Type stringclasses 20
values | Text stringlengths 1 236 | Score float64 0.22 0.96 | Original Sentence ID int64 0 6.64k | Original Sentence stringlengths 6 383 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 16.8k |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
APT | B-Hack | 0.918103 | 1,100 | Last year, B- researchers described B-Hack's behavior as unusual: " unlike many B-Hack I-Hack, which typically gather information for monetary gain or B- espionage, B-Hack and B-Hack appear to launch B- simply to gather information about certain individuals . | 2,928 |
MAL | B- | 0.879879 | 1,100 | Last year, B- researchers described B-Hack's behavior as unusual: " unlike many B-Hack I-Hack, which typically gather information for monetary gain or B- espionage, B-Hack and B-Hack appear to launch B- simply to gather information about certain individuals . | 2,929 |
SECTEAM | Kaspersky | 0.912594 | 1,101 | The discovery by Kaspersky marks at least the fifth zero-day exploit used by B-Hack and exposed by security researchers since June 2015 . | 2,930 |
VULNAME | zero-day exploit | 0.71342 | 1,101 | The discovery by Kaspersky marks at least the fifth zero-day exploit used by B-Hack and exposed by security researchers since June 2015 . | 2,931 |
APT | B-Hack | 0.572799 | 1,101 | The discovery by Kaspersky marks at least the fifth zero-day exploit used by B-Hack and exposed by security researchers since June 2015 . | 2,932 |
TIME | June 2015 | 0.923993 | 1,101 | The discovery by Kaspersky marks at least the fifth zero-day exploit used by B-Hack and exposed by security researchers since June 2015 . | 2,933 |
ACT | B-Hack | 0.552014 | 1,102 | Victims of B-Hack have been observed in the following countries: Russia, Iraq, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Libya, Jordan, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Netherlands, Bahrain, United Kingdom and Angola . | 2,934 |
LOC | Russia, Iraq, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Libya, Jordan, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Netherlands, Bahrain, United Kingdom | 0.910381 | 1,102 | Victims of B-Hack have been observed in the following countries: Russia, Iraq, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Libya, Jordan, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Netherlands, Bahrain, United Kingdom and Angola . | 2,935 |
LOC | Angola | 0.919375 | 1,102 | Victims of B-Hack have been observed in the following countries: Russia, Iraq, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Libya, Jordan, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Netherlands, Bahrain, United Kingdom and Angola . | 2,936 |
ACT | B-Hack I-Hack, | 0.55783 | 1,103 | Unlike many B-Hack I-Hack, which typically gather information for monetary gain or B- espionage, B-Hack and B-Hack appear to launch B- simply to gather information about certain individuals . | 2,937 |
ACT | B-Hack | 0.604185 | 1,103 | Unlike many B-Hack I-Hack, which typically gather information for monetary gain or B- espionage, B-Hack and B-Hack appear to launch B- simply to gather information about certain individuals . | 2,938 |
ACT | B- | 0.64025 | 1,103 | Unlike many B-Hack I-Hack, which typically gather information for monetary gain or B- espionage, B-Hack and B-Hack appear to launch B- simply to gather information about certain individuals . | 2,940 |
APT | B-Hack's | 0.892757 | 1,104 | A cursory review of B-Hack' B- I- suggests there is some overlap between the B-Hack's actions and Saudi Arabia's B- interests . | 2,941 |
LOC | Saudi Arabia's | 0.910878 | 1,104 | A cursory review of B-Hack' B- I- suggests there is some overlap between the B-Hack's actions and Saudi Arabia's B- interests . | 2,942 |
SECTEAM | Kaspersky's | 0.902989 | 1,105 | Kaspersky's research notes that B-Hack hacked into computers based in Saudi Arabia . | 2,943 |
APT | B-Hack | 0.9122 | 1,105 | Kaspersky's research notes that B-Hack hacked into computers based in Saudi Arabia . | 2,944 |
LOC | Saudi Arabia | 0.882232 | 1,105 | Kaspersky's research notes that B-Hack hacked into computers based in Saudi Arabia . | 2,945 |
SECTEAM | Kaspersky | 0.909415 | 1,106 | All 13 countries where Kaspersky reportedly observed B- I- are connected to Saudi Arabia in one of three ways: economically; from a national security perspective; or due to established policy agreements . | 2,946 |
