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Ampere is often shortened to amp. ||||| Do you know what is on top of those poles? ||||| Surely, you have noticed the tall poles along the roadside.
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What is created when the outer-most particles of an atom are flowing Electric current
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Thats right, wires that carry electric current. ||||| These wires carry electric current to your home.
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Where do the wires carry electric current To your home
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These wires carry electric current to your home. ||||| Do you know what is on top of those poles?
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Where do the wires carry electric current To your home
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Electric current is actually the flow of electrons. ||||| Alternating current (AC) flows in two directions.
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Where do the wires carry electric current To your home
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Thats right, wires that carry electric current. ||||| These wires carry electric current to your home.
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Where do the wires carry electric current At their top, in the wires
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These wires carry electric current to your home. ||||| Do you know what is on top of those poles?
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Where do the wires carry electric current At their top, in the wires
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Electric current is actually the flow of electrons. ||||| Alternating current (AC) flows in two directions.
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Where do the wires carry electric current At their top, in the wires
|
Thats right, wires that carry electric current. ||||| These wires carry electric current to your home.
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Where do the wires carry electric current Homes
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These wires carry electric current to your home. ||||| Do you know what is on top of those poles?
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Where do the wires carry electric current Homes
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Electric current is actually the flow of electrons. ||||| Alternating current (AC) flows in two directions.
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Where do the wires carry electric current Homes
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Surely, you have noticed the tall poles along the roadside. ||||| Do you know what is on top of those poles? ||||| Thats right, wires that carry electric current.
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What is on top of the poles on the roadside Wires carrying electric current
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Do you know what is on top of those poles? ||||| Electrons are able to move through wires. ||||| Direct current (DC) flows in only one direction.
|
What is on top of the poles on the roadside Wires carrying electric current
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Alternating current (AC) flows in two directions. ||||| The SI unit for electric current (or speed) is the ampere (A). ||||| This is the type of current that flows into your home through wires.
|
What is on top of the poles on the roadside Wires carrying electric current
|
Surely, you have noticed the tall poles along the roadside. ||||| Do you know what is on top of those poles? ||||| Thats right, wires that carry electric current.
|
What is on top of the poles on the roadside Wires
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Do you know what is on top of those poles? ||||| Electrons are able to move through wires. ||||| Direct current (DC) flows in only one direction.
|
What is on top of the poles on the roadside Wires
|
Alternating current (AC) flows in two directions. ||||| The SI unit for electric current (or speed) is the ampere (A). ||||| This is the type of current that flows into your home through wires.
|
What is on top of the poles on the roadside Wires
|
Surely, you have noticed the tall poles along the roadside. ||||| Do you know what is on top of those poles? ||||| Thats right, wires that carry electric current.
|
What is on top of the poles on the roadside Electric wires
|
Do you know what is on top of those poles? ||||| Electrons are able to move through wires. ||||| Direct current (DC) flows in only one direction.
|
What is on top of the poles on the roadside Electric wires
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Alternating current (AC) flows in two directions. ||||| The SI unit for electric current (or speed) is the ampere (A). ||||| This is the type of current that flows into your home through wires.
|
What is on top of the poles on the roadside Electric wires
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Surely, you have noticed the tall poles along the roadside. ||||| Do you know what is on top of those poles? ||||| Thats right, wires that carry electric current.
|
What is on top of the poles on the roadside Electricity wire
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Do you know what is on top of those poles? ||||| Electrons are able to move through wires. ||||| Direct current (DC) flows in only one direction.
|
What is on top of the poles on the roadside Electricity wire
|
Alternating current (AC) flows in two directions. ||||| The SI unit for electric current (or speed) is the ampere (A). ||||| This is the type of current that flows into your home through wires.
|
What is on top of the poles on the roadside Electricity wire
|
You may recall, an electron is the outer-most particle in an atom. ||||| They have a negative charge.
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What kind of charge does an electron have A negative charge
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You may recall, an electron is the outer-most particle in an atom. ||||| Direct current is what is used in devices like flashlights.
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What kind of charge does an electron have A negative charge
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This is the type of current that flows into your home through wires. ||||| Thats right, wires that carry electric current.
