name stringlengths 10 10 | title stringlengths 22 113 | abstract stringlengths 282 2.29k | fulltext stringlengths 15.3k 85.1k | keywords stringlengths 87 585 |
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train_I-70 | A Multi-Agent System for Building Dynamic Ontologies | Ontologies building from text is still a time-consuming task which justifies the growth of Ontology Learning. Our system named Dynamo is designed along this domain but following an original approach based on an adaptive multi-agent architecture. In this paper we present a distributed hierarchical clustering algorithm, ... | 1. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, it is well established that ontologies are needed for
semantic web, knowledge management, B2B... For knowledge
management, ontologies are used to annotate documents and to
enhance the information retrieval. But building an ontology manually
is a slow, tedious, costly, complex and time consumin... | cooperation;parent adequacy function;ontology;dynamic equilibrium;hepatitis;emergent behavior;quantitative evaluation;black-box;model quality;multi-agent field;dynamo;terminological richness |
train_I-71 | A Formal Model for Situated Semantic Alignment | Ontology matching is currently a key technology to achieve the semantic alignment of ontological entities used by knowledge-based applications, and therefore to enable their interoperability in distributed environments such as multiagent systems. Most ontology matching mechanisms, however, assume matching prior integra... | 1. INTRODUCTION
An ontology is commonly defined as a specification of the
conceptualisation of a particular domain. It fixes the
vocabulary used by knowledge engineers to denote concepts and
their relations, and it constrains the interpretation of this
vocabulary to the meaning originally intended by knowledge
engineer... | constraint;information-channel refinement;ontology;distributed logic;semantic alignment;distribute logic;knowledge-based system;channel refinement;sum infomorphism;multi-agent system;semantic web;disjoint union;federated database |
train_I-72 | Learning Consumer Preferences Using Semantic Similarity | In online, dynamic environments, the services requested by consumers may not be readily served by the providers. This requires the service consumers and providers to negotiate their service needs and offers. Multiagent negotiation approaches typically assume that the parties agree on service content and focus on findin... | 1. INTRODUCTION
Current approaches to e-commerce treat service price as the
primary construct for negotiation by assuming that the service content
is fixed [9]. However, negotiation on price presupposes that other
properties of the service have already been agreed upon.
Nevertheless, many times the service provider may... | incremental decision tree;candidate elimination algorithm;rp similarity;disjunctive cea;consumer preference;disjunctive hypothesis;service;ontology;decision tree;semantic similarity;price;datum repository;negotiation;preference learning;inductive learn;multiple version space;learning set;similarity metric;consumer agen... |
train_I-73 | Exchanging Reputation Values among Heterogeneous Agent Reputation Models: An Experience on ART Testbed | In open MAS it is often a problem to achieve agents' interoperability. The heterogeneity of its components turns the establishment of interaction or cooperation among them into a non trivial task, since agents may use different internal models and the decision about trust other agents is a crucial condition to the form... | 1. INTRODUCTION
Open multiagent systems (MAS) are composed of autonomous
distributed agents that may enter and leave the agent society at
their will because open systems have no centralized control over
the development of its parts [1]. Since agents are considered as
autonomous entities, we cannot assume that there is ... | interoperability;reputation model;agent architecture;functional ontology of reputation;ontology;heterogeneous agent;reputation value;autonomous distributed agent;reputation formation;reputation;art testbed;trust;art testb;multiagent system |
train_I-74 | On the relevance of utterances in formal inter-agent dialogues | Work on argumentation-based dialogue has defined frameworks within which dialogues can be carried out, established protocols that govern dialogues, and studied different properties of dialogues. This work has established the space in which agents are permitted to interact through dialogues. Recently, there has been inc... | 1. INTRODUCTION
Finding ways for agents to reach agreements in
multiagent systems is an area of active research. One mechanism
for achieving agreement is through the use of argumentation
- where one agent tries to convince another agent of
something during the course of some dialogue. Early examples of
argumentation-ba... | node;status;relevance;graph;tree;leaf;dialogue;argument;argumentation;multiagent system |
train_I-75 | Hypotheses Refinement under Topological Communication Constraints | We investigate the properties of a multiagent system where each (distributed) agent locally perceives its environment. Upon perception of an unexpected event, each agent locally computes its favoured hypothesis and tries to propagate it to other agents, by exchanging hypotheses and supporting arguments (observations). ... | 1. INTRODUCTION
