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Khallad helped in Yemen until he was arrested in a case of mistaken identity and freed with Bin Laden's help, as we also mentioned earlier. ||||| The plot, we now know, was a full-fledged al Qaeda operation, supervised directly by Bin Laden. ||||| Nashiri was the field commander and managed the operation in Yemen.
|
What roles did Bin Laden, Khallad, and Nashiri have in al Qaeda Bin Laden was supervising the attack
|
Nashiri was the field commander and managed the operation in Yemen. ||||| Local al Qaeda coordinators included Jamal al Badawi and Fahd al Quso, who was supposed to film the attack from a nearby apartment. ||||| The two suicide operatives chosen were Hassan al Khamri and Ibrahim al Thawar, also known as Nibras.
|
What roles did Bin Laden, Khallad, and Nashiri have in al Qaeda Bin Laden was supervising the attack
|
The blast ripped a hole in the side of the Cole, killing 17 members of the ship's crew and wounding at least 40. ||||| They had originally targeted a commercial vessel, specifically an oil tanker, but Bin Laden urged them to look for a U.S.warship instead. ||||| Nibras and Quso delivered money to Khallad in Bangkok during Khallad's January 2000 trip to Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok.
|
What roles did Bin Laden, Khallad, and Nashiri have in al Qaeda Bin Laden was supervising the attack
|
Khallad helped in Yemen until he was arrested in a case of mistaken identity and freed with Bin Laden's help, as we also mentioned earlier. ||||| The plot, we now know, was a full-fledged al Qaeda operation, supervised directly by Bin Laden. ||||| Nashiri was the field commander and managed the operation in Yemen.
|
What roles did Bin Laden, Khallad, and Nashiri have in al Qaeda Nashiri managed the operation in Yemen
|
Nashiri was the field commander and managed the operation in Yemen. ||||| Local al Qaeda coordinators included Jamal al Badawi and Fahd al Quso, who was supposed to film the attack from a nearby apartment. ||||| The two suicide operatives chosen were Hassan al Khamri and Ibrahim al Thawar, also known as Nibras.
|
What roles did Bin Laden, Khallad, and Nashiri have in al Qaeda Nashiri managed the operation in Yemen
|
The blast ripped a hole in the side of the Cole, killing 17 members of the ship's crew and wounding at least 40. ||||| They had originally targeted a commercial vessel, specifically an oil tanker, but Bin Laden urged them to look for a U.S.warship instead. ||||| Nibras and Quso delivered money to Khallad in Bangkok during Khallad's January 2000 trip to Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok.
|
What roles did Bin Laden, Khallad, and Nashiri have in al Qaeda Nashiri managed the operation in Yemen
|
Khallad helped in Yemen until he was arrested in a case of mistaken identity and freed with Bin Laden's help, as we also mentioned earlier. ||||| The plot, we now know, was a full-fledged al Qaeda operation, supervised directly by Bin Laden. ||||| Nashiri was the field commander and managed the operation in Yemen.
|
What roles did Bin Laden, Khallad, and Nashiri have in al Qaeda Nashiri was the field commander
|
Nashiri was the field commander and managed the operation in Yemen. ||||| Local al Qaeda coordinators included Jamal al Badawi and Fahd al Quso, who was supposed to film the attack from a nearby apartment. ||||| The two suicide operatives chosen were Hassan al Khamri and Ibrahim al Thawar, also known as Nibras.
|
What roles did Bin Laden, Khallad, and Nashiri have in al Qaeda Nashiri was the field commander
|
The blast ripped a hole in the side of the Cole, killing 17 members of the ship's crew and wounding at least 40. ||||| They had originally targeted a commercial vessel, specifically an oil tanker, but Bin Laden urged them to look for a U.S.warship instead. ||||| Nibras and Quso delivered money to Khallad in Bangkok during Khallad's January 2000 trip to Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok.
|
What roles did Bin Laden, Khallad, and Nashiri have in al Qaeda Nashiri was the field commander
|
Khallad helped in Yemen until he was arrested in a case of mistaken identity and freed with Bin Laden's help, as we also mentioned earlier. ||||| The plot, we now know, was a full-fledged al Qaeda operation, supervised directly by Bin Laden. ||||| Nashiri was the field commander and managed the operation in Yemen.
|
What roles did Bin Laden, Khallad, and Nashiri have in al Qaeda Operational roles
|
Nashiri was the field commander and managed the operation in Yemen. ||||| Local al Qaeda coordinators included Jamal al Badawi and Fahd al Quso, who was supposed to film the attack from a nearby apartment. ||||| The two suicide operatives chosen were Hassan al Khamri and Ibrahim al Thawar, also known as Nibras.
