mneb/malware-text-db · Datasets at Hugging Face

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Over the last 10 months, Kaspersky Lab researchers have analyzed a massive cyber-espionage operation which we call'' Epic Turla''.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
The attackers behind Epic Turla have infected several hundred computers in more than 45 countries, including government institutions, embassies, military, education, research and pharmaceutical companies.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
The attacks are known to have used at least two zero-day exploits: We also observed exploits against older (patched) vulnerabilities, social engineering techniques and watering hole strategies in these attacks.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
The primary backdoor used in the Epic attacks is also known as'' WorldCupSec'','' TadjMakhal'','' Wipbot'' or'' Tavdig''.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "The primary backdoor", "start": 0, "end": 20 }, { "text": "the Epic attacks", "start": 29, "end": 45 } ], "action": [ { "text": "used", "start": 21, "end": 25 ...	[]
When G-Data published on Turla/Uroburos back in February, several questions remained unanswered.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
One big unknown was the infection vector for Turla (aka Snake or Uroburos).	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Our analysis indicates that victims are infected via a sophisticated multi-stage attack, which begins with the Epic Turla.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "victims", "start": 28, "end": 35 }, { "text": "a sophisticated multi-stage attack", "start": 53, "end": 87 } ], "action": [ { "text": "are infected", "start": 36, "e...	[]
In time, as the attackers gain confidence, this is upgraded to more sophisticated backdoors, such as the Carbon/Cobra system.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "this", "start": 43, "end": 47 }, { "text": "more sophisticated backdoors", "start": 63, "end": 91 } ], "action": [ { "text": "is upgraded", "start": 48, "end": 59 ...	[]
Sometimes, both backdoors are run in tandem, and used to'' rescue'' each other if communications are lost with one of the backdoors.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "both backdoors", "start": 11, "end": 25 }, { "text": "tandem", "start": 37, "end": 43 } ], "action": [ { "text": "are run", "start": 26, "end": 33 } ], ...	[]
Once the attackers obtain the necessary credentials without the victim noticing, they deploy the rootkit and other extreme persistence mechanisms.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "the attackers", "start": 5, "end": 18 }, { "text": "the necessary credentials", "start": 26, "end": 51 }, { "text": "the victim noticing", "start": 60, "end": 79 }, ...	[]
The attacks are still ongoing as of July 2014, actively targeting users in Europe and the Middle East.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Note: A full analysis of the Epic attacks is available to the Kaspersky Intelligent Services subscribers.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Contact: intelreports @kaspersky.com The attacks in this campaign fall into several different categories depending on the vector used in the initial compromise: The attackers use both direct spearphishing and watering hole attacks to infect their victims.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "The attackers", "start": 161, "end": 174 }, { "text": "both direct spearphishing and watering hole attacks", "start": 179, "end": 230 }, { "text": "infect their victims", "start": 2...	[]
Watering holes (waterholes) are websites of interest to the victims that have been compromised by the attackers and injected to serve malicious code.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
So far we haven't been able to locate any e-mail used against the victims, only the attachments.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
The PDF attachments do not show any'' lure'' to the victim when opened, however, the SCR packages sometime show a clean PDF upon successful installation.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Some of known attachment names used in the spearphishing attacks are: In some cases, these filenames can provide clues about the type of victims the attackers are targeting.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Currently, the Epic attackers run a vast network of watering holes that target visitors with surgical precision.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "the Epic attackers", "start": 11, "end": 29 }, { "text": "a vast network of watering holes", "start": 34, "end": 66 }, { "text": "visitors", "start": 79, "end": 87 }, ...	[]
Some of the injected websites include: In total, we observed more than 100 injected websites.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Currently, the largest number of injected sites is in Romania.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Here's a statistic on the injected websites: The distribution is obviously not random, and it reflects some of the interests of the attackers.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
