizona, USA |
|
|
| 2Lodestar Center for Philanthropy and |
| Nonprofit Innovation, Arizona State |
| University, Phoenix, Arizona, USA |
|
|
| Correspondence |
|
|
| Thom Reilly, School of Public Affairs, Arizona |
| State University, 411 N Central Ave. Office 422K, |
| Mail Code 3720, Phoenix, AZ 85005, USA. |
| Email: thom.reilly@asu.edu |
|
|
| Abstract |
| Independents remain hard to categorize because they are, by |
| their choice of self-identification, resisting the standard cate- |
| gories of political classification. Despite the growth in inde- |
| pendent voter identity, many political strategists still view |
| independents as partisans. In this article, we contribute to the |
| academic literature on independent voting behavior by explor- |
| ing whether those who identify as politically independent |
| function as true independents by accounting for their voting |
| patterns over time. We do this by analyzing data produced by |
| the American National Election Studies (ANES) on political |
| identification and voting choices from 1972 to 2020 on each |
| of the three ANES measures of party affiliation. Our findings |
| show when tracking independent voting behavior over more |
| than one election, there is a significant volatility in voting |
| loyalty and independents as a group are distinct from parti- |
| sans. This volatility was observed in all three measures of party |
| affiliation used by the ANES survey data. The research also |
| finds evidence that a sizeable number of independents move |
| in and out of independent status from one election to another. |
|
|
| K E Y W O R D S |
| ANES, elections, fluid voter, independent voter, over time, partisanship, |
| political behavior, political parties, United States, volatility, voter identifi- |
| cation, voting behavior, voting loyalty |
|
|
| Related Articles |
| Grossmann, Matt. 2014. “The Varied Effects of Policy Cues |
| on Partisan Opinions.” Politics & Policy 42(6): 881–904. |
| https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12102. |
| Reilly, Thom, and E. C. Hedberg. 2022. “Social Networks |
| of Independents and Partisans: Are Independents a Moder- |
| ating Forcer?” Politics & Policy 50(2): 225–43. https://doi. |
| org/10.1111/polp.12460. |
| Saeki, Manabu. 2019. “Anatomy of Party Sorting: Parti- |
| san Polarization of Voters and Party Switching.” Politics & |
| Policy 47(4): 699–747. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12318. |
|
|
| Politics & Policy. 2023;00:1–22. |
|
|
| wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/polp |
|
|
| 1 |
|
|
| © 2023 Policy Studies Organization. |
| 2 |
|
|
| THE FLUID VOTER |
|
|
| Americans are increasingly declaring independence from the political parties. The rise in political |
| independence is likely an outgrowth of Americans' record or near-record negative views of the |
| U.S. two-party system (Ingraham, 2021) and their low level of trust in government (PEW, 2022). |
| Self-defined independent voters now number between 40% and 46% of the U.S. electorate |
| (Gallup, 2022) and currently constitute either the largest or second-largest group of registered |
| voters in half the states (Gruber & Opdycke, 2020). Despite the historical increase in independ- |
| ent voter identification, many political strategists still view independents as partisans (Magleby |
| et al., 2011; Petrocik, 2009) and contend that the overwhelming majority of Americans who say |
| they are “independent” really lean toward one party or the other. However, other scholars have |
| disputed the findings that most independents are leaners and suggest that there is no conclusive |
| evidence for this position (Abrams & Fiorina, 2011). |
|
|
| Our study seeks to contribute to the academic literature by exploring whether those who are |
| identified as politically independent function as true independents by accounting for their voting |
| patterns over time. We are interested in determining whether independents move in and out of |
| independent status. We do this by reviewing the voting behavior of Democrats, Republicans, |
| and independents over multiple election cycles. Our research seeks to address the following three |
| questions: |
|
|
| 1. Does political identification change across time? |
| 2. How do respondents allocate their votes across parties? |
| 3. Do voting choices change over time? |
|
|
| LITERATURE REVIEW |
|
|
| The classification of voters as independent dates back to the seminal work of Angus Campbell |
| and his colleagues, who first published The American Voter in 1960 (Campbell et al., 1960). |
| Analyzing data collected under the University of Michigan Survey Research Center (and later |
| aggregated by the American National Election Studies; ANES Data Center, 2021), the authors |
| describe the identity of party affiliation as a central characteristic explaining voting behavior |
| and other political attitudes and behaviors. The surveys that The American Voter analyzed have |
| been considered by many to be the gold standard in the field. Though officially founded in 1978, |
| the American National Election Studies (ANES) program has continuous survey data on the |
| electorate since 1948. The survey is usually administered every other year, but occasionally every |
| fourth year. ANES is a comprehensive survey which provides much information on respondents' |
| background and political attitude. |
|
|
| The American Voter authors acknowledged that some kind of “independent” existed but |
| characterized the independent as having little interest in campaigns and outcomes and suggested |
| their choice between competing candidates is uninformed. Most of what we know about inde- |
| pendents comes from survey data, and most surveys predispose the majority of independents as |
| leaners toward either of the two political parties. Since 1952, when individuals identified them- |
| selves as an independent, researchers and pollsters have asked a follow-up question on whether |
| respondents prefer one party over the other if they had to vote then and there. |
|
|
| In addition to asking respondents to identify themselves from a three-point scale: Democrat, |
| Republican, and independent, respondents were asked to self-identify on the ANES seven-point |
| political spectrum (ANES Data Center, 2015): |
|
|
| 1. Strong Democrat |
| 2. Democrat |
| 3. Independent, leans Democrat |
| 4. Independent |
|
|
| REILLY anD HUnTInG |
|
|
| 3 |
|
|
| 5. Independent, leans Republican |
| 6. Republican |
| 7. Strong Republican |
|
|
| Since the seven-point measure was introduced in the 1952 survey, researchers accessing the ANES |
| data were able to use several measures. They could use the seven-point measure, a five-point |
| measure by collapsing the three independent categories into one (as the authors of the Amer- |
| ican Voter did), a three-point measure with leaners classed as independents, or a three-point |
| measure with leaners classified as partisans. Researchers used any or all of these measures often |
| depending on which coding decision gave them big enough cell sizes for analysis by re-coding the |
| data or not (DeBell, 2010). |
|
|
| Viewing the majority of independents as partisans originates from the formative research |
| popularized in The Myth of the Independent Voter (Keith et al., 1992), which claimed that the |
| ANES' “Seven-Point Scale” should only include three actual categories (Democrat, Repub- |
| lican, and Independent). After the Petrocik (2009) and Keith and others' (1992) articles, it |
