Type stringclasses 20
values | Text stringlengths 1 236 | Score float64 0.22 0.96 | Original Sentence ID int64 0 6.64k | Original Sentence stringlengths 6 383 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 16.8k |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
APT | actors | 0.77259 | 1,615 | Based on our analysis, we believe that threat actors may compile Windows and Unix based payloads using the same code to deploy Kazuar against both platforms . | 4,053 |
OS | Windows | 0.900587 | 1,615 | Based on our analysis, we believe that threat actors may compile Windows and Unix based payloads using the same code to deploy Kazuar against both platforms . | 4,054 |
SECTEAM | Kazuar | 0.478729 | 1,615 | Based on our analysis, we believe that threat actors may compile Windows and Unix based payloads using the same code to deploy Kazuar against both platforms . | 4,055 |
TIME | 2010 | 0.922444 | 1,617 | In 2010 HBGary investigated an information security incident related to the Winnti group at one of HBGary's customers – an B- I- I- I- . | 4,056 |
SECTEAM | HBGary | 0.936691 | 1,617 | In 2010 HBGary investigated an information security incident related to the Winnti group at one of HBGary's customers – an B- I- I- I- . | 4,057 |
MAL | Winnti | 0.911962 | 1,617 | In 2010 HBGary investigated an information security incident related to the Winnti group at one of HBGary's customers – an B- I- I- I- . | 4,058 |
SECTEAM | HBGary's | 0.927641 | 1,617 | In 2010 HBGary investigated an information security incident related to the Winnti group at one of HBGary's customers – an B- I- I- I- . | 4,059 |
TIME | 2010 | 0.918029 | 1,618 | In 2010 US-based HBGary investigated an information security incident related to the Winnti group at one of HBGary's customers – an American B- I- I- . | 4,060 |
LOC | US-based | 0.912315 | 1,618 | In 2010 US-based HBGary investigated an information security incident related to the Winnti group at one of HBGary's customers – an American B- I- I- . | 4,061 |
SECTEAM | HBGary | 0.933542 | 1,618 | In 2010 US-based HBGary investigated an information security incident related to the Winnti group at one of HBGary's customers – an American B- I- I- . | 4,062 |
MAL | Winnti | 0.917147 | 1,618 | In 2010 US-based HBGary investigated an information security incident related to the Winnti group at one of HBGary's customers – an American B- I- I- . | 4,063 |
SECTEAM | HBGary's | 0.933512 | 1,618 | In 2010 US-based HBGary investigated an information security incident related to the Winnti group at one of HBGary's customers – an American B- I- I- . | 4,064 |
LOC | American | 0.74504 | 1,618 | In 2010 US-based HBGary investigated an information security incident related to the Winnti group at one of HBGary's customers – an American B- I- I- . | 4,065 |
LOC | Chinese threat actor | 0.885534 | 1,619 | For a long time the B-Hack I-Hack had been considered as a Chinese threat actor targeting B- I- specifically . | 4,066 |
TIME | April | 0.910353 | 1,620 | In April Novetta released its excellent report on the Winnti malware spotted in the operations of Axiom group . | 4,067 |
SECTEAM | Novetta | 0.920948 | 1,620 | In April Novetta released its excellent report on the Winnti malware spotted in the operations of Axiom group . | 4,068 |
MAL | Winnti malware | 0.868307 | 1,620 | In April Novetta released its excellent report on the Winnti malware spotted in the operations of Axiom group . | 4,069 |
APT | B-Hack | 0.92256 | 1,621 | The B-Hack group has been presented as an advanced Chinese threat actor carrying out B- I- against a whole range of different industries . | 4,070 |
LOC | Chinese threat actor | 0.899016 | 1,621 | The B-Hack group has been presented as an advanced Chinese threat actor carrying out B- I- against a whole range of different industries . | 4,071 |
