Type stringclasses 20
values | Text stringlengths 1 236 | Score float64 0.22 0.96 | Original Sentence ID int64 0 6.64k | Original Sentence stringlengths 6 383 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 16.8k |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
FILE | iassvcs.exe | 0.9249 | 3,909 | And the dropper execute the iassvcs.exe to make a side loading and make the persistence . | 9,639 |
FILE | Filensfer | 0.923419 | 3,910 | Over the past three years, Filensfer has been deployed against organizations in Luxembourg, Sweden, Italy, the UK, and the U.S . | 9,640 |
LOC | Luxembourg, Sweden, Italy, the UK, | 0.858019 | 3,910 | Over the past three years, Filensfer has been deployed against organizations in Luxembourg, Sweden, Italy, the UK, and the U.S . | 9,641 |
LOC | the U.S | 0.887616 | 3,910 | Over the past three years, Filensfer has been deployed against organizations in Luxembourg, Sweden, Italy, the UK, and the U.S . | 9,642 |
FILE | Hussarini, | 0.884335 | 3,911 | Our analysis of this malware shows that it belongs to Hussarini, also known as Sarhust, a backdoor family that has been used actively in APT attacks targeting countries in the ASEAN region since 2014 . | 9,643 |
LOC | ASEAN region | 0.910322 | 3,911 | Our analysis of this malware shows that it belongs to Hussarini, also known as Sarhust, a backdoor family that has been used actively in APT attacks targeting countries in the ASEAN region since 2014 . | 9,644 |
TIME | 2014 | 0.779757 | 3,911 | Our analysis of this malware shows that it belongs to Hussarini, also known as Sarhust, a backdoor family that has been used actively in APT attacks targeting countries in the ASEAN region since 2014 . | 9,645 |
FILE | OutExtra.exe | 0.918196 | 3,912 | OutExtra.exe is a signed legitimate application from Microsoft named finder.exe . | 9,646 |
IDTY | Microsoft | 0.910125 | 3,912 | OutExtra.exe is a signed legitimate application from Microsoft named finder.exe . | 9,647 |
FILE | finder.exe | 0.919822 | 3,912 | OutExtra.exe is a signed legitimate application from Microsoft named finder.exe . | 9,648 |
FILE | malware | 0.896644 | 3,913 | Today, this malware is still actively being used against the Philippines . | 9,649 |
LOC | Philippines | 0.907356 | 3,913 | Today, this malware is still actively being used against the Philippines . | 9,650 |
FILE | Xagent” | 0.918674 | 3,914 | Xagent” is the original filename Xagent.exe whereas seems to be the version of the worm . | 9,651 |
FILE | Xagent.exe | 0.918434 | 3,914 | Xagent” is the original filename Xagent.exe whereas seems to be the version of the worm . | 9,652 |
FILE | worm | 0.838874 | 3,914 | Xagent” is the original filename Xagent.exe whereas seems to be the version of the worm . | 9,653 |
FILE | malware | 0.748247 | 3,915 | Our technical analysis of the malware used in these attacks showed close ties to BS2005 backdoors from operation Ke3chang, and to a related TidePool malware family discovered by Palo Alto Networks in 2016 that targeted Indian embassies across the globe . | 9,654 |
FILE | BS2005 backdoors | 0.911416 | 3,915 | Our technical analysis of the malware used in these attacks showed close ties to BS2005 backdoors from operation Ke3chang, and to a related TidePool malware family discovered by Palo Alto Networks in 2016 that targeted Indian embassies across the globe . | 9,655 |
FILE | TidePool malware | 0.892627 | 3,915 | Our technical analysis of the malware used in these attacks showed close ties to BS2005 backdoors from operation Ke3chang, and to a related TidePool malware family discovered by Palo Alto Networks in 2016 that targeted Indian embassies across the globe . | 9,656 |
