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The dataset generation failed
Error code: DatasetGenerationError
Exception: TypeError
Message: Couldn't cast array of type string to null
Traceback: Traceback (most recent call last):
File "/usr/local/lib/python3.14/site-packages/datasets/builder.py", line 1835, in _prepare_split_single
for key, table in generator:
^^^^^^^^^
File "/src/services/worker/src/worker/job_runners/config/parquet_and_info.py", line 621, in wrapped
for item in generator(*args, **kwargs):
~~~~~~~~~^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
File "/usr/local/lib/python3.14/site-packages/datasets/packaged_modules/json/json.py", line 361, in _generate_tables
self._cast_table(pa_table, json_field_paths=json_field_paths),
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
File "/usr/local/lib/python3.14/site-packages/datasets/packaged_modules/json/json.py", line 132, in _cast_table
pa_table = table_cast(pa_table, self.info.features.arrow_schema)
File "/usr/local/lib/python3.14/site-packages/datasets/table.py", line 2381, in table_cast
return cast_table_to_schema(table, schema)
File "/usr/local/lib/python3.14/site-packages/datasets/table.py", line 2315, in cast_table_to_schema
cast_array_to_feature(
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^
table[name] if name in table_column_names else pa.array([None] * len(table), type=schema.field(name).type),
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
feature,
^^^^^^^^
)
^
File "/usr/local/lib/python3.14/site-packages/datasets/table.py", line 1861, in wrapper
return pa.chunked_array([func(chunk, *args, **kwargs) for chunk in array.chunks])
~~~~^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
File "/usr/local/lib/python3.14/site-packages/datasets/table.py", line 2155, in cast_array_to_feature
return array_cast(
array,
...<2 lines>...
allow_decimal_to_str=allow_decimal_to_str,
)
File "/usr/local/lib/python3.14/site-packages/datasets/table.py", line 1863, in wrapper
return func(array, *args, **kwargs)
File "/usr/local/lib/python3.14/site-packages/datasets/table.py", line 2014, in array_cast
raise TypeError(f"Couldn't cast array of type {_short_str(array.type)} to {_short_str(pa_type)}")
TypeError: Couldn't cast array of type string to null
The above exception was the direct cause of the following exception:
Traceback (most recent call last):
File "/src/services/worker/src/worker/job_runners/config/parquet_and_info.py", line 1379, in compute_config_parquet_and_info_response
parquet_operations, partial, estimated_dataset_info = stream_convert_to_parquet(
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^
builder, max_dataset_size_bytes=max_dataset_size_bytes
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
)
^
File "/src/services/worker/src/worker/job_runners/config/parquet_and_info.py", line 956, in stream_convert_to_parquet
builder._prepare_split(split_generator=splits_generators[split], file_format="parquet")
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
File "/usr/local/lib/python3.14/site-packages/datasets/builder.py", line 1702, in _prepare_split
for job_id, done, content in self._prepare_split_single(
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^
gen_kwargs=gen_kwargs, job_id=job_id, **_prepare_split_args
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
):
^
File "/usr/local/lib/python3.14/site-packages/datasets/builder.py", line 1887, in _prepare_split_single
raise DatasetGenerationError("An error occurred while generating the dataset") from e
datasets.exceptions.DatasetGenerationError: An error occurred while generating the datasetNeed help to make the dataset viewer work? Make sure to review how to configure the dataset viewer, and open a discussion for direct support.
platform string | contest_id string | contest_title string | sponsor string | report_date string | report_url string | findings_url string | finding_id string | severity string | severity_code string | title string | url string | source_url string | found_by string | body string | github_repo string | github_issue_number int64 | github_issue_url string | status string | state_reason string | author string | author_association string | assignees list | milestone null | labels list | tags list | created_at timestamp[s] | updated_at timestamp[s] | closed_at timestamp[s] | closed_by string | locked bool | lock_reason null | comments_count int64 | reactions dict | issue_body string | comments list |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
code4rena | 2021-04-basedloans | Based Loans | Based Loans | 2021-05-27 | https://code4rena.com/reports/2021-04-basedloans | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-basedloans-findings/issues | DUP-38 | non-critical | N | `UniswapAnchoredView`'s `PriceUpdated` event is never fired | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-basedloans-findings/issues/38 | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-basedloans-findings/issues/38 | null | # Handle
@cmichelio
# Vulnerability details
## Vulnerability Details
`UniswapAnchoredView`'s `PriceUpdated` event is never fired.
## Impact
Unused code can hint at programming or architectural errors.
## Recommended Mitigation Steps
Use it or remove it.
| code-423n4/2021-04-basedloans-findings | 38 | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-basedloans-findings/issues/38 | open | null | code423n4 | CONTRIBUTOR | [] | null | [
"bug",
"duplicate",
"disagree with severity",
"0 (Non-critical)",
"sponsor confirmed"
] | [
"judging:duplicate",
"judging:disagree-with-severity",
"severity:non-critical",
"sponsor:confirmed"
] | 2021-05-04T22:31:16 | 2021-05-12T04:43:52 | null | null | false | null | 2 | {
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} | # Handle
@cmichelio
# Vulnerability details
## Vulnerability Details
`UniswapAnchoredView`'s `PriceUpdated` event is never fired.
## Impact
Unused code can hint at programming or architectural errors.
## Recommended Mitigation Steps
Use it or remove it.
| null |
code4rena | 2021-04-basedloans | Based Loans | Based Loans | 2021-05-27 | https://code4rena.com/reports/2021-04-basedloans | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-basedloans-findings/issues | DUP-40 | low | L | Lack of a non-zero address check in the function `doTransferOut` can cause loss of funds. | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-basedloans-findings/issues/40 | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-basedloans-findings/issues/40 | null | # Handle
shw
# Vulnerability details
## Impact
The `doTransferOut` functions in both `CErc20` and `CEther` contracts do not check whether the recipient (`address payable to`) is non-zero, which could cause loss of funds if funds are accidentally sent to zero address.
## Proof of Concept
Referenced code:
[CEther.... | code-423n4/2021-04-basedloans-findings | 40 | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-basedloans-findings/issues/40 | closed | completed | code423n4 | CONTRIBUTOR | [] | null | [
"bug",
"duplicate",
"1 (Low Risk)",
"sponsor confirmed"
] | [
"judging:duplicate",
"severity:low",
"sponsor:confirmed"
] | 2021-05-04T23:49:55 | 2021-05-12T18:52:32 | 2021-05-12T18:52:32 | cemozerr | false | null | 3 | {
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} | # Handle
shw
# Vulnerability details
## Impact
The `doTransferOut` functions in both `CErc20` and `CEther` contracts do not check whether the recipient (`address payable to`) is non-zero, which could cause loss of funds if funds are accidentally sent to zero address.
## Proof of Concept
Referenced code:
[CEther.... | null |
code4rena | 2021-04-basedloans | Based Loans | Based Loans | 2021-05-27 | https://code4rena.com/reports/2021-04-basedloans | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-basedloans-findings/issues | DUP-43 | high | H | Incorrect constant comparison in `UniswapConfig.sol`. | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-basedloans-findings/issues/43 | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-basedloans-findings/issues/43 | null | # Handle
shw
# Vulnerability details
## Impact
In the file `UniswapOracle/UniswapConfig.sol`, the return value (i.e., `index`) of the three functions (`getSymbolHashIndex`, `getCTokenIndex`, and `getUnderlyingIndex`) are compared to the constant `uint(-1)` to check whether the cToken/underlying asset exists or not... | code-423n4/2021-04-basedloans-findings | 43 | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-basedloans-findings/issues/43 | closed | completed | code423n4 | CONTRIBUTOR | [] | null | [
"bug",
"duplicate",
"disagree with severity",
"3 (High Risk)",
"sponsor confirmed"
] | [
"judging:duplicate",
"judging:disagree-with-severity",
"severity:high",
"sponsor:confirmed"
] | 2021-05-04T23:52:05 | 2021-05-12T18:51:20 | 2021-05-12T18:51:20 | cemozerr | false | null | 3 | {
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} | # Handle
shw
# Vulnerability details
## Impact
In the file `UniswapOracle/UniswapConfig.sol`, the return value (i.e., `index`) of the three functions (`getSymbolHashIndex`, `getCTokenIndex`, and `getUnderlyingIndex`) are compared to the constant `uint(-1)` to check whether the cToken/underlying asset exists or not... | null |
code4rena | 2021-04-basedloans | Based Loans | Based Loans | 2021-05-27 | https://code4rena.com/reports/2021-04-basedloans | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-basedloans-findings/issues | G-01 | gas | G | requireNoError can be optimized | https://code4rena.com/reports/2021-04-basedloans#g-01-requirenoerror-can-be-optimized | null | null | The function requireNoError of Cether.sol contains 2 checks on errCode == uint(Error.NOERROR)_.
After the first check it returns. After this errCode == uint(Error.NO_ERROR) will never be true, so doesn’t have to be checked.
Recommend replacing require(errCode == uint(Error.NOERROR), string(fullMessage));_
with requir... | code-423n4/2021-04-basedloans-findings | 4 | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-basedloans-findings/issues/4 | open | null | code423n4 | CONTRIBUTOR | [] | null | [
"bug",
"sponsor acknowledged",
"G (Gas Optimization)"
] | [
"sponsor:acknowledged",
"severity:gas"
] | 2021-05-01T12:47:17 | 2021-05-05T15:08:25 | null | null | false | null | 1 | {
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} | # Handle
gpersoon
# Vulnerability details
## Impact
The function requireNoError of Cether.sol contains 2 checks on errCode == uint(Error.NO_ERROR).
After the first check it returns. After this errCode == uint(Error.NO_ERROR) will never be true, so doesn't have to be checked.
## Proof of Concept
function requireN... | [
{
"author": "ghoul-sol",
"author_association": "COLLABORATOR",
"created_at": "2021-05-05T15:08:25",
"updated_at": "2021-05-05T15:08:25",
"body": "It's added to our backlog. Thanks!"
}
] |
code4rena | 2021-04-basedloans | Based Loans | Based Loans | 2021-05-27 | https://code4rena.com/reports/2021-04-basedloans | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-basedloans-findings/issues | H-01 | high | H | UniswapConfig getters return wrong token config if token config does not exist | https://code4rena.com/reports/2021-04-basedloans#h-01-uniswapconfig-getters-return-wrong-token-config-if-token-config-does-not-exist | null | null | The UniswapConfig.getTokenConfigBySymbolHash function does not work as getSymbolHashIndex returns 0 if there is no config token for that symbol (uninitialized map value), but the outer function implements the non-existence check with -1.