| became more common to use a five-point or three-point measure with leaners classified as |
| independents. |
|
|
| Most independents indicated a lean toward one of the two major political parties' candi- |
| dates. Political scientists have labeled these individuals as “independent leaners” and have argued |
| that the number of pure independents is actually quite small—below 10%. This percentage has |
| remained constant since the 1950s (Mayer, 2008; PEW, 2019; Sides, 2013), and many political |
| scientists assert that the overwhelming majority of Americans who say there are “independent” |
| lean toward one party or the other (Teixiera, 2012). |
|
|
| Klar and Krupnikov (2016) have recently added some important research on the independent |
| voter. They explored the social significance of the growth in people refusing to identify them- |
| selves with a political party and suggested that independents and partisans differ psychologically |
| (Klar & Krupnikov, 2016). They do not dispute the notion that independents may be “closet |
| partisans” (they call them “undercover partisans”); but they do dispute the bias that independ- |
| ents are not politically engaged, stating that “engagement levels are comparable across independ- |
| ents and partisans” (Klar, 2014). They assert that many Americans are embarrassed by their |
| political party and do not wish to be associated with either side. Instead, they intentionally mask |
| their party preference, especially in social situations (Klar & Krupnikov, 2016). Nonetheless, they |
| contend that the refusal to publicly identify with a party must be revealing something important. |
| And they believe the predictors of independent political engagement differ substantially from |
| partisans. |
|
|
| However, there are some researchers that disagree with the assertion that independents |
| are leaners and suggest there is more volatility in their voter patterns, and that a sizeable |
| number of independents move in and out of independent status in ways that impact inde- |
| pendent voting over time (Abrams & Fiorina, 2011; Fiorina, 1977, 2016; Jackson, 1975; |
| Page & Jones, 1979). Their identification may depend on specific candidates or issues on the |
| ballot (Reilly et al., 2023) or may derive from short-term interest rather than a long-standing |
| loyalty (Miller, 1991). Fiorina (2017), professor of political science at Stanford University and |
| former chairman of the board of the ANES, contends that following independent leaners |
| over several elections is key to understanding their voting patterns. Along with his colleague |
| Samuel J. Abrams, they conducted such an analysis and found that, following independent |
| leaners across multiple elections, their partisan stability is closer to pure independents than |
| weak partisans (Fiorina, 2017). They also noted that “classifying all leaners as weak partisans |
| mis-characterizes the partisanship of Americans and overestimates the rate of party voting” |
| (Abrams & Fiorina, 2011). Other researchers have argued that responses to survey question |
| probes asking independents if they lean toward the Democratic or Republican Party are |
| significantly contaminated by short-term electoral elements operating in the campaign, such |
|
|
| 4 |
|
|
| THE FLUID VOTER |
|
|
| as the candidates and specific issues (Abrams & Fiorina, 2011; Brody, 1978, 1991; Brody & |
| Rothenberg, 1988; Miller, 1991). |
|
|
| Finally, given the lack of data on voting patterns of independents in state races and |
| down-ballot (other than for president, governor, and Congress), there is growing interest in |
| examining the characteristics and attitudes of unaffiliated or independent voters as they |
| compare to voters from the two major parties. Bitzer and others (2022) researched down-ballot |
| voters in North Carolina and found unaffiliated voters were not simply shadow partisans but |
| varied from Democrats and Republicans in terms of demographics, political behavior, and polit- |
| ical attitudes. |
|
|
| OUR EXPECTATIONS |
|
|
| Our study seeks to contribute to the academic literature by exploring whether those who are |
| identified as politically independent function as true independents by accounting for their voting |
| patterns over time. The study also explores whether independents move in and out of independ- |
| ent status. |
|
|
| We begin with a description of ANES data and the three measures of party affiliation used |
| by the survey. Analysis then begins with a look at how the political identification of voters |
| changes over multiple survey waves using each of the three ANES scales to be described in the |
| next section. This analysis includes a parallel review of respondents who voted in both waves and |
| those who voted in neither wave. We next investigate how frequently respondents to the ANES |
| vote “straight tickets”—always choosing candidates from the same party—or “mixed tickets” |
| where some Republican and some Democrat candidates are chosen. It is expected that those |
| identifying as Democrat or Republican will mostly choose candidates from their own party, |
| while independents will show more variety in their choices. These results will also be reported on |
| each of the three political identification scales discussed below. Finally, we explore the degree to |
| which individuals change their voting choices over time. |
|
|
| METHODOLOGY |
|
|
| The ANES Cumulative Data File (CDF) is used to examine political identification and voting |
| choices from 1972 to 2020 (ANES Data Center, n.d.). Although the CDF contains data dating |
| back to 1948, restricting the analysis to data from 1972 onward provided the best balance of: (a) |
| providing a large enough sample to be useful and (b) capturing attitudes and trends that are rele- |
| vant in the current social and political climate. There have been substantial demographic changes |
| in the United States over the 72 years of ANES data. Additionally, prior to the passage of the |
| Voting Rights Act of 1965, large portions of the population were effectively disenfranchised. |
| These changes become evident when pre-1972 ANES data are compared to 1972–2020 data. |
| Prior to 1972, 6.4% of ANES respondents who reported voting were non-White, but the figure |
| jumps to 22.4% when looking at voters between 1972 and 2020. This percentage is much more in |
| line with current voter profiles. Smaller, but still important, changes are evident in the age distri- |
| bution and gender of respondents across the two time periods. Eighteen- to twenty-year-olds |
| made up 1.5% of the pre-1972 respondents and 5.9% after that. Females made up 52.4% of |
| the pre-1972 respondents and 53.8% from 1972 to 2020. The 1972–2020 data are more closely |
| aligned with current voter demographics, making this analysis more applicable to today's voters. |
| This dataset includes political identification information for respondents and self-reported |
| voting choices for president, Senate, Congress, and governor races. Since the ANES does not |
| show 2020 election preference data in the CDF, these data were linked to the CDF using the |
| Respondent ID from the ANES 2020 timeseries file. The resulting file was then formatted so that |
|
|
| REILLY anD HUnTInG |
|
|
| 5 |
|
|
| each record represented a unique respondent, capturing party identification on three scales and |
| reported voting choices for all survey waves that each respondent answered. |
|
|
| We examine three questions, looking at each on three different political identification scales: |
