data/malware_text_db_test.jsonl

{"input": "A personal note from Cylance, CEO Stuart McClure On February 24, 1989, United Flight 811 left Honolulu, Hawaii, on its way to Auckland, New Zealand, with 364 souls on board.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Somewhere between 23,000 and 24,000 feet an enormous explosion ejected nine passengers into the dark void over the Pacific Ocean.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This aviation disaster was later determined to have been caused by a simple design flaw combined with the lack of corrective action.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Boeing and the FAA had known about this problem for over one year prior to the accident.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The result: nine people lost their lives.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The other 337 passengers plus 18 crew members who survived, live with the memory every day; all of it due to a highly preventable design flaw.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As a 19-year-old young adult, I was grateful to have survived but I had no idea how that single event would impact my future in such a profound way.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Much of my passion for cybersecurity can be directly attributed to that fateful day.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The United Flight 811 accident proves just how important it is to detect flaws before tragedy strikes.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Preventable disasters like this are what motivates the Cylance team to create a safer world.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We do everything we can to uncover the flaws in technologies before they damage the physical or cyber world.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Our mission is simple: to protect the world.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This report is an attempt to deliver on that mission.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "After tracking hackers both personally and professionally for more than 26 years, there is no doubt in my mind that the release of the information contained in the Operation Cleaver report is vital to the security of the world's critical infrastructure.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The focus of the Operation Cleaver report is on one particular Iranian team we've dubbed Tarh Andishan, the infrastructure they utilize, as well as their tactics, techniques and procedures.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Roughly translated,'' Tarh Andishan'' means'' thinkers'' or'' innovators''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This team displays an evolved skillset and uses a complex infrastructure to perform attacks of espionage, theft, and the potential destruction of control systems and networks.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "While our investigation is ongoing, and we presently have limited visibility inside many of the compromised networks, Cylance observed Tarh Andishan actively targeting, attacking, and compromising more than 50 victims since at least 2012.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Cylance is committed to responsible disclosure and has refrained from exaggeration and embellishment in this report, limiting our content to only that which can be definitively confirmed.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, we have speculated on the possible motivations behind these attacks, given our deep knowledge and understanding of the cyber landscape.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We have made every effort to notify all affected entities prior to publishing this report.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Additionally, all personally identifiable information about the members of Operation Cleaver has been withheld.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We don't care who the adversary is, where they work or reside, who they're dating or what party photos they upload to Facebook–all we care about is preventing campaigns like Operation Cleaver from negatively affecting the real world.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This report is for the world's cyber defenders–never give up! Since at least 2012, Iranian actors have directly attacked, established persistence in, and extracted highly sensitive materials from the networks of government agencies and major critical infrastructure companies in the following countries: Canada, China, England, France, Germany, India, Israel, Kuwait, Mexico, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and the United States.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Iranian actors", "start": 83, "end": 97}, {"text": "persistence", "start": 134, "end": 145}, {"text": "highly sensitive materials", "start": 164, "end": 190}, {"text": "the networks of government agencies and major critical infrastructure companies in the following countries: Canada, China, England, France, Germany, India, Israel, Kuwait, Mexico, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and the United States", "start": 196, "end": 471}], "action": [{"text": "established", "start": 122, "end": 133}, {"text": "extracted", "start": 154, "end": 163}], "modifier": [{"text": "in", "start": 146, "end": 148}, {"text": "from", "start": 191, "end": 195}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Iran is the new China.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Operation Cleaver has, over the past several years, conducted a significant global surveillance and infiltration campaign.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Operation Cleaver", "start": 0, "end": 17}, {"text": "a significant global surveillance and infiltration campaign", "start": 62, "end": 121}], "action": [{"text": "conducted", "start": 52, "end": 61}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "To date it has successfully evaded detection by existing security technologies.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "it", "start": 8, "end": 10}, {"text": "detection by existing security technologies", "start": 35, "end": 78}], "action": [{"text": "evaded", "start": 28, "end": 34}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The group is believed to work from Tehran, Iran, although auxiliary team members were identified in other locations including the Netherlands, Canada, and the UK.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The group successfully leveraged both publicly available, and customized tools to attack and compromise targets around the globe.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The targets include military, oil and gas, energy and utilities, transportation, airlines, airports, hospitals, telecommunications, technology, education, aerospace, Defense Industrial Base (DIB), chemical companies, and governments.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "During intense intelligence gathering over the last 24 months, we observed the technical capabilities of the Operation Cleaver team rapidly evolve faster than any previously observed Iranian effort.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As Iran's cyber warfare capabilities continue to morph, the probability of an attack that could impact the physical world at a national or global level is rapidly increasing.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Their capabilities have advanced beyond simple website defacements, Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, and Hacking Exposed style techniques.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "With minimal separation between private companies and the Iranian government, their modus operandi seems clear: blur the line between legitimate engineering companies and state- sponsored cyber hacking teams to establish a foothold in the world's critical infrastructure.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Iran's rising expertise, along with their choice of victims, has compelled us to release this report sooner than we would have liked in order to expose Operation Cleaver to the world.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The evidence and indicators of compromise we provide in this report will allow potentially unaware victims to detect and eliminate Cleaver's incursions into their networks.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Iran has been severely impacted by debilitating and extremely advanced malware campaigns since at least 2009.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Famous examples of these efforts include industrial sabotage via Stuxnet (2009-2010), and espionage with Duqu (2009-2011) as well as Flame (2012).", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Famous examples of these efforts", "start": 0, "end": 32}, {"text": "industrial sabotage", "start": 41, "end": 60}, {"text": "Stuxnet (2009-2010)", "start": 65, "end": 84}, {"text": "espionage", "start": 90, "end": 99}, {"text": "Duqu (2009-2011) as well as Flame (2012)", "start": 105, "end": 145}], "action": [{"text": "include", "start": 33, "end": 40}], "modifier": [{"text": "via", "start": 61, "end": 64}, {"text": "with", "start": 100, "end": 104}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These campaigns have targeted Iran's nuclear program, and oil and gas operations.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Stuxnet was an eye-opening event for Iranian authorities, exposing them to the world of physical destruction via electronic means.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Stuxnet", "start": 0, "end": 7}, {"text": "them", "start": 67, "end": 71}, {"text": "the world of physical destruction via electronic means", "start": 75, "end": 129}], "action": [{"text": "exposing", "start": 58, "end": 66}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 72, "end": 74}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Hacking campaigns sourced out of Iran are nothing new.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Since the early 2000's, the information security industry as a whole has tracked teams like the Iranian Cyber Army, which mainly focuses on patriotic hacking (website defacements).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "After the release of Stuxnet, Iran's motivations appear to have shifted.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Retaliation for Stuxnet began almost immediately in 2011 with campaigns like the certificate compromises of Comodo and DigiNotar.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These attacks served as a warning, showcasing the rapid evolution of Iran's hacking skills.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A major retaliation came in the form of 2012's Shamoon campaign, which impacted RasGas and Saudi Aramco.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It's estimated that Shamoon impacted over 30,000 computer endpoints and cost the affected companies tens-of-thousands of hours recovering from the attacks.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The direct financial impact from this retaliation and amount of downtime experienced were staggering.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Shamoon was truly a watershed event for security defenders.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It was the first glimpse into the real capabillity and intention of Iranian cyber operations.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We see the same motivation and intent here in Operation Cleaver: establishing a beachhead for cyber sabotage.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We saw further Iranian backlash in late 2012 and early 2013 in the form of Operation Ababil's Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks against US banks.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These attacks were debilitating and impacted the availability of online banking services.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "These attacks", "start": 0, "end": 13}, {"text": "the availability of online banking services", "start": 45, "end": 88}], "action": [{"text": "impacted", "start": 36, "end": 44}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Yet more backlash was witnessed with FireEye's exposure of Operation Saffron Rose, an espionage campaign executed by the Ajax Security Team in 2014.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In May 2014, evidence emerged of a highly targeted waterhole attack that leveraged social media, dubbed Operation Newscaster, which was uncovered by iSight Partners.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "a highly targeted waterhole attack", "start": 33, "end": 67}, {"text": "social media", "start": 83, "end": 95}], "action": [{"text": "leveraged", "start": 73, "end": 82}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In June 2013, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu accused Iran of carrying out'' non-stop'' attacks on'' [Israel's] vital national systems'' including'' water, power and banking''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The following September of 2013, the Wall Street Journal accused Iran of hacking into unclassified U.S. Navy computers in San Diego's NMCI (Navy Marine Corp Intranet) ,5 which we can confirm was part of Operation Cleaver.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "While previously reported operations attributed to Iran have largely focused on Defense Industrial Base (DIB) companies, the United States Federal Government, or targets in Middle Eastern countries, Operation Cleaver has instead focused on a wide array of targets, including energy producers and utilities, commercial airlines and airports, military intelligence, aerospace, hospitals, and even universities–with only ten of the targets based in the United States.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Such broad targeting demonstrates to the world that Iran is no longer content to retaliate against the US and Israel alone.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "They have bigger intentions: to position themselves to impact critical infrastructure globally.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The string cleaver is found several times in a variety of custom software used in Operation Cleaver, including: We believe our visibility into this campaign represents only a fraction of Operation Cleaver's full scope.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We believe that if the operation is left to continue unabated, it is only a matter of time before the world's physical safety is impacted by it.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "While the disclosure of this information will be a detriment to our ability to track the activity of this group, it will allow the security industry as a whole to defend against this threat.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As such, we are exposing this cyber campaign early in an attempt to minimize additional real-world impact and prevent further victimization.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• Persian hacker names are used throughout the campaign including: Salman Ghazikhani, Bahman Mohebbi, Kaj, Parviz, Alireza, and numerous others.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• Numerous domains used in the campaign were registered in Iran.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• Infrastructure leveraged in the attack was registered in Iran to the corporate entity Tarh Andishan, which translates to'' invention'' or'' innovation'' in Farsi.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• Source netblocks and ASNs are registered to Iran.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• Hacker tools warn when their external IP address traces back to Iran.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• The infrastructure is hosted through Netafraz.com, an Iranian provider out of Isfahan, Iran.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• The infrastructure utilized in the campaign is too significant to be a lone individual or a small group.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We believe this work was sponsored by Iran.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• US Military targets including NMCI in October 2013.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Confirmed targeting of global government entities.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• Networks and systems targeted in critical industries like energy and utilities, oil and gas, and chemical companies.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• Assets (both cyber and physical) and logistics information were compromised at major airline operators, airports, and transportation companies.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Assets (both cyber and physical) and logistics information", "start": 2, "end": 60}, {"text": "major airline operators, airports, and transportation companies", "start": 81, "end": 144}], "action": [{"text": "were compromised", "start": 61, "end": 77}], "modifier": [{"text": "at", "start": 78, "end": 80}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• Various global telecommunications, technology, healthcare, aerospace, and defense companies were breached as part of the operation.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• Confidential critical infrastructure documents were harvested from major educational institutions around the world.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Confidential critical infrastructure documents", "start": 2, "end": 48}, {"text": "major educational institutions around the world", "start": 69, "end": 116}], "action": [{"text": "were harvested", "start": 49, "end": 63}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 64, "end": 68}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• Initial compromise techniques include SQL injection, web attacks, and creative deception- based attacks–all of which have been implemented in the past by Chinese and Russian hacking teams.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Initial compromise techniques", "start": 2, "end": 31}, {"text": "SQL injection, web attacks, and creative deception- based attacks", "start": 40, "end": 105}], "action": [{"text": "include", "start": 32, "end": 39}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• Pivoting and exploitation techniques leveraged existing public exploits for MS08-067 and Windows privilege escalations, and were coupled with automated, worm-like propagation mechanisms.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Pivoting and exploitation techniques", "start": 2, "end": 38}, {"text": "existing public exploits for MS08-067 and Windows privilege escalations", "start": 49, "end": 120}, {"text": "automated, worm-like propagation mechanisms", "start": 144, "end": 187}], "action": [{"text": "leveraged", "start": 39, "end": 48}, {"text": "were coupled", "start": 126, "end": 138}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 139, "end": 143}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• Customized private tools with functions that include ARP poisoning, encryption, credential dumping, ASP.NET shells, web backdoors, process enumeration, WMI querying, HTTP and SMB communications, network interface sniffing, and keystroke logging.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Customized private tools with functions", "start": 2, "end": 41}, {"text": "ARP poisoning", "start": 55, "end": 68}, {"text": "encryption", "start": 70, "end": 80}, {"text": "credential dumping", "start": 82, "end": 100}, {"text": "ASP.NET shells", "start": 102, "end": 116}, {"text": "web backdoors", "start": 118, "end": 131}, {"text": "process enumeration", "start": 133, "end": 152}, {"text": "WMI querying", "start": 154, "end": 166}, {"text": "HTTP and SMB communications", "start": 168, "end": 195}, {"text": "network interface sniffing", "start": 197, "end": 223}, {"text": "keystroke logging", "start": 229, "end": 246}], "action": [{"text": "include", "start": 47, "end": 54}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• The ability to build customized tools to compromise any target they choose.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• Private signing certificates of one victim were captured allowing the Operation Cleaver team to compromise the entirety of their organization.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Private signing certificates of one victim", "start": 2, "end": 44}, {"text": "the Operation Cleaver team", "start": 68, "end": 94}, {"text": "the entirety of their organization", "start": 109, "end": 143}], "action": [{"text": "were captured", "start": 45, "end": 58}, {"text": "compromise", "start": 98, "end": 108}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• Over the past two years, Cylance has collected over 8GB of data including over 80,000 files of exfiltrated data, hacker tools, victim logs, and highly sensitive reconnaissance data.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• Data from sinkholed command and control servers has allowed us to track this active campaign.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• Cylance is releasing more than 150 IOCs and samples associated with the Cleaver campaign to empower the security community to detect existing compromises in their own organizations, as well as potentially block future attacks from these teams.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• This campaign continues Iran's retaliation for Stuxnet, Duqu, and Flame.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• This is a state-sponsored campaign.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• There is a possibility that this campaign could affect airline passenger safety.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• This campaign's intentions may be to damage Industrial Control Systems (ICS), Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, and impact Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources (CIKR).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• This campaign could be a way to demonstrate Iran's cyber capabilities for additional geopolitical leverage, due to the breadth and depth of their global targets.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• There is an intense focus on CIKR companies in South Korea, which could give Iran additional clout in their burgeoning partnership with North Korea.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In September 2012, Iran signed an extensive agreement for technology cooperation agreement with North Korea, which would allow for collaboration on various efforts including IT and security.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• Iran is recruiting from within the universities and potentially using'hackers for hire'.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Cleaver team targets some of the most sensitive global critical infrastructure companies in the world, including military, oil and gas, airlines, airports, energy producers, utilities, transportation, healthcare, telecommunications, technology, manufacturing, education, aerospace, Defense Industrial Base (DIB), chemical companies and governments.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Countries impacted include Canada, China, England, France, Germany, India, Israel, Kuwait, Mexico, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and the US.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The following is a breakdown by country of which industries were targeted and/or victimized: Cleaver's level of access into each organization varied greatly, including completely compromised systems and networks, Active Directory domain controllers and credentials, compromised data repositories and stolen VPN credentials.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Cleaver's level of access into each organization", "start": 93, "end": 141}, {"text": "completely compromised systems and networks", "start": 168, "end": 211}, {"text": "Active Directory domain controllers and credentials", "start": 213, "end": 264}, {"text": "compromised data repositories", "start": 266, "end": 295}, {"text": "stolen VPN credentials", "start": 300, "end": 322}], "action": [{"text": "including", "start": 158, "end": 167}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Compromised systems include Microsoft Windows web servers running IIS and ColdFusion, Apache with PHP, many variants of Microsoft Windows desktops and servers, and Linux servers.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Compromised systems", "start": 0, "end": 19}, {"text": "Microsoft Windows web servers running IIS and ColdFusion, Apache with PHP, many variants of Microsoft Windows desktops and servers, and Linux servers", "start": 28, "end": 177}], "action": [{"text": "include", "start": 20, "end": 27}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Compromised network infrastructure included Cisco VPNs as well as Cisco switches and routers.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Compromised network infrastructure", "start": 0, "end": 34}, {"text": "Cisco VPNs as well as Cisco switches and routers", "start": 44, "end": 92}], "action": [{"text": "included", "start": 35, "end": 43}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Unlike Stuxnet, no exotic exploitations (such as 0-days) were observed.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Within our investigation, we had no direct evidence of a successful compromise of specific Industrial Control Systems (ICS) or Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) networks, but Cleaver did exfiltrate extremely sensitive data from many critical infrastructure companies allowing them to directly affect the systems they run.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Cleaver", "start": 190, "end": 197}, {"text": "extremely sensitive data", "start": 213, "end": 237}, {"text": "many critical infrastructure companies", "start": 243, "end": 281}], "action": [{"text": "exfiltrate", "start": 202, "end": 212}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 238, "end": 242}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This data could enable them, or affiliated organizations, to target and potentially sabotage ICS and SCADA environments with ease.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "them, or affiliated organizations", "start": 23, "end": 56}, {"text": "ICS and SCADA environments", "start": 93, "end": 119}, {"text": "ease", "start": 125, "end": 129}], "action": [{"text": "target and potentially sabotage", "start": 61, "end": 92}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 120, "end": 124}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We discovered over 50 victims in our investigation, distributed around the globe.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Ten of these victims are headquartered in the US and include a major airline, a medical university, an energy company specializing in natural gas production, an automobile manufacturer, a large defense contractor, and a major military installation.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The four targets in Israel and the five targets in Pakistan are comprised of education, aerospace, airports, airlines, healthcare and technology.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Further victims were identified in numerous Middle Eastern countries as well as ones in Northern Europe including the UK, France, and Germany.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Central America was not immune either with a large oil and gas company on the list.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In fact, oil and gas was a particular focal point for the Cleaver team, going after no less than nine of these companies around the world.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Universities were targeted in the US, India, Israel, and South Korea.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The attackers targeted research efforts, student information, student housing, and financial aid systems.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The attackers", "start": 0, "end": 13}, {"text": "research efforts, student information, student housing, and financial aid systems", "start": 23, "end": 104}], "action": [{"text": "targeted", "start": 14, "end": 22}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "They had a penchant for pictures, passports, and any specifc identifying information.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Perhaps the most bone-chilling evidence we collected in this campaign was the targeting and compromise of transportation networks and systems such as airlines and airports in South Korea, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The level of access seemed ubiquitous: Active Directory domains were fully compromised, along with entire Cisco Edge switches, routers, and internal networking infrastructure.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Active Directory domains", "start": 39, "end": 63}, {"text": "entire Cisco Edge switches, routers, and internal networking infrastructure", "start": 99, "end": 174}], "action": [{"text": "were fully compromised", "start": 64, "end": 86}], "modifier": [{"text": "along with", "start": 88, "end": 98}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Fully compromised VPN credentials meant their entire remote access infrastructure and supply chain was under the control of the Cleaver team, allowing permanent persistence under compromised credentials.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Fully compromised VPN credentials", "start": 0, "end": 33}, {"text": "their entire remote access infrastructure and supply chain was under the control of the Cleaver team", "start": 40, "end": 140}, {"text": "permanent persistence", "start": 151, "end": 172}, {"text": "compromised credentials", "start": 179, "end": 202}], "action": [{"text": "meant", "start": 34, "end": 39}, {"text": "allowing", "start": 142, "end": 150}], "modifier": [{"text": "under", "start": 173, "end": 178}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "They achieved complete access to airport gates and their security control systems, potentially allowing them to spoof gate credentials.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "They", "start": 0, "end": 4}, {"text": "complete access to airport gates and their security control systems", "start": 14, "end": 81}, {"text": "them", "start": 104, "end": 108}, {"text": "spoof gate credentials", "start": 112, "end": 134}], "action": [{"text": "achieved", "start": 5, "end": 13}, {"text": "allowing", "start": 95, "end": 103}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 109, "end": 111}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "They gained access to PayPal and Go Daddy credentials allowing them to make fraudulent purchases and allowed unfettered access to the victim's domains.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "They", "start": 0, "end": 4}, {"text": "access to PayPal and Go Daddy credentials", "start": 12, "end": 53}, {"text": "them", "start": 63, "end": 67}, {"text": "make fraudulent purchases", "start": 71, "end": 96}, {"text": "unfettered access to the victim's domains", "start": 109, "end": 150}], "action": [{"text": "gained", "start": 5, "end": 11}, {"text": "allowing", "start": 54, "end": 62}, {"text": "allowed", "start": 101, "end": 108}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 68, "end": 70}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We were witnessed a shocking amount of access into the deepest parts of these companies and the airports in which they operate.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Despite today's trend toward attacker attribution, we believe it offers little real benefit to the day-to-day cyber defender.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, in this report we offer our observations on the sources of Operation Cleaver in order to benefit those that rely on attribution such as Law Enforcement.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Operation Cleaver is believed to consist of at least 20 hackers and developers, collaborating on projects and missions to support Iranian interests.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Many of the targets were predominately English-speaking and a majority of the team members were capable of reading and writing in English.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We present evidence that this team is operating, at least in part, out of Iran and in the interests of Iran.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The skills and behavior of the Operation Cleaver teams are consistent with, and in one case surpasses, Iran's cyber capabilities as we know them today.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For a complete list of IPs and domains related to this campaign, please refer to the Indicators of Compromise section.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Over the course of multiple incident response engagements related to Operation Cleaver, we were able to identify a small set of IP addresses which were commonly used during the initial stages of an attack.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "a small set of IP addresses", "start": 113, "end": 140}, {"text": "the initial stages of an attack", "start": 173, "end": 204}], "action": [{"text": "were commonly used", "start": 147, "end": 165}], "modifier": [{"text": "during", "start": 166, "end": 172}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The IP address 78.109.194.114 served as a source for one of the primary attackers.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The IP address 78.109.194.114", "start": 0, "end": 29}, {"text": "a source for one of the primary attackers", "start": 40, "end": 81}], "action": [{"text": "served", "start": 30, "end": 36}], "modifier": [{"text": "as", "start": 37, "end": 39}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "They were observed conducting SQL injections, controlling backdoors, as well as exfiltrating information using this address, and the address appears in multiple software configurations recovered from staging servers over a period of time.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "They", "start": 0, "end": 4}, {"text": "SQL injections", "start": 30, "end": 44}, {"text": "backdoors", "start": 58, "end": 67}, {"text": "information", "start": 93, "end": 104}, {"text": "this address", "start": 111, "end": 123}], "action": [{"text": "conducting", "start": 19, "end": 29}, {"text": "controlling", "start": 46, "end": 57}, {"text": "exfiltrating", "start": 80, "end": 92}], "modifier": [{"text": "using", "start": 105, "end": 110}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This IP address was also observed in multiple software configurations.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This particular net block was used over an extended period of time, indicating these were under the Cleaver team's physical control.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Additionally, prior netblocks used by the same team demonstrated to us that this wasn't simply a case of proxying or'' island hopping''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For more information see the Tarh Andishan section of this report.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The IP address 159.253.144.209 was a source for a secondary attacker in various compromises.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The IP address 159.253.144.209", "start": 0, "end": 30}, {"text": "a source for a secondary attacker in various compromises", "start": 35, "end": 91}], "action": [{"text": "was", "start": 31, "end": 34}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "They were observed conducting SQL injection attacks.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "They", "start": 0, "end": 4}, {"text": "SQL injection attacks", "start": 30, "end": 51}], "action": [{"text": "conducting", "start": 19, "end": 29}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "While this IP was this registered in the Netherlands, we believe they used Softlayer's Citrix demo environment to launch these attacks which is consistent with proxying or'' island hopping''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A number of Cleaver's attack methods require a persistent server.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In many cases, these servers were referenced by domain names.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The following malicious domains are operated by this organization and are grouped by the registrant's email address.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As is typical with malicious domains, the Whois data for most of these domains contained falsified information.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We managed to obtain a large collection of the internally developed tools used by the Cleaver team, many of which were developed by its members.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Due to operational security failures, these tools contain information that provided us insight into their organization and operations.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In the tool named Shell Creator 2, there are three main components.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The creator generates an ASPX web shell using user input as well as a collection of templates.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The creator", "start": 0, "end": 11}, {"text": "an ASPX web shell", "start": 22, "end": 39}, {"text": "user input as well as a collection of templates", "start": 46, "end": 93}], "action": [{"text": "generates", "start": 12, "end": 21}], "modifier": [{"text": "using", "start": 40, "end": 45}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The web shell could then be installed via xpcmdshell, or any other method which would grant the attacker write access.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The web shell", "start": 0, "end": 13}, {"text": "xpcmdshell, or any other method which would grant the attacker write access", "start": 42, "end": 117}], "action": [{"text": "be installed", "start": 25, "end": 37}], "modifier": [{"text": "via", "start": 38, "end": 41}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The web shell is accessible by the shell client directly.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The shell client is a portion of Shell Creator 2 that was not designed to be run on a compromised computer.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We originally located it on a staging server being utilized for multiple attacks as well as a tool for sharing data between members of the organization's team.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "a staging server", "start": 28, "end": 44}, {"text": "multiple attacks as well as a tool for sharing data between members of the organization's team", "start": 64, "end": 158}], "action": [{"text": "being utilized", "start": 45, "end": 59}], "modifier": [{"text": "for", "start": 60, "end": 63}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The shell client, which is developed in Java and is easily decompiled, is a simple interface with a feature to protect the operator from making a critical mistake.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "When executed, and before any connection to an instance of the web shell is initiated, the shell client communicates with freegeoip.net in order to get the external IP address of the current user.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the shell client", "start": 87, "end": 103}, {"text": "freegeoip.net", "start": 122, "end": 135}, {"text": "get the external IP address of the current user", "start": 148, "end": 195}], "action": [{"text": "communicates", "start": 104, "end": 116}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 117, "end": 121}, {"text": "in order to", "start": 136, "end": 147}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The country of origin is then shown to the user, to inform them of what country it appears they are connecting from.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The assumed purpose of this feature is to ensure that a proper proxy is in use, and the real origin of the attacker is not revealed.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "After decompiling the shell client, we found the following code segment controlling the display of this IP location information.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This code handles the XML response from freegeoip.net, and displays the information as different colors based on different attributes.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For instance, if the string'' ERROR'' is in the response, the text is displayed with the color magenta.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If the string IRAN is in the response, the text is displayed with the color red.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It should be noted that no other country name contains the substring IRAN.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Net Crawler is a tool developed in C #that exhibits worm-like behavior in order to gather cached credentials from any and all accessible computers on an infected network.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Net Crawler", "start": 0, "end": 11}, {"text": "worm-like behavior", "start": 52, "end": 70}, {"text": "cached credentials", "start": 90, "end": 108}, {"text": "any and all accessible computers on an infected network", "start": 114, "end": 169}], "action": [{"text": "exhibits", "start": 43, "end": 51}, {"text": "gather", "start": 83, "end": 89}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 109, "end": 113}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This is done with Windows Credential Editor (WCE) and Mimikatz in combination with PsExec.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Different versions of this malware contain ASCII art which names the authoring group as Zhoupin (in'' leetspeak'' as'' Zh0up! n'').", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For more information on Net Crawler, see the Tactics, Techniques and Procedures section.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "TinyZBot is a bot written in C #and developed by the Cleaver team.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is the longest developed malware family discovered by this group, and has been used in campaigns for close to two years.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "How it operates can vary greatly from version to version.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For a detailed technical analysis of TinyZBot, see the Tactics, Techniques and Procedures section.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As TinyZBot is developed in C #, many versions can be decompiled to code very similar to their originals, including names of namespaces.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Many versions were obfuscated with a legitimate tool for developers named SmartAssembly, which makes the recovery of some names implausible.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Many versions", "start": 0, "end": 13}, {"text": "a legitimate tool for developers named SmartAssembly", "start": 35, "end": 87}], "action": [{"text": "were obfuscated", "start": 14, "end": 29}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 30, "end": 34}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We obtained multiple versions from which we were able to recover many of the original names of variables and namespaces.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In a number of these samples, the primary namespace for TinyZBot is named ZhoupinCleaver.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In every version of TinyZBot that is not obfuscated, there is a code base referred to as Cleaver.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This code base is also shared in other malware developed by this organization, such as Csext.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "PrivEsc is a blatant plagiarism of an existing exploit for Microsoft Windows released in January 2010 called MS10-015,'' Vulnerabilities in Windows Kernel Could Allow Escalation of Privilege'', popularly known as the KiTrap0D exploit which was released publicly.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Cleaver team clearly modified the source code and compiled a new version.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The only detectable modification was to change the original author's name to instead display the following: Zhopin Exploit Team This is not the only case of this team relabeling others' work as their own.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Logger module is a component of the PVZ (PVZ is shorthand for Parviz, one of the members of the Cleaver team) bot tool chain.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "When executed, it will capture the user's keystrokes and save them to a location which PVZ bot then exfiltrates.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "it", "start": 15, "end": 17}, {"text": "the user's keystrokes", "start": 31, "end": 52}, {"text": "them", "start": 62, "end": 66}, {"text": "a location", "start": 70, "end": 80}, {"text": "PVZ bot", "start": 87, "end": 94}], "action": [{"text": "capture", "start": 23, "end": 30}, {"text": "save", "start": 57, "end": 61}, {"text": "exfiltrates", "start": 100, "end": 111}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 67, "end": 69}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The logger module binary's file description value is the following: Roughly translated from Persian, this text says: This text could potentially be a note intended to stay internal, or could be an attempt to persuade an unsuspecting victim to assume the file is not malicious.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Product Name value is GOOD FILE.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For more information on the PVZ bot tool chain, see the Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures section.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "CCProxy is a publicly available proxy server for Windows, which can handle a variety of protocols.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We do not believe that this organization was involved in the development or modification of CCProxy, but they have been observed using it.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We recovered a CCProxy configuration, which exposed various operational details.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The configuration allowed for remote connections, limited by a username as well as a limited IP range.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The username was User-001, which is the default value.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The limited IP range covered one IP: 78.109.194.114.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This IP address is located in Iran, and is owned by Tarh Andishan.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The configuration also indicates which address the CCProxy server should listen on for incoming connections such as web (80) and mail (25).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Log output from the network port scanning application NMAP was recovered from a staging server.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This log was generated during the usage of the nbrute utility, which brute-forces network credentials and relies on NMAP to do so.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the nbrute utility", "start": 43, "end": 61}, {"text": "network credentials", "start": 82, "end": 101}], "action": [{"text": "brute-forces", "start": 69, "end": 81}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The header of this NMAP log indicates that the computer used to run nbrute/nmap was set to Iran Daylight Time at the time of execution.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "With no known victims located in Iran, it is likely that this was executed on an attacker's computer, and not on a victim's computer.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A configuration file for a Squid proxy server was recovered.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Figure 12: Squid configuration file showing the use of Tarh Andishan's IP address.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The net range of 78.109.194.114/28 was inserted into the allowed local networks with an RFC comment appended in order to make it look like it was part of the default configuration.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is likely this is the same reason a /28 net range was used, in order to not look like it was intended to only allow one IP.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This would give the same access to resources accessible from the Squid proxy server to this Iranian IP address.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Tarh Andishan is listed as the registrant for a number of small net blocks based upon the email address tarh.andishan (at) yahoo.com.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The net blocks appear to rotate over time and registrant information is altered to accommodate ongoing operations and avoid potential public exposure.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The networks are included below as well as the last time that net block was observed as active.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "There are many seemingly legitimate Tarh Andishan related companies inside Tehran, but strong connections to Iranian backing have been difficult to prove definitively.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' Tarh Andishan'' is often translated as'' Thinkers'','' Innovators'' and'' Inventors''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The net blocks above have strong associations with state-owned oil and gas companies.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These companies have current and former employees who are ICS experts.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Tarh Andishan has been suspected in the past of launching attacks in the interest of Iran.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The operators of the blog IranRedLine.org, which comments on Iran's nuclear weapons efforts, has mentioned in multiple posts having been the target of debilitating brute-force authentication attacks from IP addresses registered to the same Tarh Andishan team found in Cleaver.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The operators of the blog IranRedLine.org, which comments on Iran's nuclear weapons efforts", "start": 0, "end": 91}, {"text": "multiple posts", "start": 110, "end": 124}, {"text": "having been the target of debilitating brute-force authentication attacks from IP addresses registered to the same Tarh Andishan team found in Cleaver", "start": 125, "end": 275}], "action": [{"text": "mentioned", "start": 97, "end": 106}], "modifier": [{"text": "in", "start": 107, "end": 109}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In one of IranRedLine.org's blog posts, the author speculates on Tarh Andishan's involvement with the Iranian government by showing close proximity to SPND, the Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research; however, the phone number listed under the registrant contact information has yet to be completely validated.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "During this investigation, we were able to compile a considerable amount of information on some of the members of this organization.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The following profiles were built from reverse engineering, code analysis, open source intelligence, incident response and forensics work.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Personally identifiable information about these members is not being shared publicly as it could endanger their lives and would be irresponsible.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Parviz is a developer who worked on a variety of projects, and was primarily active in 2013.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "His development skillset is based around his ability to develop in C/C++.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "He has been observed using Visual Studio 2010, and his tools are written exclusively for Windows.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Some of his tools were found to be packed with ASPack.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Parviz is the primary developer of the PVZ bot and multiple parts of its tool chain.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Parviz is likely associated with the PVZ bot as his name in hardcoded into the PDB file paths.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The PVZ tool chain includes a variety of functionality, such as HTTP command and control communications with an ASPX server-side component, a denial of service tool they developed, and the public project named XYNTService used to run ordinary applications as services.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The PVZ tool chain", "start": 0, "end": 18}, {"text": "HTTP command and control communications with an ASPX server-side component", "start": 64, "end": 138}, {"text": "a denial of service tool they developed", "start": 140, "end": 179}], "action": [{"text": "includes", "start": 19, "end": 27}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Nesha is one of the offensive members of this organization.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Nesha was seen in breaches involving SQL injection as well as other techniques.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Nesha", "start": 0, "end": 5}, {"text": "breaches involving SQL injection as well as other techniques", "start": 18, "end": 78}], "action": [{"text": "was seen", "start": 6, "end": 14}], "modifier": [{"text": "in", "start": 15, "end": 17}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Nesha often utilized web-based backdoors developed in ASPX, PHP as well as ColdFusion.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Nesha", "start": 0, "end": 5}, {"text": "web-based backdoors developed in ASPX, PHP as well as ColdFusion", "start": 21, "end": 85}], "action": [{"text": "utilized", "start": 12, "end": 20}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A copy of an MS08-067 exploit developed in Python was recovered in which Nesha shamelessly replaced the original author's name with his own.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Nesha's passwords very commonly include own handle.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "His passwords were frequently stored as hashes in backdoors, but common hash cracking methods were able to recover the plaintext versions.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "His observed password use is as follows: Cylance observed Nesha participating in compromises involving the following techniques: Nesha has additionally been identified using a variety of internally developed tools as well as the following publicly available tools: Alireza appears to be one of the senior developers of this organization.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "His tools are commonly developed in C++, Java, and C #(desktop and ASPX).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These tools are often support tools, either monitoring the activity of other tools or supplementing the function of other tools gathering information during the infiltration process.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "These tools", "start": 0, "end": 11}, {"text": "the activity of other tools", "start": 55, "end": 82}, {"text": "the function of other tools gathering information during the infiltration process", "start": 100, "end": 181}], "action": [{"text": "monitoring", "start": 44, "end": 54}, {"text": "supplementing", "start": 86, "end": 99}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Alireza's code appears to be reused internally on projects such as TinyZBot.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Alireza appears to be using a version control system for his code, and it is likely that others are using the same system.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Based on the paths, the version control system in use is likely Apache's Subversion.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Use of a version control system is indicative of code sharing, but the use of an older system like Subversion, along with other evidence, suggests there is not a large amount of collaboration on projects and likely one developer working on each project at a time.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This is not behavior typical of a professional development team.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Alireza's C #tools include the following techniques: Alireza's Java tools include the following techniques: Alireza's C++ tools include the following techniques: kaJ is a .NET", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "developer, and has only been observed working in C #.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "He has less English language proficiency than others in the organization, and likely has a supplemental role during compromises.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "He has been observed developing tools which cater to specific challenges in a compromise.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "His notable project was named Net Crawler, and a technical analysis of this tool can be found in the Tactics, Techniques and Procedures section.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Thanks to a recovered test configuration for Net Crawler, we were able to determine that kaJ's development computer has the name dev-castle, where he has the username kaJ and the password oaolrJ @vad.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "kaJ is believed to be the creator of the Zhoupin ASCII art displayed in Net Crawler.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "kaJ's projects include the following techniques.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Jimbp is a .NET", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "developer with minimal experience.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "His projects appear to be supplemental to TinyZBot and are very simplistic.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is believed he is the developer of the project Binder1.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This project was a simple malware binder which required manual configuration when compiling.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "His other work included creating a new service wrapper for TinyZBot.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Of course many associated Iranian hacker teams have been identified in public and private security circles.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Some of the teams publicly known today include Iranian Cyber Army, Ashiyane, Islamic Cyber Resistance Group, Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Cyber Fighters, Parastoo, Shabgard, Iran Black Hats and many others.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, even though the TTPs of the Cleaver team have some overlap to techniques used by Iranian Cyber Army (botnets), Ashiyane (SQL injection) and Syrian Electronic Army (phishing and RATs), we believe this is largely the work of a new team.