The same issue occurs also for:
- getTokenConfigByCToken
- getTokenConfigByUnde... | code-423n4/2021-04-basedloans-findings | 37 | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-basedloans-findings/issues/37 | open | null | code423n4 | CONTRIBUTOR | [] | null | [
"bug",
"duplicate",
"3 (High Risk)",
"sponsor confirmed"
] | [
"judging:duplicate",
"severity:high",
"sponsor:confirmed"
] | 2021-05-04T22:30:56 | 2021-05-08T21:07:04 | null | null | false | null | 2 | {
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} | # Handle
@cmichelio
# Vulnerability details
## Vulnerability Details
The `UniswapConfig.getTokenConfigBySymbolHash` function does not work as `getSymbolHashIndex` returns `0` if there is no config token for that symbol (uninitialized map value), but the outer function implements the non-existence check with `-1`.... | [
{
"author": "ghoul-sol",
"author_association": "COLLABORATOR",
"created_at": "2021-05-08T19:08:15",
"updated_at": "2021-05-08T19:08:15",
"body": "Duplicate of #24 "
},
{
"author": "ghoul-sol",
"author_association": "COLLABORATOR",
"created_at": "2021-05-08T21:07:00",
"updated... |
code4rena | 2021-04-basedloans | Based Loans | Based Loans | 2021-05-27 | https://code4rena.com/reports/2021-04-basedloans | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-basedloans-findings/issues | H-02 | high | H | uint(-1) index for not found | https://code4rena.com/reports/2021-04-basedloans#h-02-uint-1-index-for-not-found | null | null | Functions getTokenConfigBySymbolHash, getTokenConfigByCToken and getTokenConfigByUnderlying check returned index against max uint:
index != uint(-1)
-1 should indicate that the index is not found, however, a default value for an uninitialized uint is 0, so it is impossible to get -1. What is even weirder is that 0 wil... | code-423n4/2021-04-basedloans-findings | 24 | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-basedloans-findings/issues/24 | open | null | code423n4 | CONTRIBUTOR | [] | null | [
"bug",
"3 (High Risk)",
"sponsor confirmed"
] | [
"severity:high",
"sponsor:confirmed"
] | 2021-05-04T06:50:35 | 2021-05-08T21:06:56 | null | null | false | null | 1 | {
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} | # Handle
paulius.eth
# Vulnerability details
## Impact
functions getTokenConfigBySymbolHash, getTokenConfigByCToken and getTokenConfigByUnderlying check returned index against max uint:
index != uint(-1)
-1 should indicate that the index is not found, however, a default value for an uninitialized uint is 0, so it... | [
{
"author": "ghoul-sol",
"author_association": "COLLABORATOR",
"created_at": "2021-05-08T21:06:51",
"updated_at": "2021-05-08T21:06:51",
"body": "`UniswapConfig` has been refactored. Index 0 is considered a non-existent config and all comparison are against that value."
}
] |
code4rena | 2021-04-basedloans | Based Loans | Based Loans | 2021-05-27 | https://code4rena.com/reports/2021-04-basedloans | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-basedloans-findings/issues | L-01 | low | L | No account existence check for low-level call in CEther.sol | https://code4rena.com/reports/2021-04-basedloans#l-01-no-account-existence-check-for-low-level-call-in-cethersol | null | null | Low-level calls call/delegatecall/staticcall return true even if the account called is non-existent (per EVM design). Account existence must be checked prior to calling.
The doTransferOut() function was changed from using a transfer() function (which reverts) to a call() function (which returns a boolean), however the... | code-423n4/2021-04-basedloans-findings | 16 | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-basedloans-findings/issues/16 | open | null | code423n4 | CONTRIBUTOR | [] | null | [
"bug",
"1 (Low Risk)",
"sponsor confirmed"
] | [
"severity:low",
"sponsor:confirmed"
] | 2021-05-04T02:38:02 | 2021-05-05T15:04:02 | null | null | false | null | 1 | {
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} | # Handle
0xRajeev
# Vulnerability details
## Impact
Low-level calls call/delegatecall/staticcall return true even if the account called is non-existent (per EVM design). Account existence must be checked prior to calling.
The doTransferOut() function was changed from using a transfer() function (which reverts) to... | [
{
"author": "ghoul-sol",
"author_association": "COLLABORATOR",
"created_at": "2021-05-05T15:04:02",
"updated_at": "2021-05-05T15:04:02",
"body": "Recommended fix has been implemented."
}
] |
code4rena | 2021-04-basedloans | Based Loans | Based Loans | 2021-05-27 | https://code4rena.com/reports/2021-04-basedloans | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-basedloans-findings/issues | L-02 | low | L | sweepToken() function removed in CErc20.sol from original Compound code | https://code4rena.com/reports/2021-04-basedloans#l-02-sweeptoken-function-removed-in-cerc20sol-from-original-compound-code | null | null | The sweepToken() function in the original Compound code whose specified purpose was to recover accidentally sent ERC20 tokens to contract has been removed.
The original code comment says: “A public function to sweep accidental ERC-20 transfers to this contract. Tokens are sent to admin (timelock).” This safety measure... | code-423n4/2021-04-basedloans-findings | 17 | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-basedloans-findings/issues/17 | open | null | code423n4 | CONTRIBUTOR | [] | null | [
"bug",
"1 (Low Risk)",
"sponsor confirmed"
] | [
"severity:low",
"sponsor:confirmed"
] | 2021-05-04T02:42:01 | 2021-05-08T21:42:46 | null | null | false | null | 1 | {
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} | # Handle
0xRajeev
# Vulnerability details
## Impact
The sweepToken() function in the original Compound code whose specified purpose was to recover accidentally sent ERC20 tokens to contract has been removed.
The original code comment says: “A public function to sweep accidental ERC-20 transfers to this contract.... | [
{
"author": "ghoul-sol",
"author_association": "COLLABORATOR",
"created_at": "2021-05-08T21:42:40",
"updated_at": "2021-05-08T21:42:40",
"body": "Fixed as recommended, thanks!"
}
] |
code4rena | 2021-04-basedloans | Based Loans | Based Loans | 2021-05-27 | https://code4rena.com/reports/2021-04-basedloans | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-basedloans-findings/issues | L-03 | low | L | All except one Comptroller verify functions do not verify anything in Comptroller.sol/CToken.sol | https://code4rena.com/reports/2021-04-basedloans#l-03-all-except-one-comptroller-verify-functions-do-not-verify-anything-in-comptrollersolctokensol | null | null | Six of the seven Comptroller verify functions do nothing. Not sure why their calls in CToken.sol have been uncommented from the original Compound version.
Except redeemVerify(), six other verify functions transferVerify(), mintVerify(), borrowVerify(), repayBorrowVerify(), liquidateBorrowVerify() and seizeVerify() hav... | code-423n4/2021-04-basedloans-findings | 18 | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-basedloans-findings/issues/18 | open | null | code423n4 | CONTRIBUTOR | [] | null | [
"bug",
"1 (Low Risk)",
"sponsor confirmed"
] | [
"severity:low",
"sponsor:confirmed"
] | 2021-05-04T02:43:48 | 2021-05-07T17:45:04 | null | null | false | null | 1 | {
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} | # Handle
0xRajeev
# Vulnerability details
## Impact
Six of the seven Comptroller verify functions do nothing. Not sure why their calls in CToken.sol have been uncommented from the original Compound version.
Except redeemVerify(), six other verify functions transferVerify(), mintVerify(), borrowVerify(), repayBorr... | [
{
"author": "ghoul-sol",
"author_association": "COLLABORATOR",
"created_at": "2021-05-07T17:45:04",
"updated_at": "2021-05-07T17:45:04",
"body": "Fixed by commenting unused functions."
}
] |
code4rena | 2021-04-basedloans | Based Loans | Based Loans | 2021-05-27 | https://code4rena.com/reports/2021-04-basedloans | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-basedloans-findings/issues | L-04 | low | L | Floating pragma used in Uniswap*.sol | https://code4rena.com/reports/2021-04-basedloans#l-04-floating-pragma-used-in-uniswapsol | null | null | Contracts should be deployed using the same compiler version/flags with which they have been tested. Locking the floating pragma, i.e. by not using ^ in pragma solidity ^0.6.10, ensures that contracts do not accidentally get deployed using an older compiler version with unfixed bugs.
For reference, see https://swcregi... | code-423n4/2021-04-basedloans-findings | 19 | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-basedloans-findings/issues/19 | open | null | code423n4 | CONTRIBUTOR | [] | null | [
"bug",
"1 (Low Risk)",
"sponsor confirmed"
] | [
"severity:low",
"sponsor:confirmed"
] | 2021-05-04T02:46:03 | 2021-05-08T00:48:38 | null | null | false | null | 1 | {
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} | # Handle
0xRajeev
# Vulnerability details
## Impact
Contracts should be deployed using the same compiler version/flags with which they have been tested. Locking the floating pragma, i.e. by not using ^ in pragma solidity ^0.6.10, ensures that contracts do not accidentally get deployed using an older compiler versi... | [
{
"author": "ghoul-sol",
"author_association": "COLLABORATOR",
"created_at": "2021-05-08T00:48:38",
"updated_at": "2021-05-08T00:48:38",
"body": "Fixed as recommended."
}
] |
code4rena | 2021-04-basedloans | Based Loans | Based Loans | 2021-05-27 | https://code4rena.com/reports/2021-04-basedloans | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-basedloans-findings/issues | L-05 | low | L | Missing input validation may set COMP token to zero-address in Comptroller.sol | https://code4rena.com/reports/2021-04-basedloans#l-05-missing-input-validation-may-set-comp-token-to-zero-address-in-comptrollersol | null | null | Function _setCompAddress() is used by admin to change the COMP token address. However, there is no zero-address validation on the parameter. This may accidentally set COMP token address to zero-address but it can be reset by the admin. Any interim transactions might hit exceptional behavior.
Recommend adding zero-addr... | code-423n4/2021-04-basedloans-findings | 20 | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-basedloans-findings/issues/20 | open | null | code423n4 | CONTRIBUTOR | [] | null | [
"bug",
"duplicate",
"disagree with severity",
"0 (Non-critical)",
"1 (Low Risk)",
"sponsor acknowledged"
] | [
"judging:duplicate",
"judging:disagree-with-severity",
"severity:non-critical",
"severity:low",
"sponsor:acknowledged"
] | 2021-05-04T02:48:12 | 2021-05-12T02:34:42 | null | null | false | null | 1 | {
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} | # Handle
0xRajeev
# Vulnerability details
## Impact
Function _setCompAddress() is used by admin to change the COMP token address. However, there is no zero-address validation on the parameter. This may accidentally set COMP token address to zero-address but it can be reset by the admin. Any interim transactions mi... | [
{
"author": "ghoul-sol",
"author_association": "COLLABORATOR",
"created_at": "2021-05-08T16:49:23",
"updated_at": "2021-05-08T16:49:23",
"body": "Duplicate of #14 "
}
] |
code4rena | 2021-04-basedloans | Based Loans | Based Loans | 2021-05-27 | https://code4rena.com/reports/2021-04-basedloans | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-basedloans-findings/issues | L-06 | low | L | Missing zero/threshold check for maxAssets | https://code4rena.com/reports/2021-04-basedloans#l-06-missing-zerothreshold-check-for-maxassets | null | null | A zero or some minimum threshold check is missing for newMaxAssets parameter of _setMaxAssets() function which is used by admin to set the maximum number of assets that controls how many markets can be entered.
