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F ederal law provides a variety of powers for the President to use in response to crisis, exigency, or emergency circumstances threatening the nation. They are not limited to military or war situations. Some of these authorities, deriving from the Constitution or statutory law, are continuously available to the President with little or no qualification. Others—statutory delegations from Congress—exist on a standby basis and remain dormant until the President formally declares a national emergency. Congress may modify, rescind, or render dormant such delegated emergency authority. Until the crisis of World War I, Presidents utilized emergency powers at their own discretion. Proclamations announced the exercise of exigency authority. During World War I and thereafter, Chief Executives had available to them a growing body of standby emergency authority that became operative upon the issuance of a proclamation declaring a condition of national emergency. Sometimes such proclamations confined the matter of crisis to a specific policy sphere, and sometimes they placed no limitation whatsoever on the pronouncement. These activations of standby emergency authority remained acceptable practice until the era of the Vietnam War. In 1976, Congress curtailed this practice with the passage of the National Emergencies Act. The exercise of emergency powers had long been a concern of the classical political theorists, including the 18 th -century English philosopher John Locke, who had a strong influence upon the Founding Fathers in the United States. A preeminent exponent of a government of laws and not of men, Locke argued that occasions may arise when the executive must exert a broad discretion in meeting special exigencies or "emergencies" for which the legislative power provided no relief or existing law granted no necessary remedy. He did not regard this prerogative as limited to wartime or even to situations of great urgency. It was sufficient if the "public good" might be advanced by its exercise. Emergency powers were first expressed prior to the actual founding of the Republic. Between 1775 and 1781, the Continental Congress passed a series of acts and resolves that count as the first expressions of emergency authority. These instruments dealt almost exclusively with the prosecution of the Revolutionary War. At the Constitutional Convention of 1787, emergency powers, as such, failed to attract much attention during the course of debate over the charter for the new government. It may be argued, however, that the granting of emergency powers by Congress is implicit in its Article I, Section 8, authority to "provide for the common Defense and general Welfare;" the commerce clause; its war, armed forces, and militia powers; and the "necessary and proper" clause empowering it to make such laws as are required to fulfill the executions of "the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof." There is a tradition of constitutional interpretation that has resulted in so-called implied powers, which may be invoked in order to respond to an emergency situation. Locke seems to have anticipated this practice. Furthermore, Presidents have occasionally taken an emergency action that they assumed to be constitutionally permissible. Thus, in the American governmental experience, the exercise of emergency powers has been somewhat dependent upon the Chief Executive's view of the presidential office. Perhaps the President who most clearly articulated a view of his office in conformity with the Lockean position was Theodore Roosevelt. Describing what came to be called the "stewardship" theory of the presidency, Roosevelt wrote of his "insistence upon the theory that the executive power was limited only by specific restrictions and prohibitions appearing in the Constitution or imposed by the Congress under its constitutional powers." It was his view "that every executive officer, and above all every executive officer in high position, was a steward of the people," and he "declined to adopt the view that what was imperatively necessary for the Nation could not be done by the President unless he could find some specific authorization to do it." Indeed, it was Roosevelt's belief that, for the President, "it was not only his right but his duty to do anything that the needs of the Nation demanded unless such action was forbidden by the Constitution or by the laws." Opposed to this view of the presidency was Roosevelt's former Secretary of War, William Howard Taft, his personal choice for and actual successor as Chief Executive. He viewed the presidential office in more limited terms, writing "that the President can exercise no power which cannot be fairly and reasonably traced to some specific grant of power or justly implied and included within such express grant as proper and necessary to its exercise." In his view, such a "specific grant must be either in the Federal Constitution or in an act of Congress passed in pursuance thereof. There is," Taft concluded, "no undefined residuum of power which he can exercise because it seems to him to be in the public interest." Between these two views of the presidency lie various gradations of opinion, resulting in perhaps as many conceptions of the office as there have been holders. One authority has summed up the situation in the following words: Emergency powers are not solely derived from legal sources. The extent of their invocation and use is also contingent upon the personal conception which the incumbent of the Presidential office has of the Presidency and the premises upon which he interprets his legal powers. In the last analysis, the authority of a President is largely determined by the President himself. Apart from the Constitution, but resulting from its prescribed procedures, there are statutory grants of power for emergency conditions. The President is authorized by Congress to take some special or extraordinary action, ostensibly to meet the problems of governing effectively in times of exigency. Sometimes these laws are of only temporary duration. The Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, for example, allowed the President to impose certain wage and price controls for about three years before it expired automatically in 1974. The statute gave the President emergency authority to address a crisis in the nation's economy. Many of these laws are continuously maintained or permanently available for the President's ready use in responding to an emergency. The Defense Production Act, originally adopted in 1950 to prioritize and regulate the manufacture of military material, is an example of this type of statute. There are various standby laws that convey special emergency powers once the President formally declares a national emergency activating them. In 1973, a Senate special committee studying emergency powers published a compilation identifying some 470 provisions of federal law delegating to the executive extraordinary authority in time of national emergency. The vast majority of them are of the standby kind—dormant until activated by the President. However, formal procedures for invoking these authorities, accounting for their use, and regulating their activation and application were established by the National Emergencies Act of 1976. Relying upon constitutional authority or congressional delegations made at various times over the past 230 years, the President of the United States may exercise certain powers in the event that the continued existence of the nation is threatened by crisis, exigency, or emergency circumstances. What is a national emergency? In the simplest understanding of the term, the dictionary defines emergency as "an unforeseen combination of circumstances or the resulting state that calls for immediate action." In the midst of the crisis of the Great Depression, a 1934 Supreme Court majority opinion characterized an emergency in terms of urgency and relative infrequency of occurrence as well as equivalence to a public calamity resulting from fire, flood, or like disaster not reasonably subject to anticipation. An eminent constitutional scholar, the late Edward S. Corwin, explained emergency conditions as being those that "have not attained enough of stability or recurrency to admit of their being dealt with according to rule." During congressional committee hearings on emergency powers in 1973, a political scientist described an emergency in the following terms: "It denotes the existence of conditions of varying nature, intensity and duration, which are perceived to threaten life or well-being beyond tolerable limits." Corwin also indicated it "connotes the existence of conditions suddenly intensifying the degree of existing danger to life or well-being beyond that which is accepted as normal." There are at least four aspects of an emergency condition. The first is its temporal character: An emergency is sudden, unforeseen, and of unknown duration. The second is its potential gravity: An emergency is dangerous and threatening to life and well-being. The third, in terms of governmental role and authority, is the matter of perception: Who discerns this phenomenon? The Constitution may be guiding on this question, but it is not always conclusive. Fourth, there is the element of response: By definition, an emergency requires immediate action but is also unanticipated and, therefore, as Corwin notes, cannot always be "dealt with according to rule." From these simple factors arise the dynamics of national emergency powers. These dynamics can be seen in the history of the exercise of emergency powers. In 1792, residents of western Pennsylvania, Virginia, and the Carolinas began forcefully opposing the collection of a federal excise tax on whiskey. Anticipating rebellious activity, Congress enacted legislation providing for the calling forth of the militia to suppress insurrections and repel invasions. Section 3 of this statute required that a presidential proclamation be issued to warn insurgents to cease their activity. If hostilities persisted, the militia could be dispatched. On August 17, 1794, President Washington issued such a proclamation. The insurgency continued. The President then took command of the forces organized to put down the rebellion. Here was the beginning of a pattern of policy expression and implementation regarding emergency powers. Congress legislated extraordinary or special authority for discretionary use by the President in a time of emergency. In issuing a proclamation, the Chief Executive notified Congress that he was making use of this power and also apprised other affected parties of his emergency action. Over the next 100 years, Congress enacted various permanent and standby laws for responding largely to military, economic, and labor emergencies. During this span of years, however, the exercise of emergency powers by President Abraham Lincoln brought the first great dispute over the authority and discretion of the Chief Executive to engage in emergency actions. By the time of Lincoln's inauguration (March 4, 1861), seven states of the lower South had announced their secession from the Union; the Confederate provisional government had been established (February 4, 1861); Jefferson Davis had been elected (February 9, 1861) and installed as president of the confederacy (February 18, 1861); and an army was being mobilized by the secessionists. Lincoln had a little over two months to consider his course of action. When the new President assumed office, Congress was not in session. For reasons of his own, Lincoln delayed calling a special meeting of the legislature but soon ventured into its constitutionally designated policy sphere. On April 19, he issued a proclamation establishing a blockade on the ports of the secessionist states, "a measure hitherto regarded as contrary to both the Constitution and the law of nations except when the government was embroiled in a declared, foreign war." Congress had not been given an opportunity to consider a declaration of war. The next day, the President ordered the addition of 19 vessels to the navy "for purposes of public defense." A short time later, the blockade was extended to the ports of Virginia and North Carolina. By a proclamation of May 3, Lincoln ordered that the regular army be enlarged by 22,714 men, that navy personnel be increased by 18,000, and that 42,032 volunteers be accommodated for three-year terms of service. The directive antagonized many Representatives and Senators, because Congress is specifically authorized by Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution "to raise and support armies." In his July message to the newly assembled Congress, Lincoln suggested, "These measures, whether strictly legal or not, were ventured upon under what appeared to be a popular and a public necessity, trusting then, as now, that Congress would readily ratify them. It is believed," he wrote, "that nothing has been done beyond the constitutional competency of Congress." Congress subsequently did legislatively authorize, and thereby approve, the President's actions regarding his increasing armed forces personnel and would do the same later concerning some other questionable emergency actions. In the case of Lincoln, the opinion of scholars and experts is that "neither Congress nor the Supreme Court exercised any effective restraint upon the President." The emergency actions of the Chief Executive were either unchallenged or approved by Congress and were either accepted or—because of almost no opportunity to render judgment—went largely without notice by the Supreme Court. The President made a quick response to the emergency at hand, a response that Congress or the courts might have rejected in law but, nonetheless, had been made in fact and with some degree of popular approval. Similar controversy would arise concerning the emergency actions of Presidents Woodrow Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt. Both men exercised extensive emergency powers with regard to world hostilities, and Roosevelt also used emergency authority to deal with the Great Depression. Their emergency actions, however, were largely supported by statutory delegations and a high degree of approval on the part of both Congress and the public. During the Wilson and Roosevelt presidencies, a major procedural development occurred in the exercise of emergency powers—use of a proclamation to declare a national emergency and thereby activate all standby statutory provisions delegating authority to the President during a national emergency. The first such national emergency proclamation was issued by President Wilson on February 5, 1917. Promulgated on the authority of a statute establishing the U.S. Shipping Board, the proclamation concerned water transportation policy. It was statutorily terminated, along with a variety of other wartime measures, on March 3, 1921. President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued the next national emergency proclamation some 48 hours after assuming office. Proclaimed March 6, 1933, on the somewhat questionable authority of the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, the proclamation declared a "bank holiday" and halted a major class of financial transactions by closing the banks. Congress subsequently gave specific statutory support for the Chief Executive's action with the passage of the Emergency Banking Act on March 9. Upon signing this legislation into law, the President issued a second banking proclamation, based upon the authority of the new law, continuing the bank holiday until it was determined that banking institutions were capable of conducting business in accordance with new banking policy. Next, on September 8, 1939, President Roosevelt promulgated a proclamation of "limited" national emergency, though the qualifying term had no meaningful legal significance. Almost two years later, on May 27, 1941, he issued a proclamation of "unlimited" national emergency. This action, however, did not actually make any important new powers available to the Chief Executive in addition to those activated by the 1939 proclamation. The President's purpose in making the second proclamation was largely to apprise the American people of the worsening conflict in Europe and growing tensions in Asia. These two war-related proclamations of a general condition of national emergency remained operative until 1947, when certain of the provisions of law they had activated were statutorily rescinded. Then, in 1951, Congress terminated the declaration of war against Germany. In the spring of the following year, the Senate ratified the treaty of peace with Japan. Because these actions marked the end of World War II for the United States, legislation was required to keep certain emergency provisions in effect. Initially, the Emergency Powers Interim Continuation Act temporarily maintained this emergency authority. It was subsequently supplanted by the Emergency Powers Continuation Act, which kept selected emergency delegations in force until August 1953. By proclamation in April 1952, President Harry S. Truman terminated the 1939 and 1941 national emergency declarations, leaving operative only those emergency authorities continued by statutory specification. President Truman's 1952 termination, however, specifically exempted a December 1950 proclamation of national emergency he had issued in response to hostilities in Korea. This condition of national emergency would remain in force and unimpaired well into the era of the Vietnam War. Two other proclamations of national emergency would also be promulgated before Congress once again turned its attention to these matters. Faced with a postal strike, President Richard Nixon declared a national emergency in March 1970, thereby gaining permission to use units of the Ready Reserve to assist in moving the mail. President Nixon proclaimed a second national emergency in August 1971 to control the balance of payments flow by terminating temporarily certain trade agreement provisos and imposing supplemental duties on some imported goods. In the years following the conclusion of U.S. armed forces involvement in active military conflict in Korea, occasional expressions of concern were heard in Congress regarding the continued existence of President Truman's 1950 national emergency proclamation long after the conditions prompting its issuance had disappeared. There was some annoyance that the President was retaining extraordinary powers intended only for a time of genuine emergency and a feeling that the Chief Executive was thwarting the legislative intent of Congress by continuously failing to terminate the declared national emergency. Growing public and congressional displeasure with the President's exercise of his war powers and deepening U.S. involvement in hostilities in Vietnam prompted interest in a variety of related matters. For Senator Charles Mathias, interest in the question of emergency powers developed out of U.S. involvement in Vietnam and the incursion into Cambodia. Together with Senator Frank Church, he sought to establish a Senate special committee to study the implications of terminating the 1950 proclamation of national emergency that was being used to prosecute the Vietnam War "to consider problems which might arise as the result of the termination and to consider what administrative or legislative actions might be necessary." Such a panel was initially chartered by S.Res. 304 as the Special Committee on the Termination of the National Emergency in June 1972, but it did not begin operations before the end of the year. With the convening of the 93 rd Congress in 1973, the special committee was approved again with S.Res. 9 . Upon exploring the subject matter of national emergency powers, however, the mission of the special committee became more burdensome. There was not just one proclamation of national emergency in effect but four such instruments, issued in 1933, 1950, 1970, and 1971. The United States was in a condition of national emergency four times over, and with each proclamation, the whole collection of statutorily delegated emergency powers was activated. Consequently, in 1974, with S.Res. 242 , the study panel was rechartered as the Special Committee on National Emergencies and Delegated Emergency Powers to reflect its focus upon matters larger than the 1950 emergency proclamation. Its final mandate was provided by S.Res. 10 in the 94 th Congress, although its termination date was necessarily extended briefly in 1976 by S.Res. 370 . Senators Church and Mathias co-chaired the panel. The Special Committee on National Emergencies and Delegated Emergency Powers produced various studies during its existence. After scrutinizing the U . S . Code and uncodified statutory emergency powers, the panel identified 470 provisions of federal law that delegated extraordinary authority to the executive in time of national emergency. Not all of them required a declaration of national emergency to be operative, but they were, nevertheless, extraordinary grants. The special committee also found that no process existed for automatically terminating the four outstanding national emergency proclamations. Thus, the panel began developing legislation containing a formula for regulating emergency declarations in the future and otherwise adjusting the body of statutorily delegated emergency powers by abolishing some provisions, relegating others to permanent status, and continuing others in a standby capacity. The panel also began preparing a report offering its findings and recommendations regarding the state of national emergency powers in the nation. The special committee, in July 1974, unanimously recommended legislation establishing a procedure for the presidential declaration and congressional regulation of a national emergency. The proposal also modified various statutorily delegated emergency powers. In arriving at this reform measure, the panel consulted with various executive branch agencies regarding the significance of existing emergency statutes, recommendations for legislative action, and views as to the repeal of some provisions of emergency law. This recommended legislation was introduced by Senator Church for himself and others on August 22, 1974, and became S. 3957 . It was reported from the Senate Committee on Government Operations on September 30 without public hearings or amendment. The bill was subsequently discussed on the Senate floor on October 7, when it was amended and passed. Although a version of the reform legislation had been introduced in the House on September 16, becoming H.R. 16668 , the Committee on the Judiciary, to which the measure was referred, did not have an opportunity to consider either that bill or the Senate-adopted version due to the press of other business—chiefly the impeachment of President Nixon and the nomination of Nelson Rockefeller to be Vice President of the United States. Thus, the National Emergencies Act failed to be considered on the House floor before the final adjournment of the 93 rd Congress. With the convening of the next Congress, the proposal was introduced in the House on February 27, 1975, becoming H.R. 3884 , and in the Senate on March 6, becoming S. 977 . House hearings occurred in March and April before the Subcommittee on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the Committee on the Judiciary. The bill was subsequently marked up and, on April 15, was reported in amended form to the full committee on a 4-0 vote. On May 21, the Committee on the Judiciary, on a voice vote, reported the bill with technical amendments. During the course of House debate on September 4, there was agreement to both the committee amendments and a floor amendment providing that national emergencies end automatically one year after their declaration unless the President informs Congress and the public of a continuation. The bill was then passed on a 388-5 yea and nay vote and sent to the Senate, where it was referred to the Committee on Government Operations. The Senate Committee on Government Operations held a hearing on H.R. 3884 on February 25, 1976, the bill was subsequently reported on August 26 with one substantive and several technical amendments. The following day, the amended bill was passed and returned to the House. On August 31, the House agreed to the Senate amendments, clearing the proposal for President Gerald Ford's signature on September 14. In its final report, issued in May 1976, the special committee concluded "by reemphasizing that emergency laws and procedures in the United States have been neglected for too long, and that Congress must pass the National Emergencies Act to end a potentially dangerous situation." Other issues identified by the special committee as deserving attention in the future, however, did not fare so well. The panel, for example, was hopeful that standing committees of both houses of Congress would review statutory emergency power provisions within their respective jurisdictions with a view to the continued need for, and possible adjustment of, such authority. Actions in this regard were probably not as ambitious as the special committee expected. A title of the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 granting the President or Congress power to declare a civil defense emergency in the event of an attack on the United States occurred or was anticipated expired in June 1974 after the House Committee on Rules failed to report a measure continuing the statute. A provision of emergency law was refined in May 1976. Legislation was enacted granting the President the authority to order certain selected members of an armed services reserve component to active duty without a declaration of war or national emergency. Previously, such an activation of military reserve personnel had been limited to a "time of national emergency declared by the President" or "when otherwise authorized by law." Another refinement of emergency law occurred in 1977 when action was completed on the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). Reform legislation containing this statute modified a provision of the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, authorizing the President to regulate the nation's international and domestic finance during periods of declared war or national emergency. The enacted bill limited the President's Trading with the Enemy Act power to regulate the country's finances to times of declared war. In IEEPA, a provision conferred authority on the Chief Executive to exercise controls over international economic transactions in the future during a declared national emergency and established procedures governing the use of this power, including close consultation with Congress when declaring a national emergency to activate IEEPA. Such a declaration would be subject to congressional regulation under the procedures of the National Emergencies Act. Other matters identified in the final report of the special committee for congressional scrutiny included investigation of emergency preparedness efforts conducted by the executive branch, attention to congressional preparations for an emergency and continual review of emergency law, ending open-ended grants of authority to the executive, investigation and institution of stricter controls over delegated powers, and improving the accountability of executive decisionmaking. There is some public record indication that certain of these points, particularly the first and the last, have been addressed in the past two decades by congressional overseers. As enacted, the National Emergencies Act consisted of five titles. The first of these generally returned all standby statutory delegations of emergency power, activated by an outstanding declaration of national emergency, to a dormant state two years after the statute's approval. However, the act did not cancel the 1933, 1950, 1970, and 1971 national emergency proclamations, because the President issued them pursuant to his Article II constitutional authority. Nevertheless, it did render them ineffective by returning to dormancy the statutory authorities they had activated, thereby necessitating a new declaration to activate standby statutory emergency authorities. Title II provided a procedure for future declarations of national emergency by the President and prescribed arrangements for their congressional regulation. The statute established an exclusive means for declaring a national emergency. Emergency declarations were to terminate automatically after one year unless formally continued for another year by the President, but they could be terminated earlier by either the President or Congress. Originally, the prescribed method for congressional termination of a declared national emergency was a concurrent resolution adopted by both houses of Congress. This type of "legislative veto" was effectively invalidated by the Supreme Court in 1983. The National Emergencies Act was amended in 1985 to substitute a joint resolution as the vehicle for rescinding a national emergency declaration. When declaring a national emergency, the President must indicate, according to Title III, the powers and authorities being activated to respond to the exigency at hand. Certain presidential accountability and reporting requirements regarding national emergency declarations were specified in Title IV, and the repeal and continuation of various statutory provisions delegating emergency powers was accomplished in Title V. Since the 1976 enactment of the National Emergencies Act, various national emergencies have been declared pursuant to its provisions. Some were subsequently revoked, while others remain in effect. Table 1 displays the number of national emergencies in effect (some may refer to these as "active") and the number of national emergencies no longer in effect (some may refer to these as "inactive"), by President. Detailed information regarding the 31 national emergencies in effect may be found in Table 2 . Similar information regarding the 22 national emergencies no longer in may be found in Table 3 . The second column in Table 2 and Table 3 identifies the national emergency declaration, which is either an executive order (E.O.) or a presidential proclamation (Proc.). Table 3 includes declared national emergencies that are no longer in effect. The development, exercise, and regulation of emergency powers, from the days of the Continental Congress to the present, reflect at least one highly discernable trend: Those authorities available to the executive in time of national crisis or exigency have, since the time of the Lincoln Administration, come to be increasingly rooted in statutory law. The discretion available to a Civil War President in his exercise of emergency power has been harnessed, to a considerable extent, in the contemporary period. Due to greater reliance upon statutory expression, the range of this authority has come to be more circumscribed, and the options for its use have come to be regulated procedurally through the National Emergencies Act. Since its enactment the National Emergencies Act has not been revisited by congressional overseers. The 1976 report of the Senate Special Committee on National Emergencies suggested that the prospect remains that further improvements and reforms in this policy area might be pursued and perfected. An anomaly in the activation of emergency powers appears to have occurred on September 8, 2005, when President George W. Bush issued a proclamation suspending certain wage requirements of the Davis-Bacon Act in the course of the federal response to the Gulf Coast disaster resulting from Hurricane Katrina. Instead of following the historical pattern of declaring a national emergency to activate the suspension authority, the President set out the following rationale in the proclamation: "I find that the conditions caused by Hurricane Katrina constitute a 'national emergency' within the meaning of section 3147 of title 40, United States Code." A more likely course of action would seemingly have been for the President to declare a national emergency pursuant to the National Emergencies Act and to specify that he was, accordingly, activating the suspension authority. Although the propriety of the President's action in this case might have been ultimately determined in the courts, the proclamation was revoked on November 3, 2005, by a proclamation in which the President cited the National Emergencies Act as authority, in part, for his action.	[ "The President of the United States has available certain powers that may be exercised in the event that the nation is threatened by crisis, exigency, or emergency circumstances (other than natural disasters, war, or near-war situations). Such powers may be stated explicitly or implied by the Constitution, assumed by the Chief Executive to be permissible constitutionally, or inferred from or specified by statute. Through legislation, Congress has made a great many delegations of authority in this regard over the past 230 years. There are, however, limits and restraints upon the President in his exercise of emergency powers. With the exception of the habeas corpus clause, the Constitution makes no allowance for the suspension of any of its provisions during a national emergency. Disputes over the constitutionality or legality of the exercise of emergency powers are judicially reviewable. Both the judiciary and Congress, as co-equal branches, can restrain the executive regarding emergency powers. So can public opinion. Since 1976, the President has been subject to certain procedural formalities in utilizing some statutorily delegated emergency authority. The National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. §§1601-1651) eliminated or modified some statutory grants of emergency authority, required the President to formally declare the existence of a national emergency and to specify what statutory authority activated by the declaration would be used, and provided Congress a means to countermand the President's declaration and the activated authority being sought. The development of this regulatory statute and subsequent declarations of national emergency are reviewed in this report." ]	4,981	gov_report	en	null	d9e8583477ebf870fb0c379dc3a75b798a92e5ee882dd93d
USPS has a wide range of domestic competitive products that are a growing sector of its business. The volume of USPS’s competitive products increased from approximately 750 million pieces in fiscal year 2008 to 4.9 billion pieces in fiscal year 2017. Revenue from these products increased from about 10 percent of all USPS mail revenues in fiscal year 2008 to about 28 percent in fiscal year 2017 (see fig. 1). USPS forecasts that continued growth in e-commerce will increase the volume of its competitive products, especially for the “last-mile” delivery service to consumers—which involves delivery from retail locations and fulfillment centers (i.e., where online orders are processed, packaged, and shipped out to USPS for delivery) to customers. USPS reported that in fiscal year 2017, revenue from competitive products exceeded USPS’s expectations by $500 million due to the growth in e-commerce and successful marketing and sales campaigns. USPS expects increased competition, though, in the first- and last-mile delivery services—collection and delivery of packages—from other delivery providers. To remain competitive in the competitive product delivery market, USPS officials have stated that information gained from scanning is leveraged to provide customers with real-time visibility for the location of a competitive product in USPS’s delivery process as well as accurate estimates of the delivery time of USPS’s competitive products. Further, USPS’s latest strategic plan states that this information is one factor used to reduce its own costs through optimizing its network, including processing facilities, post offices, and numerous other facilities across the United States, and streamlining its operations. USPS delivers competitive products across the nation, which it divides into seven postal areas comprised of 67 postal districts (see fig. 2). Managers at each level—postal area, postal district, and post office—are responsible for overseeing and reporting on the performance of the level below them. For example, each district manager is accountable to the area vice president. Postmasters, who manage individual post offices, are accountable to district managers and also monitor the performance of employees at their post office. To track the movement of competitive products, USPS leverages automation (i.e., scanning by postal-processing equipment) and passive and active scan technology (i.e., scanning devices used by postal employees) to capture barcode information. In addition, when competitive products are not able to go through all the automated scans, USPS employees are to manually scan barcodes that have been placed on each item. These barcodes link the item with information in USPS’s databases such as: the delivery address, the type of USPS product, and when the item was accepted by USPS. According to USPS procedures, competitive products could be scanned up to 13 times to generate visibility necessary for USPS, mailers, and customers to track their packages as they move through USPS’s network (see fig. 3). For example, the first scan of the product—the “Acceptance” scan—is made when the item is dropped off at the post office or by a carrier if the product is picked up at a mailbox or customer address. The last scan—the “Acceptable Delivery Event” scan—generally means the item was successfully delivered to the addressee or that a delivery attempt was made (e.g., the product requires a signature but the recipient was not at home so another attempt will need to be made or the recipient will need to pick up the product). The interim scans reflect the product’s progress through the postal network, including through mail-processing plants and equipment. The scan data are transmitted to USPS’s data systems throughout the day. Scan information from these systems is available to USPS managers as well as mailers and customers who wish to track the progress of their items. USPS’s employees use devices to scan competitive products in postal facilities and on delivery routes (see scans 1, 2, and 11–13 in fig. 3). Carriers usually use a handheld Mobile Delivery Device (MDD) to scan a package’s barcode. MDDs contain Global Positioning System (GPS) technology and transmit package scanning data and carrier location data using a cellular network. USPS employees working inside post offices or other facilities use similar scanning devices without GPS technology, such as the handheld Intelligent Mail Device (IMD) to perform the manual scans (see fig. 4). USPS reports we reviewed indicate that competitive products are almost always scanned and scanned correctly. USPS has an overall organizational goal of accurately scanning 100 percent of all mail pieces—both competitive and other products—that have a barcode. This includes scanning each competitive product at several points from acceptance, as described earlier. However, individual management employee-performance goals for scanning are set slightly lower than 100 percent, as USPS officials stated that they recognize that some scanning issues, such as for missing or damaged barcodes, may occur across post offices. According to USPS data we reviewed for the first three quarters of fiscal year 2018, all but one of USPS’s 67 districts met USPS’s scanning goals for all five required scans for competitive products. Additionally, in one district we visited, a USPS internal report showed that every group of post offices in the district met its scanning goal for the arrival-at-unit scan for the week, the preceding 4 weeks, and the year-to- date periods, and all but one group of post offices met their scanning goals for the acceptable delivery scan for the same measurement period. In addition, representatives for mailers we interviewed that use USPS’s competitive products stated that they were generally satisfied with USPS’s scanning performance. Representatives of all the major mailers we spoke with that rely on USPS’s delivery network said they believed that USPS is generally scanning competitive products accurately, although issues still occur. Representatives of mailers told us that they receive scanning data from USPS for their items throughout the day, with some mailers receiving the data every 15 minutes, a rate that allows them to track their items through USPS. Some mailers use this information to calculate the expected time of delivery and monitor USPS’s progress against their own estimates of delivery time to measure USPS’s performance. Representatives for major mailers we spoke with said they also get complaints from customers if items are late, lost, or inaccurately scanned, so the customers provide another source of information on any scanning issues. Four of the five representatives for major mailers we interviewed that sent items via USPS competitive products told us that they have seen improvement in USPS’s scanning performance in recent years. Additionally, all of the representatives for mailers we spoke with stated that USPS has increased the amount of scanning and the information provided from the scans in recent years. Although USPS has a high scanning rate, some missed and inaccurate scans for competitive products do occur, errors that could potentially affect millions of competitive products. For example, several USPS OIG reports between 2016 and 2018 found that instances of missed or inaccurate scans still occurred both nationwide and that in nine USPS districts they analyzed, were due in part, to post office personnel not always following proper scanning procedures and post office supervisors not adequately monitoring how scanning procedures were implemented. For example, the USPS OIG analyzed approximately 2 billion delivery scans over a 6-month period in 2017 and found that 1.9 million delivery scans (about 0.1 percent) occurred at the post office instead of at the delivery address and were considered improper scans. Furthermore, examples of USPS’s internal reports we reviewed containing scanning performance results showed that a small percentage of competitive mail items had not been scanned. For example, one USPS internal report for a district we visited showed that for one week, USPS employees in the district missed about 0.73 percent of the expected delivery scans for competitive products. Due to USPS’s large volume of competitive products, a small percentage of products not scanned can represent large numbers of items. For example, about 155,000 competitive products were missing a delivery scan in one district’s 2018 year-to-date report we reviewed. Additionally, the representatives of mailers we interviewed also reported occasional scanning issues with USPS’s competitive products. Most of the mailers’ representatives stated that when they see competitive items missing scanning data, it is generally an isolated situation and USPS usually fixes the issue. According to these representatives, USPS provides them with points of contact to work with to resolve scanning issues immediately and on a regular basis. However, one major mailer’s representative we spoke with stated that even though USPS’s employees are generally good at scanning packages, inaccurate delivery scanning is an issue. The representative stated that about 8 to 10 percent of the company’s products sent through USPS were scanned by carriers as delivered, but not at the customer’s delivery address—contrary to USPS’s standard operating procedures for scanning. The representative stated that, although this percentage has decreased in recent years, the mailer would like to see that number decrease further because delivery to the destination address assures them that the item was left as close as possible to the customer. USPS is taking some steps to address missed or inaccurate scans. For example, USPS officials stated that the current electronic scanning device carried by almost all carriers on their routes does not prevent scanning a mail item as delivered to an address that is not the delivery address associated with the item’s barcode information. They also stated that USPS is updating scanning devices to alert carriers when they scan items as delivered when not physically at the correct delivery address. According to USPS officials, as of May 2018, 80 percent of hand-held electronic scanning devices used by USPS carriers had this functionality and that this functionality is being fine-tuned. This capability, though, still does not preclude all scanning errors, as it only affects the final delivery scan. USPS officials also stated that employees may still encounter scanning issues, such as damaged barcodes, which could lead to missed scans. USPS has not based its operational policies and procedures, such as those that support the accurate scanning of competitive products, on any standards for internal controls. USPS officials told us that they have not used any specific criteria for designing, implementing, and operating an internal control system for meeting its operational policies and internal controls, such as those that help ensure competitive products are accurately scanned. According to USPS officials, USPS does not follow the COSO Framework to design, implement or evaluate its operational internal controls as they believe that the COSO Framework standards are traditionally related to internal controls over financial reporting. In addition, USPS officials stated that USPS is not required to follow Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, and therefore USPS does not follow these standards as well. Instead, USPS officials stated that USPS has designed its operational policies and internal controls over the years based on its unique responsibilities, management experience, and sound business practices. However, officials could not identify any specific standards or framework they had followed. We have reported that standards for the design, implementation, and operation of their internal-control system provide an overall framework for establishing and maintaining an effective internal-control system—which is a key factor in achieving an entity’s mission. Further, internal controls help managers achieve desired results through effective stewardship of public resources. USPS has options to choose from in selecting standards for internal controls. Two widely used standards are the COSO Framework and Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, which was adapted for federal entities from the COSO Framework. Both standards are designed to help an entity design, implement, and maintain an effective internal-control system. Such a system should encompass all aspects of an entity’s objectives, including operations, reporting, and compliance objectives, and can help an entity adapt to shifting environments, evolving demands, changing risks, and new priorities. Non-federal entities can adopt either of these standards in their efforts to design, implement, and operate an effective internal control system. As stated above, we found that the COSO Framework to be a reasonable and relevant set of internal control standards to evaluate USPS’s operational internal-control activities. However, we and the USPS OIG have applied both the COSO Framework and Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government in evaluating USPS’s operational internal controls in recent reports. Without standards for an effective internal-control system for its operational policies and procedures for scanning competitive products, USPS may miss opportunities to improve how it achieves its mission to deliver those important products. USPS management has designed standard operating procedures to provide assurance that competitive products are scanned accurately. We found some of these procedures to be consistent with the COSO Framework, which states that an organization should deploy control activities through policies that establish what is expected and procedures that put policies into action. USPS has developed a scanning policy for its products, stating that “properly scanning all barcodes will result in World Class Visibility and be instrumental in retaining and growing our shipping business and providing valuable data to drive improved operational performance and reduce costs.” USPS also has procedures that establish the responsibilities of employees for accurately scanning barcodes for competitive products at various points in the mail flow. Although USPS officials stated that employees should rely on prompts from their scanning devices to ensure scans are done correctly, USPS communicates these procedures in three main ways: documents, such as City Carrier Handbook and Rural Carrier Handbook, that outline scanning procedures and that explain carriers’ duties, including scanning; job aids, such as posters showing proper scanning procedures (see fig. 5); and, standard work steps or guidance that lists procedural steps either for competitive products or for scanning mail in general (see fig. 6). Following these procedures is important to fulfill USPS’s scanning goals. As stated above, the USPS OIG found instances of missed or inaccurate scans for competitive items in recent reports. Further, the USPS OIG also recently found that USPS employees at all 15 postal facilities it visited in the Los Angeles District did not follow correct scanning procedures for USPS’s competitive Parcel Return Service product, leading to inconsistent counts for these products. Such errors can put USPS at risk of not collecting revenue for these products. The USPS OIG has made several recommendations in its recent reports to USPS management to reinforce the importance of these procedures to employees. USPS officials agreed with some of these recommendations and stated that they are taking action to address them. While reinforcing these procedures can be helpful, we found that USPS’s scanning procedures may not provide the necessary assurance for accurate scanning because they are not consistent. For example: The USPS’s City Carrier Handbook states that mail with a barcode should be scanned at the delivery point (or address). However, a standard operating procedures document for city carriers at a post office we visited stated that carriers must scan each delivery confirmation mail piece but did not specify that this scan had to be at the delivery point or address. Locally developed procedures may not be uncommon, as one district manager told us that USPS headquarters allows managers to make a certain amount of flexibility to adapt the standard operating procedures for each post office. The USPS document, SCANNING at a Glance: Delivering 100% Visibility, states that all mail items that require delivery scanning should be scanned at the delivery address, but this document also provides additional scanning procedures not contained in the City Carrier Handbook and other standard operating procedures documents we examined. In particular, the document contained procedures for scanning to account for mail being held for customers on vacation; scanning items correctly to account for mail not delivered to business that were closed; and for mail that was refused by the addressee. This inconsistency in USPS’s scanning procedures has likely occurred because many of the documents have been updated at different times and have not always reflected new operations. For city carriers, the online version of the USPS’s City Carrier Handbook was last updated in April 2001. USPS officials stated that the most recent update regarding scanning was issued in November 2015 via a separate Postal Bulletin. Further, a separate standard operating procedure document for city carriers at a post office we visited was dated June 2006. For rural carriers, the most recently updated scanning procedures we found was dated 2013. As a result, some of these documents are not updated with the latest information on new scanning procedures. In a related example, the USPS OIG recently found that employees at three of the six USPS facilities the USPS OIG visited did not have an adequate understanding of the procedures for processing election and political mail due, in part, to guidance that was not updated, even though the procedures were centrally documented on an internal USPS website. USPS officials recognized this issue and stated that these handbooks are not updated regularly as the content of the handbooks are subject to labor negotiations. Therefore, new procedures are presented to USPS employees outside of the handbooks. However, given that these efforts rely on employees to orally communicate information, having consistent documented procedures is even more important. In addition to stating that the organization should deploy control activities through policies and procedures, the COSO Framework states that senior management should communicate objectives clearly through the organization so that other management and personnel understand their individual roles in the organization. By not having consistent procedures, USPS risks not clearly communicating to its employees how they should carry out scanning procedures and therefore contributing to scanning errors. As discussed below, USPS officials told us that management updates its procedures typically through regular meetings with employees, which are documented in handouts or slides. USPS officials stated that management stresses the importance of scanning and that employees should follow the prompts on their electronic devices when scanning competitive products. However, employees can still scan competitive products as delivered even if they are not, as device prompts can be misread, misinterpreted, or ignored. Furthermore, even with current prompts, scanning errors can and do occur. Consistent procedures, clearly communicated to employees, have become increasingly important as USPS hires new employees to handle, in part, anticipated growth in the volume of competitive packages. For example, GAO analysis of USPS data showed that USPS’s carrier workforce increased by 6.4 percent between fiscal years 2015 and 2017. The USPS OIG has found that these new employees require training and guidance to properly perform their roles and to reduce turnover. In addition to deploying policies and procedures to achieve an organization’s objectives, the COSO Framework states that an organization should internally communicate objectives and responsibilities that are necessary to support the functioning of internal controls. This process can be accomplished through training and meetings. Specifically, the COSO Framework states that training should enable individuals to develop competencies appropriate for assigned roles and responsibilities, among other things, and that active forms of communication such as face-to-face meetings are often more effective than passive forms such as broadcast e-mails and intranet postings. To communicate how its procedures should be correctly implemented, USPS has developed both initial and on-going training for employees. USPS officials stated that new employees are formally trained in scanning procedures when they start their employment. For example, carriers are trained how to use USPS’s electronic scanning devices, when to scan competitive items, the correct codes to use for different delivery situations (i.e., signature required, vacation holds, how to code where a package was left at a delivery address). Any new procedures can be introduced through presentations given by managers during meetings, as described below. Required regular meetings may be tracked by USPS management to ensure they are completed. Some district officials we spoke with stated that they certify that their employees have received required training and send that certification to area and USPS headquarters officials. Additional training also helps USPS reinforce correct scanning procedures. When scanning procedures are not being followed or scanning goals are not met at a post office, USPS officials stated that reminders of the correct procedures designed to reinforce USPS’s scanning procedures are presented to employees through presentations, posters, job aids, and additional documents such as carriers’ handbooks. For example, the representative of the major mailer we spoke with that had 8 to 10 percent of competitive products not scanned to the final delivery address stated that training was needed for both new and experienced carriers to reinforce that they should scan items at the delivery address. To further ensure the accurate scanning of competitive products, USPS reported that it holds internal and external meetings. Specifically, these meetings are designed to: Reinforce procedures: Post office managers can use stand-up talks— weekly meetings between management and employees at the post office—to discuss scanning issues with employees and opportunities to address those issues. For example, the postmaster at one post office we visited stated that this post office reinforces the standard work procedures designed to improve the scanning performance of employees during these meetings. Carriers and clerks can ask questions and learn why they are asked to do something or how to do a specific task, allowing for additional training and reinforcement of procedures. For example, we reviewed a handout developed by USPS headquarters to provide managers with talking points for service talks. This handout provided information on carriers delivering and scanning accurately and instructions on scanning at point of delivery on rural routes. Introduce new procedures: USPS officials told us that post office managers use stand-up talks to introduce new procedures and processes with carriers and clerks. For example, postmasters stated that they used these meetings to introduce and train carriers on new scanning features at the post offices. USPS district and area management develop and disseminate memos and handouts to assist managers conducting these meetings. We reviewed handouts USPS provided to managers for service talks. These handouts provided information on the rollout of some of the most recent scanning procedure changes. Continuously improve operations: District managers we interviewed stated that post offices with low scanning performance scores are placed on a district’s list of underperforming post offices. USPS district managers we interviewed told us that they meet with these post offices to determine how each post office plans to improve its scanning performance. District management also conducts audits of underperforming post offices and post offices that are in need of improvement. Our review of one district office’s service review checklist identified the key areas of audit for underperforming post offices. Reassess procedures: Representatives of mailers we interviewed told us that they meet with USPS representatives to discuss ways USPS can share scanning information for competitive products. Given that inaccurate scans can and do occur, it is important that postal managers explore and investigate any instances of missed or inaccurate scans. To do so, USPS managers—including area vice presidents, district managers, and postmasters—use a variety of reports as tools to ensure that the required scans are made at the appropriate place and time, and take action to monitor the status of competitive products, track lost items, and identify scanning issues. USPS headquarters designs reports used by managers to review performance at the local level across the country. Managers at each level are responsible for overseeing and reporting on the performances of the level below them. For example, the postmaster monitors performance of employees at the post office and is accountable to the district manager. In turn, each district manager is held accountable by the area vice president. To monitor performance of scanning of competitive products, these managers have access to several USPS data systems to generate reports. They can use the reports to monitor scanning performance of carriers and clerks at each post office and to identify the causes of scanning issues, such as missing or incorrect scans. Managers can also use these reports to track the status of competitive products or to investigate customer complaints of lost items. Some examples of reports available to managers include the following: Report 1: USPS officials told us that each post office receives this report from their District Office. The report identifies competitive products that do not have all the required scans, such as scans when the item arrives at the post office or when a delivery attempt was made. For example, one district official sends postmasters weekly reports on competitive products that do not have all the required scans. The officials told us that these reports help managers investigate the cause of incorrect scans identified in the report and how to prevent future occurrences. Report 2: USPS officials told us that this report is generated by district managers to proactively identify scanning irregularities, such as scans that may be out of sequence or multiple competitive products that are scanned at the same time but are for different addresses. District management can query postmasters about these scans and ask them to investigate the reason for the irregularities and determine if the scan was appropriate. Report 3: USPS officials told us that this report is generated by postmasters to monitor scanning status and performances for each competitive product that has received an arrival scan but lacks a delivery scan. While this may indicate a problem, it could also just reflect that the final scan had not been made by the end of the day or the scan that had not been uploaded into the USPS data systems when the report was generated. While having these reports are helpful, their full potential to help USPS managers may be limited because USPS lacks detailed and up-to-date standard operating procedures for how managers should use these reports or conduct other activities to efficiently investigate and resolve scanning issues. USPS’s Scanning Performance: Delivery Standard Operating Procedures for managers are a list of bullet points outlining managers’ responsibilities to meet scanning performance target goals and not a list of detailed procedures for managers to follow, such as how to use Report 1 to identify items that do not have all the required scans. In addition, USPS officials told us that this list has not been updated since approximately October 2005. The COSO Framework states that organizations should internally communicate information, including objectives and responsibilities for internal control, necessary to support the functioning of internal control. Further, it states that a process should be in place to communicate required information to enable all personnel to understand and carry out their internal-control responsibilities. Absent such communication, managers may take different actions to address problems or may have difficulty knowing where to find the appropriate information to locate a missing item to resolve a customer’s complaint quickly. For example, one post office manager told us that he will look at the scanning history in the USPS data systems to determine if the item received an acceptable delivery event scan or what the status of the item is on the route, while another post office manager told us he will use GPS data to see where the scans were made to determine if the item was delivered to the right address. If managers do not know where to find the appropriate information, they may spend more time investigating and be less efficient in resolving issues. Further, not having detailed standard operating procedures means managers may not be aware of all the reports available to them. For example, some post office managers told us that they use Report 3 while other post office managers told us that this report was not available to them. Without using Report 3, some managers told us that they look in several sources to find the same information needed to resolve the issue, such as locating a lost package. Some managers told us that USPS management discontinued the report because it was being misused by some managers. Specifically, managers told us that some managers were manually entering scanning or service-performance information retroactively to improve their performance scores. However, they told us that USPS management recently made Report 3 available to managers again but changed features to reduce any misuse. Additionally, USPS may miss opportunities to prevent scanning issues from happening again by not clearly communicating how managers should use the various reports to address specific scanning issues. For example, the USPS OIG recently determined that instances of missed and inaccurate scans for competitive products were a result of USPS management not adequately monitoring the implementation of those procedures. Without detailed procedures to guide managers in finding and using specific information in available reports and other tools, managers will not have consistent information to use to investigate and resolve customer complaints quickly or accurately. In addition, new managers may not know where to go for the most appropriate information and how to use this information to address some issues. As competitive products have become essential to USPS’s economic viability, it is increasingly important for USPS to accurately track them to remain competitive in this market. While USPS may be scanning most mail accurately, there continue to be instances where mail is not scanned accurately or is missing scans. Given the volume and growth in these competitive products, even a small percentage of inaccurately scanned products could be a large number of such products. Since USPS’s procedures were developed absent standards for internal control, the adoption of a set of internal control standards could enhance USPS’s efforts to continuously improve the design, implementation, and evaluation of its operational internal controls for scanning of competitive products. Further, since USPS’s standard operating procedures for scanning are located in numerous documents and are not always consistent—and given USPS’s reliance on stand-up talks and meetings to keep employees current—USPS employees may not always have accurate scanning procedures easily accessible to them. Having consistent standard operating procedures is increasingly important to ensure that employees are making accurate scans. Additionally, standard procedures that guide managers to investigate and resolve scanning issues would help managers more efficiently address these issues and ideally prevent these issues from happening again. To improve USPS’s competitive products scanning, we recommend that the Postmaster General take the following three actions. The Postmaster General should identify and adopt a set of internal control standards that can be used as the basis for operational internal-control activities, such as those for scanning competitive products. (Recommendation 1) The Postmaster General should improve the communication of standard operating procedures for scanning competitive products by, for example, updating or consolidating USPS documents, job aids, and standard work steps. (Recommendation 2) The Postmaster General should create standard operating procedures for managers on how to address inaccurate scans and use available reports to investigate and resolve scanning issues. (Recommendation 3) We provided a draft of this product to USPS for its review and comment. USPS’s comments are reproduced in appendix I. USPS stated that it cannot agree with our recommendation to identify and adopt a set of internal control standards for USPS’s operational internal control activities at this time. Although USPS has adopted an internal control framework for its financial internal control activities, USPS does not know what the benefits and costs are of adopting internal control standards for its operational internal control activities. As a result, USPS agreed to conduct a cost study to determine whether to commit resources to identifying and adopting a set of internal control standards for its operational internal control activities. We are encouraged that USPS is planning to conduct such a study and anticipate that performing this study will result in the implementation of an appropriate set of internal control standards. USPS agreed with the two recommendations regarding scanning procedures and committed to completing corrective actions by November of 2018. In its general comments, USPS noted that our reference to the USPS OIG’s report, Processing Readiness for Election and Political Mail for the 2018 Midterm Elections did not appear germane to the scanning of competitive mail. We recognize that this report was focused on a different type of mail, but as USPS noted in its letter, we use the OIG report as a related example of how USPS has taken efforts to improve the communication of its scanning procedures to employees. Therefore, we determined that our use of the report is appropriate. We have added information from the OIG report to characterize the OIG’s recommendations and USPS’s actions to address those recommendations. USPS also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. We will send copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Postmaster General, the Chairman of the Postal Regulatory Commission, and other interested parties. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-2834 or rectanusl@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff making key contributions to this report are listed in appendix II. In addition to the individual named above, Kyle Browning (Assistant Director); Greg Hanna (Analyst-in-Charge); Michael Hansen; Thanh Lu; John Mingus; Faye Morrison; Malika Rice; Amy Rosewarne; Crystal Wesco; Elizabeth Wood; and Matthew Zaun made key contributions to this report.	[ "USPS's competitive products have become increasingly important, comprising about 28 percent of USPS's total revenue. USPS scans these packages at various points throughout the postal network. When scans are inaccurate or missing, questions are raised about the veracity of USPS's data on scanning performance and can lead to customer complaints. GAO was asked to review USPS's scanning policies and procedures. In this report, GAO (1) describes USPS's scanning performance and (2) examines how USPS ensures accurate scanning. GAO reviewed USPS's policies and procedures and assessed them against internal control standards; interviewed officials from USPS and five high-volume mailers; and conducted site visits to six post offices in two USPS districts that represented a range of volume, number of routes, and performance. Mail products over which the United States Postal Service (USPS) does not exercise market dominance, such as many of its packages, are called competitive products. These items are scanned throughout the mail delivery system to track their progress (see figure). USPS data show that these products are almost always scanned. For example, USPS data showed that for the first three quarters of fiscal year 2018; all but one of USPS's 67 districts met their scanning goals. Additionally, mailers that account for a high volume of USPS's competitive products told GAO that they believed USPS was generally scanning products correctly. However, a small percentage of missed or inaccurate scans occur. For example, a report from one USPS district showed that for one week, 0.73 percent of the products delivered were missing a scan and that for the fiscal year to date almost 155,000 competitive products were missing a delivery scan. USPS has designed and implemented procedures and activities to help ensure accurate scanning, but some limitations could contribute to scanning errors. For example, USPS has not based its operational procedures for scanning on any internal control standards. USPS officials said the procedures were based on USPS's unique responsibilities, management experience, and sound business practices, but the officials could not identify specific standards or a framework that they followed as the basis for the procedures. USPS officials said they did not believe any internal controls standards applied to these procedures. By not basing procedures on standards, USPS may miss opportunities to improve how it achieves its mission to scan and measure the performance of competitive products. Additionally, USPS's scanning procedure documents, such as for outlining specific delivery scanning steps, are not always consistent, and USPS relies on more informal methods, such as meetings with employees to communicate changes. Thus, employees may not have accurate procedures available to them. Finally, USPS lacks procedures to help managers identify and address incorrect scans, address customer complaints or otherwise address scanning irregularities. For example, USPS's guidance for managers is limited to a list of bullet-points that do not detail the steps managers should follow to resolve scanning irregularities. In addition, this list has not been updated since 2005. Without consistent or detailed procedures, USPS's employees and managers may not scan items accurately or find information needed to resolve scanning issues—a situation that could hinder USPS's ability to reduce inaccurate or missing scans for these important mail products. GAO recommends that USPS: (1) identify and adopt internal control standards for its operational activities such as for scanning of competitive products; (2) improve the communication of procedures for scanning competitive products; and, (3) create procedures for supervisors on how to address inaccurate scans and resolve scanning issues. USPS agreed to explore addressing the first recommendation and agreed with the other two recommendations." ]	5,486	gov_report	en	null	e71b3d540d7b0914ca85538c147331f50a7ebfa0d639cdbd
NASA’s mission is to drive advances in science, technology, aeronautics, and space exploration, and contribute to education, innovation, our country’s economic vitality, and the stewardship of the Earth. To accomplish this mission, NASA establishes programs and projects that rely on complex instruments and spacecraft. NASA’s portfolio of major projects ranges from space satellites equipped with advanced sensors to study the Earth to a telescope intended to explore the universe to spacecraft to transport humans and cargo to and beyond low-Earth orbit. Some of NASA’s projects are expected to incorporate new and sophisticated technologies that must operate in harsh, distant environments. The life cycle for NASA space flight projects consists of two phases— formulation, which takes a project from concept to preliminary design, and implementation, which includes building, launching, and operating the system, among other activities. NASA further divides formulation and implementation into phase A through phase F. Major projects must get approval from senior NASA officials at key decision points before they can enter each new phase. Figure 1 depicts NASA’s life cycle for space flight projects. Formulation culminates in a review at key decision point C, known as project confirmation, where cost and schedule baselines are established and documented in a decision memorandum. To inform those baselines, each project with a life-cycle cost estimated to be greater than $250 million must also develop a joint cost and schedule confidence level (JCL). The JCL initiative, adopted in January 2009, is a point-in-time estimate that, among other things, includes all cost and schedule elements, incorporates and quantifies known risks, assesses the impacts of cost and schedule to date, and addresses available annual resources. NASA policy requires that projects be baselined and budgeted at the 70 percent confidence level. The agency baseline commitment established at key decision point C includes cost and schedule reserves held at the project—those within the project manager’s control—and NASA headquarters level. Cost reserves are for costs that are expected to be incurred—for instance, to address project risks—but are not yet allocated to a specific part of the project. Schedule reserves are extra time in project schedules that can be allocated to specific activities, elements, and major subsystems to mitigate delays or address unforeseen risks. NASA’s current portfolio of major space telescopes includes three projects—WFIRST, TESS, and JWST—that vary in cost, complexity, and phase of the acquisition life cycle. WFIRST, a project that entered the concept and technology development phase and established preliminary cost and schedule estimates in February 2016, is in the earliest stages of the acquisition life cycle. With preliminary cost estimates ranging from $3.2 billion to $3.8 billion, this project is an observatory designed to perform wide-field imaging and survey of the sky at near-infrared wavelengths to answer questions about the structure and evolution of the universe and to expand our knowledge of planets beyond our solar system. The current design includes a 2.4 meter telescope that was built and qualified for another federal agency over 10 years ago; the project is evaluating which components to reuse and which to modify, refurbish, or build new. TESS—a smaller project whose latest cost estimate is approximately $337 million—is targeted to launch in March 2018 and will be used to conduct the first extensive survey of the sky from space for transiting exoplanets. And finally, JWST, with a life-cycle cost estimate of $8.835 billion, is one of NASA’s most complex projects and top priorities. The telescope is designed to help understand the origin and destiny of the universe, the creation and evolution of the first stars and galaxies, and the formation of stars and planetary systems. With a 6.5-meter primary mirror, JWST is expected to operate at about 100 times the sensitivity of the Hubble Space Telescope. JWST’s science instruments are to detect very faint infrared sources and, as such, are required to operate at extremely cold temperatures. To help keep these instruments cold, a multi-layered tennis-court-sized sunshield is being developed to protect the mirrors and instruments from the sun’s heat. We have reported for several years on the JWST project, which has experienced significant cost increases and schedule delays. Prior to being approved for development, cost estimates for JWST ranged from $1 billion to $3.5 billion, with expected launch dates ranging from 2007 to 2011. Before 2011, early technical and management challenges, contractor performance issues, low levels of cost reserves, and poorly phased funding levels caused JWST to delay work after confirmation, which contributed to significant cost and schedule overruns, including launch delays. The Chair of the Senate Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies requested from NASA an independent review of JWST in June 2010. In response, NASA commissioned the Independent Comprehensive Review Panel, which issued its report in October 2010. The panel concluded that JWST was executing well from a technical standpoint, but that the baseline cost estimate did not reflect the most probable cost with adequate reserves in each year of project execution, resulting in an unexecutable project. Following this review, Congress in November 2011 placed an $8 billion cap on the formulation and development costs for the project and NASA rebaselined JWST with a life-cycle cost estimate of $8.835 billion that included additional money for operations and a planned launch in October 2018. The new baseline represented a 78 percent increase to the project’s life-cycle cost from the original baseline and a launch date in October 2018, a delay of 52 months. The revised life-cycle cost estimate included a total of 13 months of funded schedule reserve. Our ongoing work indicates that these three projects are each making progress in line with their phase of the acquisition cycle, but also face challenges in execution. Some of these challenges are unique to the projects themselves and some are common among the projects in NASA’s portfolio. For example, when projects enter the integration and test phase, unforeseen challenges can arise and affect the cost and schedule for the project. Table 1 provides more details about the current acquisition phase, cost, and schedule status of NASA’s major space telescope projects based on our ongoing work. WFIRST. NASA’s preliminary cost and schedule estimates for the WFIRST project are currently under review as the project responds to findings in the WFIRST Independent External Technical/Management/Cost Review. This independent review was conducted to ensure the mission’s scope and required resources are well understood and executable. NASA initiated this review in April 2017 to address the National Academies’ concerns that WFIRST cost growth could endanger the balance of NASA’s astrophysics program and negatively affect other scientific priorities. The review found that the mission scope is understood, but not aligned with the resources provided and concluded that the mission is not executable without adjustments and/or additional resources. For example, the study team found that NASA’s current forecasted funding profile for the WFIRST project would require the project to slow down activities starting in fiscal year 2020, which would result in an increase in development cost and schedule. NASA agreed with the study team’s results and directed the project to reduce the cost and complexity of the design in order to maintain costs within the $3.2 billion cost target. The project is currently identifying potential ways to reduce the scope of planned activities (called “descopes”), assessing the science impact of those descopes, and then developing recommendations for the Astrophysics Division leadership. An example of a descope that may be considered is the requirement for WFIRST to be “star-shade ready,” which means the design must be compatible with a star-shade device that is positioned between it and the star being observed to block out starlight while allowing the light emitted by the planet through. TESS. The TESS project is currently holding cost and schedule reserves consistent with NASA center requirements, but there are no longer headquarters-held cost reserves to cover a delay if the project cannot launch as planned in March 2018. According to a project official, the project is holding 16 days of schedule reserve to its target March 2018 launch readiness date, which includes 6 days for the completion of integration and test, and 10 days for launch operations. The project previously used schedule reserves to accommodate the delayed delivery of its Ka-band transmitter, which is essential for TESS as it transmits the mission data back to Earth, due to continued performance and manufacturing issues. The two main risks to the March 2018 launch date are if: 1) SpaceX requires additional time past December 2017 for NASA’s Launch Services Program to certify that TESS can fly on its upgraded launch vehicle—certification is necessary because it will be the first time that NASA will use this version of the vehicle—and 2) any issues are identified during the remainder of environmental testing. The project is also conducting additional testing on its spare camera at temperatures seen in space to better understand expected camera performance on orbit. TESS will use four identical, wide field-of-view cameras to conduct the first extensive survey of the sky from space for transiting exoplanets. However, during thermal testing, the project found that the substance attaching the lenses to the camera barrel places pressure on the lenses and causes the cameras to be slightly out of focus. In June 2017, NASA directed the project to proceed with integrating the cameras—as they are expected to meet TESS’s top level science requirements even with the anomaly. At its most recent key decision review in August 2017, NASA reallocated $15 million of TESS’s headquarters-held reserves to the WFIRST project. While this had the effect of decreasing life cycle costs for TESS, it also increased risk as the project no longer has any additional headquarters-held cost reserves to cover a launch delay past March 2018. JWST. The JWST project continues to make progress towards launch, but the program is encountering technical challenges that require both time and money to fix and may lead to additional delays, beyond a delay recently announced. While the project has made much progress on hardware integration and testing over the past several months, it also used all of its remaining schedule reserves to address various technical issues, particularly on the spacecraft element. In September 2017, the JWST project requested from the European Space Agency—who will contribute the Ariane V launch vehicle—a launch window from March to June 2019, or 5 to 8 months later than the planned October 2018 launch readiness date, established in 2011. The project based this request on the results of a schedule risk assessment that incorporated inputs from the contractor on expected durations of ongoing spacecraft element integration work and other challenges that were expected to increase schedule. With the later launch window to June 2019, the project expected to have up to 4 months of new schedule reserves. However, shortly after requesting the revised launch window, the project learned from its contractor that up to another 3 months of schedule reserve use is likely, due to lessons learned from conducting deployment exercises of the sunshield, such as reach and access limitations on the flight hardware. As a result, and pending further examination of the schedule, the project now has approximately one month of schedule reserve to complete environmental testing of the spacecraft element and the final integration phase. The final integration phase is where the instruments and telescope will be integrated with the spacecraft and sunshield to form the completed observatory. As I previously noted, our work has shown the integration and test is the riskiest phase of development, where problems are most likely to be found and schedules slip. Given the risks associated with the integration and test work ahead, coupled with a level of schedule reserves that is currently well below the level stated in the procedural requirements issued by the NASA center responsible for managing JWST, additional delays to the project’s revised launch readiness date of June 2019 are likely. As a result, the funding available under the Congressional cost cap of $8 billion may be inadequate as the contractor will need to continue to retain higher workforce levels for longer than expected to prepare the mission for a delayed launch. As Congress, NASA, and the science community consider future telescope efforts, it will be exceedingly important to shape and manage new programs in a manner that minimizes cost overruns and schedule delays. This is particularly important for the largest programs as even small cost increases can have reverberating effects. NASA’s telescope and other science projects will always have inherent technical, design, and integration risks because they are complex, specialized, and often push the state of the art in space technology. But too often, our reports find that management and oversight problems—which can include poor planning, optimistic cost estimating, funding gaps, lax oversight, and poor contractor performance, among other issues—are the real drivers behind cost and schedule growth. To its credit, NASA has taken significant steps, partly in response to our past recommendations, to reduce acquisition risk from both a technical and management standpoint, including actions to enhance cost and schedule estimating, provide adequate levels of reserves to projects, establish better processes and metrics to monitor projects, and expand the use of earned value management to better monitor contractor performance. For example, in November 2012, we found that NASA employee skill sets available to analyze and implement earned value management vary widely from center to center, and we recommended that NASA conduct an earned value management skills gap analysis to identify areas requiring augmented capability across the agency, and, based on the results of the assessment, develop a workforce training plan to address any deficiencies. NASA concurred with this recommendation and developed an earned value management training plan in 2014 based on the results of an earned value management skills gap analysis that was conducted in 2013. Moreover, in recent years, we have found that many of the projects within the agency’s major project portfolio have improved their cost and schedule performance. Nevertheless, the extent to which NASA has adopted some of the following lessons learned within its portfolio of major projects is mixed, and NASA has an opportunity to strengthen its program management of major acquisitions, including its space telescopes, by doing so. Manage Cost and Schedule Performance for Large Projects to Limit Implications for Entire Portfolio. In 2013, following JWST’s cost increases and schedule growth, we found that though cost and schedule growth can occur on any project, increases associated with NASA’s most costly and complex missions can have cascading effects on the rest of the portfolio. For example, we found that the JWST cost growth would have reverberating effects on the portfolio for years to come and required the agency to identify $1.4 billion in additional resources over fiscal years 2012 through 2017, according to Science Mission Directorate officials. NASA identified approximately half of this required funding from the four science divisions within the Science Mission Directorate account. The majority of the cuts were related to future high priority missions, missions in the operations and sustainment phase, and research and analysis. In essence, NASA had to mortgage future high priority missions and research to address JWST’s additional resource needs. Similarly, the National Academy of Sciences has concluded in the past that it is important for NASA to have a clearly articulated and consistently applied method for prioritizing why and how its scarce fiscal resources are apportioned with respect to the science program in general and on a more granular level among component scientific disciplines. The academy noted that failure to do so could result in a loss of capacity, capability, and human resources in a number of scientific disciplines and technological areas that may take a generation or more to reconstitute once eliminated. NASA’s establishment of the WFIRST Independent External Technical/Management/Cost Review that I previously discussed is a step in the right direction to help ensure the Astrophysics Division incorporates this lesson learned. Establish Adequate Cost and Schedule Reserves to Address Risks. Twice in the history of the JWST program, independent reviewers found that the program’s planned cost reserves were inadequate. First, in April 2006, an Independent Review Team confirmed that the project’s technical content was complete and sound, but expressed concern over the project’s reserve funding, reporting that it was too low and phased in too late in the development lifecycle. The review team reported that for a project as complex as JWST, 25 to 30 percent total reserve funding was appropriate. The team cautioned that low reserve funding compromised the project’s ability to resolve issues, address risk areas, and accommodate unknown problems. As I previously mentioned, following additional cost increases and schedule threats, NASA commissioned the Independent Comprehensive Review Panel. In 2010, the panel again concluded JWST was executing well from a technical standpoint, but that the baseline cost estimate did not reflect the most probable cost with adequate reserves in each year of project execution, resulting in an unexecutable project. NASA heeded these lessons when it established a new baseline for JWST in 2011. For example, the revised schedule included more reserves than required by the procedural requirements issued by the NASA center responsible for managing JWST. We have found, however, that NASA has not applied this lesson learned to all of its large projects— most notably with its human spaceflight projects, including the Space Launch System, Orion Crew Capsule, and associated ground systems— and similar outcomes to the JWST project have started to emerge with these projects. We previously reported that all three of these programs were operating with limited cost reserves, which limited each program’s ability to address risks and unforeseen technical challenges. For example, we found in July 2016 that the Orion program planned to maintain very low levels of annual cost reserves until 2018. The lack of available cost reserves in the near term led to the program deferring work to address technical issues to stay within budget, and put the program’s future cost reserves at risk of being overwhelmed by deferred work. In April 2017, we also found that all three programs faced development challenges in completing work, and each had little to no schedule reserve remaining to the launch date—meaning they would have to complete all remaining work with minimal delay during the most challenging stage of development. We found that it was unlikely that the programs would achieve the planned launch readiness date and recommended that NASA reassess the date. NASA agreed with this recommendation and stated that it would establish a new launch readiness date. In November 2017, NASA announced that a review of the possible manufacturing and production schedule risks indicated a launch date of June 2020—a delay of 19 months—but the agency will manage to a December 2019 launch date because, according to NASA, they have put in mitigation strategies for those risks. We will follow-up on those mitigation strategies as part of future work on the human space exploration programs. Regularly and Consistently Update Project JCLs to Provide Realistic Estimates to Decision Makers. In 2009, NASA began requiring that programs and projects with estimated life-cycle costs greater than $250 million develop a JCL prior to project confirmation. This was a positive step for NASA to help ensure that cost and schedule estimates are realistic and projects are thoroughly planning for anticipated risks. This is because a JCL assigns a confidence level, or likelihood, of a project meeting its cost and schedule estimates. Our cost estimating best practices recommend that cost estimates should be updated to reflect changes to a program or be kept current as a program moves through milestones. As new risks emerge on a project, an updated cost and schedule risk analysis can provide realistic estimates to decision-makers, including the Congress. This is especially true for NASA’s largest projects as updated estimates may require the Congress to consider a variety of actions. However, there is no requirement for NASA projects to update their JCLs, and our prior work has found that projects—including JWST—do not regularly update cost risk analyses to take into account newly emerged risks. Our ongoing work indicates that of the 16 major projects currently in NASA’s portfolio that have developed JCL estimates, only 2 have reported updating their JCLs (other than required due to a rebaseline). For example, the Interior Exploration using Seismic Investigations, Geodesy, and Heat Transport Project (InSight), a Mars lander, updated its JCL after the project missed its committed launch date. As a result, the project was able to provide additional information to decision makers about the probability that it will meet its revised cost and schedule estimates. As a project reaches the later stages of development, especially integration and testing, the types of risks the project will face may change. An updated project JCL would provide both project and agency management with data on relevant risks that can guide the project decisions. For example, in December 2012, we recommended the JWST project update its JCL. NASA concurred with this recommendation; however, we recently closed the recommendation because NASA had not taken steps to implement it and the amount of time remaining before launch would not have allowed the benefit of implementing the recommendation to be realized. An updated JCL may have portended the current schedule delays, which could have been proactively addressed by the project. Enhance Oversight of Contractors to Improve Project Outcomes. In December 2012, we found that the JWST project had taken steps to enhance communications with and oversight of its contractors. According to project officials, the increased communication allowed them to better identify and manage project risks by having more visibility into contractors’ activities. The project reported that a great deal of communication existed across the project prior to the Independent Comprehensive Review Panel; however, additional improvements were made. For example, the project increased its presence at contractor facilities as necessary to provide assistance; this included assigning two engineers on a recurring basis at a Lockheed Martin facility to assist in solving problems with an instrument. The JWST project also assumed full responsibility for the mission system engineering functions from Northrop Grumman in March 2011. NASA and Northrop Grumman officials both said that NASA is better suited to perform these tasks. We continue to see instances in our ongoing work that highlight the importance of implementing this lesson learned from JWST. For example, we found in 2017 that the Space Network Ground Segment Sustainment project—a project that plans to develop and deliver a new ground system for one Space Network site that provides essential communications tracking services to NASA and non-NASA missions—exceeded its original cost baseline by at least $401.7 million and been delayed by 27 months. The project has attributed some of the cost overruns and schedule delays to the contractor’s incomplete understanding of its requirements, which led to poor contractor plans and late design changes. The project also took steps to assign a new NASA project manager, increase physical presence at the contractor facility, and have more staff focused on validation and verification activities. In summary, NASA continues to make progress developing its space telescopes to help understand the universe and our place in it. But much like other major projects that NASA is developing, there continues to be an opportunity for NASA to learn from JWST and other projects that have suffered from cost overruns and schedule delays. Key project management tools and prior GAO recommendations that I have highlighted here today, could help to better position these large, complex, and technically challenging efforts for a successful outcome. We look forward to continuing to work with NASA and this subcommittee in addressing these issues. Chairman Babin, Ranking Member Bera, and Members of the Subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to respond to any questions that you may have at this time. If you or your staff have any questions about this testimony, please contact Cristina T. Chaplain, Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management at (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. GAO staff who made key contributions to this statement include Molly Traci, Assistant Director; Richard Cederholm, Assistant Director; Carrie Rogers; Lisa Fisher; Laura Greifner; Erin Kennedy; and Jose Ramos. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.	[ "Acquisition management has been a long-standing challenge at NASA, although GAO has reported on improvements the agency has made in recent years. Three space telescope projects are the key enablers for NASA to achieve its astrophysics' science goals, which include seeking to understand the universe. In its fiscal year 2018 budget request, NASA asked for about $697 million for these three projects, which represents over 50 percent of NASA's budget for its astrophysics' major projects. In total, these projects represent an expected investment of at least $12.4 billion. This statement reflects preliminary observations on (1) the current status and cost of NASA's major telescope projects and (2) lessons learned that can be applied to NASA's management of its telescope projects. This statement is based on ongoing work on JWST and ongoing work on the status of NASA's major projects. Both reports are planned to be published in Spring 2018. This statement is also based on past GAO reports on JWST and NASA's acquisitions of major projects, and NASA input. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) current portfolio of major space telescopes includes three projects that vary in cost, complexity, and phase of the acquisition life cycle. GAO's ongoing work indicates that these projects are each making progress in line with their phase of the acquisition cycle but also face some challenges. For example, the current launch date for the James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) project reflects a 57-60-month delay from the project's original schedule. GAO's preliminary observations indicate this project still has significant integration and testing to complete, with very little schedule reserve remaining to account for delays. Therefore, additional delays beyond the delay of up to 8 months recently announced are likely, and funding available under the $8 billion Congressional cost cap for formulation and development may be inadequate. There are a number of lessons learned from its acquisitions that NASA could consider to increase the likelihood of successful outcomes for its telescope projects, as well as for its larger portfolio of projects, such as its human spaceflight projects. For example, twice in the history of the JWST program, independent reviews found that the program was not holding adequate cost and schedule reserves. GAO has found that NASA has not applied this lesson learned to all of its large projects, and similar outcomes to JWST have started to emerge. For example, NASA did not incorporate this lesson with its human spaceflight programs. In July 2016 and April 2017, GAO found that these programs were holding inadequate levels of cost and schedule reserves to cover unexpected cost increases or delays. In April 2017, GAO recommended that NASA reassess the date of the programs' first test flight. NASA concurred and, in November 2017, announced a launch delay of up to 19 months. GAO is not making any recommendations in this statement, but has made recommendations in prior reports to strengthen NASA's acquisition management of its major projects. NASA has generally agreed with GAO's recommendations and taken steps to implement them." ]	4,085	gov_report	en	null	f55b78063bcd3477ee7c7c03527c28a918095d6eb58a3523
The Small Business Administration (SBA) administers several programs to support small businesses, including loan guaranty programs to enhance small business access to capital; contracting programs to increase small business opportunities in securing federal contracts; direct loan programs for businesses, homeowners, and renters to assist their recovery from natural disasters; and small business management and technical assistance training programs to assist business formation and expansion. Congressional interest in these programs has increased in recent years, primarily because assisting small business is viewed as a means to enhance economic growth. The SBA's Surety Bond Guarantee Program has been operational since April 1971. It is designed to increase small business' access to federal, state, and local government contracting, as well as private-sector contracting, by guaranteeing bid, performance, payment, and specified ancillary bonds "on contracts … for small and emerging contractors who cannot obtain bonding through regular commercial channels." The program guarantees individual contracts of up to $6.5 million, and up to $10 million if a federal contracting officer certifies that such a guarantee is necessary. The $6.5 million limit is periodically adjusted for inflation. The SBA's guarantee currently ranges from 80% to 90% of the surety's loss if a default occurs. In FY2018, the SBA guaranteed 10,800 bid and final surety bonds (a payment bond, performance bond, or both a payment and performance bond) with a total contract value of nearly $6.5 billion. Although the surety industry does not report the total value of the bonds it issues each year, estimates based on the total amount of premiums collected by the private sector in recent years suggest that the SBA's Surety Bond Guarantee Program represents, by design, a relatively small percentage of the market for surety bonds (from about 1.1% to 6.7% of the value of surety bonds issued by the private sector). A surety bond is a three-party instrument between a surety (that agrees to be responsible for the debt or obligation of another), a contractor, and a project owner. The agreement binds the contractor to comply with the contract's terms and conditions. If the contractor is unable to successfully perform the contract, the surety assumes the contractor's responsibilities and ensures that the project is completed. The surety bond reduces the risk of contracting. Surety bonds are viewed as a means to encourage project owners to contract with small businesses that may not have the credit history or prior experience of larger businesses and are considered to be at greater risk of failing to comply with the contract's terms and conditions. The four general types of surety bonds are bid bonds guarantee that the bidder on a contract will enter into the contract and furnish the required payment and performance bonds if awarded the contract, payment bonds guarantee that suppliers and subcontractors will be paid for work performed under the contract, performance bonds guarantee that the contractor will perform the contract in accordance with its terms and conditions, and ancillary bonds ensure completion of requirements outside of performance or payment, such as maintenance. Surety bonds are important to small businesses interested in competing for a federal contract because the federal government requires prime contractors, prior to the award of a federal contract exceeding $150,000 for the construction, alteration, or repair of any building or public work of the United States, to furnish a performance bond issued by a surety satisfactory to the officer awarding the contract, and in an amount the contracting officer considers adequate, to protect the government. Prime contractors are also required to post a payment bond with a surety satisfactory to the contracting officer for the protection of all persons supplying labor and material in carrying out the work provided for in the contract. Both bonds become legally binding upon award of the contract and their "penal amounts," or the maximum amount of the surety's obligation, must generally be 100% of the original contract price plus 100% of any price increases. Most state and local governments have adopted similar legislation, often called "Little Miller Acts," referencing the Miller Act of 1935 that established the federal requirement. Many private project owners also require contractors to furnish a surety bond before awarding them a contract. This report opens with an examination of the SBA's Surety Bond Guarantee Program's legislative origin and provides a historical summary of the major issues that have influenced the program's development, including the decision to supplement the original Prior Approval Program with a Preferred Surety Bond Guarantee Program (PSB program) that initially provided SBA-approved sureties a lower guarantee rate (not to exceed 70%) than those participating in the Prior Approval Program (not to exceed 80% or 90%, depending on the size of the contract and the type of small business) in exchange for allowing preferred sureties to issue SBA-guaranteed bonds to small businesses without the SBA's prior approval; P.L. 114-92 , the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, which increased the PSB program's guarantee rate from not to exceed 70% to not to exceed 90% of losses; and the decision to increase the program's bond limit. It then examines the program's current eligibility standards and requirements, and provides performance statistics, including the number and amount of bond guarantees issued annually. In addition, it provides data concerning the number and amount of final bonds guaranteed from FY1971 through FY2017 (see Table A-1 ) and for bid and final bonds combined from FY2000 through FY2017 (see Table A-2 ). P.L. 91-609, the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1970, authorized the SBA's Surety Bond Guarantee Program. The act amended Title IV of the Small Business Investment Act of 1958 (P.L. 85-699, as amended) to provide the SBA authority to guarantee any surety against loss as the result of a breach of the terms of a bid bond, payment bond, or performance bond by a principal on any contract up to $500,000. The act specified that (1) the principal of the bond is a small business, (2) the bond is required as a condition of bidding on the contract or serving as a prime contractor or subcontractor on the project, (3) the small business is not able to obtain such bond on reasonable terms and conditions without the guarantee, (4) the SBA determines that there is a reasonable expectation that the small business will perform the covenants and conditions of the contract, (5) the contact meets SBA requirements concerning the feasibility of the contract being completed successfully and at a reasonable cost, and (6) the bond's terms and conditions are reasonable in light of the risks involved and the extent of the surety's participation. The act also required that the SBA's guarantee not exceed 90% of the loss incurred by the surety in the event of a breach of the bond's terms and conditions by the small business. The SBA was authorized to finance the program through the Leasing Guarantee Revolving Loan Fund within the Department of the Treasury, which renamed that fund the Lease and Surety Bond Guarantee Revolving Fund. The act authorized the transfer of $5 million from the SBA's Business Loan and Investment Revolving Fund to the Lease and Surety Bond Guarantee Revolving Fund, raising that fund's capital to $10 million available without fiscal year limitation, to support both the lease guarantee program and the surety bond guarantee program. The act also recommended that the program be appropriated up to $1.5 million each fiscal year for three fiscal years after its date of enactment (December 31, 1970) if additional funding were needed to offset the program's expenses. The SBA was directed to administer the program "on a prudent and economically justifiable basis." It was authorized to offset the program's administrative costs by charging a uniform annual fee, subject to periodic review to ensure that the fee is the "lowest fee that experience under the program shows to be justified," and uniform fees for the processing of applications for guarantees. The SBA also was authorized to "obligate the surety to pay the Administration such portions of the bond fee as the Administration determines to be reasonable in light of the relative risks and costs involved." The program's sponsors argued in 1970 that "there is widespread evidence that a significant number of construction contracting organizations find varying degrees of difficulty in obtaining surety bonds" and that "the major share of these organizations are small businesses, and many of them are headed by minority groups." They argued that the Surety Bond Guarantee Program would "facilitate the entry and advancement of small and minority contractors in the construction business." At that time, witnesses at congressional hearings testified that surety bonds were not necessarily required for most private sector construction contracts, but they were required for most public sector construction contracts. The SBA implemented the program on a pilot basis on April 5, 1971, in Kansas City. The program later was expanded to Los Angeles and became nationwide on September 2, 1971. Initially, the SBA guaranteed 90% of the amount of all of the surety bonds in the program and charged sureties 10% of the bond premium paid to the surety company by the contractor. It also charged small business applicants for payment and performance bonds 0.2% of the contract price upon their obtaining the contract. It did not charge for the processing of bid bonds, rejected applications, or applications that did not result in a contract award. Contractors wishing to participate in the program were required to have less than $750,000 in gross annual receipts for the past fiscal year or to have averaged less than $750,000 in gross annual receipts over the past three fiscal years. This size standard was more stringent than for other SBA programs, and it was designed "to reach that segment of small business which was obviously intended to benefit from the legislation as evidenced by the limit of $500,000 on any one contract." Demand for the program exceeded the SBA's expectations. In 1971, the SBA estimated that it would guarantee about 8,000 contracts amounting to about $540 million from FY1972 through FY1974. Instead, it guaranteed 16,118 contracts amounting to nearly $1.1 billion (see Table A-1 in the Appendix). Because the demand for the program exceeded expectations and the initial fees proved to be insufficient to recoup the program's expenses, in 1974, the SBA requested an additional $25 million for the program. The SBA argued that the additional funds were necessary to take into account the program's projected growth and to establish a reserve fund "to protect against having to suspend [the] program in the fact of more rapid growth than is projected." In response to the SBA's request for additional funding for the program, Congress held congressional hearings to reassess the need for the program and to explore options concerning how to finance the program's proposed expansion. The financing discussions focused on the relative merits of relying primarily on higher fees to increase the program's revenue, reductions in the guarantee percentage to reduce the program's expenses, or additional appropriations to finance the program's proposed expansion. Although the SBA has periodically increased the program's fees and later instituted a tiered system of guarantee percentages, historically, the SBA has tried to keep the program's fees as low as economically feasible and the guarantee percentage as high as economically feasible to encourage the program's use. As an SBA official testified before Congress in 1975: SBA's loss exposure could be reduced by a decrease in the guarantee extended to sureties from 90% to 80%. Before proceeding with this recommendation, a thorough analysis will have to be made of the adverse effect on the willingness of sureties to participate in the program which would result from the increase from 10% to 20% of the sureties' share of the loss potential. An increase in contractor's fees would obviously be beneficial to the operating income of the program, but would also increase the bids which small business-contractors would have to make, thus placing them at a competitive disadvantage with contractors with more ready access to bonding. Moreover, as mentioned previously, the SBA is required by statute to ensure that the fees are the lowest "that experience under the program shows to be justified." Determining the program's appropriate size became a recurring theme at congressional hearings, and continues to be of congressional interest today. For example, Congress has regularly requested testimony from representatives of the surety bond industry and various construction organizations concerning the extent to which the program is necessary to assist small businesses generally, and minority-owned small businesses in particular, in gaining access to surety bonds. Congress has also periodically asked the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to examine the need for the SBA's surety bond guarantee program and to recommend ways to improve the program's management. That testimony and GAO's reports have supported a need for the program, but, as will be discussed, have had somewhat limited usefulness in helping Congress determine the program's appropriate size. In 1974, Congress responded to the SBA's request for additional funding by passing P.L. 93-386 , the Small Business Amendments of 1974. It established a separate Surety Bond Guarantees Revolving Fund account (hereinafter Revolving Fund) within the Department of the Treasury to support the program. The act also increased the total contract amount that could be guaranteed to $1 million from $500,000 and recommended that the Revolving Fund receive $35 million in additional funding. The Ford Administration objected to providing additional appropriations for the Revolving Fund. Instead, the Administration recommended that the Revolving Fund receive a $20 million transfer from the SBA's Business Loan and Investment Revolving Fund. The transfer would provide the program access to additional capital without affecting the federal budget deficit. Congress approved the Administration's proposal. As shown in Table 1 , the Revolving Fund received $130.5 million in additional appropriations for FY1976 through FY1979 and continued to receive additional appropriations during the 1980s and 1990s. In addition, the program's bond limit was increased to $1.25 million from $1 million in 1986. As discussed below, the increased appropriations and bond limit were not sufficient to continue the program's growth. Instead, both the number and amount of final surety bonds guaranteed by the SBA began to slowly diminish. This general trend continued until the maximum individual surety contract amount was increased, first on a temporary basis by P.L. 111-5 , the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, and later, on a permanent statutory basis, by P.L. 112-239 , the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013. As shown in Table 1 , Congress did not appropriate funding for the Revolving Fund from FY2000 to FY2004, allowing the program to cover the cost of claim defaults through its reserve. Congress also increased the program's bond limit to $2 million from $1.25 million in 2000. Congress provided the Revolving Fund $2.9 million in FY2005, $2.86 million in FY2006, $2.86 million in FY2007, and $3 million in FY2008. During the 111 th Congress, P.L. 111-5 provided the Revolving Fund a separate appropriation of $15 million to support a temporary increase in the program's bond limit to $5 million, and up to $10 million if a federal contracting officer certified in writing that a guarantee in excess of $5 million was necessary, from $2 million. Those funds were in addition to the $2 million appropriation that had already been approved for FY2009. In FY2010, the Revolving Fund received $1 million. Congress has not approved appropriations for the Revolving Fund since then, noting that there have been sufficient funds in the program's reserve to cover the cost of anticipated claim defaults. As mentioned previously, the SBA relied primarily on increased appropriations to finance the program's expansion during the 1970s, but it also increased the program's fees charged to applicants and sureties. For example, in 1976, the SBA increased its fees to sureties to 20% from 10% of the bond premium, instituted a deductible clause on bond claims, and generally limited its approval for bid, participation, and performance bonds to $250,000 unless specified circumstances were met. In 1977, it increased the contractor applicant fee for payment and performance bonds to 0.5% from 0.2% of the contract price upon obtaining the contract. The program's current fee structure is discussed later in this report. Both the number and amount of final surety bonds guaranteed by the SBA increased relatively rapidly during the 1970s (see Table A-1 in the Appendix). The number of final surety bonds guaranteed by the SBA increased from 1,339 in FY1972 to 20,095 in FY1979, and the amount guaranteed by the SBA increased from $94.4 million in FY1972 to $1.39 billion in FY1979. During the 1980s and 1990s, both the number and amount of final surety bonds guaranteed by the SBA generally declined, in both nominal and inflation-adjusted dollars. A review of congressional testimony during that period suggests that there was no single, discernible factor to account for the program's slow contraction. Because the demand for surety bonds tends to fluctuate with changes in the economy, the program might have been expected to contract somewhat during recessions, but the economy experienced periods of both economic growth and decline during the 1980s and 1990s. There also was no indication that the ability of small businesses to access surety bonds in the private marketplace without the SBA's assistance had materially improved, which, if that had been the case, might have contributed to the decline by reducing the number of small businesses applying for assistance. One possible contributing factor to the decline in SBA-guaranteed surety bonds during that period was the continuing reluctance of many surety companies to participate in the program, either because they did not view the program as particularly profitable or they "had developed alternative methods to the program, such as requiring collateral or funds controls and underwriting programs based in part on credit scores, in order to write small and emerging contractors." Another possible contributing factor was a change in the way the program was perceived by congressional leaders and their reluctance to provide additional resources to continue the program's expansion. During the 1970s, at congressional hearings, witnesses praised the program as a great success in helping small businesses access surety bonds and compete for government contracts. During the 1980s and 1990s, congressional hearings focused less on the program's successes and more on its shortcomings. For example, in 1982, the chair of the Senate Committee on Small Business indicted that the program was subject to "the most insidious types of fraud," including "evidence of involvement of organized crime figures." In addition, reports by both GAO and the SBA's inspector general questioned the SBA's management of the program, arguing, among other things, that the SBA lacked useful underwriting guidelines for surety companies and adequate procedures for verifying applicants' information. During the 1980s, the SBA guaranteed, on average, 11,840 final surety bonds each fiscal year, with the SBA's share of those bonds' value averaging $1.0 billion. During the 1990s, the SBA guaranteed, on average, 5,859 final surety bonds each fiscal year, with the SBA's share of those bonds' value averaging $823 million. During the first decade of the 2000s, the SBA guaranteed, on average, about 1,802 final surety bonds each fiscal year, with the SBA's share of those bonds' value averaging about $385 million. Since then, as indicated in Table 2 and Table A-1 , the number and amount of final surety bonds guaranteed by the SBA has generally increased. This increase is likely due to generally improving economic conditions and the increase in 2013 of the maximum individual contract amount that could be guaranteed from $2 million to $6.5 million, and up to $10 million if a federal contracting officer certifies that such a guarantee is necessary. The surety bonding process begins when a contractor applies for a bond. As GAO has reported Surety companies are generally corporations that are licensed under various insurance laws and, under their charters, have legal power to act as a surety (making themselves responsible for another's obligations) for others. Most surety companies accept business only through independent agents and brokers. In screening a bond applicant, a surety attempts to measure the contractor's ability to undertake and complete the job. When the surety's evaluation of the contractor's acceptability to perform the contract is favorable, the surety underwrites the bond. If the surety does not provide a bond to the bond applicant, the appropriate forms are forwarded to SBA for consideration of a surety bond guarantee. Initially, the SBA surety guaranteed program's bonds were underwritten and issued by large, "standard" surety companies. However, these companies' participation in the program soon began to decline, reportedly because of the administrative burdens associated with the program, such as the SBA's requirement that sureties submit all bond applications to the SBA for review and approval. In addition, the administrative costs of dealing with relatively small bonds versus relatively large ones may have also played a role in the larger, standard surety companies leaving the program. As a congressional witness testified in 1976: You have a professional underwriter, who ... is going to be asked to spend 3 or 4 days looking into a $25,000 first-time application. There are many expenses involved. That same underwriter could very easily be writing four or five bonds for $10 million for contractors that everyone knows can perform. And it becomes a matter of how much time and resources can the surety industry devote to this type of business. Another reason may have been the outbreak of the Israeli-Egyptian War in 1973, which was followed by a tripling of oil prices and double-digit inflation. This led to the failure of many smaller contracting companies. In response to the economic downturn, many surety companies enhanced their underwriting standards to protect themselves from rising defaults. As a result, many of the larger surety companies became increasingly reluctant to participate in a program in which the profit margins were relatively small given the required paperwork and the program's limitation on the bond amount, and when the risk of defaults was at a historically high level. As standard sureties left the program, "specialty" surety companies filled the void. Initially, specialty sureties devoted almost all their business exclusively to SBA-guaranteed surety bonds. These companies later expanded their business into offering other high-risk bonds not normally handled by standard sureties. Specialty sureties typically required the contractor to provide collateral for the projects they bonded, and, in most cases, charged higher premiums than standard sureties. In 1982, the SBA invited officials from the Surety Association of America, representing the standard surety companies, to recommend ways to encourage their participation in the program. As mentioned previously, at that time, some specialty surety companies had been accused of associating with organized crime and GAO and the SBA's inspector general had reported fraud and mismanagement in the program. This may help to explain why the SBA was interested in encouraging the larger, more established surety companies to return to the program. The SBA also hoped that greater participation by the larger sureties would lead to lower premiums for small business contractors. During this outreach period, standard surety companies indicated a willingness to increase their participation in the program if the SBA would create a second special program, similar to the SBA's 7(a) loan guarantee program's Preferred Lenders Program. Under the proposal, a surety meeting specified qualification standards would be designed as a "preferred surety" and would be allowed to issue SBA-guaranteed surety bonds prior to receiving the SBA's approval. To participate in the preferred program, the surety's underwriting and administrative standards and procedures would be pre-approved by the SBA, and the surety's decisions would be subject to regular, annual audits. In addition, the SBA's reporting and access to records requirements would be retained. As a measure of their confidence in their own underwriting standards and claims decisions, the standard surety firms indicated that they would accept a 70% guarantee against losses as opposed to the then-allowed 80% or 90% guarantee against losses, as long as firms would not be required to seek the SBA's prior approval for underwriting decisions, bond administration, and claims procedures. Congress subsequently authorized the proposed Preferred Surety Bond Guarantee Program in P.L. 100-590 , the Small Business Administration Reauthorization and Amendment Act of 1988 (Title II, the Preferred Surety Bond Guarantee Program Act of 1988). The program was initially authorized on a three-year trial basis, and it was provided permanent statutory authority by P.L. 108-447 , the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005. As discussed in " 114th Congress: Preferred Surety Bond Guarantee Rates " below, P.L. 114-92 , the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, increased the SBA's guarantee for preferred sureties from not less than 70% to not less than 90% of losses. The SBA is authorized to guarantee surety bonds issued to contractors or subcontractors when the business, together with its affiliates, meets the SBA's size standard for the primary industry in which it is engaged; the bond is required; the applicant is not able to obtain such bond on reasonable terms and conditions without a guarantee; and there is a reasonable expectation that the applicant will perform the covenants and conditions of the contract, and the terms and conditions of the bond are reasonable in light of the risks involved and the extent of the surety's participation. The applicant must also "possess good character and reputation," as demonstrated by (1) not being under indictment, being convicted of a felony, or having a final civil judgment stating that the applicant has committed a breach of trust or has violated a law or regulation protecting the integrity of business transactions or business relationships; (2) not having a regulatory authority revoke, cancel, or suspend a license held by the applicant, which is necessary to perform the contract; and (3) never having obtained a bond guarantee by fraud or material misrepresentation or failing to keep the surety informed of unbonded contracts or of a contract bonded by another surety. Applicants must also certify the percentage of work under the contract to be subcontracted. The SBA does not guarantee bonds for applicants that are primarily brokers or have effectively transferred control over the project to one or more subcontractors. Applicants must also certify that they are not presently debarred, suspended, proposed for debarment, declared ineligible, or voluntarily excluded from transactions with any federal department or agency. In addition, the SBA will not guarantee a bond issued by a particular surety if that surety, an affiliate of that surety, or a close relative or member of the household of that surety or affiliate owns, directly or indirectly, 10% or more of the business applying for the guarantee. This conflict of interest prohibition also applies to ownership interests in any of the applicant's affiliates. As mentioned previously, the SBA guarantees contracts up to $6.5 million, and up to $10 million if a federal contracting officer certifies that such a guarantee is necessary. There is no limit to the number of bonds that can be guaranteed for any one contractor. The SBA guarantees up to 90% of the loss incurred and paid by a surety if the contract is $100,000 or less, or if the bond is issued on behalf of a socially and economically disadvantaged-owned and controlled small business, a qualified HUBZone small business, a veteran-owned and controlled small business, or a service-disabled veteran-owned and controlled small business. The guarantee rate is 80% if the contract is greater than $100,000, and the business is not owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals, a qualified HUBZone small business, or a veteran-owned or service-disabled veteran-owned small business. The SBA does not charge principals (small business applicants) application or bid bond guarantee fees. If the SBA guarantees a final bond, the principal must pay a contractor fee equal to a percentage of the contract amount, which is determined by the SBA and published in the Federal Register . The FY2019 contractor fee is 0.6% of the contract price for a final bond. The contractor fee is rounded to the nearest dollar, paid to the surety, and the surety remits the fee to the SBA. Sureties also charge principals a premium for issuing and servicing the bond. Sureties are not allowed to charge principals a premium that is more than the amount permitted under applicable state law. Premiums vary depending on the surety's assessment of the risk involved and job size; typically ranging from 1.5% to 3.0% of the contract amount. Sureties interested in participating in the Prior Approval Program or the Preferred Surety Bond Guarantee Program (PSB program) must apply in writing to the SBA. Applicants must be a corporation listed by the U.S. Treasury as eligible to issue bonds in connection with federal procurement contracts. The SBA considers several factors when evaluating sureties for the PSB program: the surety must have an underwriting limitation of at least $6.5 million on the Department of the Treasury's list of acceptable sureties; the surety must agree that it will neither charge a bond premium in excess of that authorized by the appropriate state insurance department nor impose any non-premium fee unless such fee is permitted by applicable state law and approved by the SBA; the surety's premium income from contract bonds guaranteed by any government agency (federal, state, or local) can account for no more than one-quarter of the surety's total contract bond premium income; and the surety must vest the underwriting authority for SBA guaranteed bonds to its own employees and final settlement authority for claims and recovery to employees in the surety's permanent claims department. The SBA also considers the surety's rating or ranking designation assigned by a recognized authority. Sureties participating in the PSB program are not eligible to participate in the Prior Approval Program. However, this prohibition does not apply to the surety's affiliates provided that the affiliate is not a participant in the PSB program, their affiliation has been fully disclosed to the SBA, and the affiliate has been approved to participate in the Prior Approval Program. Sureties in the Prior Approval Program must obtain the SBA's approval before issuing a guaranteed bond. Sureties in the PSB program may issue, monitor, and service SBA-guaranteed bonds without prior approval. However, these sureties must notify the SBA electronically of all bonds issued and, for final bonds, they must report and submit to the SBA on a monthly basis all contractor and surety fees that are due. These sureties are also subject to a periodic maximum guarantee authority amount set by the SBA. In addition, effective August 21, 2017, sureties are required, during their initial nine months in the PSB program, to obtain the SBA's prior written approval before executing a bond greater than $2 million. The SBA argued that it was in the taxpayer's interest to require newer sureties to "demonstrate an understanding of the program before being allowed to issue bonds larger than $2 million without SBA's oversight." The terms and conditions of the SBA's bond guarantee agreements with the surety, including the guarantee percentage, may vary from surety to surety, depending on past experience with the SBA. The SBA may take into consideration, among other things, the rating or ranking assigned to the surety by recognized authorities, the surety's loss rate, average contract amount, average bond penalty per guaranteed bond, and the ratio of bid bonds to final bonds, all in comparison with other sureties participating in the same SBA Surety Bond Guarantee Program (Prior Approval or PSB programs). Sureties are required, among other things, to evaluate the credit, capacity, and character of a principal using standards generally accepted by the surety industry and in accordance with the SBA's standard operating procedures on underwriting and the surety's principles and practices on unguaranteed bonds; reasonably expect that the principal will successfully perform the contract to be bonded; provide bond terms and conditions that are reasonable in light of the risks involved and the extent of the surety's participation; be satisfied as to the reasonableness of cost and the feasibility of successful completion of the contract; ensure that the principal remains viable and eligible for the program; monitor the principal's progress on guaranteed contracts; maintain documentation of job status requests; take all reasonable action to minimize risk of loss, including, but not limited to, obtaining from each principal a written indemnity agreement, secured by such collateral as the surety or the SBA finds appropriate, which covers actual losses under the contract and imminent breach payments; and in the case of loss, pursue all possible sources of salvage and recovery. Participating sureties are subject to audits by SBA-selected and -approved examiners. Prior Approval Program sureties are audited at least once each year and PSB sureties are audited at least once every three years. The SBA does not charge sureties (or small businesses) application or bid bond guarantee fees. It does require sureties to pay a guarantee fee on each SBA-guaranteed bond (other than bid bonds). The surety fee, which is determined by the SBA and published in the Federal Register , is a percentage of the bond premium. The FY2019 surety fee is 20% of the bond premium that the surety charges the small business, rounded to the nearest dollar. The surety fee is due within 60 days after the SBA's approval of the prior approval payment or performance bond. The SBA does not receive any portion of a surety's non-premium charges. As shown in Table 2 , the number and amount of bid bonds guaranteed by the SBA has generally increased in recent years. For example, in FY2007, the SBA guaranteed 4,192 bid bonds totaling $1.7 billion. In FY2018, the SBA guaranteed 7,354 bid bonds totaling $4.7 billion. Table 2 also shows that the number and amount of SBA-guaranteed final bonds declined somewhat from FY2007 through FY2009 (coinciding with the 2007-2009 recession), and has generally increased since then. Recent increases are likely due to generally improving economic conditions and legislation that temporarily ( P.L. 111-5 ) and then permanently ( P.L. 112-239 ) raised the program's maximum individual contract amount from $2 million to $5 million, and up to $10 million if a federal contracting officer certifies that such a guarantee is necessary. As shown in Table 3 , excluding program costs of about $4 million annually, the program has experienced a net positive cash flow in each of the past 12 fiscal years. There is about $97 million in the Surety Bond Guarantee Program Revolving Fund. Historically, the program's default rate has averaged about 3% to 5%. According to the SBA, on average, the default rate on larger contracts tends to be lower than for smaller contracts and the recovery rate for larger contract defaults tends to be greater than for smaller contract defaults. Currently, 28 sureties participate in the Prior Approval Program and 6 participate in the PSB program. Agents empowered to represent a participating surety company are located, or licensed, in all 50 states, American Samoa, the District of Columbia, Guam, the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, the Northern Mariana Islands, Palau, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. About 80% of the SBA's surety bonds are issued through the Prior Approval Program and 20% through the PSB program. P.L. 111-5 , the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), provided the program an additional appropriation of $15 million and temporarily increased, from February 17, 2009, through September 30, 2010, the maximum bond amount from $2 million to $5 million. The act also authorized the SBA to guarantee a bond of up to $10 million if a federal contracting officer certified in writing that a guarantee in excess of $5 million was necessary. It also revised the program's size standard to "the size standard for the primary industry in which such business concern, and the affiliates of such business concern, is engaged, as determined by the Administrator in accordance with the North American Industry Classification System." The new size standard (e.g., up to $36.5 million in average annual receipts over the previous three years for most heavy construction contractors, and up to $15 million in average annual receipts over the previous three years for specialty trade contractors) increased the number of businesses that qualified for the program. Using its rulemaking authority, the SBA made ARRA's temporary size standard permanent on August 11, 2010. Proponents argued that the increased bond limit and size were necessary to "ensure that small businesses are able to secure the surety bonds they need to compete for contracts, grow, and hire more employees." They also argued that "in our current economic recession, small businesses are finding it even more difficult to secure the credit lines necessary to get bonds in the private sector." In their view, the temporary changes would create "significant opportunities to create jobs now in which small businesses will participate and be the driving engine for creation of new jobs in our country." There was no apparent organized opposition to these specific temporary changes to the Surety Bond Guarantee Program. However, there was opposition to ARRA's package of program enhancements for the SBA as a whole, which among other things, provided the SBA $730 million in additional funding, including $255 million for a temporary, two-year small business stabilization program to guarantee loans of $35,000 or less to small businesses for qualified debt consolidation, later named the America's Recovery Capital (ARC) Loan program and $375 million to temporarily subsidize fees for the SBA's 7(a) and 504/CDC loan guaranty programs and increase the 7(a) program's maximum loan guaranty percentage to 90%. Instead of modifying the SBA's program requirements and increasing the SBA's appropriation, opponents advocated business tax reduction, reform of financial credit market regulation, and federal fiscal restraint as the best means to assist small businesses, generate economic growth, and create jobs. On September 12, 2011, the Obama Administration advocated, as part of its proposed American Jobs Act, a temporary increase in the SBA surety bond limit to $5 million until the end of FY2012. The Administration argued that raising the program's bond limit "will make it easier for small businesses to take advantage of contracting opportunities generated by the American Jobs Act's proposed infrastructure investments." On December 7, 2012, the Administration also recommended, as part of its request for an additional $60.4 billion in federal resources to address damage caused by Hurricane Sandy, that the SBA surety bond limit be increased to $5 million to enable "more small businesses to participate in the recovery efforts." There were several legislative efforts during the 112 th Congress to increase the program's bond limit. S. 1334 , the Expanding Opportunities for Main Street Act of 2011, and its companion bill in the House, H.R. 2424 , would have reinstated and made permanent ARRA's higher limits (up to $5 million and up to $10 million if a federal contracting officer certifies in writing that a guarantee in excess of $5 million is necessary). Neither of these bills was reported by a committee for consideration by the House or the Senate. S. 1660 , the American Jobs Act of 2011, and its companion bill in the House, H.R. 12 , would have provided $3 million in additional funding to pay for the cost of temporarily increasing the program's bond limit to $5 million from $2 million until the end of FY2012. Cloture on a motion to proceed to S. 1660 was not invoked in the Senate on October 11, 2011, by a vote of 50 to 49. H.R. 12 was not reported by a committee for consideration in the House. On December 12, 2012, the Senate Committee on Appropriations released its draft of the Hurricane Sandy Emergency Assistance Supplemental bill. It included a provision to increase the program's bond limit to $5 million. This provision was later removed following congressional approval of H.R. 4310 , the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, which became law ( P.L. 112-239 ) on January 2, 2013. It increased the program's bond limit to $6.5 million, and up to $10 million if a federal contracting officer certifies that such a guarantee is necessary. There was relatively little discussion in the legislative record concerning the reasons for increasing the surety bond program's bond limits, and even less discussion of the reasons for not increasing the limits. Hearings were not held on S. 1334 and H.R. 2424 . Also, only one witness during hearings on H.R. 4310 addressed the SBA surety bond program. That witness supported an increase in the surety bond limit to $5 million, and up to $10 million if a contracting officer certifies its necessity. Advocates argued that bond limits should be raised to bring them more in line with the contracting amounts for other small business programs, such as the 8(a) Minority Small Business and Capital Ownership Development Program, the Historically Underutilized Business Zone (HUBZone) program, the Women-Owned Small Business Federal Contract program, and the Service-Disabled Veteran-Owned Small Business Concerns Program. For example, under 8(a) Minority Small Business and Capital Ownership Development Program, federal contracting officials, at that time, could provide a sole source award to a 8(a) small business if the anticipated award price of the contract did not exceed $6.5 million for manufacturing contracts (now $7.0 million) or $4 million for other contract opportunities, and the contracting officer believed that the award could be made at a fair and reasonable price. Advocates argued that raising the program's bond limit would provide more consistency across small business contracting programs and make it easier for agencies experiencing difficulty issuing contracts in increments of $2 million or less (e.g., the Department of Defense [DOD], the General Services Administration, and the Department of State) to participate in the program. Advocates also argued that small businesses awarded contracts exceeding $2 million under the other small business contracting programs are at risk of not being able to complete those contracts due to difficulties in securing a surety bond. For example, the House Committee on Armed Services' Panel on Business Challenges in the Defense Industry argued that the SBA surety bond program's limit should be increased to $6.5 million to match the 8(a) program's $6.5 million threshold for manufacturing contracts and to "increase the opportunities for small businesses to compete for federal contracts, especially in those departments, such as the Department of Defense, where the average size of construction contracts awarded to small businesses for FY2010 exceeded $5.9 million—nearly triple the size for which SBA can provide bonding support." There was no organized opposition to raising the program's bond limits. One possible argument that could have been raised is that higher limits could lead to higher amounts being guaranteed by the SBA and, as a result, increase the risk of program losses. However, the SBA's experience with Recovery Act bonds (over $2 million) suggested that raising the limit may not lead to an increased risk of program losses. The SBA reported that the program's default rate on Recovery Act bonds was lower, in 2009 and 2010, than for its other bonds. The SBA guaranteed 166 Recovery Act bid bonds valued at $518 million and 52 Recovery Act final bonds valued at $145.4 million. There were two defaults, with a bond value of $2.7 million and $2.2 million, respectively. In an effort to enhance surety participation in the SBA's program, H.R. 776 , the Security in Bonding Act of 2013, introduced and referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary and the House Committee on Small Business on February 15, 2013, would have increased the PSB program's guarantee rate from not to exceed 70% to not to exceed 90% of losses. The bill was reported favorably by both committees on May 21, 2014, and included in H.R. 4435 , the Howard P. "Buck" McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, which was passed by the House on May 22, 2014. This provision was not included in the final version of the bill which was subsequently passed by Congress. Advocates of increasing the PSB program's guarantee rate argued that Despite the different guarantee amounts and the differing levels of review, both the PAP [Prior Approval Program] and PSBP [Preferred Surety Bond Guarantee Program] have similar levels of default. However, over the years, the PSBP program has become less effective for small businesses since only four sureties currently participate in the program because the guarantee rates are no longer competitive enough to encourage commercial sureties to participate. Therefore, since the PSBP is the more efficient program and … does not expose taxpayers to any risk, this legislation amends the SBIA [Small Business Investment Act] to standardize the guarantee rate at 90 percent. The SBA did not formally endorse the proposed guarantee rate increase. However, in its FY2015 and FY2016 congressional budget justification documents, the SBA indicated that it "will investigate establishing a single guaranty percentage in the Prior Approval and PSB programs and restructuring the Prior Approval program." Also, when asked at a congressional hearing held on May 23, 2013, about the proposed guarantee rate increase, an SBA official testified that We are looking very closely at the program. We have seen a decline in the preferred sureties going down from 50% to 14% of our program, which is a very small number. We would like to see more participation in that program. Because of the additional cash flow we have, we do not expect it to increase our costs. And we have some history in our other programs that demonstrate that having the same guarantee level is not a disincentive. There was no discussion in the legislative record during the 113 th Congress opposing an increase in the guarantee rate for the PSB program. One possible objection might have been that increasing the guarantee rate could increase the risk of program losses and result in higher program fees. Higher fees, in turn, could cause hardship for some companies seeking a surety bond. H.R. 838 , the Security in Bonding Act of 2015, was introduced and referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary and the House Committee on Small Business on February 10, 2015. The bill would have increased the PSB program's guarantee rate from not to exceed 70% to not to exceed 90%, specify requirements concerning the pledge of assets by individual sureties, and require GAO to examine the effects of these changes on small businesses. The House-passed version of H.R. 1735 , the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, included H.R. 838 's provisions. The Senate-passed version of the bill did not. The conference agreement for H.R. 1735 , which became P.L. 114-92 , included H.R. 838 's provision to increase the PSB program's guarantee rate from not to exceed 70% to not to exceed 90% of losses and its provision to specify requirements concerning the pledge of assets by individual sureties, subject to a one-year delay "to allow for the necessary rulemaking." Congress specified additional requirements concerning the pledge of assets by individual sureties as a means to ensure that "individual sureties have sufficient assets to redeem the bonds." The SBA's final rule implementing the increased PSB program's guarantee rate was effective as of September 20, 2017. The SBA has reported that it is focusing on "strengthening relationships with individual surety companies and the large network of bond agents and producers across the country in order to reach more small businesses in need of bonding." As part of this outreach effort, the SBA has reported that it will continue to emphasize "process improvements that will streamline the application requirements for small businesses and surety companies and their agents." For example, in August 2012, the SBA announced a "Quick APP" for surety bonds up to $250,000 that provides a streamlined underwriting and application process by combining "two applications into one to make it easier and faster for small businesses and contractors, including veteran-owned small businesses, to compete for contracts." The SBA increased the Quick APP (now called the Quick Bond Program) eligibility threshold to $400,000 in 2017. In addition, the SBA reported in 2016 that it was also considering combing the Prior Approval Program and PSB program into a single program featuring the streamlined bond approval and monitoring processes under the PSB program. Several industry groups, including the National Association of Surety Bond Producers and The Surety & Fidelity Association of America, have recommended that the programs be merged, the emphasis on reduced regulatory burdens under the PSB program be maintained, and the program's fees kept as low as economically feasible as a means to encourage more sureties to participate in the program. Perhaps because the proposal has not been formally introduced as a bill, there are no public statements opposing the merger of the two programs. Opposition might come from (1) those who are not convinced that the Surety Bond Guarantee Program is necessary to supplement the private market for surety bonds and would prefer that the program be eliminated rather than reformed or (2) those who believe that a federal program is necessary to supplement the private market for surety bonds, but the existing program is sufficient to meet that need and does not require changes to encourage its expansion. Still other opponents might argue that providing additional authority to sureties to approve and monitor bonds could increase the risk of defaults and program losses. Throughout the program's history, both congressional testimony and GAO examinations have indicated that smaller contracting firms, and especially minority-owned and women-owned small business contracting firms, often have a more difficult time accessing surety bonds in the private marketplace than larger firms. For example, in 1995, GAO reported that "it is not unusual for a small construction company to have some difficulty in obtaining a surety bond." GAO found that about one in three of the smallest contracting firms it surveyed, compared with about one in six of the larger contracting firms it surveyed, reported that they were required to provide collateral. GAO also reported The experiences of the minority-owned firms differed from those of the firms not owned by minorities in several areas. For example, these firms were more likely to be asked to provide certain types of financial documentation, as well as to provide collateral or to meet other conditions; were more likely to be denied a bond and to report losing an opportunity to bid because of delays in processing their request for a bond; and were more likely to depend on jobs requiring bonds for a higher proportion of their revenues. The women-owned firms differed from the firms not owned by women in a few key respects. For example, they … were more likely to be asked to provide more types of financial or other documentation to obtain a bond. In addition, the minority-owned firms reported more often than the firms not owned by minorities that they had to (1) establish an escrow account controlled by the surety company, (2) hire a CPA or a management or consulting firm selected by the surety company to manage the contract, and (3) enter into an arrangement that allows the surety company to manage the job even when the firm is not in default. Although congressional testimony and GAO examinations have supported the need for a program such as the SBA's Surety Bond Guarantee Program, that testimony and GAO's surveys of businesses have been somewhat less useful in helping Congress determine the appropriate size for the program. For example, a review of congressional hearings since the program's inception suggests that congressional witnesses representing the surety companies and various construction organizations, including minority-owned small contracting businesses, have focused their testimony on the need to reduce the SBA's paperwork requirements, which are designed to prevent fraud but increase the sureties' costs; keep the program's fees as low as possible; and keep the program's guarantee rates as high as possible. The SBA's testimony has tended to focus on the need to attract more sureties to the program so that it can reverse the slow downward trajectory the program has experienced over the past two decades in the number and amount of final bonds guaranteed. There has been relatively little testimony provided concerning the broader issue of how large the program should be in comparison with the private sector and what measures or metrics could be used to help make that determination. One possible starting point for determining the program's size in comparison with the private sector is to examine congressional testimony concerning the supply and demand for sureties in the private sector. That testimony suggests that the supply and demand for sureties tends to fluctuate with changes in the overall economy, with the supply of sureties contracting during economic recessions and expanding during economic expansions and the demand for sureties slowing during economic recessions and increasing during economic expansions. Arguably, federal policies could take these fluctuations into account—enacting policies that expand federal support for surety guarantees when supply is tight and reducing federal support for surety guarantees when supply is more plentiful. Of course, when making these decisions, it is necessary to first establish measures or metrics to determine current market conditions. In addition, this line of reasoning assumes that having a federal presence in the surety marketplace is desirable, an assumption not held by all. Ultimately, although having established measures or metrics concerning the supply and demand for surety bonds might be helpful in determining the appropriate size for the SBA's Surety Bond Guarantee Program, that decision will largely rest on personal views concerning the role of the federal government in the private marketplace and the level of acceptable risk in assisting small businesses to gain greater access to surety bonds.	[ "The Small Business Administration's (SBA's) Surety Bond Guarantee Program is designed to increase small businesses' access to federal, state, and local government contracting, as well as private-sector contracts, by guaranteeing bid, performance, and payment bonds for small businesses that cannot obtain surety bonds through regular commercial channels. The program guarantees individual contracts of up to $6.5 million, and up to $10 million if a federal contracting officer certifies that such a guarantee is necessary. The SBA's guarantee currently ranges from 80% to 90% of the surety's loss if a default occurs. In FY2018, the SBA guaranteed 10,800 bid and final surety bonds with a total contract value of nearly $6.5 billion. A surety bond is a three-party instrument between a surety (who agrees to be responsible for the debt or obligation of another), a contractor, and a project owner. The agreement binds the contractor to comply with the contract's terms and conditions. If the contractor is unable to successfully perform the contract, the surety assumes the contractor's responsibilities and ensures that the project is completed. Surety bonds encourage project owners to contract with small businesses that may not have the credit history or prior experience of larger businesses and may be at greater risk of failing to comply with the contract's terms and conditions. Surety bonds are important to small businesses interested in competing for federal contracts because the federal government requires prime contractors—prior to the award of a federal contract exceeding $150,000 for the construction, alteration, or repair of any building or public work of the United States—to furnish a performance bond issued by a surety satisfactory to the contracting officer in an amount that the officer considers adequate to protect the government. P.L. 112-239, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, increased the program's bond limit to $6.5 million, or up to $10 million if a federal contracting officer certifies that such a guarantee is necessary. The limit had been $2 million since 2000, with a temporary increase from February 17, 2009, through September 30, 2010, to $5 million, and up to $10 million if a federal contracting officer certified in writing that such a guarantee was necessary. Advocates of raising the program's bond limit argued that doing so would increase contracting opportunities for small businesses and bring the limit more in line with limits of other small business programs, such as the 8(a) Minority Small Business and Capital Ownership Development Program and the Historically Underutilized Business Zone (HUBZone) Program. Opponents argued that raising the limit could lead to higher amounts being guaranteed by the SBA and, as a result, increase the risk of program losses. This report examines the program's origin and development, including (1) the decision to supplement the original Prior Approval Program with the Preferred Surety Bond Guarantee Program that initially provided a lower guarantee rate (not to exceed 70%) than the Prior Approval Program (not to exceed 80% or 90%, depending on the size of the contract and the type of small business) in exchange for allowing preferred sureties to issue SBA-guaranteed surety bonds without the SBA's prior approval; (2) P.L. 114-92, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, which increased the Preferred Surety Bond Guarantee Program's guarantee rate from not to exceed 70% to not to exceed 90% of losses; and (3) the decision to increase the program's bond limit." ]	8,920	gov_report	en	null	a022464c122b9a883a7c602d46c7b93cf265219dedfe9cc4
The LDA requires lobbyists to register with the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House and to file quarterly reports disclosing their respective lobbying activities. Lobbyists are required to file their registrations and reports electronically with the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House through a single entry point. Registrations and reports must be publicly available in downloadable, searchable databases from the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House. No specific statutory requirements exist for lobbyists to generate or maintain documentation in support of the information disclosed in the reports they file. However, guidance issued by the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House recommends that lobbyists retain copies of their filings and documentation supporting reported income and expenses for at least 6 years after they file their reports. The LDA requires that the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House guide and assist lobbyists with the registration and reporting requirements and develop common standards, rules, and procedures for LDA compliance. The Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House review the guidance semiannually. It was last revised January 31, 2017, to (among other issues) update the registration threshold to reflect changes in the Consumer Price Index, and clarify the identification of clients and covered officials and issues related to rounding income and expenses. The guidance provides definitions of LDA terms, elaborates on registration and reporting requirements, includes specific examples of different scenarios, and provides explanations of why certain scenarios prompt or do not prompt disclosure under the LDA. The offices of the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House told us they continue to consider information we report on lobbying disclosure compliance when they periodically update the guidance. In addition, they told us they e-mail registered lobbyists quarterly on common compliance issues and reminders to file reports by the due dates. The LDA defines a lobbyist as an individual who is employed or retained by a client for compensation, who has made more than one lobbying contact (written or oral communication to covered officials, such as a high ranking agency official or a Member of Congress made on behalf of a client), and whose lobbying activities represent at least 20 percent of the time that he or she spends on behalf of the client during the quarter. Lobbying firms are persons or entities that have one or more employees who lobby on behalf of a client other than that person or entity. Figure 1 provides an overview of the registration and filing process. Lobbying firms are required to register with the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House for each client if the firms receive or expect to receive more than $3,000 in income from that client for lobbying activities. Lobbyists are also required to submit an LD-2 quarterly report for each registration filed. The LD-2s contain information that includes: the name of the lobbyist reporting on quarterly lobbying activities; the name of the client for whom the lobbyist lobbied; a list of individuals who acted as lobbyists on behalf of the client during the reporting period; whether any lobbyists served in covered positions in the executive or legislative branch such as high-ranking agency officials or congressional staff positions, in the previous 20 years; codes describing general issue areas, such as agriculture and education; a description of the specific lobbying issues; houses of Congress and federal agencies lobbied during the reporting reported income (or expenses for organizations with in-house lobbyists) related to lobbying activities during the quarter (rounded to the nearest $10,000). The LDA also requires lobbyists to report certain political contributions semiannually in the LD-203 report. These reports must be filed 30 days after the end of a semiannual period by each lobbying firm registered to lobby and by each individual listed as a lobbyist on a firm’s lobbying report. The lobbyists or lobbying firms must: list the name of each federal candidate or officeholder, leadership political action committee, or political party committee to which he or she contributed at least $200 in the aggregate during the semiannual period; report contributions made to presidential library foundations and presidential inaugural committees; report funds contributed to pay the cost of an event to honor or recognize an official who was previously in a covered position, funds paid to an entity named for or controlled by a covered official, and contributions to a person or entity in recognition of an official, or to pay the costs of a meeting or other event held by or in the name of a covered official; and certify that they have read and are familiar with the gift and travel rules of the Senate and House and that they have not provided, requested, or directed a gift or travel to a member, officer, or employee of Congress that would violate those rules. The Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House, along with USAO, are responsible for ensuring LDA compliance. The Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House notify lobbyists or lobbying firms in writing that they are not complying with the LDA reporting. Subsequently, they refer those lobbyists who fail to provide an appropriate response to USAO. USAO researches these referrals and sends additional noncompliance notices to the lobbyists or lobbying firms, requesting that they file reports or terminate their registration. If USAO does not receive a response after 60 days, it decides whether to pursue a civil or criminal case against each noncompliant lobbyist. A civil case could lead to penalties up to $200,000 for each violation, while a criminal case—usually pursued if a lobbyist’s noncompliance is found to be knowing and corrupt—could lead to a maximum of 5 years in prison. Generally, under the LDA, within 45 days of being employed or retained to make a lobbying contact on behalf of a client, the lobbyist must register by filing an LD-1 form with the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House. Thereafter, the lobbyist must file quarterly disclosure (LD-2) reports detailing the lobbying activities. Of the 3,433 new registrations we identified for the third and fourth quarters of 2016 and the first and second quarters of 2017, we matched 2,995 of them (87.2 percent) to corresponding LD-2 reports filed within the same quarter as the registration. These results are consistent with the findings we have reported in prior reviews. We used the House lobbyists’ disclosure database as the source of the reports. We also used an electronic matching algorithm that allows for misspellings and other minor inconsistencies between the registrations and reports. Figure 2 shows lobbyists filed disclosure reports as required for most new lobbying registrations from 2010 through 2017. For selected elements of lobbyists’ LD-2 reports that can be generalized to the population of lobbying reports, our findings have generally been consistent from year to year. Most lobbyists reporting $5,000 or more in income or expenses provided written documentation to varying degrees for the reporting elements in their disclosure reports. Figure 3 shows that for most LD-2 reports, lobbyists provided documentation for income and expenses for sampled reports from 2010 through 2017. However, in recent years our findings showed some variation in the estimated percentage of lobbyists who have reports with documentation for income and expense supporting lobbying activities. Specifically, our estimate for 2017 (99 percent) represents a statistically significant increase from 2016. Figure 4 shows that for some LD-2 reports, lobbyists did not round their income or expenses as the guidance requires. In 2017, we estimate 25 percent of reports did not round reported income or expenses according to the guidance. We have found that rounding difficulties have been a recurring issue on LD-2 reports from 2010 through 2017. As we previously reported, several lobbyists who listed expenses told us that based on their reading of the LD-2 form they believed they were required to report the exact amount. While this is not consistent with the LDA and the guidance, this may be a source of some of the confusion regarding rounding errors. In 2016, the guidance was updated to include an additional example about rounding expenses to the nearest $10,000. In 2017, 11 percent of lobbyists reported $10,000 or more in income or expenses. The LDA requires lobbyists to disclose lobbying contacts made with federal agencies on behalf of the client for the reporting period. This year, of the 98 LD-2 reports in our sample, 51 reports disclosed lobbying activities at federal agencies. Of those, lobbyists provided documentation for all lobbying activities at executive branch agencies for 34 LD-2 reports. Figures 5 through 8 show that lobbyists for most LD-2 reports provided documentation for selected elements of their LD-2 reports from 2010 through 2017. Lobbyists for an estimated 93 percent of LD-2 reports filed year-end 2016 for all lobbyists listed political contributions on the report as required. Figure 9 shows that lobbyists for most lobbying firms filed contribution reports as required in our sample from 2010 through 2017. All individual lobbyists and lobbying firms reporting lobbying activity are required to file LD-203 reports semiannually, even if they have no contributions to report, because they must certify compliance with the gift and travel rules. The LDA requires a lobbyist to disclose previously held covered positions in the executive or legislative branch, such as high ranking agency officials and congressional staff, when first registering as a lobbyist for a new client. This can be done either on a new LD-1 or on the quarterly LD- 2 filing when added as a new lobbyist. This year, we estimate that 15 percent of all LD-2 reports may not have properly disclosed previously held covered positions as required. As in our other reports, some lobbyists were still unclear about the need to disclose certain covered positions, such as paid congressional internships or certain executive agency positions. Figure 10 shows the extent to which lobbyists may not have properly disclosed one or more covered positions as required from 2010 through 2017. Lobbyists amended 15 of the 98 LD-2 disclosure reports in our original sample to change previously reported information after we contacted them. Of the 15 reports, 7 were amended after we notified the lobbyists of our review, but before we met with them. An additional 8 of the 15 reports were amended after we met with the lobbyists to review their documentation. We consistently find a notable number of amended LD-2 reports in our sample each year following notification of our review. This suggests that sometimes our contact spurs lobbyists to more closely scrutinize their reports than they would have without our review. Table 1 lists reasons lobbying firms in our sample amended their LD-1 or LD-2 reports. As part of our review, we compared contributions listed on lobbyists’ and lobbying firms’ LD-203 reports against those political contributions reported in the Federal Election Commission (FEC) database to identify whether political contributions were omitted on LD-203 reports in our sample. The sample of LD-203 reports we reviewed contained 80 reports with contributions and 80 reports without contributions. We estimate that overall for 2017, lobbyists failed to disclose one or more reportable contributions on 12 percent of reports. Additionally, ten LD-203 reports were amended in response to our review. For this element in prior reports, we reported an estimated minimum percentage of reports based on a one-sided 95 percent confidence interval rather than the estimated proportion as shown here. Estimates in the table have a maximum margin of error of 11 percentage points. The year to year differences are not statistically significant. Table 2 illustrates that from 2010 through 2017 most lobbyists disclosed FEC reportable contributions on their LD-203 reports as required. As part of our review, 88 different lobbying firms were included in our 2017 sample of LD-2 disclosure reports. Consistent with prior reviews, most lobbying firms reported that they found it “very easy” or “somewhat easy” to comply with reporting requirements. Of the 88 different lobbying firms in our sample, 34 reported that the disclosure requirements were “very easy,” 40 reported them “somewhat easy,” and 13 reported them “somewhat difficult” or “very difficult” (see figure 11). Most lobbying firms we surveyed rated the definitions of terms used in LD-2 reporting as “very easy” or “somewhat easy” to understand with regard to meeting their reporting requirements. This is consistent with prior reviews. Figures 12 through 16 show what lobbyists reported as their ease of understanding the terms associated with LD-2 reporting requirements from 2012 through 2017. U.S. Attorney’s Office (USAO) officials stated that they continue to have sufficient personnel resources and authority under the LDA to enforce reporting requirements. This includes imposing civil or criminal penalties for noncompliance. Noncompliance refers to a lobbyist’s or lobbying firm’s failure to comply with the LDA. However, USAO noted that the number of assigned personnel has decreased due to attrition. USAO officials stated that lobbyists resolve their noncompliance issues by filing LD-2, LD-203, or LD-2 amendments, or by terminating their registration, depending on the issue. Resolving referrals can take anywhere from a few days to years, depending on the circumstances. During this time, USAO creates summary reports from its database to track the overall number of referrals that are pending or become compliant as a result of the lobbyist receiving an e-mail, phone call, or noncompliance letter. Referrals remain in the pending category until they are resolved. The pending category is divided into the following areas: “initial research for referral,” “responded but not compliant,” “no response/waiting for a response,” “bad address,” and “unable to locate.” The USAO attempts to review and update all pending cases every six months. USAO focuses its enforcement efforts primarily on the “responded but not compliant” and the “no response/waiting for a response” groups. Officials told us that, if the USAO, after several unsuccessful attempts, has been unsuccessful in contacting the non-compliant firm or its lobbyist, USAO confers with both the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House to determine whether further action is needed. In the cases where the lobbying firm is repeatedly referred for not filing disclosure reports but does not appear to be actively lobbying, USAO suspends enforcement actions. USAO officials reported they will continue to monitor these firms and will resume enforcement actions if required. USAO received 3,213 referrals from both the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House for failure to comply with LD-2 reporting requirements cumulatively for filing years 2009 through 2015. Table 4 shows the number and status of the referrals received and the number of enforcement actions taken by USAO to bring lobbying firms into compliance. Enforcement actions include USAO attempts to bring lobbyists into compliance through letters, e-mails, and calls. About 45 percent (1,450 of 3,213) of the total referrals received are now compliant because lobbying firms either filed their reports or terminated their registrations. In addition, some of the referrals were found to be compliant when USAO received the referral. Therefore, no action was taken. This may occur when lobbying firms respond to the contact letters from the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House after USAO received the referrals. About 55 percent (1,752 of 3,213) of referrals are pending further action because USAO could not locate the lobbying firm, did not receive a response from the firm after an enforcement action, or plans to conduct additional research to determine if it can locate the lobbying firm. The remaining 11 referrals did not require action or were suspended because the lobbyist or client was no longer in business or the lobbyist was deceased. LD-203 referrals consist of two types: (1) LD-203(R) referrals represent lobbying firms that have failed to file LD-203 reports for their lobbying firm and (2) LD-203 referrals represent the lobbyists at the lobbying firm who have failed to file their individual LD-203 reports as required. USAO received 2,255 LD-203(R) referrals (cumulatively from 2009 through 2015) and 3,716 LD-203 referrals (cumulatively from 2009 through 2014 from the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House for lobbying firms and lobbyists for noncompliance with reporting requirements). LD- 203 referrals are more complicated than LD-2 referrals because both the lobbying firm and the individual lobbyists within the firm are each required to file a LD-203. Lobbyists employed by a lobbying firm typically use the firm’s contact information and not the lobbyists’ personal contact information. This makes it difficult to locate a lobbyist who is not in compliance and may have left the firm. USAO officials reported that, while many firms have assisted USAO by providing contact information for lobbyists, they are not required to do so. According to officials, USAO has difficulty pursuing LD-203 referrals for lobbyists who have departed a firm without leaving forwarding contact information with the firm. While USAO utilizes web searches and online databases, including social media, to find these missing lobbyists, it is not always successful. Table 5 shows the status of LD-203 (R) referrals received and the number of enforcement actions taken by USAO to bring lobbying firms into compliance. A little more than 44 percent (998 of 2,255) of the lobbying firms referred by the Secretary of the Senate and Clerk of the House for noncompliance from calendar years 2009 through 2015 are now considered compliant because firms either filed their reports or terminated their registrations. About 56 percent (1,251 of 2,255) of the referrals are pending further action. Table 6 shows that USAO received 3,716 LD-203 referrals from the Secretary of the Senate and Clerk of the House for lobbyists who failed to comply with LD-203 reporting requirements for calendar years 2009 through 2014. It also shows the status of the referrals received and the number of enforcement actions taken by USAO to bring lobbyists into compliance. In addition, table 6 shows that about 47 percent (1,741 of 3,716) of the lobbyists had come into compliance by filing their reports or are no longer registered as a lobbyist. About 53 percent (1,966 of 3,716) of the referrals are pending further action because USAO could not locate the lobbyist, did not receive a response from the lobbyist, or plans to conduct additional research to determine if it can locate the lobbyist. Table 7 shows that USAO received LD-203 referrals from the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House for 4,991 lobbyists who failed to comply with LD-203 reporting requirements for any filing year from 2009 through 2014. It also shows the status of compliance for individual lobbyists listed on referrals to USAO. About 51 percent (2,526 of 4,991) of the lobbyists had come into compliance by filing their reports or are no longer registered as a lobbyist. About 50 percent (2,465 of 4,991) of the referrals are pending action because USAO could not locate the lobbyists, did not receive a response from the lobbyists, or plans to conduct additional research to determine if it can locate the lobbyists. USAO officials said that many of the pending LD-203 referrals represent lobbyists who no longer lobby for the lobbying firms affiliated with the referrals, even though these lobbying firms may be listed on the lobbyist’s LD-203 report. According to USAO officials, lobbyists and lobbying firms who repeatedly fail to file reports are labeled chronic offenders and referred to one of the assigned attorneys for follow-up. USAO also receives complaints regarding lobbyists who are allegedly lobbying but never filed an LD-203. USAO officials added that USAO monitors and investigates chronic offenders to ultimately determine the appropriate enforcement actions, which may include settlement or other civil actions. In regards to the four active cases involving chronic offenders they reported to us in 2016, USAO officials noted that the agency is investigating one case, negotiating a resolution that will include a civil penalty in another case, and closing two other investigations without further action. In addition, USAO is reviewing its records to identify additional chronic offenders for further action due to noncompliance. We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Justice for review and comment. The Department of Justice provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. We are sending copies of this report to the Attorney General, Secretary of the Senate, Clerk of the House of Representatives, and interested congressional committees and members. In addition, this report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-2717 or jonesy@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV. Our objectives were to determine the extent to which lobbyists are able to demonstrate compliance with the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, as amended (LDA) by providing documentation to support information contained on registrations and reports filed under the LDA; to identify challenges and potential improvements to compliance, if any; and to describe the resources and authorities available to the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia (USAO), its role in enforcing LDA compliance, and the efforts it has made to improve LDA enforcement. We used information in the lobbying disclosure database maintained by the Clerk of the House of Representatives (Clerk of the House). To assess whether these disclosure data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report, we reviewed relevant documentation and consulted with knowledgeable officials. Although registrations and reports are filed through a single web portal, each chamber subsequently receives copies of the data and follows different data-cleaning, processing, and editing procedures before storing the data in either individual files (in the House) or databases (in the Senate). Currently, there is no means of reconciling discrepancies between the two databases caused by the differences in data processing. For example, Senate staff told us during previous reviews they set aside a greater proportion of registration and report submissions than the House for manual review before entering the information into the database. As a result, the Senate database would be slightly less current than the House database on any given day pending review and clearance. House staff told us during previous reviews that they rely heavily on automated processing. In addition, while they manually review reports that do not perfectly match information on file for a given lobbyist or client, staff members approve and upload such reports as originally filed by each lobbyist, even if the reports contain errors or discrepancies (such as a variant on how a name is spelled). Nevertheless, we do not have reasons to believe that the content of the Senate and House systems would vary substantially. Based on interviews with knowledgeable officials and a review of documentation, we determined that House disclosure data were sufficiently reliable for identifying a sample of quarterly disclosure reports (LD-2) and for assessing whether newly filed lobbyists also filed required reports. We used the House database for sampling LD-2 reports from the third and fourth quarters of 2016 and the first and second quarters of 2017, as well as for sampling year-end 2016 and midyear 2017 political contributions reports (LD-203). We also used the database for matching quarterly registrations with filed reports. We did not evaluate the Offices of the Secretary of the Senate or the Clerk of the House, both of which have key roles in the lobbying disclosure process. However, we did consult with officials from each office. They provided us with general background information at our request. To assess the extent to which lobbyists could provide evidence of their compliance with reporting requirements, we examined a stratified random sample of 98 LD-2 reports from the third and fourth quarters of 2016 and the first and second quarters of 2017. The sample size of 98 LD-2 reports for this year’s review represents an increase from the sample size selected for the 2015 and 2016 reviews, and is a return to the sample size selected in reviews prior to 2015. We increased the sample size because, in 2016, we observed a change in the estimate of the percentage of reports that had documentation of income and expenses (83 percent down from 92 percent in 2015). At that time, we were unable to state that this was a statistically significant change because, in part, the reduced sample size of 80 did not give us enough power to detect and report on the change of that size. We excluded reports with no lobbying activity or with income or expenses of less than $5,000 from our sampling frame. We drew our sample from 45,818 activity reports filed for the third and fourth quarters of 2016 and the first and second quarters of 2017 available in the public House database, as of our final download date for each quarter. Our sample of LD-2 reports was not designed to detect differences over time. However, we conducted tests of significance for changes from 2010 to 2017 for the generalizable elements of our review. We found that results were generally consistent from year to year and there were few statistically significant changes after using a Bonferroni adjustment to account for multiple comparisons. For this year’s review, we identified that the estimated change in the percent of LD-2 reports that provided written documentation for the income and expenses from 2016 to 2017 is notable. In recent years, our findings show some variation in the estimate percentage of reports with documentation. Specifically, our estimate for 2017 (99 percent) represents a statistically significant increase from 2016. These changes are identified in the report. The inability to detect significant differences from year to year in our results may be related to sampling error alone or the nature of our sample, which was relatively small and was designed only for cross-sectional analysis. Our sample is based on a stratified random selection and is only one of a large number of samples that we may have drawn. Because each sample could have provided different estimates, we express our confidence in the precision of our particular sample’s results as a 95 percent confidence interval. This interval would contain the actual population value for 95 percent of the samples that we could have drawn. The percentage estimates for LD-2 reports have 95 percent confidence intervals of within plus or minus 12 percentage points or fewer of the estimate itself. We contacted all the lobbyists and lobbying firms in our sample and, using a structured web-based survey, asked them to confirm key elements of the LD-2 and whether they could provide written documentation for key elements in their reports, including the amount of income reported for lobbying activities; the amount of expenses reported on lobbying activities; the names of those lobbyists listed in the report; the houses of Congress and federal agencies that they lobbied, and the issue codes listed to describe their lobbying activity. After reviewing the survey results for completeness, we interviewed lobbyists and lobbying firms to review the documentation they reported as having on their online survey for selected elements of their respective LD- 2 report. Prior to each interview, we conducted a search to determine whether lobbyists properly disclosed their covered position as required by the LDA. We reviewed the lobbyists’ previous work histories by searching lobbying firms’ websites, LinkedIn, Leadership Directories, Legistorm, and Google. Prior to 2008, lobbyists were only required to disclose covered official positions held within 2 years of registering as a lobbyist for the client. The Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007 amended that time frame to require disclosure of positions held 20 years before the date the lobbyists first lobbied on behalf of the client. Lobbyists are required to disclose previously held covered official positions either on the client registration (LD-1) or on an LD-2 report. Consequently, those who held covered official positions may have disclosed the information on the LD-1 or a LD-2 report filed prior to the report we examined as part of our random sample. Therefore, where we found evidence that a lobbyist previously held a covered official position, and that information was not disclosed on the LD-2 report under review, we conducted an additional review of the publicly available Secretary of the Senate or Clerk of the House database to determine whether the lobbyist properly disclosed the covered official position on a prior report or LD-1. Finally, if a lobbyist appeared to hold a covered position that was not disclosed, we asked for an explanation at the interview with the lobbying firm to ensure that our research was accurate. In previous reports, we reported the lower bound of a 90 percent confidence interval to provide a minimum estimate of omitted covered positions and omitted contributions with a 95 percent confidence level. We did so to account for the possibility that our searches may have failed to identify all possible omitted covered positions and contributions. As we have developed our methodology over time, we are more confident in the comprehensiveness of our searches for these items. Accordingly, this report presents the estimated percentages for omitted contributions and omitted covered positions, rather than the minimum estimates. As a result, percentage estimates for these items will differ slightly from the minimum percentage estimates presented in prior reports. In addition to examining the content of the LD-2 reports, we confirmed whether the most recent LD-203 reports had been filed for each firm and lobbyist listed on the LD-2 reports in our random sample. Although this review represents a random selection of lobbyists and firms, it is not a direct probability sample of firms filing LD-2 reports or lobbyists listed on LD-2 reports. As such, we did not estimate the likelihood that LD-203 reports were appropriately filed for the population of firms or lobbyists listed on LD-2 reports. To determine if the LDA’s requirement for lobbyists to file a report in the quarter of registration was met for the third and fourth quarters of 2016 and the first and second quarters of 2017, we used data filed with the Clerk of the House to match newly filed registrations with corresponding disclosure reports. Using an electronic matching algorithm that includes strict and loose text matching procedures, we identified matching disclosure reports for 2,995, or 87.2 percent, of the 3,433 newly filed registrations. We began by standardizing client and lobbyist names in both the report and registration files (including removing punctuation and standardizing words and abbreviations, such as “company” and “CO”). We then matched reports and registrations using the House identification number (which is linked to a unique lobbyist-client pair), as well as the names of the lobbyist and client. For reports we could not match by identification number and standardized name, we also attempted to match reports and registrations by client and lobbyist name, allowing for variations in the names to accommodate minor misspellings or typos. For these cases, we used professional judgment to determine whether cases with typos were sufficiently similar to consider as matches. We could not readily identify matches in the report database for the remaining registrations using electronic means. To assess the accuracy of the LD-203 reports, we analyzed stratified random samples of LD-203 reports from the 30,594 total LD-203 reports. The first sample contains 80 reports of the 9,474 reports with political contributions and the second contains 80 reports of the 20,335 reports listing no contributions. Each sample contains 40 reports from the year- end 2016 filing period and 40 reports from the midyear 2017 filing period. The samples from 2017 allow us to generalize estimates in this report to either the population of LD-203 reports with contributions or the reports without contributions to within a 95 percent confidence interval of within plus or minus 11 percentage points or fewer. Although our sample of LD- 203 reports was not designed to detect differences over time, we conducted tests of significance for changes from 2010 to 2017 and found no statistically significant differences after adjusting for multiple comparisons. While the results provide some confidence that apparent fluctuations in our results across years are likely attributable to sampling error, the inability to detect significant differences may also be related to the nature of our sample, which was relatively small and designed only for cross- sectional analysis. We analyzed the contents of the LD-203 reports and compared them to contribution data found in the publicly available Federal Elections Commission’s (FEC) political contribution database. We consulted with staff at FEC responsible for administering the database. We determined that the data are sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our reporting objectives. We compared the FEC-reportable contributions on the LD-203 reports with information in the FEC database. The verification process required text and pattern matching procedures so we used professional judgment when assessing whether an individual listed is the same individual filing an LD-203. For contributions reported in the FEC database and not on the LD-203 report, we asked the lobbyists or organizations to explain why the contribution was not listed on the LD-203 report or to provide documentation of those contributions. As with covered positions on LD-2 disclosure reports, we cannot be certain that our review identified all cases of FEC-reportable contributions that were inappropriately omitted from a lobbyist’s LD-203 report. We did not estimate the percentage of other non-FEC political contributions that were omitted because they tend to constitute a small minority of all listed contributions and cannot be verified against an external source. To identify challenges to compliance, we used a structured web-based survey and obtained the views from 88 different lobbying firms included in our sample on any challenges to compliance. The number of different lobbying firms is 88, which is less than our original sample of 98 reports because some lobbying firms had more than one LD-2 report included in our sample. We calculated responses based on the number of different lobbying firms that we contacted rather than the number of interviews. Prior to our calculations, we removed the duplicate lobbying firms based on the most recent date of their responses. For those cases with the same response date, the decision rule was to keep the cases with the smallest assigned case identification number. To obtain their views, we asked them to rate their ease with complying with the LD-2 disclosure requirements using a scale of “very easy,” “somewhat easy,” “somewhat difficult,” or “very difficult.” In addition, using the same scale we asked them to rate the ease of understanding the terms associated with LD-2 reporting requirements. To describe the resources and authorities available to the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia (USAO) and its efforts to improve its LDA enforcement, we interviewed USAO officials. We obtained information on the capabilities of the system officials established to track and report compliance trends and referrals and on other practices established to focus resources on LDA enforcement. USAO provided us with reports from the tracking system on the number and status of referrals and chronically noncompliant lobbyists and lobbying firms. The mandate does not require us to identify lobbyists who failed to register and report in accordance with the LDA requirements, or determine for those lobbyists who did register and report whether all lobbying activity or contributions were disclosed. Therefore, this was outside the scope of our audit. We conducted this performance audit from April 2017 to March 2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. The random sample of lobbying disclosure reports we selected was based on unique combination of House ID, lobbyist, and client names (see table 8). See table 9 for a list of the lobbyists and lobbying firms from our random sample of lobbying contribution reports with contributions. See table 10 for a list of the lobbyists and lobbying firms from our random sample of lobbying contribution reports without contributions. In addition to the contact named above, Clifton G. Douglas Jr. (Assistant Director), Shirley Jones (Assistant General Counsel) and Ulyana Panchishin (Analyst-In-Charge) supervised the development of this report. James Ashley, Ann Czapiewski, Krista Loose, Kathleen Jones, Amanda Miller, Sharon Miller, Stewart W. Small, and Kayla L. Robinson made key contributions to this report. Assisting with lobbyist file reviews were Justine Augeri, Matthew Bond, James A. Howard, Jesse Jordan, Sherrice Kerns, Dalton Matthew Lauderback, Alexandria Palmer, Alan Rozzi, Shane Spencer, Jessica Walker, Ralanda Winborn, and Kate Wulff. Lobbying Disclosure: Observations on Lobbyists’ Compliance with New Disclosure Requirements. GAO-08-1099. Washington, D.C: September 30, 2008. 2008 Lobbying Disclosure: Observations on Lobbyists’ Compliance with Disclosure Requirements. GAO-09-487. Washington, D.C: April 1, 2009. 2009 Lobbying Disclosure: Observations on Lobbyists’ Compliance with Disclosure Requirements. GAO-10-499. Washington, D.C: April 1, 2010. 2010 Lobbying Disclosure: Observations on Lobbyists’ Compliance with Disclosure Requirements. GAO-11-452. Washington, D.C: April 1, 2011. 2011 Lobbying Disclosure: Observations on Lobbyists’ Compliance with Disclosure Requirements. GAO-12-492. Washington, D.C: March 30, 2012. 2012 Lobbying Disclosure: Observations on Lobbyists’ Compliance with Disclosure Requirements. GAO-13-437. Washington, D.C: April 1, 2013. 2013 Lobbying Disclosure: Observations on Lobbyists’ Compliance with Disclosure Requirements. GAO-14-485. Washington, D.C: May 28, 2014. 2014 Lobbying Disclosure: Observations on Lobbyists’ Compliance with Disclosure Requirements. GAO-15-310. Washington, D.C.: March 26, 2015. 2015 Lobbying Disclosure: Observations on Lobbyists’ Compliance with Disclosure Requirements. GAO-16-320. Washington, D.C.: March 24, 2016. 2016 Lobbying Disclosure: Observations on Lobbyists’ Compliance with Disclosure Requirements. GAO-17-385. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2017.	[ "The LDA, as amended, requires lobbyists to file quarterly disclosure reports and semiannual reports on certain political contributions. The law also includes a provision for GAO to annually audit lobbyists' compliance with the LDA. GAO's objectives were to (1) determine the extent to which lobbyists can demonstrate compliance with disclosure requirements, (2) identify challenges to compliance that lobbyists report, and (3) describe the resources and authorities available to USAO in its role in enforcing LDA compliance, and the efforts USAO has made to improve enforcement. This is GAO's 11th report under the provision. GAO reviewed a stratified random sample of 98 quarterly disclosure LD-2 reports filed for the third and fourth quarters of calendar year 2016 and the first and second quarters of calendar year 2017. GAO also reviewed two random samples totaling 160 LD-203 reports from year-end 2016 and midyear 2017. This methodology allowed GAO to generalize to the population of 45,818 disclosure reports with $5,000 or more in lobbying activity, and 30,594 reports of federal political campaign contributions. GAO also met with officials from USAO to obtain status updates on its efforts to focus resources on lobbyists who fail to comply. GAO is not making any recommendations in this report. GAO provided a draft of this report to the Department of Justice for review and comment. The Department of Justice provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated as appropriate. For the 2017 reporting period, most lobbyists provided documentation for key elements of their disclosure reports to demonstrate compliance with the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, as amended (LDA). For lobbying disclosure (LD-2) reports and political contributions (LD-203) reports filed during the third and fourth quarter of 2016 and the first and second quarter of 2017, GAO estimates that 87 percent of lobbyists filed reports as required for the quarter in which they first registered; the figure below describes the filing process and enforcement; 99 percent of all lobbyists who filed (up from 83 percent in 2016) could provide documentation for income and expenses; and 93 percent filed year-end 2016 LD-203 reports as required. These findings are generally consistent with prior reports GAO issued for the 2010 through 2016 reporting periods. However, in recent years GAO's findings showed some variation in the estimated percentage of reports with supporting documentation. For example, an estimated increase in lobbyists who could document expenses is notable in 2017 and represents a statistically significant increase from 2016. As in GAO's other reports, some lobbyists were still unclear about the need to disclose certain previously held covered positions, such as paid congressional internships or certain executive agency positions. GAO estimates that 15 percent of all LD-2 reports may not have properly disclosed previously held covered positions. On the other hand, over the past several years of reporting on lobbying disclosure, GAO found that most lobbyists in the sample rated the terms associated with LD-2 reporting as “very easy” or “somewhat easy” to understand. The U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia (USAO) stated it has sufficient resources and authority to enforce compliance with the LDA. USAO continued its efforts to bring lobbyists into compliance by reminding them to file reports or by applying civil penalties." ]	6,271	gov_report	en	null	15f0df296bc94d46b36d3197224db55cb46215a48db21fb9
The Small Business Administration (SBA) currently administers several types of programs to support small businesses, including loan guaranty and venture capital programs to enhance small businesses' access to capital; contracting programs to increase small businesses' opportunities in federal contracting; direct loan programs for businesses, homeowners, and renters to aid in their recovery from natural disasters; and small business management and technical assistance training programs to assist in business formation and expansion. Congressional interest in these programs has increased in recent years, primarily because small businesses are viewed as a means to stimulate economic activity and create jobs. Many Members of Congress also regularly receive constituent inquiries about the SBA's programs. This report examines appropriations for the SBA (new budget authority, minus rescissions and sequestration) over time, focusing on developments and trends since FY2000. This report also provides total available funding (which includes carryover from the prior fiscal year, carryover into the next fiscal year, account transfers, rescissions, and sequestration) and, for comparative purposes, actual and anticipated expenditures for the SBA's entrepreneurial development noncredit programs. SBA appropriations, as a whole, have varied significantly from year to year since FY2000 and across all three major SBA spending categories: appropriations for disaster assistance, business loan credit subsidies, and "other programs," a spending category that includes appropriations for salaries and expenses, business loan administration, the Office of Inspector General, the Office of Advocacy, and entrepreneurial development noncredit programs. The variation in appropriations for disaster assistance since FY2000 is largely due to supplemental appropriations provided to address disaster needs arising from the impact of major hurricanes. Business loan credit subsidies represent the net present value of cash flows to and from the SBA over the life of the agency's loan portfolios. For guaranteed loans, the net present value of cash flows is affected by several factors, but it is primarily the difference between the cost of purchasing loans that have defaulted and the revenue generated from fees and collateral liquidation. For direct (Microloan) lending, it is primarily the cost of offering below-market interest rates to Microloan intermediaries. The variation in appropriations for SBA business loan credit subsidies since FY2000 is primarily due to the impact of changing economic conditions on the SBA's guaranteed loan portfolios. During good economic times, revenue from SBA fees and collateral liquidation is typically sufficient to cover the SBA's cost of purchasing guaranteed loans that have defaulted. During and immediately following economic slowdowns, however, revenue from SBA fees and collateral liquidation is typically insufficient to cover the SBA's cost of purchasing guaranteed loans that have defaulted. The shortfall occurs because the SBA's cost of purchasing guaranteed loans tends to increase when the economy slows (primarily because guaranteed loans are more likely to default during and immediately following recessions) and revenue from loan liquidation tends to be constrained during slow economic times (primarily because commercial real estate values typically fall during and immediately following recessions). As a result, additional appropriations are needed to cover these expenses, which are guaranteed by the "full faith and credit of the United States." Since FY2000, the variation in appropriations for the other programs spending category is attributable primarily to congressional response to changing economic conditions. As the report will discuss, appropriations for this spending category have generally increased at a pace that exceeds inflation. In addition, Congress approved significant, temporary increases in appropriations for SBA programs in the other programs spending category in FY2009 and FY2010. It approved these temporary increases primarily as a means to enhance small businesses' access to capital, which had become constrained during and immediately following the Great Recession (December 2007 to June 2009). The SBA's appropriations for FY1954 through FY1999 are provided in the Appendix . As shown in Table 1 , the SBA's appropriations have varied significantly since FY2000, ranging from a high of $2.359 billion in FY2018 to a low of $571.8 million in FY2007. Much of this volatility is due to significant variation in appropriations for disaster assistance, which ranged from a high of $1.7 billion in FY2006 to a low of $0 in FY2009. This variation is attributable primarily to supplemental appropriations provided to address disaster needs arising from the impact of major hurricanes, such as Hurricanes Katrina, Sandy, Harvey, Irma, and Maria. In addition, as shown in Table 1 , appropriations for business loan credit subsidies have varied significantly since FY2000, ranging from a high of $319.7 million in FY2013 ($337.3 million before sequestration and rescission) to a low of $1.3 million in FY2006 and FY2007. As mentioned previously, the variation in appropriations for business loan credit subsidies results primarily from the impact of changing economic conditions on the SBA's loan portfolios. During good economic times, revenue from fees and collateral liquidation is typically sufficient to cover the costs of purchasing defaulted loans. During and immediately following recessions, revenue from fees and collateral liquidation is typically not sufficient to cover those costs. As shown in Table 1 , appropriations for the all other programs category have also varied since FY2000, ranging from a high of $1.6253 billion in FY2010 to a low of $455.6 million in FY2007. Much of this variation resulted from significant, temporary increases in appropriations for the SBA's other programs in FY2009 ($724.0 million) and FY2010 ($962.5 million). These additional appropriations were approved primarily as a means to enhance small businesses' access to capital, which had become constrained during and immediately following the Great Recession. As mentioned previously, from FY2000 to FY2019, appropriations for the SBA's other programs spending category, as a whole, have exceeded the rate of inflation. For comparative purposes, Table 1 also presents the SBA's total available funds. As indicated in the table, the SBA's carryovers and account transfers tend to reduce variation in its budget from one fiscal year to the next. Much of this "evening out" process is due to disaster assistance appropriations, which are provided in one fiscal year and then typically spent over several fiscal years. The following section examines appropriations and total available funding for FY2000-FY2019 for the five main components of the SBA's other programs spending category: (1) salaries and expenses, (2) business loan administration, (3) the Office of Inspector General (OIG), (4) the Office of Advocacy (Advocacy), and (5) entrepreneurial development (ED) noncredit programs. The SBA's salaries and expenses account currently provides funding for the following: office operating budgets, which are used by program and administrative offices for daily operations, such as travel, supplies, and contracted services; agency-wide costs, such as rent and telecommunications, which are managed centrally; employee compensation and benefits, which are also managed centrally; and reimbursable expenses for programs for which the SBA receives reimbursable budget authority from other federal government agencies. Several adjustments were made to the SBA's reported appropriations for its salaries and expenses account to enable meaningful comparisons over time. For example, prior to FY2014, appropriations for the SBA's ED programs were included in the salaries and expenses account. They now have their own, separate appropriations account. Therefore, to allow for meaningful comparisons with current appropriations, Table 2 lists and deducts the reported appropriations for ED programs prior to FY2014 from the reported appropriations for salaries and expenses. In addition, the SBA previously included appropriations for congressional initiatives (earmarks) under the salaries and expenses account. Therefore, to allow for meaningful comparisons with current appropriations and focus the comparison on administrative expenses, appropriations for earmarks are deducted from the reported appropriations for salaries and expenses. Prior to FY2012, Advocacy was funded through the salaries and expenses' executive direction subaccount. Advocacy now has its own, separate appropriations account. To allow for meaningful comparisons with current appropriations, Table 2 lists Advocacy's funding provided through the salaries and expenses' executive direction subaccount prior to FY2012 and deducts that amount from the reported appropriation s for salaries and expenses . As discussed in greater detail below (see "Office of Advocacy"), data concerning Advocacy's funding provided through the salaries and expenses' executive direction subaccount are not available for FY2006-FY2010. However, in FY2003, FY2004, and FY2005, Advocacy's funding provided through the salaries and expenses' executive direction subaccount was 79% of its reported total cost. The estimates provided in the table for FY2006-FY2010 were derived by multiplying Advocacy's total program cost reported for each of those fiscal years by 79%. As shown in Table 2 , the SBA's appropriations for salaries and expenses have varied from year to year, with increases in some years and decreases in others. Overall, appropriations for the SBA's salaries and expenses have increased from $176.490 million in FY2000 to $267.500 million in FY2019. This increase has exceeded the rate of inflation. The SBA has statutory authorization to transfer appropriations from the business loan administration account into the salaries and expenses account. As evidenced by the amounts listed in the total available funds column in the table, the SBA exercised that authority in every fiscal year from FY2000 to FY2018 (and is expected to do so again in FY2019), transferring the entire appropriation for business loan administration into the salaries and expenses account in each of those fiscal years. Appropriations for the SBA's business loan administration account have varied since FY2000, increasing in some years and decreasing in others (see Table 3 ). Overall, appropriations for SBA business loan administration increased from $129 million in FY2000 to $155.150 million in FY2019. The program's recommended appropriations have not kept pace with inflation. As evidenced by the $0.0 balance in the total funds available column for the business loan administration account, the SBA has routinely transferred all business loan administration appropriations to the salaries and expenses account. The combined appropriations for SBA salaries and expenses and business loan administration increased from $305.490 million in FY2000 to $422.650 million in FY2019. This increase has not kept pace with inflation. According to the SBA, the OIG's mission is to "provide independent, objective oversight to improve the integrity, accountability, and performance of the SBA and its programs for the benefit of the American people." The office was created within the SBA by the Inspector General Act of 1978 ( P.L. 95-452 , as amended). The inspector general, who is nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate, directs the office. The Inspector General Act provides the OIG with the following responsibilities: promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the management of SBA programs and supporting operations; conduct and supervise audits, investigations, and reviews relating to the SBA's programs and support operations; detect and prevent fraud, waste, and abuse; review existing and proposed legislation and regulations and make appropriate recommendations; maintain effective working relationships with other governmental agencies and nongovernmental entities regarding the inspector general's mandated duties; keep the SBA administrator and Congress informed of serious problems and recommend corrective actions and implementation measures; comply with the comptroller general's audit standards; avoid duplication of Government Accountability Office activities; and report violations of federal criminal law to the U.S. attorney general. As shown in Table 4 , the OIG's appropriations have increased from $11.405 million in FY2000 to $21.900 million in FY2019. This increase has exceeded the rate of inflation. The OIG typically receives a transfer of appropriations from the disaster assistance account for auditing expenses. It was also provided additional appropriations in FY2006, FY2013, and FY2018 for expenses related to the review of SBA disaster loans following major hurricanes (e.g., Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma in 2005, Hurricane Sandy in 2012, and Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria in 2018) and in FY2009 to conduct reviews and audits of $730 million provided to the SBA by P.L. 111-5 , the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. The SBA indicates that its Office of Advocacy is "an independent voice for small business within the federal government." The chief counsel for Advocacy, who is nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate, directs the office. Advocacy's mission is to "encourage policies that support the development and growth of American small businesses" by intervening early in federal agencies' regulatory development processes on proposals that affect small businesses and providing Regulatory Flexibility Act compliance training to federal agency policymakers and regulatory development officials; producing research to inform policymakers and other stakeholders on the impact of federal regulatory burdens on small businesses, document the vital role of small businesses in the economy, and explore and explain the wide variety of issues of concern to the small business community; and fostering two-way communication between federal agencies and the small business community. As shown in Table 5 , Advocacy's funding has increased from $5.620 million in FY2000 to $9.120 million in FY2019. This increase has exceeded the rate of inflation. P.L. 111-240 , the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, enhanced Advocacy's independence by ending the practice of funding Advocacy through the SBA's salaries and expenses' executive direction subaccount. Instead, P.L. 111-240 requires the President to provide a separate statement of the appropriations request for Advocacy, "which shall be designated in a separate account in the General Fund of the Treasury." The act also requires the SBA administrator to provide Advocacy with "appropriate and adequate office space at central and field office locations, together with such equipment, operating budget, and communications facilities and services as may be necessary, and ... necessary maintenance services for such offices and the equipment and facilities located in such offices." In addition, Congress has provided Advocacy its own, separate appropriations amount since FY2012. As mentioned previously, prior to FY2012, the SBA reported Advocacy's total program cost, which includes funding provided through the salaries and expenses' executive direction subaccount, agency-wide overhead costs (rent, telecommunications, etc.), and other support costs (e.g., management and administrative support, including human resources support). From FY2000 to FY2005, the SBA provided relatively detailed information concerning Advocacy's budget, including the amount of funding Advocacy received through the salaries and expenses' executive direction subaccount. Also, Advocacy's FY2013 congressional budget justification document included the amount of funding Advocacy received through the salaries and expenses' executive direction subaccount in FY2011. However, those data are not available for FY2006-FY2010, and it was therefore necessary to estimate Advocacy's funding from the salaries and expenses' executive direction subaccount for those years. The estimates provided in the table were derived by multiplying Advocacy's total program cost for each of those fiscal years by 79%, which was the proportion of Advocacy's total program costs provided from the salaries and expenses' executive direction subaccount in FY2003, FY2004, and FY2005. The SBA's entrepreneurial development (ED) noncredit programs provide a variety of management and training services to small businesses. Congress provides appropriations for eight management and technical assistance training programs: Small Business Development Centers, the Microloan Technical Assistance Program, Women Business Centers, SCORE, the Program for Investment in Microentrepreneurs (PRIME), Veterans Programs (including Veterans Business Outreach Centers, Boots to Business, Boots to Business: Reboot, Veteran Women Igniting the Spirit of Entrepreneurship [VWISE], and Entrepreneurship Bootcamp for Veterans with Disabilities), the 7(j) Technical Assistance Program, and the Native American Outreach Program; two relatively long-standing nontraining programs: the National Women's Business Council and HUBZone administration; three initiatives: the Entrepreneurial Development Initiative (Clusters), the Entrepreneurship Education Initiative, and Growth Accelerators; and the Step Trade and Export Promotion (STEP) Pilot Grant program. Initially, the SBA provided its own management and technical assistance training programs. Over time, however, the SBA has increasingly relied on third parties to provide that training. The SBA reports that more than 1 million aspiring entrepreneurs and small business owners receive training from an SBA-supported resource partner each year. Congress specifies appropriations in appropriations acts for the Small Business Development Center (SBDC) program, the Microloan Technical Assistance program, and the STEP program. Congress provides an overall appropriation for the SBA's ED programs and recommends appropriations for the SBA's other ED programs, typically in the conference agreement or "Explanatory Statement" accompanying the appropriations act. As a result, the following tables refer to appropriations for the SBDC and Microloan Technical Assistance programs and recommended appropriations for other ED programs. Although not legally binding, the SBA has traditionally adhered to these recommended funding amounts. SBDCs provide free or low-cost assistance to small businesses using programs customized to local conditions. SBDCs support small business in marketing and business strategy, finance, technology transfer, government contracting, management, manufacturing, engineering, sales, accounting, exporting, and other topics. They are funded by grants from the SBA and matching funds. There are 63 lead SBDC service centers, at least one in each state (with four in Texas and six in California), the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, and American Samoa. These lead SBDC service centers manage more than 900 SBDC outreach locations. As shown in Table 6 , appropriations for SBDCs have increased from $84.179 million in FY2000 to $131.000 million in FY2019. This increase has exceeded the rate of inflation. In addition, as shown in the table, SBDCs received an additional $50 million in temporary funding in FY2010, which was spent over two fiscal years. The SBA reports actual and anticipated expenditures for its ED programs in its annual budget justification document. SBDC expenditures in FY2000-FY2018 and anticipated SBDC expenditures in FY2019 are presented in the table's last column for comparative purposes. The SBA's Microloan lending program is designed to address the perceived disadvantages faced by women, low-income, veteran, and minority entrepreneurs and business owners in gaining access to capital for starting or expanding their business (see P.L. 102-140 , the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1992). Under the Microloan program, the SBA provides direct loans to qualified nonprofit intermediary Microloan lenders who, in turn, provide "microloans" of up to $50,000 to small business owners, entrepreneurs, and nonprofit child care centers. The SBA's Microloan Technical Assistance program is part of the SBA's Microloan program but receives a separate appropriation. It provides grants to Microloan intermediaries to offer management and technical training assistance to Microloan program borrowers and prospective borrowers. There are currently 147 active Microloan intermediaries, serving 49 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. As shown in Table 7 , the Microloan Technical Assistance program's appropriations have varied over the years. Overall, Microloan Technical Assistance Program appropriations have increased from $23.112 million in FY2000 to $31.000 million in FY2019. This increase has been less than the rate of inflation. Microloan Technical Assistance expenditures in FY2000-FY2018 and anticipated Microloan Technical Assistance expenditures in FY2019 are presented in the table's last column for comparative purposes. Women Business Centers (WBCs) provide financial, management, and marketing assistance to small businesses, including start-up businesses, owned and controlled by women. Since its inception, the program has targeted the needs of socially and economically disadvantaged women (see P.L. 100-533 , the Women's Business Ownership Act of 1988). Currently, there are 121 WBCs located throughout most of the United States and the territories. As shown in Table 8 , WBC's recommended appropriations have increased from $8.966 million in FY2000 to $18.500 million in FY2019. This increase has exceeded the rate of inflation. WBC expenditures in FY2000-FY2018 and anticipated WBC expenditures in FY2019 are presented in the table's last column for comparative purposes. The SBA provides financial assistance to SCORE (formerly the Service Corps of Retired Executives) to provide in-person mentoring and online training to small business owners and prospective owners. SCORE's 320 chapters and more than 800 branch offices are located throughout the United States and partner with more than 11,000 volunteer counselors, who are working or retired business owners, executives and corporate leaders, to provide management and training assistance to small businesses "at no charge or at very low cost." As shown in Table 9 , SCORE's recommended appropriations have increased from $3.487 million in FY2000 to $11.700 in FY2019. This increase has exceeded the rate of inflation. SCORE expenditures in FY2000-FY2018 and anticipated SCORE expenditures in FY2019 are presented in the table's last column for comparative purposes. The Program for Investment in Microentrepreneurs (PRIME) provides grants to nonprofit microenterprise development organizations or programs that have "a demonstrated record of delivering microenterprise services to disadvantaged entrepreneurs; an intermediary; a microenterprise development organization or program that is accountable to a local community, working in conjunction with a state or local government or Indian tribe; or an Indian tribe acting on its own, if the Indian tribe can certify that no private organization or program referred to in this paragraph exists within its jurisdiction." As shown in Table 10 , PRIME's recommended appropriations have varied, starting at $14.964 million in FY2001 (the program's first recommended appropriation) and falling to $2 million in FY2006 and FY2007. PRIME has received $5.0 million since FY2015. PRIME expenditures in FY2001-FY2018 and anticipated PRIME expenditures in FY2019 are presented in the table's last column for comparative purposes. The Obama Administration argued that PRIME overlaps and duplicates the SBA's Microloan Technical Assistance program and recommended in its FY2012-FY2017 budget requests that PRIME receive no appropriations. As shown in the table, in FY2013, the Obama Administration eliminated PRIME's appropriation as part of the SBA's sequestration process. The Trump Administration recommended in its FY2018 and FY2019 budget requests that the PRIME program receive no appropriations. The SBA's Office of Veterans Business Development (OVBD) administers several management and training programs to assist veteran-owned businesses, including the Entrepreneurship Bootcamp for Veterans with Disabilities Consortium of Universities, which provides "experiential training in entrepreneurship and small business management to post-9/11 veterans with disabilities" at eight universities; the Veteran Women Igniting the Spirit of Entrepreneurship (V-WISE) program, which is administered through a cooperative agreement with Syracuse University, offers women veterans a 15-day, online course focused on entrepreneurship skills and the "language of business," followed by a 3-day conference (offered twice a year at varying locations) in which participants "are exposed to successful entrepreneurs and CEOs of Fortune 500 companies and leaders in government" and participate in courses on business planning, marketing, accounting and finance, operations and production, human resources, and work-life balance; the Operation Endure and Grow Program, which is administered through a cooperative agreement with Syracuse University, offers an eight-week online training program "focused on the fundamentals of launching and/or growing a small business" and is available to National Guard and reservists and their family members; the Boots to Business program (started in 2012), which is "an elective track within the Department of Defense's revised Training Assistance Program called Transition Goals, Plans, Success (Transition GPS) and has three parts: the Entrepreneurship Track Overview—a 10-minute introductory video shown during the mandatory five-day Transition GPS course which introduces entrepreneurship as a post-service career option; Introduction to Entrepreneurship—a two-day classroom course on entrepreneurship and business fundamentals offered as one of the three Transition GPS elective tracks; and Foundations of Entrepreneurship—an eight-week, instructor-led online course that offers in-depth instruction on the elements of a business plan and tips and techniques for starting a business"; the Boots to Business Reboot program (started in 2014), which assists veterans who have already transitioned to civilian life; and the Veterans Business Outreach Centers (VBOC) program, which provides veterans and their spouses management and technical assistance training at 15 locations, including assistance with the Boots to Business program, the development and maintenance of a five-year business plan, and referrals to other SBA resource partners when appropriate for additional training or mentoring services. Prior to FY2016, Congress recommended appropriations for VBOCs and, in FY2014 and FY2015, for the Boots to Business initiative ($7.0 million in FY2014 and $7.5 million in FY2015). Funding for the OVBD's other veterans assistance programs were provided through the SBA's salaries and expenses account. Starting in FY2016, Congress has recommended appropriations for OVBD's programs as a whole: $12.3 million in FY2016, FY2017, and FY2018, and $12.7 million in FY2019. This increase has not kept pace with inflation. OVBD expenditures in FY2015-FY2018 and anticipated OVBD expenditures in FY2019 are presented in the table's last column for comparative purposes. Recommended appropriations for VBOCs from FY2000-FY2015 are presented in Table 12 for historical comparisons. As the data indicate, recommended appropriations for VBOCs increased from $0.613 million in FY2000 to $3.000 million in FY2015. This increase has exceeded the rate of inflation. OVBD expenditures in FY2000-FY2015 are presented in the table's last column for comparative purposes. The SBA's 7(j) Technical Assistance Program provides "a wide variety of management and technical assistance to eligible individuals or concerns to meet their specific needs, including: (a) counseling and training in the areas of financing, management, accounting, bookkeeping, marketing, and operation of small business concerns; and (b) the identification and development of new business opportunities." Eligible individuals and businesses include "8(a) certified firms, small disadvantaged businesses, businesses operating in areas of high unemployment, or low income or firms owned by low income individuals." As shown in Table 13 , recommended appropriations for the 7(j) Technical Assistance Program have varied since FY2000, with increases in some years and decreases in others. Overall, the SBA's 7(j) Technical Assistance Program's recommended appropriations have decreased from $3.584 million in FY2000 to $2.800 million in FY2019. 7(j) Technical Assistance Program expenditures in FY2000-FY2018 and anticipated 7(j) Technical Assistance Program expenditures in FY2019 are presented in the table's last column for comparative purposes. The SBA's Native American Outreach (NAO) program provides management and technical educational assistance to American Indians, Alaska natives, native Hawaiians, and "the indigenous people of Guam and American Samoa … to promote entity-owned and individual 8(a) certification, government contracting, entrepreneurial education, and capital access." The program's management and technical assistance services are available to members of these groups living in most areas of the nation. As shown in Table 14 , the NAO program's recommended appropriations have varied somewhat since FY2003 (the first year it received recommended appropriations), ranging from $1.0 million to $2.0 million. The program's recommended appropriations have not kept pace with inflation. NAO program expenditures in FY2003-FY2018 and anticipated NAO expenditures in FY2019 are presented in the table's last column for comparative purposes. The National Women's Business Council (NWBC) is a bipartisan federal advisory council created to serve as an independent source of advice and counsel to the President, Congress, and the SBA on economic issues of importance to women business owners. The council's mission "is to promote bold initiatives, policies, and programs designed to support women's business enterprises at all stages of development in the public and private sector marketplaces—from start-up to success to significance." As shown in Table 15 , the recommended appropriation for the NWBC has increased from $0.598 million in FY2000 to $1.500 million in FY2019. This increase has exceeded the rate of inflation. NWBC expenditures in FY2000-FY2018 and NWBC anticipated expenditures in FY2019 are presented in the table's last column for comparative purposes. The HUBZone program helps small businesses located in designated Historically Underutilized Business Zones (HUBZones) to compete for federal contracts. Federal agencies may award contracts directly to HUBZone-certified small businesses through a sole-source contract, limit contact competitions to HUBZone-certified firms through a contract set-aside, or provide HUBZone-certified firms a price evaluation preference in full and open competitions. The HUBZone program was initially funded through the SBA's salary and expenses account. As shown in Table 16 , Congress started recommending an appropriation for the program in FY2004. This recommended appropriation remained relatively stable until FY2015, when it increased to $3.0 million. With this increase, the HUBZone program's recommended appropriations have exceeded inflation. The HUBZone program's expenditures in FY2000-FY2018 and the HUBZone program's anticipated expenditures in FY2019 are presented in the table's last column for comparative purposes. The SBA reports that "regional innovation clusters are on-the-ground collaborations between business, research, education, financing and government institutions that work to develop and grow a particular industry or related set of industries in a particular geographic region." The SBA has supported regional innovative clusters since FY2009, and the initiative has received recommended appropriations from Congress since FY2010. As shown in Table 17 , funding for the Entrepreneurial Development Initiative (Regional Innovation Clusters) has been reduced from a recommended appropriation of $10.0 million in FY2010 to $5.0 million in FY2019. The table's last column indicates that the SBA's expenditures for the initiative have often been less than the amount appropriated. The Trump Administration recommended in its FY2018 and FY2019 budget requests that the Entrepreneurial Development Initiative receive no appropriations. The SBA's Entrepreneurship Education initiative offers high‐growth small businesses in underserved communities "a seven‐month executive leader education series" consisting of "more than 100 hours of specialized training, technical resources, a professional networking system, and other resources to strengthen their business model and promote economic development within urban communities." At the conclusion of the training, "participants produce a three‐year strategic growth action plan with benchmarks and performance targets that help them access the necessary support and resources to move forward for the next stage of business growth." As shown in Table 18 , the Entrepreneurship Education initiative received its first recommended appropriation from Congress in FY2014 ($5.0 million), $7.0 million in FY2015, $10.0 million in FY2016, FY2017, and FY2018, and $3.5 million in FY2019. The SBA describes growth accelerators as "organizations that help entrepreneurs start and scale their businesses." Growth accelerators are typically run by experienced entrepreneurs and help small businesses access seed capital and mentors. The SBA claims that growth accelerators "help accelerate a startup company's path towards success with targeted advice on revenue growth, employee growth, sourcing outside funding and avoiding pitfalls." As shown in Table 19 , the Growth Accelerator initiative received its first recommended appropriation from Congress in FY2014 ($2.5 million), $4.0 million in FY2015, $1.0 million in FY2016, FY2017, and FY2018, and $2 million in FY2019. It provides $50,000 matching grants each year to universities and private sector accelerators "to support the development of accelerators and their support of startups in parts of the country where there are fewer conventional sources of access to capital (i.e., venture capital and other investors)." The Trump Administration recommended in its FY2018 and FY2019 budget requests that the Growth Accelerator Initiative receive no appropriations.	[ "This report examines the Small Business Administration's (SBA's) appropriations (new budget authority, minus rescissions and sequestration) over time, focusing on developments and trends since FY2000. It also provides total available funding (which includes carryover from the prior fiscal year, carryover into the next fiscal year, account transfers, rescissions, and sequestration) and, for entrepreneurial development noncredit programs, actual and anticipated expenditures for comparative purposes. SBA appropriations, as a whole, have varied significantly from year to year since FY2000 and across all three of the agency's major spending categories: disaster assistance, business loan credit subsidies, and \"other programs,\" a category that includes salaries and expenses, business loan administration, the Office of Inspector General, the Office of Advocacy, and entrepreneurial development programs. Overall, the SBA's appropriations have ranged from a high of $2.359 billion in FY2018 to a low of $571.8 million in FY2007. Much of this volatility is due to significant variation in appropriations for disaster assistance, which ranged from a high of $1.7 billion in FY2006 to a low of $0 in FY2009. This variation can be attributed primarily to supplemental appropriations provided to address disaster needs arising from the impact of major hurricanes, such as Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy, and more recently, Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria. The SBA's appropriations for business loan credit subsidies have also varied since FY2000, ranging from a high of $319.7 million in FY2013 ($337.3 million before sequestration and rescission) to a low of $1.3 million in FY2006 and FY2007. This variation is due to the impact of changing economic conditions on the SBA's guaranteed loan portfolios. During good economic times, revenue from SBA fees and collateral liquidation is typically sufficient to cover the costs of purchasing guaranteed loans that have defaulted. During and immediately following recessions, however, that revenue is typically insufficient to cover the costs of purchasing guaranteed loans that have defaulted. The SBA's appropriations for other programs, as a collective, have also varied since FY2000, ranging from a high of $1.6253 billion in FY2010 to a low of $455.6 million in FY2007. This variation is primarily due to congressional response to changing economic conditions. For example, Congress approved significant, temporary increases in appropriations for the SBA's other programs spending category in FY2009 and FY2010. Overall, since FY2000, appropriations for other programs have increased at a pace that exceeds inflation. This report provides appropriations for all five major components of the other programs spending category, including the SBA's entrepreneurial development programs. The SBA's appropriations for FY1954 through FY1999 are provided in the Appendix." ]	4,967	gov_report	en	null	f328905600a19b088f0d4e91dc305b59262a8f2b4b77682e
Black lung benefits include both cash assistance and medical benefits. Maximum cash assistance payments generally ranged from about $650 to $1,300 per month in fiscal year 2017, depending on the number of dependents the miner has. Miners receiving cash assistance are also eligible for medical benefits that cover the treatment of their black-lung- related conditions, which may include hospital and nursing care, rehabilitation services, and drug and equipment charges, according to DOL documentation. DOL estimates that the average annual cost for medical treatment in fiscal year 2017 was approximately $6,980 per miner. There were about 25,700 total beneficiaries (primary and dependents) receiving black lung benefits during fiscal year 2017 (see fig. 1). The decrease in the number of beneficiaries over time has resulted from a combination of declining coal mining employment and an aging beneficiary population, according to DOL officials. Further, black lung beneficiaries could increase in the near term due to the increased occurrence of black lung disease and its most severe form, progressive massive fibrosis, particularly among Appalachian coal miners, according to HHS officials. Black lung claims are processed by DOL’s Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs. Contested claims are adjudicated by DOL’s Office of Administrative Law Judges, which issues decisions that can be appealed to the Benefits Review Board. Claimants and mine operators may further appeal these agency decisions to the federal courts. If an award is contested, claimants can receive interim benefits, which are generally paid from the Trust Fund according to DOL officials, while their claims are in the appeals process. Final awards are either funded by mine operators—who are identified as the responsible employers of claimants—or the Trust Fund, when responsible employers cannot be identified or do not pay. In fiscal year 2017, black lung claims had an approval rate of about 29 percent, according to DOL data. Of the 19,430 primary black lung beneficiaries receiving benefits during fiscal year 2017, 64 percent (12,464) were paid from the Trust Fund, 25 percent (4,798) were paid by liable mine operators, and 11 percent (2,168) were receiving interim benefits, according to DOL officials. Black Lung Disability Trust Fund revenue is primarily obtained from mine operators through the coal tax. The coal tax is imposed at two rates, depending on whether the coal is extracted from underground or surface mines. The current tax rates are $1.10 per ton of underground-mined coal and $0.55 per ton of surface-mined coal, up to 4.4 percent of the sales price. Therefore, if a ton of underground-mined coal is sold for less than $25, than the tax paid would be less than $1.10. For instance, if a ton of underground-mined coal sold for $20, than it would be taxed at 4.4 percent of the sales price, or $0.88. To a lesser extent, the Trust Fund also receives other miscellaneous revenue from interest payments, and various fines and penalties paid by mine operators, among other sources, according to DOL documentation. Coal tax revenue is collected from mine operators by Treasury’s Internal Revenue Service and then transferred to the Trust Fund where it is then used by DOL officials to pay black lung benefits and the costs of administering the program. Trust Fund expenditures include, among other things, black lung benefit payments, certain administrative costs incurred by DOL and Treasury to administer the black lung benefits program, and debt repayments. When necessary for the Trust Fund to make relevant expenditures under federal law, the Trust Fund borrows from the Treasury’s general fund. When this occurs, the federal government is essentially borrowing from itself—and hence from the general taxpayer—to fund its benefit payments and other expenditures. Multiple factors have challenged Trust Fund finances since it was established about 40 years ago. Its expenditures have consistently exceeded its revenue, interest payments have grown, and legislative actions taken that were expected to improve Trust Fund finances did not completely address its debt. Combined black lung benefit payments and program administrative costs exceeded Trust Fund revenue every year for the program’s first decade (fiscal years 1979 through 1989), resulting in the accrual of debt. During the Trust Fund’s first three fiscal years in particular, revenue covered less than 40 percent of the Trust Fund’s combined benefit payments and administrative costs. For instance, in fiscal year 1980, the Trust Fund received about $251 million in revenue and paid about $726 million in black lung benefits and administrative costs. Beginning in 1982, revenue increased as a result of the Black Lung Benefits Revenue Act of 1981 that doubled the coal tax rates from $0.50 to $1 per ton of underground-mined coal and from $0.25 to $0.50 per ton of surface-mined coal, up to 4 percent of the sales price. Even with the tax rate increase, combined benefit payments and administrative costs continued to exceed revenue throughout the 1980s (see fig. 2). As a result, the Trust Fund borrowed from Treasury’s general fund to cover the annual differences between its expenditures and revenues, and by fiscal year 1989 the Trust Fund’s outstanding debt to Treasury’s general fund exceeded $3 billion. Beginning in fiscal year 1990, Trust Fund revenue generally began to exceed combined benefit payments and administrative costs, and, in fact, total Trust Fund cumulative revenue collected from fiscal years 1979 through 2017 exceeded total cumulative benefit payments and administrative costs incurred during these years. However, interest owed from earlier years of borrowing led to more borrowing and debt. From fiscal years 1979 through 1989, the Trust Fund borrowed—primarily through 30-year term loans according to Treasury officials—from Treasury’s general fund at interest rates that varied from about 6.5 percent to about 13.9 percent. In fiscal year 1985, for instance, the Trust Fund paid about $275 million in interest, which was equal to about half of the total revenue collected that year. Since fiscal year 1990, revenue has generally exceeded combined benefit payments and administrative costs, although interest payments on the Trust Fund’s outstanding debt kept the fund in a position whereby its total expenditures continued to exceed its total revenues. As a result, the principal amount of the Trust Fund’s total outstanding debt to Treasury’s general fund increased and exceeded $10 billion by fiscal year 2008. Legislation has been enacted over the years that was expected to improve Trust Fund finances: In 1981, the Black Lung Benefits Revenue Act of 1981 doubled the coal tax rates from $0.50 cents to $1 per ton of underground-mined coal, and from $0.25 cents to $0.50 cents per ton of surface-mined coal, up to 4 percent of the sales price (as mentioned previously). In 1986, the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 established a 5 year moratorium on interest accrual with respect to repayable advances to the Trust Fund (which we refer to as annual borrowing from Treasury’s general fund), and increased the coal tax rates to $1.10 per ton of underground-mined coal, and $0.55 per ton of surface-mined coal (up to 4.4 percent of the sales price), where they have remained since. In 2008, the EIEA included provisions that were expected to eliminate the Trust Fund’s debt. Specifically, EIEA (1) generally extended the coal tax rates at their current rates until December 31, 2018 (after which they are scheduled to decrease to their original levels of $0.50 per ton of underground-mined coal, and $0.25 per ton of surface- mined coal, up to 2 percent of the sales price); (2) provided for a one- time federal appropriation toward Trust Fund debt forgiveness (about $6.5 billion, according to DOL data); and (3) provided for the refinancing of the Trust Fund’s debt that was not forgiven as a result of EIEA (which we refer to as the Trust Fund’s legacy debt). Specifically, the Trust Fund’s legacy debt was refinanced with more favorable interest rates, according to DOL data. Interest rates on the refinanced legacy debt range from about 1.4 percent to about 4.5 percent. The forgiveness and refinancing of Trust Fund debt along with extending the current coal tax rates through 2018 were expected to result in annual tax revenue that could be used to pay down interest and principal on the Trust Fund’s legacy debt, according to DOL and Treasury officials. These officials said that models showed that debt would be eliminated by fiscal year 2040; however, they noted that coal tax revenue has been less than originally projected due, in part, to the 2008 recession and increased market competition from other energy sources. As a result, the Trust Fund’s total expenditures continued to exceed revenue and the Trust Fund borrowed from Treasury’s general fund each year from fiscal years 2010 through 2017 to cover debt repayments expenditures. In fiscal year 2017, the Trust Fund’s total principal amount of outstanding debt, which includes its legacy debt and the amount borrowed from Treasury’s general fund that year, was about $4.3 billion (see fig. 3). Trust Fund borrowing will likely continue to increase from fiscal years 2019 through 2050 due, in part, to the scheduled coal tax rate decrease of about 55 percent that will take effect in 2019 and declining coal production, according to our moderate simulation. We simulated the effects of the scheduled 2019 tax rate decrease on Trust Fund finances through 2050, and in this report, we generally present the results of a moderate case set of assumptions (see table 1). These simulations are not predictions of what will happen, but rather models of what could happen given certain assumptions. For more information on our simulation methodology see appendix I. In addition to the moderate case assumptions, we also simulated how Trust Fund debt could change through 2050 given various other assumptions, and the full range of results for all of our simulations are presented in appendix II. Our moderate case simulation suggests that Trust Fund revenue may decrease, from about $485 million in fiscal year 2018 to about $298 million in fiscal year 2019, due, in part, to the scheduled approximate 55 percent decrease in the coal tax. Our simulation, which incorporates EIA data on future expected coal production, also shows that annual Trust Fund revenue will likely continue to decrease beyond fiscal year 2019 due, in part, to declining coal production. Domestic coal production has declined from about 1.2 billion tons in 2008 to about 728 million tons in 2016, according to EIA. Based on these projections, our moderate simulation shows that Trust Fund annual revenue may continue to decrease from about $298 million in fiscal year 2019 to about $197 million in fiscal year 2050 (see fig. 4). With the scheduled 2019 tax rate decrease, our moderate case simulation suggests that expected revenue will likely be insufficient to cover combined black lung benefit payments and administrative costs, as well as debt repayment expenditures. Specifically, our moderate case simulation suggests that revenue may not be sufficient to cover beneficiary payments and administrative costs from fiscal years 2020 through 2050 (see fig. 5). For instance, in fiscal year 2029, simulated benefit payments and administrative costs will likely exceed simulated revenue by about $99 million. These annual deficits will likely decrease over time to about $4 million by fiscal year 2050 due, in part, to the assumed continued net decline in total black lung beneficiaries. Our simulation also therefore suggests that Trust Fund revenue may not be enough to also cover the debt repayment expenditures it must continue to make through fiscal year 2040, per the payment schedule established following the 2008 EIEA. Our moderate simulation suggests that the amount borrowed by the Trust Fund will likely increase from about $1.6 billion in fiscal year 2019 to about $15.4 billion in fiscal year 2050 (see fig. 6). Although the Trust Fund’s legacy debt decreases through fiscal year 2040, total Trust Fund expenditures—including combined benefit payments and administrative costs as well as debt repayments—will likely continue to exceed revenue which will require continued annual borrowing from Treasury’s general fund. However, the amount borrowed by the Trust Fund could vary depending, in part, on future coal production and the number of new beneficiaries and could range between about $6 billion and about $27 billion in 2050, according to our simulations (see appendix II). We simulated three options that can affect Trust Fund finances through fiscal year 2050. Specifically, we simulated the effects of (1) adjusting the coal tax, (2) forgiving interest, and (3) forgiving debt. In each of the simulations, we compared the results of the option to a baseline in which the coal tax rates will decrease by about 55 percent, which we refer to as the scheduled 2019 tax rate decrease. We compare interest and debt forgiveness options to a baseline which assumes the scheduled 2019 tax rate decrease has taken effect, and that there is no interest or debt forgiveness. The simulated options are not intended to be exhaustive and we are not endorsing any particular option or combination of options. Using the moderate case, we simulated four options: (1) implementing the 2019 coal tax rate reduction to $0.50 per ton of underground-mined coal and $0.25 per ton of surface-mined coal; (2) maintaining the current coal tax rates of $1.10 per ton for underground-mined coal and $0.55 per ton of surface-mined coal; (3) reducing the tax rates by 25 percent (from $1.10 and $0.55); and (4) increasing these tax rates by 25 percent (see fig. 7). Increasing the tax rates by 25 percent was the only option that eliminated simulated Trust Fund debt by fiscal year 2050, according to our moderate case simulation. We simulated three interest forgiveness options including forgiving interest on (1) legacy debt, (2) annual borrowing, and (3) all debt. Our moderate case simulation suggests that forgiving interest will not eliminate simulated debt by fiscal year 2050 (see fig. 8). We simulated two debt forgiveness options by forgiving principal and interest on (1) legacy debt and (2) all debt. Our moderate case simulation suggests that both debt forgiveness options would reduce simulated Trust Fund borrowing by fiscal year 2050, but these options would not eliminate debt altogether as simulated revenue will likely not be enough to cover simulated expenditures (see fig. 9). In these cases, the Trust Fund will need to continue borrowing from Treasury’s general fund to cover annual deficits, and thus accumulate debt. While adjusting coal tax rates and forgiving interest or debt could reduce the Trust Fund’s simulated borrowing by 2050, implementing them could affect the coal industry or general taxpayers, according to stakeholders we interviewed. For instance, a coal industry representative noted that maintaining the coal tax at its current rate would continue to burden the coal industry and increasing the tax would exacerbate the burden at a time when coal production has been declining. Treasury officials noted that the costs associated with forgiving Trust Fund interest or debt would be borne by the general taxpayer since Treasury borrows from taxpayers to lend to the Trust Fund as needed. These officials also said that making a one-time federal appropriation to forgive interest or debt would be the most transparent way to satisfy the Trust Fund’s outstanding debt to Treasury’s general fund. In addition to the simulations, other options could affect the financial position of the Trust Fund including reducing black lung benefits, eliminating or adjusting the coal tax cap, or creating a variable coal tax. Our moderate case simulation suggests that completely eliminating black lung benefits as of fiscal year 2019 could reduce the Trust Fund’s borrowing from Treasury’s general fund in fiscal year 2050 from about $15.4 billion to about $6.4 billion. However, doing so would generally mean that coal tax revenue would be collected solely to fund the repayment of Trust Fund debt. Another option could be to eliminate or adjust the coal tax cap, which currently prevents mine operators from paying a coal tax of more than 4.4 percent of the price per ton of coal sold. If the coal tax cap were eliminated, for instance, mine operators would pay $1.10 per ton of underground-mined coal and $0. 55 per ton of surface-mined coal regardless of price sold, which could increase revenue. As an additional option, changing the structure of the coal tax to flexible rates that change based on an annual actuarial assessment of the Trust Fund could help to ensure that coal mine operators pay the necessary amount of tax to cover Trust Fund expenditures, without resulting in a Trust Fund balance or deficit. Multiple options could reduce the Trust Fund’s future debt and distribute the financial burden among the coal industry and general taxpayers. We simulated whether various coal tax and debt forgiveness options could balance the Trust Fund by fiscal year 2050, whereby its simulated revenue would be sufficient to cover its simulated expenditures. These options were selected, in part, based on interviews with Trust Fund stakeholders and the availability of DOL and other data. We approached these simulations from two perspectives. First, we simulated how much Trust Fund debt would need to be forgiven based on various coal tax rates. Second, we simulated the average tax collected per ton needed to balance the Trust Fund by 2050, based on certain debt forgiveness options. The simulated options are not intended to be exhaustive and we are not endorsing any particular combination of options. Our first set of options using the moderate case simulations are based on the current coal tax rates of $1.10 per ton of underground-mined coal and $0.55 per ton of surface-mined coal, and show the amount of debt forgiveness in fiscal year 2019 needed to balance the Trust Fund by fiscal year 2050 based on certain tax rates (see fig. 10). Specifically, our moderate case simulations show the following: Increasing current coal tax rates by 25 percent could balance the Trust Fund by 2050 and would likely require no debt forgiveness. For this option, the simulated coal tax revenue would likely be sufficient to cover simulated Trust Fund expenditures, including combined benefit payments and administrative costs, as well as debt repayments. However, this option would place the burden solely on the coal industry that would be paying higher taxes at a time when coal production has been declining. Maintaining current coal tax rates could balance the Trust Fund by 2050 if coupled with about $2.4 billion of debt forgiveness. This option would distribute the burden among the coal industry and general taxpayers. Decreasing current coal tax rates by 25 percent could balance the Trust Fund by 2050 if coupled with about $4.8 billion in debt forgiveness. This option would burden the coal industry less than maintaining the current tax rates, but would increase the burden on general taxpayers. Decreasing current tax rates by 55 percent, which we refer to as the scheduled 2019 tax rate decrease, would balance the Trust Fund by 2050 if coupled with about $7.8 billion in debt forgiveness. This figure comprises the Trust Fund’s total simulated outstanding debt in fiscal year 2019 ($6.6 billion), and an additional about $1.2 billion that would be required because the Trust Fund will accrue additional debt from fiscal years 2020 through 2050, according to our moderate case simulations. The coal industry would bear some of the financial burden of this option, while also placing a financial burden on general taxpayers. Our second set of options using moderate case simulations show the change in average coal tax revenue collected per ton to balance the Trust Fund by fiscal year 2050 based on certain debt forgiveness options (see fig. 11). Specifically, our moderate simulations show the following: Forgiving the Trust Fund’s legacy debt would allow for an average tax collected of about $0.59 per ton to balance the Trust Fund by 2050. Based on certain assumptions, this could be accomplished with a tax of $0.88 per ton on underground-mined coal and $0.44 per ton on surface-mined coal. Forgiving all Trust Fund debt would allow for an average tax collected per ton of coal sold of $0.47 per ton to balance the Trust Fund by 2050. Based on certain assumptions, this could be accomplished with a tax of $0.70 per ton on underground-mined coal and a tax of $0.35 per ton of surface-mined coal. We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Labor (DOL), Treasury, and Health and Human Services (HHS) for review and comment. DOL, Treasury, and HHS provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the report date. At that time we will send copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretaries of Labor, Treasury, and Health and Human Services, and other interested parties. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on GAO’s web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff should have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-7215 or brownbarnesc@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix III. We examined the extent to which (1) Black Lung Disability Trust Fund (Trust Fund) debt may change through 2050 and (2) selected options to improve its future financial position. We interviewed officials from the Departments of Labor (DOL), Treasury, and Health and Human Services (HHS), as well as representatives from the National Mining Association and the United Mine Workers of America. We then selected options to simulate based, in part, on these interviews and the availability of DOL and other data. These options included adjusting the coal tax, forgiving interest on some or all Trust Fund debt, forgiving some or all Trust Fund debt, or various combinations of these options. The options we simulated are not intended to be exhaustive and we are not endorsing any particular option or combination of options. Our simulations are based on various assumptions and simulate Trust Fund revenues and expenditures from fiscal years 2016 through 2050. To develop these simulations, we used actual and projection data from (1) DOL for fiscal years 2015 through 2040; (2) Treasury’s Office of Tax Analysis for fiscal years 2011 through 2015; (3) the Department of Energy’s Energy Information Administration (EIA) for calendar years 2015 through 2050; and (4) the Office of Management and Budget for fiscal year 2017. To simulate future Trust Fund benefit expenditures, we simulated the number of beneficiaries each fiscal year, and the annual average amount of benefits received (cash assistance and medical benefits). To simulate the numbers of beneficiaries, we used DOL data on the (1) age distributions of miner and widow beneficiaries for fiscal year 2015; (2) mortality rates by age for miner and widow beneficiaries as of fiscal year 2015; and (3) numbers of beneficiaries—including married miners, single miners, widows, and miners receiving medical benefits only—in fiscal year 2015. We assumed—as DOL does in its Black Lung Budget and Liability Model—that all miners are men, all widows are women, and all spouses are 3 years younger than the miner. We also assumed that the age distribution of single miners is the same as for married miners, and that the age distribution of new miner and widow beneficiaries is the same as for miner and widow beneficiaries during fiscal year 2015. We used DOL’s mortality rates to simulate the number of beneficiaries of each age and type in each year, and used those numbers to then simulate the total number of beneficiaries of each type each year (see table 2). We also assumed that there will be no new medical-benefit-only recipients. Formula The number of married miner beneficiaries age a in fiscal year y is equal to the number of new married miner beneficiaries age a in fiscal year y plus the number of married miner beneficiaries age a-1 in fiscal year y-1 who survived and whose spouse survived. The total number of married miner beneficiaries in fiscal year y is then the sum of the number of married miner beneficiaries of all ages in fiscal year y. Finally, we averaged the number of married miner beneficiaries by averaging the prior fiscal year’s total and the current fiscal year’s total. The number of single miner beneficiaries age a in fiscal year y is equal to the number of new single miner beneficiaries age a in fiscal year y plus the number of single miner beneficiaries age a-1 in fiscal year y-1 who survived plus the number of married miner beneficiaries age a-1 in fiscal year y-1 who survived but whose spouse did not survive. The total number of single miner beneficiaries in fiscal year y is then the sum of the number of single miner beneficiaries of all ages in fiscal year y. Finally, we averaged the number of single miner beneficiaries by averaging the prior fiscal year’s total and the current fiscal year’s total. The number of widow beneficiaries age a in fiscal year y is equal to the number of new beneficiaries who are widows age a in fiscal year y plus the number of widow beneficiaries age a-1 in fiscal year y-1 who survived plus the number of married miner beneficiaries age a+2 in fiscal year y-1 who did not survive but whose spouse did survive. The total number of widow beneficiaries in fiscal year y is then the sum of the number of widow beneficiaries of all ages in fiscal year y. Finally, we averaged the number of widow beneficiaries by averaging the prior fiscal year’s total and the current fiscal year’s total. The number of MBO beneficiaries of age a in fiscal year y is equal to the number of MBO beneficiaries of age a-1 in fiscal year y-1 who survived. The total number of MBO beneficiaries only in fiscal year y is then the sum of the number of MBO beneficiaries of all ages in fiscal year y. Finally, we averaged the number of MBO beneficiaries by averaging the prior fiscal year’s total and the current fiscal year’s total. To simulate future coal tax revenue, we used Treasury and EIA data to calculate (1) the amounts of underground and surface-mined coal taxed at fixed dollar amounts of $1.10 and $0.55 per ton, respectively, in 2015; (2) the amounts of underground and surface-mined coal taxed at variable dollar amounts per ton equal to 4.4 percent of the price in 2015; and (3) average prices of underground and surface-mined coal taxed at 4.4 percent of the price in 2015. We then used EIA data on projected amounts of total coal production, underground-mined coal production, lignite coal production, and coal exports, as well as projected average coal prices, for the period from 2015 through 2050 to simulate future coal tax revenues (see table 3). We simulated other Trust Fund expenditures and revenues, including administrative costs and debt repayments (see table 4). For our simulations, total Trust Fund expenditures are the sum of black lung benefits (cash assistance and medical benefits), total administrative costs, repayment of interest and principal on outstanding debt to Treasury’s general fund, and other expenditures. Total Trust Fund revenues are the sum of coal tax revenue and other miscellaneous revenue, and exclude annual borrowing from Treasury’s general fund. Annual borrowing from Treasury’s general fund is the difference between total Trust Fund expenditures and revenues and is assumed to be repaid with interest the following year. If total revenues are greater than total expenditures, then the Trust Fund has a balance and would not have to borrow that year. In this case, we assumed that the Trust Fund will earn interest on that balance at the same rate on which interest would accrue on annual borrowing. We simulated how the scheduled 2019 tax rate decrease and various options including adjusting the coal tax, forgiving debt interest, and forgiving debt principal and interest may affect Trust Fund finances through fiscal year 2050 (see table 5). The options listed are not intended to be exhaustive and we are not endorsing any particular option or combination of options. We simulated option combinations for coal tax rates, interest forgiveness, and debt forgiveness to demonstrate how potential financial adjustments could affect future Trust Fund borrowing from Treasury’s general fund through fiscal year 2050. For options that involve adjusting coal tax rates, we estimated the amount of debt that would need to be forgiven in fiscal year 2019 for the Trust Fund’s revenues to be sufficient to cover its expenditures through fiscal year 2050, assuming the Trust Fund does not borrow from Treasury’s general fund after fiscal year 2018. To do so, we first calculated the real discounted present value of Trust Fund expenditures for fiscal years 2019 through 2050, including benefit payments, administrative costs, legacy debt repayments, and repayment of annual borrowing from Treasury’s general fund. Second, we calculated the real discounted present value of Trust Fund revenue for the same period, including coal tax revenue and other miscellaneous revenue. Third, we calculated debt forgiveness as the difference between the real discounted present value of Trust Fund expenditures from the first calculation and the real discounted present value of Trust Fund revenues from the second calculation. When the amount of debt forgiveness is greater than the amount of debt outstanding, the Trust Fund would need an additional cash inflow in addition to forgiveness of all outstanding debt. Amounts of debt forgiveness less than zero suggest that no debt forgiveness is required. For options involving forgiving debt (interest or principal), we estimated the average tax per ton of coal that, if implemented in fiscal year 2019, would provide the Trust Fund sufficient revenue to cover its expenditures through fiscal year 2050, assuming the Trust Fund does not receive any advances from Treasury’s general fund after fiscal year 2018. To do so, we first calculated the real discounted present value of Trust Fund expenditures for the period from fiscal year 2019 through fiscal year 2050, again including benefit payments, administrative costs, legacy debt repayments, and repayment of annual borrowing from Treasury’s general fund, minus the real discounted present value of miscellaneous revenues for the same period. Second, we calculated the real discounted present value of coal production for the same period. Third, we calculated the average tax per ton of coal as the first amount divided by the second amount. To assess the sensitivity of each option, we ran each simulation 36 times using four different sets of assumptions about the numbers of future beneficiaries and nine different sets of assumptions about future coal production and prices (see table 6). Doing so provided a range of estimates about the Trust Fund’s future borrowing needs and provided insight on the sensitivity of its overall financial position relative to its various expenditures and revenues. The analysis also provided a range of estimates of the amount of debt forgiveness needed to bring the Trust Fund into balance by fiscal year 2050, assuming various coal tax rates, and the average tax collection per ton needed to do the same, and assuming various amounts of debt forgiveness. From the range of estimates that resulted from our sensitivity analysis, we selected cases with moderate expectations related to future Trust Fund expenditures and revenue. Specifically, for future expenditures, we assumed an average growth rate of new black lung beneficiaries for fiscal years 2003 through 2015 as a moderate case that reflects historical experience. For future revenue, we used a moderate coal production outlook based on EIA’s reference case, which reflects moderate expectations about future coal production based on various assumptions about economic growth, oil prices, technological innovation, and energy policy. We summarized the results of our simulations by showing the extent to which the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund’s (Trust Fund) balance—the sum of tax revenue and miscellaneous revenue less expenditures—may change in fiscal year 2050 for each option simulated. For example, with the scheduled 2019 tax rate decrease, our moderate case simulations suggest that the Trust Fund would likely have a deficit in fiscal year 2050 of about $15.4 billion. Multiple options could reduce the Trust Fund’s future debt and distribute the financial burden among the coal industry and general taxpayers. We simulated how various coal tax and debt forgiveness options could balance the Trust Fund by fiscal year 2050, whereby its simulated revenue would be sufficient to cover its simulated expenditures. We approached these simulations from two perspectives. First, we simulated how much Trust Fund debt would need to be forgiven based on various coal tax rates. Second, we simulated the average tax collected per ton needed to balance the Trust Fund by 2050, based on certain debt forgiveness options. For our first set of simulations, we calculated the amount of debt outstanding in fiscal year 2019 and the amount that would likely need to be forgiven in fiscal year 2019 for the Trust Fund to have sufficient revenues to cover its expenditures by fiscal year 2050, assuming that it does not borrow from Treasury’s general fund after fiscal year 2018. For example, before any options are implemented, our moderate case simulations suggest that the Trust Fund’s outstanding debt in fiscal year 2019—including both legacy debt and annual borrowing from Treasury’s general fund—would likely be about $6.6 billion (after discounting and adjusting for inflation). Therefore, with implementation of the coal tax rate decrease of about 55 percent as scheduled in calendar year 2019, about 117.7 percent of that debt would need to be forgiven to balance the Trust Fund. In other words, balancing the Trust Fund would require forgiveness of $6.6 billion and an additional cash inflow of about $1.2 billion because the Trust Fund will accrue additional debt from fiscal years 2020 through 2050, according to our moderate case simulations (see table 8). For our second set of simulations, we estimated the average tax per ton of coal that, if implemented in fiscal year 2019, would likely provide the Trust Fund sufficient revenues to cover its expenditures in fiscal year 2050, assuming that it does not borrow from Treasury’s general fund after fiscal year 2018. For example, if all principal and interest on Trust Fund legacy debt is forgiven, as of 2019, the estimated average tax that balances the Trust Fund is about $0.59 per ton (see table 9). Based on certain assumptions, this could be accomplished with a tax of $0.88 per ton on underground-mined coal and $0.44 per ton on surface-mined coal. In addition to the contact named above, Blake Ainsworth (Assistant Director), Justin Dunleavy (analyst-in-charge), Angeline Bickner, Courtney LaFountain, and Rosemary Torres Lerma made key contributions to this report. Also contributing to this report were James Bennett, Melinda Bowman, Lilia Chaidez, Caitlin Cusati, Holly Dye, Alex Galuten, Carol Henn, John Lack, Emei Li, Almeta Spencer, Kate van Gelder, and Shana Wallace.	[ "With revenue of about $450 million in fiscal year 2017, the Trust Fund paid about $184 million in benefits to more than 25,000 coal miners and eligible dependents. However, the Trust Fund also borrowed about $1.3 billion from the Treasury's general fund in fiscal year 2017 to cover its debt repayment expenditures. Adding to this financial challenge, the coal tax that supports the Trust Fund is scheduled to decrease by about 55 percent beginning in 2019. GAO was asked to review the financial positon of the Trust Fund and identify options to improve it. This report examines (1) factors that have challenged the financial position of the Trust Fund since its inception and (2) the extent to which Trust Fund debt may change through 2050, and selected options that could improve its future financial position. GAO reviewed Trust Fund financial data from fiscal years 1979 through 2017. GAO also interviewed officials from the Departments of Labor, Treasury, Health and Human Services (HHS) and representatives of coal industry and union groups. Using assumptions, such as the about 55 percent coal tax decrease and moderately declining coal production, GAO simulated the extent to which Trust Fund debt may change through 2050. GAO also simulated how selected options, such as forgiveness of debt, could improve finances. The options simulated are not intended to be exhaustive. Further, GAO is not endorsing any particular option or combination of options. GAO provided a draft of this report to DOL, Treasury, and HHS. The agencies provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. Multiple factors have challenged Black Lung Disability Trust Fund (Trust Fund) finances since it was established about 40 years ago. Its expenditures have consistently exceeded its revenues, interest payments have grown, and actions taken that were expected to improve Trust Fund finances did not completely address its debt. When necessary to make expenditures, the Trust Fund borrows with interest from the Department of the Treasury's (Treasury) general fund. Because Trust Fund expenditures have consistently exceeded revenue, it has borrowed almost every year since 1979, its first complete fiscal year, and as a result debt and interest payments increased. Legislative actions were taken over the years including (1) raising the rate of the coal tax that provides Trust Fund revenues and (2) forgiving debt. For example, the Energy Improvement and Extension Act of 2008 provided an appropriation toward Trust Fund debt forgiveness; about $6.5 billion was forgiven, according to Department of Labor (DOL) data (see figure). However, coal tax revenues were less than expected due, in part, to the 2008 recession and increased competition from other energy sources, according to DOL and Treasury officials. As a result, the Trust Fund continued to borrow from Treasury's general fund from fiscal years 2010 through 2017 to cover debt repayment expenditures. GAO's simulation suggests that Trust Fund borrowing will likely increase from fiscal years 2019 through 2050 due, in part, to the coal tax rate decrease of about 55 percent that will take effect in 2019 and declining coal production. The simulation estimates that Trust Fund borrowing may exceed $15 billion by 2050 (see figure). However, various options, such as adjusting the coal tax and forgiving interest or debt, could reduce future borrowing and improve the Trust Fund's financial position. For example, maintaining the current coal tax rates and forgiving debt of $2.4 billion could, under certain circumstances, balance the Trust Fund by 2050, whereby revenue would be sufficient to cover expenditures. However, a coal industry representative said that maintaining or increasing the coal tax would burden the coal industry, particularly at a time when coal production has been declining. Further, Treasury officials noted that the costs associated with forgiving Trust Fund interest or debt would be paid by taxpayers." ]	5,783	gov_report	en	null	bb6b4c937f5bc4434aaac7083887674a65c1a41f8f210a32
Federal agencies’ personal property may include commonly used items, such as computers, office equipment, and furniture, and more specialized property reflective of their mission, such as scientific devices, fire control equipment, heavy machinery, precious metals, generators, and chemicals. Some items require special handling, such as hazardous materials, animals, and firearms. See figure 1 for examples of federal personal property. Federal agencies manage personal property while they are using it. Specifically, executive agencies are required by law to: maintain adequate inventory controls and accountability systems for property under their control; continually survey property under their control to identify excess; promptly report excess property to GSA and dispose of it in accordance with GSA regulations; and use existing agency property or obtain excess property from other federal agencies before purchasing new property. GSA assists agencies when they no longer need personal property and has established a government-wide personal-property disposal process in federal regulation. The process generally begins when an agency declares a personal property item as “excess”—that is, the agency determines it no longer needs the item to carry out its mission. Agencies are to make this determination only after ensuring the property is not needed elsewhere within the agency. Once property is declared excess, there are four potential property disposal methods: transfer to another federal agency or certain non-federal entities, donation, sale, and abandonment or destruction. Federal agencies and some non-federal entities have the priority to acquire excess property, through transfer. If none of these eligible entities have requested the property for transfer after 21 days, the property becomes “surplus”—that is, GSA determines that federal agencies no longer need the item to carry out their missions. Surplus property may be donated to eligible entities through a State Agency for Surplus Property, representing the state of the prospective donee. Property not donated within 5 days after the close of the 21-day screening period may be sold to the general public and, finally, unsold property may be abandoned or destroyed. See appendix II for an expanded description of the personal property disposal process. OMB is responsible for establishing government-wide management policies and requirements and provides guidance to agencies to implement them. OMB has issued guidance for specific types of personal property, such as for government aircraft and information technology systems. OMB also implemented the Freeze the Footprint and Reduce the Footprint initiatives, starting in 2012, to reduce the amount of domestic office and warehouse space needed by the federal government, in part, through consolidations and improved space utilization. As a result, federal agencies have reported achieving space reductions, and they have goals for additional reductions in the future. Although these reductions are a relatively small part of the federal government’s overall footprint, according to OMB, through this and other efforts agencies collectively reduced their office and warehouse space by about 25 million square feet from fiscal years 2012 through 20156. As federal agencies continue to reduce office and warehouse space, they will also likely have to manage or dispose of personal property, such as office furniture or stored property, from these spaces. Each of the five selected agencies we reviewed have policies and processes for carrying out their responsibilities to maintain adequate accountability systems and inventory controls for property under their control: All five agencies have policies for regularly inventorying their personal property to physically locate and verify property tracked in their asset management systems. EPA, GSA OAS, and IRS policies require physical inventories of personal property once a year, while Forest Service’s policy requires inventories every other fiscal year and a 10 percent sample inventory in the alternate years. HUD policies require inventories every 2 years at its headquarters, but according to HUD officials, field locations conduct inventories annually. All of the agencies also have an electronic asset-management system for maintaining information on personal property. Although each agency has its own system, and the type of information maintained varied by agency or type of property, generally each system generates a record for each property item that provides descriptive information about the item, such as manufacturer name, model number, serial number or other identifier, acquisition cost, condition, and current location. We found that the five agencies use these policies and processes to track and inventory certain property determined by each agency to be “accountable.” Accountable property is nonexpendable personal property with an expected useful life of 2 years or longer that an agency determines should be tracked in its property records, based on an item’s acquisition cost and sensitivity. Each agency determines its own appropriate acquisition cost threshold: four of the agencies—EPA, Forest Service, HUD, and IRS—consider property with an original acquisition cost of $5,000 or greater to be accountable; GSA OAS’s accountable threshold is $10,000 or greater. In addition, certain sensitive property— such as digital cameras, laptop computers with hard drives, and firearms—is considered accountable regardless of acquisition cost because it could be easily stolen or can store data or personal information. Table 1 provides a snapshot of accountable personal property items— including the reported original acquisition cost, amount, and examples— reported from 4 of the selected agencies’ asset management systems in 2017. The agencies in our review generally did not track in their asset management systems or formally inventory their remaining—or “non- accountable”—personal property that did not meet their definition of accountable property. According to agency officials we interviewed, they do not track or inventory low value items because: (1) the cost and manpower required to do so are too high; (2) certain property, such as office furniture, is less susceptible to theft; or (3) agencies believe they are not required by law to inventory low value items. While agencies are required to have systems of accounting and internal controls that provide effective control over, and accountability for, their assets, they generally have latitude in how they implement these procedures, including which property to track and inventory. While the five selected agencies had policies and processes for their property accountability and inventory control responsibilities, they largely did not have policies and processes for carrying out their responsibilities, as established in law, to continually survey property under their control to identify excess. According to officials at each of the selected agencies, the responsibility for identifying unneeded property generally lies with that agency’s property custodians—designated officials who are assigned responsibility for the property—or the agency program or individual using the property. Four of the five selected agencies’ policies do not require property custodians or other property users to assess property for continued need. Furthermore, these four agencies’ policies did not have specific criteria for the property custodian or user to assess property for continued need. Only IRS’s personal-property management policy specifies that the property custodian is responsible for identifying excess property and provides criteria to be applied in doing so, such as whether property is still needed in its location and the feasibility of transferring it to other locations, taking into account the property’s condition and transportation charges. An official at one of the selected agencies identified several specific criteria that should be used to assess property for continued need, including the item’s serviceability, whether it poses a safety hazard, and the feasibility of relocating it. However, the official acknowledged that these or any other criteria are not part of the agency’s formal policy. The personal property policy of an agency not included in our review— NASA—includes requirements and criteria to review NASA property for continued need in multiple ways. For example, it requires a high-level NASA official to conduct a walk-through inspection annually to identify idle or underused equipment that is no longer needed and report it as excess. It also requires, as part of an annual property inventory, that property that appears to be excess, worn out, or in obvious need of repair be noted as such and that guidance on identifying unneeded property be provided to personnel involved in conducting the inventories as well as employees assigned to use the property. In addition to not having policies on identifying and assessing property for continued need, agencies we reviewed also did not have a systematic process for doing so. Instead, when describing situations in which they declared property as excess, officials said they typically did so as a result of a “triggering event.” The types of triggering events the officials cited include an office move or consolidation or a lifecycle replacement of laptops. For example, officials from field locations of three of these agencies reported declaring most of their existing furniture as excess as the result of an office relocation or renovation. Agency officials said they were unable to use their existing furniture and had to declare it excess because it did not conform to new space utilization standards. At another agency, officials were disposing of a large number of laptop computers that had been declared excess because they had been replaced by new computers. Officials at two agencies said an assessment of property for continued need is an assumed practice that is part of the inventory for accountable property. However, an official from one of these agencies acknowledged that assessing need is not addressed in the written instructions provided to those conducting the inventory. Officials from two other agencies acknowledged that they continue to retain unneeded property that should be declared excess in storage on-site but had not pursued disposal due to other competing responsibilities with higher priorities. Proactively assessing personal property for continued need instead of responding to a triggering event can help agencies achieve both effective and efficient operations by ensuring that only needed property is retained and unneeded property is identified and declared excess. Federal internal control standards require that agencies design and maintain internal control activities—such as policies and procedures—to identify risks arising from mission and mission-support operations, and to provide reasonable assurance that agencies are operating in an efficient manner that minimizes the waste of resources. Such a system also provides reasonable assurance that agency property is safeguarded against waste, loss, or unauthorized use. OMB staff and GSA officials agreed that assessing all types of property—accountable and non-accountable—for continued need is important and called-for by internal control standards. Because the agencies we reviewed did not have systematic processes for assessing the continued need for personal property, they may not be aware of potential risks of maintaining property that may no longer be needed for operational purposes. Furthermore, previous work others have performed has shown that inaction on unneeded or idle property can limit efficient use of the government’s personal property, unnecessarily use an agency’s resources, or miss opportunities for potential cost savings, for example: The Department of Homeland Security’s Inspector General found that the U.S. Coast Guard could not ensure that personal property was efficiently reutilized or properly disposed of to prevent unauthorized use or theft because the Coast Guard did not have adequate policies, procedures, and processes to identify and screen, reutilize, and dispose of excess personal property properly, including criteria for identifying such property. The EPA’s Inspector General estimated EPA could save $8.9 million in reduced warehouse costs through improved management of stored personal property. GSA personal property asset management studies conducted in 2003 and 2005 found, among other things, that personal property is not being used to its fullest extent in some agencies and that no government-wide usage assessment or standard exists to detect whether property is no longer needed and can be reported as excess. Without a triggering event, agencies may not be seeking out or identifying property that is no longer needed and declaring it excess as often as they should. Such unneeded property may be put to better use elsewhere within the agency or the federal government, or agencies may purchase or lease new property instead of using another agency’s property that is unneeded but not reported as excess. In addition, agencies may be missing opportunities to realize cost savings by identifying and disposing of unneeded property, such as property stored in warehouses, to reduce or make better use of that space. While the requirements for agencies to continually survey property under their control to identify excess is established in law, according to GSA officials, there are no government-wide regulations on managing personal property or fulfilling this specific requirement. According to GSA OGP officials, GSA does not have the authority to promulgate regulations or issue formal guidance on personal property that is in use by executive agencies. Furthermore, according to the officials, GSA is only authorized by law to prescribe regulations on excess and surplus personal property. OMB staff stated that they could issue a notification, such as a controller alert to agencies’ chief financial officers, to reinforce the statutory requirement that agencies conduct assessments of personal property for continued need. OMB periodically issues such alerts to highlight emerging financial management issues for agencies and also issues guidance to agencies through bulletins, circulars, and memorandums. By issuing a controller alert or other guidance, OMB can help ensure that agencies are proactively taking steps to evaluate their property for continued need, including developing appropriate policies for doing so, and can thereby improve efforts to promote maximum use of excess personal property. Officials from the five agencies we reviewed reported that they followed GSA’s automated process to dispose of property once they had made the determination it was no longer needed to support their agency’s mission. As previously described, GSA regulations on disposing of property establish a specific process for all executive agencies to follow, and GSA has also issued guidance to help agencies dispose of property under this process. In particular, once an agency has determined that the property it has is no longer needed within the agency, the agency is required to promptly report the property to GSA as excess, typically by entering information about it into GSAXcess, GSA’s web-based system for facilitating personal property disposal. This method requires agency employees to manually enter information using data entry screens that include help screens and error messages. GSA encourages agencies to provide a complete description of the property and to include multiple photographs of it. Officials from the five agencies we reviewed reported no significant difficulties with entering information into GSAXcess; collectively, these agencies reported over 37,000 items as excess property from fiscal year 2012 through 2016. Figure 2 indicates the number of items each selected agency reported to GSA as excess during that period. Once information entry is completed, the disposal process begins. If the property is not disposed of during one stage, it advances to the next stage. The disposal process is shown in figure 3. Agency officials we interviewed told us that responsibility for disposing of property is decentralized and typically occurs at the property’s location, whether at an agency headquarters, regional office, or lower level. Because of the large federal government presence in the Washington, D.C., area, agency offices in that area may have access to resources to facilitate the disposal process that are unavailable elsewhere, such as transferring excess property to certain entities that complete some or all aspects of the disposal process for a fee. Two such entities are GSA’s Personal Property Center in Springfield, Virginia, which takes full accountability and control of an agency’s excess property for a fee and handles all the details of the disposal process, and USDA’s Centralized Excess Property Operation in Beltsville, Maryland. According to USDA’s Agriculture Property Management Regulations, property not needed by USDA or its bureau offices in the Washington, D.C., area must be transferred to this office for final disposal actions. It also provides these same services to some non-USDA agencies. Agencies also use GSAXcess to search for and select available excess property. Agency officials told us that the system also sends disposition instructions to the property-holding agency, when the property is to be transferred to other federal agencies, donated, or sold and that the agencies follow these instructions. For example, when an agency requests an excess item in GSAXcess and GSA approves the request, the system notifies the requesting agency and the property-holding agency and provides contact information to arrange to complete the transaction. None of the selected agency officials reported difficulties completing a transfer or donation transaction. For property not transferred, donated, or sold, GSA notifies the agency that the property has no commercial value and can be abandoned or destroyed. All of our selected agencies reported trying to recycle such property. Selected agency officials told us they disposed of property from space reduction efforts, such as Freeze the Footprint and Reduce the Footprint, the same way as other personal property—using GSA’s disposal process. To meet space reduction goals, selected agencies are undertaking projects at dozens of locations. Projects have primarily involved leased space for offices and warehouses and have included office moves, consolidations, and closures. As federal agencies carry out these space reduction projects, they must also address any personal property in the project spaces. Selected agencies reported several factors that affected their decisions about this property, which for three of the agencies was primarily office furniture. Four agencies reported needing less space than they previously occupied because of changes in agency missions or staffing levels. Furthermore, officials from GSA OAS and IRS noted that workplace trends, including teleworking and decreased staffing, reduced the space needed. Finally, agencies also reported that the office furniture itself was mostly unsuitable because it was old and because it could not be configured for use in more efficient office space designs. As a result, some selected agency locations that completed an office move or renovation project reported that most of their existing furniture was not needed in their new space. For example, in its Reduce the Footprint plan for fiscal years 2017 through 2021, HUD noted that many of its locations were designed and furnished when it had a much larger staffing level and reported that in 2016, its usable square feet per employee was 356. Subsequently, HUD revised its space design standards, requiring future office spaces to adhere to a utilization rate of 175 square feet or less. At the HUD project we visited, an official told us the furniture in use before the project was old and was generally too large to be used to achieve space design standards. In 2017, Housing and Urban Development (HUD) reduced its Denver regional office space by 30 percent. HUD’s lease was expiring and it needed less space because it had fewer employees in the office, in part due to increased telework. Adhering to new space utilization standards in its office and furniture design further reduced HUD’s overall required space. An example of a new workstation is shown above. Before the project, the agency occupied about five floors of a commercial building. HUD renovated in place, one floor at a time, and replaced its existing office furniture with new. Personal property at this office included primarily office furniture, such as desks and 25-year old modular systems, and equipment, such as telephones. As each floor was completed and employees moved to new workstations, the property official on-site disposed of their old furniture and workstations by entering its information in GSAXcess. The official reported selling some of the excess furniture after completing the first floor but recycled or discarded excess furniture in subsequent rounds. In some cases, agencies did not dispose of all the personal property after a space reduction project but instead were able to retain it for other uses within the agency. For example, IRS officials reported closing an office in Englewood, Colorado, and transferred its furniture to Ogden, Utah, for storage for an upcoming project. GSA OAS officials in Denver said that after a space reduction project in which GSA decreased the size of its regional office, it retained the unneeded furniture and office space for temporary use by other agencies. For property that was declared excess following a space reduction project, agencies reported transferring, donating, and selling property to dispose of it, using GSA’s process. For example, officials in GSA OAS, Forest Service, and IRS locations told us they transferred some excess property to other federal agencies. The Forest Service in Denver transferred some modular office furniture to the Bureau of Land Management and the U.S. Postal Service. The Forest Service and IRS also reported donating property, such as office furniture and equipment, through the State Agencies for Surplus Property program. Four agencies reported selling some of their property from a space reduction project. For example, HUD’s regional office in Denver sold some of its excess office furniture, which dated to 1992, and recycled or discarded the remainder. When disposing of property from a space reduction project, some agencies sought assistance from GSA. GSA’s Office of Personal Property Management (GSA OPPM) assists agencies, when requested, in disposing of personal property, and officials at selected agency locations reported receiving assistance and training. In one example, GSA officials told us that a regional office of a selected agency needed to dispose of an office full of furniture and, in addition to using the disposal process, contacted GSA OPPM for additional assistance. Because of the large amount of property, GSA OPPM took steps to make other agencies in the area aware of the available property and facilitated access to allow agencies to view the property. In another example, GSA OPPM officials met with officials from another agency in the planning stages of a relocation to answer questions and provided advice and guidance for disposing of personal property. When the Forest Service’s lease on its Denver-area office expired, the agency leased space in another location, requiring a move but reducing its office by over 21,000 square feet. The agency sought to conform to new space utilization standards, which required more efficiently-designed furniture than its existing office furniture. Because the Forest Service did not reuse most of its old furniture in its new space, it no longer had a need for it. The Forest Service retained some of the furniture for use in other Forest Service offices within the region and declared the remainder as excess. Through GSAXcess, the Forest Service transferred some of its excess furniture to other federal agencies, such as the Bureau of Land Management and the U.S. Postal Service. The Forest Service sold some furniture at auction; broken items were recycled. Agencies may dispose of large amounts of property during a space reduction project, but overall, agency officials reported few challenges in doing so. This may be in part because any effects from space reductions are distributed across an entire agency. Although selected agencies’ average Reduce the Footprint space reduction goals ranged from 97,000 square feet to 662,000 square feet each fiscal year from 2016 to 2020, each agency’s efforts consisted of dozens of geographically dispersed projects of various sizes to be completed over several years. For example, as of fiscal year 2016, EPA had 21 space reduction projects planned from fiscal years 2016 through 2021, with individual anticipated reductions ranging from less than 1,000 square feet to more than 140,000 square feet. At least one project is present in 8 of EPA’s 10 regions. Agencies’ ability to pay for space reduction projects may also have affected these projects’ effects. Two selected agencies said they delayed projects because of a lack of funding. Agencies may reduce costs over the long term because of lower rent for smaller spaces but they may have to pay some expenses upfront, such as for moving, renovations, and new furniture. Although officials from all five agencies told us they have been able to manage personal property disposals from space reductions, they identified factors that can impact the efficient use of the disposal process during a space reduction project and some strategies taken to address them: Inventorying non-accountable property: As a space reduction project commenced at a location, most selected agencies reported that they did not have a complete list of the personal property affected by the project. As previously described, selected agencies do not maintain an itemized list of non-accountable personal property and for four agencies, office furniture is generally non-accountable. During a space reduction project, property personnel had to develop some type of inventory to identify property that would be needed and property that should be disposed of. Selected agencies had various methods for conducting such an inventory. For example, officials from two agencies said they walked through the affected space and created a list of all the items. Officials from one agency said a contractor was hired for this purpose. Most agencies reported using the inventory they created to enter information on excess property into GSAXcess. Officials at GSA’s OPPM offices in Philadelphia and Fort Worth said that they offer training and guidance to agencies in conducting inventories. Managing disposals within time frames: Agencies generally are not able to begin the disposal process until the property is no longer in use. For example, agency staff continue to use their old workspaces until they can move to new workspaces. Agencies also face deadlines, such as vacating space due to a lease expiration or commencement of renovation work. Officials from three agencies described challenges completing the disposal process—reporting excess personal property as well as completing transactions to transfer, donate, sell or abandon or destroy it—within required time frames. Some agency officials reported using different strategies to address this timing challenge. For example, one agency official was able to enter information about the excess property items into GSAXcess while employees were still using them. According to the official, this was possible because a note could be included in the property item’s description in GSAXcess, with the date when the property would be available. When the property was no longer in-use within the agency, the transfers or other transactions were completed. Additionally, an agency may conduct an on-site screening of its unneeded property to allow other federal agencies or authorized parties to physically view and identify any furniture they want. For example, GSA OPPM officials in Philadelphia conducted an on-site screening of unneeded office furniture resulting from the agency’s regional office relocation. Federal agencies collectively have billions of dollars’ worth of personal property, ranging from office furniture to highly specialized equipment that, when in use, supports agency missions. However, the agencies in our review did not have policies and systematic processes for identifying unneeded property. Furthermore, other’s previous work has shown that agencies across the government may not be effectively assessing their property for continued need, leading to idle property that could be put to better use elsewhere within the agency or the federal government and potential unnecessary storage costs. Consequently, agencies may be retaining property that is no longer needed. GSA has recognized that opportunities may exist for agencies to more effectively manage property under their control, but according to GSA OGP officials, GSA’s authority is limited to agency property that has been declared excess or surplus. According to OMB staff, OMB has the authority to issue guidance, such as controller alerts, emphasizing agencies’ property management obligations, and thus, it is well-positioned to assist agencies to more effectively manage their property and to ensure unneeded property is made available to others, as appropriate. The Director of OMB should provide guidance to executive agencies on managing their personal property, emphasizing that agencies’ policies or processes should reflect the requirement to continuously review and identify unneeded personal property. (Recommendation 1) We provided a draft of this report to OMB, EPA, the Forest Service, GSA, HUD, and IRS for comment. OMB stated that it did not have any comments on our draft report in an email and provided a technical clarification to the report, which we incorporated. GSA and IRS provided technical comments in an email, which we incorporated as appropriate. EPA, the Forest Service, and HUD each stated in an email that they did not have any comments on the draft report. We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the Administrator of the General Services Administration, the Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development, and the Secretary of the Department of the Treasury. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-2834 or rectanusl@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff making key contributions to this report are listed in appendix III. The objectives of this report were to examine (1) how selected federal agencies assess whether personal property is needed and (2) how selected federal agencies dispose of unneeded personal property, and how, if at all, space reduction efforts have affected disposals. We excluded certain types of personal property, such as aircraft and vehicles, from our review because of our prior or ongoing work. To address our objectives, we reviewed applicable federal statutes and regulations pertaining to personal property management and disposal, our prior work, and reports by federal agencies’ Offices of Inspector General on personal property issues. In addition, to determine how selected federal agencies assess whether personal property is needed, we conducted background searches to inform our understanding of key practices for personal property and asset management through a search of databases containing peer-reviewed articles, government reports, general news, hearings and transcripts, and association and think tank papers. We also reviewed relevant asset management practices, such as ASTM standards and the General Services Administration’s (GSA) Federal Asset Management Evaluation and Personal Property Asset Management Study. In order to select agencies that may have had recent experiences with excess personal property, we selected 5 of the 24 agencies that were included in the Freeze the Footprint and Reduce the Footprint initiatives. We selected agencies based on their overall Freeze the Footprint results, in terms of the amount of square feet reduced, and Reduce the Footprint goals for reducing domestic office and warehouse space, and the amount of personal property declared excess over the last 5 years, as reported to GSA’s GSAXcess system from fiscal years 2012 to 2016, to coincide with the Freeze the Footprint time frame. Specifically, we obtained information on the Freeze the Footprint results and Reduce the Footprint goals from the Office of Management and Budget’s public website and from Performance.gov. We limited our scope to civilian federal agencies with personal property within the United States. Although we have previously reported that the overall accuracy of data that agencies reported on office and warehouse space reductions could be improved, we found that the data were generally reliable for our purposes. After reviewing the data for any inconsistencies and discussing the information with selected agency officials to ensure that the reported numbers for the Reduce the Footprint initiative were current, we determined that the quality of the data were sufficient for our use in selecting agencies. In order to select agencies that were more likely to have relevant, recent experience with excess personal property from space reduction efforts, we ranked these agencies based on their Freeze the Footprint results, Reduce the Footprint goals, and the amount of declared excess personal property, and eliminated the bottom third of the agencies. We selected GSA as our first agency due to its central role in excess personal property disposal, and randomly selected four additional agencies from the remaining agencies. These agencies were the Environmental Protection Agency, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the Department of Housing and Urban Development, and the Department of the Treasury. The organizational structure of two selected agencies, the Department of Agriculture and the Department of the Treasury, is different than the other three agencies in that they are comprised primarily of sub-agencies. Therefore, we selected the largest sub-agency for both departments—the Forest Service within the Department of Agriculture and the Internal Revenue Service within the Department of the Treasury. We obtained information from the five selected federal agencies on the total value and number of items in their asset management systems in 2017 to understand the size and scope of personal property assets they manage. As we used the information to describe the scope of the agencies’ property holdings, we did not verify the data. We also analyzed documents, such as the selected agencies’ personal property management policies, along with policies from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and Department of Energy, to understand how they addressed requirements for managing personal property. We included these agencies’ policies based on our review of prior work related to personal property. We interviewed officials from the selected agencies about their processes for managing personal property assets, such as their inventory procedures. However, we did not independently assess agencies’ inventory practices. We also interviewed staff from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to discuss regulations and policies pertaining to personal property and OMB’s role in personal property management. To determine how selected federal agencies dispose of excess and surplus personal property and how space reduction efforts may have affected disposals, in addition to the above, we obtained information from each selected agency on its space reduction projects and interviewed officials about their roles and responsibilities in the agency’s space reduction planning efforts and personal property disposal process. We also conducted site visits to Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and Denver, Colorado to meet with regional and local officials from each selected agency responsible for managing and disposing of personal property. These locations were chosen based on the number of our selected federal agencies present, the amount of excess personal property declared, and the existence of space reduction projects. We discussed property accountability policies, overall personal property disposal processes, and how the disposal processes were affected by government-wide space savings initiatives, such as Freeze the Footprint and Reduce the Footprint, and any efforts to prepare for them, and requested supporting documentation on the amount of property declared as excess and the disposition outcomes of that property. We did not independently verify the information that was provided, as data reported as excess from space reduction projects are not always tracked separately from other property disposed of for other reasons. We reviewed documents and interviewed officials from GSA’s Office of Personal Property Management (GSA OPPM) in GSA’s headquarters, in Philadelphia and in Fort Worth, Texas, to discuss their role in assisting agencies in disposing of personal property and to obtain their views on how personal property disposals have been affected by space reductions. Finally, we interviewed GSA’s Office of Government-wide Policy (GSA OGP) officials about the Interagency Committee on Property Management and the Property Management Executive Council regarding their personal property and asset management efforts and met with officials and representatives from the following: the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Centralized Excess Property Operation, the Users and Screeners Association–Federal Excess Personal Property, and the National Association of State Agencies for Surplus Property to discuss their roles in the reuse and disposal of Federal personal property. We conducted this performance audit from July 2016 to February 2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. The Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, as amended, requires executive agencies, in part, to promptly report excess property to the General Services Administration (GSA) and dispose of it in accordance with GSA regulations. Each executive agency is also required to fulfill requirements for personal property by using existing agency property or by obtaining excess property from other federal agencies before purchasing new property. GSA’s disposal process, as laid out in federal regulation, incorporates and facilitates these requirements, providing a means for both disposing of and acquiring unneeded property: agencies with excess personal property can dispose of it and other agencies, authorized non-federal entities, and, eventually, the general public can acquire this property. After determining that a property item is no longer needed to complete its mission, an agency may have several options for proceeding before formally declaring the property as excess to GSA: Immediately authorize abandonment or destruction of the property: Determine, in writing, that the property has no commercial value or the estimated cost of its continued care and handling would exceed the estimated proceeds from its sale. If an agency makes such a determination, it may abandon or destroy the property without reporting it to GSA as excess. In lieu of abandonment or destruction, an agency may donate excess personal property to a public body without going through GSA. Directly transfer the property to another federal agency: Agencies usually become aware of available property through informal means, such as a contact at the disposing agency, according to GSA. GSA approval for such a transfer is not needed if the total original acquisition cost for each item does not exceed $10,000. If this cost is greater than $10,000, the acquiring agency must obtain prior approval from GSA. In either case, the acquiring agency must notify GSA of the transfer. Directly transfer the property to an eligible recipient under a special authority: Special authorities are legal provisions that are designed to give excess assets to groups that may use them for a particular purpose, such as universities that can use the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s scientific equipment in their research. Some authorities exist to collectively support all federal agencies and some support an agency-specific program. According to GSA, the primary government-wide programs are the Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980 and Executive Order 12999, also known as the Computers for Learning program. Recipients meeting eligibility requirements of the special authority contact agencies to determine the availability of property, and the agency and recipient must complete the appropriate documentation to make a record of the transfer. An agency initiates GSA’s disposal process by formally declaring property as excess, either by completing and submitting a form to GSA or, more typically, by electronic entry of an item into GSAXcess, GSA’s real-time, Web-based site for facilitating the disposal process. The latter method requires agency employees to enter information about the excess property using data entry screens that include help screens and error messages. GSA encourages reporting agencies to provide a complete description of the property and to include multiple photographs of the property. The disposal process generally consists of four sequential stages in which personal property may be transferred to another agency or eligible recipient, donated, sold, or abandoned or destroyed, as described below. If the property is not disposed of during one stage, it advances to the next stage, though the holding agency generally retains physical custody of the property until it is disposed of. Table 2 illustrates actions a disposing agency and eligible property recipients take during each of the four stages of the disposal process after an agency declares property excess. In addition to the individual named above, the following individuals made important contributions to this report: David J. Wise (Director), Nancy Lueke (Assistant Director), Travis Thomson (Analyst-in-Charge), Lacey Coppage, Rosa Leung, Josh Ormond, Amy Rosewarne, Pamela Vines, and Elizabeth Wood.	[ "The federal government owns billions of dollars of personal property—such as office furniture, scientific equipment, and industrial machinery. By law, each agency is required to follow GSA's disposal process so that an agency's unneeded property can be used by other agencies or certain non-federal entities. Since 2012, agencies have reduced their office and warehouse space due to government-wide initiatives, a reduction that in turn has required agencies to dispose of some affected personal property. GAO was asked to review how federal agencies identify and dispose of unneeded personal property. This report examines (1) how selected agencies assess whether personal property is needed and (2) how these agencies dispose of unneeded property and how, if at all, space reduction efforts have affected disposals. GAO reviewed federal statutes and regulations, and selected five agencies—EPA, Forest Service, GSA, HUD, and IRS—mainly based on space reduction results and goals. GAO reviewed these agencies' property disposal data for 2012 through 2016 and interviewed headquarters and field staff about their property management and disposal processes. The five agencies GAO reviewed—the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Forest Service, General Services Administration (GSA), Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and Internal Revenue Service (IRS)—generally do not have policies or processes for identifying unneeded personal property, such as office furniture, on a proactive basis. Instead, officials from these agencies said they typically identified unneeded property as a result of a “triggering event,” such as an office space reduction. Executive agencies are required by law to continuously review property under their control to identify unneeded personal property and then dispose of it promptly. Without such policies or processes, agencies may not be routinely identifying unneeded property that could be used elsewhere, and efforts to maximize federal personal property use and minimize unnecessary storage costs may not be effective. GSA has issued regulations establishing a government-wide disposal process for unneeded personal property. However, according to GSA officials, the agency lacks the authority to promulgate regulations or formal guidance on management of in-use agency property, and there is no government-wide guidance to agencies on identifying unneeded personal property. Agencies are required to have internal control activities—such as policies and procedures—for reasonable assurance of efficient operations and minimal resource waste, and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) provides guidance to agencies on implementing such activities. Guidance from OMB that emphasizes agencies' internal control responsibilities could help ensure that agencies are proactively and regularly identifying property that is no longer needed. The selected agencies reported little difficulty in following GSA's personal property disposal process, reporting over 37,000 items as unneeded property in fiscal years 2012 through 2016. This property was disposed of through transfers to other agencies, donations to authorized recipients, sales, or discarding. When disposing of personal property from space reduction projects at locations GAO visited, agencies also reported using GSA's process (see figure). Overall, agencies said they have not experienced major challenges with disposing of personal property from space reduction efforts. This lack of challenges could be because projects are geographically dispersed and spread over several years. OMB should provide guidance to executive agencies on managing their personal property, emphasizing that agencies' policies or processes should reflect the requirement to continuously review and identify unneeded personal property. OMB did not comment on GAO's recommendation." ]	6,529	gov_report	en	null	2b988be725a0bfe635067b12df3e8626904fc3d9f5b3ab92
