Type stringclasses 20
values | Text stringlengths 1 236 | Score float64 0.22 0.96 | Original Sentence ID int64 0 6.64k | Original Sentence stringlengths 6 383 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 16.8k |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
APT | B-Hack | 0.87499 | 2,816 | During this operation (dubbed ‘Cloud Hopper” because of the group’s use of popular western cloud-based services), B-Hack utilized both new malware (Quasar RAT, Trochilus, RedLeaves, ChChes as well as some familiar old tools . | 6,584 |
MAL | (Quasar RAT, Trochilus, RedLeaves, ChChes | 0.87094 | 2,816 | During this operation (dubbed ‘Cloud Hopper” because of the group’s use of popular western cloud-based services), B-Hack utilized both new malware (Quasar RAT, Trochilus, RedLeaves, ChChes as well as some familiar old tools . | 6,585 |
TIME | December 20, 2018, | 0.898943 | 2,817 | Most recently, on December 20, 2018, the U.S. | 6,586 |
LOC | U.S. | 0.92555 | 2,817 | Most recently, on December 20, 2018, the U.S. | 6,587 |
IDTY | Department of Justice | 0.80998 | 2,818 | Department of Justice charged two B-Hack associated with the Chinese Ministry of State Security (MSS) with global computer intrusion campaigns targeting intellectual property . | 6,588 |
IDTY | Chinese Ministry of State Security (MSS) | 0.737043 | 2,818 | Department of Justice charged two B-Hack associated with the Chinese Ministry of State Security (MSS) with global computer intrusion campaigns targeting intellectual property . | 6,589 |
APT | B-Hack, | 0.924425 | 2,819 | This indictment attributed the intrusions to B-Hack, a group that had been conducting the malicious activities for over a decade on behalf of the MSS, China’s civilian human intelligence agency . | 6,590 |
IDTY | MSS, | 0.892042 | 2,819 | This indictment attributed the intrusions to B-Hack, a group that had been conducting the malicious activities for over a decade on behalf of the MSS, China’s civilian human intelligence agency . | 6,591 |
LOC | China’s | 0.49194 | 2,819 | This indictment attributed the intrusions to B-Hack, a group that had been conducting the malicious activities for over a decade on behalf of the MSS, China’s civilian human intelligence agency . | 6,592 |
IDTY | civilian human intelligence agency | 0.85879 | 2,819 | This indictment attributed the intrusions to B-Hack, a group that had been conducting the malicious activities for over a decade on behalf of the MSS, China’s civilian human intelligence agency . | 6,593 |
APT | B-Hack | 0.920374 | 2,820 | The B-Hack group operates across the entire Nordic region along with Benelux, Central, and Eastern Europe . | 6,594 |
LOC | Benelux, Central, | 0.844039 | 2,820 | The B-Hack group operates across the entire Nordic region along with Benelux, Central, and Eastern Europe . | 6,595 |
LOC | Eastern Europe | 0.896047 | 2,820 | The B-Hack group operates across the entire Nordic region along with Benelux, Central, and Eastern Europe . | 6,596 |
SECTEAM | Recorded Future | 0.852464 | 2,821 | Recorded Future has actively tracked B-Hack for several years, focusing specifically on the group’s targeting of MSPs and global internet infrastructure providers since the Operation Cloud Hopper report in 2017 . | 6,597 |
APT | B-Hack | 0.843258 | 2,821 | Recorded Future has actively tracked B-Hack for several years, focusing specifically on the group’s targeting of MSPs and global internet infrastructure providers since the Operation Cloud Hopper report in 2017 . | 6,598 |
IDTY | MSPs | 0.884537 | 2,821 | Recorded Future has actively tracked B-Hack for several years, focusing specifically on the group’s targeting of MSPs and global internet infrastructure providers since the Operation Cloud Hopper report in 2017 . | 6,599 |