|
What roles did Bin Laden, Khallad, and Nashiri have in al Qaeda Operational roles
|
The blast ripped a hole in the side of the Cole, killing 17 members of the ship's crew and wounding at least 40. ||||| They had originally targeted a commercial vessel, specifically an oil tanker, but Bin Laden urged them to look for a U.S.warship instead. ||||| Nibras and Quso delivered money to Khallad in Bangkok during Khallad's January 2000 trip to Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok.
|
What roles did Bin Laden, Khallad, and Nashiri have in al Qaeda Operational roles
|
Khallad helped in Yemen until he was arrested in a case of mistaken identity and freed with Bin Laden's help, as we also mentioned earlier. ||||| The plot, we now know, was a full-fledged al Qaeda operation, supervised directly by Bin Laden. ||||| Nashiri was the field commander and managed the operation in Yemen.
|
What roles did Bin Laden, Khallad, and Nashiri have in al Qaeda Bin Laden was the leader, whereas Khalland and Nashiri were coordinators
|
Nashiri was the field commander and managed the operation in Yemen. ||||| Local al Qaeda coordinators included Jamal al Badawi and Fahd al Quso, who was supposed to film the attack from a nearby apartment. ||||| The two suicide operatives chosen were Hassan al Khamri and Ibrahim al Thawar, also known as Nibras.
|
What roles did Bin Laden, Khallad, and Nashiri have in al Qaeda Bin Laden was the leader, whereas Khalland and Nashiri were coordinators
|
The blast ripped a hole in the side of the Cole, killing 17 members of the ship's crew and wounding at least 40. ||||| They had originally targeted a commercial vessel, specifically an oil tanker, but Bin Laden urged them to look for a U.S.warship instead. ||||| Nibras and Quso delivered money to Khallad in Bangkok during Khallad's January 2000 trip to Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok.
|
What roles did Bin Laden, Khallad, and Nashiri have in al Qaeda Bin Laden was the leader, whereas Khalland and Nashiri were coordinators
|
Khallad helped in Yemen until he was arrested in a case of mistaken identity and freed with Bin Laden's help, as we also mentioned earlier. ||||| The plot, we now know, was a full-fledged al Qaeda operation, supervised directly by Bin Laden. ||||| Nashiri was the field commander and managed the operation in Yemen.
|
What roles did Bin Laden, Khallad, and Nashiri have in al Qaeda Bin Laden was the al Qaeda operation supervisor, Nashiri was the field commander and managed the operation in Yemen, and Khallad helped in Yemen
|
Nashiri was the field commander and managed the operation in Yemen. ||||| Local al Qaeda coordinators included Jamal al Badawi and Fahd al Quso, who was supposed to film the attack from a nearby apartment. ||||| The two suicide operatives chosen were Hassan al Khamri and Ibrahim al Thawar, also known as Nibras.
|
What roles did Bin Laden, Khallad, and Nashiri have in al Qaeda Bin Laden was the al Qaeda operation supervisor, Nashiri was the field commander and managed the operation in Yemen, and Khallad helped in Yemen
|
The blast ripped a hole in the side of the Cole, killing 17 members of the ship's crew and wounding at least 40. ||||| They had originally targeted a commercial vessel, specifically an oil tanker, but Bin Laden urged them to look for a U.S.warship instead. ||||| Nibras and Quso delivered money to Khallad in Bangkok during Khallad's January 2000 trip to Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok.
|
What roles did Bin Laden, Khallad, and Nashiri have in al Qaeda Bin Laden was the al Qaeda operation supervisor, Nashiri was the field commander and managed the operation in Yemen, and Khallad helped in Yemen
|
More than nine months later, on October 12,2000, al Qaeda operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked a U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Cole. ||||| The plot, we now know, was a full-fledged al Qaeda operation, supervised directly by Bin Laden. ||||| He chose the target and location of the attack, selected the suicide operatives, and provided the money needed to purchase explosives and equipment.
|
Who provided the funds for the attack on the USS Cole Al Qaeda Chief
|
More than nine months later, on October 12,2000, al Qaeda operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked a U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Cole. ||||| Nashiri was the field commander and managed the operation in Yemen. ||||| Early in chapter 5 we introduced, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, two other men who became operational coordinators for al Qaeda: Khallad and Nashiri.
|
Who provided the funds for the attack on the USS Cole Al Qaeda Chief
|
Nashiri was the field commander and managed the operation in Yemen. ||||| They had originally targeted a commercial vessel, specifically an oil tanker, but Bin Laden urged them to look for a U.S.warship instead. ||||| As we explained, both were involved during 1998 and 1999 in preparing to attack a ship off the coast of Yemen with a boatload of explosives.