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Some connections to Ashiyane were discovered in our investigations including a reference to hussein1363, who had prior ties to the hacker group.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Additional connections between team members and individuals exist but are predominantly speculative and have only been shared with law enforcement.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Ultimately we believe the Cleaver team is a mix of existing team members and new recruits pulled from the universities in Iran.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Cleaver campaign used a variety of methods in multiple stages of attacks.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In this section we'll cover the commonly observed methods during different stages of the attack.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The initial compromise gets the attackers their first foothold into the target network.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Once the ability to execute arbitrary code has been established, an attacker's job becomes quite a bit easier.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Since the vector of initial compromise is usually determined by what is vulnerable on the target, we'll cover just a few of the techniques we've seen Operation Cleaver use to initiate the compromise.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "SQL injection is a very common and simple attack method.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "SQL injection", "start": 0, "end": 13}, {"text": "a very common and simple attack method", "start": 17, "end": 55}], "action": [{"text": "is", "start": 14, "end": 16}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is made possible by a lack of input sanitization by the vulnerable application before supplying that input into a SQL database query.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "SQL injection payloads used by this organization have been double encoded.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "SQL injection payloads", "start": 0, "end": 22}, {"text": "this organization", "start": 31, "end": 48}], "action": [{"text": "used", "start": 23, "end": 27}, {"text": "been double encoded", "start": 54, "end": 73}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Double encoding SQL injection payloads allows for bypassing of various anti-exploitation filters, such as those supplied by Web Application Firewalls (WAFs).", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Double encoding SQL injection payloads", "start": 0, "end": 38}, {"text": "bypassing of various anti-exploitation filters, such as those supplied by Web Application Firewalls (WAFs)", "start": 50, "end": 156}], "action": [{"text": "allows", "start": 39, "end": 45}], "modifier": [{"text": "for", "start": 46, "end": 49}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The attackers would enable xpcmdshell: Then connect outbound via anonymous FTP: Using messaging methods such as email, attackers can social engineer users into downloading and executing software, which quietly installs malware alongside of the desired program.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "connect", "start": 44, "end": 51}, {"text": "social engineer", "start": 133, "end": 148}, {"text": "installs", "start": 210, "end": 218}], "entity": [{"text": "outbound", "start": 52, "end": 60}, {"text": "anonymous FTP", "start": 65, "end": 78}, {"text": "messaging methods such as email", "start": 86, "end": 117}, {"text": "attackers", "start": 119, "end": 128}, {"text": "users", "start": 149, "end": 154}, {"text": "downloading and executing software", "start": 160, "end": 194}, {"text": "malware", "start": 219, "end": 226}, {"text": "the desired program", "start": 240, "end": 259}], "modifier": [{"text": "via", "start": 61, "end": 64}, {"text": "Using", "start": 80, "end": 85}, {"text": "into", "start": 155, "end": 159}, {"text": "alongside of", "start": 227, "end": 239}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Operation Cleaver has employed this technique numerous times across different organizations.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The domain EasyResumeCreatorPro.com was registered and a website setup which was a direct copy of a legitimate website at winresume.com.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This is how the original site looked: That's not all they copied.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In order to infect users, they combined the original Easy Resume Creator Pro product with malware by using a binder they developed internally named Binder1.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "they", "start": 26, "end": 30}, {"text": "the original Easy Resume Creator Pro product", "start": 40, "end": 84}, {"text": "malware", "start": 90, "end": 97}, {"text": "using a binder they developed internally named Binder1", "start": 101, "end": 155}], "action": [{"text": "combined", "start": 31, "end": 39}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 85, "end": 89}, {"text": "by", "start": 98, "end": 100}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A binder is an application, which combines two executables (desired software and malware) into a single executable.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The resulting executable masquerades as the desired software.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The resulting executable", "start": 0, "end": 24}, {"text": "the desired software", "start": 40, "end": 60}], "action": [{"text": "masquerades", "start": 25, "end": 36}], "modifier": [{"text": "as", "start": 37, "end": 39}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The purpose is deception, to make the binder indistinguishable from the desired application.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "make", "start": 29, "end": 33}], "entity": [{"text": "the binder", "start": 34, "end": 44}, {"text": "indistinguishable from the desired application", "start": 45, "end": 91}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "When executed, both applications are written to a temporary directory and executed.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "both applications", "start": 15, "end": 32}, {"text": "a temporary directory", "start": 48, "end": 69}], "action": [{"text": "are written", "start": 33, "end": 44}, {"text": "executed", "start": 74, "end": 82}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 45, "end": 47}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This way it appears that the desired application was executed, but the malware was also executed silently.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the malware", "start": 67, "end": 78}], "action": [{"text": "was also executed", "start": 79, "end": 96}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This attack evolved to appear more legitimate.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The attackers made the victims feel like they had a pending job opportunity at the industrial conglomerate Teledyne.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In order to take advantage of this job opportunity, the victim needed to use the fake résumé submission application supplied by the malicious recruiter.", "output": {"entities": {"modifier": [{"text": "In order to", "start": 0, "end": 11}], "entity": [{"text": "take advantage of this job opportunity", "start": 12, "end": 50}, {"text": "the victim", "start": 52, "end": 62}, {"text": "the fake résumé submission application supplied by the malicious recruiter", "start": 77, "end": 151}], "action": [{"text": "use", "start": 73, "end": 76}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Multiple domains were registered in order to make the download sites seem more realistic.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Multiple domains", "start": 0, "end": 16}, {"text": "make the download sites seem more realistic", "start": 45, "end": 88}], "action": [{"text": "were registered", "start": 17, "end": 32}], "modifier": [{"text": "in order to", "start": 33, "end": 44}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These domains included other companies as they tried to hit a wider audience.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "At this point, the résumé submission application checks the Internet connection.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the résumé submission application", "start": 15, "end": 48}, {"text": "the Internet connection", "start": 56, "end": 79}], "action": [{"text": "checks", "start": 49, "end": 55}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If it is unable to connect to the Internet, it will display a window to input proxy information.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "it", "start": 44, "end": 46}, {"text": "a window", "start": 60, "end": 68}, {"text": "input proxy information", "start": 72, "end": 95}], "action": [{"text": "display", "start": 52, "end": 59}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 69, "end": 71}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "When this information is entered, the results are cached in a location the dropped malware can access.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the results", "start": 34, "end": 45}, {"text": "a location the dropped malware can access", "start": 60, "end": 101}], "action": [{"text": "are cached", "start": 46, "end": 56}], "modifier": [{"text": "in", "start": 57, "end": 59}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "After an Internet connection is ensured, the malware (TinyZbot) is dropped and executed.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "an Internet connection", "start": 6, "end": 28}, {"text": "the malware (TinyZbot)", "start": 41, "end": 63}], "action": [{"text": "is ensured", "start": 29, "end": 39}, {"text": "is dropped", "start": 64, "end": 74}, {"text": "executed", "start": 79, "end": 87}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This clever scheme makes sure the malware can connect to the command and control server, and increases the chances that domain credentials are cached on the now infected machine.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the malware", "start": 30, "end": 41}, {"text": "the command and control server", "start": 57, "end": 87}], "action": [{"text": "connect", "start": 46, "end": 53}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 54, "end": 56}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Shortly after, the main application is launched.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the main application", "start": 15, "end": 35}], "action": [{"text": "is launched", "start": 36, "end": 47}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The first résumé submission form requests contact information.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The first résumé submission form", "start": 0, "end": 32}, {"text": "contact information", "start": 42, "end": 61}], "action": [{"text": "requests", "start": 33, "end": 41}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This form, like the rest of the submission forms, only stores the submitted information while the application is running.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This form", "start": 0, "end": 9}, {"text": "the submitted information", "start": 62, "end": 87}, {"text": "the application is running", "start": 94, "end": 120}], "action": [{"text": "stores", "start": 55, "end": 61}], "modifier": [{"text": "while", "start": 88, "end": 93}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As the infected user is going through and filling out all this information, the malware is running in the background, logging their keystrokes, retrieving their stored passwords, etc.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the malware", "start": 76, "end": 87}, {"text": "their keystrokes", "start": 126, "end": 142}, {"text": "their stored passwords", "start": 155, "end": 177}], "action": [{"text": "logging", "start": 118, "end": 125}, {"text": "retrieving", "start": 144, "end": 154}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Once all the forms are filled out, the user goes to the submission form.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "When the victim hits submit, the résumé submitter does a GET request to microsoft.com in order to make it seem like it is submitting something, then claims success.", "output": {"entities": {"modifier": [{"text": "When", "start": 0, "end": 4}, {"text": "to", "start": 69, "end": 71}, {"text": "in order to", "start": 86, "end": 97}], "entity": [{"text": "the victim hits submit", "start": 5, "end": 27}, {"text": "the résumé submitter", "start": 29, "end": 49}, {"text": "a GET request", "start": 55, "end": 68}, {"text": "microsoft.com", "start": 72, "end": 85}, {"text": "make it seem like it is submitting something", "start": 98, "end": 142}], "action": [{"text": "does", "start": 50, "end": 54}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This method is particularly effective not only because of its level of deception, but even if the victim suspects that they are infected with malware, they are not as likely to speak up about it, as they would need to explain why they were submitting a job application for another company.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Privilege escalation is a category of techniques that describe the process of going from a less privileged user on a compromised computer to a more privileged user.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Privilege escalation", "start": 0, "end": 20}, {"text": "a category of techniques that describe the process of going from a less privileged user on a compromised computer to a more privileged user", "start": 24, "end": 163}], "action": [{"text": "is", "start": 21, "end": 23}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This increase in privileges allows for the attacker to gain access to privleged areas of the operating system as well as to infect other computers on the target network.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This increase in privileges", "start": 0, "end": 27}, {"text": "the attacker", "start": 39, "end": 51}, {"text": "access to privleged areas of the operating system", "start": 60, "end": 109}, {"text": "other computers on the target network", "start": 131, "end": 168}], "action": [{"text": "allows", "start": 28, "end": 34}, {"text": "gain", "start": 55, "end": 59}, {"text": "infect", "start": 124, "end": 130}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This team did not utilize any novel methods of privilege escalation, but they were observed using a variety of publicly known exploits.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "PrivEsc is a compiled exploit, which leverages the vulnerability commonly referred to as KiTrap0D (CVE-2010-0232).", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "PrivEsc", "start": 0, "end": 7}, {"text": "the vulnerability commonly referred to as KiTrap0D (CVE-2010-0232)", "start": 47, "end": 113}], "action": [{"text": "leverages", "start": 37, "end": 46}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The exploit allows for escalation of privileges on unpatched Windows operating systems from an unprivileged user to kernel-level privilege.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The exploit", "start": 0, "end": 11}, {"text": "escalation of privileges on unpatched Windows operating systems from an unprivileged user to kernel-level privilege", "start": 23, "end": 138}], "action": [{"text": "allows", "start": 12, "end": 18}], "modifier": [{"text": "for", "start": 19, "end": 22}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This vulnerability and the corresponding exploit were discovered and developed in 2010.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The plagiarized version used in Operation Cleaver was compiled in May 2013, with a slight modification to the public source code.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This modification changed the author's details to Zhopin Exploit Team.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Pivoting is the process of leveraging access from one compromised computer in order to gain access to additional systems on the target network.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Pivoting", "start": 0, "end": 8}, {"text": "the process of leveraging access from one compromised computer in order to gain access to additional systems on the target network", "start": 12, "end": 142}], "action": [{"text": "is", "start": 9, "end": 11}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This can involve launching attacks from the compromised computer, or simply abusing access once it has been gained.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "launching", "start": 17, "end": 26}, {"text": "abusing", "start": 76, "end": 83}], "entity": [{"text": "attacks", "start": 27, "end": 34}, {"text": "the compromised computer", "start": 40, "end": 64}, {"text": "access", "start": 84, "end": 90}, {"text": "it has been gained", "start": 96, "end": 114}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 35, "end": 39}, {"text": "once", "start": 91, "end": 95}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A very common method of pivoting on a predominantly Windows operating system based network is to extract domain credentials which have been used on the compromised computer from a credential cache.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "extract", "start": 97, "end": 104}], "entity": [{"text": "domain credentials which have been used on the compromised computer from a credential cache", "start": 105, "end": 196}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "There are a few well-known tools which are capable of doing this given sufficient privileges on the infected host.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "a few well-known tools", "start": 10, "end": 32}, {"text": "sufficient privileges on the infected host", "start": 71, "end": 113}], "action": [{"text": "given", "start": 65, "end": 70}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Two of these tools used by Cleaver are Mimikatz and Windows Credential Editor.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Two similar applications were developed by Operation Cleaver in order automate the execution of Mimikatz.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Two similar applications", "start": 0, "end": 24}, {"text": "the execution of Mimikatz", "start": 79, "end": 104}], "action": [{"text": "automate", "start": 70, "end": 78}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These applications are zhMimikatz and MimikatzWrapper.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These applications store multiple versions of Mimikatz in their resources.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "When executed, they determine which version of Mimikatz to use based on whether the computer's version of Windows is 32-bit or 64-bit.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "they", "start": 15, "end": 19}, {"text": "which version of Mimikatz to use", "start": 30, "end": 62}, {"text": "whether the computer's version of Windows is 32-bit or 64-bit", "start": 72, "end": 133}], "action": [{"text": "determine", "start": 20, "end": 29}], "modifier": [{"text": "based on", "start": 63, "end": 71}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This technique is uncommon in malware and shows the advanced skillset of the Cleaver team.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Both tools were developed in C #.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In the following examples, the computer name is TheComputerName, the username of the logged in user is TheUser, and that user's password is ThePassword.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "At the time of execution, the system only has its own credentials available and no cached network credentials.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "zhMimikatz executes the correct version of Mimikatz for the current system, and parses the results for any cached credentials.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "zhMimikatz", "start": 0, "end": 10}, {"text": "the correct version of Mimikatz for the current system", "start": 20, "end": 74}, {"text": "the results", "start": 87, "end": 98}, {"text": "any cached credentials", "start": 103, "end": 125}], "action": [{"text": "executes", "start": 11, "end": 19}, {"text": "parses", "start": 80, "end": 86}], "modifier": [{"text": "for", "start": 99, "end": 102}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Output from MimikatzWrapper is essentially the same as zhMimikatz, despite being a different Visual Studio project.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The only external difference is that MimikatzWrapper also logs these results to res.txt in the executing directory.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "MimikatzWrapper", "start": 37, "end": 52}, {"text": "these results", "start": 63, "end": 76}, {"text": "res.txt", "start": 80, "end": 87}, {"text": "the executing directory", "start": 91, "end": 114}], "action": [{"text": "logs", "start": 58, "end": 62}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 77, "end": 79}, {"text": "in", "start": 88, "end": 90}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This can make it useful for tools like the PVZ tool chain and Csext to execute with logged results: Once an attacker has credentials extracted from the cache, whether in hash form or in plaintext form, PsExec can be used to run commands on any other computer which accepts those domain credentials.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "tools like the PVZ tool chain and Csext", "start": 28, "end": 67}, {"text": "logged results", "start": 84, "end": 98}, {"text": "an attacker", "start": 105, "end": 116}, {"text": "credentials", "start": 121, "end": 132}, {"text": "the cache", "start": 148, "end": 157}, {"text": "PsExec", "start": 202, "end": 208}, {"text": "commands", "start": 228, "end": 236}, {"text": "any other computer which accepts those domain credentials", "start": 240, "end": 297}], "action": [{"text": "execute", "start": 71, "end": 78}, {"text": "extracted", "start": 133, "end": 142}, {"text": "run", "start": 224, "end": 227}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 79, "end": 83}, {"text": "from", "start": 143, "end": 147}, {"text": "on", "start": 237, "end": 239}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If this technique is combined with cached credential dumping, it can be used to jump from computer to computer on a compromised network.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "this technique", "start": 3, "end": 17}, {"text": "cached credential dumping", "start": 35, "end": 60}, {"text": "it", "start": 62, "end": 64}, {"text": "computer", "start": 90, "end": 98}, {"text": "computer", "start": 102, "end": 110}, {"text": "a compromised network", "start": 114, "end": 135}], "action": [{"text": "is combined", "start": 18, "end": 29}, {"text": "jump", "start": 80, "end": 84}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 30, "end": 34}, {"text": "from", "start": 85, "end": 89}, {"text": "to", "start": 99, "end": 101}, {"text": "on", "start": 111, "end": 113}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Net Crawler utilizes a cached credential dumping technique along with PsExec in order to worm throughout a network, collecting any and all credentials that it can extract from credential caches.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Net Crawler", "start": 0, "end": 11}, {"text": "a cached credential dumping technique", "start": 21, "end": 58}, {"text": "PsExec", "start": 70, "end": 76}, {"text": "a network", "start": 105, "end": 114}, {"text": "any and all credentials that it can extract from credential caches", "start": 127, "end": 193}], "action": [{"text": "utilizes", "start": 12, "end": 20}, {"text": "worm", "start": 89, "end": 93}, {"text": "collecting", "start": 116, "end": 126}], "modifier": [{"text": "along with", "start": 59, "end": 69}, {"text": "throughout", "start": 94, "end": 104}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It has the ability to do this with both Windows Credential Editor and Mimikatz.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It starts by first extracting cached credentials from the infected computer's cache.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "It", "start": 0, "end": 2}, {"text": "cached credentials", "start": 30, "end": 48}, {"text": "the infected computer's cache", "start": 54, "end": 83}], "action": [{"text": "extracting", "start": 19, "end": 29}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 49, "end": 53}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Once this is complete, it then continues to scan a set of configured IP addresses on the local subnet to determine which IP addresses have SMB related ports open.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "it", "start": 23, "end": 25}, {"text": "a set of configured IP addresses", "start": 49, "end": 81}, {"text": "the local subnet", "start": 85, "end": 101}, {"text": "determine which IP addresses have SMB related ports open", "start": 105, "end": 161}], "action": [{"text": "scan", "start": 44, "end": 48}], "modifier": [{"text": "on", "start": 82, "end": 84}, {"text": "to", "start": 102, "end": 104}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Then an iterative methodology is applied to brute forcing each SMB enabled target with each credential that was extracted from the cache.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "an iterative methodology", "start": 5, "end": 29}, {"text": "each SMB enabled target", "start": 58, "end": 81}, {"text": "each credential that was extracted from the cache", "start": 87, "end": 136}], "action": [{"text": "brute forcing", "start": 44, "end": 57}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 82, "end": 86}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "When a positive result has been achieved, it will create a copy of itself with a modified configuration stored as a PE resource, then send and execute the copy utilizing PsExec.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "it", "start": 42, "end": 44}, {"text": "a copy of itself", "start": 57, "end": 73}, {"text": "a modified configuration stored as a PE resource", "start": 79, "end": 127}, {"text": "the copy utilizing PsExec", "start": 151, "end": 176}], "action": [{"text": "create", "start": 50, "end": 56}, {"text": "send", "start": 134, "end": 138}, {"text": "execute", "start": 143, "end": 150}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 74, "end": 78}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This copy repeats the behavior of the original, but with already discovered credentials as well as newly discovered ones on the newly infected host.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This copy", "start": 0, "end": 9}, {"text": "the behavior of the original", "start": 18, "end": 46}, {"text": "already discovered credentials as well as newly discovered ones on the newly infected host", "start": 57, "end": 147}], "action": [{"text": "repeats", "start": 10, "end": 17}], "modifier": [{"text": "but with", "start": 48, "end": 56}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Any credentials found are reported back to the original infection.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The following is a sample of some of the recovered results of Net Crawler executing on a live network: A more in depth analysis of Net Crawler, as part of the A Study in Bots series, will be available on Cylance's blog.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "MS08-067 is a vulnerability in Microsoft Windows made popular by the Conficker worm which can be exploited by a specially crafted packet to the operating system's RPC network interface.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "MS08-067", "start": 0, "end": 8}, {"text": "a vulnerability in Microsoft Windows made popular by the Conficker worm which can be exploited by a specially crafted packet to the operating system's RPC network interface", "start": 12, "end": 184}], "action": [{"text": "is", "start": 9, "end": 11}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This vulnerability has been patched since October 2008, but many networks have failed to update their systems even to this day.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Operation Cleaver used a plagiarized version of a publicly available exploit for this vulnerability developed in Python.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Someone in the Cleaver team (presumed to be Nesha) modified the exploit to read'' By Nesha''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Jasus is an ARP cache poisoner developed by the Operation Cleaver team.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Jasus", "start": 0, "end": 5}, {"text": "an ARP cache poisoner developed by the Operation Cleaver team", "start": 9, "end": 70}], "action": [{"text": "is", "start": 6, "end": 8}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It makes use of WinPcap and is developed in C. Compared to some other publicly available ARP cache poisoning utilities, Jasus is poorly developed and without many useful features.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The primary positive attribute of Jasus is its poor detection ratio by the antivirus industry.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The primary positive attribute of Jasus", "start": 0, "end": 39}, {"text": "its poor detection ratio by the antivirus industry", "start": 43, "end": 93}], "action": [{"text": "is", "start": 40, "end": 42}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Cain & Abel is a publicly available toolkit, which covers a wide range of functionality that assists attackers once they have compromised a node on a network.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It has the ability to dump stored and cached credentials, and conduct attacks like ARP cache poisoning in order to capture credentials being transmitted on the network.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "It", "start": 0, "end": 2}, {"text": "stored and cached credentials", "start": 27, "end": 56}, {"text": "attacks like ARP cache poisoning", "start": 70, "end": 102}, {"text": "credentials being transmitted on the network", "start": 123, "end": 167}], "action": [{"text": "dump", "start": 22, "end": 26}, {"text": "conduct", "start": 62, "end": 69}, {"text": "capture", "start": 115, "end": 122}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It also has a remotely installable trojan named Abel, which enables some of its functionality on a remote target.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "It", "start": 0, "end": 2}, {"text": "a remotely installable trojan named Abel", "start": 12, "end": 52}, {"text": "some of its functionality", "start": 68, "end": 93}, {"text": "a remote target", "start": 97, "end": 112}], "action": [{"text": "has", "start": 8, "end": 11}, {"text": "enables", "start": 60, "end": 67}], "modifier": [{"text": "on", "start": 94, "end": 96}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We observed the Operation Cleaver team using Cain & Abel for extracting credentials from caches and the network when they are confident that there is little to no antivirus protection on the infected target.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the Operation Cleaver team", "start": 12, "end": 38}, {"text": "Cain & Abel", "start": 45, "end": 56}, {"text": "extracting credentials from caches and the network", "start": 61, "end": 111}], "action": [{"text": "using", "start": 39, "end": 44}], "modifier": [{"text": "for", "start": 57, "end": 60}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Exfiltration is the process of moving information to an external site.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Exfiltration", "start": 0, "end": 12}, {"text": "the process of moving information to an external site", "start": 16, "end": 69}], "action": [{"text": "is", "start": 13, "end": 15}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In this context, it is the process of stealing information without being detected.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "it", "start": 17, "end": 19}, {"text": "the process of stealing information without being detected", "start": 23, "end": 81}], "action": [{"text": "is", "start": 20, "end": 22}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Operation Cleaver has a strong focus on stealing confidential/privileged information, and they have utilized a few methods in order to facilitate this objective.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Operation Cleaver", "start": 0, "end": 17}, {"text": "confidential/privileged information", "start": 49, "end": 84}], "action": [{"text": "stealing", "start": 40, "end": 48}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Cleaver Operations observed in 2013 mainly utilized FTP servers with anonymous access enabled in order to pilfer large quantities of information.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Cleaver Operations", "start": 0, "end": 18}, {"text": "FTP servers", "start": 52, "end": 63}, {"text": "anonymous access enabled", "start": 69, "end": 93}, {"text": "pilfer large quantities of information", "start": 106, "end": 144}], "action": [{"text": "utilized", "start": 43, "end": 51}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 64, "end": 68}, {"text": "in order to", "start": 94, "end": 105}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This allowed them to use existing command line utilities available on their targets in order to upload information.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "them", "start": 13, "end": 17}, {"text": "existing command line utilities available on their targets", "start": 25, "end": 83}, {"text": "information", "start": 103, "end": 114}], "action": [{"text": "use", "start": 21, "end": 24}, {"text": "upload", "start": 96, "end": 102}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This is a versatile technique as it does not require any additional software which could be detected.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These FTP servers were also observed during the infection process, as infected computers were often instructed to download additional files from these FTP servers, including backdoors and pivoting tools.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "These FTP servers", "start": 0, "end": 17}, {"text": "the infection process", "start": 44, "end": 65}, {"text": "infected computers", "start": 70, "end": 88}, {"text": "additional files", "start": 123, "end": 139}, {"text": "these FTP servers", "start": 145, "end": 162}], "action": [{"text": "were also observed", "start": 18, "end": 36}, {"text": "download", "start": 114, "end": 122}], "modifier": [{"text": "during", "start": 37, "end": 43}, {"text": "from", "start": 140, "end": 144}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The following IP addresses hosted FTP servers that were used in the infection of targets or in the exfiltration of information.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The following IP addresses", "start": 0, "end": 26}, {"text": "FTP servers", "start": 34, "end": 45}, {"text": "the infection of targets", "start": 64, "end": 88}, {"text": "the exfiltration of information", "start": 95, "end": 126}], "action": [{"text": "hosted", "start": 27, "end": 33}, {"text": "were used", "start": 51, "end": 60}], "modifier": [{"text": "in", "start": 61, "end": 63}, {"text": "in", "start": 92, "end": 94}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "NetCat is a network tool which has many valid purposes but can also be used for malicious purposes.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Its main functionality allows for a client and server communication channel, allowing for information to be transported over the network simply.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Its main functionality", "start": 0, "end": 22}, {"text": "a client and server communication channel", "start": 34, "end": 75}, {"text": "information to be transported over the network simply", "start": 90, "end": 143}], "action": [{"text": "allows", "start": 23, "end": 29}, {"text": "allowing", "start": 77, "end": 85}], "modifier": [{"text": "for", "start": 30, "end": 33}, {"text": "for", "start": 86, "end": 89}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "NetCat has an option when being compiled to enable or disable the ability for NetCat to execute a command after the connection is established.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "NetCat", "start": 78, "end": 84}, {"text": "a command", "start": 96, "end": 105}, {"text": "the connection is established", "start": 112, "end": 141}], "action": [{"text": "execute", "start": 88, "end": 95}], "modifier": [{"text": "after", "start": 106, "end": 111}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This feature can be abused to enable a reverse connecting shell, which can be used to remotely control a target.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This feature", "start": 0, "end": 12}, {"text": "a reverse connecting shell", "start": 37, "end": 63}, {"text": "a target", "start": 103, "end": 111}], "action": [{"text": "enable", "start": 30, "end": 36}, {"text": "remotely control", "start": 86, "end": 102}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "NetCat's network communications are in plaintext, and could be viewed by an egress filter looking to block the exfiltration of sensitive information.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Operation Cleaver team was observed attempting to use NetCat to exfiltrate information as well as use it as a reverse connecting shell.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The Operation Cleaver team", "start": 0, "end": 26}, {"text": "NetCat", "start": 58, "end": 64}, {"text": "exfiltrate information", "start": 68, "end": 90}, {"text": "it", "start": 106, "end": 108}, {"text": "a reverse connecting shell", "start": 112, "end": 138}], "action": [{"text": "use", "start": 54, "end": 57}, {"text": "use", "start": 102, "end": 105}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 65, "end": 67}, {"text": "as", "start": 109, "end": 111}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The use of NetCat was later replaced with zhCat.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "zhCat is a tool developed by the Operation Cleaver team which operates similarly to NetCat.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Its main purpose is to create a channel that is capable of transporting information over the network.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Its main purpose", "start": 0, "end": 16}, {"text": "a channel that is capable of transporting information over the network", "start": 30, "end": 100}], "action": [{"text": "create", "start": 23, "end": 29}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The changes made in zhCat allow for this information to be transferred with inline obfuscation and/ or encryption.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "zhCat", "start": 20, "end": 25}, {"text": "this information", "start": 36, "end": 52}, {"text": "inline obfuscation and/ or encryption", "start": 76, "end": 113}], "action": [{"text": "be transferred", "start": 56, "end": 70}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 71, "end": 75}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This makes it more difficult to detect that privileged information is being exfiltrated.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "privileged information", "start": 44, "end": 66}], "action": [{"text": "being exfiltrated", "start": 70, "end": 87}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The command line help (of a particular version) shows the following options: Multiple obfuscation/encryption methods are available.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The –h argument enables HTTP mode.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This makes the traffic between zhCat instances look like benign HTTP traffic.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This", "start": 0, "end": 4}, {"text": "the traffic between zhCat instances", "start": 11, "end": 46}, {"text": "look like benign HTTP traffic", "start": 47, "end": 76}], "action": [{"text": "makes", "start": 5, "end": 10}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For instance, if the attackers set up a zhCat instance listening on port 1000 on 192.168.116.128 in HTTP mode, the client instance of zhCat would use the following command: The server instance would use the following command: When we run both of these, we can send information just by typing it into the terminal of the running application.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Information can be supplied by standard input.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If we observe the network communications during this transfer, we can see the following HTTP POST request.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "we", "start": 63, "end": 65}, {"text": "the following HTTP POST request", "start": 74, "end": 105}], "action": [{"text": "see", "start": 70, "end": 73}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Note: research into ebizmba.com did not turn up any additional evidence of being involved with the development of zhCat.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "On the server side, we can see our message has been received: If stricter egress filtering is enabled, the attackers can use zhCat to also XOR encrypt the traffic with a shared key.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the attackers", "start": 103, "end": 116}, {"text": "zhCat", "start": 125, "end": 130}, {"text": "also XOR encrypt the traffic with a shared key", "start": 134, "end": 180}], "action": [{"text": "use", "start": 121, "end": 124}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 131, "end": 133}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These keys are stored inside zhCat.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The following is the key used for XOR encryption: The \\n represents hex character 0x0A, which is a new line character.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the key", "start": 17, "end": 24}, {"text": "XOR encryption", "start": 34, "end": 48}], "action": [{"text": "used", "start": 25, "end": 29}], "modifier": [{"text": "for", "start": 30, "end": 33}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "An attacker could set up a server instance of zhCat with the following command in order to enable both HTTP and XOR obfuscation: The client instance could then be invoked with the following command: Once again, information can be supplied via standard input.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "An attacker", "start": 0, "end": 11}, {"text": "a server instance of zhCat", "start": 25, "end": 51}, {"text": "the following command", "start": 57, "end": 78}, {"text": "enable both HTTP and XOR obfuscation", "start": 91, "end": 127}], "action": [{"text": "set up", "start": 18, "end": 24}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 52, "end": 56}, {"text": "in order to", "start": 79, "end": 90}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Upon inspecting the network traffic again, we see the following HTTP POST request.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "we", "start": 43, "end": 45}, {"text": "the following HTTP POST request", "start": 50, "end": 81}], "action": [{"text": "see", "start": 46, "end": 49}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "On the server side, we can see this information being received: zhCat has a variety of other features such as port mirroring as well as traffic redirecting.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "zhCat", "start": 64, "end": 69}, {"text": "a variety of other features such as port mirroring as well as traffic redirecting", "start": 74, "end": 155}], "action": [{"text": "has", "start": 70, "end": 73}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "PLink is one of the many utilities provided in the PuTTY (SSH) suite, which has many benign purposes.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is capable of communicating over various protocols, the most notable being SSH.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The SSH protocol is a heavily utilized encrypted protocol, most commonly used for remote administration of UNIX based operating systems.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "PLink is designed to implement some of the SSH functions related to forwarding traffic as well as other functionality.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Operation Cleaver uses PLink to forward local RDP ports to remote SSH servers.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Operation Cleaver", "start": 0, "end": 17}, {"text": "PLink", "start": 23, "end": 28}, {"text": "forward local RDP ports to remote SSH servers", "start": 32, "end": 77}], "action": [{"text": "uses", "start": 18, "end": 22}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 29, "end": 31}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This allows them to easily connect to RDP servers inside the networks of their victims.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "them", "start": 12, "end": 16}, {"text": "RDP servers", "start": 38, "end": 49}, {"text": "the networks of their victims", "start": 57, "end": 86}], "action": [{"text": "connect", "start": 27, "end": 34}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 35, "end": 37}, {"text": "inside", "start": 50, "end": 56}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These RDP connections can be used to exfiltrate information visually, as well as to remotely control the computers hosting the RDP servers.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "These RDP connections", "start": 0, "end": 21}, {"text": "information", "start": 48, "end": 59}, {"text": "the computers hosting the RDP servers", "start": 101, "end": 138}], "action": [{"text": "exfiltrate", "start": 37, "end": 47}, {"text": "remotely control", "start": 84, "end": 100}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Early Cleaver operations abused SMTP in order to exfiltrate information.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Early Cleaver operations", "start": 0, "end": 24}, {"text": "SMTP", "start": 32, "end": 36}, {"text": "exfiltrate information", "start": 49, "end": 71}], "action": [{"text": "abused", "start": 25, "end": 31}], "modifier": [{"text": "in order to", "start": 37, "end": 48}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The sending is performed by internally developed malware samples such as TinyZBot and Csext in order to exfiltrate information about the infected computer, as well as requested files and keystroke logging information.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The sending", "start": 0, "end": 11}, {"text": "internally developed malware samples such as TinyZBot and Csext", "start": 28, "end": 91}, {"text": "exfiltrate information about the infected computer, as well as requested files and keystroke logging information", "start": 104, "end": 216}], "action": [{"text": "is performed", "start": 12, "end": 24}], "modifier": [{"text": "in order to", "start": 92, "end": 103}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Messages were sent using an open SMTP relay at BeyondSys.com with the sender email address dyanachear (at) beyondsys.com.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Messages", "start": 0, "end": 8}, {"text": "an open SMTP relay at BeyondSys.com", "start": 25, "end": 60}, {"text": "the sender email address dyanachear (at) beyondsys.com", "start": 66, "end": 120}], "action": [{"text": "were sent", "start": 9, "end": 18}], "modifier": [{"text": "using", "start": 19, "end": 24}, {"text": "with", "start": 61, "end": 65}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This allowed the attackers to use infrastructure that was not theirs to exfiltrate information.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the attackers", "start": 13, "end": 26}, {"text": "infrastructure that was not theirs", "start": 34, "end": 68}, {"text": "exfiltrate information", "start": 72, "end": 94}], "action": [{"text": "use", "start": 30, "end": 33}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 69, "end": 71}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The known recipient addresses of this information were testmail00001 (at) yahoo.com and TerafficAnalyzer (at) yahoo.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "com.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In order to deceive anyone reading these emails, they made them appear to be a spam message that most would not think twice about.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The subject used is the following: The message used is the following: The files being exfiltrated are added to the email as attachments.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The files being exfiltrated", "start": 70, "end": 97}, {"text": "the email", "start": 111, "end": 120}, {"text": "attachments", "start": 124, "end": 135}], "action": [{"text": "are added", "start": 98, "end": 107}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 108, "end": 110}, {"text": "as", "start": 121, "end": 123}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "SOAP is a sub-protocol communicated via HTTP.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "SOAP", "start": 0, "end": 4}, {"text": "a sub-protocol communicated via HTTP", "start": 8, "end": 44}], "action": [{"text": "is", "start": 5, "end": 7}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In relation to Operation Cleaver, it is used as the command and control protocol for TinyZBot, which was the preferred backdoor, and underwent long-term development.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "it", "start": 34, "end": 36}, {"text": "the command and control protocol for TinyZBot", "start": 48, "end": 93}], "action": [{"text": "is used", "start": 37, "end": 44}], "modifier": [{"text": "as", "start": 45, "end": 47}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "HTTP communications are often used by botnets, but it is uncommon to use a sub-protocol such as SOAP.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "HTTP communications", "start": 0, "end": 19}, {"text": "botnets", "start": 38, "end": 45}], "action": [{"text": "are often used", "start": 20, "end": 34}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is likely that SOAP was used because it is simple to implement in C #, and has the added benefit of blending in with other benign HTTP traffic.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "SOAP", "start": 18, "end": 22}, {"text": "other benign HTTP traffic", "start": 120, "end": 145}], "action": [{"text": "blending in", "start": 103, "end": 114}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 115, "end": 119}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As part of TinyZBot's command and control protocol, files can be exfiltrated over SOAP to the command and control server.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "files", "start": 52, "end": 57}, {"text": "SOAP", "start": 82, "end": 86}, {"text": "the command and control server", "start": 90, "end": 120}], "action": [{"text": "be exfiltrated", "start": 62, "end": 76}], "modifier": [{"text": "over", "start": 77, "end": 81}, {"text": "to", "start": 87, "end": 89}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For more information about TinyZBot, see the Persistence section.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Persistence is the means of maintaining access to a compromised network.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Persistence", "start": 0, "end": 11}, {"text": "the means of maintaining access to a compromised network", "start": 15, "end": 71}], "action": [{"text": "is", "start": 12, "end": 14}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "There are limitless methods of persistence; the following are techniques and tools for persistence used by Cleaver.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the following are techniques and tools for persistence", "start": 44, "end": 98}, {"text": "Cleaver", "start": 107, "end": 114}], "action": [{"text": "used", "start": 99, "end": 103}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "TinyZBot is a backdoor developed in C #.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "TinyZBot", "start": 0, "end": 8}, {"text": "a backdoor developed in C #", "start": 12, "end": 39}], "action": [{"text": "is", "start": 9, "end": 11}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This bot is the longest developed malware we have analyzed from this organization.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The earliest known version was compiled in January 2013 and we continued to see new versions being created actively.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The purpose of TinyZBot is to gather information from an infected computer as well as maintain and further access into a compromised network.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "TinyZBot", "start": 15, "end": 23}, {"text": "information", "start": 37, "end": 48}, {"text": "an infected computer", "start": 54, "end": 74}, {"text": "access into a compromised network", "start": 107, "end": 140}], "action": [{"text": "gather", "start": 30, "end": 36}, {"text": "maintain", "start": 86, "end": 94}, {"text": "further", "start": 99, "end": 106}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 49, "end": 53}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "TinyZBot was developed with the clear intention of targeted campaigns.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The name TinyZBot is assumed to be referring to this project as a less versatile version of the ZeuS botnet, although it does not exhibit the major browser injection features of ZeuS.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "To be clear, TinyZBot shares no code with ZeuS or its variants, and is developed in a different programming language.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The majority of the code in TinyZBot was created by Cleaver.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "TinyZBot supports a wide array of features that continually evolved over time.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For the evolution of features, see the History section.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The following is a list of supported features: The command and control mechanism for TinyZBot utilizes SOAP communicating over HTTP.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The command and control mechanism for TinyZBot", "start": 47, "end": 93}, {"text": "SOAP communicating over HTTP", "start": 103, "end": 131}], "action": [{"text": "utilizes", "start": 94, "end": 102}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Potential reasons for using SOAP are: 1.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "SOAP-based communications are simple to implement in C #.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "2.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "SOAP traffic could easily be considered benign traffic, as it is not commonly seen in malware.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "SOAP traffic", "start": 0, "end": 12}, {"text": "benign traffic", "start": 40, "end": 54}], "action": [{"text": "be considered", "start": 26, "end": 39}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As part of SOAP communications, a URI is specified.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This is internal to the sub-protocol, and does not necessarily reflect the URI of the host running the SOAP server (ASMX file).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In the case of TinyZBot, and many examples for developing SOAP applications, this URI is tempuri.org.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Since the first version of the SOAP-based command and control protocol was implemented, TinyZBot used what is referred to as a'' dynamic password''.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the SOAP-based command and control protocol", "start": 27, "end": 70}], "action": [{"text": "was implemented", "start": 71, "end": 86}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The result of this is a cryptographically hashed version of the server time (which must be obtained through a SOAP query), the TinyZBot's GUID, and the TinyZBot's AppUsageID (campaign identifier).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For the command and control examples below, red text represents TCP data sent from the TinyZBot infection while blue text represents TCP data sent from the command and control server.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "TCP data", "start": 64, "end": 72}, {"text": "the TinyZBot infection", "start": 83, "end": 105}, {"text": "TCP data", "start": 133, "end": 141}, {"text": "the command and control server", "start": 152, "end": 182}], "action": [{"text": "sent", "start": 73, "end": 77}, {"text": "sent", "start": 142, "end": 146}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 78, "end": 82}, {"text": "from", "start": 147, "end": 151}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The server time lookup query invokes the SOAP command GetServerTime.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This is the first query done by a running TinyZBot instance, and needs to be done shortly before most other queries, in order to update the dynamic password.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the first query", "start": 8, "end": 23}, {"text": "a running TinyZBot instance", "start": 32, "end": 59}], "action": [{"text": "done", "start": 24, "end": 28}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Commands, updates and files to drop and execute are stored as files on the SOAP server, and access is restricted by the AppUsageID as well as the bot GUID.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Commands, updates and files to drop and execute", "start": 0, "end": 47}, {"text": "files on the SOAP server", "start": 62, "end": 86}], "action": [{"text": "are stored", "start": 48, "end": 58}], "modifier": [{"text": "as", "start": 59, "end": 61}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This allows for commands to be sent to all bots for a campaign as well as individual control.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "commands", "start": 16, "end": 24}, {"text": "all bots for a campaign", "start": 39, "end": 62}], "action": [{"text": "be sent", "start": 28, "end": 35}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 36, "end": 38}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The TinyZBot queries the server in order to enumerate all files currently available to it.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The TinyZBot", "start": 0, "end": 12}, {"text": "the server", "start": 21, "end": 31}, {"text": "enumerate all files currently available to it", "start": 44, "end": 89}], "action": [{"text": "queries", "start": 13, "end": 20}], "modifier": [{"text": "in order to", "start": 32, "end": 43}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In order to download the file and parse for commands to execute, the TinyZBot must request the file.