IDTY | internet infrastructure providers | 0.777764 | 2,821 | Recorded Future has actively tracked B-Hack for several years, focusing specifically on the group’s targeting of MSPs and global internet infrastructure providers since the Operation Cloud Hopper report in 2017 . | 6,600 |
TIME | 2017 | 0.894059 | 2,821 | Recorded Future has actively tracked B-Hack for several years, focusing specifically on the group’s targeting of MSPs and global internet infrastructure providers since the Operation Cloud Hopper report in 2017 . | 6,601 |
IDTY | customers | 0.608402 | 2,822 | We were particularly interested in identifying whether any customers of the targeted MSPs were subsequently compromised by B-Hack, given their potential access through compromised B- networks . | 6,602 |
IDTY | MSPs | 0.891329 | 2,822 | We were particularly interested in identifying whether any customers of the targeted MSPs were subsequently compromised by B-Hack, given their potential access through compromised B- networks . | 6,603 |
APT | B-Hack, | 0.570183 | 2,822 | We were particularly interested in identifying whether any customers of the targeted MSPs were subsequently compromised by B-Hack, given their potential access through compromised B- networks . | 6,604 |
SECTEAM | Recorded Future’s | 0.849108 | 2,823 | Recorded Future’s Insikt Group has actively tracked APT10 for several years, focusing specifically on the group’s targeting of B- and global internet B- I- since the Operation Cloud Hopper report in 2017 . | 6,605 |
APT | Insikt | 0.709103 | 2,823 | Recorded Future’s Insikt Group has actively tracked APT10 for several years, focusing specifically on the group’s targeting of B- and global internet B- I- since the Operation Cloud Hopper report in 2017 . | 6,606 |
APT | APT10 | 0.920994 | 2,823 | Recorded Future’s Insikt Group has actively tracked APT10 for several years, focusing specifically on the group’s targeting of B- and global internet B- I- since the Operation Cloud Hopper report in 2017 . | 6,607 |
TIME | 2017 | 0.914266 | 2,823 | Recorded Future’s Insikt Group has actively tracked APT10 for several years, focusing specifically on the group’s targeting of B- and global internet B- I- since the Operation Cloud Hopper report in 2017 . | 6,608 |
TIME | September 2018, | 0.917621 | 2,824 | In September 2018, one of our clients (and a supplier as well), Visma, reached out to us for assistance in investigating an incident uncovered on their network following a breach notification by B-Hack . | 6,609 |
MAL | Visma | 0.692028 | 2,825 | This was followed by an initial exploitation, network enumeration, and malicious tool deployment on various Visma endpoints within two weeks of initial access . | 6,610 |
TIME | August 30, 2018, | 0.929088 | 2,826 | On August 30, 2018, B-Hack deployed their first modified version of Trochilus that had its C2 communications encrypted using Salsa20 and RC4 ciphers instead of the more common RC4-encrypted Trochilus variant seen in the wild . | 6,611 |
APT | B-Hack | 0.892074 | 2,826 | On August 30, 2018, B-Hack deployed their first modified version of Trochilus that had its C2 communications encrypted using Salsa20 and RC4 ciphers instead of the more common RC4-encrypted Trochilus variant seen in the wild . | 6,612 |
MAL | Trochilus | 0.920545 | 2,826 | On August 30, 2018, B-Hack deployed their first modified version of Trochilus that had its C2 communications encrypted using Salsa20 and RC4 ciphers instead of the more common RC4-encrypted Trochilus variant seen in the wild . | 6,613 |
TOOL | C2 | 0.916033 | 2,826 | On August 30, 2018, B-Hack deployed their first modified version of Trochilus that had its C2 communications encrypted using Salsa20 and RC4 ciphers instead of the more common RC4-encrypted Trochilus variant seen in the wild . | 6,614 |
ENCR | Salsa20 | 0.87914 | 2,826 | On August 30, 2018, B-Hack deployed their first modified version of Trochilus that had its C2 communications encrypted using Salsa20 and RC4 ciphers instead of the more common RC4-encrypted Trochilus variant seen in the wild . | 6,615 |
