| --- |
| license: mit |
| task_categories: |
| - text-classification |
| - question-answering |
| language: |
| - en |
| tags: |
| - formal-methods |
| - protocol-verification |
| - security |
| - model-checking |
| - ieee-802-11 |
| - 3gpp |
| - reasoning |
| - counterexamples |
| pretty_name: Protocol-Bench |
| size_categories: |
| - n<1K |
| configs: |
| - config_name: default |
| data_files: protocol_bench.jsonl |
| --- |
| |
| # Protocol-Bench |
|
|
| **15 published IEEE 802.11 and 3GPP procedures with ground-truth safety verdicts — and, where a |
| property fails, the shortest counterexample trace that proves it.** |
|
|
| Most reasoning benchmarks accept an answer. This one asks for a **proof**: if a model says a protocol |
| is broken, it must supply a trace that starts at the initial state, moves only along real |
| transitions, and ends in a genuinely violating state. Traces are replayed mechanically. A |
| plausible-sounding trace that does not replay earns nothing. |
|
|
| ## Why the metric is shaped this way |
|
|
| The task set is **deliberately imbalanced** — 13 of 15 procedures are safe, which is what the |
| published-procedure population actually looks like. |
|
|
| | Strategy | Accuracy | Balanced accuracy | Valid counterexamples | |
| |---|---|---|---| |
| | Answer "safe" every time | **0.867** | 0.500 | 0 | |
| | Answer "violated" every time | 0.133 | 0.500 | **0** | |
| | Exhaustive model checker | 1.000 | **1.000** | **2** | |
|
|
| Plain accuracy is nearly uninformative here — hence **balanced accuracy** as the headline, and the |
| **valid-counterexample count** as the column separating a detector from a guesser. |
|
|
| There is a second reason, specific to language models: a verdict is separable from the reasoning that |
| should justify it. *"The WPA2 four-way handshake"* is strongly associated with *"vulnerable"* in any |
| training corpus, so a model can be right about it having done no reasoning at all. Recalling a CVE |
| does not produce a replaying trace; reasoning about the state machine does. |
|
|
| ## Schema |
|
|
| 21 fields per row. Everything is derived from the live models at export time, never hand-maintained. |
|
|
| | Field | Type | Description | |
| |---|---|---| |
| | `id` | string | Task identifier | |
| | `standards_body` | string | `IEEE` (8) or `3GPP` (7) | |
| | `spec_clause` | string | The published clause modelled | |
| | `property` | string | Name of the safety property that must hold | |
| | `label` | string | `KNOWN_COUNTEREXAMPLE` \| `CANDIDATE_COUNTEREXAMPLE` \| `PROVEN_SAFE` | |
| | `violated` | bool | Binary target, derived from `label` | |
| | `prompt` | string | Ready-to-use prompt | |
| | `prompt_mode` | string | `model` or `spec` (see below) | |
| | `state_machine` | string | Human-readable rendering of the machine | |
| | `state_fields` | list[string] | State variable names, in order | |
| | `initial_state` | object | Field → initial value | |
| | `transitions` | list[object] | Every reachable edge: `{from, label, to}` | |
| | `n_state_fields` | int | Number of state variables | |
| | `n_reachable_states` | int | Reachable state count | |
| | `n_transitions` | int | Reachable edge count | |
| | `counterexample` | list[object] \| null | Shortest violating trace: `{label, state}` per step | |
| | `counterexample_length` | int | Steps in the trace (0 if none) | |
| | `has_fixed_twin` | bool | Whether a repaired variant exists | |
| | `fixed_twin_holds` | bool \| null | Whether the repair actually removes the violation | |
| | `citation` | string \| null | Publication, where the finding is published | |
| | `known_finding` | string \| null | One-line description of the published finding | |
|
|
| Corpus totals: **67 reachable states** and **83 transitions** across the 15 machines; 2 rows carry a |
| counterexample; 2 carry a repaired twin, and both twins verify. |
|
|
| ## Two difficulty modes |
|
|