SECTEAM | Palo Alto | 0.867717 | 3,915 | Our technical analysis of the malware used in these attacks showed close ties to BS2005 backdoors from operation Ke3chang, and to a related TidePool malware family discovered by Palo Alto Networks in 2016 that targeted Indian embassies across the globe . | 9,657 |
TIME | 2016 | 0.917145 | 3,915 | Our technical analysis of the malware used in these attacks showed close ties to BS2005 backdoors from operation Ke3chang, and to a related TidePool malware family discovered by Palo Alto Networks in 2016 that targeted Indian embassies across the globe . | 9,658 |
FILE | Okrum malware | 0.902907 | 3,916 | The malicious actors behind the Okrum malware were focused on the same targets in Slovakia that were previously targeted by Ketrican 2015 backdoors . | 9,659 |
LOC | Slovakia | 0.926719 | 3,916 | The malicious actors behind the Okrum malware were focused on the same targets in Slovakia that were previously targeted by Ketrican 2015 backdoors . | 9,660 |
FILE | backdoors | 0.859863 | 3,916 | The malicious actors behind the Okrum malware were focused on the same targets in Slovakia that were previously targeted by Ketrican 2015 backdoors . | 9,661 |
FILE | Okrum backdoor | 0.916459 | 3,917 | We started connecting the dots when we discovered that the Okrum backdoor was used to drop a Ketrican backdoor, freshly compiled in 2017 . | 9,662 |
FILE | Ketrican backdoor, | 0.923525 | 3,917 | We started connecting the dots when we discovered that the Okrum backdoor was used to drop a Ketrican backdoor, freshly compiled in 2017 . | 9,663 |
FILE | Okrum malware | 0.908787 | 3,918 | In 2017, the same entities that were affected by the Okrum malware and by the 2015 Ketrican backdoors again became targets of the malicious actors . | 9,664 |
FILE | Ketrican backdoors | 0.910243 | 3,918 | In 2017, the same entities that were affected by the Okrum malware and by the 2015 Ketrican backdoors again became targets of the malicious actors . | 9,665 |
FILE | RoyalDNS malware | 0.644475 | 3,919 | This time, the attackers used new versions of the RoyalDNS malware and a Ketrican 2017 backdoor . | 9,666 |
FILE | Ketrican | 0.581963 | 3,919 | This time, the attackers used new versions of the RoyalDNS malware and a Ketrican 2017 backdoor . | 9,667 |
SECTEAM | ESET | 0.892013 | 3,920 | According to ESET telemetry, Okrum was first detected in December 2016, and targeted diplomatic missions in Slovakia, Belgium, Chile, Guatemala and Brazil throughout 2017 . | 9,668 |
FILE | Okrum | 0.917973 | 3,920 | According to ESET telemetry, Okrum was first detected in December 2016, and targeted diplomatic missions in Slovakia, Belgium, Chile, Guatemala and Brazil throughout 2017 . | 9,669 |
TIME | December 2016, | 0.919432 | 3,920 | According to ESET telemetry, Okrum was first detected in December 2016, and targeted diplomatic missions in Slovakia, Belgium, Chile, Guatemala and Brazil throughout 2017 . | 9,670 |
LOC | Slovakia, Belgium, Chile, Guatemala | 0.916814 | 3,920 | According to ESET telemetry, Okrum was first detected in December 2016, and targeted diplomatic missions in Slovakia, Belgium, Chile, Guatemala and Brazil throughout 2017 . | 9,671 |
LOC | Brazil | 0.921197 | 3,920 | According to ESET telemetry, Okrum was first detected in December 2016, and targeted diplomatic missions in Slovakia, Belgium, Chile, Guatemala and Brazil throughout 2017 . | 9,672 |
FILE | Okrum | 0.916353 | 3,921 | According to our telemetry, Okrum was used to target diplomatic missions in Slovakia, Belgium, Chile, Guatemala, and Brazil, with the attackers showing a particular interest in Slovakia . | 9,673 |
LOC | Slovakia, Belgium, Chile, Guatemala, | 0.931235 | 3,921 | According to our telemetry, Okrum was used to target diplomatic missions in Slovakia, Belgium, Chile, Guatemala, and Brazil, with the attackers showing a particular interest in Slovakia . | 9,674 |
