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When 74-year-old Penny Sweat was evicted from the HUD-subsidized Glendale Senior Housing in Salt Lake City last month, she moved to a nonsubsidized apartment at five times her previous rent because she was unaware of her rights. ||||| Lee Kemp, a hearing-impaired World War II disabled vet, also was evicted, but he contacted Utah Legal Services and was told to stay put.
|
Which two people were unfairly evicted from there homes Lee Kemp
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Lee Kemp, a hearing-impaired World War II disabled vet, also was evicted, but he contacted Utah Legal Services and was told to stay put. ||||| Utah Nonprofit Housing President Marion Willey returned from an out-of-town trip and learned HUD procedures were not followed.
|
Which two people were unfairly evicted from there homes Lee Kemp
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Blaustein then took Sweat's case along with Kemp's and demanded her ousting be rectified. ||||| Utah Nonprofit Housing President Marion Willey returned from an out-of-town trip and learned HUD procedures were not followed.
|
Which two people were unfairly evicted from there homes Lee Kemp
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When 74-year-old Penny Sweat was evicted from the HUD-subsidized Glendale Senior Housing in Salt Lake City last month, she moved to a nonsubsidized apartment at five times her previous rent because she was unaware of her rights. ||||| Willey says he has offered Sweat and Kemp apartments in another complex operated by his company at their old rates.
|
What was the rate of apartments Penny Sweat had to move to Five times her previous rent
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Willey says he has offered Sweat and Kemp apartments in another complex operated by his company at their old rates. ||||| He also is retaining new attorneys.
|
What was the rate of apartments Penny Sweat had to move to Five times her previous rent
|
Utah Nonprofit Housing President Marion Willey returned from an out-of-town trip and learned HUD procedures were not followed. ||||| Nobody knew.
|
What was the rate of apartments Penny Sweat had to move to Five times her previous rent
|
When 74-year-old Penny Sweat was evicted from the HUD-subsidized Glendale Senior Housing in Salt Lake City last month, she moved to a nonsubsidized apartment at five times her previous rent because she was unaware of her rights. ||||| Willey says he has offered Sweat and Kemp apartments in another complex operated by his company at their old rates.
|
What was the rate of apartments Penny Sweat had to move to 5 times more
|
Willey says he has offered Sweat and Kemp apartments in another complex operated by his company at their old rates. ||||| He also is retaining new attorneys.
|
What was the rate of apartments Penny Sweat had to move to 5 times more
|
Utah Nonprofit Housing President Marion Willey returned from an out-of-town trip and learned HUD procedures were not followed. ||||| Nobody knew.
|
What was the rate of apartments Penny Sweat had to move to 5 times more
|
When 74-year-old Penny Sweat was evicted from the HUD-subsidized Glendale Senior Housing in Salt Lake City last month, she moved to a nonsubsidized apartment at five times her previous rent because she was unaware of her rights. ||||| Willey says he has offered Sweat and Kemp apartments in another complex operated by his company at their old rates.
|
What was the rate of apartments Penny Sweat had to move to 5 times the old rate, and then the old rate again
|
Willey says he has offered Sweat and Kemp apartments in another complex operated by his company at their old rates. ||||| He also is retaining new attorneys.
|
What was the rate of apartments Penny Sweat had to move to 5 times the old rate, and then the old rate again
|
Utah Nonprofit Housing President Marion Willey returned from an out-of-town trip and learned HUD procedures were not followed. ||||| Nobody knew.
|
What was the rate of apartments Penny Sweat had to move to 5 times the old rate, and then the old rate again
|
When 74-year-old Penny Sweat was evicted from the HUD-subsidized Glendale Senior Housing in Salt Lake City last month, she moved to a nonsubsidized apartment at five times her previous rent because she was unaware of her rights. ||||| Lee Kemp, a hearing-impaired World War II disabled vet, also was evicted, but he contacted Utah Legal Services and was told to stay put.
|
Who was evicted in addition to Penny Sweat Lee Kemp
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Lee Kemp, a hearing-impaired World War II disabled vet, also was evicted, but he contacted Utah Legal Services and was told to stay put. ||||| That didn't stop Utah Nonprofit Housing's attorneys from then sending Kemp a summons to show cause why he had not moved out.