ACT | B- I- | 0.894804 | 1,621 | The B-Hack group has been presented as an advanced Chinese threat actor carrying out B- I- against a whole range of different industries . | 4,072 |
TIME | August 22 | 0.926537 | 1,622 | this library includes two drivers compiled on August 22 and September 4, 2014 . | 4,073 |
TIME | September 4, 2014 | 0.7651 | 1,622 | this library includes two drivers compiled on August 22 and September 4, 2014 . | 4,074 |
SECTEAM | Kaspersky Security Network (KSN) | 0.604303 | 1,623 | Also our visibility as a vendor does not cover every company in the world (at least so far;)) and the Kaspersky Security Network (KSN) did not reveal other B- except those against B- I- . | 4,075 |
MAL | LokiBot | 0.915192 | 1,624 | Conversely, LokiBot and Agent Tesla are new malware tools . | 4,076 |
MAL | Agent Tesla | 0.837589 | 1,624 | Conversely, LokiBot and Agent Tesla are new malware tools . | 4,077 |
SECTEAM | Novetta | 0.925504 | 1,625 | Based on multiple active compromises by the Axiom threat group, Novetta was able to capture and analyze new Winnti malware samples . | 4,078 |
MAL | Winnti malware samples | 0.878374 | 1,625 | Based on multiple active compromises by the Axiom threat group, Novetta was able to capture and analyze new Winnti malware samples . | 4,079 |
MAL | B- | 0.82458 | 1,626 | Initial B- targets are commonly software and B- I- in United States, Japan, South Korea, and China . | 4,080 |
LOC | United States, Japan, South Korea, | 0.889178 | 1,626 | Initial B- targets are commonly software and B- I- in United States, Japan, South Korea, and China . | 4,081 |
LOC | China | 0.877632 | 1,626 | Initial B- targets are commonly software and B- I- in United States, Japan, South Korea, and China . | 4,082 |
MAL | B- | 0.82458 | 1,627 | Initial B- targets are commonly software and B- I- in United States, Japan, South Korea, and China . | 4,083 |
LOC | United States, Japan, South Korea, | 0.889178 | 1,627 | Initial B- targets are commonly software and B- I- in United States, Japan, South Korea, and China . | 4,084 |
LOC | China | 0.877632 | 1,627 | Initial B- targets are commonly software and B- I- in United States, Japan, South Korea, and China . | 4,085 |
SECTEAM | Novetta | 0.926822 | 1,628 | The samples Novetta obtained from the active Axiom infection were compiled in mid- to late 2014 and represent what Novetta is referring to as version 3.0 of the B-Hack lineage . | 4,086 |
TIME | 2014 | 0.930427 | 1,628 | The samples Novetta obtained from the active Axiom infection were compiled in mid- to late 2014 and represent what Novetta is referring to as version 3.0 of the B-Hack lineage . | 4,087 |
MAL | Winnti | 0.913594 | 1,629 | We assess with high confidence that the Winnti umbrella is associated with the Chinese state intelligence apparatus, with at least some elements located in the Xicheng District of Beijing . | 4,089 |
LOC | Chinese state intelligence apparatus, | 0.811368 | 1,629 | We assess with high confidence that the Winnti umbrella is associated with the Chinese state intelligence apparatus, with at least some elements located in the Xicheng District of Beijing . | 4,090 |
LOC | Xicheng District of Beijing | 0.931597 | 1,629 | We assess with high confidence that the Winnti umbrella is associated with the Chinese state intelligence apparatus, with at least some elements located in the Xicheng District of Beijing . | 4,091 |
MAL | Winnti | 0.914384 | 1,630 | The Winnti umbrella continues to operate highly successfully in 2018 . | 4,092 |
TIME | 2018 | 0.922883 | 1,630 | The Winnti umbrella continues to operate highly successfully in 2018 . | 4,093 |
MAL | Winnti | 0.90882 | 1,631 | The Winnti umbrella and closely associated entities has been active since at least 2009 . | 4,094 |
