Datasets:
naorm
/
dnrti-securebert-ner

Dataset card Data Studio Files
xet
 Community
1
Type
stringclasses
20 values
Text
stringlengths
1
236
Score
float64
0.22
0.96
Original Sentence ID
int64
0
6.64k
Original Sentence
stringlengths
6
383
__index_level_0__
int64
0
16.8k
TIME
2010
0.918138
2,686
Its activities were traced back to 2010 in FireEye's 2013 report on operation B-Hack – a cyberespionage campaign directed at diplomatic organizations in Europe .
6,282
SECTEAM
FireEye's
0.920865
2,686
Its activities were traced back to 2010 in FireEye's 2013 report on operation B-Hack – a cyberespionage campaign directed at diplomatic organizations in Europe .
6,283
TIME
2013
0.920946
2,686
Its activities were traced back to 2010 in FireEye's 2013 report on operation B-Hack – a cyberespionage campaign directed at diplomatic organizations in Europe .
6,284
ACT
B-Hack
0.888833
2,686
Its activities were traced back to 2010 in FireEye's 2013 report on operation B-Hack – a cyberespionage campaign directed at diplomatic organizations in Europe .
6,285
ACT
cyberespionage campaign
0.882371
2,686
Its activities were traced back to 2010 in FireEye's 2013 report on operation B-Hack – a cyberespionage campaign directed at diplomatic organizations in Europe .
6,286
IDTY
diplomatic organizations
0.81161
2,686
Its activities were traced back to 2010 in FireEye's 2013 report on operation B-Hack – a cyberespionage campaign directed at diplomatic organizations in Europe .
6,287
LOC
Europe
0.898396
2,686
Its activities were traced back to 2010 in FireEye's 2013 report on operation B-Hack – a cyberespionage campaign directed at diplomatic organizations in Europe .
6,288
APT
B-Hack
0.916958
2,687
We have been tracking the malicious activities related to this threat actor and discovered a previously undocumented malware family with strong links to the B-Hack group – a backdoor we named Okrum .
6,289
MAL
Okrum
0.920516
2,687
We have been tracking the malicious activities related to this threat actor and discovered a previously undocumented malware family with strong links to the B-Hack group – a backdoor we named Okrum .
6,290
TIME
2015
0.918778
2,688
Furthermore, from 2015 to 2019, we detected new versions of known malware families attributed to the B-Hack group – BS2005 backdoors from operation Ke3chang and the RoyalDNS malware, reported by NCC Group in 2018 .
6,291
TIME
2019,
0.914944
2,688
Furthermore, from 2015 to 2019, we detected new versions of known malware families attributed to the B-Hack group – BS2005 backdoors from operation Ke3chang and the RoyalDNS malware, reported by NCC Group in 2018 .
6,292
APT
B-Hack group
0.777252
2,688
Furthermore, from 2015 to 2019, we detected new versions of known malware families attributed to the B-Hack group – BS2005 backdoors from operation Ke3chang and the RoyalDNS malware, reported by NCC Group in 2018 .
6,293
MAL
BS2005 backdoors
0.880899
2,688
Furthermore, from 2015 to 2019, we detected new versions of known malware families attributed to the B-Hack group – BS2005 backdoors from operation Ke3chang and the RoyalDNS malware, reported by NCC Group in 2018 .
6,294
MAL
RoyalDNS malware,
0.901652
2,688
Furthermore, from 2015 to 2019, we detected new versions of known malware families attributed to the B-Hack group – BS2005 backdoors from operation Ke3chang and the RoyalDNS malware, reported by NCC Group in 2018 .
6,295
SECTEAM
NCC Group
0.874876
2,688
Furthermore, from 2015 to 2019, we detected new versions of known malware families attributed to the B-Hack group – BS2005 backdoors from operation Ke3chang and the RoyalDNS malware, reported by NCC Group in 2018 .
6,296
TIME
2018
0.9213
2,688
Furthermore, from 2015 to 2019, we detected new versions of known malware families attributed to the B-Hack group – BS2005 backdoors from operation Ke3chang and the RoyalDNS malware, reported by NCC Group in 2018 .
6,297
APT
B-Hack
0.912207
2,689
B-Hack behind the attacks seemed to have a particular interest in Slovakia, where a big portion of the discovered malware samples was detected; Croatia, the Czech Republic and other countries were also affected .
