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Clarke pushed for the funding of such a center at Treasury, but neither Treasury nor the CIA was willing to commit the resources. ||||| Ultimately, although the intelligence community devoted more resources to the issue and produced somewhat more intelligence, it remained difficult to distinguish al Qaeda's financial transactions among the vast sums moving in the international financial system.
What type of center did Clarke push to establish before 9/11 to collect information related to terrorist funding An all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center
Within the United States, various FBI field offices gathered intelligence on organizations suspected of raising funds for al Qaeda or other terrorist groups. ||||| A U.S. interagency group traveled to Saudi Arabia twice, in 1999 and 2000, to get information from the Saudis about their understanding of those finances.
What type of center did Clarke push to establish before 9/11 to collect information related to terrorist funding An all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center
After the 1998 embassy bombings, the U.S. government tried to develop a clearer picture of Bin Laden's finances. ||||| A U.S. interagency group traveled to Saudi Arabia twice, in 1999 and 2000, to get information from the Saudis about their understanding of those finances.
What was the US government trying to find during 1999 and 2000 US government agencies were trying to find financial funding for terrorism
A U.S. interagency group traveled to Saudi Arabia twice, in 1999 and 2000, to get information from the Saudis about their understanding of those finances. ||||| Before 9/11, Treasury did not consider terrorist financing important enough to mention in its national strategy for money laundering.
What was the US government trying to find during 1999 and 2000 US government agencies were trying to find financial funding for terrorism
The group eventually concluded that the oft-repeated assertion that Bin Laden was funding al Qaeda from his personal fortune was in fact not true. ||||| Within the United States, various FBI field offices gathered intelligence on organizations suspected of raising funds for al Qaeda or other terrorist groups.
What was the US government trying to find during 1999 and 2000 US government agencies were trying to find financial funding for terrorism
After the 1998 embassy bombings, the U.S. government tried to develop a clearer picture of Bin Laden's finances. ||||| A U.S. interagency group traveled to Saudi Arabia twice, in 1999 and 2000, to get information from the Saudis about their understanding of those finances.
What was the US government trying to find during 1999 and 2000 Bin Laden's finances
A U.S. interagency group traveled to Saudi Arabia twice, in 1999 and 2000, to get information from the Saudis about their understanding of those finances. ||||| Before 9/11, Treasury did not consider terrorist financing important enough to mention in its national strategy for money laundering.
What was the US government trying to find during 1999 and 2000 Bin Laden's finances
The group eventually concluded that the oft-repeated assertion that Bin Laden was funding al Qaeda from his personal fortune was in fact not true. ||||| Within the United States, various FBI field offices gathered intelligence on organizations suspected of raising funds for al Qaeda or other terrorist groups.
What was the US government trying to find during 1999 and 2000 Bin Laden's finances
After the 1998 embassy bombings, the U.S. government tried to develop a clearer picture of Bin Laden's finances. ||||| A U.S. interagency group traveled to Saudi Arabia twice, in 1999 and 2000, to get information from the Saudis about their understanding of those finances.
What was the US government trying to find during 1999 and 2000 Information regarding Bin Laden's finances
A U.S. interagency group traveled to Saudi Arabia twice, in 1999 and 2000, to get information from the Saudis about their understanding of those finances. ||||| Before 9/11, Treasury did not consider terrorist financing important enough to mention in its national strategy for money laundering.
What was the US government trying to find during 1999 and 2000 Information regarding Bin Laden's finances
The group eventually concluded that the oft-repeated assertion that Bin Laden was funding al Qaeda from his personal fortune was in fact not true. ||||| Within the United States, various FBI field offices gathered intelligence on organizations suspected of raising funds for al Qaeda or other terrorist groups.
What was the US government trying to find during 1999 and 2000 Information regarding Bin Laden's finances
After the 1998 embassy bombings, the U.S. government tried to develop a clearer picture of Bin Laden's finances. ||||| A U.S. interagency group traveled to Saudi Arabia twice, in 1999 and 2000, to get information from the Saudis about their understanding of those finances.
What was the US government trying to find during 1999 and 2000 Get information from the Saudis about their understanding of those finances
A U.S. interagency group traveled to Saudi Arabia twice, in 1999 and 2000, to get information from the Saudis about their understanding of those finances. ||||| Before 9/11, Treasury did not consider terrorist financing important enough to mention in its national strategy for money laundering.
What was the US government trying to find during 1999 and 2000 Get information from the Saudis about their understanding of those finances
The group eventually concluded that the oft-repeated assertion that Bin Laden was funding al Qaeda from his personal fortune was in fact not true. ||||| Within the United States, various FBI field offices gathered intelligence on organizations suspected of raising funds for al Qaeda or other terrorist groups.
What was the US government trying to find during 1999 and 2000 Get information from the Saudis about their understanding of those finances
After the 1998 embassy bombings, the U.S. government tried to develop a clearer picture of Bin Laden's finances. ||||| A U.S. interagency group traveled to Saudi Arabia twice, in 1999 and 2000, to get information from the Saudis about their understanding of those finances.