If accidentally set to 0 then all users cannot enter any market which will significantly affect protocol ope... | code-423n4/2021-04-basedloans-findings | 21 | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-basedloans-findings/issues/21 | open | null | code423n4 | CONTRIBUTOR | [] | null | [
"bug",
"disagree with severity",
"1 (Low Risk)",
"sponsor acknowledged"
] | [
"judging:disagree-with-severity",
"severity:low",
"sponsor:acknowledged"
] | 2021-05-04T02:49:33 | 2021-05-12T03:57:44 | null | null | false | null | 2 | {
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} | # Handle
0xRajeev
# Vulnerability details
## Impact
A zero or some minimum threshold check is missing for newMaxAssets parameter of _setMaxAssets() function which is used by admin to set the maximum number of assets that controls how many markets can be entered.
If accidentally set to 0 then all users cannot ent... | [
{
"author": "ghoul-sol",
"author_association": "COLLABORATOR",
"created_at": "2021-05-08T17:04:53",
"updated_at": "2021-05-08T17:04:53",
"body": "Added to backlog, however, it's a non-critical issue."
},
{
"author": "cemozerr",
"author_association": "NONE",
"created_at": "2021-05... |
code4rena | 2021-04-basedloans | Based Loans | Based Loans | 2021-05-27 | https://code4rena.com/reports/2021-04-basedloans | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-basedloans-findings/issues | L-07 | low | L | Usage of address.transfer | https://code4rena.com/reports/2021-04-basedloans#l-07-usage-of-addresstransfer | null | null | The transfer function is used in Maximillion.sol to send ETH to an account.
It is performed with a fixed amount of GAS and might fail if GAS costs change in the future or if a smart contract’s fallback function handler is complex.
Consider using the lower-level .call{value: value} instead and checking its success ret... | code-423n4/2021-04-basedloans-findings | 31 | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-basedloans-findings/issues/31 | open | null | code423n4 | CONTRIBUTOR | [] | null | [
"bug",
"1 (Low Risk)",
"sponsor confirmed"
] | [
"severity:low",
"sponsor:confirmed"
] | 2021-05-04T22:28:36 | 2021-05-06T16:30:04 | null | null | false | null | 1 | {
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} | # Handle
@cmichelio
# Vulnerability details
## Vulnerability Details
The `transfer` function is used in `Maximillion.sol` to send ETH to an account.
## Impact
It is performed with a fixed amount of GAS and might fail if GAS costs change in the future or if a smart contract's fallback function handler is complex... | [
{
"author": "ghoul-sol",
"author_association": "COLLABORATOR",
"created_at": "2021-05-06T16:29:56",
"updated_at": "2021-05-06T16:29:56",
"body": "`Maximillion.sol` is not being used and will be deleted."
}
] |
code4rena | 2021-04-basedloans | Based Loans | Based Loans | 2021-05-27 | https://code4rena.com/reports/2021-04-basedloans | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-basedloans-findings/issues | L-08 | low | L | Unbounded iteration on refreshCompSpeedsInternal | https://code4rena.com/reports/2021-04-basedloans#l-08-unbounded-iteration-on-refreshcompspeedsinternal | null | null | The Comptroller.refreshCompSpeedsInternal function iterates over all markets and does expensive computations like updating all borrower / supply indices.
When the total number of markets is high, this iteration could exceed the total block gas amount breaking the functionality and making it impossible to update the re... | code-423n4/2021-04-basedloans-findings | 32 | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-basedloans-findings/issues/32 | open | null | code423n4 | CONTRIBUTOR | [] | null | [
"bug",
"disagree with severity",
"1 (Low Risk)",
"sponsor acknowledged"
] | [
"judging:disagree-with-severity",
"severity:low",
"sponsor:acknowledged"
] | 2021-05-04T22:29:06 | 2021-05-12T04:05:09 | null | null | false | null | 2 | {
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} | # Handle
@cmichelio
# Vulnerability details
## Vulnerability Details
The `Comptroller.refreshCompSpeedsInternal` function iterates over all markets and does expensive computations like updating all borrower / supply indices.
## Impact
When the total number of markets is high, this iteration could exceed the tot... | [
{
"author": "ghoul-sol",
"author_association": "COLLABORATOR",
"created_at": "2021-05-08T17:32:41",
"updated_at": "2021-05-08T17:32:41",
"body": "While true, estimated gas to update speed for 50 markets is `3377184` gas. Current block gas limit is `14,999,986`, that means we could in theory, get... |
code4rena | 2021-04-basedloans | Based Loans | Based Loans | 2021-05-27 | https://code4rena.com/reports/2021-04-basedloans | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-basedloans-findings/issues | L-09 | low | L | uint[] memory parameter is tricky | https://code4rena.com/reports/2021-04-basedloans#l-09-uint-memory-parameter-is-tricky | null | null | Using memory array parameters (e.g. uint[] memory) as function parameters can be tricky in Solidity, because an attack is possible with a very large array which will overlap with other parts of the memory. See proof of concept below.
The function propose of GovernorAlpha.sol seems most vulnerable because this function... | code-423n4/2021-04-basedloans-findings | 12 | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-basedloans-findings/issues/12 | open | null | code423n4 | CONTRIBUTOR | [] | null | [
"bug",
"1 (Low Risk)",
"sponsor acknowledged"
] | [
"severity:low",
"sponsor:acknowledged"
] | 2021-05-01T14:37:03 | 2021-05-07T19:00:33 | null | null | false | null | 1 | {
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} | # Handle
gpersoon
# Vulnerability details
## Impact
Using memory array parameters (e.g. uint[] memory) as function parameters can be tricky in Solidity, because an attack is possible with a very large array which will overlap with other parts of the memory. See proof of concept below.
The function "propose" of Gov... | [
{
"author": "ghoul-sol",
"author_association": "COLLABORATOR",
"created_at": "2021-05-07T19:00:28",
"updated_at": "2021-05-07T19:00:28",
"body": "As mentioned, this applies to either admin functions or ones that are using a loop. The `propose` function is used by governance so its outcome will b... |
code4rena | 2021-04-basedloans | Based Loans | Based Loans | 2021-05-27 | https://code4rena.com/reports/2021-04-basedloans | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-basedloans-findings/issues | L-10 | low | L | CarefulMath / safe math not allways used | https://code4rena.com/reports/2021-04-basedloans#l-10-carefulmath--safe-math-not-allways-used | null | null | CarefulMath is used in most calculations, however it isn’t always used.
Recommend double checking to see if safe math functions really are not necessary and otherwise add a comment.
ghoul-sol (Based Loans) commented:
Agreed, however, in my opinion it’s a non-critical issue.
cemozerr (Judge) commented:
I will rate ... | code-423n4/2021-04-basedloans-findings | 6 | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-basedloans-findings/issues/6 | open | null | code423n4 | CONTRIBUTOR | [] | null | [
"bug",
"disagree with severity",
"1 (Low Risk)",
"sponsor acknowledged"
] | [
"judging:disagree-with-severity",
"severity:low",
"sponsor:acknowledged"
] | 2021-05-01T13:25:51 | 2021-05-12T04:51:59 | null | null | false | null | 2 | {
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} | # Handle
gpersoon
# Vulnerability details
## Impact
CarefulMath is used in most calculations, however it isn't always used.
Although I didn't spot any real issues with this it isn't consistent.
## Proof of Concept
.\Governance\Blo.sol: return nCheckpoints > 0 ? checkpoints[account][nCheckpoints - 1].votes ... | [
{
"author": "ghoul-sol",
"author_association": "COLLABORATOR",
"created_at": "2021-05-08T00:43:07",
"updated_at": "2021-05-08T00:43:07",
"body": "Agreed, however, in my opinion it's a non-critical issue."
},
{
"author": "cemozerr",
"author_association": "NONE",
"created_at": "202... |
code4rena | 2021-04-basedloans | Based Loans | Based Loans | 2021-05-27 | https://code4rena.com/reports/2021-04-basedloans | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-basedloans-findings/issues | L-11 | low | L | Use ‘receive’ when expecting eth and empty call data | https://code4rena.com/reports/2021-04-basedloans#l-11-use-receive-when-expecting-eth-and-empty-call-data | null | null | Contract CEther fallback function was refactored to be compatible with the Solidity 0.6 version:
/**
* @notice Send Ether to CEther to mint
*/
fallback () external payable {
(uint err,) = mintInternal(msg.value);
requireNoError(err, "mint failed");
}
From Solidity 0.6 documentation:
“The unnamed function com... | code-423n4/2021-04-basedloans-findings | 25 | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-basedloans-findings/issues/25 | open | null | code423n4 | CONTRIBUTOR | [] | null | [
"bug",
"1 (Low Risk)",
"sponsor confirmed"
] | [
"severity:low",
"sponsor:confirmed"
] | 2021-05-04T06:52:41 | 2021-05-08T16:47:47 | null | null | false | null | 1 | {
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} | # Handle
paulius.eth
# Vulnerability details
## Impact
contract CEther fallback function was refactored to be compatible with the Solidity 0.6 version:
/**
* @notice Send Ether to CEther to mint
*/
fallback () external payable {
(uint err,) = mintInternal(msg.value);
requireNoError(err, "mint... | [
{
"author": "ghoul-sol",
"author_association": "COLLABORATOR",
"created_at": "2021-05-08T16:47:40",
"updated_at": "2021-05-08T16:47:40",
"body": "Fixed as recommended"
}
] |
code4rena | 2021-04-basedloans | Based Loans | Based Loans | 2021-05-27 | https://code4rena.com/reports/2021-04-basedloans | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-basedloans-findings/issues | L-12 | low | L | Allow borrowCap to be filled fully | https://code4rena.com/reports/2021-04-basedloans#l-12-allow-borrowcap-to-be-filled-fully | null | null | Here the condition should be ’<=’, not ’<’ to allow filling the cap fully:
require(nextTotalBorrows < borrowCap, "market borrow cap reached");
require(nextTotalBorrows <= borrowCap, "market borrow cap reached");
ghoul-sol (Based Loans) commented:
Added to backlog.
Non-Critical Findings | code-423n4/2021-04-basedloans-findings | 28 | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-basedloans-findings/issues/28 | open | null | code423n4 | CONTRIBUTOR | [] | null | [
"bug",
"1 (Low Risk)",
"sponsor acknowledged"
] | [
"severity:low",
"sponsor:acknowledged"
] | 2021-05-04T06:57:10 | 2021-05-12T05:06:25 | null | null | false | null | 1 | {
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} | # Handle
paulius.eth
# Vulnerability details
## Impact
Here the condition should be '<=', not '<' to allow filling the cap fully:
require(nextTotalBorrows < borrowCap, "market borrow cap reached");
## Recommended Mitigation Steps
require(nextTotalBorrows <= borrowCap, "market borrow cap reached");
| [
{
"author": "ghoul-sol",
"author_association": "COLLABORATOR",
"created_at": "2021-05-06T16:31:25",
"updated_at": "2021-05-06T16:31:25",
"body": "Added to backlog."