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "download", "start": 12, "end": 20}, {"text": "request", "start": 83, "end": 90}], "entity": [{"text": "the file", "start": 21, "end": 29}, {"text": "the TinyZBot", "start": 65, "end": 77}, {"text": "the file", "start": 91, "end": 99}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The file is downloaded Base64-encoded inside of the SOAP response.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The file", "start": 0, "end": 8}, {"text": "Base64-encoded", "start": 23, "end": 37}, {"text": "the SOAP response", "start": 48, "end": 65}], "action": [{"text": "is downloaded", "start": 9, "end": 22}], "modifier": [{"text": "inside of", "start": 38, "end": 47}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The command file downloaded in this example is as follows: The first line is a timestamp of the command.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The TinyZBot command parser ignores it.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The RUNCMD line requests that cmd.exe be executed, with the command ipconfig /all being redirected to a file in a directory designated for files to be uploaded.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "cmd.exe", "start": 30, "end": 37}], "action": [{"text": "be executed", "start": 38, "end": 49}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The UPLOAD command requests that this file is then uploaded over SOAP to the command and control server.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "this file", "start": 33, "end": 42}, {"text": "SOAP", "start": 65, "end": 69}, {"text": "the command and control server", "start": 73, "end": 103}], "action": [{"text": "is then uploaded", "start": 43, "end": 59}], "modifier": [{"text": "over", "start": 60, "end": 64}, {"text": "to", "start": 70, "end": 72}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The DELETE command then requests that the file be deleted from the infected system.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the file", "start": 38, "end": 46}, {"text": "the infected system", "start": 63, "end": 82}], "action": [{"text": "be deleted", "start": 47, "end": 57}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 58, "end": 62}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The following is a list of supported commands that TinyZBot responds to: Commands such as GETINFO are often run on newly infected systems, as they decide whether the infection has hit the correct target.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "a list of supported commands", "start": 17, "end": 45}, {"text": "TinyZBot", "start": 51, "end": 59}, {"text": "Commands such as GETINFO", "start": 73, "end": 97}, {"text": "newly infected systems", "start": 115, "end": 137}, {"text": "they", "start": 142, "end": 146}, {"text": "whether the infection has hit the correct target", "start": 154, "end": 202}], "action": [{"text": "responds", "start": 60, "end": 68}, {"text": "are often run", "start": 98, "end": 111}, {"text": "decide", "start": 147, "end": 153}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 69, "end": 71}, {"text": "on", "start": 112, "end": 114}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "There are additional SOAP commands, but they will not be covered in detail.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The following is a list of all the SOAP commands: CheckFileMD5, GetFile, GetFileList, GetServerTime, UploadFile.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "TinyZBot is commonly installed using some form of deception.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "TinyZBot", "start": 0, "end": 8}, {"text": "some form of deception", "start": 37, "end": 59}], "action": [{"text": "is commonly installed", "start": 9, "end": 30}], "modifier": [{"text": "using", "start": 31, "end": 36}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Recent versions use the resume- based methods reported in the Initial Compromise sections.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Recent versions", "start": 0, "end": 15}, {"text": "the resume- based methods reported in the Initial Compromise sections", "start": 20, "end": 89}], "action": [{"text": "use", "start": 16, "end": 19}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "An additional method was used for earlier versions.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "When early versions of TinyZBot were executed, they opened an image stored in the resource section of the executable and copied the malicious TinyZBot executable to the% AppData% directory.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "they", "start": 47, "end": 51}, {"text": "an image stored in the resource section of the executable", "start": 59, "end": 116}, {"text": "the malicious TinyZBot executable", "start": 128, "end": 161}, {"text": "the% AppData% directory", "start": 165, "end": 188}], "action": [{"text": "opened", "start": 52, "end": 58}, {"text": "copied", "start": 121, "end": 127}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 162, "end": 164}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Many of the images identified were of the popular Lebanese singer and actress Haifa Wehbe.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The backdoor additionally replaced the original malicious executable with an appropriately named image file and padded the image file with null bytes in order to mirror the original file size.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The backdoor", "start": 0, "end": 12}, {"text": "the original malicious executable", "start": 35, "end": 68}, {"text": "an appropriately named image file", "start": 74, "end": 107}, {"text": "the image file", "start": 119, "end": 133}, {"text": "null bytes", "start": 139, "end": 149}, {"text": "mirror the original file size", "start": 162, "end": 191}], "action": [{"text": "replaced", "start": 26, "end": 34}, {"text": "padded", "start": 112, "end": 118}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 69, "end": 73}, {"text": "with", "start": 134, "end": 138}, {"text": "in order to", "start": 150, "end": 161}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The earliest known version on TinyZBot was compiled on January 27, 2013.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This early version had very little functionality.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It was limited to logging keystroke data, sending emails, and creating a link in the user's startup folder for persistence.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "It", "start": 0, "end": 2}, {"text": "keystroke data", "start": 26, "end": 40}, {"text": "emails", "start": 50, "end": 56}, {"text": "a link", "start": 71, "end": 77}, {"text": "the user's startup folder", "start": 81, "end": 106}, {"text": "persistence", "start": 111, "end": 122}], "action": [{"text": "logging", "start": 18, "end": 25}, {"text": "sending", "start": 42, "end": 49}, {"text": "creating", "start": 62, "end": 70}], "modifier": [{"text": "in", "start": 78, "end": 80}, {"text": "for", "start": 107, "end": 110}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Its method of exfiltrating the logged keystrokes relied upon a hardcoded email address stored in the binary.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Its method of exfiltrating the logged keystrokes", "start": 0, "end": 48}, {"text": "a hardcoded email address stored in the binary", "start": 61, "end": 107}], "action": [{"text": "relied", "start": 49, "end": 55}], "modifier": [{"text": "upon", "start": 56, "end": 60}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The sender email address was dyanachear (at) beyondsys.com and emails were destined for testmail00001 (at) yahoo.com.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The message was intended to look like common Viagra spam from China, but would be sent with the keystroke logging data as attachments, as well as system information.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The message", "start": 0, "end": 11}, {"text": "the keystroke logging data as attachments, as well as system information", "start": 92, "end": 164}], "action": [{"text": "be sent", "start": 79, "end": 86}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 87, "end": 91}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The initial version did not provide any means of receiving commands and was obfuscated with SmartAssembly.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The initial version", "start": 0, "end": 19}, {"text": "SmartAssembly", "start": 92, "end": 105}], "action": [{"text": "was obfuscated", "start": 72, "end": 86}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 87, "end": 91}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The following iteration compiled on March 12, 2013, only contained minor bug fixes.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The next version was compiled on April 24, 2013.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This version starts to look more like an average bot.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A command and control protocol was established, using HTTP and SOAP for the protocol.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "A command and control protocol", "start": 0, "end": 30}, {"text": "HTTP and SOAP", "start": 54, "end": 67}, {"text": "the protocol", "start": 72, "end": 84}], "action": [{"text": "was established", "start": 31, "end": 46}, {"text": "using", "start": 48, "end": 53}], "modifier": [{"text": "for", "start": 68, "end": 71}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The command and control server for this version was located at 173.192.144.68/ DefaultWS (dot) asmx.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The command and control server for this version", "start": 0, "end": 47}, {"text": "173.192.144.68/ DefaultWS (dot) asmx", "start": 63, "end": 99}], "action": [{"text": "was located", "start": 48, "end": 59}], "modifier": [{"text": "at", "start": 60, "end": 62}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This new command and control protocol allowed for the addition of quite a few other features.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "An update mechanism was added, and could be regularly scheduled, so unassisted periodic update checks were automatically performed.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "unassisted periodic update checks", "start": 68, "end": 101}], "action": [{"text": "were automatically performed", "start": 102, "end": 130}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The SOAP API used a dynamic password mechanism, which required the computation of a simple key in order to access certain parts of the API.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The email data exfiltration method also underwent modification to be activated at a scheduled interval.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The email data exfiltration method", "start": 0, "end": 34}, {"text": "modification", "start": 50, "end": 62}, {"text": "be activated at a scheduled interval", "start": 66, "end": 102}], "action": [{"text": "underwent", "start": 40, "end": 49}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 63, "end": 65}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "There were also some changes, which looked to be bug fixes, such as limiting the number of times sending an email could fail.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The next day, April 25, 2013, a new version was compiled which allowed for self-deletion.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "a new version", "start": 30, "end": 43}, {"text": "self-deletion", "start": 75, "end": 88}], "action": [{"text": "allowed", "start": 63, "end": 70}], "modifier": [{"text": "for", "start": 71, "end": 74}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "On May 14, 2013, we noticed a change which assisted in the identification of active targets.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The AppUsageId (at this point named AppType) was an identifier used by this organization in order to differentiate between targets infected with TinyZBot, meaning they could effectively run multiple campaigns using the same command and control server and know which target was infected.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The AppUsageId (at this point named AppType)", "start": 0, "end": 44}, {"text": "between targets infected with TinyZBot", "start": 115, "end": 153}, {"text": "they", "start": 163, "end": 167}, {"text": "multiple campaigns", "start": 190, "end": 208}, {"text": "the same command and control server", "start": 215, "end": 250}, {"text": "which target was infected", "start": 260, "end": 285}], "action": [{"text": "differentiate", "start": 101, "end": 114}, {"text": "run", "start": 186, "end": 189}, {"text": "know", "start": 255, "end": 259}], "modifier": [{"text": "using", "start": 209, "end": 214}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This also allowed for separate commands to be supplied to different targets without the need for per-bot commands.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "separate commands", "start": 22, "end": 39}, {"text": "different targets", "start": 58, "end": 75}], "action": [{"text": "be supplied", "start": 43, "end": 54}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 55, "end": 57}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "At this time, the AppUsageId was total0, but later we observed names, which aligned with active targets.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The exfiltration email address was also changed to TerafficAnalyzer (at) yahoo.com.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The exfiltration email address", "start": 0, "end": 30}, {"text": "TerafficAnalyzer (at) yahoo.com", "start": 51, "end": 82}], "action": [{"text": "was also changed", "start": 31, "end": 47}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 48, "end": 50}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "On June 17, 2013, there was an addition that allowed for the loading of configuration data from the PE's resources.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "At this time, it was limited to the exfiltration email address.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This version was not obfuscated with SmartAssembly We do not see a new version of TinyZBot until June 7, 2014.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "There are quite a few notable improvements, but nowhere near enough to indicate consistent development on the project for a year.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "SmartAssembly was reused again.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "SmartAssembly", "start": 0, "end": 13}], "action": [{"text": "was reused", "start": 14, "end": 24}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A method was added to detect what security related software is installed.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "A method", "start": 0, "end": 8}, {"text": "what security related software is installed", "start": 29, "end": 72}], "action": [{"text": "detect", "start": 22, "end": 28}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Avira antivirus was specifically targeted and disabled, due to its detection of the new keystroke logger module added in this version.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Avira antivirus", "start": 0, "end": 15}, {"text": "the new keystroke logger module", "start": 80, "end": 111}, {"text": "this version", "start": 121, "end": 133}], "action": [{"text": "was specifically targeted and disabled", "start": 16, "end": 54}, {"text": "added", "start": 112, "end": 117}], "modifier": [{"text": "in", "start": 118, "end": 120}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This keystroke logger source is publicly available and referred to as DeadkeyLogger.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This keystroke logger source", "start": 0, "end": 28}, {"text": "publicly available and referred to as DeadkeyLogger", "start": 32, "end": 83}], "action": [{"text": "is", "start": 29, "end": 31}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A new string encryption class is added, but the code was copied and pasted from a Microsoft example.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The ability to extract Internet Explorer passwords was added.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The ability to extract Internet Explorer passwords", "start": 0, "end": 50}], "action": [{"text": "was added", "start": 51, "end": 60}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Clipboard monitoring code was added, but not invoked.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Clipboard monitoring code", "start": 0, "end": 25}], "action": [{"text": "was added", "start": 26, "end": 35}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The emailing features were removed, but the classes which previously contained them were still present but empty.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Many more options were enabled to be loaded from PE resources.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The ability to add PE resources was added.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Another version was compiled on June 7, 2014, with no feature difference.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "On June 17, 2014, we see2the first instance of Binder1, which is aptly named, as it is a binder.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The legitimate application used in this version of Binder1 was compiled on August 22, 2013, and is a self-extracting archive of desktop wallpapers, including an image from the game Mirror's Edge.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The TinyZBot included was the version compiled on June 7, 2014.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The version compiled on June 23, 2014, added functionality which allowed screenshots of the desktop to be taken.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The version compiled on June 23, 2014", "start": 0, "end": 37}, {"text": "screenshots of the desktop", "start": 73, "end": 99}, {"text": "be taken", "start": 103, "end": 111}], "action": [{"text": "allowed", "start": 65, "end": 72}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 100, "end": 102}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "On August 2, 2014, we see another version without SmartAssembly obfuscation.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A bug fix is made to the keystroke logging method, and clipboard monitoring is enabled.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "A bug fix", "start": 0, "end": 9}, {"text": "the keystroke logging method", "start": 21, "end": 49}, {"text": "clipboard monitoring", "start": 55, "end": 75}], "action": [{"text": "is made", "start": 10, "end": 17}, {"text": "is enabled", "start": 76, "end": 86}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 18, "end": 20}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Three items were compiled on August 18, 2014.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Two of them are TinyZBot binaries, which contain a minor key logging bug fix.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The third is a new Binder1 instance, which contains one of the TinyZBot instances compiled that day.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The legitimate application included in this binder is called Easyresumecreator and is a legitimate application named EasyRésuméCreatorPro.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This version targeted a major Saudi Arabian oil company.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "From August 23 to August 26, 2014, new versions of TinyZBot were compiled with the AppUsageIds targeting major oil and gas companies in Qatar and Kuwait, Ministries of Foreign Affairs in the Persian Gulf, and a major airline holding company in UAE.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These versions of TinyZBot moved towards a more modular architecture where each component was in its own .NET", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "assembly.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This was presumably done to limit antivirus detection of each individual file as well as allow for dynamic updating of specific modules.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This", "start": 0, "end": 4}, {"text": "antivirus detection of each individual file", "start": 34, "end": 77}], "action": [{"text": "limit", "start": 28, "end": 33}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "All of these were included in their own Binder1 instance, which also dropped Easyresumecreator.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "There also seem to be improved software engineering practices in many locations.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "FTP upload support was added, with hardcoded credentials of ano:1.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "FTP upload support", "start": 0, "end": 18}, {"text": "hardcoded credentials of ano:1", "start": 35, "end": 65}], "action": [{"text": "was added", "start": 19, "end": 28}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 30, "end": 34}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This FTP upload functionality points to the command and control server, and is invoked by a command in the SOAP command and control channel.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This FTP upload functionality", "start": 0, "end": 29}, {"text": "the command and control server", "start": 40, "end": 70}, {"text": "a command in the SOAP command and control channel", "start": 90, "end": 139}], "action": [{"text": "points", "start": 30, "end": 36}, {"text": "is invoked", "start": 76, "end": 86}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 37, "end": 39}, {"text": "by", "start": 87, "end": 89}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These versions have the capability to install as a service.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "These versions", "start": 0, "end": 14}, {"text": "a service", "start": 49, "end": 58}], "action": [{"text": "install", "start": 38, "end": 45}], "modifier": [{"text": "as", "start": 46, "end": 48}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "On August 25, 2014, the version compiled on August 18 was submitted to VirusTotal in a ZIP archive located at http: //dl.doosan-job (dot) com/cv/EasyResumeCreator- v2.0.zip.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This indicates that TinyZBot is not only being installed while impersonating a résumé creation suite, but is also impersonating potential employers when distributed.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "TinyZBot", "start": 20, "end": 28}, {"text": "impersonating a résumé creation suite", "start": 63, "end": 100}, {"text": "potential employers", "start": 128, "end": 147}, {"text": "distributed", "start": 153, "end": 164}], "action": [{"text": "being installed", "start": 41, "end": 56}, {"text": "is also impersonating", "start": 106, "end": 127}], "modifier": [{"text": "while", "start": 57, "end": 62}, {"text": "when", "start": 148, "end": 152}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "On September 9, 2014, a ZIP file containing TinyZBot and a configuration targeting a major US university with its AppUsageId was created.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This was discovered on an anonymous FTP server in the same IP range as dl.doosan-job (dot) com along with other malware.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "From September 11 through September 17, 2014, some TinyZBot components were compiled, along with a new dropper.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This dropper impersonated a tool to submit a résumé to Teledyne.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This dropper", "start": 0, "end": 12}, {"text": "a tool to submit a résumé to Teledyne", "start": 26, "end": 63}], "action": [{"text": "impersonated", "start": 13, "end": 25}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "When executed, the user is prompted to enter personal information, and at the end is given a button to submit the résumé to Teledyne, although nothing is actually submitted.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "While the user enters this information, their machine is infected with TinyZBot.", "output": {"entities": {"modifier": [{"text": "While", "start": 0, "end": 5}, {"text": "with", "start": 66, "end": 70}], "entity": [{"text": "the user enters this information", "start": 6, "end": 38}, {"text": "their machine", "start": 40, "end": 53}, {"text": "TinyZBot", "start": 71, "end": 79}], "action": [{"text": "is infected", "start": 54, "end": 65}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The AppUsageIds for these versions target a major US-based university as well as an Israeli aerospace company.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These versions began to include a new method of installing as a service.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "These versions", "start": 0, "end": 14}, {"text": "a new method of installing as a service", "start": 32, "end": 71}], "action": [{"text": "include", "start": 24, "end": 31}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The service runs with the name Network Connectivity Manager.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "TinyZBot, as well as some other tools (Csext, Net Crawler) initially would not run without a command line parameter set.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This was likely to avoid detonation-based detection engines.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This", "start": 0, "end": 4}, {"text": "detonation-based detection engines", "start": 25, "end": 59}], "action": [{"text": "avoid", "start": 19, "end": 24}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This command line parameter was opensesemi which is often stored in the application's code in an obfuscated manner.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The binders and droppers for TinyZBot provided this command line argument and others when executing.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "TinyZBot uses a dynamic mutex.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This was accomplished by combining a static preset prefix with the active process ID.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This allowed supplemental tools to keep TinyZBot running by enumerating every process and checking if the process ID and mutex prefix existed.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "supplemental tools", "start": 13, "end": 31}, {"text": "every process", "start": 72, "end": 85}], "action": [{"text": "enumerating", "start": 60, "end": 71}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If no mutex and process pair was located, another TinyZBot instance would be started.", "output": {"entities": {"modifier": [{"text": "If", "start": 0, "end": 2}], "entity": [{"text": "no mutex and process pair was located", "start": 3, "end": 40}, {"text": "another TinyZBot instance", "start": 42, "end": 67}], "action": [{"text": "be started", "start": 74, "end": 84}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Multiple backdoors were used by this organization.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Multiple backdoors", "start": 0, "end": 18}, {"text": "this organization", "start": 32, "end": 49}], "action": [{"text": "were used", "start": 19, "end": 28}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These are scripts or applications that allowed for command or code execution outside of the victim network.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "scripts or applications", "start": 10, "end": 33}, {"text": "command or code execution outside of the victim network", "start": 51, "end": 106}], "action": [{"text": "allowed", "start": 39, "end": 46}], "modifier": [{"text": "for", "start": 47, "end": 50}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Many of their backdoors were web applications, added to web servers, so commands can be executed from a browser or client able to communicate with them.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Many of their backdoors", "start": 0, "end": 23}, {"text": "web applications", "start": 29, "end": 45}, {"text": "commands", "start": 72, "end": 80}, {"text": "a browser or client able to communicate with them", "start": 102, "end": 151}], "action": [{"text": "were", "start": 24, "end": 28}, {"text": "be executed", "start": 85, "end": 96}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 97, "end": 101}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This group includes the results of the Shell Creator mentioned in the Attribution section, as well as ASPX backdoors used by Nesha.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This group", "start": 0, "end": 10}, {"text": "the results of the Shell Creator mentioned in the Attribution section, as well as ASPX backdoors used by Nesha", "start": 20, "end": 130}], "action": [{"text": "includes", "start": 11, "end": 19}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A PHP shell was also observed, which also included attribution to Nesha in its hashed password.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "A PHP shell", "start": 0, "end": 11}], "action": [{"text": "was also observed", "start": 12, "end": 29}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "An ASPX backdoor named Zh0uSh311 was located on live servers as well as recovered fro a staging server.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "An ASPX backdoor named Zh0uSh311", "start": 0, "end": 32}, {"text": "live servers", "start": 48, "end": 60}, {"text": "a staging server", "start": 86, "end": 102}], "action": [{"text": "was located", "start": 33, "end": 44}, {"text": "recovered", "start": 72, "end": 81}], "modifier": [{"text": "on", "start": 45, "end": 47}, {"text": "fro", "start": 82, "end": 85}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This backdoor does not require authentication, and its use appears to be straightforward.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Its functionality breaks down into three fairly standard components: SQL queries, executing commands, and uploading files.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Its functionality", "start": 0, "end": 17}, {"text": "SQL queries", "start": 69, "end": 80}, {"text": "executing commands", "start": 82, "end": 100}, {"text": "uploading files", "start": 106, "end": 121}], "action": [{"text": "breaks down", "start": 18, "end": 29}], "modifier": [{"text": "into", "start": 30, "end": 34}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This organization utilized backdoors which masqueraded as varying versions of Notepad.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This organization", "start": 0, "end": 17}, {"text": "backdoors", "start": 27, "end": 36}, {"text": "varying versions of Notepad", "start": 58, "end": 85}], "action": [{"text": "utilized", "start": 18, "end": 26}, {"text": "masqueraded", "start": 43, "end": 54}], "modifier": [{"text": "as", "start": 55, "end": 57}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "They replace the existing Notepad.exe on the infected machine, and when run they call out to a remote server and execute any shell code returned by the remote server.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "they", "start": 76, "end": 80}, {"text": "a remote server", "start": 93, "end": 108}, {"text": "any shell code returned by the remote server", "start": 121, "end": 165}], "action": [{"text": "call out", "start": 81, "end": 89}, {"text": "execute", "start": 113, "end": 120}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 90, "end": 92}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "There will be a detailed analysis of these backdoors posted to Cylance's blog in the future.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "PVZ is a name for a set of executables used together to create a botnet.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The name PVZ was assigned by us as this is one of the few tools this organization has not named themselves.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The components are as follows: XYNTService was not developed by the Cleaver team, but instead is a publicly available project which executes an executable as a service.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "a publicly available project", "start": 97, "end": 125}, {"text": "an executable", "start": 141, "end": 154}, {"text": "a service", "start": 158, "end": 167}], "action": [{"text": "executes", "start": 132, "end": 140}], "modifier": [{"text": "as", "start": 155, "end": 157}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The purpose of PVZ-In is to communicate with a command and control server.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "PVZ-In", "start": 15, "end": 21}, {"text": "a command and control server", "start": 45, "end": 73}], "action": [{"text": "communicate", "start": 28, "end": 39}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 40, "end": 44}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Communication is primarily unidirectional, as little information is provided from the bot to its command and control server.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The known command and control server is located at http: //kundenpflege. menrad (dot) de/js/jquery/default.aspx and the command and control protocol only uses HTTP.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The known command and control server", "start": 0, "end": 36}, {"text": "http: //kundenpflege. menrad (dot) de/js/jquery/default.aspx", "start": 51, "end": 111}, {"text": "the command and control protocol", "start": 116, "end": 148}, {"text": "HTTP", "start": 159, "end": 163}], "action": [{"text": "is located", "start": 37, "end": 47}, {"text": "uses", "start": 154, "end": 158}], "modifier": [{"text": "at", "start": 48, "end": 50}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The commands as well as infected computer information are transferred in the Content- Disposition HTTP header, making the traffic easy to pass over as benign.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The commands as well as infected computer information", "start": 0, "end": 53}, {"text": "the Content- Disposition HTTP header", "start": 73, "end": 109}, {"text": "the traffic", "start": 118, "end": 129}, {"text": "benign", "start": 151, "end": 157}], "action": [{"text": "are transferred", "start": 54, "end": 69}, {"text": "pass over", "start": 138, "end": 147}], "modifier": [{"text": "in", "start": 70, "end": 72}, {"text": "as", "start": 148, "end": 150}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "When a command is received from the server, the results are stored in a central location on disk that the PVZ tools utilize.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "a command", "start": 5, "end": 14}, {"text": "the server", "start": 32, "end": 42}, {"text": "the results", "start": 44, "end": 55}, {"text": "a central location on disk that the PVZ tools utilize", "start": 70, "end": 123}], "action": [{"text": "is received", "start": 15, "end": 26}, {"text": "are stored", "start": 56, "end": 66}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 27, "end": 31}, {"text": "in", "start": 67, "end": 69}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Command functionality is limited to executing supplied commands, downloading and executing executables as well as self-updating.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Command functionality", "start": 0, "end": 21}, {"text": "executing supplied commands", "start": 36, "end": 63}, {"text": "downloading", "start": 65, "end": 76}, {"text": "executing executables", "start": 81, "end": 102}, {"text": "self-updating", "start": 114, "end": 127}], "action": [{"text": "is limited", "start": 22, "end": 32}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 33, "end": 35}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The debug file path for PVZ-In is: PVZ-In has been observed using the file name ossisvc.exe.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "PVZ-Out is the other half of the command and control channel, primarily uploading results of commands and keystroke logging data to a remote server.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "PVZ-Out", "start": 0, "end": 7}, {"text": "the other half of the command and control channel", "start": 11, "end": 60}, {"text": "results of commands and keystroke logging data", "start": 82, "end": 128}, {"text": "a remote server", "start": 132, "end": 147}], "action": [{"text": "is", "start": 8, "end": 10}, {"text": "uploading", "start": 72, "end": 81}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 129, "end": 131}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The known command and control server for PVZ-Out is located at http: //www.gesunddurchsjahr (dot) de/tor/default.aspx.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The known command and control server for PVZ-Out", "start": 0, "end": 48}, {"text": "http: //www.gesunddurchsjahr (dot) de/tor/default.aspx", "start": 63, "end": 117}], "action": [{"text": "is located", "start": 49, "end": 59}], "modifier": [{"text": "at", "start": 60, "end": 62}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Much like PVZ-In, this command and control channel communicates with the Content-Disposition HTTP header, but for file data, POST data is supplied.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "this command and control channel", "start": 18, "end": 50}, {"text": "the Content-Disposition HTTP header", "start": 69, "end": 104}, {"text": "file data", "start": 114, "end": 123}, {"text": "POST data", "start": 125, "end": 134}], "action": [{"text": "communicates", "start": 51, "end": 63}, {"text": "is supplied", "start": 135, "end": 146}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 64, "end": 68}, {"text": "for", "start": 110, "end": 113}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Data uploaded is often compressed, which can make it more difficult to detect the exfiltration of sensitive information.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Data uploaded", "start": 0, "end": 13}, {"text": "it", "start": 50, "end": 52}, {"text": "more difficult to detect the exfiltration of sensitive information", "start": 53, "end": 119}], "action": [{"text": "is often compressed", "start": 14, "end": 33}, {"text": "make", "start": 45, "end": 49}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The debug file path for PVZ-Out is: PVZ-Out has been observed with the file name osppsvc.exe.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "SYN Flooder is a simple network based denial of service tool.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "SYN Flooder", "start": 0, "end": 11}, {"text": "a simple network based denial of service tool", "start": 15, "end": 60}], "action": [{"text": "is", "start": 12, "end": 14}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is a command line utility capable of being invoked by PVZ-In.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "a command line utility", "start": 6, "end": 28}, {"text": "PVZ-In", "start": 57, "end": 63}], "action": [{"text": "being invoked", "start": 40, "end": 53}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Targeting information is supplied via command line parameters.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The debug file path for SYN Flooder is: SYN Flooder has been observed using the name ossysvc.exe.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Logger Module observes the user's actions and records them to a file.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Logger Module", "start": 0, "end": 13}, {"text": "the user's actions", "start": 23, "end": 41}, {"text": "them", "start": 54, "end": 58}, {"text": "a file", "start": 62, "end": 68}], "action": [{"text": "observes", "start": 14, "end": 22}, {"text": "records", "start": 46, "end": 53}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 59, "end": 61}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The recorded actions include mouse clicks, active windows, keypresses, as well as clipboard data.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The recorded actions", "start": 0, "end": 20}, {"text": "mouse clicks", "start": 29, "end": 41}, {"text": "active windows", "start": 43, "end": 57}, {"text": "keypresses", "start": 59, "end": 69}, {"text": "clipboard data", "start": 82, "end": 96}], "action": [{"text": "include", "start": 21, "end": 28}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The resulting log is written out to a location where PVZ-Out can exfiltrate it to its command and control server.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The resulting log", "start": 0, "end": 17}, {"text": "PVZ-Out", "start": 53, "end": 60}, {"text": "it", "start": 76, "end": 78}, {"text": "its command and control server", "start": 82, "end": 112}], "action": [{"text": "is written out", "start": 18, "end": 32}, {"text": "exfiltrate", "start": 65, "end": 75}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 79, "end": 81}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Logger Module has been observed using the name ospcsvc.exe.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The following command and control servers for Logger Module have been observed: WndTest is the evolution of the PVZ tool chain into a single executable.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The following command and control servers for Logger Module", "start": 0, "end": 59}], "action": [{"text": "been observed", "start": 65, "end": 78}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The tool chain is minimized down to a command and control communications, keystroke logging, and clipboard monitoring.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The tool chain", "start": 0, "end": 14}, {"text": "a command and control communications", "start": 36, "end": 72}, {"text": "keystroke logging", "start": 74, "end": 91}, {"text": "clipboard monitoring", "start": 97, "end": 117}], "action": [{"text": "is minimized down", "start": 15, "end": 32}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 33, "end": 35}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The command and control still supports upgrading, downloading, and executing of applications, as well as executing batch scripts.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The command and control", "start": 0, "end": 23}, {"text": "applications", "start": 80, "end": 92}, {"text": "batch scripts", "start": 115, "end": 128}], "action": [{"text": "upgrading", "start": 39, "end": 48}, {"text": "downloading", "start": 50, "end": 61}, {"text": "executing", "start": 67, "end": 76}, {"text": "executing", "start": 105, "end": 114}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "WndTest installs as a service and has been observed attempting to impersonate Adobe Report Service.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "WndTest", "start": 0, "end": 7}, {"text": "a service", "start": 20, "end": 29}, {"text": "Adobe Report Service", "start": 78, "end": 98}], "action": [{"text": "installs", "start": 8, "end": 16}, {"text": "impersonate", "start": 66, "end": 77}], "modifier": [{"text": "as", "start": 17, "end": 19}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "WndTest starts using PHP servers for its command and control server, some of which are listed as defaced sites.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "WndTest", "start": 0, "end": 7}, {"text": "PHP servers", "start": 21, "end": 32}, {"text": "its command and control server", "start": 37, "end": 67}], "action": [{"text": "using", "start": 15, "end": 20}], "modifier": [{"text": "for", "start": 33, "end": 36}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We have seen wndTest communicate with the following servers: Csext is a backdoor application developed in C #which runs as a service.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "wndTest", "start": 13, "end": 20}, {"text": "the following servers", "start": 38, "end": 59}, {"text": "Csext", "start": 61, "end": 66}, {"text": "a backdoor application developed in C #", "start": 70, "end": 109}, {"text": "a service", "start": 123, "end": 132}], "action": [{"text": "communicate", "start": 21, "end": 32}, {"text": "is", "start": 67, "end": 69}, {"text": "runs", "start": 115, "end": 119}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 33, "end": 37}, {"text": "as", "start": 120, "end": 122}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Its primary functionality is based on commands supplied by its configuration file.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The configuration file is able to store specific commands, which are intended to run at particular times.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A recovered configuration is as follows: This configuration executes zhCat to connect back to srv01.microsoftwindowsupdate (dot) net (a deceptive domain owned by this group with falsified Whois data attributing to Microsoft Investor Relations) with XORed communication using the HTTP protocol on TCP port 443.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This configuration", "start": 41, "end": 59}, {"text": "zhCat", "start": 69, "end": 74}, {"text": "srv01.microsoftwindowsupdate (dot) net (a deceptive domain owned by this group with falsified Whois data attributing to Microsoft Investor Relations)", "start": 94, "end": 243}, {"text": "XORed communication", "start": 249, "end": 268}, {"text": "the HTTP protocol", "start": 275, "end": 292}, {"text": "TCP port 443", "start": 296, "end": 308}], "action": [{"text": "executes", "start": 60, "end": 68}, {"text": "connect", "start": 78, "end": 85}], "modifier": [{"text": "back to", "start": 86, "end": 93}, {"text": "with", "start": 244, "end": 248}, {"text": "using", "start": 269, "end": 274}, {"text": "on", "start": 293, "end": 295}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This zhCat instance is running cmd.exe, effectively making it a reverse connecting shell.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This zhCat instance", "start": 0, "end": 19}, {"text": "cmd.exe", "start": 31, "end": 38}, {"text": "it", "start": 59, "end": 61}, {"text": "a reverse connecting shell", "start": 62, "end": 88}], "action": [{"text": "is running", "start": 20, "end": 30}, {"text": "making", "start": 52, "end": 58}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This command runs at 00:29 in the morning, and is killed by taskkill at 00:35.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This command", "start": 0, "end": 12}, {"text": "taskkill", "start": 60, "end": 68}, {"text": "00:35", "start": 72, "end": 77}], "action": [{"text": "is killed", "start": 47, "end": 56}], "modifier": [{"text": "at", "start": 69, "end": 71}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This gives the attackers a predictable method to regain access to a compromised network if they ever lose access.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the attackers", "start": 11, "end": 24}, {"text": "access to a compromised network", "start": 56, "end": 87}, {"text": "they ever lose access", "start": 91, "end": 112}], "action": [{"text": "regain", "start": 49, "end": 55}], "modifier": [{"text": "if", "start": 88, "end": 90}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Csext also has email functionality similar to TinyZBot.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Csext", "start": 0, "end": 5}, {"text": "email functionality similar to TinyZBot", "start": 15, "end": 54}], "action": [{"text": "has", "start": 11, "end": 14}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This email functionality is used to exfiltrate the results of commands from the command file which can also include requests like gathering user information.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This email functionality", "start": 0, "end": 24}, {"text": "the results of commands from the command file which can also include requests like gathering user information", "start": 47, "end": 156}], "action": [{"text": "exfiltrate", "start": 36, "end": 46}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We have seen Csext configured to communicate with the following servers: If after reviewing the Indicators of Compromise (IOC) listed in Appendix A, you believe your organization to be a victim of Operation Cleaver, we recommend you consider the following course of action: 1.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Csext", "start": 13, "end": 18}, {"text": "the following servers", "start": 50, "end": 71}], "action": [{"text": "communicate", "start": 33, "end": 44}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 45, "end": 49}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If inside the United States, contact the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) via either your local FBI team or FBI CYWATCH at 1-855-292-3937 or cywatch @ic.fbi.gov.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "2.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If outside the United States, contact your local, district, state or federal law enforcement authorities.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "3.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If you have visibility into the attacks on your company and the tools and expertise to track them down, leverage the IOCs in Appendix A to identify their presence in your network, prevent them from expanding the scope of the compromise, and remove their access immediately.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "4.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If you do NOT have visibility into the attacks, need help identifying an existing successful compromise in your organization, or more importantly wish to prevent this attack or attacks similar to Operation Cleaver, please contact your security provider.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "5.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If you wish to contact Cylance for additional details not available in this report, please email opcleaver @cylance.com.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "6.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If you would like to learn more about Cylance products and professional services, or discuss how Cylance can mitigate Operation Cleaver's impact to your organization, please contact us directly.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Iran in 2014 can probably be best described as galvanizing.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "They have long been an'' enemy'' of the west, and the United States in particular, but today's headlines include a variety of topics from nuclear talks to human rights to terrorism to cyber hacking.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Iran continues to be extremely active on the global stage–and thereby on the radar of every superpower.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Iran's cyber sophistication has grown rapidly since the dawn of Stuxnet and they have used hard dollars combined with national pride to help build their cyber army.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Few doubt their commitment as a government and nation state to funding and recruiting cyber warriors to infiltrate and damage their enemies.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "And it has been commonly postulated that almost all activity since 2010 coming out of Iran is associated with retaliation for Stuxnet/Duqu/Flame, which seems natural given the severity of the impact.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "But they don't need Stuxnet as motivation to want to hack the world.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "They have long desired power on the political stage, in particular in the fight for nuclear power autonomy.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "With the deadlines around the Iranian nuclear discussions pushed to 2015, the attacks may be tied to negotiating power when discussing a pact with the nuclear superpowers of United States, Britain, France, Germany, Russia and China.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The inner workings of the Iranian government remain largely a mystery to the western world.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, Iran's control over its people and the private businesses birthed inside has been well reported.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In a 2014 Reuters article, the reporters detail how the secret Iranian organization called'' Setad Ejraiye Farmane Hazrate Emam'' has become one of the most powerful organizations in the country, capable of taking over properties and businesses, buying controlling interests in numerous sectors including finance, oil, telecommunications and many others totaling in upwards of $95B.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Even the US Treasury has documented an extensive fronting of companies in its report of Execution of Imam Khomeini's Order (EIKO), which through its two main subsidiaries controls 37 private businesses that are purely front companies for the Iranian government.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The history of Iran controlling the usage of the Internet and the very Internet on-ramps into Iran is well known,.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "They have controlled much of the country's Internet access to date and have taken over controlling interests in those companies to carry out their work.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Given Operation Cleaver's frequent spin-up and take-down of large IP blocks inside the AFRANET IP space inside Iran, and Iran's well recorded investment in cyber warfare leads us to one simple conclusion: Iran is extremely active in the world of hacking.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Operation Cleaver's intense focus on critical infrastructure companies, especially in South Korea, hints at information sharing or joint operations with Iran's partner, North Korea.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In September, 2012, Iran signed an extensive agreement for technology cooperation agreement with North Korea, which allows for collaboration on a variety of efforts including IT and security.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Operation Cleaver's carefully selected targets like the oil and gas industry, energy and utility companies, as well as airlines and airports, indicates Iran's desire to gain deep access into the world's most critical environments.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The end goal of this operation is not known at this time.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "University student recruitment was hinted at within Operation Cleaver and is consistent with Iran's reported history of active warrior recruitment in the educational space.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Overall, there are many reasons that Iran may be pursuing the targets they did in Operation Cleaver.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "While we may never truly know, it is important to consider all the above and more when trying to understand the why.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "After tracking the Operation Cleaver team for over two years, we're led to the inexorable conclusion: the government of Iran, and particularly the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), is backing numerous groups and front entities to attack the world's critical infrastructure.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As security experts in Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources (CIKR), Industrial Control Systems (ICS), Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, Building Management Systems (BMS), embedded systems and fixed-function systems, we know how easy they are to hack.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We have worked with countless customers and vendors throughout the years to notify them of vulnerabilities, assist with remediatation efforts, and help mitigate threats to their environments.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Unfortunately, many critical infrastructure organizations are unable to secure their complex envirnoments against modern attacks.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "They fall victim to the'' glue flu'', a malaise of feeling stuck, not wanting to change the status quo for fear they will find problems that they have no idea how to prevent.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This'' security anaphylaxis'' spells real disaster.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If Operation Cleaver doesn't get the world to wake up to what is happening in the silent world of cyber, then perhaps nothing will.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Prevention is everything and we should never give up until it's achieved.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Challenge your trusted advisors.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Challenge your security vendors.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Demand better technology and services to detect, respond, but most importantly PREVENT not just contemporary attacks, but future exotic attacks that have yet to be imagined.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "That is what truly disruptive and innovative technology is.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Don't settle for anything less.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We hope that by exposing the Operation Cleaver team to the world, current global critical infrastructure victims can be notified, and prevent future victimization from suffering the consequences of'' status quo'' security.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Unlike United Flight 811, perhaps we can prevent the next disaster.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "DEFENDERS, NEVER GIVE UP! In the face of growing and evolving threats, traditional cyber protection technologies are now widely considered inadequate.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The only way to regain the upper hand against a new generation of attackers, is to embrace something entirely new.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Something that'' thinks'' like an attacker.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Something that doesn't rely on a trust model or care about hash lookups.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Something with a brain.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Cylance has eschewed the old foundations that existing cybersecurity products are built upon.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Instead, we've based our approach on mathematics, machine learning, and data science.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This algorithmic approach has been proven to detect–and stop–exponentially more modern threats.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Leveraging algorithmic risk modeling, CylancePROTECT protects endpoints from everyday viruses, worms, trojans, and spyware, but unlike other security products, CylancePROTECT offers true future-proof protection against the most malicious threats in the world.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Advanced Persistent Threats (APT), 0-days, and exotic exploitation techniques are easily detected and halted with little-to-no impact on the end-user.