LOC | Brazil, | 0.93154 | 3,921 | According to our telemetry, Okrum was used to target diplomatic missions in Slovakia, Belgium, Chile, Guatemala, and Brazil, with the attackers showing a particular interest in Slovakia . | 9,675 |
FILE | Okrum | 0.923133 | 3,922 | The detection evasion techniques we observed in the Okrum malware include embedding the malicious payload within a legitimate PNG image, employing several anti-emulation and anti-sandbox tricks, as well as making frequent changes in implementation . | 9,676 |
SECTEAM | ClearSky, | 0.930177 | 3,923 | According to ClearSky, the suspected Lazarus operatives looked to leverage a vulnerability in outdated WinRAR file-archiving software that hackers have been exploiting since it was disclosed last month . | 9,677 |
FILE | WinRAR | 0.91186 | 3,923 | According to ClearSky, the suspected Lazarus operatives looked to leverage a vulnerability in outdated WinRAR file-archiving software that hackers have been exploiting since it was disclosed last month . | 9,678 |
FILE | Sea Turtle | 0.759959 | 3,924 | The diagram below illustrates how we believe the actors behind the Sea Turtle campaign used DNS hijacking to achieve their end goals . | 9,679 |
PROT | DNS | 0.87779 | 3,924 | The diagram below illustrates how we believe the actors behind the Sea Turtle campaign used DNS hijacking to achieve their end goals . | 9,680 |
MAL | xlsm file, | 0.919518 | 3,925 | If the user enables macro to open the xlsm file, it will then drop the legitimate script engine AutoHotkey along with a malicious script file . | 9,681 |
FILE | link file | 0.916097 | 3,926 | Create a link file in the startup folder for AutoHotkeyU32.exe, allowing the attack to persist even after a system restart . | 9,682 |
FILE | AutoHotkeyU32.exe, | 0.91801 | 3,926 | Create a link file in the startup folder for AutoHotkeyU32.exe, allowing the attack to persist even after a system restart . | 9,683 |
ACT | downloading files | 0.90257 | 3,927 | Such attacks highlight the need for caution before downloading files from unknown sources and enabling macro for files from unknown sources . | 9,684 |
IDTY | NOC | 0.478683 | 3,928 | Its configuration utilities like Margarita allows the NOC (Network Operation Center) to customize tools based on requirements from 'Fine Dining' questionairies . | 9,685 |
FILE | Honeycomb | 0.903826 | 3,929 | Honeycomb toolserver receives exfiltrated information from the implant; an operator can also task the implant to execute jobs on the target computer, so the toolserver acts as a C2 (command and control) server for the implant . | 9,686 |
TOOL | C2 | 0.912272 | 3,929 | Honeycomb toolserver receives exfiltrated information from the implant; an operator can also task the implant to execute jobs on the target computer, so the toolserver acts as a C2 (command and control) server for the implant . | 9,687 |
FILE | UMBRAGE | 0.915391 | 3,930 | UMBRAGE components cover keyloggers, password collection, webcam capture, data destruction, persistence, privilege escalation, stealth, anti-virus (PSP) avoidance and survey techniques . | 9,688 |
FILE | 'Improvise' | 0.920093 | 3,931 | 'Improvise' is a toolset for configuration, post-processing, payload setup and execution vector selection for survey/exfiltration tools supporting all major operating systems like Windows (Bartender), MacOS (JukeBox) and Linux (DanceFloor). | 9,689 |
ACT | survey/exfiltration | 0.926259 | 3,931 | 'Improvise' is a toolset for configuration, post-processing, payload setup and execution vector selection for survey/exfiltration tools supporting all major operating systems like Windows (Bartender), MacOS (JukeBox) and Linux (DanceFloor). | 9,690 |