}
] |
code4rena | 2021-04-basedloans | Based Loans | Based Loans | 2021-05-27 | https://code4rena.com/reports/2021-04-basedloans | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-basedloans-findings/issues | M-01 | medium | M | Reward rates can be changed through flash borrows | https://code4rena.com/reports/2021-04-basedloans#m-01-reward-rates-can-be-changed-through-flash-borrows | null | null | The rewards per market are proportional to their totalBorrows which can be changed by a large holder who deposits lots of collateral, takes out a huge borrow in the market, updates the rewards, and then unwinds the position.
They’ll only pay gas fees as the borrow / repay can happen in the same block.
The Comptroller.... | code-423n4/2021-04-basedloans-findings | 33 | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-basedloans-findings/issues/33 | open | null | code423n4 | CONTRIBUTOR | [] | null | [
"bug",
"2 (Med Risk)",
"sponsor acknowledged"
] | [
"severity:medium",
"sponsor:acknowledged"
] | 2021-05-04T22:29:34 | 2021-05-08T22:09:48 | null | null | false | null | 1 | {
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@cmichelio
# Vulnerability details
## Vulnerability Details
The rewards per market are proportional to their `totalBorrows` which can be changed by a large holder who deposits lots of collateral, takes out a huge borrow in the market, updates the rewards, and then unwinds the position.
They'll only pay g... | [
{
"author": "ghoul-sol",
"author_association": "COLLABORATOR",
"created_at": "2021-05-08T22:09:43",
"updated_at": "2021-05-08T22:09:43",
"body": "Restricting `Comptroller.refreshCompSpeeds` function to admin only would centralize an ability to update speeds. I think better solution is a bot that... |
code4rena | 2021-04-basedloans | Based Loans | Based Loans | 2021-05-27 | https://code4rena.com/reports/2021-04-basedloans | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-basedloans-findings/issues | N-01 | non-critical | N | Outdated Compiler | https://code4rena.com/reports/2021-04-basedloans#n-01-outdated-compiler | null | null | The project is using Solidity compiler version 0.6.12 which was released in July 2020, while the latest compiler version is 0.8.4. Using such an older version makes the project susceptible to any compiler bugs fixed or dangerous features deprecated since then, and also prevents it from leveraging the newly introduced f... | null | null | null | null | null | null | null | null | null | null | null | null | null | null | null | null | null | null | null | null | null |
code4rena | 2021-04-basedloans | Based Loans | Based Loans | 2021-05-27 | https://code4rena.com/reports/2021-04-basedloans | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-basedloans-findings/issues | N-02 | non-critical | N | Missed NatSpec @param for newly introduced parameter distributeAll | https://code4rena.com/reports/2021-04-basedloans#n-02-missed-natspec-param-for-newly-introduced-parameter-distributeall | null | null | The distributeSupplierComp() function has been modified to take in a third parameter which is a boolean distributeAll. But the corresponding NatSpec comments for the function have not been updated to add this new parameter. This could lead to minor confusion where NatSpec is consulted.
Recommend adding @param for dist... | code-423n4/2021-04-basedloans-findings | 22 | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-basedloans-findings/issues/22 | open | null | code423n4 | CONTRIBUTOR | [] | null | [
"bug",
"0 (Non-critical)",
"sponsor confirmed"
] | [
"severity:non-critical",
"sponsor:confirmed"
] | 2021-05-04T02:51:04 | 2021-05-05T16:23:59 | null | null | false | null | 1 | {
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} | # Handle
0xRajeev
# Vulnerability details
## Impact
The distributeSupplierComp() function has been modified to take in a third parameter which is a boolean distributeAll. But the corresponding NatSpec comments for the function have not been updated to add this new parameter. This could lead to minor confusion wher... | [
{
"author": "ghoul-sol",
"author_association": "COLLABORATOR",
"created_at": "2021-05-05T16:23:59",
"updated_at": "2021-05-05T16:23:59",
"body": "Fixed as recommended."
}
] |
code4rena | 2021-04-maple | Maple Finance | Maple Finance | 2021-05-03 | https://code4rena.com/reports/2021-04-maple | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings/issues | DUP-107 | non-critical | N | FundsWithdrawn event emitted when amount withdrawn is 0 | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings/issues/107 | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings/issues/107 | null | # Handle
janbro
# Vulnerability details
## Summary
_prepareWithdraw emits a FundsWithdrawn event even when the amount withdrawn is 0. This is contradictory to the comment
@dev It emits a `FundsWithdrawn` event if the amount of withdrawn ether is greater than 0.
## Risk Rating
Low
## Vulnerability Details
BasicFD... | code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings | 107 | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings/issues/107 | closed | completed | code423n4 | CONTRIBUTOR | [] | null | [
"bug",
"duplicate",
"0 (Non-critical)",
"sponsor confirmed"
] | [
"judging:duplicate",
"severity:non-critical",
"sponsor:confirmed"
] | 2021-04-21T21:01:50 | 2021-04-27T02:15:49 | 2021-04-23T20:04:01 | lucas-manuel | false | null | 1 | {
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} | # Handle
janbro
# Vulnerability details
## Summary
_prepareWithdraw emits a FundsWithdrawn event even when the amount withdrawn is 0. This is contradictory to the comment
@dev It emits a `FundsWithdrawn` event if the amount of withdrawn ether is greater than 0.
## Risk Rating
Low
## Vulnerability Details
BasicFD... | null |
code4rena | 2021-04-maple | Maple Finance | Maple Finance | 2021-05-03 | https://code4rena.com/reports/2021-04-maple | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings/issues | DUP-114 | medium | M | Bypass or reduction on the lockup period. | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings/issues/114 | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings/issues/114 | null | # Handle
shw
# Vulnerability details
## Impact
In `Pool.sol`, the lockup restriction of withdrawal can be bypassed or reduced if new liquidity providers cooperate with existing ones.
## Proof of Concept
1. A liquidity provider Alice deposits liquidity assets into the pool and gained some FDTs. She then waits for... | code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings | 114 | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings/issues/114 | closed | completed | code423n4 | CONTRIBUTOR | [] | null | [
"bug",
"duplicate",
"2 (Med Risk)",
"Will Revisit"
] | [
"judging:duplicate",
"severity:medium"
] | 2021-04-22T00:00:14 | 2021-04-27T04:03:29 | 2021-04-23T19:58:38 | lucas-manuel | false | null | 1 | {
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} | # Handle
shw
# Vulnerability details
## Impact
In `Pool.sol`, the lockup restriction of withdrawal can be bypassed or reduced if new liquidity providers cooperate with existing ones.
## Proof of Concept
1. A liquidity provider Alice deposits liquidity assets into the pool and gained some FDTs. She then waits for... | null |
code4rena | 2021-04-maple | Maple Finance | Maple Finance | 2021-05-03 | https://code4rena.com/reports/2021-04-maple | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings/issues | DUP-115 | low | L | Potential reentrancy when the borrower drawdowns the loan. | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings/issues/115 | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings/issues/115 | null | # Handle
shw
# Vulnerability details
## Impact
If the `liquidityAsset` or `collateralAsset` is an ERC777 that allowed receviers to define receive hooks when tranferring, reentrancy is theoretically possible when the borrower calls the `drawdown` function, which will possibly break the functionality of lending loan... | code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings | 115 | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings/issues/115 | open | null | code423n4 | CONTRIBUTOR | [] | null | [
"bug",
"duplicate",
"1 (Low Risk)",
"sponsor disputed"
] | [
"judging:duplicate",
"severity:low",
"sponsor:disputed"
] | 2021-04-22T00:00:56 | 2021-04-27T04:05:58 | null | null | false | null | 2 | {
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} | # Handle
shw
# Vulnerability details
## Impact
If the `liquidityAsset` or `collateralAsset` is an ERC777 that allowed receviers to define receive hooks when tranferring, reentrancy is theoretically possible when the borrower calls the `drawdown` function, which will possibly break the functionality of lending loan... | null |
code4rena | 2021-04-maple | Maple Finance | Maple Finance | 2021-05-03 | https://code4rena.com/reports/2021-04-maple | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings/issues | DUP-18 | low | L | claim doesn't check state | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings/issues/18 | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings/issues/18 | null | # Handle
gpersoon
# Vulnerability details
## Impact
The function claim() of Pool.sol doesn't include a call to _isValidState(...)
So the function might be called in all states, for example when state=Deactivated
The most of the other functions in Pool.sol do check _isValidState().
## Proof of Concept
_isValidStat... | code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings | 18 | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings/issues/18 | closed | completed | code423n4 | CONTRIBUTOR | [] | null | [
"bug",
"duplicate",
"1 (Low Risk)"
] | [
"judging:duplicate",
"severity:low"
] | 2021-04-16T13:00:38 | 2021-04-23T19:14:28 | 2021-04-23T19:14:24 | lucas-manuel | false | null | 1 | {
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} | # Handle
gpersoon
# Vulnerability details
## Impact
The function claim() of Pool.sol doesn't include a call to _isValidState(...)
So the function might be called in all states, for example when state=Deactivated
The most of the other functions in Pool.sol do check _isValidState().
## Proof of Concept
_isValidStat... | null |
code4rena | 2021-04-maple | Maple Finance | Maple Finance | 2021-05-03 | https://code4rena.com/reports/2021-04-maple | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings/issues | DUP-20 | low | L | External and public not used consistently | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings/issues/20 | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings/issues/20 | null | # Handle
gpersoon
# Vulnerability details
## Impact
Several function are defined to be public and others are external.
Even with very similar functions the use of public and external differs.
Making this the same everywhere (where possible) will make the code cleaner
## Proof of Concept
LoanFactory.sol:
function ... | code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings | 20 | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings/issues/20 | closed | completed | code423n4 | CONTRIBUTOR | [] | null | [
"bug",
"duplicate",
"1 (Low Risk)",
"0 (Non-critical)",
"sponsor confirmed",
"disagree with severity"
] | [
"judging:duplicate",
"severity:low",
"severity:non-critical",
"sponsor:confirmed",
"judging:disagree-with-severity"
] | 2021-04-16T13:14:04 | 2021-04-23T20:04:40 | 2021-04-23T20:04:40 | lucas-manuel | false | null | 2 | {
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"hooray": 0,
"confused": 0,
"heart": 0,
"rocket": 0,
"eyes": 0
} | # Handle
gpersoon
# Vulnerability details
## Impact
Several function are defined to be public and others are external.
Even with very similar functions the use of public and external differs.