|
|
| 1. Does political identification change across time? |
| 2. How do respondents allocate their votes across parties? |
| 3. Do voting choices change over time? |
|
|
| To probe these areas, we look at political identification with three different scales commonly used |
| by the ANES. First, with the initial party identification queried in question VCF0302, which |
| asks, “Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Democrat, a Republican, an |
| Independent, or what?” This “Initial Party ID Response” gives a three-point scale with Demo- |
| crats and Republicans, and all minor-party and independent respondents grouped under the |
| independent umbrella. Second, we use the ANES Seven-Point Scale (VCF0301, “Seven Point |
| Scale”) that divides Democrats and Republicans into “strong” and “weak” supporters of their |
| parties, and divides independents into Democrat-leaners, Republican-leaners, and true independ- |
| ents. Finally, we use the modified three-point scale from VCF0303 “Summary 3-Category.” The |
| Summary 3-Category measure collapses the Seven-Point Scale by counting Democrat-leaning |
| independents as Democrats and Republican-leaning independents as Republicans. This leaves |
| only a small fraction of the respondents as independents. |
|
|
| American National Election Studies Survey |
|
|
| The CDF was downloaded in SPSS format and filtered to include responses from 1972 to 2020. |
| Since 2020 post-election voting information is not currently in the CDF, data from the 2020 |
| time-series file were joined to the CDF to provide complete information on the 2016–2020 panel. |
| The resulting file contains responses from 43,423 individuals, of whom 27,832 voted in at least |
| one election (Table 1). |
|
|
| The ANES contains data on how respondents reported voting on four different contests, |
| giving the party choice for president, Congress, Senate, and governor. Respondents do not neces- |
| sarily vote in each of these races due to the timing of elections. Choices for a total of 77,729 |
| contests are recorded for the 27,832 voters in the data. For each election cycle, the total number |
| of votes for Democratic, Republican, and third-party candidates were totaled for each respond- |
| ent, along with their party identification at that time. The survey has also included time-series |
| panel data from time to time, where respondents are contacted multiple times over the years. For |
| respondents that appeared in multiple waves of the survey, their votes and party identification |
| were tallied at each survey point. |
|
|
| Since 1970, there have been seven panels as shown in Table 2, each covering a single presi- |
| dential election. Of the 13,399 respondents to the survey in these panels, 4770 voted in all waves |
| available to them. These voters reported their voting choice on a total of 25,024 races for pres- |
| ident, Congress, Senate, and governor. Due to the timing of election cycles, not all respondents |
| reported voting in each of these races in each wave of the survey. |
|
|
| Party identification on three scales |
|
|
| ANES CDF classifies the political identification of respondents according to their answers to |
| questions VCF0302, VCF0301, and VCF0303. |
|
|
| VCF0302 is the initial party identification response and asks: |
|
|
| 6 |
|
|
| THE FLUID VOTER |
|
|
| T A B L E 1 ANES respondents by year |
|
|
| Total respondents |
|
|
| Respondents who voted |
|
|
| Total votes tallied |
|
|
| Year |
|
|
| 1972 |
|
|
| 1974 |
|
|
| 1976 |
|
|
| 1978 |
|
|
| 1980 |
|
|
| 1982 |
|
|
| 1984 |
|
|
| 1986 |
|
|
| 1988 |
|
|
| 1990 |
|
|
| 1992 |
|
|
| 1994 |
|
|
| 1996 |
|
|
| 1998 |
|
|
| 2000 |
|
|
| 2002 |
|
|
| 2004 |
|
|
| 2008 |
|
|
| 2012 |
|
|
| 2016 |
|
|
| 2020 |
|
|
| 2705 |
|
|
| 475 |
|
|
| 1323 |
|
|
| 2304 |
|
|
| 1614 |
|
|
| 1418 |
|
|
| 2257 |
|
|
| 2176 |
|
|
| 2040 |
|
|
| 1980 |
|
|
| 1126 |
|
|
| 1036 |
|
|
| 398 |
|
|
| 1281 |
|
|
| 1807 |
|
|
| 324 |
|
|
| 1212 |
|
|
| 2322 |
|
|
| 5914 |
|
|
| 4270 |
|
|
| 5441 |
|
|
| 1718 |
|
|
| 237 |
|
|
| 691 |
|
|
| 1167 |
|
|
| 989 |
|
|
| 798 |
|
|
| 1427 |
|
|
| 1087 |
|
|
| 1226 |
|
|
| 1236 |
|
|
| 807 |
|
|
| 693 |
|
|
| 239 |
|
|
| 648 |
|
|
| 1240 |
|
|
| 160 |
|
|
| 829 |
|
|
| 1580 |
|
|
| 4355 |
|
|
| 3124 |
|
|
| 3581 |
|
|
| 7215 |
|
|
| 760 |
|
|
| 1731 |
|
|
| 2463 |
|
|
| 2572 |
|
|
| 1860 |
|
|
| 3314 |
|
|
| 2549 |
|
|
| 3104 |
|
|
| 4294 |
|
|
| 3888 |
|
|
| 2575 |
|
|
| 562 |
|
|
| 1509 |
|
|
| 3838 |
|
|
| 247 |
|
|
| 2058 |
|
|
| 3624 |
|
|
| 11,322 |
|
|
| 12,981 |
|
|
| 5263 |
|
|
| 77,729 |
|
|
| Total |
|
|
| 43,423 |
|
|
| 27,832 |
|
|
| T A B L E 2 Multiple-wave voters in ANES data, 1972–2000 |
|
|
| Year of 1st wave |
|
|
| Year of 2nd wave |
|
|
| Total respondents |
|
|
| Voted in both waves |
|
|
| Total votes in |
| Wave 1 |
|
|
| Total votes |
| in Wave 2 |
|
|
| 1972 |
|
|
| 1974 |
|
|
| 1990 |
|
|
| 1992 |
|
|
| 1994 |
|
|
| 2000 |
|
|
| 2016 |
|
|
| Grand total |
|
|
| 1974 |
|
|
| 1976 |
|
|
| 1992 |
|
|
| 1994 |
|
|
| 1996 |
|
|
| 2002 |
|
|
| 2020 |
|
|
| 2705 |
|
|
| 475 |
|
|
| 1980 |
|
|
| 1126 |
|
|
| 1036 |
|
|
| 1807 |
|
|
| 4270 |
|
|
| 13,399 |
|
|
| 658 |
|
|
| 83 |
|
|
| 582 |
|
|
| 444 |
|
|
| 367 |
|
|
| 604 |
|
|
| 2032 |
|
|
| 4770 |
|
|
| 1644 |
|
|
| 189 |
|
|
| 902 |
|
|
| 763 |
|
|
| 560 |
|
|
| 1171 |
|
|
| 2858 |
|
|
| 8087 |
|
|
| 701 |
|
|
| 131 |
|
|
| 916 |
|
|
| 463 |
|
|
| 500 |
|
|
| 673 |
|
|
| 2298 |
|
|
| 5682 |
|
|
| Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Democrat, a Republican, |
| an Independent, or what? |
|
|
| VCF0301 is party identification on a Seven-Point Scale and is constructed by combining the |
| VCF0302 question with one of two follow-up questions. Respondents who identify as either |
| Republicans or Democrats in their initial response are asked a follow-up question: |
|
|
| REILLY anD HUnTInG |
|
|
| 7 |
|
|
| Would you call yourself a strong [Democrat/Republican] or a not very strong |
| [Democrat/Republican]? |
|
|
| These responses form the two ends of the Seven-Point Scale, with Strong Democrats coded as 1, |
| Weak Democrats coded as 2, Weak Republicans coded as 6, and Strong Republicans as 7. A small |
| number (92) of those who expressed partisan affiliation in VCF0302 were coded as DK, NA, |
| Other at this point in the survey. |
|
|
| Those who did not identify as either Democrats or Republicans are given this follow-up |
|
|
| question: |
|
|
| Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican Party or to the Democratic |
| Party? |
|
|
| These responses are used to construct the middle three categories of the Seven-Point Scale. Those |
| answering “Democratic” are assigned to Independent-Democrats (3), with “Republican” coded as |
| Independent-Republican (5). Respondents who choose “Neither” are Independent-Independents at |
| scale point 4. Note that although the above question is asked in the ANES time series surveys, |
| it does not appear in the CDF data. The results of this question are captured in CDF item |
| VCF0301. Also note that a small number of respondents answered “do not know” or refused |
| to answer VCF0302 but indicated a party preference in the follow-up. These were moved to the |
| Independent-Republican and Independent-Democrat categories for VCF0301. |
|
|
| Finally, the Seven-Point Scale of VCF0301 is collapsed to three categories for VCF0303. |
| This is done by combining the strong and weak Democrats with Independent-Democrats under |
| Democrats (including leaners) and ANES political identification data on 43,423 respondents |