6,298
LOC
Slovakia,
0.922351
2,689
B-Hack behind the attacks seemed to have a particular interest in Slovakia, where a big portion of the discovered malware samples was detected; Croatia, the Czech Republic and other countries were also affected .
6,299
LOC
Croatia,
0.92299
2,689
B-Hack behind the attacks seemed to have a particular interest in Slovakia, where a big portion of the discovered malware samples was detected; Croatia, the Czech Republic and other countries were also affected .
6,300
LOC
Czech Republic
0.917863
2,689
B-Hack behind the attacks seemed to have a particular interest in Slovakia, where a big portion of the discovered malware samples was detected; Croatia, the Czech Republic and other countries were also affected .
6,301
FILE
malware
0.748247
2,690
Our technical analysis of the malware used in these attacks showed close ties to BS2005 backdoors from operation Ke3chang, and to a related TidePool malware family discovered by Palo Alto Networks in 2016 that targeted Indian embassies across the globe .
6,302
FILE
BS2005 backdoors
0.911416
2,690
Our technical analysis of the malware used in these attacks showed close ties to BS2005 backdoors from operation Ke3chang, and to a related TidePool malware family discovered by Palo Alto Networks in 2016 that targeted Indian embassies across the globe .
6,303
FILE
TidePool malware
0.892627
2,690
Our technical analysis of the malware used in these attacks showed close ties to BS2005 backdoors from operation Ke3chang, and to a related TidePool malware family discovered by Palo Alto Networks in 2016 that targeted Indian embassies across the globe .
6,304
SECTEAM
Palo Alto
0.867717
2,690
Our technical analysis of the malware used in these attacks showed close ties to BS2005 backdoors from operation Ke3chang, and to a related TidePool malware family discovered by Palo Alto Networks in 2016 that targeted Indian embassies across the globe .
6,305
TIME
2016
0.917145
2,690
Our technical analysis of the malware used in these attacks showed close ties to BS2005 backdoors from operation Ke3chang, and to a related TidePool malware family discovered by Palo Alto Networks in 2016 that targeted Indian embassies across the globe .
6,306
TIME
2016,
0.54499
2,691
The story continued in late 2016, when we discovered a new, previously unknown backdoor that we named Okrum .
6,307
MAL
Okrum
0.913006
2,691
The story continued in late 2016, when we discovered a new, previously unknown backdoor that we named Okrum .
6,308
FILE
Okrum malware
0.902907
2,692
The malicious actors behind the Okrum malware were focused on the same targets in Slovakia that were previously targeted by Ketrican 2015 backdoors .
6,309
LOC
Slovakia
0.926719
2,692
The malicious actors behind the Okrum malware were focused on the same targets in Slovakia that were previously targeted by Ketrican 2015 backdoors .
6,310
FILE
backdoors
0.859863
2,692
The malicious actors behind the Okrum malware were focused on the same targets in Slovakia that were previously targeted by Ketrican 2015 backdoors .
6,311
FILE
Okrum backdoor
0.916459
2,693
We started connecting the dots when we discovered that the Okrum backdoor was used to drop a Ketrican backdoor, freshly compiled in 2017 .
6,312
FILE
Ketrican backdoor,
0.923525
2,693
We started connecting the dots when we discovered that the Okrum backdoor was used to drop a Ketrican backdoor, freshly compiled in 2017 .
6,313
FILE
Okrum malware
0.908787
2,694
In 2017, the same entities that were affected by the Okrum malware and by the 2015 Ketrican backdoors again became targets of the malicious actors .
6,314
FILE
Ketrican backdoors
0.910243
2,694
In 2017, the same entities that were affected by the Okrum malware and by the 2015 Ketrican backdoors again became targets of the malicious actors .
6,315
FILE
RoyalDNS malware
0.644475
2,695
This time, the attackers used new versions of the RoyalDNS malware and a Ketrican 2017 backdoor .
6,316
FILE
Ketrican
0.581963
2,695
This time, the attackers used new versions of the RoyalDNS malware and a Ketrican 2017 backdoor .
6,317
SECTEAM
ESET
0.892013
2,696
According to ESET telemetry, Okrum was first detected in December 2016, and targeted diplomatic missions in Slovakia, Belgium, Chile, Guatemala and Brazil throughout 2017 .