ENCR | RC4 | 0.821837 | 2,826 | On August 30, 2018, B-Hack deployed their first modified version of Trochilus that had its C2 communications encrypted using Salsa20 and RC4 ciphers instead of the more common RC4-encrypted Trochilus variant seen in the wild . | 6,616 |
ENCR | RC4-encrypted | 0.723527 | 2,826 | On August 30, 2018, B-Hack deployed their first modified version of Trochilus that had its C2 communications encrypted using Salsa20 and RC4 ciphers instead of the more common RC4-encrypted Trochilus variant seen in the wild . | 6,617 |
MAL | Trochilus variant | 0.683397 | 2,826 | On August 30, 2018, B-Hack deployed their first modified version of Trochilus that had its C2 communications encrypted using Salsa20 and RC4 ciphers instead of the more common RC4-encrypted Trochilus variant seen in the wild . | 6,618 |
FILE | sample, | 0.822174 | 2,827 | This sample, similar to other Trochilus samples, was deployed using a DLL sideloading method utilizing three files, uploaded to the same folder on the victim machine as identified in US-CERT advisory TA17-117A last revised on December 20, 2018 . | 6,619 |
FILE | Trochilus | 0.896258 | 2,827 | This sample, similar to other Trochilus samples, was deployed using a DLL sideloading method utilizing three files, uploaded to the same folder on the victim machine as identified in US-CERT advisory TA17-117A last revised on December 20, 2018 . | 6,620 |
TOOL | DLL | 0.860621 | 2,827 | This sample, similar to other Trochilus samples, was deployed using a DLL sideloading method utilizing three files, uploaded to the same folder on the victim machine as identified in US-CERT advisory TA17-117A last revised on December 20, 2018 . | 6,621 |
FILE | configuration file | 0.91949 | 2,828 | The configuration file then loads the Trochilus payload into memory by injecting it into a valid system process . | 6,622 |
APT | B-Hack | 0.602663 | 2,829 | B-Hack also used WinRAR and cURL for Windows, both often renamed, to compress and upload the exfiltrated files from the Visma network to the Dropbox API . | 6,623 |
MAL | WinRAR | 0.473118 | 2,829 | B-Hack also used WinRAR and cURL for Windows, both often renamed, to compress and upload the exfiltrated files from the Visma network to the Dropbox API . | 6,624 |
TOOL | cURL | 0.557924 | 2,829 | B-Hack also used WinRAR and cURL for Windows, both often renamed, to compress and upload the exfiltrated files from the Visma network to the Dropbox API . | 6,625 |
OS | Windows, | 0.891646 | 2,829 | B-Hack also used WinRAR and cURL for Windows, both often renamed, to compress and upload the exfiltrated files from the Visma network to the Dropbox API . | 6,626 |
MAL | Visma | 0.770911 | 2,829 | B-Hack also used WinRAR and cURL for Windows, both often renamed, to compress and upload the exfiltrated files from the Visma network to the Dropbox API . | 6,627 |
TOOL | Dropbox | 0.740484 | 2,829 | B-Hack also used WinRAR and cURL for Windows, both often renamed, to compress and upload the exfiltrated files from the Visma network to the Dropbox API . | 6,628 |
APT | B-Hack | 0.778161 | 2,830 | In order to exfiltrate the compromised data, B-Hack employed custom malware that used Dropbox as its C2 . | 6,629 |
MAL | Dropbox | 0.852599 | 2,830 | In order to exfiltrate the compromised data, B-Hack employed custom malware that used Dropbox as its C2 . | 6,630 |
TOOL | C2 | 0.907188 | 2,830 | In order to exfiltrate the compromised data, B-Hack employed custom malware that used Dropbox as its C2 . | 6,631 |
TOOL | WinRAR | 0.91662 | 2,831 | They also used WinRAR and cURL for Windows, both often renamed, to compress and upload the exfiltrated files from the Visma network to the Dropbox API . | 6,632 |
