Datasets:
certificate dict | common_name string | cve string | cwe string | has_certificate bool | id string | n_domain_atoms int64 | n_guard_atoms int64 | n_safety_conjuncts int64 | project string | relation_in_words string | schema string | spec dict | variables list | weakness string |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
{
"obligations": [
{
"multipliers": {
"3": [
1,
1
],
"5": [
1,
1
]
}
},
{
"multipliers": {
"4": [
1,
1
],
"5": [
1,
1
]
}
}
],
"sc... | curl NTLM type-3 overflow | CVE-2019-3822 | CWE-787 | true | curl_ntlm_type3 | 3 | 2 | 2 | curl | the NTLM response length plus header must fit the output buffer | cve-proof-corpus/v1 | {
"domain": [
{
"coeff": {
"cu_size": [
-1,
1
]
},
"const": [
0,
1
],
"strict": false
},
{
"coeff": {
"cu_ntresplen": [
-1,
1
]
},
"const": [
0,
1
]... | [
"cu_size",
"cu_ntresplen",
"cu_bufsize"
] | stack out-of-bounds write |
{
"obligations": [
{
"multipliers": {
"1": [
1,
1
],
"3": [
1,
1
]
}
},
{
"multipliers": {
"2": [
1,
1
],
"3": [
1,
1
]
}
}
],
"sc... | libpng time formatting overflow | CVE-2015-7981 | CWE-125 | true | libpng_rfc1123 | 1 | 2 | 2 | libpng | the formatted output must fit the fixed destination buffer | cve-proof-corpus/v1 | {
"domain": [
{
"coeff": {
"pn_month": [
-1,
1
]
},
"const": [
0,
1
],
"strict": false
}
],
"fingerprint": "1506ef6cd6ee1a5377e4523e745599bdd848226e37b667e85c4a331f5443e94b",
"guard": [
{
"coeff": {
"pn_m... | [
"pn_month"
] | out-of-bounds read |
{
"obligations": [
{
"multipliers": {
"4": [
1,
1
],
"5": [
1,
1
]
}
}
],
"schema": "certkit/farkas/v1",
"spec_fingerprint": "5be7d1c5c62ce8bc3f63a16fe4e587404feec56027a0f0d66b6561f637223998"
} | libxml2 length overflow | CVE-2015-8317 | CWE-125 | true | libxml2_len_overflow | 4 | 1 | 1 | libxml2 | a declared length must not exceed the remaining input | cve-proof-corpus/v1 | {
"domain": [
{
"coeff": {
"xl_len": [
-1,
1
]
},
"const": [
0,
1
],
"strict": false
},
{
"coeff": {
"xl_len": [
1,
1
]
},
"const": [
-2147483647,
1
... | [
"xl_len",
"xl_incr"
] | out-of-bounds read |
{
"obligations": [
{
"multipliers": {
"3": [
1,
1
],
"4": [
1,
1
]
}
}
],
"schema": "certkit/farkas/v1",
"spec_fingerprint": "eec4d1b54a17fd9baa5103f0f9b98394c7eb164f831d6cb1c413f9b5045bae13"
} | Heartbleed | CVE-2014-0160 | CWE-125 | true | openssl_heartbeat | 3 | 1 | 1 | OpenSSL | the heartbeat payload length must fit inside the record it arrived in | cve-proof-corpus/v1 | {
"domain": [
{
"coeff": {
"hb_payload": [
-1,
1
]
},
"const": [
0,
1
],
"strict": false
},
{
"coeff": {
"hb_record_len": [
-1,
1
]
},
"const": [
0,
1
... | [
"hb_payload",
"hb_record_len"
] | out-of-bounds read |
{
"obligations": [
{
"multipliers": {
"3": [
1,
1
],
"4": [
1,
1
]
}
}
],
"schema": "certkit/farkas/v1",
"spec_fingerprint": "4f252ba298a05dab568f41f58cc1b102d34feeb57cbb9142a6329c723f4841e9"
} | Baron Samedit | CVE-2021-3156 | CWE-787 | true | sudo_set_cmnd | 3 | 1 | 1 | sudo | the concatenated argument length must fit the allocated buffer | cve-proof-corpus/v1 | {
"domain": [
{
"coeff": {
"su_idx": [
-1,
1
]
},
"const": [
0,
1
],
"strict": false
},
{
"coeff": {
"su_size": [
-1,
1
]
},
"const": [
0,
1
],
... | [
"su_idx",
"su_size"
] | heap out-of-bounds write |
{
"obligations": [
{
"multipliers": {
"3": [
1,
1
],
"5": [
1,
1
]
}
},
{
"multipliers": {
"4": [
1,
1
],
"5": [
1,
1
]
}
}
],
"sc... | zlib inflate extra-field overflow | CVE-2022-37434 | CWE-787 | true | zlib_inflate_extra | 3 | 2 | 2 | zlib | the extra-field copy must fit the destination state buffer | cve-proof-corpus/v1 | {
"domain": [
{
"coeff": {
"zl_off": [
-1,
1
]
},
"const": [
0,
1
],
"strict": false
},
{
"coeff": {
"zl_copy": [
-1,
1
]
},
"const": [
0,
1
],
... | [
"zl_off",
"zl_copy",
"zl_extra_max"
] | out-of-bounds write |
CVE Proof Corpus
Six real vulnerability classes, each with a machine-checkable proof that the shipped fix eliminates it — and a checker that shares no code with whatever produced the proof.