|
Who provided the funds for the attack on the USS Cole Al Qaeda Chief
|
More than nine months later, on October 12,2000, al Qaeda operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked a U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Cole. ||||| The plot, we now know, was a full-fledged al Qaeda operation, supervised directly by Bin Laden. ||||| He chose the target and location of the attack, selected the suicide operatives, and provided the money needed to purchase explosives and equipment.
|
Who provided the funds for the attack on the USS Cole Bin Laden
|
More than nine months later, on October 12,2000, al Qaeda operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked a U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Cole. ||||| Nashiri was the field commander and managed the operation in Yemen. ||||| Early in chapter 5 we introduced, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, two other men who became operational coordinators for al Qaeda: Khallad and Nashiri.
|
Who provided the funds for the attack on the USS Cole Bin Laden
|
Nashiri was the field commander and managed the operation in Yemen. ||||| They had originally targeted a commercial vessel, specifically an oil tanker, but Bin Laden urged them to look for a U.S.warship instead. ||||| As we explained, both were involved during 1998 and 1999 in preparing to attack a ship off the coast of Yemen with a boatload of explosives.
|
Who provided the funds for the attack on the USS Cole Bin Laden
|
In September 2000, Bin Laden reportedly told Nashiri that he wanted to replace Khamri and Nibras. ||||| Nashiri was angry and disagreed, telling others he would go to Afghanistan and explain to Bin Laden that the new operatives were already trained and ready to conduct the attack.
|
In September 2000, Bin Laden wanted to replace two people, who was angered by this Nashiri
|
In September 2000, Bin Laden reportedly told Nashiri that he wanted to replace Khamri and Nibras. ||||| He chose the target and location of the attack, selected the suicide operatives, and provided the money needed to purchase explosives and equipment.
|
In September 2000, Bin Laden wanted to replace two people, who was angered by this Nashiri
|
In January 2000, their team had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank. ||||| The two suicide operatives chosen were Hassan al Khamri and Ibrahim al Thawar, also known as Nibras.
|
In September 2000, Bin Laden wanted to replace two people, who was angered by this Nashiri
|
In September 2000, Bin Laden reportedly told Nashiri that he wanted to replace Khamri and Nibras. ||||| Nashiri was angry and disagreed, telling others he would go to Afghanistan and explain to Bin Laden that the new operatives were already trained and ready to conduct the attack.
|
In September 2000, Bin Laden wanted to replace two people, who was angered by this Operational Coordinator for Al Qaeda
|
In September 2000, Bin Laden reportedly told Nashiri that he wanted to replace Khamri and Nibras. ||||| He chose the target and location of the attack, selected the suicide operatives, and provided the money needed to purchase explosives and equipment.
|
In September 2000, Bin Laden wanted to replace two people, who was angered by this Operational Coordinator for Al Qaeda
|
In January 2000, their team had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank. ||||| The two suicide operatives chosen were Hassan al Khamri and Ibrahim al Thawar, also known as Nibras.
|
In September 2000, Bin Laden wanted to replace two people, who was angered by this Operational Coordinator for Al Qaeda
|
Early in chapter 5 we introduced, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, two other men who became operational coordinators for al Qaeda: Khallad and Nashiri. ||||| As we explained, both were involved during 1998 and 1999 in preparing to attack a ship off the coast of Yemen with a boatload of explosives.
|
Who were the two men, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, that were preparing to attack a ship in 1998 and 1999 Khallad
|
As we explained, both were involved during 1998 and 1999 in preparing to attack a ship off the coast of Yemen with a boatload of explosives. ||||| Nashiri was the field commander and managed the operation in Yemen.
|
Who were the two men, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, that were preparing to attack a ship in 1998 and 1999 Khallad
|
In September 2000, Bin Laden reportedly told Nashiri that he wanted to replace Khamri and Nibras. ||||| Local al Qaeda coordinators included Jamal al Badawi and Fahd al Quso, who was supposed to film the attack from a nearby apartment.
|
Who were the two men, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, that were preparing to attack a ship in 1998 and 1999 Khallad
|
Early in chapter 5 we introduced, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, two other men who became operational coordinators for al Qaeda: Khallad and Nashiri. ||||| As we explained, both were involved during 1998 and 1999 in preparing to attack a ship off the coast of Yemen with a boatload of explosives.
|
Who were the two men, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, that were preparing to attack a ship in 1998 and 1999 Khallad and Nashiri
|
As we explained, both were involved during 1998 and 1999 in preparing to attack a ship off the coast of Yemen with a boatload of explosives. ||||| Nashiri was the field commander and managed the operation in Yemen.
