Type stringclasses 20
values | Text stringlengths 1 236 | Score float64 0.22 0.96 | Original Sentence ID int64 0 6.64k | Original Sentence stringlengths 6 383 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 16.8k |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
APT | actors | 0.877667 | 2,073 | When B- targeting of B- I- subsided, the actors instead appeared to have focused on external targets, such a series of attempts to spearphish the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs . | 4,971 |
ACT | spearphish | 0.915211 | 2,073 | When B- targeting of B- I- subsided, the actors instead appeared to have focused on external targets, such a series of attempts to spearphish the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs . | 4,972 |
SECTEAM | Palo Alto Networks | 0.879962 | 2,074 | Palo Alto Networks has noted and described the differences of two malware agents developed in parallel, with commonalities in behavior but differing functionalities; families described as Infy and Infy M. Our primary observation was of the Infy (non-M) malware, which primarily functions as a keylogger for the collectio... | 4,973 |
MAL | Infy | 0.911146 | 2,074 | Palo Alto Networks has noted and described the differences of two malware agents developed in parallel, with commonalities in behavior but differing functionalities; families described as Infy and Infy M. Our primary observation was of the Infy (non-M) malware, which primarily functions as a keylogger for the collectio... | 4,974 |
MAL | Infy M. | 0.87988 | 2,074 | Palo Alto Networks has noted and described the differences of two malware agents developed in parallel, with commonalities in behavior but differing functionalities; families described as Infy and Infy M. Our primary observation was of the Infy (non-M) malware, which primarily functions as a keylogger for the collectio... | 4,975 |
MAL | keylogger | 0.869353 | 2,074 | Palo Alto Networks has noted and described the differences of two malware agents developed in parallel, with commonalities in behavior but differing functionalities; families described as Infy and Infy M. Our primary observation was of the Infy (non-M) malware, which primarily functions as a keylogger for the collectio... | 4,977 |
MAL | Infy malware | 0.919904 | 2,076 | The Infy malware was seen targeting B- again in June 2015, when it was shared with researchers after being sent to a B- I- at BBC Persian with a generic introduction and a PowerPoint presentation attached titled " Nostalogy " (sic). | 4,978 |
TIME | June 2015, | 0.913488 | 2,076 | The Infy malware was seen targeting B- again in June 2015, when it was shared with researchers after being sent to a B- I- at BBC Persian with a generic introduction and a PowerPoint presentation attached titled " Nostalogy " (sic). | 4,979 |
IDTY | BBC Persian | 0.820682 | 2,076 | The Infy malware was seen targeting B- again in June 2015, when it was shared with researchers after being sent to a B- I- at BBC Persian with a generic introduction and a PowerPoint presentation attached titled " Nostalogy " (sic). | 4,980 |
TOOL | PowerPoint | 0.900638 | 2,076 | The Infy malware was seen targeting B- again in June 2015, when it was shared with researchers after being sent to a B- I- at BBC Persian with a generic introduction and a PowerPoint presentation attached titled " Nostalogy " (sic). | 4,981 |
LOC | Iran's | 0.906576 | 2,077 | Based on information collected in the course of this research, the targets and victims of Infy's B- have continued to be strongly aligned with Iran's " soft war " agenda, internal security policies, and regional adversaries of the hardline establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran . | 4,982 |
LOC | Islamic Republic of Iran | 0.904578 | 2,077 | Based on information collected in the course of this research, the targets and victims of Infy's B- have continued to be strongly aligned with Iran's " soft war " agenda, internal security policies, and regional adversaries of the hardline establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran . | 4,983 |
TIME | December 2015, | 0.923831 | 2,078 | Until late December 2015, in nearly every Infy message documented since our tracking began in May 2013, no attempt included strong tailoring of the approach, often not even including an email body, instead relying on cryptic filenames and email subjects to attract interest . | 4,984 |
MAL | Infy message | 0.894683 | 2,078 | Until late December 2015, in nearly every Infy message documented since our tracking began in May 2013, no attempt included strong tailoring of the approach, often not even including an email body, instead relying on cryptic filenames and email subjects to attract interest . | 4,985 |