For instance, in Romania many of the infected sites are in the Mures region, while many of the Spanish infected sites belong to local governments (City Hall).	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Most of the infected sites use the TYPO3 CMS (see: http: //typo3.org/), which could indicate the attackers are abusing a specific vulnerability in this publishing platform.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Injected websites load a remote JavaScript into the victim's browser: The script'' sitenavigatoin.js'' is a Pinlady-style browser and plugin detection script, which in turn, redirects to a PHP script sometimes called main.php or wreq.php.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "Injected websites", "start": 0, "end": 17 }, { "text": "a remote JavaScript", "start": 23, "end": 42 }, { "text": "the victim's browser", "start": 48, "end": 68 } ...	[]
Sometimes, the attackers register the .JPG	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "the attackers", "start": 11, "end": 24 } ] } }	[]
extension with the PHP handler on the server, using'' JPG'' files to run PHP scripts: The main exploitation script'' wreq.php'','' main.php'' or'' main.jpg'' performs a numbers of tasks.	{ "entities": { "action": [ { "text": "using", "start": 46, "end": 51 } ], "entity": [ { "text": "'' JPG'' files", "start": 51, "end": 65 }, { "text": "run PHP scripts", "start": 69, "end": 84 } ...	[]
We have located several versions of this script which attempt various exploitation mechanisms.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "several versions of this script", "start": 16, "end": 47 }, { "text": "various exploitation mechanisms", "start": 62, "end": 93 } ], "action": [ { "text": "attempt", "start"...	[]
One version of this script attempts to exploit Internet Explorer versions 6, 7 and 8: Unfortunately, the Internet Explorer exploits have not yet been retrieved.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "One version of this script", "start": 0, "end": 26 }, { "text": "Internet Explorer versions 6, 7 and 8", "start": 47, "end": 84 } ], "action": [ { "text": "exploit", "start"...	[]
Another more recent version attempts to exploit Oracle Sun Java and Adobe Flash Player: Although the Flash Player exploits couldn't be retrieved, we did manage to obtain the Java exploits: The Java files exploit a popular vulnerability, CVE-2012-1723, in various configurations.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "Another more recent version", "start": 0, "end": 27 }, { "text": "Oracle Sun Java and Adobe Flash Player", "start": 48, "end": 86 }, { "text": "The Java files", "start": 189, ...	[]
The payload dropped by these Java exploits is the following: The Java exploit use a special loader that attempts to inject the final Epic backdoor payload into explorer.exe.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "The payload", "start": 0, "end": 11 }, { "text": "Java exploits", "start": 29, "end": 42 }, { "text": "The Java exploit", "start": 61, "end": 77 }, { "te...	[]
The backdoor extracted from the Java exploits has the following C & C hardcoded inside: This C & C is still online at the moment although it redirects to a currently suspended page at'' hxxp: //busandcoachdirectory.com [.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "The backdoor extracted from the Java exploits", "start": 0, "end": 45 }, { "text": "the following C & C", "start": 50, "end": 69 } ], "action": [ { "text": "has", "start": 4...	[]
] au''.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
For a full list of C & C servers, please see the Appendix.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
The Epic Turla attackers are extremely dynamic in using exploits or different methods depending on what is available at the moment.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Most recently, we observed them using yet another technique coupled with watering hole attacks.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "them", "start": 27, "end": 31 }, { "text": "yet another technique coupled with watering hole attacks", "start": 38, "end": 94 } ], "action": [ { "text": "using", "start": 32...	[]
This takes advantage of social engineering to trick the user into running a fake Flash Player (MD5: 030f5fdb78bfc1ce7b459d3cc2cf1877): In at least one case, they tried to trick the user into downloading and running a fake Microsoft Security Essentials app (MD5: 89b0f1a3a667e5cd43f5670e12dba411): The fake application is...	{ "entities": { "action": [ { "text": "takes", "start": 5, "end": 10 }, { "text": "trick", "start": 46, "end": 51 }, { "text": "trick", "start": 171, "end": 176 }, { "text": "was distributed",...	[]
The file is a .NET	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "The file", "start": 0, "end": 8 } ] } }	[]
application that contains an encrypted resource.	{ "entities": { "action": [ { "text": "contains", "start": 17, "end": 25 } ], "entity": [ { "text": "an encrypted resource", "start": 26, "end": 47 } ] } }	[]
This drops the malicious file with the MD5 7731d42b043865559258464fe1c98513.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "This", "start": 0, "end": 4 }, { "text": "the malicious file with the MD5 7731d42b043865559258464fe1c98513", "start": 11, "end": 75 } ], "action": [ { "text": "drops", "star...	[]
This is an Epic backdoor which connects to the following C & Cs, with a generic internal ID of 1156fd22- 3443-4344-c4ffff: A full list with all the C & C server URLs that we recovered from the samples can be found in the technical Appendix.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "This", "start": 0, "end": 4 }, { "text": "an Epic backdoor", "start": 8, "end": 24 }, { "text": "the following C & Cs", "start": 43, "end": 63 }, { "text...	[]