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Existing reactive solutions rely on a constant stream of signature updates for threat detection, which is not only costly and inconvenient, but also requires'' sacrificial lambs''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Only after a previously unseen threat has inflicted damage can the rest of the industry begin to detect it.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "CylancePROTECT doesn't require constant updates or even a network connection to protect against so-called'' previously undetectable'' threats.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "By identifying and defusing attacks in near real time, before the attack can execute, we can finally do away with the need for a'' patient zero''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As Richard Stiennon, Chief Research Analyst at IT-Harvest, put it,'' Many vendors are trying to solve the endpoint problem, yet Cylance is the only one using the power of math to stop malware and with more effectiveness and efficiency than current solutions''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Interested in seeing what CylancePROTECT can do for your organization? Contact us! Cylance is one of the fastest growing cybersecurity technology firms in the US.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Cylance's flagship product CylancePROTECT has been adopted by Fortune 500 companies and government agencies across the globe.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Cylance was founded by 27-year security industry luminary, Stuart McClure, former Global CTO of McAfee, original founder of Foundstone, and lead author of the international best-selling book Hacking Exposed.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In building Cylance, Stuart brought together the best scientific and executive minds from the likes of Cisco, Sourcefire, Google and McAfee.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Cylance board of advisors includes former high-ranking officials from the DHS, the FBI, CIA, and executive titans of business.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "CylancePROTECT is the only next generation endpoint security product that applies math to mute existing and future malware, viruses, worms, trojans, bots, APTs, 0-days, exploits, adware, spyware and hacking tools–without needing any updates or even a connection to the Internet.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The technology is founded on the principle that to fix the industry, you must start from scratch with a way as yet unseen.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "CylancePROTECT does not rely on signatures of any sort (blacklist or whitelist), behavioral analysis using IOCs, sandboxing analysis, heuristics, micro-virtualization, or dynamic detonation–to detect and prevent malicious files from executing on a target endpoint.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "While every other endpoint security product must collect a sample, analyze, and write a signature to detect it, CylancePROTECT can detect malware before it executes by statically analyzing features found in the binary itself.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Features and Benefits of CylancePROTECT: • Near real time detection of malicious files, even if they've never been seen in the wild.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• Can be used to augment existing endpoint security or be deployed as a complete replacement.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• Does not require any signature updates or connection to the cloud.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• An easy-to-use web management console with intuitive workflows.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• Low-impact endpoint agent.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For a demo of CylancePROTECT, contact a Cylance expert today! Cylance's Professional Services team is available to assist companies affected by this campaign.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Cylance is providing consulting to companies that may have been targeted by these advanced threat actors.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Cylance will perform initial triage in order to determine the extent to which your company has been affected by this campaign and work towards establishing a containment strategy.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Cylance has two tailored offerings for clients affected by this campaign.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The first one includes ICS in our incident response since many companies affected are in the Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources (CIKR) vertical.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The second offering's focus is to deploy our proprietary tools and methodologies to detect and mitigate the threats posed by Operation Cleaver.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For more information on how the Cylance Professional Services team can assess and respond to attacks like the ones obseved in Operation Cleaver, contact sales @cylance.com today.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Brian is a Sr. Security Researcher for Cylance who joined shortly after the company was established.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "He is best known for his avid botnet research (often going by'' botnethunter'') and for his novel malware analysis in the A Study in Bots blog series hosted by Cylance.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Brian has been a dedicated open-source developer as well as an advocate for public and private anti-botnet operations.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Brian actively develops techniques to combat cyber oppositions in positions where resources and leverage are in too limited of supply for conventional means.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These techniques, cultivated by Stuart McClure, are the Art of Deterrence.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In a previous investigation, Art of Deterrence techniques were successfully used to divert Indonesian hackers motivated by monetary gain away from their highest yielding target group.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Brian's botnet research covers a wide range of topics, from using graph analysis to estimate the amount of ransom that has been paid to a ransomware operator, to utilizing IPv4 scanning techniques to identify and take down point of sale malware panels.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Stuart is founder, CEO/President and Chairman of Cylance.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Widely recognized for his extensive and in-depth knowledge of security products, Stuart McClure is considered one of the industry's leading authorities in information security today.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A well-published and acclaimed security visionary with currently eleven books in print, McClure is the originating founder of the Hacking Exposed series of books, the most successful security book ever written.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "From his work, he founded Foundstone in October of 1999 which sold to McAfee in 2004.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "McClure brings over two decades of technology and executive leadership with profound technical, operational, and financial experience.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Besides Foundstone, Stuart held leadership positions at InfoWorld, Ernst & Young, Kaiser Permanente and a number of government agencies.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "At McAfee, McClure held numerous positions including SVP/General Manager for the Security Management BU as well as EVP/Global Chief Technology Officer responsible for almost $3B worth of revenues.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Today, McClure is CEO of Cylance, a disruptive and innovative startup applying math to the problem of security.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Cylance products such as CylancePROTECT prevent the most advanced attacks in the world without signatures or sandboxing in realtime on the endpoint.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Cylance Services offer highly specialized security services such as incident response, forensics, compromise assessments and advanced penetration assessments for global critical infrastructure.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Cylance employees work passionately and tirelessly every day to achieve one goal: Protect the world from cyber attacks.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "And with their efforts in tracking Operation Cleaver, they have achieved that goal.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Our endless thanks to all the Cylancers who contributed to this report.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Operation Cleaver logo, created by Cylance specifically for this report, was inspired by the infamous logo used by the Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution, also known in the west as the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Due to the close connection between the members tracked in this report and the IRGC, it was only fitting to replicate the look and feel of the IRGC's iconography as the anchor for this document's branding.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The striking visual elements that make up the logo of the IRGC have very specific meanings: • The clenched fist holding a rifle, most likely an AK-47, represents armed resistance.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• The globe symbolizes the IRGC's worldwide ambitions.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• The book, from which the clenched first emanates, represents the Qur'an, connecting the religious ideals on which the group was founded to the armed struggle.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• The plants, possibly wheat, represent prosperity.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• The name of the group in Persian, the year in which it was founded and a passage from the Qur'an (8:60)'And make ready against them all you can of power', are represented in text.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Several of the visual elements present in the IRGC logo have been carried over to the Operation Cleaver logo including: • A clenched fist, this time holding a cleaver, represents the group's likely connection with the IRGC as well as armed resistence in general.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• The globe in the background represents Operation Cleaver's worldwide reach.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• An ethernet cable connected to the clenched first represents the nature of these attacks (cyber as opposed to traditional warfare).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• The hex string translates to'' Think Evil, Do Good'', a mantra our research team lives by.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This Appendix details the IOCs discovered in the investigation of Operation Cleaver.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "CylancePROTECT prevents the malware used in Operation Cleaver from ever executing.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These mutexes are used with the process ID of the malware as a suffix: Listed below are both the MD5 and SHA-256 hashes for samples related to Operation Cleaver.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Thank you for subscribing to Episode 16 of the HP Security Briefing.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In this edition we discuss the cyber landscape within the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), known in the West as North Korea, is a unique country with a military-focused society and an unconventional technology infrastructure.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "While North Korea was formerly on the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism, it was removed in 2008.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, due to North Korea's hostility toward other nations, its pursuit of nuclear weapons, and human rights violations against its own citizens, the United Nations and many Western entities have placed sanctions and embargoes against North Korea.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For example, U.S. export laws forbid the sale of dual-use technologies, or those that can be used or repurposed for both civilian and military use, to North Korea.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "< /n > 5 < /fn > Additionally, the U.S. has a military alliance with the Republic of Korea (ROK), known in the West as South Korea, North Korea's primary target of conflict.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Due to North Korea's global interactions, its cyber warfare capabilities are of particular interest to the U.S.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "According to a 2009 report by Major Steve Sin, an intelligence analyst at U.S.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Forces Korea, North Korean hackers have successfully penetrated U.S. defense networks more frequently than any other country that has targeted U.S. defense assets.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "While Major Sin may have been overly optimistic about North Korea's abilities, it is clear that they should not be underestimated.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Frank Cilluffo, co-director of the Cyber Center for National and Economic Security at George Washington University, testified before Congress that North Korea's cyber capability'' poses an important'wild card' threat, not only to the United States but also to the region and broader international stability…'' In an April 2014 testimony given to the House Armed Services Committee, General Curtis M. Scaparrotti noted that'' North Korea remains a significant threat to United States' interests, the security of South Korea, and the international community due to its willingness to use force, its continued development and proliferation of nuclear weapon and long- range ballistic missile programs, and its abuse of its citizens' human rights, as well as the legitimate interests of its neighbors and the international community.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' Scaparrotti stressed that'' While North Korea's massive conventional forces have been declining due to aging and lack of resources…North Korea is emphasizing the development of its asymmetric capabilities.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "North Korea's asymmetric arsenal includes…an active cyber warfare capability.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' While one would expect the regime's digital infrastructure to also suffer from aging or lack of resources, these factors do not take away from their technical abilities to wage cyber warfare.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "While the U.S. views North Korea's cyber warfare program as the regime's foray into modern asymmetrical warfare, South Korea views the regime's cyber capabilities as a terroristic threat, -a build-up for an impending multifaceted attack.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is important to note that, to date, no such attack has occurred.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "According to a report written by Captain Duk-Ki Kim, Republic of Korea Navy officer and Ph.D.'' …the North Korean regime will first conduct a simultaneous and multifarious cyber offensive on the Republic of Korea's society and basic infrastructure, government agencies, and major military command centers while at the same time suppressing the ROK government and its domestic allies and supporters with nuclear weapons.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' South Korea's view of North Korea as a terroristic threat may be an attempt to downgrade North Korea politically, since South Korea does not recognize the regime as a legitimate state.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "South Korean reports also claim that North Korea's premier hacking unit, Unit 121, trails Russia and the U.S. as the world's third largest cyber unit.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "While this claim may be exaggerated, in 2012, South Korean reports estimated North Korea's hacker forces at around 3000 personnel.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In a July 2014 report from South Korea's Yonhap News Agency, that figure was upgraded to 5900 hacker elite.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We must stress that although these claims have not been corroborated, South Korea has taken the regime's cyber threats very seriously and is reportedly training 5000 personnel to defend against North Korean cyber attacks.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Obtaining details on North Korea's cyber warfare capabilities is not an easy task.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This paper will examine the known cyber capabilities of North Korea's regime and how the country maintains secrecy in these matters.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Through information obtained via open source intelligence (OSINT), we will present what is known about North Korea's cyber warfare and supporting intelligence and psychological operations capabilities.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The following conditions proved to be research roadblocks when gathering intelligence regarding North Korea's cyber warfare capabilities:  Much of the intelligence available on North Korea is dated and may not accurately reflect the regime's current capabilities.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": " Much of the intelligence available on North Korea comes from U.S. or South Korean military or agency reports.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These reports omit details that are likely classified, such as specific IP addresses and individual actor information.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": " While South Korea is an ally of the United States, its reports on North Korean cyber activity potentially contain incomplete or biased information.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Cultural factors that stem from a history of tension and conflict between the two nations may skew perception and make objectivity difficult.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": " North Korea's Internet infrastructure and the regime's strict control over its use ensures that there are no rogue actors and that all officially sanctioned actors exercise careful OPSEC and PERSEC practices in order to prevent inadvertent information leaks.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In other words, there was no significant identifying information in the form of an OSINT trail left behind by the actors.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This hinders collection of original, actionable threat intelligence and individual actor attribution.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": " North Korea is well-isolated from the outside world, and its strong intelligence and psychological operations presence effectively creates confusion via counterintelligence and disinformation about the regime's capabilities.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For this reason, any'' official'' reports emanating from North Korea must be taken with a grain of salt.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This also hinders attempts to obtain original, actionable threat intelligence.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In order for Westerners to understand the North Korean mindset, it is necessary to examine the key components of North Korean political and ideological thought.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is also necessary to provide a brief explanation of how North Korea and South Korea view one another, in order to understand the basis for conflict between the two.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "North Korea has two primary ideologies that provide context for the regime's motivations and activities: juche (ju-cheh) and songun (sun-goon).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Juche is the official political ideology of North Korea.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It was instituted in 1972 and is based on the ideologies of Kim Il-Sung, the founder of the DPRK.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Juche emphasizes self-reliance, mastering revolution and reconstruction in one's own country, being independent of others, displaying one's strengths, defending oneself, and taking responsibility for solving one's own problems.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "North Korea's air-gapped intranet, described below, exemplifies this philosophy in the country's cyber infrastructure.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The juche philosophy explains North Korea's disdain for outside cultural and political influence.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Juche challenges North Koreans to contribute to the regime's chaju (ja-ju), a concept of national sovereignty and independence.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The regime's greatest fear is internal dissent and resulting destabilization.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In a June 2014 Reddit AMA session, Dr. Andrei Lankov, an expert on North Korean culture and society, noted'' there are also serious signs of public alienation and discontent.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "And I can not rule out a public outbreak of such discontent in the near future.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Of course, if it happens, it will have a serious impact on the government.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' Despite North Korea's strong conviction in juche, the regime collaborates with and receives support from other nations.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, due to this deep-seated ideology, it is doubtful that North Korea fully trusts these apparent allies.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Later in this document, we will show that North Korea relies heavily on China for Internet access.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "North Korea also collaborates with China and Russia to train its cyber warriors and has longstanding political and military relationships with several nations.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Songun is North Korea's'' military first'' doctrine.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Songun emphasizes the priority of the military in resource allocation and political and economic affairs.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This doctrine stems from the belief that the military is vital for preservation of chaju.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Understanding songun mindset gives context for this potential threat actor's motivations.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "According to a 2013 Congressional report, the strategy established under former leader Kim Jong-Il focused on'' internal security, coercive diplomacy to compel acceptance of its diplomatic, economic and security interests, development of strategic military capabilities to deter external attack, and challenging South Korea and the U.S.-South Korean alliance.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' North Korea's songun permeates the lives of all North Korean citizens.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Article 58 of the North Korean Constitution states that the nation should base itself on a nationwide defense system that includes all people.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "North Korea, with a population of 25 million, has an active duty force of 1.19 million personnel, the fourth largest in the world.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The country's reserve and paramilitary units comprise 7.7 million additional personnel.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In other words, over a third of the country's population serves in a military or paramilitary capacity.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Some North Korean youth aged 7-13 are inducted into the Korean Children's Union.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Korean Children's Union is responsible for indoctrinating youths who pledge to build up their strength to later defend the regime.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Children aged 14-16 can begin military training as members of the Young Red Guards, a paramilitary unit.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Beginning at age 17, North Koreans are eligible to join the Reserve Military Training Unit.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Reserve Military Training Unit forms the core of North Korea's reserves and is typically assigned to the front or regional defense in wartime.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The youngest age at which a citizen can be conscripted for active duty is unclear; reported ages range from 18-20.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Youths can volunteer for active duty service at age 16 or 17.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Worker-Peasant Militia, or Red Guards, includes males ages 17-60 and unmarried females ages 17-30 who are not part of active duty units or the Reserve Military Training Unit.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The regime has an impressive number of conventional weapons, considering the nation's small land area and population size.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "According to statistics released by CNN in 2014, North Korea's ground arsenal includes 4100 tanks, 2100 armored vehicles, and 8500 pieces of field artillery.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The regime's sea weaponry includes 70 submarines, 420 patrol combatants, and 260 amphibious landing craft.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Their airpower includes 730 combat aircraft, 300 helicopters, and 290 transport aircraft.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "While the limits of the regime's ballistic missile program are unknown, North Korea is thought to have fewer than 100 short-range missiles and fewer than 100 medium to long-range missiles.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, in recent years, North Korea has suffered oil, fuel, electricity, and food shortages.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Without aid from another entity, the regime does not have sufficient resources to maintain and sustain the majority of its weapons and associated personnel for rapid deployment or prolonged combat.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Tension between North and South Korea has continued well past the armistice meant to end the Korean War.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Neither nation recognizes the other as a legitimate state.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "South Korea's constitution legally defines South Korean territory as the entire Korean peninsula and its adjacent islands, with'' North Korea'' being a part of South Korea.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "North Korea also claims to be the sole government of the Korean Peninsula.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Each country's claim of sovereignty and refusal to acknowledge the other as a legitimate state creates the condition for perpetual conflict.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "North Korea's negative sentiment towards the U.S. stems from two major factors: the U.S.–South Korea military alliance and North Korea's perception that the U.S. is imperialistic and prone to exploitative capitalism.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In recent years, two primary factors have heavily influenced the current state of North Korea's relations with South Korea and her allies: the rise of the regime's leader Kim Jong Un and the inauguration of South Korean president Park Guen Hye.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Kim Jong Un officially rose to power in April 2012, following the death of his father Kim Jong Il in December 2011.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "While his age remained a mystery for quite some time, it was later revealed that he was born in January 1983, making him age 31 at present.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This makes Kim Jong Un the world's youngest leader of an established nation.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The young leader's rise to power brought about several changes in North Korea.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "First, Kim Jong Un's personal life is more public and more extravagant than that of his father.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Unlike his father, the young Kim is often accompanied by his wife when making public appearances.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Second, the young Kim, who is more high-tech than his predecessor, is reported to have an affinity for luxury items and is an avid gamer and basketball fan.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Third, Kim Jong Un is more totalitarian than his father.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Following his rise to power, the regime reportedly expanded its labor camps, and more military resources were allocated to target those attempting to defect.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Kim also executed his own uncle, a high-ranking official who did not share his ideals.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These moves indicate the regime's priority to deter internal destabilization and dissent, which is perceived to be a greater threat than outside adversity.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "According to Phil Robertson, deputy Asia director at Human Rights Watch,'' The government now recognizes that the accounts of escaping North Koreans reveal Pyongyang's crimes–so it is doing what it can to stop people from fleeing.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' Under Kim Jong Un's rule, the regime has stepped up its nuclear materials production, and the propaganda distributed by state media has become more menacing.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The regime's response to perceived threats has also become more volatile.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Christian Whiton, a former deputy envoy to North Korea, noted that following Kim Jong Un's rise to power,'' the regime still acts in a very belligerent manner, but it seems less predictable, and more random.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' Ellen Kim, assistant director of the Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, assessed the situation thusly:'' Since [Kim Jong Un] took power he has purged almost all of his elder guardians ...", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "and filled his surroundings with new faces.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We are in a situation where we are learning about him a little bit every day through his unpredictable behavior and actions, which is why the current situation with North Korea is a lot more dangerous than before.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' The regime's recent reaction to an upcoming film supports these statements.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The plot for the comedy film'' The Interview'' follows two talk show hosts who are asked to assassinate Kim Jong Un.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The regime even sent a complaint about the movie to the UN.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In response to the film, a North Korean official stated,'' The enemies have gone beyond the tolerance limit in their despicable moves to dare hurt the dignity of the supreme leadership.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' The official referred to the movie as'' the most undisguised terrorism and a war action to deprive the service personnel and people of the DPRK of their mental mainstay and bring down its social system.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' The official also issued a threat:'' If the U.S. administration connives at and patronizes the screening of the film, it will invite a strong and merciless countermeasure.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' This reaction demonstrates North Korea's priority of preserving the regime's self-perceived dignity in the global arena and its intolerance of any disrespect directed at the Kim family.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "While tensions between North and South Korea have persisted since the Korean War, these tensions escalated following the 2013 inauguration of South Korea's current president, Park Geun Hye.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Her platform, in her words, is as follows:'' North Korea must keep its agreements made with South Korea and the international community to establish a minimum level of trust, and second there must be assured consequences for actions that breach the peace.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "To ensure stability, trustpolitik should be applied consistently from issue to issue based on verifiable actions, and steps should not be taken for mere political expediency.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' Shortly after Park's inauguration, North Korea denounced UN Security Council Resolution 2094, which is'' a resolution strengthening and expanding the scope of United Nations sanctions against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea by targeting the illicit activities of diplomatic personnel, transfers of bulk cash, and the country's banking relationships, in response to that country's third nuclear test on 12 February [2013].", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' North Korea also responded strongly to joint U.S.-South Korea military exercises in March 2013, as is noted later in this paper.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "North Korea's cyber infrastructure is divided into two major parts: an outward-facing Internet connection and a regime-controlled intranet.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "North Korea's outward-facing Internet connection is only available to select individuals and is closely monitored for any activity that is deemed anti- regime.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Individuals using the outward-facing Internet connection must be authorized.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In 2013, Jean H. Lee, the Associated Press bureau chief in Pyongyang, stated that foreigners visiting North Korea are allowed Internet access with no firewalls.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Common citizens are limited to using the Kwangmyong (gwang me-young), a nationwide intranet with no access to the world outside North Korea.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "According to Lee, Kwangmyong allows citizens'' access to the state media, information sources that are vetted by the government, and picked and pulled from the Internet and posted to their intranet site.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' As of May 2013, North Korea had only one'' Internet café.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' A 2003 report from the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive stated that North Korea's'' Internet café'' was'' the only place in North Korea for the public to access the Internet'' and that foreigners were allowed to access the Internet from this café.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Whether citizens are allowed to access the Internet from this location is unknown.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Star Joint Venture Co. is responsible for providing North Korea's Internet access.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Star Joint Venture Co. was established by the Post and Telecommunications Corporation in cooperation with Loxley Pacific in Thailand.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In December 2009, Star Joint Venture became responsible for North Korea's Internet address allocation.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Previously, Internet access was provided by a German satellite link via Korea Computer Center Europe or via direct connections with China Netcom, which was later merged into China Unicom.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "By October 2010, North Korea had made its first known direct connection to the Internet, hosting an outward-facing Korean Central News Agency website accessible from the global Internet.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, many of North Korea's globally accessible websites are hosted in other countries.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In 2001, South Korean reports indicated that North Korea had joined the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As of April 2012, North Korea reportedly used the Intelsat connection, which appeared in border gateway protocol (BGP) announcements.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Some reports referred to the Intelsat connection as North Korea's backup Internet connection, in case the China Unicom connection fails.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A March 2013 post on the blog rdns.im showed that North Korea no longer used the Intelsat connection.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In the blog post, the author noted his method for proving that The Pirate Bay was not hosted in North Korea.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "While his analysis of The Pirate Bay's hosting is irrelevant to our research, he did detail that 175.45.177.0/24 always routes through AS4837, and AS131279.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "AS131279 is Star-KP, North Korea's Star Joint Venture Company, and AS4837 is China Unicom.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The author concluded that'' all [traffic] is ONLY routed through China Unicom and NOT through Intelsat.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' In February 2014, North Korean and South Korean officials agreed to extend Internet access to Kaesong Industrial Zone, a jointly operated industrial complex just north of the border.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, this would likely require a major electrical and network infrastructure expansion.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "North Korea's electrical grid can not support a large technological infrastructure.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Electrical power is reported to be unreliable and sporadic, with many citizens only receiving a few hours of electricity per day.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The photo above (Figure 3), from the International Space Station, shows North Korea's sparse power grid, in comparison with surrounding nations.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We have highlighted North Korea in red.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Koryolink, the country's only cellular phone network, is tightly controlled by the regime.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Cell phone data plans are not available to most users.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Most cellular phones can not access the Internet and can only make domestic calls.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "According to a 2013 report, North Korea has a 3G data network for cellular phones.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Visiting reporter Jean H. Lee purportedly used this 3G network to post to both Twitter and Instagram.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, citizens are not generally allowed to use the 3G network.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Email is also regulated by the regime.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The first email provider in North Korea was Silibank.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Silibank has servers in Pyongyong and Shenyang and is a joint venture with China.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The North Korean Silibank homepage is silibank.net, and the Chinese homepage is silibank.com.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In order to use the email service, users had to initially register, provide personal information, and pay a registration fee and monthly service fees.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This registration information was current as of 2001.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, it is unknown whether the same process still applies.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "WHOIS records for silibank.net show that the site was registered anonymously via a Japanese registrar.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This information can be found in Appendix A at the end of this paper.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Korea Computer Center (KCC) is North Korea's leading government research center for information technology.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "KCC has eleven regional information centers and eight development and production centers.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Other countries with KCC branch offices include China, Syria, Germany, and United Arab Emirates.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "KCC has a vested interest in Linux research and is responsible for the development of North Korea's national operating system, Red Star OS, which is discussed in more detail below.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "KCC's other projects have included a proprietary search engine, a document writer, a game called Jang-Gi, the Kwangmyong intranet, a food study program, a Korean input method editor, a pen-based English-Korean and Korean-English translator, Korean voice recognition software, a video conferencing system, a distance education system, SilverStar Paduk software, HMS Player, and the Samjiyon tablet.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In addition to research and development, KCC also monitors websites of foreign government and business entities and conducts technical reconnaissance to blueprint the technical specifications and vulnerabilities in foreign systems and technologies.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "KCC has also been involved in clandestine information and cyber operations, serving as a command center.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "North Korea's proprietary operating system is Red Star OS.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The development of this Linux-based operating system started in 2002.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Red Star OS is only offered in the Korean language and features proprietary software including Naenara (a Firefox-based browser), as well as a text editor, email client, audio and video players, and games.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Red Star OS's keyboard layouts include Korean, English, Russian, Chinese, and Japanese.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Regime ideals extend to Red Star OS.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The readme file, which goes with the installation disc, reportedly includes a quote from Kim Jong-Il regarding the importance of North Korea having its own Linux-based operating system that is compatible with Korean traditions.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "While prior versions of Red Star were KDE-based, version 3.0 mimics Apple's OS X.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This could indicate the regime leader Kim Jong Un's preference for the OS X environment, as Kim reportedly uses an iMac.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Citizens do not need permission to obtain Red Star OS.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, the purchase of computers is heavily regulated.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The OS's design suggests it was developed with means for the regime to monitor user activity.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "North Korea is known to use two IP ranges.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "175.45.176.0/22 is North Korea's own IP block.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Additionally, North Korea's Telecommunications Ministry is the registered user of China Unicom IP range 210.52.109.0/24.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The country's only autonomous system (AS) number is AS131279, and its only peer is AS4837, the AS for China Unicom.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "North Korea's country code top-level domain (ccTLD) is .kp", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": ".", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In 2007, the .kp", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "TLD was initially delegated to and administered by the German-based KCC Europe.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "After KCC Europe failed to maintain the TLD, it was re-delegated to Star Joint Venture Company.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The .kp", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "TLD uses the following nameservers and IP addresses: Various U.S., U.N, and other sanctions prohibit export of dual-use technologies to North Korea.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In light of this, North Korea has managed to develop both hardware and software and hosts an annual National Exhibition of Invention and New Technologies to promote its products.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, the regime has historically failed in its attempts at large-scale production of electronic components.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The country's sparse electrical grid is one of the major obstacles hindering large- scale manufacturing.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Additionally, the famine in the early 1990's negatively impacted existing manufacturing facilities, and the regime simply does not have the capital to modernize those factories.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A member of the World International Property Organization (WIPO), North Korea joined the WIPO Patent Cooperation Treaty that protects patents and trademarks worldwide, and leverages intellectual property laws to ensure Westerners do not take credit for North Korean inventions.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The regime, in its efforts to isolate its citizens from Western influence, leverages intellectual property laws to ensure Westerners do not take credit for North Korean inventions.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This is ironic since foreign-made electronic components are sometimes smuggled into North Korea for military use and for personal use by the regime's upper echelon.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A comparison of a scan of North Korea's IP ranges in November 2010, just one month after North Korea made its first direct connection to the Internet, and a series of several scans we conducted in May 2014, shows that North Korea has made significant headway in establishing its Internet presence.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In the November 2010 scan, 175.45.176.0-175.45.176.16 showed a variety of devices including D-link, Cisco, Linksys, HP, and Nokia devices, and a Juniper networks firewall.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Operating systems detected included FreeBSD 6.x, Linux 2.6.x, and Red Hat Enterprise Linux.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "175.45.176.14 returned'' Naenara'' as an html-title.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Most hosts in the 175.45.176.xx and 175.45.177.xx ranges were down.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As of 2014, IP addresses 175.45.176.0-175.45.177.255 appear to be used for websites, nameservers, databases, email, and voice over IP (VoIP).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In November 2010, the 175.45.178.xx range showed all hosts down, and the 175.45.179.xx range showed most hosts were down.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In 2014, several webservers and nameservers were found in the 175.45.178.xx range, and several nameservers and mail servers were found in the 175.45.179.xx range.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This comparison demonstrates that there has been some growth in DPRK Internet infrastructure over the past four years.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, it seemingly lags behind even most third world nations.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The 2014 scans detected dated technology that is potentially susceptible to multiple vulnerabilities and consistently showed the same open ports and active devices on scanned hosts.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is not clear whether the regime failed to notice and react to the scanning or whether the regime allows these open ports and devices to be detected or spoofed to serve as a distraction or possible honeypot.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Domains, nameservers, and mail servers present during the May 2014 scan are listed in Appendix B at the end of this report.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "According to Alexa rankings, the three most visited websites in North Korea are kcna.kp, the official website of the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA); rodong.rep.kp, another North Korean news site; and naenara.com.kp, North Korea's official web portal.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Naenara translates to'' my country''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The kcna.kp site was registered using a Loxley.co.th email address and is administrated by Star Joint Venture Company.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The WHOIS Record can be found in Appendix A. Rodong.rep.kp was registered using the same loxley.co.th email address and is also administered by Star Joint Venture Company.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The WHOIS Record for this site can be found in Appendix A.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The WHOIS information for Naenara.com.kp was not available.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In March 2013, there were reports that the Chrome browser was blocking Naenara.com.kp due to malware.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is difficult to say whether this incident is a case of North Korea serving malware or whether a third party took advantage of an improperly secured website.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Several major North Korean websites are hosted outside of North Korea.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The popular Uriminzokkiri.com website, whose name translates to'' our nation,'' is hosted in China.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The administrative contact for the website is Kim Sejun, and the email address given as contact information is hyk1979 @hotmail.com.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The WHOIS Record for this site can be found in Appendix A.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The website for Kim Il Sung Open University, otherwise known as'' Our Nation School'' is also hosted in China.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The WHOIS record for this site can be found in Appendix A.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "At the top of North Korea's military structure is the National Defense Commission (NDC).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The NDC is also the highest branch of government and the regime's supreme policymaking body.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Along with the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea and the Cabinet, NDC is at the top of North Korea's political hierarchy.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Article 106 of North Korea's Constitution gives the NDC the following powers:  The power to establish policies of the state in accordance with the military-first revolutionary line.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": " The power to guide the armed forces and oversee defense building.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": " The power to supervise and ensure the NDC and its chairman's orders are executed and to establish necessary measures.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": " The power to override any state decisions or directives that are in opposition to the NDC or its chairman's decisions and directives.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": " The power to create or remove central organs of the national defense sector.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": " The power to create and bestow military titles above general-grade officer rank.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The NDC oversees several defense and intelligence bodies including the Ministry of State Security, the Ministry of People's Security, the Ministry of People's Armed Forces, and the Korean People's Army.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Ministry of State Security (MSS), also known as the State Security Department, is North Korea's primary counterintelligence service.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is considered an autonomous agent of the regime and reports directly to leader Kim Jong Un.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The MSS's duties include oversight of North Korean prison camps, investigation of domestic espionage, repatriation of defectors, and overseas counterespionage operations.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Ministry of People's Security is also known as the Ministry of Public Security (MPS).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Focused on domestic order, it oversees North Korea's national police force, conducts criminal investigations and preliminary examinations, and oversees correctional facilities, excluding prison camps.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "While the roles of the MSS and MPS focus more on intelligence than on cyber operations, the MSS also reportedly has a communications monitoring and computer hacking group.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Ministry of People's Armed Forces (MPAF) administrates the Korean People's Army (KPA) and oversees the General Staff Department (GSD), which is responsible for operational command and control of North Korea's armed forces.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The General Staff Department also oversees the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB), North Korea's agency for clandestine operations.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The RGB has a role in both traditional and cyber operations.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In the past, the RGB has sent agents on overseas military assistance missions to train insurgent groups.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The RGB reportedly has a special operations forces (SOF) element and oversees six bureaus that specialize in operations, reconnaissance, technology and cyber matters, overseas intelligence collection, inter-Korean talks, and service support.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Two of these bureaus have been identified as the No.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "91 Office and Unit 121.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The No.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "91 Office, an office responsible for hacking, operates out of the Mangkyungdae-district of Pyongyang.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Unit 121 comprises both an intelligence component and an attack component.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Unit 121's headquarters is in the Moonshin-dong area of Pyongyang, near the Taedong River.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It also has components that conduct operations from within China.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "One of Unit 121's command posts is Chilbosan Hotel in Shenyang, the capital of Liaoning Province, which borders North Korea.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Shenyang is a Chinese military district.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "According to Dr. Alexandre Mansourov, an expert on North Korea and a visiting scholar at the U.S.-Korea Institute at Johns Hopkins University,'' They [Unit 121] are believed to have conducted hacking operations from inside China that falsify classified data and disrupt U.S. and South Korean systems.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' Both Unit 121 and an entity known as Lab 110 are reported to maintain technical reconnaissance teams responsible for infiltrating computer networks, hacking to obtain intelligence, and planting viruses on enemy networks.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Several entities are nested under the Workers' Party.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Central Party Committee oversees the Central Party Investigative Group, also known as Unit 35.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Unit 35 is reportedly responsible for technical education and training of cyber warriors.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Unification Bureau's Operations Department is responsible for cyber-psychological warfare, organizational espionage, and oversight of Unit 204.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Unit 204's responsibilities include planning and execution of cyber-psychological warfare operations and technological research.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Psychological Operations Department of the North Korea Defense Commission also engages in cyber-psychological warfare.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The 225th Bureau, or Office 225, is responsible for training agents, infiltration operations in South Korea, and creation of underground political parties in order to incite disorder and revolution.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It plays a more traditional intelligence and psychological operations role, rather than focusing on cyber operations.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The United Front Department (UFD) conducts overt operations to create pro-North Korean groups in South Korea.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Examples of this activity include the Korean Asia-Pacific Committee and the Ethnic Reconciliation Council.