TIME | May 2013, | 0.923163 | 2,078 | Until late December 2015, in nearly every Infy message documented since our tracking began in May 2013, no attempt included strong tailoring of the approach, often not even including an email body, instead relying on cryptic filenames and email subjects to attract interest . | 4,986 |
ACT | email | 0.909989 | 2,078 | Until late December 2015, in nearly every Infy message documented since our tracking began in May 2013, no attempt included strong tailoring of the approach, often not even including an email body, instead relying on cryptic filenames and email subjects to attract interest . | 4,988 |
ACT | spearphishing | 0.91434 | 2,079 | One narrowly-targeted spearphishing from Infy was sent from the compromised account of a B- I- promoting participation inside of Iran, claiming to be a set of images of a B- dual national that has been held in Evin Prison for five years on espionage charges . | 4,989 |
LOC | Iran, | 0.916218 | 2,079 | One narrowly-targeted spearphishing from Infy was sent from the compromised account of a B- I- promoting participation inside of Iran, claiming to be a set of images of a B- dual national that has been held in Evin Prison for five years on espionage charges . | 4,990 |
LOC | Saudi | 0.832909 | 2,081 | The actors successfully compromised a host of an Saudi B- I- on January 17, 2016, and maintained access for at least two weeks . | 4,991 |
TIME | January 17, 2016, | 0.838586 | 2,081 | The actors successfully compromised a host of an Saudi B- I- on January 17, 2016, and maintained access for at least two weeks . | 4,992 |
ACT | malicious documents containing | 0.900966 | 2,083 | In order to initially compromise the designated targets, Infy typically distributed specifically-crafted malicious documents containing Infy through B- I- . | 4,993 |
MAL | Infy | 0.910018 | 2,083 | In order to initially compromise the designated targets, Infy typically distributed specifically-crafted malicious documents containing Infy through B- I- . | 4,994 |
ACT | malicious documents containing | 0.871906 | 2,084 | In order to initially compromise the designated targets, the attackers typically distributed specifically-crafted malicious documents containing Infy through B- I- . | 4,995 |
MAL | Infy | 0.909678 | 2,084 | In order to initially compromise the designated targets, the attackers typically distributed specifically-crafted malicious documents containing Infy through B- I- . | 4,996 |
TIME | May 2, 2016, | 0.858848 | 2,085 | On May 2, 2016, Palo Alto Networks published the report " Prince of Persia ", which provided the first public and widely-reported indication of B-Hack's B- in Iran, while other publications either refrained from making the association or were not openly available . | 4,997 |
SECTEAM | Palo Alto Networks | 0.869303 | 2,085 | On May 2, 2016, Palo Alto Networks published the report " Prince of Persia ", which provided the first public and widely-reported indication of B-Hack's B- in Iran, while other publications either refrained from making the association or were not openly available . | 4,998 |
APT | B-Hack's | 0.889656 | 2,085 | On May 2, 2016, Palo Alto Networks published the report " Prince of Persia ", which provided the first public and widely-reported indication of B-Hack's B- in Iran, while other publications either refrained from making the association or were not openly available . | 4,999 |
LOC | Iran, | 0.901575 | 2,085 | On May 2, 2016, Palo Alto Networks published the report " Prince of Persia ", which provided the first public and widely-reported indication of B-Hack's B- in Iran, while other publications either refrained from making the association or were not openly available . | 5,000 |
MAL | Infy | 0.913696 | 2,086 | Prior to the distribution of new versions of the agent, the Infy developers appear to consistently conduct tests from local hosts, which indicates that the control and maintenance of the software occurs in the Khorasan Razavi province of Iran, potentially in the city of Mashhad . | 5,001 |
LOC | Iran, | 0.913618 | 2,086 | Prior to the distribution of new versions of the agent, the Infy developers appear to consistently conduct tests from local hosts, which indicates that the control and maintenance of the software occurs in the Khorasan Razavi province of Iran, potentially in the city of Mashhad . | 5,002 |
LOC | Mashhad | 0.924756 | 2,086 | Prior to the distribution of new versions of the agent, the Infy developers appear to consistently conduct tests from local hosts, which indicates that the control and maintenance of the software occurs in the Khorasan Razavi province of Iran, potentially in the city of Mashhad . | 5,003 |
TIME | May 2, 2016, | 0.855888 | 2,087 | On May 2, 2016, Palo Alto published the report " Prince of Persia ", which provided the first public and widely-reported indication of Infy's B- in Iran, while other publications either refrained from making the association or were not openly available . | 5,004 |