Making this the same everywhere (where possible) will make the code cleaner
## Proof of Concept
LoanFactory.sol:
function ... | null |
code4rena | 2021-04-maple | Maple Finance | Maple Finance | 2021-05-03 | https://code4rena.com/reports/2021-04-maple | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings/issues | DUP-28 | low | L | Missing event for critical operation of new Collateral locker creation in CollateralLockerFactory.sol | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings/issues/28 | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings/issues/28 | null | # Handle
0xRajeev
# Vulnerability details
## Impact
Lockers are critical contracts that hold custody of different Maple assets. While there are five lockers created initially (as described in https://github.com/maple-labs/maple-core/wiki/Lockers), such new lockers created by the factory should be logged as events ... | code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings | 28 | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings/issues/28 | open | null | code423n4 | CONTRIBUTOR | [] | null | [
"bug",
"duplicate",
"1 (Low Risk)"
] | [
"judging:duplicate",
"severity:low"
] | 2021-04-19T15:09:15 | 2021-04-23T20:03:02 | null | null | false | null | 1 | {
"total_count": 0,
"+1": 0,
"-1": 0,
"laugh": 0,
"hooray": 0,
"confused": 0,
"heart": 0,
"rocket": 0,
"eyes": 0
} | # Handle
0xRajeev
# Vulnerability details
## Impact
Lockers are critical contracts that hold custody of different Maple assets. While there are five lockers created initially (as described in https://github.com/maple-labs/maple-core/wiki/Lockers), such new lockers created by the factory should be logged as events ... | null |
code4rena | 2021-04-maple | Maple Finance | Maple Finance | 2021-05-03 | https://code4rena.com/reports/2021-04-maple | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings/issues | DUP-48 | non-critical | N | Missing input validation on critical globals variable for zero address in MapleTreasury.sol | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings/issues/48 | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings/issues/48 | null | # Handle
0xRajeev
# Vulnerability details
## Impact
Input validation on address parameters checking for zero addresses is always recommended. This becomes especially critical for parameters which cannot be later changed (if/when zero addresses are used mistakenly) and will force redeployment of contracts.
The se... | code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings | 48 | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings/issues/48 | open | null | code423n4 | CONTRIBUTOR | [] | null | [
"bug",
"duplicate",
"0 (Non-critical)",
"sponsor disputed"
] | [
"judging:duplicate",
"severity:non-critical",
"sponsor:disputed"
] | 2021-04-19T15:39:30 | 2021-04-26T23:51:41 | null | null | false | null | 2 | {
"total_count": 0,
"+1": 0,
"-1": 0,
"laugh": 0,
"hooray": 0,
"confused": 0,
"heart": 0,
"rocket": 0,
"eyes": 0
} | # Handle
0xRajeev
# Vulnerability details
## Impact
Input validation on address parameters checking for zero addresses is always recommended. This becomes especially critical for parameters which cannot be later changed (if/when zero addresses are used mistakenly) and will force redeployment of contracts.
The se... | null |
code4rena | 2021-04-maple | Maple Finance | Maple Finance | 2021-05-03 | https://code4rena.com/reports/2021-04-maple | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings/issues | DUP-49 | non-critical | N | Missing input validation on critical globals variable for zero address in PoolFactory.sol | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings/issues/49 | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings/issues/49 | null | # Handle
0xRajeev
# Vulnerability details
## Impact
Input validation on address parameters checking for zero addresses is always recommended. This becomes especially critical for parameters which cannot be later changed (if/when zero addresses are used mistakenly) and will force redeployment of contracts.
The se... | code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings | 49 | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings/issues/49 | open | null | code423n4 | CONTRIBUTOR | [] | null | [
"bug",
"duplicate",
"0 (Non-critical)",
"sponsor disputed"
] | [
"judging:duplicate",
"severity:non-critical",
"sponsor:disputed"
] | 2021-04-19T15:40:51 | 2021-04-26T23:53:01 | null | null | false | null | 2 | {
"total_count": 0,
"+1": 0,
"-1": 0,
"laugh": 0,
"hooray": 0,
"confused": 0,
"heart": 0,
"rocket": 0,
"eyes": 0
} | # Handle
0xRajeev
# Vulnerability details
## Impact
Input validation on address parameters checking for zero addresses is always recommended. This becomes especially critical for parameters which cannot be later changed (if/when zero addresses are used mistakenly) and will force redeployment of contracts.
The se... | null |
code4rena | 2021-04-maple | Maple Finance | Maple Finance | 2021-05-03 | https://code4rena.com/reports/2021-04-maple | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings/issues | DUP-50 | non-critical | N | Missing input validation on critical globals variable for zero address in LoanFactory.sol | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings/issues/50 | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings/issues/50 | null | # Handle
0xRajeev
# Vulnerability details
## Impact
Input validation on address parameters checking for zero addresses is always recommended. This becomes especially critical for parameters which cannot be later changed (if/when zero addresses are used mistakenly) and will force redeployment of contracts.
The se... | code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings | 50 | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings/issues/50 | open | null | code423n4 | CONTRIBUTOR | [] | null | [
"bug",
"duplicate",
"0 (Non-critical)"
] | [
"judging:duplicate",
"severity:non-critical"
] | 2021-04-19T15:41:54 | 2021-04-26T23:54:03 | null | null | false | null | 2 | {
"total_count": 0,
"+1": 0,
"-1": 0,
"laugh": 0,
"hooray": 0,
"confused": 0,
"heart": 0,
"rocket": 0,
"eyes": 0
} | # Handle
0xRajeev
# Vulnerability details
## Impact
Input validation on address parameters checking for zero addresses is always recommended. This becomes especially critical for parameters which cannot be later changed (if/when zero addresses are used mistakenly) and will force redeployment of contracts.
The se... | null |
code4rena | 2021-04-maple | Maple Finance | Maple Finance | 2021-05-03 | https://code4rena.com/reports/2021-04-maple | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings/issues | DUP-51 | non-critical | N | Missing input validation on critical globals variable for zero address in MplRewardsFactory.sol | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings/issues/51 | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings/issues/51 | null | # Handle
0xRajeev
# Vulnerability details
## Impact
Input validation on address parameters checking for zero addresses is always recommended. This becomes especially critical for parameters which cannot be later changed (if/when zero addresses are used mistakenly) and will force redeployment of contracts.
The se... | code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings | 51 | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings/issues/51 | open | null | code423n4 | CONTRIBUTOR | [] | null | [
"bug",
"duplicate",
"0 (Non-critical)",
"sponsor disputed"
] | [
"judging:duplicate",
"severity:non-critical",
"sponsor:disputed"
] | 2021-04-19T15:42:59 | 2021-04-26T23:54:32 | null | null | false | null | 2 | {
"total_count": 0,
"+1": 0,
"-1": 0,
"laugh": 0,
"hooray": 0,
"confused": 0,
"heart": 0,
"rocket": 0,
"eyes": 0
} | # Handle
0xRajeev
# Vulnerability details
## Impact
Input validation on address parameters checking for zero addresses is always recommended. This becomes especially critical for parameters which cannot be later changed (if/when zero addresses are used mistakenly) and will force redeployment of contracts.
The se... | null |
code4rena | 2021-04-maple | Maple Finance | Maple Finance | 2021-05-03 | https://code4rena.com/reports/2021-04-maple | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings/issues | DUP-53 | non-critical | N | Specification/Implementation mismatch on Security Multisig capability | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings/issues/53 | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings/issues/53 | null | # Handle
0xRajeev
# Vulnerability details
## Impact
The protocol specification specifies that the Security Multisig controls the pause/unpause functionality of three functions Loan.fundLoan(), Pool.setLiquidityCap() and StakeLocker.stake() as indicated here: https://github.com/maple-labs/maple-core/wiki/Security#s... | code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings | 53 | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings/issues/53 | open | null | code423n4 | CONTRIBUTOR | [] | null | [
"bug",
"duplicate",
"0 (Non-critical)",
"sponsor disputed"
] | [
"judging:duplicate",
"severity:non-critical",
"sponsor:disputed"
] | 2021-04-19T15:45:25 | 2021-04-27T20:18:39 | null | null | false | null | 3 | {
"total_count": 0,
"+1": 0,
"-1": 0,
"laugh": 0,
"hooray": 0,
"confused": 0,
"heart": 0,
"rocket": 0,
"eyes": 0
} | # Handle
0xRajeev
# Vulnerability details
## Impact
The protocol specification specifies that the Security Multisig controls the pause/unpause functionality of three functions Loan.fundLoan(), Pool.setLiquidityCap() and StakeLocker.stake() as indicated here: https://github.com/maple-labs/maple-core/wiki/Security#s... | null |
code4rena | 2021-04-maple | Maple Finance | Maple Finance | 2021-05-03 | https://code4rena.com/reports/2021-04-maple | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings/issues | DUP-6 | low | DUP | Attackers Can Steal Any MPL That Is Burned/Sent To 0x000...000 | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings/issues/6 | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings/issues/6 | null | # Handle
jvaqa
# Vulnerability details
## Impact
Any MPL that is sent to 0x000...000 is available to be stolen by anyone.
When ecrecover() is given an incorrect signature, it fails silently and returns a zero address (see the second paragraph of Security Considerations at EIP 2612).
The MPL token's implementation... | code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings | 6 | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings/issues/6 | closed | completed | code423n4 | CONTRIBUTOR | [] | null | [
"bug",
"duplicate",
"sponsor acknowledged",
"invalid"
] | [
"judging:duplicate",
"sponsor:acknowledged",
"judging:invalid"
] | 2021-04-11T04:49:34 | 2021-04-27T04:11:38 | 2021-04-27T04:11:38 | Arachnid | false | null | 7 | {
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"+1": 0,
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"laugh": 0,
"hooray": 0,
"confused": 0,
"heart": 0,
"rocket": 0,
"eyes": 0
} | # Handle
jvaqa
# Vulnerability details
## Impact
Any MPL that is sent to 0x000...000 is available to be stolen by anyone.
When ecrecover() is given an incorrect signature, it fails silently and returns a zero address (see the second paragraph of Security Considerations at EIP 2612).
The MPL token's implementation... | null |
code4rena | 2021-04-maple | Maple Finance | Maple Finance | 2021-05-03 | https://code4rena.com/reports/2021-04-maple | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings/issues | DUP-72 | non-critical | N | Event emission inconsistent with NatSpec comment in ERC2222.sol | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings/issues/72 | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings/issues/72 | null | # Handle
0xRajeev
# Vulnerability details
## Impact
_prepareWithdraw() and _prepareWithdrawOnBehalf() emit FundsWithdrawn event but their @dev Natspec comments say this:
@dev It emits a `FundsWithdrawn` event if the amount of withdrawn ether is greater than 0.