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The UFD also manages inter-Korean dialogue and North Korea's policy toward South Korea.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Its operations are also more traditional rather than cyber-focused.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Liaison Department of the Worker's Party oversees a faction of ethnic North Koreans residing in Japan who are critical to North Korea's cyber and intelligence programs.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This group, which was established in 1955, is referred to by various names including the Chosen Soren, Chongryon, and the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Chongryon ascribe to juche and seek to preserve North Korean culture while living in Japan.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "They operate North Korean style schools and refuse to assimilate with Japanese culture.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "According to Mitsuhiro Suganuma, former section head of the second intelligence department of the Japanese Public Security Intelligence Agency (PSIA),'' Chongryon is virtually under the direct control of the Liaison Department of the Workers' Party of Korea, which has been in charge of North Korea's covert operations and underground activities against South Korea.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Chongryon in Japan has been a strong support organization aimed at bringing a revolution in South Korea, or a red unification by force.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' He also stated'' North Korea will continue to make Chongryon serve as Pyongyang's pawn in covert operations against South Korea.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' The Chongryon are vital to North Korea's military budget, raising funds via weapons trafficking, drug trafficking, and other black market activities.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The group also forms'' front companies'' abroad that benefit the regime by generating hard currency.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "One example is Unikotech, which was formed to sell KCC products abroad.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Chongryon's underground group known as the Gakushu-gumi, or'' the study group'', gathers intelligence for North Korea and helps the regime procure advanced technologies.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Chongryon's role in North Korean intelligence and resource acquisition is discussed below in more detail.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The regime also has several government bodies under the Cabinet that oversee its infrastructure, intelligence, and technological development.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These include the Central Scientific and Technological Information Agency (CSTIA), the Ministry of Electronics Industry, and the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The CSTIA collects, analyzes, and processes data regarding advanced science and technology then sends relevant information to appropriate areas of the national economy.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The amount of information contained in CSTIA's technical database makes it North Korea's largest scientific facility.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "According to a CIA article, review of CSTIA's publications showed that China, Russia, and Japan are important sources of technical data.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "CSTIA's publications include newsletters and an 18-volume science and technology reference series.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications is the body of oversight for Star Joint Venture Co. North Korea's cyber warfare doctrine has not been clearly stated.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, based on cultural and technical observations, we may deduce that North Korea's cyber doctrine follows the tenets of juche nationalism and the songun doctrine.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Although North Korea's limited online presence makes a thorough analysis of their cyber warfare capabilities a difficult task, it must be noted that what is known of those capabilities closely mirrors their kinetic warfare tactics.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Cyber warfare is simply the modern chapter in North Korea's long history of asymmetrical warfare.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "North Korea has used various unconventional tactics in the past, such as guerilla warfare, strategic use of terrain, and psychological operations.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The regime also aspires to create viable nuclear weapons.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Asymmetrical warfare is defined as'' a conflict in which the resources of two belligerents differ in essence and in the struggle, interact and attempt to exploit each other's characteristic weaknesses.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Such struggles often involve strategies and tactics of unconventional warfare, the'weaker' combatants attempting to use strategy to offset deficiencies in quantity or quality''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "According to the aforementioned report to the House Armed Service Committee,'' Cyber warfare is an important asymmetric dimension of conflict that North Korea will probably continue to emphasize-in part because of its deniability and low relative costs.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' North Korea's poor economic state, further explains the regime's reliance on these tactics.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In 2014, the regime reportedly spent 16% of its budget on defense.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The North Korean military places a strong emphasis on information warfare capabilities including political and psychological warfare and cyber or hacker warfare.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The report by Capt.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Duk-Ki Kim, Ph.D. highlighted North Korea's counter-asymmetric strategy and ranked each based on intensity and frequency: Just ten years ago, experts noted that North Korea was one of the'' least network-ready and most isolated societies on the planet.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' Today North Korea's air-gapped networks and prioritization of resources for military use provide both a secure and structured base of operations for cyber operations and a secure means of communications.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "North Korea's hermit infrastructure creates a cyber-terrain that deters reconnaissance.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Because North Korea has few Internet connections to the outside world, anyone seeking intelligence on North Korea's networks has to expend more resources for cyber reconnaissance.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A 2003 article by the U.S. Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive assessed that'' Development of the nation, rather than empowerment of the individual, appears to be driving DPRK efforts to develop domestic IT infrastructure and industry.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' In November 2013, Kim Jong Un referred to cyber warfare capabilities as a'' magic weapon'' in conjunction with nuclear weapons and missiles.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "According to Kim Heung-kwang, a North Korean defector and former computer science professor, the regime has the following motivations for expanding its cyber warfare capabilities:  Cyber capabilities are a cost-effective way to offset North Korea's lack of kinetic military prowess.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": " North Korea's school systems place a strong emphasis on math, giving the nation confidence in its programmers, cryptographers, and security researchers.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": " In the modern warfare landscape, cyber capabilities are potentially more utilitarian than heavy artillery or aircraft.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": " Cyber warfare capabilities provide a platform for espionage, psychological operations, and other forms of non-kinetic warfare.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": " Considering the separatist nature of North Korea's infrastructure, cyber warfare provides a strategic advantage since outbound attacks are possible, but inbound attacks would have limited reach.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": " Cyber warfare allows North Korea to leverage the Internet's inherent flaws for offensive purposes while maintaining its defenses, primarily via air-gapping its most critical networks from the outside world.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "North Korea's attack and defense capabilities reportedly include the following cyber warfare and electronic warfare components: offensive cyber operations (OCO); computer network operations (CNO), which includes both computer network attack (CNA) and computer network exploitation (CNE); distributed denial of service (DDoS); satellite monitoring; drones; GPS jamming capabilities; and deployment of electromagnetic pulse (EMP).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "North Korea's OCO and CNO capabilities became apparent as early as 2004, when North Korea reportedly gained access to 33 of 80 South Korean military wireless communication networks.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In June 2006, an attack on the U.S. State Department originating in the East Asia-Pacific region coincided with U.S.-North Korea negotiations over the regime's nuclear missile testing.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A month later, a South Korean military report implicated North Korea's Unit 121 in hacking the South Korean and U.S. Defense Departments.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "North Korea also tested a logic bomb in October 2007.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A logic bomb is malicious code programmed to execute based on a pre-defined triggering event.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Following the logic bomb test, the UN passed a resolution banning sales of certain computer hardware to North Korea.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "North Korea considers its cyber warfare capabilities an important asymmetric asset in the face of its perceived enemies, the U.S. and South Korea.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "While North Korea does not have an immersive digital culture, both the U.S. and South Korea are heavily dependent upon technological infrastructure for social, economic, and political stability.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For this reason, a cyber attack that cripples or compromises the reliability of the U.S. or South Korea's technological infrastructure could have a far-reaching impact.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "North Korea has reportedly used computer games for both illegal capital gain and orchestrating cyber attacks.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In 2011, South Korean police arrested five individuals, including one Chinese national, for allegedly collaborating with North Korean hackers affiliated with the Korea Computer Center to steal money via online games.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "According to South Korean reports, the culprits used an auto-player to quickly progress in the massively multiplayer online role-playing game (MMORPG)'' Lineage'' and were able to use the game's market to obtain real currency.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In 2013, South Korean officials released information stating they had found evidence that North Korea was using games as a medium for infecting machines and launching cyber attacks.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "North Korea had used game downloads to infect 100,000 South Korean machines for a botnet used to launch a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack against Incheon Airport.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This clever tactic sought to leverage a seemingly innocent game as a force multiplier in order to amplify the effects of a DDoS attack on a critical infrastructure target.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, in this case, there was little impact on the target.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "North Korea's intelligence program is one of its strongest military assets, providing foundational support for all other military operations.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The regime's cyber warfare capabilities, in particular, rely heavily on open-source intelligence (OSINT) collection and cyber-espionage.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As noted in a CIA publication,'' It is a significant irony of our information age that open-source intelligence is contributing to the survival and development of one of the world's most secretive regimes.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' Historically, the primary goals of the regime's intelligence program included collection and dissemination of intelligence concerning any possible political, military, or economic threat to the regime's security and stability.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Secondary goals have included'' acquisition of foreign military and civilian technologies and equipment, support of the DPRK's foreign policy goals, training and support for foreign revolutionary and terrorist organizations, and the acquisition of foreign capital for state and intelligence operations.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' North Korea has a broad reach for intelligence collection, which extends to cyber intelligence.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In April 2013, Solutionary, a company providing managed security services, reported a marked increase in both overt attacks and information gathering attempts originating from North Korean IPs.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Solutionary refers to any overt external attacks on company networks or attempts to steal data as'' touches.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' They reportedly recorded 12,473 of these touches in February 2013, 11,000 of which were directed at a single financial institution.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As a baseline, Solutionary noted that typically only 200 incidents per month are traced to North Korean origin.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This is an interesting claim, considering that attacks attributed to North Korea are usually routed through other countries.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As mentioned above, a faction of ethnic North Koreans residing in Japan, known as the Chongryon, are critical to North Korea's cyber and intelligence programs and help generate hard currency for the regime.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Chongryon headquarters has been recognized as the de facto North Korean embassy in Japan.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In 2012, the organization's headquarters was seized to pay for the group's past due debts.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It was then purchased by a monk named Ekan Ikeguchi, who let the Chongryon continue to use the building in what he referred to as a'' goodwill gesture''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Ikeguchi is one of the Chongryon's many ties to organized crime.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Ikeguchi was arrested in the past for an attempted coup against the Japanese government.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "He also has ties to the political group Nihon Seinensya, which is involved in illegal activities in conjunction with the yakuza syndicate Sumiyoshi-kai, which imports and sells amphetamines made in North Korea.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "North Korea also has black market ties to Sumiyoshi-kai's rival syndicate, Yamaguchi-gumi.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Many members of the Kodo-kai, Yamaguchi-gumi's ruling faction, are Korean-Japanese, with ties to North Korea.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Masahiro Namikawa, leader of the drug trafficking Seido-kai yakuza organization, also has ties to the Chongryon.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Chongryon operate at least two websites, chongryon.com, which is in Japanese, and korea- np.co.jp.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "WHOIS records for chongryon.com indicate that it was registered by'' guanin o'' using the email address park2 @mac.com.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The WHOIS information for korea-np.co.jp.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "shows that it was registered by Choson Shinbo Company Inc.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The WHOIS records for these sites can be found in Appendix A. Additionally, the Chongryon operate a ferry called the Mangyongbong-92, the only direct transit from Japan to North Korea.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In 2003, they were suspected of using the ferry to smuggle missile parts.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In 2006, the ferry was temporarily banned from Japanese waters when Japanese officials discovered the Chongryon were using it to smuggle dual-use electronics to North Korea to be used for military purposes.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "North Korea has a global network of state-run businesses located in 30 to 40 countries that is used for espionage activities.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Reconnaissance General Bureau is responsible for oversight of this network.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The businesses include cafes and other non-suspect establishments.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The highest concentration of these is in China.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Members of this espionage network reportedly'' send more than $100 million in cash per year to the regime and provide cover for spies.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' These establishments are also used for money laundering and drug trafficking.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The regime is also known to kidnap foreign citizens and use them as instruments for intelligence.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Prisoners are first tortured and psychologically conditioned to bend to the regime's will.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "They are then used based on their skillset.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This may include teaching their language to North Koreans, spreading propaganda in their native language, providing translation services, conducting military training, or other skills the regime deems useful.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In July 2014, Japanese officials agreed to lift some sanctions on North Korea when the regime agreed to investigate the whereabouts of Japanese citizens who were allegedly abducted by North Korean agents decades ago.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Sanctions to be lifted include the ban on port calls to Japan by North Korean ships.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "North Korea has also infiltrated important positions in South Korea for both intelligence and psychological operations purposes.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In 2011, South Korea's National Intelligence Service reportedly discovered the presence of Communist spies.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These spies within their trusted circles had been reporting back to North Korea for almost 10 years.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The embedded spies included a Democratic Party representative.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "According to the agency, the spies were on a mission to infiltrate and influence the Democratic Party and to gather military intelligence.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The regime also attempts to infiltrate organizations made up of North Koreans who seek shelter in South Korea, in order to gain intelligence.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In the past several years, South Korea has arrested at least 14 defectors who were found to be spies.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These intelligence collection and counterintelligence capabilities are an attempt to provide the regime with a strategic asymmetrical advantage.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The regime leverages its human and cyber resources around the globe to provide an influx of intelligence, while very little credible intelligence about the regime's activities and capabilities ever becomes available to the outside world.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "North Korea continues to be a master of propaganda and deception and leverages the cyber realm for psychological operations.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Modern North Korean psychological operations tactics include distribution of propaganda via traditional media outlets, websites, and social media.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Many of these psychological operations campaigns are politically focused.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "According to Dr. Andrei Lankov, the North Korean government has'' very rational and highly successful manipulators who usually get what they want by outsmarting everybody else in the process.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' The regime's Unit 204 is responsible for cyber-psychological operations.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These operations are PSYOP tailored for the cyber arena.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In order to be successful, cyber- psychological campaigns require speed, precision, and creativity.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These campaigns leverage the phenomenon of viral, unverified news stories that tend to rapidly propagate via social media, mobile text messaging, and other electronic communications.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This phenomenon creates an arena for strategic propagation of both fact and fiction for the purposes of sentiment manipulation.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Such messages may be used for recruitment, cyber mobilization, and to instill fear in a target population.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Cyber-psychological operations may also include mental suggestion using technology as a delivery mechanism for subliminal cues.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is unknown whether North Korea possesses this capability.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "North Korean citizens have access to state-approved social networks on the Kwangmyong.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The regime has a limited overt social media presence on the Internet.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Some of the known social media platforms employed by the regime include Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The YouTube channel North Korea Today, operated by user rodrigorojo1, features news clips from North Korea.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is unclear whether this channel is officially sanctioned.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The North Korea Today YouTube channel also has corresponding profiles on Twitter and Facebook.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Uriminzokkiri website, known for pushing juche ideology and anti-American and anti-South Korean messages, has accompanying social media profiles on YouTube, Google+, and Facebook.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It also has Twitter profiles in both Korean and English.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "North Korean propaganda is used for several purposes: to enforce the ideals of allies and sympathizers, to frame North Korea in a favorable light to outsiders, to sensationalize the regime's perceived self-reliance and military prowess, and to shield its own citizens from the outside world.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Juche ideology and indoctrination of the regime's youth ensure support of the local population.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "North Koreans accept military duty as an honor and strive to excel in their service to the regime.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In the spirit of juche, the regime uses disinformation to'' hide lapses or tout accomplishments that may have never been achieved.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' Limiting citizen access to the outside world by instituting the Kwangmyong intranet, North Korea ensures its citizens are not exposed to outside information that is counterproductive to citizen indoctrination or in conflict with juche ideals.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "North Korea portrays the West, particularly the United States, as an enemy.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The regime uses this strategy of shifting the population's negative sentiments toward an external entity to keep its citizens ignorant of North Korea's own economic hardship, regime brutality, and systemic incompetence.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For example, prior to Kim Jong Il's death in 2011, North Korean media altered photos of their'' Dear Leader'' to make him appear younger and healthier than he really was.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This became obvious when the altered photos were compared to those taken by Western media around the same time.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "According to Dr. Andrei Lankov,'' North Koreans now have a much better understanding of what is going on in the outside than they did before.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This is largely thanks to the spread of DVDs and video content in the country, but also because some of them have been to China and talk about what they have seen…many [of] them sincerely believe that the United States remains ready to attack at any moment and that Japan is an incurably aggressive place…nearly all of them swallow the official propaganda myths about the Korean War being started by the'American Imperialists' who invaded them.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Hence, they see the outside world as an inherently dangerous place.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' Some human rights groups seek to reach out to North Korean citizens and break them from this isolation.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In August 2014, the New York-based charity Human Rights Foundation sponsored a hackathon in San Francisco called'' Hack North Korea'' to find new ways to get information in, out, and around North Korea.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The event brought together many programmers, human rights campaigners, and defectors.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "North Korea even uses'' trolling'' as a PSYOP tactic.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "On the Internet,'' trolls'' are users who post messages that are often crass, controversial, inflammatory, or offensive, in order to evoke a strong reaction or influence a reader's opinion.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Often, the motivation for trolling is simply for the troll's enjoyment.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The rude and offensive trolling tactics are in stark contrast to traditional forms of persuasive rhetoric.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, North Korea reportedly utilizes over 200 military intelligence operatives to troll South Korean message boards and social media pages with pro-North Korean sentiments. < /fn > Matt Rhoades, director of the cyberspace and security program at the Truman National Security Project, said,'' North Korea's cyber-development is almost just a new harassment mechanism for them, a low-cost, asymmetric method to harass its neighbor in the south…'' Leveraging the cyber and intelligence resources noted above, North Korea's psychological operations serve an important strategic role.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The ability to influence outsiders, while effectively isolating its own population from most outside influence, allows North Korea to remain an enigma.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Additionally, in line with its PSYOP tactics, North Korea may strategically take credit for cyber attacks that were, in reality, launched by another entity.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Whether the targeted entity blames North Korea for the attacks, or the regime simply takes credit for an attack that has not yet been attributed, several PSYOP goals can come into play.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "First, to claim credit for an attack amplifies the impact of a show of force, particularly if South Korea is the target.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This tactic can be used to stir sentiments in order to provoke a reaction.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Second, North Korea may lay claim to responsibility for an attack that exceeds its capabilities in order to seem more technologically advanced and more capable.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Third, any success, or the appearance thereof, enforces the juche ideal of regime self-sufficiency.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Finally, North Korea may act as a scapegoat and claim credit for a cyber attack of an ally such as China so the attack is not attributed to the real actors.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "North Korea reportedly has the electronic warfare capabilities to jam GPS and to inject false GPS coordinates.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "North Korea demonstrated these capabilities in March 2011 by jamming South Korea's GPS signals during a joint U.S.-South Korea military exercise.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "North Korea has the capability to create an EMP.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "An EMP is a sudden, extreme outburst of atmospheric electricity creating an intense magnetic field that can burn out electrical equipment.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A report from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) noted North Korea's ability to deliver a nuclear warhead as a satellite over the South Pole, effectively creating the burst needed to deliver an EMP targeting the United States.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "An EMP could effectively disrupt electronic communications including critical infrastructure components such as telecommunications, financial institutions, the energy sector, transportation, food and water delivery, emergency services, and space systems.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "North Korea reportedly acquired its EMP technology from Russia.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "North Korea also has a drone program.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The regime reportedly acquired its first drones in the late 1980's or early 1990's.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The regime's drones are complimentary to its intelligence program and are primarily used for surveillance.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In early 2014 a North Korean drone crashed south of the 38th parallel, the line dividing North Korea from the south.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "While early reports noted that the drones appeared similar to those manufactured by Chinese company Tauyuan Navigation Friend Aviation Technology, the company denied involvement.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Stressing the importance of the regime's electronic warfare capabilities, in 1999 former regime leader Kim Jong Il said'' The basic key to victory in modern warfare is to do well in electronic warfare.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' Since the regime's advanced technology lags behind that of South Korea and the U.S., its capability to disrupt the communications of these perceived adversaries is a vital asymmetric capability.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "North Korea utilizes primary and secondary education and the university system to train its cyber warfare operators.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "According to reports by defectors, the regime seeks out children who show mathematical talent and sends them through rigorous advanced training.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A vintage North Korean animation stresses the importance of mathematics in North Korean education.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The short film follows a young boy as he does his geometry homework.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The frustrated boy begins to daydream then has visions of going to war with the U.S. and needing geometry to effectively calculate missile trajectory during the battle.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Science and technology students are expected to learn foreign languages, which may include Chinese, Japanese, and English.233 Student emails, chats, and web browsing activities are heavily monitored.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Around age twelve or thirteen, chosen students are enrolled in accelerated computer courses at First and Second Geumseong Senior-Middle Schools.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The successful students are then sent to Kim Il-sung University, Kim Chaek University of Technology, or the Command Automation University, traditionally known as Mirim University.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Kim Il-sung University's computer center was started in 1985.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Its computer courses have a heavy programming element.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The university reportedly developed the Intelligent Locker hard disc protection program, Worluf Antivirus, SIMNA (simulation and system analysis program), a war games program, a hepatitis diagnosis and prescription system, and a C++ program development tool called FC 2.0.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Kim Il-sung University also has programs focusing on nuclear research.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Kim Chaek University of Technology was established in 1948.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In the late 1990s, it began to restructure its computer-focused courses to reflect more modern technologies.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As of 2002, the university had three colleges focusing on computer science, information science and technology, and machine science.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Software developed by the university includes Computer Fax and SGVision, an image-reprocessing program used for steganography.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Students and instructors must submit a formal request for permission in order to use the Internet for research.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Command Automation University periodically chooses around 100 students for an intensive five-year course prior to their assignment to serve in cyber intelligence and cyber warfare capacities.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Programs at the Command Automation University include command automation, computers, programming, automated reconnaissance, and electronic warfare.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Other students attend a two-year accelerated university program, then study abroad in Russia or China before they are assigned to a cyber-operator role.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The elite cyber operators are given special incentives.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For example, parents of students graduating from the cyber program with top scores are given the opportunity to live in Pyongyang; and married cyber operators are given housing, a food allowance, and a stipend if operating overseas.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Due to the nature of their profession, these cyber elite are some of the only North Koreans allowed to access the outside Internet.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "While this report focuses on North Korea's cyber warfare capabilities, these capabilities can not be fully separated from the implications of partnerships with countries known to deal in illegal weapons trade with the regime.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Now that cyberspace has become a legitimate arena for warfare, these nations are also potential allies in the cyber realm.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For this reason, the regime's key political and military relationships are explored below.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "North Korea has a longstanding historical relationship with China.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "During the Korean War (1950- 1953), China allied with North Korea's Communist forces.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "China has also provided ongoing political and economic support to the regime's leadership and is a primary trade partner.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "North Korea is economically dependent on China.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "North Korea gets an estimated 90 percent of its energy imports, 80 percent of its consumer goods, and 45 percent of its food supply from China.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This relationship is prudent–in the event of a military conflict, China can strategically use North Korea as a buffer zone between itself and South Korea, where many U.S. military personnel are stationed.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Chinese aid to North Korea also deters the likelihood that the regime will collapse, resulting in internal destabilization that could catalyze a U.S.-China conflict.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "North Korea relies heavily on China for technological resources.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As noted above, North Korea relies on China's Unicom for Internet access.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Additionally, the regime sends some of its cyber warriors to train in China and stations a portion of its Unit 121 personnel in Shenyang.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Some of North Korea's official websites are hosted in China, and KCC has a branch office there.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "North Korea also relies on China to provide much of its network hardware, including servers and routers.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "North Korea has a long history of ties to Russia.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The former Soviet Union was the major sponsor of the North Korean state and a major trading partner.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, aid to North Korea was halted and trade diminished significantly.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This chain of events contributed to North Korea's eventual economic collapse, as it could not survive without aid.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "North Korea currently has a collaborative relationship with Russia in the cyber realm.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The regime's CSTIA relies on Russia as one of several sources for technical data.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "North Korea also sends some of its cyber warriors to train in Russia, and the regime reportedly acquired its EMP technology from there.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Political ties between Russia and North Korea have become stronger in recent months.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In 2014, potentially as a result of the U.S. response to the Russian-Ukranian conflict, Russia began to strengthen ties with North Korea.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Negotiations reportedly included promises of trade and development projects.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Narushige Michishita, a North Korea and Asia security expert at Japan's National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, stated'' By strengthening its relationship with North Korea, Russia is trying to enhance its bargaining position vis-à-vis the United States and Japan.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' Russia also recently forgave most of the regime's debts.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "North Korea and Iran have longstanding political and military ties.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "North Korea supplied Iran with conventional arms during the Iran-Iraq War.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Iran and North Korea reportedly collaborate closely in ballistic missile development efforts.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In the past, Iran provided the North Korean regime with necessary funds and oil in exchange for missile parts and technology.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In 2009, a North Korean plane transporting 35 tons of weapons and allegedly bound for Iran was seized after making an unscheduled stop in Bangkok, Thailand.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "That same year, United Arab Emirates seized a ship bound for Iran that was transporting several containers of North Korean weapons, including rocket-propelled grenades and ammunition.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Reportedly, the customer was a company affiliated with Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "North Korea also has cyberwar ties with Iran.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In 2012, North Korea and Iran signed a technology treaty to help combat'' common enemies'' in cyberspace.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The treaty included provisions for cooperation in research, student exchanges, and joint laboratories.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Joint projects reportedly include IT information sharing, engineering, biotechnology, renewable energy, and sustainability.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "F-Secure's Mikko Hypponen stated,'' It's highly likely that one of the reasons for this co-operation is for them to work together regarding their cyber defence and cyber offense strategies''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Hypponen cited Flame malware as a possible triggering event for the creation of this treaty.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Others also suspect that Iran and North Korea's mutual interest in development of nuclear weapons and the need to protect refineries against malware such as Stuxnet were driving factors in the establishment of the treaty.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee leaders assert that the treaty indicates North Korea and Iran are collaborating on a joint nuclear weapons program.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Additionally, North Korea, in conjunction with Iran and Syria, reportedly supports both Hamas and Hezbollah in procuring kinetic weaponry and communications equipment and in establishing operational infrastructure.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "North Korea has both a cyber relationship and kinetic weapons ties with Syria.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "KCC reportedly has a branch in Syria.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In 2007, Israel launched an airstrike, destroying a Syrian target that was allegedly a nuclear facility under construction with North Korea's assistance.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "U.S. officials noted the facility was modeled on the North Korean nuclear reactor at Yongbyon.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The North Korea-Syria relationship becomes more important in the context of both countries' ties with Iran.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As noted above, Iran, North Korea, and Syria jointly provide support to extremist groups Hamas and Hezbollah.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Additionally, as we explored in HPSR Security Briefing Episode 11, Iran and Syria's military alliances extend to joint SIGINT and cyber operations.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "North Korea also has an interesting relationship with Cuba–one that includes supplying weapons and apparent attempts to illegally smuggle weapons.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In 2013, a North Korean cargo ship on its return voyage was stopped near the Panama Canal.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The ship was carrying surface-to-air missile parts, disguised as containers of sugar.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In an attempt to save face, Cuba's Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the cargo included'' 240 metric tons of obsolete defensive weapons -- two anti- aircraft missile complexes Volga and Pechora, nine missiles in parts and spares, two Mig-21 Bis and 15 motors for this type of airplane, all of it manufactured in the mid-20th century -- to be repaired and returned to Cuba.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' Experts said the cargo appeared to include a SNR-75 Fan Song fire-control radar system for an SA-2 missile, a Soviet-era missile system that was also used in Cuba.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Following the incident, Fidel Castro credited former North Korean leader Kim Il-Sung for providing Cuba with weapons near the end of the Cold War.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Weapons included 100,000 AK rifles and necessary ammunition.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "While no apparent cyber relationship exists between North Korea and Cuba at this time, their track record for weapons trade means the potential for future collaboration in the cyber realm can not be discounted.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": " North Korea gains access to 33 South Korean military wireless communication networks  The U.S. State Department is attacked by entities in the East Asia-Pacific region.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The attacks coincided with State Department negotiations with North Korea regarding the regime's nuclear missile tests.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "(June)  A South Korean military official states North Korea's Unit 121 has breached South Korean and U.S. military entities.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "(July)  North Korea states that it is'' fully ready for any form of high-tech war.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' (June)  DarkSeoul DDoS and disk wiping malware targeting South Korean and U.S. government, media outlet, and financial websites.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These attacks also coincided with U.S.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Independence Day.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "(July)  Malware for'' Operation Troy'' was likely planted.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is interesting to note that much of North Korea's cyber activity follows a distinct pattern.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Analysis of North Korean cyber activity gives insight into these patterns and also helps tie together North Korea's strategic, tactical, and operational capabilities.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Strategic capabilities refer to the assets used in support of a long-term, overarching goal.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Tactical capabilities refer to the methods and maneuvers actually implemented in pursuit of the strategic goal.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Operational capabilities refer to the potential use of these capabilities.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In 2004, in response to the annual U.S.–South Korea joint military exercises, North Korea reportedly gained access to 33 South Korean military wireless communication networks.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The next significant cyber attack attributed to North Korea was in June 2006.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The U.S. State Department was attacked by entities in the East Asia-Pacific region.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The attacks coincided with State Department negotiations with North Korea regarding the regime's nuclear missile tests.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In July 2006, North Korea's Unit 121 reportedly breached South Korean and U.S. military entities.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This attack was concurrent with the regime's test-fire of at least one long-range missile and several medium-range missiles.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "2007 was politically tumultuous for North Korea.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Following multi-national talks, the UN's International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) ordered the shutdown of the regime's nuclear facilities in Yongbyon in July.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Its nuclear efforts temporarily thwarted, North Korea tested a logic bomb in October 2007.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In April 2009, North Korea ejected IAEA and U.S. nuclear compliance officials.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The regime indicated refusal to comply with any UN agreements regarding nuclear weaponry and announced it would reinstate its nuclear materials production.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The next month, North Korea conducted an underground nuclear test and voiced its confidence that the regime was well on its way to producing viable nuclear technology.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The UN called an emergency meeting condemning the nuclear weapons test, and South Korea joined the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "North Korea issued a statement via KCNA calling South Korea's involvement in PSI an act of war.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In June 2009, North Korea stated that it was'' fully ready for any form of high-tech war.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' The following month, DDoS and disk wiping malware, later known as DarkSeoul, targeted South Korean and U.S. government entities, media outlets, and financial websites.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The attacks coincided with U.S.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Independence Day.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Other malware used for Operation Troy was also planted.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Operation Troy would continue for several years, largely undetected.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In early 2011, political and military tensions were high.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In February, James Clapper, United States Director of National Intelligence, testified that North Korea likely had undeclared uranium enrichment facilities as part of its nuclear weapons program.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In March 2011, South Korean media, financial, and critical infrastructure targets suffered a DDoS and disk-wiping malware attack later known as the'' 10 Days of Rain''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "U.S. and South Korean military entities were also targeted by DDoS during this attack.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The attack used the DarkSeoul malware.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "North Korea also disrupted South Korean GPS signals.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Additionally, North Korean actors reportedly attempted a DDoS attack against South Korea's Incheon Airport that same month.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These incidents coincided with the annual U.S.–South Korea joint military exercises.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The following month, North Korean actors reportedly launched a DDoS attack against South Korea's Nonghyup bank.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In 2012, an attack on South Korean Newspaper JoongAng Ilbo was attributed to North Korean actors.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This attack also coincided with the timing of the annual joint U.S.–South Korea military exercises.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In September 2012, North Korea signed a cyber treaty with Iran, agreeing the two nations would collaborate to combat'' common enemies'' in cyberspace.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The week of March 11, 2013, the U.S. and South Korea began their annual joint military exercise near the Korean Peninsula.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Like clockwork, attacks attributed to North Korea and now known as the March 20 attacks targeted three South Korean media outlets and Shinhan, Nonghyup, and Jeju banks.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "North Korea also exhibited other hostile activity at that time.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "North Korea cut communication with Seoul and announced it had scrapped the 1953 armistice between the two Koreas.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "North Korea's foreign ministry also issued a statement that it perceived this exercise as a precursor to invasion and that the regime would respond with a'' strong military counteraction'' if the situation escalated.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "That same week, the North Korean military conducted a drone attack simulation.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "On March 18, the Uriminzokkiri YouTube channel posted an anti-U.S. video entitled'' Firestorms Will Rain on the Headquarters of War'' that showed a depiction of the White House in crosshairs, followed by an explosion.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In May 2013, DarkSeoul malware was used to attack several South Korean financial institutions; and in June, DarkSeoul DDoS attacks were launched against the South Korean government's DNS server.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "DarkSeoul DDoS attacks", "start": 108, "end": 130}, {"text": "the South Korean government's DNS server", "start": 153, "end": 193}], "action": [{"text": "were launched", "start": 131, "end": 144}], "modifier": [{"text": "against", "start": 145, "end": 152}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The latter took place on June 25, the anniversary of the start of the Korean War.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As evidenced above, much of North Korea's cyber activity coincides with the annual U.S.–South Korea joint military exercises.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Attacks not following that pattern were typically in response to political events impacting the regime or correlated with significant dates, such as the anniversary of the start of the Korean War.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The regime's strategic assets and tactical capabilities in the cyber arena seem to have evolved only slightly since 2009.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Most of the attacks attributed to North Korea employ limited tactics, and their operational capability demonstrates an increase in the frequency and volume of attacks but is otherwise unimpressive to date.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In June 2014, the regime demanded cancellation of the annual U.S.-South Korea joint military exercise, attempting to use participation in the upcoming Asian Games as a bargaining chip.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The regime's demands may have had other political motivations, as they preceded the July 2014 meeting between South Korean president Park and Chinese President Xi Jinping.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The meeting centered on trade and regional security issues, including the ever-present rhetoric around denuclearization of North Korea.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Both leaders were critical of Japan's recent announcement to soften sanctions on North Korea.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As this report headed to press, the annual U.S.–South Korea joint military exercises were underway.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The most prominent North Korean threat actor group is the group responsible for the DarkSeoul malware.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "According to statements from the South Korean government, North Korea's Lab 110 were the actors behind the DarkSeoul malware.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "South Korean intelligence reports stated that Lab 110, which is affiliated with the regime's defense ministry, was ordered by the North Korean regime to destroy South Korean communications networks.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Although the March 20 attacks used DarkSeoul malware, it is interesting to note that two groups, WhoIs Team and New Romantic Cyber Army Team, claimed responsibility for the'' March 20'' 2013 attacks on South Korean media and financial institutions.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Some of the DarkSeoul attacks corresponded with significant dates, such as U.S.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Independence Day or the anniversary of the start of the Korean War.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "DarkSeoul attacks go beyond denial of service and sabotage.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As early as 2009, the group responsible for the Dark Seoul attacks launched'' Operation Troy'', an espionage campaign targeting the South Korean military.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The operation was codenamed'' Troy'' due to the frequent use of the word'' Troy'' in the malware's compile path strings.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The malware used in these attacks sought out and exfiltrated data, based on keyword searches.