TOOL | cURL | 0.876233 | 2,831 | They also used WinRAR and cURL for Windows, both often renamed, to compress and upload the exfiltrated files from the Visma network to the Dropbox API . | 6,633 |
OS | Windows, | 0.92674 | 2,831 | They also used WinRAR and cURL for Windows, both often renamed, to compress and upload the exfiltrated files from the Visma network to the Dropbox API . | 6,634 |
TOOL | Visma | 0.472335 | 2,831 | They also used WinRAR and cURL for Windows, both often renamed, to compress and upload the exfiltrated files from the Visma network to the Dropbox API . | 6,635 |
TOOL | Dropbox | 0.895319 | 2,831 | They also used WinRAR and cURL for Windows, both often renamed, to compress and upload the exfiltrated files from the Visma network to the Dropbox API . | 6,636 |
SECTEAM | Rapid7 | 0.921224 | 2,832 | Our research partner Rapid7 investigated the Dropbox use and found that the B-Hack had used the same account to store exfiltrated data from a global apparel company . | 6,637 |
TOOL | Dropbox | 0.898406 | 2,832 | Our research partner Rapid7 investigated the Dropbox use and found that the B-Hack had used the same account to store exfiltrated data from a global apparel company . | 6,638 |
APT | B-Hack | 0.504194 | 2,832 | Our research partner Rapid7 investigated the Dropbox use and found that the B-Hack had used the same account to store exfiltrated data from a global apparel company . | 6,639 |
IDTY | apparel company | 0.744044 | 2,832 | Our research partner Rapid7 investigated the Dropbox use and found that the B-Hack had used the same account to store exfiltrated data from a global apparel company . | 6,640 |
LOC | U.S | 0.660378 | 2,833 | They also identified broadly similar TTPs being used in the B- I- a U.S law firm specializing in intellectual property law . | 6,641 |
SECTEAM | Rapid7’s | 0.873472 | 2,834 | Rapid7’s investigation revealed the B- I- was first targeted in late 2017, followed by the apparel company a few months later, and finally, the B- I- in August 2018 . | 6,642 |
TIME | 2017, | 0.682114 | 2,834 | Rapid7’s investigation revealed the B- I- was first targeted in late 2017, followed by the apparel company a few months later, and finally, the B- I- in August 2018 . | 6,643 |
TIME | August 2018 | 0.850533 | 2,834 | Rapid7’s investigation revealed the B- I- was first targeted in late 2017, followed by the apparel company a few months later, and finally, the B- I- in August 2018 . | 6,644 |
SECTEAM | Rapid7 | 0.912784 | 2,835 | In one of the attacks, Rapid7 identified the B-Hack escaping a Citrix application in order to run the payload script on the victim desktop . | 6,645 |
FILE | B-Hack | 0.554008 | 2,835 | In one of the attacks, Rapid7 identified the B-Hack escaping a Citrix application in order to run the payload script on the victim desktop . | 6,646 |
TOOL | Citrix | 0.582448 | 2,835 | In one of the attacks, Rapid7 identified the B-Hack escaping a Citrix application in order to run the payload script on the victim desktop . | 6,647 |
TOOL | DLL | 0.906459 | 2,836 | Additionally, the same DLL sideloading technique observed in the Visma attack was used, and many of the tools deployed by the B-Hack shared naming similarities as well 1.bat, cu.exe, ss.rar, r.exe, pd.exe . | 6,648 |
MAL | Visma | 0.875299 | 2,836 | Additionally, the same DLL sideloading technique observed in the Visma attack was used, and many of the tools deployed by the B-Hack shared naming similarities as well 1.bat, cu.exe, ss.rar, r.exe, pd.exe . | 6,649 |
ACT | B-Hack | 0.679756 | 2,836 | Additionally, the same DLL sideloading technique observed in the Visma attack was used, and many of the tools deployed by the B-Hack shared naming similarities as well 1.bat, cu.exe, ss.rar, r.exe, pd.exe . | 6,650 |
MAL | 1.bat, cu.exe, ss.rar, r.exe, pd.exe | 0.863211 | 2,836 | Additionally, the same DLL sideloading technique observed in the Visma attack was used, and many of the tools deployed by the B-Hack shared naming similarities as well 1.bat, cu.exe, ss.rar, r.exe, pd.exe . | 6,651 |