Where did an interagency group travel to in 1999 and 2000 to find out about Bin Laden's finances Saudi Arabia
A U.S. interagency group traveled to Saudi Arabia twice, in 1999 and 2000, to get information from the Saudis about their understanding of those finances. ||||| The CIA was not able to find or disrupt al Qaeda's money flows.
Where did an interagency group travel to in 1999 and 2000 to find out about Bin Laden's finances Saudi Arabia
The group eventually concluded that the oft-repeated assertion that Bin Laden was funding al Qaeda from his personal fortune was in fact not true. ||||| Before 9/11, Treasury did not consider terrorist financing important enough to mention in its national strategy for money laundering.
Where did an interagency group travel to in 1999 and 2000 to find out about Bin Laden's finances Saudi Arabia
After the 1998 embassy bombings, the U.S. government tried to develop a clearer picture of Bin Laden's finances. ||||| A U.S. interagency group traveled to Saudi Arabia twice, in 1999 and 2000, to get information from the Saudis about their understanding of those finances.
Where did an interagency group travel to in 1999 and 2000 to find out about Bin Laden's finances Middle East
A U.S. interagency group traveled to Saudi Arabia twice, in 1999 and 2000, to get information from the Saudis about their understanding of those finances. ||||| The CIA was not able to find or disrupt al Qaeda's money flows.
Where did an interagency group travel to in 1999 and 2000 to find out about Bin Laden's finances Middle East
The group eventually concluded that the oft-repeated assertion that Bin Laden was funding al Qaeda from his personal fortune was in fact not true. ||||| Before 9/11, Treasury did not consider terrorist financing important enough to mention in its national strategy for money laundering.
Where did an interagency group travel to in 1999 and 2000 to find out about Bin Laden's finances Middle East
The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center. ||||| Clarke pushed for the funding of such a center at Treasury, but neither Treasury nor the CIA was willing to commit the resources.
What type of center did Clarke push funding for Analysis
Clarke pushed for the funding of such a center at Treasury, but neither Treasury nor the CIA was willing to commit the resources. ||||| The group eventually concluded that the oft-repeated assertion that Bin Laden was funding al Qaeda from his personal fortune was in fact not true.
What type of center did Clarke push funding for Analysis
The FBI operated a web of informants, conducted electronic surveillance, and had opened significant investigations in a number of field offices, including New York, Chicago, Detroit, San Diego, and Minneapolis. ||||| Large-scale scandals, such as the use of the Bank of New York by Russian money launderers to move millions of dollars out of Russia, captured the attention of the Department of the Treasury and of Congress.
What type of center did Clarke push funding for Analysis
The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center. ||||| Clarke pushed for the funding of such a center at Treasury, but neither Treasury nor the CIA was willing to commit the resources.
What type of center did Clarke push funding for Intelligence
Clarke pushed for the funding of such a center at Treasury, but neither Treasury nor the CIA was willing to commit the resources. ||||| The group eventually concluded that the oft-repeated assertion that Bin Laden was funding al Qaeda from his personal fortune was in fact not true.
What type of center did Clarke push funding for Intelligence
The FBI operated a web of informants, conducted electronic surveillance, and had opened significant investigations in a number of field offices, including New York, Chicago, Detroit, San Diego, and Minneapolis. ||||| Large-scale scandals, such as the use of the Bank of New York by Russian money launderers to move millions of dollars out of Russia, captured the attention of the Department of the Treasury and of Congress.
What type of center did Clarke push funding for Intelligence
The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center. ||||| Clarke pushed for the funding of such a center at Treasury, but neither Treasury nor the CIA was willing to commit the resources.
What type of center did Clarke push funding for An all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center
Clarke pushed for the funding of such a center at Treasury, but neither Treasury nor the CIA was willing to commit the resources. ||||| The group eventually concluded that the oft-repeated assertion that Bin Laden was funding al Qaeda from his personal fortune was in fact not true.
What type of center did Clarke push funding for An all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center
The FBI operated a web of informants, conducted electronic surveillance, and had opened significant investigations in a number of field offices, including New York, Chicago, Detroit, San Diego, and Minneapolis. ||||| Large-scale scandals, such as the use of the Bank of New York by Russian money launderers to move millions of dollars out of Russia, captured the attention of the Department of the Treasury and of Congress.
What type of center did Clarke push funding for An all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center
The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center. ||||| Clarke pushed for the funding of such a center at Treasury, but neither Treasury nor the CIA was willing to commit the resources.
What type of center did Clarke push funding for A terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center
Clarke pushed for the funding of such a center at Treasury, but neither Treasury nor the CIA was willing to commit the resources. ||||| The group eventually concluded that the oft-repeated assertion that Bin Laden was funding al Qaeda from his personal fortune was in fact not true.