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What kind of charge does an electron have A negative charge
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You may recall, an electron is the outer-most particle in an atom. ||||| They have a negative charge.
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What kind of charge does an electron have Negative
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You may recall, an electron is the outer-most particle in an atom. ||||| Direct current is what is used in devices like flashlights.
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What kind of charge does an electron have Negative
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This is the type of current that flows into your home through wires. ||||| Thats right, wires that carry electric current.
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What kind of charge does an electron have Negative
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Electric current is actually the flow of electrons. ||||| They have a negative charge.
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Electric current is a flow of electrons. Do electrons have a negative or positive charge Negative Only
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Electric current is actually the flow of electrons. ||||| These wires carry electric current to your home.
|
Electric current is a flow of electrons. Do electrons have a negative or positive charge Negative Only
|
Direct current is what is used in devices like flashlights. ||||| Electric current may flow in just one direction, or it may keep reversing direction.
|
Electric current is a flow of electrons. Do electrons have a negative or positive charge Negative Only
|
Electric current is actually the flow of electrons. ||||| They have a negative charge.
|
Electric current is a flow of electrons. Do electrons have a negative or positive charge They have a negative charge
|
Electric current is actually the flow of electrons. ||||| These wires carry electric current to your home.
|
Electric current is a flow of electrons. Do electrons have a negative or positive charge They have a negative charge
|
Direct current is what is used in devices like flashlights. ||||| Electric current may flow in just one direction, or it may keep reversing direction.
|
Electric current is a flow of electrons. Do electrons have a negative or positive charge They have a negative charge
|
Direct current (DC) flows in only one direction. ||||| Alternating current (AC) flows in two directions.
|
What are two types of electric current AC and DC
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Direct current (DC) flows in only one direction. ||||| Ampere is often shortened to amp.
|
What are two types of electric current AC and DC
|
Electricity is the continuous flow of these particles. ||||| Ampere is often shortened to amp.
|
What are two types of electric current AC and DC
|
Direct current (DC) flows in only one direction. ||||| Alternating current (AC) flows in two directions.
|
What are two types of electric current Direct Current and Alternating Current
|
Direct current (DC) flows in only one direction. ||||| Ampere is often shortened to amp.
|
What are two types of electric current Direct Current and Alternating Current
|
Electricity is the continuous flow of these particles. ||||| Ampere is often shortened to amp.
|
What are two types of electric current Direct Current and Alternating Current
|
Direct current (DC) flows in only one direction. ||||| Alternating current (AC) flows in two directions.
|
What are two types of electric current Alternating current and direct current
|
Direct current (DC) flows in only one direction. ||||| Ampere is often shortened to amp.
|
What are two types of electric current Alternating current and direct current
|
Electricity is the continuous flow of these particles. ||||| Ampere is often shortened to amp.
|
What are two types of electric current Alternating current and direct current
|
Requirements for a Successful Attack As some of the core operatives prepared to leave for the United States, al Qaeda's leaders could have reflected on what they needed to be able to do in order to organize and conduct a complex international terrorist operation to inflict catastrophic harm. ||||| The information we have presented about the development of the planes operation shows how, by the spring and summer of 2000, al Qaeda was able to meet these requirements.
|
What requirements was Al Qaeda able to meet by spring and summer of 2000 Sufficient communications
|
Requirements for a Successful Attack As some of the core operatives prepared to leave for the United States, al Qaeda's leaders could have reflected on what they needed to be able to do in order to organize and conduct a complex international terrorist operation to inflict catastrophic harm. ||||| Our investigation has uncovered no credible evidence that any person in the United States gave the hijackers substantial financial assistance.
|
What requirements was Al Qaeda able to meet by spring and summer of 2000 Sufficient communications
|
We have found no evidence that the Hamburg cell members (Atta, Shehhi, Jarrah, and Binalshibh) received funds from al Qaeda before late 1999. ||||| Three of the four Hamburg cell members would soon arrive.
|
What requirements was Al Qaeda able to meet by spring and summer of 2000 Sufficient communications
|
Requirements for a Successful Attack As some of the core operatives prepared to leave for the United States, al Qaeda's leaders could have reflected on what they needed to be able to do in order to organize and conduct a complex international terrorist operation to inflict catastrophic harm. ||||| The information we have presented about the development of the planes operation shows how, by the spring and summer of 2000, al Qaeda was able to meet these requirements.