6,318
FILE
Okrum
0.917973
2,696
According to ESET telemetry, Okrum was first detected in December 2016, and targeted diplomatic missions in Slovakia, Belgium, Chile, Guatemala and Brazil throughout 2017 .
6,319
TIME
December 2016,
0.919432
2,696
According to ESET telemetry, Okrum was first detected in December 2016, and targeted diplomatic missions in Slovakia, Belgium, Chile, Guatemala and Brazil throughout 2017 .
6,320
LOC
Slovakia, Belgium, Chile, Guatemala
0.916814
2,696
According to ESET telemetry, Okrum was first detected in December 2016, and targeted diplomatic missions in Slovakia, Belgium, Chile, Guatemala and Brazil throughout 2017 .
6,321
LOC
Brazil
0.921197
2,696
According to ESET telemetry, Okrum was first detected in December 2016, and targeted diplomatic missions in Slovakia, Belgium, Chile, Guatemala and Brazil throughout 2017 .
6,322
SECTEAM
DeepSight
0.910386
2,697
In addition to file-based protection, customers of the DeepSight has received reports on B-Hack, which detail methods of detecting and thwarting activities of this group .
6,323
APT
B-Hack,
0.795928
2,697
In addition to file-based protection, customers of the DeepSight has received reports on B-Hack, which detail methods of detecting and thwarting activities of this group .
6,324
TIME
2018,
0.927027
2,698
In 2018, we discovered a new version of the Ketrican backdoor that featured some code improvements .
6,325
FILE
Ketrican
0.879167
2,698
In 2018, we discovered a new version of the Ketrican backdoor that featured some code improvements .
6,326
FILE
Okrum
0.916353
2,699
According to our telemetry, Okrum was used to target diplomatic missions in Slovakia, Belgium, Chile, Guatemala, and Brazil, with the attackers showing a particular interest in Slovakia .
6,327
LOC
Slovakia, Belgium, Chile, Guatemala,
0.931235
2,699
According to our telemetry, Okrum was used to target diplomatic missions in Slovakia, Belgium, Chile, Guatemala, and Brazil, with the attackers showing a particular interest in Slovakia .
6,328
LOC
Brazil,
0.93154
2,699
According to our telemetry, Okrum was used to target diplomatic missions in Slovakia, Belgium, Chile, Guatemala, and Brazil, with the attackers showing a particular interest in Slovakia .
6,329
APT
B-Hack,
0.89957
2,700
Indeed, we have detected various external tools being abused by B-Hack, such as a keylogger, tools for dumping passwords, or enumerating network sessions .
6,330
MAL
keylogger,
0.877589
2,700
Indeed, we have detected various external tools being abused by B-Hack, such as a keylogger, tools for dumping passwords, or enumerating network sessions .
6,331
FILE
Okrum
0.923133
2,701
The detection evasion techniques we observed in the Okrum malware include embedding the malicious payload within a legitimate PNG image, employing several anti-emulation and anti-sandbox tricks, as well as making frequent changes in implementation .
6,332
IDTY
military
0.851258
2,702
The unnamed company makes products used in the military and aerospace industries, and the hackers could have been after commercial secrets or more traditional espionage, according to ClearSky, the cybersecurity firm that exposed the B- .
6,333
IDTY
aerospace industries,
0.767182
2,702
The unnamed company makes products used in the military and aerospace industries, and the hackers could have been after commercial secrets or more traditional espionage, according to ClearSky, the cybersecurity firm that exposed the B- .
6,334
SECTEAM
ClearSky,
0.928409
2,702
The unnamed company makes products used in the military and aerospace industries, and the hackers could have been after commercial secrets or more traditional espionage, according to ClearSky, the cybersecurity firm that exposed the B- .
6,335
IDTY
B-
0.877311
2,702
The unnamed company makes products used in the military and aerospace industries, and the hackers could have been after commercial secrets or more traditional espionage, according to ClearSky, the cybersecurity firm that exposed the B- .
6,336
LOC
North Korean
0.904002
2,703
North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un has set ambitious economic goals, and some cybersecurity analysts have predicted he will unleash the B-Hack I-Hack to meet those deadlines by targeting B- I- trade secrets .
6,337
IDTY
economic
0.470178
2,703
North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un has set ambitious economic goals, and some cybersecurity analysts have predicted he will unleash the B-Hack I-Hack to meet those deadlines by targeting B- I- trade secrets .