The U.S. government engages with the governments of other countries in the Western Hemisphere through various inter-American organizations including the OAS, PAHO, IICA, and PAIGH. According to State, the OAS is the primary inter-American political forum through which the United States engages with other countries in the Western Hemisphere to promote democracy, human rights, security, and development. PAHO serves as the Regional Office for the Americas of the World Health Organization, the United Nations agency on health. IICA supports agricultural development and rural well-being through technical cooperation and the execution of agricultural projects throughout the hemisphere. PAIGH specializes in regional cartography, geography, history, and geophysics and has facilitated the settlement of regional border disputes. According to U.S. agency officials, the organizations’ regional knowledge and technical expertise make them effective implementing partners for projects serving U.S. national interests and priorities throughout the hemisphere. Member states collectively finance these organizations by providing assessed and voluntary contributions (see table 1). For each organization, its member states’ assessed contributions are intended to finance the organization’s regular budgets, which generally cover the organization’s day-to-day operating expenses, such as facilities and salaries. Member states also finance certain OAS, PAHO, and IICA activities and projects through voluntary contributions. According to U.S. officials, the United States provides voluntary contributions to the OAS, PAHO, and IICA primarily through assistance agreements for specific projects from State, USAID, HHS, and USDA. The Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) provides the framework for international organizations to oversee funds such as the assessed contributions provided by member states to OAS, PAHO, IICA, and PAIGH. The institute’s authoritative guidance, International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing, includes mandatory performance standards that describe the nature of internal audit activities and provide criteria for evaluating these activities. Organizations are required to subscribe to these IIA standards, according to PAIGH officials and OAS, PAHO, and IICA documents. Assistance agreements are a critical tool the U.S. government uses to achieve important national objectives. As we have previously reported, effective oversight and internal control are important to provide reasonable assurance to federal managers and taxpayers that assistance agreements are awarded properly, recipients are eligible, and federal funds are used as intended and in accordance with applicable laws and regulations. State, USAID, HHS, and USDA oversee funds provided to OAS, PAHO, and IICA through assistance agreements using monitoring activities such as financial and performance reports. Within each of these agencies, various bureaus and offices are responsible for awarding and managing assistance agreements to these inter-American organizations, including State’s Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement in the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, USAID’s Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance, HHS’s Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and its Food and Drug Administration, and USDA’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service. The documentation of these monitoring activities as called for by federal standards for internal control enables the agencies to determine the effectiveness of the agreement activity. We found that the strategic goals of the four inter-American organizations are predominantly aligned with the high-level strategic goals for the Western Hemisphere documented by State, USAID, HHS, and USDA. According to officials, the agencies all consider U.S. strategic goals when deciding which projects to fund at OAS, PAHO, and IICA. State, USAID, HHS, and USDA have goals for foreign assistance to the Western Hemisphere, as shown in table 2. For example, four of the five goals in State and USAID’s Joint Strategy correspond with goals at the OAS, IICA, and PAIGH. U.S. agencies, on an ongoing basis, evaluate each inter- American organization to ensure U.S. and organization goals are aligned. Officials from all four agencies provided examples of how they help to ensure alignment of U.S. strategic goals when funding projects at OAS, PAHO, and IICA. State: According to State officials, State created an Annual Performance and Budget Review process in 2014 specifically to review entities, such as the OAS, that receive voluntary contributions funded through the International Organization and Programs account. This process examines performance of State-funded activities relative to those activities from the previous year and the extent to which the activities advance U.S. priorities and objectives. State officials further noted that the Annual Performance and Budget Review helps inform State’s decision-making on what to include in the following year’s budget request. For example, during the 2016 review for the OAS Development Assistance Program, State reported the program’s significant activities, funds expended, and achievements such as training government officials on successful small business policies in the United States. USAID: According to USAID officials, USAID’s project design and approval policies and procedures ensure that all USAID-funded activities are linked to applicable U.S. and USAID strategies. USAID’s agency guidance requires, at a minimum, that each project or activity must be formally approved in writing by the relevant Mission Director or Principal Officer for a given program. Officials stated that this approval memo and supporting documentation address a number of planning considerations, including how the proposed activity aligns with broader strategies. Furthermore, officials stated that USAID’s lawyers review project approval documentation prior to final approval and verify that the activity complies with all applicable statutes, regulations, and policies. HHS: According to HHS officials, HHS engages with PAHO on its Biennial Work Plans, which are operational planning instruments that PAHO uses to identify activities that it can implement within each of its member states. HHS officials noted that they use PAHO’s Biennial Work Plan to strengthen U.S. approaches on issues of common concern and to advance U.S. priorities within the region. According to HHS officials, proposals for technical cooperation projects are required to correspond to one of the technical priorities in PAHO’s strategic plan for 2014–2019 and to be aligned with the HHS global strategy and U.S. priorities. USDA: USDA officials said that they compare the U.S. strategic goals with IICA’s goals and objectives when they formulate project proposals with IICA to ensure that the projects are aligned with U.S. priorities for the region. Additionally, USDA officials told us that USDA helped shape and influence IICA’s recent 10-year strategic plan, ensuring that IICA’s strategic objectives were closely aligned with U.S. strategic goals. OAS, PAHO, IICA, and PAIGH have established mechanisms for overseeing their use of assessed and voluntary contributions, such as external auditors and internal audit boards as required by IIA standards. State and USDA have directly supported these oversight mechanisms. OAS, PAHO, IICA, and PAIGH have oversight mechanisms, as shown in table 3. The four organizations follow the internal control standards of the IIA, codified in the International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing, according to PAIGH officials and OAS, PAHO, and IICA documents. All four organizations have internal and external auditors, as required by these standards. Furthermore, OAS, PAHO, and IICA have additional oversight mechanisms, such as anti-fraud policies and program evaluation processes. The officials we interviewed from State, USAID, HHS, and USDA expressed confidence in the four organizations’ management of their assessed and voluntary contributions. All four organizations document the status of their financial and internal control activities in audit reports posted on their public websites. For example, the OAS Office of the Inspector General’s April 2017 Annual Report included an update on its five ongoing audits and investigations. The report also outlined progress made against prior recommendations. U.S. agency officials support budget and administrative subcommittees in three of the four organizations and promote the participation of U.S. experts on independent audit committees, as shown in table 4. For example, according to officials, State plays a significant role in promoting policies on oversight and accountability at the four organizations through formal engagement in deliberations and decision-making of each organization’s governing body and through informal engagement with other member states and the secretariat by recommending best practices in governance, management, and oversight. State and USDA are also directly involved in implementing some of the additional oversight mechanisms at the organizations. For example, a USDA official serves as a member of IICA’s Audit Review Committee. Additionally, an IICA official told us the United States was involved in defining IICA’s Convention and Rules of Procedure for its governing bodies, which established the requirement for internal and external auditing. According to State officials, the United States led efforts to strengthen oversight at several of the organizations under review in recent years, such as advocating for the creation of an ethics officer position at PAHO, proposing language to strengthen the authority and independence of the OAS’s Office of the Inspector General, and encouraging the creation of audit committees at both organizations. In addition, State has played a lead role in supporting the ongoing reform of the OAS administration, which includes improved oversight and accountability, according to officials from the OAS and the U.S. Mission to the OAS. We reviewed 12 selected assistance agreements that the four U.S. agencies awarded to OAS, PAHO, and IICA that were active during calendar years 2014 through 2016, and found that two agencies did not consistently include all key monitoring provisions in their agreements. While HHS and USAID implemented applicable guidance by including all key monitoring provisions in their agreements, USDA and State did not do so. USDA and State agency officials did not explain why USDA and State did not include these monitoring provisions in their agreements. However, State has since taken corrective action to ensure that they are included in future agreements, according to State officials. Applicable agency guidance calls for agencies to conduct monitoring activities as part of their oversight of their agreements. Each of the four agencies has established agency-specific guidance that outlines the monitoring activities for assistance agreements. In some cases, the agency-specific guidance may mandate additional monitoring activities beyond those called for in applicable federal regulations, such as risk assessments. For example, State’s guidance calls for the creation of a monitoring plan. Federal standards for internal control require that agencies include in agreements all key provisions delineating the parties’ responsibilities. For the 12 agreements we reviewed, the number of total key monitoring provisions per agreement varied—including within one agency—depending on when the agency issued and updated its guidance relative to when the agreements were approved. Federal standards for internal control call for agencies to document internal controls, transactions, and significant events. Specifically, internal control standards state that agency management should include internal control activities (e.g., monitoring activities) in policies or directives for transactions such as assistance agreements. For the 12 assistance agreements we reviewed, USDA and State did not include provisions implementing 6 of the 55 total (11 percent) applicable monitoring activities required by applicable guidance to carry out required monitoring activities (see table 5). State took corrective action in 2015 by issuing a standard operating procedure. USDA: USDA did not include 4 of the 13 key monitoring provisions implementing the applicable guidance for the three USDA agreements we reviewed (see table 6). Two of the agreements and supporting documentation each included all four key applicable monitoring provisions. However, Agreement 2 in the table did not include 4 of the 5 monitoring provisions in the agreement or work plan, which documents the monitoring provisions. The agreement partially included performance goals, because it included objectives for the agreement’s activities, but did not include time frames to complete all of the activities. The USDA grant official did not explain why the work plan did not adhere to applicable federal regulations when it was drafted and approved. State: State did not include 2 of the 21 key monitoring provisions implementing the applicable guidance for the three State agreements we reviewed (see table 7). Two of the agreements and supporting documentation we reviewed included the 7 monitoring provisions implementing the requirements in the applicable agency guidance. However, one agreement awarded in 2012 did not include 2 of the provisions: a risk assessment and a monitoring plan. That office that awarded this agreement took corrective action in 2015 by issuing a standard operating procedure requiring that risk assessments and monitoring plans accompany its grants and cooperative agreements. USAID: USAID included both key monitoring provisions implementing the applicable guidance for the three USAID agreements we reviewed (see table 8). USAID’s Automated Directives System 308, Standard Provisions for Cost-Type Awards to Public International Organizations contains two key monitoring provisions for agreements. USAID incorporated the monitoring provisions nearly verbatim into the agreements we reviewed, using templates from this guidance for required terms and conditions. HHS: HHS included the 15 monitoring provisions implementing the applicable guidance for the three HHS agreements we reviewed (see table 9). None of the agencies provided us with full documentation to demonstrate their adherence to the required monitoring activities called for in all of their agreements that we reviewed, including the previously mentioned key monitoring provisions that we reviewed. State and HHS have taken corrective actions to address the gaps we found in documentation for the agreements we reviewed. Agency officials told us that they use these monitoring documents, such as financial and progress reports, to inform future budgetary and programmatic decisions. Therefore, they may lack information needed to make such decisions if they do not have access to complete monitoring documentation. According to federal standards for internal control, each agency is to include key monitoring provisions as part of its agreements. In the individual assistance agreements, the agencies specify the requirements to fulfill these activities, such as requiring financial reports on a quarterly basis or including specific information in performance reports. Grants officers at times, if they deem it necessary or appropriate, include additional monitoring provisions requiring activities beyond those required by the applicable guidance, such as site visits. Federal standards for internal control call for agency management to design monitoring activities, such as financial and performance reporting, so that all transactions are completely and accurately recorded. Recording these activities maintains their relevance and value to management in controlling operations and making decisions. Without access to complete monitoring documentation, the agencies risk weakening the effectiveness of these controls. None of the four U.S. agencies had full documentation of all of the monitoring activities required by their agreements we reviewed (see table 10). The agencies did not have full documentation of monitoring activities for 9 of the 12 agreements we reviewed. For the 42 monitoring activities identified across all of the individual agreements, the four agencies did not have full documentation of 18 of the activities (43 percent). However, State took corrective action in May 2017 to address its gaps in documentation, and according to HHS officials, the Food and Drug Administration addressed its gap in documentation by implementing its agreement monitoring program in fiscal year 2018. USDA did not have full documentation of any of the 10 monitoring activities we identified (see table 11). USDA demonstrated that it had partially documented 2 of the 10 monitoring activities (20 percent) by providing us with some, but not all, quarterly performance reports. For one of the agreements, USDA had no documentation of the monitoring activities for that agreement. For its other two agreements, USDA did not have full documentation of the required monitoring activities. USDA officials did not explain why they did not have full documentation. Without full documentation of the required monitoring activities, USDA may not have the information it needs to make appropriate budgetary and programmatic decisions. USAID did not have full documentation of 2 of the 11 total monitoring activities (18 percent) we identified across the three agreements we reviewed (see table 12). USAID had partial documentation of those 2 monitoring activities. For example, USAID provided us with some, but not all, records such as financial reports required by the terms of the monitoring activities in the agreements. According to USAID officials, the agencies’ lack of complete monitoring documentation was in part due to agency officials not following some of their agency’s requirements for managing agreement documents, such as placing all documents in a shared document management system. For example, for one of the agreements we reviewed, USAID officials stated that they stored some agreement documentation electronically—such as modifications, correspondence with the agreement recipient, and quarterly financial reports—but primarily maintained paper files. USAID officials told us they use the monitoring documents of these agreements, such as financial and progress reports, to inform future budgetary and programmatic decisions. For example, according to USAID officials, USAID uses monitoring documents to identify and address potential project delays or other “red flags.” For one of the agreements we reviewed, USAID officials stated these monitoring reports also assist them in determining whether to award additional funds and establish new indicators in subsequent agreements. Without full documentation of the required monitoring activities, USAID may not have the information it needs to make appropriate budgetary and programmatic decisions. State did not have full documentation for 5 of the 16 monitoring activities (31 percent) we identified across the three agreements we reviewed (see table 13). However, State had partial documentation of 4 of those 5 monitoring activities. For example, State had some, but not all, records such as standard reporting metrics, required by the terms of the monitoring activities in one of the agreements. State did not have documentation of one of the monitoring activities (site visits). According to State officials, the agency’s lack of complete monitoring documentation was in part due to agency officials not following some of the agency’s requirements for managing agreement documents, such as placing all documents in a shared document management system. For example, according to State officials, for one of the agreements we reviewed, the grants officer mistakenly had saved site visit reports and similar documents to personal folders because the officer did not know how to use State’s grant document storage system. As a result, neither the current grants officer nor other State officials could retrieve these documents. In May 2017, after awarding the agreements we reviewed, State took corrective action by issuing the Federal Assistance Directive to establish internal guidance, policies, and procedures for all domestic and overseas grant-making bureaus, offices, and posts within the department when administering federal financial assistance. The directive notes that State implemented a grant management system for domestic and overseas grants to resolve its “significant deficiency in the management of Federal financial assistance.” In addition, the directive indicates that officials from State’s Bureau of Administration, Office of the Procurement Executive, Federal Assistance Division will evaluate compliance with risk assessment requirements and review documentation for selected agreements each fiscal year. One of the stated purposes of these reviews is to mitigate risk by strengthening management and oversight of awards, including grants. According to a State Office of Inspector General report, State should complete the full deployment of this system for overseas grants in fiscal year 2019. HHS did not have full documentation of 1 of the 5 applicable monitoring activities (20 percent) we identified across the three agreements we reviewed (see table 14). HHS had partial documentation of the semiannual progress report activity for one of its agreements, required by the terms of its agreement. HHS officials did not explain why they did not have full documentation for this monitoring activity. HHS had full documentation of all applicable monitoring activities for the other two agreements we reviewed. According to agency officials, the Food and Drug Administration, which administered one of the HHS agreements we reviewed, has taken corrective action to evaluate its agreement documentation and address deficiencies. According to HHS officials, the Food and Drug Administration developed a pilot program intended to provide an additional layer of oversight to ensure adherence to the terms of each agreement. Under the pilot, officials said, a grant monitoring specialist reviews the agreement documentation and monitoring reports to identify agreements that need additional assistance. According to HHS officials, the Food and Drug Administration implemented this program in fiscal year 2018 and will eventually include all Food and Drug Administration agreements. U.S. assistance agreements for projects with inter-American organizations further U.S. strategic goals in the Western Hemisphere, but State, HHS, USAID, and USDA did not consistently include all key monitoring provisions as part of their assistance agreements or demonstrate that they had full documentation of monitoring activities for the agreements we reviewed. Of these four agencies, USAID and USDA have not taken corrective actions. Monitoring the implementation of U.S. assistance agreements and fully documenting the results of such monitoring are key management controls to help ensure that U.S. agreement recipients use federal funds appropriately and effectively. The agencies risk weakening the effectiveness of these controls by not including all key monitoring provisions called for by applicable agency guidance. Further, if the agencies do not have full documentation of the agreements’ required monitoring activities, they may not be able to effectively manage federally funded projects that support U.S. strategic goals. In addition, agencies may not have all the information they need to make budgetary and programmatic decisions. We are making a total of three recommendations: one to USAID and two to USDA. The USAID Administrator should ensure that USAID officials have full documentation of required monitoring activities in agreements with inter- American organizations. (Recommendation 1) The Secretary of Agriculture should ensure that USDA includes all key monitoring provisions specified by applicable guidance as part of agreements with inter-American organizations. (Recommendation 2) The Secretary of Agriculture should ensure that USDA officials have full documentation of required monitoring activities in agreements with inter- American organizations. (Recommendation 3) We provided a draft of this report for comment to State, USAID, HHS, and USDA. USDA concurred with our recommendations in an e-mail. In its written comments, reproduced in appendix IV, USAID stated that it has policies, procedures, and training in place for the officials who manage these agreements. In response to our recommendations, USAID stated that it will issue an agency notice to remind all such officials of these responsibilities, including the requirement to maintain complete files for each agreement. State and HHS did not provide formal comments. They did provide technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of State, the Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, and the Secretary of Agriculture. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-9601, or melitot@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V. Congressional requesters asked us to review several issues related to the Organization of American States (OAS), the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), the Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture (IICA), and the Pan-American Institute of Geography and History (PAIGH). In this report, we (1) assess the extent to which the organizations’ strategic goals align with those of U.S. agencies; (2) examine how the organizations oversee the use of their funds and the extent to which U.S. agencies have supported those efforts; (3) assess the extent to which U.S. agencies included key monitoring provisions as part of their assistance agreements; and (4) assess the extent to which U.S. agencies had documentation of monitoring activities, including those called for by these provisions. To address the first objective, we gathered documentation and interviewed officials from the four U.S. agencies and the four organizations to determine the U.S. strategic goals for foreign assistance to the Western Hemisphere and the goals of the four organizations. According to Department of State (State) and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) officials, the strategic document that underpins their foreign assistance priorities for the region is The Department of State’s Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs’ and USAID’s Bureau for Latin American and Caribbean Affairs’ Joint Regional Strategy. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) officials said that HHS’s relevant strategic document is The Global Strategy of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) strategic goals for foreign assistance, according to officials, are outlined in the United States Department of Agriculture Strategic Plan FY2015–2018. The OAS outlined its strategic goals in the Comprehensive Strategic Plan of the Organization, adopted on October 31, 2016. PAHO’s goals are laid out in Strategic Plan of the Pan American Health Organization 2014–2019. IICA’s strategic document is the IICA 2010–2020 Strategic Plan, which took effect in October 2010. PAIGH’s strategic document is the Declaration and Guide for the Pan American Agenda 2010-2020. We compared the strategic goals articulated by the four organizations against U.S. strategic goals to assess the extent to which the organizations’ goals contribute to U.S. interests in the region. We then interviewed officials from the four agencies and reviewed relevant documentation on efforts they undertake to ensure that U.S.-funded activities align with U.S. strategic goals. To address the second objective, we reviewed documentation of the organizations’ internal control mechanisms and confirmed our findings with the organizations. We identified mechanisms to include policies, directives, rules, practices, and organizational structures that can have an oversight role in the use of the organizations’ funds. We also interviewed officials from State, USAID, HHS, and USDA to discuss their support of these mechanisms. To address the third objective, we identified 60 active assistance agreements that these agencies oversaw with OAS, PAHO, and IICA during calendar years 2014 through 2016 and selected a nongeneralizable sample of 12 agreements, three each from State, USAID, HHS, and USDA. To determine which agreements we would review for each agency, we selected the three agreements with the lowest, median, and highest dollar value. If any of an agency’s agreements supported the same country or activity or were for one-time projects such as seminars, we selected the next appropriate agreement based on dollar value. For these selected agreements, we then identified the applicable agency guidance for monitoring activities in the agreements, which we define as all documents related to each agreement provided to us by the agencies, such as monitoring reports. The number of key monitoring provisions varied—even within each agency—depending on when agency guidance was issued and updated relative to when the agreements were approved. USDA did not have applicable internal agency-specific guidance for monitoring of assistance agreements at the time it awarded the agreements we reviewed; thus, with USDA’s input, we used the applicable sections of the Code of Federal Regulations, which together have five key monitoring provisions for agreements. However, USDA approved two of the agreements in 2012 and the third agreement in 2016, and this third agreement was subject to an amended version of the Code of Federal Regulations, which added an additional provision for performance goals. State’s four applicable grants policy directives have seven key monitoring provisions for agreements that were applicable at the time the agreements we reviewed were approved. USAID’s Standard Provisions for Cost-Type Awards to Public International Organizations (PIOs): A Mandatory Reference to ADS Chapter 308 has two key monitoring provisions for agreements: audits and records, and the organization’s adherence to their rules. HHS’s grants policy has five key monitoring provisions for grant documentation. We identified key monitoring provisions for agencies to include as part of agreements to ensure oversight of the use of funds, such as financial and progress reports. For the 12 agreements in our sample, we analyzed the assistance agreements from the four agencies, and then determined the extent to which the agencies’ agreements included key monitoring provisions implementing monitoring activities called for by applicable agency guidance. We did not include subsequent amendments to these 12 agreements in our review of key monitoring provisions. We interviewed officials from State, USAID, HHS, and USDA (1) to confirm we were applying the appropriate federal or agency guidance and (2) to discuss instances in which the agreements did not include key monitoring provisions. To address the fourth objective, we reviewed the 12 selected assistance agreements and guidance to identify specific required monitoring activities, such as financial and program reports, site visits, and other forms of oversight. The agreements specify the requirements for these activities such as requiring financial reports on a quarterly basis. For these 12 agreements, we reviewed all the documentation provided to us by the agencies, then determined the extent to which the agencies had full documentation of key monitoring activities as specified in the assistance agreements, including those called for by key monitoring provisions, as well as those called for by guidance when the monitoring provisions were absent. We did not include subsequent amendments to these 12 agreements in our review of monitoring activities. We interviewed officials from State, USAID, HHS, and USDA to discuss instances in which the agency did not have full documentation of key monitoring activities. We also discussed how State, USAID, and HHS agency officials manage their agreement documentation and use the information in the agreements’ required monitoring documentation. We conducted this performance audit from July 2016 to December 2017 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. The Organization of American States (OAS), Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), the Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture (IICA), and the Pan-American Institute on Geography and History (PAIGH) have established mechanisms for overseeing their use of funds. Tables 15–18 show the mechanisms (oversight policies and oversight committees and organizations) for each of these inter-American organizations, as confirmed by the organizations’ officials. To oversee the execution of their agreements, the Department of State (State), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) are to conduct monitoring activities called for by applicable federal regulations or agency guidance and document these provisions in assistance agreements as called for by federal standards for internal control. We identified key monitoring provisions implementing the applicable agency guidance for State, USAID, HHS, and the applicable regulations for USDA, as shown in table 19. For both the agency guidance and the federal regulations, those listed are the ones that were in effect when the agreements in our sample were approved. Some of the agency guidance and regulations have since been amended or superseded. In addition to the contact named above, Pierre Toureille (Assistant Director), Julia Jebo Grant (Analyst-in-Charge), Leslie Stubbs, and Paul Sturm, Alana Miller, and Shirley Min made key contributions to this report. In addition, David Dayton, Martin de Alteriis, Neil Doherty, Jeff Isaacs, and Alex Welsh provided technical assistance.	[ "The United States is a member of the OAS, PAHO, IICA, and PAIGH, which promote democracy, health care, agricultural development, and scientific exchange. GAO was asked to review U.S. assistance to these four organizations. In this report, GAO (1) assesses the extent to which the organizations' strategic goals align with those of U.S. agencies; (2) examines how the organizations oversee the use of their funds and the extent to which U.S. agencies have supported those efforts; (3) assesses the extent to which U.S. agencies included key monitoring provisions as part of assistance agreements; and (4) assesses the extent to which U.S. agencies had documentation of monitoring activities, including those called for by these provisions. GAO analyzed documents and interviewed officials from State, USAID, HHS, USDA, and the organizations. GAO also analyzed a nongeneralizable sample of 12 of the 60 assistance agreements that were awarded by State, USAID, HHS, and USDA to OAS, PAHO, and IICA and were active during calendar years 2014 through 2016. For each agency, GAO selected three agreements with the lowest, median, and highest dollar value. GAO found that strategic goals of the Organization of American States (OAS), the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), the Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture (IICA), and the Pan-American Institute of Geography and History (PAIGH) are predominantly aligned with the strategic goals of the Department of State (State), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). For example, IICA's strategic goals of a productive agricultural sector, enhancing agricultural development, and food security are aligned with USDA's foreign assistance goals. State, USAID, HHS, and USDA fund activities in the form of assistance agreements (e.g., grants and cooperative agreements) with OAS, PAHO, and IICA, which in 2016 totaled $32 million. According to agency officials, the agencies employ mechanisms to ensure that these agreements align with U.S. strategic goals. OAS, PAHO, IICA, and PAIGH have established mechanisms for overseeing their use of funds, such as external auditors, internal audit boards, and anti-fraud and ethics policies. State and USDA have directly supported these mechanisms. For example, State engaged in the selection process for OAS's Inspector General. GAO's review of 12 selected assistance agreements found that USDA included no financial or performance monitoring provisions in one of its agreements and that State did not include two key monitoring provisions in one of its agreements, called for by applicable guidance. GAO found that the remaining 10 agreements it reviewed contained all key monitoring provisions and that State has since taken corrective action. GAO found that U.S. agencies did not have full documentation of 18 of the 42 monitoring activities required by the 12 assistance agreements GAO reviewed (see table). For example, USDA did not have full documentation, such as for financial reports, of any of its 10 required monitoring activities and USDA officials did not explain their lack of documentation. USAID officials explained that their lack of full documentation was due, in part, to grant officers not always following their document management policies. State and HHS have since taken corrective action. If an agency does not have full documentation of monitoring activities, it may lack information needed to make appropriate budgetary and programmatic decisions. GAO recommends that (1) USDA ensure inclusion of all monitoring provisions as part of agreements and (2) USAID and USDA ensure full documentation of monitoring activities. USDA and USAID concurred with GAO's recommendations." ]	5,123	gov_report	en	null	c7393715e680d82fdb24c789bb43e37ef7a27babb1da2ae7
The rise of e-commerce has contributed to a fundamental change in the market for counterfeit goods, according to our analysis of documents from CBP, ICE, and international organizations and our interviews with CBP and ICE officials. U.S. agencies and international organizations have observed a shift in the sale of counterfeit goods from “underground” or secondary markets, such as flea markets or sidewalk vendors, to primary markets, including e-commerce websites, corporate and government supply chains, and traditional retail stores. Whereas secondary markets are often characterized by consumers who are knowingly purchasing counterfeits, primary markets involve counterfeiters who try to deceive consumers into purchasing goods they believe are authentic. This shift has been accompanied by changes in the ways in which counterfeit goods are sold. In the past, consumers could often rely on indicators such as the location of sale or the goods’ appearance or price to identify counterfeit goods in the marketplace. However, counterfeiters have now adopted new ways to deceive consumers. For example, as consumers increasingly purchase goods online, counterfeiters may exploit third-party online marketplaces to gain an appearance of legitimacy and access to consumers. When selling online, counterfeiters may post pictures of authentic goods on the websites where they are selling counterfeits and may post pseudonymous reviews of their products or businesses in order to appear legitimate. Additionally, by setting the price of a counterfeit at, or close to, the retail price of a genuine good, counterfeiters may deceive consumers, who will pay the higher price because they believe the goods are real or who believe that they are getting a slight bargain on genuine goods. According to CBP seizure data and CBP officials, the volume, variety, and methods of shipment of counterfeit goods seized by CBP and ICE have changed in recent years. CBP reports indicate that the number of IPR seizures increased by 38 percent in fiscal years 2012 through 2016. According to CBP data, approximately 88 percent of IPR seizures made during this period were shipped from China and Hong Kong. The variety of products being counterfeited has also increased, according to CBP officials. CBP and ICE officials noted that, while many consumers may think of luxury handbags or watches as the most commonly counterfeited goods, counterfeiting occurs in nearly every industry and across a broad range of products. In addition, according to CBP data we reviewed and officials we spoke to, the methods of importing counterfeit goods into the United States have changed in recent years. Specifically, express carriers and international mail have become the predominant form of transportation for IPR-infringing goods entering the United States, constituting approximately 90 percent of all IPR seizures in fiscal years 2015 and 2016, according to CBP data. In an attempt to illustrate the risk that consumers may unknowingly encounter counterfeit products online, we purchased a nongeneralizable sample of four types of consumer products—shoes, travel mugs, cosmetics, and phone chargers—from third-party sellers on five popular e-commerce websites. According to CBP data we reviewed and officials we spoke to, CBP often seizes IPR-infringing counterfeits of these types of products. As table 1 shows, the rights holders for the four selected products we purchased determined that 20 of the 47 items were counterfeit. We did not identify any clear reasons for the variation among the counterfeit and authentic items that we purchased based on the products that they represented, the e-commerce websites where we bought the items, or the third-party sellers from whom we bought them. For three of the four product types, at least one item we purchased was determined to be counterfeit, with results varying considerably by product. Representatives of the rights holders also could not provide a specific explanation for the variation among authentic and counterfeit goods that we received. They noted that the results of covert test purchases can fluctuate depending on enforcement activities and the variety of goods and sellers on a particular website on a given day. Rights-holder testing also showed that we purchased at least one counterfeit item and one authentic item from each of the five e-commerce websites. In addition, our analysis of the customer ratings of third-party sellers from whom we bought the items did not provide any clear indications that could warn consumers that a product marketed online may be counterfeit. For example, we received both counterfeit and authentic items from third- party sellers with ratings that were less than 70 percent positive as well as sellers with ratings that were up to 100 percent positive. Rights holders were able to determine that items we purchased were not authentic on the basis of inferior quality, incorrect markings or construction, and incorrect labeling. Some counterfeit items we purchased were easily identifiable as likely counterfeit once we received them. For example, one item contained misspellings of “Austin, TX” and “Made in China.” Other items could be more difficult for a typical consumer to identify as counterfeit. For example, the rights holder for a cosmetic product we purchased identified one counterfeit item on the basis of discrepancies in the color, composition, and design of the authentic and counterfeit items’ packaging. Counterfeit goods may also lack key elements of certification markings and other identifiers. For example, on a counterfeit phone charger we purchased, the UL certification mark did not include all components of the authentic mark. Figure 1 shows examples of these counterfeit items. The risks associated with the types of counterfeit goods we purchased can extend beyond the infringement of a company’s IPR. For example, a UL investigation of counterfeit iPhone adapters found a 99 percent failure rate in 400 counterfeit adapters tested for safety, fire, and shock hazards and found that 12 of the adapters tested posed a risk of lethal electrocution to the user. Similarly, according to a rights holder representative, counterfeits of common consumer goods, such as Yeti travel mugs, may contain higher-than-approved concentrations of dangerous chemicals such as lead, posing health risks to consumers. According to ICE, seized counterfeit cosmetics have been found to contain hazardous substances, including cyanide, arsenic, mercury, lead, urine, and rat droppings. Representatives of rights holders and e-commerce websites whom we interviewed reported taking independent action to try to protect IPR within their areas of responsibility. For example, both rights holders and e- commerce websites maintain IPR protection teams that work with one another and with law enforcement to address infringement issues. E- commerce websites may also take a variety of steps to block and remove counterfeit items listed by third-party sellers. These efforts rely on data collected through a variety of means, including consumer reporting of counterfeits, rights-holder notifications of IPR infringement, and corporate efforts to vet potential third-party sellers, according to private sector representatives. Our January 2018 report includes information on steps that consumer protection organizations and government agencies recommend consumers take to limit the risk of purchasing counterfeits online. These steps include, for example, buying only from authorized retailers online, avoiding prices that look “too good to be true,” and reporting counterfeit purchases. We identified a number of key challenges that the changes in the market for counterfeit goods can pose to CBP and ICE as well as to the private sector. First, the increasing sophistication of counterfeits can make it difficult for law enforcement officers to distinguish between legitimate and counterfeit goods. Second, as the range of counterfeit goods expands, CBP has a wider variety of goods to screen, which requires CBP officials to have in-depth knowledge of a broad range of products and of how to identify counterfeits. Third, counterfeiters may break up large shipments into multiple smaller express carrier or mail packages to decrease the risk of losing significant quantities of merchandise to a single seizure. This shift toward smaller express shipments of counterfeit goods to the United States poses challenges to CBP and ICE because, according to CBP officials, seizure processing requires roughly the same amount of time and resources regardless of shipment size or value. The changing marketplace also presents challenges to the private sector, according to representatives from rights holders and e-commerce websites. For example, it is more difficult for rights holders and e- commerce websites to identify and investigate individual counterfeit cases, because e-commerce websites face a growing inventory from a larger registry of sellers. Tracking goods from known counterfeiters through various website fulfillment and delivery mechanisms is also a significant challenge for the private sector. Furthermore, the growth of e- commerce has accelerated the pace at which counterfeiters can gain access to consumers or reinvent themselves if shut down. CBP and ICE engage in a number of activities to enhance IPR enforcement; however, while ICE has assessed some of its efforts, CBP has taken limited steps to do so. CBP’s and ICE’s IPR enforcement activities broadly include detecting imports of potentially IPR-infringing goods, conducting special operations at U.S. ports, engaging with international partners, and undertaking localized pilot programs or port- led initiatives. CBP and ICE have collected some performance data on activities we reviewed, and ICE has taken some steps to better understand the impact of its efforts, such as creating a process to track cases it deems significant. However, we found that CBP has conducted limited evaluation of its efforts to enhance IPR enforcement. Consequently, we concluded that CBP may lack information needed to ensure it is investing its resources in the most efficient and effective activities. We recommended in our report that CBP take steps to evaluate the effectiveness of its IPR enforcement efforts; CBP concurred with this recommendation. Our analysis showed that CBP and ICE interagency collaboration on IPR enforcement is generally consistent with the following selected key practices for effective interagency collaboration: (1) define and articulate a common outcome; (2) establish mutually reinforcing or joint strategies; (3) identify and address needs by leveraging resources; (4) agree on roles and responsibilities; and (5) establish compatible policies, procedures, and other means to operate across agency boundaries. For example, the agencies may leverage resources by collocating staff or sharing their expertise. CBP and ICE have also issued guidance and developed standard operating procedures to clarify roles and responsibilities. CBP and ICE also coordinate with the private sector in a variety of ways, such as obtaining private sector assistance to determine whether detained goods are authentic and to conduct training. Representatives of rights holders and e-commerce websites noted that information shared by law enforcement entities is critical to private sector IPR enforcement, such as pursuing civil action against a counterfeiter or removing counterfeit items from websites. In the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015, Congress provided CBP with explicit authority to share certain information with trademark and copyright owners before completing a seizure. CBP officials stated that they share information about identified counterfeits with e-commerce websites and rights holders to the extent possible under current regulations. However, according to private sector representatives we spoke to, restrictions on the amount and type of information about seized items shared by CBP limit the ability of rights holders and e-commerce websites to protect IPR. CBP officials noted that there are legal limitations to the amount and type of information they can share, particularly if the e-commerce website is not listed as the importer on forms submitted to CBP. Several private sector representatives stated that receiving additional information from CBP would enhance their ability to protect IPR. Representatives of one website noted that information on the exterior of seized packages, such as business identifiers on packages destined for distribution centers, would be helpful for identifying groups of counterfeit merchandise from the same seller. However, according to CBP officials, CBP cannot provide such information to e-commerce websites. Representatives of one e-commerce website noted that ICE sometimes shares information related to an investigation, but that ICE’s involvement in the enforcement process begins only after CBP has identified and seized counterfeit items. Representatives of two e-commerce websites stated that, because of the limited information shared by CBP, they may not be aware of IPR-infringing goods offered for sale on their websites, even if CBP has seized related items from the same seller. According to CBP officials, CBP is reviewing options for sharing additional information with rights holders and e-commerce websites and is assessing what, if any, additional information would be beneficial to share with private sector entities. CBP officials stated that they have not yet determined whether changes to the amount and types of information provided to e-commerce websites would require regulatory changes or additional legal authorities. These officials also said that they have discussed differences in CBP’s and ICE’s information sharing with ICE officials. In our report, we recommended that CBP, in consultation with ICE, assess what, if any, additional information would be beneficial to share with the private sector and, as appropriate, take action to enhance information sharing where possible. CBP concurred with this recommendation. Chairman Hatch, Ranking Member Wyden, and Members of the Committee, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to answer any questions that you may have at this time. If you or your staff have any questions about this testimony, please contact Kimberly Gianopoulos, Director, International Affairs and Trade, at (202) 512-8612 or gianopoulosk@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. GAO staff who made key contributions to this testimony are Joyee Dasgupta, Kara Marshall, Katie Bassion, Kristen Timko, Reid Lowe, Sarah Collins, Neil Doherty, Ramon Rodriguez, Helina Wong, Julie Spetz, Kevin Loh, Wayne McElrath, Grace Lui, James Murphy, Mary Moutsos, Justin Fisher, Rachel Stoiko, and Sarah Veale. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.	[ "This testimony summarizes the information contained in GAO's January 2018 report, entitled Intellectual Property: Agencies Can Improve Efforts to Address Risks Posed by Changing Counterfeits Market , ( GAO-18-216 ). Changes in the market for counterfeit goods entering the United States pose new challenges for consumers, the private sector, and U.S. agencies that enforce intellectual property rights (IPR). Specifically, growth in e-commerce has contributed to a shift in the sale of counterfeit goods in the United States, with consumers increasingly purchasing goods online and counterfeiters producing a wider variety of goods that may be sold on websites alongside authentic products. For example, 20 of 47 items GAO purchased from third-party sellers on popular consumer websites were counterfeit, according to testing by the products' rights holders (see table), highlighting potential risks to consumers. The changes in the market for counterfeit goods can also pose challenges to the private sector—for example, the challenge of distinguishing counterfeit from authentic goods listed for sale online—and complicate the enforcement efforts of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). CBP and ICE engage in a number of activities to enhance IPR enforcement; however, while ICE has assessed some of its efforts, CBP has taken limited steps to do so. CBP's and ICE's IPR enforcement activities broadly include detecting imports of potentially IPR-infringing goods, conducting special operations at U.S. ports, engaging with international partners, and undertaking localized pilot programs or port-led initiatives. CBP and ICE have collected some performance data for each of the eight activities GAO reviewed, and ICE has taken some steps to understand the impact of its efforts. However, CBP has conducted limited evaluation of its efforts to enhance IPR enforcement. Consequently, CBP may lack information needed to ensure it is investing its resources in the most efficient and effective activities. CBP and ICE generally collaborate on IPR enforcement, but according to private sector representatives, restrictions on CBP's information sharing limit private sector enforcement efforts. GAO found that CBP and ICE have undertaken efforts that align with selected key practices for interagency collaboration, such as participating in developing a national IPR enforcement strategy and agreeing on roles and responsibilities. However, sharing additional information about seized items with rights-holding companies and e-commerce websites could improve enforcement, according to private sector representatives. CBP officials said they share information to the extent allowed under current regulations, but CBP has not completed an assessment of what, if any, additional information would be beneficial to share with private sector entities. Without such an assessment, CBP will not know if sharing additional information requires regulatory or legal changes." ]	2,313	gov_report	en	null	9c038d48de72e6cf08727c99ab31e04aa4da29bcfa0bcf13
This report provides responses to frequently asked questions about the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant. It is intended to serve as a quick reference to provide easy access to information and data. Appendix B presents a series of tables with state-level data. This report does not provide information on TANF program rules (for a discussion of TANF rules, see CRS Report RL32748, The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) Block Grant: A Primer on TANF Financing and Federal Requirements , by Gene Falk). On January 24, 2019, the President signed legislation ( P.L. 116-4 ) that funds TANF and related programs through June 30, 2019. The legislation permits states to receive their quarterly TANF grants for the 2 nd quarter (January through March) and 3 rd quarter (April through June) of FY2019. Additional legislation would be required to pay TANF grants in the final quarter (July through September) of FY2019. TANF programs are funded through a combination of federal and state funds. In FY2018, TANF has two federal grants to states. The bulk of the TANF funding is in a basic block grant to the states, totaling $16.5 billion for the 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands, and American Indian tribes. There is also a contingency fund available that provides extra federal funds to states that meet certain conditions. Additionally, states are required to expend a minimum amount of their own funds for TANF and TANF-related activities under what is known as the maintenance of effort (MOE) requirement. States are required to spend at least 75% of what they spent in FY1994 on TANF's predecessor programs. The minimum MOE amount, in total, is $10.3 billion per year for the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and the territories. TANF was created in the 1996 welfare reform law, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA, P.L. 104-193 ). A TANF basic block grant amount—both nationally and for each state—was established in the 1996 welfare reform law. The amount established in that law for the 50 states, District of Columbia, territories, and tribes was $16.6 billion in total. From FY1997 through FY2016, that amount remained the same. It was not adjusted for changes that occur over time, such as inflation, the size of the TANF assistance caseload, or changes in the poverty population. During this period, the real (inflation-adjusted) value of the block grant declined by one-third (33.1%). Beginning with FY2017, the state family assistance grant was reduced by 0.33% from its historical levels to finance TANF-related research and technical assistance. The reduced block grant amount is $16.5 billion. Table 1 shows the state family assistance grant, in both nominal (actual) and real (inflation-adjusted) dollars for each year, FY1997 through FY2018. In real (inflation-adjusted) terms, the FY2018 block grant was 36% below its value in FY1997. Figure 1 shows the uses of federal TANF grants to states and state MOE funds in FY2017. In FY2017, a total of $31.1 billion of both federal TANF and state MOE expenditures were either expended or transferred to other block grant programs. Basic assistance—ongoing benefits to families to meet basic needs—represented 23% ($7.1 billion) of total FY2017 TANF and MOE dollars. TANF is a major contributor of child care funding. In FY2017, $5 billion (16% of all TANF and MOE funds) were either expended on child care or transferred to the child care block grant (the Child Care and Development Fund, or CCDF). TANF work-related activities (including education and training) were the third-largest TANF and MOE spending category at $3.3 billion, or 11% of total TANF and MOE funds. TANF also helps low-wage parents by helping to finance state refundable tax credits, such as state add-ons to the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). TANF and MOE expenditures on refundable tax credits in FY2017 totaled $2.8 billion, or 9% of total TANF and MOE spending. TANF is also a major contributor to the child welfare system, which provides foster care, adoption assistance, and services to families with children who either have experienced or are at risk of experiencing child abuse or neglect, spending about $2.2 billion on such activities. TANF and MOE funds also help fund state prekindergarten (pre-K) programs, with total FY2017 expenditures for that category also at $2.5 billion. TANF and MOE funds are also used for short-term and emergency benefits and a wide range of other social services. For state-specific information on the use of TANF funds, see Table B-1 and Table B-2 . TANF law permits states to "reserve" unused funds without time limit. This permits flexibility in timing of the use of TANF funds, including the ability to "save" funds for unexpected occurrences that might increase costs (such as recessions or natural disasters). At the end of FY2017 (September 30, 2017, the most recent data currently available), a total of $5.1 billion of federal TANF funding remained neither transferred nor spent. However, some of these unspent funds represent monies that states had already committed to spend later. At the end of FY2017, states had made such commitments to spend—that is, had obligated—a total of $1.8 billion. At the end of FY2017, states had $3.3 billion of "unobligated balances." These funds are available to states to make new spending commitments. Table B-3 shows unspent TANF funds by state. This number is not known. Federal TANF reporting requirements focus on families receiving only ongoing assistance . There is no complete reporting on families receiving other TANF benefits and services. Assistance is defined as benefits provided to families to meet ongoing, basic needs. It is most often paid in cash. However, some states use TANF or MOE funds to provide an "earnings supplement" to working parents added to monthly Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) allotments. These "earnings supplements" are paid separately from the regular TANF cash assistance program. Additionally, TANF MOE dollars are used to fund food assistance for immigrants barred from regular SNAP benefits in certain states. These forms of nutrition aid meet an ongoing need, and thus are considered TANF assistance. As discussed in a previous section of this report, TANF basic assistance accounts for about 24% of all TANF expenditures. Therefore, the federal reporting requirements that pertain to families receiving "assistance" are likely to undercount the number of families receiving any TANF-funded benefit or service. Table 2 provides assistance caseload information. A total of 1.2 million families, composed of 3.1 million recipients, received TANF- or MOE-funded assistance in September 2018. The bulk of the "recipients" were children—2.3 million in that month. For state-by-state assistance caseloads, see Table B-4 . Figure 2 provides a long-term historical perspective on the number of families receiving assistance from TANF or its predecessor program, from July 1959 to September 2017. The shaded areas of the figure represent months when the national economy was in recession. Though the health of the national economy has affected the trend in the cash assistance caseload, the long-term trend in receipt of cash assistance does not follow a classic countercyclical pattern. Such a pattern would have the caseload rise during economic slumps, and then fall again during periods of economic growth. Factors other than the health of the economy (demographic trends, policy changes) also have influenced the caseload trend. The figure shows two periods of sustained caseload increases: the period from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s and a second period from 1988 to 1994. The number of families receiving assistance peaked in March 1994 at 5.1 million families. The assistance caseload fell rapidly in the late 1990s (after the 1996 welfare reform law) before leveling off in 2001. In 2004, the caseload began another decline, albeit at a slower pace than in the late 1990s. During the recent 2007-2009 recession and its aftermath, the caseload began to rise from 1.7 million families in August 2008, peaking in December 2010 at close to 2.0 million families. By September 2018, the assistance caseload had declined to 1.2 million families. Table B-5 shows recent trends in the number of cash assistance families by state. Before PRWORA, the "typical" family receiving assistance has been headed by a single parent (usually the mother) with one or two children. That single parent has also typically been unemployed. However, over the past 20 years the assistance caseload decline has occurred together with a major shift in the composition of the rolls. Figure 3 shows the change in the size and composition of the assistance caseload under both AFDC (1988 and 1994) and TANF. In FY1988, an estimated 84% of AFDC families were headed by an unemployed adult recipient. In FY2016, families with an unemployed adult recipient represented 32% of all cash assistance families. This decline occurred, in large part, as the number of families headed by unemployed adult recipients declined more rapidly than other components of the assistance caseload. In FY1994, a monthly average of 3.8 million families per month who received AFDC cash assistance had adult recipients who were not working. In FY2016, a monthly average of 485,000 families per month had adult recipients or work-eligible individuals, with no adult recipient or work-eligible individual working. With the decline in families headed by unemployed adults, the share of the caseload represented by families with employed adults and "child only" families has increased. In FY2017, families with all adult recipients unemployed and families with employed adult recipients each represented 31% of all assistance families. The latter category includes families in "earnings supplement" programs separate from the regular TANF cash assistance program. "Child-only" families are those where no adult recipient receives benefits in their own right; the family receives benefits on behalf of its children. The share of the caseload that was child-only in FY2017 was 38%. In FY2017, families with a nonrecipient, nonparent relative (grandparents, aunts, uncles) represented 14% of all assistance families. Families with ineligible, noncitizen adults or adults who have not reported their citizenship status made up 9% of the assistance caseload in that year. Families where the parent received Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and the children received TANF made up 9% of all assistance families in FY2017. There are no federal rules that help determine the amount of TANF cash benefits paid to a family. (There are also no federal rules that require states to use TANF to pay cash benefits, though all states do so.) Benefit amounts are determined solely by the states. Most states base TANF cash benefit amounts on family size, paying larger cash benefits to larger families on the presumption that they have greater financial needs. The maximum monthly cash benefit is usually paid to a family that receives no other income (e.g., no earned or unearned income) and complies with program rules. Families with income other than TANF often are paid a reduced benefit. Moreover, some families are financially sanctioned for not meeting a program requirement (e.g., a work requirement), and are also paid a lower benefit. Figure 4 shows the maximum monthly TANF cash benefit by state for a single mother caring for two children (family of three) in July 2016. The benefit amounts shown are those for a single-parent family with two children. For a family of three, the maximum TANF benefit paid in July 2017 varied from $170 per month in Mississippi to $1,201 per month in New Hampshire. The map shows a regional pattern to the maximum monthly benefit paid, with lower benefit amounts in the South than in other regions. Only New Hampshire (at 60% of the federal poverty guidelines) had a maximum TANF cash assistance amount for this sized family in excess of 50% of poverty-level income. TANF's main federal work requirement is actually a performance measure that applies to the states, rather than individual recipients. States determine the work rules that apply to individual recipients. The TANF statute requires states to have 50% of their caseload meet standards of participation in work or activities—that is, a family member must be in specified activities for a minimum number of hours. There is a separate participation standard that applies to the two-parent portion of a state's caseload, requiring 90% of the state's two-parent caseload to meet participation standards. However, the statutory work participation standards are reduced by a "caseload reduction credit." The caseload reduction credit reduces the participation standard one percentage point for each percentage point decline in a state's caseload. Additionally, under a regulatory provision, a state may get "extra" credit for caseload reduction if it spends more than required under the TANF MOE. Therefore, the effective standards states face are often less than the 50% and 90% targets, and vary by state and by year. States that do not meet the TANF work participation standard are at risk of being penalized through a reduction in their block grant. However, penalties can be forgiven if a state claims, and the Secretary of HHS finds, that it had "reasonable cause" for not meeting the standard. Penalties can also be forgiven for states that enter into "corrective compliance plans," and subsequently meet the work standard. The 50% and 90% target standards that states face, as well as the caseload reduction credit, date back to the 1996 welfare reform law. However, the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA, P.L. 109-171 ) made several changes to the work participation rules effective in FY2007 The caseload reduction credit was changed to measure caseload reduction from FY2005, rather than the original law's FY1995. The work participation standards were broadened to include families receiving cash aid in "separate state programs." Separate state programs are programs run with state funds, distinct from a state's "TANF program," but with expenditures countable toward the TANF MOE. HHS was instructed to provide definition to the allowable TANF work activities listed in law. HHS was also required to define what is meant by a "work-eligible" individual, expanding the number of families that are included in the work participation calculation. States were required to develop plans and procedures to verify work activities. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA, P.L. 111-5 ), a law enacted in response to the sharp economic downturn of 2007-2009, held states "harmless" for caseload increases affecting the work participation standards for FY2009 through FY2011. It did so by allowing states to "freeze" caseload reduction credits at pre-recession levels through the FY2011 standards. HHS computes two work participation rates for each state that are then compared with the effective (after-credit) standard to determine if it has met the TANF work standard. An "all-families" work participation rate is computed and compared with the all-families effective standard (50% minus the state's caseload reduction credit). HHS also computes a two-parent work participation rate that is compared with the two-parent effective standard (90% minus the state's caseload reduction credit). Figure 5 shows the national average all-families work participation rate for FY2002 through FY2017. For the period FY2002 through FY2011, states achieved an average all-families work participation rate hovering around 30%. The work participation rate increased since then. In FY2016, it exceeded 50% for the first time since TANF was established. However, it is important to note that the increase in the work participation rate has not come from an increase in the number of recipients in regular TANF assistance programs who are either working or in job preparation activities. This increase stems mostly from states creating new "earnings supplement" programs that use TANF funds to aid working parents in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly food stamps) or who have left the regular TANF assistance programs for work. Figure 6 shows which states did not meet the TANF all-families work participation standards from FY2006 through FY2017. Before FY2007, the first year that DRA was effective, only a few jurisdictions did not meet TANF all-families work participation standards. However, in FY2007, 15 jurisdictions did not meet the all-families standard. This number declined to 9 in FY2008 and 8 in FY2009. In FY2012, despite the uptick in the national average work participation rate, 16 states did not meet the all-family standard, the largest number of states that did not meet their participation standards in any one year since the enactment of TANF. FY2012 was the year that ARRA's "freeze" of the caseload reduction credit expired, and states were generally required to meet higher standards than in previous years. The number of jurisdictions that did not meet the all-families standard declined over the FY2012 to FY2017 period. In FY2017, two jurisdictions did not meet the all-family participation standard: Nevada and Guam. In addition to meeting a work standard for all families, TANF also imposes a second standard—90%—for the two-parent portion of its cash assistance caseload. This standard can also be lowered by caseload reduction. Figure 7 shows whether each state met its two-parent work participation standard for FY2006 through FY2017. However, the display on the table is more complex than that for reporting whether a state met or did not meet its "all family" rate. A substantial number of states have reported no two-parent families subject to the work participation standard. These states are denoted on the table with an "NA," indicating that the two-parent standard was not applicable to the state in that year. Before the changes made by the DRA were effective, a number of states had their two-parent families in separate state programs that were not included in the work participation calculation. When DRA brought families receiving assistance in separate state programs into the work participation rate calculations, a number of states moved these families into solely state-funded programs. These are state-funded programs with expenditures not countable toward the TANF maintenance of effort requirement, and hence are outside of TANF's rules. For states with two-parent families in their caseloads, the table reports "Yes" for states that met the two-parent standard, and "No" for states that did not meet the two-parent standard. Of the 28 jurisdictions that had two-parent families in their FY2017 TANF work participation calculation, 19 met the standard and 9 did not. Appendix A. Supplementary Tables Appendix B. State Tables	[ "The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant funds a wide range of benefits and services for low-income families with children. TANF was created in the 1996 welfare reform law (P.L. 104-193). This report responds to some frequently asked questions about TANF; it does not describe TANF rules (see, instead, CRS Report RL32748, The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) Block Grant: A Primer on TANF Financing and Federal Requirements, by Gene Falk). TANF Funding and Expenditures. TANF provides fixed funding for the 50 states, the District of Columbia, the territories, and American Indian tribes. The basic block grant totals $16.5 billion per year. States are also required in total to contribute, from their own funds, at least $10.3 billion annually under a maintenance-of-effort (MOE) requirement. Though TANF is best known for funding cash assistance payments for needy families with children, the block grant and MOE funds are used for a wide variety of benefits and activities. In FY2017, expenditures on basic assistance totaled $7.1 billion—23% of total federal TANF and MOE dollars. Basic assistance is often—but not exclusively—paid as cash. In addition to funding basic assistance, TANF also contributes funds for child care and services for children who have been, or are at risk of being, abused and neglected. Some states also count expenditures in prekindergarten programs toward the MOE requirement. The TANF Assistance Caseload. A total of 1.2 million families, composed of 3.1 million recipients, received TANF- or MOE-funded assistance in September 2018. The bulk of the \"recipients\" were children—2.3 million in that month. The assistance caseload is heterogeneous. The type of family once thought of as the \"typical\" assistance family—one with an unemployed adult recipient—accounted for 32% of all families on the rolls in FY2016. Additionally, 31% of cash assistance families had an employed adult, while 38% of all TANF families were \"child-only\" and had no adult recipient. Child-only families include those with disabled adults receiving Supplemental Security Income (SSI), adults who are nonparents (e.g., grandparents, aunts, uncles) caring for children, and families consisting of citizen children and ineligible noncitizen parents. Cash Assistance Benefits. TANF cash benefit amounts are set by states. In July 2017, the maximum monthly benefit for a family of three ranged from $1,021 in New Hampshire to $170 in Mississippi. Only New Hampshire (at 60% of the federal poverty guidelines) had a maximum TANF cash assistance amount for this sized family in excess of 50% of poverty-level income. Work Requirements. TANF's main federal work requirement is actually a performance measure that applies to the states. States determine the work rules that apply to individual recipients. TANF law requires states to engage 50% of all families and 90% of two-parent families with work-eligible individuals in work activities, though these standards can be reduced by \"credits.\" Therefore, the effective standards states face are often less than the 50% or 90% targets, and vary by state. In FY2017, states achieved, on average, an all-family participation rate of 53.0% and a two-parent rate of 69.5%. In FY2017, two jurisdictions did not meet the all-family participation standard: Nevada and Guam. This is a reduction from FY2012, when 16 states did not meet that standard. In FY2017, nine jurisdictions did not meet the two-parent standard. States that do not meet work standards are at risk of being penalized by a reduction in their block grant." ]	3,000	gov_report	en	null	4db8caaa719ef5944f368d2cdad0f3a2499eb2d7e9de64a5
Medicare pays for laboratory tests that are performed individually or in a group. For individual tests, laboratories submit claims to Medicare for each test they perform that is on the CLFS; tests are identified using a billing code. Prior to the implementation of PAMA in 2018, the payment rates on the CLFS were based on rates charged for laboratory tests in 1984 through 1985 adjusted for inflation. Additionally, 57 geographic jurisdictions had their own fee schedules for laboratory tests. CMS used the 57 separate fee schedules to calculate a national limitation amount, which served as the maximum payment for individual laboratory tests. Thus, the payment rate for an individual test was the lesser of the amount claimed by the laboratory, the local fee for a geographic area, or the national limitation amount for a particular test. Medicare pays bundled payment rates for certain laboratory tests that are performed as a group, called panel tests. Panel tests can be divided into two categories—those without billing codes and those with billing codes. Panel tests without billing codes are composed of at least 2 of 23 distinct component tests. Additionally, there are 7 specific combinations of these 23 component tests that are commonly used and have their own billing code. Prior to 2018, Medicare paid for both types of panel tests (those without or with a billing code) using a bundled rate based on the number of tests performed, with modest payment increases for each additional test conducted. For example, in 2017, Medicare paid $7.15 for panel tests with two component tests and $9.12 for panel tests with 3 component tests, with a maximum bundled payment rate of $16.64 for all 23 component tests. Prior to 2018, the Medicare Administrative Contractors would count the number of tests performed before determining the appropriate bundled payment rate. For those panel tests with a billing code, the payment rate was the same if laboratories used the associated billing code for the panel test or listed each of the component tests separately. After PAMA’s implementation in 2018, the 57 separate fee schedules for individual laboratory tests were replaced with a single national fee schedule. The payment rates for this single national fee schedule were based on private-payer rates for laboratory tests paid from January 1, 2016 through June 30, 2016. Specifically, the payment rate for an individual test was generally based on the median private-payer rates for a given test, weighted by test volume. Payment for panel tests also changed in 2018. For panel tests without billing codes, Medicare Administrative Contractors no longer counted the number of component tests performed to determine the bundled payment rate; instead, Medicare paid the separate rate for each component test in the panel. For panel tests with a billing code, the payment rate depended on how the laboratory submitted the claim. If a laboratory used the billing code associated with the panel test, Medicare paid the bundled payment rate for that billing code. If a laboratory submitted a claim for the panel test, but listed each of the component tests separately instead of using the panel test’s billing code, Medicare paid the individual payment rate for each component test. Table 1 below summarizes the changes to payment rates before and after 2018. Multiple types of laboratories receive payment under Medicare. The three laboratory types that received the most revenue from the CLFS in 2016 were independent laboratories, hospital-outreach laboratories, and physician-office laboratories. (See table 2.) Estimates of the size of the total U.S. laboratory market vary. For example, the Healthcare Fraud Prevention Partnership estimated that the laboratory industry received $87 billion in revenue in 2017, while another market report estimated the laboratory industry received $75 billion in revenue in 2016. Similar to Medicare, the three laboratory types that generally receive the most revenue overall are independent laboratories, hospital-outreach laboratories, and physician-office laboratories, when laboratory tests performed in hospital inpatient and outpatient settings were excluded. Estimates of revenue received by these laboratories also vary. For example, in recent years, estimates of the share of laboratory industry revenue generated by independent laboratories ranged from 37 percent to 54 percent. Additionally, estimates of revenue generated by hospital- outreach laboratories recently ranged from 21 to 35 percent, and physician-office laboratories ranged from 4 to 11 percent of total laboratory industry revenue. Private-payer rates for laboratory tests conducted by the three largest laboratory types generally vary by type and other characteristics, according to market reports and the laboratory industry officials we interviewed. Independent laboratories. These laboratories generally receive lower private-payer rates than other types of laboratories, according to industry officials we interviewed. Market reports we reviewed noted that about half of the independent laboratory market is dominated by two national laboratories and that these national laboratories provide more competitive pricing by performing a large volume of tests at one time. Medicare accounted for a smaller proportion of the revenue earned by these two national laboratories (12 percent), compared to other laboratories, according to another market report we reviewed. In contrast, a different market report noted that smaller, independent laboratories tend to earn more of their revenue from Medicare (34 percent). Hospital-outreach laboratories. These hospital-affiliated laboratories typically receive relatively higher private-payer rates, according to industry officials we interviewed. Although hospital- outreach laboratories perform tests similar to other laboratories, they can obtain above-average payment rates by leveraging the market power of their affiliated hospital when negotiating rates with private payers, according to industry officials and market reports. Hospital-outreach laboratories generally receive about 25 to 30 percent of their revenue from the Medicare CLFS. Physician-office laboratories. Physician-office laboratories typically receive higher private-payer rates than independent laboratories, according to a recent analysis by a laboratory industry association. This industry association also noted that the cost structure to operate in a setting such as a physician-office laboratory is different than in large independent laboratories, as the physician-office laboratory is unable to conduct a large number of tests at one time. Officials from another industry association we interviewed said that payment rates for these laboratories are generally dependent on the size of the physician practice group. These same officials told us that larger physician groups (e.g., 10 or more physicians) typically negotiate higher rates from private payers than smaller physician groups. Most physician-office laboratories received less than $25,000 in revenue per year from Medicare, according to CMS. Additionally, in 2013, the Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General found that Medicare’s payment rates on the CLFS were higher than rates paid by some private health insurance plans. Specifically, it found that Medicare rates for laboratory tests were 18 percent to 30 percent higher than rates paid by certain insurers under health benefits plans for federal employees. Definition of Applicable Laboratories Required to Report Private-Payer Data to CMS CMS defined applicable laboratories as those meeting four criteria: (1) they met the definition of laboratory under regulations implementing the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988; (2) they billed Medicare Part B under their own Medicare billing number, also called the national provider identifier; (3) more than 50 percent of their total Medicare revenues came from the Clinical Laboratory Fee Schedule (CLFS) and/or the Physician Fee Schedule; and (4) they received at least $12,500 in Medicare revenue from the CLFS from January 1, 2016, through June 30, 2016. CMS analyzed private-payer data it collected from about 2,000 laboratories to develop new payment rates for individual laboratory tests on the CLFS. PAMA defined laboratories required to report private-payer data, called applicable laboratories, as laboratories that meet certain criteria. (See sidebar.) Applicable laboratories with their own specific billing number, the NPI, submitted these data to CMS. If one organization operated multiple applicable laboratories, each with its own NPI, then the organization could report data to CMS for multiple applicable laboratories. CMS collected data from applicable laboratories on payments they received from private payers during the first half of 2016. Specifically, CMS collected data on (1) the unique billing code associated with a laboratory test; (2) the private-payer rate for each laboratory test for which final payment was made during the data collection period (January 1, 2016, through June 30, 2016); and (3) the volume of tests performed for each unique billing code at that private- payer rate. For the data CMS collected between January 1, 2017, and May 30, 2017, CMS relied on the entities reporting to CMS to attest to the completeness and accuracy of the data they submitted. CMS relied on each laboratory to identify whether or not it was an applicable laboratory and took steps to assist laboratories in meeting reporting requirements. According to CMS officials, they relied on laboratories to self-identify as applicable laboratories because they were unable to accurately identify the number of laboratories required to report. To assist laboratories, CMS issued multiple guidance documents to the industry outlining the criteria for being an applicable laboratory and describing the type of data CMS intended to collect. CMS also conducted educational calls when the proposed and final rules were issued and prior to the data collection period. CMS officials told us they conducted additional outreach activities, including holding conference calls with national laboratory associations and attending professional conferences. Officials said they used these outreach activities in addition to the guidance issued to inform laboratories of the reporting requirements for applicable laboratories, for example. In addition, CMS established a revenue threshold of $12,500 in an effort to reduce the reporting burden for entities that receive a relatively small amount of revenues under the CLFS. In its final rule, CMS noted that it expected that many of the laboratories that would be below this revenue threshold and, thus exempt from reporting data to CMS, would be physician-office laboratories. CMS also chose to use the NPI in its definition of applicable laboratory in the final rule to allow hospital- outreach laboratories that use their own NPI to submit data to the agency. In its proposed rule, CMS suggested using an alternative identification number to the NPI. However, according to the final rule, CMS chose to use the NPI in its definition of applicable laboratory to allow those hospital-outreach laboratories billing using their own NPI to submit private-payer data to the agency. According to CMS, at the end of the 5-month submission period, the agency had received data from approximately 2,000 applicable laboratories, representing a volume of almost 248 million laboratory tests; these data accounted for about $31 billion in revenue from private payers. CMS reported that the data it collected included private-payer rates for 96 percent of the 1,347 eligible billing codes on the CLFS. CMS used these data to calculate a median, private-payer rate, weighted by volume and phased in this change by limiting payment-rate reductions to 10 percent per year. Beginning in 2018, these new payment rates served as the single, national payment rate for individual laboratory tests. These payment rates were also used for the individual, component tests that make up panel tests and were used when laboratories billed Medicare for panel tests by listing the component tests separately. In general, the median payments rates, weighted for volume, that CMS calculated were lower than Medicare’s previous payment rates for most laboratory tests. According to our analysis, these median payment rates were lower than the corresponding 2017 CLFS national limitation amounts (the maximum that CMS would pay for laboratory tests) for approximately 88 percent of tests. Figure 1 below describes the percentage difference between these median payment rates and Medicare’s 2017 national limitation amounts for laboratory tests. The final payment rates that CMS calculated, which included the 10- percent, phased in, payment-rate reductions, will remain in effect until December 31, 2020; PAMA requires CMS to calculate new payment rates for the CLFS every 3 years. Reporting entities will next be required to submit data on private-payer rates to CMS in early 2020, for final payments made from January 1, 2019 through June 30, 2019. PAMA capped any reductions for the second 3-year cycle after implementation to a maximum of 15 percent per year. CMS did not collect private-payer data from all laboratories required to report this information and did not estimate how much data was not reported by these laboratories, according to agency officials. CMS relied on laboratories to determine whether they met data reporting requirements and submit data accordingly. CMS emphasized the importance of receiving data from all laboratories required to report by stating that it is critical that CMS collect complete data on private-payer rates in order to set accurate Medicare rates. However, agency officials told us that CMS did not receive data from all laboratories required to report. They also told us that CMS did not have the information available to estimate how much data was missing because not all laboratories reported or the extent to which the data collected were representative of all of the data that laboratories were required to report. Prior to collecting private-payer data, CMS estimated that laboratories subject to reporting requirements would receive more than 90 percent of CLFS expenditures to physician-office laboratories and independent laboratories. Specifically, based on its analysis of 2013 Medicare expenditures, CMS estimated that reporting requirements would apply to the laboratories that received 92 percent of CLFS payments to physician- office laboratories and 99 percent of CLFS payments to independent laboratories. After laboratories reported private-payer data, we analyzed the share of CLFS expenditures received by the laboratories that reported. Our analysis found that CMS collected data from laboratories that received the majority of CLFS payments to physician-office, independent, and other non-hospital laboratories in 2016. However, the laboratories that reported private-payer data received less than 70 percent of CLFS expenditures to physician-office, independent, and other non-hospital laboratories. Specifically, using Medicare claims data, we calculated that CMS collected data from laboratories that received 68 percent of 2016 CLFS payments to physician-office, independent, and other non-hospital laboratories. Although it did not collect complete data, CMS concluded that it collected sufficient private-payer data to set Medicare payment rates and that collecting more data from additional laboratories that were required to report would not significantly affect Medicare expenditures. This conclusion was based, in part, on a sensitivity analyses that CMS conducted of the effects that collecting certain types and amounts of additional data would have on weighted median private-payer rates and the effects those rates could have on Medicare payment rates and, thus, expenditures. Results from these analyses showed that Medicare expenditures based on the CLFS would have changed by 2 percent or less after collecting more data from the various types of laboratories. For example, CMS estimated that doubling the amount of private-payer data from physician-office laboratories would increase expenditures by 2 percent and collecting ten times as much data from hospital outreach laboratories would increase expenditures by 1 percent. (See fig. 2.) PAMA’s 10-percent limit on annual payment-rate reductions likely reduced the effect that incomplete private-payer data could have on the CLFS because this limit applied to most Medicare payment rates for laboratory tests. As demonstrated in figure 1, while 59 percent of tests had median private-payer rates that were at least 30 percent less than their respective 2017 national limitation amounts, CMS published Medicare rates for these tests for 2018 through 2020 that were reduced by only 10 percent per year as a result of this limit. For example, a hypothetical laboratory test with a 2017 CLFS national limitation amount of $10.00 and a median private-payer rate of $7.00 would result in CLFS rates of $9.00 in 2018, $8.10 in 2019, and $7.29 in 2020. Changes to median private-payer rates due to collecting more complete data or eliminating inaccurate data would have no effect on Medicare payment rates from 2018 through 2020 for this hypothetical test if they resulted in new median rates of $7.29 or less. Our analysis of the potential effects that collecting data from additional laboratories could have had on Medicare payment rates and expenditures found that the effect of CMS not collecting complete data would likely have been greater absent PAMA’s limits on annual reductions to Medicare payment rates. As a result, CMS may face challenges setting accurate Medicare rates if it does not collect complete data from all laboratories required to report in the future when PAMA allows for greater annual payment-rate reductions. To conduct this analysis, we used the private-payer data CMS collected to analyze the range of effects that collecting additional data could have on Medicare expenditures, assuming 2016 utilization rates remain constant. The extent of these effects depends on the amount of additional data CMS would need to collect to obtain complete data and whether the payment rates in these additional data would have been greater or less than the medians of the rates reported. For example, we estimated that if CMS needed to collect 20 percent more data for its collection to be complete, doing so could increase Medicare CLFS expenditures from 2018 through 2020 by as much as 3 percent or reduce them by as much as 3 percent depending on the payment rates in these additional data. However, if annual limits to Medicare payment-rate reductions were not applied, collecting these additional data could increase CLFS expenditures by as much as 9 percent or reduce them by as much as 9 percent. (See fig. 3 and app. II for additional information about these estimates.) As demonstrated in figure 2, CMS did analyze how collecting certain types and amounts of data from additional laboratories would affect Medicare expenditures. However, without valid estimates of how much more data these additional laboratories were required to report and how much these data would change median payment rates, it remains unknown whether CMS’s analyses estimate the actual risk of setting Medicare payment rates that do not reflect private-payer rates from all applicable laboratories, as mandated by PAMA. CMS could have compared the data it collected with independent information on the payment rates laboratories were required to report, for example. The independent information could be estimated by auditing a random sample of laboratories or could be estimated using data from third-party vendors, if these vendors could supply relevant and reliable information. We found that CMS mitigated challenges to setting accurate Medicare payment rates by identifying, analyzing, and responding to potentially inaccurate private-payer data. CMS addressed potentially inaccurate private-payer data and other data that CMS determined did not meet reporting requirements. CMS removed or replaced data from four reporting entities that appeared to have or confirmed having reported revenue—which is the payment rate multiplied by the volume of tests paid at that rate—instead of payment rates. We estimated that if CMS had included these data that CLFS expenditures from 2018 through 2020 would have increased by 7 percent. CMS removed data it determined were reported in error including duplicate submissions and submissions with payment rates of $0.00. We estimated that removing these data will change CLFS expenditures from 2018 through 2020 by less than one percent. CMS identified four other types of potentially inaccurate data that it determined would not significantly impact Medicare payment rates or expenditures and did not exclude them from calculations of median private-payer rates. CMS considered the following potentially inaccurate data to have met its reporting requirements: 1. data from 57 entities that reported particularly high rates in at least 60 percent of their data, 2. data from 12 entities that reported particularly low rates in at least 50 percent of their data, 3. data with payment rates that were 10 times greater than the 2017 national limitation amounts or 10 times less than these amounts, and 4. data from laboratories that may not have met the $12,500 low- expenditure threshold or that reported data from a hospital NPI instead of a laboratory NPI. We found that each of these four types of potentially inaccurate data would have changed estimated Medicare CLFS expenditures from 2018 through 2020 by 1 percent or less if CMS had instead excluded the data. To conduct this analysis, we recalculated Medicare rates after excluding each type of data and estimated Medicare expenditures assuming 2016 rates of utilization. Although weighted median private-payer rates were lower than Medicare’s 2017 national limitation amounts for 88 percent of tests, we estimated the total Medicare expenditures based on the 2018 CLFS would likely increase by 3 percent ($225 million overall) compared to 2016 expenditures, assuming test utilization remained at 2016 levels. This increase in estimated expenditures is due, in part, to CMS’s use of above-average payment rates as a baseline to calculate payment rates for those laboratory tests affected by PAMA’s annual payment-rate reduction limit of 10 percent. (See fig. 4.) When applying the 10-percent payment-rate reduction limit, CMS used as its starting point the 2017 national limitation amounts in order to set a single, national payment rate for each laboratory test. Thus, the Medicare payment rate for a test in 2018 could not be less than 90 percent of the test’s 2017 national limitation amount. However, prior to 2018, some payment rates were commonly lower than the national limitation amounts because they were based on the lesser of (1) the amount billed on claims, (2) the local fee for a geographic area, or (3) a national limitation amount, and because panel tests had different bundled payment rates. As a result, by reducing payment rates from national limitation amounts, CMS did not always reduce rates from what Medicare actually paid. Panel tests, in particular, frequently received bundled payment rates that differed substantially from national limitation amounts associated with their billing codes prior to 2018. We compared national limitation amounts, which represent maximum Medicare payment rates for tests, with the average amounts Medicare allowed for payment in 2016, which reflect actual Medicare payment rates. For example, figure 5 below shows that the 2017 national limitation amount for comprehensive metabolic panel tests ($14.49) was substantially higher than both the average amount Medicare allowed for payment in 2016 ($11.45) and the median payment rate laboratories reported receiving from private payers ($9.08). As a result, using the 2017 national limitation amount as a basis for payment reductions caused Medicare’s payment rate to increase from an average allowed amount of $11.45 in 2016, to a payment rate of $13.04 in 2018, instead of decreasing towards a lower median private- payer rate of $9.08. By increasing average payment rates rather than phasing in reductions to rates, CMS’s implementation may lead to paying more than necessary for some tests. Federal standards for internal control for information and communications require agency management to use quality information to achieve its objectives. Basing reductions on national limitation amounts rather than more relevant information on how much Medicare actually paid—such as the average allowable amounts in 2016, for example—could result in Medicare paying more than necessary by $733 million from 2018 through 2020, according to our estimates. In implementing PAMA, CMS eliminated bundled rates for panel tests that lack billing codes and started paying separately for each component test instead. CMS also implemented the 2018 CLFS in a manner that could lead to unbundling payment rates for panel tests with billing codes. If payment rates for all panel tests were unbundled, we estimated that Medicare expenditures could increase by $218 million for panel tests that lack billing codes and by as much as $10.1 billion for panel tests with billing codes from 2018 through 2020. CMS also estimated that there could be significant risks of paying more than necessary associated with unbundling and has taken initial steps to monitor these risks and explore possible responses, but had not yet responded to these risks as of July 2018. CMS Unbundled Payment Rates for Panel Tests without Billing Codes Beginning in 2018, CMS no longer uses bundled payment rates for panel tests without billing codes and instead pays laboratories individual payments for each component test that comprises these panel tests. However, CMS staff and members of its advisory panel discussed concerns with this approach. At an advisory panel meeting in 2016, CMS staff relayed concerns from stakeholders that CMS would not be able to collect valid data on private-payer rates for these panel tests. According to agency staff, stakeholders had informed CMS that private payers commonly use bundled payment rates for these panel tests, but laboratories would only be able to report unbundled payment rates for individual component tests. We estimated that unbundling these payment rates would increase Medicare expenditures from 2018 through 2020 by $218 million in comparison to the estimated Medicare expenditures over the same time period based on Medicare’s 2016 utilization and allowable amounts. For example, under the 2016 CLFS, Medicare paid approximately 435,000 claims for panel tests that included the laboratory tests assay of creatinine (HCPCS code 82565) and assay of urea nitrogen (HCPCS code 84520) at an average bundled payment rate of $6.82. In contrast, under the 2018 CLFS, these two component tests are reimbursed individually at $6.33 and $4.88, respectively, or $11.21 combined—a 63 percent increase. Despite concerns about the validity of available private-payer data on component tests for panel tests without billing codes, CMS used these data to set payment rates for component tests. CMS officials told us that they stopped using bundled payment rates for these panel tests because it is not clear that CMS has the authority to combine the individual component tests into groups for bundled payment as it did before 2018 due to PAMA’s reference to payments for each test. However, in July 2018, CMS officials told us the agency was reviewing its authority regarding this issue. CMS officials told us they are exploring alternative approaches that could limit increases to Medicare expenditures but had not yet determined what additional legal authority would be needed, if any, and did not know when CMS would make this determination. Agency officials told us that CMS has taken initial steps to monitor unbundling and explore possible responses, including the following: Monitoring unbundling: CMS has begun monitoring changes in panel test utilization, payment rates, and expenditures associated with its implementation of PAMA, according to officials. For example, CMS officials told us that preliminary data indicated that Medicare payments for individual component tests of panel tests has increased substantially in 2018, but, as of July 2018, it was too early to draw conclusions from these data because laboratories have up to one year to submit claims for tests. Collecting input on alternatives: In 2016, a subcommittee of an advisory panel that CMS established reviewed Medicare’s use of bundled payment rates for panel tests and published different approaches for CMS to consider implementing in combination with other changes to implement PAMA. CMS’s Implementation of PAMA May Have Allowed Unbundling of Payment Rates for Panel Tests with Billing Codes Beginning in 2018, laboratories that submit claims for any of the seven panel tests with billing codes by using the billing codes for the individual component tests now receive the payment rate for each component test, rather than the bundled rate. Prior to 2018, laboratories could submit claims for these panel tests either by using the specific codes for panel tests or by billing separately for each of the component tests, and, regardless of how laboratories submitted claims, Medicare Administrative Contractors would pay bundled payment rates based on how many of the 23 component tests were conducted. However, CMS instructed Medicare Administrative Contractors to stop bundling payment rates for tests that are billed individually on claims rather than billed on claims using codes for panel tests, beginning in 2018. CMS did so because it was not clear that CMS had the authority to combine the individual component tests into groups for bundled payment as it did before 2018 due to PAMA’s reference to payments for individual tests, according to agency officials. This change could potentially have a large effect on Medicare spending. For example, if a laboratory submitted a claim individually for the 14 component tests that comprise a comprehensive metabolic panel it would receive a payment of $81.91, a 528 percent increase from the 2018 Medicare bundled payment rate of $13.04 for this panel test. (See fig. 6.) Improving how reductions to payment rates for panel tests are phased in could mitigate, but not completely counteract, the effect of unbundling these payment rates. For example, for the comprehensive metabolic panel test described in figure 6, basing maximum reductions on 2016 average allowable amounts would result in a 2018 Medicare bundled payment rate of $10.31 instead of $13.04 and individual payment rates for the 14 component tests that total $56.06—a 32 percent decrease from $81.91 that Medicare would otherwise pay. If the payment rate for each panel test with a billing code were unbundled, we estimated that Medicare expenditures for these tests from 2018 through 2020 could reach $13.5 billion, a $10.1 billion increase from the $3.3 billion we estimated Medicare would spend using the bundled payment rates in the CLFS. Similarly, prior to implementing PAMA, CMS estimated that Medicare expenditures to physician-office, independent, and other non-hospital laboratories could potentially increase as much as $2.5 billion in 2018, alone if it paid for the same number of panel tests with billing codes as it did in 2016 but paid for each component test individually. These estimates represent an upper limit on the increased expenditures that could occur if every laboratory stopped using panel test billing codes and instead used the billing codes for individual component tests. We do not know the extent to which laboratories will stop filing claims using panel test billing codes. CMS officials also told us that they were aware of the risks associated with paying for the individual component tests instead of the bundled payment rate for a panel test with a billing code. However, CMS guidance, which was effective in 2018, continued to allow laboratories to use the billing codes for individual component tests rather than the billing code for the panel. CMS officials explained that this was due to PAMA’s reference to payments for individual tests, similar to CMS’s decision to stop paying bundled rates for panel tests without billing codes. At the time we did our work, CMS had not implemented a response to these risks but had taken some initial steps to monitor unbundling and consider alternative approaches to Medicare payment rates for these tests. HHS provided additional information on planned activities to address these risks in its written comments on a draft of this report. (See app. III.) CMS collected data on private-payer rates from laboratories that were required to report these data, but not all laboratories complied with the reporting requirement, and the extent of noncompliance remains unclear. PAMA’s provision directing CMS to phase in payment-rate reductions to Medicare payment rates likely moderates the potential adverse effects of incomplete private-payer data. However, in the future, failing to collect complete data could substantially affect Medicare payment rates because private-payer rates alone will determine Medicare payment rates. In addition, we estimated that Medicare expenditures on laboratory tests will be $733 million higher from 2018 through 2020, because CMS started phasing in payment-rate reductions from national limitation amounts instead of more relevant data on actual payment rates, such as average allowable amounts. Finally, changes to payment rates, billing practices, and testing practices could increase Medicare expenditures by as much as $10.3 billion from 2018 through 2020, if CMS does not address the risks associated with unbundling payment rates for panel tests. Agency officials indicated that it was unclear if PAMA limited CMS’s ability to combine individual component tests into groups for bundled payment, and, as of July 2018, CMS was reviewing this matter but did not know when it would make a determination. We are making the following three recommendations to CMS: The Administrator of CMS should take steps to collect all of the data from all laboratories that are required to report. If only partial data can be collected, CMS should estimate how incomplete data would affect Medicare payment rates and address any significant challenges to setting accurate Medicare rates. (Recommendation 1) The Administrator of CMS should phase in payment-rate reductions that start from the actual payment rates Medicare paid prior to 2018 rather than the national limitation amounts. CMS should revise these rates as soon as practicable to prevent paying more than necessary. (Recommendation 2) The Administrator of CMS should use bundled rates for panel tests, consistent with its practice prior to 2018, rather than paying for them individually; if necessary, the Administrator of CMS should seek legislative authority to do so. (Recommendation 3) We provided a draft of this report to HHS for review and comment. HHs provided written comments, which are reproduced in appendix III. HHS also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. HHS concurred with our first recommendation to take steps to collect all data from laboratories required to report and commented that it is evaluating ways to increase reporting. In particular, in a November 2018 final rule, HHS changed the definition of an applicable laboratory, which it expects will increase the number of laboratories required to report data on private-payer rates to the agency. HHS neither agreed nor disagreed with our second recommendation to phase in payment-rate reductions that start from the actual payment rates Medicare paid prior to 2018. HHS noted that any changes to the phasing in of payment-rate reductions would need to be implemented through rulemaking. We estimated that by using the national limitation amounts as a starting point for these reductions, Medicare expenditures would increase by $733 million from 2018 through 2020. For this reason, we continue to believe CMS should revise these rates as soon as practicable and through whatever mechanism CMS determines appropriate. HHS neither agreed nor disagreed with our third recommendation to use bundled rates for panel tests. However, HHS commented that it is taking steps to address this issue. More specifically, for panel tests with billing codes, HHS is working to implement an automated process to identify claims for panel tests that should receive bundled payments, similar to the process used to bundle payment rates for these panel tests prior to PAMA’s implementation and anticipates implementing this change by the summer of 2019. In addition, HHS posted guidance on November 14, 2018, stating that the panel tests with billing codes, laboratories should submit claims using the corresponding code rather than the codes for the separate component tests beginning in 2019. To reduce the potential of paying more than necessary, we believe it is important that CMS implement its proposed automated process to allow for these payments as soon as possible. In contrast, for panel tests without billing codes, HHS commented that it is continuing to review its authority and considering other approaches to payment for these panel tests, such as adding codes to the CLFS. We estimate that unbundling the payment for these panel tests could increase Medicare expenditures by $218 million from 2018 through 2020 compared to expenditures based on Medicare’s 2016 utilization, and the actual amount could be higher if utilization increases. For this reason, we believe CMS should implement bundled payment rates for these panel tests to avoid excess payments. We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees and the Administrator of CMS. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-7114 or cosgrovej@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV. Appendix I: Table of Key Dates Related to Developing the New Payment Rates for the 2018 Clinical Laboratory Fee Schedule Event Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) issued the CLFS proposed rule. CMS issued responses to frequently asked questions regarding the CLFS proposed rule. CMS issued the CLFS final rule. CMS issued responses to frequently asked questions regarding the CLFS final rule. CMS held the joint Annual Laboratory Public Meeting and Medicare Advisory Panel on Clinical Diagnostic Laboratory Tests meeting. CMS issued laboratory billing codes subject to data collection and reporting. CMS issued guidance to laboratories for collecting and reporting data. CMS held a Medicare Advisory Panel on Clinical Diagnostic Laboratory Tests meeting. CMS issued the CLFS data reporting template. CMS collected data on (1) the billing code associated with a laboratory test; (2) the private-payer rate for each laboratory test for which final payment was made during the data collection period (i.e., January 1, 2016, through June 30, 2016); and (3) the volume of tests performed for each billing code at that private-payer rate. CMS issued additional guidance for laboratories as the data collection period began. CMS issued the CLFS fee-for-service data collection user’s manual. CMS issued revised guidance to laboratories for collecting and reporting data. CMS held a Medicare Advisory Panel on Clinical Diagnostic Laboratory Tests meeting. CMS released the proposed CLFS rates. CMS held a Medicare Advisory Panel on Clinical Diagnostic Laboratory Tests meeting. Deadline for stakeholders to submit comments on the proposed CLFS rates to CMS. CMS issued the final CLFS rates. New CLFS rates became effective. Table 4 below demonstrates the challenges the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) faces in setting accurate Medicare payment rates to the extent it does not collect complete data from laboratories on private-payer rates. Specifically, the table shows the potential effect that collecting additional data for each laboratory test could have on Medicare expenditures and how this effect could vary depending on (1) the amount of additional data collected, (2) payment rates in the additional data, and (3) limits to annual reductions in Medicare payment rates. These limits are in place from 2018 through 2023 to phase in changes to payment rates. In addition to the contact named above, Martin T. Gahart, Assistant Director; Gay Hee Lee, Analyst-in-Charge; Kaitlin Farquharson, Sandra George, Dan Lee, Elizabeth T. Morrison, Laurie Pachter, Vikki Porter, and Russell Voth made key contributions to this report.	[ "Medicare paid $7.1 billion for 433 million laboratory tests in 2017. These tests help health care providers prevent, diagnose, and treat diseases. PAMA included a provision for GAO to review CMS's implementation of new payment rates for these tests. This report addresses, among other objectives, (1) how CMS developed the new payment rates; (2) challenges CMS faced in setting accurate payment rates and what factors may have mitigated these challenges; and (3) the potential effect of the new payment rates on Medicare expenditures. GAO analyzed 2016 Medicare claims data (the most recent data available when GAO started its work and the year on which new payment rates were based) and private-payer data CMS collected. GAO also interviewed CMS and industry officials. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) revised the Clinical Laboratory Fee Schedule (CLFS) for 2018, establishing new Medicare payment rates for laboratory services. Prior to 2018, these rates were based on historical laboratory fees and were typically higher than the rates paid by private payers. The Protecting Access to Medicare Act of 2014 (PAMA) required CMS to develop a national fee schedule for laboratory tests based on private-payer data. To revise the rates, CMS collected data on private-payer rates from approximately 2,000 laboratories and calculated median payment rates, weighted by volume. GAO found that the median private-payer rates were lower than Medicare's maximum payment rates in 2017 for 88 percent of tests. CMS is gradually phasing in reductions to Medicare payment rates, limited annually at 10 percent over a 3-year period (2018 through 2020), as outlined in PAMA. CMS relied on laboratories to determine whether they met data reporting requirements, but agency officials told GAO that CMS did not receive data from all laboratories required to report. CMS did not estimate the amount of data it should have received from laboratories that were required to report but did not. CMS took steps to exclude inaccurate private-payer data and estimated how collecting certain types and amounts of additional private-payer data could affect Medicare expenditures. However, it is not known whether CMS's estimates reflect the actual risk of incomplete data resulting in inaccurate Medicare payment rates. GAO found that PAMA's phased in reductions to new Medicare payment rates likely mitigated this risk of inaccurate Medicare payment rates from 2018 through 2020. However, GAO found that collecting incomplete data could have a larger effect on the accuracy of Medicare payment rates in future years when PAMA allows for greater payment-rate reductions. CMS's implementation of the new payment rates could lead Medicare to pay billions of dollars more than is necessary and result in CLFS expenditures increasing from what Medicare paid prior to 2018 for two reasons. First, CMS used the maximum Medicare payment rates in 2017 as a baseline to start the phase in of payment-rate reductions instead of using actual Medicare payment rates. This resulted in excess payments for some laboratory tests and, in some cases, higher payment rates than those Medicare previously paid, on average. GAO estimated that Medicare expenditures from 2018 through 2020 may be $733 million more than if CMS had phased in payment-rate reductions based on the average payment rates in 2016. Second, CMS stopped paying a bundled payment rate for certain panel tests (groups of laboratory tests generally performed together), as was its practice prior to 2018, because CMS had not yet clarified its authority to do so under PAMA, according to officials. CMS is currently reviewing whether it has the authority to bundle payment rates for panel tests to reflect the efficiency of conducting a group of tests. GAO estimated that if the payment rate for each panel test were unbundled, Medicare expenditures could increase by as much as $10.3 billion from 2018 through 2020 compared to estimated Medicare expenditures using lower bundled payment rates for panel tests. GAO recommends that the Administrator of CMS (1) collect complete private-payer data from all laboratories required to report or address the estimated effects of incomplete data, (2) phase in payment-rate reductions that start from the actual payment rates rather than the maximum payment rates Medicare paid prior to 2018, and (3) use bundled rates for panel tests. HHS concurred with GAO's first recommendation, neither agreed nor disagreed with the other two, and has since issued guidance to help address the third. GAO believes CMS should fully address these recommendations to prevent Medicare from paying more than is necessary." ]	6,322	gov_report	en	null	155a5ed26a157dfdae3b46f8f627df30831753dab59c6bdf
B anks play a critical role in the United States economy, channeling money from savers to borrowers and facilitating productive investment. Among other things, banks provide loans to businesses, help individuals finance purchases of cars and homes, and offer services such as checking and savings accounts, debit cards, and ATMs. In addition to occupying a central role in the American economy, the banking industry is a perennial subject of political interest. While the nature of lawmakers' interest in bank regulation has shifted over time, most bank regulations fall into one of three general categories. First, banks must abide by a variety of safety-and-soundness requirements designed to minimize the risk of their failure and maintain macroeconomic stability. Second, banks must comply with consumer protection rules intended to deter abusive practices and provide consumers with complete information about financial products and services. Third, banks are subject to various reporting , recordkeeping , and anti-money laundering requirements designed to assist law enforcement in investigating criminal activity. The substantive content of these requirements remains the subject of intense debate. However, the division of regulatory authority over banks between the federal government and the states plays a key role in shaping that content. In some cases, federal law displaces (or "preempts") state bank regulations. In other cases, states are permitted to supplement federal regulations with different, sometimes stricter requirements. Because of its substantive implications, federal preemption has recently become a "flashpoint" in debates surrounding bank regulation, with one commentator observing that preemption is "[t]he issue at the center of most disputes between state and federal banking regulators." This report provides an overview of banking preemption. First, the report discusses general principles of federal preemption. Second, the report provides a brief history of the American "dual banking system." Third, the report discusses the Supreme Court's decision in Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson , where the Court held that federal law preempts state laws that "significantly interfere" with the powers of national banks. Fourth, the report reviews two Supreme Court decisions concerning the extent to which states may exercise "visitorial powers" over national banks. Fifth, the report discusses the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency's (OCC's) preemption rules and provisions in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act concerning the preemption of state consumer protection laws. Finally, the report outlines a number of current issues in banking preemption, including (1) the extent to which non-banks can benefit from federal preemption of state usury laws, (2) the OCC's decision to grant special purpose national bank charters to financial technology (FinTech) companies, and (3) proposals to provide legal protections to banks serving marijuana businesses that comply with state law. The doctrine of federal preemption is grounded in the Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the Constitution, which provides that "the Laws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." The Supreme Court has explained that "under the Supremacy Clause . . . any state law, however clearly within a State's acknowledged power, which interferes with or is contrary to federal law, must yield." The Court has identified two general ways in which federal law can preempt state law. Federal law can expressly preempt state law when a federal statute or regulation contains explicit preemptive language—that is, where a clause in the relevant federal statute or regulation explicitly provides that federal law displaces certain categories of state law. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act, for example, contains a preemption clause providing that some of the Act's provisions "shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any [regulated] employee benefit plan." Federal law can also impliedly preempt state law "when Congress' command is . . . implicitly contained in" the relevant federal law's "structure and purpose." The Supreme Court has identified two subcategories of implied preemption. First, "field preemption" occurs "where [a] scheme of federal regulation is so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it." Second, "conflict preemption" occurs where "compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility," or where state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." In Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council , for example, the Court held that a federal law imposing sanctions on Burma impliedly preempted a Massachusetts law that prohibited state entities from doing business with Burma. The Court reached this conclusion after determining that the state statute posed an obstacle to the federal statute's purposes of (1) providing the President with "flexible" authority over sanctions policy, (2) limiting economic pressure against the Burmese government to the specific range reflected in the federal statute, and (3) granting the President the ability to speak for the country "with one voice." Some federal banking laws expressly preempt state law. Section 521 of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, for example, expressly grants federally insured state banks the right to charge the highest interest rate allowed by the states in which they are located, even when lending to borrowers in other states with stricter usury laws. Other federal banking laws impliedly preempt state law. Specifically, the Supreme Court has held that the National Bank Act impliedly preempts state laws that "significantly interfere" with the powers of national banks. However, all banking preemption issues are heavily influenced by the regulatory architecture surrounding the banking system. The following section of the report accordingly outlines the development of the American "dual banking system." Disputes over the federal government's role in regulating the financial system have been a feature of American politics since the country's inception. In 1791, Congress approved the creation of the First Bank of the United States over fierce opposition from many of the nation's leaders, including James Madison and Thomas Jefferson. In addition to accepting deposits and making loans to the public, the First Bank acted as the federal government's fiscal agent by collecting tax revenues, securing the government's funds, and paying the government's bills. The First Bank's proponents argued that the Bank would facilitate economic growth by extending credit to private businesses and establishing a uniform national currency in the form of the Bank's notes. By contrast, the First Bank's critics argued that the concentration of financial power in a single federal institution threatened state sovereignty and undermined the operations of state-chartered banks. This debate culminated in a victory for the First Bank's critics when Congress refused to renew the Bank's charter by a single vote in 1811. But disputes over the federal government's role in the banking system did not end with the demise of the First Bank. After the War of 1812 generated significant economic turmoil, Congress chartered the Second Bank of the United States for a twenty-year term in 1816. The Second Bank performed many of the same functions as the First Bank and attracted similar criticism, eventually becoming the target of populist fury led by President Andrew Jackson. In 1832, President Jackson vetoed legislation to extend the Second Bank's charter, leading to its demise in 1836. After the Second Bank's charter expired, bank regulation was wholly entrusted to the states. Inspired by the Jacksonian attack on concentrated economic power, a number of states dispensed with the requirement that banks obtain a charter via a special act of the state legislature. Instead, banks in these states could obtain charters from state banking authorities as long as they met certain general conditions. During this "Free Banking era," the country lacked a uniform national currency and relied instead on notes issued by state banks, which circulated at a discount from their face value that reflected the issuing bank's location and credit quality. In some states, so-called "wildcat banks" in remote areas issued notes back by minimal specie (gold or silver), assuming that noteholders would be unlikely to travel long distances to redeem them. These wildcat banks failed at a far higher rate than their urban rivals. Economic historians continue to debate the merits and drawbacks of the Free Banking era. According to the standard narrative, Free Banking was largely a failure, resulting in a large number of bank failures, financial instability, and inefficiencies that accompanied a heterogeneous currency. However, a number of revisionist scholars have questioned this assessment, arguing that despite the high rate of bank failures during the Free Banking Era, total losses to bank noteholders during the period were in fact relatively small. Whatever its virtues and vices, the Free Banking Era came to an end during the Civil War. After the Treasury Department's efforts to finance the war by borrowing from Northern banks led to a shortage in specie, Congress enacted the National Currency Act in 1863 and the National Bank Act (NBA) in 1864. Under the Acts, banks were offered the opportunity to apply for a national charter from the newly created OCC, creating a "dual banking system" in which both the federal government and the states chartered and regulated banks. As a condition of obtaining a national charter, the Acts required banks to purchase United States government bonds, giving the federal government a new source of revenue to fight the war. Once national banks deposited those bonds with the federal government, they were allowed to issue national banknotes up to 90 percent of the market value of their bonds. These national banknotes functioned as a uniform national currency and gave the federal government significant control over the nation's money supply. The creation of a dual banking system was not intended by the proponents of the NBA, who assumed that all state-chartered banks would convert to national charters. In order to incentivize state-chartered banks to make this switch, Congress enacted a ten percent tax on state banknotes in 1865. But the tax did not accomplish its intended purpose. While the number of state-chartered banks fell significantly after the enactment of the NBA, state banks eventually skirted this tax by issuing paper checks in lieu of banknotes. And in the late 19th century, state banking authorities contributed to this regulatory arbitrage by offering their banks laxer regulations than the OCC. As a result, state-chartered banks have outnumbered national banks since 1895, and the dual banking system has survived to this day. Under the contemporary dual banking system, the OCC serves as the primary regulator of national banks and has broad powers to regulate their organization, examination, and operations. Section 24 of the NBA grants national banks a number of powers, including: (1) "discounting and negotiating promissory notes, drafts, bills of exchange, and other evidences of debt," (2) "receiving deposits," (3) "buying and selling exchange, coin, and bullion," (4) "loaning money on personal security," and (5) "obtaining, issuing, and circulating notes." Section 24 also grants national banks "all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking." Federal court and OCC decisions have identified roughly 80 activities that fall within the "incidental powers" of national banks, including the ability to broker annuities charge customers non-interest fees. By contrast, state banking authorities are the primary regulators of state-chartered banks. While state banking laws are by no means uniform, they typically provide state-chartered banks with the power to engage in activities similar to those listed in the NBA and activities that are "incidental to the business of banking." While the OCC and state banking authorities figure prominently in the dual banking system, the Federal Reserve and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) also play important roles in the bank regulatory regime. Congress created the Federal Reserve in 1913 in response to a 1907 banking panic that highlighted the need for a "lender of last resort" to replenish banks' reserves when they experience liquidity shortfalls. Today, the Federal Reserve also conducts the nation's monetary policy, manages certain elements of the country's payment systems, and regulates bank holding companies, financial market utilities, and banks that join the Federal Reserve System (FRS). The Federal Reserve Act requires all national banks to join the FRS and gives state banks the option of joining. The Federal Reserve accordingly serves as the principal federal regulator of state-chartered banks that become members of the FRS. The FDIC serves as the principal federal regulator of state-chartered banks that do not join the FRS. Congress created the FDIC in 1933 after a wave of bank failures generated a self-reinforcing cycle of "contagion," leading depositors to "run" from other banks and cause additional failures. In order to minimize the risk of these types of bank runs, the FDIC insures deposits at regulated institutions up to certain limits and regulates those institutions to ensure their safety and soundness. Because federal law requires national banks to obtain FDIC insurance and all states impose that same requirement on the banks they charter, the FDIC plays a key role in regulating the banking system. This complex regulatory architecture has resulted in "symbiotic system" with both state regulation of national banks and federal regulation of state banks. In the modern dual banking system, national banks are not wholly immune from generally applicable state laws, and state banks are not wholly immune from generally applicable federal laws. The Supreme Court has explained that "general state laws" concerning "the dealings and contracts of national banks" are valid as long as they do not "expressly conflict" with federal law, "frustrate the purpose for which national banks were created," or impair the ability of national banks to "discharge the duties imposed upon them" by federal law. National banks are accordingly "governed in their daily course of business far more by the laws of the State than of the nation" because their contracts, ability to acquire and transfer property, rights to collect debts, and liability to be sued for debts "are all based on State law." The OCC has attempted to synthesize the relevant case law as establishing a general principle that state regulations of national banks are valid as long as they "do not regulate the manner, content or extent of the activities authorized for national banks under federal law, but rather establish the legal infrastructure around the conduct of that business." Similarly, state-chartered banks are not wholly immune from federal law. Rather, state banks are subject to certain federal consumer protection, tax, and antidiscrimination laws, in addition to a range of Federal Reserve and FDIC regulations. A number of other legal developments have caused the regulatory treatment of national banks and state banks to converge. Beginning in the 1960s, many states passed so-called "wild card" statutes granting their banks the power to engage in any activities permitted for national banks. Statutes extending the powers of the Federal Reserve and the FDIC have also ensured competitive equality in the opposite direction. In 1980, Congress enacted legislation requiring all state-chartered banks—including those that do not join the FRS—to abide by reserve requirements set by the Federal Reserve, eliminating the competitive advantage conferred by lower state-law reserve requirements. Similarly, in 1991, Congress enacted legislation prohibiting FDIC-insured state banks from engaging as a principal in activities that are not permitted for national banks absent permission from the FDIC. Because all states require the banks they charter to obtain FDIC insurance, the legislation "had the ultimate effect of unifying the state and the federal banking systems." Finally, some federal statutes either explicitly or implicitly preempt state laws in ways that eliminate unequal regulatory treatment for national and state banks. In Marquette National Bank of Minneapolis v. First Omaha Services Corporation , the Supreme Court held that the NBA grants national banks the power to "export" the maximum interest rates allowed by their "home" states, even when lending to borrowers in other states with stricter usury laws. In that decision, the Court considered whether a national bank headquartered in Nebraska—which permitted banks to charge credit-card holders up to 18 percent interest per year on certain unpaid balances—could charge its Minnesota customers more than the 12 percent maximum interest allowable under Minnesota law. Specifically, the Court evaluated whether an NBA provision allowing national banks to charge interest rates allowed by the states "where the bank[s] [are] located" applies even when national banks extend credit to customers in other states with stricter usury laws. The Court held that the NBA provision indeed afforded national banks this power, concluding that the national bank was permitted to charge the maximum interest rate allowable under Nebraska law even when lending to Minnesota customers. Two years after the Marquette decision, Congress enacted legislation to extend the same power to federally insured state banks, preempting contrary state law and equalizing the regulatory treatment of national and state banks vis-à-vis "interest rate exportation." While the regulatory treatment of national and state banks has accordingly converged, federal preemption nevertheless confers certain unique benefits on national banks. Under the Supreme Court's decision in Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson , federal laws that grant national banks the power to engage in specific activities impliedly preempt state laws that "significantly interfere" with the ability of national banks to engage in those activities. In Barnett Bank , the Court held that a federal law granting national banks the authority to sell insurance impliedly preempted a state law that prohibited banks from selling insurance, subject to certain exceptions. In reaching this conclusion, the Court explained that the state law posed an obstacle to the federal statute's purpose of granting national banks the authority to sell insurance "whether or not a State grants . . . similar approval." The Court inferred this purpose from the principle that "normally Congress would not want States to forbid, or to impair significantly, the exercise of a power that Congress explicitly granted." Lower courts have followed Barnett Bank 's rule that absent indications to the contrary, federal statutes and regulations that grant national banks the power to engage in specific activities preempt state laws that prohibit or "significantly interfere" with those activities. In Wells Fargo Bank of Texas N.A. v. James , for example, the Fifth Circuit held that an OCC rule granting national banks the power to "charge [their] customers non-interest charges and fees" preempted a state statute prohibiting banks from charging a fee for cashing checks in certain circumstances. Similarly, in Monroe Retail, Inc. v. RBS Citizens, N.A. , the Sixth Circuit held that this rule preempted state law conversion claims brought against a class of national banks based on fees they charged for processing garnishment orders. Specifically, the Sixth Circuit reasoned that under Barnett Bank , "the level of 'interference' that gives rise to preemption under the NBA is not very high," and that the relevant conversion claims "significantly interfere[d]" with national banks' ability to collect fees. Finally, the Ninth Circuit employed similar reasoning in Rose v. Chase Bank USA, N.A. , where it held that an NBA provision granting national banks the power to "loan money on personal security" preempted a state statute imposing various disclosure requirements on credit card issuers. In arriving at this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that "[w]here . . . Congress has explicitly granted a power to a national bank without any indication that Congress intended for that power to be subject to local restriction, Congress is presumed to have intended to preempt state laws." Federal courts have also adopted broad interpretations of an NBA provision authorizing national banks to dismiss officers "at pleasure." In Schweikert v. Bank of America , N.A. , the Fourth Circuit held that this provision preempted a state law claim for wrongful discharge brought by a former officer of a national bank. Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has held that this provision preempted a claim brought by a former officer of a national bank for breach of an employment agreement, reasoning that "[a]n agreement which attempts to circumvent the complete discretion of a national bank's board of directors to terminate an officer at will is void as against [federal] public policy." Finally, in Wiersum v. U.S. Bank, N.A. , the Eleventh Circuit relied on Barnett Bank and the Fourth Circuit's reasoning in Schweikert to conclude that this "at pleasure" provision preempted a wrongful-termination claim brought by a former officer of a national bank under a state whistleblower statute. While federal courts have accordingly adopted expansive views of the circumstances in which state laws "significantly interfere" with national banks' powers, they have also recognized certain general limits on the preemptive scope of federal banking statutes and regulations. In Gutierrez v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA , for example, the Ninth Circuit held that federal banking regulations did not preempt a generally applicable state law prohibiting certain types of fraud. The Gutierrez litigation involved a national bank's use of a bookkeeping method known as "high-to-low" posting for debit-card transactions, whereby the bank posted large transactions to customers' accounts before small transactions. In Gutierrez , customers of the bank brought a variety of state law claims based on the theory that the bank adopted high-to-low posting for the sole purpose of maximizing the overdraft fees it could charge customers. In response, the bank argued that OCC regulations preempted the state law claims. The Ninth Circuit held that the OCC regulations preempted some, but not all, of the customers' claims. Specifically, the court held that an OCC regulation authorizing national banks to establish the method of calculating noninterest charges and fees "in [their] discretion" preempted claims premised on the theory that high-to-low posting was an unfair business practice. The court also held an OCC regulation providing that national banks may exercise their deposit-taking powers "without regard to state law limitations concerning . . . disclosure requirements" preempted the customers' claims that the bank failed to affirmatively disclose its use of high-to-low posting. However, the court held that federal law did not preempt claims that the bank defrauded its customers by making misleading statements about its posting method. Specifically, the court reasoned that these claims survived preemption because they were based on "a non-discriminating state law of general applicability that does not conflict with federal law, frustrate the purposes of the [NBA], or impair the efficiency of national banks to discharge their duties." In reaching this conclusion, the court rejected the argument that federal law preempted the customers' fraud claims because those claims "necessarily touche[d] on" national banks' authority to provide checking accounts. The court rejected this argument on the grounds that such an expansive preemption standard "would swallow all laws." The Ninth Circuit accordingly allowed the customers' fraud claims to proceed because they did not "significantly interfere" with national banks' ability to offer checking accounts. While the implications of Barnett Bank have been fleshed out most thoroughly in the lower federal courts, the Supreme Court has also applied that decision's reasoning in two cases concerning an NBA provision prohibiting states from exercising "visitorial powers" over national banks. In Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A. , the Court held that this provision—together with an OCC regulation providing that national banks may conduct authorized activities through operating subsidiaries—preempted state licensing, reporting, and visitation requirements for the operating subsidiaries of national banks. Specifically, the Court reasoned that the proper inquiry in analyzing whether state law interferes with federally permitted bank activities "focuse[s] on the exercise of a national bank's powers , not on its corporate structure." The Court accordingly concluded that the operating subsidiaries of national banks should be treated "as equivalent to national banks with respect to powers exercised under federal law." And because "duplicative state examination, supervision, and regulation would significantly burden" national banks' ability to engage in authorized activities, the Court held that those same regulatory burdens also unacceptably interfere with the ability of national bank subsidiaries to engage in those activities. However, as discussed later in this report, Congress has abrogated Watters 's holding that states may not examine or regulate the activities of national bank subsidiaries. While the Court adopted a broad view of preemption in Watters , it cabined the preemptive effect of the relevant NBA provision two years later in Cuomo v. C learing House Association, LLC. In that decision, the Court held that this NBA provision did not preempt an information request that the New York Attorney General (NYAG) sent to several national banks. Specifically, the NYAG had sent letters to several national banks requesting nonpublic information about their lending practices in order to determine whether the banks had violated state fair lending laws. In response, a banking trade group and the OCC argued that the relevant NBA provision—together with an OCC regulation interpreting that provision to mean that "[s]tate officials may not . . . prosecut[e] enforcement actions" against national banks, "except in limited circumstances authorized by federal law"—preempted the information request. The Supreme Court rejected this interpretation of the NBA's visitorial powers provision, drawing a distinction between (1) "supervision," or "the right to oversee corporate affairs," which qualify as "visitorial powers," and (2) "law enforcement." Because the Court concluded that the NYAG had issued the information requests in his "law enforcement" capacity—as opposed to "acting in the role of sovereign-as-supervisor"—it held that the NBA did not preempt the requests. As the above discussion makes clear, OCC regulations have figured prominently in litigation over the preemptive scope of federal banking law. While some commentators have contended that the NBA's text and legislature history implicitly provides the OCC with the authority to promulgate preemption rules, Congress formally recognized that the OCC has such authority in the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 (Riegle-Neal Act). Specifically, Section 114 of the Riegle-Neal Act provides that "[b]efore issuing any opinion letter or interpretive rule . . . that concludes that Federal law preempts the application to a national bank of any State law" concerning certain specified subjects, the OCC must give the public notice and an opportunity submit written comments. In the 1990s and early 2000s, the OCC exercised this authority in a number of interpretive letters and legal opinions. In these documents, the OCC took the position that federal law preempted state laws that limited the ability of national banks to: advertise; operate offices within a certain distance from state-chartered bank home offices; operate ATM machines; engage in fiduciary activities; finance automobile purchases; sell annuities; sell repossessed automobiles without an automobile dealer license; and conduct Internet auctions of certificates of deposit. In 2004, the OCC expanded upon these interpretive letters and legal opinions by issuing what one commentator has described as "sweeping" preemption rules. The OCC's 2004 preemption rules articulated a general preemption standard according to which "state laws that obstruct, impair, or condition a national bank's ability to fully exercise" its federally authorized powers "are not applicable to national banks" except "where made applicable by Federal law." This general standard accordingly expanded on Barnett Bank 's "significant interference" test in two ways. First, the OCC's 2004 standard omitted the intensifying phrase "significantly" from the Barnett Bank test. Second, the 2004 standard by its terms required that national banks be able to "fully" exercise their authorized powers—a phrase that does not appear in Barnett Bank . However, despite these facial differences with the Barnett Bank test, the OCC explained that it intended the phrase "obstruct, impair, or condition" to function "as the distillation of the various preemption constructs articulated by the Supreme Court, as recognized in Hines [ v. Davidowitz ] and Barnett Bank , and not as a replacement construct that is in any way inconsistent with those standards." Beyond this general preemption standard, the OCC's 2004 rules concluded that the NBA preempted certain categories of state laws. First, the rules provided that national banks "may make real estate loans . . . without regard to state law limitations concerning": licensing and registration (except for purposes of service of process); "[t]he ability of a creditor to require or obtain private mortgage insurance, insurance for other collateral, or other credit enhancements or risk mitigants, in furtherance of safe and sound banking practices"; loan-to-value ratios; terms of credit; "[t]he aggregate amount of funds that may be loaned upon the security of real estate"; escrow accounts; security property; access to and use of credit reports; disclosure and advertising; processing, origination, servicing, sale or purchase of, or investment or participation in, mortgages; disbursements and repayments; rates of interest on loans; due-on-sale clauses, with certain exceptions; and "[c]ovenants and restrictions that must be contained in a lease to qualify the leasehold as acceptable security for a real estate loan." Second, the rules provided that national banks "may make non-real estate loans without regard to state law limitations concerning" many of the same matters identified in the regulation concerning real estate lending. Finally, the rules provided that national banks "may exercise [their] deposit-taking powers without regard to state law limitations concerning": (1) abandoned and dormant accounts, (2) checking accounts, (3) disclosure requirements, (3) funds availability, (4) savings account orders of withdrawal, (5) state licensing or registration requirements (except for purposes of service of process), and (6) special purpose savings services. The OCC's 2004 rules also identified general categories of state law that the agency interpreted as surviving preemption. Specifically, the rules provided that the NBA does not preempt state laws that are consistent with federal law and involve (1) contracts, (2) torts, (3) criminal law, (4) rights to collect debts, (5) the acquisition and transfer of property, (5) taxation, (6) zoning, and, with respect to real estate lending, (7) certain homestead laws. According to the OCC's 2004 rules, such laws survive preemption so long as they "do not regulate the manner, content or extent of the activities authorized for national banks under federal law." The OCC's 2004 preemption rules proved controversial. In 2008, the United States experienced a financial crisis caused in part by reckless subprime mortgage lending and a collapse in the real estate market. In the wake of the crisis, commentators debated the role that federal preemption of state predatory lending laws played in generating the pre-2008 housing bubble. Some commentators contended that national banks played a significant role in the predatory lending that preceded the crisis, and that federal preemption "effectively gut[ted] states' ability to legislate against predatory lending practices." By contrast, others rejected the contention that preemption played a significant role in causing the crisis, arguing that national banks and their subsidiaries accounted for only a small share of subprime mortgage lending. In 2010, Congress responded to concerns over federal preemption of state consumer protection laws in Section 1044 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank). Section 1044 provides that federal law preempts such laws only if: (A) application of a State consumer financial law would have a discriminatory effect on national banks, in comparison with the effect of the law on a bank chartered by that State; (B) in accordance with the legal standard for preemption in the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in [ Barnett Bank ], the State consumer financial law prevents or significantly interferes with the exercise by the national bank of its powers; and any preemption determination under this subparagraph may be made by a court, or by regulation or order of the Comptroller of the Currency on a case-by-case basis, in accordance with applicable law; or (C) the State consumer financial law is preempted by a provision of Federal law other than title 62 of the Revised Statutes. Beyond this general preemption standard, Section 1044 contains a number of other provisions narrowing the OCC's preemption authority. First, Section 1044 provides that courts reviewing OCC preemption determinations should accord those determinations only Skidmore deference, under which courts assess an agency's interpretation of a statute "depending upon the thoroughness evident in the consideration of the agency, the validity of the reasoning of the agency, the consistency with other valid determinations made by the agency, and other factors which the court finds persuasive and relevant to its decision." Before the enactment of Dodd-Frank, certain courts had afforded OCC preemption determinations a more permissive form of deference known as Chevron deference, according to which courts defer to agency interpretations as long as they are reasonable. Section 1044 accordingly requires that courts take a less deferential posture toward OCC preemption determinations. Second, Section 1044 provides that no OCC preemption determination "shall be interpreted or applied so as to invalidate, or otherwise declare inapplicable to a national bank, the provision of the State consumer financial law, unless substantial evidence, made on the record of the proceeding, supports the specific finding regarding the preemption of such provision in accordance with the legal standard" established by Barnett Bank . This "substantial evidence" standard is often used in cases involving the Administrative Procedure Act, which provides that courts shall hold unlawful an agency's formal rules and other determinations made on the basis of a formal hearing when they are "unsupported by substantial evidence." The Supreme Court has explained that "substantial evidence" entails "more than a mere scintilla" of evidence, and requires "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Third, Section 1044 provides that the OCC shall (1) "periodically conduct a review, through public notice and comment, of each determination that a provision of Federal law preempts a State consumer financial law," (2) "conduct such review within the 5-year period after prescribing or otherwise issuing such determination, and at least once during each 5-year period thereafter," and (3) "[a]fter conducting the review of, and inspecting the comments made on, the determination, . . . publish a notice in the Federal Register announcing the decision to continue or rescind the determination or a proposal to amend the determination." Fourth, Section 1044 provides that the OCC must submit to Congress a report addressing its decision to continue, rescind, or propose an amendment to any preemption determination. Finally, Section 1044 abrogated the Supreme Court's decision in Watters , providing that "State consumer financial laws" apply to the subsidiaries and affiliates of national banks "to the same extent" that they apply "to any person, corporation, or other entity subject to such State law." After Dodd-Frank's enactment, commentators debated the meaning of Section 1044's general preemption standard. As discussed, Section 1044's preemption standard provides that federal law preempts "State consumer financial laws" that "prevent[] or significantly interfere[]" with the powers of national banks "in accordance with the legal standard for preemption in the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in [ Barnett Bank ]." Some commentators have argued that this language simply codifies the Barnett Bank standard and was not intended to significantly modify pre-existing law. However, others have argued that Section 1044 was intended to pare back the OCC's 2004 preemption rules, which interpreted the NBA as preempting state laws that "obstruct, impair, or condition" the powers of national banks. According to this latter group of commentators, the OCC's "obstruct, impair, or condition" standard was more expansive than Barnett Bank 's "significant interference" test, meaning that a codification of that test would modify pre-existing law. In 2011, the OCC responded to the enactment of Section 1044 by issuing a notice of proposed rulemaking that reaffirmed its pre-Dodd-Frank preemption decisions while deleting the "obstruct, impair, or condition" language from its preemption rules. While the OCC acknowledged that this language "created ambiguities and misunderstandings regarding the preemption standard that it was intended to convey," it maintained that the specific preemption determinations reflected in its 2004 rules were nevertheless consistent with Barnett Bank . The OCC accordingly proposed reaffirming the specific preemption determinations in its 2004 rules while removing the "obstruct, impair, or condition" standard. The OCC's proposal quickly generated controversy. After the OCC issued the notice, the Treasury Department's General Counsel wrote a letter to the Comptroller of the Currency arguing that the OCC's proposed rule was "inconsistent with the plain language of [Dodd-Frank] and its legislative history." Specifically, the Treasury Department argued that interpreting Section 1044 as making no significant changes to existing preemption law conflicted with "basic canons of statutory construction" and legislative history indicating that the provision was intended to "revise[]" the OCC's preemption standard. Senator Carl Levin also expressed disagreement with the proposed rules in a letter to the Comptroller, arguing that "[i]f [Congress] had wanted to leave the OCC's purported federal preemptive powers unchanged, [it] could have engaged in a very simple exercise—do nothing." Other Senators expressed support for the OCC's proposed rules. Senators Tom Carper and Mark Warner criticized the Treasury Department's letter for "ignor[ing] the clear legislative history indicating that [Section 1044] is intended to codify the Barnett case." In responding to the Treasury Department's argument that Section 1044 was intended to "revise" the OCC's preemption standards, Senators Carper and Warner argued that the OCC's proposed rules would effectuate the contemplated revision by removing the potentially troublesome "obstruct, impair, or condition" language from the agency's 2004 rules. The OCC ultimately agreed with Senators Carper and Warner. In July 2011, the OCC published a final regulation revising its preemption rules. In the final rule, the OCC concluded that "the Dodd-Frank Act does not create a new, stand-alone 'prevents or significantly interferes' preemption standard, but, rather, incorporates the conflict preemption legal standard and the reasoning that supports it in the Supreme Court's Barnett decision." The OCC's 2011 rule also deleted the phrase "obstruct, impair, or condition" from the relevant preemption standard, noting that preemption determinations based "exclusively" on that language "would need to be reexamined to ascertain whether the determination is consistent with the Barnett conflict preemption analysis." However, the rule indicated that the OCC had not identified any preemption determinations that in fact relied "exclusively" on the relevant language. The final rule also noted that all future OCC preemption determinations would be subject to Section 1044's requirement concerning "case-by-case" determinations. Since the enactment of Dodd-Frank, a number of courts have interpreted Section 1044 as codifying the Barnett Bank standard. Some courts have accordingly concluded that Barnett Bank demarcates the boundaries of the OCC's 2011 preemption rules, reasoning that those rules do not preempt any state laws that would survive preemption under the Barnett Bank test. One court has also addressed the appropriate level of judicial deference towards the OCC's 2011 preemption determinations. As discussed, Section 1044 provides that courts "shall" assess OCC preemption determinations "depending upon the thoroughness evident in the consideration of the agency, the validity of the reasoning of the agency, the consistency with other valid determinations made by the agency, and other factors which the court finds persuasive and relevant to its decision"—a standard commonly known as " Skidmore deference." In 2018, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the OCC's 2011 preemption determinations are "entitled to little, if any, deference" under Skidmore . Specifically, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that because the OCC's 2011 preemption determinations represent the agency's "articulation of its legal analysis" under Barnett Bank (as opposed to being grounded in expert factual findings), those determinations would not warrant significant deference even in the absence of Section 1044. Whether other federal circuit courts will follow the Ninth Circuit in affording minimal deference to the OCC's 2011 preemption rules remains to be seen. As the debates over Section 1044 of Dodd-Frank make clear, a number of banking preemption issues remain the subject of active debate. This final section of the report discusses three additional current issues involving banking preemption and related federalism questions. A number of recent judicial decisions have generated debate over the circumstances in which non-bank financial companies can benefit from banks' ability to "export" the maximum interest rates of their "home" states. As discussed, the Supreme Court has held that national banks may charge any interest rate allowable under the laws of their home states even when lending to borrowers in other states with stricter usury laws. After this decision, Congress extended the power to export maximum interest rates to federally insured state banks. Recently, courts have grappled with whether this exportation power extends to non-bank financial companies and debt collectors that purchase loans originated by federally insured banks. That is, courts have addressed the circumstances in which loans originated by federally insured banks remain subject to the usury laws of the banks' home states even when the loans are (1) made to borrowers in other states with stricter usury laws, and (2) subsequently purchased by non-banks, which do not possess the exportation power when they originate loans themselves. A number of courts have concluded that in certain contexts, a loan that is non-usurious when originated remains non-usurious irrespective of the identity of its subsequent purchasers—a principle that some commentators have labeled the "valid when made" doctrine. However, in 2015, the Second Circuit rejected the application of this rule in Madden v. Midland Funding , holding that non-bank debt collectors that had purchased debt originated by a national bank could not benefit from the bank's exportation power. In Madden , a New York resident brought a putative class action under New York usury law against debt collectors that had purchased her credit card debt from a Delaware-based national bank. In response, the debt collectors argued that federal law preempted the New York usury claims because the credit card debt had been originated by a Delaware-based national bank and was not usurious under Delaware law. The Second Circuit rejected this argument, reasoning that the application of New York usury law to the debt collectors did not "significantly interfere" with the national bank's powers under Barnett Bank . Specifically, the court reasoned that because the debt collectors were not national banks and were not acting "on behalf of" a national bank, the New York usury claims did not interfere with the national bank's power to export the maximum interest rates of its home state. The Second Circuit's decision in Madden has generated significant debate. In an amicus brief supporting the debt collectors' petition for re-hearing before the Second Circuit, industry groups argued that the decision threatened to seriously disrupt lending markets. Specifically, these groups argued that the court's decision would "significantly impair" banks' ability to manage their risk by selling loans in secondary credit markets—a result that would ultimately inhibit their capacity to originate loans. Similarly, in an amicus brief submitted to the Supreme Court, the OCC and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argued that the Second Circuit's decision was "incorrect," reasoning that "[a] national bank's federal right to charge interest up to the rate allowed by [the NBA] would be significantly impaired if [a] national bank's assignee could not continue to charge that rate." In response, the plaintiff in Madden argued that the Second Circuit's decision is unlikely to significantly affect credit markets. Specifically, the Madden plaintiff argued that the court's decision will not disrupt credit markets because non-banks that purchase loans originated by banks retain the right to collect the balances of those loans within applicable state law usury limits. While the Second Circuit ultimately denied the debt collectors' petition for re-hearing and the Supreme Court denied their petition for a writ of certiorari, the Madden decision has attracted congressional interest. The Financial CHOICE Act—comprehensive regulatory reform legislation that passed the House of Representatives in June 2017 but did not become law—would have codified the "valid when made" doctrine and abrogated Madden . A more limited bill directed solely at codifying the "valid when made" doctrine ( H.R. 3299 ) also passed the House in February 2018 but did not become law. Echoing the arguments made by industry groups, the bill's sponsor contended that the Second Circuit's decision will harm credit markets and impede financial innovation. By contrast, the bill's critics argued that it would facilitate predatory lending by allowing non-banks to evade state usury laws. These proposals have not been re-introduced in the 116th Congress. In a number of cases involving the scope of the exportation doctrine, non-bank financial companies have played a more active role in the origination process than the debt collectors in Madden . Specifically, a number of these cases have involved arrangements in which a non-bank financial company solicits borrowers, directs a partner bank to originate a high-interest loan, and purchases the loan from the bank shortly after origination in order to benefit from the bank's exportation power. Some courts have held that non-banks employing these so-called "rent-a-charter" schemes are not eligible for federal preemption, reasoning that preemption depends on a transaction's economic realities rather than its formal characteristics. Specifically, these courts have concluded that non-banks do not assume their partner banks' exportation power when the economic realities surrounding a transaction indicate that the non-banks are the "true lenders." According to this "true lender" doctrine, non-banks that have established these types of relationships qualify as the "true lenders" when they possess the "predominant economic interest" in the relevant loans when the loans are originated. In these circumstances, some courts have concluded that the non-banks are not entitled to the benefits of federal preemption. Like the Second Circuit's decision in Madden , these "true lender" decisions have attracted Congress's attention. In the 115th Congress, H.R. 4439 would have abrogated this line of decisions by making clear that a loan's originator is always the "true lender" for purposes of the exportation doctrine. The bill's supporters argued that the "true lender" decisions threaten to undermine partnerships between banks and FinTech companies —a broad category of businesses offering digital financial products that some commentators have hailed for their innovative potential. The bill's opponents, by contrast, contended that the legislation would allow non-banks to circumvent state usury laws and questioned the value of bank-FinTech partnerships designed with that purpose in mind. H.R. 4439 was referred to the House Committee on Financial Services during the 115th Congress but has not been re-introduced in the 116th Congress. Congress is not alone in considering whether to extend the benefits of federal preemption to FinTech companies. In July 2018, the OCC issued a Policy Statement announcing that it will begin accepting applications for "special purpose national bank charters" (SPNB charters) from FinTech companies that are engaged in "the business of banking" but do not take deposits. In the Policy Statement, the OCC explained that the NBA provides it "broad authority" to grant national bank charters to institutions that engage in the "business of banking"—a category that includes paying checks and lending money. The OCC accordingly concluded that it has the statutory authority to grant national bank charters to FinTech companies that engage in these core banking activities. According to the OCC, SPNB charters will help foster responsible innovation and promote regulatory consistency between FinTech companies and traditional banks. The OCC further explained that it will use its existing chartering standards and procedures to evaluate applications for SPNB charters, and that FinTech companies that receive such charters "will be supervised like similarly situated national banks, including with respect to capital, liquidity, and risk management." While the OCC touted the ability of SPNB charters to "level the playing field with regulated institutions" without explicitly mentioning federal preemption, commentators have observed that preemption represents "the central benefit" offered by such charters. The OCC's decision to accept applications for national bank charters from FinTech companies has generated debate. Critics of the policy have contended that FinTech companies' interest in such charters "is virtually entirely about avoiding state consumer protection laws," and that "[f]ederal chartering should not be a move to eviscerate" such laws. State regulators have also filed lawsuits challenging the OCC's authority to charter non-depository FinTech companies. In the spring of 2017, the Conference of State Bank Supervisors (CSBS) and the New York Department of Financial Services (NYDFS) responded to an early OCC proposal to charter FinTech companies by filing suits in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia and the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, respectively. The CSBS and NYDFS made substantially similar claims, arguing that (1) the NBA does not give the OCC the authority to charter non-depository institutions, (2) the Administrative Procedure Act requires the OCC to follow notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures before issuing SPNBs, (3) the OCC's decision was arbitrary and capricious, and (4) the OCC's decision violated the Tenth Amendment by invading states' sovereign powers. Both district courts dismissed the lawsuits on jurisdictional grounds, reasoning that the organizations failed to identify any imminent injuries to their members and that the case was not ripe for resolution because the OCC had not issued any SPNBs. However, after the OCC issued its Policy Statement in July 2018, both organizations filed new lawsuits that remain pending. Policymakers have also turned their attention to how federal law affects traditional banks' responses to changes in state law—namely, state-level efforts to legalize marijuana. While a number of states have legalized marijuana for medical or recreational use, federal law criminalizes the drug's sale, distribution, and possession, in addition to the aiding and abetting of such activities. Federal law also criminalizes money laundering, making it unlawful to: conduct a financial transaction involving the proceeds of a specified unlawful activity —a category that includes the sale or distribution of marijuana—"knowing that the transaction is designed . . . to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership or the control of the proceeds . . . or to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under State or Federal law"; or knowingly engage in a monetary transaction in criminally derived property of a value greater than $10,000 that is derived from specified unlawful activity . Finally, the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) and associated regulations require that financial institutions report illegal and suspicious activities to the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) and maintain programs designed to prevent money laundering. Federal banking regulators have broad powers to discipline banks for violations of these laws. The Federal Reserve regularly conducts examinations of member banks that include evaluations of BSA compliance, and the FDIC has the authority to terminate a bank's deposit insurance for violations of law. Because of marijuana's status under federal law, many banks have refused to serve marijuana businesses even when those businesses operate in compliance with state law. While some small banks have offered accounts to marijuana businesses, an estimated 70 percent of marijuana businesses remain unbanked. Because of this inability to access the banking system, many marijuana businesses reportedly operate entirely in cash, raising concerns about tax collection and public safety. These perceived problems have attracted congressional interest. In March 2019, the House Committee on Financial Services approved legislation intended to minimize the legal risks associated with banking the marijuana industry. The proposed bill— H.R. 1595 , the SAFE Banking Act of 2019—would create a "safe harbor" under which federal banking regulators could not take various adverse actions against depository institutions for serving marijuana businesses that comply with applicable state laws ("cannabis-related legitimate businesses"). The legislation would also provide that for purposes of federal anti-money laundering law, the proceeds from transactions conducted by cannabis-related legitimate businesses shall not qualify as the proceeds of unlawful activity "solely because the transaction[s] [were] conducted by a cannabis-related legitimate business." Finally, H.R. 1595 would require FinCEN to issue guidance concerning the preparation of suspicious activity reports for cannabis-related legitimate businesses that is "consistent with the purpose and intent" of the bill and "does not significantly inhibit the provision of financial services" to cannabis-related legitimate businesses. Variations on some of the SAFE Banking Act's provisions have been incorporated into broader marijuana-related legislation. The Responsibly Addressing Marijuana Policy Gap Act of 2019 ( S. 421 and H.R. 1119 ) would eliminate federal criminal penalties for persons who engage in various marijuana-related activities in compliance with state law and create a "safe harbor" from adverse regulatory action for depository institutions that serve marijuana businesses. Another Senate bill— S. 1028 , the STATES Act—would provide that the Controlled Substances Act's (CSA's) marijuana-related provisions do not apply to persons acting in compliance with state marijuana regulation s, subject to certain exceptions. While the bill does not have the type of "safe harbor" for depository institutions in H.R. 1595 , S. 421 , or H.R. 1119 , it contains a "Rule of Construction" clarifying that conduct in compliance with the legislation shall not serve as the basis for federal money laundering charges or criminal forfeiture under the CSA.	[ "Banks play a critical role in the United States economy, channeling money from savers to borrowers and facilitating productive investment. While the nature of lawmakers' interest in bank regulation has shifted over time, most bank regulations fall into one of three general categories. First, banks must abide by a variety of safety-and-soundness requirements designed to minimize the risk of their failure and maintain macroeconomic stability. Second, banks must comply with consumer protection rules intended to deter abusive practices and provide consumers with complete information about financial products and services. Third, banks are subject to various reporting, recordkeeping, and anti-money laundering requirements designed to assist law enforcement in investigating criminal activity. The substantive content of these requirements remains the subject of intense debate. However, the division of regulatory authority over banks between the federal government and the states plays a key role in shaping that content. In some cases, federal law displaces (or \"preempts\") state bank regulations. In other cases, states are permitted to supplement federal regulations with different, sometimes stricter requirements. Because of its substantive implications, federal preemption has recently become a flashpoint in debates surrounding bank regulation. In the American \"dual banking system,\" banks can apply for a national charter from the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) or a state charter from a state's banking authority. A bank's choice of chartering authority is also a choice of primary regulator, as the OCC serves as the primary regulator of national banks and state regulatory agencies serve as the primary regulators of state-chartered banks. However, the Federal Reserve and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) also play an important role in bank regulation. The Federal Reserve supervises all national banks and state-chartered banks that become members of the Federal Reserve System (FRS), while the FDIC supervises all state banks that do not become members of the FRS. This complex regulatory architecture has resulted in a \"symbiotic system\" with both federal regulation of state banks and state regulation of national banks. In the modern dual banking system, national banks are often subject to generally applicable state laws, and state banks are subject to both generally applicable federal laws and regulations imposed by their federal regulators. The evolution of this system during the 20th century caused the regulation of national banks and state banks to converge in a number of important ways. However, despite this convergence, federal preemption provides national banks with certain unique advantages. In Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson, the Supreme Court held that the National Bank Act (NBA) preempts state laws that \"significantly interfere\" with the powers of national banks. The Court has also issued two decisions on the preemptive scope of a provision of the NBA limiting states' \"visitorial powers\" over national banks. Finally, OCC rules have taken a broad view of the preemptive effects of the NBA, limiting the ways in which states can regulate national banks. Courts, regulators, and legislators have recently confronted a number of issues involving banking preemption and related federalism questions. Specifically, Congress has considered legislation that would overturn a line of judicial decisions concerning the circumstances in which non-banks can benefit from federal preemption of state usury laws. The OCC has also announced its intention to grant national bank charters to certain financial technology (FinTech) companies—a decision that is currently being litigated. Finally, Congress has recently turned its attention to the banking industry's response to state efforts to legalize and regulate marijuana." ]	8,713	gov_report	en	null	35ce22a29d4d12011610a91738995fc3027f173219e1c6fe
This report provides background information and issues for Congress on the John Lewis (TAO-205) class oiler shipbuilding program, a program to build a new class of 20 fleet oilers for the Navy. The Navy's proposed FY2020 budget requests the procurement of the fifth and sixth ships in the program. Issues for Congress regarding the TAO-205 program include the following: whether to approve, reject, or modify the Navy's FY2020 procurement funding request for the program; the number of oilers the Navy will require in coming years to support its operations; and whether to encourage or direct the Navy to build TAO-205s with more ship self-defense equipment than currently planned by the Navy. Decisions that Congress makes regarding the program could affect Navy capabilities and funding requirements and the U.S. shipbuilding industrial base. For an overview of the strategic and budgetary context in which the TAO-205 program and other Navy shipbuilding programs may be considered, see CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress , by Ronald O'Rourke. The primary role of Navy fleet oilers is to transfer fuel to Navy surface ships that are operating at sea, so as to extend the operating endurance of these surface ships and their embarked aircraft. Fleet oilers also provide other surface ships with lubricants, fresh water, and small amounts of dry cargo. Fleet oilers transfer fuel and other supplies to other surface ships in operations called underway replenishments (UNREPs). During an UNREP, an oiler steams next to the receiving ship and transfers fuel by hose (see Figure 1 , Figure 2 , and Figure 3 ). Oilers are one kind of Navy UNREP ship; other Navy UNREP ships include ammunition ships, dry cargo ships, and multiproduct replenishment ships. The Navy's UNREP ships are known more formally as the Navy's combat logistics force (CLF). Most of the Navy's CLF ships are operated by the Military Sealift Command (MSC). Navy oilers carry the designation TAO (sometimes written as T-AO). The T means that the ships are operated by MSC with a mostly civilian crew; the A means it is an auxiliary ship of some kind; and the O means that it is, specifically, an oiler. Although the role of fleet oilers might not be considered as glamorous as that of other Navy ships, fleet oilers are critical to the Navy's ability to operate in forward-deployed areas around the world on a sustained basis. The U.S. Navy's ability to perform UNREP operations in a safe and efficient manner on a routine basis is a skill that many other navies lack. An absence of fleet oilers would significantly complicate the Navy's ability to operate at sea on a sustained basis in areas such as the Western Pacific or the Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf region. The Navy states that the ability to rearm, refuel and re-provision our ships at sea, independent of any restrictions placed on it by a foreign country, is critical to the Navy's ability to project warfighting power from the sea. As the lifeline of resupply to Navy operating forces underway, the ships of the Navy's Combat Logistic Force (CLF) enable Carrier Strike Groups and Amphibious Ready Groups to operate forward and remain on station during peacetime and war, with minimal reliance on host nation support. The Navy's existing force of fleet oilers consists of 15 Henry J. Kaiser (TAO-187) class ships ( Figure 4 ). These ships were procured between FY1982 and FY1989 and entered service between 1986 and 1996. They have an expected service life of 35 years; the first ship in the class will reach that age in 2021. The ships are about 677 feet long and have a full load displacement of about 41,000 tons, including about 26,500 tons of fuel and other cargo. The ships were built by Avondale Shipyards of New Orleans, LA, a shipyard that eventually became part of the shipbuilding firm Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII). HII subsequently wound down Navy shipbuilding operations at Avondale, and the facility no longer builds ships. (HII continues to operate two other shipyards that build Navy ships.) The TAO-205 class program was originally called the TAO(X) program, with the (X) meaning that the exact design of the ship had not yet been determined. On January 6, 2015, then-Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus announced that ships in the class will be named for "people who fought for civil rights and human rights," and that the first ship in the class, TAO-205, which was procured in FY2016, will be named for Representative John Lewis. The class consequently is now known as the John Lewis (TAO-205) class. As part of its goal for achieving a fleet of 355 ships, the Navy wants to procure a total of 20 TAO-205 class ships. The required number of oilers largely depends on the numbers and types of other surface ships (and their embarked aircraft) to be refueled, and the projected operational patterns for these ships and aircraft. The first TAO-205 class ship was procured in FY2016, the second in FY2018, and the third and fourth in FY2019. The Navy's FY2020 five-year (FY2020-FY2023) shipbuilding plan calls for procuring the next seven ships in the class in annual quantities of 2-1-1-2-1. The Navy's FY2020 30-year (FY2020-FY2049) shipbuilding plan calls for procuring the remaining nine ships in the program at a rate of one per year starting in FY2025. The first TAO-205 is scheduled for delivery in November 2020. Table 1 shows procurement funding for the TAO-205 program in the Navy's FY2020 budget submission. The Navy's FY2020 budget submission estimates the total procurement cost of the 20 planned TAO-205s at $12,196.1 million (i.e., about 12.2 billion) in then-year dollars, or an average of $609.8 million each. Since the figure of $12,196.1 million is in then-year dollars, it incorporates estimated annual inflation rates for TAO-205s to be procured out to FY2033. The TAO-205 class design ( Figure 5 ) will have capabilities similar to those of the Kaiser-class ships, and will rely on existing technologies rather than new technologies. To guard against oil spills, TAO-205s are to be double-hulled, like modern commercial oil tankers, with a space between the two hulls to protect the inner hull against events that puncture the outer hull. (The final Kaiser-class ships are double-hulled, but earlier ships in the class are single-hulled.) TAO-205s are being built by General Dynamics/National Steel and Shipbuilding Company (GD/NASSCO) of San Diego, CA, a shipyard that builds Navy auxiliaries and DOD sealift ships. On June 25, 2015, the Navy, as part of its acquisition strategy for TAO-205 program, issued a combined solicitation consisting of separate Requests for Proposals (RFPs) for the detailed design and construction (DD&C) of the first six TAO-205s; the DD&C in FY2017 (and also procurement of long lead-time materials in FY2016) for an amphibious assault ship called LHA-8 that the Navy procured in FY2017; and contract design support for the LPD-17 Flight II program (previously called the LX[R] program), a program to procure a new class of 13 amphibious ships. The Navy limited bidding in this combined solicitation to two bidders—Ingalls Shipbuilding of Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII/Ingalls) and GD/NASSCO—on the grounds that these are the only two shipbuilders that have the capability to build both TAO-205s and LHA-8. Under the Navy's plan for the combined solicitation, one of these two yards was to be awarded the DD&C contract for the first six TAO-205s, the other yard was to be awarded the DD&C contract (and procurement of long lead-time materials) for LHA-8, and the shipyard with the lowest combined evaluated price was to receive a higher profit on its DD&C contract and was to be awarded the majority of the LPD-17 Flight II contract design engineering man-hours. On June 30, 2016, the Navy announced its awards in the above-described combined solicitation, awarding a fixed price incentive block buy contract for the DD&C of the first six TAO-205s to GD/NASSCO. (The Navy awarded the contract for the DD&C of LHA-8 to HII/Ingalls. HII/Ingalls was also awarded the majority of the LPD-17 Flight II contract design engineering man-hours.) The Navy was granted authority for using a block buy contract to procure the first six TAO-205s by Section 127 of the FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act ( S. 1356 / P.L. 114-92 of November 25, 2015). It was earlier estimated that the block buy contract would reduce the procurement cost of the second through sixth TAO-205s by an average of about $45 million each, compared to costs under the standard or default DOD approach of annual contracting. The Navy states that about $35 million of the $45 million in per-ship savings will come from using advance procurement (AP) funding for batch-ordering TAO-205 components. The Navy states that this use of AP funding could have occurred under annual contracting, and that the savings that are intrinsic to the block buy contract are thus about $10 million per ship. Section 8117 of the FY2019 Appropriations Act (Division A of H.R. 6157 / P.L. 115-245 of September 28, 2018) states the following: Sec. 8117. None of the funds provided in this Act for the TAO Fleet Oiler program shall be used to award a new contract that provides for the acquisition of the following components unless those components are manufactured in the United States: Auxiliary equipment (including pumps) for shipboard services; propulsion equipment (including engines, reduction gears, and propellers); shipboard cranes; and spreaders for shipboard cranes. The Appendix presents the Government Accountability Office's (GAO's) assessment of the TAO-205 class program from GAO's annual report surveying DOD major acquisition programs. The Navy's proposed FY2020 budget requests the procurement of the 5th and 6th ships in the program. The Navy estimates the combined procurement cost of the two ships at $1,056.3 million, or an average of $528.1 million each. The two ships have received $75.0 million in prior-year advance procurement (AP) funding, and the Navy's proposed FY2020 budget requests the remaining $981.2 million in procurement funding needed to complete the two ships' estimated combined procurement cost. The Navy's proposed FY2020 budget also requests $73.0 million in AP funding for TAO-205s to be procured in future fiscal years, and $3.7 million in cost-to-complete procurement funding to cover cost growth on TAO-205s procured in prior fiscal years, bringing the total FY2020 procurement funding request for the TAO-205 program (aside from outfitting and post-delivery costs) to $1,057.9 million. One issue for Congress is whether to approve, reject, or modify the Navy's FY2020 procurement funding request for the TAO-205 program. In assessing this issue, Congress may consider, among other things, whether the Navy has accurately priced the work that it is requesting to fund in FY2020. Another issue for Congress concerns the number of oilers the Navy will require in coming years to support its operations. The Navy is implementing a new operational concept, called Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO), that could lead to the development of a fleet with larger numbers of individually smaller ships, and to more-widely dispersed Navy operations. DMO could affect requirements for Navy logistics, including oilers. The Navy states that Recapitalizing the auxiliary and sealift fleet in support of DMO has become a top priority. The initial reviews of the requirements to support this operational maritime concept indicate potential growth across the five lines of effort: refuel, rearm, resupply, repair, and revive. Coincident is the review of the level of effort needed to distribute logistics into a contested maritime environment following safe transfer by the logistics fleet—smaller, faster, multi-mission transports likely resident within the future battle force. The work to fully flesh out the requirement is ongoing, but the aggregate is expected to be no less than the current requirement, reinforcing the urgency to recapitalize the current fleet. An August 2017 GAO report states the following: The readiness of the surge sealift and combat logistics fleets has trended downward since 2012. For example, GAO found that mission-limiting equipment casualties—incidents of degraded or out-of-service equipment—have increased over the past 5 years, and maintenance periods are running longer than planned, indicating declining materiel readiness across both fleets.... The Navy has not assessed the effects of widely distributed operations, which could affect the required number and type of combat logistics ships. The Navy released its new operational concept of more widely distributed operations—ships traveling farther distances and operating more days to support a more distributed fleet—in 2017. The Navy has not assessed the effects that implementing this concept will have on the required number and type of combat logistics ships. These effects could be exacerbated in the event that the Navy is less able to rely on in-port refueling—which has comprised about 30 percent of all refuelings over the past 3 years—placing greater demand on the combat logistics fleet. Given the fleet's dependence on the combat logistics force, waiting until 2019 or 2020 to conduct an assessment, as planned, could result in poor investment decisions as the Navy continues to build and modernize its fleet. Furthermore, without assessing the effects of widely distributed operations on logistics force requirements and modifying its force structure plans accordingly, the Navy risks being unprepared to provide required fuel and other supplies. Another issue for Congress is whether to encourage or direct the Navy to build TAO-205s with more ship self-defense equipment than currently planned by the Navy. The issue relates to how changes in the international security environment might affect how the Navy operates and equips its underway replenishment ships. During the Cold War, the Navy procured underway replenishment ships to support a two-stage approach to underway replenishment in which single-product "shuttle" ships (such as oilers, ammunition ships, and dry stores ships) would take their supplies from secure ports to relatively safe midocean areas, where they would then transfer them to multiproduct "station" ships called TAOEs and AORs. The TAOEs and AORs would then travel to Navy carrier strike groups operating in higher-threat areas and transfer their combined supplies to the carrier strike group ships. As a result, single-product shuttle ships were equipped with lesser amounts of ship self-defense equipment, and TAOEs and AORs were equipped with greater amounts of such equipment. When the Cold War ended and transitioned to the post-Cold War era, threats to U.S. Navy ships operating at sea were substantially reduced. As a consequence, the amount of ship self-defense equipment on the TAOEs and AORs was reduced, and a single-stage approach to underway replenishment, in which oilers and dry stores ships took supplies from secure ports all the way to carrier strike group ships, was sometimes used. Now that the post-Cold War era has transitioned to a new strategic environment featuring renewed great power competition with countries like China and Russia, and a consequent renewal of potential threats to U.S. Navy ships operating at sea, the question is whether TAO-205s should be equipped with lesser amounts of ship self-defense equipment, like oilers were during both the Cold War and post-Cold War eras, or with greater amounts of ship self-defense equipment, like TAOEs and AORs were during the Cold War. Building TAO-205s with more ship self-defense equipment than currently planned by the Navy could increase TAO-205 procurement costs by tens of millions of dollars per ship, depending on the amount of additional ship self-defense equipment. Section 1026 of the FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act ( S. 1356 / P.L. 114-92 of November 25, 2015) required an independent assessment of the Navy's combat logistics force ships. The report was delivered to Congress in February 2016. A copy of the report was posted by the media outlet Politico on March 11, 2016. The report states the following: The T-AO(X) will only have a limited capability to defeat a submarine launched torpedo attack and no capability to defeat a missile attack. When delivered, the TAO(X) will have: —[the] NIXIE Torpedo Countermeasure System [for decoying certain types of torpedoes] —[the] Advanced Degaussing System (Anti-Mine) [for reducing the ship's magnetic signature, so as to reduce the likelihood of attack by magnetically fused mines] When required, the T-AO(X) will also have ability to embark Navy Expeditionary Combat Command Expeditionary Security Teams (EST). The ESTs will embark with several crew served weapons and are designed to provide limited self-defense against a small boat attack. The T-AO(X) will have Space, Weight, Power and Cooling (SWAP-C) margins for future installations of the following systems: —[the] Close In Weapon System (CIWS) or SeaRAM (Rolling Airframe Missile) [for defense against missile attack] —[the] Anti-Torpedo Torpedo Defense System (ATTDS) [for destroying torpedoes] Even after the installation of a CIWS or ATTDS, if the T-AO(X) was to operate in anything other than a benign environment, the ship will require both air and surface escorts. The decision to rely on [other] Fleet assets to provide force protection [i.e., defense against attacks] for the T-AO(X) was validated by the JROC [in June 2015]. Table 2 summarizes congressional action on the Navy's request for FY2020 procurement funding for the TAO-205 program. A May 2019 GAO report—the 2019 edition of GAO's annual report surveying DOD major acquisition programs—stated the following regarding the TAO-205 program: Technology Maturity and Design Stability The Navy has matured all Lewis class critical technologies and stabilized the ships' design. In 2014, the Navy identified three critical technologies for the Lewis class, all of which involved a new system for transferring cargo at sea. Prior to initiating detail design activities in June 2016, the Navy completed prototype tests of the critical technologies and found that they were fully mature—an approach consistent with shipbuilding best practices. In 2017, the Navy removed one critical technology—the Heavy e-STREAM cargo delivery system—from the Lewis class design. The Navy had intended to use this system to deliver F-35 Lightning II power modules. The Navy subsequently decided to deliver these by air, which precluded any need for the Heavy system. Lead ship construction began in September 2018 with 95 percent of the ship's total design effort complete. Program officials stated that this figure meant that 100 percent of the ship's basic and functional design were by then complete—an approach consistent with best practices. Throughout detail design and now into construction, the Navy has not changed the Lewis class program's performance requirements. The Navy also leveraged commercial vessel designs to minimize design and construction risks. The Lewis class features a modern double-hull construction, an environmental-based design standard for commercial tankers, to ensure the ships can dock at ports-of-call. This design was included in the final three Kaiser class oilers. Production Readiness The program office has largely kept to its construction schedule to date for the first ship, but a flooding incident at a NASSCO graving dock in July 2018 has affected the delivery of future ships. The program office stated that this incident has not affected current ship fabrication activities. However, the dock's unavailability while repairs are planned and implemented has disrupted the contractor's schedule for future ships. According to the program office, the incident has resulted in some delays to certain delivery dates for ships two through six. Other Program Issues As part of the Navy's plan to expand the fleet, the Navy concluded that it would need an additional three Lewis class ships. The Navy's budget request for fiscal year 2019 increased its planned one-ship-per-year buy to two for fiscal years 2019, 2021, and 2023. The Congress provided appropriations for the additional fiscal year 2019 ship in support of the Navy's request. To account for the additional ships in fiscal years 2019 and 2021, the Navy plans to add two more ships to the low-rate initial production phase. Subsequently, program officials stated that they plan to compete a new contract for the remaining 12 ships using the construction knowledge gained from efforts under the existing contract. Program Office Comments We provided a draft of this assessment to the program office for review and comment. The program office provided technical comments, which we incorporated where appropriate. The program office stated that it continues to follow GAO shipbuilding best practices and has leveraged commercial vessel design practices to minimize risk. The program office also stated that it is currently revising its acquisition baseline to reflect the update in total quantities to 20 ships. In addition, the program office noted that, in fiscal year 2019, it fully funded the third and fourth ships and funded advance procurement for the fifth ship.	[ "The Navy began procuring John Lewis (TAO-205) class oilers in FY2016, and a total of four have been procured through FY2019, including two in FY2019. The first six ships are being procured under a block buy contract that was authorized by Section 127 of the FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act (S. 1356/P.L. 114-92 of November 25, 2015). The Navy wants to procure a total of 20 TAO-205s. The Navy's proposed FY2020 budget requests the procurement of the fifth and sixth ships in the program. The Navy estimates the combined procurement cost of the two ships at $1,056.3 million, or an average of $528.1 million each. The two ships have received $75.0 million in prior-year advance procurement (AP) funding, and the Navy's proposed FY2020 budget requests the remaining $981.2 million in procurement funding needed to complete the two ships' estimated combined procurement cost. The Navy's proposed FY2020 budget also requests $73.0 million in AP funding for TAO-205s to be procured in future fiscal years, and $3.7 million in cost-to-complete procurement funding to cover cost growth on TAO-205s procured in prior fiscal years, bringing the total FY2020 procurement funding request for the TAO-205 program (aside from outfitting and post-delivery costs) to $1,057.9 million. Issues for Congress include the following: whether to approve, reject, or modify the Navy's FY2020 procurement funding request for the TAO-205 program; the number of oilers the Navy will require in coming years to support its operations; and whether to encourage or direct the Navy to build TAO-205s with more ship self-defense equipment than currently planned by the Navy." ]	3,373	gov_report	en	null	282fcfa4d5fc83fc9149c72060bd90ca36a80b173dacc48f
The federal government is the nation's largest employer, with over two million workers employed in the United States, U.S. Territories, and foreign countries. A majority of these employees work in the competitive service of the executive branch. Applicants for competitive service positions compete with other applicants and are evaluated according to objective standards. The executive branch includes two other service classifications—the excepted service and the Senior Executive Service (SES)—with hiring and removal standards that diverge from those prescribed for the competitive service. Positions in the excepted service are specifically excepted from the competitive service by statute, by the President, or by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). SES positions are also not in the competitive service. The SES includes senior managerial, supervisory, and policy positions that are subject to a different pay scale, as well as different hiring and removal standards. This report examines the three service classifications, and reviews some of the central features and notable differences among these classifications. The competitive service consists of all civil service positions in the executive branch, except the following: positions that are specifically excepted from the competitive service by or under statute; positions to which appointments are made by presidential nomination for confirmation by the Senate, unless the Senate otherwise directs; and positions in the SES. The competitive service also includes non-executive branch positions and positions in the District of Columbia government that are specifically included in the competitive service by statute. OPM administers examinations for entrance into the competitive service. These examinations are meant to be "practical in character" and relate to "matters that fairly test the relative capacity and fitness of the applicants for the appointment sought[.]" OPM identifies the relative weights for the subjects in an examination, and assigns numerical ratings on a 100-point scale. Applicants who meet the minimum requirements for entrance to an examination, such as citizenship and residence requirements, and are rated 70 or more in the examination are eligible for appointment in the competitive service. These individuals are placed on registers or lists of eligibles. When an agency seeks to fill a competitive service position, it requests a certificate of eligibles from OPM. This certificate is to include enough names from the top of the relevant register to allow an agency appointing official to consider at least three individuals for every position to be filled. The competitive service includes several types of appointments. An individual selected for a continuing position is generally appointed as a career-conditional employee subject to an initial one-year probationary period. After three continuous years of service in a career-conditional appointment, an employee will be converted to a career appointment. A term appointment is a nonpermanent appointment for a period of more than one year, but less than four years. An agency may make a term appointment when the need for an employee's services is not permanent, but involves a special project, extraordinary workload, or reorganization. A temporary appointment is a time-limited appointment for a period not to exceed one year. An agency may make a temporary appointment to fill a short-term position or meet an employment need that is scheduled to end within a specified timeframe. Employees in the competitive service are generally paid in accordance with the General Schedule, a schedule of annual basic pay rates that consists of 15 grades, designated "GS-1" through "GS-15." The grades include 10 steps that provide for increasing rates of pay. An employee who has not reached the maximum pay rate for his or her position is generally advanced to the next step at specified intervals. General Schedule salaries are based on the principles that there is equal pay for substantially equal work within a local pay area, that any pay distinctions are based on work and performance, that federal pay rates are comparable with non-federal pay rates for the same level of work, and that any pay disparities between federal and non-federal employees should be eliminated. Employees in the competitive service who are not serving a probationary or trial period, or have completed one year of current continuous service in a position other than a temporary appointment limited to one year or less, maintain specified notice and appeal rights for adverse personnel actions. Before an agency may suspend such a qualifying employee for 14 days or less, the employee must be given an advance written notice that identifies the specific reasons for the suspension. The employee must also be provided a reasonable time to answer the notice and furnish affidavits and other evidence to support the answer. Similar notice is required before an agency may subject a qualifying employee to other adverse personnel actions. Before a removal, a suspension for more than 14 days, a reduction in grade or pay, or a furlough of 30 days or less, the agency must provide at least 30 days' advance written notice to the employee. The employee must also be given a reasonable time to respond to the notice and provide affidavits and other evidence to support the answer. Unlike suspensions for 14 days or less, these adverse actions may be appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB or Board), an independent, quasi-judicial agency that reviews and adjudicates specified personnel actions taken against qualifying federal employees. In general, an agency must establish three factors to withstand an individual's challenge of his or her adverse personnel action. First, the agency must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the charged conduct occurred. Second, it must establish a nexus between that conduct and the efficiency of the civil service. Finally, the agency must show that the penalty imposed on the employee is reasonable. An agency's action may not be sustained if the appellant shows: (1) harmful error in applying the agency's procedures in arriving at its decision; (2) that the decision was based on a prohibited personnel practice; or (3) that the decision was not in accordance with law. About one-third of all federal workers are employed in the excepted service. The excepted service consists of those civil service positions that are not in the competitive service or the SES. Positions in the excepted service may be designated by statute or by OPM, and are not subject to competitive examination. OPM will exempt a position from the competitive service when it determines that an appointment through competitive examination is not practicable, or the recruitment of certain students or recent graduates would be better achieved through alternate recruitment and assessment processes. For example, OPM may determine that a position should be excepted from the competitive service because it is impracticable to examine the knowledge, skills, and abilities required for a position. Positions in the excepted service are categorized into four schedules. Schedule A includes positions that are not of a confidential or policy-determining character for which it is not practicable to examine applicants. Attorneys, chaplains, and short-term positions for which there is a critical hiring need are examples of schedule A positions. Schedule B also includes positions that are not of a confidential or policy-determining character for which it is not practicable to examine applicants. Unlike Schedule A positions, however, these positions require an applicant to satisfy basic qualification standards established by OPM for the relevant occupation and grade level. Individuals appointed to schedule B positions engage in a variety of activities, including policy analysis, teaching, and technical assistance. Positions in schedule C are policy-determining or involve a close and confidential working relationship with the head of an agency or other key appointed officials. These positions include most political appointees below the cabinet and subcabinet levels. An agency's senior advisor and special assistant positions are typically in schedule C. Finally, schedule D includes positions that are not of a confidential or policy-determining character for which competitive examination makes it difficult to recruit a sufficient number of certain students or recent graduates. Examples of schedule D positions include those involving science, technology, engineering, or mathematics (STEM) occupations and positions in the Presidential Management Fellows Program. Schedule D positions generally require an applicant to satisfy basic qualification standards established by OPM for the relevant occupation and grade level. Like employees in the competitive service, excepted service employees are generally paid in accordance with the General Schedule. In addition, excepted service employees maintain the same notice and appeal rights for adverse personnel actions. Some employees in the excepted service, however, must satisfy different durational requirements before these rights become available. So-called "preference eligibles" in an executive agency, the Postal Service, or the Postal Rate Commission must complete one year of current continuous service to avail themselves of the relevant notice and appeal rights. The term "preference eligible" refers to specified military veterans and some of their family members, such as an unmarried widow, and the wife or husband of a service-connected disabled veteran. Employees in the excepted service who are not preference eligibles and (1) are not serving a probationary or trial period under an initial appointment pending conversion to the competitive service, or (2) have completed two years of current or continuous service in the same or similar position, have the same notice and appeal rights as qualifying employees in the competitive service. The SES is a cadre of high-level government administrators who manage major programs and projects within most federal agencies. While they are considered federal employees within the civil service system, the SES is governed by a regulatory structure separate from the competitive and excepted services. As defined in statute, SES positions are generally managerial or supervisory positions that are classified above the GS-15 grade (or certain equivalent positions) and need not be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. In these leadership roles, SES members may serve as intermediaries between top-level political appointees of an agency who seek to carry out the objectives of a particular President and career civil servants with institutional experience relating to relevant issues. According to a 2018 report, there are currently more than 7,000 permanent SES positions. There are two types of SES positions: (1) career reserved and (2) general. Career reserved positions must be filled with career appointees to shield certain SES roles from political influence. Generally, agency heads are to determine whether a particular SES position warrants a career reserved designation, to "ensure impartiality, or the public's confidence in the impartiality, of the Government." OPM regulations reflect the types of SES roles in which this designation is appropriate, including those involving adjudication and appeals, auditing, and law enforcement duties. General positions may be filled by career appointees, as well as other noncareer and limited term (i.e., political) appointees. There are four types of SES appointments: career, noncareer, limited term, and limited emergency appointees. The SES mainly consists of "career appointees" chosen through a merit-based competitive hiring process. As part of this process, each agency must maintain a recruitment program for career appointees, as well as at least one executive board that reviews qualifications and makes recommendations regarding SES candidates. An OPM-convened Qualification Review Board (QRB) must certify the executive and managerial qualifications of a selected candidate before a career appointment may be made to an SES position. Unlike career appointees, noncareer appointees are not subject to the competitive selection process, but agency heads must determine that these appointees meet the qualifications of the SES position. While noncareer appointees are not QRB-certified, OPM must approve these appointees. Limited term and limited emergency appointees make up a small subset of the SES, and their terms are non-renewable. These appointments are used when a position is needed for a specified period (such as to manage a special project), or a position is established to meet a "bona fide, unanticipated, urgent need." Limited term and limited emergency appointments are also subject to OPM approval. To restrict the politicization of the SES, Title 5 of the U.S. Code (Title 5) limits the number of noncareer and limited term appointees who may serve in SES positions. The SES pay structure is also distinct from the rest of the civil service. Title 5 specifies that the pay rate of each senior executive is based on the executive's individual performance or contribution to agency performance (or both), as measured under a "rigorous" performance appraisal system. Each federal agency must maintain at least one of these appraisal systems, subject to OPM standards, review, and approval. Performance appraisals of SES members may consider factors such as improvements in efficiency, productivity, and quality of work or service, cost efficiency, and performance timeliness. In response to earlier concerns that SES appraisal systems were flawed because most executives received the highest rating, Title 5 tasks OPM, in collaboration with the Office of Management and Budget, with the establishment and maintenance of a government-wide performance appraisal system certification process, in an effort to ensure that an agency's appraisal systems for SES employees make "meaningful distinctions based on relative performance." Title 5 also sets out different pay rates for the SES, with a minimum rate of basic pay equal to 120 percent of the rate for GS-15, step 1, and a maximum rate of basic pay equal to the rate for Level III of the Executive Schedule. But SES members' annual aggregate pay (that includes additional compensation such as bonuses, awards, and other payments in addition to basic pay) is capped at the rate for Level I of the Executive Schedule. If a senior executive's total compensation exceeds the aggregate limitation, the executive receives the overage in the following calendar year. To encourage federal agencies to establish and maintain an OPM-certified performance appraisal system, Title 5 allows for a higher range of SES pay for agencies that have these certified systems. Title 5 also articulates conditions and procedures for removing, suspending, or taking other adverse actions against a member of the SES. Career SES appointees who have successfully completed a one-year probationary period may be removed or subject to adverse action only for specified reasons. For example, an SES career appointee may be removed from the civil service or suspended for more than 14 days only for misconduct, neglect of duty, malfeasance, or failure to accept a directed reassignment or to accompany a position in a transfer of function. SES members must receive advance written notice about the action and opportunity to provide an answer or receive hearing, subject to exception. The senior executive may also appeal the employment action to the MSPB. A career appointee receiving a single unsatisfactory performance rating may be reassigned or transferred within the SES or removed from the SES. A career SES member who receives two unsatisfactory ratings in any period of five consecutive years, or twice in any period of three consecutive years receives less than fully successful ratings, must be removed from the SES. Affected SES career appointees must receive advance written notice of these actions. While these appointees may not appeal these actions to the MSPB, they may request an informal hearing before the Board. SES career appointees are also generally entitled to be placed in a civil service position at GS-15 or above (or an equivalent position). In comparison, noncareer, limited term, and limited emergency appointees are generally not subject to the same removal protections and may be removed from the SES at any time. The procedures for removal of noncareer and limited term appointees are largely not addressed in federal statute, and the terms and procedures for their removal are mainly at the discretion of the agency head. In response to concerns about performance and accountability of SES members employed by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), Congress recently created special removal requirements that apply to these positions. In 2017, Congress passed the Department of Veterans Affairs Accountability and Whistleblower Protection Act, which amended an existing provision concerning removal procedures for these covered senior executives. Under the 2017 Act, the VA Secretary has discretion to suspend, demote, remove, or take other actions against SES career appointees or other high-level executives if the Secretary determines that the individual's misconduct or performance warrants such action. To address SES job performance issues more expeditiously, SES employees at the VA Department are entitled to abbreviated notice and appeals rights, as compared to the removal procedures in place in other federal agencies.	[ "According to the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), the federal workforce consists of an estimated two million civilian employees. Federal law categorizes these employees into three types of service—the competitive service, the excepted service, and the Senior Executive Service (SES)—that may be distinguished by different selection, compensation, and other standards. Title 5 of the U.S. Code (Title 5) contains most of the standards governing federal employment, and OPM is generally responsible for implementing these requirements. The competitive service largely consists of all civil service positions in the executive branch, other than (1) positions excepted from the competitive service by statute; (2) positions appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate; and (3) the SES. Traditionally, OPM has administered examinations for entrance into the competitive service. These examinations are meant to be \"practical in character\" and relate to \"matters that fairly test the relative capacity and fitness of the applicants for the appointment sought.\" Title 5 also authorizes OPM to prescribe rules allowing agencies to hire candidates directly under specified circumstances. The excepted service includes designated civil service positions that are not in the competitive service or the SES and are not subject to competitive examination. OPM maintains authority to exempt a position from the competitive service when it determines that an appointment through competitive examination is not practicable, or the recruitment of students or recent graduates would be better achieved through alternate recruitment and assessment processes. The pay structure for the competitive service and the excepted service is similar. Both services are typically paid in accordance with the General Schedule, a schedule of annual basic pay rates that consists of 15 grades, designated \"GS-1\" through \"GS-15.\" This fixed pay scale is generally designed to reflect, among other things, equal pay for substantially equal work within a local pay area. Additionally, the competitive service and the excepted service generally have similar notice and appeal rights for adverse personnel actions. For example, before a removal, a suspension for more than 14 days, a reduction in grade or pay, or a furlough of 30 days or less, the agency must provide at least 30 days' advance written notice to the affected employee. The employee must also be given a reasonable time to respond to the notice and provide affidavits and other evidence to support the answer. Some adverse actions may also be appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB or Board), an independent, quasi-judicial agency that reviews and adjudicates specified personnel actions taken against qualifying federal employees. The SES is a corps of some 7,000 high-level government administrators who manage major programs and projects within most federal agencies. In these leadership roles, SES members may serve as a link between top-level political appointees of an agency and career civil servants within the agency. The SES is governed by a regulatory structure separate from the competitive and excepted services. While SES members are primarily career appointees chosen through a merit-based competitive hiring process, others are noncareer, limited term or limited emergency appointees (commonly political appointees) selected by agency leadership. To shield certain SES roles from political influence, some SES positions (career reserved positions) must be filled with career appointees, and Title 5 limits the number of noncareer and limited term appointees that may serve in SES positions. The SES pay structure is distinct from the rest of the civil service. Title 5 specifies that SES members are paid within a particular range based on an executive's individual performance or contribution to agency performance (or both), as measured under a performance appraisal system. In addition, Title 5 articulates special conditions and procedures for removing, suspending, or taking other adverse actions against a member of the SES. For example, career SES appointees who have successfully completed a one-year probationary period may be removed or subject to adverse action only for specified reasons, including misconduct and substandard performance. Career appointees must receive advance written notice of these actions, and an opportunity to appeal the action. In comparison, noncareer, limited term, and limited emergency appointees are generally not subject to the same protections and may be removed from the SES at any time." ]	2,697	gov_report	en	null	0f7b34bf500e114b1c6b6a3ac7e15cf8d9b9b8f8eab45e76
This report provides background information and issues for Congress regarding China's actions in the South China Sea (SCS) and East China Sea (ECS), with a focus on implications for U.S. strategic and policy interests. Other CRS reports focus on other aspects of maritime territorial disputes involving China. The issue for Congress is how the United States should respond to China's actions in the SCS and ECS—particularly China's island-building and base-construction activities in the Spratly Islands in the SCS—and to China's strengthening position in the SCS. A key oversight question for Congress is whether the Trump Administration has an appropriate strategy—and an appropriate amount of resources for implementing that strategy—for countering China's "salami-slicing" strategy or gray zone operations for gradually strengthening its position in the SCS, for imposing costs on China for its actions in the SCS and ECS, and for defending and promoting U.S. interests in the region. Decisions that Congress makes on these issues could substantially affect U.S. strategic, political, and economic interests in the Indo-Pacific region and elsewhere. In this report, the term China's near-seas region refers to the SCS, ECS, and Yellow Sea. The term first island chain refers to a string of islands, including Japan and the Philippines, that encloses China's near-seas region. The term second island chain , which reaches out to Guam, refers to a line that can be drawn that encloses both China's near-seas region and the Philippine Sea between the Philippines and Guam. The term exclusive economic zone ( EEZ ) dispute is used in this report to refer to a dispute principally between China and the United States over whether coastal states have a right under international law to regulate the activities of foreign military forces operating in their EEZs. Although maritime territorial disputes in the SCS and ECS involving China and its neighbors may appear at first glance to be disputes between faraway countries over a few rocks and reefs in the ocean that are of seemingly little importance to the United States, the situation in the SCS and ECS can engage U.S. interests for a variety of strategic, political, and economic reasons, including but not necessarily limited to those discussed in the sections below. The SCS, ECS, and Yellow Sea border three U.S. treaty allies—Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines. In addition, the SCS and ECS (including the Taiwan Strait) surround Taiwan, regarding which the United States has certain security-related policies under the Taiwan Relations Act ( H.R. 2479 / P.L. 96-8 of April 10, 1979), and the SCS borders Southeast Asian nations that are current, emerging, or potential U.S. partner countries, such as Singapore, Vietnam, and Indonesia. In a conflict with the United States, Chinese bases in the SCS and forces operating from them would add to a regional network of Chinese anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) forces intended to keep U.S. military forces outside the first island chain (and thus away from China's mainland). Among other things, Chinese bases in the SCS and forces operating from them could help create a bastion (i.e., a defended operating sanctuary) in the SCS for China's emerging sea-based strategic deterrent force of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). In a conflict with the United States, Chinese bases in the SCS and forces operating from them would be vulnerable to U.S. attack. Attacking the bases and the forces operating from them, however, would tie down the attacking U.S. forces for a time at least, delaying the use of those U.S. forces elsewhere in a larger conflict, and potentially delay the advance of U.S. forces into the SCS. Short of a conflict with the United States, Chinese bases in the SCS, and more generally, Chinese domination over or control of its near-seas region could help China to do one or more of the following on a day-to-day basis: control fishing operations and oil and gas exploration activities in the SCS; coerce, intimidate, or put political pressure on other countries bordering on the SCS; announce and enforce an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) over the SCS; announce and enforce a maritime exclusion zone (i.e., a blockade) around Taiwan; facilitate the projection of Chinese military presence and political influence further into the Western Pacific; and help achieve a broader goal of becoming a regional hegemon in its part of Eurasia. In light of some of the preceding points, Chinese bases in the SCS, and more generally, Chinese domination over or control of its near-seas region could complicate the ability of the United States to intervene militarily in a crisis or conflict between China and Taiwan; fulfill U.S. obligations under U.S defense treaties with Japan and the Philippines and South Korea; operate U.S. forces in the Western Pacific for various purposes, including maintaining regional stability, conducting engagement and partnership-building operations, responding to crises, and executing war plans; and prevent the emergence of China as a regional hegemon in its part of Eurasia. A reduced U.S. ability to do one or more of the above could encourage countries in the region to reexamine their own defense programs and foreign policies, potentially leading to a further change in the region's security architecture. Some observers believe that China is trying to use disputes in the SCS and ECS to raise doubts among U.S. allies and partners in the region about the dependability of the United States as an ally or partner, or to otherwise drive a wedge between the United States and its regional allies and partners, so as to weaken the U.S.-led regional security architecture and thereby facilitate greater Chinese influence over the region. Some observers remain concerned that maritime territorial disputes in the ECS and SCS could lead to a crisis or conflict between China and a neighboring country such as Japan or the Philippines, and that the United States could be drawn into such a crisis or conflict as a result of obligations the United States has under bilateral security treaties with Japan and the Philippines. Most recently, those concerns have focused more on the possibility of a crisis or conflict between China and Japan over the Senkaku Islands. A key element of the U.S.-led international order that has operated since World War II is the principle that force or coercion should not be used as a means of settling disputes between countries, and certainly not as a routine or first-resort method. Some observers are concerned that China's actions in SCS and ECS challenge this principle and—along with Russia's actions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine—could help reestablish the very different principle of "might makes right" (i.e., the law of the jungle) as a routine or defining characteristic of international relations. Another key element of the U.S.-led international order that has operated since World War II is the treatment of the world's seas under international law as international waters (i.e., as a global commons), and the principle of freedom of operations in international waters. The principle of freedom of operations in international waters is often referred to in shorthand as freedom of the seas. It is also sometimes referred to as freedom of navigation, although this term can be defined—particularly by parties who might not support freedom of the seas—in a narrow fashion, to include merely the freedom for commercial ships to navigate (i.e., pass through) sea areas, as opposed to the freedom for both commercial and naval ships to conduct various activities at sea. A more complete way to refer to the principle of freedom of the seas, as stated in the Department of Defense's (DOD's) annual Freedom of Navigation (FON) report, is "all of the rights, freedoms, and lawful uses of the sea and airspace, including for military ships and aircraft, guaranteed to all nations under international law." The principle of freedom of the seas dates back hundreds of years. Some observers are concerned that China's actions in the SCS appear to challenge the principle that the world's seas are to be treated under international law as international waters. If such a challenge were to gain acceptance in the SCS region, it would have broad implications for the United States and other countries not only in the SCS, but around the world, because international law is universal in application, and a challenge to a principle of international law in one part of the world, if accepted, could serve as a precedent for challenging it in other parts of the world. Overturning the principle of freedom of the seas, so that significant portions of the seas could be appropriated as national territory, would overthrow hundreds of years of international legal tradition relating to the legal status of the world's oceans and significantly change the international legal regime governing sovereignty over much of the surface of the world. Some observers are concerned that if China's position that coastal states have a right under international law to regulate the activities of foreign military forces in their EEZs were to gain greater international acceptance under international law, it could substantially affect U.S. naval operations not only in the SCS and ECS, but around the world, which in turn could substantially affect the ability of the United States to use its military forces to defend various U.S. interests overseas. Significant portions of the world's oceans are claimable as EEZs, including high-priority U.S. Navy operating areas in the Western Pacific, the Persian Gulf, and the Mediterranean Sea. The legal right of U.S. naval forces to operate freely in EEZ waters—an application of the principle of freedom of the seas—is important to their ability to perform many of their missions around the world, because many of those missions are aimed at influencing events ashore, and having to conduct operations from more than 200 miles offshore would reduce the inland reach and responsiveness of ship-based sensors, aircraft, and missiles, and make it more difficult to transport Marines and their equipment from ship to shore. Restrictions on the ability of U.S. naval forces to operate in EEZ waters could potentially require changes (possibly very significant ones) in U.S. military strategy or U.S. foreign policy goals. Major commercial shipping routes pass through the SCS, which links the Western Pacific to the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. An estimated $3.4 trillion worth of international shipping trade passes through the SCS each year. DOD states that "the South China Sea plays an important role in security considerations across East Asia because Northeast Asia relies heavily on the flow of oil and commerce through South China Sea shipping lanes, including more than 80 percent of the crude oil [flowing] to Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan." In addition, the ECS and SCS contain potentially significant oil and gas exploration areas. Exploration activities there could potentially involve U.S. firms. The results of exploration activities there could eventually affect world oil prices. As China continues to emerge as a major world power, observers are assessing what kind of international actor China will ultimately be. China's actions in the SCS and ECS could influence assessments that observers might make on issues such as China's approach to settling disputes between states (including whether China views force and coercion as acceptable means for settling such disputes, and consequently whether China believes that "might makes right"), China's views toward the meaning and application of international law, and whether China views itself more as a stakeholder and defender of the current international order, or alternatively, more as a revisionist power that will seek to change elements of that order that it does not like. Developments in the SCS and ECS could affect U.S.-China relations in general, which could have implications for other issues in U.S.-China relations. China is a party to multiple maritime territorial disputes in the SCS and ECS, including in particular the following (see Figure 1 for locations of the island groups listed below): a dispute over the Paracel Islands in the SCS, which are claimed by China and Vietnam, and occupied by China; a dispute over the Spratly Islands in the SCS, which are claimed entirely by China, Taiwan, and Vietnam, and in part by the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei, and which are occupied in part by all these countries except Brunei; a dispute over Scarborough Shoal in the SCS, which is claimed by China, Taiwan, and the Philippines, and controlled since 2012 by China; and a dispute over the Senkaku Islands in the ECS, which are claimed by China, Taiwan, and Japan, and administered by Japan. The island and shoal names used above are the ones commonly used in the United States; in other countries, these islands are known by various other names. These island groups are not the only land features in the SCS and ECS—the two seas feature other islands, rocks, and shoals, as well as some near-surface submerged features. The territorial status of some of these other features is also in dispute. There are additional maritime territorial disputes in the Western Pacific that do not involve China. Maritime territorial disputes in the SCS and ECS date back many years, and have periodically led to diplomatic tensions as well as confrontations and incidents at sea involving fishing vessels, oil exploration vessels and oil rigs, coast guard ships, naval ships, and military aircraft. In addition to maritime territorial disputes in the SCS and ECS, China is involved in a dispute, principally with the United States, over whether China has a right under international law to regulate the activities of foreign military forces operating within China's EEZ. The position of the United States and most other countries is that while the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which established EEZs as a feature of international law, gives coastal states the right to regulate economic activities (such as fishing and oil exploration) within their EEZs, it does not give coastal states the right to regulate foreign military activities in the parts of their EEZs beyond their 12-nautical-mile territorial waters. The position of China and some other countries (i.e., a minority group among the world's nations) is that UNCLOS gives coastal states the right to regulate not only economic activities, but also foreign military activities, in their EEZs. In response to a request from CRS to identify the countries taking this latter position, the U.S. Navy states that countries with restrictions inconsistent with the Law of the Sea Convention [i.e., UNCLOS] that would limit the exercise of high seas freedoms by foreign navies beyond 12 nautical miles from the coast are [the following 27]: Bangladesh, Brazil, Burma, Cambodia, Cape Verde, China, Egypt, Haiti, India, Iran, Kenya, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritius, North Korea, Pakistan, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Vietnam. Other observers provide different counts of the number of countries that take the position that UNCLOS gives coastal states the right to regulate not only economic activities but also foreign military activities in their EEZs. For example, one set of observers, in an August 2013 briefing, stated that 18 countries seek to regulate foreign military activities in their EEZs, and that 3 of these countries—China, North Korea, and Peru—have directly interfered with foreign military activities in their EEZs. The dispute over whether China has a right under UNCLOS to regulate the activities of foreign military forces operating within its EEZ appears to be at the heart of incidents between Chinese and U.S. ships and aircraft in international waters and airspace, including incidents in March 2001, September 2002, March 2009, and May 2009, in which Chinese ships and aircraft confronted and harassed the U.S. naval ships Bowditch , Impeccable , and Victorious as they were conducting survey and ocean surveillance operations in China's EEZ; an incident on April 1, 2001, in which a Chinese fighter collided with a U.S. Navy EP-3 electronic surveillance aircraft flying in international airspace about 65 miles southeast of China's Hainan Island in the South China Sea, forcing the EP-3 to make an emergency landing on Hainan Island; an incident on December 5, 2013, in which a Chinese navy ship put itself in the path of the U.S. Navy cruiser Cowpens as it was operating 30 or more miles from China's aircraft carrier Liaoning , forcing the Cowpens to change course to avoid a collision; an incident on August 19, 2014, in which a Chinese fighter conducted an aggressive and risky intercept of a U.S. Navy P-8 maritime patrol aircraft that was flying in international airspace about 135 miles east of Hainan Island —DOD characterized the intercept as "very, very close, very dangerous"; and an incident on May 17, 2016, in which Chinese fighters flew within 50 feet of a Navy EP-3 electronic surveillance aircraft in international airspace in the South China Sea—a maneuver that DOD characterized as "unsafe." Figure 2 shows the locations of the 2001, 2002, and 2009 incidents listed in the first two bullets above. The incidents shown in Figure 2 are the ones most commonly cited prior to the December 2013 involving the Cowpens , but some observers list additional incidents as well. DOD stated in 2015 that The growing efforts of claimant States to assert their claims has led to an increase in air and maritime incidents in recent years, including an unprecedented rise in unsafe activity by China's maritime agencies in the East and South China Seas. U.S. military aircraft and vessels often have been targets of this unsafe and unprofessional behavior, which threatens the U.S. objectives of safeguarding the freedom of the seas and promoting adherence to international law and standards. China's expansive interpretation of jurisdictional authority beyond territorial seas and airspace causes friction with U.S. forces and treaty allies operating in international waters and airspace in the region and raises the risk of inadvertent crisis. There have been a number of troubling incidents in recent years. For example, in August 2014, a Chinese J-11 fighter crossed directly under a U.S. P-8A Poseidon operating in the South China Sea approximately 117 nautical miles east of Hainan Island. The fighter also performed a barrel roll over the aircraft and passed the nose of the P-8A to show its weapons load-out, further increasing the potential for a collision. However, since August 2014, U.S.-China military diplomacy has yielded positive results, including a reduction in unsafe intercepts. We also have seen the PLAN implement agreed-upon international standards for encounters at sea, such as the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES), which was signed in April 2014. A recent incident in the SCS occurred on September 30, 2018, between the U.S. Navy destroyer Decatur (DDG-73) and a Chinese destroyer, as the Decatur was conducting a freedom of navigation (FON) operation near Gaven Reef in the Spratly Islands. In the incident, the Chinese destroyer overtook the U.S. destroyer close by on the U.S. destroyer's port (i.e., left) side, requiring the U.S. destroyer to turn starboard (i.e., to the right) to avoid the Chinese ship. U.S. officials stated that at the point of closest approach between the two ships, the stern (i.e., back end) of the Chinese ship came within 45 yards (135 feet) of the bow (i.e., front end) of the Decatur . As the encounter was in progress, the Chinese ship issued a warning by radio stating, "If you don't change course your [sic] will suffer consequences." One observer, commenting on the incident, stated, "To my knowledge, this is the first time we've had a direct threat to an American warship with that kind of language." U.S. officials characterized the actions of the Chinese ship in the incident as "unsafe and unprofessional." A November 3, 2018, press report states the following: The US Navy has had 18 unsafe or unprofessional encounters with Chinese military forces in the Pacific since 2016, according to US military statistics obtained by CNN. "We have found records of 19 unsafe and/or unprofessional interactions with China and Russia since 2016 (18 with China and one with Russia)," Cmdr. Nate Christensen, a spokesman for the US Pacific Fleet, told CNN. A US official familiar with the statistics told CNN that 2017, the first year of the Trump administration, saw the most unsafe and or unprofessional encounters with Chinese forces during the period. At least three of those incidents took place in February, May and July of that year and involved Chinese fighter jets making what the US considered to be "unsafe" intercepts of Navy surveillance planes. While the 18 recorded incidents only involved US naval forces, the Air Force has also had at least one such encounter during this period…. The US Navy told CNN that, in comparison, there were 50 unsafe or unprofessional encounters with Iranian military forces since 2016, with 36 that year, 14 last year and none in 2018. US and Iranian naval forces tend to operate in relatively narrow stretches of water, such as the Strait of Hormuz, increasing their frequency of close contact. DOD states that Although China has long challenged foreign military activities in its maritime zones in a manner that is inconsistent with the rules of customary international law as reflected in the LOSC, the PLA has recently started conducting the very same types of military activities inside and outside the first island chain in the maritime zones of other countries. This contradiction highlights China's continued lack of commitment to the rules of customary international law. Even though China is a state party to the LOSC [i.e., UNCLOS], China's domestic laws restrict military activities in its exclusive economic zone (EEZ), including intelligence collection and military surveys, contrary to LOSC. At the same time, the PLA is increasingly undertaking military operations in other countries' EEZs. The map on the following page [not reproduced here] depicts new PLA operating areas in foreign EEZs since 2014. In 2017, the PLAN conducted air and naval operations in Japan's EEZ; employed an AGI [intelligence-gathering ship] ship, likely to monitor testing of a THAAD system in the U.S. EEZ near the Aleutian Islands; and employed an AGI ship to monitor a multi-national naval exercise in Australia's EEZ. PLA operations in foreign EEZs have taken place in Northeast and Southeast Asia, and a growing number of operations are also occurring farther from Chinese shores. The issue of whether China has the right under UNCLOS to regulate foreign military activities in its EEZ is related to, but ultimately separate from, the issue of territorial disputes in the SCS and ECS: The two issues are related because China can claim EEZs from inhabitable islands over which it has sovereignty, so accepting China's claims to sovereignty over inhabitable islands in the SCS or ECS could permit China to expand the EEZ zone within which China claims a right to regulate foreign military activities. The two issues are ultimately separate from one another because even if all the territorial disputes in the SCS and ECS were resolved, and none of China's claims in the SCS and ECS were accepted, China could continue to apply its concept of its EEZ rights to the EEZ that it unequivocally derives from its mainland coast—and it is in this unequivocal Chinese EEZ that several of the past U.S.-Chinese incidents at sea have occurred. Press reports of maritime disputes in the SCS and ECS sometimes focus on territorial disputes while devoting little or no attention to the EEZ dispute, or do relatively little to distinguish the EEZ dispute from the territorial disputes. From the U.S. perspective, the EEZ dispute is arguably as significant as the maritime territorial disputes because of the EEZ dispute's proven history of leading to U.S.-Chinese incidents at sea and because of its potential for affecting U.S. military operations not only in the SCS and ECS, but around the world. For background information on treaties and international agreements related to the disputes, see Appendix C . For background information on the July 2016 tribunal award in the SCS arbitration case involving the Philippines and China concerning maritime territorial issues in the SCS, see Appendix D . In general, China's approach to the maritime disputes in the SCS and ECS, and to strengthening its position over time in the SCS, can be characterized as follows: China appears to have identified the assertion and defense of its maritime territorial claims in the SCS and ECS, and the strengthening of its position in the SCS, as important national goals. To achieve these goals, China appears to be employing an integrated, whole-of-society strategy that includes diplomatic, informational, economic, military, paramilitary/law enforcement, and civilian elements. In implementing this integrated strategy, China appears to be persistent, patient, tactically flexible, willing to expend significant resources, and willing to absorb at least some amount of reputational and other costs that other countries might seek to impose on China in response to China's actions. Observers frequently characterize China's approach to the SCS and ECS as a "salami-slicing" strategy that employs a series of incremental actions, none of which by itself is a casus belli , to gradually change the status quo in China's favor. At least one Chinese official has used the term "cabbage strategy" to refer to a strategy of consolidating control over disputed islands by wrapping those islands, like the concentric leaves of a cabbage, in successive layers of occupation and protection formed by fishing boats, Chinese Coast Guard ships, and then finally Chinese naval ships. Other observers have referred to China's approach as a strategy of gray zone operations (i.e., operations that reside in a gray zone between peace and war), of creeping annexation or creeping invasion, or as a "talk and take" strategy, meaning a strategy in which China engages in (or draws out) negotiations while taking actions to gain control of contested areas. Perhaps more than any other set of actions, China's island-building (aka land-reclamation) and base-construction activities at sites that it occupies in the Paracel Islands and Spratly Islands in the SCS have heightened concerns among U.S. observers that China is rapidly gaining effective control of the SCS. China's island-building and base-construction activities in the SCS appear to have begun around December 2013, and were publicly reported starting in May 2014. Awareness of, and concern about, the activities appears to have increased substantially following the posting of a February 2015 article showing a series of "before and after" satellite photographs of islands and reefs being changed by the work. China occupies seven sites in the Spratly Islands. It has engaged in island-building and facilities-construction activities at most or all of these sites, and particularly at three of them—Fiery Cross Reef, Subi Reef, and Mischief Reef, all of which now feature lengthy airfields as well as substantial numbers of buildings. Although other countries, such as Vietnam, have engaged in their own island-building and facilities-construction activities at sites that they occupy in the SCS, these efforts are dwarfed in size by China's island-building and base-construction activities in the SCS. DOD stated in 2017 that In 2016, China focused its main effort on infrastructure construction at its outposts on the Spratly Islands. Although its land reclamation and artificial islands do not strengthen China's territorial claims as a legal matter or create any new territorial sea entitlements, China will be able to use its reclaimed features as persistent civil-military bases to enhance its presence in the South China Sea and improve China's ability to control the features and nearby maritime space. China reached milestones of landing civilian aircraft on its airfields on Fiery Cross Reef, Subi Reef, and Mischief Reef for the first time in 2016, as well as landing a military transport aircraft on Fiery Cross Reef to evacuate injured personnel.... China's Spratly Islands outpost expansion effort is currently focused on building out the land-based capabilities of its three largest outposts—Fiery Cross, Subi, and Mischief Reefs—after completion of its four smaller outposts early in 2016. No substantial land has been reclaimed at any of the outposts since China ended its artificial island creation in the Spratly Islands in late 2015 after adding over 3,200 acres of land to the seven features it occupies in the Spratlys. Major construction features at the largest outposts include new airfields—all with runways at least 8,800 feet in length—large port facilities, and water and fuel storage. As of late 2016, China was constructing 24 fighter-sized hangars, fixed-weapons positions, barracks, administration buildings, and communication facilities at each of the three outposts. Once all these facilities are complete, China will have the capacity to house up to three regiments of fighters in the Spratly Islands. China has completed shore-based infrastructure on its four smallest outposts in the Spratly Islands: Johnson, Gaven, Hughes, and Cuarteron Reefs. Since early 2016, China has installed fixed, land-based naval guns on each outpost and improved communications infrastructure. The Chinese Government has stated that these projects are mainly for improving the living and working conditions of those stationed on the outposts, safety of navigation, and research; however, most analysts outside China believe that the Chinese Government is attempting to bolster its de facto control by improving its military and civilian infrastructure in the South China Sea. The airfields, berthing areas, and resupply facilities on its Spratly outposts will allow China to maintain a more flexible and persistent coast guard and military presence in the area. This would improve China's ability to detect and challenge activities by rival claimants or third parties, widen the range of capabilities available to China, and reduce the time required to deploy them.... China's construction in the Spratly Islands demonstrates China's capacity—and a newfound willingness to exercise that capacity—to strengthen China's control over disputed areas, enhance China's presence, and challenge other claimants.... In 2016, China built reinforced hangars on several of its Spratly Island outposts in the South China Sea. These hangars could support up to 24 fighters or any other type of PLA aircraft participating in force projection operations. In April, May, and June 2018, it was reported that China has landed aircraft and moved electronic jamming equipment, surface-to-air missiles, and anti-ship missile systems to its newly built facilities in the SCS. In July 2018, it was reported that "China is quietly testing electronic warfare assets recently installed at fortified outposts in the South China Sea…." Also in July 2018, Chinese state media announced that a Chinese search and rescue ship had been stationed at Subi Reef—the first time that such a ship had been permanently stationed by China at one of its occupied sites in the Spratly Islands. For additional discussion of China's island-building and facility-construction activities, see CRS Report R44072, Chinese Land Reclamation in the South China Sea: Implications and Policy Options , by Ben Dolven et al. In addition to the island-building and base-construction activities discussed above, additional Chinese actions in the SCS and ECS have heightened concerns among U.S. observers. Following a confrontation in 2012 between Chinese and Philippine ships at Scarborough Shoal, China gained de facto control over access to the shoal and its fishing grounds. Subsequent Chinese actions that have heightened concerns among U.S. observers, particularly since late 2013, include the following, among others: China's announcement on November 23, 2013, of an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) over the ECS that includes airspace over the Senkaku Islands; frequent patrols by Chinese Coast Guard ships—some observers refer to them as harassment operations—at the Senkaku Islands; Chinese pressure against the small Philippine military presence at Second Thomas Shoal in the Spratly Islands, where a handful of Philippine military personnel occupy a beached (and now derelict) Philippine navy amphibious ship; the implementation on January 1, 2014, of fishing regulations administered by China's Hainan province applicable to waters constituting more than half of the SCS, and the reported enforcement of those regulations with actions that have included the apprehension of non-Chinese fishing boats; and a growing civilian Chinese presence on some of the sites in the SCS occupied by China in the SCS, including both Chinese vacationers and (in the Paracels) permanent settlements. China asserts and defends its maritime claims not only with navy ships, but also with coast guard cutters and maritime militia vessels. Indeed, China employs its coast guard and maritime militia more regularly and extensively than its navy in its maritime sovereignty-assertion operations. DOD states that China's navy, coast guard, and maritime militia together "form the largest maritime force in the Indo-Pacific." DOD states that the China Coast Guard (CCG) is the world's largest coast guard. It is much larger than the coast guard of any country in the region, and it has increased substantially in size in recent years through the addition of many newly built ships. China makes regular use of CCG ships to assert and defend its maritime claims, particularly in the ECS, with Chinese navy ships sometimes available over the horizon as backup forces. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) states the following: Under Chinese law, maritime sovereignty is a domestic law enforcement issue under the purview of the CCG. Beijing also prefers to use CCG ships for assertive actions in disputed waters to reduce the risk of escalation and to portray itself more benignly to an international audience. For situations that Beijing perceives carry a heightened risk of escalation, it often deploys PLAN combatants in close proximity for rapid intervention if necessary. China also relies on the PAFMM—a paramilitary force of fishing boats—for sovereignty enforcement actions…. China primarily uses civilian maritime law enforcement agencies in maritime disputes, employing the PLAN [i.e., China's navy] in a protective capacity in case of escalation. The CCG has rapidly increased and modernized its forces, improving China's ability to enforce its maritime claims. Since 2010, the CCG's large patrol ship fleet (more than 1,000 tons) has more than doubled in size from about 60 to more than 130 ships, making it by far the largest coast guard force in the world and increasing its capacity to conduct extended offshore operations in a number of disputed areas simultaneously. Furthermore, the newer ships are substantially larger and more capable than the older ships, and the majority are equipped with helicopter facilities, high-capacity water cannons, and guns ranging from 30-mm to 76-mm. Among these ships, a number are capable of long-distance, long-endurance out-of-area operations. In addition, the CCG operates more than 70 fast patrol combatants ([each displacing] more than 500 tons), which can be used for limited offshore operations, and more than 400 coastal patrol craft (as well as about 1,000 inshore and riverine patrol boats). By the end of the decade, the CCG is expected to add up to 30 patrol ships and patrol combatants before the construction program levels off. In March 2018, China announced that control of the CCG would be transferred from the civilian State Oceanic Administration to the Central Military Commission. The transfer occurred on July 1, 2018. On May 22, 2018, it was reported that China's navy and the CCG had conducted their first joint patrols in disputed waters off the Paracel Islands in the SCS, and had expelled at least 10 foreign fishing vessels from those waters. China also uses the People's Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM)—a force that essentially consists of fishing ships with armed crew members—to defend its maritime claims. In the view of some observers, the PAFMM—even more than China's navy or coast guard—is the leading component of China's maritime forces for asserting its maritime claims, particularly in the SCS. U.S. analysts in recent years have paid increasing attention to the role of the PAFMM as a key tool for implementing China's salami-slicing strategy, and have urged U.S. policymakers to focus on the capabilities and actions of the PAFMM. DOD states that "the PAFMM is the only government-sanctioned maritime militia in the world," and that it "has organizational ties to, and is sometimes directed by, China's armed forces." DIA states that The PAFMM is a subset of China's national militia, an armed reserve force of civilians available for mobilization to perform basic support duties. Militia units organize around towns, villages, urban subdistricts, and enterprises, and they vary widely from one location to another. The composition and mission of each unit reflects local conditions and personnel skills. In the South China Sea, the PAFMM plays a major role in coercive activities to achieve China's political goals without fighting, part of broader Chinese military doctrine that states that confrontational operations short of war can be an effective means of accomplishing political objectives. A large number of PAFMM vessels train with and support the PLA and CCG in tasks such as safeguarding maritime claims, protecting fisheries, and providing logistic support, search and rescue (SAR), and surveillance and reconnaissance. The Chinese government subsidizes local and provincial commercial organizations to operate militia ships to perform "official" missions on an ad hoc basis outside their regular commercial roles. The PAFMM has played a noteworthy role in a number of military campaigns and coercive incidents over the years, including the harassment of Vietnamese survey ships in 2011, a standoff with the Philippines at Scarborough Reef in 2012, and a standoff involving a Chinese oil rig in 2014. In the past, the PAFMM rented fishing boats from companies or individual fisherman, but it appears that China is building a state-owned fishing fleet for its maritime militia force in the South China Sea. Hainan Province, adjacent to the South China Sea, ordered the construction of 84 large militia fishing boats with reinforced hulls and ammunition storage for Sansha City, and the militia took delivery by the end of 2016. China regularly states that it supports freedom of navigation and has not interfered with freedom of navigation. China, however, appears to hold a narrow definition of freedom of navigation that is centered on the ability of commercial cargo ships to pass through international waters. In contrast to the broader U.S./Western definition of freedom of navigation (aka freedom of the seas), the Chinese definition does not appear to include operations conducted by military ships and aircraft. It can also be noted that China has frequently interfered with commercial fishing operations by non-Chinese fishing vessels—something that some observers would regard as a form of interfering with freedom of navigation for commercial ships. An August 12, 2015, press report states the following (emphasis added): China respects freedom of navigation in the disputed South China Sea but will not allow any foreign government to invoke that right so its military ships and planes can intrude in Beijing's territory, the Chinese ambassador [to the Philippines] said. Ambassador Zhao Jianhua said late Tuesday [August 11] that Chinese forces warned a U.S. Navy P-8A [maritime patrol aircraft] not to intrude when the warplane approached a Chinese-occupied area in the South China Sea's disputed Spratly Islands in May.... "We just gave them warnings, be careful, not to intrude," Zhao told reporters on the sidelines of a diplomatic event in Manila.... When asked why China shooed away the U.S. Navy plane when it has pledged to respect freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, Zhao outlined the limits in China's view. "Freedom of navigation does not mean to allow other countries to intrude into the airspace or the sea which is sovereign. No country will allow that," Zhao said. "We say freedom of navigation must be observed in accordance with international law. No freedom of navigation for warships and airplanes ." A July 19, 2016, press report states the following: A senior Chinese admiral has rejected freedom of navigation for military ships, despite views held by the United States and most other nations that such access is codified by international law. The comments by Adm. Sun Jianguo, deputy chief of China's joint staff, come at a time when the U.S. Navy is particularly busy operating in the South China Sea, amid tensions over sea and territorial rights between China and many of its neighbors in the Asia-Pacific region. "When has freedom of navigation in the South China Sea ever been affected? It has not, whether in the past or now, and in the future there won't be a problem as long as nobody plays tricks," Sun said at a closed forum in Beijing on Saturday, according to a transcript obtained by Reuters. "But China consistently opposes so-called military freedom of navigation, which brings with it a military threat and which challenges and disrespects the international law of the sea," Sun said. A March 4, 2017, press report states the following: Wang Wenfeng, a US affairs expert at the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, said Beijing and Washington obviously had different definitions of what constituted freedom of navigation. "While the US insists they have the right to send warships to the disputed waters in the South China Sea, Beijing has always insisted that freedom of navigation should not cover military ships," he said. A February 22, 2018, press report states the following: Hundreds of government officials, experts and scholars from all over the world conducted in-depth discussions of various security threats under the new international security situation at the 54 th Munich Security Conference (MSC) from Feb. 16 to 18, 2018. Experts from the Chinese delegation at the three-day event were interviewed by reporters on hot topics such as the South China Sea issue and they refuted some countries' misinterpretation of the relevant international law. The conference included a panel discussion on the South China Sea issue, which China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries have been committed to properly solving since the signing of the draft South China Sea code of conduct. Senior Colonel Zhou Bo, director of the Security Cooperation Center of the International Military Cooperation Office of the Chinese Ministry of National Defense, explained how some countries' have misinterpreted the international law. "First of all, we must abide by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)," Zhou said. "But the problem now is that some countries unilaterally and wrongly interpreted the 'freedom of navigation' of the UNCLOS as the 'freedom of military operations', which is not the principle set by the UNCLOS," Zhou noted. A June 27, 2018, opinion piece in a British newspaper by China's ambassador to the UK stated that freedom of navigation is not an absolute freedom to sail at will. The US Freedom of Navigation Program should not be confused with freedom of navigation that is universally recognised under international law. The former is an excuse to throw America's weight about wherever it wants. It is a distortion and a downright abuse of international law into the "freedom to run amok". Second, is there any problem with freedom of navigation in the South China Sea? The reality is that more than 100,000 merchant ships pass through these waters every year and none has ever run into any difficulty with freedom of navigation.... The South China Sea is calm and the region is in harmony. The so-called "safeguarding freedom of navigation" issue is a bogus argument. The reason for hyping it up could be either an excuse to get gunboats into the region to make trouble, or a premeditated intervention in the affairs of the South China Sea, instigation of discord among the parties involved and impairment of regional stability…. China respects and supports freedom of navigation in the South China Sea according to international law. But freedom of navigation is not the freedom to run amok. For those from outside the region who are flexing their muscles in the South China Sea, the advice is this: if you really care about freedom of navigation, respect the efforts of China and Asean countries to safeguard peace and stability, stop showing off your naval ships and aircraft to "militarise" the region, and let the South China Sea be a sea of peace. A September 20, 2018, press report stated the following: Chinese Ambassador to Britain Liu Xiaoming on Wednesday [September 19] said that the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea has never been a problem, warning that no one should underestimate China's determination to uphold peace and stability in the region…. Liu stressed that countries in the region have the confidence, capability and wisdom to deal with the South China Sea issue properly and achieve enduring stability, development and prosperity. "Yet to everyone's confusion, some big countries outside the region did not seem to appreciate the peace and tranquility in the South China Sea," he said. "They sent warships and aircraft all the way to the South China Sea to create trouble." The senior diplomat said that under the excuse of so-called "freedom of navigation," these countries ignored the vast sea lane and chose to sail into the adjacent waters of China's islands and reefs to show off their military might. "This was a serious infringement" of China's sovereignty, he said. "It threatened China's security and put regional peace and stability in jeopardy." Liu stressed that China has all along respected and upheld the freedom of navigation and over-flight in the South China Sea in accordance with international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. "Freedom of navigation is not a license to do whatever one wishes," he said, noting that freedom of navigation is not freedom to invade other countries' territorial waters and infringe upon other countries' sovereignty. "Such 'freedom' must be stopped," Liu noted. "Otherwise the South China Sea will never be tranquil." In contrast to China's narrow definition, the U.S./Western definition of freedom of navigation is much broader, encompassing operations of various types by both commercial and military ships and aircraft in international waters and airspace. As discussed earlier in this report, an alternative term for referring to the U.S./Western definition of freedom of navigation is freedom of the seas, meaning "all of the rights, freedoms, and lawful uses of the sea and airspace, including for military ships and aircraft, guaranteed to all nations under international law." When Chinese officials state that China supports freedom of navigation, China is referring to its own narrow definition of the term, and is likely not expressing agreement with or support for the U.S./Western definition of the term. China prefers to discuss maritime territorial disputes with other regional parties to the disputes on a bilateral rather than multilateral basis. Some observers believe China prefers bilateral talks because China is much larger than any other country in the region, giving China a potential upper hand in any bilateral meeting. China generally has resisted multilateral approaches to resolving maritime territorial disputes, stating that such approaches would internationalize the disputes, although the disputes are by definition international even when addressed on a bilateral basis. (China's participation with the ASEAN states in the 2002 declaration of conduct DOC and in negotiations with the ASEAN states on the follow-on binding code of conduct (COC) [see Appendix C ] represents a departure from this general preference.) Some observers believe China is pursuing a policy of putting off a negotiated resolution of maritime territorial disputes so as to give itself time to implement the salami-slicing strategy. Along with its above-discussed preference for treating territorial disputes on a bilateral rather than multilateral basis, China resists and objects to U.S. involvement in maritime disputes in the SCS and ECS. Statements in China's state-controlled media sometimes depict the United States as an outsider or interloper whose actions (including freedom of navigation operations) are seeking to "stir up trouble" in an otherwise peaceful regional situation. Potential or actual Japanese involvement in the SCS is sometimes depicted in China's state-controlled media in similar terms. Depicting the United States in this manner can be viewed as consistent with goals of attempting to drive a wedge between the United States and its allies and partners in the region and of ensuring maximum leverage in bilateral (rather than multilateral) discussions with other countries in the region over maritime territorial disputes. A July 31, 2018, press report stated the following: The Philippines has expressed concern to China over an increasing number of Chinese radio messages warning Philippine aircraft and ships to stay away from newly fortified islands and other territories in the South China Sea claimed by both countries, officials said Monday. A Philippine government report showed that in the second half of last year alone, Philippine military aircraft received such Chinese radio warnings at least 46 times while patrolling near artificial islands built by China in the South China Sea's Spratly archipelago. The Chinese radio messages were "meant to step up their tactics to our pilots conducting maritime air surveillance in the West Philippine Sea", the report said, using the Philippine name for the South China Sea. A Philippine air force plane on patrol near the Chinese-held islands received a particularly offensive radio message in late January according to the Philippine government report. It was warned by Chinese forces that it was "endangering the security of the Chinese reef. Leave immediately and keep off to avoid misunderstanding," the report said. Shortly afterwards, the plane received a veiled threat: "Philippine military aircraft, I am warning you again, leave immediately or you will pay the possible consequences." The Filipino pilot later "sighted two flare warning signals from the reef", said the report, which identified the Chinese-occupied island as Gaven Reef. Philippine officials have raised their concern twice over the radio transmissions, including in a meeting with Chinese counterparts in Manila earlier this year that focused on the Asian countries' long-unresolved territorial disputes, according to two officials who spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not authorised to discuss the issue publicly. It is a new problem that emerged after China transformed seven disputed reefs into islands using dredged sand in the Spratlys… The messages used to originate from Chinese coastguard ships in past years but US military officials suspect transmissions now are also being sent from the Beijing-held artificial islands, where far more powerful communications and surveillance equipment has been installed along with weapons such as surface-to-air missiles. "Our ships and aircraft have observed an increase in radio queries that appear to originate from new land-based facilities in the South China Sea," Commander Clay Doss, public affairs officer of the US 7th Fleet, said by email in response to questions about the Chinese messages. "These communications do not affect our operations," Doss said…. US Navy ships and aircraft communicate routinely with regional navies, including the Chinese navy. "The vast majority of these communications are professional, and when that is not the case, those issues are addressed by appropriate diplomatic and military channels," Doss said. For discussion of some additional elements of China's approach to maritime disputes in the SCS and ECS, including China's nine-dash line in the SCS, see Appendix E . The U.S. position on territorial and EEZ disputes in the Western Pacific (including those involving China) includes the following elements, among others: The United States supports the principle that disputes between countries should be resolved peacefully, without coercion, intimidation, threats, or the use of force, and in a manner consistent with international law. The United States supports the principle of freedom of seas, meaning the rights, freedoms, and uses of the sea and airspace guaranteed to all nations in international law. The United States opposes claims that impinge on the rights, freedoms, and lawful uses of the sea that belong to all nations. The United States takes no position on competing claims to sovereignty over disputed land features in the ECS and SCS. Although the United States takes no position on competing claims to sovereignty over disputed land features in the ECS and SCS, the United States does have a position on how competing claims should be resolved: Territorial disputes should be resolved peacefully, without coercion, intimidation, threats, or the use of force, and in a manner consistent with international law. Claims of territorial waters and EEZs should be consistent with customary international law of the sea and must therefore, among other things, derive from land features. Claims in the SCS that are not derived from land features are fundamentally flawed. Parties should avoid taking provocative or unilateral actions that disrupt the status quo or jeopardize peace and security. The United States does not believe that large-scale land reclamation with the intent to militarize outposts on disputed land features is consistent with the region's desire for peace and stability. The United States, like most other countries, believes that coastal states under UNCLOS have the right to regulate economic activities in their EEZs, but do not have the right to regulate foreign military activities in their EEZs. U.S. military surveillance flights in international airspace above another country's EEZ are lawful under international law, and the United States plans to continue conducting these flights as it has in the past. The Senkaku Islands are under the administration of Japan and unilateral attempts to change the status quo raise tensions and do nothing under international law to strengthen territorial claims. For additional information regarding the U.S. position on the issue of operational rights of military ships in the EEZs of other countries, see Appendix F . U.S. Navy ships challenge what the United States views as excessive maritime claims and carry out assertions of operational rights as part of the U.S. Freedom of Navigation (FON) program for challenging maritime claims that the United States believes to be inconsistent with international law. The FON program began in 1979, involves diplomatic activities as well as operational assertions by U.S. Navy ships, and is global in scope, encompassing activities and operations directed not only at China, but at numerous other countries around the world, including U.S. allies and partner states. DOD's record of "excessive maritime claims that were challenged by DoD operational assertions and activities during the period of October 1, 2016, to September 30, 2017, in order to preserve the rights, freedoms, and uses of the sea and airspace guaranteed to all nations by international law" includes a listing for multiple challenges that were conducted to challenge Chinese claims relating to "excessive straight baselines; jurisdiction over airspace above the exclusive economic zone (EEZ); restriction on foreign aircraft flying through an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) without the intent to enter national airspace; domestic law criminalizing survey activity by foreign entities in the EEZ; prior permission required for innocent passage of foreign military ships through the TTS; and actions/statements that indicate a claim to a TTS [territorial sea] around features not so entitled." Some observers now assess that China's actions in the SCS have achieved for China a more dominant or more commanding position in the SCS. One observer, for example, writes in a March 28, 2018, commentary piece that as Beijing's regional clout continues to grow, it can be hard for weaker nations to resist it, even with these allies' support. Barely three weeks after the [the U.S. aircraft carrier Carl] Vinson's visit [to Vietnam], the Vietnamese government bowed to Chinese pressure and canceled a major oil drilling project in disputed South China waters. It was yet another sign of the region's rapidly shifting dynamics. For the last decade, the United States and its Asian allies have been significantly bolstering their military activities in the region with the explicit aim of pushing back against China. But Beijing's strength and dominance, along with its diplomatic, economic and military reach, continues to grow dramatically.... Western military strategists worry that China will, in time, be able to block any activity in the region by the United States and its allies. Already, satellite photos show China installing sophisticated weapons on a range of newly-reclaimed islands where international law says they simply should not be present. In any war, these and other new weapons that China is acquiring could make it all but impossible for the U.S. Navy and other potential enemies of China to operate in the area at all.... China's increasing confidence in asserting control over the South China Sea has clearly alarmed its neighbors, particularly the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei, all of whom have competing territorial claims over waters that China claims for itself. But it also represents a major and quite deliberate challenge to the United States which, as an ally to all these nations, has essentially staked its own credibility on the issue. Over the last several years, it has become common practice for U.S. warships to sail through nearby waters, pointedly refusing to acknowledge Chinese demands that they register with its unilaterally-declared air and maritime "identification zones" (which the United States and its allies do not recognize).... None of this, however, addresses the seismic regional change produced by China's island-building strategy.... ... China sees this confrontation as a test case for its ability to impose its will on the wider region—and so far it is winning.... The United States remains the world's preeminent military superpower, and there is little doubt it could win a fight with China almost anywhere else in the world. In its own backyard, however, Beijing is making it increasingly clear that it calls the shots. And for now, there is little sign anyone in Washington—or anywhere else—has the appetite to seriously challenge that assumption. An April 9, 2018, article from a Chinese media outlet states the following: The situation in the South China Sea has been developing in favor of China, said Chinese observers after media reported that China is conducting naval drills in the region, at the same time as "three US carrier battle groups passed by" the area. "The regional strategic situation is tipping to China's side in the South China Sea, especially after China's construction of islands and reefs," Chen Xiangmiao, a research fellow at the National Institute for the South China Sea, told the Global Times on Sunday. China has strengthened its facilities in the region and conducted negotiations and cooperation on the South China Sea, which have narrowed China's gap in power with the US, while gaining advantages over Japan and India, according to Chen. U.S. Navy Admiral Philip Davidson, in responses to advance policy questions from the Senate Armed Services Committee for an April 17, 2018, hearing before the committee to consider nominations, including Davidson's nomination to become Commander, U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), stated the following in part (emphasis added): With respect to their actions in the South China Sea and more broadly through the Belt and Road Initiative, the Chinese are clearly executing deliberate and thoughtful force posture initiatives. China claims that these reclaimed features and the Belt and Road Initiative [BRI] will not be used for military means, but their words do not match their actions.... While Chinese air forces are not as advanced as those of the United States, they are rapidly closing the gap through the development of new fourth and fifth generation fighters (including carrier-based fighters), long range bombers, advanced UAVs, advanced anti-air missiles, and long-distance strategic airlift. In line with the Chinese military's broader reforms, Chinese air forces are emphasizing joint operations and expanding their operations, such as through more frequent long range bomber flights into the Western Pacific and South China Sea. As a result of these technological and operational advances, the Chinese air forces will pose an increasing risk not only to our air forces but also to our naval forces, air bases and ground forces.... In the South China Sea, the PLA has constructed a variety of radar, electronic attack, and defense capabilities on the disputed Spratly Islands, to include: Cuarteron Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, Gaven Reef, Hughes Reef, Johnson Reef, Mischief Reef and Subi Reef. These facilities significantly expand the real-time domain awareness, ISR, and jamming capabilities of the PLA over a large portion of the South China Sea, presenting a substantial challenge to U.S. military operations in this region.... China's development of forward military bases in the South China Sea began in December 2013 when the first dredger arrived at Johnson Reef. Through 2015, China used dredging efforts to build up these reefs and create manmade islands, destroying the reefs in the process. Since then, China has constructed clear military facilities on the islands, with several bases including hangars, barracks, underground fuel and water storage facilities, and bunkers to house offense and defensive kinetic and non-kinetic systems. These actions stand in direct contrast to the assertion that President Xi made in 2015 in the Rose Garden when he commented that Beijing had no intent to militarize the South China Sea. Today these forward operating bases appear complete. The only thing lacking are the deployed forces. Once occupied, China will be able to extend its influence thousands of miles to the south and project power deep into Oceania. The PLA will be able to use these bases to challenge U.S. presence in the region, and any forces deployed to the islands would easily overwhelm the military forces of any other South China Sea-claimants. In short, China is now capable of controlling the South China Sea in all scenarios short of war with the United States .... Ultimately, BRI provides opportunities for China's military to expand its global reach by gaining access to foreign air and maritime port facilities. This reach will allow China's military to extend its striking and surveillance operations from the South China Sea to the Gulf of Aden. Moreover, Beijing could leverage BRI projects to pressure nations to deny U.S. forces basing, transit, or operational and logistical support, thereby making it more challenging for the United States to preserve international orders and norms.... With respect to the Indo-Pacific region, specifically, I am concerned that some nations, including China, assert their interests in ways that threaten the foundational standards for the world's oceans as reflected in the Law of the Sea Convention. This trend is most evident off the coast of China and in the South China Sea where China's policies and activities are challenging the free and open international order in the air and maritime domains. China's attempts to restrict the rights, freedoms, and lawful uses of the sea available to naval and air forces is inconsistent with customary international law and as President Reagan said in the 1983 Statement on United States Oceans Policy, "the United States will not, however, acquiesce in unilateral acts of other states designed to restrict the rights and freedoms of the international community in navigation and overflight." A May 8, 2018, press report states the following: China's neighbors and rivals fear that the Asian powerhouse is slowly but surely establishing the foundation of an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in one of the world's most important and busy waterways…. Boosting China's missile defense system in the area would allow it to progressively restrict the movement as well as squeeze the supply lines of smaller claimant states, all of which maintain comparatively modest military capabilities to fortify their sea claims." Another observer writes in a May 10, 2018, commentary piece that All these developments [in the SCS], coupled with the lack of any concerted or robust response from the United States and its allies and partners in the region, point to the inevitable conclusion that the sovereignty dispute in the SCS has – irreversibly – become a foregone conclusion. Three compelling reasons justify this assertion…. First, China sees the SCS issue as a security matter of paramount importance, according it the status of a "core interest" – on par with resolution of the Taiwan question…. Second, the sovereignty of SCS waters is a foregone conclusion partly because of U.S. ambivalence toward Chinese military encroachment…. Third, the implicit acquiescence of ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations] states toward China's moves in the SCS has strengthened its position that all features and waters within the "nine-dashed line" belongs to Beijing…. The above three factors – Beijing's sharpened focus on national security, lack of American resolve to balance China in the SCS, and ASEAN's prioritization of peace and stability over sovereignty considerations – have contributed to the bleak state of affairs today…. From the realist perspective, as Beijing accrues naval dominance in the SCS, the rules meant to regulate its behavior are likely to matter less and less—underscoring the geopolitical truism that 'might is right.' While China foreswears the use of coercive force on its Southeast Asian neighbors and may indeed have no offensive intentions today, it has now placed itself in a position to do so in future. In other words, while it had no capacity nor intent to threaten Southeast Asian states previously, it has developed the requisite capabilities today. Another observer writes in a separate May 10, 2018, commentary piece that the South China Sea is being increasingly dominated militarily by China at both its eastern and western ends. This is what researchers at the US Naval War College meant when they told the author that Chinese militarization activities in the region are an attempt to create the equivalent of a "strategic strait" in the South China Sea. In other words, through the more or less permanent deployment of Chinese military power at both extreme ends of the South China Sea – Hainan and Woody Island in the west, and the new (and newly militarized) artificial islands in the east – Beijing is seeking to transform the South China Sea from an international SLOC into a Chinese-controlled waterway and a strategic chokepoint for other countries…. This amalgamation of force means that China's decades-long "creeping assertiveness" in this particular body of water has become a full-blown offensive. What all this means is that China is well on its way toward turning the South China Sea in a zone of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD). This means keeping military competitors (particularly the US Navy) out of the region, or seriously impeding their freedom of action inside it. A June 1, 2018, press report states the following: Through its navy, coast guard, a loose collection of armed fishing vessels, and a network of military bases built on artificial islands, Beijing has gained de facto control of the South China Sea, a panel of Indo-Pacific security experts said Friday. And the implications of that control—militarily, economically, diplomatically—are far-reaching for the United States and its partners and allies in the region. "Every vessel [sent on a freedom of navigation transit] is shadowed" by a Chinese vessel, showing Beijing's ability to respond quickly events in areas it considers its own, retired Marine Lt. Gen. Wallace "Chip" Gregson said during an American Enterprise Institute forum. Another observer writes in a June 5, 2018, commentary piece that It's over in the South China Sea. The United States just hasn't figured it out yet…. It is past time for the United States to figure out what matters in its relationship with China, and to make difficult choices about which values have to be defended, and which can be compromised. A June 21, 2018, editorial states the following: America's defence secretary, James Mattis, promised "larger consequences" if China does not change track [in the SCS]. Yet for now [Chinese President Xi Jinping], while blaming America's own "militarisation" as the source of tension, must feel he has accomplished much. He has a chokehold on one of the world's busiest shipping routes and is in a position to make good on China's claims to the sea's oil, gas and fish. He has gained strategic depth in any conflict over Taiwan. And, through the sheer fact of possession, he has underpinned China's fatuous historical claims to the South China Sea. To his people, Mr Xi can paint it all as a return to the rightful order. Right now, it is not clear what the larger consequences of that might be. Another observer writes in a July 17, 2018, commentary piece that Two years after an international tribunal rejected expansive Chinese claims to the South China Sea, Beijing is consolidating control over the area and its resources. While the U.S. defends the right to freedom of navigation, it has failed to support the rights of neighboring countries under the tribunal's ruling. As a result, Southeast Asian countries are bowing to Beijing's demands…. In late July 2017, Beijing threatened Vietnam with military action if it did not stop oil and gas exploration in Vietnam's exclusive economic zone, according to a report by the BBC's Bill Hayton. Hanoi stopped drilling. Earlier this year, Vietnam again attempted to drill, and Beijing issued similar warnings…. Other countries, including the U.S., failed to express support for Vietnam or condemn China's threats. Beijing has also pressured Brunei, Malaysia and the Philippines to agree to "joint development" in their exclusive economic zones—a term that suggests legitimate overlapping claims. Meanwhile China is accelerating its militarization of the South China Sea. In April, it deployed antiship cruise missiles, surface-to-air missiles and electronic jammers to artificial islands constructed on Fiery Cross Reef, Subi Reef and Mischief Reef. In May, it landed long-range bombers on Woody Island. The Trump administration's failure to press Beijing to abide by the tribunal's ruling is a serious mistake. It undermines international law and upsets the balance of power in the region. Countries have taken note that the tide in the South China Sea is in China's favor, and they are making their strategic calculations accordingly. This hurts U.S. interests in the region. Up through 2014, U.S. concern over maritime territorial and EEZ disputes involving China centered more on their potential for causing tension, incidents, and a risk of conflict between China and its neighbors in the region, including U.S. allies Japan and the Philippines and emerging partner states such as Vietnam. While that concern remains, particularly regarding the potential for a conflict between China and Japan involving the Senkaku Islands, U.S. concern since 2014 (i.e., since China's island-building activities in the Spratly Islands were first publicly reported) has shifted increasingly to how China's strengthening position in the SCS may be affecting the risk of a U.S.-China crisis or conflict in the SCS and the broader U.S.-Chinese strategic competition. A key issue for Congress is how the United States should respond to China's actions in the SCS and ECS—particularly its island-building and base-construction activities in the Spratly Islands—and to China's strengthening position in the SCS. A key oversight question for Congress is whether the Trump Administration has an appropriate strategy for countering China's "salami-slicing" strategy or gray zone operations for gradually strengthening its position in the SCS, for imposing costs on China for its actions in the SCS and ECS, and for defending and promoting U.S. interests in the region. In considering how to respond to China's actions in the SCS and ECS, an initial step can be to review China's approach to the region. As stated earlier, in general, China's approach to the maritime disputes in the SCS and ECS, and to strengthening its position over time in the SCS, can be characterized as follows: China appears to have identified the assertion and defense of its maritime territorial claims in the SCS and ECS, and the strengthening of its position in the SCS, as important national goals. To achieve these goals, China appears to be employing an integrated, whole-of-society strategy that includes diplomatic, informational, economic, military, paramilitary/law enforcement, and civilian elements. In implementing this integrated strategy, China appears to be persistent, patient, tactically flexible, willing to expend significant resources, and willing to absorb at least some amount of reputational and other costs that other countries might seek to impose on China in response to China's actions. The above points raise a possible question as to how likely a U.S. response might be to achieve U.S. goals if it were one-dimensional rather than multidimensional or whole-of-government; halting or intermittent rather than persistent; insufficiently resourced; reliant on imposed costs that are not commensurate with the importance that China appears to have assigned to achieving its goals in the region, or some combination of these things. Potential general U.S. goals in responding to China's actions in the SCS and ECS include but are not necessarily limited to the following, which are not mutually exclusive: fulfilling U.S. security commitments in the Western Pacific, including treaty commitments to Japan and the Philippines; maintaining and enhancing the U.S.-led security architecture in the Western Pacific, including U.S. security relationships with treaty allies and partner states; maintaining a regional balance of power that is favorable to the United States and its allies and partners; de fending the principle of peaceful resolution of disputes , under which disputes between countries should be resolved peacefully, without coercion, intimidation, threats, or the use of force, and in a manner consistent with international law, and resisting the emergence of an alternative "might-makes-right" approach to international affairs; defending the principle of freedom of the seas , meaning the rights, freedoms, and uses of the sea and airspace guaranteed to all nations in international law, including the interpretation held by the United States and many other countries concerning operational freedoms for military forces in EEZs; and preventing China from becoming a regional hegemon in East Asia, and potentially as part of that, preventing China from controlling or dominating the ECS or SCS. Potential specific U.S. goals in responding to China's actions in the SCS and ECS include but are not necessarily limited to the following, which are not mutually exclusive: dissuading China from carrying out any additional base-construction activities that it might be planning for sites that it occupies in the SCS; dissuading China from moving any additional military personnel, equipment, and supplies to bases at sites that it occupies in the SCS, and persuading China to remove military personnel, equipment, and supplies that have already been moved to those bases; dissuading China from initiating island-building or base-construction activities at Scarborough Shoal; dissuading China from declaring an ADIZ over the SCS; encouraging China to reduce or end Chinese Coast Guard ships at the Senkaku Islands in the ECS; encouraging China to halt actions intended to put pressure against the small Philippine military presence at Second Thomas Shoal in the Spratly Islands (or against any other Philippine-occupied sites in the Spratly Islands); encouraging China to provide greater access by Philippine fisherman to waters surrounding Scarborough Shoal or in the Spratly Islands; encouraging China to adopt the U.S./Western definition regarding freedom of the seas, including the freedom of U.S. and other non-Chinese military vessels to operate freely in China's EEZ; and encouraging China to accept and abide by the July 2016 tribunal award in the SCS arbitration case involving the Philippines and China (see Appendix D ). In terms of identifying specific actions that are intended to support U.S. policy goals, a key element would be to have a clear understanding of which actions are intended to support which goals, and to maintain an alignment of actions with policy goals. For example, U.S. freedom of navigation (FON) operations, which often feature prominently in discussions of actual or potential U.S. actions, can directly support a general goal of defending principle of freedom of the seas, but might support other goals only indirectly, marginally, or not at all. In assessing how the United States should respond to China's actions in the SCS, another factor that policymakers may consider is the potential contribution that could be made by allies such as Japan, the Philippines, Australia, the UK, and France, as well as potential or emerging partner countries such as Vietnam, Indonesia, and India. Most or all of the countries just mentioned have taken steps of one kind or another in response to China's actions in the SCS and ECS. For U.S. policymakers, one key question is how effective those steps by allies and partner countries have been, whether those steps could be strengthened, and whether they should be undertaken independent of or in coordination with the United States. A second key question concerns the kinds of actions that Philippine president Rodrigo Duterte might be willing to take, given his largely nonconfrontational policy toward China regarding the SCS, and what implications Philippine reluctance to take certain actions may have for limiting or reducing the potential effectiveness of U.S. options for responding to China's actions in the SCS. In apparent response to China's actions in the SCS and ECS, the United States during the Obama Administration took a number of actions, including the following: reiterating the U.S. position on maritime territorial claims in the area in various public fora; expressing strong concerns about China's island-building and base-construction activities, and calling for a halt on such activities by China and other countries in the region; taking steps to improve the ability of the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Indonesia to maintain maritime domain awareness (MDA) and patrol their EEZs, including the Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative (MSI), an initiative (since renamed the Indo-Pacific MSI) announced by the Obama Administration in May 2015 and subsequently legislated by Congress to provide $425 million in maritime security assistance to those four countries over a five-year period; taking steps to strengthen U.S. security cooperation with Japan, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Singapore, including signing an agreement with the Philippines that provides U.S. forces with increased access to Philippine bases, increasing the scale of joint military exercises involving U.S. and Philippine forces, relaxing limits on sales of certain U.S. arms to Vietnam, and operating U.S. Navy P-8 maritime patrol aircraft from Singapore; expressing support for the idea of Japanese patrols in the SCS; and stating that the United States would support a multinational maritime patrol of the SCS by members of ASEAN. Some observers, both during and after the Obama Administration, have criticized the Obama Administration for not doing enough to counter China's actions in the SCS and ECS. In particular, they have argued that the Obama Administration did not react strongly enough to China's occupation of Scarborough Shoal in 2012; react strongly enough to China's island-building and base-construction activities in the Spratly Islands starting around December 2013; do enough in terms of conducting and offering sufficiently clear and strong legal rationales for U.S. freedom of navigation (FON) operations in the SCS; do enough to publicize, rhetorically support, and enforce the July 2016 tribunal award in the SCS arbitration case involving the Philippines and China; and impose sufficiently strong costs on China's for its actions in the SCS and ECS. As a result of the above, these critics have argued, the Obama Administration in effect sent a message to China that the United States would not strongly oppose China's actions in the SCS and ECS—a message, these critics have argued, that may have encouraged and accelerated China's actions. Supporters of the Obama Administration's actions in response to China's actions in the SCS and ECS have argued that those actions were substantial and proportionate to China's actions and successful in deterring China from initiating island-building and base-construction activities at Scarborough Shoal; having U.S. military aircraft disregard the ADIZ that China declared over the ECS, and in deterring China from declaring an ADIZ over the SCS; imposing political and reputational costs on China for its actions in the ECS and SCS during this time; and working with regional allies and partners to impose costs on China and strengthen the U.S.-led security architecture for the region. In addition to continuing to implement the above-mentioned Indo-Pacific MSI and conducting recurring freedom of navigation (FON) operations in the SCS (see next section), the Trump Administration reportedly has taken other actions to promote U.S. interests in that area. These steps include actions to increase U.S. defense and intelligence cooperation with Vietnam and Indonesia, and U.S. assistance to improve the maritime security capabilities of the two countries. A January 9, 2018, press report states the following: The United States has accused China of "provocative militarisation" of disputed areas in the South China Sea and will continue sending vessels to the region to carry out freedom-of-navigation patrols, according to a top US adviser on Asia policy. Brian Hook, a senior adviser to US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, said on Tuesday [January 9] that the issue of the South China Sea was raised at all diplomatic and security dialogues between China and the US... "China's provocative militarisation of the South China Sea is one area where China is contesting international law. They are pushing around smaller states in ways that put a strain on the global system," Hook said during a media telephone conference. "We are going to back up freedom-of-navigation operations and let them know we will fly, sail and operate wherever international law allows."... "We strongly believe China's rise cannot come at the expense of the values and rule-based order. That order is the foundation of peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific and also around the world," Hook said. "When China's behaviour is out of step with these values and these rules we will stand up and defend the rule of law." A May 3, 2018, press report stated the following: The United States has raised concerns with China about its latest militarization of the South China Sea and there will be near-term and long-term consequences, the White House said on Thursday [May 3]. U.S. news network CNBC reported on Wednesday that China had installed anti-ship cruise missiles and surface-to-air missile systems on three manmade outposts in the South China Sea. It cited sources with direct knowledge of U.S. intelligence. Asked about the report, White House spokeswoman Sarah Sanders told a regular news briefing: "We're well aware of China's militarization of the South China Sea. We've raised concerns directly with the Chinese about this and there will be near-term and long-term consequences." Sanders did not say what the consequences might be. On May 23, 2018, DOD announced that it was disinviting China from the 2018 RIMPAC (Rim of the Pacific) exercise. RIMPAC is a U.S.-led, multilateral naval exercise in the Pacific involving naval forces from more than two dozen countries that is held every two years. At DOD's invitation, China participated in the 2014 and 2016 RIMPAC exercises. DOD had invited China to participate in the 2018 RIMPAC exercise, and China had accepted that invitation. Observers who have argued for the United States to take stronger actions in response to China's actions in the ECS and SCS have argued that the United States should, among other things, not invite China to participate in the 2018 RIMPAC exercise, on the grounds that doing so would in effect reward China for its recent actions in the ECS and SCS. They have also argued that the value to the United States and its allies of information gained from observing Chinese naval forces operate during the exercise would be outweighed by the value to China of information that China would gain from observing U.S. and other allied and partner navies operate during the exercise. After DOD had issued the invitation to China to participate in the 2018 RIMPAC exercise, these observers argued that the invitation should be withdrawn. Supporters of having China participate in RIMPAC exercises have argued that they are valuable for maintaining a constructive working relationship with China's navy—something, they argue, that could be of particular value if there were a U.S.-Chinese incident at sea or a U.S.-China crisis over some issue. They have also argued that China's participation in RIMPAC exercises provides opportunities to encourage China's navy to adopt U.S. and Western norms relating to issues such as freedom of the seas and avoidance of incidents at sea, and that the value to the United States and its allies of information gained from observing China's naval forces operate during the exercise is not outweighed by value to China of the information gained by China from observing U.S., allied, and partner navies operate during the exercises, particularly since China could observe the exercise using intelligence-gathering ships or perhaps other means, even without participating in the exercise. A statement from DOD about the withdrawal of the invitation for China to participate in the 2018 RIMPAC exercise states the following: The United States is committed to a free and open Indo-Pacific. China's continued militarization of disputed features in the South China Sea only serve to raise tensions and destabilize the region. As an initial response to China's continued militarization of the South China Sea we have disinvited the PLA Navy from the 2018 Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) Exercise. China's behavior is inconsistent with the principles and purposes of the RIMPAC exercise. We have strong evidence that China has deployed anti-ship missiles, surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems, and electronic jammers to contested features in the Spratly Islands region of the South China Sea. China's landing of bomber aircraft at Woody Island has also raised tensions. While China has maintained that the construction of the islands is to ensure safety at sea, navigation assistance, search and rescue, fisheries protection, and other non-military functions the placement of these weapon systems is only for military use. We have called on China to remove the military systems immediately and to reverse course on the militarization of disputed South China Sea features. We believe these recent deployments and the continued militarization of these features is a violation of the promise that President Xi made to the United States and the World not to militarize the Spratly Islands. A May 23, 2018, press report states the following: The Pentagon rescinded an invitation to China to participate in an international military exercise in the Pacific Ocean next month, signaling disapproval to Beijing for what U.S. officials say is its refusal to stop militarizing South China Sea islands. Defense Secretary Jim Mattis, after weeks of internal debate within the Pentagon, concluded that China shouldn't be allowed to participate in the American-led biennial Rim of the Pacific exercise, slated to begin in June, according to U.S. officials. The invitation's withdrawal hasn't been previously disclosed. Chinese officials in Washington were notified of the decision Wednesday morning, said the U.S. officials. China's top diplomat, State Councilor Wang Yi, criticized the Pentagon's decision in comments while visiting the State Department Wednesday. "We find that a very unconstructive move, nonconstructive move," Mr. Wang told reporters. "We hope the U.S. will change such a negative mindset."... After The Wall Street Journal published [an initial version of] this article on Wednesday [May 23], Pentagon officials called their move "an initial response" to China's militarization of the islands. "We have strong evidence that China has deployed anti-ship missiles, surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems, and electronic jammers to contested features in the Spratly Islands region of the South China Sea," Lt. Col. Chris Logan, a Pentagon spokesman, said in a statement. "China's landing of a bomber aircraft at Woody Island has also raised tensions." Eric Sayers, of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a think tank in Washington, and a former adviser to U.S. Pacific Command, said the Pentagon move "will be a minor blow to the PLA Navy's prestige." He said, "It will also send the signal to Beijing that China cannot expect to continue to militarize the South China Sea and still be treated as a welcomed member of the international maritime community." But, Mr. Sayers added, the Trump administration must still develop an overall strategy in the Indo- Pacific region if it hopes to influence the maritime domain there. "Thus far, there is little evidence or new initiatives one can point to that distinguishes this administration's regional policy from the previous one," he said. The decision to rescind the invitation came after more than a month of internal Trump administration debate about China, including the timing of any rescission, the officials said, especially given the trade talks. Top State Department officials initially advised against rescinding the invitation, hoping that diplomatic interventions would convince China to at least remove missiles from those islands, said the U.S. officials. State Department officials didn't immediately respond to a request for comment. But Pentagon officials held the view that it was time to impose a cost on the Chinese for their behavior in the South China Sea, the officials said. A June 3, 2018, press report states the following: The United States is considering intensified naval patrols in the South China Sea in a bid to challenge China's growing militarization of the waterway, actions that could further raise the stakes in one of the world's most volatile areas. The Pentagon is weighing a more assertive program of so-called freedom-of-navigation operations close to Chinese installations on disputed reefs, two U.S. officials and Western and Asian diplomats close to discussions said. The officials declined to say how close they were to finalizing a decision. Such moves could involve longer patrols, ones involving larger numbers of ships or operations involving closer surveillance of Chinese facilities in the area, which now include electronic jamming equipment and advanced military radars. U.S. officials are also pushing international allies and partners to increase their own naval deployments through the vital trade route as China strengthens its military capabilities on both the Paracel and Spratly islands, the diplomats said, even if they stopped short of directly challenging Chinese holdings. "What we have seen in the last few weeks is just the start, significantly more is being planned," said one Western diplomat, referring to a freedom of navigation patrol late last month that used two U.S. ships for the first time. "There is a real sense more needs to be done."… Critics have said the patrols have little impact on Chinese behavior and mask the lack of a broader strategy to deal with China's growing dominance of the area…. U.S. Defence Secretary Jim Mattis warned in Singapore on Saturday [June 2] that China's militarization of the South China Sea was now a "reality" but that Beijing would face unspecified consequences. A November 13, 2018, press report states the following: National security adviser John Bolton said [on November 13] the U.S. would oppose any agreements between China and other claimants to the South China Sea that limit free passage to international shipping, and that American naval vessels would continue to sail through those waters. Mr. Bolton's remarks served as a warning to Southeast Asian leaders, who are preparing for a regional summit in Singapore this week, and particularly for the Philippines, which is now in talks with Beijing about jointly exploring natural resources in the contested area. In meetings to develop a code of conduct this year for the South China Sea, China has tried to secure a veto over Southeast Asian nations hosting military exercises with other countries in the disputed waters…. Mr. Bolton said the U.S. welcomes the negotiations in principle. In a media briefing in Singapore, he described them as a plus. But he stressed that "the outcome has to be mutually acceptable, and also has to be acceptable to all the countries that have legitimate maritime and naval rights to transit and other associate rights that we don't want to see infringed." Some observers have expressed concern that the Trump Administration's focus from time to time on North Korea has sometimes distracted the Administration from the situation in the SCS, permitting China to more easily increase or consolidate its gains in the area. Other observers have expressed concern that the Trump Administration's focus on reducing the U.S. trade deficit with China could distract the Administration from other issues relating to China, including China's actions in the SCS. At a September 17, 2015, hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee on DOD's maritime security strategy in the Asia-Pacific region, DOD witnesses stated, in response to questioning, that the United States had not conducted a freedom of navigation (FON) operation within 12 miles of a Chinese-occupied land feature in the Spratly Islands since 2012. This led to a public debate in the United States (that was watched by observers in the Western Pacific) over whether the United States should soon conduct such an operation, particularly given China's occupation of Scarborough Shoal in 2012 and China's island-building activities at sites that its occupies in the SCS. Opponents argued that conducting a FON operation could antagonize China and give China an excuse to militarize its occupied sites in the SCS. Supporters argued that not conducting such an operation was inconsistent with the underlying premise of the U.S. FON program that navigational rights which are not regularly exercised are at risk of atrophy; that it was inconsistent with the U.S. position of taking no position on competing claims to sovereignty over disputed land features in the SCS (because it tacitly accepts Chinese sovereignty over those features); that it effectively rewarded (rather than imposed costs on) China for its assertive actions in the SCS, potentially encouraging further such actions; and that China intends to militarize its occupied sites in the Spratly Islands, regardless of whether the United States conducts FON operations there. The Obama Administration reportedly considered, for a period of weeks, whether to conduct such an operation in the near future. Some observers argued that the Obama Administration's extended consideration of the question, and the press reporting on that deliberation, unnecessarily raised the political stakes involved in whether to conduct what, in the view of these observers, should have been a routine FON operation. The Obama Administration decided in favor of conducting the operation, and the operation reportedly was conducted near the Chinese-occupied site of Subi Reef on October 27, 2015 (which was October 26, 2015, in Washington, DC), using the U.S. Navy destroyer Lassen in conjunction with a U.S. Navy P-8 maritime patrol aircraft flying overhead. Statements from executive branch sources about the operation that were reported in the press created some confusion among observers regarding how the operation was conducted and what rationale the Obama Administration was citing as the legal basis for the operation. In particular, there was confusion among observers as to whether the United States was defending the operation as an expression of the right of innocent passage —a rationale, critics argued, that would muddle the legal message sent by the operation, possibly implying U.S. acceptance of Chinese sovereignty over Subi Reef, which would inadvertently turn the operation into something very different and perhaps even self-defeating from a U.S. perspective. A second FON operation in the SCS was conducted on January 29, 2016, near Triton Island in the Paracel Islands, by the U.S. Navy destroyer C urtis Wilber . A third FON operation in the SCS was conducted on May 10, 2016, in which the destroyer William P. Lawrence conducted an innocent passage within 12 nautical miles of Fiery Cross Reef, a Chinese-occupied feature in the Spratly Islands that is also claimed by Taiwan, Vietnam, and the Philippines. A fourth FON operation in the SCS occurred on October 21, 2016, involving the destroyer Decatur operating near the Paracel Islands. This was the final announced FON operation in the South China Sea during the Obama Administration. As of early May 2017, the Trump Administration had not conducted any announced FON operations in the SCS, and DOD reportedly had turned down proposals from the Navy to conduct such operations, prompting some observers to argue that the Trump Administration, in its first few months in office, appeared to be more hesitant about conducting FON operations in the SCS than the Obama Administration was during its final 15 months in office (i.e., since October 2015). DOD officials stated that in spite of the absence of announced FON operations in the SCS, U.S. policy on such operations had not changed, and that the United States intended to conduct FON operations in the SCS in the near future. As shown in Table 1 , the Trump Administration conducted an FON operation in the SCS on May 25, 2017, and has conducted multiple additional FON operations in the SCS since then. In general, China has objected to each of these operations and has stated that it sent Chinese Navy ships in each case to warn the U.S. Navy ships to leave the areas in question. The FON operation conducted on September 30, 2018, led to an intense encounter, discussed elsewhere in this report, between the U.S. Navy ship that conducted the operation (the USS Decatur [DDG-73]) and the Chinese Navy ship that was sent to warn it off. In addition to conducting FON operations in the Spratly and Paracel islands, U.S. Navy ships have steamed through the Taiwan Strait on multiple occasions, and Air Force long-range bombers have periodically conducted flyovers above the ECS and SCS. A September 1, 2017, press report states that The Pentagon for the first time has set a schedule of naval patrols in the South China Sea in an attempt to create a more consistent posture to counter China's maritime claims there, injecting a new complication into increasingly uneasy relations between the two powers. The U.S. Pacific Command has developed a plan to conduct so-called freedom-of-navigation operations two to three times over the next few months, according to several U.S. officials, reinforcing the U.S. challenge to what it sees as excessive Chinese maritime claims in the disputed South China Sea. Beijing claims sovereignty over all South China Sea islands and their adjacent waters. The plan marks a significant departure from such military operations in the region during the Obama administration, when officials sometimes struggled with when, how and where to conduct those patrols. They were canceled or postponed based on other political factors after what some U.S. officials said were contentious internal debates. The idea behind setting a schedule contrasts with the more ad hoc approach to conducting freedom-of-navigation operations, known as "fonops" in military parlance, and establish more regularity in the patrols. Doing so may help blunt Beijing's argument that the patrols amount to a destabilizing provocation each time they occur, U.S. officials said.... Officials described the new plan as a more predetermined way of conducting such patrols than in the past, though not immutable. The plan is in keeping with the Trump administration's approach to military operations, which relies on giving commanders leeway to determine the U.S. posture. In keeping with policies against announcing military operations before they occur, officials declined to disclose where and when they would occur.... In a new facet, some freedom-of-navigation patrols may be "multi-domain" patrols, using not only U.S. Navy warships but U.S. military aircraft as well. Thus far, there have been three publicly disclosed freedom-of-navigation operations under the Trump administration. The last one was conducted on Aug. 10 by the navy destroyer, the USS John S. McCain, which days later collided with a cargo ship, killing 10 sailors. That patrol around Mischief Reef—one of seven fortified artificial islands that Beijing has built in the past three years in the disputed Spratlys archipelago—also included an air component. According to U.S. officials, two P-8 Poseidon reconnaissance aircraft flew above the McCain in a part of the operation that hadn't been previously disclosed. More navigation patrols using warships likely now will include aircraft overhead, they said." An October 12, 2017, blog post states the following: The [reported October 10, 2017,] FONOP is the fourth in just five months and demonstrates that the Trump administration is accepting a higher frequency for these operations. After the Obama administration initiated South China Sea operations in October 2015, beginning with challenges to Chinese and other South China Sea claimant state possessions in the Spratly group, it only carried out three additional operations in 2016. Critics of the Obama administration's approach to the U.S. Navy's freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea suggested that the relative infrequency and perception that the operations were subject of the overall ebbs and flows of the U.S.-China bilateral relationship undermined their stated utility as legal signaling tools. Even with stepped up FONOPs this year, the Trump administration hasn't changed the fundamentals of U.S. South China Sea policy, which continues to remain agnostic about sovereignty claims and focuses exclusively on freedom of navigation, overflight, and the preservation of international law and order in the region. With the exception of USS Dewey's May 2017 FONOP around Mischief Reef—notable for being the first FONOP this year—successive Trump administration FONOPs have attracted comparatively less attention in the press. Proponents of these operations in the United States have argued that they should not be seen as noteworthy events, but more as a fact of life in the South China Sea—a reminder of the U.S. Navy's forward presence in the area and its commitment to freedom of navigation. A corollary of the increased pace of operations this year is that a slowdown in U.S. FONOPs could appear to be motivated by broader diplomatic concerns in the bilateral U.S.-China relationship. In assessing U.S. FON operations that take place within 12 nautical miles of Chinese-occupied sites in the SCS, one question relates to whether to conduct such operations, exactly where, and how often. A second question relates to the rationale that is cited as the legal basis for conducting them. Regarding this second question, one U.S. specialist on international law of the sea states the following regarding three key legal points in question (emphasis added): Regarding features in the water whose sovereignty is in dispute, "Every feature occupied by China is challenged by another claimant state, often with clearer line of title from Spanish, British or French colonial rule. The nation, not the land, is sovereign, which is why there is no territorial sea around Antarctica—it is not under the sovereignty of any state, despite being a continent. As the United States has not recognized Chinese title to the features, it is not obligated to observe requirements of a theoretical territorial sea. Since the territorial sea is a function of state sovereignty of each rock or island, and not a function of simple geography, if the United States does not recognize any state having title to the feature, then it is not obligated to observe a theoretical territorial sea and may treat the feature as terra nullius . Not only do U.S. warships have a right to transit within 12 nm [nautical miles] of Chinese features, they are free to do so as an exercise of high seas freedom under article 87 of the Law of the Sea Convention, rather than the more limited regime of innocent passage. Furthermore, whereas innocent passage does not permit overflight, high seas freedoms do, and U.S. naval aircraft lawfully may overfly such features.... More importantly, even assuming that one or another state may have lawful title to a feature, other states are not obligated to confer upon that nation the right to unilaterally adopt and enforce measures that interfere with navigation, until lawful title is resolved. Indeed, observing any nation's rules pertaining to features under dispute legitimizes that country's claim and takes sides." Regarding features in the water whose sovereignty has been resolved, "It is unclear whether features like Fiery Cross Reef are rocks or merely low-tide elevations [LTEs] that are submerged at high tide, and after China has so radically transformed them, it may now be impossible to determine their natural state. Under the terms of the law of the sea, states with ownership over naturally formed rocks are entitled to claim a 12 nm territorial sea. On the other hand, low-tide elevations in the mid-ocean do not qualify for any maritime zone whatsoever. Likewise, artificial islands and installations also generate no maritime zones of sovereignty or sovereign rights in international law, although the owner of features may maintain a 500-meter vessel traffic management zone to ensure navigational safety." Regarding features in the water whose sovereignty has been resolved and which do qualify for a 12-nautical-mile territorial sea, " Warships and commercial vessels of all nations are entitled to conduct transit in innocent passage in the territorial sea of a rock or island of a coastal state, although aircraft do not enjoy such a right." These three legal points appear to create at least four options for the rationale to cite as the legal basis for conducting an FON operation within 12 miles of Chinese-occupied sites in the SCS: One option would be to state that since there is a dispute as to the sovereignty of the site or sites in question, that site or those sites are terra nullius , that the United States consequently is not obligated to observe requirements of a theoretical territorial sea, and that U.S. warships thus have a right to transit within 12 nautical miles of the site or sites as an exercise of high seas freedom under article 87 of the Law of the Sea Convention. A second option, if the site or sites were LTEs prior to undergoing land reclamation, would be to state that the site or sites are not entitled to a 12-nautical-mile territorial sea, and that U.S. warships consequently have a right to transit within 12 nautical miles as an exercise of high seas freedom. A third option would be to state that the operation was being conducted under the right of innocent passage within a 12-nautical-mile territorial sea. A fourth option would be to not provide a public rationale for the operation, so as to create uncertainty for China (and perhaps other observers) as to exact U.S. legal rationale. If the fourth option is not taken, and consideration is given to selecting from among the first three options, then it might be argued that choosing the second option might inadvertently send a signal to observers that the legal point associated with the first option was not being defended, and that choosing the third option might inadvertently send a signal to observers that the legal points associated with the first and second options were not being defended. Regarding the FON operation conducted on May 24, 2017, near Mischief Reef, the U.S. specialist on international law of the sea quoted above states the following: This was the first public notice of a freedom of navigation (FON) operation in the Trump administration, and may prove the most significant yet for the United States because it challenges not only China's apparent claim of a territorial sea around Mischief Reef, but in doing so questions China's sovereignty over the land feature altogether.... The Pentagon said the U.S. warship did a simple military exercise while close to the artificial island—executing a "man overboard" rescue drill. Such drills may not be conducted in innocent passage, and therefore indicate the Dewey exercised high seas freedoms near Mischief Reef. The U.S. exercise of high seas freedoms around Mischief Reef broadly repudiates China's claims of sovereignty over the feature and its surrounding waters. The operation stands in contrast to the flubbed transit by the USS Lassen near Subi Reef on October 27, 2015, when it appeared the warship conducted transit in innocent passage and inadvertently suggested that the feature generated a territorial sea (by China or some other claimant). That operation was roundly criticized for playing into China's hands, with the muddy legal rationale diluting the strategic message. In the case of the Dewey, the Pentagon made clear that it did not accept a territorial sea around Mischief Reef—by China or any other state. The United States has shoehorned a rejection of China's sovereignty over Mischief Reef into a routine FON operation. Mischief Reef is not entitled to a territorial sea for several reasons. First, the feature is not under the sovereignty of any state. Mid-ocean low-tide elevations are incapable of appropriation, so China's vast port and airfield complex on the feature are without legal effect. The feature lies 135 nautical miles from Palawan Island, and therefore is part of the Philippine continental shelf. The Philippines enjoys sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the feature, including all of its living and non-living resources.... Second, even if Mischief Reef were a naturally formed island, it still would not be entitled to a territorial sea until such time as title to the feature was determined. Title may be negotiated, arbitrated or adjudicated through litigation. But mere assertion of a claim by China is insufficient to generate lawful title. (If suddenly a new state steps forward to claim the feature—Britain, perhaps, based on colonial presence—would it be entitled to the presumption of a territorial sea?) Even Antarctica, an entire continent, does not automatically generate a territorial sea. A territorial sea is a function of state sovereignty, and until sovereignty is lawfully obtained, no territorial sea inures. Third, no state, including China, has established baselines around Mischief Reef in accordance with article 3 of UNCLOS. A territorial sea is measured from baselines; without baselines, there can be no territorial sea. What is the policy rationale for this construction? Baselines place the international community on notice that the coastal state has a reasonable and lawful departure from which to measure the breadth of the territorial sea. Unlike the USS Lassen operation, which appeared to be a challenge to some theoretical or "phantom" territorial sea, the Dewey transit properly reflects the high seas nature of the waters immediately surrounding Mischief Reef as high seas. As a feature on the Philippine continental shelf, Mischief Reef is not only incapable of ever generating a territorial sea but also devoid of national airspace. Aircraft of all nations may freely overfly Mischief Reef, just as warships and commercial ships may transit as close to the shoreline as is safe and practical. The Dewey transit makes good on President Obama's declaration in 2016 that the Annex VII tribunal for the Philippines and China issued a "final and binding" decision.... The United States will include the Dewey transit on its annual list of FON operations for fiscal year 2017, which will be released in the fourth quarter or early next year. How will the Pentagon account for the operation—what was challenged? The Dewey challenged China's claim of "indisputable sovereignty" to Mischief Reef as one of the features in the South China Sea, and China's claim of "adjacent" waters surrounding it. This transit cuts through the diplomatic dissembling that obfuscates the legal seascape and is the most tangible expression of the U.S. view that the arbitration ruling is "final and binding." Regarding this same FON operation, two other observers stated the following: The Dewey's action evidently challenged China's right to control maritime zones adjacent to the reef—which was declared by the South China Sea arbitration to be nothing more than a low tide elevation on the Philippine continental shelf. The operation was hailed as a long-awaited "freedom of navigation operation" (FONOP) and "a challenge to Beijing's moves in the South China Sea," a sign that the United States will not accept "China's contested claims" and militarization of the Spratlys, and a statement that Washington "will not remain passive as Beijing seeks to expand its maritime reach." Others went further and welcomed this more muscular U.S. response to China's assertiveness around the Spratly Islands to challenge China's "apparent claim of a territorial sea around Mischief Reef…[as well as] China's sovereignty over the land feature" itself. But did the Dewey actually conduct a FONOP? Probably—but maybe not. Nothing in the official description of the operation or in open source reporting explicitly states that a FONOP was in fact conducted. Despite the fanfare, the messaging continues to be muddled. And that is both unnecessary and unhelpful. In this post, we identify the source of ambiguity and provide an overview of FONOPs and what distinguishes them from the routine practice of freedom of navigation. We then explain why confusing the two is problematic—and particularly problematic in the Spratlys, where the practice of free navigation is vastly preferable to the reactive FONOP. FONOPs should continue in routine, low-key fashion wherever there are specific legal claims to be challenged (as in the Paracel Islands, the other disputed territories in the SCS); they should not be conducted—much less hyped up beyond proportion—in the Spratlys. Instead, the routine exercise of freedom of navigation is the most appropriate way to use the fleet in support of U.S. and allied interests.... ... was the Dewey's passage a FONOP designed to be a narrow legal challenge between the US and Chinese governments? Or was it a rightful and routine exercise of navigational freedoms intended to signal reassurance to the region and show U.S. resolve to defend the rule sets that govern the world's oceans? Regrettably, the DOD spokesman's answer was not clear. The distinction is not trivial.... The U.S. should have undertaken, and made clear that it was undertaking, routine operations to exercise navigational freedoms around Mischief Reef—rather than (maybe) conducting a FONOP. The first problem with conducting FONOP operations at Mischief Reef or creating confusion on the point is that China has made no actual legal claim that the U.S. can effectively challenge. In fact, in the Spratlys, no state has made a specific legal claim about its maritime entitlements around the features it occupies. In other words, not only are there no "excessive claims," there are no clear claims to jurisdiction over water space at all. Jurisdictional claims by a coastal state begin with an official announcement of baselines—often accompanied by detailed geographic coordinates—to put other states on notice of the water space the coastal state claims as its own. China has made several ambiguous claims over water space in the South China Sea. It issued the notorious 9-dashed line map, for instance, and has made cryptic references that eventually it might claim that the entire Spratly Island area generates maritime zones as if it were one physical feature. China has a territorial sea law that requires Chinese maritime agencies only to employ straight baselines (contrary to international law). And it formally claimed straight baselines all along its continental coastline, in the Paracels, and for the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, which China claims and Japan administers. All of these actions are contrary to international law and infringe on international navigational rights. These have all been subject to American FONOPs in the past—and rightly so. They are excessive claims. But China has never specified baselines in the Spratlys. Accordingly, no one knows for sure where China will claim a territorial sea there. So for now, since there is no specific legal claim to push against, a formal FONOP is the wrong tool for the job. The U.S. Navy can and should simply exercise the full, lawful measure of high seas freedoms in and around the Spratly Islands. Those are the right tools for the job where no actual coastal state claim is being challenged. Second, the conflation of routine naval operations with the narrow function of a formal FONOP needlessly politicizes this important program, blurs the message to China and other states in the region, blunts its impact on China's conduct, and makes the program less effective in other areas of the globe. This conflation first became problematic with the confused and confusing signaling that followed the FONOP undertaken by the USS Lassen in the fall of 2015. Afterward, the presence or absence of a FONOP dominated beltway discussion about China's problematic conduct in the South China Sea and became the barometer of American commitment and resolve in the region. Because of this discussion, FONOPs became reimagined in the public mind as the only meaningful symbol of U.S. opposition to Chinese policy and activity in the SCS. In 2015 and 2016 especially, FONOPs were often treated as if they were the sole available operational means to push back against rising Chinese assertiveness. This was despite a steady U.S. presence in the region for more than 700 ship days a year and a full schedule of international exercises, ample intelligence gathering operations, and other important naval demonstrations of U.S. regional interests. In consequence, we should welcome the apparent decision not to conduct a FONOP around Scarborough Shoal—where China also never made any clear baseline or territorial sea claim. If U.S. policy makers intend to send a signal to China that construction on or around Scarborough would cross a red line, there are many better ways than a formal FONOP to send that message.... The routine operations of the fleet in the Pacific theater illustrate the crucial—and often misunderstood—difference between a formal FONOP and operations that exercise freedoms of navigation. FONOPs are not the sole remedy to various unlawful restrictions on navigational rights across the globe, but are instead a small part of a comprehensive effort to uphold navigational freedoms by practicing them routinely. That consistent practice of free navigation, not the reactive FONOP, is the policy best suited to respond to Chinese assertiveness in the SCS. This is especially true in areas such as the Spratly Islands where China has made no actual legal claims to challenge. As mentioned earlier, in terms of identifying specific actions that are intended to support U.S. policy goals, a key element would be to have a clear understanding of which actions are intended to support which goals, and to maintain an alignment of actions with policy goals. U.S. freedom of navigation (FON) operations can directly support a general goal of defending principle of freedom of the seas, but might support other goals only indirectly, marginally, or not at all. Some of the actions taken to date by the United States, as well as some of those suggested by observers who argue in favor of stronger U.S. actions, are intended to impose costs on China for conducting certain activities in the ECS and SCS, with the aim of persuading China to stop or reverse those activities. Cost-imposing actions can come in various forms (e.g., reputational/political, institutional, or economic). Although the potential additional or strengthened actions often relate to the Western Pacific, potential cost-imposing actions do not necessarily need to be limited to that region. As a hypothetical example for purposes of illustrating the point, one potential cost-imposing action might be for the United States to respond to unwanted Chinese activities in the ECS or SCS by moving to suspend China's observer status on the Arctic Council. Expanding the potential scope of cost-imposing actions to regions beyond the Western Pacific can make it possible to employ elements of U.S. power that cannot be fully exercised if the examination of potential cost-imposing strategies is confined to the Western Pacific. It may also, however, expand, geographically or otherwise, areas of tension or dispute between the United States and China. Actions to impose costs on China can also impose costs, or lead to China imposing costs, on the United States and its allies and partners. Whether to implement cost-imposing actions thus involves weighing the potential benefits and costs to the United States and its allies and partners of implementing those actions, as well as the potential consequences to the United States and its allies and partners of not implementing those actions. Some observers argue that the current response to China's actions in the SCS is inadequate, and have proposed taking stronger actions. Appendix G presents a bibliography of some recent writings by these observers. In general, actions proposed by these observers include (but are not limited to) the following: making a statement (analogous to the one that U.S. leaders have made concerning the Senkaku islands and the U.S.