|
What requirements was Al Qaeda able to meet by spring and summer of 2000 Requirements to evaluate, approve, and supervise the planning and direction of the operation
|
Requirements for a Successful Attack As some of the core operatives prepared to leave for the United States, al Qaeda's leaders could have reflected on what they needed to be able to do in order to organize and conduct a complex international terrorist operation to inflict catastrophic harm. ||||| Our investigation has uncovered no credible evidence that any person in the United States gave the hijackers substantial financial assistance.
|
What requirements was Al Qaeda able to meet by spring and summer of 2000 Requirements to evaluate, approve, and supervise the planning and direction of the operation
|
We have found no evidence that the Hamburg cell members (Atta, Shehhi, Jarrah, and Binalshibh) received funds from al Qaeda before late 1999. ||||| Three of the four Hamburg cell members would soon arrive.
|
What requirements was Al Qaeda able to meet by spring and summer of 2000 Requirements to evaluate, approve, and supervise the planning and direction of the operation
|
Requirements for a Successful Attack As some of the core operatives prepared to leave for the United States, al Qaeda's leaders could have reflected on what they needed to be able to do in order to organize and conduct a complex international terrorist operation to inflict catastrophic harm. ||||| The information we have presented about the development of the planes operation shows how, by the spring and summer of 2000, al Qaeda was able to meet these requirements.
|
What requirements was Al Qaeda able to meet by spring and summer of 2000 Planning the operation
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Requirements for a Successful Attack As some of the core operatives prepared to leave for the United States, al Qaeda's leaders could have reflected on what they needed to be able to do in order to organize and conduct a complex international terrorist operation to inflict catastrophic harm. ||||| Our investigation has uncovered no credible evidence that any person in the United States gave the hijackers substantial financial assistance.
|
What requirements was Al Qaeda able to meet by spring and summer of 2000 Planning the operation
|
We have found no evidence that the Hamburg cell members (Atta, Shehhi, Jarrah, and Binalshibh) received funds from al Qaeda before late 1999. ||||| Three of the four Hamburg cell members would soon arrive.
|
What requirements was Al Qaeda able to meet by spring and summer of 2000 Planning the operation
|
Requirements for a Successful Attack As some of the core operatives prepared to leave for the United States, al Qaeda's leaders could have reflected on what they needed to be able to do in order to organize and conduct a complex international terrorist operation to inflict catastrophic harm. ||||| The information we have presented about the development of the planes operation shows how, by the spring and summer of 2000, al Qaeda was able to meet these requirements.
|
What requirements was Al Qaeda able to meet by spring and summer of 2000 Ability to move people
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Requirements for a Successful Attack As some of the core operatives prepared to leave for the United States, al Qaeda's leaders could have reflected on what they needed to be able to do in order to organize and conduct a complex international terrorist operation to inflict catastrophic harm. ||||| Our investigation has uncovered no credible evidence that any person in the United States gave the hijackers substantial financial assistance.
|
What requirements was Al Qaeda able to meet by spring and summer of 2000 Ability to move people
|
We have found no evidence that the Hamburg cell members (Atta, Shehhi, Jarrah, and Binalshibh) received funds from al Qaeda before late 1999. ||||| Three of the four Hamburg cell members would soon arrive.
|
What requirements was Al Qaeda able to meet by spring and summer of 2000 Ability to move people
|
Requirements for a Successful Attack As some of the core operatives prepared to leave for the United States, al Qaeda's leaders could have reflected on what they needed to be able to do in order to organize and conduct a complex international terrorist operation to inflict catastrophic harm. ||||| The information we have presented about the development of the planes operation shows how, by the spring and summer of 2000, al Qaeda was able to meet these requirements.
|
What requirements was Al Qaeda able to meet by spring and summer of 2000 "What they needed to be able to do in order to organize and conduct a complex international terrorist operation to inflict catastrophic harm."
|
Requirements for a Successful Attack As some of the core operatives prepared to leave for the United States, al Qaeda's leaders could have reflected on what they needed to be able to do in order to organize and conduct a complex international terrorist operation to inflict catastrophic harm. ||||| Our investigation has uncovered no credible evidence that any person in the United States gave the hijackers substantial financial assistance.