LOC | Saudi Arabia | 0.878133 | 1,106 | All 13 countries where Kaspersky reportedly observed B- I- are connected to Saudi Arabia in one of three ways: economically; from a national security perspective; or due to established policy agreements . | 2,947 |
SECTEAM | McAfee | 0.913933 | 1,107 | The B- I-, named by McAfee and announced in January 2010, and the WikiLeaks document disclosures of 2010 have highlighted the fact that external and internal threats are nearly impossible to prevent . | 2,948 |
TIME | January 2010, | 0.921263 | 1,107 | The B- I-, named by McAfee and announced in January 2010, and the WikiLeaks document disclosures of 2010 have highlighted the fact that external and internal threats are nearly impossible to prevent . | 2,949 |
SECTEAM | WikiLeaks | 0.858833 | 1,107 | The B- I-, named by McAfee and announced in January 2010, and the WikiLeaks document disclosures of 2010 have highlighted the fact that external and internal threats are nearly impossible to prevent . | 2,950 |
TIME | 2010 | 0.918622 | 1,107 | The B- I-, named by McAfee and announced in January 2010, and the WikiLeaks document disclosures of 2010 have highlighted the fact that external and internal threats are nearly impossible to prevent . | 2,951 |
IDTY | Microsoft | 0.906974 | 1,108 | These B- have involved B- I-, B- I-, exploitation of Microsoft Windows operating systems vulnerabilities, Microsoft Active Directory compromises, and the use of remote administration tools (RATs) in targeting and harvesting sensitive competitive proprietary operations and project-financing information with regard to B-... | 2,952 |
OS | Windows | 0.747189 | 1,108 | These B- have involved B- I-, B- I-, exploitation of Microsoft Windows operating systems vulnerabilities, Microsoft Active Directory compromises, and the use of remote administration tools (RATs) in targeting and harvesting sensitive competitive proprietary operations and project-financing information with regard to B-... | 2,953 |
MAL | remote administration tools (RATs) | 0.76831 | 1,108 | These B- have involved B- I-, B- I-, exploitation of Microsoft Windows operating systems vulnerabilities, Microsoft Active Directory compromises, and the use of remote administration tools (RATs) in targeting and harvesting sensitive competitive proprietary operations and project-financing information with regard to B-... | 2,955 |
OS | Windows | 0.830275 | 1,109 | B-Hack I-Hack's B- have involved B- I-, B- I-, exploitation of Microsoft Windows operating systems vulnerabilities, Microsoft Active Directory compromises, and the use of remote administration tools (RATs) in targeting and harvesting sensitive competitive proprietary operations and project-financing information with re... | 2,957 |
IDTY | Microsoft | 0.897452 | 1,109 | B-Hack I-Hack's B- have involved B- I-, B- I-, exploitation of Microsoft Windows operating systems vulnerabilities, Microsoft Active Directory compromises, and the use of remote administration tools (RATs) in targeting and harvesting sensitive competitive proprietary operations and project-financing information with re... | 2,958 |
MAL | remote administration tools (RATs) | 0.840941 | 1,109 | B-Hack I-Hack's B- have involved B- I-, B- I-, exploitation of Microsoft Windows operating systems vulnerabilities, Microsoft Active Directory compromises, and the use of remote administration tools (RATs) in targeting and harvesting sensitive competitive proprietary operations and project-financing information with re... | 2,959 |
ACT | B-Hack I-Hack | 0.668149 | 1,110 | We have identified the tools, techniques, and B- I- used in these continuing attacks—which we have dubbed B-Hack I-Hack originating primarily in China . | 2,960 |
LOC | China | 0.906299 | 1,110 | We have identified the tools, techniques, and B- I- used in these continuing attacks—which we have dubbed B-Hack I-Hack originating primarily in China . | 2,961 |
APT | B-Hack | 0.571478 | 1,111 | B-Hack using several locations in China have leveraged C&C servers on purchased hosted services in the United States and compromised servers in the Netherlands to wage B- against global B-, B-, and B- I-, as well as individuals and B- in Kazakhstan, Taiwan, Greece, and the United States to acquire proprietary and highl... | 2,962 |