We consider a multiagent system where each (distributed)
agent locally perceives its environment, and we assume that
some unexpected event occurs in that system. If each agent
computes only locally its favoured hypothesis, it is only
natural to assume that agents will seek to coordinate and
refine their... | global consistency;hypothesis exchange protocol;inter-agent communication;favoured hypothesis;bounded perception;context request step;negotiation and argumentation;bilateral exchange;temporal path;sequence of time point;agent communication language and protocol;time point sequence;topological constraint;mutual consiste... |
train_I-76 | Negotiation by Abduction and Relaxation | This paper studies a logical framework for automated negotiation between two agents. We suppose an agent who has a knowledge base represented by a logic program. Then, we introduce methods of constructing counter-proposals in response to proposals made by an agent. To this end, we combine the techniques of extended abd... | 1. INTRODUCTION
Automated negotiation has been received increasing
attention in multi-agent systems, and a number of frameworks
have been proposed in different contexts ([1, 2, 3, 5, 10, 11,
13, 14], for instance). Negotiation usually proceeds in a
series of rounds and each agent makes a proposal at every
round. An age... | relaxation;logic program;anti-instantiation;abductive program;abductive framework;dropping condition;specific meta-knowledge;inductive generalization;one-to-one negotiation;minimal explanation;conditional proposal;integrity constraint;negotiation;extend abduction;automated negotiation;multi-agent system;alternative pro... |
train_I-77 | The LOGIC Negotiation Model | Successful negotiators prepare by determining their position along five dimensions: Legitimacy, Options, Goals, Independence, and Commitment, (LOGIC). We introduce a negotiation model based on these dimensions and on two primitive concepts: intimacy (degree of closeness) and balance (degree of fairness). The intimacy i... | 1. INTRODUCTION
In this paper we propose a new negotiation model to deal
with long term relationships that are founded on successive
negotiation encounters. The model is grounded on results
from business and psychological studies [1, 16, 9], and
acknowledges that negotiation is an information exchange
process as well a... | set predicate;confidence measure;ontology;view of acceptability;acceptability view;acceptance criterion;component dialogue;long term relationship;utilitarian interpretation;utterance;successive negotiation encounter;negotiation;logic agent architecture;multiagent system;negotiation strategy |
train_J-33 | Bid Expressiveness and Clearing Algorithms in Multiattribute Double Auctions | We investigate the space of two-sided multiattribute auctions, focusing on the relationship between constraints on the offers traders can express through bids, and the resulting computational problem of determining an optimal set of trades. We develop a formal semantic framework for characterizing expressible offers, a... | 1. BACKGROUND
A multiattribute auction is a market-based mechanism where
goods are described by vectors of features, or attributes [3, 5, 8,
19]. Such mechanisms provide traders with the ability to negotiate
over a multidimensional space of potential deals, delaying
commitment to specific configurations until the most ... | bid;constraint;one-sided mechanism;partial specification;multiattribute auction;combinatorial auction;auction;global allocation;seller valuation function;preference;continuous double auction;multiattribute utility theory;semantic framework |
train_J-34 | (In)Stability Properties of Limit Order Dynamics | We study the stability properties of the dynamics of the standard continuous limit-order mechanism that is used in modern equity markets. We ask whether such mechanisms are susceptible to butterfly effects - the infliction of large changes on common measures of market activity by only small perturbations of the order s... | 1. INTRODUCTION
In recent years there has been an explosive increase in
the automation of modern equity markets. This increase
has taken place both in the exchanges, which are
increasingly computerized and offer sophisticated interfaces for
order placement and management, and in the trading
activity itself, which is ev... | bid;market microstructure;absolute trader model;computational finance;penny-jumping;standard continuous limit-order mechanism;modern execution optimization;relative trader model;modern equity market;high-frequency microstructure signal;relative price model;quantitative trading strategy;electronic communication network |
train_J-35 | Efficiency and Nash Equilibria in a Scrip System for P2P Networks | A model of providing service in a P2P network is analyzed. It is shown that by adding a scrip system, a mechanism that admits a reasonable Nash equilibrium that reduces free riding can be obtained. The effect of varying the total amount of money (scrip) in the system on efficiency (i.e., social welfare) is analyzed, an... | 1. INTRODUCTION
A common feature of many online distributed systems is
that individuals provide services for each other.
