Type stringclasses 20
values | Text stringlengths 1 236 | Score float64 0.22 0.96 | Original Sentence ID int64 0 6.64k | Original Sentence stringlengths 6 383 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 16.8k |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
LOC | United States, Canada, United Kingdom, Russia, Chile, Morocco, Greece, Belgium, Austria, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, Australia, Hong Kong, Japan, China, Mongolia, Iran, Turkey, India, Pakistan, South Korea, Thailand, Qatar, Kazakhstan, | 0.921942 | 2,319 | Based on Kaspersky Lab's analysis of NetTraveler's C&C data, there were a total of 350 victims in 40 countries across including the United States, Canada, United Kingdom, Russia, Chile, Morocco, Greece, Belgium, Austria, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, Australia, Hong Kong, Japan, China, Mongolia, Iran, Turkey, India, Pak... | 5,474 |
LOC | Jordan | 0.923972 | 2,319 | Based on Kaspersky Lab's analysis of NetTraveler's C&C data, there were a total of 350 victims in 40 countries across including the United States, Canada, United Kingdom, Russia, Chile, Morocco, Greece, Belgium, Austria, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, Australia, Hong Kong, Japan, China, Mongolia, Iran, Turkey, India, Pak... | 5,475 |
SECTEAM | Kaspersky Lab's | 0.811352 | 2,320 | Kaspersky Lab's products detect the Microsoft Office exploits used in the B- I-, including Exploit.MSWord.CVE-2010-333, Exploit.Win32.CVE-2012-0158 . | 5,476 |
IDTY | Microsoft Office | 0.903542 | 2,320 | Kaspersky Lab's products detect the Microsoft Office exploits used in the B- I-, including Exploit.MSWord.CVE-2010-333, Exploit.Win32.CVE-2012-0158 . | 5,477 |
VULNAME | exploits | 0.917824 | 2,320 | Kaspersky Lab's products detect the Microsoft Office exploits used in the B- I-, including Exploit.MSWord.CVE-2010-333, Exploit.Win32.CVE-2012-0158 . | 5,478 |
FILE | Exploit.MSWord.CVE-2010-333, Exploit.Win32.CVE-2012-0158 | 0.934754 | 2,320 | Kaspersky Lab's products detect the Microsoft Office exploits used in the B- I-, including Exploit.MSWord.CVE-2010-333, Exploit.Win32.CVE-2012-0158 . | 5,479 |
SECTEAM | Symantec | 0.908531 | 2,321 | In this case, it was a group commonly referred to as " Nitro ", which was coined by Symantec in its 2011 whitepaper . | 5,480 |
TIME | 2011 | 0.918703 | 2,321 | In this case, it was a group commonly referred to as " Nitro ", which was coined by Symantec in its 2011 whitepaper . | 5,481 |
MAL | Poison Ivy malware, | 0.833759 | 2,322 | Historically, Nitro is known for targeted B- I- I- and using Poison Ivy malware, which was not seen in these B- . | 5,482 |
TIME | 2013, | 0.930874 | 2,323 | Since at least 2013, Nitro appears to have somewhat modified their malware and delivery methods to include Spindest and legitimate compromised websites, as reported by Cyber Squared's TCIRT . | 5,483 |
MAL | Spindest | 0.907582 | 2,323 | Since at least 2013, Nitro appears to have somewhat modified their malware and delivery methods to include Spindest and legitimate compromised websites, as reported by Cyber Squared's TCIRT . | 5,484 |
MAL | legitimate compromised websites, | 0.884233 | 2,323 | Since at least 2013, Nitro appears to have somewhat modified their malware and delivery methods to include Spindest and legitimate compromised websites, as reported by Cyber Squared's TCIRT . | 5,485 |
SECTEAM | Cyber Squared's TCIRT | 0.881656 | 2,323 | Since at least 2013, Nitro appears to have somewhat modified their malware and delivery methods to include Spindest and legitimate compromised websites, as reported by Cyber Squared's TCIRT . | 5,486 |
LOC | South Korean | 0.895508 | 2,324 | In July, Nitro compromised a South Korean clothing and accessories manufacturer's website to serve malware commonly referred to as " Spindest " . | 5,487 |
MAL | Spindest | 0.914168 | 2,324 | In July, Nitro compromised a South Korean clothing and accessories manufacturer's website to serve malware commonly referred to as " Spindest " . | 5,488 |