|
What requirements was Al Qaeda able to meet by spring and summer of 2000 "What they needed to be able to do in order to organize and conduct a complex international terrorist operation to inflict catastrophic harm."
|
We have found no evidence that the Hamburg cell members (Atta, Shehhi, Jarrah, and Binalshibh) received funds from al Qaeda before late 1999. ||||| Three of the four Hamburg cell members would soon arrive.
|
What requirements was Al Qaeda able to meet by spring and summer of 2000 "What they needed to be able to do in order to organize and conduct a complex international terrorist operation to inflict catastrophic harm."
|
As noted above, the 9/11 plotters spent somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 to plan and conduct their attack. ||||| The available evidence indicates that the 19 operatives were funded by al Qaeda, either through wire transfers or cash provided by KSM, which they carried into the United States or deposited in foreign accounts and accessed from this country. ||||| Our investigation has uncovered no credible evidence that any person in the United States gave the hijackers substantial financial assistance. ||||| Similarly, we have seen no evidence that any foreign government-or foreign government official-supplied any funding.
|
Where did money to fund the 9/11 plotters come from and where didn't it come from KSM
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Our investigation has uncovered no credible evidence that any person in the United States gave the hijackers substantial financial assistance. ||||| It appears they supported themselves. ||||| We have found no evidence that the Hamburg cell members (Atta, Shehhi, Jarrah, and Binalshibh) received funds from al Qaeda before late 1999. ||||| By late May 2000, two operatives assigned to the planes operation were already in the United States.
|
Where did money to fund the 9/11 plotters come from and where didn't it come from KSM
|
Requirements for a Successful Attack As some of the core operatives prepared to leave for the United States, al Qaeda's leaders could have reflected on what they needed to be able to do in order to organize and conduct a complex international terrorist operation to inflict catastrophic harm. ||||| We believe such a list of requirements would have included leaders able to evaluate, approve, and supervise the planning and direction of the operation; communications sufficient to enable planning and direction of the operatives and those who would be helping them; a personnel system that could recruit candidates, vet them, indoctrinate them, and give them necessary training; an intelligence effort to gather required information and form assessments of enemy strengths and weaknesses; the ability to move people; and the ability to raise and move the necessary money. ||||| By late May 2000, two operatives assigned to the planes operation were already in the United States. ||||| We have found no evidence that the Hamburg cell members (Atta, Shehhi, Jarrah, and Binalshibh) received funds from al Qaeda before late 1999.
|
Where did money to fund the 9/11 plotters come from and where didn't it come from KSM
|
As noted above, the 9/11 plotters spent somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 to plan and conduct their attack. ||||| The available evidence indicates that the 19 operatives were funded by al Qaeda, either through wire transfers or cash provided by KSM, which they carried into the United States or deposited in foreign accounts and accessed from this country. ||||| Our investigation has uncovered no credible evidence that any person in the United States gave the hijackers substantial financial assistance. ||||| Similarly, we have seen no evidence that any foreign government-or foreign government official-supplied any funding.
|
Where did money to fund the 9/11 plotters come from and where didn't it come from Al Qaeda
|
Our investigation has uncovered no credible evidence that any person in the United States gave the hijackers substantial financial assistance. ||||| It appears they supported themselves. ||||| We have found no evidence that the Hamburg cell members (Atta, Shehhi, Jarrah, and Binalshibh) received funds from al Qaeda before late 1999. ||||| By late May 2000, two operatives assigned to the planes operation were already in the United States.
|
Where did money to fund the 9/11 plotters come from and where didn't it come from Al Qaeda
|
Requirements for a Successful Attack As some of the core operatives prepared to leave for the United States, al Qaeda's leaders could have reflected on what they needed to be able to do in order to organize and conduct a complex international terrorist operation to inflict catastrophic harm. ||||| We believe such a list of requirements would have included leaders able to evaluate, approve, and supervise the planning and direction of the operation; communications sufficient to enable planning and direction of the operatives and those who would be helping them; a personnel system that could recruit candidates, vet them, indoctrinate them, and give them necessary training; an intelligence effort to gather required information and form assessments of enemy strengths and weaknesses; the ability to move people; and the ability to raise and move the necessary money. ||||| By late May 2000, two operatives assigned to the planes operation were already in the United States. ||||| We have found no evidence that the Hamburg cell members (Atta, Shehhi, Jarrah, and Binalshibh) received funds from al Qaeda before late 1999.