Peer-topeer (P2P) networks (such as Kazaa [25] or BitTorrent [3])
have proved popular as mechanisms for file sharing, and
applications such as distributed computation and file storage
are on the hori... | nash equilibrium;game theory;gnutellum network;scrip system;agent;threshold strategy;reputation system;social welfare;game;online system;maximum entropy;p2p network;bittorrent;emule |
train_J-36 | Playing Games in Many Possible Worlds | In traditional game theory, players are typically endowed with exogenously given knowledge of the structure of the game-either full omniscient knowledge or partial but fixed information. In real life, however, people are often unaware of the utility of taking a particular action until they perform research into its con... | 1. INTRODUCTION
Late October 1960. A smoky room. Democratic Party
strategists huddle around a map. How should the Kennedy
campaign allocate its remaining advertising budget? Should
it focus on, say, California or New York? The Nixon
campaign faces the same dilemma. Of course, neither campaign
knows the effectiveness of... | algorithm;game theory;nash equilibrium;strategic multiplayer environment;constant-sum game;correlate equilibrium;auction;arbitrary partial information;questionand-answer session;information acquisition;socratic game;priori probability distribution;observable-query model;missing information;game-either full omniscient k... |
train_J-37 | Finding Equilibria in Large Sequential Games of Imperfect Information | Finding an equilibrium of an extensive form game of imperfect information is a fundamental problem in computational game theory, but current techniques do not scale to large games. To address this, we introduce the ordered game isomorphism and the related ordered game isomorphic abstraction transformation. For a multi-... | 1. INTRODUCTION
In environments with more than one agent, an agent"s
outcome is generally affected by the actions of the other
agent(s). Consequently, the optimal action of one agent can
depend on the others. Game theory provides a normative
framework for analyzing such strategic situations. In
particular, it provides ... | imperfect information;ordered game isomorphism;related ordered game isomorphic abstraction transformation;nash equilibrium;game theory;strategy profile;computer poker;sequential game;computational game theory;equilibrium find;ordered signal space;observable action;gameshrink;rational behavior;signal tree;automate abstr... |
train_J-38 | Multi-Attribute Coalitional Games∗ | We study coalitional games where the value of cooperation among the agents are solely determined by the attributes the agents possess, with no assumption as to how these attributes jointly determine this value. This framework allows us to model diverse economic interactions by picking the right attributes. We study the... | 1. INTRODUCTION
When agents interact with one another, the value of their
contribution is determined by what they can do with their
skills and resources, rather than simply their identities.
Consider the problem of forming a soccer team. For a team to
be successful, a team needs some forwards, midfielders,
defenders, a... | cooperation;polynomial function min-cost flow problem;diverse economic interaction;coalitional game theory;coalitional game;linear combination;min-cost flow problem;graph;agent;unrestricted aggregation of subgame;shapley value;multi-issue representation;superadditive game;compact representation;computational complexity... |
train_J-39 | The Sequential Auction Problem on eBay: An Empirical Analysis and a Solution | Bidders on eBay have no dominant bidding strategy when faced with multiple auctions each offering an item of interest. As seen through an analysis of 1,956 auctions on eBay for a Dell E193FP LCD monitor, some bidders win auctions at prices higher than those of other available auctions, while others never win an auction... | 1. INTRODUCTION
Electronic markets represent an application of information
systems that has generated significant new trading
opportunities while allowing for the dynamic pricing of goods. In
addition to marketplaces such as eBay, electronic marketplaces
are increasingly used for business-to-consumer auctions (e.g.
to ... | business-to-consumer auction;empirical analysis;automated trading agent;electronic marketplace;computer simulation;market effect;option;trading opportunity;options-based extension;ebay;sequential auction problem;bidding strategy;strategic behavior;commoditized market;proxy-bidding system;multiple auction;proxy bid;onli... |
train_J-40 | Networks Preserving Evolutionary Equilibria and the Power of Randomization | We study a natural extension of classical evolutionary game theory to a setting in which pairwise interactions are restricted to the edges of an undirected graph or network. We generalize the definition of an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS), and show a pair of complementary results that exhibit the power of randomiz... | 1. INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we introduce and examine a natural
extension of classical evolutionary game theory (EGT) to a setting
in which pairwise interactions are restricted to the edges of
an undirected graph or network. This extension generalizes
the classical setting, in which all pairs of organisms in an
infin... | nash equilibrium;game theory;randomization power;evolutionary stable strategy;natural strengthening;geographical restriction;equilibrium outcome;power of randomization;undirected graph;edge density condition;graph topology;mutation set;evolutionary game theory;graph-theoretic model;relationship of topology;network;topo... |
train_J-41 | An Analysis of Alternative Slot Auction Designs for Sponsored Search | Billions of dollars are spent each year on sponsored search, a form of advertising where merchants pay for placement alongside web search results. Slots for ad listings are allocated via an auction-style mechanism where the higher a merchant bids, the more likely his ad is to appear above other ads on the page. In this... | 1. INTRODUCTION
Today, Internet giants Google and Yahoo! boast a
combined market capitalization of over $150 billion, largely on
the strength of sponsored search, the fastest growing
component of a resurgent online advertising industry.