OS | Windows | 0.788359 | 3,931 | 'Improvise' is a toolset for configuration, post-processing, payload setup and execution vector selection for survey/exfiltration tools supporting all major operating systems like Windows (Bartender), MacOS (JukeBox) and Linux (DanceFloor). | 9,691 |
OS | MacOS | 0.687731 | 3,931 | 'Improvise' is a toolset for configuration, post-processing, payload setup and execution vector selection for survey/exfiltration tools supporting all major operating systems like Windows (Bartender), MacOS (JukeBox) and Linux (DanceFloor). | 9,692 |
OS | Linux | 0.566821 | 3,931 | 'Improvise' is a toolset for configuration, post-processing, payload setup and execution vector selection for survey/exfiltration tools supporting all major operating systems like Windows (Bartender), MacOS (JukeBox) and Linux (DanceFloor). | 9,693 |
FILE | sample, | 0.822174 | 3,932 | This sample, similar to other Trochilus samples, was deployed using a DLL sideloading method utilizing three files, uploaded to the same folder on the victim machine as identified in US-CERT advisory TA17-117A last revised on December 20, 2018 . | 9,694 |
FILE | Trochilus | 0.896258 | 3,932 | This sample, similar to other Trochilus samples, was deployed using a DLL sideloading method utilizing three files, uploaded to the same folder on the victim machine as identified in US-CERT advisory TA17-117A last revised on December 20, 2018 . | 9,695 |
TOOL | DLL | 0.860621 | 3,932 | This sample, similar to other Trochilus samples, was deployed using a DLL sideloading method utilizing three files, uploaded to the same folder on the victim machine as identified in US-CERT advisory TA17-117A last revised on December 20, 2018 . | 9,696 |
FILE | configuration file | 0.91949 | 3,933 | The configuration file then loads the Trochilus payload into memory by injecting it into a valid system process . | 9,697 |
TOOL | DLL | 0.906459 | 3,934 | Additionally, the same DLL sideloading technique observed in the Visma attack was used, and many of the tools deployed by the B-Hack shared naming similarities as well 1.bat, cu.exe, ss.rar, r.exe, pd.exe . | 9,698 |
MAL | Visma | 0.875299 | 3,934 | Additionally, the same DLL sideloading technique observed in the Visma attack was used, and many of the tools deployed by the B-Hack shared naming similarities as well 1.bat, cu.exe, ss.rar, r.exe, pd.exe . | 9,699 |
ACT | B-Hack | 0.679756 | 3,934 | Additionally, the same DLL sideloading technique observed in the Visma attack was used, and many of the tools deployed by the B-Hack shared naming similarities as well 1.bat, cu.exe, ss.rar, r.exe, pd.exe . | 9,700 |
MAL | 1.bat, cu.exe, ss.rar, r.exe, pd.exe | 0.863211 | 3,934 | Additionally, the same DLL sideloading technique observed in the Visma attack was used, and many of the tools deployed by the B-Hack shared naming similarities as well 1.bat, cu.exe, ss.rar, r.exe, pd.exe . | 9,701 |
SECTEAM | Rapid7 | 0.920608 | 3,935 | Most interestingly, Rapid7 observed the use of the Notepad++ updater gup.exe as a legitimate executable to sideload a malicious DLL (libcurl.dll) in order to deploy a variant of the UPPERCUT backdoor also known as ANEL . | 9,702 |
FILE | gup.exe | 0.918886 | 3,935 | Most interestingly, Rapid7 observed the use of the Notepad++ updater gup.exe as a legitimate executable to sideload a malicious DLL (libcurl.dll) in order to deploy a variant of the UPPERCUT backdoor also known as ANEL . | 9,703 |
TOOL | DLL | 0.931826 | 3,935 | Most interestingly, Rapid7 observed the use of the Notepad++ updater gup.exe as a legitimate executable to sideload a malicious DLL (libcurl.dll) in order to deploy a variant of the UPPERCUT backdoor also known as ANEL . | 9,704 |
MAL | ANEL | 0.901525 | 3,935 | Most interestingly, Rapid7 observed the use of the Notepad++ updater gup.exe as a legitimate executable to sideload a malicious DLL (libcurl.dll) in order to deploy a variant of the UPPERCUT backdoor also known as ANEL . | 9,705 |