Every record carries the safety relation, the guard the upstream project shipped, the declared attacker domain, and the nonnegative multipliers that prove the guard implies safety. All six verify.
pip install "certkit@git+https://github.com/nickharris808/certkit@main"
python verify.py
VERIFIED curl_ntlm_type3 CVE-2019-3822 2 obligation(s)
VERIFIED libpng_rfc1123 CVE-2015-7981 2 obligation(s)
VERIFIED libxml2_len_overflow CVE-2015-8317 1 obligation(s)
VERIFIED openssl_heartbeat CVE-2014-0160 1 obligation(s)
VERIFIED sudo_set_cmnd CVE-2021-3156 1 obligation(s)
VERIFIED zlib_inflate_extra CVE-2022-37434 2 obligation(s)
6 of 6 records verified by certkit
Every published certificate re-checks against its published spec.
That output is a real run.
30-second quickstart
from datasets import load_dataset
corpus = load_dataset("nickh007/cve-proof-corpus", split="train")
print(len(corpus), "records")
print(corpus[0]["cve"], "-", corpus[0]["relation_in_words"])
No datasets install needed either — it is one JSONL file:
pip install "certkit@git+https://github.com/nickharris808/certkit@main"
curl -sL https://huggingface.co/datasets/nickh007/cve-proof-corpus/resolve/main/cve-proof-corpus.jsonl -o corpus.jsonl
python - <<'EOF'
import json
from certkit import check_certificate
rows = [json.loads(line) for line in open("corpus.jsonl") if line.strip()]
for r in rows:
print(f"{r['cve']:<16} {check_certificate(r['spec'], r['certificate']).verdict}")
EOF
CVE-2019-3822 ACCEPTED
CVE-2015-7981 ACCEPTED
CVE-2015-8317 ACCEPTED
CVE-2014-0160 ACCEPTED
CVE-2021-3156 ACCEPTED
CVE-2022-37434 ACCEPTED
Every certificate re-verifies from the published file, by a checker that shares no code with whatever produced it. That is the whole point of the corpus: you do not have to take the proofs on trust, and re-checking takes milliseconds.
Honest scope
What each record proves: that the relations transcribed from the fixed check imply the safety property, over the declared domain. The certificate is a Farkas refutation and it is exact.
What it does not prove:
- Not that the project is secure. The relations are a model a human wrote from reading the fix. A correct proof about a wrong model is still a wrong result, and nothing here reads source code.
- Not machine-word arithmetic. The atoms are relations over the mathematical integers. A proof says nothing about a path where the real arithmetic wraps.
- Not a survey. Six classes are six classes. This is not a statistical claim about real code.
- Nothing about current versions. Every CVE here is historical and fixed. No record is a statement about any software you might be running today.
Why this exists
Proof-carrying security work usually publishes conclusions — "we verified it" — which a reader has no way to check. This corpus publishes the proofs, in a format small enough to re-verify with a checker you can read in an afternoon.
The relations are the real ones. openssl_heartbeat is the CVE-2014-0160 length relation, not a
paraphrase or a toy analogue. Six classes across six ecosystems and two weakness families.