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Who was evicted in addition to Penny Sweat Lee Kemp
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Willey said when his building manager called attorneys retained by the company, they erroneously told her she could go ahead and kick out the tenants. ||||| That didn't stop Utah Nonprofit Housing's attorneys from then sending Kemp a summons to show cause why he had not moved out.
|
Who was evicted in addition to Penny Sweat Lee Kemp
|
When 74-year-old Penny Sweat was evicted from the HUD-subsidized Glendale Senior Housing in Salt Lake City last month, she moved to a nonsubsidized apartment at five times her previous rent because she was unaware of her rights. ||||| Lee Kemp, a hearing-impaired World War II disabled vet, also was evicted, but he contacted Utah Legal Services and was told to stay put.
|
What Penny Sweat and Lee Kemp were unaware about Their rights
|
Lee Kemp, a hearing-impaired World War II disabled vet, also was evicted, but he contacted Utah Legal Services and was told to stay put. ||||| Willey said when his building manager called attorneys retained by the company, they erroneously told her she could go ahead and kick out the tenants.
|
What Penny Sweat and Lee Kemp were unaware about Their rights
|
Meanwhile, Sweat's granddaughter called Salt Lake City housing officials, federal housing officials, state officials and several agents of Utah Nonprofit Housing to find out about her grandmother's rights. ||||| It turns out the manager of the seniors complex, its attorneys and government overseers were unaware, too.
|
What Penny Sweat and Lee Kemp were unaware about Their rights
|
When 74-year-old Penny Sweat was evicted from the HUD-subsidized Glendale Senior Housing in Salt Lake City last month, she moved to a nonsubsidized apartment at five times her previous rent because she was unaware of her rights. ||||| Lee Kemp, a hearing-impaired World War II disabled vet, also was evicted, but he contacted Utah Legal Services and was told to stay put.
|
What Penny Sweat and Lee Kemp were unaware about Eviction
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Lee Kemp, a hearing-impaired World War II disabled vet, also was evicted, but he contacted Utah Legal Services and was told to stay put. ||||| Willey said when his building manager called attorneys retained by the company, they erroneously told her she could go ahead and kick out the tenants.
|
What Penny Sweat and Lee Kemp were unaware about Eviction
|
Meanwhile, Sweat's granddaughter called Salt Lake City housing officials, federal housing officials, state officials and several agents of Utah Nonprofit Housing to find out about her grandmother's rights. ||||| It turns out the manager of the seniors complex, its attorneys and government overseers were unaware, too.
|
What Penny Sweat and Lee Kemp were unaware about Eviction
|
When 74-year-old Penny Sweat was evicted from the HUD-subsidized Glendale Senior Housing in Salt Lake City last month, she moved to a nonsubsidized apartment at five times her previous rent because she was unaware of her rights. ||||| Lee Kemp, a hearing-impaired World War II disabled vet, also was evicted, but he contacted Utah Legal Services and was told to stay put.
|
What Penny Sweat and Lee Kemp were unaware about Their rights regarding illegal eviction
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Lee Kemp, a hearing-impaired World War II disabled vet, also was evicted, but he contacted Utah Legal Services and was told to stay put. ||||| Willey said when his building manager called attorneys retained by the company, they erroneously told her she could go ahead and kick out the tenants.
|
What Penny Sweat and Lee Kemp were unaware about Their rights regarding illegal eviction
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Meanwhile, Sweat's granddaughter called Salt Lake City housing officials, federal housing officials, state officials and several agents of Utah Nonprofit Housing to find out about her grandmother's rights. ||||| It turns out the manager of the seniors complex, its attorneys and government overseers were unaware, too.