What type of center did Clarke push funding for A terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center
The FBI operated a web of informants, conducted electronic surveillance, and had opened significant investigations in a number of field offices, including New York, Chicago, Detroit, San Diego, and Minneapolis. ||||| Large-scale scandals, such as the use of the Bank of New York by Russian money launderers to move millions of dollars out of Russia, captured the attention of the Department of the Treasury and of Congress.
What type of center did Clarke push funding for A terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center
Treasury regulators, as well as U.S. financial institutions, were generally focused on finding and deterring or disrupting the vast flows of U.S. currency generated by drug trafficking and high-level international fraud. ||||| Large-scale scandals, such as the use of the Bank of New York by Russian money launderers to move millions of dollars out of Russia, captured the attention of the Department of the Treasury and of Congress. ||||| Before 9/11, Treasury did not consider terrorist financing important enough to mention in its national strategy for money laundering.
What types of activities did the Treasury Department focus on while missing the boat on terrorist funding International fraud
Treasury regulators, as well as U.S. financial institutions, were generally focused on finding and deterring or disrupting the vast flows of U.S. currency generated by drug trafficking and high-level international fraud. ||||| The FBI operated a web of informants, conducted electronic surveillance, and had opened significant investigations in a number of field offices, including New York, Chicago, Detroit, San Diego, and Minneapolis. ||||| The group eventually concluded that the oft-repeated assertion that Bin Laden was funding al Qaeda from his personal fortune was in fact not true.
What types of activities did the Treasury Department focus on while missing the boat on terrorist funding International fraud
By 9/11, FBI agents understood that there were extremist organizations operating within the United States supporting a global jihadist movement and with substantial connections to al Qaeda. ||||| The FBI operated a web of informants, conducted electronic surveillance, and had opened significant investigations in a number of field offices, including New York, Chicago, Detroit, San Diego, and Minneapolis. ||||| The CIA was not able to find or disrupt al Qaeda's money flows.
What types of activities did the Treasury Department focus on while missing the boat on terrorist funding International fraud
Treasury regulators, as well as U.S. financial institutions, were generally focused on finding and deterring or disrupting the vast flows of U.S. currency generated by drug trafficking and high-level international fraud. ||||| Large-scale scandals, such as the use of the Bank of New York by Russian money launderers to move millions of dollars out of Russia, captured the attention of the Department of the Treasury and of Congress. ||||| Before 9/11, Treasury did not consider terrorist financing important enough to mention in its national strategy for money laundering.
What types of activities did the Treasury Department focus on while missing the boat on terrorist funding Drug trafficing, international fraud and Russian money laundering
Treasury regulators, as well as U.S. financial institutions, were generally focused on finding and deterring or disrupting the vast flows of U.S. currency generated by drug trafficking and high-level international fraud. ||||| The FBI operated a web of informants, conducted electronic surveillance, and had opened significant investigations in a number of field offices, including New York, Chicago, Detroit, San Diego, and Minneapolis. ||||| The group eventually concluded that the oft-repeated assertion that Bin Laden was funding al Qaeda from his personal fortune was in fact not true.
What types of activities did the Treasury Department focus on while missing the boat on terrorist funding Drug trafficing, international fraud and Russian money laundering
By 9/11, FBI agents understood that there were extremist organizations operating within the United States supporting a global jihadist movement and with substantial connections to al Qaeda. ||||| The FBI operated a web of informants, conducted electronic surveillance, and had opened significant investigations in a number of field offices, including New York, Chicago, Detroit, San Diego, and Minneapolis. ||||| The CIA was not able to find or disrupt al Qaeda's money flows.
What types of activities did the Treasury Department focus on while missing the boat on terrorist funding Drug trafficing, international fraud and Russian money laundering
Treasury regulators, as well as U.S. financial institutions, were generally focused on finding and deterring or disrupting the vast flows of U.S. currency generated by drug trafficking and high-level international fraud. ||||| Large-scale scandals, such as the use of the Bank of New York by Russian money launderers to move millions of dollars out of Russia, captured the attention of the Department of the Treasury and of Congress. ||||| Before 9/11, Treasury did not consider terrorist financing important enough to mention in its national strategy for money laundering.
What types of activities did the Treasury Department focus on while missing the boat on terrorist funding Drug trafficking
Treasury regulators, as well as U.S. financial institutions, were generally focused on finding and deterring or disrupting the vast flows of U.S. currency generated by drug trafficking and high-level international fraud. ||||| The FBI operated a web of informants, conducted electronic surveillance, and had opened significant investigations in a number of field offices, including New York, Chicago, Detroit, San Diego, and Minneapolis. ||||| The group eventually concluded that the oft-repeated assertion that Bin Laden was funding al Qaeda from his personal fortune was in fact not true.