|
Who were the two men, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, that were preparing to attack a ship in 1998 and 1999 Khallad and Nashiri
|
In September 2000, Bin Laden reportedly told Nashiri that he wanted to replace Khamri and Nibras. ||||| Local al Qaeda coordinators included Jamal al Badawi and Fahd al Quso, who was supposed to film the attack from a nearby apartment.
|
Who were the two men, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, that were preparing to attack a ship in 1998 and 1999 Khallad and Nashiri
|
Early in chapter 5 we introduced, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, two other men who became operational coordinators for al Qaeda: Khallad and Nashiri. ||||| As we explained, both were involved during 1998 and 1999 in preparing to attack a ship off the coast of Yemen with a boatload of explosives.
|
Who were the two men, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, that were preparing to attack a ship in 1998 and 1999 Nashiri
|
As we explained, both were involved during 1998 and 1999 in preparing to attack a ship off the coast of Yemen with a boatload of explosives. ||||| Nashiri was the field commander and managed the operation in Yemen.
|
Who were the two men, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, that were preparing to attack a ship in 1998 and 1999 Nashiri
|
In September 2000, Bin Laden reportedly told Nashiri that he wanted to replace Khamri and Nibras. ||||| Local al Qaeda coordinators included Jamal al Badawi and Fahd al Quso, who was supposed to film the attack from a nearby apartment.
|
Who were the two men, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, that were preparing to attack a ship in 1998 and 1999 Nashiri
|
Early in chapter 5 we introduced, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, two other men who became operational coordinators for al Qaeda: Khallad and Nashiri. ||||| In January 2000, their team had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank.
|
What happened when Khallad and Nashiri. first attempted an attack Their attempt failed
|
In January 2000, their team had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank. ||||| Prior to departing, Nashiri gave Nibras and Khamri instructions to execute the attack on the next U.S.warship that entered the port of Aden.
|
What happened when Khallad and Nashiri. first attempted an attack Their attempt failed
|
As we explained, both were involved during 1998 and 1999 in preparing to attack a ship off the coast of Yemen with a boatload of explosives. ||||| In September 2000, Bin Laden reportedly told Nashiri that he wanted to replace Khamri and Nibras.
|
What happened when Khallad and Nashiri. first attempted an attack Their attempt failed
|
Early in chapter 5 we introduced, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, two other men who became operational coordinators for al Qaeda: Khallad and Nashiri. ||||| In January 2000, their team had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank.
|
What happened when Khallad and Nashiri. first attempted an attack The suicide boat sank
|
In January 2000, their team had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank. ||||| Prior to departing, Nashiri gave Nibras and Khamri instructions to execute the attack on the next U.S.warship that entered the port of Aden.
|
What happened when Khallad and Nashiri. first attempted an attack The suicide boat sank
|
As we explained, both were involved during 1998 and 1999 in preparing to attack a ship off the coast of Yemen with a boatload of explosives. ||||| In September 2000, Bin Laden reportedly told Nashiri that he wanted to replace Khamri and Nibras.
|
What happened when Khallad and Nashiri. first attempted an attack The suicide boat sank
|
Early in chapter 5 we introduced, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, two other men who became operational coordinators for al Qaeda: Khallad and Nashiri. ||||| In January 2000, their team had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank.
|
What happened when Khallad and Nashiri. first attempted an attack The War ship they were targeting didn't have a successful mission because the suicide attack boat sunk
|
In January 2000, their team had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank. ||||| Prior to departing, Nashiri gave Nibras and Khamri instructions to execute the attack on the next U.S.warship that entered the port of Aden.
|
What happened when Khallad and Nashiri. first attempted an attack The War ship they were targeting didn't have a successful mission because the suicide attack boat sunk
|
As we explained, both were involved during 1998 and 1999 in preparing to attack a ship off the coast of Yemen with a boatload of explosives. ||||| In September 2000, Bin Laden reportedly told Nashiri that he wanted to replace Khamri and Nibras.
|
What happened when Khallad and Nashiri. first attempted an attack The War ship they were targeting didn't have a successful mission because the suicide attack boat sunk
|
Early in chapter 5 we introduced, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, two other men who became operational coordinators for al Qaeda: Khallad and Nashiri. ||||| Local al Qaeda coordinators included Jamal al Badawi and Fahd al Quso, who was supposed to film the attack from a nearby apartment.
|
How may coordinators were involved, according to the above information 5
|
Early in chapter 5 we introduced, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, two other men who became operational coordinators for al Qaeda: Khallad and Nashiri. ||||| More than nine months later, on October 12,2000, al Qaeda operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked a U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Cole.