-Japan treaty on mutual cooperation and security) that clarifies what the United States would do under the U.S.-Philippines mutual defense treaty in the event of certain Chinese actions at Scarborough Shoal, Second Thomas Shoal, or elsewhere in the SCS; further increasing and/or accelerating actions to strengthen the capacity of allied and partner countries in the region to maintain maritime domain awareness (MDA) and defend their maritime claims by conducting coast guard and/or navy patrols of claimed areas; further increasing U.S. Navy operations in the region, including sending U.S. Navy ships more frequently to waters within 12 nautical miles of Chinese-occupied sites in the SCS, and conducting FON operations in the SCS jointly with navy ships of U.S. allies; further strengthening U.S. security cooperation with allied and partner countries in the region, and with India, to the point of creating a coalition for balancing China's assertiveness; and taking additional actions to impose costs on China for its actions in its near-seas region, such as inviting Taiwan to participate in the 2018 RIMPAC exercise. As mentioned earlier, some observers remain concerned that maritime territorial disputes in the ECS and SCS could lead to a crisis or conflict between China and a neighboring country such as Japan or the Philippines, and that the United States could be drawn into such a crisis or conflict as a result of obligations the United States has under bilateral security treaties with Japan and the Philippines. Regarding this issue, potential oversight questions for Congress include the following: Have U.S. officials taken appropriate and sufficient steps to help reduce the risk of maritime territorial disputes in the SCS and ECS escalating into conflicts? Do the United States and Japan have a common understanding of potential U.S. actions under Article IV of the U.S.-Japan Treaty on Mutual Cooperation and Security (see Appendix B ) in the event of a crisis or conflict over the Senkaku Islands? What steps has the United States taken to ensure that the two countries share a common understanding? Do the United States and the Philippines have a common understanding of how the 1951 U.S.-Philippines mutual defense treaty applies to maritime territories in the SCS that are claimed by both China and the Philippines, and of potential U.S. actions under Article IV of the treaty (see Appendix B ) in the event of a crisis or conflict over the territories? What steps has the United States taken to ensure that the two countries share a common understanding? Aside from public statements, what has the United States communicated to China regarding potential U.S. actions under the two treaties in connection with maritime territorial disputes in the SCS and ECS? Has the United States correctly balanced ambiguity and explicitness in its communications to various parties regarding potential U.S. actions under the two defense treaties? How do the two treaties affect the behavior of Japan, the Philippines, and China in managing their territorial disputes? To what extent, for example, would they help Japan or the Philippines resist potential Chinese attempts to resolve the disputes through intimidation, or, alternatively, encourage risk-taking or brinksmanship behavior by Japan or the Philippines in their dealings with China on the disputes? To what extent do they deter or limit Chinese assertiveness or aggressiveness in their dealings with Japan the Philippines on the disputes? Has the DOD adequately incorporated into its planning crisis and conflict scenarios arising from maritime territorial disputes in the SCS and ECS that fall under the terms of the two treaties? Another issue for Congress—particularly the Senate—is the potential impact of China's actions in the SCS and ECS on the question of whether the United States should become a party to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). UNCLOS and an associated 1994 agreement relating to implementation of Part XI of the treaty (on deep seabed mining) were transmitted to the Senate on October 6, 1994. In the absence of Senate advice and consent to adherence, the United States is not a party to UNCLOS or the associated 1994 agreement. During the 112 th Congress, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held four hearings on the question of whether the United States should become a party to the treaty on May 23, June 14 (two hearings), and June 28, 2012. Supporters of the United States becoming a party to UNCLOS argue or might argue one or more of the following: The treaty's provisions relating to navigational rights, including those in EEZs, reflect the U.S. position on the issue; becoming a party to the treaty would help lock the U.S. perspective into permanent international law. Becoming a party to the treaty would give the United States greater standing for participating in discussions relating to the treaty—a "seat at the table"—and thereby improve the U.S. ability to call on China to act in accordance with the treaty's provisions, including those relating to navigational rights, and to defend U.S. interpretations of the treaty's provisions, including those relating to whether coastal states have a right under UNCLOS to regulate foreign military activities in their EEZs. At least some of the ASEAN member states want the United States to become a member of UNCLOS, because they view it as the principal framework for resolving maritime territorial disputes. Relying on customary international law to defend U.S. interests in these issues is not sufficient, because it is not universally accepted and is subject to change over time based on state practice. Opponents of the United States becoming a party to UNCLOS argue or might argue one or more of the following: China's ability to cite international law (including UNCLOS) in defending its position on whether coastal states have a right to regulate foreign military activities in their EEZs shows that UNCLOS does not adequately protect U.S. interests relating to navigational rights in EEZs; the United States should not help lock this inadequate description of navigational rights into permanent international law by becoming a party to the treaty. The United States becoming a party to the treaty would do little to help resolve maritime territorial disputes in the SCS and ECS, in part because China's maritime territorial claims, such as those depicted in the map of the nine-dash line, predate and go well beyond what is allowed under the treaty and appear rooted in arguments that are outside the treaty. The United States can adequately support the ASEAN countries and Japan in matters relating to maritime territorial disputes in the SCS and ECS in other ways, without becoming a party to the treaty. The United States can continue to defend its positions on navigational rights on the high seas by citing customary international law, by demonstrating those rights with U.S. naval deployments (including those conducted under the FON program), and by having allies and partners defend the U.S. position on the EEZ issue at meetings of UNCLOS parties. In H.R. 5515 as reported by the House Armed Services Committee ( H.Rept. 115-676 of May 15, 2018), Section 1254 states the following: SEC. 1254. Modification, redesignation, and extension of Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative. (a) Modification and redesignation.— (1) IN GENERAL.—Subsection (a) of section 1263 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114–92; 129 Stat. 1073; 10 U.S.C. 2282 note), as amended by section 1289 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114–328; 130 Stat. 2555), is further amended— (A) in paragraph (1), by striking "South China Sea" and inserting "South China Sea and Indian Ocean"; and (B) in paragraph (2), by striking "the 'Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative'" and inserting "the 'Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative'". (2) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—The heading of such section is amended to read as follows: "Sec. 1263. Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative.". (b) Covered countries.—Subsection (e)(2) of such section is amended by adding at the end the following: "(D) India.". (c) Designation of additional countries.—Such section is further amended— (1) in subsection (e)(1), by striking "subsection (f)" and inserting "subsection (g)"; (2) by redesignating subsections (f), (g), and (h) as subsections (g), (h), and (i), respectively; and (3) by inserting after subsection (e) the following: "(f) Inclusion of additional countries.—The Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, is authorized to include additional foreign countries under subsection (b) for purposes of providing assistance and training under subsection (a) and additional foreign countries under subsection (e)(2) for purposes of providing payment of incremental expenses in connection with training described in subsection (a)(1)(B) if, with respect to each such additional foreign country, the Secretary determines and certifies to the appropriate committees of Congress that it is important for increasing maritime security and maritime domain awareness in the Indo-Pacific region.". (d) Extension.—Subsection (i) of such section, as redesignated, is amended by striking "September 30, 2020" and inserting "September 30, 2023". On May 22, 2018, as part of its consideration of H.R. 5515 , the House agreed to by voice vote H.Amdt. 644 , an en bloc amendment including, inter alia, amendment number 91 as printed in H.Rept. 115-698 of May 21, 2018, providing for consideration of H.R. 5515 . Amendment 91 added Section 1298, which states the following: SEC. 1298. Modification to annual report on military and security developments involving the People's Republic of China. Paragraph (22) of section 1202(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (Public Law 106–65; 10 U.S.C. 113 note), as most recently amended by section 1261 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 (Public Law 115–91; 131 Stat. 1688), is further amended by striking "activities in the South China Sea" and inserting the following: ""activities— "(A) in the South China Sea; "(B) in the East China Sea, including in the vicinity of the Senkaku islands; and "(C) in the Indian Ocean region.". In S. 2987 as reported by the Senate Armed Services Committee ( S.Rept. 115-262 of June 5, 2018), Section 1064 states the following: SEC. 1064. United States policy with respect to freedom of navigation and overflight. (a) Declaration of policy.—It is the policy of the United States to fly, sail, and operate throughout the oceans, seas, and airspace of the world wherever international law allows. (b) Implementation of policy.—In furtherance of the policy set forth in subsection (a), the Secretary of Defense should— (1) plan and execute a robust series of routine and regular air and naval presence missions throughout the world and throughout the year, including for critical transportation corridors and key routes for global commerce; (2) in addition to the missions executed pursuant to paragraph (1), execute routine and regular air and maritime freedom of navigation operations throughout the year, in accordance with international law, including the use of expanded military options and maneuvers beyond innocent passage; and (3) to the maximum extent practicable, execute the missions pursuant to paragraphs (1) and (2) with regional partner countries and allies of the United States. Section 1241 of S. 2987 as reported states the following: SEC. 1241. Redesignation, expansion, and extension of Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative. (a) Redesignation as Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative.— (1) IN GENERAL.—Subsection (a)(2) of section 1263 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (10 U.S.C. 333 note) is amended by striking "the 'Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative'" and inserting "the 'Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative'". (2) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—The heading of such section is amended to read as follows: "SEC. 1263. Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative". (b) Expansion.— (1) EXPANSION OF REGION TO RECEIVE ASSISTANCE AND TRAINING.—Subsection (a)(1) of such section is amended by inserting "and the Indian Ocean" after "South China Sea" in the matter preceding subparagraph (A). (2) RECIPIENT COUNTRIES OF ASSISTANCE AND TRAINING GENERALLY.—Subsection (b) of such section is amended— (A) in paragraph (2), by striking the comma at the end and inserting a period; and (B) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs: "(6) Bangladesh. "(7) Sri Lanka.". (3) COUNTRIES ELIGIBLE FOR PAYMENT OF CERTAIN INCREMENTAL EXPENSES.—Subsection (e)(2) of such section is amended by adding at the end the following new subparagraph: "(D) India.". (c) Extension.—Subsection (h) of such section is amended by striking "September 30, 2020" and inserting "December 31, 2025". Regarding Section 1241, S.Rept. 115-262 states the following: Redesignation, expansion, and extension of Southeast AsiaMaritime Security Initiative (sec. 1241) The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 1263 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114–92) to: redesignate the Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative as the Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative; add Bangladesh and Sri Lanka as recipient countries of assistance and training; add India as a covered country eligible for payment of certain incremental expenses; and extend the authority under the section through December 31, 2025. The committee continues to strongly support efforts under the Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative aimed at enhancing the capabilities of regional partners to more effectively exercise control over their maritime territory and to deter adversaries. The committee is encouraged by the progress that has been made under the initiative, and notes that to date, the Department of Defense has utilized the authority under section 1263 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114–92), as amended, to support specified partner capacity-building efforts in the region, to include the provision of training, sustainment support, and participation in multilateral engagements. The committee recognizes that the initiative was designed to support a long-term capacity building effort, which will require increased resources in future years as requirements are established and refined, as programs mature, and as the regional security environment continues to evolve. The committee believes the Department's efforts to improve maritime domain awareness and maritime security should be fully integrated into a U.S. strategy for a free and open Indo-Pacific. Therefore, the committee supports redesignating the authority under section 1263 as the Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative, the inclusion of Bangladesh and Sri Lanka as recipient countries, and the addition of India as a covered country to encourage its participation in regional security initiatives of this kind. Furthermore, as a demonstration of the United States' commitment to allies and partners in the region, the committee supports the extension of the Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative through the end of 2025. Beyond the Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative, the committee encourages the Department to make use of the full complement of security cooperation authorities available to the Department, particularly those under section 1241 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114–328), to enhance the capabilities of foreign security partners in South and Southeast Asia to protect mutual security interests. (Pages 296-297) Section 1245 of S. 2987 as reported states the following: SEC. 1245. Prohibition on participation of the People's Republic of China in Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) naval exercises. (a) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that— (1) the pace and militarization by the Government of the People's Republic of China of land reclamation activities in the South China Sea is destabilizing the security of United States allies and partners and threatening United States core interests; (2) these activities of the Government of the People's Republic of China adversarially threaten the maritime security of the United States and our allies and partners; (3) no country that acts adversarially should be invited to multilateral exercises; and (4) the involvement of the Government of the People's Republic of China in multilateral exercises should undergo reevaluation until such behavior changes. (b) Conditions for future participation in RIMPAC.—The Secretary of Defense shall not enable or facilitate the participation of the People's Republic of China in any Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) naval exercise unless the Secretary certifies to the congressional defense committees that China has— (1) ceased all land reclamation activities in the South China Sea; (2) removed all weapons from its land reclamation sites; and (3) established a consistent four-year track record of taking actions toward stabilizing the region. A June 26, 2018, statement of Administration policy regarding S. 2987 stated the following: Prohibition on Participation of the People's Republic of China in Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) Naval Exercises. The Administration objects to section 1245 because China's participation in RIMPAC and other military-to-military events may be appropriate or inappropriate in any given year, depending on numerous other factors. Section 1245 would place restrictions on the Secretary of Defense's ability to manage a strategic relationship in the context of competition, limiting DOD's options on China and ability to act in the national security interest of the United States. Section 1251 of S. 2987 as reported states the following: SEC. 1251. Report on military and coercive activities of the People's Republic of China in South China Sea. (a) In general.—Except as provided in subsection (d), immediately after the commencement of any significant reclamation or militarization activity by the People's Republic of China in the South China Sea, including any significant military deployment or operation or infrastructure construction, the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, shall submit to the congressional defense committees, and release to the public, a report on the military and coercive activities of China in the South China Sea in connection with such activity. (b) Elements of report to public.—Each report on a significant reclamation or militarization activity under subsection (a) shall include a short narrative on, and one or more corresponding images of, such significant reclamation or militarization activity. (c) Form.— (1) SUBMITTAL TO CONGRESS.—Any report under subsection (a) that is submitted to the congressional defense committees shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. (2) RELEASE TO PUBLIC.—If a report under subsection (a) is released to the public, such report shall be so released in unclassified form. (d) Waiver.— (1) RELEASE OF REPORT TO PUBLIC.—The Secretary of Defense may waive the requirement in subsection (a) for the release to the public of a report on a significant reclamation or militarization activity if the Secretary determines that the release to the public of a report on such activity under that subsection in the form required by subsection (c)(2) would have an adverse effect on the national security interests of the United States. (2) NOTICE TO CONGRESS.—If the Secretary issues a waiver under paragraph (1) with respect to a report on an activity, not later than 48 hours after the Secretary issues such waiver, the Secretary shall submit to the congressional defense committees written notice of, and justification for, such waiver. Regarding Section 1251, S.Rept. 115-262 states the following: Report on military and coercive activities of the People's Republic of China in the South China Sea (sec. 1251) The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, to submit to the congressional defense committees and release to the public, a report on the military and coercive activities of China in the South China Sea in connection with such activity immediately after the commencement of any significant reclamation or militarization activity by the People's Republic of China in the South China Sea, including any significant military deployment or operation or infrastructure construction. The committee is concerned that sufficient information has not been made publicly available in a timely fashion regarding China's reclamation and militarization activities of China in the South China Sea. Therefore, the committee urges the Secretary of Defense to determine that the public interest in selective declassification of China's activities in the South China Sea outweighs the potential damage from disclosure. The Secretary should consider mandating that the directors of National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency provide the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) at the State Department with declassified aircraft-generated imagery and supporting analysis describing Chinese activities of concern. The committee also urges that the State Department brief and distribute the reports to the media and throughout Southeast Asia. (Page 300) In the conference report ( H.Rept. 115-874 of July 25, 2018) on H.R. 5515 / P.L. 115-232 of August 13, 2018, Section 1086 states the following: SEC. 1086. UNITED STATES POLICY WITH RESPECT TO FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION AND OVERFLIGHT. (a) DECLARATION OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States to fly, sail, and operate throughout the oceans, seas, and airspace of the world wherever international law allows. (b) IMPLEMENTATION OF POLICY.—In furtherance of the policy set forth in subsection (a), the Secretary of Defense should— (1) plan and execute a robust series of routine and regular air and naval presence missions throughout the world and throughout the year, including for critical transportation corridors and key routes for global commerce; (2) in addition to the missions executed pursuant to paragraph (1), execute routine and regular air and maritime freedom of navigation operations throughout the year, in accordance with international law, including, but not limited to, maneuvers beyond innocent passage; and (3) to the maximum extent practicable, execute the missions pursuant to paragraphs (1) and (2) with regional partner countries and allies of the United States. Section 1252 of H.R. 5515 states the following: SEC. 1252. REDESIGNATION, EXPANSION, AND EXTENSION OF SOUTHEAST ASIA MARITIME SECURITY INITIATIVE. (a) REDESIGNATION AS INDO-PACIFIC MARITIME SECURITY INITIATIVE.— (1) IN GENERAL.—Subsection (a)(2) of section 1263 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (10 U.S.C. 333 note) is amended by striking ''the 'Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative' '' and inserting ''the 'Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative' ''. (2) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—The heading of such section is amended to read as follows: ''SEC. 1263. INDO-PACIFIC MARITIME SECURITY INITIATIVE.''. (b) EXPANSION.— (1) EXPANSION OF REGION TO RECEIVE ASSISTANCE AND TRAINING.—Subsection (a)(1) of such section is amended by inserting ''and the Indian Ocean'' after ''South China Sea'' in the matter preceding subparagraph (A). (2) RECIPIENT COUNTRIES OF ASSISTANCE AND TRAINING GENERALLY.—Subsection (b) of such section is amended— (A) in paragraph (2), by striking the comma at the end and inserting a period; and (B) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs: ''(6) Bangladesh. ''(7) Sri Lanka.''. (3) COUNTRIES ELIGIBLE FOR PAYMENT OF CERTAIN INCREMENTAL EXPENSES.—Subsection (e)(2) of such section is amended by adding at the end the following new subparagraph: ''(D) India.''. (c) EXTENSION.—Subsection (h) of such section is amended by striking ''September 30, 2020'' and inserting ''December 31, 2025''. Section 1259 of H.R. 5515 states the following: SEC. 1259. PROHIBITION ON PARTICIPATION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN RIM OF THE PACIFIC (RIMPAC) NAVAL EXERCISES. (a) CONDITIONS FOR FUTURE PARTICIPATION IN RIMPAC.— (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of Defense shall not enable or facilitate the participation of the People's Republic of China in any Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) naval exercise unless the Secretary certifies to the congressional defense committees that China has— (A) ceased all land reclamation activities in the South China Sea; (B) removed all weapons from its land reclamation sites; and (C) established a consistent four-year track record of taking actions toward stabilizing the region. (2) FORM.—The certification under paragraph (1) shall be in unclassified form but may contain a classified annex as necessary. (b) NATIONAL SECURITY WAIVER.— (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of Defense may waive the certification requirement under subsection (a) if the Secretary determines the waiver is in the national security interest of the United States and submits to the congressional defense committees a detailed justification for the waiver. (2) FORM.—The justification required under paragraph (1) shall be in unclassified form but may contain a classified annex as necessary. Section 1262 of H.R. 5515 states the following: SEC. 1262. REPORT ON MILITARY AND COERCIVE ACTIVITIES OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN SOUTH CHINA SEA. (a) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in subsection (d), immediately after the commencement of any significant reclamation, assertion of an excessive territorial claim, or militarization activity by the People's Republic of China in the South China Sea, including any significant military deployment or operation or infrastructure construction, the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees, and release to the public, a report on the military and coercive activities of China in the South China Sea in connection with such activity. (b) ELEMENTS OF REPORT TO PUBLIC.—Each report on the commencement of a significant reclamation, an assertion of an excessive territorial claim, or a militarization activity under subsection (a) shall include a short narrative on, and one or more corresponding images of, such commencement of a significant reclamation, assertion of an excessive territorial claim, or militarization activity. (c) FORM.— (1) SUBMISSION TO CONGRESS.—Any report under subsection (a) that is submitted to the appropriate congressional committees shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. (2) RELEASE TO PUBLIC.—If a report under subsection (a) is released to the public, such report shall be so released in unclassified form. (d) WAIVER.— (1) RELEASE OF REPORT TO PUBLIC.—The Secretary of Defense may waive the requirement in subsection (a) for the release to the public of a report on the commencement of any significant reclamation, an assertion of an excessive territorial claim, or a militarization activity by the People's Republic of China in the South China Sea if the Secretary determines that the release to the public of a report on such activity under that subsection in the form required by subsection (c)(2) would have an adverse effect on the national security interests of the United States. (2) NOTICE TO CONGRESS.—If the Secretary issues a waiver under paragraph (1) with respect to a report on an activity, not later than 48 hours after the Secretary issues such waiver, the Secretary shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees written notice of, and justification for, such waiver. (e) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In this section, the term ''appropriate congressional committees'' means— (1) the congressional defense committees; and (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives. Regarding Section 1262, H.Rept. 115-874 states the following: Report on military and coercive activities of the People's Republic of China in South China Sea (sec. 1262) The House bill contained a provision (sec. 1261) that would require Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of State, to submit a report to appropriate congressional committees on a quarterly basis describing China's activities in the Indo-Pacific region, and to disseminate the report to regional allies and partners and provide public notification, as appropriate. The provision would require that the dissemination and availability of the report and public notification be made in a manner consistent with national security and the protection of classified national security information. The Senate amendment contained a similar provision (sec. 1251) that would require the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, to submit to the congressional defense committees and release to the public, a report on the military and coercive activities of China in the South China Sea in connection with such activity immediately after the commencement of any significant reclamation or militarization activity by the People's Republic of China in the South China Sea, including any significant military deployment or operation or infrastructure construction. The House recedes with an amendment that would clarify that the required report shall be submitted to the congressional defense committees immediately after the commencement of any significant reclamation, assertion of an excessive territorial claim, or military activity by the People's Republic of China in the South China Sea. The conferees are concerned that sufficient information has not been made publicly available in a timely fashion regarding China's reclamation and militarization activities in the South China Sea. Moreover, the conferees recognize that China has engaged in provocative military activities elsewhere throughout the Indo-Pacific Region, including the East China Sea, the Taiwan Strait, and the Indian Ocean. The conferees urge the Secretary of Defense to give full consideration to the strategic and public interest in selective declassification of China's activities in the South China Sea and elsewhere in the Indo-Pacific region. (Pages 993-994) Section 1288 of H.R. 5515 states the following: SEC. 1288. MODIFICATION OF FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION REPORTING REQUIREMENTS. Subsection (a) of section 1275 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114–328; 130 Stat. 2540), as amended by section 1262(a)(1) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 (Public Law 115–91; 131 Stat. 1689), is further amended by striking ''the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives'' and inserting ''the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives''. Appendix A. Strategic Context from U.S. Perspective This appendix presents a brief discussion of some elements of the strategic context from a U.S. perspective in which the issues discussed in this report may be considered. There is also a broader context of U.S.-China relations and U.S. foreign policy toward the Indo-Pacific that is covered in other CRS reports. Shift in International Security Environment World events have led some observers, starting in late 2013, to conclude that the international security environment has undergone a shift from the familiar post-Cold War era of the past 20 to 25 years, also sometimes known as the unipolar moment (with the United States as the unipolar power), to a new and different situation that features, among other things, renewed great power competition with China and Russia and challenges by these two countries and others to elements of the U.S.-led international order that has operated since World War II. China's actions in the SCS and ECS can be viewed as one reflection of that shift. Uncertainty Regarding Future U.S. Role in World The overall U.S. role in the world since the end of World War II in 1945 (i.e., over the past 70 years) is generally described as one of global leadership and significant engagement in international affairs. A key aim of that role has been to promote and defend the open international order that the United States, with the support of its allies, created in the years after World War II. In addition to promoting and defending the open international order, the overall U.S. role is generally described as having been one of promoting freedom, democracy, and human rights, while criticizing and resisting authoritarianism where possible, and opposing the emergence of regional hegemons in Eurasia or a spheres-of-influence world. Certain statements and actions from the Trump Administration have led to uncertainty about the Administration's intentions regarding the future U.S. role in the world. Based on those statements and actions, some observers have speculated that the Trump Administration may want to change the U.S. role in one or more ways. A change in the overall U.S. role could have profound implications for U.S. foreign policy, including U.S. policy regarding maritime territorial and EEZ disputes involving China. U.S. Grand Strategy Discussion of the above-mentioned shift in the international security environment has led to a renewed emphasis in discussions of U.S. security and foreign policy on grand strategy and geopolitics. From a U.S. perspective, grand strategy can be understood as strategy considered at a global or interregional level, as opposed to strategies for specific countries, regions, or issues. Geopolitics refers to the influence on international relations and strategy of basic world geographic features such as the size and location of continents, oceans, and individual countries. From a U.S. perspective on grand strategy and geopolitics, it can be noted that most of the world's people, resources, and economic activity are located not in the Western Hemisphere, but in the other hemisphere, particularly Eurasia. In response to this basic feature of world geography, U.S. policymakers for the past several decades have chosen to pursue, as a key element of U.S. grand strategy, a goal of preventing the emergence of a regional hegemon in one part of Eurasia or another, on the grounds that such a hegemon could represent a concentration of power strong enough to threaten core U.S. interests by, for example, denying the United States access to some of the other hemisphere's resources and economic activity. Although U.S. policymakers have not often stated this key national strategic goal explicitly in public, U.S. military (and diplomatic) operations in recent decades—both wartime operations and day-to-day operations—can be viewed as having been carried out in no small part in support of this key goal. Focus on Great Power Competition with China and Russia The Trump Administration's December 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS) and the 11-page unclassified summary of its January 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) reorient U.S. national security strategy and, within that, U.S. defense strategy, toward an explicit primary focus on great power competition with China and Russia and on countering Chinese and Russian military capabilities. The new U.S. strategy orientation set forth in the 2017 NSS and 2018 NDS is sometimes referred to a "2+3" strategy, meaning a strategy for countering two primary challenges (China and Russia) and three additional challenges (North Korea, Iran, and terrorist groups). Concept of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) In addition to the 2017 NSS and 2018 NDS, the Trump Administration has highlighted the concept of a free and open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), with the term Indo-Pacific referring to the Indian Ocean, the Pacific Ocean, and the countries (particularly those in Eurasia) bordering on those two oceans. The concept, which is still being fleshed out by the Trump Administration, appears to be a general U.S foreign policy and national security construct for the region, but observers view it as one that includes a military component. Challenge to U.S. Sea Control and U.S. Position in Western Pacific Observers of Chinese and U.S. military forces view China's improving naval capabilities as posing a potential challenge in the Western Pacific to the U.S. Navy's ability to achieve and maintain control of blue-water ocean areas in wartime—the first such challenge the U.S. Navy has faced since the end of the Cold War. More broadly, these observers view China's naval capabilities as a key element of an emerging broader Chinese military challenge to the long-standing status of the United States as the leading military power in the Western Pacific. Regional U.S. Allies and Partners The United States has certain security-related policies pertaining to Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations Act ( H.R. 2479 / P.L. 96-8 of April 10, 1979). The United States has bilateral security treaties with Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines, and an additional security treaty with Australia and New Zealand. In addition to U.S. treaty allies, certain other countries in the Western Pacific can be viewed as current or emerging U.S. security partners. Appendix B. U.S. Treaties with Japan and Philippines This appendix presents brief background information on the U.S. security treaties with Japan and the Philippines. U.S.-Japan Treaty on Mutual Cooperation and Security The 1960 U.S.-Japan treaty on mutual cooperation and security states in Article V that Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes. The United States has reaffirmed on a number of occasions over the years that since the Senkaku Islands are under the administration of Japan, they are included in the territories referred to in Article V of the treaty, and that the United States "will honor all of our treaty commitments to our treaty partners." (At the same time, the United States, noting the difference between administration and sovereignty, has noted that such affirmations do not prejudice the U.S. approach of taking no position regarding the outcome of the dispute between China, Taiwan, and Japan regarding who has sovereignty over the islands.) Some observers, while acknowledging the U.S. affirmations, have raised questions regarding the potential scope of actions that the United States might take under Article V. U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty The 1951 U.S.-Philippines mutual defense treaty states in Article IV that Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common dangers in accordance with its constitutional processes. Article V states that For the purpose of Article IV, an armed attack on either of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of either of the Parties, or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific or on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific. The United States has reaffirmed on a number of occasions over the years its obligations under the U.S.-Philippines mutual defense treaty. On May 9, 2012, Filipino Foreign Affairs Secretary Albert F. del Rosario issued a statement providing the Philippine perspective regarding the treaty's application to territorial disputes in the SCS. U.S. officials have made their own statements regarding the treaty's application to territorial disputes in the SCS. Appendix C. Treaties and Agreements Related to the Maritime Disputes This appendix briefly reviews some international treaties and agreements that bear on the issues discussed in this report. UN Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) establishes a treaty regime to govern activities on, over, and under the world's oceans. UNCLOS was adopted by Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea in December 1982, and entered into force in November 1994. The treaty established EEZs as a feature of international law, and contains multiple provisions relating to territorial waters and EEZs. As of May 10, 2018, 168 nations were party to the treaty, including China and most other countries bordering on the SCS and ECS (the exceptions being North Korea and Taiwan). The treaty and an associated 1994 agreement relating to implementation of Part XI of the treaty (on deep seabed mining) were transmitted to the Senate on October 6, 1994. In the absence of Senate advice and consent to adherence, the United States is not a party to the convention and the associated 1994 agreement. A March 10, 1983, statement on U.S. ocean policy by President Ronald Reagan states that UNCLOS contains provisions with respect to traditional uses of the oceans which generally confirm existing maritime law and practice and fairly balance the interests of all states. Today I am announcing three decisions to promote and protect the oceans interests of the United States in a manner consistent with those fair and balanced results in the Convention and international law. First, the United States is prepared to accept and act in accordance with the balance of interests relating to traditional uses of the oceans—such as navigation and overflight. In this respect, the United States will recognize the rights of other states in the waters off their coasts, as reflected in the Convention, so long as the rights and freedoms of the United States and others under international law are recognized by such coastal states. Second, the United States will exercise and assert its navigation and overflight rights and freedoms on a worldwide basis in a manner that is consistent with the balance of interests reflected in the convention. The United States will not, however, acquiesce in unilateral acts of other states designed to restrict the rights and freedoms of the international community in navigation and overflight and other related high seas uses. Third, I am proclaiming today an Exclusive Economic Zone in which the United States will exercise sovereign rights in living and nonliving resources within 200 nautical miles of its coast. This will provide United States jurisdiction for mineral resources out to 200 nautical miles that are not on the continental shelf. UNCLOS builds on four 1958 law of the sea conventions to which the United States is a party: the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, the Convention on the High Seas, the Convention on the Continental Shelf, and the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas. 1972 Convention on Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGs) China and the United States, as well as more than 150 other countries (including all those bordering on the South East and South China Seas, but not Taiwan), are parties to an October 1972 multilateral convention on international regulations for preventing collisions at sea, commonly known as the collision regulations (COLREGs) or the "rules of the road." Although commonly referred to as a set of rules or regulations, this multilateral convention is a binding treaty. The convention applies "to all vessels upon the high seas and in all waters connected therewith navigable by seagoing vessels." It thus applies to military vessels, paramilitary and law enforcement (i.e., coast guard) vessels, maritime militia vessels, and fishing boats, among other vessels. In a February 18, 2014, letter to Senator Marco Rubio concerning the December 5, 2013, incident involving the Cowpens , the State Department stated the following: In order to minimize the potential for an accident or incident at sea, it is important that the United States and China share a common understanding of the rules for operational air or maritime interactions. From the U.S. perspective, an existing body of international rules and guidelines—including the 1972 International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGs)—are sufficient to ensure the safety of navigation between U.S. forces and the force of other countries, including China. We will continue to make clear to the Chinese that these existing rules, including the COLREGs, should form the basis for our common understanding of air and maritime behavior, and we will encourage China to incorporate these rules into its incident-management tools. Likewise, we will continue to urge China to agree to adopt bilateral crisis management tools with Japan and to rapidly conclude negotiations with ASEAN on a robust and meaningful Code of Conduct in the South China in order to avoid incidents and to manage them when they arise. We will continue to stress the importance of these issues in our regular interactions with Chinese officials. In the 2014 edition of its annual report on military and security developments involving China, the DOD states the following: On December 5, 2013, a PLA Navy vessel and a U.S. Navy vessel operating in the South China Sea came into close proximity. At the time of the incident, USS COWPENS (CG 63) was operating approximately 32 nautical miles southeast of Hainan Island. In that location, the U.S. Navy vessel was conducting lawful military activities beyond the territorial sea of any coastal State, consistent with customary international law as reflected in the Law of the Sea Convention. Two PLA Navy vessels approached USS COWPENS. During this interaction, one of the PLA Navy vessels altered course and crossed directly in front of the bow of USS COWPENS. This maneuver by the PLA Navy vessel forced USS COWPENS to come to full stop to avoid collision, while the PLA Navy vessel passed less than 100 yards ahead. The PLA Navy vessel's action was inconsistent with internationally recognized rules concerning professional maritime behavior (i.e., the Convention of International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea), to which China is a party. 2014 Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) On April 22, 2014, representatives of 21 Pacific-region navies (including China, Japan, and the United States), meeting in Qingdao, China, at the 14 th Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS), unanimously agreed to a Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES). CUES, a nonbinding agreement, establishes a standardized protocol of safety procedures, basic communications, and basic maneuvering instructions for naval ships and aircraft during unplanned encounters at sea, with the aim of reducing the risk of incidents arising from such encounters. The CUES agreement in effect supplements the 1972 COLREGs Convention (see previous section); it does not cancel or lessen commitments that countries have as parties to the COLREGS Convention. Two observers stated that "the [CUES] resolution is non-binding; only regulates communication in 'unplanned encounters,' not behavior; fails to address incidents in territorial waters; and does not apply to fishing and maritime constabulary vessels [i.e., coast guard ships and other maritime law enforcement ships], which are responsible for the majority of Chinese harassment operations." DOD stated in 2015 that Going forward, the Department is also exploring options to expand the use of CUES to include regional law enforcement vessels and Coast Guards. Given the growing use of maritime law enforcement vessels to enforce disputed maritime claims, expansion of CUES to MLE [maritime law enforcement] vessels would be an important step in reducing the risk of unintentional conflict. U.S. Navy officials have stated that the CUES agreement is generally working well, and that the United States (as noted in the passage above) is interested in expanding the agreement to cover coast guard ships. Officials from Singapore and Malaysia reportedly have expressed support for the idea. An Obama Administration fact sheet about Chinese President Xi Jinping's state visit to the United States on September 24-25, 2015, stated the following: The U.S. Coast Guard and the China Coast Guard have committed to pursue an arrangement whose intended purpose is equivalent to the Rules of Behavior Confidence Building Measure annex on surface-to-surface encounters in the November 2014 Memorandum of Understanding between the United States Department of Defense and the People's Republic of China Ministry of National Defense. A November 3, 2018, press report published following an incident in the SCS between a U.S. Navy destroyer and a Chinese destroyer stated the following: The U.S. Navy's chief of naval operations has called on China to return to a previously agreed-upon code of conduct for at-sea encounters between the ships of their respective navies, stressing the need to avoid miscalculations. During a Nov. 1 teleconference with reporters based in the Asia-Pacific region, Adm. John Richardson said he wants the People's Liberation Army Navy to "return to a consistent adherence to the agreed-to code that would again minimize the chance for a miscalculation that could possibly lead to a local incident and potential escalation." The CNO cited a case in early October when the U.S. Navy's guided-missile destroyer Decatur reported that a Chinese Type 052C destroyer came within 45 yards of the Decatur as it conducted a freedom-of-navigation operation in the South China Sea. However, he added that the "vast majority" of encounters with Chinese warships in the South China Sea "are conducted in accordance with the Code of Unplanned Encounters at Sea and done in a safe and professional manner." The code is an agreement reached by 21 Pacific nations in 2014 to reduce the chance of an incident at sea between the agreement's signatories. 2014 U.S.-China MOU on Air and Maritime Encounters In November 2014, the U.S. DOD and China's Ministry of National Defense signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) regarding rules of behavior for safety of air and maritime encounters. The MOU makes reference to UNCLOS, the 1972 COLREGs convention, the Conventional on International Civil Aviation (commonly known as the Chicago Convention), the Agreement on Establishing a Consultation Mechanism to Strengthen Military Maritime Safety (MMCA), and CUES. The MOU as signed in November 2014 included an annex on rules of behavior for safety of surface-to-surface encounters. An additional annex on rules of behavior for safety of air-to-air encounters was signed on September 15 and 18, 2015. An October 20, 2018, press report states the following: Eighteen nations including the U.S. and China agreed in principle Saturday [October 20] to sign up to guidelines governing potentially dangerous encounters by military aircraft, a step toward stabilizing flashpoints but one that leaves enough wiggle room to ignore the new standards when a country wants. The guidelines essentially broaden a similar agreement reached by the U.S. and China three years ago and are an attempt to mitigate against incidents and collisions in some of the world's most tense areas…. The in-principle agreement, which will be put forward for formal adoption by the group of 18 nations next year, took place at an annual meeting of defense ministers under the aegis of the 10-country Association of Southeast Asian Nations, hosted by Singapore. Asean nations formally adopted the new guidelines themselves Friday. "The guidelines are very useful in setting norms," Singapore's defense minister Ng Eng Hen told reporters after the meeting. "All the 18 countries agreed strong in-principle support for the guidelines."… The aerial-encounters framework agreed to Saturday includes language that prohibits fast or aggressive approaches in the air and lays out guidelines on clear communications including suggestions to "refrain from the use of uncivil language or unfriendly physical gestures." Signatories to the agreement, which is voluntary and not legally binding, would agree to avoid unprofessional encounters and reckless maneuvers…. The guidelines fall short on enforcement and geographic specifics, but they are "better than nothing at all," said Evan Laksmana, senior researcher with the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Jakarta. "Confidence-building surrounding military crises or encounters can hardly move forward without some broadly agreed-upon rules of the game," he said. Negotiations on SCS Code of Conduct (COC) In 2002, China and the 10 member states of ASEAN signed a nonbinding Declaration on the Conduct (DOC) of Parties in the South China Sea in which the parties, among other things, ... reaffirm their respect for and commitment to the freedom of navigation in and overflight above the South China Sea as provided for by the universally recognized principles of international law, including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.... ... undertake to resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means, without resorting to the threat or use of force, through friendly consultations and negotiations by sovereign states directly concerned, in accordance with universally recognized principles of international law, including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.... ... undertake to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability including, among others, refraining from action of inhabiting on the presently uninhabited islands, reefs, shoals, cays, and other features and to handle their differences in a constructive manner.... ...reaffirm that the adoption of a [follow-on] code of conduct in the South China Sea would further promote peace and stability in the region and agree to work, on the basis of consensus, towards the eventual attainment of this objective.... In July 2011, China and ASEAN adopted a preliminary set of principles for implementing the DOC. U.S. officials since 2010 have encouraged ASEAN and China to develop the follow-on binding Code of Conduct (COC) mentioned in the final quoted paragraph above. China and ASEAN have conducted negotiations on the follow-on COC, but China has not yet agreed with the ASEAN member states on a final text. On March 8, 2017, China announced that the first draft of a framework for the COC had been completed, and that "China and ASEAN countries feel satisfied with this." On May 18 and 19, 2017, it was reported that the China and the ASEAN countries had agreed on the framework. An article from a Chinese news outlet stated the following: All countries involved have agreed not to release the framework document, but to maintain it as an internal document at this time since the consultation will continue and they do not want any external interference, [Vice-Foreign Minister] Liu [Zhenmin] said. "Against the backdrop of economic globalization, China and ASEAN countries should continue making our regional rules to guide our own actions and protect our common interests," Liu said. A May 18, 2017, press report stated that Liu Zhemin "called on others to stay out [of the negotiations], apparently a coded message to the United States. 'We hope that our consultations on the code are not subject to any outside interference,' Liu said." An August 3, 2017, press report stated the following: Southeast Asian ministers meeting this week are set to avoid tackling the subject of Beijing's arming and building of manmade South China Sea islands, preparing to endorse a framework for a code of conduct that is neither binding nor enforceable. The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) has omitted references to China's most controversial activities in its joint communique, a draft reviewed by Reuters shows. In addition, a leaked blueprint for establishing an ASEAN-China code of maritime conduct does not call for it to be legally binding, or seek adherence to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).... Analysts and some ASEAN diplomats worry that China's sudden support for negotiating a code of conduct is a ploy to buy time to further boost its military capability.... The agreed two-page framework is broad and leaves wide scope for disagreement, urging a commitment to the "purposes and principles" of UNCLOS, for example, rather than adherence. The framework papers over the big differences between ASEAN nations and China, said Patrick Cronin of the Center for a New American Security. "Optimists will see this non-binding agreement as a small step forward, allowing habits of cooperation to develop, despite differences," he said. "Pessimists will see this as a gambit favorable to a China determined to make the majority of the South China Sea its domestic lake." An August 6, 2017, press report stated the following: Southeast Asian nations agreed with China on Sunday [August 6] to endorse a framework for a maritime code of conduct that would govern behavior in disputed waters of the South China Sea, a small step forward in a negotiation that has lasted well over a decade. Though not the long-discussed code itself, the framework sets out parameters for discussion of an agreement intended to bring predictability to a potential flashpoint as China increasingly asserts its military presence over the area in the face of rival claims. The 10 countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations will meet with China at the end of August to discuss legalities for negotiations on the code of conduct, with formal talks beginning soon after, Philippines department of foreign affairs spokesman Robespierre Bolivar said Sunday. The endorsement of the framework, which was tentatively agreed to in May, came during a bilateral meeting between China and Asean on the sidelines of a series of security-oriented meetings that will conclude Tuesday. The unsticking of the framework after years of obstruction is widely seen as a concession by China, which has opposed any legally binding code on maritime engagement, stepped up naval patrols and built artificial islands to enforce its claims, equipping them with military weapons. Beijing's move to allow discussion on the code of conduct follows a resetting of ties with the Philippines under President Rodrigo Duterte, who in October—just four months after taking office—visited Beijing and declared a new friendship between the two countries. An August 8, 2017, blog post about the framework states the following: In Manila on 6 August 2017, the foreign ministers of ASEAN and China endorsed the framework for the Code of Conduct for the South China Sea (COC). While the framework is a step forward in the conflict management process for the South China Sea, it is short on details and contains many of the same principles and provisions contained in the 2002 ASEAN-China Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) which has yet to be even partially implemented. The text includes a new reference to the prevention and management of incidents, as well as a seemingly stronger commitment to maritime security and freedom of navigation. However, the phrase "legally binding" is absent, as are the geographical scope of the agreement and enforcement and arbitration mechanisms. The framework will form the basis for further negotiations on the COC. Those discussions are likely to be lengthy and frustrating for those ASEAN members who had hoped to see a legally binding, comprehensive and effective COC. Some observers have argued that China has been dragging out the negotiations on the COC for years as part of a "talk and take strategy," meaning a strategy in which China engages in (or draws out) negotiations while taking actions to gain control of contested areas. A May 25, 2017, news report states the following: To call negotiations between China and the ten-country Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) over rival claims in the South China Sea "drawn out" would be a gross understatement. At the centre of the matter is an unsquareable circle: the competing claims of China and several South-East Asian countries. Nobody wants to go to war; nobody wants to be accused of backing down. Still, at a meeting of senior Chinese and ASEAN officials on May 18 th , something happened: the two sides agreed on a "framework" for a code of conduct. An official from Singapore (which currently co-ordinates ASEAN-China relations) called the agreement a sign of "steady progress".... ASEAN members called for a legally binding code of conduct as far back as 1996.... Since then, code-of-conduct negotiations have proceeded glacially.... Last July, after China received an unfavourable ruling on its maritime claims in a case brought by the Philippines to a tribunal in The Hague, China agreed to expedite the talks.... The draft framework will be presented to ASEAN and Chinese foreign ministers at a conference in August. This will then form the basis for the thorny negotiations to follow. The text has not (yet) been leaked. But its most salient feature may be what it appears to lack: any hint of enforcement mechanisms or consequences for violations. China has long rejected a legally binding agreement—or indeed any arrangement that could limit its actions in the South China Sea. The result, explains Ian Storey, of the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, a think-tank in Singapore, is a framework "that makes China look co-operative…without having to do anything that might constrain its freedom of action". ASEAN, meanwhile, gets the appearance of progress. "The ASEAN secretariat is a bureaucracy, and bureaucrats like process," explains Mr Storey. A July 13, 2018, blog post states the following: The COC has become a "holy grail," highly desired but unattainable. A major concern should be that this holy grail could turn into a tool for China to legitimize its actions in the South China Sea by engaging in the process while subverting its spirit. To this end, the challenges to the COC process are likely to be: China will use the COC talks to delay, exploit, and divert focus from any ASEAN consensus on the South China Sea; China will seek to include unhelpful and imprecise language in the COC which it could then use to justify its actions; China will nonetheless claim the COC as a diplomatic success and will use it as cover to avoid criticism while still pursuing its unilateral strategy to control the South China Sea…. If the COC process continues on its current trajectory, and China succeeds in filling the document with vague articles that would have little impact on its behavior, it would effectively be abusing the rules-based order to its own benefit. Instead of protecting against unilateral actions in the South China Sea, the rules-based order in the form of the COC could assist and justify China's expansion and ultimately its sole control of the South China Sea. Other regional actors need to recognize these traps of concluding a counter-productive COC, and resist the urge to reach an agreement just to be able to say they made progress. Instead, they should insist on negotiating the terms and conditions of a real COC, one that would establish effective rules-based dispute management mechanisms, not one that would by-pass them for the sake of an easy "win." An August 2, 2018, press report states the following: After more than a decade of talks, a bloc of Southeast Asian nations and China have agreed on a draft code of conduct that will lay the foundation for negotiations over the disputed South China Sea. Observers said the agreement showed that China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) could make progress through talks despite rising regional tensions, but they also warned that there was still a long way to go until a final deal. The agreement on the "Single Draft COC Negotiating Text" was announced at a meeting of Asean foreign ministers in Singapore on Thursday [August 2], after being nailed down at a China-Asean meeting in the central Chinese city of Changsha in June. An August 9, 2018, press report stated the following: Talks on completing a code of conduct for the disputed South China Sea will be long and complex and it would be unrealistic to set a timetable, state media on Thursday [August 9] cited a senior Chinese diplomat as saying…. In an interview with China Newsweek magazine, Yi Xianliang, Director General of the Chinese Foreign Ministry's Department of Boundary and Ocean Affairs, said the talks were continuing. Many of the topics were complex and sensitive and there were many different points of view, he said. "If these issues are to be resolved, and the code finally comes together, all sides need to keep looking for the greatest common denominator," Yi added. "There are voices from the outside, who are trying to set a timetable for the talks on the code. I think this is unrealistic," he said. Any multilateral talks take time, especially on such a complex issue as the South China Sea, Yi added. "It is impossible to define a timetable. Instead of setting the timetable unrealistically, and binding one's hands, it's better to step forward one foot at a time."… "Certain countries outside the region have been agitating that the code must be legally binding. This issue is quite complicated, including the domestic legal procedures involved in the countries concerned," he added, without elaborating. An October 22, 2018, press report stated the following: As China moves to complete the creation of military outposts in the South China Sea, Beijing's negotiation with southeastern Asian nations over a binding code of conduct is gaining momentum. But U.S. officials and experts warn China's insertions in the draft South China Sea code of conduct may put Washington and Beijing on a collision course. The text of the draft also shows that deep divisions remain among claimants. One of the Chinese provisions in the text states, "The Parties shall not hold joint military exercises with countries from outside the region, unless the parties concerned are notified beforehand and express no objection." China also proposed cooperation on the marine economy "shall not be conducted in cooperation with companies from countries outside the region." A State Department spokesperson told VOA the United States is concerned by reports China has been pressing members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations "in the closed-door talks, to accept restrictions on their ability to conduct exercises with security partners, and to agree not to conduct oil and gas exploration in their claimed waters with energy firms based in countries which are not part of the ongoing negotiations." "These proposals, if accepted, would limit the ability of ASEAN nations to conduct sovereign, independent foreign and economic policies and would directly harm the interests of the broader international community," added the State Department spokesperson…. "In other words, China would like a veto over all the military exercises held by ASEAN countries with other nations. I think this really provides some evidence that China indeed is trying to limit American influence in the region, one might go so far as to say to push American military presence out of the region eventually, but certainly in the area of the South China Sea," said Bonnie Glaser, director of the China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington…. The United States is also calling for ongoing discussions on the South China Sea code of conduct to be transparent and consultative with the rest of the international community. U.S. officials said the international community has direct stakes in the outcome. A September 6, 2018, blog post stated the following: After two decades of talks, scepticism about the development of a South China Sea Code of Conduct (COC) is well-deserved, but it is also important to acknowledge progress when it happens. The agreement on a single draft negotiating text, revealed ahead of the ASEAN–China Post Ministerial Meeting on 2 August 2018, is an important step in the process that deserves recognition. The COC will not resolve the South China Sea disputes, nor was it ever meant to. Instead the COC is intended to manage disputes to avoid conflict pending their eventual resolution by direct negotiation or arbitration among the claimants. But any system to effectively manage the South China Sea disputes would require three things, none of which are achieved yet in the draft text. First, an effective COC would need to be geographically defined…. Second, an effective COC would need a dispute settlement mechanism…. Third, any effective regime to manage the South China Sea disputes would need detailed provisions on fisheries management and oil and gas development…. The solution to this problem could be a COC signed by all 10 ASEAN members and China that establishes general rules of behaviour within a clear geographic area, sets up an effective dispute settlement mechanism and endorses the immediate start of follow-on negotiations involving only the relevant claimants on fisheries management and oil and gas cooperation. Such a document would be a major step towards peacefully managing the South China Sea disputes and there are hints that at least some sections of the negotiating text might be on the right track. But the differences between parties remain considerable and final agreement on an effective COC still seems some way off. An October 29, 2018, press report states the following: The Philippines on Monday said a set of rules intended to prevent conflict in the South China Sea need not legally compel countries to follow it—an issue of importance for the Chinese government. Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary Teodoro Locsin Jr. raised this possibility during a joint news conference with Wang Yi, his Chinese counterpart, in Davao City where they held bilateral talks to firm up preparations for President Xi Jinping's visit to Manila next month. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations and China are negotiating a code of conduct in the South China Sea. The 10-member bloc wants it to be legally binding, but Beijing prefers just "binding," ASEAN diplomats have said. "Perhaps, we will not be able to arrive at a legally binding COC, but it will be a standard on how people of ASEAN and governments of ASEAN will behave with each other -- always with honor, never with aggression, and always for mutual progress," Locsin said…. Wang said China will abide by the code whether it is legally binding or not. He said China hopes to finish the negotiations before Manila's term as ASEAN-China coordinator ends. "We welcome constructive opinions within the framework... that has been agreed," Wang said, referring to the general outline agreed last year, which dropped a reference to a legally binding code. The framework essentially repeats the spirit of a 2002 declaration on the South China Sea that called on parties to exercise restraint to avoid escalating tensions, and respect international law, among other things. Critics and ASEAN officials said the declaration failed to manage tensions in the disputed area because it was not legally binding. A November 14, 2018, press report stated the following: A rulebook to settle disputes in the hotly contested South China Sea should be finished in three years, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang said on Tuesday, insisting his nation does not seek "hegemony or expansion." Li's comments appeared to be the first clear timeframe for finishing the code of conduct. Talks have dragged on for years, with China accused of delaying progress as it prefers to deal with less powerful countries on a one-to-one basis. Appendix D. July 2016 Tribunal Award in SCS Arbitration Case Involving Philippines and China This appendix provides background information on the July 2016 tribunal award in the SCS arbitration case involving the Philippines and China. Overview In 2013, the Philippines sought arbitration under UNCLOS over the role of historic rights and the source of maritime entitlements in the South China Sea, the status of certain maritime features and the maritime entitlements they are capable of generating, and the lawfulness of certain actions by China that were alleged by the Philippines to violate UNCLOS. A tribunal was constituted under UNCLOS to hear the case. China stated repeatedly that it would not accept or participate in the arbitration and that, in its view, the tribunal lacked jurisdiction in this matter. China's nonparticipation did not prevent the case from moving forward, and the tribunal decided that it had jurisdiction over various matters covered under the case. On July 12, 2016, the tribunal issued its award (i.e., ruling) in the case. The award was strongly in favor of the Philippines—more so than even some observers had anticipated. The tribunal ruled, among other things, that China's nine-dash line claim had no legal basis; that none of the land features in the Spratlys is entitled to any more than a 12-nm territorial sea; that three of the Spratlys features that China occupies generate no entitlement to maritime zones; and that China violated the Philippines' sovereign rights by interfering with Philippine vessels and by damaging the maritime environment and engaging in reclamation work on a feature in the Philippines' EEZ. Under UNCLOS, the award is binding on both the Philippines and China (China's nonparticipation in the arbitration does not change this). There is, however, no mechanism for enforcing the tribunal's award. The United States has urged China and the Philippines to abide by the award. China, however, has declared the ruling null and void. Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte, who took office just before the tribunal's ruling, has not sought to enforce it. The tribunal's press release summarizing its award states the following in part: The Award is final and binding, as set out in Article 296 of the Convention [i.e., UNCLOS] and Article 11 of Annex VII [of UNCLOS]. Historic Rights and the 'Nine-Dash Line': ... On the merits, the Tribunal concluded that the Convention comprehensively allocates rights to maritime areas and that protections for pre-existing rights to resources were considered, but not adopted in the Convention. Accordingly, the Tribunal concluded that, to the extent China had historic rights to resources in the waters of the South China Sea, such rights were extinguished to the extent they were incompatible with the exclusive economic zones provided for in the Convention. The Tribunal also noted that, although Chinese navigators and fishermen, as well as those of other States, had historically made use of the islands in the South China Sea, there was no evidence that China had historically exercised exclusive control over the waters or their resources. The Tribunal concluded that there was no legal basis for China to claim historic rights to resources within the sea areas falling within the 'nine-dash line'. Status of Features: ... Features that are above water at high tide generate an entitlement to at least a 12 nautical mile territorial sea, whereas features that are submerged at high tide do not. The Tribunal noted that the reefs have been heavily modified by land reclamation and construction, recalled that the Convention classifies features on their natural condition, and relied on historical materials in evaluating the features. The Tribunal then considered whether any of the features claimed by China could generate maritime zones beyond 12 nautical miles. Under the Convention, islands generate an exclusive economic zone of 200 nautical miles and a continental shelf, but "[r]ocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf." ... the Tribunal concluded that none of the Spratly Islands is capable of generating extended maritime zones. The Tribunal also held that the Spratly Islands cannot generate maritime zones collectively as a unit. Having found that none of the features claimed by China was capable of generating an exclusive economic zone, the Tribunal found that it could—without delimiting a boundary—declare that certain sea areas are within the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines, because those areas are not overlapped by any possible entitlement of China. Lawfulness of Chinese Actions: ... Having found that certain areas are within the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines, the Tribunal found that China had violated the Philippines' sovereign rights in its exclusive economic zone by (a) interfering with Philippine fishing and petroleum exploration, (b) constructing artificial islands and (c) failing to prevent Chinese fishermen from fishing in the zone. The Tribunal also held that fishermen from the Philippines (like those from China) had traditional fishing rights at Scarborough Shoal and that China had interfered with these rights in restricting access. The Tribunal further held that Chinese law enforcement vessels had unlawfully created a serious risk of collision when they physically obstructed Philippine vessels. Harm to Marine Environment: The Tribunal considered the effect on the marine environment of China's recent large-scale land reclamation and construction of artificial islands at seven features in the Spratly Islands and found that China had caused severe harm to the coral reef environment and violated its obligation to preserve and protect fragile ecosystems and the habitat of depleted, threatened, or endangered species. The Tribunal also found that Chinese authorities were aware that Chinese fishermen have harvested endangered sea turtles, coral, and giant clams on a substantial scale in the South China Sea (using methods that inflict severe damage on the coral reef environment) and had not fulfilled their obligations to stop such activities. Aggravation of Dispute: Finally, the Tribunal considered whether China's actions since the commencement of the arbitration had aggravated the dispute between the Parties. The Tribunal found that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the implications of a stand-off between Philippine marines and Chinese naval and law enforcement vessels at Second Thomas Shoal, holding that this dispute involved military activities and was therefore excluded from compulsory settlement. The Tribunal found, however, that China's recent large-scale land reclamation and construction of artificial islands was incompatible with the obligations on a State during dispute resolution proceedings, insofar as China has inflicted irreparable harm to the marine environment, built a large artificial island in the Philippines' exclusive economic zone, and destroyed evidence of the natural condition of features in the South China Sea that formed part of the Parties' dispute. Assessments of Impact of Arbitral Award One Year Later In July 2017, a year after the arbitral panel's award, some observers assessed the impact to date of the award. For example, one observer stated the following: One year ago, China suffered a massive legal defeat when an international tribunal based in The Hague ruled that the vast majority of Beijing's extensive claims to maritime rights and resources in the South China Sea were not compatible with international law. Beijing was furious. At an official briefing immediately after the ruling, Vice Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin twice called it "nothing more than a piece of waste paper," and one that "will not be enforced by anyone." And yet, one year on, China is, in many ways, abiding by it.... China is not fully complying with the ruling—far from it. On May 1, China imposed a three-and-a-half-month ban on fishing across the northern part of the South China Sea, as it has done each year since 1995. While the ban may help conserve fish stocks, its unilateral imposition in wide areas of the sea violates the ruling. Further south, China's occupation of Mischief Reef, a feature that is submerged at high tide and the tribunal ruled was part of the Philippines' continental shelf, endures. Having built a vast naval base and runway here, China looks like it will remain in violation of that part of the ruling for the foreseeable future. But there is evidence that the Chinese authorities, despite their rhetoric, have already changed their behavior. In October 2016, three months after the ruling, Beijing allowed Philippine and Vietnamese boats to resume fishing at Scarborough Shoal, west of the Philippines. A China Coast Guard ship still blocks the entrance to the lagoon, but boats can still fish the rich waters around it. The situation is not perfect but neither is China flaunting its defiance.... Much more significantly, China has avoided drilling for oil and gas on the wrong side of the invisible lines prescribed by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).... ... the ruling means China has no claim to the fish, oil or gas more than 12 nautical miles from any of the Spratlys or Scarborough Shoal. The Chinese authorities appear not to accept this.... There are clear signs from both China's words and deeds that Beijing has quietly modified its overall legal position in the South China Sea. Australian researcher Andrew Chubb noted a significant article in the Chinese press in July last year outlining the new view.... ... China's new position seems to represent a major step towards compliance with UNCLOS and, therefore, the ruling. Most significantly, it removes the grounds for Chinese objections to other countries fishing and drilling in wide areas of the South China Sea.... Overall, the picture is of a China attempting to bring its vision of the rightful regional order (as the legitimate owner of every rock and reef inside the U-shaped line) within commonly understood international rules. Far from being "waste paper," China is taking the tribunal ruling very seriously. It is still some way from total compliance but it is clearly not deliberately flouting the ruling. Another observer stated the following: A year ago today, an arbitral tribunal formed pursuant to the United Nations Convention for the Law of the Sea issued a blockbuster award finding much of China's conduct in the South China Sea in violation of international law. As I detailed that day on this blog and elsewhere, the Philippines won about as big a legal victory as it could have expected. But as many of us also warned that day, a legal victory is not the same as an actual victory. In fact, over the past year China has succeeded in transforming its legal defeat into a policy victory by maintaining its aggressive South China Sea policies while escaping sanction for its non-compliance. While the election of a new pro-China Philippines government is a key factor, much of the blame for China's victory must also be placed on the Obama Administration.... International law seldom enforces itself, and even the reputational costs of violating international law do not arise unless other states impose those costs on the law-breaker. Both the Philippines and the U.S. had policy options that would have raised the costs of China's non-compliance with the award. But neither country's government chose to press China on the arbitral award.... Looking back after one year, we cannot say (yet) that U.S. policy in the South China Sea is a failure. But we can say that the U.S. under President Obama missed a huge opportunity to change the dynamics in the region in its favor, and it is hard to know whether or when another such opportunity will arise in the future. Reported Chinese Characterization of Arbitral Award as "Waste Paper" When the arbitral panel's award was announced, China stated that "China does not accept or recognize it," and that the award "is invalid and has no binding force." The first of the two passages quoted above states that "at an official briefing immediately after the ruling, Vice Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin twice called it 'nothing more than a piece of waste paper,' and one that 'will not be enforced by anyone.'" A November 22, 2017, press report states the following: An eight-page essay pumped through social media and Chinese state newspapers in recent days extolled the virtues of president Xi Jinping. Among his achievements, in the Chinese language version, was that he had turned the South China Sea Arbitration at The Hague—which found against China—into "waste paper". It was an achievement that state news agency Xinhua's lengthy hymn, entitled "Xi and His Era", did not include in the English version for foreign consumption. Assessments and Events Two Years Later Another observer writes in a May 10, 2018, commentary piece that Two years after an international tribunal rejected expansive Chinese claims to the South China Sea, Beijing is consolidating control over the area and its resources. While the U.S. defends the right to freedom of navigation, it has failed to support the rights of neighboring countries under the tribunal's ruling. As a result, Southeast Asian countries are bowing to Beijing's demands…. While Beijing's dramatic military buildup in the South China Sea has received much attention, its attempts at "lawfare" are largely overlooked. In May, the Chinese Society of International Law published a "critical study" on the South China Sea arbitration case. It rehashed old arguments but also developed a newer one, namely that China is entitled to claim maritime zones based on groups of features rather than from individual features. Even if China is not entitled to historic rights within the area it claims, this argument goes, it is entitled to resources in a wide expanse of sea on the basis of an exclusive economic zone generated from outlying archipelagoes. But the Convention on the Law of the Sea makes clear that only archipelagic states such as the Philippines and Indonesia may draw straight archipelagic baselines from which maritime zones may be claimed. The tribunal also explicitly found that there was "no evidence" that any deviations from this rule have amounted to the formation of a new rule of customary international law. China's arguments are unlikely to sway lawyers, but that is not their intended audience. Rather Beijing is offering a legal fig leaf to political and business elites in Southeast Asia who are already predisposed to accept Beijing's claims in the South China Sea. They fear China's threat of coercive economic measures and eye promises of development through offerings such as the Belt and Road Initiative. Why did Washington go quiet on the 2016 tribunal decision? One reason is Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte's turn toward China and offer to set aside the ruling. The U.S. is also worried about the decision's implications for its own claims to exclusive economic zones from small, uninhabited land features in the Pacific. The Trump administration's failure to press Beijing to abide by the tribunal's ruling is a serious mistake. It undermines international law and upsets the balance of power in the region. Countries have taken note that the tide in the South China Sea is in China's favor, and they are making their strategic calculations accordingly. This hurts U.S. interests in the region. A July 12, 2018, press report stated the following: The Philippines is celebrating today the second anniversary of its landmark arbitration award against China's territorial claims in the South China Sea handed down by an arbitral tribunal in The Hague…. Until now, the Philippines remains sharply divided on how to leverage its arbitration award. Filipino President Rodrigo Duterte has repeatedly downplayed the relevance of the ruling by questioning its enforceability amid China's vociferous opposition. Soon after taking office in mid-2016, Duterte declared that he would "set aside" the arbitration award in order to pursue a "soft landing" in bilateral relations with China. In exchange, he has hoped for large-scale Chinese investments as well as resource-sharing in the South China Sea…. Other major leaders in the Philippines, however, have taken a tougher stance and continue to try to leverage the award to resist China's expanding footprint in the area. The Stratbase-Albert Del Rosario Institute, an influential think tank co-founded by former Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs Albert del Rosario, hosted today a high-level forum on the topic at the prestigious Manila Polo Club. Del Rosario oversaw the arbitration proceedings against China under Duterte's predecessor, Benigno Aquino. He opened the event attended by dignitaries from major Western and Asian countries with a strident speech which accused China of trying to "dominate the South China Sea through force and coercion." He defended the arbitration award as an "overwhelming victory" to resist "China's unlawful expansion agenda." The ex-top diplomat also accused the Duterte administration of acquiescence to China by acting as an "abettor" and "willing victim" by soft-pedaling the Philippines' claims in the South China Sea and refusing to raise the arbitration award in multilateral fora. The keynote speaker of the event was Vice President Leni Robredo, who has recently emerged as the de facto leader of the opposition against Duterte. Though falling short of directly naming Duterte, her spirited speech served as a comprehensive indictment of the administration's policy in the South China Sea…. Her keynote address, widely covered by the local media, was followed by an even more spirited speech by interim Supreme Court Chief Justice Antonio Carpio, another leading critic of Duterte's foreign policy. The chief magistrate, who also oversaw the Philippines' arbitration proceedings against China, lashed out at Duterte for placing the landmark award in a "deep freeze." He called on the Duterte administration to leverage the award by negotiating maritime delimitation agreements with other Southeast Asian claimant states such as Malaysia and Vietnam which welcomed the arbitral tribunal's nullification of China's nine-dashed-line map. He also called on the Philippines to expand its maritime entitlement claims in the area, in accordance to the arbitration award, by applying for an extended continental shelf in the South China Sea at the UN. Another July 12, 2018, press report stated the following: Tarpaulins bearing the words "Welcome to the Philippines, province of China" were seen hanging from several footbridges in Metro Manila Thursday, two years after the country won its arbitration case against China. The red banners bore the Chinese flag and Chinese characters. It is unclear who installed the tarpaulins, which are possible reference to a "joke" by President Rodrigo Duterte that the country can be a province of the Asian giant. "He (Xi Jinping) is a man of honor. They can even make us 'Philippines, province of China,' we will even avail of services for free," Duterte said in apparent jest before an audience of Chinese-Filipino business leaders earlier in 2018. "If China were a woman, I'd woo her."… In a Palace briefing, presidential spokesperson Harry Roque said enemies of the government are behind the tarpaulins. A report on ANC said that the Metro Manila Development Authority already took the banners down. The tarpaulins sparked outrage among social media users. A July 17, 2018, press report stated the following: Protesters held a rally in front of the Chinese Consulate [in San Francisco] before proceeding to the Philippine Consulate downtown, demanding that China "get out of Philippine territory in the West Philippine Sea." The protest was timed with others in Los Angeles and Vancouver on the second anniversary of the UN's Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling that China had no right to the territory it was claiming. Filipino American Human Rights Advocates (FAHRA) in a statement celebrated the court's finding that "China's historical claim of the "nine-dash line" [is] illegal and without basis." "China continues to violate the UN's decision with the backing of its puppet Philippine government headed by President Duterte, who is deceived by the 'build, build, build' economic push while China establishes a 'steal, steal, steal' approach to islands and territories belonging to the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of the Philippines as determined by UN," the statement lamented. FAHRA also found it unacceptable that Filipino fishermen must now ask permission to fish in the Philippine waters from "a Chinese master." "Duterte is beholden to the $15-billion loan with monstrous interest rate and China's investments in Boracay and Marawi, at the expense of Philippine sovereignty," FAHRA claimed. "This is not to mention that China remains to be the premier supplier of illegal drugs to the country through traders that include the son, Paolo Duterte, with his P6 billion shabu shipment to Davao," it further charged. The group demanded that "China abide by the UN International Tribunal Court's decision two years ago, to honor the full sovereignty of the Philippines over all territories at the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) including the West Philippine Sea and the dismantling of the nuclear missiles and all military facilities installed by the Chinese government at the Spratly islands meant to coerce the Filipinos and all peace-loving people of Southeast Asia who clamor for equal respect and equal sovereignty in the area" among others. Appendix E. Additional Elements of China's Approach to Maritime Disputes This appendix presents background information on additional elements of China's approach to the maritime disputes in the SCS and ECS. Map of Nine-Dash Line China depicts its claims in the SCS using the so-called map of the nine-dash line—a Chinese map of the SCS showing nine line segments that, if connected, would enclose an area covering roughly 90% (earlier estimates said about 80%) of the SCS ( Figure E-1 ). The area inside the nine line segments far exceeds what is claimable as territorial waters under customary international law of the sea as reflected in UNCLOS, and, as shown in Figure E-2 , includes waters that are within the claimable EEZs (and in some places are quite near the coasts) of the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Vietnam. The map of the nine-dash line, also called the U-shaped line or the cow tongue, predates the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949. The map has been maintained by the PRC government, and maps published in Taiwan also show the nine line segments. In a document submitted to the United Nations on May 7, 2009, which included the map shown in Figure E-1 as an attachment, China stated the following: China has indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea and the adjacent waters, and enjoys sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the relevant waters as well as the seabed and subsoil thereof (see attached map [of the nine-dash line]). The above position is consistently held by the Chinese Government, and is widely known by the international community. The map does not always have exactly nine dashes. Early versions of the map had as many as 11 dashes, and a map of China published by the Chinese government in June 2014 includes 10 dashes. The exact positions of the dashes have also varied a bit over time. China has maintained ambiguity over whether it is using the map of the nine-dash line to claim full sovereignty over the entire sea area enclosed by the nine-dash line, or something less than that. Maintaining this ambiguity can be viewed as an approach that preserves flexibility for China in pursuing its maritime claims in the SCS while making it more difficult for other parties to define specific objections or pursue legal challenges to those claims. It does appear clear, however, that China at a minimum claims sovereignty over the island groups inside the nine line segments—China's domestic Law on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, enacted in 1992, specifies that China claims sovereignty over all the island groups inside the nine line segments. China's implementation on January 1, 2014, of a series of fishing regulations covering much of the SCS suggests that China claims at least some degree of administrative control over much of the SCS. An April 30, 2018, blog post states the following: In what is likely a new bid to reinforce and even expand China's sweeping territorial claims in the South China Sea, a group of Chinese scholars recently published a "New Map of the People's Republic of China." The alleged political national map, reportedly first published in April 1951 but only "discovered" through a recent national archival investigation, could give new clarity to the precise extent of China's official claims in the disputed waters. Instead of dotted lines, as reflected in China's U-shaped Nine-Dash Line claim to nearly all of the South China Sea, the newly discovered map provides a solid "continuous national boundary line and administrative region line." The Chinese researchers claim that through analysis of historical maps, the 1951 solid-line map "proves" beyond dispute that the "U-boundary line is the border of China's territorial sea" in the South China Sea. They also claim that the solid administrative line overlaying the U-boundary "definitely indicated that the sovereignty of the sea" enclosed within the U-boundary "belonged to China." The study, edited by the Guanghua and Geosciences Club and published by SDX Joint Publishing Company, has not been formally endorsed by the Chinese government. April 2018 Press Report of Proposal for Continuous Boundary Line in SCS An April 22, 2018, press report states the following: Researchers are proposing a new boundary in the South China Sea that they say will help the study of natural science while potentially adding weight to China's claims over the disputed waters, according to a senior scientist involved in the government-funded project. The new boundary will help to define more clearly China's claims in the contested region, but it is not clear whether or when it will be officially adopted by Beijing, the scientist said. A precise continuous line will split the Gulf of Tonkin between China and Vietnam, go south into waters claimed by Malaysia, take a U-turn to the north along the west coast of the Philippines and finish at the southeast of Taiwan. For decades, China's sovereign claim in the South China Sea has been murky, in large part because of the use of a segmented, vaguely located borderline known as the 'nine-dash line'. A United Nations tribunal ruled in July 2016 that China had no legal basis to claim the area within the dash lines. One reason for China losing the case was that it could not define the territory precisely. However, analysts said Beijing was unlikely to officially change the nine-dash line any time soon, in the face of potential international opposition.... The vast area of blue outlined by the new boundary, hanging on a map like a Christmas stocking under South China, overlaps the dashes and fills in the gaps. It includes all contested waters, such as the Paracel Islands, the Spratly Islands, James Shoal and Scarborough Shoal. The boundary would determine for the first time the exact area that China claimed to own with historic rights in the South China Sea, according to the researcher. Its purpose was partly the study of natural science and partly driven by a political motivation "to strengthen China's claims" over the waters to prepare for possible changes in its South China Sea policy in the future, the researcher said. Within the boundary, China would claim the right to activities ranging from fishing, prospecting and mining for energy or mineral resources to the construction of military bases with deep water ports or airports. Other countries' access to these rights would, however, be open for discussion, as is the case at Scarborough Shoal, which China controls but allows Philippine fishing boats to access. While Beijing would consider the area within the boundary its territory, other countries would still have freedom of navigation, the researcher said.... "Soon we will have a clear idea of what belongs to us in the South China Sea and what does not," said the researcher. "This will allow us to better plan and coordinate the efforts to protect our national interest in the region while reducing the risk of conflict with other countries caused by the absence of a border over the ocean."... "More often, when we are sending vessels out to the sea or looking down at an area via satellite, we are not sure whether it was our water," said the researcher in the boundary-drawing project. "The nine-dash line can no longer meet the demands of increasing Chinese activities in the South China Sea."... The continuous boundary was generated not only by curve-extending, gap-filling algorithms on computer. It was also based on a solid piece of historic evidence, according to the project team. In 1951, an official map approved by the central government of China marked the China-claimed area in the South China Sea with a pair of non-stopping lines. There was an inner black line indicating the sovereign boundary and an outer red line representing where China could exercise administrative power. "We were thrilled when we found the map," the researcher said. "It is something we can show the world." A detailed description of the map was published by the project team in a paper in domestic academic journal China Science Bulletin in March this year. Its authors recommended using the continuous U-shape boundary line as a replacement for the nine-dash line. The "U-boundary is the border of China's sea in the South China Sea, and its sovereignty belongs to China", the authors wrote in the paper. It "can further express the certainty of the integrity, continuity and border of China's seas in the South China Sea", they wrote, adding that it was "more vivid, accurate, complete and scientific". Professor Yu Minyou, director of the China Institute of Boundary and Ocean Studies at Wuhan University, said that if the old map was published with government approval, which was usually the case in China, "it surely will add legal weight to China's claim" in the region.... But other countries should bear in mind that it did not represent the Chinese government's position as long as the dash lines stayed on official maps, Yu said, adding that China's strategy for the South China Sea was "open and clear". "China wants to achieve peace, stability, harmony and prosperity in the region," he said. "We are willing to share natural resources with other countries and leave the disputes to be solved in the future. "What we are doing now is creating a suitable environment for the final settlement of the issue." A government expert at the National Institute for South China Sea Studies in Haikou, Hainan, said the continuous boundary would serve as a useful tool for some studies of natural science. But it was highly unlikely to be printed on an official map, said the expert, who requested not to be named because he was not allowed to speak to overseas media about sensitive issues. "To my knowledge, the Chinese government currently has no plan to change the dash lines," he said. "Most diplomats and ocean law experts will oppose joining the dashes." The tension in the South China Sea has eased significantly in recent times, with neighbouring countries such as the Philippines and Vietnam no longer seeking direct confrontation with China over disputed areas. "Things are moving towards the right direction," the government expert said. "It is not the best time to cut a boundary." September 2017 Press Report of Potential New "Four-Sha" Legal Claim A September 21, 2017, press report states the following: The Chinese government recently unveiled a new legal tactic to promote Beijing's aggressive claim to own most of the strategic South China Sea. The new narrative that critics are calling "lawfare," or legal warfare, involves a shift from China's so-called "9-Dash Line" ownership covering most of the sea. The new lawfare narrative is called the "Four Sha"—Chinese for sand—and was revealed by Ma Xinmin, deputy director general in the Foreign Ministry's department of treaty and law, during a closed-door meeting with State Department officials last month. China has claimed three of the island chains in the past and recently added a fourth zone in the northern part of the sea called the Pratas Islands near Hong Kong. The other locations are the disputed Paracels in the northwestern part and the Spratlys in the southern sea. The fourth island group is located in the central zone and includes Macclesfield Bank, a series of underwater reefs and shoals. China calls the island groups Dongsha, Xisha, Nansha, and Zhongsha, respectively. Ma, the Foreign Ministry official, announced during the meetings in Boston on Aug. 28 and 29 that China is asserting sovereignty over the Four Sha through several legal claims. He stated the area is China's historical territorial waters and also part of China's 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone that defines adjacent zones as sovereign territory. Beijing also claims ownership by asserting the Four Sha are part of China's extended continental shelf. U.S. officials attending the session expressed surprise at the new Chinese ploy to seek control over the sea as something not discussed before.... A State Department notice at the end of what was billed as an annual U.S.-China Dialogue on the Law of the Sea and Polar Issues made no mention of the new Chinese lawfare tactic. The statement said only that officials from foreign affairs and maritime agencies "exchanged views on a wide range of issues related to oceans, the law of the sea, and the polar regions." A September 25, 2017, blog post about the claim states the following: While dropping or even de-emphasizing China's Nine-Dash Line claim in favor of the Four Shas has important diplomatic and political implications, the legal significance of such a shift is harder to assess. The constituent parts of China's Four Sha claims have long been set forth publicly in Chinese domestic law and official statements. Based on what we know so far, these new Chinese legal justifications are no more lawful than China's Nine-Dash Line claim. The challenge for critics of Chinese claims in the South China Sea, however, will be effectively explaining and articulating why this shift does not actually strengthen China's legal claims in the South China Sea. The Four Sha claim has a long pedigree in Chinese law and practice. China's 1992 law on the territorial sea and contiguous zone, for example, declared that China's land territory included the "Dongsha island group, Xisha island group, Zhongsha island group, [and] Nansha island group." A 2016 white paper disputing the Philippines' claims in the South China Sea arbitral process similarly claimed that: China's Nanhai Zhudao (the South China Sea Islands) consist of Dongsha Qundao (the Dongsha Islands), Xisha Qundao (the Xisha Islands), Zhongsha Qundao (the Zhongsha Islands) and Nansha Qundao (the Nansha Islands). These Islands include, among others, islands, reefs, shoals and cays of various numbers and sizes.... In a 2016 white paper, Beijing stated that, "China has, based on Nanhai Zhudao [the "Four Sha"], internal waters, territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone and continental shelf." Neither the white paper nor the Beacon's report explain how China derives these maritime zones from the four island groups.... Because China is not constituted "wholly by one or more archipelagos" (think Indonesia or the Philippines), the U.S. and most countries would view straight baselines around an island group as contrary to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).... For this reason, this new Chinese legal strategy is even weaker than the Nine-Dash Line given that it clearly violates UNCLOS (e.g., Articles 46 and 47). Most Chinese defenses of the Nine Dash Line argued that the claim predated China's accession to UNCLOS and therefore not governed by it. Despite the legal weaknesses of its possible new strategy, China may still reap some benefits from trading the Nine-Dash Line for the Four Shas. First, the Chinese leadership may have realized that the Nine Dash Line has become too much of a diplomatic liability. The Nine-Dash Line is completely sui generis and no other state has made a historic maritime claim anything like it. For this reason, the Nine-Dash Line makes China an easy target for foreign criticism in a way that straight baselines around island groups probably will not. Second, by adopting language more similar to that found in UNCLOS, China may be betting that it can tamp down criticism, and win potential partners in the region.... Third, and most intriguingly, China may have concluded that it can better shape (or undermine, depending on your point of view) the law of the sea by adopting UNCLOS terminology.... So while we might be encouraged to see the Nine-Dash Line pass into the (legal) dustbins of history, we should be skeptical about whether the Four Shas herald a new more modest Chinese role in the South China Sea. China's legal justification for the Four Shas is just as weak, if not weaker, than its Nine-Dash Line claim. But explaining why the Four Shas is weak and lawless will require sophisticated legal analysis married with effective public messaging. Comparison with U.S. Actions Toward Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico Some observers have compared China's approach toward its near-seas region with the U.S. approach toward the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico in the age of the Monroe Doctrine. It can be noted, however, that there are significant differences between China's approach to its near-seas region and the U.S. approach—both in the 19 th and 20 th centuries and today—to the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico. Unlike China in its approach to its near-seas region, the United States has not asserted any form of sovereignty or historical rights over the broad waters of the Caribbean or Gulf of Mexico (or other sea areas beyond the 12-mile limit of U.S. territorial waters), has not published anything akin to the nine-dash line for these waters (or other sea areas beyond the 12-mile limit), and does not contest the right of foreign naval forces to operate and engage in various activities in waters beyond the 12-mile limit. Appendix F. U.S. Position on Operational Rights in EEZs This appendix presents additional background information on the U.S. position on the issue of operational rights of military ships in the EEZs of other countries. Operational Rights in EEZs Regarding a coastal state's rights within its EEZ, Scot Marciel, then-Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, stated the following as part of his prepared statement for a July 15, 2009, hearing before the East Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: I would now like to discuss recent incidents involving China and the activities of U.S. vessels in international waters within that country's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). In March 2009, the survey ship USNS Impeccable was conducting routine operations, consistent with international law, in international waters in the South China Sea. Actions taken by Chinese fishing vessels to harass the Impeccable put ships of both sides at risk, interfered with freedom of navigation, and were inconsistent with the obligation for ships at sea to show due regard for the safety of other ships. We immediately protested those actions to the Chinese government, and urged that our differences be resolved through established mechanisms for dialogue—not through ship-to-ship confrontations that put sailors and vessels at risk. Our concern over that incident centered on China's conception of its legal authority over other countries' vessels operating in its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and the unsafe way China sought to assert what it considers its maritime rights. China's view of its rights on this specific point is not supported by international law. We have made that point clearly in discussions with the Chinese and underscored that U.S. vessels will continue to operate lawfully in international waters as they have done in the past. As part of his prepared statement for the same hearing, Robert Scher, then-Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Asian and Pacific Security Affairs, Office of the Secretary of Defense, stated that we reject any nation's attempt to place limits on the exercise of high seas freedoms within an exclusive economic zones [sic] (EEZ). Customary international law, as reflected in articles 58 and 87 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, guarantees to all nations the right to exercise within the EEZ, high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight, as well as the traditional uses of the ocean related to those freedoms. It has been the position of the United States since 1982 when the Convention was established, that the navigational rights and freedoms applicable within the EEZ are qualitatively and quantitatively the same as those rights and freedoms applicable on the high seas. We note that almost 40% of the world's oceans lie within the 200 nautical miles EEZs, and it is essential to the global economy and international peace and security that navigational rights and freedoms within the EEZ be vigorously asserted and preserved. As previously noted, our military activity in this region is routine and in accordance with customary international law as reflected in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. As mentioned earlier in the report, if China's position on whether coastal states have a right under UNCLOS to regulate the activities of foreign military forces in their EEZs were to gain greater international acceptance under international law, it could substantially affect U.S. naval operations not only in the SCS and ECS (see Figure F-1 for EEZs in the SCS and ECS), but around the world, which in turn could substantially affect the ability of the United States to use its military forces to defend various U.S. interests overseas. As shown in Figure F-2 , significant portions of the world's oceans are claimable as EEZs, including high-priority U.S. Navy operating areas in the Western Pacific, the Persian Gulf, and the Mediterranean Sea. Some observers, in commenting on China's resistance to U.S. military survey and surveillance operations in China's EEZ, have argued that the United States would similarly dislike it if China or some other country were to conduct military survey or surveillance operations within the U.S. EEZ. Skeptics of this view argue that U.S. policy accepts the right of other countries to operate their military forces freely in waters outside the 12-mile U.S. territorial waters limit, and that the United States during the Cold War acted in accordance with this position by not interfering with either Soviet ships (including intelligence-gathering vessels known as AGIs) that operated close to the United States or with Soviet bombers and surveillance aircraft that periodically flew close to U.S. airspace. The U.S. Navy states that When the commonly recognized outer limit of the territorial sea under international law was three nautical miles, the United States recognized the right of other states, including the Soviet Union, to exercise high seas freedoms, including surveillance and other military operations, beyond that limit. The 1982 Law of the Sea Convention moved the outer limit of the territorial sea to twelve nautical miles. In 1983, President Reagan declared that the United States would accept the balance of the interests relating to the traditional uses of the oceans reflected in the 1982 Convention and would act in accordance with those provisions in exercising its navigational and overflight rights as long as other states did likewise. He further proclaimed that all nations will continue to enjoy the high seas rights and freedoms that are not resource related, including the freedoms of navigation and overflight, in the Exclusive Economic Zone he established for the United States consistent with the 1982 Convention. DOD states that the PLA Navy has begun to conduct military activities within the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) of other nations, without the permission of those coastal states. Of note, the United States has observed over the past year several instances of Chinese naval activities in the EEZ around Guam and Hawaii. One of those instances was during the execution of the annual Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise in July/August 2012. While the United States considers the PLA Navy activities in its EEZ to be lawful, the activity undercuts China's decades-old position that similar foreign military activities in China's EEZ are unlawful. In July 2014, China participated, for the first time, in the biennial U.S.-led Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) naval exercise, the world's largest multilateral naval exercise. In addition to the four ships that China sent to participate in RIMPAC, China sent an uninvited intelligence-gathering ship to observe the exercise without participating in it. The ship conducted operations inside U.S. EEZ off Hawaii, where the exercise was located. A July 29, 2014, press report stated that The high profile story of a Chinese surveillance ship off the cost of Hawaii could have a positive aspect for U.S. operations in the Pacific, the head of U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) said in a Tuesday [July 29] afternoon briefing with reporters at the Pentagon. "The good news about this is that it's a recognition, I think, or acceptance by the Chinese for what we've been saying to them for sometime," PACOM commander Adm. Samuel Locklear told reporters. "Military operations and survey operations in another country's [Exclusive Economic Zone]—where you have your own national security interest—are within international law and are acceptable. This is a fundamental right nations have." One observer stated the following: The unprecedented decision [by China] to send a surveillance vessel while also participating in the RIMPAC exercises calls China's proclaimed stance on international navigation rights [in EEZ waters] into question... During the Cold War, the U.S. and Soviets were known for spying on each other's exercises. More recently, Beijing sent what U.S. Pacific Fleet spokesman Captain Darryn James called "a similar AGI ship" to Hawaii to monitor RIMPAC 2012—though that year, China was not an official participant in the exercises.... ... the spy ship's presence appears inconsistent with China's stance on military activities in Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs).... That Beijing's AGI [intelligence-gathering ship] is currently stationed off the coast of Hawaii suggests either a double standard that could complicate military relations between the United States and China, or that some such surveillance activities are indeed legitimate—and that China should clarify its position on them to avoid perceptions that it is trying to have things both ways.... In its response to the Chinese vessel's presence, the USN has shown characteristic restraint. Official American policy permits surveillance operations within a nation's EEZ, provided they remain outside of that nation's 12-nautical mile territorial sea (an EEZ extends from 12 to 200 nautical miles unless this would overlap with another nations' EEZ). U.S. military statements reflect that position unambiguously.... That consistent policy stance and accompanying restraint have characterized the U.S. attitude toward foreign surveillance activity since the Cold War. Then, the Soviets were known for sending converted fishing ships equipped with surveillance equipment to the U.S. coast, as well as foreign bases, maritime choke points, and testing sites. The U.S. was similarly restrained in 2012, when China first sent an AGI to observe RIMPAC.... China has, then, sent a surveillance ship to observe RIMPAC in what appears to be a decidedly intentional, coordinated move—and in a gesture that appears to contradict previous Chinese policy regarding surveillance and research operations (SROs). The U.S. supports universal freedom of navigation and the right to conduct SROs in international waters, including EEZs, hence its restraint when responding to the current presence of the Chinese AGI. But the PRC opposes such activities, particularly on the part of the U.S., in its own EEZ.... How then to reconcile the RIMPAC AGI with China's stand on surveillance activities? China maintains that its current actions are fully legal, and that there is a distinct difference between its operations off Hawaii and those of foreign powers in its EEZ. The PLAN's designated point of contact declined to provide information and directed inquiries to China's Defense Ministry. In a faxed statement to Reuters, the Defense Ministry stated that Chinese vessels had the right to operate "in waters outside of other country's territorial waters," and that "China respects the rights granted under international law to relevant littoral states, and hopes that relevant countries can respect the legal rights Chinese ships have." It did not elaborate. As a recent Global Times article hinted—China's position on military activities in EEZs is based on a legal reading that stresses the importance of domestic laws. According to China maritime legal specialist Isaac Kardon, China interprets the EEZ articles in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as granting a coastal state jurisdiction to enforce its domestic laws prohibiting certain military activities—e.g., those that it interprets to threaten national security, economic rights, or environmental protection—in its EEZ. China's domestic laws include such provisions, while those of the United States do not. Those rules would allow China to justify its seemingly contradictory approach to AGI operations—or, as Kardon put it, "to have their cake and eat it too." Therefore, under the Chinese interpretation of UNCLOS, its actions are neither hypocritical nor illegal—yet do not justify similar surveillance against China. Here, noted legal scholar Jerome Cohen emphasizes, the U.S. position remains the globally dominant view—"since most nations believe the coastal state has no right to forbid surveillance in its EEZ, they do not have domestic laws that do so." This renders China's attempted constraints legally problematic, since "international law is based on reciprocity." To explain his interpretation of Beijing's likely approach, Cohen invokes the observation that a French commentator made several decades ago in the context of discussing China's international law policy regarding domestic legal issues: "I demand freedom from you in the name of your principles. I deny it to you in the name of mine." Based on his personal experience interacting with Chinese officials and legal experts, Kardon adds, "China is increasingly confident that its interpretation of some key rules and—most critically—its practices reinforcing that interpretation can over time shape the Law of the Sea regime to suit its preferences." But China is not putting all its eggs in that basket. There are increasing indications that it is attempting to promote its EEZ approach vis-à-vis the U.S. not legally but politically. "Beijing is shifting from rules- to relations-based objections," Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute Director Peter Dutton observes. "In this context, its surveillance operations in undisputed U.S. EEZs portend an important shift, but that does not mean that China will be more flexible in the East or South China Seas." The quasi-authoritative Chinese commentary that has emerged thus far supports this interpretation.... [A recent statement from a Chinese official] suggests that Beijing will increasingly oppose U.S. SROs on the grounds that they are incompatible with the stable, cooperative Sino-American relationship that Beijing and Washington have committed to cultivating. The Obama Administration must ensure that the "new-type Navy-to-Navy relations" that Chinese Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Wu Shengli has advocated to his U.S. counterpart does not contain expectations that U.S. SROs will be reduced in nature, scope, or frequency.... China's conducting military activities in a foreign EEZ implies that, under its interpretation, some such operations are indeed legal. It therefore falls to China now to clarify its stance—to explain why its operations are consistent with international law, and what sets them apart from apparently similar American activities. If China does not explain away the apparent contradiction in a convincing fashion, it risks stirring up increased international resentment—and undermining its relationship with the U.S. Beijing is currently engaging in activities very much like those it has vociferously opposed. That suggests the promotion of a double standard untenable in the international system, and very much at odds with the relationships based on reciprocity, respect, and cooperation that China purports to promote.... If, however, China chooses to remain silent, it will likely have to accept—at least tacitly, without harassing—U.S. surveillance missions in its claimed EEZ. So, as we watch for clarification on Beijing's legal interpretation, it will also be important to watch for indications regarding the next SROs in China's EEZ. In September 2014, a Chinese surveillance ship operated in U.S. EEZ waters near Guam as it observed a joint-service U.S. military exercise called Valiant Shield. A U.S. spokesperson for the exercise stated the following: "We'd like to reinforce that military operations in international commons and outside of territorial waters and airspace is a fundamental right that all nations have.... The Chinese were following international norms, which is completely acceptable." Appendix G. Options Suggested by Observers for Strengthening U.S. Actions This appendix presents a bibliography of some recent writings by observers who have suggested options (or are reporting on options suggested by others) for strengthening U.S. actions for responding to China's actions in the SCS and ECS, organized by date, beginning with the most-recent item. Andrew S. Erickson, "Maritime Numbers Game, Understanding and Responding to China's Three Sea Forces," Indo-Pacific Defense Forum , January 28, 2019. James R. Holmes, "Use It or Lose It: Seagoing Nations Must Defend Embattled Waterways," The Hill , January 27, 2019. Gregory Poling and Eric Sayers, "Time to Make Good on the U.S.-Philippine Alliance," War on the Rocks , January 21, 2019. Gregory Poling and Bonnie S. Glaser, "How the U.S. Can Step Up in the South China Sea," Foreign Affairs , January 16, 2019. Zack Cooper and Gregory Poling, "America's Freedom of Navigation Operations Are Lost at Sea, Far Wider Measures Are Needed to Challenge Beijing's Maritime Aggression," Foreign Policy , January 8, 2019. Andrew S. Erickson, "Shining a Spotlight: Revealing China's Maritime Militia to Deter its Use," National Interest , November 25, 2018. Eric Sayers, "Assessing America's Indo-Pacific Budget Shortfall," War on the Rocks , November 15, 2018. Patrick N. Cronin and Richard Javad Heydarian, "This Is How America and the Philippines Can Upgrade Their Alliance," National Interest , November 12, 2018. John Lee, Freedom of Navigation and East Asian Stability: Countering Beijing's Campaign of Historical Revisionism ," Hudson Institute, November 2018, 8 pp. Ryan Martinson and Peter Dutton, "Chinese Scientists Want to Conduct Research in U.S. Waters—Should Washington Let Them?" National Interest , November 4, 2018. Hunter Stires, "Understanding and Defeating China's Maritime Insurgency in the South china Sea," National Interest , November 1, 2018. Robert D. Kaplan, "How President Trump Is Helping Beijing Win in the South China Sea," Washington Post , October 9, 2018. Tuan Pham, "China's Worth Nightmare: RIMPAC 2020 in the South China Sea?" National Interest , September 29, 2018. Patrick M. Cronin, "China is Waging a Maritime Insurgency in the South China Sea. It's Time for the Unitd States to Counter It." National Interest , August 6, 2018. Shigeki Sakamoto, "China's South China Sea Project Must Not Succeed; The International Community Shouldn't Quietly Let China Ignore the 2016 [Arbitral Tribunal] Decision." Diplomat , August 6, 2018. James Amedeo, "America Needs a Clear Strategy to Counter China's Expansion in the South China Sea," National Interest , August 1, 2018. Lynn Kuok, "Countering China's Actions in the South China Sea," Lawfare , August 1, 2018. Timothy Perry, "Use Maritime-Law Trends to Offset Beijing's Gains in the South China Sea," Defense One , July 24, 2018. J. Michael Cole, "It's Time to Stop China's Seaward Expansion," National Interest , July 21, 2018. Lindsey W. Ford, "Was China's RIMPAC Exclusion An Opening or a Wasted Shot?" East Asia Forum , July 20, 2018. Lynn Kuok, "China Is Winning in the South China Sea," Wall Street Journal , July 17, 2018. "Washington and Its Allies Need to Contain Beijing," Financial Times , July 1, 2018. Patrick M. Cronin and Melodiw Ha, "Toward a New maritime Strategy in the South China Sea," The Diplomat , June 22, 2018. (A similar version was posted as: Patrick M. Cronin and Melodie Ha, "Toward a New Maritime Strategy in the South China Sea," CSIS, June 21, 2018 (PacNet #42). Paul J. Leaf, "Taiwan and the South China Sea Must Be Taken Off the Back Burner," National Interest , June 18, 2018. Robert E. McCoy, "A Better Way to Repel China in the South China Sea," Asia Times , June 8, 2018. Robert Farley, "The South China Sea Conundrum for the United States," The Diplomat , June 5 2018. Joel Gehrke, "Marco Rubio: US Must Develop Plan to 'Destroy' Chinese Assets in South China Sea," Washington Examiner , June 4, 2018. Duncan DeAeth, "Taiwan Should Invite US to Open Military Base on Taiping Island, Says DPP Think-Tank," Taiwan News , June 4, 2018. Julian Ku, "It's Time for South China Sea Economic Sanctions," Lawfare , June 1, 2018. Eric Sayers, "Time to Launch a Combined Maritime Task Force for the Pacific," War on the Rocks , June 1, 2018. Matthew Krull, "America's Annual Naval Patrol Report and How to Fix It," National Interest , May 29, 2018. Tuan N. Pham, "A Sign of the Times: China's Recent Actions and the Undermining of Global Rules, Pt. 3," CIMSEC (Center for International Maritime Security), May 24, 2018. Ryan D. Martinson and Andrew Erickson, "Re-Orienting American Seapower for the China Challenge," War on the Rocks , May 10, 2018. Ben Cipperley, "In the Era of Great Power Competition, the US Needs to Step Up Its Game," The Diplomat , May 8, 2018. Stephen Bryen, "How to Counter China's Fortified Islands in South China Sea," Asia Times , May 5, 2018. Ely Ratner, "Exposing China's Actions in the South China Sea," Council on Foreign Relations, April 6, 2018. Shawn Lansing, "A White Hull Approach to Taming the Dragon: Using the Coast Guard to Counter China," War on the Rocks , February 22, 2018. Dean Cheng, "Wanted: A Strategy to Limit China's Grand Plans for the South China Sea," National Interest , January 30, 2018. Hal Brands, "China Hasn't Won the Pacific (Unless You Think It Has)," Bloomberg , January 5, 2018.	[ "China's actions in recent years in the South China Sea (SCS)—particularly its island-building and base-construction activities at sites that it occupies in the Spratly Islands—have heightened concerns among U.S. observers that China is rapidly gaining effective control of the SCS, an area of strategic, political, and economic importance to the United States and its allies and partners, particularly those in the Indo-Pacific region. U.S. Navy Admiral Philip Davidson, in his responses to advance policy questions from the Senate Armed Services Committee for an April 17, 2018, hearing to consider his nomination to become Commander, U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), stated that \"China is now capable of controlling the South China Sea in all scenarios short of war with the United States.\" Chinese control of the SCS—and, more generally, Chinese domination of China's near-seas region, meaning the SCS, the East China Sea (ECS), and the Yellow Sea—could substantially affect U.S. strategic, political, and economic interests in the Indo-Pacific region and elsewhere. China is a party to multiple territorial disputes in the SCS and ECS, including, in particular, disputes with multiple neighboring countries over the Paracel Islands, Spratly Islands, and Scarborough Shoal in the SCS, and with Japan over the Senkaku Islands in the ECS. Up through 2014, U.S. concern over these disputes centered more on their potential for causing tension, incidents, and a risk of conflict between China and its neighbors in the region, including U.S. allies Japan and the Philippines and emerging partner states such as Vietnam. While that concern remains, particularly regarding the potential for a conflict between China and Japan involving the Senkaku Islands, U.S. concern since 2014 (i.e., since China's island-building activities in the Spratly Islands were first publicly reported) has shifted increasingly to how China's strengthening position in the SCS may be affecting the risk of a U.S.-China crisis or conflict in the SCS and the broader U.S.-Chinese strategic competition. In addition to territorial disputes in the SCS and ECS, China is involved in a dispute, particularly with the United States, over whether China has a right under international law to regulate the activities of foreign military forces operating within China's exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The position of the United States and most other countries is that while international law gives coastal states the right to regulate economic activities (such as fishing and oil exploration) within their EEZs, it does not give coastal states the right to regulate foreign military activities in the parts of their EEZs beyond their 12-nautical-mile territorial waters. The position of China and some other countries (i.e., a minority group among the world's nations) is that UNCLOS gives coastal states the right to regulate not only economic activities, but also foreign military activities, in their EEZs. The dispute appears to be at the heart of multiple incidents between Chinese and U.S. ships and aircraft in international waters and airspace since 2001, and has potential implications not only for China's EEZs, but for U.S. naval operations in EEZs globally, and for international law of the sea. A key issue for Congress is how the United States should respond to China's actions in the SCS and ECS—particularly its island-building and base-construction activities in the Spratly Islands—and to China's strengthening position in the SCS. A key oversight question for Congress is whether the Trump Administration has an appropriate strategy—and an appropriate amount of resources for implementing that strategy—for countering China's \"salami-slicing\" strategy or gray zone operations for gradually strengthening its position in the SCS, for imposing costs on China for its actions in the SCS and ECS, and for defending and promoting U.S. interests in the region." ]	40,508	gov_report	en	null	505345771a2e5b438ea4bfa7c0f238f8787f45b0ca52ef7d
The defense lab enterprise consists of 63 labs, warfare centers, and engineering centers across the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, as shown in Figure 1 below. About 50,000 federally employed scientists and engineers work at these defense labs to support warfighter needs and develop transformative capabilities. Defense labs are managed and operated within the military service chain of command. DOD budgets for technology and product development activities under its research, development, test, and evaluation budget, which DOD groups into seven budget activity categories for its annual budget estimates. Air Force and Army labs rely on appropriated funding provided from the service—often referred to as mission funding—or from customers (or some combination thereof). Customers, such as program offices, provide funding to defense labs for technology development activities and related research. The Air Force and Army funding structure is in contrast to Navy research and development activities, which operate under the Navy Working Capital Fund—a revolving fund that finances Department of the Navy activities on a reimbursable basis. Under this funding model, the Navy employs a Capital Investment Program to obtain capital assets, including minor military construction projects for labs. The program provides the framework for planning, coordinating, and controlling Navy working capital funds and expenditures to obtain capital assets. Figure 2 illustrates the varying funding models used by the military service labs. In addition to its labs, DOD sponsors other entities to provide for its technology development needs. Specifically, these include: FFRDCs are operated by universities, other not-for-profit or nonprofit organizations, or private firms under long-term contracts and provide special research and development services that generally cannot be readily satisfied by government personnel or private contractors. For example, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Lincoln Laboratory develops key radar and electronic warfare technologies for integrated air and missile defense systems. In addition, the Software Engineering Institute operated by Carnegie Mellon University provides cybersecurity solutions for defense entities. While DOD sponsors 10 FFRDCs in total, it designates 3 FFRDCs as research and development labs, which maintain long-term competencies in key technology areas. In addition to these, DOD sponsors 2 systems engineering and integration FFRDCs and 5 studies and analysis FFRDCs. UARCs provide specialized research and development services similar to FFRDCs and also operate under long-term contracts. However, unlike FFRDCs, DOD requires that UARCs be affiliated with a university. Generally, UARCs may not compete against industry in response to a competitive Request for Proposals for development or production that involves engineering expertise. DOD currently sponsors 13 UARCs. Key DOD offices provide oversight to the defense labs: The Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (USD(R&E))—the principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense for research, engineering, and technology development activities and programs—serves as DOD’s chief technology officer. The powers and duties of this office include establishing policies and providing oversight for DOD’s research, engineering, and technology development activities. The Defense Laboratories Office—within the Office of the USD(R&E)—supports DOD’s research and engineering mission by helping to ensure comprehensive department-level insight into the activities and capabilities of the defense labs. This office carries out a range of core functions related to the defense labs, including analysis of capabilities, alignment of activities, and advocacy. Congress has granted authorities that address hiring, infrastructure, and technology transition challenges to defense labs since 1995. These authorities provide defense lab directors with certain flexibilities within the established legal framework to manage their operations. While Congress has provided a number of authorities, in this report we focus on four authorities that our prior work on best practices in science and technology management and expedited lab hiring has shown are, or have the potential to be, the most crucial for supporting innovation within DOD labs. Laboratory Initiated Research Authority. This authority provides lab directors with the means to fund some of the research projects that the lab will pursue. The authority provided in Section 219 of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, as implemented, provides lab directors with a means to fund projects they consider to be a priority in four allowable categories: (1) basic and applied research, (2) technology transition, (3) workforce development, and (4) revitalization, recapitalization, or repair or minor construction of lab infrastructure. These projects include those not specifically tied to defined requirements, outside of the normal 2-year budget planning process. The authority directs the Secretary of Defense to establish mechanisms under which lab directors may use an amount of funds equal to not less than 2 percent and not more than 4 percent of all funds available to the defense lab for projects under the four allowable categories. Further, lab directors are permitted to obtain additional funding by charging customers a fixed percentage fee that may not exceed 4 percent of costs. Direct Hire Authorities. These authorities provide lab directors with a streamlined and accelerated hiring process. Congress has enacted four types of direct hire authorities since 2008, which help labs compete with private industry and academia for high-quality scientific, engineering, and technical talent. Specific types of direct hire authorities include hiring: (1) candidates with advanced degrees; (2) candidates with bachelor’s degrees; (3) veterans; and (4) students currently enrolled in graduate or undergraduate science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) programs., Laboratory Enhancement Pilot Program. This authority provides methods for effective lab management operations. Section 233 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 established a pilot program for lab directors to propose alternative and innovative methods that might lead to more effectively managing labs, and authorized lab directors to waive any regulation, restriction, requirement, guidance, policy, procedure, or departmental instruction that would affect implementation of these methods, unless such implementation would be prohibited by a provision of an existing statute or common law. Micro-purchase Authority. This authority facilitates the purchasing process for labs. The FAR states a preference for government agencies to purchase and pay for micro-purchases of supplies or services using the government-wide commercial purchase card up to and at the micro-purchase threshold, but micro-purchases may be conducted using any of the simplified acquisition methods. This facilitates the ability of lab officials to quickly and easily acquire needed items for their activities and reduce the administrative costs associated with such small purchases. While the FAR micro-purchase was generally $3,500 during our review, Congress increased it to $10,000 for activities of the science and technology reinvention labs in Section 217 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017. As we found in June 2018, the federal government spends approximately $137 billion annually government-wide on research and development (R&D) to help further agencies’ missions, including at federal labs. From fiscal years 2015 to 2017, DOD, Energy, and NASA represented three of the top four federal agencies with the highest annual federal R&D spending, accounting for about 66 percent of total federal R&D spending on average, as shown in Figure 3. While the labs primarily support the agencies that directly fund them, DOD, Energy, and NASA research entities also collaborate extensively to support activities of shared interest. For example, DOD and NASA research centers have collaborated to develop hypersonic vehicle capabilities. Further, Energy’s national labs help provide critical national security capabilities for DOD and support NASA’s deep space mission radioisotope requirements. In 2017, Energy reported performing about $2.6 billion of work per year from fiscal years 2011 through 2015 for other federal agencies and other customers, including DOD. Most defense labs have used the selected authorities since 2008, but their use has sometimes been limited for a variety of reasons. According to lab directors, this is because of DOD legal and policy restrictions and stakeholder concerns. For example: Use of the laboratory initiated research authority was limited by DOD’s military construction funding and financial management policies. Use of the direct hire authority was limited, in part, by personnel- related delays, security clearance challenges, and military hiring restrictions. Use of the laboratory enhancement pilot program was limited by stakeholder uncertainty about how to use this authority effectively. Use of the increased micro-purchase authority was limited by stakeholder concerns about the authority’s potential effect on small businesses. We found that most defense labs have used the laboratory initiated research authority. Twenty-three of 31 of respondents to our survey— about 74 percent—reported obligating funds under this authority. However, we found that most labs are not using the full 4 percent of all funds available to each lab, or charging customers the full fixed percentage fee of 4 percent of costs, as allowed by law. Specifically, we found that, as of September 2018: Navy labs reported charging customers a percentage fee of about 2 percent of costs as of fiscal year 2018. Prior to this, Navy labs only charged a 1 percent fixed fee on these costs. Because Navy labs are working capital funded organizations, they can use payments from customers for goods delivered or services performed. Army labs reported using between 2 and 3 percent of all funds available to the lab for projects under the four allowable categories and charging customers a fixed fee of between zero and 3 percent of costs to fund such activities. Only the Air Force Research Laboratory reported using the full 4 percent of all funds available to the lab. According to agency officials, the lab is using 3 percent of all funds available to the lab and is allowing individual technology directorates the option to use the additional 1 percent of funds available. In fiscal year 2018, three of the lab’s nine technology directorates chose to use this additional 1 percent. However, the lab has not charged customers a fixed percentage fee on their costs at all. As figure 4 shows, in fiscal year 2017, the aggregate fixed percentage fee charged by labs in each of the military departments totaled under the full 4 percent allowed by law for each funding source. Decisions to charge lower percentages are decisions to forego additional potential funding, although agencies have various reasons why this can happen, as we will discuss later. In total, DOD reported that this authority provided almost $300 million to labs in fiscal year 2017 and funded more than 1,750 projects across the four allowable categories, as Figure 5 illustrates. We previously found, in June 2017, that the laboratory initiated research authority provides defense lab directors with limited flexibility to initiate science and technology projects. These projects include those that are not road mapped or tied to defined requirements outside of the normal 2- year budget planning process, and are focused on both near- and long- term needs. For this review, defense lab officials we interviewed stated that the laboratory initiated research authority enables their scientists and researchers to pursue projects not necessarily tied to requirements and provides necessary funds for workforce development and lab infrastructure projects. Further, as shown in Figure 6, lab directors we surveyed generally view the authority as both fostering innovation and increasing efficiency across the four allowable categories on which funds can be used. In accordance with the one of the statutory purposes for the use of the funds, lab directors have developed new, innovative technologies using this authority. For example, DOD reported that: In fiscal year 2017, the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane Division, developed and fielded a solution to an urgent requirement for defeating small unmanned aerial vehicles that attack Navy assets or surveil naval activities. The center delivered this technology to the warfighter in May 2017 just 7 weeks after the Navy submitted the requirement. The Army Research Laboratory used the authority to fund a project that eventually developed a material that could increase the speed and lower the power needs of future generations of computer chips, thereby supporting Army networks. The Navy invested more than $700 thousand in laboratory initiated research authority funds to commission a Ballast Water Research Lab at Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division. Through the use of this new facility, engineers will be able to study ways to treat ballast water to prevent introduction of non- native aquatic species into a new environment that can be disastrous for the marine life that already inhabit that environment, and ensure that the Navy is able to meet various port regulations around the world for its ships. The Air Force Research Laboratory invested funds in fiscal year 2017 to renovate an existing facility to provide high performance computing capability to aid the rapid development of “game-changing” technologies and weapon systems. Officials at the Army’s Space and Missile Defense Command Technical Center noted they used the laboratory initiated research authority for the first time in fiscal year 2018 because the current executive director, who assumed the position in 2017, prioritized implementing this authority. Most of the Center’s planned investments are focused on workforce development and laboratory infrastructure projects; officials cited a high energy laser technology lab as one of the projects being supported by the revitalization, recapitalization, or minor military construction portion of this authority. Although the majority of defense labs reported using the laboratory initiated research authority, interviews we conducted throughout our review, along with other DOD reports, identified certain obstacles that have, at times, impeded wider usage. DOD-wide military construction funding restrictions. DOD restrictions limit the amount of laboratory initiated research authority funds that labs can spend on lab infrastructure. DOD’s limit is $6 million for the revitalization and recapitalization projects that can be funded under the laboratory initiated research authority. Lab officials stated that this amount is often insufficient to construct advanced lab facilities. Air Force Research Laboratory officials indicated that it is nearly impossible to construct lab facilities for less than $6 million. Officials at the Army’s Aviation and Missile Research, Development and Engineering Center echoed this sentiment and noted that they have primarily used funds to renovate existing buildings rather than fund new lab facility construction. In January 2017, the Defense Science Board identified lab infrastructure challenges, including that the average age of research and development facilities was nearly 50 years. Further, the Board reported that the labs are usually not successful in competing against broader service needs for military construction funds. Air Force does not charge customers a fixed percentage fee of costs. The Air Force Research Laboratory reported that it is not charging customers the allowable fixed percentage fee of costs to fund science and technology activities because it does not have a mechanism in place to do so. Air Force Research Laboratory officials estimated the lab would collect approximately $3 million a year if the lab charged customer activities the maximum allowable fee (4 percent). Air Force financial management officials stated that the service’s accounting system does not currently have an automated capability to transfer the allowable percentage fee of costs to a central account at the Air Force Research Laboratory. This lack of capability, officials noted, creates a significant administrative burden for charging these fees. The officials stated that they have not yet estimated the cost to add an automated capability. Although it is possible for the Air Force Research Laboratory to charge customer work orders manually—outside of the Air Force’s accounting system—officials with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Financial Management and Comptroller perceive that the resources (time and people) required to manage such a process would be cost prohibitive. However, according to these officials, the Air Force has not assessed the costs required to improve the accounting system to do so, nor has it identified the potential benefits any improvements would provide. Federal internal control standards state that changes in condition affecting an entity and its environment often require changes to the entity’s internal control system, as existing controls may not be effective for meeting objectives (or addressing risks) under changed conditions. Further, these standards state that any internal control deficiencies require further evaluation and remediation by management. By not assessing the potential costs and benefits related to the options for collecting these allowable fees, the Air Force could be missing out on a potential source of funding to support its needs. DOD lacks clear guidance on how the Navy should use the initiated research authority for some infrastructure investments within the Capital Investment Program. In our review of DOD documentation, we found that, among the military departments, Navy labs funded recapitalization and revitalization projects using the laboratory initiated research authority the least. As recently as early 2017, a DOD-commissioned study found that defense labs face substantial infrastructure deficiencies that it has not yet identified funding to address. In fiscal year 2017, Navy labs invested $7.3 million in lab recapitalization projects, compared to $32.9 million and $53.7 million at the Air Force and Army, respectively. Navy lab officials told us that their ability to fund lab recapitalization and revitalization projects using funds available under the laboratory initiated research authority is limited because they have not been provided with clear guidance as to whether and how to use the laboratory initiated research authority within the Capital Investment Program of the Navy Working Capital Fund. Some Navy lab officials stated that they have found ways to use the initiated research authority for certain infrastructure investments. These officials stated that they used authority outside of the Capital Investment Program of the Navy Working Capital Fund, for instance, for projects below applicable thresholds because using the authority within the Program creates a bureaucratic and financial burden for them. For example, officials at two separate warfare centers—Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane Division, and the Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, noted that they did not expend funds in either fiscal year 2016 or fiscal year 2017 for recapitalization and revitalization projects. Both cited the Capital Investment Program as a significant barrier to their desired use of the laboratory initiated research authority. Officials from the Office of Budget, within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Financial Management and Comptroller agreed that, to date, clarifying guidance on the use of the laboratory initiated research authority within the Capital Investment Program has not been issued, effectively limiting the extent to which the labs can use it for infrastructure needs. According to these officials, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Comptroller—in coordination with the Office of Financial Policy and Systems within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Financial Management and Comptroller—is responsible for developing the clarifying guidance their office has sought. This persistent lack of guidance on whether or how Navy labs should use the laboratory initiated research authority within the context of the Capital Investment Program presents an opportunity cost. Namely, the Navy’s labs have missed out on, and continue to miss, opportunities to invest in needed improvements to its aging lab infrastructure. The Army requires its laboratories to apply similar percentages to what is refers to as “Army direct appropriations” and “customer funds.” The Army requires that the percentage fee applied to direct appropriations not vary from the percentage fee applied to customer funds by more than 1 percent. The Army implemented this policy to maximize the laboratory initiated research authority’s effect on its 17 laboratories. However, the Office of the USD(R&E) reported in March 2018 that the policy was having a significant limiting effect on the breadth and scope of activities executed under this authority. Similarly, we found that the policy may, in practice, create a disincentive for Army lab directors to use the authority. In their responses to our survey, Army lab directors, representing key capability areas, acknowledged their concern about the percentage fee they assessed on customer funds affecting their ability to increase or maintain their customer bases. Further, some Army lab directors reported assessing a lower percentage fee on customer funds than allowed, which could help retain customers that might otherwise be driven away with higher assessed fees to carry out activities. As a result, these labs generally are setting a lower percentage fee on their directly appropriated funds, thereby lowering the overall laboratory initiated research funding available to them. Nonetheless, the Army has not assessed its policy to determine whether changes are needed to eliminate these disincentives. Continuing to operate without such an assessment could result in Army labs using the laboratory initiated research authority to fund fewer self-initiated projects—with the downstream effect that fewer new technologies for warfighters are available. The Navy applies a consistent fixed percentage fee of costs across its labs. Within the Navy, senior leadership has set the fixed percentage fee of costs the labs charge on customer funds at 2 percent. A senior Navy science and technology official stated that Navy leadership set a uniform fixed percentage fee to charge to customer activities across the Navy lab enterprise, in part, to ensure the labs were not inadvertently competing against one another for customer funds. For example, without a uniform rate, a Navy warfare center could offer a lower fee to entice a customer to use it rather than another center. The use of a fixed percentage fee facilitates program offices selecting warfare centers on the basis of best available match in capabilities. On the other hand, the Navy’s fixed 2 percentage fee of costs does limit—by half, as compared to the maximum 4 percent allowable—the amount of fees that Navy labs can collect. Consequently, several Navy lab directors told us that they would like to have the ability to increase the fixed percentage fee of costs above the Navy’s 2 percent to provide their labs with additional resources they said they need for innovation-related investments. Among the lab directors that responded to our survey, 30 of 31 replied that their lab had used at least one of the four types of direct hire authorities previously discussed since fiscal year 2014. Officials view direct hire authority as allowing the labs to compete with private industry for qualified applicants. Lab directors reported they generally believe that each type of direct hire is extremely or very useful for fostering innovation and increasing efficiency, as shown in Figure 7. Selected Officials’ Testimony on the Value of Direct Hire Authority: The U.S. Army Engineer Research and Development Center “was able to meet this important goal [of annually hiring more than 160 new researchers] in large part because of its direct hiring authorities, which save time, effort, and costs, and allow the organization to more effectively hire the best and brightest minds available.” – Dr. Jeffrey P. Holland, Past Director, U.S. Army Engineer Research and Development Center, in testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services (Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee), May 3, 2017. “The Air Force’s ability to recruit, retain, and develop the STEM workforce is vital toward building the future Air Force; Congress has been greatly supportive of these efforts…the addition of direct hire for candidates has been extremely useful in hiring qualified scientists and engineers in less than half the time of traditional hiring methods.” – Jeffrey Stanley, Air Force Deputy Assistant Secretary— Science, Technology and Engineering in testimony before the House Committee on Armed Services (Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee), March 14, 2018. Although participation in the laboratory enhancement pilot program is open to the DOD labs—and 19 of the 31 lab directors, or 61 percent, that responded to our survey reported they were participating—to date, only the Navy has formally established a pilot program for its labs. The Army and Air Force have not yet used this relatively new authority. A senior Navy science and technology official told us the Navy took important steps to facilitate the implementation of that service’s pilot program. According to the Navy official: The Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, Test and Evaluation led the effort across the Navy labs, compiling—from each lab’s submission—a single list of proposals to forward to Navy leadership that would apply to all participating Navy labs. The Navy pursued a three-phased approach with its pilot program, with Phase 1 primarily focused on contracting and acquisition policy- related matters. Senior Navy research and development officials perceived these matters as being the easiest from which to obtain buy-in from Navy policy officials and attorneys, as well as Navy leadership. Phase 2 will include proposals related to Information Technology systems for research and development networks, while Phase 3 will most likely address personnel issues. Navy research and development officials deferred proposals— including information technology network enhancements—that might require extensive discussions with policy officials and attorneys stakeholders across the Navy. These proposals were pushed back to allow time for those stakeholders to see how the pilot program was being implemented and executed by the labs. None of the Army and Air Force labs has yet established a laboratory enhancement pilot program. Consistent with Army policy, the Medical Research and Materiel Command and the Space and Missile Defense Command Technical Center submitted proposals; however, they have yet to establish a pilot program. The Army’s Research, Development and Engineering Command, with input from its subordinate labs and engineering centers, developed a list of lab enhancement proposals but, as of September 2018, had yet to formally submit these final proposals to Army leadership for approval. These include initiatives in business operations, contracting, finance, information technology, and personnel management. A senior Army science and technology acknowledged that organizations across the military department have concerns about providing the labs with too much autonomy to use this new authority. Air Force Research Laboratory officials said they previously submitted a list of approximately 30 proposals to the Defense Laboratories Office in September 2017, but ultimately pulled back those requests because of stakeholder concerns within the Air Force. Specifically, officials with the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Science, Technology, and Engineering stated that the Air Force Materiel Command, to which the lab is a subordinate organization, had not seen the proposals before they were submitted. In addition, these officials identified concerns about how various stakeholders throughout the Air Force—such as those from financial management and personnel—would react to these proposals. These proposals could potentially sidestep the stakeholders’ oversight function of related lab activities. A senior Air Force Research Laboratory official stated that the lab re-submitted its proposals to the Air Force Materiel Command and that Air Force leadership was still reviewing them at the time of this report. Twenty-six of 31 labs directors—84 percent—reported having used the $10,000 micro-purchase threshold authority granted by Congress in 2016. However, we found that contracting and small business management officials’ concerns with this authority have created implementation challenges at some defense labs. For instance, a senior Navy official indicated that multiple stakeholders from across the Navy—including its Office of Small Business Programs—raised concerns about the authority’s potential impact on small businesses as micro-purchasing allows defense labs to bypass small business set asides. Several labs reported similar stakeholder concerns that prevented implementation of the micro-purchase threshold increase. At the same time, however, lab officials we interviewed expressed the view that the increased threshold will be beneficial, consistent with their opinions about the laboratory enhancement pilot program. For example, officials at the Naval Research Laboratory stated that increasing the threshold to $10,000 allows their scientists and engineers to directly purchase necessary equipment and materials through simplified procedures. They identified examples of projects that had been delayed by as much as several months because scientists and engineers used other than simplified acquisition procedures to purchase a relatively inexpensive piece of equipment, such as a specialized microscope, because the cost was above the previous threshold of $3,500. Similarly, the Army’s Armament Research, Development and Engineering Center reported that the micro-purchase threshold increase enables the lab to use simplified acquisition procedures for more items. As a result, they noted that the new authority increases efficiency by reducing contracting time and cost for those additional items. The Navy’s Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center Atlantic similarly reported that requirements, which were previously procured using other than simplified acquisition procedures, took up to 60 to 90 days to procure, while it took as little as 3 to 4 days under this new authority, which enabled its scientists and engineers to purchase materials needed for critical, time sensitive projects. However, lab officials acknowledged that the $10,000 micro-purchase threshold authority—like the laboratory enhancement pilot program—is too new to fully understand how it will increase efficiency and foster innovation over the long term. DOD sponsors several research centers, which are governed through noncompetitive agreements, including contracts. These centers provide the department with access to scientific experts employed by universities and other non-profit organizations. Scientists employed by these external to DOD research centers—specifically, three lab FFRDCs and 13 UARCs—execute DOD-funded science and technology development projects in emerging technical areas. DOD staff oversee these centers using routine oversight of funded research tasks and comprehensive reviews, which help DOD determine whether the centers’ funding should continue. DOD and research center officials told us that their ability to authorize work at the FFRDCs that DOD sponsors is limited by legislative restrictions on the staffing levels at these centers, as well as by infrastructure modernization challenges they face. DOD sponsors three research and development FFRDC labs that were established under noncompetitive procedures. Two of the three lab FFRDCs are operated by universities and one is operated by a nonprofit company. DOD also has contracts with 13 UARCs that fulfill a similar scientific role as the lab FFRDCs, while also differing from them in other respects. These differences are described in more detail in table 1. DOD’s contractor-operated research centers received about $1.3 billion annually in DOD funding in fiscal year 2016 and fiscal year 2017, according to DOD data. The two largest research and development FFRDCs, the Lincoln Laboratory and the Software Engineering Institute, received about 67 percent of total research center funding from DOD in 2017. UARCs received an average of $27 million in DOD funding, which was a 15 percent decrease from 2016. Research centers may also receive work and funding from other federal departments and private companies after obtaining DOD sponsor approval. Appendix II provides an overview of DOD FFRDC and UARC funding in fiscal years 2016 and 2017. DOD Sponsorship and Contract Awards: We reported in 2014 that FFRDCs in the federal government are defined through the sponsoring agreement between the agency and the contractor retained to operate the FFRDC. A written agreement of sponsorship between the government and the FFRDC must be prepared when the FFRDC is established, which may be included in a contract between the government and the FFRDC, or in another legal instrument under which an FFRDC accomplishes effort, or it may be in a separate written agreement. Historically, DOD sponsors retain contractors for many years or decades as FFRDC operators. We found that research centers undertake DOD-sponsored projects and, in some limited instances, scientific projects initiated by centers that are overseen by DOD staff. Individual sponsors enter into noncompetitive contracts with FFRDCs and UARCs. DOD uses noncompetitive contracts to establish or maintain an essential engineering, research, or development capability to be provided by an educational or other nonprofit institution or a federally funded research and development center. Scientific Project Funding: We found that project sponsors provide funding to existing contracts. For example, the government issues orders for requirements under Lincoln Laboratory’s indefinite delivery indefinite quantity base contract as funding sponsors approve new projects. Individual project sponsors, along with the primary sponsor, oversee how project funds are spent by the centers. Project sponsors decide whether they will continue to work with these entities based on perceived performance success. This effectively provides an incentive for FFRDCs and UARCS to perform successfully. This work and review cycle is described in Figure 9 below. FFRDCs and UARCs also partner with DOD government-operated labs to plan and execute technology development projects. For example, according to Navy officials, Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division collaborated with Navy-sponsored UARCs, such as Penn State’s Applied Research Laboratory, to help develop Navy submarine propeller and propulsion designs. Self-initiated Projects: Research center officials said that DOD provides some research centers with limited funds to self-initiate innovative projects. This funding helps the centers ensure that development projects are not limited to just satisfying near-term DOD requirements. Instead, future generations of DOD technologies can be funded. For example, officials at Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory proactively conducted work on advanced naval defense technologies in response to similar technology development in adversary countries. Although Navy sponsors did not fund this initial work, they subsequently provided funding in this area after Hopkins’ research identified a risk reduction strategy for the Navy, according to the Johns Hopkins officials. This allowed the UARC to move relatively quickly on a new science and technology project idea. DOD uses 13 UARCs and three lab FFRDCs to obtain direct access to scientific expertise in emerging technical areas, supplementing research conducted at DOD’s government-owned and operated labs. These research centers provide DOD with additional scientific capabilities and the ability to expand quickly into new technical fields. Hiring Scientific Personnel: Although FFRDCs are largely federally funded, they are generally operated, managed, and administered by either a university or consortium of universities, other not-for-profit or nonprofit organization, or an industrial firm, as an autonomous organization or as an identifiable separate operating unit of a parent organization. The contractor operating the FFRDC exercises primary control over its FFRDC’s business concerns, such as personnel policies and compensation. DOD-funded research centers have flexibility in hiring scientists that leverage a parent institution’s expertise in emerging scientific fields. For example, leadership officials at the Army Institute for Soldier Nanotechnologies UARC at MIT and the Software Engineering Institute FFRDC at Carnegie-Melon University noted that projects they have conducted for DOD have benefitted from university experts in fields such as dark matter physics and artificial intelligence. Personnel Compensation: Research center officials we spoke with noted that their workforce policies permit them to flexibly hire, fire, and compensate staff as needed. Although employee salaries are established separately from the government schedule, they are approved by the government. Further, officials noted that university centers typically offer salaries in line with the labor market, but do not attempt to compete on a salary basis with relatively high, unaffordable private sector company salaries. Instead, they compete on the basis of other factors, such as offering scientists the opportunity to work for a prestigious university conducting science and technology research. Research Center Infrastructure: As with personnel matters, research centers have discretion to manage infrastructure in accordance with the policies and procedures of their parent institutions. While one center, Lincoln Laboratory, is located on government property, others primarily reside on property owned or leased by their parent institutions. According to agency officials, DOD contributes funding for the use and repair of these facilities through their contracts with research centers. Officials noted that Lincoln Laboratory uses military construction funding to pay for new buildings as it is located on government property. Trusted Advisor Role: FFRDCs and UARCs function as trusted advisors for the government and operate in the public interest with objectivity and independence. FFRDCs are independent, private-sector, non-profit organization units required to be free from personal or organizational conflicts of interest, as the FFRDCs answer to the government customer. As a result, DOD’s lab FFRDCs perform tasks that are closely associated with the performance of inherently governmental functions and have access to sensitive and proprietary data. Research center officials noted challenges limiting their work providing scientific expertise to DOD. FFRDCs are also limited in executing infrastructure investments. Limitation on Available Work Hours: DOD FFRDCs are limited by an annual ceiling set by Congress on the amount of staff years of technical effort (STE) that may be funded for defense FFRDCs. We previously found in October 2008 these limits were imposed in response to concerns that DOD was inefficiently using its FFRDCs. We found that the STE workload limitation aimed to ensure that FFRDC work was appropriate and limited resources were being used for DOD’s highest priorities. As a result, Software Engineering Institute officials said they decline many DOD programs’ requests for assistance due to the annual work hour limitation. Further, officials at the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Studies and FFRDC Management Office reported that this limit significantly constrains the use of DOD’s FFRDCs and that DOD customer demand for their services is significantly greater than the annual STE limit. OSD officials indicated that FFRDC related work must be deferred to later years when these limits are reached, since there are no other legally compliant alternatives capable of fulfilling these requirements. Infrastructure: FFRDC officials we interviewed identified infrastructure challenges—including aging facilities and equipment—as hindering their research and development efforts. For example, many buildings at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Lincoln Laboratory are over 60 years old; MIT considers over half of them to be in substandard condition. According to an MIT official, these facilities, located on government property, were not structurally designed for modern research and have relatively poor vibration isolation, resulting in inefficient workarounds or work that could not be performed. Officials from the Defense Laboratories Office noted that the MIT Lincoln Laboratory is unique among DOD’s FFRDCs in that it is operated on government- owned property. A 2013 study, conducted on behalf of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, found that lab infrastructure project funding proposals must compete with hospitals, barracks, runways, and roads and, therefore, tend to be lower on the priority list for military construction funding. A 2017 Defense Science Board report and DOD officials we spoke with indicated this continues to be true. While contract research centers have significant flexibility to execute infrastructure work, they are still affected by limited availability of military construction funding. Officials at another center noted that in some instances, DOD sponsors have been unable or slow to provide required secure facilities and equipment within needed time frames. Delays of this nature can affect the research centers’ ability to deliver the technologies or related services needed by DOD. The Department of Energy (Energy) primarily relies on contractor- operated FFRDCs to operate its labs, while the majority of NASA labs and centers are government-operated. Energy’s national labs form the core of the agency’s scientific work and mission. This is in contrast to DOD-funded labs, which constitute a relatively small aspect of DOD’s overall mission. We have previously found that Energy’s labs can use funding for minor infrastructure improvements. NASA centers can also approve and fund certain facility projects, in accordance with NASA policies, and they have encountered significant challenges with aging infrastructure. Also, in some cases, energy and space research centers have significant challenges with hiring replacement staff and competing with private sector employers for staff. Energy’s labs can hire scientific personnel with the flexibility of private companies, while NASA centers were previously provided hiring flexibilities by Congress in 2004 to facilitate staff hiring. While Energy and NASA’s research entities follow their specific governance models, there are broad characteristics common across these agencies as well as DOD. Table 2 illustrates that while research centers are largely government-owned, the government is not always the operator. As we have reported, Department of Energy national labs are primarily operated by for-profit, non-profit and university FFRDC contractors using management and operating contracts, which are competed on a limited basis. Energy’s funding sponsors and headquarters officials are required to reevaluate FFRDC performance in increments not to exceed 5 years by federal acquisition regulations, which inform future decisions to renew the agreement. In 1990, we designated Energy’s contract management—including both contract administration and project management—a high-risk area because of Energy’s inadequate management and oversight of contractors, leaving the department vulnerable to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. In 2009, we subsequently narrowed the focus of Energy’s high-risk designation to the National Nuclear Security Administration and Office of Environmental Management, which together oversee four national labs. Further, in our 2017 High Risk report, we found that these two agencies had made progress in addressing our contract management concerns, but we identified continued problems with the agencies having sufficient capacity to mitigate contract and project management risks. Also, we found that they had demonstrated little progress in addressing contract management challenges, particularly in the area of financial management. The Department of Energy uses performance-based management and operating contracts, which have been subject to limited competition, with universities, non-profit companies and for-profit companies to operate the national labs on government-owned property. These contractor-operated FFRDCs provide the vast majority of Energy’s science and technology capacity, rather than supplementing the work of government-operated labs like DOD’s FFRDCs. Energy has depended on the expertise of private organizations to execute its science and technology work since the Manhattan Project produced the first atomic bomb during World War II. The Spallation Neutron Source is an experimental research facility at Oak Ridge National Laboratory—a government-owned contractor-operated laboratory. The Spallation Neutron Source includes the world’s most powerful pulsed-neutron sources and provides information about the structure and properties of materials that cannot be obtained by other means. The Spallation Neutron Source is a user facility whereby researchers from universities, national laboratories, and industry submit proposals, which are peer- reviewed and must compete for time at the user facility. The primary focus of each lab varies based on its expertise and facilities. Energy largely oversees its lab contractors through its headquarters program offices, which include the National Nuclear Security Administration, Office of Science, the Office of Fossil Energy, as well as co-located government field offices. Office of Science-sponsored labs primarily support scientific research for energy and physical sciences, while the National Nuclear Security Administration-sponsored (NNSA) labs primarily focus on nuclear weapons and related science and technologies. Energy also oversees its lab contractors’ activities through on-site Energy oversight offices that work alongside lab management at each FFRDC. Some labs specialize in earlier-phase science, while other labs work on later-phase nuclear weapons technologies in addition to earlier-phase science. As Figure 10 shows, these labs are spread across the United States. Energy has only one government-operated and government-owned lab, the National Energy Technology Laboratory. Key differences between Energy’s contractor-operated and government-operated governance models are described in table 3. Energy’s FFRDCs use their own personnel systems, which Energy officials stated provide more flexibility for hiring and retaining qualified staff. Management within these FFRDCs can move staff in or out of scientific areas more quickly than government labs can, thereby providing greater agility to meet Energy’s needs in emerging science areas. For example, Energy’s lab oversight staff at Oak Ridge National Laboratory told us that use of lab contractors’ human resources management systems allows for workforce flexibilities to meet Energy’s needs. While these contractors have leeway in managing their human resources systems, Energy’s headquarters maintains oversight—through its contracting officers—over employee compensation. Energy’s FFRDC contractors manage and operate nearly all of the department’s government-owned national lab facilities—including day-to- day management of government-controlled facilities and real property. Lab operators used funding to complete minor construction projects, which cost $10 million or less. This funding comes from a percentage of science and technology projects’ funding, requires local Energy oversight office approval, and has streamlined project management requirements. In contrast, major infrastructure upgrades are funded through relatively long and complex line-item funding processes, and projects over $50 million are subject to more rigorous project management requirements. Energy’s labs use a small portion of their funding to initiate discretionary projects for science and technologies that will benefit sponsors in the long-term by maintaining the scientific and technical vitality of the laboratories. To maintain and enhance lab expertise, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 authorized Energy’s contractor-operated labs receiving funding for national security programs to use a percentage of lab funds to perform lab-directed R&D of a creative and innovative nature. The actual percentages allowed to be used for lab-directed R&D are subject to Energy’s approval. Energy’s entities sponsor most national lab projects based on their needs and lab expertise. Typically, earlier foundational science projects are funded through a process whereby funding sponsors issue calls for proposals to Energy’s national labs. Interested scientific teams at labs provide proposals to conduct these projects for sponsor consideration. Sponsors then assess proposals for scientific merit and decide which teams receive funding to execute their projects. NNSA provides funding for later-phase nuclear technology development projects to its labs after agreement is made regarding objectives and deliverables for specific projects, according to Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory officials. Despite their flexibilities with regard to hiring and infrastructure decisions compared to government operated labs, Energy’s lab leadership and government oversight officials noted human resource and facilities related challenges, such as: Sufficiently compensating staff located in high-cost of living areas. For example, the labor market of the San Francisco area, where several Department of Energy national labs are located, is highly competitive for employers. Commercial firms offer salaries and compensation that typically exceed those of government-funded, contractor-operated labs, although Energy’s contractors have more pay flexibility than is allowed for Energy’s government employees. Obtaining government clearances in a timely manner. Energy’s NNSA oversight officials and lab management staff, in particular, cited this challenge, which they stated has led to a backlog of people needing clearances. Government hiring freeze constraining overall hiring. Officials at Energy’s government-operated National Energy Technology Laboratory reported that as a result of a government hiring freeze, the lab has increasingly hired private contractor staff to the point that more than half of the total lab staff is now comprised of contractor employees. Major infrastructure challenges at Energy labs. Energy reported in July 2018 that over half of all national lab buildings are in either substandard or inadequate condition. The Energy Inspector General also identified infrastructure modernization as one of Energy’s top management challenges. This finding followed a mandated commission’s report in 2015 that facilities and infrastructure across Energy’s national lab network were hampered by high levels of deferred maintenance and excess facilities. The majority of NASA’s science and technology facilities are operated within the governance framework of government-operated research centers, similarly to most DOD labs. While government-operated, they have been granted additional legislative flexibilities for hiring employees beyond those normally available to government entities. NASA locates its science and technology staff at four government- operated research centers, one contractor-operated FFRDC, and at five NASA centers assisting space and space flight development. These centers and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory—NASA’s sole sponsored FFRDC—execute NASA’s research missions including technology development in exploration and aeronautics. The differences between these two governance approaches are described in Table 4. NASA also works with Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Lab, a UARC, to develop major space flight missions. The NASA Glenn Research Center—a government- operated laboratory—is currently developing solar electric propulsion technologies intended to allow manned and unmanned spacecraft to be propelled far beyond earth orbit using solar power. This project is developing large, flexible, radiation-resistant solar arrays that can be unfurled to capture solar energy powering fuel-efficient electrostatic thrusters. Scientists expect a system-level flight test within the next decade to demonstrate key technologies supporting NASA’s Lunar Orbital Platform-Gateway project, a platform to mature necessary short- and long-duration deep space exploration capabilities. Headquarters, including funding sponsors providing oversight for their individual projects. Title 51, Chapters 201 and 203 of U.S. Code and technology efforts with DOD and other organizations, including use of NASA lab and test facilities. Operated by university contractor having sole source contract. Not permitted to compete against industry, except for operation of an FFRDC. property (originally part of DOD). 5-year contract renewable to 10 years total. Headquarters, including funding sponsors providing oversight for their individual projects. Title 51, Chapters 201 and 203 of U.S. Code; 10 U.S.C. § 2304 (c) (3)(B) ; Federal Acquisition Regulation § 35.017 based NASA oversight staff. sponsors seeking FFRDC assistance with NASA approval. “Lab” as used in this context refers to science and technology organizations equivalent to NASA Research Centers, DOD UARCs and FFRDCs. Mission leadership officials at NASA Headquarters—including the Associate Administrators for Aeronautics Research, Human Exploration, Science and Space Technology—oversee NASA’s research centers as well as the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. These officials are responsible for technology programs providing funds to research centers and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory to support their specific mission areas. NASA’s science and technology project portfolios are based on the requirements and priorities established by NASA’s leaders in collaboration with key stakeholders in academia and industry among others. In planning their science and technology work, NASA’s Glenn Research Center officials noted that NASA research center directors consider the capabilities and resources—including staff and facilities—of other research centers to minimize redundant work. NASA depends on a highly skilled civil servant and contractor workforce to plan and execute its missions. Congress provided NASA with additional human resource authorities beyond those otherwise allowed for federal government personnel through the NASA Flexibility Act of 2004. We found in September 2008 that NASA sought this flexibility to ensure that it could hire and retain the workforce it desired. This law consisted of multiple provisions to address a range of human capital challenges and to strengthen all levels of the workforce. The provisions included incentives—including compensation—to allow NASA to compete successfully in the labor market with the private sector and reshape its workforce more effectively to support the Agency’s mission. NASA also employs a significant contractor workforce across its different centers. Glenn Research Center officials we interviewed stated their portfolio of science and technology projects—and funding—mostly aligns with NASA’s top requirements and priorities. They, along with NASA sponsors, create technology roadmaps and investment plans to determine their future projects. NASA policy requires that NASA’s scientific teams offer proposals for potential research and science and technology projects. This is similar in some ways to how many DOD and Energy centers must find sponsors willing to fund specific technology development projects, rather than receiving technology development funding for a given year. These proposals are reviewed by peer review teams, who identify for selecting officials those proposals they believe have the most scientific merit. Ames Research Center officials said they believe this process can foster innovation, encourage employees to keep skills honed, and mitigate complacency. Glenn Research Center officials said that while most of the work they conduct is for sponsored applied research or advanced technology development, about 2 percent of their science and technology budget is spent on early-stage scientific innovation. Recommended projects of this nature proposed by the research center are typically approved by headquarters officials, according to these Glenn officials. NASA provides technical grants for basic research and applied science to university scientists nationwide on a competitive basis, and also funds similar research done internally at research centers. As with DOD and Energy’s research centers, NASA officials have identified some key operating challenges, including: Aging infrastructure and facilities. The NASA Inspector General listed infrastructure area as one of the top five management and performance challenges facing NASA. Further, the Inspector General identified deficiencies with facilities planning and reported that about 80 percent of facilities at three of four NASA research centers are over 50 years old, while about half of the facilities at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory and the fourth research center are that old. Infrastructure projects and upgrades of $1 million or less are undertaken by research center management instead of at the NASA headquarters level. Construction above this threshold has significantly more requirements and is approved by NASA headquarters. Glenn Research Center officials indicated it is difficult to obtain funding for projects that exceed the minor infrastructure threshold, in part, due competition with major construction of facilities proposals from across the agency for limited funds. As a result, they put most of their efforts into sustaining existing infrastructure. Workforce shortages in key technical areas. As we found in May 2018, NASA has experienced workforce challenges on several major projects such as the Mars 2020 and Europa Clipper projects. Also, over 40 percent of NASA’s workforce is either eligible to retire now or will be eligible in the next 5 years. NASA headquarters officials noted that NASA’s workforce is aging because NASA has a low attrition rate—about 4 percent annually—and high numbers of staff stay several years beyond retirement. Further, in 2017, the NASA Inspector General found gaps in NASA’s workforce planning for specific capability areas and how workforce plans would meet future needs, and recommended that NASA establish standardized guidance defining the data and analyses for these planning efforts. NASA concurred with and identified its plan to implement this recommendation. However, NASA has not implemented this recommendation, according to the NASA Inspector General’s latest semiannual report to Congress. Congress provided DOD lab directors with key authorities to foster targeted, timely investments in the most pressing technology areas. Lab directors have used these authorities—such as laboratory initiated research and direct hire authorities—to varying degrees, but more needs to be done to facilitate innovation and efficiency. Specifically, service specific obstacles in the Air Force, Navy, and Army impede lab directors from capitalizing on laboratory initiated research authority to a greater extent. Service leadership can take actions to better understand and potentially remove barriers to more fully use laboratory initiated research tools. We are making the following three recommendations to DOD: The Secretary of the Air Force should assess the potential costs and benefits of implementing accounting system improvements that would allow the Air Force Research Laboratory to charge customers a fixed percentage fee on provided science and technology activities to the extent allowed under the laboratory initiated research authority. (Recommendation 1) The Secretary of the Navy should clarify whether and how to use the laboratory initiated research authority within the Capital Investment Program. (Recommendation 2) The Secretary of the Army should assess existing Army policy for laboratory initiated research authority and determine whether to implement changes to eliminate disincentives for lab usage of the authority. (Recommendation 3) We provided a draft of this report to DOD, Energy, and NASA for review and comment. Energy and NASA did not provide any comments on the draft report. In DOD’s written comments, reproduced in appendix III, DOD concurred with our three recommendations. Further, in its response to our third recommendation, DOD stated that the Army plans to initiate a study by January 2, 2019, regarding its use of the laboratory initiated research authority. According to DOD, the Army’s study will identify potential opportunities for policy improvements. We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees and offices; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; the Secretary of Energy; and the NASA Administrator. In addition, the report will be made available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please contact me at (202) 512-4841. Contact points for our offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Staff members making key contributions to the report are listed in appendix IV. This report examines (1) how the Department of Defense (DOD) labs have used selected legislative authorities to foster innovation and efficiency and identify what barriers impede their use; (2) identifies and describes governance models used by selected DOD-sponsored federally funded research centers and university affiliated research centers; and (3) identifies and describes governance models used non-defense labs, specifically at the Department of Energy (Energy) and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). To address the first objective, we selected four specific authorities for our review based on previous work identifying science and technology best practices and expedited lab hiring: Laboratory Initiated Research Authority. The authority provided in Section 219 of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, as implemented, provides lab directors with flexibility to fund projects in four allowable categories: basic and applied research; technology transition; workforce development; and revitalization, recapitalization, or repair or minor military construction of lab infrastructure. Laboratory Enhancement Pilot Program. Section 233 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 established a pilot program for lab directors to propose alternative and innovative methods that might lead to more effectively managing and operating labs and authorized lab directors to waive any regulation, restriction, requirement, guidance, policy, procedure, or departmental instruction that would affect implementation of these methods unless such implementation would be prohibited by a provision of an existing statute or common law. Direct Hire Authority. Four types of direct hire authorities authorized by Congress since 2008 are intended to provide a streamlined and accelerated hiring process to allow the labs to successfully compete with private industry and academia for high-quality scientific, engineering, and technician talent. Micro-purchase Authority. The Federal Acquisition Regulation states a preference for government agencies, to purchase and pay for micro-purchases of supplies or services using the government-wide commercial purchase card up to and at the micro-purchase threshold, but micro-purchases may be conducted using any of the simplified acquisition methods. While the FAR micro-purchase threshold was generally $3,500 at the time of our review, Congress increased this threshold to $10,000 for activities of DOD science and technology reinvention laboratories in Section 217 the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017. Although Congress has provided additional legislative authorities to defense lab directors to address hiring, infrastructure, and technology transition challenges, the authorities that we covered in our review are the ones that our prior and current work have shown are currently, or have the potential to be, the most critical for supporting science and technology reinvention laboratories’ innovation mission within DOD labs. DOD lab leaders use these authorities to flexibly fund projects intended to facilitate research and development; propose alternative and innovative methods that might lead to more effective lab management; directly hire personnel at DOD labs including students currently enrolled in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) programs; and expand critical science and technology purchases using simplified acquisition methods. To identify the extent to which DOD laboratories have used these authorities as well as to identify what potential barriers existed to using these authorities, we administered a survey to 44 STRL directors (or their equivalent) to collect information on the use of these specific authorities, their perceptions about the effectiveness of those authorities, and their perceptions about any barriers to using these authorities. The members of the population surveyed were the 44 defense laboratories defined as science and technology reinvention laboratories. For the purposes of our review, we defined laboratories as inclusive of Air Force technical directorates (10), Army warfare centers (17), and Navy warfare centers (17). We emailed questionnaires to the laboratories beginning in late March 2018, and survey data collection ended in early May 2018, with 31 labs returning completed questionnaires, for an overall response rate of 71 percent at the laboratory level. We took steps to minimize the potential errors that the practical difficulties of conducting any survey may introduce. Nonresponse error can result when a survey fails to capture information from all population members selected into a survey sample. Of the 13 questionnaires not returned, 4 were Army warfare centers, and 9 were Air Force research directorates. Throughout the data collection period, we made multiple follow-up attempts by email and phone to those labs not yet responding. The Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) provided a single survey response for the entire laboratory enterprise. Not all returned questionnaires may have answers to every question applicable to a respondent. However, this question-level nonresponse did not exceed one for any of the questions applicable to all 31 labs. Because we selected the entire population of laboratories for our survey, our estimates are not subject to sampling error. We developed our list of the 44 labs in our population in consultation with DOD, and are confident that none were left out, so our or survey has no known sources of coverage error. We conducted pretests of the draft questionnaire with 3 laboratories in the population and made revisions to reduce the possibility of measurement error from differences in how questions were interpreted and the sources of information available to respondents. After reviewing the answers received, we also followed up as necessary with respondents to clarify apparent inconsistencies or other possible misreports, and made changes to responses where corrections were needed. A second, independent analyst checked the accuracy of all computer analyses to minimize the likelihood of errors in data processing. To obtain additional information on this objective, we reviewed relevant legislation which established or amended these authorities and reviewed applicable DOD and service policy documentation. Further, we collected military service related information on the usage of two authorities, such as: Spending data on the use of the laboratory initiated research authority. We gathered this information from DOD-mandated reports to Congress on the use of this authority and military service officials. We determined these data to be reliable based on reviews of agency documentation collected and interviews with agency officials. Data on the usage of direct hire authorities by the service laboratories. We collected direct hire data from each of the military services including the number of direct hire authority candidates hired as well as the number of direct hire positions the laboratories were authorized to hire. We determined these data to be reliable based on reviews of agency documentation collected and interviews with agency officials. We also used select findings from our May 2018 report where we evaluated DOD’s use of hiring authorities, including direct hire authority. More information about the scope and methodology of our prior work can be found in that report. In addition, we also collected information on military service proposals to utilize the laboratory enhancement pilot program authority. To obtain further information on department- and service-level involvement in and perspectives of defense laboratory authorities and challenges, we interviewed officials responsible for the management, execution, and oversight of DOD’s science and technology enterprise, including military service labs. At the Office of the Secretary of Defense and military department headquarters level, those responsible for the management and oversight of science and technology activities, we met with officials from the: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and DOD Defense Laboratories Office; Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research and Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Science, Technology, and Engineering; Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Financial Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation; and Office of the Budget, within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Financial Management and Comptroller We also met with military department lab officials responsible for the management and execution of science and technology activities from the: Army Research, Development and Engineering Command; Army Research Laboratory; Army Aviation and Missile Research, Development, and Engineering Air Force Research Laboratory; Naval Research Laboratory; Naval Surface Warfare Center, Headquarters; and Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division To identify and describe governance models used by selected DOD- sponsored federally funded research centers (FFRDCs) and university affiliated research centers (UARCs), we focused our review on the 3 FFRDCs designated as research and development labs as well as all 13 UARCS sponsored by DOD entities. We reviewed appropriate sections of the FAR language related to FFRDCs and UARCs, DOD guidance for working with FFRDCs and UARCs, relevant contracts, and performance assessments. Further, we met with officials from the office of the Deputy Director, OSD Studies and Federally Funded Research & Development Centers Management and Office to discuss overall FFRDC and UARC management, policies, and challenges facing FFRDCs and UARCs. We interviewed officials at selected research and development FFRDCs and UARCS to discuss their experience conducting DOD research and interactions with their customers, such as defense program executive offices. We met with officials at the two major research and development lab FFRDCs—The Lincoln Laboratory at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and the Software Engineering Institute at Carnegie Mellon University. We also selected a university affiliated research center sponsored by the Army and Navy: The Applied Physics Laboratory at Johns Hopkins University and the Institute for Soldier Nanotechnologies also at the MIT. To identify and describe governance models by non-defense labs, we selected Energy and NASA to focus our efforts. We identified 17 Energy national labs and 4 NASA research centers conducting basic and applied research similar to DOD labs. These agencies, along with DOD, represent 3 of the top 4 agencies in terms of average federal research and development spending from fiscal years 2015 to 2017. In our August 2016 GAO Technology Readiness Assessment Guide, we drew heavily from DOD, NASA, and Energy for best practices, terminology, and examples. This contributed to our decision to focus on Energy and NASA’s research entities in this laboratory governance review. We did not include the fourth agency—the National Institutes of Health—in our review because it is not as similar to DOD. We also reviewed relevant Energy and NASA guidance as well as relevant FAR sections. At Energy, we met with officials from the National Nuclear Security Administration which is semi-autonomous entity within Energy responsible for managing the nation’s nuclear weapons and nuclear security. We also met with Officials from the Office of Science, a program office responsible for supporting energy related fundamental science and research. To gain further insights on operating structures, funding arrangements, and their overall experience we met with lab leadership at selected Energy labs which were chosen based on initial discussions with agency officials and our review of past GAO work: Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and National Energy Technology Laboratory (the sole Energy government owned and operated laboratory) We also met with leadership from Battelle Memorial Institute, which is the sole or joint contract manager for five Energy national labs including Oak Ridge National Laboratory. In addition, Battelle is an integrated subcontractor at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. At NASA, we met with officials with NASA’s Science Mission Directorate and Mission Support Directorate to discuss overall research center management and operations. We also leveraged ongoing and recently completed work at GAO to gain additional insight on NASA’s operations such as human capital management. Almost all of NASA’s research, space, and space flight centers conduct research and development activities. However, we focused our review on four research centers where NASA primarily conducts its aeronautics research, which has substantial overlap with DOD activities. To gain additional insight into the experience of lab leaders at NASA research centers, we met with officials at NASA’s Glenn Research Center and Ames Research Center. In addition, we also met with officials at the NASA Jet Propulsion Center, which is the only NASA-sponsored FFRDC. We conducted this performance audit from July 2017 to December 2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) In addition to the contact named above, Christopher R. Durbin (Assistant Director); Charlie Shivers, III (Analyst-in-Charge); Emily Bond; Lorraine Ettaro; Carl Ramirez; Sylvia Schatz; Sean Seales; Brian Smith; and Robin Wilson made significant contributions to this report.	[ "Congress created several authorities that provide DOD research labs with ways to increase efficiency and foster innovation. Senate report 114-255 contained a provision for GAO to study governance models used by federal labs. This report evaluates DOD labs' use of authorities to foster innovation and efficiency. GAO selected four authorities that recent work on best practices for science and technology management and expedited defense lab hiring have shown to be the most crucial for supporting innovation; administered a survey to 44 lab directors to gain insight into their use of the authorities; interviewed key lab officials and contractors; and reviewed relevant policies and guidance. Congress has provided the Department of Defense's (DOD) research labs with several authorities to enhance management and operations. Four authorities that GAO examined provide lab directors with greater ability to make their own decisions regarding the funding of projects, hiring, lab management, and purchasing of equipment or services. 1. Laboratory initiated research authority. This authority, as implemented, provides labs with a means to fund new science and technology projects that they consider a priority. Labs may use a percentage of all funds available to the lab and are permitted to charge customers of the lab a percentage fee of the costs for activities performed by the lab for the customer. 2. Direct hire authority. This authority enables labs to compete with private industry for high-quality talent. For example, it provides for streamlined hiring of applicants with relevant advanced degrees, or students enrolled in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics programs. 3. Laboratory enhancement pilot program authority. This authority generally allows lab directors to propose alternative methods that might lead to more effective lab management, and waive certain policies or procedures that might affect implementation of these methods. 4. Micro-purchase authority. This authority raises the threshold for small purchases for DOD research lab activities from $3,500 to $10,000 to facilitate acquisitions. While labs have used these authorities, their use has sometimes been limited, particularly with the laboratory initiated research authority. DOD lab directors at Air Force, Navy, and Army cited several obstacles that impede wider use of that authority, specifically: Air Force: Financial management officials at the Air Force stated that the service's accounting system does not currently have an automated capability to transfer the allowable percentage fee of costs to a central account at the Air Force Research Laboratory. This lack of capability, officials noted, creates a significant administrative burden related to charging these fees. Navy: In fiscal year 2017, Navy labs invested $7.3 million in lab infrastructure projects, compared to $32.9 million and $53.7 million at the Air Force and Army, respectively. Navy lab officials told us that they were restricted in their use of infrastructure funds available under the laboratory initiated research authority due to a lack of clear guidance as to whether and how to use this authority within the Capital Investment Program of the Navy Working Capital Fund. Army: The Army requires its labs to use a similar percentage of funds from two sources: (1) what it refers to as directly appropriated funds and (2) funds labs charge for customer activities. Some Army lab directors reported assessing a lower rate on customer funds than allowed so as not to drive customers away. The labs then generally charge a lower than desired rate on their directly appropriated funds, which further constrains the total funding available to them. GAO is making three recommendations to enhance DOD's use of laboratory initiated research authority, including that the Air Force assess potential accounting system improvements, the Navy clarify how labs can use the authority for infrastructure improvements, and the Army assess its policy to determine whether changes are needed to remove disincentives for labs to use the authority. DOD concurred with the recommendations." ]	11,171	gov_report	en	null	8715d32b4155d9bfe5ec4f00d13dbe44c5c57a75b58ce2dc
Federal agencies provide a range of assistance to individual survivors; state, territorial, and local governments; and nongovernmental entities after major disasters, including natural disasters and terrorist attacks. Types of aid can include, but are not limited to, operational, logistical, and technical support; financial assistance through grants, loans, and loan guarantees; and the provision of federally owned equipment and facilities. Many, but not all, programs are available after the President issues a major disaster declaration pursuant to the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act) authority. More limited aid is available under a Stafford Act emergency declaration, a declaration issued by a department or agency head, or on an as needed basis. This report only identifies programs frequently used to provide financial assistance in the disaster response and recovery process. It provides brief descriptive information to help congressional offices determine which programs merit further consideration in the planning, organization, or execution of the disaster response and recovery process. Most of the programs listed here are authorized as assistance programs and are listed at the General Services Administration (GSA) website beta.SAM.gov. The list does not include operational or technical assistance that some agencies provide in emergency or disaster situations. It is also not inclusive of all forms of financial disaster assistance that may be available to every jurisdiction in every circumstance, as unique factors often trigger unique forms of assistance. Congress may, and frequently has, authorized specific forms of financial assistance on a limited basis following particular disasters. Programs discussed in this report satisfy one or more of the following criteria: Congress expressly designated the program to provide financial assistance for disaster relief or recovery. The program is applicable to most disaster situations, even if not specifically authorized for that purpose. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and other federal agencies have frequently used the program to provide financial assistance. The program is potentially useful for addressing short-term and long-term recovery needs (e.g., assistance with processing survivor benefits or repair of public facilities). Most of the programs listed in this report are specifically authorized for use during situations occurring because of a disaster. General assistance programs that may apply to disaster situations are described at the end of the report (see " General Assistance Programs "). As Congress and the Administration respond to domestic needs arising from major disasters, some conditions of these programs may be changed. For the most up-to-date information on a particular program, please contact the CRS analyst or department or agency program officers listed in the report. The Individuals and Households Program (IHP) is the primary vehicle for FEMA assistance to individuals and households after the President issues an emergency or major disaster declaration, when authorized. It is intended to meet basic needs and support recovery efforts, but it cannot compensate disaster survivors for all losses. Congress appropriates money for the IHP (and most other aid authorized by the Stafford Act) to the Disaster Relief Fund. IHP assistance is available in the form of financial and direct assistance to eligible individuals and households who, as a result of a disaster, have uninsured or under-insured necessary expenses and serious needs that cannot be met through other means or forms of assistance. Program funds have a wide range of eligible uses, including different forms of temporary housing assistance; housing repairs; housing replacement; and permanent housing construction. IHP funds may also be used for other needs assistance (ONA), including funeral, medical, dental, childcare, personal property, transportation, and other expenses. FEMA provides 100% of the housing assistance costs, but ONA is subject to a 75% federal and 25% state cost share. In addition, there is a limitation on the amount of financial assistance an individual or household may receive, with financial assistance including assistance to reimburse temporary lodging expenses; rent for alternate housing accommodations; home repairs and replacement; as well as ONA. Financial assistance for repairs and replacement may not exceed $34,900 (FY2019). Separately, financial assistance for ONA may not exceed $34,900 (FY2019). Financial assistance to rent alternate housing accommodations under Section 408 (c)(1)(A)(i) of the Stafford Act, however, is excluded from the cap. The maximum amount of financial assistance is adjusted annually to reflect changes in the Consumer Price Index. IHP assistance is intended to be temporary and is generally limited to a period of 18 months from the date of the declaration, but may be extended by FEMA. (Also see " Physical Disaster Loans—Residential SBA Disaster Loans Available to Homeowners and Renters " below for additional assistance for homeowners and renters.) Agency : Federal Emergency Management Agency Authority : 42 U.S.C. §5174 Regulation : 44 C.F.R. §§206.110–206.120 Phone : Office of Congressional Affairs, 202-646-4500 Website : https://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/24945 CFDA Program Numbers : 97.048 and 97.050 CRS Contact : Elizabeth Webster, 202-707-9197 Disaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA) provides benefits to previously employed or self-employed individuals rendered jobless as a direct result of a major disaster and who are not eligible for regular federal or state unemployment compensation (UC). In certain cases, individuals who have no work history or are unable to work may also be eligible for DUA benefits. DUA is federally funded through FEMA, but is administered by the Department of Labor and state UC agencies. In general, individuals must apply for benefits within 30 days after the date the state announces availability of DUA benefits. When applicants have good cause, they may file claims after the 30-day deadline. This deadline may be extended; however, initial applications filed after the 26 th week following the declaration date will not be considered. When a reasonable comparative earnings history can be constructed, DUA benefits are determined in a similar manner to regular state UC benefit rules. The minimum weekly DUA benefit is required to be half of the average weekly UC benefit for the state where the disaster occurred. DUA assistance is available to eligible individuals as long as the major disaster continues, but no longer than 26 weeks after the disaster declaration. For more information, see CRS Report RS22022, Disaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA) , by Julie M. Whittaker. Agency: Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration Authority: 42 U.S.C. §5177 Regulation: 20 C.F.R. §625; 44 C.F.R. §206.141 Contact: See listings of resources by state , https://www.careeronestop.org/localhelp/unemploymentbenefits/unemployment-benefits.aspx Website: http://ows.doleta.gov/unemploy/disaster.asp CFDA Program Number : 97.034 CRS Contact: Julie Whittaker, 202-707-2587 The dislocated worker program helps fund training and related assistance to persons who have lost their jobs and are unlikely to return to their current jobs or industries. Of the funds appropriated, 80% are allotted by formula grants to states and local entities and 20% are reserved by the Secretary of Labor to fund a national reserve that supports national dislocated worker grants to states or local ent ities. One type of national emergency grant is Disaster Relief Employment Assistance, under which funds can be made available to states to employ dislocated workers in temporary jobs involving recovery after a national emergency. An individual may be employed for up to 12 months. There are no matching requirements for Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act (WIOA) programs. Agency: Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration Authority: 29 U.S.C. §3225 Regulation: 20 C.F.R. §671 Contact: See listings of state Dislocated Worker/Rapid Response Coordinators at http://www.doleta.gov/layoff/rapid_coord.cfm Website: https://www.doleta.gov/DWGs/eta_default.cfm CFDA Program Number : 17.278 CRS Contact: David H. Bradley, 202-707-7352 The majority of disaster loans provided by the Small Business Administration (SBA), approximately 80%, are made available to individuals and households. SBA disaster assistance is provided in the form of loans, not grants, and therefore must be repaid to the federal government. Homeowners, renters, and personal property owners located in a declared disaster area (and in contiguous counties) may apply to the SBA for loans to help recover losses from the disaster. SBA's Home Disaster Loan Program falls into two categories: personal property loans and real property loans. These loans cover only uninsured or underinsured property and primary residences. Loan maturities may be up to 30 years. A personal property loan provides a creditworthy homeowner or renter with up to $40,000 to repair or replace personal property items, such as furniture, clothing, or automobiles, damaged or lost in a disaster. These loans cover only uninsured or underinsured property and primary residences and cannot be used to replace extraordinarily expensive or irreplaceable items, such as antiques, recreational vehicles, or furs. A creditworthy homeowner may apply for a "real property loan" of up to $200,000 to repair or restore the homeowner's primary residence to its predisaster condition. The loans may not be used to upgrade homes or build additions, unless upgrades or changes are required by city or county building codes. A real property loan may be increased by 20% for repairs to protect the damaged property from a similar disaster in the future. Agency: Small Business Administration Authority: 15 U.S.C. §636(b) Regulation: 13 C.F.R. §§123.200–123.204 Contact : Office of Congressional and Legislative Affairs, 202-205-6700 Website : https://disasterloan.sba.gov/ela/Information/TypesOfLoans CFDA Program Number : 59.008 CRS Contact : Bruce R. Lindsay, 202-707-3752 This unique fund directs payments to individuals and groups for disaster-related needs that have not been or will not be met by government agencies or other organizations. A disaster survivor will normally receive no more than $2,000 from this fund in any one declared disaster unless the Assistant Administrator for the Disaster Assistance Directorate determines that a larger amount is in the best interest of the disaster victim and the federal government. There is no matching requirement for this program and no limitation on the time period in which assistance is available. Agency: Federal Emergency Management Agency Authority: 42 U.S.C. §5121 et seq. Regulation: 44 C.F.R. §206.181 Contact : Office of Congressional Affairs, 202-646-4500 Website : http://www.fema.gov/library/viewRecord.do?id=5037 CRS Contact: Bruce R. Lindsay, 202-707-3752 This program provides grants that enable states to offer crisis counseling services, when required, to victims of a federally declared major disaster for the purpose of relieving mental health problems caused or aggravated by the disaster or its aftermath. Assistance is short-term and community-oriented. Cost-share requirements are not imposed on this assistance. The regulations specify that program funding generally ends after nine months, but time extensions may be approved if requested by the state and approved by federal officials. Agency: Federal Emergency Management Agency Authority: 42 U.S.C. §5183 Regulation: 44 C.F.R. §206.171 Contact : Office of Congressional Affairs, 202-646-4500 Website: https://www.fema.gov/recovery-directorate/crisis-counseling-assistance-training-program CFDA Pr ogram Number : 97.032 CRS Contact: Sarah A. Lister, 202-707-7320 Disaster Legal Services (DLS) are provided for free to low-income individuals who require them as a result of a major disaster, and the provision of services is "confined to the securing of benefits under the [Stafford] Act and claims arising out of a major disaster." Assistance may include help with insurance claims, drawing up new wills and other legal documents lost in the disaster, help with home repair contracts and contractors, and appeals of FEMA decisions. Neither the statute nor the regulations establish cost-share requirements or time limitations for DLS. Agency: Federal Emergency Management Agency Authority: 42 U.S.C. §5182 Regulation: 44 C.F.R. §206.164 Contact : Office of Congressional Affairs, 202-646-4500 Website: https://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/24413 CFDA Program Number : 97.033 CRS Contact: Elizabeth Webster, 202-707-9197 The Disaster Case Management (DCM) program partners case managers and disaster survivors to develop and implement Disaster Recovery Plans to address unmet needs. The DCM program is authorized under the Stafford Act. Following a presidentially declared major disaster that includes Individual Assistance (IA), the governor or tribal executive may request a grant to use DCM providers to supply services to survivors with long-term, disaster-caused unmet needs. The program is time-limited, and it shall not exceed 24 months from the date of the presidential major disaster declaration. Agency: Federal Emergency Management Agency Authority: 42 U.S.C. §5189d Contact: Office of Congressional Affairs, 202-646-4500 Website: https://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/101292 CFDA Program Number : 97.088 CRS Contact: Elizabeth Webster, 202-707-9197 The Internal Revenue Code (IRC) includes tax relief provisions that apply to individuals and businesses affected by federally declared disasters, and the following are some examples. Individuals located in affected areas are allowed extra time (four years instead of the general two) to replace homes due to involuntary conversion (e.g., destruction from wind or floods, theft, or property ordered to be demolished) and still defer any gain. Taxpayers may also be able to deduct personal casualty losses attributable to federally declared disasters, subject to certain limitations. Qualifying disaster relief payments received by affected individuals are not subject to tax. The Internal Revenue Service also has the authority to provide some relief, including the extension of tax filing deadlines. In addition to these and other permanent tax relief provisions, special temporary provisions have been enacted for certain disasters. The 2017 tax revision ( P.L. 115-97 ) provided tax relief related to 2016 and 2017 disasters. These measures were expanded to cover the California wildfires in the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 ( P.L. 115-123 ). Agency : Internal Revenue Service Authority : Various provisions throughout the Internal Revenue Code, Title 26 U.S.C., including §§123, 139, 165, 402, 408, 1033, 6654, 7508A Regulation : No specific regulation Contact : Congressional Liaison, 202-317-6985 Website : http://www.irs.gov/uac/Tax-Relief-in-Disaster-Situations CRS Contact s : Molly Sherlock, 202-707-7797 Authorized by multiple sections of the Stafford Act, the Public Assistance (PA) Grant Program is FEMA's primary form of financial assistance for state and local governments. The PA Program provides grant assistance for many eligible purposes, including the following: Emergency work, as authorized by Sections 403, 407, and 502 of the Stafford Act, which provide for the removal of debris and emergency protective measures, such as the establishment of temporary shelters and emergency power generation. Permanent work, as authorized by Section 406, which provides for the repair, replacement, or restoration of disaster-damaged, publicly owned facilities and the facilities of certain private nonprofit organizations (PNPs). At its discretion, FEMA may provide assistance for hazard mitigation measures that are not required by applicable codes and standards. As a condition of PA assistance, applicants must obtain and maintain insurance on their facilities for similar future disasters. Management costs, as authorized by Section 324, which reimburses some of the applicant's administrative expenses incurred managing the totality of the PA Program's projects and grants. PNPs are generally eligible for permanent work assistance if they provide a governmental type of service, though PNPs not providing a "critical" service must first apply to the SBA for loan assistance for facility projects. The federal government provides a minimum of 75% of the cost of eligible assistance, and this cost share can rise if certain criteria are met. Funding for the PA Program comes through discretionary appropriations to the Disaster Relief Fund. Agency: Federal Emergency Management Agency Authority: 42 U.S.C. §§5170b, 5172, 5173, 5189f, 5192 Regulation: 44 C.F.R. §206, subparts G, H, I Contact : Office of Congressional Affairs, 202-646-4500 Website: http://www.fema.gov/public-assistance-local-state-tribal-and-non-profit CFDA Program Number : 97.036 CRS Contact: Natalie Keegan, 202-707-9569 The Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) provides grants to states for implementing mitigation measures after a disaster and to provide funding for previously identified mitigation measures to lessen future damage and loss of life. The federal government provides up to 75% of the cost share of eligible projects. Historically, the amount available for HMGP awards is established by a scale that authorizes three tiers of awards: 15% of the total of other Stafford Act assistance in a state for a major disaster in which no more than $2 billion is provided; 10% for assistance that ranges from more than $2 billion to $10 billion; and 7.5% for a major disaster that involves Stafford Act assistance from more than $10 billion to $35.3 billion. Funding for HMGP comes through discretionary appropriations to the Disaster Relief Fund. The amount of funding provided can be increased if the state has an approved enhanced mitigation plan. HMGP funding is only awarded with a major disaster declaration, not an emergency declaration. However, during FY2015, FY2017, and FY2018, Congress directed that HMGP grants be made available with fire management assistance grants. Agency: Federal Emergency Management Agency Authority: 42 U.S.C. §5170c Regulation: 44 C.F.R. §§206.430–206.440 Contact : Office of Congressional Affairs , 202-646-4500 Website : http://www.fema.gov/hazard-mitigation-grant-program CFDA Program Number : 97.039 CRS Contact: Diane P. Horn, 202-707-3472 The Pre-Disaster Mitigation (PDM) Grant Program provides grants and technical assistance to states, territories, and local communities for cost-effective hazard mitigation activities that complement a comprehensive hazard mitigation program and reduce injuries, loss of life, and damage and destruction of property. Through FY2018, a minimum of the lesser of $575,000 or 1.0% of appropriated funds was provided to a state or local government, with assistance capped at 15% of appropriated funds. Federal funds generally comprise 75% of the cost of approved mitigation projects, except for small impoverished communities that may receive up to 90% of the cost. Funding for the PDM Program changed significantly with the passage of the Disaster Recovery Reform Act of 2018 (DRRA). DRRA authorizes the National Public Infrastructure Pre-Disaster Mitigation Fund, for which the President may set aside from the DRF, with respect to each major disaster, an amount equal to 6% of the estimated aggregate amount of the grants to be made pursuant to the following sections of the Stafford Act: 403 (essential assistance), 406 (repair, restoration, and replacement of damaged facilities), 407 (debris removal), 408 (federal assistance to individuals and households), 410 (unemployment assistance), 416 (crisis counseling assistance and training), and 428 (public assistance program alternative program procedures). These changes may increase the focus on funding public infrastructure projects that improve community resilience before a disaster occurs, although FEMA has the discretion to shape the program in many ways. There is potential for significantly increased funding post-DRRA through the new transfer from the DRF, but it is not yet clear how FEMA will implement this new program. Agency: Federal Emergency Management Agency Authority: 42 U.S.C. §5133 Regulation: 44 C.F.R. §201 Contact : Office of Congressional Affairs, 202-646-4500 Website: http://www.fema.gov/pre-disaster-mitigation-grant-program CFDA Program Number : 97.047 CRS Contact: Diane P. Horn, 202-707-3472 The Community Disaster Loan (CDL) program provides loans to local governments that have suffered substantial loss of tax and other revenue in areas included in a major disaster declaration. Typically, the loan may not exceed 25% of the local government's annual operating budget for the fiscal year of the disaster. The limit is 50% if the local government lost 75% or more of its annual operating budget. A loan may not exceed $5 million, and there is no matching requirement. The statute does not impose time limitations on the assistance, but the normal term of a loan is five years. The statute provides that the repayment requirement is cancelled if local government revenues are not sufficient to meet operations expenses during a three-fiscal-year period after a disaster. The governor's authorized representative must officially approve the application and funds must be available in the Disaster Assistance Direct Loan Program (DADLP) account. In P.L. 115-72 , Congress provided up to $4.9 billion for the CDL program to assist local governments in providing essential services as a result of Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, or Maria. However, this legislation departed from the traditional CDL program framework by giving the Secretary of Homeland Security (in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury) broad authority over lending terms, eligible uses, and criteria for loan cancelation, among other program elements. As a result, this CDL-type program operates differently from the traditional program. For more information, see CRS Insight IN11106, Community Disaster Loans: Homeland Security Issues in the 116th Congress , by Michael H. Cecire. Agency: Federal Emergency Management Agency Authority: 42 U.S.C. §5184 Regulation: 44 C.F.R. §§206.360–206.378 Contact : Office of Congressional Affairs, 202-646-4500 CFDA Program Number : 97.030 CRS Contact: Michael H. Cecire, 202-707-7109 This program provides grants to state and local governments to aid states and their communities with the mitigation, management, and control of fires burning on publicly or privately owned forests or grasslands. The federal government provides 75% of the costs associated with fire management projects, but funding is limited to calculations of the "fire cost threshold" for each state. No time limitation is applied to the program. For more information, see CRS Report R43738, Fire Management Assistance Grants: Frequently Asked Questions , by Bruce R. Lindsay and Katie Hoover. Agency: Federal Emergency Management Agency Authority: 42 U.S.C. §5187 Regulation: 44 C.F.R. §§204.1–204.64 Contact : Office of Congressional Affairs, 202-646-4500 Website: https://www.fema.gov/fire-management-assistance-grant-program CFDA Program Number : 97.046 CRS Contact: Bruce R. Lindsay, 202-707-3752 Congress created the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF) in 1986. Subsequent laws authorized the OSLTF taxing authority, appropriations from the fund, and eligible uses for the fund. The OSLTF complements the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA; P.L. 101-380 ), which established a new federal oil spill liability framework, replaced existing federal liability frameworks, and amended the existing Clean Water Act oil spill response authorities. In addition, OPA transferred monies into the OSLTF from existing liability funds. The OSLTF may be used, among other purposes, to fund oil spill response activities and to compensate individuals, businesses, and governments for applicable economic damages resulting from an oil spill. Potential damages include injury or loss of property and loss of profits or earning capacity. OPA established a claims process for compensating parties affected by an oil spill. In general, claims must be presented first to the party responsible for the spill, but specific circumstances (e.g., the responsible party is unknown) allow persons to present a claim directly to the OSLTF. Agency : National Pollution Funds Center (part of the U.S. Coast Guard) Authority : 26 U.S.C. §9509 and 33 U.S.C. §2712 Regulation : 33 C.F.R. §136 Contact : Office of Legislative Affairs, 202-245-0520 Website : http://www.uscg.mil/npfc/ CRS Contact : Jonathan L. Ramseur, 202-707-7919 This program assists small businesses and nonprofits suffering economic injury as a result of disasters by offering loans and loan guarantees. Businesses must be located in disaster areas declared by the President, the Small Business Administration, or the Secretary of Agriculture. There is no matching requirement in this program. The maximum loan amount is $2 million. Loan terms may extend for up to 30 years. The application period is announced at the time of the disaster declaration. For more information, see CRS Report R41309, The SBA Disaster Loan Program: Overview and Possible Issues for Congress , by Bruce R. Lindsay. Agency: Small Business Administration Authority: 15 U.S.C. §636(b) Regulation: 13 C.F.R. §§123.300–123.303 Contact : Office of Congressional Affairs, 202-205-6700 Website : https://disasterloan.sba.gov/ela/Information/EIDLLoans CFDA Program Number : 59.008 CRS Contact: Bruce R. Lindsay, 202-707-3752 This program provides loans to businesses and nonprofits in declared disaster areas for uninsured physical damage and losses. The maximum loan amount is $2 million. Loan terms may extend for up to 30 years. There is no matching requirement in this program. For more information, see CRS Report R41309, The SBA Disaster Loan Program: Overview and Possible Issues for Congress , by Bruce R. Lindsay. Agency: Small Business Administration Authority: 15 U.S.C. §636(b) Regulation: 13 C.F.R. §§123.200–123.204 Contact : Office of Congressional Affairs, 202-205-6700 Website: https://disasterloan.sba.gov/ela/Information/BusinessPhysicalLoans CFDA Program Number : 59.008 CRS Contact: Bruce R. Lindsay, 202-707-3752 When a county has been declared a disaster area by either the President or the Secretary of Agriculture, agricultural producers in that county may become eligible for low-interest emergency disaster (EM) loans available through the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Farm Service Agency. Producers in counties that are contiguous to a county with a disaster designation also become eligible for an EM loan. EM loan funds may be used to help eligible farmers, ranchers, and aquaculture producers recover from production losses (e.g., when the producer suffers a significant loss of an annual crop) or from physical losses (e.g., repairing or replacing damaged or destroyed structures or equipment, or replanting permanent crops, such as orchards). A qualified applicant can then borrow up to 100% of actual production or physical losses (not to exceed $500,000) at a below-market interest rate. For more information see CRS Report RS21212, Agricultural Disaster Assistance , by Megan Stubbs. Agency: Department of Agriculture, Farm Service Agency Authority: 7 U.S.C. §1961 Regulation: 7 C.F.R. §764 Contact : Legislative Liaison Staff, 202-720-7095 Website: https://www.fsa.usda.gov/programs-and-services/farm-loan-programs/emergency-farm-loans/index CFDA Program Number : 10.404 CRS Contact: Megan Stubbs, 202-707-8707 Since 1968, the federal government has pursued a comprehensive flood risk management strategy designed to (1) identify and map flood-prone communities across the country (flood hazard mapping); (2) encourage property owners in NFIP participating communities to purchase insurance as a protection against flood losses (flood insurance); and (3) require communities in designated flood risk zones to adopt and enforce approved floodplain management ordinances to reduce future flood risk to new construction in regulated floodplains (floodplain management). The Federal Insurance and Mitigation Administration (FIMA), a part of FEMA, manages the NFIP. For more information, see CRS Report R44593, Introduction to the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) , by Diane P. Horn and Baird Webel, and CRS In Focus IF11023, Selected Issues for National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) Reauthorization and Reform , by Diane P. Horn. Agency: Federal Emergency Management Agency Authority: 42 U.S.C. §4001 et seq. Regulation: 44 C.F.R. §59.1–§82.21 Contact : Office of Congressional Affairs, 202-646-4500 Website: http://www.fema.gov/national-flood-insurance-program CFDA Program Number : 97.022 CRS Contact : Diane Horn, 202-707-3472 In addition to programs described above that provide targeted assistance to individuals, states, territories, local governments, and businesses specifically affected by disasters, other general assistance programs may be useful to communities in disaster situations. For example, individuals who lose income, employment, or health insurance may become eligible for programs that are not specifically intended as disaster relief, such as cash assistance under the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program, job training under the Workforce Investment Act, Medicaid, or the State Children's Health Insurance Program (S-CHIP). Likewise, state or local officials have the discretion to use funds under programs such as the Social Services Block Grant or Community Development Block Grant to meet disaster-related needs, even though these programs were not established specifically for such purposes. Other agencies may offer assistance to state and local governments, including the Economic Development Administration and the Army Corps of Engineers. For businesses, however, only the disaster programs administered by the Small Business Administration are generally applicable. Numerous other federal programs could offer disaster relief, but specific eligibility criteria or other program rules might make it less likely that they would actually be used. Moreover, available funds might already be obligated for ongoing program activities. To the extent that federal agencies have discretion in the administration of programs, some agencies may choose to adapt these non-targeted programs for use in disaster situations. Also, Congress may choose to provide additional funds through emergency supplemental appropriations for certain general assistance programs, specifically for use after a disaster. CRS analysts and program specialists can help provide information regarding general assistance programs that might be relevant to a given disaster situation. CRS appropriations reports may have information on disaster assistance within particular federal agencies. These reports also list CRS's key policy staff by their program area and agency expertise. CRS Report R41981, Congressional Primer on Responding to Major Disasters and Emergencies , by Bruce R. Lindsay and Elizabeth M. Webster CRS Report R41101, FEMA Disaster Cost-Shares: Evolution and Analysis , by Natalie Keegan and Elizabeth M. Webster CRS Report RL33330, Community Development Block Grant Funds in Disaster Relief and Recovery , by Eugene Boyd CRS Report RL33579, The Public Health and Medical Response to Disasters: Federal Authority and Funding , by Sarah A. Lister CRS Report R44593, Introduction to the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) , by Diane P. Horn and Baird Webel CRS Insight IN10450, Private Flood Insurance and the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) , by Baird Webel and Diane P. Horn CRS Report R45099, National Flood Insurance Program: Selected Issues and Legislation in the 115th Congress , by Diane P. Horn CRS In Focus IF10730, Tax Policy and Disaster Recovery , by Molly F. Sherlock CRS Report R41884, Considerations for a Catastrophic Declaration: Issues and Analysis , by Bruce R. Lindsay CRS Report R43784, FEMA's Disaster Declaration Process: A Primer , by Bruce R. Lindsay CRS Report R43738, Fire Management Assistance Grants: Frequently Asked Questions , by Bruce R. Lindsay and Katie Hoover CRS Report R45085, FEMA Individual Assistance Programs: In Brief , by Shawn Reese CRS Report R45238, FEMA and SBA Disaster Assistance for Individuals and Households: Application Process, Determinations, and Appeals , by Bruce R. Lindsay and Shawn Reese CRS Report RS22022, Disaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA) , by Julie M. Whittaker CRS Report R41309, The SBA Disaster Loan Program: Overview and Possible Issues for Congress , by Bruce R. Lindsay CRS Report RS21212, Agricultural Disaster Assistance , by Megan Stubbs CRS Report R42854, Emergency Assistance for Agricultural Land Rehabilitation , by Megan Stubbs CRS In Focus IF10565, Federal Disaster Assistance for Agriculture , by Megan Stubbs CRS In Focus IF10730, Tax Policy and Disaster Recovery , by Molly F. Sherlock CRS Report R44808, Federal Disaster Assistance: The National Flood Insurance Program and Other Federal Disaster Assistance Programs Available to Individuals and Households After a Flood , by Diane P. Horn CRS Insight IN11094, The Evolving Use of Disaster Housing Assistance and the Roles of the Disaster Housing Assistance Program (DHAP) and the Individuals and Households Program (IHP) , by Elizabeth M. Webster CRS Insight IN11054, Disaster Housing Assistance: Homeland Security Issues in the 116th Congress , by Elizabeth M. Webster CRS Insight IN11106, Community Disaster Loans: Homeland Security Issues in the 116th Congress , by Michael H. Cecire Note: Because not all agencies have complete, up-to-date information available on the internet, in particular during and immediately after a disaster, congressional users are encouraged to contact the appropriate CRS program analysts or department or agency program officers for more complete, timely information. USA.gov http://www.USA.gov/ Many federal agencies have established websites specifically for responding to disasters. Some agencies maintain websites with comprehensive information about their disaster assistance programs, whereas others supply only limited information; most list contact phone numbers. An A-Z index of U.S. government departments and agencies is available at the website above. FEMA Website http://www.fema.gov From its website, FEMA offers regular updates on recovery efforts in areas under a major disaster declaration. Information on a specific disaster may include a listing of declared counties and contact information for local residents. Disaster Assistance.gov http://www.disasterassistance.gov/ DisasterAssitance.gov provides information on how help might be obtained from the U.S. government before, during, and after a disaster. The website includes tools to find, apply for, and check the status of assistance by category or agency. The website also includes disaster-related news feeds and information on community resources. Assistance Listings at beta.SAM.gov https://beta.SAM.gov/ Official descriptions of more than 2,200 federal assistance programs, including disaster and recovery grants and loans, can be found on beta.SAM.gov. The website is currently in beta, and it houses federal assistance listings previously found on the now-retired Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance (CFDA). For programs summarized in this report, CFDA program numbers are given (which are searchable at the "Assistance Listings" domain at beta.SAM.gov). Full assistance listing descriptions, updated by departments and agencies, cover authorizing legislation, objectives, and eligibility and compliance requirements. For current appropriations and additional information, users can contact CRS analysts, or departments and agencies.	[ "This report is designed to assist Members of Congress and their staff as they address the needs of their states, communities, and constituents after a disaster. It includes a summary of federal programs that provide federal disaster assistance to individual survivors, states, territories, local governments, and nongovernmental entities following a natural or man-made disaster. A number of federal agencies provide financial assistance through grants, loans, and loan guarantees to assist in the provision of critical services, such as temporary housing, counseling, and infrastructure repair. The programs summarized in this report fall into two broad categories. First, there are programs specifically authorized for use during situations occurring because of a disaster. Most of these programs are administered by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Second are general assistance programs that in some instances may be used either in disaster situations or to meet other needs unrelated to a disaster. Many federal agencies, including the Departments of Health and Human Services (HHS) and Housing and Urban Development (HUD), administer programs that may be included in the second category. The programs in the report are primarily organized by recipient: individuals, state and local governments, nongovernmental entities, or businesses. These programs address a variety of short-term needs, such as food and shelter, and long-term needs, such as the repair of public utilities and public infrastructure. The report also includes a list of Congressional Research Service (CRS) reports on disaster assistance as well as relevant federal agency websites that provide information on disaster responses, updates on recovery efforts, and resources on federal assistance programs. This report will be updated as significant legislative or administrative changes occur." ]	5,189	gov_report	en	null	a61971d6aebb74ace0e7c436c66e24d408c7bad423b95877
In order to receive federal matching funds, states report expenditures quarterly to CMS on the CMS-64. States are required to report their expenditures to CMS within 30 days of the end of each quarter, but may adjust their past reporting for up to 2 years after the expenditure was made, referred to as the 2-year filing limit. Adjustments can reflect resolved disputes or reclassifications of expenditures. Expenditures reported after the 2-year filing limit are generally not eligible for a federal match, with certain exceptions. The CMS-64 is a series of forms that capture expenditure data for different aspects of states’ Medicaid programs, such as different types of services, populations, and different federal matching rates. (See table 1 for examples of the expenditure types captured by the CMS-64.) States report their expenditures quarterly on the CMS-64 at an aggregate level— such as a state’s total expenditures for such categories of services as inpatient hospital services—and these reported expenditures are not linked to individual enrollees or services. States’ reporting may vary depending on the features of their Medicaid program. Some examples of this variation include the following: States that expanded eligibility under PPACA would need to report expenditures not only by the type of services (e.g., inpatient hospital services), but also by populations receiving different federal matching rates, such as expansion enrollees. States with waivers—that is, where the state received approval from HHS to waive certain Medicaid requirements in order to test and evaluate new approaches for delivering and financing care under a demonstration—would need to report those expenditures associated with these waivers on additional forms. CMS is responsible for assuring that expenditures reported by states are supported and allowable, meaning that the state actually made and recorded the expenditure and that the expenditure is consistent with Medicaid requirements. CMS regional offices perform the ongoing oversight, with enhanced oversight procedures in the 20 states with the highest federal Medicaid expenditures. (See fig.1) CMS is required to review the expenditures reported by states each quarter. (See fig. 2.) Regional office reviewers have 50 days to review the expenditures and compute the federal share of states’ Medicaid expenditures. As part of the quarterly review, regional office reviewers also check that expenditures receive the correct matching rate. In general, the amount of federal funds that states receive for Medicaid services is determined annually by a statutory formula—the Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP), which results in a specific federal matching rate for each state. However, there are a number of exceptions where higher federal matching rates can apply for certain types of beneficiaries, services, or administrative costs. See table 2 for examples of higher matching rates that apply for expenditures for certain types of enrollees, services, or administrative costs. When CMS identifies questionable expenditures or errors through its reviews, there are several ways that they can be resolved, as summarized below. Deferral of federal funds. CMS can defer federal matching funds if, during the quarterly review, the regional office reviewer needs additional information to determine whether a particular expenditure is allowable. The reviewer may recommend that CMS defer the expenditure until the state provides additional support or corrects the reporting. State reducing reported expenditures. If the state agrees that the questionable expenditure is an error, the state can submit an adjusted report during the quarterly review or make an adjustment in a subsequent quarter. These adjustments prevent federal payments for those expenditures. Disallowance of expenditure. If CMS determines an expenditure is not allowable, CMS can issue a disallowance, and the state returns federal funds through reductions in future federal allocations. States may appeal disallowances. CMS uses a variety of processes to assure that state-reported expenditures are supported during quarterly reviews and performs focused financial management reviews on expenditures considered at risk of not complying with Medicaid requirements. Although we found that CMS was identifying errors and compliance issues using both review methods, we also found weaknesses in how CMS targets its oversight resources to address risks. CMS uses quarterly reviews to assess whether expenditures are supported by the state’s accounting systems; are in accordance with CMS approved methodologies, plans, and spending caps; and whether there are significant unexplained variances—changes in expenditures— from one quarter to the next (referred to as a variance analysis). CMS review procedures include validation measures that check to ensure that expenditures were reported within the 2-year limit, which is a check done on all types of expenditures. Another validation measure compares expenditures to various approval documents. For example, when a state has a waiver in place, expenditures are reviewed against waiver agreements that authorize payment for specified services or populations. Other examples include comparing supplemental payment expenditures to caps set for those expenditures. (See table 3.) Our examination of the quarterly reviews indicated that the reviews involved significant coordination with other CMS staff and the state. In addition to reviewing state documentation, officials from two regional offices told us that they consult other regional office staff who oversee the approval of new expenditures to ensure that expenditures reflect approved program features. For example, officials in region 9 told us that in reviewing managed care expenditures, they consult with their colleagues who review the state’s payment methodologies for capitated payments. In reviewing information technology development expenditures—which are subject to a higher federal matching rate— reviewers for all six selected states examined advanced planning documents, which requires coordination with staff who approve those documents to ensure that the state was receiving the correct matching rates and staying within the approved amounts. With regard to coordination with states, we found that regional reviewers for all six reviews contacted states to follow-up on issues identified during the review. Officials also described being in regular contact with states to stay abreast of program, system, and staffing changes to inform their reviews. For example, according to regional officials, Arkansas experienced some significant and unexpected staffing challenges in 2016 that resulted in delays in the state reporting expenditures and returning federal overpayments, and the reviewer worked closely with state staff to track the state’s progress. We found evidence that reviewers identified errors during their quarterly reviews. In the six quarterly reviews we examined, regional offices identified errors in three of the six states. For example, region 3 reviewers found errors in Maryland’s expenditure reporting—including claims for the wrong matching rate for two enrollees who were not eligible for PPACA’s Medicaid expansion and reporting provider incentive payments on the wrong line—and worked with the state to correct those errors. Additionally, region 9 reviewers found errors in California’s reporting of expenditures. For example, they found that the state reported waiver expenditures for the incorrect time period, which has implications for CMS’s ability to monitor and enforce spending limits for the waiver. Reviewers worked with the state to correct those errors. To supplement the quarterly reviews, CMS generally directs regional offices to conduct a focused financial management review (FMR) each year on an area of high risk within the region, typically within one state. According to regional officials, CMS uses these reviews to investigate expenditures in greater depth and detail than is reasonable within the timeframes of a quarterly review. For example, reviewers can examine individual claims for services from providers or the methodologies developed for certain payment types. Regional reviewers also use these reviews to investigate errors that could not have been detected by the quarterly review. For example, regional office 6 officials told us that they uncovered inappropriate financing arrangements when they used an FMR to examine how Texas financed the state share of its supplemental payments to hospitals in one of its counties. To do so, the regional office reviewed payments from the state to the provider, project plans, and interviewed providers—steps that are not part of the quarterly review process. Rather, in the quarterly review, the reviewer only checks that state-reported payments are supported by state accounting records and are within applicable caps; thus, inappropriate financing of the state share would not have been detected through the quarterly review. In fiscal years 2014 through 2017, CMS used FMRs to review various expenditures considered to be at risk for not complying with Medicaid requirements. Specifically, as outlined in annual work plans, regional offices planned to conduct 31 FMRs and estimated that the total amount of federal funds at risk in expenditure areas covered by their planned reviews was $12 billion. (See app. I.) Planned FMRs targeted a wide range of topics, with the reviews most frequently targeting expenditures for the Medicaid expansion population. (See table 4.) We found that CMS frequently identified compliance issues through FMRs. As of March 2018, CMS reported that reviewers had identified compliance issues with financial impact in 11 of the 31 planned FMRs, though most of those findings were still under review. More findings from the planned FMRs are likely as some of the reviews were still ongoing. We reviewed the draft results for 5 FMRs. Among these, CMS found that four states were reporting expenditures that were not allowable. For example, as noted earlier, a 2014 FMR on supplemental payments in Texas revealed inappropriate funding arrangements, and CMS issued a disallowance for approximately $27 million. In some cases, FMRs did not have apparent financial findings, but identified significant internal control weaknesses in the state and recommended specific corrective actions— such as better aligning eligibility and expenditures systems to better detect and correct irregularities—that would provide greater assurances that federal funds are appropriately spent. Both the quarterly reviews and the FMRs occur in conjunction with other ongoing CMS financial oversight activities. For example in addition to reviewing expenditures, regional office reviewers assess how states estimate their costs, set payment rates for managed care and home and community based services, and allocate costs among different Medicaid administrative activities under their cost allocation plans. CMS officials told us that issues relating to state compliance with Medicaid requirements for expenditures could be identified during these other oversight activities and could inform follow-up during the quarterly reviews or be the subject of a FMR. Officials also told us that since FMRs were instituted, the agency has built in more front-end procedures for preventing problems with the accuracy and allowability of reported expenditures. As examples, they cited their work on managed care rate reviews, among other things. We identified two weaknesses in how CMS is allocating resources for overseeing state-reported expenditures that limited the agency’s ability to target risk in its efforts to assure that these expenditures are supported and consistent with Medicaid requirements. First, we found that CMS has allocated similar staff resources to states with differing levels of risk. For example, the staff resources dedicated to reviewing California’s expenditures—ranking first nationally in expenditures and constituting 15 percent of all federal Medicaid expenditures—are comparable to significantly smaller states in other regions, despite California’s history of reporting challenges and its inability to provide electronic records, which requires on-site review. (See fig. 3.) CMS has allocated 2.2 staff to review California’s expenditures in contrast to one person to review Arkansas’ expenditures, which constitute 1 percent of federal Medicaid expenditures, and Arkansas does not have a similar history of complex reporting challenges. We also found that California’s reviewers have set a higher threshold for investigating variances in reported expenditures than in the five other selected states. Specifically, reviewers investigated variances in California of plus or minus 10 percent if the variances represented more than 2 percent of medical expenditures, or $450 million in the quarter we reviewed. The state experienced an approximately 24 percent increase in its prescription drug expenditures—roughly $200 million—during that quarter, but the variance was deemed not significant. In contrast, for two of our five other selected states, we found that reviewers generally investigated variances of plus or minus 10 percent regardless of the dollar amount of the variance and in the remaining three states they had significantly lower dollar thresholds than used for California. Second, CMS reported cancelling the FMR requirement for regional offices in 17 out of 51 instances in the last 5 years when faced with resource constraints. In some cases, CMS excused individual regional offices from conducting planned FMRs due to staff shortage as the agency did for regions 3 and 7 in 2014; region 8 in 2016; and regions 3, 7, 8, and 9 in 2018. In 2015, according to CMS officials, all 10 regions were excused from conducting an FMR, because the regional offices needed their staff to focus on implementing new procedures for validating expenditures for the Medicaid expansion population. In addition to cancelling FMRs, CMS was delayed in finalizing FMRs. Among the eight FMRs that were conducted in fiscal year 2014, three have been issued as final reports, CMS decided no report was needed on a fourth, and the four remaining FMRs from 2014 were still under review as of March 2018, delaying important feedback to states on their vulnerabilities. According to CMS officials, resource constraints have contributed to both of these weaknesses. Our analysis of staffing data indicated that, from fiscal years 2014 to 2018, the number of full time equivalent staff dedicated to financial oversight activities declined by approximately 19 percent across all 10 regions. These staff are responsible not only for completing the quarterly reviews and FMRs, but also other financial oversight activities, including resolving audit findings and other on-going oversight activities noted previously. During this period, federal Medicaid expenditures are estimated to have increased by approximately 31 percent, and the reporting of expenditures has grown more complex. In addition to the decline in dedicated staff, officials told us they faced challenges in filling vacancies either because of hiring restrictions or challenges in recruiting qualified candidates. Officials described instances where regional offices shared resources with other offices to address critical gaps in resources. For example region 9 was able to obtain part-time assistance from a region 6 reviewer to help review California’s expenditures. However, CMS officials told us that they had not permanently reallocated resources between regional offices, because all regional offices are under-resourced given their various oversight responsibilities as of May 2018. With regard to cancelling FMRs, CMS officials noted that other oversight responsibilities, including the quarterly reviews, are required under statute or regulation and thus have a higher priority than FMRs. Compounding its resource allocation challenges, CMS has not conducted a comprehensive, national assessment of risk to determine whether resources for financial oversight activities are (1) adequate and (2) allocated—both across regional offices and oversight tools—to focus on the greatest areas of risk. Agency officials told us that they have not conducted a formal risk assessment, because they are assessing risk on an on-going basis, allocating resources within each region accordingly and sharing resources across regions to the extent possible. However, this approach does not make clear whether the level of resources dedicated to financial oversight nationally is adequate given the risk. Federal internal control standards for risk assessment require agencies to identify and analyze risks related to achieving the defined objectives (i.e., assuring that state-reported expenditures are in accordance with Medicaid rules), and respond to risks based on the significance of the risk. Without completing a comprehensive, national assessment of risk and determining whether staff resources dedicated to financial oversight are adequate and allocated commensurate with risk, CMS is missing an opportunity to improve its ability to identify errors in reported expenditures that could result in hundreds of millions of dollars in potential savings to the Medicaid program. CMS reviewers in the selected regional offices we reviewed did not consistently perform variance analyses—which compare changes in expenditures from the quarter under review to the previous quarter—of higher matched expenditures during quarterly reviews. Further, the sampling procedures used to examine Medicaid expansion expenditures did not account for varying risks across states. CMS has multiple procedures in place to review expenditures that receive a higher federal matching rate. As with other expenditures, reviewers are required to complete a variance analysis, comparing reported expenditures in the quarter under review to those reported in the prior quarter and investigating variances above a certain threshold. However, we found that our three selected regional offices were not consistently conducting these analyses across several different types of expenditures with higher matching rates. While CMS’s internal guidance required that regional offices conduct variance analyses on expenditures with higher matching rates, we found that for the quarter we investigated (generally the 1st quarter of fiscal year 2017), our selected regional offices did not consistently do so for three types of expenditures that we reviewed: IHS, family planning, and certain women with breast or cervical cancer. Two of the three regional offices (regions 3 and 9) did not conduct or did not document these required variance analyses, and the remaining regional office (region 6) conducted the analyses but deviated from standard procedures outlined in CMS guidance, as summarized below. CMS region 3. Reviewers did not conduct variance analyses for either Maryland or Pennsylvania. Regional office staff with whom we spoke said that as part of the quarterly review they conduct the standard variance analysis on category of service lines of the CMS-64. Expenditures for IHS, family planning and services for certain women with breast or cervical cancer are not separately identified at that level. Although CMS reviewers said they thought the standard analysis was sufficient, net changes within a broad service category may obscure major changes within these higher matched expenditures. For example, examining changes in total inpatient hospital expenditures would not necessarily reveal a significant variance limited to inpatient expenditures in IHS facilities that receive a higher federal match. CMS region 9. Reviewers told us that they examined higher matched expenditures for California; however, no variance analyses of IHS, family planning, or breast or cervical cancer services were included in the work papers provided to us. In addition, they told us that they do not conduct a variance analysis on IHS, family planning, and services for certain women with breast or cervical cancer for Nevada, noting that expenditures in these areas tend to be quite small. CMS region 6. Reviewers conducted a variance analysis of these higher matched expenditures for Arkansas and Texas and provided us documentation; however, the documentation showed some deviation from the required steps specified in CMS’s guidance. For example, for Texas, spending on two of the three categories was beyond the threshold for significance, but the reviewer did not document any follow-up with the state. Although expenditures for IHS, family planning, and certain women with breast or cervical cancer constituted a small share of total federal spending on Medicaid services—roughly 1 percent—combined spending on these categories was approximately $1 billion in the first quarter of fiscal year 2017. Our analysis indicated that variances in spending for these three services ranged widely across our six states, and in four of the states, some of their expenditures were above the thresholds for significance. (See fig. 4.) For example, in regional office 3, Maryland experienced a significant variance in its family planning expenditures—an increase of approximately $8 million dollars or 7,700 percent from the previous quarter—but there was no indication in the documentation provided that the regional office identified or investigated that variance. Similar to the variance analyses for other higher matched expenditure types, we found that the selected regional offices did not consistently conduct variance analyses on expenditures reported for the Medicaid expansion population. First, although five of our six states opted to expand Medicaid under PPACA, two of the five states (Maryland and Pennsylvania) were not subjected to a variance analysis for their expansion populations, a segment that accounted for nearly $7 billion in Medicaid expenditures in fiscal year 2016. Among the remaining three states, CMS regional office staff conducted a variance analysis, but in two of them, the reviewers did not document whether they investigated significant variances, leaving it unclear whether this required step was taken. Specifically, for two of the three remaining states—Arkansas and Nevada—reviewers did not document which variances were deemed significant or that any such variances were discussed with state officials. The guidance specified in CMS’s quarterly review guide is not always clear or consistent. For example: For IHS, family planning, and certain women with breast or cervical cancer, the guidance is explicit that the analysis is required, but the automated variance report used by reviewers for the step does not include these expenditures. For Medicaid expansion expenditures, the review guide is not explicit about whether a variance analysis is required, but CMS has an automated variance report available for these expenditures, which suggests that such an analysis was expected. The guidance suggests that a variance analysis should be conducted for expansion enrollees; however, it does not specify whether the analysis should be conducted in conjunction with—or take the place of—more in-depth examinations. According to federal internal controls standards for information and communication, agencies should communicate the information necessary for staff to achieve the agency’s objectives. CMS’s guidance on conducting variance analyses for types of expenditures with higher federal matching rates has not been sufficiently clear to assure that such analyses are being consistently conducted. By not consistently conducting such checks, errors may be going undetected and CMS may be providing federal funds at a higher matching rate than is allowable. CMS has additional procedures in place to review service expenditures reported for the Medicaid expansion population, a category of expenditures that received a 95 percent federal match in 2017. Specifically, in addition to a variance analysis, CMS guidance specifies that each regional office reviewer is to review claims for a sample. The guide directs the reviewer to obtain a full list of all expansion enrollees from the state and to select 30 to 40 for further review. Next, the reviewer is to obtain supporting documentation from the state listing the eligibility factors for the sampled enrollees, such as age, pregnancy status, Medicare enrollment, and income. The reviewer is to select a single claim for each enrollee and verify that the corresponding expenditures were reported under the correct federal matching rate category—i.e., that the sample claim for each individual was accounted for in the relevant section of the CMS-64. The review guide specifies that the sample review be conducted each quarter unless the state has had four consecutive quarters with three or fewer errors, in which case, the sampling must be performed only annually. We found that regional offices were identifying errors in their sampling reviews. For example, region 3 reviewers found that Pennsylvania had incorrectly categorized an individual in the sample as a Medicaid expansion enrollee, with the selected expenditures initially reported as eligible for the higher matching rate. According to CMS central office officials, the sampling methodology has helped identify systemic issues with state expenditure systems in some states and resulted in corrections, adjustments, and in one case, a disallowance. Under current procedures, among our five selected states that expanded Medicaid under PPACA, all five were determined to have had four consecutive clean quarters according to agency officials; that is, the state had three or fewer errors in each quarter. Nationally, all but one of the 33 states that have implemented Medicaid expansion under PPACA had four consecutive clean quarters as of March 2018, according to CMS officials. We found, however, that CMS’s procedures for sampling reviews had a key weakness in that they did not account for varying risks across states, as illustrated in the following examples. We found that sample size does not account for significant differences in program size. For example, both California and Arkansas have expanded Medicaid under PPACA, and regional office staff told us they reviewed claims for 30 expansion enrollees in each of the two states, despite the fact that California has over 10 times as many expansion enrollees as Arkansas. Region 9 officials told us that for California they had initially sampled 100 enrollees during the first quarter they were required to conduct this analysis, but the review was time consuming given staff resources, and they were advised by CMS’s central office to limit their sample to 30 individuals. CMS officials told us that the sampling procedures are resource intensive and that the sample size they decided upon was what they thought they had the resources to complete. Additionally, the sample size does not account for previously identified risks in a state’s program. Specifically, as we noted in a 2015 report, CMS’s sampling review of expansion expenditures was not linked to or informed by reviews of eligibility determinations conducted by CMS, some of which identified high levels of eligibility determination errors. According to CMS officials, the expenditure review is primarily intended to ensure that states are correctly assigning expenditures for the expanded eligibility groups as initially determined, not whether the eligibility determination is correct. Federal standards for internal control related to risk assessment require that agencies identify, analyze, and respond to risks. However, because CMS’s sampling methodology does not account for risk factors like program size and high levels of eligibility determination errors, the agency’s review of expansion population expenditures may be missing opportunities to detect systemic issues with improperly matched expenditures. Quarterly variance analyses and sampling of Medicaid expansion enrollees can be supplemented by financial management reviews. For fiscal year 2016, CMS recommended regional offices conduct FMRs on expenditure claims for expansion enrollees. As of March 2018, however, regional offices had completed an FMR on Medicaid expansion expenditures in only one state, with no findings, and were in the process of completing FMRs for five other states. According to CMS officials, no additional reviews in this area were planned for fiscal year 2018. Financial Impact of Expenditure Reviews Compared with Program Integrity Recoveries The impact of CMS’s expenditure review activities is greater than the impact from other program integrity efforts. For example, in fiscal year 2015, CMS resolved errors through expenditure reviews that saved over $1.4 billion in federal funds. In the same year, CMS reported that efforts by states and the federal government to identify improper payments to providers—for example, services that were billed by a provider but were not received by a beneficiary—resulted in recoveries that totaled $852.9 million, in both state and federal funds. In fiscal years 2014 through 2017, CMS’s regional offices resolved expenditure errors that reduced federal spending by over $5.1 billion, with at least $1 billion in errors resolved in each of three of those four years. Errors were resolved through states agreeing to reduce their reported expenditures, which prevented federal payments to the state for those expenditures; and through CMS issuing disallowances, under which states are required to return federal funds. Although CMS resolved over $1 billion in expenditure errors in each year of fiscal years 2014 through 2016, CMS resolved less than $600 million in fiscal year 2017. CMS officials explained that this change likely reflects delays in clearance of disallowances due to the transition between presidential administrations. (See fig. 3.) In addition to these resolved errors, as of the end of 2017, CMS had $4.47 billion in outstanding deferrals of federal funds, where CMS was delaying federal funds until additional information was provided. Expenditures flagged for deferrals may or may not represent errors. All 10 CMS regional offices resolved errors from fiscal years 2014 through 2017, though the magnitude varied across regions. (See table 5.) Among the 10 regional offices, 9 reported that they had resolved errors through states agreeing to reduce reported expenditures. Additionally, 9 regional offices issued a total of 49 disallowances across 16 states, with the majority of the disallowances occurring in regional offices 2 and 3. Finally, all 10 regional offices had taken deferrals for questionable expenditures, with 22 states having outstanding “active” deferrals that had not been resolved as of the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2017, which ranged in amount from $178 to $444 million. CMS officials told us that the range of resolved errors and deferred funds across regional offices may reflect differences in the proportion of high-expenditure states. For example, regional office 4 oversees four states ranking in the top 20 in terms of Medicaid expenditures, while regional office 8 does not oversee any top- 20 states. The variation may also reflect large actions taken in specific states. For example, the majority of the disallowed funds in regional office 2 from fiscal years 2014 to 2017 were due to a single disallowance of $1.26 billion in one state. The financial significance of individual errors resolved by CMS’s regional offices varied significantly. We found that regional offices resolved errors that ranged from reporting errors that had no federal financial impact— such as expenditures that were allowable, but were reported on the incorrect line—to hundreds of millions of dollars in expenditures that were found to be unallowable under Medicaid requirements. Over the fiscal years we reviewed, more than half of the disallowances CMS issued were less than $15 million; however, in four states CMS issued disallowances of over $100 million, including a disallowance of over $1 billion in New York. (See fig. 5.) In some cases, actions taken by CMS to resolve errors were the culmination of years of work. For example, over several years the California Medicaid program reported a large volume of expenditures for which it did not yet have sufficient supporting documentation. The regional office officials told us that the state reported these expenditures in order to comply with the 2-year filing limit, and had reported these as “placeholder claims,” with the intention of providing additional support at a later time. Over the course of at least 6 years, CMS deferred hundreds of millions of dollars in federal funds related to these placeholder claims. Of the active deferrals as of the end of fiscal year 2017, most of the total amount of deferred funds was taken for expenditures in California, which represented $3.4 billion of the $4.5 billion in total active deferrals. According to CMS officials, in 2015, CMS prohibited California from reporting additional placeholder claims. Region 9 officials told us that they continue to work with the state to clear the deferrals related to this issue. They were able to resolve 9 related deferrals in fiscal year 2017; however, another over 60 deferrals were still unresolved. The growth of federal Medicaid expenditures, estimated at about $370 billion in fiscal year 2017, makes it critically important to assure expenditures are consistent with Medicaid requirements. CMS has a variety of processes in place to review state-reported expenditures, and those reviews have resulted in CMS resolving errors that have saved the federal government a considerable amount of money; over $5 billion in the last 4 years. However, the increasing complexity of expenditure reporting is occurring as resources to review these expenditures are decreasing, hindering CMS’s ability to target risk and potentially allowing for hundreds of millions of federal dollars in errors to go undetected. In the absence of a comprehensive risk assessment, which CMS has not conducted, CMS may be missing opportunities to better target resources to higher risk expenditures and increase the savings from these oversight activities. The variety of different matching rates has contributed to the increased complexity of CMS’s expenditure reviews. Although CMS has review procedures in place to assure that the correct matching rate is applied for services and populations receiving a higher federal matching rate, unclear guidance has contributed to inconsistency in the extent to which these reviews are conducted. In addition, we found weaknesses in the sampling methodology CMS requires its regional offices to use to help ensure that expenditures for Medicaid expansion enrollees—expenditures that receive a higher matching rate and that represented almost 20 percent of total federal Medicaid spending in 2016—are consistent with Medicaid requirements. In particular, the methodology does not account for risk factors like program size or vulnerabilities in state eligibility-determination processes and systems. As a result of the inconsistency in reviews and a sampling methodology that does not consider program risk, errors may be going undetected, resulting in CMS providing federal funds at higher federal matching rates than is allowable. In addition, CMS could be missing opportunities to identify any systemic issues that may contribute to such errors. We are making the following three recommendations to CMS: 1. The Administrator of CMS should complete a comprehensive, national risk assessment and take steps, as needed, to assure that resources to oversee expenditures reported by states are adequate and allocated based on areas of highest risk. (Recommendation 1) 2. The Administrator of CMS should clarify in internal guidance when a variance analysis on expenditures with higher match rates is required. (Recommendation 2) 3. The Administrator of CMS should revise the sampling methodology for reviewing expenditures for the Medicaid expansion population to better target reviews to areas of high risk. (Recommendation 3) We provided a draft of this report to HHS for review and comment. HHS concurred with all three recommendations, noting that it takes seriously its responsibilities to protect taxpayer funds by conducting thorough oversight of states’ claims for federal Medicaid expenditures. Regarding our first recommendation—that CMS complete a comprehensive, national risk assessment and take steps to assure that resources are adequate and allocated based on risk—HHS noted that CMS will complete such an assessment, and, based on this review, will determine the appropriate allocation of resources based on expenditures, program risk, and historical financial issues. CMS will also identify opportunities to increase resources. Regarding our second recommendation—clarifying internal guidance on when a variance analysis on higher matched expenditures is required—HHS noted that CMS will issue such internal guidance. Regarding our third recommendation—that CMS revise the sampling methodology for reviewing expenditures for the Medicaid expansion population to better target reviews to areas of high risk—HHS noted CMS is considering ways to revise its methodology. HHS’s comments are reproduced in appendix II. As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the Secretary of Health and Human Services, appropriate congressional committees, and other interested parties. The correspondence is also available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-7114 or yocomc@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix III. Public psychiatric residential treatment facilities Medicare Part B premium buy-ins Outpatient hospital reimbursement for mental health services Review of comprehensive psychiatric emergency program rates Provider taxes implemented to avoid program reductions Health homes data and expenditures reporting Provider incentive payments for health information technology 1115 demonstration provider incentive payments Public psychiatric residential treatment facilities Managed care organizations’ provider payments Provider incentive payments for health information technology Federally qualified health center reimbursement payments Eligibility and enrollment maintenance and operations Managed care organizations’ reporting of drug rebates 3 CMS cancelled these 2014 FMRs due to a staffing shortage. Region 8 was excused from the requirement to conduct an FMR in 2016 due to staffing constraints. In addition to the contact named above, Susan Barnidge (Assistant Director), Jasleen Modi (Analyst-in-Charge), Caroline Hale, Perry Parsons, and Sierra Gaffney made key contributions to this report. Also contributing were Giselle Hicks, Drew Long, and Jennifer Whitworth.	[ "Medicaid has grown by over 50 percent over the last decade, with about $370 billion in federal spending in fiscal year 2017. CMS is responsible for assuring that expenditures—reported quarterly by states—are consistent with Medicaid requirements and matched with the correct amount of federal funds. CMS's review of reported expenditures has become increasingly complex due to variation in states' Medicaid programs and an increasing number of different matching rates. GAO was asked to examine CMS's oversight of state-reported Medicaid expenditures. In this report, GAO examined how CMS assures that (1) expenditures are supported and consistent with requirements; and (2) the correct federal matching rates were applied to expenditures subject to a higher match. GAO also examined the financial impact of resolved errors. GAO reviewed documentation for the most recently completed quarterly reviews by 3 of CMS's 10 regional offices for six states that varied by Medicaid program expenditures and design. GAO also reviewed policies, procedures, and data on resolved errors; and interviewed CMS and state officials. GAO assessed CMS's oversight processes against federal standards for internal control. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), which oversees Medicaid, has various review processes in place to assure that expenditures reported by states are supported and consistent with Medicaid requirements. The agency also has processes to review that the correct federal matching rates were applied to expenditures receiving a higher than standard federal matching rate, which can include certain types of services and populations. These processes collectively have had a considerable federal financial benefit, with CMS resolving errors that reduced federal spending by over $5.1 billion in fiscal years 2014 through 2017. However, GAO identified weaknesses in how CMS targets its resources to address risks when reviewing whether expenditures are supported and consistent with requirements. CMS devotes similar levels of staff resources to review expenditures despite differing levels of risk across states. For example, the number of staff reviewing California's expenditures—which represent 15 percent of federal Medicaid spending—is similar to the number reviewing Arkansas' expenditures, which represents 1 percent of federal Medicaid spending. CMS cancelled in-depth financial management reviews in 17 out of 51 instances over the last 5 years. These reviews target expenditures considered by CMS to be at risk of not meeting program requirements. CMS told GAO that resource constraints contributed to both weaknesses. However, the agency has not completed a comprehensive assessment of risk to (1) determine whether oversight resources are adequate and (2) focus on the most significant areas of risk. Absent such an assessment, CMS is missing an opportunity to identify errors in reported expenditures that could result in substantial savings to the Medicaid program. GAO also found limitations in CMS's processes for reviewing expenditures that receive a higher federal matching rate. Internal guidance for examining variances in these expenditures was unclear, and not all reviewers in the three CMS regional offices GAO reviewed were investigating significant variances in quarter-to-quarter expenditures. Review procedures for expenditures for individuals newly eligible for Medicaid under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act were not tailored to different risk levels among states. For example, in its reviews of a sample of claims for this population, CMS reviewed claims for the same number of enrollees—30—in California as for Arkansas, even though California had 10 times the number of newly eligible enrollees as Arkansas. Without clear internal guidance and better targeting of risks in its review procedures for expenditures receiving higher matching rates, CMS may overpay states. GAO is making three recommendations, including that CMS improve its risk-based targeting of oversight efforts and resources, and clarify related internal guidance. The Department of Health and Human Services concurred with these recommendations." ]	5,872	gov_report	en	null	79efb6240ef8486e6a6eeb17feafaae41d5cbd53412d244e
Since 1952, when a cabal of Egyptian Army officers, known as the Free Officers Movement, ousted the British-backed king, Egypt's military has produced four presidents; Gamal Abdel Nasser (1954-1970), Anwar Sadat (1970-1981), Hosni Mubarak (1981-2011), and Abdel Fattah el Sisi (2013-present). In general, these four men have ruled Egypt with strong backing from the country's security establishment. The only significant and abiding opposition has come from the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, an organization that has opposed single party military-backed rule and advocated for a state governed by a vaguely articulated combination of civil and Shariah (Islamic) law. Egypt's sole departure from this general formula took place between 2011 and 2013, after popular demonstrations sparked by the "Arab Spring," which had started in neighboring Tunisia, compelled the military to force the resignation of former President Hosni Mubarak in February 2011. During this period, Egypt experienced tremendous political tumult, culminating in the one-year presidency of the Muslim Brotherhood's Muhammad Morsi. When Morsi took office on June 30, 2012, after winning Egypt's first truly competitive presidential election, his ascension to the presidency was supposed to mark the end of a rocky 16-month transition period. Proposed time lines for elections, the constitutional drafting process, and the military's relinquishing of power to a civilian government had been constantly changed, contested, and sometimes even overruled by the courts. Instead of consolidating democratic or civilian rule, Morsi's rule exposed the deep divisions in Egyptian politics, pitting a broad cross-section of Egypt's public and private sectors, the Coptic Church, and the military against the Brotherhood and its Islamist supporters. The atmosphere of mutual distrust, political gridlock, and public dissatisfaction that permeated Morsi's presidency provided Egypt's military, led by then-Defense Minister Sisi, with an opportunity to reassert political control. On July 3, 2013, following several days of mass demonstrations against Morsi's rule, the military unilaterally dissolved Morsi's government, suspended the constitution that had been passed during his rule, and installed an interim president. The Muslim Brotherhood and its supporters declared the military's actions a coup d'etat and protested in the streets. Weeks later, Egypt's military and national police launched a violent crackdown against the Muslim Brotherhood, resulting in police and army soldiers firing live ammunition against demonstrators encamped in several public squares and the killing of at least 1,150 demonstrators. The Egyptian military justified these actions by decrying the encampments as a threat to national security. As Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al Sisi consolidates his power amid a continuing macroeconomic recovery, Egypt is poised to play an increasingly active role in the region, albeit from a more independent position vis-a-vis the United States than in the past. Although Egyptian relations with the Trump Administration are solid, and Egypt has relied on the International Monetary Fund (IMF) program to guide its economic recovery, Egypt seems committed to broadening its international base of support. The United States plays a key role in that international base, but Egypt also has other significant partners, including the Arab Gulf states, Israel, Russia, and France. The Egyptian government blames American criticism of its human rights record for preventing closer U.S.-Egyptian ties. From the U.S. perspective, some Members of Congress, U.S. media outlets, and advocacy groups document how Egyptian authorities have widened the scope of a crackdown against dissent, which initially was aimed at the Muslim Brotherhood but has evolved to encompass a broader range of political speech. Egypt's parliament is currently considering whether to adopt a package of draft constitutional amendments that would extend presidential term limits and executive branch control over the judiciary. If Egypt's 2019 constitutional amendments are approved, President Sisi will attain unprecedented power in the political system over the military and the judiciary and, if reelected, will have the potential to remain in office until 2034. He has inserted his older brother and oldest son into key security and intelligence positions while stymying all opposition to his rule and criticism of his government. This consolidation of power and crackdown against dissent has taken place during a period of steady economic growth, which has not benefitted wide swaths of the population. The state has enacted a series of austerity measures to reduce debt in compliance with IMF-mandated reforms. In the year ahead, economists anticipate gross domestic product (GDP) growth of 5.3%, driven by an expansion in tourism and natural gas production. Nevertheless, Egyptians continue to endure double-digit inflation stemming in part from the 2016 flotation of the currency, tax increases, and reductions in food and fuel subsidies. While it is difficult to ascertain how dissatisfied the public is with rising prices, President Sisi has responded to criticisms of his economic policies, stating: "The path of real reform is difficult and cruel and causes a lot of suffering.... But there is no doubt that the suffering resulting from the lack of reform is much worse." The IMF has praised the Egyptian government's record of reform implementation, while also highlighting the need for private sector growth "that will absorb the rapidly growing labor force and ensure that the benefits are perceived more widely." After several years of observers seeing Egypt as more inwardly focused, several recent developments suggest an increasingly active foreign policy. In January 2019, Egypt hosted an international forum on Mediterranean gas which included European and Arab countries together with Israel. A month later, President Sisi was elected head of the African Union for a year-long term. In February 2019, Egypt hosted the first-ever European Union- Arab summit in Sharm el Sheikh, where officials discussed terrorism, migration, and the need for greater European-Arab cooperation to counter a perceived growing Chinese and Russian interest in the Middle East. Personnel moves and other developments in Egypt highlight apparent efforts by President Sisi to consolidate power with the help of political allies, including colleagues from Egypt's security establishment. In June 2018, Sisi reshuffled his cabinet, making key changes to the defense and interior ministries, among other appointments. Sisi appointed Mohamed Ahmed Zaki, former head of the Republican Guard, as defense minister and Mahmoud Tawfik, former head of the National Security Service, as interior minister. According to one account, Sisi may have been rewarding Zaki for his role in arresting former Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi in 2013. In July 2018, parliament passed Law 161 of 2018, providing judicial immunity to senior military commanders for military acts committed during the two-and-a-half-year period beginning with the military coup of July 2013. The new law grants immunity to senior commanders while potentially keeping high-ranking officers on reserve duty for life, making them ineligible to run for president. In order for a senior commander to be prosecuted under this new law, a case would have to be first authorized by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), which President Sisi appoints. According to one analysis, the law deters senior officers from challenging President Sisi (for example, some challenges occurred during the run-up to the 2018 presidential election), thereby acting "as a guarantor of President Sisi's authoritarian rule, setting the stage for him to remain president for life." Per the 2014 Egyptian constitution (article 140), President Sisi, who was reelected in April 2018, may only serve two four-year terms in office (current term ends in 2022). However, his supporters have proposed a set of amendments to the constitution which, if approved by parliament and public referendum, have the potential to make President Sisi eligible for an additional two six-year terms when his current term ends in 2022. Other proposed changes to the constitution include granting the president the authority to appoint all chief justices of Egyptian judicial bodies, and the public prosecutor; requiring that at least one-quarter of the seats in the parliament be allocated to women and reducing the number of the seats in the House of Representatives from 596 to 450; and establishing an upper house of parliament (Senate) consisting of 250 members, two-thirds of whom would be elected and one-third of whom would be appointed by the president. President Sisi has come under repeated international criticism for an ongoing government crackdown against various forms of political dissent and freedom of expression. Certain practices of Sisi's government, the parliament, and the security apparatus have been contentious. According to the U.S. State Department's report on human rights conditions in Egypt in 2017: The most significant human rights issues included arbitrary or unlawful killings by the government or its agents; major terrorist attacks; disappearances; torture; harsh or potentially life-threatening prison conditions; arbitrary arrest and detention; including the use of military courts to try civilians; political prisoners and detainees; unlawful interference in privacy; limits on freedom of expression, including criminal "defamation of religion" laws; restrictions on the press, internet, and academic freedom; and restrictions on freedoms of assembly and association, including government control over registration and financing of NGOs [nongovernmental organizations]. LGBTI persons faced arrests, imprisonment, and degrading treatment. The government did not effectively respond to violence against women, and there were reports of child labor. Select international human rights, democracy, and development monitoring organizations provide the following rankings for Egypt globally: Other human rights issues of potential interest to Congress may include the 2013 convictions of American, European, and Egyptian civil society representatives; the controversial 2017 NGO law; the detention of American citizens in Egypt; and the treatment of Coptic Christians, discussed in the following sections. In 2013, an Egyptian court convicted and sentenced 43 individuals from the United States, Egypt, and Europe, including the Egypt country directors of the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the International Republican Institute (IRI), for spending money from organizations that were operating in Egypt without a license and for receiving foreign funds (known as Case 173 or the "foreign funding case"). Some lawmakers had protested that those individuals were wrongfully convicted and had requested that the Egyptian government and judiciary resolve the matter. In 2018, a retrial began and, on December 20, 2018, the individuals were acquitted of all charges. In January 2019, U.S. Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo traveled to Cairo, where he remarked: "I was happy to see our citizens, wrongly convicted of improperly operating NGOs here, finally be acquitted. And we strongly support President Sisi's initiative to amend Egyptian law so that this does not happen again. More work certainly needs to be done to maximize the potential of the Egyptian nation and its people. I'm glad that America will be a partner in those efforts." However, Case 173 remains active, as the judiciary has imposed asset freezes and travel bans on several Egyptian civil society activists. In May 2017, President Sisi signed Law 70 of 2017 on Associations and Other Foundations Working in the Field of Civil Work. The parliament had passed this bill six months earlier, and both the passage and signing drew widespread international condemnation. The new law (which replaced a 2002 NGO law) requires NGOs to receive prior approval from internal security before accepting foreign funding. It also restricts the scope of permitted NGO activities and increases penalties for violations, including possible imprisonment for up to five years. However, the government did not issue implementing regulations for the new NGO law. At Egypt's November 2018 World Youth Forum in Sharm el Sheikh, President Sisi announced plans to amend Law 70. According to Sisi, "I want to reassure those who are listening to me inside Egypt and outside of Egypt, that in Egypt, we are keen that the law becomes balanced and achieves what is required of it to regulate the work of these groups in a good way. This is not just political talk." Since then, Egypt's Ministry of Social Solidarity has held multiple rounds of talks with local NGOs aimed at determining which articles of the law need to be amended. A draft proposal is expected to be ready in the spring of 2019, when it will be sent to parliament for consideration. The detention of American citizens in Egypt has continued to strain U.S.-Egyptian relations. Some Members of Congress are concerned about the case of 53-year-old New York resident Mustafa Kassem, who was detained by authorities in 2013 and sentenced to 15 years in prison in a mass trial in September 2018. These lawmakers insist that Kassem, who has been on a limited hunger strike, was wrongfully arrested and convicted, and they have sought Trump Administration support in securing his release from the government of Egypt. In January 2018, Vice President Pence raised Kassem's case directly with President Sisi in a meeting in Cairo, saying "I told him we'd like to see those American citizens restored to their families and restored to our country." Since taking office, President Sisi has publicly called for greater Muslim-Christian coexistence and national unity. In January 2019, he inaugurated Egypt's Coptic Cathedral of Nativity in the new administrative capital east of Cairo saying, "This is an important moment in our history.... We are one and we will remain one." Despite these public calls for improved interfaith relations in Egypt, the minority Coptic Christian community continues to claim that they face professional and social discrimination, along with occasional sectarian attacks by terrorists and vigilantes. Coptic Christians have also voiced concern about state regulation of church construction. They have long demanded that the government reform long-standing laws (with two dating back to 1856 and 1934, respectively) on building codes for Christian places of worship. Article 235 of Egypt's 2014 constitution mandates that parliament reform these building code regulations. In 2016, parliament approved a church construction law (Law 80 of 2016) that expedited the government approval process for the construction and restoration of Coptic churches, among other structures. Although Coptic Pope Tawadros II welcomed the law, others claim that it continues to be discriminatory. According to Human Rights Watch , "the new law allows governors to deny church-building permits with no stated way to appeal, requires that churches be built 'commensurate with' the number of Christians in the area, and contains security provisions that risk subjecting decisions on whether to allow church construction to the whims of violent mobs." For 2019, the IMF projects 5.3% GDP growth for the Egyptian economy, noting that the outlook remains "favorable, supported by strong policy implementation." In 2016, the IMF and Egypt reached a three-year, $12 billion loan agreement, $10 billion of which has been disbursed as of March 2019. Key sources of foreign exchange (tourism and remittances) are up and unemployment is at its lowest level since 2011. In line with IMF recommendations, the government has taken several steps to reform the economy, including depreciating the currency, reducing fuel subsidies, enacting a value-added tax (VAT), and providing cash payments to the poor in lieu of subsidizing household goods (though many food subsidies continue). Egypt's energy sector also is contributing to the economy's rebound. Egypt is the largest oil producer in Africa outside of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the third-largest natural gas producer on the continent following Algeria and Nigeria. In December 2017, an Egyptian and Italian partnership began commercial output from the Zohr natural gas field (est. 30 trillion cubic feet of gas), the largest ever natural gas field discovered in the Mediterranean Sea (see Figure 3 ). The Egyptian government also has repaid debts owed to foreign energy companies, allowing for new investments from BP and BG Group. Egypt is attempting to position itself as a regional gas hub, whereby its own gas fields meet domestic demand while imported gas from Israel and Cyprus can be liquefied in Egypt and reexported. Israeli and Egyptian companies have bought significant shares of an unused undersea pipeline connecting Israel to the northern Sinai Peninsula (see Figure 4 ). The pipeline will be used to transport natural gas from Israel to Egypt for possible reexport, as part of an earlier 10-year, $15 billion gas deal between the U.S. Company Noble Energy, its Israeli partner Delek, and the Egyptian company Dolphinus Holdings. In January 2019, Egypt convened the first ever Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF), a regional consortium consisting of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, Cyprus, Greece, and Italy, intended to consolidate regional energy policies and reduce costs. Despite Egypt's positive economic outlook, significant challenges remain. Inflation remains over 11%, making the cost of goods high for many Egyptians. In addition, while the fiscal deficit may be decreasing, Egypt's overall public and foreign debt have grown significantly in recent years and remain high, leading the government to allocate resources (nearly 38% of Egypt's budget) toward debt-service payments and away from spending on health and education. Economists forecast that total public debt will reach 84.8% of GDP and external debt 32% of GDP ($101.7 billion) in 2019. Some observers assert that Egypt's recent economic reforms, while successful in the short term, have not addressed deeper structural impediments to growth. For example, Egypt's industrial sector is heavily dependent upon imports and, as the economy expands, the demand for foreign currency increases. According to Bloomberg , "this means, the more the economy grows, the greater the pressure on dollar reserves. It doesn't help that these were built up almost entirely through foreign borrowing, pushing Egypt's foreign debt from $55 billion in 2016 to $92 billion in late 2018. It won't be long before the country's finances are once again in crisis." Many experts argue that to sustain growth over the long term, Egypt requires dramatic expansion of the nonhydrocarbon private sector. For decades, Egypt's military has played a key role in the nation's economy as a food producer and low-cost domestic manufacturer of consumable products; however, due to political sensitivities, the extent of its economic power is rarely quantified. Egypt's military is largely economically self-sufficient. It produces what it consumes (food and clothes) and then sells surplus goods for additional revenue. Egyptian military companies have been the main beneficiaries of the massive infrastructure contracts Sisi has commissioned. Moreover, military-owned manufacturing companies have expanded into new markets, producing goods (appliances, solar panels, some electronics, and some medical equipment) that are cheaper than either foreign imports or domestically produced goods made by the private sector. President Sisi, who led the 2013 military intervention and was elected president in mid-2014, came to power promising not only to defeat violent Salafi-Jihadi terrorist groups militarily, but also to counter their foundational ideology, which President Sisi and his supporters often attribute to the Muslim Brotherhood. President Sisi has outlawed the Muslim Brotherhood while launching a more general crackdown against a broad spectrum of opponents, both secular and Islamist. While Egypt is no longer beset by the kind of large-scale civil unrest and public protest it faced during the immediate post-Mubarak era, it continues to face terrorist and insurgent violence, both in the Sinai Peninsula and in the rest of Egypt. Terrorists based in the Sinai Peninsula (the Sinai) have been waging an insurgency against the Egyptian government since 2011. While the terrorist landscape in Egypt is evolving and encompasses several groups, the Islamic State's Sinai Province affiliate (IS-SP) is known as the most lethal. Since its affiliation with the Islamic State in 2014, IS-SP has attacked the Egyptian military continually, targeted Coptic Christian individuals and places of worship, and occasionally fired rockets into Israel. In October 2015, IS-SP targeted Russian tourists departing the Sinai by planting a bomb aboard Metrojet Flight 9268, which exploded midair, killing all 224 passengers and crew aboard. Two years later, on November 24, 2017, IS-SP gunmen launched an attack against the Al Rawdah mosque in the town of Bir al Abed in northern Sinai. That attack killed at least 305 people, making it the deadliest terrorist attack in Egypt's modern history. Combating terrorism in the Sinai is particularly challenging due to an array of factors, including the following: Geograph y : The peninsula's interior is mountainous and sparsely populated, providing militants with ample freedom of movement. Demograph y and Culture : The Sinai's northern population is a mix of Palestinians and Bedouin Arab tribes whose relationship to the state is filled with distrust. Sinai Bedouin have faced discrimination and exclusion from full citizenship and access to the economy. In the absence of development, a black market economy based primarily on smuggling has thrived, further contributing to the popular portrayal of Bedouin as outlaws. State authorities charge that the Sinai Bedouin seek autonomy from the central government, while residents insist on obtaining basic rights, such as property rights, full citizenship, and access to government services such as education and health care. Econom ics : Bedouins claim that Egypt has underinvested in northern Sinai, channeling development toward southern tourist destinations that cater to foreign visitors. Northern Sinai consists of mostly flat desert terrain inhospitable to large-scale agriculture without significant investment in irrigation. For decades, the Egyptian state has claimed to follow successive Sinai development plans. However, Egyptian governance and development of the Sinai has been hampered by corruption. Diploma cy : The 1979 Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty limits the number of soldiers that Egypt can deploy in the Sinai, subject to the parties' ability to negotiate changes as circumstances necessitate. Egypt and Israel mutually agree upon any short-term increase of Egypt's military presence in the Sinai. Since Israel returned control over the Sinai to Egypt in 1982, the area has been partially demilitarized, and the Sinai has served as an effective buffer zone between the two countries. The Multinational Force and Observers, or MFO, are deployed in the Sinai to monitor the terms of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty (see Figure 5 ). Egypt and Israel reportedly continue to cooperate in countering terrorism in the Sinai. In a televised interview, President Sisi responded to a question on whether Egyptian-Israeli military cooperation was the closest it has ever been, saying "That is correct. The [Egyptian] Air Force sometimes needs to cross to the Israeli side. And that's why we have a wide range of coordination with the Israelis." One news account suggests that Israel, with Egypt's approval, has used its own drones, helicopters, and aircraft to carry out more than 100 covert airstrikes inside Egypt against militant targets. In order to counter IS-SP in northern Sinai, the Egyptian armed forces and police have declared a state of emergency, imposed curfews and travel restrictions, and erected police checkpoints along main roads. Authorities also have limited domestic and foreign media access to the northern Sinai, declaring it an active combat zone and unsafe for journalists. According to Jane's Defence Weekly , Egypt may be upgrading an old air base in the Sinai (Bir Gifgafa), where it could deploy Apache attack helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles for use in counterterrorism operations. While an increased Egyptian military presence in the Sinai may be necessary to stabilize the area, many observers have argued that military means alone are insufficient. These critics say that force should be accompanied by policies to reduce the appeal of antigovernment militancy by addressing local political and economic grievances. According to one account: Sinai residents are prohibited from joining any senior post in the state. They cannot work in the army, police, judiciary, or in diplomacy. Meanwhile, no development projects have been undertaken in North Sinai the past 40 years. The villages of Rafah and Sheikh Zuwayed have no schools or hospitals and no modern system to receive potable water. They depend on rainwater and wells, as if it were the Middle Ages. Egyptian counterterrorism efforts in the Sinai appear to have reduced the frequency of terrorist attacks somewhat. In February 2018, the military launched an offensive campaign, dubbed "Operation Sinai 2018." During the campaign, the military deployed tens of thousands of troops to the peninsula and was able to eliminate several senior IS-SP leaders. One report suggests that unlike previous military operations against militants in the Sinai, this time the Egyptian military armed progovernment tribesmen to assist conventional forces in combating IS-SP. According to one analysis, the military's recent campaign has "to some degree, restricted the militants' movements, destroyed a number of hideouts, and most importantly eliminated several trained and influential elements." However, as in previous major operations, once the military reduces its presence in northern Sinai, terrorist groups may reconstitute themselves. In March 2019, CENTCOM Commander General Joseph L. Votel testified before Congress, stating that the "Egyptian Armed Forces have more effectively fought ISIS in the Sinai and are now taking active measures to address the underlying issues that give life to—to these violent extremist groups and are helping to contain the threat." Outside of the Sinai, either in the western desert near the Libya border or other areas (Cairo, Nile Delta, Upper Egypt), small nationalist insurgent groups, such as Liwa al Thawra (The Revolution Brigade) and Harakat Sawaed Misr (Arms of Egypt Movement, referred to by its Arabic acronym HASM), have carried out high-level assassinations of military/police officials and bombings of infrastructure. According to one expert, these insurgent groups are comprised mainly of former Muslim Brotherhood activists who have splintered off from the main organization to wage an insurgency against the government. On January 31, 2018, the U.S. State Department designated Liwa al Thawra and HASM as Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs) under Section 1(b) of Executive Order (E.O.) 13224. The State Department noted that some of the leaders of both groups "were previously associated with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood." Terrorist attacks against key sectors of the economy continue. In December 2018, a bus carrying a group of Vietnamese tourists to the pyramids in Giza hit a roadside bomb killing 4 people and injuring 11 others. No group claimed responsibility for the attack. In February 2019, a terrorist detonated a suicide bomb he was carrying while being pursued by police, killing himself and two officers near Cairo's popular Khan el Khalili market and famous Al Azhar Mosque. Egypt and Israel have continued to find specific areas in which they can cooperate. In 2018, Israeli and Egyptian companies entered into a decade-long agreement by reaching a $15 billion natural gas deal, according to which Israeli off-shore natural gas will be exported to Egypt for liquefaction before being exported elsewhere (see " The Economy " above). While people-to-people relations remain cold, Israel and Egypt continue to cooperate against Hamas in the Gaza Strip. In mid-November 2018, Egyptian mediation between Israel and Hamas helped calm tensions after an Israeli raid inside Gaza escalated tensions. Egypt reportedly continues to broker indirect Israel-Hamas talks aimed at establishing a long-term cease-fire. Egypt is opposed to Islamist groups wielding political power across the Middle East, and opposes Turkish and Qatari support for Hamas. On the Egyptian-Gaza border, Egypt has tried to thwart arms tunnel smuggling into Gaza and has accused Palestinian militants in Gaza of aiding terrorist groups in the Sinai. In order to weaken Hamas's rule in Gaza, Egypt has sought to restore a Palestinian Authority (PA) presence in Gaza by reconciling it with the PA. Though Egypt has helped broker several agreements aimed at ending the West Bank-Gaza split, Hamas still effectively controls Gaza. Egypt controls the Rafah border crossing into Gaza, the only non-Israeli-controlled entryway into the Strip, which it periodically closes for security reasons. Control over the Rafah border crossing provides Egypt with some leverage over Hamas, though Egyptian authorities use it carefully in order not to spark a humanitarian crisis on their border. Egypt's relations with most Gulf Arab monarchies are strong. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Kuwait have provided billions of dollars in financial assistance to Egypt's military-backed government since 2013. Saudi Arabia also hosts nearly 3 million Egyptian expatriates who work in the kingdom, providing a valuable source of remittances for Egyptians back home. From 2013 onward, Emirati companies have made significant investments in the Egyptian economy. Egypt transferred sovereignty to Saudi Arabia over two islands at the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba—Tiran and Sanafir—that had been under Egyptian control since 1950, in a move that sparked rare public criticism of President Sisi. In June 2017, Egypt joined other Gulf Arab monarchies in boycotting Qatar. In Yemen, Egypt is officially part of the Saudi-led coalition against Houthi forces, though its contribution to the war effort has been minimal. The Egyptian government supports Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar and the Libyan National Army (LNA) movement, which controls most of eastern Libya. Haftar's politics closely align with President Sisi's, as both figures hail from the military and broadly oppose Islamist political forces. From a security standpoint, Egypt seeks the restoration of order on its western border, which has experienced occasional terrorist attacks and arms smuggling. From an economic standpoint, thousands of Egyptian guest workers were employed in Libya's energy sector prior to unrest in Libya in 2011, and Egypt seeks their return to Libya and a resumption of the vital remittances those workers provided the Egyptian economy. Diplomatically, Egypt has tried to leverage its close ties to Haftar and the LNA in order to play the role of mediator between the LNA and Fayez al Sarraj, the Chairman of the Presidential Council of Libya and Prime Minister of the U.N.-backed Government of National Accord. Egypt's policy toward Libya also is closely aligned with other foreign backers of the LNA, including France and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Reportedly, the three countries are working in concert to strengthen the position of Haftar in order to facilitate the eventual reunification of the Libyan army. A 2019 LNA offensive into southern Libya has placed additional pressure on the Government of National Accord and may complicate U.S.-backed efforts by the United Nations to facilitate a national dialogue, constitutional referendum, and elections in 2019. To Egypt's south, the government is embroiled in regional disputes with Nile Basin countries, such as Ethiopia, which is nearing completion of the $4.2 billion Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, a major hydroelectric project. Egypt argues that the dam, once filled, will limit the flow of the Nile River below Egypt's agreed share. However, many analysts expect that Egypt will address the dispute by increasing water-use efficiency and investing in desalination, rather than using its military to bomb the dam. Reduced Nile flow into Egypt may exacerbate existing water shortages and cause short-term political problems for the Egyptian government, which faces extensive domestic water needs. In February 2019, President Sisi assumed the one-year chairmanship of the African Union, during which he is expected to promote closer relations with fellow African states. Egypt and Russia, close allies in early years of the Cold War, have again strengthened bilateral ties under President Sisi, who has promised to restore Egyptian stability and international prestige. His relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin has rekindled, in the words of one observer, "a romanticized memory of relations with Russia during the Nasser era." President Sisi first turned to Russia during the Obama Administration, when U.S.-Egyptian ties were strained, and Egypt seemed intent on signaling its displeasure with U.S. policy. Since 2014, Egypt and Russia have improved ties in a number of ways, including through arms deals. Reportedly, Egypt is upgrading its aging fleet of legacy Soviet MiG-21 aircraft to a fourth generation MiG-29M variant with additional deliveries to Egypt in 2018 (first delivered in April 2017). Egypt also has purchased 46 standard Ka-52 Russian attack helicopters for its air force. Egypt reportedly also has purchased the naval version of the Ka-52 for use on Egypt's two French-procured Mistral-class helicopter dock vessels (see below), and the S-300VM surface-to-air missile defense system from Russia. In August 2018, Egyptian Defense Minister Mohamed Zaki visited Russia, where he attended a Russian arms exhibition. Additionally, Egypt and Russia reportedly have expanded their cooperation on nuclear energy. In 2015, Egypt reached a deal with Russian state energy firm Rosatom to construct a 4,800-megawatt nuclear power plant in the Egyptian Mediterranean coastal town of Daba'a, 80 miles northwest of Cairo. Russia is lending Egypt $25 billion over 35 years to finance the construction and operation of the nuclear power plant (this will cover 85% of the project's total costs). The contract also commits Russia to supply the plant's nuclear fuel for 60 years and transfer and store depleted nuclear fuel from the reactors. As Egyptian and Russian foreign policies have become more closely aligned in conflict zones such as eastern Libya, bilateral military cooperation has expanded. One report suggests that Russian Special Forces based out of an airbase in Egypt's western desert (Sidi Barrani) may be aiding General Haftar. In November 2017, Egypt and Russia signed a draft agreement governing the use of each other's air space. While Egyptian-Russian ties have grown warmer in recent years, they are not without complications. In the aftermath of an October 2015 terrorist attack against a Russian passenger jet departing from Sharm El Sheikh, visits to Egypt by Russian tourists, previously the country's largest source of tourists, dropped significantly. Russian commercial aircraft have resumed direct flights to Cairo but not to Sharm El Sheikh. Egypt and Russia also engaged in a trade dispute in 2016 over Russian wheat imports. Egypt is the largest global importer of wheat, and the largest export market for Russian wheat. Aside from Russia, France stands out as a non-U.S. country with which President Sisi has sought to build a diplomatic and military procurement relationship. In the last five years, as French-Egyptian ties have improved, Egypt has purchased major air and naval defense systems from French defense contractors, including the following: Four Gowind Corvettes (produced by Naval Group)—This deal was signed in July 2014. As part of the French-Egyptian arrangement, some of the Corvette construction has taken place at the Alexandria Shipyard in Egypt. One FREMM multi-mission Frigate (produced by Naval Group)—Named the Tahya Misr (Long Live Egypt), this vessel was delivered to Egypt in 2015. This ship has participated in an annual joint French-Egyptian naval exercise, known as Cleopatra. In February 2015, Egypt purchased 24 Rafale multirole fighters (produced by Dassault Aviation). Under the initial agreement, Egypt and France may enter into a new procurement agreement for 12 additional Rafale fighters. According to the manufacturer, the Rafale has flown in combat in Afghanistan, Libya, Mali, Iraq, and Syria and is used by Egypt, Qatar, and India. In 2018, French officials said that the United States would not permit France to export the SCALP air-launched land-attack cruise missile used on the Rafale to Egypt under the International Trade in Arms Regulation (ITAR) agreement. The United States may have been concerned over the transfer of sensitive technology to Egypt. Two Mistral-class Helicopter Carriers (produced by Naval Group)—In the fall of 2015, France announced that it would sell Egypt two Mistral-class Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD) vessels (each carrier can carry 16 helicopters, 4 landing craft, and 13 tanks) for $1 billion. The LHDs (ENS Anwar El Sadat and ENS Gamal Abdel Nasser ) were delivered in 2016. In 2017, Egypt announced that it would purchase Russian 46 Ka-52 Alligator helicopters, which can operate on the LHDs. In January 2019, French President Emmanuel Macron paid a three-day visit to Egypt, where he raised human rights issues in public and with Egyptian authorities and civil society representatives. According to Macron, "I can't see how you can pretend to ensure long-term stability in this country, which was at the heart of the Arab Spring and showed its taste for freedom, and think you can continue to harden beyond what's acceptable or justified for security reasons." President Trump has praised the Egyptian government's counterterrorism efforts while his Administration has worked to restore high-level diplomatic engagement, joint military exercises, and arms sales. Many commentators initially expected President Trump to bring the United States and Egypt closer together, and that largely has been the case. The Administration has withheld some foreign assistance for policy reasons on at least one occasion, however, and the United States has not had an ambassador in Cairo since June 30, 2017. As evidence of improved bilateral ties, the U.S. Defense Department notified Congress in November 2018 of a major $1 billion sale of defense equipment to Egypt, consisting of 10 AH-64E Apache Attack Helicopters, among other things. The Egyptian Air Force already possesses 45 less advanced versions of the Apache that were acquired between 2000 and 2014. In January 2019, U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo delivered a major policy speech at the American University in Cairo, where he stated: "And as we seek an even stronger partnership with Egypt, we encourage President Sisi to unleash the creative energy of Egypt's people, unfetter the economy, and promote a free and open exchange of ideas. The progress made to date can continue." U.S. officials have not yet publicly criticized efforts by supporters of President Sisi to advance amendments to the constitution (see above) to extend the possibility of Sisi's continued presidency. Human rights advocates have called for Western governments to withhold assistance to Egypt if the amendments are approved. According to Human Rights Watch , "Al-Sisi's government is encouraged by the continued silence of its allies, and if the US, UK, and France want to avoid the destabilizing consequences of entrenching authoritarian rule in Egypt, they should act now." On February 22, 2019, a bipartisan group of national security experts called on U.S. officials to "express strong concern about the amendments to the Egyptian constitution now moving through a rapid approval process." Egypt's poor record on human rights and democratization has sparked regular criticism from U.S. officials and some Members of Congress. Since FY2012, Members have passed appropriations legislation that withholds the obligation of FMF to Egypt until the Secretary of State certifies that Egypt is taking various steps toward supporting democracy and human rights. With the exception of FY2014, lawmakers have included a national security waiver to allow the Administration to waive these congressionally mandated certification requirements under certain conditions. Over the last year, the Administration has obligated several tranches of FMF to Egypt, including the following: In September 2018, the Administration obligated $1 billion in FY2018 FMF. Per Section 7041(a)(3)(A) of P.L. 115-141 , the Consolidated Appropriations Act, FY2018, $300 million in FMF remains withheld from obligation until the Secretary of State certifies that Egypt is taking various steps toward supporting democracy and human rights. In previous acts, the amount withheld had been $195 million. FY2018 FMF for Egypt remains available to be expended until September 30, 2019. In August 2018, the Administration waived the certification requirement in Section 7041(a)(3)(B) of P.L. 115-31 , the Consolidated Appropriations Act, FY2017, allowing for the obligation of $195 million in FY2017 FMF, which occurred in September 2018. However, according to one report, Senator Patrick Leahy has placed a hold on $105 million in FY2017 FMF and is seeking more information on the plight of detained Egyptian-American Moustafa Kassem. In January 2018, the Administration notified Congress of its intent to obligate $1.039 billion in FY2017 FMF out of a total of $1.3 billion appropriated for FY2017. It chose not to obligate $65.7 million in FY2017 FMF. The remaining $195 million had been withheld until a national security waiver was issued in August 2018 (see above). For FY2019, the President requested a total of $1.381 billion in foreign assistance for Egypt, the same amount requested for the previous year. Nearly all of the requested funds for Egypt are for the FMF account. For FY2020, the request is nearly identical from previous years, as the President is seeking a total of $1.382 billion in bilateral assistance for Egypt. The FY2019 Omnibus ( P.L. 116-6 ) provides the following for Egypt: a total of $1.419 billion in bilateral U.S. foreign assistance for Egypt, of which $1.3 billion is in FMF, $112.5 million in ESF, $3 million in NADR, $2 million in INCLE, and $1.8 million in IMET; and a reauthorization of ESF to support future loan guarantees to Egypt; P.L. 116-6 sets the following conditions for Egypt: As in previous years, it requires that funds may only be made available when the Secretary of State certifies that the government of Egypt is sustaining the strategic relationship with the United States and meeting its obligations under the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty. As in previous years, the act withholds ESF that "the Secretary determines to be equivalent to that expended by the United States Government for bail, and by nongovernmental organizations for legal and court fees, associated with democracy-related trials in Egypt until the Secretary certifies and reports to the Committees on Appropriations that the Government of Egypt has dismissed the convictions issued by the Cairo Criminal Court on June 4, 2013, in Public Prosecution Case No. 1110 for the Year 2012 and has not subjected the defendants to further prosecution or if convicted they have been granted full pardons ." This last condition (bolded) was added in 2019 to account for the acquittal of the 43 foreign defendants in Case 173 (see above). As in previous years, the FY2019 Omnibus also includes a limitation on ESF, stating that no FY2018 ESF or prior-year ESF "may be made available for a contribution, voluntary or otherwise, to the Civil Associations and Foundations Support Fund, or any similar fund, established pursuant to Law 70 on Associations and Other Foundations Working in the Field of Civil Work [informally known as the NGO law]." As in previous years, the act also includes a provision that withholds $300 million of FMF funds until the Secretary of State certifies that the Government of Egypt is taking effective steps to advance, among other things, democracy and human rights in Egypt. The Secretary of State may waive this certification requirement, though any waiver must be accompanied by, among other things, an assessment of the Government of Egypt's compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 2270 and other such resolutions regarding North Korea. There has been some concern in the Administration and Congress over Egypt's alleged weapons procurement from North Korea in recent years. P.L. 115-245 , the Department of Defense (DOD) and Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education Appropriations Act, 2019 and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2019, specifies that the Secretary of Defense may provide Egypt with funds from the Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund (CTEF) to enhance its border security. To date, Egypt has not received security assistance from DOD-managed accounts. Between 1946 and 2016, the United States provided Egypt with $78.3 billion in bilateral foreign aid (calculated in historical dollars—not adjusted for inflation). The 1979 Peace Treaty between Israel and Egypt ushered in the current era of U.S. financial support for peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors. In two separate memoranda accompanying the treaty, the United States outlined commitments to Israel and Egypt, respectively. In its letter to Israel, the Carter Administration pledged to "endeavor to take into account and will endeavor to be responsive to military and economic assistance requirements of Israel." In his letter to Egypt, former U.S. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown wrote the following: In the context of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, the United States is prepared to enter into an expanded security relationship with Egypt with regard to the sales of military equipment and services and the financing of, at least a portion of those sales, subject to such Congressional review and approvals as may be required. All U.S. foreign aid to Egypt (or any foreign recipient) is appropriated and authorized by Congress . The 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty is a bilateral peace agreement between Egypt and Israel, and the United States is not a legal party to the treaty. The treaty itself does not include any U.S. aid obligations, and any assistance commitments to Israel and Egypt that could be potentially construed in conjunction with the treaty were through ancillary documents or other communications and were—by their terms—subject to congressional approval (see above). However, as the peace broker between Israel and Egypt, the United States has traditionally provided foreign aid to both countries to ensure a regional balance of power and sustain security cooperation with both countries. In some cases, an Administration may sign a bilateral "Memorandum of Understanding" (MOU) with a foreign country pledging a specific amount of foreign aid to be provided over a selected time period subject to the approval of Congress. In the Middle East, the United States has signed foreign assistance MOUs with Israel and Jordan. Currently, there is no U.S.-Egyptian MOU specifying a specific amount of total U.S. aid pledged to Egypt over a certain time period. Congress typically specifies a precise allocation of most foreign assistance for Egypt in the foreign operations appropriations bill. Egypt receives the bulk of foreign aid funds from three primary accounts: Foreign Military Financing (FMF), Economic Support Funds (ESF), and International Military Education and Training (IMET). The United States offers IMET training to Egyptian officers in order to facilitate U.S.-Egyptian military cooperation over the long term. Since the 1979 Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty, the United States has provided Egypt with large amounts of military assistance. U.S. policymakers have routinely justified this aid to Egypt as an investment in regional stability, built primarily on long-running military cooperation and sustaining the treaty—principles that are supposed to be mutually reinforcing. Egypt has used U.S. military aid through the FMF to (among other things) purchase major U.S. defense systems, such as the F-16 fighter aircraft, the M1A1 Abrams battle tank, and the AH-64 Apache attack helicopter. For decades, FMF grants have supported Egypt's purchases of large-scale conventional military equipment from U.S. suppliers. However, as mentioned above, the Obama Administration announced that future FMF grants may only be used to purchase equipment specifically for "counterterrorism, border security, Sinai security, and maritime security" (and for sustainment of weapons systems already in Egypt's arsenal). It is not yet clear how the Trump Administration will determine which U.S.-supplied military equipment would help the Egyptian military counter terrorism and secure its land and maritime borders. Overall, some defense experts continue to view the Egyptian military as inadequately prepared, both doctrinally and tactically, to face the threat posed by terrorist/insurgent groups such as Sinai Province. According to a former U.S. National Security Council official, "they [the Egyptian military] understand they have got a problem in Sinai, but they have been unprepared to invest in the capabilities to deal with it." To reorient the military toward unconventional warfare, the Egyptian military needs, according to one assessment, "heavy investment into rapid reaction forces equipped with sophisticated infantry weapons, optics and communication gear ... backed by enhanced intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance platforms. In order to transport them, Egypt would also need numerous modern aviation assets." In addition to substantial amounts of annual U.S. military assistance, Egypt has benefited from certain aid provisions that have been available to only a few other countries. For example Early Disbursal and Interest - Bearing Account : Between FY2001 and FY2011, Congress granted Egypt early disbursement of FMF funds (within 30 days of the enactment of appropriations legislation) to an interest-bearing account at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Interest accrued from the rapid disbursement of aid has allowed Egypt to receive additional funding for the purchase of U.S.-origin equipment. In FY2012, Congress began to condition the obligation of FMF, requiring the Administration to certify certain conditions had been met before releasing FMF funds, thereby eliminating their automatic early disbursal. However, Congress has permitted Egypt to continue to earn interest on FMF funds already deposited in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The Excess Defense Articles (EDA) program provides one means by which the United States can advance foreign policy objectives—assisting friendly and allied nations through provision of equipment in excess of the requirements of its own defense forces. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) manages the EDA program, which enables the United States to reduce its inventory of outdated equipment by providing friendly countries with necessary supplies at either reduced rates or no charge. As a designated "major non-NATO ally," Egypt is eligible to receive EDA under Section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act and Section 23(a) of the Arms Export Control Act. Over the past two decades, U.S. economic aid to Egypt has been reduced by over 90%, from $833 million in FY1998 to a request of $75 million for FY2019. Beginning in the mid to late 1990s, as Egypt moved from an impoverished country to a lower-middle-income economy, the United States and Egypt began to rethink the assistance relationship, emphasizing "trade not aid." Congress began to scale back economic aid both to Egypt and Israel due to a 10-year agreement reached between the United States and Israel in the late 1990s known as the "Glide Path Agreement," which gradually reduced U.S. economic aid to Egypt to $400 million by 2008. U.S. economic aid to Egypt stood at $200 million per year by the end of the George W. Bush Administration, whose relations with then-President Hosni Mubarak suffered over the latter's reaction to the Administration's democracy agenda in the Arab world. During the final years of the Obama Administration, distrust of U.S. democracy promotion assistance led the Egyptian government to obstruct many U.S.-funded economic assistance programs. According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) reported hundreds of millions of dollars ($460 million as of 2015) in unobligated prior year ESF funding. As these unobligated balances grew, it created pressure on the Obama Administration to reobligate ESF funds for other purposes. In 2016, the Obama Administration notified Congress that it was reprogramming $108 million of ESF that had been appropriated for Egypt in FY2015 but remained unobligated for other purposes. The Administration claimed that its actions were due to "continued government of Egypt process delays that have impeded the effective implementation of several programs." In 2017, the Trump Administration also reprogrammed FY2016 ESF for Egypt. U.S. economic aid to Egypt is divided into two components: (1) USAID-managed programs (public health, education, economic development, democracy and governance); and (2) the U.S.-Egyptian Enterprise Fund. Both are funded primarily through the Economic Support Fund (ESF) appropriations account.	[ "Historically, Egypt has been an important country for U.S. national security interests based on its geography, demography, and diplomatic posture. Egypt controls the Suez Canal, which is one of the world's most well-known maritime chokepoints, linking the Mediterranean and Red Seas. Egypt, with its population of more than 100 million people, is by far the most populous Arabic-speaking country. Although it may not play the same type of leading political or military role in the Arab world as it has in the past, Egypt may retain some \"soft power\" by virtue of its history, media, and culture. Cairo plays host both to the 22-member Arab League and Al Azhar University, which claims to be the oldest continuously operating university in the world and has symbolic importance as a leading source of Islamic scholarship. Additionally, Egypt's 1979 peace treaty with Israel remains one of the most significant diplomatic achievements for the promotion of Arab-Israeli peace. While people-to-people relations remain cold, the Israeli and Egyptian governments have increased their cooperation against Islamist militants and instability in the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip. Personnel moves and possible amendments to the Egyptian constitution highlight apparent efforts by President Sisi to consolidate power with the help of political allies, including colleagues from Egypt's security establishment. President Sisi has come under repeated international criticism for an ongoing government crackdown against various forms of political dissent and freedom of expression. The Egyptian government has defended its human rights record, asserting that the country is under pressure from terrorist groups seeking to destabilize Arab nation-states. The Trump Administration has tried to normalize ties with the Sisi government that were generally perceived as strained under President Obama. In January 2019, U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo delivered a major policy speech at the American University in Cairo, where he stated, \"And as we seek an even stronger partnership with Egypt, we encourage President Sisi to unleash the creative energy of Egypt's people, unfetter the economy, and promote a free and open exchange of ideas.\" The United States has provided significant military and economic assistance to Egypt since the late 1970s. Successive U.S. Administrations have justified aid to Egypt as an investment in regional stability, built primarily on long-running cooperation with the Egyptian military and on sustaining the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. All U.S. foreign aid to Egypt (or any recipient) is appropriated and authorized by Congress. Since 1946, the United States has provided Egypt with over $83 billion in bilateral foreign aid (calculated in historical dollars—not adjusted for inflation). Annual appropriations legislation includes several conditions governing the release of these funds. All U.S. military aid to Egypt finances the procurement of weapons systems and services from U.S. defense contractors. For FY2019, Congress has appropriated $1.4 billion in total bilateral assistance for Egypt, the same amount it provided in FY2018. For FY2020, the President is requesting a total of $1.382 billion in bilateral assistance for Egypt. Nearly all of the U.S. funds for Egypt come from the FMF account (military aid). In November 2018, the U.S. Defense Department notified Congress of a major $1 billion sale of defense equipment to Egypt, consisting of 10 AH-64E Apache Attack Helicopters, among other things. Beyond the United States, President Sisi has broadened Egypt's international base of support to include several key partners, including the Arab Gulf states, Israel, Russia, and France. In the last five years, as French-Egyptian ties have improved, Egypt has purchased major air and naval defense systems from French defense companies." ]	8,280	gov_report	en	null	a3d447e9e71289db0d265d538e7e639471f9adfddf14cb48