|
What Penny Sweat and Lee Kemp were unaware about Their rights regarding illegal eviction
|
When 74-year-old Penny Sweat was evicted from the HUD-subsidized Glendale Senior Housing in Salt Lake City last month, she moved to a nonsubsidized apartment at five times her previous rent because she was unaware of her rights. ||||| Lee Kemp, a hearing-impaired World War II disabled vet, also was evicted, but he contacted Utah Legal Services and was told to stay put.
|
What Penny Sweat and Lee Kemp were unaware about They were unfairly evicted from there homes
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Lee Kemp, a hearing-impaired World War II disabled vet, also was evicted, but he contacted Utah Legal Services and was told to stay put. ||||| Willey said when his building manager called attorneys retained by the company, they erroneously told her she could go ahead and kick out the tenants.
|
What Penny Sweat and Lee Kemp were unaware about They were unfairly evicted from there homes
|
Meanwhile, Sweat's granddaughter called Salt Lake City housing officials, federal housing officials, state officials and several agents of Utah Nonprofit Housing to find out about her grandmother's rights. ||||| It turns out the manager of the seniors complex, its attorneys and government overseers were unaware, too.
|
What Penny Sweat and Lee Kemp were unaware about They were unfairly evicted from there homes
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Meanwhile, Sweat's granddaughter called Salt Lake City housing officials, federal housing officials, state officials and several agents of Utah Nonprofit Housing to find out about her grandmother's rights. ||||| Nobody knew.
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Who knew what Penny's rights were Marty Blaustein
|
Nobody knew. ||||| Several tenants blame other neighbors as perpetrators of the rift, however.
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Who knew what Penny's rights were Marty Blaustein
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Several tenants blame other neighbors as perpetrators of the rift, however. ||||| When she called HUD to make sure, the inquiry got bogged down in bureaucracy and nobody called her back.
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Who knew what Penny's rights were Marty Blaustein
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Meanwhile, Sweat's granddaughter called Salt Lake City housing officials, federal housing officials, state officials and several agents of Utah Nonprofit Housing to find out about her grandmother's rights. ||||| Nobody knew.
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Who knew what Penny's rights were Penny's Granddaughter
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Nobody knew. ||||| Several tenants blame other neighbors as perpetrators of the rift, however.
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Who knew what Penny's rights were Penny's Granddaughter
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Several tenants blame other neighbors as perpetrators of the rift, however. ||||| When she called HUD to make sure, the inquiry got bogged down in bureaucracy and nobody called her back.
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Who knew what Penny's rights were Penny's Granddaughter
|
Meanwhile, Sweat's granddaughter called Salt Lake City housing officials, federal housing officials, state officials and several agents of Utah Nonprofit Housing to find out about her grandmother's rights. ||||| Nobody knew.
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Who knew what Penny's rights were Nobody
|
Nobody knew. ||||| Several tenants blame other neighbors as perpetrators of the rift, however.
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Who knew what Penny's rights were Nobody
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Several tenants blame other neighbors as perpetrators of the rift, however. ||||| When she called HUD to make sure, the inquiry got bogged down in bureaucracy and nobody called her back.
|
Who knew what Penny's rights were Nobody
|
The hijackers attacked at 9:28. ||||| While traveling 35,000 feet above eastern Ohio, United 93 suddenly dropped 700 feet.
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When did Unit 93 drop While traveling 35,000 feet
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While traveling 35,000 feet above eastern Ohio, United 93 suddenly dropped 700 feet. ||||| The terrorists who hijacked three other commercial flights on 9/11 operated in five-man teams.
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When did Unit 93 drop While traveling 35,000 feet
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They initiated their cockpit takeover within 30 minutes of takeoff. ||||| During the first broadcast, the captain or first officer could be heard declaring "Mayday" amid the sounds of a physical struggle in the cockpit.