TOOL | (C2). | 0.554395 | 2,325 | Of all the samples we've tied to this B- so far noted in this blog, this is the only one configured to connect directly to an IP address for Command and Control (C2). | 5,489 |
MAL | Spindest | 0.914877 | 2,326 | The next sample was another Spindest variant and had the same timestamp as the aforementioned PcClient sample . | 5,490 |
MAL | PcClient sample | 0.890394 | 2,326 | The next sample was another Spindest variant and had the same timestamp as the aforementioned PcClient sample . | 5,491 |
TIME | late July 2011 | 0.720391 | 2,330 | The B- wave started in late July 2011 and continued into midSeptember 2011 . | 5,492 |
TIME | midSeptember 2011 | 0.640459 | 2,330 | The B- wave started in late July 2011 and continued into midSeptember 2011 . | 5,493 |
TIME | May | 0.911414 | 2,332 | They then moved on to the B- I- in late May . | 5,494 |
TIME | May, | 0.912011 | 2,333 | From late April to early May, the attackers focused on human rights related NGOs . | 5,495 |
IDTY | NGOs | 0.89908 | 2,333 | From late April to early May, the attackers focused on human rights related NGOs . | 5,496 |
TIME | May | 0.913476 | 2,334 | Attackers then moved on to the B- I- in late May . | 5,497 |
TOOL | email | 0.874565 | 2,336 | The attackers first researched desired targets and then sent an email specifically to the target . | 5,498 |
TOOL | emails, | 0.908391 | 2,338 | While the attackers used different pretexts when sending these malicious emails, two methodologies stood out . | 5,499 |
TOOL | emails | 0.913043 | 2,339 | Secondly, when the emails were being sent to a broad set of recipients, the mails purported to be a necessary security update . | 5,500 |
MAL | B- | 0.463265 | 2,340 | The B- were traced back to a computer system that was a virtual private server (VPS) located in the United States . | 5,501 |
LOC | United States | 0.913815 | 2,340 | The B- were traced back to a computer system that was a virtual private server (VPS) located in the United States . | 5,502 |
TOOL | PDF | 0.627392 | 2,341 | Attackers are sending malicious PDF and DOC files, which use exploits to drop variants of Backdoor.Sogu . | 5,503 |
TOOL | DOC | 0.479432 | 2,341 | Attackers are sending malicious PDF and DOC files, which use exploits to drop variants of Backdoor.Sogu . | 5,504 |
FILE | Backdoor.Sogu | 0.713503 | 2,341 | Attackers are sending malicious PDF and DOC files, which use exploits to drop variants of Backdoor.Sogu . | 5,505 |
MAL | Backdoor.Sogu, | 0.472219 | 2,343 | The Sogu gang use a custom developed threat – Backdoor.Sogu, whereas the group described in this document use an off the shelf threat – Poison Ivy . | 5,506 |
MAL | Poison Ivy | 0.861904 | 2,343 | The Sogu gang use a custom developed threat – Backdoor.Sogu, whereas the group described in this document use an off the shelf threat – Poison Ivy . | 5,507 |
MAL | PDF | 0.577905 | 2,344 | The Sogu gang, in contrast, use PDF and DOC files in very tailored, targeted emails . | 5,508 |
MAL | DOC files | 0.53859 | 2,344 | The Sogu gang, in contrast, use PDF and DOC files in very tailored, targeted emails . | 5,509 |
TOOL | emails | 0.907867 | 2,344 | The Sogu gang, in contrast, use PDF and DOC files in very tailored, targeted emails . | 5,510 |
APT | B- | 0.780899 | 2,345 | These B- are primarily targeting B- I- in search of key intellectual property for competitive advantage, B- I-, and B- I- often in search of documents related to current B- events and B- I- I- . | 5,511 |
APT | B-Hack's B- | 0.676076 | 2,346 | B-Hack's B- focused on the B- I- with the goal of obtaining sensitive documents such as proprietary designs, formulas, and manufacturing processes . | 5,512 |
LOC | Middle East | 0.678743 | 2,348 | These have been highly active in the Middle East region and unveiled ongoing B- I- in multiple regions . | 5,513 |
ACT | spear phishing | 0.920553 | 2,349 | The attackers try to lure targets through spear phishing emails that include compressed executables . | 5,514 |
TOOL | emails | 0.903287 | 2,349 | The attackers try to lure targets through spear phishing emails that include compressed executables . | 5,515 |