What types of activities did the Treasury Department focus on while missing the boat on terrorist funding Drug trafficking
By 9/11, FBI agents understood that there were extremist organizations operating within the United States supporting a global jihadist movement and with substantial connections to al Qaeda. ||||| The FBI operated a web of informants, conducted electronic surveillance, and had opened significant investigations in a number of field offices, including New York, Chicago, Detroit, San Diego, and Minneapolis. ||||| The CIA was not able to find or disrupt al Qaeda's money flows.
What types of activities did the Treasury Department focus on while missing the boat on terrorist funding Drug trafficking
Treasury regulators, as well as U.S. financial institutions, were generally focused on finding and deterring or disrupting the vast flows of U.S. currency generated by drug trafficking and high-level international fraud. ||||| Large-scale scandals, such as the use of the Bank of New York by Russian money launderers to move millions of dollars out of Russia, captured the attention of the Department of the Treasury and of Congress. ||||| Before 9/11, Treasury did not consider terrorist financing important enough to mention in its national strategy for money laundering.
What types of activities did the Treasury Department focus on while missing the boat on terrorist funding Russian Money Laundering
Treasury regulators, as well as U.S. financial institutions, were generally focused on finding and deterring or disrupting the vast flows of U.S. currency generated by drug trafficking and high-level international fraud. ||||| The FBI operated a web of informants, conducted electronic surveillance, and had opened significant investigations in a number of field offices, including New York, Chicago, Detroit, San Diego, and Minneapolis. ||||| The group eventually concluded that the oft-repeated assertion that Bin Laden was funding al Qaeda from his personal fortune was in fact not true.
What types of activities did the Treasury Department focus on while missing the boat on terrorist funding Russian Money Laundering
By 9/11, FBI agents understood that there were extremist organizations operating within the United States supporting a global jihadist movement and with substantial connections to al Qaeda. ||||| The FBI operated a web of informants, conducted electronic surveillance, and had opened significant investigations in a number of field offices, including New York, Chicago, Detroit, San Diego, and Minneapolis. ||||| The CIA was not able to find or disrupt al Qaeda's money flows.
What types of activities did the Treasury Department focus on while missing the boat on terrorist funding Russian Money Laundering
Treasury regulators, as well as U.S. financial institutions, were generally focused on finding and deterring or disrupting the vast flows of U.S. currency generated by drug trafficking and high-level international fraud. ||||| Large-scale scandals, such as the use of the Bank of New York by Russian money launderers to move millions of dollars out of Russia, captured the attention of the Department of the Treasury and of Congress. ||||| Before 9/11, Treasury did not consider terrorist financing important enough to mention in its national strategy for money laundering.
What types of activities did the Treasury Department focus on while missing the boat on terrorist funding High international fraud
Treasury regulators, as well as U.S. financial institutions, were generally focused on finding and deterring or disrupting the vast flows of U.S. currency generated by drug trafficking and high-level international fraud. ||||| The FBI operated a web of informants, conducted electronic surveillance, and had opened significant investigations in a number of field offices, including New York, Chicago, Detroit, San Diego, and Minneapolis. ||||| The group eventually concluded that the oft-repeated assertion that Bin Laden was funding al Qaeda from his personal fortune was in fact not true.
What types of activities did the Treasury Department focus on while missing the boat on terrorist funding High international fraud
By 9/11, FBI agents understood that there were extremist organizations operating within the United States supporting a global jihadist movement and with substantial connections to al Qaeda. ||||| The FBI operated a web of informants, conducted electronic surveillance, and had opened significant investigations in a number of field offices, including New York, Chicago, Detroit, San Diego, and Minneapolis. ||||| The CIA was not able to find or disrupt al Qaeda's money flows.
What types of activities did the Treasury Department focus on while missing the boat on terrorist funding High international fraud
The FBI operated a web of informants, conducted electronic surveillance, and had opened significant investigations in a number of field offices, including New York, Chicago, Detroit, San Diego, and Minneapolis. ||||| On a national level, however, the FBI never used the information to gain a systematic or strategic understanding of the nature and extent of al Qaeda fundraising.
Which U.S. agency failed to connect the dots collected by a number of field offices concerning al Queda fundraising FBI
The FBI operated a web of informants, conducted electronic surveillance, and had opened significant investigations in a number of field offices, including New York, Chicago, Detroit, San Diego, and Minneapolis. ||||| Ultimately, although the intelligence community devoted more resources to the issue and produced somewhat more intelligence, it remained difficult to distinguish al Qaeda's financial transactions among the vast sums moving in the international financial system.
Which U.S. agency failed to connect the dots collected by a number of field offices concerning al Queda fundraising FBI
The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center. ||||| The group eventually concluded that the oft-repeated assertion that Bin Laden was funding al Qaeda from his personal fortune was in fact not true.
Which U.S. agency failed to connect the dots collected by a number of field offices concerning al Queda fundraising FBI
The CIA was not able to find or disrupt al Qaeda's money flows. ||||| The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center. ||||| Within the United States, various FBI field offices gathered intelligence on organizations suspected of raising funds for al Qaeda or other terrorist groups.