PricewaterhouseCoopers estimates that 2004 industry-wide sponsored
search revenues ... | rank by bid;second pricing;incomplete information;web search engine;resurgent online advertising industry;second-price payment rule;alternative slot auction design;rank by revenue;pay per click;divergence of value;divergence of economic value;auction theory;combined market capitalization;multitude of equilibrium;sponso... |
train_J-42 | The Dynamics of Viral Marketing ∗ | We present an analysis of a person-to-person recommendation network, consisting of 4 million people who made 16 million recommendations on half a million products. We observe the propagation of recommendations and the cascade sizes, which we explain by a simple stochastic model. We then establish how the recommendation... | 1. INTRODUCTION
With consumers showing increasing resistance to
traditional forms of advertising such as TV or newspaper ads,
marketers have turned to alternate strategies, including
viral marketing. Viral marketing exploits existing social
networks by encouraging customers to share product
information with their frien... | directed multi graph;product;consumer;recommender system;viral market;recommendation network;viral marketing;advertisement;pricing category;probability;e-commerce;purchase;stochastic model;connected individual |
train_J-44 | Scouts, Promoters, and Connectors: The Roles of Ratings in Nearest Neighbor Collaborative Filtering | Recommender systems aggregate individual user ratings into predictions of products or services that might interest visitors. The quality of this aggregation process crucially affects the user experience and hence the effectiveness of recommenders in e-commerce. We present a novel study that disaggregates global recomme... | 1. INTRODUCTION
Recommender systems have become integral to e-commerce,
providing technology that suggests products to a visitor
based on previous purchases or rating history.
Collaborative filtering, a common form of recommendation, predicts
a user"s rating for an item by combining (other) ratings of
that user with ot... | opinion;list rank accuracy;recommender system;neighborhood;nearest neighbor;rating;recommender;promoter;aggregation process;scout;purchase;collaborative filtering algorithm;collaborative filter;user-base and item-base algorithm;connector |
train_J-45 | Empirical Mechanism Design: Methods, with Application to a Supply-Chain Scenario | Our proposed methods employ learning and search techniques to estimate outcome features of interest as a function of mechanism parameter settings. We illustrate our approach with a design task from a supply-chain trading competition. Designers adopted several rule changes in order to deter particular procurement behavi... | 1. MOTIVATION
We illustrate our problem with an anecdote from a supply chain
research exercise: the 2003 and 2004 Trading Agent Competition
(TAC) Supply Chain Management (SCM) game. TAC/SCM [1]
defines a scenario where agents compete to maximize their profits
as manufacturers in a supply chain. The agents procure compo... | analysis;nash equilibrium;participant;game theory;observed behavior;outcome feature of interest;parameter setting;player;gametheoretic model;supply-chain trading;two-stage game;empirical mechanism design;interest outcome feature;empirical mechanism |
train_J-47 | On the Computational Power of Iterative Auctions∗ | We embark on a systematic analysis of the power and limitations of iterative combinatorial auctions. Most existing iterative combinatorial auctions are based on repeatedly suggesting prices for bundles of items, and querying the bidders for their demand under these prices. We prove a large number of results showing the... | 1. INTRODUCTION
Combinatorial auctions have recently received a lot of
attention. In a combinatorial auction, a set M of m
nonidentical items are sold in a single auction to n competing
bidders. The bidders have preferences regarding the bundles
of items that they may receive. The preferences of bidder i
are specified ... | bound;ascend auction;combinatorial auction;price;optimal allocation;ascending-price auction;approximation factor;demand query;bidder;polynomial demand;preference elicitation;communication complexity |
train_J-49 | Information Markets vs. Opinion Pools: An Empirical Comparison | In this paper, we examine the relative forecast accuracy of information markets versus expert aggregation. We leverage a unique data source of almost 2000 people"s subjective probability judgments on 2003 US National Football League games and compare with the market probabilities given by two different information mark... | 1. INTRODUCTION
Forecasting is a ubiquitous endeavor in human societies.
For decades, scientists have been developing and exploring
various forecasting methods, which can be roughly divided
into statistical and non-statistical approaches. Statistical
approaches require not only the existence of enough
historical data b... | prediction accuracy;pooled prediction;future event;expertise;price;contract;information market;market probability;opinion pool;expert aggregation;forecast;expert opinion |
train_J-50 | Communication Complexity of Common Voting Rules∗ | We determine the communication complexity of the common voting rules. The rules (sorted by their communication complexity from low to high) are plurality, plurality with runoff, single transferable vote (STV), Condorcet, approval, Bucklin, cup, maximin, Borda, Copeland, and ranked pairs. For each rule, we first give a ... | 1. INTRODUCTION
One key factor in the practicality of any preference
aggregation rule is its communication burden. To successfully
aggregate the agents" preferences, it is usually not necessary
for all the agents to report all of their preference information.