However, this event is emitted before the greater-th... | code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings | 72 | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings/issues/72 | open | null | code423n4 | CONTRIBUTOR | [] | null | [
"bug",
"duplicate",
"0 (Non-critical)",
"sponsor acknowledged"
] | [
"judging:duplicate",
"severity:non-critical",
"sponsor:acknowledged"
] | 2021-04-19T16:01:33 | 2021-04-27T02:16:17 | null | null | false | null | 1 | {
"total_count": 0,
"+1": 0,
"-1": 0,
"laugh": 0,
"hooray": 0,
"confused": 0,
"heart": 0,
"rocket": 0,
"eyes": 0
} | # Handle
0xRajeev
# Vulnerability details
## Impact
_prepareWithdraw() and _prepareWithdrawOnBehalf() emit FundsWithdrawn event but their @dev Natspec comments say this:
@dev It emits a `FundsWithdrawn` event if the amount of withdrawn ether is greater than 0.
However, this event is emitted before the greater-th... | null |
code4rena | 2021-04-maple | Maple Finance | Maple Finance | 2021-05-03 | https://code4rena.com/reports/2021-04-maple | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings/issues | DUP-88 | non-critical | N | Possible sandwich-attack when treasury converts tokens | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings/issues/88 | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings/issues/88 | null | # Handle
@cmichelio
# Vulnerability details
## Vulnerability Details
As the docs say:
> If the MapleTreasury collects fees from a Loan drawdown that was performed with WBTC, it can swap WBTC to USDC so that it can distribute those funds to token holders.
When this trade is observed, it can be [sandwich-attacked]... | code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings | 88 | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings/issues/88 | open | null | code423n4 | CONTRIBUTOR | [] | null | [
"bug",
"duplicate",
"0 (Non-critical)",
"sponsor disputed"
] | [
"judging:duplicate",
"severity:non-critical",
"sponsor:disputed"
] | 2021-04-20T20:08:59 | 2021-04-27T03:43:36 | null | null | false | null | 4 | {
"total_count": 0,
"+1": 0,
"-1": 0,
"laugh": 0,
"hooray": 0,
"confused": 0,
"heart": 0,
"rocket": 0,
"eyes": 0
} | # Handle
@cmichelio
# Vulnerability details
## Vulnerability Details
As the docs say:
> If the MapleTreasury collects fees from a Loan drawdown that was performed with WBTC, it can swap WBTC to USDC so that it can distribute those funds to token holders.
When this trade is observed, it can be [sandwich-attacked]... | null |
code4rena | 2021-04-maple | Maple Finance | Maple Finance | 2021-05-03 | https://code4rena.com/reports/2021-04-maple | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings/issues | L-01 | low | L | Cross-Chain Replay Attack | https://code4rena.com/reports/2021-04-maple#l-01-cross-chain-replay-attack | null | null | The constructor of the Maple token calculates the chainid it should assign during its execution and permanently stores it in an immutable variable. Should Ethereum fork in the feature, the chainid will change however the one used by the permits will not enabling a user to use any new permits on both chains thus breakin... | code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings | 2 | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings/issues/2 | open | null | code423n4 | CONTRIBUTOR | [] | null | [
"bug",
"1 (Low Risk)",
"sponsor acknowledged"
] | [
"severity:low",
"sponsor:acknowledged"
] | 2021-04-08T20:18:42 | 2021-04-22T13:37:03 | null | null | false | null | 1 | {
"total_count": 0,
"+1": 0,
"-1": 0,
"laugh": 0,
"hooray": 0,
"confused": 0,
"heart": 0,
"rocket": 0,
"eyes": 0
} | # Handle
0xsomeone
# Vulnerability details
## Impact
The `constructor` of the Maple token calculates the `chainid` it should assign during its execution and permanently stores it in an `immutable` variable. Should Ethereum fork in the feature, the `chainid` will change however the one used by the permits will not ... | [
{
"author": "lucas-manuel",
"author_association": "COLLABORATOR",
"created_at": "2021-04-22T13:37:02",
"updated_at": "2021-04-22T13:37:02",
"body": "Not going to implement, if Ethereum forks we will not used forked MPL"
}
] |
code4rena | 2021-04-maple | Maple Finance | Maple Finance | 2021-05-03 | https://code4rena.com/reports/2021-04-maple | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings/issues | L-02 | low | L | Missing check for Pool state on several functions in Pool.sol | https://code4rena.com/reports/2021-04-maple#l-02-missing-check-for-pool-state-on-several-functions-in-poolsol | null | null | The Pool may be in three states: Initialized, Finalized and Deactivated as indicated by the enum State variable. While a couple of functions such as fundLoan() and deposit() check against a valid Pool state i.e. Finalized using \_isValidState(State.Finalized), most other functions miss this check. This could cause unex... | code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings | 68 | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings/issues/68 | open | null | code423n4 | CONTRIBUTOR | [] | null | [
"bug",
"1 (Low Risk)",
"sponsor acknowledged"
] | [
"severity:low",
"sponsor:acknowledged"
] | 2021-04-19T15:58:13 | 2021-04-27T16:30:18 | null | null | false | null | 3 | {
"total_count": 0,
"+1": 0,
"-1": 0,
"laugh": 0,
"hooray": 0,
"confused": 0,
"heart": 0,
"rocket": 0,
"eyes": 0
} | # Handle
0xRajeev
# Vulnerability details
## Impact
The Pool may be in three states: Initialized, Finalized and Deactivated as indicated by the enum State variable. While a couple of functions such as fundLoan() and deposit() check against a valid Pool state i.e. Finalized using _isValidState(State.Finalized), mos... | [
{
"author": "lucas-manuel",
"author_association": "COLLABORATOR",
"created_at": "2021-04-23T19:15:09",
"updated_at": "2021-04-23T19:15:09",
"body": "Informational, will address, not really a bug."
},
{
"author": "Arachnid",
"author_association": "COLLABORATOR",
"created_at": "202... |
code4rena | 2021-04-maple | Maple Finance | Maple Finance | 2021-05-03 | https://code4rena.com/reports/2021-04-maple | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings/issues | L-03 | low | L | Mirrored admin variables in global context, Pool, PoolFactory, Loan and LoanFactory may make it confusing for deployment and maintenance | https://code4rena.com/reports/2021-04-maple#l-03-mirrored-admin-variables-in-global-context-pool-poolfactory-loan-and-loanfactory-may-make-it-confusing-for-deployment-and-maintenance | null | null | The access control model for the different contracts and how they interact is confusing and may cause issues during deployment and maintenance. Multiple contracts have the notion of admin(s), all of which use setAdmin function to update admin status. This mirroring and reuse of the admin variable is susceptible to acci... | code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings | 36 | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings/issues/36 | open | null | code423n4 | CONTRIBUTOR | [] | null | [
"bug",
"1 (Low Risk)",
"sponsor confirmed",
"resolved"
] | [
"severity:low",
"sponsor:confirmed",
"sponsor:resolved"
] | 2021-04-19T15:21:30 | 2021-04-26T23:37:55 | null | null | false | null | 2 | {
"total_count": 0,
"+1": 0,
"-1": 0,
"laugh": 0,
"hooray": 0,
"confused": 0,
"heart": 0,
"rocket": 0,
"eyes": 0
} | # Handle
0xRajeev
# Vulnerability details
## Impact
The access control model for the different contracts and how they interact is confusing and may cause issues during deployment and maintenance. Multiple contracts have the notion of admin(s), all of which use setAdmin function to update admin status. This mirrori... | [
{
"author": "lucas-manuel",
"author_association": "COLLABORATOR",
"created_at": "2021-04-22T15:35:57",
"updated_at": "2021-04-22T15:35:57",
"body": "Not a bug, informational, but a good idea and will address."
},
{
"author": "Arachnid",
"author_association": "COLLABORATOR",
"crea... |
code4rena | 2021-04-maple | Maple Finance | Maple Finance | 2021-05-03 | https://code4rena.com/reports/2021-04-maple | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings/issues | L-04 | low | L | Full payment does not consider late fees of the payment | https://code4rena.com/reports/2021-04-maple#l-04-full-payment-does-not-consider-late-fees-of-the-payment | null | null | Since the calculation of makeFullPayment (Loan.sol#249) does not consider whether the payment is late or not, the borrower can avoid paying late fees by only calling makeFullPayment instead of makePayment (Loan.sol#238). The borrower has no incentive to repay the loan in time and could
The full payment is calculated b... | code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings | 112 | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings/issues/112 | open | null | code423n4 | CONTRIBUTOR | [] | null | [
"bug",
"1 (Low Risk)",
"sponsor disputed",
"resolved"
] | [
"severity:low",
"sponsor:disputed",
"sponsor:resolved"
] | 2021-04-21T23:57:09 | 2021-04-28T17:11:41 | null | null | false | null | 5 | {
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"+1": 0,
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"hooray": 0,
"confused": 0,
"heart": 0,
"rocket": 0,
"eyes": 0
} | # Handle
shw
# Vulnerability details
## Impact
Since the calculation of `makeFullPayment` (`Loan.sol#249`) does not consider whether the payment is late or not, the borrower can avoid paying late fees by only calling `makeFullPayment` instead of `makePayment` (`Loan.sol#238`). The borrower has no incentive to repa... | [
{
"author": "Arachnid",
"author_association": "COLLABORATOR",
"created_at": "2021-04-27T03:58:10",
"updated_at": "2021-04-27T03:58:10",
"body": "Another way to look at this is that the borrower gets `gracePeriod` extra days of borrowing for free - just by deferring their final payment. Agree wit... |
code4rena | 2021-04-maple | Maple Finance | Maple Finance | 2021-05-03 | https://code4rena.com/reports/2021-04-maple | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings/issues | L-05 | low | L | Chainlink Price data could be stale | https://code4rena.com/reports/2021-04-maple#l-05-chainlink-price-data-could-be-stale | null | null | There is no check if the return value indicates stale data. This could lead to stale prices according to the Chainlink documentation:
- “if answeredInRound < roundId could indicate stale data.”
- “A timestamp with zero value means the round is not complete and should not be used.”
The price oracle might return unrel... | code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings | 82 | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings/issues/82 | open | null | code423n4 | CONTRIBUTOR | [] | null | [
"bug",
"1 (Low Risk)",
"sponsor confirmed",
"resolved"
] | [
"severity:low",
"sponsor:confirmed",
"sponsor:resolved"
] | 2021-04-20T20:05:53 | 2021-04-27T19:50:07 | null | null | false | null | 3 | {
"total_count": 0,
"+1": 0,
"-1": 0,
"laugh": 0,
"hooray": 0,
"confused": 0,
"heart": 0,
"rocket": 0,
"eyes": 0
} | # Handle
@cmichelio
# Vulnerability details
## Vulnerability Details
There is no check if the return value indicates stale data. This could lead to stale prices according to the Chainlink documentation:
* ["if answeredInRound < roundId could indicate stale data."](https://docs.chain.link/docs/developer-communica... | [
{
"author": "lucas-manuel",
"author_association": "COLLABORATOR",
"created_at": "2021-04-22T21:32:59",
"updated_at": "2021-04-22T21:32:59",
"body": "We will add this check, but disagree that this is a high severity bug."