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When did Unit 93 drop While traveling 35,000 feet
|
The hijackers attacked at 9:28. ||||| While traveling 35,000 feet above eastern Ohio, United 93 suddenly dropped 700 feet.
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When did Unit 93 drop While travelling above eastern Ohio
|
While traveling 35,000 feet above eastern Ohio, United 93 suddenly dropped 700 feet. ||||| The terrorists who hijacked three other commercial flights on 9/11 operated in five-man teams.
|
When did Unit 93 drop While travelling above eastern Ohio
|
They initiated their cockpit takeover within 30 minutes of takeoff. ||||| During the first broadcast, the captain or first officer could be heard declaring "Mayday" amid the sounds of a physical struggle in the cockpit.
|
When did Unit 93 drop While travelling above eastern Ohio
|
Eleven seconds into the descent, the FAA's air traffic control center in Cleveland received the first of two radio transmissions from the aircraft. ||||| The second radio transmission, 35 seconds later, indicated that the fight was continuing.
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How many seconds into decent was the second call 46 seconds
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The second radio transmission, 35 seconds later, indicated that the fight was continuing. ||||| Because several passengers on United 93 described three hijackers on the plane, not four, some have wondered whether one of the hijackers had been able to use the cockpit jump seat from the outset of the flight.
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How many seconds into decent was the second call 46 seconds
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All the hijackers had assigned seats in first class, and they seem to have used them. ||||| During the first broadcast, the captain or first officer could be heard declaring "Mayday" amid the sounds of a physical struggle in the cockpit.
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How many seconds into decent was the second call 46 seconds
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They initiated their cockpit takeover within 30 minutes of takeoff. ||||| On Flight 93, however, the takeover took place 46 minutes after takeoff and there were only four hijackers.
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How much longer was the United 93 takeover than their previous attemps 16 minutes
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On Flight 93, however, the takeover took place 46 minutes after takeoff and there were only four hijackers. ||||| The captain or first officer could be heard shouting:" Hey get out of here-get out of here-get out of here."
|
How much longer was the United 93 takeover than their previous attemps 16 minutes
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All the hijackers had assigned seats in first class, and they seem to have used them. ||||| The hijackers attacked at 9:28.
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How much longer was the United 93 takeover than their previous attemps 16 minutes
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The terrorists who hijacked three other commercial flights on 9/11 operated in five-man teams. ||||| On Flight 93, however, the takeover took place 46 minutes after takeoff and there were only four hijackers.
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How many less hijackers were on United 93 than the other 3 commercial flights they hijackers 1 less hijacker
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On Flight 93, however, the takeover took place 46 minutes after takeoff and there were only four hijackers. ||||| The captain or first officer could be heard shouting:" Hey get out of here-get out of here-get out of here."
|
How many less hijackers were on United 93 than the other 3 commercial flights they hijackers 1 less hijacker
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Because several passengers on United 93 described three hijackers on the plane, not four, some have wondered whether one of the hijackers had been able to use the cockpit jump seat from the outset of the flight. ||||| This was below the norm for Tuesday mornings during the summer of 2001.
|
How many less hijackers were on United 93 than the other 3 commercial flights they hijackers 1 less hijacker
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On Flight 93, however, the takeover took place 46 minutes after takeoff and there were only four hijackers. ||||| All the hijackers had assigned seats in first class, and they seem to have used them.
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How many hijackers sat in first class 4
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On Flight 93, however, the takeover took place 46 minutes after takeoff and there were only four hijackers. ||||| During the first broadcast, the captain or first officer could be heard declaring "Mayday" amid the sounds of a physical struggle in the cockpit.
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How many hijackers sat in first class 4
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But there is no evidence that the hijackers manipulated passenger levels or purchased additional seats to facilitate their operation. ||||| On the morning of 9/11, there were only 37 passengers on United 93-33 in addition to the 4 hijackers.