| - **`model`** — the full transition table is in the prompt. No protocol knowledge needed; isolates |
| formal reasoning. |
| - **`spec`** — only the standards clause and a description of the procedure. The model must know or |
| infer the behaviour. This is the mode corresponding to what a security researcher actually does. |
|
|
| Regenerate either: `python load_dataset.py --regenerate --mode spec`. |
|
|
| ## Usage |
|
|
| ```python |
| # No dependencies |
| from load_dataset import load, stats |
| rows = load() |
| stats() # {'n_rows': 15, 'n_violated': 2, 'trivial_always_safe_accuracy': 0.8667, ...} |
| |
| # Or as a datasets.Dataset |
| from load_dataset import load_hf |
| ds = load_hf() |
| print(ds[0]["prompt"]) |
| ``` |
|
|
| ```bash |
| python load_dataset.py --stats # summary counts |
| python load_dataset.py --regenerate # rebuild from the package, so data cannot drift from code |
| ``` |
|
|
| Scoring — including trace replay — needs the package, because a trace only means something when |
| replayed against the real model: |
|
|
| ```bash |
| pip install "protocol-bench @ git+https://github.com/nickharris808/protocol-bench.git" |
| # `pip install protocol-bench` does not work yet — the package is not on PyPI. |
| protocol-bench prompts --mode model -o prompts.json |
| # ... run your model, save {task_id: completion} to completions.json ... |
| protocol-bench score-completions completions.json |
| ``` |
|
|
| ## Provenance |
|
|
| Rows are generated by `protocol_bench.export.export_rows()` from the same finite-state models the |
| package ships and the test suite checks. Nothing in this file is hand-written: |
|
|
| - `n_reachable_states`, `n_transitions`, and `transitions` come from exhaustive reachability; |
| - `counterexample` is the shortest violating trace found by breadth-first search; |
| - `fixed_twin_holds` is the verdict on the repaired model; |
| - `label` is cross-checked against exhaustive reachability by a test, so a label cannot drift away |
| from its model. |
|
|
| A further test asserts that **the committed JSONL is byte-equal to what the package generates**, and |
| another asserts that **every counterexample in this file replays against its own model**. |
|
|
| ## Labels, and one deliberate open question |
|
|
| `KNOWN_COUNTEREXAMPLE` means the violation is published and cited. The single instance is the WPA2 |
| 4-way handshake — **KRACK** (Vanhoef & Piessens, ACM CCS 2017, CVE-2017-13077…13088). |
|
|
| `CANDIDATE_COUNTEREXAMPLE` means the property fails and **no published citation was found**. It is |
| labelled unconfirmed on purpose, and it is a genuine open question posed publicly: if you can cite |
| it, or show the model is wrong, please say so. |
|
|
| ## Limitations |
|
|
| These are **models of published procedures**, not the standards themselves and not implementations. |
| `PROVEN_SAFE` means the property holds over the modelled state space — not that any shipping product |
| is secure. Abstractions hide things. |
|
|
| The set is small (15 rows) and drawn from one modelling effort, so a system tuned on it will overfit |
| quickly. Treat per-task outcomes as the primary result and the aggregate as a summary. Two further |
| procedures exist in the source corpus and are withheld. |
|
|
| Replay validation checks that a trace is a genuine execution reaching a violating state; it does not |
| check that the trace is the *explanation* a human would give. |
|
|
| ## Licence and attribution |
|
|
| MIT, for the code and the task metadata. The KRACK finding belongs to Vanhoef & Piessens; this |
| dataset reproduces it and does not claim it. Specification clauses are cited, not reproduced. |
|
|
| ## Citation |
|
|
| ```bibtex |
| @misc{protocolbench2026, |
| title = {Protocol-Bench: ground-truth safety verdicts for published IEEE 802.11 and 3GPP procedures}, |
| year = {2026}, |
| note = {Counterexamples are machine-validated by replay against the model.} |
| } |
| ``` |
|
|