SECTEAM | Kaspersky | 0.897605 | 2,351 | Using the Kaspersky Security Network (KSN) and artifacts from malware files and B- sites, we were able to trace the B- back to March 2015 . | 5,516 |
TIME | March 2015 | 0.911369 | 2,351 | Using the Kaspersky Security Network (KSN) and artifacts from malware files and B- sites, we were able to trace the B- back to March 2015 . | 5,517 |
SECTEAM | Kaspersky | 0.886186 | 2,352 | B- I- is one of the many B- in the wild targeting B-, B- and B- I-, Kaspersky Lab recommends users to be extra cautious while checking and opening emails and attachments . | 5,518 |
TOOL | emails | 0.916185 | 2,352 | B- I- is one of the many B- in the wild targeting B-, B- and B- I-, Kaspersky Lab recommends users to be extra cautious while checking and opening emails and attachments . | 5,519 |
APT | B- | 0.91516 | 2,354 | The B- appear to be geopolitically motivated and target B- I- I- . | 5,520 |
TIME | 2017, | 0.873982 | 2,356 | The attackers have targeted a large number of organizations globally since early 2017, with the main focus on the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), especially Palestine . | 5,521 |
LOC | Middle East | 0.905741 | 2,356 | The attackers have targeted a large number of organizations globally since early 2017, with the main focus on the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), especially Palestine . | 5,522 |
LOC | North Africa | 0.896559 | 2,356 | The attackers have targeted a large number of organizations globally since early 2017, with the main focus on the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), especially Palestine . | 5,523 |
LOC | Palestine | 0.894264 | 2,356 | The attackers have targeted a large number of organizations globally since early 2017, with the main focus on the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), especially Palestine . | 5,524 |
LOC | MENA | 0.92397 | 2,357 | The B- were initially discovered while investigating a B- I- that targeted B- figures in the MENA region . | 5,525 |
MAL | BlackEnergy | 0.739097 | 2,358 | Like BlackEnergy (a.k.a B-Hack, B-Hack), Potao is an example of targeted espionage (APT) malware detected mostly in Ukraine and a number of other CIS countries, including Russia, Georgia and Belarus . | 5,526 |
MAL | Potao | 0.919588 | 2,358 | Like BlackEnergy (a.k.a B-Hack, B-Hack), Potao is an example of targeted espionage (APT) malware detected mostly in Ukraine and a number of other CIS countries, including Russia, Georgia and Belarus . | 5,527 |
LOC | Ukraine | 0.920448 | 2,358 | Like BlackEnergy (a.k.a B-Hack, B-Hack), Potao is an example of targeted espionage (APT) malware detected mostly in Ukraine and a number of other CIS countries, including Russia, Georgia and Belarus . | 5,528 |
LOC | Russia, Georgia | 0.923303 | 2,358 | Like BlackEnergy (a.k.a B-Hack, B-Hack), Potao is an example of targeted espionage (APT) malware detected mostly in Ukraine and a number of other CIS countries, including Russia, Georgia and Belarus . | 5,529 |
LOC | Belarus | 0.920241 | 2,358 | Like BlackEnergy (a.k.a B-Hack, B-Hack), Potao is an example of targeted espionage (APT) malware detected mostly in Ukraine and a number of other CIS countries, including Russia, Georgia and Belarus . | 5,530 |
MAL | Potao | 0.913409 | 2,359 | The main reason for the increase in Potao detections in 2014 and 2015 were infections through USB drives . | 5,531 |
TIME | 2014 | 0.917029 | 2,359 | The main reason for the increase in Potao detections in 2014 and 2015 were infections through USB drives . | 5,532 |
TIME | 2015 | 0.914578 | 2,359 | The main reason for the increase in Potao detections in 2014 and 2015 were infections through USB drives . | 5,533 |
TIME | August 2011 | 0.923667 | 2,360 | The first B- I- that we examined took place in August 2011 . | 5,534 |
TIME | March 2014, | 0.925043 | 2,361 | In March 2014, the gang behind Potao started using a new infection vector . | 5,535 |
MAL | Potao | 0.910237 | 2,361 | In March 2014, the gang behind Potao started using a new infection vector . | 5,536 |