LOC | China | 0.901764 | 1,111 | B-Hack using several locations in China have leveraged C&C servers on purchased hosted services in the United States and compromised servers in the Netherlands to wage B- against global B-, B-, and B- I-, as well as individuals and B- in Kazakhstan, Taiwan, Greece, and the United States to acquire proprietary and highl... | 2,963 |
TOOL | C&C | 0.905678 | 1,111 | B-Hack using several locations in China have leveraged C&C servers on purchased hosted services in the United States and compromised servers in the Netherlands to wage B- against global B-, B-, and B- I-, as well as individuals and B- in Kazakhstan, Taiwan, Greece, and the United States to acquire proprietary and highl... | 2,964 |
LOC | United States | 0.908438 | 1,111 | B-Hack using several locations in China have leveraged C&C servers on purchased hosted services in the United States and compromised servers in the Netherlands to wage B- against global B-, B-, and B- I-, as well as individuals and B- in Kazakhstan, Taiwan, Greece, and the United States to acquire proprietary and highl... | 2,965 |
LOC | Netherlands | 0.869151 | 1,111 | B-Hack using several locations in China have leveraged C&C servers on purchased hosted services in the United States and compromised servers in the Netherlands to wage B- against global B-, B-, and B- I-, as well as individuals and B- in Kazakhstan, Taiwan, Greece, and the United States to acquire proprietary and highl... | 2,966 |
LOC | Kazakhstan, Taiwan, Greece, | 0.91733 | 1,111 | B-Hack using several locations in China have leveraged C&C servers on purchased hosted services in the United States and compromised servers in the Netherlands to wage B- against global B-, B-, and B- I-, as well as individuals and B- in Kazakhstan, Taiwan, Greece, and the United States to acquire proprietary and highl... | 2,967 |
APT | B-Hack | 0.571478 | 1,112 | B-Hack using several locations in China have leveraged C&C servers on purchased hosted services in the United States and compromised servers in the Netherlands to wage B- against global B-, B-, and B- I-, as well as individuals and B- in Kazakhstan, Taiwan, Greece, and the United States to acquire proprietary and highl... | 2,969 |
LOC | China | 0.901764 | 1,112 | B-Hack using several locations in China have leveraged C&C servers on purchased hosted services in the United States and compromised servers in the Netherlands to wage B- against global B-, B-, and B- I-, as well as individuals and B- in Kazakhstan, Taiwan, Greece, and the United States to acquire proprietary and highl... | 2,970 |
TOOL | C&C | 0.905678 | 1,112 | B-Hack using several locations in China have leveraged C&C servers on purchased hosted services in the United States and compromised servers in the Netherlands to wage B- against global B-, B-, and B- I-, as well as individuals and B- in Kazakhstan, Taiwan, Greece, and the United States to acquire proprietary and highl... | 2,971 |
LOC | United States | 0.908438 | 1,112 | B-Hack using several locations in China have leveraged C&C servers on purchased hosted services in the United States and compromised servers in the Netherlands to wage B- against global B-, B-, and B- I-, as well as individuals and B- in Kazakhstan, Taiwan, Greece, and the United States to acquire proprietary and highl... | 2,972 |
LOC | Netherlands | 0.869151 | 1,112 | B-Hack using several locations in China have leveraged C&C servers on purchased hosted services in the United States and compromised servers in the Netherlands to wage B- against global B-, B-, and B- I-, as well as individuals and B- in Kazakhstan, Taiwan, Greece, and the United States to acquire proprietary and highl... | 2,973 |
LOC | Kazakhstan, Taiwan, Greece, | 0.91733 | 1,112 | B-Hack using several locations in China have leveraged C&C servers on purchased hosted services in the United States and compromised servers in the Netherlands to wage B- against global B-, B-, and B- I-, as well as individuals and B- in Kazakhstan, Taiwan, Greece, and the United States to acquire proprietary and highl... | 2,974 |