| from 1972 through 2020 is shown on these three scales in Table 3. Independents make up 36% |
| of the total respondents over these surveys, with 13% identified as having no party leaning or |
| Independent-Independents. |
|
|
| RESULTS |
|
|
| Change in political identification over time—voters |
|
|
| We now use ANES data from multiple waves to look at how political identification changes for |
| voters over time. Between 1972 and 2020, ANES has data on 4770 respondents who voted in |
| two consecutive waves of the survey (Table 2). The following section looks at how these voters |
| changed their party identification from one survey cycle to the next. A small portion of this |
| number did not report party identification on one of the three scales analyzed below. |
|
|
| Initial Party ID Response (VCF0302) |
|
|
| Of the 4745 respondents shown in Figure 1, 22% changed their initial-response party ID from |
| one wave to another. Independents were more fluid on this metric than party-affiliated respond- |
| ents: 16% of both Democrats and Republicans were changed at the second survey wave, while |
| 36% of Independents changed. |
|
|
| In each major party, 13% of the wave-one respondents changed their position and identi- |
| fied as independents at wave two, while 3% went to the opposite party. Independents saw 17% |
| of the wave-one respondents move to Democrat and 19% move to Republican. The absolute |
| number of voters switching from party-affiliated to independent (426) and from independent to |
| party-affiliated (520) are similar, but the percentage of independents becoming party-affiliated |
|
|
| 8 |
|
|
| THE FLUID VOTER |
|
|
| T A B L E 3 Three political ID scales: 1972–2020 ANES data |
|
|
| Democrat |
|
|
| Republican |
|
|
| Independent |
|
|
| Other |
|
|
| DK/NA Total |
|
|
| VCF0302 (initial |
| response) |
|
|
| Percent |
|
|
| 16,263 |
|
|
| 37% |
|
|
| 10,976 |
|
|
| 25% |
|
|
| VCF0301 (7-Point |
|
|
| Scale) |
|
|
| Strong |
| Dem |
|
|
| Weak |
|
|
| Weak |
|
|
| Dem |
|
|
| Rep |
|
|
| Strong |
| Rep |
|
|
| 12,772 |
|
|
| 29% |
|
|
| 3085 |
|
|
| 7% |
|
|
| 327 |
|
|
| 1% |
|
|
| 43,423 |
|
|
| Ind-Dem Ind-Ind Ind-Rep DK/NA Total |
|
|
| Percent |
|
|
| VCF0303 |
|
|
| (Summary |
| 3-Category) |
|
|
| Percent |
|
|
| 8523 |
|
|
| 20% |
|
|
| 7677 |
|
|
| 18% |
|
|
| 5354 |
|
|
| 12% |
|
|
| 5592 |
|
|
| 13% |
|
|
| 5515 |
|
|
| 13% |
|
|
| 5677 |
|
|
| 13% |
|
|
| 4726 |
|
|
| 11% |
|
|
| 359 |
|
|
| 1% |
|
|
| 43,423 |
|
|
| 100% |
|
|
| Democrat (incl. |
| leaners) |
|
|
| 21,715 |
|
|
| 50% |
|
|
| Republican (incl. |
|
|
| Independent |
|
|
| DK/NA Total |
|
|
| leaners) |
|
|
| 15,672 |
|
|
| 36% |
|
|
| 5677 |
|
|
| 13% |
|
|
| 359 |
|
|
| 1% |
|
|
| 43,423 |
|
|
| 100% |
|
|
| F I G U R E 1 Change in initial response (VCF0302) voters, 1972–2020 |
|
|
| is nearly three times that of party-affiliates becoming independent. Respondents coded as Inde- |
| pendent, No Preference, and Other are included in the independent category. This flow is illus- |
| trated in Figure 1. |
|
|
| Seven-Point Scale (VCF0301) |
|
|
| When the Seven-Point Scale of variable VCF0301 is analyzed across two survey waves, more |
| fluidity in political identification becomes apparent. Of the 4735 respondents who voted in two |
| waves of the survey and recorded scores on this scale in both waves, 43% changed their identifi- |
| cation at the second wave. This is nearly double the 22% rate seen in the initial response variable |
| above. |
|
|
| Partisan respondents at the extremes of the scale were more consistent in their identification, |
| with 21% of Strong Democrats and 22% of Strong Republicans changing at the second wave. |
| Fifty-seven percent of Weak Democrats and 55% of Weak Republicans changed their identifica- |
| tion at wave two. Overall, 36% of Democrats and 36% of Republicans changed their party iden- |
| tification by at least one point on this scale between wave one and wave two; this is substantially |
| higher than the 36% of party-identified respondents who changed their position. |
|
|
| REILLY anD HUnTInG |
|
|
| 9 |
|
|
| F I G U R E 2 Change in 7-point scale (VCF0301) voters, 1972–2020 |
|
|
| The complex flow of the three independent classifications is shown in Figure 2. As noted |
| above, 36% of those reporting to be independent at the first wave interview were identifying with |
| one of the two parties at the second wave. In addition, another 22% of independents remained |
| independent at wave two, but shifted their position within the three independent categories on |
| this scale. Overall, 57% of those in one of the three independent categories of the Seven-Point |
| Scale changed their identification at wave two. This flow is illustrated in Figure 2. |
|
|
| Summary 3-Category Scale (VCF0303) |
|
|
| The collapsed categories of the Summary 3-Category Scale presented in VCF0303 necessarily |
| suppress much of the change in party identification seen in the previous two scales. By this |
| measure, 10% of Democrats (including leaners) and 12% of Republicans (including leaners) |
| changed their identification between the two survey waves. The independents represent just 7% |
| of respondents on this scale, as those who identify as independent but leaning toward a party are |
| grouped with their respective parties. The 328 remaining “true” independents fractured nearly |
| in thirds when queried at the second wave: 36% remained Independent while 30% switched to |
| Democrat and 34% to Republican. A total of 64% of the Independents from wave one were clas- |
| sified as partisans at wave two. Among those classified as either Democrats or Republicans at |
| wave one, just 11% changed their identification on this scale at wave two (Figure 3). |
|
|
| 10 |
|
|
| THE FLUID VOTER |
|
|
| F I G U R E 3 Change in Summary 3-Category Scale (VCF0303) voters, 1972–2020 |
|
|
| F I G U R E 4 Change in initial response (VCF0302) non-voters, 1972–2020 |
|
|
| Change in political identification over time—Non-voters |
|
|
| ANES data 1972–2020 also contain information on political identification for respondents |
| who did not vote. In this section we examine changes in political identification in the 15,292 |
| respondents who answered two consecutive waves of the survey but voted in neither election. |
| For the purposes of this article, we use the term non-voters to identify those respondents who |
| did not vote in either wave of this analysis. It is unknown what portion of this population votes |
| on occasion. |
|
|
| Initial party response (VCF0302) |
|
|
| Of the 15,592 respondents shown in Figure 4, 60% changed their initial response party identifi- |
| cation from one wave to the next. This is nearly three times the 22% rate seen among those who |
| voted in both waves. Fifty-seven percent of the non-voting Democrat-identified respondents and |
|
|
| REILLY anD HUnTInG |
|
|
| 11 |
|
|
| 69% of Republicans changed their identification. Taken together, 62% of the party-identified |
| non-voters changed their identification at wave two. This compares with 59% of the independ- |
| ents who changed.1 |
|
|
| Of the 5201 who identified with Democrats at wave one, just 43% identified as such at wave |
| two, with 34% now seeing themselves as independents, and 23% crossing over to be Republicans. |
| This contrasts with just three percent of voting Democrats crossing over to the other party at |
| wave two. Non-voting Republicans showed even more fluidity between the two survey waves. |