The Epic backdoors are commanded by a huge network of hacked servers that deliver command and control functionality.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "The Epic backdoors", "start": 0, "end": 18 }, { "text": "a huge network of hacked servers", "start": 36, "end": 68 }, { "text": "command and control functionality", "start": 82, ...	[]
The huge network commanded by the Epic Turla attackers serves multiple purposes.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "The huge network", "start": 0, "end": 16 }, { "text": "the Epic Turla attackers", "start": 30, "end": 54 } ], "action": [ { "text": "commanded", "start": 17, "end": ...	[]
For instance, the motherships function as both exploitation sites and command and control panels for the malware.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "the motherships", "start": 14, "end": 29 }, { "text": "exploitation sites", "start": 47, "end": 65 }, { "text": "command and control panels", "start": 70, "end": 96 } ...	[]
Here's how the big picture looks like: The first level of command and control proxies generally talk to a second level of proxies, which in turn, talk to the'' mothership'' server.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "The first level of command and control proxies", "start": 39, "end": 85 }, { "text": "a second level of proxies", "start": 104, "end": 129 }, { "text": "the'' mothership'' server", ...	[]
The mothership server is generally a VPS, which runs the Control panel software used to interact with the victims.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "The mothership server", "start": 0, "end": 21 }, { "text": "the Control panel software", "start": 53, "end": 79 }, { "text": "the victims", "start": 102, "end": 113 } ...	[]
The attackers operate the mothership using a network of proxies and VPN servers for anonymity reasons.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
The mothership also work as the exploitation servers used in the watering hole attacks, delivering Java, IE or fake applications to the victim.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "The mothership", "start": 0, "end": 14 }, { "text": "the exploitation servers", "start": 28, "end": 52 }, { "text": "the watering hole attacks", "start": 61, "end": 86 ...	[]
We were able to get a copy of one of the motherships, which provided some insight into the operation.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
It runs a control panel which is password protected: Once logged into the Control panel, the attackers can see a general overview of the system including the number of interesting potential targets: A very interesting file on the servers is task.css, where the attackers define the IP ranges they are interested in.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "the attackers", "start": 257, "end": 270 }, { "text": "the IP ranges they are interested in", "start": 278, "end": 314 } ], "action": [ { "text": "define", "start": 271, ...	[]
To change the file, they are using the'' Task editor'' from the menu.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Depending on the'' tasks'', they will decide whether to infect the visitors or not.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "they", "start": 28, "end": 32 }, { "text": "whether to infect the visitors or not", "start": 45, "end": 82 } ], "action": [ { "text": "decide", "start": 38, "end": 4...	[]
In this case, we found they targeted two ranges belonging to: It should be noted though, the fact that the attackers were targeting these ranges doesn't necessarily mean they also got infected.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "they", "start": 23, "end": 27 }, { "text": "two ranges", "start": 37, "end": 47 } ], "action": [ { "text": "targeted", "start": 28, "end": 36 } ] } }	[]
Some other unknown IPs were also observed in the targeting schedules.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
There is also an'' except.css'' file where attackers log the reasons they didn't try to exploit certain visitors.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
There are three possible values: These are the'' don't meet the conditions'' reasons observed in the logs: For this first stage of the attack, the threat actor uses a custom backdoor.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "the threat actor", "start": 143, "end": 159 }, { "text": "a custom backdoor", "start": 165, "end": 182 } ], "action": [ { "text": "uses", "start": 160, "end": 164 ...	[]
In some cases, the backdoor is packaged together with the CVE-2013-5065 EoP exploit and heavily obfuscated.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "the backdoor", "start": 15, "end": 27 } ], "action": [ { "text": "obfuscated", "start": 96, "end": 106 } ] } }	[]
This makes the analysis more difficult.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
The CVE-2013-5065 exploit allows the backdoor to achieve administrator privileges on the system and run unrestricted.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "the backdoor", "start": 33, "end": 45 }, { "text": "administrator privileges on the system", "start": 57, "end": 95 }, { "text": "unrestricted", "start": 104, "end": 116 ...	[]