SECTEAM | Palo Alto | 0.837224 | 2,087 | On May 2, 2016, Palo Alto published the report " Prince of Persia ", which provided the first public and widely-reported indication of Infy's B- in Iran, while other publications either refrained from making the association or were not openly available . | 5,005 |
LOC | Iran, | 0.872968 | 2,087 | On May 2, 2016, Palo Alto published the report " Prince of Persia ", which provided the first public and widely-reported indication of Infy's B- in Iran, while other publications either refrained from making the association or were not openly available . | 5,006 |
LOC | Iran, | 0.892346 | 2,088 | Only one client, based in Iran, continued to communicate with the infrastructure . | 5,007 |
LOC | Iranian-linked group | 0.886418 | 2,089 | A researcher has attributed a recently publicized B- on B- internal network to the Iranian-linked group known as IRIDIUM – and said that the data heist involved 6 terabytes of sensitive data . " | 5,008 |
SECTEAM | Resecurity's | 0.926139 | 2,091 | B- told Threatpost that this is indeed the same B- I- it announced itself last week – but it wouldn't confirm the other details in Resecurity's post, including the attribution . | 5,009 |
SECTEAM | B- I- Resecurity | 0.790846 | 2,092 | In wake of these events, a B- I- Resecurity reached out to NBC news and claimed that they had reasons to believe that the B- were carried out by Iranian-linked group known as IRIDIUM . | 5,010 |
LOC | Iranian-linked group | 0.923725 | 2,092 | In wake of these events, a B- I- Resecurity reached out to NBC news and claimed that they had reasons to believe that the B- were carried out by Iranian-linked group known as IRIDIUM . | 5,011 |
SECTEAM | Resecurity | 0.923399 | 2,093 | Resecurity says that IRIDIUM " has hit more than 200 B- I-, B- and B- I-, and B- I- including B- . | 5,012 |
SECTEAM | Resecurity | 0.92369 | 2,094 | Resecurity claims that IRIDIUM breached B-'s network during December 2018 . | 5,013 |
TIME | December 2018 | 0.919994 | 2,094 | Resecurity claims that IRIDIUM breached B-'s network during December 2018 . | 5,014 |
MAL | Infy | 0.91699 | 2,095 | Infy engaged in malware spearphishing against the same targets as Flying Kitten from the outset of its B-; B- I- has registered several resources related to B- I- that have been the subject of intrusion attempts by others since February 2014 . | 5,015 |
ACT | spearphishing | 0.917719 | 2,095 | Infy engaged in malware spearphishing against the same targets as Flying Kitten from the outset of its B-; B- I- has registered several resources related to B- I- that have been the subject of intrusion attempts by others since February 2014 . | 5,016 |
TIME | February 2014 | 0.92086 | 2,095 | Infy engaged in malware spearphishing against the same targets as Flying Kitten from the outset of its B-; B- I- has registered several resources related to B- I- that have been the subject of intrusion attempts by others since February 2014 . | 5,017 |
ACT | spear-phishing e-mails | 0.906648 | 2,096 | The malicious samples we found are the early stage malware most often delivered by spear-phishing e-mails . | 5,018 |
OS | Windows | 0.886214 | 2,097 | This next stage library copies itself into the System32 directory of the Windows folder after the hardcoded file name — either KBDLV2.DLL or AUTO.DLL, depending on the malware sample . | 5,019 |
FILE | KBDLV2.DLL | 0.9184 | 2,097 | This next stage library copies itself into the System32 directory of the Windows folder after the hardcoded file name — either KBDLV2.DLL or AUTO.DLL, depending on the malware sample . | 5,020 |
FILE | AUTO.DLL, | 0.917291 | 2,097 | This next stage library copies itself into the System32 directory of the Windows folder after the hardcoded file name — either KBDLV2.DLL or AUTO.DLL, depending on the malware sample . | 5,021 |
LOC | South Korea | 0.870816 | 2,099 | Hancom Office is widely used in South Korea . | 5,022 |
LOC | North Korean | 0.890689 | 2,100 | Perhaps it also points to the suspected North Korean origin of B- . | 5,023 |
LOC | North Korea | 0.913472 | 2,101 | The attacker is from North Korea . | 5,024 |
LOC | Jilin Province Network | 0.923444 | 2,102 | All of them lie in ranges of the Jilin Province Network and Liaoning Province Network, in China . | 5,025 |
LOC | Liaoning Province Network, | 0.92553 | 2,102 | All of them lie in ranges of the Jilin Province Network and Liaoning Province Network, in China . | 5,026 |
LOC | China | 0.910764 | 2,102 | All of them lie in ranges of the Jilin Province Network and Liaoning Province Network, in China . | 5,027 |
ACT | B-Hack | 0.70064 | 2,103 | Finally, this geo-location supports the likely theory that the attackers behind B-Hack are based in North Korea . | 5,028 |