DOD defines a hosted payload as an instrument or package of equipment—a sensor or communications package, for example— integrated onto a host satellite, which operates on orbit making use of the host satellite’s available resources, including size, weight, power, or communications. A commercially hosted DOD payload is a DOD payload on a commercial satellite. In general, hosted payloads may be either experimental or operational. Experimental payloads demonstrate new or existing technologies on orbit for potential use on future operational space systems. Operational payloads deliver required capabilities to end users. Hosted payload arrangements may be unsuitable for some missions. For example, some payloads may be too large or need too much power for a host satellite to feasibly accommodate, or may require unique satellite maneuvers that, if exercised, would negatively affect a host satellite’s primary mission. Civil government agencies, like NASA and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), have used or have plans to use commercially hosted payloads. For more information on the commercially hosted payloads that civil agencies have used or plan to use, see appendix I. We and others have identified potential benefits of using commercially hosted payloads to gain space-based capability, such as: Cost savings—Commercially hosted payloads may increase affordability because the government payload owner pays for only a portion of the satellite development and shared launch and ground systems costs, rather than for the entire system. Also, smaller, lighter, and less complex systems may shorten procurement timelines, reduce research and development investment, and reduce risk in technology development. Some government agencies have reported saving hundreds of millions of dollars to date from using innovative arrangements such as hosted payloads. Faster on-orbit capability—Because commercial satellites tend to take less time from concept development to launch than DOD systems do and have relatively frequent launches, hosting government payloads on commercial satellites may achieve on-orbit capability more quickly. Increased deterrence and resilience—Distributing capabilities across more satellites increases the number and diversity of potential targets for an adversary and may make it more difficult for an adversary to decide which assets to attack, serving as a deterrent. Additionally, more frequent launches could increase DOD’s ability to reconstitute its satellite groups—or constellations—more quickly in case of unexpected losses of on-orbit capabilities. Recent strategic and policy guidance government-wide and at DOD have stressed the need for U.S. space systems to be survivable, or resilient, against intentional and unintentional threats—both types of which have increased over the past 20 years. Intentional threats can include purposeful signal jamming, laser dazzling and blinding of satellite sensors, missiles intended to destroy satellites, and ground system attacks. Some unintentional threats to satellites are created by the harsh space environment itself, like extreme temperature fluctuations and radiation, and the growing number of satellites, used rocket parts, and other space debris on orbit, which could collide with orbiting satellites. Continual technology upgrades and industrial base stability— New technologies may be continually incorporated into space systems using hosted payloads, which may be uniquely suited for higher rates of production and launches than traditional DOD satellites. Using commercial satellites for government payloads could help maintain the U.S. commercial space industry’s ongoing technology developments by maintaining stable business and incentivizing new companies to enter the marketplace. Further, increased production may be distributed over multiple contractors—including traditionally lower-tier contractors—to foster more competition. As we reported in October 2014, hosted payloads are among several avenues DOD is considering to increase the resilience of its satellites in the face of growing threats. DOD has been looking at ways to break up larger satellites into multiple smaller satellites or payloads after decades of building large, complex satellites to meet its space-based requirements. The broader concept of breaking up larger satellites into smaller ones is known as disaggregation. In 2014, we reported that DOD lacked critical knowledge about the concept of disaggregation, including how to quantify a broad range of potential effects. At the time, for example, DOD did not have common measures for resilience, which we found is a key consideration in making a choice as to whether to continue with a current system architecture or to change it. Recently, senior DOD officials have also made public statements that indicate a willingness to consider innovative acquisition approaches so that acquisition timelines can be reduced. For example, in a 2016 strategic intent document, the Commander of Air Force Space Command stated that the Air Force should seek innovative acquisition approaches that leverage DOD’s buying power across the industry. Additionally, the Secretary of the Air Force stated that the Air Force is exploring more affordable and innovative ways to acquire its satellite communication services through investments in commercial industry and international partnerships. Opportunities to match a DOD payload with a commercial host can arise in various ways. DOD may first develop a payload and seek to match it with a commercial host, DOD may work in tandem with a commercial company to develop a payload to be hosted, or commercial companies— likely the satellite owner, operator, or system integrator—can first identify upcoming satellite hosting opportunities to DOD. In each scenario, the DOD program (or payload owner) and the commercial host generally consider the basic properties of both the payload and host satellite in attempting to find a match. These properties—including the size, weight, area, power, and required orbital characteristics of the payload and host satellite—should be complementary to create an arrangement that is mutually compatible for each party, according to Aerospace Corporation recommendations and officials we spoke with. Specifically, these properties include: The size of the payload when it is stowed and when it is deployed on orbit, including the available area on the host satellite; The available weight and mass distribution the host satellite can The available power on the host satellite; The thermal requirements of the payload and corresponding capability of the host satellite; The requirements to limit electromagnetic interference—disturbances that affect electrical circuits on the payload and host satellite; The available command, telemetry, and mission data rate requirements of the payload and corresponding capability of the host satellite; The compatibility of interfaces between the payload and host satellite; The pointing accuracy and stability of the host satellite; and The necessary orbits, including altitude and inclination. Other considerations when matching a DOD payload with a host satellite are the compatibility of radio frequency spectrum (spectrum) needs between the payload and host, and the satellite’s intended orbital location. Spectrum is a natural resource used to provide essential government functions and missions ranging from national defense, weather services, and aviation communication, to commercial services such as television broadcasting and mobile voice and data communications. The frequencies, or frequency bands, of spectrum have different characteristics that make them more or less suitable for specific purposes, such as the ability to carry data long distances or penetrate physical obstacles. Each frequency band has a limited capacity to carry information. This means that multiple users operating at approximately the same frequency, location, and time have the potential to interfere with one another. Harmful interference occurs when two communication signals are either at the same frequencies or close to the same frequencies in the same vicinity, a situation that can lead to degradation of a device’s operation or service. As such, a payload or satellite’s specific placement in any given orbit could potentially interfere with a neighboring payload or satellite in the same orbit. In the United States, the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) of the Department of Commerce is responsible for establishing policy on regulating federal government spectrum use and assigning spectrum bands to government agencies. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) allocates spectrum and assigns licenses for various consumer and commercial purposes. Additionally, all government and commercial satellite programs must apply for approval to operate at a given orbital location using a given band of spectrum internationally through the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). The ITU is an agency of the United Nations and coordinates spectrum standards and regulations. In 2011, the Air Force created the Space and Missile Systems Center’s (SMC) Hosted Payload Office (HPO) to provide acquisition architectures that achieve on-orbit capability more quickly and affordably. The HPO uses various resources and capabilities to meet its objectives: Hosted Payload Solutions Contract: In 2014, SMC established the Hosted Payload Solutions (HOPS) multiple award indefinite delivery indefinite quantity (IDIQ) vehicle. According to HPO documents, SMC established the contract—available to all DOD and civil agencies—to streamline commercially hosted payload arrangements by selecting a pool of commercial vendors that government payload owners can use to access space on commercial host satellites. Programs do not have to use HOPS, however, and may contract with commercial companies directly. The HOPS vehicle includes 14 vendors across the commercial satellite industry. SMC awarded task orders for studies to each of the vendors with a contract to gather information on potential host opportunities, orbits and launch schedules, cost estimates for hosting fees, and existing host satellite interfaces. Feasibility Studies: Using the information it gathered from the 14 vendor studies, the HPO stated that it built a database to provide information on potential satellite hosts and the suitability of certain payloads for host opportunities, including cost estimates. The HPO stated that it can use this information to assess the feasibility of a hosted payload opportunity for interested SMC space programs. The HPO also conducts feasibility studies for interested programs based on publicly available information and from industry requests for information. Hosted Payload Interface Design guidelines: The HPO published hosted payload interface design guidelines to provide technical recommendations for hosted payload developers. According to HPO officials, the intent of these guidelines is to reduce integration costs and improve the host-ability of all hosted payloads. Hosted Payload Data Interface Unit: The HPO is developing a secure hosted payload data interface unit to protect payload data from unauthorized access by the host. Following its release of draft documentation to industry stakeholders in March 2018, the HPO is currently integrating National Security Agency requirements into its request for data interface unit prototype proposals. According to HPO officials, the office plans to issue a request for prototype proposals in May 2018, integrate a data interface unit and payload in 2020, and launch the integrated system in 2022. Hosted Payload Expertise: The HPO provides general advice and expertise to programs in the form of hosted payload architectural studies, input on acquisition planning and strategy documents, and other research efforts, according to the office. Since 2009, DOD has launched three experimental payloads on commercial host satellites and plans to conduct three more missions through 2022, as shown in figure 1. DOD estimates that it has achieved cost savings of several hundred million dollars from these experimental payloads. According to DOD officials, DOD expects to realize additional cost savings and be able to place capabilities on orbit more quickly from several hosted payload efforts that are planned or underway. Opportunities for additional hosted payload efforts may arise in the near term amid DOD planning for upcoming and follow-on space systems. Since 2009, DOD has placed experimental payloads—intended to test or demonstrate an on-orbit capability—for three programs on commercial host satellites. Several officials within DOD told us that experimental payloads tend to be smaller, less expensive, and their missions more risk- tolerant than traditional operational DOD payloads. In these ways, they said experimental payloads are better-suited to hosting arrangements than operational DOD payloads. The Air Force has not yet used the HOPS multiple award IDIQ vehicle—which was awarded to facilitate commercially hosted payload arrangements—to match a government payload with a commercial host. The HPO told us that, in 2019, NASA and NOAA will be the first agencies to use the HOPS vehicle to find a host satellite for two of their payloads. Table 1 describes the three experimental payloads hosted on commercial satellites to date. For more information on civilian agencies that use or plan to use commercially hosted payloads, see appendix I. Air Force officials told us that using commercial host satellites for their experimental payloads has saved several hundred million dollars across these programs and shortened timelines for launching payloads into space. For example, the HPO estimated that the Air Force saved nearly $300 million by using a commercial host satellite for its Commercially Hosted Infrared Payload (CHIRP), as compared to acquiring the same capability using a dedicated, free-flying satellite. In addition, Air Force officials estimated that using commercial host satellites for its Responsive Environmental Assessment Commercially Hosted (REACH) effort saved the Air Force approximately $230 million. The REACH effort consists of over 30 payloads hosted on multiple satellites. Further, because of the commercial host’s launch schedule, the Air Force achieved its on-orbit capability sooner than if it had acquired free-flying satellites. In April 2013, we found that the Internet Protocol Routing in Space (IRIS) payload, launched in 2009, was a commercially hosted payload pilot mission that would provide internet routing onboard the satellite, eliminating the need for costs associated with certain ground infrastructure. DOD and Air Force officials told us they are planning to pursue commercially hosted payloads for three programs in the coming decade to achieve cost savings and on-orbit capability more quickly. In each case, officials said they have identified cost and schedule benefits for their respective programs. For example, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) stated that it expects to save approximately $700 million compared to the cost of traditional, free-flying satellites by acquiring its Spacebased Kill Assessment capability as payloads on commercial host satellites, and expects to achieve on-orbit capability years earlier than if it had acquired dedicated satellites for these payloads. Additionally, a program official from the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) told us DARPA plans to use a commercially hosted payload for the Phoenix Payload Orbital Delivery effort to test more affordable ways to access space. Moreover, Air Force officials told us they expect to save $900 million over free-flying satellites by using two Space Norway satellites to fly an Enhanced Polar System Recapitalization payload. Space Norway plans to launch its satellites in 2022, which the Air Force expects will allow it to meet its need for DOD’s required capability. See table 2 for additional details on DOD’s planned hosted payloads. Additional opportunities for commercially hosted payloads may be forthcoming as DOD develops requirements and designs for new and follow-on space programs. DOD has been analyzing various alternatives to explore possible future space system designs and acquisition strategies for several of its upcoming follow-on programs. In these cases, the analysis of alternatives (AOA) study guidance, set forth by DOD’s Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, included direction for the studies to consider new approaches for acquiring space capabilities. For example, AOA guidance directed study teams to include hosted payloads or other disaggregated designs, and commercial innovations in technology and acquisition to meet some space mission requirements. Table 3 provides further details of recently completed and ongoing AOAs to study new designs—or architectures—for upcoming follow-on satellite systems. Two factors have contributed to DOD’s limited use of commercially hosted payloads. First, DOD officials identified logistical challenges to matching government payloads with any given commercial host satellite. For example, most of the offices we spoke with cited size, weight, and power constraints, among others, as barriers to using hosted payloads. Second, while individual DOD offices have realized cost and schedule benefits, DOD as a whole has limited information on costs and benefits of hosted payloads. Further, the knowledge it has gathered is fragmented across the agency—with multiple offices collecting piecemeal information on the use of hosted payloads. The limited knowledge and data on hosted payloads that is fragmented across the agency has contributed to resistance among space acquisition officials to adopting this approach. DOD acquisition officials within the Office of the Secretary of Defense told us matching requirements between government payloads and commercial satellites is typically too difficult for programs to overcome. Specifically, they said the cumulative complexity of matching size, weight, power, and spectrum needs; aligning government and commercial timelines; and, addressing concerns over payload control and cybersecurity amounts to too great a challenge. DOD’s Hosted Payload Office is developing tools designed to help address these challenges and DOD offices that have used hosted payloads have also found ways to overcome them. Officials from DOD acquisition and policy offices, as well as Air Force and industry officials we spoke with, cited matching size, weight, and power between DOD payloads and commercial host satellites as a challenge. We similarly found in April 2013 that ensuring compatibility between payloads and host satellites can pose challenges because not all commercial satellites are big enough or have enough power to support hosting a payload. Whether a host satellite can accommodate a payload can depend on the size of the payload. Additionally, according to industry representatives, the space taken up by the hosted payload affects the amount of revenue-generating payloads the host may place on its satellite, such as additional transponders—devices that emit and receive signals—for the communications services it provides to customers. The complexity of integrating a government payload onto a commercial host can also drive the overall cost of the arrangement. However, officials said these challenges can be mitigated through the use of various expertise and lessons learned. HPO officials and industry representatives have proposed several approaches to help match properties like size, weight, and power between a DOD payload and a commercial host satellite. The HPO is developing a hosted payload interface unit that could potentially provide a standard for payload developers and system integrators to develop and test their systems. One commercial company proposed an interface unit that would accommodate a “universal” DOD payload. Additionally, industry experts stated that with sufficient planning and time for system integration, nearly any payload can be accommodated on a host satellite. The HPO issued guidelines in 2017 to assist DOD payload developers in working toward typical payload requirements and standards for host satellites in low Earth orbit and geostationary Earth orbit. These guidelines inform the payload’s electrical power and mechanical designs. The principal guideline—echoed by the successful CHIRP demonstration in 2011—is that the hosted payload must “do no harm” to the mission performance of its host. Also, satellite interfaces can vary from company to company. Some commercial companies had experience with the task—and business opportunity—of integrating multiple customers’ payloads onto satellites since at least the 1990s. Air Force, HPO, and industry officials told us that, ideally, the payload should use the same spectrum allocation as the commercial host. They said that this is due in part to the lengthy satellite registration process that takes place in the United States and through the ITU that must be undertaken prior to placing a satellite on orbit. Some DOD officials added that the process for all new satellites from initial filing to ITU approval takes around 7 years. If a satellite owner registers for one frequency band of spectrum and later requires a different band, the owner has to begin the registration process from the beginning—restarting the 7-year timeline. This can be problematic for DOD payload owners seeking to match their military communications payload with an already-registered host satellite—particularly if the host satellite’s spectrum allocation is incompatible with the DOD payload. HPO and other DOD officials said that very different spectrum needs between payload and host would therefore preclude the match. Moreover, a need for military—as opposed to commercial—spectrum for communications payloads can introduce additional complications. Although a process exists for a commercial satellite owner to license military spectrum for use by a hosted payload, representatives from DOD’s Chief Information Officer’s (CIO) office could cite only one instance where this has happened. One possible explanation stems from a 2012 memorandum from DOD’s CIO that outlines various preferred processes for a commercial host satellite to host military communications payloads. Several industry officials we spoke to said that the various processes outlined in the 2012 memorandum would add to the already-lengthy process of spectrum registration. Further, the memorandum instructs that contractual terms between the payload and host satellite owners should restrict all military spectrum use exclusively to the U.S. military. However, one industry official told us that international entities do not necessarily recognize U.S. military spectrum, and commercial companies that obtain licenses through other countries are permitted to use those frequencies. For example, a senior official of one commercial company we met with stated that the company licensed U.S. military spectrum through another North Atlantic Treaty Organization government after failing to successfully coordinate an FCC request with DOD and NTIA. DOD and industry representatives told us that from a business perspective, it makes little sense for a commercial company to seek hosting opportunities for DOD payloads that require U.S. military spectrum. Government and industry officials we spoke with said that aligning the development and acquisition timelines of a government payload and commercial host satellite is a challenge. The timeline associated with developing government sensors is generally much longer than that of commercial satellites, potentially creating difficulties in scheduling and funding commercially hosted payload arrangements. For example, DOD satellite systems take, on average, over 7 years to develop and launch a first vehicle, while commercial satellite programs typically take between 2 and 3 years. DOD payload owners may find it challenging to accelerate development and acquisition schedules to match those of the commercial satellite host. Additionally, DOD officials we spoke with said that their budget and planning processes require funding commitments up to 2 years in advance of actually receiving those funds. This can further complicate alignment with commercial timelines because the development of a government sensor would need to be underway well in advance of a decision to fund a commercially hosted payload approach. Furthermore, federal law generally prohibits agencies from paying in advance for a future service or from obligating future appropriations. However, several DOD and other government agency officials we spoke with said that it is possible to align government and commercial timelines. For example, MDA adopted the commercial host’s schedule to ensure its Spacebased Kill Assessment payload was ready for integration and launch without delaying the host satellite or worse—missing its own ride to space. DARPA officials told us they were also able to align DARPA acquisition and development schedules with the commercial host. The Air Force’s Enhanced Polar System (EPS) Recapitalization program officials were able to leverage existing documents such as requirements documents and acquisition strategies from the predecessor program to speed up the acquisition process. According to Air Force officials, the EPS Recapitalization program had a unique opportunity to take advantage of the availability of a commercial host and had the support of a high ranking Air Force official that enabled the program to move forward using a commercially hosted payload approach. Some officials cited concerns with combining government and commercial space missions. For example, officials across DOD told us they were wary of losing control over a hosted payload should a commercial company’s needs change. They said that theoretically, a commercial provider could decide to turn off power to the government’s payload if the host satellite needed extra power to perform a certain function. Additionally, DOD space program officials expressed concern that commercial practices for ensuring the mission success of the payload may not be up to government standards—that commercial testing and integration standards may be less robust than those used by traditional government programs to ensure success, adding risk to the government payload. Furthermore, officials in one DOD program office expressed a distrust of commercial host motives in offering to support a government payload on their satellite, suggesting that a company could be intending to steal government technologies. However, industry officials we spoke with said that DOD can generally issue a solicitation that includes necessary stipulations. For example, including a condition to preserve the payload’s priority of mission and other terms to protect the government’s investment may provide some assurance to those officials that perceive security risks. Additionally, some officials we spoke to cited cybersecurity concerns. They cited loss of control over data security as a challenge to using hosted payloads. Officials told us the data could be vulnerable to eavesdropping or manipulation as it travels between government ground systems and the commercially hosted government payload. However, according to HPO officials, the Air Force overcame this challenge on the CHIRP mission by procuring a secure interface that provided a data link between the payload and dedicated transponder and ground terminal. As mentioned previously, the Hosted Payload Office is developing a hosted payload data interface unit to mitigate this challenge by securing payload data communications from the host satellite. DOD, at the department-wide level, has limited information on commercially hosted payloads—mostly due to a lack of experience in using hosted payloads and complexities associated with them. For example, acquisition officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense told us that DOD needs more data and analysis of the potential costs and benefits. However, realistic cost modeling for commercially hosted DOD payloads is unavailable because costs can vary across potential hosts and DOD has minimal experience using commercial hosts. Similarly, the HPO performs market research and cost estimates based on data from commercial companies, but according to one official in the HPO, the costs tend to vary based on the supply and demand in the commercial satellite industry. Additionally, HPO officials said their cost savings analyses are based on only two real-world commercially hosted DOD payloads— CHIRP and REACH. HPO officials told us that with additional government data they could compare the costs of system architectures that include free-flier satellites with those that use commercially hosted payloads. Additionally, some potential benefits of using commercially hosted payloads, such as resilience, may be difficult to measure. In our 2014 report on disaggregation, we recommended that DOD define key measures related to disaggregation, including developing metrics to measure resilience. DOD is in the process of developing standard metrics for resilience. DOD’s knowledge of commercially hosted payloads is also fragmented across the agency. Several DOD offices are independently conducting activities related to commercially hosted payloads, such as pursuing commercially hosted payload arrangements, developing lessons learned, and determining demand for commercial hosts. For example, MDA officials told us they have developed cost and technical data and lessons learned based on MDA’s Spacebased Kill Assessment payload— launched earlier this year—but have not shared it across the agency. On the other hand, the Space Test Program, also housed within the Air Force’s SMC develops lessons learned on its payloads, which are government payloads on government host satellites and officials there told us they provide lessons learned to the HPO. In October 2017, SMC’s Launch Office sent a request for data on hosted payloads to DOD agencies, research laboratories, and universities, but the HPO was not an active participant in this request. Independent efforts within DOD to collect and analyze cost, schedule, and performance results from hosted payloads can create fragmentation in DOD’s knowledge base and can increase the risk of duplicative efforts within DOD. DOD does not collect or consolidate agency-wide knowledge on commercially hosted payloads and has no plans to do so. Agency officials stated that DOD does not require programs outside of SMC to consult the HPO when seeking commercially hosted payload arrangements. The Air Force established the HPO to facilitate commercially hosted payloads, however, the 2011 Program Management Directive that established the HPO states that the HPO will coordinate with SMC directorates for detailed implementation of hosted payloads but does not address coordination with agencies or directorates outside of SMC. According to an HPO official, programs are not required to use HPO expertise or tools as they pursue using hosted payloads. Further, this official stated that programs are not required to provide any data or lessons learned to the HPO, or any other central point within DOD, following the pursuit or completion of a hosted payload arrangement. The 2011 Program Management Directive directs the HPO to provide lessons learned to SMC directorates but does not direct SMC offices to share information— such as costs, technical data and lessons learned on completed commercially hosted payload efforts—with the HPO. An HPO official indicated that the HPO obtains data through informal communication with those programs using hosted payloads that are willing to share data. We found that limitations and fragmentation of data and knowledge are contributing to resistance within DOD to using hosted payloads. Several DOD acquisition and program officials we spoke with who did not have experience with hosted payloads generally stated that the potential risks to using hosted payloads outweighed the benefits, and that there was little evidence-based analysis to prove otherwise. They were not aware of existing tools that could assist them in making decisions even though the HPO has been developing these tools and has made efforts to share them within SMC. DOD acquisition and program officials consistently cited a preference for maintaining the acquisition status quo over introducing any perceived added risk to their programs. At the same time, however, officials who have used hosted payloads were able to overcome logistical and technical challenges and realize cost savings. However, according to an HPO official, there is currently no requirement in place to facilitate sharing their approaches to doing so. We have reported in the past that DOD’s culture has generally been resistant to changes in space acquisition approaches and that fragmented responsibilities for acquisitions have made it very difficult to coordinate and deliver interdependent systems. Moreover, our past studies of commercial strategic sourcing best practices have found that that leading companies centralize procurement decisions by aligning, prioritizing, and integrating procurement functions within the organization. Establishing the Hosted Payload Office is one step in this direction, but the office is organized under the Advanced Systems and Development Directorate—a research and development organization—under SMC. Moreover, the 2011 directive that established the HPO does not address coordination or responsibilities for agencies or directorates beyond SMC. Consolidating knowledge is important because it allows organizations to share information and data upon which to develop consistent procurement tactics, such as ways to overcome challenges in matching a government payload with a commercial host. As we found in our work on commercial strategic sourcing best practices, organizations that struggled with fragmented information in the past overcame this challenge in part by consolidating their data on costs and spending. While hosted payload acquisitions are not a typical service acquisition, successful organizations have found that these techniques work for highly specialized technical services for which few suppliers exist. As DOD considers new architectures and acquisition approaches, commercially hosted payloads have the potential to play a role in delivering needed capabilities on orbit more quickly and at a more affordable cost than traditional DOD space acquisitions. Placing DOD payloads on commercial satellites might also be an effective method by which to increase resiliency. However, DOD’s experience and the data collected so far are limited in informing decisions on the use of these payloads. DOD would benefit from leveraging the knowledge and information gained from each hosted payload experience. Centralized collection and assessment of agency-wide data would help enable DOD to mitigate the logistical challenges inherent in matching payloads to hosts, and better position DOD to make reasoned, evidence-based decisions on whether a hosted payload would be a viable solution to meet warfighter needs. Without such knowledge, and a way for interested programs to leverage it, DOD may not be fully informed about using hosted payloads and may risk missing opportunities to rapidly and affordably address emerging threats in space. The Secretary of Defense should require programs using hosted payloads to provide cost and technical data, and lessons learned to a central office. In implementing this recommendation, DOD should consider whether the Hosted Payload Office is the most appropriate office to centralize agency-wide knowledge. (Recommendation 1) We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Commerce, NASA, and DOD for comment. The Department of Commerce provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. NASA did not have comments on our draft report. In its written comments, DOD concurred with our recommendation and stated that SMC had initiated a major reorganization since we drafted our report and that under the new organizational construct, the Hosted Payload Office had changed and may not be the appropriate office for centralizing DOD-wide hosted payload knowledge. DOD’s comments are reproduced in appendix II. DOD also provided technical comments which we incorporated as appropriate. We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Defense, the Administrator of NASA, and other interested parties. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or by email at chaplainc@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix III. As shown in table 4, civil and other government agencies use commercially hosted payloads to enhance navigation systems, monitor environmental pollution, conduct scientific missions, and improve search and rescue systems. Officials from all of the agencies we spoke with cited cost savings and the ability to leverage existing commercial schedules and technologies among the reasons they use commercial host satellites. Cristina T. Chaplain (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov. In addition to the contact named above, Rich Horiuchi (Assistant Director), Erin Cohen (Analyst in Charge), Claire Buck, Jon Felbinger, Stephanie Gustafson, Matthew Metz, Sylvia Schatz, and Roxanna Sun made key contributions to this report.	[ "Each year, DOD spends billions of dollars to develop, produce, and field large, complex satellites. For such satellite systems, a single adversary attack or on-orbit failure can result in the loss of billions of dollars of investment and significant loss of vital capabilities. As DOD plans new space systems and addresses an increasingly contested space environment, it has the opportunity to consider different acquisition approaches. One such approach is to integrate a government sensor or payload onto a commercial host satellite. House Armed Services Committee report 115-200, accompanying a bill for the Fiscal Year 2018 National Defense Authorization Act, included a provision for GAO to review DOD's use of commercially hosted payloads. This report (1) determines the extent to which DOD uses commercially hosted payloads and (2) describes and assesses factors that affect their use. GAO reviewed DOD policies, documentation, and planning documents, and interviewed a wide range of DOD and civil government officials, and commercial stakeholders. GAO and others have found that using commercial satellites to host government sensors or communications packages—called payloads—may be one way DOD can achieve on-orbit capability faster and more affordably. Using hosted payloads may also help facilitate a proliferation of payloads on orbit, making it more difficult for an adversary to defeat a capability. Since 2009, DOD has used three commercially hosted payloads, with three more missions planned or underway through 2022 (see figure below). DOD estimates that it has achieved cost savings of several hundred million dollars from using commercially hosted payloads to date, and expects to realize additional savings and deliver faster capabilities on orbit from planned missions. Cost savings can result from sharing development, launch, and ground system costs with the commercial host company. Among the factors that affect DOD's use of hosted payloads are a perception among some DOD officials that matching government payloads to commercial satellites is too difficult; and limited, fragmented knowledge on how to mitigate various challenges GAO found that further opportunities to use hosted payloads may emerge as DOD plans new and follow-on space systems in the coming years. However, DOD's knowledge on using hosted payloads is fragmented, in part because programs are not required to share information. In 2011, the Air Force created a Hosted Payload Office to provide expertise and other tools to facilitate matching government payloads with commercial hosts. However, GAO found that DOD programs using hosted payloads are not required and generally do not provide cost and technical data, or lessons learned, to the Hosted Payload Office, or another central office for analysis. Requiring programs that use hosted payloads agency-wide to provide this information to a central location would better position DOD to make informed decisions when considering acquisition approaches for upcoming space system designs. GAO recommends that DOD require programs using commercially hosted payloads to contribute resulting data to a central location. In implementing this recommendation, DOD should assess whether the Air Force's Hosted Payload Office is the appropriate location to collect and analyze the data. DOD concurred with the recommendation." ]	5,576	gov_report	en	null	eb5a517ba6ff00fd56e52316805295e66ddef0011793a97a
The technology sector has major employment hubs across the country, including the San Francisco Bay area, the greater New York City region, and the Washington-Arlington-Alexandria region (see fig. 1). In addition, technology workers are employed at companies outside the technology sector, such as in the retail or financial services industries. For example, a large retail company may require technology workers to create and manage their online sales activities, but the company itself would be considered part of the retail industry. Private companies are generally prohibited by federal law from discriminating in employment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, and disability status. Additionally, federal contractors and subcontractors are generally required to take affirmative action to ensure that all applicants and employees are treated without regard to race, sex, color, religion, national origin, sexual orientation, and gender identity, and to employ or advance in employment qualified individuals with disabilities and qualified covered veterans. EEOC is responsible for enforcement of federal antidiscrimination laws, and OFCCP enforces affirmative action and nondiscrimination requirements for federal contractors. EEOC and OFCCP have some shared activities and have established a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to minimize any duplication of effort. For example, under the MOU, individual complaints filed with OFCCP alleging discrimination under Title VII are generally referred to EEOC. In addition, on occasions when EEOC receives a complaint not within its purview, such as cases that involve veteran status, but over which it believes OFCCP has jurisdiction, it will refer the complaint to OFCCP. The EEOC, created by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, enforces federal laws that prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of race, sex, color, religion, national origin, age, and disability. As the nation’s primary enforcer of antidiscrimination laws, EEOC investigates charges of employment discrimination from the public, litigates major cases, and conducts outreach to prevent discrimination by educating employers and workers. In fiscal year 2016, EEOC received about 91,500 charges, secured more than $482 million for victims of discrimination, and filed 114 lawsuits. According to EEOC, many states, counties, cities, and towns have their own laws prohibiting discrimination, usually similar to those EEOC enforces, as well as agencies responsible for enforcing those laws, called Fair Employment Practices Agencies. However, in some cases, these agencies enforce laws that offer greater protection to workers. An individual can file a charge with either the EEOC or with a Fair Employment Practices Agency. When an individual initially files with a Fair Employment Practices Agency that has a worksharing agreement with the EEOC, and the allegation is covered by a law enforced by the EEOC, the Fair Employment Practices Agency will dual file the charge with EEOC (meaning EEOC will receive a copy of the charge), but will usually retain the charge for processing. If the charge is initially filed with EEOC and the charge is also covered by state or local law, EEOC dual files the charge with the state or local Fair Employment Practices Agency (meaning the Fair Employment Practices Agency will receive a copy of the charge), but EEOC ordinarily retains the charge for processing. EEOC also pursues a limited number of cases each year designed to combat systemic discrimination, defined by the agency as patterns or practices where the alleged discrimination presented by a complainant has a broad impact on an industry, profession, company, or geographic location. EEOC can also initiate a systemic investigation under Title VII with the approval of an EEOC commissioner, called a “commissioner charge”, provided the commissioner finds there is a reasonable basis for the investigation. In addition, EEOC district directors can approve systemic investigations, called “directed investigations” which are initiated by EEOC field office directors under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and the Equal Pay Act. Under Title VII, EEOC generally requires that large employers and non- exempt federal contractors file Employer Information Reports (EEO-1 reports) annually, which collect employees’ demographic data by business location on sex, race, and ethnic group for 10 occupational job categories. According to EEOC documentation, EEO-1 data are used in investigations of Title VII violations, litigation, research, comparative analyses, class action suits, and affirmative action plans. The OFCCP is responsible for ensuring that the nearly 200,000 federal contractor establishments comply with federal nondiscrimination and affirmative action requirements. Under Executive Order 11246 and other federal laws and regulations, covered federal contractors and subcontractors are prohibited from discriminating in employment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, or national origin and are required to take affirmative action to help ensure that all applicants and employees are treated without regard to these factors. In general, OFCCP’s regulations require covered contractors to comply with certain recordkeeping and reporting requirements, and provide for enforcement procedures such as compliance evaluations and complaint investigations to assist OFCCP in ensuring federal contractor compliance with these regulations. Among other provisions, OFCCP’s regulations generally require that covered contractors prepare and maintain an affirmative action program (AAP). Under OFCCP’s regulations, an AAP is a management tool that is designed to ensure equal employment opportunity, with an underlying premise that the gender, racial, and ethnic makeup of a contractor’s workforce should be representative of the labor pools from which the contractor recruits and selects. Companies must create an AAP for each business establishment—generally, a physical facility or unit that produces the goods or services, such as a factory, office, or store for the federal contractor. An AAP will also include any practical steps to address underrepresentation of women and minorities, such as expanding employment opportunities to underrepresented groups. Covered contractors must also comply with certain recordkeeping requirements, including records pertaining to hiring, promotion, lay off or termination, rates of pay, and applications, among other records. OFCCP’s enforcement program represents the majority of the agency’s activity and is carried out primarily by using compliance officers, who evaluate contractors’ compliance with various requirements, according to agency officials. In addition to conducting compliance evaluations, OFCCP also conducts investigations in response to complaints. In 2016, we reported that according to OFCCP officials, responding to complaints accounted for close to 16 percent of OFCCP’s enforcement activities. OFCCP selects contractor establishments for evaluations based on a number of neutrally applied factors, such as employee count at the establishment, contract value, or contract expiration date. We previously found that OFCCP reviews, on average, 2 percent of federal contractor establishments annually. As we previously reported, as part of its compliance evaluations, OFCCP is to review the selected contractor’s hiring, promotion, compensation, termination, and other employment practices to determine whether contractors are maintaining nondiscriminatory hiring and employment practices. OFCCP conducts evaluations at the establishment level. When a contractor establishment is selected for evaluation, OFCCP sends the contractor a “scheduling letter” requesting the AAP and supporting data, such as the percentage of women and minority staff at the workplace by job group. Then, a compliance officer is to conduct a desk audit, which is an off-site review of the submitted materials. If necessary, the compliance officer may also conduct an on-site review or further off-site analysis to make a final determination as to whether the contractor is in compliance. In addition to looking at whether federal contractors maintain nondiscriminatory hiring and employment practices, which can result in finding discrimination violations, OFCCP also frequently finds other types of violations, such as failure to keep necessary records or conduct annual reviews of equal employment and affirmative action efforts. These findings by the agency often require administrative changes on the part of the contractor, such as improved record-keeping. There are many different forms of remedies for discrimination violations, including financial, employment, and organizational change remedies. Although rare, under some circumstances, OFCCP may bar a contractor from doing business with the government. From 2005 to 2015, the estimated number of workers in the technology workforce—people who worked in mathematics, computing, or engineering occupations—increased at a higher rate (24 percent) than the estimated number of workers in the general workforce (9 percent), according to ACS data. In 2015, the technology workforce comprised an estimated 7.5 million workers, an increase of slightly over 1.4 million workers since 2005. (For a complete list of the occupations we include as technology occupations, see appendix II). Most technology workers have a college degree and have a higher median income than workers in the general workforce. Specifically, in 2015, an estimated 69 percent of technology workers held at least a bachelor’s degree, compared to 31 percent of workers in the general workforce. In 2015, the estimated median income for technology workers was $81,000 compared to $42,000 for the general workforce. From 2005 to 2015, the percentage of women in the technology workforce remained flat and women remained a smaller proportion of the technology workforce compared to their representation in the general workforce. In 2015, women represented 22 percent (about 1.6 million workers) of workers in technology occupations, compared to 48.7 percent of workers in the general workforce (see fig. 2). Although the estimated percentage of minority technology workers as a whole had grown since 2005, we found that this trend did not apply to Black technology workers. Specifically, from 2005 through 2015, although the number of Black workers increased as the technology workforce grew, there was no statistically significant change in their representation as a percentage of the entire technology workforce. In contrast, from 2005 to 2015, Hispanic and Asian technology workers had statistically significant increases in their representation in the technology workforce. Even with the increase in their numbers in the technology workforce, Black and Hispanic technology workers remained a smaller proportion of these workers compared to their representation in the general workforce. In contrast, Asian workers were an increasing share of the technology workforce, where they remained more represented than they were in the general workforce (see fig. 3). We found that when we examined gender representation for each minority group, both Black and Hispanic men and women were less represented in the technology workforce compared to their representation in the general workforce. The same was true for White women, whereas White men, Asian men, and Asian women were more represented in the technology workforce compared to their representation in the general workforce (see fig. 4). We defined the technology sector as those companies that have the highest concentration of technology workers and are in such industries as computer systems design and software publishing. Companies categorized as outside the technology sector, for example, retail or finance companies, may still employ some technology workers. However, we found differences in median incomes for technology workers within and outside the technology sector. In 2015, technology workers employed in the technology sector earned an estimated median income of $89,000 compared to median incomes of $78,000 for those working outside the technology sector. We also compared the characteristics of technology workers within the technology sector and outside the technology sector, and found male and Asian technology workers were relatively more represented in the technology sector than outside the technology sector. Similar to the lower representation of female, Black, and Hispanic technology workers in technology occupations, we found technology workers from these groups were also more likely to work outside the technology sector than in the technology sector. For example, according to our analysis of 2015 ACS data, women represented an estimated 18 percent of all technology workers employed in the technology sector, compared to 25 percent of all technology workers employed outside the technology sector (see fig. 5). White technology workers were also more represented outside the technology sector than within the technology sector. Companies in the technology sector also employ non-technical workers such as sales people, and the lower representation of women and certain minorities in the technology sector was also present in such non-technical job categories. According to our analysis of EEO-1 data, women were less represented across the full range of management and non- management positions at companies within the technology sector, including at leading technology companies, compared to their representation in companies outside the technology sector. We determined this by comparing specific occupations at companies both within and outside the technology sectors using 2015 EEO-1 data. For example, women held about 19 percent of senior-level management positions at companies in the technology sector compared to nearly 31 percent of such positions at companies outside the technology sector in 2015. Women were also less represented in all of the remaining job categories (mid-level managers, professionals, technicians, and all other jobs) in the technology sector. (See fig. 6.) Comparing EEO-1 data at three points in time for 2007, 2011, and 2015, we found women’s representation in management positions as well as among professionals and technicians at companies within the technology sector remained at about the same level, and decreased for “all other jobs” (see table 1). Similar to women, Black and Hispanic workers were less represented across multiple job categories in companies within the technology sector compared to those outside the technology sector (see fig.7). For example, 1.8 percent of senior level managers in the technology sector were Black compared to 3.4 percent of senior level managers in all other sectors. Appendix IV provides percentages for each minority group in different job categories within and outside the technology sector. The lower representation of Black workers in the technology sector relative to their representation in other sectors was consistent across all job categories (mid-level managers, professionals, technicians, and “all other jobs”). Hispanic workers were less represented in the technology sector compared to outside the technology sector across all job categories (senior and mid-level managers, professionals, technicians, and “all other jobs”). Compared to their representation across job categories within the technology sector in general, Black and Hispanic workers had slightly greater representation at the leading technology companies in senior management and technician categories, and lower representation among mid-level managers, professionals, and holders of “all other jobs.” Asian workers comprised a greater proportion of managerial and professional roles in the technology sector than in other sectors, according to our analysis of 2015 EEO-1 data. Asian workers represented 11.0 percent of senior level managers in the technology sector compared to 4.3 percent in industries outside the technology sector. This higher representation of Asian workers in the technology sector was consistent among mid-level managers, professionals and technicians. Asian workers were more represented in the same categories at the leading technology companies. However, a lower proportion of Asian workers held senior management positions compared to their representation in professional positions in both the technology sector and leading technology companies. Further, the proportion of Asian workers in mid-level management positions was also lower than their representation in professional positions, from which mid-level managers might be selected, in both the technology sector and leading technology companies. In contrast, a higher proportion of White workers were in senior and mid- level management positions compared to their representation in professional positions in both the technology sector and leading technology companies. Comparing EEO-1 data at three points in time—2007, 2011, and 2015— we saw varied representation across job categories in the technology sector by race/ethnicity. For example, Black workers decreased in their representation in all job categories in the technology sector from 2007 to 2015. In contrast, Hispanic and Asian workers increased in their representation in all job categories we examined from 2007 to 2015 (see table 2). Several factors may contribute to the lower representation of female, Hispanic, and Black workers in the technology workforce and at companies in the technology sector, based on research and interviews with researchers and representatives from workforce and industry organizations and technology companies. These include the lower diversity of degree earners in technology-related fields, and company- based factors such as hiring practices and retention of women and underrepresented minorities. The smaller proportion of women in the technology workforce may reflect the number of women earning technology-related degrees. Slightly over two-thirds of technology workers report having earned their bachelor’s degree in a computer, engineering, mathematics, or technology field. However, according to our analysis of 2014 IPEDS data, the percentage of technology-related bachelor’s and master’s degrees earned by women is far less than for men, although women were comparable to men in their receipt of science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM) degrees, and surpassed men in obtaining degrees in all other fields. In 2014, about 60,000 women were awarded technology-related bachelor’s or master’s degrees (compared to about 50,000 in 2004) and about 190,000 men were awarded such degrees (compared to about 147,000 in 2004). (See fig. 8.) An estimated 218,000 technology workers were added to the technology workforce in 2015, according to our analysis of 2015 American Community Survey data from the U.S. Census Bureau. In addition, technology degrees are also issued at the associate’s level. Two researchers told us that women often have the academic preparation to enter into technology-related degree programs, but they may choose not to pursue such degrees because of instances of gender bias within technology classes. Our prior work reported on studies that found women leave STEM fields at a higher rate than their male peers, citing one study that found women leave STEM academic positions at a higher rate than men in part due to dissatisfaction with departmental culture, faculty leadership, and research support. Further, a 2012 consulting firm report found that businesses viewed as male-dominated tended to attract fewer women at the entry level. In addition, according to our analysis of 2014 IPEDS data, three minority racial or ethnic groups each constituted 10 percent or fewer of bachelor’s and master’s degree earners in a technology-related field. Specifically, among the 202,200 earners of degrees in a technology-related field in 2014, there were about 20,000 Hispanic recipients, 13,000 Black recipients, and 18,000 recipients who were Multiracial or other race, which includes American Indian or Alaska Native, Other or Unknown Race, and Two or more Races, i.e. respondents who selected one or more racial designations. Among all minority groups, Asian students, including Pacific Islander, earned the highest proportion of technology- related degrees (about 24,000 individuals). (See fig. 9). One barrier to entry into technology degree paths for Black and Hispanic students may be lower likelihood of access to preparatory academic programs in secondary school. In 2016, we reported that the K-12 public schools in the United States with students who are mostly Black or Hispanic offered disproportionately fewer math and science classes for their students. One researcher told us some colleges and universities, to help these students be academically successful, provide additional academic support such as tutoring to help bridge knowledge gaps. To address the uneven access to preparatory math and science classes, representatives from five technology companies told us they have started to invest in exposing Black and Hispanic children to technology occupations by, for example, developing online resources targeted to them and their parents and creating partnerships with secondary schools to improve their academic preparation in computer science. However, we have previously also reported that the number of students graduating with STEM degrees may not be a good measure of the supply of STEM workers because students often pursue careers in fields different from the ones they studied. For example, a lower percentage of women who obtained technology-related degrees became technology workers compared to men who earned the same degrees, according to our analysis of 2015 ACS data. Specifically, among women who earned technology degrees, an estimated 33 percent worked as a technology worker compared to 45 percent of men who earned technology degrees. Several representatives we interviewed from workforce and industry organizations and technology companies told us that recruitment practices may also have affected diversity in the technology workforce. For example, representatives from three workforce and industry organizations said technology companies tend to recruit from a select number of universities and colleges, thereby limiting their pool of potential applicants. To address this, representatives from several of the technology companies we interviewed told us they had changed recruitment practices and offered internships targeted to underrepresented groups. For example, representatives of four technology companies told us that their companies had expanded recruitment to include more schools. Representatives from two companies told us they offer programs such as summer and semester internships for which the company actively recruits from Historically Black Colleges and Universities and other specific schools to increase its pool of diverse candidates. In addition, representatives from workforce organizations and technology companies discussed concerns and strategies to address companies’ hiring practices and internal cultures that may limit workforce diversity. For example, one of these representatives said that technology companies often offer financial incentives to current employees to make referrals for new hires, which can result in reliance on social networks. These networks may be largely comprised of the same race and this practice therefore makes it harder for potential candidates from demographically different groups to have their resumes reviewed. Another workforce organization representative reported that some hiring managers filter out eligible candidates if their background and qualifications are not the same as those of previously successful employees. To address these concerns, representatives from one technology company told us that they had moved away from depending on referrals since this practice may result in leaders hiring people within their own networks, which generally does not increase diversity of gender or race/ethnicity. In addition, representatives from another company said they plan to begin reviewing resumes with names removed to limit bias by the reviewer. Further, representatives we interviewed from three technology companies told us they offer training to employees to help employees identify their own, unconscious biases. Other factors may affect retention of women and underrepresented minorities. For example, a representative from a workforce organization said that women leave technology occupations at a higher rate than men because they feel as if they have not been given the same opportunities for promotion and advancement within the company. A 2016 study that examined women in engineering and science found that women’s concerns about pay and promotion are often an issue in male-dominated fields regardless of the industry. Further, this study found that retention difficulties become more severe as the share of men in the workforce increased and that affected women’s pay and promotion. Representatives from one company told us another challenge is the lack of Black workers at the top levels, which might make it more difficult for Black employees in particular to see a leadership path. Representatives we interviewed from five technology companies told us they had implemented efforts to increase retention and promotion rates among minority and female workers, for example, by developing a diversity and inclusion newsletter, employee resource groups with executive sponsors, and internal training and classes for employees to improve their readiness to be promoted. Representatives from five technology companies told us that commitment of top leadership is an important factor that can help women and underrepresented minorities in the technology sector. For example, representatives from one company told us that top management support for diversity efforts, such as setting hiring goals, can help move a company in the direction of achieving representation goals and that leadership is very important to this effort. Representatives from several companies told us that there is often a business case for such changes: These companies work in a diverse, global environment and strive to make better products for diverse users. However, our prior work on workforce diversity in the financial services sector found that some diversity initiatives faced challenges gaining the "buy-in" of key employees, such as the middle managers who are often responsible for implementing such programs. According to EEOC officials, EEOC primarily oversees compliance with equal employment opportunity requirements by investigating workers’ individual charges of employment discrimination filed against companies. EEOC has publicly acknowledged the low levels of diversity in the technology sector. However, we were unable to identify a specific number of charges received by EEOC against companies in industries that are part of this sector because EEOC does not require investigators to record the industry of the charged company. EEOC’s database of charges and enforcement actions—the Integrated Mission System (IMS)—has a data field for the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) industry code, the standard used by federal statistical agencies in classifying business establishments. However, we found that it is completed for only about half the entries in the system. EEOC officials in both the San Francisco and New York district offices told us that, while they cannot readily identify individual charges against technology companies, they believe they have received far fewer charges against technology companies than they would have expected given the public attention to the issue of diversity in the technology sector. In terms of systemic cases, according to EEOC, as of June 2017, the commission had 255 systemic cases pending since fiscal year 2011 involving technology companies (13 of these were initiated as commissioner charges and 8 were directed investigations involving age discrimination or pay parity issues). Officials from the New York region reported that they had seen an increase in systemic cases against technology companies in the past 3 years, largely involving practices of information technology staffing firms. Several EEOC officials we interviewed noted that technology workers may be initiating few complaints at the federal level due to factors such as fear of retaliation from employers or the availability of other employment or legal options. According to EEOC officials, fear of retaliation can affect charges across sectors and, given the growth in the technology workforce, an individual who feels discriminated against may simply leave the company because there are many other opportunities for individuals with technical skills. They also said that technology workers may generally have greater wealth and can afford to hire private attorneys to sue in state court rather than go through the EEOC. Moreover, they said that some states, including California, have stronger employment discrimination laws that allow for better remedies than federal laws, which could lead employees to file charges at the state level rather than with the EEOC. In addition, EEOC has acknowledged in a 2016 report that binding arbitration policies, which require individuals to submit their claims to private arbiters rather than courts, can also deter workers from bringing discrimination claims to the agency, leaving significant violations in entire segments of the workforce unreported. The report stated that an increasing number of arbitration policies have added bans on class actions that prevent individuals from joining together to challenge practices in any forum. The report concluded that the use of arbitration policies hinders EEOC’s ability to detect and remedy potential systemic violations. Researchers report that the use of such clauses has grown and data on federal civil filings for civil rights employment cases reflect a marked reduction in the number of such filings. Beyond pursuing charges, EEOC has taken some steps to address diversity in the technology sector including research and outreach efforts. In May 2016, citing the technology sector as a source for an increasing number of U.S. jobs, EEOC released a report analyzing EEO-1 data on diversity in the technology sector in tandem with a commission meeting raising awareness on the topic. In addition, EEOC’s fiscal year 2017- 2021 Strategic Enforcement Plan identified barriers to hiring and recruiting in the technology sector as a strategic priority. EEOC has also been involved in outreach efforts with the technology sector. For example, the EEOC Pacific Region described more than 15 in-person or webinar events since 2014 in collaboration with OFCCP and local organizations focused on diversity in the technology sector. The topics of these events included equity in pay and the activities of these two agencies in enforcing nondiscrimination laws. Finally, in fall 2016, EEOC initiated an internal working group to identify practices to help improve gender and racial diversity in technology, but as of June 2017 had no progress to report. OFCCP’s regulations require covered federal contractors to take proactive steps to ensure equal employment opportunity. OFCCP annually conducts routine evaluations of selected federal contractors, which includes those in the technology sector, for compliance with federal nondiscrimination and affirmative action requirements. To the extent that technology contractors are selected for evaluation through OFCCP’s normal selection process, these contractors are assessed for compliance with nondiscrimination and affirmative action laws as are other selected contractors. While evaluation of technology contractors occurs in the course of OFCCP’s routine activities, OFCCP does not currently use type of industry as a selection factor, according to officials. We also found that few (less than 1 percent) of OFCCP’s 2,911 closed technology contractor evaluations from fiscal years 2011 through 2016 resulted in discrimination violations, though 13 percent resulted in other violations, such as record- keeping violations and failure to establish an affirmative action program (AAP). An AAP is a key tool OFCCP requires contractors to complete to ensure equal employment opportunity. The remaining 86 percent of evaluations either found no violations or ended in administrative closure. Technology contractor evaluations that had discrimination violations resulted in back pay, salary adjustments, or other benefits totaling more than $4.5 million for 15,316 individuals (averaging about $300 per award) for fiscal years 2011 through 2016. The vast majority of discrimination violations were on the basis of gender or race/ethnicity rather than disability or veteran status. Corrective actions OFCCP identified for federal technology contractors over this timeframe also included requiring contractors to fill a total of 410 job vacancies as they arise with applicants who had been denied employment on the basis of discrimination. In addition, OFCCP recently filed three complaints against technology companies. According to our analysis, OFCCP conducted evaluations on 36 of the 65 leading technology companies from fiscal year 2011 through fiscal year 2016. During this timeframe there were 272 reviews of establishments— physical business locations—affiliated with these 36 companies. Based on these evaluations, 15 of the 36 companies had administrative violations, and 2 of the 36 also had discrimination violations. As a result of the discrimination findings against these leading technology companies, 541 individuals received monetary benefits totaling $783,387 (an average of $1,448 per award). In terms of other steps to conduct oversight of the technology sector, OFCCP officials in the Pacific Region said they are hiring compliance officers with legal training to be better able to address needs for reviews in the technology sector, such as responding to lawyers representing technology contractors. Officials in both the Pacific and Northeast regions work closely with statisticians and labor economists on their cases, an effort officials said has increased over the past few years. OFCCP has also requested funding in its fiscal year 2018 congressional budget justification to establish centers in San Francisco and New York that would develop expertise to handle large, complex compliance evaluations in specific industries, including information technology. We found that by not requiring an industry code in its investigations data, EEOC cannot analyze charge data by industry to help identify investigation and outreach priorities, in contradiction to EEOC strategic planning documents and EEOC Inspector General reports, which have emphasized the importance of doing so. By not requiring the use of the NAICS code for each entry in IMS, EEOC is limited in its ability to use these data for the purposes of identifying charges by industry sector and conducting sector-related analyses. Officials were aware of substantial gaps in coding of charges by industry and acknowledged limitations in the commission’s ability to analyze its investigations data by industry. However, officials expressed concern that routinely creating more complete records of the companies against which charges had been filed would require investigators to divert attention from their efforts to investigate charges. EEOC officials explained that the charging party provides initial information on the respondent company and requiring EEOC personnel to generate this information would slow down the process. They said their priority is to investigate individual charges, not to address larger trends or target specific industries. “The Strategic Enforcement Plan recommends using EEOC data to allow our enforcement and outreach efforts to focus on areas of significant concern. This might include tailoring outreach efforts for industries that experience greater likelihood of certain charges or informing enforcement decisions based on knowledge that certain industries have persistent problems, such as harassment. The data maintained in IMS provide a rich resource of information that can be used to explore the characteristics of industries that appear to have higher levels of certain allegations than comparative industries.” In addition, reports completed by the Urban Institute for the EEOC Office of Inspector General in 2013 and 2015 similarly recommended analysis of charge data, including by industry, to help identify priorities and measure performance. While EEOC has plans to review a year of IMS data to clean it and determine how best to add missing industry codes, among other objectives, officials could not provide a specific timeframe for when this review would begin and end. Standards for internal control in the federal government state that management should use quality information to achieve the agency’s objectives and objectives should be defined in specific terms so they are understood at all levels of the entity. This involves clearly defining what is to be achieved, who is to achieve it, how it will be achieved, and the time frames for achievement. Efforts to scrub these data and identify missing codes could help EEOC determine how to collect industry information on an ongoing basis for all entries. Doing so would also help EEOC determine the level of NAICS code that would be feasible and useful for investigators to identify and input into IMS. Without analyzing its data on charges across industries, EEOC’s ability to proactively identify priorities for its outreach and enforcement resource use is limited. We found that OFCCP also faces challenges that may hinder the agency’s oversight of technology companies. Specifically, OFCCP reported facing delays in receiving information from federal contractors, including technology companies, but has not yet evaluated whether its own policies and practices also impede its efforts to hold federal technology contractors responsible for the legal requirements to take affirmative action and not discriminate against protected groups. In addition, OFCCP regulations do not require federal contractors to disaggregate data for the purpose of determining placement goals for hiring, which may hinder contractors’ efforts to implement effective affirmative action programs. OFCCP has not analyzed delays in obtaining information from contractors OFCCP officials told us that they face delays in obtaining complete, accurate, and timely documentation from federal contractors, including technology companies, as part of the compliance review process. They said this limited their access to critical information and hindered OFCCP’s ability to determine whether discrimination had occurred. Officials in the Pacific Region reported that when issues are identified during OFCCP’s initial review that will require additional data, the data requests can be extensive. Consequently, technology contractors are taking longer to submit complete and accurate data that are needed to conduct analyses of the contractor’s workforce. In addition, officials in both the Pacific and Northeast regions reported that companies may not provide raw data as requested, or provide access to employees for OFCCP to interview, which is part of the compliance review process. Using 2015 OFCCP compliance evaluation data, we previously reported that close to 85 percent of contractor establishments across all sectors did not submit an AAP within 30 days of being scheduled for an OFCCP compliance evaluation, as required by OFCCP policy. Officials told us of the potential need for a more flexible set of investigatory tools or sanctions, such as subpoena power to speed up data-gathering or penalties for delays in providing information, in order to obtain accurate and timely information. In the case of incomplete data, OFCCP officials said one option is to enter into an agreement with the contractor whereby the contractor will gather the missing data, and OFCCP will monitor the contractor’s efforts and review detailed records at a later date. However, they said that such an agreement could give the contractor an opportunity to modify the data in the contractor’s favor. Currently, OFCCP’s primary sanction is the threat of debarment, which makes a company ineligible to receive future federal contracts. At the same time, OFCCP officials acknowledged there may additionally be delays in their own review processes. In prior work, we’ve reported concerns by contractors and industry groups about lengthy and expansive OFCCP evaluations. However, OFCCP has not analyzed its data on closed evaluations to assess the cause of delays, which would help determine whether changes should be made to its internal processes or if stronger sanctions to obtain information from contractors are needed. Internal control standards state that management should identify, analyze, and respond to risks related to achieving its objectives. Further, it states that management should design appropriate mechanisms to enforce its directives to achieve those objectives and address related risks. Without more information on the root cause of the delays, these delays may continue, straining resources and inhibiting OFCCP’s efforts to identify potential discrimination. “An affirmative action program is a management tool designed to ensure equal employment opportunity. A central premise underlying affirmative action is that, absent discrimination, over time a contractor’s workforce, generally, will reflect the gender, racial and ethnic profile of the labor pools from which the contractor recruits and selects. Affirmative action programs contain a diagnostic component which includes a number of quantitative analyses designed to evaluate the composition of the workforce of the contractor and compare it to the composition of the relevant labor pools. Affirmative action programs also include action- oriented programs. If women and minorities are not being employed at a rate to be expected given their availability in the relevant labor pool, the contractor’s affirmative action program includes specific practical steps designed to address this underutilization.” “The placement goal-setting process . . . contemplates that contractors will, where required, establish a single goal for all minorities. In the event of a substantial disparity in the utilization of a particular minority group or in the utilization of women or women of a particular minority group, a contractor may be required to establish separate goals for those groups.” According to OFCCP officials, a contractor may be required to establish separate goals for particular minority groups as part of a compliance review. We found, however, that OFCCP’s regulations do not require federal contractors to disaggregate demographic data for the purpose of establishing placement goals in their AAP. This may hinder their efforts to implement effective AAPs, which are designed to assist the company in achieving a workforce that reflects the gender, racial, and ethnic profile of the labor pools from which the contractor recruits and selects. OFCCP officials in headquarters and in the field said, based on their experience evaluating companies’ compliance, it was not common for companies to have placement goals disaggregated by race and ethnicity in their AAPs. A diversity and inclusion officer we interviewed from one large technology contractor noted that the requirement in the AAP to identify the need for placement goals for minorities as a whole does not address underrepresentation in certain minority groups. According to the officer, the company does not count Asian workers in setting the company’s diversity goals because Asians are well represented and the company believes it should set a placement goal for groups for which the company knows it needs to make progress. Citing comments received during development of other regulations, OFCCP officials cautioned that an analysis of utilization disaggregated by race/ethnicity may be more challenging for smaller companies with fewer employees. Further, looking at trends in diversity for minorities as a whole may not assist a company’s affirmative action efforts to identify groups that need particular outreach or support. Specifically, our analysis of workforce data found differences in representation for Black and Hispanic workers in the technology workforce compared to Asian workers. Under the current AAP regulations, companies may opt not to detect and address underrepresentation of particular minority groups since OFCCP does not require placement goals disaggregated by race/ethnicity. While OFCCP may be able to detect underrepresentation of particular minority groups during its reviews, the office reviews only 2 percent of federal contractor establishments each year. OFCCP officials said that they would need to amend their regulations in order to require disaggregated race/ethnicity information for placement goals on AAPs. The officials said disaggregating race in placement goals could help an establishment determine how to tailor outreach accordingly or better identify impediments to its equal employment opportunity efforts. However, they have not pursued this regulatory change because of competing priorities on their regulatory agenda. OFCCP’s mission includes holding federal contractors responsible for the legal requirements to take affirmative action and not discriminate against protected groups. However, not requiring contractors to set placement goals for each minority group may hinder OFCCP’s ability to effectively achieve this mission. OFCCP has not reviewed key aspects of its current approach to evaluations OFCCP officials report the agency intends to incorporate additional information on gender, racial, and ethnic disparities by industry into its compliance evaluation selection process, but we found the methodology to determine the disparities may have weaknesses. We have previously reported on the challenges OFCCP faces with its enforcement efforts, and identified additional areas that may limit OFCCP’s enforcement of federal contractors’ equal employment and affirmative action efforts. For example, our 2016 report found that OFCCP’s weak compliance evaluation selection process, reliance on voluntary compliance, and lack of staff training create several challenges to its enforcement efforts. This report found that because OFCCP was not able to identify which factors are associated with risk of noncompliance, the agency does not have reasonable assurance that it is focusing its efforts on those contractors at greatest risk of not following nondiscrimination or affirmative action requirements. OFCCP agreed with recommendations we made to address these areas and detailed steps the agency would take. In particular, to strengthen its compliance evaluation process to select contractors at greatest risk of potential discrimination, the agency stated that it planned to incorporate information on pay disparities and employment disparities. OFCCP officials indicated this information would be based on analysis of gender and race/ethnicity by industry using ACS data and EEO-1 compensation data that was to be collected beginning March 2018. However, in August 2017, the Office of Management and Budget issued a memo suspending the pay-related data collection aspects of the EEO-1 form. Despite this change, OFCCP officials said they are exploring other options for focusing on compensation disparities by industry, including through the use of ACS data, administrative data, a previous study conducted by the Department of Labor, as well as options proposed by contractors. We also found OFCCP’s current methodology for identifying disparities by industry with the ACS data may have some weaknesses that could affect the accuracy of the outcomes. For example, its reliance on the broadest industry level available may not sufficiently identify specific industries at elevated risk. Further, the methodology includes future plans to conduct the analysis for metropolitan areas. Given the importance of regional and local labor markets for assessing affirmative action efforts, regional and local analysis should also be completed before OFCCP incorporates this analysis into its selection process. It is important that OFCCP use reliable information in modifying its basic processes and setting priorities. For the reasons cited earlier regarding the importance of using quality information to make management decisions, it is important that OFCCP assess the quality of the methods for its analysis of employment disparities among industries. Without doing so, OFCCP may not accurately identify industries at greatest risk of potential noncompliance with nondiscrimination and affirmative action requirements so it can focus its limited investigation resources most effectively. Further, according to OFCCP officials, although the agency has made slight changes to various thresholds and factors for its selection process, the agency has not made any significant changes to the selection process for about 10 years, and has made no changes to its establishment-based approach since OFCCP was founded in 1965. While OFCCP currently grounds its review of a contractor in a particular physical establishment, OFCCP officials acknowledged the changing nature of a company’s work can involve multiple locations and corresponding changes in the scope of hiring and recruitment. Officials we interviewed from five of our eight selected technology companies discussed their work spread across locations, including the United States or overseas, and the related challenges they face with OFCCP’s establishment-based approach to reviews. One company representative said the AAP is not useful because site specific plans do not connect to business decisions. However, OFCCP has not reviewed the implications for the effectiveness of its mission of continuing with its establishment-based approach to conducting compliance evaluations. In addition, OFCCP officials acknowledged their inability, in identifying establishments for review, to consistently identify and include all subcontractors to which OFCCP rules should apply. They said the agency has not assessed the potential significance of any omissions of subcontractors from the oversight process. Internal control standards state that management should identify risks throughout the entity related to achieving its defined objectives to form a basis for designing risk responses, as well as the importance of periodically reviewing policies, procedures and related control activities for continued relevance and effectiveness in achieving the agency’s objectives. OFCCP officials said they have informally discussed how to adjust their work based on how work is performed in today’s economy—with virtual sites, workplace flexibilities, and nontraditional forms of employment. However, due to competing priorities, they have not conducted a formal review of these key aspects of its current approach to selecting entities for review. They acknowledged such a review would be useful. Without assessing its current approach to its establishment-based reviews and identification of all relevant subcontractors, OFCCP does not have reasonable assurance that its approach can identify discrimination occurring within the companies it oversees and may be missing opportunities to identify more effective practices or adjust its methods to external changes. While OFCCP has offered an option—the Functional Affirmative Action Program (FAAP)—for companies to move away from establishment- based reviews and which may be more appropriate for some multi– establishment contractors, uptake has been low and the agency has not conducted an evaluation of this program. Since 2002, OFCCP has allowed companies to create FAAPs, with OFCCP approval, which are based on a business function or unit that may exist at multiple establishments. As of May 2017, 73 companies across all industries had FAAPs in place. Further, some of the companies we interviewed were unaware that the FAAP was an option or believed it was cumbersome to establish given the complexity of their workforce. Asked why the FAAP has not been more broadly adopted, OFCCP officials hypothesized it could have to do with a requirement intended to ensure that companies with FAAPs would be reviewed at least as often as others, but that may result in these companies being reviewed more often than most. Standards for internal control for government agencies state that management should periodically review policies, procedures, and related control activities for continued relevance and effectiveness in achieving the entity’s objectives. Reviewing and refining the FAAP program could help OFCCP improve its ability to achieve its objectives and may provide broader insight for OFCCP’s overall enforcement approach. Jobs in the high paying technology sector are projected to grow in coming years. Female, Black, and Hispanic workers, however, comprised a smaller proportion of technology workers compared to their representation in the general workforce from 2005 through 2015, and have also been less represented among technology workers inside the technology sector than outside it. Both EEOC’s and OFCCP’s mission is to combat discrimination and support equal employment opportunity for U.S. workers; however, weaknesses in their processes impact the effectiveness of their efforts. When conducting investigations, EEOC has not been consistently capturing information on industry codes. This impedes its ability to conduct industry sector analysis that could be used to more effectively focus its limited enforcement resources and outreach activities. Similarly, OFCCP faces delays in its compliance review process but it has not analyzed its closed evaluations to understand the causes of these delays and whether its processes need to be modified to reduce them. In addition, as part of their affirmative action programs federal contractors are only required to set placement goals for all minorities in general. By not requiring contractors to disaggregate demographic data for the purpose of establishing placement goals, OFCCP has limited assurance that these contractors are setting goals that will address potential underrepresentation in certain minority groups. Further, OFCCP plans to incorporate information on disparities by industry into its process for selecting establishments for compliance evaluations, but has not fully assessed its planned methods. Without such assessment, OFCCP may use a process that does not effectively identify the industries at greatest risk of potential noncompliance with nondiscrimination and affirmative action requirements. In addition, key aspects of OFCCP’s approach to compliance reviews of contractors’ affirmative action efforts have not changed in over 50 years, whereas the structure and locations of these companies’ work have changed. Finally, although OFCCP has developed an alternative affirmative action program for multi-establishment contractors, few contractors participate in this program. Because OFCCP has not evaluated the program, it does not have information to determine why there has not been greater uptake and whether it provides a more effective alternative to an establishment-based AAP. We are making a total of six recommendations, including one to EEOC and five to OFCCP. Specifically: The Chair of the EEOC should develop a timeline to complete the planned effort to clean IMS data for a one-year period and add missing industry code data. (Recommendation 1) The Director of OFCCP should analyze internal process data from closed evaluations to better understand the cause of delays that occur during compliance evaluations and make changes accordingly. (Recommendation 2) The Director of OFCCP should take steps toward requiring contractors to disaggregate demographic data for the purpose of setting placement goals in the AAP rather than setting a single goal for all minorities, incorporating any appropriate accommodation for company size. For example, OFCCP could provide guidance to contractors to include more specific goals in their AAP or assess the feasibility of amending their regulations to require them to do so. (Recommendation 3) The Director of OFCCP should assess the quality of the methods used by OFCCP to incorporate consideration of disparities by industry into its process for selecting contractor establishments for compliance evaluation. It should use the results of this assessment in finalizing its procedures for identifying contractor establishments at greatest risk of noncompliance. (Recommendation 4) The Director of OFCCP should evaluate the current approach used for identifying entities for compliance review and determine whether modifications are needed to reflect current workplace structures and locations or to ensure that subcontractors are included. (Recommendation 5) The Director of OFCCP should evaluate the Functional Affirmative Action Program to assess its usefulness as an effective alternative to an establishment-based program, and determine what improvements, if any, could be made to better encourage contractor participation. (Recommendation 6) We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Labor (DOL), Commerce, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the National Science Foundation (NSF). We received written comments from DOL that are reproduced in appendix V. In addition, DOL, Commerce, EEOC, and NSF provided technical comments which we incorporated into the report as appropriate. DOL agreed with 4 of the 5 recommendations we made to improve oversight of federal contractors, and identified some steps it plans to take to implement them. Specifically, the department agreed with our recommendations to analyze internal process data to better understand the cause of delays that occur during compliance evaluations, assess the quality of methods used to incorporate consideration of disparities by industry into the process to select contractors for review, and to evaluate its current approach to identifying entities for review in light of changes in workplace structures, as well as its Functional Affirmative Action Program. DOL stated that it appreciated, but neither agreed nor disagreed, with our recommendation to take steps toward requiring contractors to disaggregate demographic data for the purpose of setting placement goals in the AAP rather than setting a single goal for all minorities. The department said this would require a regulatory change with little immediate benefit as contractors are already required to collect demographic data on each employee and applicant, and must conduct in- depth analyses of their total employment processes to identify where impediments to equal opportunity exist. While we acknowledge these data collection requirements for federal contractors, we remain concerned that without requiring contractors to also establish placement goals to address any underrepresentation for specific minority groups, contractors may not develop objectives or targets to make affirmative action efforts work. We maintain, therefore, that DOL should take steps toward requiring contractors to develop placement goals disaggregated by race/ethnicity. EEOC provided us a memo that it characterized as technical comments on the draft report. In these comments, EEOC neither agreed nor disagreed with our recommendation to develop a timeline to complete its planned effort to clean IMS data for a one-year period, which would include adding missing industry codes, but stated that it was taking some actions to enhance these data. We continue to maintain a timeline should be developed to complete this review, which is needed for the commission to conduct industry sector analysis that could be used to more effectively focus its limited resources and outreach activities. EEOC also emphasized the importance of systemic investigations, noting that while outreach may be somewhat useful in generating charges, individual charges are unlikely to make a substantial impact on a systemic practice affecting an entire employment sector. We maintain that the ability to analyze IMS data by industry could help EEOC to focus its resource use, including for systemic investigations. EEOC also noted staffing and resource constraints as issues faced by the commission. As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of Labor, the Chair of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Director of the National Science Foundation. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on GAO’s website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff should have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-7215 or brownbarnesc@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix VI. Our two objectives were to: (1) identify the demographic trends in the technology workforce over the past 10 years, and (2) assess the efforts by the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the Department of Labor’s Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP) to oversee technology companies and technology contractors’ compliance with equal employment opportunity and affirmative action requirements. This appendix provides details of the data sources used to answer these questions, the analyses we conducted, and any limitations we encountered. There is no commonly accepted definition of the technology sector or technology-oriented occupations. To arrive at our definition for the technology sector, we identified industries with the highest concentration of technology-oriented occupations, a similar approach to what other federal agencies have used recently to analyze trends within this sector. To identify technology-oriented occupations, we reviewed relevant research and interviewed researchers and other individuals knowledgeable about the technology sector. Based on this research, we defined technology-oriented occupations to include all computer, engineering and mathematical occupations, including managers. We selected our occupations using Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) System codes, and crosswalked those occupations to the corresponding U.S. Census Bureau occupation codes to conduct our analysis. (For a complete list of the occupations we included as technology occupations, see appendix II). We defined the technology sector as a group of industries with the highest concentration of technology workers. Using data from the American Community Survey, an ongoing national survey conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau that collects information from a sample of households, we identified the 15 industries with the highest concentration of technology workers. For this analysis, we used Census industry codes since we used this dataset for many of our analyses. The concentration of technology workers in these industries ranged from a high of 62.2 percent in the computer systems design and related services industry to a low of 19.33 percent in the wired telecommunications carriers industry (see table 3). Companies in the technology sector also employ non-technical workers, such as sales people. We cross-walked the industries we identified in the American Community Survey with corresponding industry codes from the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS), which is the standard used by federal statistical agencies in classifying business establishments. The other data sets used in this review use NAICS codes to identify industry. The NAICS system has six levels of industry classification, with the smallest level (2-digit code) providing the most general industry classification, and the largest (6-digit) providing the most specific classification. In total, we identified 55 6-digit NAICS industry codes that comprise the technology sector using this method. (See appendix III for a list of the 6-digit NAICS codes and industry names that correspond to the Census industries we identified.) We compared our list of industries to those included in the 2016 reports by EEOC and the BLS on the technology sector. While each report includes a somewhat different set of industries depending on the authors’ particular definition of technology occupations, most of the 15 industries we selected overlap with industries selected in these other reviews. Stemming from their particular focus, these reports included some additional industries and/or occupations excluded from our analysis, such as those in the life sciences. We also compared our findings on the demographic trends in the technology workforce to 2016 EEOC and Census Bureau reports that reviewed diversity in the technology sector. Despite the definitional and methodological variations, the demographic trends found in these other reports were generally comparable to our findings. To determine the demographic trends in the technology workforce over the past decade, we analyzed quantitative data on technology workers within and outside the technology sector from 2005 through 2015 from the Census Bureau’s Public Use Microdata Sample of the American Community Survey (ACS) for the years 2005, 2007, 2009, 2011, 2013, and 2015. ACS is an ongoing national survey that collects information from a sample of households. We analyzed trend data for gender, race, and ethnicity, and median salary by occupation and sector, and analyzed point-in-time data on educational background by occupation. We analyzed the percentage of technology workers who earned bachelor’s degrees in computer, engineering, mathematics, and technology fields. For median salary, we analyzed data for workers who were employed full-time, which included those who, over the past 12 months, reported usually working 35 hours or more per week and 50 weeks or more per year, and those with wages greater than zero. To account for the sample representation and design used in the ACS, we used the person weight present in the ACS data. We used the successive difference replication method to estimate the standard errors around any population estimate. For each comparison, we tested the statistical significance of the difference for men and women and for specific racial and ethnic groups at the p-value <0.05 level. In addition, we tested the statistical significance of the change between 2005 and 2015 for each gender and racial/ethnic group. For race categories using ACS data in this report, we included only non- Hispanic members of White, Black, Asian, and Other categories. For the Asian category, we included Asian American, Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander. The Hispanic category incorporated Hispanics of all races. Our analysis included American Indian or Alaskan Native, and Two or More Races, in the category reported as “Other.” We assessed the reliability of the ACS generally and of data elements that were critical to our analyses and determined that they were sufficiently reliable for our analyses. Specifically, we reviewed documentation on the general design and methods of the ACS and on the specific elements of the ACS data that were used in our analysis. We interviewed Census Bureau officials knowledgeable about the ACS data and completed our own electronic data testing to assess the accuracy and completeness of the data used in our analyses. To determine workforce trends in companies within the technology sector and at leading information technology companies, we analyzed data from EEOC’s Employer Information Reports (EEO-1) for the years 2007, 2011, and 2015. We report EEO-1 data starting in 2007 because EEOC made significant changes to its requirements related to the reporting of EEO-1 data over time. For example, beginning in 2007, EEOC changed its requirements related to the reporting of data on managers and changed its practices for collecting certain racial/ethnicity information. EEO-1 reports contain firm-level data that is annually submitted to EEOC, generally by private-sector firms with at least 100 employees or federal contractors with at least 50 employees that have a contract, subcontract or purchase order amounting to $50,000 or more. Companies that fit the above criteria submit separate EEO-1 reports for their headquarters as well as each establishment facility. EEOC requires employers to use the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) to classify their industry. To identify trends using EEO-1 data for workers, we analyzed data for companies with the NAICS codes we initially identified as technology industries. We selected the leading information technology companies using Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 500 Information Technology Index list, which identifies the largest public information technology companies at a given time. In October 2016, this list consisted of 67 companies in the world that have stocks trading with the United States, and we analyzed EEO-1 data from 65 of these companies. For both analyses, we analyzed EEO-1 data from all job categories by gender, race and ethnicity, and industry sectors. For job categories, the EEO-1 form collects data on 10 major job categories including 1) Executives, Senior Level Officials and Managers; 2) First/Mid-Level Officials and Managers; 3) Professionals; 4) Technicians; 5) Sales Workers; 6) Administrative Support Workers; 7) Craft Workers; 8) Operatives; 9) Laborers and Helpers; and 10) Service Workers. In our analysis, “all other jobs” combines sales workers, administrative support workers, craft workers, operatives, laborers and helpers, and service workers. We used the race/ethnicity categories used by the EEOC as follows: White, Black or African American, Asian (including Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander), Hispanic or Latino, and “Two or more Races” (including American Indian or Alaska Native). We assessed the reliability of the EEO-1 data and determined that despite limitations, they were sufficiently reliable for our analyses. To determine the reliability of the EEO-1 data that we received from EEOC, we interviewed knowledgeable EEOC officials, reviewed relevant documents provided by agency officials and obtained on its website, and performed manual data testing for missing variables. For our analysis of technology degree earners, we used degree completion data tabulated by the National Science Foundation from the National Center for Education Statistics’ Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) for the year 2014. Using a variety of sources, such as academic research and interviews with representatives from academia, we defined technology-related fields as degree programs in computer science, engineering, and mathematics. We analyzed IPEDS data by race and gender and who had obtained a bachelor’s or master’s degree in technology-related fields. We determined that the potential external candidates for technology positions generally had obtained either a bachelor’s or a master’s degree in a technology-related field. We used the race/ethnicity categories used by IPEDS as follows: White, Black, Asian (including Pacific Islander), Hispanic, and Multiracial or other (which includes American Indian or Alaska Native, Other or Unknown Race, and Two or more Races, i.e. respondents who selected one or more racial designations). Race and ethnicity breakouts are for U.S. citizens and permanent residents only, and thus do not include data on temporary residents. The analysis by gender includes temporary residents. To determine the reliability of IPEDs data, we reviewed relevant documents obtained on the National Center for Education Statistics website, such as annual methodology reports and the handbook of NCES survey methods. We determined that data from IPEDs were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. To identify how EEOC and OFCCP have overseen technology companies’ compliance with federal equal opportunity and affirmative action requirements, we reviewed relevant federal statutes and regulations, EEOC and OFCCP policies, strategic planning documents, and operational manuals. We interviewed EEOC and OFCCP officials in headquarters, and in two regional locations selected based on the large proportion of technology companies in those areas. At EEOC, we met with officials from the San Francisco and New York district offices. At OFCCP, we met with officials from the Pacific and Northeast regional offices. To explore charges of discrimination filed with the EEOC against technology companies, we planned to analyze data from the EEOC Integrated Mission System (IMS), which contains records on EEOC charges and enforcement activities. However, since industry code is not a mandatory field for investigators to complete, roughly half the entries did not have an industry code. Therefore, we could not reliably identify technology companies that have faced charges or enforcement. We attempted to match information we had developed on federal technology contractors with charges filed in the IMS database. Depending on the matching method we used, this yielded very different results and we determined this was not a sufficiently reliable method. Further, any matching method we used would have excluded technology companies that did not hold a federal contract. To obtain information on evaluations of technology contractors completed by OFCCP and complaints received against technology contractors, we took a two-step approach. First, using the Federal Procurement Data System–Next Generation (FPDS-NG), we developed a list of company establishments and their subsidiaries that received federal contract obligations in fiscal years 2011-2015 under any of the 55 NAICS codes we included above as technology industries. We selected only company establishments that received 50 percent or more of their total federal contract obligations under these NAICS codes. Each establishment was counted only once regardless of how many federal contracts it received during the time period. Using this method, we identified 43,448 establishments in our pool of “technology contractors.” To identify subsidiaries, which are also subject to OFCCP requirements and evaluations, we identified any other establishments that shared the global vendor code with the contractors we identified, regardless of their NAICS code. This yielded 2,116 additional contractors. Second, we matched the names (removing suffixes) of the technology contractors and their subsidiaries that we identified in FPDS-NG against OFCCP’s data on their evaluations of contractors to identify the evaluations of technology contractors that OFCCP opened and completed from fiscal year 2011 through fiscal year 2016. We conducted a similar matching exercise to identify the complaints OFCCP received against technology companies. In addition, we identified which of the leading technology companies had completed evaluations between fiscal year 2011 through 2016. We obtained information during interviews with researchers, and representatives of workforce and industry organizations and associations. In addition, we interviewed diversity and compliance representatives of eight of the leading information technology companies located in the San Francisco Bay area which were also federal contractors to discuss their efforts to increase diversity and to gain their perspectives on the federal role in overseeing compliance with nondiscrimination laws. These companies were: Cisco Systems, Inc. Facebook, Inc. Google Inc. Hewlett Packard Enterprise Company Intuit Inc. Oracle America, Inc. This is the list of technology occupations that we used in our analyses. We selected our occupations using Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) System codes, and cross- walked those occupations to the corresponding U.S. Census Bureau occupation codes. This is the list of the 55 6-digit North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) codes we identified as technology-related industries. To develop this list, we identified the 15 industries with the highest concentration of technology workers using U.S. Census Bureau industry codes and then used the U.S. Census Bureau’s 2012 Industry Code List for Household Surveys to crosswalk the Census codes with NAICS codes. In addition to the contact named above, Betty Ward-Zukerman (Assistant Director), Kate Blumenreich (Analyst-in-Charge), Sheranda Campbell, Julianne Hartmann Cutts, Clarita Mrena, Moon Parks, Alexandra Rouse, and John Yee made significant contributions to all phases of the work. Also contributing to this report were Rachel Beers, James Bennett, Hedieh Fusfield, Julia Kennon, Jean McSween, Jessica Orr, Dae Park, James Rebbe, Almeta Spencer, and Alexandra Squitieri.	[ "Technology companies are a major source of high-paying U.S. jobs, but some have questioned the sector's commitment to equal employment opportunity. EEOC provides federal oversight of nondiscrimination requirements by investigating charges of discrimination, and OFCCP enforces federal contractors' compliance with affirmative action requirements. GAO was asked to review workforce trends in the technology sector and federal oversight. This report examines (1) trends in the gender, racial, and ethnic composition of the technology sector workforce; and (2) EEOC and OFCCP oversight of technology companies' compliance with equal employment and affirmative action requirements. GAO analyzed workforce data from the American Community Survey for 2005-2015 and EEOC Employer Information Reports for 2007-2015, the latest data available during our analysis. GAO analyzed OFCCP data on compliance evaluations for fiscal years 2011-2016. GAO interviewed agency officials, researchers, and workforce, industry, and company representatives. The estimated percentage of minority technology workers increased from 2005 to 2015, but GAO found that no growth occurred for female and Black workers, whereas Asian and Hispanic workers made statistically significant increases (see figure). Further, female, Black, and Hispanic workers remain a smaller proportion of the technology workforce—mathematics, computing, and engineering occupations—compared to their representation in the general workforce. These groups have also been less represented among technology workers inside the technology sector than outside it. In contrast, Asian workers were more represented in these occupations than in the general workforce. Stakeholders and researchers GAO interviewed identified several factors that may have contributed to the lower representation of certain groups, such as fewer women and minorities graduating with technical degrees and company hiring and retention practices. Both the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the Department of Labor's Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP) have taken steps to enforce equal employment and affirmative action requirements in the technology sector, but face limitations. While EEOC has identified barriers to recruitment and hiring in the technology sector as a strategic priority, when EEOC conducts investigations, it does not systematically record the type of industry, therefore limiting sector-related analyses to help focus its efforts. EEOC has plans to determine how to add missing industry codes but has not set a timeframe to do this. In addition, OFCCP's regulations may hinder its ability to enforce contractors' compliance because OFCCP directs contractors to set placement goals for all minorities as a group rather than for specific racial/ethnic groups. OFCCP also has not made changes to its establishment-based approach to selecting entities for review in decades, even though changes have occurred in how workplaces are structured. Without taking steps to address these issues, OFCCP may miss opportunities to hold contractors responsible for complying with affirmative action and nondiscrimination requirements. GAO makes 6 recommendations, including that EEOC develop a timeline to improve industry data collection and OFCCP take steps toward requiring more specific minority placement goals by contractors and assess key aspects of its selection approach. EEOC neither agreed nor disagreed with its recommendation, and OFCCP stated the need for regulatory change to alter placement goal requirements. GAO continues to believe actions are needed, as discussed in the report." ]	11,390	gov_report	en	null	610a8939f0468afb49281c0bfd81d3dbf0dd43a787207cd6
According to VA officials and Omaha donor group representatives, two main factors coalesced to become the impetus for the CHIP-IN Act. One factor was an Omaha donor group’s interest in constructing an ambulatory care center that could help address the needs of veterans in the area, given uncertainty about when or whether VA would be able to build a planned replacement medical center. In 2011, VA allocated $56 million for the design of the replacement medical center in Omaha, which had a total estimated cost of $560 million. However, VA officials told us that given the agency’s backlog of construction projects, the replacement medical center was not among its near-term projects. In the meantime, according to VA officials and the Omaha donor group, they discussed a change in the scope of the project— from the original plan of a replacement medical center to a smaller- scope project for a new ambulatory care center—that could potentially be constructed using the existing appropriation of $56 million plus a donation from the Omaha donor group. Another factor was the Congress’s and VA’s broader interest in testing innovative approaches to meeting VA’s infrastructure needs. According to VA officials, the agency was interested in constructing medical facilities in a more expeditious manner and developing legislation that allowed private money to help address VA’s needs. The CHIP-IN Act authorized a total of five pilot projects but did not name any specific project locations. Subsequently, the Omaha donor group applied to participate in the pilot program—with the construction of an ambulatory care center—and VA executed a donation agreement in April 2017. VA may accept up to four more real property donations under the pilot program, which is authorized through 2021. The CHIP-IN Act places certain requirements on donations under the pilot program. VA may accept CHIP-IN donations only if the property: (1) has already received appropriations for a VA facility project, or (2) has been identified as a need as part of VA’s long-range capital planning process and the location is included on the Strategic Capital Investment Planning process priority list provided in VA’s most recent budget submission to Congress. The CHIP-IN Act also requires that a formal agreement between VA and the non-federal entity provide that the entity conduct necessary environmental and historic preservation due diligence, obtain permits, and use construction standards required of VA, though the VA Secretary may permit exceptions. VA entered into an agreement with the Omaha donor group for the design and construction of an ambulatory care center in April 2017—4 months after enactment of the CHIP-IN Act. According to this agreement, which establishes the terms of the donation, the Omaha donor group will complete the design and construction of the facility and consult with VA. The facility will provide approximately 158,000 gross square feet of outpatient clinical functions, including primary care, an eye clinic, general purpose radiology and ambulatory surgery, specialty care, and mental health care. According to VA officials, planning for the facility began in April 2017, after the donation agreement was executed, and the project broke ground in April 2018. This donation agreement includes the mutually agreed- upon design and construction standards, which incorporate both VA’s standards and private sector building standards. The donation agreement also sets the terms of VA’s review of the design and construction documents and establishes escrow operations for the holding and disbursement of federal funds. Upon the Omaha donor group’s completion of the facility (scheduled for summer 2020) and VA’s acceptance, the Omaha donor group will turn the facility over to VA. The total estimated project cost is approximately $86 million. VA is contributing the $56 million that had already been appropriated for the design of the replacement medical facility. The Omaha donor group will donate the remaining approximately $30 million in private sector donations needed to build the facility. As shown in figure 2 and described below, VA officials told us that several offices are involved in various aspects of the CHIP-IN pilot—such as executing the Omaha project, seeking additional partnerships, and establishing the overall pilot program effort. The VA Office of Construction and Facilities Management (CFM) includes its Office of Real Property (ORP) and Office of Operations. ORP has taken a lead role in establishing the pilot program, while CFM Operations has led the execution of the Omaha project. Other VA offices that have been involved at different stages include the Office of General Counsel and the Secretary’s Center for Strategic Partnerships. Within the Veterans Health Administration (VHA), the local medical-center leadership was involved with developing the Omaha project, and the Office of Capital Asset Management, Engineering, and Support (Capital Asset Management Office) has contributed to efforts to identify additional projects. Some of these offices are involved with a steering committee created to implement the CHIP-IN Act (CHIP-IN steering committee). This steering committee met for the first time in September 2018. In 2016, we identified five leading practices for designing a well- developed and documented pilot program: articulating an assessment methodology, developing an evaluation plan, assessing scalability, and ensuring stakeholder communication. (See fig. 3.) These practices enhance the quality, credibility, and usefulness of pilot program evaluations and help ensure that time and resources are used effectively. While each of the five practices serves a purpose on its own, taken together, they form a framework for effective pilot design. VA officials have worked to communicate with relevant stakeholders, but have not yet established objectives, developed an assessment methodology and evaluation plan, or documented how they will make decisions about scalability of the pilot program. In 2016, we reported that clear, measurable objectives can help ensure that appropriate evaluation data are collected from the outset of a pilot program. Measurable objectives should be defined in qualitative or quantitative terms, so that performance toward achieving the objectives can be assessed, according to federal standards for internal control. For example, broad pilot objectives should be translated into specific researchable questions that articulate what will be assessed. Establishing well-defined objectives is critical to effectively implementing the other leading practices for a pilot program’s design. Objectives are needed to develop an assessment methodology to help determine the data and information that will be collected. Objectives also inform the evaluation plan because performance of the pilot should be evaluated against these objectives. In addition, objectives are needed to assess the scalability of the pilot, to help inform decisions on whether and how to implement a new approach in a broader context (i.e., whether the approach could be replicable in other settings). Relevant VA stakeholders have not yet collectively agreed upon and documented overall objectives for the CHIP-IN pilot program, but the stakeholders said they are planning to do so. However, at the time of our review, each of the VA offices we interviewed presented various ideas of what the objectives for the pilot should be, reflecting their varied missions and roles in the CHIP-IN pilot. For example, A senior VHA official said the objectives should include (1) determining whether the CHIP-IN donation partnership approach is an effective use of VA resources and (2) defining general principles for the pilot, including a repeatable process for future CHIP-IN projects. A senior VA official who has been closely involved with the pilot said one objective should be determining how VA can partner with the private sector for future construction projects, whether through donation partnerships or other means. Officials from ORP, who have taken a lead role in establishing the pilot, told us their objectives include identifying the four additional projects authorized by the CHIP-IN Act, developing a process to undertake potential projects, and determining whether a recommendation should be made that Congress extend VA’s CHIP-IN authority beyond the 5-year pilot. ORP officials said they have written some of these objectives in an early draft of plans for the CHIP-IN steering committee, but they have also discussed other objectives that are not yet documented. While the various VA offices involved may have somewhat different interests in the pilot program, developing a set of clear, measureable objectives is an important part of a good pilot design. For example, several VA officials who are involved in the pilot told us that it would be useful for relevant internal stakeholders to collectively agree upon and document overall objectives. ORP officials told us that the newly formed CHIP-IN steering committee will discuss and formalize objectives for the pilot. However, at the time of our review, a draft of these objectives had not been developed and a timeline for developing objectives was not yet established. A discussion of objectives was planned for the steering committee’s first meeting in September but had been rescheduled for the next meeting in October 2018. VA officials told us that they did not immediately move to establish a framework for the pilot program—which would include objectives for the pilot—for various reasons. Some officials said that VA and the Omaha donor group entered into formal discussions shortly after the CHIP-IN Act was enacted, and that their focus at the time was on negotiating and then executing a donation agreement for that particular project. As such, formal efforts to establish the framework for the overall pilot effort were in initial stages at the time of our review. ORP officials also said that the enactment of the CHIP-IN Act was not anticipated at the time CFM was planning and budgeting its resources for fiscal years 2017 and 2018, so work on the pilot had to be managed within available resources, largely as an additional duty for staff. In addition, a senior VHA official said a meeting to agree upon the pilot program’s objectives was needed but had not been held yet, noting that VA has competing priorities and vacancies at the senior executive level. ORP officials said they are now following project management principles in implementing the pilot. As part of this effort, they said that they intend to develop foundational documents for review by the CHIP-IN steering committee—such as a program plan containing objectives—but they have not done so yet. Without clearly defined and agreed-upon objectives, stakeholders within VA may have different understandings of the pilot’s purpose and intended outcomes. As a result, the agency risks pursuing projects that may not contribute to what VA hopes to learn or gain from the pilot. While VA officials are planning to establish objectives as they formalize the CHIP-IN steering committee, at the time of our review these objectives had not been documented and no timeline has been established for when they would be. Without clear, measurable objectives, VA will be unable to implement other leading practices for pilot design, such as determining how to make decisions about scalability. Further, not defining objectives in the near future would ultimately affect VA’s ability to evaluate the pilot and provide information to Congress about its results. We have reported that developing a clearly articulated assessment methodology and a detailed evaluation plan are leading practices for pilot design. The assessment methodology and evaluation plan should be linked to the pilot’s objectives so that evaluation results will show successes and challenges of the pilot, to help the agency draw conclusions about whether the pilot met its objectives. The assessment methodology and evaluation plan are also needed to determine scalability, because evaluation results will show whether and how the pilot can be expanded or incorporated into broader efforts. Given that several VA offices are involved in the pilot’s implementation, it is important for relevant stakeholders to be involved with defining and agreeing upon the assessment methodology and evaluation plan. VA has not yet fully developed and documented either an assessment methodology or evaluation plan for the pilot, but VA officials told us they plan to do so. For example, ORP officials said they intend to collect lessons learned and then evaluate the pilot at its end in 2021 by reviewing this information with relevant stakeholders. However, more specific details for this assessment methodology have not been defined in accordance with this leading practice. For example, we found that ORP has not yet determined which offices will contribute lessons learned, how frequently that information will be collected, or who will collect it. Similarly, details for an evaluation plan have not been defined, including who will participate in the evaluation and how information will be analyzed to evaluate the pilot’s implementation and performance. Now that the CHIP- IN steering committee has met for the first time, this group intends to discuss assessment of the pilot at a future meeting, but it is not clear when that discussion will occur, what leading practices will be considered, and when plans will be defined and documented. According to VA officials, an assessment methodology and evaluation plan have not been developed because, as discussed above, after the CHIP-IN Act was enacted, efforts were focused on negotiating the Omaha donation agreement and then executing that project. As such, formal efforts to establish the pilot through the CHIP-IN steering committee were in initial stages at the time of our review. Further, until VA has agreed- upon and documented objectives for the pilot program, it may be difficult to determine what information is needed for an assessment methodology and how the pilot will be evaluated. Unless VA establishes a clear assessment methodology that articulates responsibilities for contributing and documenting lessons learned, VA may miss opportunities to gather this information from the pilot. For example, while some stakeholders are documenting lessons learned relevant to their roles in the pilot, others are not. Specifically, ORP and CFM Operations are documenting lessons learned, but other VA offices and the Omaha donor group have not, though some told us they would be willing to share lessons learned if asked. Without an assessment methodology, there may also be confusion about who is responsible for documenting lessons learned. For example, a senior CFM official said that the Omaha donor group was compiling lessons learned from the pilot overall and would subsequently share those with VA. However, representatives from the donor group told us they have not been asked to share lessons learned with VA, but they would be willing to do so. When key individuals leave their positions—a situation that has occurred a number of times during implementation of the CHIP-IN pilot—their lessons learned may not be captured. For example, VA officials and donor group representatives told us that two VA officials who were involved in developing the pilot have since left the agency. In addition, stakeholders’ memories of lessons learned may fade unless they record them. Waiting to develop an evaluation plan—which should include details about how lessons learned will be used to measure the pilot’s performance—may ultimately affect VA’s preparedness to evaluate the pilot and provide information to Congress about its results. The purpose of a pilot is to generally inform a decision on whether and how to implement a new approach in a broader context—or in other words, whether the pilot can be scaled up or increased in size to a larger number of projects over the long term. Our prior work has found that it is important to determine how scalability will be assessed and the information needed to inform decisions about scalability. Scalability is connected to other leading practices for pilot design, as discussed above. For example, criteria to measure scalability should provide evidence that the pilot objectives have been met, and the evaluation’s results should inform scalability by showing whether and how the pilot could be expanded or how well lessons learned from the pilot can be incorporated into broader efforts. VA officials have begun to implement this leading practice by considering the pilot as a means of testing the viability of the donation partnership approach; however, plans for assessing scalability have not been fully defined and documented. A senior VA official said scalability is seen as a way to determine if the donation approach or other types of private sector partnerships are a viable way to address VA’s infrastructure needs. Similarly, ORP officials told us they are first considering scalability in terms of whether the CHIP-IN donation approach is an effective or feasible way of delivering VA projects. These officials said scalability will be largely determined by whether all five authorized projects can be executed before authorization for the CHIP-IN pilot program sunsets. For example, if VA can find four additional projects and execute donation agreements before the pilot’s authority expires, then potentially VA could seek congressional reauthorization to extend the program beyond the 5- year pilot. ORP officials are also considering scalability in terms of any changes to the program, such as incentives for donors, that could potentially increase its effectiveness. However, ORP officials explained that scalability may be limited because the types of projects that can be accomplished with the CHIP-IN donation approach may not be the projects that are most needed by VA. Along with other pilot design topics, the CHIP-IN steering committee intends to discuss scalability at a future meeting, but it is not clear when that discussion will occur. Thus, while VA officials have considered what scalability might look like, they have not fully determined and documented how to make decisions about whether the pilot is scalable. Since VA has not defined and documented the pilot’s objectives and its evaluation plans, it may be more difficult to determine how to make decisions about scalability. Considering how the pilot’s objectives and evaluation plans will inform decisions about scalability is critical to providing information about the pilot’s results. For example, at the end of the pilot, VA and Congress will need clear information to make decisions about whether the CHIP-IN donation approach could be extended beyond a pilot program, if any changes could enhance the program’s effectiveness, or if particular lessons learned could be applied to VA construction projects more broadly. Without clear information about scalability, VA may be limited in its ability to communicate quality information about the achievement of its objectives. Such communication is part of the federal standards for internal control. We have reported that appropriate two-way stakeholder communication and input should occur at all stages of the pilot, including design, implementation, data gathering, and assessment. To that end, it is critical that agencies identify who or what entities the relevant stakeholders are and communicate with them early and often. This process may include communication with external stakeholders and among internal stakeholders. Communicating quality information both externally and internally is also consistent with federal standards for internal control. VA has begun to implement this practice, with generally successful communication with the Omaha donor group. While VA has experienced some external and internal communication challenges about the pilot, officials have taken steps to help resolve some of these challenges. External communication. VA officials and representatives from the Omaha donor group generally described excellent communication between their two parties. For example, donor group representatives told us that in-person meetings helped to establish a strong relationship that has been useful in negotiating the donation agreement and executing the project to date. Further, VA officials and donor group representatives said that all relevant stakeholders—such as the donor group’s construction manager, general contractor, and architect, as well VA’s engineer, project manager, and medical center director—were included in key meetings once the Omaha project began, and said that this practice has continued during the construction phase. Although the Omaha donor group reported overall effective relations and communications with VA, donor group representatives noted that additional public relations support from VA would have been helpful. For example, after the CHIP-IN project was initiated in Omaha, the donor group encountered a public relations challenge when news reports about unauthorized waiting lists at the Omaha medical center jeopardized some donors’ willingness to contribute to the project. While donor group representatives said this challenge was addressed when the donor group hired a public relations firm, they also explained that it would be helpful for VA headquarters to provide more proactive public relations support to the local areas where future CHIP-IN projects are located. VA officials stated that they experienced some initial challenges communicating pilot requirements to external entities that are interested in CHIP-IN donation partnerships, but officials said that in response the agency has changed its outreach approach. As discussed below, the donation commitment aspect of the pilot can be a challenge. When interested entities contact VA to request information on the CHIP-IN pilot, VA officials told us they find the entities are often surprised by the donation commitment. For example, two entities that responded to VA’s RFI told us they were not clear about the donation requirement or the expected level of donation, or both. One respondent did not understand the pilot required a donation and would not provide an opportunity for a financial return on investment. Another respondent indicated that when they asked VA for clarification about the expected project’s scope, personnel from a headquarters office and the local VA medical center could not fully answer their questions. VA officials acknowledged these challenges and said they have changed their outreach efforts to focus on certain potential CHIP-IN locations, rather than RFIs aimed at a broader audience. Further, VA officials said that when speaking with potential donors going forward, they plan to involve a small group of officials who are knowledgeable about the pilot and its donation approach. Internal communication. While VA initially experienced some challenges in ensuring that all relevant internal stakeholders have been included in the pilot’s implementation, according to officials, the agency has taken recent steps to address this concern and involve appropriate internal offices. For example, officials from the Capital Asset Management Office said they could have assisted ORP in narrowing the list of potential projects in the RFIs but were not consulted. Later, after revising the marketing approach, ORP reached out to the Capital Asset Management Office and other relevant offices for help in determining priority locations for additional CHIP-IN projects, according to an ORP official. Officials from the Capital Asset Management Office told us that with improved engagement they were able to participate more actively in discussions about the pilot. In addition, initial plans for the CHIP-IN steering committee did not include VHA representation. However, in summer 2018 ORP expanded the planned steering committee to include VHA representatives, a plan that some other VA offices told us is needed to ensure that the pilot addresses the agency’s healthcare needs and that VHA offices are informed about pilot efforts. Based on the experience with the Omaha project, the CHIP-IN donation approach can result in potential cost and time savings—through the leveraging of private-sector funding, contracting, and construction practices—according to VA officials and the Omaha donor group. Regarding cost savings, one VA official stated that using donations makes VA’s appropriated funds available to cover other costs. In addition, based on the experience with the Omaha project, other VA officials told us that a CHIP-IN project can potentially be completed for a lower cost because of practices resulting from private sector leadership. Specifically, VA estimated that the Omaha ambulatory care center would cost about $120 million for VA to build outside of a donation partnership—as a standard federal construction project. Under the CHIP-IN pilot, however, the total estimated cost of the Omaha facility is $86 million—achieving a potential $34 million cost savings. Regarding time savings, CHIP-IN projects can potentially be completed at a faster pace because of the use of certain private sector practices and because projects can be addressed earlier than they otherwise would be, according to VA officials. The use of private-sector building practices can result in cost and time savings in a number of ways, according to VA officials and the Omaha donor group, as follows: The use of private-sector building standards contributed to cost savings for the Omaha project, according to VA officials and donor group representatives. VA and the donor group negotiated a combination of industry and VA building standards. A CFM official told us that using this approach and working with the private sector donor group encouraged the design team to think creatively about the risk assessment process and about how to meet the intent of VA’s physical security standards, but at a lower cost than if they were required to build a facility using all of VA’s building standards as written. For example, when assessing the safety and physical-security risk, the donor group and VA identified a location where two sides of the facility will not have direct exposure to the public or roadway traffic. Prohibiting exposure to roadways on two sides of the facility will mean spending less money to harden (i.e., protect) the facility against threats such as vehicular ramming. According to VA officials, using the combined standards did not compromise security on the Omaha project. Involving the general contractor early on in the design for the Omaha project, an approach VA does not typically take, contributed to both time and cost savings. VA officials told us that engaging the general contractor during the project’s design stage allowed the project to begin more quickly and was also helpful in obtaining information about costs and keeping the project within budget. However, VA officials said that depending on the project and contracting method used, it might not be possible to apply this contracting practice to VA construction projects outside of the pilot program. A private-sector design review method helped to save time. The Omaha donor group used a software package that allowed all design- document reviewers to simultaneously review design documents and then store their comments in a single place. VA officials said this approach was more efficient than VA’s typical review method and cut about 18 weeks from the project’s timeline. VA officials also said use of this software was a best practice that could be applied to VA construction projects more broadly. In addition, the donor group and VA employed fewer rounds of design reviews than VA typically uses; this streamlining also helped to save time during the design process, according to VA officials. Further, VA officials said that the CHIP-IN donation approach can allow VA to address projects more quickly because they are addressed outside of VA’s typical selection and funding process. For example, VA officials told us that because of the agency’s current major construction backlog, using the CHIP-IN donation approach allowed work on the Omaha project to begin at least 5 years sooner than if the CHIP-IN approach had not been used. The Omaha project’s priority was low relative to other potential projects, so that it was unlikely to receive additional funding for construction for several years. For example, one agency official noted that even if the project was at the top of VA’s priorities, there is a backlog of 20 major construction projects worth $5 billion ahead of it—meaning the Omaha project would probably not be addressed for at least 5 years. VA officials also told us that as they consider future CHIP-IN projects, they are looking for other projects that, like the one in Omaha, are needed, but may not be a top priority given available funding and could be moved forward with a private sector donation. In addition, use of the CHIP-IN donation approach and decision to pursue an ambulatory care center contributed to an earlier start on a project to address veterans’ needs. However, as mentioned earlier, VA officials said that future construction projects will be necessary to address some needs that were part of the original replacement medical center plan. A main challenge to establishing pilot partnerships is the reliance on large philanthropic donations, according to VA officials, the Omaha donor group, and RFI respondents. In general, the potential donor pool may not be extensive given the size of the expected donations—in some cases tens or hundreds of millions of dollars—and the conditions under which the donations must be made. For example, as discussed earlier, VA officials said that when interested entities contact them about the pilot, they are often surprised by the donation commitment. When we spoke with two entities that responded to VA’s RFI, one told us that they “could not afford to work for free” under the pilot while another told us that developers are more likely to participate in the pilot if they see an incentive, or a return on their financial contribution. Also, VA officials told us that some potential project locations have not received any appropriations—making the projects’ implementation less appealing to potential donors. The Omaha donor group noted that a VA financial contribution at or above 50 percent of a project’s estimated cost is essential for demonstrating the agency’s commitment and for leveraging private-sector donations. To address challenges involving the philanthropic nature of the pilot, ORP officials told us that VA has tried to identify strategies or incentives that could encourage donor involvement. For example, the CHIP-IN steering committee is considering what incentives might be effective to encourage greater participation. One ORP official told us that such incentives could include potential naming opportunities (that is, authority to name items such as facility floors, wings, or the actual facility), although offering such incentives may require changes in VA’s authority. Further, because it may be difficult to secure donations for larger, more costly projects, some VA officials, donor group representatives, and one RFI respondent we spoke to suggested that VA consider developing less costly CHIP-IN projects—giving VA a better chance of serving veterans by filling gaps in service needs. Other VA officials, however, said they wanted to focus on larger projects because the pilot allows only five projects. Another challenge is that VA generally does not possess marketing and philanthropic development experience. VA officials told us that this makes the inherent challenge of finding donors more difficult. While VA officials have used the assistance of a nonprofit entity that has marketing expertise, they also said that going forward it would be helpful to have staff with relevant marketing and philanthropic development experience to assist with identifying donors. VA officials said this expertise could possibly be acquired through hiring a contractor, but funding such a hire may be difficult within their existing resources. As discussed above, the CHIP-IN pilot presents an uncharted approach to VA’s implementation of projects, and using CHIP-IN has aspects of an organizational transformation in property acquisition for the agency because it leverages donation partnerships and streamlines VA’s typical funding process. We have found that a key practice of organizational transformation includes a dedicated implementation team to manage the transformation process and that leading practices for cross-functional teams include clear roles and responsibilities, and committed members with relevant expertise. VA officials and Omaha donor group representatives acknowledged that a dedicated CHIP-IN team could help focus pilot implementation—and that no such team existed within the agency. ORP officials told us that the newly formed CHIP-IN steering committee would provide the necessary leadership for pilot implementation. They anticipate that a working group will be part of the committee and serve as a dedicated team for the pilot. However, as discussed below, roles and responsibilities have not been defined and staff resource decisions have not been made. Clear and documented roles and responsibilities. Several VA officials told us that responsibility for managing the overall pilot effort had not been assigned, and that they had different interpretations of which office had responsibility for leading the pilot. Some officials identified ORP as the leader, while others thought it was CFM or the Center for Strategic Partnerships. One CFM official told us that a clear definition of responsibilities is needed under the pilot along with a dedicated office or person with the ability to make decisions when an impasse across offices exists. Similarly, a senior VHA official told us that leadership roles and responsibilities for the pilot are not fully understood within the agency, which has made establishing partnerships under the pilot a challenge. For example, both VA officials and Omaha donor group representatives identified the lack of a senior-level leader for the pilot as a challenge and emphasized the need for strong pilot leadership going forward. Now that a CHIP-IN steering committee is being formed to provide pilot leadership, ORP officials intend to discuss committee members’ roles and responsibilities. This discussion was planned for the first committee meeting but was rescheduled for the next meeting in October 2018. ORP officials, however, told us that they do not expect to assign individual members’ roles and responsibilities until a future date. VA officials did not have a timeline for when committee or individual members’ roles and responsibilities would be formally documented. ORP officials said that roles and responsibilities for the pilot have not been defined because after enactment of the CHIP-IN Act, their first priority was to engage the Omaha donor group and negotiate an agreement. Later, after the Omaha project was progressing, ORP officials said they turned their attention to formalizing the pilot program and identifying additional donation partnerships. While it is important to concentrate on completion of individual projects, it is also important to plan for the overall pilot’s implementation—to help ensure that the pilot’s purpose and goals are met and in a timely manner. We have found that clarifying roles and responsibilities is an important activity in facilitating strong collaboration and building effective cross-functional teams. In addition, we have found that articulating roles and responsibilities is a powerful tool in collaboration and that it is beneficial to detail such collaborations in a formal, written document. Committed team members. Various VA offices and staff members have worked on the CHIP-IN pilot in addition to their other responsibilities, but several VA officials told us the resources currently dedicated to the pilot are insufficient. During our review, an ORP official told us that two ORP staff each spent about 4 to 6 hours per week on the pilot, as collateral duties. However, since that time, one of these two staff members has left the agency. A senior VA official told us that ORP and the Center for Strategic Partnerships could each use two to three more dedicated staff members to work solely on the pilot. While one ORP official said that additional staff would likely be assigned after other CHIP-IN projects are identified, a Center for Strategic Partnerships official said a specified percentage of staff time should be dedicated now to identifying potential donors. As mentioned above, VA officials told us they anticipate a working group will be part of the CHIP-IN steering committee and will serve as the dedicated team to implement the pilot. However, VA has not yet documented how it will staff the working group, including how it will obtain the needed expertise within its existing resources. According to one VA official, staff had not been initially dedicated to the pilot because the CHIP-IN Act did not provide resources to fund a dedicated team for the pilot, so VA has needed to implement the pilot within its existing resources. This VA official also told us that they were not certain VA could support a dedicated team with existing resources. Another official indicated that VA would need to consider how to incorporate CHIP-IN into the agency’s operations if the pilot program were expanded beyond the initial pilot and then dedicate needed resources. Dedicating a strong and stable implementation team is important to ensuring that the effort receives the focused, full-time attention needed. Team members with relevant knowledge and expertise. As previously discussed, VA officials told us that it would be helpful for a CHIP-IN team to include stakeholders with certain expertise, such as marketing and philanthropic development experience. In addition, representatives from the Omaha donor group said going forward, proactive public relations expertise is needed from VA headquarters (in particular, for external communications outside of the partnership) to quickly and positively address any incidents that could negatively impact VA’s ability to encourage donor participation in the pilot at the local level. For example, in the event of critical news reports about a local VA facility, such as what occurred in Omaha, donor group representatives said that additional public relations support would be helpful. VA officials also told us that a CHIP-IN team should be a collaborative effort across several offices. Specifically, one senior VA official said a cross-functional team with representation from ORP, CFM Operations, the Center for Strategic Partnerships, VHA, and the Office of Asset Enterprise Management (which has budget and finance expertise) would be useful in focusing and implementing the pilot. Leading practices for cross-functional teams include having members with a wide diversity of knowledge and expertise. Having a dedicated team or working group that consists of committed members with clear roles and responsibilities could assist VA in implementing the CHIP-IN pilot. For example, the working group could focus time and attention on strengthening design of the pilot program as a whole, instead of implementing projects on a piecemeal basis. Further, clearly identifying and documenting roles and responsibilities could help relevant stakeholders define and agree upon pilot objectives as well as an assessment methodology and evaluation plan. In addition, including stakeholders with relevant expertise on the dedicated team may assist VA in identifying viable projects and negotiating partnership agreements more readily. The CHIP-IN pilot is a unique, time-limited opportunity for VA to test a new way of building needed medical facilities by using non-federal funding sources—donors—to leverage federal funds. Though the first project is still under way, stakeholders have already noted benefits of the donation partnership approach, including potential cost and time savings as well as learning about private sector practices that could be applied more broadly to VA construction. However, VA is not yet collecting the information it needs to support decisions by VA or Congress about the pilot. Without a strengthened pilot design—including measurable objectives, an assessment methodology, and an evaluation plan—that can help inform decisions about the scalability of the pilot, it may not be clear to VA and Congress whether the CHIP-IN approach could be part of a longer-term strategy or how lessons learned could enhance other VA construction efforts. While leadership for the pilot had not been previously assigned, a newly formed CHIP-IN steering committee is meant to focus on the pilot’s implementation. Defining and documenting roles and responsibilities for this committee—and identifying the resources needed to effectively implement the pilot—could assist VA in partnering with additional donors and creating new opportunities to meet the urgent needs of veterans. We are making the following three recommendations to VA. The Secretary of VA should ensure that internal stakeholders—such as the CHIP-IN steering committee’s members—agree to and document clear, measurable objectives for the CHIP-IN pilot that will help inform decisions about whether and how to scale the program. (Recommendation 1) The Secretary of VA should ensure that internal stakeholders—such as the CHIP-IN steering committee’s members—develop an assessment methodology and an evaluation plan that are linked to objectives for the CHIP-IN pilot and that help inform decisions about whether and how to scale the program. (Recommendation 2) The Secretary of VA should ensure that the CHIP-IN steering committee documents the roles and responsibilities of its members and identifies available staff resources, including any additional expertise and skills that are needed to implement the CHIP-IN pilot program. (Recommendation 3) We provided a draft of this report to VA for comment. In its written comments, reproduced in appendix I, VA concurred with our recommendations and stated that it has begun or is planning to take actions to address them. VA also provided a general comment on the role of VHA in the CHIP-IN pilot, which we incorporated in our report. We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, and other interested parties. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions regarding this report, please contact me at (213) 830-1011 or vonaha@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix II. In addition to the contact named above, Cathy Colwell (Assistant Director), Kate Perl (Analyst in Charge), Melissa Bodeau, Jennifer Clayborne, Peter Del Toro, Shirley Hwang, Terence Lam, Malika Rice, Crystal Wesco, and Elizabeth Wood made key contributions to this report.	[ "VA has pressing infrastructure needs. The Communities Helping Invest through Property and Improvements Needed for Veterans Act of 2016 (CHIP-IN Act) authorized VA to accept donated real property—such as buildings or facility construction or improvements—through a pilot program. VA has initiated one project in Omaha, Nebraska, through a partnership with a donor group. VA can accept up to five donations through the pilot program, which is authorized through 2021. The CHIP-IN Act includes a provision for GAO to report on donation agreements. This report (1) examines the extent to which the VA's pilot design aligns with leading practices and (2) discusses what VA has learned from the pilot to date. GAO reviewed VA documents, including plans for the pilot program, and visited the Omaha pilot project. GAO interviewed VA officials, the Omaha donor group, and three non-federal entities that responded to VA's request seeking donors. GAO compared implementation of VA's pilot to leading practices for pilot design, organizational transformation, and cross-functional teams. The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) is conducting a pilot program, called CHIP-IN, that allows VA to partner with non-federal entities and accept real property donations from them as a way to help address VA's infrastructure needs. Although VA signed its first project agreement under the program in April 2017, VA has not yet established a framework for effective design of the pilot program. Specifically, VA's pilot program design is not aligned with four of five leading practices for designing a well-developed and documented pilot program. VA has begun to implement one leading practice by improving its efforts to communicate with relevant stakeholders, such as including external stakeholders in key meetings. However, the VA offices involved have not agreed upon and documented clear, measurable objectives for the pilot program, which is a leading practice. Further, VA has not developed an assessment methodology or an evaluation plan that would help inform decisions about whether or how the pilot approach could be expanded. While VA officials said they intend to develop these items as tasks for the newly formed CHIP-IN steering committee, they have no timeline for doing so. Without clear objectives and assessment and evaluation plans, VA and Congress may have difficulty determining whether the pilot approach is an effective way to help address VA's infrastructure needs. To date, the CHIP-IN pilot suggests that donation partnerships could improve construction projects, but identifying donors and establishing a team for the pilot program have presented challenges. Officials from VA and the donor group for the first pilot project—an ambulatory care center in Omaha, Nebraska—said they are completing the project faster than if it had been a standard federal construction project, while achieving potential cost savings by using private sector practices. However, VA officials said it is challenging to find partners to make large donations with no financial return, and VA's lack of marketing and philanthropic development experience exacerbates that challenge. VA and the donor group agreed that a dedicated team of individuals with relevant expertise could facilitate the pilot's implementation. The new CHIP-IN steering committee could serve this purpose, but it lacks documented roles and responsibilities. Establishing a team with clear roles and responsibilities and identifying both available and needed staff resources could assist VA in partnering with additional donors and creating new opportunities to meet veterans' needs. GAO is recommending that VA: (1) establish pilot program objectives, (2) develop an assessment methodology and an evaluation plan, and (3) document roles and responsibilities and identify available and needed staff resources. VA concurred with GAO's recommendations." ]	6,691	gov_report	en	null	455ea6169f0dff9cff822c093b20ce36787c309b129adbf6
While HUD has primary responsibility for addressing lead paint hazards in federally-assisted housing, EPA also has responsibilities related to setting federal lead standards for housing. EPA sets federal standards for lead hazards in paint, soil, and dust. Additionally, EPA regulates the training and certification of workers who remediate lead paint hazards. CDC sets a health guideline known as the “blood lead reference value” to identify children exposed to more lead than most other children. As of 2012, CDC began using a blood lead reference value of 5 micrograms of lead per deciliter of blood. For children whose blood lead level is at or above CDC’s blood lead reference value, health care providers and public health agencies can identify those children who may benefit the most from early intervention. CDC’s blood lead reference value is based on the 97.5th percentile of the blood lead distribution in U.S. children (ages 1 to 5), using data from the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey. Children with blood lead levels above CDC’s blood lead reference value have blood lead levels in the highest 2.5 percent of all U.S. children (ages 1 to 5). HUD, EPA, and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) are members of the President’s Task Force on Environmental Health Risks and Safety Risks to Children. HUD co- chairs the lead subcommittee of this task force with EPA and HHS. The task force published the last national lead strategy in 2000. The primary federal legislation to address lead paint hazards and the related requirements for HUD is the Residential Lead-Based Paint Hazard Reduction Act (Title X of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1992). We refer to this law as Title X throughout this report. Title X required HUD to, among other things, promulgate lead paint regulations, implement the lead hazard control grant programs, and conduct research and reporting, as discussed throughout this report. The two key regulations that HUD has issued under Title X are the Lead Disclosure Rule and the Lead Safe Housing Rule: Lead Disclosure Rule. In 1996, HUD and EPA jointly issued the Lead Disclosure Rule. The rule applies to most housing built before 1978 and requires sellers and lessors to disclose any known information, available records, and reports on the presence of lead paint and lead paint hazards and provide an EPA-approved information pamphlet prior to sale or lease. Lead Safe Housing Rule. In 1999, HUD first issued the Lead Safe Housing Rule, which applies only to housing receiving federal assistance or federally-owned housing being sold. The rule established procedures for evaluating whether a lead paint hazard exists, controlling or eliminating the hazard, and notifying occupants of any lead paint hazards identified and related remediation efforts. The rule established an “elevated blood lead level” as a threshold that requires landlords and PHAs to take certain actions if a child’s blood test shows lead levels meeting or exceeding this threshold. In 2017, HUD amended the rule to align its definition of an “elevated blood lead level” with CDC’s blood lead reference value. This change lowered the threshold that generally required landlords and PHAs to act from 20 micrograms to 5 micrograms of lead per deciliter of blood. According to the rule, when a child under age 6 living in HUD-assisted housing has an elevated blood lead level, the housing provider must take several steps. These generally include testing the home and other potential sources of the child’s lead exposure within 15 days, ensuring that identified lead paint hazards are addressed within 30 days of receiving a report detailing the results of that testing, and reporting the case to HUD. Office of Lead Hazard Control and Healthy Homes (Lead Office). HUD’s Lead Office is primarily responsible for administering HUD’s two lead hazard control grant programs, providing guidance on HUD’s lead paint regulations, and tracking HUD’s efforts to make housing lead-safe. The Lead Office collaborates with HUD program offices on its oversight and enforcement of lead paint regulations. For instance, the Lead Office issues guidance, responds to questions about requirements of lead paint regulations, and provides training and technical assistance to HUD program staff, PHA staff, and property owners. The Lead Office’s oversight efforts also include maintaining email and telephone hotlines to receive complaints and tips from tenants or homeowners, among others, as they pertain to lead paint regulations. Additionally, the Lead Office, in collaboration with EPA, contributes to the operation of the National Lead Information Center––a resource that provides the general public and professionals with information about lead, lead hazards, and their prevention. Office of Public and Indian Housing (PIH). HUD’s PIH oversees and enforces HUD’s lead paint regulations for the rental assistance programs. As discussed earlier, this report focuses on the two largest rental assistance programs serving the most families with children––the Housing Choice Voucher and public housing programs. Housing Choice Voucher program. In the voucher program, eligible families and individuals are given vouchers as rental assistance to use in the private housing market. Generally, eligible families with vouchers live in the housing of their choice in the private market. The voucher generally pays the difference between the family’s contribution toward rent and the actual rent for the unit. Vouchers are portable; once a family receives one, it can take the voucher and move to other areas where the voucher program is administered. In 2017, there were roughly 2.5 million vouchers available. Public housing program. Public housing is reduced-rent developments owned and operated by the local PHA and subsidized by the federal government. PHAs receive several streams of funding from HUD to help make up the difference between what tenants pay in rent and what it costs to maintain public housing. For example, PHAs receive operating and capital funds through a formula allocation process. PHAs use operating funds to pay for management, administration, and day-to-day costs of running a housing development. Capital funds are used for modernization needs, such as replacing roofs or remediating lead paint hazards. According to HUD rules, generally families that are income-eligible to live in public housing pay 30 percent of their adjusted income toward rent. In 2017, there were roughly 1 million public housing units available. For both of these rental assistance programs, the Office of Field Operations (OFO) within PIH oversees PHAs’ compliance with lead paint regulations, in conjunction with HUD field office staff. The office has a risk-based approach to overseeing PHAs and performs quarterly risk assessments. Also within PIH, staff from the Real Estate Assessment Center are responsible for inspecting the physical condition of public housing properties. Office of Policy Development and Research (PD&R). HUD’s PD&R is the primary office responsible for data analysis, research, and program evaluations to inform the development and implementation of programs and policies across HUD offices. of the total grant amount, while the Lead Hazard Reduction Demonstration grant program has required at least a 25 percent match. For fiscal years 2013–2017, HUD awarded $527 million for its lead hazard control grants, which included 186 grants to state and local jurisdictions (see fig. 1). In these 5 years, about 40 percent of grants awarded went to jurisdictions in the Northeast and 31 percent to jurisdictions in the Midwest––regions of the country known to have a high prevalence of lead paint hazards. Additionally, in these 5 years, 90 percent of grant awards went to grantees at the local jurisdiction level (cities, counties, and the District of Columbia). The other 10 percent of grant awards went to state governments. During this time period, HUD awarded the most grants to jurisdictions in Ohio (17 grants), Massachusetts and New York (15 grants each), and Connecticut (14 grants). HUD’s Lead-Based Paint Hazard Control grant and the Lead Hazard Reduction Demonstration grant programs have incorporated Title X statutory requirements through recent annual funding notices and their grant processes. Title X contains applicant eligibility requirements and selection criteria HUD should use to award lead grants. To be eligible to receive a grant, applicants need to be a state or local jurisdiction, contribute matching funds to supplement the grant award, have an approved comprehensive affordable housing strategy, and have a certified lead abatement program (if the applicant is a state government). HUD has incorporated these eligibility requirements in its grant programs’ 2017 funding notices, which require applicants to demonstrate that they meet these requirements when they apply for a lead grant. According to the 2017 funding notices, applicants must detail the sources and amounts of their matching contributions in their applications. Similarly, applicants must submit a form certifying that the proposed grant activities are consistent with their local affordable housing strategy. HUD’s 2017 funding notices state that if applicants did not meet these eligibility requirements, HUD would not consider their applications. Additionally, Title X requires HUD to award lead grants according to the following applicant selection criteria: the extent to which an applicant’s proposed activities will reduce the risk of lead poisoning for children under the age of 6; the degree of severity and extent of lead paint hazards in the applicant’s jurisdiction; the applicant’s ability to supplement the grant award with state, local, or private funds; the applicant’s ability to carry out the proposed grant activities; and other factors determined by the HUD Secretary to ensure that the grants are used effectively. In its 2017 funding notices, HUD incorporated the Title X applicant selection criteria through five scoring factors that it used to assess lead grant applications. HUD allocated a certain number of points to each scoring factor. Applicants are required to develop their grant proposals in response to the scoring factors. When reviewing applications, HUD staff evaluated an applicant’s response to the factors and assigned points for each factor. See table 1 for a description of the 2017 lead grant programs’ scoring factors and points. As shown in table 1, HUD awarded the most points (46 out of 100) to the “soundness of approach” scoring factor, according to HUD’s 2017 funding notices. Through this factor, HUD incorporated Title X selection criteria on an applicant’s ability to carry out the proposed grant activities and supplement a grant award with state, local, or private funds. For example, HUD’s 2017 funding notices required applicants to describe their detailed plans to implement grant activities, including how the applicants will establish partnerships to make housing lead-safe. Specifically, HUD began awarding 2 of the 100 points to applicants who demonstrated partnerships with local public health agencies to identify families with children for enrollment in the lead grant programs. Additionally, HUD asked applicants to identify partners that can help provide assistance to complete the lead hazard control work for high-cost housing units. Furthermore, HUD required applicants to identify any nonfederal funding, including funding from the applicants’ partners. Appendix I includes examples of state, local, and nongovernmental funds that selected grantees planned to use to supplement their lead grants. In its lead grant programs, HUD has taken actions that were consistent with OMB’s requirements for competitively awarded grants. OMB generally requires federal agencies to: (1) establish a merit-review process for competitive grants that includes the criteria and process to evaluate applications; and (2) develop a framework to assess the risks posed by applicants for competitive grants, among other things. Through a merit-review process, an agency establishes and applies criteria to evaluate the merit of competitive grant applications. Such a process helps to ensure that the agency reviews grant applications in a fair, competitive, and transparent manner. Consistent with the OMB requirement to establish a merit review process, HUD has issued annual funding notices that communicate clear and explicit evaluative criteria. In addition, HUD has established processes for reviewing and scoring grant applications using these evaluative criteria, and selects grant recipients based on the review scores (see fig. 2). For example, applicants that score at or above 75 points are qualified to receive awards from HUD. Also, HUD awards funds beginning with the highest scoring applicant and proceeds by awarding funds to applicants in a descending order until funds are exhausted. Furthermore, consistent with the OMB requirement to develop a framework to assess applicant risks, HUD has developed a framework to assess the risk posed by lead grant applicants by, among other things, deeming ineligible those applicants with past performance deficiencies or those that do not have a financial management system that meets federal standards. However, HUD has not fully documented or evaluated its lead grant processes in reviewing and scoring the grants and making award decisions: Documenting grant processes and award decisions. While HUD has established processes for its lead grant programs, it lacks documentation, including detailed guidance to help ensure that staff carry out processes consistently and appropriately. Federal internal control standards state that agency management should develop and maintain documentation of its internal control system. Such documentation assists agency management by establishing and communicating the processes to staff. Additionally, documentation of processes can provide a means to retain organizational knowledge and communicate that knowledge as needed to external parties. The Lead Office’s Application Review Guide describes its grant application review and award processes at a high level but does not provide detailed guidance for staff as to how tasks should be performed. For example, the Guide notes that reviewers score eligible applications according to factors contained in the funding notices but does not describe how the reviewers should allocate points to the subfactors that make up each factor. Lead Office staff told us that creating detailed scoring guidance would be challenging because applicants’ proposed grant activities differ widely, and they said that scoring grant applications is a subjective process. While scoring grant applications may involve subjective judgments, improved documentation of grant review and scoring processes, including additional direction to staff, can help staff apply their professional judgment more consistently in evaluating applications. By better documenting processes, HUD can better ensure that staff evaluate applications consistently. Additionally, HUD has not fully documented its rationale for deciding which applicants receive lead grant awards and for deciding the dollar amounts of grant awards to successful applicants. In prior work examining federal grant programs, one recommended practice we identified is that agencies should document the rationale for award decisions, including the reasons individual applicants were selected or not and how award funding amounts were determined. While HUD’s internal memorandums listed the applicants selected and the award amounts, these memorandums did not document the rationale for these decisions or provide information sufficient to help applicants understand award outcomes. Lead Office staff told us that most grantees have received the amount of funding they requested in their applications, which was generally based on HUD’s maximum grant award amount. Lead Office staff said they could use their professional judgment to adjust award amounts to extend funding to more applicants when applicants received similar scores. However, the Lead Office’s documentation we reviewed did not explain this type of decision making. For example, in 2017, when two applicants received identical scores on their applications, HUD awarded each applicant 50 percent of the remaining available funds rather than awarding either applicant the amount they requested. Representatives of one of the two grantees told us they did not know why the Lead Office had not provided them the full amount they had requested. Lead Office staff told us that, to date, HUD has not considered alternative ways to award grant funding amounts. By fully documenting grant award processes, including the rationale for award decisions and amounts, HUD could provide greater transparency to grant applicants about its grant award decisions. Evaluating processes. HUD lacks a formal process for reviewing and updating its lead grant funding notices, including the factors and point allocations used to score applications. Federal internal control standards state that agencies should implement control activities through policies and that periodic review of policies and procedures can provide assurance of their effectiveness in achieving the agency’s objectives. Lead Office staff told us that previous changes to the factors and point allocation used to score applicants have been made based on informal discussions among staff. However, the Lead Office does not have a formal process to review and evaluate the relevance and appropriateness of the factors or points used to score applicants. Lead Office staff told us that they have never analyzed the scores applicants received for the factors to identify areas where applicants may be performing well or poorly or to help inform decisions about whether changes may be needed to the factors or points. Additionally, HUD has not changed the threshold criteria used to make award decisions since the threshold was established in 2003. As previously shown in figure 2, applicants who received at least 75 points (out of 100) have been qualified to receive a grant award. However, HUD grant documentation, including the funding notices and the Application Review Guide, does not explain the significance of this 75-point threshold. Lead Office staff stated that this threshold was first established in 2003 by HUD based on OMB guidance. A formal review of this 75-point threshold can help HUD determine whether it remains appropriate for achieving the grant programs’ objectives. Furthermore, by periodically evaluating processes for reviewing and scoring grant applications, HUD can better determine whether these processes continue to help ensure that lead grants reach areas of the country at greater risk for lead paint hazards. HUD has begun to develop analyses and tools to inform its efforts to target outreach and ensure that grant awards go to areas of the country that are at risk for lead paint hazards. However, HUD has not developed time frames for incorporating the results of the analyses into its lead grant programs’ processes. HUD has required jurisdictions applying for lead grants to include data on the need or extent of the problem in their jurisdiction (i.e., scoring factor 2). Additionally, Lead Office staff told us that HUD uses information from the American Healthy Homes Survey to obtain information on lead paint hazards across the country. However, the staff explained that the survey was designed to provide meaningful results at the regional level and did not include enough homes in its sample to provide information about housing conditions, such as lead paint hazards, at the state or local level. Because HUD awards lead grants to state and local jurisdictions, it cannot effectively use the survey results to help the agency make award decisions or inform decisions about areas for potential outreach. In early 2017, the Lead Office began working with PD&R to develop a model to identify local jurisdictions (at the census-tract level) that may be at heightened risk for lead paint hazards. Lead Office staff said that they hope to use results of this model to develop geographic tools to help target HUD funding to areas of the country at risk for lead paint hazards but not currently receiving a HUD lead grant. Lead Office staff said that they could reach out to these at-risk areas, help them build the capacity needed to administer a grant, and encourage them to apply. For example, HUD has identified that Mississippi and two major metropolitan areas in Florida (Miami and Tampa) had not applied for a lead grant. HUD has conducted outreach to these areas to encourage them to apply for a lead grant. In 2016, the City of Jackson, Mississippi, applied for and received a lead grant. Though the Lead Office has collaborated with PD&R on the model, HUD has not developed specific time frames to operationalize the model and incorporate the results of the model for using local-level data to help better identify areas at risk for lead paint hazards. Federal internal control standards require agencies to define objectives clearly to enable the identification of risks. This includes clearly defining time frames for achieving the objectives. Setting specific time frames could help to ensure that HUD operationalizes this model in a timely manner. By operationalizing a model that incorporates local data on lead paint hazard risk, HUD can better target its limited grant resources towards areas of the country with significant potential for lead hazard control needs. We performed a county-level analysis using HUD and Census Bureau data and found that most lead grants from 2013 through 2017 have gone to counties with at least one indicator of lead paint hazard risk. Information we reviewed, such as relevant literature, suggests that the two common indicators of lead paint hazard risk are the prevalence of housing built before the 1978 lead paint ban and the prevalence of individuals living below the poverty line. We defined areas with lead paint hazard risk as counties that had percentages higher than the corresponding national percentages for both of these indicators. The estimated average percentage nationwide of total U.S. housing stock constructed before 1980 was 56.9 percent and the estimated average percentage nationwide of individuals living below the poverty line was 17.5 percent. As shown in figure 3, our analysis estimated that 18 percent of lead grants from 2013 through 2017 have gone to counties with both indicators above the estimated national percentages, 59 percent of grants have gone to counties with estimated percentages of old housing above the estimated national percentage, and 7 percent of grants have gone to counties that had estimated poverty rates above the estimated national percentage. (For an interactive version of this map, click here.) When HUD finalizes its model and incorporates information into its lead grant processes, HUD will be able to better target its grant resources to areas that may be at heightened risk for lead paint hazards. In 2016, HUD began to incorporate new steps to monitor PHAs’ compliance with lead paint regulations for nearly 4,000 PHAs. Previously, according to PIH staff, HUD required only that PHAs annually self-certify their compliance with lead paint laws and regulations, and HUD’s Real Estate Assessment Center inspectors check for lead paint inspection reports and disclosure forms at public housing properties during physical inspections. Starting in June 2016, PIH began using new tools for HUD field staff to track PHAs’ compliance with lead paint requirements in the voucher and public housing programs. As shown in figure 4, PIH’s compliance oversight processes for the voucher and public housing programs include various monitoring tools for overseeing PHAs. Key components of PIH’s lead paint oversight processes include the following: Tools for tracking lead hazards and cases of elevated blood levels in children. HUD uses two databases to monitor PHAs’ compliance with lead paint regulations: (1) the Lead-Based Paint Response Tracker, which PIH uses to collect and monitor information on the status of lead paint-related documents, including lead inspection reports and disclosure forms, in public housing properties but not in units with voucher assisted households; and (2) the Elevated Blood Lead Level Tracker, which PIH uses to collect and monitor information reported by PHAs on cases of elevated blood levels in children living in voucher and public housing units. In June 2016, OFO began using the Lead-Based Paint Response Tracker database to store information on public housing units and to help HUD field office staff to follow up with PHAs that have properties missing required lead documentation. In July 2017, OFO began using information recorded in the Elevated Blood Lead Level Tracker to track whether PHAs started lead remediation activities in HUD- assisted housing within the time frames required by the Lead Safe Housing Rule. Lead paint hazards included in PHAs’ risk assessment scores. OFO assigns scores to PHAs based on their relative risk in four categories: physical condition, financial condition, management capacity, and governance. OFO uses these scores to identify high- and very high-risk PHAs that will receive on-site full compliance reviews. In July 2017, OFO incorporated data from the Real Estate Assessment Center into the physical condition category of its Risk Assessment Protocol to help account for potential lead paint hazards at public housing properties. Questions about lead paint included as part of on-site full compliance reviews. In fiscal year 2016, HUD field offices began conducting on-site full compliance reviews at high- and very high-risk PHAs as part of HUD’s compliance monitoring program to enhance oversight and accountability of PHAs. In fiscal year 2017, as part of the reviews, HUD field office staff started using a compliance monitoring checklist to determine if PHAs comply with major HUD rules and to gather additional information on the PHAs. This checklist included lead-related questions that PIH field office staff use to determine whether PHAs meet the requirements in lead paint regulations for both the voucher and public housing programs. In 2016, OFO and HUD field offices began using information from the new monitoring efforts to identify potential noncompliance by PHAs with lead paint regulations and help the PHAs resolve the identified issues. According to HUD data, as of November 2017, the Lead-Based Paint Response Tracker indicated that 9 percent (357) of PHAs were missing both lead inspection reports and lead disclosure forms for one or more properties. There were 973 PHAs missing one of the two required documents. OFO staff told us that they prioritized following up with PHAs that were missing both documents. According to OFO staff, PHAs can resolve potential noncompliance by submitting adequate lead documentation to HUD. OFO staff told us the agency considers missing lead documentation as “potential” noncompliance because PHAs may provide the required documentation or they may be exempt from certain requirements (e.g., HUD-designated elderly housing). While HUD has taken steps to strengthen compliance monitoring processes, it does not have a plan to identify and address the risks of noncompliance by PHAs with lead paint regulations. Federal internal control standards state that agencies should identify, analyze, and respond to risks related to achieving the defined objectives. Furthermore, when an agency has made significant changes to its processes—as HUD has done with its compliance monitoring processes—management review of changes to these processes can help the agency determine that its control activities are designed appropriately. Our review found that HUD does not have a plan to help mitigate and address risks related to noncompliance with lead paint regulations by PHAs (i.e., ensuring lead safety in assisted housing). Additionally, our review found several limitations with HUD’s new compliance monitoring approach, which include the following: Reliance on PHA self-certifications. HUD’s compliance monitoring processes rely in part on PHAs self-certifying that they are in compliance with lead paint regulations, but recent investigations have found that some PHAs may have falsely certified that they were in compliance. In November 2017, HUD filed a fraud complaint against two former officials of the Alexander County (Illinois) Housing Authority, alleging that the former official, among other things, falsely certified to HUD that the Housing Authority was in compliance with lead paint regulations. Further, PIH staff told us there are ongoing investigations related to potential noncompliance with lead paint regulations and false certifications at two other housing authorities. Lack of comprehensive data for the public housing program. OFO started to collect data for the public housing program in the Lead-Based Paint Response Tracker in June 2016 and the inventory of all public housing properties includes units inspected since 2012. In addition, HUD primarily relies on the presence of lead inspection reports but does not record in the database when inspections and remediation activities occurred and does not determine whether they are still effective. Because of this, the information contained in the lead inspection reports may no longer be up-to-date. For example, a lead inspection report from the 1990s may provide evidence that abatement work was conducted at that time, but according to PIH staff, the housing may no longer be lead-safe. Lack of readily available data for the voucher program. The voucher program does not have readily available data on housing units’ physical condition and compliance with lead paint regulations because data on the roughly 2.5 million units in the program are kept at the PHA level. According to PIH staff, HUD plans to adopt a new system for the voucher program that will include standardized, electronic data for voucher units. PIH staff said the new system (Uniform Physical Condition Standards for Vouchers Protocol) will allow greater oversight and provide HUD the ability to conduct data analysis for voucher units. Challenges identifying children with elevated blood lead levels. For several reasons, PHAs face ongoing challenges receiving information from state and local public health departments on the number of children identified with elevated blood lead levels. First, children across the U.S. are not consistently screened and tested for exposure to lead. Second, according to CDC data, many states use a less stringent health guideline to identify children compared to the health standard that HUD uses (i.e., CDC’s current blood lead reference value). PIH staff told us that some public health departments may not report children with elevated blood levels to PHAs because they do not know that a child is living in a HUD- assisted unit and needs to be identified using the more stringent HUD standard. Lastly, Lead Office staff told us that privacy laws in some states may impose restrictions on public health departments’ ability to share information with PHAs. Limited coverage of on-site compliance reviews. While full on-site compliance reviews can be used to determine if PHAs are in compliance with lead paint regulations, OFO conducts a limited number of these reviews annually. For example, in Fiscal Year 2017, OFO conducted 72 reviews of the roughly 4,000 total PHAs. Based on OFO information, there are 973 PHAs that are missing either lead inspection reports or lead disclosure forms indicating some level of potential noncompliance. HUD’s steps since June 2016 to enhance monitoring of PHAs’ compliance with lead paint regulations have some limitations that create risks in its new compliance monitoring approach. By developing a plan to help mitigate and address the various limitations associated with the new compliance monitoring approach, HUD could further strengthen its oversight and help ensure that PHAs maintain lead-safe housing units. HUD does not have detailed procedures to address PHA noncompliance with lead paint regulations or to determine when enforcement decisions may be needed. Lead Office staff told us that their enforcement program aims to ensure that PHAs have the information necessary to remain in compliance with lead paint regulations. According to federal internal control standards, agencies should implement control activities through policies and procedures. Effective design of procedures to address noncompliance would include documenting specific actions to be performed by agency staff when deficiencies are identified and related time frames for these actions. While HUD staff stated that they address PHA noncompliance through ongoing communication and technical assistance to PHAs, HUD has not documented specific actions to be performed by staff when deficiencies are identified. OFO staff told us that in general, PIH has not needed to take many enforcement actions because field offices are able to resolve most lead paint regulation compliance concerns with PHAs through ongoing communication and technical assistance. For example, HUD field offices sent letters to PHAs when Real Estate Assessment Center inspectors could not locate required lead inspection reports and lead disclosure forms, and requested that the PHA send the missing documentation within 30 days. However, OFO’s fiscal years 2015–2017 internal memorandums on monitoring and oversight guidance for HUD field offices did not contain detailed procedures, including time frames or criteria HUD staff would use to determine when to consider whether a more formal enforcement action might be warranted. Additionally, Lead Office staff said if efforts to bring a PHA into compliance are unsuccessful, the Lead Office would work in conjunction with PIH and HUD’s Office of General Counsel’s Departmental Enforcement Center to determine if an enforcement action is needed, such as withholding or delaying funds from a PHA or imposing civil money penalties on a PHA. Lead Office staff also told us that instead of imposing a fine on a PHA, HUD would rather work with the PHA to resolve the lead paint hazard. However, the Lead Office provided no documentation detailing the specific steps or time frames HUD staff would follow to determine when a noncompliance case is escalated to the Office of General Counsel. In a March 2018 report to Congress, HUD noted that children continued to test positive for lead in HUD-assisted housing in 2017. In the same report, HUD notes PIH and the Lead Office will continue to work with PHAs to ensure compliance with lead paint regulations. By adopting procedures that clearly describe when lead paint hazard compliance efforts are no longer sufficient and enforcement decisions are needed, HUD can better keep PHAs accountable in a consistent and timely manner. The standard HUD uses to identify children with elevated blood lead levels and initiate lead hazard control activities in its rental assistance aligns with the health guideline set by CDC in 2012. HUD also uses CDC’s health guideline in its lead grant programs. In HUD’s January 2017 amendment to the Lead Safe Housing Rule, HUD made its standard for lead in a child’s blood more stringent by lowering it from 20 micrograms to 5 micrograms of lead per deciliter of blood, matching CDC’s health guideline (i.e., blood lead reference value). Specifically, HUD’s stronger standard allows the agency to respond more quickly when children under 6 years old are exposed to lead paint hazards in voucher and public housing units. The January 2017 rule also established more comprehensive testing for children and evaluation procedures for HUD assisted housing. According to HUD’s press release that accompanied the rule, by aligning HUD’s standard with CDC’s guidance, HUD can respond more quickly in cases when a child who lives in HUD assisted housing shows early signs of lead in their blood. The 2017 rule notes HUD will revise the agency’s elevated blood lead level to align with future changes HHS may make to its recommended environmental intervention level. HUD’s standards for lead dust levels align with EPA standards for its rental assistance programs and exceed EPA standards for the lead grant programs. In 2001, EPA published a final rule on lead paint hazard standards, including lead dust clearance standards. The rule established standards to help property owners, contractors, and government agencies identify lead hazards in residential paint, dust, and soil and address these hazards in and around homes. Under these standards, lead is considered a hazard when equal to or exceeding 40 micrograms of lead in dust per square foot sampled on floors and 250 micrograms of lead in dust per square foot sampled on interior window sills. In 2004, HUD amended the Lead Safe Housing Rule to incorporate the 2001 EPA lead dust standards as HUD’s standards. Since this time, HUD has used EPA’s 2001 lead hazard standards in its rental assistance programs. In February 2017, HUD released policy guidance for its lead grantees requiring them to meet new and more protective requirements for identifying and addressing lead paint hazards in the lead grant programs than those imposed by EPA’s 2001 standards that HUD uses in the rental assistance programs. For example, the policy guidance requires grantees to consider lead dust a hazard on floors at 10 micrograms per square foot sampled (down from 40) and on window sills at 100 micrograms per square foot sampled (down from 250). The policy guidance noted that the new requirements are supported by scientific evidence on the adverse effects of lead exposure at low blood lead levels in children. Further, the policy guidance established a standard for porch floors––an area that EPA has not covered––because porch floors can be both a direct exposure source for children and a source of lead dust that can be tracked into the home. On December 27, 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ordered EPA to issue a proposed rule updating its lead dust hazard standard and the definition of lead-based paint within 90 days of the decision becoming final and a final rule within 1 year of the proposed rule. Because HUD’s Lead Safe Housing Rule generally defines lead paint hazards and lead dust hazards to mean the levels promulgated by EPA, if EPA changes its 2001 standards those new standards would be used in HUD’s rental assistance programs. On March 16, 2018, EPA filed a request to the court asking for clarification for when EPA is required to issue the proposed rule and followed up with a motion seeking clarification or an extension. In response to EPA’s motion, on March 26, 2018, the court issued an order clarifying time frames and ordered that the proposed rule be issued within 90 days from March 26, 2018. HUD’s Lead Safe Housing Rule requires a stricter lead inspection standard for public housing than for voucher units. According to HUD staff, HUD does not have the authority to require the more stringent inspection in the voucher program. While HUD has acknowledged that moving to a stricter inspection standard for voucher units would provide greater assurance that these units are lead-safe and expressed its plan to support legislative change to authorize it to impose a more stringent inspection standard, HUD has not requested authority from Congress to amend its inspection standard for the voucher program. For voucher units, HUD requires PHAs to ensure that trained inspectors conduct visual assessments to identify deteriorated paint for housing units inhabited by a child under 6 years old. In a visual assessment, an inspector looks for deteriorated paint and visible surface dust but does not conduct any testing of paint chips or dust samples from surfaces to determine the presence of lead in the home’s paint. By contrast, for public housing units, HUD requires a stronger inspection process. Lead- based paint inspections are required for pre-1978 public housing units. If that inspection identifies lead-based paint, PHAs must then perform a risk assessment. In a risk assessment, in addition to conducting a visual inspection, an inspector tests for the presence of lead paint by collecting and testing samples of paint chips and surface dust, and typically using a specialized device (an X-ray fluorescence analyzer) to measure the amount of lead in the paint on a surface, such as a wall, door, or window sill. Staff from HUD’s Lead Office and the Office of General Counsel told us that Title X did not include specific risk assessment requirements for voucher units, and HUD does not believe, therefore, that it has the statutory authority to require an assessment more thorough than a visual assessment of voucher units. As of May 2018, HUD had not requested statutory authority to change the visual assessment standard used in the voucher program. However, HUD previously acknowledged the limitation of the weaker inspection standard in a June 2016 publication titled Lead- Safe Homes, Lead-Free Kids Toolkit. In this publication, HUD noted its plans to support legislative change to strengthen lead safety in voucher units by eliminating reliance on visual-only inspections. Staff from HUD’s Lead Office and Office of General Counsel told us the agency recognizes that risk assessments are more comprehensive than visual assessments. The staff noted that, by definition, a risk assessment is a stronger inspection standard than a visual-only assessment because it includes additional identification and testing. In responding to a draft of this report, HUD cited the need to conduct and evaluate the results of a statistically rigorous study on the impacts of requiring a lead risk assessment versus a visual assessment, such as the impact on leasing times and the availability of housing for low-income families. HUD further noted that such a study could explore whether alternative options to the full risk assessment standard (such as targeted dust sampling) could achieve similar levels of protection for children in the voucher program. Requesting and obtaining authority to amend the standard for the voucher program would not preclude HUD from doing such a study. Such analysis might support a range of options based on consideration of health effects for children, housing availability, and other relevant factors. Because HUD’s Lead Safe Housing Rule contains a weaker lead inspection standard for the voucher program children living in voucher units may be less protected from lead paint hazards than children living in public housing. By requesting and obtaining statutory authority to amend the voucher program inspection standard, HUD would be positioned to take steps to ensure that children in the voucher program are provided better protection as indicated by analysis of the benefits and costs from amending the standard. HUD has taken limited steps to measure, evaluate, and report on the performance of its programmatic efforts to ensure that housing is lead- safe. First, HUD has tracked one performance measure for its lead grant programs but lacks comprehensive performance goals and measures. Second, while HUD has evaluated the effectiveness of its Lead-Based Paint Hazard Control grant program, it has not formalized plans and does not have a time frame for evaluating its lead paint regulations. Third, HUD has not issued an annual report on the results of its lead efforts since 1997. A key aspect to promoting improved federal management and greater efficiency and effectiveness is that agencies set goals and report on performance. We have previously reported that a program performance assessment contains three key elements––program goals, performance measures, and program evaluations (see fig. 5). In our prior work, we have noted that both the executive branch and congressional committees need evaluative information to help them make decisions about the programs they oversee––information that tells them whether, and why, a program is working well or not. Program goals and performance measures. HUD has tracked one performance measure for making private housing units lead-safe as part of its lead grant programs but lacks goals and performance measures that more fully cover the range of its lead efforts. In addition to our prior work on program goals and performance measures, federal internal control standards state that management should define objectives clearly and that defining objectives in measurable terms allows agency management to assess performance toward achieving objectives. According to Lead Office staff, HUD provides information on its goals and performance measures related to its lead efforts in the agency’s annual performance reports. For example, the fiscal year 2016 report contains information about the number of private housing units made lead-safe as part of HUD’s lead grant programs but does not include any performance measures on HUD’s lead efforts for the voucher and public housing programs. Lead Office staff told us HUD does not have systems to count the number of housing units made lead-safe in these two housing programs. The staff said the Lead Office and PIH recently began discussing whether data from an existing HUD database could be used to count units made lead-safe within these programs. However, they could not provide additional details on the status of all these efforts. Without comprehensive goals and performance measures, HUD does not know the results it is achieving with all its lead paint hazard reduction efforts. Moreover, HUD may be missing opportunities to use performance information to improve the results of its lead efforts. Program evaluations. HUD has evaluated the effectiveness of its Lead- Based Paint Hazard Control grant program but has not taken similar steps to evaluate the Lead Safe Housing Rule or Lead Disclosure Rule. As previously stated, our prior work on program performance assessment has noted the importance of program evaluations to know how well a program is working relative to its objectives. Additionally, Title X required HUD to conduct research to evaluate the long-term cost-effectiveness of interim lead hazard control and abatement strategies. For its Lead-Based Paint Hazard Control Grant program, HUD has contracted with outside experts to conduct evaluations. For example, the National Center for Healthy Housing and the University of Cincinnati’s Department of Environmental Health evaluated whether the lead hazard control methods used by grantees continued to be effective 1, 3, 6, and 12 years later. The evaluations concluded that the lead hazard control activities used by grantees substantially reduced lead dust levels and the original evaluation and those completed 1 and 3 years later were also associated with substantial declines in the blood lead levels of children living in the housing remediated using lead grant program funds. HUD has general plans to conduct evaluations of the Lead Safe Housing Rule and the Lead Disclosure Rule, but Lead Office and PD&R staff said they did not know when or if the studies will begin. In a 2016 publication, HUD noted its plans to evaluate the Lead Safe Housing Rule requirements and noted that such an evaluation would contribute toward policy recommendations and program improvements. Additionally, in its 2017 Research Roadmap, PD&R outlined HUD’s plans for two studies to evaluate the effectiveness of requirements within the Lead Safe Housing and Lead Disclosure Rules. However, PD&R and Lead Office staff were not able to provide a time frame for when the studies would begin. PD&R staff told us that the plans noted within the Research Roadmap were HUD’s first step in research planning and prioritization but that appropriations for research have been prescriptive in recent years (i.e., tied to specific research topics) and fell short of the agency’s research needs. By studying the effectiveness of requirements included within the Lead Safe Housing and Lead Disclosure Rules, including the cost- effectiveness of the various lead hazard control methods, HUD could have more complete information to assess how effectively it uses federal dollars to make housing units lead-safe. Reporting. HUD has not reported on its lead efforts as required since 1997. Title X includes annual and biennial reporting requirements for HUD. Staff from HUD’s Lead Office and General Counsel told us that in 1998 the agency agreed with the congressional committees of jurisdiction that HUD could satisfy this reporting requirement by including the required information in its annual performance reports. Lead Office staff told us HUD’s recent annual performance reports do not contain specific information required by law and that HUD has not issued other publicly available reports that contain the Title X reporting requirements. Title X requires HUD to annually provide Congress information on its progress in implementing the lead grant programs; a summary of studies looking at the incidence of lead poisoning in children living in HUD-assisted housing; the results of any required lead technical studies; and estimates of federal funds spent on lead hazard evaluation and reduction in HUD-assisted housing. As previously stated, the annual performance reports have provided information on the number of housing units made lead-safe through the agency’s lead grant programs, but not through the voucher or public housing programs. In March 2018, Lead Office staff told us HUD plans to submit separate reports on the agency’s lead effort, covering the Title X reporting requirements, starting in fiscal year 2019. By HUD complying with Title X statutory reporting requirements, Congress and the public will be in a position to better know the progress HUD is making toward ensuring that housing is lead-safe. Lead exposure can cause serious, irreversible cognitive damage that can impair a child for life. Through its lead grant programs and oversight of lead paint regulations, HUD is helping to address lead paint hazards in housing. However, our review identified specific areas where HUD could improve the effectiveness of its efforts to identify and address lead paint hazards and protect children in low-income housing from lifelong health problems: Documenting and evaluating grant processes. HUD could improve documentation for its lead grant programs’ processes by providing more specific direction to staff and documenting grant award rationale. In doing so, HUD could better ensure that grant program staff score grant applications consistently and appropriately and provide greater transparency about its award decisions. Additionally, periodically evaluating its grant processes and procedures could help HUD better ensure that its lead grants reach areas most at risk for lead paint hazards. Identifying areas at risk for lead hazards. By developing specific time frames to finalize and incorporate the results of its model to more fully identify areas at risk for lead paint hazards, HUD can better identify and conduct outreach to at-risk localities that its lead grant programs have not yet reached. Overseeing compliance with lead paint regulations. False self- certifications of compliance by some PHAs and other limitations in HUD’s compliance monitoring approach make it essential for HUD to develop a plan to mitigate and address limitations, as well as establish procedures to determine when enforcement decisions are needed. These actions could further strengthen HUD’s oversight and keep PHAs accountable for ensuring that housing units are lead-safe. Amending inspection standard in the voucher program. Children living in voucher units may receive less protection from lead paint hazards than children living in public housing units because HUD applies different lead inspection standards to the two programs. HUD could ensure that children in the voucher program are provided better protection from lead by requesting and obtaining statutory authority to amend the voucher program inspection standard as indicated by analysis of the benefits and costs of amending the standard. Assessing and reporting on performance. Fully incorporating key elements of performance assessment—by developing comprehensive goals, improving performance measures, and adhering to reporting requirements—could better enable HUD to assess its own progress and target its resources toward lead efforts that maximize impact. Additionally, HUD may be missing opportunities to inform the Congress and the public about how HUD’s lead efforts have helped reduce lead poisoning in children. We are making the following nine recommendations to HUD: The Director of HUD’s Lead Office should ensure that the office more fully documents its processes for scoring and awarding lead grants and its rationale for award decisions. (Recommendation 1) The Director of HUD’s Lead Office should ensure that the office periodically evaluates its processes for scoring and awarding lead grants. (Recommendation 2) The Director of HUD’s Lead Office, in collaboration with PD&R, should set time frames for incorporating relevant data on lead paint hazard risks into the lead grant programs’ processes. (Recommendation 3) The Director of HUD’s Lead Office and the Assistant Secretary for PIH should collaborate to establish a plan to mitigate and address risks within HUD’s lead paint compliance monitoring processes. (Recommendation 4) The Director of HUD’s Lead Office and the Assistant Secretary for PIH should collaborate to develop and document procedures to ensure that HUD staff take consistent and timely steps to address issues of PHA noncompliance with lead paint regulations. (Recommendation 5) The Secretary of HUD should request authority from Congress to amend the inspection standard to identify lead paint hazards in the Housing Choice Voucher program as indicated by analysis of health effects for children, the impact on landlord participation in the program, and other relevant factors. (Recommendation 6) The Director of the Lead Office should develop performance goals and measures to cover the full range of HUD’s lead efforts, including its efforts to ensure that housing units in its rental assistance programs are lead-safe. (Recommendation 7) The Director of the Lead Office, in conjunction with PD&R, should finalize plans and develop a time frame for evaluating the effectiveness of the Lead Safe Housing and Lead Disclosure Rules, including an evaluation of the long-term cost effectiveness of the lead remediation methods required by the Lead Safe Housing Rule. (Recommendation 8) The Director of the Lead Office should complete statutory reporting requirements, including but not limited to its efforts to make housing lead-safe through its lead grant programs and rental-assistance programs, and make the report publicly available. (Recommendation 9) We provided a draft of this report to HUD for review and comment. We also provided the relevant excerpts of the draft report to CDC and EPA for their review and technical comments. In written comments, reproduced in appendix III, HUD disagreed with one of our recommendations and generally agreed with the remaining eight. HUD and CDC also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. EPA did not have any comments on the relevant excerpts of the draft report provided to them. In its general comments, HUD noted that the lead grant programs and HUD’s compliance assistance and enforcement of lead paint regulations have contributed significantly to, among other things, the low prevalence of lead-based paint hazards in HUD-assisted housing. Further, HUD said the lead grant programs and compliance assistance and enforcement of lead paint regulations have played a critical part in developing and maintaining the national lead-based paint safety infrastructure. HUD asked that this contextual information be included in the background of the report. The draft report included detailed information on the purpose and scope of HUD’s lead grant programs, two key regulations related to lead paint hazards, and efforts to make housing lead-safe. Furthermore, the draft report provided context on other federal agencies’ role in establishing relevant standards and guidelines for lead paint hazards. We made no changes in response to this comment because we did not think it was necessary for background purposes. HUD disagreed with the draft report’s sixth recommendation to request authority from Congress to use the risk assessment inspection standard to identify lead paint hazards in the Housing Choice Voucher program. As discussed in the report, HUD’s Lead Safe Housing Rule requires a more stringent lead inspection standard (risk assessments) for public housing than for Housing Choice Voucher units, for which a weaker inspection standard is used (visual assessments). In its written comments, HUD said that before deciding whether to request the statutory authority to implement risk assessments for voucher units, it would need to conduct and evaluate the results of a statistically rigorous study on the impacts of requiring a lead risk assessment versus a visual assessment, such as the impact on leasing times and the availability of housing for low-income families. HUD further noted that such a study could explore whether alternative options to the full risk assessment standard (such as targeted dust sampling) could achieve similar levels of protection for children in the voucher program. We note that requesting and obtaining authority to amend the standard for the Housing Choice Voucher program would not preclude HUD from doing such a study. We acknowledge that the results of such a study might support a range of options. Therefore, we revised our recommendation to provide HUD with greater flexibility in how it might amend the lead inspection standard for the voucher program based on consideration of not only leasing time and availability of housing, as HUD emphasized in its written comments, but also based on the health effects on children. The need for HUD to review the lead inspection standard for the voucher program is underscored by the greater number of households with children served by the voucher program compared to public housing, as well as recent information indicating that more children with elevated blood lead levels are living in voucher units than in public housing. HUD generally agreed with our remaining eight recommendations and provided specific information about planned steps and other considerations related to implementing them. For example, in response to our first three recommendations on the lead grant programs, HUD outlined specific steps it plans to take, such as updating its guidance for scoring grant applications and reviewing its grant application scoring methods to identify potential improvements. In response to our fourth and fifth recommendations to the Director of HUD’s Lead Office on compliance monitoring and enforcement of lead paint regulations, HUD noted that PIH should be the primary office for these recommendations with the Lead Office providing support. While these recommendations had already recognized the need for the Lead Office to collaborate with PIH, we reworded them to clarify that it is not necessary for the Lead Office to have primary responsibility for their implementation. HUD generally agreed with our seventh and eighth recommendations, but noted some considerations for implementing them. For our seventh recommendation about performance goals and measures, HUD noted that it will re-examine the availability of information from the current housing databases to determine whether data on housing unit production can be added to the existing data collected. HUD noted if that information is not sufficient, it would need to obtain Office of Management and Budget approval and have sufficient funds for such an information technology project. For our eighth recommendation about evaluating the Lead Safe Housing and Lead Disclosure Rules, HUD noted if its own resources are insufficient, the time frame for implementing this recommendation may depend on the availability of funding for contracted resources. Finally, in response to our ninth recommendation, HUD said that it will draft and submit annual and biennial reports to the congressional authorizing and appropriations committees and then post the reports on the Lead Office’s public website. We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Secretary of Health and Human Services, and other interested parties. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-8678 or garciadiazd@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV. Under the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) Lead-Based Paint Hazard Control and the Lead Hazard Reduction Demonstration grant programs, HUD competitively awards grants to state and local jurisdictions, as authorized by the Residential Lead-Based Paint Hazard Reduction Act (Title X of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1992). Title X requires each grant recipient to make matching contributions with state, local, and private funds (i.e., nonfederal) toward the total cost of activities. For the Lead-Based Paint Hazard Control grant and the Lead Hazard Reduction Demonstration grant programs, the matching contribution has been set at no less than 10 percent and 25 percent, respectively, of the total grant amount. For example, if the total grant amount is $3 million, then state or local jurisdictions must provide at least $300,000 and $750,000, respectively, for each grant program, in additional funding toward the cost of activities. HUD requires lead grant applicants to include information on the sources and amounts of grantees’ matching contributions as part of their grant applications. Additionally, Title X requires HUD to award grants in part based on an applicant’s ability to leverage state, local, and private funds to supplement the federal grant funds. To identify the nonfederal funding sources grantees used in the lead hazard control grants, we selected and reviewed the lead grant applications of 20 HUD grantees and interviewed representatives from 10 of these. We selected these grantees based on their geographic locations; the number of HUD lead grants they had previously received; experience with HUD’s lead hazard control grants; and whether they have received both grants from 2013 through 2017. Grantees we selected included entities at the state, municipality, and county levels. Information from our grant application reviews and interviews of grantees cannot be generalized to all HUD grantees. Based on our review of the selected grant applications and interviews of selected grantees, we found that grantees planned to use the following types of nonfederal funding sources as their matching contributions to support their lead grants activities: State and local funds. Eighteen of the 20 grantees we selected noted that they planned to use state or local funding sources to supplement HUD’s grant funds. The state and local funding sources included state or local general funds and local property taxes or fees. For example, grantees in Connecticut, Baltimore, and Philadelphia used state or local general funds to cover personnel and operating costs. Additionally, grantees in Alameda County (California), Hennepin County (Minnesota), Malden, St. Louis, and Winnebago County (Illinois) planned to use local taxes, including property taxes or fees, such as real estate recording and building permit fees, to cover some costs associated with their lead hazard control grants activities. Community Development Block Grant funds. Ten of the 20 grantees we selected indicated that they planned to use Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program funds to cover part of the costs of their lead hazard control grants. CDBG program funds can be used by states and local communities for housing; economic development; neighborhood revitalization; and other community development activities. For example, grantees in Baltimore and Memphis noted in their grant applications that they planned to use the funds to cover costs related to personnel, operations, and training. Nongovernmental contributions or discounts. Eight of 20 grantees we selected stated that they anticipated some forms of nongovernmental contributions from nonprofit organizations or discounts from contractors to supplement the lead grants. For example, all eight grantees stated that they expected to receive matching contributions from nonprofit organizations. Table 2 summarizes the nonfederal funds by source that the 20 selected grantees planned to use, based on our review of these grantees’ applications. Furthermore, almost all of the selected grantees stated in their grant applications or told us that they expected to receive or have received other nonfederal funds in excess of their matching contributions. For example, 15 grantees stated that they generally required or encouraged property owners or landlords to contribute toward the lead hazard remediation costs. Also, grantees in Baltimore, District of Columbia, Lewiston, and Providence indicated that they expected to receive monetary or in-kind donations from organizations to help carry out lead hazard remediation, blood lead-level testing, or training. Additionally, the grantee in Alameda County (California) told us that they have received nonfederal funds from a litigation settlement with a private paint manufacturer. This report examines the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) efforts to (1) incorporate statutory requirements and other relevant federal standards in its lead grant programs; (2) monitor and enforce compliance with lead paint regulations for its rental assistance programs; (3) adopt federal health guidelines and environmental standards for lead hazards in its lead grant and rental assistance programs; and (4) measure and report on its performance related to making housing lead-safe. In this report, we examine lead paint hazards in housing, and we focus on HUD’s lead hazard control grant programs and its two largest rental assistance programs that serve the most families with children: the Housing Choice Voucher (voucher) and public housing programs. To address all four objectives, we reviewed relevant laws, such as the Residential Lead-Based Paint Hazard Reduction Act (Title X of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1992, referred to as Title X throughout this appendix) and relevant HUD regulations, such as the Lead Safe Housing Rule and a January 2017 amendment to this rule. To examine trends in funding for HUD’s lead grant programs for the past 10 years, we also reviewed HUD’s budget information for fiscal years 2008 through 2017. We interviewed HUD staff from the Office of Lead Hazard Control and Healthy Homes (Lead Office), Office of Public and Indian Housing (PIH), Office of Policy Development and Research (PD&R), and other relevant HUD program and field offices. Finally, we reviewed our prior work and those of HUD’s Office of Inspector General. To address the first objective, we reviewed HUD’s Notices of Funding Availability (funding notices), policies, and procedures to identify HUD’s grant award processes for the Lead-Based Paint Hazard Control grant and Lead Hazard Reduction Demonstration grant programs. For example, we reviewed HUD’s annual notices of funding availability from 2013 through 2017 to identify HUD’s scoring factors for evaluating grant applications. We compared HUD’s grant award processes in 2017 with Title X statutory requirements, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) requirements for awarding federal grants, and relevant federal internal control standards. We also interviewed HUD staff about the agency’s grant application review and award processes. To determine the extent to which HUD’s grants have gone to counties in the United States potentially at high risk for lead paint hazards, we compared grantee locations from HUD’s lead grant data for grants awarded from 2013 through 2017 with county-level data on two indicators of lead paint hazard risk from the 2011–2015 American Community Survey—a continuous survey of households conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau. We analyzed HUD’s grant data to determine the number and dollar amount of grants received by each grantee, and the grantees’ addresses. We then conducted a geographic analysis to determine whether each HUD lead grant went to a county that met at least one, both, or neither of the two commonly known indicators of lead paint hazard risk—the age of housing and poverty level. We identified these two indicators through a review of relevant academic literature, agency research, and state lead modelling methodologies. We used data from the 2011–2015 American Community Survey because the data covered a time frame that best aligned with the 5 years of lead grant data (2013 through 2017). Using its county-level data, we calculated an estimated average percentage nationwide of housing units built before 1980 (56.9 percent) and an estimated average percentage nationwide of individuals living below the poverty level (17.5 percent). We used 1980 as a benchmark for age of housing because the American Community Survey data for age of housing is separated by the decade of construction and 1980 was closest in time to the 1978 federal lead paint ban. We categorized counties based on whether their levels of pre-1980 housing and poverty were above one, both, or neither of the respective national average percentage for each indicator. The estimated average nationwide and county-level percentages of the two indicators (e.g., older housing and poverty rate) are expressed as a range of values. For the lower and upper ends of the range, we generated a 95 percent confidence interval that was within plus or minus 20 percentage points. We classified a county as above the estimated average percentages nationwide if the county’s confidence interval was higher and did not overlap with the nationwide estimate’s confidence interval. We omitted the data for 12 counties that we determined were unreliable for our purposes. We analyzed data starting in 2013 because that was the first year for which these grant data were available electronically. We also interviewed HUD staff to understand their efforts and plans to perform similar analyses using indicators of lead paint hazard risk. To assess the reliability of HUD’s grant data, we reviewed documentation of HUD’s grant database, interviewed Lead Office staff on the processes HUD used to collect and ensure the reliability of the data, and tested the data for missing values, outliers, and obvious errors. To assess the reliability of the American Community Survey data, we reviewed statistical information from the Census Bureau and other publicly available documentation on the survey and conducted electronic testing of the data. We determined that the HUD grant data and American Community Survey county-level data on age of housing and poverty were sufficiently reliable for identifying areas at risk of lead paint hazards and determining the extent to which lead grants from 2013 through 2017 have gone to at-risk areas. Furthermore, to obtain information about how HUD works with grantees to achieve program objectives, we conducted in-person site visits to five grantees located in five localities (Alameda County, California; Atlanta, Georgia; Baltimore, Maryland; District of Columbia; and San Francisco, California); and interviewed an additional five grantees on the telephone (Hennepin County, Minnesota; Lewiston, Maine; Malden, Massachusetts; Providence, Rhode Island; and Winnebago County, Illinois). In addition, we reviewed the grant applications of the 10 grantees we spoke to and an additional 10 grantees from 10 additional jurisdictions (State of Connecticut; Cuyahoga County, Ohio; Denver, Colorado; Monroe County, New York; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Memphis, Tennessee; San Antonio, Texas; St. Louis, Missouri; Tucson, Arizona; and State of Vermont). We selected the 10 grantees for site visits or interviews based on the following criteria: geographic variation, number of years the grantees had HUD’s lead grants, and grantees that have received both types of lead grants from 2013 through 2017. We selected the 10 additional grantees’ applications for review based on geographic diversity and to achieve a total of two applications for each year during our 5-year time frame, with at least one application from each of the two HUD lead grant programs. As part of our review of selected grant applications, we identified nonfederal funding sources used by grantees, such as local tax revenues, contractor discounts, and property owner contributions. Information from the selected grantees and grant applications review cannot be generalized to those grantees we did not include in our review. Additionally, we interviewed representatives from housing organizations to obtain additional examples of any nonfederal funding sources, such as state or local bond measures, or low-interest loans to homeowners. To address the second objective, we also reviewed HUD guidance and internal memorandums related to its efforts to monitor and enforce compliance with lead paint regulations for public housing agencies (PHA), the entities that manage HUD’s voucher and public housing rental assistance programs. In addition, we reviewed HUD’s documentation of databases it uses to monitor compliance, including the Lead-Based Paint Response Tracker and the Elevated Blood Lead Level Tracker, and observed HUD staff’s demonstrations of these databases. HUD staff also provided a demonstration of the Record and Process Inspection Data database (known as “RAPID”) used by HUD’s Real Estate Assessment Center to collect physical inspection data for public housing units. We obtained and reviewed information from HUD about instances of potential noncompliance with lead paint regulations by PHAs as of November 2017 and enforcement actions HUD has taken. We compared HUD’s regulatory compliance monitoring and enforcement approach to federal internal control standards. We interviewed staff from HUD’s Lead Office, Office of General Counsel, Office of Field Operations, and field staff, including four HUD regional directors in areas of the country known to have a high prevalence of lead paint hazards, about internal procedures for monitoring and enforcing compliance with lead paint regulations by the PHAs within their respective regions. To address the third objective on HUD’s adoption of federal health guidelines and environmental standards for lead paint hazards in its lead grant and rental assistance programs, we reviewed relevant rules and HUD documentation. To identify relevant federal health guidelines and environmental standards, we reviewed guidelines and regulations from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and interviewed staff from each agency. To identify state and local laws with different requirements than these federal guidelines and standards, we obtained information from and interviewed staff from CDC’s Public Health Law Program and the National Conference of State Legislatures. We compared HUD’s requirements to CDC’s health guideline known as the “blood lead reference value” and EPA’s standards for lead-based paint hazards and lead-dust clearance standards. Finally, we reviewed information in HUD’s 2017 funding notices and lead grant programs’ policy guidance about requirements for grantees as they pertain to health guidelines and environmental standards. We also interviewed HUD staff about how HUD has used the findings from lead technical study grants to consider changes to HUD’s requirements and processes regarding identifying and addressing lead paint hazards for the grant programs. To address the fourth objective, we reviewed HUD documentation related to performance goals and measures, program evaluations, and reporting. For example, we reviewed HUD’s recent annual performance reports to identify goals and performance measures related to HUD’s efforts to make housing lead-safe. Further, we reviewed Title X to identify requirements related to evaluating and reporting on HUD’s lead efforts. We reviewed program evaluations and related studies completed by outside experts for the lead grant programs and interviewed staff from one of the organizations that conducted the evaluations. In addition, we interviewed Lead Office and PD&R staff about the agency’s plans to evaluate the requirements in the Lead Safe Housing Rule and reviewed corresponding agency documentation about these plans. Additionally, we reviewed the Lead Office’s most recent strategic plan (2009) and annual report (1997) on the agency’s lead efforts. We compared HUD’s use of performance goals and measures, program evaluations, and reporting against leading practices for assessing program performance and federal internal control standards. Finally, we interviewed staff from HUD to understand goals and performance measures used by the agency to assess their lead efforts. We conducted this performance audit from March 2017 to June 2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. In addition to the contact named above, John Fisher (Assistant Director), Beth Faraguna (Analyst in Charge), Enyinnaya David Aja, Farah Angersola, Carol Bray, William R. Chatlos, Anna Chung, Melinda Cordero, Elizabeth Dretsch, Christopher Lee, Marc Molino, Rebecca Parkhurst, Tovah Rom, Tyler Spunaugle, and Sonya Vartivarian made key contributions to this report.	[ "Lead paint in housing is the most common source of lead exposure for U.S. children. HUD awards grants to state and local governments to reduce lead paint hazards in housing and oversees compliance with lead paint regulations in its rental assistance programs. The 2017 Consolidated Appropriations Act, Joint Explanatory Statement, includes a provision that GAO review HUD’s efforts to address lead paint hazards. This report examines HUD’s efforts to (1) incorporate statutory requirements and other relevant federal standards in its lead grant programs, (2) monitor and enforce compliance with lead paint regulations in its rental assistance programs, (3) adopt federal health guidelines and environmental standards for its lead grant and rental assistance programs, and (4) measure and report on the performance of its lead efforts. GAO reviewed HUD documents and data related to its grant programs, compliance efforts, performance measures, and reporting. GAO also interviewed HUD staff and some grantees. The Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) lead grant and rental assistance programs have taken steps to address lead paint hazards, but opportunities exist for improvement. For example, in 2016, HUD began using new tools to monitor how public housing agencies comply with lead paint regulations. However, HUD could further improve efforts in the following areas: Lead grant programs. While its recent grant award processes incorporate statutory requirements on applicant eligibility and selection criteria, HUD has not fully documented or evaluated these processes. For example, HUD’s guidance is not sufficiently detailed to ensure consistent and appropriate grant award decisions. Better documentation and evaluation of HUD’s grant program processes could help ensure that lead grants reach areas at risk of lead paint hazards. Further, HUD has not developed specific time frames for using available local-level data to better identify areas of the country at risk for lead paint hazards, which could help HUD target its limited resources. Oversight. HUD does not have a plan to mitigate and address risks related to noncompliance with lead paint regulations by public housing agencies. We identified several limitations with HUD’s monitoring efforts, including reliance on public housing agencies’ self-certifying compliance with lead paint regulations and challenges identifying children with elevated blood lead levels. Additionally, HUD lacks detailed procedures for addressing noncompliance consistently and in a timely manner. Developing a plan and detailed procedures to address noncompliance with lead paint regulations could strengthen HUD’s oversight of public housing agencies. Inspections. The lead inspection standard for the Housing Choice Voucher program is less strict than that of the public housing program. By requesting and obtaining statutory authority to amend the standard for the voucher program, HUD would be positioned to take steps to better protect children in voucher units from lead exposure as indicated by analysis of benefits and costs. Performance assessment and reporting. HUD lacks comprehensive goals and performance measures for its lead reduction efforts. In addition, it has not complied with annual statutory reporting requirements, last reporting as required on its lead efforts in 1997. Without better performance assessment and reporting, HUD cannot fully assess the effectiveness of its lead efforts. GAO makes nine recommendations to HUD including to improve lead grant program and compliance monitoring processes, request authority to amend its lead inspection standard in the voucher program, and take additional steps to report on progress. HUD generally agreed with eight of the recommendations. HUD disagreed that it should request authority to use a specific, stricter inspection standard. GAO revised this recommendation to allow HUD greater flexibility to amend its current inspection standard as indicated by analysis of the benefits and costs." ]	12,091	gov_report	en	null	35702fb495ed7d8c2e9e8316e0e456a50378a632f98ada4b
GPRAMA significantly enhances GPRA, the centerpiece of a statutory framework that Congress put in place during the 1990s to help resolve longstanding performance and management problems in the federal government and provide greater accountability for results. Congress passed GPRAMA in 2010 to address a number of persistent federal performance challenges, including focusing attention on crosscutting issues and enhancing the use and usefulness of performance information. OMB and agencies are to establish various government-wide and agency-specific performance goals, in line with GPRAMA requirements or OMB guidance. These include the following: Cross-agency priority (CAP) goals: CAP goals are crosscutting and include outcome-oriented goals covering a limited number of policy areas as well as goals for management improvements needed across the government. OMB is to coordinate with agencies to establish CAP goals at least every 4 years. OMB is also required to coordinate with agencies to develop annual federal government performance plans to, among other things, define the level of performance to be achieved toward the CAP goals. Strategic objectives: A strategic objective is the outcome or impact the agency is intending to achieve through its various programs and initiatives. Agencies establish strategic objectives in their strategic plans and may update the objectives during the annual update of performance plans. Agency priority goals (APG): At the agency level, every 2 years, GPRAMA requires that the heads of certain agencies, in consultation with OMB, identify a subset of agency performance goals as APGs. These goals are to reflect the agencies’ highest priorities. They should be informed by the CAP goals as well as consultations with relevant congressional committees and other interested parties. In a schedule established by GPRAMA, OMB and agencies are to develop and publish new CAP goals, APGs, and strategic plans (with updated strategic objectives) in February 2018. GPRAMA and related OMB guidance require agencies to regularly assess their progress in achieving goals and objectives through performance reviews. Data-driven reviews: Agency leaders and managers are to use regular meetings, at least quarterly, to review data and drive progress toward key performance goals and other management-improvement priorities. For each APG, GPRAMA requires agency leaders to conduct reviews at least quarterly to assess progress toward the goal, determine the risk of the goal not being met, and develop strategies to improve performance. Similarly, the Director of OMB, with relevant parties, is to review progress toward each CAP goal. Strategic reviews: OMB guidance directs agency leaders to annually assess progress toward achieving each strategic objective using a broad range of evidence. GPRAMA establishes certain senior leadership positions and a council, as described below. Chief Operating Officer (COO): The deputy agency head, or equivalent, is designated COO, with overall responsibility for improving agency management and performance. Performance Improvement Officer (PIO): Agency heads are to designate a senior executive within the agency as the PIO. The PIO reports directly to the COO and assists the agency head and COO with various performance management activities. Goal leaders: Goal leaders are responsible for developing strategies to achieve goals, managing execution, and regularly reviewing performance. GPRAMA requires goal leaders for CAP goals and agency performance goals, including APGs. OMB guidance directs agencies to designate goal leaders for strategic objectives. Performance Improvement Council (PIC): The PIC is charged with assisting OMB to improve the performance of the federal government and achieve the CAP goals. The PIC is chaired by the Deputy Director for Management at OMB and includes agency PIOs from each of the 24 CFO Act agencies as well as other PIOs and individuals designated by the chair. Among its responsibilities, the PIC is to work to resolve government-wide or crosscutting performance issues, and facilitate the exchange among agencies of practices that have led to performance improvements within specific programs, agencies, or across agencies. GPRAMA includes several provisions related to providing the public and Congress with information, as described below. Performance.gov: GPRAMA calls for a single, government-wide performance website to communicate government-wide and agency performance information. Among other things, the website— implemented by OMB as Performance.gov—is to include (1) quarterly progress updates on CAP goals and APGs; (2) an inventory of all federal programs; and (3) agency strategic plans, annual performance plans, and annual performance reports. Reporting burden: GPRAMA establishes a process to reexamine the usefulness of certain existing congressional reporting requirements. Specifically, GPRAMA requires an annual review (including congressional consultation), based on OMB guidance, of agencies’ reporting requirements to Congress. Additionally, OMB is to include in the budget a list of plans and reports determined to be outdated or duplicative and may submit legislation to eliminate or consolidate such plans or reports. In early 2017, the administration announced several efforts that are intended to improve government performance. The 2018 Budget Blueprint states that the President’s Management Agenda will seek to improve the federal government’s effectiveness by using evidence-based approaches, balancing flexibility with accountability to better achieve results, improving mission support functions, and developing and monitoring critical performance measures. In addition, OMB issued several memoranda detailing the administration’s plans to improve government performance by reorganizing the government, reducing the federal workforce, and reducing federal agency burden. A number of these efforts, which are to leverage GPRAMA and our past work, have the potential to further progress in addressing key governance challenges. As part of reorganization efforts, OMB and agencies are developing government-wide and agency reform plans, respectively, that are to leverage various GPRAMA provisions. For example, an April 2017 memorandum states that OMB intends to monitor implementation of the reform plans using CAP goals, APGs, annual strategic reviews, and Performance.gov. The government-wide plan also is to include crosscutting reform proposals, such as merging agencies or programs that have similar missions. To that end, the memorandum states agencies should consider our reports, including our work on fragmentation, overlap, and duplication, as well as inspectors general reports. Many of the meaningful results that the federal government seeks to achieve, such as those related to ensuring public health, providing homeland security, and promoting economic development, require the coordinated efforts of more than one federal agency, level of government, or sector. For more than 2 decades, we have reported on agencies’ missed opportunities for improved collaboration through the effective implementation of GPRA and, more recently, GPRAMA. Our reports also have demonstrated that collaboration across agencies is critical to address issues of fragmentation, overlap, and duplication as well as many of the areas on our High-Risk List. Fragmentation, Overlap, and Duplication: Since 2011, our annual reports have identified 133 crosscutting areas that require the coordinated effort of more than one federal organization, level of government, or sector. For instance, for the area of federal grant awards, we found in January 2017 that the National Park Service (NPS), Fish and Wildlife Service, Food and Nutrition Service, and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) had not established guidance and formal processes to ensure their grant-management staff review applications for potential duplication and overlap among grants in their agencies before awarding. We recommended that these agencies do so, and they agreed. As of August 2017, these agencies had taken several actions to address the recommendation. For example, the Department of the Interior (Interior) provided documentation showing that the Fish and Wildlife Service now requires discretionary grant applicants to provide a statement that addresses whether there is any overlap or duplication of proposed projects or activities to be funded by the grant. Fish and Wildlife also updated its guidance to grant awarding offices instructing them to perform a potential overlap and duplication review of all selected applicants prior to award. Our Action Tracker provides details on the status of actions from our annual reports. Within the 133 crosscutting areas, since 2011 we have identified 315 targeted actions where opportunities exist to better manage fragmentation, overlap, and duplication, including 29 new actions in our most recent report issued in April 2017. We found that the executive branch and Congress addressed 145 (46 percent) of the 315 actions. For example, in November 2014, we recommended that the U.S. Coast Guard and Consumer Product Safety Commission establish a formal approach to coordination (such as a memorandum of understanding) to facilitate information sharing; better leverage their resources; and address challenges, including those related to fragmentation and overlap that we identified. In response to this recommendation, the two agencies signed a formal policy document to govern their coordination in May 2015. This policy document outlined procedures for determining jurisdictional authority for recreational boat-associated equipment and marine safety items. Specifically, the procedures clarified that upon receiving notice of a possible defect, the agency receiving such notice shall determine whether the item properly falls within its jurisdiction, and if not, initiate discussions to determine the appropriate jurisdiction. These new procedures should help the agencies share information and leverage each other’s resources so they can better ensure that recreational boat-associated equipment and marine safety items are fully regulated. However, more work is needed on the remaining 170 actions (54 percent) that have not been fully addressed. For example, in July 2016, we reported that four federal agencies—the Departments of Defense, Education, Health and Human Services, and Justice—manage at least 10 efforts to collect data on sexual violence, which differ in target population, terminology, measurements, and methodology. We found that data collection efforts use 23 different terms to describe sexual violence. Data collection efforts also differed in how they categorized particular acts of sexual violence, the context in which data were collected, data sources, units of measurement, and time frames. We recommended that OMB convene an interagency forum to better manage fragmentation of efforts to collect sexual violence data. In commenting on that report, OMB stated it would consider implementing the action in the future but did not believe it was the most effective use of resources at that time, in part because the agencies were not far enough along in their research. In response, we stated that given the number of federal data collection efforts, the range of differences across them, and the potential for causing confusion, it would be beneficial for agencies to discuss these differences and determine whether they are, in fact, necessary. As of July 2017, OMB had not provided an update on the status of this recommendation. High-Risk List: Since the early 1990s, our high-risk program has focused attention on government operations with greater vulnerabilities to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement or that are in need of transformation to address economy, efficiency, or effectiveness challenges. As of February 2017, there were 34 high-risk areas covering a wide range of issues including human capital management, modernizing the U.S. financial regulatory system, and ensuring the security of federal information systems and cyber critical infrastructure. Many of these high- risk areas require a coordinated response from more than one branch of government, agency, or sector. In the time between our 2015 and 2017 High-Risk Updates, many of these high-risk areas on our list demonstrated solid progress. During that period, 15 high-risk areas fully met at least one of the five criteria required for removal from the High-Risk List. In many cases, progress was possible through the joint efforts of Congress and leadership and staff in agencies. For example, Congress passed over a dozen laws following our 2015 High-Risk Update to help address high-risk issues. In addition, in 2017, we removed one high-risk area on managing terrorism-related information, because significant progress had been made to strengthen how intelligence on terrorism, homeland security, and law enforcement is shared among federal, state, local, tribal, international, and private sector partners. Despite this progress, continued oversight and attention is also warranted given the issue’s direct relevance to homeland security as well as the constant evolution of terrorist threats and changing technology. Our February 2017 High-Risk Update also highlighted a number of long- standing high-risk areas that require additional attention. We also added three new crosscutting areas to incorporate the management of federal programs that serve tribes and their members, the government’s environmental liabilities, and the 2020 decennial census. Based on our body of work on federal programs that serve tribes and their members, we concluded that federal agencies had (1) ineffectively administered Indian education and health care programs and (2) inefficiently fulfilled their responsibilities for managing the development of Indian energy resources. For example, we identified numerous challenges facing Interior’s Bureau of Indian Education (BIE) and Bureau of Indian Affairs, and the Department of Health and Human Services’ (HHS) Indian Health Service (IHS), in administering education and health care services. We concluded that these challenges put the health and safety of American Indians served by these programs at risk. In May 2017, we issued two additional reports on accountability for school construction and safety at schools funded by BIE. Although these agencies have taken some actions to address recommendations we made related to Indian programs, about 50 recommendations have yet to be fully resolved. We are monitoring federal efforts to address the unresolved recommendations. We also are reviewing IHS’s workforce, and tribal nations’ management and use of their energy resources. Many of the crosscutting areas highlighted by our annual reports on fragmentation, overlap, and duplication and designated as high-risk would benefit from enhanced collaboration among the federal agencies involved in them. GPRAMA establishes a framework aimed at taking a more crosscutting and integrated approach to focusing on results and improving government performance. Our survey results and past work demonstrate that agencies continue to face difficulties when working together on crosscutting issues, but also that implementing certain GPRAMA requirements can have a positive effect on collaboration. An item related to coordination in our survey of federal managers is statistically significantly lower in 2017, relative to our previous survey in 2013 and our initial survey in 1997. In 2017, an estimated 43 percent of managers agreed that they use information obtained from performance measurement to a great or very great extent when coordinating program efforts with internal or external organizations (compared to an estimated 50 percent in 2013 and an estimated 57 percent in 1997). Moreover, our past work has found that agencies face a variety of challenges when working across organizational boundaries to deliver programs and improve performance. For example, our work has found that interagency groups have, at times, encountered difficulty clarifying roles and responsibilities or developing shared outcomes and performance measures. In contrast, our past work demonstrates that implementing GPRAMA provisions can improve collaboration. For example, in May 2016, we found that OMB and the PIC updated the governance structure for CAP goals to include both agency-level and Executive Office of the President goal leaders and held regular, senior-level reviews on CAP goal progress. Moreover, CAP goal teams told us that the CAP goal designation increased leadership attention and improved interagency collaboration on their crosscutting issues. Furthermore, our prior work has found that priority goals and related data-driven reviews have also been used to help manage crosscutting issues and enhance collaboration. Various GPRAMA requirements are aimed at improving agencies’ coordination of efforts to address crosscutting issues. As with our 2013 survey, our 2017 survey continues to show that CAP goals, APGs, and related data-driven reviews—also called quarterly performance reviews (QPR)—are associated with reported higher levels of collaboration with internal and external stakeholders. For example, our 2017 survey data indicate that about half of federal managers (an estimated 54 percent) reported they were somewhat or very familiar with CAP goals. Among these individuals, those who viewed their programs as contributing to CAP goals to a great or very great extent (36 percent) were more likely to report collaborating outside their program to a great or very great extent to help achieve CAP goals (62 percent), as shown in figure 2. Our analysis shows a similar pattern exists for APGs and QPRs. Our past work also has highlighted ways in which OMB and agencies could better implement GPRAMA’s crosscutting provisions—many of which have been addressed. A continued focus on fully and effectively implementing these provisions will be important as OMB and agencies establish new CAP goals and APGs, and assess progress toward them through related QPRs. Cross-agency priority (CAP) goals: In May 2012 and June 2013, we found that OMB had not always identified relevant agencies and program activities as contributors to the initial set of CAP goals. OMB took actions in response to our recommendations to include relevant contributors. Our most recent review, in May 2016, found that all relevant contributors had been identified for a subsequent set of CAP goals. In that report, we also found that OMB and the PIC had improved implementation of the CAP goals, in part, by helping agencies build their capacity to contribute to implementing the goals. Appendix II summarizes our past recommendations related to GPRAMA and the actions agencies have taken to address them. Agency priority goals (APGs): In April 2013, we found that agencies did not fully explain the relationship between their APGs and crosscutting efforts. Identify contributors: Similar to OMB’s responsibilities with the CAP goals, agencies are to identify the various organizations and programs that contribute to each of their performance goals, including APGs. We found that agencies identified internal contributors for their APGs, but did not list external contributors in some cases. We recommended that the Director of OMB ensure that agencies adhere to OMB’s guidance for website updates by providing complete information about the organizations, program activities, regulations, tax expenditures, policies, and other activities—both within and external to the agency— that contribute to each APG. In response, in April 2015, OMB asked agencies to identify organizations, program activities, regulations, policies, tax expenditures, and other activities contributing to their 2014-2015 APGs. Based on an analysis of the final quarterly updates for those APGs, published in December 2015, we found that agencies made progress in identifying external organizations and programs for their APGs. Describe how agency goals contribute to CAP goals: Agencies generally did not identify how their APGs contributed to CAP goals. We recommended that OMB direct agencies to describe in their performance plans how the agency’s performance goals—including APGs—contribute to any of the CAP goals as required by GPRAMA. In response, in July 2013, OMB updated its guidance directing agencies to include a list of the CAP goals to which the agency contributes and explain the agency’s contribution to them in their strategic plans, performance plans, and performance reports. Data-driven reviews: For their data-driven reviews of agency priority goals, agencies are to include, as appropriate, relevant personnel within and outside the agency who contribute to the accomplishment of each goal. However, in February 2013, we found that most Performance Improvement Officers (PIO) we surveyed (16 of 24) indicated that there was little to no involvement in these reviews from external officials who contribute to achieving agency goals. We recommended that OMB and the PIC help agencies extend their QPRs to include, as relevant, representatives from outside organizations that contribute to achieving their APGs. OMB staff told us that they generally concurred with the recommendation, but believed it would not always be appropriate to regularly include external representatives in agencies’ data-driven reviews, which they considered to be internal management meetings. In a subsequent review, we found in July 2015 that PIOs at 21 of the 22 agencies we surveyed said that their data-driven reviews had a positive effect on collaboration among officials from different offices or programs within the agency. Despite the positive effects, most agency PIOs (17) indicated that there continued to be little to no involvement in the reviews from external officials who contribute to achieving agency goals. In May 2016, OMB and PIC staff reported that, in response to our earlier recommendation, they were working with agencies to identify examples where agencies included representatives from outside organizations in data-driven reviews, and to identify promising practices based on those experiences. PIC staff told us they would disseminate any promising practices identified through the PIC Internal Reviews Working Group and other venues. In August 2017, OMB staff told us they plan to hold a summit with agencies later in the year to discuss implementing various performance management requirements, which could include agencies highlighting experiences and promising practices related to involving external officials in their data-driven reviews. We continue to believe data- driven reviews should include any relevant contributors from outside organizations and will continue to monitor progress. Despite the important role priority goals and related reviews can play in addressing crosscutting issues and enhancing collaboration, OMB recently removed the priority status of the current sets of priority goals. According to OMB staff, removing the priority designation from CAP goals and APGs returned them to regular performance goals, which are not subject to quarterly data-driven reviews or updates on the results of those reviews on Performance.gov. In a June 2017 memorandum, OMB stated that CAP goals and APGs are intended to focus efforts toward achieving the priorities of current political leadership, and therefore reporting on the priority goals of the previous administration on Performance.gov was discontinued for the remainder of the period covered by the goals (through September 30, 2017, the end of fiscal year 2017). The memorandum further noted that agencies and teams working on those goals should continue working on the current goals where they align with the priorities of the current administration. Moreover, the memorandum states that agencies have flexibility in structuring their data-driven reviews, but they should continue such reviews focused on agency priorities. When asked about these actions, OMB staff told us that they believed they were working in line with the intentions of GPRAMA, which realigned the timing of goal setting with presidential terms, to better take into account changes in priorities. This is the first presidential transition since GPRAMA was enacted, and OMB staff told us they thought the act was unclear on how to handle priority goals during the changes in administrations and priorities. They stated that it was not practical to continue reporting on the priority goals of the prior administration as agencies worked to develop new strategic plans and priority goals for publication in February 2018. Hence, they told us OMB ended the current round of CAP goals and directed agencies to remove the priority designation from the APGs, returning them to regular performance goals. OMB staff further told us that although the guidance was published in a June 2017 memorandum, these decisions had been made and previously communicated to agencies during the transition in administrations. Therefore, reporting on the fiscal year 2014-2017 CAP goals, fiscal year 2016-2017 APGs, and related reviews stopped much earlier in the year, well before goal cycles were planned to be completed on September 30, 2017. OMB staff further stated that although the goals no longer had priority designations, work towards them largely continued in 2017. For example, one of the prior administration’s CAP goals was to modernize the federal permitting and review process for major infrastructure projects. OMB staff told us that they and agencies have continued many of the activities intended to achieve that goal, but they are no longer subject to quarterly data-driven reviews or updates on the results of these reviews on Performance.gov. Moreover, they expect most of this work will continue towards a new and refocused CAP goal on infrastructure permitting modernization. OMB staff reaffirmed to us their intentions to resume implementation of CAP goals, APGs, and related data-driven reviews when the new planning and reporting cycle begins in February 2018. This is in line with stated plans to leverage various GPRAMA provisions to track progress of proposed government-wide and agency-specific reforms, as outlined in OMB’s April 2017 memorandum on the reform plans. In addition, OMB’s July 2017 update to its guidance for implementing GPRAMA similarly focuses on continued implementation of the act. Additional aspects of GPRAMA implementation could similarly help improve the management of crosscutting issues. Strategic reviews: OMB’s 2012 guidance implementing GPRAMA established a process in which agencies, beginning in 2014, were to conduct leadership-driven, annual reviews of their progress toward achieving each strategic objective established in their strategic plans. As we found in July 2015, effectively implementing strategic reviews could help identify opportunities to reduce, eliminate, or better manage instances of fragmentation, overlap, and duplication. Under OMB’s guidance, agencies are to identify the various organizations, program activities, regulations, tax expenditures, policies, and other activities that contribute to each objective, both within and outside the agency. Where progress in achieving an objective is lagging, the reviews are intended to identify strategies for improvement, such as strengthening collaboration to better address crosscutting challenges, or using evidence to identify and implement more effective program designs. If successfully implemented in a way that is open, inclusive, and transparent—to Congress, delivery partners, and a full range of stakeholders—this approach could help decision makers assess the relative contributions of various programs to a given objective. Successful strategic reviews could also help decision makers identify and assess the interplay of public policy tools that are being used to ensure that those tools are effective and mutually reinforcing, and that results are being efficiently achieved. In July 2017, OMB released guidance which updated the status of the 2017 strategic reviews. Because agencies are currently developing new strategic goals and objectives, OMB stated that agencies may forego the reporting and categorization requirements for any current strategic objectives that an agency determines will be substantively different or no longer aligned with the current administration’s policy, legislative, regulatory, or budgetary priorities. In addition, OMB stated that while there will be no formal meetings between OMB and the agencies to discuss findings and related progress from the 2017 strategic reviews, it expects that agencies will continue to conduct strategic reviews or assess progress made toward strategic goals and objectives aligned with administration policy. Furthermore, OMB stated that during this transition year, updates of progress on agency strategic objectives will only be published in the agency’s annual performance report and will not be reported to Performance.gov. Full reporting through Performance.gov is to resume after new agency strategic plans are published in February 2018. Agencies are to include a progress update for strategic objectives as part of their progress update in their fiscal year 2017 annual performance reports. Agencies also must address next steps for performance improvement as part of their fiscal year 2019 annual performance plans. Program inventories: GPRAMA requires OMB to publish a list of all federal programs, along with related budget and performance information, on a central government-wide website. Such a list could help decision makers and the public fully understand what the federal government does, how it does it, and how well it is doing. An inventory of federal programs could also be a critical tool to help decision makers better identify and manage fragmentation, overlap, and duplication across the federal government. Agencies developed initial program inventories in May 2013, but since then have not updated or more fully implemented these inventories. In October 2014, we found several issues limited the completeness, comparability, and usefulness of the May 2013 program inventories. OMB and agencies did not take a systematic approach to developing comprehensive inventories. For example, OMB’s guidance in Circular No. A-11 presented five possible approaches agencies could take to define their programs and noted that agencies could use one or more of those approaches in doing so. We found that because the agencies used inconsistent approaches to define their programs, the comparability of programs was limited within agencies as well as government-wide. In addition, we found that the inventories had limited usefulness for decision making, as they did not consistently provide the program and related budget and performance information required by GPRAMA. Moreover, we found that agencies did not solicit feedback on their inventories from external stakeholders—which can include Congress, state and local governments, third party service providers, and the public. Doing so would have provided OMB and agencies an opportunity to ensure they were presenting useful information for stakeholder decision making. We concluded that the ability to tag and sort information about programs through a more dynamic, web-based presentation could make the inventory more useful. In October 2014, we made several recommendations to OMB to update relevant guidance to help develop a more coherent picture of all federal programs and to better ensure relevant information is useful for decision makers. For example, we recommended that OMB revise its guidance to direct agencies to consult with relevant congressional committees and stakeholders on their approach to defining and identifying programs when developing or updating their inventories. OMB staff generally agreed with these recommendations, but have not yet taken any actions to implement them. OMB’s guidance for the program inventory has largely remained unchanged since 2014, when OMB postponed further development of the program inventory and eliminated portions of the guidance. For example, the guidance no longer describes, or provides directions for agencies to meet, GPRAMA’s requirements for presenting related budget or performance information for each program. OMB decided to postpone implementing a planned May 2014 update to the program inventory in order to coordinate with the implementation of the public spending reporting required by the Digital Accountability and Transparency Act of 2014 (DATA Act). OMB subsequently stated that it would not begin implementing the program inventory until after the DATA Act was implemented in May 2017, despite requirements for regular updates to the program inventory to reflect current budget and performance information. The DATA Act is now being implemented, but OMB has postponed resuming the development of the program inventory. In July 2017, OMB staff told us that they are now considering how to align GPRAMA’s program inventory provisions with future implementation of the Program Management Improvement Accountability Act (PMIAA). This was reflected in OMB’s July 2017 update to its guidance, which states that OMB is working with agencies to determine the right strategy to merge the implementation of the DATA Act and PMIAA with GPRAMA’s program inventory requirements to the extent possible to avoid duplicating efforts. For example, PMIAA requires OMB to coordinate with agency Program Management Improvement Officers to conduct portfolio reviews of agency programs to assess the quality and effectiveness of program management. GPRAMA requires OMB to issue guidance for implementing the program inventory requirements, among other things. Moreover, federal internal control standards state that organizations should clearly define what is to be achieved, who is to achieve it, how it will be achieved, and the time frames for achievement. As described above, OMB’s current guidance for the program inventory lacks some of those details—such as describing and providing direction to meet GPRAMA’s requirements for budget and performance information—in part because OMB is working with agencies to determine a strategy for implementation. Ensuring all GPRAMA requirements are covered and taking action on our past recommendations would help OMB improve its guidance to more fully implement the program inventory and improve its usefulness. To that end, in a report issued earlier this month, we identified a series of iterative steps that OMB could use in directing agencies to develop a useful inventory, as described in figure 3. A useful inventory would consist of all programs identified, information about each program, and the organizational structure of the programs. Our work showed that the principles and practices of information architecture—a discipline focused on organizing and structuring information—offer an approach for developing such an inventory to support a variety of uses, including increased transparency for federal programs. Such a systematic approach to planning, organizing, and developing the inventory that centers on maximizing the use and usefulness of information could help OMB ensure the inventory is implemented in line with GPRAMA requirements and meets the needs of decision makers and the public, among others. OMB’s guidance also lacks specific time frames, with associated milestones for resuming implementation of the program inventory requirements. As part of PMIAA’s requirements, OMB is to issue standards, policies, and guidelines for program and project management for agencies by December 2017. OMB staff told us that, within a year after that, they expect to issue further guidance on moving forward with resuming the program inventory. However, that general time frame was not reflected in the July 2017 update to OMB’s guidance. Providing specific time frames and associated milestones would bring the program inventory guidance in line with other portions of OMB’s guidance for implementing GPRAMA requirements, which contains a timeline of various performance planning and reporting requirements, including specific dates for meeting those requirements and related descriptions of required actions. For example, OMB’s July 2017 guidance identifies over 30 actions agencies should take between June 2017 and December 2018 to implement various GPRAMA provision. More specific time frames and milestones related to the program inventory requirements would help agencies prepare for resumed implementation by allowing them to know what actions they would be expected to take and by when. Moreover, publicly disclosing planned implementation time frames and associated milestones also would help ensure that external stakeholders are prepared to engage with agencies as they develop and update their program inventories. Effectively implementing various GPRAMA tools could help inform assessments of the performance of tax expenditures, which are reductions in tax liabilities that result from preferential provisions (figure 4). In fiscal year 2016, tax expenditures represented an estimated $1.4 trillion in forgone revenue, an amount greater than total discretionary spending that year. Despite the magnitude of these investments, our work has also shown that little has been done to determine how well specific tax expenditures work to achieve their stated purposes and how their benefits and costs compare to those of spending programs with similar goals. GPRAMA requires OMB to identify tax expenditures that contribute to the CAP goals. In addition, OMB guidance directs agencies to identify tax expenditures that contribute to their strategic objectives and APGs. However, our past work reviewing GPRAMA implementation found that OMB and agencies rarely identified tax expenditures as contributors to these goals. Fully implementing our recommendation to identify how tax expenditures contribute to various goals could help the federal government establish a process for evaluating the performance of tax expenditures. To that end, in May 2017, we provided the Director of OMB with three priority recommendations that require attention: Develop framework for reviewing performance: In June 1994, and again in September 2005, we recommended that OMB develop a framework for reviewing tax expenditure performance. We explained that the framework should (1) outline leadership responsibilities and coordination among agencies with related responsibilities, (2) set a review schedule, (3) identify review methods and ways to address the lack of credible tax expenditure performance information, and (4) identify resources needed for tax expenditure reviews. Since their initial efforts in 1997 and 1999 to outline a framework for evaluating tax expenditures and preliminary performance measures, OMB and the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) have ceased to make progress and retreated from setting a schedule for evaluating tax expenditures. Inventory tax expenditures: In October 2014, we found that OMB had not included tax expenditures in the federal program inventory, and therefore was missing an opportunity to increase the transparency of tax expenditures and the outcomes to which they contribute. We recommended that OMB should designate tax expenditures as a program type in relevant guidance, and develop, in coordination with the Secretary of the Treasury, a tax expenditure inventory that identifies each tax expenditure and provides a description of how the tax expenditure is defined, its purpose, and related budget and performance information. OMB staff said they neither agreed nor disagreed with these recommended actions. As noted earlier, OMB has not resumed updates to the program inventory. Therefore, OMB had not taken any actions in response to this recommendation, according to OMB staff as of July 2017. Identify contributions to agency goals: In July 2016, we found that agencies had made limited progress identifying tax expenditures’ contribution to agency goals, as directed by OMB guidance. As of January 2016, 7 of the 24 CFO Act agencies identified tax expenditures as contributing to their missions or goals. The 11 tax expenditure they identified—out of the 169 tax expenditures included in the President’s Budget for Fiscal Year 2017—represented approximately $31.9 billion of the $1.2 trillion in estimated forgone revenues for fiscal year 2015. (See figure 5.) To help address this issue, we recommended that OMB, in collaboration with the Department of the Treasury, work with agencies to identify which tax expenditures contribute to their agency goals, as appropriate. In particular, we recommended that they identify which specific tax expenditures contribute to specific strategic objectives and APGs. In July 2017, OMB staff said they had taken no actions to address the recommendation. Our July 2016 report also identified options for policymakers to further incorporate tax expenditures into federal budgeting processes, several of which options align with the recommendations discussed above. These options could help achieve various benefits, but we also reported that policymakers would need to consider challenges and tradeoffs in deciding whether or how to implement them. For example, one option was to require that all tax expenditures, or some subset of them, expire after a finite period. This option could result in greater oversight, requiring policymakers to explicitly decide whether to extend more or all tax expenditures. One consideration with this option is that it could lead to frequent changes in the tax code, such as from extended or expired tax expenditures, which can create uncertainty and make tax planning more difficult. Our previous work has shown that using performance information in decision making is essential to improving results. Performance information can be used across a range of management activities, such as setting priorities, allocating resources, or identifying problems to be addressed. However, our work continues to show that agencies can better use performance information in decision making, as shown in the example in the text box below. Department of Justice (DOJ) Could Better Analyze Performance Information to Reduce Backlog in Immigration Courts In June 2017, we found that the case backlog—cases pending from previous years that remain open at the start of a new fiscal year—at DOJ’s Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) courts more than doubled from fiscal years 2006 through 2015. Stakeholders identified various factors that potentially contributed to the backlog, including continuances—temporary case adjournments until a different day or time. Our analysis of continuance records showed that the use of continuances increased by 23 percent from fiscal years 2006 through 2015. We found that EOIR collects continuance data but does not systematically assess them. Systematically analyzing the use of continuances could provide EOIR officials with valuable information about challenges the immigration courts may be experiencing, such as with operational issues like courtroom technology malfunctions, or areas that may merit additional guidance for immigration judges. Further, using this information to potentially address operational challenges could help that office meet its goals for completing cases in a timely manner. We recommended that the Director of EOIR systematically analyze immigration court continuance data to identify and address any operational challenges faced by courts or areas for additional guidance or training. EIOR agreed with this recommendation. EOIR stated that it supports conducting additional analysis of immigration court continuance data and recognizes that additional guidance or training regarding continuances may be beneficial to ensure that immigration judges use continuances appropriately in support of EOIR’s mission to adjudicate immigration cases in a careful and timely manner. We will monitor EOIR’s progress in taking these actions. Our 2017 survey of federal managers shows little change in their reported use of performance information. Using a set of survey questions, we previously developed an index that reflects the extent to which managers reported that their agencies used performance information for various management activities and decision making. The index suggests that government-wide use of performance information did not change significantly between 2013 and 2017, and it is statistically significantly lower relative to our 2007 survey, when we created the index. Figure 6 shows the questions included in the index and the government-wide results. In regard to individual survey items, in 2017 federal managers reported no changes or decreases in their use of performance information when compared to our last survey and when those survey items were first introduced. These results are generally consistent with our last few surveys. For example, in 2008 we found that there had been little change in federal managers’ reported use of performance information government-wide from 1997 to our 2007 survey. Citing those results, the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs report accompanying the bill that would become GPRAMA stated that agencies were not consistently using performance information to improve their management and results. The report further stated that provisions in GPRAMA are intended to address those findings and increase the use of performance information to improve performance and results. However, five items that were highlighted in our 2008 statement on the 2007 survey results generally show no improvement when compared to the 2017 results, as shown in figure 7. The one exception is for managers’ reported use of performance information to refine program performance measures. While this item was statistically significantly higher in 2013 relative to 2007—an estimated 46 percent to 53 percent—the 2017 result (43 percent) is a statistically significant decrease relative to 2013 and is not statistically different from the 2007 results. Another item, the use of performance information to adopt new program approaches or change work processes, also was statistically significantly lower in 2017 (47 percent) when compared to 2007 and 2013 (53 and 54 percent, respectively). This is of particular concern as agencies are developing their reform plans. Moreover, when compared to our 1997 survey, the 2017 results show four of the five items are statistically significantly lower, and the remaining item—allocating resources—has not changed. Similarly, we found there was no improvement in 2017 for more recent survey items on other uses of performance information compared to the years in which they were introduced, as shown in figure 8. Although one item, on the use of performance information to develop program strategy, was statistically significantly higher in 2013 relative to 2007 (an estimated 58 and 51 percent, respectively), the 2017 result (53 percent) does not represent a statistically significant change from either of those years. Another item, on the use of performance information to streamline programs to reduce duplicative activities, is statistically significantly lower relative to 2013, when it was introduced (from 44 to 33 percent in 2017). This is especially concerning because streamlining and reducing duplication are to be key parts of agencies’ reform plans. There is one area in the survey where we saw improvement: an estimated 46 percent of managers agreed to a great or very great extent that employees who report to them pay attention to their agency’s use of performance information in management decision making. That is statistically significantly higher relative to 2013 (40 percent), as well as when compared to when the item was introduced in 2007 (37 percent). For a new and related item in the 2017 survey that asked managers the amount of attention their employees pay to the use of performance information in decision making when compared to 3 years ago, we found an estimated 48 percent reported that employees pay about the same 33 percent reported that employees pay somewhat or a great deal more attention. In September 2005, we identified five practices that agencies can apply to enhance the use of performance information in their decision making and improve results: demonstrating management commitment; communicating performance information frequently and efficiently; improving the usefulness of performance information, such as by ensuring the accessibility of the information; developing the capacity to use performance information; and aligning agency-wide goals, objectives, and measures. Many of the requirements put in place by GPRAMA reinforce the importance of these practices. Our 2017 survey of federal managers includes a number of items related to these practices. However, the 2017 results suggest that managers have not effectively adopted them. In the following sections, we examine several of the practices to enhance the use of performance information and their related survey items further. In doing so, we also highlight a subset of six survey items related to these practices that, while separate from those in our use of performance information index, we found in September 2014 to have a statistically significant and positive relationship with it. The commitment of agency leaders to results-oriented management is critical to increased use of performance information for policy and program decisions. GPRAMA requires top leadership involvement in performance management, including leading data-driven performance reviews. However, we have previously reported that improvements are needed to strengthen leadership’s commitment to use performance information, as discussed in the text box below. Department of Defense Should Strengthen Leadership Responsibilities for Using Performance Information In January 2005, we designated the Department of Defense’s (DOD) approach to business transformation as high-risk because DOD had not taken the necessary steps to achieve and sustain business reform on a broad, strategic, department-wide, and integrated basis. In the February 2017 update to our High-Risk List, we found that DOD had taken some positive steps to improve its business transformation efforts.continuing to hold business function leaders accountable for diagnosing performance problems and identifying strategies for improvement, and leading regular DOD performance reviews regarding transformation goals and associated metrics and ensuring that business function leaders attend these reviews to facilitate problem solving. In July 2017, DOD officials told us that the department’s performance reviews have been put on hold until after the new Agency Strategic Plan is issued. We will review DOD’s updated Agency Strategic Plan when it is issued (expected in February 2018, as required by GPRAMA) to see if it addresses continuing to hold business function leaders accountable for diagnosing performance problems and identifying strategies for improvement. We will continue to monitor the status of these actions. GAO, High-Risk Series: Progress on Many High-Risk Areas, While Substantial Efforts Needed on Others, GAO-17-317 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 15, 2017). Results from our 2017 survey show no statistically significant difference relative to 2013 in managers’ perceptions of leaders’ and supervisors’ attention and commitment to the use of performance information. (See figure 9.) Three items are statistically significantly different from the years when they were introduced. Two items increased between 1997 and 2017: changes by management to my program(s) are based on results-oriented information (from an estimated 16 to 25 percent), and the individual I report to periodically reviews with me the outcomes of my program(s) (from 42 to 54 percent). For the third item, top leadership demonstrates a strong commitment to using performance information to guide decision making, results decreased from 49 percent in 2007 to 42 percent in 2017. New items in the 2017 survey show some improvement in management commitment to the use of performance information in decision making. An estimated 36 percent of federal managers reported that, when compared to 3 years ago, the individual they report to pays somewhat or a great deal more attention to the use of performance information in decision making, while 46 percent said they pay about the same amount of attention. Additionally, an estimated 21 percent of federal managers said that, when compared to 3 years ago, the head of their agency pays somewhat or a great deal more attention to the use of performance information in decision making, while 33 percent said they pay about the same amount of attention. Communicating performance information frequently and effectively throughout an agency can help to achieve the agency’s goals. GPRAMA includes requirements for communicating performance information, such as reporting progress updates for APGs at least quarterly. However, our prior work has found that some agencies could continue to improve in the communication of performance information, as illustrated by the example in the text box below. Department of Education (Education) Could Better Share Effective Practices across States in Grant Program Education awards 21st Century Community Learning Centers grants to states, which in turn competitively award funds to local organizations that use them to offer academic enrichment and other activities to improve students’ academic and behavioral outcomes. In April 2017, we found that states are experiencing substantial difficulty in sustaining their programs after 21st Century funding ends. We further found that Education was missing opportunities in its monitoring efforts to collect information on states’ strategies and practices for program sustainability—information that could be useful for sharing promising practices across states. We recommended that Education use the information it collects from its monitoring visits and ongoing interactions with states to share effective practices across states for sustaining their 21st Century programs once program funding ends. Education neither agreed nor disagreed with the recommendation but outlined steps it is taking to address it. We will continue to monitor progress on the implementation of this recommendation. There is no difference for two survey items on federal managers communicating performance information relative to 2013 or since those items were introduced in 2007. In 2017, we estimate that 44 percent of federal managers agreed to a great or very great extent that agency managers at their level effectively communicate performance information on a routine basis. In addition, 34 percent agreed to a great or very great extent that managers at their level use performance information to share effective program approaches with others. Our 2017 survey data also indicate that agencies may not be effectively communicating to their employees about contributions to CAP goals or progress toward achieving APGs. Of the estimated 54 percent of federal managers who indicated they were familiar with CAP goals, 23 percent reported that their agency has communicated to its employees on those goals to a great or very great extent. Of the 74 percent of federal managers who indicated familiarity with APGs, 44 percent reported that their agency has communicated on progress toward achieving those goals to great or very great extent. Our prior work has shown that agencies should consider users’ differing needs—for accessibility, accuracy, completeness, consistency, ease of use, timeliness, and validity, among others things—to ensure that performance information will be both useful and used. GPRAMA introduced several requirements that could help to address aspects of usefulness, such as requiring agencies to disclose more information about the accuracy and validity of their performance data and actions to address limitations to the data. However, agencies face challenges in ensuring their performance information is useful, with one instance from our past work described in the text box below. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Could Improve Usefulness of Information in Planned Grantee Portal EPA monitors performance reports and program-specific data from grantees to ensure that grants achieve environmental and other program results. However, in July 2016, we found that EPA’s 2014 internal analysis of its grants management business processes identified improvements that, if implemented into EPA’s planned web-based portal, could improve the accessibility and usefulness of information in grantee performance reports for EPA, grantees, and other users. We recommended, among other actions, that EPA incorporate expanded search capability features, such as keyword searches, into its proposed web- based portal for collecting and accessing performance reports to improve their accessibility. EPA agreed with our recommendation but stated that it is a long- term initiative, subject to the agency’s budget process and replacement of its existing grants management system. As of May 2017, EPA officials said that they have not begun work on the web-based portal project, which is subject to the availability of funds. Federal managers generally responded similarly in 2017 on a variety of survey items related to usefulness, relative to earlier surveys. On a broadly worded item, less than half of managers agreed to a great or very great extent that agency managers at their level take steps to ensure that performance information is useful and appropriate. At an estimated 43 percent in 2017, this represents no statistically significant change compared to our last surveys in 2013 or 2007, when the item was introduced. Responses to four survey items indicate no changes in hindrances related to the usefulness of performance information. There is no statistically significant change in managers reporting hindrances compared to 1997 or 2013, as shown in figure 10. In addition, there was a statistically significant increase when compared to 2013 on only one of six items about managers’ views on the usefulness of performance information, as shown in figure 11. As the figure shows, approximately one-third to half of managers agreed to a great or very great extent on each item related to the usefulness of performance information. Although less than half of managers reported having sufficient information on validity of performance data used to make decisions, this represents a statistically significant increase to an estimated 42 percent in 2017 compared to 36 percent in 2013, and from 28 percent in 2000, when this item was introduced. This is a notable improvement because our September 2014 report found that the strongest driver of the use of performance information was whether federal managers had confidence in its validity. Our analysis suggests that easy access to performance information is related to the effective communication of performance information. Of the estimated 49 percent of federal managers in 2017 who agreed to a great or very great extent that performance information is easily accessible to managers at their level, 63 percent also agreed that agency managers at their level effectively communicate performance information on a routine basis to a great or very great extent. Conversely, of the 20 percent that agreed to a small or no extent that performance information is easily accessible to managers at their level, 12 percent also agreed that agency managers at their level effectively communicate performance information on a routine basis to a great or very great extent. Our prior work has shown that building capacity—including analytical tools and staff expertise—is critical to using performance information in a meaningful manner. GPRAMA lays out specific requirements that reinforce the importance of staff capacity to use performance information. GPRAMA directed the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) to take certain actions to support agency hiring and training of performance management staff. Specifically, by January 2012, OPM was to identify skills and competencies needed by government personnel for setting goals, evaluating programs, and analyzing and using performance information for improving government efficiency and effectiveness. By January 2013, OPM was to incorporate these skills and competencies into relevant position classifications and to work with each agency to incorporate the identified skills into employee training. In April 2013, we found that OPM had completed its work on the first two responsibilities and taken steps to work with agencies to incorporate performance management staff competencies into training. However, OPM did not assess competency gaps among agency performance management staff to inform its work. Without this information, OPM, working with the PIC, was not well-positioned to focus on the most- needed resources and help other agencies use them. We recommended that the Director of OPM, in coordination with the PIC and the Chief Learning Officer Council, work with agencies to take the following three actions: 1. Identify competency areas needing improvement within agencies. 2. Identify agency training that focuses on needed performance management competencies. 