TIME | 2009 | 0.923733 | 1,631 | The Winnti umbrella and closely associated entities has been active since at least 2009 . | 4,095 |
SECTEAM | Kaspersky Lab | 0.881157 | 1,632 | The B-Hack and Axiom B-Hack names were created by Kaspersky Lab and Symantec, respectively, for their 2013/2014 reports on the original group . | 4,096 |
SECTEAM | Symantec, | 0.918401 | 1,632 | The B-Hack and Axiom B-Hack names were created by Kaspersky Lab and Symantec, respectively, for their 2013/2014 reports on the original group . | 4,097 |
TIME | 2013/2014 | 0.917181 | 1,632 | The B-Hack and Axiom B-Hack names were created by Kaspersky Lab and Symantec, respectively, for their 2013/2014 reports on the original group . | 4,098 |
APT | actor's | 0.72595 | 1,634 | However, based on the findings shared in this report we assess with high confidence that the actor's primary long-term mission is politically focused . | 4,099 |
MAL | Winnti | 0.912158 | 1,635 | The Winnti umbrella and linked groups' initial targets are B- I- and B- I- I- . | 4,100 |
MAL | Cobalt Strike | 0.862739 | 1,636 | During the same time period, we also observed the actor using the Browser Exploitation Framework (BeEF) to compromise victim hosts and download Cobalt Strike . | 4,101 |
MAL | publicly available tooling | 0.887559 | 1,637 | In this B-, the attackers experimented with publicly available tooling for B- I- . | 4,102 |
LOC | Chinese intelligence apparatus | 0.807167 | 1,639 | The Chinese intelligence apparatus has been reported on under many names, including Winnti, PassCV, APT17, Axiom, LEAD, BARIUM, Wicked Panda, and GREF . | 4,103 |
MAL | Winnti, | 0.923485 | 1,639 | The Chinese intelligence apparatus has been reported on under many names, including Winnti, PassCV, APT17, Axiom, LEAD, BARIUM, Wicked Panda, and GREF . | 4,104 |
TIME | 2018 | 0.91866 | 1,640 | The attackers behind observed B- in 2018 operate from the Xicheng District of Beijing via the net block 221.216.0.0/13 . | 4,105 |
LOC | Xicheng District of Beijing | 0.919832 | 1,640 | The attackers behind observed B- in 2018 operate from the Xicheng District of Beijing via the net block 221.216.0.0/13 . | 4,106 |
TIME | 221.216.0.0/13 | 0.938147 | 1,640 | The attackers behind observed B- in 2018 operate from the Xicheng District of Beijing via the net block 221.216.0.0/13 . | 4,107 |
SECTEAM | Department of Homeland Security (DHS). | 0.890115 | 1,641 | B- I- closely resembles Palmetto Fusion described by the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS). | 4,108 |
SECTEAM | Department of Homeland Security | 0.886205 | 1,642 | B- I- closely resembles Palmetto Fusion described by the US Department of Homeland Security . | 4,109 |
MAL | compromised websites | 0.859044 | 1,643 | ALLANITE uses B- I- I- and compromised websites called watering holes to steal credentials and gain access to target networks, including collecting and distributing screenshots of industrial control systems . | 4,110 |
ACT | watering holes | 0.905016 | 1,643 | ALLANITE uses B- I- I- and compromised websites called watering holes to steal credentials and gain access to target networks, including collecting and distributing screenshots of industrial control systems . | 4,111 |
TIME | October 2017, | 0.921698 | 1,644 | In October 2017, a DHS advisory documented ALLANITE technical operations combined with B- with a group Symantec calls Dragonfly (which Dragos associates with DYMALLOY). | 4,112 |
SECTEAM | DHS | 0.907263 | 1,644 | In October 2017, a DHS advisory documented ALLANITE technical operations combined with B- with a group Symantec calls Dragonfly (which Dragos associates with DYMALLOY). | 4,113 |
SECTEAM | Symantec | 0.919691 | 1,644 | In October 2017, a DHS advisory documented ALLANITE technical operations combined with B- with a group Symantec calls Dragonfly (which Dragos associates with DYMALLOY). | 4,114 |