APT | B-Hack | 0.466078 | 3,936 | B-Hack I-Hack analysis of network metadata to and from the VPN endpoint IPs revealed consistent connectivity to Citrix-hosted infrastructure from all eight VPN endpoint IPs starting on August 17, 2018 — the same date the first authenticated login to Visma’s network was made using stolen credentials . | 9,706 |
FILE | Citrix-hosted | 0.918071 | 3,936 | B-Hack I-Hack analysis of network metadata to and from the VPN endpoint IPs revealed consistent connectivity to Citrix-hosted infrastructure from all eight VPN endpoint IPs starting on August 17, 2018 — the same date the first authenticated login to Visma’s network was made using stolen credentials . | 9,708 |
TOOL | VPN | 0.905658 | 3,936 | B-Hack I-Hack analysis of network metadata to and from the VPN endpoint IPs revealed consistent connectivity to Citrix-hosted infrastructure from all eight VPN endpoint IPs starting on August 17, 2018 — the same date the first authenticated login to Visma’s network was made using stolen credentials . | 9,709 |
TIME | August 17, 2018 | 0.868457 | 3,936 | B-Hack I-Hack analysis of network metadata to and from the VPN endpoint IPs revealed consistent connectivity to Citrix-hosted infrastructure from all eight VPN endpoint IPs starting on August 17, 2018 — the same date the first authenticated login to Visma’s network was made using stolen credentials . | 9,710 |
FILE | KHRAT | 0.913415 | 3,937 | KHRAT is a backdoor trojan purported to be used with the China-linked cyberespionage group B-Hack . | 9,711 |
MAL | backdoor trojan | 0.882469 | 3,937 | KHRAT is a backdoor trojan purported to be used with the China-linked cyberespionage group B-Hack . | 9,712 |
LOC | China-linked | 0.912279 | 3,937 | KHRAT is a backdoor trojan purported to be used with the China-linked cyberespionage group B-Hack . | 9,713 |
APT | B-Hack | 0.915202 | 3,937 | KHRAT is a backdoor trojan purported to be used with the China-linked cyberespionage group B-Hack . | 9,714 |
SECTEAM | Rapid7 | 0.915186 | 3,938 | Rapid7 reviewed malware discovered in the victim’s environment and found implants that used Dropbox as the C2 . | 9,715 |
FILE | Dropbox | 0.892716 | 3,938 | Rapid7 reviewed malware discovered in the victim’s environment and found implants that used Dropbox as the C2 . | 9,716 |
TOOL | C2 | 0.910795 | 3,938 | Rapid7 reviewed malware discovered in the victim’s environment and found implants that used Dropbox as the C2 . | 9,717 |
FILE | sample | 0.888518 | 3,939 | The analyzed RTF files share the same object dimension (objw2180\objh300) used to track the RTF weaponizer in our previous report, however, the sample was not exploiting CVE-2017-11882 or CVE-2018-0802 . | 9,718 |
VULID | CVE-2017-11882 | 0.916521 | 3,939 | The analyzed RTF files share the same object dimension (objw2180\objh300) used to track the RTF weaponizer in our previous report, however, the sample was not exploiting CVE-2017-11882 or CVE-2018-0802 . | 9,719 |
VULID | CVE-2018-0802 | 0.915896 | 3,939 | The analyzed RTF files share the same object dimension (objw2180\objh300) used to track the RTF weaponizer in our previous report, however, the sample was not exploiting CVE-2017-11882 or CVE-2018-0802 . | 9,720 |
FILE | RTF files | 0.900055 | 3,940 | After further analysis, it was discovered that the RTF files were exploiting the CVE-2018-0798 vulnerability in Microsoft’s Equation Editor (EQNEDT32). | 9,721 |
VULID | CVE-2018-0798 | 0.915499 | 3,940 | After further analysis, it was discovered that the RTF files were exploiting the CVE-2018-0798 vulnerability in Microsoft’s Equation Editor (EQNEDT32). | 9,722 |