SECTEAM | Rapid7 | 0.920608 | 2,837 | Most interestingly, Rapid7 observed the use of the Notepad++ updater gup.exe as a legitimate executable to sideload a malicious DLL (libcurl.dll) in order to deploy a variant of the UPPERCUT backdoor also known as ANEL . | 6,652 |
FILE | gup.exe | 0.918886 | 2,837 | Most interestingly, Rapid7 observed the use of the Notepad++ updater gup.exe as a legitimate executable to sideload a malicious DLL (libcurl.dll) in order to deploy a variant of the UPPERCUT backdoor also known as ANEL . | 6,653 |
TOOL | DLL | 0.931826 | 2,837 | Most interestingly, Rapid7 observed the use of the Notepad++ updater gup.exe as a legitimate executable to sideload a malicious DLL (libcurl.dll) in order to deploy a variant of the UPPERCUT backdoor also known as ANEL . | 6,654 |
MAL | ANEL | 0.901525 | 2,837 | Most interestingly, Rapid7 observed the use of the Notepad++ updater gup.exe as a legitimate executable to sideload a malicious DLL (libcurl.dll) in order to deploy a variant of the UPPERCUT backdoor also known as ANEL . | 6,655 |
SECTEAM | B-Hack | 0.718981 | 2,838 | B-Hack used this approach to deploy UPPERCUT when targeting B- I- in July 2018 . | 6,656 |
MAL | UPPERCUT | 0.910943 | 2,838 | B-Hack used this approach to deploy UPPERCUT when targeting B- I- in July 2018 . | 6,657 |
TIME | July 2018 | 0.888509 | 2,838 | B-Hack used this approach to deploy UPPERCUT when targeting B- I- in July 2018 . | 6,658 |
APT | B-Hack | 0.915119 | 2,839 | B-Hack actors gained initial access to the Visma network around August 17, 2018 . | 6,659 |
MAL | Visma | 0.544028 | 2,839 | B-Hack actors gained initial access to the Visma network around August 17, 2018 . | 6,660 |
TIME | August 17, 2018 | 0.922868 | 2,839 | B-Hack actors gained initial access to the Visma network around August 17, 2018 . | 6,661 |
APT | B-Hack actors | 0.717931 | 2,840 | While we are confident that B-Hack actors gained access to the B- network in August using stolen employee Citrix remote desktop credentials, it is not clear how or when these credentials were initially compromised . | 6,662 |
TIME | August | 0.909146 | 2,840 | While we are confident that B-Hack actors gained access to the B- network in August using stolen employee Citrix remote desktop credentials, it is not clear how or when these credentials were initially compromised . | 6,663 |
MAL | Citrix | 0.391345 | 2,840 | While we are confident that B-Hack actors gained access to the B- network in August using stolen employee Citrix remote desktop credentials, it is not clear how or when these credentials were initially compromised . | 6,664 |
APT | B-Hack | 0.466078 | 2,841 | B-Hack I-Hack analysis of network metadata to and from the VPN endpoint IPs revealed consistent connectivity to Citrix-hosted infrastructure from all eight VPN endpoint IPs starting on August 17, 2018 — the same date the first authenticated login to Visma’s network was made using stolen credentials . | 6,665 |
FILE | Citrix-hosted | 0.918071 | 2,841 | B-Hack I-Hack analysis of network metadata to and from the VPN endpoint IPs revealed consistent connectivity to Citrix-hosted infrastructure from all eight VPN endpoint IPs starting on August 17, 2018 — the same date the first authenticated login to Visma’s network was made using stolen credentials . | 6,667 |
TOOL | VPN | 0.905658 | 2,841 | B-Hack I-Hack analysis of network metadata to and from the VPN endpoint IPs revealed consistent connectivity to Citrix-hosted infrastructure from all eight VPN endpoint IPs starting on August 17, 2018 — the same date the first authenticated login to Visma’s network was made using stolen credentials . | 6,668 |