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How many hijackers sat in first class 4
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On Flight 93, however, the takeover took place 46 minutes after takeoff and there were only four hijackers. ||||| All the hijackers had assigned seats in first class, and they seem to have used them.
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How many hijackers sat in first class all of them
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On Flight 93, however, the takeover took place 46 minutes after takeoff and there were only four hijackers. ||||| During the first broadcast, the captain or first officer could be heard declaring "Mayday" amid the sounds of a physical struggle in the cockpit.
|
How many hijackers sat in first class all of them
|
But there is no evidence that the hijackers manipulated passenger levels or purchased additional seats to facilitate their operation. ||||| On the morning of 9/11, there were only 37 passengers on United 93-33 in addition to the 4 hijackers.
|
How many hijackers sat in first class all of them
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On the morning of 9/11, there were only 37 passengers on United 93-33 in addition to the 4 hijackers. ||||| This was below the norm for Tuesday mornings during the summer of 2001.
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Was there a normal amount of passengers on United 99-33 on 9/11 There were many empty seats
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On the morning of 9/11, there were only 37 passengers on United 93-33 in addition to the 4 hijackers. ||||| The second radio transmission, 35 seconds later, indicated that the fight was continuing.
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Was there a normal amount of passengers on United 99-33 on 9/11 There were many empty seats
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We believe it is more likely that Jarrah, the crucial pilot-trained member of their team, remained seated and inconspicuous until after the cockpit was seized; and once inside, he would not have been visible to the passengers. ||||| We have found no evidence indicating that one of the hijackers, or anyone else, sat there on this flight.
|
Was there a normal amount of passengers on United 99-33 on 9/11 There were many empty seats
|
On the morning of 9/11, there were only 37 passengers on United 93-33 in addition to the 4 hijackers. ||||| This was below the norm for Tuesday mornings during the summer of 2001.
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Was there a normal amount of passengers on United 99-33 on 9/11 No.
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On the morning of 9/11, there were only 37 passengers on United 93-33 in addition to the 4 hijackers. ||||| The second radio transmission, 35 seconds later, indicated that the fight was continuing.
|
Was there a normal amount of passengers on United 99-33 on 9/11 No.
|
We believe it is more likely that Jarrah, the crucial pilot-trained member of their team, remained seated and inconspicuous until after the cockpit was seized; and once inside, he would not have been visible to the passengers. ||||| We have found no evidence indicating that one of the hijackers, or anyone else, sat there on this flight.
|
Was there a normal amount of passengers on United 99-33 on 9/11 No.
|
Because several passengers on United 93 described three hijackers on the plane, not four, some have wondered whether one of the hijackers had been able to use the cockpit jump seat from the outset of the flight. ||||| We have found no evidence indicating that one of the hijackers, or anyone else, sat there on this flight.
|
Was there any evidence that the jump seat was used on Flight 00 No, it is merely speculation
|
Because several passengers on United 93 described three hijackers on the plane, not four, some have wondered whether one of the hijackers had been able to use the cockpit jump seat from the outset of the flight. ||||| The hijackers attacked at 9:28.
|
Was there any evidence that the jump seat was used on Flight 00 No, it is merely speculation
|
But there is no evidence that the hijackers manipulated passenger levels or purchased additional seats to facilitate their operation. ||||| The hijackers attacked at 9:28.
|
Was there any evidence that the jump seat was used on Flight 00 No, it is merely speculation
|
Because several passengers on United 93 described three hijackers on the plane, not four, some have wondered whether one of the hijackers had been able to use the cockpit jump seat from the outset of the flight. ||||| We have found no evidence indicating that one of the hijackers, or anyone else, sat there on this flight.
|
Was there any evidence that the jump seat was used on Flight 00 No.
|
Because several passengers on United 93 described three hijackers on the plane, not four, some have wondered whether one of the hijackers had been able to use the cockpit jump seat from the outset of the flight. ||||| The hijackers attacked at 9:28.
|
Was there any evidence that the jump seat was used on Flight 00 No.