3. Share information about available agency training on competency areas needing improvement. In July 2017, PIC staff stated they have not focused on identifying competency areas because the competencies do not resonate strongly with the performance community. Instead, staff said they identified a need for introductory training on performance management, which they have developed and piloted. They said that they are not sure when they will implement the training, since the PIC is reviewing priorities with its new executive director. We continue to believe that identifying the competency areas would be useful, and will monitor the PIC’s efforts to identify and share training. The need for performance management training is further highlighted by our survey results. Our 2017 survey shows no statistically significant change in managers’ responses about the availability of training on various performance management activities relative to 2013, including the use of performance information to make decisions. However, the response to each of the six questions related to specific training is statistically significantly higher relative to the year in which it was introduced, as shown in figure 12. Similarly, in 2017 there was no statistically significant change on four survey items related to agencies’ analysis and evaluation tools and staff’s skills and competencies when compared to 2013 or when these items were introduced. We estimate that in 2017 29 percent of managers agreed to a great or very great extent that their agencies were investing in resources to improve the agencies’ capacity to use performance information; 28 percent of managers agreed to a great or very great extent that their agencies were investing the resources needed to ensure that performance data are of sufficient quality; 33 percent of managers reported that they agreed to a great or very great extent that their agencies have sufficient analytical tools for managers at their levels to collect, analyze, and use performance information; and 33 percent of managers reported that they agree to a great or very great extent that the programs they are involved with have sufficient staff with the knowledge and skills needed to analyze performance information. Performance reviews can serve as a strategy to bring leadership and other responsible parties together to review performance information and identify important opportunities to drive performance improvements. Our prior work has examined how different types of performance reviews—strategic reviews, data-driven reviews, and retrospective regulatory reviews—can contribute to agencies assessing progress toward desired results. Strategic reviews: As previously mentioned, in implementing GPRAMA, OMB established a review process in which agencies are to annually assess their progress in achieving each strategic objective in their strategic plans, known as strategic reviews. Given the long-term and complex nature of many outcomes, the strategic review should be informed by a variety of evidence regarding the implementation of strategies and their effectiveness in achieving outcomes. OMB’s guidance states that the strategic review process should consider multiple perspectives and sources of evidence to understand the progress made on each strategic objective. It further states that the results of these reviews should inform many of the decision-making processes at the agency, as well as decision making by the agency’s stakeholders, in areas such as long-term strategy, budget formulation, and risk management. In 2017, agencies are completing their fourth round of these reviews. Our prior work has identified ways in which agencies can effectively conduct these reviews and leverage the results that come from them. In July 2015, we identified seven practices federal agencies can employ to facilitate effective strategic reviews. (See sidebar.) In addition, earlier this month we reported on selected agencies’ experiences in implementing these reviews. Specifically, we found that (1) strategic reviews helped direct leadership attention to progress on strategic objectives, (2) agencies used existing management and performance processes to conduct the reviews, and (3) agencies refined their reviews by capturing lessons learned. Data-driven reviews: GPRAMA requires agencies to review progress toward APGs at least once a quarter. The Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs report accompanying the bill that would become GPRAMA stated that this approach is aimed at increasing the use of performance information to improve performance and results. In February 2013, we identified nine leading practices to promote successful data-driven performance reviews in the federal government. (See sidebar.) In July 2015, we found that most of the 24 CFO Act agencies were conducting their reviews in line with GPRAMA requirements and our leading practices. Moreover, agencies reported that their data-driven performance reviews had positive effects on progress toward agency goals, collaboration between agency officials, the ability to hold officials accountable for progress, and efforts to improve the efficiency of operations. Our 2017 survey shows that federal managers remain largely unfamiliar with their agency’s data-driven performance reviews, also known as quarterly performance reviews (QPRs). An estimated 35 percent of managers reported familiarity with their agency’s QPRs. Survey results show that a greater percentage of Senior Executive Service (SES) managers than non-SES managers reported that they were familiar with QPRs. Approximately 50 percent of SES managers reported being somewhat or very familiar with QPRs; 34 percent of non-SES reported the same. However, for the estimated 35 percent of managers who reported familiarity with QPRs, the more they viewed their programs being subject to a QPR, the more likely they were to report their agency’s QPRs were driving results and conducted in line with our leading practices. Figure 13 shows several illustrative examples of these survey items. For example, of the estimated 48 percent of federal managers who reported their programs being subject to QPRs to a great or very great extent, 83 percent also reported their agencies use QPRs to identify problems or opportunities associated with agency performance goals. Conversely, for the 24 percent of managers who reported their programs were subject to QPRs to a small or no extent, 22 percent also reported the reviews were used for these purposes to a great or very great extent. Being subject to a QPR is also positively related to viewing QPRs as having led to similar meetings at lower levels. An estimated 62 percent of federal managers who reported being subject to QPRs to a great or very great extent also reported their agencies have similar meetings at lower levels to a great or very great extent. An estimated 16 percent of federal managers subject to QPRs to a small or no extent reported the same. Despite the reported benefits of and results achieved through QPRs, as found by our past work and survey data, these reviews are not necessarily widespread. GPRAMA requires agencies to conduct QPRs for APGs, which represent a small subset of goals—generally 2 to 8 priority goals at each designated agency, with approximately 100 total government-wide. Moreover, these required reviews are at the department (or major independent agency) level. These reasons may explain why most managers reported they were not familiar with the reviews. As was described previously, our 2017 survey data show that the reported use of performance information in decision making generally has not improved and in some cases is lower than it was 20 years ago. Survey data also show that managers generally have not reported increases in their employment of practices that further promote the use of performance information in decision making. This suggests that agencies could increase the use of performance information in decision making and the likelihood of achieving desired results by going beyond the specific GPRAMA requirements and expanding their use of data-driven performance reviews—in line with leading practices—to more broadly cover other agency-wide performance goals, as well as goals at lower levels within the agency. For example, such reviews at the program level could help inform the previously mentioned portfolio reviews required by the Program Management Improvement Accountability Act (PMIAA). We have already suggested expanding reviews to other performance goals. Our management agenda for the presidential and congressional transition includes a key action to expand the use of data-driven performance reviews to assess progress toward meeting agency performance goals. Our prior work has stated that although GPRAMA’s requirements apply at the agency-wide level, they can also serve as leading practices at other organizational levels, such as component agencies, offices, programs, and projects. In addition, federal internal control standards call for the design of appropriate control activities, such as top-level reviews of actual performance and reviews by management at the functional or activity level. The standards also recommend that management design control activities at the appropriate levels in the organizational structure. The July 2017 update to OMB’s guidance states that agency leaders, including various chief officer positions, are to conduct frequent data- driven reviews to drive improvements on various management functions. For example, the agency Chief Human Capital Officer is to conduct quarterly data-driven reviews (known as HRStat) to monitor the progress of human capital goals and measures contained in the human capital operating plan. Beyond these management areas, OMB’s guidance also states that agencies may expand quarterly progress reviews beyond APGs to include other goals and priorities. However, OMB’s guidance does not identify practices for agencies to expand the use of these reviews to other goals, such as other agency-wide performance goals or those at lower levels within the agency. As mentioned previously, one of the responsibilities of the Performance Improvement Council (PIC) is to facilitate the exchange among agencies of practices that have led to performance improvements within specific programs, agencies, or across agencies. By working with the PIC to identify and share among agencies practices to expand the use of data- driven reviews, OMB could help agencies increase the use of performance information in decision making and achieve results. Retrospective regulatory reviews: In retrospective reviews, agencies evaluate how existing regulations are working in practice and whether they are achieving expected outcomes. GPRAMA requires agencies to identify and assess how their various program activities and other activities, including regulations, contribute to APGs. However, in April 2014, we found that agencies reported mixed experiences linking retrospective analyses to APGs. We recommended that OMB strengthen these reviews by issuing guidance for agencies to take actions to ensure that contributions made by regulations toward achieving APGs are properly considered, and improve how retrospective regulatory reviews can be used to help inform assessments of progress toward these APGs. OMB staff agreed with this recommendation and stated that the agency was working on strategies to help facilitate agencies’ ability to use retrospective reviews to inform APGs. To that end, in April 2017, OMB issued guidance to agencies that, among other things, emphasized the importance of performance measures related to evaluating and improving the net benefits of their respective regulatory programs. OMB included explicit references to section 6 of Executive Order 13563, which directed agencies’ efforts to conduct retrospective regulatory reviews. Specifically, the updated guidance encourages agencies to establish and report “meaningful performance indicators and goals for the purpose of evaluating and improving the net benefits of their respective regulatory programs.” The guidance further states that agencies’ efforts to improve such net benefits may be conducted as part of developing agency strategic and performance plans and priority goals. In July 2017, OMB confirmed that the updated guidance was issued, in part, to address our April 2014 recommendation. For several years, OMB has encouraged agencies to expand their use of evidence—performance measures, program evaluation results, and other relevant data analytics and research studies—in budget, management, and policy decisions with the goal of improving government effectiveness. In particular, OMB has encouraged agencies to strengthen their program evaluations—systematic studies that use research methods to address specific questions about program performance. Evaluation is closely related to performance measurement and reporting. Evaluations can be designed to better isolate the causal impact of programs from other external economic or environmental conditions in order to assess a program’s effectiveness. Thus, an evaluation study can provide a valuable supplement to ongoing performance reporting by measuring results that are too difficult or expensive to assess annually, explaining the reasons why performance goals were not met, or assessing whether one approach is more effective than another. Despite the valuable insights and information that program evaluations can provide, we continue to find that most federal managers lack access to or awareness of such studies. Our 2017 survey shows that an estimated 40 percent of managers reported that an evaluation had been completed within the past 5 years of any program, operation, or project in which they were involved—comparable to the results in our 2013 survey, when questions about program evaluations were added. In recent years, OMB has encouraged agencies to explore evidence-based tools to strengthen agency and grantee evaluation capacity, consider the effectiveness of their programs, and foster innovation rooted in research and rigorous evaluation. During the past 2 years, we examined several of those tools, as described below. Pay for success: Also known as social impact bonds, pay for success is a contracting mechanism under which investors provide the capital the government uses to provide a social service. The government specifies performance outcomes in pay for success contracts and generally includes a requirement that a program’s impact be independently evaluated. The evaluators also are to regularly review performance data, while those managing and investing in a project focus on performance and accountability, as shown in the figure 14. In September 2015, we found that the federal government’s involvement in pay for success had been limited. In addition, a formal mechanism for federal agencies to collaborate on pay for success did not exist. We concluded that, given the evolving nature of pay for success, a mechanism for federal agencies to collaborate would increase access to leading practices. We therefore recommended that OMB establish a formal means for federal agencies to collaborate on pay for success. OMB concurred and, in February 2016, announced that it had developed the Pay for Success Interagency Learning Network with representatives from 10 federal agencies to share lessons, hone policy, and strengthen implementation. Tiered evidence grants: Tiered evidence grants seek to incorporate evidence of effectiveness into grant making. Federal agencies establish tiers of grant funding based on the level of evidence grantees provide on their approaches to deliver social, educational, health, or other services. (See figure 15.) Smaller awards are used to test new and innovative approaches, while larger awards are used to scale up approaches that have strong evidence of effectiveness. This creates incentives for grantees to use approaches supported by evidence and helps them build the capacity to conduct evaluations. In September 2016, we found that interagency collaboration had helped federal agencies that administer tiered evidence grants address challenges and share lessons learned. At that time, such collaborative efforts relied on informal networks. We recommended that OMB establish a formal means for agencies to collaborate on tiered evidence grants. OMB had no comment on the recommendation. In July 2017, OMB staff told us that they had established an interagency working group and other mechanisms to facilitate collaboration and disseminate information on tiered evidence grants. Performance partnerships: Performance partnerships allow federal agencies to provide grant recipients flexibility in how they use funding across two or more programs along with additional flexibilities. In exchange, the recipient commits to improve and assess progress toward agreed-upon outcomes. Figure 16 provides an overview of the performance partnership model. In April 2017, we examined two performance partnership initiatives authorized by Congress: the Environmental Protection Agency’s Performance Partnership Grants and the Performance Partnership Pilots for Disconnected Youth, which allows funding from multiple programs across multiple agencies to be combined into pilot programs serving disconnected youth. For the Performance Partnership Pilots for Disconnected Youth, we found that the agencies involved in the initiative had not fully identified the key financial and staff resources each agency would need to contribute over the lifetime of the initiative in line with leading practices for interagency collaboration. This was because agencies primarily had been focused on meeting near-term needs to support design and implementation. We also found that agencies had not developed criteria to help determine whether, how, and when to implement the flexibilities tested by the pilots in a broader context. (This is known as scalability.) Officials involved in the pilots told us it was too early in pilot implementation to determine such criteria. However, by not identifying these criteria while designing the pilots, they were risking not collecting needed data during pilot implementation. We recommended that OMB coordinate with federal agencies to identify (1) agency resource contributions needed for the lifetime of the pilots and (2) criteria and related data for assessing scalability. OMB neither agreed nor disagreed with these recommendations. We continue to monitor progress on these recommendations. In 2003, we identified nine key practices for effective performance management that collectively create a “line of sight” between individual performance and organizational success. (See sidebar on next page.) Our recent work and the results of our 2017 survey of federal managers highlight areas where agencies have made progress but could take additional action to better reflect several of these practices, thereby better instilling results-oriented cultures. Align individual performance expectations with organizational goals: Our 2003 report found that high-performing organizations use their performance management systems to help individuals see the connection between their daily activities and organizational goals. The executive branch has taken several steps to link individual and organizational results. For example, in October 2000, OPM issued guidance to link SES performance expectations with GPRA-required goals. In January 2012, OPM and OMB released a government-wide SES performance appraisal system that provided agencies with a standard framework to manage the performance of SES members. However, our work continues to identify areas for improvement. Goal leaders and deputy goal leaders are responsible for achieving APGs, but our July 2014 review found that the performance plans for a sample of goal and deputy goal leaders generally did not link their individual performance and the broader goal. We recommended that OMB ensure that those plans demonstrate a clear connection with APGs. OMB staff generally agreed with our recommendation. In July 2017, OMB staff stated that components of both OMB and OPM guidance support accountability for agency priority goals. Despite this, we continue to believe that ensuring an explicit connection in performance plans to APGs will improve accountability, and that additional action is needed to do so. In May 2016, we found that the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) had not aligned Federal Disaster Recovery Coordinators’ performance expectations with its organizational goals for implementing the National Disaster Recovery Framework. We concluded that without this linkage, FEMA could not evaluate how effectively the coordinators performed in implementing the framework. We recommended that FEMA align performance expectations consistent with leading practices. The Department of Homeland Security concurred with our recommendation. In July 2017, FEMA stated that it is preparing the Field Leader Manual, which will define the core competencies and duties of coordinators. We will continue to monitor FEMA’s actions to implement this recommendation. Our 2017 survey also shows that this linkage could be improved for other federal employees. An estimated 58 percent of federal managers reported using performance information to a great or very great extent in setting expectations for employees they manage or supervise. The 2017 responses do not represent a statistically significant change when compared to our last survey in 2013 (62 percent) or to 1997 (61 percent), the year this survey item was introduced. Address organizational priorities: Our prior work showed that, by requiring and tracking follow-up actions on performance gaps, high- performing organizations underscore the importance of holding individuals accountable for making progress on their priorities. Our past and 2017 surveys have identified differences in responses between SES and non-SES managers reporting being held accountable for results. For example, in 2017, our survey results indicate that there was a statistically significant difference between SES and non-SES managers reporting to a great or very great extent that they were held accountable for results of the programs for which they are responsible. However, our 2017 survey shows no change compared to our last survey in either SES or non-SES managers reporting they were held accountable for results. There are statistically significant increases when compared to 1997, when these survey items were introduced. For example, an estimated 79 percent of SES managers and 64 percent of non-SES managers reported being held accountable to a great or very great extent for results of the programs for which they are responsible in 2017. This does not represent a statistically significant change from our 2013 survey (80 percent and 67 percent, respectively), but it is statistically significantly higher than the 62 percent of SES managers and 54 percent of non-SES managers in 1997. (See figure 17.) Similarly, as shown in figure 18, an estimated 71 percent of SES managers reported being held accountable to a great or very great extent for accomplishing agency strategic goals in 2017. This represents no statistical change since 2013 (73 percent), but it is a statistically significant increase compared to when this item was introduced in 2003 (61 percent). Additionally, as figure 18 shows, a gap between being held accountable for strategic goals and having the decision-making authority needed to help accomplish those goals has nearly closed, due to an increase in the latter survey item. The estimated 69 percent of SES managers who reported having such authority to a great or very great extent in 2017 is a statistically significant increase relative to both 2013 (61 percent) and 1997 (51 percent). As noted earlier, GPRAMA requires goal leaders for CAP goals and APGs. Our past work has generally found that they are in place. GPRAMA also requires agencies to identify an agency official responsible for resolving major management challenges, which can help ensure accountability. (See sidebar.) However, in June 2016 we found that 17 of the 24 CFO Act agencies had not identified an agency official responsible for resolving each of their challenges, partly because OMB guidance was not clear that major management challenges should be identified in agency performance plans. We recommended that the 17 agencies identify such officials in their performance plans, and that OMB clarify its guidance. OMB revised its guidance accordingly in July 2016, and, as of July 2017, 7 of the 17 agencies had identified officials responsible for resolving major management challenges. Link pay to individual and organizational performance: High- performing organizations seek to create pay, incentive, and reward systems that clearly link employee knowledge, skills, and contributions to organizational results. Our work has found that agencies have made progress in this area. For example, in July 2013, we found that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) lacked mechanisms to monitor how supervisors used its performance management system to recognize and reward performance. To help enhance the credibility of SEC’s performance management system, we recommended that it create mechanisms to monitor how supervisors use the performance management system. In a subsequent (December 2016) report, we found that, in response to our recommendation, SEC began monitoring how supervisors provide feedback, recognize and reward staff, and address poor performance. However, federal managers generally reported no change on three items related to recognizing and rewarding employee performance since our last survey in 2013 (figure 19). One of those items—managers agreeing to a great or very great extent that employees in their agency receive positive recognition for helping the agency to accomplish its strategic goals—had a statistically significant increase between 1997 and 2017 (from an estimated 26 percent to 46 percent). Make meaningful distinctions in performance: Effective performance management requires the organization’s leadership to meaningfully distinguish between acceptable and outstanding performance of individuals and to appropriately reward those who perform at the highest level. For example, in January 2015, we found disparities in performance ratings for SES among agencies. Across the 24 CFO Act agencies, the percent of SES rated at the highest level ranged from about 22 percent to 95 percent in fiscal year 2013. To help address these disparities, we recommended that the Director of OPM consider the need to refine the performance certifications guidelines addressing distinctions in performance. To address this recommendation, OPM informed us, in June 2015, that it had convened a cross-agency working group that developed a standard template for agencies to complete and post on a website to more transparently justify their SES ratings distributions. In May 2016, we found that about 74 percent of non-SES employees under a five-level appraisal system—the most commonly used system— were rated in the top two of five performance categories in 2013. We explored this issue further in our December 2016 review of human capital challenges at the Veterans Health Administration (VHA), which illustrates the importance of making meaningful distinctions in performance for non- SES employees. We found that in fiscal year 2014, about 73 percent of VHA employees were rated in the top two of five performance categories. This may have been due, in part, to a policy that did not require standards to be defined for each level of performance. We recommended that VHA ensure that meaningful distinctions are being made in employee performance ratings by reviewing and revising performance management policies consistent with leading practices, among other actions. The Department of Veterans Affairs partially concurred with our recommendation. In May 2017, the department stated that it had begun piloting a new performance management process and would analyze results at the end of fiscal year 2017. One key aspect of connecting daily operations to results is aligning program performance measures to agency-wide goals and objectives. However, in 2017, an estimated 50 percent of federal managers agreed to a great or very great extent that managers at their level took steps to create such an alignment. There has been no statistically significant change since this item was introduced in 2007. In addition, GPRAMA calls for agencies to develop a balanced set of performance measures, which reinforces the need for agencies to have a variety of measures across program areas. Our 2017 survey shows that managers have not reported any difference in the availability of performance measures for their programs when compared to the 2013 results. However, the 2017 result (an estimated 87 percent) represents a statistically significant increase when compared to 1997 (76 percent). When asked about the availability of certain types of performance measures, three of the five types (outcome, output, and efficiency) were statistically significantly higher in 2017 when compared to our initial 1997 survey. However, when comparing 2017 results to those in 2013, two of the five types (output and quality) showed a statistically significant decrease, and the other types did not change. These are illustrated in figure 20. Beyond the survey results, our work has found that some agencies had not developed or used outcome measures, but have taken steps to do so. Agencies have been responsible for measuring program outcomes since GPRA was enacted in 1993. The text box below describes two illustrative examples from our past work. Examples of Agencies That Did Not Develop or Use Outcome Measures Patient access to electronic health information: In March 2017, we found that the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) had invested over $35 billion since 2009 to enhance patient access to electronic health information, among other things. HHS had not developed outcome measures to gauge the effectiveness of these efforts, which meant the department did not have information to determine whether the efforts were contributing to its overall goals. We recommended that HHS develop relevant outcome measures and HHS concurred. Safety interventions: According to the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA), between 2011 and 2015, over 4,000 people died in crashes involving motor carriers each year. GAO, Motor Carriers: Better Information Needed to Assess Effectiveness and Efficiency of Safety Interventions, GAO-17-49 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 27, 2016). Further OMB actions could also help agencies make progress in measuring the performance of different program types. In our June 2013 report on initial GPRAMA implementation, we found that agencies experienced common issues in measuring the performance of various types of programs, such as contracts and grants. We recommended that OMB work with the PIC to develop a detailed approach to examine those difficulties. Although they took some actions, OMB and the PIC have not yet developed a comprehensive and detailed approach to address these issues. We concluded that, without such an approach, it would be difficult for the PIC and agencies to fully understand these measurement issues and develop a crosscutting approach to help address them. In August 2017, OMB staff stated that efforts related to the future implementation of the Program Management Improvement Accountability Act (PMIAA) could help address this recommendation. As highlighted in table 1, our work continues to show why it is important for OMB and the PIC to take actions to more fully address our recommendation. Congress has passed legislation to increase the transparency and accessibility of federal performance and financial data. For example, GPRAMA modernized agency reporting requirements to ensure that they make timely, relevant data available to inform decision making by Congress and agency officials as well as improve transparency for the public. Results of our 2017 survey, however, show the need for improvements in the public availability of agency performance information. An estimated 17 percent of managers reported that their agency’s performance information is easily accessible to the public to a great or very great extent, the same percentage as in 2013. Moreover, of the 87 percent of managers that reported there are performance measures for the programs they are involved in, 25 percent reported that they use information obtained from performance measurement when informing the public about how programs are performing to a great or very great extent. This is not statistically different from the 30 percent estimated in 2013. The DATA Act, enacted in 2014, built on previous transparency legislation by expanding what federal agencies are required to report regarding their spending. The act significantly increases the types of data that must be reported, requires government-wide data standards, and regular reviews of data quality to help improve the transparency and accountability of federal spending data. OMB provides websites and guidance to make agency performance and financial information available to the public; however, our prior work has identified a number of areas related to Performance.gov and the DATA Act where OMB action is needed to improve the transparency and accessibility of this information. Performance.gov: Since 2013, our work has identified a number of issues with Performance.gov, the website intended to serve as a central source of information on the federal government’s goals and performance. Over time, we have recommended that OMB take a number of specific actions to improve the website. For example, in June 2013, we found that the website offered an inconsistent user experience and presented accessibility and navigation challenges. To clarify the purpose of the website and enhance its usability, we recommended that OMB take steps to systematically collect customer input. In August 2016, we reported that OMB was not meeting all of the reporting requirements for Performance.gov, and did not have a plan to develop and improve the website. We recommended that OMB ensure that information presented on Performance.gov consistently complies with reporting requirements and develop a plan for the website that includes, among other things, a customer outreach plan. OMB agreed with these recommendations and, in July 2017, OMB staff informed us that they will be partnering with a vendor to redesign Performance.gov to improve the accessibility of information on the website. To inform this redesign, OMB staff said that they will consider our previous recommendations and plan to engage a wide group of stakeholders, including Congress, agency staff, and interested members of the public and outside organizations. OMB staff anticipated releasing updated agency reporting guidance in the fall of 2017 and the redesigned website in February 2018. Under GPRAMA, OMB is required to make available, through Performance.gov, quarterly updates on progress toward CAP goals and APGs. As described earlier, in June 2017 OMB announced that reporting to Performance.gov has been discontinued through the end of fiscal year 2017 as agencies develop new priority goals. However, Performance.gov does not state that it will not be updated, nor does it provide the location of the final progress updates for these goals. OMB’s guidance states that agencies should report the results of progress on their previous APGs in their annual performance reports for fiscal year 2017. Moreover, OMB staff told us that the existing updates on Performance.gov for CAP goals, last updated in December 2016, represent the final updates on those goals, although they are not labeled as such on the website. As a result, those interested in progress updates and reported results for the previous priority goals may not know where they will be able to find this information, limiting the transparency and accessibility of those results for decision makers and the public. DATA Act: The DATA Act requires federal agencies to disclose their spending and link this to program activities so that policymakers and the public can more effectively track federal spending. The act has the potential to improve the accuracy and transparency of federal spending information and increase its usefulness for government decision making and oversight. Since the DATA Act became law, OMB and Treasury have taken significant steps to make more complete and accurate federal spending data available. These have included standardizing data element definitions to make it easier to compare different federal agencies’ financial information, and issuing guidance to help agencies submit required data. In May 2017, federal agencies started to report data under the standardized definitions developed under the act. We have made a number of recommendations to address challenges that could affect the consistency and quality of the data. Addressing these recommendations could help ensure that financial data are provided to the public in a transparent and useful manner. For example, in January 2016, we found some standardized data element definitions were imprecise or ambiguous, which could result in inconsistent or potentially misleading reporting. We recommended that OMB provide agencies with additional guidance to address potential issues with the clarity, consistency, and quality of reported data. OMB released guidance in May and November 2016, but in April 2017 we found that additional guidance was needed to help agencies implement certain data definitions to produce data that would be consistent and comparable across agencies. We are in the process of examining the quality of the data that was submitted by agencies in May 2017 and was made available to the public on an early version of the USAspending.gov website. We expect to issue the results of this work in fall 2017. Our past work also identified a number of actions agencies need to take to make performance information more transparent. Increasing the accessibility of this information could enhance oversight and accountability of agency performance and results. CAP goals: In May 2016, we found that while selected CAP goal teams were working to develop performance measures to track progress, they were not consistently reporting on their efforts to develop these measures. We recommended that OMB report on Performance.gov the actions that CAP goal teams are taking to develop performance measures and quarterly targets to help ensure that measures are aligned with major activities, and ensure that it is possible to track teams’ progress toward establishing measures. While OMB agreed with this recommendation, it did not address it before reporting on the CAP goals was discontinued, as discussed earlier. Customer service standards: As we described earlier, in 2017, an estimated 48 percent of federal managers that indicated they have performance measures for the programs they are involved in also agreed to a great or very great extent that they have customer service performance measures. There has been no statistically significant change relative to our last survey in 2013, or the initial survey in 1997. Relatedly, in October 2014, we reviewed customer service standards at five federal agencies. Customer service standards inform customers about what they have a right to expect when they request services, and the standards should include goals for the quality and timeliness of a service an agency provides to its customers. They should also be easily available to the public so that customers know what to expect, when to expect it, and from whom. In our review of standards at five agencies, however, we found that only Customs and Border Protection had standards that were easily available to the public. We recommended the other four agencies—the United States Forest Service, Federal Student Aid, the National Park Service (NPS), and the Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA)—make their standards more easily accessible to the public. As of July 2017, only VBA had done so. Major management challenges: In June 2016, we found that 14 of the 24 CFO Act agencies did not describe their major management challenges in their performance plans, as required by GPRAMA. Furthermore, 22 of the 24 agencies reviewed did not report complete performance information for each of their major management challenges, including performance goals, milestones, indicators, and planned actions that they have developed to address such challenges. As a result, it was not always transparent what these agencies considered to be their major management challenges or how they planned to resolve these challenges. We recommended that the 22 agencies describe their major management challenges in their agency performance plans and include goals, measures, milestones, and information on planned actions and responsible officials. As of August 2017, 8 agencies—the U.S. Agency for International Development, Small Business Administration, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, OPM, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and the Departments of Education, State, and Veterans Affairs—had fully implemented our recommendations; the other 14 agencies had not. Quality of performance information: In September 2015, we found that six selected agencies reported limited information on the actions they are taking to ensure the quality of their performance information for selected APGs, as required by GPRAMA. We recommended that all six of the agencies work with OMB to fully report this information. In response, the Department of Homeland Security and NASA described how they ensure reliable performance information is reported to external audiences. As of June 2017, the Departments of Agriculture, Defense, the Interior, and Labor had not yet taken actions to address this recommendation by providing more specific explanations of how they ensure reliable performance information is reported for their APGs. Unnecessary reports: GPRAMA requires that OMB guide an annual review of agencies’ plans and reports for Congress and include in the President’s budget a list of those plans and reports determined to be outdated or duplicative. However, in July 2017, we found that OMB did not implement the report review process on an annual basis, as required. We also found that OMB published the list of agency plans and reports on Performance.gov, rather than in the President’s annual budget, where they may be more visible and useful to congressional decision makers and others. Therefore, we recommended that OMB instruct agencies to identify outdated or duplicative reports on an annual basis and submit or reference the list of identified plans and reports with the President’s annual budget. OMB agreed with these recommendations. In July 2017, OMB stated it would include a list of report modification proposals in the President’s fiscal year 2019 budget as required by GPRAMA. For all of the unimplemented recommendations described above, we will continue to monitor agencies’ actions. In addition to providing access to performance and financial information, federal agencies can directly engage and collaborate with citizens, nonprofits, academic institutions, and other levels of government using open innovation strategies. Open innovation involves using various tools and approaches to harness the ideas, expertise, and resources of those outside an organization to address an issue or achieve specific goals. In October 2016, we found that in recent years agencies had frequently used five open innovation strategies—singularly or in combination—to collaborate with citizens and encourage their participation in agency initiatives. (See figure 21.) Our October 2016 report found that agencies can use these strategies for a variety of purposes. To develop new ideas, solutions to specific problems, or new products: For example, from April 2015 to November 2016, the Department of Energy held a prize competition to create more efficient devices that would double the energy captured from ocean waves. According to the competition’s website, the winning team achieved a five-fold improvement. To enhance collaboration and agency capacity by leveraging external resources, knowledge, and expertise: For example, every 2 years since 2009, the Federal Highway Administration has regularly engaged stakeholders to identify and implement innovative ideas that have measurably improved the execution of highway construction projects. To collect the perspectives and preferences of a broad group of citizens and external stakeholders: For example, the Food and Drug Administration used in-person and online dialogue to engage outside stakeholders in the development of an online platform designed to make key datasets easily accessible to the public. Subsequently, in June 2017, we found that OMB, the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), and the General Services Administration (GSA) developed resources to support the use of open innovation strategies by federal agencies. These resources included guidance, staff to assist agencies in implementing initiatives, and websites to improve access to relevant information. For example, GSA developed a step-by-step implementation guide, program management team, and website to help agency staff carry out prize competitions and challenges. Agencies have also developed their own resources, including guidance, staff positions, and websites, to reach specific audiences and to provide tailored support for open innovation strategies they use frequently. For example, NASA’s Solve website provides a central location for the public to find the agency’s challenges and citizen science projects, as well as links to relevant resources. We also evaluated key government-wide guidance for the five strategies listed above to determine the extent to which the guidance reflects leading practices for effectively implementing open innovation initiatives. We identified these practices in our October 2016 report. We found that the guidance for each strategy reflected these practices to differing extents, as shown in figure 22. We made 22 recommendations to GSA, OMB, and OSTP to enhance the guidance. GSA and OMB generally agreed with these recommendations and OSTP neither agreed nor disagreed. We will monitor their progress toward implementing these recommendations. GPRAMA provides important tools that can help decision makers better achieve results and address the federal government’s significant and long-standing governance challenges. Although OMB and agencies have made progress in improving implementation of the act over the years, our work has highlighted numerous opportunities for further improvements. In 2017, OMB removed the priority designation of CAP goals and APGs. For those goals, this action stopped related data-driven reviews and quarterly updates of progress on Performance.gov until new priority goals are published next year. What OMB considers to be the final results of CAP goals for fiscal years 2014 to 2017 already are on Performance.gov (although not labeled as such). In addition, agencies may report on their former APGs in their annual fiscal year 2017 performance reports. However, Performance.gov does not state that it will not be updated or provide the location of the final progress updates for these goals, limiting transparency and its value to the public. OMB has stated its plans to restart implementation of those provisions in February 2018, with the start of a new goal cycle. We believe it is critical for OMB to do so, given the important role those tools play in addressing key governance challenges and the results we have seen in better managing crosscutting areas and driving performance improvements across the government. In addition, OMB has postponed implementation of the federal program inventory. To date, the inventory has only been developed once, in 2013, despite requirements for regular updates to reflect current budget and performance information. OMB has given a variety of reasons for the delays over the past 4 years—most recently, to determine the right strategy to merge implementation of the DATA Act and PMIAA with GPRAMA’s program inventory requirements. Although OMB staff told us that they expect to issue guidance by the end of 2018 to resume implementation of the program inventory requirements, they have not provided more specific time frames and milestones related to the program inventory requirements. Doing so would help agencies prepare for resumed implementation. Moreover, publicly disclosing planned implementation time frames and associated milestones would help ensure that interested stakeholders, such as federal decision makers and the public, are prepared to engage with agencies as they develop and update their program inventories, which in turn could help ensure the inventories meet stakeholders’ needs. A well-developed inventory would provide key program, budget, and performance information in one place to help federal decision makers better understand the federal investment and results in given policy areas, and better identify and manage fragmentation, overlap, and duplication. Information architecture offers one approach to developing an inventory. As OMB determines a strategy for implementing the program inventory and develops its guidance, considering such a systematic approach to planning, organizing, and developing the inventory that centers on maximizing the use and usefulness of information could help it ensure the inventory meets GPRAMA requirements as well as the needs of decision makers and the public. Moreover, such an approach could also help OMB implement our past recommendations related to the program inventory, which are intended to ensure the inventory provides more complete information and is useful to various stakeholders. Our survey of federal managers continues to generally show no improvement in their reported use of performance information in decision making, nor in the employment of practices that can enhance such use. One area where our survey data and past work show promise is through the use of regular, leadership-driven reviews of performance data at agencies, especially when conducted in line with related leading practices. However, GPRAMA only requires these data-driven reviews for APGs, which represent a small subset of goals, both within individual agencies as well as across the government. This is probably why most federal managers were not familiar with the reviews. Identifying and sharing practices for expanding the use of those reviews—such as for additional agency-wide performance goals and at lower levels within agencies—could significantly enhance the use of performance information and drive to better and greater results. We are making the following four recommendations to OMB: The Director of OMB should update Performance.gov to explain that quarterly reporting on the fiscal year 2014 through 2017 CAP goals and fiscal year 2016 and 2017 APGs was suspended, and provide the location of final progress updates for these goals. (Recommendation 1) The Director of OMB should revise and publicly issue OMB guidance— through an update to its Circular No. A-11, a memorandum, or other means—to provide time frames and associated milestones for implementing the federal program inventory. (Recommendation 2) The Director of OMB should consider—as OMB determines its strategy for resumed implementation of the federal program inventory—using a systematic approach, such as the information architecture framework, to help ensure that GPRAMA requirements and our past recommendations for the inventory are addressed. (Recommendation 3) The Director of OMB should work with the Performance Improvement Council to identify and share among agencies practices for expanding the use of data-driven performance reviews beyond APGs, such as for other performance goals and at lower levels within agencies, that have led to performance improvements. (Recommendation 4) We provided a draft of this report to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget for review and comment. In comments provided orally and via email, OMB staff agreed with the recommendations in this report. OMB staff also asked us to (1) consider revising the draft title of the report, to better reflect progress in GPRAMA implementation, and (2) clarify our recommendations on issuing guidance for implementing the federal program inventory and expanding the use of data-driven performance reviews, by describing possible actions that could be taken to implement them. We agreed and made revisions accordingly. We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional committees, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and other interested parties. This report will also be available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-6806 or mihmj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of our report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix III. The GPRA Modernization Act (GPRAMA) includes a statutory provision for us to periodically evaluate implementation of the act. Since 2012, we have issued over 30 products in response to this provision; this is the third summary report. This report assesses how implementation of GPRAMA has affected the federal government’s progress in resolving key governance challenges in (1) addressing crosscutting issues, (2) ensuring performance information is useful and used in decision making, (3) aligning daily operations with results, and (4) building a more transparent and open government. We reviewed relevant statutory requirements, related Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance, and our recent work related to GPRAMA implementation and the four key governance challenges included in our reporting objectives. Specifically, since our last summary report in September 2015, we examined various aspects of GPRAMA implementation in 12 products that covered 35 agencies, including the 24 agencies covered under the Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act of 1990, as amended (identified in table 2). We interviewed OMB and Performance Improvement Council staff to obtain (1) their perspectives on GPRAMA implementation and progress on the four governance challenges, and (2) updates on the status of our past recommendations. We also received updates from other agencies on the status of our past recommendations to them related to GPRAMA implementation. To supplement this review, we administered our periodic survey of federal managers on organizational performance and management issues from November 2016 through March 2017. This survey is comparable to five previous surveys we conducted in 1997, 2000, 2003, 2007, and 2013. We selected a stratified random sample of 4,395 people from a population of approximately 153,779 mid-level and upper-level civilian managers and supervisors working in the 24 executive branch agencies covered by the CFO Act, as shown in table 2. We obtained the sample from the Office of Personnel Management’s (OPM) Enterprise Human Resources Integration (EHRI) database as of September 30, 2015, which was the most recent fiscal year data available at the time. We used file designators indicating performance of managerial and supervisory functions. In reporting survey data, we use the term “government-wide” and the phrases “across the government” or “overall” to refer to the 24 CFO Act executive branch agencies. We use the terms “federal managers” and “managers” to collectively refer to both managers and supervisors. We designed the questionnaire to obtain the observations and perceptions of respondents on various aspects of results-oriented management topics. These topics include the presence and use of performance measures, any hindrances to measuring performance and using performance information, agency climate, and program evaluation use. To assess implementation of GPRAMA, the questionnaire included questions to collect respondents’ views on various provisions of GPRAMA, such as cross-agency priority goals, agency priority goals, and related quarterly performance reviews. Similar to the five previous surveys, the sample was stratified by agency and by whether the manager or supervisor was a member of the Senior Executive Service (SES). The management levels covered general schedule (GS) or equivalent schedules at levels comparable to GS-13 through GS-15 and career SES or equivalent. Stratifying the sample in this way ensured that the population from which we sampled covered at least 90 percent of all mid- to upper-level managers and supervisors at the departments and agencies we surveyed. Most of the items on the questionnaire were closed-ended, meaning that depending on the particular item, respondents could choose one or more response categories or rate the strength of their perception on a 5-point extent scale ranging from “no extent” to “very great extent.” On most items, respondents also had an option of choosing the response category “no basis to judge/not applicable.” A few items had other options, such as “yes,” “no,” or “do not know,” or a 3-point familiarity scale (“not familiar,” “somewhat familiar,” and “very familiar”). We asked many of the items on the questionnaire in our earlier surveys, though we introduced a number of new items in 2013, including the sections about GPRAMA and program evaluations. For 2017, we added a new question on use of performance information (question 12) and a new question on program evaluation (question 24). Before administering the survey, questions were reviewed by our staff, including subject matter experts, a survey specialist, and a research methodologist. We also conducted pretests of the new questions with federal managers in several of the 24 CFO Act agencies. We changed the wording of subquestions or added clarifying examples based on pretester feedback. To administer the survey, we e-mailed managers in the sample to notify them of the survey’s availability on our website and we included instructions on how to access and complete the survey. To follow up with managers in the sample who did not respond to the initial notice, we emailed or called multiple times to encourage survey participation or provide technical assistance, as appropriate. Similar to our last survey, we worked with OPM to obtain the names of the managers and supervisors in our sample, except for those within selected subcomponents whose names were withheld from the EHRI database. Since Foreign Service officials from the Department of State (State) are not in the EHRI database, we drew a sample for that group with the assistance from State. We worked with officials at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) to gain access to these individuals to maintain continuity of the population of managers surveyed from previous years. The Department of Justice (DOJ) was concerned about providing identifying information (e.g., names, e-mail addresses, and phone numbers) of federal agents to us, so we administered the current survey to DOJ managers in our sample through DOJ officials. To identify the sample of managers whose names were withheld from the EHRI database, we provided DOJ with the last four digits of Social Security numbers, the subcomponent, duty location, and pay grade information. To ensure that DOJ managers received the same survey administration process as the rest of the managers in our sample to the extent possible, we provided DOJ with text for the survey activation and reminder e-mails similar to ones we emailed to managers at other agencies. DOJ administered the survey to these managers and emailed them one reminder to complete the survey. To help determine the reliability and accuracy of the EHRI data elements used to draw our sample of federal managers, we checked the data for reasonableness and the presence of any obvious or potential errors in accuracy and completeness and reviewed past analyses of the reliability of this database. For example, we identified cases where the managers’ names were withheld and contacted OPM to discuss this issue. We also checked the names of the managers in our selected sample provided by OPM with the applicable agency contacts to verify these managers were still employed with the agency. We noted discrepancies when they occurred and excluded them from our population of interest, as applicable. On the basis of these procedures, we believe the data we used from the EHRI database are sufficiently reliable for the purpose of the survey. Of the 4,395 managers selected for the 2017 survey, we found that 388 of the sampled managers had retired, separated, or otherwise left the agency or had some other reason that excluded them from the population of interest. These exclusions included managers that the agency could not locate, and therefore we were unable to request that they participate in the survey. We received usable questionnaires from 2,726 sample respondents, for a weighted response rate of about 67 percent of the remaining eligible sample. The weighted response rate across 23 of the 24 agencies ranged from 57 percent to 82 percent, while DOJ had a weighted response rate of 36 percent. See the supplemental material for each agency’s response rate. We conducted a nonresponse bias analysis using information from the survey and sampling frame as available. The analysis confirmed discrepancies in the tendency to respond to the survey related to agency and SES status. The analysis also revealed some differences in response propensity by age and GS level; however, the direction and magnitude of the differences on these factors were not consistent across agencies or strata. Our data may be subject to bias from unmeasured sources for which we cannot control. Results, and in particular estimates from agencies with low response rates such as DOJ, should be interpreted with caution because these estimates are associated with a higher level of uncertainty. The overall survey results are generalizable to the government-wide population of managers as described above. The responses of each eligible sample member who provided a usable questionnaire were weighted in the analyses to statistically account for all members of the population. All results are subject to some uncertainty or sampling error as well as nonsampling error, including the potential for nonresponse bias as noted above. Because we followed a probability procedure based on random selections, our sample is only one of a large number of samples that we might have drawn. The magnitude of sampling error will vary across the particular surveys, groups, or items being compared because we (1) used complex survey designs that differed in the underlying sample sizes, usable sample respondents, and associated variances of estimates, and (2) conducted different types of statistical analyses. For example, the 2000 and 2007 surveys were designed to produce agency-level estimates and had effective sample sizes of 2,510 and 2,943, respectively. However, the 1997 and 2003 surveys were designed to obtain government-wide estimates only, and their sample sizes were 905 and 503, respectively. Consequently, in some instances, a difference of a certain magnitude may be statistically significant. In other instances, depending on the nature of the comparison being made, a difference of equal or even greater magnitude may not achieve statistical significance. Because each sample could have provided different estimates, we express our confidence in the precision of our particular sample’s results as a 95 percent confidence interval. This is the interval that would contain the actual population value for 95 percent of the samples we could have drawn. The percentage estimates presented in this report based on our sample for the 2017 survey have 95 percent confidence intervals within plus or minus 5.5 percentage points of the estimate itself, unless otherwise noted. We also note in this report when we are 95 percent confident that changes from 1997 or 2013 relative to 2017 are statistically significant. Online supplemental material shows the questions asked on the survey along with the percentage estimates and associated 95 percent confidence intervals for each item for each agency and government-wide. In a few instances, we report estimates with larger margins of error because we deemed them reliable representations of given findings due to the statistical significance of larger differences between comparison groups. In all cases, we report the applicable margins of error. In addition to sampling errors, the practical difficulties of conducting any survey may also introduce other types of errors, commonly referred to as nonsampling errors. For example, difficulties in how a particular question is interpreted, in the sources of information available to respondents, or in how the data were entered into a database or analyzed can introduce unwanted variability into the survey results. With this survey, we took a number of steps to minimize these nonsampling errors. For example, our staff with subject matter expertise designed the questionnaire in collaboration with our survey specialists. As noted earlier, the new questions added to the survey were pretested to ensure they were relevant and clearly stated. When the data were analyzed, a second independent analyst on our staff verified the analysis programs to ensure the accuracy of the code and the appropriateness of the methods used for the computer-generated analysis. Since this was a web-based survey, respondents entered their answers directly into the electronic questionnaire, thereby eliminating the need to have the data keyed into a database, thus avoiding a source of data entry error. To supplement descriptive analysis of the survey questions, we generated an index to gauge government-wide use of performance information. The index, which was identical to one we reported in 2014, averaged manager’s responses to 11 questions deemed to relate to the concept of performance information use. The index runs from 1 (corresponding to an average value of “to no extent”) to 5 (corresponding to an average value of “to a very great extent”). We used Cronbach’s alpha to assess the internal consistency of the scale. Our government- wide index score weights each agency’s contribution equally, and provides a relative measure of the use of performance information over time rather than an absolute indicator of the government-wide level of use of performance information. We conducted this performance audit from January 2016 to September 2017 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and agencies have taken some actions to address our recommendations related to implementation of the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA); however, the majority of recommendations remain open. Since GPRAMA was enacted in January 2011, we have made 100 recommendations in 18 reports to OMB and agencies aimed at improving the act’s implementation (table 3). Of those 100, OMB and the agencies have implemented 42 recommendations. Fifty-eight recommendations require additional action. Nearly half (47) of our recommendations are directed to OMB. For the 23 recommendations that OMB has implemented, many represent revisions to guidance to better reflect GPRAMA’s requirements or to enhance implementation. Many of the 24 recommendations to OMB that are not implemented deal with long-standing or complex challenges, on which OMB has taken limited action to date. Of those, we have designated 3 as priorities for OMB to address. Agencies have also taken some action on our recommendations, implementing 19 of the 53 recommendations we have made. The following tables present each of the 100 recommendations along with a summary of actions taken to address it. Tables 4 and 5 provide information about our recommendations to OMB that are implemented and not implemented, respectively. Tables 6 and 7 provide information about our recommendations to other agencies that are implemented and not implemented, respectively. In addition to the above contact, Benjamin T. Licht (Assistant Director) and Shannon Finnegan (Assistant Director) supervised this review and the development of the resulting report. Leah Q. Nash (Assistant Director), Elizabeth Fan (Analyst-in-Charge), and Adam Miles (Analyst-in- Charge) supervised the development and administration of the Federal Managers Survey and the resulting supplemental material. Peter Beck, Valerie Caracelli, Karin Fangman, Steven Flint, Robert Gebhart, Ricky Harrison Jr., John Hussey, Jill Lacey, Won Lee, Krista Loose, Meredith Moles, Anna Maria Ortiz, Steven Putansu, Alan Rozzi, Cindy Saunders, Stephanie Shipman, Shane Spencer, Andrew J. Stephens, and Brian Wanlass also made key contributions. Ann Czapiewski and Donna Miller developed the graphics for this report. John Ahern, Divya Bali, Jeff DeMarco, Alexandra Edwards, Ellen Grady, Jyoti Gupta, Erinn L. Sauer, and Katherine Wulff verified the information presented in this report. Managing for Results: Implementation of GPRA Modernization Act Has Yielded Mixed Progress in Addressing Pressing Governance Challenges. GAO-15-819. Washington, D.C.: September 30, 2015. Managing For Results: Executive Branch Should More Fully Implement the GPRA Modernization Act to Address Pressing Governance Challenges. GAO-13-518. Washington, D.C.: June 26, 2013. Supplemental Material for GAO-17-775: 2017 Survey of Federal Managers on Organizational Performance and Management Issues. GAO-17-776SP. Washington, D.C.: September 29, 2017. Program Evaluation: Annual Agency-wide Plans Could Enhance Leadership Support for Program Evaluations. GAO-17-743. Washington, D.C.: September 29, 2017. Managing for Results: Agencies’ Trends in the Use of Performance Information to Make Decisions. GAO-14-747. Washington, D.C.: September 26, 2014. Managing for Results: Executive Branch Should More Fully Implement the GPRA Modernization Act to Address Pressing Governance Challenges. GAO-13-518. Washington, D.C.: June 26, 2013. Managing for Results: 2013 Federal Managers Survey on Organizational Performance and Management Issues, an E-supplement to GAO-13-518. GAO-13-519SP. Washington, D.C.: June 26, 2013. Program Evaluation: Strategies to Facilitate Agencies’ Use of Evaluation in Program Management and Policy Making. GAO-13-570. Washington, D.C.: June 26, 2013. Government Performance: Lessons Learned for the Next Administration on Using Performance Information to Improve Results. GAO-08-1026T. Washington, D.C.: July 24, 2008. Government Performance: 2007 Federal Managers Survey on Performance and Management Issues, an E-supplement to GAO-08-1026T. GAO-08-1036SP. Washington, D.C.: July 24, 2008. Results-Oriented Government: GPRA Has Established a Solid Foundation for Achieving Greater Results. GAO-04-38. Washington, D.C.: March 10, 2004. Managing for Results: Federal Managers’ Views on Key Management Issues Vary Widely Across Agencies. GAO-01-592. Washington, D.C.: May 25, 2001. Managing for Results: Federal Managers’ Views Show Need for Ensuring Top Leadership Skills. GAO-01-127. Washington, D.C.: October 20, 2000. The Government Performance and Results Act: 1997 Governmentwide Implementation Will Be Uneven. GAO/GGD-97-109. Washington, D.C.: June 2, 1997. Federal Programs: Information Architecture Offers a Potential Approach for Inventory Development. GAO-17-739. Washington, D.C.: September 28, 2017. Managing for Results: Selected Agencies’ Experiences in Implementing Strategic Reviews. GAO-17-740R. Washington, D.C.: September 7, 2017. Federal Reports: OMB and Agencies Should More Fully Implement the Process to Streamline Reporting Requirements. GAO-17-616. Washington, D.C.: July 14, 2017. Open Innovation: Executive Branch Developed Resources to Support Implementation, but Guidance Could Better Reflect Leading Practices. GAO-17-507. Washington, D.C.: June 8, 2017. Performance Partnerships: Agencies Need to Better Identify Resource Contributions to Sustain Disconnected Youth Pilot Programs and Data to Assess Pilot Results. GAO-17-208. Washington, D.C.: April 18, 2017. Open Innovation: Practices to Engage Citizens and Effectively Implement Federal Initiatives. GAO-17-14. Washington, D.C.: October 13, 2016. Tiered Evidence Grants: Opportunities Exist to Share Lessons from Early Implementation and Inform Future Federal Efforts. GAO-16-818. Washington, D.C.: September 21, 2016. Performance.gov: Long-Term Strategy Needed to Improve Website Usability. GAO-16-693. Washington, D.C.: August 30, 2016. Tax Expenditures: Opportunities Exist to Use Budgeting and Agency Performance Processes to Increase Oversight. GAO-16-622. Washington, D.C.: July 7, 2016. Managing for Results: Agencies Need to Fully Identify and Report Major Management Challenges and Actions to Resolve them in their Agency Performance Plans. GAO-16-510. Washington, D.C.: June 15, 2016. Managing for Results: OMB Improved Implementation of Cross-Agency Priority Goals, But Could Be More Transparent About Measuring Progress. GAO-16-509. Washington, D.C.: May 20, 2016. Managing for Results: Greater Transparency Needed in Public Reporting on the Quality of Performance Information for Selected Agencies’ Priority Goals. GAO-15-788. Washington, D.C.: September 10, 2015. Pay for Success: Collaboration among Federal Agencies Would Be Helpful as Governments Explore New Financing Mechanisms. GAO-15-646. Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2015. Managing for Results: Practices for Effective Agency Strategic Reviews. GAO-15-602. Washington, D.C.: July 29, 2015. Managing for Results: Agencies Report Positive Effects of Data-Driven Reviews on Performance but Some Should Strengthen Practices. GAO-15-579. Washington, D.C.: July 7, 2015. Program Evaluation: Some Agencies Reported that Networking, Hiring, and Involving Program Staff Help Build Capacity. GAO-15-25. Washington, D.C.: November 13, 2014. Government Efficiency and Effectiveness: Inconsistent Definitions and Information Limit the Usefulness of Federal Program Inventories. GAO-15-83. Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2014. Managing for Results: Selected Agencies Need to Take Additional Efforts to Improve Customer Service. GAO-15-84. Washington, D.C.: October 24, 2014. Managing for Results: Enhanced Goal Leader Accountability and Collaboration Could Further Improve Agency Performance. GAO-14-639. Washington, D.C.: July 22, 2014. Managing for Results: OMB Should Strengthen Reviews of Cross-Agency Goals. GAO-14-526. Washington, D.C.: June 10, 2014. Managing for Results: Implementation Approaches Used to Enhance Collaboration in Interagency Groups. GAO-14-220. Washington, D.C.: February 14, 2014. Managing for Results: Leading Practices Should Guide the Continued Development of Performance.gov. GAO-13-517. Washington, D.C.: June 6, 2013. Managing for Results: Agencies Should More Fully Develop Priority Goals under the GPRA Modernization Act. GAO-13-174. Washington, D.C.: April 19, 2013. Managing for Results: Agencies Have Elevated Performance Management Roles, but Additional Training Is Needed. GAO-13-356. Washington, D.C.: April 16, 2013. Managing for Results: Data-Driven Performance Reviews Show Promise But Agencies Should Explore How to Involve Other Relevant Agencies. GAO-13-228. Washington, D.C.: February 27, 2013. Managing for Results: A Guide for Using the GPRA Modernization Act to Help Inform Congressional Decision Making. GAO-12-621SP. Washington, D.C.: June 15, 2012. Managing for Results: GAO’s Work Related to the Interim Crosscutting Priority Goals under the GPRA Modernization Act. GAO-12-620R. Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2012. Managing for Results: Opportunities for Congress to Address Government Performance Issues. GAO-12-215R. Washington, D.C.: December 9, 2011.	[ "Full implementation of GPRAMA could facilitate efforts to reform the federal government and make it more effective. GPRAMA includes a provision for GAO to review the act's implementation. This report assesses how GPRAMA implementation has affected the federal government's progress in resolving key governance challenges in (1) addressing cross-cutting issues, (2) ensuring performance information is useful and used, (3) aligning daily operations with results, and (4) building a more transparent and open government. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed statutory requirements, OMB guidance, and GAO's recent work related to GPRAMA implementation and the key governance challenges. GAO also interviewed OMB staff and surveyed a stratified random sample of 4,395 federal managers from 24 agencies on various performance and management topics. With a 67 percent response rate, the survey results are generalizable to the government-wide population of managers. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and agencies have made some progress in more fully implementing the GPRA Modernization Act (GPRAMA), but GAO's work and 2017 survey of federal managers highlight numerous areas where improvements are needed. Cross-cutting issues: Various GPRAMA provisions are aimed at addressing cross-cutting issues, such as cross-agency and agency priority goals and related data-driven reviews of progress towards those goals. To ensure alignment with the current administration's priorities, OMB's 2017 guidance removed the priority status of those goals, which stopped quarterly data-driven reviews and related public progress reports until new goals are published. OMB plans to resume implementation of these provisions in February 2018. GPRAMA also requires OMB and agencies to implement an inventory of federal programs, which could help decision makers better identify and manage fragmentation, overlap, and duplication. OMB and agencies implemented the inventory once, in May 2013. In October 2014, GAO found several issues limited the usefulness of that inventory. Since then, OMB has postponed updating the inventory, citing among other reasons the passage of subsequent laws. OMB has yet to develop a systematic approach for resuming implementation of the inventory and specific time frames for doing so. A systematic approach to developing the inventory could help ensure it provides useful information for decision makers and the public. Performance information: Survey results show federal managers generally reported no improvements in their use of performance information in decision making for various management activities, or practices that can enhance such use, since GAO's 2013 survey. For example, the use of performance information to streamline programs to reduce duplicative activities (an estimated 33 percent in 2017) is statistically significantly lower relative to 2013 (44 percent). In contrast, managers who were familiar with and whose programs were subject to quarterly data-driven reviews reported that those reviews were used to make progress toward agency priority goals. Identifying and sharing practices to expand the use of such reviews—for other performance goals and at lower levels within agencies—could lead to increased use of performance information. Daily operations: Agencies have made progress in developing results-oriented cultures but need to take additional actions. GAO's past work found that high-performing organizations use performance management systems to help individuals connect their daily activities to organizational goals. In 2017, about half of federal managers reported using performance information when setting expectations with employees (no change from GAO's last survey in 2013). Transparent and open government: GAO's past work identified a number of needed improvements to Performance.gov, the central government-wide website required by GPRAMA. The site is to provide quarterly updates on priority goals in effect through September 2017, but those updates stopped in December 2016. According to OMB, the existing information for cross-agency priority goals is the final update, and agencies should publish final updates on their priority goals in annual performance reports. Performance.gov does not provide users with this information, thereby limiting the transparency and accessibility of those results. In addition to following through on plans to resume implementation of key GPRAMA provisions, GAO recommends that OMB (1) consider a systematic approach to developing the program inventory, (2) revise guidance to provide specific time frames for inventory implementation, (3) identify and share practices for expanding the use of data-driven reviews, and (4) update Performance.gov to explain that reporting on priority goals was suspended and provide the location of final progress updates. OMB staff agreed with these recommendations." ]	20,579	gov_report	en	null	fb70e010d41eb638eb5a92f57ae858347858b41f986857fc
From its headwaters in Colorado and Wyoming to its terminus in the Gulf of California, the Colorado River Basin covers more than 246,000 square miles. The river runs through seven U.S. states (Wyoming, Colorado, Utah, New Mexico, Arizona, Nevada, and California) and Mexico. Pursuant to federal law, the Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation, part of the Department of the Interior [DOI]) plays a prominent role in the management of the basin's waters. In the Lower Basin (i.e., Arizona, Nevada, and California), Reclamation also serves as water master on behalf of the Secretary of the Interior, a role that elevates the status of the federal government in basin water management. The federal role in the management of Colorado River water is magnified by the multiple federally owned and operated water storage and conveyance facilities in the basin, which provide low-cost water and hydropower supplies to water users. Colorado River water is used primarily for agricultural irrigation and municipal and industrial (M&I) purposes. The river's flow and stored water also are important for power production, fish and wildlife, and recreation, among other uses. A majority (70%) of basin water supplies are used to irrigate 5.5 million acres of land; basin waters also provide M&I water supplies to nearly 40 million people. Much of the area that depends on the river for water supplies is outside of the drainage area for the Colorado River Basin. Storage and conveyance facilities on the Colorado River provide trans-basin diversions that serve areas such as Cheyenne, WY; multiple cities in Colorado's Front Range (e.g., Fort Collins, Denver, Boulder, and Colorado Springs, CO); Provo, UT; Albuquerque and Santa Fe, NM; and Los Angeles, San Diego, and the Imperial Valley in Southern California ( Figure 1 ). Colorado River hydropower facilities can provide up to 42 gigawatts of electrical power per year. The river also provides habitat for a wide range of species, including several federally endangered species. It flows through 7 national wildlife refuges and 11 National Park Service (NPS) units; these and other areas of the river support important recreational opportunities. Precipitation and runoff in the basin are highly variable. Water conditions on the river depend largely on snowmelt in the basin's northern areas. Observed data (1906-2018) show that natural flows in the Colorado River Basin in the 20 th century averaged about 14.8 million acre-feet (MAF) annually. Flows have dipped significantly during the current drought, which dates to 2000; natural flows from 2000 to 2018 averaged approximately 12.4 MAF per year . In 2018, Reclamation estimated that the 19-year period from 2000 to 2018 was the driest period in more than 100 years of record keeping. The dry conditions are consistent with prior droughts in the basin that were identified through tree ring studies; some of these droughts lasted for decades. Climate change impacts, including warmer temperatures and altered precipitation patterns, may further increase the likelihood of prolonged drought in the basin. Pursuant to the multiple compacts, federal laws, court decisions and decrees, contracts, and regulatory guidelines governing Colorado River operations (collectively known as the Law of the River ), Congress and the federal government play a prominent role in the management of the Colorado River. Specifically, Congress funds and oversees Reclamation's management of Colorado River Basin facilities, including facility operations and programs to protect and restore endangered species. Congress has also approved and continues to actively consider Indian water rights settlements involving Colorado River waters, and development of new and expanded water storage in the basin. In addition, Congress has approved funding to mitigate drought and stretch basin water supplies and has considered new authorities for Reclamation to combat drought and enter into agreements with states and Colorado River contractors. This report provides background on management of the Colorado River, including a discussion of trends and agreements since 2000. It also discusses the congressional role in the management of basin waters. In the latter part of the 19 th century, interested parties in the Colorado River Basin began to recognize that local interests alone could not solve the challenges associated with development of the Colorado River. Plans conceived by parties in California's Imperial Valley to divert water from the mainstream of the Colorado River were thwarted because these proposals were subject to the sovereignty of both the United States and Mexico. The river also presented engineering challenges, such as deep canyons and erratic water flows, and economic hurdles that prevented local or state groups from building the necessary storage facilities and canals to provide an adequate water supply. Because local or state groups could not resolve these "national problems," Congress considered ideas to control the Colorado River and resolve potential conflicts between the states. Thus, in an effort to resolve these conflicts and prevent litigation, Congress gave its consent for the states and Reclamation to enter into an agreement to apportion Colorado River water supplies in 1921. The below sections discuss the resulting agreement, the Colorado River Compact, and other documents and agreements that form the basis of the Law of the River, which governs Colorado River operations. The Colorado River Compact of 1922, negotiated by the seven basin states and the federal government, was signed by all but one basin state (Arizona). Under the compact, the states established a framework to apportion the water supplies between the Upper Basin and the Lower Basin, with the dividing line between the two basins at Lee Ferry, AZ, near the Utah border. Each basin was apportioned 7.5 MAF annually for beneficial consumptive use, and the Lower Basin was given the right to increase its beneficial consumptive use by an additional 1 MAF annually. The agreement also required Upper Basin states to deliver to the Lower Basin a total of 75 MAF over each 10-year period, thus allowing for averaging over time to make up for low-flow years. The compact did not address inter- or intrastate allocations of water (which it left to future agreements and legislation), nor did it address water to be made available to Mexico, the river's natural terminus; this matter was addressed in subsequent international agreements. The compact was not to become binding until it had been approved by the legislatures of each of the signatory states and by Congress. Congress approved and modified the Colorado River Compact in the Boulder Canyon Project Act (BCPA) of 1928. The act ratified the 1922 compact, authorized the construction of a federal facility to impound water in the Lower Basin (Boulder Dam, later renamed Hoover Dam) and related facilities to deliver water in Southern California (e.g., the All-American Canal, which delivers Colorado River water to California's Imperial Valley), and apportioned the Lower Basin's 7.5 MAF per year among the three Lower Basin states. It provided 4.4 MAF per year to California, 2.8 MAF to Arizona, and 300,000 acre-feet (AF) to Nevada, with the states to divide any surplus waters among them. It also directed the Secretary of the Interior to serve as the sole contracting authority for Colorado River water use in the Lower Basin and authorized several storage projects for study in the Upper Basin. Congress's approval of the compact in the BCPA was conditioned on a number of factors, including ratification by California and five other states (thereby allowing the compact to become effective without Arizona's concurrence), and California agreeing by act of its legislature to limit its water use to 4.4 MAF per year and not more than half of any surplus waters. California met this requirement by passing the California Limitation Act of March 4, 1929. Arizona did not ratify the Colorado River Compact until 1944, at which time the state began to pursue a federal project to bring Colorado River water to its primary population centers in Phoenix and Tucson. California opposed the project, arguing that under the doctrine of prior appropriation, California's historical use of the river trumped Arizona's rights to the Arizona allotment. California also argued that Colorado River apportionments under the BCPA included water developed on Colorado River tributaries, whereas Arizona claimed, among other things, that these apportionments included the river's mainstream waters only. In 1952, Arizona filed suit in the U.S. Supreme Court to settle the issue. Eleven years later, in the 1963 Arizona v. California decision, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of Arizona, finding that Congress had intended to apportion the mainstream of the Colorado River and that California and Arizona each would receive one-half of surplus flows. The same Supreme Court decision held that Section 5 of the BCPA controlled the apportionment of waters among Lower Basin States, and that the BCPA (and not the law of prior appropriation) controlled the apportionment of water among Lower Basin states. The ruling was notable for its directive to forgo traditional Reclamation deference to state law under the Reclamation Act of 1902, and formed the basis for the Secretary of the Interior's unique role as water master for the Lower Basin. The decision also held that Native American reservations on the Colorado River were entitled to priority under the BCPA. Later decrees by the Supreme Court in 1964 and 1979 supplemented the 1963 decision. Following the Arizona v. California decision, Congress eventually authorized Arizona's conveyance project for Colorado River water, the Central Arizona Project (CAP), in the Colorado River Basin Project Act of 1968 (CRBPA). As a condition for California's support of the project, Arizona agreed that, in the event of shortage conditions, California's 4.4 MAF has priority over CAP water supplies. In 1944, the United States signed a water treaty with Mexico (1944 U.S.-Mexico Water Treaty) to guide how the two countries share the waters of the Colorado River and the Rio Grande. The treaty established water allocations for the two countries and created a governance framework (the International Boundary and Water Commission) to resolve disputes arising from the treaty's execution. The treaty requires the United States to provide Mexico with 1.5 MAF of water annually, plus an additional 200,000 AF when a surplus is declared. During drought, the United States may reduce deliveries to Mexico in similar proportion to reductions of U.S. consumptive uses. The treaty has been supplemented by additional agreements between the United States and Mexico, known as m inutes . Projects originally authorized for study in the Upper Basin under BCPA were not allowed to move forward until the Upper Basin states determined their individual water allocations, which they did under the Upper Colorado River Basin Compact of 1948. The Upper Basin Compact established Colorado (where the largest share of runoff to the river originates) as the largest entitlement holder in the Upper Basin, with rights to 51.75% of any Upper Basin flows after Colorado River Compact obligations to the Lower Basin have been met. Other states also received percentage-based allocations, including Wyoming (14%), New Mexico (11.25%), and Utah (23%). Arizona was allocated 50,000 AF in addition to its Lower Basin apportionment, in recognition of the small portion of the state in the Upper Basin. Basin allocations by state following approval of the Upper Basin Compact (i.e., the allocations that generally guide current water deliveries) are shown below in Figure 2 . The Upper Basin Compact also established the Upper Colorado River Commission, which coordinates operations and positions among Upper Basin states. Subsequent federal legislation paved the way for development of Upper Basin allocations. The Colorado River Storage Project (CRSP) Act of 1956 authorized storage reservoirs and dams in the Upper Basin, including the Glen Canyon, Flaming Gorge, Navajo, and Curecanti Dams. The act also established the Upper Colorado River Basin Fund, which receives revenues collected in connection with the projects, to be made available for defraying the project's costs of operation, maintenance, and emergency expenditures. In addition to the aforementioned authorization of CAP in Arizona, the 1968 CRBPA amended CRSP to authorize several additional Upper Basin projects (e.g., the Animas La Plata and Central Utah projects) as CRSP participating projects. It also directed that the Secretary of the Interior propose operational criteria for Colorado River Storage Project units (including the releases of water from Lake Powell) that prioritize (1) Treaty Obligations to Mexico, (2) the Colorado River Compact requirement for the Upper Basin to deliver 75 MAF to Lower Basin states over any 10-year period, and (3) carryover storage to meet these needs. The CRBPA also established the Upper Colorado River Basin Fund and the Lower Colorado River Basin Development Fund, both of which were authorized to utilize revenues from power generation from relevant Upper and Lower Basin facilities to fund certain expenses in the sub-basins. Due to the basin's large water storage projects, basin water users are able to store as much as 60 MAF, or about four times the Colorado River's annual flows. Thus, storage and operations in the basin receive considerable attention, particularly at the basin's two largest dams and their storage reservoirs: Glen Canyon Dam/Lake Powell in the Upper Basin (26.2 MAF of storage capacity) and Hoover Dam/Lake Mead in the Lower Basin (26.1 MAF). The status of these projects is of interest to basin stakeholders and observers and is monitored closely by Reclamation. Glen Canyon Dam, completed in 1963, provides the linchpin for Upper Basin storage and regulates flows from the Upper Basin to the Lower Basin, pursuant to the Colorado River Compact. It also generates approximately 5 billion kilowatt hours (KWh) of electricity per year, which the Western Area Power Administration (WAPA) supplies to 5.8 million customers in Upper Basin States. Other significant storage in the Upper Basin includes the initial "units" of the CRSP: the Aspinall Unit in Colorado (including Blue Mesa, Crystal, and Morrow Point dams on the Gunnison River, with combined storage capacity of more than 1 MAF), the Flaming Gorge Unit in Utah (including Flaming Gorge Dam on the Green River, with a capacity of 3.78 MAF), and the Navajo Unit in New Mexico (including Navajo Dam on the San Juan River, with a capacity of 1 MAF). The Upper Basin is also home to 16 "participating" projects which are authorized to use water for irrigation, municipal and industrial uses, and other purposes. In the Lower Basin, Hoover Dam, completed in 1936, provides the majority of the Lower Basin's storage and generates about 4.2 billion KWh of electricity per year for customers in California, Arizona, and Nevada. Also important for Lower Basin Operations are Davis Dam/Lake Mohave, which regulates flows to Mexico under the 1944 Treaty, and Parker Dam/Lake Havasu, which impounds water for diversion into the Colorado River Aqueduct (thereby allowing for deliveries to urban areas in southern California) and CAP (allowing for diversion to users in Arizona). Further downstream on the Arizona/California border, Imperial Dam (a diversion dam) diverts Colorado River water to the All-American Canal for use in California's Imperial and Coachella Valleys. Reclamation monitors Colorado River reservoir levels and projects them 24 months into the future in monthly studies (called 24-month studies ). The studies take into account forecasted hydrology, reservoir operations, and diversion and consumptive use schedules to model a single scenario of reservoir conditions. The studies inform operating decisions by Reclamation looking one to two years into the future. They express water storage conditions at Lake Mead and Lake Powell in terms of elevation, as feet above mean sea level (ft). In addition to the 24-month studies, the CRBPA requires the Secretary to transmit to Congress and the governors of the basin states, by January 1 of each year, a report describing the actual operation for the preceding water year and the projected operation for the coming year. This report is commonly referred to as the annual operating plan (AOP). The AOP's projected January 1 water conditions for the upcoming calendar year establish a baseline for future annual operations. Since the adoption of guidelines by Reclamation and basin states in 2007 (see below section, " 2007 Interim Guidelines "), operations of the Hoover and Glen Canyon Dams have been tied to specific pool elevations at Lake Mead and Lake Powell. For Lake Mead, the first level of shortage (1 st Tier Shortage Condition), under which Arizona and Nevada's allocations would be decreased, would be triggered if Lake Mead falls below 1,075 ft. For Lake Powell, releases under tiered operations are based on storage levels in both Lake Powell and Lake Mead (specific delivery curtailments based on lake levels similar to Lake Mead have not been adopted). As of January 2019, Reclamation predicted that Lake Mead's 2019 elevation would remain above 1,075 ft (approximately 9.6 MAF of storage) and that Lake Powell would remain at its prior year level (i.e., the Upper Elevation Balancing Tier) during 2019. However, Reclamation also projected that there was a 69% chance of a 1 st Tier Shortage Condition at Lake Mead beginning in January 2020. Reclamation predicted a small (3%) chance of Lake Powell dropping to 3,490 feet, or minimum power pool (i.e., a level beyond which hydropower could not be generated) by 2020; the chance of this occurring by 2022 was greater (15%). Improved hydrology for 2019 may decrease the likelihood of shortage in the immediate future. Construction of most of the Colorado River's water supply infrastructure predated major federal environmental protection statutes, such as the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA; 42 U.S.C. §§4321 et seq. ) and the Endangered Species Act (ESA; 87 Stat. 884, 16 U.S.C. §§1531-1544). Thus, many of the environmental impacts associated with the development of basin resources were not originally taken into account. Over time, multiple efforts have been initiated to mitigate these effects. Some of the highest-profile efforts have been associated with water quality (in particular, salinity control) and the effects of facility operations on endangered species. Salinity and water quality are long-standing issues in the Colorado River Basin. Parts of the Upper Basin are covered by salt-bearing shale (which increases salt content in water inflows), and salinity content increases as the river flows downstream due to both natural leaching and return flows from agricultural irrigation. The 1944 U.S.-Mexico Water Treaty did not set water quality or salinity standards in the Colorado River Basin. However, after years of dispute between the United States and Mexico regarding the salinity of the water reaching Mexico's border, the two countries reached an agreement on August 30, 1973, with the signing of Minute 242 of the International Boundary and Water Commission. The agreement guarantees Mexico that the average salinity of its treaty deliveries will be no more than 115 parts per million higher than the salt content of the water diverted to the All-American Canal at Imperial Dam in Southern California. To control the salinity of Colorado River water in accordance with this agreement, Congress passed the Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Act of 1974 ( P.L. 93-320 ), which authorized desalting and salinity control facilities to improve Colorado River water quality. The most prominent of these facilities is the Yuma Desalting Plant, which was largely completed in 1992 but has never operated at capacity. In 1974, the seven basin states also established water quality standards for salinity through the Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Forum. Congress enacted the ESA in 1973. As basin species became listed in accordance with the act, federal agencies and nonfederal stakeholders consulted with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) to address the conservation of the listed species. As a result of these consultations, several major programs have been developed to protect and restore fish species on the Colorado River and its tributaries. Summaries of some of the key programs are below. The Upper Colorado Endangered Fish Recovery Program was established in 1988 to assist in the recovery of four species of endangered fish in the Upper Colorado River Basin. Congress authorized this program in P.L. 106-392 . The program is implemented through several stakeholders under a cooperative agreement signed by the governors of Colorado, Utah, and Wyoming; DOI; and the Administrator of WAPA. The recovery goals of the program are to reduce threats to species and improve their status so they are eventually delisted from the ESA. Some of the actions taken in the past include providing adequate instream flows for fish and their habitat, restoring habitat, reducing nonnative fish, augmenting fish populations with stocked fish, and conducting research and monitoring. Reclamation is the lead federal agency for the program and provides the majority of federal funds for implementation. It is also funded through a portion of Upper Basin hydropower revenues from WAPA; FWS; the states of Colorado, Wyoming, and Utah; and water users, among others. The San Juan River Basin Recovery Implementation Program was established in 1992 to assist in the recovery of ESA-listed fish species on the San Juan River, the Colorado's largest tributary. The program is concerned with the recovery of the Razorback sucker ( Xyrauchen texanus ) and Colorado pikeminnow ( Ptychocheilus Lucius ). Congress authorized this program in P.L. 106-392 with the aim to protect the genetic integrity and population of listed species, conserve and restore habitat (including water quality), reduce nonnative species, and monitor species. The Recovery Program is coordinated by FWS. Reclamation is responsible for operating the Animas-La Plata Project and Navajo Dam on the San Juan River in a way that reduces effects on the fish populations. The program is funded by a portion of revenues from power generation, Reclamation, participating states, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Recovery efforts for listed fish are coordinated with the Upper Colorado River Program discussed above. The Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Program was established in 1997 in response to a directive from Congress under the Grand Canyon Protection Act of 1992 ( P.L. 102-575 ) to operate Glen Canyon Dam "in such a manner as to protect, mitigate adverse impacts to, and improve the values for which Grand Canyon National Park and Glen Canyon National Recreation Area were established." This program uses experiments to determine how water flows affect natural resources south of the dam. Reclamation is in charge of modifying flows for experiments, and the U.S. Geological Survey conducts monitoring and other studies to evaluate the effects of the flows. The results are expected to better inform managers how to provide water deliveries and conserve species. The majority of program funding comes from hydropower revenues generated at Glen Canyon Dam. The MSCP is a multistakeholder initiative to conserve 27 species (8 listed under ESA) along the Lower Colorado River while maintaining water and power supplies for farmers, tribes, industries, and urban residents. The MSCP began in 2005 and is planned to last for at least 50 years. The MSCP was created through consultation under ESA. To achieve compliance under ESA, federal entities involved in managing water supplies in the Lower Colorado River met with resource agencies from Arizona, California, and Nevada; Native American Tribes; environmental groups; and recreation interests to develop a program to conserve species along a portion of the Colorado River. A biological opinion (BiOp) issued by the FWS in 1997 served as a basis for the program. Modifications to the 1997 BiOp were made in 2002, and in 2005, the BiOp was renewed for 50 years. Nonfederal entities received an incidental take permit under Section 10(a) of the ESA for their activities in 2005 and shortly thereafter implemented a habitat conservation plan. The objective of the MSCP is to create habitat for listed species, augment the populations of species listed under ESA, maintain current and future water diversions and power production, and abide by the incidental take authorizations for listed species under the ESA. The estimated total cost of the program over its lifetime is approximately $626 million in 2003 dollars ($882 million in 2018 dollars) and is to be split evenly between Reclamation (50%) and the states of California, Nevada, and Arizona (who collectively fund the remaining 50%). The management and implementation of the MSCP is the responsibility of Reclamation, in consultation with a steering committee of stakeholders. Twenty-two federally recognized tribes in the Colorado River Basin have quantified water diversion rights that have been confirmed by court decree or final settlement. These tribes collectively possess rights to 2.9 MAF per year of Colorado River water. However, as of 2015, these tribes typically were using just over half of their quantified rights. Additionally, 13 other basin tribes have reserved water rights claims that have yet to be resolved. Increased water use by tribes with existing water rights, and/or future settlement of claims and additional consumptive use of basin waters by other tribes, is likely to exacerbate the competition for basin water resources. The potential for increased use of tribal water rights (which, once ratified, are counted toward state-specific allocations where the tribal reservation is located) has been studied in recent years. In 2014, Reclamation, working with a group of 10 tribes with significant reserved water rights claims on the Colorado River, initiated a study known as the 10 Tribes Study . The study, published in 2018, estimated that, cumulatively, the 10 tribes could have reserved water rights (including unresolved claims) to divert nearly 2.8 MAF per year. Of these water rights, approximately 2 MAF per year were decreed and an additional 785,273 AF (mostly in the Upper Basin) remained unresolved. The report estimated that, overall, the 10 tribes are diverting (i.e., making use of) almost 1.5 MAF of their 2.8 MAF in resolved and unresolved claims. Table 1 shows these figures at the basin and sub-basin levels. According to the study, the majority of unresolved claims in the Upper Basin are associated with the Ute Tribe in Utah (370,370 AF per year), the Navajo Nation in Utah (314,926 AF), and the Navajo Nation in the Upper Basin in Arizona (77,049 AF). When the Colorado River Compact was originally approved, it was assumed based on the historical record that average annual flows on the river were 16.4 MAF per year. According to Reclamation data, from 1906 to 2018, observed natural flows on the river at Lee Ferry, AZ—the common point of measurement for observed basin flows—averaged 14.8 MAF annually. Natural flows from 2000 to 2018 (i.e., during the ongoing drought) averaged considerably less than that—12.4 MAF annually. While natural flows have trended down, consumptive use in the basin has grown and has regularly exceeded natural flows since 2000. From 1971 to 2015, average total consumptive use grew from 13 MAF to over 15 MAF annually. Combined, the two trends have caused a significant drawdown of basin storage levels ( Figure 3 ). From 2009 to 2015, the largest consumptive water use occurred in the Lower Basin (7.5 MAF per year), while Upper Basin consumptive use averaged about 3.8 MAF annually. Use of Treaty water by Mexico (1.5 MAF per year) and evaporative loss from reservoirs (approximately 2 MAF per year) in both basins also factored significantly into total basin consumptive use. Notably, consumptive use in the Lower Basin, combined with mandatory releases to Mexico, regularly exceeds the mandatory 8.23 MAF per year that must be released from the Upper Basin to the Lower Basin and Mexico pursuant to Reclamation requirements. This imbalance between Lower Basin inflows and use, known as the structural deficit , causes additional stress on basin storage. The current drought in the basin has included some of the lowest flows on record. According to Reclamation, the 19-year period from 2000 to 2018 was the driest period in more than 100 years of record keeping. Observers have pointed out that flows in some recent years have been lower than would be expected given the amount of precipitation that has occurred, and have noted that warmer temperatures appear to be a significant contributor to these diminished flows. Based on these and other observations, some have argued that Colorado River flows are unlikely to return to 20 th century averages, and that future water supply risk is high. A 2012 study by Reclamation projected a long-term imbalance in supply and demand in the Colorado River Basin. In the study, Reclamation noted that the basin had thus far avoided serious impacts on water supplies due to the significant storage within the system, coupled with the fact that some Upper Basin states have yet to fully develop the use of their allocations. However, Reclamation projected that in the coming half century, flows would decrease by an average of 9% at Lee Ferry and drought would increase in frequency and duration. At the same time, Reclamation projected that demand for basin water supplies would increase, with annual consumptive use projected to rise from 15 MAF to 18.1-20.4 MAF by 2050, depending on population growth. A range of 64%-76% of the growth in demand was expected to come from increased M&I demand. Reclamation's 2012 study also posited several potential ways to alleviate future shortages in the basin, such as alternative water supplies, demand management, drought action plans, water banking, and water transfer/markets. Some of these options already are being pursued. In particular, some states have become increasingly active in banking unused Colorado River surface water supplies, including through groundwater banks or storage of unused surface waters in Lake Mead (see below section, " 2007 Interim Guidelines "). Drought conditions throughout the basin have raised concerns about potential negative impacts on water supplies. Concerns center on uncertainty that might result if the Secretary of the Interior were to determine that a shortage condition exists in the Lower Basin, and that related curtailments were warranted. Some in Upper Basin States are also concerned about the potential for a c ompact call of Lower Basin states on Upper Basin states. Drought and other uncertainties related to water rights priorities (e.g., potential tribal water rights claims) spurred the development of several efforts that generally attempted to relieve pressure on basin water supplies, stabilize storage levels, and provide assurances of available water supplies. Some of the most prominent developments since the year 2000 (i.e., the beginning of the current drought) are discussed below. Prior to the 2003 QSA, California had been using approximately 5.2 MAF of Colorado River on average each year (with most of its excess water use attributed to urban areas). Under the QSA, an agreement between several California water districts and DOI, California agreed to reduce its use to the required 4.4 MAF under the Law of the River. It sought to accomplish this aim by quantifying Colorado River entitlement levels of several water contractors; authorizing efforts to conserve additional water supplies (e.g., the lining of the All-American Canal); and providing for several large-scale, long-term agriculture-to-urban water transfers. The QSA also committed the state to a path for restoration and mitigation related to the Salton Sea, a water body in Southern California that was historically sustained by Colorado River irrigation runoff from the Imperial and Coachella Valleys. A related agreement between Reclamation and the Lower Basin states, the Inadvertent Overrun and Payback Policy (IOPP), went into effect concurrently with the QSA in 2004. IOPP is an administrative mechanism that provides an accounting of inadvertent overruns in consumptive use compared to the annual entitlements of water users in the Lower Basin. These overruns must be "paid back" in the calendar year following the overruns, and the paybacks must be made only from "extraordinary conservation measures" above and beyond normal consumptive use. The 2004 Arizona Water Settlements Act ( P.L. 108-451 , AWSA) significantly altered the allocation of CAP water in Arizona and set the stage for some of the cutbacks in the state that are currently under discussion. It ratified three water rights settlements (one in each title) between the federal government and the State of Arizona, the Gila River Indian Community (GRIC), and the Tohono O'odham Nation, respectively. For the state and its CAP water users, the settlement resolved a final repayment cost for CAP by reducing the water users' reimbursable repayment obligation from about $2.3 billion to $1.65 billion. Additionally, Arizona agreed to new tribal and non-tribal allocations of CAP water so that approximately half of CAP's annual allotment would be available to Indian tribes in Arizona, at a higher priority than most other uses. The tribal communities were authorized to lease the water so long as the water remains within the state via the state's water banking authority. The act also authorized funds to cover the cost of infrastructure required to deliver the water to the Indian communities, much of it derived from power receipts accruing to the Lower Colorado River Basin Development Fund. Another significant development in the basin was the 2007 adoption of the Colorado River Interim Guidelines for Lower Basin Shortages and the Coordinated Operations for Lake Powell and Lake Mead (2007 Interim Guidelines). Development of the agreement began in 2005, when, in response to drought in the Southwest and the decline in basin water storage (and a record low point in Lake Powell of 33% active capacity), the Secretary of the Interior instructed Reclamation to develop coordinated strategies for Colorado River reservoir operations during drought or shortages. The resulting guidelines included criteria for releases from Lakes Mead and Powell determined by "trigger levels" in both reservoirs, as well as a schedule of Lower Basin curtailments at different operational tiers ( Table 2 ). Under the guidelines, Arizona and Nevada, which have junior rights to California, would face reduced allocations if Lake Mead elevations dropped below 1,075 ft. At the time, it was thought that the 2007 Guidelines would significantly reduce the risk of Lake Mead falling to 1,025 feet. The guidelines are considered "interim" because they were scheduled to expire in 20 years (i.e., at the end of 2026). The 2007 agreement also included for the first time a mechanism by which parties in the Lower Basin were able to store conserved water in Lake Mead, known as Intentionally Created Surplus (ICS). Reclamation accounts for this water annually, and the users storing the water may access the surplus in future years, in accordance with the Law of the River. From 2013 to 2017, the portion of Lake Mead water in storage that was classified as ICS ranged from a low of 711,864 AF in 2015 to a high of 1.261 MAF in 2017 ( Figure 4 ). In 2014, Reclamation and several major basin water supply agencies (Central Arizona Water Conservation District, Southern Nevada Water Authority, Metropolitan Water District of Southern California, and Denver Water) executed a memorandum of understanding to provide funding for voluntary conservation projects and reductions of water use. These activities had the goal of developing new system water , to be applied toward storage in Lake Mead, by the end of 2019. Congress formally authorized federal participation in these efforts in the Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2015 ( P.L. 113-235 , Division D ), with an initial sunset date for the authority at the end of FY2018. The Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2019 ( P.L. 115-244 , Division A ) extended the authority through the end of FY2022, with the stipulation that Upper Basin agreements could not proceed without the participation of the Upper Basin states through the Upper Colorado River Commission. As of mid-2018, Reclamation estimated that the program had resulted in a total of 194,000 AF of system water conserved. These savings were carried out through 64 projects conserving 47,000 AF in the Upper Basin and 11 projects conserving 147,000 AF in the Lower Basin. In 2017, the United States and Mexico signed Minute 323, which extended and replaced elements of a previous agreement, Minute 319, signed in 2012. Minute 323 included, among other things, options for Mexico to hold water in reserve in U.S. reservoirs for emergencies and water conservation efforts, as well as U.S. commitments for flows to support the ecological health of the Colorado River Delta. It also extended initial Mexican cutback commitments made under Minute 319 (which were similar in structure to the 2007 cutbacks negotiated for Lower Basin states) and established a Binational Water Scarcity Contingency Plan that included additional cutbacks that would be triggered if drought contingency plans (DCPs) are approved by U.S. basin states (see following section, " 2019 Drought Contingency Plans "). Ongoing drought conditions and the potential for water supply shortages prompted discussions and negotiations focused on how to conserve additional basin water supplies. After several years of negotiations, on March 19, 2019, Reclamation and the Colorado River Basin states finalized DCPs for both the Upper Basin and the Lower Basin. These plans required final authorization by Congress to be implemented. Following House and Senate hearings on the DCPs in early April, on April 16, 2019, Congress authorized the DCP agreements in the Colorado River Drought Contingency Plan Authorization Act ( P.L. 116-14 ). Each of the basin-level DCPs is discussed below in more detail. The Upper Basin DCP aims to protect against Lake Powell reaching critically low elevations; it also authorizes storage of conserved water in the Upper Basin that could help establish the foundation for a water use reduction effort (i.e., a "Demand Management Program") that may be developed in the future. Under the Upper Basin DCP, the Upper Basin states agree to operate system units to keep the surface of Lake Powell above 3,525 ft, which is 35 ft above the minimum elevation needed to run the dam's hydroelectric plant. Other large Upper Basin reservoirs (e.g., Navajo Reservoir, Blue Mesa Reservoir, and Flaming Gorge Reservoir) would be operated to protect the targeted Lake Powell elevation, potentially through drawdown of their own storage. If established by the states, an Upper Basin DCP Demand Management Program would likely entail willing seller/buyer agreements allowing for temporary paid reductions in water use that would provide for more storage volume in Lake Powell. Reclamation and other observers have stated their belief that these efforts will significantly decrease the risk of Lake Powell's elevation falling below 3,490 ft, an elevation at which significantly reduced hydropower generation is possible. The Lower Basin DCP is designed to require Arizona, California, and Nevada to curtail use and thereby contribute additional water to Lake Mead storage at predetermined "trigger" elevations, while also creating additional flexibility to incentivize voluntary conservation of water to be stored in Lake Mead, thereby increasing lake levels. Under the DCP, Nevada and Arizona (which were already set to have their supplies curtailed beginning at 1,075 ft under the 2007 Interim Guidelines) are to contribute additional supplies to maintain higher lake levels (i.e., beyond previous commitments). The reductions of supply would reach their maximums when reservoir levels drop below 1,045 ft. At the same time, the Lower Basin DCP would, for the first time, include commitments for delivery cutbacks by California. These cutbacks would begin with 200,000 AF (4.5%) in reductions at Lake Mead elevations of 1,040-1,045 ft, and would increase to as much as 350,000 AF (7.9%) at elevations of 1,025 ft or lower. The curtailments in the Lower Basin DCP are in addition to those agreed to under the 2007 Interim Guidelines and under Minute 323 with Mexico. Specific and cumulative reductions are shown in Table 2 . In addition to the state-level reductions, under the Lower Basin DCP, Reclamation also would agree to pursue efforts to add 100,000 AF or more of system water within the basin. Some of the largest and most controversial reductions under the Lower Basin DCP would occur in Arizona, where pursuant to previous changes under the 2004 AWSA, a large group of agricultural users would face major cutbacks to their CAP water supplies. Reclamation has noted that the Lower Basin DCP significantly decreases the chance of Lake Mead elevations falling below 1,020 ft, which would be a critically low level. Some parties have pointed out that although the DCP is unlikely to prevent a shortage from being declared at 1,075 ft, it would slow the rate at which the lake recedes thereafter. Combined with the commitments from Mexico, total planned cutbacks under shortage scenarios (i.e., all commitments to date, combined) would reduce Lower Basin consumptive use by 241,000 AF to 1.375 MAF per year, depending on Lake Mead's elevation. Although the DCPs and the related negotiations were widely praised, some expressed concerns related to the implementation of the DCPs as they relate to federal and state environmental laws. Most Colorado River contractors supported the agreements, but one major basin contractor, Imperial Irrigation District (IID, a major holder of Colorado River water rights in Southern California), did not approve the DCPs. IID has argued that the DCPs will further degrade the Salton Sea, a shrinking and ecologically degraded water body in southern California that relies on drainage flows from lands irrigated using Colorado River water. Following enactment of the DCPs, IID filed suit in state court alleging that state approval of the DCPs violated the California Environmental Quality Act. Others have questioned whether federal implementation of the DCPs without a new or supplemental Environmental Impact Statement might violate federal law, such as NEPA. The principal role of Congress as it relates to storage facilities on the Colorado River is funding and oversight of facility operations, construction, and programs to protect and restore endangered species (e.g., Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Program and the Upper Colorado River Endangered Fish Program). In the Upper Basin, Colorado River facilities include the 17 active participating units in the Colorado River Storage Projects, as well as the Navajo-Gallup Water Supply Project. In the Lower Basin, major facilities include the Salt River Project and Theodore Roosevelt Dam, Hoover Dam and All-American Canal, Yuma and Gila Projects, Parker-Davis Project, Central Arizona Project, and Robert B. Griffith Project (now Southern Nevada Water System). Congressional appropriations in support of Colorado River projects and programs typically account for a portion of overall project budgets. For example, the Lower Colorado Region's FY2017 operating budget was $517 million; $119.8 million of this total was provided by discretionary appropriations, and the remainder of funding came from power revenues (which are made available without further appropriation) and nonfederal partners. In recent years, Congress has also authorized and appropriated funding that has targeted the Colorado River Basin in general (i.e., the Pilot System Conservation Plan). Congress may choose to extend or amend these and other authorities specific to the basin. While discretionary appropriations for the Colorado River are of regular interest to Congress, Congress may also be asked to weigh in on Colorado River funding that is not subject to regular appropriations. For instance, in the coming years, the Lower Colorado River Basin Development Fund is projected to face a decrease in revenues and may thus have less funding available for congressionally established funding priorities for the Development Fund. Congress has previously approved Indian water rights settlements associated with more than 2 MAF of tribal diversion rights on the Colorado River. Only a portion of this water has been developed. Congress likely will face the decision of whether to fund development of previously authorized infrastructure associated with Indian water rights settlements in the Colorado River Basin. For example, the ongoing Navajo-Gallup Water Supply Project is being built to serve the Jicarilla Apache Nation, the Navajo Nation, and the City of Gallup, New Mexico. Congress may also be asked to consider new settlements that may result in tribal rights to more Colorado River water. For example, in the 116 th Congress, H.R. 244 would authorize the Navajo Nation Water Settlement in Utah. In addition to development of new tribal water supplies, some states in the Upper Basin have indicated their intent to further develop their Colorado River water entitlements. For example, in the 115 th Congress, Section 4310 of America's Water Infrastructure Act ( P.L. 115-270 ) authorized the Secretary of the Interior to enter into an agreement with the State of Wyoming whereby the state would fund a project to add erosion control to Fontenelle Reservoir in the Upper Basin. The project would allow the state to potentially utilize an additional 80,000 acre-feet of water storage on the Green River, a tributary of the Colorado River. Congress may remain interested in implementation of the DCPs, including their success or failure at stemming further Colorado River cutbacks and the extent to which the plans comply with federal environmental laws such as NEPA. Similarly, Congress may be interested in the overall hydrologic status of the Colorado River Basin, as well as future efforts to plan for increased demand in the basin and stretch limited basin water supplies.	[ "The Colorado River Basin covers more than 246,000 square miles in seven U.S. states (Wyoming, Colorado, Utah, New Mexico, Arizona, Nevada, and California) and Mexico. Pursuant to federal law, the Bureau of Reclamation (part of the Department of the Interior) manages much of the basin's water supplies. Colorado River water is used primarily for agricultural irrigation and municipal and industrial (M&I) uses, but it also is important for power production, fish and wildlife, and recreational uses. In recent years, consumptive uses of Colorado River water have exceeded natural flows. This causes an imbalance in the basin's available supplies and competing demands. A drought in the basin dating to 2000 has raised the prospect of water delivery curtailments and decreased hydropower production, among other things. In the future, observers expect that increasing demand for supplies, coupled with the effects of climate change, will further increase the strain on the basin's limited water supplies. River Management The Law of the River is the commonly used shorthand for the multiple laws, court decisions, and other documents governing Colorado River operations. The foundational document of the Law of the River is the Colorado River Compact of 1922. Pursuant to the compact, the basin states established a framework to apportion the water supplies between the Upper and Lower Basins of the Colorado River, with the dividing line between the two basins at Lee Ferry, AZ (near the Utah border). The Upper and Lower Basins each were allocated 7.5 million acre-feet (MAF) annually under the Colorado River Compact; an additional 1.5 MAF in annual flows was made available to Mexico under a 1944 treaty. Future agreements and court decisions addressed numerous other issues (including intrastate allocations of flows), and subsequent federal legislation provided authority and funding for federal facilities that allowed users to develop their allocations. A Supreme Court ruling also confirmed that Congress designated the Secretary of the Interior as the water master for the Lower Basin, a role in which the federal government manages the delivery of all water below Hoover Dam. Reclamation and basin stakeholders closely track the status of two large reservoirs—Lake Powell in the Upper Basin and Lake Mead in the Lower Basin—as an indicator of basin storage conditions. Under recent guidelines, dam releases from these facilities are tied to specific water storage levels. For Lake Mead, the first tier of \"shortage,\" under which Arizona's and Nevada's allocations would be decreased, would be triggered if Lake Mead's January 1 elevation is expected to fall below 1,075 feet above mean sea level. As of early 2019, Reclamation projected that there was a 69% chance of a shortage condition at Lake Mead in 2020; there was also a lesser chance of Lake Powell reaching critically low levels. Improved hydrology in early 2019 may decrease the chances of shortage in the immediate future. Drought Contingency Plans Despite previous efforts to alleviate future shortages, the basin's hydrological outlook has generally worsened in recent years. After several years of negotiations, in early 2019 Reclamation and the basin states transmitted to Congress additional plans to alleviate stress on basin water supplies. These plans, known as the drought contingency plans (DCPs) for the Upper and Lower Basins, were authorized by Congress in April 2019 in the Colorado River Drought Contingency Plan Authorization Act (P.L. 116-14). The DCPs among other things obligate Lower Basin states to additional water supply cutbacks at specified storage levels (i.e., cutbacks beyond previous curtailment plans), commit Reclamation to additional water conservation efforts, and coordinate Upper Basin operations to protect Lake Powell storage levels and hydropower generation. Congressional Role Congress plays a multifaceted role in federal management of the Colorado River basin. Congress funds and oversees management of basin facilities, including operations and programs to protect and restore endangered species. It has also enacted and continues to consider Indian water rights settlements involving Colorado River waters and development of new water storage facilities in the basin. In addition, Congress has approved funding to mitigate water shortages and conserve basin water supplies and has enacted new authorities to combat drought and its effects on basin water users (i.e., the DCPs and other related efforts)." ]	7,367	gov_report	en	null	251ea5626e6d1114c4dc6a78c7da53e963adfff095740ef3
The federal government receives funds from numerous sources in addition to tax revenues, including collections of user fees, fines, and penalties. According to the Budget of the U.S. Government, in fiscal year 2017, the U.S. government’s total receipts were $3.3 trillion and collections of fees, fines, penalties, and forfeitures were more than $350 billion. User fees (fees): Fees are charges assessed to users for goods or services provided by the federal government, such as fees to enter a national park, and charges assessed for regulatory services, such as fees charged by the Food and Drug Administration for prescription drug applications. Fees are an approach to financing federal programs or activities that, in general, are related to some voluntary transaction or request for government services above and beyond what is normally available to the public. By requiring identifiable beneficiaries to pay all or part of the cost of a good or service, fees can promote both equity and economic efficiency. Regularly reviewing fees help ensure that agencies, Congress, and stakeholders have complete information. Fines and penalties: Criminal fines and penalty payments are imposed by courts as punishment for criminal violations. Civil monetary penalties are not a result of criminal proceedings but are employed by courts and federal agencies to enforce federal laws and regulations. For example, civil monetary penalty payments are collected from financial institutions by certain financial regulators, such as the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, from enforcement actions assessed against financial institutions for violations related to anti-money laundering requirements. Reviews and, as needed, adjustments to fines and penalties could help ensure they provide a meaningful incentive for compliance. The design and structure of statutory authorities for fees, fines, and penalties can vary widely. In prior work, we have identified key design decisions related to how fee, fine, and penalty collections are used that help Congress balance agency flexibility with congressional control and oversight. Congress determines the availability of collections by defining the extent to which an agency may obligate and expend them, including the availability of the funds, the period of time the collections are available for obligation, the purposes for which they may be obligated, and the amount of the collections that are available to the agency. Fees, fines, and penalties may be categorized as one of three types of collections based on the structure of their statutory authority: offsetting collections, offsetting receipts, or governmental receipts (see figure 1). Offsetting collections can provide agencies with more flexibility because they are generally available for agency obligation without an additional annual appropriation. In contrast, offsetting receipts and governmental receipts involve greater congressional opportunities for control and oversight because, generally, additional congressional action is needed before the collections are available for agency obligation. For example, Congress must appropriate collections from offsetting receipts before agencies are authorized to obligate these funds. The type of collection also determines how OMB and Treasury report the collections. Offsetting collections and offsetting receipts result from businesslike transactions and are recorded as offsets to spending. Offsetting collections are authorized by law to be credited to appropriation or fund expenditure accounts, while offsetting receipts are deposited in receipt accounts. Because offsetting collections are offsets to spending, an account will generally show the net amount that was collected and spent at any point in time. While there is no statutory requirement for government-wide reporting of data of specific fees, fines and penalties, Congress has enacted legislation to make other data on federal spending and federal programs publicly available: The Digital Accountability and Transparency Act of 2014 (DATA Act). The DATA Act built on previous transparency legislation by expanding what federal agencies are required to report regarding their spending. The act significantly increased the types of data that must be reported, and required the use of government-wide data standards and regular reviews of data quality to help improve the transparency and accountability of federal spending data. These data are reported on the USAspending.gov website. The GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA). GPRAMA, in part, requires OMB to present a coherent picture of all federal programs by making information available about each federal program on a website, including related budget and performance information. Programs have been defined as an organized set of activities directed toward a common purpose or goal that an agency undertakes or proposes to carry out its responsibilities. A federal program inventory would consist of the individual programs identified by the agencies and OMB and information collected about each of them. OMB and agencies implemented the inventory once, in May 2013. In October 2014, we found several issues limited the usefulness of that inventory and made several recommendations to OMB to ensure the effective implementation of federal program inventory requirements and to make the inventories more useful. Further, in September 2017, we found that OMB continued to delay implementation of the program inventory. We recommended that OMB consider a systematic approach to developing the program inventory and issue instructions to provide time frames and milestones for its implementation. Although OMB updated its instruction in June 2018, it did not provide any time frames or milestones for implementing the inventory. OMB has yet to develop a systematic approach for resuming implementation of the inventory or specific time frames for doing so. There is no source of data that lists all collections of specific fees, fines, and penalties at a government-wide or agency level. Both OMB and Treasury report government-wide budgetary and financial data, including some information on collections of fees, fines, and penalties; however, none of the reports identifies all specific fees, fines, and penalties, and their associated collection amounts at a government-wide level. OMB reports budgetary and financial data in various parts of the Budget of the U.S. Government, including Analytical Perspectives, the Budget Appendix, and the Public Budget Database. Treasury reports financial data in the Combined Statement. Each source provides information for a broader purpose than reporting on collections of fees, fines, and penalties. OMB and Treasury provide specific instructions for agency submission of the underlying data, as described in table 2. OMB’s reports include budgetary and financial information on federal collections at different levels of detail—from aggregated government-wide data to agency account-level data—depending on the source and its purpose. Analytical Perspectives identifies collections as fees and as fines, penalties, and forfeitures and reports government-wide summary information on these collections. For example, in a table summarizing government-wide governmental receipts in Analytical Perspectives, OMB reported fines, penalties, and forfeitures in federal funds as $20.98 billion and in trust funds as $1.17 billion for fiscal year 2017. These summary data do not provide a government-wide total of all federal collections from fines, penalties, and forfeitures because they do not include those that are categorized as offsetting collections or offsetting receipts, according to OMB staff. OMB staff said that OMB does not publish a government- wide total of fines, penalties, and forfeitures. OMB data on governmental receipts include source codes—including a code that identifies fines, penalties, and forfeitures—but data on offsetting collections and offsetting receipts do not include a comparable source code. In the Budget Appendix and the Public Budget Database, OMB reports account-level information by agency, identified by types of collections, such as offsetting collections, offsetting receipts, and governmental receipts. The Budget Appendix and the Public Budget Database do not label collections as fees, fines, or penalties and therefore, cannot be used to calculate government-wide totals for fees, fines, or penalties. To assemble Analytical Perspectives, the Budget Appendix, and the Public Budget Database, OMB compiles data from federal agencies into OMB MAX. OMB MAX, which is not publicly available, contains government-wide data at the account level and captures information such as the type of collection and the type of fund to which collections are deposited. While the data in OMB MAX help drive reporting in the Budget, not all data compiled in OMB MAX appear in the Budget. For example, OMB MAX includes an indicator for accounts that contain fees, but that information is not made available in the Budget of the U.S. Government. According to congressional staff we spoke with, they do not have open access to OMB MAX, but OMB provides excerpts of OMB MAX data to staff upon request. Treasury’s Combined Statement reports both government-wide totals and agency account-level data for collections classified as receipts, by various source categories—such as proprietary receipts from the public, miscellaneous receipts, and fines, penalties, and forfeitures. Fees. Fees may fall within several source categories. Therefore, Treasury does not have a single government-wide total for fees. It does present government-wide totals for various source categories, including, Sale of Products and Fees for Permits and Regulatory and Judicial Services, for example. Treasury also reports some fees under non-fee categories, such as Miscellaneous Taxes and Excise Taxes. Fines, Penalties, and Forfeitures. Treasury reports a government- wide total of receipts of fines, penalties, and forfeitures, which in fiscal year 2017 was $22.2 billion. Treasury’s Combined Statement presents these data, disaggregated by account, in the tables Receipts by Source Categories and Receipts by Department. For example, it identifies total Internal Revenue Service receipts in the category Fines, Penalties, and Forfeitures of about $6.8 million in fiscal year 2017. Treasury also reports some fines, penalties, and forfeitures receipts under other categories; these receipts are not included in its total of fines, penalties, and forfeitures. For example, Department of Homeland Security breached bond penalties are reported in two categories labeled as fees: Miscellaneous Receipts – Fees for Permits and Regulatory and Judicial Services and Offsetting Governmental Receipts – Regulatory Fees (see figure 2). In addition to the government-wide data sources, agencies report some data on their collections of specific fees, fines, and penalties in their annual financial reports, congressional budget justifications, and on agency websites. These data are dispersed by agency, are not comprehensive, and cannot be aggregated to create government-wide data because they vary in format and in the level of detail presented. For example: The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has an online, searchable database of enforcement and compliance information that includes data on individual fine and penalty assessments for violations of certain, but not all, statutes. The Department of Labor also makes selected enforcement data accessible in an online database collected by the Employee Benefits Security Administration, the Mine Safety and Health Administration, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, and the Wage and Hour Division without Department of Labor-wide data standards on individual fine and penalty assessments. USDA’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service’s 2019 Congressional Budget Justification, on the other hand, is a PDF document that provides annual collection totals for Agriculture Quarantine Inspection Fees, Import-Export User Fees, Phytosanitary Certificate User Fees, Veterinary Diagnostics User Fees, and Other User Fees, rather than disaggregated to individual fee assessments. The government-wide totals for fees that OMB reports in Analytical Perspectives are not presented at a more disaggregated level, such as by agency or program, except for some major fee collections identified by OMB. For example, in Analytical Perspectives for fiscal year 2017, OMB reported $335.4 billion as a government-wide total of fee collections. OMB also reported some disaggregated data for the subset of fees that were offsetting collections and offsetting receipts. Specifically, it listed 11 fees totaling $258.4 billion collected by specific agencies and listed the remaining $72.3 billion as “all other user charges” without identifying the agency or program. As described in table 1 above, clear and accessible data can be aggregated or disaggregated by the user. OMB has more detailed data on collections in OMB MAX, including the agency, account, type of collection, and fund type, which it uses to compile reported totals of fees as well as fines, penalties, and forfeitures. OMB does not publicly report these data disaggregated below the government-wide level, such as at the agency level. OMB staff said that they do not report the disaggregated data because the purpose of Analytical Perspectives is to develop or support the President’s policies and more detailed tables may not be included if they are not considered necessary for that purpose. However, Analytical Perspectives also serves to provide other significant data that place the President’s Budget in context and assist the public and policymakers in better understanding the budget proposals. For example, Analytical Perspectives includes a chapter on aid to state and local governments that presents the President’s budget proposals for grant programs along with crosscutting information on federal grants to state and local governments, including government-wide grant spending, by agency and program. Analytical Perspectives also presents a summary of fee proposals but does not provide comparable crosscutting information about current fees. For fines and penalties, neither proposals nor crosscutting information is presented by agency. Until OMB makes more disaggregated data on fees, fines, and penalties maintained in its OMB MAX database—such as collections by agency—publicly available, Congress has limited information on such collections to inform oversight and decision-making. Analytical Perspectives’ government-wide totals of fees may include inaccurately labeled collections—other collections that are not fees—and may exclude some fee collections. Data that are clear and accessible are presented with known limitations, as shown in table 1. OMB Circular No. A-11 states that all accounts in which more than half of collections are from fees will be designated as containing fees. OMB staff said that the entire account is designated as containing fees because account-level data are the most disaggregated data OMB collects from agencies. OMB calculates its government-wide total for fees by adding collections in all accounts designated in OMB MAX as containing user fees. However, agency accounts can include multiple sources of budget authority. For example, Treasury’s U.S. Mint’s account “United States Mint Public Enterprise Fund” includes offsetting collections from Mint operations and programs; these include the production and sale of commemorative coins and medals, the production and sale of circulating coinage, the protection of government assets, as well as gifts and bequests of property. The United States Mint Public Enterprise Fund is designated as containing fees in OMB MAX. Therefore, budget authority that is not derived from the collection of fees but is still included in this account will be designated as fees as well when calculating a government-wide total. Conversely, accounts in which fees contribute to less than half of collections are not designated as containing fees amounts, and those fees will not be included in the government-wide total OMB calculates. OMB Circular No. A-11 describes the designation of fee accounts, but the data presented in Analytical Perspectives as totals for fees do not disclose OMB’s designation criteria, including the limitations to the accuracy of the data. OMB staff said they do not report this limitation because they consider OMB Circular No. A-11 a more appropriate document for providing technical information like the designation of accounts containing user fees. However, the section on fees in Analytical Perspectives does not direct the reader to OMB Circular No. A-11 for key information related to the data presented on fees. For other topics, including lease-purchase agreements, Analytical Perspectives directs the reader to OMB Circular No. A-11 for further details. Furthermore, for other topics, OMB provided explanatory information along with the data in Analytical Perspectives. For example, OMB explained a recent change to definitions in the research and development section of Analytical Perspectives and the effect of the change on budget authority. Until OMB provides a description of data limitations regarding the criteria used to identify accounts with fees for compiling government-wide totals in Analytical Perspectives, or directs users to the relevant section of OMB Circular No. A-11, some users are likely to be unaware of the potential for the total user fees to be overestimated or underestimated. In addition, OMB does not regularly review and update implementation of its criteria for designating fees. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government state that agency management should use quality information to achieve the objectives, such as processing data into quality information that is current and accurate. OMB Circular No. A-11 states that the fee designation is applied at the time the account is established. OMB staff told us that when establishing a new account, OMB collaborates with Treasury to determine the legal attributes of the account, including any fee authorities, and whether to designate the account as containing fees. OMB staff further explained they review the designation when new legislation is enacted that would change the attributes of the account, or if an agency informs OMB that the makeup of an account has changed because of programmatic changes. However, OMB Circular No. A-11 does not instruct agencies to regularly review or update this designation and report changes to OMB. Therefore, if the makeup of collections in an account changes so that fees go from being more than half of the collections to less than half, or vice versa, the account’s fee designation may not be updated accordingly. Until OMB instructs agencies to regularly review the fee designation in OMB MAX and update the designation, as needed, OMB cannot provide reasonable assurance that accounts are designated correctly, and that the government-wide totals of fees reported in Analytical Perspectives are accurate. While Analytical Perspectives reports government-wide data labeled as fees, fines, and penalties, the other three sources we reviewed—the Budget Appendix, the Public Budget Database, and the Combined Statement—report account-level information by agency. Users cannot further disaggregate the data presented to specific fee, fine, and penalty collections. For example, USDA’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) is funded in part by six fees: (1) Agricultural Quarantine Inspection (AQI) fee, (2) Phytosanitary Export Certification fee, (3) Veterinary Services Import Export fee, (4) Veterinary Diagnostics fee, (5) Reimbursable Overtime, and (6) Trust Funds and Reimbursable Funds. However, a user cannot identify collections from each of these APHIS fees in the Budget Appendix. The Budget Appendix specifically identifies AQI fee collections—$768 million in fiscal year 2017—because they are receipts deposited to a trust fund. The other five fees are combined within the total for offsetting collections—$152 million (see figure 3). The Budget Appendix, the Public Budget Database, and the Combined Statement report data at the account level because the purposes of these reports are broader than fees, fines, and penalties, and OMB and Treasury instruct agencies to report data at that level. Treasury’s Financial Manual states that agencies post appropriations and spending authorizations by Congress to accounts established by Treasury. OMB’s Circular No. A-11 instructs agencies to report data at the budget account level in OMB MAX, which supports the data in the Budget Appendix and the Public Budget Database. Because OMB and Treasury do not collect data that can be disaggregated to the level of fee, fine, or penalty, the collections for specific fees, fines, and penalties within accounts are not identifiable within account totals. Both the Budget Appendix and Public Budget Database label and present data within each account by collection type: offsetting collections, offsetting receipts, and governmental receipts. These collection types include fees, fines, and penalties, as well as other sources of collections, as shown in the text box below. Budgetary Collections as Labeled by the Budget of the U.S. Government Include More than Fees, Fines, and Penalties Offsetting Collections and Offsetting Receipts include user fees as w ell as reimbursements for damages, intragovernmental transactions, and voluntary gifts and donations to the government. Governmental Receipts include collections that result from the government’s exercise of its sovereign pow er to tax or otherw ise compel payment, and include taxes, compulsory user fees, regulatory fees, customs duties, court fines, certain license fees, and deposits of earnings by the Federal Reserve System. As a result, the user cannot separate fees, fines, and penalties from other collections. For example, offsetting collections may include fees, reimbursements for damages, gifts or donations of money to the government, and intragovernmental transactions with other government accounts. Analytical Perspectives explains that amounts collected by government agencies are recorded in two ways that broadly affect the formulation of the government-wide budget, but may not provide detail on specific agency collections: (1) governmental receipts, which are compared to total outlays in calculating the surplus or deficit; and (2) offsetting collections or offsetting receipts, which are deducted from gross outlays to calculate net outlay figures. These collections are presented together for budgeting purposes, but cannot be separated to specific fees, fines, or penalties. Therefore, it is not clear what percentage of the reported collections are fees, fines, and penalties as opposed to other collections. Treasury’s Combined Statement and OMB’s Public Budget Database do not identify offsetting collections, including collections of fees, fines, and penalties. Instead, the Combined Statement reports net outlays, which include any offsetting collections as deductions from outlays. Similarly, the Public Budget Database reports budget authority net of any offsetting collections. Treasury clearly describes this presentation of the data in the Combined Statement, but OMB does not in the Public Budget Database. In the “Explanation of Transactions and Basis of Figures” section of the Combined Statement, Treasury describes that outlays are stated net of collections representing reimbursements as authorized by law, which include offsetting collections. With the description provided in the Combined Statement, the user can understand that fees, fines, and penalties that are offsetting collections are not identifiable in the data. OMB reports receipts and budget authority—which include collections from fees, fines, and penalties—in separate spreadsheets of the Public Budget Database. Similar to outlays reported in Treasury’s Combined Statement, the Budget Authority spreadsheet reports the net budget authority of accounts after agencies have credited offsetting collections from fees, fines, penalties, or other collections. For example, the National Park Service reported net budget authority of $2.425 billion for the Operation of the National Park System account in fiscal year 2017 in both the Budget Appendix and the Public Budget Database, both of which present data compiled in OMB MAX. The Budget Appendix presents additional information, reporting offsetting collections that are at least partially derived from fees of $35 million, and gross budget authority of $2.46 billion, as shown in figure 4. The Public Budget Database, on the other hand, does not identify the amount of offsetting collections in the account or gross budget authority. OMB does not describe this presentation of the data in the Public Budget Database User’s Guide. As shown in table 1, data that are clear and accessible are presented with descriptions of the data. The User’s Guide directs users who may not be familiar with federal budget concepts to Analytical Perspectives and OMB Circular No. A-11. However, OMB does not describe, either in the User’s Guide or in the Budget Authority spreadsheet of the Public Budget Database, that this source reports budget authority net of offsetting collections, such as collections of fees, fines, and penalties. OMB staff said they do not describe the presentation because it is explained in Analytical Perspectives. However, the Public Budget Database is available for download separate from Analytical Perspectives, and the User’s Guide specific to the Public Budget Database includes other information describing the data in the spreadsheets. Describing the presentation of the data in the User’s Guide would help ensure that users of the Public Budget Database can correctly interpret the information and not underestimate agencies’ fee, fine, or penalty collections. No source of government-wide data consistently reports data elements related to fees, fines, and penalties that could help inform congressional oversight of agencies and programs, such as the amount collected annually, account balances, and whether the collection is a fee, fine, or penalty. See figure 5 for the extent to which data elements are included in the Budget Appendix, Public Budget Database, and Combined Statement. See appendix I for more detailed information on the data elements that are useful for congressional oversight. To a limited extent there are some cases where government-wide reports included data elements useful for the purpose of congressional oversight of fees, fines, and penalties. In some cases the Budget Appendix includes information on the fund type receiving collections and the extent to which the collections from fees may be appropriated to the agency collecting the fee. The Budget Appendix, for example, reports that collections for the Agricultural Quarantine Inspection (AQI) fee are recorded under “Special and Trust Fund Receipts,” as shown previously in figure 3. The user can also identify the appropriation of collections from the AQI fee under “Program and Financing, Budgetary resources,” as shown below in figure 6. As discussed previously, the other five fees the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service(APHIS) collects are not individually identifiable in the Budget Appendix, but fall under offsetting collections. OMB and Treasury reports, and the systems that support them, are designed for budget and financial information and not for an inventory of fees, fines, and penalties that includes the data elements that Congress may use in oversight. OMB staff said the agency does not have a requirement to prioritize reporting fee, fine, and penalty data over more detailed information on other types of funds. OMB staff said while they generally agree that additional data elements would be useful for oversight, there are trade-offs between transparency and the burden of collecting and reporting additional information. According to OMB staff and officials from Treasury, the Congressional Research Service, and external organizations with expertise in federal budget issues and data transparency, there are two primary benefits to government-wide reporting of fee, fine, and penalty data: increased transparency and better information for congressional oversight and decision-making. Generally, all congressional staff we spoke with said making additional government-wide data on fees, fines, and penalties, such as those data elements described previously, without additional outreach to agencies, would be useful and increase transparency. While some congressional staff said such data elements are available through direct outreach to agencies, other congressional staff told us they could not always obtain the information they wanted. For example, staff from a congressional committee said that one of the most critical data elements for the purpose of congressional oversight is information on agency reporting of obligations and expenditures because, in their view, currently many agencies do not adequately report this information and some agencies do not report this information at all. These data would provide Congress a more complete picture of individual agencies’ activities and any potential overlap or duplication in multiple agencies’ activities. Congressional staff also said having government-wide data on collections of fees could inform efforts that are crosscutting in nature. For example, APHIS and Customs and Border Protection jointly implement the AQI program to help prevent the introduction of harmful agricultural pests and diseases into the United States, and AQI fee collections are divided between the two agencies. Publicly available data on government-wide collections of fines and penalties could inform the public on agency enforcement activities and compliance of regulated parties, such as those related to health or safety. Some officials from external organizations and congressional staff said that it would be useful to have government-wide data on individual fines and penalties levied by agencies. For example, the Environmental Protection Agency publishes an online database on its compliance and enforcement actions, Enforcement and Compliance History Online (ECHO). According to the website, the data available on ECHO allows the public to monitor environmental compliance in communities, corporations to monitor compliance across facilities they own, and investors to more easily factor environmental performance into decisions. Further, an official from an external organization with expertise in data transparency stated that, ideally, a user would be able to link fine and penalty data to spending data on USAspending.gov to increase transparency in instances where an organization receiving a federal grant or contract has also had a fine or penalty levied against it. Last, publicly available government-wide data on collections could inform the public, specifically payers of fees, fines, and penalties, and facilitate their participation in public comment opportunities. For example, OMB staff said government-wide data could provide the public with clear, transparent information across agencies on fee collections and allow the public to analyze differences in fee programs among agencies. Payers of fees may be able to make more informed comments on proposed changes to a fee program if they had information on how it relates to other fee programs across the federal government. Government-wide fee, fine, and penalty data would provide more information to facilitate congressional oversight. These data could help Congress identify trends in collections and significant changes that could be an indication of an agency’s performance. For example, staff of a Congressional committee stated that fine and penalty data can be used to examine enforcement actions on a particular issue or to identify potential trends over time as an indicator of stronger or weaker enforcement actions by an agency. Congress could also use these data to identify variations in enforcement action among geographic regions or as an indicator of the frequency of violations. Additionally, data on review and reporting requirements can inform congressional oversight of fees, fines, and penalties. We previously reported that regular comprehensive reviews of fees provide opportunities for agencies and Congress to make improvements to a fee’s design which, if left unaddressed, could contribute to inefficient use of government resources. For example, fee reviews could help ensure that fees are properly set to cover the total costs of those activities which are intended to be fully fee-funded. Fee reviews may also allow agencies and Congress to identify where similar activities are funded differently; for example, one by fees and one by appropriations. One such example is the export control system, in which the State Department charges fees for the export of items on the U.S. Munitions List, while the Commerce Department does not charge fees for those items exported under its jurisdiction. Government-wide reporting of fee, fine, and penalty data could also inform Congress’s funding decisions by providing a clearer picture of agencies’ total resources. Congressional staff stated that knowing the statutory authority to collect and obligate funding from fees, fines, and penalties—along with any appropriation an agency may have received from an annual appropriation act, which are currently available to congressional staff—would provide a more complete picture of an agency’s total annual funding, including the portion attributed to the taxpayer and the portion attributed to payers of specific fees, fines, and penalties. For example, staff from congressional committees we spoke with said it would be useful to have data to show programs that receive appropriations from both offsetting collections and appropriations not derived from offsetting collections to inform decisions on how the program is funded. Congressional staff also said this would provide more opportunities to track the flow of money in and out of the government. Overall funding decisions may be affected if an agency has an increase in fee collections, for example. Congressional committee staff also said it would be useful to have government-wide data on specific fees, fines, and penalties that are offsetting collections because these collections are available for obligation without going through the annual appropriations process. Our prior work has shown that it is important to consider how the agencies and entities with this authority facilitate oversight to ensure effective management, transparency, and public accountability. Some committee staff said they can request data directly from agencies when they need more disaggregated information on fees, fines, and penalties, and reported different levels of responsiveness from agencies. Publicly available data could reduce potentially overlapping or duplicative requests from staff to agencies. According to officials from agencies and external organizations, there are potential challenges to defining the government-wide data standard or definition of fee, fine, and penalty programs by which agencies could report. Because there is no statutory requirement for government-wide reporting of fee, fine, and penalty data, agencies collect and use these data for their own purposes, and are not using government-wide data elements and standards that are consistent and comparable between agencies. First, an agency may define a fee program as a single fee or a set of related fees. For example, the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services charges more than 40 immigration and naturalization fees to applicants and petitioners that could be grouped together as related fees or split into up to 40 different fee programs. Second, officials from external organizations said there are also challenges in defining data standards the level of detail to report. For example, an official from an external organization said, for large financial penalties, it may be useful for oversight for the data to identify each instance of the penalty, including the fined party. However, that level of detail could raise privacy sensitivities. For example, reporting every individual that paid an entrance fee at a national park could present privacy concerns. Finally, for elements that are useful for congressional oversight, one challenge could be the timing of when funds are collected compared to when they are available for obligation. The amount of funds collected in a year does not necessarily equal the amount available to the agency that year. For example, collections of Harbor Maintenance Fees are deposited to the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund and are not available for obligation without appropriation. Funds collected in one year may not be necessarily appropriated and obligated until a subsequent year. Our prior work on the Digital Accountability and Transparency Act of 2014 (DATA Act) implementation underscores the importance of standardized and clearly defined data elements. We found inconsistent and potentially confusing instructions from OMB regarding the Primary Place of Performance data elements that resulted in inconsistent reporting among agencies. The standard established by OMB and Treasury defines Primary Place of Performance as “where the predominant performance of the award will be accomplished” while other instructions define it as “the location of the principal plant or place of business where the items will be produced, supplied from stock, or where the service will be performed.” We found some agencies used the first definition and some used the second. In one case, the Departments of Labor and Health and Human Services issued contracts to the same company for similar office printers, but one reported the primary place of performance as California, the location of the office where the printers were delivered and used. The other agency reported the primary place of performance as New Jersey, the location of the company that supplied the printers. As a result, the data were not comparable between agencies or across the federal government, limiting the usefulness for congressional oversight. We previously recommended that OMB and Treasury provide additional instruction to agencies on how to report Primary Place of Performance to ensure the definitions are clear and the data standards are implemented consistently by agencies. Staff from one congressional committee cautioned that attempts to present information on budget authorities for fees, fines, and penalties in a simple and accessible database create an unacceptable risk of confusion and legislative error. The staff said an accurate description of the nature of the spending–-including whether there is authority to obligate without further appropriation–-would be labor intensive and require significant legal analysis and research. Government-wide reporting of fees, fines, and penalties could increase transparency and facilitate oversight and decision-making, but would require time and resources to develop given that there is currently no government-wide system or requirements for agencies to collect and report detailed fee, fine, and penalty data. The level of federal investment would vary depending on factors, such as the number of data elements included and the level of detail reported. Developing a comprehensive and accessible data source would provide greater benefits, but would likely be resource intensive. We have reported on other federal transparency efforts that could provide strategies for reporting government-wide fee, fine, and penalty data. For example, to create a clear and accessible government-wide data source that includes the data elements we identified that would be useful for congressional oversight, Treasury officials said the process would be similar to the implementation of the DATA Act for spending data. To implement the DATA Act, OMB and Treasury led an intensive effort starting in May 2014 through May 2017 when the first government-wide data were reported under the DATA Act’s new standards. Data Standards: OMB, in coordination with Treasury, established 57 standardized data element definitions and approximately 400 associated sub-elements for reporting federal spending information. OMB and Treasury created opportunities for non-federal stakeholders to provide input into the development of data standards, including publishing a Federal Register notice seeking public comment on the establishment of financial data standards; presenting periodic updates on the status of DATA Act implementation to federal and non-federal stakeholders at meetings and conferences; soliciting public comment on data standards using an online collaboration space; and collaborating with federal agencies on the development of data standards and the technical schema through MAX.gov, an OMB- supported website. Technical Process for Reporting: Treasury developed the initial DATA Act Information Model Schema, which provided information on how to standardize the way financial assistance awards, contracts, and other financial and nonfinancial data would be collected and reported under the DATA Act. System to Collect and Validate Data: Treasury developed a system that collects and validates agency data (the DATA Act Broker), which operationalizes the reporting framework laid out in the schema. In addition, Treasury employed online software development tools to provide responses to stakeholder questions and comments related to the development and revision of the broker. Public Reporting: Treasury created and updated the new USAspending.gov website to display certified agency data submitted under the DATA Act. Agencies also took steps to prepare to report spending data. They reviewed data elements OMB identified, participated in standardizing the definitions, performed an inventory of their existing data and associated business processes, and updated their systems and processes to report data to Treasury. OMB and Treasury issued policy directions to help agencies meet their reporting requirements under the act. They also conducted a series of meetings with participating agencies to obtain information on any challenges that could impede effective implementation and assess agencies’ readiness to report required spending data. Although the steps to developing comprehensive, detailed reporting on government-wide collections of fees, fines, and penalties might be similar to the DATA Act efforts, the dollar amounts of collections would be smaller than those of federal spending. In fiscal year 2017, federal spending was $3.98 trillion compared to about $350 billion in collections of fees, fines, penalties, and forfeitures reported by OMB. On the other hand, defining data elements and standards for fee, fine, and penalty data could be more resource intensive than developing data standards for DATA Act implementation because the DATA Act built on earlier reporting requirements. The DATA Act amended the Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act of 2006 (FFATA), which required OMB to establish the website USAspending.gov to report data on federal awards, including contracts, grants, and loans. The DATA Act required OMB and Treasury to standardize data required to be reported by FFATA. For fee, fine, and penalty data, OMB and Treasury would be starting without the benefit of some data elements already defined. Further, we have previously reported that effective implementation of provisions to make federal data publicly available, including the DATA Act and GPRAMA’s program inventory, especially the ability to crosswalk spending data to individual programs, could provide vital information to assist federal decision makers in addressing significant challenges the government faces. Incorporating a small number of data elements that Congress identifies as most useful for oversight into ongoing government-wide agency reporting efforts could incrementally improve transparency and information for oversight and decision-making, with fewer resources. For example, Congress required agencies to add selected data elements to their annual financial reports on civil monetary penalties. Specifically, the Federal Civil Penalties Adjustment Act Improvements Act of 2015 requires agencies to include information about the civil monetary penalties within the agencies’ jurisdiction, including catch-up inflation adjustment of the civil monetary penalty amounts, in annual agency financial reports or performance and accountability reports. As shown in figure 7, to facilitate agencies’ reporting, OMB provided a table to define the data elements required in the act in its annual instructions, OMB Circular No. A-136, Financial Reporting Requirements. Agencies started reporting these data in their agency financial reports in fiscal year 2016. In July 2018, we reported that 40 of 45 required agencies reported in their fiscal year 2017 agency financial report information on civil monetary penalties as directed by the OMB instructions. Similarly, if Congress sought additional fine and penalty data elements, such as amounts collected and authority to spend collections, OMB could expand this table in Circular No. A-136 to include those data elements. Circular No. A-136 also outlines that agencies may include the results of biennial reviews of fees and other collections in their agency financial reports. OMB could also update this portion of the circular to require agencies to report specific data elements that are useful for oversight, such as review and reporting requirements. While this information reported in agency financial reports would be disaggregated in portable document format, or PDF, documents, it would provide some transparency on agencies’ activities that Congress could use to prioritize its oversight efforts. In another example, if OMB implements the federal program inventory as required by GPRAMA, it could include a data element on whether a program has a fee, fine, or penalty. We previously reported that the principles and practices of information architecture—a discipline focused on organizing and structuring information—offer an approach for developing such an inventory to support a variety of uses, including increased transparency for federal programs. A program inventory creates the potential to aggregate, disaggregate, sort, and filter information across multiple program facets. For example, from a user’s perspective, a program could be tagged to highlight whether it includes activities to collect fees, fines, or penalties. Then, a user interested in this data facet could select a tag (e.g., fees) that could generate a list of programs that also have fees, fines, or penalties. While the program inventory is broader than agency collections of fees, fines, and penalties and would include programmatic descriptions, it would increase transparency by enabling Congress and the public to identify and isolate all programs that include, as a source of funding or a key data element, a fee, fine, or penalty to inform oversight and target additional requests for information to agencies. Federal agencies are authorized to collect hundreds of billions of dollars from fees, fines, and penalties each year that fund a wide variety of programs, but Congress and the American public do not have government-wide data on these collections that would provide increased transparency and facilitate oversight. OMB’s MAX database contains some disaggregated data labeled as fees, fines, and penalties, but OMB does not make these data publicly available. Without more disaggregated, government-wide, accessible data on collections of fees, fines, and penalties, such as by agency, Congress and the public do not have a complete and accurate picture of federal finances, the sources of federal funds, and the resources available to fund federal programs. In addition, improving the data OMB currently reports related to fees, fines, and penalties could help the user better understand the data and the potential limitations. First, until OMB describes how it identifies accounts with fees including that the government-wide totals of fees it reports in Analytical Perspectives may include collections that are not fees and exclude some fee collections, some users will likely be unaware that reported totals could be over- or under-estimates. Second, without OMB instruction to agencies to regularly review and update implementation of the criteria for designating accounts that contain fees, accounts could be designated incorrectly if the makeup of the collections changes. Therefore, OMB cannot provide reasonable assurance that the total amount of fees it reports is accurate. Third, until OMB describes in the User’s Guide that its Public Budget Database reports budget authority net of offsetting collections, including collections of fees, fines, and penalties, users could misinterpret the information and underestimate collections in some cases. OMB and Treasury do not collect many of the data elements on fees, fines, and penalties that would be useful for congressional oversight, such as review and reporting requirements. There are trade-offs between the potential costs and the potential benefits. While reporting government- wide data on specific fees, fines, and penalties would improve transparency and information for decision-making, more data elements would require greater investment of resources from OMB, Treasury, and agencies. Any new reporting of fee, fine, and penalty data would be most useful if it is designed to be compatible with other transparency efforts— the DATA Act reporting and the federal program inventory. Regardless of the approach taken, linkage of data on fees, fines, and penalties with other government-wide data reporting, such as USASpending.gov, would enhance transparency and facilitate congressional oversight. We are making the following four recommendations to OMB: The Director of OMB should make available more disaggregated data on fees, fines, and penalties that it maintains in its OMB MAX database. For example, OMB could report data on fee collections by agency in Analytical Perspectives. (Recommendation 1) The Director of OMB should present, in Analytical Perspectives, the data limitations related to the government-wide fee totals by describing the 50- percent criteria OMB uses to identify accounts with fees or by directing users to the relevant sections of OMB Circular No. A-11. (Recommendation 2) The Director of OMB should instruct agencies to regularly review the application of the user fee designation in the OMB MAX data and update the designation, as needed, to meet the criteria in OMB Circular No. A-11. (Recommendation 3) The Director of OMB should describe in the Public Budget Database User’s Guide that budget authority is reported net of any offsetting collections, such as collections of fees, fines, and penalties. (Recommendation 4) We provided a draft of this report to Treasury and OMB for review and comment on December 10, 2018. Treasury informed us that they had no comments. As of March 4, 2019, OMB did not provide comments. We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of the Department of the Treasury, and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget. In addition, the report is available at no charge on GAO’s website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-6806 or nguyentt@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix II. This report examines: (1) the extent to which government-wide data on collections of fees, fines, and penalties are publicly available and useful for the purpose of congressional oversight, and (2) the benefits and challenges to government-wide reporting of specific fees, fines, and penalties including data elements that facilitate congressional oversight. To assess the extent and usefulness of publicly available data, we developed criteria for the availability and usefulness for the purpose of congressional oversight of data on collections of fees, fines, and penalties reported in government-wide sources (see table 3). The first three criteria—clear and accessible presentation, complete, and accurate—address the availability of the data and the final criterion, useful for the purpose of congressional oversight, addresses content of the data specific to congressional oversight needs. These criteria are based on: Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government related to Digital Accountability and Transparency Act of 2014 (DATA Act) government-wide instruction from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) on public access to data and open government, our prior work on user fees, fines, and penalties, and input from staff of congressional committees on appropriations, budget, and oversight. Using a standard list of semistructured interview questions, we interviewed congressional staff that were available to meet with us on or before November 1, 2018. We shared the criteria with OMB staff and Department of the Treasury (Treasury) officials, and they agreed the criteria are relevant and reasonable. To identify publicly available government-wide sources of data with information on collections of fees, fines, and penalties, we reviewed our prior work on user fees, fines, penalties, and permanent funding authorities, conducted general background research including reviewing Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and Congressional Research Service (CRS) reports, and interviewed staff from OMB, and officials from Treasury, CBO, and CRS. We identified the Budget of the U.S. Government—including Analytical Perspectives, the Budget Appendix, and the Public Budget Database—produced annually by OMB; the Financial Report of the U.S. Government (Financial Report), the Daily Treasury Statement, the Monthly Treasury Statement, the Combined Statement of Receipts, Outlays, and Balances, and USAspending.gov produced by Treasury; and CBO products, such as its budget projections and historical budget tables as containing government-wide federal budget or financial data. Of the sources we identified, we included Analytical Perspectives, the Budget Appendix, the Public Budget Database, and the Combined Statement of Receipts, Outlays, and Balances in our study because they contain government-wide information on collections of fees, fines, and penalties. We excluded the Treasury’s Daily Treasury Statement, Monthly Treasury Statement, Financial Report, and USAspending.gov from this review because we determined that the information presented did not differentiate between types of collections in a way that would allow us to separately identify fees, fines, and penalties. For example, Treasury’s Financial Report reports government-wide information in categories that are broader than fees, fines, and penalties. Specifically, it reports “earned revenue,” which includes collections of interest payments for federal loan programs. Such collections are not fees. The Financial Report also reports fines and penalties combined with interest and other revenues. We also reviewed and excluded CBO products because the data reported are not designed to differentiate between types of collections. We assessed Analytical Perspectives, the Budget Appendix, the Public Budget Database, and the Combined Statement of Receipts, Outlays, and Balances using the criteria we developed for clear and accessible presentation, accurate, and complete. We also assessed the Budget Appendix, the Public Budget Database, and the Combined Statement of Receipts, Outlays, and Balances using the criteria for useful for the purpose of congressional oversight. Further, we assessed relevant portions of OMB and Treasury instructions using Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government. We also used OMB and Treasury data to identify and report government- wide totals for fees, fines, and penalties to the extent that they were reported. To assess the reliability of OMB’s MAX database data related to the collections of fees, fines, and penalties, we reviewed related documentation, interviewed knowledgeable agency officials, and conducted electronic data testing. To assess Treasury’s Bureau of the Fiscal Service data related to the collections of fees, fines, and penalties, we reviewed related documentation and interviewed knowledgeable agency officials. In both cases, we found the data to be reliable for our purposes. We did not examine whether agencies accurately report collections as fees, fines, and penalties to OMB and Treasury. In addition, we identified and reviewed other sources of data on fees, fines, and penalties that are specific to federal agencies, including annual financial reports and agency websites. We did not apply the criteria we developed for available and useful for the purpose of congressional oversight to these sources because they contain data for an individual agency rather than government-wide data. To determine the benefits and challenges to government-wide reporting of fees, fines, and penalties, we interviewed staff of congressional committees on appropriations, budget, and oversight, OMB staff and Treasury officials, staff of CBO, and external organizations, including the Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget, the Data Coalition, the Data Foundation, the Project on Government Oversight, the Peter G. Peterson Foundation, and the Sunlight Foundation, on the potential benefits and challenges of government-wide reporting of fees, fines, and penalties. In addition, we reviewed our prior work on the DATA Act, federal program inventories, and federal fees, to identify and assess issues to consider in government-wide reporting. We conducted this performance audit from November 2017 to March 2019 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. In addition to the contact named above, Susan E. Murphy (Assistant Director), Barbara Lancaster (Analyst in Charge), Michael Bechetti, Jacqueline Chapin, Colleen Corcoran, Ann Marie Cortez, Lorraine Ettaro, John Mingus, and Rachel Stoiko made key contributions to this report.	[ "Congress has authorized federal agencies to collect hundreds of billions of dollars annually in fees, fines, and penalties. These collections can fund a variety of programs, including programs related to national security, and the protection of natural resources. Data on collections are important for congressional oversight and to provide transparency in agencies' use of federal resources. GAO was asked to review the availability of government-wide data on fees, fines, and penalties. This report examines (1) the extent to which data on collections of fees, fines, and penalties are publically available and useful for the purpose of congressional oversight; and (2) the benefits and challenges to government-wide reporting of fees, fines, and penalties. GAO assessed government-wide fee, fine, and penalty data against criteria for availability and usefulness based on multiple sources, including prior GAO work and input from staff of selected congressional committees. GAO interviewed OMB staff, Treasury officials, and representatives of organizations with expertise in federal budget issues and reviewed prior GAO work to identify benefits and challenges of reporting these data. There are no comprehensive, government-wide data at the level of detail that identifies specific fees, fines, or penalties. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) report data that include these collections at the budget account level, which generally covers a set of agency activities or programs. OMB and Treasury also report some summary data for budgeting and financial management purposes. In the Budget of the U.S. Government , for example, OMB data showed government-wide fees totaled just over $335 billion in fiscal year 2017. These reports, however, are not designed to inventory or analyze fee, fine, or penalty collections and have significant limitations for that purpose. Although OMB collects more disaggregated data on fees, fines, and penalties, it does not make the data publicly available. OMB uses the disaggregated data in its OMB MAX database—such as the agency and account—to compile reported totals, such as the government-wide fees total in the Budget of the U.S. Government . Until OMB makes more disaggregated data publicly available, Congress has limited information on collections by agency to inform oversight and decision-making. OMB's government-wide total of fees includes collections that are not fees and excludes some fee collections. The total includes all collections for accounts in which fees make up at least half of the account's collections and excludes all others. OMB does not direct agencies to regularly review and update the accounts included in the total. Therefore, if accounts' makeups change such that fee collections drop below, or rise above, the 50 percent threshold, accounts may have incorrect fee designations and the total may be inaccurate. Further, OMB does not disclose the limitation that the total may exclude some fees and include other collections that are not fees. As a result, some users of the data are likely unaware of the potential for the total fees to be overestimated or underestimated. Further, no source of government-wide data consistently reports data elements on fees, fines, and penalties that could help inform congressional oversight. Generally, congressional staff told us that additional data, such as amounts of specific penalties, would increase transparency and facilitate oversight. These data could help Congress identify trends in collections and significant changes that could be an indication of an agency's performance. While reporting government-wide fee, fine, and penalty data provides benefits, there are trade-offs in terms of the time and federal resources it would take to develop and implement a process for agencies to report these data. The level of federal investment would vary depending on factors, such as the number of data elements included and the level of detail reported. Developing a comprehensive and accessible data source would provide greater benefits, but would likely be resource intensive. Alternatively, incorporating a small number of data elements that Congress identifies as most useful for oversight into ongoing government-wide reporting efforts could incrementally improve transparency and information for oversight and decision-making, with fewer resources. GAO is making four recommendations to enhance OMB reporting on fees, fines, and penalties, including making disaggregated data publically available, updating instructions to federal agencies to review accounts designated as containing fees, and disclosing limitations in data reported. OMB did not provide comments." ]	8,704	gov_report	en	null	319c69c85ff4fca2d9614e3b8dec5fd53d7248892400e56c
The Small Business Administration (SBA) administers programs to support small businesses, including loan guaranty programs to encourage lenders to provide loans to small businesses "that might not otherwise obtain financing on reasonable terms and conditions." The SBA's 7(a) loan guaranty program is considered the agency's flagship loan program. Its name is derived from Section 7(a) of the Small Business Act of 1953 (P.L. 83-163, as amended), which authorizes the SBA to provide and guarantee business loans to American small businesses. The SBA also administers several 7(a) subprograms that offer streamlined and expedited loan procedures for particular groups of borrowers, including the SBAExpress, Export Express, and Community Advantage Pilot programs (see the Appendix for additional details). Although these subprograms have their own distinguishing eligibility requirements, terms, and benefits, they operate under the 7(a) program's authorization. Proceeds from 7(a) loans may be used to establish a new business or to assist in the operation, acquisition, or expansion of an existing business. Specific uses include to acquire land (by purchase or lease); improve a site (e.g., grading, streets, parking lots, and landscaping); purchase, convert, expand, or renovate one or more existing buildings; construct one or more new buildings; acquire (by purchase or lease) and install fixed assets; purchase inventory, supplies, and raw materials; finance working capital; and refinance certain outstanding debts. In FY2018, the SBA approved 60,353 7(a) loans totaling nearly $25.4 billion. The average approved 7(a) loan amount was $420,401. As will be discussed, the total number and amount of SBA 7(a) loans approved (and actually disbursed) declined in FY2008 and FY2009, increased during FY2010 and FY2011, declined somewhat in FY2012, and have increased since then. Historically, one of the justifications presented for funding the SBA's loan guaranty programs has been that small businesses can be at a disadvantage, compared with other businesses, when trying to obtain access to sufficient capital and credit. Congressional interest in the 7(a) loan program has increased in recent years because of concerns that small businesses might be prevented from accessing sufficient capital to enable them to grow and create jobs. Some Members of Congress have argued that the SBA should be provided additional resources to assist small businesses in acquiring capital necessary to start, continue, or expand operations with the expectation that in so doing small businesses will create jobs. Others worry about the long-term adverse economic effects of spending programs that increase the federal deficit. They advocate business tax reduction, reform of financial credit market regulation, and federal fiscal restraint as the best means to help small businesses further economic growth and job creation. This report discusses the rationale provided for the 7(a) program; the program's borrower and lender eligibility standards and program requirements; and program statistics, including loan volume, loss rates, use of the proceeds, borrower satisfaction, and borrower demographics. It also examines issues raised concerning the SBA's administration of the 7(a) program, including the oversight of 7(a) lenders and the program's lack of outcome-based performance measures. This report also surveys congressional and presidential actions taken in recent years to help small businesses gain greater access to capital. For example, during the 111 th Congress P.L. 111-5 , the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), provided the SBA an additional $730 million, including $375 million to temporarily subsidize the 7(a) and 504/Certified Development Companies (504/CDC) loan guaranty programs' fees ($299 million) and to temporarily increase the 7(a) program's maximum loan guaranty percentage to 90% ($76 million). P.L. 111-240 , the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, provided $505 million (plus $5 million for administrative expenses) to extend the fee subsidies and 90% loan guaranty percentage through December 31, 2010; increased the 7(a) program's gross loan limit from $2 million to $5 million; and established an alternative size standard for the 7(a) and 504/CDC loan programs to enable more small businesses to qualify for assistance. P.L. 111-322 , the Continuing Appropriations and Surface Transportation Extensions Act, 2011, authorized the SBA to continue the fee subsidies and the 7(a) program's 90% maximum loan guaranty percentage through March 4, 2011, or until available funding was exhausted (which occurred on January 3, 2011). During the 112 th Congress, several bills were introduced to expand the 7(a) program: S. 1828 , a bill to increase small business lending (and for other purposes), would have reinstated for one year following the date of its enactment the fee subsidies for the 7(a) and 504/CDC loan guaranty programs and the 90% loan guaranty percentage for the 7(a) program, which were originally authorized by ARRA. H.R. 2936 , the Small Business Administration Express Loan Extension Act of 2011, would have extended a one-year increase in the maximum loan amount for the SBAExpress program from $350,000 to $1 million for an additional year. That temporary increase was authorized by P.L. 111-240 and expired on September 27, 2011. S. 532 , the Patriot Express Authorization Act of 2011, would have provided statutory authorization for the Patriot Express Pilot Program and increased its loan guaranty percentages and its maximum loan amount from $500,000 to $1 million. The Patriot Express Pilot Program was subsequently discontinued by the SBA on December 31, 2013. During the 113 th Congress, the SBA waived the up-front, one-time loan guaranty fee and ongoing servicing fee for 7(a) loans of $150,000 or less approved in FY2014 and FY2015 as a means to encourage the demand for smaller 7(a) loans. H.R. 2462 , the Small Business Opportunity Acceleration Act of 2013, would have made the fee waiver for smaller 7(a) loans permanent. waived the up-front, one-time loan guaranty fee for a loan to a veteran or to a veteran's spouse under the SBAExpress program (up to $350,000) from January 1, 2014, through the end of FY2015 (called the SBA Veterans Advantage Program). waived 50% of the up-front, one-time loan guaranty fee on all non-SBAExpress 7(a) loans to veterans of $150,001 up to and including $5 million in FY2015. In addition, P.L. 113-235 , the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, provided statutory authorization for the Veterans Advantage fee waiver in FY2015. During the 114 th Congress, the SBA waived the up-front, one-time loan guaranty fee for 7(a) loans of $150,000 or less approved in FY2016 and FY2017 as a means to encourage the demand for smaller 7(a) loans. waived the annual service fee for 7(a) loans of $150,000 or less approved in FY2016 (increased to 0.546% in FY2017). waived 50% of the up-front, one-time loan guaranty fee on all non-SBAExpress 7(a) loans to veterans of $150,001 to $5 million in FY2016; and 50% of the up-front, one-time loan guaranty fee on all non-SBAExpress 7(a) loans to veterans of $150,001 to $500,000 in FY2017. In addition P.L. 114-38 , the Veterans Entrepreneurship Act of 2015, provided statutory authorization and made permanent the veteran's fee waiver under the SBAExpress program, except during any upcoming fiscal year for which the President's budget, submitted to Congress, includes a cost for the 7(a) program, in its entirety, that is above zero. The SBA waived this fee in FY2016, FY2017, FY2018, and is waiving this fee in FY2019. The act also increased the 7(a) program's FY2015 authorization limit of $18.75 billion (on disbursements) to $23.5 billion. P.L. 114-113 , the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, increased the 7(a) program's authorization limit to $26.5 billion in FY2016. P.L. 114-223 , the Continuing Appropriations and Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2017, authorized the SBA to use funds from its business loan program account "to accommodate increased demand for commitments for [7(a)] general business loans" for the duration of the continuing resolution (initially December 9, 2016, later extended by P.L. 114-254 , the Further Continuing and Security Assistance Appropriations Act, 2017, to April 28, 2017). During the 115 th Congress, the SBA waived the up-front, one-time loan guaranty fee for 7(a) loans of $125,000 or less approved in FY2018 as a means to encourage the demand for smaller 7(a) loans. waived 50% of the up-front, one-time loan guaranty fee on all non-SBAExpress 7(a) loans to veterans of $125,001 to $350,000 in FY2018. is waiving the annual service fee for 7(a) loans of $150,000 or less made to small businesses located in a rural area or a HUBZone and reducing the up-front one-time guaranty fee for these loans from 2.0% to 0.6667% of the guaranteed portion of the loan in FY2019. In addition P.L. 115-31 , the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017, increased the 7(a) program's authorization limit to $27.5 billion in FY2017 and P.L. 115-141 , the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, increased the 7(a) program's authorization limit to $29.0 billion in FY2018. P.L. 115-189 , the Small Business 7(a) Lending Oversight Reform Act of 2018, among other provisions, codified the SBA's Office of Credit Risk Management; required that office to annually undertake and report the findings of a risk analysis of the 7(a) program's loan portfolio; created a lender oversight committee within the SBA; authorized the Director of the Office of Credit Risk Management to undertake informal and formal enforcement actions against 7(a) lenders under specified conditions; redefined the credit elsewhere requirement; and authorized the SBA Administrator to increase the amount of 7(a) loans not more than once during any fiscal year to not more than 115% of the 7(a) program's authorization limit. The SBA is required to provide at least 30 days' notice of its intent to exceed the 7(a) loan program's authorization limit to the House and Senate Committees on Small Business and the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations' Subcommittees on Financial Services and General Government and may exercise this option only once per fiscal year. P.L. 115-232 , the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, included provisions originally in H.R. 5236 , the Main Street Employee Ownership Act of 2018, to make 7(a) loans more accessible to employee-owned small businesses (ESOPs) and cooperatives. The act clarified that 7(a) loans to ESOPs may be made under the Preferred Lenders Program; allows the seller to remain involved as an officer, director, or key employee when the ESOP or cooperative has acquired 100% ownership of the small business; and authorizes the SBA to finance transition costs to employee ownership and waive any mandatory equity injection by the ESOP or cooperative to help finance the change of ownership. The act also directs the SBA to create outreach programs and an interagency working group to promote lending to ESOPs and cooperatives. President Trump's FY2019 budget request included proposals to offset SBA business loan administrative costs by, among other provisions, (1) allowing the SBA to set the 7(a) program's annual servicing fee at rates below zero credit subsidy; (2) increasing the 7(a) loan program's FY2019 annual servicing fee's cap from 0.55% to 0.625%; and (3) increasing the FY2019 upfront loan guarantee fee on 7(a) loans over $1 million by 0.25%. The Trump Administration estimated that these changes would raise $93 million in additional revenue. The Trump Administration also requested that the 7(a) loan program's authorization limit be increased to $30.0 million in FY2019; that the SBA be allowed to further increase the 7(a) loan program's authorization amount in FY2019 by 15% under specified circumstances "to better equip the SBA to meet peaks in demand while continuing to operate at zero subsidies"; and that the SBAExpress program's loan limit be increased from $350,000 to $1 million. During the 116 th Congress P.L. 116-6 , the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019, increased the 7(a) program's authorization limit to $30.0 billion in FY2019. This report's Appendix provides a brief description of the 7(a) program's SBAExpress, Export Express, and Community Advantage programs. To be eligible for an SBA business loan, a small business applicant must be located in the United States; be a for-profit operating business (except for loans to eligible passive companies and businesses engaged in specified industries, such as insurance companies and financial institutions primarily engaged in lending); qualify as small under the SBA's size requirements; demonstrate a need for the desired credit; and be certified by a lender that the desired credit is unavailable to the applicant on reasonable terms and conditions from nonfederal sources without SBA assistance. To qualify for an SBA 7(a) loan, applicants must be creditworthy and able to reasonably assure repayment. SBA requires lenders to consider the strength of the business and the applicant's character, reputation, and credit history; experience and depth of management; past earnings, projected cash flow, and future prospects; ability to repay the loan with earnings from the business; sufficient invested equity to operate on a sound financial basis; potential for long-term success; nature and value of collateral (although inadequate collateral will not be the sole reason for denial of a loan request); and affiliates' effect on the applicant's repayment ability. Borrowers may use 7(a) loan proceeds to establish a new business or to assist in the operation, acquisition, or expansion of an existing business. 7(a) loan proceeds may be used to acquire land (by purchase or lease); improve a site (e.g., grading, streets, parking lots, landscaping), including up to 5% for community improvements such as curbs and sidewalks; purchase one or more existing buildings; convert, expand, or renovate one or more existing buildings; construct one or more new buildings; acquire (by purchase or lease) and install fixed assets; purchase inventory, supplies, and raw materials; finance working capital; and refinance certain outstanding debts. Borrowers are prohibited from using 7(a) loan proceeds to refinance existing debt where the lender is in a position to sustain a loss and the SBA would take over that loss through refinancing; effect a partial change of business ownership or a change that will not benefit the business; permit the reimbursement of funds owed to any owner, including any equity injection or injection of capital for the business's continuance until the loan supported by the SBA is disbursed; repay delinquent state or federal withholding taxes or other funds that should be held in trust or escrow; or pay for a nonsound business purpose. As mentioned previously, P.L. 111-240 increased the 7(a) program's maximum gross loan amount for any one 7(a) loan from $2 million to $5 million (up to $3.75 million maximum guaranty). In FY2018, the average approved 7(a) loan amount was $420,401, and about 36% of all 7(a) loans exceeded $2 million. A 7(a) loan is required to have the shortest appropriate term, depending upon the borrower's ability to repay. The maximum term is 10 years, unless the loan finances or refinances real estate or equipment with a useful life exceeding 10 years. In that case, the loan term can be up to 25 years, including extensions. Lenders are allowed to charge borrowers "a reasonable fixed interest rate" or, with the SBA's approval, a variable interest rate. The SBA uses a multistep formula to determine the maximum allowable fixed interest rate for all 7(a) loans (with the exception of the Export Working Capital Program and Community Advantage loans) and periodically publishes that rate and the maximum allowable variable interest rate in the Federal Register . The maximum allowable fixed interest rates in February 2019 are 13.50% for 7(a) loans of $25,000 or less; 12.50% for loans over $25,000 but not exceeding $50,000; 11.50% for loans over $50,000 up to and including $250,000; and 10.50% loans greater than $250,000. The 7(a) program's maximum allowable variable interest rate may be pegged to the lowest prime rate (5.50% in February 2019), the 30-day LIBOR rate plus 300 basis points (5.51% in February 2019), or the SBA optional peg rate (3.13% in the second quarter of FY2019). The optional peg rate is a weighted average of rates the federal government pays for loans with maturities similar to the average SBA loan. For 7(a) loans of $25,000 or less, the SBA does not require lenders to take collateral. For 7(a) loans exceeding $25,000 to $350,000, the lender must follow the collateral policies and procedures that it has established and implemented for its similarly sized non-SBA-guaranteed commercial loans. However, the lender must, at a minimum, obtain a first lien on assets financed with loan proceeds, and a lien on all of the applicant's fixed assets, including real estate, up to the point that the loan is fully secured. For 7(a) loans exceeding $350,000, the SBA requires lenders to collateralize the loan to the maximum extent possible up to the loan amount. If business assets do not fully secure the loan, the lender must take available equity in the principal's personal real estate (residential and investment) as collateral. 7(a) loans are considered "fully secured" if the lender has taken security interests in all available fixed assets with a combined "net book value" up to the loan amount. The SBA directs lenders to not decline a loan solely on the basis of inadequate collateral because "one of the primary reasons lenders use the SBA-guaranteed program is for those Applicants that demonstrate repayment ability but lack adequate collateral to repay the loan in full in the event of a default." Lenders must have a continuing ability to evaluate, process, close, disburse, service, and liquidate small business loans; be open to the public for the making of such loans (and not be a financing subsidiary, engaged primarily in financing the operations of an affiliate); have continuing good character and reputation; and be supervised and examined by a state or federal regulatory authority, satisfactory to the SBA. They must also maintain satisfactory performance, as determined by the SBA through on-site review/examination assessments, historical performance measures (such as default rate, purchase rate, and loss rate), and loan volume to the extent that it affects performance measures. In FY2017, 1,978 lenders provided 7(a) loans. The SBA started the Preferred Lenders Program (PLP) on March 1, 1983, initially on a pilot basis. It is designed to streamline the procedures necessary to provide financial assistance to small businesses by delegating the final credit decision and most servicing and liquidation authority and responsibility to carefully selected PLP lenders. PLP loan approvals are subject only to a brief eligibility review and the assignment of a loan number by SBA. PLP lenders draft the SBA Authorization (of loan guaranty approval) without the SBA's review, and execute it on behalf of the SBA. In FY2018, PLP lenders approved 26,497 7(a) loans (43.9% of all 7(a) loans), amounting to $18.8 billion (74.2% of the total amount approved). PLP lenders must comply with all of the SBA's business loan eligibility requirements, credit policies, and procedures. The PLP lender is required to stay informed on, and apply, all of the SBA's loan program requirements. They must also complete and retain in the lender's file all forms and documents required of standard 7(a) loan packages. Borrowers submit applications for a 7(a) business loan to private lenders. The lender reviews the application and decides if it merits a loan on its own or if it has some weaknesses which, in the lender's opinion, do not meet standard, conventional underwriting guidelines and require additional support in the form of an SBA guaranty. The SBA guaranty assures the lender that if the borrower does not repay the loan and the lender has adhered to all applicable regulations concerning the loan, the SBA will reimburse the lender for its loss, up to the percentage of the SBA's guaranty. The small business borrowing the money remains obligated for the full amount due. If the lender determines that it is willing to provide the loan, but only with an SBA guaranty, it submits the application for approval to the SBA's Loan Guaranty Processing Center (LGPC) through the SBA's E-Tran (Electronic Loan Processing/Servicing) website (which is available through SBA One, the SBA's automated lending platform) or, if attachments to the application are too large for E-Tran, by secured electronic file transfer. The LGPC has two physical locations: Citrus Heights, CA, and Hazard, KY. This center has responsibility for processing 7(a) loan guaranty applications for lenders who do not have delegated authority to make 7(a) loans without the SBA's final approval. The SBA has authorized PLP and express lenders to make credit decisions without SBA review prior to loan approval. However, the PLP and express lender's analysis is subject to the SBA's review and determination of adequacy when the lender requests the SBA to purchase its guaranty and when the SBA is conducting a review of the lender. As an additional safeguard against the potential for loan defaults, the SBA now requires all non-express 7(a) loans of $350,000 or less to be SBA credit scored through E-Tran prior to submission/approval. If the credit score is below the minimum set by the SBA (currently 140 for 7(a) loans of $350,000 or less, including Community Advantage loans), the loan must be submitted to the SBA for approval with a full credit write-up for consideration. The loan cannot be processed under delegated authority. If the credit score is acceptable to the SBA, the lender is a PLP lender, and the loan is eligible to be processed under the PLP lender's delegated authority, the lender will receive an SBA loan number indicating that the loan is approved. The PLP lender's documentation, including underwriting, closing, and servicing, must be maintained in their files, and can be reviewed by the SBA at any time. If the lender is not a PLP lender or if the loan is not eligible to be submitted under the PLP lender's delegated authority, the lender must refer the loan to the LGPC for review. The application materials required for a SBA guaranty vary depending on the size of the loan ($350,000 or less versus exceeding $350,000) and the method of processing used by the lender (standard versus expedited/express). The following SBA documentation is required for all 7(a) standard loans of $350,000 or less: Form 191 9: Borrower Information Form . SBA form 1919 provides information about the borrower (name, name of business, social security number, date and place of birth, gender, race, veteran, etc.); the loan request; any indebtedness; the principals and affiliates; current or previous government financing; the applicant's eligibility (e.g., criminal information, citizenship status); the loan's eligibility for delegated or expedited processing (e.g., the borrower is not more than 60 days delinquent in child support payments, not proposed or presently excluded from participation in this transaction by any federal department or agency, has no potential for a conflict of interest due to an owner being a current or former SBA employee, a Member of Congress, or a SCORE volunteer); and, among other disclosures, the firm's existing number of employees, the number of jobs to be created as a result of the loan, and the number of jobs that will be retained as a result of the loan that would have otherwise been lost. Form 912 : Statement of Personal History . SBA form 912 is required if the borrower reports on Form 1919 an arrest in the past six months for a criminal offense or had ever been convicted, plead guilty, plead nolo contendere, been placed on pretrial diversion, or been placed on any form of parole or probation (including probation before judgment) of any criminal offense. Form 912 requires the borrower to furnish details concerning his or her offense(s) and authorizes the SBA's Office of Inspector General to request criminal record information about the applicant from criminal justice agencies for determining program eligibility. It must be dated within 90 days of the application's submission to the SBA. Form 159 : Fee Disclosure and Compensation Agreement . SBA form 159 is required if the borrower reports on Form 1919 that he or she used (or intends to use) a packager, broker, accountant, lawyer, etc. to assist in preparing the loan application or any related materials. SBA form 159 is also required if the lender retains the services of a packager, broker, accountant, lawyer, etc. to assist in preparing the loan application or any related materials. Form 159 provides identifying information about the packager, broker, accountant, lawyer, etc. and the fees paid to any such person. Form 601 : Agreement of Compliance (prohibiting discrimination). SBA form 601 is required if the borrower reports on Form 1919 that more than $10,000 of the loan proceeds will be used for construction. Form 601 certifies that the borrower will cooperate actively in obtaining compliance with Executive Order 11246, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin and requires affirmative action to ensure equality of opportunity in all aspects of employment related to federally assisted construction projects in excess of $10,000. Form 1920 : Lenders Application for Guaranty for all 7(a) Programs . SBA form 1920 provides identifying information about the lender; the loan type (standard, SBAExpress, Export Express, etc.); loan terms; use of proceeds; the business's size and information about affiliates, if any; the applicant's character; if credit is reasonably available elsewhere; the type of business; potential conflicts of interest; and other information such the number of jobs created or retained. PLP lenders complete the form and retain it in the loan file. Other lenders must submit this form electronically to the LGPC. Verification of Alien Status . Documentation of the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) status of each alien is required prior to submission of the application to the SBA. Lender's Credit Memo randum . For loans up to and including $350,000, the Lender's Credit Memorandum includes a brief description of the history of the business and its management; the debt service coverage ratio (net operating income compared to total debt service must be at least 1:1); statement that the lender has reconciled financial data (including seller's financial data) against IRS transcripts; an owner/guarantor analysis (including personal financial condition); lender's discussion of life insurance requirements; explanation and justification for any refinancing; analysis of credit, including lender's rationale for recommending approval; for a change of ownership, discussion/analysis of business valuation and how the change benefits the business; discussion of any liens, judgments, or bankruptcy filings; and discussion of any other relevant information. For loans exceeding $350,000, the Lender's Credit Memorandum must also include an analysis of collateral and a financial analysis which includes an analysis of the historical financial statements; defining assumptions supporting projected cash flow; and, when used, spread of pro forma balance sheet, ratio calculations, and working capital analysis. Cash Flow Projections . A projection of the borrower's cash flow, month-by-month for one year, is required for all new businesses, and when otherwise applicable. The following forms and documentation are also required for 7(a) standard loans exceeding $350,000: Form 413 : Personal Financial Statement . SBA form 413 provides detailed information concerning the applicant's assets and liabilities and must be dated within 90 days of submission to the SBA, on all owners of 20% or more (including the assets of the owner's spouse and any minor children), and proposed guarantors. Lenders may substitute their own Personal Financial Statement form. Form 1846 : Statement Regarding Lobbying . SBA Form 1846 must be signed and dated by lender. It indicates that if any funds have been paid or will be paid to any person for influencing or attempting to influence an officer or employee of any agency, a Member of Congress, an officer or employee of Congress, or an officer or employee of a Member of Congress in connection with this commitment, the lender will complete and submit a Standard Form LLL "Disclosure of Lobbying Activities." A copy of Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Form 4506-T, Request for Copy of Tax Return . Lenders must identify the date IRS Form 4506-T was sent to the IRS. For nondelegated lenders, verification of IRS Form 4506-T is required prior to submission of the application to the SBA. For PLP and express lenders, verification of IRS Form 4506-T is required prior the first disbursement. Business Financial Statements or tax returns dated within 180 days of the application's submission to the SBA, consisting of (1) year-end balance sheets for the last three years, (2) year-end profit and loss statements for the last three years, (3) reconciliation of net worth, (4) interim balance sheet, and (5) interim profit and loss statements. Affiliate and Subsidiary Financial Statements or tax returns dated within 180 days of the application's submission to the SBA, consisting of (1) year-end balance sheets for the last three years, (2) year-end profit and loss statements for the last three years, (3) reconciliation of net worth, (4) interim balance sheet, and (5) interim profit and loss statements. A copy of the Le ase Agreement , if applicable. A detailed Schedule of C ollateral . A detailed List of M&E (machinery and equipment) being purchased with SBA loan proceeds, including cost quotes. If real estate is to be purchased with the loan proceeds, a Real Estate Appraisal , Environmental Investigation Report questionnaire, a cost breakdown, and copy of any Real Estate Purchase Agreements . If purchasing an existing business with loan proceeds, a (1) copy of buy-sell agreement, (2) copy of business valuation, (3) pro forma balance sheet for the business being purchased as of the date of transfer, (4) copy of the seller's financial statements for the last three complete fiscal years or for the number of years in business if less than three years, (5) interim statements no older than 180 days from date of submission to the SBA, and (6) if the seller's financial statements are not available, the seller must provide an alternate source of verifying revenues. An explanation of the type and source of applicant's equity injection. Proper evidence of a borrower's equity injection may include the copy of a check together with proof it was processed, or a copy of an escrow settlement sheet with a bank account statement showing the injection into the business prior to disbursement. A promissory note, "gift letter," or financial statement is generally not sufficient evidence. To offset its costs, the SBA is authorized to charge lenders an up-front, one-time guaranty fee and an annual, ongoing service fee for each 7(a) loan approved and disbursed. The SBA's fees vary depending on loan amount and loan maturity. The maximum guaranty fee for 7(a) loans with maturities exceeding 12 months is set by statute and varies depending on the loan amount. The fee is a percentage of the SBA guaranteed portion of the loan. On short-term loans (maturities of less than 12 months), the lender must pay the guaranty fee to the SBA electronically through www.pay.gov within 10 days from the date the SBA loan number is assigned. If the fee is not received within the specified time frame, the SBA will cancel the guaranty. On loans with maturities in excess of 12 months, the lender must pay the guaranty fee to the SBA within 90 days of the date of loan approval. For short-term loans, the lender may charge the guaranty fee to the borrower only after the lender has paid the guaranty fee. For loans with maturities in excess of 12 months, the lender may charge the guaranty fee to the borrower after initial disbursement. Lenders are permitted to retain 25% of the guaranty fee on loans with a gross amount of $150,000 or less. The annual service fee cannot exceed 0.55% of the outstanding balance of the SBA's share of the loan and is required to be no more than the "rate necessary to reduce to zero the cost to the Administration" of making guaranties. The lender's annual service fee to the SBA cannot be charged to the borrower. In an effort to assist small business owners, the SBA waived its annual service fee for all 7(a) loans of $150,000 or less approved from FY2014 through FY2016 (the annual service fee for other small businesses was 0.52% in FY2014, 0.519% in FY2015, and 0.473% in FY2016); is waiving the annual service fee for 7(a) loans of $150,000 or less made to small businesses located in a rural area or a HUBZone in FY2019 (the annual service fee for other small businesses is 0.55% in FY2019); waived the up-front, one-time guaranty fee for all 7(a) loans of $150,000 or less approved from FY2014 through FY2017; waived the up-front, one-time guaranty fee for all 7(a) loans of $125,000 or less approved in FY2018; and is reducing the up-front one-time guaranty fee for loans made small businesses located in a rural area or a HUBZone from 2.0% to 0.6667% of the guaranteed portion of the loan in FY2019. Table 1 shows the annual service fee and guaranty fee for 7(a) loans in FY2019. The annual service fee is a percentage of the outstanding balance of the SBA's share of the loan. The guaranty fee is a percentage of the SBA guaranteed portion of the loan. As mentioned previously, the SBA waived its up-front, one-time guaranty fee for all veteran loans under the 7(a) SBAExpress program (up to $350,000) from January 1, 2014, through the end of FY2015. P.L. 114-38 , the Veterans Entrepreneurship Act of 2015, made this fee waiver permanent, except during any upcoming fiscal year for which the President's budget, submitted to Congress, includes a cost for the 7(a) program, in its entirety, that is above zero. The SBA waived this fee in FY2016, FY2017, and FY2018 and is waiving it in FY2019. The SBA also waived 50% of the up-front, one-time guaranty fee on all non-SBAExpress 7(a) loans of $150,001 to $5 million for veterans in FY2015 and FY2016; 50% of the up-front, one-time guaranty fee on all non-SBAExpress 7(a) loans of $150,001 to $500,000 for veterans in FY2017; and 50% of the up-front, one-time guaranty fee on all non-SBAExpress 7(a) loans of $125,001 to $350,000 for veterans in FY2018. The Obama Administration argued that fee waivers for 7(a) loans of $150,000 or less were necessary because the demand for smaller 7(a) loans had fallen and the waiver reduction "can be achieved with zero credit subsidy appropriations" because the "annual fees for larger 7(a) loans will cover the cost for those smaller loans." The Administration also contended that waiving the fees on smaller SBA loans would "promote lending to small businesses that face the most constraints on credit access." For context, 7(a) loans of $150,000 or less accounted for about 11.8% of the total amount of 7(a) loan approvals in FY2010 ($1.46 billion of $12.41 billion); 8.3% in FY2011 ($1.63 billion of $19.64 billion); 9.5% in FY2012 ($1.44 billion of $15.15 billion); 8.1% in FY2013 ($1.45 billion of $17.87 billion); 9.7% in FY2014 ($1.86 billion of $19.19 billion); 9.7% in FY2015 ($2.28 billion of $23.58 billion); 9.4% in FY2016 ($2.75 billion of $24.13 billion), and 9.2% in FY2017 ($2.33 billion of $25.45 billion). The SBA also announced that eliminating guaranty fees for 7(a) loans of $150,000 or less ($125,000 or less in FY2018) was part of its broader effort to "reduce barriers, attract new lenders, grow loan volumes of existing lenders and improve access to capital for small businesses and entrepreneurs." Some in Congress questioned whether it is appropriate to require borrowers of larger 7(a) loans to, in effect, subsidize borrowers of smaller 7(a) loans, who might be direct competitors. They have suggested that it might be more appropriate to reduce fees across-the-board without regard to loan size. The lender may charge an applicant "reasonable fees" customary for similar lenders in the geographic area where the loan is being made for packaging and other services. The lender must advise the applicant in writing that the applicant is not required to obtain or pay for unwanted services. These fees are subject to SBA review at any time, and the lender must refund any such fee considered unreasonable by the SBA. The lender may also charge an applicant an additional fee if, subject to prior written SBA approval, all or part of a loan will have extraordinary servicing needs. The additional fee cannot exceed 2% per year on the outstanding balance of the part requiring special servicing (e.g., field inspections for construction projects). The lender may also collect from the applicant necessary out-of-pocket expenses, including filing or recording fees, photocopying, delivery charges, collateral appraisals, environmental impact reports that are obtained in compliance with SBA policy, and other direct charges related to loan closing. The lender is prohibited from requiring the borrower to pay any fees for goods and services, including insurance, as a condition for obtaining an SBA guaranteed loan, and from imposing on SBA loan applicants processing fees, origination fees, application fees, points, brokerage fees, bonus points, and referral or similar fees. The lender is also allowed to charge the borrower a late payment fee not to exceed 5% of the regular loan payment when the borrower is more than 10 days delinquent on its regularly scheduled payment. The lender may not charge a fee for full or partial prepayment of a loan. For loans with a maturity of 15 years or longer, the borrower must pay to the SBA a subsidy recoupment fee when the borrower voluntarily prepays 25% or more of its loan in any one year during the first three years after first disbursement. The fee is 5% of the prepayment amount during the first year, 3% in the second year, and 1% in the third year. As shown in Table 2 , the total number and amount of SBA 7(a) loans approved (before and after cancellations and modifications) declined in FY2008 and FY2009, increased during FY2010 and FY2011, declined somewhat in FY2012, and have increased since then. The number and amount of 7(a) loans approved annually is higher than the number and amount of loans disbursed because some borrowers decide not to accept the loan for a variety of reasons, such as financing was secured elsewhere, the funds are no longer needed, or there was a change in business ownership. The SBA attributed the decreased number and amount of 7(a) loans approved in FY2008 and FY2009 to a reduction in the demand for small business loans resulting from the economic uncertainty of the recession (December 2007-June 2009) and to tightened loan standards imposed by lenders concerned about the possibility of higher loan default rates resulting from the economic slowdown. The SBA attributed the increased number of loans approved in FY2010 and FY2011 to legislation that provided funding to temporarily reduce the 7(a) program's loan fees and temporarily increase the 7(a) program's loan guaranty percentage to 90% for all standard 7(a) loans from up to 85% of loans of $150,000 or less and up to 75% of loans exceeding $150,000. The fee subsidies and 90% loan guaranty percentage were in place during most of FY2010 and the first quarter of FY2011. The increased number and amount of 7(a) loans approved since FY2012 are generally attributed to improving economic conditions. Table 2 also provides the 7(a) program's unpaid principal balance by fiscal year. Precise measurements of the small business credit market are not available. However, the SBA has estimated that the small business credit market (outstanding bank loans of $1 million or less, plus credit extended by finance companies and other sources) is roughly $1.2 trillion. The 7(a) program's unpaid principal balance of $92.41 billion at the end of FY2018 was about 7.7% of that amount. One of the SBA's goals is to achieve a zero subsidy rate for its loan guaranty programs. A zero subsidy rate occurs when the SBA's loan guaranty programs generate sufficient revenue through fee collections and recoveries of collateral on purchased (defaulted) loans to not require appropriations to issue new loan guarantees. From 2005 to 2009, the SBA did not request appropriations to subsidize the cost of any of its loan guaranty programs, including the 7(a) program. However, as indicated in Table 3 , loan guaranty fees and loan liquidation recoveries did not generate enough revenue to cover loan losses in the 7(a) loan guaranty program from FY2010 through FY2013 and in the 504/CDC loan guaranty program from FY2012 through FY2015. Appropriations were provided to address the shortfalls. Congress did not approve appropriations for 7(a) and 504/CDC loan guaranty program credit subsidies for FY2016 through FY2019 because the President's budget request indicated that those programs did not require appropriations for credit subsidies in those fiscal years. In FY2017, the SBA spent $82.2 million on the 7(a) program for administrative expenses, including $63.0 million for loan making, $4.1 million for loan servicing, and $15.1 million for loan liquidation. Also, the SBA spent $36.9 million on lender oversight, including oversight of 7(a) lenders. The SBA anticipated that 7(a) program administrative expenses will be about $82.2 million in FY2018 and $84.5 million in FY2019. In addition, the SBA anticipated that it will spend about $36.9 million in FY2018 and $36.6 million in FY2019 for lender oversight of the SBA's various lending programs. In FY2017, borrowers used 7(a) loan proceeds to purchase land or make land improvements (26.62%); purchase a business (17.06%); finance working capital (15.59%); pay off loans, accounts payable or notes payable (13.23%); construct new buildings (6.06%); purchase equipment (5.76%); make leasehold improvements (3.25%); expand or renovate current buildings (2.39%); refinance existing debt (1.40%); and cover other expenses (8.64%). In 2008, the Urban Institute released the results of an SBA-commissioned study of the SBA's loan guaranty programs. As part of its analysis, the Urban Institute surveyed a random sample of SBA loan guaranty borrowers. The survey indicated that most of the 7(a) borrowers responding to the survey rated their overall satisfaction with their 7(a) loan and loan terms as either excellent (18%) or good (50%). One out of every five 7(a) borrowers (20%) rated their overall satisfaction with their 7(a) loan and loan terms as fair, and 6% rated their overall satisfaction with their 7(a) loan and loan terms as poor (7% reported don't know or did not respond). In addition, 90% of the survey's respondents reported that the 7(a) loan was either very important (62%) or somewhat important (28%) to their business success (2% reported somewhat unimportant, 3% reported very unimportant, and 4% reported don't know or did not respond). The Urban Institute found that about 9.9% of conventional small business loans are issued to minority-owned small businesses, and about 16% of conventional small business loans are issued to women-owned businesses. In FY2018, 32.8% of 7(a) loan approvals ($8.32 billion of $25.37 billion) were to minority-owned businesses (23.0% Asian, 6.0% Hispanic, 3.1% African-American, and 0.7% American Indian) and 13.6% ($3.46 billion of $25.37 billion) were to women-owned businesses. From its comparative analysis of conventional small business loans and the SBA's loan guaranty programs, the Urban Institute concluded the following: SBA's loan programs are designed to enable private lenders to make loans to creditworthy borrowers who would otherwise not be able to qualify for a loan. As a result, there should be differences in the types of borrowers and loan terms associated with SBA-guaranteed and conventional small business loans. Our comparative analysis shows such differences. Overall, loans under the 7(a) and 504 programs were more likely to be made to minority-owned, women-owned, and start-up businesses (firms that have historically faced capital gaps) as compared to conventional small business loans. Moreover, the average amounts for loans made under the 7(a) and 504 programs to these types of firms were substantially greater than conventional small business loans to such firms. These findings suggest that the 7(a) and 504 programs are being used by lenders in a manner that is consistent with SBA's objective of making credit available to firms that face a capital opportunity gap. Congressional interest in the 7(a) loan program has increased in recent years largely because of concerns that small businesses might be prevented from accessing sufficient capital to enable them to assist in the economic recovery. During the 110 th and 111 th Congresses, several laws were enacted to increase the supply and demand for capital for both large and small businesses. For example, in 2008, Congress adopted P.L. 110-343 , the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, which authorized the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). Under TARP, the U.S. Department of the Treasury was authorized to purchase or insure up to $700 billion in troubled assets, including small business loans, from banks and other financial institutions. The law's intent was "to restore liquidity and stability to the financial system of the United States." P.L. 111-203 , the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, reduced total TARP purchase authority from $700 billion to $475 billion. The Department of the Treasury's authority to make new financial commitments under TARP ended on October 3, 2010. The Department of the Treasury has disbursed approximately $430 billion in TARP funds, including $370 million to purchase SBA 7(a) loan guaranty program securities. In addition, as mentioned previously, in 2009, ARRA provided an additional $730 million for SBA programs, including $375 million to temporarily reduce fees in the SBA's 7(a) and 504/CDC loan guaranty programs and increase the 7(a) program's maximum loan guaranty percentage from up to 85% of loans of $150,000 or less and up to 75% of loans exceeding $150,000 to 90% for all standard 7(a) loans. Congress subsequently provided another $265 million, and authorized the SBA to reprogram another $40 million, to extend the fee reductions and loan modification through May 31, 2010, and the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010 provided another $505 million (plus $5 million for administrative expenses) to extend the fee reductions and loan modification from September 27, 2010, through December 31, 2010. Also, P.L. 111-322 , the Continuing Appropriations and Surface Transportation Extensions Act, 2011, authorized the use of any funding remaining from the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010 to extend the fee subsidies and 90% maximum loan guaranty percentage through March 4, 2011, or until the available funding was exhausted. Funding for these purposes was exhausted on January 3, 2011. The Obama Administration argued that TARP and the additional funding for the SBA's loan guaranty programs helped to improve the small business lending environment and supported "the retention and creation of hundreds of thousands of jobs." Critics argued that small business tax reduction, reform of financial credit market regulation, and federal fiscal restraint are the best means to assist small business economic growth and job creation. Over the years, the SBA's Office of Inspector General (OIG) and the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) have independently reviewed the SBA's administration of the SBA's loan guaranty programs. Although improvements have been noted, both agencies have reported deficiencies in the SBA's administration of its loan guaranty programs that they argue need to be addressed, including issues involving the oversight of 7(a) lenders and the lack of outcome-based performance measures. On December 1, 2000, the OIG released its FY2001 list of the most serious management challenges facing the SBA and included, for the first time, the oversight of SBA lenders. Since then, the OIG has determined that the SBA has made significant progress in improving its oversight of SBA lenders. For example The SBA established an Office of Lender Oversight (renamed the Office of Credit Risk Management in 2007), led by an Associate Administrator, which, in October 2000, drafted a strategic plan to serve as a basis for developing a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for lender oversight and, among other activities, initiated "steps to develop and implement a comprehensive loan monitoring system to evaluate lender performance. The system will collect data on lenders such as delinquency default rates, liquidations, loan payments, and loan originations." In 2004, the SBA's National Guaranty Purchase Center developed a quality control plan "to review the quality of the guaranty purchase process." In 2006, the SBA issued an SOP that established procedures for on-site, risk-based lender reviews and safety and soundness examinations for 7(a) lenders and Certified Development Companies (CDCs) participating the SBA's 504/CDC loan guaranty program. In 2007, the SBA completed the centralization of all 7(a) loan processing activities and, with very limited exception, ended loan making, servicing, liquidation, and guaranty purchase activity at district offices. In 2008, the SBA issued an SOP for 7(a) lender oversight which included uniform policies and procedures for the evaluation of lender performance and the SBA's Office of Financial Program Operations (OFPO) began designing "a comprehensive quality control program across all of its centers." Previously, quality control was conducted within each loan center (Standard 7(a) Loan Guaranty Processing Center, Commercial Loan Service Center, and National Guaranty Purchase Center) "at various levels of sophistication." The SBA issued an interim final rule in the Federal Register on December 1, 2008, incorporating the SBA's risk-based lender oversight program into the SBA's regulations. In 2010, the SBA's OFPO established its agency-wide quality control program, which is designed to improve service and "reduce waste, fraud, and abuse" by ensuring "that centers accurately and consistently apply statutory, regulatory, and procedural loan program requirements." The SBA also developed a "risk-based, off-site analysis of lending partners through its Loan/Lender Monitoring System (L/LMS), a state-of-the-art portfolio monitoring system that incorporates credit scoring metrics for portfolio management purposes." In 2012-2013, the SBA "(1) developed risk profiles and lender performance thresholds, (2) developed a select analytical review process to allow for virtual risk-based reviews, (3) updated its lender risk rating model to better stratify and predict risk, and (4) conducted test reviews under the new risk-based review protocol." In 2013-2014, the SBA "improved its monitoring and verification of corrective actions by lenders by: (1) developing corrective action assessment procedures, (2) finalizing a system to facilitate the corrective action process, and (3) populating the system with lender oversight results requiring corrective action." In 2015, the SBA's Office of Credit Risk Management (OCRM) "engaged contractor support to expand on its corrective action follow-up process. Additionally, OCRM issued its FY2015 Risk Management Oversight Plan, which included plans to conduct 170 corrective action reviews between 7(a) and 504 lenders." In 2016, OCRM reported that it conducted 147 corrective action follow-up assessments, established performance measures and risk mitigation goals for the SBA's entire lending portfolio, and "conducted portfolio analyses of problem lenders with heavy concentrations in SBA 7(a) lending and sales on the secondary market." Despite these improvements, the OIG continues to list lender oversight as one of the most serious management challenges facing the SBA because it argues that several issues that it has identified in audits have not been fully addressed. Specifically, the OIG reports that the SBA needs to show that the portfolio risk management program is used to support risk based decisions, implement additional controls to mitigate risks, develop an effective method for tracking loan agents, and update regulations on loan agents. GAO has argued that the 7(a) program's performance measures (e.g., number of loans approved, loans funded, and firms assisted across the subgroups of small businesses) provide limited information about the impact of the loans on participating small businesses: The program's performance measures focus on indicators that are primarily output measures–for instance, they report on the number of loans approved and funded. But none of the measures looks at how well firms do after receiving 7(a) loans, so no information is available on outcomes. As a result, the current measures do not indicate how well the agency is meeting its strategic goal of helping small businesses succeed. The SBA's OIG has made a similar argument concerning the SBA's Microloan program's performance measures. Because the SBA uses similar program performance measures for its Microloan and 7(a) programs, the OIG's recommendations could also be applied to the SBA's 7(a) program. Specifically, as part of its audit of the SBA Microloan program's use of ARRA funds, the OIG found that the SBA's performance measures for the Microloan program are based on the number of microloans funded, the number of small businesses assisted, and program's loan loss rate. It argued that these "performance metrics ... do not ensure the ultimate program beneficiaries, the microloan borrowers, are truly assisted by the program" and "without appropriate metrics, SBA cannot ensure the Microloan program is meeting policy goals." It noted that the SBA does not track the number of microloan borrowers who remain in business after receiving a microloan to measure the extent to which the loans contributed to the success of borrowers and does not determine the effect that technical training assistance may have on the success of microloan borrowers and their ability to repay loans. It recommended that the SBA "develop additional performance metrics to measure the program's achievement in assisting microloan borrowers in establishing and maintaining successful small businesses." In its response to GAO's recommendation to develop additional performance measures for the 7(a) program, the SBA formed, in July 2014, an impact evaluation working group to develop a methodology for conducting impact evaluations of the agency's programs using administrative data sources residing at the SBA and in other federal agencies, such as the U.S. Census Bureau and the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Numerous SBA program offices participated in this working group and each office developed its own program evaluation methodology or established program evaluation frameworks. More recently, the SBA indicated in its FY2017 congressional budget justification document that although it "continues to face barriers gathering outcome rich evaluation data with current restrictions in collecting personal identification information (PII) and business identification information (BII)" it "plans to further develop its analytical capabilities, enhance collaboration across its programs, provide evaluation-specific trainings, and broaden use of impact evaluations to support senior leaders and institutionalize the evidence-based process across programs." To encourage evidence-based evaluations across its programs, the SBA has created an annual Enterprise Learning Agenda designed to "help program managers continue to build and use evidence and to foster an environment of continuous learning." As part of this agenda building process, the SBA identifies programs for evidence-based evaluation and undertakes both internal evaluations using available data or contracts with third parties to conduct the evaluations. Congress authorized several changes to the 7(a) program during the 111 th Congress in an effort to increase the number and amount of 7(a) loans. During the 111 th Congress, the Obama Administration supported congressional efforts to temporarily subsidize fees for the 7(a) and 504/CDC loan guaranty programs and to increase the 7(a) program's loan guaranty percentage from up to 85% of loans of $150,000 or less and up to 75% of loans exceeding $150,000 to 90%. Congress subsequently provided nearly $1.1 billion to temporarily subsidize fees for the 7(a) and 504/CDC loan guaranty programs and to increase the 7(a) program's maximum loan guaranty percentage to 90% for all standard 7(a) loans. The Obama Administration also proposed the following modifications to several SBA programs, including the 7(a) program: increase the maximum loan size for 7(a) loans from $2 million to $5 million; increase the maximum loan size for the 504/CDC program from $2 million to $5 million for regular projects and from $4 million to $5.5 million for manufacturing projects; increase the maximum loan size for microloans to small business concerns from $35,000 to $50,000; increase the maximum loan limits for lenders in their first year of participation in the Microloan program, from $750,000 to $1 million, and from $3.5 million to $5 million in the subsequent years; temporarily increase the cap on SBAExpress loans from $350,000 to $1 million; and temporarily allow in FY2010 and FY2011, with an option to extend into FY2012, the refinancing of loans for owner-occupied commercial real estate that are within one year of maturity under the SBA's 504/CDC program. The Obama Administration argued that increasing the maximum loan limits for the 7(a), 504/CDC, Microloan, and SBAExpress programs would allow the SBA to "support larger projects," which would "allow the SBA to help America's small businesses drive long-term economic growth and the creation of jobs in communities across the country." The Administration also argued that increasing the maximum loan limits for these programs would be "budget neutral" over the long run and "help improve the availability of smaller loans." Critics of the Obama Administration's proposals to increase the SBA's maximum loan limits argued that higher loan limits might increase the risk of defaults, resulting in higher guaranty fees or the need to provide the SBA additional funding, especially for the SBAExpress program, which has experienced somewhat higher default rates than other SBA loan guaranty programs. Others advocated a more modest increase in the maximum loan limits to ensure that the 7(a) program "remains focused on startup and early-stage small firms, businesses that have historically encountered the greatest difficulties in accessing credit," and "avoids making small borrowers carry a disproportionate share of the risk associated with larger loans." Others argued that creating a small business direct lending program within the SBA would reduce paperwork requirements and be more efficient in providing small businesses access to capital than modifying existing SBA programs that rely on private lenders to determine if they will issue the loans. Also, as mentioned previously, others argued that providing additional resources to the SBA or modifying the SBA's loan programs as a means to augment small business access to capital is ill-advised. In their view, the SBA has limited impact on small businesses' access to capital. They argued that the best means to assist small business economic growth and job creation is to focus on small business tax reduction, reform of financial credit market regulation, and federal fiscal restraint. As mentioned previously, in 2009, ARRA provided an additional $730 million for SBA programs, including $375 million to temporarily reduce fees in the SBA's 7(a) and 504/CDC loan guaranty programs ($299 million) and increase the 7(a) program's maximum loan guaranty percentage from up to 85% of loans of $150,000 or less and up to 75% of loans exceeding $150,000 to 90% for all standard 7(a) loans ($76 million). P.L. 111-240 provided $505 million (plus $5 million for administrative expenses) to extend the 7(a) program's 90% maximum loan guaranty percentage and 7(a) and 504/CDC loan guaranty programs' fee subsidies through December 31, 2010 (later extended to March 4, 2011), or until available funding was exhausted (which occurred on January 3, 2011). The act also made the following changes to the SBA's programs: increased the maximum loan size for 7(a) loans from $2 million to $5 million; temporarily increased for one year (through September 27, 2011) the cap on SBAExpress loans from $350,000 to $1 million; increased the maximum loan size for the 504/CDC loans from $1.5 million to $5 million for regular projects, from $2 million to $5 million for projects meeting one of the program's specified public policy goals, and from $4 million to $5.5 million for manufacturers; increased the maximum loan size for the Microloan program from $35,000 to $50,000; authorized the SBA to establish an alternative size standard for the 7(a) and 504/CDC programs that uses maximum tangible net worth and average net income as an alternative to the use of industry standards and established an interim size standard of a maximum tangible net worth of not more than $15 million and an average net income after federal taxes (excluding any carryover losses) for the preceding two fiscal years of not more than $5 million; and allowed 504/CDC loans to be used to refinance up to $7.5 billion in short-term commercial real estate debt each fiscal year for two years after enactment (through September 27, 2012) into long-term fixed rate loans. The act also authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to establish a $30 billion Small Business Lending Fund (SBLF) to encourage community banks to provide small business loans ($4 billion was issued), a $1.5 billion State Small Business Credit Initiative to provide funding to participating states with small business capital access programs, and about $12 billion in tax relief for small businesses. It also contained revenue raising provisions to offset the act's cost and authorized a number of changes to other SBA loan and contracting programs. Congress did not approve any changes to the 7(a) program during the 112 th Congress. However, several bills were introduced during the 112 th Congress that would have changed the program. S. 1828 , a bill to increase small business lending, and for other purposes, was introduced on November 8, 2011, and referred to the Senate Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship. The bill would have reinstated for a year following the date of its enactment the temporary fee subsidies for the 7(a) and 504/CDC loan guaranty programs and the 90% loan guaranty for standard 7(a) loans, which were originally authorized by ARRA and later extended by several laws, including the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010. H.R. 2936 , the Small Business Administration Express Loan Extension Act of 2011, introduced on September 15, 2011, and referred to the House Committee on Small Business, would have extended a one-year increase in the maximum loan amount for the SBAExpress program from $350,000 to $1 million for an additional year. The temporary increase in that program's maximum loan amount was authorized by P.L. 111-240 , the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, and expired on September 27, 2011 (see Appendix ). S. 532 , the Patriot Express Authorization Act of 2011, introduced on March 9, 2011, and referred to the Senate Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship, would have provided statutory authorization for the Patriot Express Pilot Program. This program was subsequently discontinued by the SBA on December 31, 2013. The bill would have increased the program's maximum loan amount from $500,000 to $1 million, and it would have increased the guaranty percentages from up to 85% of loans of $150,000 or less and up to 75% of loans exceeding $150,000 to up to 85% of loans of $500,000 or less and up to 80% of loans exceeding $500,000. H.R. 2451 , the Strengthening Entrepreneurs' Economic Development Act of 2013, was introduced on June 20, 2013, and referred to the House Committee on Small Business. It would have authorized the SBA to make direct loans of up to $150,000 to businesses with fewer than 20 employees. It would have also required the SBA to assess, collect, and retain a fee with respect to the outstanding balance of the deferred participation share of each 7(a) loan in excess of $2 million that is no more than is necessary to reduce to zero the SBA's cost of making the loan. H.R. 2461 , the SBA Loan Paperwork Reduction Act of 2013, was introduced on June 20, 2013, and referred to the House Committee on Small Business. It would have provided statutory authorization for the Small Loan Advantage (SLA) pilot program. The SBA started that program on February 15, 2011. It provided a streamlined application process for 7(a) loans of up to $350,000 if the loan received an acceptable credit score from the SBA prior to the loan being submitted for processing. The SBA adopted the SLA application process as the model for processing all non-express 7(a) loans of $350,000 or less, effective January 1, 2014. As mentioned previously, the Obama Administration waived the up-front, one time loan guaranty fee and ongoing servicing fee for 7(a) loans of $150,000 or less approved in FY2014 (and later extended the fee waiver in FY2015 and FY2016). H.R. 2462 , the Small Business Opportunity Acceleration Act of 2013, introduced on June 20, 2013, and referred to the House Committee on Small Business, would have made the fee waiver permanent. Also, the Obama Administration waived the up-front, one-time loan guaranty fee for veteran loans under the SBAExpress program (up to $350,000) from January 1, 2014, through the end of FY2015 (called the Veterans Advantage Program). S. 2143 , the Veterans Entrepreneurship Act, would have authorized this fee waiver and made it permanent. Also, P.L. 113-235 provided statutory authorization to waive the 7(a) SBAExpress program's guarantee fee for veterans (and their spouse) in FY2015. P.L. 114-38 , the Veterans Entrepreneurship Act of 2015, authorized and made permanent the waiver of the up-front, one-time loan guaranty fee for veterans (and their spouse) in the SBAExpress program beginning on or after October 1, 2015, except during any upcoming fiscal year for which the President's budget, submitted to Congress, includes a cost for the 7(a) program, in its entirety, that is above zero. The act also increased the 7(a) program's authorization limit from $18.75 billion in FY2015 to $23.5 billion. On June 25, 2015, the SBA informed Congress that the 7(a) program "is on track to hit its authorization ceiling of $18.75 billion well before the end of FY2015." The SBA indicated that "our activity and trend analysis reveal a strong uptick that, if sustained, would exceed our lending authority ceiling by late August." If that were to occur, and in the absence of statutory authority to do otherwise, the SBA reported that it would have to suspend 7(a) loan making for the remainder of the fiscal year. The SBA requested an increase in the 7(a) loan program's authorization limit to $22.5 billion in FY2015. On July 23, 2015, citing "unprecedented demand," the SBA suspended 7(a) program lending. The SBA indicated that it would continue to process loan applications "up to the point of approval" and then place approved loans "into a queue awaiting the availability of program authority." Loans would be released "once program authority became available due to Congressional action or as a result of cancellations of loans previously approved this fiscal year." Applications would then "be funded in the order they were approved by SBA, with the exception that requests for increases to previously approved loans will be funded before applications for new loans." The SBA resumed 7(a) lending on July 28, 2015, following P.L. 114-38 's enactment. In addition to increasing the 7(a) program's authorization limit for FY2015, the act added requirements designed to ensure that SBA loans do not displace private sector loans (e.g., the SBA Administrator may not guarantee a 7(a) loan if the lender determines that the borrower is unable to obtain credit elsewhere solely because the liquidity of the lender depends upon the guarantied portion of the loan being sold on the secondary market, or if the sole purpose for requesting the guarantee is to allow the lender to exceed the lender's legal lending limit), and requires the SBA to report, on a quarterly basis, specified 7(a) program statistics to the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations and Small Business. These required statistics are designed to inform the committees of the SBA's pace of 7(a) lending, provide estimates concerning the date on which the program's authorization limit may be reached, and present information concerning early defaults and actions taken by the SBA to combat early defaults. As mentioned previously, P.L. 114-113 increased the 7(a) program's authorization limit from $23.5 billion in FY2015 to $26.5 billion for FY2016. In addition, P.L. 114-223 , the Continuing Appropriations and Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2017, authorized the SBA to use funds from its business loan program account "to accommodate increased demand for commitments for [7(a)] general business loans" for the duration of the continuing resolution (initially December 9, 2016, later extended by P.L. 114-254 , the Further Continuing and Security Assistance Appropriations Act, 2017, to April 28, 2017). In a related development, S. 2496 , the Help Small Businesses Access Affordable Credit Act, introduced on February 2, 2016, would have authorized the SBA Administrator, with prior approval of the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations, to make loans in an amount equal to not more than 110% of the 7(a) program's authorization limit if the demand for 7(a) loans should exceed that limit. The Obama Administration also requested authorization to allow the SBA Administrator to continue to issue loans should the demand for 7(a) loans exceed the program's authorization limit. Also. S. 2992 , the Small Business Lending Oversight Act of 2016, would have required the Director of the SBA's Office of Credit Risk Management (OCRM) to impose penalties on 7(a) lenders who "knowingly and repeatedly" undertake specified activities; required the SBA to annually undertake and report the findings of a risk analysis of the 7(a) program's loan portfolio; redefined the credit elsewhere requirement; authorized fees to be used to support OCRM operations; required the SBA to identify potential loan risks by lenders participating in the Preferred Lenders Program by requiring the SBA, at the end of each year, to "calculate the percentage of loans in a lender's portfolio made without a contribution of borrower equity when the loan's purpose was to establish a new small business concern, to effectuate a change of small business ownership, or to purchase real estate"; and, among other provisions, prohibited the SBA from approving any loan if its financing is more than 100% of project costs. Legislation was also introduced ( S. 2125 , the Small Business Lending and Economic Inequality Reduction Act of 2015) to provide permanent, statutory authorization for the Community Advantage Pilot program (see Appendix ). The SBA announced on December 28, 2015, that it was extending the Community Advantage Pilot program through March 31, 2020. It had been set to expire on March 15, 2017. Recognizing that 7(a) loan approvals during the first half of FY2017 were about 9% higher than during the first half of FY2016, Congress included a provision in P.L. 115-31 , the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017, that increased the 7(a) program's authorization limit to $27.5 billion in FY2017 from $26.5 billion in FY2016. Congress also approved legislation ( P.L. 115-141 , the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018) that increased the 7(a) program's authorization limit to $29.0 billion in FY2018. In addition, as mentioned earlier, P.L. 115-189 , the Small Business 7(a) Lending Oversight Reform Act of 2018, among other provisions, codified the SBA's Office of Credit Risk Management; required that office to annually undertake and report the findings of a risk analysis of the 7(a) program's loan portfolio; created a lender oversight committee within the SBA; authorized the Director of the Office of Credit Risk Management to undertake informal and formal enforcement actions against 7(a) lenders under specified conditions; redefined the credit elsewhere requirement; and authorized the SBA Administrator to increase the amount of 7(a) loans not more than once during any fiscal year to not more than 115% of the 7(a) program's authorization limit. The SBA is required to provide at least 30 days' notice of its intent to exceed the 7(a) loan program's authorization limit to the House and Senate Committees on Small Business and the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations' Subcommittees on Financial Services and General Government and may exercise this option only once per fiscal year. Also, P.L. 115-232 , the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, included provisions to make 7(a) loans more accessible to employee-owned small businesses (ESOPs) and cooperatives. The act authorizes the SBA to make "back-to-back" loans to ESOPs to better align with industry practices (the loan proceeds must only be used to make a loan to a qualified employee trust); clarifies that 7(a) loans to ESOPs may be made under the Preferred Lenders Program; allows the seller to remain involved as an officer, director, or key employee when the ESOP or cooperative has acquired 100% ownership of the small business; and authorizes the SBA to finance transition costs to employee ownership and waive any mandatory equity injection by the ESOP or cooperative to help finance the change of ownership. The act also directs the SBA to create outreach programs with Small Business Investment Companies and Microloan intermediaries to make their lending programs more accessible to all eligible ESOPs and cooperatives, an interagency working group to promote lending to ESOPs and cooperatives, and a Small Business Employee Ownership and Cooperatives Promotion Program, administered by Small Business Development Centers, to offer technical assistance and training to small businesses on the transition to employee ownership through cooperatives and ESOPs. Congress did not focus much attention on the Trump Administration's proposal in its FY2019 budget request to "introduce counter-cyclical policies in SBA's business guaranty loan programs and update certain fees structures to offset $155 million in business loan administration." As mentioned earlier, the proposal included raising $93 million in additional revenue by allowing the SBA to set the 7(a) program's annual servicing fee at rates below zero credit subsidy; increasing the 7(a) loan program's FY2019 annual servicing fee's cap from 0.55% to 0.625%; and increasing the FY2019 upfront loan guarantee fee on 7(a) loans over $1 million by 0.25%. The Administration also requested that the 7(a) loan program's authorization limit be increased to $30.0 million in FY2019; that the SBA be allowed to further increase the 7(a) loan program's authorization amount in FY2019 by 15% under specified circumstances "to better equip the SBA to meet peaks in demand while continuing to operate at zero subsidies;" that the SBA be allowed to impose an annual fee, not to exceed 0.05% per year, of the outstanding balance on 7(a) secondary market trust certificates to help offset administrative costs; and that the SBAExpress program's loan limit be increased from $350,000 to $1 million. P.L. 116-6 , the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019, increased the 7(a) program's authorization limit to $30.0 billion in FY2019. The congressional debate concerning the SBA's 7(a) program during the 111 th Congress was not whether the federal government should act, but which federal policies would most likely enhance small businesses' access to capital and result in job retention and creation. As a general proposition, some Members of Congress argued that the SBA should be provided additional resources to assist small businesses in acquiring capital necessary to start, continue, or expand operations with the expectation that in so doing small businesses will create jobs. Others worried about the long-term adverse economic effects of spending programs that increase the federal deficit. They advocated business tax reduction, reform of financial credit market regulation, and federal fiscal restraint as the best means to help small businesses further economic growth and job creation. In terms of specific program changes, increasing the 7(a) program's loan limit, extending the 7(a) program's temporary fee subsidies and 90% maximum loan guaranty percentage, and establishing an alternative size standard for the 7(a) program were all designed to achieve the same goal: to enhance job creation by increasing the ability of 7(a) borrowers to access credit at affordable rates. However, determining how specific changes in federal policy are most likely to enhance job creation is a challenging task. For example, a 2008 Urban Institute study concluded that differences in the term, interest rate, and amount of SBA financing were "not significantly associated with increasing sales or employment among firms receiving SBA financing." The study also reported that the analysis accounted for less than 10% of the variation in firm performance. The Urban Institute suggested that local economic conditions, local zoning regulations, state and local tax rates, state and local business assistance programs, and the business owner's charisma or business acumen also "may play a role in determining how well a business performs after receipt of SBA financing." As the Urban Institute study suggests, because many factors influence business success, measuring the 7(a) program's effect on job retention and creation is complicated. That task is made even more challenging by the absence of performance-oriented measures that could serve as a guide. Both GAO and the SBA's OIG have recommended that the SBA adopt outcome performance-oriented measures for its loan guaranty programs, such as tracking the number of borrowers who remain in business after receiving a loan to measure the extent to which the program contributed to their ability to stay in business. Other performance-oriented measures that Congress might also consider include requiring the SBA to survey 7(a) borrowers to measure the difficulty they experienced in obtaining a loan from the private sector and the extent to which the 7(a) loan or technical assistance received contributed to their ability to create jobs or expand their scope of operations. The 7(a) program has several specialized programs that offer streamlined and expedited loan procedures for particular groups of borrowers, including the SBAExpress, Export Express, and Community Advantage programs. Lenders must be approved by the SBA for participation in these programs. SBAExpress Program The SBAExpress program was established as a pilot program by the SBA on February 27, 1995, and made permanent through legislation, subject to reauthorization, in 2004 ( P.L. 108-447 , the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005). The program is designed to increase the availability of credit to small businesses by permitting lenders to use their existing documentation and procedures in return for receiving a reduced SBA guaranty on loans. It provides a 50% loan guaranty on loan amounts up to $350,000. As shown in Table A-1 , the SBA approved 27,794 SBAExpress loans (46.1% of total 7(a) program loan approvals), totaling $1.98 billion (7.8% of total 7(a) program amount approvals) in FY2018. The program's higher loan amount in FY2011 was due, at least in part, to a provision in P.L. 111-240 , the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, which temporarily increased the SBAExpress program's loan limit to $1 million for one year following enactment (through September 27, 2011). During the 112 th Congress, H.R. 2936 , the Small Business Administration Express Loan Extension Act of 2011, would have extended the SBAExpress program's higher loan limit for an additional year (through September 27, 2012). SBAExpress loan proceeds can be used for the same purposes as those of the 7(a) program (expansion, renovation, new construction, the purchase of land or buildings, the purchase of equipment, fixtures, and lease-hold improvements, working capital, to refinance debt for compelling reasons, seasonal line of credit, and inventory); except that participant debt restructure cannot exceed 50% of the project and may be used for revolving credit. The program's loan terms are the same as those of the 7(a) program (the loan maturity for working capital, machinery, and equipment (not to exceed the life of the equipment) is typically 5 years to 10 years; and the loan maturity for real estate is up to 25 years, except that the term for a revolving line of credit cannot exceed 7 years. The SBAExpress loan's interest rates and fees are the same as those used for the 7(a) program. To account for the program's lower guaranty rate of 50%, lenders are allowed to perform their own loan analysis and procedures and receive SBA approval with a targeted 36-hour maximum turnaround time. Also, collateral is not required for loans of $25,000 or less. Lenders are allowed to use their own established collateral policy for loans over $25,000. As mentioned earlier, the SBA waived the up-front, one-time loan guaranty fee for 7(a) loans of $125,000 or less approved in FY2018. The SBA also waived 50% of the up-front, one-time loan guaranty fee on all non-SBAExpress 7(a) loans to veterans of $125,001 to $350,000 in FY2018. In addition, P.L. 114-38 , the Veterans Entrepreneurship Act of 2015, provided statutory authorization and made permanent the veteran's fee waiver in the SBAExpress program, except during any upcoming fiscal year for which the President's budget, submitted to Congress, includes a cost for the 7(a) program, in its entirety, that is above zero. The SBA waived this fee in FY2016, FY2017, and FY2018 and is waiving it in FY2019. The SBA indicated that its fee waivers for veterans are part "of SBA's broader efforts to make sure that veterans have the tools they need to start and grow a business." In a related development, the SBA discontinued the Patriot Express Pilot Program on December 31, 2013. It provided loans of up to $500,000 (with a guaranty of up to 85% of loans of $150,000 or less and up to 75% of loans exceeding $150,000) to veterans and their spouses. It had been in operation since 2007, and, like the SBAExpress program, featured streamlined documentation requirements and expedited loan processing. Over its history, the Patriot Express Pilot Program disbursed 9,414 loans amounting to more than $791 million. Export Express The Export Express program was established as a subprogram of the SBAExpress program in 1998, and made a separate pilot program in 2000. It was made permanent through legislation, subject to reauthorization, in 2010 ( P.L. 111-240 , the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010). The Export Express program is designed to increase the availability of credit to current and prospective small business exporters that have been in business, though not necessarily in exporting, for at least 12 full months, particularly those small businesses needing revolving lines of credit. Export Express loans may not be used to finance overseas operations, except for the marketing or distribution of products or services exported from the United States. The program is generally subject to the same loan processing, making, closing, servicing, and liquidation requirements as well as the same maturity terms, interest rates, and applicable fees as the SBAExpress program. Two key differences between the two programs is that the Export Express program's maximum loan amount is up to $500,000, and its guaranty rate is 90% for loans of $350,000 or less, and 75% for loans exceeding $350,000. There were 215 lenders with approved SBA Export Express loan guaranties at the end of FY2017. These lenders are located in 46 states, Guam, and Puerto Rico. As shown in Table A-2 , the SBA approved 59 Export Express loans totaling $15.45 million in FY2018. Community Advantage 7(a) Loan Initiative The SBA's Community Advantage (CA) 7(a) loan initiative became operational on February 15, 2011. Originally announced as a three-year pilot program (through March 15, 2014), it subsequently was extended through March 15, 2017; March 31, 2020; and September 30, 2022. As of September 12, 2018, there were 113 approved CA lenders, 99 of which were actively making and servicing CA loans. The CA loan initiative is designed to increase lending to underserved low- and moderate-income communities. It, along with the now-discontinued Small Loan Advantage program, replaced the Community Express Pilot Program, which also was designed to increase lending to underserved communities. The CA loan initiative provides the same loan terms, guaranty fees, and guaranty as that of the 7(a) program on loan amounts up to $250,000 (85% for loans up to $150,000 and 75% for those greater than $150,000). Loan proceeds can be used for the same purposes as those of the 7(a) program. The loan's maximum interest rate is prime, plus 6%. The program has an expedited approval process, which includes a two-page application for borrowers and a goal of completing the approval process within 5 to 10 days. The CA loan initiative is designed to increase "the number of SBA 7(a) lenders who reach underserved communities, targeting community-based, mission-focused financial institutions which were previously not able to offer SBA loans." These mission-focused financial institutions include the following: nonfederally regulated Community Development Financial Institutions certified by the U.S. Department of the Treasury, SBA's Certified Development Companies, SBA's nonprofit microlending intermediaries, and, added in December 2015, SBA's Intermediary Lending Pilot Program intermediaries. They are expected to maintain at least 60% of their SBA loan portfolio in underserved markets, including loans to small businesses in, or that have more than 50% of their full-time workforce residing in, low-to-moderate income (LMI) communities; Empowerment Zones and Enterprise Communities; HUBZones; start-ups (firms in business less than two years); businesses eligible for the SBA's Veterans Advantage program; Promise Zones (added in December 2015); and Opportunity Zones and Rural Areas (added in October 2018). The SBA placed a moratorium, effective October 1, 2018, on accepting new CA lender applications, primarily as a means to mitigate the risk of future loan defaults. The SBA also increased the minimum acceptable credit score for CA loans "that satisfies the need to consider several required underwriting criteria" from 120 to 140; increased the wait time for CA lenders ineligible for delegated lender status at the time of approval as a CA lender from 6 months to 12 months and increased the number of CA loans that must be initially dispersed before a CA lender may process applications under delegated authority from five to seven loans; increased the loan loss reserve requirement for CA loans sold in the secondary market from 3% to 5% of the outstanding amount of the guaranteed portion of each loan; modified requirements related to the refinancing of debts with a CA loan; limited fees that can be charged by a CA lender for assistance in obtaining a CA loan to no more than $2,500, with the exception of necessary out-of-pocket costs such as filing or recording fees; and as mentioned previously, added Opportunity Zones and Rural Areas to the list of economically distressed communities that are eligible for a CA loan. As shown in Table A-3 , the SBA approved 1,118 CA loans amounting to $157.5 million in FY2018 and 4,906 CA loans amounting to $643.72 million from the time the program became operational to the end of FY2018. As mentioned previously, legislation was introduced during the 114 th Congress ( S. 2125 , the Small Business Lending and Economic Inequality Reduction Act of 2015) to provide the Community Advantage Pilot program permanent, statutory authorization.	[ "The Small Business Administration (SBA) administers several programs to support small businesses, including loan guaranty programs designed to encourage lenders to provide loans to small businesses \"that might not otherwise obtain financing on reasonable terms and conditions.\" The SBA's 7(a) loan guaranty program is considered the agency's flagship loan program. Its name is derived from Section 7(a) of the Small Business Act of 1953 (P.L. 83-163, as amended), which authorizes the SBA to provide business loans and loan guaranties to American small businesses. In FY2018, the SBA approved 60,353 7(a) loans totaling nearly $25.4 billion. The average approved 7(a) loan amount was $420,401. Proceeds from 7(a) loans may be used to establish a new business or to assist in the operation, acquisition, or expansion of an existing business. This report discusses the rationale provided for the 7(a) program; the program's borrower and lender eligibility standards and program requirements; and program statistics, including loan volume, loss rates, use of proceeds, borrower satisfaction, and borrower demographics. It also examines issues raised concerning the SBA's administration of the 7(a) program, including the oversight of 7(a) lenders and the program's lack of outcome-based performance measures. The report also surveys congressional and presidential actions taken in recent years to enhance small businesses' access to capital. For example, Congress approved legislation during the 111th Congress to provide more than $1.1 billion to temporarily subsidize the 7(a) and 504/Certified Development Companies (504/CDC) loan guaranty programs' fees and temporarily increase the 7(a) program's maximum loan guaranty percentage to 90% (funding was exhausted on January 3, 2011); raise the 7(a) program's gross loan limit from $2 million to $5 million; and establish an alternative size standard for the 7(a) and 504/CDC loan programs. The SBA waived the up-front, one-time loan guaranty fee for smaller 7(a) loans from FY2014 through FY2018; and is waiving the annual service fee for 7(a) loans of $150,000 or less made to small businesses located in a rural area or a HUBZone and reducing the up-front one-time guaranty fee for these loans from 2.0% to 0.6667% of the guaranteed portion of the loan in FY2019. The SBA has also waived the up-front, one-time loan guaranty fee for veteran loans under the SBAExpress program (up to $350,000) since January 1, 2014; and reduced the up-front, one-time loan guaranty fee on non-SBAExpress 7(a) loans to veterans from FY2015 through FY2018. P.L. 114-38, the Veterans Entrepreneurship Act of 2015, provided statutory authorization and made permanent the veteran's fee waiver under the SBAExpress program, except during any upcoming fiscal year for which the President's budget, submitted to Congress, includes a cost for the 7(a) program, in its entirety, that is above zero. Congress also approved legislation that increased the 7(a) program's authorization limit from $18.75 billion (on disbursements) in FY2014 to $23.5 billion in FY2015, $26.5 billion in FY2016, $27.5 billion in FY2017, $29.0 billion in FY2018, and $30 billion in FY2019. P.L. 115-189, the Small Business 7(a) Lending Oversight Reform Act of 2018, among other provisions, codified the SBA's Office of Credit Risk Management; required that office to annually undertake and report the findings of a risk analysis of the 7(a) program's loan portfolio; created a lender oversight committee within the SBA; authorized the Director of the Office of Credit Risk Management to undertake informal and formal enforcement actions against 7(a) lenders under specified conditions; redefined the credit elsewhere requirement; and authorized the SBA Administrator, starting in FY2019 and after providing at least 30 days' notice to specified congressional committees, to increase the amount of 7(a) loans not more than once during any fiscal year to not more than 115% of the 7(a) program's authorization limit. The Appendix provides a brief description of the 7(a) program's SBAExpress, Export Express, and Community Advantage programs." ]	14,118	gov_report	en	null	6d5ca6fc8b8c5d3fedeec78b574fa9f418e57fec837cff3a
Created in 1968, the SFSP is authorized under the Richard B. Russell National School Lunch Act and generally provides free meals to children age 18 and under in low-income areas during certain periods when school is not in session. Specifically, the SFSP operates during school summer vacation periods between May through September, vacation periods in any month for programs operating on a continuous school calendar, and certain other times for areas affected by an unanticipated school closure, such as for a natural disaster. However, the majority of SFSP meals are served to children during the summer months. In fiscal years 2007 through 2016, federal expenditures on SFSP increased, according to FNS data, though there was a slight decrease between fiscal years 2015 and 2016 (see fig. 1). The SFSP is administered at the federal level by FNS through its national and regional offices. FNS is responsible for issuing regulations, instructions, and guidance; reviewing states’ program management and administration plans; overseeing program administration; and reimbursing states for meals served that meet program requirements. At the state level, the program is administered by state agencies and locally operated by state-approved sponsors, such as school districts, local government entities, or private nonprofit organizations. State agencies are responsible for approving, providing training to, and inspecting and monitoring sponsors and meal sites. Sponsors, in turn, are responsible for monitoring their SFSP meal sites, managing the meal service, and providing training to administrative staff and site operators. A sponsor may operate one site or multiple sites. Sites are physical locations in the community where children receive and consume meals in a supervised setting. According to FNS guidance, sites may be located in a variety of settings, including schools, parks, community centers, health clinics, hospitals, apartment complexes, churches, and migrant camps. States may approve different types of SFSP meal sites, including open sites, closed enrolled sites, and camps. Open sites operate in an area where at least half of the children are eligible for free or reduced-price school meals (referred to as “area eligible”), according to data from entities such as schools or the U.S. Census Bureau. Children are generally eligible for free or reduced-price school meals if their households have incomes at or below 185 percent of federal poverty guidelines. At open sites, meals are made available to all children in the area, and all meals served that meet program requirements are reimbursable. Closed enrolled sites, on the other hand, are open only to enrolled children, as opposed to the community at large. At closed enrolled sites, meals served to all children in attendance are reimbursable as long as at least half of the enrolled children are eligible for free or reduced-price school lunch. Unlike other types of sites, camps are reimbursed only for meals served to children who have been individually determined to be eligible for free or reduced-price school meals. SFSP meals must meet certain requirements in order to be eligible for federal reimbursement; for example, the meals must be served and consumed on-site at an approved site. Federal reimbursements for summer meals are provided for each breakfast, lunch, supper, or snack served to an eligible child at an eligible site that also meets federal requirements for menu components, scheduled meal times, and nutrition. For example, to meet nutritional requirements, a lunch or a supper must, at a minimum, include four components: 2 ounces of meat or a comparable serving of a meat alternate, 3/4 cup of fruits and/or vegetables (at least two kinds), a slice of bread or a comparable serving of another grain, and a cup of milk. In 2017, the federal reimbursement rate was $3.83 or $3.77 for each eligible SFSP lunch or supper served, depending on the type of meal site. Each site may serve up to two meals or one meal and one snack per day. Some flexibilities are available to FNS in implementing the SFSP program, under its waiver and demonstration authorities. Specifically, the National School Lunch Act authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to waive, upon request of a state or eligible service provider, certain program requirements established under the National School Lunch Act or the Child Nutrition Act of 1966, as amended, including some for the SFSP. In order to grant a waiver request, the Secretary must determine that the waiver would facilitate the state or service provider’s ability to carry out the purpose of the program, and that the waiver will not increase the overall cost of the program to the federal government, among other things. In the event a waiver request is submitted, the Secretary is required to act promptly and state in writing whether the waiver request is granted or denied, and why. The Secretary is also required to periodically review the performance of waiver recipients, and submit an annual report to Congress summarizing the use of waivers and their effectiveness, among other details. In addition to this waiver authority, the Secretary is also authorized to carry out demonstration projects to develop and test methods of providing access to summer meals for low-income children in urban and rural areas, to reduce or eliminate the food insecurity and hunger of low-income children and improve their nutritional status. The Secretary is required to provide for an independent evaluation of the demonstration projects carried out under this authority, and submit an annual report to Congress on the status of each project and the results of the evaluations. The total number of SFSP meals served nationwide during the summer— one indicator of program participation—increased from 113 million meals in fiscal year 2007 to 149 million meals in fiscal year 2016, or by 32 percent, according to our analysis of FNS data. The number of SFSP meals served has generally increased from year to year over this 10-year period. Most recently, meals decreased by 6 percent from 156 million meals in summer 2015 to 149 million meals in summer 2016, according to our analysis of FNS data (see fig. 2). Factors that may have affected year-to-year fluctuations include changes in funding for summer programs, sponsor participation, weather, and the number of weekdays available for sites to serve meals within a given summer, according to FNS and state agency officials we interviewed. For example, state agency officials in one of the three selected states we visited said they believe that reductions in state and local funding for summer programs that also provide meals, and turnover of sponsors, including losing one of the state’s largest sponsors in a recent summer, affected the total number of SFSP meals served in their state in 2016. According to our analysis of FNS data, SFSP lunches served in the summer months increased by over 17 million from fiscal year 2007 through fiscal year 2016, accounting for almost half of the total increase in the number of SFSP meals served in that period. However, when comparing across each of the meal types, supper and breakfast had the largest percentage increases over the 10-year period, 50 and 48 percent, respectively (see table 1). In comparison, the number of SFSP lunches served increased by 26 percent from fiscal years 2007 through fiscal year 2016. From fiscal year 2007 through fiscal year 2016, there were increases in the numbers of meals served in both SFSP and NSLP, the largest child nutrition assistance program. Specifically, SFSP lunches served in July increased from 32 million to 40 million, or 24 percent, from fiscal year 2007 to 2016, and NSLP lunches served in March increased from 328 million to 376 million meals, or 15 percent, according to our analysis of FNS data. Although the programs generally serve similar populations, different factors likely affected the number of meals served by each program, in part because NSLP serves children in schools during the school year and SFSP serves children in a variety of settings during the summer months. Although states report the actual number of SFSP meals served to FNS, they estimate the number of children participating in SFSP, and information obtained from our state survey and FNS indicate that these participation estimates have been calculated inconsistently. FNS instructs state agencies on how to calculate a statewide estimate of children’s participation in the SFSP, referred to as average daily attendance (ADA), using sponsor-reported information on the number of meals served and days of operation in July of each year. However, states’ methods for calculating ADA have differed from state to state and from year to year, according to our review of states’ survey responses and FNS documents. For example, although FNS directed states to include the number of meals served in each site’s primary meal service— which may or may not be lunch—some states, according to our survey and FNS data, were calculating ADA using only meals served at lunch. FNS officials told us that these states were therefore not following the agency’s instructions. Further, some states have changed their methods for calculating ADA over time—five states reported in our survey that the method they used to calculate ADA in fiscal year 2016 differed from the one they used previously. While FNS clarified its instructions in May 2017 to help improve the consistency of states’ ADA calculations moving forward, ADA remains an unreliable estimate of children’s daily participation in SFSP for at least two reasons, according to our analysis. (See sidebar for the revised ADA calculation instructions.) First, ADA is based on summary data that does not account for existing variation in site days of operation, and second, it is based on July data, which does not reflect the month with the greatest number of meals served in every state. According to our analysis, ADA is an unreliable estimate of children’s participation in SFSP because it currently does not account for existing variation in the number of days that each site serves meals to children. Specifically, because FNS’s instructions indicate that sites’ ADAs are to be combined to provide a statewide ADA estimate, differences in the number of days of meal service are disregarded. As a result, ADA does not reflect the average number of children served SFSP meals daily throughout the month. Our analysis of site-level data from one of the selected states illustrates this limitation. In this state, multiple sites reported an ADA of 60 for July, yet two of those sites served meals to children on only 1 day of the month and another site served meals to children on 20 days. Although 120 children were served SFSP meals only 1 day in July across two of these sites, the combined ADA across all three sites, which we calculated following FNS’s instructions, inaccurately suggests an average of 180 children were participating in SFSP at these sites on a daily basis in July. According to our analysis, ADA is also an unreliable estimate of children’s participation in SFSP because it currently does not account for state variation in the month with the greatest number of SFSP meals served, potentially leading to an underestimate. According to FNS officials, the agency instructs states to calculate ADA for July because officials identified this as the month with the largest number of meals served nationwide. However, because of reasons such as state variations in school calendars, July is not the month with the largest number of meals served in every state. In one of the selected states, Arizona, using July to calculate ADA cuts the estimate almost in half. Specifically, we followed FNS’s instructions and calculated that Arizona’s ADA was 14,987 in July 2016 compared to 26,772 in June 2016. Nationwide, in summer 2016, 26 states served more SFSP meals in June or August than in July, according to our analysis of FNS data. However, without site level data on meals served and operating days, the extent to which these states had higher ADAs in June or August as compared to July is unknown. In its May 2017 memo to states revising the ADA calculation instructions, FNS said that it is critical that the agency’s means of estimating children’s participation in the SFSP is as accurate as possible because it helps inform program implementation at the national level and facilitates strategic planning and outreach to areas with low participation. In addition, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government state that agencies should maintain quality data and process it into quality information that is shared with stakeholders to help achieve agency goals. Although FNS has also collected information on other data that states collect on the SFSP, the agency has not yet used this information to help improve its estimate of children’s participation in the program. In 2015, FNS published a Request for Information, asking whether states or sponsors collect any SFSP data that are not reported to FNS. While FNS received responses from only 15 states, these responses suggest that some states collect additional data, such as site-level data that may allow for an improved estimate of children’s SFSP participation, potentially addressing the issues we found in our analysis. In response to the information FNS received, they followed up with up to 9 of the 15 states in 2016 and 2017 to explore the feasibility of collecting additional data and improving estimates of children’s participation. Although they took these steps, FNS officials told us they are cognizant of the burden on states and site operators that would be associated with additional reporting requirements. At this time, the agency has not taken further action to improve the estimate, such as addressing the reliability issues caused by variation in the number of operating days of meal sites and in the months with the greatest number of meals served by state. As a result, FNS’s understanding of children’s participation in the SFSP remains limited, which impairs its ability to both inform program implementation and facilitate strategic planning and outreach to areas with low participation. Other federal programs that operate solely in the summer, as well as those operating year-round, help feed low-income children in the summer months. These programs include the NSLP Seamless Summer Option, which provides nutrition assistance benefits solely in the summer, and several federal programs that operate year-round. In July 2016, in addition to the 70 million meals provided through the SFSP, 26 million meals were provided to low-income children through school food authorities participating in the NSLP’s Seamless Summer Option, according to FNS data. The Seamless Summer Option was established in 2004, and according to FNS, streamlines administrative requirements to encourage school food authorities providing free or reduced-price meals during the school year under the NSLP and SBP to continue providing meals to low-income children when school is not in session. For example, officials from a national organization involved in summer meals told us the Seamless Summer Option makes it easier for school food authorities to provide summer meals because they continue working with the same state agency, reporting the same information to the state, and operating without having to transition to a separate program. Nonetheless, school food authorities can choose to provide free summer meals to children through either the SFSP or Seamless Summer Option, and the majority of states (34) reported in our survey that a greater proportion of school food authorities participated in the SFSP than the Seamless Summer Option in summer 2016. According to FNS and selected state officials, this may be related to the generally lower meal reimbursement rates school food authorities participating in the Seamless Summer Option receive compared to the rates received by those participating in the SFSP. In summer 2016, the Seamless Summer Option added to the geographic availability of summer meal sites in two of the three states we visited as part of our review. School food authorities provided summer meals through the Seamless Summer Option in Arizona and Illinois, but not in Massachusetts, based on our analysis of data provided by these states. In Arizona and Illinois, school food authorities participating in the Seamless Summer Option added 643 and 298 summer meal sites, respectively, in the month with the largest number of SFSP meals served in each state (see fig. 3). In addition, some of the Seamless Summer Option sites in these two states provided meals to children in areas where there were no SFSP sites. For example, Seamless Summer Option sites provided meals in areas near the northeastern and southwestern corners of Arizona that lacked nearby SFSP sites. In addition to the SFSP and the Seamless Summer Option, the Summer Electronic Benefit Transfer for Children (Summer EBT) demonstration provided nutrition assistance benefits to 209,000 low-income children in summer 2016 in select areas across 6 states and 2 Indian Tribal Organizations, according to FNS officials. Since the summer of 2011, Summer EBT benefits have been provided to eligible households on an electronic benefits transfer card, which households use to purchase eligible foods at authorized retailers. Specifically, the demonstration has provided monthly benefits of $30 or $60 per eligible child to households with children in areas with a perceived high level of need, based on the demonstration grantees’ assessments of the percentage of children eligible for free or reduced-price school meals and the availability of the SFSP. Consistent with this, three of the states that participated in Summer EBT in 2016 reported through our survey that these benefits helped children who were unable to access summer meals through the SFSP or the Seamless Summer Option. Further, according to an FNS- funded evaluation, Summer EBT improved food security among low- income children who participated in the demonstration. Specifically, the evaluation found the receipt of these benefits reduced the number of children in the demonstration experiencing very low food security between 2011 and 2013 by one-third. Some low-income children also receive nutrition assistance in the summer through federal programs that operate year-round. According to FNS data, in June 2016, 5.8 million infants and children participated in the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) and 3 million children participated in the Child and Adult Care Food Program (CACFP). In addition, an average of 19.2 million children participated each month in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) in fiscal year 2016, according to FNS data. These benefits are provided year-round, including when school is in session and children may also be eligible to receive school meals. In our previous work on federal domestic food assistance programs, we reported that no one program alone is intended to meet a household’s full nutritional needs. At that time, several officials and providers told us that the variety of food assistance programs offers eligible individuals and households different types of assistance and can help households fill the gaps and address the specific needs of individual members. For example, a mother with two children may rely on SNAP for her household’s basic groceries, the NSLP to feed a school-age child during the school year, and WIC to obtain supplemental foods for herself and an infant. Some low-income children also receive summer meals through nonfederal programs, according to our state survey and interviews with organizations involved in summer meals. Twenty-seven states reported in our survey that they were aware of other state- or non-state-funded programs that provided children of low-income households with meals in their states during the summer months. According to our analysis of state survey responses, local faith-based organizations and foodbanks were the most common types of entities operating these types of programs. Similarly, officials from FNS and two regional organizations we interviewed said they were aware of children receiving summer meals through nonfederal programs operated by faith- based and other community organizations. In addition, SFSP site operators at 6 of the 30 meal sites we visited in the selected states told us nearby foodbanks and faith-based organizations may also be providing children with free meals to some extent. For example, one of the meal sites we visited was operated by a foodbank that, in addition to the SFSP, provided food boxes to those in need and distributed food to other local community organizations to provide to persons in need of immediate assistance, including families with children. Although FNS and the majority of states do not collect data on nonfederal programs, results from our state survey and interviews with SFSP providers and organizations involved in summer meals indicate the reach of nonfederal programs is limited. In our survey, states reported that the geographic coverage of these nonfederal programs varied by state, with 11 states indicating that they operated in some portions of the state—the most common state response. In addition, 16 states reported that they were not aware of any nonfederal programs providing summer meals to children in their state (see fig. 4). Similarly, SFSP site operators at 24 of the 30 meal sites we visited were unaware of nonfederal programs providing meals to children in the areas in which they operated. In addition, officials from several national organizations involved in summer meals told us children have very few options for receiving summer meals beyond the federal summer meals programs. Specifically, officials from one national organization explained that food is often a significant part of the cost of a summer activity program for children and suggested that is one reason why organizations choose to participate in the SFSP. Although the SFSP provides for federal reimbursement of eligible meals and certain administrative and operating costs, nonfederal programs that provide children with summer meals may choose not to participate in the SFSP for several reasons, according to officials we interviewed from several organizations involved in summer meals. For example, some nonfederal program providers may not participate in the SFSP because they are unaware the program exists. Additionally, some nonfederal program providers may be aware of the SFSP, but choose not to participate because they do not want to follow certain program requirements, such as the nutrition or meal pattern standards. In addition, some providers may not participate in the program because they do not think they can handle certain aspects of the administrative workload associated with the SFSP. For example, a state official we interviewed told us the administrative workload associated with the SFSP can be particularly challenging, especially for smaller sponsors. Similarly, officials from a regional organization involved in summer meals told us one of the providers they work with who operated 10 meal sites chose to leave the SFSP because the paperwork required to operate the sites was too administratively burdensome for their volunteer site operators. States and SFSP providers reported challenges with meal sites, participation, and administration, though federal, state, and local entities have taken steps to improve these areas. Half or more of states reported in our survey that SFSP issues related to meal site availability, such as in rural areas, increasing children’s participation, and program administration were moderately to extremely challenging (see fig. 5). Overall, 41 states reported facing at least one challenge with the SFSP, while 9 reported facing none. Availability of transportation, low population density, and limited meal sites pose challenges for SFSP in rural areas, according to states we surveyed, selected national organizations, and state and local officials in the three selected states we visited. More than two-thirds of states in our survey reported they faced a moderate to extreme challenge with limited options in rural areas to transport children to summer meal sites (37), as well as with the distance to summer meal sites in rural areas resulting in low child turnout that affects the financial viability of site sponsorship (36). As officials from one national organization explained, it may not be cost- effective for sponsors to operate in remote or rural areas if there are not enough meal sites or children participating in the program. Similarly, a sponsor in one of the selected states indicated that there are large parts of the state where the distances between meal sites are substantial, and travel between them takes several hours. An official from one of the selected states said transportation challenges can lead to underserved rural areas, including Indian reservations. Of the three states we reviewed, each had rural areas with few or no federally funded meal sites in summer 2016. However, a majority of the children in some of those areas were eligible for free or reduced price school meals, according to Census data provided by FNS, and would therefore be “area eligible” for the purposes of SFSP. For example, as shown in figure 6, “area eligible” locations in rural western parts of Arizona did not have any SFSP or Seamless Summer Option meals sites in June 2016, the month with the greatest number of summer meals served in that state. States and SFSP providers have responded to challenges with meal sites in rural areas by using other meal delivery approaches—efforts that FNS has supported through information sharing and grants. For example, according to one national organization involved in summer meals, some SFSP providers offer vans or buses to transport children to meal sites or partner with local bus authorities to give children free rides to meal sites. Instead of transporting children to sites, other sponsors transport meals to children through mobile meal delivery, an alternative summer meal model used in 48 states according to our survey. In this model, sponsors deliver meals by bus, using a route with state-approved stops in a community, and children consume the meal at the stop under a supervised setting. According to FNS officials and representatives from national organizations, this approach can be particularly helpful for providing summer meals to children in rural areas. State officials in two selected states told us they use mobile meal delivery to help fill gaps in meal service and help children overcome the lack of transportation or resources in their community. To serve children in very remote areas with limited resources, a sponsor in one of the selected states reported piloting a model involving delivering frozen meals every other week to such areas and supplying equipment, such as freezers and microwaves, to support meal service. To help sponsors address challenges related to meal sites in rural areas, FNS has shared information on alternative delivery models through its SFSP toolkit and webinars and has also provided related grant funding. For example, in summer 2011 and 2012, FNS funded the Meal Delivery demonstration project to provide meals to children in rural areas where low population density, long distances, and transportation issues made it difficult for children to get to SFSP sites, making site and sponsor operation financially unsustainable. The demonstration project funded meals to children in rural areas of Delaware, Massachusetts, and New York, providing food delivery to homes or drop-off sites near homes of eligible children. More than half the states (30) in our survey reported they faced a moderate to extreme challenge reaching low-income children in communities that are not area eligible. Areas in which fewer than 50 percent of children qualify for free or reduced-price meals during the school year are not eligible to have open summer meal sites at which all children who come to the site can receive a free meal. As a result, some children who are eligible for free and reduced-price meals during the school year do not have open summer meal sites located in close proximity to their residences, according to several national organization officials and SFSP providers. Eligible children in these areas may instead be limited to other types of SFSP sites, such as closed enrolled summer meal sites, or nonfederal programs providing meals, if available. For example, in one of the selected states, a sponsor of SFSP sites funded meals without federal support at one site that they operated as an open site in order to serve low-income children residing in low-income housing. These children did not otherwise have access to a federally funded summer meals site, according to these officials, because the broader area was part of a school district that had a greater than 50 percent proportion of children from higher-income families. Recognizing that some children may reside in an area that is not area eligible but is immediately adjacent to such an area, FNS has allowed additional flexibility in establishing area eligibility for open meal sites. Specifically, in 2014 and 2016 policy memos, FNS expanded the ways in which states and sponsors can use Census data to establish area eligibility. For example, FNS has allowed states and sponsors to average Census data across adjacent geographic areas to determine area eligibility. FNS noted that these additional flexibilities help ensure meal sites can be located in more areas in which poor economic conditions exist. Nearly all states (50) reported in our survey that the availability of meal sites throughout the summer months was a factor critical to the success of the SFSP, yet more than half the states (27) also reported they faced a moderate to extreme challenge with limited meal site days of operation. Nineteen of the 40 states that provided information about site days of operation reported 1 day as the shortest length of operation for SFSP sites in their state in fiscal year 2016. Limited meal site days of operation was a significant challenge in one of the three selected states we visited, as almost one-quarter of sites operated for only 1 to 2 weeks across a 2-month period in summer 2016, and an additional half of sites operated for 3 to 4 weeks across that same period, according to our analysis of state data. In contrast, in the other two selected states, the majority of sites (64 and 76 percent, respectively) operated for 5 or more weeks during a 2-month period. SFSP sites may have limited days of operation for various reasons, such as constraints with program administration and costs, according to interviews with a national organization official and a sponsor in one of the selected states. Some SFSP providers and national organizations involved in summer meals have responded to these challenges by working to extend the days of operation of meal sites—efforts that FNS has supported through related grant funding. Officials from one meal site located at a school in one of the selected states told us that 2017 was the first year the site stayed open an additional 4 weeks after summer school classes ended in an effort to expand participation, an extension made possible through support from an experienced sponsor. In addition, officials from a national organization involved in sponsoring summer meals told us they encourage their local sites to operate in August—a month where there are generally fewer summer meal service offerings—to meet children’s needs. At the federal level, under its demonstration authority, FNS funded the Extending Length of Operation Incentive project, a grant which provided an additional 50-cent reimbursement for all lunch meals served at sites in Arkansas in 2010 that offered meals for 40 or more days. Two-thirds of states (34) reported through our survey that they also faced a moderate to extreme challenge with a lack of awareness of summer meal sites among children and families, a challenge also mentioned by SFSP providers in the selected states. Meal site operators in one selected state noted that making families aware that all children may receive a meal for free at open sites can be a challenge. For example, one sponsor operating a meal site in a school said the perception among some is that the meal program is only for children attending summer school, and not for others in the community. Although that site had outside banners and advertising to help address that misperception, another SFSP provider explained that having sufficient funds to market the SFSP and increase awareness among families is also a challenge. To address these challenges, state agencies, some SFSP providers, and FNS have taken steps to help promote awareness of the SFSP. For example, nearly all states (47) reported in our survey that they have increased their outreach efforts for the SFSP in the last 5 years. More than half of states (36) also reported increases in overall SFSP participation during that time, which they believe were related to their outreach efforts. The majority of states in our survey reported conducting outreach on the SFSP to groups including children, parents and guardians, and schools, among others, using methods such as flyers, email, newspapers, and social media (see fig. 7). Further, state agency officials and sponsors in the selected states reported that they have developed partnerships with state and local advocacy groups and community leaders, among others, to promote the SFSP. For example, one state agency official said they partner with local advocacy organizations to field calls from parents seeking information about summer meal sites through their hunger hotline. FNS has promoted the use of such partnerships, as well as traditional and social media, to raise awareness of the SFSP. In addition, FNS developed the Summer Meals Site Finder, an online mapping tool that provides information on summer meal sites nationwide. Attracting children of all ages to SFSP meal sites can also be a challenge, according to states and SFSP providers. More than half of the states (31) reported in our survey that they faced a moderate to extreme challenge with limited youth and teen participation at summer meal sites, and an official from a national organization involved in the SFSP explained that it is difficult to attract children to a meal site when the site is focused solely on food. Similarly, 46 states in our survey reported that providing age- appropriate programming and enrichment activities for children at summer meal sites is a factor critical to the success of the SFSP. However, some meal sites may lack the resources to add activities, according to some SFSP providers in the selected states as well as FNS and national organization officials. Attracting teens can be particularly challenging, in part because of meal service time periods, a lack of age- appropriate activities, and stigma, according to national organizations and providers we interviewed. For example, early morning meal sites generally attract younger kids as teens may be apt to sleep later in the summer, and teens may also perceive a stigma in participating in a free meal program and may face peer pressure not to eat. In addition, meal offerings at SFSP sites may also present challenges to teen participation. Specifically, because FNS bases minimum portion size requirements for meals on the needs of younger children, meals are not always adequate to meet the nutritional needs of teens, according to one sponsor we interviewed. Across the 30 meal sites in the 3 states we visited in summer 2016, we observed variety in the meals served during different meal services. (see fig. 8.) States and SFSP providers have collaborated with others and sought specific types of sites to help provide enrichment activities and attract certain age groups—efforts that FNS has supported through information sharing and related grant funding. Sponsors in the selected states said they have focused on partnerships with groups such as those focused on youth development, churches, libraries, and police or fire departments, to offer age-appropriate activities for children (see fig. 9). For example, programs with local police departments, such as Cops N Kids in one selected state, or libraries in two selected states, provided meal services in combination with youth development or other enrichment activities. (See sidebar for highlights on the Cops N Kids program.) One national organization official said activities at SFSP sites can help take away the stigma around the program because children are not just there for the meal. Efforts to rebrand the SFSP as a community event where entire families can participate at the meal site also can have this effect, which is why some sponsors in the selected states said they partnered with foodbanks to donate meals for adults. In addition, a sponsor in one selected state told us they adjusted their meal offerings to match the needs of children of different age groups, for example, by serving meals to younger children earlier in the day and meals to teens later in the day. To support participation from children of all ages, FNS has shared information on age-appropriate activities through its SFSP toolkit and provided related grant funding. For example, in 2010, FNS funded the Activity Incentive demonstration project, in which sponsors in Mississippi were provided with mini-grants to increase enrichment and recreational activities, such as education, tutoring, sports and games, arts and other activities, to draw children to meal sites. More than half the states reported in our survey that they faced a moderate to extreme challenge with limited state agency staffing (27), a limited amount of federal funding for SFSP administration (27), as well as ensuring sponsor participation to meet needs (28). In addition, 28 states reported in our survey that they faced a moderate to extreme challenge with sponsors not following program requirements. Limited staffing can affect a state agency’s ability to conduct efforts aimed at increasing participation, identifying potential sponsors, and reviewing and monitoring sponsors, according to national organization and state officials we interviewed. For example, increases in sponsors and sites requires additional staff and time to conduct pre-approval visits, sponsor and site reviews, vendor reviews, and technical assistance visits, which directly affects the amount of funding needed to support staff salaries and travel reimbursement, according to one state in our survey. However, because the SFSP administrative funds FNS provides to states are based on the number of meals served in the previous year, increasing the number of staff to help increase SFSP participation is difficult, according to a national organization official we interviewed. States reported a moderate to extreme challenge with the following issues related to ensuring sponsor participation: a lack of sponsors to meet summer meal needs, a lack of awareness of the summer meal program among potential sponsors or sites, completing federal requirements for monitoring of SFSP sponsors, and identifying potential sponsors. State agencies responsible for administering the SFSP reported relying on other resources and partners to help with program administration— strategies that FNS has supported through information sharing and its online tools. As discussed earlier, all three selected state agencies we interviewed told us they partner with advocacy groups to help expand and conduct outreach on the SFSP. Additionally, more than half the states in our survey reported several factors—which may ease the administrative burden on states—as critical to the success of the SFSP, including partnerships with SFSP sponsors (49) and retaining sponsors and sites over multiple summers (51). To support states’ use of alternative funding sources to help administer the SFSP, FNS has shared information on federal, state, and private funding and grant opportunities. FNS also developed the online Capacity Builder tool, which 35 states reported in our survey was moderately to extremely useful in identifying or confirming meal site eligibility in fiscal year 2017. Seventeen states reported in our survey that ensuring summer meal sites are in safe locations was moderately to very challenging, a challenge that some states and SFSP providers have taken steps to help address. State officials and SFSP providers in the selected states reported that when crime has occurred near a site, there are concerns about ensuring children’s safety while they are consuming meals at the site, as well as the safety of site staff delivering meals. Some sponsors noted, in particular, parents’ concerns for the safety of their children at meal sites in light of criminal activities in the surrounding area. To ensure children continue to have access to meals, some sponsors noted that in the event of an immediate threat at an outdoor meal site, site staff are sometimes able to bring children to a nearby indoor space instead. States and SFSP provider officials in two selected states told us they have also used other strategies, including partnerships with local law enforcement agencies, to help address safety concerns during the meal service and ensure children have access to meals. For example, national organizations involved in summer meals and sponsor officials in the selected states said they encourage partnerships with local police departments to use police escorts at meal sites or to follow mobile meal routes in situations where safety at the meal site is a concern. When violence or crime has occurred near a site, some states and SFSP sponsors have also sought flexibility from FNS with respect to the federal requirement that children consume summer meals on site, according to state and local officials. FNS has used its available authorities to grant some states and sponsors flexibility with respect to the requirement that children consume summer meals on site, such as when safety at the site is a concern; however, FNS has not clearly communicated to all states and sponsors the circumstances it considers when deciding whether to grant this flexibility. According to our review of letters FNS sent to multiple states approving their requests for this type of flexibility, the agency identified a consistent set of circumstances that needed to be met for it to grant this flexibility. These circumstances were described in the letters the agency sent to states and generally included verification that violent crime activities occurred within both a 6-block radius of the meal site and 72 hours prior to the meal service. FNS’s letters to states indicate that when documentation was provided to the agency showing that these circumstances existed at a summer meals site on a particular day or days, meals consumed by children off site on those days were eligible for federal reimbursement. Although FNS has issued guidance on the general processes for requesting flexibility from program requirements under its waiver and demonstration authorities, these guidance documents do not detail the specific circumstances that the agency considers when deciding whether to grant flexibility from the on-site requirement due to safety concerns. FNS has communicated this information only in its responses to specific state and sponsor requests, and it has not communicated these circumstances more broadly to all states and sponsors. FNS officials explained that they review state and sponsor requests for flexibility due to safety concerns on a case-by-case basis. However, they also acknowledged that the set of circumstances used for approval of state and sponsor requests for flexibility, which we identified in their letters to states, has been used repeatedly. Further, states and sponsors reported challenges obtaining the specific data needed for approval of a site for this type of flexibility, hampering some providers’ efforts to ensure safe delivery of meals. For example, state agency and sponsor officials in one selected state said obtaining the crime data needed to qualify for the flexibility can be an administrative burden on sponsors, and these data are not consistently available in a timely manner. According to state agency and sponsor officials in one of the selected states, daily crime statistics are not available in all areas, and while a sponsor can sometimes access current data on crime in a city, the most recent available data on crime in suburban areas are sometimes one year old. FNS is aware of state and local challenges obtaining the necessary crime data, according to our discussions with FNS officials. FNS officials acknowledged that while they have granted some state and sponsor requests to allow children to consume meals off site in certain areas where violence or crime has occurred, some sponsors were unable to implement the flexibility because they could not obtain the necessary crime data. To help achieve agency objectives and address related risks, the Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government state that agencies should communicate key information to their internal and external stakeholders. Although FNS officials told us they do not have one set of circumstances under which they approve these requests, our review found only one set of circumstances under which this type of flexibility has been approved. However, FNS has not broadly communicated the circumstances it considers in deciding whether to approve requests for flexibility with respect to the requirement that children consume summer meals on site in areas with violence or crime. Unless FNS shares this information with all states and sponsors, states and sponsors will likely continue to be challenged to use this flexibility, hindering its usefulness in ensuring safe summer meal delivery to children. In addition, FNS has issued reports to Congress evaluating some of its demonstration projects, as required under its statutory authorities, but the agency has not issued any such reports to Congress specifically on the use of flexibilities with respect to the on-site requirement in areas where safety is a concern. As previously discussed, the agency is required to annually submit certain reports to Congress regarding the use of waivers and evaluations of projects carried out under its demonstration authority. Furthermore, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government state that management should use quality information to make informed decisions and evaluate the entity’s performance in achieving key objectives and addressing risks. Yet, FNS has not evaluated nor reported on the use of waivers and demonstration projects in cases where safety was a concern. Although FNS requests reports from state agencies or sponsors that have received flexibility with summer meals delivery under FNS’s demonstration and waiver authorities, FNS officials told us they have not assessed whether their use of these flexibilities to address safety issues has been effective in ensuring safe meal delivery. FNS officials told us that they have not evaluated or reported on these flexibilities, in part, because they have limited information on their outcomes. Without understanding the impact of its use of these flexibilities, neither FNS nor Congress knows whether these flexibilities are helping provide meals to children. In addition to the challenges with safety at meal sites, sponsors also sometimes face administrative challenges when participating in multiple child nutrition programs that are operated by different state agencies or divisions within the same agency, according to officials from national and regional organizations and sponsors we interviewed. For example, officials from national organizations involved in summer meals told us the management of each child nutrition program and processes related to applications, funding, and oversight are fragmented in many states. For example, a sponsor in one of the selected states told us aspects of the SFSP and CACFP sponsor applications are highly duplicative and estimated it took 42 hours last year to complete duplicative paperwork. Another sponsor that provides school meals during the school year told us they had to fill out 60 additional pages of paperwork to provide summer meals, which coupled with having a state contact for the SFSP that was different from the one they worked with for the NSLP, was a significant burden for them. Officials from one national organization told us a lack of interoperability of some state agencies’ data systems has caused challenges and administrative burden for some sponsors. For example, in some states, different agencies oversee child nutrition programs, yet are unable to share data on sponsor approval, and therefore, sponsors are required to submit similar information to both, according to these officials. Duplicative paperwork can be particularly burdensome for some SFSP providers, as national organization officials and SFSP providers in the selected states said completing SFSP application paperwork can be especially challenging when a sponsor has staff shortages or no dedicated SFSP staff. Some selected states have worked with SFSP sponsors to help minimize the administrative burden. For example, state agency officials from one of the selected states said they have connected less-experienced sponsors to more-experienced sponsors in the community to help them with program administration. In one case, an experienced SFSP sponsor partnered with a small sponsor new to the program to help with SFSP administration, including helping them understand program rules and paperwork requirements. One SFSP sponsor also noted that their state agency took additional steps to ease administrative burden, such as making the forms for the CACFP more consistent with those for the SFSP and streamlining certain requirements for large and experienced sponsors, which the sponsor found helpful. At the federal level, FNS has established program and policy simplifications to help lessen the administrative burden on sponsors participating in multiple child nutrition programs, though the persistence of these challenges indicate that information about these simplifications has not reached all relevant state agencies. While FNS officials told us that some of the duplicative requirements may be a function of differences in statute, FNS provided guidance to states in 2011 and 2014 on simplified application procedures for institutions participating in CACFP that also wish to apply for SFSP. FNS noted in its guidance that in states where CACFP and SFSP are administered by different state agencies, state agencies are encouraged to work together to share information and streamline the application and agreement process as much as possible. FNS also addressed these simplifications in a state agency meeting in November 2017. Additionally, FNS provided guidance to states in 2012 on simplified application and review procedures for school food authorities participating in the NSLP that wish to also participate in the SFSP. Although FNS has shared this information with states in an attempt to make them aware of streamlining options, FNS officials noted that some states may choose not to implement them. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government state that management should externally communicate the necessary quality information to achieve the entity’s objectives, as well as periodically evaluate the methods of communication to ensure communication is effective and appropriate. FNS’s existing guidance addresses options for streamlining administrative requirements for sponsors participating in multiple child nutrition programs. However, information on program and policy simplifications available for sponsors participating in both NSLP and SFSP has not been shared with states recently, and challenges in this area persist, indicating this information has not reached all relevant state agencies. Without further efforts from FNS to disseminate information on current options for streamlining administrative requirements across child nutrition programs, overlapping and duplicative administrative requirements may limit children’s access to meals by discouraging sponsor participation in child nutrition programs. The purpose of the SFSP is to continue to provide children in low-income areas with nutritious meals over the summer when school is no longer in session, and to that end, the program provided 149 million SFSP meals to children in fiscal year 2016. Although meals served are one indicator of participation, FNS’s current estimates of children participating in SFSP are unreliable. Without additional understanding of children’s participation in the SFSP, FNS lacks information critical for informing program implementation, strategic planning, and outreach. The majority of states nationwide and SFSP providers in the three states we visited reported experiencing a number of challenges with the SFSP, and FNS has taken important steps to address these challenges. Two key challenges identified by officials in the selected states and national organizations we interviewed are ensuring summer meal sites are in safe locations, and meeting administrative requirements when participating in multiple child nutrition programs. FNS has taken steps to address these challenges by providing flexibilities in how meals are delivered to children and streamlining options for those providers participating in more than one child nutrition program. However, a lack of clarity concerning the circumstances under which FNS grants flexibilities in areas of violence and crime, and a lack of information on its use of these flexibilities and their impact on program administration, hinder efforts to ensure program goals are met. Furthermore, absent a reminder to states regarding existing options for streamlining administration across multiple nutrition programs, some providers may continue to be discouraged from participating in these programs due to duplicative and burdensome administrative requirements, which may ultimately limit the provision of nutritious meals to children. We are making the following four recommendations to FNS: The Administrator of FNS should improve its estimate of children’s participation in the SFSP by focusing on addressing, at a minimum, data reliability issues caused by variations in the number of operating days of meal sites and in the months in which states see the greatest number of meals served. (Recommendation 1) The Administrator of FNS should communicate to all SFSP stakeholders the circumstances it considers in approving requests for flexibility with respect to the requirement that children consume SFSP meals on-site in areas that have experienced crime and violence, taking into account the feasibility of accessing data needed for approval, to ensure safe delivery of meals to children. (Recommendation 2) The Administrator of FNS should evaluate and annually report to Congress, as required by statute, on its use of waivers and demonstration projects to grant states and sponsors flexibility with respect to the requirement that children consume SFSP meals on-site in areas experiencing crime or violence, to improve its understanding of the use and impact of granting these flexibilities on meeting program goals. (Recommendation 3) The Administrator of FNS should disseminate information about existing flexibilities available to state agencies to streamline administrative requirements for sponsors participating in the SFSP and other child nutrition programs to help lessen the administrative burden. For example, FNS could re-distribute existing guidance to state agencies that explains available flexibilities and encourage information sharing. (Recommendation 4) We provided a draft of this report to the Secretary of the USDA for review and comment. FNS officials provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. In addition, in oral comments, FNS officials, including the Deputy Administrator for Child Nutrition Programs, generally agreed with the recommendations in the report. As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to the Secretary of the USDA and interested congressional committees. The report will also be available at no charge on the GAO website at www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-7215 or larink@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV. This appendix discusses in detail our methodology for addressing three research objectives: (1) What is known about participation in the Summer Food Service Program (SFSP) and how has it changed in the last 10 years? (2) What other programs help feed low-income children over the summer? and (3) What challenges exist, if any, in providing summer meals to children, and to what extent does the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) provide assistance to states and sponsors to address these challenges? In addition to the methods we discuss below, to address all three research objectives, we reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, and guidance; interviewed FNS officials in its headquarters and seven regional offices; and interviewed a broad range of regional and nationwide organizations involved in the SFSP. In addition, we coordinated with officials in USDA’s Office of Inspector General on their ongoing work in this area. To address our first objective about participation in the SFSP, we analyzed FNS data on meals served for fiscal years 2007 through 2016. Specifically, we analyzed the total number of meals served nationwide through the SFSP from fiscal year 2007 through fiscal year 2016. Each month, states report to FNS the number of meals served by meal type (breakfast, lunch, snack, and supper) and the number of meals served by meal and sponsor type (e.g., government, nonprofit, etc.) using the FNS- 418 form. To add context on these trends, we also analyzed and compared the number of SFSP lunches served in July with the number of free and reduced-price lunches served to children in March through the National School Lunch Program (NSLP), the largest child nutrition assistance program, from fiscal year 2007 through fiscal year 2016. Each month, states report to FNS the number of meals served through the NSLP using the FNS-10 form. To assess the reliability of SFSP and NSLP data, we (1) performed electronic testing of relevant data elements, (2) reviewed existing information about the data and the system that produced them, and (3) interviewed agency officials knowledgeable about the data. Electronic testing included, but was not limited to, checks for missing data elements, duplicative records, and values outside a designated range or valid time period. We determined that these data were sufficiently reliable to identify the number of SFSP meals served and assess change over time. To further examine what is known about participation in the SFSP, we also reviewed FNS’s data on estimates of children’s participation in the program and determined that these estimates have been calculated inconsistently and are unreliable. To assess the reliability of these data, we reviewed documentation about the estimates, interviewed FNS officials, and asked states about the estimate calculation in our survey. As described in our findings, FNS does not collect data on the number of children participating in the SFSP. Instead, FNS relies on states’ estimates of children’s participation, which are based on other data reported by sponsors, such as the number of meals served and meal service days in July. To address our second objective about other programs that help feed children in the summer, we reviewed FNS’s estimate of the number of meals served through the NSLP’s Seamless Summer Option in fiscal year 2016. FNS does not collect data on the number of meals served through the Seamless Summer Option. Instead, FNS annually estimates the number of Seamless Summer Option meals served nationally by aggregating the number of free and reduced-price breakfasts, lunches, and snacks served through the School Breakfast Program (SBP) and NSLP in July. As previously noted, states report these data monthly to FNS. Although FNS does not know the actual number of meals served through the Seamless Summer Option, agency officials told us they believe the number of summer meals provided through the NSLP is small relative to the number of meals served through the Seamless Summer Option during the summer months. They noted that their use of July NSLP data to estimate the Seamless Summer Option meals likely overestimates the number of these meals for July and underestimates the number of these meals for the entire summer. To assess the reliability of the July NSLP data, we (1) performed electronic testing of relevant data elements, (2) reviewed existing information about the data and the system that produced them, and (3) interviewed agency officials knowledgeable about the data. Electronic testing included, but was not limited to, checking for missing data and data that fell outside of a reasonable range or date for the specific time period (July). We determined that these data were sufficiently reliable to describe the number of meals served. In addition to the data FNS requires states to report, some states collect summer meals data at the meal site level and we used such data from the three selected states to address all three objectives. For objective one, to examine the number of meals served and days of operation at each summer meals site, we analyzed site-level data for 2 months from summer 2016, including the month with the largest number of SFSP meals served in each selected state: Arizona (June and July 2016), Illinois (July and August 2016), and Massachusetts (July and August 2016). Each state also provided us with data on the number and types of meals served at each SFSP site, the site location, and the duration of time each site operated over the summer. Using the data provided by the states, we calculated the average daily attendance (ADA) for each meal site based on FNS’s instructions and examined the variation in ADA across sites and months. For our second objective on other programs, these selected states provided similar site level data for the state’s Seamless Summer Option sites, if applicable. We assessed the reliability of these data by (1) performing electronic testing of relevant data elements, (2) reviewing existing information about the data and the system that produced them, and (3) interviewing agency officials knowledgeable about the data. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. For both our second objective on other programs and third objective about challenges in providing summer meals to children, we also examined meal site availability in the three selected states by mapping the locations of meal sites. On the maps, we included fiscal year 2016 area eligibility data from FNS’s Capacity Builder mapping tool, as provided by FNS. The site area eligibility data from FNS’s Capacity Builder is based on the U.S. Census Bureau’s 5-Year American Community Survey (ACS) estimates of children ages 0-12 and 0-18 eligible for free and reduced-price meals by Census block group and tract. According to FNS officials, FNS obtains 5-Year ACS estimates annually from the U.S. Census Bureau and updates its site area eligibility in the Capacity Builder accordingly. For fiscal year 2016, FNS used 2009- 2013 ACS data to identify and include site area eligibility in its Capacity Builder. To help inform all of our research objectives, we conducted a survey of the state agencies that oversee the SFSP in the 50 states and the District of Columbia. We administered our web-based survey between August and October 2017 and received 100 percent response rate. The survey included questions about participation in the SFSP, factors critical to the overall success of the SFSP, outreach efforts, federal technical assistance, barriers and challenges in providing summer meals, alternative summer feeding models, the NSLP’s Seamless Summer Option and the federal Summer Electronic Benefit Transfer for Children demonstration, and nonfederal programs that provide children of low- income households with meals during the summer months. The survey also requested data on SFSP sites participating in the program in fiscal year 2016 and the method state agencies used to calculate ADA in SFSP on the FNS-418 form in fiscal year 2016. Because this was not a sample survey, there are no sampling errors. However, the practical difficulties of conducting any survey may introduce nonsampling errors, such as variations in how respondents interpret questions and their willingness to offer accurate responses. We took steps to minimize nonsampling errors, including pretesting draft instruments and using a web-based administration system. Specifically, during survey development, we pretested draft instruments with SFSP staff from four states (Michigan, New Mexico, North Carolina, and South Dakota) in May 2017. We selected the pretest states based on information provided by officials from FNS’s regional offices and national organizations involved in summer meals about state administration of summer meals programs, with the goal of selecting a group of states with varied experiences. In the pretests, we were generally interested in the clarity, precision, and objectivity of the questions, as well as the flow and layout of the survey. For example, we wanted to ensure definitions used in the surveys were clear and known to the respondents, categories provided in close-ended questions were complete and exclusive, and the ordering of survey sections and the questions within each section were appropriate. We revised the final survey based on pretest results. Another step we took to minimize nonsampling errors was using a web-based survey. Allowing respondents to enter their responses directly into an electronic instrument created a record for each respondent in a data file and eliminated the need for and the errors associated with a manual data entry process. We did not fully validate specific information that states reported through our survey. To help inform all of our objectives and gather information about the SFSP directly at the local-level, we conducted 30 site visits in three states: Arizona (12 sites), Illinois (8 sites), and Massachusetts (10 sites) between June and July 2017, and interviewed organizations involved with the SFSP in each site visit state. We used U.S. Census Bureau data to select states and local areas within those states based on a high proportion of children in poverty, a mix of urban and rural locations, as well as a mix of sponsor and site type and diverse locations. We visited a wide variety of site locations including, but not limited to, schools, parks, community recreation areas, and libraries. At each SFSP site, we gathered information on local level factors related to SFSP participation and administration by interviewing the organization sponsoring the site, the site operators and staff, and those participating at the site using semi-structured questions. While interviewing SFSP sponsor organizations, we collected information on the sponsors’ roles in the SFSP, characteristics of the sites the organizations sponsored, outreach efforts, any challenges or barriers to SFSP administration and any efforts to address such challenges, relationships with the state agencies that administer the SFSP, relationships with FNS (national and regional offices), and the availability of nonfederally funded programs that provide meals to low-income children over the summer. During the interviews with site operators and staff, we collected information about site operation (e.g., site operating days, meals offered, etc.), any challenges to providing SFSP meals to children and any efforts to address such challenges, outreach efforts, and the proximity of the next closest meal site. The information we collected from those participating at the sites included their perspectives on the SFSP food, site food consumption habits, ease of travel to the site, and access to other SFSP sites. At each site, we made observations as to how the food was provided to the children, food consumption and waste, the approximate age range of the children being served, and availability of programs or activities (e.g., recreational sports). Using semi-structured questions, we also interviewed the state agencies responsible for administering the SFSP in the site visit states to gather further information on how the SFSP is administered in each state, statewide participation in the program, related data collection activities, any challenges to administering the program and any efforts to address such challenges, related outreach efforts, alternative meal delivery models being employed by SFSP sponsors, FNS guidance or technical assistance, and the availability of nonfederally funded programs that provide meals to low-income children over the summer. For states that indicated there were other challenge(s), we provided an open-ended question that requested a description of the challenge(s) and 14 states provided descriptions of other challenges, not shown here. For states that indicated there were other challenge(s), we provided an open-ended question that requested a description of the challenge(s) and 8 states provided descriptions of other challenges, not shown here. In addition to the contact named above, Rachel Frisk (Assistant Director), Claudine Pauselli (Analyst-in-Charge), Melissa Jaynes, and Matthew Nattinger made key contributions to this report. Also contributing to this report were Susan Aschoff, Sarah Cornetto, Ying Long, Jean McSween, Mimi Nguyen, Almeta Spencer, and Ashanta Williams.	[ "The SFSP, a federal nutrition assistance program, is intended to provide food to children in low-income areas during periods when area schools are closed for vacation. In the last decade, federal expenditures for SFSP have increased as the program has expanded, according to USDA data. GAO was asked to review the SFSP. This report examines (1) what is known about SFSP participation, (2) other programs that help feed low-income children over the summer, and (3) challenges, if any, in providing summer meals to children and the extent to which USDA provides assistance to address these challenges. GAO reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, and guidance; analyzed USDA's SFSP data for fiscal years 2007 through 2016; surveyed state agencies responsible for administering the SFSP in 50 states and the District of Columbia; visited a nongeneralizable group of 3 states and 30 meal sites, selected based on Census data on child poverty rates and urban and rural locations; analyzed meal site data from the 3 states; and interviewed USDA, state and national organization officials, and SFSP providers, including sponsors and site operators. Nationwide, the total number of meals served to children in low-income areas through the Summer Food Service Program (SFSP) increased from 113 to 149 million (about 32 percent) from fiscal year 2007 through 2016. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) directs states to use the number of meals served, along with other data, to estimate the number of children participating in the SFSP. However, participation estimates have been calculated inconsistently from state to state and year to year. In 2017, USDA took steps to improve the consistency of participation estimates, noting they are critical for informing program implementation and strategic planning. However, GAO determined that the method USDA directs states to use will continue to provide unreliable estimates of participation, hindering USDA's ability to use them for these purposes. Other federal and nonfederal programs help feed low-income children over the summer to some extent, according to states GAO surveyed and SFSP providers and others GAO interviewed. For example, in July 2016, USDA data indicate about 26 million meals were served through a separate federal program that allows school meal providers to serve summer meals. Some children also received summer meals through nonfederal programs operated by faith-based organizations and foodbanks, though GAO's state survey and interviews with providers and national organizations indicate the reach of such efforts is limited. States and SFSP providers reported challenges with meal sites, participation, and program administration; USDA has taken steps to address these areas. Specifically, in GAO's survey, a majority of states reported challenges with availability and awareness of meal sites, as well as limited program participation and administrative capacity. National, state, and local officials have taken steps to address these issues, such as increasing outreach and offering activities to attract participation. In addition, 17 states in GAO's survey and providers in the states GAO visited reported a challenge with ensuring meal sites are in safe locations. To address this safety issue, USDA has granted some states and sponsors flexibility from the requirement that children consume meals on-site. However, USDA has not broadly communicated the circumstances it considers when granting this flexibility. Further, some states and sponsors that have requested this flexibility reported difficulty obtaining data to show these circumstances exist, hampering their ability to ensure safe meal delivery. GAO is making four recommendations, including that USDA improve estimates of children's participation in SFSP and communicate the circumstances it considers when granting flexibilities to ensure safe meal delivery. USDA generally agreed with GAO's recommendations." ]	11,048	gov_report	en	null	b9daebf4ce1384e0deff985966ebdb1db056ff7c5808d497