|
Where did money to fund the 9/11 plotters come from and where didn't it come from Al Qaeda
|
As noted above, the 9/11 plotters spent somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 to plan and conduct their attack. ||||| The available evidence indicates that the 19 operatives were funded by al Qaeda, either through wire transfers or cash provided by KSM, which they carried into the United States or deposited in foreign accounts and accessed from this country. ||||| Our investigation has uncovered no credible evidence that any person in the United States gave the hijackers substantial financial assistance. ||||| Similarly, we have seen no evidence that any foreign government-or foreign government official-supplied any funding.
|
Where did money to fund the 9/11 plotters come from and where didn't it come from From Al Queda. Not from any foreign government-or foreign government official
|
Our investigation has uncovered no credible evidence that any person in the United States gave the hijackers substantial financial assistance. ||||| It appears they supported themselves. ||||| We have found no evidence that the Hamburg cell members (Atta, Shehhi, Jarrah, and Binalshibh) received funds from al Qaeda before late 1999. ||||| By late May 2000, two operatives assigned to the planes operation were already in the United States.
|
Where did money to fund the 9/11 plotters come from and where didn't it come from From Al Queda. Not from any foreign government-or foreign government official
|
Requirements for a Successful Attack As some of the core operatives prepared to leave for the United States, al Qaeda's leaders could have reflected on what they needed to be able to do in order to organize and conduct a complex international terrorist operation to inflict catastrophic harm. ||||| We believe such a list of requirements would have included leaders able to evaluate, approve, and supervise the planning and direction of the operation; communications sufficient to enable planning and direction of the operatives and those who would be helping them; a personnel system that could recruit candidates, vet them, indoctrinate them, and give them necessary training; an intelligence effort to gather required information and form assessments of enemy strengths and weaknesses; the ability to move people; and the ability to raise and move the necessary money. ||||| By late May 2000, two operatives assigned to the planes operation were already in the United States. ||||| We have found no evidence that the Hamburg cell members (Atta, Shehhi, Jarrah, and Binalshibh) received funds from al Qaeda before late 1999.
|
Where did money to fund the 9/11 plotters come from and where didn't it come from From Al Queda. Not from any foreign government-or foreign government official
|
As noted above, the 9/11 plotters spent somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 to plan and conduct their attack. ||||| The available evidence indicates that the 19 operatives were funded by al Qaeda, either through wire transfers or cash provided by KSM, which they carried into the United States or deposited in foreign accounts and accessed from this country. ||||| Our investigation has uncovered no credible evidence that any person in the United States gave the hijackers substantial financial assistance. ||||| Similarly, we have seen no evidence that any foreign government-or foreign government official-supplied any funding.
|
Where did money to fund the 9/11 plotters come from and where didn't it come from 19 operatives were funded by al Qaeda, either through wire transfers or cash provided by KSM, which they carried into the United States or deposited in foreign accounts and accessed from this country, no credible evidence that any person in the United States gave the hijackers substantial financial assistance, no evidence that any foreign government-or foreign government official-supplied any funding
|
Our investigation has uncovered no credible evidence that any person in the United States gave the hijackers substantial financial assistance. ||||| It appears they supported themselves. ||||| We have found no evidence that the Hamburg cell members (Atta, Shehhi, Jarrah, and Binalshibh) received funds from al Qaeda before late 1999. ||||| By late May 2000, two operatives assigned to the planes operation were already in the United States.