| Just 31% of those who said they were Republican at wave one maintained that identification |
| at wave two, with a third of the respondents switching to Democratic identification and 36% |
| now calling themselves Independent. Non-voting independents switched to Democrat in 36% of |
| the cases, and to Republican 23%, with 41% remaining independent. This flow is illustrated in |
| Figure 4. |
|
|
| Seven-Point Scale (VCF0301) |
|
|
| Non-voting respondents to ANES changed their political identification on the Seven-Point Scale |
| between wave one and wave two in 81% of the cases. This fluidity was relatively consistent across |
| the scale, ranging from 76% of Strong Democrats changing identification by at least one scale |
| point to 87% of Independent-Republicans. |
|
|
| Changes in party identification for the three independent categories are shown in Figure 5. |
| A total of 5923 (83%) of those who identified as one of the three independent categories at wave |
| one had moved by at least one scale point at wave two. Of this amount, 1722 (29%) remained |
| within the independent domain while 4201 (81%) moved to one of the parties. Changes in inde- |
| pendent non-voter identification are shown in Figure 5. |
|
|
| Summary 3-Category Scale (VCF0303) |
|
|
| When non-voting ANES respondents are examined on the summary 3-category scale of |
| VCF0303, 58% are seen to change categories. Democrats (including leaners) moved to another |
| point on the scale 46% of the time, with 32% identifying as Republicans at wave 2 and 13% |
| as independents. Well over half (60%) of the non-voters identified as Republicans at wave one |
| changed identification at wave two, with 47% later identifying as Democrat and 13% as inde- |
| pendent. Independent non-voters changed identification 81% of the time, with 48% moving to |
| Democrat at wave two and 33% to Republican. These flows are illustrated in Figure 6. |
|
|
| Voting patterns: Straight and split-ticket voters |
|
|
| ANES asks respondents to state how they voted in four contests: president, Congress, Senate7, |
| and governor. Respondents may not have the opportunity to vote in each of these races, depend- |
| ing on the timing of the election cycle. There are 27,832 respondents in the ANES data that said |
| they voted in at least one election, and these respondents give us information on a total of 77,729 |
| races. |
|
|
| Of the ANES respondents who reported voting from 1972 to 2010, Figure 7 shows that 20,521 |
| (73.7%) always voted a straight ticket for either Democrats (11,638 respondents) or Republicans |
| (8883). Conversely, 9316 respondents never voted for a Democrat and 12,201 never voted Repub- |
|
|
| 1 Z-test for proportions <.01. |
|
|
| 12 |
|
|
| THE FLUID VOTER |
|
|
| F I G U R E 5 Change in 7-Point Scale (VCF0301) non-voters, 1972–2020 |
|
|
| lican (Figure 7) in the races surveyed. Note that the 0% and 100% columns do not exactly mirror |
| each other due to the number of votes for minor parties. |
|
|
| The great majority of voters surveyed by ANES exclusively vote for one of the major parties, |
| with only a small percentage splitting their votes between Republicans and Democrats. The |
| 40%–59% bracket in Figure 7 shows that 4655 people (16.7%) divided their votes evenly between |
| the two parties. Considering both the small number of election contests available for analysis |
| and the polarized nature of voting noted above, further analysis divides voters into three groups: |
| those who voted for Democrats in 100% of the contests, those who voted for Republicans in |
| 100% of the contests, and those who voted for some mix of Democrats and Republicans. With |
| this information, we can see what portion of the sample consistently vote for one party and what |
| portion switch their votes between parties (Figure 7). |
|
|
| Initial Party ID Response (VCF0302) |
|
|
| As expected, Democrats generally vote a straight ticket for Democrats, at a rate of 74% while 71% |
| of Republicans, 5678 of the total 7990 Republican voters, always vote Republican (Figure 8). |
| Incongruously, 5% of Democrats and 5% of Republicans report that they always vote for the |
| opposite party. |
|
|
| Independents are much more evenly divided in their vote choices. A significant portion still |
| vote straight tickets for one party or the other, with 34.8% always voting for Democrats and |
| 30% always voting Republican. A plurality of independents (35.2%) split their votes between |
| Democrats and Republicans at least occasionally. This compares with the combined figures for |
|
|
| REILLY anD HUnTInG |
|
|
| 13 |
|
|
| F I G U R E 6 Change in Summary 3-Category Scale (VCF0303) non-voters, 1972–2020 |
|
|
| 12,000 |
|
|
| 12,101 |
|
|
| 10,000 |
|
|
| 9,316 |
|
|
| 11,638 |
|
|
| 8,883 |
|
|
| s |
| t |
| n |
| e |
| d |
| n |
| o |
| p |
| s |
| e |
| R |
| S |
| E |
| N |
| A |
|
|
| 8,000 |
|
|
| 6,000 |
|
|
| 4,000 |
|
|
| 2,000 |
|
|
| - |
|
|
| 1,882 |
|
|
| 2,086 |
|
|
| 2,327 |
|
|
| 2,328 |
|
|
| 2,061 |
|
|
| 1,869 |
|
|
| 165 |
|
|
| 191 |
|
|
| 443 |
|
|
| 374 |
|
|
| 0% |
|
|
| 1%-19% 20%-39% 40%-59% 60%-79% 80%-99% |
|
|
| 100% |
|
|
| Dem Votes |
|
|
| Rep Votes |
|
|
| F I G U R E 7 Percent of each respondent's votes by party, 1972–2020 |
|
|
| Democrats and Republicans showing that 22% of the party-identified voters voted a mixed ticket |
| at least once.2 Respondents coded as Independent, No Preference, and Other are included in the |
| Independent category (Figure 8). |
|
|
| Seven-Point Scale (VCF0301) |
|
|
| With the Independent-Democrats and Independent-Republicans broken out on the |
| 7-Point Scale of VCF0301, we see a steady progression from left-to-right, with decreas- |
| ing Democratic straight-ticket voting and increasing Republican support (Figure 9). The |
| Independent-Independents at the middle of the scale have truly mixed voting choices: 31% only |
| voting for Democrats, 27% on voting for Republicans, and 43% choosing a mixture of Democrat |
| and Republican candidates. The votes reported by Independent-Independents represent 8% of |
| the 27,704 reported to ANES by respondents (Figure 9). |
|
|
| 2 Z-test for proportions <.01. |
|
|
| 14 |
|
|
| THE FLUID VOTER |
|
|
| 8,160 |
|
|
| s |
| t |
| n |
| e |
| d |
| n |
| o |
| p |
| s |
| e |
| R |
| S |
| E |
| N |
| A |
|
|
| 9,000 |
|
|
| 8,000 |
|
|
| 7,000 |
|
|
| 6,000 |
|
|
| 5,000 |
|
|
| 4,000 |
|
|
| 3,000 |
|
|
| 2,000 |
|
|
| 1,000 |
|
|
| - |
|
|
| 5,678 |
|
|
| 3,026 |
|
|
| 3,056 |
|
|
| 2,610 |
|
|
| 2,324 |
|
|
| 1,906 |
|
|
| 560 |
|
|
| 406 |
|
|
| Democrat |
|
|
| Republican |
|
|
| Independent |
|
|
| Always Votes DEM |
|
|
| Mixed Votes |
|
|
| Always Votes REP |
|
|
| F I G U R E 8 |
|
|
| Straight-ticket and mixed voting by Initial Party ID Response, 1972–2020 |
|
|
| s |
| t |
| n |
| e |
| d |
| n |
| o |
| p |
| s |
| e |
| R |
| S |
| E |
| N |
| A |
|
|
| 6,000 |
|
|
| 5,000 |
|
|
| 4,000 |
|
|
| 3,000 |
|
|
| 2,000 |
|
|
| 1,000 |
|
|
| - |
|
|
| Strong Dem Weak Dem Ind-Dem |
|
|
| Ind-Ind |
|
|
| Ind-Rep Weak Rep Strong Rep |
|
|
| Always vote DEM |
|
|
| Mixed Votes |
|
|
| Always vote REP |
|
|
| F I G U R E 9 |
|
|
| Straight-ticket and mixed voting by 7-point scale, 1972–2010 |
|
|
| Interestingly, Independent-Democrats show a higher percentage of straight-ticket support of |
| Democratic candidates (63%) than the Weak Democrats who explicitly declare support for the |
| party (60%).3 |
|
|
| Summary 3-Category Scale (VCF0303) |
|
|
| With the Independent-Democrats and Independent-Republicans of VCF0301 included as “lean- |