Clever protocols that elicit the agents" preferences partial... | communication;protocol;preference aggregation;maximin;voting rule;complexity;preference;stv;vote;resource allocation;communication complexity;elicitation problem |
train_J-51 | Complexity of (Iterated) Dominance∗ | We study various computational aspects of solving games using dominance and iterated dominance. We first study both strict and weak dominance (not iterated), and show that checking whether a given strategy is dominated by some mixed strategy can be done in polynomial time using a single linear program solve. We then mo... | 1. INTRODUCTION
In multiagent systems with self-interested agents, the
optimal action for one agent may depend on the actions taken
by other agents. In such settings, the agents require tools
from game theory to rationally decide on an action. Game
theory offers various formal models of strategic settings-the
best-know... | game theory;nash equilibrium;bayesian game;dominance;normal form game;elimination;iterated dominance;self-interested agent;strategy;optimal action;multiagent system |
train_J-52 | Hidden-Action in Multi-Hop Routing | In multi-hop networks, the actions taken by individual intermediate nodes are typically hidden from the communicating endpoints; all the endpoints can observe is whether or not the end-to-end transmission was successful. Therefore, in the absence of incentives to the contrary, rational (i.e., selfish) intermediate node... | 1. INTRODUCTION
Endpoints wishing to communicate over a multi-hop network
rely on intermediate nodes to forward packets from the sender to
the receiver. In settings where the intermediate nodes are
independent agents (such as individual nodes in ad-hoc and
peer-topeer networks or autonomous systems on the Internet), th... | mechanism;moralhazard;route;multi-hop;endpoint;hidden action;contract;hidden-action;failure cause;cost;multi-hop network;principal-agent model;intermediate node;moral hazard;cause of failure;priority;incentive;mechanism design |
train_J-53 | A Price-Anticipating Resource Allocation Mechanism for Distributed Shared Clusters | In this paper we formulate the fixed budget resource allocation game to understand the performance of a distributed marketbased resource allocation system. Multiple users decide how to distribute their budget (bids) among multiple machines according to their individual preferences to maximize their individual utility. ... | 1. INTRODUCTION
The primary advantage of distributed shared clusters like
the Grid [7] and PlanetLab [1] is their ability to pool
together shared computational resources. This allows increased
throughput because of statistical multiplexing and the bursty
utilization pattern of typical users. Sharing nodes that are
disp... | algorithm;nash equilibrium;distributed shared cluster;fairness;parallelism;efficiency;anarchy price;simulation;price-anticipate mechanism;utility;bidding mechanism;resource allocation;price-anticipating scheme;price of anarchy |
train_J-55 | From Optimal Limited To Unlimited Supply Auctions | We investigate the class of single-round, sealed-bid auctions for a set of identical items to bidders who each desire one unit. We adopt the worst-case competitive framework defined by [9, 5] that compares the profit of an auction to that of an optimal single-price sale of least two items. In this paper, we first deriv... | 1. INTRODUCTION
The research area of optimal mechanism design looks at
designing a mechanism to produce the most desirable outcome for the
entity running the mechanism. This problem is well studied for the
auction design problem where the optimal mechanism is the one
that brings the seller the most profit. Here, the cl... | unlimited supply;ratio;benchmark;bound;distribution;competitive analysis;auction;preference;aggregation auction;mechanism design |
train_J-56 | Robust Solutions for Combinatorial Auctions | Bids submitted in auctions are usually treated as enforceable commitments in most bidding and auction theory literature. In reality bidders often withdraw winning bids before the transaction when it is in their best interests to do so. Given a bid withdrawal in a combinatorial auction, finding an alternative repair sol... | 1. INTRODUCTION
A combinatorial auction (CA) [5] provides an efficient means of
allocating multiple distinguishable items amongst bidders whose
perceived valuations for combinations of items differ. Such
auctions are gaining in popularity and there is a proliferation in their
usage across various industries such as tel... | bid;bid withdrawal;winner determination problem;mutual bid bond;robustness;mandatory mutual bid bond;constraint programming;combinatorial auction;bid-taker's exposure problem;set partition problem;weighted super solution;constraint program;exposure problem;enforceable commitment;weight super solution |
train_J-57 | Marginal Contribution Nets: A Compact Representation Scheme for Coalitional Games | We present a new approach to representing coalitional games based on rules that describe the marginal contributions of the agents. This representation scheme captures characteristics of the interactions among the agents in a natural and concise manner. We also develop efficient algorithms for two of the most important ... | 1. INTRODUCTION
Agents can often benefit by coordinating their actions.