MAL | RAT tools | 0.853136 | 1,113 | The primary operational technique used by B-Hack I-Hack comprised a variety of hacker tools, including privately developed and customized RAT tools that provided complete remote administration capabilities to the B-Hack . | 2,976 |
ACT | B-Hack | 0.860939 | 1,115 | In addition, the B-Hack employed hacking tools of Chinese origin and that are prevalent on Chinese underground hacking forums . | 2,977 |
LOC | Chinese | 0.864513 | 1,115 | In addition, the B-Hack employed hacking tools of Chinese origin and that are prevalent on Chinese underground hacking forums . | 2,979 |
SECTEAM | Unit 42 | 0.781341 | 1,116 | We have been presented with a rare opportunity to see some B- I- from the B-Hack associated with the B- I- I-, a B- Unit 42 has been following since May 2016 . | 2,980 |
TIME | May 2016 | 0.922459 | 1,116 | We have been presented with a rare opportunity to see some B- I- from the B-Hack associated with the B- I- I-, a B- Unit 42 has been following since May 2016 . | 2,981 |
APT | B-Hack | 0.914831 | 1,117 | Recently we were able to observe these B-Hack making modifications to their Clayslide delivery documents in an attempt to evade antivirus detection . | 2,982 |
MAL | Clayslide delivery documents | 0.887661 | 1,117 | Recently we were able to observe these B-Hack making modifications to their Clayslide delivery documents in an attempt to evade antivirus detection . | 2,983 |
MAL | Clayslide samples | 0.895514 | 1,118 | We collected two sets of Clayslide samples that appear to be created during the B-Hack I-Hack's development phase of their B- lifecycle . | 2,984 |
TIME | November 15, 2016, | 0.932978 | 1,119 | On November 15, 2016, an B-Hack related to the B- I- began testing the Clayslide delivery documents . | 2,985 |
MAL | Clayslide delivery documents | 0.870636 | 1,119 | On November 15, 2016, an B-Hack related to the B- I- began testing the Clayslide delivery documents . | 2,986 |
ACT | B-Hack | 0.436046 | 1,120 | The B-Hack then made subtle modifications to the file and uploaded the newly created file to the same popular antivirus testing website in order to determine how to evade detection . | 2,987 |
ACT | Excel worksheets | 0.92055 | 1,121 | In addition to making changes to the Excel worksheets that contain the decoy content, the B-Hack also made changes to the worksheet that is initially displayed to the user . | 2,988 |
ACT | B-Hack | 0.522436 | 1,121 | In addition to making changes to the Excel worksheets that contain the decoy content, the B-Hack also made changes to the worksheet that is initially displayed to the user . | 2,989 |
SECTEAM | B-Hack | 0.44791 | 1,122 | Taking a step back, as discussed in the Appendix in our initial B-Hack blog, Clayslide delivery documents initially open with a worksheet named " Incompatible " that displays content that instructs the user to " Enable Content " to see the contents of the document, which in fact runs the malicious macro and compromises... | 2,990 |
FILE | Clayslide delivery documents | 0.909114 | 1,122 | Taking a step back, as discussed in the Appendix in our initial B-Hack blog, Clayslide delivery documents initially open with a worksheet named " Incompatible " that displays content that instructs the user to " Enable Content " to see the contents of the document, which in fact runs the malicious macro and compromises... | 2,991 |
MAL | delivery | 0.577258 | 1,123 | This realization suggests that the B-Hack B-Hack I-Hack will continue to use their delivery documents for extended periods with subtle modifications to remain effective . | 2,992 |
LOC | Iranian | 0.876337 | 1,124 | Iranian threat agent B-Hack has been targeting multiple organisations in Israel and other countries in the Middle East since the end of 2015 . | 2,993 |
APT | B-Hack | 0.76737 | 1,124 | Iranian threat agent B-Hack has been targeting multiple organisations in Israel and other countries in the Middle East since the end of 2015 . | 2,994 |
LOC | Israel | 0.903325 | 1,124 | Iranian threat agent B-Hack has been targeting multiple organisations in Israel and other countries in the Middle East since the end of 2015 . | 2,995 |
LOC | Middle East | 0.858821 | 1,124 | Iranian threat agent B-Hack has been targeting multiple organisations in Israel and other countries in the Middle East since the end of 2015 . | 2,996 |