|
Where did money to fund the 9/11 plotters come from and where didn't it come from 19 operatives were funded by al Qaeda, either through wire transfers or cash provided by KSM, which they carried into the United States or deposited in foreign accounts and accessed from this country, no credible evidence that any person in the United States gave the hijackers substantial financial assistance, no evidence that any foreign government-or foreign government official-supplied any funding
|
Requirements for a Successful Attack As some of the core operatives prepared to leave for the United States, al Qaeda's leaders could have reflected on what they needed to be able to do in order to organize and conduct a complex international terrorist operation to inflict catastrophic harm. ||||| We believe such a list of requirements would have included leaders able to evaluate, approve, and supervise the planning and direction of the operation; communications sufficient to enable planning and direction of the operatives and those who would be helping them; a personnel system that could recruit candidates, vet them, indoctrinate them, and give them necessary training; an intelligence effort to gather required information and form assessments of enemy strengths and weaknesses; the ability to move people; and the ability to raise and move the necessary money. ||||| By late May 2000, two operatives assigned to the planes operation were already in the United States. ||||| We have found no evidence that the Hamburg cell members (Atta, Shehhi, Jarrah, and Binalshibh) received funds from al Qaeda before late 1999.
|
Where did money to fund the 9/11 plotters come from and where didn't it come from 19 operatives were funded by al Qaeda, either through wire transfers or cash provided by KSM, which they carried into the United States or deposited in foreign accounts and accessed from this country, no credible evidence that any person in the United States gave the hijackers substantial financial assistance, no evidence that any foreign government-or foreign government official-supplied any funding
|
Requirements for a Successful Attack As some of the core operatives prepared to leave for the United States, al Qaeda's leaders could have reflected on what they needed to be able to do in order to organize and conduct a complex international terrorist operation to inflict catastrophic harm. ||||| We believe such a list of requirements would have included leaders able to evaluate, approve, and supervise the planning and direction of the operation; communications sufficient to enable planning and direction of the operatives and those who would be helping them; a personnel system that could recruit candidates, vet them, indoctrinate them, and give them necessary training; an intelligence effort to gather required information and form assessments of enemy strengths and weaknesses; the ability to move people; and the ability to raise and move the necessary money. ||||| The information we have presented about the development of the planes operation shows how, by the spring and summer of 2000, al Qaeda was able to meet these requirements.
|
By what period was al-Qaeda able to meet the requirements for a successful attack Summer of 2000
|
The information we have presented about the development of the planes operation shows how, by the spring and summer of 2000, al Qaeda was able to meet these requirements. ||||| Financial transactions of the plotters are discussed in more detail in chapter 7. ||||| KSM, Binalshibh, and another plot facilitator, Mustafa al Hawsawi, each received money, in some cases perhaps as much as $10,000, to perform their roles in the plot.
|
By what period was al-Qaeda able to meet the requirements for a successful attack Summer of 2000
|
We have found no evidence that the Hamburg cell members (Atta, Shehhi, Jarrah, and Binalshibh) received funds from al Qaeda before late 1999. ||||| Our knowledge of the funding during this period, before the operatives entered the United States, remains murky. ||||| By late May 2000, two operatives assigned to the planes operation were already in the United States.
|
By what period was al-Qaeda able to meet the requirements for a successful attack Summer of 2000
|
Requirements for a Successful Attack As some of the core operatives prepared to leave for the United States, al Qaeda's leaders could have reflected on what they needed to be able to do in order to organize and conduct a complex international terrorist operation to inflict catastrophic harm. ||||| We believe such a list of requirements would have included leaders able to evaluate, approve, and supervise the planning and direction of the operation; communications sufficient to enable planning and direction of the operatives and those who would be helping them; a personnel system that could recruit candidates, vet them, indoctrinate them, and give them necessary training; an intelligence effort to gather required information and form assessments of enemy strengths and weaknesses; the ability to move people; and the ability to raise and move the necessary money. ||||| The information we have presented about the development of the planes operation shows how, by the spring and summer of 2000, al Qaeda was able to meet these requirements.
|
By what period was al-Qaeda able to meet the requirements for a successful attack By the spring and summer of 2000
|
The information we have presented about the development of the planes operation shows how, by the spring and summer of 2000, al Qaeda was able to meet these requirements. ||||| Financial transactions of the plotters are discussed in more detail in chapter 7. ||||| KSM, Binalshibh, and another plot facilitator, Mustafa al Hawsawi, each received money, in some cases perhaps as much as $10,000, to perform their roles in the plot.