Coalitional games capture these opportunities of
coordination by explicitly modeling the ability of the agents to take
joint actions as primitives. As an abstraction, coalitional
games assign a payoff to each group of agents in the game.
This payof... | marginal contribution;mc-net;coalitional game theory;coalitional game;treewidth;coremembership;agent;markov random field;shapley value;representation;interaction;core;marginal diminishing return;compact representation scheme |
train_J-58 | Towards Truthful Mechanisms for Binary Demand Games: A General Framework | The family of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms is arguably the most celebrated achievement in truthful mechanism design. However, VCG mechanisms have their limitations. They only apply to optimization problems with a utilitarian (or affine) objective function, and their output should optimize the objective functi... | 1. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, with the rapid development of the Internet, many
protocols and algorithms have been proposed to make the Internet
more efficient and reliable. The Internet is a complex distributed
system where a multitude of heterogeneous agents cooperate to
achieve some common goals, and the existing ... | mechanism design;cut value function;objective function;monotonicity property;selfish wireless network;price;selfish agent;composition-based technique;demand game;truthful mechanism;pricing;vickrey-clarke-grove;combination;binary demand game |
train_J-59 | Cost Sharing in a Job Scheduling Problem Using the Shapley Value | A set of jobs need to be served by a single server which can serve only one job at a time. Jobs have processing times and incur waiting costs (linear in their waiting time). The jobs share their costs through compensation using monetary transfers. We characterize the Shapley value rule for this model using fairness axi... | 1. INTRODUCTION
A set of jobs need to be served by a server. The server can
process only one job at a time. Each job has a finite
processing time and a per unit time waiting cost. Efficient ordering
of this queue directs us to serve the jobs in increasing
order of the ratio of per unit time waiting cost and processing
... | job scheduling;cooperative game theory approach;unit waiting cost;processing time;expected cost bound;agent;monetary transfer;queueing problem;shapley value;job schedule;queue problem;fairness axiom;cost sharing;allocation rule;cost share |
train_J-60 | On Decentralized Incentive Compatible Mechanisms for Partially Informed Environments | Algorithmic Mechanism Design focuses on Dominant Strategy Implementations. The main positive results are the celebrated Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms and computationally efficient mechanisms for severely restricted players (single-parameter domains). As it turns out, many natural social goals cannot be impleme... | 1. INTRODUCTION
Recently, global networks have attracted widespread study.
The emergence of popular scalable shared networks with
self-interested entities - such as peer-to-peer systems over
the Internet and mobile wireless communication ad-hoc
networks - poses fundamental challenges.
Naturally, the study of such giant... | iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategy;cooperation;distribute algorithmic mechanism design;p-informed environment;partially informed environment;weakly dominated strategy iterative elimination;agent;dominant strategy implementation;decentralized incentive compatible mechanism;distributed algorithmic mechani... |
train_J-61 | ICE: An Iterative Combinatorial Exchange | We present the first design for an iterative combinatorial exchange (ICE). The exchange incorporates a tree-based bidding language that is concise and expressive for CEs. Bidders specify lower and upper bounds on their value for different trades. These bounds allow price discovery and useful preference elicitation in e... | 1. INTRODUCTION
Combinatorial exchanges combine and generalize two
different mechanisms: double auctions and combinatorial
auctions. In a double auction (DA), multiple buyers and sellers
trade units of an identical good [20]. In a combinatorial
auction (CA), a single seller has multiple heterogeneous items
up for sale ... | winner-determination;double auction;combinatorial auction;price;combinatorial exchange;vcg;bidding;threshold payment;tree-based bidding language;trade;preference elicitation;iterative combinatorial exchange;buyer and seller |
train_J-62 | Weak Monotonicity Suffices for Truthfulness on Convex Domains | Weak monotonicity is a simple necessary condition for a social choice function to be implementable by a truthful mechanism. Roberts [10] showed that it is sufficient for all social choice functions whose domain is unrestricted. Lavi, Mu"alem and Nisan [6] proved the sufficiency of weak monotonicity for functions over o... | 1. INTRODUCTION
Social choice theory centers around the general problem of
selecting a single outcome out of a set A of alternative
outcomes based on the individual preferences of a set P of
players. A method for aggregating player preferences to select
one outcome is called a social choice function. In this paper