},
{
"author": "lucas-manuel",
"author_association": "COLLABORA... |
code4rena | 2021-04-maple | Maple Finance | Maple Finance | 2021-05-03 | https://code4rena.com/reports/2021-04-maple | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings/issues | L-06 | low | L | Chainlink Price oracle always assumes 8 decimals | https://code4rena.com/reports/2021-04-maple#l-06-chainlink-price-oracle-always-assumes-8-decimals | null | null | The response from the price oracle always assumes 8 decimals (see PoolLib.convertFromUsd) but it’s never checked if the oracle response has 8 decimals using ChainLink’s .decimals() function. At some point, the governor might set up a USD price feed oracle that contains more than 8 decimals leading to inflated prices ev... | code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings | 83 | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings/issues/83 | open | null | code423n4 | CONTRIBUTOR | [] | null | [
"bug",
"1 (Low Risk)",
"sponsor acknowledged"
] | [
"severity:low",
"sponsor:acknowledged"
] | 2021-04-20T20:06:21 | 2021-04-27T19:49:20 | null | null | false | null | 3 | {
"total_count": 0,
"+1": 0,
"-1": 0,
"laugh": 0,
"hooray": 0,
"confused": 0,
"heart": 0,
"rocket": 0,
"eyes": 0
} | # Handle
@cmichelio
# Vulnerability details
## Vulnerability Details
The response from the price oracle always assumes 8 decimals (see `PoolLib.convertFromUsd`) but it's never checked if the oracle response has 8 decimals using ChainLink's `.decimals()` function.
## Impact
At some point, the governor might set u... | [
{
"author": "lucas-manuel",
"author_association": "COLLABORATOR",
"created_at": "2021-04-22T21:34:37",
"updated_at": "2021-04-22T21:34:37",
"body": "We were going to do this manually, we were aware of this issue, but it is a good idea to just add a check. Disagree with severity."
},
{
"a... |
code4rena | 2021-04-maple | Maple Finance | Maple Finance | 2021-05-03 | https://code4rena.com/reports/2021-04-maple | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings/issues | L-07 | low | L | Missing check on setManualPrice(int256 _price) | https://code4rena.com/reports/2021-04-maple#l-07-missing-check-on-setmanualpriceint256-_price | null | null | The ChainlinkOracle.setManualPrice function specifies that it can only be called “if manualOverride == true”.
This is not the case.
Assume an oracle failure happened, and the oracle needs to be manually set to prevent losses.
The setManualPrice function succeeds and the owner might think that the oracle price is over... | code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings | 85 | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings/issues/85 | open | null | code423n4 | CONTRIBUTOR | [] | null | [
"bug",
"1 (Low Risk)",
"sponsor confirmed",
"resolved"
] | [
"severity:low",
"sponsor:confirmed",
"sponsor:resolved"
] | 2021-04-20T20:07:15 | 2021-04-27T19:48:09 | null | null | false | null | 3 | {
"total_count": 0,
"+1": 0,
"-1": 0,
"laugh": 0,
"hooray": 0,
"confused": 0,
"heart": 0,
"rocket": 0,
"eyes": 0
} | # Handle
@cmichelio
# Vulnerability details
## Vulnerability Details
The `ChainlinkOracle.setManualPrice` function specifies that it can only be called "if manualOverride == true".
This is not the case.
## Impact
Assume an oracle failure happened, and the oracle needs to be manually set to prevent losses.
The ... | [
{
"author": "lucas-manuel",
"author_association": "COLLABORATOR",
"created_at": "2021-04-22T21:38:40",
"updated_at": "2021-04-22T21:38:40",
"body": "Not really a bug, but we will address this."
},
{
"author": "Arachnid",
"author_association": "COLLABORATOR",
"created_at": "2021-0... |
code4rena | 2021-04-maple | Maple Finance | Maple Finance | 2021-05-03 | https://code4rena.com/reports/2021-04-maple | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings/issues | L-08 | low | L | Missing non-zero check | https://code4rena.com/reports/2021-04-maple#l-08-missing-non-zero-check | null | null | The MapleGlobals.setPriceOracle should check that the oracle address is not zero.
A wrong call to this function might set the oracle address to the zero address and break core oracle functionality.
Add a require(oracle != 0) statement.
lucas-manuel (Maple) disputed:
We actually are not going to address this, we do ... | null | null | null | null | null | null | null | null | null | null | null | null | null | null | null | null | null | null | null | null | null |
code4rena | 2021-04-maple | Maple Finance | Maple Finance | 2021-05-03 | https://code4rena.com/reports/2021-04-maple | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings/issues | L-09 | low | L | MPL reward claims of balancer pools can be exploited | https://code4rena.com/reports/2021-04-maple#l-09-mpl-reward-claims-of-balancer-pools-can-be-exploited | null | null | When MPL tokens are added as liquidity to the Balancer pool, the Balancer pool is the owner of those tokens, which are accruing USDC interest.
Anyone can send the USDC interest to the balancer pool by calling withdrawFundsOnBehalf(balancerPool).
An attacker can abuse this to capture part of this interest by doing the... | code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings | 90 | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings/issues/90 | open | null | code423n4 | CONTRIBUTOR | [] | null | [
"bug",
"1 (Low Risk)",
"sponsor disputed"
] | [
"severity:low",
"sponsor:disputed"
] | 2021-04-20T20:10:31 | 2021-04-27T01:56:16 | null | null | false | null | 2 | {
"total_count": 0,
"+1": 0,
"-1": 0,
"laugh": 0,
"hooray": 0,
"confused": 0,
"heart": 0,
"rocket": 0,
"eyes": 0
} | # Handle
@cmichelio
# Vulnerability details
## Vulnerability Details
> [When MPL tokens are added as liquidity to the Balancer pool, the Balancer pool is the owner of those tokens, which are accruing USDC interest.](https://github.com/maple-labs/maple-core/wiki/MPL-Token)
Anyone can send the USDC interest to the ... | [
{
"author": "lucas-manuel",
"author_association": "COLLABORATOR",
"created_at": "2021-04-23T19:32:43",
"updated_at": "2021-04-23T19:32:43",
"body": "Not a bug, `distributeToHolders` and `withdrawFundsOnBehalfOf` will always be called atomically by the governor."
},
{
"author": "Arachnid"... |
code4rena | 2021-04-maple | Maple Finance | Maple Finance | 2021-05-03 | https://code4rena.com/reports/2021-04-maple | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings/issues | L-10 | low | L | MPL USDC distributions can be withdrawn by anyone | https://code4rena.com/reports/2021-04-maple#l-10-mpl-usdc-distributions-can-be-withdrawn-by-anyone | null | null | Anyone can withdraw USDC interest of another address by calling withdrawFundsOnBehalf(addr).
Imagine a smart contract that has a specific function for withdrawing the USDC contract to their contract:
function withdrawAndTransfer() {
mpt.withdraw();
usdc.transfer(usdc.balanceOf(address(this), owner);
}
If the con... | code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings | 91 | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings/issues/91 | open | null | code423n4 | CONTRIBUTOR | [] | null | [
"bug",
"1 (Low Risk)",
"sponsor disputed"
] | [
"severity:low",
"sponsor:disputed"
] | 2021-04-20T20:10:56 | 2021-04-27T02:00:50 | null | null | false | null | 2 | {
"total_count": 0,
"+1": 0,
"-1": 0,
"laugh": 0,
"hooray": 0,
"confused": 0,
"heart": 0,
"rocket": 0,
"eyes": 0
} | # Handle
@cmichelio
# Vulnerability details
## Vulnerability Details
Anyone can withdraw USDC interest of another address by calling `withdrawFundsOnBehalf(addr)`.
Imagine a smart contract that has a specific function for withdrawing the USDC contract to their contract:
```solidity
function withdrawAndTransfer(... | [
{
"author": "lucas-manuel",
"author_association": "COLLABORATOR",
"created_at": "2021-04-23T19:38:30",
"updated_at": "2021-04-23T19:38:30",
"body": "Not a bug, this was intended. Projects taht integrate with MPL will have to take this functionality into account."
},
{
"author": "Arachnid... |
code4rena | 2021-04-maple | Maple Finance | Maple Finance | 2021-05-03 | https://code4rena.com/reports/2021-04-maple | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings/issues | L-11 | low | L | LoanLib.unwind uses globals.fundingPeriod() | https://code4rena.com/reports/2021-04-maple#l-11-loanlibunwind-uses-globalsfundingperiod | null | null | Every loan has its own fundingPeriod which is set once in the constructor:
fundingPeriod = globals.fundingPeriod();
fundingPeriod in globals can change. It does not effect already deployed Loans.
However, in Loan contract function unwind() calls LoanLib.unwind which checks against globals.fundingPeriod():
IGlobals glob... | code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings | 100 | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings/issues/100 | open | null | code423n4 | CONTRIBUTOR | [] | null | [
"bug",
"1 (Low Risk)",
"sponsor confirmed",
"resolved"
] | [
"severity:low",
"sponsor:confirmed",
"sponsor:resolved"
] | 2021-04-21T20:31:32 | 2021-04-27T03:19:18 | null | null | false | null | 1 | {
"total_count": 0,
"+1": 0,
"-1": 0,
"laugh": 0,
"hooray": 0,
"confused": 0,
"heart": 0,
"rocket": 0,
"eyes": 0
} | # Handle
paulius.eth
# Vulnerability details
## Vulnerability details
Every loan has its own fundingPeriod which is set once in the constructor:
fundingPeriod = globals.fundingPeriod();
fundingPeriod in globals can change. It does not effect already deployed Loans.
However, in Loan contract function unwin... | [
{
"author": "lucas-manuel",
"author_association": "COLLABORATOR",
"created_at": "2021-04-23T14:52:58",
"updated_at": "2021-04-23T14:52:58",
"body": "Definitely not a high severity bug, but will address this."
}
] |
code4rena | 2021-04-maple | Maple Finance | Maple Finance | 2021-05-03 | https://code4rena.com/reports/2021-04-maple | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings/issues | L-12 | low | L | Uniswap DOS | https://code4rena.com/reports/2021-04-maple#l-12-uniswap-dos | null | null | Borrowers can launch a front running/sandwich attack on triggerDefault() which manipulates the price on Uniswap outside the maxSwapSlippage range causing the function to revert and the collateral to stay in the collateralLocker There is no way to transfer the collateral out of the collateralLocker after a loan default ... | null | null | null | null | null | null | null | null | null | null | null | null | null | null | null | null | null | null | null | null | null |
code4rena | 2021-04-maple | Maple Finance | Maple Finance | 2021-05-03 | https://code4rena.com/reports/2021-04-maple | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings/issues | M-01 | medium | M | Loans of tokens with >18 decimals can result in incorrect collateral calculation | https://code4rena.com/reports/2021-04-maple#m-01-loans-of-tokens-with-18-decimals-can-result-in-incorrect-collateral-calculation | null | null | It is possible for a user to mislead a Pool Delegate to a seemingly innocuous loan by utilizing a token with more than 18 decimals as collateral and lucrative loan terms.