This exploit only works on unpatched Microsoft Windows XP systems.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Other known detection names for the backdoor is Trojan.Wipbot (Symantec) or Tavdig.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
The main backdoor is about 60KB in size and implements a C & C protocol on top of normal HTTP requests.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "The main backdoor", "start": 0, "end": 17 }, { "text": "a C & C protocol", "start": 55, "end": 71 }, { "text": "normal HTTP requests", "start": 82, "end": 102 } ],...	[]
The communication protocol uses requests in the C & C replies, which the malware decrypts and processes.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "The communication protocol", "start": 0, "end": 26 }, { "text": "requests", "start": 32, "end": 40 }, { "text": "the C & C replies", "start": 44, "end": 61 }, { ...	[]
The replies are sent back to the C & C through the same channel.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "The replies", "start": 0, "end": 11 }, { "text": "the C & C", "start": 29, "end": 38 }, { "text": "the same channel", "start": 47, "end": 63 } ], "action": [ ...	[]
The malware behavior is defined by a configuration block.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
The configuration block usually contains two hard-coded C & C URLs.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
He have also seen one case where the configuration block contains just one URL.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
The configuration can also be updated on the fly by the attackers, via the C & C.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "The configuration", "start": 0, "end": 17 }, { "text": "the attackers", "start": 52, "end": 65 }, { "text": "the C & C", "start": 71, "end": 80 } ], "action": ...	[]
The backdoor attempts to identify the following processes and, if found, it will terminate itself: It contains an internal unique ID, which is used to identify the victim to the C & C.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "The backdoor", "start": 0, "end": 12 }, { "text": "the following processes", "start": 34, "end": 57 }, { "text": "it", "start": 73, "end": 75 }, { "text"...	[]
Most samples, especially old ones, have the ID 1156fd22-3443-4344-c4ffff.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Once a victim is confirmed as'' interesting'', the attackers upload another Epic backdoor which has a unique ID used to control this specific victim.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "a victim", "start": 5, "end": 13 }, { "text": "'' interesting''", "start": 29, "end": 45 }, { "text": "the attackers", "start": 47, "end": 60 }, { "text"...	[]
During the first C & C call, the backdoor sends a pack with the victim's system information.	{ "entities": { "modifier": [ { "text": "During", "start": 0, "end": 6 } ], "entity": [ { "text": "the first C & C call", "start": 7, "end": 27 }, { "text": "the backdoor", "start": 29, "end": 41 },...	[]
All further information sent to the C & C is encrypted with a public key framework, making decryption impossible.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "All further information", "start": 0, "end": 23 }, { "text": "the C & C", "start": 32, "end": 41 }, { "text": "a public key framework", "start": 60, "end": 82 } ],...	[]
The commands from the C & C are encrypted in a simpler manner and can be decrypted if intercepted because the secret key is hardcoded in the malware.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "The commands from the C & C", "start": 0, "end": 27 } ], "action": [ { "text": "are encrypted", "start": 28, "end": 41 } ] } }	[]
Through monitoring, we were able to capture a large amount of commands sent to the victims by the attackers, providing an unique view into this operation.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "a large amount of commands", "start": 44, "end": 70 }, { "text": "the victims", "start": 79, "end": 90 }, { "text": "the attackers", "start": 94, "end": 107 } ], ...	[]
Here's a look at one of the encrypted server replies: Once a victim is infected and'' checks in'' with the server, the attackers send a template of commands: Next, the attackers try to move through the victim's network using pre-defined or collected passwords: Listing all .doc	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "a victim", "start": 59, "end": 67 }, { "text": "the server", "start": 103, "end": 113 }, { "text": "the attackers", "start": 115, "end": 128 }, { "text":...	[]
files recursively is also a common'' theme'': In total, we have decoded several hundreds of these command packages delivered to the victims, providing an unique insight into the inner workings of the attackers.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
In addition to generic searches, some very specific lookups have been observed as well.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
These include searches for: In this case, the attackers were interested to find e-mails related to'' NATO'','' Energy Dialogue within European Unition'' and so on.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "the attackers", "start": 42, "end": 55 }, { "text": "e-mails related to'' NATO'','' Energy Dialogue within European Unition'' and so on", "start": 80, "end": 162 } ], "action": [ { ...	[]