APT | Dragonfly | 0.919541 | 1,644 | In October 2017, a DHS advisory documented ALLANITE technical operations combined with B- with a group Symantec calls Dragonfly (which Dragos associates with DYMALLOY). | 4,115 |
SECTEAM | Dragos | 0.928077 | 1,644 | In October 2017, a DHS advisory documented ALLANITE technical operations combined with B- with a group Symantec calls Dragonfly (which Dragos associates with DYMALLOY). | 4,116 |
MAL | DYMALLOY). | 0.90745 | 1,644 | In October 2017, a DHS advisory documented ALLANITE technical operations combined with B- with a group Symantec calls Dragonfly (which Dragos associates with DYMALLOY). | 4,117 |
TIME | October 2017, | 0.92553 | 1,645 | In October 2017, a DHS advisory documented ALLANITE technical operations combined with B- with a group . | 4,118 |
SECTEAM | DHS | 0.902218 | 1,645 | In October 2017, a DHS advisory documented ALLANITE technical operations combined with B- with a group . | 4,119 |
TIME | October 2017, | 0.925369 | 1,648 | In October 2017, a DHS advisory documented ALLANITE technical operations combined with B- with a group Symantec calls Dragonfly . | 4,120 |
SECTEAM | DHS | 0.906824 | 1,648 | In October 2017, a DHS advisory documented ALLANITE technical operations combined with B- with a group Symantec calls Dragonfly . | 4,121 |
SECTEAM | Symantec | 0.908867 | 1,648 | In October 2017, a DHS advisory documented ALLANITE technical operations combined with B- with a group Symantec calls Dragonfly . | 4,122 |
APT | Dragonfly | 0.926969 | 1,648 | In October 2017, a DHS advisory documented ALLANITE technical operations combined with B- with a group Symantec calls Dragonfly . | 4,123 |
SECTEAM | DHS, | 0.783106 | 1,649 | Public disclosure by third-parties, including the DHS, associate B- I- with Russian strategic interests . | 4,124 |
OS | Windows | 0.840477 | 1,650 | ALLANITE conducts malware-less operations primarily leveraging legitimate and available tools in the Windows operating system . | 4,125 |
SECTEAM | Dragos | 0.924116 | 1,651 | Dragos does not publicly describe ICS activity group technical details except in extraordinary circumstances in order to limit tradecraft proliferation . | 4,126 |
SECTEAM | Dragos WorldView | 0.895931 | 1,652 | However, full details on ALLANITE and other group tools, techniques, procedures, and infrastructure is available to network defenders via Dragos WorldView . | 4,127 |
LOC | US, Germany, Sweden, | 0.914466 | 1,653 | In addition to maritime operations in this region, Anchor Panda also heavily targeted western companies in the US, Germany, Sweden, the UK, and Australia, and other countries involved in maritime satellite systems, B- I-, and B- I- . | 4,128 |
LOC | UK, | 0.889512 | 1,653 | In addition to maritime operations in this region, Anchor Panda also heavily targeted western companies in the US, Germany, Sweden, the UK, and Australia, and other countries involved in maritime satellite systems, B- I-, and B- I- . | 4,129 |
LOC | Australia, | 0.91519 | 1,653 | In addition to maritime operations in this region, Anchor Panda also heavily targeted western companies in the US, Germany, Sweden, the UK, and Australia, and other countries involved in maritime satellite systems, B- I-, and B- I- . | 4,130 |
APT | B- | 0.441001 | 1,654 | A current round of B- from Chinese source groups are targeting the B- I- in an attempt to steal technology . | 4,131 |
LOC | Chinese source groups | 0.915169 | 1,654 | A current round of B- from Chinese source groups are targeting the B- I- in an attempt to steal technology . | 4,132 |
LOC | PLA Navy | 0.79458 | 1,655 | PLA Navy B-Hack I-Hack is an adversary that CrowdStrike has tracked extensively over the last year targeting both civilian and military maritime operations in the green/brown water regions primarily in the area of operations of the South Sea Fleet of the PLA Navy . | 4,133 |