What government agencies were involved in tracking financial funding for al Qaeda FBI and NSC
The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center. ||||| On a national level, however, the FBI never used the information to gain a systematic or strategic understanding of the nature and extent of al Qaeda fundraising. ||||| Treasury regulators, as well as U.S. financial institutions, were generally focused on finding and deterring or disrupting the vast flows of U.S. currency generated by drug trafficking and high-level international fraud.
What government agencies were involved in tracking financial funding for al Qaeda FBI and NSC
The group eventually concluded that the oft-repeated assertion that Bin Laden was funding al Qaeda from his personal fortune was in fact not true. ||||| Ultimately, although the intelligence community devoted more resources to the issue and produced somewhat more intelligence, it remained difficult to distinguish al Qaeda's financial transactions among the vast sums moving in the international financial system. ||||| Before 9/11, Treasury did not consider terrorist financing important enough to mention in its national strategy for money laundering.
What government agencies were involved in tracking financial funding for al Qaeda FBI and NSC
The CIA was not able to find or disrupt al Qaeda's money flows. ||||| The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center. ||||| Within the United States, various FBI field offices gathered intelligence on organizations suspected of raising funds for al Qaeda or other terrorist groups.
What government agencies were involved in tracking financial funding for al Qaeda CIA
The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center. ||||| On a national level, however, the FBI never used the information to gain a systematic or strategic understanding of the nature and extent of al Qaeda fundraising. ||||| Treasury regulators, as well as U.S. financial institutions, were generally focused on finding and deterring or disrupting the vast flows of U.S. currency generated by drug trafficking and high-level international fraud.
What government agencies were involved in tracking financial funding for al Qaeda CIA
The group eventually concluded that the oft-repeated assertion that Bin Laden was funding al Qaeda from his personal fortune was in fact not true. ||||| Ultimately, although the intelligence community devoted more resources to the issue and produced somewhat more intelligence, it remained difficult to distinguish al Qaeda's financial transactions among the vast sums moving in the international financial system. ||||| Before 9/11, Treasury did not consider terrorist financing important enough to mention in its national strategy for money laundering.
What government agencies were involved in tracking financial funding for al Qaeda CIA
The CIA was not able to find or disrupt al Qaeda's money flows. ||||| The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center. ||||| Within the United States, various FBI field offices gathered intelligence on organizations suspected of raising funds for al Qaeda or other terrorist groups.
What government agencies were involved in tracking financial funding for al Qaeda NCS
The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center. ||||| On a national level, however, the FBI never used the information to gain a systematic or strategic understanding of the nature and extent of al Qaeda fundraising. ||||| Treasury regulators, as well as U.S. financial institutions, were generally focused on finding and deterring or disrupting the vast flows of U.S. currency generated by drug trafficking and high-level international fraud.
What government agencies were involved in tracking financial funding for al Qaeda NCS
The group eventually concluded that the oft-repeated assertion that Bin Laden was funding al Qaeda from his personal fortune was in fact not true. ||||| Ultimately, although the intelligence community devoted more resources to the issue and produced somewhat more intelligence, it remained difficult to distinguish al Qaeda's financial transactions among the vast sums moving in the international financial system. ||||| Before 9/11, Treasury did not consider terrorist financing important enough to mention in its national strategy for money laundering.
What government agencies were involved in tracking financial funding for al Qaeda NCS
The CIA was not able to find or disrupt al Qaeda's money flows. ||||| The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center. ||||| Within the United States, various FBI field offices gathered intelligence on organizations suspected of raising funds for al Qaeda or other terrorist groups.
What government agencies were involved in tracking financial funding for al Qaeda The FBI
The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center. ||||| On a national level, however, the FBI never used the information to gain a systematic or strategic understanding of the nature and extent of al Qaeda fundraising. ||||| Treasury regulators, as well as U.S. financial institutions, were generally focused on finding and deterring or disrupting the vast flows of U.S. currency generated by drug trafficking and high-level international fraud.
What government agencies were involved in tracking financial funding for al Qaeda The FBI
The group eventually concluded that the oft-repeated assertion that Bin Laden was funding al Qaeda from his personal fortune was in fact not true. ||||| Ultimately, although the intelligence community devoted more resources to the issue and produced somewhat more intelligence, it remained difficult to distinguish al Qaeda's financial transactions among the vast sums moving in the international financial system. ||||| Before 9/11, Treasury did not consider terrorist financing important enough to mention in its national strategy for money laundering.
What government agencies were involved in tracking financial funding for al Qaeda The FBI
The CIA was not able to find or disrupt al Qaeda's money flows. ||||| The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center. ||||| Within the United States, various FBI field offices gathered intelligence on organizations suspected of raising funds for al Qaeda or other terrorist groups.