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The malware used in these attacks", "start": 0, "end": 33}, {"text": "data", "start": 61, "end": 65}], "action": [{"text": "sought out", "start": 34, "end": 44}, {"text": "exfiltrated", "start": 49, "end": 60}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "While the malware was clearly intended to search for and exfiltrate certain types of data, its true impact on the targets was never revealed.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the malware", "start": 6, "end": 17}, {"text": "certain types of data", "start": 68, "end": 89}], "action": [{"text": "search", "start": 42, "end": 48}, {"text": "exfiltrate", "start": 57, "end": 67}], "modifier": [{"text": "for", "start": 49, "end": 52}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The March 2011'' 10 Days of Rain'' DDoS attacks on U.S. and South Korean sites have also been attributed to the actors associated with DarkSeoul.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "According to Symantec, the politically motivated attacks have required a level of intelligence, coordination, monetary support, and technical sophistication that suggests state sponsorship.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This designation means the group can be considered an advanced persistent threat (APT).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A March 20, 2013 attack attributed to the DarkSeoul actors targeted three South Korean media outlets and Shinhan, Nonghyup, and Jeju banks.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The impact of the March 20 attacks included disruption of service at financial institutions and data deletion.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the March 20 attacks", "start": 14, "end": 34}, {"text": "disruption of service at financial institutions", "start": 44, "end": 91}, {"text": "data deletion", "start": 96, "end": 109}], "action": [{"text": "included", "start": 35, "end": 43}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, the targeted entities resumed normal operations shortly thereafter.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "According to South Korean reports, the media outlets targeted corresponded with those listed by the North Korean regime in 2012 as right-wing press that manipulated South Korea's public opinion.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In April 2012, the regime reportedly listed those entities as attack targets.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The malware used in the March 20, 2013 attacks were wiper malware.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The malware used in the March 20, 2013 attacks", "start": 0, "end": 46}, {"text": "wiper malware", "start": 52, "end": 65}], "action": [{"text": "were", "start": 47, "end": 51}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The malware attempted to disable AhnLab and Hauri AV antivirus products then proceeded to overwrite the master boot record (MBR).", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The malware", "start": 0, "end": 11}, {"text": "AhnLab and Hauri AV antivirus products", "start": 33, "end": 71}, {"text": "the master boot record (MBR)", "start": 100, "end": 128}], "action": [{"text": "disable", "start": 25, "end": 32}, {"text": "overwrite", "start": 90, "end": 99}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The attack was capable of wiping both Linux and Windows machines.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The attack", "start": 0, "end": 10}, {"text": "both Linux and Windows machines", "start": 33, "end": 64}], "action": [{"text": "wiping", "start": 26, "end": 32}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "McAfee found that these attacks were the culmination of the malware campaign they dubbed'' Operation Troy''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A report from IssueMakersLab tied the actors responsible for the March 20, 2013 attacks to cyber attack activity occurring as early as 2007.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "IssueMakersLab found that these actors consistently used the same 16-digit password for file compression, the same stage 1 C2 protocol, the same collection keywords and encryption keys, and the same development path.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "these actors", "start": 26, "end": 38}, {"text": "the same 16-digit password", "start": 57, "end": 83}, {"text": "file compression", "start": 88, "end": 104}, {"text": "the same stage 1 C2 protocol", "start": 106, "end": 134}, {"text": "the same collection keywords and encryption keys", "start": 136, "end": 184}], "action": [{"text": "used", "start": 52, "end": 56}], "modifier": [{"text": "for", "start": 84, "end": 87}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "According to South Korea's Korea Internet and Security Agency, the North Korean IP address 175.45.178.xx was found scanning South Korean routes the month before the attacks, and the same IP was reportedly logged as accessing one of the targets 13 times.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the North Korean IP address 175.45.178.xx", "start": 63, "end": 104}, {"text": "South Korean routes", "start": 124, "end": 143}], "action": [{"text": "scanning", "start": 115, "end": 123}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Details of the March 20 attack also suggested possible ties to China.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "AlienVault suspected the Chinese exploit kit GonDad was used to spread the malware, and the Korean domains serving the malware were registered using a Chinese email address.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the Chinese exploit kit GonDad", "start": 21, "end": 51}, {"text": "the malware", "start": 71, "end": 82}], "action": [{"text": "spread", "start": 64, "end": 70}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Additionally, researchers at AhnLab in South Korea noted a Chinese IP address linked to the attacks.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "While no concrete evidence has been released that indicates Lab 110 was responsible for the DarkSeoul attacks, the responsible group's targets, TTP, and attack timing demonstrate a strong pro-North Korean sentiment.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Known tactics, techniques and procedures Targets WhoIs Team is one of two groups that claimed responsibility for the'' March 20'' attacks targeting South Korea.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A defacement on the LG +U webpage stated that it was'' Hacked by WhoIs Team'' and that the attackers would return.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The page featured three skulls.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, no other attacks by WhoIs Team have been observed.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Known tactics, techniques, and procedures Targets Associated actors Based on North Korea's affinity for disinformation and counterintelligence, we must note the distinct possibility that operatives claiming to be WhoIs Team are part of another group and that the defacement was a false flag operation meant to pin blame on RAONASRT.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "RAONASRT is a South Korean white hat capture the flag (CTF) team, whose members also operate under the name'' WhoIs''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "l RAONASRT (the RaonSecure Advanced Security Research Team) and its sub-teams WhoIs Team and Cpark Team have participated in and performed well in CTF contests such as the one hosted by DefCon.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In 2013, a member of RAONASRT was invited to Blue House, the residence of the South Korean president, to meet with president Park and discuss the security industry.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "RAONASRT runs the Secuinside CTF competition.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Their parent organization RaonSecure operates a whitehat training program.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The group also runs the Korea WhiteHat Contest, which is hosted by South Korea's Ministry of National Defense and National Intelligence Service and supervised by South Korean Cyber Command.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For these reasons, it seems unlikely that the RAONASRT WhoIs Team would maliciously target South Korean entities.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "IsOne is the group that claimed responsibility for the June 2012 attack on the website of South Korean newspaper JoongAng Ilbo.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The attack included an attempt to wipe JoongAng Ilbo's servers as well as a defacement depicting a laughing cat.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Despite efforts to wipe the target's servers, the target only suffered defacement and temporary downtime.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Although the groups have a similar name and both use a cat theme, it is unclear whether a CTF team known as'' The Cat is Number 1'' and IsOne are the same actors.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' The Cat is Number 1'' members claim to hail from North Korea, but there is no hard evidence linking team members to the region.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Again, it seems that the actors responsible for the attack borrowed the moniker of another group.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "According to South Korea's National Police Agency, the attack on JoongAng Ilbo shares characteristics with previous attacks attributed to North Korean actors.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "An investigation conducted by the agency's Cyber Terror Response Center found that the actors targeting JoongAng Ilbo used two North Korean servers and 17 servers in 10 other countries.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "One server maintained a constant connection to an IP address belonging to Joson Telecommunication Company, which is affiliated with North Korea's Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Investigators found that one of the servers used in the attack on JoongAng Ilbo was also used in the March 2011 DDoS attacks on South Korean critical infrastructure sites and the April 2011 attack on Nyongyup Bank.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Known tactics, techniques and procedures Targets The Kimsuky malware, which targeted South Korean think tanks, is loosely attributed to an actor referred to as Kimsukyang.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Little is known about the actor or group responsible for the malware.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, the following email addresses are associated with the Kimsuky operation: The email address iop110112 @hotmail.com was registered using the alias'' kimsukyang'', and rsh1213 @hotmail.com was registered using the alias'' Kim asdfa''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Kaspersky found that the Kimsuky operation used 10 IP addresses in two Chinese provinces that border North Korea: Jilin and Liaoning.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Known tactics, techniques and procedures Targets The New Romantic Cyber Army Team also took credit for the March 20, 2013 attacks.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "McAfee suspected New Romantic Cyber Army Team were responsible for Operation Troy and the resulting March 20, 2013 attacks due to the group's'' frequent use of Roman and classical terms in their code.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' It is unknown whether Hastati is an alternate name for the group or whether Hastati is an individual actor within the group.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is interesting to note that the malware associated with these actors uses the strings'' HASTATI'' and'' PRINCIPES'' to overwrite the MBR.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The name Hastati likely refers to a class of infantrymen of the early Roman Republic.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Hastati were less experienced soldiers who fought on the frontlines with spears and swords.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Principes likely refers to more experienced Roman soldiers who fought on the second line of battle.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Known tactics, techniques and procedures Targets HP researchers had previously analyzed samples of the DarkSeoul dropper, and findings were published in our annual HP Cyber Risk Report 2013.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Analysis of this malware is included in Appendix C. Analysis of additional malware used in these campaigns produced no new findings and only corroborated what was found by external security researchers.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These publicly available analyses have been cited throughout the report.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Some of the malware samples were no longer publicly available.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, CrowdStrike obtained these missing samples before they disappeared from the wild and conducted thorough analysis, which was released in their subscription-only reports.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "While we can not divulge detailed information from those reports, an overview of the findings is provided below.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The majority of the malware used in cyber incidents attributed to North Korea were variations of three types of malware: dropper, wiper, and IRC remote access trojan (RAT).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "CrowdStrike's attribution of this malware to North Korean actors stemmed from two primary factors: Korean language characters found in the binaries and the propensity to specifically target South Korean entities.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Dropper samples consistently targeted AhnLab Policy Center as a propagation method.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This information is corroborated in a Black Hat Asia 2014 presentation by Fortinet researcher Kyle Yang.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "CrowdStrike's report also briefly noted the use of an update server vector.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Yang analyzed the malware's update config metadata and matched its format to the AhnLab Policy Center.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "To test its payload, Yang set up a server/client and executed the update through the server.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As Yang had predicted, it wiped the client.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "While the method for initial compromise of the update server is not noted in detail, CrowdStrike's report cites'' collateral information'' that suggests targeted email attacks were used to gain initial entry, and policy servers were then compromised.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "targeted email attacks", "start": 153, "end": 175}, {"text": "gain initial entry", "start": 189, "end": 207}, {"text": "policy servers", "start": 213, "end": 227}], "action": [{"text": "were used", "start": 176, "end": 185}, {"text": "were then compromised", "start": 228, "end": 249}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 186, "end": 188}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The upload server vector included a time-based logic bomb that allowed the wiper to target a large number of systems, on a set time and date, with full permissions on all of the targeted systems.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the wiper", "start": 71, "end": 80}, {"text": "a large number of systems", "start": 91, "end": 116}, {"text": "a set time and date", "start": 121, "end": 140}, {"text": "full permissions on all of the targeted systems", "start": 147, "end": 194}], "action": [{"text": "target", "start": 84, "end": 90}], "modifier": [{"text": "on", "start": 118, "end": 120}, {"text": "with", "start": 142, "end": 146}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "According to CrowdStrike, the wiper malware was dropped on the systems as AgentBase.exe.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the wiper malware", "start": 26, "end": 43}, {"text": "the systems", "start": 59, "end": 70}, {"text": "AgentBase.exe", "start": 74, "end": 87}], "action": [{"text": "was dropped", "start": 44, "end": 55}], "modifier": [{"text": "on", "start": 56, "end": 58}, {"text": "as", "start": 71, "end": 73}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The wiper used the Windows utility'taskkill' to kill the processes pasvc.exe and clisvc.exe, which are the main processes for the Ahnlab and Hauri antivirus applications.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The wiper", "start": 0, "end": 9}, {"text": "the processes pasvc.exe and clisvc.exe", "start": 53, "end": 91}], "action": [{"text": "kill", "start": 48, "end": 52}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The wiper then performed system reconnaissance, gathering drive information and operating system version.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The wiper", "start": 0, "end": 9}, {"text": "system reconnaissance", "start": 25, "end": 46}, {"text": "drive information and operating system version", "start": 58, "end": 104}], "action": [{"text": "performed", "start": 15, "end": 24}, {"text": "gathering", "start": 48, "end": 57}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Depending on the OS used, the wiper recursively deleted files on the file system, deleting the Windows folder last.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the wiper", "start": 26, "end": 35}, {"text": "files on the file system", "start": 56, "end": 80}, {"text": "the Windows folder", "start": 91, "end": 109}], "action": [{"text": "deleted", "start": 48, "end": 55}, {"text": "deleting", "start": 82, "end": 90}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It then overwrote the MBR with the strings'' HASTATI'','' PRINCPES'','' PRINCIPES'', or'' PR! NCPES''.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "It", "start": 0, "end": 2}, {"text": "the MBR", "start": 18, "end": 25}, {"text": "the strings'' HASTATI'','' PRINCPES'','' PRINCIPES'', or'' PR! NCPES''", "start": 31, "end": 101}], "action": [{"text": "overwrote", "start": 8, "end": 17}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 26, "end": 30}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "While there are several variants of the wiper, all seem to have been used on the same date.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is unclear why multiple wiper variants with slightly differing behavior were used for the same campaign.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "One possible explanation is that multiple variants were used to minimize the operational damage to the mission in the case of an early detection of one of the variants.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For example, if one wiper variant was compromised or detected by antivirus or IDS signatures, the other variants may have differed enough to remain undetected, still resulting in mission success.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "According to CrowdStrike, a third malware component downloaded an IRC RAT from various compromised websites.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "a third malware component", "start": 26, "end": 51}, {"text": "an IRC RAT", "start": 63, "end": 73}, {"text": "various compromised websites", "start": 79, "end": 107}], "action": [{"text": "downloaded", "start": 52, "end": 62}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 74, "end": 78}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This RAT is detected by Symantec as Backdoor.Prioxer.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This RAT", "start": 0, "end": 8}, {"text": "Symantec", "start": 24, "end": 32}, {"text": "Backdoor.Prioxer", "start": 36, "end": 52}], "action": [{"text": "is detected", "start": 9, "end": 20}], "modifier": [{"text": "as", "start": 33, "end": 35}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Prioxer has been linked to other 2011 attacks on South Korea.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is unclear whether these downloaders were pushed out in the same update server vector as the wipers.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, the two malware types both use the same packer'Jokra' and both contain the strings'' HASTATI'' and'' PRINCPES''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Based on the information above, we have identified strategic challenges that impact the development of North Korea's cyber warfare capabilities.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We have also noted relevant implications: • The North Korean regime strictly controls all Internet infrastructure, meaning cyber activity by dissidents or autonomous hacker groups are very unlikely.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In other words, any cyber attacks originating in North Korea can be assumed to be state sponsored.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For this reason, according to defectors, the regime's cyber operators do not typically launch attacks directly from within North Korea.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Instead, many regime-sponsored attacks are launched from cells based in China, U.S., South Asia, Europe, and even South Korea.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• North Korea has a limited number of outgoing connections.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For this reason, there is a low probability of DDoS originating from within.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, this does not preclude the use of botnets with a local C2 server or the use of networks in third-party nations to launch attacks.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As seen in the July 2009 attacks on South Korean and U.S. targets, North Korea has leveraged networks in countries such as Austria, Georgia, Germany, and even South Korea and the U.S., in order to launch cyber attacks.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "North Korea will likely be forced to rely on third parties for quite some time, due to its lack of sufficient infrastructure for launching large-scale CNO.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• Several outward facing websites are hosted in China and other countries.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This implies two possibilities: that North Korea's infrastructure can not handle a heavy incoming traffic load or that the regime wants to separate the propaganda crafted for an outside target audience from internally-focused propaganda.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This arrangement seems unlikely to change in the foreseeable future.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• North Korea is known to have unstable power supplies, which limits scalability of the regime's current CNO capabilities.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This is another reason why expansion of CNO capabilities using the nation's own infrastructure seems unlikely in the foreseeable future.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• North Korea is known to have monetary deficiencies, which further limit expansion of infrastructure and CNO capabilities, at least without third-party aid.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "North Korea continues to rely heavily on China for sustainment.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• Although we see few instances of overt cyber operations, that North Korea reportedly spends so much of its limited resources on training and equipping cyber operators speaks volumes.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The human element of the regime's cyber war program, at least, has potential.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• Sanctions against North Korea and export laws prohibit the sale of certain technologies to the regime.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In other words, in order to obtain the technology needed for a cyber warfare program, the regime must improvise.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "North Korea must develop its own technology, manufacture technology using plans obtained via industrial espionage, or rely on third parties to procure it for them.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, the regime has historically failed in its attempts of large-scale production of electronic components.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "At present, North Korea relies on China to provide much of its network hardware, including servers and routers.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is unlikely that North Korea will compromise on its nuclear program, meaning sanctions will likely be longstanding, and the regime will have to continue to rely on third parties to procure technology.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Cyber incidents attributed to North Korean actors seem to follow distinct patterns:  According to reports by other researchers, the conventions and C2 structure used by North Korean cyber actors show continuity and consistency over time.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": " The majority of the incidents attributed to North Korean actors consistently used wiper malware.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": " Several of the incidents included defacements, with a different group taking credit each time.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Additionally, little information or attack history was found about any of the groups, aside from information acknowledged in this report.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These factors seem to indicate that a single group may have been responsible for several attacks over time, using different group names as a false flag.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": " On more than one occasion, the malware included provisions to disable security software made by South Korean security company AhnLab.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This detail strengthens the case that the malware was written or modified to specifically target South Korean machines.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": " The attacks followed an explicit pattern: most were around the time of U.S.–South Korean joint military exercises, while the others fell on a significant date or were in response to political events.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": " The primary targets were South Korean and U.S. entities.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "While these nations are traditionally targeted by the regime, it is also possible that South Korean entities are quick to attribute any attack on their infrastructure to North Korean actors.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In fact, in some cases, South Korean reports were the only source of attribution.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Does North Korea have sufficient cyber infrastructure and cyber warfare capabilities to harm the U.S. and its allies? While North Korea's cyber warfare capabilities pale in comparison to those of wealthier nations, the regime has made significant progress in developing its infrastructure and in establishing cyber operations.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The rate of this progress warrants a closer look at North Korea's motivations, TTPs, and capabilities.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As noted above, North Korea views the U.S. and South Korea as its primary adversaries.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The U.S. and South Korea are high-tech nations with economies that depend heavily on technology.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In contrast, North Korea does not have a high tech culture.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For these reasons, we should not overestimate the regime's advanced cyber capability, yet we should never underestimate the potential impact of North Korea utilizing less advanced, quick-and-dirty tactics like DDoS to cripple their high-tech targets.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Both government and corporate entities are susceptible to being targeted by North Korean cyber attacks.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "North Korean juche ideology places the survival of the regime as its primary goal, and any perceived threat to the regime may be targeted.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Several attacks on U.S. and South Korean government, financial, and critical infrastructure entities have been attributed to North Korean origins.. These attacks were often preceded by or occurred in conjunction with North Korea voicing negative sentiments about the targeted entities.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As we saw with Iranian cyber actors in HPSR Security Briefing Episode 11, state sponsored cyber actors often launch an attack in response to a political trigger.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The same pattern seems to apply to pro-North Korean cyber actors, who have launched attacks to coincide with U.S.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Independence Day and the anniversary of the start of the Korean War, as well as propaganda and cyber attacks in response to joint military exercises between the U.S. and South Korea.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As shown by North Korea's past behavior (which is consistent with their doctrine), they are easily'' pushed into a corner''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "At the slightest perceived threat, the regime responds with saber-rattling and peacocking.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The regime is extremely defensive and will, in turn, flex its muscles to show the world how capable it is, even if this is an inaccurate display of their overall capabilities.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The regime fears losing its control and the nation's culture to the ever-growing threat of outside influence, as is evidenced in the regime's reaction to the comedy film'' The Interview''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The regime has represented itself to its citizens as a powerful and capable entity and has used this status to control the populace.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For this reason, the regime's leaders are forced to continually demonstrate this strength and power, or an illusion thereof, both domestically and globally, in order to maintain the status needed to ensure continued suppression of the population.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This show of power may require that the regime takes chances and stretches beyond its abilities at times, but in the spirit of juche and songun, the regime will continue this façade, fearful of losing the image its leaders have worked so hard to maintain.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "North Korean cyber operations are not generally observed originating from home field IP address space, so geo-IP based blocking of traffic originating from those net-blocks is ineffective.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Given that North Korea has capable and technically trained forces and will demonstrate their power when they feel provoked, western entities should consciously avoid promoting ideas or doctrine that is blatantly slanderous to the regime.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Encouraging such ideas could cause those entities to become a focal point for North Korean cyber attacks.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Due to the fact that North Korean infrastructure is aging and its resources are not able to keep up with the rest of the world, entities with interesting R & D or IP (intellectual property)-especially military in nature–could become targets of interest for North Korea.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Interest in defense-related IP and R & D could also stem from North Korea's relationship with China.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In the Chinese business culture, taking another entity's IP or R & D is not stealing–it is accepted as business as usual.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is possible that North Korea, if under Chinese influence, would adopt the same attitude, given the regime's limited capacity for homegrown innovation.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Known DPRK targets have been limited primarily to South Korean and U.S. organizations and government entities.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For these targets, prudent measures should include: The dropper component that we examined was distributed as a UPX-packed binary.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "When executed it creates the following files in the affected user's% Temp% directory: After determining the location of user profile directories on the affected computer, the malware searches these directories for configuration files and directories that may be associated with the connection manager clients mRemote and SecureCRT.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the malware", "start": 171, "end": 182}, {"text": "these directories", "start": 192, "end": 209}, {"text": "configuration files and directories that may be associated with the connection manager clients mRemote and SecureCRT", "start": 214, "end": 330}], "action": [{"text": "searches", "start": 183, "end": 191}], "modifier": [{"text": "for", "start": 210, "end": 213}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• mRemote-an open source tool for centrally managing remote server connections using a GUI (Kevin Kline, 2008).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This tool is no longer being actively developed or supported.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• SecureCRT-a commercial SSH and Telnet client by VanDyke Software.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If an mRemote installation is located, the dropper reads the configuration file and checks if there's a NODE that is defined with'' Username=root'','' Protocol=SSH'', and a password that is not blank.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the dropper", "start": 39, "end": 50}, {"text": "the configuration file", "start": 57, "end": 79}], "action": [{"text": "reads", "start": 51, "end": 56}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If those conditions are satisfied it extracts the information.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "it", "start": 34, "end": 36}, {"text": "the information", "start": 46, "end": 61}], "action": [{"text": "extracts", "start": 37, "end": 45}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The password is decrypted after being extracted.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If a SecureCRT installation is located, the dropper extracts information from sessions that have Username=root, Protocol=SSH and a saved password.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the dropper", "start": 40, "end": 51}, {"text": "information", "start": 61, "end": 72}, {"text": "sessions that have Username=root, Protocol=SSH and a saved password", "start": 78, "end": 145}], "action": [{"text": "extracts", "start": 52, "end": 60}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 73, "end": 77}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If these conditions are satisfied, the username, hostname, port, and password are extracted.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The password is then decrypted.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "After extracting these connection and server details, the dropper uses the previously dropped alg.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the dropper", "start": 54, "end": 65}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "exe and conime.exe to attempt to connect remote servers, upload and run the bash script ~pr1.tmp.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "connect", "start": 33, "end": 40}, {"text": "upload", "start": 57, "end": 63}, {"text": "run", "start": 68, "end": 71}], "entity": [{"text": "remote servers", "start": 41, "end": 55}, {"text": "the bash script ~pr1.tmp", "start": 72, "end": 96}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The bash script initially checks which UNIX it is running on (of HP-UX, SunOS, Linux, or AIX) and then attempts to wipe the /kernel, /usr /etc and /home directories, thus rendering the machine inoperative.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The bash script", "start": 0, "end": 15}, {"text": "UNIX", "start": 39, "end": 43}, {"text": "the /kernel, /usr /etc and /home directories", "start": 120, "end": 164}, {"text": "the machine inoperative", "start": 181, "end": 204}], "action": [{"text": "checks", "start": 26, "end": 32}, {"text": "wipe", "start": 115, "end": 119}, {"text": "rendering", "start": 171, "end": 180}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "When the AgentBase.exe component is executed, it first attempts to stop the following processes, presumably in order to evade detection: It then enumerates all physical drives and overwrites the first 512 bytes with the string:'' princpes'', effectively destroying the MBR (master boot record) of the affected drive.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the AgentBase.exe component", "start": 5, "end": 32}, {"text": "it", "start": 46, "end": 48}, {"text": "the following processes", "start": 72, "end": 95}, {"text": "detection", "start": 126, "end": 135}, {"text": "It", "start": 137, "end": 139}, {"text": "all physical drives", "start": 156, "end": 175}, {"text": "the first 512 bytes", "start": 191, "end": 210}, {"text": "the string:'' princpes''", "start": 216, "end": 240}, {"text": "the MBR (master boot record) of the affected drive", "start": 265, "end": 315}], "action": [{"text": "is executed", "start": 33, "end": 44}, {"text": "stop", "start": 67, "end": 71}, {"text": "evade", "start": 120, "end": 125}, {"text": "enumerates", "start": 145, "end": 155}, {"text": "overwrites", "start": 180, "end": 190}, {"text": "destroying", "start": 254, "end": 264}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 211, "end": 215}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It continues to look for removable and fixed drives, locates the root directory on these drives, and then attempts to delete all files and folders in this directory.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "It", "start": 0, "end": 2}, {"text": "removable and fixed drives", "start": 25, "end": 51}, {"text": "the root directory on these drives", "start": 61, "end": 95}, {"text": "all files and folders in this directory", "start": 125, "end": 164}], "action": [{"text": "look", "start": 16, "end": 20}, {"text": "locates", "start": 53, "end": 60}, {"text": "delete", "start": 118, "end": 124}], "modifier": [{"text": "for", "start": 21, "end": 24}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Finally, the affected computer is shut down and rebooted, although if the wiping mechanisms were successful then the machine will not be able to boot.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the affected computer", "start": 9, "end": 30}], "action": [{"text": "is shut down and rebooted", "start": 31, "end": 56}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "After taking a look at recent Korplug (PlugX) detections, we identified two larger scale campaigns employing this well-known Remote Access Trojan.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "two larger scale campaigns", "start": 72, "end": 98}, {"text": "this well-known Remote Access Trojan", "start": 109, "end": 145}], "action": [{"text": "employing", "start": 99, "end": 108}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This blog gives an overview of the first one, related to Afghanistan & Tajikistan.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The other campaign, where the targets were a number of high-profile organizations in Russia, will be the subject of Anton Cherepanov's presentation at the ZeroNights security conference in Moscow this week.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Sometimes malware used in various attacks is unique enough to identify related incidents, which makes tracking individual botnets simpler.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "An example is the BlackEnergy Lite variant (also known as BlackEnergy 3) used by a group of attackers (that was then given the name Quedagh, or Sandworm) against targets in Ukraine and other countries.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "BlackEnergy Lite is clearly distinguishable from the numerous binaries of the more common BlackEnergy 2 also circulating in-the-wild.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In other cases, attackers use more common tools for accomplishing their criminal goals.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For example, the Korplug RAT (a.k.a .PlugX) is a well-known toolkit associated with Chinese APT groups and used in a large number of targeted attacks since 2012.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the Korplug RAT (a.k.a .PlugX)", "start": 13, "end": 43}, {"text": "a large number of targeted attacks", "start": 115, "end": 149}, {"text": "2012", "start": 156, "end": 160}], "action": [{"text": "used", "start": 107, "end": 111}], "modifier": [{"text": "in", "start": 112, "end": 114}, {"text": "since", "start": 150, "end": 155}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For the past several weeks we have taken a closer look at a great number of detections of this malware in many unrelated incidents.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Among these, we were able to discover several successful infections where the employed Korplug samples were connecting to the same C & C domain.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the employed Korplug samples", "start": 74, "end": 102}, {"text": "the same C & C domain", "start": 122, "end": 143}], "action": [{"text": "were connecting", "start": 103, "end": 118}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 119, "end": 121}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Other Korplug samples were connecting to a different domain name resolving to the same IPs as notebookhk.net: Taking these C & Cs as a starting point, we were able to locate a number of victims infected through various exploit-laden spear-phishing documents and cunningly-named archives.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Other Korplug samples", "start": 0, "end": 21}, {"text": "a different domain name resolving to the same IPs as notebookhk.net", "start": 41, "end": 108}], "action": [{"text": "were connecting", "start": 22, "end": 37}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 38, "end": 40}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A table with a selection of RTF documents and RAR self-extracting archives with a .SCR", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "extension is shown below: Some of the above-mentioned files also contained decoy documents: In all of the cases, three binary files were dropped (apart from decoy documents) that led to the Korplug trojan being loading into memory.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Some of the above-mentioned files", "start": 26, "end": 59}, {"text": "decoy documents", "start": 75, "end": 90}, {"text": "three binary files", "start": 113, "end": 131}, {"text": "the Korplug trojan", "start": 186, "end": 204}, {"text": "memory", "start": 224, "end": 230}], "action": [{"text": "contained", "start": 65, "end": 74}, {"text": "were dropped", "start": 132, "end": 144}, {"text": "being loading", "start": 205, "end": 218}], "modifier": [{"text": "into", "start": 219, "end": 223}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Korplug RAT is known to use this side-loading trick by abusing legitimate digitally signed executables and is a way to stay under the radar, since a trusted application with a valid signature among startup items is less likely to raise suspicion.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The Korplug RAT", "start": 0, "end": 15}, {"text": "this side-loading trick", "start": 32, "end": 55}, {"text": "the radar", "start": 134, "end": 143}], "action": [{"text": "use", "start": 28, "end": 31}, {"text": "stay", "start": 123, "end": 127}], "modifier": [{"text": "under", "start": 128, "end": 133}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The maliciously crafted documents are RTF files that successfully exploit the CVE-2012-0158 vulnerability in Microsoft Word.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The maliciously crafted documents", "start": 0, "end": 33}, {"text": "the CVE-2012-0158 vulnerability in Microsoft Word", "start": 74, "end": 123}], "action": [{"text": "exploit", "start": 66, "end": 73}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The image below shows the beginning of the CVE-2012-0158 shellcode in ASCII encoding within the document (the opcodes 60, 55, 8bec disassemble to pusha; push ebp; mov ebp, esp).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Interestingly, though, the documents also contain the newer CVE-2014-1761 exploit that was extensively used in targeted attacks carried out by a number other malware families this year (including BlackEnergy, Sednit, MiniDuke, and others).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, this exploit is not implemented correctly due to a wrong file offset in the 1st stage shellcode.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Below we see the disassembly of the 1st stage shellcode where it checks the presence of the tag'' p! 11'' marking the beginning of the 2nd stage shellcode and loads it into memory.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Even though the tag and 2nd stage shellcode is present in the RTF, it's at a different offset, and thus never is loaded.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Sophos' Gabor Szappanos gives a possible explanation how these malformed samples may have come into existence.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "ESET LiveGrid telemetry indicates that the attacks against these targets have been going on since at least June 2014 and continue through today.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We were able to pinpoint the targets to residents of the following countries: From the topics of the files used to spread the malware, as well as from the affected targets, it appears that the attackers are interested in gathering intelligence related to Afghan, Tajik and Russian military and diplomatic subjects.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Interestingly, most of the affected victims have another thing in common–a number of other RATs, file stealing trojans or keyloggers were detected on their systems on top of the Korplug RAT detection.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "One of these'alternative RATs' was connecting to a domain also used by the Korplug samples.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "One of these'alternative RATs'", "start": 0, "end": 30}, {"text": "a domain also used by the Korplug samples", "start": 49, "end": 90}], "action": [{"text": "was connecting", "start": 31, "end": 45}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 46, "end": 48}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Since the functionality of these tools was partly overlapping with that of Korplug, it left us wondering whether the attackers were just experimenting with different RATs or were they supplementing some functionality that they were unable to accomplish.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Additional information about two malware families that were most often found accompanying Korplug infections is given below.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A curious Remote Access Trojan, as research points to a Chinese connection but the commands it listens to are in Spanish (translation in English): The malware can manage processes and services on the infected machine, transfer files to and from the C & C server, run shell commands, and so on.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The malware", "start": 147, "end": 158}, {"text": "processes and services on the infected machine", "start": 170, "end": 216}, {"text": "files", "start": 227, "end": 232}, {"text": "the C & C server", "start": 245, "end": 261}, {"text": "shell commands", "start": 267, "end": 281}], "action": [{"text": "manage", "start": 163, "end": 169}, {"text": "transfer", "start": 218, "end": 226}, {"text": "run", "start": 263, "end": 266}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 233, "end": 235}, {"text": "from", "start": 240, "end": 244}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is written in Delphi and connects to www.dicemention.com.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "It", "start": 0, "end": 2}, {"text": "www.dicemention.com", "start": 40, "end": 59}], "action": [{"text": "connects", "start": 28, "end": 36}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 37, "end": 39}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Some samples contain a digital signature by'' Nanning weiwu Technology co., ltd''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This malware, written in C, and contains several functions for harvesting files off the victim's hard drive according to criteria set in the configuration file.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This malware", "start": 0, "end": 12}, {"text": "files", "start": 74, "end": 79}, {"text": "the victim's hard drive", "start": 84, "end": 107}, {"text": "criteria set in the configuration file", "start": 121, "end": 159}], "action": [{"text": "harvesting", "start": 63, "end": 73}], "modifier": [{"text": "off", "start": 80, "end": 83}, {"text": "according to", "start": 108, "end": 120}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Apart from doing a recursive sweep of all logical fixed and remote drives, it also continually monitors any attached removable media or network shares by listening to DBTDEVICEARRIVAL events.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "doing", "start": 11, "end": 16}, {"text": "monitors", "start": 95, "end": 103}], "entity": [{"text": "a recursive sweep of all logical fixed and remote drives", "start": 17, "end": 73}, {"text": "it", "start": 75, "end": 77}, {"text": "attached removable media", "start": 108, "end": 132}, {"text": "network shares", "start": 136, "end": 150}, {"text": "listening to DBTDEVICEARRIVAL events", "start": 154, "end": 190}], "modifier": [{"text": "by", "start": 151, "end": 153}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In addition to collecting files, the malware attempts to gather saved passwords, history of visited URLs, account information and proxy information from the following applications: The C & C domains used by this malware are: Some samples of this file stealer detected in these campaigns also contain the signature by'' Nanning weiwu Technology co., ltd''–another indicator that the infections are related.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "collecting", "start": 15, "end": 25}, {"text": "gather", "start": 57, "end": 63}, {"text": "detected", "start": 259, "end": 267}], "entity": [{"text": "files", "start": 26, "end": 31}, {"text": "the malware", "start": 33, "end": 44}, {"text": "saved passwords", "start": 64, "end": 79}, {"text": "history of visited URLs", "start": 81, "end": 104}, {"text": "account information", "start": 106, "end": 125}, {"text": "proxy information", "start": 130, "end": 147}, {"text": "the following applications", "start": 153, "end": 179}, {"text": "Some samples of this file stealer", "start": 225, "end": 258}, {"text": "these campaigns", "start": 271, "end": 286}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 148, "end": 152}, {"text": "in", "start": 268, "end": 270}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "APT3 (also known as UPS), the actors responsible for Operation Clandestine Fox has quietly continued to send waves of spearphishing messages over the past few months.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the actors responsible for Operation Clandestine Fox", "start": 26, "end": 78}, {"text": "waves of spearphishing messages", "start": 109, "end": 140}, {"text": "the past few months", "start": 146, "end": 165}], "action": [{"text": "send", "start": 104, "end": 108}], "modifier": [{"text": "over", "start": 141, "end": 145}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This actor initiated their most recent campaign on November 19, 2014 targeting multiple organizations.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The attacker leveraged multiple exploits, targeting both CVE-2014-6332 and CVE-2014-4113.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "CVE-2014-6332 was disclosed publicly on 2014-11-11 and is a Windows OLE Automation Array Remote Code Execution vulnerability.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "CVE-2014-6332", "start": 0, "end": 13}, {"text": "a Windows OLE Automation Array Remote Code Execution vulnerability", "start": 58, "end": 124}], "action": [{"text": "is", "start": 55, "end": 57}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "CVE-2014- 4113 is a privilege escalation vulnerability that was disclosed publicly on 2014-10-14.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "CVE-2014- 4113", "start": 0, "end": 14}, {"text": "a privilege escalation vulnerability", "start": 18, "end": 54}], "action": [{"text": "is", "start": 15, "end": 17}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The use of CVE-2014-6332 is notable, as it demonstrates that multiple classes of actors, both criminal and APT alike, have now incorporated this exploit into their toolkits.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Further, the use of both of these two known vulnerabilities in tandem is notable for APT3.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This actor is historically known for leveraging zero- day vulnerabilities in widespread but infrequent phishing campaigns.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The use of known exploits and more frequent attacks may indicate both a shift in strategy and operational tempo for this group.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The body of the message is below: One Month's Free Membership for The PLAYBOY ClUB 1080P HD VIDEOS 100,000 PHOTOS 4,000 MODELS Nude Celebrities, Playmates, Cybergirls & More! Click hxxp: //join.playboysplus.com/signup/ To Get a Free Plus Member Now & Never Miss Another Update.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Your Member referrals must remain active.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If anyone getting'' Promotion not available'' for 1 month free membership, you might get the issue up to 48 hrs once your membership is expired and make sure to Clear out cookies or use another browser or use another PC.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The webpage contained both CVE-2014-6332 exploit code and a VBScript that invoked PowerShell on the affected users' system to download the below payload: The CVE-2014-6332 exploit code seen in this incident is derived from the code published at http: //www.exploit-db.com/exploits/35230/, which has also been incorporated in the Metasploit project.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "a VBScript", "start": 58, "end": 68}, {"text": "the below payload", "start": 135, "end": 152}], "action": [{"text": "download", "start": 126, "end": 134}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "After the exploit or script executes, the system downloads install.exe, which has the following metadata: The file install.exe attempts to write two files (doc.exe and test.exe) to the hard-coded path'' C: \\Users\\Public'', which fails on Windows XP because that path is not present by default.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the system", "start": 38, "end": 48}, {"text": "install.exe", "start": 59, "end": 70}, {"text": "The file install.exe", "start": 106, "end": 126}, {"text": "two files (doc.exe and test.exe)", "start": 145, "end": 177}, {"text": "the hard-coded path'' C: \\Users\\Public''", "start": 181, "end": 221}], "action": [{"text": "downloads", "start": 49, "end": 58}, {"text": "write", "start": 139, "end": 144}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 178, "end": 180}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The first dropped file, doc.exe, contains the CVE-2014-4113 exploit and then attempts to execute test.exe with the elevated privileges.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The first dropped file, doc.exe", "start": 0, "end": 31}, {"text": "the CVE-2014-4113 exploit", "start": 42, "end": 67}, {"text": "test.exe", "start": 97, "end": 105}, {"text": "the elevated privileges", "start": 111, "end": 134}], "action": [{"text": "contains", "start": 33, "end": 41}, {"text": "execute", "start": 89, "end": 96}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 106, "end": 110}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These files have the following metadata: These payload files also have interesting PDB debug strings.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The most interesting PDB string is the'' 4113.pdb,'' which appears to reference CVE-2014-4113.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This CVE is a local kernel vulnerability that, with successful exploitation, would give any user SYSTEM access on the machine.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This CVE", "start": 0, "end": 8}, {"text": "any user", "start": 88, "end": 96}, {"text": "SYSTEM access on the machine", "start": 97, "end": 125}], "action": [{"text": "give", "start": 83, "end": 87}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The malware component, test.exe, uses the Windows command'' cmd.exe'' /C whoami'' to verify it is running with the elevated privileges of'' System'' and creates persistence by creating the following scheduled task: When executed, the malware first establishes a SOCKS5 connection to 192.157.198.103 using TCP port 1913.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The malware component, test.exe", "start": 0, "end": 31}, {"text": "the Windows command'' cmd.exe'' /C whoami''", "start": 38, "end": 81}, {"text": "verify it is running with the elevated privileges of'' System''", "start": 85, "end": 148}, {"text": "persistence", "start": 161, "end": 172}, {"text": "creating the following scheduled task", "start": 176, "end": 213}, {"text": "the malware", "start": 230, "end": 241}, {"text": "a SOCKS5 connection", "start": 260, "end": 279}, {"text": "192.157.198.103", "start": 283, "end": 298}, {"text": "TCP port 1913", "start": 305, "end": 318}], "action": [{"text": "uses", "start": 33, "end": 37}, {"text": "creates", "start": 153, "end": 160}, {"text": "establishes", "start": 248, "end": 259}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 82, "end": 84}, {"text": "by", "start": 173, "end": 175}, {"text": "to", "start": 280, "end": 282}, {"text": "using", "start": 299, "end": 304}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The malware sends the SOCKS5 connection request'' 05 01 00'' and verifies the server response starts with'' 05 00''.