we a... | truthful implementation;weak monotonicity;non-truthful function;strategyproof;individual preference;social choice function;truthful;truthfulness;dominant strategy;recognition algorithm;affine maximizer;convex domain;nonnegative cycle property;mechanism design |
train_J-63 | Negotiation-Range Mechanisms: Exploring the Limits of Truthful Efficient Markets | This paper introduces a new class of mechanisms based on negotiation between market participants. This model allows us to circumvent Myerson and Satterthwaite"s impossibility result and present a bilateral market mechanism that is efficient, individually rational, incentive compatible and budget balanced in the single-... | 1. INTRODUCTION
In this paper we introduce the concept of negotiation
based mechanisms in the context of the theory of efficient
truthful markets. A market consists of multiple buyers and
sellers who wish to exchange goods. The market"s main
objective is to produce an allocation of sellers" goods to buyers
as to maximi... | negotiation-range mechanism;real-world market environment;efficient market;impossibility result;negotiationrange market;zone of possible agreement;negotiation based mechanism;incentive compatibility;utility;efficient truthful market;individual rationality;good exchange;possible agreement zone;buyer and seller;mechanism... |
train_J-65 | Privacy in Electronic Commerce and the Economics of Immediate Gratification | Dichotomies between privacy attitudes and behavior have been noted in the literature but not yet fully explained. We apply lessons from the research on behavioral economics to understand the individual decision making process with respect to privacy in electronic commerce. We show that it is unrealistic to expect indiv... | 1. PRIVACY AND ELECTRONIC
COMMERCE
Privacy remains an important issue for electronic
commerce. A PriceWaterhouseCoopers study in 2000 showed
that nearly two thirds of the consumers surveyed would
shop more online if they knew retail sites would not do
anything with their personal information [15]. A Federal Trade
Commi... | privacy;financial privacy;electronic commerce;psychological inconsistency;personal information protection;rationality;hyperbolic discounting;time-inconsistent preference;individual decision making process;privacy enhancing technology;psychological distortion;self-control problem;immediate gratification;privacy sensitiv... |
train_J-66 | Expressive Negotiation over Donations to Charities∗ | When donating money to a (say, charitable) cause, it is possible to use the contemplated donation as negotiating material to induce other parties interested in the charity to donate more. Such negotiation is usually done in terms of matching offers, where one party promises to pay a certain amount if others pay a certa... | 1. INTRODUCTION
When money is donated to a charitable (or other) cause
(hereafter referred to as charity), often the donating party
gives unconditionally: a fixed amount is transferred from
the donator to the charity, and none of this transfer is
contingent on other events-in particular, it is not contingent
on the amo... | bidding language;linear programming;expressive negotiation;supporter of charity;combinatorial auction;economic efficiency;charity supporter;expressive charity donation;threshold bid;incentive compatibility;market clear;concave bid;donation to charity;payment willingness function;negotiating material;quasilinearity;bidd... |
train_J-67 | Mechanism Design for Online Real-Time Scheduling | For the problem of online real-time scheduling of jobs on a single processor, previous work presents matching upper and lower bounds on the competitive ratio that can be achieved by a deterministic algorithm. However, these results only apply to the non-strategic setting in which the jobs are released directly to the a... | 1. INTRODUCTION
We consider the problem of online scheduling of jobs on
a single processor. Each job is characterized by a release
time, a deadline, a processing time, and a value for successful
completion by its deadline. The objective is to maximize the
sum of the values of the jobs completed by their respective
dead... | deterministic mechanism;game theory;non-strategic setting;online algorithm;profitable deviation;monotonicity;online scheduling of job;competitive ratio;deadline;importance ratio;incentive compatibility;job online scheduling;individual rationality;zero laxity;quasi-linear function;schedule;deterministic algorithm;mechan... |
train_J-69 | Robust Incentive Techniques for Peer-to-Peer Networks | Lack of cooperation (free riding) is one of the key problems that confronts today"s P2P systems. What makes this problem particularly difficult is the unique set of challenges that P2P systems pose: large populations, high turnover, asymmetry of interest, collusion, zero-cost identities, and traitors. To tackle these c... | 1. INTRODUCTION
Many peer-to-peer (P2P) systems rely on cooperation among
selfinterested users. For example, in a file-sharing system, overall
download latency and failure rate increase when users do not share
their resources [3]. In a wireless ad-hoc network, overall packet