What government agencies were involved in tracking financial funding for al Qaeda NSC, CIA, and FBI were investigating financial ties to al Qaeda
The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center. ||||| On a national level, however, the FBI never used the information to gain a systematic or strategic understanding of the nature and extent of al Qaeda fundraising. ||||| Treasury regulators, as well as U.S. financial institutions, were generally focused on finding and deterring or disrupting the vast flows of U.S. currency generated by drug trafficking and high-level international fraud.
What government agencies were involved in tracking financial funding for al Qaeda NSC, CIA, and FBI were investigating financial ties to al Qaeda
The group eventually concluded that the oft-repeated assertion that Bin Laden was funding al Qaeda from his personal fortune was in fact not true. ||||| Ultimately, although the intelligence community devoted more resources to the issue and produced somewhat more intelligence, it remained difficult to distinguish al Qaeda's financial transactions among the vast sums moving in the international financial system. ||||| Before 9/11, Treasury did not consider terrorist financing important enough to mention in its national strategy for money laundering.
What government agencies were involved in tracking financial funding for al Qaeda NSC, CIA, and FBI were investigating financial ties to al Qaeda
By 9/11, FBI agents understood that there were extremist organizations operating within the United States supporting a global jihadist movement and with substantial connections to al Qaeda. ||||| The FBI operated a web of informants, conducted electronic surveillance, and had opened significant investigations in a number of field offices, including New York, Chicago, Detroit, San Diego, and Minneapolis. ||||| Ultimately, although the intelligence community devoted more resources to the issue and produced somewhat more intelligence, it remained difficult to distinguish al Qaeda's financial transactions among the vast sums moving in the international financial system.
Why was FBI conducting electronic surveillance and used informants in major US cities FBI was looking for financial funding of al Qaeda
Ultimately, although the intelligence community devoted more resources to the issue and produced somewhat more intelligence, it remained difficult to distinguish al Qaeda's financial transactions among the vast sums moving in the international financial system. ||||| The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center. ||||| On a national level, however, the FBI never used the information to gain a systematic or strategic understanding of the nature and extent of al Qaeda fundraising.
Why was FBI conducting electronic surveillance and used informants in major US cities FBI was looking for financial funding of al Qaeda
Treasury regulators, as well as U.S. financial institutions, were generally focused on finding and deterring or disrupting the vast flows of U.S. currency generated by drug trafficking and high-level international fraud. ||||| The group eventually concluded that the oft-repeated assertion that Bin Laden was funding al Qaeda from his personal fortune was in fact not true. ||||| The CIA was not able to find or disrupt al Qaeda's money flows.
Why was FBI conducting electronic surveillance and used informants in major US cities FBI was looking for financial funding of al Qaeda
By 9/11, FBI agents understood that there were extremist organizations operating within the United States supporting a global jihadist movement and with substantial connections to al Qaeda. ||||| The FBI operated a web of informants, conducted electronic surveillance, and had opened significant investigations in a number of field offices, including New York, Chicago, Detroit, San Diego, and Minneapolis. ||||| Ultimately, although the intelligence community devoted more resources to the issue and produced somewhat more intelligence, it remained difficult to distinguish al Qaeda's financial transactions among the vast sums moving in the international financial system.
Why was FBI conducting electronic surveillance and used informants in major US cities To gather information about Al Qaeda's fundraising
Ultimately, although the intelligence community devoted more resources to the issue and produced somewhat more intelligence, it remained difficult to distinguish al Qaeda's financial transactions among the vast sums moving in the international financial system. ||||| The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center. ||||| On a national level, however, the FBI never used the information to gain a systematic or strategic understanding of the nature and extent of al Qaeda fundraising.
Why was FBI conducting electronic surveillance and used informants in major US cities To gather information about Al Qaeda's fundraising
Treasury regulators, as well as U.S. financial institutions, were generally focused on finding and deterring or disrupting the vast flows of U.S. currency generated by drug trafficking and high-level international fraud. ||||| The group eventually concluded that the oft-repeated assertion that Bin Laden was funding al Qaeda from his personal fortune was in fact not true. ||||| The CIA was not able to find or disrupt al Qaeda's money flows.
Why was FBI conducting electronic surveillance and used informants in major US cities To gather information about Al Qaeda's fundraising
By 9/11, FBI agents understood that there were extremist organizations operating within the United States supporting a global jihadist movement and with substantial connections to al Qaeda. ||||| The FBI operated a web of informants, conducted electronic surveillance, and had opened significant investigations in a number of field offices, including New York, Chicago, Detroit, San Diego, and Minneapolis. ||||| Ultimately, although the intelligence community devoted more resources to the issue and produced somewhat more intelligence, it remained difficult to distinguish al Qaeda's financial transactions among the vast sums moving in the international financial system.
Why was FBI conducting electronic surveillance and used informants in major US cities FBI agents understood that there were extremist organizations operating within the United States
Ultimately, although the intelligence community devoted more resources to the issue and produced somewhat more intelligence, it remained difficult to distinguish al Qaeda's financial transactions among the vast sums moving in the international financial system. ||||| The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center. ||||| On a national level, however, the FBI never used the information to gain a systematic or strategic understanding of the nature and extent of al Qaeda fundraising.