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The malware", "start": 0, "end": 11}, {"text": "the SOCKS5 connection request'' 05 01 00''", "start": 18, "end": 60}, {"text": "the server response starts with'' 05 00''", "start": 74, "end": 115}], "action": [{"text": "sends", "start": 12, "end": 17}, {"text": "verifies", "start": 65, "end": 73}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The malware then requests a connection to 192.184.60.229 on TCP port 81 using the command'' 05 01 00 01 c0 b8 3c e5 00 51'' and verifies that the first two bytes from the server are'' 05 00'' (c0 b8 3c e5 is the IP address and 00 51 is the port in network byte order).", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The malware", "start": 0, "end": 11}, {"text": "a connection to 192.184.60.229 on TCP port 81", "start": 26, "end": 71}, {"text": "the command'' 05 01 00 01 c0 b8 3c e5 00 51''", "start": 78, "end": 123}, {"text": "the first two bytes from the server are'' 05 00''", "start": 142, "end": 191}], "action": [{"text": "requests", "start": 17, "end": 25}, {"text": "verifies", "start": 128, "end": 136}], "modifier": [{"text": "using", "start": 72, "end": 77}, {"text": "that", "start": 137, "end": 141}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Once the connection to the server is established, the malware expects a message containing at least three bytes from the server.", "output": {"entities": {"modifier": [{"text": "Once", "start": 0, "end": 4}], "entity": [{"text": "the connection to the server is established", "start": 5, "end": 48}, {"text": "the malware", "start": 50, "end": 61}, {"text": "a message containing at least three bytes from the server", "start": 70, "end": 127}], "action": [{"text": "expects", "start": 62, "end": 69}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These first three bytes are the command identifier.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The following commands are supported by the malware: On October 28, we observed APT3 sending out spearphishing messages containing a compressed executable attachment.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "APT3", "start": 80, "end": 84}, {"text": "spearphishing messages containing a compressed executable attachment", "start": 97, "end": 165}], "action": [{"text": "sending", "start": 85, "end": 92}], "modifier": [{"text": "out", "start": 93, "end": 96}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The deflated exe was a variant of the same downloader described above and connected to 198.55.115.71 over port 1913 via SOCKS5 proxy.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The deflated exe", "start": 0, "end": 16}, {"text": "a variant of the same downloader described above", "start": 21, "end": 69}, {"text": "198.55.115.71", "start": 87, "end": 100}, {"text": "port 1913", "start": 106, "end": 115}, {"text": "SOCKS5 proxy", "start": 120, "end": 132}], "action": [{"text": "was", "start": 17, "end": 20}, {"text": "connected", "start": 74, "end": 83}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 84, "end": 86}, {"text": "over", "start": 101, "end": 105}, {"text": "via", "start": 116, "end": 119}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The secondary payload in that case was detected as Backdoor.APT.CookieCutter (aka Pirpi) and also named newnotepad.exe (MD5 8849538ef1c3471640230605c2623c67) and connected to the known APT3 domains: The 192.184.60.229 IP address seen in this current campaign also hosts securitywap [.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The secondary payload", "start": 0, "end": 21}, {"text": "Backdoor.APT.CookieCutter (aka Pirpi)", "start": 51, "end": 88}, {"text": "the known APT3 domains", "start": 175, "end": 197}], "action": [{"text": "was detected", "start": 35, "end": 47}, {"text": "connected", "start": 162, "end": 171}], "modifier": [{"text": "as", "start": 48, "end": 50}, {"text": "to", "start": 172, "end": 174}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "] com–another known domain referenced in our Operation Clandestine Fox blog.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In addition, the join.playboysplus [.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "] com exploit and payload delivery site resolves to 104.151.248.173.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This IP has hosted other domains used by APT3 in past campaigns: As we discussed in our previous blog detailing previous APT3 activity, the walterclean [.] com served as a Plugx/Kaba command and control server.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the walterclean [.] com", "start": 136, "end": 159}, {"text": "a Plugx/Kaba command and control server", "start": 170, "end": 209}], "action": [{"text": "served", "start": 160, "end": 166}], "modifier": [{"text": "as", "start": 167, "end": 169}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Although APT3 is well known for employing zero-day exploits in their attacks, recent activity has demonstrated that they will also attack targets with known exploits or social engineering.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "they", "start": 116, "end": 120}, {"text": "targets", "start": 138, "end": 145}, {"text": "known exploits or social engineering", "start": 151, "end": 187}], "action": [{"text": "attack", "start": 131, "end": 137}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 146, "end": 150}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Since Operation Clandestine Fox, we have observed this actor execute multiple attacks that did not rely on zero-day exploits.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The combination of this sustained operational tempo and lack of zero-day exploits may indicate that this group has changed strategy and has decided to attack more frequently and does not have steady access to zero-day exploit code.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "No matter the strategy, this actor has shown an ability to operate successfully.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "IOCs for this threat can be found here.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "JustSystems has issued an update to its Ichitaro product line (Japanese office suite software), plugging a zero-day vulnerability.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This vulnerability is being actively exploited in the wild to specifically target Japanese organizations.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The exploit is sent to the targeted organizations through emails with a malicious Ichitaro document file attached, which Symantec products detect as Bloodhound.Exploit.557.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The exploit", "start": 0, "end": 11}, {"text": "the targeted organizations", "start": 23, "end": 49}, {"text": "emails with a malicious Ichitaro document file attached", "start": 58, "end": 113}], "action": [{"text": "is sent", "start": 12, "end": 19}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 20, "end": 22}, {"text": "through", "start": 50, "end": 57}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Payloads from the exploit may include Backdoor.Emdivi, Backdoor.Korplug, and Backdoor.ZXshell; however, all payloads aim to steal confidential information from the compromised computer.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Payloads from the exploit", "start": 0, "end": 25}, {"text": "Backdoor.Emdivi, Backdoor.Korplug, and Backdoor.ZXshell", "start": 38, "end": 93}, {"text": "all payloads", "start": 104, "end": 116}, {"text": "confidential information", "start": 130, "end": 154}, {"text": "the compromised computer", "start": 160, "end": 184}], "action": [{"text": "include", "start": 30, "end": 37}, {"text": "steal", "start": 124, "end": 129}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 155, "end": 159}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The content of the emails vary depending on the business interest of the targeted recipient's organization; however, all are about recent political events associated with Japan.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Opening the malicious attachment with Ichitaro will drop the payload and display the document.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Opening the malicious attachment with Ichitaro", "start": 0, "end": 46}, {"text": "the payload", "start": 57, "end": 68}], "action": [{"text": "drop", "start": 52, "end": 56}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Often such exploitation attempts crash and then relaunch the document viewer to open a clean document in order to trick users into believing it is legitimate.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In this particular attack, opening the document and dropping the payload are done without crashing Ichitaro and, as such, users have no visual indications as to what is really happening in the background.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As Security Response previously discussed, unpatched vulnerabilities being exploited is nothing new for Ichitaro.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, during our investigation of this Ichitaro zero-day attack, we discovered that the attack was in fact part of an ongoing cyberespionage campaign specifically targeting various Japanese organizations.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Symantec has named this attack campaign CloudyOmega.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In this campaign, variants of Backdoor.Emdivi are persistently used as a payload.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "variants of Backdoor.Emdivi", "start": 18, "end": 45}, {"text": "a payload", "start": 71, "end": 80}], "action": [{"text": "are persistently used", "start": 46, "end": 67}], "modifier": [{"text": "as", "start": 68, "end": 70}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "All attacks arrive on the target computers as an attachment to email messages.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "All attacks", "start": 0, "end": 11}, {"text": "the target computers", "start": 22, "end": 42}, {"text": "an attachment to email messages", "start": 46, "end": 77}], "action": [{"text": "arrive", "start": 12, "end": 18}], "modifier": [{"text": "on", "start": 19, "end": 21}, {"text": "as", "start": 43, "end": 45}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Mostly the attachments are in a simple executable format with a fake icon.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the attachments", "start": 7, "end": 22}, {"text": "a simple executable format", "start": 30, "end": 56}, {"text": "a fake icon", "start": 62, "end": 73}], "action": [{"text": "are", "start": 23, "end": 26}], "modifier": [{"text": "in", "start": 27, "end": 29}, {"text": "with", "start": 57, "end": 61}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, some of the files exploit software vulnerabilities, and the aforementioned vulnerability in Ichitaro software is only one of them.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This group's primary goal is to steal confidential information from targeted organizations.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This group", "start": 0, "end": 10}, {"text": "confidential information", "start": 38, "end": 62}, {"text": "targeted organizations", "start": 68, "end": 90}], "action": [{"text": "steal", "start": 32, "end": 37}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 63, "end": 67}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This blog provides insights into the history of the attack campaign, infection methods, malware payload, and the group carrying out the attacks.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The first attack of the campaign can be traced back to at least 2011.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Figure 1 shows the targeted sectors and the number of attacks carried out each year.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The perpetrators were very cautious launching attacks in the early years with attacks beginning in earnest in 2014.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "By far, the public sector in Japan is the most targeted sector hit by Operation CloudyOmega.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This provides some clue as to who the attack group is.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Email is the predominant infection vector used in this campaign.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Figure 2 is an example of an email used in recent attacks prior to those exploiting the Ichitaro zero-day vulnerability.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The emails include password-protected .zip files containing the malware.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The emails", "start": 0, "end": 10}, {"text": "password-protected .zip files containing the malware", "start": 19, "end": 71}], "action": [{"text": "include", "start": 11, "end": 18}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Ironically, the attackers follow security best practices by indicating in the first email that the password will be sent to the recipient in a separate email.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This is merely to trick the recipient into believing the email is from a legitimate and trustworthy source.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This", "start": 0, "end": 4}, {"text": "the recipient", "start": 24, "end": 37}, {"text": "believing the email is from a legitimate and trustworthy source", "start": 43, "end": 106}], "action": [{"text": "trick", "start": 18, "end": 23}], "modifier": [{"text": "into", "start": 38, "end": 42}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The body of the email is very short and claims the attachment includes a medical receipt.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The email also requests that the recipient open the attachment on a Windows computer.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The email", "start": 0, "end": 9}, {"text": "the recipient open the attachment on a Windows computer", "start": 29, "end": 84}], "action": [{"text": "requests", "start": 15, "end": 23}], "modifier": [{"text": "that", "start": 24, "end": 28}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The file in the attachment has a Microsoft Word icon but, as indicated within Windows Explorer, it is an executable file.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The malicious payload is Backdoor.Emdivi, a threat that opens a back door on the compromised computer.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The malicious payload", "start": 0, "end": 21}, {"text": "Backdoor.Emdivi", "start": 25, "end": 40}, {"text": "a threat", "start": 42, "end": 50}, {"text": "a back door", "start": 62, "end": 73}, {"text": "the compromised computer", "start": 77, "end": 101}], "action": [{"text": "is", "start": 22, "end": 24}, {"text": "opens", "start": 56, "end": 61}], "modifier": [{"text": "on", "start": 74, "end": 76}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The malware is exclusively used in the CloudyOmega attack campaign and first appeared in 2011 when it was used in an attack against a Japanese chemical company.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Emdivi allows the remote attacker executing the commands to send the results back to the command-and-control (C & C) server through HTTP.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the remote attacker", "start": 14, "end": 33}, {"text": "the commands", "start": 44, "end": 56}, {"text": "the results", "start": 65, "end": 76}, {"text": "the command-and-control (C & C) server", "start": 85, "end": 123}, {"text": "HTTP", "start": 132, "end": 136}], "action": [{"text": "executing", "start": 34, "end": 43}, {"text": "send", "start": 60, "end": 64}], "modifier": [{"text": "back to", "start": 77, "end": 84}, {"text": "through", "start": 124, "end": 131}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Each Emdivi variant has a unique version number and belongs to one of two types: Type S and Type T.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The unique version number is not only a clear sign that Emdivi is systematically managed, but it also acts as an encryption key.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The malware adds extra words to the version number and then, based on this, generates a hash, which it uses as an encryption key.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The malware", "start": 0, "end": 11}, {"text": "a hash", "start": 86, "end": 92}, {"text": "it", "start": 100, "end": 102}, {"text": "an encryption key", "start": 111, "end": 128}], "action": [{"text": "generates", "start": 76, "end": 85}, {"text": "uses", "start": 103, "end": 107}], "modifier": [{"text": "as", "start": 108, "end": 110}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Both Emdivi Type S and Type T share the following functionality: Type T is primarily used in Operation CloudyOmega, has been in constant development since the campaign was first launched in 2011, and is written in the C++ programing language.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Type T employs techniques to protect itself from security vendors or network administrators.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Type T", "start": 0, "end": 6}, {"text": "techniques", "start": 15, "end": 25}, {"text": "protect itself from security vendors or network administrators", "start": 29, "end": 91}], "action": [{"text": "employs", "start": 7, "end": 14}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 26, "end": 28}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Important parts of Type T, such as the C & C server address it contacts and its protection mechanisms, are encrypted.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Important parts of Type T, such as the C & C server address it contacts and its protection mechanisms", "start": 0, "end": 101}], "action": [{"text": "are encrypted", "start": 103, "end": 116}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Type T also detects the presence of automatic analysis systems or debuggers, such as the following: Type S, on the other hand, was used only twice in the attack campaign.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Type T", "start": 0, "end": 6}, {"text": "the presence of automatic analysis systems", "start": 20, "end": 62}, {"text": "debuggers", "start": 66, "end": 75}], "action": [{"text": "detects", "start": 12, "end": 19}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Type S is a .NET", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Type S", "start": 0, "end": 6}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "application based on the same source code and shared C & C infrastructure as Type T.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "based", "start": 12, "end": 17}], "modifier": [{"text": "on", "start": 18, "end": 20}], "entity": [{"text": "and shared C & C infrastructure as Type T", "start": 42, "end": 83}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, protection mechanisms and encryption, essential features for threat survival, are not present in Type S. One interesting trait of Type S is that it uses Japanese sentences that seem to be randomly taken from the internet to change the file hash.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For instance, in the example shown in Figure 4, it uses a sentence talking about the special theory of relativity.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Once infected, Emdivi connects to hardcoded C & C servers using the HTTP protocol.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Emdivi", "start": 15, "end": 21}, {"text": "hardcoded C & C servers", "start": 34, "end": 57}, {"text": "the HTTP protocol", "start": 64, "end": 81}], "action": [{"text": "connects", "start": 22, "end": 30}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 31, "end": 33}, {"text": "using", "start": 58, "end": 63}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "So far, a total of 50 unique domains have been identified from 58 Emdivi variants.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Almost all websites used as C & C servers are compromised Japanese websites ranging from sites belonging to small businesses to personal blogs.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We discovered that 40 out of the 50 compromised websites, spread across 13 IP addresses, are hosted on a single cloud-hosting service based in Japan.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The compromised sites are hosted on various pieces of web server software, such as Apache and Microsoft Internet Information Services (IIS), and are on different website platforms.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This indicates that the sites were not compromised through a vulnerability in a single software product or website platform.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Instead, the attacker somehow penetrated the cloud service itself and turned the websites into C & C servers for Backdoor.Emdivi.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the attacker", "start": 9, "end": 21}, {"text": "the websites", "start": 77, "end": 89}, {"text": "C & C servers for Backdoor.Emdivi", "start": 95, "end": 128}], "action": [{"text": "turned", "start": 70, "end": 76}], "modifier": [{"text": "into", "start": 90, "end": 94}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The compromised cloud hosting company has been notified but, at the time of writing, has not replied.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Symantec offers two IPS signatures that detect and block network communication between infected computers and the Emdivi C & C server: During our research, multiple samples related to this attack campaign were identified and allowed us to connect the dots, as it were, when it came to CloudyOmega's connections to other attack groups.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In August 2012, the CloudyOmega attackers exploited the zero-day Adobe Flash Player and AIR'copyRawDataTo ()' Integer Overflow Vulnerability (CVE-2012-5054) in an attack against a high-profile organization in Japan.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The attackers sent a Microsoft Word file containing a maliciously crafted SWF file that exploited the vulnerability.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The attackers", "start": 0, "end": 13}, {"text": "a Microsoft Word file containing a maliciously crafted SWF file that exploited the vulnerability", "start": 19, "end": 115}], "action": [{"text": "sent", "start": 14, "end": 18}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Once successfully exploited, the file installed Backdoor.Emdivi.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the file", "start": 29, "end": 37}, {"text": "Backdoor.Emdivi", "start": 48, "end": 63}], "action": [{"text": "installed", "start": 38, "end": 47}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As CVE- 2012-5054 was publicly disclosed in the same month, the attack utilized what was, at the time, a zero-day exploit.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Interestingly, the Flash file that was used in an Emdivi attack in 2012 and the one used in the LadyBoyle attack in 2013 look very similar.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Figure 6 shows the malformed SWF file executing LadyBoyle () code that attempts to exploit the Adobe Flash Player CVE-2013-0634 Remote Memory Corruption Vulnerability (CVE-2013-0634).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Flash file seems to have been created using the same framework used by the CloudyOmega group, but with a different exploit.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Both attacks use a .doc", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "file containing an Adobe Flash zero-day exploit that is used to install a back door.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "an Adobe Flash zero-day exploit", "start": 16, "end": 47}, {"text": "a back door", "start": 72, "end": 83}], "action": [{"text": "install", "start": 64, "end": 71}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "No other evidence connects these two different campaigns; however, as described previously in Symantec Security Response's Elderwood blog, it is strongly believed that a single parent organization has broken into a number of subgroups that each target a particular industry.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In terms of the latest attack on Ichitaro, we collected a dozen samples of JTD files, all of which are exactly the same except for their payload.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The parent organization, it would seem, supplied the zero-day exploit to the different subgroups as part of an attack toolkit and each group launched a separate attack using their chosen malware.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This is why three different payloads (Backdoor.Emdivi, Backdoor.Korplug, and Backdoor.ZXshell) were observed in the latest zero-day attack.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Operation CloudyOmega was launched by an attack group that has communication channels with other notorious attack groups including Hidden Lynx and the group responsible for LadyBoyle.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "CloudyOmega has been in operation since 2011 and is persistent in targeting Japanese organizations.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "With the latest attack employing a zero-day vulnerability, there is no indication that the group will stop their activities anytime soon.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Symantec Security Response will be keeping a close eye on the CloudyOmega group.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is highly recommended that customers using Ichitaro products apply any patches as soon as possible.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Symantec offers the following protection against attacks associated with Operation CloudyOmega:", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As the pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong has continued, we've been watching for indications of confrontation taking place in cyberspace.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Protests began in September and have continued to escalate.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In recent weeks, attackers have launched a series of Distributed Denial of Service attacks (DDoS) against websites promoting democracy in Hong Kong.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "attackers", "start": 17, "end": 26}, {"text": "a series of Distributed Denial of Service attacks (DDoS)", "start": 41, "end": 97}, {"text": "websites promoting democracy in Hong Kong", "start": 106, "end": 147}], "action": [{"text": "launched", "start": 32, "end": 40}], "modifier": [{"text": "against", "start": 98, "end": 105}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "According to the Wall Street Journal, websites belonging to Next Media's Apple Daily publication have suffered from an ongoing DDoS attack that'' brought down its email system for hours''.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "websites belonging to Next Media's Apple Daily publication", "start": 38, "end": 96}, {"text": "an ongoing DDoS attack that'' brought down its email system for hours''", "start": 116, "end": 187}], "action": [{"text": "suffered", "start": 102, "end": 110}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 111, "end": 115}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "According to other reports, Next Media's network has suffered a'' total failure'' as a result of these attacks.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Next Media's network", "start": 28, "end": 48}, {"text": "a'' total failure''", "start": 62, "end": 81}, {"text": "these attacks", "start": 97, "end": 110}], "action": [{"text": "suffered", "start": 53, "end": 61}], "modifier": [{"text": "as a result of", "start": 82, "end": 96}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Additionally, at least one member of the popular online forum HKGolden was arrested for posting messages encouraging support for the OccupyCentral Pro Democracy movement.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The use of DDoS attacks as a political tool during times of conflict is not new; patriotic hacktivist groups frequently use them as a means to stifle political activity of which they disapprove.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The question of state sponsorship (or at least tacit approval) in online crackdowns is often up for debate and ambiguous from a technical evidence and tradecraft perspective.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In this case, however, we've discovered an overlap in the tools and infrastructure used by China-based advanced persistent threat (APT) actors and the DDoS attack activity.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We believe that these DDoS attacks are linked to previously observed APT activity, including Operation Poisoned Hurricane.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This correlation sheds light on the potential relationships, symbiosis and tool sharing between patriotic hacker activities designed to disrupt anti-government activists in China, and the APT activity we consistently see that is more IP theft and espionage-focused.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "FireEye has identified a number of binaries coded to receive instructions from a set of command and control (C2) servers instructing participating bots to attack Next Media-owned websites and the HKGolden forum.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "a number of binaries", "start": 23, "end": 43}, {"text": "instructions", "start": 61, "end": 73}, {"text": "a set of command and control (C2) servers", "start": 79, "end": 120}, {"text": "participating bots", "start": 133, "end": 151}, {"text": "attack Next Media-owned websites and the HKGolden forum", "start": 155, "end": 210}], "action": [{"text": "receive", "start": 53, "end": 60}, {"text": "instructing", "start": 121, "end": 132}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 74, "end": 78}, {"text": "to", "start": 152, "end": 154}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Next Media is a large media company in Hong Kong and the HkGolden forum has been used as a platform to organize pro-democracy protests.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Each sample we identified is signed with digital certificates that have also been used by APT actors to sign binaries in previous intrusion operations: These binaries are W32 Cabinet self-extracting files that drop a variant of an older DDoS tool known as KernelBot.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "These binaries", "start": 152, "end": 166}, {"text": "a variant of an older DDoS tool known as KernelBot", "start": 215, "end": 265}], "action": [{"text": "drop", "start": 210, "end": 214}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "All of the samples we identified have the'' NewVersion'' value of 20140926.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Structurally, all of these samples are similar in that they drop three files: The KernelBot implants receive targeting instructions from C2 servers hard-coded directly into the sample.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "they", "start": 55, "end": 59}, {"text": "three files", "start": 65, "end": 76}, {"text": "The KernelBot implants", "start": 78, "end": 100}, {"text": "targeting instructions", "start": 109, "end": 131}, {"text": "C2 servers hard-coded directly into the sample", "start": 137, "end": 183}], "action": [{"text": "drop", "start": 60, "end": 64}, {"text": "receive", "start": 101, "end": 108}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 132, "end": 136}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For example, c3d6450075d618b1edba17ee723eb3ca drops a KernelBot variant that connects to both www.sapporo-digital-photoclub [.] com and wakayamasatei [.] com.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "c3d6450075d618b1edba17ee723eb3ca", "start": 13, "end": 45}, {"text": "a KernelBot variant", "start": 52, "end": 71}, {"text": "both www.sapporo-digital-photoclub [.] com and wakayamasatei [.] com", "start": 89, "end": 157}], "action": [{"text": "drops", "start": 46, "end": 51}, {"text": "connects", "start": 77, "end": 85}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 86, "end": 88}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The full list of C2 servers we identified is as follows: On Oct. 21, the control server at wakayamasatei [.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "] com responded with the following encoded configuration file: This configuration file can be decoded by stripping the leading and trailing @$@characters.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "At this point, a simple base64 and XOR decode will reveal the plaintext configuration.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The following snippet of python code can be used to decode this command: FireEye has observed two different single-byte XOR keys used to encode configuration files issued by the DDOS C2 servers in this campaign.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "two different single-byte XOR keys", "start": 94, "end": 128}, {"text": "configuration files issued by the DDOS C2 servers in this campaign", "start": 144, "end": 210}], "action": [{"text": "encode", "start": 137, "end": 143}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The two different keys are 0x2A or 0x7E.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The encoded configuration file shown above decodes to: During the course of our research, we've observed more than 30 different unique configuration files issued by the C2 servers listed above.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "more than 30 different unique configuration files", "start": 105, "end": 154}, {"text": "the C2 servers listed above", "start": 165, "end": 192}], "action": [{"text": "issued", "start": 155, "end": 161}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These configurations issued commands to attack the following domains and IPs: All of the above IPs host Next Media or Apple daily websites, with the exception of 58.64.139.10 and 124.217.214.149.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "These configurations", "start": 0, "end": 20}, {"text": "commands to attack the following domains and IPs", "start": 28, "end": 76}], "action": [{"text": "issued", "start": 21, "end": 27}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The IP 58.64.139.10 has hosted hkgolden [.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "] com–the domain for the HKGolden forum mentioned above.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For approximately 14 hours between October 23rd and 24th, the attackers pushed a configuration update to four controls servers that instructed bots under their control to flood 124.217.214.149 with UDP traffic.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the attackers", "start": 58, "end": 71}, {"text": "a configuration update", "start": 79, "end": 101}, {"text": "four controls servers", "start": 105, "end": 126}, {"text": "bots under their control", "start": 143, "end": 167}, {"text": "124.217.214.149", "start": 177, "end": 192}, {"text": "UDP traffic", "start": 198, "end": 209}], "action": [{"text": "pushed", "start": 72, "end": 78}, {"text": "instructed", "start": 132, "end": 142}, {"text": "flood", "start": 171, "end": 176}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 102, "end": 104}, {"text": "with", "start": 193, "end": 197}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The IP 124.217.214.149 hosted the attacker controlled domain p.java-sec [.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "] com.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "On Oct. 23, 2014, two of the active controls began instructing participating bots to cease attacks.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "two of the active controls", "start": 18, "end": 44}, {"text": "participating bots", "start": 63, "end": 81}, {"text": "cease attacks", "start": 85, "end": 98}], "action": [{"text": "instructing", "start": 51, "end": 62}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 82, "end": 84}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "By Oct. 24, 2014, all five of the known active control servers were issuing commands to cease the attacks.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "all five of the known active control servers", "start": 18, "end": 62}, {"text": "commands", "start": 76, "end": 84}, {"text": "cease the attacks", "start": 88, "end": 105}], "action": [{"text": "were issuing", "start": 63, "end": 75}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 85, "end": 87}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It should come as no surprise that hkgolden [.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "] com, nextmedia [.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "] com, and appledaily.com [.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "] hk websites are now or previously have been blocked by the Great Firewall of China–indicating that the PRC has found the content hosted on these sites objectionable.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The most direct connection between these DDoS attacks and previous APT activity is the use of the QTI International and CallTogether code signing certificates, which we have seen in malware attributed to APT activity.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The QTI International digital certificate has been previously used to sign binaries used in APT activity including Operation Poisoned Hurricane.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Specifically, 17bc9d2a640da75db6cbb66e5898feb1 is a PlugX variant signed by the QTI International certificate.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This PlugX variant connected to a Google Code project at code.google [.] com/p/udom/, where it decoded a command that configured its C2 server.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This PlugX variant", "start": 0, "end": 18}, {"text": "a Google Code project at code.google [.] com/p/udom/", "start": 32, "end": 84}, {"text": "it", "start": 92, "end": 94}, {"text": "a command that configured its C2 server", "start": 103, "end": 142}], "action": [{"text": "connected", "start": 19, "end": 28}, {"text": "decoded", "start": 95, "end": 102}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 29, "end": 31}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The sample 0b54ae49fd5a841970b98a078968cb6b was signed with the QTI International certificate as well.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This sample was first observed during a drive-by attack in June 2014, and was downloaded from java-se [.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "] com/jp.jpg.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This sample is detected as Backdoor.APT.Preshin and connected to luxscena [.] com for C2.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This sample", "start": 0, "end": 11}, {"text": "Backdoor.APT.Preshin", "start": 27, "end": 47}, {"text": "luxscena [.] com", "start": 65, "end": 81}, {"text": "C2", "start": 86, "end": 88}], "action": [{"text": "is detected", "start": 12, "end": 23}, {"text": "connected", "start": 52, "end": 61}], "modifier": [{"text": "as", "start": 24, "end": 26}, {"text": "to", "start": 62, "end": 64}, {"text": "for", "start": 82, "end": 85}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The QTI International certificate was also used to sign e2a4b96cce9de4fb126cfd5f5c73c3ed.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We detect this payload as Backdoor.APT.PISCES and it used hk.java-se [.] com for C2.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "We", "start": 0, "end": 2}, {"text": "this payload", "start": 10, "end": 22}, {"text": "Backdoor.APT.PISCES", "start": 26, "end": 45}, {"text": "it", "start": 50, "end": 52}, {"text": "hk.java-se [.] com", "start": 58, "end": 76}, {"text": "C2", "start": 81, "end": 83}], "action": [{"text": "detect", "start": 3, "end": 9}, {"text": "used", "start": 53, "end": 57}], "modifier": [{"text": "as", "start": 23, "end": 25}, {"text": "for", "start": 77, "end": 80}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The java-se [.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "] com website was previously used in other attacks targeting the pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We first observed the presence of malicious javascript inserted into Hong Kong Association for Democracy and People's Livelihood on June 26, 2014, which appeared as the following: More recently, as noted by Claudio Guarnieri, the website of the Democratic Party of Hong Kong was seen hosting a redirect to the same malicious javascript.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The CallTogether certificate has been used to sign ecf21054ab515946a812d1aa5c408ca5.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We also detect this payload as Backdoor.APT.PISCES and observed it connect to u.java-se [.] com.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "We", "start": 0, "end": 2}, {"text": "this payload", "start": 15, "end": 27}, {"text": "Backdoor.APT.PISCES", "start": 31, "end": 50}, {"text": "it", "start": 64, "end": 66}, {"text": "u.java-se [.] com", "start": 78, "end": 95}], "action": [{"text": "detect", "start": 8, "end": 14}, {"text": "connect", "start": 67, "end": 74}], "modifier": [{"text": "as", "start": 28, "end": 30}, {"text": "to", "start": 75, "end": 77}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Both of these certificates are valid but can be detected and blocked via the following Yara signatures: These ongoing DDoS attacks and previous APT intrusion activity both target the hkgolden [.] com website.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "These ongoing DDoS attacks", "start": 104, "end": 130}, {"text": "the hkgolden [.] com website", "start": 179, "end": 207}], "action": [{"text": "target", "start": 172, "end": 178}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As noted above, this site has been targeted with a DDoS attack by a KernelBot network.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "this site", "start": 16, "end": 25}, {"text": "a DDoS attack", "start": 49, "end": 62}, {"text": "a KernelBot network", "start": 66, "end": 85}], "action": [{"text": "been targeted", "start": 30, "end": 43}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 44, "end": 48}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We also found that the hkgolden [.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "] com website was compromised on Sept. 5, 2014 and had a redirect to a malicious javascript again hosted at another jave-se [.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "] com host, which appeared as follows: Finally, as noted above the IP 124.217.214.149 was seen hosting the domain p.java-sec [.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "] com between Oct. 25, 2014 and Oct. 27, 2014.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As Brandon Dixon noted here, the java-sec [.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "] com domain is linked to the java- se [.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "] com by shared hosting history at the following IP address: It is unclear why these actors would attack an IP address they were actively using.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It's possible that the attackers wanted to test their botnet's capability by attacking an IP they were using to gather statistics on the size of the attack.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is also possible that the attackers simply made a mistake and accidentally issued commands to attack their own infrastructure.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "On Oct. 24, 2014, after attacking their own infrastructure, the attackers issued new instructions to their botnet that ceased all attacks.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the attackers", "start": 60, "end": 73}, {"text": "new instructions", "start": 81, "end": 97}, {"text": "their botnet", "start": 101, "end": 113}], "action": [{"text": "issued", "start": 74, "end": 80}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 98, "end": 100}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "While not conclusive, the evidence presented above shows a link between confirmed APT activity and ongoing DDoS attacks that appear to be designed to silence the Pro Democracy movement in Hong Kong.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The evidence does not conclusively prove that the same actors responsible for the DDoS attacks are also behind the observed intrusion activity discussed above–such as Operation Poisoned Hurricane.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Rather, the evidence may indicate that a common quartermaster supports both the DDoS attacks and ongoing intrusion activity.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In either scenario, there is a clear connection between the intrusion activity documented in Operation Poisoned Hurricane and the DDOS attacks documented here.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "While the tactics of these activities are very different from a technical perspective, each supports distinct political objectives.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Operation Poisoned Hurricane's objective appeared to have in part been IP theft possibly for economic gain or other competitive advantages.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In the DDOS attacks, the objective was to silence free speech and suppress the pro democracy movement in Hong Kong.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Chinese government is the entity most likely to be interested in achieving both of these objectives.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This entry was posted in Threat Intelligence, Threat Research and tagged advanced malware, Cybersecurity, malware, zero-day by Ned Moran, Mike Oppenheim and Mike Scott.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Bookmark the permalink.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "On September 24 2014, FireEye observed a new strategic web compromise (SWC) campaign that we believe is targeting non-profit organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGO) by hosting iframes on legitimate websites.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The compromised websites contained an iframe to direct site visitors to a threat actor-controlled IP address that dropped a Poison Ivy remote access tool (RAT) onto victims' systems.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "an iframe", "start": 35, "end": 44}, {"text": "site visitors", "start": 55, "end": 68}, {"text": "a threat actor-controlled IP address", "start": 72, "end": 108}, {"text": "a Poison Ivy remote access tool (RAT)", "start": 122, "end": 159}, {"text": "victims' systems", "start": 165, "end": 181}], "action": [{"text": "direct", "start": 48, "end": 54}, {"text": "dropped", "start": 114, "end": 121}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 69, "end": 71}, {"text": "onto", "start": 160, "end": 164}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "FireEye has not yet attributed this activity though we have identified links to the Sunshop Digital Quartermaster, a collective of malware authors that supports multiple China-based advanced persistent threat (APT) groups.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "FireEye previously established detection measures for this threat activity, ensuring our clients were prepared for these intrusion attempts well in advance of threat actor implementation.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "On September 24, FireEye observed SWCs, likely conducted by a unitary threat group based on shared infrastructure and tools, on at least three different websites: an international non-profit organization that focuses on environmental advocacy, and two different NGOs that promote democracy and human rights.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The group was able to compromise these websites and insert malicious iframes.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The group", "start": 0, "end": 9}, {"text": "these websites", "start": 33, "end": 47}, {"text": "malicious iframes", "start": 59, "end": 76}], "action": [{"text": "compromise", "start": 22, "end": 32}, {"text": "insert", "start": 52, "end": 58}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Figure 1 displays one of the iframes.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The threat group obfuscated the iframe on two of the compromised websites.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The threat group", "start": 0, "end": 16}, {"text": "the iframe", "start": 28, "end": 38}, {"text": "two of the compromised websites", "start": 42, "end": 73}], "action": [{"text": "obfuscated", "start": 17, "end": 27}], "modifier": [{"text": "on", "start": 39, "end": 41}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The iframes on these websites directed visitors to Java exploits hosted at 103.27.108.45.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The iframes on these websites", "start": 0, "end": 29}, {"text": "visitors", "start": 39, "end": 47}, {"text": "Java exploits hosted at 103.27.108.45", "start": 51, "end": 88}], "action": [{"text": "directed", "start": 30, "end": 38}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 48, "end": 50}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In turn, these exploits downloaded and decoded a payload hosted at: hxxp: //103.27.108.45/img/js.php.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "these exploits", "start": 9, "end": 23}, {"text": "a payload hosted at: hxxp: //103.27.108.45/img/js.php", "start": 47, "end": 100}], "action": [{"text": "downloaded", "start": 24, "end": 34}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A GET request to this URI returned the following content: The'bin' param shown in Figure 2 is decoded from ASCII into hex by the Java exploit.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Once decoded, FireEye identified the payload as a Poison Ivy variant.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It had the following properties: The backdoor also contained the below versioning info embedded in the RTVERSION of one of the PE resources: This versioning info attempted to masquerade as a Google Chrome file.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This versioning info", "start": 141, "end": 161}, {"text": "a Google Chrome file", "start": 189, "end": 209}], "action": [{"text": "masquerade", "start": 175, "end": 185}], "modifier": [{"text": "as", "start": 186, "end": 188}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, the malware author misspelled multiple words when attempting to put in versioning information for this particular build.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Poison Ivy implant had the following configuration properties: The C2 domain quakegoogle.servequake [.] com resolved to 115.126.62.100 at the time of the SWCs.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The C2 domain quakegoogle.servequake [.] com", "start": 67, "end": 111}, {"text": "115.126.62.100", "start": 124, "end": 138}, {"text": "the time of the SWCs", "start": 142, "end": 162}], "action": [{"text": "resolved", "start": 112, "end": 120}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 121, "end": 123}, {"text": "at", "start": 139, "end": 141}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Other domains resolving to the same IP include the following: Between August 30, 2014 and September 16, 2014 we also observed SOGU (aka Kaba) callback traffic sent to assign.ddnsking.com over port 443.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "SOGU (aka Kaba) callback traffic", "start": 126, "end": 158}, {"text": "assign.ddnsking.com", "start": 167, "end": 186}, {"text": "port 443", "start": 192, "end": 200}], "action": [{"text": "sent", "start": 159, "end": 163}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 164, "end": 166}, {"text": "over", "start": 187, "end": 191}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Poison Ivy backdoor also had a RTMANIFEST PE resource with a SHA256 fingerprint of 82a98c88d3dd57a6ebc0fe7167a86875ed52ebddc6374ad640407efec01b1393.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This same RTMANIFEST resource was documented in our previous Sunshop Digital Quartermaster report.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "FireEye previously identified this specific RTMANIFEST as the'Sunshop Manifest,' and we have observed this same manifest resource used in 86 other samples.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As we stated in the Quartermaster report, we believe this shared resource is an artifact of a builder toolkit made available to a number of China- based APT groups.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This activity represents a new SWC campaign.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We suspect threat actors are leveraging their access to compromised websites belonging to NGOs and non-profits to target other organizations in the same industries.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These websites are often visited by organization employees and other organizations in the same industries, allowing threat actors to move laterally within already compromised networks or gain access to new networks.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "While FireEye has not attributed this activity to a specific threat group, we frequently observe China-based threat actors target non-profits and NGOs, and we suspect that they seek to monitor activity within their borders that may lead to domestic unrest or embarrass the Chinese government.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For example, in 2013, FireEye observed China-based threat actors steal grant applications and activity reports specifically related to an international NGO's China-based activities.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We suspects threat actors sought to monitor these programs and involved individuals.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The three organizations whose websites are hosting the malicious iframes have China-based operations.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "FireEye is releasing information on this campaign to allow organizations to investigate and prepare for this activity in their networks.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We believe non-profits and NGOs remain at elevated risk of intrusion and should be especially wary of attempts to compromise their networks using SWC.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Threat actors may use SWCs to achieve this goal, but FireEye does not discount the possibility that threat actors will use other means at their disposal, including phishing.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Based on past threat actor activity in this industry, FireEye expects threat actors are motivated to steal programmatic data and monitor organizations' programs in specific countries.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If China-based threat actors are behind the observed campaign, FireEye expects that organizations with operations in China are high-priority targets.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "FireEye currently has detection measures in place that should allow users of FireEye products to detect this SWC activity.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is also likely that other industries or organizations were affected by this SWC activity, since these sites are public facing and frequently visited.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Special thanks to Google's Billy Leonard for providing additional information and research.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Thanks to the following authors for their contributions: Mike Oppenheim, Ned Moran, and Steve Stone.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This entry was posted in Threat Intelligence, Threat Research by Sarah Engle and Ben Withnell.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Bookmark the permalink.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Hikit consists of at least two generations of malware that provides basic RAT functionality.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "at least two generations of malware", "start": 18, "end": 53}, {"text": "basic RAT functionality", "start": 68, "end": 91}], "action": [{"text": "provides", "start": 59, "end": 67}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The first generation of Hikit (referred to as'' Gen 1'') operates as a server and requires an externally exposed network interface in order for an attacker to access the victim machine.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The first generation of Hikit (referred to as'' Gen 1'')", "start": 0, "end": 56}, {"text": "a server", "start": 69, "end": 77}, {"text": "an attacker", "start": 144, "end": 155}, {"text": "the victim machine", "start": 166, "end": 184}], "action": [{"text": "operates", "start": 57, "end": 65}, {"text": "access", "start": 159, "end": 165}], "modifier": [{"text": "as", "start": 66, "end": 68}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The second generation of Hikit (referred to as'' Gen 2'') uses the more traditional client model and beacons out to an attacker's C2 server.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The second generation of Hikit (referred to as'' Gen 2'')", "start": 0, "end": 57}, {"text": "an attacker's C2 server", "start": 116, "end": 139}], "action": [{"text": "beacons", "start": 101, "end": 108}], "modifier": [{"text": "out to", "start": 109, "end": 115}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "While the communication models shifted dramatically between Gen 1 and Gen 2, both generations of Hikit retain the same basic RAT function consisting of remote command shell, file management, network proxy and port forwarding.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "both generations of Hikit", "start": 77, "end": 102}, {"text": "the same basic RAT function consisting of remote command shell, file management, network proxy and port forwarding", "start": 110, "end": 224}], "action": [{"text": "retain", "start": 103, "end": 109}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Both Gen 1 and Gen 2 sub-families of Hikit consist of a main DLL (referred to as'' the DLL'') that contains the RAT functionality; a kernel driver (referred to as'' the Driver'') with Gen 2 also employs an additional component: a loader executable.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "a main DLL (referred to as'' the DLL'')", "start": 54, "end": 93}, {"text": "the RAT functionality", "start": 108, "end": 129}], "action": [{"text": "contains", "start": 99, "end": 107}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The driver component of Gen 1 and Gen 2 are drastically different in their operation and intent.