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5GReasoner: A Property-Directed Security and Privacy Analysis Framework for 5G Cellular Network Protocol Syed Rafiul Hussain Purdue University hussain1@purdue. edu Mitziu Echeverria University of Iowa mitziu-echeverria@uiowa. edu Imtiaz Karim Purdue University karim7@purdue. edu Omar Chowdhury University of Iowa omar-c... | 5GReasoner.pdf |
the 3GPP standard encompass only primitive security requirements lacking both completeness and the consideration of adversarial environments. Finally, the current 5G test suites do not include conformance requirements of the core network components. Existing Efforts on 5G formal verification. Only two previous efforts ... | 5GReasoner.pdf |
RRCNAS NAS RRCPublic Channel Public Channel Private Channel UE g NB Private Channel AUSF UDM AMF Other Nodes 5G Core Network NG-AP Figure 1: Simplified 5G Architecture 5G-RAN : In 5G, a geographical area is partitioned into hexagonal cells, where each cell is serviced by a g NB (5G base-station). A key difference betw... | 5GReasoner.pdf |
state; it can move to RRC connected with an initial RRC setup or with connection establishment. If there is no activity from UE for a short time, it can suspend its session by moving to the RRC inactive state. The motivation for this state is to reduce system access, save power and optimize mobility. For a UE to transi... | 5GReasoner.pdf |
Abstract Cellular Protocol Model Adversarial Model Instrumentor2 Threat Instrumented Abstract Cellular Protocol Model3 Model Checker4 Cryptography-enabled Protocol Model & Query Generator Cryptographic Protocol V erfifier Invariant Generator9 Protocol T echnical Specification Conformance T est Suits & T echnical Requir... | 5GReasoner.pdf |
UE-DEREGISTER-ED UE-REGISTERED-INITIA TED UE-REGISTERED AMF-DEREGISTER-ED AMF-COMMON-PROCEDURE-INITIA TED AMF-REGISTEREDenable_N1 / reg_reqreg_req / auth_req auth_req / auth_respauth_resp / sec_mode_cmd sec_mode_cmd & !cmd_mac_failure / sec_mode_completesec_mode_cmd & cmd_mac_failure / sec_mode_rejreg_accept ... | 5GReasoner.pdf |
with {The UE in 5GMM-REGISTERED-INITIATED state} ensure that{ when { the SS sends an EAP-request/AKA'-challenge within AU-THENTICATION REQUEST} then { the UE sends an EAP-response/AKA'-challenge message within AUTHENTICATION RESPONSE } } Figure 5: A conformance test case for authentication procedure [7]. possible use c... | 5GReasoner.pdf |
4. 4 Modeling Timers In our 5G model, some transitions are dependent on various timers. The protocol behaves differently based on the various state of the timer. We do not model timers counting down, that is, given a timer for5time units we do not model every clock tick as this would severely impede the analysis scalab... | 5GReasoner.pdf |
UE AMF 16 bits 8 bits16 bits 8 bits cnt u lu ecnt u la m f cnt d lu ecnt d la m foc u lu e oc d la m foc d lu eoc u la m fseq u lu e seq u la m f seq d lu e seq d la m f Figure 8: Counters maintained by UE and AMF environment variables. (B) We model the RRC layer to consume the outgoing events generated for the NAS lay... | 5GReasoner.pdf |
V ictim UE Legitimate AMF Mit M r elay refresh key g N B, same K A M F...... security_mode_command security_mode_commandsecurity_mode_completecaptured security_mode_command security_mode_completesecurity_mode_completekey g NB = f(K AMF, = 0 ) key' g NB = f(K AMF, = X )registration_request auth... | 5GReasoner.pdf |
uplink NAS counters ( cntue ulandcntamf ul) between the UE and the legitimate AMF. Impact. : As a result of such desynchronization, though the vic-tim UE can correctly verify the downlink messages from AMF, but the legitimate AMF will discard any uplink messages (both control plane and data) sent from the victim UE. Ev... | 5GReasoner.pdf |
V ictim UE Malicious UE RRC setup procedure RRC_setup_request Deletes victim's security contextg NBFigure 11: Do S with rrc_setup_request Vulnerability. The rrc_setup_request message, which does not in-clude any integrity protection, is sent by the UE to set up an RRC layer connection with the base station. This lack o... | 5GReasoner.pdf |
Attack Variants. The adversary may use a similar philosophy, but use the rrc_resume and rrc_reestablish_request messages with arbitrary invalid MAC to achieve a similar impact on the victim UE. Impact. This attack enables the adversary to coerce a device to move to the RRC idle state by deleting its security context (T... | 5GReasoner.pdf |
Attack Vulnerability Assumption & Validation New Attack? Notable Implication NAS Layer Counter reset Generating/verifying integrity using MAC in sec_mode_command and sec_mode_complete messages Known C-RNTI [ 45], Mit M re-lay [28, 45]Y Do S, over billing Uplink NAS Counter Desynchroniza-tion Lack of attempt counter for... | 5GReasoner.pdf |
unprotected rrc_sec_mode_failure to retrieve the SUPI when the UE is in limited service mode. Main-in-the-Middle Relay. Rupprecht et al. [ 44] and Chlosta et al. [20] devise a Mit M and an impersonation attack by exploiting implementation bugs in an LTE dongle and operational networks, respectively. Rupprecht et al. [ ... | 5GReasoner.pdf |
[29] Syed Rafiul Hussain, Mitziu Echeverria, Omar Chowdhury, Ninghui Li, and Elisa Bertino. 2019. Privacy Attacks to the 4G and 5G Cellular Paging Protocols Using Side Channel Information. In 26th Annual Network and Distributed System Security Symposium, NDSS, San Diego, CA, USA, February 24-27, 2019. [30] Syed Rafiul ... | 5GReasoner.pdf |
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