|
How may coordinators were involved, according to the above information 5
|
Khallad helped in Yemen until he was arrested in a case of mistaken identity and freed with Bin Laden's help, as we also mentioned earlier. ||||| In January 2000, their team had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank.
|
How may coordinators were involved, according to the above information 5
|
Early in chapter 5 we introduced, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, two other men who became operational coordinators for al Qaeda: Khallad and Nashiri. ||||| Local al Qaeda coordinators included Jamal al Badawi and Fahd al Quso, who was supposed to film the attack from a nearby apartment.
|
How may coordinators were involved, according to the above information Jamal al Badawi and Fahd al Quso
|
Early in chapter 5 we introduced, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, two other men who became operational coordinators for al Qaeda: Khallad and Nashiri. ||||| More than nine months later, on October 12,2000, al Qaeda operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked a U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Cole.
|
How may coordinators were involved, according to the above information Jamal al Badawi and Fahd al Quso
|
Khallad helped in Yemen until he was arrested in a case of mistaken identity and freed with Bin Laden's help, as we also mentioned earlier. ||||| In January 2000, their team had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank.
|
How may coordinators were involved, according to the above information Jamal al Badawi and Fahd al Quso
|
Early in chapter 5 we introduced, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, two other men who became operational coordinators for al Qaeda: Khallad and Nashiri. ||||| Local al Qaeda coordinators included Jamal al Badawi and Fahd al Quso, who was supposed to film the attack from a nearby apartment.
|
How may coordinators were involved, according to the above information More than two
|
Early in chapter 5 we introduced, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, two other men who became operational coordinators for al Qaeda: Khallad and Nashiri. ||||| More than nine months later, on October 12,2000, al Qaeda operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked a U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Cole.
|
How may coordinators were involved, according to the above information More than two
|
Khallad helped in Yemen until he was arrested in a case of mistaken identity and freed with Bin Laden's help, as we also mentioned earlier. ||||| In January 2000, their team had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank.
|
How may coordinators were involved, according to the above information More than two
|
In January 2000, their team had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank. ||||| More than nine months later, on October 12,2000, al Qaeda operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked a U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Cole.
|
How long was it between the failed suicide mission and the successful attack on the USS Cole More than nine months
|
More than nine months later, on October 12,2000, al Qaeda operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked a U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Cole. ||||| In September 2000, Bin Laden reportedly told Nashiri that he wanted to replace Khamri and Nibras.
|
How long was it between the failed suicide mission and the successful attack on the USS Cole More than nine months
|
The plot, we now know, was a full-fledged al Qaeda operation, supervised directly by Bin Laden. ||||| Nashiri was angry and disagreed, telling others he would go to Afghanistan and explain to Bin Laden that the new operatives were already trained and ready to conduct the attack.
|
How long was it between the failed suicide mission and the successful attack on the USS Cole More than nine months
|
In January 2000, their team had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank. ||||| More than nine months later, on October 12,2000, al Qaeda operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked a U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Cole.
|
How long was it between the failed suicide mission and the successful attack on the USS Cole Around ten months
|
More than nine months later, on October 12,2000, al Qaeda operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked a U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Cole. ||||| In September 2000, Bin Laden reportedly told Nashiri that he wanted to replace Khamri and Nibras.
|
How long was it between the failed suicide mission and the successful attack on the USS Cole Around ten months
|
The plot, we now know, was a full-fledged al Qaeda operation, supervised directly by Bin Laden. ||||| Nashiri was angry and disagreed, telling others he would go to Afghanistan and explain to Bin Laden that the new operatives were already trained and ready to conduct the attack.
|
How long was it between the failed suicide mission and the successful attack on the USS Cole Around ten months
|
In January 2000, their team had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank. ||||| More than nine months later, on October 12,2000, al Qaeda operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked a U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Cole.
|
How long was it between the failed suicide mission and the successful attack on the USS Cole 9 months
|
More than nine months later, on October 12,2000, al Qaeda operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked a U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Cole. ||||| In September 2000, Bin Laden reportedly told Nashiri that he wanted to replace Khamri and Nibras.
|
How long was it between the failed suicide mission and the successful attack on the USS Cole 9 months
|
The plot, we now know, was a full-fledged al Qaeda operation, supervised directly by Bin Laden. ||||| Nashiri was angry and disagreed, telling others he would go to Afghanistan and explain to Bin Laden that the new operatives were already trained and ready to conduct the attack.
|
How long was it between the failed suicide mission and the successful attack on the USS Cole 9 months
|
More than nine months later, on October 12,2000, al Qaeda operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked a U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Cole. ||||| The blast ripped a hole in the side of the Cole, killing 17 members of the ship's crew and wounding at least 40.