6,338
APT
B-Hack I-Hack
0.776041
2,703
North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un has set ambitious economic goals, and some cybersecurity analysts have predicted he will unleash the B-Hack I-Hack to meet those deadlines by targeting B- I- trade secrets .
6,339
SECTEAM
ClearSky,
0.930177
2,704
According to ClearSky, the suspected Lazarus operatives looked to leverage a vulnerability in outdated WinRAR file-archiving software that hackers have been exploiting since it was disclosed last month .
6,340
FILE
WinRAR
0.91186
2,704
According to ClearSky, the suspected Lazarus operatives looked to leverage a vulnerability in outdated WinRAR file-archiving software that hackers have been exploiting since it was disclosed last month .
6,341
ACT
B-Hack I-Hack campaign
0.809846
2,705
This new B-Hack I-Hack campaign delivers a malicious RTF document posing as an ASEAN Defence Minister's Meeting (ADMM) directory (decoy) that also carries an executable (payload) embedded as an OLE object, the Elise backdoor .
6,342
IDTY
ASEAN Defence Minister's Meeting
0.700806
2,705
This new B-Hack I-Hack campaign delivers a malicious RTF document posing as an ASEAN Defence Minister's Meeting (ADMM) directory (decoy) that also carries an executable (payload) embedded as an OLE object, the Elise backdoor .
6,343
TOOL
OLE
0.814138
2,705
This new B-Hack I-Hack campaign delivers a malicious RTF document posing as an ASEAN Defence Minister's Meeting (ADMM) directory (decoy) that also carries an executable (payload) embedded as an OLE object, the Elise backdoor .
6,344
MAL
Elise backdoor
0.906366
2,705
This new B-Hack I-Hack campaign delivers a malicious RTF document posing as an ASEAN Defence Minister's Meeting (ADMM) directory (decoy) that also carries an executable (payload) embedded as an OLE object, the Elise backdoor .
6,345
ACT
B-Hack
0.488167
2,706
Just months after the B-Hack B- I- I- against ASEAN-related websites was observed in Fall 2017, this new activity clearly indicates the association (ASEAN) clearly remains a priority collection target in the region .
6,346
TIME
Fall 2017,
0.637507
2,706
Just months after the B-Hack B- I- I- against ASEAN-related websites was observed in Fall 2017, this new activity clearly indicates the association (ASEAN) clearly remains a priority collection target in the region .
6,347
APT
B-Hack Group
0.911405
2,707
Researchers implicated B-Hack Group because of digital clues including a malicious implant known as B-Hack I-Hack that has been attributed to the group .
6,348
MAL
malicious implant
0.825264
2,707
Researchers implicated B-Hack Group because of digital clues including a malicious implant known as B-Hack I-Hack that has been attributed to the group .
6,349
MAL
B-Hack I-Hack
0.861327
2,707
Researchers implicated B-Hack Group because of digital clues including a malicious implant known as B-Hack I-Hack that has been attributed to the group .
6,350
APT
B-Hack
0.630484
2,708
The B-Hack originally embedded an implant into the malicious document as a hypertext application (HTA) file, and then quickly moved to hide it in an image on a remote server and used obfuscated Visual Basic macros to launch the decoder script .
6,351
TOOL
Visual Basic
0.885715
2,708
The B-Hack originally embedded an implant into the malicious document as a hypertext application (HTA) file, and then quickly moved to hide it in an image on a remote server and used obfuscated Visual Basic macros to launch the decoder script .
6,352
APT
B-Hack
0.553727
2,709
B-Hack used the open-source tool Invoke-PSImage, released December 20, to embed the PowerShell script into the image file .
6,353
TOOL
Invoke-PSImage,
0.431958
2,709
B-Hack used the open-source tool Invoke-PSImage, released December 20, to embed the PowerShell script into the image file .
6,354
TOOL
PowerShell
0.7293
2,709
B-Hack used the open-source tool Invoke-PSImage, released December 20, to embed the PowerShell script into the image file .
6,355
OS
Windows
0.9032
2,710
Once the script runs, B-Hack passes the decoded script from the image file to the Windows command line in a variable $x, which uses cmd.exe to execute the obfuscated script and run it via PowerShell .