Contents
| id | CVE | Project | CWE | Weakness | Safety conjuncts |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
openssl_heartbeat |
CVE-2014-0160 (Heartbleed) | OpenSSL | CWE-125 | out-of-bounds read | 1 |
libxml2_len_overflow |
CVE-2015-8317 | libxml2 | CWE-125 | out-of-bounds read | 1 |
zlib_inflate_extra |
CVE-2022-37434 | zlib | CWE-787 | out-of-bounds write | 2 |
libpng_rfc1123 |
CVE-2015-7981 | libpng | CWE-125 | out-of-bounds read | 2 |
sudo_set_cmnd |
CVE-2021-3156 (Baron Samedit) | sudo | CWE-787 | heap OOB write | 1 |
curl_ntlm_type3 |
CVE-2019-3822 | curl | CWE-787 | stack OOB write | 2 |
Schema
One JSON object per line.
| Field | Type | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
schema |
string | cve-proof-corpus/v1 |
id |
string | stable class identifier |
cve |
string | upstream CVE identifier |
common_name |
string | the name people actually use (e.g. "Heartbleed") |
project |
string | upstream project |
cwe |
string | weakness classification |
weakness |
string | plain-English weakness type |
relation_in_words |
string | what the safety relation means, in one sentence |
variables |
list[string] | the variables the relations range over |
spec |
object | a certkit/spec/v1 object: domain, guard, safety, fingerprint |
certificate |
object | a certkit/farkas/v1 object: multipliers per obligation |
n_safety_conjuncts |
int | number of obligations |
n_domain_atoms |
int | size of the declared domain |
n_guard_atoms |
int | size of the shipped guard |
has_certificate |
bool | whether every obligation carries multipliers |
An atom is a linear relation in canonical form, with exact rational coefficients encoded as
[numerator, denominator] pairs:
{"coeff": {"hb_payload": [1, 1], "hb_record_len": [-1, 1]}, "const": [19, 1], "strict": false}
meaning hb_payload - hb_record_len + 19 <= 0, i.e. 19 + payload <= record_len.
The obligation model
The claim for each record is: within domain, guard implies safety.
safety is a conjunction, so its negation is a disjunction — which is not a single atom list. So
there is one obligation per safety conjunct, and obligation i is the atom list
domain ++ guard ++ [negate(safety[i])]
in exactly that order. Multiplier indices refer to positions in that reconstructed list, not to anything the certificate carries. The property holds only if every obligation is refuted.
Usage
from loader import load_corpus, to_certkit
from certkit import check_certificate
for rec in load_corpus():
spec, cert = to_certkit(rec)
report = check_certificate(spec, cert)
print(rec["cve"], "->", "VERIFIED" if report.ok else "FAILED")
With datasets:
from datasets import load_dataset
ds = load_dataset("json", data_files="cve-proof-corpus.jsonl", split="train")
print(ds[0]["cve"], ds[0]["relation_in_words"])
Provenance
Exported by export.py from a specification manifest and its Farkas certificates. The manifest
encodes each CVE's bounds relation as small integer inequalities; the certificates were produced by a
solver-free decision procedure that is not part of this release.
That asymmetry is deliberate and is the reason the corpus is publishable at all: producing these
certificates is the hard part, and checking them is cheap enough that you need not trust us.
Re-run export.py --repo-root <path> to regenerate, and verify.py to re-check.
Limitations
- Six classes is a small corpus. It is a demonstration that the format carries real relations, not a statistical sample of anything.
- Quantifier-free linear integer arithmetic only. These are bounds and length relations. Nothing here involves the heap shape, aliasing, or nonlinear arithmetic.
- A proof about a relation, not about a program. Each record proves the guard implies the stated bounds relation over the declared domain. It does not prove the upstream project is free of other defects, nor that the relation captures every safety requirement of that code path. The relation is stated explicitly so you can judge that yourself.
- The domain is declared, not inferred. A conclusion holds over the domain in the record and says nothing outside it.
- Fingerprints detect drift, not forgery. The
spec.fingerprintbinds a certificate to a spec and catches accidental mismatch. A deliberate forger would edit the spec and recompute it — soundness rests on a human reading the relations, which is why they are kept small.
The rest of the toolkit
| certkit | the checker that verifies this corpus |
| exploit-counter | how many states an unsound guard admits |
| crs-mcp | the verdict surface AI agents call |
| soundnessbench | the benchmark that grades soundness tools |
| Try it in your browser | re-verify all six live, no install |
License
Apache-2.0. The CVE identifiers and upstream relations are public facts; the encoding and certificates are released for copying and re-verification.
Part of certified discovery — ten artifacts built on one asymmetry: checking a proof is cheap and auditable, so the thing that produced it does not have to be trusted.
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