Why was FBI conducting electronic surveillance and used informants in major US cities FBI agents understood that there were extremist organizations operating within the United States
Treasury regulators, as well as U.S. financial institutions, were generally focused on finding and deterring or disrupting the vast flows of U.S. currency generated by drug trafficking and high-level international fraud. ||||| The group eventually concluded that the oft-repeated assertion that Bin Laden was funding al Qaeda from his personal fortune was in fact not true. ||||| The CIA was not able to find or disrupt al Qaeda's money flows.
Why was FBI conducting electronic surveillance and used informants in major US cities FBI agents understood that there were extremist organizations operating within the United States
By 9/11, FBI agents understood that there were extremist organizations operating within the United States supporting a global jihadist movement and with substantial connections to al Qaeda. ||||| The FBI operated a web of informants, conducted electronic surveillance, and had opened significant investigations in a number of field offices, including New York, Chicago, Detroit, San Diego, and Minneapolis. ||||| Ultimately, although the intelligence community devoted more resources to the issue and produced somewhat more intelligence, it remained difficult to distinguish al Qaeda's financial transactions among the vast sums moving in the international financial system.
Why was FBI conducting electronic surveillance and used informants in major US cities To find organizations with Al Qaeda connections
Ultimately, although the intelligence community devoted more resources to the issue and produced somewhat more intelligence, it remained difficult to distinguish al Qaeda's financial transactions among the vast sums moving in the international financial system. ||||| The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center. ||||| On a national level, however, the FBI never used the information to gain a systematic or strategic understanding of the nature and extent of al Qaeda fundraising.
Why was FBI conducting electronic surveillance and used informants in major US cities To find organizations with Al Qaeda connections
Treasury regulators, as well as U.S. financial institutions, were generally focused on finding and deterring or disrupting the vast flows of U.S. currency generated by drug trafficking and high-level international fraud. ||||| The group eventually concluded that the oft-repeated assertion that Bin Laden was funding al Qaeda from his personal fortune was in fact not true. ||||| The CIA was not able to find or disrupt al Qaeda's money flows.
Why was FBI conducting electronic surveillance and used informants in major US cities To find organizations with Al Qaeda connections
The group eventually concluded that the oft-repeated assertion that Bin Laden was funding al Qaeda from his personal fortune was in fact not true. ||||| The officials developed a new theory: al Qaeda was getting its money elsewhere, and the United States needed to focus on other sources of funding, such as charities, wealthy donors, and financial facilitators.
What different possible funding sources for Bin Laden were considered Financial facilitators
The officials developed a new theory: al Qaeda was getting its money elsewhere, and the United States needed to focus on other sources of funding, such as charities, wealthy donors, and financial facilitators. ||||| On a national level, however, the FBI never used the information to gain a systematic or strategic understanding of the nature and extent of al Qaeda fundraising.
What different possible funding sources for Bin Laden were considered Financial facilitators
By 9/11, FBI agents understood that there were extremist organizations operating within the United States supporting a global jihadist movement and with substantial connections to al Qaeda. ||||| Before 9/11, Treasury did not consider terrorist financing important enough to mention in its national strategy for money laundering.
What different possible funding sources for Bin Laden were considered Financial facilitators
The group eventually concluded that the oft-repeated assertion that Bin Laden was funding al Qaeda from his personal fortune was in fact not true. ||||| The officials developed a new theory: al Qaeda was getting its money elsewhere, and the United States needed to focus on other sources of funding, such as charities, wealthy donors, and financial facilitators.
What different possible funding sources for Bin Laden were considered Bin Laden's personal fortune, charities, wealthy donors, and financial facilitators
The officials developed a new theory: al Qaeda was getting its money elsewhere, and the United States needed to focus on other sources of funding, such as charities, wealthy donors, and financial facilitators. ||||| On a national level, however, the FBI never used the information to gain a systematic or strategic understanding of the nature and extent of al Qaeda fundraising.
What different possible funding sources for Bin Laden were considered Bin Laden's personal fortune, charities, wealthy donors, and financial facilitators
By 9/11, FBI agents understood that there were extremist organizations operating within the United States supporting a global jihadist movement and with substantial connections to al Qaeda. ||||| Before 9/11, Treasury did not consider terrorist financing important enough to mention in its national strategy for money laundering.
What different possible funding sources for Bin Laden were considered Bin Laden's personal fortune, charities, wealthy donors, and financial facilitators
The group eventually concluded that the oft-repeated assertion that Bin Laden was funding al Qaeda from his personal fortune was in fact not true. ||||| The officials developed a new theory: al Qaeda was getting its money elsewhere, and the United States needed to focus on other sources of funding, such as charities, wealthy donors, and financial facilitators.