TIME | end of 2015 | 0.919465 | 1,124 | Iranian threat agent B-Hack has been targeting multiple organisations in Israel and other countries in the Middle East since the end of 2015 . | 2,997 |
MAL | VPN Web Portal | 0.876434 | 1,125 | In recent B- they set up a fake VPN Web Portal and targeted at least five Israeli B- I-, several B- I-, and the B- I- I- . | 2,998 |
MAL | stolen code signing certificate | 0.903576 | 1,126 | In these websites they hosted malware that was digitally signed with a valid, likely stolen code signing certificate . | 2,999 |
TIME | December 2015, | 0.930289 | 1,127 | In December 2015, Symantec published a post about " two Iran-based B-Hack I-Hack that appear to be connected, B-Hack and B-Hack " that " have been using Backdoor.Cadelspy and Backdoor.Remexi to spy on Iranian individuals and Middle Eastern organizations " . | 3,000 |
SECTEAM | Symantec | 0.916631 | 1,127 | In December 2015, Symantec published a post about " two Iran-based B-Hack I-Hack that appear to be connected, B-Hack and B-Hack " that " have been using Backdoor.Cadelspy and Backdoor.Remexi to spy on Iranian individuals and Middle Eastern organizations " . | 3,001 |
LOC | Iran-based | 0.919348 | 1,127 | In December 2015, Symantec published a post about " two Iran-based B-Hack I-Hack that appear to be connected, B-Hack and B-Hack " that " have been using Backdoor.Cadelspy and Backdoor.Remexi to spy on Iranian individuals and Middle Eastern organizations " . | 3,002 |
APT | B-Hack I-Hack | 0.802896 | 1,127 | In December 2015, Symantec published a post about " two Iran-based B-Hack I-Hack that appear to be connected, B-Hack and B-Hack " that " have been using Backdoor.Cadelspy and Backdoor.Remexi to spy on Iranian individuals and Middle Eastern organizations " . | 3,003 |
APT | B-Hack | 0.915571 | 1,127 | In December 2015, Symantec published a post about " two Iran-based B-Hack I-Hack that appear to be connected, B-Hack and B-Hack " that " have been using Backdoor.Cadelspy and Backdoor.Remexi to spy on Iranian individuals and Middle Eastern organizations " . | 3,004 |
MAL | Backdoor.Cadelspy | 0.921979 | 1,127 | In December 2015, Symantec published a post about " two Iran-based B-Hack I-Hack that appear to be connected, B-Hack and B-Hack " that " have been using Backdoor.Cadelspy and Backdoor.Remexi to spy on Iranian individuals and Middle Eastern organizations " . | 3,006 |
MAL | Backdoor.Remexi | 0.924251 | 1,127 | In December 2015, Symantec published a post about " two Iran-based B-Hack I-Hack that appear to be connected, B-Hack and B-Hack " that " have been using Backdoor.Cadelspy and Backdoor.Remexi to spy on Iranian individuals and Middle Eastern organizations " . | 3,007 |
LOC | Iranian | 0.909656 | 1,127 | In December 2015, Symantec published a post about " two Iran-based B-Hack I-Hack that appear to be connected, B-Hack and B-Hack " that " have been using Backdoor.Cadelspy and Backdoor.Remexi to spy on Iranian individuals and Middle Eastern organizations " . | 3,008 |
LOC | Middle Eastern | 0.905891 | 1,127 | In December 2015, Symantec published a post about " two Iran-based B-Hack I-Hack that appear to be connected, B-Hack and B-Hack " that " have been using Backdoor.Cadelspy and Backdoor.Remexi to spy on Iranian individuals and Middle Eastern organizations " . | 3,009 |
TIME | May 2016, | 0.923742 | 1,128 | In May 2016, Unit 42 observed B- of B-Hack primarily focused on B- I- and B- I- within Saudi Arabia . | 3,010 |
SECTEAM | Unit 42 | 0.863082 | 1,128 | In May 2016, Unit 42 observed B- of B-Hack primarily focused on B- I- and B- I- within Saudi Arabia . | 3,011 |
LOC | Saudi Arabia | 0.905483 | 1,128 | In May 2016, Unit 42 observed B- of B-Hack primarily focused on B- I- and B- I- within Saudi Arabia . | 3,012 |
MAL | Helminth' | 0.920124 | 1,130 | The B- appears highly targeted and delivers a backdoor we have called' Helminth' . | 3,013 |
LOC | Saudi Arabia, | 0.928419 | 1,131 | Artifacts identified within the malware samples related to these B- also suggest the targeting of the B- I- in Saudi Arabia, which appears to be related to an earlier wave of B- carried out in the fall of 2015 . | 3,014 |