For some of the C & C servers, the attackers implemented RSA encryption for the C & C logs, which makes it impossible to decrypt them.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "the attackers", "start": 31, "end": 44 }, { "text": "RSA encryption", "start": 57, "end": 71 }, { "text": "the C & C logs", "start": 76, "end": 90 } ], "action...	[]
This scheme was implemented in April 2014.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Once a victim is compromised, the attackers upload several tools that are used for lateral movement.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "a victim", "start": 5, "end": 13 }, { "text": "the attackers", "start": 30, "end": 43 }, { "text": "several tools that are used for lateral movement", "start": 51, "end": 99...	[]
One such tool observed in the attacks and saved as'' C: \Documents and Settings\All users\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\winsvclg.exe'' is: This is a keylogger tool that creates% temp% \~DFD3O8.tmp.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "This", "start": 137, "end": 141 }, { "text": "a keylogger tool", "start": 145, "end": 161 } ], "action": [ { "text": "is", "start": 142, "end": 144 } ] }...	[]
Note: the filename can change across victims.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
On one Central Asian government's Ministry of Foreign Affairs victim system, the filename used was'' adobe32updt.exe''.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
In addition to these custom tools, we observed the usage of standard administration utilities.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
For instance, another tool often uploaded by the attackers to the victim's machine is'' winrs.exe'': This is an UPX packed binary, which contains the genuine'' dnsquery.exe'' tool from Microsoft, unpacked MD5: c0c03b71684eb0545ef9182f5f9928ca.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "another tool", "start": 14, "end": 26 }, { "text": "the attackers", "start": 45, "end": 58 }, { "text": "the victim's machine", "start": 62, "end": 82 }, { ...	[]
In several cases, an interesting update has been observed -- a malware from a different, yet related family.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
This backdoor is more sophisticated and belongs to the next level of cyber-espionage tools called the'' Carbon system'' or Cobra by the Turla attackers.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "This backdoor", "start": 0, "end": 13 }, { "text": "the'' Carbon system'' or Cobra", "start": 98, "end": 128 }, { "text": "the Turla attackers", "start": 132, "end": 151 ...	[]
Several plugins for the'' Carbon system'' are known to exist.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Note: the command and control servers www.losguayaberos [.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
] com and thebesttothbrushes [.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
] com have been sinkholed by Kaspersky Lab.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Other packages delivered to the victims include: These top level packages deploy both updated Epic backdoors and Turla Carbon system backdoors to confirmed victims, effectively linking the Epic and Turla Carbon operations together.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "These top level packages", "start": 49, "end": 73 }, { "text": "both updated Epic backdoors and Turla Carbon system backdoors", "start": 81, "end": 142 }, { "text": "confirmed victims", ...	[]
The Turla Carbon dropper from these packages has the following properties: This is called internally by the authors'' Carbon System'', part of the'' Cobra'' project, as it can be seen from the debug path inside: This acts as a dropper for the following modules, both 32 and 64 bit: The Carbon system is in essence an ext...	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "This", "start": 212, "end": 216 }, { "text": "a dropper for the following modules", "start": 225, "end": 260 } ], "action": [ { "text": "acts", "start": 217, "end": ...	[]
The plugins for the Carbon system can be easily recognized as they always feature at least two exports named: Several Epic backdoors appear to have been designed to work as Carbon system plugins as well-they require a specialized loader to start in victim systems that do not have the Carbon system deployed.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Some modules have artifacts which indicate the Carbon system is already at version 3.x, although the exact Carbon system version is very rarely seen in samples: The author of the Carbon module above can be also seen in the code, as'' gilg'', which also authored several other Turla modules.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
We are planning to cover the Turla Carbon system with more details in a future report.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
The payload recovered from one of the mothership servers (at newsforum.servehttp [.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "The payload", "start": 0, "end": 11 } ] } }	[]
] com/wordpress/wp-includes/css/img/upload.php, MD5: 4dc22c1695d1f275c3b6e503a1b171f5, Compiled: Thu Sep 06 14:09:55 2012) contains two modules, a loader/injector and a backdoor.	{ "entities": { "action": [ { "text": "contains", "start": 123, "end": 131 } ], "entity": [ { "text": "a loader/injector", "start": 145, "end": 162 }, { "text": "a backdoor", "start": 167, "end": 177 ...	[]
Internally, the backdoor is named'' Zagruzchick.dll'': The word'' Zagruzchick'' means'' boot loader'' in Russian.	{ "entities": {} }	[]