|
By what period was al-Qaeda able to meet the requirements for a successful attack By the spring and summer of 2000
|
We have found no evidence that the Hamburg cell members (Atta, Shehhi, Jarrah, and Binalshibh) received funds from al Qaeda before late 1999. ||||| Our knowledge of the funding during this period, before the operatives entered the United States, remains murky. ||||| By late May 2000, two operatives assigned to the planes operation were already in the United States.
|
By what period was al-Qaeda able to meet the requirements for a successful attack By the spring and summer of 2000
|
Our investigation has uncovered no credible evidence that any person in the United States gave the hijackers substantial financial assistance. ||||| Similarly, we have seen no evidence that any foreign government-or foreign government official-supplied any funding.
|
What did the investigators conclude in terms of government funding for the terror attacks Our investigation has uncovered no credible evidence that any person in the United States gave the hijackers substantial financial assistance.Similarly, we have seen no evidence that any foreign government-or foreign government official-supplied any funding
|
Our investigation has uncovered no credible evidence that any person in the United States gave the hijackers substantial financial assistance. ||||| Three of the four Hamburg cell members would soon arrive.
|
What did the investigators conclude in terms of government funding for the terror attacks Our investigation has uncovered no credible evidence that any person in the United States gave the hijackers substantial financial assistance.Similarly, we have seen no evidence that any foreign government-or foreign government official-supplied any funding
|
We have found no evidence that the Hamburg cell members (Atta, Shehhi, Jarrah, and Binalshibh) received funds from al Qaeda before late 1999. ||||| Three of the four Hamburg cell members would soon arrive.
|
What did the investigators conclude in terms of government funding for the terror attacks Our investigation has uncovered no credible evidence that any person in the United States gave the hijackers substantial financial assistance.Similarly, we have seen no evidence that any foreign government-or foreign government official-supplied any funding
|
Our investigation has uncovered no credible evidence that any person in the United States gave the hijackers substantial financial assistance. ||||| Similarly, we have seen no evidence that any foreign government-or foreign government official-supplied any funding.
|
What did the investigators conclude in terms of government funding for the terror attacks No government funded for the attack
|
Our investigation has uncovered no credible evidence that any person in the United States gave the hijackers substantial financial assistance. ||||| Three of the four Hamburg cell members would soon arrive.
|
What did the investigators conclude in terms of government funding for the terror attacks No government funded for the attack
|
We have found no evidence that the Hamburg cell members (Atta, Shehhi, Jarrah, and Binalshibh) received funds from al Qaeda before late 1999. ||||| Three of the four Hamburg cell members would soon arrive.
|
What did the investigators conclude in terms of government funding for the terror attacks No government funded for the attack
|
Our investigation has uncovered no credible evidence that any person in the United States gave the hijackers substantial financial assistance. ||||| Similarly, we have seen no evidence that any foreign government-or foreign government official-supplied any funding.
|
What did the investigators conclude in terms of government funding for the terror attacks Foriegn government didn't fund anything
|
Our investigation has uncovered no credible evidence that any person in the United States gave the hijackers substantial financial assistance. ||||| Three of the four Hamburg cell members would soon arrive.
|
What did the investigators conclude in terms of government funding for the terror attacks Foriegn government didn't fund anything
|
We have found no evidence that the Hamburg cell members (Atta, Shehhi, Jarrah, and Binalshibh) received funds from al Qaeda before late 1999. ||||| Three of the four Hamburg cell members would soon arrive.
|
What did the investigators conclude in terms of government funding for the terror attacks Foriegn government didn't fund anything
|
We have found no evidence that the Hamburg cell members (Atta, Shehhi, Jarrah, and Binalshibh) received funds from al Qaeda before late 1999. ||||| It appears they supported themselves.
|
Who supported themselves before Al Qaeda began giving them funding in late 1999 Hamburg cell members
|
It appears they supported themselves. ||||| Financial transactions of the plotters are discussed in more detail in chapter 7.
|
Who supported themselves before Al Qaeda began giving them funding in late 1999 Hamburg cell members
|
Our investigation has uncovered no credible evidence that any person in the United States gave the hijackers substantial financial assistance. ||||| Requirements for a Successful Attack As some of the core operatives prepared to leave for the United States, al Qaeda's leaders could have reflected on what they needed to be able to do in order to organize and conduct a complex international terrorist operation to inflict catastrophic harm.