| ers” in their respective partisan buckets for VCF0303, the Independent-Independents are high- |
| lighted (Figure 10). Combining the straight-ticket Democrat and Republican votes shows that |
|
|
| 3 Z-test for proportions p < .05. |
|
|
| REILLY anD HUnTInG |
|
|
| 15 |
|
|
| s |
| t |
| n |
| e |
| d |
| n |
| o |
| p |
| s |
| e |
| R |
| S |
| E |
| N |
| A |
|
|
| 12,000 |
|
|
| 10,000 |
|
|
| 8,000 |
|
|
| 6,000 |
|
|
| 4,000 |
|
|
| 2,000 |
|
|
| - |
|
|
| 10,207 |
|
|
| 7,412 |
|
|
| 3,284 |
|
|
| 3,019 |
|
|
| 817 |
|
|
| 665 |
|
|
| 705 |
|
|
| 984 |
|
|
| 611 |
|
|
| Democrat (incl. leaners) |
|
|
| Republican (incl. leaners) |
|
|
| Independent |
|
|
| Always Votes DEM |
|
|
| Mixed Votes |
|
|
| Always Votes REP |
|
|
| F I G U R E 1 0 |
|
|
| Straight-ticket and mixed voting by Summary 3-Category scale, 1972–2010 |
|
|
| 77% of the Democrat (including leaners) category always votes a straight ticket, 73% of Repub- |
| licans (including leaners), and 57% of independents (Figure 10). |
|
|
| Voting change over time |
|
|
| Changes in voting behavior for ANES two-wave voters are summarized in Table 4. The 1464 |
| respondents reported voting a straight Democrat ticket both the first and second time they were |
| interviewed, with 1239 voting straight Republican both times, and 434 casting mixed votes at |
| each wave. This total of 3137 represents 66% of the total 4770 who voted in two waves of the |
| survey. This leaves 34% who altered their behavior across the election cycles. |
|
|
| The 4754 respondents who voted in two waves of the ANES survey and stated their political |
| identification are summarized in Table 5.4 Respondents who identified as Republicans or Demo- |
| crats as their Initial Party ID Response for VCF0302 are grouped together as Party Affiliated in |
| this table, for comparison to independent voters. Respondents coded as Independent, No Prefer- |
| ence, and Other are included in the independent category. |
|
|
| Party-affiliated voters exhibited the same voting behavior, either straight-ticket or mixed |
| voting in each wave, in 70% of the cases. For Independents, this percentage drops to 57%. |
| Conversely, 30% of party affiliates changed their voting patterns across two elections, while 43% |
| of Independents changed. |
|
|
| Party-affiliated voters voted a straight ticket for the same party at a rate of 62%. Independ- |
| ents, while still voting consistently for a single party at a significant rate (44%), were still more |
| likely to change their voting behavior at the second wave of the survey. A small number of voters |
| voted a straight ticket for one party at Wave 1 and then switched to the other party at Wave 2. |
| Here we see that independents were twice as likely to make this large shift than party affiliates. |
| There is a small difference between the two groups on percentages that went from straight ticket |
| at Wave 1 to mixed at Wave 2. Independents were more likely to go from mixed to straight voting |
| and much more likely to vote for a mix of the two parties in both waves. |
|
|
| 4 Sixteen of the 4770 ANES respondents who reported voting in two waves of the survey are coded as DK or NA, refused in VCF0302, |
| leaving 4754 who could have their political identification classified. |
|
|
| 16 |
|
|
| THE FLUID VOTER |
|
|
| T A B L E 4 Changes in voting behavior, all respondents |
|
|
| Wave 2 |
|
|
| Wave 1 |
|
|
| Straight REP |
|
|
| Mixed vote |
|
|
| Straight DEM |
|
|
| Total |
|
|
| Straight REP |
|
|
| Mixed Vote |
|
|
| Straight DEM |
|
|
| 1239 |
|
|
| 399 |
|
|
| 55 |
|
|
| 1693 |
|
|
| 285 |
|
|
| 434 |
|
|
| 264 |
|
|
| 983 |
|
|
| 123 |
|
|
| 507 |
|
|
| 1464 |
|
|
| 2094 |
|
|
| T A B L E 5 Voting changes over two waves of ANES data |
|
|
| Party affiliated |
|
|
| Independent |
|
|
| Initial Party ID Response (VCF0302) |
|
|
| Straight ticket Wave 1 & Wave 2: same party both waves* |
|
|
| Mixed ticket, both Wave 1 & Wave 2* |
|
|
| Subtotal: Same voting behavior in Wave 1 & 2* |
|
|
| Straight ticket Wave 1 & Wave 2: switched parties* |
|
|
| Straight ticket in Wave 1, mixed ticket in Wave 2** |
|
|
| Mixed ticket in Wave 1, straight ticket in Wave 2* |
|
|
| Subtotal: Different voting behavior in Wave 1 & 2* |
|
|
| n |
|
|
| 2056 |
|
|
| 237 |
|
|
| 2293 |
|
|
| 96 |
|
|
| 355 |
|
|
| 547 |
|
|
| 998 |
|
|
| % |
|
|
| 62% |
|
|
| 7% |
|
|
| 70% |
|
|
| 3% |
|
|
| 11% |
|
|
| 17% |
|
|
| 30% |
|
|
| n |
|
|
| 640 |
|
|
| 196 |
|
|
| 836 |
|
|
| 81 |
|
|
| 191 |
|
|
| 355 |
|
|
| 627 |
|
|
| Total |
|
|
| 1647 |
|
|
| 1340 |
|
|
| 1783 |
|
|
| 4770 |
|
|
| % |
|
|
| 44% |
|
|
| 13% |
|
|
| 57% |
|
|
| 6% |
|
|
| 13% |
|
|
| 24% |
|
|
| 43% |
|
|
| Total |
|
|
| *Z-test for proportions p < .01. |
| **Z-test for proportions p < .05. |
| |
| Initial Party ID Response (VCF0302) |
| |
| 3291 |
| |
| 100% |
| |
| 1463 |
| |
| 100% |
| |
| When the party-affiliated category shown in Table 5 is broken out to show the two parties, we see |
| the results are largely the same. Democrats continued their pattern from Wave 1, either voting |
| a straight ticket for a particular party or voting a mixed ticket, in 71% of the cases. This left |
| 29% of self-identified Democrats changing their voting behavior in some fashion, with 32% of |
| Republicans exhibiting changed behavior. The p-value for a comparison of these percentages is |
| .176, suggesting that there is little meaningful difference between Democrats and Republicans on |
| this measure. |
| |
| As noted above, 43% of independents showed changed behavior between Wave 1 and Wave 2, |
| |
| with a p-value of <.01 compared to party-affiliated respondents (Table 6). |
| |
| Seven-Point Scale (VCF0301) |
| |
| When this same measure of voting change over time is applied to the Seven-Point Scale of |
| VCF0301, we see that, unsurprisingly, the Strong Democrats and Strong Republicans are most |
| consistent in their behavior, with less than a quarter of these groups changing their voting profile |
| from one wave to the next (Table 7). Independent-Independents were the most likely to change their |
| voting profile at 48%, followed by Independent-Republicans at 45%. Independent-Democrats |
| again seem to be as committed to Democratic candidates as the Weak Democrats with the party |
| in the question posed in VCF0301. Weak Democrats voted for a straight Democratic ticked at a |
| |
| REILLY anD HUnTInG |
| |
| T A B L E 6 Changes in voting behavior by Initial Party ID Response |
| |
| VCF0302 |
| |
| Democrat |
| |
| Republican |
| |
| Subtotal: Party-identified |
| |
| Independent, Other, No Pref. |
| |
| Total |
| |
| Voted in two waves |
| |
| Percent that changed voting behavior |
| |
| 1803 |
| |
| 1488 |
| |
| 3291 |
| |
| 1463 |
| |
| 4754 |
| |
| 29% |
| |
| 32% |
| |
| 30% |
| |
| 43% |
| |
| 34% |
| |
| 17 |
| |
| Percent that |
| did not change |
| |
| 71% |
| |
| 68% |
| |
| 70% |
| |
| 57% |
| |
| 66% |
| |
| T A B L E 7 Changes in voting behavior by 7-Point Scale |
| |
| VCF0301 |
| |
| Voted in two waves |
| |
| Percent that changed voting behavior |
| |
| Percent that did not change |
| |
| Strong Democrat |
| |
| 1045 |
| |
| Weak Democrat |
| |
| Independent-Democrat |
| |
| Independent-Independent |
| |
| Independent-Republican |
| |
| Weak Republican |
| |
| Strong Republican |
| |
| Total |
| |
| 757 |
| |
| 547 |
| |
| 332 |
| |
| 588 |
| |
| 637 |
| |
| 850 |
| |
| 4756 |
| |
| 22% |
| |
| 40% |
| |
| 38% |
| |
| 48% |
| |
| 45% |
| |
| 42% |
| |
| 24% |
| |
| 34% |
| |
| 78% |
| |
| 60% |
| |
| 62% |
| |
| 52% |
| |
| 55% |