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For the Gen 1 sub-family of Hikit, the driver acts as a NDIS (network) driver that is responsible for interfacing the DLL to the network while preventing a direct WinSock interface from occurring.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Gen 1 Driver listens to network traffic arriving at the local network interface and waits for a specific trigger string.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The Gen 1 Driver", "start": 0, "end": 16}, {"text": "network traffic arriving at the local network interface", "start": 28, "end": 83}], "action": [{"text": "listens", "start": 17, "end": 24}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 25, "end": 27}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The trigger string varies by Driver and DLL sample.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Gen 2 Driver is a simpler system driver that acts as a rootkit to hide processes, registry keys and network connections associated with Gen 2 activity on the victim's system.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The Gen 2 Driver", "start": 0, "end": 16}, {"text": "processes, registry keys and network connections associated with Gen 2 activity on the victim's system", "start": 75, "end": 177}], "action": [{"text": "hide", "start": 70, "end": 74}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Gen 2 uses a standard client-server malware model meaning that the malware no longer requires a direct Internet-facing network card, no longer uses a network driver for networking, and provides the ability to network multiple Gen 2 samples behind a firewall with greater ease (from the attacker's perspective).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Gen 2 sub-family, however, no longer employs network stealth provided by the Gen 1 network driver which exposes the C2 server addresses to analysts.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Each of the Hikit generations contains multiple sub-generations as the author (s) of Hikit have evolved their code over time.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "There is a noticeable steep improvement over the code base of Gen 1 Hikit family during its 2011 development period.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Gen 2 sub-generations share a similar improvement scale between late 2011 and late 2013.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The earliest known Hikit sample dates back to 31 March 2011.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Known as the Gen 1.0 sub-generation of Hikit Gen 1, the first known sample of Hikit deviated from the later traditional Gen 1 model.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Gen 1.0 sample was a standalone executable whereas subsequent Gen 1 sub-generations use a DLL running as a service.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Gen 1.0 sample is clearly a work-in-progress.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Gen 1.0 sample, while different than subsequent sub-generations, does still rely on the Driver component and for the most part the structure of the code does not differ much going forward into the Gen 1 evolution.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Less than three weeks after Gen 1.0, the author (s) of Hikit move into Gen 1.1.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The notable change is that the Hikit model of using a DLL and driver, which has remained until present day, comes into being.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The code matures slightly between Gen 1.0 and Gen 1.1 but the functionality does not change.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Both Gen 1.0 and Gen 1.1 use plaintext data transmissions.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Development appears to halt on Gen 1 for 4 months between 20 June 2011 and 23 October 2011 based on a lack of available samples found.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "During this time the development of Hikit appears to change locations.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Gen 1 samples have Program Database (PDB) file strings that identify the file path of the Hikit source code.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For Gen 1.0 and Gen 1.1 samples, the file path of the Hikit source code is consistently h: \\JmVodServer\\hikit.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Starting with Gen 1.2, the file path switches to e: \\SourceCode\\hikitnew.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is at this time that the functionality of Hikit Gen 1 begins to mature.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In Gen 1.2, the communication between the infected machine and the attacker is encrypted using an XOR mask.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the communication between the infected machine and the attacker", "start": 12, "end": 75}, {"text": "an XOR mask", "start": 95, "end": 106}], "action": [{"text": "is encrypted", "start": 76, "end": 88}], "modifier": [{"text": "using", "start": 89, "end": 94}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A more subtle change is the renaming of the'' socks5'' command to simply'' proxy'' within the code.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The code within Hikit begins to mature but the overall functionality does not expand beyond the original set of commands found in Gen 1.0.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The other remarkable change within the Gen 1.1 to Gen 1.2 development is the way in which the session handshake trigger operates.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In Gen 1.0 and Gen 1.1, the DLL instructs the Driver to listen for a specific string (typically a HTTP request string) and responds with another string.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In Gen 1.2, the Driver has a hardcoded trigger string (a specific HTTP request string) and the DLL instructs the Driver to inspect a specific HTTP header field for a specific hexadecimal value.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This moves Gen 1.2 into more of a username/password authentication scheme whereas previous sub-generations could potentially be accessed by accidental HTTP requests.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "At the same time, the Driver responds with a specific value with in the Etag HTTP header field.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This places Gen 1.2 into a more stealth position as a random, non-HTTP compliant response from Gen 1.0 and Gen 1.1 samples is more obvious than a legitimate HTTP response with a specially crafted Etag header.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Gen 1.2's development cycle appears to exist between 23 October 2011 and 2 November 2011 with several new samples being found on the Internet having legitimate compile times during this time window.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "There is, however, evidence that the development of Hikit Gen 1 and Gen 2 overlap by several months.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The earliest Gen 2 sample known to exist dates to 28 August 2011, two months before the first known Gen 1.2 sample.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The last known Gen 1.2 sample, and by extension, the last known Gen 1 sample, dates to 9 April 2012.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The first known Gen 2 sub-generation, Gen 2.0 Alpha, much like Gen 1.0, represents an early development version of the Gen 2 Hikit sub-family.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Gen 2.0 Alpha is a stand-alone Windows console executable that can run as a service executable.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Gen 2.0 Alpha supports the same commands as Gen 1.2 with an additional command that returns the infection's configuration information.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "On 9 February 2012 the first known sample for Gen 2.0 Beta is compiled by the developer (s) of Hikit.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Also a stand-alone console executable like Gen 2.0 Alpha, the Gen 2.0 Beta code changes internally without providing significant functionality improvements with the exception of now the executable uses a device driver to hide network, file, and registry artifacts related to its operation.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Both Gen 2.0 Alpha and Gen 2.0 Beta still retain PDB file path information within their binaries.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "During the development phase of Gen 2.0 Alpha, development of the Gen 2.0 Alpha variants changes locations.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "First version of the Gen 2.0 Alpha malware, from 28 August 2011, has the PDB path located in H: \\JmVodServer\\Matrixnew2 whereas the file path for later Gen 2.0 Alpha and Gen 2.0 Beta binaries has the PDB path in E: \\SourceCode\\Matrixnew which suggests that the source code for both Gen 1 and Gen 2 existed on the same machine and moved at roughly the same time.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This may indicate either a single developer or a team (or set of teams) with shared resources.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The first known Gen 2.1 binary has a compile date of 17 April 2012.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Gen 2.1 represents the first Gen 2 sub-generation to use an executable-based loader, DLL and driver model, a model that all subsequent Gen 2 sub-generations employ.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The functionality of the Gen 2.1 sub-generation is the same as the previous generations with no new commands being introduced.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Gen 2.1 is the first sub-generation in the Gen 2 sub-family to introduce 64-bit binaries.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Gen 2.2 sub-generation appears to have begun on 20 July 2012.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Gen 2.2 is notable for altering where the configuration information of the RAT is stored and using both DLL-based and executable- based loaders.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Also notable is the fact that the sub-generation spans a significant amount of time with intermittent periods of development.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The bulk of the Gen 2.2 samples that have the tell-tale marks of being the product of a builder have a compile date of 26 July 2013, a full year after the first known Gen 2.2 sample.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Between 21 July 2012 and 20 February 2013, there are no known Gen 2.2 binaries.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The two 20 July 2012 samples have different compile times indicating they were not the product of a builder but rather unique compilations.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Between 21 February 2013 and 27 February 2013, there are 4 unique compilation dates for the DLL component with 7 unique, known Gen 2.2 DLLs.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The bulk of Gen 2.2 samples have a compile date of 26 July 2013.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "There are approximately 25 known Gen 2.2 DLLs with the 26 July 2013 compile date.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Gen 2.2 sub-generation appears to exist through at least 19 September 2013.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The last known Gen 2 sub-generation, Gen 2.3, began on 12 December 2013.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Gen 2.3 is notable for its use of a legitimate SSL certificate as part of the handshake between the infected machine and the attacker's C2.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The DLL will send a legitimate SSL certificate as a means to disrupt heuristic IDS sensors that look for encrypted traffic.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The DLL", "start": 0, "end": 7}, {"text": "a legitimate SSL certificate", "start": 18, "end": 46}, {"text": "a means to disrupt heuristic IDS sensors that look for encrypted traffic", "start": 50, "end": 122}], "action": [{"text": "send", "start": 13, "end": 17}], "modifier": [{"text": "as", "start": 47, "end": 49}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Another interesting aspect of the Gen 2.3 sub-generation is that there is no longer a marker to designate the beginning of the embedded configuration.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Gen 2.1 and Gen 2.2 uses a specific string to indicate the beginning of the embedded configuration presumably in order to allow the builder to locate the configuration space when constructing a new configuration for the binaries.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Gen 2.3, however, uses a specific location instead, requiring the builder to calculate the specific location using the PE/COFF header of the binary.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Also, while Gen 2.1 and Gen 2.2 retain the configuration within the DLL component, Gen 2.3 stores the configuration within the loader component.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This allows the attackers to configure the loader without having to update the DLL.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The evolution of Hikit is a long and drawn out series of small, incremental development changes.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The important take away from the evolution of Hikit is that the developers for Gen 1 appear to have changed in late 2011 and development of Gen 2 has a several month overlap with the development and usage of Gen 1.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The following table provides a quick reference to the generational (and sub-generational) designations of Hikit.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Driver component for Hikit varies based on the specific Hikit sub-family (Gen 1 or Gen 2).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As such it is necessary to describe each in the context of its specific sub-family.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Driver component of Gen 1 Hikit variants provides the interface between the victim's network interface card (NIC) and the DLL.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Driver is a NDIS (network) driver that integrates into the victim's network stack.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Driver intercepts any and all network communication that traverses the Windows network stack and potentially removes the data from the network stack under very specific conditions.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The Driver", "start": 0, "end": 10}, {"text": "any and all network communication that traverses the Windows network stack", "start": 22, "end": 96}], "action": [{"text": "intercepts", "start": 11, "end": 21}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "When the Driver removes data from the network stack, the Driver stores the removed data in local buffers for the Gen 1 DLL to query against.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The purpose of this behavior is to allow the DLL to interact with the network without utilizes the WinSock API which could potentially reveal the presence of Hikit.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the DLL", "start": 41, "end": 48}, {"text": "the network", "start": 66, "end": 77}, {"text": "utilizes the WinSock API which could potentially reveal the presence of Hikit", "start": 86, "end": 163}], "action": [{"text": "interact", "start": 52, "end": 60}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 61, "end": 65}, {"text": "without", "start": 78, "end": 85}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In order to interact with the Driver, the DLL uses the function The Driver will remove data from the network stack only if a new channel is being established.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A new channel occurs when the Driver detects a trigger string.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The trigger string is typically a short form HTTP request with the following trigger strings found in the wild: Up to and including Gen 1.1 Drivers required the DLL to specify the trigger string in addition to the authentication value whereas Gen 1.2 Drivers had the trigger strings hardcoded.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In Gen 1.2, whenever the Driver detects a trigger string, the Driver inspects the rest of the data received for the authentication value.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If the token follows the trigger string (there is no specific limitation on how far from the trigger string the password token must be), then the Driver generates a new channel that the DLL will use as the conduit between the DLL and the client.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Driver appears to be based off the NDIS example source code PassThru.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "More specifically, the author (s) of the Driver appear to have used the modified version of the PassThru example, PassThruEx, by James Antognini and Thomas Devine from a 2003 blog post.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Gen 2 sub-family, beginning with Gen 2.0 Beta, employs a Windows device driver ('' the Driver'') to hide aspects of the DLL's functionality from normal system processes.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The Gen 2 sub-family, beginning with Gen 2.0 Beta", "start": 0, "end": 49}, {"text": "a Windows device driver ('' the Driver'')", "start": 59, "end": 100}, {"text": "hide aspects of the DLL's functionality from normal system processes", "start": 104, "end": 172}], "action": [{"text": "employs", "start": 51, "end": 58}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 101, "end": 103}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Driver is a relatively straightforward piece of software.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It does not attempt to obfuscate its functionality from static analysis and it hooks a minimum number of kernel API functions in order to hide different pieces of information.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "it", "start": 76, "end": 78}, {"text": "a minimum number of kernel API functions", "start": 85, "end": 125}, {"text": "hide different pieces of information", "start": 138, "end": 174}], "action": [{"text": "hooks", "start": 79, "end": 84}], "modifier": [{"text": "in order to", "start": 126, "end": 137}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Driver is based primarily on the open source Agony rootkit and it has evidence of some portions of the code coming directly from a Chinese blog.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Driver expose an IOCTL interface that supports the following OIDs: The Driver is capable of hiding processes (by PID, not name), system modules, services, network connections, listening ports, directories (and by extension, files), as well as registry keys and values.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The Driver", "start": 71, "end": 81}, {"text": "processes", "start": 103, "end": 112}, {"text": "system modules", "start": 133, "end": 147}, {"text": "services", "start": 149, "end": 157}, {"text": "network connections", "start": 159, "end": 178}, {"text": "listening ports", "start": 180, "end": 195}, {"text": "directories", "start": 197, "end": 208}, {"text": "files", "start": 228, "end": 233}, {"text": "registry keys and values", "start": 247, "end": 271}], "action": [{"text": "hiding", "start": 96, "end": 102}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In order to hide these items, the Driver hooks various Windows Kernel API calls.", "output": {"entities": {"modifier": [{"text": "In order to", "start": 0, "end": 11}], "entity": [{"text": "hide these items", "start": 12, "end": 28}, {"text": "the Driver", "start": 30, "end": 40}, {"text": "various Windows Kernel API calls", "start": 47, "end": 79}], "action": [{"text": "hooks", "start": 41, "end": 46}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The following table maps the items the Driver can hide to the API function that the Driver hooks: In order to hide services, the Driver will access the memory of the services.exe process, locate the linked list of services and remove the service entry that the Driver wishes to hide.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the items", "start": 25, "end": 34}, {"text": "the Driver", "start": 35, "end": 45}, {"text": "the API function", "start": 58, "end": 74}, {"text": "the Driver", "start": 80, "end": 90}, {"text": "services", "start": 115, "end": 123}, {"text": "the Driver", "start": 125, "end": 135}, {"text": "the memory of the services.exe process", "start": 148, "end": 186}, {"text": "the service entry that the Driver wishes to hide", "start": 234, "end": 282}], "action": [{"text": "hide", "start": 50, "end": 54}, {"text": "hooks", "start": 91, "end": 96}, {"text": "hide", "start": 110, "end": 114}, {"text": "access", "start": 141, "end": 147}, {"text": "remove", "start": 227, "end": 233}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This is a surprisingly invasive method to obfuscate a process.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "obfuscate", "start": 42, "end": 51}], "entity": [{"text": "a process", "start": 52, "end": 61}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Upon activation, the Driver will expose its interface by calling IoCreateDevice with the name \\Device\\agony (for Gen 2.0 Beta samples), \\Device\\HTTPS (for Gen 2.1 samples), \\Device\\advcachemgr (for Gen 2.2 samples) or \\Device\\diskdump (for Gen 2.3 samples).", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the Driver", "start": 17, "end": 27}, {"text": "IoCreateDevice", "start": 65, "end": 79}, {"text": "the name \\Device\\agony (for Gen 2.0 Beta samples), \\Device\\HTTPS (for Gen 2.1 samples), \\Device\\advcachemgr (for Gen 2.2 samples) or \\Device\\diskdump (for Gen 2.3 samples)", "start": 85, "end": 256}], "action": [{"text": "calling", "start": 57, "end": 64}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 80, "end": 84}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Driver also creates a symbolic link to the device using the same name but under the \\DosDevices\\ tree.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The Driver", "start": 0, "end": 10}, {"text": "a symbolic link", "start": 24, "end": 39}, {"text": "the device", "start": 43, "end": 53}, {"text": "the same name but under the \\DosDevices\\ tree", "start": 60, "end": 105}], "action": [{"text": "creates", "start": 16, "end": 23}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 40, "end": 42}, {"text": "using", "start": 54, "end": 59}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For reasons unknown, the authors of the Driver used code from a Chinese blog that details how to hide network connections on Windows Vista and later decided to keep the example IP address within the code.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Hikit family has supported roughly the same set of commands since the first known samples of Gen 1.0.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The Hikit family", "start": 0, "end": 16}, {"text": "roughly the same set of commands", "start": 31, "end": 63}, {"text": "the first known samples of Gen 1.0", "start": 70, "end": 104}], "action": [{"text": "supported", "start": 21, "end": 30}], "modifier": [{"text": "since", "start": 64, "end": 69}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Gen 2.0 introduced a single command to provide insight into an infected machine's Hikit configuration (something that is not necessary for Gen 1 variants since they are server-based).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The RAT supports the following commands: The shell command activates a remote shell on the victim's computer.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The RAT", "start": 0, "end": 7}, {"text": "the following commands", "start": 17, "end": 39}, {"text": "The shell command", "start": 41, "end": 58}, {"text": "a remote shell", "start": 69, "end": 83}, {"text": "the victim's computer", "start": 87, "end": 108}], "action": [{"text": "supports", "start": 8, "end": 16}, {"text": "activates", "start": 59, "end": 68}], "modifier": [{"text": "on", "start": 84, "end": 86}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The remote shell function uses the standard pipe redirection method for interfacing a network application (in this case, the DLL) to a hidden command shell.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The file command provides an attacker with a variety of disk access options such as listing directories, changing the current directory, and uploading and downloading files.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The file command", "start": 0, "end": 16}, {"text": "directories", "start": 92, "end": 103}, {"text": "files", "start": 167, "end": 172}], "action": [{"text": "listing", "start": 84, "end": 91}, {"text": "uploading", "start": 141, "end": 150}, {"text": "downloading", "start": 155, "end": 166}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The connect function provides the functionality to allow one Hikit DLL to interface with another DLL of a similar version.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The use of this functionality can best be illustrated by considering the fact that the Gen 1 Driver requires an exposed network interface in order for an external attacker to access the Gen 1's RAT function.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This would prohibit lateral movement within a victim's network as the bulk of any organization's network infrastructure is not directly exposed to the Internet.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "By using the connect command, an attacker can instruct the externally exposed Gen 1 DLL to route traffic to a Gen 1 DLL that is behind the firewall, effectively making the externally exposed Gen 1 DLL a local router for Hikit traffic.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The proxy (or socks5) command allows an attacker to utilize a Hikit-infected machine as a proxy.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "an attacker", "start": 37, "end": 48}, {"text": "a Hikit-infected machine", "start": 60, "end": 84}, {"text": "a proxy", "start": 88, "end": 95}], "action": [{"text": "utilize", "start": 52, "end": 59}], "modifier": [{"text": "as", "start": 85, "end": 87}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Gen 2 samples rely on a configuration in order to know where the C2 server exists along with other operational aspects such as the name of its service and operational times.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Gen 2 samples", "start": 0, "end": 13}, {"text": "a configuration", "start": 22, "end": 37}, {"text": "know where the C2 server exists", "start": 50, "end": 81}], "action": [{"text": "rely", "start": 14, "end": 18}], "modifier": [{"text": "on", "start": 19, "end": 21}, {"text": "in order to", "start": 38, "end": 49}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This information is important for the attacker to have access to in order to determine if any aspect of the configuration is out of date (thus requiring a new variant of the Gen 2 binary to be configured and deployed).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The information command returns to the attacker the complete configuration and current state of the Gen 2 malware.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As the name implies, the exit command causes the DLL to discontinue the current connection.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "With the Gen 1 sub-family using a server model and the Gen 2 sub-family using the client model, understanding how each of the DLL components of the sub-families works is best done, as with the Driver above, in the context of the specific sub-family.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As noted previously in this report, the Gen 1 sub-family has several sub-generations but overall the functionality of the Gen 1 sub-family has remained constant.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "With the exception of Gen 1.0, the functionality of Gen 1 comes from the DLL component (Gen 1.0 uses a stand-alone executable to achieve the same results).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The DLL operates as a service, requiring an attacker is install the DLL as a service at some point prior to activation.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "an attacker", "start": 41, "end": 52}, {"text": "the DLL", "start": 64, "end": 71}, {"text": "a service", "start": 75, "end": 84}, {"text": "some point prior to activation", "start": 88, "end": 118}], "action": [{"text": "is install", "start": 53, "end": 63}], "modifier": [{"text": "as", "start": 72, "end": 74}, {"text": "at", "start": 85, "end": 87}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The DLL contains only two exports: DllEntryPoint and DllRegisterServer.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Ultimately, both exports generate a new thread of the same function ('' mainThread'').", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "both exports", "start": 12, "end": 24}, {"text": "a new thread of the same function ('' mainThread'')", "start": 34, "end": 85}], "action": [{"text": "generate", "start": 25, "end": 33}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The difference between the two exports is that DllRegisterServer can take an optional command line argument of the letter'' u'' which will instruct the main thread to uninstall the Gen 1 system from a victim's computer.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the main thread", "start": 148, "end": 163}, {"text": "the Gen 1 system", "start": 177, "end": 193}, {"text": "a victim's computer", "start": 199, "end": 218}], "action": [{"text": "uninstall", "start": 167, "end": 176}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 194, "end": 198}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If the uninstall argument exists, mainThread will simply remove the Driver from the victim's machine and terminate.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "mainThread", "start": 34, "end": 44}, {"text": "the Driver", "start": 64, "end": 74}, {"text": "the victim's machine", "start": 80, "end": 100}], "action": [{"text": "remove", "start": 57, "end": 63}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 75, "end": 79}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The authors of Gen 1 used freely available source code found online for their removal function.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "When the DLL activates, either by a call to DllEntryPoint or by calling DllRegisterServer without the u parameter, mainThread begins by verifying the version of the Driver installed on the victim's machine.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "calling", "start": 64, "end": 71}], "entity": [{"text": "DllRegisterServer", "start": 72, "end": 89}, {"text": "the u parameter", "start": 98, "end": 113}], "modifier": [{"text": "without", "start": 90, "end": 97}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This requires sending OID 0x12C850 to the Driver and comparing the resulting 32-bit value with the required driver version.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If the version is incorrect (i.e.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "it doesn't match the specified version), the DLL installs the version of the Driver found within the DLL's resource section (under the BIN resource tree).", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the DLL", "start": 41, "end": 48}, {"text": "the version of the Driver found within the DLL's resource section (under the BIN resource tree)", "start": 58, "end": 153}], "action": [{"text": "installs", "start": 49, "end": 57}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "With the Driver version verified (or forcibly corrected by installing the appropriate Driver), the DLL will instruct the Driver to use a specified string (for Gen 1.0 and Gen 1.1 samples) or a DWORD (for Gen 1.2 samples) as the acknowledgment value to send to a connecting client who requests the appropriate URL.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "installing", "start": 59, "end": 69}], "entity": [{"text": "the appropriate Driver", "start": 70, "end": 92}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The DLL again checks the version of the Driver and, in some versions of the DLL, will print a message indicating the version of the Driver installed and report the'' Transate version'' (the word translate is misspelled within the binary).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It appears that the Driver and the communication protocol version do not necessarily have to match exactly, allowing the possibility that the Driver and the DLL could be compiled at separate times.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If the Driver version is less than the'' Transate'' version (indicating that the Driver is a version too old to support the necessary communication protocols), the DLL will, in some version of the DLL, print out a line to the screen indicating the DRIVERMINVERSION required along with the current Driver version.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Following this, the DLL will then attempt to install the correct version of the Driver prior to terminating.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the DLL", "start": 16, "end": 23}, {"text": "the correct version of the Driver", "start": 53, "end": 86}, {"text": "terminating", "start": 96, "end": 107}], "action": [{"text": "install", "start": 45, "end": 52}], "modifier": [{"text": "prior to", "start": 87, "end": 95}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is unclear why this code exists given that the DLL will check the Driver version and correct the Driver if necessary prior to reaching the portion of the code that reports the DRIVERMINVERSION.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is possible that the second Driver version check is a last ditch effort to ensure the correct Driver is installed.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the second Driver version check", "start": 20, "end": 51}, {"text": "the correct Driver is installed", "start": 85, "end": 116}], "action": [{"text": "ensure", "start": 78, "end": 84}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The DLL enters an infinite loop where the DLL waits for the Driver to report a new channel exists.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A channel represents an established connection between the Driver and an external party that has provided the proper initial request and, for Gen 1.2 variants, provided the proper authentication value.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "When the Driver establishes a new channel, the DLL generates a runtime data structure before generating a new thread ('' HikitThreadFunc'') which will service any request coming from the new channel.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the DLL", "start": 43, "end": 50}, {"text": "a new thread ('' HikitThreadFunc'') which will service any request coming from the new channel", "start": 104, "end": 198}], "action": [{"text": "generating", "start": 93, "end": 103}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This allows the DLL to service multiple channels at one time.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The HikitThreadFunc function is, at its core, a simple wait and respond loop.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The function begins by transmitting a Hikit command prompt to the client (Hikit >) before settling into an infinite loop of The communication scheme between the DLL and the client consists of a 20 to 24 byte header (for Gen 1.0 and Gen 1.1) or a 28 byte header (for Gen 1.2) followed by an optional payload.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The format of the Gen 1.0 and Gen 1.1 header is as follows: While the Gen 1.2 header is: For Gen 1.0 and Gen 1.1 samples, the magic field contains the string'' ..", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "..", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' (two dots followed by a space then two more dots).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Whereas the key field in Gen 1.2 samples contains a 32-bit value that represents the XOR key for the remainder of the PacketHeader and any additional payload data.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The XOR scheme works on 32-bit chunks of data where each 32-bit chunk of data is XOR'd against the key value.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Version checking is important in all Gen 1 variants.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The dwHikitVersion field allows the client and the DLL to ensure that they have a compatible communication scheme in place prior to executing commands.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The dwHikitVersion field", "start": 0, "end": 24}, {"text": "the client and the DLL", "start": 32, "end": 54}, {"text": "ensure that they have a compatible communication scheme in place", "start": 58, "end": 122}, {"text": "executing commands", "start": 132, "end": 150}], "action": [{"text": "allows", "start": 25, "end": 31}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 55, "end": 57}, {"text": "prior to", "start": 123, "end": 131}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Gen 1 samples have a particular interest in the victim's locale language preferences.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "While it is typical for most RATs that provide remote shells to simply pass data unfiltered from client to server and server to client without regard to code pages, Gen 1 samples take special care to record the code page and locale information in each and every packet header that traverses the divide between client and server and server and client.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This could indicate that the authors of Gen 1 understood from an early stage in the development of Gen 1 that they would be attacking computer systems with different locales and code pages.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Gen 2 sub-family, like Gen 1.2, uses a DLL for the core of its RAT functionality.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The Gen 2 sub-family", "start": 0, "end": 20}, {"text": "a DLL", "start": 41, "end": 46}, {"text": "the core of its RAT functionality", "start": 51, "end": 84}], "action": [{"text": "uses", "start": 36, "end": 40}], "modifier": [{"text": "for", "start": 47, "end": 50}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In order for the DLL to load, Gen 2 (starting with Gen 2.1) uses a loader application (referred to simply as'' the Loader'').", "output": {"entities": {"modifier": [{"text": "In order for", "start": 0, "end": 12}], "entity": [{"text": "the DLL to load", "start": 13, "end": 28}, {"text": "Gen 2", "start": 30, "end": 35}, {"text": "a loader application", "start": 65, "end": 85}], "action": [{"text": "uses", "start": 60, "end": 64}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Loader comes in the form of a standard executable image or a DLL image.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Despite the different models, both variants of the Loader load the embedded DLL in the exact same way.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "both variants of the Loader", "start": 30, "end": 57}, {"text": "the embedded DLL", "start": 63, "end": 79}, {"text": "the exact same way", "start": 83, "end": 101}], "action": [{"text": "load", "start": 58, "end": 62}], "modifier": [{"text": "in", "start": 80, "end": 82}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The only difference between the executable and DLL versions of the Loader comes in how they handle the initialization of the embedded DLL.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Figure 1 provides a side by side comparison of the startup routines for the executable and DLL Loaders.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Both versions of the Loader begin by loading the embedded DLL from the Loader's resources (item 102 under the Group Icons resource tree), decrypting and decompressing the image into memory, then manually loading the DLL into memory using a custom loading routine.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Both versions of the Loader", "start": 0, "end": 27}, {"text": "the embedded DLL", "start": 45, "end": 61}, {"text": "the Loader's resources", "start": 67, "end": 89}, {"text": "the DLL", "start": 212, "end": 219}, {"text": "memory", "start": 225, "end": 231}, {"text": "a custom loading routine", "start": 238, "end": 262}], "action": [{"text": "loading", "start": 37, "end": 44}, {"text": "loading", "start": 204, "end": 211}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 62, "end": 66}, {"text": "into", "start": 220, "end": 224}, {"text": "using", "start": 232, "end": 237}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The function LoadEmbeddedImage, as seen in part in Figure 2, is responsible for this operation.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Loader obfuscates many strings by using a simple XOR encoding scheme.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Decryption of encoded strings consists of taking the first value of the string as the XOR key, XOR'ing all subsequent bytes until the result of the XOR returns 0.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The decoding of the encoded strings is handled by the DecodeString function.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Loader stores the embedded DLL within a Group Icon resource within a legitimate icon image.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In order to locate the embedded DLL, LoadEmbeddedImage will use the DecodeString function to decrypt the delimiter string (which is typically zzzzzzzzzz or yyyyyyyyyy) and then search the icon's resource memory for the delimiter string.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Once located, LoadEmbeddedImage will use the first 12 bytes immediately after the string as the information structure about the embedded DLL.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The structure (seen below) defines the size of the embedded DLL within the icon's resource memory, the size of the DLL after it is decompressed and a 4-byte XOR key that LoadEmbeddedImage must use to decode the embedded DLL prior to decompression.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "LoadEmbeddedImage copies the compressed embedded DLL into a newly allocated heap buffer and then calls the function decodeBuffer (using the EncodingKey value) to decrypt the embedded DLL.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "LoadEmbeddedImage", "start": 0, "end": 17}, {"text": "the compressed embedded DLL", "start": 25, "end": 52}, {"text": "a newly allocated heap buffer", "start": 58, "end": 87}, {"text": "the function decodeBuffer (using the EncodingKey value)", "start": 103, "end": 158}, {"text": "decrypt the embedded DLL", "start": 162, "end": 186}], "action": [{"text": "copies", "start": 18, "end": 24}, {"text": "calls", "start": 97, "end": 102}], "modifier": [{"text": "into", "start": 53, "end": 57}, {"text": "to", "start": 159, "end": 161}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Another heap buffer is allocated with a size equal to the value of dwImageSizeDecompressed.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The decompression buffer along with the now decoded compressed buffer are given to lzodecompress which decompresses the compressed image using the LZO1X algorithm.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "With the embedded DLL now decompressed into a heap buffer, LoadEmbeddedImage calls ImageLoaderData: :LoadDll to manually load the DLL into memory.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "LoadEmbeddedImage", "start": 59, "end": 76}, {"text": "ImageLoaderData: :LoadDll", "start": 83, "end": 108}, {"text": "the DLL", "start": 126, "end": 133}, {"text": "memory", "start": 139, "end": 145}], "action": [{"text": "calls", "start": 77, "end": 82}, {"text": "load", "start": 121, "end": 125}], "modifier": [{"text": "into", "start": 134, "end": 138}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "ImageLoaderData: :LoadDll interprets the PE/COFF header of the DLL image, loads the image into the appropriate memory configuration, performs the necessary relocation operations, and calls the DllMain (DLL's entry point) function.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "ImageLoaderData: :LoadDll", "start": 0, "end": 25}, {"text": "the image", "start": 80, "end": 89}, {"text": "the appropriate memory configuration", "start": 95, "end": 131}, {"text": "the DllMain (DLL's entry point) function", "start": 189, "end": 229}], "action": [{"text": "loads", "start": 74, "end": 79}, {"text": "calls", "start": 183, "end": 188}], "modifier": [{"text": "into", "start": 90, "end": 94}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "After loading the embedded DLL image into memory, the Loader will either call the DLL's StartServer or MatrixMain function depending on the type of Loader.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "loading", "start": 6, "end": 13}, {"text": "call", "start": 73, "end": 77}], "entity": [{"text": "the embedded DLL image", "start": 14, "end": 36}, {"text": "memory", "start": 42, "end": 48}, {"text": "the Loader", "start": 50, "end": 60}, {"text": "the DLL's StartServer or MatrixMain function", "start": 78, "end": 122}], "modifier": [{"text": "into", "start": 37, "end": 41}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The standalone Loaders use the MatrixMain function while the DLL Loaders will call the StartServer function.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The standalone Loaders", "start": 0, "end": 22}, {"text": "the MatrixMain function", "start": 27, "end": 50}, {"text": "the DLL Loaders", "start": 57, "end": 72}, {"text": "the StartServer function", "start": 83, "end": 107}], "action": [{"text": "use", "start": 23, "end": 26}, {"text": "call", "start": 78, "end": 82}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Loaders, upon unloading, will call the StopServer function in order to shut down the embedded DLL.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The Loaders", "start": 0, "end": 11}, {"text": "unloading", "start": 18, "end": 27}, {"text": "the StopServer function", "start": 39, "end": 62}, {"text": "shut down the embedded DLL", "start": 75, "end": 101}], "modifier": [{"text": "upon", "start": 13, "end": 17}, {"text": "in order to", "start": 63, "end": 74}], "action": [{"text": "call", "start": 34, "end": 38}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Gen 2 DLL exposes five exported functions (besides the DllEntryPoint/DllMain).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "MatrixMain and StartServer both ultimately generate a new thread (using the POSIX API function beginthreadex instead of the more common CreateThread) that contains the main loop of the Gen 2 RAT functionality.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "MatrixMain and StartServer", "start": 0, "end": 26}, {"text": "a new thread", "start": 52, "end": 64}, {"text": "the POSIX API function beginthreadex", "start": 72, "end": 108}, {"text": "the more common CreateThread", "start": 120, "end": 148}], "action": [{"text": "generate", "start": 43, "end": 51}], "modifier": [{"text": "using", "start": 66, "end": 71}, {"text": "instead of", "start": 109, "end": 119}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "MatrixMain, however, has added functionality.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The prototype for MatrixMain is as follows: where Arguments parameter can be: If the i parameter is given, the DLL will install itself as a service on the victim's machine.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the DLL", "start": 107, "end": 114}, {"text": "itself", "start": 128, "end": 134}, {"text": "a service", "start": 138, "end": 147}, {"text": "the victim's machine", "start": 151, "end": 171}], "action": [{"text": "install", "start": 120, "end": 127}], "modifier": [{"text": "as", "start": 135, "end": 137}, {"text": "on", "start": 148, "end": 150}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The DLL will create a new service (e.g.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The DLL", "start": 0, "end": 7}, {"text": "a new service", "start": 20, "end": 33}], "action": [{"text": "create", "start": 13, "end": 19}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' Network DDE Service'') and assign itself as the executable for the service.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The DLL's RAT functionality provides basic features such as network port forwarding (proxying), file transfer, and remote command shell.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The DLL's RAT functionality", "start": 0, "end": 27}, {"text": "remote command shell", "start": 115, "end": 135}], "action": [{"text": "provides", "start": 28, "end": 36}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The RAT functionality provides an attacker with the ability to establish a phantom network within a victim's infrastructure by having individual instances of Gen 2 DLL listen for incoming connections on local ports (presumably, NAT'd ports) and accept commands from the inbound connection.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "individual instances of Gen 2 DLL", "start": 134, "end": 167}, {"text": "incoming connections", "start": 179, "end": 199}, {"text": "local ports", "start": 203, "end": 214}, {"text": "commands", "start": 252, "end": 260}, {"text": "the inbound connection", "start": 266, "end": 288}], "action": [{"text": "listen", "start": 168, "end": 174}, {"text": "accept", "start": 245, "end": 251}], "modifier": [{"text": "for", "start": 175, "end": 178}, {"text": "on", "start": 200, "end": 202}, {"text": "from", "start": 261, "end": 265}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This allows an attacker to establish several Gen2 infections within a victim's infrastructure and if outbound connectivity is prohibited for any of the infected machines, the attacker can route commands to the pseudo-isolated infections through accessible infected machines providing a high level of persistence to the malware.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "providing", "start": 274, "end": 283}], "entity": [{"text": "a high level of persistence", "start": 284, "end": 311}, {"text": "the malware", "start": 315, "end": 326}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 312, "end": 314}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Each Gen 2 infection can support up to 10 listening ports.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Each Gen 2 infection", "start": 0, "end": 20}, {"text": "10 listening ports", "start": 39, "end": 57}], "action": [{"text": "support", "start": 25, "end": 32}], "modifier": [{"text": "up to", "start": 33, "end": 38}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The communication between the Gen 2 malware and the C2 (or other Gen 2 malware, in the case of the internal routing functionality) is encrypted using a simple DWORD XOR scheme.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The communication between the Gen 2 malware and the C2", "start": 0, "end": 54}, {"text": "a simple DWORD XOR scheme", "start": 150, "end": 175}], "action": [{"text": "is encrypted", "start": 131, "end": 143}], "modifier": [{"text": "using", "start": 144, "end": 149}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Each communication burst (either between the malware and the C2 or the malware and neighboring malware) begins with a 24-byte header identical to the header found in Gen 1.2.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Immediately following the header is the type-specific (as indicated by the dwPayloadType field) payload data.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Note that the dwXORKey value is NOT encoded with the XOR value, but rather is the value that is used for encoding the header and payload.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Each DLL includes a hardcoded, default configuration.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "At the time that the RAT functionality activates, the DLL will drop the current configuration to disk.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If the configuration file already exists, then the RAT will use the file version of the configuration over the default configuration.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The configuration data structure (seen below) doubles as a current state record for some aspects of the communication subsystem of the DLL.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "When stored on disk, the configuration is preceded by a GUID value (16 bytes) that represents the unique identifier for the specific infection.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The configuration is XOR encoded using the first 4 bytes (as a DWORD) of the GUID.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In order to provide some level of stealth, the RAT will install a rootkit on 32-bit versions of Windows.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the RAT", "start": 43, "end": 50}, {"text": "a rootkit", "start": 64, "end": 73}, {"text": "32-bit versions of Windows", "start": 77, "end": 103}], "action": [{"text": "install", "start": 56, "end": 63}], "modifier": [{"text": "on", "start": 74, "end": 76}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The DLL contains a device driver image embedded within an encoded buffer which the RAT functionality code will extract to the% TEMP% directory (after XOR'ing the buffer with 0x76).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "To activate the rootkit, the RAT functionality code creates a service with the driver in the% TEMP% directory as the executable for the service.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the RAT functionality code", "start": 25, "end": 51}, {"text": "a service", "start": 60, "end": 69}, {"text": "the driver in the% TEMP% directory as the executable for the service", "start": 75, "end": 143}], "action": [{"text": "creates", "start": 52, "end": 59}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 70, "end": 74}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The RAT functionality code then activates the service and opens a handle to device driver's interface (e.g.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The RAT functionality code", "start": 0, "end": 26}, {"text": "the service", "start": 42, "end": 53}], "action": [{"text": "activates", "start": 32, "end": 41}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "\\Globals\\HTTPS).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "With the handle open to the rootkit driver, the RAT functionality code deletes the service in order to reduce the visible footprint of the new driver.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the RAT functionality code", "start": 44, "end": 70}, {"text": "the service", "start": 79, "end": 90}, {"text": "reduce the visible footprint of the new driver", "start": 103, "end": 149}], "action": [{"text": "deletes", "start": 71, "end": 78}], "modifier": [{"text": "in order to", "start": 91, "end": 102}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "To further reduce the footprint of the driver, the RAT functionality code also uses the cloaking functionality of the rootkit to hide the DLL's PID, any references to the GUID {4AE26357-79A3-466D-A6D9- FC38BFB67DEA}, the DLL's service names (e.g.'' NetDDESrv'' and'' Network DDE Service'') and the service entry as well.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the RAT functionality code", "start": 47, "end": 73}, {"text": "the DLL's PID", "start": 134, "end": 147}, {"text": "the DLL's service names (e.g.'' NetDDESrv'' and'' Network DDE Service'') and the service entry as well", "start": 217, "end": 319}], "action": [{"text": "hide", "start": 129, "end": 133}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Additionally, the code also attempts to hide a service named'' Hitx''.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the code", "start": 14, "end": 22}, {"text": "a service named'' Hitx''", "start": 45, "end": 69}], "action": [{"text": "hide", "start": 40, "end": 44}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In addition to the main Hikit malware, there are at least two examples of support programs that belong to the Hikit family.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Samples b04de6c417b6f8836e3f2d8822be2e68f4f9722b and 7c4da9deff3e5c7611b9e1bd67d0e74aa7d2d0f6 are examples of Gen 1.0 and Gen 1.2 operator consoles.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The console is a text based application that takes a Gen 1.0 or Gen 1.2 infection's IP address and proceeds to connect and authenticate with the infected server.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The console", "start": 0, "end": 11}, {"text": "the infected server", "start": 141, "end": 160}], "action": [{"text": "connect and authenticate", "start": 111, "end": 135}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 136, "end": 140}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Once connected, the operator has the basic Hikit functionalities available to them via commands such as file and shell.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the operator", "start": 16, "end": 28}, {"text": "the basic Hikit functionalities available to them", "start": 33, "end": 82}, {"text": "commands such as file and shell", "start": 87, "end": 118}], "action": [{"text": "has", "start": 29, "end": 32}], "modifier": [{"text": "via", "start": 83, "end": 86}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Detecting Hikit variants on disk and in memory is possible using the following YARA signature developed by Symantec: Detecting nominal Gen 1.2 and later network activity is problematic given the nature of the communication structure.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The encrypted nature of the nominal Gen 1.2 and later network traffic makes a signature difficult.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Snort signature 30948 may detect some Hikit based network traffic for only Gen 1.0 and Gen 1.1.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "From a system objects perspective, Gen 2 samples produce up to three named events.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Gen 2 samples", "start": 35, "end": 48}, {"text": "three named events", "start": 63, "end": 81}], "action": [{"text": "produce", "start": 49, "end": 56}], "modifier": [{"text": "up to", "start": 57, "end": 62}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The event names change per infection, but have a common format.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The following three strings represent the known mutex strings for Gen 2 samples: where the% s format variable is replaced with a UUID value string specific to the infected machine.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}