APT | B- | 0.703222 | 1,131 | Artifacts identified within the malware samples related to these B- also suggest the targeting of the B- I- in Saudi Arabia, which appears to be related to an earlier wave of B- carried out in the fall of 2015 . | 3,015 |
TIME | fall of 2015 | 0.904582 | 1,131 | Artifacts identified within the malware samples related to these B- also suggest the targeting of the B- I- in Saudi Arabia, which appears to be related to an earlier wave of B- carried out in the fall of 2015 . | 3,016 |
TIME | May 2016, | 0.917484 | 1,132 | In May 2016, Unit 42 began researching B- that used spear-phishing emails with attachments, specifically malicious Excel spreadsheets sent to B- I- within Saudi Arabia . | 3,017 |
SECTEAM | Unit 42 | 0.863636 | 1,132 | In May 2016, Unit 42 began researching B- that used spear-phishing emails with attachments, specifically malicious Excel spreadsheets sent to B- I- within Saudi Arabia . | 3,018 |
ACT | spear-phishing | 0.927652 | 1,132 | In May 2016, Unit 42 began researching B- that used spear-phishing emails with attachments, specifically malicious Excel spreadsheets sent to B- I- within Saudi Arabia . | 3,019 |
TOOL | emails | 0.574795 | 1,132 | In May 2016, Unit 42 began researching B- that used spear-phishing emails with attachments, specifically malicious Excel spreadsheets sent to B- I- within Saudi Arabia . | 3,020 |
ACT | Excel spreadsheets | 0.898503 | 1,132 | In May 2016, Unit 42 began researching B- that used spear-phishing emails with attachments, specifically malicious Excel spreadsheets sent to B- I- within Saudi Arabia . | 3,021 |
LOC | Saudi Arabia | 0.913083 | 1,132 | In May 2016, Unit 42 began researching B- that used spear-phishing emails with attachments, specifically malicious Excel spreadsheets sent to B- I- within Saudi Arabia . | 3,022 |
MAL | Helminth backdoor, | 0.878683 | 1,133 | Over the course of the B- I-, we have observed two different variations of the Helminth backdoor, one written in VBScript and PowerShell that was delivered via a macro within Excel spreadsheets and the other a standalone Windows executable . | 3,023 |
TOOL | PowerShell | 0.913461 | 1,133 | Over the course of the B- I-, we have observed two different variations of the Helminth backdoor, one written in VBScript and PowerShell that was delivered via a macro within Excel spreadsheets and the other a standalone Windows executable . | 3,024 |
ACT | Excel spreadsheets | 0.918561 | 1,133 | Over the course of the B- I-, we have observed two different variations of the Helminth backdoor, one written in VBScript and PowerShell that was delivered via a macro within Excel spreadsheets and the other a standalone Windows executable . | 3,025 |
ACT | Windows | 0.716245 | 1,133 | Over the course of the B- I-, we have observed two different variations of the Helminth backdoor, one written in VBScript and PowerShell that was delivered via a macro within Excel spreadsheets and the other a standalone Windows executable . | 3,026 |
SECTEAM | FireEye | 0.921093 | 1,134 | FireEye also reported on these B- in a May 22 blog post . | 3,027 |
TIME | May 22 | 0.927981 | 1,134 | FireEye also reported on these B- in a May 22 blog post . | 3,028 |
MAL | Helminth | 0.911237 | 1,135 | The executable variant of Helminth is installed with a dropper Trojan that we are tracking as the HerHer Trojan . | 3,029 |
MAL | dropper Trojan | 0.89299 | 1,135 | The executable variant of Helminth is installed with a dropper Trojan that we are tracking as the HerHer Trojan . | 3,030 |
MAL | HerHer Trojan | 0.895867 | 1,135 | The executable variant of Helminth is installed with a dropper Trojan that we are tracking as the HerHer Trojan . | 3,031 |
MAL | Helminth | 0.914182 | 1,136 | The Helminth executable variant is very similar in functionality to its script-based counterpart, as it also communicates with its C2 server using both HTTP and DNS queries . | 3,032 |
TOOL | C2 | 0.906076 | 1,136 | The Helminth executable variant is very similar in functionality to its script-based counterpart, as it also communicates with its C2 server using both HTTP and DNS queries . | 3,033 |
MAL | HTTP | 0.860667 | 1,136 | The Helminth executable variant is very similar in functionality to its script-based counterpart, as it also communicates with its C2 server using both HTTP and DNS queries . | 3,034 |
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