Medicare is one of four principal health-insurance programs administered by CMS; it provides health insurance for persons aged 65 and over, certain individuals with disabilities, and individuals with end-stage renal disease. See table 1 for information about Medicare’s component programs. Medicare is the largest CMS program, at $702 billion in fiscal year 2017. As discussed earlier, according to CBO, Medicare outlays are projected to rise to $1.5 trillion in 2028 (see fig. 1). Fraud involves obtaining something of value through willful misrepresentation. There are no reliable estimates of the extent of fraud in the Medicare program, or in the health-care industry as a whole. By its very nature, fraud is difficult to detect, as those involved are engaged in intentional deception. Further, potential fraud cases must be identified, investigated, prosecuted, and adjudicated—resulting in a conviction— before fraud can be established. As I mentioned earlier, we designated Medicare as a high-risk program in 1990 because its size, scope, and complexity make it vulnerable to fraud, waste, and abuse. Similarly, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) designated all parts of Medicare a “high priority” program because they each report $750 million or more in improper payments in a given year. We also highlighted challenges associated with duplicative payments in Medicare in our annual report on duplication and opportunities for cost savings in federal programs. Improper payments are a significant risk to the Medicare program and may include payments made as a result of fraud. However, I would note that improper payments are not a proxy for the amount of fraud or extent of fraud risk in a particular program as improper payment measurement does not specifically identify or estimate such payments due to fraud. Improper payments are those that are either made in an incorrect amount (overpayments and underpayments) or those that should not have been made at all. Our December 2017 report found that CMS manages its fraud risks as part of a broader program-integrity approach working with a broad array of stakeholders. CMS’s program-integrity approach includes efforts to address waste, abuse, and improper payments as well as fraud across its four principal programs. In Medicare, CMS collaborates with contractors, health-insurance plans, and law-enforcement and other agencies to carry out its program-integrity responsibilities. According to CMS officials, this broader program-integrity approach can help the agency develop control activities to address multiple sources of improper payments, including fraud. According to federal standards and guidance, executive-branch agency managers are responsible for managing fraud risks and implementing practices for combating those risks. Federal internal control standards call for agency management officials to assess the internal and external risks their entities face as they seek to achieve their objectives. The standards state that as part of this overall assessment, management should consider the potential for fraud when identifying, analyzing, and responding to risks. Risk management is a formal and disciplined practice for addressing risk and reducing it to an acceptable level. In July 2015, GAO issued the Fraud Risk Framework, which provides a comprehensive set of key components and leading practices that serve as a guide for agency managers to use when developing efforts to combat fraud in a strategic, risk-based way. The Fraud Risk Framework describes leading practices in four components: commit, assess, design and implement, and evaluate and adapt, as depicted in figure 2. The Fraud Reduction and Data Analytics Act of 2015, enacted in June 2016, requires OMB to establish guidelines for federal agencies to create controls to identify and assess fraud risks and design and implement antifraud control activities. The act further requires OMB to incorporate the leading practices from the Fraud Risk Framework in the guidelines. In July 2016, OMB published guidance about enterprise risk management and internal controls in federal executive departments and agencies. Among other things, this guidance affirms that managers should adhere to the leading practices identified in the Fraud Risk Framework. Further, the act requires federal agencies to submit to Congress a progress report each year for 3 consecutive years on the implementation of the controls established under OMB guidelines, among other things. CMS’s antifraud efforts partially aligned with the Fraud Risk Framework. Consistent with the framework, CMS has demonstrated commitment to combating fraud by creating a dedicated entity to lead antifraud efforts. It has also taken steps to establish a culture conducive to fraud risk management, although it could expand its antifraud training to include all employees. CMS has taken some steps to identify fraud risks in Medicare; however, it has not conducted a fraud risk assessment or developed a risk-based antifraud strategy for Medicare as defined in the Fraud Risk Framework. CMS has established monitoring and evaluation mechanisms for its program-integrity control activities that, if aligned with a risk-based antifraud strategy, could enhance the effectiveness of fraud risk management in Medicare. The commit component of the Fraud Risk Framework calls for an agency to commit to combating fraud by creating an organizational culture and structure conducive to fraud risk management. This component includes establishing a dedicated entity to lead fraud risk management activities. Within CMS, the Center for Program Integrity (CPI) serves as the dedicated entity for fraud, waste, and abuse issues in Medicare, which is consistent with the Fraud Risk Framework. CPI was established in 2010, in response to a November 2009 Executive Order on reducing improper payments and eliminating waste in federal programs. This formalized role, according to CMS officials, elevated the status of program-integrity efforts, which previously were carried out by other parts of CMS. As an executive-level Center—on the same level with five other executive-level Centers at CMS, such as the Center for Medicare—CPI has a direct reporting line to executive-level management at CMS. The Fraud Risk Framework identifies a direct reporting line to senior-level managers within the agency as a leading practice. According to CMS officials, this elevated organizational status offers CPI heightened visibility across CMS, attention by CMS executive leadership, and involvement in executive-level conversations. The commit component of the Fraud Risk Framework also includes creating an organizational culture to combat fraud at all levels of the agency. Consistent with the Fraud Risk Framework, CMS has promoted an antifraud culture by, for example, coordinating with internal and external stakeholders. Consistent with leading practices in the Fraud Risk Framework to involve all levels of the agency in setting an antifraud tone, CPI has worked collaboratively with other CMS Centers. In addition to engaging executive-level officials of other CMS Centers through the Program Integrity Board, CPI has worked collaboratively with other Centers within CMS to incorporate antifraud features into new program design or policy development and established regular communication at the staff level. For example: Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation (CMMI). When developing the Medicare Diabetes Prevention Program, CMMI officials told us they worked with CPI’s Provider Enrollment and Oversight Group and Governance Management Group to develop risk-based screening procedures for entities that would enroll in Medicare to provide diabetes-prevention services, among other activities. The program was expanded nationally in 2016, and CMS determined that an entity may enroll in Medicare as a program supplier if it satisfies enrollment requirements, including that the supplier must pass existing high categorical risk-level screening requirements. Center for Medicare (CM). In addition to building safeguards into programs and developing policies, CM officials told us that there are several standing meetings, on monthly, biweekly, and weekly bases, between groups within CM and CPI that discuss issues related to provider enrollment, FFS operations, and contractor management. A senior CM official also told us that there are ad hoc meetings taking place between CM and CPI: “We interact multiple times daily at different levels of the organization. Working closely is just a regular part of our business.” CMS has also demonstrated its commitment to addressing fraud, waste, and abuse to its stakeholders. Representatives of CMS’s extensive stakeholder network whom we interviewed—contractors and officials from public and private entities—generally recognized the agency’s commitment to combating fraud. In our interviews with stakeholders, officials observed CMS’s increased commitment over time to address fraud, waste, and abuse and cited examples of specific CMS actions. CMS contractors told us that CMS’s commitment to combating fraud is incorporated into contractual requirements, such as requiring (1) data analysis for potential fraud leads and (2) fraud-awareness training for providers. Officials from entities that are members of the Healthcare Fraud Prevention Partnership (HFPP), specifically, a health-insurance plan and the National Health Care Anti-Fraud Association, added that CMS’s effort to establish the HFPP and its ongoing collaboration and information sharing reflect CMS’s commitment to combat fraud in Medicare. The Fraud Risk Framework identifies training as one way of demonstrating an agency’s commitment to combating fraud. Training and education intended to increase fraud awareness among stakeholders, managers, and employees serve as a preventive measure to help create a culture of integrity and compliance within the agency. The Fraud Risk Framework discusses requiring all employees to attend training upon hiring and on an ongoing basis thereafter. To increase awareness of fraud risks in Medicare, CMS offers and requires training for stakeholder groups such as providers, beneficiaries, and health-insurance plans. Specifically, through its National Training Program and Medicare Learning Network, CMS makes available training materials on combating Medicare fraud, waste, and abuse. These materials help to identify and report fraud, waste, and abuse in CMS programs and are geared toward providers, beneficiaries, as well as trainers and other stakeholders. Separately, CMS requires health- insurance plans working with CMS to provide annual fraud, waste, and abuse training to their employees. However, CMS does not offer or require similar fraud-awareness training for the majority of its workforce. For a relatively small portion of its overall workforce—specifically, contracting officer representatives who are responsible for certain aspects of the acquisition function—CMS requires completion of fraud and abuse prevention training every 2 years. According to CMS, 638 of its contracting officer representatives (or about 10 percent of its overall workforce) completed such training in 2016 and 2017. Although CMS offers fraud-awareness training to others, the agency does not require fraud-awareness training for new hires or on a regular basis for all employees because the agency has focused on providing process-based internal controls training for its employees. While fraud-awareness training for contracting officer representatives is an important step in helping to promote fraud risk management, fraud- awareness training specific to CMS programs would be beneficial for all employees. Such training would not only be consistent with what CMS offers to or requires of its stakeholders and some of its employees, but would also help to keep the agency’s entire workforce continuously aware of fraud risks and examples of known fraud schemes, such as those identified in successful HHS OIG investigations. Such training would also keep employees informed as they administer CMS programs or develop agency policies and procedures. Considering the vulnerability of Medicare and Medicaid programs to fraud, waste, and abuse, without regular required training CMS cannot be assured that its workforce of over 6,000 employees is continuously aware of risks facing its programs. In our December 2017 report, we recommended that the Administrator of CMS provide fraud-awareness training relevant to risks facing CMS programs and require new hires to undergo such training and all employees to undergo training on a recurring basis. In its March 2018 letter to GAO, HHS stated that CMS is in the process of developing Fraud, Waste, and Abuse Training for all new employees, to be presented at CMS New Employee Orientations. Additionally, CMS is also developing training to be completed by current CMS employees on an annual basis. As of July 2018, this recommendation remains open. The assess component of the Fraud Risk Framework calls for federal managers to plan regular fraud risk assessments and to assess risks to determine a fraud risk profile. Identifying fraud risks is one of the steps included in the Fraud Risk Framework for assessing risks to determine a fraud risk profile. In our December 2017 report, we discussed several examples of steps CMS has taken to identify fraud risks as well as control activities that target areas the agency has designated as higher risk within Medicare, including specific provider types and specific geographic locations. These examples include data analytics to assist investigations in Medicare FFS, including Medicare’s Fraud Prevention System (FPS ), prior authorization for Medicare FFS services or supplies, revised provider screening and enrollment processes for Medicare FFS, and temporary provider enrollment moratoriums for certain providers and geographic areas for Medicare FFS. CMS officials told us that CPI initially focused on developing control activities for Medicare FFS and consider these activities to be the most mature of all CPI efforts to address fraud risks. CMS Has Not Conducted a Fraud Risk Assessment for Medicare The assess component of the Fraud Risk Framework calls for federal managers to plan regular fraud risk assessments and assess risks to determine a fraud risk profile. Furthermore, federal internal control standards call for agency management to assess the internal and external risks their entities face as they seek to achieve their objectives. The standards state that, as part of this overall assessment, management should consider the potential for fraud when identifying, analyzing, and responding to risks. The Fraud Risk Framework states that, in planning the fraud risk assessment, effective managers tailor the fraud risk assessment to the program by, among other things, identifying appropriate tools, methods, and sources for gathering information about fraud risks and involving relevant stakeholders in the assessment process. Fraud risk assessments that align with the Fraud Risk Framework involve (1) identifying inherent fraud risks affecting the program, (2) assessing the likelihood and impact of those fraud risks, (3) determining fraud risk tolerance, (4) examining the suitability of existing fraud controls and prioritizing residual fraud risks, and (5) documenting the results (see fig. 3). Although CMS had identified some fraud risks posed by providers in Medicare FFS, the agency had not conducted a fraud risk assessment for the Medicare program as a whole. Such a risk assessment would provide the detailed information and insights needed to create a fraud risk profile, which, in turn, is the basis for creating an antifraud strategy. According to CMS officials, CMS had not conducted a fraud risk assessment for Medicare because, within CPI’s broader approach of preventing and eliminating improper payments, its focus has been on addressing specific vulnerabilities among provider groups that have shown themselves particularly prone to fraud, waste, and abuse. With this approach, however, it is unlikely that CMS will be able to design and implement the most-appropriate control activities to respond to the full portfolio of fraud risks. A fraud risk assessment consists of discrete activities that build upon each other. Specifically: Identifying inherent fraud risks affecting the program. As discussed earlier, CMS took steps to identify fraud risks. However, CMS has not used a process to identify inherent fraud risks from the universe of potential vulnerabilities facing Medicare, including threats from various sources. According to CPI officials, most of the agency’s fraud control activities are focused on fraud risks posed by providers. The Fraud Risk Framework discusses fully considering inherent fraud risks from internal and external sources in light of fraud risk factors such as incentives, opportunities, and rationalization to commit fraud. For example, according to CMS officials, the inherent design of the Medicare Part C program may pose fraud risks that are challenging to detect. A fraud risk assessment would help CMS identify all sources of fraudulent behaviors, beyond threats posed by providers, such as those posed by health-insurance plans, contractors, or employees. Assessing the likelihood and impact of fraud risks and determining fraud risk tolerance. CMS has taken steps to prioritize fraud risks in some areas, but it had not assessed the likelihood or impact of fraud risks or determined fraud risk tolerance across all parts of Medicare. Assessing the likelihood and impact of inherent fraud risks would involve consideration of the impact of fraud risks on program finances, reputation, and compliance. Without assessing the likelihood and impact of risks in Medicare or internally determining which fraud risks may fall under the tolerance threshold, CMS cannot be certain that it is aware of the most-significant fraud risks facing this program and what risks it is willing to tolerate based on the program’s size and complexity. Examining the suitability of existing fraud controls and prioritizing residual fraud risks. CMS had not assessed existing control activities or prioritized residual fraud risks. According to the Fraud Risk Framework, managers may consider the extent to which existing control activities—whether focused on prevention, detection, or response—mitigate the likelihood and impact of inherent risks and whether the remaining risks exceed managers’ tolerance. This analysis would help CMS to prioritize residual risks and to determine mitigation approaches. For example, CMS had not established preventive fraud control activities in Medicare Part C. Using a fraud risk assessment for Medicare Part C and closely examining existing fraud control activities and residual risks, CMS could be better positioned to address fraud risks facing this growing program and develop preventive control activities. Furthermore, without assessing existing fraud control activities and prioritizing residual fraud risks, CMS cannot be assured that its current control activities are addressing the most-significant risks. Such analysis would also help CMS determine whether additional, preferably preventive, fraud controls are needed to mitigate residual risks, make adjustments to existing control activities, and potentially scale back or remove control activities that are addressing tolerable fraud risks. Documenting the risk-assessment results in a fraud risk profile. CMS had not developed a fraud risk profile that documents key findings and conclusions of the fraud risk assessment. According to the Fraud Risk Framework, the risk profile can also help agencies decide how to allocate resources to respond to residual fraud risks. Given the large size and complexity of Medicare, a documented fraud risk profile could support CMS’s resource-allocation decisions as well as facilitate the transfer of knowledge and continuity across CMS staff and changing administrations. Senior CPI officials told us that the agency plans to start a fraud risk assessment for Medicare after it completes a separate fraud risk assessment of the federally facilitated marketplace. This fraud risk assessment for the federally facilitated marketplace eligibility and enrollment process is being conducted in response to a recommendation we made in February 2016. In April 2017, CPI officials told us that this fraud risk assessment was largely completed, although in September 2017 CPI officials told us that the assessment was undergoing agency review. CPI officials told us that they have informed CM officials that there will be future fraud risk assessments for Medicare; however, they could not provide estimated timelines or plans for conducting such assessments, such as the order or programmatic scope of the assessments. Once completed, CMS could use the federally facilitated marketplace fraud risk assessment and apply any lessons learned when planning for and designing fraud risk assessments for Medicare. According to the Fraud Risk Framework, factors such as size, resources, maturity of the agency or program, and experience in managing risks can influence how the entity plans the fraud risk assessment. Additionally, effective managers tailor the fraud risk assessment to the program when planning for it. The large scale and complexity of Medicare as well as time and resources involved in conducting a fraud risk assessment underscore the importance of a well-planned and tailored approach to identifying the assessment’s programmatic scope. Planning and tailoring may involve decisions to conduct a fraud risk assessment for Medicare as a whole or divided into several subassessments to reflect their various component parts (e.g., Medicare Part C). CMS’s existing fraud risk identification efforts as well as communication channels with stakeholders could serve as a foundation for developing a fraud risk assessment for Medicare. The leading practices identified in the Fraud Risk Framework discuss the importance of identifying appropriate tools, methods, and sources for gathering information about fraud risks and involving relevant stakeholders in the assessment process. CMS’s fraud risk identification efforts discussed earlier could provide key information about fraud risks and their likelihood and impact. Furthermore, existing relationships and communication channels across CMS and its extensive network of stakeholders could support building a comprehensive understanding of known and potential fraud risks for the purposes of a fraud risk assessment. For example, the fraud vulnerabilities identified through data analysis and information sharing with health-insurance plans, law-enforcement organizations, and contractors could inform a fraud risk assessment. CPI’s Command Center missions—facilitated collaboration sessions that bring together experts from various disciplines to improve the processes for fraud prevention in Medicare—could bring together experts to identify potential or emerging fraud vulnerabilities or to brainstorm approaches to mitigate residual fraud risks. As CMS makes plans to move forward with a fraud risk assessment for Medicare, it will be important to consider the frequency with which the fraud risk assessment would need to be updated. While, according to the Fraud Risk Framework, the time intervals between updates can vary based on the programmatic and operating environment, assessing fraud risks on an ongoing basis is important to ensure that control activities are continuously addressing fraud risks. The constantly evolving fraud schemes, the size of the programs in terms of beneficiaries and expenditures, as well as continual changes in Medicare—such as development of innovative payment models and increasing managed- care enrollment—call for constant vigilance and regular updates to the fraud risk assessment. In our December 2017 report we recommended that the Administrator of CMS conduct fraud risk assessments for Medicare and Medicaid to include respective fraud risk profiles and plans for regularly updating the assessments and profiles. In its March 2018 letter to GAO, HHS stated that it is currently evaluating its options with regards to implementing this recommendation. As of July 2018, the recommendation remains open. The design and implement component of the Fraud Risk Framework calls for federal managers to design and implement a strategy with specific control activities to mitigate assessed fraud risks and collaborate to help ensure effective implementation. According to the Fraud Risk Framework, effective managers develop and document an antifraud strategy that describes the program’s approach for addressing the prioritized fraud risks identified during the fraud risk assessment, also referred to as a risk-based antifraud strategy. A risk- based antifraud strategy describes existing fraud control activities as well as any new fraud control activities a program may adopt to address residual fraud risks. In developing a strategy and antifraud control activities, effective managers focus on fraud prevention over detection, develop a plan for responding to identified instances of fraud, establish collaborative relationships with stakeholders, and create incentives to help effectively implement the strategy. Additionally, as part of a documented strategy, management identifies roles and responsibilities of those involved in fraud risk management activities; describes control activities as well as plans for monitoring and evaluation; creates timelines; and communicates the antifraud strategy to employees and stakeholders, among other things. As discussed earlier, CMS had some control activities in place to identify fraud risk in Medicare, particularly in the FFS program. However, CMS had not developed and documented a risk-based antifraud strategy to guide its design and implementation of new antifraud activities and to better align and coordinate its existing activities to ensure it is targeting and mitigating the most-significant fraud risks. Antifraud strategy. CMS officials told us that CPI does not have a documented risk-based antifraud strategy. Although CMS has developed several documents that describe efforts to address fraud, the agency had not developed a risk-based antifraud strategy for Medicare because, as discussed earlier, it had not conducted a fraud risk assessment that would serve as a foundation for such strategy. In 2016, CPI identified five strategic objectives for program integrity, which include antifraud elements and an emphasis on prevention. However, according to CMS officials, these objectives were identified from discussions with CMS leadership and various stakeholders and not through a fraud risk assessment process to identify inherent fraud risks from the universe of potential vulnerabilities, as described earlier and called for in the leading practices. These strategic objectives were presented at an antifraud conference in 2016, but were not announced publicly until the release of the Annual Report to Congress on the Medicare and Medicaid Integrity Programs for Fiscal Year 2015 in June 2017. Stakeholder relationships and communication. CMS has established relationships and communicated with stakeholders, but, without an antifraud strategy, stakeholders we spoke with lacked a common understanding of CMS’s strategic approach. Prior work on practices that can help federal agencies collaborate effectively calls for a strategy that is shared with stakeholders to promote trust and understanding. Once an antifraud strategy is developed, the Fraud Risk Framework calls for managers to collaborate to ensure effective implementation. Although some CMS stakeholders were able to describe various CMS program- integrity priorities and activities, such as home health being a fraud risk priority, the stakeholders could not communicate, articulate, or cite a common CMS strategic approach to address fraud risks in its programs. Incentives. The Fraud Risk Framework discusses creating incentives to help ensure effective implementation of the antifraud strategy once it is developed. Currently, some incentives within stakeholder relationships may complicate CMS’s antifraud efforts. Among contractors, CMS encourages information sharing through conferences and workshops; however, competition for CMS business among contractors can be a disincentive to information sharing. CMS officials acknowledged this concern and said that they expect contractors to share information related to fraud schemes, outcomes of investigations, and tips for addressing fraud, but not proprietary information such as algorithms to risk-score providers. Without developing and documenting an antifraud strategy based on a fraud risk assessment, as called for in the design and implement component of the Fraud Risk Framework, CMS cannot ensure that it has a coordinated approach to address the range of fraud risks and to appropriately target and allocate resources for the most-significant risks. Considering fraud risks to which Medicare is most vulnerable, in light of the malicious intent of those who aim to exploit the programs, would help CMS to examine its current control activities and potentially design new ones with recognition of fraudulent behavior it aims to prevent. This focus on fraud is distinct from a broader view of program integrity and improper payments by considering the intentions and incentives of those who aim to deceive rather than well-intentioned providers who make mistakes. Also, continued growth of the program, such as growth of Medicare Part C, calls for consideration of preventive fraud control activities across the entire network of entities involved. Furthermore, considering the large size and complexity of Medicare and the extensive stakeholder network involved in managing fraud in the program, a strategic approach to managing fraud risks within the programs is essential to ensure that a number of existing control activities and numerous stakeholder relationships and incentives are being aligned to produce desired results. Once developed, an antifraud strategy that is clearly articulated to various CMS stakeholders would help CMS to address fraud risks in a more coordinated and deliberate fashion. Thinking strategically about existing control activities, resources, tools, and information systems could help CMS to leverage resources while continuing to integrate Medicare program-integrity efforts along functional lines. A strategic approach grounded in a comprehensive assessment of fraud risks could also help CMS to identify future enhancements for existing control activities, such as new preventive capabilities for its Fraud Prevention System (FPS) or additional fraud factors in provider enrollment and revalidation, such as provider risk-scoring, to stay in step with evolving fraud risks. CMS Has Established Monitoring and Evaluation Mechanisms That Could Inform a Risk-Based Antifraud Strategy for Medicare The evaluate and adapt component of the Fraud Risk Framework calls for federal managers to evaluate outcomes using a risk-based approach and adapt activities to improve fraud risk management. Furthermore, according to federal internal control standards, managers should establish and operate monitoring activities to monitor the internal control system and evaluate the results, which may be compared against an established baseline. Ongoing monitoring and periodic evaluations provide assurances to managers that they are effectively preventing, detecting, and responding to potential fraud. CMS has established monitoring and evaluation mechanisms for its program-integrity activities that it could incorporate into an antifraud strategy. As described in the Fraud Risk Framework, agencies can gather information on the short-term or intermediate outcomes of some antifraud initiatives, which may be more readily measured. For example, CMS has developed some performance measures to provide a basis for monitoring its progress towards meeting the program-integrity goals set in the HHS Strategic Plan and Annual Performance Plan. Specifically, CMS measures whether it is meeting its goal of “increasing the percentage of Medicare FFS providers and suppliers identified as high risk that receive an administrative action.” CMS does not set specific antifraud goals for other parts of Medicare; other CMS performance measures relate to measuring or reducing improper payments in the various parts of Medicare. CMS uses return-on-investment and savings estimates to measure the effectiveness of its Medicare program-integrity activities and FPS. For example, CMS uses return-on-investment to measure the effectiveness of FPS and, in response to a recommendation we made in 2012, CMS developed outcome-based performance targets and milestones for FPS. CMS has also conducted individual evaluations of its program-integrity activities, such as an interim evaluation of the prior-authorization demonstration for power mobility devices that began in 2012 and is currently implemented in 19 states. Commensurate with greater maturity of control activities in Medicare FFS compared to other parts of Medicare and Medicaid, monitoring and evaluation activities for Medicare Parts C and D and Medicaid are more limited. For example, CMS calculates savings for its program-integrity activities in Medicare Parts C and D, but not a full return-on-investment. CMS officials told us that calculating costs for specific activities is challenging because of overlapping activities among contractors. CMS officials said they continue to refine methods and develop new savings estimates for additional program-integrity activities. According to the Fraud Risk Framework, effective managers develop a strategy and evaluate outcomes using a risk-based approach. In developing an effective strategy and antifraud activities, managers consider the benefits and costs of control activities. Ongoing monitoring and periodic evaluations provide reasonable assurance to managers that they are effectively preventing, detecting, and responding to potential fraud. Monitoring and evaluation activities can also support managers’ decisions about allocating resources, and help them to demonstrate their continued commitment to effectively managing fraud risks. As CMS takes steps to develop an antifraud strategy, it could include plans for refining and building on existing methods such as return-on- investment or savings measures, and setting appropriate targets to evaluate the effectiveness of all of CMS’s antifraud efforts. Such a strategy would help CMS to efficiently allocate program-integrity resources and to ensure that the agency is effectively preventing, detecting, and responding to potential fraud. For example, while doing so would involve challenges, CMS’s strategy could detail plans to advance efforts to measure a potential fraud rate through baseline and periodic measures. Fraud-rate measurement efforts could also inform risk assessment activities, identify currently unknown fraud risks, align resources to priority risks, and develop effective outcome metrics for antifraud controls. Such a strategy would also help CMS ensure that it has effective performance measures in place to assess its antifraud efforts beyond those related to providers in Medicare FFS, and establish appropriate targets to measure the agency’s progress in addressing fraud risks. In our December 2017 report we recommended that the Administrator of CMS should, using the results of the fraud risk assessments for Medicare, create, document, implement, and communicate an antifraud strategy that is aligned with and responsive to regularly assessed fraud risks. This strategy should include an approach for monitoring and evaluation. In its March 2018 letter to GAO, HHS stated that it is currently evaluating its options with regards to implementing this recommendation. As of July 2018, the recommendation remains open. Chairman Jenkins and Ranking Member Lewis, this concludes my prepared statement. I look forward to the subcommittee’s questions. If you or your staff have any questions concerning this testimony, please contact Seto J. Bagdoyan, who may be reached at (202) 512-6722 or bagdoyans@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. Other individuals who made key contributions to this testimony include Tonita Gillich (Assistant Director), Irina Carnevale (Analyst-in- Charge), Colin Fallon, Scott Hiromoto, and Maria McMullen. Improper Payments: Actions and Guidance Could Help Address Issues and Inconsistencies in Estimation Processes. GAO-18-377. Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2018. Medicare: CMS Should Take Actions to Continue Prior Authorization Efforts to Reduce Spending. GAO-18-341. Washington, D.C.: April 20, 2018. Medicare and Medicaid: CMS Needs to Fully Align Its Antifraud Efforts with the Fraud Risk Framework. GAO-18-88. Washington, D.C.: December 5, 2017. Medicare: CMS Fraud Prevention System Uses Claims Analysis to Address Fraud. GAO-17-710. Washington, D.C.: August 30, 2017. Medicare Advantage Program Integrity: CMS’s Efforts to Ensure Proper Payments and Identify and Recover Improper Payments. GAO-17-761T. Washington, D.C.: July 19, 2017. Medicare Provider Education: Oversight of Efforts to Reduce Improper Billing Needs Improvement. GAO-17-290. Washington, D.C.: March 10, 2017. High-Risk Series: Progress on Many High-Risk Areas, While Substantial Efforts Needed on Others. GAO-17-317. Washington, D.C.: February 15, 2017. Medicare Advantage: Limited Progress Made to Validate Encounter Data Used to Ensure Proper Payments. GAO-17-223. Washington, D.C.: January 17, 2017. Medicare: Initial Results of Revised Process to Screen Providers and Suppliers, and Need for Objectives and Performance Measures. GAO-17-42. Washington, D.C.: November 15, 2016. Medicare: Claim Review Programs Could Be Improved with Additional Prepayment Reviews and Better Data. GAO-16-394. Washington, D.C.: April 13, 2016. Medicare Advantage: Fundamental Improvements Needed in CMS’s Effort to Recover Substantial Amounts of Improper Payments. GAO-16- 76. Washington, D.C.: April 8, 2016. Health Care Fraud: Information on Most Common Schemes and the Likely Effect of Smart Cards. GAO-16-216. Washington, D.C.: January 22, 2016. A Framework for Managing Fraud Risks in Federal Programs. GAO-15-593SP. Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2015. Medicare Program Integrity: Increased Oversight and Guidance Could Improve Effectiveness and Efficiency of Postpayment Claims Reviews. GAO-14-474. Washington, D.C.: July 18, 2014. Medicare Fraud Prevention: CMS Has Implemented a Predictive Analytics System, but Needs to Define Measures to Determine Its Effectiveness. GAO-13-104. Washington, D.C.: October 15, 2012. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.	[ "Medicare covered over 58 million people in 2017 and has wide-ranging impact on the health-care sector and the overall U.S. economy. However, the billions of dollars in Medicare outlays as well as program complexity make it susceptible to improper payments, including fraud. Although there are no reliable estimates of fraud in Medicare, in fiscal year 2017 improper payments for Medicare were estimated at about $52 billion. Further, about $1.4 billion was returned to Medicare Trust Funds in fiscal year 2017 as a result of recoveries, fines, and asset forfeitures. In December 2017, GAO issued a report examining how CMS managed its fraud risks overall and particularly the extent to which its efforts in the Medicare and Medicaid programs aligned with GAO's Framework. This testimony, based on that report, discusses the extent to which CMS's management of fraud risks in Medicare aligns with the Framework. For the report, GAO reviewed CMS policies and interviewed officials and external stakeholders. In its December 2017 report, GAO found that the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services' (CMS) antifraud efforts for Medicare partially align with GAO's 2015 A Framework for Managing Fraud Risks in Federal Programs (Framework). The Fraud Reduction and Data Analytics Act of 2015 required OMB to incorporate leading practices identified in this Framework in its guidance to agencies on addressing fraud risks. Consistent with the Framework, GAO determined that CMS had demonstrated commitment to combating fraud by creating a dedicated entity to lead antifraud efforts; the Center for Program Integrity (CPI) serves as this entity for fraud, waste, and abuse issues in Medicare. CMS also promoted an antifraud culture by, for example, coordinating with internal stakeholders to incorporate antifraud features into new program design. To increase awareness of fraud risks in Medicare, CMS offered and required training for stakeholder groups such as providers of medical services, but it did not offer or require similar fraud-awareness training for most of its workforce. CMS took some steps to identify fraud risks in Medicare; however, it had not conducted a fraud risk assessment or designed and implemented a risk-based antifraud strategy for Medicare as defined in the Framework. CMS identified fraud risks through control activities that target areas the agency designated as higher risk within Medicare, including specific provider types, such as home health agencies. Building on earlier steps and conducting a fraud risk assessment, consistent with the Framework, would provide the detailed information and insights needed to create a fraud risk profile, which, in turn, is the basis for creating an antifraud strategy. CMS established monitoring and evaluation mechanisms for its program-integrity control activities that, if aligned with an antifraud strategy, could enhance the effectiveness of fraud risk management in Medicare. For example, CMS used return-on-investment and savings estimates to measure the effectiveness of its Medicare program-integrity activities. In developing an antifraud strategy, consistent with the Framework, CMS could include plans for refining and building on existing methods such as return-on-investment, to evaluate the effectiveness of all of its antifraud efforts. In its December 2017 report, GAO made three recommendations, namely that CMS (1) require and provide fraud-awareness training to its employees; (2) conduct fraud risk assessments; and (3) create an antifraud strategy for Medicare, including an approach for evaluation. The Department of Health and Human Services agreed with these recommendations and reportedly is evaluating options to implement them. Accordingly, the recommendations remain open." ]	5,746	gov_report	en	null	a12d1df7a84ab7478fc861b8b0221e9b0dd8d0e6a96d18fc
SSA’s mission is to deliver Social Security services that meet the changing needs of the public. The Social Security Act and amendments established three programs that the agency administers: Old-Age and Survivors Insurance provides monthly retirement and survivors benefits to retired and disabled workers, their spouses and their children, and the survivors of insured workers who have died. SSA has estimated that, in fiscal year 2019, $892 billion in old-age and survivors insurance benefits are expected to be paid to a monthly average of approximately 54 million beneficiaries. Disability Insurance provides monthly benefits to disabled workers and their spouses and children. The agency estimates that, in fiscal year 2019, a total of approximately $149 billion in disability insurance benefits will be paid to a monthly average of about 10 million eligible workers. Supplemental Security Income is a needs-based program financed from general tax revenues that provides benefits to aged adults, blind or disabled adults, and children with limited income and resources. For fiscal year 2019, SSA estimates that nearly $59 billion in federal benefits and state supplementary payments will be made to a monthly average of approximately 8 million recipients. SSA relies heavily on its IT resources to support the administration of its programs and related activities. For example, its systems are used to handle millions of transactions on the agency’s website, maintain records for the millions of beneficiaries and recipients of its programs, and evaluate evidence and make determinations of eligibility for benefits. According to the agency’s most recent Information Resources Strategic Plan, its systems supported the processing of an average daily volume of about 185 million individual transactions in fiscal year 2015. SSA’s Office of the Deputy Commissioner for Systems is responsible for developing, overseeing, and maintaining the agency’s IT systems. Comprised of approximately 3,800 staff, the office is headed by the Deputy Commissioner, who also serves as the agency’s CIO. SSA has long been challenged in its management of IT. As a result, we have previously issued a number of reports highlighting various weaknesses in the agency’s system development practices, governance, requirements management, and strategic planning, among other areas. Collectively, our reports stressed the need for the agency to strengthen its IT management controls. In 2016, we reported that SSA’s acting commissioner had stated that the agency’s aging IT infrastructure was not sustainable because it was increasingly difficult and expensive to maintain. Accordingly, the agency requested $132 million in its fiscal year 2019 budget to modernize its IT environment. As reflected in the budget, these modernization efforts are expected to include projects such as updating database designs by converting them to relational databases, eliminating the use of outdated code, and upgrading infrastructure. Among the agency’s priority IT spending initiatives in the budget is its Disability Case Processing System, which has been under development since December 2010. This system is intended to replace the 52 disparate Disability Determination Services’ component systems and associated processes with a modern, common case processing system. According to SSA, the new system is to modernize the entire claims process, including case processing, correspondence, and workload management. However, SSA has reported substantial difficulty in the agency’s ability to carry out this initiative, citing software quality and poor system performance as issues. Consequently, in June 2016, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) placed the initiative on its government- wide list of 10 high-priority programs requiring attention. As previously mentioned, Congress enacted federal IT acquisition reform legislation (commonly referred to as FITARA) in December 2014. This legislation was intended to improve agencies’ acquisitions of IT and enable Congress to monitor agencies’ progress and hold them accountable for reducing duplication and achieving cost savings. It includes specific requirements related to seven areas: (1) agency CIO authority enhancements, (2) federal data center consolidation initiative, (3) enhanced transparency and improved risk management, (4) portfolio review, (5) IT acquisition cadres, (6) government-wide software purchasing program, and (7) the Federal Strategic Sourcing Initiative. In June 2015, OMB released guidance describing how agencies are to implement FITARA. The guidance identifies a number of actions that agencies are to take to establish a basic set of roles and responsibilities (referred to as the common baseline) for CIOs and other senior agency officials and, thus, to implement the authorities described in the law. More recently, on May 15, 2018, the President signed Executive Order 13833, Enhancing the Effectiveness of Agency Chief Information Officers. Among other things, this executive order is intended to better position agencies to modernize their technology, execute IT programs more efficiently, and reduce cybersecurity risks. The order pertains to 22 of the 24 Chief Financial Officers Act agencies; the Department of Defense and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission are exempt. For the covered agencies, including SSA, the executive order strengthens the role of the CIO by, among other things, requiring the CIO to report directly to the agency head; to serve as the agency head’s primary IT strategic advisor; and to have a significant role in all management, governance, and oversight processes related to IT. In addition, one of the cybersecurity requirements directs agencies to ensure that the CIO works closely with an integrated team of senior executives, including those with expertise in IT, security, and privacy, to implement appropriate risk management measures. In June 2018, we issued a report that examined the cybersecurity workforce of the government. We noted that most of the 24 agencies we examined had developed baseline assessments to identify cybersecurity personnel within their agencies that held certifications, but the results were potentially unreliable. However, SSA’s baseline was found to be reliable because it addressed all of the reportable information, such as the extent to which personnel without professional certifications were ready to obtain them or strategies for mitigating any gaps. Further, we found that most of the 24 agencies had established procedures to assign cybersecurity codes to positions, including SSA. We also have ongoing work at SSA, including reviewing its cybersecurity workforce; standardized approach to security assessment, authorization, and continuous monitoring; cybersecurity strategy; and intrusion detection and prevention capabilities. From July 2011 through January 2018, we issued a number of reports that addressed specific weaknesses in SSA’s management of IT acquisitions and operations and in the role of its CIO. These reports included 15 recommendations aimed at improving the agency’s efforts with regard to data center consolidation, incremental development, IT acquisitions, and software licenses. We also made a recommendation to SSA to address weaknesses related to the role of the CIO in key management areas. SSA has taken steps to improve its management of IT acquisitions and operations by addressing 14 of the 15 recommendations that we previously directed to the agency regarding data center consolidation, incremental development, IT acquisitions, and software licenses. Data center consolidation. OMB established the Federal Data Center Consolidation Initiative in February 2010 to improve the efficiency, performance, and environmental footprint of federal data center activities. The enactment of FITARA in 2014 codified and expanded the initiative. In addition, pursuant to FITARA, in August 2016, the Federal CIO issued a memorandum that announced the Data Center Optimization Initiative as a successor effort to the Federal Data Center Consolidation Initiative. Further, in August 2016, OMB released guidance which established the Data Center Optimization Initiative and included instructions on how to implement the date center consolidation and optimization provisions of FITARA. Among other things, the guidance required agencies to consolidate inefficient infrastructure, optimize existing facilities, improve their security posture, and achieve cost savings. In addition, the guidance directed agencies to develop a data center consolidation and optimization strategic plan that defines the agency’s data center strategy for fiscal years 2016, 2017, and 2018. This strategy is to include, among other things, a statement from the agency CIO indicating whether the agency has complied with all data center reporting requirements in FITARA. Further, the guidance indicates that OMB is to maintain a public dashboard to display consolidation-related cost savings and optimization performance information for the agencies. In a series of reports that we issued from July 2011 through August 2017, we noted that, while data center consolidation could potentially save the federal government billions of dollars, weaknesses existed in agencies’ data center consolidation plans and data center optimization efforts. Specifically with regard to SSA, in 2011, we reported that the agency had an incomplete consolidation plan and inventory of IT assets. In 2016, we reported that SSA did not meet any of the seven applicable data center optimization targets, as required by OMB. In addition, in 2017, we reported that the agency had an incomplete data center optimization plan. We stressed that until SSA completed these required activities, it might not be able to consolidate data centers, as required, and realize expected savings. We made a total of four recommendations to SSA in our 2011, 2016, and 2017 reports to help improve the agency’s reporting of data center-related cost savings and to achieve data center optimization targets. As of September 2018, SSA had implemented all four recommendations. Consequently, the agency is better positioned to improve the efficiency of its data centers and achieve cost savings. In addition, we reported in May 2018 that the agencies participating in the Data Center Optimization Initiative had communicated mixed progress toward achieving OMB’s goals for closing data centers by September 2018. With regard to SSA, we noted that the agency had not yet achieved its planned savings but that its data centers were among the most optimized that we reviewed. In particular, while SSA reported that it planned to save $1.08 million on its data center initiative from 2016 through 2018, it had not achieved any of those savings. However, the agency reported having met the goal of closing 25 percent of its tiered data centers. Further, SSA reported the most progress among the 22 applicable agencies in meeting OMB’s data center optimization targets. Specifically, SSA reported that it had met four of the five targets. (One other agency reported that it had met three targets, 6 agencies reported having met either one or two targets, and 14 agencies reported meeting none of the targets). Consequently, we did not make any additional recommendations to SSA in our May 2018 report. We also have ongoing work involving SSA related to agencies’ progress on closing data center and achieving optimization targets. Incremental development. OMB has emphasized the need to deliver investments in smaller parts, or increments, in order to reduce risk, deliver capabilities more quickly, and facilitate the adoption of emerging technologies. In 2010, it called for agencies’ major investments to deliver functionality every 12 months and, since 2012, every 6 months. Subsequently, FITARA codified a requirement that covered agency CIOs certify that IT investments are adequately implementing incremental development, as defined in the capital planning guidance issued by OMB. Further, subsequent OMB guidance on the law’s implementation, issued in June 2015, directed agency CIOs to define processes and policies for their agencies to ensure that they certify that IT resources are adequately implementing incremental development. In November 2017, we reported that 21 agencies, including SSA, needed to improve their certification of incremental development. We pointed out that, as of August 2016, agencies had reported that 103 of 166 major IT software development investments (62 percent) were certified by the agency CIO for implementing adequate incremental development in fiscal year 2017, as required by FITARA. With regard to SSA, we noted that only 3 of the agency’s 10 investments primarily in development had been certified by the agency CIO as using adequate incremental development, as required by FITARA. In addition, we noted that SSA’s incremental development certification policy did not describe the CIO’s role in the certification process or how CIO certification would be documented. However, accurate agency CIO certification of the use of adequate incremental development for major IT investments is critical to ensuring that agencies are making the best effort possible to create IT systems that add value while reducing the risks associated with low-value and wasteful investments. As a result of these findings, we recommended that SSA ensure that its CIO (1) reports major IT investment information related to incremental development accurately, in accordance with OMB guidance; and (2) updates the agency’s policy and processes for the certification of incremental development and confirm that the policy includes a description of how the CIO certification will be documented. SSA agreed with our recommendations and implemented both of them. Thus, the agency should be better positioned to realize the benefits of incremental development practices, such as reducing investment risk, delivering capabilities more rapidly, and permitting easier adoption of emerging technologies. IT acquisitions. FITARA includes a provision to enhance covered agency CIOs’ authority through, among other things, requiring agency heads to ensure that CIOs review and approve IT contracts. OMB’s FITARA implementation guidance expanded upon this aspect of the legislation in a number of ways. Specifically, according to the guidance, CIOs may review and approve IT acquisition strategies and plans, rather than individual IT contracts, and CIOs can designate other agency officials to act as their representatives. In January 2018, we reported that most of the CIOs at 22 selected agencies, including SSA, were not adequately involved in reviewing and approving billions of dollars of IT acquisitions. In particular, we found that SSA’s process to identify IT acquisitions for CIO review did not involve the acquisition office, as required by OMB. In addition, we noted that SSA had a CIO review and approval process in place that fully satisfied the requirements set forth in OMB’s guidance. However, while SSA provided evidence of the CIO’s review of most of the IT contracts we examined, the agency had not ensured that the CIO or a designee reviewed and approved each IT acquisition plan or strategy. Specifically, of 10 randomly selected IT contracts that we examined at SSA, 7 acquisitions associated with those contracts had been reviewed and approved, as required by OMB. We pointed out that, until SSA ensured that its CIO or designee reviewed and approved all IT acquisitions, the agency would have limited visibility and input into its planned IT expenditures and would not be effectively positioned to benefit from the increased authority that FITARA’s contract approval provision is intended to provide. Further, the agency could miss an opportunity to strengthen the CIO’s authority and the oversight of IT acquisitions—thus, increasing the potential to award IT contracts that are duplicative, wasteful, or poorly conceived. Accordingly, we made three recommendations to SSA to address these weaknesses. As of September 2018, the agency had made progress by implementing two of the recommendations: to ensure that (1) the acquisition office is involved in identifying IT acquisitions and (2) the CIO or designee reviews and approves IT acquisitions according to OMB guidance. By taking these actions, SSA should be better positioned to properly identify and provide oversight of IT acquisitions. However, SSA has not yet implemented our third recommendation that it issue guidance to assist in the identification of IT acquisitions. SSA stated that, in September 2017, it updated its policy for acquisition plan approval to address this recommendation; however, upon review of this policy, we did not find guidance for identifying IT acquisitions. Without the proper identification of IT acquisitions, SSA’s CIO cannot effectively provide oversight of these acquisitions. Software licenses. Federal agencies engage in thousands of software licensing agreements annually. The objective of software license management is to manage, control, and protect an organization’s software assets. Effective management of these licenses can help avoid purchasing too many licenses, which can result in unused software, as well as too few licenses, which can result in noncompliance with license terms and cause the imposition of additional fees. As part of its PortfolioStat initiative, OMB has developed policy that addresses software licenses. This policy requires agencies to conduct an annual, agency-wide IT portfolio review to, among other things, reduce commodity IT spending. Such areas of spending could include software licenses. In May 2014, we reported on federal agencies’ management of software licenses and determined that better management was needed to achieve significant savings government-wide. Of the 24 agencies we reviewed, SSA was 1 of 22 that lacked comprehensive policies that incorporated leading practices. In particular, SSA’s policy partially met four of the leading practices and did not meet one. Further, we noted that SSA was among 22 of the 24 selected agencies that had not established comprehensive software license inventories—a leading practice that would help the agencies to adequately manage their software licenses. As such, we made six recommendations to SSA to improve its policies and practices for managing software licenses. These included recommendations that the agency develop a comprehensive policy for the management of software licenses and establish a comprehensive inventory of software licenses. SSA agreed with the recommendations and, as of September 2018, had implemented all six of them. As a result, the agency should be better positioned to manage its software licenses and identify opportunities for reducing software license costs. While SSA has taken steps that improved its IT management in the areas of data center consolidation, incremental development, IT acquisitions, and software licenses, we reported in August 2018 that the agency had not fully addressed the role of the CIO in its policies. As previously mentioned, FITARA and the President Executive Order 13833, among other laws and guidance, outline the roles and responsibilities for agency CIOs in an attempt to improve the government’s performance in IT and related information management functions. Within these laws and guidance, we identified IT management responsibilities assigned to CIOs in six key IT areas: Leadership and accountability. CIOs are responsible and accountable for the effective implementation of IT management responsibilities. For example, CIOs are to report directly to the agency head or that official’s deputy and designate a senior agency information security officer. Strategic planning. CIOs are required to lead the strategic planning for all IT management functions. An example of a CIO requirement related to the strategic planning area is measuring how well IT supports agency programs and reporting annually on the progress in achieving the goals. IT workforce. CIOs are to assess agency IT workforce needs and develop strategies and plans for meeting those needs. For example, CIOs are responsible for annually assessing the extent to which agency personnel meet IT management knowledge and skill requirements, developing strategies to address deficiencies, and reporting to the head of the agency on the progress made in improving these capabilities. IT budgeting. CIOs are responsible for the processes for all annual and multi-year IT planning, programming, and budgeting decisions. For example, CIOs are to have a significant role in IT planning, programming, and budgeting decisions. IT investment management. CIOs are to manage, evaluate, and assess how well the agency is managing its IT resources. In particular, CIOs are required to improve the management of the agency’s IT through portfolio review. Information security. CIOs are to establish, implement, and ensure compliance with an agency-wide information security program. For example, CIOs are required to develop and maintain an agency-wide security program, policies, procedures, and control techniques. In our August 2018 report, we noted that SSA, along with 23 other agencies, did not have policies that fully addressed the role of the CIO in these six key areas, consistent with the laws and guidance. To its credit, SSA had fully addressed the role of the CIO in the IT leadership and accountability area. In particular, the agency’s policies addressed the requirements that the CIO report directly to the agency head, assume responsibility and accountability for IT investments, and designate a senior agency information security officer. However, the policies did not fully address the role of the CIO in the other five areas (i.e., strategic planning, workforce, budgeting, investment management, and information security). For example, the agency’s policies did not address the IT workforce area at all, including the requirements that the CIO annually assess the extent to which agency personnel meet IT management knowledge and skill requirements, develop strategies to address deficiencies, and report to the head of the agency on the progress made in improving these capabilities. Further, SSA’s policies minimally addressed the requirements for IT strategic planning. Specifically, while the agency’s policies required the CIO to establish goals for improving agency operations through IT, the policies did not require the CIO to measure how well IT supports agency programs and report annually on the progress in achieving the goals. Table 1 summarizes the extent to which SSA’s policies addressed the role of its CIO, as reflected in our August 2018 report. As a result of these findings, we made a recommendation to SSA to address the weaknesses in its policies with regard to the remaining five key management areas. In response, the agency agreed with our recommendation and, subsequently, stated that it planned to do so by the end of September 2018. Following through to ensure that the identified weaknesses are addressed in its policies will be essential to helping SSA overcome its longstanding IT management challenges. In conclusion, effective IT management is critical to the performance of SSA’s mission. Toward this end, the agency has taken steps to improve its management of IT acquisitions and operations by implementing 14 of the 15 recommendations we made from 2011 through 2018 to improve its IT management. Nevertheless, SSA would be better positioned to effectively address longstanding IT management challenges by ensuring that it has policies in place that fully address the role and responsibilities of its CIO in the five key management areas, as we previously recommended. Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member Larson, and Members of the Subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to respond to any questions that you may have. If you or your staffs have any questions about this testimony, please contact Carol C. Harris at (202) 512-4456 or harriscc@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this testimony statement. GAO staff who made key contributions to this statement are Kevin Walsh (Assistant Director), Jessica Waselkow (Analyst in Charge), and Rebecca Eyler. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.	[ "SSA delivers services that touch the lives of almost every American, and relies heavily on IT resources to do so. Its systems support a range of activities, such as processing Disability Insurance payments, to calculating and withholding Medicare premiums, and issuing Social Security numbers and cards. For fiscal year 2018, the agency planned to spend approximately $1.6 billion on IT. GAO has previously reported that federal IT projects have often failed, in part, due to a lack of oversight and governance. Given the challenges that federal agencies, including SSA, have encountered in managing IT acquisitions, Congress and the administration have taken steps to improve federal IT, including enacting federal IT acquisition reform legislation and issuing related guidance. This statement summarizes GAO's previously reported findings regarding SSA's management of IT acquisitions and operations. In developing this testimony, GAO summarized findings from its reports issued in 2011 through 2018, and information on SSA's actions in response to GAO's recommendations. The Social Security Administration (SSA) has improved its management of information technology (IT) acquisitions and operations by addressing 14 of the 15 recommendations that GAO has made to the agency. For example, Incremental development . The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has emphasized the need for agencies to deliver IT investments in smaller increments to reduce risk and deliver capabilities more quickly. In November 2017, GAO reported that agencies, including SSA, needed to improve their certification of incremental development. As a result, GAO recommended that SSA's CIO (1) report incremental development information accurately, and (2) update its incremental development policy and processes. SSA implemented both recommendations. Software licenses . Effective management of software licenses can help avoid purchasing too many licenses that result in unused software. In May 2014, GAO reported that most agencies, including SSA, lacked comprehensive software license policies. As a result, GAO made six recommendations to SSA, to include developing a comprehensive software licenses policy and inventory. SSA implemented all six recommendations. However, SSA's IT management policies have not fully addressed the role of its CIO. Various laws and related guidance assign IT management responsibilities to CIOs in six key areas. In August 2018, GAO reported that SSA had fully addressed the role of the CIO in one of the six areas (see table). Specifically, SSA's policies fully addressed the CIO's role in the IT leadership and accountability area by requiring the CIO to report directly to the agency head, among other things. In contrast, SSA's policies did not address or minimally addressed the IT workforce and IT strategic planning areas. For example, SSA's policies did not include requirements for the CIO to annually assess the extent to which personnel meet IT management skill requirements or to measure how well IT supports agency programs. GAO recommended that SSA address the weaknesses in the remaining five key areas. SSA agreed with GAO's recommendation and stated that the agency plans to implement the recommendation by the end of this month. GAO has made 15 recommendations to SSA to improve its management of IT acquisitions and operations from 2011 through 2018, and 1 recommendation to improve its CIO policies. While SSA has implemented nearly all of them, it would be better positioned to overcome longstanding IT management challenges when it addresses the CIO's role in its policies." ]	3,733	gov_report	en	null	181291f41792b5469d807cb0ac8bbef173c02c436a85cbc9
T he federal government collects various fees and other charges from businesses and households. Choosing to raise public funds via user fees, as opposed to other means such as taxes, has important administrative and economic consequences. Many fees stem from "business-like activities," in which the government provides a service or benefit in return for payment. For example, many n ational p arks charge entry fees , which then help fund maintenance projects. Some fees are closely tied to regulatory or judicial activities, such as filing or inspection fees, which stem from the federal government's sovereign powers. Other federal fees or charges are intragovernmental transactions that do not involve the public. For example, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) charges other federal agencies fees to cover the cost of background investigations. For many federal agencies, fees or user charges amount to a minimal portion of budgetary resources. Other regulatory agencies, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), are wholly or partially funded by user fees and other nontax receipts. User fees from the public accounted for $331 billion in FY2017, about a tenth of total federal receipts ( $3.32 trillion ). Fees and charges generally result from voluntary choices, such as entering a national park. By contrast, the collection of taxes ultimately relies on the government's sovereign power to compel payments. Fees may not be compulsory, but not paying them may make it impossible to carry out many activities legally. For instance, without paying passport application fees and obtaining a passport, people cannot fly to other countries. Nor can businesses issue securities without paying federal filing fees. The statutory basis for each particular fee or user charge varies in specificity and in the degree of discretion granted to the executive branch. For example, authorizing legislation might specify in detail how certain fees are imposed and how proceeds are used. In other cases, federal agencies rely on broader authorities to impose user fees. User fees have several advantages as a means of financing public activities. They are voluntary, they connect the burden of financing activities to those who directly benefit from them, and they can help decentralize decisionmaking by bypassing centralized allocation of resources. At times, proposals to raise fees may encounter less political resistance than proposals to raise an equivalent sum via taxes. On the other hand, the flow of user fees and charges may reflect fluctuations in economic conditions, which may complicate the financing of government operations. Some are also concerned that funding arrangements may bypass regular congressional scrutiny and dilute Congress's power of the purse. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) defines a user fee as a fee assessed to users for goods or services provided by the federal government. User fees generally apply to federal programs or activities that provide special benefits to identifiable recipients above and beyond what is normally available to the public. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) defines the term user charge to include transactions not normally considered fees, such as land or asset sales. OMB's budget preparation documents state that user charges include not only proceeds from selling postage stamps, electricity, and Medicare Part B premiums, but also sales of assets and natural resources, among other categories. The federal government, which operates on a modified cash accounting basis, does not recognize in its budgetary accounts the loss of asset values when it sells assets or natural resources, as a private firm would using typical business accounting methods. For instance, if the government were to sell oil at a price of $60 per barrel that it bought at $120 per barrel, only the current revenues would be reflected in budget accounts. A private firm would normally adjust its balance sheet to reflect a loss. OMB designates whether each account receives collections associated with user charges, and that information is contained within OMB's MAX budget data system. OMB has not released data on those designations. The Budget Appendix that OMB issues annually, while not including information on that designation, does present detailed subaccount-level data that often indicate whether a federal program's budgetary resources rely on fee income. The format of the Budget Appendix, however, makes it an impractical source of data for government-wide research. As far as CRS can determine, a comprehensive and authoritative list of federal fees is not publicly available. Budget and financial documents from OMB and the U.S. Treasury, however, do provide detailed information on offsetting collections and offsetting receipts—the budget categories that typically contain user fees and other charges—as well as information on budgetary accounts. In some cases, account descriptions clearly indicate an association with one or more fees. In other cases, however, whether or not an account receives fees is unclear. For example, an account might be labeled as miscellaneous receipts, or as fines, fees, and penalties. User fees classified as offsetting collections, which go into expenditure accounts, generally can be used without further congressional action. Offsetting collections, as the term suggests, typically count as offsets to spending when accounts are scored to check compliance with various budgetary controls. Scorekeeping is the process of measuring the budgetary effects of legislation. For example, the Budget Control Act of 2011 ( P.L. 112-25 ) imposed caps on specified categories of discretionary budget authority. When evaluating compliance with those caps, scorekeepers (CBO, OMB, and the b udget c ommittees) subtract offsetting collections from budget authority totals. User fees or charges are collected into the U.S. Treasury General Fund or into special fund accounts. Offsetting receipts, which go into receipt accounts, typically require approval through appropriations acts. User fees can be classified as discretionary or mandatory spending, depending on how those fees are authorized. Some payments to the federal government, such as electromagnetic spectrum auction proceeds or offshore continental shelf oil and gas leases that are classified as undistributed offsetting receipts, do not offset spending of any agency, but are recorded as reducing the federal deficit. OMB provides a discussion of budget concepts related to offsetting receipts and offsetting collections, which include the bulk of user fees and charges in terms of dollar amounts, in the President's annual budget submission. More detailed supplementary tables that summarize collections of offsetting receipts and offsetting collections are also provided online. The U.S. Treasury's Bureau of the Fiscal Service issues its annual Combined Statement that reports budget data for all federal agencies at an account level as well as detailed summaries of receipts, including user fees. The Monthly Treasury Statement and a quarterly statement of offsetting receipts provide data on an ongoing basis. As the Treasury's role and responsibilities differ from those of OMB, totals from Treasury sources may not coincide with data issued by OMB due to various budgetary reporting adjustments. GAO has analyzed the administration of various user fees and has set out some principles for the design of those fees . User fees, as noted above, can tie benefits enjoyed by households or firms—such as passports, access to national parks, or approvals to raise investment funds from the public—to payments that can help defray public costs of providing them. An economist's rule of thumb known as the benefit principle, which suggests linking the fiscal burden of publicly provided benefits to those who enjoy those benefits, can promote fairness and efficiency. For example, many would contend that those with the opportunity to travel abroad should shoulder more of the costs of reviewing passport applications and issuing documents than those who do not. Moreover, if fees are set at levels that match the incremental cost of providing benefits, then when an agency is called to expand its work—such as an uptick in demand for passports, park visits, or company registrations—then those fees could fund the needed extra resources. Matching fees to incremental costs, however, is difficult where demand is irregular or unpredictable. OMB guidelines on user fees outline aims similar to the benefit principle, mandating that federal agencies ensure that each service, sale, or use of Government goods or resources provided by an agency to specific recipients be self-sustaining; promote efficient allocation of the Nation's resources by establishing charges for special benefits provided to the recipient that are at least as great as costs to the Government of providing the special benefits; and allow the private sector to compete with the Government without disadvantage in supplying comparable services, resources, or goods where appropriate. OMB mandates that agencies review user fees every other year. OMB also encourages agencies seeking new authority to assess fees to "seek to remove restraints on user charges." In some cases, federal agencies and regulated industries negotiate over user fee levels and the improvements in federal regulatory operations supported in large part by those fees. For instance, pharmaceutical companies negotiate with the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) over fees charged to review drug applications. Over time, the scope of FDA activities supported in part by fees has expanded. Some contend that the FDA's increasing reliance on user fees has tilted the agency's priorities toward industry interests and away from consumer protection responsibilities. One 2005 analysis of the FDA drug review process found that approval times decreased after legislation expanded the agency's reliance on user fees, while it found no statistically significant evidence of a decrease in one proxy measure of drug safety. Federal agencies such as the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) are largely supported from amounts paid by covered industries. The costs and benefits associated with many goods and services mainly involve buyers and sellers. For example, buying a stamp allows a correspondent to mail a letter, which leads the postal service to incur roughly similar costs. Others—at least to a first approximation—are not affected. For other goods, market or market-like transactions may impose costs or convey benefits on third parties. When prices paid by buyers or received by sellers do not reflect spillover costs or benefits to others, economic theory suggests levels of transactions will be inefficient, in the sense that alternative economic arrangements could make all participants—at least potentially—better off. The benefit principle is in some ways similar to the concept of Pigou taxation—that taxing goods linked to negative spillovers, such as pollution, can enhance economic efficiency by diminishing those spillovers. More generally, spillovers are costs borne or benefits enjoyed by one party due to activities of another party where no voluntary exchange or market transaction occurs. Conversely, subsidizing goods or services that provide beneficial spillovers can also increase economic efficiency. For instance, some justify federal tax subsidies to home ownership on the grounds that homeowners generate positive spillovers in their neighborhoods. Charges aimed at limiting negative spillovers are known as Pigou taxes, after the English economist who first articulated the concept. Pigou taxation provides a more narrowly based efficiency rationale for user fees that would limit negative spillovers. Moreover, administering an excise tax imposed on Pigou tax grounds—which would involve a private vendor collecting and remitting tax revenues—differs from user fees and charges collected directly by a government. Nonetheless, the same logic that raising the end-user price of goods linked to negative spillovers can enhance economic efficiency can be applied to the design of user fees. For instance, federal policymakers might choose to charge pharmaceutical companies application fees lower than the full cost of associated approval processes because introducing new drugs onto the market may have wider positive social benefits. The economic suitability of the benefit principle depends on whether the publicly provided benefit has meaningful spillover effects. For example, benefits generated by governments such as national defense or support for basic research are widely shared and thus, arguably, are appropriately supported by general taxation. By contrast, while the broader economy benefits from the ability of firms to raise capital in transparent and competitive markets, the chief beneficiary of having a security offering approved is the issuing firm. Similarly, a family visiting a federal park presumably benefits more than another family that stayed at home. Financing more of park maintenance through general taxation would thus involve an implicit subsidy from nonusers to users, something that reliance on user fees would mitigate. In other cases, the linkage between fees and benefits is not apparent. For example, a 2009 law ( Travel Promotion Act of 2009 , TPA; P.L. 111-145 ) imposed a $10 fee on most international air travelers from visa-waiver countries to fund tourism marketing initiatives . An exact match between the level of user fees and publicly provided benefits may be hard or impossible to determine in many situations. While public corporations operating on a largely commercial basis, such as the Tennessee Valley Authority, may set prices and fees much as a private firm would, many of the federal government's activities are within the public sector because past policymakers considered them to be closely associated with inherently governmental functions—such as providing security—or as services that the private sector would have had trouble providing, such as basic research. The U.S. Postal Service sets rates to cover nearly all of its costs according to a 2006 statutory framework . Subsidized rates for certain classes of mail users, such as the blind, reflect adaptation of pricing schemes to broader social priorities. The proper boundaries between public, private, and nonprofit sectors, of course, is an ongoing concern of policymakers. In many cases, it is difficult to design fees, charges, or taxes that directly influence activities generating negative spillovers. For instance, cars and trucks generate air pollution as well as wear and tear on roadways. Excise taxes on gasoline and other fuels—if set at levels that approximate the costs of pollution and road wear—can motivate drivers to use roads less often when the total costs of driving, including pollution, road wear, and other costs, exceed the benefits of driving. Thus, excise taxes can be a way of using the price mechanism to induce individuals to make decisions that lead to more economically efficient outcomes. Setting excise taxes at levels that reflect all costs to third parties may involve complex estimates. For instance, while higher fuel usage implies greater use of roads and more production of air pollutants, several other factors complicate that linkage. Heavier vehicles may cause disproportionate damage to roads. Vehicles vary widely in fuel efficiency and in the volume of pollutants generated. In addition, driving also imposes congestion costs on other drivers, and those costs vary by location and time of day. One recent analysis estimated that fuel excise taxes addressed less than a third of the air-pollution-related efficiency losses. While excise taxes are a public finance instrument that is distinct from user fees and charges, similar complications may be encountered. In some cases, adopting new fiscal instruments—such as using road charges or tolls—may prove more effective tools in increasing efficiency. In the case of transportation policy, increased economic efficiency, depending on how consumers and policymakers respond, might manifest itself in some combination of higher after-tax incomes, greater provision of publicly provided goods, cleaner air, and less-congested highways. Changes in the design of some user fees or charges might also yield analogous efficiency improvements. Some observers have raised concerns that federal agencies that rely more heavily on user fees may put greater weight on the interests of those paying fees rather than the broader public interest. For instance, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office charges application and examination fees to those seeking to obtain a patent. Certainly, the applicant would be a central beneficiary of a patent, if granted, although many others—including other inventors, business competitors, and consumers—might also be significantly harmed or benefited. Some contend that the Patent Office's reliance on fees motivates it to approve invalid patents . Tying patent fees narrowly to the benefits obtained by the applicant, while overlooking wider spillover effects, might then result in poor decisions. Of course, nonfinancial policy instruments, such as applicable laws, regulations, or congressional oversight, may affect outcomes more directly. Administrative concerns may also play a role. In some cases, where the costs of collecting fees are high relative to the costs of providing public services, imposing user fees may be a suboptimal choice of funding. For instance, federal courts collect more in PACER fees (which provide access to court documents ) than is needed to maintain the underlying computer system , with excess fees being earmarked for other court improvements. Some argue that funding that system and other court improvements with general revenues would allow broader access to court filings and related public documents, which one proposal ( H.R. 6714 introduced in the 115 th Congress ) would have implemented. Charging access fees above incremental costs—which for electronic documents may be minimal—can limit access to public information. Eliminating PACER user fees , however, may require Congress to shift that fiscal burden elsewhere. Other policy concerns also may play a role. Ability to pay among households varies widely; a national park entrance fee that one family regarded as trivial might deter another family. Policymakers may also wish to express preferences for identifiable groups, such as the elderly, children, or veterans. The classification of fees, charges, taxes, and even negative loan subsidy amounts hinges on budget concepts outlined above along with scorekeeping rules and precedents. In some cases, the distinctions made to categorize a given receipt might seem arbitrary to some. For example, the Travel Promotion Act fees imposed on most international air travelers convey n o special benefit on them, but are not categorized a s tax es . Refundable biofuel tax credits are counted as negative taxes in budget documents rather than as subsidy outlays. Those distinctions, however, can affect the tax treatment of those receipts. For instance, a firm can generally deduct an excise tax from its gross revenues, but typically cannot deduct a fee. Some governments have instituted user fees to fill shortfalls in tax revenues. The economic burden of higher fees or charges might be less obvious and therefore subject to less resistance than broad-based taxes. For example, policymakers in several states have sought to avoid increases in general taxes by increasing fee revenues. That strategy may have two downsides. First, more narrowly focused fees set at higher levels could cause greater economic distortions than smaller taxes applied to a broader base. Second, more narrowly based fees might be less stable in economic downturns. To the extent that fees diverge from the incremental costs of publicly provided services, sudden fiscal adjustments might be required. If benefits from federal operations are distributed narrowly enough to justify financing them via user fees or charges, one might ask whether those activities should be carried out by the private sector. State and local governments and the federal government have privatized many services previously provided by government. Foreign governments have also privatized provision of goods and services once delivered by the public sector. Some activities, however, may involve inherently governmental responsibilities that would be difficult to devolve to the private sector. A 1997 GAO report noted that rigorous evaluations of cost savings of privatization initiatives at the state and local government level were not common. GAO also noted that privatization increased the need for oversight and evaluation, although some local officials deemed that the "weakest link" in privatization initiatives. Others note that while privatization may yield efficiency gains, it may also lead to policy or operational failure. Conflicts between executive branch agencies, which often have sought greater flexibility to use funds to respond to public priorities as they see them, and Congress, which has sought to defend its fiscal prerogatives and ability to set federal policy priorities, are long-standing. In 1849, Congress sought to bolster its powers of the purse by passing the Miscellaneous Receipts Act , which required all government revenues, aside from postal sales, to be deposited into the U.S. Treasury "at as early a day as practicable, without any abatement or deduction on account of salary, fees, costs, charges, expenses, or claim of any description whatever…" Over time, Congress set out exceptions to the modern version of the Miscellaneous Receipts Act that let agencies charge user fees, accept gifts, and collect and retain fines and penalties within specified limits or as detailed in appropriations laws. Some legislative proposals, such as H.R. 850 (115 th Congress) , would eliminate most exceptions and require most fees and charges to be deposited in the U.S. Treasury General Fund. Congress could fund agencies and activities directly through annual appropriations. Funding through lump-sum appropriations, as opposed to via user fees, however, might change incentives facing decisionmakers and could affect federal operations and programmatic outcomes. Congress could constrain agency discretion by requiring more user fee proceeds be either subject to annual appropriations or deposited in the U.S. Treasury General Fund, although that may limit agencies' capacity to respond to new public demands and other changing conditions, as the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has noted . Some inspectors general and congressional committees have also called for tighter, more efficient, and more consistent financial management of user fee funds. During the mid-1980s, Congress, with GAO support, conducted a comprehensive review of so-called "backdoor spending"—an informal term for budget authority provided in laws other than appropriations acts—including spending supported by user fees, which was updated in 1996 . A narrower follow-up in 2017 covering five agencies concluded that "all entities GAO examined have policies and procedures to manage and report on their permanent funding authorities," but that "some, however, could improve practices to manage funds and report information that facilitates oversight." Sweeping changes to the budgetary treatment of user fees, however, could add new pressures on the congressional appropriations process. Proposals to require that most fees be collected into the Treasury General Fund and that activities previously supported by those fees be funded by annual appropriations could create new demands on appropriations committees. Such proposals could also affect the division of responsibilities among authorizing committees and appropriations committees. Statutory texts governing many fees, including those noted above, have evolved over many years and involve substantive policy decisions, often related to industry or programmatic concerns. Congress may also enhance its oversight of agencies reliant on user fees by requiring more timely and detailed financial reports as well as more precise and systematic explanations of linkages between those fees and associated programs. OMB and Treasury issue extensive information on user fees and charges. Nonetheless, the format and level of detail of published data make it difficult to address some government-wide policy questions regarding user fees and charges. Congress could modify laws governing the President's budget submission (31 U.S.C. 1105) to require OMB to release data that it collects on which budget accounts receive material amounts of user fee and user charge revenues. That could allow Congress to track and analyze user fees and charges more easily. In particular, it would also provide a means to distinguish discretionary and mandatory fees and charges, which could be useful in understanding the effects or constraints imposed by budget enforcement measures. That might provide Congress with a clearer view of its fiscal options when considering budgetary measures. Mandating that OMB or other agencies provide more data would probably require additional budgetary resources to cover costs of new personnel and capabilities. Congress can promote economic efficiency and an equitable sharing of public burdens by choosing appropriate means of financing federal operations. User fees and charges, as noted above, can help tie the costs of supporting specific federal operations with those who benefit from them. Even if closely regulated industries may find federal requirements, inspections, or approval processes burdensome, they also presumably benefit from the increased demand for their products that carry the imprimatur of explicit or implicit federal approval. Federal regulation and inspection operations, however, also serve broader interests of consumers, taxpayers, and related industries. To the extent that inherently governmental responsibilities motivate federal operations, the argument for using general revenues may be stronger. If benefits of federal actions are more narrowly distributed, the case for financing operations with user fees or charges may become stronger. Of course, the structure and administration of federal inspection and regulation plays a central role in enhancing efficiency and minimizing burdens borne relative to benefits enjoyed.	[ "The federal government collects various fees from businesses and households. Choosing to raise public funds via user fees, as opposed to other means such as taxes, has important administrative and economic consequences. Many fees stem from \"business-like activities,\" in which the government provides a service or benefit in return for payment. For example, many national parks charge entry fees, which then help fund maintenance projects. Such fees and charges that result from voluntary choices, such as entering a national park, are distinguished from taxes—which stem from the government's sovereign power to compel payments. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) defines a user fee as a \"fee assessed to users for goods or services provided by the federal government. User fees generally apply to federal programs or activities that provide special benefits to identifiable recipients above and beyond what is normally available to the public.\" User fees and charges have several advantages as a means of financing public activities. They are voluntary, they connect the burden of financing activities to those who directly benefit from them, and can help decentralize decisionmaking by bypassing centralized allocation of resources. Some have expressed concerns that user fee arrangements may bypass regular congressional scrutiny and dilute Congress's power of the purse. Collections of fees and charges may also be more sensitive to economic fluctuations, which could complicate financing of programs dependent on those revenue streams. Many user fees or charges are classified as offsetting collections, which are deposited into expenditure accounts. Offsetting collections can be used to offset agency spending and typically require no further congressional approval to use. Other fees and charges are classified as offsetting receipts, which are collected into revenue accounts and typically require congressional authorization to be spent. User fees and charges can be classified as discretionary or mandatory spending, depending on how they are legally authorized. The levels and administration of some fees are specified in detailed statutory text, while other fees are created under broader agency authorities. Certain agencies, such as the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), have increased their reliance on user fees in past decades. Some critics have raised concerns that increased reliance on user fees could shift incentives facing those agencies. Some legislative proposals, such as H.R. 850 introduced in the 115th Congress, would limit or eliminate most exceptions and require most fees and charges to be deposited in the U.S. Treasury General Fund. Congress could fund agencies and activities now funded in whole or in part via user fees directly through the annual appropriations process. Such proposals would mark a departure from past practice. Statutory text governing many fees has evolved over many years and involves substantive policy decisions, often related to the industry or programmatic concerns. A general change in funding from user fees and charges to annual appropriations would likely shift the division of responsibilities between authorizing committees and appropriations committees. Congress may also enhance its oversight of agencies reliant on user fees by requiring more timely and detailed financial reports as well as more precise and systematic explanations of linkages between those fees and associated programs. Congress could also ask for greater transparency in fiscal data. While the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the U.S. Treasury Bureau of the Fiscal Service provide extensive data on user fees and charges, it is difficult to conduct governmentwide analyses using publicly available sources. Congress could mandate more detailed and more easily accessed data on user fees and charges. Additional funding may be needed to develop the capacity to issue those data." ]	4,022	gov_report	en	null	f67887ca668cbec0cc6bec7c9f079d3c7fe75962957e0f2d
The U.S. Constitution does not clearly specify how military bases should be managed. Article II, Section 2, appoints the President as the commander-in-chief, with the implied power to deploy, and redeploy, the armed forces as necessary for national defense. In common practice, this has included the authority to create and close military installations needed to accommodate and train personnel under the President's command. However, Article I, Section 8, charges Congress with the responsibility to raise armies, maintain a Navy, and regulate the militia. Through annual authorization and appropriation legislation, Congress legislates policy for managing DOD real property assets and funds the construction, maintenance, operation, and disposal of military infrastructure. Throughout most of American history, the President has exercised broad, relatively unchallenged authority for opening, closing, or realigning military installations. Congress largely deferred to the Executive branch primarily because the President, as commander-in-chief, is empowered with the responsibility of deploying military forces. Prompted by large-scale closures of World War II era infrastructure during the 1960s and 1970s, Congress enacted legislation in 1977 that effectively limited the Executive branch's ability to close or realign major military installations. The new statute, later codified as 10 U.S.C. 2687 (Section 612 of the Military Construction Authorization Act of 1978, P.L. 95-82 ), generally required DOD to conduct comprehensive and lengthy assessments of major basing decisions as part of a congressional report-and-wait process. These assessments could be challenged in court on environmental grounds or on questions related to their sufficiency, further lengthening delays. The new legislation effectively halted DOD's ability to close or realign domestic bases of significant size. In the decade that followed the passage of 10 U.S.C. 2687, congressional pressure grew to accommodate DOD basing priorities. By 1988, ongoing negotiations between the Secretary of Defense and the House and Senate Armed Service Committees led to new legislation ( P.L. 100-526 ) that authorized a limited number of base closures based on the oversight of an independent panel. Though later modified, the effort marked the beginning of the first Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process, which was intended to insulate base closings from considerations such as favoritism or other political interference. Widely considered a success, the 1988 BRAC legislation was taken up again and modified in succeeding BRAC rounds; first in 1991, 1993, and 1995; and again in 2005. The modern BRAC process refers to a temporary authority that amends the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 ( P.L. 101-510 ), hereinafter referred to as the Base Closure Act , and features a framework of elements that entrusts an independent commission with certifying closure and realignment recommendations made by the Secretary of Defense. In general, the process has required the Secretary to submit a list of military installations recommended for closure or realignment to an independent, bipartisan BRAC commission. After analyzing the Secretary's recommendations, the commission may accept, reject, or modify the list. Upon completing its review, the commission forwards its final findings and recommendations to the President. Upon acceptance of commission's recommendations, the President then submits them to Congress. If the President does not submit the recommendations to Congress within the timeframe required under the Base Closure Act, the BRAC process is terminated. Upon receipt of the report from the President, Congress has the opportunity to disapprove of the recommendations in toto through the enactment of a joint resolution. The hallmarks of this framework include establishment of an independent commission whose members are appointed by the President, in consultation with congressional leadership (and the advice and consent of the Senate); reliance on objective and uniform criteria for evaluating basing recommendations; GAO review and certification of DOD data; deliberations that include open hearings, solicitation of feedback, installation visits, and data available for public review; requirement that the commission's final list of closure and realignment actions be accepted or rejected in its entirety; and presidential and congressional off-ramps that would terminate the BRAC process when certain conditions are not met. The timeline to complete an entire BRAC round has varied; however, the most recent one conducted in 2005 took approximately 10 years, from authorization to completion (end of the six-year BRAC implementation period). Key milestones of a typical BRAC timeline include DOD force structure plan, infrastructure inventory, and analysis of options (up to four years); nomination and confirmation of BRAC commissioners; DOD submission of BRAC recommendations (and associated reports) to the commission; commission deliberations (typically four months); final report sent to the President for approval; 45-day deadline for Congress to reject recommendations in their entirety (Joint Resolution of Disapproval) or allow implementation to begin; DOD implementation (two years to begin; six years to complete); and DOD disposal of real property (indeterminate). BRAC is often characterized as a cost efficiency measure that enables DOD to more effectively manage its real property assets by allowing it to shed excess infrastructure, but historically, potential costs and savings have been a consideration that have ranked below military value. No BRAC round has established cost savings targets, floors, or ceilings. During BRAC rounds in 1991, 1993, and 1995, Congress required the Secretary of Defense to develop and report a set of objective selection criteria that would be used for identifying bases for closure and realignment. For the 2005 round, Congress amended the BRAC statute to require the Secretary to regard military value (defined below) as the primary consideration. Other factors, such as potential costs and savings, were explicitly categorized as lower priority. Because the amended legislative language reflected longstanding DOD policy, the 2005 BRAC criteria appear almost identical when compared with previous versions, with additional language added for emphasis or included for explanatory examples. The excerpt below indicates the 2005 BRAC selection criteria. Emphasized text (in italics) represents new language not included as part of the 1995 criteria. SEC. 2913. SELECTION CRITERIA FOR 2005 ROUND. (a) FINAL SELECTION CRITERIA.—The final criteria to be used by the Secretary in making recommendations for the closure or realignment of military installations inside the United States under this part in 2005 shall be the military value and other criteria specified in subsections (b) and (c). (b) MILITARY VALUE CRITERIA.—The military value criteria are as follows: (1) The current and future mission capabilities and the impact on operational readiness of the total force of the Department of Defense, including the impact on joint warfighting, training, and readiness. (2) The availability and condition of land, facilities, and associated airspace (including training areas suitable for maneuver by ground, naval, or air forces throughout a diversity of climate and terrain areas and staging areas for the use of the Armed Forces in homeland defense missions) at both existing and potential receiving locations. (3) The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge, and future total force requirements at both existing and potential receiving locations to support operations and training. (4) The cost of operations and the manpower implications. (c). OTHER CRITERIA.—The other criteria that the Secretary shall use in making recommendations for the closure or realignment of military installations inside the United States under this part in 2005 are as follows: (1) The extent and timing of potential costs and savings, including the number of years, beginning with the date of completion of the closure or realignment, for the savings to exceed the costs. (2) The economic impact on existing communities in the vicinity of military installations. (3) The ability of the infrastructure of both the existing and potential receiving communities to support forces, missions, and personnel. (4) The environmental impact , including the impact of costs related to potential environ mental restoration, waste management, and environmental compliance activities. The transfer and disposal of DOD real property made available following the implementation of a BRAC round is a complex process that may extend for years beyond the initial six-year implementation window. Disposal may be delayed or otherwise affected by the participation of local and state communities and the degree to which environmental remediation by federal authorities is necessary. The graph below shows the total acreage from previous BRAC rounds yet to be disposed. The Base Closure Act authorizes a variety of conveyance mechanisms not otherwise available for the transfer and disposal of federal property, a process typically performed by the General Services Administration (GSA). Under a BRAC, conveyance authority is delegated from GSA, through the Secretary of Defense to the various military departments, which receive special approval to supersede GSA regulations with BRAC specific regulations. The primary difference between the routine disposal of federal property and real property conveyed under a BRAC is the role of local communities. Under normal (non-BRAC) circumstances, the General Services Administration (GSA) is directly responsible for disposing of any surplus federal real property, which includes defense property. A military department in possession would, for example, declare property as excess to its needs and turn over the administration of a site to the GSA. The GSA would then follow a number of consecutive steps for disposal of federal property laid out in statute. It would first offer the excess property to other federal agencies. If none expressed an interest, the excess property would be declared surplus . The GSA would then offer the surplus property to state or local governments and non-profits that might use it for a public benefit ( public benefit conveyance) , such as a homeless shelter or medical center. Finally, if the property has neither been transferred nor conveyed in the previous steps, the surplus property would be offered for sale to the public. Under a BRAC, local communities can significantly affect the BRAC property transfer and disposal decisions, which are managed by the Secretary of the responsible military department. Once approved for closure, communities around an installation typically organize a Local Redevelopment Authority (LRA) for the purpose of creating and executing a redevelopment plan for the property. While the plan is not binding on DOD, the Department has been statutorily directed to give the plan considerable weight. DOD makes economic development grants and technical support available through its Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA) to assist LRAs with the process. In recent BRAC rounds, Congress has authorized a special transfer authority that has permitted DOD to transfer title to property at less than fair market value, or even at no cost, if the LRA agrees to certain conditions designed to create employment at the former defense facility. This has been referred to as an Economic Development Conveyance (EDC). DOD has asserted that savings generated from BRAC are generally the result of avoiding the cost of retaining and operating unneeded infrastructure, with upfront costs eventually offset by annual savings. Between FY2012 and FY2018, the Department consistently argued for a new BRAC, asserting that "absent another BRAC round, the Department will continue to operate some of its installations sub-optimally as other efficiency measures, changing force structure, and technology reduce the number of missions and personnel." Emphasizing the potential cost savings, DOD has suggested a new "efficiency-focused BRAC" could save the Department billions of dollars annually: "Savings from BRAC rounds are real and substantial. The last five BRAC rounds are collectively saving the Department $12B annually. A new efficiency-focused BRAC could save the Department an additional ~$2B annually (based on the '93/'95 rounds)." In its ongoing series of BRAC-related reports, the GAO has noted the unreliability of DOD cost savings estimates. In 2013, GAO concluded that, though the Department had achieved annual recurring savings as the result of the 2005 round, visibility into the outcome has been limited due to missing and inconsistent recordkeeping. Similar studies have raised questions about the data DOD has used to predict and monitor BRAC effectiveness, long-term savings, and outcomes. For example "... the services did not develop baseline operating costs before implementing the BRAC recommendations, which would have enabled it to determine whether savings were achieved." "... We found that DOD's process for providing the BRAC commission with cost and savings estimates was hindered by underestimating recommendation-specific requirements and that DOD did not fully anticipate information technology requirements for many of the recommendations." "The department cannot provide documentation to show to what extent it reduced plant replacement value or vacated leased space as it reported in May 2005 that it was intended to do.... In addition, DOD bundled multiple closures ... thus limiting visibility into the estimated costs and savings for individual closures and realignments." "... DOD has not reported to Congress how the cleanup of emerging contaminants, especially certain perfluorinated compounds, at installations closed under BRAC will significantly increase the estimated (BRAC) cleanup costs." "... We found that OSD (Office of the Secretary of Defense) did not have a fully developed method for accurately collecting information on costs, savings, and efficiencies achieved specifically from joint basing, and that OSD had not developed a plan to guide joint bases in achieving cost savings and efficiencies...." "... DOD has not committed to take action on some of our recommendations related to implementing any future BRAC rounds, such as improving DOD's ability to estimate potential liabilities, and savings to achieve desired outcomes." In its final report to the President, the 2005 BRAC commission noted DOD's initial estimate of savings had been "vastly overestimated," and suggested that the Department had claimed savings that were "not truly savings in the commonly understood sense of the term." Reflecting on the quality of cost estimates and savings associated with 2005 BRAC round, Anthony Principi, Chairman of the 2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, has suggested opportunities exist for the DOD to improve its analysis by adopting more consistent accounting practices and inclusive metrics: To start, DoD has to do a better job estimating the true cost of any closure or realignment.... Second, the cost of base realignment actions (COBRA) accounting procedure, used by DoD as a basis of comparison among scenarios, should include cost estimates for environmental restoration not just "clean to current use" standards. In addition, COBRA or some other cost evaluation process should also include transportation and infrastructure costs and burden sharing with the federal government.... In addition to refining DOD accounting metrics, some observers have suggested congressional visibility into BRAC cost and long-term effectiveness could be improved by amending the process to require the Department to disclose how closure and realignment recommendations meet expected cost saving and reduced infrastructure targets. A BRAC process is the chief means by which DOD disposes of excess infrastructure. Each year between 2013 and 2017, the Department requested a new BRAC round as a means of realizing greater efficiency and reducing excess infrastructure. It has also attempted to allay concerns related to the 2005 BRAC experience - marked by unexpectedly high costs and complexity - by emphasizing cost savings and efficiencies rather than force transformation. In April 2016, DOD submitted to the House Armed Services Committee an I nfrastructure C apacity R eport (interim version) that assessed 22% of the Department's base infrastructure excess to its needs. The methodology used in the report—required by Section 2815 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2016 (P.L. 114-92)—remained consistent with excess capacity reports submitted prior to the 1998 and 2005 BRAC rounds round. The Department stated its purpose for obtaining "a sense of excess and whether excess remains after various changes, such as (prior) BRAC or force structure reductions." A final infrastructure capacity report, submitted to Congress in October 2017, modified the original excess capacity estimate to 19%. The Department concluded its infrastructure capacity analysis by arguing it had established sufficient justification for a new BRAC round, a process that would allow it to more effectively dispose of excess infrastructure and manage remaining real property assets. The Department believes we have addressed all congressional concerns.... The time to authorize another BRAC round is now. The BRAC process requires considerable time to analyze and develop recommendations, have those recommendations reviewed by the independent BRAC Commission, and then implemented over a six-year period of time. The longer authorization is delayed, the longer the Department will be forced to expend valuable resources on unnecessary facilities instead of weapons systems, readiness, and other national security priorities. Critics of the Department's methodology for estimating excess infrastructure have asserted it includes unreasonable research assumptions and metrics, undermining the basis for DOD's conclusion. For example, observers have cited the report's reliance on Cold War baseline values to establish excess capacity, inconsistent application of existing metrics for measuring capacity shortfalls, and overly broad categorization schemes. Some observers have also cited longstanding data management challenges that continue to affect the Department's ability to measure current excess facility inventory and utilization rates. Others have noted the dearth of data that support DOD claims related to BRAC effectiveness and the disposal of excess property. During a news briefing on the FY2019 defense budget, Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller) David L. Norquist noted that the Department had declined to propose a BRAC round that year, stating that it would work instead to focus on internal reforms while preparing for a financial audit. And so, I think we're looking at doing two things, going forward. One is, working with Congress to find common areas where we can make reforms and changes that don't create the same types of obstacles. The other is that we are undergoing a financial-statement audit that includes a look at property, and assets and investments and improving the accuracy of the data behind it. And as a view of being able to take advantage of the data coming out of that process, to help us make better decision-making on real property. But, yes, you are correct, there is not (a) request for another BRAC round in this budget. In testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee Subcommittee on Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies, Lucian Niemeyer, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Energy, Installations and Environment, indicated DOD would be working in FY2019 to improve its excess infrastructure accounting processes and demolish unneeded infrastructure: In lieu of another request for legislation in FY 2019 to authorize an additional Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round, we will review our facilities, to include facility usage optimization review to ensure we have a better accounting of excess infrastructure. We also have proposed for FY 2019 increased efforts to demolish unneeded or obsolete facilities over the course of this year. The 2005 BRAC round was unique among all previous rounds due to its relative size, scope and complexity. (See Figure 2 for comparison of major and minor BRAC actions between rounds.) Colloquially called "the mother of all BRACs," the objectives of the 2005 round were primarily about transforming military infrastructure; however, unanticipated expenses have played a role in shaping subsequent congressional views of the BRAC process and, according to many observers, dampened support for consideration of a new round. Savings estimates submitted during the 2005 round were overvalued by as much as 67%, according to GAO analysis, with one-time implementation costs rising from $21 to $35.1 billion. GAO found that the $14.1 billion increase was due primarily to the rising cost of new construction associated with subsidiary projects not included in the original BRAC implementation plan. Referring to the implementation of the 2005 round, Assistant Secretary Niemeyer, noted, "BRAC legislation effectively limited the ability of Congress to oversee BRAC implementation costs and the Department made deliberate decisions to use BRAC implementation as a recapitalization tool, expanding facility requirements and associated costs." To address congressional concerns about spiraling costs in new BRAC rounds, DOD has periodically proposed legislative language that would constrain the Secretary's ability to recommend BRAC actions that would not yield savings within 20 years and to emphasize recommendations that would yield net savings within five years. Each year, Congress appropriates funding for the Department of Defense Base Closure Account, part of the Military Construction Defense-Wide appropriation. With no BRAC round authorized or underway, the primary purpose of continuing BRAC appropriations is to fund the environmental cleanup and caretaker functions at bases that were closed under prior rounds (see Figure 3 ). In FY2020, the Trump Administration has requested $278.5 million for BRAC continuing environmental and caretaker costs, with $158.3 million provided for the Navy (57%), $66.1 million for the Army (24%), and $54 million for the Air Force (19%). The total request represents a $63 million decrease (19%) from FY2019 enacted levels ($342 million). In FY2018, Congress urged DOD to accelerate environmental remediation at BRAC sites. In report language, appropriators stated that additional funds were provided to speed environmental remediation at installations closed under previous rounds. Accelerated cleanup.—The agreement includes additional funding to accelerate environmental remediation at installations closed during previous Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) rounds. Priority should be given to those sites with newly identified radiological cleanup cost. There are many factors hindering the cleanup of BRAC sites. However, strategic investments can lead to quicker clean-ups and faster turnover of DOD property to the local community. Therefore, the Department is directed to submit to the congressional defense committees a spend plan for the additional BRAC funds not later than 30 days after enactment of this Act. Congressional authorizers and appropriators have regularly inserted language into annual defense legislation that would disallow the use of funds for the purpose of a new BRAC round. In FY2019, for example, though DOD did not propose a BRAC, authorizers inserted language into the annual NDAA that prohibited a new round: SEC. 2703. Prohibition on Conducting Additional Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Round. Nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize an additional Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round. A similar provision was included in the final FY2019 defense appropriations bill: SEC. 8122. None of the funds made available by this Act may be used to propose, plan for, or execute a new or additional Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round. In 2017, Members in both chambers proposed legislation that would have authorized a new round of base closures. Though no legislation for a full BRAC was enacted, a provision included the following year in the final FY2019 NDAA. Under the new scenario described by Section 2702 of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 ( H.R. 5515 , P.L. 115-232 ), BRAC-like actions are authorized within the confines of a state based on the recommendation of the governor and support of local communities affected by the proposed actions. Unlike a traditional BRAC process, the new authorities would forgo the creation of an independent review panel. The Secretary of Defense is, instead, required to deliver a report of planned BRAC actions to congressional defense committees and, following a 90-day waiting period, begin implementation. For details, please refer to "In-State BRAC" in Appendix A of this report. The BRAC related legislative proposals above illustrate the flexibility Congress has for amending or adopting the template of past BRAC processes that DOD has called "the only fair, objective, and comprehensive process to achieve these goals (eliminating excess infrastructure)." Congress may consider whether future legislative proposals for base closures and realignments will adopt the lessons learned from previous rounds while retaining the basic framework, or fundamentally alter the process. No BRAC legislation has so far been proposed in the 116 th Congress. Additionally, the Department has asserted that it does not intend to use the new BRAC-like authorities authorized by Section 2702 of the FY2019 NDAA. To date, DOD has received no state requests under this authority. Appendix A. Legislative References BRAC Authorizing Legislation 1988 Round The Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act, enacted October 24, 1988 (P.L.100-526) 1991, 1993, 1995 Rounds National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, enacted November 5, 1990 (P.L. 107-107, Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, Title XXIX) 2005 Round National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, ( P.L. 101-510 ; amended the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 ( P.L. 101-510 ) 10 U.S.C. 2687, 10 U.S.C. 993 Summary In 1977, Congress enacted 10 U.S.C. 2687, the first statutory restriction on the President's ability to close or realign military installations. Amended over the years, the statute has retained its essential elements, establishing procedures the Secretary of Defense must follow before closing a military installation where a threshold number (currently 300) of civilian personnel are authorized to be employed, or realigning an installation that involves a reduction by more than 50% (or 1,000) of civilian workers. A more recent statute, 10 U.S.C. 993, introduced additional reporting requirements that would restrict the Secretary's ability to realign installations if the plan would affect more than 1,000 assigned members of the Armed Forces. In-State BRAC Section 2702 of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 ( H.R. 5515 , P.L. 115-232 ) authorizes new in-state BRAC authorities. Text of the provision is included below in its entirety. SEC. 2702. ADDITIONAL AUTHORITY TO REALIGN OR CLOSE CERTAIN MILITARY INSTALLATIONS. (a) Authorization.—Notwithstanding sections 993 or 2687 of title 10, United States Code, and subject to subsection (d), the Secretary of Defense may take such actions as may be necessary to carry out the realignment or closure of a military installation in a State during a fiscal year if— (1) the military installation is the subject of a notice which is described in subsection (b); and (2) the Secretary includes the military installation in the report submitted under paragraph (2) of subsection (c) with respect to the fiscal year. (b) Notice From Governor of State.—A notice described in this subsection is a notice received by the Secretary of Defense from the Governor of a State (or, in the case of the District of Columbia, the Mayor of the District of Columbia) in which the Governor recommends that the Secretary carry out the realignment or closure of a military installation located in the State, and which includes each of the following elements: (1) A specific description of the military installation, or a specific description of the relevant real and personal property. (2) Statements of support for the realignment or closure from units of local government in which the installation is located. (3) A detailed plan for the reuse or redevelopment of the real and personal property of the installation, together with a description of the local redevelopment authority which will be responsible for the implementation of the plan. (c) Response to Notice.— (1) Mandatory response to governor and congress.—Not later than 1 year after receiving a notice from the Governor of a State (or, in the case of the District of Columbia, from the Mayor of the District of Columbia), the Secretary of Defense shall submit a response to the notice to the Governor and the congressional defense committees indicating whether or not the Secretary accepts the recommendation for the realignment or closure of a military installation which is the subject of the notice. (2) Acceptance of recommendation.—If the Secretary of Defense determines that it is in the interests of the United States to accept the recommendation for the realignment or closure of a military installation which is the subject of a notice received under subsection (b) and intends to carry out the realignment or closure of the installation pursuant to the authority of this section during a fiscal year, at the time the budget is submitted under section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code, for the fiscal year, the Secretary shall submit a report to the congressional defense committees which includes the following: (A) The identification of each military installation for which the Secretary intends to carry out a realignment or closure pursuant to the authority of this section during the fiscal year, together with the reasons the Secretary of Defense believes that it is in the interest of the United States to accept the recommendation of the Governor of the State involved for the realignment or closure of the installation. (B) For each military installation identified under subparagraph (A), a master plan describing the required scope of work, cost, and timing for all facility actions needed to carry out the realignment or closure, including the construction of new facilities and the repair or renovation of existing facilities. (C) For each military installation identified under subparagraph (A), a certification that, not later than the end of the fifth fiscal year after the completion of the realignment or closure, the savings resulting from the realignment or closure will exceed the costs of carrying out the realignment or closure, together with an estimate of the annual recurring savings that would be achieved by the realignment or closure of the installation and the timeframe required for the financial savings to exceed the costs of carrying out the realignment or closure. (d) Limitations.— (1) Timing.—The Secretary may not initiate the realignment or closure of a military installation pursuant to the authority of this section until the expiration of the 90-day period beginning on the date the Secretary submits the report under paragraph (2) of subsection (c). (2) Total costs.—Subject to appropriations, the aggregate cost to the government in carrying out the realignment or closure of military installations pursuant to the authority of this section for all fiscal years may not exceed $2,000,000,000. In determining the cost to the government for purposes of this section, there shall be included the costs of planning and design, military construction, operations and maintenance, environmental restoration, information technology, termination of public-private contracts, guarantees, and other factors contributing to the cost of carrying out the realignment or closure, as determined by the Secretary. (e) Process for Implementation.—The implementation of the realignment or closure of a military installation pursuant to the authority of this section shall be carried out in accordance with section 2905 of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (title XXIX of P.L. 101-510 ; 10 U.S.C. 2687 note) in the same manner as the implementation of a realignment or closure of a military installation pursuant to the authority of such Act. (f) State Defined.—In this section, the term ``State'' means each of the several States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, American Samoa, Guam, the United States Virgin Islands, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands. (g) Termination of Authority.—The authority of the Secretary to carry out a realignment or closure pursuant to this section shall terminate at the end of fiscal year 2029. Appendix B. BRAC Acreage Disposal Status, By State	[ "Since 1977, statutory thresholds have effectively constrained the President's ability to close or realign major military installations in the United States. Congress has instead periodically granted temporary authorities—known as a Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC)—that have established independent commissions for the review and approval of basing changes submitted by the Secretary of Defense. These unique and transient authorities last expired on April 16, 2006. There have been five rounds of base closures: 1988, 1991, 1993, 1995, and 2005. Though Congress has periodically adjusted the BRAC process to account for lessons learned, the modern framework has remained generally consistent with earlier rounds, and includes establishment of an independent commission; reliance on objective and uniform criteria; Government Accountability Office (GAO) review and certification of Department of Defense (DOD) data; deliberations designed to be transparent that include open hearings, solicitation of feedback, installation visits, and data available for public review; and requirement that the final list of closure and realignment recommendations be accepted or rejected in their entirety. Congress has defined BRAC selection criteria in statute, thus requiring the Secretary to prioritize military value over cost savings. Additionally, Congress has required the Secretary to align the Department's recommendations with a comprehensive 20-year force structure plan. The commission may modify, reject, or add recommendations during its review before forwarding a final list to the President. After receiving the Commission's list of recommendations, the President may either accept the report in its entirety or seek to modify it by indicating disapproval and returning it to the commission for further evaluation. If the President accepts the commission's recommendations, they are forwarded to Congress. BRAC implementation begins by default unless Congress rejects the recommendations in their entirety within 45 days by enacting a joint resolution. During the implementation phase, DOD is required to initiate closures and realignments within two years and complete all actions within six years. The BRAC process represents a legislative compromise between the executive and legislative branches wherein each shares power in managing the closure and realignment of military bases. The imposition of an independent, third-party mediator was intended to insulate base closings from political considerations by both branches that had complicated similar actions in the past. This report provides background on the development of BRAC, describes its major elements and milestones, and outlines issues frequently cited in the context of new rounds, such as potential savings." ]	5,035	gov_report	en	null	985169b1a6f4b238cfa8a949b381b30e81fdac77c8738d49
Title IV of the Higher Education Act (HEA; P.L. 89-329), as amended, authorizes programs that provide financial assistance to students to attend certain institutions of higher education (IHEs). In academic year (AY) 2016-2017, 6,760 institutions were classified as Title IV eligible IHEs. Of these IHEs eligible to participate in Title IV programs, approximately 29.4% were public institutions, 27.8% were private nonprofit institutions, and 42.9% were proprietary (or private, for-profit) institutions. It is estimated that $122.5 billion was made available to students through Title IV federal student aid in FY2017. To be able to receive Title IV assistance, students must attend an institution that is eligible to participate in the Title IV programs. IHEs must meet a variety of requirements to participate in the Title IV programs. First, an IHE must meet basic eligibility criteria, including offering at least one eligible program of education. In addition, an IHE must satisfy the program integrity triad, under which it must be legally authorized to provide a postsecondary education in the state in which it is located; accredited or preaccredited by an agency recognized by the Department of Education (ED) for such purposes, and certified by ED as eligible to participate in Title IV programs. The state authorization and accreditation components of the triad were developed independently to address the issues of quality assurance and consumer protection, and the federal government (ED specifically) generally relies on states and accrediting agencies to determine standards of educational program quality. The federal government's only direct role in determining Title IV eligibility is through the process of certification of eligibility and ensuring IHEs meet some additional Title IV requirements. Certification, as a component of the program integrity triad, focuses on an institution's fiscal responsibility and administrative capacity to administer Title IV funds. An IHE must fulfill a variety of other related requirements, including those that relate to institutional recruiting practices, student policies and procedures, and Title IV program administration. Finally, additional criteria may apply to an institution depending on its control or the type of educational programs it offers. For instance, proprietary institutions must derive at least 10% of their revenues from non-Title IV funds (also known as the 90/10 rule). Failure to fulfill some of these requirements does not necessarily end an IHE's participation in the Title IV programs, but may lead to additional oversight from ED and/or restrictions placed an IHE's Title IV participation. This report provides a general overview of HEA provisions that affect a postsecondary institution's eligibility for participation in Title IV student aid programs. It first describes general eligibility criteria at both the institutional and programmatic level and then, in more detail, the program integrity triad. Next, it discusses several issues that are closely related to institutional eligibility: Program Participation Agreements, campus safety policies and crime reporting required under the Clery Act, the return of Title IV funds, and distance education. To be eligible to participate in HEA Title IV student aid programs, institutions must meet several criteria. These criteria include requirements related to programs offered by the institutions, student enrollment, institutional operations, and the length of academic programs. This section discusses the definition of an eligible IHE for the purposes of Title IV participation and program eligibility requirements. The HEA contains two definitions of institutions of higher education. Section 101 provides a general definition of IHE that applies to institutional eligibility for participation in HEA programs other than Title IV programs. The Section 102 definition of IHE is used only to determine institutional eligibility to participate in HEA Title IV programs. Section 101 of the HEA provides a general definition of IHE. This definition applies to institutional participation in non-Title IV HEA programs. Section 101 IHEs can be public or private nonprofit educational institutions. Section 101 specifies criteria both public and private nonprofit educational institutions must meet to be considered IHEs. Neither the HEA nor regulations specifically define a public institution of higher education. However, in general, public institutions can be described as those whose educational programs are operated by states or other government entities and are primarily supported by public funds. Regulations define a nonprofit IHE as one that (1) is owned and operated by a nonprofit corporation or association, with no part of the corporation's or association's net earnings benefiting a private shareholder or individual, (2) is determined by the Internal Revenue Service to be a tax-exempt organization under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC), and (3) is legally authorized to operate as a nonprofit organization by each state in which it is physically located. To be considered a Section 101 IHE, public and private nonprofit educational institutions must admit as regular students only individuals with a high school diploma or its equivalent, individuals beyond the age of compulsory school attendance, or individuals who are dually or concurrently enrolled in both the institution and in a secondary school; be legally authorized to provide a postsecondary education within the state in which they are located; offer a bachelor's degree, provide a program of at least two-years that is acceptable for full credit toward a bachelor's degree, award a degree that is accepted for admission to a graduate or professional program, or provide a training program of at least a one-year that prepares students for gainful employment in a recognized occupation; and be accredited or preaccredited by an accrediting agency recognized by ED to grant accreditation or preaccreditation status Section 102 of the HEA defines IHE only for the purposes of Title IV participation. The Section 102 definition includes all institutions included in the Section 101 definition (i.e., public and private nonprofit IHEs) and also includes proprietary institutions, postsecondary vocational institutions, and foreign institutions that have been approved by ED. Section 102 specifies that proprietary and postsecondary vocational institutions must meet many of the same Section 101 requirements that are applicable to public and private nonprofit institutions. In addition, Section 102 specifies other criteria that all types of educational institutions must meet to be considered Title IV eligible IHEs. HEA Section 102 specifies that a proprietary IHEs is an institution that is neither a public nor a private nonprofit institution. In addition to the basic Title IV eligibility criteria that all IHEs must meet (e.g., state authorization, accreditation by an ED-recognized accrediting agency), proprietary IHEs must meet additional criteria to be considered Title IV eligible. Specifically, a proprietary IHE must (1) provide an eligible program of training "to prepare students for gainful employment in a recognized occupation" or (2) provide a program leading to a baccalaureate degree in liberal arts that has been continuously accredited by a regional accrediting agency since October 1, 2007, and have provided the program continuously since January 1, 2009. Additionally, it must have been legally authorized to provide (and have continuously been providing) the same or a substantially similar educational program for at least two consecutive years. HEA Section 102 defines a postsecondary vocational institution as a public or private nonprofit institution that provides an eligible program of training "to prepare students for gainful employment in a recognized occupation," and has been legally authorized to provide (and has continuously been providing) the same or a substantially similar educational program for at least two consecutive years. It is possible for a public or private nonprofit IHE that offers a degree program (e.g., an associate's or bachelor's degree) to also qualify as a postsecondary vocational institution by offering programs that are less than one academic year and that lead to a nondegree recognized credential such as a certificate. Institutional participation in Title IV student aid programs allows students from the United States to borrow through the federal Direct Loan program to attend postsecondary institutions located outside of the United States. In general, a foreign institution is eligible to participate in the Direct Loan program if it is comparable to an eligible IHE (as defined in HEA Section 101) within the United States, is a public or private nonprofit institution, and has been approved by ED. Foreign graduate medical schools, veterinary schools, and nursing schools are also eligible to participate in Title IV student aid programs, but must meet additional requirements. Freestanding foreign graduate medical schools, veterinary schools, and nursing schools may be proprietary institutions. Additional requirements for foreign institutions to participate in Title IV student aid programs are beyond the scope of this report and, generally, will not be discussed hereinafter. The definitions of proprietary institutions and postsecondary vocational institutions contained in Section 102 have several overlapping components with the Section 101 definition of IHE. For instance, both proprietary and postsecondary vocational institutions must (1) admit as regular students only those individuals with a high school diploma or its equivalent, individuals beyond the age of compulsory school attendance, or individuals who are dually or concurrently enrolled in both the institution and in a secondary school; (2) be legally authorized to provide a postsecondary education by the state in which they are located; and (3) be accredited or preaccredited by an accrediting agency recognized by ED to grant such statuses. In addition, all types of institutions (including public and private nonprofit institutions) must meet requirements related to the course of study offered at the institution and student enrollment to be considered Title IV eligible under Section 102. In general, any type of institution is considered ineligible to participate in Title IV programs if more than 25% of its enrolled students are incarcerated, or if more than 50% of the its enrolled students do not have a secondary school diploma or equivalent and the institution does not provide a two-year associate's degree or a four-year bachelor's degree. Also, in general, an institution is ineligible if more than 50% of the courses offered are correspondence courses or if 50% or more of its students are enrolled in correspondence courses. These "50% rules" are discussed in more detail in the distance education section of this report. Finally, an institution is considered ineligible to participate in Title IV programs if the institution has filed for bankruptcy or the institution (or its owner or chief executive officer) has been convicted of or pled no contest or guilty to a crime involving the use of Title IV funds. While the above-described criteria generally apply to most types of Section 102 institutions, specific criteria apply to individual types of Section 102 institutions. The following sections provide information on Title IV eligibility criteria that apply to those additional types of IHEs not specified in Section 101, but specified in Section 102: proprietary IHEs, postsecondary vocational institutions, and foreign institutions. Hereinafter, unless otherwise noted, the term "institution of high education (IHE)" only refers to Section 102 institutions. To qualify as an eligible institution for Title IV participation, an institution must offer at least one eligible program, but overall institutional eligibility does not necessarily extend to all programs offered by the institution. Not all of an institution's programs must meet program eligibility requirements for an IHE to participate in Title IV, but, in general, students enrolled solely in ineligible programs cannot receive Title IV student aid. To be Title IV eligible, a program must lead to a degree (e.g., an associate's or bachelor's degree) or certificate or prepare students for gainful employment in a recognized occupation. Before awarding Title IV aid to students, an IHE must determine that the program in which a student is participating is Title IV eligible, ensure that the program is included in its accreditation notice, and ensure that the the IHE is authorized by the appropriate state to offer the program. In addition to the general criteria for all types of institutions, a program must meet specific eligibility requirements depending on whether the institution at which it is offered is a public or private nonprofit IHE, a proprietary IHE, or a postsecondary vocational IHE. At a public or private nonprofit IHE, the following types of programs are Title IV eligible: (1) programs that lead to an associate's, bachelor's, professional, or graduate degree; (2) transfer programs that are at least two academic years in length and for which the institution does not award a credential but that are acceptable for full credit toward a bachelor's degree; (3) programs that lead to a certificate or other recognized nondegree credential, that prepare students for gainful employment in a recognized occupation, and that are at least one academic year in length; (4) certificate or diploma training programs that are less than one year in length, if the institution also meets the definition of a postsecondary vocational institution; and (5) programs consisting of courses required for elementary or secondary teacher certification in the state in which the student intends to teach. For all of these, an academic year must also require an undergraduate course of study to contain an amount of instructional time in which a full-time student is expected to complete at least 24 semester or trimester credit hours, 36 quarter credit hours, or 900 clock hours. In general, eligible programs at proprietary and postsecondary vocational institutions must meet a specified number of weeks of instruction and must provide training that prepares students for gainful employment in a recognized occupation (described below). At proprietary and postsecondary vocational institutions, the following types of programs are Title IV eligible: undergraduate programs that provide at least 600 clock hours, 16 semester or trimester hours, or 24 quarter hours of instruction offered over a minimum of at least 15 weeks ; such programs may admit, as regular students, individuals who have not completed the equivalent of an associate's degree; programs that provide at least 300 clock hours, 8 semester hours, or 12 quarter hours of instruction offered over a minimum of 10 weeks; such programs must be graduate or professional programs or must admit as regular students only individuals who have completed the equivalent of an associate's degree; short-term programs that provide between 300 and 600 clock hours of instruction over a minimum of 10 weeks ; such programs must have been in existence for at least one year, have verified completion and placement rates of at least 70%, may not last more than 50% longer than the minimum training period required by the state or federal agency for the occupation for which the program is being offered, and must admit as regular students some individuals who have not completed the equivalent of an associate's degree; and programs offered by accredited proprietary IHEs that lead to a bachelor's degree in liberal arts; the school must have been continuously accredited by an ED-recognized accrediting agency since at least October 1, 2007 and must have provided the program continuously since January 1, 2009. Most nondegree programs offered by public and private nonprofit IHEs must prepare students for "gainful employment in a recognized occupation." Gainful employment requirements also apply to almost all programs offered by proprietary and postsecondary vocational institutions, regardless of whether they lead to a degree. In response to concerns about the quality of programs that prepare students for gainful employment and the level of student debt assumed by individuals who attend these programs, ED issued final rules on gainful employment on October 31, 2014. The regulations require that educational programs subject to gainful employment requirements offered by IHEs meet minimum performance standards to be considered offering education that prepares students for gainful employment in a recognized occupation. They also require IHEs to disclose specified information about each of its gainful employment programs to enrolled or prospective students. Finally, the gainful employment rules require IHEs to report information to ED necessary to calculate the debt-to-earnings ratios. Although the gainful employment regulations became effective July 1, 2015, various aspects of them have not yet been fully implemented or have been delayed in implementation. For example, ED delayed until July 1, 2019, some portions of the rule relating to certain disclosure requirements. Additionally, to enable ED to calculate whether an IHE's programs meet the minimum performance standards (discussed below), regulations specify that ED obtains data from the Social Security Administration (SSA). However, a memorandum of understanding relating to data sharing between ED and SSA lapsed in 2018. In August 2018, ED issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that proposes to rescind the gainful employment rules in their entirety. Based on HEA requirements relating to the implementation date for Title IV regulations, the earliest possible date the proposed rules could go into effect is July 1, 2020. The gainful employment regulations establish a framework within which educational programs offered by IHEs must meet minimum performance standards to be considered offering education that prepares students for gainful employment in a recognized occupation. Under the framework, ED annually calculates two debt-to-earnings (D/E) rates for each gainful employment program offered by an IHE, the discretionary income rate and the annual earnings rate. These rates measure a gainful employment program's completers' debt (their annual loan payments) as a percentage of their post-completion earnings. Using these measures, institutions will be determined to be "passing," "in the zone," or "failing." Thresholds for each category are as follows: Passing : Programs whose completers have annual loan payments less than or equal to 8% of annual earnings (the annual earnings rate) or less than or equal to 20% of discretionary income (the discretionary income rate). In the zone: Programs whose completers have annual loan payments greater than 8% but less than or equal to 12% of annual earnings or greater than 20% but less than or equal to 30% of discretionary income. Failing : Programs whose completers have annual loan payments greater than 12% of annual earnings and greater than 30% of discretionary income. Programs that are failing in two out of any three consecutive years or that are in the zone for four consecutive years will be ineligible for Title IV participation for three years. The gainful employment rules also contain several disclosure requirements. For any year in which ED notifies an IHE that a gainful employment program could become ineligible in the next year based on its debt-to-earnings ratios (i.e., one year of failure or three years in the zone), the IHE must provide a warning to current and prospective students that the program does not meet the gainful employment standards and that if the program does not meet the gainful employment standards in the future, students would not be able to receive Title IV aid. In addition, an IHE must disclose specified information about each of its gainful employment programs to enrolled and prospective students. Information to be disclosed includes the following: the primary occupation that the program prepares students to enter; whether the program satisfies applicable educational prerequisites for professional licensure or certification in each state within the institution's metropolitan statistical area (MSA); program length and number of clock or credit hours, or equivalent, in the program; the program's completion rates for full-time and less-than-full-time students and the program's withdrawal rates; Federal Family Education Loan (FFEL) and Direct Loan program loan repayment rates for all students who entered repayment on Title IV loans and who enrolled in the program, for those who withdrew from the program, and for those who completed the program; the program tuition, fees, and additional costs incurred by a student who completes the program within the program's published length; the job placement rate for the program, if otherwise required by the institution's accrediting agency or state; the percentage of enrolled students who received Title IV or private loans for enrollment in the program; the median loan debt and mean or median earnings of students who completed the program, of students who withdrew from the program, and of both groups combined; the program cohort default rate; and the annual earnings rate for the program. Institutions must also certify that each of their gainful employment programs is included in the IHE's accreditation, meets any state or federal entity accreditation requirements, and meets any state licensing and certification requirements for the state in which the IHE is located. Title IV of the HEA sets forth three requirements to ensure program integrity in postsecondary education, known as the program integrity triad. The three requirements are state authorization, accreditation by an accrediting agency recognized by ED, and eligibility and certification by ED. This triad is intended to provide a balance in the Title IV eligibility requirements. The states' role is to provide consumer protection, the accrediting agencies' role is to provide quality assurance, and the federal government's role is to provide oversight of compliance to ensure administrative and fiscal integrity of Title IV programs at IHEs. The state role in the program integrity triad is to provide legal authority for an institution to operate a postsecondary educational program in the state in which it is physically located. There are two basic requirements for an IHE to be considered legally authorized by a state: 1. the state must authorize the IHE by name to operate postsecondary educational programs, and 2. the state must have in place a process to review and address complaints concerning IHEs, including enforcing applicable state law. An IHE can be authorized by name through a state charter, statute, constitutional provision, or other action by an appropriate state agency (e.g., authorization to conduct business or operate as a nonprofit organization). Additionally, an institution must also comply with any applicable state approval or licensure requirements. The state agency responsible for the authorization of postsecondary institutions must also perform three additional functions: upon request, provide the Secretary with information about the process it uses to authorize institutions to operate within its borders; notify the Secretary if it has evidence to believe that an institution within its borders has committed fraud in the administration of Title IV programs; and notify the Secretary if it revokes an institution's authorization to operate. On December 19, 2016, ED issued final regulations related to state authorization for IHEs offering postsecondary distance or correspondence education (discussed later in this report). The regulations would require an IHE offering postsecondary distance or correspondence education to students residing in a state in which the IHE is not physically located to meet any requirements within the student's state of residence. Under the rules, an IHE may meet this requirement if it participates in a state authorization reciprocity agreement. These regulations were scheduled to become effective July 1, 2018. However, on July 3, 2018 (and effective June 29, 2018), the Secretary of Education (Secretary) issued a final rule delaying the implementation of these requirements until July 1, 2020. The second component of the program integrity triad is accreditation by an ED-recognized accrediting agency or association. In higher education, accreditation is intended to help ensure an acceptable level of quality within IHEs. For Title IV purposes, an institution must be accredited or preaccredited by an ED-recognized accrediting agency. Each accrediting agency must meet HEA-specified standards to be recognized by ED. From its inception, accreditation has been a voluntary process. It developed with the formation of associations that distinguished between IHEs that merited the designation of college or university from those that did not. Since then, accreditation has been used as a form of "external quality review ... to scrutinize colleges, universities and programs for quality assurance and quality improvement." In 1952, shortly after the passage of the Veterans' Readjustment Act of 1952 (the Korean GI Bill; P.L. 82-550), the federal government began formally recognizing accrediting agencies. This was done as one means to assess higher education quality and link it to determining which institutions would qualify to receive federal aid under the Korean GI Bill. Rather than creating a centralized authority to assess quality, the federal government chose to rely in part on the existing expertise of accrediting agencies. Today, ED's formal recognition of accrediting agencies is important, because an IHE's Title IV eligibility is conditioned upon accreditation from an ED-recognized accreditation organization. As part of the accreditation system's development, three types of accrediting agencies have emerged: Regional accrediting agencies. These operate in six regions of the United States, with each agency concentrating on a specific region. Generally, these accredit entire public and private nonprofit degree-granting IHEs. National accrediting agencies. These operate across the United States and also accredit entire institutions. There are two types of national accrediting agencies: faith-based agencies that accredit religiously affiliated or doctrinally based institutions, which are typically private nonprofit degree-granting institutions, and career-related agencies that typically accredit proprietary, career-based, degree- and nondegree-granting institutions. Specialized or programmatic accrediting agencies. These operate throughout the United States and accredit individual educational programs (e.g., law) and single-purpose institutions (e.g., freestanding medical schools). Specific educational programs are often accredited by a specialized accrediting agency, and the institution at which the program is offered is accredited by a regional or national accrediting organization. Generally, an institution must be accredited by an ED-recognized accrediting agency that has the authority to cover all of the institution's programs. Alternatively, a public or private nonprofit IHE may be preaccredited by an agency recognized by ED to grant such preaccreditation, and a public postsecondary vocational institution may be accredited by a state agency that ED determines is a reliable authority. Proprietary institutions must be accredited by an ED-recognized accrediting agency. The accreditation process begins with an institution or program requesting accreditation. Institutional accreditation is cyclical, with a cycle ranging from every few years up to 10 years. Initial accreditation does not guarantee subsequent renewal of the accredited status. Typically, an institution seeking accreditation will first perform a self-assessment to determine whether its operations and performance meet the basic standards required by the relevant accrediting agency. Next, an outside group of higher education peers (e.g., faculty and administrators) and members of the public conduct an on-site visit at the institution during which the team determines whether the accrediting organization's standards are being met. Based on the results of the self-assessment and site visit, the accrediting organization determines whether accreditation will be awarded, renewed, denied, or provisionally awarded to an institution. Educational programs within institutions can be accredited by programmatic accrediting agencies; however, a program is not required to be accredited by a programmatic accrediting agency for Title IV purposes. Rather, it only needs to be covered by the IHE's primary accrediting agency. Frequently, programmatic accrediting agencies review a specific program within an IHE that is accredited by a regional or national accrediting agency. An institution that has had its accreditation revoked or terminated for cause cannot be recertified as an IHE eligible to participate in Title IV programs for 24 months following the loss of accreditation, unless the accrediting agency rescinds the loss. The same rules apply if an institution voluntarily withdraws its accreditation. The Secretary can, however, continue the eligibility of a religious institution whose loss of accreditation, whether voluntary or not, is related to its religious mission and not to the HEA accreditation standards. If an institution's accrediting agency loses its recognition from ED, it has up to 18 months to obtain accreditation from another ED-recognized agency. Although the federal government does not set specific standards for institutional or programmatic accreditation, generally, it does require that institutions be accredited or preaccredited by a recognized accrediting organization to be eligible for Title IV participation. ED's primary role in accreditation is to recognize an accrediting agency as a "reliable authority regarding the quality of education or training offered" at IHEs through the processes and conditions set forth in the HEA and federal regulations. For ED recognition, Section 496 of the HEA specifically requires that an accrediting agency be a state, regional, or national agency that demonstrates the ability to operate as an accrediting agency within the relevant state or region or nationally. Additionally, agencies must meet one of the following criteria: IHE membership with the agency must be voluntary, and one of the primary purposes of the agency must be accreditation of the IHEs. The agency must be a state agency approved by the Secretary as an accrediting agency on or before October 1, 1991. The agency must either conduct accreditation through a voluntary membership of individuals in a profession, or it must have as its primary purpose the accreditation of programs within institutions that have already been accredited by another ED-recognized agency. Agencies that meet the first or third criterion listed above must also be administratively and financially separate and independent of any related trade association or membership organization. For an agency that meets the third criterion and that was ED-recognized on or before October 1, 1991, the Secretary may waive the requirement that the agency be administratively and financially independent of any related organization, but only if the agency can show that the existing relationship with the related organization has not compromised its independence in the accreditation process. All types of accrediting agencies must show that they consistently apply and enforce standards that ensure that the education programs, training, or courses of study offered by an IHE are of sufficient quality to meet the stated objectives for which the programs, training, or courses are offered. The standards used by the accrediting agencies must assess student achievement in relation to the institution's mission; this may include course completion, job placement rates, and passage rates of state licensing exams. Agencies must also consider curricula, faculty, facilities, fiscal and administrative capacity, student support services, and admissions practices. Accrediting agencies must also meet requirements that focus on the review of an institution's operating procedures, including reviewing an institution's policies and procedures for determining credit hours, the application of those policies and procedures to programs and coursework, and reviewing any newly established branch campuses. They must also perform regular on-site visits that focus on the quality of education and program effectiveness. The final component of the program integrity triad is eligibility and certification by ED. Here, ED is responsible for verifying an institution's legal authority to operate within a state and its accreditation status. ED also evaluates an institution's financial responsibility and administrative capability to administer Title IV student aid programs. An institution can be certified to participate in Title IV for up to six years before applying for recertification. ED determines an IHE's financial responsibility based on its ability to provide the services described in its official publications, to administer the Title IV programs in which it participates, and to meet all of its financial obligations. A public IHE is deemed financially responsible if its debts and liabilities are backed by the full faith and credit of the state or another government entity. A proprietary or private nonprofit IHE is financially responsible if it meets specific financial ratios (e.g., equity ratio) established by ED, has sufficient cash reserves to make any required refunds (including the return of Title IV funds), is meeting all of its financial obligations, and is current on its debt payments. Even if an institution meets the above requirements, ED does not consider it financially responsible if the IHE does not meet third-party financial audit requirements or if the IHE violated past performance requirements, such as failing to satisfactorily resolve any compliance issues identified in program reviews or audits. Alternatively, if an institution does not meet the above standards of financial responsibility, ED may still consider it financially responsible or give it provisional certification, under which it may operate for a time, if it qualifies under an alternative standard. These alternative standards include submitting an irrevocable letter of credit to ED that is equal to at least 50% of the Federal Student Aid (FSA) program funds that the IHE received during its most recently completed fiscal year, meeting specific monitoring requirements, or participating in the Title IV programs under provisional certification. Along with demonstrating financial responsibility, an institution must demonstrate its ability to properly administer the Title IV programs in which it participates and to provide the education it describes in public documents (e.g., marketing brochures). Administrative capability focuses on the processes, procedures, and personnel used in administering Title IV funds and indicators of student success. Administrative capability standards address numerous aspects of Title IV administration. For example, to administer Title IV programs an institution must use ED's electronic processes and develop a system to identify and resolve discrepancies in Title IV information received by various institutional offices. The IHE must also refer cases of Title IV student fraud or criminal misconduct to ED's Office of Inspector General for resolution, and it must provide all enrolled and prospective students financial aid counseling. Finally, the IHE must have an adequate internal system of checks and balances that includes dividing the functions of authorizing payments and disbursing funds between two separate offices. Institutions are required to have a capable staff member to administer Title IV programs and coordinate those programs with other aid received by students. This person must also have an adequate number of qualified staff to assist with aid administration. Before receiving Title IV funds, an IHE must certify that neither it nor its employees have been debarred or suspended by a federal agency; similar limitations apply to lenders, loan servicers, and third-party servicers. Relating to indicators of student success, an institution must have satisfactory academic progress (SAP) standards for students receiving Title IV funds. In general, IHEs must develop SAP standards that establish a minimum grade point average (or its equivalent) for students and a maximum time frame in which students must complete their educational programs. A student who fails to meet the SAP requirements becomes ineligible to receive Title IV funds. Also related to student success indicators, an institution that seeks to participate in Title IV programs for the first time may not have an undergraduate withdrawal rate for regular students that is greater than 33% during its most recently completed award year. An institution may be deemed administratively incapable if it has a high cohort default rate (CDR). In general, the CDR is the number of an IHE's federal loan recipients who enter repayment in a given fiscal year (the cohort fiscal year) and who default within a certain period of time after entering repayment (cohort default period; CDP), divided by the total number of borrowers who entered repayment in the cohort fiscal year. Since 2014, ED has used a three-year CDP in calculating an institution's CDR. An IHE will be found administratively incapable if one of the following conditions is met: 1. an institution's CDR is greater than 40% in one year for loans made under the FFEL and Direct Loans programs; 2. an institution's CDR is 30% or greater for each of the three most recent fiscal years for loans made under the FFEL and Direct Loans programs; or 3. an institution's CDR is 15% or greater in any single year for loans made under the Federal Perkins Loan Program. When an IHE is determined to be administratively incapable due to a high CDR, it may become ineligible to participate in the Direct Loan, Pell Grant, and/or Perkins Loan programs (but not other Title IV programs). ED may grant provisional certification for up to three years to an institution that would be deemed administratively capable except for its high cohort default rates. If an institution is seeking initial certification, ED can grant it up to one year of provisional certification. ED can also grant an institution provisional certification for up to three years if ED is determining the IHE's administrative capacity and financial responsibility for the first time, if the IHE has experienced a partial or total change in ownership, or if ED determines that the administrative or financial condition of the IHE may hinder its ability to meet its financial responsibilities. Additionally, if an accrediting agency loses its ED recognition, any institution that was accredited by that agency may continue to participate in Title IV programs for up to 18 months after ED's withdrawal of recognition. To ensure that an institution is conforming to eligibility requirements, ED can conduct program reviews. During a program review, ED evaluates an institution's compliance with Title IV requirements and identifies actions the IHE must take to correct any problem(s). Review priority is given to those institutions with high cohort default rates; IHEs with significant fluctuations in Pell Grant awards or Direct Loan volume that are not accounted for by changes in programs offered; IHEs that are reported to have deficiencies or financial aid problems by their state or accrediting agency; IHEs with high annual dropout rates; and IHEs determined by ED to pose a significant risk of failing to comply with the administrative capability or financial responsibility requirements. If, during a review, ED determines that an institution is not administratively capable or financially responsible or is violating Title IV program rules, ED may grant it provisional certification, take corrective actions, or impose sanctions. ED has the authority to impose a variety of sanctions and corrective actions on an institution that violates Title IV program rules, a Program Participation Agreement (discussed later in this report) or any other agreement made under the laws or regulations, or if it substantially misrepresents the nature of its educational programs, financial charges, or graduates' employability. Sanctions include fines, limitations, suspensions, emergency actions, and terminations. ED can also sanction third-party servicers performing tasks related to the institution's Title IV programs. ED may impose several types of sanctions on institutions for statutory and regulatory violations, including fines, limitations, and suspensions. ED can fine an institution up to $55,907 for each statutory or regulatory violation it commits, depending on the size of the IHE and the seriousness of the violation. Under a limitation, ED imposes specific conditions or restrictions on an institution related to its administration of Title IV funds. A limitation lasts for at least 12 months, and if an institution fails to abide by the limitation, ED may initiate a termination proceeding. Finally, under a suspension, an institution is not allowed to participate in Title IV programs for up to 60 days. Each of these sanctions may require an institution to take corrective actions as well, which may include repaying illegally used funds or making payments to eligible students from the IHE's own funds. ED can take emergency action to withhold Title IV funds from an institution if it receives reliable information that an IHE is violating applicable laws or regulations, agreements, or limitations. ED must determine that the institution is misusing federal funds, that immediate action is necessary to stop misuses, and that the potential losses outweigh the importance of using established procedures for limitation, suspension, or termination. An emergency action suspends an institution's participation in Title IV programs and prohibits it from disbursing such funds. Typically, the emergency action may not last more than 30 days. The final action ED can take is the termination of an institution's participation in Title IV programs. Generally, an institution that has had its participation terminated cannot reapply to be reinstated for at least 18 months. To request reinstatement, an institution must submit a fully completed application to ED and demonstrate that it has corrected the violation(s) for which its participation was terminated. ED may then approve, approve subject to limitations, or deny the institution's request. Several other requirements affect institutional eligibility for Title IV programs. Some of these requirements include institution Program Participation Agreements, which include provisions related to incentive compensation and campus crime reporting requirements; return of Title IV funds; and distance education. The failure to meet the requirements for any of these may result in the loss of Title IV eligibility or other sanctions. HEA Section 487 specifies that each institution wanting to participate in Title IV student aid programs is required to have a current Program Participation Agreement (PPA). A PPA is a document in which the institution agrees to comply with the laws, regulations, and policies applicable to the Title IV programs; it applies to an IHE's branch campuses and locations that meet Title IV requirements, as well as its main campus. It also lists all of the Title IV programs in which the IHE is eligible to participate, the date on which the PPA expires, and the date on which the IHE must reapply for participation. By signing a PPA, an institution agrees that it will act as a fiduciary responsible for properly administering Title IV funds, will not charge students a processing fee to determine a student's eligibility for such funds, and will establish and maintain administrative and fiscal procedures to ensure the proper administration of Title IV programs. The PPA reiterates many provisions required for institutional eligibility and ED certification discussed earlier in this report and contains several additional notable requirements that may affect an IHE's Title IV eligibility, which are described below. Along with the general participation requirements with which an institution must comply, a PPA may also contain institution-specific requirements. As part of their PPAs, domestic and foreign proprietary IHEs must agree to derive at least 10% of their revenue from non-Title IV funds (i.e., no more than 90% of their revenue can come from Title IV funds). This is known as the 90/10 rule. Examples of non-Title IV funds include private education loans and some military and veterans' benefits, such as benefits provided under the Post-9/11 GI Bill program. If an IHE violates the 90/10 rule in one year, it does not immediately lose its Title IV eligibility. Rather, it is placed on a provisional eligibility status for two years. If the IHE violates the 90/10 rule for two consecutive years, it loses its eligibility for at least two years. In a PPA, an IHE must agree it will not provide any commission or incentive compensation to individuals based directly or indirectly on their success in enrolling students or the enrolled students' obtaining financial aid; however, some exceptions apply to this general rule. For instance, IHEs can provide incentive compensation to individuals for the recruitment of foreign students who are ineligible to receive Title IV funds or they can provide incentive compensation through a profit-sharing plan. The ban on incentive compensation only applies to the activities of securing enrollment (recruitment) and securing financial aid. Other activities are not banned, and ED draws a distinction between activities that involve directly working with individual students and policy-level determinations that affect recruitment and financial aid awards. For instance, an individual who is responsible for contacting potential student applicants or assisting students in filling out an enrollment application cannot receive incentive compensation, but an individual who conducts marketing activities, such as the broad dissemination of informational brochures or the collection of contact information, can receive incentive compensation. HEA Section 485(f), referred to as the Clery Act, requires domestic Title IV participating IHEs (1) to report to ED campus crime statistics and (2) establish and disseminate campus safety and security policies. Both the campus crime statistics and campus safety and security policies must be compiled and disseminated to current and prospective students and employees in an IHE's annual security report (ASR). Campus crime statistics required to be reported to ED and included in an ASR include data on the occurrence on campus of a range of offenses specified in statute, including murder, burglary, robbery, domestic violence, rape, and other forms of sexual violence. In addition to campus crime statistics, ASRs must include statements of campus safety and security policies regarding, for example, procedures and facilities for students and others to report criminal actions or other emergencies occurring on campus and an IHE's response to such reports; security and access to campus facilities; campus law enforcement, including the law enforcement authority of campus security personnel, and the working relationship between campus security personnel and state and local law enforcement; programs designed to inform students and employees about the prevention of crimes; and the possession, use, and sale of alcoholic beverages and illegal drugs; enforcement of state underage drinking laws; enforcement of federal and state drug laws; and any drug or alcohol abuse education programs required under the HEA. An ASR must also include statements of policies specifically relating to incidence of domestic and sexual violence. For example, an ASR must include statements of policy regarding programs to prevent such incidents; procedures a victim should follow if such an incident as occurred; procedures an IHE will follow once such an incident has been reported and procedures for institutional disciplinary actions in cases of alleged incidents (including a statement of the standard of evidence that will be used in any school proceeding arising from the incident report); and possible sanctions and protective measures that an IHE may impose following a final determination in an institutional proceeding regarding such incidences. The Clery Act prohibits the Secretary of Education from requiring IHEs to adopt particular policies, procedures, or practices; and prohibits retaliation against anyone exercising his or her rights or responsibilities under the act. HEA Section 484B specifies that when a Title IV aid recipient withdraws from an IHE before the end of the payment or enrollment period for which funds were disbursed, Title IV funds must be returned to ED according to a statutorily prescribed schedule. In general, when a student withdraws from an IHE, an IHE first determines the portion of Title IV aid considered to be "earned" by the student while enrolled and the portion considered to be "unearned." Unearned aid must be returned to ED. Up to the 60% point of a payment or enrollment period, unearned funds must be returned on a pro rata schedule. After the 60% point of a payment or enrollment period, the total amount of funds awarded is considered to have been earned by the student and no funds are required to be returned. Whether an IHE and/or the student is required to return the funds to ED depends on a variety of circumstances, including whether Title IV funds have been applied directly to a student's institutional charges. Unearned funds must be returned to their respective programs in a specified order, with loans being returned first, followed by Pell Grants, and then other Title IV aid. In some instances, a student may have earned more aid than has been disbursed, and the difference is disbursed to the student after the student withdraws. Generally, distance education and correspondence education refers to educational instruction with a separation in time, place, or both between the student and instructor. It is a way in which institutions can increase student access to postsecondary education by offering alternatives to traditional on-campus instruction. Recently, due to the greater availability of new technologies, there has been substantial growth in the amount and types of courses institutions offer. Section 103(7)(A) and (B) of the HEA and the accompanying regulations define distance education as instruction that uses "(1) the internet; (2) one-way and two-way transmissions through open broadcast, closed circuit, cable, microwave, broadband lines, fiber optics, satellite, or wireless communications devices; [or] ... (3) audio conferencing" to deliver instruction to students separated from the instructor. A course taught through a video cassette, DVD, or CD-ROM is considered a distance education course if one of the above-mentioned technologies is used to support student-instructor interaction. Regardless of the technology used, "regular and substantive interaction between the students and the instructor" must be ensured. Correspondence courses are expressly excluded from the definition of distance education. A correspondence course is one for which an institution provides instructional materials and exams for students who do not physically attend classes at the IHE, but does not include those courses that are delivered with "regular and substantive interaction between the students and the instructor" via one of the above-described technologies. In 1992, partially in response to cases of some correspondence institutions' fraudulent and abusive practices used to attract unqualified students to enroll in programs of poor or questionable quality, Congress incorporated provisions referred to as the "50% rules" into the HEA. The rules affected both the eligibility of institutions offering correspondence courses and their students' eligibility for Title IV aid. In general, under the rules, an institution is ineligible for Title IV aid if more than 50% of its courses are offered by correspondence, or if 50% or more of its students are enrolled in correspondence courses. As discussed earlier in this report, rules promulgated in 2016 would have required an IHE offering postsecondary distance or correspondence education in a state in which it is not physically located to meet any state authorization requirements within that state. Under the regulations, an IHE could meet this requirement if it participates in a state authorization reciprocity agreement. These regulations were scheduled to become effective July 1, 2018. However, on July 3, 2018 (and effective June 29, 2018), the Secretary of Education issued a final rule delaying the implementation of these requirements until July 1, 2020. The distinction between distance education and traditional instruction is also important for the purposes of Title IV program eligibility. Distance education programs provided by domestic IHEs are eligible for Title IV participation if they have been accredited by an accrediting agency recognized by ED to evaluate distance education programs. A program offered by a foreign IHE, in whole or in part, through distance education (including telecommunications) or correspondence is ineligible for Title IV participation.	[ "Title IV of the Higher Education Act (HEA) authorizes programs that provide financial assistance to students to assist them in obtaining a postsecondary education at certain institutions of higher education (IHEs). These IHEs include public, private nonprofit, and proprietary institutions. For students attending such institutions to be able to receive Title IV assistance, an institution must meet basic criteria, including offering at least one eligible program of education (e.g., programs leading to a degree or preparing a student for gainful employment in a recognized occupation). In addition, an IHE must satisfy the program integrity triad, under which it must be licensed or otherwise legally authorized to operate in the state in which it is physically located, accredited or preaccredited by an agency recognized for that purpose by the Department of Education (ED), and certified by ED as eligible to participate in Title IV programs. These requirements are intended to provide a balance between consumer protection, quality assurance, and oversight and compliance in postsecondary education providers participating in Title IV student aid programs. An IHE must also fulfill a variety of other related requirements, including those that relate to institutional recruiting practices, student policies and procedures, and the administration of the Title IV student aid programs. Finally, additional criteria may apply to an institution depending on its control or the type of educational programs it offers. For example, proprietary institutions must meet HEA requirements that are otherwise inapplicable to public and private nonprofit institutions, including deriving at least 10% of their revenues from non-Title IV funds (also known as the 90/10 rule). While an institution is ineligible to participate in Title IV programs if more than 50% of its courses are offered by correspondence or if 50% or more of its students are enrolled in correspondence courses. This report first describes the types of institutions eligible to participate in Title IV programs and discusses the program integrity triad. It then discusses additional issues related to institutional eligibility, including program participations agreements, required campus safety policies and crime reporting, and distance and correspondence education." ]	8,147	gov_report	en	null	6de6104b947ecf7c0278c210270d494ed8eb0ee3cd0f3170
This section provides an overview of FMD, as well as information on the potential impact of an outbreak in the United States; USDA activities to respond to outbreaks of diseases, including FMD; federal, state, tribal, and industry roles in FMD control; and FMD vaccines. FMD is a highly contagious viral disease that causes fever and painful lesions on cloven-hoofed animals’ hooves, mouths, and udders (see fig. 1). These debilitating effects, rather than high mortality rates, are responsible for severe productivity losses associated with FMD. The disease generally does not infect humans and is not considered a public health or food safety threat. Young animals may die from the virus, while most adult animals recover. However, livestock infected with FMD have severely diminished meat and milk production. FMD virus can be found in all secretions and excretions from infected animals, including in breath, saliva, milk, urine, feces, and semen, as well as in the fluid from the lesions. Animals can release the virus for up to 4 days before showing visible signs of infection, and FMD can spread from one animal species to another. The virus itself can survive in the environment for many months and can spread when healthy animals come into contact with infected animals or via contaminated vehicles, equipment, clothes, feed, or animal products, as shown in figure 2. The United States has not had an FMD outbreak since 1929, but the disease could be introduced here from countries in Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, or South America where it is present. The United States is vulnerable to FMD transmission, given the large size and mobility of the U.S. livestock sector. In 2018, the United States had about 94 million head of cattle, 74 million swine, 5 million sheep, and more than 2 million goats. Many of these livestock are concentrated in major livestock- producing states such as Texas and Iowa, but livestock are present in every state. (See figs. 3 and 4 for the populations of cattle and swine by state.) According to USDA documents, a large percentage of livestock in the United States are kept on large farms, ranches, or feedlots (i.e., areas or buildings where livestock are fed and fattened up), some with capacity for 50,000 to 100,000 or more animals. Livestock are transported daily to feeding facilities, markets, slaughter plants, and other farms or ranches. For example, swine are often moved among multiple premises at different stages of their life spans to accommodate their growth in size, among other things. According to the swine industry, approximately 1 million swine are on the road every day in transit to various stages of the production process. An FMD outbreak in the United States could have serious economic consequences. A 2001 outbreak of FMD in the United Kingdom, for example, resulted in the killing of more than 6 million animals, with direct costs of more than $3 billion to the public sector and more than $5 billion to the private sector. The extent of economic damage in the United States would depend primarily on the duration and geographic extent of the outbreak, the extent of trade disruptions, and how consumers reacted to the disease and associated control measures, according to USDA. In a large and long-lasting outbreak, control measures such as killing animals and halting the transportation of animals could cause significant losses for livestock operations. In addition, trade disruptions could have an enormous impact because U.S. exports of livestock, meat, and dairy products—together valued at more than $19 billion in 2017 based on estimates from the U.S. Meat Export Federation and the U.S. Dairy Export Council—would likely stop or be sharply reduced. In addition, domestic consumers might be reluctant to purchase meat and animal products such as milk during an FMD outbreak, even though the products would be safe for people to consume, according to USDA. Partly to protect the economic interests of the U.S. livestock industry, the Animal Health Protection Act authorizes USDA to detect, control, and eradicate diseases in livestock. USDA’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) is the lead agency for responding to outbreaks of foreign animal diseases, including FMD. According to APHIS, in responding to an outbreak of FMD or any foreign animal disease, APHIS, in coordination with state and industry partners, would conduct the following activities, among others: Surveillance. Observing animals for visible signs of disease and analyzing data on locations and numbers of disease cases to detect premises with the disease, determine the size and extent of an outbreak, and determine whether outbreak control measures are working. Epidemiologic tracing. Gathering and analyzing data on cases of a disease, premises with such cases, movement of infected animals, and their potential contact with uninfected animals to locate other animals or premises with the disease, understand the outbreak’s rate and direction of spread, and investigate the source of the outbreak. Diagnostic testing. Conducting approved and validated assessments of samples taken from animals to identify infected animals or to demonstrate that healthy animals are free of disease. Applying quarantines and stop-movement orders. Restricting the movement of infected or potentially infected animals, animal products, and contaminated items to prevent the virus from spreading to healthy animals. Biosecurity Biosecurity measures, which help minimize disease spread, include the following: placing signs indicating precautions personnel and visitors must follow; establishing sign-in procedures at entry points; removing dirt from boots and disinfecting them prior to entering a facility; using disposable personal protective equipment, such as Tyvek suits, gloves, masks, and boots, when entering premises; disposing of contaminated items properly; designating “clean” and “dirty” storage areas in vehicles; and controlling movement on and off premises. Employing biosecurity measures. Taking steps, such as cleaning and disinfecting trucks that travel between premises, to contain the virus on infected premises and prevent it from spreading via objects or equipment that can carry infection. Stamping out and vaccination. Killing infected animals and vaccinating uninfected animals—for example in buffer zones around infected premises—to limit the spread of the virus. Compensating owners. Paying owners fair market value for animals and equipment that the government determines must be destroyed to limit disease spread. To help prepare for a potential FMD outbreak, APHIS and its partners conduct preparedness exercises in which officials practice responding to simulated FMD outbreaks. Such exercises range from small-scale, narrowly scoped exercises to full-scale, broadly scoped exercises. For example, some exercises focus on specific response tasks such as electronic messaging between laboratories or shipping response supplies to the field, and involve relatively few people for less than a day. Other exercises simulate a wide range of response activities that APHIS and its partners would use in an FMD outbreak, involve dozens of people from different agencies and industry organizations in locations across the country, and last for multiple days. Multiple units within APHIS carry out these preparedness and response activities at the agency’s headquarters in Maryland; field offices in 27 states and Puerto Rico; and the National Veterinary Services Laboratories in Ames, Iowa, and on Plum Island, New York. APHIS’s Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory on Plum Island, New York, develops and performs diagnostic tests for foreign animal diseases, including FMD. APHIS also works with federal agencies within and outside of USDA, along with states, tribes, and academic and industry partners—all of which have roles related to FMD control, as discussed below. USDA’s Food Safety and Inspection Service is responsible for the safety of meat, poultry, and egg products. Agency officials assigned to slaughter establishments examine animals before processing to look for visible symptoms of FMD, among other things. USDA’s Agricultural Research Service conducts research on agricultural problems of high national priority, including the FMD virus and FMD vaccine. USDA’s National Institute of Food and Agriculture invests in and conducts agricultural research, education, and extension to help solve national challenges in agriculture, food, the environment, and communities. The agency has funded modeling of FMD spread and research on potential economic impacts. DHS has funded research on FMD vaccine and development of response decisions tools, training, and equipment; sponsored preparedness exercises; and developed emergency plans, among other things. In an FMD outbreak, DHS may assume the lead for coordination of federal resources if the Secretary of Agriculture requests assistance from DHS. The Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the Secretaries of Agriculture, Health and Human Services, the Attorney General, and the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, is to ensure that the combined federal, state, and local response capabilities are adequate to respond quickly and effectively to a major disease outbreak, among other things, affecting the national agriculture or food infrastructure. The Department of the Interior carries out disease surveillance of wild animals and coordinates surveillance activities with state fish and wildlife agencies, among other things. The Department of the Interior’s U.S. Geological Service conducts research on wildlife diseases, including FMD, and if needed in an FMD outbreak, would administer diagnostic tests for wildlife. The Federal Bureau of Investigation coordinates the federal investigation of criminal activities through the Joint Terrorism Task Force. If animals, livestock, or poultry are suspected targets of a terrorist attack, or if any evidence suggests a foreign animal disease may have been or could be intentionally introduced, USDA notifies the Federal Bureau of Investigation to investigate. State governments prepare plans for foreign animal diseases, including FMD; conduct preparedness exercises; and would play a key role in a response effort. In an FMD outbreak, a state animal health official and an APHIS field official would co-lead initial response efforts. For example, state governments might take immediate actions, such as applying quarantines and stop-movement orders. Tribal governments, like state governments, would play a key role in initial response efforts and conduct activities similar to those of state governments. The National Animal Health Laboratory Network is a partnership of 59 federal, state, and university-associated animal health laboratories throughout the United States, of which 45 are approved to administer diagnostic tests for FMD. Livestock industry organizations support communication and education efforts with their members and the public, participate in FMD preparedness exercises, and have helped develop some FMD planning documents. As part of its response to an FMD outbreak, APHIS may access vaccine through the North American Foot-and-Mouth Disease Vaccine Bank (vaccine bank), which is jointly administered by the United States, Mexico, and Canada. Because finished vaccines have a short shelf life, the vaccine bank manages a supply of vaccine concentrate, which can be stored at extremely cold temperatures for about 5 years. Some of the concentrate is stored at the Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory on Plum Island, New York, and some at the manufacturer’s facilities in Lyon, France. During an FMD outbreak, the manufacturer would convert the concentrate into finished vaccine and ship it to the United States. For the concentrate stored in the United States, the vaccine bank would need to first ship it to the manufacturer overseas. APHIS’s National Veterinary Stockpile coordinates logistics planning, particularly for catastrophic outbreaks, and would be responsible for delivering the finished vaccine to affected states, according to USDA planning documents. The FMD virus has seven distinct variations, or serotypes, and more than 60 subtypes within the serotypes, according to USDA documents. FMD vaccine should be as closely matched to the outbreak subtype as possible to provide more effective protection, according to USDA officials and a document on FMD vaccination. A vaccine for one FMD subtype may also provide good or partial immunity to other closely related subtypes, but it would not generally protect against other serotypes. The vaccine bank has concentrate for a number of FMD subtypes that pose the greatest risk to North American livestock based on recommendations from the World Reference Laboratory for FMD. We have previously reported on APHIS’s management of foreign animal diseases, including FMD. For example, in May 2015, we recommended that USDA assess and address its veterinarian workforce needs for emergency response to an outbreak of an animal disease such as FMD. USDA agreed, in part, with the recommendation, and in 2017 hired additional veterinarians. The agency is currently building a model to develop workforce estimates for a large-scale FMD outbreak, according to agency officials. USDA’s planned approach for responding to an FMD outbreak relies on several different strategies emphasizing stamping out, vaccination, or both, depending on factors such as the size of the outbreak. To aid agency officials in implementing the strategies, USDA has developed overarching guidance for responding to animal disease outbreaks and detailed procedures for many response activities. USDA’s APHIS has developed several different, but not mutually exclusive, outbreak response strategies that the agency will consider to control and eradicate FMD in an outbreak as part of its planned approach, according to USDA documents and officials. These strategies rely on stamping out—killing and disposing of—infected and susceptible animals, vaccination of uninfected animals, or both. For strategies involving vaccination, options include killing and disposing of vaccinated animals (vaccinate-to-kill), allowing the animals to be slaughtered and their meat processed (vaccinate-to-slaughter), or allowing the animals to live out their useful lifespan (vaccinate-to-live). Response strategies would likely change as an outbreak unfolds, and might also vary by region or type of animal affected, according to APHIS planning documents. Over time, USDA’s FMD planned approach has evolved from relying solely on stamping out to including vaccination strategies as it became apparent that in many potential scenarios, reliance on stamping out alone would not be effective or feasible. Specifically, in 2010, USDA’s Foot-and- Mouth Disease Response Plan: The Red Book (Red Book) first stated that APHIS would consider vaccination strategies such as vaccinate-to- slaughter and vaccinate-to-live. In 2014 APHIS updated the Red Book with the addition of a vaccinate-to-kill strategy to better distinguish what would happen to animals if they were not eligible for slaughter. By 2016, USDA had determined that complete stamping out of anything beyond a small FMD outbreak was not a viable, effective, or sustainable response strategy for the United States, according to USDA’s FMD vaccination policy. Experiences in preparedness exercises and foreign outbreaks of FMD influenced a shift in USDA’s planned approach toward vaccination strategies. In 2010, Japan and South Korea both experienced FMD outbreaks and initially relied on stamping out combined with strict movement restrictions. Japan stamped out about 300,000 cattle and swine, and South Korea stamped out about 150,000 cattle and 3 million swine—a third of the country’s total swine population. Despite these efforts, FMD continued to spread in both countries until they implemented vaccination strategies, according to USDA documents. A 2007 FMD preparedness exercise, sponsored by the Texas Animal Health Commission and USDA, found that killing and disposing of infected animals in a livestock-dense area like the Texas panhandle would not be feasible in a timely manner because of the large number of animals on infected premises (e.g., 50,000 to 75,000 head of cattle on large cattle feedlots). USDA learned that having vaccination strategies in place would be necessary to effectively respond to an FMD outbreak. If an FMD outbreak occurred, APHIS would select a response strategy or multiple strategies, or it would modify strategies to achieve its FMD response goals based on the unique circumstances of the outbreak, according to agency planning documents. APHIS would do so in consultation with affected states and tribes, and if the agency chose to use vaccine, states would request it from USDA. According to agency planning documents we reviewed, APHIS would consider a number of factors when deciding on its approach, including the following: FMD vaccine availability; consequences of the outbreak (e.g., trade restrictions or loss of valuable genetic stock); public acceptance of response strategy or strategies; scale of the outbreak (i.e., number and size of infected premises); rate of outbreak spread; location of initial outbreak (e.g., isolated ranch versus livestock- producing area); movement of animals (number of locations that infected or potentially infected animals have traveled to or through); and federal and state resources available to implement response strategies. Resource needs vary among strategies and generally increase with the scale of an outbreak, according to USDA planning documents. Having the necessary resources available to implement a stamping-out response strategy would include having qualified personnel to kill animals in accordance with accepted protocols and having appropriate disposal facilities. To implement strategies involving vaccination, APHIS would need a sufficient quantity of vaccine, the resources for distributing and administering the vaccine, and the diagnostic tests necessary to distinguish between vaccinated and infected animals, according to USDA’s FMD vaccination policy. If the scale of an outbreak were small, and APHIS had access to sufficient resources, agency officials would likely implement a stamping-out strategy in an attempt to quickly stop the production of virus in infected animals and limit the outbreak’s spread, according to agency planning documents. However, these planning documents indicate that if the outbreak grew to a moderate regional, large regional, national, or catastrophic scale, the resources required for killing all infected and potentially infected animals, disposing of carcasses, and paying compensation to livestock owners would quickly multiply, and APHIS policy calls for strategies focused on vaccination, according to USDA documents. Over time, USDA’s APHIS has developed various documents to guide its response to FMD, including overarching guidance for responding to FMD and other foreign animal diseases, procedures with in-depth operational details, and plans to secure the nation’s food supply. To aid agency officials in implementing FMD response strategies broadly, APHIS has developed FMD response plans and guidance for responding to foreign animal disease outbreaks more generally. For example, the Red Book describes USDA’s FMD response strategies; identifies the capabilities needed to respond to an FMD outbreak; and provides guidance on the critical activities required during the response, including time frames for these activities. The Red Book is intended for responders at all levels of government and industry partners. For example, if a state official or a livestock owner wanted to know the steps to test and confirm a positive case of FMD, the Red Book explains the process and has a flowchart to illustrate the steps. APHIS also has developed response manuals that provide guidance relevant to foreign animal disease outbreaks, including FMD. For example, a manual on roles and coordination provides an overview of USDA’s framework for incident management, funding, communication strategies, relationships, and authorities during a foreign animal disease outbreak, including an FMD outbreak. APHIS also has produced ready reference guides that condense guidance material from these broader documents into short summary documents for training and education purposes. In addition, APHIS has developed standard operating procedures (SOP) for many response activities. Some SOPs are specific to an FMD outbreak, and others provide more general instruction on activities to respond to foreign animal diseases. The FMD biosecurity SOP, for example, describes steps responders at all levels of government and industry partners can take to help prevent the spread of the virus, such as protocols for putting on and taking off personal protective equipment (e.g., coverall suits, boots, and gloves); standards for separating “clean” and “dirty” zones in vehicles and on premises; and instructions for cleaning and disinfecting vehicles before arrival at and after departure from different premises. Many of the more general SOPs have proven useful during outbreaks of other animal diseases and exercises simulating FMD outbreaks, according to APHIS and state government officials, and APHIS has revised them to incorporate lessons learned. For example, one state animal health official said that during the 2014 avian influenza outbreak, the SOP for disposing of poultry carcasses through composting was initially insufficient because the poultry industry had not previously been composting in all states. To improve consistency across states, APHIS updated protocols during the outbreak and created composting protocols for avian influenza-infected flocks and livestock to supplement the agency’s disposal SOP, which addresses carcass disposal for foreign animal diseases generally. These composting protocols expanded on and clarified guidance to be used in subsequent outbreaks. In addition, APHIS held training on composting procedures for birds and on large animal composting, which could be part of an FMD response. USDA, in coordination with industry, state, federal, and academic representatives, has also developed supply plans to secure the nation’s food supply and keep businesses operating during an FMD outbreak while managing the risk of spreading the virus, which would decrease the economic impact of an outbreak. To date, USDA and its industry and university partners have developed Secure Milk Supply and Secure Pork Supply plans and have partially completed a Secure Beef Supply plan. These plans guide industry on managing uninfected premises and uninfected animals during an FMD or other foreign animal disease outbreak. For example, the Secure Milk Supply plan has guidance on what producers can do to continue moving shipments of milk during an outbreak, including how to implement enhanced biosecurity plans to prevent the spread of FMD to their facilities. The sheep industry is currently developing its own secure food and wool supply plan, according to industry representatives. USDA would likely face significant challenges in pursuing its FMD response goals of detecting, controlling, and containing FMD as quickly as possible; eradicating FMD using strategies that seek to stabilize animal agriculture industries and the economy; and facilitating continuity of commerce in uninfected animals. We identified 11 challenge areas, based on our review of USDA documents, interviews with agency officials and others with expertise with FMD, and 29 responses to our questionnaire. A majority of respondents indicated that in 10 of the 11 areas USDA would face challenges that are significant—that is, important enough to be worthy of USDA action. (See app. I, fig. 7, for a summary of the responses.) For the 11th area, which is communication and coordination, opinions were split on whether the area would present significant challenges. The 11 challenge areas, which sometimes overlap or fall outside of USDA’s direct control, are described below. Examples of actions USDA is taking to address these challenges are described later in this report. USDA would likely face surveillance challenges that could delay detection of the first cases in an FMD outbreak. A majority (22 of 29) of respondents to our questionnaire indicated that USDA would face significant challenges in this area. FMD can spread without detection for the following reasons: there is no active surveillance for FMD, animals may not have visible signs until up to 4 days after becoming signs can be difficult to notice in some species, and infected wild animals could go undetected and spread the virus. For initial detection of an FMD outbreak, USDA relies on passive surveillance, waiting for producers or veterinarians to notice and report visible signs. In contrast, for initial detection of other diseases, such as bovine spongiform encephalopathy (commonly known as mad cow disease), USDA has active surveillance programs in which animals are routinely tested regardless of visible signs. According to USDA officials, the cost and resources required to conduct active surveillance for initial detection of an FMD outbreak would not be justified because the United States has not had an FMD outbreak for decades and there is a risk that false positives could create unnecessary disruptions. However, the officials said the agency would likely use active surveillance during an outbreak. Passive surveillance, however, may not allow for timely detection of the initial cases of FMD, particularly in sheep. FMD infection in sheep often causes only mild signs or symptoms, such as an elevated temperature or loose stool, and in some cases will not cause any overt signs or symptoms at all, even though the animal may be spreading the virus, according to representatives of the sheep industry. Therefore, an FMD outbreak could become widespread before USDA detects the first cases. Even if responders are able to detect FMD in domesticated animals before an outbreak becomes widespread, wild animals may become infected and spread the virus, posing additional challenges for USDA and its partners. For example, the U.S. population of feral swine, which are susceptible to FMD, is estimated at 6 million and is rapidly expanding, according to APHIS. Detecting and controlling infected wild animals could be extremely difficult, according to agency officials, and if not controlled, these populations could serve as carriers for the disease. In addition, limitations in diagnostic capabilities, discussed below, could hamper the availability of data needed for surveillance, such as accurate information on new cases of FMD. USDA would likely face challenges related to its capability to diagnose FMD. Such challenges include the lack of validated population-level diagnostic tests and potentially insufficient resources to collect samples and perform diagnostic testing in a large outbreak. A majority (24 of 29) of respondents to our questionnaire indicated that USDA would face significant challenges in this area. Currently, during an FMD outbreak, USDA would rely on individual animal testing, given that it has not validated any diagnostic tests that can be used for a group or population of animals, according to USDA’s surveillance SOP. If an FMD outbreak expands, the ability to test a large number of animals quickly with minimal resources would be useful for USDA. In a 2017 study of the potential uses of a bulk milk test for FMD in dairy cattle, for example, USDA found that 720 bulk milk tests could replace over 35,000 individual animal tests with the same level of confidence in disease status. However, the study identifies additional work needed to implement bulk milk tests. USDA and state officials investigate suspected cases of FMD on previously uninfected premises, according to USDA documents. To do so, USDA or state officials travel to the suspected premises—sometimes over long distances—collect samples from the animal or animals, and send them to a qualified laboratory for diagnostic testing. During an outbreak, massive quantities of diagnostic testing may need to be conducted, straining the capacity of federal and state laboratories that are qualified to investigate suspected cases of FMD, and potentially causing delays in detecting infected premises, according to both an after-action report for a preparedness exercise and agency officials. In addition, USDA officials we interviewed expressed concern that diagnostic kits used for these individual animal tests would be in short supply during an outbreak and said that they do not currently know how much time it would take for manufacturers to produce more. In the event of a large FMD outbreak, delays in getting diagnostic results could slow USDAs ability to detect, control, and contain an outbreak. USDA would likely face challenges in the area of information management during an outbreak, including incompatible data systems at the state and federal levels or between diagnostic laboratories and USDA and responders who lack familiarity with USDA data systems. A majority (20 of 29) of respondents to our questionnaire indicated that USDA would face significant challenges in this area. USDA and state data systems track information on registered livestock premises and animals. In addition, USDA has an emergency response database for collecting and analyzing data on disease outbreaks and managing response resources. However, state data systems cannot always communicate directly with USDA’s data systems because they use different software, according to two state animal health officials. Such impediments to communication could delay information sharing about the location of infected and susceptible animals. One industry representative said that such delays could prolong decisions about permits for uninfected animals to move, disrupting industries’ continuity of business. According to an academic researcher, interruptions in movement of animals could cause processing facilities to either close, operate at a diminished capacity, or be overwhelmed by a backlog of animals once movement is restarted, leading to animal welfare concerns. These disruptions could present challenges for USDA to facilitate continuity of commerce in uninfected animals, one of its response goals. USDA’s ability to control an outbreak could also be impaired if responders lack familiarity with USDA data systems. For example, according to a USDA after-action report, during the 2014 avian influenza outbreak, some responders were unfamiliar with USDA’s system for entering outbreak response information, resulting in incorrect usage or underutilization of the system. As a result, USDA’s overall response was slower than it would have been if timely information had been available. USDA would likely face challenges related to the traceability of animals (i.e., the ability to trace their locations and movements) after an outbreak was detected. We found that these challenges result from insufficient use of identification numbers for livestock premises (such as farms and ranches) and individual animals to enable tracing of infected, exposed, and susceptible animals, and from identification numbers that cannot be easily read (e.g., because they are not electronic). A majority (25 of 29) of respondents to our questionnaire indicated that USDA would face significant challenges in this area. In an outbreak, responders would use premises and animal identification numbers, if available, to trace the location and movements of infected animals to identify other animals that may have been exposed. They would also use the identification numbers to locate all susceptible animals in the region, in order to notify owners about the outbreak and any response measures in place, such as stop- movement orders. These activities would be hampered without the identification numbers. For example, Iowa and Texas regulations do not require producers to register all of their animals with the state. Also, record keeping varies at individual farms and ranches, where some producers have electronic records, but others have no written records or rely on hand-written paper documents, according to USDA documents. Searching through records by hand at individual farms could take days rather than the hours that it would take if the records were electronic, according to a USDA planning document. Without timely and accurate tracing through the use of premises and animal identification numbers, USDA may face challenges controlling and containing an FMD outbreak and facilitating continuity of commerce in uninfected animals. In addition, some animals have identification numbers on ear tags that must be read visually, which could slow USDA’s efforts to control and contain an outbreak. In an outbreak, responders would need to inspect animals with such ear tags to manually read and record the identification numbers for individual animals. In contrast, for animals with electronic tags, responders could use electronic readers, which can accurately read identification numbers for a group of animals from a distance of up to 12 feet, according to a 2016 USDA study on electronic identification for livestock. One industry representative said that the beef cattle industry has not widely implemented electronic identification because it is difficult for many operators to justify the added cost of purchasing and attaching an electronic tag for each animal. In an FMD outbreak, USDA would likely face biosecurity challenges including lack of sufficient biosecurity on some premises, difficulty in implementing biosecurity measures for certain species, and lack of documentation (such as a written plan) specifying what measures are currently in place. A majority (20 of 29) of respondents to our questionnaire indicated that USDA would face significant challenges in this area. If sufficient biosecurity measures are not consistently in place on farms, ranches, and feedlots, people and vehicles may inadvertently spread the FMD virus when they travel among premises, impeding USDA’s ability to control and contain an outbreak. For example during the 2001 FMD outbreak in the United Kingdom, poor biosecurity and livestock owners’ movements between scattered farms led to the introduction of FMD in previously uninfected areas, according to a 2002 report by the United Kingdom’s National Audit Office. Some livestock owners have not implemented extensive biosecurity measures on their premises, in part because they have not experienced a recent animal disease outbreak and measures may be difficult or expensive to implement, according to an industry representative. In addition, it may be difficult to implement biosecurity measures for certain species. For example, cattle feedlots operate outdoors and may have unrestricted points of entry and exit, so it can be more difficult and costly to control access and implement other biosecurity measures. In addition, even if producers have biosecurity measures in place, these measures may not be sufficiently documented to facilitate continuity of commerce in uninfected animals. According to USDA guidance documents, during an FMD outbreak, premises in areas with movement restrictions will be required to obtain permits to move any animals or animal products. To obtain such a permit, producers must show that they are not contributing to the spread of disease or putting their animals at risk of exposure, and producers without documented biosecurity plans may face delays moving their animals. According to swine industry representatives, even swine farms with biosecurity procedures do not always document such procedures or the steps they have taken. USDA would likely face depopulation challenges during an FMD outbreak, including limited capability for killing large numbers of animals in a timely manner and difficulties owing to the large size of some animals affected by FMD. A majority (22 of 29) of respondents to our questionnaire indicated that USDA would face significant challenges in this area. For example, USDA officials said killing animals in large feedlots—which can hold 50,000 or more animals—would quickly overwhelm resources, such as the staff and equipment required to kill animals. USDA policy calls for depopulating infected premises within 24 hours, but this may not be feasible on large livestock operations because the animals have to be killed individually, which would be time-consuming according to an industry representative. If infected premises are not quickly depopulated, animals will continue producing the virus and increase the risk of infecting animals on additional premises, hampering USDA’s ability to control and contain an outbreak. Rapid depopulation of infected swine is particularly critical to containing the spread of an outbreak because swine are known as amplifiers of FMD virus, producing and excreting 3,000 times more virus than cattle or sheep, according to USDA documents. USDA would likely face disposal challenges during an FMD outbreak, including the feasibility and logistics of disposing of a large number of animal carcasses, public concern about disposal options, and the environmental impacts of disposal. A majority (25 of 29) of respondents to our questionnaire indicated that USDA would face significant challenges in this area. In a large FMD outbreak, millions of cattle could be affected. It is possible that FMD can survive for several months on a frozen carcass, according to USDA documents, so if such carcasses are not disposed of properly, they could pose a risk for spreading FMD, hampering USDA’s efforts to control and contain an outbreak. Disposing of the carcasses of a 50,000- head herd of cattle from a large feedlot would be a massive effort: the total weight for disposal could be as much as 30,000 tons, or about 1,500 dump truck loads to move all the animals to disposal sites, according to an industry representative. One state animal health official stated that disposal of one or two herds may be possible, but if an outbreak were more widespread, the state would quickly run out of options. In addition, certain disposal strategies, such as incinerating large piles of carcasses, may cause a negative public reaction, according to an industry representative, USDA’s disposal SOP, and state animal health officials. Figure 5 illustrates carcass disposal during a 2001 FMD outbreak in the United Kingdom, where the government implemented a policy of stamping out all susceptible animals within 3 kilometers of known FMD cases. In reaction to the policy, the public staged protests, and businesses in rural areas lost customers who stayed away because of the striking images in the media, according to a 2002 report by the University of Newcastle. Finally, carcass disposal can create environmental impacts, such as when a burial site contaminates the groundwater or incineration contaminates the air. In general, states regulate disposal, including such things as the timing (e.g., within 24 hours of an animal’s death) and the method of disposal (e.g., prohibiting outdoor incineration or specifying that up to 7 cattle may be buried per acre per year). In an FMD outbreak, large numbers of carcasses could make it difficult to comply with such regulations. USDA would likely face resource challenges in pursuing its FMD response goals, including insufficient numbers of incident responders to effectively implement USDA strategies in a medium or large outbreak, as well as insufficient resources devoted to preparedness planning in some states. A majority (23 of 29) of respondents to our questionnaire indicated that USDA would face significant challenges in this area. During the 2014 avian influenza outbreak, there were difficulties quickly providing response resources, such as personnel and equipment, to rapidly stamp out affected flocks, according to a USDA after-action report. According to an academic researcher, an FMD outbreak would be significantly more difficult to handle than recent avian influenza outbreaks. One state official noted that in his state there is not enough of a workforce to adequately respond to an outbreak, and there is no assigned workforce at the local level. For example, this official noted that his state employed only two veterinarians and a few animal health technicians to collect samples for testing in the event of an FMD outbreak. Other state animal health officials expressed concern that states and counties will have difficulty fielding adequate workforces to inspect animal transport vehicles and implement stop-movement orders. Insufficient preparedness planning in some states could also hamper response efforts, according to a response to our questionnaire from an academic researcher with expertise in FMD preparedness. Some states have not allocated resources to develop FMD response plans, including, for example, the conditions that would trigger a stop-movement order. States typically control intrastate movement under the state’s authority, and if states delay issuing stop-movement orders, it may be more difficult for USDA to control and contain an outbreak. Communication and coordination may be an area where USDA could face challenges during an FMD outbreak because of ineffective external or internal communications and unclear roles and responsibilities. Responses to our questionnaire in all categories (federal and state government officials, industry representatives, and academic researchers) were mixed about whether communication and coordination was an area with significant challenges. Specifically, 11 respondents said it was an area with significant challenges, 12 said it was not, and 6 were unsure. One industry respondent who said that the area was not a challenge cited a team of industry representatives that is working with USDA and states to prepare for an FMD outbreak. On the other hand, during a 2016 FMD preparedness exercise in Texas, coordination between USDA and other participants was at times inadequate. For example, during the exercise USDA and the Texas Animal Health Commission shared leadership of the response effort, and some respondents cited frustration with this top-down leadership structure because they were accustomed to emergency management practices and protocols designed for incidents such as natural disaster response efforts, which are generally initiated at the local level. Participants commented that they were confused about who did what and said that coordination needs to be improved between USDA and local governments, according to an after-action report. Also, communication across participating agencies broke down. For example, information from USDA on stop-movement orders, the size of the quarantine zone, and the number of sites quarantined did not reach all stakeholders in a timely manner, according to an after-action report. Compensating livestock owners for animals or equipment that the government determines must be destroyed to limit the spread of FMD would likely pose various challenges for the agency. USDA would provide the owners with up to 100 percent of the expenses of purchase, destruction, and disposition of animals or materials required to be destroyed, based on the agency’s appraisal of the fair market value. Doing so would likely pose various challenges for the agency, according to USDA and state government officials. A majority (19 of 29) of respondents to our questionnaire indicated that USDA would face significant challenges in this area. Such challenges include uncertainties about fair appraisal methods (especially when an outbreak has caused livestock prices to decline), owners resisting killing their animals if compensation rates are too low, and the potentially massive scale of compensation payments. According to USDA economists, if trade restrictions were imposed during an FMD outbreak, the fair market value of animals and their products would likely drop as a result of oversupply. USDA’s response to the outbreak could be slowed if producers brought legal challenges to stop the stamping out of their herds because they were not satisfied with compensation levels, a scenario that took place in a 2018 USDA-led exercise simulating the first few days of an FMD outbreak. Moreover, in a widespread FMD outbreak, the scale of federal compensation payments could be substantial. For example, in the 2001 United Kingdom FMD outbreak, compensation costs were estimated at over $1 billion for the killing of about 6 million animals. Given the larger size of the livestock industry in the United States, federal compensation costs could be much higher, depending on the number of animals killed as part of the response. USDA would likely face challenges related to vaccination, an area of particular importance given vaccination’s central role in USDA’s strategies for pursuing its response goals. All 29 respondents to our questionnaire agreed that the challenges USDA faces related to vaccination are significant. In particular, USDA does not have access to sufficient vaccine to achieve its response goals under many potential outbreak scenarios, and there is not consensus about how to allocate the limited supply, according to USDA officials and documents. Other challenges in this area relate to the timing and logistics of obtaining, distributing, and administering vaccine and to scientific, procedural, and infrastructure issues in vaccine production. Supplies of FMD vaccine concentrate in the vaccine bank may be sufficient to help control and eradicate a small, localized outbreak, but it is unlikely that they would be sufficient to stop a larger outbreak, according to USDA planning documents and officials. With a vaccine that is matched to the appropriate FMD subtype, a single dose can protect cattle for 6 months, and two doses are required to provide the same protection to swine. APHIS’s 2016 FMD vaccination policy states that 25 million doses for each of 10 subtypes of the virus is an appropriate minimum target to have available. However, the United States currently has access to only 1.75 million doses of each subtype available in the vaccine bank, according to USDA documents. In the United States, there are 24 states in which the number of livestock exceeds the doses available in the vaccine bank, according to USDA documents. In a 2016 report to Congress, USDA stated that the cost to reach its target of 25 million doses would be about $125 million, which would be about 10 percent of APHIS’s budgetary resources in fiscal year 2016. In addition, because the vaccine concentrate has a 5-year shelf life, USDA would incur costs to routinely replace the supply of concentrate, according to agency officials. The Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018 contains a provision that directs the Secretary of Agriculture to establish a national animal vaccine and veterinary countermeasures bank, and to prioritize the acquisition and maintenance of sufficient quantities of FMD vaccine and accompanying diagnostic products. The need for additional FMD vaccine was reinforced by a 2016 survey of states by USDA and Iowa State University. On the basis of responses from 32 state animal health officials, the authors estimated that in a widespread or national outbreak, states would plan to use on average 4.2 million doses during the first 14 weeks of the outbreak. Based on these estimates, a vaccine request from a single state could greatly exceed the 1.75 million doses available per subtype in the vaccine bank’s supply. Moreover, if an FMD outbreak occurred in Texas or Iowa, the states with the largest cattle and swine populations, respectively, the available vaccine supply would provide a single dose for about 14 percent of Texas’s 12.3 million cattle or the required two doses for about 4 percent of Iowa’s 22.8 million swine. Texas’s and Iowa’s cattle and swine populations together make up about 24 percent of the combined population of cattle and swine nationwide. Figure 6 illustrates the vaccine doses needed to protect cattle and swine in Texas and Iowa compared with the currently available FMD vaccine bank supply of 1.75 million doses per subtype. In addition, because of the large number of FMD subtypes present around the world, and because the FMD virus is constantly mutating, it is possible that an FMD subtype could be introduced in the United States that is not covered by vaccines currently in the vaccine bank. According to a representative from an FMD vaccine manufacturer, producing a vaccine for a new subtype of FMD could take from 6 to 18 months, depending on whether the subtype was known and other factors. Because of the limited supply of vaccine and the potentially high demand for it, USDA would likely face the challenge of deciding how to allocate it in an FMD outbreak. In a 2016 survey of 13 industry veterinarians, there was no consensus within the beef, dairy, and swine industries about priorities for the vaccine. Specifically, USDA and Iowa State University asked the veterinarians to rank the importance of vaccinating various populations (e.g., bull studs, lactating cows, and boar studs) within the beef, dairy, and swine industries, assuming there was only enough vaccine to vaccinate 25 to 50 percent of animals in a specified area. The responses varied widely, with high and low rankings for nearly every population of animals. The timing and logistics of obtaining, distributing, and administering the FMD vaccine could also pose challenges. The timing to reformulate the banked vaccine would pose challenges for USDA in an outbreak, according to respondents to our questionnaire. In addition, in March 2005, we found that USDA would not be able to deploy vaccines rapidly enough to contain a widespread FMD outbreak. After USDA requests FMD vaccine from the vaccine bank, vaccine manufacturers could take from 4 to 13 days to finish and ship all of the requested vaccine to the United States, during which time the virus could spread within the livestock population, according to USDA documents. If the vaccine bank’s supply of concentrate is exhausted during an outbreak and more is needed, manufacturers may take several months to produce it, according to a vaccine manufacturer. After obtaining the vaccine, USDA would distribute it to affected states, and the states would distribute it to veterinarians, producers, or others who would be responsible for administering vaccine, according to USDA and state FMD vaccination documents. Many states do not currently have vaccination plans in place and may not have identified the warehousing locations, staff needs, and tracking required to efficiently distribute FMD vaccine, according to agency and state government officials, which could slow USDA’s efforts to contain and control an outbreak. States with vaccination plans may be able to more quickly and effectively distribute and administer FMD vaccine during an outbreak. For example, California has a vaccination plan that details how it would receive, distribute, and administer FMD vaccine while maintaining the appropriate temperatures and documentation. The plan includes details such as the supplies needed for administering FMD vaccine to cattle. USDA faces challenges in obtaining vaccine and using it in a response effort because of scientific, procedural, and infrastructure challenges related to the vaccine and its production. There are very few vaccine manufacturers in the world with the capacity to produce most of the FMD vaccine subtypes and meet the quality standards required by the United States, according to agency officials. Further, there is currently no production capacity for FMD vaccine in the United States because dedicated infrastructure is not in place to produce vaccines without live virus. There is a statutory prohibition against working with live FMD virus on the U.S. mainland, absent a permit granted by the Secretary of Agriculture, and live virus is needed to produce conventional vaccines. To work within this constraint, USDA’s Agricultural Research Service (ARS) and DHS developed new technologies to produce vaccine using modified versions of the virus that are unable to cause or transmit disease. The agencies transferred these technologies to vaccine companies that are investing in their development, according to USDA officials. In 2018, the Secretary of Agriculture announced that vaccine companies could apply for permits to work with a specific modified, noninfectious version of the FMD virus on the mainland. One company has exclusive rights to use this modified version, which was developed and patented by ARS. The company plans to produce FMD vaccine in the United States, but it could take several years to license the initial product, complete the necessary permitting procedures, and build manufacturing infrastructure, according to USDA documents and a company official. Using FMD vaccine to respond to an outbreak presents additional challenges that are related to limitations of FMD vaccines. Specifically, animals may take up to 28 days after vaccination to develop protective immunity to FMD, depending on the species, potency of vaccine, and other factors. Even after 28 days, some vaccinated animals may not be fully immune to FMD and may continue spreading the virus despite having no visible signs of infection, according to USDA documents. To mitigate challenges in responding to potential FMD outbreaks, USDA’s APHIS has identified corrective actions through preparedness exercises, surveys, and lessons learned in other outbreaks, as called for in its SOPs. However, APHIS generally does not follow its SOPs for prioritizing or monitoring the completion of these actions. A USDA SOP outlines a process for identifying corrective actions to improve the agency’s preparedness for outbreaks of foreign animal diseases. According to the SOP, APHIS is to identify corrective actions after preparedness exercises and animal disease incidents. Consistent with this SOP, APHIS identifies corrective actions for FMD preparedness through exercises simulating FMD outbreaks, surveys of agency officials and others, and lessons learned from outbreaks of other diseases. More specifically, see the following: APHIS sponsors FMD preparedness exercises and participates in some such exercises that other federal or state agencies sponsor. After an exercise, the sponsoring agency generally prepares an after- action report that specifies corrective actions, and may include a responsible party for and a date for completing each action. APHIS has after-action reports for more than 40 FMD preparedness exercises that it sponsored or participated in from 2007 through 2018, which include corrective actions for USDA and APHIS. APHIS conducts annual surveys of its staff and others—including state government officials, industry representatives, and academics— to identify corrective actions related to preparedness and response training needs. APHIS identifies corrective actions for FMD preparedness based on lessons learned after outbreaks of other diseases. For example, some of the actions that APHIS identified after outbreaks of avian influenza, such as improving a database used for emergency response, could also help the agency mitigate challenges it would face in an FMD outbreak, according to agency officials. APHIS has identified dozens of corrective actions in all 11 of the areas where we identified challenges for USDA in pursuing its FMD response goals. APHIS has taken corrective actions in each area. For example, to help mitigate the challenge of insufficient biosecurity on some premises, the agency partnered with Iowa State University to offer producers across the nation training on developing enhanced biosecurity plans for implementation during a foreign animal disease outbreak. However, APHIS has not yet taken some other corrective actions that it has identified. According to agency officials and experts we interviewed, these corrective actions can help mitigate, but may not completely resolve, the challenges identified. Some challenges may be outside USDA’s control to fully resolve. For example, the logistical challenges of carcass disposal could be overwhelming in a large-scale outbreak, which could generate thousands of tons of carcasses. A corrective action calling for training on carcass management may help educate FMD responders about disposal methods or preventing environmental impacts; however, such training may not fully resolve the challenge. Table 1 shows examples of corrective actions identified by USDA in after- action reports, planning documents, other agency documents, or interviews, which the agency has taken or not yet taken for the 11 challenge areas we identified. Some of the corrective actions that USDA has identified and taken relate to the challenge area of vaccination. For example, to help speed access to vaccine, in 2018, the Secretary of Agriculture announced that vaccine companies could apply for permits to enable them to develop and produce certain types of FMD vaccine in the United States in the future, thereby avoiding delays from producing the vaccine overseas and shipping it here. Also, APHIS officials have used an FMD predictive model to evaluate the effectiveness of different vaccination schemes at the state level, and they told us that they plan to conduct a similar analysis at the national level. The results could help inform USDA’s vaccine prioritization decisions in advance of an outbreak, according to the officials. USDA has also begun implementing other corrective actions that have been identified related to FMD vaccination, although more work remains. For example, in February 2009, we recommended—and USDA agreed— that it should detail in a contingency response plan how a response using vaccines would be implemented. Similarly, after-action reports for 2013 and 2016 preparedness exercises highlighted the need for procedures to guide the implementation of FMD vaccination strategies. APHIS has taken or planned several steps to help address this need: In 2009, APHIS began drafting vaccine implementation procedures but realized that the national procedures needed to be developed in collaboration with states because of variation among states in their predominant industries, agriculture infrastructure, and government resources. When more states have developed vaccination implementation procedures, APHIS may revise and finalize the national procedures originally drafted in 2009, according to agency officials. APHIS’s National Veterinary Stockpile developed plans in 2009 and 2011 outlining how some aspects of a vaccination strategy would be implemented. Specifically, in 2009 it developed a template that states and tribes can use to develop their own plans, and in 2011 it prepared a logistical plan for distributing FMD vaccine to the field. The National Veterinary Stockpile also held preparedness exercises from 2008 to 2018 for states and tribes to practice requesting, receiving, and delivering the vaccine and to obtain information that could help APHIS develop national vaccination procedures. From 2011 to 2018, APHIS and the California Department of Food and Agriculture worked together to draft detailed procedures for implementing an FMD vaccination strategy in California. The draft procedures and related planning documents are intended to serve as templates to help other states develop such procedures, according to agency officials. APHIS also piloted a workshop on FMD vaccination planning in October 2018 and plans to hold related preparedness exercises with states from 2019 to 2021. Although APHIS has identified dozens of corrective actions for FMD preparedness, it has not consistently followed its SOP for prioritizing all of the actions and monitoring progress in implementing them. Specifically, once corrective actions have been identified, APHIS’s SOP calls for prioritizing the actions in an improvement plan, and monitoring the actions to track their completion. APHIS has sometimes designated actions related to FMD vaccination as high priority during annual management meetings, but not all corrective actions have been prioritized, according to agency officials. For example, a 2016 corrective action called for USDA to conduct an exercise to explore roles, responsibilities, and activities related to recovery from a large-scale animal disease outbreak. However, as of December 2018, this action has not been prioritized in an improvement plan, according to the after-action report and an agency official. In addition, corrective actions have sometimes been identified multiple times without being tracked to completion. For example, an after-action report for a 2007 exercise found that a process for making vaccine- allocation decisions was needed and suggested that a vaccine advisory group could assist with doing so. A 2014 after-action report stated that processes governing vaccine prioritization and allocation were not clear and identified a corrective action calling for USDA to develop a federal- level doctrine for vaccine prioritization and allocation. USDA’s 2016 FMD vaccination policy states that APHIS, in coordination with state, local, and industry stakeholders, should consider developing processes, procedures, and strategies for prioritizing the use of currently available vaccine in an outbreak. However, APHIS has not developed processes, procedures, or strategies for prioritizing and allocating its supply of FMD vaccine, according to agency officials. The officials said they have not developed such a process because of limited resources and competing priorities. Also, it would require participation from state and industry stakeholders, and given the small quantity of FMD vaccine relative to the large number of susceptible animals in the country, the stakeholders have had little incentive to devote the necessary time to the issue, according to agency officials. More generally, agency officials told us that the agency has not prioritized or monitored completion of some corrective actions because they have been responding to actual outbreaks of animal and plant diseases. They also noted that they have limited resources for FMD preparedness, which may make it difficult for them to complete all of the corrective actions that have been identified. However, for avian influenza preparedness, APHIS compiled and prioritized more than 300 corrective actions in a database and tracked more than 200 of them to completion. Through this process, it completed nearly all of the 111 high-priority actions and over 100 moderate-priority actions, according to its database as of May 2018. For example after the 2014 avian influenza outbreak, APHIS completed corrective actions that improved its response to a subsequent outbreak in 2016, according to agency documents. The corrective actions addressed such issues as how to quickly depopulate and dispose of infected poultry and efficiently compensate affected producers. APHIS continues to monitor its progress in implementing the remaining corrective actions for that disease, according to agency officials. APHIS’s SOP calls for prioritizing corrective actions to identify the most beneficial use of resources. The SOP also calls for monitoring corrective actions to track their completion so that APHIS can improve its response capabilities and correct problems or deficiencies identified in exercises or incidents. Without following its SOP to prioritize corrective actions for FMD preparedness, APHIS cannot ensure that it is allocating its limited resources toward implementing the most beneficial actions. And without following its SOP for monitoring the corrective actions, APHIS cannot ensure that the highest-priority actions are completed. APHIS has taken important steps to prepare for an FMD outbreak and to mitigate challenges it may face in responding to one. For example, the agency has developed an extensive collection of strategy and guidance documents, held FMD preparedness exercises to practice response activities, and identified dozens of corrective actions and completed some of these actions. However, APHIS has not yet completed other corrective actions, including actions that have been identified multiple times, such as developing a process for prioritizing and allocating the limited supply of FMD vaccine. APHIS has an SOP for prioritizing and monitoring corrective actions. By following this SOP for avian influenza preparedness, the agency succeeded in prioritizing more than 300 corrective actions and tracking over 200 corrective actions to completion, including nearly all high-priority actions. In contrast, for FMD preparedness, APHIS has not consistently prioritized or monitored the corrective actions it has identified. Without following its SOP to prioritize and monitor corrective actions for FMD preparedness, APHIS cannot ensure that it is allocating its limited resources to the most beneficial actions to prepare for a possible FMD outbreak. We are making the following two recommendations to USDA: The Administrator of the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service should follow the agency’s SOP to prioritize corrective actions for FMD preparedness. (Recommendation 1) The Administrator of the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service should follow the agency’s SOP to monitor progress and track completion of corrective actions for FMD preparedness. (Recommendation 2) We provided a draft of this report to USDA and DHS for review and comment. USDA provided comments, reproduced in appendix II, in which it agreed with our recommendations. In addition, USDA and DHS provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. In response to our recommendations, USDA said that, starting in the second quarter of fiscal year 2019, APHIS will implement the agency’s SOP and prioritize corrective actions to be tracked in its corrective actions database, as we recommended. USDA also said that, starting in the third quarter of fiscal year 2019, APHIS will assess and update the items related to FMD in its corrective actions database, as we recommended. In addition, USDA said that APHIS will track accomplishments it makes under a related provision of the Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018. We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and other interested parties. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If your or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-3841 or morriss@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix III. This report (1) describes the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) planned approach for responding to a foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) outbreak; (2) identifies what challenges, if any, USDA would face in pursuing its FMD response goals; and (3) examines how USDA identifies, prioritizes, and monitors corrective actions to mitigate these challenges. To describe USDA’s planned approach for responding to an FMD outbreak, we reviewed relevant legislation and USDA strategy and guidance documents. We also interviewed officials from USDA’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) at the agency’s headquarters in Riverdale, Maryland; laboratories on Plum Island, New York, and in Ames, Iowa; center for epidemiology and animal health in Fort Collins, Colorado; and center for veterinary biologics in Ames, Iowa; and officials from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Agricultural Research Service (ARS) at DHS’s Plum Island Animal Disease Center on Plum Island, New York. We selected these officials to interview because of their knowledge about USDA’s planned approach, their involvement in preparing for an FMD outbreak, and the roles they would play in responding to such an outbreak. To identify what challenges, if any, USDA would face in pursuing its FMD response goals, we first came up with a list of potential challenge areas. To develop the list of potential challenge areas, we reviewed USDA documents, reports about FMD outbreaks in other countries, and after- action reports from 41 preparedness exercises in the United States from 2007 to 2018 in which officials practiced responding to simulated FMD outbreaks and identified emerging challenges. The preparedness exercises included small-scale as well as large-scale ones with a variety of participants, durations, and response activities. We also interviewed APHIS headquarters staff and field staff in Iowa (the state with the most livestock); APHIS and ARS laboratory officials; state animal health officials in California, Colorado, Iowa, and North Carolina; representatives from the beef cattle, dairy cattle, swine, and sheep industries; and academic researchers with expertise in this area. We selected the individuals to interview based on their knowledge about challenges that USDA could face in pursuing its FMD response goals, their central role in preparing for an FMD outbreak, and recommendations from other interviewees, as well as diversity in geographic location. We also visited a swine farm and cattle feedlot in Iowa and interviewed the owners. We selected a swine farm and cattle feedlot to visit because swine and cattle were the livestock industries with the greatest populations of animals in the United States in 2016. We identified a list of 11 potential challenge areas. To confirm the significance of the challenge areas, we used a questionnaire with the list of potential challenge areas. To select the questionnaire recipients, we identified four categories of people who are knowledgeable about challenges that USDA could face in pursuing its FMD response goals, including those who could be involved in a response effort. The four categories are (1) federal government officials, (2) state government officials, (3) livestock industry representatives, and (4) academic researchers with expertise in FMD preparedness. For categories with multiple individuals, we selected individuals to represent relevant units within APHIS, ARS, and DHS (e.g. headquarters; field offices; laboratories; surveillance, preparedness and response services; and science, technology, and analysis services); different livestock industries (beef cattle, dairy cattle, swine, and sheep); and states with relatively high livestock populations. We asked the recipients whether USDA would face a significant challenge in each of the 11 areas and whether they knew of other challenge areas we had not listed. We defined significant to mean a challenge that is sufficiently great or important enough to be worthy of USDA action to address the challenge. We initially sent the questionnaire with potential challenges to 39 recipients. Two federal officials had retired from their positions, so we sent the list to their replacements. Of the 39 recipients, we received responses from 28. We also included an additional response that APHIS provided from an official who we had not initially contacted and who had relevant expertise, for a total of 29 responses. Despite two follow-up attempts, we did not receive responses from 11 recipients, including both recipients from ARS, 5 of the 18 from APHIS, 3 of the 10 state animal health officials, and 1 of the 2 national animal health laboratory network officials (these are affiliated with universities). Figure 7 shows the categories of respondents and their responses in each of the11 challenge areas. Since we used a nonprobability sample, the results are not generalizable to all government officials, livestock industry officials, or FMD experts, but the responses helped confirm the list of 11 challenge areas and provided illustrative information about each one. We reviewed challenges related to vaccination for FMD in greater depth than other challenges because of the significant role vaccination could play if reliance solely on stamping out is not feasible. Specifically, we visited DHS’s Plum Island Animal Disease Center on Plum Island, New York, where we interviewed officials from USDA’s Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory and the Agricultural Research Service, as well as DHS officials, about challenges related to FMD vaccination. We also reviewed agency documents on the topic and interviewed other officials from USDA, the North American Vaccine Bank, universities, states, and industry groups about issues related to FMD vaccination. Further, we interviewed officials from the vaccine company that currently produces the majority of FMD vaccine available for use in the United States and a company that has rights to use a modified version of the FMD virus to produce FMD vaccine in the future. To determine how USDA identifies, prioritizes, and monitors corrective actions to mitigate the challenges, we reviewed APHIS and DHS guidance on evaluation and improvement planning and other agency documents, observed an FMD preparedness exercise, reviewed after- action reports from 41 FMD preparedness exercises conducted from 2007 through 2018, and interviewed USDA officials. We reviewed APHIS’s and DHS’s procedures for evaluation and improvement planning to understand how APHIS is to identify, prioritize, and monitor corrective actions. To determine whether APHIS was consistently following these procedures, we observed the preparedness exercise at APHIS’s Riverdale, Maryland, office; reviewed a preliminary after-action report for that exercise; and reviewed after-action reports for the 41 other preparedness exercises. We interviewed APHIS officials about corrective actions identified in the after-action reports and what steps the agency has taken to prioritize the actions and monitor their progress. We reviewed agency documents about these procedures and about actions USDA has taken and identified but not yet taken to mitigate challenges. To find examples of corrective actions that USDA has identified and taken or not yet taken, we reviewed after-action reports for the 41 preparedness exercises; APHIS’s 2018-2020 training and exercise plan for its veterinary services emergency preparedness and response unit; and other agency documents, such as contracts and plans, and interviewed agency officials. The examples of corrective actions in table 1 are illustrative only and do not include or represent all of the actions that USDA has identified. We sent a draft table of examples to APHIS officials and incorporated their comments as appropriate. We also reviewed a GAO report on USDA’s management of highly pathogenic avian influenza (avian influenza) outbreaks; interviewed agency officials; reviewed USDA after-action reports for avian influenza outbreaks; and reviewed USDA’s database of related corrective actions to learn how the agency identifies, prioritizes, and monitors actions to mitigate challenges for that disease. To assess the overall reliability of that database to use information from the database in our report, we reviewed management controls over the information systems that maintain the data and interviewed USDA officials who manage the database. We determined that the database was sufficiently reliable to describe the contents of the database and general status of corrective actions. We conducted this performance audit from May 2017 to March 2019 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. In addition to the contact named above, Nico Sloss (Assistant Director), Kevin Bray, Emily Christoff, Mary Denigan-Macauley, Christine Feehan, Jesse Lamarre-Vincent, Cynthia Norris, Anne Rhodes-Kline, and Amber Sinclair made key contributions to this report. Ross Campbell, Barb El Osta, Kathryn Godfrey, Hayden Huang, and Dan Royer also made important contributions to this report. Foot-and-Mouth Disease: USDA’s Evaluations of Foreign Animal Health Systems Could Benefit from Better Guidance and Greater Transparency. GAO-17-373. Washington, D.C.: April 28, 2017. Avian Influenza: USDA Has Taken Actions to Reduce Risks but Needs a Plan to Evaluate Its Efforts. GAO-17-360. Washington, D.C.: April 13, 2017. Emerging Animal Diseases: Actions Needed to Better Position USDA to Address Future Risks. GAO-16-132. Washington, D.C.: December 15, 2015. Federal Veterinarians: Efforts Needed to Improve Workforce Planning. GAO-15-495. Washington, D.C.: May 26, 2015. Homeland Security: An Overall Strategy Is Needed to Strengthen Disease Surveillance in Livestock and Poultry. GAO-13-424. Washington, D.C.: May 21, 2013. Veterinarian Workforce: Actions Are Needed to Ensure Sufficient Capacity for Protecting Public and Animal Health. GAO-09-178. Washington, D.C.: February 4, 2009. High-Containment Biosafety Laboratories: DHS Lacks Evidence to Conclude That Foot-and-Mouth Disease Research Can Be Done Safely on the U.S. Mainland. GAO-08-821T. Washington, D.C.: May 22, 2008. National Animal Identification System: USDA Needs to Resolve Several Key Implementation Issues to Achieve Rapid and Effective Disease Traceback. GAO-07-592. Washington, D.C.: July 6, 2007. Avian Influenza: USDA Has Taken Important Steps to Prepare for Outbreaks, but Better Planning Could Improve Response. GAO-07-652. Washington, D.C.: June 11, 2007. Homeland Security: Much Is Being Done to Protect Agriculture from a Terrorist Attack, but Important Challenges Remain. GAO-05-214. Washington, D.C.: March 8, 2005.	[ "FMD is a highly contagious viral disease that causes painful lesions on the hooves and mouths of some livestock, making it difficult for them to stand or eat, thus greatly reducing meat and milk production. The United States has not had an FMD outbreak since 1929, but FMD is present in much of the world. An FMD outbreak in the United States could have serious economic impacts, in part because trade partners would likely halt all imports of U.S. livestock and livestock products until the disease was eradicated. These imports were valued at more than $19 billion in 2017. GAO was asked to review USDA's efforts to prepare for an FMD outbreak. This report examines (1) USDA's planned approach for responding to an FMD outbreak; (2) challenges USDA would face in pursuing its response goals; and (3) how USDA identifies, prioritizes, and monitors corrective actions to mitigate the challenges. GAO observed a USDA FMD preparedness exercise; reviewed agency documents and nongeneralizable questionnaire responses from 29 respondents from federal and state government, livestock industries, and universities; and interviewed officials from federal and state governments and representatives of livestock industries and universities. The U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) planned approach for responding to an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) includes several strategies. These strategies generally rely on killing infected and susceptible animals, vaccinating uninfected animals, or a combination of both approaches. USDA would implement one or more of the strategies, depending on factors such as the outbreak's size and the resources available, according to agency documents. USDA would likely face significant challenges in pursuing its response goals of detecting, controlling, and containing FMD quickly; eradicating FMD while seeking to stabilize industry and the economy; and facilitating continuity of commerce in uninfected animals. GAO identified challenges in 11 areas—including allocating a limited supply of FMD vaccine—based on its review of USDA documents, responses to GAO's questionnaire, and interviews with agency officials and others with expertise on FMD. According to USDA, the agency may not have a sufficient supply of FMD vaccine to control more than a small outbreak because of limited resources to obtain vaccine. As shown below, the current vaccine supply would be sufficient to protect about 14 percent of Texas's cattle or about 4 percent of Iowa's swine; these states' cattle and swine populations are the nation's largest. The Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018 includes a provision to increase the FMD vaccine supply. USDA has identified dozens of corrective actions to mitigate the challenges of responding to an FMD outbreak, as called for in USDA procedures, but has not prioritized these corrective actions or monitored their completion, as also called for in its procedures. USDA has identified the corrective actions through exercises simulating FMD outbreaks, surveys, and lessons learned from other foreign animal disease outbreaks. However, USDA has not completed all of the corrective actions, including actions related to vaccination. Agency officials stated that they have not completed such corrective actions because they have been responding to outbreaks of other animal diseases and have limited resources. Without following agency procedures to prioritize and monitor corrective actions, USDA cannot ensure that it is allocating its resources to the most beneficial actions to prepare for a possible FMD outbreak. GAO is recommending that USDA follow its procedures to prioritize and monitor the completion of corrective actions that the agency has identified for FMD preparedness. USDA agreed with these recommendations, and described actions it will take to implement them." ]	11,771	gov_report	en	null	dc41fbf74e1c82b1902f266a75ae9e43a1605b4879fabf18
Health care practitioners prescribe opioid medications to treat pain and sometimes for other health problems, such as severe coughing. Opioid medications are available as immediate or extended release and in different forms, such as a pill, liquid, or a patch worn on the skin. Opioids slow down some processes of the body, such as breathing and heartbeat, by binding with certain receptors in the body. Over time, the body becomes tolerant to opioids, which means that larger doses of opioid medications are needed to achieve the same effect. People may use opioids in a manner other than as prescribed—that is, they can be misused. Because opioids are highly addictive substances, they can pose serious risks when they are misused, which can lead to addiction and death. Symptoms of an opioid use disorder include a strong desire for opioids, the inability to control or reduce use, and continued use despite interference with major obligations or social functioning. Another concern associated with prescribed opioids is the potential for diversion for illegal purposes, such as nonmedical use or financial gain. Research has shown that MAT—which combines behavioral therapy and the use of certain medications (methadone, buprenorphine, and naltrexone)—can be more effective in reducing opioid use and increasing retention (i.e., reducing dropouts) compared to abstinence based treatment—that is when patients are treated without medication. Three medications are currently approved by FDA for use in MAT for opioid use disorders—methadone, buprenorphine, and naltrexone. Methadone: Methadone is a full opioid agonist, meaning it binds to and activates opioid receptors to help prevent withdrawal symptoms and reduce drug cravings. It has a long history of use for the treatment of opioid dependence in adults. Methadone suppresses withdrawal symptoms during detoxification therapy, which involves stabilizing patients who are addicted to opioids by withdrawing them in a controlled manner. Methadone also controls the craving for opioids during maintenance therapy, which is ongoing therapy meant to prevent relapse and increase treatment retention. Methadone can be administered to patients as an oral solution or in tablet form. Buprenorphine: Buprenorphine is a partial opioid agonist, meaning it binds to opioid receptors and activates them, but not to the same degree as full opioid agonists. It reduces or eliminates opioid withdrawal symptoms, including drug cravings. It can be used for detoxification treatment and maintenance therapy. It is available for MAT for opioid use disorder in tablet form for sublingual (under the tongue) administration, in film form for sublingual or buccal (inside the cheek) administration, and as a subdermal (under the skin) implant. Naltrexone: Naltrexone is an opioid antagonist, meaning it binds to opioid receptors but does not activate them. It is used for relapse prevention following complete detoxification from opioids. Naltrexone prevents opioid drugs from binding to and activating opioid receptors, thus blocking the euphoria the user would normally feel. It also results in withdrawal symptoms if recent opioid use has occurred. It can be taken daily in an oral tablet form or as a once-monthly injection given in a doctor’s office. Two of the three medications used to treat opioid use disorders— methadone and buprenorphine—are drugs that carry a potential for misuse. Under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), treatment involving these medications can take place in certain authorized settings: as part of federally regulated OTPs or in other settings, such as a physician’s office, within certain restrictions. OTPs. OTPs provide MAT, including methadone and buprenorphine, for people diagnosed with an opioid use disorder. Methadone may generally only be administered or dispensed within an OTP, as prescriptions for methadone cannot be issued when used for opioid use disorder treatment. Buprenorphine may be administered or dispensed within an OTP, or may also be prescribed by a qualifying practitioner who has received a waiver from SAMHSA. Naltrexone is not a controlled substance and can be used in OTPs and other settings. Office-Based and Other Settings. Under a Drug Addiction Treatment Act of 2000 (DATA 2000) waiver, practitioners may prescribe buprenorphine to up to 30 patients in the first year of their waiver, 100 patients in the second year, and up to 275 patients in the third year. Practitioners at the 275-patient level must meet additional qualifications and requirements. Naltrexone does not have similar restrictions. HHS has implemented five key efforts from 2015 through August 2017 that focus on expanding access to MAT for opioid use disorders. Four of these are grant programs, including programs focused on health centers or primary care practices in rural areas. Targeted Capacity Expansion: Medication Assisted Treatment – Prescription Drug and Opioid Addiction (MAT-PDOA). This grant program is administered by SAMHSA and provides funding to states to increase their capacity to provide MAT and recovery support services to individuals with opioid use disorders. Grant recipients are expected to identify a minimum of two high-risk communities within the state and partner with local government or community- based organizations to address the MAT-related treatment needs in these communities. Among other things, recipients are to use outreach and other engagement activities to increase participation in and access to MAT for diverse populations at risk for opioid use disorders. In August 2015, SAMHSA awarded 3-year grants to 11 states, under which each of the states will receive up to $1 million in each grant year. In September 2016, SAMHSA awarded 11 additional 3-year grants to other states. Total funding is expected to be up to $66 million for all 22 grants. SAMHSA announced the availability of up to 5 additional 3-year grants for fiscal year 2017. Applications for these grants of up to $2 million per year were due in July 2017 and as of August 2017 they had not been awarded. Substance Abuse Service Expansion Supplement to Health Centers. This grant program is administered by HRSA and provides funds for existing health centers to improve and expand their delivery of substance abuse services, including services with a specific focus on MAT for opioid use disorders in underserved populations. Health centers that receive these grants are required to increase the number of patients with health center-funded access to MAT for opioid use or for other substance abuse disorders treatment by adding at least one full-time substance abuse provider and supporting new or enhanced existing substance abuse services. HRSA awarded 2-year grants in March 2016 to 271 health centers. According to HRSA documents, total funding could be up to $200 million for all grants over 2 years. HRSA announced the availability of another set of grants to health centers for fiscal year 2017. Applications for these grants were due in July 2017, and as of August 2017 they had not been awarded. Increasing Access to Medication-Assisted Treatment in Rural Primary Care Practices. This grant program is administered by AHRQ and funds demonstration research projects that aim to expand access to MAT for opioid use disorders in primary care practices in rural areas of the United States. Grant recipients are expected to recruit and engage primary care providers and their practices, provide training, and support physicians and their practices in initiating treatment. The program also identifies and tests strategies for overcoming the challenges associated with implementing MAT in primary care settings and creates training and other resources for implementing MAT. AHRQ awarded these 3-year grants of up to $1 million per year to four recipients—the recipients are teams of state health departments, academic health centers, local community organizations, physicians, and others—with project start dates of September 30, 2016. According to AHRQ documents, total funding is expected to be up to $12 million for the four grants over 3 years. State Targeted Response to the Opioid Crisis Grants (Opioid STR). This grant program is administered by SAMHSA and provides funding to states and others to increase access to treatment services for opioid use disorders, including MAT; reduce unmet treatment needs; and reduce opioid overdose deaths. Grant recipients are expected to implement or expand access to evidence-based practices, particularly the use of MAT, and to report on the number of people who receive opioid use disorder treatment, the number of providers implementing MAT, and the number of providers trained to use MAT. SAMHSA awarded 2-year grants starting in May 2017 to 50 states, the District of Columbia, four U.S. territories and the free associated states of Micronesia and Palau. According to SAMHSA documents, total funding could be up to $970 million for all grants over 2 years. Figure 1 displays the implementation timeframes, the number of grants, and funding levels for the four HHS grant programs related to MAT. As the figure shows, some of these awards were made in fiscal year 2015, while others were made as recently as May 2017. As of August 2017, these efforts were ongoing. In addition to these four grant programs, HHS’s fifth key effort increases treatment capacity by expanding the waivers that practitioners may receive to prescribe buprenorphine. Specifically, SAMHSA issued a regulation that became effective August 8, 2016 increasing the number of patients that eligible practitioners can treat with buprenorphine outside of an OTP (e.g., in an office-based setting). Previously, qualified practitioners could request approval to treat up to 30 patients at a time, and after 1 year the limit could increase to 100 patients at a time upon SAMHSA approval. The new regulation expanded access to MAT by allowing eligible practitioners who have had waivers to prescribe buprenorphine to 100 patients for at least 1 year to request approval to treat up to 275 patients thereafter. Similarly, SAMHSA has implemented provisions of the Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act of 2016 (CARA) that expanded the types of practitioners who can receive a waiver to prescribe buprenorphine in an office-based setting to include qualifying nurse practitioners and physician assistants. CARA generally requires that these nurse practitioners and physician assistants complete 24 hours of training to be eligible for a waiver. According to HHS documents, as of early 2017, nurse practitioners and physician assistants who have completed this training could request a waiver from SAMHSA to treat up to 30 patients at a time. In addition to its five key efforts focused specifically on expanding access to MAT for opioid use disorders, HHS has other efforts with broader focuses, such as treating multiple types of substance abuse. While these efforts are not specifically focused on expanding access to MAT for opioid use disorders, they may result in expanded access to MAT. For example, CMS has approved section 1115 Medicaid demonstration projects to allow states to undertake comprehensive reforms of their delivery of substance abuse services, including provisions to enhance the use of MAT for opioid use disorders. In July 2015, CMS issued a state Medicaid Director letter informing states that they may seek approval of section 1115 demonstrations to undertake comprehensive substance use service reforms. According to CMS, all participating states are using the demonstration authority to develop a full continuum of care for individuals with substance abuse disorders, including coverage of short-term residential treatment services not otherwise covered by Medicaid. In addition, FDA has programs to help expedite development and to provide for faster review of marketing applications for certain drugs. According to FDA, it has conducted expedited reviews of Suboxone (buprenorphine and naloxone sublingual film), Vivitrol (extended release naltrexone injection) and Probuphine (buprenorphine subdermal implant). According to some federal officials and other stakeholders that we interviewed, as part of efforts to expand access to MAT for opioid use disorder, steps are being taken to prevent the possibility that the MAT medications could, in some cases, be diverted for illicit use, misuse, or for purposes not intended by a prescriber. For example, OTPs and practitioners who request and receive a waiver to prescribe buprenorphine to treat up to 275 patients outside of an OTP setting are required under federal regulations to maintain a diversion control plan. In addition, the MAT-PDOA grant program explicitly requires grant recipients to implement a diversion control plan, though the other grant programs do not have similar additional requirements. (See appendix I for an overview of the diversion control plan requirements for OTPs and the practitioners who prescribe buprenorphine outside of an OTP.) The 2016 Surgeon General’s report on Alcohol, Drugs, and Health noted that decades of research have shown that the benefits of MAT greatly outweigh the risks associated with diversion, and that withholding these medications greatly increases the risk of relapse to illicit opioid use and overdose death. HHS officials told us that as of August 2017, the department is in the process of finalizing its approach for evaluating the implementation of its agencies’ collective efforts to address the opioid epidemic that were undertaken as part of the HHS Opioid Initiative and will continue under the new administration’s Opioid Strategy. HHS officials provided a draft of the evaluation’s schedule. According to the officials, the evaluation will include, but not be limited to, efforts to expand access to MAT. In September 2016, HHS awarded a 2-year contract to Research Triangle Institute International (RTI) to evaluate HHS agencies’ collective efforts. HHS officials told us that they are still working with RTI to finalize the evaluation approach given new leadership priorities. Specifically, in April 2017, the new Secretary of HHS announced a revised strategy for addressing the opioid epidemic that will continue to address access to MAT for opioid use disorders but also include additional priority areas. According to HHS officials, to be responsive to the new priorities, the evaluation will focus initially on whether HHS’s efforts have been implemented as intended, and officials expect the evaluation to also provide information on any challenges HHS has faced in implementing these efforts. According to HHS officials, while the evaluation of MAT expansion efforts will use information from several sources, they have not yet determined exactly which information will be used or how it will be used. This information may include, for example, results from a separate, planned evaluation of one of the grant programs, Opioid STR, as well as other information HHS agencies collect as part of their ongoing monitoring efforts for each of their individual MAT grant programs. While the reporting requirements vary across the four MAT grant programs, the grantees provide HHS with information related to expanding access to MAT. Specifically, Targeted Capacity Expansion: Medication Assisted Treatment – Prescription Drug and Opioid Addiction (MAT-PDOA): Every 6 months, grant recipients are expected to submit progress reports to SAMHSA on the planned and actual number of patients treated, as well as information on other performance measures. Increasing Access to Medication-Assisted Treatment in Rural Primary Care Practices: Grant recipients are expected to submit quarterly progress reports to AHRQ with various information, such as information on the number of physicians who have been certified to prescribe buprenorphine and the number of primary care practices successfully initiating the delivery of MAT services as a result of the grant project. Substance Abuse Service Expansion Supplement to Health Centers: Health centers that received these grants were expected to submit quarterly progress reports to HRSA through the second quarter of 2017 on the number of physicians who have obtained a DATA 2000 waiver and the number of patients who received MAT from these physicians. Health centers must now report these data elements in their annual performance reporting along with information on the number of certified nurse practitioners and physician assistants who have received a DATA 2000 waiver. State Targeted Response to the Opioid Crisis Grants (Opioid STR): Every 6 months, grant recipients are expected to submit progress reports to SAMHSA on the number of individuals who receive opioid use disorder treatment, the number who receive opioid use disorder recovery services, and the number of providers implementing MAT, among other measures. While HHS’s evaluation will focus on whether HHS’s efforts have been implemented as intended, officials told us that in the future an evaluation may also focus on the effectiveness of these efforts, including the effectiveness of efforts to expand access to MAT. Doing so would be consistent with federal standards for internal control, which call for agencies to evaluate results. HHS has some of the information that could be used in a future evaluation of the effectiveness of its efforts to expand access to MAT. In particular, an HHS document describing the department’s fiscal year 2016 – 2017 goals identifies expanding MAT access as an important strategy for the success of HHS’s longer-term goal of reducing opioid use disorders and opioid overdoses. In addition, HHS has identified three potential ways to measure access to MAT: the number of prescriptions for MAT medications, the treatment capacity of practitioners who are authorized to prescribe buprenorphine for opioid use disorders through a DATA 2000 waiver, and the treatment capacity of OTPs certified to administer methadone and other medications. In addition, HHS has data that could be useful for tracking progress in these areas (see table 1). However, HHS has not adopted specific performance measures with targets specifying the magnitude of the increases HHS hopes to achieve through its efforts to expand access to MAT, and by when. For example, HHS has not established a long-term target specifying the percentage increase in the number of prescriptions for buprenorphine HHS would like to achieve, which would help to show whether efforts by HHS and others are resulting in sufficient progress in increasing prescriptions for this MAT medication. HHS has also not chosen a specific method of measuring treatment capacity or established targets associated with it, which would help to show whether a sufficient number of providers are becoming available to evaluate and treat patients who may benefit from MAT. Without specifying these performance measures and associated targets, HHS will not have an effective means to determine whether its efforts are helping to expand access to MAT. The lack of such performance measures with associated targets is inconsistent with federal internal control standards that specify that management should define objectives and evaluate results. According to these standards, using performance information such as performance measures can help agencies monitor results and determine progress in meeting program goals. In the context of HHS’s efforts to expand access to MAT, establishing appropriate performance measures with associated targets would allow HHS to determine whether its efforts are making sufficient progress or whether they need to be improved. Gauging this progress is particularly important, given the large nationwide MAT treatment gap identified in 2015 between the total number of individuals who could benefit from MAT and the limited number who can access it based on provider availability. This gap was estimated at nearly 1 million people as of 2012, and according to HHS officials and other stakeholders, lack of providers continues to be a challenge. Until HHS establishes performance measures with associated targets for the factors related to access to MAT, the department will be unable to evaluate its progress expanding access to MAT for opioid use disorders. In addition, as of August 2017, HHS has not finalized its approach for the planned evaluation activities, including timeframes. ASPE officials said that timeframes for a finalized evaluation approach had not been established because they were still working with RTI to finalize the evaluation approach given the new leadership priorities. When we spoke with the officials, they provided us with a draft evaluation schedule that covered the contract period ending September 2018. As of October 2017, HHS had not provided a finalized evaluation approach or schedule. Federal internal controls call for management to establish and operate monitoring activities and evaluate results. Without an implementation timeframe for the evaluation’s activities, HHS increases the risk that its evaluation of its agencies’ efforts will not be completed as expeditiously as possible, including an evaluation of HHS’s efforts to expand access to MAT. Officials from selected state health departments and behavioral health agencies, private health insurers, and national associations reported using several different efforts to help expand patients’ access to MAT for opioid use disorders. All of the stakeholders we interviewed reported conducting outreach efforts to communicate information about the importance of MAT and how to access it, or providing training to educate providers on prescribing MAT medications. Efforts by states. State health officials we spoke to described several planned or ongoing efforts to expand access to MAT, some of which are supported by federal funding, including federal grant programs. Officials from all five selected states told us that they are offering outreach to and training for providers to help expand access to MAT. For example, several state officials told us that they are promoting training to (1) encourage physicians to obtain authorization (DATA 2000 waivers) to prescribe buprenorphine and (2) encourage physicians with waivers to treat patients up to their patient limit or to request a higher patient limit. According to the stakeholders, all five selected states have implemented or are planning to implement a health care delivery model or approach that will expand access to MAT. Specifically, these models or approaches focus on integrating the use of MAT into primary care settings. For example, health officials from three states described use of a hub-and-spoke model. This model generally involves centralized intake and initial management of patients at a “hub” (e.g., an OTP) and then connecting these patients to community providers at “spokes” (e.g., primary care clinics) for ongoing care, with ongoing support provided by the hub as needed. Additionally, officials from two states described offering remote MAT-related consultations through telehealth that connects patients in rural areas with addiction specialists. According to a 2017 Healthcare Fraud Prevention and Partnership whitepaper, telehealth expands the reach of the addiction professional workforce and the existing pool of MAT providers, and it supports remote forms of behavioral therapy to make trained professionals more accessible to those in underserved or isolated communities. Officials from three states described focusing their MAT expansion efforts in various settings, such as in the criminal justice setting and emergency room departments. State health officials from four of the five states told us that programs in their states are using peer specialists (individuals who have successfully recovered from substance abuse disorders) in emergency rooms and other settings to engage with addicted patients and refer them to addiction specialists or behavioral health counselors. Officials from the selected states said that some of these and other efforts are funded through federal sources, such as MAT expansion grants awarded by SAMHSA, or with state funds to the extent they are available. Efforts by private health insurers. Officials from private health insurers reported that they are expanding access to MAT through outreach or training for providers and through the following three efforts: Eliminating the need for prior authorization to prescribe MAT medications. Officials from three insurers reported removing prior authorization requirements for MAT medications, thereby making it easier for patients to access needed MAT medications more readily, rather than undergoing a waiting period for approval to receive the medications. Other private health insurers told us that they continue to require prior authorization, intended for safety reasons and to reduce drug misuse, and officials from one insurer told us that they will allow a patient to access a limited amount of MAT medications for a period of 24 to 72 hours while making a determination about the appropriate treatment services for the patient. Modifying health benefit coverage. Officials from one private health insurance plan told us that the company is redesigning the benefit coverage for methadone and has removed member copays. This effort is intended to make MAT medications more affordable and allow members who are not able to use buprenorphine to have an alternative, such as methadone, that is not cost-prohibitive. Incentivizing providers and health insurance plan members to use MAT. Officials from four private health insurance plans described plans to offer incentives to providers or patients to use MAT. For example, officials from three health plans stated that they are offering alternative payment models or paying higher rates to providers that offer MAT, and another private health insurer is offering incentives to its members who are enrolled in behavioral health programs that provide access to MAT. Efforts by national associations. Officials we interviewed from the national associations—including the American Society of Addiction Medicine, the National Governors Association, and the Association of State and Territorial Health Officials—told us that they are helping to expand access to MAT through outreach and training for their members and by developing tools and resource guides for their members. An official from one association told us that it shares federal grant announcements, including those that are focused on expanding access to MAT, with its members. Officials from another association said it provides training to providers on how to appropriately prescribe MAT medications. In addition, officials from one association told us that they developed an opioid-related road map that identifies examples of strategies—including MAT—that state policymakers can use in their ongoing efforts to address the opioid epidemic. Examples of strategies include reducing the stigma associated with MAT through educating the public and potential providers. Another strategy in the road map is changing payment policies to expand access to MAT services, such as ensuring that Medicaid and other state health programs adequately cover all MAT medications and behavioral interventions and encouraging or requiring commercial health plans to adopt similar policies. HHS funds grant programs and has taken other steps to expand access to MAT, which has been shown to be effective in reducing the prevalence of opioid use disorders and with them, the likelihood of drug overdoses. HHS’s Opioid Initiative began in 2015, and the grants that support it are ongoing, so it is likely too early to determine how effective HHS’s efforts have been in expanding access to MAT and in meeting HHS’s other priorities related to addressing the opioid epidemic. According to HHS, access to MAT can be measured in terms of the number of prescriptions for MAT and by the treatment capacities of OTPs and practitioners who are authorized to prescribe buprenorphine. Our review suggests, however, that HHS may not be ready to perform this evaluation. While HHS told us that it may evaluate the effectiveness of its efforts in the future, the department has not established performance measures with targets that would specify the results that HHS hopes to achieve through its efforts, and by when. Furthermore, HHS has not established timeframes for the activities that will make up its planned evaluation of whether HHS’s efforts have been implemented as intended. Without performance measures with targets and evaluation timeframes, HHS increases the risk that the evaluation will not be completed in a timely manner or that HHS will not know whether its MAT- related efforts are successful or whether new approaches are needed. The evaluation is particularly important, given the hundreds of millions of dollars HHS has invested in its MAT-related grant programs. We are making the following two recommendations to HHS. The Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation should establish performance measures with targets related to expanding access to MAT for opioid use disorders. (Recommendation 1) The Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation should establish timeframes in its evaluation approach that specify when its evaluation of efforts to expand access to MAT will be implemented and completed. (Recommendation 2) We provided a draft of this report to HHS for review, and HHS provided written comments, which are reprinted in appendix II. HHS also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. In its written comments, HHS concurred with both of our recommendations. Specifically, for our first recommendation to establish performance measures with targets related to expanding access to MAT for opioid use disorders, HHS stated that developing such measures is appropriate and that the department will continue to work to develop robust performance measures, including measures related to MAT, as part of its overall Opioid Strategy, which includes the department’s most recent efforts to address the opioid epidemic. For our second recommendation to establish timeframes in its evaluation approach that specify when its evaluation of efforts to expand access to MAT will be implemented and completed, HHS agreed that timeframes are important to any evaluation. HHS noted that its evaluation is being conducted under a 2-year contract that is scheduled to end in September 2018. HHS has also provided us with a draft evaluation schedule. We clarified in our report, however, that HHS has not yet provided a finalized approach for the planned evaluation or a finalized schedule establishing timeframes for the activities that will make up the evaluation. Until it finalizes its evaluation approach and establishes related timeframes, HHS increases the risk that it will not complete its planned evaluation by September 2018. We are sending copies of this report to the HHS, and appropriate congressional committees. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-7114 or curdae@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix III. According to the Department of Health and Human Services, a diversion control plan is a set of documented procedures intended to reduce the possibility that controlled substances will be transferred or used illicitly. Opioid treatment programs (OTPs) and practitioners who prescribe buprenorphine at the highest patient level through a Drug Addiction Treatment Act of 2000 (DATA 2000) waiver are required to have these plans. OTPs are programs that may administer or dispense medication- assisted treatment (MAT) for people diagnosed with an opioid use disorder, including the use of methadone and buprenorphine. In addition, under a DATA 2000 waiver, practitioners may prescribe buprenorphine for patients, up to a 30-, 100-, or 275 patient limit. An OTP must maintain a current diversion control plan that contains specific measures to reduce the possibility of diversion of controlled substances from legitimate treatment use. Per federal guidelines, the goal of the diversion control plan is to reduce the scope and significance of diversion and its impact on communities. The guidelines state that each OTP’s diversion control plan should make every effort to balance diversion control against the therapeutic needs of the individual patient. They also state that diversion control plans should address at least four general areas of concern: program environment, dosing and take-home medication, prevention of multiple program enrollment, and prescription medication misuse. The guidelines include details about each of these areas: Program environment: Diversion in the program environment can be deterred and detected by regular surveillance and the monitoring of areas in and around the program, where opportunities for diversion may exist. A visible human presence at a program’s location gives community members the opportunity to approach staff with concerns and communicates the program’s commitment to assuring a safe environment and a positive impact on the surrounding community. Dosing and take-home medication: In the area of dosing and take- home medication, diversion control encompasses careful control of inventory, attentive patient dosing, and close supervision of take- home medication. Observing a patient take his or her dose and having each of them drink and speak after dosing are fundamental components of diversion control. Take-home dosing should be provided with careful attention to regulatory compliance and the therapeutic benefit and safety these regulations are meant to promote. Prevention of multiple program enrollment: Reasonable measures should be taken to prevent patients from enrolling in treatment provided by more than one clinic or individual practitioner. An OTP, after obtaining patient consent, may contact other OTPs within a reasonable geographic distance (100 miles) to verify that a patient is not enrolled in another OTP. Misuse of prescription medication: The misuse of prescription medication has become an area of great concern nationally and impacts diversion control planning at OTPs. All OTP physicians and other healthcare providers, as permitted, should register to use their respective state’s prescription drug monitoring program (PDMP) and query it for each newly admitted patient prior to initiating dosing. The PDMP should be checked periodically (for example, quarterly) through the course of each individual’s treatment and, in particular, before ordering take-home doses as well as at other important clinical decision points. SAMHSA’s best-practice guidelines for using buprenorphine for treating opioid use disorders include multiple references to diversion, including monitoring for diversion, storage of this medication to minimize diversion, and use of formulations that may be less likely to be diverted. Specifically, the best practices state that, when possible, practitioners should use the combination buprenorphine/naloxone product, which increases safety and decreases the likelihood of diversion and misuse. Further, physicians who request and receive a waiver to prescribe buprenorphine to treat up to 275 patients outside of an OTP are required to have a diversion control plan. According to an HHS official, as of July 13, 2017, roughly 3,330 of the over 39,000 practitioners with a waiver had a 275-patient limit waiver. The majority of these practitioners, just over 27,000, have a 30-patient limit. According to SAMHSA guidance, the diversion plan should contain specific measures to reduce the possibility of diversion of buprenorphine from legitimate treatment use and should assign specific responsibilities of the medical and administrative staff of the practice setting for carrying out these measures. Further, the guidance states that the plan should address how: the environment at the practice setting can prevent onsite diversion; to prevent diversion with regard to dosing and take-home medication; and to prevent patients from receiving a prescription from more than one practitioner and later diverting some of the prescribed medication. Elizabeth H. Curda, Director, (202) 512-7114 or curdae@gao.gov. In addition to the contact name above, Will Simerl, Assistant Director; Natalie Herzog, Analyst-in-Charge; La Sherri Bush; and Emily Wilson made key contributions to this report. Also contributing were Muriel Brown, Krister Friday, Sandra George, and Christina Ritchie.	[ "The misuse of prescription opioid pain relievers and illicit opioids, such as heroin, has contributed to increases in overdose deaths. According to the most recent Centers for Disease Control and Prevention data, in 2015 over 52,000 people died of drug overdose deaths, and about 63 percent of them involved an opioid. For those who are addicted to or misuse opioids, MAT has been shown to be an effective treatment. GAO was asked to review HHS and other efforts related to MAT for opioid use disorders. This report (1) describes HHS's key efforts to expand access to MAT, (2) examines HHS's evaluation, if any, of its efforts to expand access to MAT, and (3) describes efforts by selected stakeholders (states, private health insurers, and national associations) to expand access to MAT. GAO gathered information from HHS officials as well as a non-generalizable selection of 15 stakeholders selected based on their MAT expansion activities, among other factors. GAO also assessed HHS's evaluation plans using internal control standards for defining objectives and evaluating results. In an effort to reduce the prevalence of opioid misuse and the fatalities associated with it, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) established a goal to expand access to medication-assisted treatment (MAT). MAT is an approach that combines behavioral therapy and the use of certain medications, such as methadone and buprenorphine. HHS has implemented five key efforts since 2015 that focus on expanding access to MAT for opioid use disorders—four grant programs that focus on expanding access to MAT in various settings (including rural primary care practices and health centers) and regulatory changes that expand treatment capacity by increasing patient limits for buprenorphine prescribers and allowing nurse practitioners and physician assistants to prescribe buprenorphine. Some of the grant awards were made in 2015, while others were made as recently as May 2017. (See figure.) As of August 2017, efforts under all the grant programs were ongoing. Grant recipients can use funding to undertake a range of activities, such as hiring and training providers and supporting treatments involving MAT. In addition, certain providers and grant recipients are required to develop plans for preventing MAT medications from being diverted for nonmedical purposes. HHS officials told GAO that as of August 2017, the department was in the process of finalizing its plans to evaluate its efforts to address the opioid epidemic. In September 2016, HHS awarded a contract to conduct the evaluation. HHS officials told GAO that they are still working with the contractor to finalize the evaluation approach and that it will focus on whether HHS's efforts to address the opioid epidemic have been implemented as intended. HHS officials said that in the future, HHS may also evaluate whether, or to what extent, its efforts have been effective in expanding access to MAT, in addition to evaluating implementation. While HHS has some of the information that could be used in a future evaluation of the effectiveness of its efforts to expand access to MAT, it has not adopted specific performance measures with targets specifying the magnitude of the increases HHS hopes to achieve through its efforts to expand access to MAT, and by when. For example, HHS has not established a long-term target specifying the percentage increase in the number of prescriptions for buprenorphine HHS would like to achieve, which would help to show whether efforts by HHS and others are resulting in a sufficient number of prescriptions for MAT medications. HHS has also not chosen a specific method of measuring treatment capacity or established targets associated with it, which would help determine whether a sufficient number of providers are becoming available to evaluate and treat patients who may benefit from MAT. Without specifying these performance measures and associated targets, HHS will not have an effective means to determine whether its efforts are helping to expand access to MAT or whether new approaches are needed. Gauging this progress is particularly important given the large gap identified nationwide between the total number of individuals who could benefit from MAT and the limited number who can currently access it based on provider availability. In addition, GAO also found that as of August 2017, HHS had not finalized its approach for its planned evaluation activities, including timeframes. Without timeframes for the evaluation's activities, HHS increases the risk that the evaluation will not be completed as expeditiously as possible. In addition to HHS efforts to expand access to MAT, officials from selected states, private health insurers, and national associations reported using several efforts to expand patients' access to MAT for opioid use disorders. For example, several stakeholders provided GAO with the following examples of their efforts: States. State health officials from all five selected states have implemented or are planning approaches that focus on integrating the use of MAT into primary care, such as by providing services for centralized intake and initial management of patients or through telehealth that connects patients in rural areas with addiction specialists in a different location. Private health insurers. Three private health insurers reported removing prior authorization requirements for MAT medications so patients can avoid a waiting period before receiving the medications. National associations. Officials told GAO that they are conducting outreach and training for their members and developing tools and resource guides. For example, one association developed a road map with strategies that state policymakers can use to address the opioid epidemic, including strategies for reducing the stigma associated with MAT through educating the public and potential providers. GAO recommends that HHS take two actions: (1) establish performance measures with targets related to expanding access to MAT, and (2) establish timeframes for its evaluation of its efforts to expand access to MAT. HHS concurred with both recommendations." ]	5,601	gov_report	en	null	051da025ed4174d751c0be47d05cce6cf5d36d4d7e0897bc
Congressional rules establish a general division of responsibility under which questions of policy are kept separate from questions of funding. Broadly, the term authorization is used to describe legislation that establishes, continues, or modifies the organization or activities of a federal entity or program. By itself, such legislation does not provide funding for such purposes. Instead, the authority to obligate payments from the Treasury is left to separate appropriations measures. This distinction between appropriations and general legislation as two separate classes of measures, and their consideration in separate legislative vehicles, is a construct of congressional rules and practices. It has been developed and formalized by the House and Senate pursuant to the constitutional authority for each chamber to "determine the Rules of its Proceedings." This power permits each chamber of Congress to enforce, modify, waive, repeal, or ignore its rules as it sees fit. Because the two chambers exercise this rulemaking authority independently, they have developed differing (albeit generally similar) rules and practices. This report addresses solely developments in the House. According to Hinds' Precedents , the origin of a formal rule mandating the separation of general legislation from appropriations can be traced to 1835, when the House debated the increasing problem of delay in enacting appropriations due to the inclusion of "debatable matters of another character, new laws which created long debates in both Houses" and suggested that the Committee on Ways and Means should "strip the appropriation bills of every thing but were legitimate matters of appropriation." In the following Congress (25 th Congress, 1837-1839), language was added to House rules that stated: No appropriation shall be reported in such general appropriation bills, or be in order as an amendment thereto, for any expenditure not previously authorized by law. This rule was applied broadly on occasion to exclude legislative provisions authorizing new expenditures as well, such as a case in 1838 when it was used to exclude an amendment that included a provision for refurnishing the White House. Gradually, the rule "became construed through a long line of decisions to admit amendments increasing salaries but as excluding amendments providing for decreases." As a consequence of this, in 1876, the language was expanded (at the suggestion of Representative William Holman of Indiana) to further state: Nor shall any provision in any such bill or amendment thereto, changing existing law, be in order except such as, being germane to the subject matter of the bill, shall retrench expenditures. As described by one scholar, this provision effectively granted the Appropriations Committee authority to include virtually any legislative provision in an appropriations measure so long as it reduced the number and salary of federal officials, the compensation of any person paid out of the Treasury, or the amounts of money covered in an appropriation bill. According to one contemporary account, a broad initial construction of the rule by the House resulted in "putting a great mass of general legislation upon the appropriation bills." The rule was retained in this form until 1880 (46 th Congress), when it was modified to define retrenchments as the reduction of "the number and salary of officers of the United States, the reduction of compensation of any person paid out of the Treasury of the United States, or the reduction of the amounts of money covered by the bill." That form of the rule remained a part of House rules until the 49 th Congress eliminated it in 1885. It was reinserted in the rules for the 52 nd and 53 rd Congresses (1891-1895) but was again dropped for the 54 th through 61 st Congresses (1895-1911) before being readopted in the 62 nd Congress. Although the Holman rule has remained a part of House rules since that time, its language was amended at the start of the 98 th Congress (1983-1984). At that time, it was restructured to narrow the exception to the general prohibition against legislation to allow only retrenchments reducing amounts of money covered by the bill. In addition, the House rules for the 98 th Congress changed when retrenchment amendments could be offered. Amendments that only alter the items or amounts in an appropriation bill are generally in order when the measure is read for amendment and must be offered as the relevant paragraph or section of the bill is read. The new version of the rule provided, however, that germane amendments to retrench expenditures (as well as limitation amendments) would be in order only after the reading of a general appropriation bill and if a preferential motion that the Committee of the Whole rise and report (essentially ending consideration of the bill) were rejected. Further stylistic changes were made when the House recodified its rules in the 106 th Congress (1999-2000) to make explicit that retrenchment amendments are in order if the motion to rise and report is not offered—as well as if the motion is rejected. It also clarified that the effect of a point of order against legislation in an appropriations bill (and, by extension, the application of the Holman rule exception) is surgical so that it lies against an offending provision in the text and not against consideration of the entire bill. The Holman rule currently states the following: A provision changing existing law may not be reported in a general appropriation bill, including a provision making the availability of funds contingent on the receipt or possession of information not required by existing law for the period of the appropriation, except germane provisions that retrench expenditures by the reduction of amounts of money covered by the bill [emphasis added]. The Holman rule, thus, does not circumscribe Congress's lawmaking authority but rather provides a limited exception to the general prohibition in House rules against legislation in appropriation measures. For the 115 th Congress, the House included a separate order as Section 3(a) of H.Res. 5 , adopting the rules of the House, that provides the following: During the first session of the One Hundred Fifteenth Congress, any reference in clause 2 of rule XXI to a provision or amendment that retrenches expenditures by a reduction of amounts of money covered by the bill shall be construed as applying to any provision or amendment (offered after the bill has been read for amendment) that retrenches expenditures by— (1) the reduction of amounts of money in the bill; (2) the reduction of the number and salary of the officers of the United States; or (3) the reduction of the compensation of any person paid out of the Treasury of the United States. As stated in a section-by section summary included in the Congressional Record by Representative Pete Sessions, the chairman of the House Rules Committee, the purpose of this provision is "to see if the reinstatement of the Holman rule will provide Members with additional tools to reduce spending during consideration of the regular general appropriation bill." The applicability of this separate order was extended under Section 5 of H.Res. 787 (115 th Congress) which provided that "Section 3(a) of House Resolution 5 is amended by striking 'the first session of.'" This separate order was not adopted for the 116 th Congress, so the application of the rule reverts to being guided by prior precedents rather than this language. Since the period immediately after the initial adoption of the rule in the 19 th century, the House has interpreted it through precedents that have tended to incrementally narrow its application. For example, early precedents established that while it was not always necessary that a retrenchment specify the amount of a reduction of expenditures, it must appear as a necessary result of the legislation to be in order and that it is not sufficient that such reduction would probably (or would in the opinion of the chair) result therefrom. For example, legislation that would simply confer discretionary authority to terminate employment of federal employees is not in order under the Holman exception because any resulting savings would be speculative. The reduction also may not be contingent on an event. Furthermore, the rule is not applicable to funds other than those appropriated in the pending general appropriations bill. The Holman rule then is intended to apply only when an obvious reduction of funds in a general appropriations bill is achieved by the provision in question, such as the cessation of specific government activities, or through a specific reduction of total appropriations in the bill. In addition, the exception does not apply to limitations (on the grounds that such language is not legislative) or legislative language unaccompanied by a reduction of funds in the bill. Legislation that is too broad has also typically not been allowed under the Holman rule exception. The House has held, for example, that a provision that stated no part of an appropriation could be expended for a specific, designated purpose qualified as a retrenchment. However, a proposal that effectively repealed the law under which appropriations for that purpose were authorized was held not to come within the exception. In another case, the House held that even when a provision does reduce expenditures, it may not be accompanied by additional legislative provisions not directly contributing to the reduction. The separate order for the 115 th Congress effectively reinstated language that had been stricken from the rule in 1983. While the full scope of amendments might be in order as a consequence of this language, it is possible to analyze its potential impact based on past precedents and the limited experience of the 115 th Congress. The additional language opened the door to the consideration of retrenchments resulting from a reduction of the number and salary of the officers of the United States or the reduction of the compensation of any person paid out of the Treasury of the United States. There are precedents regarding provisions allowed under the older, pre-1983 form of the rule that may be illustrative for understanding what might be in order. For example, a proposal that pay for a class of employees be limited to a smaller number of employees than authorized by law was allowed, as were proposals that would reduce the number of officers. The Holman rule also allowed proposals that would consolidate or eliminate offices. On at least one occasion, the Holman rule was the basis for allowing a proposal to replace civilian employees with lower paid U.S. Army enlisted personnel. In another case, the rule allowed for an amendment that capped the salaries of certain employees. In the 115 th Congress, one amendment was considered in order based on a plain reading of the text of the separate order to allow for "the reduction of the compensation of any person paid out of the Treasury of the United States." Although the amendment failed of passage, it would have provided that: The salary of Mark Gabriel, the Administrator of the Western Area Power Administration, shall be reduced to $1. As cited above, however, neither the rule nor the separate order allows for retrenchments that would be applicable to funds other than those appropriated in the pending general appropriations bill. In addition, the application of the broader exceptions in the separate order were still subject to the general requirement for germaneness. The Holman rule is not intended to open the door for legislative provisions that would expand the scope of the bill. As a consequence, even with the additional scope provided by the language of the separate order, it would likely not be in order to include broad legislative provisions in, or amendments to, a specific appropriation bill that would apply to the salary or number of federal employees funded through appropriations in other measures. Furthermore, House precedent establishes that simply providing for a reduction of the number and salaries of officers in a paragraph when it is complicated by other elements does not necessarily bring a proposition within the exception. The Holman rule was also cited as the basis for allowing the consideration of one additional amendment during the 115 th Congress. That amendment also failed to pass, but it would have abolished the Budget Analysis Division of the Congressional Budget Office, comprising 89 employees with annual salaries aggregating $15 million, transferring responsibility for any duties imposed by law and regulation to the Office of the Director of the Congressional Budget Office. When discussing the application of rules and precedents, it is important to note that the House Parliamentarian is the sole definitive authority on questions relating to the chamber's precedents and procedures and should be consulted if a formal opinion on any specific parliamentary question is desired.	[ "Although congressional rules establish a general division of responsibility under which questions of policy are kept separate from questions of funding, House rules provide for exceptions in certain circumstances. One such circumstance allows for the inclusion of legislative language in general appropriations bills or amendments thereto for \"germane provisions that retrench expenditures by the reduction of amounts of money covered by the bill.\" This exception appears in clause 2(b) of House Rule XXI and is known as the Holman rule, after Representative William Holman of Indiana, who first proposed the exception in 1876. Since the period immediately after its initial adoption, the House has interpreted the Holman rule through precedents that have tended to incrementally narrow its application. Under current precedents, for a legislative provision or amendment to be in order, the legislative language in question must be both germane to other provisions in the measure and must produce a clear reduction of appropriations in that bill. In addition, the House adopted a separate order during the 115th Congress that provided for retrenchments of expenditures by a reduction of amounts of money covered by the bill to be construed as applying to: any provision or amendment that retrenches expenditures by— (1) the reduction of amounts of money in the bill; (2) the reduction of the number and salary of the officers of the United States; or (3) the reduction of the compensation of any person paid out of the Treasury of the United States. This separate order was not readopted for the 116th Congress. This report provides a history of this provision in House rules and an analysis of precedents that are illustrative of its possible application." ]	2,095	gov_report	en	null	bc0254cd594c65959abda9aead0ab2b04eb7b270b7485432