MAL | infection vector | 0.890351 | 2,361 | In March 2014, the gang behind Potao started using a new infection vector . | 5,537 |
TIME | March 2015, | 0.922056 | 2,362 | Since March 2015, ESET has detected Potao binaries at several high-value Ukrainian targets that include B- and B- I- and one of the major Ukrainian B- I- . | 5,538 |
SECTEAM | ESET | 0.866592 | 2,362 | Since March 2015, ESET has detected Potao binaries at several high-value Ukrainian targets that include B- and B- I- and one of the major Ukrainian B- I- . | 5,539 |
MAL | Potao | 0.914164 | 2,362 | Since March 2015, ESET has detected Potao binaries at several high-value Ukrainian targets that include B- and B- I- and one of the major Ukrainian B- I- . | 5,540 |
SECTEAM | ESET | 0.88592 | 2,363 | As confirmation that the malware writers are still very active even at the time of this writing, ESET detected a new Potao sample compiled on July 20, 2015 . | 5,541 |
MAL | Potao sample | 0.887638 | 2,363 | As confirmation that the malware writers are still very active even at the time of this writing, ESET detected a new Potao sample compiled on July 20, 2015 . | 5,542 |
TIME | July 20, 2015 | 0.849222 | 2,363 | As confirmation that the malware writers are still very active even at the time of this writing, ESET detected a new Potao sample compiled on July 20, 2015 . | 5,543 |
SECTEAM | ESET | 0.91701 | 2,364 | In the previous pages we have presented our findings based on ESET detection telemetry and our analysis of Win32/Potao and Win32/FakeTC samples . | 5,544 |
MAL | Win32/Potao | 0.908505 | 2,364 | In the previous pages we have presented our findings based on ESET detection telemetry and our analysis of Win32/Potao and Win32/FakeTC samples . | 5,545 |
MAL | Win32/FakeTC samples | 0.888751 | 2,364 | In the previous pages we have presented our findings based on ESET detection telemetry and our analysis of Win32/Potao and Win32/FakeTC samples . | 5,546 |
MAL | Potao | 0.917879 | 2,365 | Potao is another example of targeted espionage malware, a so-called APT, to use the popular buzzword, although technically the malware is not particularly advanced or sophisticated . | 5,547 |
MAL | malware | 0.893879 | 2,365 | Potao is another example of targeted espionage malware, a so-called APT, to use the popular buzzword, although technically the malware is not particularly advanced or sophisticated . | 5,548 |
MAL | Potao | 0.906817 | 2,366 | Examples of notable Potao dissemination techniques, some of which were previously unseen, or at least relatively uncommon, include the use of highly-targeted spear-phishing SMS messages to drive potential victims to malware download sites and USB worm functionality that tricked the user into' willingly' executing the t... | 5,549 |
ACT | spear-phishing | 0.916168 | 2,366 | Examples of notable Potao dissemination techniques, some of which were previously unseen, or at least relatively uncommon, include the use of highly-targeted spear-phishing SMS messages to drive potential victims to malware download sites and USB worm functionality that tricked the user into' willingly' executing the t... | 5,550 |
ACT | B-Hack I-Hack | 0.622821 | 2,368 | The B-Hack I-Hack typically utilized publicly available RATs in addition to some custom code, which ultimately provided backdoor functionality to affected systems via phony resumes and curriculum vitae (CVs). | 5,551 |
MAL | RATs | 0.909764 | 2,368 | The B-Hack I-Hack typically utilized publicly available RATs in addition to some custom code, which ultimately provided backdoor functionality to affected systems via phony resumes and curriculum vitae (CVs). | 5,552 |
APT | B-Hack group | 0.86071 | 2,369 | he B-Hack group typically utilized publicly available RATs in addition to some custom code, which ultimately provided backdoor functionality to affected systems via phony resumes and curriculum vitae (CVs). | 5,553 |
MAL | RATs | 0.910639 | 2,369 | he B-Hack group typically utilized publicly available RATs in addition to some custom code, which ultimately provided backdoor functionality to affected systems via phony resumes and curriculum vitae (CVs). | 5,554 |