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But there is no evidence that the hijackers manipulated passenger levels or purchased additional seats to facilitate their operation. ||||| The hijackers attacked at 9:28.
|
Was there any evidence that the jump seat was used on Flight 00 No.
|
During the first broadcast, the captain or first officer could be heard declaring "Mayday" amid the sounds of a physical struggle in the cockpit. ||||| The second radio transmission, 35 seconds later, indicated that the fight was continuing.
|
How much time passed between the 1st radio mayday transmission and the second 35 seconds.
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During the first broadcast, the captain or first officer could be heard declaring "Mayday" amid the sounds of a physical struggle in the cockpit. ||||| The operative likely intended to round out the team for this flight, Mohamed al Kahtani, had been refused entry by a suspicious immigration inspector at Florida's Orlando International Airport in August.
|
How much time passed between the 1st radio mayday transmission and the second 35 seconds.
|
This was below the norm for Tuesday mornings during the summer of 2001. ||||| They initiated their cockpit takeover within 30 minutes of takeoff.
|
How much time passed between the 1st radio mayday transmission and the second 35 seconds.
|
On the morning of 9/11, there were only 37 passengers on United 93-33 in addition to the 4 hijackers. ||||| This was below the norm for Tuesday mornings during the summer of 2001.
|
What was below average for this particular day The number of passengers on board.
|
This was below the norm for Tuesday mornings during the summer of 2001. ||||| The hijackers attacked at 9:28.
|
What was below average for this particular day The number of passengers on board.
|
They initiated their cockpit takeover within 30 minutes of takeoff. ||||| The second radio transmission, 35 seconds later, indicated that the fight was continuing.
|
What was below average for this particular day The number of passengers on board.
|
The terrorists who hijacked three other commercial flights on 9/11 operated in five-man teams. ||||| They initiated their cockpit takeover within 30 minutes of takeoff. ||||| On Flight 93, however, the takeover took place 46 minutes after takeoff and there were only four hijackers.
|
Which two factors were different between the three other hijacked planes and United 93 The amount of time that passed before the takeover started.
|
On Flight 93, however, the takeover took place 46 minutes after takeoff and there were only four hijackers. ||||| While traveling 35,000 feet above eastern Ohio, United 93 suddenly dropped 700 feet. ||||| On the morning of 9/11, there were only 37 passengers on United 93-33 in addition to the 4 hijackers.
|
Which two factors were different between the three other hijacked planes and United 93 The amount of time that passed before the takeover started.
|
While traveling 35,000 feet above eastern Ohio, United 93 suddenly dropped 700 feet. ||||| The second radio transmission, 35 seconds later, indicated that the fight was continuing. ||||| The operative likely intended to round out the team for this flight, Mohamed al Kahtani, had been refused entry by a suspicious immigration inspector at Florida's Orlando International Airport in August.
|
Which two factors were different between the three other hijacked planes and United 93 The amount of time that passed before the takeover started.
|
The terrorists who hijacked three other commercial flights on 9/11 operated in five-man teams. ||||| They initiated their cockpit takeover within 30 minutes of takeoff. ||||| On Flight 93, however, the takeover took place 46 minutes after takeoff and there were only four hijackers.
|
Which two factors were different between the three other hijacked planes and United 93 United 93 took longer and had less hijackers
|
On Flight 93, however, the takeover took place 46 minutes after takeoff and there were only four hijackers. ||||| While traveling 35,000 feet above eastern Ohio, United 93 suddenly dropped 700 feet. ||||| On the morning of 9/11, there were only 37 passengers on United 93-33 in addition to the 4 hijackers.
|
Which two factors were different between the three other hijacked planes and United 93 United 93 took longer and had less hijackers
|
While traveling 35,000 feet above eastern Ohio, United 93 suddenly dropped 700 feet. ||||| The second radio transmission, 35 seconds later, indicated that the fight was continuing. ||||| The operative likely intended to round out the team for this flight, Mohamed al Kahtani, had been refused entry by a suspicious immigration inspector at Florida's Orlando International Airport in August.