Running away from home is not a recent phenomenon. Folkloric heroes Huckleberry Finn and Davy Crockett fled their abusive fathers to find adventure and employment. Although some youth today also leave home due to abuse and neglect, they often endure far more negative outcomes than their romanticized counterparts from an earlier era. Without adequate and safe shelter, runaway and homeless youth are vulnerable to engaging in high-risk behaviors and further victimization. Youth who live away from home for extended periods may become removed from school and systems of support. Runaway and homeless youth are vulnerable to multiple problems while they are away from a permanent home, including untreated mental health disorders, drug use, and sexual exploitation. They also report other challenges including poor health and the lack of basic provisions. Congress began to hear concerns about the vulnerabilities of the runaway population in the 1970s due to increased awareness about these youth and the establishment of runaway shelters to assist them in returning home. Congress and the President went on to enact the Runaway Youth Act of 1974 as Title III of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act ( P.L. 93-415 ) to assist runaways through services specifically for this population. Since that time, the law has been updated to authorize services to provide support for runaway and homeless youth outside of the juvenile justice, mental health, and child welfare systems. The Runaway Youth Act—now known as the Runaway and Homeless Youth Act—authorized federal funding to be provided through annual appropriations for three programs that assist runaway and homeless youth: the Basic Center Program (BCP), Transitional Living Program (TLP), and Street Outreach Program (SOP). Together, the programs make up the Runaway and Homeless Youth Program (RHYP), administered by the Family and Youth Services Bureau (FYSB) in the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) Administration for Children and Families (ACF). Basic Center Program: Provides funding to community-based organizations for crisis intervention, temporary shelter, counseling, family unification, and after care services to runaway and homeless youth under age 18 and their families. In some cases, BCP-funded programs may serve older youth. Over 31,000 youth participated in FY2016, the most recent year for which data are available. Transitional Living Program: Supports community-based organizations that provide homeless youth ages 16 through 22 with stable, safe, longer-term residential services up to 18 months (or longer under certain circumstances), including counseling in basic life skills, building interpersonal skills, educational advancement, job attainment skills, and physical and mental health care. Over 6,000 youth participated in FY2016. Street Outreach Program: Provides funding to community-based organizations for street-based outreach and education, including treatment, counseling, provision of information, and referrals for runaway, homeless, and street youth who have been subjected to, or are at risk of being subjected to, sexual abuse, sexual exploitation, prostitution, and trafficking. SOP grantees made contact with more than 36,000 youth in FY2016. This report begins with an overview of the runaway and homeless youth population. It then describes the challenges in defining and counting this population, as well as the factors that influence homelessness and leaving home. The report also provides background on federal efforts to support runaway and homeless youth, including the evolution of federal policies to respond to these youth, with a focus on the period from the Runaway Youth Act of 1974 to the present time. The report then describes the administration and funding of the Basic Center, Transitional Living, and Street Outreach programs that were created from authorizations in the act. The appendixes include funding information for the BCP program and discuss other federal programs that may be used to assist runaway and homeless youth. There is no single federal definition of the terms "homeless youth" or "runaway youth." However, HHS relies on definitions from the Runaway and Homeless Youth Act in administering the Runaway and Homeless Youth program: The act includes the following definitions: "Homeless youth," for purposes of the BCP, includes individuals under age 18 (or some older age if permitted by state or local law) for whom it is not possible to live in a safe environment with a relative and who lack safe alternative living arrangements. "Homeless youth," for purposes of the TLP, includes individuals ages 16 through 22 for whom it is not possible to live in a safe environment with a relative and who lack safe alternative living arrangements. Youth older than age 22 may participate if they entered the program before age 22 and meet other requirements. "Runaway youth" includes individuals under age 18 who absent themselves from their home or legal residence at least overnight without the permission of their parents or legal guardians. Separately, the McKinney-Vento Act authorizes several federal programs for homeless individuals that are administered by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). The definition of "homeless individual" in McKinney-Vento refers to "unaccompanied youth," which applies to selected homelessness programs. HUD's related regulation defines an "unaccompanied youth" as someone under age 25 who meets the definition of "homeless" in the Runaway and Homeless Youth Act or other specified federal laws. The regulation also provides additional criteria, including that they have lived independently without permanent housing for at least 60 days. The research literature discusses definitions of runaway and homeless youth. While studies have often categorized young people based on their status as runaways , homeless, or street youth , a 2011 report suggests that overlap exists between these categories. The authors of the study note that these "typologies," or classifications, are too narrowly defined by the youth's housing status and reasons for homelessness, among other factors. The authors explain that typologies based on mental health status or age cohort are promising, but they suggest further research in this area to ensure that the typologies are accurate. The precise number of homeless and runaway youth is unknown due to their residential mobility. These youth often eschew the shelter system for locations or areas that are not easily accessible to shelter workers and others who count the homeless and runaways. Youth who come into contact with census takers may also be reluctant to report that they have left home or are homeless. Determining the number of homeless and runaway youth is further complicated by the lack of a standardized methodology for counting the population and inconsistent definitions of what it means to be homeless or a runaway. Differences in methodology for collecting data on homeless populations may also influence how the characteristics of the runaway and homeless youth population are reported. Some studies have relied on point prevalence estimates that report whether youth have experienced homelessness at a given point in time, such as on a particular day. According to researchers that study the characteristics of runaway and homeless youth, these studies appear to be biased toward describing individuals who experience longer periods of homelessness. HUD requires communities receiving certain HUD funding to conduct annual point-in-time (PIT) counts of people experiencing homelessness, including homeless youth. The PIT counts include people living in emergency shelter, transitional housing, and on the street or other places not meant for human habitation. It does not include people who are temporarily living with family or friends. In the 2018 PIT count, communities identified 36,361 unaccompanied youth under age 25 (versus 40,799 in 2017) and another 8,724 under age 25 who were homeless parents (versus 9,434 in 2017). While PIT counts do not provide a confident estimate of youth experiencing homelessness across the country, they provide some information to communities about the potential scope of youth homelessness. The Reconnecting Homeless Youth Act ( P.L. 110-378 ), which renewed authorization of appropriations for the Runaway and Homeless Youth Program through FY2013, also authorized funding for HHS to conduct periodic studies of the incidence and prevalence of youth who have run away or are homeless. Separately, the accompanying conference report to the FY2016 appropriations law ( P.L. 114-113 ) directed HUD to use $2 million to conduct a national incidence and prevalence study of homeless youth as authorized under the Runaway and Homeless Youth program. HUD provided these funds to Chapin Hall at the University of Chicago to carry out the study. The study, known as Voices of Youth Count , used a nationally representative phone survey to derive national estimates and conducted brief surveys of youth and in-depth interviews of youth who had experiences of homelessness. The phone survey involved interviews with adults whose households had youth and young adults ages 13 to 25 and with adults ages 18 to 25. Voices of Youth Count estimated that approximately 700,000 youth ages 13 to 17 and 3.5 million young adults ages 18 to 25 had experienced homelessness within a one-year period, meaning they were sleeping in places not meant for human habitation, staying in shelters, or temporarily staying with others while lacking a safe and stable alternative living arrangement. This differs from the PIT counts because it includes individuals who are staying with others. The study also found that youth homelessness affected youth in rural and urban areas at similar levels. A 2010 study on the lifetime prevalence of running away used longitudinal survey data of young people who were 12 to 18 years old when they were first interviewed about whether they had run away—defined as staying away at least one night without their parents' prior knowledge or permission—along with other behaviors. In subsequent years, youth who were under age 17 at their previous interview were asked if they had run away since their last interview. Youth who had ever run away were asked how many times they had done so and the age at which they first did. The study found that 19% of those who ran away did so before turning 18; females were more likely than males to run away; and among white, black, and Hispanic youth, black youth have the highest rate of ever running away. Youth who ran away reported that they did so about three times on average; however, about half of runaways had only run away once. Approximately half of the youth had run away before age 14. A subset of runaway youth is those in foster care. In FY2017, over 500 children in the United States had run away from their foster care home or other placement. While this represents less than 1% of all children in foster care, running away is more prevalent among older youth in care. A study of over 50,000 youth ages 13 through 17 in 21 states indicated that 17% ran away at least once during their first time in foster care. The study found that female, black, and Hispanic youth were more likely to run away than male and white youth in care. The study further found that youth were more likely to run away from congregate care (i.e., group care) settings compared to other settings, such as living with a relative or in a foster family home. Youth were also more likely to run away from care if they lived in the most socioeconomically disadvantaged counties or lived in a state that lacked a process to screen youth on the risk of running away. States report on the characteristics and experiences of certain current and former foster youth through the National Youth in Transition Database (NYTD). Among other information, states must report data on cohorts of foster youth beginning when they are age 17, and later at ages 19 and 21. Among youth surveyed in FY2015 at age 21, about 43% reported having experienced homelessness. Youth most often cite family conflict as the major reason for their homelessness or episodes of running away. According to the research literature, a youth's poor family dynamics, sexual activity, sexual orientation, pregnancy, school problems, and alcohol and drug use are strong predictors of family discord. One-third of callers who used the National Runaway Safeline in 2017—a crisis call center funded under the Runaway and Homeless Youth Program for youth and their relatives involved in runaway incidents—gave family dynamics (not defined) as the reason for their call. Further, a longitudinal survey of middle school and high school youth examined the effects of family instability (e.g., child maltreatment, lack of parental warmth, and parent rejection) and other factors on the likelihood of running away from home approximately two to six years after youth were initially surveyed. Researchers found that youth with family instability were more likely to run away. Family instability also influenced problem behaviors, such as illicit drug use, which, in turn, were associated with running away. Researchers further determined that certain other effects (e.g., school engagement, neighborhood cohesiveness, physical victimization, and friends' support) were not strong predicators of whether youth in the sample ran away. In a study of youth who ran away from foster care between 1993 and 2003, the youth cited three primary reasons why they ran from foster care: to connect with their biological families, express their autonomy and find normalcy, and maintain relationships with nonfamily members. The Voices of Youth Count study found that certain youth ages 18 to 25 were at heightened risk of experiencing homelessness. This included youth with less than a high school diploma or GED; who were Hispanic or black; who were parenting and unmarried; or identified as lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, or questioning (LGBTQ). Gay and lesbian youth appear to be at greater risk for homelessness and are overrepresented in the homeless population, due often to experiencing negative reactions from their parents when they come out about their sexuality. The Voices of Youth Count study found that LGBTQ young adults ages 18 to 25 had more than twice the risk of being homeless than their heterosexual peers. LGBTQ youth made up about 20% of young adults who reported homelessness. In addition, a study involving LGBTQ young adults in seven cities found that the most common reason youth became homeless was due to being kicked out or asked to leave the home of a parent, relative, foster home, or group home. Under an HHS grant, Youth with Child Welfare Involvement at Risk of Homelessness , the 18 grantees (state, local, and tribal child welfare agencies or community-based organizations) evaluated multiple risk factors for homelessness among child welfare-involved populations: which include those who have had numerous foster care placements, run away from foster care, been placed in a group home, had a history of mental health or behavioral health diagnoses, had juvenile justice involvement, had a history of substance abuse, been emancipated from foster care, and been parenting or fathered a child. Runaway and homeless youth are vulnerable to multiple problems while they are away from a permanent home, including untreated mental health disorders, drug use, and sexual exploitation. Studies of homeless youth indicate that they are more likely to experience mental health and substance abuse disorders than their counterparts in the general population. A literature review of studies on psychiatric disorders among homeless youth found high prevalence of conduct disorders, major depression, psychosis, and other disorders. A study of participants in the Street Outreach Program found that about 6 out of 10 reported symptoms associated with depression and almost three-fourths reported that they had experienced major trauma, such as physical or sexual abuse or witnessing or being a victim of violence. Substance abuse is more prevalent among youth who live on the street, compared to homeless youth who are in shelters. Still, both groups of youth use alcohol or drugs at higher rates than their peers who live in family households, even after researchers control for demographic differences. While away from a permanent home, runaway and homeless youth are also vulnerable to sexual exploitation; sex and labor trafficking; and other victimization such as being beaten up, robbed, or otherwise assaulted. Some youth resort to illegal activity including stealing, exchanging sex for food or a place to stay, and selling drugs for survival. Runaway and homeless youth report other challenges including poor health and a lack of basic provisions. Prior to the enactment of the Runaway Youth Act of 1974 (Title III, Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, P.L. 93-415 ), federal policy provided limited services to runaway and homeless youth. If they received any services, most of these youth were served through the local child welfare agency, juvenile justice court system, or both. The 1970s marked a shift to a more rehabilitative model for assisting youth who had run afoul of the law, including those who committed status offenses such as running away. During this period, Congress focused increasing attention on runaways and other vulnerable youth due, in part, to emerging sociological models to explain why youth engaged in deviant behavior. The first runaway shelters were created in the late 1960s and 1970s to assist them in returning home. The landmark Runaway Youth Act of 1974 decriminalized runaway youth and authorized funding for programs to provide shelter, counseling, and other services. Since the law's enactment, Congress and the President have expanded the services available to both runaway youth and homeless youth under what is now referred to as the Runaway and Homeless Youth Program. In more recent years, other federal entities have been involved in responding to the challenges facing runaway and homeless youth. These efforts are coordinated through the U.S. Interagency Council on Homelessness (USICH). Figure 1 traces the evolution of federal policy in this area. The Runaway and Homeless Youth Program is a major part of recent federal efforts to end youth homelessness through the U.S. Interagency Council on Homelessness. The USICH, established under the 1987 Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act, is made up of several federal agencies, including HHS and HUD. The HEARTH Act, enacted in 2009 as part of the Helping Families Save Their Homes Act ( P.L. 111-22 ), charged USICH with developing a National Strategic Plan to End Homelessness. In June 2010, USICH released this plan, entitled Opening Doors . The plan set out goals for ending homelessness, including (1) ending chronic homelessness by 2015; (2) preventing and ending homelessness among veterans by 2015; (3) preventing and ending homelessness for families, youth, and children by 2020; and (4) setting a path to ending all types of homelessness. In 2012, USICH amended Opening Doors to specifically address strategies for improving the educational outcomes for children and youth and assisting unaccompanied homeless youth. USICH outlined its intention to improve outcomes for youth in four areas: stable housing, permanent connections, education or employment options, and socio-emotional well-being. In 2013, a USICH working group developed a guiding document for ending youth homelessness by 2020. Known as the Framework to End Youth Homelessness , the document outlines a data strategy to collect better data on the number and characteristics of youth experiencing homelessness. This data strategy includes coordinating the former data collection system for the Runaway and Homeless Youth program—referred to as RHYMIS—with HUD's Homeless Management Information Systems (HMIS). RHYMIS was a data system administered by HHS for previous RHYP grantees to upload demographic and other data for the youth they served. HMIS is a locally administered data system used to record and analyze client, service, and housing data for individuals and families who are homeless or at risk of homelessness in a given community. As of FY2015, RHYP grantees stopped reporting to RHYMIS and instead report to HMIS. Grantees reported to RHYMIS on the basic demographics of the youth, the services they received, and the status of the youth upon exiting the programs. RHY grantees are now required to report this same (and new information) to HMIS. According to HHS, some grantees have had have encountered inaccurate software programming for their data standards or have had issues with successfully extracting their data to submit to HHS. The data strategy outlined in the framework also involves, if funding is available, designing and implementing a national study to estimate the number, needs, and characteristics of youth experiencing homelessness. This is consistent with the Runaway and Homeless Youth Act's directive for HHS to conduct a study of youth homelessness. As noted, this study— Voices of Youth Count —received funding from FY2016 HUD appropriations. In addition, HHS has supported other research on homeless youth, including factors associated with prolonged homelessness and risk factors for homelessness among children and youth with involvement in child welfare. In 2018, the USICH issued a brief that outlines continued gaps in data on the homeless youth population, citing the need for greater understanding about the causes of youth homelessness and how youth enter and exit homelessness. Separately, the framework also outlined a strategy to strengthen and coordinate the capacity of federal, state, and local systems to work toward ending youth homelessness. USICH has provided guidance to communities, including by establishing community-level criteria for ending homelessness and accompanying benchmarks to assess whether they have achieved an end to youth homelessness. Still, the 2018 USICH brief called for greater evidence regarding the impact of housing and service interventions in helping youth exit homelessness. As mentioned, the Runaway and Homeless Youth Program is administered by the Family and Youth Services Bureau (FYSB) within HHS's Administration for Children and Families (ACF). The Runaway and Homeless Youth Act includes three authorizations of appropriations. The authorization of appropriations for the Basic Center Program and Transitional Living program is $127.4 million for each of FY2019 and FY2020. Under the law, 90% of the federal funds appropriated under the two programs must be used for the BCP and TLP (together, the programs and their related activities are known as the Consolidated Runaway and Homeless Youth program). Of this amount, 45% is reserved for the BCP and no more than 55% is reserved for the TLP. The remaining share of consolidated funding is allocated for (1) a national communication system to facilitate communication between service providers, runaway youth, and their families (National Safeline); (2) training and technical support for grantees; (3) evaluations of the programs; (4) federal coordination efforts on matters relating to the health, education, employment, and housing of these youth; and (5) studies of runaway and homeless youth. The authorization of appropriations for the Street Outreach program is $25 million for each of FY2019 and FY2020. Although the SOP is a separately funded component, SOP services are coordinated with those provided under the BCP and TLP. The authorization of appropriations for the periodic estimate of incidence and prevalence of youth homelessness is such sums as may be necessary for FY2019 and FY2020. Funding has not been provided by HHS under this authority, and as noted, funds appropriated to HUD for this purpose have been used to support Voices of Youth Count. Table 1 shows funding levels for the Runaway and Homeless Youth Program from FY2006 through FY2019. Over this period, funding has increased notably for the program three times, most recently from FY2017 to FY2018. Congress has provided some guidance on how the additional funds are to be spent. In the conference report to accompany the FY2019 consolidated appropriations act, Congress stated that the increase should be provided to current TLP grantees whose awards end on March 31, 2019. The funding is to be used to continue services until new awards are made to those grantees, or for those grantees that did not receive a new grant, to provide services until the end of FY2019. Funding may then be used for additional new awards. The Basic Center Program is intended to provide short-term shelter and services for youth and their families at centers operated by BCP grantees, which are public and private community-based organizations. Youth eligible to receive BCP services include those youth who are at risk of running away or becoming homeless (and may live at home with their parents), or have already left home, either voluntarily or involuntarily. To stay at the shelter, youth must be under age 18, or an older age if the BCP center is located in a state or locality that permits this higher age. Some centers may serve homeless youth through street-based services, home-based services, and drug abuse education and prevention services. Grantees seek to connect youth with their families, whenever possible, or to locate appropriate alternative placements. They also provide individual or group and family counseling, health care, education, and employment assistance. As specified in the law, BCP grantees or centers are intended to provide services as an alternative to involving runaway and homeless youth in the law enforcement, juvenile justice, child welfare, and mental health systems. Youth may stay in a center continuously up to 21 days. In FY2017, the program served 23,288 youth, and in FY2018 it funded 280 BCP shelters (most recent figures available). These centers, which can shelter as many as 20 youth, are generally supposed to be located in areas that are frequented or easily reached by runaway and homeless youth. BCP grantees must make efforts to contact the parents and relatives of runaway and homeless youth. Grantees are also required to establish relationships with law enforcement, health and mental health care, social service, welfare, and school district systems to coordinate services. Grantees maintain confidential statistical records of youth, including youth who are not referred to out-of-home shelter services. Further, grantees are required to submit an annual report to HHS detailing the program activities and the number of youth participating in such activities, as well as information about the operation of the centers. BCP grants are allocated directly to grantees for a three-year period. Funding is generally distributed to entities based on the proportion of the nation's youth under age 18 in the jurisdiction where the entities are located. The 50 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico each receive a minimum allotment of $200,000. Separately, the territories (currently, this includes American Samoa and Guam) each receive a minimum of $70,000. The amount of funding for each state or territory can further depend on whether grant applicants in that jurisdiction applied for funding, and if so, whether the applicant fulfilled the requirements in the authorizing law and grant application. For example, the authorizing law directs HHS to give priority to applicants who have demonstrated experience in providing services to runaway and homeless youth. HHS is to re-allot any funds designated for grantees in one state to grantees in other states that will not be obligated before the end of a fiscal year. See Table A-1 for the amount of funding allocated for each state in FY2017 and FY2018. The costs of the BCP are shared by the federal government (90%) and grantees (10%). In FY2008, HHS began funding a three-year Rural Host Homes Demonstration Project , which was initiated to expand BCP shelter and support services to runaway and homeless youth who live in rural areas not served by shelter facilities. The project supported grantees that provided youth with shelter (via host home families who were recruited, screened, and trained) and preventive services, including transportation, counseling, educational assistance, and aftercare planning, among others. Over the course of the three years, the project served 781 youth, 411 of whom received shelter and 370 of whom received preventive services without shelter. Recognizing the difficulty that youth face in becoming self-sufficient adults, the Transitional Living Program provides longer-term shelter and assistance for youth ages 16 through 22 (or older if the youth entered the TLP prior to reaching age 22) who may leave their biological homes due to family conflict, or have left and are not expected to return home. Pregnant and/or parenting youth are eligible for TLP services. In FY2017, the TLP provided services to 3,517 youth. In FY2018, the program funded 229 organizations. Each TLP grantee may shelter up to 20 youth at various sites, such as host family homes, supervised apartments owned by a social service agency, scattered-site apartments, or single-occupancy apartments rented directly with the assistance of the grantee. Youth may remain at TLP sites for up to 540 days (18 months), or longer for youth under age 18. Youth ages 16 through 22 may remain in the program for a continuous period of 635 days (approximately 21 months) under "exceptional circumstances." This term means circumstances in which a youth would benefit to an unusual extent from additional time in the program. A youth in a TLP who has not reached age 18 on the last day of the 635-day period may, in exceptional circumstances and if otherwise qualified for the program, remain in the program until his or her 18 th birthday. Youth receive several types of services at TLP-funded programs: basic life-skills training, including consumer education and instruction in budgeting and the use of credit; parenting support and child care (as appropriate); building interpersonal skills; educational opportunities, such as GED courses and postsecondary training; assistance in job preparation and attainment; and mental and physical health care services. TLP grantees are required to develop a written plan designed to help youth transition to living independently or another appropriate living arrangement, and they are to refer youth to other systems that can help to meet their educational, health care, and social service needs. The grantees must also submit an annual report to HHS that includes information regarding the activities carried out with funds and the number and characteristics of the homeless youth. As part of the FY2002 budget request, the George W. Bush Administration proposed a $33 million initiative to fund maternity group homes—or centers that provide shelter to pregnant and parenting teens who are vulnerable to abuse and neglect—as a component of the TLP. Although the TLP authorized services for pregnant and parenting teens prior to FY2002, the Bush Administration sought funds specifically to serve this population. Increased funds were ultimately provided to enable these youth to access TLP services. The 2003 amendments to the Runaway and Homeless Youth Act ( P.L. 108-96 ) provided explicit authority to use TLP funds for this purpose. Since FY2004, funding for adult-supervised transitional living arrangements that serve pregnant or parenting women ages 16 to 21 and their children has been awarded to organizations that receive TLP grants. These organizations provide youth with parenting skills, including child development education, family budgeting, health and nutrition, and other skills to promote family well-being. TLP grants are distributed competitively by HHS to community-based public and private organizations throughout the country for a five-year period. Grantees must provide at least 10% of the total cost of the program. HHS is carrying out a study to learn more about the long-term outcomes of 1,250 youth who have used TLP services. The study seeks to describe the outcomes and to isolate and describe promising practices and other factors that may contribute to their successes or challenges. Of particular interest for the study is how services are delivered, the demographics of youth, and their socio-emotional wellness and life experiences. It involves both a process evaluation and impact evaluation, with youth randomly assigned to the treatment (i.e., participation in the TLP) and control groups. The study seeks to address the following questions: (1) How do TLP programs operate, what types of program models are used to deliver services, and what services are delivered to homeless youth? (2) What are the long-term housing outcomes and protective factors for youth who participate in the TLP program immediately, six months, 12 months, and 18 months after exiting the program? (3) What interventions can be attributed to any positive outcomes experienced by youth who participate in the TLP? According to HHS, the pilot study revealed challenges "in collecting data from a large enough sample size of youth to detect any effects so that conclusions could be drawn about the impact of homeless youth served by TLPs." HHS is not certain how it will move forward with the study. In FY2016, HHS began the Transitional Living Program Special Population Demonstration project. The project funded nine grantees over a two-year period that tested approaches for serving populations that need additional support: LGBTQ runaway and homeless youth ages 16 to 21; and young adults who have left foster care because of emancipation. Grantees were expected to provide strategies that help youth build protective factors, such as connections with schools, employment, and appropriate family members and other caring adults. According to HHS, a process evaluation will assess how grantees are implementing the demonstration project. HHS separately funded a project from FY2012 through FY2014 to build the capacity of TLPs in serving LGBTQ youth. Known as the 3/40 Blueprint: Creating the Blueprint to Reduce LGBTQ Youth Homelessness , the purpose of the grant was develop information about serving the LGBTQ youth population experiencing homelessness, such as through efforts to identify innovative intervention strategies, determine culturally appropriate screening and assessment tools, and better understand the needs of LGBTQ youth served by RHY providers. The website developed by the grantee, the University of Illinois at Chicago, identifies promising practices that serve LGBTQ youth who are experiencing homelessness and publishes information about their challenges. In FY2009, HHS began the Support Systems for Rural Homeless Youth Demonstration Project . Six states received grants to support TLPs in rural communities in serving young adults who have few or no connections to a supportive family structure or community resources. The five-year project sought to provide services across three main areas: survival support, which includes housing, health care (including mental health), and substance abuse treatment and prevention; community, which includes community service, youth and adult partnerships, mentoring, and peer support groups; and education and employment, which includes high school or GED completion, postsecondary education, and job training and employment. The six states—Colorado, Iowa, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Vermont—each received annual grants of $200,000. According to HHS, all of the sites engaged youth in positive youth development activities that included safe places for youth to go. In addition, they raised awareness about homelessness in rural areas and addressed some of the unique needs around employment, housing, and transportation. However, the sites also confirmed that there is a general lack of available housing for homeless youth and that transportation was the most critical impediment to serving these youth. The Street Outreach Program provides runaway and homeless youth living on the streets or in areas that increase their risk of using drugs or being subjected to sexual abuse, prostitution, sexual exploitation, and trafficking are eligible to receive services. The program's goal is to assist youth in transitioning to safe and appropriate living arrangements. SOP services include the following: treatment and counseling; crisis intervention; drug abuse and exploitation prevention and education activities; survival aid; street-based education and outreach; information and referrals; and follow-up support. Grants are awarded for a three-year period, and grantees must provide 10% of the funds to cover the cost of the program. In FY2018, 96 grantees were funded. In FY2017 grantees made contact with 24,366 youth. The Family and Youth Services Bureau initiated the Street Outreach Program Data Collection Project in 2012 to learn more about the lives and needs of homeless and runaway youth served by SOP grantees. The purpose of the project was to design services to better meet the needs of these youth. FYSB collected information through focus groups and computer-assisted personal interviews with 656 youth (ages 14 to 21 years) served by grantees in 11 cities. The project found that participants were homeless on average for nearly two years and had challenges with substance abuse, mental health, and exposure to trauma. Youth most identified that they were in need of job training or help finding a job, transportation assistance, and clothing. The top barriers to obtaining shelter were shelters being full, not knowing where to go for shelter, and lacking transportation to get to a shelter. The study researchers concluded that more emergency shelters could help prevent youth from sleeping on the street. Further, they noted that youth on the streets need more intensive case management (e.g., careful assessment and treatment planning, linkages to community resources, etc.) and more intensive interventions. HHS funds the Runaway and Homeless Youth Training and Technical Assistance Center (RHYTTAC) to provide technical assistance to RHYP grantees. HHS awarded a five-year cooperative agreement, from September 30, 2017, through September 29, 2020, to National Safe Place to operate RHYTTAC. National Safe Place is a national youth outreach program that aims to educate young people about the dangers of running away or trying to resolve difficult, threatening situations on their own. RHYTTAC is designed to provide training and conference services to RHYP grantees that enhance and promote continuous quality improvement to services provided by RHYP grantees. Further, RHYTTAC offers resources and information through its website, tip sheets, a quarterly newsletter, toolkits, sample policies and procedures, and other resources. RHYTTAC also provides assistance to individual grantees in response to their questions or concerns, as well as concerns raised by HHS as part of the Runaway and Homeless Youth Program Monitoring System (see subsequent section). A portion of the funds for the BCP, TLP, and related activities are allocated for a national communications system known as the National Runaway Safeline ("Safeline"). The Safeline is intended to help homeless and runaway youth (or youth who are contemplating running away) through counseling, referrals, and communicating with their families. Beginning with FY1974 and every year after, the Safeline, which until 2013 was called the National Runaway Switchboard, has been funded through the Basic Center Program grant or the Consolidated Runaway and Homeless Youth Program grant. The Safeline is located in Chicago and operates each day to provide services to youth and their families across the country. Services include (1) a channel through which runaway and homeless youth or their parents may leave messages; (2) 24-hour referrals to community resources, including shelter, community food banks, legal assistance, and social services agencies; and (3) crisis intervention counseling to youth. In calendar year 2017, the Safeline handled nearly 30,000 contacts with youth (via phone, computer, emails, and postings), of which nearly three-quarters were from youth and 9% were from parents; the other callers were relatives, friends, and others. Other services are also provided through the Safeline. Since 1995, the "Home Free" family reunification program has provided bus tickets for youth ages 12 to 21 to return home or to an alternative placement near their home through Home Free. HHS evaluates each RHYP grantee through the Runaway and Homeless Youth Monitoring System. Staff from regional ACF offices and other grant recipients (known as peer reviewers) inspect the program site, conduct interviews, review case files and other agency documents, and conduct entry and exit conferences. The monitoring team then prepares a written report that identifies the strengths of the program and areas that require corrective action. The Reconnecting Homeless Youth Act of 2008 required that within one year of its enactment (October 8, 2009), HHS was to issue rules that specified performance standards for public and nonprofit entities that receive BCP, TLP, and SOP grants. On April 14, 2014, HHS issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) for the new performance standards and other requirements for the Runaway and Homeless youth program grantees. On December 20, 2016, HHS implemented a final rule that was similar to the provisions in the NPRM. These standards are used to monitor individual grantee performance. The Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions (HELP) and the House Committee on Education and Labor have exercised jurisdiction over the Runaway and Homeless Youth Program. HHS must submit reports biennially to the committees on the status, activities, and accomplishments of program grant recipients and evaluations of the programs performed by HHS. The most recent report was submitted in January 2018, and covered FY2014 and FY2015. The 2003 reauthorization law ( P.L. 108-96 ) of the Runaway and Homeless Youth Act required that HHS, in consultation with the U.S. Interagency Council on Homelessness, submit a report to Congress on the promising strategies to end youth homelessness within two years of the reauthorization, in October 2005. The report was submitted to Congress in June 2007. As mentioned above, the 2008 reauthorization law ( P.L. 110-378 ) required HHS, as of FY2010, to periodically submit to Congress an incidence and prevalence study of runaway and homeless youth ages 13 to 26, as well as the characteristics of a representative sample of these youth. As discussed, Congress appropriated funding to HUD for this purpose and the study, known as Voices of Youth Count , includes multiple publications about its findings. The 2008 law also directed the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to evaluate the process by which organizations apply for BCP, TLP, and SOP, including HHS's response to these applicants. GAO submitted a report to Congress in May 2010 on its findings. GAO found weaknesses in several of the procedures for reviewing grants, such as that peer reviewers for the grant did not always have expertise in runaway and homeless youth issues and feedback on grants was not provided in a permanent record. In addition, GAO found that HHS delayed telling successful grantees that the grant had been awarded to them. HHS has implemented the recommendations made in the report. Appendix A. Basic Center Program (BCP) Funding Appendix B. Additional Federal Support for Runaway and Homeless Youth Since the creation of the Runaway and Homeless Youth Program, other federal initiatives have also established services for such youth. Youth Homelessness Demonstration Program (YHDP): The omnibus appropriations laws for FY2016 through FY2018 enabled HUD to set aside up to $33 million (FY2016), $43 million (FY2017), and $80 million (FY2018) from the Homeless Assistance Grants account to implement projects that demonstrate how a "comprehensive approach" can "dramatically reduce" homelessness for youth through age 24. The appropriations laws each fiscal year direct this funding to up to 10 communities with the FY2016 funding; up to 11 communities with the FY2017 funding, including at least five rural communities; and up to 25 communities with the FY2018 funding, including at least eight rural communities. HUD has allocated $33 million to 10 communities for FY2016 and $43 million for FY2017. In addition, HUD is taking steps to evaluate the YHDP grantee communities in developing and carrying out a coordinated community approach to preventing and ending youth homelessness. 100-Day Challenges to End Youth Homelessness : Since 2016, cities have partnered with public and private entities to accelerate efforts to prevent and end youth homelessness. A Way Home America and Rapid Results Institute, organizations that focus on pressing social problems, have provided support to the organizations. HHS provided training and technical assistance through RHYTTAC to the first three cities involved in the challenge: Los Angeles, CA; Cleveland, OH; and Austin, TX. In general, participating communities have housed homeless youth and have identified new housing options for this population. Youth with Child Welfare Involvement At-Risk of Homelessness (YAHR): HHS has funded grants to build evidence on what works to prevent homelessness among youth and young adults who have child welfare involvement. HHS awarded funds to 18 grantees for a two-year planning period (2013-2015). Six of the grantees received additional funding to refine and test their service models during a second phase (2015-2018). A subset of those grantees will then be selected to conduct a rigorous evaluation of their impact on homelessness. In school year 2016-2017, more than 1.3 million children and youth were homeless. Of these students, over 118,000 were homeless youth unaccompanied by their families. The Department of Education administers the Education for Homeless Children and Youth program, which was established under the McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act of 1987 ( P.L. 100-77 ), as amended. This program assists state education agencies (SEAs) to ensure that all homeless children and youth have equal access to the same, appropriate education, including public preschool education, that is provided to other children and youth. Grants made by SEAs to local education agencies (LEAs) under this program must be used to facilitate the enrollment, attendance, and success in school of homeless children and youth. Program funds may be appropriated for activities such as tutoring, supplemental instruction, and referral services for homeless children and youth, as well as providing them with medical, dental, mental, and other health services. McKinney-Vento liaisons for homeless children and youth in each LEA is responsible for coordinating activities for these youth with other entities and agencies, including local Basic Center and Transitional Living Program grantees. States that receive McKinney-Vento funds are prohibited from segregating homeless students from non-homeless students, except for short periods of time for health and safety emergencies or to provide temporary, special, supplemental services. FY2019 funding for the program is $93.5 million. According to a 2017 survey of 43,000 college students at selected colleges and universities, 9% of those attending four-year universities and 12% of those attending community college had been homeless in the last year. In addition, 37% of university students and 46% of community college students were housing insecure in the past year, meaning that they had difficulty paying rent or lived with others beyond the expected capacity of the housing, among other scenarios. The Higher Education Act (HEA) authorizes financial aid and support programs that target homeless students and other vulnerable populations. For purposes of applying for federal financial aid, a student's expected family contribution (EFC) is the amount that can be expected to be contributed by a student and the student's family toward his or her cost of education. Certain groups of students are considered "independent," meaning that only the income and assets of the student (and not their parents or guardians) are counted. Individuals under age 24 who have been verified during the school year as either (1) unaccompanied and homeless or (2) unaccompanied, self-supporting, and risk of homelessness. This verification can come from a McKinney-Vento liaison for homeless children and youth in the local education agency; the director (or designee) of a program funded under the Runaway and Homeless Youth program; the director (or designee) of an emergency shelter or transitional housing program funded by HUD; or a financial aid administrator. Separately, HEA provides that homeless children and youth are eligible for what are collectively called the federal TRIO programs. This includes the following TRIO programs: Talent Search, Upward Bound, Student Support Services, and Educational Opportunity Centers. The TRIO programs are designed to identify potential postsecondary students from disadvantaged backgrounds, prepare these students for higher education, provide certain support services to them while they are in college, and train individuals who provide these services. HEA directs the Department of Education (ED), which administers the programs, to (as appropriate) require applicants seeking TRIO funds to identify and make services available, including mentoring, tutoring, and other services, to these youth. TRIO funds are awarded by ED on a competitive basis. In addition, HEA authorizes services for homeless youth through TRIO Student Support Services—a program intended to improve the retention and graduation rates of disadvantaged college students—that include temporary housing during breaks in the academic year. In FY2019, TRIO appropriations are $1.1 billion. Separately, HEA allows additional uses of funds through the Fund for the Improvement of Postsecondary Education (FIPSE) to establish demonstration projects that provide comprehensive support services for students who are or were homeless at age 13 or older. FIPSE is a grant program that seeks to support the implementation of innovative educational reform ideas and evaluate how well they work. As specified in the law, the projects can provide housing to the youth when housing at an educational institution is closed or unavailable to other students. FY2019 appropriations for FIPSE are $5 million. Recently emancipated foster youth are vulnerable to becoming homeless. In FY2017, nearly 20,000 youth "aged out" of foster care. The Chafee Foster Care Independence Program (CFCIP), created under the Chafee Foster Care Independence Act of 1999 ( P.L. 106-169 ), provides states with funding to support children and youth ages 14 to 21 who are in foster care and former foster youth ages 18 to 21 (and up to age 23 in states that extend foster care to age 21). States are authorized to receive funds based on their share of the total number of children in foster care nationwide. However, the law's "hold harmless" clause precludes any state from receiving less than the amount of funds it received in FY1998 or $500,000, whichever is greater. The program specifies funding for transitional living services, and as much as 30% of the funds may be dedicated to room and board. The program is funded through mandatory spending, and as such $140 million ($143 million as of FY2020) is provided for the program each year through the annual appropriations process. The Family Violence Prevention and Services Act (FVPSA), Title III of the Child Abuse Amendments of 1984 ( P.L. 98-457 ), authorized funds for Family Violence Prevention and Service grants that work to prevent family violence, improve service delivery to address family violence, and increase knowledge and understanding of family violence. From FY2007 to FY2009, one of these projects focused on runaway and homeless youth in dating violence situations through HHS's Domestic Violence/Runaway and Homeless Youth Collaboration on the Prevention of Adolescent Dating Violence initiative. The initiative was created because many runaway and homeless youth come from homes where domestic violence occurs and may be at risk of abusing their partners or becoming victims of abuse. The initiative funded eight states and community-based organizations to address the issue of teen dating violence among runaway and homeless youth. The grants funded activities such as curriculum on dating violence, small groups for teens, and a sexual assault/dating violence reduction program. The initiative resulted in an online toolkit for advocates in the runaway and homeless youth and domestic and sexual assault fields to help programs better address relationship violence with runaway and homeless youth.	[ "This report discusses runaway and homeless youth, and the federal response to support this population. There is no single definition of the terms \"runaway youth\" or \"homeless youth.\" However, both groups of youth share the risk of not having adequate shelter and other provisions, and may engage in harmful behaviors while away from a permanent home. Youth most often cite family conflict as the major reason for their homelessness or episodes of running away. A youth's sexual orientation, sexual activity, school problems, and substance abuse are associated with family discord. The precise number of homeless and runaway youth is unknown due to their residential mobility and overlap among the populations. The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) is supporting data collection efforts, known as Voices of Youth Count, to better determine the number of homeless youth. The 2017 study found that approximately 700,000 youth ages 13 to 17 and 3.5 million young adults ages 18 to 25 experienced homelessness within a 12-month period because they were sleeping in places not meant for habitation, in shelters, or with others while lacking alternative living arrangements. From the early 20th century through the 1960s, the needs of runaway and homeless youth were handled locally through the child welfare agency, juvenile justice courts, or both. The 1970s marked a shift toward federal oversight of programs that help youth who had run afoul of the law, including those who committed status offenses (i.e., a noncriminal act that is considered a violation of the law because of the youth's age). The Runaway Youth Act of 1974 was enacted as Title III of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (P.L. 93-415) to assist runaways through services specifically for this population. The act was amended over time to include homeless youth. It authorizes funding for services carried out under the Runaway and Homeless Youth Program (RHYP), which is administered by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). The program was most recently authorized through FY2020 by the Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-385). This law did not make other changes to the RHYP statute. Funding is discretionary, meaning provided through the appropriations process. FY2019 appropriations are $127.4 million. The RHYP program is made up of three components: the Basic Center Program (BCP), Transitional Living Program (TLP), and Street Outreach Program (SOP). The BCP provides temporary shelter, counseling, and after care services to runaway and homeless youth under age 18 and their families. In FY2017, the program served 23,288 youth, and in FY2018 it funded 280 BCP shelters (most recent figures available). The TLP is targeted to older youth ages 16 through 22 (and sometimes an older age). In FY2017, the TLP program served 3,517 youth, and in FY2018 it funded 299 grantees (most recent figures available). Youth who use the TLP receive longer-term housing with supportive services. The SOP provides education, treatment, counseling, and referrals for runaway, homeless, and street youth who have been subjected to, or are at risk of being subjected to, sexual abuse, sex exploitation, and trafficking. In FY2017, the SOP grantees made contact with 24,366 youth. The RHYP is a part of larger federal efforts to end youth homelessness through the U.S. Interagency Council on Homelessness (USICH). The USICH is a coordinating body made up of multiple federal agencies committed to addressing homelessness. The USICH's Opening Doors plan to end homelessness includes strategies for ending youth homelessness by 2020, including through collecting better data and supporting evidence-based practices to improve youth outcomes. Voices of Youth Count is continuing to report on characteristics of homeless youth. In addition to the RHYP, there are other federal supports to address youth homelessness. HUD's Youth Homelessness Demonstration Program is funding a range of housing options for youth, in selected urban and rural communities. Other federal programs have enabled homeless youth to access services, including those related to education and family violence." ]	8,238	gov_report	en	null	f0b6de4760fccf02dae411eb40e6d3e59e2559e9aa709f43
This report provides an overview of the FY2019 budget request and appropriations for the International Trade Administration (ITA), the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC), and the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR). These three trade-related agencies are funded through the annual Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies (CJS) appropriations. This report also provides a review of these trade agencies' programs. When comparing the Administration's FY2019 request with FY2018 funding, one may want to consider that the Administration formulated its FY2019 budget request before full-year appropriations for FY2018 were enacted. In this report, FY2018 funding levels reflect the amounts appropriated in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 ( P.L. 115-141 ), enacted on March 23, 2018. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, provided $482.0 million in direct funding for ITA, $93.7 million for USTIC, and a total of $72.6 million for USTR for FY2018. The FY2018 appropriation for the three CJS trade-related agencies totaled $648.3 million. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019, provided $484.0 million in direct appropriations for ITA, $95.0 million in funding for USITC, and a total of $68.0 million for USTR. The FY2019 appropriations for three CJS trade-related agencies totaled $647.0 million, a 0.2% decrease from FY2018 appropriations. See the Appendix for enacted budget authority for the trade-related agencies for FY2009-FY2019. The President submitted his FY2019 budget request to Congress on February 12, 2018. In it, the Administration requested a total of $590.8 million for the three CJS trade-related agencies (see Table 1 ). This request represented an 8.9% decrease in funding from the FY2018 appropriated amount. The request included reduced funding for all three trade agencies: $440.1 million in direct funding for ITA (an 8.7% decrease from the FY2018 appropriation), $87.6 million for USITC (a 6.5% decrease), and $63.0 million for USTR (a 13.2% decrease). Despite the proposed overall decrease in funding for CJS trade-related agencies, the Administration proposed increasing some trade enforcement activities within ITA and USTR. For ITA, the Administration proposed increasing trade enforcement activities while reducing funding for certain export promotion activities. For USTR, the Administration requested funds to increase staffing; however, the request did not include a request for funding to be drawn from the Trade Enforcement Trust Fund. (For a description of the " Trade Enforcement Trust Fund ," see section below.) The President's budget did not provide a rationale for requesting a decrease in funding for USITC. A more detailed overview of these agencies' FY2019 budget requests is provided below. The House and Senate Appropriations Committees reported their CJS appropriation bills in the spring of 2018. Both committees largely declined the budget cuts requested by the Administration for these three trade agencies. (See Table 1 .) The House Committee on Appropriations reported H.R. 5952 on May 17, 2018. The House committee bill included a total of $647.6 million for the three trade-related agencies, which was $56.8 million more (9.6%) than the Administration's request and $0.7 million less (-0.1%) than the FY2018-enacted amount. The House committee recommended $480.0 million in direct funding for ITA, $95.0 million for USTIC, and a total of $72.6 million for USTR. The Senate Committee on Appropriations reported S. 3072 on June 14, 2018. The Senate bill included a total of $655.6 million for the three agencies, which was $64.8 million (11.0%) more than the Administration's request and $7.3 million (1.1%) more than the FY2018-enacted appropriation. The Senate committee recommended $488.0 million in direct funding for ITA, $95.0 million for USITC, and a total of $72.6 million for USTR. Through February 15, 2019, the CJS trade-related agencies operated under continuing resolutions (CR)—with the exception of a three-week lapse in funding when agencies halted most operations. Congress passed final FY2019 appropriations in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 ( P.L. 116-6 ), which was signed into law on February 15, 2019. The act included a total of $647.0 million in funding for the three trade-related agencies—a 0.2% decrease from FY2018 appropriations. For FY2019, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019, included $484.0 million in direct appropriations for ITA (a 0.4% increase from the FY2018 appropriation), $95.0 million in funding for USITC (a 1.4% increase), and a total of $68.0 million for USTR (a 0.2% decrease). Within the Department of Commerce, ITA's mission is to improve U.S. prosperity by strengthening the competitiveness of U.S. industry, promoting trade and investment, and ensuring compliance with trade laws and agreements. ITA provides export promotion services; works to enforce and ensure compliance with trade laws and agreements; administers trade remedies such as antidumping and countervailing duties; and provides analytical support for ongoing trade negotiations. ITA went through a major organizational change in October 2013 in which it consolidated four organizational units into three more functionally aligned units: (1) Global Markets; (2) Industry and Analysis; and (3) Enforcement and Compliance. ITA also has a fourth organizational unit, the Executive and Administrative Directorate, which is responsible for providing policy leadership, information technology support, and administration services for all of ITA. ( Table A-1 shows budget amounts for ITA by unit between FY2009 and FY2019.) For FY2019, the Administration requested $440.1 million for ITA in direct funding, with an additional $11.0 million to be collected in user fees, for a total of $451.1 million in authorized spending. The request for direct funding represents a $41.9 million decrease (-8.7%) from the FY2018-enacted amount ($482.0 million). According to ITA's budget justification, the Administration proposed increasing ITA's enforcement and compliance efforts in FY2019, while deemphasizing other initiatives, such as export promotion. The Administration specifically proposed closing some domestic and international offices of the United States and Foreign Commercial Service (US&FCS). The House committee-reported H.R. 5952 proposed $480.0 million for ITA in direct funding, with an additional $11.0 million to be collected from user fees, for a total of $491.0 million in authorized spending. The amount in direct funding proposed by the House Committee on Appropriations was $39.9 million (9.1%) more than the Administration's request and $2.0 million less (-0.4%) than the FY2018-enacted amount. The Senate committee-reported S. 3072 included $488.0 million in direct funding for ITA, with an additional $11.0 million in user fees, for a total of $499.0 million in authorized spending. The amount in direct funding proposed by the Senate Committee on Appropriations was $47.9 million (10.9%) more than the Administration's request and $6.0 million (1.2%) more than the FY2018-enacted amount. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 ( P.L. 116-6 ) provided $484.0 million in direct appropriations for ITA, with an additional $11.0 million to be collected in user fees, for a total of $495.0 in authorized spending. The act provided $2 million more (0.4%) in direct appropriations for ITA than the FY2018-enacted amount and $43.9 million more (10.0%) than the Administration's request. ITA's Global Markets (GM) unit is a combination of the United States and Foreign Commercial Service (US&FCS) unit, a program that provides export promotion services to U.S. businesses, and SelectUSA, a program that works to attract foreign investment into the United States. Through US&FCS, GM promotes U.S. exports by helping U.S. exporters research foreign markets and identify opportunities abroad. GM's country and regional experts―in domestic and overseas offices—help to advise U.S. companies on market access, local standards, and regulations. The unit also helps to make connections through business-to-business trade shows, fairs, and missions. GM is designed to advance U.S. commercial interests by engaging with foreign governments and U.S. businesses, identifying and resolving market barriers, and leading efforts that advocate for U.S. firms with foreign governments. Through its SelectUSA program, the GM unit also promotes the United States as a destination for foreign investment. (For more on SelectUSA, see section below, " SelectUSA Program .") For FY2019, the Administration proposed reducing funding for the Global Markets unit. The Administration requested $276.5 million for Global Markets in direct funding, a 13.4% decrease from the FY2018-enacted appropriation. In its FY2019 budget submission, ITA proposed "rescaling export promotion" activities in the GM unit by reducing staff and its domestic and overseas offices, with a total reduction of 133 positions. The budget submission did not indicate how many or which domestic and overseas offices it was proposing to close. The House and Senate Appropriation Committees did not adopt the proposed cuts. The House Appropriations Committee recommended $319.0 million for the Global Markets unit for FY2019. This was $42.5 million (15.4%) more than the Administration's request. According to the committee report, "the recommendation does not adopt the proposal to reduce U.S. and Foreign Commercial Service staff or close overseas offices or U.S. Export Assistance Centers." The Senate Appropriations Committee report did not provide an exact funding amount, but recommended that ITA "fund US&FCS, and its core mission of export promotion, at the highest possible level in fiscal year 2019, and at no less than the amount provided in fiscal year 2018." Like the House committee, the Senate committee did not adopt the Administration's proposal to close offices. The Senate committee report specifically noted, "No offices shall be closed in fiscal year 2019 unless the Committee approves a reprogramming request to close such office or offices. Additionally, the Committee will not approve requests to close any domestic offices, called U.S. Export Assistance Centers, if such Center is the only one located in a given State." According to the conference report accompanying the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 ( P.L. 116-6 ), the final agreement for FY2019 appropriations included "no less than $320 million" in funding for Global Markets and required ITA to report quarterly to the Committees on staffing levels within the US&FCS. ITA's Industry and Analysis unit brings together ITA's industry, trade, and economic experts to advance the competitiveness of U.S. industries through the development and execution of international trade and investment policies, export promotion strategies, and investment promotion. It develops economic and international policy analysis to improve market access for U.S. businesses, and designs and implements trade and investment promotion programs. The unit serves as the primary liaison between U.S. industries and the federal government on trade and investment promotion. It administers programs that support small and medium-sized enterprises, such as the Market Development Cooperator Program. For FY2019, the Administration requested $52.3 million for Industry and Analysis. The request is $3.4 million less than the FY2018 funding level. The Administration proposed refocusing some of the unit's priorities away from export promotion and toward trade enforcement. Specifically, the Administration proposed reducing activities related to trade missions, the International Buyer Program, and certified trade fairs, and eliminating Market Development Cooperator Program grants. The House committee proposed $52.0 million for Industry and Analysis. This represented $0.3 million less (-0.5%) than the Administration's request. The Senate committee-reported bill did not include a specific recommendation for Industry and Analysis. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 ( P.L. 116-6 ), did not provide an exact funding guidance for Industry and Analysis. The mission of ITA's Enforcement and Compliance unit is to enforce U.S. trade laws and ensure compliance with negotiated international trade agreements. It is responsible for enforcing U.S. antidumping and countervailing duty (AD/CVD) laws; overseeing a variety of programs and policies regarding the enforcement and administration of U.S. trade remedy laws; assisting U.S. industry and businesses with unfair trade matters; and administering the Foreign Trade Zone program and other U.S. import programs. For FY2019, the Administration requested $90.6 million for the Enforcement and Compliance unit, an increase of $3.1 million (3.6%) from the FY2018-enacted amount. For the requested increase in funding, ITA cited the unit's increasing number of AD/CVD investigations, its new focus on self-initiating AD/CVD cases, and the increased workload due to the tariffs and investigations initiated through Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. The House Appropriations Committee proposed $85.5 million for Enforcement and Compliance. The House committee proposal represented $2.1 million less (-2.3%) than the Administration's request, and $1.0 million (1.1%) more than the FY2018-enacted amount . The Senate Committee on Appropriations recommended $91.5 million for Enforcement and Compliance. The Senate recommendation represented $0.9 million more than the Administration's request and $4.0 million more than the 2018-enacted amount. The Senate committee report noted that the committee was supportive of the Administration's request to self-initiate AD/CVD cases. For FY2019 appropriations, the conference report accompanying the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 ( P.L. 116-6 ), included $88.5 million for Enforcement and Compliance. This amount was $1.0 million more (1.1%) than the FY2018 funding, and $2.1 million less (-2.1%) than the Administration's request. USITC is an independent, quasi-judicial agency responsible for conducting trade-related investigations and providing independent technical advice related to U.S. international trade policy to Congress, the President, and the USTR. The commission (1) investigates and determines whether imports injure a domestic industry or violate U.S. intellectual property rights; (2) provides independent tariff, trade, and competitiveness-related analysis to the President and Congress; and (3) maintains the U.S. tariff schedule. USITC also serves as a federal resource for trade data and other trade policy information. It makes most of its information and analyses available to the public to promote understanding of competitiveness, international trade issues, and the role that international trade plays in the U.S. economy. In addition to the President's budget request for the commission, USITC also has bypass authority to submit its budget directly to Congress without revision by the President, pursuant to Section 175 of the Trade Act of 1975. For FY2019, the President requested $87.6 million for USITC, which represented a $6.1 million decrease (-6.5%) from the FY2018-enacted amount ($93.7 million). While the President requested a decrease in funding for USITC, the commission's independent budget submission—sent directly to Congress without revision by the President—requested $97.5 million for FY2019, an increase of $3.8 million (4.0%) from the FY2018-enacted amount. USITC cited the increasing number of import injury cases in the previous five years and projected that the caseload would increase further in FY2019. Both the House and Senate committee-reported bills recommended $95.0 million for USITC. This amount was $7.4 million (8.4%) more than the President's request and $1.3 million (1.4%) more than the FY2018-enacted amount. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 ( P.L. 116-6 ), provided $95.0 million for USITC, which was $7.4 million (8.4%) more than the President's request and $1.3 million (1.4%) more than the FY2018-enacted amount. USTR, located in the Executive Office of the President, is responsible for developing and coordinating U.S. international trade and direct investment policies. USTR is the President's chief negotiator for international trade agreements, including commodity and direct investment negotiations. It negotiates directly with foreign governments to create trade agreements, resolve disputes, and participate in global trade policy organizations such as the World Trade Organization. It also meets with business groups, policymakers, and public interest groups on trade policy issues. In 2018, USTR led the negotiations for the modernization of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the investigations into Chinese intellectual property practices. In addition to direct appropriations for USTR, supplementary funding for the agency is available through the congressionally established Trade Enforcement Trust Fund. For more detail on the trust fund, see section " Trade Enforcement Trust Fund ," below. For FY2019, the Administration requested $63.0 million for USTR's salaries and expenses, and no additional funding from the Trade Enforcement Trust Fund. The request represents a $9.6 million decrease (-13.2%) from the FY2018-enacted amounts ($72.6 million). In the Administration's budget request, USTR outlined the Trump Administration's "aggressive trade agenda," and its goals of "(1) defending U.S. national sovereignty over trade policy; (2) strictly enforcing U.S. trade laws; (3) using all possible sources of leverage to encourage other countries to open their markets to U.S. exports of goods and services, and protecting U.S. intellectual property rights; and (4) negotiating better trade deals with countries in key markets around the world." Both the House and Senate committee-reported bills recommended a total of $72.6 million for USTR for FY2019. These proposals included $57.6 million for USTR's salaries and expenses and $15.0 million from the Trade Enforcement Trust Fund for enforcement activities authorized in Section 611 of the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 ( P.L. 114-125 ). The total proposals were $9.6 million (15.2%) more than the Administration's request, and were equal to the FY2018-enacted amount. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 ( P.L. 116-6 ), provided a total of $63.0 million for USTR, which included $53.0 million in salaries and expenses for USTR and an additional $15.0 million to be derived from the Trade Enforcement Trust Fund. The total funding was $4.6 million less (-6.3%) than the FY2018 appropriated amount. Over the past decade, Congress has provided funding for specific trade-related programs, including (1) China trade enforcement and compliance activities; (2) trade promotion and attracting foreign direct investment to the United States through ITA's SelectUSA program; and (3) trade enforcement activities through the Trade Enforcement Trust Fund and the Interagency Center on Trade Implementation, Monitoring, and Enforcement (ICTIME, formerly the Interagency Trade Enforcement Center (ITEC)). Since 2004, Congress has dedicated some of ITA's funding to AD/CVD enforcement and compliance activities with respect to China and other nonmarket economies. ITA's Office of China Compliance was established by the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2004 ( P.L. 108-199 ). Its primary role has been to enforce U.S. AD/CVD laws and to develop and implement other policies and programs aimed at countering unfair foreign trade practices in China. ITA's China Countervailing Duty Group was established in FY2009 to accommodate the workload that resulted from the application of countervailing duty law to imports from nonmarket economy countries. The Office of China Compliance is within the Enforcement and Compliance unit at ITA. ITA's FY2019 budget justification did not provide a breakdown of funding for its China AD/CVD activities. Both the House and Senate committee-reported bills included $16.4 million from ITA's funding for China AD/CVD enforcement and compliance activities for FY2019. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 ( P.L. 116-6 ), provided $16.4 million from ITA's funding for China AD/CVD enforcement and compliance activities for FY2019. This amount was equal to the FY2018-enacted amount. SelectUSA was created in 2011 and is now part of ITA's Global Markets unit. It coordinates investment-related resources across more than 20 federal agencies to (1) promote the United States as an investment market and (2) address investor climate concerns that may impede investment in the United States. The program serves as an information resource for international investors and advocates for U.S. cities, states, and regions as investment destinations. ITA's budget justification did not provide a breakdown for requested funding for SelectUSA. The House committee-reported bill did not propose a specific funding amount for SelectUSA. The Senate committee report recommended $10.0 million in funding for SelectUSA, an amount equal to the FY2018-enacted amount. The Senate Committee on Appropriation proposed making funding contingent on (1) SelectUSA updating its protocol to ensure that its programs did not encourage foreign investments by state-owned entities into the United States and (2) SelectUSA reporting its updated protocol to the committee within 30 days of enactment of the bill. According to the conference report accompanying the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 ( P.L. 116-6 ), the final agreement adopted the Senate committee report language regarding SelectUSA. ITA's Survey of International Air Travelers (SIAT) gathers statistics about air passenger travelers in the United States. These statistics are used across federal agencies, for a variety of purposes, such as to estimate the contribution of international travel to the economy, develop public policy on the travel industry, and forecast staffing needs at consulates and ports of entry. The Administration requested $5.0 million for FY2019 for SIAT to expand the survey and data collection. The Administration proposed that "$5 million in fee revenues collected from the surcharge on international travelers utilizing the Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA) be redirected to fully fund the SIAT." The House committee-reported bill did not include a specific recommendation for SIAT. According to the Senate committee report, the Senate Committee on Appropriations did not adopt the Administration's proposal to seek alternative funding sources for SIAT and "direct[ed] ITA to continue funding SIAT out of its base budget. Within funds provided, ITA [was] encouraged to increase the sample size for SIAT." The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 ( P.L. 116-6 ), and the accompanying conference report did not provide specific language regarding SIAT. In order to provide additional funding for USTR's trade enforcement activities, Congress established the Trade Enforcement Trust Fund (TETF) in 2016. In Section 611 of the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 ( P.L. 114-125 ), Congress set up the trust fund and outlined authorized uses of the funds. According to Section 611(d), USTR can use funds from the TETF to monitor and enforce trade agreements and WTO commitments and to support trade capacity-building assistance to help partner countries meet their free-trade agreement obligations and commitments. USTR can also transfer funds to select federal agencies for trade enforcement activities authorized in Section 611(d) of the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015. For FY2019, the Administration requested no funding to be derived from the TETF; the FY2018-enacted amount was $15.0 million. Both the House and Senate committee bills proposed $15.0 million from the TETF for enforcement activities authorized in Section 611 of the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015. These proposals were equal to the FY2018-enacted amount. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 ( P.L. 116-6 ), provided $15.0 million to be derived from the TETF for USTR, for enforcement activities authorized in Section 611 of the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015. This amount is equal to the FY2018-enacted amount. ITEC was established by executive order in 2012 to take a "whole-of-government" approach to monitoring and enforcing U.S. trade rights by using expertise from across the federal government. In 2016, the ITEC was succeeded by ICTIME, which Congress established through the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 ( P.L. 114-125 ). The executive-established ITEC received its funding through ITA; funding for ICTIME is now appropriated through USTR. ICTIME's purpose is to advance U.S. trade policy through strengthened and coordinated enforcement of U.S. trade rights. ICTIME investigates potential disputes under the auspices of the World Trade Organization; inspects potential disputes pursuant to bilateral and regional trade agreements to which the United States is a party; and carries out the functions of USTR with respect to the monitoring and enforcement of trade agreements to which the United States is a party. USTR and ITA work closely within the ICTIME to identify issues and develop information in areas of economic importance to U.S. industries. The USTR's budget justification did not provide a breakdown for requested funding for ICTIME. The House and Senate committee-reported bills did not include a specific funding amount for ICTIME. The Senate committee report did note that the Senate committee supports ICTIME within the funds provided for USTR. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 ( P.L. 116-6 ) and the accompanying conference report also did not provide specific language regarding ICTIME.	[ "The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 116-6), was signed into law on February 15, 2019. The act included a total of $647.0 million in funding for three trade-related agencies under the Commerce, Justice, Science and Related Agencies (CJS) account—the International Trade Administration (ITA), the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC), and the office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR). This represents a 0.2% decrease from FY2018 appropriations. For FY2019, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019, included $484.0 million in direct appropriations for ITA (a 0.4% increase from the FY2018 appropriation), $95.0 million in funding for USITC (a 1.4% increase), and a total of $68.0 million for USTR (a 0.2% decrease). The Administration's Request On February 12, 2018, the Trump Administration submitted its FY2019 budget request to Congress. The FY2019 proposal included a total of $590.8 million for the three CJS trade-related agencies, an 8.9% decrease from FY2018 total appropriated amounts for these agencies. The Administration requested reducing funding for all three trade-related agencies. For FY2019, the request included $440.1 million in direct funding for ITA (an 8.7% decrease from the FY2018 appropriation), $87.6 million for USITC (a 6.5% decrease), and $63.0 million for USTR (a 13.2% decrease). Congressional Actions In the spring of 2018, the House and Senate reported FY2019 CJS appropriations bills, which included proposed funding for ITA, USITC, and USTR. The reported bills did not adopt many of the Administration's budget reductions, and instead proposed funding levels that were more similar to the FY2018-enacted amounts. The House Committee on Appropriations reported H.R. 5952 on May 17, 2018. The House proposal recommended a total of $647.6 million for the three CJS trade-related agencies. This proposal was $56.8 million more (9.6%) than the Administration's request, and $0.7 million less (-0.1%) than the FY2018-enacted legislation. The House committee proposed $480.0 million in direct funding for ITA, $95.0 million for USTIC, and a total of $72.6 million for USTR, comprised of $57.6 million for salaries and expenses and an additional $15.0 million from the Trade Enforcement Trust Fund for trade enforcement activities as authorized by the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 (P.L. 114-125). The Senate Committee on Appropriations reported S. 3072 on June 14, 2018. The Senate committee-reported proposal recommended a total of $655.6 million for the three CJS trade-related agencies. This is $64.8 million (11.0%) more than the Administration's request and $7.3 million (1.1%) more than the FY2018-enacted appropriations. The Senate committee proposed $488.0 million in direct funding for ITA, $95 million for USITC, and a total of $72.6 million for USTR, comprised of $57.6 million for salaries and expenses and an additional $15.0 million from the Trade Enforcement Trust Fund for trade enforcement activities. After three continuing resolutions and a three-week lapse in funding, Congress passed the Consolidated Appropriations Act. 2019 (P.L. 116-6), which was signed into law on February 15, 2019. The act included a total of $647.0 million in funding for the three trade-related agencies, which represented a 0.2% decrease from FY2018 funding levels." ]	3,802	gov_report	en	null	505fee99f21568a0ba3f034052073611384ef23894390ab1
Our simulations suggest that the sector will likely continue to face a difference between revenue and spending during the next 50 years. This long-term outlook is measured by the operating balance—a measure of the sector’s ability to cover its current expenditures out of current receipts. While both expenditures and revenues are projected to increase as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) during the simulation period, a difference between the two is projected to persist because expenditures are generally expected to grow at a faster rate than revenues. (see figure 1). Absent any policy changes by state and local governments, revenues are likely to be insufficient to maintain the sector’s capacity to provide services at levels consistent with current policies during the next 50 years. Our simulations suggest that state and local governments will need to make policy changes to avoid fiscal imbalances before then and assure that revenues are at least equal to expenditures. We simulated the state and local government sector’s operating balance (the difference between the sector’s operating revenues and operating expenditures) in order to understand the sector’s long-term fiscal outlook. The sector’s operating expenditures were 15.1 percent of GDP in 2017. As shown in figure 2, these state and local government sector operating expenditures are comprised of employee compensation, social benefit payments, interest payments, capital outlays, and other expenditures. The sector’s operating revenues were 13.8 percent of GDP in 2017. As shown in figure 3, these state and local government sector operating revenues are comprised of taxes, transfer receipts, and other types of revenues. One way of measuring the long-term fiscal challenges faced by the state and local government sector is through an indicator known as the “fiscal gap.” The fiscal gap is an estimate of actions—such as revenue increases or expenditure reductions—that must be taken today and maintained for each year going forward to achieve fiscal balance during the simulation period. While we measured the gap as the amount of reductions in expenditures needed to prevent negative operating balances, increases in revenues, reductions in expenditures, or a combination of the two of sufficient magnitude would allow the sector to close the fiscal gap. Our simulations suggest that the fiscal gap is about 14.7 percent of total expenditures or about 2.4 percent of GDP. That is, assuming no change in projected total revenues, eliminating the difference between the sector’s expenditures and revenues during the 50-year simulation period would likely require action to be taken today, and maintained for each year equivalent to a 14.7 percent reduction in the sector’s total expenditures (see figure 4). Alternatively, assuming no change in projected total expenditures, closing the fiscal gap by increasing revenue would also likely require actions of similar magnitude. More likely, eliminating the difference between expenditures and revenues would involve some combination of spending reductions and revenue increases. Our simulations suggest that growth in the sector’s overall spending is largely driven by health care expenditures. As shown in figure 5, these expenditures are projected to increase from about 4.1 percent of GDP in 2018 to 6.3 percent of GDP in 2067. Two types of health care expenditures—Medicaid spending and spending on health benefits for state and local government employees and retirees—will likely constitute a growing expenditure for state and local governments during the simulation period. Medicaid expenditures are expected to rise, on average, by 1 percentage point more than GDP each year. According to CBO, growth in Medicaid spending reflects growth in both the number of people receiving Medicaid benefits and the cost of Medicaid benefits each person receives. Specifically, CBO reported that between 2019 and 2028, Medicaid spending is projected to grow at an average rate of 5.5 percent per year—nearly 5 percentage points of this growth is due to an increase in per capita costs and about 1 percentage point of this growth is due to an increase in enrollment. Data from CBO and the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) also suggest that growth in Medicaid spending per capita is generally expected to outpace GDP growth in the future—referred to as excess cost growth. Our estimates of Medicaid excess cost growth using CMS data suggest that Medicaid spending per capita will grow, on average, about 0.5 percent faster than GDP per capita for the period from 2018 through 2067. Our simulations also suggest that health benefits for state and local government employees and retirees—a type of employee compensation spending—are likely to rise, on average, by 0.9 percentage points more than GDP each year. Growth in these health benefits also reflects growth in the projected number of employees and retirees and growth in the projected amount of health benefits for each employee and retiree. Growth in spending by states and local governments on health care per capita, which includes spending on employee and retiree health benefits, is generally expected to outpace GDP per capita. Data from CMS suggest that national health expenditures per capita are likely to grow on average about 0.8 percent faster than GDP per capita each year during the simulation period from 2018 through 2067. If employee and retiree health benefits follow trends in overall national health spending, they will likely make up an increasingly large share of total employee compensation going forward (see figure 6). While state and local government contributions to employee pension plans—another type of employee compensation spending—will likely decline as a percentage of GDP, as shown in figure 6, our simulations nonetheless suggest that state and local governments may need to take steps to manage their pension obligations in the future. From 1998 through 2007, state and local governments’ pension contributions amounted to about 8 percent of wages and salaries on average. In addition, for the period from 2008 through 2017, pension contributions amounted to about 12.3 percent of wages and salaries on average. Our simulations suggest that those pension contributions will need to be about 12.9 percent of wages and salaries for state and local governments to meet their long-term pension obligations. This is the case even though pension asset values have increased in recent years, from about $2.4 trillion in 2008 to about $4.2 trillion in 2017 (adjusted for inflation and measured in 2012 dollars). This suggests that state and local governments may need to take additional steps to manage their pension obligations by reducing benefits or increasing employees’ contributions. Along with pension contributions, other types of state and local government expenditures are projected to grow more slowly than GDP. For example, in 2017, wages and salaries of state and local government employees constituted a large expenditure for the sector. However, these expenditures are projected to decline as a percentage of GDP during the simulation period. Our simulations also suggest that state and local governments’ capital outlays—which include spending on infrastructure, such as buildings, highways and streets, sewer systems, and water systems, as well as equipment and land— will grow more slowly than GDP if state and local governments continue to provide current levels of capital per resident. Our simulations suggest that federal grants overall will increase as a share of GDP, while Medicaid grants will likely grow more quickly than other types of federal grants (see figure 7). Thus, Medicaid grants will likely make up an increasing share of revenues in the future. Since Medicaid is a matching formula grant program, the projected increase in federal Medicaid grants, therefore, reflects expected increased Medicaid expenditures that will be shared by state governments. Our simulations also suggest that federal investment grants (i.e., grants intended to finance capital infrastructure investments) and other federal grants unrelated to Medicaid (i.e., grants intended to finance education, social services, housing, and community investment) are likely to decline as a share of GDP. Further, our simulations suggest that if historical relationships between state and local governments’ tax revenues and tax bases persist, total tax revenues for the state and local government sector will increase from 8.8 percent of GDP in 2018 to 9.4 percent of GDP by the end of the simulation period. This increase is driven largely by the growth in personal income taxes, as shown in figure 8. Specifically, our simulations suggest that personal income tax revenues will increase as a share of GDP by about 1 percentage point during the simulation period. Sales taxes and property taxes, on the other hand, are projected to remain relatively constant as a share of GDP during the simulation period through 2067. While our long-term simulations do not account for pending or future federal policy changes that will result in changes to expenditures and revenues, an understanding of several recent federal policy changes related to taxes and health care are important to note because they present sources of uncertainty for the state and local government sector’s long-term fiscal outlook. In addition, as is the case in any model that is reliant on historical data to simulate a long-term outlook, other considerations, such as economic growth and rates of return on pension assets, could shift future fiscal outcomes. These policy changes and uncertainties are discussed below and may help federal policy makers and state and local governments consider how these changes could affect the long-term outlook. Recently enacted legislation, such as Public Law 115-97, commonly referred to by the President and administrative documents as the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA), could affect the sector’s revenues over the long-term. Enacted in December 2017, TCJA included significant changes to corporate and individual tax law, with implications for state and local government tax collections. In particular, for individual taxpayers, for tax years 2018 through 2025, tax rates were lowered for nearly all income levels, some deductions from taxable income were changed (personal exemptions were eliminated, while the standard deduction was increased), and certain credits, such as the child tax credit, were expanded. The effect of TCJA on the long-term state and local fiscal outlook is still evolving, and will likely depend on how states incorporate the law’s changes into their state income tax rules. That is, because some states link their state income taxes to federal income tax rules, states must decide whether to let the changes from TCJA flow through to their state income tax systems, or establish new state income tax rules. For example, some states have adopted the federal definition of taxable income as a starting point for state tax calculations, while other states use the federal definition of adjusted gross income as a starting point. The choices states make to continue to link to these definitions could have long-term implications for their state tax revenues. In addition, under TCJA, the amount of the federal itemized deductions allowed for all state and local income, sales, and property taxes (commonly referred to as the state and local tax (SALT) deduction) is now capped at $10,000 for tax years 2018 to 2025. The magnitude or net effect of these changes is uncertain in that states are still working to understand the impact of the tax laws on their revenues. It remains to be seen whether and how states will see changes in their revenues in the future. Moreover, a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision involving state sales taxes could have implications for states’ ability to collect revenue. Specifically, the court’s ruling in June 2018 in South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc. held that states could require out-of-state sellers to collect and remit sales taxes on purchases made from those out-of-state sellers, even if the seller does not have a substantial physical presence in the taxing state. Prior to this ruling, a seller that did not have a substantial physical presence in a state could not be required to collect and remit a sales tax on goods sold into the state. Instead, a purchaser may have been required to pay a use tax (i.e., a tax levied on the consumer for the privilege of use, ownership, or possession of taxable goods and services) in the same amount to his or her state government. In 2017, we reported that states could realize between an estimated $8.5 billion and $13.4 billion in additional state sales tax revenue across all states if all sellers were required to collect taxes on all remote sales at current rates. The extent to which states realize changes in sales tax revenue will likely depend on how they revise their state laws and enforcement efforts in response to this June 2018 ruling. Enacted health care legislation could also affect the long-term fiscal position of state and local governments. As we have reported in prior work, the effect of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) on the long-term state and local fiscal outlook could depend on how states implement PPACA, and on future rates of health care cost growth. For example, consider the states that have opted, under PPACA, to expand Medicaid program coverage to millions of lower income adults. While the federal government is expected to cover a large share of the costs of the Medicaid expansion, these states are ultimately expected to bear some of the costs. Specifically, the federal government reimbursed 100 percent of the costs of the expanded population beginning in 2014. This reimbursement rate will decline from the 2018 reimbursement rate of 94 percent to 90 percent by 2020. As such, the reduced federal reimbursement rate may affect those states that expanded their Medicaid populations in recent years. As discussed earlier in this report, our simulations suggest that Medicaid spending will make up an increasing share of the state and local government sector’s operating expenditures in the future. A weakening of the economy could add to the fiscal pressures states face in funding these Medicaid obligations. As our prior work has shown, past recessions in 2001 and 2007 hampered states’ ability to fund increased Medicaid enrollment and maintain their existing services. Specifically, Medicaid enrollment increased during these recessions, in part due to increased unemployment, which led more individuals to become eligible for the program. We have also reported on the use of Medicaid demonstrations, which allow states to test new approaches to coverage to improve quality and access, or generate savings or efficiencies. Specifically, CMS may waive certain Medicaid requirements and approve new types of expenditures that would not otherwise be eligible for federal Medicaid matching funds. For example, under demonstrations, states have extended coverage to certain populations, provided services not otherwise eligible for Medicaid, and made payments to providers to incentivize delivery system improvements. We previously reported that, as of November 2016, nearly three-quarters of states have CMS- approved demonstrations. In fiscal year 2015, federal spending under demonstrations represented a third of all Medicaid spending nationwide. We also reported that in 10 states, federal spending on demonstrations represented 75 percent or more of all federal spending on Medicaid. Joint financing of Medicaid is a fixture of this federal-state partnership. Demonstration waivers hold the potential for changing state Medicaid spending. However, as we have reported, these demonstrations are required, under HHS policy, to achieve budget neutrality and not raise costs for the federal government. In addition to federal tax- and health-related policy changes, a number of other factors could affect the state and local government sector’s long- term fiscal outlook. Specifically, we developed simulations using alternative assumptions of the growth of key model variables—which include economic growth, health care excess cost growth, and the rate of return on pension assets. We determined that changes in the growth projections of these key variables could affect the operating balance of state and local governments, thereby shifting future fiscal outcomes for the sector. Future trends in GDP growth could affect the state and local government sector’s fiscal outlook. Data from CBO and the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Federal Disability Insurance Trust Funds (OASDI Trustees) project real GDP to grow by 1.9 percent per year on average from 2018 through 2028, and by 2.1 percent per year on average after 2028, respectively. Using these projections, our simulations suggest that maintaining current policies would cause the sector’s expenditures to exceed its revenues and that the difference between revenues and expenditures would become increasingly negative during the next several decades. However, simulations we developed using the OASDI Trustees’ alternative projections of real GDP growth suggest that the difference between revenues and expenditures would expand before narrowing toward the end of the simulation period if real GDP were to grow at a faster rate—2.8 percent per year on average—as shown in figure 9. Our simulations also show that if GDP were to grow at a slower rate—1.5 percent per year on average—the difference between revenues and expenditures would expand. This would result in an increasingly negative operating balance during the simulation period. As discussed earlier in this report, excess cost growth in health care is another key determinant of the sector’s fiscal balance. Data from CBO project Medicaid spending per capita to grow about 1.5 percent faster than GDP per capita on average for the period from 2019 through 2028. Data from CMS project Medicaid spending per capita to grow about 0.6 percent faster on average for the period from 2029 through 2067. Data from CMS also project national health expenditures per capita to grow about 0.8 percent faster than GDP per capita for the period from 2018 through 2067. Using these projections, our simulations suggest that maintaining current policies will cause the sector’s expenditures to exceed its revenues, and that the difference between revenues and expenditures will become increasingly negative during the next several decades. However, simulations developed using alternative projections of excess cost growth in Medicaid and national health expenditures suggest that the difference between revenues and expenditures may be reduced but not eliminated within the simulation period if excess cost growth in health care is zero. In the scenario where excess cost growth rises faster—0.7 percent on average for Medicaid for the period from 2029 through 2067 and 1 percent for national health expenditures for the period from 2018 through 2067—our simulations show that the difference between revenues and expenditures will persist for the remainder of the simulation period (see figure 10). The rate of return on pension assets could also affect the state and local government sector’s fiscal outlook. Based on an inflation-adjusted rate of return on pension assets of 5 percent, our simulations suggest that state and local governments will need to make pension contributions equivalent to about 12.9 percent of their wages and salaries to meet their long-term pension obligations. However, this estimate is sensitive to the rate of return on state and local governments’ pension assets. Simulations we developed using a higher rate of return—7.5 percent—suggest that pension contributions needed to meet pension obligations would be about 3 percent of state and local government employees’ wages and salaries. In addition, under this scenario, our simulations suggest that the difference between revenues and expenditures will be reduced, but not eliminated within the simulation period. Alternatively, we estimated that if the rate of return on pension assets is relatively low—at 2.5 percent— required pension contributions would need to be about 23 percent of state and local government employees’ wages and salaries during the simulation period. Under this scenario, our simulations show that the sector’s negative operating balance will continue to grow larger throughout the simulation period. It follows therefore, that high rates of return on pension assets are associated with an improved outlook for state and local governments, and vice versa (see figure 11). This report was prepared under the direction of Michelle A. Sager, Director, Strategic Issues, who can be reached at (202) 512-6806 or sagerm@gao.gov, and Oliver M. Richard, Director, Center for Economics, who can be reached at (202) 512-8424 or richardo@gao.gov if there are any questions. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV. To simulate measures of fiscal balance for the state and local government sector for the long term, we used aggregate data on the state and local government sector and national data on other variables from the following sources: Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Federal Disability Insurance Trust Funds (OASDI Trustees); Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA); Bureau of Labor Statistics; Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS); Congressional Budget Office (CBO); and Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Our approach generally follows the approach used in GAO-08-317 and in subsequent updates of that report. Specifically, we developed a model that projects the levels of receipts and expenditures of the state and local government sector (henceforth, the sector) in future years based on current and historical spending and revenue patterns. We use table 3.3 of the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA)—State and Local Government Current Receipts and Expenditures—prepared by BEA at the U.S. Department of Commerce as an organizing framework for developing our model of the sector’s revenues and expenditures (see table 1). In this table, current revenues are grouped in five main categories. Current tax receipts. These receipts are tax payments made by persons or businesses to state and local governments. They include income taxes, general sales taxes, property taxes, and excise taxes. Current taxes also include fees for motor vehicle licenses, drivers’ licenses, and business licenses. Social insurance contributions. These contributions finance the provision of certain social benefits to qualified persons, and include contributions from employers and employees for temporary disability insurance, worker’s compensation insurance, and other programs. Income receipts from government assets. These receipts include interest, dividends, and rental income, such as royalties paid on drilling on the outer continental shelf. Also, state and local governments earn interest and dividend income on financial assets. Current transfer receipts. Transfer receipts are receipts for which state and local governments provide nothing of value in return. Current transfer receipts include federal grants, fines, fees, donations, and tobacco settlements. Also included are net insurance settlements, certain penalty taxes, court fees, and other miscellaneous transfers. Current surplus of government enterprises. This surplus is a profit- type measure for state and local government enterprises, such as water, sewer, gas, and electricity providers; toll providers; liquor stores; air and water terminals; public transit; and state lotteries. Some types of enterprises, such as state lotteries, consistently earn surpluses which are used to fund general government activities. In contrast, many enterprises run deficits, which, in turn, reduce receipts. State and local governments also receive income from the sale of goods and services, such as school tuition. In the NIPAs, this income is treated as an offset against expenditures, not revenue. This income comes from voluntary purchases that might have been made from a private sector provider of such services. In addition to current receipts, state and local governments receive capital transfer receipts. These receipts include estate and gift taxes, and federal government investment grants for capital such as highways, transit, air transportation, and water treatment plants. State and local government current expenditures are grouped into four main categories. Consumption expenditures. Generally, spending for which some value is provided in return. State and local government consumption spending is the sum of inputs used to provide goods and services, including compensation of general government employees, consumption of general government fixed capital (depreciation), and intermediate goods and services purchased, less sales to other sectors and own-account investment. Current transfer payments. Payments for which nothing of value is provided in return. For state and local governments, current transfer payments consist primarily of social benefits, which are payments to persons to provide for needs that arise from circumstances such as sickness, unemployment, retirement, and poverty. There are two kinds of social benefits—benefits from social insurance funds, such as temporary disability insurance and workers’ compensation, and other social benefits, such as medical benefits from Medicaid and the state Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP), family assistance from Temporary Assistance to Needy Families, education assistance, and other public assistance programs. While NIPA table 3.3 also includes other current transfer payments to the rest of the world as part of current transfer payments, these amounts are generally equal to zero. Interest payments. These include actual and imputed interest and represent the cost of borrowing by state and local governments to finance their capital and operational costs. Subsidies. State and local government subsidies are largely payments to railroads. State and local government spending also includes gross investment, capital transfer payments, and net purchases of nonproduced assets. Gross investment is spending on capital goods like structures, equipment, and intellectual property—items that are called fixed assets or capital because of their repeated or continuous use in providing government services for more than 1 year. Structures include residential and commercial buildings, highways and streets, sewer systems, and water systems. State and local government capital transfer payments include disaster-related insurance benefits paid to the U.S. territories and the Commonwealths of Puerto Rico and Northern Mariana Islands. Net purchases of nonproduced assets are composed of net purchases of land less oil bonuses (payments to states for the long-term rights to extract oil). Our main indicator of the sector’s fiscal balance is its operating balance net of funds for capital expenditures (henceforth, operating balance), which is a measure of the sector’s ability to cover its current expenditures out of current revenues. The operating balance is defined as total receipts minus (1) capital outlays not financed by medium- and long-term debt issuance, (2) total current expenditures less depreciation, (3) current surplus of state and local government enterprises, and (4) net social insurance fund balance. Alternative indicators of fiscal balance include net saving and net lending or borrowing. Net saving is the difference between current receipts and current expenditures. Since current expenditures exclude capital investment but include a depreciation measure, net saving can be thought of as a measure of the extent to which governments are covering their current operations from current receipts. Net lending or borrowing is the difference between total receipts and total expenditures, and is analogous to the federal unified surplus or deficit. Total receipts differ from current receipts because they include capital transfer receipts. Total expenditures differ from current expenditures because they include capital investment, capital transfer payments, and net purchases of nonproduced assets. However, they exclude fixed capital consumption. The former three categories are cash expenditures, while the latter is a noncash charge. Net lending or net borrowing represents the governments’ cash surplus or borrowing requirement. This measure is normally negative because governments borrow to finance their capital investment (and sometimes to finance current operations as well). The following equations describe how we simulated state and local government receipts and expenditures, as well as the intermediate variables used in those simulations. For this update, we started with historical data for 2017, or the most recent year available, and then simulated each variable for each year from 2018 through 2092 (the simulation period). To simulate state and local government receipts and expenditures, we use simulations of various national-level demographic, macroeconomic, and health care variables derived from projections produced by CBO, CMS, and the OASDI Trustees, and otherwise derived using our own assumptions (see table 2). This approach is similar to the approach we have used in prior model updates. To simulate state and local government spending on defined benefit pensions, we first estimate the contribution rate (as a fraction of state and local government general government wages and salaries) that state and local governments would need to make each year going forward to ensure that their pension systems are fully funded on an ongoing basis. Our goal is to estimate the financial commitments to employees that have been and are likely to continue to be made by the state and local sector to better understand the full fiscal outlook for the sector. As such, our analysis projects the liabilities that the sector is likely to continue to incur in the future based on simulations of future numbers of retirees receiving pension benefits and their benefit amounts; future numbers of employees, their wages and salaries, and their pension contributions; and assets in state and local government defined benefit pension funds. Although we are only interested in applying contribution rates over the simulation time frame, we actually have to derive the contribution rate for a longer time frame in order to find the steady-state level of necessary contributions. This longer time frame is required because the estimated contribution rate increases as the projection horizon increases and eventually converges to a steady state. If the projection period is of insufficient length, the steady-state level of contribution is not attained, and the necessary contribution rate is understated. We simulated variables used to estimate the pension contribution rate using the approach summarized in table 3. This approach is similar to the approach we have used in prior model updates. Future growth in the number of state and local government retirees— many of whom will be entitled to pension and health care benefits—is largely driven by the size of the workforce in earlier years. We simulated the number of state and local government retirees by assuming that the growth rate in the number of retirees is a weighted average of the growth rates in lagged general government and government enterprise employment. We estimated the weights using a regression of the percent change in the number of retirees on the percent change in employment 1, 6, 11, 16, 21, 26, 31, 36, and 41 years in the past. The coefficients on the past percentage changes in employment were constrained to be non- negative and to sum to 1. For this regression, we removed cyclical swings in employment using the Hodrick-Prescott filter. Similarly, future changes in the real amount of pension benefits will be a function of past changes in real wages and salaries. As indicated in table 3, we used a weighted average of past values of the state and local government employment cost index to simulate the employment cost index for state and local government retirees. We chose the weights to reflect changes in the share and average real benefit level of three subsets of the retiree population over time: (1) new retirees entering the beneficiary pool, (2) deceased retirees leaving the pool, and (3) continuing retirees from the previous year. We simulated the weight for new retirees in a year as the number of retirees less the number of continuing retirees divided by the number of retirees. We simulated the weight for deceased retirees as the mortality rate multiplied by last year’s retirees divided by this year’s retirees. We simulated the weight for continuing retirees as last year’s retirees divided by this year’s retirees. Finally, we simulated the employment cost index for state and local government retirees as the sum of the weight on new retirees multiplied by the state and local government employment cost index and the weight on continuing retirees multiplied by the state and local government employment cost index 8 years prior, less the weight on deceased retirees multiplied by the state and local government employment cost index 21 years prior. As discussed above, we started with historical data for 2017, or the most recent year available, simulated all of the variables in table 3 over the long run, and then used the consumer price index (CPI) and the real return on pension assets to calculate the total present value of wages and salaries for state and local government general government and government enterprise employees, the total present value of real pension benefits paid to state and local government retirees, and the total present value of state and local government employees’ pension contributions. Then, we calculated the total present value of state and local governments’ pension liabilities as the total present value of real pension benefits paid to state and local government retirees less the total present value of state and local government employees’ pension contributions, and the value of assets in state and local government defined benefit pension funds in 2017. Finally, we estimated state and local governments’ pension contribution rate as the ratio of the total present value of their pension liabilities to the total present value of wages and salaries for state and local government employees. Table 4 summarizes the approach we used to simulate interest rates on state and local government financial assets and liabilities. This approach is similar to the approach we have used in prior model updates. Table 5 summarizes our approach to simulating state and local government receipts. This approach is similar to the approach we have used in prior model updates. These variables track state and local government receipts in table 1 above as follows: State and local government personal income tax revenue is the sum of state personal income tax revenue and local personal income tax revenue; State and local government personal tax revenue is the sum of personal income tax revenue and other personal tax revenue; State and local government revenue from taxes on production and imports is the sum of general sales tax revenue, excise tax revenue, property tax revenue, and revenue from other taxes on production and imports; State and local government current tax revenue is the sum of personal tax revenue, revenue from taxes on production and imports, and corporate income tax revenue; State and local government current transfer receipts are equal to federal Medicaid grants minus Medicare Part D payments to the federal government, plus other federal grants (excluding investment grants), transfer receipts from businesses, and transfer receipts from persons; State and local government current receipts are the sum of current tax revenue, current transfer receipts, income on assets, social insurance contributions, and government enterprise surplus; State and local government capital transfer receipts are the sum of federal investment grants and estate and gift tax revenue; and State and local government total receipts are the sum of current receipts and capital transfer receipts. Our general approach to simulating state and local government expenditures is to assume that state and local governments maintain the current level of public goods and services provision per capita (see table 6). Thus, we generally assume that expenditures keep up with U.S. population growth and some measure of inflation, where the relevant rate of inflation varies depending on the specific type of expenditure. However, we use alternative approaches—described below—to simulate depreciation, interest payments, and social benefits for health care. This approach is similar to the approach we have used in prior model updates. These variables correspond to state and local government expenditures in table 1 as follows: Employee compensation is the sum of wages and salaries, pension contributions, health benefits for current employees, health benefits for retirees, and other compensation, for state and local government general government employees. Consumption expenditures are the sum of employee compensation, general government fixed capital consumption, and other general government consumption expenditures. Social benefit payments are the sum of Medicaid benefits, non- Medicaid health benefits, and non-health social benefits. Current expenditures are the sum of consumption expenditures, social benefit payments, interest payments, and subsidy payments. Total expenditures are the sum of current expenditures, gross investment, capital transfer payments, and purchases of nonproduced assets, minus general government and government enterprise fixed capital consumption. Table 7 summarizes our approach for simulating state and local government financial assets and liabilities. This approach is similar to the approach we have used in prior model updates. Our method for simulating the sectors’ short-term debt outstanding leverages the fact that for any entity, there is a direct relationship between budget outcomes and changes in financial position. Specifically, if expenditures exceed receipts, the gap needs to be financed by some combination of changes in financial assets and changes in financial liabilities. If governments spend more than they take in, they must pay for it by issuing debt, cashing in assets, or some combination of the two. Conversely, if receipts exceed expenditures and the sector is a net lender, its net financial investment (the net change in financial assets minus the net change in financial liabilities) must equal the budget surplus. The relationship between budget outcomes and the sector’s financial position is shown in the following accounting identity: total receipts – total expenditures = change in financial assets – change in financial liabilities. The sector’s financial liabilities include short-, medium-, and long-term debt; trade payables; and loans from the federal government, so the accounting identity can be rewritten as follows: total receipts – total expenditures = change in financial assets – change in medium- and long-term debt – change in trade payables – change in federal government loans – change in short term debt. For a given difference between total receipts and total expenditures, various combinations of changes in financial assets and changes in financial liabilities can satisfy this identity. However, we assumed that financial assets grow at the same rate as U.S. GDP, that medium- and long-term debt outstanding is determined using the historical relationship described in table 7, that federal government loans to state and local governments are determined using the historical relationship described in table 7, and that trade payables grow at the same rate as other state and local government consumption spending. If the first four terms on the right hand side of the identity are already determined, then only the fifth term— the change in short-term debt—is free to satisfy this identity. As discussed above, our indicators of fiscal balance are operating balance, net saving, and net lending or borrowing. This approach is similar to the approach we have used in prior model updates. Recall that we defined operating balance as follows: operating balance = total receipts – (gross investment + capital transfer payments + net purchases of nonproduced assets – medium- and long-term debt issuance) – (current expenditures – consumption of general government fixed assets) – current surplus of state and local government enterprises – net social insurance fund balance. By substituting for total receipts and current expenditures using the relationships described above and rearranging terms, we can also calculate operating balance using a formula that more easily identifies its revenue components—the items in the first set of parentheses—and expenditure components—the items in the second set of parentheses: operating balance = (current tax revenues + estate and gift tax revenues + social insurance fund contributions + income receipts from assets + current transfers + federal investment grants + medium- and long-term debt issuance) – (compensation of general government employees + social benefit payments + interest payments + gross investment + capital transfer payments + net purchases of nonproduced assets + other general government consumption expenditures + subsidy payments + net social insurance fund balance). Some of our simulations are based on estimated historical relationships between pairs of variables: Elasticity of real personal consumption expenditures less food and services with respect to real wages and salaries; Elasticity of the real U.S. market value of real estate with respect to Relationship between effective interest rates on financial assets and Relationship between state and local government bond yields and 10- year Treasury rates; Relationship between effective interest rates on long-term state and local government debt and federal government loans and state and local government bond yields; Elasticity of real state personal income tax revenue with respect to Elasticity of real state and local government excise tax revenue with respect to real wages and salaries; Relationship between long-term debt issuance as a fraction of gross investment and nonproduced asset purchases in excess of federal investment grants and the change in state and local government bond yields; and Relationship between real federal government lending to state and local governments and real U.S. GDP. To estimate each of these historical relationships, we used the following approach: first, we assessed the order of integration of both variables using unit root tests of the levels and the first differences, where a variable is integrated of order 0 (I(0) or stationary) if we rejected the null hypothesis of a unit root in the levels at standard significance levels, and is integrated of order 1 (I(1) or first-order nonstationary) if we could not reject the null hypothesis of a unit root in the levels but we could do so for the first differences. For relationships between variables that were both stationary, we estimated an autoregressive distributed lag model, where y is the dependent variable, x is the independent variable, and ε is an independent, identically distributed error term. The long-run impact on y of a one unit change in x is given by ∑ . We initially chose the number of lags based on the Bayesian Information Criteria and then added additional lags of the dependent variable, if needed, until the residuals were consistent with a white noise process at standard significance levels. For relationships between variables that were both first-order nonstationary, we used the same approach but also used the Pesaran, Shin, and Smith bounds test for the existence of a cointegrating (long-run equilibrium) relationship. We concluded that the variables were cointegrated if we rejected the null hypothesis of no relationship at standard significance levels. Tables 8 and 9 summarize the estimated regression models as well as the results of the unit root, white noise, and cointegration tests. We simulated the model for the 75-year period from 2018 through 2092, and we used the results to calculate the operating balance for the state and local government sector as a percentage of U.S. GDP. Our results suggest that if the sector maintains current policy and continues to provide current per capita levels of public goods and services, then its operating balance will decline from about -1 percent of U.S. GDP to about -3 percent of U.S. GDP over the next 50 years. To shed light on how maintaining the operating balance at or above zero would affect the state and local government sector, we used the model to simulate the level of total expenditures that would keep the operating balance greater than or equal to zero. We then calculated the difference between the present value of total expenditures simulated assuming the sector maintains balance, and the present value of total expenditures simulated assuming the sector maintains current policies, both as a percentage of the present value of total expenditures assuming the sector maintains current policies, and as a percentage of the present value of U.S. GDP. We calculated all of the present values for the 50-year period from 2018 through 2067, and we used a discount rate equal to the average of the 3-month Treasury rate and the 10-year Treasury rate for each year. Our results suggest that the difference between the present value of total expenditures that maintain balance and the present value of total expenditures that maintain current policies is about -14.7 percent of the present value of total expenditures that maintain current policies, or about -2.4 percent of the present value of U.S. GDP. That is, our simulations suggest that maintaining balance would require the sector to spend about 14.7 percent less than it would spend each year to maintain current policies. We note that a similar exercise based on simulating total revenues required to maintain the operating balance at or above zero would generate a similar result. Our approach has a number of limitations and the results should be interpreted with caution: The state and local government fiscal model is not designed for certain types of analyses. The simulations are not intended to provide precise predictions. Even though we know that these governments regularly make changes to tax laws and expenditures, the model essentially holds current policy in place and analyzes the fiscal future for the sector as if those policies were maintained because it would be highly speculative to make any assumptions about future policy adjustments. Fiscal outcomes, as related to the state and local government sector’s financial position and solvency, may not reflect all aspects of the sector’s fiscal health. Other indicators include economic indicators that go beyond the sector’s financial position to include economic growth, income, or distributional equity, as well as indicators of the quality of services provided by the sector, including education, health care, infrastructure, and other public goods and services. Our unit of analysis is the state and local government sector as a whole, so our results provide an assessment of the sector’s fiscal outlook. However, individual state and local governments likely exhibit significant heterogeneity in their expenditure and revenue patterns, so their fiscal outlooks will likely differ from that for the sector. Nevertheless, it is informative to assess the overall fiscal outlook of the sector because doing so reveals the outlook for the average state or local government. In addition, aggregate data on the sector are available on a more timely basis than data for individual state and local governments. This allows for a better assessment of the sector’s current fiscal outlook. Our results for the sector also provide a baseline from which to view the experiences of individual state and local governments. Finally, assessing the fiscal outlook of the sector as a whole can help mitigate the tendency to extrapolate from the most visible, but potentially not representative, experiences of individual states or localities. Our baseline approach to simulating the fiscal outlook for the state and local government sector is described in appendix I. As part of our simulation approach, we used five variables with values for the simulation period—the period from 2018 through 2092—that are projected outside the model and that do not rely on maintaining historical relationships: U.S. population, real U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) growth, national health care excess cost growth, Medicaid excess cost growth, and the real rate of return on pension assets. U.S. population. For our baseline simulations, we used the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Federal Disability Insurance Trust Funds’ (OASDI Trustees) intermediate population projections. Real U.S. GDP. For our baseline simulations, we projected real U.S. GDP to grow at the same rate as Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projections for the period from 2018 through 2028 and to grow at the same rate as the OASDI Trustees’ intermediate projections of real U.S. GDP growth for the period from 2029 through 2092. National health expenditures excess cost growth. For our baseline simulations, we used Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services’ (CMS) baseline projection of national health expenditures excess cost growth. Medicaid excess cost growth. For our baseline simulations, for the period from 2029 through 2092, we used Medicaid excess cost growth derived from CMS’s baseline projections. Real rate of return on state and local government pension assets. For our baseline simulations, we assumed a 5 percent real rate of return on state and local government pension assets. To assess the sensitivity of our results to changes in these baseline projections, we selected two alternative projections of each of these variables, one associated with a faster growth rate or rate of return and one associated with a slower growth rate or rate of return. U.S. population. For our alternative simulations, we used the OASDI Trustees’ high cost and low cost population projections. Real U.S. GDP. For our alternative simulations, we used the OASDI Trustees’ high cost and low cost projections of real U.S. GDP growth. National health expenditures excess cost growth. For our alternative simulations, we used CMS’s alternative projection of national health expenditures excess cost growth. As another alternative, we simulated the model assuming excess cost growth for national health expenditures is zero. Medicaid excess cost growth. For our alternative simulations, for the period from 2029 through 2092, we used Medicaid excess cost growth derived from CMS’s alternative projections for the period from 2029 through 2092. As another alternative, we simulated the model assuming Medicaid excess cost growth is zero for the period from 2029 through 2092. Real rate of return on state and local government pension assets. For our sensitivity analysis, we used real rates of return of 2.5 percent and 7.5 percent. Table 10 shows the average annual growth rate or rate of return associated with the baseline and alternative projections of each variable for the simulation period. For our simulations based on alternative assumptions about U.S. population growth and real U.S. GDP growth, as well as simulations based on alternative assumptions about real pension asset returns, we simulated the model changing one variable at a time and leaving the others fixed at their baseline values. For example, for one simulation we used the slower assumption for real U.S. GDP growth and the baseline assumptions for all other variables. For our simulations based on alternative assumptions about excess cost growth for national health expenditures and for Medicaid, we changed both variables in the same direction and left the others fixed at their baseline values. For example, for one simulation we used zero excess cost growth for both national health expenditures and for Medicaid, and made the baseline assumption for the other variables. Thus, our sensitivity analysis is in the spirit of a partial equilibrium comparative statics analysis that sheds light on how each of the individual variables may affect the state and local government sector’s fiscal outlook. However, these variables are likely to be correlated so future changes in one would likely be associated with changes in others. State and Local Governments’ Fiscal Outlook: December 2016 Update, GAO-17-213SP. Washington, D.C.: Dec. 8, 2016. State and Local Governments’ Fiscal Outlook: December 2015 Update, GAO-16-260SP. Washington, D.C.: Dec. 16, 2015. State and Local Governments’ Fiscal Outlook: December 2014 Update, GAO-15-224SP. Washington, D.C.: Dec. 17, 2014. State and Local Governments’ Fiscal Outlook: April 2013 Update, GAO-13-546SP. Washington, D.C.: Apr. 29, 2013. State and Local Governments’ Fiscal Outlook: April 2012 Update, GAO-12-523SP. Washington, D.C.: Apr. 5, 2012. State and Local Government Pension Plans: Economic Downturn Spurs Efforts to Address Costs and Sustainability, GAO-12-322. Washington, D.C.: Mar. 2, 2012. State and Local Governments’ Fiscal Outlook: April 2011 Update, GAO-11-495SP. Washington, D.C.: Apr. 6, 2011. State and Local Governments: Knowledge of Past Recessions Can Inform Future Federal Fiscal Assistance, GAO-11-401. Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2011. State and Local Governments: Fiscal Pressures Could Have Implications for Future Delivery of Intergovernmental Programs, GAO-10-899. Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2010. State and Local Governments’ Fiscal Outlook: March 2010 Update, GAO-10-358. Washington, D.C.: Mar. 2, 2010. Update of State and Local Government Fiscal Pressures, GAO-09-320R. Washington, D.C.: Jan. 26, 2009. State and Local Fiscal Challenges: Rising Health Care Costs Drive Long- term and Immediate Pressures, GAO-09-210T. Washington, D.C.: Nov. 19, 2008. State and Local Governments: Growing Fiscal Challenges Will Emerge during the Next 10 Years, GAO-08-317. Washington, D.C.: Jan. 22, 2008. Our Nation’s Long-Term Fiscal Challenge: State and Local Governments Will Likely Face Persistent Fiscal Challenges in the Next Decade, GAO-07-1113CG. Washington, D.C.: July 18, 2007. State and Local Governments: Persistent Fiscal Challenges Will Likely Emerge within the Next Decade, GAO-07-1080SP. Washington, D.C.: July 18, 2007. In addition to the contacts listed above, Brenda Rabinowitz and Courtney LaFountain (Assistant Directors), David Aja, Brett Caloia, Ann Czapiewski, Joe Silvestri, Stewart Small, Andrew J. Stephens, Frank Todisco, Walter Vance, and Chris Woika made significant contributions to this report.	[ "Fiscal sustainability presents a national challenge shared by all levels of government. Since 2007, GAO has published simulations of long-term fiscal trends in the state and local government sector, which have consistently shown that the sector faces long-term fiscal pressures. While most states have requirements related to balancing their budgets, deficits can arise because the planned annual revenues are not generated at the expected rate, demand for services exceeds planned expenditures, or both, resulting in a near-term operating deficit. This report updates GAO's state and local fiscal model to simulate the fiscal outlook for the state and local government sector. This includes identifying the components of state and local expenditures likely to contribute to the sector's fiscal pressures. In addition, this report identifies considerations related to federal policy and other factors that could contribute to uncertainties in the state and local government sector's long-term fiscal outlook. GAO's model uses the Bureau of Economic Analysis's National Income and Product Accounts as the primary data source and presents the results in the aggregate for the state and local sector as a whole. The model shows the level of receipts and expenditures for the sector until 2067, based on current and historical spending and revenue patterns. In addition, the model assumes that the current set of policies in place across state and local government remains constant to show a simulated long-term outlook. GAO's simulations suggest that the state and local government sector will likely face an increasing difference between revenues and expenditures during the next 50 years as reflected by the operating balance--a measure of the sector's ability to cover its current expenditures out of its current receipts. While both expenditures and revenues are projected to increase as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP), a difference between the two is projected to persist because expenditures are expected to grow faster than revenues throughout the simulation period. GAO's simulations also suggest that growth in the sector's overall spending is largely driven by health care expenditures--in particular, Medicaid spending and spending on health benefits for state and local government employees and retirees. These expenditures are projected to grow as a share of GDP during the simulation period. GAO's simulations also suggest that revenues from personal income taxes and federal grants to states and localities will increase during the simulation period. However, revenues will grow more slowly than expenditures such that the sector faces a declining fiscal outlook. GAO also identified federal policy changes that could affect the state and local government sector's fiscal outlook. For example, the effects of the recently-enacted Tax Cuts and Jobs Act will likely depend on how states incorporate the Act into their state income tax rules. In addition, other factors, such as economic growth and rates of return on pension assets, could shift future fiscal outcomes for the sector." ]	8,477	gov_report	en	null	52c18fcac6f70755770f9bd45f030388a448a9ad0f9b64be
U.S. Code, Title 10, Section 5063, United States Marine Corps: Composition and Functions, dated October 1, 1986, states the following: The Marine Corps will be organized, trained and equipped to provide an amphibious and land operations capability to seize advanced naval bases and to conduct naval land campaigns. In this regard, the Marines are required by law to have the necessary equipment to conduct amphibious operations and land operations. The ACV and MPC were considered integral systems by the Department of Defense (DOD) and Marine Corps to meet this legal requirement, as well as providing critical capabilities to execute the nation's military strategy. On January 6, 2011, after spending approximately $3 billion in developmental funding, the Marine Corps—with "encouragement" from DOD—cancelled the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) program. The EFV was intended to replace the 40-year-old Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV), which currently transports Marines from ships to shore under hostile conditions. The Marine Corps cancelled the EFV due to excessive cost growth and poor performance in operational testing. Recognizing the need to replace the AAV, the Pentagon pledged to move quickly to develop a "more affordable and sustainable" vehicle to take the place of the EFV. The Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) is intended to replace the AAV, incorporating some EFV capabilities but in a more practical and cost-efficient manner. In concert with the ACV, the Marines were developing the Marine Personnel Carrier (MPC) to serve as a survivable and mobile platform to transport Marines when ashore. At present, the Marines do not have a wheeled armored fighting vehicle that can operate as a dedicated infantry carrier with Marine maneuver forces inland. The MPC was not intended to be amphibious like an AAV, EFV, or the ACV but instead would be required to have a swim capability for inland waterways such as rivers, lakes, and other water obstacles such as shore-to-shore operations in the littorals. Because of a perceived amphibious "redundancy," some have questioned the need for both the ACV and MPC. In June 2013, citing budgetary pressures, the Marines reportedly put the MPC program "on ice" and suggested that it might not be resurrected for about 10 years. Although some have questioned why the Marines cannot simply "adopt" a U.S. Army personnel carrier, Marine requirements for a personnel carrier reflect the need for this vehicle to be compatible with amphibious assault craft, as well as to have an enhanced amphibious capability, which is not necessarily an Army requirement. With the Marines involved in decades-long land conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and proliferating anti-access technologies such as guided missiles, some analysts questioned whether the Marines would ever again be called on to conduct a large-scale amphibious assault operation. In response to these questions and the perceived need to examine the post-Iraq and Afghanistan Marine Corps, the Department of the Navy and DOD studied the requirement to conduct large-scale amphibious operations and in early 2012 released a strategic vision for how amphibious operations will be conducted in the future. The primary assertion of this study is that the Marine Corps' and Navy's amphibious capabilities serve a central role in the defense of the global interests of a maritime nation. The need to maintain an amphibious assault capability is viewed by Marine Corps leadership as establishing the requirement for the ACV and MPC (as discussed in greater detail below). Congress is responsible for authorizing and appropriating funds for all weapon systems programs, including the ACV. In its oversight role, Congress could be concerned about how the ACV enables the Marines to conduct not only amphibious operations but also operations ashore. Another possible congressional concern is to what extent a robust amphibious assault capability is a necessary component of U.S. national security. Cost is another issue of interest to Congress. At present, the Marines use the AAV-7A1 series amphibious assault vehicle to move Marines from ship to shore. The Marines have used the AAV since 1971 and expect to continue to use it until replaced by the ACV or a similar vehicle. Over the years, the Marines have claimed the AAV has become increasingly difficult to operate, maintain, and sustain. As weapons technology and threat capabilities have evolved since the early 1970s, the AAV—despite upgrades—is viewed as having capabilities shortfalls in the areas of water and land mobility performance, lethality, protection, and network capability. The AAV's two-mile ship-to-shore range is viewed by many as a significant survivability issue not only for the vehicle itself but also for naval amphibious forces. Although the AAV has some armor protection and can operate inland to a limited extent, it is not intended for use as an infantry combat vehicle. The Marines do have the LAV-25, Light Armored Vehicle-25, an eight-wheeled armored vehicle that carries a crew of three and six additional marines. The LAV-25 is armed with a 25 mm chain gun and a 7.62 mm machine gun but is not fully amphibious, as it cannot cross a surf zone and would get to the beach via some type of connector such as the Landing Craft, Air Cushioned (LCAC). The LAV-25 has been in service since 1983. According to the Marine Program Executive Office (PEO) Land Systems, the LAV is not employed as an armored personnel carrier and usually carries a four-person Marine scout/reconnaissance team in addition to its crew. In this regard, the MPC was viewed as necessary by Marine leadership for the transport and enhanced armor protection of Marine infantry forces. The Marines' 2011 Request for Information (RFI) to industry provides an overview of the operational requirements for the ACV. These requirements include the following: The proposed vehicle must be able to self-deploy from amphibious shipping and deliver a reinforced Marine infantry squad (17 marines) from a launch distance at or beyond 12 miles with a speed of not less than 8 knots in seas with 1-foot significant wave height and must be able to operate in seas up to 3-foot significant wave height. The vehicle must be able to maneuver with the mechanized task force for sustained operations ashore in all types of terrain. The vehicle's road and cross-country speed as well as its range should be greater than or equal to the M-1A1. The vehicle's protection characteristics should be able to protect against direct and indirect fire and mines and improvised explosive device (IED) threats. The vehicle should be able to accommodate command and control (C2) systems that permit it to operate both at sea and on land. The vehicle, at a minimum, should have a stabilized machine gun in order to engage enemy infantry and light vehicles. The Marine Corps' 2011 Request for Information (RFI) to industry provided an overview of the operational requirements for the MPC. These requirements included the following: The vehicle must accommodate nine marines and two crew members and have a "robust tactical swim capability (shore-to-shore [not designed to embark from an amphibious ship]) and be capable of operating at 6 knots in a fully developed sea." The vehicle must be able to operate on land with M-1A1s in mechanized task forces across the Marine Corps' mission profile. The vehicle shall provide protection for the occupants from the blasts, fragments, and incapacitating effects of attack from kinetic threats, indirect fire, and improvised explosive devices and mines. The vehicle shall be capable of firing existing Marine anti-structure and anti-armor missiles and should be able to accommodate existing command and control (C2) systems. Defense officials have noted the Marine Corps is "not currently organized, trained and equipped to face a peer adversary in the year 2025" and enemies with advanced air and shore defense will make amphibious operations even riskier. To counter this, the Navy is developing the Expeditionary Advance Base Operations (EABO) operational concept to address these concerns. EABO is described as follows: Expeditionary Advance Base Operations is a naval operational concept that anticipates the requirements of the next paradigm of US Joint expeditionary operations. The concept is adversary based, cost informed and advantage focused. EABO calls for an alternative, difficult to target forward basing infrastructure that will enable US naval and joint forces to create a more resilient forward based posture to persist, partner and operate within range of adversary long range precision fires. The alternative forward posture enabled by Expeditionary Advance Bases (EABs) is designed to mitigate the growing threat posed by the abundant quantity, expanded range and enhanced precision of potential adversary weaponry—particularly ballistic and cruise missiles designed to attack critical joint fixed forward infrastructure and large platforms. EABs provide a dispersed and largely mobile forward basing infrastructure that enables a persistent alternative force capability set that is similarly designed to be difficult to target and inherently resilient. The resilient, reduced signature infrastructure of EABs, combined with naval forces designed and structured to persist and operate within the arc of adversary anti-access/aerial denial (A2AD) capabilities enables naval commanders to conduct Expeditionary Advance Base Operations to support Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC), and Fleet Commanders in the fight for sea control, by exploiting the opportunities afforded by key maritime terrain, particularly in close and confined seas. EABO advances, sustains and maintains the naval and joint sensor, shooter and sustainment capabilities of dispersed forces to leverage the decisive massed capabilities of the larger joint force with enhanced situational awareness, augmented fires and logistical support. The EABO Concept enables US naval forces to exercise 21 st Century naval operational art, meet new enemy A2AD threats with new capabilities and operate and thrive in and around close and confined seas. In terms of Marine Corps amphibious assault operations, the adoption of EABO could reportedly result in "an entirely different approach to amphibious assaults as well as new weapon systems." Noting that "missiles can now hit ships and landing craft while they are hundreds of miles from shore, making it far too dangerous for Marines to storm a beach with current capabilities," Marine officials are reportedly exploring ways to create temporary "bubbles" where Marines can get ashore. In response to these challenges, current and planned weapons systems might need to be modified to accommodate EABO operational concepts. As previously noted, in June 2013, citing budgetary pressures, the Marines reportedly put the MPC program "on ice" and suggested it might not be resurrected for about 10 years. At the time of the decision, the Marines' acquisition priorities were refocused to the ACV as well as the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV). Although the Marines refocused budgetary resources to the ACV, difficulties in developing an affordable high water speed capability for the ACV continued to confront Marine leadership. In what was described as a "drastic shift," the Marines decided in March 2014 to "resurrect" the MPC and designate it as ACV Increment 1.1 and initially acquire about 200 vehicles. The Marines also plan to develop ACV Increment 1.2, a tracked version, and to acquire about 470 vehicles and fund an ongoing high water speed study. Although ACV Increment 1.1 will have a swim capability, a connector will be required to get the vehicles from ship to shore. Plans called for ACV Increment 1.1 to enter the acquisition cycle at Milestone B (Engineering and Manufacturing Development) in FY2016, award prototype contracts leading to a down select to one vendor in FY2018, and enter low-rate initial production. On April 23, 2014, the Marines released an RFI for ACV Increment 1.1. Some of the required capabilities included the following: ... operate in a significant wave height of two feet and sufficient reserve buoyancy to enable safe operations; a high level of survivability and force protection; operate in four to six feet plunging surf with ship-to-shore operations and launch from amphibious ships as an objective; land mobility, operate on 30 percent improved surfaces and 70 percent unimproved surfaces; ability to integrate a .50 calibre remote weapon station (RWS) with growth potential to a dual mount 40 mm/.50 calibre RWS or a 30 mm cannon RWS; carrying capacity to include three crew and 10 embarked troops as the threshold, 13 embarked troops as the objective, carry mission essential equipment and vehicle ammunition; and the ability to integrate a command, control and communications suite provided as government furnished equipment ... The RFI included a requirement for industry to deliver 16 prototype vehicles nine months after contract award in April 2016 at a rate of 4 vehicles per month. The Marines estimated ACV Increment 1.1 would cost about $5 million to $6 million per vehicle, about $10 million less than what the previous ACV version was expected to cost. On November 5, 2014, the Marines reportedly released a draft RFP for ACV Increment 1.1. The Marines were looking for information from industry regarding program milestones, delivery schedules, and where in the program cost savings could be achieved. Plans were for two companies to build 16 prototype vehicles each for testing. Companies who competed for the two contracts included BAE Systems, General Dynamics Land Systems (GDLS), Lockheed Martin, and Scientific Applications International Corporation (SAIC). Under the provisions of the RFP, the ACV 1.1 was envisioned as an eight-wheeled vehicle capable of carrying 10 Marines and a crew of 3 that would cost between $4 million to $7.5 million per copy—a change from the RFI estimate of $5 million to $6 million per vehicle. In terms of mobility, the ACV 1.1 would need to be able to travel at least 3 nautical miles from ship to shore, negotiate waves up to at least 2 feet, travel 5 to 6 knots in calm seas, and be able to keep up with the M-1 Abrams tank once ashore. Proposals were due in April 2016 and the Marines reportedly planned to award two EMD contracts for 16 vehicles each to be delivered in November 2016. In 2018, the Marines would then down select to one vendor and start full production. The Marines reportedly plan to acquire 204 ACV 1.1s, to be allocated as follows: 1 st Marine Expeditionary Force, Camp Pendleton, CA— 67 ; 2 nd Marine Expeditionary Force, Camp Lejeune, NC— 46 ; 3 rd Marine Expeditionary Force, Okinawa, Japan— 21 ; Assault Amphibian School, Camp Pendleton, CA— 25 ; Exercise Support Division, Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center, Twenty Nine Palms, CA— 25 ; and Program Manager, Quantico, VA, and Amphibious Vehicle Test Branch, Camp Pendleton, CA— 20 . In April 2016 testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, the Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration testified that the Marines' Acquisition Objective for the ACV 1.1 remained at 204 vehicles, which would provide lift for two infantry battalions. Full Operational Capability (FOC) for ACV 1.1 is planned for FY2020. On November 24, 2015, the Marine Corps awarded BAE Systems and SAIC contracts to develop ACV 1.1 prototypes for evaluation. BAE's contract was for $103.8 million and SAIC's for $121.5 million, and each company is to build 16 prototypes. The Marines expect to down select to a single vendor in 2018. Initial operational capability (IOC) was expected by the end of 2020, and all ACV 1.1 vehicles are planned to be fielded by summer 2023. Plans are to equip six battalions with ACV 1.1s and 392 existing upgraded AAVs. Both BAE and SAIC reportedly have a long history related to amphibious vehicles, as BAE built the Marines' original AAV and SAIC has built hundreds of Terrex 1 vehicles used by Singapore, and both companies had Marine Corps contracts to modernize AAVs. ACV 1.1 is intended to have some amphibious capability but would rely on ship-to-shore connectors. ACV 1.2 is intended to have greater amphibious capability, including greater water speed and the ability to self-deploy from amphibious ships. BAE planned to team with Italian manufacturer Iveco (which owns Chrysler and Ferrari). BAE's prototype would accommodate 13 Marines and travel 11.5 miles at about 7 miles per hour (mph) in surf and 65 mph on land. BAE's version would incorporate a V hull design intended to protect passengers from underside blasts and have external fuel tanks for increased safety. BAE intends to produce its prototypes at its York, PA, facility. SAIC planned to team with Singapore Technology Kinetics to develop its prototype based on an existing design called Terrex. SAIC's version is said to travel 7 mph in water and incorporates a V hull design as well as blast-mitigating seats. It would carry a crew of 3 and can accommodate 11 Marines. SAIC's version plans for a Common Remote Weapons System (CROWS) (.50 calibre machine gun and a 30 mm cannon), which could be operated from inside the vehicle while buttoned up, therefore not exposing crewmen to hostile fire. On December 7, 2015, it was reported that GDLS would protest the award of the ACV 1.1 contract to BAE and SAIC, claiming the Marines asked for particular capabilities and then evaluated vendors by a different set of standards. On March 15, 2016, GAO denied GDLS's protest, noting that "the Marine Corps' evaluation was reasonable and consistent with the evaluation scheme identified in the solicitation." The Marines reportedly stated that the protest put the ACV 1.1 program about 45 days behind schedule but anticipated the ACV 1.1 would still be fielded on time. BAE and SAIC reportedly delivered their ACV 1.1 prototypes, with BAE delivering its first prototype in December 2016 and SAIC delivering its prototype in February 2017. This early delivery could potentially result in an unspecified incentive fee award for both companies. EMD testing began the week of March 13 and was scheduled to last eight months. In early December 2017, the Marines reportedly sent the ACV 1.1 down select request for proposals to BAE and SAIC. Plans called for operational testing to start in January 2018, with the Marines anticipating announcing a contract winner in June 2018 for the delivery of 204 ACV 1.1s over a four-year period. In accordance with the provisions of the FY2014 National Defence Authorization Act ( P.L. 113-66 ) Section 251, GAO submitted its annual report to Congress on the ACV program in April 2018. GAO reviewed program cost estimates, updated schedules, and program assessments of test results and production readiness, and compared ACV acquisition efforts to DOD guidance and GAO-identified best practices. GAO found the following: The first version of the Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV 1.1) is on track to meet development cost goals with no additional anticipated delays for major acquisition milestones. With regard to costs, the development phase of ACV 1.1 is on pace to not exceed cost goals that were established at the start of development, based on a recent Navy estimate, the ACV program office, and reporting from the contractors. GAO recommended that the Marine Corps (1) not enter the second year of low rate production for ACV 1.1 until after the contractor has achieved an overall Manufacturing Readiness Level (MRL) of 8 and (2) not enter full-rate production until achieving an overall MRL of 9. DOD partially concurred with this recommendation but noted that it was "reasonable to proceed at lower MRL levels if steps are taken to mitigate risks." On June 19, 2018, the Marine Corps selected BAE Systems to produce the ACV. Reportedly, the initial contract—valued at $198 million—will be for low-rate production of 30 vehicles to be delivered by the autumn of 2019. Eventually, 204 vehicles are to be delivered under the ACV 1.1 phase of the project. BAE will also produce the ACV 1.2 variant and, all told, the entire ACV 1.1 and 1.2 project is expected to deliver 700 vehicles, and, if all options are exercised, the total contract will reportedly be worth $1.2 billion. In December 2018, the Navy reportedly awarded BAE Systems a $140 million contract modification to build 30 Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) ACVs as part of Lot 2, with the first vehicles expected to be delivered in the summer of 2020. Lot 1 is reportedly still scheduled to start delivery in the summer of 2019. In DOT&E's December 2018 FY2018 Annual Report, it was noted During the operational evaluation (OA), the ACV-equipped unit demonstrated the ability to maneuver to an objective, conduct immediate action drills, and provide suppressive fires in support of dismounted infantry maneuver in a desert environment. The ACV-equipped unit was able to maneuver in the littorals; embark aboard a landing craft air cushioned (LCAC), transit the open ocean and surf zone, and debark from the LCAC. The ACV demonstrated water mobility and the ability to self-deploy from the beach, cross the surf zone, enter the ocean, swim, and return to the beach. Based on data from the OA, reliability is below the program reliability growth curve (58 hours Mean Time Between Operational Mission Failures [MTBOMF]). BAE vehicles demonstrated 24.9 hours MTBOMF. There were no systemic problems identified that indicate a major redesign is required. The ACV section was successful in 15 of 16 missions and demonstrated the capability to negotiate terrain in the desert and littorals, operate with tanks and light armored vehicles, and maneuver to achieve tactical advantage over the opposing threat force. ACV crews, supported infantry, and the opposing force noted that the vehicles performed better than the legacy vehicle in a wide variety of areas. In terms of recommendations, DOT&E noted the Program Manager, Advanced Amphibious Assault should do the following: Modify the infantry troop commander's station to make it easier to move between the hatch and seat. Assess the capability of all existing Marine Corps recovery assets to recover the ACV. Investigate options for preventing damage to steering/suspension when encountering battlefield debris, such as concertina wire. According to reports, the Marines envisioned that the successor to ACV 1.1—the ACV 1.2—would have a threshold requirement of 12 miles from ship-to-shore. If this threshold can be achieved, it could help to reduce the vulnerability of U.S. naval vessels supporting Marine amphibious operations to enemy shore fire. On April 10, 2019, during testimony to the Subcommittee on Seapower of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Navy and Marine Corps leadership noted During the fall of 2018, ACV 1.1 prototypes demonstrated satisfactory water mobility performance in high surf conditions, and in doing so met the full water mobility transition requirement for ACV 1.2 capability. Subsequently, the Milestone Decision Authority Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition (ASN (RD&A)) approved the consolidation of increments one and two into a single program to enable continuous production of ACVs to completely replace the AAV. The next key acquisition event is the Full Rate Production decision scheduled for the third quarter of FY 2020 following Initial Operational Test & Evaluation. ACV remains on schedule to achieve Initial Operational Capability in the fourth quarter of FY 2020. With the consolidation of ACV variants into a single variant, there will likely be a number of programmatic changes and potential ramifications for the ACV and ACV 2.0 programs. Reportedly, the Marines plan to develop an ACV 2.0, capable of carrying 10 to 13 Marines plus crew, capable of high water speeds and deployment from ships far from the coast. ACV 2.0 is planned to be capable of operating on land alongside tanks and light armored vehicles. According to the Marines ACV 2.0 serves as a conceptual placeholder for a future Decision Point (~ 2025, or sooner) at which time knowledge gained in the fielding and employment of the first phase of ACV (1.1 and 1.2), the state of the naval connector strategy, and science & technology work towards a high water speed capable self-deploying vehicle will support an informed decision. The FY2020 presidential budget request includes RDT&E and Procurement funding requests in the Base Budget, as well as FY2020 requested quantities. The Marines did not request ACV Overseas Contingency operations (OCO) funding in FY2020. According to DOD, the FY2020 ACV budget request will fund The ACV 1.1 Full Rate Production (FRP) Lot 3 of 56 vehicles, plus procurement of related items such as production support, systems engineering, program management, Engineering Change Orders (ECOs), Government Furnished Equipment (GFE), and integrated logistics support. Research and Development efforts include the procurement of ACV 1.2 MRV test articles, associated GFE, and initiation of a Vehicle Protective System trade study and integration efforts. While from an overall programmatic perspective, the consolidation of the ACV 1.1 and ACV 1.2 variants could be viewed as a favourable programmatic outcome, there are likely ramifications that might be of interest to policymakers. Potential issues include the following: Will the consolidation of ACV 1.1 and ACV 1.2 result in an overall cost savings? Will this consolidation permit the acquisition of additional ACVs because of potential cost savings? With the consolidation and the stated intent to replace AAVs, what is the revised timeline for the replacement of AAVs and will this result in cost savings from not having to upgrade and maintain AAVs longer than previously intended? How will the consolidation of ACV 1.1 and ACV 1.2 affect the ACV 2.0 program? If the Navy and Marine Corps decide to adopt Expeditionary Advance Base Operations (EABO) as an operational concept, it could possibly have implications for the ACV program, including the following: At the weapon systems level, would EABO require any changes to the vehicles themselves, such as enhanced survivability, lethality, or Command, Control, Communications, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) features? If changes are required to facilitate EABO, how would this affect the program's overall acquisition timeline and cost? If EABO does not require any technical changes in the ACV program, would the adoption of EABO modify the Marines' current procurement quantities of ACVs? If EABO requires different procurement quantities for the different ACV versions (more or fewer), how might this affect program timelines and program costs?	[ "On January 6, 2011, after spending approximately $3 billion in developmental funding, the Marine Corps cancelled the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) program due to poor reliability demonstrated during operational testing and excessive cost growth. Because the EFV was intended to replace the 40-year-old Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV), the Pentagon pledged to move quickly to develop a \"more affordable and sustainable\" vehicle to replace the EFV. The Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) is intended to replace the AAV, incorporating some EFV capabilities but in a more practical and cost-efficient manner. In concert with the ACV, the Marines were developing the Marine Personnel Carrier (MPC) to serve as a survivable and mobile platform to transport Marines when ashore. The MPC was not intended to be amphibious like an AAV, EFV, or the ACV but instead would be required to have a swim capability for inland waterways such as rivers, lakes, and other water obstacles such as shore-to-shore operations in the littorals. Both vehicles were intended to play central roles in future Marine amphibious operations. On June 14, 2013, Marine leadership put the MPC program \"on ice\" due to budgetary pressures but suggested the program might be resurrected some 10 years down the road when budgetary resources might be more favorable. In what was described as a \"drastic shift,\" the Marines decided to \"resurrect\" the MPC in March 2014. The Marines designated the MPC as ACV Increment 1.1 and planned to acquire about 200 vehicles. The Marines also plan to develop ACV Increment 1.2, a tracked, fully amphibious version, and at the time planned to acquire about 470 vehicles and fund an ongoing high water speed study. Although ACV Increment 1.1 is to have a swim capability, another mode of transport (ship or aircraft) would be required to get the vehicles from ship to shore. The Marines are reportedly exploring the possibility of developing a high water speed ACV 2.0, which could accompany tanks and light armored vehicles into combat. On November 5, 2014, the Marines released a draft Request for Proposal (RFP) for ACV Increment 1.1. On November 24, 2015, the Marine Corps awarded BAE Systems and SAIC contracts to develop ACV 1.1 prototypes for evaluation. BAE's contract was for $103.8 million and SAIC's for $121.5 million, and each company was to build 16 prototypes to be tested over the next two years. Both BAE and SAIC delivered their prototypes early, and Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) testing began mid-March 2017. In early December 2017, the Marines reportedly sent the ACV 1.1 down select request for proposals to BAE and Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC). On June 19, 2018, the Marine Corps selected BAE Systems to produce the ACV. The initial contract—valued at $198 million—was for low-rate production of 30 vehicles to be delivered by the autumn of 2019. On April 10, 2019, during testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Navy and Marine Corps leadership announced that during the fall of 2018, ACV 1.1 prototypes demonstrated satisfactory water mobility performance in high surf conditions and, in doing so, met the full water mobility transition requirement for ACV 1.2 capability. As a result, ACV 1.1 and ACV 1.2 were to be consolidated into a single variant—the ACV—which is intended to replace all AAVs. Potential issues for Congress include the potential ramifications of the consolidation of the ACV 1.1 and ACV 1.2 programs and how the possible adoption of the Expeditionary Advance Base Operations (EABO) operational concept could affect the ACV program." ]	4,254	gov_report	en	null	127e7f0f8f477509213721a8f6c0be22aca9c44292dacafe
Strong relations between the United States and Israel have led to bilateral cooperation in many areas. Matters of particular significance include the following: Israel's own capabilities for addressing threats, and its cooperation with the United States. Shared U.S.-Israel concerns about Iran, within the context of the U.S. exit from the 2015 international nuclear agreement, and growing tension involving Iran and Hezbollah at Israel's northern border with Syria and Lebanon. Israeli-Palestinian issues, including those involving Jerusalem, Hamas and the Gaza Strip, funding for Palestinians, and a possible Trump Administration peace plan. Israeli domestic political issues, including probable corruption-related indictments against Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and closely contested elections that are scheduled for April 9, 2019. For background information and analysis on these and other topics, including aid, arms sales, and missile defense cooperation, see CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations , by Jim Zanotti; and CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel , by Jeremy M. Sharp. Israel relies on a number of strengths to manage potential threats to its security and existence. These strengths include robust military and homeland security capabilities, as well as close cooperation with the United States. Israel maintains conventional military superiority relative to its neighbors and the Palestinians. Shifts in regional order and evolving asymmetric threats during this decade have led Israel to update its efforts to project military strength, deter attack, and defend its population and borders. Israel appears to have reduced some unconventional threats via missile defense systems, reported cyber defense and warfare capabilities, and other heightened security measures. Israel has a robust homeland security system featuring sophisticated early warning practices and thorough border and airport security controls; most of the country's buildings have reinforced rooms or shelters engineered to withstand explosions. Israel also has proposed and partially constructed a national border fence network of steel barricades (accompanied at various points by watch towers, patrol roads, intelligence centers, and military brigades) designed to minimize militant infiltration, illegal immigration, and smuggling from Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and the Gaza Strip. Additionally, Israeli authorities have built a separation barrier in and around parts of the West Bank. Israel is not a party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and maintains a policy of "nuclear opacity" or amimut . A 2017 report estimated that Israel possesses a nuclear arsenal of around 80-85 warheads. The United States has countenanced Israel's nuclear ambiguity since 1969, when Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir and U.S. President Richard Nixon reportedly reached an accord whereby both sides agreed never to acknowledge Israel's nuclear arsenal in public. Israel might have nuclear weapons deployable via aircraft, submarine, and ground-based missiles. No other Middle Eastern country is generally thought to possess nuclear weapons. Israeli officials closely consult with U.S. counterparts in an effort to influence U.S. decisionmaking on key regional issues, and U.S. law requires the executive branch to take certain actions to preserve Israel's "qualitative military edge," or QME. Additionally, a 10-year bilateral military aid memorandum of understanding (MOU)—signed in 2016—commits the United States to provide Israel $3.3 billion in Foreign Military Financing and to spend $500 million annually on joint missile defense programs from FY2019 to FY2028, subject to congressional appropriations. Israel's leaders and supporters routinely make the case that Israel's security and the broader stability of the region remain critically important for U.S. interests. They also argue that Israel is a valuable U.S. ally. The United States and Israel do not have a mutual defense treaty or agreement that provides formal U.S. security guarantees. Iran remains of primary concern to Israeli officials largely because of (1) Iran's antipathy toward Israel, (2) Iran's broad regional influence, and (3) the probability that some constraints on Iran's nuclear program could loosen in the future. In recent years, Israel and Arab Gulf states have discreetly cultivated closer relations with one another in efforts to counter Iran. Prime Minister Netanyahu has sought to influence U.S. decisions on the international agreement on Iran's nuclear program (known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA). He argued against the JCPOA when it was negotiated in 2015—including in a speech to a joint session of Congress—and welcomed President Trump's May 2018 withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA and accompanying reimposition of U.S. sanctions on Iran's core economic sectors. A few days before President Trump's May announcement, Netanyahu presented information that Israeli intelligence operatives apparently seized in early 2018 from an Iranian archive. He used the information to question Iran's credibility and highlight its potential to parlay existing know-how into nuclear-weapons breakthroughs after the JCPOA expires. In his September 2018 speech before the U.N. General Assembly, Netanyahu claimed that Iran maintains a secret "atomic warehouse for storing massive amounts of equipment and materiel." An unnamed U.S. intelligence official was quoted as saying in response, "so far as anyone knows, there is nothing in [the facility Netanyahu identified] that would allow Iran to break out of the JCPOA any faster than it otherwise could." After Netanyahu publicly exposed the Iranian nuclear archive, some former Israeli officials speculated about what action Israel might consider taking against Iranian nuclear facilities if Iran abrogates the JCPOA and expands nuclear activities currently restricted under the agreement. However, Netanyahu had said in an interview that he was not seeking a military confrontation with Iran. Israel and Iran have engaged in hostile action over Iran's presence in Syria. In the early years of the Syria conflict, Israel primarily employed air strikes to prevent Iranian weapons shipments destined for the Iran-backed group Hezbollah in Lebanon. Later, as the Syrian government regained control of large portions of the country with Iranian backing, Israeli leaders began pledging to prevent Iran from constructing and operating bases or advanced weapons manufacturing facilities in Syria. Since 2018, Israeli and Iranian forces have repeatedly targeted one another in and over Syrian- and Israeli-controlled areas. In January 2019, Prime Minister Netanyahu said that Israel had targeted Iranian and Hezbollah targets in Syria "hundreds of times." Limited Israeli strikes to enforce "redlines" against Iran-backed forces could expand into wider conflict, particularly if there is a miscalculation by one or both sides. U.S. involvement in Syria could be one factor in Israeli calculations on this issue. The U.S. base at Al Tanf in southern Syria has reportedly "served as a bulwark against Iran's efforts to create a land route for weapons from Iran to Lebanon." Israeli officials favor continued U.S. involvement in Syria, while also preparing for the possibility that they may need to take greater direct responsibility for countering Iran there. Russia's advanced air defense systems in Syria could make it more difficult for Israel to operate there. Since 2015, Russia has operated an S-400 system at Russia's Khmeimim air base in Lattakia, a city on Syria's Mediterranean coast. To date, however, Russia does not appear to have acted militarily to thwart Israeli air strikes against Iranian or Syrian targets, and Israel and Russia maintain communications aimed at deconflicting their operations. In addition to the S-400 that it owns and operates, Russia delivered an S-300 air defense system for Syria's military to Khmeimim airbase in October 2018. The delivery followed Syria's downing of a Russian military surveillance plane in September 2018 under disputed circumstances, shortly after an Israeli operation in the vicinity. According to an Israeli satellite imagery analysis company, three launchers appeared to be operational as of February 2019. It is unclear to what extent Russia has transferred the S-300 to Syrian military control, and how this might affect future Israeli military action in Syria. An Israeli journalist wrote that "Israel has the knowledge, experience and equipment to evade the S-300, but the fact that additional batteries, manned by Russian personnel, are on the ground, will necessitate greater care [when carrying out future operations against Iran-aligned targets in Syria]." Since the September 2018 incident, Israeli air strikes appear to have decreased somewhat. On March 25, 2019, President Trump signed a proclamation stating that the United States recognizes the Golan Heights (hereinafter, the Golan) to be part of the State of Israel. The proclamation stated that "any possible future peace agreement in the region must account for Israel's need to protect itself from Syria and other regional threats" —presumably including threats from Iran and the Iran-backed Lebanese group Hezbollah. Israel gained control of the Golan from Syria during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, and effectively annexed it unilaterally by applying Israeli law to the region in 1981 (see Figure 2 ). President Trump's proclamation changed long-standing U.S. policy on the Golan. Since 1967, successive U.S. Administrations supported the general international stance that the Golan is Syrian territory occupied by Israel, with its final status subject to negotiation. In reaction to the U.S. proclamation, others in the international community have insisted that the Golan's status has not changed. In Congress, Senate and House bills introduced in February 2019 ( S. 567 and H.R. 1372 ) support Israeli sovereignty claims to the Golan, and would treat the Golan as part of Israel in any existing or future law "relating to appropriations or foreign commerce." For decades after 1967, various Israeli leaders, reportedly including Prime Minister Netanyahu as late as 2011, had entered into indirect talks with Syria aimed at returning some portion of the Golan as part of a lasting peace agreement. However, the effect of civil war on Syria and the surrounding region, including an increase in Iran's presence, may have influenced Netanyahu to shift focus from negotiating with Syria on a "land for peace" basis to obtaining international support for Israel's claims of sovereignty. As part of the periodic conflict in Syria between Israel and Iran , some Iranian missiles have targeted Israeli positions in the Golan. The Syrian government has denounced the U.S. policy change as an illegal violation of Syrian sovereignty and territorial integrity, and insisted that Syria is determined to recover the Golan. Additionally, observers have argued that the policy change could unintentionally bolster Syrian President Bashar al Asad within Syria by rallying Syrian nationalistic sentiment in opposition to Israel's claims to the Golan and deflecting attention from Iran's activities inside Syria. Since 1974, the U.N. Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) has patrolled an area of the Golan Heights between the regions controlled by Israel and Syria, with about 880 troops from five countries stationed there as of January 2019. During that time, Israel's forces in the Golan have not faced serious military resistance to their continued deployment, despite some security threats and diplomatic challenges. Periodic resolutions by the U.N. General Assembly have criticized Israel's occupation as hindering regional peace and Israel's settlement and de facto annexation of the Golan as illegal. Hezbollah's forces and Israel's military have sporadically clashed near the Lebanese border for decades—with the antagonism at times contained in the border area, and at times escalating into broader conflict. Speculation persists about the potential for wider conflict and its regional implications. Israeli officials have sought to draw attention to Hezbollah's buildup of mostly Iran-supplied weapons—including reported upgrades to the range, precision, and power of its projectiles—and its alleged use of Lebanese civilian areas as strongholds. Ongoing tension between Israel and Iran over Iran's presence in Syria raises questions about the potential for Hezbollah's forces in Lebanon to open another front against Israel. After the September 2018 incident leading to Russia's installation of an S-300 system in Syria (discussed above), Iran reportedly began directly transferring weapons to Hezbollah in Lebanon while reducing Syria's use as a transshipment hub. One Israeli media account warned that Hezbollah's threat to Israel is increasing because of initiatives to build precision-weapons factories in Lebanon and to set up a military infrastructure in southern Syria. In late 2018 and early 2019, Israel's military undertook an effort—dubbed "Operation Northern Shield"—to seal six Hezbollah attack tunnels to prevent them from crossing into Israel. Israeli officials claim that they do not want another war, while at the same time taking measures aimed at constraining and deterring Hezbollah, including through consultation with the U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). President Trump has expressed interest in brokering a final-status Israeli-Palestinian agreement, and his Administration has supposedly prepared a proposal to facilitate negotiations, but the Administration has repeatedly postponed releasing the proposal. Many factors may account for the delays, including recent U.S. actions regarding Jerusalem, tension in and around the Gaza Strip, reduced funding for the Palestinians, Israeli settlements in the West Bank, and political jockeying and domestic constraints among Israelis and Palestinians. The U.S. decision—announced in December 2017—to recognize Jerusalem as Israel's capital and move the U.S. embassy there has fed U.S.-Palestinian tensions. Israeli leaders generally celebrated the change, but Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Chairman and Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas strongly objected. Many other countries opposed President Trump's actions on Jerusalem, as reflected in action at the United Nations. Claiming U.S. bias favoring Israel, Palestinian leaders broke off high-level political contacts with the United States shortly after the December 2017 announcement and have made efforts to advance Palestinian national claims in international fora. However, the PA continues security coordination with Israel in the West Bank. U.S.-Palestinian tensions appear to have influenced Administration decisions to cut off various types of U.S. funding to the Palestinians, and arguably have dimmed prospects for restarting Israeli-Palestinian talks. In a September 2018 address before the U.N. General Assembly, PLO Chairman/PA President Abbas denounced Administration actions that he characterized as taking disputed Israeli-Palestinian issues—such as Jerusalem's status and Palestinian refugee claims—off the negotiating table. Funding for economic and humanitarian needs in the West Bank and Gaza could become even scarcer. In February 2019, Israel announced that it would withhold a portion of the tax revenue it collects for the PA because—pursuant to a law passed by the Knesset in 2018—Israel had determined that amount represented PLO/PA payments made on behalf of individuals allegedly involved in terrorist acts. In response, Abbas announced that the PA would completely reject monthly revenue transfers from Israel if it withheld any amount, even though the transfers comprise approximately 65% of the PA budget. For February, Israel withheld approximately $11 million from the $193 million due to the PA, with the PA rejecting the entire amount as a result. The PA is reportedly seeking temporary financial support from the private sector and local banks, and also asking the Arab League to follow through on its 2010 decision to provide $100 million per month as a "financial safety net" for the PA. At the end of January 2019, U.S. bilateral aid to the Palestinians—including nonlethal security assistance that Israel generally supports—ended completely due to the Anti-Terrorism Clarification Act (ATCA, P.L. 115-253 ), which became law on October 3, 2018. Two months after the law's enactment, PA Prime Minister Rami Hamdallah informed Secretary of State Michael Pompeo that the PA would not accept aid that subjected it to federal court jurisdiction. Apparently, U.S. aid will not resume unless Congress amends or repeals the ATCA, or the Administration channels the aid differently. Assistant to the President and Senior Advisor Jared Kushner has stated that the Administration will publicly release a peace plan sometime after Israeli national elections, which are set to occur on April 9, 2019. According to Kushner, the peace plan contains detailed proposals on the various issues that divide Israel and the PLO. Many observers express skepticism about the prospect that these proposals can serve as a basis for the serious resumption of bilateral talks, but Kushner has reportedly said that the Administration is focusing on formulating "realistic solutions," and that "privately, people are more flexible." U.S. officials hope to surmount potential obstacles to the peace plan in the Israeli and Palestinian domestic arenas by obtaining political and economic support for the U.S. initiative from key Arab states in the region, including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, and Egypt. A number of Arab states share common interests in working behind the scenes with Israel to counter Iranian regional influence. While some diplomatic developments have fed speculation about warming Arab-Israeli ties, reports suggest that key Arab Gulf states remain reluctant to embrace more formal relations with Israel without a resolution of the Palestinian issue. Saudi Arabia's press agency responded to the U.S. recognition of Israel's claims to sovereignty in the Golan Heights by saying that it "will have significant negative effects on the peace process in the Middle East and the security and stability of the region." In a statement with implications both for domestic and international audiences, Prime Minister Netanyahu reportedly said that the March 2019 change in U.S. policy on the Golan proves that countries can retain territory captured in a defensive war. His statement prompted speculation over the possibility that Israeli leaders might consider annexing part of the West Bank and whether the situation in the Golan is sufficiently similar to invite comparison. Days before the April elections, Netanyahu asserted that if he were to lead the next government, he would apply Israeli law to West Bank settlements. The closely contested Israeli national elections—scheduled for April 9, 2019—and the subsequent government formation process will have significant implications for the country's leadership and future policies. Prime Minister Netanyahu faces a challenge from the centrist Blue and White party under the combined leadership of former top general Benny Gantz and former Finance Minister Yair Lapid. Some setbacks for Netanyahu during the campaign have included the attorney general's announcement of probable corruption-related indictments against Netanyahu, new media allegations of possible misconduct relating to Israel's procurement of German submarines, and questions about some individuals or groups possibly spreading rumors against Netanyahu's opponents via social media. Yet, some observers calculate that Netanyahu's Likud could possibly get fewer Knesset seats than Blue and White and still form the next coalition. For more information on the actors involved in the elections, see CRS Insight IN11068, Israel: April 2019 Elections and Probable Indictments Against Prime Minister Netanyahu , by Jim Zanotti and this report's Appendix . In July 2018, the Knesset passed a Basic Law defining Israel as the national homeland of the Jewish people. Some observers have expressed concern that the law might further undermine the place of Arabs in Israeli society, while others view its effect as mainly symbolic. In March 2019, Netanyahu said that Israel is a Jewish, democratic state with equal rights for all its citizens, and "the nation-state not of all its citizens, but only of the Jewish people," reviving domestic debate about the 2018 law and perhaps seeking support during the election campaign from sympathetic voter groups.	[ "Strong relations between the United States and Israel have led to bilateral cooperation in many areas. Matters of particular significance to U.S.-Israel relations include Israel's ability to address the threats it faces in its region. Shared U.S.-Israel concerns about Iran and its allies on the nuclear issue and in Syria and Lebanon. Israeli-Palestinian issues. Israeli domestic political issues, including elections scheduled for 2019. Israel relies on a number of strengths to manage potential threats to its security and existence. It maintains conventional military superiority relative to neighboring states and the Palestinians. It also takes measures to deter attack and defend its population and borders from evolving asymmetric threats such as rockets and missiles, cross-border tunneling, drones, and cyberattacks. Additionally, Israel has an undeclared but presumed nuclear weapons capability. Against a backdrop of strong bilateral cooperation, Israel's leaders and supporters routinely make the case that Israel's security and the broader stability of the region remain critically important for U.S. interests. A 10-year bilateral military aid memorandum of understanding (MOU)—signed in 2016—commits the United States to provide Israel $3.3 billion in Foreign Military Financing annually from FY2019 to FY2028, along with additional amounts from Defense Department accounts for missile defense. All of these amounts remain subject to congressional appropriations. Israeli officials seek to counter Iranian regional influence and prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu released new Israeli intelligence on Iran's nuclear program in April 2018, days before President Trump announced the U.S. withdrawal from the 2015 international agreement that constrains Iran's nuclear activities. It is unclear whether Israel might take future military action in Iran if Iranian nuclear activities resume. Since 2018, Israel has conducted a number of military operations in Syria against Iran and its allies, including Lebanese Hezbollah. Israel and Iran also appear to be competing for military advantage over each other at the Israel-Lebanon border. Amid uncertainty in the area, in March 2019 President Trump recognized Israel's claim to sovereignty over the Golan Heights, changing long-standing U.S. policy that held—in line with U.N. Security Council Resolution 497 from 1981—the Golan was occupied Syrian territory whose final status was subject to Israel-Syria negotiation. The prospects for an Israeli-Palestinian peace process are complicated by many factors. Palestinian leaders cut off high-level political contacts with the Trump Administration after it recognized Jerusalem as Israel's capital in December 2017. U.S.-Palestinian tensions have since worsened amid U.S. cutoffs of funding to the Palestinians and diplomatic moves—including the May 2018 opening of the U.S. embassy to Israel in Jerusalem. Palestinian leaders interpreted these actions as prejudicing their claims to a capital in Jerusalem and to a just resolution of Palestinian refugee claims. Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu has welcomed these U.S. actions. The Trump Administration has suggested that it will release a proposed peace plan after Israeli elections, which are scheduled for April 9, 2019. Speculation continues about how warming ties between Israel and Arab Gulf states may affect Israeli-Palestinian diplomacy, though Saudi Arabia said that the U.S. policy change on the Golan Heights would negatively affect the peace process. Bouts of tension and violence between Israel and Hamas in Gaza have continued—reportedly accompanied by indirect talks between the two parties that are being brokered by Egypt and aim for a long-term cease-fire. Domestically, Israel is preparing for the April 9 elections, which are closely contested. Former top general Benny Gantz is combining with former Finance Minister Yair Lapid to challenge Netanyahu, whom the attorney general has recommended be indicted for corruption in three separate cases. The elections and subsequent government formation process will have significant implications for Israel's future leadership and policies." ]	3,079	gov_report	en	null	9fb60bd9896530a232a2f60b678f1656122cfec5fa2d0bce
As part of the annual budget formulation process for each fiscal year, DOD establishes for each of nine foreign currencies, a foreign currency budget rate (units of foreign currency per one United States (U.S.) Dollar) to use when developing O&M and MILPERS funding requirements for overseas expenditures. Foreign currency budget rates for a particular fiscal year are established approximately 18 months prior to the fiscal year when overseas obligations will be incurred and disbursements made. For example, in June 2015, OUSD(C) issued guidance to, in part, instruct the services on the foreign currency rates to use in building their fiscal year 2017 budgets. In February 2016, as part of the President’s budget, DOD submitted its proposed fiscal year 2017 budget to Congress, and it began incurring obligations against subsequently appropriated amounts on October 1, 2016. DOD has used various methodologies for establishing the foreign currency budget rates. In 2005, we reviewed DOD’s methodology for developing its foreign currency budget rates and reported that DOD’s approach for estimating its foreign currency requirements for the fiscal year 2006 budget was a reasonable approach for forecasting foreign currency rates that could produce a more realistic estimate than its historical approach. In its fiscal year 2006 through 2016 budget requests, DOD used a centered weighted average model that combined both a 5-year average of exchange rates and an average of the most recently observed 12 months of exchange rates. For its fiscal year 2017 request, DOD adjusted its methodology to establish the foreign currency budget rates. Specifically, DOD established its foreign currency rates by calculating a 6-month average of Wall Street Journal rates published every Monday from May 25, 2015, to November 16, 2015. According to an OUSD(C) official, the 6-month average more closely represented foreign currency exchange rates experienced by the department during budget formulation, and it accounted for the strength of the U.S. Dollar, which had increased as compared with its historical 5- year average. DOD’s analysis found that the use of the 5-year historical average would have resulted in substantial gains when compared with gains expected from application of the 6-month average. More specifically, DOD projected gains of about $1 billion using the 5-year average of rates. During the fiscal year for which a budget is developed, DOD incurs obligations for its overseas O&M and MILPERS activities. Those obligations are recorded using the foreign currency budget rates. DOD uses various methods for selecting foreign currency rates to liquidate those obligations through disbursements, which may differ from the budget rates. DOD’s preferred payment method for foreign currency transactions is the Department of Treasury’s (Treasury) comprehensive international payment and collection system—the International Treasury Services (ITS.gov) system—which serves federal agencies making payments in nearly 200 countries. ITS.gov offers a number of rates, including advanced rates available up to 5 days in advance of disbursement, and the spot rate. The spot rate is the price for foreign currencies for delivery in 2 business days. While advanced rates, like spot rates, are based on the current market rate, advanced rates at the time they are selected are generally higher than the spot rate, with the 5-day advanced rate being the highest, because the rates are locked in ahead of the actual value date. While the spot rate can be more cost-effective, it requires immediate transaction processing, which may not be feasible for all disbursements. Differences between obligations incurred at the foreign currency budget rates and the amounts that DOD actually disburses drive gains or losses in the appropriated amounts DOD has available for its planned overseas expenditures. For example, if DOD budgeted for the U.K. Pound at a rate of .6289 (that is, 1 U.S. Dollar buys .6289 U.K. Pounds) as it did in fiscal year 2016, and the rate experienced at the time of disbursement was .6845, then DOD would have requested more funds than were actually needed for transactions involving the U.K. Pound. That would have resulted in a gain from the transaction—meaning that DOD would need less funds than were budgeted for the transaction. Conversely, a current rate that is lower than what was budgeted will result in a loss—and DOD would require more funds than were budgeted for the transaction. Within each of the services’ O&M and MILPERS appropriations accounts, amounts are available for overseas activities. Amounts obligated for overseas activities, along with associated foreign currency gains and losses, are managed by the services as part of the overall management of their O&M and MILPERS appropriations accounts. Service components use foreign currency fluctuation accounts within their O&M and MILPERs appropriations to manage realized gains and losses in direct programs due to fluctuations in foreign exchange rates. The service-level foreign currency fluctuation accounts are maintained at various budgetary levels within the service components. In fiscal year 1979, Congress appropriated $500 million to establish the FCFD account for purposes of maintaining the budgeted level of operations in the MILPERS and O&M appropriation accounts by mitigating substantial gains or losses to those appropriations caused by foreign currency rate fluctuations. FCFD appropriations are different from the O&M and MILPERS appropriations in two ways. First, FCFD account amounts are no-year amounts, meaning that they are available until expended, while in general, O&M and MILPERS appropriations are 1-year amounts and expire at the end of the fiscal year for which they were appropriated. Expired O&M and MILPERS amounts remain available only for limited purposes for 5 additional fiscal years. At the end of the 5-year expired period, any remaining O&M or MILPERS amounts, obligated or unobligated, are canceled and returned to Treasury. Second, FCFD account amounts may be used only to pay obligations incurred because of fluctuations in currency exchange rates of foreign countries, while O&M amounts are available for diverse expenses necessary for the operation and maintenance of the services and MILPERS amounts are available for service personnel-related expenses, such as pay, permanent changes of station travel, and expenses of temporary duty travel, among other purposes. Amounts from the FCFD account may be transferred to service-level foreign currency fluctuation accounts within O&M and MILPERS appropriation accounts to offset losses in buying power due to unfavorable differences between the budget rate and the foreign currency exchange rate prevailing at the time of disbursement. The FCFD account may be replenished in several ways. Amounts transferred from the FCFD to O&M and MILPERS appropriations may be returned when not needed to liquidate obligations because of subsequent favorable foreign currency rates in relation to the budget rate, or because other amounts have become available to cover obligations. A transfer back to the FCFD of unneeded amounts must be made before the end of the second fiscal year of expiration following the fiscal year of availability of the O&M or MILPERS appropriation to which the funds were originally transferred. Amounts may also be transferred to the FCFD account even if they did not originate there. Specifically, DOD may transfer to the FCFD account any unobligated O&M and MILPERS amounts unrelated to foreign currency exchange fluctuations so long as the transfers are made not later than the end of the second fiscal year of expiration of the appropriation. While multiple transfers of these unobligated amounts may be made during a fiscal year, any such transfer is limited so that the amount in the FCFD account does not exceed the statutory maximum of $970 million at the time of transfer. When the FCFD account balance is at the maximum balance, the services normally retain in their service- level O&M and MILPERs foreign currency fluctuation accounts any gains resulting from favorable foreign currency rates. Finally, any amounts transferred, whether from the FCFD account to an O&M or MILPERS account, or from an O&M or MILPERS account to the FCFD, are merged with the account and assume the characteristics of that account, including the period of availability of the funds contained in the account. Visibility of service-level foreign currency fluctuation account and FCFD transactions is maintained through the services’ accounting systems and execution reports. DOD uses the following reports to track its foreign currency funds: Foreign Currency Fluctuations, Defense Report (O&M): provides data on O&M foreign currency gains and losses for each service, by currency, including data on projected gains or losses for any remaining obligations that have not yet been liquidated and disbursed at the time of the report. Foreign Currency Fluctuation, Defense Report (MILPERS): provides data on MILPERS foreign currency gains and losses for each service, by currency, including data on projected gains or losses for any remaining obligations that have not yet been disbursed at the time of the report. In 2013 we analyzed and reported on carryover balances in federal accounts, which amounted to $2.2 trillion in fiscal year 2012, and we found that greater examination of carryover balances by an agency provides opportunities for enhanced oversight of their management of federal funds and may help identify opportunities for potential budgetary savings. Carryover balances are composed of both obligated and unobligated amounts. Only accounts with multi-year or no-year amounts, such as the FCFD, may carry over amounts that remain legally available for new obligations from one fiscal year to the next. DOD’s carryover balances would include FCFD account balances carried from one year to the next. DOD’s FCFD account is composed of unobligated carryover amounts that accumulate when unneeded for transfer to O&M and MILPERS accounts to cover foreign currency fluctuations. FCFD unobligated carryover balances include any expired, unobligated balances from the military services’ O&M and MILPERS accounts, which can include any gains due to favorable foreign currency fluctuations that are not used to cover other losses and that are transferred into the FCFD. DOD revised its foreign currency budget rates in fiscal years 2014 through 2016, which resulted in budget rates in these years that were more closely aligned with rates published by Treasury. Furthermore, the revised budget rates in fiscal years 2014 through 2016 decreased DOD’s projected O&M and MILPERS funding needs. The revised budget rates also decreased potential gains and losses in the amount of funds that DOD had available for its planned overseas expenditures. DOD revised its foreign currency budget rates in fiscal year 2014 and continued to do so in fiscal years 2015 and 2016 before making adjustments to its methodology in fiscal year 2017. According to an OUSD(C) official, the methodology developed in 2017 resulted in budget rates that were more closely aligned with market rates than in previous years, making revision of the 2017 budget rates unnecessary. DOD’s revisions to its foreign currency budget rates in fiscal years 2014 through 2016 resulted in rates that more closely aligned with those published by Treasury. Further, they decreased the expected gains that would have otherwise resulted from a substantial increase in the strength of the U.S. Dollar, in fiscal years 2014 through 2016, relative to other foreign currencies from the time the budget rates were set as compared with the rates available once the fiscal year began. Prior to fiscal year 2014, DOD did not revise its foreign currency budget rates. DOD officials did not provide an explanation for why the budget rates for fiscal years 2009 through 2013 were not revised. DOD developed, in November 2015, a set of standard operating procedures that describe the methodology it used for formulating budget rates for the nine foreign currencies included in its budget submission. These procedures also state that DOD is required to update the budget rates once an appropriation is enacted for the fiscal year. For example, if Congress reduces DOD’s appropriations due to favorable foreign currency rates, such as the $1.5 billion reduction in DOD’s total fiscal year 2016 appropriations, OUSD(C) then revises the budget rates to absorb the reduced funding levels. OUSD(C) officials stated that other factors are also considered when determining whether to revise the foreign currency budget rates, and that the department communicates the revised budget rates to the DOD components and Congress. For example, OUSD(C) assesses the value of each of the nine foreign currencies used to develop the budget request relative to the strength of the U.S. Dollar during the fiscal year. An OUSD(C) official also noted that the effects that the rate changes would have across these foreign currencies are also considered prior to submitting recommended rate revisions to the OUSD(C) leadership for approval. The official stated that one currency may be experiencing a loss, while another is experiencing a gain, which can affect whether to revise the rates and what those revisions should be. Additionally, the OUSD(C) official stated that “significant” projected gains or losses could drive a revision to the foreign currency budget rates, and that an informal $10 million threshold for projected gains and losses is used to determine when the foreign currency budget rates are revised. According to OUSD(C) officials, DOD components and Congress were notified when the budget rates were revised during fiscal years 2014 through 2016, including an explanation for why the rates were revised. OUSD(C) also includes the budget rates for each of the nine foreign currencies on its website and identifies any instances in which the budget rates were revised with the effective date of any rate revisions. Our analysis of DOD’s use of revised budget rates during fiscal years 2014 through 2016 found that the revised budget rates for those years were more closely aligned with rates published by Treasury. More specifically, for the nine foreign currencies included in DOD’s budget, our analysis comparing DOD’s initial and revised budget rates for fiscal years 2009 through 2017 with average Treasury rates for these years found that DOD’s budget rates differed from Treasury rates by less than 10 percent in about 64 percent of the total 162 occurrences we examined. While we are unaware of any criteria that suggest how closely DOD’s foreign currency budget rates should align with market rates, we used 10 percent as a basis for our analysis because Treasury’s guidance states that amendments to its published exchange rates are required if rates differ from current rates by 10 percent or more. We further examined these occurrences to determine what the differences were between the DOD and Treasury rates before and after DOD began revising its budget rates in fiscal year 2014. Of the 162 occurrences we reviewed, there were 90 occurrences included in our comparison for fiscal years 2009 through 2013, and 72 occurrences were included in our comparison for fiscal years 2014 through 2017. Our analysis shows the following: For fiscal years 2014 through 2017, DOD’s budget rates for its nine foreign currencies differed from Treasury rates by less than 10 percent in about 71 percent of the occurrences. This increased from about 59 percent of the occurrences for the period of fiscal years 2009 through 2013, before DOD began revising its rates after the fiscal year began. For fiscal years 2014 through 2017, DOD’s budget rates differed from Treasury’s rates by 10 percent or more after DOD began revising its rates in fiscal year 2014 in about 29 percent of the occurrences, which is a decrease from about 41 percent of the occurrences prior to fiscal year 2014. Figure 2 below shows the number of occurrences in which DOD’s initial and revised rates differed from Treasury rates by less than 10 percent, and the occurrences in which DOD’s rates differed from Treasury rates by 10 percent or more. The occurrences that are less than 10 percent of Treasury rates are most closely aligned with Treasury rates. According to DOD officials, the differences between DOD’s foreign currency budget rates and Treasury rates are driven primarily by market volatility (that is, the differences in the foreign currency rates from when DOD formulates its budget rates, prior to the fiscal year, and the foreign currency rates determined by Treasury when obligated amounts are liquidated through disbursements during the fiscal year). According to the OUSD(C) official responsible for formulating and revising the foreign currency budget rates, the delay that occurs between the time when a budget rate is set (approximately 18 months prior to the beginning of a particular fiscal year) and the actual fiscal year is a major factor for why the budget rate may be revised. According to the official, the market rates experienced during fiscal years 2014 through 2016 were substantially different from those expected when the budget rates for those years were developed. Therefore, DOD revised its budget rates during these years to more closely align with market rates experienced. Specifically, this official stated that DOD revised its budget rates during fiscal years 2014 through 2016 to decrease the expected gains that would have otherwise resulted during these fiscal years from a substantial increase in the strength of the U.S. Dollar relative to other foreign currencies from the time the budget rates were set as compared with more favorable rates available once the fiscal year began. In order to more closely align its budget rates with market rates, DOD introduced a new methodology to establish the foreign currency budget rates for fiscal year 2017 because DOD anticipated approximately $1 billion in projected gains if it used the prior methodology. As a result of this change in the methodology, according to the OUSD(C) official, DOD did not experience substantial gains or losses in fiscal year 2017. Therefore, DOD did not revise its foreign currency budget rates during fiscal year 2017. However, as previously stated, the official did not provide an explanation as to why the budget rates for fiscal years 2009 through 2013 were not revised. DOD’s use of revised foreign currency budget rates decreased DOD’s projected O&M and MILPERS funding needs and any potential gains and losses that would have occurred due to foreign currency fluctuations during fiscal years 2014 through 2016. Because DOD uses its budget rates to establish its projected annual O&M and MILPERS funding requirements for planned overseas expenditures, any revisions to the budget rates affect DOD’s estimate of its funding needs. For example, our analysis shows that as a result of revising its budget rates during fiscal years 2014 through 2016, DOD’s projected funding needs for the period of fiscal years 2009 through 2017 decreased from about $60.2 billion to about $57.5 billion—a decrease of about $2.7 billion. To further show the effect that changing foreign currency rates could have on DOD’s projected funding for planned overseas expenditures for fiscal years 2009 through 2017, we also compared DOD’s projected O&M and MILPERS funding needs, based on its initial and revised foreign currency budget rates, against projected funding needs based on the use of foreign currency rates published by Treasury during the fiscal year. Our analysis shows that DOD’s projected O&M and MILPERS foreign currency funding needs using Treasury rates would have been about $58.4 billion, or about $885 million more than the $57.5 billion that DOD had projected using its initial and revised budget rates. DOD also uses foreign currency budget rates to calculate gains or losses attributable to foreign currency fluctuations. Specifically, DOD determines gains and losses due to foreign currency fluctuations by comparing the budget rate (that is, initial or revised budget rate) used to incur obligations against a more current market rate at the time it liquidates its obligations through disbursements. Therefore, revisions to the budget rates not only change DOD’s projected O&M and MILPERS funding requirements for the fiscal year in which the revisions occur, but also change the baseline from which the potential gains or losses would result when DOD liquidates its overseas O&M and MILPERS obligations through disbursements. For example, in fiscal year 2016, Congress reduced DOD’s total appropriations by $1.5 billion. As a result of this reduction and favorable foreign currency rates, DOD revised its fiscal year 2016 budget rates in February 2016 and applied the revised foreign currency budget rates in its calculations of gains and losses due to foreign currency fluctuations since the beginning of the fiscal year to absorb the reduced funding level. In applying the revised budget rates, a $30 million gain DOD had previously projected became a projected loss of about $186.2 million. The use of revised budget rates also affects the movement of funds from the FCFD account. For example, if the use of the revised budget rate creates a loss and DOD is unable to cover the increased costs to its O&M or MILPERS appropriations, funds from the FCFD account may be used to cover its planned overseas expenditures. DOD has taken some steps to reduce costs in selecting foreign currency rates to liquidate its obligations through disbursements. However, DOD organizations are not always selecting the most cost-effective rates to convert U.S. Dollars, and DOD has not determined whether opportunities exist to achieve additional efficiencies when making disbursements. DOD liquidates its obligations through disbursements for overseas expenditures using Treasury’s ITS.gov system, which provides DOD organizations with a choice of foreign currency rates to apply when making disbursements in a foreign currency. The foreign currency rate chosen determines how many U.S. Dollars must be paid for the transaction. Treasury officials explained that customers may choose either the spot rate or an advanced rate. The spot rate is the price for foreign currencies for delivery in 2 business days. Treasury officials explained that advanced rates are exchange rates that are “locked in” and guaranteed by the bank processing the disbursement 5, 4, or 3 days in advance of payment processing, which is known as the “value date” of a disbursement. Normally, the cost of the rate increases the further from the date of disbursement that it is locked in. While DOD often uses a 5-day advanced rate to make its disbursements, the other rate options available, such as a 3-day advanced and a spot rate, can be more cost-effective. We analyzed data provided by Treasury from its ITS.gov system and found that for disbursements made during the period of June and July 2017, the 5-day advanced rate was more costly than the 3-day advanced rate. In instances where the spot rate was available, we found that it was also more cost-effective than either the 3- day or 5-day advanced rates. For example, for those transactions processed through ITS.gov on June 13, 2017, DOD would have paid 1 U.S. Dollar for .881 European Euros if using the 5-day advanced rate; .883 European Euros if using the 3-day advanced rate; and .889 European Euros if using the spot rate. In the case of the Army, an Army Financial Management Command official provided us information indicating that the service has estimated potential cost savings that would result from more consistently selecting 3-day advanced rates through the ITS.gov system to make overseas disbursements of amounts, rather than the 5-day advanced rate. More specifically, the Army estimated between $8 million and $10 million in annual savings by transitioning from a 5-day to a 3-day advanced rate when selecting foreign currency rates. According to officials, the Army has transitioned all paying locations to the 3-day advanced rate. The Army estimates that these locations have produced $6.04 million in savings through February 2018. Although the Army indicated that it also planned to analyze whether use of the spot rate was feasible, it had not conducted this review at the time of our review. Data provided to us by Treasury from its ITS.gov system indicate that in June and July of 2017, the Air Force used the 5-day advanced rate exclusively for its disbursements, while the Navy and Marine Corps relied on both the 5-day and the 3-day advanced rates. Our analysis of these data show the Air Force would have achieved total savings for those 2 months of about $258,000 if it had made its disbursements using the 3- day versus the 5-day advanced rate. The savings resulting from each transaction varied based on the amount of the transaction. For example, on June 13, 2017, the Air Force disbursed a payment exceeding $3.7 million and would have saved more than $9,000 for that transaction if the 3-day advanced rate had been used. For the same single transaction, if the spot rate had been used instead of the 5-day advanced rate, the Air Force would have saved more than $31,000. The savings associated with the Navy’s and Marine Corps’ disbursements for the same 2-month period showed the potential for less dramatic savings of less than $100 because the Navy and Marine Corps used the 3-day advanced rate as opposed to the 5-day advanced rate for most of its disbursements. Where information on the spot rate was available, its use, as opposed to either the 5-day or 3-day advanced rate, would have resulted in additional savings opportunities for those 2 months. While these examples are illustrative of cost savings opportunities in June and July 2017, Treasury data show that in fiscal year 2016, DOD disbursed more than $11.8 billion through ITS.gov and, as of July 2017, had disbursed more than $9.6 billion through ITS.gov. Our analysis suggests that DOD could achieve further cost savings by more consistently selecting cost-effective foreign currency rates, such as the 3-day advanced or spot rates, with which to make disbursements. In selecting foreign currency rates, DOD’s Financial Management Regulation states that disbursements should be computed to avoid gains or deficiencies (losses) due to fluctuations in rates of exchange to the greatest extent possible. If there is no rate of exchange established by agreement between the U.S. government and the foreign country, then foreign currency transactions are to be conducted at the prevailing rate. The prevailing rate of exchange is the most favorable rate legally available for acquisition of foreign currency for official disbursement and other exchange transactions. Additionally, GAO’s Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government calls for management to periodically review policies, procedures, and related control activities for continued relevance and effectiveness in achieving the entity’s objectives or addressing related risks. DOD disbursement organizations have flexibility in selecting foreign currency rates to use when making disbursements using ITS.gov. There is no DOD-wide requirement for the services to review the rates used to make disbursements and, except for the Army, the services have not conducted such a review. This step is necessary to determine whether there are opportunities for savings by more consistently selecting cost- effective foreign currency rates. We discussed disbursement processes with DOD and Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps financial management officials, including the factors considered when selecting foreign currency rates. In addition, a Defense Finance and Accounting Service official noted that currencies can have criteria specifying when a payment is made and provided us the ITS.gov user’s guide, which addresses “special currency requirements,” such as those that would drive advanced payment for a currency. For example, the user’s guide indicates that payment for transactions involving the Afghanistan Afghani must be made 2 days in advance of the value date, and cannot be made on a Friday. However, information that is contained in the ITS.gov user’s guide and that we received from a Treasury official indicate that none of the nine foreign currencies for which DOD budgets place restrictions on when payment must be made; and therefore, this consideration should not drive the use of a specific rate at disbursement. Marine Corps financial management officials told us that the foreign currency rate selected at disbursement is at the discretion of the disbursing officer based on operational requirements, with the understanding that the most favorable rate for the government is the preference, while balancing mission requirements and the time necessary to process the transaction. These officials acknowledged that the 3-day advanced rate can be more cost-effective to the government but indicated that there are occasions when the 5-day advanced rate should be used because it provides more time to process the payments from deployed locations operating in different time zones or with limited communication capabilities. However, we found that OUSD (C) officials and financial management officials with the headquarters of the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps were not involved in disbursement, were unaware of what rates were being used at disbursement, and had not reviewed the rationale for selecting one rate over another. For example, Air Force and Navy headquarters officials we spoke with were unable to provide insight as to what drives the decision to use one rate over another. One Navy financial management official told us that he was unaware of any Navy policy that directs a specific rate to be used when disbursing funds, and suggested that the absence of such a policy provides the flexibility for officials to determine which approach is best. Headquarters, Marine Corps officials also stated that they did not monitor foreign currency rates used for disbursements or the reasons why one rate was selected over another. Based on our inquiry, officials indicated that they would analyze the foreign currency rates used for disbursements in 2017 and whether opportunities existed to achieve savings by using other rates available through ITS.gov. A Marine Corps official subsequently provided us with information that showed that two of three disbursing offices that currently utilize ITS.gov for disbursements use the 3-day advanced rate exclusively and one uses the 5-day advanced rate. The official noted that a technical issue within ITS.gov has restricted the disbursing office currently using the 5-day advanced rate from choosing any other rate, but that the service was further assessing options to correct the issue. In our conversations with an official in OUSD(C) about why the other services had not reviewed the foreign currency rates used for disbursements to determine what was being paid through ITS.gov and whether there was an opportunity for savings, the official commented that OUSD(C) had not directed the services to conduct any reviews in this area. This official was unaware that different foreign currency rates were used to make disbursements, and assumed that the military services all make disbursements in the same way. However, as discussed above, the services are using different rates resulting in inconsistency across the department. The official further indicated that DOD could perform a review to determine the cost differences of using one disbursement rate over another. Absent a review of the rates the services are using in making disbursements and whether cost savings could be achieved by more consistently selecting the most cost-effective foreign currency rates available for use at disbursement, DOD is at risk for paying more to convert U.S. Dollars for overseas expenditures than would otherwise be required. In fiscal years 2009 through 2016, DOD used the FCFD account to cover losses that the services experienced due to foreign currency fluctuations in 6 of the 8 years we reviewed. However, DOD does not effectively manage the FCFD account balance based on projected gains or losses. Transfers of expired unobligated balances from MILPERS and O&M accounts into the FCFD account have been made to replenish the account balance to the statutory limit of $970 million, without consideration of projected losses due to foreign currency fluctuations. Furthermore, DOD’s financial reporting on foreign currency fluctuations for fiscal years 2009 through 2016 contains incomplete and inaccurate information. In fiscal years 2009 through 2016, DOD transferred approximately $1.92 billion out of the FCFD account to cover losses that the services experienced due to foreign currency fluctuations in 6 of the 8 years we reviewed. For these years, DOD transferred funds from the FCFD account to the services’ MILPERS and O&M accounts during the fiscal year in which the funds were obligated for overseas expenses. The transfer amounts were based on both losses realized from actual disbursements and projected losses for any remaining obligations to be liquidated. The projected losses were calculated based on the current foreign currency market rates as of the time of the calculation. Based on the service-level data we reviewed, all of the services reported that they experienced losses in at least 5 of the fiscal years we reviewed. For example, the Army reported that it experienced losses in its MILPERS account for 5 of 8 years, while the Marine Corps reported that it experienced losses in its O&M and MILPERS accounts in each of the 8 years. In addition to the transfers to cover losses within the services’ MILPERS and O&M accounts, in fiscal year 2013 DOD transferred an additional $969 million to the Defense Working Capital Fund to offset fuel cost losses. Since fiscal year 2012, DOD has maintained the FCFD end-of-year account balance at $970 million—the maximum allowed by statute. To replenish the funds that were transferred out of the FCFD account, DOD transferred unobligated balances to the FCFD account from the services’ O&M and MILPERS accounts. While DOD can also replenish the FCFD account or absorb foreign currency losses in certain currencies by transferring to the FCFD account any gains experienced by the services, our analysis found that DOD did not transfer any gains into the FCFD account for fiscal years 2009 through 2016. Figure 3 shows the transfers into and out of the FCFD account and the end-of-year FCFD account balance for fiscal years 2009 through 2016. Our analysis also shows that DOD transferred funds to maintain the FCFD account at its maximum balance since 2012, despite experiencing fewer losses due to foreign currency fluctuations than it had experienced in fiscal years 2009 to 2011. Of the $1.92 billion transferred from the FCFD account to the services’ MILPERS and O&M accounts to cover losses, $464.5 million was transferred since fiscal year 2012, when DOD began maintaining its FCFD account at the maximum level. During that time, some of the services experienced foreign currency gains, while others experienced losses. For example, at the end of fiscal year 2013 the Navy reported a total realized and projected cumulative gain for its O&M and MILPERS accounts of about $98.6 million. In that same year, the Marine Corps reported a cumulative realized and projected loss for its O&M and MILPERS accounts of approximately $12.7 million. Had DOD not transferred unobligated funds back into the FCFD account, it would have retained a positive balance of approximately $505.5 million. However, DOD maintained the account balance at $970 million by transferring approximately $495.3 million in unobligated balances into the account. As part of its management of the FCFD account balance, DOD analyzes data on realized and projected losses as the basis for transferring funds from the FCFD account to the services’ MILPERS and O&M accounts to cover losses. However, DOD does not consider projected losses when making transfers of unobligated O&M and MILPERS balances into the FCFD account. Figure 4 below shows the FCFD account balance that DOD has maintained in relation to the transfers out of the account to cover losses. Specifically, according to the OUSD(C) official responsible for managing the FCFD account, DOD maintains the FCFD account balance at $970 million to maximize unobligated balances within the military services’ O&M and MILPERS accounts before they are canceled and are no longer available to DOD. In addition, this official stated that DOD prefers to maintain the maximum balance in case it is needed due to sudden, unfavorable swings in foreign currency exchange rates. Our review of the documentation used to make transfers into and out of the FCFD account corroborates that DOD maintains the FCFD account balance to maximize the retention of unobligated balances. Specifically, we found instances in which the documentation states that the transfers of unobligated balances into the FCFD account were made for the purpose of replenishing the account balance to the statutory limit. For example, DOD transferred $89 million from the FCFD account to the Army for losses it had realized and projected in fiscal year 2014, and later transferred unobligated balances of the same amount back into the account. DOD’s documentation states that this transfer of unobligated balances was made for the purpose of replenishing the account to $970 million in order to finance estimated foreign currency losses resulting from the decline in value of the U.S. Dollar. However, the transfer to the Army already covered the realized losses and projected losses for any remaining disbursements. In other words, estimated foreign currency losses had already been accounted for at the time of the transfer to the Army. In addition, based on data reported by the Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy, DOD had an estimated cumulative gain of about $30 million for fiscal year 2014 based on the other services’ gains and losses, which could have been transferred to the FCFD account to absorb any additional foreign currency losses elsewhere. However, DOD did not transfer those gains to the FCFD account. Similarly, based on data reported by these services, DOD experienced cumulative realized and projected gains of more than $200 million in fiscal year 2013 and about $92.6 million in fiscal year 2015, but it did not transfer any gains to the FCFD account because the account balance had already reached its maximum using transferred unobligated balances. Despite replenishing the account balance to the maximum amount for the purpose of covering additional losses, the FCFD transfers have not been made to fully offset losses in some years, further raising questions about the need to maintain the balance at the statutory cap of $970 million annually. Specifically, in 3 of the 6 years in which DOD transferred funds from the FCFD account to the services’ MILPERS and O&M accounts, DOD did not use the FCFD account to fully cover the losses that the Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy experienced. In fiscal year 2011, for example, DOD’s transfers out of the FCFD account to these services covered about 88 percent of the reported MILPERS and O&M losses that these services had realized and projected to lose by the end of the fiscal year. In fiscal year 2012, FCFD transfers covered almost 72 percent of the MILPERS and O&M realized and projected losses reported by the Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy, as of the end of the fiscal year. In fiscal year 2016, DOD FCFD transfers to these services covered approximately 55 percent of their reported MILPERS and O&M realized and projected losses by the end of the fiscal year. The OUSD(C) official we spoke with stated that FCFD transfers to cover losses begin with a request from the services, and the OUSD(C) office and the services then coordinate on the final transfer amount. In addition, some service officials told us that they try to cover their losses using each service’s available funding before reaching out for assistance from the FCFD account. Therefore, based on a service’s ability to cover the loss, it may not always request an FCFD transfer to cover the full amount of realized and projected losses. Further, according to an OUSD(C) official, the timing of a service’s request for an FCFD transfer may also affect any differences between the amount transferred and the actual losses experienced. Specifically, if a service requests a transfer early in the fiscal year based on realized and projected losses, actual losses experienced as of the end of the fiscal year may be greater than or less than the transfer amount due to foreign currency fluctuations. Using transfers of unobligated balances, DOD has maintained its FCFD account balance at the maximum level allowed by statute because it has not analyzed realized and projected losses to determine what size account balance is necessary to meet the intended purpose of the account. In our prior work, we have developed key questions for evaluating federal account balances that agencies may use to identify the amount of the balance necessary to maintain agency or program operations. Through examination of carryover balances, oversight of agencies’ management of federal funds may be enhanced. Specifically, we reported that understanding an agency’s processes for estimating and managing carryover balances provides information to assess how effectively agencies anticipate program needs, and ensure the most efficient use of resources. To estimate and manage carryover balances, agencies may consider such factors as future needs of the account, economic indicators, and historical data. If an agency does not have a robust strategy in place to manage carryover balances or is unable to adequately explain or support the reported carryover balance, then a more in-depth review is warranted. In those cases, balances may either fall too low to efficiently manage operations or rise to unnecessarily high levels, producing potential opportunities for those funds to be used more efficiently elsewhere. When asked about maintaining the balance at a level necessary to cover losses, rather than at the maximum level allowed by statute, the OUSD(C) official indicated that the OUSD(C) takes a cautious approach and prefers to have the additional flexibility allowed by the higher balance. Further, the official stated that it would be difficult for DOD to attempt to base its unobligated balance transfers and the FCFD account balance on analysis and evaluation, given the unpredictable nature and constant volatility of foreign currency rates. Our guidelines on evaluating carryover balances acknowledge that external events beyond an agency’s control can dramatically affect carryover balances. However, the challenges that are inherent in predicting foreign currency rates do not preclude DOD from conducting analysis to glean insight as to the appropriate size for the balance of the account and what potential opportunities for savings might exist. Specifically, our guidelines suggest that agencies would benefit from considering the sources and fiscal characteristics of an account with carryover balances. In this case, the FCFD account can receive funds from transfers of unobligated balances and realized foreign currency gains. In addition, DOD can make multiple transfers throughout a fiscal year and can transfer funds from the FCFD to and from the services’ O&M and MILPERS accounts simultaneously, if necessary. These characteristics of the FCFD account already provide the department with flexibility, indicating that DOD may be positioned to manage the FCFD balance in a more analytical manner based on any projected losses. Without analyzing any realized or projected losses to determine what balance may be needed to meet the FCFD account’s intended purpose, the account balance may be kept at a higher level than is necessary. As a result, although an exact amount is unknown, DOD may be maintaining balances in the FCFD account that are hundreds of millions of dollars higher than needed to cover any losses it has experienced, and these funds may have been more efficiently used in supporting other defense activities or returned to Treasury after the account is canceled by law. DOD prepares financial reports to monitor the status of its foreign currency funds, but some of DOD’s financial reporting on foreign currency fluctuations for fiscal years 2009 through 2016 is incomplete and inaccurate. DOD’s Financial Management Regulation establishes reporting requirements specifically for tracking all transactions that increase or decrease the FCFD. In accordance with that guidance, the services provide data from their accounting systems to the Defense Finance and Accounting Service to generate reports that are used as a tool with which the services and OUSD(C) can monitor how they are expending funds appropriated for overseas expenditures. For O&M appropriations, the Foreign Currency Fluctuations, Defense (O&M) report provides data on foreign currency gains and losses for each service, by currency, including data on projected gains or losses for any remaining obligations that have not yet been disbursed at the time of the report. The Foreign Currency Fluctuations, Defense Report (MILPERS) provides similar information for the MILPERS appropriation. We reviewed end-of-year Foreign Currency Fluctuations, Defense (O&M) and (MILPERS) reports for fiscal years 2009 through 2016 and found that some of the reporting for O&M was incomplete and inaccurate, which hampers the quality of information available to manage the FCFD account. For instance, we found the following: Incomplete data in the Foreign Currency Fluctuations Defense (O&M) reports: In our review of the end-of-year Foreign Currency Fluctuations Defense (O&M) and (MILPERS) reports we observed several instances of incomplete data in the O&M reports, and these affect managers’ ability to make sound decisions to manage foreign currency gains and losses. First, for the Navy, we found that the report data showed, for multiple currencies across fiscal years 2011 through 2016, values in the realized variance column, indicating that the service had experienced a gain or loss in a particular currency; however, the reports showed values of zero in other columns that are necessary for calculating the gain or loss. Second, the Air Force data for the Turkey Lira, in fiscal year 2012, showed a gain or loss without any data indicating what would have driven the gain or loss. Third, in one instance, Marine Corps data on obligations for fiscal year 2011 were missing from the end-of-year reports until 2014. Missing obligation data for these end-of-year reports indicate a limitation in using these reports for tracking actual gains and losses. Inaccurate data in the Army’s Foreign Currency Fluctuations Defense (O&M) reports: The Army’s Foreign Currency Fluctuation Defense (O&M) reports are inaccurate and cannot be used to reliably track gains or losses, and this hinders managers from making sound decisions regarding the Army’s foreign currency gains and losses. The reports are inaccurate in that the Army’s accounting system charges disbursements to the current fiscal year appropriation rather than to the fiscal year appropriation that incurred the obligation, as required by the Financial Management Regulation. According to officials from the Army Budget Office, the Army designed its General Fund Enterprise Business System (GFEBS) to record disbursements to the current fiscal year based on differing interpretations of a previous version of the Regulation. Because the Army is not recording its disbursements to the fiscal year appropriation as the other services are, Army data are inaccurate and cannot be used by the OUSD(C) official responsible for overseeing DOD’s foreign currency program to track the Army’s foreign currency transactions and maintain full visibility of DOD’s overall gains and losses in a given fiscal year. Army Budget Office officials acknowledged that the Army will need to modify its system to record disbursements consistent with Financial Management Regulation guidance, but it has not developed a plan or timeline for doing so. Without accurate reporting of the Army’s foreign currency transactions, DOD lacks information for tracking and helping to manage the Army’s foreign currency gain and losses. DOD’s Financial Management Regulation specifies the data that must be included in the Foreign Currency Fluctuations Defense (O&M) and (MILPERS) reports and the roles and responsibilities of the services as well as the Defense Finance and Accounting Service for ensuring the quality of those data. However, we identified data issues in our analysis that indicate that quality is inconsistent. For example, officials from the Navy stated that they had observed the incomplete data for some currencies and speculated that the incompleteness was attributable to data entry errors. Similarly, according to an OUSD(C) official, the Defense Finance and Accounting Service is notified when discrepancies are found in the reports and the Defense Finance and Accounting Service officials coordinate with the services to correct the data. However, neither Navy nor the Defense Finance and Accounting Service officials have corrected the data. Although DOD’s Financial Management Regulation specifies the data that are to be included, as well as roles and responsibilities of the services and the Defense Finance and Accounting Service, it does not identify who is responsible for correcting erroneous or missing data. According to an OUSD(C) official, correcting reporting issues is an area that OUSD(C), the Defense Finance and Accounting Service, and the services can improve on, and they would benefit from guidance in the Financial Management Regulation that establishes the steps that should be taken for making such corrections. Further, GAO’s Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government and the Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board’s Handbook of Federal Accounting Standards and Other Pronouncements, as Amended, both establish the importance of using reliable and complete information for making decisions. In addition, DOD’s Financial Management Regulation establishes responsibilities for both the DOD components and the Defense Finance and Accounting Service to establish appropriate internal controls to ensure that financial reporting data are complete, accurate, and supportable, in order for managers to make sound decisions and exercise proper stewardship over these resources. Effectively managing foreign currency gains and losses as well as any projected gains or losses for any remaining obligations that have not yet been liquidated through disbursement requires complete and accurate data. OUSD(C) and service officials recognize the importance of reliable data, as well as the need to take steps to improve the quality of the foreign currency gains and losses data. Without OUSD(C) establishing guidance to ensure that the Foreign Currency Fluctuation Defense (O&M) report data that tracks foreign currency gains and losses are complete, DOD and Congress do not have information to make sound decisions and exercise proper stewardship over resources due to foreign currency fluctuations. Furthermore, until the Army establishes a plan and timeline for modifying its system to record foreign currency disbursements in an accurate manner, the Army and DOD will lack quality information for tracking and helping to manage the Army’s and DOD’s foreign currency gain and losses. Congress provides DOD with a significant amount of funding each year to purchase goods and services overseas and to pay service-members stationed abroad. DOD develops and can revise foreign currency budget rates to determine its funding needs and calculate any gains or losses that result from DOD’s overseas expenditures. The Army has estimated potential cost savings that would result from more consistently selecting a more cost-effective foreign currency rate for making disbursements to liquidate its overseas O&M obligations. However, DOD has not fully determined whether additional cost-saving opportunities exist because the services have not reviewed the rates used for foreign currency disbursements. Absent a review of the foreign currency rates the services are using at disbursement, including whether cost-saving opportunities exist, by more consistently selecting cost-effective foreign currency rates, DOD risks paying more than would be required otherwise. Further, while DOD has used the FCFD account to cover losses that resulted from foreign currency fluctuations, it has not managed the FCFD account balance by basing the transfers of unobligated balances into the FCFD account on an analysis of realized and projected losses. Without basing its FCFD account balance on such analyses, DOD may be maintaining balances in the FCFD account that are hundreds of millions of dollars higher than needed to cover any losses it has experienced, and these amounts may have been more efficiently used supporting other defense activities or ultimately returned to Treasury, once expired. Moreover, DOD has not established guidance and other procedures to ensure that complete and accurate data are included in financial reporting on foreign currency funds, and this limits the quality of information available to effectively manage the FCFD account. We are making the following four recommendations to DOD. The Secretary of Defense ensures that: The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), in coordination with the U.S. Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps, should conduct a review of the foreign currency rates used at disbursement to determine whether cost-saving opportunities exist by more consistently selecting cost- effective rates at disbursement. (Recommendation 1) The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) should analyze realized and projected losses to determine the necessary size of the FCFD account balance and use the results of this analysis as the basis for transfers of unobligated balances to the account. (Recommendation 2) The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) should revise the Financial Management Regulation to include guidance on ensuring that data are complete and accurate, including assignment of responsibility for correcting erroneous data in its Foreign Currency Fluctuations Defense (O&M) reports. (Recommendation 3) The Secretary of the Army should develop a plan with timelines for implementing changes to its General Fund Enterprise Business System to accurately record its disbursements, consistent with DOD Financial Management Regulation guidance. (Recommendation 4) We provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and comment. In its written comments, reproduced in appendix II, DOD concurred with our first, third, and fourth recommendations and outlined its plan to address them. DOD partially concurred with our second recommendation that the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) analyze realized and projected losses to determine the necessary size of the FCFD account balance and use the results of the analysis as the basis for transfers of unobligated balances to the account. DOD also provided technical comments, which we incorporated in the report, where appropriate. In partially concurring with our second recommendation, DOD stated that projecting foreign currency gains or losses can be difficult given that foreign currency rates can be volatile due to various factors, such as trade balances, money supply, and national income, as well as arbitrary disturbances that affect foreign currency rates that cannot be predicted or forecasted, such as the departure of the United Kingdom from the European Union. DOD noted that because of the risk and volatility associated with foreign currency rates, the Congress established the FCFD account. We agree that forecasting foreign currency rates is challenging due to market volatility and include examples in our report of the effect of foreign currency rate fluctuations on DOD’s planned foreign currency obligations. Our report also describes the relationship between gains and losses and foreign currency fluctuations, and the movement of funds from the FCFD account to offset any losses. As our report also discusses, DOD calculates actual and projected losses due to foreign currency fluctuations and uses those projections as the basis, at least in part, for any transfers out of the FCFD account to cover losses experienced in the military services’ O&M and MILPERS appropriations. However, our report also notes that DOD does not consider its calculations of actual and future projected losses when making transfers of unobligated O&M and MILPERS balances to replenish the FCFD account. Instead, since fiscal year 2012, DOD has kept the FCFD account balance at the maximum level allowed by statute by using unobligated balances before they are canceled and are no longer available to DOD, regardless of whether the funds were needed in the account to offset any projected losses. DOD’s comments also stated that projecting gains or losses for foreign currency to determine the size of the FCFD account opens the door to greater uncertainty and risk at a time when the department is working to rebuild readiness and implement the National Defense Strategy. Our report describes the characteristics of the FCFD account that provide DOD with flexibility to manage market volatility, thereby helping to address uncertainty and reduce risk. For example, DOD can make multiple transfers of funds to the FCFD account throughout a fiscal year in response to unforeseen foreign currency fluctuations. The FCFD account can also receive funds from transfers of actual foreign currency gains and/or unobligated balances. As we also noted, DOD made use of its authority to transfer expired unobligated MILPERS and O&M amounts into the FCFD account in the event that actual losses exceeded the projected amounts and additional transfers were deemed necessary. We continue to believe that by analyzing actual and projected losses and basing the transfer of any unobligated balances on these losses, DOD would be better positioned to determine the size of the FCFD account balance that is necessary to meet its intended purpose. Further, such analyses would provide opportunities to more efficiently use unobligated balances for other defense activities or return the balances to Treasury. We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of the Air Force, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and appropriate congressional committees. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-5431 or russellc@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix III. To describe the Department of Defense’s (DOD) revised foreign currency budget rates since 2009 and the relationship between the revised budget rates and DOD’s projected Operation and Maintenance (O&M) and Military Personnel (MILPERS) funding needs, we reviewed DOD’s foreign currency budget rates for the period of fiscal years 2009 through 2017, and we identified any years during which DOD revised the initial budget rates. We compared DOD’s initial foreign currency budget rates and revised foreign currency budget rates with rates published by the U.S. Treasury Department (Treasury) for fiscal years 2009 through 2017. This period corresponded with data available to us on DOD’s initial and revised rates and allowed for use of the most current data available, since DOD had not yet decided whether or not to revise the fiscal year 2018 budget rates, while we were conducting our audit work. We chose rates published by Treasury for this comparison because Treasury has the sole authority to establish for all foreign currencies or credits the exchange rates at which such currencies are to be reported by all agencies of the government. Because Treasury rates are issued quarterly, we averaged Treasury’s first and second quarter rates for each currency and compared the Treasury average with DOD’s initial budget rates. Similarly, we computed an average of the third and fourth quarter Treasury rates for each currency and compared them with the DOD initial or revised budget rates, where applicable. These comparisons are meant to show the difference between DOD’s budget rates and Treasury rates for the first 6 months of the fiscal year, and the difference between DOD’s revised exchange rates and Treasury rates for the last 6 months of the fiscal year. Further, we analyzed the extent to which DOD’s budget rates were within 10 percent of Treasury rates during these same years. We chose 10 percent as the basis for our analysis because Treasury’s guidance states that amendments to the quarterly rates will be published during the quarter to reflect significant changes in the quarterly data, such as rate changes of 10 percent or more. Additionally, to understand the effect that revising the budget rates had on DOD’s O&M and MILPERS funding estimates and on potential gains or losses due to foreign currency fluctuations, we used a three-step approach. First, we identified the amount of O&M and MILPERS funds DOD requested for each currency. We converted the U.S. Dollars requested to the total amount of foreign currency needed by multiplying the U.S. Dollars requested by DOD’s initial budget rate. Second, we determined the total amount of U.S. Dollars required using the revised rates by dividing the total amount of foreign currency needed using DOD’s initial budget rate by DOD’s revised budget rate. We used this same approach to determine the total amount of U.S. Dollars required using the average Treasury rates. Third, we computed the differences in DOD’s O&M and MILPERS foreign currency funding needs by subtracting the U.S. Dollars required to meet its foreign currency needs based on the average Treasury rates from the amounts required based on DOD’s initial budget rates and DOD’s revised budget rates, respectively. We discussed further with officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Comptroller (OUSD(C)) the factors considered in revising the rates and whether those factors are communicated within and outside of the department. To evaluate the extent to which DOD has taken steps to reduce costs in selecting foreign currency rates at which to make disbursements and determine whether opportunities exist to gain additional savings, we reviewed accounting standards and any guidelines that exist regarding disbursements and calculations of foreign currency gains and losses, such as DOD’s Financial Management Regulation 7000.14-R, which calls for the use of prevailing foreign currency rates to make disbursements. We also discussed with agency officials how those guidelines are being carried out, and whether DOD or the services have developed guidance that instructs the services in selecting rates used for disbursements in foreign currencies. Additionally, we examined a non-generalizable selection of data for DOD disbursements made during the months June and July 2017 from Treasury’s International Treasury Service (ITS.gov) system to determine which rates DOD used during this period and what savings might be achievable from using alternate rates. We chose data from those 2 months because it was the most recent data available on disbursements at the time Treasury provided the data for our review. Additionally, we discussed with officials from OUSD(C) and the services any analysis and ongoing efforts to transition to more cost-effective rates, including savings that may result. To assess the extent to which DOD has effectively managed the Foreign Currency Fluctuations, Defense (FCFD) account to cover losses, and maintained quality information to manage these funds, we analyzed DOD data for fiscal years 2009 through 2016 on foreign currency gains and losses reported by each of the services as reported in their Foreign Currency Fluctuation, Defense (O&M) and (MILPERS) reports; movements of funds between the FCFD account and the services’ O&M and MILPERS accounts; and the end-of-year FCFD account balances. We chose this time period in order to capture years in which both gains and losses were experienced, and for which DOD had complete data on gains and losses, fund transfers, and end-of-year balances for the FCFD account. Because the Army charges disbursements to the current fiscal year appropriation instead of the fiscal year appropriation that incurred the obligation, we requested that the Army adjust its reported data on foreign currency gains and losses and provide information consistent with how the other services report them, and with DOD’s Financial Management Regulation. However, the Army was unable to provide us with data that were consistent with what was provided by the other services at the time of our review. We, therefore, were unable to use Army data for purposes of comparison with data provided by the other services. We compared the end-of-year FCFD account balances and the use of the account with guidelines established in our prior work on the importance of examining unobligated balances. Additionally, we reviewed and analyzed DOD financial reports on foreign currency gains or losses and compared the reports, including any identified discrepancies, against best practices and standards on accurate reporting and maintaining quality information, such as those in GAO’s Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, and the Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board’s Handbook of Federal Accounting Standards and Other Pronouncements, as Amended. To determine the reliability of the data used in addressing these objectives, we analyzed DOD and Treasury foreign currency rates, data on DOD foreign currency disbursements, and DOD financial reporting data on foreign currency gains and losses to identify any missing or inaccurate information, and we discussed with agency officials any identified abnormalities and how the information was extracted from systems, when appropriate. We found the data to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our reporting objectives, with the exception of the financial reporting on financial gains and losses. Specifically, based on problems with the completeness and accuracy of DOD’s financial reporting on foreign currency gains and losses, we found that these data were not sufficiently reliable for the purpose of computing exact totals for the gains and losses DOD experienced. However, because DOD uses these data as the basis for decisions related to management of the FCFD account, we included the data in our analysis to provide insight into the scope of gains and losses experienced. We also spoke with OUSD(C), military service, and Treasury officials regarding the process and systems used to input the reviewed data and generate the foreign currency reports we reviewed. We conducted this performance audit from February 2017 to April 2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. In addition to the contact named above, Matt Ullengren, Assistant Director; and Tulsi Bhojwani, Justin Bolivar, Carol Bray, Amie Lesser, Kelly Liptan, Felicia Lopez, Leah Nash, Randy Neice, Jacqueline McColl, Mike Silver, Roger Stoltz, Susan Tindall, John Trubey, Elaine Vaurio, and Cheryl Weissman made key contributions to this report.	[ "DOD requested about $60 billion for fiscal years 2009 - 2017 to purchase goods and services overseas and reimburse service-members for costs incurred while stationed abroad. DOD uses foreign currency exchange rates to budget and pay (that is, disburse amounts) for these expenses. It also manages the FCFD account to mitigate a loss in buying power that results from foreign currency rate changes. GAO was asked to examine DOD's processes to budget for and manage foreign currency fluctuations. This report (1) describes DOD's revision of its foreign currency budget rates since 2009 and the relationship between the revised rates and projected O&M and MILPERS funding needs; (2) evaluates the extent to which DOD has taken steps to reduce costs in selecting foreign currency rates to disburse funds to liquidate O&M obligations, and determined whether opportunities exist to gain additional savings; and (3) assesses the extent to which DOD has effectively managed the FCFD account balance. GAO analyzed data on foreign currency rates, DOD financial management regulations, a non-generalizable sample of foreign currency disbursement data, and FCFD account balances. The Department of Defense (DOD) revised its foreign currency exchange rates (“budget rates”) during fiscal years 2014 through 2016 for each of the nine foreign currencies it uses to develop its Operation and Maintenance (O&M) and Military Personnel (MILPERS) budget request. These revisions decreased DOD's projected O&M and MILPERS funding needs. DOD's revision of the budget rates during these years also decreased the expected gains (that is, buying power) that would have resulted from an increase in the strength of the U.S. Dollar relative to other foreign currencies. DOD did not revise its budget rates in fiscal years 2009 through 2013. For fiscal year 2017, DOD changed its methodology for producing budget rates, resulting in rates that were more closely aligned with market rates. According to officials, that change made it unnecessary to revise the budget rates during the fiscal year. DOD has taken some steps to reduce costs in selecting foreign currency rates used to pay (that is, disburse amounts) for goods and services, but DOD has not fully determined whether opportunities exist to achieve additional savings. The Army has estimated potential savings of up to $10 million annually by using a foreign currency rate available 3 days in advance of paying for goods or services rather than a more costly rate available up to 5 days in advance. The Army has converted to the use of a 3-day advanced rate. GAO's analysis suggests that DOD could achieve cost savings if the services reviewed and consistently selected the most cost-effective foreign currency rates when paying for their goods and services. Absent a review, DOD is at risk for paying more than it would otherwise be required to conduct its transactions. DOD used the Foreign Currency Fluctuations, Defense (FCFD) account to cover losses (that is, less buying power) due to unfavorable foreign currency fluctuations in 6 of the 8 years GAO reviewed. Since 2012, DOD has maintained the FCFD account balance at the statutory limit of $970 million, largely by transferring unobligated balances before they are cancelled from certain DOD accounts into the FCFD. However, DOD has not identified the appropriate FCFD account balance needed to maintain program operations by routinely analyzing projected losses and basing any transfers into the account on those expected losses. Thus, DOD may be maintaining balances that are hundreds of millions of dollars higher than needed, and that could have been used for other purposes or returned to the Treasury Department (see figure). GAO is making four recommendations, including that DOD review opportunities to achieve cost savings by more consistently selecting the most cost-effective foreign currency rates used for the payment of goods and services, and analyze projected losses to manage the FCFD account balance. DOD generally concurred with the recommendations." ]	10,667	gov_report	en	null	12ad5b0b70969611c55885d07240169385511b1e2668e3f0
Our past work has identified progress and challenges in a number of areas related to DHS’s management of the CFATS program including (1) the process for identifying high risk chemical facilities; (2) how it assesses risk and prioritizes facilities; (3) reviewing and approving facility security plans; (4) how it conducts facility compliance inspections; and (5) efforts to conduct stakeholder outreach and gather feedback. DHS has made a number of programmatic changes to CFATS in recent years that may also impact its progress in addressing our open recommendations; these changes are included as part of our ongoing review of the program. In May 2014, we found that more than 1,300 facilities had reported having ammonium nitrate to DHS. However, based on our review of state data and records, there were more facilities with ammonium nitrate holdings than those that had reported to DHS under the CFATS program. Thus, we concluded that some facilities that were required to report may have failed to do so. We recommended that DHS work with other agencies, including the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), to develop and implement methods of improving data sharing among agencies and with states as members of a Chemical Facility Safety and Security Working Group. DHS agreed with our recommendation and has since addressed it. Specifically, DHS compared DHS data with data from other federal agencies, such as EPA, as well as member states from the Chemical Facility Safety and Security Working Group to identify potentially noncompliant facilities. As a result of this effort, in July 2015, DHS officials reported that they had identified about 1,000 additional facilities that should have reported information to comply with CFATS and subsequently contacted these facilities to ensure compliance. DHS officials told us that they continue to engage with states to identify potentially non-compliant facilities. For example, as of June 2018, DHS officials stated they have received 43 lists of potentially noncompliant facilities from 34 state governments, which are in various stages of review by DHS. DHS officials also told us that they recently hired an individual to serve as the lead staff member responsible for overseeing this effort. DHS has also taken action to strengthen the accuracy of data it uses to identify high risk facilities. In July 2015, we found that DHS used self- reported and unverified data to determine the risk categorization for facilities that held toxic chemicals that could threaten surrounding communities if released. At the time, DHS required that facilities self- report the Distance of Concern—an area in which exposure to a toxic chemical cloud could cause serious injury or fatalities from short-term exposure—as part of its Top-Screen. We estimated that more than 2,700 facilities with a toxic release threat had misreported the Distance of Concern and therefore recommended that DHS (1) develop a plan to implement a new Top-Screen to address errors in the Distance of Concern submitted by facilities, and (2) identify potentially miscategorized facilities that could cause the greatest harm and verify that the Distance of Concern of these facilities report is accurate. DHS has fully addressed both of these recommendations. Specifically, DHS implemented an updated Top-Screen in October 2016 and now collects data from facilities and calculates the Distance of Concern itself, rather than relying on the facilities’ calculation. In response to our second recommendation, in November 2016, DHS officials stated they completed an assessment of all Top-Screens that reported threshold quantities of toxic release chemicals of interest and identified 158 facilities with the potential to cause the greatest harm. As of May 2017, according to ISCD officials, 156 of the 158 facilities submitted updated Top-Screens and 145 of the 156 Top-Screens had undergone a quality assurance review process. DHS has also taken actions to better assess regulated facilities’ risks in order to place the facilities into the appropriate risk tier. In April 2013, we reported that DHS’s risk assessment approach did not consider all of the elements of threat, vulnerability, and consequence associated with a terrorist attack involving certain chemicals. Our work showed that DHS’s risk assessment was based primarily on consequences from human casualties, but did not consider economic consequences, as called for by the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) and the CFATS regulation. We also found that (1) DHS’s approach was not consistent with the NIPP because it treated every facility as equally vulnerable to a terrorist attack regardless of location or on-site security and (2) DHS was not using threat data for 90 percent of the tiered facilities—those tiered for the risk of theft or diversion—and using 5-year-old threat data for the remaining 10 percent of those facilities that were tiered for the risks of release or sabotage. We recommended that DHS enhance its risk assessment approach to incorporate all elements of risk and conduct a peer review after doing so. DHS agreed with our recommendations and has made progress towards addressing them. Specifically, with regard to our recommendation that DHS enhance its risk assessment approach to incorporate all elements of risk, DHS worked with Sandia National Laboratories to develop a model to estimate the economic consequences of a chemical attack. In addition, DHS worked with Oak Ridge National Laboratory to devise a new tiering methodology, called the Second Generation Risk Engine. In so doing, DHS revised the CFATS threat, vulnerability, and consequence scoring methods to better cover the range of CFATS security issues. Additionally, with regard to our recommendation that DHS conduct a peer review after enhancing its risk assessment approach, DHS conducted peer reviews and technical reviews with government organizations and facility owners and operators, and worked with Sandia National Laboratories to verify and validate the new tiering approach. We are currently reviewing the reports and data that DHS has provided about its new tiering methodology as part of our ongoing work and will report on the results of this work later this summer. To further enhance its risk assessment approach, in fall 2016, DHS also revised its Chemical Security Assessment Tool (CSAT), which supports DHS efforts to gather information from facilities to assess their risk. According to DHS officials, the new tool—called CSAT 2.0—is intended to eliminate duplication and confusion associated with DHS’s original CSAT. DHS officials told us that they have improved the tool by revising some questions in the original CSAT to make them easier to understand; eliminating some questions; and pre-populating data from one part of the tool to another so that users do not have to retype the same information multiple times. DHS officials also told us that the facilities that have used the CSAT 2.0 have provided favorable feedback that the new tool is more efficient and less burdensome than the original CSAT. Finally, DHS officials told us that as of June 2018, DHS has completed all notifications and has processed tiering results for all but 226 facilities. DHS officials stated they are currently working to identify correct points of contact to update registration information for these remaining facilities. We are currently assessing DHS’s efforts to assess risk and prioritize facilities as part of our ongoing work and will report on the results of this work in our report later this summer. DHS has also made progress reviewing and approving facility site security plans by reducing the time it takes to review these plans and eliminating the backlog of plans awaiting review. In April 2013, we reported that DHS revised its procedures for reviewing facilities’ security plans to address DHS managers’ concerns that the original process was slow, overly complicated, and caused bottlenecks in approving plans. We estimated that it could take DHS another 7 to 9 years to review the approximately 3,120 plans in its queue at that time. We also estimated that, given the additional time needed to do compliance inspections, the CFATS program would likely be implemented in 8 to 10 years. We did not make any recommendations for DHS to improve its procedures for reviewing facilities’ security plans because DHS officials reported that they were exploring ways to expedite the process, such as reprioritizing resources and streamlining inspection requirements. In July 2015, we reported that DHS had made substantial progress in addressing the backlog—estimating that it could take between 9 and 12 months for DHS to review and approve security plans for the approximately 900 remaining facilities. DHS officials attributed the increased approval rate to efficiencies in DHS’s review process, updated guidance, and a new case management system. Subsequently, DHS reported in its December 2016 semi-annual report to Congress that it had eliminated its approval backlog. Finally, we found in our 2017review that DHS also took action to implement an Expedited Approval Program (EAP). The CFATS Act of 2014 required that DHS create the EAP as another option that tier 3 and tier 4 chemical facilities may use to develop and submit security plans to DHS. Under the program, facilities may develop a security plan based on specific standards published by DHS (as opposed to the more flexible performance standards using the standard, non-expedited process). DHS issued guidance intended to help facilities prepare and submit their EAP security plans to DHS, which includes an example that identifies prescriptive security measures that facilities are to have in place. According to committee report language, the EAP was expected to reduce the regulatory burden on smaller chemical companies, which may lack the compliance infrastructure and the resources of large chemical facilities, and help DHS to process security plans more quickly. If a tier 3 or 4 facility chooses to use the expedited option, DHS is to review the plan to determine if it is facially deficient, pursuant to the reporting requirements of the CFATS Act of 2014. If DHS approves the EAP site security plan, it is to subsequently conduct a compliance inspection. In 2017, we found that DHS had implemented the EAP and had reported to Congress on the program, as required by the CFATS Act of 2014. In addition, as of June 2018 according to DHS officials, only 18 of the 3,152 facilities eligible to use the EAP opted to use it. DHS officials we interviewed attributed the low participation to several possible factors including: DHS had implemented the expedited program after most eligible facilities already submitted standard (non-expedited) security plans to DHS; facilities may consider the expedited program’s security measures to be too strict and prescriptive, not providing facilities the flexibility of the standard process; and the lack of an authorization inspection may discourage some facilities from using the expedited program because this inspection provides useful information about a facility’s security. We also found in 2017 that recent changes made to the CFATS program could affect the future use of the expedited program. As discussed previously, DHS has revised its methodology for determining the level of each facility’s security risk, which could affect a facility’s eligibility to participate in the EAP. DHS continues to apply the revised methodology to facilities regulated under the CFATS program and but it is too early to assess the impact on participation in the EAP. In our July 2015 report, we found that DHS began conducting compliance inspections in September 2013, and by April 2015, had conducted inspections of 83 of the 1,727 facilities that had approved security plans. Our analysis showed that nearly half of the facilities were not fully compliant with their approved site security plans and that DHS had not used its authority to issue penalties because DHS officials found it more productive to work with facilities to bring them in compliance. We also found that DHS did not have documented processes and procedures for managing the compliance of facilities that had not implemented planned measures by the deadlines outlined in the plans. We recommended that DHS document processes and procedures for managing compliance to provide more reasonable assurance that facilities implement planned measures and address security gaps. DHS agreed and has taken steps toward implementing this recommendation. DHS updated its CFATS Enforcement Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) and has made progress on the new CFATS Inspections SOP. Once completed these two documents collectively are expected to formally document the processes and procedures currently being used to track noncompliant facilities and ensure they implement planned measures as outlined in their approved site security plans, according to ISCD officials. DHS officials stated they expect to finalize these procedures by the end of fiscal year 2018. We are examining compliance inspections as part of our ongoing work and will report on the results of our work in our report later this summer. In April 2013, we reported that DHS took various actions to work with facility owners and operators, including increasing the number of visits to facilities to discuss enhancing security plans, but that some trade associations had mixed views on the effectiveness of DHS’s outreach. We found that DHS solicited informal feedback from facility owners and operators in its efforts to communicate and work with them, but did not have an approach for obtaining systematic feedback on its outreach activities. We recommended that DHS take action to solicit and document feedback on facility outreach consistent with DHS efforts to develop a strategic communication plan. DHS agreed and implemented this recommendation by developing a questionnaire to solicit feedback on outreach with industry stakeholders and began using the questionnaire in October 2016. Chairman Shimkus, Ranking Member Tonko, and Members of the Subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to respond to any questions that you may have at this time. If you or your staff members have any questions about this testimony, please contact me at (404) 679-1875 or curriec@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. Other individuals making key contributions to this work include John Mortin, Assistant Director; and Brandon Jones, Analyst-in-Charge; Michael Lennington, Ben Emmel, and Hugh Paquette. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.	[ "Thousands of facilities have hazardous chemicals that could be targeted or used to inflict mass casualties or harm surrounding populations in the United States. In accordance with the DHS Appropriations Act, 2007, DHS established the CFATS program in 2007 to, among other things, identify and assess the security risk posed by chemical facilities. DHS inspects high-risk facilities after it approves facility security plans to ensure that the facilities are implementing required security measures and procedures. This statement summarizes progress and challenges related to DHS's CFATS program management. This statement is based on prior products GAO issued from July 2012 through June 2017, along with updates conducted in June 2018 on DHS actions to address prior GAO recommendations. To conduct the prior work, GAO reviewed relevant laws, regulations, and DHS policies for administering the CFATS program, how DHS assesses risk, and data on high-risk chemical facilities. GAO also interviewed DHS officials and reviewed information on DHS actions to implement its prior recommendations. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has made progress addressing challenges that GAO's past work identified to managing the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) program. The following summarizes progress made and challenges remaining in key aspects of the program. Identifying high-risk chemical facilities. In July 2015, GAO reported that DHS used self-reported and unverified data to determine the risk of facilities holding toxic chemicals that could threaten surrounding communities if released. GAO recommended that DHS should better verify the accuracy of facility-reported data. DHS implemented this recommendation by revising its methodology so it now calculates the risk of toxic release, rather than relying on facilities to do so. Assessing risk and prioritizing facilities. In April 2013, GAO reported weaknesses in multiple aspects of DHS's risk assessment and prioritization approach. GAO made two recommendations for DHS to review and improve this process, including that DHS enhance its risk assessment approach to incorporate all of the elements of consequence, threat, and vulnerability associated with a terrorist attack involving certain chemicals. DHS launched a new risk assessment methodology in October 2016 and is currently gathering new or updated data from about 27,000 facilities to (1) determine which facilities should be categorized as high-risk because of the threat of sabotage, theft or diversion, or a toxic release and (2) assign those facilities deemed high risk to one of four risk-based tiers. GAO has ongoing work assessing these efforts and will report later this summer on the extent to which they fully address prior recommendations. Reviewing and approving facilities' site security plans . DHS is to review security plans and visit facilities to ensure their security measures meet DHS standards. In April 2013, GAO reported a 7 to 9 year backlog for these reviews and visits. In July 2015, GAO reported that DHS had made substantial progress in addressing the backlog—estimating that it could take between 9 and 12 months for DHS to review and approve security plans for the approximately 900 remaining facilities. DHS has since taken additional action to expedite these activities and has eliminated this backlog. Inspecting facilities and ensuring compliance. In July 2015, GAO reported that DHS conducted compliance inspections at 83 of the 1,727 facilities with approved security plans. GAO found that nearly half of the inspected facilities were not fully compliant with their approved security plans and that DHS did not have documented procedures for managing facilities' compliance. GAO recommended that DHS document procedures for managing compliance. As a result, DHS has developed an enforcement procedure and a draft compliance inspection procedure and expects to finalize the compliance inspection procedure by the end of fiscal year 2018. GAO has made various recommendations to strengthen DHS's management of the CFATS program, with which DHS has generally agreed. DHS has implemented or described planned actions to address most of these recommendations." ]	2,363	gov_report	en	null	b978a8d7782ef7d8702af64cbc4ab554d2d1aef0104a24db
Coal accounted for 17 percent of energy production (30 percent of electricity production) in the United States in 2016. To generate this energy, approximately 730 million tons of coal were mined domestically in 2016, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, approximately 40 percent of which was produced on federal lands. As of 2016, state regulatory authorities and OSMRE had received financial assurances associated with coal mines that had been permitted to disturb approximately 2.3 million acres, according to OSMRE data. Coal is mined in two different ways: surface mining and underground mining. In surface coal mining, before the underlying coal can be extracted, the land is cleared of forests and other vegetation and topsoil is removed and stored for later use. Explosives or other techniques are then used to break up the overlying solid rock, creating dislodged earth, rock, and other materials known as spoil. Surface coal mines can cover an area of many square miles. In underground coal mining, tunnels are dug to access coal that is too deep for surface mining methods. In some cases, underground coal mines are designed to leave sufficient coal in the mine to support the overlying surface, and in other cases, they are designed to extract higher quantities of coal that results in subsidence of the overlying surface as mining progresses. In addition to disturbing the land surface, coal mining can affect water quality, according to the Environmental Protection Agency, the National Academies, and others. For example, mining can increase sediments in rivers or streams, which may negatively affect aquatic species. Moreover, mining can expose minerals and heavy metals to air and water, leading to a condition known as acid mine drainage, which can lead to long-term water pollution and harm some fish and wildlife species. Mining can also lower the water table or change surface drainage patterns. The surface effects of coal mining in the United States are regulated under SMCRA, which also created OSMRE to administer the act. SMCRA allows an individual state or Indian tribe to develop its own program to implement the act if the Secretary of the Interior finds that the program is in accordance with federal law. A state with an approved program is said to have “primacy” for that program. To obtain primacy, a state or Indian tribe submits to the Secretary of the Interior for approval a program that demonstrates that the state or tribe has the capability of carrying out the requirements of SMCRA. The program must demonstrate that the state or Indian tribe has, among other things, a law that provides for the regulation of the surface effects of coal mining and reclamation in accordance with the requirements of SMCRA, and a regulatory authority with sufficient personnel and funding to do so. Of the 25 states and four Indian tribes that OSMRE identified as having active coal mining in 2017, 23 states had primacy, and OSMRE manages the coal program in 2 states and for the four Indian tribes. SMCRA requires a mine operator to obtain a permit before starting to mine. The permit process requires operators to submit plans describing the extent of proposed mining operations and how and on what timeline the mine sites will be reclaimed. In general, an operator must reclaim the land to a use it was capable of supporting before mining or to an alternative postmining land use that OSMRE or the state regulatory authority deems higher or better than the premining land use. In reclaiming the mine site, operators must comply with regulatory standards that govern, among other things, how the reclaimed area is regraded, replanting of the site, and the quality of water flowing from the site. Specifically: Operators are generally required to return mine sites to their approximate original contour unless the operator receives a variance from the regulatory authority. To return to this contour, the surface configuration achieved by backfilling and grading of the mined area must closely resemble the general surface configuration of the land before mining and blend into and complement the drainage pattern of the surrounding terrain, with all highwalls and spoil piles eliminated. Operators are required to demonstrate successful revegetation of the mine site for 5 years (in locations that receive more than 26 inches of rain annually) or 10 years (in drier areas). States have requirements for what vegetation may be planted depending on the approved postmining land use. For example, West Virginia’s regulations call for sites with a postmining land use of forest land to be planted with at least 500 woody plants per acre. The state specifies that at least five species of trees be used, including at least three of the species being higher value hardwoods, such as oak, ash, or maple. SMCRA requires that financial assurances be sufficient to ensure reclamation compliant with water quality standards, including those established by the Environmental Protection Agency or the states under the Clean Water Act. SMCRA’s implementing regulations also contain additional water protection requirements. For example, the regulations require that all surface mining and reclamation activities be conducted to minimize disturbance of the hydrologic balance within the permit and adjacent areas and to prevent material damage to the hydrologic balance outside the permit area. The federal government also enacted SMCRA, in part, to implement an abandoned mine land program to promote the reclamation of mined areas left without adequate reclamation prior to 1977, when SMCRA was enacted, and that continue to substantially degrade the quality of the environment, prevent or damage the beneficial use of land or water resources, or endanger the health or safety of the public. Specifically, Congress found that a substantial number of acres of land throughout the United States had been disturbed by surface and underground coal mining on which little or no reclamation was conducted. Further, it found that the impacts from these unreclaimed lands imposed social and economic costs on residents in nearby areas as well as impaired environmental quality. Since the abandoned mine land program was created, approximately $3.9 billion has been spent to reclaim abandoned mine lands, and there is at least $10.2 billion in remaining reclamation costs for coal mines abandoned prior to 1977, as of September 30, 2017, according to OSMRE. SMCRA generally requires operators to submit a financial assurance in an amount sufficient to ensure that adequate funds will be available for OSMRE or the state regulatory authority to complete the reclamation if the operator does not do so. The amount of financial assurance required is determined by the regulatory authority—OSMRE or the state—and is based on its calculation of the estimated cost to complete the reclamation plan it approved as part of the mining permit. Financial assurance amounts can be adjusted as the size of the permit area or the projected cost of reclamation changes. SMCRA also authorizes states to enact an OSMRE-approved alternative bonding system as long as the alternative achieves the same objectives. One kind of alternative bonding system is known as a bond pool. Under this type of system, the operator may post a financial assurance for an amount determined by multiplying the number of acres in the permit area by a per-acre assessment. The per-acre assessment may vary depending on the site-specific characteristics of the planned mining operation and the operator’s history of compliance with state regulations. However, the per-acre bond amount may be less than the estimated cost of reclamation. To supplement the per-acre bond, the operator generally must pay a fee for each ton of mined coal and may also be required to pay other types of fees. These funds are pooled and can be used to reclaim sites that participants in the alternative bonding system do not reclaim. Under OSMRE regulations, all alternative bonding systems must provide a substantial economic incentive for the operator to comply with reclamation requirements and must ensure that the regulatory authority has adequate resources to complete the reclamation plan for any sites that may be in default at any time. OSMRE regulations implementing SMCRA recognize three major types of financial assurances: surety bonds, collateral bonds, and self-bonds. A surety bond is a bond in which the operator pays a surety company to guarantee the operator’s obligation to reclaim the mine site. If the operator does not reclaim the site, the surety company must pay the bond amount to the regulatory authority, or the regulatory authority may allow the surety company to perform the reclamation instead of paying the bond amount. Collateral bonds include cash; certificates of deposit; liens on real estate; letters of credit; federal, state, or municipal bonds; and investment-grade rated securities deposited directly with the regulatory authority. A self-bond is a bond in which the operator promises to pay reclamation costs itself. Self-bonds are available only to operators with a history of financial solvency and continuous operation. To remain qualified for self-bonding, operators must, among other requirements, do one of the following: have an “A” or higher bond rating, maintain a net worth of at least $10 million, or possess fixed assets in the United States of at least $20 million. In addition, the total amount of self-bonds any single operator can provide shall not exceed 25 percent of its tangible net worth in the United States. Primacy states have the discretion on whether to accept self-bonds. State regulatory authorities and OSMRE reported holding a total of approximately $10.2 billion in surety bonds, collateral bonds, and self- bonds as financial assurances for coal mine reclamation in 2017. Of the total amount of financial assurances, approximately 76 percent ($7.8 billion) were in the form of surety bonds, 12 percent ($1.2 billion) in collateral bonds, and 12 percent ($1.2 billion) in self-bonds (see fig. 1). Twenty-four states reported holding surety bonds, 20 states reported holding collateral bonds, and 8 states reported holding self-bonds (see table 1). In addition, OSMRE officials identified 6 states—Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Ohio, Virginia, and West Virginia—that have also established alternative bonding systems, such as bond pools. In a state with a bond pool, the operator may generally post a financial assurance for less than the full estimated cost of reclamation; in addition, the operator must pay into a bond pool. The pooled funds can be used to supplement forfeited financial assurances to reclaim sites that operators participating in the bond pool do not reclaim. States and OSMRE reported that operators forfeited more than 450 financial assurances for reclaiming coal mines between July 2007 and June 2016, with 13 of the 25 states reporting at least one forfeiture. States and OSMRE reported that the amount of financial assurance forfeited was sufficient to cover the cost of required reclamation in about 52 percent of the cases and did not cover the cost of required reclamation in about 22 percent of the cases. In the remainder of the cases (26 percent), the state or OSMRE reported that it had not yet determined if the financial assurance amount covered the reclamation costs that it was intended to cover. State and OSMRE officials said that it can take many years to fully reclaim a site and that it may take time for them to identify the extent of reclamation needed and to determine if the amount of financial assurance forfeited was sufficient to cover reclamation costs. State and OSMRE officials said there were several reasons why the amount of financial assurance obtained might not be sufficient to cover reclamation costs. For example, officials said the amount of financial assurance might not be sufficient if an operator mined in a manner inconsistent with the approved mining plan upon which the amount of financial assurance was calculated or if mining activity resulted in water pollution that was not considered when the amount of financial assurance was calculated. In cases where the amount of financial assurance does not cover the cost of reclamation, the operator remains responsible for reclaiming the mine site. However, OSMRE officials said that in those cases where the operator may be experiencing financial difficulties, it might be difficult for the states or OSMRE to compel the operator to complete the reclamation or provide additional funds to do so without having the operator go out of business or into bankruptcy. If the operator does not reclaim the site, the regulatory authority must use the forfeited financial assurance to do so. If the forfeited funds are not adequate, the site may not be fully reclaimed unless the regulatory authority either successfully sues the operator for more funds or provides any additional funds needed for reclamation. One other source of funds states can use to reclaim forfeited mines is civil penalties that the United States government collects from operators that violate conditions of their mining permits. OSMRE obligated approximately $2.8 million in civil penalties from fiscal years 2012 through 2017 for states to use to perform reclamation in cases where the financial assurance was not sufficient, according to agency officials. OSMRE has taken steps—including periodically reviewing financial assurance amounts, inspecting mine sites, and reviewing state programs that implement SMCRA—to oversee financial assurances and aspects of the mining and reclamation process that can affect whether the amount of financial assurances obtained will cover the cost of required reclamation. SMCRA requires OSMRE or the primacy state regulatory authority to calculate the amount of financial assurance required for each mine and to adjust the amount when the area requiring bond coverage increases or decreases or when the cost of future reclamation changes. OSMRE officials and state regulatory authority officials from four of the six states we interviewed said they generally review the amount of financial assurance at least every 2 1/2 years or when the mining plan has been modified in a way that may affect the amount of financial assurance required. Such periodic reviews are in part to help ensure that OSMRE and state regulatory authorities continue to hold an amount sufficient to complete required reclamation as conditions change. These reviews can lead to OSMRE or the state regulatory authority changing the amount of financial assurance required for a mine. For example: A state regulatory authority official in Utah said that the regulatory authority reviewed an existing mine permit in 2014, which led to it recalculating the estimated cost of reclamation on the basis of current costs. The state regulatory authority requested that the operator provide a financial assurance to cover the difference (approximately $195,000), in addition to the $445,000 financial assurance already in place. However, the official said that the operator—which had stopped mining the site in 2012 and filed for bankruptcy in 2013—did not provide the additional financial assurance amount. As a result, in 2017 the state regulatory authority collected the financial assurance that was in place (i.e., the operator forfeited its assurance). The official said in December 2017 that the state regulatory authority is determining the steps it will take to reclaim the site and expects that the forfeited amount will be sufficient to cover reclamation costs. OSMRE officials said that the agency reviewed a permit for a mine on Navajo tribal lands and determined that it needed to ask the operator to provide an additional financial assurance in the amount of $5.7 million. The increase was due to inflation and to include certain costs, such as the cost of mobilizing equipment needed for reclamation, that had inadvertently been excluded from the earlier calculation of the financial assurance required. The officials said that the operator provided the additional financial assurance amount. State regulatory authority officials in Wyoming said they review financial assurance amounts annually, and in 2017 they reduced the financial assurance for one mine by almost $35 million because of a substantial decline in fuel costs and the mine’s ability to share the cost of needed reclamation equipment with a neighboring mine. SMCRA requires OSMRE to make an average of at least one complete inspection per calendar quarter and one partial inspection per month for each active permit for which it is the regulatory authority to ensure that mines are in compliance with SMCRA and federal regulations. Complete inspections cover all inspection elements in OSMRE’s directive, while partial inspections may instead focus on issues that most frequently result in violations or a specific topic identified for oversight, according to OSMRE officials. In addition, OSMRE’s directive instructs the agency to inspect a sample of mines annually in states that have primacy to monitor and evaluate approved state programs’ compliance with SMCRA. The total number of inspections OSMRE is directed to conduct in primacy states is based on the number of inspectable units in each state. Complete inspections are to be done on 33 percent of those sites selected for inspection. Overall, OSMRE completed more inspections in primacy states than directed each year for evaluation years 2013 through 2016, according to agency data. For example, in evaluation year 2016, OSMRE’s directive called for it to conduct 1,225 inspections and OSMRE completed 1,388. As part of a complete inspection, OSMRE confirms that the operator is following the mining and reclamation plans to assure that the amount of financial assurance in place is adequate, according to OSMRE officials. If a violation is identified during an inspection, SMCRA requires OSMRE to issue a ten-day notice to the state regulatory authority or an immediate cessation order to the operator. If the violation increases the estimated cost of reclamation (e.g., if the operator disturbed more land than it was approved for) or an adequate financial assurance had not been collected, OSMRE or the state regulatory authority can request that the operator provide an additional financial assurance. For example: OSMRE issued a ten-day notice to the Pennsylvania regulatory authority in 2015 because a water treatment system for a mine in that state did not have a financial assurance. According to OSMRE officials, the state regulatory authority took appropriate action to resolve the situation by issuing an order for the operator to post a financial assurance within 7 days. During an inspection of a mine in Tennessee, a nonprimacy state, OSMRE determined that the operator had not correctly reclaimed a portion of the mine because the slope of the regraded area was too steep, according to an OSMRE official. For the reclamation work that would be needed to regrade that area, OSMRE determined that the operator needed to provide an additional financial assurance of $272,000. Under SMCRA, OSMRE is required to evaluate each primacy state’s coal program annually to ensure that it complies with SMCRA. SMCRA includes a requirement that the regulatory authority secure necessary financial assurances to assure the reclamation of each permitted mine site. While OSMRE’s directive on oversight of state and tribal regulatory programs does not instruct the agency to review state regulatory authority calculations of financial assurance amounts, it instructs OSMRE to focus on the state programs’ success in achieving the overall purposes of SMCRA. For example, OSMRE, in conducting its oversight, is to evaluate the states’ effectiveness in successfully reclaiming lands affected by mining and in avoiding negative effects outside of areas authorized for mining activities. If OSMRE’s review of a state program identifies an issue that could result in the state not effectively implementing, administering, enforcing, or maintaining all or any portion of its approved coal program, OSMRE can work with the state regulatory authority to develop an action plan to correct the issue. If a state regulatory authority does not take the necessary corrective action, OSMRE may begin the process of withdrawing approval for a part or all of the state’s primacy. In addition to annually evaluating state programs, OSMRE can conduct national or regional reviews on specific topics. For example, OSMRE conducted a national review in 2010 that examined how state regulatory authorities calculated the required amount of financial assurances for coal mine reclamation. The review examined financial assurance practices in 23 states and reported that on the basis of the sample of mining permits reviewed, OSMRE was unable to determine if the amount of financial assurances was adequate for at least one of the permits it reviewed in 10 of the 23 states. Among the potential issues OSMRE identified were errors in the methods state regulatory authorities used to calculate financial assurance amounts and insufficient information in the reclamation plan upon which to calculate reclamation costs. OSMRE has worked with the 10 state regulatory authorities to address the financial assurance issues identified in the 2010 review. For example, OSMRE’s review found that the regulatory authority in Pennsylvania did not secure sufficient financial assurances to complete reclamation plans, in part because amounts were not calculated based on the actual sizes of the areas excavated for mining. In August 2014, OSMRE and Pennsylvania’s regulatory authority agreed to an action plan to ensure that the financial assurances for all active and new permits would be calculated using the actual sizes of the excavated areas. According to an OSMRE official, as of February 2017, the state regulatory authority had recalculated the financial assurance amount for all mines and had secured the additional financial assurances needed from operators of all but two of the mines. State officials said in October 2017 that they were continuing to work to obtain the assurances required for the two mines. OSMRE’s 2010 review also found that financial assurances in Kentucky were not always sufficient to cover required reclamation costs, in part because the method Kentucky’s regulatory authority used to calculate financial assurance amounts did not factor in all costs, such as the cost of moving equipment to and from the reclamation site. In February 2011, OSMRE and Kentucky’s regulatory authority signed an action plan identifying steps needed to address the issues OSMRE had identified. However, in May 2012, OSMRE determined that the state regulatory authority’s proposed changes to its method for calculating financial assurance amounts was an improvement but would not result in the authority obtaining sufficient funds to cover required reclamation. As a result, OSMRE initiated the process of revoking Kentucky’s primacy for this aspect of its program. In response, Kentucky implemented regulations to increase the minimum financial assurance required. The regulations also required the state regulatory authority to evaluate financial assurance amounts every 2 years to determine whether they need to be increased, among other things. The state regulatory authority sent a set of program amendments to OSMRE designed to address the identified deficiencies, some of which OSMRE is currently reviewing. OSMRE and state regulatory authorities face a number of challenges in managing financial assurances for coal mine reclamation—including those related to self-bonding, unanticipated reclamation costs, and the financial stability of surety companies—according to federal and selected state regulatory authority officials, representatives from organizations associated with the mining and financial assurance industries, and representatives from environmental nongovernmental organizations whom we interviewed. Challenges facing OSMRE and state regulatory authorities related to self- bonding include the following: Not knowing the complete financial health of an operator. The information federal regulations require operators to provide to regulatory authorities may provide an incomplete picture of the financial health of an operator, according to some parties we interviewed. For example, the financial information that operators provide reflects their past financial health, which may not reflect the operators’ current financial position, according to OSMRE’s response to the 2016 petition seeking revisions to its self-bonding regulations. In addition, if an operator applying for a self-bond is a subsidiary of another company, the operator is not required by regulation to submit information on the financial health of its parent company. While the operator applying may have sufficient financial assets to qualify for self-bonding, if its parent company experiences financial difficulties, the operator’s assets may be drawn on to meet the parent’s obligations, which could worsen the financial health of the self-bonded operator. In addition, according to OSMRE officials, even if OSMRE or a state regulatory authority were to become aware that an operator’s parent company was at financial risk, it would be difficult for the agency to deny the operator’s request for a self-bond because eligibility is specific to the entity applying for the self-bond, according to regulations. OSMRE could change its self-bonding regulations to require more information, according to OSMRE officials. However, the financial relationships between parent and subsidiary companies have become increasingly complex, making it difficult to ascertain an operator’s financial health on the basis of information reported in company financial and accounting documents, according to officials. When OSMRE first approved its self-bonding regulations in 1983, it noted that it was attempting to provide rules that would allow self-bonding without necessitating regulatory authorities to employ financial experts to determine which companies should be allowed to self-bond. However, according to OSMRE officials, financial expertise is now often needed to evaluate the current complex financial structures of large coal companies, which was not envisioned when the regulations were developed. Difficulty in determining whether an operator qualifies for self- bonding. The regulatory authority in a given state may not be aware that an operator had self-bonded in other states, making it difficult for the agency to determine whether the operator qualifies for self- bonding, according to some parties we interviewed. Operators are only allowed to self-bond for up to 25 percent of their net worth in the United States, according to regulations. Regulatory authority decisions on accepting self-bonds generally focus on assessing activities occurring in a specific state, not nationwide, according to the Interstate Mining Compact Commission. As a result, the state regulatory authority or OSMRE may know whether an operator has applied for self-bonds in other states that if approved would exceed 25 percent of its net worth in total. Difficulty in replacing existing self-bonds with other assurances if needed. OSMRE and state regulatory authorities may find it difficult to get operators to replace existing self-bonds with another type of financial assurance when needed, according to some parties we interviewed. If an operator no longer qualifies for self-bonding (e.g., if it has declared bankruptcy), federal regulations require it to either replace self-bonds with other types of financial assurances or stop mining and reclaim the site. In either case, however, some parties noted that such actions could lead to a worsening of the operator’s financial condition, which could make it less likely that the operator will successfully reclaim the site. Some parties we interviewed have noted that regulatory authorities may be reluctant to direct the operator to replace a self-bond with another type of financial assurance and may instead allow the operator to keep mining so that any generated revenue could help the operator reclaim the site. For example, in 2015 the Wyoming regulatory authority determined that an operator no longer qualified for self-bonding and ordered it to replace a $411 million self-bond. However, the operator entered into bankruptcy without having replaced the self-bond. In this case, the state regulatory authority determined that reclamation was more likely to occur if the operator continued mining and allowed the operator to do so without a valid financial assurance. The operator replaced its self-bond as a part of its bankruptcy settlement approximately 17 months after the state regulatory authority’s order to replace the self-bond, according to OSMRE officials. However, if a self-bonded operator were to enter bankruptcy and did not secure a financial assurance to replace the self-bond or complete the required reclamation, the state regulatory authority would have to work through the bankruptcy proceedings to obtain funds for reclamation, according to OSMRE’s preamble to its 1983 self-bonding regulations. As a result, the state may recover only some, or possibly none, of the funds promised through the self- bond, and the cost of reclamation could fall on taxpayers. Difficulty in managing the risk associated with self-bonding. The risk associated with self-bonding is greater now than when the practice was first authorized under SMCRA, according to some parties we interviewed. According to SMCRA, the purpose of financial assurances is to ensure that regulatory authorities have sufficient funds to complete required reclamation if the operator does not do so. While SMCRA allows self-bonding in certain circumstances, when OSMRE first approved its self-bonding regulations, the agency did so noting that at the time there were companies financially sound enough that the probability of bankruptcy was small. Furthermore, the regulations stated that the intent was to avoid, to the extent reasonably possible, the acceptance of a self-bond from a company that would enter bankruptcy. However, as previously mentioned, three of the largest coal companies in the United States declared bankruptcy in 2015 and 2016, and these companies held approximately $2 billion in self-bonds at the time, according to an OSMRE August 2016 policy advisory, making it a very different risk landscape than originally envisioned. Following these bankruptcies—and recognizing that the coal industry was likely to continue to face economic challenges for several more years— OSMRE initiated steps in 2016 to reexamine the role of self-bonding for coal mine reclamation. Specifically, as previously mentioned, OSMRE issued a policy advisory in August 2016 noting that given these circumstances, state regulatory authorities should exercise their discretion under SMCRA and not accept new or additional self-bonds for any permit until coal production and consumption market conditions reach equilibrium. OSMRE has reported that it is not likely for that to occur until at least 2021. OSMRE also announced in September 2016 that the agency planned to examine changes to its bonding regulations that would, among other things, help ensure that reclamation is completed if a self-bonded operator does not do so. However, following a review of department actions that could affect domestic energy production, Interior announced in October 2017 that it was reconsidering the need for and scope of potential changes to its bonding regulations. OSMRE officials said that they did not have a timeline for finalizing a decision on potential changes in its bonding regulations. In addition, OSMRE rescinded its August 2016 policy advisory that states take steps to assess whether operators currently using self-bonds can still quality to do so and that states not accept any new self-bonds. Similar issues involving bankruptcies of hardrock mining operators led the Bureau of Land Management to implement regulations in 2001 eliminating the use of self-bonding for hardrock mining. In doing so, the Bureau of Land Management determined that a self-bond is less secure than other types of financial assurances, especially in cases where commodity prices fluctuate. The agency also noted that operators that would otherwise be eligible to self-bond should not have a significant problem obtaining another type of financial assurance. In our previous work examining other types of environmental cleanup, we found that the financial risk to the government and the amount of oversight needed for self-bonds are relatively high compared to other forms of financial assurances. Furthermore, we also previously reviewed federal financial assurance requirements for coal mining, hardrock mining, onshore oil and gas extraction, and wind and solar energy production and found that of these activities coal mining is the only one where self-bonding was allowed. Because SMCRA explicitly allows states to decide whether to accept self-bonds, eliminating the risk that self-bonding poses to the federal government and states would require that SMCRA be amended. Unanticipated reclamation costs, such as those related to long-term treatment for water pollution, may arise late in a mine’s projected lifespan, and the operator may not have the financial means to cover the additional costs, according to OSMRE officials. Under SMCRA, OSMRE and state regulatory authorities are not to approve a permit for a coal mine if the regulatory authority expects the mine to result in long-term water pollution. As a result, since long-term water pollution is not anticipated to occur, the cost of addressing it would not be included in the initial financial assurance that the operator provides. If the regulatory authority later determines that long-term water treatment is needed, the regulatory authority must adjust the amount of financial assurance that the operator is required to provide. Some parties we interviewed have also noted that the costs and duration of long-term water treatment are not well defined and that surety bonds are not well-suited to provide assurance for such indefinite long-term costs. For example, according to the Interstate Mining Compact Commission, surety bonds are designed for shorter-term, defined obligations that have a high certainty for bond release following the completion of reclamation. To help address this challenge, some states have established, or allowed operators to establish, trust funds to help cover such unanticipated reclamation costs. For example, West Virginia established a fund, primarily supported through a tax on the amount of coal mined, to operate water treatment systems on forfeited sites. West Virginia’s regulatory authority is also working to evaluate permits for sites with water pollution to estimate water treatment costs within the state more precisely. Similarly, Pennsylvania allows operators to establish trust funds that are maintained by foundations and monitored by the state regulatory authority and are intended to ensure that there are sufficient funds to cover the costs of long-term water treatment, according to state regulatory authority officials. In addition, the OSMRE-run coal program in Tennessee allows trust funds for water treatment, in part because an assurance system that provides an income stream may be better suited to ensuring the treatment of long-term water pollution than conventional financial assurances, according to an OSMRE notice in the Federal Register. The utility of surety bonds in providing a financial assurance depends on the surety company’s ability to pay the amount pledged if the operator forfeits. OSMRE regulations require that a surety company be licensed to do business in the state where a mine is located. Some parties we interviewed noted that surety companies have declared bankruptcy or experienced financial difficulties in the past and could experience similar difficulties in the future. In addition, two states reported recent issues related to surety companies. For example, state regulatory authority officials in Alabama said that a surety company that had provided surety bonds totaling $760,000 for four mines in that state had gone bankrupt or was insolvent. As of May 2017, the state had collected only $127,000. Similarly, state regulatory authority officials in Alaska said that as of August 2017, the state had not collected any part of a forfeited $150,000 surety bond because the surety company had gone bankrupt. In our previous work examining other types of environmental cleanup, we have found that the financial risk to the government and the amount of oversight needed for surety bonds are relatively low to moderate compared to other forms of financial assurances. Billions have been spent to reclaim mines abandoned prior to the financial assurance requirements SMCRA put in place, and billions more remain. Under SMCRA, self-bonding is allowed for coal mine operators with a history of financial solvency and continuous operation—the only type of energy production or mineral extraction activity we have reviewed for which this is allowed. Bankruptcies of coal mine operators in 2015 and 2016 have highlighted risks that OSMRE and state regulatory authorities face in managing self-bonding—a risk that may be greater today than when self-bonding was first authorized under SMCRA. If a self-bonded operator were to enter bankruptcy and does not provide a different type of financial assurance or complete the required reclamation, the regulatory authority and the taxpayer potentially assume the risk of paying for the reclamation. Although OSMRE said it would examine changes to its self- bonding regulations following recent bankruptcies, Interior recently said that it is reconsidering the need to do so. Because SMCRA explicitly allows states to decide whether to accept self-bonds, eliminating the risk that self-bonding poses would require amending SMCRA. Until such a change is made, the government will remain potentially at financial risk for future reclamation costs resulting from coal mines with unsecured financial assurances. Congress should consider amending SMCRA to eliminate the use of self- bonding as a type of financial assurance for coal mine reclamation. (Matter for Consideration 1) We provided a draft of this report to the Department of the Interior for review and comment. Interior did not provide written comments on our findings and matter for congressional consideration. OSMRE provided technical comments in an e-mail, which we incorporated as appropriate. As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of the Interior, the Acting Director of OSMRE, and other interested parties. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions, please contact Anne-Marie Fennell at (202) 512-3841 or fennella@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix II. We selected a nonprobability sample of states to examine the Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement’s (OSMRE) oversight activities in more detail. We generally selected states that produced the most coal in 2015 but also selected states in order to achieve some variation in factors such as geographic location, the dominant type of coal mining conducted (e.g., surface or underground mining), whether the state had primacy, and whether the state allowed self-bonding (see table 2). In addition to the contact named above, Elizabeth Erdmann (Assistant Director), Antoinette Capaccio, Jonathan Dent, Cynthia Grant, Marya Link, Anne Rhodes-Kline, Sheryl Stein, Guiovany Venegas, and Jack Wang made key contributions to this report.	[ "Coal accounts for 17 percent of domestic energy production. SMCRA requires coal mine operators to reclaim lands that were disturbed during mining and to submit a financial assurance in an amount sufficient to ensure that adequate funds will be available to complete reclamation if the operator does not do so. Recent coal company bankruptcies have drawn attention to whether financial assurances obtained by OSMRE and state agencies will be adequate to reclaim land once coal mining operations have ceased. GAO was asked to review management of financial assurances for coal mine reclamation. This report describes, among other things, the amounts and types of financial assurances held for coal mine reclamation in 2017 and the challenges that OSMRE and state agencies face in managing these financial assurances. GAO collected and analyzed data from OSMRE and 23 state agencies; reviewed federal laws, regulations, and directives; and interviewed OSMRE and state agency officials and representatives from organizations associated with the mining and financial assurance industries and environmental organizations. State agencies and the Department of the Interior's Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement (OSMRE) reported holding approximately $10.2 billion in surety bonds (guaranteed by a third party), collateral bonds (guaranteed by a tangible asset, such as a certificate of deposit), and self-bonds (guaranteed on the basis of a coal operator's own finances) as financial assurances for coal mine reclamation. OSMRE and state agencies face several challenges in managing financial assurances, according to the stakeholders GAO interviewed. Specifically, Obtaining additional financial assurances from operators for unanticipated reclamation costs, such as long-term treatment for water pollution, can be difficult. Determining the financial stability of surety companies has been challenging in certain instances. Self-bonding presents a risk to the government because it is difficult to (1) ascertain the financial health of an operator, (2) determine whether the operator qualifies for self-bonding, and (3) obtain a replacement for existing self-bonds when an operator no longer qualifies. In addition, some stakeholders said that the risk from self-bonding is greater now than when the practice was first authorized under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA). GAO's previous work examining environmental cleanup found that the financial risk to government and the amount of oversight needed for self-bonds are relatively high compared to other forms of financial assurances. GAO also previously reviewed federal financial assurance requirements for various energy and mineral extraction sectors and found that coal mining is the only one where self-bonding was allowed. However, because SMCRA explicitly allows states to decide whether to accept self-bonds, eliminating the risk that self-bonds pose to the federal government and states would require SMCRA be amended. GAO recommends that Congress consider amending SMCRA to eliminate self-bonding. Interior neither agreed nor disagreed with GAO's recommendation." ]	6,217	gov_report	en	null	782123f3af90344e3508996b17d47cf959a4521d6b1886de