SECTEAM | CrowdStrike | 0.926521 | 1,655 | PLA Navy B-Hack I-Hack is an adversary that CrowdStrike has tracked extensively over the last year targeting both civilian and military maritime operations in the green/brown water regions primarily in the area of operations of the South Sea Fleet of the PLA Navy . | 4,134 |
LOC | South Sea Fleet of the PLA Navy | 0.890988 | 1,655 | PLA Navy B-Hack I-Hack is an adversary that CrowdStrike has tracked extensively over the last year targeting both civilian and military maritime operations in the green/brown water regions primarily in the area of operations of the South Sea Fleet of the PLA Navy . | 4,135 |
TIME | May 2017 | 0.915739 | 1,656 | B- I- continue and intelligence indicates B- since at least May 2017 . | 4,136 |
LOC | Chinese threat actor group | 0.880488 | 1,657 | APT Anchor Panda is a Chinese threat actor group who target maritime operations . | 4,137 |
LOC | Chinese PLA Navy, | 0.891055 | 1,658 | According to cyber security researchers, Anchor Panda, who work directly for the Chinese PLA Navy, likely remains active . | 4,138 |
SECTEAM | Dragos | 0.926108 | 1,659 | Dragos does not corroborate nor conduct political attribution to B- I- . | 4,139 |
MAL | Adobe Gh0st, Poison Ivy | 0.885853 | 1,660 | In the past they used Adobe Gh0st, Poison Ivy and Torn RAT malware as their primary B- vector is sphere phishing . | 4,140 |
MAL | Torn RAT malware | 0.86765 | 1,660 | In the past they used Adobe Gh0st, Poison Ivy and Torn RAT malware as their primary B- vector is sphere phishing . | 4,141 |
ACT | phishing | 0.863303 | 1,660 | In the past they used Adobe Gh0st, Poison Ivy and Torn RAT malware as their primary B- vector is sphere phishing . | 4,142 |
LOC | South China Sea, | 0.908233 | 1,661 | Their targets are B- I- that operate in and around the South China Sea, an area of much Chinese interest . | 4,143 |
LOC | Chinese | 0.848163 | 1,661 | Their targets are B- I- that operate in and around the South China Sea, an area of much Chinese interest . | 4,144 |
LOC | Chinese hackers | 0.899662 | 1,662 | As recently as this past week, researchers observed Chinese hackers escalating B- efforts to steal military research secrets from US B- . | 4,145 |
LOC | US | 0.876276 | 1,662 | As recently as this past week, researchers observed Chinese hackers escalating B- efforts to steal military research secrets from US B- . | 4,146 |
IDTY | B- | 0.415133 | 1,662 | As recently as this past week, researchers observed Chinese hackers escalating B- efforts to steal military research secrets from US B- . | 4,147 |
APT | B-Hack | 0.476066 | 1,663 | The B- I- has labelled the group B-Hack I-Hack B-Hack I-Hack I-Hack I-Hack I-Hack or, titled, B-Hack . | 4,148 |
TIME | January 2013 | 0.910659 | 1,664 | The group has been active since at least January 2013 . | 4,149 |
LOC | South China Sea, | 0.909698 | 1,665 | The group has also targeted B- operating in the South China Sea, which is a strategically important region and the focus of disputes between China and other states . | 4,150 |
LOC | China | 0.630602 | 1,665 | The group has also targeted B- operating in the South China Sea, which is a strategically important region and the focus of disputes between China and other states . | 4,151 |
LOC | US | 0.684777 | 1,666 | The main targets seem to be US I- in B-, B- and B-, although it has targeted other organizations around the world . | 4,152 |
LOC | Chinese operations, | 0.873091 | 1,667 | The times of day the group is active also suggests that it is based near Beijing and the group has reportedly used malware that has been observed in other Chinese operations, indicating some level of collaboration . | 4,153 |
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