|
Which two factors were different between the three other hijacked planes and United 93 United 93 took longer and had less hijackers
|
The terrorists who hijacked three other commercial flights on 9/11 operated in five-man teams. ||||| They initiated their cockpit takeover within 30 minutes of takeoff. ||||| On Flight 93, however, the takeover took place 46 minutes after takeoff and there were only four hijackers.
|
Which two factors were different between the three other hijacked planes and United 93 The number of hijackers
|
On Flight 93, however, the takeover took place 46 minutes after takeoff and there were only four hijackers. ||||| While traveling 35,000 feet above eastern Ohio, United 93 suddenly dropped 700 feet. ||||| On the morning of 9/11, there were only 37 passengers on United 93-33 in addition to the 4 hijackers.
|
Which two factors were different between the three other hijacked planes and United 93 The number of hijackers
|
While traveling 35,000 feet above eastern Ohio, United 93 suddenly dropped 700 feet. ||||| The second radio transmission, 35 seconds later, indicated that the fight was continuing. ||||| The operative likely intended to round out the team for this flight, Mohamed al Kahtani, had been refused entry by a suspicious immigration inspector at Florida's Orlando International Airport in August.
|
Which two factors were different between the three other hijacked planes and United 93 The number of hijackers
|
All the hijackers had assigned seats in first class, and they seem to have used them. ||||| We believe it is more likely that Jarrah, the crucial pilot-trained member of their team, remained seated and inconspicuous until after the cockpit was seized; and once inside, he would not have been visible to the passengers.
|
Jarrah remained seated where during the takeover In his seat in first class
|
We believe it is more likely that Jarrah, the crucial pilot-trained member of their team, remained seated and inconspicuous until after the cockpit was seized; and once inside, he would not have been visible to the passengers. ||||| The operative likely intended to round out the team for this flight, Mohamed al Kahtani, had been refused entry by a suspicious immigration inspector at Florida's Orlando International Airport in August.
|
Jarrah remained seated where during the takeover In his seat in first class
|
The second radio transmission, 35 seconds later, indicated that the fight was continuing. ||||| The captain or first officer could be heard shouting:" Hey get out of here-get out of here-get out of here."
|
Jarrah remained seated where during the takeover In his seat in first class
|
The terrorists who hijacked three other commercial flights on 9/11 operated in five-man teams. ||||| They initiated their cockpit takeover within 30 minutes of takeoff.
|
How many men were on the teams that completed the takeoff in 30 minutes more than three
|
The terrorists who hijacked three other commercial flights on 9/11 operated in five-man teams. ||||| But there is no evidence that the hijackers manipulated passenger levels or purchased additional seats to facilitate their operation.
|
How many men were on the teams that completed the takeoff in 30 minutes more than three
|
During the first broadcast, the captain or first officer could be heard declaring "Mayday" amid the sounds of a physical struggle in the cockpit. ||||| On Flight 93, however, the takeover took place 46 minutes after takeoff and there were only four hijackers.
|
How many men were on the teams that completed the takeoff in 30 minutes more than three
|
Eleven seconds into the descent, the FAA's air traffic control center in Cleveland received the first of two radio transmissions from the aircraft. ||||| The second radio transmission, 35 seconds later, indicated that the fight was continuing. ||||| The captain or first officer could be heard shouting:" Hey get out of here-get out of here-get out of here."
|
When did the captain (or first officer) demand that the attacker "get out of here!" During the second radio transmission
|
The captain or first officer could be heard shouting:" Hey get out of here-get out of here-get out of here." ||||| But there is no evidence that the hijackers manipulated passenger levels or purchased additional seats to facilitate their operation. ||||| The operative likely intended to round out the team for this flight, Mohamed al Kahtani, had been refused entry by a suspicious immigration inspector at Florida's Orlando International Airport in August.