Over the last 10 months, Kaspersky Lab researchers have analyzed a massive cyber-espionage operation which we call'' Epic Turla''.

{ "entities": {} }

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The attackers behind Epic Turla have infected several hundred computers in more than 45 countries, including government institutions, embassies, military, education, research and pharmaceutical companies.

{ "entities": {} }

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The attacks are known to have used at least two zero-day exploits: We also observed exploits against older (patched) vulnerabilities, social engineering techniques and watering hole strategies in these attacks.

{ "entities": {} }

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The primary backdoor used in the Epic attacks is also known as'' WorldCupSec'','' TadjMakhal'','' Wipbot'' or'' Tavdig''.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "The primary backdoor", "start": 0, "end": 20 }, { "text": "the Epic attacks", "start": 29, "end": 45 } ], "action": [ { "text": "used", "start": 21, "end": 25 ...

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When G-Data published on Turla/Uroburos back in February, several questions remained unanswered.

{ "entities": {} }

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One big unknown was the infection vector for Turla (aka Snake or Uroburos).

{ "entities": {} }

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Our analysis indicates that victims are infected via a sophisticated multi-stage attack, which begins with the Epic Turla.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "victims", "start": 28, "end": 35 }, { "text": "a sophisticated multi-stage attack", "start": 53, "end": 87 } ], "action": [ { "text": "are infected", "start": 36, "e...

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In time, as the attackers gain confidence, this is upgraded to more sophisticated backdoors, such as the Carbon/Cobra system.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "this", "start": 43, "end": 47 }, { "text": "more sophisticated backdoors", "start": 63, "end": 91 } ], "action": [ { "text": "is upgraded", "start": 48, "end": 59 ...

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Sometimes, both backdoors are run in tandem, and used to'' rescue'' each other if communications are lost with one of the backdoors.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "both backdoors", "start": 11, "end": 25 }, { "text": "tandem", "start": 37, "end": 43 } ], "action": [ { "text": "are run", "start": 26, "end": 33 } ], ...

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Once the attackers obtain the necessary credentials without the victim noticing, they deploy the rootkit and other extreme persistence mechanisms.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "the attackers", "start": 5, "end": 18 }, { "text": "the necessary credentials", "start": 26, "end": 51 }, { "text": "the victim noticing", "start": 60, "end": 79 }, ...

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The attacks are still ongoing as of July 2014, actively targeting users in Europe and the Middle East.

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Note: A full analysis of the Epic attacks is available to the Kaspersky Intelligent Services subscribers.

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Contact: intelreports @kaspersky.com The attacks in this campaign fall into several different categories depending on the vector used in the initial compromise: The attackers use both direct spearphishing and watering hole attacks to infect their victims.

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Watering holes (waterholes) are websites of interest to the victims that have been compromised by the attackers and injected to serve malicious code.

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So far we haven't been able to locate any e-mail used against the victims, only the attachments.

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The PDF attachments do not show any'' lure'' to the victim when opened, however, the SCR packages sometime show a clean PDF upon successful installation.

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Some of known attachment names used in the spearphishing attacks are: In some cases, these filenames can provide clues about the type of victims the attackers are targeting.

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Currently, the Epic attackers run a vast network of watering holes that target visitors with surgical precision.

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Some of the injected websites include: In total, we observed more than 100 injected websites.

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Currently, the largest number of injected sites is in Romania.

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Here's a statistic on the injected websites: The distribution is obviously not random, and it reflects some of the interests of the attackers.

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For instance, in Romania many of the infected sites are in the Mures region, while many of the Spanish infected sites belong to local governments (City Hall).

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Most of the infected sites use the TYPO3 CMS (see: http: //typo3.org/), which could indicate the attackers are abusing a specific vulnerability in this publishing platform.

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Injected websites load a remote JavaScript into the victim's browser: The script'' sitenavigatoin.js'' is a Pinlady-style browser and plugin detection script, which in turn, redirects to a PHP script sometimes called main.php or wreq.php.