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Who supported themselves before Al Qaeda began giving them funding in late 1999 Hamburg cell members
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We have found no evidence that the Hamburg cell members (Atta, Shehhi, Jarrah, and Binalshibh) received funds from al Qaeda before late 1999. ||||| It appears they supported themselves.
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Who supported themselves before Al Qaeda began giving them funding in late 1999 Hamburg
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It appears they supported themselves. ||||| Financial transactions of the plotters are discussed in more detail in chapter 7.
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Who supported themselves before Al Qaeda began giving them funding in late 1999 Hamburg
|
Our investigation has uncovered no credible evidence that any person in the United States gave the hijackers substantial financial assistance. ||||| Requirements for a Successful Attack As some of the core operatives prepared to leave for the United States, al Qaeda's leaders could have reflected on what they needed to be able to do in order to organize and conduct a complex international terrorist operation to inflict catastrophic harm.
|
Who supported themselves before Al Qaeda began giving them funding in late 1999 Hamburg
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By late May 2000, two operatives assigned to the planes operation were already in the United States. ||||| Three of the four Hamburg cell members would soon arrive.
|
When did al Qaeda members plotting the 9/11 attacks arrive in the U.S. By late May 2000, two operatives assigned to the planes operation were already in the United States. Three of the four Hamburg cell members would soon arrive
|
By late May 2000, two operatives assigned to the planes operation were already in the United States. ||||| According to KSM, the Hamburg cell members each received $5,000 to pay for their return to Germany from Afghanistan after they had been selected to join the plot, and they received additional funds for travel from Germany to the United States.
|
When did al Qaeda members plotting the 9/11 attacks arrive in the U.S. By late May 2000, two operatives assigned to the planes operation were already in the United States. Three of the four Hamburg cell members would soon arrive
|
After the Hamburg recruits joined the 9/11 conspiracy, al Qaeda began giving them money. ||||| KSM, Binalshibh, and another plot facilitator, Mustafa al Hawsawi, each received money, in some cases perhaps as much as $10,000, to perform their roles in the plot.
|
When did al Qaeda members plotting the 9/11 attacks arrive in the U.S. By late May 2000, two operatives assigned to the planes operation were already in the United States. Three of the four Hamburg cell members would soon arrive
|
By late May 2000, two operatives assigned to the planes operation were already in the United States. ||||| Three of the four Hamburg cell members would soon arrive.
|
When did al Qaeda members plotting the 9/11 attacks arrive in the U.S. By late May 2000
|
By late May 2000, two operatives assigned to the planes operation were already in the United States. ||||| According to KSM, the Hamburg cell members each received $5,000 to pay for their return to Germany from Afghanistan after they had been selected to join the plot, and they received additional funds for travel from Germany to the United States.
|
When did al Qaeda members plotting the 9/11 attacks arrive in the U.S. By late May 2000
|
After the Hamburg recruits joined the 9/11 conspiracy, al Qaeda began giving them money. ||||| KSM, Binalshibh, and another plot facilitator, Mustafa al Hawsawi, each received money, in some cases perhaps as much as $10,000, to perform their roles in the plot.
|
When did al Qaeda members plotting the 9/11 attacks arrive in the U.S. By late May 2000
|
By late May 2000, two operatives assigned to the planes operation were already in the United States. ||||| Three of the four Hamburg cell members would soon arrive.
|
When did al Qaeda members plotting the 9/11 attacks arrive in the U.S. May 2000
|
By late May 2000, two operatives assigned to the planes operation were already in the United States. ||||| According to KSM, the Hamburg cell members each received $5,000 to pay for their return to Germany from Afghanistan after they had been selected to join the plot, and they received additional funds for travel from Germany to the United States.
|
When did al Qaeda members plotting the 9/11 attacks arrive in the U.S. May 2000
|
After the Hamburg recruits joined the 9/11 conspiracy, al Qaeda began giving them money. ||||| KSM, Binalshibh, and another plot facilitator, Mustafa al Hawsawi, each received money, in some cases perhaps as much as $10,000, to perform their roles in the plot.
|
When did al Qaeda members plotting the 9/11 attacks arrive in the U.S. May 2000
|
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