LOC | North Korea | 0.9107 | 2,103 | Finally, this geo-location supports the likely theory that the attackers behind B-Hack are based in North Korea . | 5,029 |
MAL | Winnti malware | 0.870712 | 2,104 | In this blog, we look at the Winnti malware implant as used by two known activity groups B-Hack and LEAD . | 5,030 |
APT | B-Hack | 0.840926 | 2,104 | In this blog, we look at the Winnti malware implant as used by two known activity groups B-Hack and LEAD . | 5,031 |
LOC | German | 0.892249 | 2,105 | According to the German press, the intruders used the Winnti family of malware as their main implant, giving them persistent access to the conglomerate's network as early as February 2016 . | 5,032 |
MAL | Winnti family of malware | 0.865437 | 2,105 | According to the German press, the intruders used the Winnti family of malware as their main implant, giving them persistent access to the conglomerate's network as early as February 2016 . | 5,033 |
TIME | February 2016 | 0.912872 | 2,105 | According to the German press, the intruders used the Winnti family of malware as their main implant, giving them persistent access to the conglomerate's network as early as February 2016 . | 5,034 |
MAL | Winnti | 0.91287 | 2,106 | In the case of this malware, the activity groups strongly associated with Winnti are BARIUM and LEAD . | 5,035 |
APT | BARIUM | 0.883828 | 2,106 | In the case of this malware, the activity groups strongly associated with Winnti are BARIUM and LEAD . | 5,036 |
APT | LEAD | 0.836617 | 2,106 | In the case of this malware, the activity groups strongly associated with Winnti are BARIUM and LEAD . | 5,037 |
MAL | Winnti, | 0.916805 | 2,107 | But even though they share the use of Winnti, the BARIUM and LEAD activity groups are involved in very different intrusion scenarios . | 5,038 |
APT | BARIUM | 0.84034 | 2,107 | But even though they share the use of Winnti, the BARIUM and LEAD activity groups are involved in very different intrusion scenarios . | 5,039 |
APT | LEAD | 0.831823 | 2,107 | But even though they share the use of Winnti, the BARIUM and LEAD activity groups are involved in very different intrusion scenarios . | 5,040 |
SECTEAM | Windows Defender ATP | 0.561877 | 2,108 | To show how this breach and similar breaches can be mitigated, we look at how Windows Defender ATP flags B- associated with B-, B-, and other known activity groups and how it provides extensive threat intelligence about these groups . | 5,041 |
APT | LEAD's | 0.924047 | 2,110 | During these intrusions, LEAD's objective was to steal sensitive data, including research materials, process documents, and project plans . | 5,042 |
MAL | Win32/Barlaiy | 0.879444 | 2,111 | Initial intrusion stages feature the Win32/Barlaiy implant—notable for its use of social network profiles, collaborative document editing sites, and blogs for C&C . | 5,043 |
TOOL | social network profiles, collaborative document editing sites, | 0.636614 | 2,111 | Initial intrusion stages feature the Win32/Barlaiy implant—notable for its use of social network profiles, collaborative document editing sites, and blogs for C&C . | 5,044 |
TOOL | blogs | 0.542083 | 2,111 | Initial intrusion stages feature the Win32/Barlaiy implant—notable for its use of social network profiles, collaborative document editing sites, and blogs for C&C . | 5,045 |
PROT | C&C | 0.958665 | 2,111 | Initial intrusion stages feature the Win32/Barlaiy implant—notable for its use of social network profiles, collaborative document editing sites, and blogs for C&C . | 5,046 |
ACT | spear-phish | 0.837715 | 2,112 | Once B- has established rapport, they spear-phish the victim using a variety of unsophisticated malware installation vectors, including malicious shortcut (.lnk) files with hidden payloads, compiled HTML help (.chm) files, or Microsoft Office documents containing macros or exploits . | 5,047 |
MAL | malware | 0.689591 | 2,112 | Once B- has established rapport, they spear-phish the victim using a variety of unsophisticated malware installation vectors, including malicious shortcut (.lnk) files with hidden payloads, compiled HTML help (.chm) files, or Microsoft Office documents containing macros or exploits . | 5,048 |
TOOL | emails | 0.926954 | 2,113 | Instead, the group often simply emails a Winnti installer to potential victims, relying on basic social engineering tactics to convince recipients to run the attached malware . | 5,049 |
MAL | Winnti installer | 0.799331 | 2,113 | Instead, the group often simply emails a Winnti installer to potential victims, relying on basic social engineering tactics to convince recipients to run the attached malware . | 5,050 |
ACT | social engineering tactics | 0.904596 | 2,113 | Instead, the group often simply emails a Winnti installer to potential victims, relying on basic social engineering tactics to convince recipients to run the attached malware . | 5,051 |