What different possible funding sources for Bin Laden were considered Wealthy Donors
The officials developed a new theory: al Qaeda was getting its money elsewhere, and the United States needed to focus on other sources of funding, such as charities, wealthy donors, and financial facilitators. ||||| On a national level, however, the FBI never used the information to gain a systematic or strategic understanding of the nature and extent of al Qaeda fundraising.
What different possible funding sources for Bin Laden were considered Wealthy Donors
By 9/11, FBI agents understood that there were extremist organizations operating within the United States supporting a global jihadist movement and with substantial connections to al Qaeda. ||||| Before 9/11, Treasury did not consider terrorist financing important enough to mention in its national strategy for money laundering.
What different possible funding sources for Bin Laden were considered Wealthy Donors
The group eventually concluded that the oft-repeated assertion that Bin Laden was funding al Qaeda from his personal fortune was in fact not true. ||||| The officials developed a new theory: al Qaeda was getting its money elsewhere, and the United States needed to focus on other sources of funding, such as charities, wealthy donors, and financial facilitators.
What different possible funding sources for Bin Laden were considered Charities
The officials developed a new theory: al Qaeda was getting its money elsewhere, and the United States needed to focus on other sources of funding, such as charities, wealthy donors, and financial facilitators. ||||| On a national level, however, the FBI never used the information to gain a systematic or strategic understanding of the nature and extent of al Qaeda fundraising.
What different possible funding sources for Bin Laden were considered Charities
By 9/11, FBI agents understood that there were extremist organizations operating within the United States supporting a global jihadist movement and with substantial connections to al Qaeda. ||||| Before 9/11, Treasury did not consider terrorist financing important enough to mention in its national strategy for money laundering.
What different possible funding sources for Bin Laden were considered Charities
The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center. ||||| Clarke pushed for the funding of such a center at Treasury, but neither Treasury nor the CIA was willing to commit the resources.
What did Clarke try to find through creating an intelligence analysis center Where al quaeda was funding its operations
Clarke pushed for the funding of such a center at Treasury, but neither Treasury nor the CIA was willing to commit the resources. ||||| The CIA was not able to find or disrupt al Qaeda's money flows.
What did Clarke try to find through creating an intelligence analysis center Where al quaeda was funding its operations
The officials developed a new theory: al Qaeda was getting its money elsewhere, and the United States needed to focus on other sources of funding, such as charities, wealthy donors, and financial facilitators. ||||| By 9/11, FBI agents understood that there were extremist organizations operating within the United States supporting a global jihadist movement and with substantial connections to al Qaeda.
What did Clarke try to find through creating an intelligence analysis center Where al quaeda was funding its operations
The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center. ||||| Clarke pushed for the funding of such a center at Treasury, but neither Treasury nor the CIA was willing to commit the resources.
What did Clarke try to find through creating an intelligence analysis center Clark was looking for terrorist financing sources
Clarke pushed for the funding of such a center at Treasury, but neither Treasury nor the CIA was willing to commit the resources. ||||| The CIA was not able to find or disrupt al Qaeda's money flows.
What did Clarke try to find through creating an intelligence analysis center Clark was looking for terrorist financing sources
The officials developed a new theory: al Qaeda was getting its money elsewhere, and the United States needed to focus on other sources of funding, such as charities, wealthy donors, and financial facilitators. ||||| By 9/11, FBI agents understood that there were extremist organizations operating within the United States supporting a global jihadist movement and with substantial connections to al Qaeda.
What did Clarke try to find through creating an intelligence analysis center Clark was looking for terrorist financing sources
The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center. ||||| Clarke pushed for the funding of such a center at Treasury, but neither Treasury nor the CIA was willing to commit the resources.
What did Clarke try to find through creating an intelligence analysis center To distinguish Al Qaeda's transactions
Clarke pushed for the funding of such a center at Treasury, but neither Treasury nor the CIA was willing to commit the resources. ||||| The CIA was not able to find or disrupt al Qaeda's money flows.
What did Clarke try to find through creating an intelligence analysis center To distinguish Al Qaeda's transactions
The officials developed a new theory: al Qaeda was getting its money elsewhere, and the United States needed to focus on other sources of funding, such as charities, wealthy donors, and financial facilitators. ||||| By 9/11, FBI agents understood that there were extremist organizations operating within the United States supporting a global jihadist movement and with substantial connections to al Qaeda.
What did Clarke try to find through creating an intelligence analysis center To distinguish Al Qaeda's transactions
The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center. ||||| Clarke pushed for the funding of such a center at Treasury, but neither Treasury nor the CIA was willing to commit the resources.
What did Clarke try to find through creating an intelligence analysis center Different organizations raising funds for Al Qaeda
Clarke pushed for the funding of such a center at Treasury, but neither Treasury nor the CIA was willing to commit the resources. ||||| The CIA was not able to find or disrupt al Qaeda's money flows.
What did Clarke try to find through creating an intelligence analysis center Different organizations raising funds for Al Qaeda