|
How many casualties resulted in the attack on the U.S Navy Destroyer The attack killed 17 members of the ship's crew and wounded at least 40
|
The blast ripped a hole in the side of the Cole, killing 17 members of the ship's crew and wounding at least 40. ||||| Prior to departing, Nashiri gave Nibras and Khamri instructions to execute the attack on the next U.S.warship that entered the port of Aden.
|
How many casualties resulted in the attack on the U.S Navy Destroyer The attack killed 17 members of the ship's crew and wounded at least 40
|
Khallad helped in Yemen until he was arrested in a case of mistaken identity and freed with Bin Laden's help, as we also mentioned earlier. ||||| Local al Qaeda coordinators included Jamal al Badawi and Fahd al Quso, who was supposed to film the attack from a nearby apartment.
|
How many casualties resulted in the attack on the U.S Navy Destroyer The attack killed 17 members of the ship's crew and wounded at least 40
|
More than nine months later, on October 12,2000, al Qaeda operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked a U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Cole. ||||| The blast ripped a hole in the side of the Cole, killing 17 members of the ship's crew and wounding at least 40.
|
How many casualties resulted in the attack on the U.S Navy Destroyer At 17 members were killed and at least 40 members wounded in the attack
|
The blast ripped a hole in the side of the Cole, killing 17 members of the ship's crew and wounding at least 40. ||||| Prior to departing, Nashiri gave Nibras and Khamri instructions to execute the attack on the next U.S.warship that entered the port of Aden.
|
How many casualties resulted in the attack on the U.S Navy Destroyer At 17 members were killed and at least 40 members wounded in the attack
|
Khallad helped in Yemen until he was arrested in a case of mistaken identity and freed with Bin Laden's help, as we also mentioned earlier. ||||| Local al Qaeda coordinators included Jamal al Badawi and Fahd al Quso, who was supposed to film the attack from a nearby apartment.
|
How many casualties resulted in the attack on the U.S Navy Destroyer At 17 members were killed and at least 40 members wounded in the attack
|
More than nine months later, on October 12,2000, al Qaeda operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked a U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Cole. ||||| The blast ripped a hole in the side of the Cole, killing 17 members of the ship's crew and wounding at least 40.
|
How many casualties resulted in the attack on the U.S Navy Destroyer 17 members
|
The blast ripped a hole in the side of the Cole, killing 17 members of the ship's crew and wounding at least 40. ||||| Prior to departing, Nashiri gave Nibras and Khamri instructions to execute the attack on the next U.S.warship that entered the port of Aden.
|
How many casualties resulted in the attack on the U.S Navy Destroyer 17 members
|
Khallad helped in Yemen until he was arrested in a case of mistaken identity and freed with Bin Laden's help, as we also mentioned earlier. ||||| Local al Qaeda coordinators included Jamal al Badawi and Fahd al Quso, who was supposed to film the attack from a nearby apartment.
|
How many casualties resulted in the attack on the U.S Navy Destroyer 17 members
|
Nibras and Quso delivered money to Khallad in Bangkok during Khallad's January 2000 trip to Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok. ||||| In September 2000, Bin Laden reportedly told Nashiri that he wanted to replace Khamri and Nibras. ||||| Nashiri was angry and disagreed, telling others he would go to Afghanistan and explain to Bin Laden that the new operatives were already trained and ready to conduct the attack. ||||| Prior to departing, Nashiri gave Nibras and Khamri instructions to execute the attack on the next U.S.warship that entered the port of Aden.
|
Nashri's defiance led to what event Nashiri gave Nibras and Khamri instructions to execute the attack on the next U.S.warship that entered the port of Aden
|
In September 2000, Bin Laden reportedly told Nashiri that he wanted to replace Khamri and Nibras. ||||| He chose the target and location of the attack, selected the suicide operatives, and provided the money needed to purchase explosives and equipment. ||||| Nashiri was the field commander and managed the operation in Yemen. ||||| The blast ripped a hole in the side of the Cole, killing 17 members of the ship's crew and wounding at least 40.
|
Nashri's defiance led to what event Nashiri gave Nibras and Khamri instructions to execute the attack on the next U.S.warship that entered the port of Aden
|
The blast ripped a hole in the side of the Cole, killing 17 members of the ship's crew and wounding at least 40. ||||| The plot, we now know, was a full-fledged al Qaeda operation, supervised directly by Bin Laden. ||||| Local al Qaeda coordinators included Jamal al Badawi and Fahd al Quso, who was supposed to film the attack from a nearby apartment. ||||| Early in chapter 5 we introduced, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, two other men who became operational coordinators for al Qaeda: Khallad and Nashiri.