SECTEAM | Microsoft Analytics | 0.880533 | 2,114 | Microsoft Analytics shows that Winnti has been used in intrusions carried out throughout Asia, Europe, Oceania, the Middle East, and the United States in the last six months (Figure 1). | 5,052 |
MAL | Winnti | 0.916795 | 2,114 | Microsoft Analytics shows that Winnti has been used in intrusions carried out throughout Asia, Europe, Oceania, the Middle East, and the United States in the last six months (Figure 1). | 5,053 |
LOC | Asia, Europe, Oceania, | 0.67668 | 2,114 | Microsoft Analytics shows that Winnti has been used in intrusions carried out throughout Asia, Europe, Oceania, the Middle East, and the United States in the last six months (Figure 1). | 5,054 |
LOC | the United States | 0.803721 | 2,114 | Microsoft Analytics shows that Winnti has been used in intrusions carried out throughout Asia, Europe, Oceania, the Middle East, and the United States in the last six months (Figure 1). | 5,055 |
TOOL | emails | 0.928225 | 2,115 | Instead, Lead often simply emails a Winnti installer to potential victims, relying on basic social engineering tactics to convince recipients to run the attached malware . | 5,056 |
MAL | Winnti installer | 0.851229 | 2,115 | Instead, Lead often simply emails a Winnti installer to potential victims, relying on basic social engineering tactics to convince recipients to run the attached malware . | 5,057 |
ACT | social engineering tactics | 0.911396 | 2,115 | Instead, Lead often simply emails a Winnti installer to potential victims, relying on basic social engineering tactics to convince recipients to run the attached malware . | 5,058 |
TOOL | SQL | 0.499539 | 2,116 | In some other cases, LEAD gains access to a target by brute-forcing remote access login credentials, performing SQL injection, or exploiting unpatched web servers, and then they copy the Winnti installer directly to compromised machines . | 5,059 |
TOOL | web | 0.74796 | 2,116 | In some other cases, LEAD gains access to a target by brute-forcing remote access login credentials, performing SQL injection, or exploiting unpatched web servers, and then they copy the Winnti installer directly to compromised machines . | 5,060 |
MAL | Winnti installer | 0.848835 | 2,116 | In some other cases, LEAD gains access to a target by brute-forcing remote access login credentials, performing SQL injection, or exploiting unpatched web servers, and then they copy the Winnti installer directly to compromised machines . | 5,061 |
TIME | 2015, | 0.913408 | 2,117 | This was the case in two known intrusions in 2015, where attackers named the implant DLL " ASPNET_FILTER.DLL " to disguise it as the DLL for the ASP.NET ISAPI Filter . | 5,062 |
FILE | ASPNET_FILTER.DLL | 0.9229 | 2,117 | This was the case in two known intrusions in 2015, where attackers named the implant DLL " ASPNET_FILTER.DLL " to disguise it as the DLL for the ASP.NET ISAPI Filter . | 5,064 |
TOOL | DLL | 0.912758 | 2,117 | This was the case in two known intrusions in 2015, where attackers named the implant DLL " ASPNET_FILTER.DLL " to disguise it as the DLL for the ASP.NET ISAPI Filter . | 5,065 |
FILE | ASP.NET | 0.922134 | 2,117 | This was the case in two known intrusions in 2015, where attackers named the implant DLL " ASPNET_FILTER.DLL " to disguise it as the DLL for the ASP.NET ISAPI Filter . | 5,066 |
TOOL | Windows Defender | 0.645904 | 2,118 | Windows Defender ATP helps network security professionals deal with intrusions from activity groups like LEAD and BARIUM in several ways . | 5,067 |
MAL | LEAD | 0.501997 | 2,118 | Windows Defender ATP helps network security professionals deal with intrusions from activity groups like LEAD and BARIUM in several ways . | 5,068 |
MAL | BARIUM | 0.479449 | 2,118 | Windows Defender ATP helps network security professionals deal with intrusions from activity groups like LEAD and BARIUM in several ways . | 5,069 |
MAL | Winnti installer | 0.864522 | 2,119 | The following examples were developed using a Winnti installer that was used in B- in December 2016 . | 5,070 |
TIME | December 2016 | 0.909502 | 2,119 | The following examples were developed using a Winnti installer that was used in B- in December 2016 . | 5,071 |
SECTEAM | Windows Defender ATP | 0.485231 | 2,120 | The Windows 10 Creators Update will bring several enhancements to Windows Defender ATP that will provide B- I- with options for immediate mitigation of a detected threat . | 5,072 |
APT | LEAD | 0.783331 | 2,121 | LEAD and BARIUM are not known for large-scale spear-phishing, so it is unlikely that B- I- would have to deal with multiple machines having been compromised by these groups at the same time . | 5,073 |
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