APT | B-Hack | 0.533925 | 2,370 | B-Hack continues to maintain a heavy reliance on obfuscated and signed versions of older RATs like ZxShell and Ghost RAT, which have remained a favorite of the wider Chinese criminal community since their initial public release . | 5,555 |
MAL | RATs | 0.90588 | 2,370 | B-Hack continues to maintain a heavy reliance on obfuscated and signed versions of older RATs like ZxShell and Ghost RAT, which have remained a favorite of the wider Chinese criminal community since their initial public release . | 5,556 |
MAL | ZxShell | 0.914395 | 2,370 | B-Hack continues to maintain a heavy reliance on obfuscated and signed versions of older RATs like ZxShell and Ghost RAT, which have remained a favorite of the wider Chinese criminal community since their initial public release . | 5,557 |
MAL | Ghost RAT, | 0.863677 | 2,370 | B-Hack continues to maintain a heavy reliance on obfuscated and signed versions of older RATs like ZxShell and Ghost RAT, which have remained a favorite of the wider Chinese criminal community since their initial public release . | 5,558 |
SECTEAM | SPEAR | 0.923141 | 2,371 | SPEAR identified recent PassCV samples which implemented another commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) RAT called Netwire . | 5,559 |
MAL | PassCV samples | 0.901081 | 2,371 | SPEAR identified recent PassCV samples which implemented another commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) RAT called Netwire . | 5,560 |
MAL | RAT | 0.779336 | 2,371 | SPEAR identified recent PassCV samples which implemented another commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) RAT called Netwire . | 5,561 |
MAL | Netwire | 0.918011 | 2,371 | SPEAR identified recent PassCV samples which implemented another commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) RAT called Netwire . | 5,562 |
SECTEAM | SPEAR | 0.923141 | 2,372 | SPEAR identified recent PassCV samples which implemented another commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) RAT called Netwire . | 5,563 |
MAL | PassCV samples | 0.901081 | 2,372 | SPEAR identified recent PassCV samples which implemented another commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) RAT called Netwire . | 5,564 |
MAL | RAT | 0.779336 | 2,372 | SPEAR identified recent PassCV samples which implemented another commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) RAT called Netwire . | 5,565 |
MAL | Netwire | 0.918011 | 2,372 | SPEAR identified recent PassCV samples which implemented another commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) RAT called Netwire . | 5,566 |
SECTEAM | SPEAR | 0.91926 | 2,373 | The first new connection SPEAR identified was derived from an email address listed in Blue Coat Systems' original report on B-Hack . | 5,567 |
TOOL | email | 0.915671 | 2,373 | The first new connection SPEAR identified was derived from an email address listed in Blue Coat Systems' original report on B-Hack . | 5,568 |
APT | B-Hack | 0.882349 | 2,373 | The first new connection SPEAR identified was derived from an email address listed in Blue Coat Systems' original report on B-Hack . | 5,569 |
APT | B-Hack | 0.879894 | 2,375 | The B-Hack group continues to be extremely effective in compromising both small and large B- I- and surreptitiously using their code-signing certificates to infect an even larger swath of organizations . | 5,570 |
APT | B-Hack | 0.836624 | 2,376 | Since the last report, B-Hack has significantly expanded its targets to include victims in the United States, Taiwan, China and Russia . | 5,571 |
LOC | United States, Taiwan, China | 0.908511 | 2,376 | Since the last report, B-Hack has significantly expanded its targets to include victims in the United States, Taiwan, China and Russia . | 5,572 |
LOC | Russia | 0.912155 | 2,376 | Since the last report, B-Hack has significantly expanded its targets to include victims in the United States, Taiwan, China and Russia . | 5,573 |
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