| |
| 58% |
| |
| 76% |
| |
| 66% |
| |
| rate of 45%, while Independent-Democrats did so at a rate of 47% with a p-value of .472 between |
| the two rates, indicating little actual difference between the two groups. |
| |
| Summary 3-Category Scale (VCF0303) |
| |
| The Summary 3-Category Scale once again shrinks the size of the independent category but |
| maximizes its difference from the enlarged party-identified categories. Democrats (including |
| leaners) were slightly less likely to change their behavior (31%) than Republicans (including lean- |
| ers) at 35%.5 True independents, as above, changed their voting profile 48% of the time between |
| the first and second survey waves (Table 8). |
| |
| DISCUSSION |
| |
| Analyzing each of the three ANES measures of party affiliation (Initial Party ID, Seven-Point |
| Scale, and Summary 3 Category) over multiple elections provides some important findings on |
| the voting patterns of independents. We find evidence that, when tracking independent voting |
| behavior over more than one election, there is a significant volatility in voting loyalty and as |
| a group, independents are distinct from partisans. The research also confirms that a sizeable |
| number of independents move in and out of independent status from one election to another. |
| |
| In the first analysis on how political identification of voters changes over multiple survey |
| waves, we explored how these respondents changed their party identification from one survey |
| cycle to the next. The Initial Party ID scale found that independents were more fluid on this metric |
| than party-affiliated respondents with the percent of independents changing at the second wave |
| |
| 5 Z-test for proportions <.01. |
| |
| 18 |
| |
| THE FLUID VOTER |
| |
| T A B L E 8 Changes in voting behavior by Summary 3-Category Scale |
| |
| VCF0303 |
| |
| Voted in two waves |
| |
| Percent that changed voting behavior |
| |
| Democrat (including leaners) |
| |
| Republican (including leaners) |
| |
| Subtotal: Party-Identified |
| |
| Independent |
| |
| Total |
| |
| 2349 |
| |
| 2075 |
| |
| 4424 |
| |
| 332 |
| |
| 4756 |
| |
| 31% |
| |
| 35% |
| |
| 33% |
| |
| 48% |
| |
| 34% |
| |
| Percent that |
| did not change |
| |
| 69% |
| |
| 65% |
| |
| 67% |
| |
| 52% |
| |
| 66% |
| |
| by more than double that of partisans. Additionally, the percentage of independents becoming |
| party affiliated was nearly three times that of party affiliates becoming independent. Moving to |
| the analysis of the Seven-Point Scale, even more fluidity was found with an overall 57% of those |
| in one of the three independent categories of the Seven-Point Scale changing their identification |
| at wave two. The last analysis collapsed categories of the Summary 3-Category Scale in party |
| identification seen in the previous two scales and resulted in a significantly reduced (7%) number |
| of independent respondents. Despite this small percentage of independent respondents, almost |
| two-thirds or 64% of the independents changed classification to partisans at Wave 2. |
| |
| ANES participants who responded to two consecutive waves of the survey but voted in |
| neither of the corresponding elections showed much greater fluidity in their political identifica- |
| tion between waves. Overall, 60% of respondents changed their Initial Party Identification. In |
| contrast with the voting respondents, non-voting Independents were substantially the same as |
| party affiliates, 59% making a switch to party affiliation. Non-voting independents were more |
| likely to move by at least one point on the Seven-Point Scale (64%) than either Democrats (50%) |
| or Republicans (49%). Thirty-nine percent of non-voters who identified as Independent in the |
| first survey wave chose party affiliation at wave two. When the Summary 3-Category Scale is |
| analyzed, we see that 81% of the non-voting independents identified with one of the major |
| parties at wave two, compared with 58% of all respondents. |
| |
| Our analysis on how independent voters and non-voters changed their party identification |
| from one cycle to the next showed a significant amount of fluidity with non-voters being espe- |
| cially unpredictable. On all three political identification scales, independent respondents changed |
| their political identification over time more often than partisans (ranging from 36% to 64% for |
| voters and 59% to 83% for non-voters) with the exception of non-voting Republicans on the |
| Initial Party ID Scale. These findings suggest that independent voters and non-voters who iden- |
| tify in one political classification in one election are less likely to identify themselves in the same |
| manner in the next election. Their identification may depend on specific candidates or issues on |
| the ballot (Reilly et al., 2023) or may derive from short-term interest rather than a long-standing |
| loyalty (Miller, 1991). This finding supports Fiorina's (2016) assertion about independent voting |
| behavior: “whatever they are, they are an important component of the electoral instability that |
| characterizes the contemporary era. Their critical contribution to contemporary elections lies in |
| their volatility” (p. 10). |
| |
| We next investigated how frequently respondents to the ANES scales vote “straight tickets,” |
| always choosing candidates from the same party or “mixed tickets” where some Republican |
| and some Democrat candidates are chosen. Our expectation that those identifying as Demo- |
| crat or Republican would mostly choose candidates from their own party was confirmed, while |
| independents demonstrated more variety in their choices. For the Initial Party ID scale, over |
| 70% of partisans voted straight ticket, while 65% of independent respondents did, with the |
| independent straight-ticket voters divided; 35% voting for Democrats and 30% for Republi- |
| cans. While the Seven-Point Scale showed similar results, Independent-Democrats showed a |
| |
| REILLY anD HUnTInG |
| |
| 19 |
| |
| higher percentage of straight-ticket support of Democratic candidates than the Weak Demo- |
| crats, while Independent Republicans were slightly less likely to vote a straight ticket than Weak |
| Republicans. |
| |
| Finally, we explored the degree to which individuals change their voting choices over time |
| (two-wave voters). Partisan voters exhibited the same voting behavior, either straight-ticket |
| or mixed voting in each wave, in 70% of the cases. For independents, this percentage drops |
| to 57%. The Initial Party ID analysis found that approximately 30% of partisans changed |
| between waves compared to 43% of independents; while the Seven-Point Scale showed |
| Independent-Independents were the most likely to change their voting profile at 48%, followed |
| by Independent-Republicans at 45%. Weak Democrats voted for a straight Democratic ticket at |
| a rate of 45%, while Independent-Democrats did so at a rate of 47%. Independents were more |
| likely to go from mixed to straight voting and much more likely to vote for a mix of the two |
| parties in both waves. For the Summary 3-Category, approximately a third of partisans changed |
| their voting patterns over the two waves compared to 48% of independents. |
| |
| Our research on independent voting behavior included analyses of voting patterns over time. |
| The findings confirm that independents do indeed move in and out of independent status when |
| tracked over multiple elections. Further, this study lends support to the notion that there is a |