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Nashri's defiance led to what event Nashiri gave Nibras and Khamri instructions to execute the attack on the next U.S.warship that entered the port of Aden
|
Nibras and Quso delivered money to Khallad in Bangkok during Khallad's January 2000 trip to Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok. ||||| In September 2000, Bin Laden reportedly told Nashiri that he wanted to replace Khamri and Nibras. ||||| Nashiri was angry and disagreed, telling others he would go to Afghanistan and explain to Bin Laden that the new operatives were already trained and ready to conduct the attack. ||||| Prior to departing, Nashiri gave Nibras and Khamri instructions to execute the attack on the next U.S.warship that entered the port of Aden.
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Nashri's defiance led to what event The defiance led to the attack on the next warship to enter port of Aden against Bin Laden's wishes
|
In September 2000, Bin Laden reportedly told Nashiri that he wanted to replace Khamri and Nibras. ||||| He chose the target and location of the attack, selected the suicide operatives, and provided the money needed to purchase explosives and equipment. ||||| Nashiri was the field commander and managed the operation in Yemen. ||||| The blast ripped a hole in the side of the Cole, killing 17 members of the ship's crew and wounding at least 40.
|
Nashri's defiance led to what event The defiance led to the attack on the next warship to enter port of Aden against Bin Laden's wishes
|
The blast ripped a hole in the side of the Cole, killing 17 members of the ship's crew and wounding at least 40. ||||| The plot, we now know, was a full-fledged al Qaeda operation, supervised directly by Bin Laden. ||||| Local al Qaeda coordinators included Jamal al Badawi and Fahd al Quso, who was supposed to film the attack from a nearby apartment. ||||| Early in chapter 5 we introduced, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, two other men who became operational coordinators for al Qaeda: Khallad and Nashiri.
|
Nashri's defiance led to what event The defiance led to the attack on the next warship to enter port of Aden against Bin Laden's wishes
|
They had originally targeted a commercial vessel, specifically an oil tanker, but Bin Laden urged them to look for a U.S.warship instead. ||||| In January 2000, their team had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank.
|
Why did the team avert from attacking an oil tanker and attempt to attack a warship The team was convinced by Bin Laden to attack warship instead of an oil tanker
|
They had originally targeted a commercial vessel, specifically an oil tanker, but Bin Laden urged them to look for a U.S.warship instead. ||||| He chose the target and location of the attack, selected the suicide operatives, and provided the money needed to purchase explosives and equipment.
|
Why did the team avert from attacking an oil tanker and attempt to attack a warship The team was convinced by Bin Laden to attack warship instead of an oil tanker
|
Khallad helped in Yemen until he was arrested in a case of mistaken identity and freed with Bin Laden's help, as we also mentioned earlier. ||||| The two suicide operatives chosen were Hassan al Khamri and Ibrahim al Thawar, also known as Nibras.
|
Why did the team avert from attacking an oil tanker and attempt to attack a warship The team was convinced by Bin Laden to attack warship instead of an oil tanker
|
They had originally targeted a commercial vessel, specifically an oil tanker, but Bin Laden urged them to look for a U.S.warship instead. ||||| In January 2000, their team had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank.
|
Why did the team avert from attacking an oil tanker and attempt to attack a warship Bin Laden urged them to look for a U.S.warship instead
|
They had originally targeted a commercial vessel, specifically an oil tanker, but Bin Laden urged them to look for a U.S.warship instead. ||||| He chose the target and location of the attack, selected the suicide operatives, and provided the money needed to purchase explosives and equipment.
|
Why did the team avert from attacking an oil tanker and attempt to attack a warship Bin Laden urged them to look for a U.S.warship instead
|
Khallad helped in Yemen until he was arrested in a case of mistaken identity and freed with Bin Laden's help, as we also mentioned earlier. ||||| The two suicide operatives chosen were Hassan al Khamri and Ibrahim al Thawar, also known as Nibras.
|
Why did the team avert from attacking an oil tanker and attempt to attack a warship Bin Laden urged them to look for a U.S.warship instead
|
They had originally targeted a commercial vessel, specifically an oil tanker, but Bin Laden urged them to look for a U.S.warship instead. ||||| In January 2000, their team had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank.
|
Why did the team avert from attacking an oil tanker and attempt to attack a warship The two suicide operatives chosen were Hassan al Khamri and Ibrahim al Thawar, also known as Nibras
|
They had originally targeted a commercial vessel, specifically an oil tanker, but Bin Laden urged them to look for a U.S.warship instead. ||||| He chose the target and location of the attack, selected the suicide operatives, and provided the money needed to purchase explosives and equipment.