latency and loss rate increase when nodes re... | generosity;prisoner dilemma;p2p system;reputation;free-ride;selfinterested user;peer-to-peer;maxflow-based algorithm;stranger adaptive;cheap pseudonym;game-theoretic approach;reciprocative peer;mutual cooperation;parameter nominal value;adaptive stranger policy;incentive for cooperation;collusion;whitewasher;reciprocat... |
train_J-70 | Self-interested Automated Mechanism Design and Implications for Optimal Combinatorial Auctions∗ | Often, an outcome must be chosen on the basis of the preferences reported by a group of agents. The key difficulty is that the agents may report their preferences insincerely to make the chosen outcome more favorable to themselves. Mechanism design is the art of designing the rules of the game so that the agents are mo... | 1. INTRODUCTION
In multiagent settings, often an outcome must be
chosen on the basis of the preferences reported by a group of
agents. Such outcomes could be potential presidents, joint
plans, allocations of goods or resources, etc. The preference
aggregator generally does not know the agents" preferences
a priori. Rat... | preference aggregator;desirable outcome;statistical knowledge;automated mechanism design;revenue maximization;nonmanipulable mechanism;payment maximizing;complementarity;combinatorial auction;minsat;fallback outcome;manipulability;individual rationality;automate mechanism design;self-interested amd;classical mechanism;... |
train_J-71 | A Dynamic Pari-Mutuel Market for Hedging, Wagering, and Information Aggregation | I develop a new mechanism for risk allocation and information speculation called a dynamic pari-mutuel market (DPM). A DPM acts as hybrid between a pari-mutuel market and a continuous double auction (CDA), inheriting some of the advantages of both. Like a pari-mutuel market, a DPM offers infinite buy-in liquidity and z... | 1. INTRODUCTION
A wide variety of financial and wagering mechanisms have
been developed to support hedging (i.e., insuring) against
exposure to uncertain events and/or speculative trading on
uncertain events. The dominant mechanism used in
financial circles is the continuous double auction (CDA), or in
some cases the C... | trader interface;information speculation;bet;dynamic pari-mutuel market;pari-mutuel market;gamble;dpm;demand;double auction format;risk allocation;hedge;bid-ask queue;price;continuous double auction;combinatorial bet;selling;price function;market institution;loss;gain;event resolution;automated market maker;information... |
train_J-72 | Applying Learning Algorithms to Preference Elicitation | We consider the parallels between the preference elicitation problem in combinatorial auctions and the problem of learning an unknown function from learning theory. We show that learning algorithms can be used as a basis for preference elicitation algorithms. The resulting elicitation algorithms perform a polynomial nu... | 1. INTRODUCTION
In a combinatorial auction, agents may bid on bundles of
goods rather than individual goods alone. Since there are
an exponential number of bundles (in the number of goods),
communicating values over these bundles can be
problematic. Communicating valuations in a one-shot fashion can
be prohibitively ex... | xor bid;learning theory;polynomial communication;elicitation algorithm;learning;linear-threshold function;learn;preference elicitation problem;combinatorial auction;monotone dnf;learning algorithm;conversion procedure;preference elicitation algorithm;polynomial;polynomial number of query;parallel;resulting algorithm;pr... |
train_J-73 | Competitive Algorithms for VWAP and Limit Order Trading | We introduce new online models for two important aspects of modern financial markets: Volume Weighted Average Price trading and limit order books. We provide an extensive study of competitive algorithms in these models and relate them to earlier online algorithms for stock trading. | 1. INTRODUCTION
While popular images of Wall Street often depict
swashbuckling traders boldly making large gambles on just their
market intuitions, the vast majority of trading is actually
considerably more technical and constrained. The constraints
often derive from a complex combination of business,
regulatory and in... | share;modern financial market;online algorithm;online trade;sequence of trade;trade sequence;competitive analysis;market order;volume weighted average price trading model;vwap;competitive algorithm;stock trading;online model;limit order book trading model |
train_J-74 | On Cheating in Sealed-Bid Auctions | Motivated by the rise of online auctions and their relative lack of security, this paper analyzes two forms of cheating in sealed-bid auctions. The first type of cheating we consider occurs when the seller spies on the bids of a second-price auction and then inserts a fake bid in order to increase the payment of the wi... | 1. INTRODUCTION
Among the types of auctions commonly used in practice,
sealed-bid auctions are a good practical choice because they
require little communication and can be completed almost
instantly. Each bidder simply submits a bid, and the winner
is immediately determined. However, sealed-bid auctions
do require that... | sealed-bid auction;game theory;seller;cheating;first-price auction;sealed-bid;auction;agent;cheat;payment;case;bidsecond-price auction;possibility |
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