| good deal more fluidity in voting patterns of independents. This was the case when analyzing |
| data across all three ANES scales. Our analysis of the ANES Seven-Point Scale showed that |
| Independent-Republicans and Weak-Republicans resembled each other's voting patterns on |
| straight/split ticket and voting change over time analyses (Mayer, 2008; Petrocik, 2009; Smith |
| et al., 1995); however, this was not the case with Independent-Democrats and Weak-Democrats. |
| Independent-Democrats, who did not affiliate with any party in the Initial Party Response ID |
| question, were more likely to vote only for Democrats than Weak-Democrats that specifically |
| identified as Democrat. Similarly, Independent-Republicans were as likely to vote a straight |
| Republican ticket in both waves than Weak Republicans. Respondents who were coded as either |
| 5 (Independent-Republican) or 6 (Weak Republican) showed essentially the same voting behav- |
| ior, while those coded as 3 (Independent-Democrat) were more Democratic in their behavior |
| than the supposedly more liberal Weak Democrats at scale point 2. This indicates that caution |
| needs to be exercised when treating the Seven-Point Scale (VCF0301) as a continuous variable. |
| |
| It may be that traditional ways of measuring voter identification do not capture the independ- |
| ent voter due to voter composition of the electorate and our hyperpolarized political environ- |
| ment. Due to the research of Keith and others (1992), it became most common for researchers |
| with the ANES to utilize a three-point or five-point scale that classified independent-leaning |
| Democrats, or independent-leaning Republicans, as partisans (VCF0302, Initial Party ID |
| response). This resulted in a significant reduction in the number of self-described independ- |
| ents. Reilly and Hedberg (2022) have argued that in light of the more recent work of Klar and |
| Krupnikov (2016) and Zschirnt (2011), which showed the importance of the independent iden- |
| tity, classifying self-identified independents as partisans seems counterproductive in examining |
| their influence on partisans, especially when respondents elected to self-identify as leaners. The |
| authors collapsed three groups—respondents who selected option 3, 4, or 5—as independ- |
| ent, thus treating leaners as Independents (VCF0303, Summary 3-category scale). Similarly, |
| Fiorina (2016) has long been an opponent of classifying leaning independents as partisans and |
| leaving pure independents in the middle ID category arguing that “We can think of no other case |
| in political science where analysts change a respondent's explicit response to a survey item on |
| the basis of information from other items—especially one generally used as the dependent varia- |
| ble” (Abrams & Fiorina, 2011, p. 5). Perhaps it is time to develop new explanatory constructs to |
| capture independent voter classification. |
| |
| 20 |
| |
| CONCLUSION |
| |
| THE FLUID VOTER |
| |
| Our study contributes to previous literature on the independent voter by showing their voting |
| patterns are volatile, unpredictable, and distinct from partisans. Additionally, when analyz- |
| ing voting behavior over time, our research confirmed that a sizeable number of independ- |
| ents move in and out of independent status from one election to another. This volatility was |
| observed in all three measures of party affiliation used by the ANES survey data. When inde- |
| pendents are followed over multiple elections, they have been found to have no firm partisan |
| loyalties. |
| |
| Despite our contributions, our study has several limitations. First, as with any survey, the |
| voting classification and behavior details are all based on self-reports, which are suspectable to |
| response bias. Second, although ANES is a rich dataset with a long history to draw from, it does |
| have limitations for this sort of analysis. There is limited information about voter choices in the |
| data. The survey asks for party choices on just four races: president, Congress, Senate, and gover- |
| nor. With the survey waves spaced two years apart (except for the 2016–2020 waves), respondents |
| will not be able to provide answers to presidential, senatorial, and most governor's races in both |
| waves, which limits the data available for analysis. These four races, especially at the presidential |
| level, are susceptible to a “celebrity effect” where a high-profile candidate's perceived charm |
| (or repulsiveness) may overwhelm a voter's policy-based preferences when selecting a candidate. |
| Data that included more frequent and down-ballot races would provide a better picture of the |
| relationship between the stated political identification of voters and their voting choices (Bitzer |
| et al., 2021). Finally, it is also difficult to draw solid conclusions about the behavior of non-voters |
| from these data. These non-voters may be latent voters who generally lie dormant but turn out |
| at the polls when there is an issue or candidate that particularly motivates them. Without a very |
| long time-series survey, it is difficult to say with what frequency these latent voters are activated |
| or what motivates changes in their political identification. |
| |
| There is a lot that still needs to be learned about this emerging group of voters. Future |
| research should explore the fluidity of Black and Latino voters as well as the increasing genera- |
| tional divide. Most importantly, there is a need to continue to track independent voting behavior |
| over time and more analysis on the voting patterns of independents is needed down ballot at the |
| state and local level. |
| |
| ORCID |
| Thom Reilly |
| |
| https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8614-0482 |
| |
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| |
| 22 |
| |
| THE FLUID VOTER |
| |
| AUT HOR BI OG RAP HIES |
| |
| Thom Reilly is a Professor and Co-Director for the Center for an Independent and Sustaina- |
| ble Democracy in the School of Public Affairs at Arizona State University. He is the former |
| Chancellor of the Nevada System of Higher Education and County Manager for Clark |
| County, Nevada. Reilly's research focuses on public pay and benefit schemes, nonpartisan |
| governance, the independent voter, and child welfare. He is the author of several books |
| including The Independent Voter (Routledge Press, 2023) with co-authors Jacqueline Salit and |
| Omar Ali, The Failure of Governance in Bell, California (Lexington Press, 2016), and Rethink- |
| ing Public Sector Compensation (M.E. Sharpe, 2012). |
| |
| Dan Hunting is Senior Researcher at Arizona State University's Lodestar Center for Philan- |
| thropy & Nonprofit Innovation. His research interests include economic impacts of the |
| nonprofit sector, voter dynamics, workforce development, education funding, and urban |
| growth. Hunting has authored several foundational works that have informed Arizona policy |
| discussions including Finding & Keeping: Educators for Arizona's Classrooms an analysis |
| of the state's teacher shortage, and Sun Corridor: A Competitive Mindset (co-authored with |
| Grady Gammage, Jr.) which described the complex connections between the economies of |
| Phoenix and Tucson. |
| |
| How to cite this article: Reilly, Thom, and Dan Hunting. 2023. “The fluid voter: |
| Exploring independent voting patterns over time.” Politics & Policy 00: 1–22. https://doi. |
| org/10.1111/polp.12517. |
| |
| |