The final calculation within the collateralRequiredForDrawdown of LoanLib incorrectly assumes the collateral token of a loan to be less than 18 deci... | code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings | 4 | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings/issues/4 | open | null | code423n4 | CONTRIBUTOR | [] | null | [
"bug",
"2 (Med Risk)",
"sponsor acknowledged",
"resolved"
] | [
"severity:medium",
"sponsor:acknowledged",
"sponsor:resolved"
] | 2021-04-08T20:54:32 | 2021-04-27T23:28:46 | null | null | false | null | 2 | {
"total_count": 0,
"+1": 0,
"-1": 0,
"laugh": 0,
"hooray": 0,
"confused": 0,
"heart": 0,
"rocket": 0,
"eyes": 0
} | # Handle
0xsomeone
# Vulnerability details
## Impact
It is possible for a user to mislead a Pool Delegate to a seemingly innocuous loan by utilizing a token with more than 18 decimals as collateral and lucrative loan terms.
## Proof of Concept
The final calculation within the `collateralRequiredForDrawdown` of `... | [
{
"author": "lucas-manuel",
"author_association": "COLLABORATOR",
"created_at": "2021-04-22T13:41:58",
"updated_at": "2021-04-22T13:41:58",
"body": "We are aware that we cannot onboard liquidityAssets or collateralAssets with more that 18 decimals of precision, and will make that part of our onb... |
code4rena | 2021-04-maple | Maple Finance | Maple Finance | 2021-05-03 | https://code4rena.com/reports/2021-04-maple | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings/issues | M-02 | medium | M | Potential huge arbitrage opportunities / MPL price decrease | https://code4rena.com/reports/2021-04-maple#m-02-potential-huge-arbitrage-opportunities--mpl-price-decrease | null | null | When the protocol suffers a default, the BPT stakers are the first line of defense and the protocol trades the BPT pool tokens for the single-sided liquidity asset of the Balancer LIQUIDITY <> MPT pool. (PoolLib.handleDefault)
Note that a pool token to single-asset trade is the same as burning the LP tokens to receive... | code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings | 92 | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-04-maple-findings/issues/92 | open | null | code423n4 | CONTRIBUTOR | [] | null | [
"bug",
"2 (Med Risk)",
"sponsor acknowledged"
] | [
"severity:medium",
"sponsor:acknowledged"
] | 2021-04-20T20:11:40 | 2021-04-27T19:57:16 | null | null | false | null | 2 | {
"total_count": 0,
"+1": 0,
"-1": 0,
"laugh": 0,
"hooray": 0,
"confused": 0,
"heart": 0,
"rocket": 0,
"eyes": 0
} | # Handle
@cmichelio
# Vulnerability details
## Vulnerability Details
When the protocol suffers a default, the BPT stakers are the first line of defence and the protocol trades the BPT pool tokens for the single-sided liquidity asset of the Balancer LIQUIDITY <> MPT pool. (`PoolLib.handleDefault`)
Note that a pool... | [
{
"author": "lucas-manuel",
"author_association": "COLLABORATOR",
"created_at": "2021-04-23T19:53:54",
"updated_at": "2021-04-23T19:53:54",
"body": "This is a valid concern, but not something that we are going to mitigate before launch. We are going to plan for PDs to atomically liquidate and bu... |
End of preview.
Code4rena and Sherlock Audit Findings
Public contest findings from Code4rena and Sherlock, in one JSONL schema, with the matching GitHub issue attached when one could be resolved.
Each row is one finding or one duplicate submission: the published write-up, the contest it came from, the judged severity, and the GitHub issue labels, status, reactions, and comments that were available at collection time.
Collected on 28 October 2026. findings.jsonl is about 460 MB (481,702,167 bytes).
Contents
| Rows | 68,494 |
| Published findings | 18,044 |
| Duplicate submissions | 50,450 |
| Code4rena rows | 55,910 across 408 contests |
| Sherlock rows | 12,584 across 235 contests |
| Sponsors | 282 |
| Report dates | 2021-01-05 to 2026-08-20 |
| Rows linked to a GitHub issue | 62,556 across 562 repositories |
Severity counts use the severity field:
| Severity | Rows |
|---|---|
| medium | 27,696 |
| high | 19,030 |
| qa | 8,140 |
| gas | 6,126 |
| low | 4,508 |
| non-critical | 2,811 |
| informational | 114 |
| specification | 57 |
| suggestion | 11 |
| Z | 1 |
severity_code is the short letter: H high, M medium, L low, N non-critical, G gas, Q qa, I informational, S specification or suggestion. On Code4rena, S means suggestion. On Sherlock, S means specification. 1,028 duplicate rows use severity_code DUP and still carry a parent severity in severity (740 high, 253 gas, 29 medium, 6 low). Filter on severity when you need the judged level.
How a row is built
Published findings come from the contest report. Code4rena findings are the report headings and linked issue lists ([H-01], M-01, [01] under a High / Medium / Low / QA / Gas section, and unnumbered finding headings). Sherlock findings are the markdown report, split on headings like # Issue H-1: title.
A row is a duplicate submission when its GitHub issue is labeled exactly duplicate or duplicate-N. finding_id is the parent report id when duplicate-N points at an issue already matched to a finding, otherwise a report-id label on the issue, otherwise DUP-{issue number}. 33,703 duplicate rows use a DUP- id. The issue's own judged severity replaces the parent's when the labels carry one. Sherlock titles shaped like handle - title fill found_by and strip the handle from title.
Has Duplicates marks the primary finding that already appears in the report. Those primaries stay as published rows. Wrongly Duplicated is a judging note, and those issues are not added as copies.
Schema
Every line is one JSON object with these fields, in this order.
| Field | What it holds |
|---|---|
platform |
code4rena or sherlock |
contest_id |
Contest slug or numeric id |
contest_title |
Contest name |
sponsor |
Sponsoring project |
report_date |
Report date, YYYY-MM-DD on 68,199 rows |
report_url |
Published report |
findings_url |
Findings repo or contest findings page |
finding_id |
Report id such as H-01, or DUP-{issue} |
severity |
Judged severity name |
severity_code |
Short letter, or DUP |
title |
Finding title |
url |
Best link for this row |
source_url |
Page or issue the text was taken from |
found_by |
Warden or handle, when known |
body |
Report write-up, or the issue body for a duplicate |
github_repo |
owner/name |
github_issue_number |
Issue number |
github_issue_url |
Issue URL |
status |
GitHub state: open or closed |
state_reason |
GitHub state_reason |
author |
Issue opener. Bot accounts stay here |
author_association |
OWNER, CONTRIBUTOR, NONE, … |
assignees |
List of logins |
milestone |
Milestone title |
labels |
GitHub label names, unchanged |
tags |
Normalized labels, see below |
created_at, updated_at, closed_at |
Issue timestamps |
closed_by |
Login that closed the issue |
locked |
Whether the issue is locked |
lock_reason |
GitHub lock reason |
comments_count |
Comment count reported by GitHub |
reactions |
Reaction name to count. The url key is dropped |
issue_body |
GitHub issue body |
comments |
List of {author, author_association, created_at, updated_at, body}, [] when the issue has no comments, or null when the thread was not fetched |
GitHub issue state is a weak signal on these repos. Judging lives in labels and tags. Of the linked issues, 49,125 are closed, 13,431 are open, and 12,238 are locked.
found_by is set on 13,732 rows. Bot openers (code423n4, c4-submissions, c4-bot*, sherlock-admin*, github-actions*, and logins ending in [bot]) stay in author and are left out of found_by.
body is present on 68,478 rows. For a published finding it is the report section. For a duplicate it is the issue body. issue_body is always the GitHub body when an issue was attached.
Tags
tags is derived from labels. 62,502 rows have at least one tag.
| Tag | Meaning |
|---|---|
severity:* |
Judged severity from labels such as 3 (High Risk), QA (Quality Assurance), High, Specification |
sponsor:* |
confirmed, disputed, acknowledged, resolved, will-fix, fixed |
judging:primary |
primary issue |
judging:selected |
selected for report |
judging:duplicate |
duplicate or duplicate-N |
judging:has-duplicates |
This finding is the primary that has copies |
judging:invalid, judging:nullified, judging:out-of-scope |
Thrown out in judging |
judging:satisfactory, judging:unsatisfactory |
Fix review |
judging:withdrawn-by-warden, judging:withdrawn-by-judge |
Withdrawn |
judging:downgraded, judging:upgraded |
Severity changed by the judge |
judging:wrongly-duplicated |
Duplicate mark disputed |
judging:reward |
Sherlock reward label |
duplicate-of:N |
duplicate-N, pointing at issue N |
duplicate-group:NN |
Code4rena :robot:_NN_group |
report-id:H-01 |
A label that is itself a report id |
partial:N |
partial-N |
quality:* |
Report-quality labels |
grade:a, grade:b, grade:c |
grade-a and the same for b and c |
place:1, place:2, place:3 |
Placement labels |
Load
from datasets import load_dataset
ds = load_dataset("safebuffer/code4rena-sherlock-findings", split="train")
import json
with open("findings.jsonl") as handle:
for line in handle:
row = json.loads(line)
Read the file line by line. json.dumps can leave U+2028 and U+2029 inside strings, and str.splitlines() splits on those characters.
Coverage
- Duplicate rows are issues labeled
duplicateorduplicate-N. On some Sherlock contests the primary is labeledHas Duplicatesand the copies have noDuplicatelabel, so those copies are not separate rows. - Comment bodies are stored for 2,420 issues. 9,897 linked issues have an empty comment list. 50,239 linked issues have
comments_count > 0andcomments: null, because the GitHub hourly limit stopped the comment fetch.comments_count, labels, and the rest of the issue metadata are still filled on those rows. A fetched thread includes at most the first 300 comments. - 295
report_datevalues are the raw report header or an unpadded date (2022-6-16) rather thanYYYY-MM-DD. - A few early Code4rena reports exist only as a PDF, and some Sherlock contests have an empty report. Those contests contribute no rows.
- About 54
(github_repo, github_issue_number)pairs appear on more than one row.
License and sources
The text is the public contest reports and the public GitHub issues those contests already published. This dataset does not add a license to that text. Wardens and the platforms keep whatever rights the original posts have.
- Code4rena reports: https://code4rena.com/reports
- Sherlock contests: https://audits.sherlock.xyz/contests
- GitHub issue trackers linked from those contests, read with the public issues API
Citation
@misc{code4rena_sherlock_findings_2026,
title = {Code4rena and Sherlock Audit Findings},
author = {safebuffer},
year = {2026},
howpublished = {\url{https://huggingface.co/datasets/safebuffer/code4rena-sherlock-findings}},
note = {Public contest findings collected on 28 October 2026}
}
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