|
When did the captain (or first officer) demand that the attacker "get out of here!" During the second radio transmission
|
On the morning of 9/11, there were only 37 passengers on United 93-33 in addition to the 4 hijackers. ||||| Because several passengers on United 93 described three hijackers on the plane, not four, some have wondered whether one of the hijackers had been able to use the cockpit jump seat from the outset of the flight. ||||| We believe it is more likely that Jarrah, the crucial pilot-trained member of their team, remained seated and inconspicuous until after the cockpit was seized; and once inside, he would not have been visible to the passengers.
|
When did the captain (or first officer) demand that the attacker "get out of here!" During the second radio transmission
|
Eleven seconds into the descent, the FAA's air traffic control center in Cleveland received the first of two radio transmissions from the aircraft. ||||| The second radio transmission, 35 seconds later, indicated that the fight was continuing. ||||| The captain or first officer could be heard shouting:" Hey get out of here-get out of here-get out of here."
|
When did the captain (or first officer) demand that the attacker "get out of here!" 35 seconds after the first transmission
|
The captain or first officer could be heard shouting:" Hey get out of here-get out of here-get out of here." ||||| But there is no evidence that the hijackers manipulated passenger levels or purchased additional seats to facilitate their operation. ||||| The operative likely intended to round out the team for this flight, Mohamed al Kahtani, had been refused entry by a suspicious immigration inspector at Florida's Orlando International Airport in August.
|
When did the captain (or first officer) demand that the attacker "get out of here!" 35 seconds after the first transmission
|
On the morning of 9/11, there were only 37 passengers on United 93-33 in addition to the 4 hijackers. ||||| Because several passengers on United 93 described three hijackers on the plane, not four, some have wondered whether one of the hijackers had been able to use the cockpit jump seat from the outset of the flight. ||||| We believe it is more likely that Jarrah, the crucial pilot-trained member of their team, remained seated and inconspicuous until after the cockpit was seized; and once inside, he would not have been visible to the passengers.
|
When did the captain (or first officer) demand that the attacker "get out of here!" 35 seconds after the first transmission
|
Eleven seconds into the descent, the FAA's air traffic control center in Cleveland received the first of two radio transmissions from the aircraft. ||||| The second radio transmission, 35 seconds later, indicated that the fight was continuing. ||||| The captain or first officer could be heard shouting:" Hey get out of here-get out of here-get out of here."
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When did the captain (or first officer) demand that the attacker "get out of here!" During the second radio transmission
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The captain or first officer could be heard shouting:" Hey get out of here-get out of here-get out of here." ||||| But there is no evidence that the hijackers manipulated passenger levels or purchased additional seats to facilitate their operation. ||||| The operative likely intended to round out the team for this flight, Mohamed al Kahtani, had been refused entry by a suspicious immigration inspector at Florida's Orlando International Airport in August.
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When did the captain (or first officer) demand that the attacker "get out of here!" During the second radio transmission
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On the morning of 9/11, there were only 37 passengers on United 93-33 in addition to the 4 hijackers. ||||| Because several passengers on United 93 described three hijackers on the plane, not four, some have wondered whether one of the hijackers had been able to use the cockpit jump seat from the outset of the flight. ||||| We believe it is more likely that Jarrah, the crucial pilot-trained member of their team, remained seated and inconspicuous until after the cockpit was seized; and once inside, he would not have been visible to the passengers.
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When did the captain (or first officer) demand that the attacker "get out of here!" During the second radio transmission
|
Eleven seconds into the descent, the FAA's air traffic control center in Cleveland received the first of two radio transmissions from the aircraft. ||||| The second radio transmission, 35 seconds later, indicated that the fight was continuing. ||||| The captain or first officer could be heard shouting:" Hey get out of here-get out of here-get out of here."
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When did the captain (or first officer) demand that the attacker "get out of here!" 46 seconds after the plane started to descend.
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