TIME | August 17, 2018 | 0.868457 | 2,841 | B-Hack I-Hack analysis of network metadata to and from the VPN endpoint IPs revealed consistent connectivity to Citrix-hosted infrastructure from all eight VPN endpoint IPs starting on August 17, 2018 — the same date the first authenticated login to Visma’s network was made using stolen credentials . | 6,669 |
TIME | August 30, 2018, | 0.879276 | 2,842 | After almost two weeks, on August 30, 2018, B-Hack attackers used their access to the network to move laterally and made their first deployment of an RC4- and Salsa20-encrypted variant of the Trochilus malware using a previously associated DLL sideloading techniquE . | 6,670 |
APT | B-Hack attackers | 0.900966 | 2,842 | After almost two weeks, on August 30, 2018, B-Hack attackers used their access to the network to move laterally and made their first deployment of an RC4- and Salsa20-encrypted variant of the Trochilus malware using a previously associated DLL sideloading techniquE . | 6,671 |
ENCR | RC4- | 0.82857 | 2,842 | After almost two weeks, on August 30, 2018, B-Hack attackers used their access to the network to move laterally and made their first deployment of an RC4- and Salsa20-encrypted variant of the Trochilus malware using a previously associated DLL sideloading techniquE . | 6,672 |
ENCR | Salsa20-encrypted | 0.832747 | 2,842 | After almost two weeks, on August 30, 2018, B-Hack attackers used their access to the network to move laterally and made their first deployment of an RC4- and Salsa20-encrypted variant of the Trochilus malware using a previously associated DLL sideloading techniquE . | 6,673 |
MAL | Trochilus malware | 0.920248 | 2,842 | After almost two weeks, on August 30, 2018, B-Hack attackers used their access to the network to move laterally and made their first deployment of an RC4- and Salsa20-encrypted variant of the Trochilus malware using a previously associated DLL sideloading techniquE . | 6,674 |
TOOL | DLL | 0.902914 | 2,842 | After almost two weeks, on August 30, 2018, B-Hack attackers used their access to the network to move laterally and made their first deployment of an RC4- and Salsa20-encrypted variant of the Trochilus malware using a previously associated DLL sideloading techniquE . | 6,675 |
APT | B-Hack | 0.920758 | 2,843 | This means that B-Hack actors had two separate access points into the Visma network . | 6,676 |
MAL | Visma | 0.898466 | 2,843 | This means that B-Hack actors had two separate access points into the Visma network . | 6,677 |
ACT | B-Hack | 0.922964 | 2,844 | This slight delay may point to the handing over of active exploitation duties to other operator(s) in a multi-team B-Hack effort within the Ministry of State Security for the attack . | 6,678 |
IDTY | Ministry of State Security | 0.539798 | 2,844 | This slight delay may point to the handing over of active exploitation duties to other operator(s) in a multi-team B-Hack effort within the Ministry of State Security for the attack . | 6,679 |
DOM | internet.bs | 0.814095 | 2,845 | Other examples of malicious infrastructure registered with internet.bs include domains for B-Hack VPNFilter malware campaign and the registration of the cyber-berkut . | 6,680 |
ACT | B-Hack | 0.521985 | 2,845 | Other examples of malicious infrastructure registered with internet.bs include domains for B-Hack VPNFilter malware campaign and the registration of the cyber-berkut . | 6,681 |
MAL | VPNFilter | 0.536483 | 2,845 | Other examples of malicious infrastructure registered with internet.bs include domains for B-Hack VPNFilter malware campaign and the registration of the cyber-berkut . | 6,682 |
LOC | Russian | 0.83471 | 2,846 | org domain that was affiliated with the pro-Russian and potentially Russian state-linked threat actor B-Hack . | 6,683 |
APT | B-Hack | 0.831685 | 2,846 | org domain that was affiliated with the pro-Russian and potentially Russian state-linked threat actor B-Hack . | 6,684 |
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