IDTY | Microsoft’s | 0.498415 | 3,940 | After further analysis, it was discovered that the RTF files were exploiting the CVE-2018-0798 vulnerability in Microsoft’s Equation Editor (EQNEDT32). | 9,723 |
TOOL | Equation Editor | 0.758274 | 3,940 | After further analysis, it was discovered that the RTF files were exploiting the CVE-2018-0798 vulnerability in Microsoft’s Equation Editor (EQNEDT32). | 9,724 |
SECTEAM | Anomali | 0.927906 | 3,941 | Anomali Researchers were able to identify multiple samples of malicious RTF documents ITW using the same exploit for CVE-2018-0798 . | 9,725 |
FILE | ITW | 0.906466 | 3,941 | Anomali Researchers were able to identify multiple samples of malicious RTF documents ITW using the same exploit for CVE-2018-0798 . | 9,726 |
VULNAME | exploit | 0.92824 | 3,941 | Anomali Researchers were able to identify multiple samples of malicious RTF documents ITW using the same exploit for CVE-2018-0798 . | 9,727 |
VULID | CVE-2018-0798 | 0.918448 | 3,941 | Anomali Researchers were able to identify multiple samples of malicious RTF documents ITW using the same exploit for CVE-2018-0798 . | 9,728 |
VULNAME | exploit | 0.852605 | 3,942 | The earliest use of the exploit ITW we were able to identify and confirm is a sample (e228045ef57fb8cc1226b62ada7eee9b) dating back to October 2018 (VirusTotal submission of 2018-10-29) with the RTF creation time 2018-10-23 . | 9,729 |
FILE | ITW | 0.912987 | 3,942 | The earliest use of the exploit ITW we were able to identify and confirm is a sample (e228045ef57fb8cc1226b62ada7eee9b) dating back to October 2018 (VirusTotal submission of 2018-10-29) with the RTF creation time 2018-10-23 . | 9,730 |
TIME | October 2018 | 0.916241 | 3,942 | The earliest use of the exploit ITW we were able to identify and confirm is a sample (e228045ef57fb8cc1226b62ada7eee9b) dating back to October 2018 (VirusTotal submission of 2018-10-29) with the RTF creation time 2018-10-23 . | 9,731 |
TOOL | (VirusTotal | 0.904612 | 3,942 | The earliest use of the exploit ITW we were able to identify and confirm is a sample (e228045ef57fb8cc1226b62ada7eee9b) dating back to October 2018 (VirusTotal submission of 2018-10-29) with the RTF creation time 2018-10-23 . | 9,732 |
TOOL | RTF | 0.911879 | 3,942 | The earliest use of the exploit ITW we were able to identify and confirm is a sample (e228045ef57fb8cc1226b62ada7eee9b) dating back to October 2018 (VirusTotal submission of 2018-10-29) with the RTF creation time 2018-10-23 . | 9,733 |
TIME | 2018-10-23 | 0.929048 | 3,942 | The earliest use of the exploit ITW we were able to identify and confirm is a sample (e228045ef57fb8cc1226b62ada7eee9b) dating back to October 2018 (VirusTotal submission of 2018-10-29) with the RTF creation time 2018-10-23 . | 9,734 |
FILE | wsc_proxy.exe” | 0.921865 | 3,943 | Upon decrypting and executing, it drops two additional files wsc_proxy.exe” (legitimate Avast executable) and a malicious DLL wsc.dll” in the%TEMP% folder . | 9,735 |
TOOL | DLL | 0.90579 | 3,943 | Upon decrypting and executing, it drops two additional files wsc_proxy.exe” (legitimate Avast executable) and a malicious DLL wsc.dll” in the%TEMP% folder . | 9,736 |
FILE | wsc.dll” | 0.920209 | 3,943 | Upon decrypting and executing, it drops two additional files wsc_proxy.exe” (legitimate Avast executable) and a malicious DLL wsc.dll” in the%TEMP% folder . | 9,737 |
FILE | AsyncRAT | 0.918215 | 3,944 | However, Beginning on 25 June 2019, we started observing multiple commodity campaigns Mostly dropping AsyncRAT using the updated RTF weaponizer with the same exploit (CVE-2018-0798). | 9,738 |
VULNAME | exploit | 0.923761 | 3,944 | However, Beginning on 25 June 2019, we started observing multiple commodity campaigns Mostly dropping AsyncRAT using the updated RTF weaponizer with the same exploit (CVE-2018-0798). | 9,739 |
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