6,356
FILE
cmd.exe
0.910197
2,710
Once the script runs, B-Hack passes the decoded script from the image file to the Windows command line in a variable $x, which uses cmd.exe to execute the obfuscated script and run it via PowerShell .
6,357
TOOL
PowerShell
0.913936
2,710
Once the script runs, B-Hack passes the decoded script from the image file to the Windows command line in a variable $x, which uses cmd.exe to execute the obfuscated script and run it via PowerShell .
6,358
SECTEAM
Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
0.901208
2,711
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued an alert about this activity on Jan.
6,359
TIME
Jan.
0.89978
2,711
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued an alert about this activity on Jan.
6,360
TIME
24 2019,
0.826179
2,712
24 2019, warning that an attacker could redirect user traffic and obtain valid encryption certificates for an organization's domain names .
6,361
ACT
B- I- campaign,
0.9116
2,713
In the B- I- campaign, Talos was able to identify two distinct groups of victims .
6,362
SECTEAM
Talos
0.917321
2,713
In the B- I- campaign, Talos was able to identify two distinct groups of victims .
6,363
ACT
B-Hack,
0.645522
2,714
The first B-Hack, we identify as primary victims, includes B- I- I-, B- of foreign affairs, and B- I- I- .
6,364
ACT
B-Hack
0.732644
2,715
The B-Hack I-Hack behind the B- I- campaign show clear signs of being highly capable and brazen in their endeavors .
6,365
ACT
B- I- campaign
0.814876
2,715
The B-Hack I-Hack behind the B- I- campaign show clear signs of being highly capable and brazen in their endeavors .
6,366
APT
B-Hack I-Hack
0.903705
2,716
In most cases, B-Hack I-Hack typically stop or slow down their activities once their campaigns are publicly revealed .
6,367
ACT
activities
0.529872
2,716
In most cases, B-Hack I-Hack typically stop or slow down their activities once their campaigns are publicly revealed .
6,368
ACT
campaigns
0.583855
2,716
In most cases, B-Hack I-Hack typically stop or slow down their activities once their campaigns are publicly revealed .
6,369
ACT
B-Hack
0.641841
2,717
The B-Hack I-Hack behind the B- I- campaign were successful in compromising entities by manipulating and falsifying DNS records at various levels in the domain name space .
6,370
ACT
B- I- campaign
0.898587
2,717
The B-Hack I-Hack behind the B- I- campaign were successful in compromising entities by manipulating and falsifying DNS records at various levels in the domain name space .
6,371
PROT
DNS
0.898477
2,717
The B-Hack I-Hack behind the B- I- campaign were successful in compromising entities by manipulating and falsifying DNS records at various levels in the domain name space .
6,372
ACT
B-Hack
0.89885
2,718
If an B-Hack was able to compromise an organization's network administrator credentials, the attacker would be able to change that particular organization's DNS records at will .
6,373
PROT
DNS
0.898006
2,718
If an B-Hack was able to compromise an organization's network administrator credentials, the attacker would be able to change that particular organization's DNS records at will .
6,374
FILE
B-Hack
0.499539
2,719
If the B-Hack were able to obtain one of these EPP keys, they would be able to modify any DNS records that were managed by that particular registrar .
6,375
PROT
DNS
0.91514
2,719
If the B-Hack were able to obtain one of these EPP keys, they would be able to modify any DNS records that were managed by that particular registrar .
6,376
FILE
Sea Turtle
0.759959
2,721
The diagram below illustrates how we believe the actors behind the Sea Turtle campaign used DNS hijacking to achieve their end goals .
6,377
PROT
DNS
0.87779
2,721
The diagram below illustrates how we believe the actors behind the Sea Turtle campaign used DNS hijacking to achieve their end goals .
6,378
TIME
early 2019,
0.923381
2,722
As of early 2019, the only evidence of the spear-phishing B-Hack I-Hack came from a compromised organization's public disclosure .
6,379
ACT
spear-phishing
0.921353
2,722
As of early 2019, the only evidence of the spear-phishing B-Hack I-Hack came from a compromised organization's public disclosure .
6,380
TIME
January 4,
0.590664
2,723
On January 4, Packet Clearing House, which is not an Internet exchange point but rather is an NGO which provides support to Internet exchange points and the core of the domain name system, provided confirmation of this aspect of the B-Hack tactics when it publicly revealed its internal DNS had been briefly hijacked as ...
6,381