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Sometimes, the attackers register the .JPG

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extension with the PHP handler on the server, using'' JPG'' files to run PHP scripts: The main exploitation script'' wreq.php'','' main.php'' or'' main.jpg'' performs a numbers of tasks.

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We have located several versions of this script which attempt various exploitation mechanisms.

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One version of this script attempts to exploit Internet Explorer versions 6, 7 and 8: Unfortunately, the Internet Explorer exploits have not yet been retrieved.

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Another more recent version attempts to exploit Oracle Sun Java and Adobe Flash Player: Although the Flash Player exploits couldn't be retrieved, we did manage to obtain the Java exploits: The Java files exploit a popular vulnerability, CVE-2012-1723, in various configurations.

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The payload dropped by these Java exploits is the following: The Java exploit use a special loader that attempts to inject the final Epic backdoor payload into explorer.exe.

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The backdoor extracted from the Java exploits has the following C & C hardcoded inside: This C & C is still online at the moment although it redirects to a currently suspended page at'' hxxp: //busandcoachdirectory.com [.

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] au''.

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For a full list of C & C servers, please see the Appendix.

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The Epic Turla attackers are extremely dynamic in using exploits or different methods depending on what is available at the moment.

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Most recently, we observed them using yet another technique coupled with watering hole attacks.

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This takes advantage of social engineering to trick the user into running a fake Flash Player (MD5: 030f5fdb78bfc1ce7b459d3cc2cf1877): In at least one case, they tried to trick the user into downloading and running a fake Microsoft Security Essentials app (MD5: 89b0f1a3a667e5cd43f5670e12dba411): The fake application is...

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The file is a .NET

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application that contains an encrypted resource.

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This drops the malicious file with the MD5 7731d42b043865559258464fe1c98513.

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This is an Epic backdoor which connects to the following C & Cs, with a generic internal ID of 1156fd22- 3443-4344-c4ffff: A full list with all the C & C server URLs that we recovered from the samples can be found in the technical Appendix.

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The Epic backdoors are commanded by a huge network of hacked servers that deliver command and control functionality.

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The huge network commanded by the Epic Turla attackers serves multiple purposes.

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For instance, the motherships function as both exploitation sites and command and control panels for the malware.

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Here's how the big picture looks like: The first level of command and control proxies generally talk to a second level of proxies, which in turn, talk to the'' mothership'' server.

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The mothership server is generally a VPS, which runs the Control panel software used to interact with the victims.

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The attackers operate the mothership using a network of proxies and VPN servers for anonymity reasons.

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The mothership also work as the exploitation servers used in the watering hole attacks, delivering Java, IE or fake applications to the victim.

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We were able to get a copy of one of the motherships, which provided some insight into the operation.

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It runs a control panel which is password protected: Once logged into the Control panel, the attackers can see a general overview of the system including the number of interesting potential targets: A very interesting file on the servers is task.css, where the attackers define the IP ranges they are interested in.

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To change the file, they are using the'' Task editor'' from the menu.

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Depending on the'' tasks'', they will decide whether to infect the visitors or not.

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In this case, we found they targeted two ranges belonging to: It should be noted though, the fact that the attackers were targeting these ranges doesn't necessarily mean they also got infected.

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Some other unknown IPs were also observed in the targeting schedules.

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There is also an'' except.css'' file where attackers log the reasons they didn't try to exploit certain visitors.

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There are three possible values: These are the'' don't meet the conditions'' reasons observed in the logs: For this first stage of the attack, the threat actor uses a custom backdoor.

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In some cases, the backdoor is packaged together with the CVE-2013-5065 EoP exploit and heavily obfuscated.

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This makes the analysis more difficult.

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The CVE-2013-5065 exploit allows the backdoor to achieve administrator privileges on the system and run unrestricted.

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This exploit only works on unpatched Microsoft Windows XP systems.

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Other known detection names for the backdoor is Trojan.Wipbot (Symantec) or Tavdig.

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The main backdoor is about 60KB in size and implements a C & C protocol on top of normal HTTP requests.

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The communication protocol uses requests in the C & C replies, which the malware decrypts and processes.

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The replies are sent back to the C & C through the same channel.

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The malware behavior is defined by a configuration block.