|
Why did the team avert from attacking an oil tanker and attempt to attack a warship The two suicide operatives chosen were Hassan al Khamri and Ibrahim al Thawar, also known as Nibras
|
Khallad helped in Yemen until he was arrested in a case of mistaken identity and freed with Bin Laden's help, as we also mentioned earlier. ||||| The two suicide operatives chosen were Hassan al Khamri and Ibrahim al Thawar, also known as Nibras.
|
Why did the team avert from attacking an oil tanker and attempt to attack a warship The two suicide operatives chosen were Hassan al Khamri and Ibrahim al Thawar, also known as Nibras
|
In January 2000, their team had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank. ||||| More than nine months later, on October 12,2000, al Qaeda operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked a U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Cole.
|
Describe the events that occurred before the attack on the USS Cole They had originally targeted a commercial vessel, specifically an oil tanker, but Bin Laden urged them to look for a U.S.warship instead. Then in January 2000, their team had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank ,more than nine months later, on October 12,2000, al Qaeda operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked a U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Cole
|
In January 2000, their team had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank. ||||| Prior to departing, Nashiri gave Nibras and Khamri instructions to execute the attack on the next U.S.warship that entered the port of Aden.
|
Describe the events that occurred before the attack on the USS Cole They had originally targeted a commercial vessel, specifically an oil tanker, but Bin Laden urged them to look for a U.S.warship instead. Then in January 2000, their team had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank ,more than nine months later, on October 12,2000, al Qaeda operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked a U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Cole
|
Local al Qaeda coordinators included Jamal al Badawi and Fahd al Quso, who was supposed to film the attack from a nearby apartment. ||||| They had originally targeted a commercial vessel, specifically an oil tanker, but Bin Laden urged them to look for a U.S.warship instead.
|
Describe the events that occurred before the attack on the USS Cole They had originally targeted a commercial vessel, specifically an oil tanker, but Bin Laden urged them to look for a U.S.warship instead. Then in January 2000, their team had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank ,more than nine months later, on October 12,2000, al Qaeda operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked a U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Cole
|
In January 2000, their team had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank. ||||| More than nine months later, on October 12,2000, al Qaeda operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked a U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Cole.
|
Describe the events that occurred before the attack on the USS Cole Local al Qaeda coordinators included Jamal al Badawi and Fahd al Quso, who was supposed to film the attack from a nearby apartment
|
In January 2000, their team had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank. ||||| Prior to departing, Nashiri gave Nibras and Khamri instructions to execute the attack on the next U.S.warship that entered the port of Aden.
|
Describe the events that occurred before the attack on the USS Cole Local al Qaeda coordinators included Jamal al Badawi and Fahd al Quso, who was supposed to film the attack from a nearby apartment
|
Local al Qaeda coordinators included Jamal al Badawi and Fahd al Quso, who was supposed to film the attack from a nearby apartment. ||||| They had originally targeted a commercial vessel, specifically an oil tanker, but Bin Laden urged them to look for a U.S.warship instead.
|
Describe the events that occurred before the attack on the USS Cole Local al Qaeda coordinators included Jamal al Badawi and Fahd al Quso, who was supposed to film the attack from a nearby apartment
|
In January 2000, their team had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank. ||||| More than nine months later, on October 12,2000, al Qaeda operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked a U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Cole.
|
Describe the events that occurred before the attack on the USS Cole The teams attack on a warship failed after the suicide boat sank causing them to regroup and attack the USS Cole nine months later
|
In January 2000, their team had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank. ||||| Prior to departing, Nashiri gave Nibras and Khamri instructions to execute the attack on the next U.S.warship that entered the port of Aden.
|
Describe the events that occurred before the attack on the USS Cole The teams attack on a warship failed after the suicide boat sank causing them to regroup and attack the USS Cole nine months later
|
Local al Qaeda coordinators included Jamal al Badawi and Fahd al Quso, who was supposed to film the attack from a nearby apartment. ||||| They had originally targeted a commercial vessel, specifically an oil tanker, but Bin Laden urged them to look for a U.S.warship instead.
|
Describe the events that occurred before the attack on the USS Cole The teams attack on a warship failed after the suicide boat sank causing them to regroup and attack the USS Cole nine months later
|
In January 2000, their team had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank. ||||| More than nine months later, on October 12,2000, al Qaeda operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked a U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Cole.
|
Describe the events that occurred before the attack on the USS Cole In January 2000 operational coordinators for al Qaeda: Khallad and Nashiri had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank
|
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