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The configuration block usually contains two hard-coded C & C URLs.

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He have also seen one case where the configuration block contains just one URL.

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The configuration can also be updated on the fly by the attackers, via the C & C.

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The backdoor attempts to identify the following processes and, if found, it will terminate itself: It contains an internal unique ID, which is used to identify the victim to the C & C.

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Most samples, especially old ones, have the ID 1156fd22-3443-4344-c4ffff.

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Once a victim is confirmed as'' interesting'', the attackers upload another Epic backdoor which has a unique ID used to control this specific victim.

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During the first C & C call, the backdoor sends a pack with the victim's system information.

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All further information sent to the C & C is encrypted with a public key framework, making decryption impossible.

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The commands from the C & C are encrypted in a simpler manner and can be decrypted if intercepted because the secret key is hardcoded in the malware.

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Through monitoring, we were able to capture a large amount of commands sent to the victims by the attackers, providing an unique view into this operation.

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Here's a look at one of the encrypted server replies: Once a victim is infected and'' checks in'' with the server, the attackers send a template of commands: Next, the attackers try to move through the victim's network using pre-defined or collected passwords: Listing all .doc

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files recursively is also a common'' theme'': In total, we have decoded several hundreds of these command packages delivered to the victims, providing an unique insight into the inner workings of the attackers.

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In addition to generic searches, some very specific lookups have been observed as well.

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These include searches for: In this case, the attackers were interested to find e-mails related to'' NATO'','' Energy Dialogue within European Unition'' and so on.

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For some of the C & C servers, the attackers implemented RSA encryption for the C & C logs, which makes it impossible to decrypt them.

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This scheme was implemented in April 2014.

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Once a victim is compromised, the attackers upload several tools that are used for lateral movement.

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One such tool observed in the attacks and saved as'' C: \Documents and Settings\All users\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\winsvclg.exe'' is: This is a keylogger tool that creates% temp% \~DFD3O8.tmp.

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Note: the filename can change across victims.

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On one Central Asian government's Ministry of Foreign Affairs victim system, the filename used was'' adobe32updt.exe''.

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In addition to these custom tools, we observed the usage of standard administration utilities.

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For instance, another tool often uploaded by the attackers to the victim's machine is'' winrs.exe'': This is an UPX packed binary, which contains the genuine'' dnsquery.exe'' tool from Microsoft, unpacked MD5: c0c03b71684eb0545ef9182f5f9928ca.

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In several cases, an interesting update has been observed -- a malware from a different, yet related family.

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This backdoor is more sophisticated and belongs to the next level of cyber-espionage tools called the'' Carbon system'' or Cobra by the Turla attackers.

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Several plugins for the'' Carbon system'' are known to exist.

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Note: the command and control servers www.losguayaberos [.

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] com and thebesttothbrushes [.

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] com have been sinkholed by Kaspersky Lab.

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Other packages delivered to the victims include: These top level packages deploy both updated Epic backdoors and Turla Carbon system backdoors to confirmed victims, effectively linking the Epic and Turla Carbon operations together.

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The Turla Carbon dropper from these packages has the following properties: This is called internally by the authors'' Carbon System'', part of the'' Cobra'' project, as it can be seen from the debug path inside: This acts as a dropper for the following modules, both 32 and 64 bit: The Carbon system is in essence an ext...

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The plugins for the Carbon system can be easily recognized as they always feature at least two exports named: Several Epic backdoors appear to have been designed to work as Carbon system plugins as well-they require a specialized loader to start in victim systems that do not have the Carbon system deployed.

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Some modules have artifacts which indicate the Carbon system is already at version 3.x, although the exact Carbon system version is very rarely seen in samples: The author of the Carbon module above can be also seen in the code, as'' gilg'', which also authored several other Turla modules.

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We are planning to cover the Turla Carbon system with more details in a future report.

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The payload recovered from one of the mothership servers (at newsforum.servehttp [.

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] com/wordpress/wp-includes/css/img/upload.php, MD5: 4dc22c1695d1f275c3b6e503a1b171f5, Compiled: Thu Sep 06 14:09:55 2012) contains two modules, a loader/injector and a backdoor.

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Internally, the backdoor is named'' Zagruzchick.dll'': The word'' Zagruzchick'' means'' boot loader'' in Russian.

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