The routine activities of most federal agencies are funded annually by one or more of the regular appropriations acts. When action on the regular appropriations acts is delayed, a continuing appropriations act, also sometimes referred to as a continuing resolution or CR, may be used to provide interim budget authority. Since the federal fiscal year was shifted to October 1-September 30 beginning with FY1977, all of the regular appropriations acts have been enacted by the beginning of the fiscal year in only four instances (FY1977, FY1989, FY1995, and FY1997), although CRs were not needed for interim funding in one of these fiscal years. CRs were enacted for FY1977 but only to fund certain unauthorized programs whose funding had been excluded from the regular appropriations acts. The Antideficiency Act (31 U.S.C. 1341-1342, 1511-1519) generally bars the obligation or expenditure of federal funds in the absence of appropriations. The interval during a fiscal year when appropriations for a particular project or activity are not enacted into law, either in the form of a regular appropriations act or a CR, is referred to as a funding gap or funding lapse . Although funding gaps may occur at the start of the fiscal year, they may also occur any time a CR expires and another CR (or the relevant regular appropriations bill) is not enacted immediately thereafter. Multiple funding gaps may occur within a fiscal year. In 1980 and early 1981, then-Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti issued opinions in two letters to the President that have been put into effect through guidance provided to federal agencies under various Office of Management and Budget (OMB) circulars clarifying the limits of federal government activities upon the occurrence of a funding gap. The Civiletti letters state that, in general, the Antideficiency Act requires that if Congress has enacted no appropriation beyond a specified period, the agency may make no contracts and obligate no further funds except as "authorized by law." In addition, because no statute generally permits federal agencies to incur obligations without appropriations for the pay of employees, the Antideficiency Act does not, in general, authorize agencies to employ the services of their employees upon a lapse in appropriations, but it does permit agencies to fulfill certain legal obligations connected with the orderly termination of agency operations. The second letter, from January 1981, discusses the more complex problem of interpretation presented with respect to obligational authorities that are "authorized by law" but not manifested in appropriations acts. In a few cases, Congress has expressly authorized agencies to incur obligations without regard to available appropriations. More often, it is necessary to inquire under what circumstances statutes that vest particular functions in government agencies imply authority to create obligations for the accomplishment of those functions despite a lack of current appropriations. It is under this guidance that exceptions may be made for activities involving "the safety of human life or the protection of property." As a consequence of these guidelines, when a funding gap occurs, executive agencies begin a shutdown of the affected projects and activities, including the furlough of non-excepted personnel. The general practice of the federal government after the shutdown has ended has been to retroactively pay furloughed employees for the time they missed, as well as employees who were required to come to work. Under current practice, although a shutdown may be the result of a funding gap, the two events should be distinguished. This is because a funding gap may result in a shutdown of all affected projects or activities in some instances but not in others. For example, when a funding gap is of a short duration, agencies may not have enough time to complete a shutdown of affected projects and activities before funding is restored. In addition, the Office of Management and Budget has previously indicated that a shutdown of agency operations within the first day of a funding gap may be postponed if it appears that an additional CR or regular appropriations act is likely to be enacted that same day. To avoid funding gaps, proposals have previously been offered to establish an "automatic continuing resolution" (ACR) that would provide a fallback source of funding authority for activities, at a specified formula or level, in the event that timely enactment of appropriations is disrupted. Funding would become available automatically and remain available as long as needed so that a funding gap would not occur. Although the House and Senate have considered ACR proposals in the past, none has been enacted into law on a permanent basis. As illustrated in Table 1 , there have been 20 funding gaps since FY1977. The enactment of a CR on the day after the budget authority in the previous CR expired, which has occurred in several instances, is not counted in this report as involving a funding gap because there was no full day for which there was no available budget authority. For example, between FY2000 and FY2018, "next-day" CRs were enacted on 21 occasions. A majority of the funding gaps occurred between FY1977 and FY1995. During this period of 19 fiscal years, 15 funding gaps occurred. Multiple funding gaps have occurred during a single fiscal year in four instances: (1) three gaps covering a total of 28 days in FY1978, (2) two gaps covering a total of four days in FY1983, (3) two gaps covering a total of three days in FY1985, and (4) two gaps covering a total of 26 days in FY1996. Seven of the funding gaps commenced with the beginning of the fiscal year on October 1. The remaining 13 funding gaps occurred at least more than one day after the fiscal year had begun. Ten of the funding gaps ended in October, four ended in November, three ended in December, and three ended in January. Funding gaps have ranged in duration from 1 to 34 full days. Six of the 8 lengthiest funding gaps, lasting between 8 days and 17 days, occurred between FY1977 and FY1980—before the Civiletti opinions were issued and for which there was no government shutdown. Between 1980 and 1990, the duration of funding gaps was generally shorter, typically ranging from one day to three days. In most cases these occurred over a weekend with only limited impact in the form of government shutdown activities. Notably, many of the funding gaps that have occurred since FY1977 do not appear to have resulted in a "shutdown." Prior to the issuance of the Civiletti opinions, the expectation was that agencies would not shut down during a funding gap. Continuing resolutions typically included language ratifying obligations incurred prior to the resolution's enactment. For example, the first CR for FY1980 provided All obligations incurred in anticipation of the appropriations and authority provided in this joint resolution are hereby ratified and confirmed if otherwise in accordance with the provisions of the joint resolution. Thus, while agencies tended to curtail some operations in response to a funding gap, they often "continued to operate during periods of expired funding." In addition, some of the funding gaps after the Civiletti opinions did not result in a completion of shutdown operations due to both a funding gap's short duration and an expectation that appropriations would soon be enacted. For example, during the three-day FY1984 funding gap, "no disruption to government services" reportedly occurred, due to both the three-day holiday weekend and the expectation that the President would soon sign into law appropriations passed by the House and Senate during that weekend. Some of the funding gaps during this period, however, did have a broader impact on affected government operations, even if only for a matter of hours. For example, in response to the one-day funding gap that occurred on October 4, 1984, a furlough of non-excepted personnel for part of that day was reportedly implemented. It should be noted that when most of these funding gaps occurred, one or more regular appropriations measures had been enacted, so any effects were not felt government-wide. For example, the three funding gaps in FY1978 were limited to activities funded in the Departments of Labor and Health, Education, and Welfare Appropriations Act. Similarly, 8 of 13 regular appropriations acts had been enacted prior to the three-day funding gap in FY1984. The most recent funding gaps—two in FY1996, one in FY2014, one in FY2018, and one in FY2019—all resulted in widespread cessation of non-excepted activities and furlough of associated personnel. The legislative history of these funding gaps are summarized below. The two FY1996 funding gaps occurred between November 13 and 19, 1995, and December 15, 1995, through January 6, 1996. The chronology of regular and continuing appropriations enacted during that fiscal year is illustrated in Figure 1 . In the lead-up to the first funding gap, only 3 out of the 13 regular appropriations acts had been signed into law, and budget authority, which had been provided by a CR since the start of the fiscal year, expired at the end of the day on November 13. On this same day, President Clinton vetoed a CR that would have extended budget authority through December 1, 1995, because of the Medicare premium increases contained within the measure. The ensuing funding gap reportedly resulted in the furlough of an estimated 800,000 federal workers. After five days, a deal was reached to end the shutdown and extend funding through December 15. Agencies that had been zeroed out in pending appropriations bills were funded at a rate of 75% of FY1995 budget authority. All other agencies were funded at the lower of the House- or Senate-passed level of funding contained in the FY1996 full-year appropriations bills. The CR also included an agreement between President Clinton and Congress regarding future negotiations to lower the budget deficit within seven years. During the first FY1996 funding gap and prior to the second one, an additional four regular appropriations measures were enacted, and three others were vetoed. The negotiations on the six remaining bills were unsuccessful before the budget authority provided in the CR expired at the end of the day on December 15, 1995. Reportedly, about 280,000 executive branch employees were furloughed during the funding gap between December 15, 1995, and January 6, 1996. A CR to provide benefits for veterans and welfare recipients and to keep the District of Columbia government operating was passed and signed into law on December 22, 1995. The shutdown officially ended on January 6, 1996, when the first of a series of CRs to reopen affected agencies and provide budget authority through January 26, 1996, was enacted. This funding gap commenced at the beginning of FY2014 on October 1, 2013. None of the 12 regular appropriations bills for FY2014 was enacted prior to the beginning of the funding gap. Nor had a CR to provide budget authority for the projects and activities covered by those 12 bills been enacted. On September 30, however, an ACR was enacted to cover FY2014 pay and allowances for (1) certain members of the Armed Forces, (2) certain Department of Defense (DOD) civilian personnel, and (3) other specified DOD and Department of Homeland Security contractors ( H.R. 3210 ; P.L. 113-39 , 113 th Congress). At the beginning of this 16-day funding gap, more than 800,000 executive branch employees were reportedly furloughed. This number was reduced during the course of the funding gap due to the implementation of P.L. 113-39 and other redeterminations of whether certain employees were excepted from furlough. Prior to the resolution of the funding gap, congressional action on appropriations was generally limited to a number of narrow CRs to provide funding for certain programs or classes of individuals. Of these, only the Department of Defense Survivor Benefits Continuing Appropriations Resolution of 2014 ( H.J.Res. 91 ; P.L. 113-44 ) was enacted into law. On October 16, 2013, the Senate passed H.R. 2775 , which had been previously passed by the House on September 12, with an amendment. This amendment, in part, provided interim continuing appropriations for the previous year's programs and activities through January 15, 2014. Later that same day, the House agreed to the Senate amendment to H.R. 2775 . The CR was signed into law on October 17, 2013 ( P.L. 113-46 ), thus ending the funding gap. At the beginning of FY2018, none of the 12 regular appropriations bills had been enacted, so the federal government operated under a series of CRs. The first, P.L. 115-56 , provided government-wide funding through December 8, 2017. The second, P.L. 115-90 , extended funding through December 22, and the third, P.L. 115-96 , extended it through January 19, 2018. In the absence of agreement on legislation that would further extend the period of these CRs, however, a funding gap began with the expiration of P.L. 115-96 at midnight on January 19. A furlough of federal personnel began over the weekend and continued through Monday of the next week, ending with enactment of a fourth CR, P.L. 115-120 , on January 22. At the beginning of FY2019, 5 of the 12 regular appropriations bills had been enacted in two consolidated appropriations bills. The remaining seven regular appropriations bills were funded under two CRs. The first CR, P.L. 115-245 , provided funding through December 7, 2018. The second CR, P.L. 115-298 , extended funding through December 21, 2018. When no agreement was reached on legislation to further extend the period of these CRs, a funding gap began with the expiration of P.L. 115-298 at midnight on December 21, 2018. Because of this funding gap, federal agencies and activities funded in these seven regular appropriations bills were required to shut down. The funding gap ended when a CR, P.L. 116-5 , was signed into law on January 25, 2019, which ended the partial government shutdown and allowed government departments and agencies to reopen. The funding gap lasted 34 full days.	[ "The Antideficiency Act (31 U.S.C. 1341-1342, 1511-1519) generally bars the obligation of funds in the absence of appropriations. Exceptions are made under the act, including for activities involving \"the safety of human life or the protection of property.\" The interval during the fiscal year when appropriations for a particular project or activity are not enacted into law, either in the form of a regular appropriations act or a continuing resolution (CR), is referred to as a funding gap or funding lapse. Although funding gaps may occur at the start of the fiscal year, they may also occur any time a CR expires and another CR (or the regular appropriations bill) is not enacted immediately thereafter. Multiple funding gaps may occur within a fiscal year. When a funding gap occurs, federal agencies are generally required to begin a shutdown of the affected projects and activities, which includes the prompt furlough of non-excepted personnel. The general practice of the federal government after the shutdown has ended has been to retroactively pay furloughed employees for the time they missed, as well as employees who were required to come to work. Although a shutdown may be the result of a funding gap, the two events should be distinguished. This is because a funding gap may result in a total shutdown of all affected projects or activities in some instances but not others. For example, when funding gaps are of a short duration, agencies may not have enough time to complete a shutdown of affected projects and activities before funding is restored. In addition, the Office of Management and Budget has previously indicated that a shutdown of agency operations within the first day of the funding gap may be postponed if a resolution appears to be imminent. Since FY1977, 20 funding gaps occurred, ranging in duration from 1 day to 34 full days. These funding gaps are listed in Table 1. About half of these funding gaps were brief (i.e., three days or less in duration). Notably, many of the funding gaps do not appear to have resulted in a \"shutdown.\" Prior to the issuance of the opinions in 1980 and early 1981 by then-Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti, while agencies tended to curtail some operations in response to a funding gap, they often \"continued to operate during periods of expired funding.\" In addition, some of the funding gaps after the Civiletti opinions did not result in a completion of shutdown operations due to both the funding gap's short duration and an expectation that appropriations would soon be enacted. Some of the funding gaps during this period, however, did have a broader impact on affected government operations, even if only for a matter of hours. Two funding gaps occurred in FY1996, amounting to 5 days and 21 days. The chronology of regular and continuing appropriations enacted during FY1996 is illustrated in Figure 1. At the beginning of FY2014 (October 1, 2013), none of the regular appropriations bills had been enacted, so a government-wide funding gap occurred. It concluded on October 17, 2013, after lasting 16 full days. During FY2018, there was a funding gap when a CR covering all of the regular appropriations bills expired on January 19, 2018. It concluded on January 22, 2018, after lasting two full days. The most recent funding gap occurred during FY2019, when a CR covering federal agencies and activities funded in 7 of the 12 regular appropriations bills expired on December 21, 2018. It concluded on January 25, 2019, after lasting 34 full days. For a general discussion of federal government shutdowns, see CRS Report RL34680, Shutdown of the Federal Government: Causes, Processes, and Effects, coordinated by Clinton T. Brass." ]	2,304	gov_report	en	null	134b07658f28cfc8a41b3f313669d73802d9945c738abc13
Document services at DOD are generally encompassed by three broad categories, shown in figure 1. Printing and reproduction includes the high-speed, high-volume reproduction of printed documents, as well as the distribution of those products. Documents are printed internally by DOD components, which include the military services, or printing is procured through an organization such as DLA Document Services, the Government Publishing Office (GPO), or a commercial vendor. Device procurement covers the acquisition of all office-level and production-level equipment. Office-level equipment includes printers; copiers; multi-function devices (MFDs), which perform multiple functions—printing, copying, scanning, and faxing—in one device; and all other devices that produce documents on-site and in low volume. Production-level equipment can include offset printers, digital presses, and other devices that are capable of high- speed, high-volume production of documents. Electronic content management is the digitization of printed documents and the creation and management of electronic content management systems, such as databases and automation services. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment is the principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense on document services policies and programs and provides policy guidance regarding the operation and management of document services. DOD’s Instruction on document services also designates DLA Document Services as DOD’s single manager for printing and high-speed, high- volume duplication. This includes both the operation of DOD’s in-house print facilities and the procurement of such services from outside DOD. It also establishes DLA Document Services as the preferred provider of document conversion and automation services within DOD. DOD is in the process of revising its instruction on document services and is considering changes to DLA’s single manager role. DLA Document Services customer service network is comprised of a headquarters located in New Cumberland, Pennsylvania and 132 production facilities worldwide. Each military service also provides internally some document services of the type assigned to DLA. Service-level implementing guidance governs how each military service will provide document service-related activities to its components, commands, and organizations, such as through the Army Publishing Directorate, the Navy’s Chief Information Officer, and the Marine Corps Publishing and Logistics Systems Management Section. The Air Force’s major commands operate their own printing operations, according to a service official. DLA funds document services through the Defense-wide Working Capital Fund, which covers DLA’s costs for purchasing various commodities and providing services. DOD components and other customers, such as other federal agencies, reimburse the Defense-wide Working Capital Fund through the purchase of these commodities and services. In obtaining document services from DLA, DOD components—including the military services—use annual appropriations and their own working capital funds to reimburse the Defense-wide Working Capital Fund. DLA Document Services’ primary customers, by sales, are shown in table 1. DOD components can also fund document services outside of DLA Document Services with annual appropriations. Beginning in 2011, Congress, the federal government, and DOD initiated efforts to increase efficiencies in various areas involving document services. For example, Executive Order 13589 directed agencies to pursue steps to reduce administrative costs across the federal government by setting reduction goals for certain areas, such as printing and employee use of IT devices. According to DOD, it set—and achieved—a goal of a 20 percent reduction in fiscal year 2013 spending in these areas. Following this effort, in 2015, the Senate Committee on Appropriations recommended that DOD work with the Office of Management and Budget to reduce costs for printing and reproduction by 34 percent. DOD issued a report in December 2016 that identified the reductions it would make to achieve this goal. The plan focused on two main areas: emphasizing electronic content management over a reliance on printed materials and reducing the number of print devices. Starting in fiscal year 2015, DLA Document Services undertook a separate but complementary effort to further increase efficiencies and better accomplish its mission of providing document services to DOD and the military services. Figure 2 provides a time line of efficiency initiatives related to DOD’s document services. We discuss the status of these efforts later in this report. DOD has taken steps toward achieving efficiencies in its document services, including implementing a transformation plan for DLA Document Services, taking steps to reduce the cost and number of office print devices, and increasing its use of electronic content management. However, we identified four areas where further gains may be possible: better managing fragmentation in printing and reproduction services, reducing overlap in procuring print devices, meeting goals to reduce the number of print devices, and consolidating locations that provide mission specialty printing. In fiscal year 2015, DLA Document Services developed and, starting in fiscal year 2017, began implementing a transformation plan to further increase efficiencies and better accomplish its mission of providing document services to DOD and the military services. The objective of this transformation plan is to transition DOD from on-site printing to digital, online services by transforming the way customers, the workforce, and in- house facilities operate. Based on the plan, DLA Document Services is closing or consolidating 74 of its 112 brick and mortar facilities in the continental United States over the course of fiscal years 2018 and 2019, bringing its footprint to 38 facilities. An internal analysis of the transformation plan, conducted by DLA, estimates annual savings of 20 percent compared to DLA Document Services’ fiscal year 2017 operating costs once the plan is fully implemented in fiscal year 2019. Figure 3 shows DLA Document Services’ facility footprint prior to the implementation of its transformation plan and the locations it intends to retain following completion of the plan in fiscal year 2019. The transformation plan also calls for DLA Document Services to adjust the size and composition of its workforce by the plan’s completion in fiscal year 2019. For example, DLA Document Services intends to reduce its total number of full-time equivalent positions from about 600 to about 400, mainly through Voluntary Early Retirement Agreements and Voluntary Separation Incentive Payments. According to officials, DLA Document Services is also in the process of converting existing positions and hiring staff as customer relations specialists at each of the consolidated facilities. These officials noted that these positions are intended to help customers learn about and access the full range of services offered by DLA Document Services, including printing and reproduction services, office print devices, and electronic content management services. The goal of establishing these positions, officials stated, is to help facilitate the increased use of technology to meet customers’ needs, because DLA Document Services intends to transition customers to using an online portal to fulfill their printing needs. According to DLA, it is hiring many of the customer relations specialists from current DLA Document Services locations, and the planned reduction in its total full-time equivalent positions is a net reduction that accounts for the hiring of, and conversion of existing positions to, these customer relations specialists. DLA Document Services also plans to use and expand its existing public and private sector partnerships to support an increased emphasis on online services as it implements its transformation plan. For example, DLA Document Services currently works in partnership with GPO’s GPOExpress, an online portal for fulfilling printing and reproduction services in cooperation with FedEx Office. For those customer orders that DLA Document Services is unable to fulfill in-house, whether due to workload or lack of capability, GPO and GPOExpress meet these needs. According to a GPO official, GPOExpress will also serve customers located in areas where DLA Document Services has closed or consolidated 74 of its 112 U.S. facilities. We found that DLA Document Services’ transformation plan generally reflects leading practices for initiatives to consolidate physical infrastructure or management functions. For example, DLA Document Services identified goals for its transformation plan, ensured top leadership engagement, dedicated an implementation team, and established metrics that it is using to track progress toward the plan’s goals. As of June 2018, DLA Document Services is ahead in its goals for overall personnel reductions and for hiring customer service representatives and is behind on its goal for closing facilities, as shown in table 2. According to DLA Document Services officials, delays in reducing facilities have been due to a variety of factors, including earlier delays in hiring customer service representatives, equipment removal, and administrative delays at installations. There have also been delays as DLA Document Services has sought to minimize the effect of the consolidations on affected employees by offering buyout packages or transfers. DLA Document Services officials told us they anticipate that their efforts to consolidate facilities and reduce the overall number of employees will begin to achieve savings by fiscal year 2020. DOD, including the military services, has also taken steps to reduce the cost and number of office-level print devices, including identifying goals for reducing the number of print devices and plans for each military service to establish a mandatory source (e.g., one particular contract or organization) for obtaining print devices. The Army and Air Force have each established their own service-wide contracts for obtaining print devices and have mandated their use, while the Department of the Navy has mandated that the Navy and Marine Corps use DLA Document Services to obtain these devices. Military service officials told us that consolidating purchases with a single service-wide source reduces the cost of these devices by taking advantage of economies of scale, because vendors can offer better pricing for larger numbers of customer orders. Our previous work on strategic sourcing—a process that moves agencies away from numerous individual purchases to an aggregate approach—shows that such practices can allow agencies to better manage acquisitions and reduce costs. In addition, DOD and the military services have identified reducing the number of print devices as an opportunity for significant savings and have established guidance on reducing the number of these devices. DOD’s Chief Information Officer (CIO) issued a memorandum in 2012 on, among other things, reducing the number of print devices to one per office space of 12 or fewer users and assessing the ratio of printers to employees in larger spaces. In response to this memorandum and to Army Audit Agency findings of excessive user-to-printer ratios, the Secretary of the Army issued guidance in fiscal year 2013, requiring all Army commands, organizations, and activities to assess print capacity and plan for reductions, if necessary, based on the results of those assessments, which the Army last completed in fiscal year 2014. The Department of the Navy, in adopting DLA Document Services as the exclusive source for acquiring and sustaining print devices for the Navy and Marine Corps, also directed Department of the Navy officials to work with DLA Document Services to conduct assessments and develop a phased execution plan regarding the number and type of print devices Navy and Marine Corps organizations require. DLA began conducting these assessments for the Navy and Marine Corps in fiscal year 2014. In conducting these assessments, DLA Document Services reviews the inventory, cost, and use of output devices within an organization and then conducts an analysis that results in recommendations. According to DLA Document Services, its recommendations are designed to optimize an organization’s equipment to meet the organization’s needs, while reducing cost by shifting from single-function, or standalone devices, to shared, multifunction devices. Led by DLA Document Services, DOD has also made greater use of electronic content management, with the objective of reducing the volume and cost of printed materials. DLA Document Services is using a number of electronic content management systems, including its Document Automation and Content Services, and has deployed those systems for a number of DOD customers, such as DLA Distribution and U.S. Transportation Command. According to DLA Document Services officials, because Document Automation and Content Services functions as one large system with separate libraries for individual customers, and costs for the system are shared, increasing adoption of the system will reduce costs for each organization using the system. DOD’s document services initiatives have gained efficiencies, but we identified four areas where further gains may be possible, including (1) managing fragmentation in printing and reproduction services, (2) reducing overlap in procuring print devices, (3) meeting goals to reduce the number of print devices, and (4) consolidating locations that provide mission specialty printing. Our review found that DOD components, including the military services, use multiple approaches to obtain printing and reproduction services. These approaches include (1) using DLA Document Services to obtain printing and reproduction services, which, in turn, can outsource the work to GPO; (2) obtaining these services directly from GPO and its network of private sector vendors without first involving DLA Document Services; and (3) providing these services at in-house print locations, as shown in figure 4. For example, according to DLA Document Service officials, the Army Publishing Directorate, which is responsible for obtaining print services for the Department of the Army and local commands in the Washington, D.C. region, has been given authority by DLA Document Services to obtain printing and reproduction services directly from GPO under a contract that DLA Document Services established for that purpose. In contrast, the Army Marketing and Research Group (AMRG), which is responsible for developing and distributing printed materials for recruitment, obtains services directly from GPO without the involvement of DLA Document Services. Finally, some DOD components, such as the Navy, Marine Corps, and National Guard Bureau, also operate their own in-house print facilities. In our interviews with military service officials, they stated that they obtained services outside of DLA Document Services because of concerns regarding the cost, quality, and timeliness of its work, including inefficiencies that can result from using DLA Document Services to obtain printing services that are ultimately outsourced to GPO. For example, an analysis by the Army Publishing Directorate found that ordering directly through GPO results in savings of 35 percent, compared to fulfilling the same orders in house through DLA Document Services. In addition, headquarters officials with the Army and Navy stated that there have been significant delays in obtaining services through DLA Document Services, including cases where GPO ultimately fulfilled the orders. Navy officials also said that there were issues with the quality of DLA Document Services’ work, including orders they had to return repeatedly because of quality issues. Further, Army officials—as well as DLA Document Services—acknowledged that certain print jobs, including some bulk printing or magazine- and advertising-quality printing, are beyond DLA Document Services’ capabilities to provide in house. According to DLA Document Services officials, DLA Document Services offers value as a single manager for printing and reproduction services, including when GPO fulfills printing and reproduction orders. For example, DLA Document Services may be able to identify different options that allow customers to reduce costs, such as different contract options that GPO may not identify. Officials also said that DLA provides administrative support, such as centralized billing and record keeping, that the military services would have to replicate in their absence. These officials also stated that they were unaware of any persistent problems with the quality or timeliness of DLA Document Services’ work, and that they work with customers to resolve such issues when they arise. As noted above, DOD is in the process of revising DOD Instruction 5330.03, and a draft of the revision continues to assign DLA as the single manager for printing and reproduction services within DOD. However, despite the concerns expressed by some military service officials, DOD has not assessed the extent to which DLA Document Services is fulfilling its duties in accordance with DOD Instruction 5330.03 when considering any revisions to the instruction. Specifically, DOD has not assessed whether the products and services DLA Document Services provides are based on “best value,” as determined by quality, price, and delivery time, in accordance with the instruction. According to both DLA Document Services officials and the official at the office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment who is responsible for document services policy, the office of Acquisition and Sustainment has had minimal involvement in ensuring that DLA Document Services is fulfilling its duties in accordance with the instruction. For example, DOD’s last formal report on defense agencies and DOD field activities, including DLA Document Services, was completed in 2013, before DLA Document Services began implementing its transformation plan. Because it has not assessed DLA Document Services’ provision of document services since 2013, DOD has not ensured that DLA Document Services is providing the best value in an efficient and effective way. In light of changes such as DLA Document Services’ transformation plan, DOD has also not determined whether DLA’s single manager role as it is currently constituted is the most effective and efficient model for providing printing and reproduction services, or whether additional efficiencies may be possible. For instance, as a part of its transformation plan, DLA Document Services is increasing its use of GPO to fulfill customer orders, in lieu of using its in-house print facilities. As previously discussed, DLA Document Services can provide certain arrangements—such as establishing term contracts with GPO for certain customers while still providing administrative support for those customers—which may allow for greater efficiencies in printing and reproduction services. However, the draft revision to DOD Instruction 5330.03 does not address how DLA Document Services might use or expand these more flexible arrangements in light of its transformation plan. DOD Instruction 5025.01 requires that, when revising DOD issuances—such as DOD Instructions—the relevant Office of the Secretary of Defense component head will ensure that each assignment of authority or responsibility is verified to be a current requirement and is appropriately assigned. Without assessing whether DLA’s single manager role as it is currently constituted is the most effective and efficient model for providing printing and reproduction services in light of the current transformation plan, DOD may miss opportunities to gain additional efficiencies and better manage fragmentation when obtaining these services. Our review found that DOD has not implemented a department-wide approach for acquiring print devices, and DOD components use at least four different sources to acquire them, with costs that vary widely for similar devices. For example, as one of its services, DLA Document Services provides print devices, as well as associated maintenance and supplies, to DOD components. The Department of the Navy has adopted DLA Document Services as the exclusive source for acquiring and sustaining print devices for the Navy and Marine Corps. In addition, both the Army and Air Force have established their own contracts for print devices. Further, the Defense Information Systems Agency’s Joint Service Provider delivers print devices to organizations in the Pentagon and the national capital region, including the headquarters organizations of some of the military services, and officials noted that they use a government-wide contract managed by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Based on DLA Document Services’ assessments of customers’ print device requirements, its print device procurement service resulted in savings of between 33 and 45 percent compared to the customers’ prior costs for devices, primarily because of reductions in unnecessary devices and efficiencies that are gained through the economies of scale of a single organization procuring these devices. More specifically, DLA Document Services, as a part of its print device procurement service, assesses customers’ device requirements, which officials told us generally results in reducing the number of devices and the associated costs. In addition, DLA Document Services is pursuing, with the support of the General Services Administration, a “best-in-class” designation for its print device procurement service as a part of an effort to reduce costs by using multi-agency and government-wide acquisition vehicles. Army and Air Force officials told us that they had established their own print device procurement sources primarily because they believed that these sources are less expensive than using DLA Document Services. This is primarily because DLA Document Services charges administrative and overhead costs to support its operations, such as facility and maintenance costs, whereas the services’ own contracts do not require any additional fees, according to these officials. However, service officials were unable to provide any analyses or other documentation to support these determinations, and some service officials have been reassessing their approach to obtaining devices. For example, Air Force officials told us they recognize that print procurement services like those provided by DLA Document Services can result in savings, and these officials plan to issue guidance instructing commands to use either DLA Document Services or a similar service offered through the General Services Administration. Conversely, the Marine Corps official responsible for implementing the Department of the Navy’s policy on print devices told us that two installations had reported that the mandated use of DLA Document Services for print device procurement had not yielded savings. That official told us that the office plans to survey additional Marine Corps installations and may make recommendations on the current policy as a result. Our analysis found differences in cost among the contracts for similar devices and associated services (see fig. 5). However, we were unable to determine which sources provided the greatest value, because of differences in device specifications (such as handling different paper sizes or the capability to be used on classified networks), approaches to obtaining devices, and whether associated maintenance services and supplies were included. We analyzed DLA Document Services’ standard pricing for customers, contractor quotes for the Army’s mandatory source, and standard pricing for the Air Force’s mandatory source for devices with similar capabilities offered by two or more of the sources, and we found that prices varied widely. For example, we found that DLA Document Services offered customers high capacity color multifunction devices for between $280 and $315 a month, including maintenance and supplies. Vendor quotes we reviewed for similar devices through the Army’s mandatory source were for between $185 and $479 a month, not including maintenance and supplies, while the cost under the Air Force’s mandatory source was between $92 and $145, including maintenance but excluding supplies. Our prior work on strategic sourcing—an approach to procurement that moves away from numerous individual procurements to a broader aggregate approach—has found that this approach can result in considerable savings. OMB has also promoted category management— an approach that includes strategic sourcing as well as improving data analysis and more frequently using private sector (as well as government) best practices. OMB also encourages the use of multi-agency and government-wide approaches to acquiring goods and services. Our work has further found that collecting and using transactional data—information generated when the government purchases goods or services from a vendor, including specific details such as descriptions, part numbers, quantities, and prices paid for the items purchased—can help ensure that the benefits of strategic sourcing are maintained. The proposed revisions to DOD Instruction 5330.03 would designate the DLA Director as DOD’s single manager for procuring print devices. The current version of the Instruction designates DLA Document Services as the preferred provider for document conversion and automation services, which includes print device procurement services. Further consolidation of print device procurement, such as under DLA Document Services, might reduce costs. However, it is unclear what approach represents the best value to the government. This is because DOD has not conducted an analysis to establish which approach—or approaches—to obtaining print devices would be most cost effective, according to officials from DOD, DLA, and the military services. By assessing which approach to acquiring print devices represents the best value to the department, DOD would be better positioned, as it revises DOD Instruction 5330.03, to establish a policy that consolidates print device procurements and further reduces its costs. Beginning in fiscal year 2012, the DOD CIO and some of the military services established goals for reducing the number of print devices, which—according to internal DOD analyses—would save millions of dollars annually. DOD’s Chief Information Officer (CIO) issued a memorandum in 2012, which instructed DOD components, including the military services, to issue guidance to, among other things, reduce the number of print devices to one per office space of 12 or fewer users and assess the ratio of printers to employees in larger spaces. However, the services have not demonstrated that they have achieved their goals for print device reductions. Specifically, we found the following: Army: The Secretary of the Army issued guidance in 2013, requiring all Army commands, organizations, and activities to assess print device capacity and plan for reductions if necessary based on the results of those assessments. The guidance noted that those reductions could save millions of dollars annually. The guidance also included a requirement for biannual reporting by all Army commands, organizations, and activities on their print device inventory, number of printing devices required, and annual costs for printing device acquisitions. In June 2014, Army commands reported an average of 5 users for each single function printer, compared to an industry standard of 7 users per device and a DOD goal of one print device per office space of 12 or fewer users and assessing the ratio of printers to employees in larger spaces. According to Headquarters, Department of the Army officials, however, Army commands objected to the workload associated with this reporting requirement and discontinued issuing the reports. As a result, the Army did not follow through with enforcing the reporting, which limited the ability of Army officials to ensure that Army commands achieved the planned reductions. Navy and Marine Corps: The Department of the Navy established guidance in 2013, directing Department of the Navy officials to work with DLA Document Services to conduct assessments and develop a phased execution plan for the number and type of print devices Navy and Marine Corps organizations require. The guidance also directed Department of the Navy officials to develop policy requiring that the acquisition of new devices be exclusively through DLA Document Services. DLA subsequently conducted these assessments and found that the Navy and Marine Corps had an average of one device for every seven users. DLA Document Services recommended further reductions in the number of print devices across the Navy and Marine Corps, which it estimated could save over $63 million annually. However, Department of the Navy officials were unable to provide us with data on the total number of Navy and Marine Corps print devices that would indicate whether these device reductions and savings had occurred. Air Force: The Air Force did not issue any guidance based on the CIO memorandum. In response to our review, the Air Force developed draft guidance on print device management, which includes a goal of increasing the ratio of users to devices from 4 users per device to 12 users per device. The draft guidance also includes requirements for quarterly reporting by the Air Force Information Technology Business Analytics Office on the number of devices and related metrics to monitor progress. According to an Air Force analysis, doing so would achieve savings of over $67 million as it replaces or retires devices. As of July 2018, the Air Force had not fully implemented this guidance. Efforts by the military services to demonstrate that they have achieved print device reduction goals have been limited because they have not monitored the actions they have taken to reduce the number of print devices. Military service officials we interviewed said they were unaware of any efforts by the DOD CIO to ensure that device reductions occurred and that DOD components achieved their planned savings, such as providing information to the CIO on the status of their efforts to implement the guidance in the memorandum or data on reductions in the number of devices. Standards for internal control state that management should implement control activities through policies that use quality information to achieve an entity’s objectives, monitor the internal control system, and evaluate the results of the system. Efforts to implement the memorandum to achieve print device reduction goals have also been limited because responsibility for implementation was not clearly assigned. According to a DOD CIO official, the responsibility for the memorandum is not clearly assigned to a member of the CIO staff. This official also stated that because of the consolidation of information technology services in the Pentagon and the national capital region, the Defense Information Systems Agency’s Joint Service Provider assumed responsibility for implementing the memorandum. According to Joint Service Provider officials, however, they were only responsible for implementing the memorandum for the customers they serve in the Pentagon and the national capital region, and not for other DOD components outside those areas, such as military services. Standards for internal control state that management should ensure that key roles in operating the internal control system are clearly assigned. In the absence of these controls, such as reporting procedures to monitor actions to reduce the number of print devices and establishing clear responsibility for implementing the CIO memorandum, DOD has been unable to ensure that it is achieving any estimated savings, which could represent tens of millions of dollars annually. DLA Document Services may be able to realize additional savings from further consolidating facilities beyond those already identified, but it does not currently plan to do so, and it does not have the complete data it would need to make those determinations. As a part of its transformation plan, DLA Document Services identified 38 of its 112 facilities in the continental United States that it would retain. DLA Document Services officials stated that they considered a number of factors in determining whether to consolidate or retain facilities, including the number of staff and customers and the facilities’ workloads, but that they generally consolidated or retained facilities based on whether the facility provided “mission specialty” services. These mission specialties are services that DLA Document Services officials believe cannot be easily outsourced, such as printing and reproduction of classified and sensitive documents and on-demand printing and distribution of certain technical materials. However, our analysis of DLA Document Services data found that some facilities retained for certain mission specialties were responsible for a relatively small share of business for those specialties in fiscal year 2016 (the last full year for which data were provided), which suggests that further consolidations are possible. For example, for each of the four mission specialties for which DLA Document Services provided us with revenue data, the bottom quartile (25 percent) of the facilities retained for each specialty were responsible for less than 5 percent of the total revenue for that specialty, as shown in figure 6. We also found some cases in which DLA Document Services retained facilities that reported less revenue for a given specialty than facilities that it did not retain. According to officials, DLA Document Services took a number of factors into consideration in deciding on consolidations, including the complexity of the work at a facility and whether nearby sites could fulfill the orders. According to these officials, this allowed them to consolidate some facilities even if those facilities had greater revenue from a given mission specialty than other facilities. DOD Instruction 5330.03 requires DLA Document Services to provide effective and efficient document services support to DOD components. Our key practices for efficiency initiatives also note the importance of targeting both short-term and long-term efficiency initiatives. DLA Document Services officials stated that they would consider additional consolidations of facilities, but they have not conducted any analysis or planning to gain further efficiencies and do not currently have plans to do so. These officials stated they are committed to implementing the current transformation plan as announced. Officials also stated that they want to have a better sense of the results from the current transformation, including how workloads may change among facilities as consolidations occur, before considering additional consolidations. DLA Document Services’ current transformation plan includes the possible consolidation of facilities outside the continental United States following the implementation of its current plan (which only addressed facilities inside the continental United States); it does not have any plans for further consolidations within the continental United States. We also found that DLA Document Services did not have revenue data on all of its mission specialties to inform any future decisions on facility consolidations. Standards for internal control state that entities’ management should use quality information to achieve the entities’ objectives. However, DLA Document Services could not provide revenue data on three specific mission specialties—sensitive, classified, and Naval Nuclear Propulsion Information—for which it retained 30 of its facilities, including some that it retained exclusively for those specialties. According to DLA Document Services officials, they did not collect revenue data for these mission specialties because the facilities responsible for processing this type of information were generally retained, regardless of the revenue they produced, due to the sensitive nature of this work. As noted above, our analysis of available mission specialty data found that some facilities that DLA retained for certain mission specialties did a relatively small share of business for those specialties, indicating that there may be opportunities for additional facility consolidations. DLA Document Services officials told us that they had consulted with managers at the facilities about the amount of sensitive and classified they conducted. Because of these consultations, DLA Document Services is closing some facilities that handled sensitive and classified information. However, DLA Document Services does not routinely collect these data as it does for other mission specialties. By collecting and analyzing more complete revenue data on its mission specialties and using those data to evaluate opportunities for further consolidations, DLA Document Services would be better positioned to determine if opportunities exist to achieve additional cost savings. DOD reports some financial information regarding its document services, but this information does not accurately capture the scope of its document services mission. We reviewed the O&M obligations for printing and reproduction in fiscal years 2012 through 2016 that were reported to Congress by the military services. The total obligations ranged from about $534 million to about $736 million annually for the 5-year period (see fig. 7). Our analysis found that DOD’s O&M budget materials for printing and reproduction are inaccurate in two ways. First, the budget materials include obligations that are primarily for non-printing activities, such as the purchase of advertising and radio and television time. DOD and military service financial management officials prepare budget justification materials for their O&M funding requests on an annual basis. DOD and the services report printing and reproduction costs in the Summary of Price and Program Changes budget exhibit (the “OP-32”). It contains information by line item, detailing, among other items, printing and reproduction and related operations performed by the military services, DLA, or GPO. It also contains elements of expenses for purchases related to document services that are provided by DLA. The OP-32 exhibits are provided to Congress with the budget justification materials accompanying the President’s annual budget request. Officials from AMRG told us that, in accordance with Army guidance, printing and reproduction obligations are coupled with other obligations, including the purchase of advertising space and radio and television time for recruiting activities. Data provided by these officials show that in fiscal year 2016, AMRG’s obligations for printing and reproduction accounted for only about $2 million, or 2 percent, of the Army’s total fiscal year 2016 obligations included in the printing and reproduction line of the OP-32. Obligations for the publication of notices, advertising, and radio and television time accounted for about $78 million, or 63 percent, of the obligations reported for printing and reproduction. According to officials, the Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps also follow their respective guidance on reporting printing and reproduction obligations together with these other obligations. Second, the budget justification information does not represent the full scope of the military services’ document services mission. Specifically, we found that the military services’ annual budget requests do not provide distinct information on two areas of their document services mission— print device procurement and electronic content management. Data we reviewed indicate that the military services obligate a considerable amount of resources in these areas. For example, according to DLA Document Services, sales to DOD and the military services for its print device services are comparable to sales for its printing and reproduction services. According to DLA data, in fiscal year 2017, it received in revenue about $108 million for print device and about $105 million for printing and reproduction services. Officials from the military services told us that obligations for these activities are included within the budget requests for various IT procurement categories. For example, Army Budget Office officials noted that the budget request for IT procurement and office supplies would include estimates associated with the purchase and sustainment of devices, but those line items would include other, non-printing obligations as well. According to these officials, the Army has made efforts to standardize the procurement of information technology, including collecting better data on spending for these types of devices. They told us that these efforts will result in shifts in how those obligations are reported in budget justification materials. The accuracy and completeness of DOD’s financial information about its document services can affect the allocation of budgetary resources, and inaccurate or incomplete information can hamper initiatives to gain further efficiencies. The Handbook of Federal Accounting Standards states that its managerial cost accounting concepts and standards are aimed at agencies providing reliable and timely information on the full costs of their federal programs that congressional and executive decision makers can use in making decisions about allocating federal resources and program managers can use in making decisions to improve operating economy and efficiency. DOD’s Financial Management Regulation lays out the structure of the budget exhibits that the military services develop during the department’s budget process. According to a DOD Comptroller official, DOD has historically reported its budget requests following the format prescribed by the Financial Management Regulation, and it follows this format in its reporting of printing and reproduction costs that are coupled with non-printing costs. Although the department has followed this format, the House Armed Services Committee has expressed concern about the military services’ printing budgets, noting that they were excessive and that portions of the budgets should be realigned to address unfunded readiness priorities. Further, as we discussed earlier in this report, DOD has outlined specific steps it intends to take to achieve a recommended goal of 34 percent reduction in spending on its printing and related activities. Without quality information on the scope of its document services mission, DOD will lack the information it needs to assess whether it is achieving this goal. To assess its progress toward achieving this goal, it will be critical for decision makers to have accurate financial information. According to a DOD Comptroller official, the Financial Management Regulation provides flexibility in how obligations are categorized and reported internally and to Congress, but DOD has not evaluated options to report more accurate funding information on its document services. Unless DOD evaluates options to report more accurate funding information and takes steps to improve the accuracy of its budgetary and financial information reporting, DOD and Congress will not have the full visibility over these costs that they need to make informed decisions. DOD is taking important steps to address congressional concerns about its spending on document service activities. Most notably, DOD is implementing its plan to transform its DLA Document Services mission and has taken certain steps to reduce the number and cost of print devices. These efforts have begun to produce results, but DOD can do more to build on these gains. By better managing fragmentation in printing and reproduction services, DOD could ensure that DLA Document Services is providing the best value in obtaining document services. DOD could further reduce overlap in print device procurement by assessing the various approaches employed by DLA and the military services to determine what constitutes the most cost-effective approach for the department. DOD has set goals intended to reduce the number of print devices and realize tens of millions of dollars in savings each year, but it has not demonstrated that it has achieved these savings, because of limitations in internal controls. Additional efforts aimed at collecting and analyzing information to examine areas for further consolidation of DLA Document Services’ mission specialty locations might provide DOD with additional cost savings. DOD’s O&M budget materials for printing and reproduction activities include information on non-printing activities that make up a much larger portion of its reported spending than printing does. In addition, these O&M budget materials omit information that would capture the full scope of DOD’s document services mission, such as device procurement and electronic content management, which are included with information technology budget materials. By providing more accurate costs for its document services activities, DOD would ensure that Congress and departmental leaders have the insight needed to make informed decisions. We are making a total of six recommendations to DOD. The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment assesses whether DLA Document Services’ single manager role for printing and reproduction provides the best value to the government—as determined by quality, price, and delivery time and in light of DLA Document Services’ transformation plan—and whether any additional efficiencies are possible, and use the results of that assessment to inform the revision of DOD Instruction 5330.03. (Recommendation 1) The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment assesses whether DOD’s current approach to obtaining print devices represents the best value to the government or whether other approaches, such as further consolidations under DLA Document Services as a proposed single manager for print device procurement, would be more cost effective. (Recommendation 2) The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the DOD CIO implements controls, such as reporting procedures, to routinely monitor actions to reduce the number of print devices, consistent with department-wide goals for reducing the number of print devices that are included in the CIO’s 2012 memorandum. (Recommendation 3) The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the DOD CIO assigns responsibility for implementing the CIO’s 2012 memorandum on optimizing the use of employee information technology devices. (Recommendation 4) The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Director, DLA, in coordination with the Director, DLA Document Services and following implementation of the current transformation plan, gathers data on workload revenue at retained facilities and all mission specialties and evaluate whether additional opportunities for consolidation exist based on those data. (Recommendation 5) The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), in consultation with the military services and DLA, evaluates options to report more accurate funding information and takes steps to improve the accuracy of its budgetary and financial information reporting on document services internally and to Congress, including making distinctions between printing and non-printing-related costs and information on device procurement and electronic content management. This information could be provided as part of DOD’s annual O&M budget justification materials. (Recommendation 6) We provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and comment. In its written comments, DOD concurred with five recommendations and identified specific actions and time frames for addressing them, and it partially concurred with the remaining recommendation. DOD’s written comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix II. DOD also provided technical comments, which we incorporated into the report, where appropriate. DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), in consultation with the military services and DLA, evaluate options to report more accurate funding information and take steps to improve the accuracy of budgetary and financial information reporting on document services internally and to Congress, including making distinctions between printing and non- printing-related costs and information on device procurement and electronic content management. Our recommendation noted that this information could be provided as part of DOD’s annual O&M budget justification materials. DOD stated that the budget materials it submits to Congress are in compliance with OMB Circular A-11’s definitions of printing and reproduction and equipment. It further noted that Working Capital Fund exhibits provided with each annual budget include a breakout, by service, of the appropriated and Working Capital Fund activities and a detailed accounting of unit cost and pricing for all sub- activities of DLA Document Services. As we noted in our report, a DOD Comptroller official told us that the Financial Management Regulation provides DOD with flexibility in categorizing and reporting obligations internally and to Congress. However, we found that, based on this flexibility, DOD’s O&M budget materials reported obligations for printing and reproduction that were primarily for non-printing activities, such as the purchase of advertising and radio and television time. This budget information did not represent the full scope of DOD’s document services mission, since it omitted obligations for print device procurement and electronic content management. We also reported that DOD had not evaluated options to report more accurate funding information on its document services. DOD’s comments did not include plans to address this recommendation. We continue to believe that by providing more accurate costs for its document services activities, DOD would ensure that Congress and departmental leaders have the insight needed to make more informed decisions. We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of Defense, the DOD Chief Information Officer, the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, the Director, Defense Logistics Agency, the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-2775 or fielde1@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix III. Our objectives were to evaluate (1) the progress the Department of Defense (DOD) has made in achieving efficiencies in its document services and opportunities, if any, for further efficiencies, and (2) the extent to which DOD reports accurate financial information about its document services to key stakeholders. For our first objective, we reviewed DOD documents and interviewed DOD officials in order to understand how each military service obtains document services and identify department-wide and military service efficiency initiatives for these services. We also reviewed the Defense Logistics Agency’s (DLA) and the military services’ document services activities and compared them with a DOD statutory periodic review; DOD Instructions and other guidance; Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance; internal control standards; and best practices for consolidation initiatives, efficiency initiatives, and strategic sourcing to identify any potentially unnecessary duplication, overlap, or fragmentation and any opportunities for greater efficiencies. For specific efficiency initiatives identified by DOD officials or in DOD documents, we interviewed DOD officials regarding their progress in implementing and meeting the goals of these initiatives. To evaluate DLA Document Services’ transformation plan, we interviewed DLA Document Services officials, reviewed DLA Document Services documents regarding the plan, and assessed that plan based on leading practices for consolidation and efficiency initiatives. To assess the plan against these practices, one analyst reviewed the testimony and documents provided and compared it to our key questions to consider when evaluating proposals to consolidate physical infrastructure and management functions. A second analyst reviewed and concurred with the first analyst’s assessments. In any cases where there was a disagreement, the analysts discussed any discrepancies. If they were not resolved, a third analyst reviewed the assessments. To assess the extent to which there may be additional opportunities for facility consolidations, we obtained DLA Document Services data on revenue reported by each facility, which DOD Document Services officials told us they used in determining which facilities to consolidate as a part of their transformation plan. We analyzed the share of mission specialty revenue reported by facilities that (1) were retained by DLA Document Services for a given mission specialty, (2) were retained but not for a given specialty, and (3) were not retained. We further divided those facilities retained for a given specialty into quartiles to better understand the concentration of revenue in those facilities. To assess the reliability of these data, we interviewed DLA Documents Services officials regarding how the data were gathered, analyzed, reported, and used. We found that these data were reliable for the purpose of analyzing the shares of mission specialty revenue represented by each facility or group of facilities. To compare the cost of print devices offered by DLA Document Services, the Army, and the Air Force, we gathered and analyzed data on the monthly cost of multifunction devices with comparable specifications. We compared costs for similar devices based on device specifications including print speeds, monthly volumes, and paper capacities. Because Army and Air Force costs are estimated and there might be other differences in device specifications, approaches to obtaining devices, and which associated services were included, this analysis does not allow us to conclude which sources provide the greatest value. However, it illustrates differences in the cost of print devices across sources. For DLA Document Services, we used DLA Document Services’ standard monthly pricing for 2018 for various categories of multifunction devices. For the Army, Army officials were unable to provide data on the cost of multifunction devices purchased by Army customers. Instead, they provided us with documentation of vendor responses to requests for quotes from the Army’s mandatory source for print devices from April 2017 through January 2018. We reviewed those documents and assigned each device to a DLA Document Services category, based on the device’s specifications as identified in the documentation. We then estimated the monthly cost for each device. For leased devices, we used the monthly cost of the lease. For purchased devices, we used the total cost of the device divided by an estimated service life for the device. We estimated this service life using some indication available in the documentation, such as the length of time a maintenance agreement or extended warranty was provided for the device. Army officials provided 183 quotes for devices. Of those, we were able to include 24 in our analysis. We excluded the other 159 because either we could not determine the cost for individual devices in a quote, there was not enough information on a device’s specifications, there was no DLA Document Services equivalent for the device, or we were unable to estimate a service life based on the information provided. Because the information included all vendor quotes provided and not just those that were selected by a customer, the costs may not represent the actual costs of devices to the customer. For the Air Force, we used an estimated average monthly cost based the standard pricing included in the Air Force’s 2018 catalog for print devices. We reviewed the catalog and assigned each multifunction device offered to a DLA Document Services category, based on the devices’ specifications. The Air Force’s catalog contained 32 devices; we were able to determine the equivalent DLA Document Services category for 13 of those devices. All devices in the Air Force’s catalog are available for purchase and include a 4-year maintenance agreement; therefore, we estimated the average monthly cost as the purchase price divided by 48. To evaluate the extent to which DOD reports accurate and complete financial information to key stakeholders to manage its document services, we analyzed DOD’s operation and maintenance (O&M) budget justification materials for fiscal years 2012 through 2016 and Defense Logistics Agency data on its document services mission. We focused our review on O&M obligations reported by DLA and the military services, which accounted for an average of about 92 percent of DOD’s total document service costs reported by DLA Document Services in fiscal years 2012 through 2016. We interviewed officials, including officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), DLA Document Services, and the military services to determine how they reported costs for document services. We assessed the information we collected against federal accounting standards on how information should be recorded and communicated to management and others. To determine the reliability of the O&M budget justification data provided to us by DOD, we obtained information on how the data were collected, managed, and used through interviews with relevant officials. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable to represent the military services’ total O&M obligations for document services for fiscal years 2012 through 2016. We interviewed officials and, where appropriate, obtained documentation, from the following organizations: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) Department of Defense Chief Information Officer Defense Logistics Agency – Chief Information Officer Defense Logistics Agency – Document Services Defense Information Systems Agency – Joint Service Provider Army Chief Information Officer Army Publishing Directorate Army Marketing Research Group Army 7th Signal Command Headquarters Air Force – Chief Information Officer Department of the Navy – Chief Information Officer Headquarters Marine Corps Command, Control, Communications, Headquarters Marine Corps Publishing and Logistics Headquarters Marine Corps Budget and Execution Marine Corps Combat Camera Marine Corps Reprographic Equipment Management Program We conducted this performance audit from August 2017 to October 2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. In addition to the contact named above, Matthew Ullengren (Assistant Director), Adam Hatton (Analyst in Charge), Adam Brooks, Joanne Landesman, Amie Lesser, Daniel Ramsey, Carter Stevens, and Walter Vance made key contributions to this report.	[ "DOD has reported printing costs that totaled about $608 million, on average, during fiscal years 2010 through 2015. DLA Document Services has key DOD-wide responsibilities for (1) printing and reproduction, (2) print device procurement, and (3) electronic content management (e.g., digital document repositories). Other DOD components, including the military services, also maintain some document services capabilities at various locations. House Report 115-200 accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2018 included a provision for GAO to examine DOD's document services. This report evaluates (1) the progress DOD has made in achieving efficiencies in its document services and opportunities, if any, to achieve further efficiencies, and (2) the extent to which DOD reports accurate financial information about its document services to key stakeholders. GAO reviewed documents and interviewed officials regarding DOD's efficiency initiatives, including DLA Document Services' transformation plan; reviewed print device procurement contracts and pricing information; and analyzed DOD budget data for fiscal years 2012 through 2016. The Department of Defense (DOD) has taken steps to achieve efficiencies in its document services, including implementing a transformation plan to consolidate existing Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) Document Services facilities. However, GAO identified four areas where further gains may be possible: Managing fragmentation in printing and reproduction services. DOD has designated DLA Document Services as the single manager for printing and reproduction services, but DOD customers, citing concerns with DLA's services, have also obtained these services directly from the Government Publishing Office and via in-house print facilities (see fig.). DOD has not assessed DLA's performance in this role or whether additional efficiencies may be possible in light of DLA's transformation plan. Reducing overlap in procuring print devices. GAO found that DOD components used at least four different contract sources to acquire print devices. DOD has not assessed which acquisition approach represents the best value; doing so might better position DOD to further reduce its costs. Meeting goals to reduce the number of print devices. DOD and the military services have not demonstrated that they achieved established goals for reducing the number of print devices. Additional controls and assignment of oversight responsibilities to monitor progress could better enable DOD to achieve its cost savings goals, estimated to be millions of dollars annually. Consolidating DLA facilities. DLA is closing or consolidating 74 of its 112 facilities in the United States. However, GAO found that for four of seven types of specialty services, DLA plans to retain facilities that are responsible for less than 5 percent of the total revenue for each of those specialties, which suggests that further consolidations are possible. DOD includes the cost of non-printing activities, such as the purchase of advertising time for recruiting, within its budget materials for printing and reproduction. It does not include costs to acquire print devices and for electronic content management. As a result, DOD and the Congress lack the oversight into total document services costs needed to make informed decisions. GAO is making six recommendations, including that DOD evaluate options to achieve additional cost savings and other efficiencies in its document services and report more accurate budget data. DOD generally agreed with the recommendations." ]	8,903	gov_report	en	null	3aefe57b8fc0900533ff595b34971a18d6ca08c54c54b433
The federal government owns and leases hundreds of thousands of buildings across the country that cost billions of dollars annually to operate and maintain. In recent years, the federal government has taken steps to improve the management of federal real property and address long-standing issues by undertaking several government-wide initiatives and issuing memorandums to the CFO Act agencies. Within the executive branch, OMB and GSA provide leadership in managing federal real property. As the chief management office for the executive branch, OMB oversees how federal agencies devise, implement, manage, and evaluate programs and policies. OMB provides direction to federal agencies by, among other things, issuing policies and memorandums on real property management. In 2012, OMB issued a memorandum that required agencies to move aggressively to dispose of excess properties held by the federal government and more efficiently use real estate assets. This memorandum initially laid out the requirement to “freeze the footprint.” In 2013, OMB issued a memorandum clarifying the Freeze the Footprint policy. This memorandum required agencies going forward to maintain no more than their fiscal year 2012 total square footage of domestic office and warehouse space. The policy required agencies to specifically identify existing properties to be disposed of to offset any new property acquisitions. In March 2015, OMB transitioned from freezing the federal government’s real property footprint to reducing it. Specifically, OMB issued the National Strategy for the Efficient Use of Real Property (National Strategy) to provide a framework to guide agencies’ real property management, increase efficient real property use, control costs, and reduce federal real property. The National Strategy outlined three key steps to improve real property management: (1) freeze growth in the inventory; (2) measure performance and use data to identify opportunities to improve the efficiency of the real property portfolio; and (3) reduce the size of the inventory by consolidating, co-locating, and disposing of properties. OMB also issued the RTF policy which clarified existing policy to dispose of excess properties and promote more efficient use of real property assets. The RTF policy requires agencies to: (1) submit annual Real Property Efficiency Plans (Plan) to GSA and OMB; (2) issue a policy that specifies a design standard for maximum useable square feet by workstation for use in domestic office space; (3) set and specify in their Plans annual reduction targets for their domestic office and warehouse space for a 5-year period; (4) set and specify in their Plans annual reduction targets for domestic owned building properties reported in the Federal Real Property Profile; and (5) continue to not increase the square footage of their domestic inventory of office and warehouse space. Additionally, agencies must identify in their Plans potential projects related to office and warehouse consolidation, co-location, disposal, as well as construction and acquisition efforts. OMB is responsible for reporting the progress of agencies’ efforts in reducing the amount of federal real property space under the RTF policy. GSA has two key leadership responsibilities related to real property management. First, GSA’s Public Buildings Service functions as the federal government’s principal landlord. In this role, GSA acquires, manages, and disposes of federally owned real property for which it has custody and control on behalf of federal agencies that occupy the space. Additionally, GSA leases commercial buildings on behalf of agencies and manages the lease agreements. In these situations, GSA executes an occupancy agreement with a customer agency for each space assignment that is similar to a sublease between GSA and the agency. The occupancy agreement outlines both the financial specifics of the agreement and the responsibilities of GSA and the customer agency. There are certain unique advantages for customer agencies when GSA leases on their behalf. For example, GSA is able to enter into longer-term leases, and agencies can release space back to GSA with 4 months’ written notice if certain conditions are met, relieving the agencies of the cost for the returned space. Second, GSA’s Office of Government-wide Policy is responsible for, among other things, identifying, evaluating, and promoting best practices to improve the efficiency of management processes. In this policy role, GSA provides guidance for federal agencies and publishes performance measures. It also maintains the Federal Real Property Profile, a real property inventory database that contains information on federal real property government-wide. Based on our review of agencies’ 2016 and 2017 Plans, we found that all 24 CFO Act agencies described strategies for reducing office and warehouse space. As previously mentioned, these annual Plans must include all potential projects related to office and warehouse consolidation, co-location, disposal, as well as construction and acquisition efforts. The agencies’ Plans cited consolidation, co-location, and disposal as the primary means to reduce their office and warehouse space, activities mentioned in the National Strategy. Agencies also cited other methods, such as utilizing telework and decreasing the space they allocate per person to achieve space reductions. The space reduction strategies included most often in the Plans we reviewed include the following. Consolidation: All 24 agencies reported planned or ongoing efforts to reduce their space by consolidating their offices or operations. For example, we spoke with officials at HUD, which is in the process of consolidating staff from four offices in the National Capital Region into its 1.12-million square foot headquarters building in Washington, D.C. HUD started by remodeling one floor to create a more open floor plan and intends to apply this design throughout the building. As part of the consolidation project, HUD has reduced the size of some office cubicles from 64 square feet to 56 square feet. (See fig. 1.) HUD leases its space through GSA and estimates that it will be able to return about 175,000 square feet of unneeded space back to GSA once all four offices are closed. At that point, GSA would then bear the cost of the space and work to lease it to another agency or otherwise dispose of it. Once the project is completed, HUD estimated that its headquarters building will accommodate about 500 more personnel (for a total of 3,200) and reduce its annual lease payments by about $11 million. Fifteen of the 24 agencies identified consolidation opportunities outside of their headquarters buildings. For example, the Department of Agriculture (USDA) discussed a consolidation project involving five component agencies in Albuquerque, New Mexico, in its fiscal year 2017 Plan. According to USDA officials, four component agencies occupying nearly 44,500 square feet in one building were to be consolidated into about 34,000 square feet of space in another building already occupied by a different USDA agency. In the prior location, the multiple components spaces’ square footage per person averaged 327, but the proposed consolidation would bring the utilization rate down to 255 square feet per person. USDA estimated that the consolidation project would result in about $238,000 in annual rent cost savings for the four components. Additionally, to enable this consolidation project, the component agency already occupying the building consolidated and vacated about 20,000 square feet, a move that resulted in an annual rental savings of about $500,000. In its fiscal year 2017 Plan, Interior’s Bureau of Reclamation anticipated eliminating 87,000 square feet of office space by consolidating operations from two buildings in Denver, Colorado. Interior estimated that the consolidation will result in a 40 percent reduction in its overall utilization rate to 165 square feet per person and an annual cost savings of about $2.1 million. Co-location: Thirteen of the 24 agencies’ Plans stated that they are exploring or implementing co-location projects to reduce space by merging staff from different components or agencies into another agency’s space. For example, the Social Security Administration (SSA) recently initiated a co-location pilot program with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) within Treasury to combine SSA field offices with IRS Taxpayer Assistance Centers. Co-location of operations can reduce the overall space required by allowing agencies to share common space such as waiting rooms, an action that can reduce rent and operating costs for the co-located agencies. Since the inception of the 1-year program in January 2017, four IRS offices are participating and have moved into SSA field offices. According to SSA, IRS and SSA staff have adjusted to sharing space and the IRS presence in SSA space has not affected SSA wait times or created security or parking issues. According to an IRS official, IRS employees continue all normal operations from their co-located offices with SSA, including meeting with taxpayers in-person. The official also noted that IRS has extended the terms of its agreement with SSA for an additional year. However, SSA noted that the agencies are still working through customer access issues that could determine whether it would be possible to expand the pilot program and pursue additional co-location opportunities. In another example, according to Interior officials, the U.S. Geological Survey is co-locating staff from Menlo Park, California, to a National Aeronautics and Space Administration facility in the nearby city of Mountain View, California. About 40 percent of the staff will move early in fiscal year 2019, and the U.S. Geological Survey expects the remaining staff to be co- located by the end of 2021. Interior officials estimate that the co- location will result in an overall reduction of 165,000 square feet (about 50 percent of its space) and expects to save about $12 to $14 million in annual rent costs. To help agencies identify potential co-location opportunities and work with other agencies to meet their space requirements, GSA developed and provided agencies access to its Asset Consolidation Tool in fiscal year 2015. This database tool provides agencies with information about federal spaces in their area, including the buildings’ vacancy and utilization rates. Disposal of unneeded space: Thirteen of the 24 agencies reported that they plan to reduce their real property footprint by disposing of unneeded space, including selling or demolishing federal buildings or terminating leases, among other actions. For example, IRS has five tax submission-processing centers that receive all mailed income-tax returns and have warehouses that store the physical tax records. Each of these five processing centers, which include both office and warehouse spaces in multiple buildings, is approximately 500,000 square feet. According to IRS officials, 87 percent of all 2016 individual income-tax returns were filed electronically. As a result, the IRS plans to dispose of three of the five centers by 2024 to align with its reduced need for income-tax return processing and storage space. GSA has the statutory authority to dispose of property for all federal agencies and generally does so on their behalf. In addition, some federal agencies, such as Energy, or departmental components have statutory authority to dispose of buildings and other types of property and are not required to notify or use the services of GSA to complete the disposal. Better utilization of existing space: In their Plans, agencies also reported using tactical tools, such as incorporating space utilization rates into their capital-planning process, to identify opportunities to reduce space. For example, 22 of the 24 agencies reported incorporating office space design standards and agency utilization rates into their processes to identify space reduction opportunities. Agencies set their own space design standards and space utilization rates, which may vary based on agency mission requirements across their components. The RTF policy requires agencies to establish a design standard for the maximum workstation size, which should, at a minimum, be applied to all space renovations and new acquisitions. In addition, GSA has a recommended office space-utilization rate range of 150 to 200 square feet per person. Officials from our case study agencies noted several practices they said were helpful to identify opportunities to better utilize and ultimately reduce their space. For example, Commerce officials described developing a process for identifying and prioritizing space reduction opportunities using a two-factor matrix. Through this process, Commerce plans to target office space with a large number of employees and poor utilization rates (compared to its 170 square foot utilization rate). According to Commerce officials, these situations may offer the most opportunity for space reductions and achieving significant rent and operating cost savings, particularly in high-cost real estate markets. Using this process, Commerce identified the potential for reducing as much as 1.6-million square feet (16 percent) of its total office space within 52 high priority facilities. According to IRS, retirements, hiring freezes, budget reductions, and increased telework have resulted in excess space throughout its portfolio. In fiscal year 2016, IRS started using a Strategic Facility Plan model to help identify space reduction projects. IRS’s objectives include consolidating multiple offices within a metropolitan area, closing outlying buildings, and leveraging telework, mobility, and its attrition rates. This model utilizes a template form to provide a consistent decision-making framework for assessing various options, articulating the rationale for selecting the preferred option, and documenting decisions and concurrence. According to IRS officials, this model has helped IRS to reduce a lot of its space. In 2014, GSA developed and provided agencies with access to the Real Property Management Tool, which can aid agencies that want to more effectively utilize their space. The database tool provides agencies with the capability to comprehensively view their real property portfolio by consolidating data from the assets that agencies directly manage with the assets that GSA manages on their behalf. As such, regardless of whether an agency initiated the action or GSA did so on its behalf, the tool gives an agency the ability to see all of its data, such as on expiring leases, in one place. The tool enables agencies to create individualized analytic reports allowing them to analyze the data in various ways. Teleworking and hoteling: Fifteen of the 24 agencies also described alternate workplace arrangements enabled by information technology, such as telework and hoteling, to help reduce office space. Telework is a work flexibility arrangement under which an employee performs their work responsibilities at an approved alternative worksite (e.g., home). Executive agencies are required to establish policies that authorize eligible employees to telework, determine the eligibility of all employees to participate in telework, and notify all employees of their eligibility. Federal law also requires that agencies consider whether space needs can be met using alternative workspace arrangements when deciding whether to acquire new space. As such, some agencies are eliminating designated offices for staff who primarily telework, a step that can improve space utilization. In a hoteling arrangement, employees use non-dedicated, non-permanent workspaces assigned for use by reservation and on an as needed basis. For example, the Office of Personnel Management implemented a workspace sharing initiative at one of its program offices. Staff who are not physically present in the office 4 or more days per week are required to share cubicles and offices. The Office of Personnel Management estimated that the initiative resulted in a 47 percent office space reduction for the program office. As part of their fiscal year 2016 and 2017 Plans, the 24 CFO Act agencies also described the major challenges they anticipated facing in their efforts to meet their space reduction targets. The agencies most frequently cited the following challenges: Space reduction costs: Twenty of 24 agencies stated that the costs of space reduction projects pose a challenge. Agencies are generally responsible for the up-front costs associated with relocations and tenant improvements, such as acquiring new furniture and renovating existing areas to reduce space or to accommodate more personnel in a smaller area. For example, the Department of Labor (Labor) reported in its fiscal year 2017 Plan that it did not have sufficient funding to implement a space reduction project that would have reduced commercially leased office space by 4,000 square feet. Similarly, the Department of Veterans Affairs’ fiscal year 2017 Plan noted that assuming a limited budget, large scale consolidations would be difficult to achieve. Some agencies have used or report that they intend to use funding from GSA’s Consolidation Activities program to help fund their space reduction projects. According to GSA, from fiscal years 2014 to 2017, GSA’s Consolidation Activities program funded projects that will eliminate 1.4-million rentable square feet from the GSA inventory and reduce agencies’ annual rent payments by $54 million. According to the IRS, GSA’s Consolidation funds have helped the agency reduce about 500,000 square feet of space. IRS officials noted that these funds helped the agency implement larger and more expensive space reduction projects than it would have been able to do otherwise. However, according to officials from several agencies, to use this program, agencies must also contribute funds to the projects. HUD officials stated that they considered applying for project funding through GSA but did not do so because HUD did not have sufficient funds for the agency’s share of project costs. Three of the 24 agencies specifically noted that the cost to clean up environmentally contaminated buildings is a challenge to disposing of excess office and warehouse space. Agencies are required to consider the environmental impact of property disposals. We have previously found that assessments and remediation of contaminated properties can be expensive and complicate the disposal process. Also, agencies are responsible for supervising decontamination of excess and surplus real property that has been contaminated with hazardous materials of any sort. In its fiscal year 2017 Plan, Energy estimated that over 60 percent of its excess buildings require extensive decontamination prior to disposal. Overall, Energy projected that its total liability for environmental clean-up could cost more than $280 billion. Mission delivery: Thirteen of the 24 agencies reported that mission delivery requirements can also affect their ability to reduce space. Agency missions may require office locations in certain areas or require additional space to accommodate activities such as customer interactions. These requirements may preclude disposals or limit opportunities to reduce space. For example, in its fiscal year 2017 Plan, SSA stated that its efforts to reduce space are affected by its mission, which requires offices widely dispersed throughout the country to administer and support its benefit programs, among other things. SSA has about 1,500 office spaces nationwide, most of which require space to accommodate the public. SSA had an overall office space utilization rate of 301 square feet per person, which exceeded GSA’s recommended office space utilization rate range of 150 to 200 square feet per person. USDA’s fiscal year 2017 Plan stated that its missions require office space in rural areas to, among other things, provide program assistance and leadership on food, agriculture, natural resources, rural development, nutrition, and related issues. In its fiscal year 2017 Plan, USDA also observed that the real estate market in rural areas is less competitive than in urban areas because there are fewer rental options, a situation that can also drive up rent costs. As such, USDA noted that these factors may contribute to difficulties identifying disposal opportunities and finding alternate spaces that could allow for more effective space utilization. Employee organization concerns: Ten of the 24 agencies reported that considering employee organizations’ concerns and addressing collective bargaining requirements when reconfiguring space can add time and affect the extent of their space reductions. For example, in its fiscal year 2017 Plan, SSA noted that the agency must meet with three employee unions when revising office space policies or design standards and collaborating with these organizations adds to the project’s implementation timeline. In July 2017, we reported that SSA officials met with employee union groups about the impact of potential changes to its space configuration or usage. Officials said that while the interactions with the union groups were positive—including gaining input on issues such as ergonomics, the security of field offices, and overall implementation—at times, these negotiations caused delays to individual projects and complicated reduction efforts by requiring union buy-in. In addition, Labor reported in its fiscal year 2017 Plan that its collective bargaining agreement and agency mission requirements for offices and work stations do not always enable it to take advantage of the previously discussed GSA Consolidation Funding program as well as GSA’s Total Workplace Furniture & Information Technology program. For example, the Total Workplace Furniture & Information Technology program requires that cubicles and offices must not exceed a specified square footage. However, according to Labor officials, Labor’s Departmental Space Management Regulation requires a certain utilization rate per person which may make it challenging to also stay within the program’s square footage requirements. Workload growth: Eight of the 24 agencies noted that increases in their workload limited their ability to achieve overall agency space reductions. For example, according to the Department of Justice’s fiscal year 2017 Plan, the agency anticipated having to provide additional court rooms to support an increased volume of immigration cases and accommodate the additional immigration judges needed to handle that volume. The Department of Justice estimated that the space needed to accommodate the new judges and additional public areas could add about 155,000 square feet to its portfolio. Also, according to the Department of Health and Human Services’ fiscal years 2016 and 2017 Plans, the Office of Medicare Hearings and Appeals experienced a 30 percent growth in cases and expected 1.2- million new cases annually after 2017. The Department of Health and Human Services projected that the growth in cases and additional staff needed to process the cases required additional field offices, which would increase its total office space square footage. As previously mentioned, agencies are required to set annual square foot reduction targets for domestic office and warehouse space in their annual Plans. According to an OMB official, to help ensure the targets are realistic, agencies are also required to identify the specific projects that will help them to achieve their space reduction targets. According to GSA and OMB officials, agencies submit their Plans, including their reduction targets, and their Plans are reviewed by both GSA and OMB. But each individual agency ultimately establishes its targets based on what it determines to be cost-effective and feasible. Through its Real Property Efficiency Plan template, GSA provides guidance to agencies on what is expected in their annual submissions. Each agency is required to document its internal controls, such as the process for identifying and prioritizing reductions to office and warehouse space and disposal of properties based on return on investment and mission requirements. The identified internal controls should help ensure that an agency’s proposed space reduction projects reflect an efficient use of space and are cost effective. A review of our five case study agencies illustrated some of the different approaches agencies used to determine their reduction targets. For example, several agencies’ targets were based on the total estimated feasible reductions identified by each agency component. In contrast, one agency centrally established a reduction target percentage and then asked its components to develop projects to meet that target. According to case-study agency officials, the agencies considered many factors, including their missions, priorities, component needs, and available budgets, when determining their targets. We found that the number and magnitude of the space reduction projects agencies identified in their fiscal year 2017 Plans varied greatly and were generally proportional to the size of the agency’s real property portfolio. The number of projects identified in agency Plans ranged from as few as 3 projects (the minimum required in the Plans) to nearly 400 projects. The estimated space reductions per project across agencies ranged from about 1,400 to over 94,000 square feet. For example, the Department of Veterans Affairs has a relatively large office and warehouse portfolio of over 28-million square feet. As part of its fiscal year 2017 Plan, the agency reported 320 planned or ongoing projects with an average space reduction of about 1,800 square feet per project. Conversely, the Office of Personnel Management has a relatively small office space portfolio of about 1-million square feet; its fiscal year 2017 Plan identified 4 ongoing or potential projects with an average space reduction of about 6,000 square feet. In fiscal year 2016—the first and only year RTF data were available at the time of our review—the majority (71 percent or 17 of the 24 agencies) reported they achieved reductions in their office and warehouse space even though the agencies had varying success in achieving the individual targets they set for themselves. For example, as shown in figure 2, of the 17 agencies that reduced space, 9 exceeded their targets (i.e., reduced more space than planned); 7 reduced space but missed their target (by anywhere between 2.8 and 96.7 percent); and 1 agency expected to increase in square footage, but reduced space. Whether an agency met its target is not the only indicator of an agency’s success in reducing space. For example, although some agencies missed their targets, they reduced their office and warehouse space by a larger percentage than some agencies that exceeded their targets. Also, the fact that some agencies missed their targets can in part be attributed to setting more aggressive targets than other agencies. Agencies’ fiscal year 2016 targets ranged from a 0.8 percent increase to an 8.4 percent decrease in office and warehouse space. Of the 9 agencies that exceeded their reduction targets, 4 more than tripled their target. As mentioned, agency targets are set by the agency and are a reflection of their unique situation including mission needs and priorities and therefore cannot be generalized across agencies. For example, Energy exceeded its fiscal year 2016 reduction target and reduced 292,140 square feet of space (0.8 percent of its total square footage). However, the Environmental Protection Agency missed its target, which was the second most aggressive target across all the agencies at 7.2 percent of its total square footage; but the agency reduced 174,003 square feet (3.24 percent of its total square footage). Of the three agencies with the most aggressive target reductions—those that ranged between 6.7 and 8.4 percent of their total square footage—only one met its target. Figure 3 shows the extent to which each of the CFO Act agencies met its fiscal year 2016 targets. See appendix II for more detailed information on each agencies’ square footage of space, reduction targets and fiscal year 2016 reductions. Officials from our case study agencies cited a number of factors that influenced whether or not they met their fiscal year 2016 targets, and may also affect their target achievement in subsequent years. Of our five case study agencies, three exceeded their fiscal year 2016 reduction target and two missed their target. Timing and funding: Officials from two case study agencies cited timing as a factor, noting that there is fluidity to the project’s planning, implementation, and disposal process that may not always be within an agency’s control. As a result, space reductions anticipated in one fiscal year may not be realized until a subsequent fiscal year; conversely, some space reduction opportunities may present themselves unexpectedly. For example, according to officials at HUD, which missed its fiscal year 2016 reduction target, some projects take longer than anticipated to start or complete. HUD officials said that their fiscal year 2016 target may have been too ambitious and planned projects were delayed because they were unable to secure sufficient funding. As such, the officials said the agency must carefully select which projects to move forward with in a given fiscal year, but expected to move forward with their delayed, planned projects in the next fiscal year. Energy on the other hand, exceeded its fiscal year 2016 reduction target. Energy officials said that they tend to be conservative in listing potential RTF projects in their Plans. They noted that it takes a long time to dispose of a building and the timing was dependent on the building’s level of contamination, location, size, agency budget, and other factors. As a result, even though the agency may have planned to dispose of a building in a given fiscal year, there were numerous reasons why the project may get delayed. Further, RTF is a long-term effort and should not be judged based on agencies’ progress in their first year. According to an OMB official, it is understood that there may be circumstances in a given year that may hinder agencies from reaching their RTF targets, such as budget constraints or the timing of leases; however, the expectation is that agencies will continue to work toward accomplishing their target in the next year. Accordingly, under RTF, agencies set annual space reduction targets for a 5-year period. Officials from our case study agencies emphasized that the 5-year targets are not static, but rather are subject to annual updates. The RTF policy also acknowledged that changes to mission requirements and the availability of budgetary resources may require modifications to an agency’s targets, particularly in each of the subsequent years. Lastly, given that the RTF policy is still relatively recent, an OMB official noted that agencies are still in the process of learning how to set appropriate targets. Previous space reductions: Officials from three of our case study agencies noted that prior space reductions made during the Freeze the Footprint policy limited their ability to reduce space more aggressively. Though the thrust of Freeze the Footprint was to maintain the fiscal year 2012 size of an agency’s portfolio, agencies started to look more strategically for opportunities to dispose of excess space in their portfolios. The majority of agencies (18 of 24) have been decreasing the square footage of their domestic office and warehouse space since the Freeze the Footprint policy was implemented in 2013. OMB reported that under Freeze the Footprint, agencies achieved a 24.7-million square foot reduction between fiscal years 2012 and 2015. Officials from the IRS, which accounts for 70 percent of Treasury’s real property inventory, noted it has released 2.7-million square feet (approximately 10 percent) in the past 5 years, bringing its total square footage down to 25.3 million. According to officials from three of our case study agencies, a certain amount of space is required to effectively fulfill their missions. As such, the closer agencies get to attaining their optimum footprint, their ability to achieve further space reductions may be limited. In November 2016, GSA put into effect a new standard operating procedure to, among other things, standardize and streamline the process of receiving, reviewing, and documenting agencies’ space release actions. As previously mentioned, GSA’s occupancy agreements for space it leases on behalf of its customer agencies generally allow the agencies to release space back to GSA with as little as 4 months’ notice, if certain conditions are met. This can enable agencies to reduce their space and related rent costs relatively quickly without penalty. As a result of this new process, GSA established a centralized e-mail for agencies to submit their space release requests. The e-mail is maintained at GSA headquarters before it is forwarded to the respective GSA region. GSA also developed a centralized space release tracking spreadsheet to help ensure that all GSA regions were (1) notifying the customer agency of GSA’s determination on whether the space release request was within GSA’s policy, and (2) processing the space release and ceasing rent billings in a timely manner. According to GSA headquarters officials, this new process was implemented to rectify past concerns that space release requests were not centrally tracked, GSA regions may not have been making consistent determinations, and some requests either were missed or were not processed within the appropriate time frames. GSA officials noted that GSA similarly manages all vacant space in federally owned property under its custody and control and in commercial space it leases, and the agency seeks to utilize the space as quickly as possible. GSA has 11 regional offices throughout the country that generally conduct the day-to-day real property management activities for its customer agencies. These responsibilities include acquiring, managing, and disposing of real property, as well as executing, renewing, and terminating leases on behalf of its customer agencies in exchange for a monthly fee for GSA’s services. GSA headquarters officials told us that GSA regional offices track all the occupancy agreements and proactively work with customer agencies to help manage their space needs well before the agreements expire to understand ongoing space requirements. For example, according to GSA headquarters officials, this process includes working with agencies at a strategic level and helping them think about how they can accomplish their space needs and meet their targets 4 to 5 years in advance. GSA headquarters and regional officials noted that the advance planning helps the GSA regional officials integrate agencies’ potential space needs into the work they are already doing in the region as GSA manages the regional inventory as a whole, including managing the amount of vacant space. GSA regional officials told us that they work closely with the agencies in their space consolidation and reduction efforts to minimize the likelihood that GSA would be caught off guard by a release of space. This work enables GSA to develop options for either filling vacant space based on the known needs in the region or developing an alternative plan to effectively utilize the unneeded space. One of GSA’s strategic objectives is to improve the federal utilization of space in order to lower the government’s operational costs. To assess progress, GSA has an agency-wide vacant space performance goal of 3.2 percent for its federally-owned and leased inventory (with a 5 percent goal for federally owned and 1.5 percent goal for leased space). Based on GSA data, the agency has steadily lowered its percentage of vacant space under its custody and control from 3.8 percent in fiscal year 2013 to 3 percent in fiscal year 2016, exceeding its performance goal of 3.2 percent for the first time in 4 years. The vacant space performance goal’s data help GSA evaluate its real property assets and plan for and make investment decisions while meeting its customer’s needs. According to GSA officials, the lower vacant space percentage is a reflection of the agency’s continued focus on working with its customer agencies to: (1) move into federally owned space, when possible; (2) decrease the size of commercially leased space to reduce agency rental costs and overall government reliance on leased space; and (3) dispose of unneeded federally owned assets. However, GSA officials noted that a certain level of vacant space is necessary to meet the space needs of new customers and customers with changing space requirements. According to GSA officials, GSA also tracks and reports annual cost avoidance data for all office and warehouse space reductions. These data include space covered under RTF in federally owned buildings under GSA’s custody and control and commercial space that GSA leases. Cost avoidance is defined as the results of an action taken in the immediate timeframe that will decrease future costs. The government-wide cost avoidance for fiscal year 2016 was $104 million based upon a net 10.7 million square foot reduction to all office and warehouse space. Of the government-wide figure, according to GSA, the total cost avoidance associated with office and warehouse space reductions in federally- owned space under GSA’s custody and control and commercial space GSA leased in fiscal year 2016 was over $75.8 million and 3.1 million square feet. In its cost avoidance calculation, GSA accounts for space returned to it by customer agencies only if there is a net square footage reduction in GSA’s total square footage across all the space that it manages. Similarly, the space returned to GSA does not reduce the federal government’s overall office and warehouse square footage unless GSA disposes of it. However, space that is returned to GSA is reflected as a square footage reduction for the customer agency and contributes toward that agency’s RTF target reduction. According to GSA regional officials, agencies’ requests to return space prior to the end of their occupancy agreements appear to have increased since the implementation of the RTF policy. Thus far, GSA has processes to manage agencies’ space release requests and keep its vacant space to a minimum. However, it is too early to determine how the recent increase in space release requests, in combination with agencies’ continued focus on occupying a smaller footprint and reducing their square footage, will affect: (1) the size of GSA’s inventory of vacant space in the long term, (2) GSA’s regional office workload to manage the requests, and (3) the cost savings for the federal government. We provided a draft of this report to GSA, OMB, Commerce, Energy, HUD, Interior, and Treasury for review and comment. We received technical comments from Energy, which we incorporated, where appropriate. GSA, OMB, Commerce, HUD, Interior, and Treasury did not have comments on our draft report. We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees; the Administrator of GSA; the Director of the OMB; the Secretaries of the Departments of Commerce, Energy, HUD, the Interior, and the Treasury; and other interested parties. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please contact me at (202) 512-2834 or rectanusl@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix III. Our objectives were to determine: (1) the approaches and any challenges the 24 Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act agencies identified to achieving their Reduce the Footprint (RTF) reduction targets for all their domestic office and warehouse space; (2) the extent to which these agencies reduced space and met their fiscal year 2016 RTF targets; and (3) how the General Services Administration (GSA) manages vacated space that it had leased to these agencies. To obtain background information for all three objectives, we reviewed relevant literature, including laws governing federal real-property management and agencies’ efforts to reduce their real property portfolios and Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) and GSA’s memorandums and guidance governing the RTF policy. We also reviewed prior GAO and GSA inspector general reports describing agencies’ real-property management and efforts to more efficiently manage their real property portfolios. To determine the approaches used and any challenges faced by the CFO Act agencies in achieving their RTF reduction targets for all their domestic office and warehouse space, we conducted a content analysis of the agencies’ 5-year Real Property Efficiency Plans (Plans) for fiscal years 2016 and 2017. These Plans were obtained directly from each of the agencies. Each Plan describes an agency’s overall strategic and tactical approach in managing its real property, provides a rationale for and justifies its optimum portfolio, and directs the identification and execution of real property disposals, efficiency improvements, general usage, and cost-savings measures. The content analysis of the Plans helped us to understand the approaches agencies used to reduce space, how space- reduction targets were set, and any challenges they experienced in reducing their space. To identify agencies’ approaches to achieving their RTF targets, we reviewed all agencies’ Plans to determine the most frequently mentioned approaches agencies reported using or planned to use to reduce their real-property footprints. As part of their plans, each agency is required to include a section detailing approaches it plans to use to reduce space. While these sections were the primary focus of the analysis, we analyzed the Plans as a whole for any additional mention of agencies’ approaches to reduce space. Based on the frequently identified approaches, codes were developed. An analyst reviewed all the agencies’ Plans and coded the approaches and another analyst reviewed the coding. If there was a disagreement, the two analysts reviewed and discussed until they reached an agreement. As a result of the analysis, five approaches were identified that agencies most frequently reported using or were planning to use to achieve their RTF targets. These five approaches are described in more detail in the report: (1) consolidation; (2) co-location; (3) disposition of unneeded space; (4) better utilization of existing space; and (5) teleworking and hoteling. For the purposes of our report, telework and hoteling were combined because these approaches are often used in combination. For example, agencies can use telework strategically to reduce space needs and increase efficiency by making hoteling (i.e., desk sharing) possible. To identify any challenges agencies faced in achieving their RTF targets, we similarly conducted a content analysis of agencies’ fiscal year 2016 and 2017 Plans. As part of their Plans, each agency included a section describing challenges it faced to reducing space. While these sections were the primary focus of the analysis, we analyzed the Plans as a whole for any additional mention of agencies’ challenges. Based on the frequently identified challenges, codes were developed. An analyst went through all the agencies’ Plans to code the challenges and another analyst reviewed the coding. If there was a disagreement, the two analysts reviewed and discussed until they reached an agreement. As a result of the analysis, we identified the four challenges that agencies most frequently described in their Plans: (1) space reduction costs; (2) mission delivery; (3) employee organization concerns; and (4) workload growth. In our report, we relied specifically on agencies’ fiscal year 2016 and 2017 Plans to provide examples and context for our description of the approaches agencies use and challenges they experience in achieving their RTF targets. However, after these Plans were submitted, agencies reported that the specific details as described in their Plans may in some instances, have changed due to a variety of factors. For our case study agencies, to the extent possible, we have provided updated information from agency officials as of December 2017. We selected five agencies as case studies to inform our first two objectives. We selected the agencies using a variety of considerations such as the diversity in the size of the agency’s domestic office and warehouse portfolio, the extent to which the agency met its fiscal year 2016 RTF targets, the types of real property authorities the agency has, as well as suggestions from GSA and OMB related to agencies’ experiences. Based on these factors, we selected the: (1) Department of Commerce (Commerce); (2) Department of Energy (Energy); (3) Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD); (4) Department of the Interior (Interior); and (5) Department of the Treasury (Treasury). While our case-study agencies and their experiences reducing their space are not generalizable to all CFO Act agencies, they provide a range of examples of how agencies are implementing the RTF policy. We interviewed officials at the selected agencies as well as GSA and OMB, and reviewed relevant agency real-property management and RTF guidance, to obtain more detailed information about agencies’ RTF approaches, challenges, specific RTF projects, RTF project funding and prioritization, and experiences in meeting their RTF targets. In addition, we visited three office buildings of our case study agencies in Washington, D.C., with ongoing or recently completed RTF projects that illustrated approaches the agencies used to reduce space and met with officials to discuss the projects in more detail. The spaces we visited were the headquarters buildings for Commerce, HUD, and Interior. We selected the buildings based on recommendations from officials at our case study agencies. To determine to what extent agencies reduced their space and met their fiscal year 2016 RTF targets, we analyzed the 24 CFO Act agencies’ data as submitted to GSA on their RTF targets and reported reductions for fiscal year 2016. The office and warehouse square footage reductions are calculated annually using GSA occupancy agreement data and agencies’ self-reported data in GSA’s Federal Real Property Profile. For example, for fiscal year 2016, the space reduction calculations based on these data sources at the end of the fiscal year was compared to the square footage reported in fiscal year 2015. At the time of our review, this was the first and only year of RTF data available as the policy was implemented in March 2015. We conducted a data reliability assessment of the RTF data GSA provided by interviewing GSA officials and reviewing documentation, and concluded the data were reliable for our purposes. We also interviewed officials at GSA and OMB and reviewed relevant documentation to learn more about each agency’s role and the requirements of the RTF policy. We interviewed officials from our selected case-study agencies to obtain supporting documentation and to improve our understanding of how agencies set their RTF targets, agencies’ progress toward those targets, and the approaches used and challenges faced in meeting those targets. We also asked the agency officials for examples of successful practices used to reduce their office and warehouse space. To determine how GSA manages vacated federally owned and commercially leased space that it leases to agencies, we reviewed federal requirements and GSA policies and vacancy data. We conducted a data reliability assessment of GSA’s vacancy and cost avoidance data by interviewing GSA officials and reviewing documentation, and concluded the data were reliable for our purposes. We also interviewed GSA headquarters and regional officials and obtained documentation on how GSA manages space returned by agencies. We conducted this performance audit from April 2017 to March 2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. FY 2016- FY 2020 target reduction (118,127) Social Security Administration Missed target and increased in space Department of Health and Human Services (170,147) (520,987) (15,466) (47,946) (56,062) In addition to the individual named above, Maria Edelstein (Assistant Director); Lacey Coppage; Edgar Garcia; Delwen Jones; Catherine Kim (Analyst-in-Charge); Michael Mgebroff; Malika Rice; Kelly Rubin; and David Wise made key contributions to this report.	[ "The federal government continues to work to reduce its real property inventory and associated costs. GSA provides space for agencies in government-owned and commercially leased buildings. In 2015, the OMB issued a memorandum requiring the 24 agencies with chief financial officers to reduce their domestic office and warehouse space. These agencies are required to set annual reduction targets for a 5-year time period and update their real property plans annually. GAO was asked to review the implementation of this space reduction initiative. This report discusses: (1) the approaches and any challenges the 24 agencies identified to achieving their reduction targets for all their domestic office and warehouse space; (2) the extent these agencies reduced their space and met their fiscal year 2016 targets; and (3) how GSA manages vacated space it had leased to these agencies. GAO conducted a content analysis of the 24 agencies' real property plans for fiscal years 2016 and 2017 and analyzed agencies' data as submitted to GSA on their targets and reductions for fiscal year 2016, the only year for which data were available. GAO selected five agencies as case studies based on several factors, including size of the agencies' office and warehouse portfolio, agency reduction targets, and fiscal year 2016 reported reductions. GAO reviewed relevant documentation and interviewed officials from GSA, OMB, and GAO's case study agencies. GAO provided a draft of this product to GSA, OMB, and our case study agencies for comment. GAO incorporated technical comments, as appropriate. Most of the 24 agencies with chief financial officers reported to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the General Services Administration (GSA) that they planned to consolidate their office and warehouse space and allocate fewer square feet per employee as the key ways to achieve their space reduction targets. For example, the Department of Agriculture reported it will consolidate staff from five component agencies in two office buildings. When complete, the space allocated per employee will average about 250 square feet down from a high of 420 square feet per employee. In taking these actions, the agencies most often identified the cost of space reduction projects as a challenge to achieving their targets. Agencies cited costs such as for space renovations to accommodate more staff and required environmental clean-up before disposing of property as challenges to completing projects. Some agencies required to maintain offices across the country reported that their mission requirements limit their ability to reduce their space. In fiscal year 2016, 17 of the 24 agencies reported they reduced their space, but had varying success achieving their first-year targets. Of the 17 agencies, 9 exceeded their target and reduced more space than planned, 7 missed their target (by anywhere between 2.8 and 96.7 percent), and 1 reduced space, despite a targeted increase. Agency officials said that it is not unusual for projects to shift to different years and that such shifts could lead to missing targets one year and exceeding them the next. GSA has processes to manage the space vacated by agencies that is leased through GSA. For example, starting in November 2016, GSA started tracking agencies' space release requests centrally to help standardize the process and established an e-mail address to which agencies can submit requests. GSA relies on regional offices to manage real property in their regions and to identify tenants for vacant space or to remove unused space from the inventory. GSA's regional officials said regular monitoring and coordinating with agencies minimizes the likelihood GSA is caught off guard by a return of space. These processes also help them to plan ahead. GSA met its 2016 performance goal to have an annual vacant space rate of no more than 3.2 percent in its federally owned and leased buildings. However, given the recent implementation of the space reduction initiative, it is too early to determine the extent to which agencies will return space to GSA prior to the end of their leases and the effect on GSA's inventory." ]	7,578	gov_report	en	null	9df657c6cce9210cfbd1229e1a32c01d3350b61b93cbdb26
Because of technological advances in digitization and data processing, electronic forms of payment have become increasingly available, convenient, and cost efficient. Established technologies, such as credit and debit cards, have long been a popular payment option. In addition, new payment methods (e.g., PayPal's Venmo app and Square's point-of-sale hardware, among others) use underlying traditional banking and payments systems to make electronic payments less expensive and more available to individuals and small businesses. Newer digital currencies, such as cryptocurrencies, offer alternative (though not yet widely adopted) options that have a high degree of independence from traditional systems. Although cash remains an important method of payment in the United States (see Figure 1 ), anecdotal reporting suggests that various electronic payment systems have become so effective and inexpensive relative to cash payments that some U.S. businesses—even those at which sales generally have a low dollar value—are increasingly choosing not to accept cash. In some developed countries, such as Sweden, cash payments are becoming relatively scarce. In addition, a number of central banks worldwide are examining the possibility of issuing government-backed digital currencies that exist only electronically. These trends suggest that due to buyer or seller preference or government policy, the role of cash in the payment system may continue to decline, perhaps significantly, in coming years. Some observers have examined the consequences of an evolution away from cash. Proponents of reducing the use of physical currency (or even eliminating it all together and becoming a cashless society ) argue that it will generate important benefits, including potentially improved efficiency of the payment system, a reduction of crime, and less constrained monetary policy. Proponents of maintaining cash as a payment option argue that significant reductions in cash usage and acceptance would further marginalize people with limited access to the financial system, increase the financial system's vulnerability to cyberattack, and reduce personal privacy. Given developments and debate in this area, Congress may consider policy issues related to the declining use of cash relative to electronic forms of payment. This report is divided into two parts. The first part analyzes cash and noncash payment systems, and the second analyzes potential outcomes if cash were to be significantly displaced as a commonly accepted form of payment. Part I describes the characteristics of cash and the various electronic payment systems that could potentially supplant cash. The noncash payment systems include traditional electronic payment systems (such as credit cards or payment apps) and alternative electronic payment systems, focusing on private systems using distributed ledger technology (such as cryptocurrencies) and central bank digital currencies (which are only under consideration by central banks at this time). Part I also examines the advantages and costs specific to each payment system and the potential obstacles to the adoption of alternative electronic payment systems. Part II of this report analyzes the potential implications of a reduced role of cash payments in the economy, including potential benefits, costs, and risks. The report also includes an Appendix that presents two international case studies of economies in which noncash payment systems rapidly expanded. This section provides analysis of cash, traditional noncash payment systems, and potential alternative payment systems. It describes the characteristics, presents usage data, and analyzes the advantages and costs of each system. It also includes a discussion on the potential decline in cash usage and a short inset on the legality of businesses' refusing to accept cash. How well something serves as money in a payment system depends on how well it serves as (1) a medium of exchange, (2) a unit of account, and (3) a store of value. To function as a medium of exchange , the thing must be tradable and agreed to have value. To function as a unit of account , the thing must act as a good measurement system. To function as a store of value , the thing must be able to purchase approximately the same value of goods and services at some future date as it can purchase now. Currently, cash continues to serve the three functions of money well as part of a robust, physical payment system. Physical currency can be carried easily in a pocket and thus is tradeable. Each unit of currency (e.g., a dollar) is identical and can be divided into fractions (e.g., cents) of the whole, making dollars effective units of account. A bill or coin, when well cared for, will not degrade substantively for years, meaning it can function as a store of value. In the United States, paper currency and coins are produced by the Bureau of Engraving and Printing (BEP) and the United States Mint, respectively, both of which are units within the Department of the Treasury (Treasury). The Federal Reserve (the Fed) distributes the currency and coin to banks, savings associations, and credit unions upon request, and the banks in turn make the cash available to their customers. When a bank orders cash, the Fed deducts the amount from the bank's Fed account. The revenues and costs to the government from this system are examined in the " Cash Effects on Government " section below. Data suggests that the demand for cash in the United States has continued to grow despite the introduction of new payment services and systems. Fed data indicates that the amount of currency in circulation has increased steadily over at least the past 20 years (see Figure 2 ). As of December 31, 2018, there were more than 43 billion notes (more commonly called bills ) worth over $1.67 trillion in circulation. The Fed determines how many new notes "are needed to meet the public's demand [, which]…reflects the Board's assessment of the expected growth rates for payments of currency to and receipts of currency from circulation." This growth in demand is not wholly surprising, because demand for cash would be expected to grow as does the economy, the population, and price levels. In addition, the demand for cash is growing because certain people may be increasingly using it solely as a store of value or safe investment (imagine the proverbial risk-averse saver keeping money under the mattress), rather than to make purchases. In addition, there remains a high demand for U.S. currency abroad, both as a store of value and medium of exchange. Some evidence suggests people are using cash for payments less often. For example, according to preliminary findings of a Fed survey, cash transactions in the United States fell from 40.7% of all transactions in 2012 to 32.5% in 2015. Taken together with data from the triennial Federal Reserve Payment S tudy , these survey results suggest the number of cash transactions during that time fell from roughly 84.8 billion per year to 69.4 billion. However, Fed economists have subsequently noted that significant changes in the survey methodology and unaccounted for effects from economic conditions means the eight-point decline in the share of transactions "almost surely does not accurately reflect actual changes in consumer preferences for cash." After making adjustments to account for these factors, those economists estimated the decline in the percentage of transactions that were in cash was roughly half of the initially estimated decline in the share of cash transactions. The most recent data indicates that Americans used cash for 31% of their transactions in 2016, with stronger cash preference for small, in-person transactions (60% of in-person transactions under $10). One of the main benefits of cash is that it is a simple, easy, robust payment mechanism that requires no ancillary technologies. Payers and payees validate and settle transactions simply by physically exchanging the currency; the consumer needs no magnetic-stripe card or mobile device, and the seller does not need a card-reading machine or other payment-receiving device. Relatedly, some observers assert cash provides a security against potential disruptions to electronic payment systems. For example, in the event of a significant cyberattack or extended power outage, cash could continue to serve the functions of money while electronic payment systems could not. Cash also acts as a safe asset in which to invest savings and its usage can involve a high degree of privacy, features that will be examined in more detail in the " Potential Costs and Risks of a Reduced Role for Cash " section below. In addition, holding cash might impart other psychological benefits to a consumer, such as feelings of greater control over budgeting and associations with wealth. Using and accepting cash involves certain costs to consumers and businesses. For example, consumers may have to pay fees to withdraw cash from automatic teller machines (ATMs). Banks with more than $1 billion in assets are required to report their revenue from ATM fees, and a Congressional Research Service (CRS) analysis indicates those banks collected at least $1.9 billion in ATM fees in 2018. Other costs—including consumer losses through theft, misplacement, or accidental destruction of cash—are more difficult to estimate. Businesses must pay for cash management services, such as cash delivery with armored trucks (an industry with estimated annual U.S. revenues of $2.8 billion) and security systems to dissuade thieves or robbers from attempting to steal cash kept on the retailer's premises. Despite these efforts, U.S. businesses lose about $40 billion in employee cash thefts per year. Similar to consumer's costs, quantifying all the costs of cash to businesses presents challenges, as certain costs are not straightforward and easily measurable. For example, some portion of retail staff and managers' paid time is spent counting cash and reconciling tills. In addition to its impacts on consumers and businesses, cash directly affects government revenues through three main mechanisms: (1) seigniorage (i.e., the "profit" the government makes by producing cash), (2) Federal Reserve remittances to the Treasury, and (3) tax evasion. Two of these mechanisms—seigniorage and remittances—increase government revenues. The third mechanism—tax evasion, facilitated by the anonymous and difficult-to-trace nature of cash transactions—decreases government revenue. Revenue Generating: Seignoriage . In general, the value of the physical currency produced by the government exceeds the cost incurred to produce it. For example, a $100 bill costs about 14 cents to print, generating revenues $99.86 greater than cost. The profit generated by this difference is called seigniorage, and this income would decrease if demand for cash were to fall. In FY2017, the U.S. Mint generated $391.5 million in net income from circulating coins and the U.S. Bureau of Engraving and Printing generated revenues $693 million greater than expenses. Revenue Generating: Fed Remittances . The second source of cash-generating revenue is remittances, which are transferred from the Fed to the U.S. Treasury. Any income the Fed earns after expenses and dividends paid to member banks, it remits to the Treasury (in 2017, the amount was $80.6 billion), and hence becomes a source of revenue for the federal government. A significant expense for the Fed is the interest it pays on depository institutions' deposits held in their Fed accounts. Such payments accounted for $28.9 billion of the Fed's $35.4 billion total expenses in 2017. However, currency is a Fed liability on which it pays no interest. Recall that when a bank orders cash from the Fed, the Fed deducts the amount from the bank's account. Thus, the more cash that is in circulation, the less interest the Fed must pay, and the greater its remittances to Treasury. In January 2019, there was approximately $1.7 trillion of currency in circulation, and the Fed (as of this publication) paid an annual interest rate of 2.4% on reserve balances. By these measures, if all currency were instead bank reserve balances held at the Fed, it could increase Fed expenses (and thus reduce government revenues) by more than $40 billion a year. If interest rates on reserves (which change when the Fed alters monetary policy) rose or fell, then expenses would increase or decrease, respectively, in this scenario. Revenue Reducing: Tax Evasion . Because cash leaves no electronic record, wage earners and businesses are able to underreport (in general, illegally) how much cash they receive in order to reduce their tax payments. Thus, cash contributes to the tax gap —the difference between what the government is owed and what is actually paid. The most recent Internal Revenue Service estimate released in 2016 examined the tax gap for the years 2008-2010, and found that the gap due to underreporting averaged $387 billion a year. This estimate does not directly measure how much underreporting is facilitated by cash payments, and the figure for recent years is likely to be different. However, it provides a general context for how much tax revenue the government does not collect due to underreporting that is at least in part made possible by cash transactions. Businesses have long set conditions under which they would not accept cash. For example, certain businesses refuse to accept high-denomination bills. However, according to anecdotal reporting, retail businesses are increasingly deciding that the costs of transacting in cash are high enough that they would rather not accept it at all. Notably, this is occurring at businesses at which transactions are typically in-person for small dollar amounts—traditionally viewed as the type of transactions for which cash is the least costly option. If these stories are in fact indicative of a sustained trend, widespread non-acceptance of cash could have a variety of effects on consumers, businesses, as well as society and the economy at large. One particular effect that has drawn significant attention, as well as litigation, is that non-acceptance of cash could potentially marginalize those that have limited access to the financial system or mobile technological devices. This issue is examined in the " Lack of Financial Access for Certain Groups " section later in the report. Were cash to decline as a payment system, the most likely replacement—at least at the current time—would appear to be traditional noncash, electronic payment systems, such as debit cards, credit cards, or payment mobile apps. In traditional noncash payment systems like those that are prevalent today, participants hold their money in an account at a bank or other financial intermediary that maintains accurate ledgers of how much money each customer has available. To make a payment, the payer instructs (using a physical check or an electronic message) the intermediary to transfer money to the recipient's account. If the recipient holds an account at a different intermediary, those intermediaries will send messages to each other via messaging networks connecting them, instructing each to make the necessary changes to their ledgers. The intermediaries validate the transaction, ensure the payer has sufficient funds for the payment, deduct the appropriate amount from the payer's account, and add that amount to the payee's account. For example, in the United States, a retail consumer may initiate an electronic payment by swiping a debit card, at which time an electronic message is sent over a network instructing the purchaser's bank to send payment to the seller's bank. Those banks then make the appropriate changes to their account ledgers (possibly using the Fed's payment system) reflecting that value has been transferred from the purchaser's account to the seller's account. As with physical currency, digital entries in account ledgers can serve the three functions of money well for use in payments. Instructions to change entries in a ledger can easily be sent, making the values in the ledger easily tradable. Numerical entries can be denominated in identical and divisible units, making them good units of account. Because numbers in a ledger can remain unchanged during periods when no transactions are made, they can serve as a store of value. According to the most recent complete Federal Reserve Payment S tudy on noncash payments, the number of traditional noncash payments made in the U.S. totaled more than 144 billion transactions with a value of almost $178 trillion in 2015. These included payments via debit cards (69.5 billion transactions worth $2.56 trillion), credit cards (33.8 billion transactions worth $3.16 trillion), automated clearing house payments (ACH; 23.5 billion transactions worth $26.83 trillion), and check payments (17.3 billion payments worth $26.83 trillion). Between 2012 and 2015, the number of transactions of the three electronic systems, debit, credit, and ACH, grew at annual rates of 7.1%, 8.0%, and 4.9%, respectively. Their values grew by 6.8%, 7.4%, and 4.0%, respectively. Check payments declined by an annual rate of 4.4% by number and 0.5% by value. According to a recent supplement to that study, both the growth of electronic payments and the decline of check payments accelerated in 2017. Payment based on physically exchanging currency has some notable shortcomings that can be addressed by a payment system based on maintaining account ledgers. One is that physical currency requires both the payer and the payee to either (1) be physically near each other, allowing the physical currency to pass from the possession of the former into the possession of the latter; or (2) have a sufficient trust in each other that the payee believes an assurance that he or she will receive the currency later. Another shortcoming is that holders of physical currency may have little recourse if it is lost, stolen, or accidentally destroyed. If, instead, money is exchanged by making valid changes in ledgers maintained by trusted intermediaries, the exchange can be accomplished without the risk of lost, stolen, or damaged currency. In addition, noncash systems can make payments fast, easy, and convenient. Using them decreases the need for people to make regular estimations of how much cash they need to have on a particular day, the frequency of trips to the bank or ATM to get cash, and the amount of time waiting for cashiers to make change. Instead, a plastic card or an app on a mobile device can replace those activities with a card swipe or button push. As information technology has progressed, the convenience has increased and the option to use electronic payments has become nearly ubiquitous. Until fairly recently, it was not uncommon for a retail establishment to reject card payments. Now, services such as Venmo, Apple Pay, and Google Pay, and card-reading devices, such as those made by Square, have made electronic payment options increasingly available, even for individuals to accept electronic payments from other individuals. The previously mentioned anecdotal reporting suggests there is a growing number of establishments that only accept electronic payments. For these systems to work well, participants must trust that banks and other intermediaries are keeping accurate ledgers that are changed only for valid transfers. Otherwise, an individual's money could be lost or stolen if a bank records the account as having an inaccurately low amount or transfers value without his or her permission. Another advantage of systems using traditional intermediaries is that they have a number of features that generate a high degree of trust and accuracy. Banks and other intermediaries have both a market and governmental incentive to be accurate. A bank or financial intermediary that does not have a good reputation for protecting a customer's money and processing transactions accurately would likely lose customers. In addition, governments typically subject banks to laws and regulations designed in part to ensure that banks are well run and that the money they hold is safe. As such, banks take substantial measures to ensure security and accuracy. In addition, intermediaries generally are required to provide certain protections to consumers involved in electronic transactions, in part to protect them from losses resulting from unauthorized transfers. For example, the Electronic Fund Transfer Act ( P.L. 95-630 ) limits consumers' liability for unauthorized transfers made using their accounts. Similarly, the Fair Credit Billing Act ( P.L. 93-495 ) requires credit card companies to take certain steps to correct billing errors, including when the goods or services a consumer purchased are not delivered as agreed. Both laws also require financial institutions to make certain disclosures to consumers related to the costs and terms of using an institution's services. Significant costs and physical infrastructure underlie systems for electronic money transfers to ensure the systems' integrity, performance, and availability. For example, payment system providers operate and maintain robust digital networks to connect retail locations with banks. The Fed operates and maintains electronics networks to connect banks to itself and each other. These intermediaries store and protect huge amounts of data. Because these intermediaries are generally highly regulated, they incur regulatory compliance costs. Intermediaries recoup the costs associated with these systems and regulations and earn profits by charging fees directly when the system is used (such as the fees a merchant pays to have a card reading machine and "swipe fees" on each card transaction) or by charging fees for related services (such as checking account fees). It is difficult to quantify how much traditional noncash payment systems cost and what portion of those costs is passed on to consumers and businesses. Performing a quantitative analysis is beyond the scope of this report. What bears mentioning here is that certain costs of traditional payment systems—and, in particular, the fees intermediaries in those systems charge—have at times been high enough to raise policymakers' concern and elicit policy responses. For example, in response to businesses' assertions that Visa and MasterCard had exercised market power in setting debit card swipe fees at unfairly high levels, Congress included Section 1075 in the Dodd-Frank Consumer Protection and Wall Street Reform Act (Dodd-Frank Act; P.L. 111-203 )—sometimes called the Durbin Amendment. Section 1075 directs the Fed to limit debit card swipe fees charged by banks with assets of more than $10 billion. In addition, studies on unbanked and underbanked populations cite the fees associated with traditional bank accounts, a portion of which may be the result of providing payment services, as a possible cause for those populations' limited interaction with the traditional banking system. Although electronic payment systems protect customers from physical theft and are subject to a complex and sometimes overlapping array of state and federal laws, regulators, and regulations related to cybersecurity, they could nevertheless expose individuals to cyber-theft and identity theft. In addition, the systems themselves could be susceptible to disruption from cyberattacks. The occurrence of successful hacks of banks and other financial institutions, wherein huge amounts of individuals' personal information are stolen or compromised, illustrates cyber-related risks. For example, in 2014, JPMorgan Chase, the largest U.S. bank, experienced a data breach that exposed financial records of 76 million households. However, no consensus exists on how best to reduce the occurrence of such incidents, and whether current cybersecurity measures and regulatory frameworks are effective and efficient in mitigating cybersecurity risk is an open question. For a more detailed examination of cybersecurity at financial institutions, see CRS Report R44429, Financial Services and Cybersecurity: The Federal Role , by N. Eric Weiss and M. Maureen Murphy. In addition, although the traditional electronic payment system is sufficiently fast and convenient to complete many transactions, other transactions can involve problematic delays. One such delay that can be particularly costly for consumers is the lag between when a payment (such as a paycheck) is deposited and when the full amount of the funds are available to the individual. Depending on factors related to which networks the payer's and payee's bank uses to process payments, it can take up to two business days (or more under certain circumstances) after a deposit is made for banks to fully validate, process, and settle the deposit. Settlement delays can create a situation in which an individual has made a deposit that would give sufficient funds to pay a bill that is due, but nevertheless may overdraw the account because the deposit is awaiting processing. In such a situation, the individual faces a choice between costly outcomes—a late payment penalty on the bill, an overdraft fee on the bank account, or a fee from a check cashing or payday lending service. These costs are likely disproportionately borne by low- or moderate-income individuals who typically have low balances in their bank accounts. Faster or immediate payment processing could potentially reduce or eliminate costs incurred by individuals facing this situation. While delays in the payment system may seem anachronistic at a time when digital messages can be sent and data processed nearly instantaneously, the fact remains that aspects of the systems, networks, and infrastructures used today (including those operated by the Fed) were developed and deployed decades ago. Both the Fed and private institutions are working to increase system speed and efforts are underway to make real-time payments in the United States the norm. However, payment system operators arguably have little incentive to achieve faster or real-time payments because (1) they are in compliance with the current requirement facing banks pursuant to the Expedited Funds Availability Act of 1987 ( P.L. 108-100 ) to generally make most types of deposits available by the second business day, (2) updating legacy systems is costly for the institutions that operate them, and (3) banks are generating revenue through overdraft fees. Currently, it appears that the traditional noncash payment systems described above likely would replace cash payments should cash usage significantly decline. However some observers, citing the various costs and disadvantages associated with those systems—including delays in processing as well as reliance on traditional financial intermediaries—point to alternative electronic payment systems as potential dominant payment systems of the future. Cryptocurrenc y , such as Bitcoin , is the most well-known of these alternatives. Described in more detail below, cryptocurrencies use blockchain technology and public or "distributed" ledgers to achieve validated transfers of digital representations of value. The use of these systems to make payments is quite rare relative to cash and traditional systems, and the role they will play in the future is speculative. Nevertheless, their potential to significantly affect the usage of cash and traditional systems for payments has drawn the attention of central banks. Some central banks are examining whether they should create a comparable payment system of digital currencies to offer the advantages of those systems themselves and to avoid being bypassed in the future. This section briefly describes (1) existing private alternative electronic payment systems and (2) possible future central bank-run systems. With respect to alternative electronic payment systems, the section examines their potential advantages, costs, and obstacles to their widespread adoption. With respect to a potential central bank-run system, which is more speculative at this time, the section examines potential advantages and obstacles to their widespread adoption and uncertainties they present. In general, private electronic payment systems using distributed ledgers allow individuals to establish an account identified by a string of numbers and characters (often called an address or public key ) that is paired with a password or private key known only to the account holder. A transaction occurs when two parties agree to transfer digital currency (perhaps in payment for a good or service) from one account to another. The buying party will "unlock" the currency used as payment with her private key, allowing some amount to be transferred from her account to the seller's. The seller then "locks" the currency in her account using her own private key. From the perspective of the individuals using the system, the mechanics are similar to authorizing payment on any website that requires an individual to enter a username and password. In addition, companies offer applications or interfaces that users can download onto a device to make transacting in cryptocurrencies more user-friendly. Many digital currency platforms use blockchain technology to validate changes to the ledgers. In a blockchain-enabled system, payments are validated on a public or "distributed" ledger by a decentralized network of system users and cryptographic protocols. In these systems, parties that otherwise do not know each other can exchange something of value (i.e., a digital currency) not because they trust each other but because they trust the platform and its protocols to prevent invalid changes to the ledger. A notable feature of transfers using blockchain is that they require no centralized, trusted intermediary such as a bank, government central bank, or other financial or government institution. Proponents envision these systems could achieve instantaneous transfers, although they currently require minutes or hours to finalize transfers. The decentralized nature of digital currencies and their recent proliferation poses challenges to performing industry-wide analysis of their use in payments. For example, as of August 27, 2018, one industry group purported to track trading prices of 1,890 cryptocurrencies alone. For brevity and clarity, this report uses statistics on Bitcoin—the first and most well-known cryptocurrency, the total value of which accounts for more than half of the industry as a whole —as an illustrative example of a digital currency's use in payments. In January 2017, the price of a Bitcoin on an exchange was about $993. The price surged during the year, peaking at about $19,650 in December 2017, an almost 1,880% increase. However, the price then dramatically declined. Overall, the price of Bitcoin has experienced a high degree of volatility. On March 12, 2018, the price of Bitcoin was $3,860, down 80% from its peak. More recently, the price rebounded and was $5,948 on May 8, 2019. Although price data on Bitcoin illustrates the public interest in and overall demand for this cryptocurrency, it is a poor indicator of how often it is being exchanged for goods and services (i.e., how often it is being used as money). Certain analyses appear to show that digital currencies are not being widely used and accepted as payment for goods and services, but rather as investment vehicles. The number of Bitcoin transactions may serve as a better indicator—though a flawed one—of the use of Bitcoin as a payment system. This number reveals how many times Bitcoins are transferred between accounts each day, and data indicates the number of transactions is miniscule compared with those of traditional systems. For example, in 2019 through March 12, the Bitcoin system averaged about 310,000 transactions per day globally, a pace that would result in about 113 million transactions per year. Recall that in the United States alone, more than 144 billion traditional (nearly 1,275 times as many) noncash payments were made in 2015. Moreover, one problem with this measure it that it is a count of how many times two parties have exchanged Bitcoin, not a count of how many times Bitcoin has been used to buy something. Some portion of those exchanges, possibly a significantly large portion, is driven by investors giving fiat currency to an exchange to buy and hold the Bitcoin as an investment. In those transfers, Bitcoin is not acting as money (i.e., not being exchanged for a good or service). Advantages of Private Payment Systems Using Distributed Ledgers . As discussed in an earlier section, traditional electronic payment systems involve a number of intermediaries, such as government central banks and private financial institutions. To carry out transactions, these institutions operate and maintain extensive electronic networks and other infrastructure, employ workers, and require time to finalize transactions. To meet costs and earn profits, these institutions charge various user fees. Cryptocurrency advocates anticipate that a decentralized payment system operated through the internet could be less costly than traditional payment systems and existing infrastructures. However, whether such efficiencies can or will be achieved remains an open question. In addition, opening a bank account or otherwise using traditional electronic payment systems generally requires an individual to divulge to a financial institution certain basic personal information, such as name, Social Security number, and birthdate. Financial institutions store and may analyze or share this information. In some instances hackers have stolen personal information from financial institutions, causing concerns over how well these institutions can protect sensitive data. Individuals seeking a higher degree of privacy or control over their personal data than that afforded by traditional systems may choose to use an alternative digital currency system that provides a degree of pseudonymity or anonymity. Although inflation in the United States and other developed economies has been low in recent decades, some individuals may nevertheless believe that nontraditional digital money may maintain its value better than government-backed money in traditional systems. The dollar and most modern currencies are fiat money—that is, money that derives value based solely on government decree. Historically, incidents of hyperinflation in certain countries have seen government-backed currencies lose most or nearly all of their value. Thus, some individuals may judge the probability of their fiat money losing a significant portion of its value to be undesirably high. These individuals may place greater trust in the ability of a decentralized network using cryptographic protocols that limit the creation of new money to maintain stable value of money than in the ability of government institutions to do so. Obstacles to Widespread Adoption of Private Payment Systems Using Distributed Ledgers . Several characteristics of cryptocurrency undermine its ability to serve the functions of money in a payment system. Currently, a relatively small number of businesses and individuals use or accept cryptocurrency for payment. As discussed above, Bitcoin transactions have averaged about 310,000 per day globally. Cryptocurrency may be used as a medium of exchange less frequently than traditional money for several reasons. Unlike the dollar and most other government-backed currencies, cryptocurrencies are not legal tender, meaning creditors are not legally required to accept them to settle debts. Consumers and businesses also may be hesitant to place their trust in these systems because they have limited understanding of them. Relatedly, consumers and businesses may have sufficient trust in and be generally satisfied with traditional payment systems. The recent high volatility in the price of many cryptocurrencies undermines their ability to serve as a unit of account and a store of value. Cryptocurrencies can have significant value fluctuations within short periods of time; as a result, pricing goods and services in units of cryptocurrency would require frequent repricing and likely would cause confusion among buyers and sellers. Whether cryptocurrency systems are scalable —meaning their capacity can be increased in a cost-effective way without loss of functionality—is uncertain. At present, the systems underlying cryptocurrencies do not appear capable of processing the number of transactions that would be required of a widely adopted, global payment system. One concern involves the significant energy consumption required to run and cool the computers that validate the transactions on these platforms. Costs of Private Payment Systems Using Distributed Ledgers . As the energy consumption of a digital currency system demonstrates, these systems are not costless. In addition to energy, they require computer hardware and facilities. Often making payments on these platforms involves paying fees. Whether these direct economic costs of using the system are fixed or—as they develop and mature—become less than existing systems is an open question. Digital currency systems, at least as currently designed and regulated, also might impose other costs on society. Some critics of these systems fear their pseudonymous, decentralized nature may provide a new avenue for criminals to launder money, evade taxes, or sidestep financial sanctions. For example, Bitcoin was the currency used on the internet-based, illegal drug marketplace and Bitcoin escrow service called Silk Road. This marketplace facilitated more than 100,000 illegal drug sales from approximately January 2011 to October 2013, at which time the government shut down the website and arrested the individuals running the site. Consumer groups and other observers are also concerned that digital currency users are inadequately protected against unfair, deceptive, and abusive acts and practices. The way cryptocurrencies are sold, exchanged, or marketed can subject cryptocurrency exchanges or other cryptocurrency-related businesses to generally applicable consumer protection laws, and certain state laws and regulations are being applied to cryptocurrency-related businesses. However, other laws and regulations aimed at protecting consumers engaged in electronic financial transactions may not apply. For example, the Electronic Fund Transfer Act of 1978 (EFTA; P.L. 95-630 ) requires traditional financial institutions engaging in electronic fund transfers to make certain disclosures about fees, correct errors when identified by the consumer, and limit consumer liability in the event of unauthorized transfers. Because no bank or other centralized financial institution is involved in digital currency transactions, EFTA generally has not been applied to these transactions. In addition, the laws and regulations that do apply generally have not been implemented specifically to address digital currencies or related businesses. Whether the current regulatory regime applied to digital currency transactions, but originally implemented for different financial activities (e.g., traditional money transmission), is effective and efficient is a debated issue. Finally, some central bankers and other experts and observers have speculated that the widespread adoption of cryptocurrencies could affect the ability of the Fed and other central banks to implement and transmit monetary policy. The Fed conducts monetary policy with the goals of achieving price stability and low unemployment. Like other central banks it achieves its goals by, putting it simply, controlling the amount of money in circulation in the economy. If one or more additional currencies that the government did not control the supply of were also prevalent and viable payment options, it could limit central banks' ability to transmit monetary policy to financial markets and the real economy. In this scenario, central banks likely would have to make larger adjustments to the fiat currency they do control to have the same effect as previous adjustments. Another possibility is that they would have to start buying and selling the digital currencies themselves in an effort to affect the availability of these currencies. These risks have led some central banks and other observers to suggest that perhaps central banks could issue their own digital currencies. The risks and challenges posed by private digital currencies have led some observers to suggest that perhaps central banks should offer their own central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) to realize certain hoped-for efficiencies in the payment system in a way that would be "safe, robust, and convenient." To date, no country has successfully created a CBDC for payment use by the general public. The extent to which a central bank could or would want to create a new, digital-only payment system likely would be weighed against the consideration that these government institutions already have trusted digital payment systems in place. Because of such considerations, the exact form that CBDCs would take could vary across a number of features and characteristics. Nevertheless, some central banks are examining the idea of CBDCs and the possible benefits and issues they may present. For the purposes of this discussion, this report examines a CBDC that would be available to consumers for retail payments. Some proposals would limit CBDCs to wholesale payments between banks and other financial institutions. Potential Advantages of CBDCs . Proponents of CBDCs generally argue they could provide efficiency gains over traditional legacy systems and contend that central banks could use the technologies underlying digital currencies to deploy a faster, less costly government-supported payment system. Observers have speculated that a CBDC could take the form of a central bank allowing individuals to hold accounts directly at the central bank. Advocates argue that a CBDC created in this way could increase systemic stability by imposing additional discipline on commercial banks. Because consumers would have the alternative of safe deposits made directly with the central bank, commercial banks likely would have to offer interest rates and limit risks at levels necessary to attract deposits above any deposit insurance limit. In addition, CBDCs could increase government revenue through a seignoriage-like mechanism. A more expansive definition of seignoriage is the income government obtains from having government liabilities act as money. Physical money—because it is liquid and low-risk—earns no interest rate and carries a cost to produce. Money—both physical and electronic in the traditional system—is also a balance sheet liability to the issuing authority, such as the Fed or other central banks. If the Fed allowed individuals to hold accounts directly with the Fed, the Fed would issue low- or no-interest liabilities to individuals (as electronic entries in a ledger produced at less cost than physical currency). Then, as happens now, the Fed would use those liabilities to fund purchases of assets that earn a higher interest rate than what the Fed pays on liabilities. This would produce income, perhaps greater income than is earned through traditional seignoriage. Potential Obstacles to Creation of CBDCs . One of the main arguments critics—including various central bank officials—make against CBDCs is that there is no "compelling demonstrated need" for such a currency, because central banks and private banks already operate trusted electronic payment systems that generally offer fast, easy, and inexpensive transfers of value. Opponents also argue that a CBDC in the form of individual direct accounts at the central bank would reduce the role of private banks in financial intermediation and potentially expand the role of government central banks inappropriately. A portion of consumers likely would shift their deposits away from private banks toward central bank digital money, which would be a safe, government-backed liquid asset. Deprived of this funding, private banks likely would have to reduce their lending, leaving central banks to decide whether or how they should support lending markets to avoid a reduction in credit availability. In addition, skeptics of CBDCs object to the assertion that these currencies would increase systemic stability, arguing that CBDCs would create a less-stable system because they would facilitate runs on private banks. These critics argue that at the first signs of distress at an individual institution or the bank industry, depositors would transfer their funds to this alternative liquid, government-backed asset. Uncertaint y : CBDCs' Potential Effects on Monetary Policy . Observers also disagree over whether CBDCs would have a desirable effect on central banks' role and abilities in carrying out monetary policy. Proponents argue that, if individuals held a CBDC on which the central bank set interest rates, the central bank could directly transmit a policy rate to the macroeconomy, rather than achieving transmission through the rates the central bank charges banks and the indirect influence of rates in particular markets. In addition, if holding cash (which in effect has a 0% interest rate) were not an option for consumers, central banks potentially would be less constrained by the zero lower bound . The zero lower bound is the idea that the ability of individuals and businesses to hold cash and thus avoid negative interest rates limits central banks' ability to transmit negative interest rates to the economy. Critics argue that taking on such a direct and influential role in private financial markets is an inappropriately expansive role for a central bank. They assert that if CBDCs were to displace cash and private bank deposits, central banks would have to increase asset holdings, support lending markets, and otherwise provide a number of credit intermediation activities that private institutions currently perform in response to market conditions. As discussed above, although cash remains a frequently used payment system, other payment systems continue to develop that offer their own advantages and costs. Various trends suggest that due to market preference or government policy, the role of cash in the payment system has begun to decline and may continue to decline, perhaps significantly, in coming years. If the relative benefits and costs of cash and the various other payment methods evolve in such a way that cash is significantly displaced as a commonly accepted form of payment, that evolution could have a number of effects, both positive and negative, on the economy and society. This section of the report describes a number of potential benefits of a reduced role for cash in the U.S. economy and the various risks and costs that may occur. Many of the factors discussed below may not occur wholly as a benefit, risk, or cost; rather, a potential benefit may bring with it a risk, and vice versa. Some observers argue that reducing or eliminating cash payments in the U.S. economy will produce certain beneficial outcomes, including improved efficiency in payments, reduced criminality, and improved ability for the Fed to implement certain monetary policy. As discussed below, although these outcomes generally may be beneficial, that does not mean that there are not certain costs, or drawbacks, that may counterbalance these positive effects. Proponents of noncash payment systems assert that net economic benefits from the use and maintenance of a cash payment system are (or will become as technology advances) less than the net benefits of using and maintaining noncash systems. Put another way, they argue that the resources, labor, and capital that go into the cash system—for example, producing currency; stocking and maintaining ATMs; safely transporting cash; protecting businesses from theft and robbery—make it less efficient than noncash systems. If true—and absent policy interventions—market forces likely will result in the displacement of cash by other payment methods as businesses increasingly choose not to accept cash and consumers increasingly prefer not to use it. Under this scenario, although the payment system on net may be more efficient, it would not necessarily be true that all people would benefit, as is discussed in the " Potential Costs and Risks of a Reduced Role for Cash " section. Proponents of cashless societies assert that the elimination of cash would reduce crime by making operating an illegal enterprise more difficult and certain crimes, such as robbery and burglary, less remunerative. These proponents argue that criminals are more likely to conduct business in cash and to hold cash as an asset, in large part because cash is anonymous and allows them to avoid establishing relationships with and generating records at financial institutions that may be subject to anti-money laundering reporting and compliance requirements. Accordingly, they assert that the elimination of cash would be beneficial on net, because operating a criminal enterprise would become more difficult. Certain studies have shown that the prevalence of cash is correlated with the incidence of crime. In addition, the amount of "strong" currencies (i.e., highly valuable and highly stable currencies) in circulation exceeds what many people would consider a reasonable amount needed for typical consumer transactions. For example, with the U.S. population at approximately 329 million, the $1.6 trillion of currency in circulation equates to about $4,900 per person. Proponents of a cashless society assert that this number is inflated due in part to the cash demand of criminals (although part is also due to demand for the U.S. dollar from abroad). Although a robust analysis of this question is beyond the scope of this report, arguments that cash facilitates crime and even that reducing cash may reduce crime appear in certain cases to be well founded. However, when analyzing the net benefit to society of going cashless, reduced crime should be weighed against any cost that a reduction in cash would impose on legitimate cash users. One such legitimate group is examined in more detail in the " Lack of Financial Access for Certain Groups " section below. The effect a reduction in cash payments would have on crime should not be overstated, as criminals likely would seek other ways to commit and hide their crimes. For example, the prevalence of cybercrime may increase. Another benefit (from a macroeconomic perspective) of a cashless society cited by economists would be the potential elimination of the practical inability of central banks, such as the Fed, to implement negative interest rates. When an economy is in recession or otherwise performing poorly, one monetary policy response is to lower interest rates. Lower interest rates can spur companies to borrow in order to invest and spur consumers to borrow in order to make additional purchases, thus boosting economic activity and mitigating the impact of recessions. However, many economists believe that policymakers are constrained by a zero lower bound—that whatever policy rate they may set, interest rates in many markets will not fall below zero. The reason is that holding cash offers a zero interest rate. Thus, if the Fed attempted to implement negative interest rates, individuals could avoid those rates by transferring their funds into cash. If holding cash was not an available option, it would be easier for negative interest rates to be transmitted to more financial markets. However, any benefit provided by increasing policymakers' ability to affect the macroeconomy with negative interest rates should be weighed against the cost it would impose on the individual savers whose account balances would decrease in value during a period of negative interest rates. Skeptics of reducing or eliminating the role of cash in the economy assert that cash serves a number of beneficial purposes, and argue that eliminating it would have adverse effects on certain financially vulnerable groups, eliminate an asset that provides safety against cyber vulnerabilities and financial crises, and reduce individuals' privacy. As with potential benefits to a reduction in cash, many of the factors discussed below may not occur wholly as a risk or cost, and they must be weighed against potential benefits when considering their overall impact. If the United States were to move toward becoming a cashless society that required consumers to use noncash, electronic payment services, it could present difficulties for those segments of the population who lack access to the financial system or to an electronic network. Access to electronic payments typically requires an account with some financial institution, usually a bank. Often—and increasingly—it also involves using or accessing a device connected to the internet. However, these factors can present hardships and obstacles for certain vulnerable groups. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation reported that in the United States in 2015, 9 million households were unbanked, meaning that no member had a bank account. Of these, 37.8% reported that the main reason was that they do not have enough money to keep in an account, 9.4% reported that fees were too high, and 1.9% reported fees were unpredictable. In total, this indicates almost half of the total unbanked, or roughly 4.5 million households, do not access banking services due to economic obstacles. Sweden has been at the forefront of the move away from cash (see Appendix ), and observers there, including Stefan Ingves, governor of Sweden's central bank, have voiced some of these concerns about going cashless. In addition, anecdotal reporting indicates that retirees in Sweden are finding the change difficult and costly. In the United States, many assert that it would be beneficial to bring the unbanked into the banking system. Nevertheless, if the unbanked engaged with the banking system at a relatively high cost only because cash (which was a less expensive option for them) was no longer available, it would likely be a detrimental outcome for this group. Conversely, if the move to a cashless system led to less costly financial access for this group, they may stand to benefit. Proponents of cash often cite the robustness of physical currency as a payment system. Once in an individual's possession, cash does not rely on financial institutions or information technology (IT) based payment networks. These proponents argue that if payments became entirely electronic, events such as power outages, hacker attacks, or (in the event of future cyber war) a state-sponsored attack would be capable of shutting down the most simple financial transaction—the exchange of money for goods and services. The financial system is already exposed to these threats to varying degrees, but the argument is that the elimination of cash amplifies those risks. Because it functions well as a store of value, cash is a relatively safe asset in which to invest savings with no risk of losses resulting from a decline in a securities value or the failure of financial institutions or other entities. The perceived safety of cash and its non-reliance on financial institutions also makes it desirable in times of financial turmoil or distress, when confidence in such institutions decreases. During these periods, many people prefer assets that are free from credit risk. For some of these individuals, deposit insurance guarantees may not wholly eliminate their fear of losses, whereas the safety of physical currency would. Holding cash, then, could also provide a sense of security to risk-adverse people that may mistrust the financial system. Opening a bank account or otherwise using traditional noncash payment systems generally requires an individual to divulge certain basic personal information, such as name, Social Security number, and birthdate, to a financial institution. Financial institutions store this information and information about the transactions linked to this identity. Under certain circumstances, they may analyze or share this information, such as with a credit-reporting agency. In some instances hackers have stolen personal information from financial institutions, causing concerns over how well these institutions can protect sensitive data. Finally, provided it follows proper legal procedures, the government also can access this information under certain circumstances. Similarly, although new alternative payment systems may offer a degree of anonymity or pseudonymity, these systems still generate an unalterable record of transactions between parties. Cash, by contrast, can be used anonymously, and people may wish to use cash for legitimate purposes to ensure their privacy. Certain consumers who are uncomfortable divulging and generating private information—even basic information that a transaction occurred—may prefer cash to any electronic payment methods. Cash has a number of advantageous features that has made it a simple and robust payment system throughout most of human history. It is difficult to imagine conditions under which cash would be replaced entirely, and disappear from the economy, at least in the near future. Nevertheless, its hegemony as a payment system appears to have come to an end, as electronic payment systems have gained popularity, and the ubiquity of cash acceptance for in-person purchases also seems precarious. If noncash payment systems significantly displace cash and cash usage and acceptance significantly declines, there would be a number of effects (both positive and negative) on the economy and society. Now or in the near future, policymakers may face decisions about whether to impede or hasten the decline of cash and consider the implications of doing so. Two countries provide interesting case studies of market forces drastically changing the way a society makes payments. Sweden In recent years, the use of cash in Sweden has quickly and substantially declined, dropping from 40% to 13% of transactions between 2010 and 2018. In many cases, businesses no longer accept cash, and one survey indicated that two-thirds of small businesses planned to stop accepting cash. Anecdotal reporting indicates that about 5% of bank branches accept cash deposits or offer cash withdrawals. Furthermore, Sweden's central bank is examining the possibility of creating registered accounts for the purpose of issuing currency electronically. Reportedly, many Swedes are generally in favor of the trend (the displacement of cash is due largely to consumer preference), though some have voiced concerns about financial access issues that the change causes for certain groups, such as the elderly. Observers have put forward a number of explanations for the Sweden's growing preference for electronic payment methods such as cards and mobile app enabled payments. One argument asserts that Sweden is an especially technology savvy country. As such, Swedes are comfortable using electronic payment systems, and Swedish companies have developed fast and easy payment technologies, such as iZettle and Swish. Some observers also have suggested that Swedes are especially trusting of institutions and thus have fewer privacy concerns. Some have noted that the timing of the start of the decline in cash use among Swedes coincided with the start of a transition to new Swedish banknotes and coins. They suggest that this spurred people and businesses to make a switch not to the new bills and coins but instead to electronic payment methods. Kenya In 2007, a company named Safaricom—Kenya's largest mobile phone network operator—introduced a "mobile money" service called M-Pesa ("M" stands for "mobile" and "pesa" is the Swahili word for money). Users of the service download a phone application and deposit cash with M-Pesa employees called "agents." They can then transfer money into any other M-Pesa account using their phone. Originally intended as a service for Kenyans who had moved to a city to earn money to send back home to rural areas, the service became tremendously popular as a general use payment system. By 2016, there were approximately 31.6 million mobile money accounts in Kenya, which had a total population of 47.6 million in 2017. Many observers identify the combination of lack of access to traditional banking services and the proliferation of mobile phones in Kenya as a driving factor for the expansion of M-Pesa and subsequent mobile money services. These observers argue that in Kenya, as with many developing and largely rural nations, both consumers and banks view financial and bank services as a business need of the rich. In 2006, before the introduction of M-Pesa, just 19% of Kenyans had bank accounts and there was 1.5 bank branches for every 100,000 people. However, 54% of Kenyans had their own mobile phone or access to one. Another explanation for the rise of mobile money is that Safaricom successfully identified a large, profitable, and previously untapped market in Kenya. Available mobile technology and its proliferation among the population meant low-cost money transfers could be profitably offered to lower-income consumers. Certain observers assert that the success of M-Pesa has caused Kenyan financial institutions to reevaluate their business models, shifting their focus to offering services to lower-income groups than they previously targeted, and cite the increase in bank accounts and the decline of the average account balances as evidence of this change. As a result, the portion of the Kenyan population with access to some type of formal financial services has grown from 27% in 2006 to 75% in 2017. Although mobile money appears to have filled a market need, the degree to which it has displaced cash should not be overstated. An official at Safaricom estimated in February 2018 that as many as 8 out of 10 transactions are still cash transactions, as Kenyans still reportedly prefer cash for small, in-person purchases because of convenience and using M-Pesa generally involves fees. In addition, workers are still generally paid in cash.	[ "Electronic forms of payment have become increasingly available, convenient, and cost efficient due to technological advances in digitization and data processing. Anecdotal reporting and certain analyses suggest that businesses and consumers are increasingly eschewing cash payments in favor of electronic payment methods. Such trends have led analysts and policymakers to examine the possibility that the use and acceptance of cash will significantly decline in coming years and to consider the effects of such an evolution. Cash is still a common and widely accepted payment system in the United States. Cash's advantages include its simplicity and robustness as a payment system that requires no ancillary technologies. In addition, it provides privacy in transactions and protection from cyber threats or financial institution failures. However, using cash involves costs to businesses and consumers who pay fees to obtain, manage, and protect cash and exposes its users to loss through misplacement, theft, or accidental destruction of physical currency. Cash also concurrently generates government revenues through \"profits\" earned by producing it and by acting as interest-free liabilities to the Federal Reserve (in contrast to reserve balances on which the Federal Reserve pays interest), while reducing government revenues by facilitating some tax avoidance. The relative advantages and costs of various payment methods will largely determine whether and to what degree electronic payment systems will displace cash. Traditional noncash payment systems (such as credit and debit cards and interbank clearing systems) involving intermediaries such as banks and central banks address some of the shortcomings of cash payments. These systems can execute payments over physical distance, allow businesses and consumers to avoid some of the costs and risks of using cash, and are run by generally trusted and closely regulated intermediaries. However, the maintenance and operation of legacy noncash systems involve their own costs, and the intermediaries charge fees to recoup those costs and earn profits. The time it takes to finalize certain transactions—including crediting customer accounts for check or electronic deposits—can lead to consumers incurring additional costs. In addition, these systems involve cybersecurity risks and generally require customers to divulge their private personal information to gain system access, which raises privacy concerns. To date, the migration away from cash has largely been in favor of traditional noncash payment systems; however, some observers predict new alternative systems will play a larger role in the future. Such alternative systems aim to address some of the inefficiencies and risks of traditional noncash systems, but face obstacles to achieving that aim and involve costs of their own. Private systems using distributed ledger technology, such as cryptocurrencies, may not serve the main functions of money well and face challenges to widespread acceptance and technological scalability. These systems also raise concerns among certain observers related to whether these systems could facilitate crime, provide inadequate protections to consumers, and may adversely affect governments' ability to implement or transmit monetary policy. The potential for increased payment efficiency from these systems is promising enough that certain central banks have investigated the possibility of issuing government-backed, electronic-only currencies—called central bank digital currencies (CBDCs)—in such a way that the benefits of certain alternative payment systems could be realized with appropriately mitigated risk. How CBDCs would be created and function are still matters of speculation at this time, and the possibility of their introduction raises questions about the appropriate role of a central bank in the financial system and the economy. If the relative benefits and costs of cash and the various other payment methods evolve in such a way that cash is significantly displaced as a commonly accepted form of payment, that evolution could have a number of effects, both positive and negative, on the economy and society. Proponents of reducing cash usage (or even eliminating it all together and becoming a cashless society) argue that doing so will generate important benefits, including potentially improved efficiency of the payment system, a reduction of crime, and less constrained monetary policy. Proponents of maintaining cash as a payment option argue that significant reductions in cash usage and acceptance would further marginalize people with limited access to the financial system, increase the financial system's vulnerability to cyberattack, and reduce personal privacy. Based on their assessment of the magnitude of these benefits and costs and the likelihood that market forces will displace cash as a payment system, policymakers may choose to encourage or discourage this trend." ]	9,601	gov_report	en	null	d83f991dcb7c0f3caf4d1f675d4c46e1345881cc66d25fff
The federal government, through the Department of Energy, operates four regional power marketing administrations (PMAs), created by statute: the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA), the Southeastern Power Administration (SEPA), the Southwestern Power Administration (SWPA), and the Western Area Power Administration (WAPA). Each PMA operates in a distinct geographic area of the coterminous United States (see Figure 1 ). Congressional interest in the PMAs has included diverse issues such as rate setting, cost and compliance associated with the Endangered Species Act (ESA; P.L. 93-205 ; 16 U.S.C. §§1531 et seq.), and questions of privatization of these federal agencies. In general, the PMAs came into being because of the government's need to dispose of electric power produced by federal dams constructed largely for irrigation, flood control, or other purposes, and to achieve small community and farm electrification—that is, providing service to customers whom it would not have been profitable for a private utility to serve. With minor exceptions, these agencies market the electric power produced by federal dams constructed, owned, and operated by the Corps of Engineers (Corps) and the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (BOR). PMAs must give preference to public utility districts and cooperatives (e.g., "preference customers"), selling their power at cost-based rates set at the lowest possible rate consistent with sound business principles. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) regulates PMA rates to ensure that they are set high enough to repay the U.S. Treasury on schedule for the portion of federal facility costs that have been allocated to hydropower beneficiaries. Since FY2011, power revenues associated with the PMAs have been classified as discretionary offsetting receipts (i.e., receipts that are available for spending by the PMAs), thus the agencies are sometimes noted as having a "net-zero" spending authority. Only the capital expenses of WAPA and SWPA require appropriations from Congress. Each PMA also has unique elements and regional issues that affect its business. They are discussed in alphabetical order. Created by the Bonneville Project Act of 1937 (16 U.S.C. §832) just before the completion of two large dams in the Pacific Northwest—Bonneville Dam in 1938 and Grand Coulee Dam in 1941—BPA was the first PMA. Though it serves a smaller geographical area, BPA is on par with WAPA (which serves the largest area) in the size of its transmission system. The agency operates and maintains about 75% of the high voltage transmission lines in its service territory, which includes Idaho, Oregon, Washington, western Montana and small parts of eastern Montana, California, Nevada, Utah, and Wyoming. BPA also markets wholesale electricity from 31 federally owned hydropower facilities in the Northwest. These generation facilities are owned both by the Corps and BOR. BPA differs from the other three PMAs in that it is self-financed: it receives no federal appropriations. Since passage of the Federal Columbia River Transmission System Act of 1974 (16 U.S.C. §838), BPA has covered its operating costs through power rates set to ensure repayment to the Treasury of capital and interest on funds used to construct the Columbia River power system. BPA also has permanent Treasury borrowing authority, which it may use for capital on large projects. This money is repaid with interest, through power sales. As of 2018, BPA had $5.53 billion of bonds outstanding to the U.S. Treasury, with BPA's current borrowing authority capped by Congress at $7.70 billion. BPA has also looked at other financing options as it approaches its debt limit, looking at nonfederal debt refinancing, lease-purchases, and other asset management strategies. BPA has initiated strategies and a financial plan to address a changing power generation and demand market, as it endeavors to meet its mandate for cost-based electric power rates. These plans are outlined in its Strategic Plan for 2018 to 2023, and address goals from financial health to infrastructure modernization. Wholesale power prices in the United States are generally trending downward, while BPA's firm power rates have trended upward. BPA repays its funding from the U.S. Treasury largely through electricity sales to customers. While BPA generates its electricity from hydropower (which is traditionally one of the lower-cost means of power generation), increasing amounts of renewable electricity from growing wind and solar capacity installations in the Pacific Northwest are challenging BPA's price competitiveness, and perhaps its ability to repay its debts in a timely manner. In 2014, BPA entered into the Regional Cooperation Agreement (RCA) with the State of Washington to address the debt of Energy Northwest, a "joint action agency formed by the Washington state legislature in 1957" to manage public power utility costs. Energy Northwest owns and operates four electric power generation facilities: White Bluffs Solar Station, Packwood Lake Hydroelectric Project, Nine Canyon Wind Project, and the Columbia Generating Station. The Regional Cooperation debt is "the issuance of new bonds by Energy Northwest to refund outstanding bonds shortly before their maturities when substantial principal repayments were and are due." According to BPA, this allows for "integrated debt management" for the combined total debt portfolios of BPA and Energy Northwest, with a net effect reducing the "weighted average interest rate and the maturity of BPA's overall debt portfolio" over the life of the program. This refinancing, according to BPA, has enabled BPA to prepay higher-interest-rate federal obligations, and has "preserved or restored U.S. Treasury borrowing authority." However, the debt service of the RCA is "borne by BPA ratepayers through BPA rates." BPA estimates that the "aggregate potential principal amount" of RCA refunding through bonds issued in fiscal years 2019 through 2030 could exceed $4.0 billion. BPA is responsible for maintaining and modernizing the generation and transmission infrastructure of its systems, and preserving and enhancing its physical and cybersecurity. With energy and capacity markets changing in the western United States (especially with the growing need to integrate increasing amounts of variable renewable sources), and the development of the Energy Imbalance Market (EIM) in the West, BPA is considering whether to join the EIM, and how this might affect its operations and customers. Environmental, fishing, and tribal advocates have sued the federal government over concerns that operating rules for hydropower dams on the Columbia and Snake Rivers (i.e., operations consistent with the National Marine Fisheries Service Biological Opinion) are inadequate to ensure survival of species threatened or endangered under the Endangered Species Act. In addition, several environmental groups filed a lawsuit blaming the dams for warm river waters in summer 2015 that resulted in the deaths of about 250,000 adult sockeye salmon migrating up the Columbia and Snake Rivers. Some of these parties have sought to remove the four lower dams on the Snake River to ensure survival of some salmon and steelhead species. In 2016, a federal judge overturned a previous management plan for the dams, finding that it would not be sufficient to protect salmon runs, and ordered a new management plan that could include removing the dams. However, in 2018, President Trump issued a Presidential Memorandum accelerating the process for a new management plan, requiring the biological opinion to be ready by 2020. The memorandum ordered the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Commerce "to appropriately suspend, revise, or rescind any regulations or procedures that unduly burden" water infrastructure projects so they "are better able to meet the demands of their authorized purposes." How this will affect the fish endangerment finding is unclear at this time. The Southeastern Power Administration was created in 1950 by the Secretary of the Interior to carry out the functions assigned to the Secretary by the Flood Control Act of 1944 (P.L. 78-534) in 11 states (Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia). SEPA is unique among the four PMAs in two ways. It is the smallest PMA, with just over 40 employees, and, unlike the other three agencies, SEPA does not operate or maintain any transmission facilities, and thus contracts with other utilities for transmitting the federal power it markets to more than 12 million consumers. Southeastern markets approximately 3,400 MW of power produced at 22 multipurpose water projects, operated and maintained by the Corps. SEPA's facilities are aging; for instance, in 2018 it reported that its Cumberland System customers have agreed to fund $1.2 billion of planned rehabilitations of the nine hydroelectric facilities in the Corps' Nashville District. According to SEPA, it has an overcapacity issue. Projections for electricity load growth (in consultation with its preference customers) made before the 2008 economic downturn reportedly led to SEPA acquiring additional capacity it currently does not use. As a result, municipalities and electric cooperatives in SEPA's service area will have to make economic decisions regarding how to handle this excess capacity. As of 2018, at least one preference customer has terminated its contract with SEPA due to this issue. Section 5 of the Flood Control Act of 1944 (P.L. 78-534) established the Southwestern Power Administration. SWPA markets hydroelectric power in Arkansas, Kansas, Louisiana, Missouri, Oklahoma, and Texas from 24 multipurpose Corps dams with a combined capacity of 2,194 MW. SWPA serves more than 100 preference customer utilities with more than 8 million end-use customers. The agency manages nearly 1,400 miles of high-voltage transmission lines. SWPA is the only U.S. electrical balancing area supported solely by hydroelectric generation, and its use of the reservoirs and river systems within the SWPA marketing area must be balanced with flood control and other required uses so that the power needs of its customers can be met. SWPA states that it uses alternative financing and offsetting collection authorities to fund expenses and purchase power to help SWPA meet its obligations while minimizing congressional appropriations. Periodically, SWPA has been challenged by low water conditions. It has a rain-based water supply—rather than one that is snow-based, like the mountain snowpack water supply of WAPA and BPA—and sells power from a comparatively small reservoir system which stores that water. Extended dry periods sometimes mean that SWPA must purchase replacement power and energy to meet its contractual obligations. This means that SWPA requires congressional authority to use its revenues from power sales over the long term—across high and low water years. Prior year balances have been available to Southwestern so that we are financially prepared and able to achieve rate stability for our customers. This authority is critical to operating our program according to sound business principles. Southwestern's program is funded by authority to use receipts, alternative financing, and other authorities approved by Congress, including appropriations, which represent only 6.5% of Southwestern's total program. Created by the Department of Energy Organization Act of 1977 ( P.L. 95-91 ), WAPA is the newest and largest of the PMAs in terms of service area. WAPA's service area covers 1.3 million square miles, and its power—transmitted by a high voltage grid over 17,000 miles long—serves customers in 15 western states. WAPA markets and transmits hydropower from 56 federal dams operated by BOR, and the Corps. It also sells hydropower power produced by facilities administered by the International Boundary and Water Commission, and markets the United States' 24.3% share (547 megawatts) of the coal-fired Navajo Generating Station in Arizona. In addition to the types of public bodies traditionally served as preference customers by the other PMAs, WAPA has developed a policy to give preference to Native American tribes regardless of their utility status. WAPA has been working with other regional entities to address the changing electric power needs of its customers. In 2014, WAPA published its Strategic Roadmap 2024, titled "Powering the Energy Frontier." The document is intended to serve as WAPA's strategic plan to guide the agency's actions for the next 10 years. However, according to some, the developing Energy Imbalance Market in the West may provide additional options for WAPA to address transmission development needs to balance regional generation and demand. An issue of continuing importance to WAPA is its role in relieving transmission congestion within its marketing area. There are a number of constrained transmission paths in the West whose limited capacity to transfer power may reduce the ability of utilities to serve electric loads on a seasonal or ongoing basis. In 2009, Section 402 of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act ( P.L. 111-5 ) amended the Hoover Power Plant Act of 1984 to give WAPA authority to borrow up to $3.25 billion from the U.S. Treasury to pursue transmission projects that integrate renewable generation sources into the electric transmission grid. The law provides authority to construct and upgrade transmission lines to help deliver renewable resources to market. Western created the Transmission Infrastructure Program, also known as TIP, to implement this new initiative. Several transmission projects have been initiated under the program. Previous budget proposals and legislation have proposed repealing WAPA's loan authority, but to date, none of these proposals have been enacted. In 2015, WAPA's Upper Great Plains (UGP) region joined the Southwest Power Pool (SPP), a Regional Transmission Organization (RTO). Under the operating agreement with SPP, WAPA was required to transfer functional control of UGP's eligible transmission facilities to SPP. WAPA is the first PMA to formally join an RTO, and states that benefits to date from joining SPP have significantly exceeded the original estimate of $11.5 million per year. WAPA reports that two of its other regions are considering joining SPP. For Water Year 2017, WAPA reported that it delivered 26,148 gigawatt-hours of hydroelectric power to its customers, which is 101% of average annual power sales. The West has been experiencing periodic droughts for a number of years, resulting in lower snowmelts and less water in storage and available for power generation. To help smooth the resulting annual differences, a "drought-adder" reduction program has been implemented in recent years. A drought-adder charge was levied to help repay deferred drought costs accrued during the 2000s in the Rocky Mountain and Upper Great Plains regions. The balance was paid a year ahead of schedule and, as of this year, has resulted in $40 million annual savings for more than 50 percent of WAPA's customers in Colorado, Wyoming, Montana, Kansas, Nebraska, the Dakotas and the western sections of Minnesota and Iowa. This is the second year that 417 of WAPA's customers, out of 700, have had a rate reduction. The drought-adder component of the rate remains available to WAPA to adjust to the variable hydropower resource—a lasting risk if drought conditions persist in WAPA's territory. Moderate to extreme drought conditions have been reported in parts of the western United States. In addition to issues specific to individual PMAs, some recent proposals have applied to multiple PMAs. In 2018, the Trump Administration proposed to sell the transmission assets owned and operated by the federal Power Marketing Administrations. The proposal suggested that "eliminating or reducing" the federal government's role in owning and operating transmission assets and increasing the private sector role would "encourage a more efficient allocation of economic resources and mitigate unnecessary risk to taxpayers." The proposal calls for federal transmission infrastructure assets (lines, towers, substations, and/or rights of way) to be sold, with the private sector and/or state and local entities potentially taking over the transmission functions now provided by the PMAs. The Federal entities that would result after such sales could contract with other utilities to provide transmission service for the delivery of Federal power just as the Southeastern Power Administration, which does not own transmission lines, already does. The proposal reports that according to the Administration's FY2019 budget justification, the sale of federal transmission assets would result in a net budgetary savings of $9.5 billion, in total, over a 10-year window. Reportedly, the Administration dropped the plan due to stakeholder opposition, with the Department of Energy stating that such a sale of PMA transmission assets would not proceed unless directed by Congress. Proposals to sell all or part of the PMAs are not new, and have been made in some form by almost every President since Reagan. However, Congress has sought to prevent executive branch alterations of PMA structures and authority. Under Section 208 of the Urgent Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1986 ( P.L. 99-349 ), the executive branch is prohibited from spending funds to study or draft proposals to transfer from federal control any portion of the assets of the PMAs unless specifically authorized by Congress. The Trump Administration divestment proposal could have had an indirect impact on the original congressional intent for the PMAs to provide electricity at the lowest possible cost. This in turn could require changes to the following provisions: Flood Control Act of 1944, as amended (FCA; 16 U.S.C. §825s et seq. ); The 1937 Bonneville Project Act (BPA; 16 U.S.C. §832c ); and The Reclamation Project Act of 1939 (RPA; 43 U.S.C. §485h(c)) . These laws also stipulate a preference of public bodies for the sale of federal power. Selling federally owned transmission assets could potentially affect the "lowest possible" rates of sale, and the statutory preference for publicly or cooperatively owned utilities to be the vehicle for sale of electric power produced by federal facilities.	[ "The federal government, through the Department of Energy, operates four regional power marketing administrations (PMAs), created by statute: the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA), the Southeastern Power Administration (SEPA), the Southwestern Power Administration (SWPA), and the Western Area Power Administration (WAPA). Each PMA operates in a distinct geographic area. Congressional interest in the PMAs has included diverse issues such as rate setting, cost and compliance associated with the Endangered Species Act (ESA; P.L. 93-205; 16 U.S.C. §§1531 et seq.), and questions of privatization of these federal agencies. In general, the PMAs came into being because of the government's need to dispose of electric power produced by dams constructed largely for irrigation, flood control, or other purposes, and to achieve small community and farm electrification—that is, providing service to customers whom it would not have been profitable for a private utility to serve. With minor exceptions, these agencies market the electric power produced by federal dams constructed, owned, and operated by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) and the Bureau of Reclamation (BOR). By statute, PMAs must give preference to public utility districts and cooperatives (e.g., \"preference customers\"), and sell their power at cost-based rates set at the lowest possible rate consistent with sound business principles. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission regulates PMA rates to ensure that they are set high enough to repay the U.S. Treasury for the portion of federal facility costs allocated to hydropower beneficiaries. With energy and capacity markets changing in the western United States (especially with the growing need to integrate increasing amounts of variable renewable sources), and the development of the Energy Imbalance Market in the West, BPA and WAPA may have to adapt their plans with regard to generation needs and how transmission systems are developed. In 2018, the Trump Administration proposed to sell the transmission assets (lines, towers, substations, and/or rights of way) owned and operated by the federal Power Marketing Administrations. The proposal suggested that \"eliminating or reducing\" the federal government's role in owning and operating transmission assets, and increasing the private sector's role, would \"encourage a more efficient allocation of economic resources and mitigate unnecessary risk to taxpayers.\" The resulting PMA entities would then contract with other utilities to provide transmission services for the delivery of federal power, similar to what SEPA does currently. Reportedly, the proposed sale of PMA assets was dropped after opposition to the plan emerged from stakeholders. Under Section 208 of the Urgent Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1986 (P.L. 99-349), the executive branch is prohibited from spending funds to study or draft proposals to transfer from federal control any portion of the assets of the PMAs unless specifically authorized by Congress. Environmental, fishing, and tribal advocates have sued the federal government over concerns that operating rules for hydropower dams on the Columbia and Snake Rivers (i.e., the National Marine Fisheries Service Biological Opinion) are inadequate to ensure survival of species threatened or endangered under the ESA. In 2016, a federal judge overturned a previous management plan for the dams, finding that it would not be sufficient to protect salmon runs, and ordered a new management plan that could include removing the dams. However, in 2018, President Trump issued a Presidential Memorandum accelerating the process for a new management plan, requiring the biological opinion to be ready by 2020. Since FY2011, power revenues associated with the PMAs have been classified as discretionary offsetting receipts (i.e., receipts that are available for spending by the PMAs), thus the agencies are sometimes noted as having a \"net-zero\" spending authority. Only the capital expenses of WAPA and SWPA require appropriations from Congress." ]	2,817	gov_report	en	null	a03f4200caaa4d88820dbb93f6ef152c78cd7b28e3fcdb7e
The minority leader of the modern House is the head of the "loyal opposition." As the minority party's nominee for Speaker at the start of a new Congress, the minority leader traditionally hands the gavel to the Speaker-elect, who is usually elected on a straight party-line vote. The speakership election illustrates the main problem that confronts the minority leader: the subordinate status of the minority party in an institution noted for majority rule. As David Bonior, D-MI, explained: "This body, unlike the other, operates under the principle that a determined majority should be allowed to work its will while protecting the rights of the minority to be heard." Minority party lawmakers are certain to be heard, but whether they will be heeded is sometimes another matter. Thus, the uppermost goal of any minority leader is to recapture majority control of the House. The minority leader is elected every two years by secret ballot of his or her party caucus or conference. These party leaders are typically experienced lawmakers when they win election to this position. The current minority leader, Kevin McCarthy, R-CA, served 12 years in the House, including as majority leader, prior to assuming his current role (a position he also held during his time in the California state assembly). Speaker Nancy Pelosi, D-CA, served in the House for 16 years when she first became minority leader in the 108 th Congress (2003-2004). Following her first tenure as Speaker from 2007 to 2010, Pelosi was again elected minority leader in the 112 th Congress (2011-2012), at which point she was a 24-year veteran of the House. When her predecessor, John Boehner, R-OH, was elected minority leader in the 110 th Congress (2007-2008), he had served in the House for 18 years including as majority leader, committee chair (Education and the Workforce), and, prior to that, chair of the Republican Conference. Richard Gephardt, D-MO, began his tenure as minority leader in the 104 th Congress (1995-1996) as an 18-year House veteran and a former majority leader and chair of the Democratic Caucus. Gephardt's predecessor, Robert Michel, R-IL, became minority leader in 1981 after 24 years in the House. Much like his successors, John Rhodes, R-AZ, had served in the House for 20 years when he was elected minority leader in 1973. While the position itself is usually occupied by Members with significant House experience, the roles and responsibilities of the minority leader are not well-defined. To a large extent, the duties of the minority leader are based on tradition and custom. Representative Bertrand Snell, R-NY, minority leader from 1931 to 1938, described the position in the following way: He is spokesman for his party and enunciates its policies. He is required to be alert and vigilant in defense of the minority's rights. It is his function and duty to criticize constructively the policies and programs of the majority, and to this end employ parliamentary tactics and give close attention to all proposed legislation. Since Snell's description, other responsibilities have been added to the job. Broadly speaking, the role of the minority leader in the contemporary Congress is twofold: to serve as the leader and spokesperson for the minority party, and to participate in certain institutional prerogatives afforded to Members in the minority. How the minority leader handles these responsibilities is likely to depend on a variety of elements, including personality and contextual factors; the size and cohesion of the minority party; whether or not the party controls the White House; the general political climate both inside and outside the House; and expectations of the party's performance in upcoming elections. The next section of the report discusses the historical origin of this position, and the sections that follow take account of the various party and institutional responsibilities of the minority leader. To a large extent, the position of minority leader is a late-19 th -century innovation. Prior to this time congressional parties were often relatively disorganized, so it was not always evident who functioned as the opposition floor leader. Decades went by before anything like our modern two-party congressional system emerged on Capitol Hill with official titles for those who were selected as party leaders. However, from the beginning days of Congress, various House Members intermittently assumed the role of "opposition leader." Some scholars suggest that Representative James Madison of Virginia informally functioned as the first "minority leader" because in the First Congress he led the opposition to Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton's fiscal policies. During this early period, it was common for neither major party grouping (Federalists and Republicans) to have an official leader. In 1813, for instance, a scholar recounts that the Federalist minority of 36 Members needed a committee of 13 "to represent a party comprising a distinct minority" and "to coordinate the actions of men who were already partisans in the same cause." In 1828, a foreign observer of the House offered this perspective on the absence of formal party leadership on Capitol Hill: I found there were absolutely no persons holding the stations of what are called, in England, Leaders, on either side of the House.... It is true, that certain members do take charge of administration questions, and certain others of opposition questions; but all this so obviously without concert among themselves, actual or tacit, that nothing can be conceived less systematic or more completely desultory, disjointed. Internal party disunity compounded the difficulty of identifying lawmakers who might have informally functioned as a minority leader. For instance, "seven of the fourteen speakership elections from 1834 through 1859 had at least twenty different candidates in the field. Thirty-six competed in 1839, ninety-seven in 1849, ninety-one in 1859, and 138 in 1855." With so many candidates competing for the speakership, it is not at all clear that one of the defeated lawmakers then assumed the mantle of "minority leader." The Democratic minority from 1861 to 1875 was so completely disorganized that they did not "nominate a candidate for Speaker in two of these seven Congresses and nominated no man more than once in the other five. The defeated candidates were not automatically looked to for leadership." In the judgment of one congressional scholar, since 1883 "the candidate for Speaker nominated by the minority party has clearly been the Minority Leader." However, this assertion is subject to dispute. On December 3, 1883, the House elected Democrat John G. Carlisle of Kentucky as Speaker. Republicans nominated J. Warren Keifer of Ohio, who was Speaker the previous Congress. But Keifer was viewed by his colleagues as a discredited leader in part because as Speaker he arbitrarily handed out "choice jobs to close relatives ... all at handsome salaries." Keifer received "the empty honor of the minority nomination. But with it came a sting—for while this naturally involves the floor leadership, he was deserted by his [party] associates and his career as a national figure terminated ingloriously." Representative Thomas Reed, R-ME, who later became Speaker, assumed the de facto role of minority floor leader in Keifer's stead. "[A]lthough Keifer was the minority's candidate for Speaker, Reed became its acknowledged leader, and ever after, so long as he served in the House, remained the most conspicuous member of his party." Although congressional historians disagree as to the exact time period when the minority leadership emerged officially as a party position, it seems safe to conclude that the position was established during the latter part of the 19 th century. This era was "marked by strong partisan attachments, resilient patronage-based party organizations, and ... high levels of party voting in Congress." These conditions were conducive to the establishment of a more highly differentiated House leadership structure in which Members assumed more specialized roles within the institution. (See the Appendix for a list of House minority leaders selected since 1899.) One other historical point merits brief mention. Until the 61 st Congress (1909-1910), "it was the custom to have the minority leader also serve as the ranking minority member on the two most powerful committees, Rules and Ways and Means." Today, the minority leader no longer serves on these committees but does chair the Republican Steering Committee, a party leadership committee responsible for making recommendations to the Conference regarding the committee assignments of House Republicans. The minority leader has a number of formal and informal party responsibilities. Formally, the rules of each party specify certain roles and responsibilities for their leader. For example, under Republican Conference rules for the 116 th Congress (2019-2020), the minority leader nominates party members to the Committees on Rules and House Administration, subject to Conference approval. Republican Conference rules also authorize the minority leader to appoint a "Leadership Member" to the Committee on the Budget who "will serve as the second highest-ranking Republican on the committee," and to "recommend to the House all Republican Members of such joint, select, and ad hoc committees as shall be created by the House, in accordance with law." Beyond their formal responsibilities, minority leaders are expected to handle a wide range of informal party assignments. Lewis Deschler, a former House Parliamentarian (1928-1974), summarized the diverse duties of a party's floor leader: A party's floor leader, in conjunction with other party leaders, plays an influential role in the formulation of party policy and programs. He is instrumental in guiding legislation favored by his party through the House, or in resisting those programs of the other party that are considered undesirable by his own party. He is instrumental in devising and implementing his party's strategy on the floor with respect to promoting or opposing legislation. He is kept constantly informed as to the status of legislative business and as to the sentiment of his party respecting particular legislation under consideration. Such information is derived in part from the floor leader's contacts with his party's members serving on House committees, and with the members of the party's whip organization. These and several other party roles merit further discussion because they influence significantly the minority leader's overarching objective: to retake majority control of the House. "I want to get [my] members elected and win more seats," said former Minority Leader Richard Gephardt, D-MO. "That's what [my party colleagues] want to do, and that's what they want me to do." Five activities illustrate how minority leaders seek to accomplish this primary goal. Minority leaders are typically energetic and aggressive campaigners for party incumbents and challengers. For example, they assist in recruiting qualified and competitive candidates; they establish "leadership PACs" to raise and distribute funds to House candidates of their party; they encourage party colleagues not to retire or run for other offices so as to limit the number of open seats the party would need to defend; they coordinate their campaign activities with congressional and national party campaign committees; they encourage outside groups to back their candidates; they travel around the country to speak on behalf of party candidates; and they encourage incumbent colleagues to make significant financial contributions to the party's campaign committee. In the weeks leading up to the 2018 congressional elections, for instance, Minority Leader Pelosi was actively campaigning for Democratic incumbents and challengers: With 21 days until the midterm elections, the California Democrat and House minority leader is crisscrossing the country fundraising and rallying the Democratic troops—and plotting her return to the speakership.... In the third quarter [of 2018], Pelosi will report raising $34.2 million for Democrats, including $30.5 million for the DCCC [Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee]. She is by far the biggest source of cash for House Democrats and House Democratic candidates. The minority leader, in consultation with other party colleagues, has a range of strategic options that can be employed to advance minority party objectives. The options selected depend on a wide range of circumstances, such as the visibility or significance of the issue and the relative degree of cohesion within the majority and minority parties. For instance, a majority party riven by internal dissension—as occurred during the early 1900s when "progressive" and "regular" Republicans were at loggerheads, or beginning in the late 1930s when a "conservative coalition" of Southern Democrats and like-minded Republicans emerged—may provide the minority leader with greater opportunities to achieve party priorities than if the majority party exhibited high degrees of party cohesion (and could simply outvote the minority). Among the variable strategies available to the minority party, which can vary from bill to bill and be used in combination or at different stages of the lawmaking process, are the following: Cooperation . The minority party supports and cooperates with the majority party in building winning coalitions on the floor. Inconsequential Opposition . The minority party offers opposition, but it is of marginal significance, typically because the minority is so small. Withdrawal . The minority party chooses not to take a position on an issue, perhaps because of intraparty divisions or to spotlight divisions within the majority party. Innovation . The minority party develops alternatives and agendas of its own and attempts to construct winning coalitions on their behalf. Partisan Opposition . The minority party offers strong opposition to majority party initiatives, but does not counter with policy alternatives of their own. Participation . The minority party is in the position of having to consider the views and proposals of a same-party President and to assess their majority-building role with respect to the President's priorities. A look at one minority leadership strategy—partisan opposition—may suggest why it might be employed in specific circumstances. The purposes of obstruction are several, such as frustrating the majority party's ability to govern or attracting media attention to the alleged ineffectiveness of the majority party. "We know how to delay," remarked Minority Leader Gephardt. Dilatory motions to adjourn, appeals of the presiding officer's ruling, or numerous requests for roll call votes, including on noncontroversial items like approving the House Jou rnal , are standard time-consuming parliamentary tactics. By stalling action on the majority party's agenda, the minority leader may be able to launch a campaign against a "do-nothing Congress" and convince enough voters to elevate the party to the House majority. To be sure, the minority leader recognizes that outright opposition carries risks. As a congressional scholar explains, "A program of consistent opposition to majority party proposals and a refusal to engage in compromise, while electorally valuable, means forsaking policy gains that may otherwise have been achieved." Another important aim of the minority leader is to develop an electorally attractive agenda of ideas and proposals that unites party members and appeals to core electoral supporters as well as independents and swing voters. Despite the minority leader's limited ability to set the House's agenda, there are still opportunities to raise minority priorities. For example, the minority leader may file discharge petitions in an effort to bring minority priorities to the floor. If the required 218 signatures on a discharge petition can be obtained—a number that demands at least some support from the majority—minority initiatives can be brought to the floor even despite opposition from the majority leadership or the committee(s) of jurisdiction (or both). As a GOP minority leader explained, the challenge here is to "keep our people together, and to look for votes on the other side." Minority leaders may engage in a range of activities to publicize their party's priorities and to criticize those of the opposition. For instance, to keep their party colleagues "on message," they ensure that their party colleagues are sent packets of suggested press releases or "talking points" for constituent meetings in their districts; they help to organize "town hall meetings" in Members' districts around the country to publicize the party's agenda or a specific priority, such as health care or tax reform; they sponsor party "retreats" to discuss issues and assess the party's public image; they create "theme teams" to craft party messages that might be conveyed during the one-minute, morning hour, or special order period in the House; they conduct surveys of party colleagues to discern their policy preferences; they establish websites and Twitter feeds to highlight party priorities; they organize task forces or issue teams to formulate party programs and to develop strategies for communicating these programs to the public; and they appear on various media programs or write newspaper articles to win public support for the party's agenda. House minority leaders also hold joint news conferences with party colleagues and consult with their counterparts in the Senate. The overall objectives are to develop a coordinated communications strategy, to share ideas and information, and to present a united front on issues. Minority leaders also make floor speeches and may close debate for their side on major issues before the House. They must also be prepared "to debate on the floor, ad lib , no notes, on a moment's notice," remarked Minority Leader Michel. In brief, minority leaders are key strategists in developing and promoting the party's agenda and in outlining ways to respond to the opposition's arguments and proposals. A "Dear Colleague" letter delivered to House Democratic offices ahead of the August 2018 recess illustrates the point. In the letter, Minority Leader Pelosi outlined the party's agenda and provided this guidance to her Democratic colleagues: A key part of our For The People agenda is to clean up corruption to make Washington work for the American people.... To honor the pledge of our For The People agenda, a Democratic majority will swiftly act to pass tougher ethics and campaign finance laws and crack down on the conduct that has poisoned the GOP Congress and the Trump Administration.... In district events and on social media, we must drive home the clear contrast between the corruption of the GOP Congress and the better deal that Democrats are offering the American people. We will own August with strength, confidence and clarity, as we make our case to the American people. If his or her party controls the White House, the minority leader confers regularly with the President and his aides about issues before Congress, the Administration's agenda, and political events generally. Strategically, the role of the minority leader will vary depending on whether the President is of the same party or the other party. In general, minority leaders will work to advance the goals and aspirations of their party's President in Congress. When Robert Michel, R-IL, was minority leader (1981-1994), he typically functioned as the "point man" for Republican Presidents. President Ronald Reagan's 1981 policy successes in the Democratic-controlled House were due in no small measure to Minority Leader Michel's effectiveness in wooing so-called "Reagan Democrats" to support, for instance, the Administration's landmark budget reconciliation bill. There are occasions, of course, when minority leaders will fault the legislative initiatives of their President. On an Administration proposal that could adversely affect his district, Michel stated that he might "abdicate my leadership role [on this issue] since I can't harmonize my own views with the administration's." Minority Leader Gephardt publicly opposed a number of President Clinton's legislative initiatives, from "fast track" trade authority to various budget issues, and Minority Leader Pelosi came out against a multilateral trade agreement with Asian-Pacific countries negotiated by the Obama White House. When the President and House majority are of the same party, then the House minority leader assumes a larger role in formulating alternatives to executive branch initiatives and in acting as a national spokesperson for his or her party. "As Minority Leader during [President Lyndon Johnson's] Democratic administration, my responsibility has been to propose Republican alternatives," said Minority Leader Gerald Ford, R-MI. Greatly outnumbered in the House, Minority Leader Ford devised a political strategy that allowed Republicans to offer their alternatives in a manner that provided them political protection. As Ford explained, We used a technique of laying our program out in general debate. When we got to the amendment phase, we would offer our program as a substitute for the Johnson proposal. If we lost in the Committee of the Whole, then we would usually offer it as a motion to recommit and get a vote on that. And if we lost on the motion to recommit, our Republican members had a choice: They could vote against the Johnson program and say we did our best to come up with a better alternative. Or they could vote for it and make the same argument. Usually we lost; but when you're only 140 out of 435, you don't expect to win many. Ford also teamed with Senate Minority Leader Everett McKinley Dirksen, R-IL, to act as national spokesmen for their party. They held a press conference every Thursday following the weekly joint leadership meeting, a tradition that began with Ford's predecessor as minority leader, Charles Halleck, R-IN. When Minority Leaders Dirksen and Halleck appeared together they were dubbed the "Ev and Charlie Show" by the press, and the "Republican National Committee budgeted $30,000 annually to produce the weekly news conference." Minority status, by itself, is often an important inducement for minority party members to stay together, to accommodate different interests, and to submerge intraparty factional disagreements. To hold a diverse membership together often requires extensive consultations and discussions with rank-and-file Members and with different factional groupings. As Minority Leader Gephardt said, We have weekly caucus meetings. We have daily leadership meetings. We have weekly ranking Member meetings. We have party effectiveness meetings. There's a lot more communication. I believe leadership is bottom up, not top down. I think you have to build policy and strategy and vision from the bottom up, and involve people in figuring out what that is. Gephardt added that "inclusion and empowerment of the people on the line have to be done to get the best performance" from the minority party. Other techniques for fostering party harmony include the appointment of task forces composed of party colleagues with conflicting views to reach consensus on issues; daily meetings in the l eader's office (or at breakfast, lunch, or dinner) to lay out floor strategy or political objectives for the minority party; periodic retreats to allow party members to discuss issues and interact with one another outside the confines of Capitol Hill; and the creation of new leadership positions as a way to reach out and involve a greater diversity of party members in the leadership structure. Beyond the party responsibilities of the minority leader are a number of institutional obligations associated with their position as a top House official. Many of these assignments or roles are spelled out in the standing rules of the House, while others have devolved upon the position in other ways. To be sure, the minority leader is provided with extra staff resources—beyond those accorded him or her as a Representative—to assist in carrying out diverse leadership functions. There are limits on the institutional role of the minority leader, because the majority party exercises disproportionate influence over the legislative agenda, partisan ratios on committees, staff resources, administrative operations, and the day-to-day schedule and management of floor activities. Under the rules of the House, the minority leader has certain roles and responsibilities. They include, among others, the following: Under Rule XIII, clause 6(c), the Rules Committee may not issue a "rule" that prevents the minority leader or a designee from offering a motion to recommit with instructions during initial House consideration of a bill or joint resolution. This motion allows the minority leader (or a designee) to offer a policy alternative to what the majority is proposing and obtain a floor vote on the minority's preferred solution. Under Rule IX, clause 2, a resolution "offered as a question of privilege by the Majority Leader or the Minority Leader ... shall have precedence of all other questions except motions to adjourn." This rule further references the minority leader with respect to the division of time for debate of these resolutions. If offered by the majority or minority leader, a valid question of privilege—one that involves "the rights of the House collectively, its safety, dignity and the integrity of its proceedings"—receives immediate consideration by the House. Rule II, clause 6, states that the "Inspector General shall be appointed for a Congress by the Speaker, the Majority Leader, and the Minority Leader, acting jointly." This rule further states that the minority leader and other specified House leaders shall be notified of any financial irregularity involving the House and receive audit reports of the inspector general. Under Rule X, clause 2, not later "than March 31 in the first session of a Congress, after consultation with the Speaker, the Majority Leader, and the Minority Leader, the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform shall report to the House the authorization and oversight plans" of the standing committees along with any recommendations it or the House leaders have proposed to ensure the effective coordination of committees' oversight plans. Rule X, clause 5, stipulates, "At the beginning of a Congress, the Speaker or a designee and the Minority Leader or a designee each shall name 10 Members, Delegates, or the Resident Commissioner from the respective party of such individual who are not members of the Committee on Ethics to be available to serve on investigative subcommittees of that committee during that Congress." Another institutional prerogative of the minority leader is attendance at meetings of the Intelligence Committee. Rule X, clause 11, provides, "The Speaker and the Minority Leader shall be ex officio members of the select committee but shall have no vote in the select committee and may not be counted for purposes of determining a quorum thereof." In addition, each leader "may designate a respective leadership staff member to assist in the capacity of the Speaker or Minority Leader as ex officio member." In addition, the minority leader has a number of other institutional functions. For instance, the minority leader is sometimes statutorily authorized to appoint individuals to certain federal entities. The minority leader also selects three Members to serve as Private Calendar objectors—the majority leader names the other three—and serves on various commissions and groups, including the House Office Building Commission, the United States Capitol Preservation Commission, and the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group. After consultation with the Speaker the minority leader may convene an early organizational party caucus or conference. Informally, the minority leader maintains ties with majority party leaders to learn about the schedule and other House matters, consults with the majority with respect to reconvening the House per the usual formulation of conditional concurrent adjournment resolutions, and forges agreements or understandings with them insofar as feasible. By House tradition, time is not charged to their side when party leaders, including the minority leader, make extended remarks on the floor. Given the concentration of agenda control and other institutional resources in the majority leadership, the minority leader faces real challenges in promoting and publicizing the party's priorities, serving the interests of his rank-and-file Members, managing intraparty conflict, and forging party unity. The ultimate goal of the minority leader is to lead the party into majority status. Yet there is no set formula on how this is to be done. "If the history of elections is any guide," wrote a congressional scholar, "it seems apparent that the congressional record of the minority party is only one of many factors that may result in majority status. Most of the other factors cannot be controlled by the minority party and its leaders ." There is one central dilemma that confronts the minority leader: inferior numbers. This limitation can be overcome on occasion with the right strategic approach, but on many issues this might not be possible. One study of the House minority party summarizes the strategic challenge succinctly: The minority party in the House faces a strategic problem: how do you respond when given only a small slice of the legislative pie? Do you accept the slice you've been given, bargain for more, or use every means at your disposal to win the right to cut the pie yourself? It is this problem, and how the minority party chooses to solve it, that underlies the logic of minority party politics in the House of Representatives.	[ "The House minority leader, the head of the \"loyal opposition,\" is elected every two years by secret ballot of his or her party caucus or conference. The minority leader occupies a number of important institutional and party roles and responsibilities, and his or her fundamental goal is to recapture majority control of the House. From a party perspective, the minority leader has a wide range of assignments, all geared toward retaking majority control of the House. Five principal party activities direct the work of the minority leader. First, he or she provides campaign assistance to party incumbents and challengers. Second, the minority leader devises strategies, in consultation with like-minded colleagues, to advance party objectives. Third, the minority leader works to promote and publicize the party's agenda. Fourth, the minority leader, if his or her party controls the White House, confers regularly with the President and his aides about issues before Congress, the Administration's agenda, and political events generally. Fifth, the minority leader strives to promote party harmony so as to maximize the chances for legislative and political success. From an institutional perspective, the rules of the House assign a number of specific responsibilities to the minority leader. For example, Rule XIII, clause 6, grants the minority leader (or a designee) the right to offer a motion to recommit with instructions; and Rule II, clause 6, states that the Inspector General shall be appointed by joint recommendation of the Speaker, majority leader, and minority leader. The minority leader also has other institutional duties, such as appointing individuals to certain federal or congressional entities." ]	4,660	gov_report	en	null	3910aa375bb33e25d4f76cc763d7003fec38409a6512c7e7
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (Title IX) provides an avenue of legal relief for victims of sexual abuse and harassment committed by professors, teachers, coaches, and others at educational institutions. The statute prohibits discrimination "on the basis of sex" of any person in an educational program or activity receiving federal funding. Though Title IX makes no explicit reference to sexual abuse or harassment, the Supreme Court has held that a school district can violate the statute, and be held liable for damages, based on a deliberately indifferent response to a teacher's sexual abuse or harassment of a student. The Court has also held that a school board may be liable under Title IX for a deliberately indifferent response to student-on-student sexual harassment. Meanwhile, federal agencies that administratively enforce the statute, such as the Department of Education (ED), have also determined that educational institutions can be held responsible for instances of sexual harassment under Title IX in certain circumstances. Title IX is thus primarily enforced in two ways: (1) through private rights of action directly against schools by or on behalf of students subject to such harassment in certain circumstances; and (2) by federal agencies that provide funding to educational programs. With respect to the latter enforcement prong, like several other federal civil rights statutes, Title IX makes compliance with its antidiscrimination mandate a condition for receiving federal funding in any education program or activity. Title IX applies to federal-funded schools at all levels of education. For instance, all public school districts receive some federal financial assistance, as do most institutions of higher education through participation in federal student aid programs. Notably, when any part of a school district or institution of higher education receives federal funds, all of the recipient's operations are covered by Title IX. The text of Title IX does not expressly mention sexual abuse or harassment, while current regulations implementing the statute also do not explicitly address sexual harassment (although the regulations do require schools to designate at least one employee to function as a Title IX Coordinator). In each of the last several presidential administrations, however, the Department of Education (ED) has issued guidance documents that instruct schools regarding their responsibilities under Title IX when addressing allegations of sexual harassment. In response, educational institutions have developed procedures and practices to investigate and respond to allegations of sexual harassment and assault. And ED recently issued another notice of proposed rulemaking, after having revoked some of its prior guidance to schools in 2017. As discussed in this report, if adopted, the regulations would significantly change educational institutions' responsibilities for responding to sexual harassment allegations. To place the proposed Title IX regulations in context, this report provides background on the legal landscape that informs the proposal. First, the report examines how federal courts have understood Title IX's requirements in the context of private rights of actions brought by students directly against educational institutions seeking damages for sexual abuse or harassment. The report continues by examining how federal agencies have enforced Title IX, with particular focus on ED's guidance documents that direct schools on how to respond to sexual harassment and assault allegations. The report then considers various constitutional challenges brought by students against public universities, which claim that some universities' responses to allegations of sexual harassment have violated the due process rights of the accused. With this backdrop set, the report examines ED's proposed regulations with an emphasis on how they would alter the responsibilities of schools in complying with Title IX. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 states that "No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance," subject to certain exemptions. In other words, recipients of federal funding, which administer an educational program or activity, are prohibited from discriminating on the basis of sex. The statute, however, does not expressly provide for a private right of action by which victims of sex discrimination may recover for a Title IX violation. Nor does the statute expressly prohibit sexual harassment, abuse, or molestation as forms of unlawful sex discrimination, or otherwise define unlawful sexual abuse or harassment. Title IX also does not delineate the circumstances in which a school or educational program may be liable for such conduct. Given the absence of statutory text "to shed light on Congress' intent," federal courts have played a primary, if not exclusive, role in establishing the remedial scheme by which victims of sexual harassment or abuse may seek relief under Title IX through a private right of action. The Supreme Court first interpreted Title IX to provide for a judicially implied private right of action against a federal-funded educational institution for sexual harassment, and later, an implied damages remedy in such actions. Since then, and in the absence of legislative amendments to Title IX on those issues, the Court has also created the legal standard for establishing liability under Title IX for sexual abuse or harassment committed by a teacher, and other students. The Court, and numerous federal courts of appeals, have described this judicially created liability standard—which draws upon the "deliberate indifference" standard as applied under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 —as a "high bar for plaintiffs to recover under Title IX." Critically, in a Title IX private right of action for damages, an educational institution (or other federally funded program or activity) is not strictly liable for a principal's or teacher's sexual harassment or abuse of a student. In other words, the fact that sexual harassment or abuse occurred and was committed by these individuals is not the basis for a funding recipient's liability under the Supreme Court's remedial scheme. Rather, Title IX liability turns on the recipient's response to its actual knowledge of that conduct. A recipient will be liable only when its response was so deficient as to amount to "deliberate indifference" to the alleged harassment or abuse. The private right of action currently available under Title IX is one of judicial implication—that is, the Court has interpreted the statute to imply such a right, in the absence of express statutory language providing for it. A private right of action provides a personal legal remedy for victims of sex discrimination in the form of specific relief or damages. In contrast, and as discussed in a later section, administrative enforcement of the statute makes its general focus the institutional policies and practices of the recipient educational institution. Two Supreme Court decisions, together, set out the requirements for establishing an educational funding recipient's liability under Title IX for damages for sexual abuse or harassment: Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District and Davis N ext Friend LaShonda D. v. Monroe County Board of Education . The Court's liability standard premises an institution's Title IX liability for sexual harassment or abuse based on the institution's "deliberate indifference" in responding to knowledge of that conduct. Thus—and critical to understanding a Title IX private right of action for damages—an educational institution (or other federally funded program or activity) is not strictly liable for a principal's or teacher's sexual harassment or abuse of a student. Indeed, the Supreme Court in Gebser expressly rejected such arguments urging it to apply agency principles to Title IX such that a school would be vicariously liable for such harassment. Instead, liability attaches only if a plaintiff establishes that the funding recipient's response to its "actual" knowledge of the discrimination was deliberately indifferent. Put another way, under the Court's remedial scheme, liability under Title IX is based on the funding recipient's " own failure to act" adequately in response to known misconduct, not the misconduct itself. Thus, an institution will not be liable absent a showing of deliberate indifference, regardless of whether the conduct committed by a principal or teacher could be characterized as egregious. In creating this standard in Gebser , the Court had attempted to "'infer how the [1972] Congress would have addressed the issue had the . . . action been included as an express provision in the' statute." That task, the Court observed, "inherently entail[ed] a degree of speculation." To inform its analysis, the Court relied significantly on the statute's administrative enforcement provision because, in its view, the provision "contain[ed] important clues" from which to infer legislative intent regarding Title IX liability. The Court observed that, pursuant to that provision, agencies that disburse federal funds may suspend or cut funds to a funding recipient for violating Title IX, but only after they "ha[ve] advised the appropriate person or persons of the failure to comply with the requirement and ha[ve] determined that compliance cannot be secured by voluntary means." Because the statute's administrative procedure "require[s] notice to the recipient and an opportunity to come into voluntary compliance," the Court reasoned that it too would similarly require "actual notice" to an "appropriate person" to establish liability for damages in a private right of action under Title IX. The Court also concluded that a recipient would be liable under Title IX only where a school official responds to that "actual" notice so deficiently that its response amounts to "deliberate indifference." In so holding, the Court again looked to Title IX's administrative enforcement scheme and observed that it "presupposes that an official who is advised of a Title IX violation refuses to take action to bring the recipient into compliance." The Court found "a rough parallel in the standard of deliberate indifference," from case law arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 addressing claims "alleging that a municipality's actions in failing to prevent a deprivation of federal rights" caused a violation. The Court thus held that "[u]ntil Congress speaks directly on the subject . . . we will not hold a school district liable in damages under Title IX for a teacher's sexual harassment of a student absent actual notice and deliberate indifference" —a conclusion that elicited a strong dissent. Deliberate indifference is a "high standard," as described by the Supreme Court in Davis , and must "at a minimum, 'cause [students] to undergo' harassment or 'make them liable or vulnerable' to it." Notably, the "deliberate indifference" standard does not require funding recipients to "remedy" the harassment. Rather, under Davis , a recipient's response to harassment will amount to deliberate indifference only if it is " clearly unreasonable in light of the known circumstances." Because this standard is not "a mere 'reasonableness' standard," a plaintiff must show more than the unreasonableness of a funding recipient's response to sexual abuse or harassment. The plaintiff must show that the recipient was clearly unreasonable in its response. Accordingly, a funding recipient is not liable under Title IX if it responds to sexual abuse or harassment "in a manner that is not clearly unreasonable." In addition to the requisite showing of "deliberate indifference," the Court's standard also requires a plaintiff to establish other threshold showings to prevail in a Title IX suit for damages—both before reaching the question of "deliberate indifference" and after establishing "deliberate indifference" on the part of the school or entity. Before reaching the issue of whether a funding recipient acted with "deliberate indifference," Gebser requires that a plaintiff establish that "an appropriate person" at the funding recipient had "actual knowledge of discrimination." Failure to show either "actual" notice or that such notice was provided to "an appropriate person" of the funding recipient may constitute the sole basis for a court's dismissal of a Title IX claim seeking damages for sexual harassment or abuse. An "appropriate person," under Gebser , is "an official who at a minimum has authority to address the alleged discrimination and to institute corrective measures on the recipient's behalf." As discussed later in this report, what constitutes "actual" notice, and who may constitute an "appropriate person," have caused substantive splits among the circuits. Even where "deliberate indifference" is established, the Supreme Court's liability standard further requires a plaintiff alleging student-to-student or peer harassment to make several additional showings: (1) that a funding recipient exercised "substantial control" over the harasser and the context in which the harassment occurred; (2) that the harassment itself was "severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive"; and (3) the denial of educational access resulting from the harassment. With respect to "substantial control," Davis limits a school's liability for damages to circumstances in which the funding recipient exercised "substantial control" over the harasser and in which the harassment took place in a context subject to the recipient's control. If "the harasser is under the school's disciplinary authority," a recipient of federal funding may be liable for its deliberate indifference to the harassment, as the Court in Davis particularly emphasized the recipient's authority to take "remedial action" against the harassment. As for "substantial control" over the environment, "the harassment must take place in a context subject to the school district's control." As to the nature of the sexual harassment itself, Davis requires that the plaintiff show that the conduct "is so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive, and [] so undermines and detracts from the victims' educational experience, that the victim-students are effectively denied equal access to an institution's resources and opportunities." Whether the conduct rises to this level depends, as the Court stated in Davis , "on a constellation of surrounding circumstances, expectations, and relationships," "including, but not limited to, the ages of the harasser and the victim and the number of individuals involved." Finally, for harassment to have sufficiently affected the victim's education, the Court in Davis made two additional observations. On the one hand, the Court noted that evidence of a decline in the victim's grades—as was alleged there—"provides necessary evidence of a potential link between her education" and the alleged harassment. Yet, the Court also concluded that harassment is actionable under Title IX only when it is "serious enough to have the systemic effect of denying the victim equal access to an educational program or activity." Without defining what might constitute a "systemic effect," the Court offered one example of harassment that does not have such effect: "a single instance" of harassment, even when "sufficiently severe." The Supreme Court's Gebser and Davis decisions establish that a school or other educational program that receives federal funding will be liable under Title IX for damages for the sexual abuse or harassment of a student only if it acted with "deliberate indifference" in its response to known discrimination. Deliberate indifference, the Fifth Circuit has recently observed, "'is an extremely high standard to meet.'" Applying this and other components of the Supreme Court's Title IX liability standard, lower federal courts have varied in their formulations of the evidence required to prove a Title IX claim. Some courts, for example, have interpreted Gebser and Davis to adopt a "hostile environment" analysis of Title IX claims alleging teacher-to-student harassment, in light of precedent analyzing harassment claims in the workplace context under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Meanwhile, other federal courts have focused their teacher-to-student analysis on whether a plaintiff has established the following elements: "actual" notice of discrimination; by an "appropriate person" authorized to take corrective measures; and "deliberate indifference" by the funding recipient in response to known discrimination. Where a Title IX claim alleges sexual harassment or assault committed by a student against another student , courts have additionally required the plaintiff to establish that: the harassment was "so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive"; the "victim-students [were] effectively denied equal access to an institution's resources and opportunities"; and the recipient exercised "substantial control" over the harasser and the context in which the harassment occurred. As discussed in further detail below, federal courts of appeals vary—and at times directly conflict—regarding the evidence sufficient to satisfy these elements. Failure to satisfy any one of the elements may be the sole basis for dismissal of a Title IX claim. Under Gebser , a plaintiff must show that the funding recipient had "actual" notice of the discrimination; therefore, it is not enough to present evidence that a funding recipient reasonably s hould have known about the alleged sexual misconduct. Under the standard, then, what type of allegations reported to a school give rise to "actual" notice? Is it enough, for example, if a funding recipient has actual knowledge of a " substantial risk of abuse"? Does it require knowledge of specific allegations of harassment or abuse or—perhaps most narrowly—require knowledge of "severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive" conduct? Meanwhile, if a school is notified of a perpetrator's previous acts of sexual harassment or abuse, may that constitute actual notice of that individual's conduct as to others ? Federal courts differ on these questions of actual notice, with some courts further differentiating between evidence that establishes actual notice of a teacher's sexual abuse versus actual notice of sexual violence or harassment committed by a student. As reflected below, which standard a court applies to evaluate "actual notice" is determinative—the claim may either proceed to the next phase of the analysis or be foreclosed altogether. In Doe v. School Board of Broward County , the Eleventh Circuit addressed the question of whether complaints of two separate students about the same teacher were "sufficient in substance to alert [the principal] to the possibility" of that teacher's sexual assault of a third student. The court held in the affirmative, emphasizing the similarity between the two preceding reports, which alleged multiple occasions of the teacher's propositions for sex and dates, sexual touching, and sexual comments about their bodies. These reports, the court held, raised a triable issue that the principal had actual notice "of a pattern of harassment." And where the analysis of "actual notice" looks to knowledge of the risk of sexual abuse or harassment, the court further observed, "lesser harassment may [] provide actual notice of sexually violent conduct." In Bay n ard v. Malone , however, the Fourth Circuit held that the school principal had no "actual" notice that a sixth grade teacher was sexually abusing a student in his class, despite receiving multiple prior reports that he molested children. There, the evidence reflected that before the plaintiff started sixth grade at the school, the principal had met with one of this teacher's former students, who reported that he had been sexually molested by the teacher while in the sixth grade, warned that the teacher was a pedophile, and that the principal should watch for certain behaviors. In addition, another teacher at the school told the principal about allegations that this teacher sexually molested children. Separately, the school librarian reported to the principal that she had walked in on the teacher with the plaintiff sitting in his lap, with his arm around the student, and their faces very close together, and that when the teacher saw her, he jumped up and the plaintiff fell to the floor. In relaying the incident, the librarian told the principal the behavior had been "inappropriate." Though the court noted that the principal "certainly should have been aware of the potential for abuse," it held that there was "no evidence in the record to support a conclusion that [the principal] was in fact aware that a student was being abused." The court dismissed the Title IX claim on the basis that no appropriate person had actual notice of the abuse of the plaintiff student. As the above cases reflect, in the absence of a clear definition—either in the statute or from the Supreme Court—courts vary with respect to the nature, specificity, and frequency of allegations sufficient to constitute "actual" notice for the purpose of satisfying the first prong of the analysis for Title IX liability for sexual abuse or harassment. The Supreme Court's liability standard for Title IX not only requires actual notice, but also that this notice be made to "an appropriate person"—that is, "an official who at a minimum has authority to address the alleged discrimination and to institute corrective measures on the recipient's behalf." Generally, federal appellate case law reflects that rather than treating an individual's title as dispositive, courts engage in fact-specific determinations that appear to focus principally on whether an individual had the ability to halt or address the misconduct or whether the individual occupied a position high enough within the hierarchy of the funding recipient to be fairly said to act in a representative capacity for the recipient. Because the Court's opinions in Gebser and Davis do not clearly delineate which individuals may constitute "appropriate person[s]," federal courts have reached varying—and at times conflicting—determinations. In the elementary or secondary school context, for example, courts vary as to which individuals— a principal, teacher, or guidance counselor —have the requisite "authority to address the alleged discrimination" and "institute" corrective action to constitute "an appropriate person." Some federal courts of appeals have held that a public school principal may—but not always—constitute "an appropriate person." In Warren ex rel . Good v. Reading School District , the Third Circuit held, in a Title IX case alleging sexual abuse by a fourth grade teacher, that the school principal was an "appropriate person" in light of her authority to investigate a teacher's misconduct, which in turn implied her authority to "initiate" corrective measures such as reporting her findings to the school board. The Fourth Circuit, however, reached the opposite conclusion in Baynard v. Malone , holding that the principal—despite being responsible for supervising and evaluating teachers—was not an "appropriate person." The court emphasized that the principal could not "be considered the functional equivalent of the school district" and lacked the authority to "hire, fire, transfer, or suspend teachers." Meanwhile, at least one federal court of appeals has held that a principal who engages directly in sexual abuse or harassment may not constitute an "appropriate person." In Salazar v. South San Antonio Independent School District , the Fifth Circuit interpreted Gebser to hold that where a school official sexually abuses a student, he or she cannot be considered an "appropriate person," even if he would otherwise constitute an "appropriate person." That case involved allegations that a vice principal, who later became principal, sexually abused a student from his third grade to seventh grade year. Though "uncontroverted testimony at trial" established that the school official had corrective authority to address sexual harassment during the time he molested the plaintiff, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that it was "highly unlikely" that he would take corrective measures or report his own behavior so as to provide actual notice to the funding recipient. The court further rejected the argument that the principal's abuse should be treated as an official action of the school district for Title IX liability purposes, given the Supreme Court's rejection of agency principles to Title IX. The Fifth Circuit concluded that the "goals and purpose" of Title IX "would not be accomplished or effectuated by permitting damage awards" in such circumstances. In the higher education context, federal courts of appeals have engaged in similarly fact-specific analyses to determine whether a university employee—for example, a college dean, university counsel, or athletics director —constitutes an "appropriate person" for the purposes of a Title IX private right of action. The analyses in these cases appear to emphasize evidence relating to the individual's ranking in the university hierarchy, responsibilities involving receiving allegations of harassment, and ability to correct or halt the misconduct. Yet, even when there arguably is such evidence, it may not be sufficient to render that individual an "appropriate person." In Ross v. University of Tulsa , for example, the Tenth Circuit held that campus security officers were not "appropriate person[s]" through whom the university could have actual notice of an on-campus sexual assault. The court rejected the contention that the officers' mandatory reporting of sexual assaults to university personnel rendered them "appropriate person[s]," instead likening mandatory reporting to a "clerical act" rather than taking corrective action. The court also rejected the argument that the officers' participation in investigations of campus violence rendered them "appropriate person[s]," as that contention, as presented, "would assume that anyone participating in the initiation of a corrective process" is an "appropriate person." Given the variability of courts' analyses as to who may constitute an "appropriate person," it is unlikely that a school's or university's Title IX Coordinator will categorically constitute an "appropriate person." Rather, as reflected in the above decisions, a court's determination—based on the legal standard set out in Gebser —will likely depend on the characteristics it finds indicative of an "appropriate person" and the evidence relating to the individual's responsibilities in that institution. As discussed earlier, after establishing "actual notice" of the discrimination to an "appropriate person," a plaintiff must additionally prove that the funding recipient acted with deliberate indifference in its response—that is, that the entity acted in a manner that was " clearly unreasonable in light of the known circumstances." Federal appellate courts interpret this standard to require more than a showing that the school or institution failed to respond or act reasonably, or was negligent. Nor is a school required to remedy the harassment to avoid liability in a private right of action based on "deliberate indifference." In these highly fact-intensive analyses, courts examine the nature of the allegations the funding recipient had knowledge of, and what actions the recipient took, if any, in response to that information to determine whether the response was so "clearly unreasonable" as to amount to "deliberate indifference" to the alleged sexual harassment or abuse. The clearest cases of "deliberate indifference" generally concern evidence that the recipient made no effort to respond at all to "actual" notice of sexual harassment or abuse. Evidence of such circumstances might include, for example, a funding recipient's failure to initiate an investigation into serious allegations, or take any disciplinary actions in light of repeated reports of sexual harassment. Where there is evidence that the funding recipient responded in some manner, however, federal case law reflects what appear to be divergent and variable analyses as to whether a response is so deficient as to amount to deliberate indifference. Federal appellate courts have commonly described the requisite showing for deliberate indifference as a "high" bar to meet. In Doe ex rel . Doe v. Dallas Independent School District , for example, the Fifth Circuit held that the school district's response did not amount to deliberate indifference, despite evidence that could arguably be described as reflecting a deficient response. In that case, the plaintiffs, a group of former students, alleged that the same third grade teacher had sexually abused numerous male students, over the course of four years. The plaintiffs presented evidence that in response to a report of sexual molestation, the principal told the parent that the alleged perpetrator was a "good teacher" and that he knew her son was lying; failed to report the allegation to Child Protective Services; did not monitor the teacher further or require him to attend any training; and never raised the issue of sexual abuse again with the teacher until he was ultimately arrested. In the court's view, this evidence failed to create a triable issue of deliberate indifference, as the principal had nonetheless interviewed the student, spoken with his mother, and warned the teacher that if the allegations were true, "he would be 'dealt with.'" It could not say, the court concluded, that these actions "were an inadequate response" to the student's allegation. When faced with apparently similar evidence of a school's response to allegations of teacher sexual misconduct, the Eleventh Circuit held that, given "serious deficiencies," the district court had erred in holding that defendant's response, as a matter of law, was not deliberately indifferent. There, the principal had received sexual harassment complaints by two students about the same teacher. In its analysis, the court highlighted the response to the second complaint, because by that time, the principal had notice of a possible pattern. The principal, however, "effectively did nothing other than obtain a written statement" from the student and the teacher. In addition, though the principal, as he had with the first complaint, reported the second complaint to the school board's special investigative unit, he nonetheless failed to notify the unit that the allegation concerned "the same teacher who had been the subject of a formal investigation just months earlier." It could not be said, the court concluded, that "merely because school officials 'confronted [the teacher],' 'obtained statements' from the complaining students, and 'informed the [unit] of the sexual misconduct allegations' (while omitting material details)," that this response was reasonable. Rather, the "failure to institute any corrective measures aimed at ferreting out the possibility of [the teacher]'s sexual harassment of his students could constitute deliberate indifference." Meanwhile, some courts of appeals have analyzed allegations of deliberate indifference that, in their view, the Court's Gebser and Davis decisions did not directly address. In Simpson v. University of Colorado, Boulder , for example, the Tenth Circuit addressed allegations that a university had an "official policy of deliberate indifference" by failing to provide adequate training or guidance in light of an "obvious" need for such actions. There, the head coach and other staff of the university's football program selected current players to host high school recruits on campus, for the purpose of "'show[ing] the recruits a good time.'" During one such football recruiting visit, the plaintiffs, who had agreed to meet with them, alleged that university football players and high school recruits sexually assaulted them. In analyzing the issue of deliberate indifference, the court highlighted evidence that the university coaching staff had prior and ongoing knowledge of sexual assaults occurring during football recruitment and by football players, including the rape of a female student by a university football player two months before the plaintiffs were assaulted. The university had also been previously advised by the local district attorney to implement changes and training to its football recruiting program in light of such sexual assaults. In addition, the head coach "continued to resist recruiting reforms." One player testified that he received little guidance on his responsibilities as a "player-host"; and a handbook provided by the school to the players, the court observed, did not "provide guidance to player-hosts on appropriate behavior by themselves and recruits." The court emphasized that the evidence would support findings that, before the plaintiffs had been assaulted, the head coach had both general and specific knowledge of sexual assaults occurring during recruiting visits, that there had been no change in the recruiting program to lessen the likelihood of such assaults, and that the university "nevertheless maintained an unsupervised player-host program." The evidence, the court held, created a triable issue of deliberate indifference. As with the other components of the Supreme Court's standard for a Title IX private right of action—"actual" notice to an "appropriate person"—federal case law reflects fact-intensive, variable determinations with respect to the evidence necessary to meet the "high" bar for showing deliberate indifference on the part of a funding recipient. In addition to the private rights of action discussed above, Title IX is also enforced by federal agencies that provide funding to educational programs. Title IX makes nondiscrimination based on sex a condition for receiving federal financial assistance in any education program or activity. In this administrative enforcement context, if a school is found to have violated Title IX, the ultimate sanction is termination or suspension of federal funds, rather than a legal judgment requiring payment of damages to a particular student. Agencies are authorized to issue regulations (subject to presidential approval) and orders to enforce the statute and are responsible for monitoring recipients' compliance with Title IX. While a number of federal agencies issue funds for educational programs, and thus are responsible for enforcing the statute with respect to recipients of financial assistance for educational programs, two agencies play particularly prominent roles in enforcing Title IX. Pursuant to the Education Amendments of 1974, the Secretary of Education (ED) is specifically directed to promulgate regulations concerning the prohibition of sex discrimination at education programs that receive federal assistance. Because ED is, among other things, "the primary administrator of federal financial assistance to education," the agency plays a lead role in enforcing Title IX against educational institutions. And according to an executive order, the Attorney General coordinates the implementation and enforcement of Title IX across the executive branch. Subject to the coordinating function of the Attorney General, the Department of Justice's Civil Rights Division and OCR collaborate in enforcing Title IX consistent with a memorandum of understanding reached between the agencies, which notes that OCR has primary responsibility for enforcing the statute directly against recipients of financial assistance from ED through complaint investigations and compliance reviews. Accordingly, ED has promulgated regulations implementing Title IX that apply to traditional educational institutions of all levels that receive federal assistance, including elementary and secondary schools, as well as institutions of higher education. Those regulations specifically bar educational institutions from excluding individuals or denying the benefits of any education program or activity on the basis of sex. ED regulations also require that recipients of federal financial assistance that operate education programs designate an employee (commonly referred to as the Title IX Coordinator) to coordinate efforts to comply with ED regulations regarding sex-based discrimination. Further, schools must establish grievance procedures that provide "prompt and equitable resolution" of complaints alleging prohibited actions. Pursuant to its role in enforcing Title IX, OCR may conduct periodic reviews of institutions, or directed investigations, to ensure that recipients of federal funds are complying with applicable requirements. OCR also receives complaints from individuals alleging violations of Title IX by educational institutions and investigates allegations. When violations of the statute are found through these means, the office can seek informal resolution through a resolution agreement. According to OCR, if negotiations do not reach a resolution agreement, it may then take more formal enforcement measures, including seeking to suspend or terminate an institution's funding. Notably, neither Title IX's text nor ED's current regulations directly address sexual harassment. In the administrative context, ED's OCR has issued a series of guidance documents that have interpreted Title IX to bar sexual harassment and define distinct responsibilities for educational institutions with regard to such allegations. These documents—while sometimes subject to change—generally reflect a different analysis for assessing a school's Title IX liability for harassment than the Supreme Court case law addressing private rights of action for damages for sexual abuse or harassment. In particular, ED has applied a constructive notice requirement that prompts a school's Title IX responsibility to respond, rather than "actual notice" to "an appropriate person" as required in the context of suits for damages. In addition, while the Supreme Court has explained that a school's response will result in liability only where "clearly unreasonable," ED has articulated baseline standards for how schools must respond to comply with Title IX. Finally, while the Supreme Court rejected holding schools responsible for sexual harassment under theories of vicarious liability, ED has held schools responsible for sexual harassment under Title IX where a teacher commits misconduct in the scope of their employment. In 1997, OCR released a guidance document stating that sexual harassment of students by school employees, other students, or third parties is a form of sex discrimination prohibited by Title IX. The guidance explained that two general types of conduct constituted sexual harassment: 1. Quid pro quo harassment: wherein a school employee "explicitly or implicitly conditions a student's participation in an education program or activity or bases an educational decision on the student's submission to unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, or other verbal, nonverbal, or physical conduct of a sexual nature"; or 2. Hostile environment harassment: wherein sexual harassing conduct by a school's employee, another student, or a third party "is sufficiently severe, persistent, or pervasive to limit a student's ability to participate in or benefit from an education program or activity, or to create a hostile or abusive educational environment." In the former case, the 1997 Guidance explained that a school would be liable for quid pro quo harassment by an employee in a position of authority whether or not it knew or should have known of the harassment. In the latter case, the 1997 Guidance explained that, in instances of hostile environment harassment by employees , a school would be liable for harassment if the employee acted with apparent authority or was aided in carrying out the harassment due to his or her position. With respect to sexual harassment by other students or third parties , a school would be liable for harassment if "(i) a hostile environment exists in the school's programs or activities, (ii) the school knows or should have known of the harassment, and (iii) the school fails to take immediate and appropriate corrective action." The Guidance explained that while Title IX does not render a school responsible for the actions of its students, it does make schools responsible for their "own discrimination in failing to remedy [harassment] once the school has notice." Following the release of OCR's 1997 Guidance, the Supreme Court shortly thereafter recognized a substantively different standard for establishing liability in a private suit for damages directly against a school. As discussed above, in 1998, in Gebser , the Supreme Court ruled that in cases of harassment committed by a teacher , a school district is liable only when it has actual knowledge of allegations by an "appropriate person," and so deficiently responds to those allegations that its response amounts to deliberate indifference to the discrimination. And the next year in Davis , the Court held that in addition to a showing of actual knowledge by an appropriate person, and deliberate indifference, a plaintiff suing for damages for sexual harassment committed by a student must show that the conduct was "so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive" that it denied the victim equal access to educational opportunities or benefits. Crucially, the Court in Gebser distinguished between actions by a school that could result in Title IX liability for damages in a private right of action, and Title IX administrative requirements imposed by a federal agency in implementing and enforcing the statute. According to the Court, agencies possess authority to enforce requirements that effectuate Title IX's mandate, "even if those requirements do not purport to represent a definition of discrimination under the statute." In other words, agencies enforcing Title IX may administratively require recipients to comply with certain procedures and rescind funding for violations, even though breaches of such requirements might not subject a school to liability under a private suit for damages. Following these Supreme Court decisions regarding the standard for liability in Title IX damages suits alleging sexual harassment, ED issued a number of guidance documents generally reaffirming its basic position outlined in its 1997 Guidance, including with respect to notice, a school's responsibilities under Title IX to comply with the statute, and the application of vicarious liability in certain situations. In these documents, ED has indicated that the liability standard imposed by the Supreme Court for Title IX sexual harassment violations is distinct from the standards appropriate in the administrative enforcement context. In other words, a school's responsibilities in responding to sexual harassment allegations under Title IX have been treated differently in the context of a suit for damages than in the administrative enforcement context. In 2001, OCR issued a Revised Sexual Harassment Guidance document that—in light of the intervening Supreme Court decisions that set a more stringent standard for obtaining relief regarding private damages actions —reaffirmed the standards of the agency's 1997 Guidance as grounded in Title IX regulations and distinct from private damages litigation. The guidance explicitly applies to all educational institutions that receive federal funds, including universities. It outlines the compliance standards OCR uses for enforcing and investigating violations of Title IX. As a threshold matter, schools are responsible for adopting grievance procedures that provide prompt and equitable resolution of complaints of sexual harassment. Failure to do so will mean that a school is in violation of Title IX. Generally speaking, when sexual harassment has occurred, educational institutions must take "prompt and effective action calculated to end the harassment, prevent its recurrence, and, as appropriate, remedy its effects." If the "school, upon notice of the harassment, responds by taking prompt and effective action to end the harassment and prevent its recurrence, the school has carried out its responsibility under the Title IX regulations." Though framed as guidance, the 1997 and 2001 documents were promulgated by ED after an opportunity for the public to comment on them. (This does not mean, however, that the documents are legislative rules that carry the force of law; guidance documents generally serve to inform the public about the agency's approach to enforcement of the laws and regulations it administers. ) The 2001 Guidance stated that "unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature" constitutes sexual harassment. It indicated, however, that it aimed to "move away from specific labels for types of sexual harassment." Instead, the 2001 Guidance explained that the crucial issue in each case "is whether the harassment rises to a level that it denies or limits a student's ability to participate in or benefit from the school's program based on sex." In that situation, "harassment has occurred that triggers a school's responsibilities under, or violates, Title IX or its regulations." That said, it went on to describe types of harassment that largely tracked the categories outlined in the 1997 Guidance: quid pro quo harassment and hostile environment harassment. In the former situation, wherein a teacher or employee conditions a benefit or educational decision on a student's submission to unwelcome sexual conduct, such harassment is automatically considered harassment that limits or denies a student's ability to participate in or benefit from the school's program and thus discriminates based on sex in violation of Title IX. Unlike so-called quid pro quo harassment, a case of hostile environment harassment requires a further investigation into whether the conduct is sufficiently serious to limit or deny a student's ability to benefit from or participate in a school's program because of sex. Because fellow students do not generally have positions of authority, student-on-student harassment generally is considered hostile environment harassment rather than quid pro quo harassment, although teachers and employees may also create a hostile environment. The 2001 Guidance explained that, in evaluating whether hostile environment harassment has occurred, OCR examines all circumstances relevant to the situation. This includes whether the conduct in question was welcome. The 2001 Guidance also explained that, in the context of harassment by a teacher or school employee, the extent of a school's responsibilities to address harassment depends on whether the harassment occurs within "the context of the employee's provision of aid, benefits, or services to students" (i.e., in the context of their job responsibilities). With respect to harassment by teachers or employees in the scope of their job responsibilities (or who reasonably appear to be acting in that capacity), assuming the harassment limits or denies a student's ability to benefit from or participate in a school program, a school is responsible for the discriminatory conduct and must stop the behavior, prevent its recurrence, and remedy the effects of harassment for the victim. In such situations, a school is responsible to do this "whether or not" it has notice of the behavior. Whether sexual harassment occurs within the scope of an employee's job responsibilities can depend on a variety of factors. In cases of quid pro quo harassment, the behavior clearly occurs in the scope of an employee's job responsibilities. For hostile environment harassment, OCR will evaluate a number of factors to determine whether the harassment occurred in the context of an employee's job responsibilities. The 2001 Guidance also indicates that sometimes harassment that does not occur within an employee's job responsibilities will be sufficiently serious to create a hostile environment. In these cases, once a school has notice of the behavior, it has a duty to stop the harassment and prevent its recurrence. Likewise, in the context of student-on-student harassment (or harassment by third parties) that creates a hostile environment, the school is responsible for eliminating the environment and preventing its recurrence. However, a school is in violation of Title IX if it has notice of the environment and fails to take "prompt and effective action" to correct the situation. In that case, the school is responsible for ending the harassment, preventing its recurrence, and remedying the effects of harassment for the student that "could reasonably have been prevented" if the school reacted appropriately. As noted above, in certain situations of harassment by a teacher or employee, schools are responsible for harassment even without notice. Otherwise, in cases of sexual harassment by employees, students, or third parties, the 2001 Guidance explains that recipients have notice of a sexually hostile environment if a responsible school employee "knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known," of the harassment. A responsible employee is "any employee who has the authority to take action to redress the harassment, who has the duty to report to appropriate school officials sexual harassment or any other misconduct by students or employees, or an individual who a student could reasonably believe has this authority or responsibility." Even if a student fails to inform the school or use the appropriate grievance procedures to complain of harassment, a school will be in violation of Title IX if it knows or reasonably should know of a hostile environment. A school is in violation of Title IX if it has notice of a hostile environment and fails to take immediate and effective corrective action. Once a school has notice of potential sexual harassment of students, the 2001 Guidance explained that "it should take immediate and appropriate steps to investigate or otherwise determine what occurred and take prompt and effective steps reasonably calculated to end any harassment, eliminate a hostile environment if one has been created, and prevent harassment from occurring again." In cases of reports of harassment by a student, parent of an elementary or secondary student, or harassment observed by a responsible employee, regardless of whether the harassed student, or student's parents, decide to file a formal complaint, "the school must promptly investigate to determine what occurred and then take appropriate steps to resolve the situation." For situations where a school learns of harassment via other means, a variety of factors will determine whether there are reasonable grounds for the school to investigate. If the allegations are confirmed, then a school has a responsibility to respond as described above. The 2001 Guidance also noted that informal mechanisms may sometimes be used to resolve complaints if the parties agree to do so. However, it made clear that certain informal procedures, such as mediation, are not appropriate in certain cases, such as alleged sexual assault. Finally, the Guidance noted that while "the rights established under Title IX must be interpreted consistent with any federal guaranteed due process rights," schools should nevertheless "ensure that steps to accord due process rights do not restrict or unnecessarily delay the protections provided by Title IX to the complainant." In 2011, OCR issued a Dear Colleague Letter that supplemented its 2001 Guidance and focused on the obligations under Title IX for schools that focused exclusively on peer-to-peer harassment, rather than harassment by a teacher. The Letter explained that sexual harassment "is unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature," and includes "unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal, nonverbal, or physical conduct of a sexual nature." Sexual harassment also includes sexual violence, which refers to "physical sexual acts perpetrated against a person's will or where a person is incapable of giving consent due to the victim's use of drugs or alcohol." Sexual harassment creates a hostile environment "if the conduct is sufficiently serious that it interferes with or limits a student's ability to participate in or benefit from the school's program." When a school "knows or reasonably should know about student-on-student harassment that creates a hostile environment, Title IX requires the school to take immediate action to eliminate the harassment, prevent its recurrence, and address its effects." The Letter also noted that schools will sometimes have an obligation to respond to incidents of sexual harassment that occur "off school grounds, outside a school's education program or activity." And whether or not the conduct occurred, if a student files a complaint, "the school must process the complaint in accordance with its established procedures." Because students can experience the effects of off-campus sexual harassment at school, "schools should consider the effects of the off-campus conduct when evaluating whether there is a hostile environment on campus." With respect to investigations of sexual harassment allegations, the Letter stated that the standards for liability in the criminal context are distinct from Title IX, and therefore a criminal investigation into allegations of sexual violence does not relieve a school of its duty to conduct a Title IX investigation. It also instructed schools not to wait until the conclusion of a criminal investigation or proceeding to begin their own investigation under Title IX, and if appropriate, to take immediate steps to protect students while a criminal investigation occurs. Although a school may need to temporarily delay an investigation while a criminal fact-finding occurs by police, once the police have finished their fact-finding, the school must promptly resume and complete its fact-finding for Title IX purposes. The 2011 Dear Colleague Letter also outlined various elements of a school's grievance procedures that are critical in order to provide "prompt and equitable resolution of sexual harassment complaints," including sexual violence. The Letter noted "in order for a school's grievance procedures to be consistent with Title IX standards, the school must use a preponderance of the evidence standard." This standard contrasted with the 2001 Guidance, which did not impose an evidentiary standard on school investigations, as well as the prior practice of some schools, which used a "clear and convincing" standard. A preponderance of the evidence standard, which requires a showing that a fact or event is more likely than not, is lower than a clear and convincing standard, which requires providing the "ultimate factfinder [with] an abiding conviction that the truth of . . . factual contentions are 'highly probable.'" The Letter also strongly discouraged schools from allowing the parties in a hearing to personally cross-examine one another. It noted that if a school allows parties to appeal a finding or remedy, it must do so for both parties. Following requests by schools on how to adequately comply with the 2011 Dear Colleague Letter, ED issued a forty-six-page supplemental Questions and Answers document in 2014 (2014 Q&A) that further explained the responsibilities of schools with regard to allegations of student-on-student sexual violence. It provided more specific instructions to educational institutions regarding their obligations under Title IX. Like the 2011 Dear Colleague Letter, the 2014 Q&A took the form of a guidance document, rather than a legally enforceable legislative rule. The Q&A made clear that when "a school knows or reasonably should know of possible sexual violence, it must take immediate and appropriate steps to investigate or otherwise determine what occurred." It clarified that, in cases of student-on-student sexual violence, a school violates Title IX when (1) "the alleged conduct is sufficiently serious to limit or deny a student's ability to participate in or benefit from the school's educational program" (creating a hostile environment) and (2) "the school, upon notice, fails to take prompt and effective steps reasonably calculated to end the sexual violence, eliminate the hostile environment, prevent its recurrence, and, as appropriate, remedy its effects." The 2014 Q&A also explained that Title IX requires schools, upon notice of an allegation, to protect complainants and ensure their safety through the use of interim steps before an investigation is complete. Among other things, it further specified in detail the requirements of Title IX with respect to the responsibilities of a school's Title IX Coordinator (the employee required by regulation to coordinate a school's compliance with Title IX), the elements expected in a school's written grievance procedures for responding to complaints of sexual violence, and which individuals qualify as responsible employees who are required to report allegations of sexual violence to a school's Title IX Coordinator. The document also detailed the requirements for schools in conducting investigations into alleged sexual violence. It stressed that while a school is permitted to use its own "student disciplinary procedures" to process complaints of sexual violence, that if a school chooses to do so, the imposition of sanctions against a perpetrator, "without additional remedies, likely will not be sufficient to eliminate the hostile environment and prevent recurrence." The 2014 Q&A noted that because Title IX investigations will not result in the incarceration of individuals, "the same procedural protections and legal standards are not required" in Title IX investigations as are compelled in criminal proceedings. Even if a criminal investigation of student-on-student sexual violence is ongoing, a school must conduct its own Title IX investigation. Indeed, the conclusion of a criminal investigation without charges "does not affect a school's Title IX obligations." The document also explained that schools were not required to conduct hearings to assess allegations of sexual violence, but if they did, they could not require the complainant to attend. Further, in the 2014 Q&A, OCR "strongly discourage[d]" schools from allowing parties to personally cross-examine one another because such actions "may be traumatic or intimidating, and may perpetuate a hostile environment." Instead, schools could allow parties to submit questions to a trained third party to ask on their behalf. The third party was advised to screen those questions "and only ask those it deem[ed] appropriate and relevant to the case." In response to the foregoing guidance from ED, as well as increased oversight from OCR between 2011 and 2016, schools developed a variety of procedures to ensure that their responses to allegations of sexual assault complied with Title IX. Generally speaking, the specific type of procedures for investigating allegations of sexual harassment vary considerably across educational institutions. While Title IX provides ED with some discretion in terms of administrative enforcement of the statute's bar on sex-based discrimination, including the ability to require public and private schools to develop certain procedures for handling complaints (as long as those schools receive federal funds), this discretion is constrained with respect to state actors (including public universities) by due process protections that set a baseline for the procedural protections afforded to the accused. In the public university context, a number of students subject to disciplinary sanctions for misconduct thus challenged the disciplinary procedures in state and federal courts as unconstitutional. In particular, a number of students faced with disciplinary action by public universities have raised constitutional challenges to the Title IX procedures used to find them responsible for sexual misconduct, arguing that universities violated the Due Process Clause in the handling of their case. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires states to observe certain procedures when depriving individuals of life, liberty, or property. In addition to protecting against the deprivation of an individual's physical property, the Constitution guards against the deprivation of certain "property interests" without due process. The property interests protected by the Due Process Clause are not themselves created by the Constitution; instead, those interests arise from an independent source, such as state or federal law. To have a protected property interest in a government-created benefit, one must show a "legitimate claim of entitlement" that originates in "existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law." Likewise, when a state deprives an individual of liberty, states must afford due process to the individual. In fact, when a "person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to him," due process may be implicated. In these circumstances, courts often require an accompanying state action that alters or removes a legal status to constitute a deprivation of liberty. Precisely what procedures are constitutionally required before depriving individuals of a protected interest can vary. When deciding what process is due, courts balance three factors enunciated by the Supreme Court in Ma thews v. Eldridge : (1) "the private interest that will be affected by the official action"; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation and the probable value of additional procedures; and (3) the interest of the government. In general, the Court has made clear that individuals with a protected interest are entitled to notice of the proposed action and a "meaningful opportunity to be heard" before the state may deprive them of that interest. The Supreme Court has explained, however, that due process is not a "technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place, and circumstances." Instead, the concept is "flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands." In conducting the balancing of factors pursuant to M athews v. Eldridge , the severity of the deprivation is a key factor in determining what procedures are constitutionally required. In general, the stronger the private interest at risk of deprivation, the more formal and exacting procedures will be required by courts. The only Supreme Court case to focus on procedural due process in the (nonacademic) student discipline context is Goss v. Lopez . In that case, high school students challenged their suspension from school for up to 10 days without a hearing. The Court first ruled that the public school students had a "legitimate entitlement to a public education," which was a property interest protected by due process; and that interest was deprived by the suspension. As to the process required, the Court ruled that, at a minimum, "students facing suspension . . . must be given some kind of notice and some kind of hearing." The Court also clarified that cases of more stringent sanctions, such as suspensions beyond 10 days or expulsions, "may require more formal procedures." Generally speaking, because public universities constitute state actors subject to the Due Process Clause, they must comply with constitutional standards when suspending or expelling students. Private universities, on the other hand, do not. The Supreme Court has assumed, without deciding on the merits, that students of public universities enjoy a "constitutionally protectable property right" in their continued enrollment in an educational institution. A number of federal courts of appeals have ruled that students enrolled in public universities have liberty and/or property interests in their education and that expulsion and certain suspensions can constitute a deprivation of that interest. As discussed in further detail below, as a baseline matter, federal courts have held that due process requires public schools to provide students with notice of the charges against them, the evidence used to make a determination, and the ability to present their side of the story to an unbiased decisionmaker. Of course, whether a public university has afforded a student due process "is a fact-intensive inquiry and the procedures required to satisfy due process will necessarily vary depending on the particular circumstances of each case." While colleges and universities have developed various procedures to comply with OCR's guidance regarding an institution's response to allegations of sexual harassment, a number of individuals subject to these disciplinary processes have challenged some of these procedures in federal court. Several courts have since issued decisions in cases brought by students asserting a due process violation in the context of a Title IX investigation or adjudicatory proceeding. The following section discusses recent notable judicial rulings that address the constitutionality of disciplinary proceedings in the context of sexual misconduct. The discussion below is organized by the type of claim raised against the public university: 1. the university failed to provide adequate notice of the charges against the student; 2. the university did not permit the accused student to confront and challenge the credibility of witnesses who testified against him; 3. the university allowed biased decisionmakers to oversee the proceedings; and 4. the university employed unfair review processes when rehearing an allegation brought by a complainant. Importantly, some of the judicial rulings discussed below address whether a student's stated claim is sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss and do not reach conclusive determinations about the evidence sufficient to establish a due process violation. One type of legal challenge raised by students accused of sexual misconduct is that the public universities failed to adequately notify them of the charges. As an initial matter, reviewing courts have taken the view that there generally will be no due process violation on notice grounds when the school (1) provides a student with timely notice of the actual, full charges against him; and (2) provides the accused student with a meaningful opportunity to prepare for the disciplinary hearing against him. The absence of such protocols, however, can form the basis of a viable due process claim. For example, at one university, an accused student alleged that he was interviewed by a school staff member assigned to investigate charges of sexual misconduct against him without first being notified of the existence of the sexual misconduct allegation. The student was eventually suspended from the university. A federal district court ruled that, given the severity of the suspension (three years), the lack of notice could amount to a due process violation. The court thus held that the student had stated a claim sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. In another case, an accused student alleged that he was not given adequate notice of the scope of charges against him. Rather, the school only notified him that his conduct on a particular day was under review, but expelled him for sexual misconduct that occurred in relation to other incidents and dates. The federal district court ruled that "[b]y conveying a limited scope of focus to plaintiff, defendants prejudiced plaintiff's ability to mount an effective defense, which increased the possibility of an erroneous outcome." Taken together with other procedural issues in the school's investigation and decision, the court concluded that the school had deprived the student of a liberty interest without due process of law. Similarly, the Sixth Circuit ruled that a student suspended by a university because of suspected sexual assault had sufficiently pleaded a due process violation when the university allegedly did not make available the evidence used in its disciplinary decision against him. The university's Title IX investigator compiled an investigatory report, which was allegedly used by the school's disciplinary hearing panel to adjudicate the student's case. However, the investigator failed to provide the report to the defendant. The court reasoned that the Constitution requires that a school provide the evidence used against a student in the context of significant disciplinary decisions and that a failure to do so constitutes a due process violation. A number of students have brought claims alleging a denial of due process because they were not afforded the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses in school disciplinary hearings. Courts have often rejected these arguments, however, in both sexual harassment proceedings and other disciplinary hearings, noting that the rights of students in disciplinary proceedings are not the same as those of criminal defendants. Case law reflects that courts have been more willing to entertain such claims when students have been denied an opportunity to challenge the credibility of witnesses where a witness's testimony concerns disputed and critical facts. As a general matter, cross-examination has not been regarded as a necessary feature of due process in the civil context. Even outside the context of sexual harassment allegations, courts have often denied due process challenges to university adjudicatory proceedings where students were not permitted to directly cross-examine witnesses, noting that the Due Process Clause does not guarantee the right to cross-examination in school disciplinary proceedings. This principle has been applied in recent cases alleging due process violations in the sexual harassment context. In one case, students challenged a university's adjudicatory proceedings regarding allegations of sexual assault, where accused students were permitted to submit written questions to a panel chair rather than directly to the complainant. The reviewing district court nonetheless rejected a due process challenge to the proceedings. Similarly, the Sixth Circuit denied a due process challenge to a university's disciplinary hearing concerning sexual assault allegations where students were not permitted to directly cross-examine their accuser. The students were permitted to submit written questions to the hearing panel, but were not permitted to submit any follow-up questions, and the panel failed to ask all of the questions they submitted. The circuit court reasoned that the proceedings satisfied the "limited" requirement of cross-examination where credibility is at issue, as the "marginal benefit that would accrue to the fact-finding process by allowing follow-up questions … is vastly outweighed by the burden" on the school. Likewise, the Fifth Circuit rejected a due process challenge to a university's disciplinary proceedings where the challengers argued they were denied the ability to effectively cross-examine witnesses and confront their accuser. In that case, the court noted that the school's decision did not rest on testimonial evidence, but on the videos and a photo taken and distributed by one of the challengers. Where a credibility determination was critical to the outcome of a proceeding, however, courts have often ruled in favor of due process challenges. For instance, the Sixth Circuit held that a university violated due process when it failed to provide any form of cross-examination in the hearing and the disciplinary decision necessarily rested on a credibility determination. In that case, the university based its decision to suspend a student entirely on the hearsay statement of the complainant, who did not appear at the disciplinary hearing. Importantly, the court noted that the suspended student only requested the additional procedure of posing questions to his accuser through the hearing panel, but he did not ask for the opportunity to directly cross-examine her. The court concluded that in such circumstances, some method must be made available to the adjudicative body to "assess the demeanor of both the accused and his accuser." The court concluded this procedure was necessary to comport with due process when the university's decision rested on a credibility determination. Likewise, the absence of a live hearing may sometimes form the basis of a viable due process claim. For instance, one federal district court ordered a university to provide an accused student facing the possibility of expulsion with a live hearing in order to comply with due process. In that case, the university's procedures for handling sexual misconduct allegations involved an investigator who would meet separately with the parties, conduct interviews with witnesses, and eventually reach a determination as to culpability without any opportunity for a hearing. The court reasoned that due to "the University's method of private questioning through the investigator, Plaintiff has no way of knowing which questions are actually being asked of Claimant or her response to those questions." Accordingly, the court concluded that the university violated the accused student's right to due process. Similarly, the Sixth Circuit has ruled that where credibility is at issue, a university "must give the accused student or his agent an opportunity to cross-examine the accuser and adverse witnesses in the presence of a neutral fact-finder." In that case, a university investigator concluded that the evidence supporting a finding of sexual misconduct was not sufficient, but the university's appeals board reversed after reviewing the report because it found the description of events given by the alleged victim and adverse witnesses more persuasive. At no time was the accused student given a live hearing or a chance to cross-examine his accuser or any adverse witnesses. The Sixth Circuit ruled that because the university ultimately had to "choose between competing narratives" in order to resolve the case, due process required a chance to cross-examine his accuser and adverse witnesses before a neutral fact-finder. Some students have also brought due process claims alleging that they were denied the ability to offer exculpatory evidence on their own behalf. Courts appear to examine such claims on a largely fact-specific basis. For instance, in one suit brought against a university, a student alleged he was denied the opportunity to present physical exculpatory evidence on his own behalf at a sexual assault disciplinary hearing. Specifically, the student claimed he was unable to present text messages at his hearing that he claimed would exonerate him. The district court ruled that this allegation raised concerns that he was denied due process. Students subject to disciplinary proceedings regarding sexual harassment or assault at institutions of higher education have also brought challenges alleging that a decisionmaker was biased against them. As a threshold matter, courts generally assume that school disciplinary panels are "entitled to a presumption of impartiality, absent a showing of actual bias." A plaintiff must generally allege facts sufficient to overcome this baseline presumption, such as statements by decisionmakers or a pattern of decisionmaking evidencing bias. For instance, a Fifth Circuit panel rejected a due process claim alleging bias in a university disciplinary hearing concerning sexual assault because the challengers failed to show how the integrity of the proceedings was undermined. In that case, the individual tasked as a victim advocate for the school investigated the charges against the accused and advised the panel members who made the disciplinary decision. The court reasoned that the investigator relied on photo and video evidence to render his findings to the panel and "there is nothing in the record . . . to suggest that a different investigator would have uncovered information diminishing the significance of that graphic evidence to the initial findings." Further, a separate university attorney advised the panel that they were free to draw their own conclusions from the proffered evidence. Evidence of bias in the consequential behavior or statements of decisionmakers, however, may give rise to a viable due process challenge. For example, the Sixth Circuit recently held that a student sufficiently pleaded a due process claim where he alleged that a university disciplinary hearing for alleged sexual assault was biased against him. In that case, one of the hearing panel members acted as investigator, prosecutor, and judge. The court noted that that fact alone did not give rise to a due process violation. Rather, because that individual also allegedly dominated the panel with remarks intended to reduce the defendant's credibility, and reportedly said during the hearing, "I'll bet you do this [commit sexual assault] all the time," the student had plausibly alleged that the hearing panel member was not impartial and had pre-judged his case. Courts have also addressed claims alleging a due process violation for bias based on institutional pressures, such as the sexual assault training received by university officials. For example, one district court rejected a due process claim which argued that university staff members were biased because they received sexual assault training that was not balanced with training for protecting the due process rights of accused students. The court reasoned that it was a "laudable goal" for the university to raise awareness of sexual assault and increase sensitivity to problems that victims of sexual violence experience. Plaintiffs' mere belief that the school "ha[d] a practice of railroading students accused of sexual misconduct simply to appease the Department of Education and preserve its federal funding" was unsupported by any evidence. In contrast, another district court rejected a motion to dismiss a due process claim brought by an expelled student alleging that the investigation and training materials given to the panel who decided his case were biased. The court reasoned that while this was a "he-said/she-said" case, "there seems to have been an assumption under [the] training materials that an assault occurred. As a result, there is a question whether the panel was trained to ignore some of the alleged deficiencies in the investigation and official report the panel considered." Accordingly, the court concluded that there may have been a due process violation because it was "plausible that the scales were tipped" against the accused student. Finally, a number of federal district court cases have addressed allegations that a university's disciplinary proceedings violated due process on the basis of unfair review processes for rehearing appeals. In one district court case, a student was cleared by a hearing panel on a charge of sexual assault, but the university ordered a new hearing, apparently premised only on the school being unable to adequately prove its case in the first hearing. The district court found this to be fundamentally unfair to the student and ruled that the allegations survived the university's motion to dismiss. Similarly, in another district court case, a suspended student challenged the validity of a school's procedures where he was initially found not responsible for sexual misconduct by a hearing board, but was later determined guilty after the complainant appealed that decision. At the administrative appeal stage, the school did not give the defendant sufficient notice of, or time to respond to, new evidence against him; did not provide him with details of the identity of a woman he was newly accused of assaulting; did not tell him the names of the members of the appeal board; did not give him notice of the appeal board's meeting; and did not permit him to attend that meeting. The appeals board reversed the initial hearing board's determination that the student was not responsible for sexual misconduct, without explanation, and without any oral presentations or live testimony. The reviewing federal district court ruled that the school failed to provide the student with a meaningful hearing. Likewise, a student brought a claim in federal district court against a university after being expelled for sexual assault even though he had been found not responsible by an initial hearing panel. In that case the school permitted a rehearing after the complainant appealed the initial hearing panel's decision, and subsequently the individual presiding over the appeal expelled the student. The individual presiding over the appeal conducted off-the-record and ex parte meetings with the accuser and failed to deliver the accused student a record of those meetings. According to the reviewing court, by the time the student was permitted to present his defense, the individual overseeing his appeal had pre-judged the case, and expelled the accused student without providing a basis for the decision. The court ruled that these procedural inadequacies, combined with a failure to offer the student notice of the full scope of allegations against him, combined to constitute a due process violation. With the foregoing considerations in the background, in September 2017 OCR withdrew the 2011 Dear Colleague Letter and 2014 Questions and Answers document. ED explained that it would begin the rulemaking process to codify a school's responsibilities under Title IX. In the interim, ED stated that it would continue to rely on the 2001 Guidance; it also issued a new Question and Answer document indicating how the department would address sexual misconduct during that time. The document notifies schools that they may, in certain circumstances, resolve complaints through mediation. It also notifies schools that they may choose to allow appeals either by both parties or solely by the party found to have committed sexual misconduct and not the alleged victim. On November 29, 2018, ED issued a notice of proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register . If adopted, the proposal would significantly alter the responsibilities of schools in responding to allegations of sexual harassment. Among other things, the proposed regulation would (1) define in narrower terms what conduct qualifies as sexual harassment under Title IX; (2) require "actual notice" of harassment, rather than constructive notice, to trigger a school's Title IX responsibilities; (3) provide that a school's response to allegations of sexual harassment will violate the statute only if amounting to deliberate indifference; and (4) impose new procedural requirements that reflect concern for due process when schools investigate allegations and make determinations of culpability. The proposed regulation would first define sexual harassment in the following ways: an employee conditioning the provision of a benefit, service, or aid on the individual's participation in unwelcome sexual conduct (i.e., quid pro quo); "unwelcome conduct on the basis of sex that is so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it effectively denies a person equal access to the recipient's education program or activity" (i.e., hostile environment); or sexual assault (as defined in regulations implementing the Clery Act). Notably, among the changes to past definitions of sexual harassment issued by ED, the proposal would establish a higher threshold to show a Title IX violation based on hostile environment harassment than that required by ED in the past. As explained in an earlier section of this report, ED's 2001 Guidance described hostile environment harassment as sexually harassing "conduct [that] is sufficiently serious to deny or limit a student's ability to participate in or benefit from the school's program based on sex." The proposed regulations would instead generally adopt the standard for actionable harassment that the Supreme Court's 1999 Davis decision applied in the context of private suits for damages: "unwelcome conduct on the basis of sex that is so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it effectively denies a person equal access to the recipient's education program or activity." In other words, whereas ED previously defined a hostile environment harassment as harassment that is "sufficiently serious to limit" a student's ability to benefit from or participate in a school's program, the proposed regulations would define a hostile environment as one "that is so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it effectively denies a person equal access to the recipient's education program or activity." Second, in a departure from past administrative practice, in which ED considered "constructive notice" (i.e., known or should have known) to trigger a school's responsibilities in cases of student-on-student harassment, and did not impose a notice requirement in certain cases of harassment by a teacher or employee, the proposal would establish that a school has a duty to respond to allegations of sexual harassment only when it has "actual knowledge." Actual knowledge is defined as notice of harassment (or allegation of harassment) to a school's Title IX Coordinator or official with authority to institute corrective measures; the regulations explicitly reject imputing knowledge to a school based on respondeat superior or constructive notice. Notably, in contrast to past guidance from ED, the mere ability or obligation to report by a school employee does not qualify them as one who possesses authority to institute corrective measures. The proposal explains that this threshold for triggering a school's obligations is intended to align the administrative standard imposed by ED with that articulated by the Supreme Court in Gebser and Davis in the context of private litigation seeking money damages. Further, the proposed regulations would compel schools to respond only to sexual harassment that occurs within a school's "education program or activity." This contrasts with past ED guidance which provided that schools sometimes will be responsible to respond to harassment that occurs "outside a school's education program or activity." For instance, past ED guidance (since rescinded) required schools to "process all complaints of sexual violence, regardless of where the conduct occurred," in order to determine if the conduct has effects on campus. In another departure from prior administrative practice, in which ED judged a school's response under a "reasonableness" standard, the proposed regulations only require a school to respond in a manner that is not "deliberately indifferent." Deliberate indifference is a "response to sexual harassment [that] is clearly unreasonable in light of the known circumstances." Once again, this would tether a school's responsibility to that announced by the Court in Davis in the context of private suits for damages. The proposal explains that, for ED, this standard aptly holds schools accountable while allowing for flexibility in making disciplinary decisions. The proposal outlines three situations in which a safe harbor is provided to a school from a finding of deliberate indifference. First, when a formal Title IX complaint is made (by a complainant or Title IX Coordinator), the proposed regulations outline a number of grievance procedures (outlined below) that schools must follow. When a school follows these procedures it would not be deliberately indifferent and has not discriminated under Title IX. Second, if a school has actual knowledge of harassment because of multiple complainants, the Title IX Coordinator must file a complaint. Again, compliance with the grievance procedures would negate any inference of deliberate indifference in this situation. Third, with respect to institutions of higher education, and in situations where there is not a formal complaint, a school would not be deliberately indifferent if it offers and implements supportive measures to the complainant that are aimed to restore or preserve the complainant's access to a school's education program or activity. The school must also at this time notify the complainant in writing of the right to file a formal complaint. As long as an institution of higher education follows these requirements, it would not be deliberately indifferent. Aside from these three situations, the proposed regulations provide that a school with actual knowledge of sexual harassment in an education program or activity must respond in a manner that is not deliberately indifferent. The proposal would also allow schools to remove an individual accused of sexual harassment from an educational program or activity on an emergency basis. However, a school must conduct an individualized risk and safety analysis, determine that the removal is justified because of an immediate threat to students or employees, and provide the accused with notice and an opportunity to challenge the decision. The regulations also allow schools to place a nonstudent employee on administrative leave during an investigation. A significant component of the proposal reflects concern that schools provide accused students with due process protections during the fact-finding process and ultimate determination of culpability. As a threshold matter, schools must investigate allegations received in a formal complaint, but if the alleged conduct would not (if proved) constitute sexual harassment under the regulations, or if it did not occur within a sch ool's program or activity, the complaint must be dismissed. Upon receipt of a formal Title IX complaint regarding sexual harassment, a school must provide written notice to the relevant parties of the allegations, including notice of the available grievance procedures, and notice of the allegations constituting a potential violation, "including sufficient details known at the time and with sufficient time to prepare a response before any initial interview." A school's grievance procedures must treat complainants and respondents equitably, which means that a school must both provide remedies for complainants upon a finding of sexual harassment as well as due process protections for a respondent before any sanctions are imposed. The proposal would provide that a school's treatment of a complainant in response to a formal complaint of harassment can constitute discrimination in violation of Title IX; likewise, a school's treatment of a respondent can discriminate on the basis of sex in violation of Title IX. The procedures must also require an objective evaluation of evidence (both inculpatory and exculpatory) and provide that credibility determinations not be made based on one's status; require that individuals involved in the investigation or decisionmaking process not be biased and receive training on ensuring student safety and providing due process for all parties; include a presumption that respondents are not guilty until proven otherwise; and describe the range of possible sanctions and remedies available, the standard of evidence used, the ability to appeal (if offered) and the range of available supportive measures. With respect to a school's actual investigation of alleged harassment, the proposed regulations require that a school must: place the burden of proof and of gathering evidence on the school (rather than either party); allow each party equal opportunity to present witnesses and evidence; not restrict parties from gathering and presenting relevant evidence or from discussing the allegations; permit both parties equally to have their choice of advisor or other person join them during proceedings, although the school may restrict an advisor's participation so long as restrictions apply equally to both parties; provide parties with written notice of the relevant details of hearings and interviews and allow sufficient time to prepare; for institutions of higher education, provide a live hearing where the decisionmaker must allow each party to ask the other party and witnesses all relevant questions (and follow-up questions) including those that challenge one's credibility; cross-examination must be done by the party's advisor; at the request of either party, schools must allow for cross-examination via technology with the parties in separated rooms; decisionmakers must not rely on any party or witness's statement if they do not submit to cross-examination; allow both parties an equal opportunity to review evidence from the investigation that is directly related to the allegations; and develop a report summarizing the relevant evidence and provide this to the parties at least 10 days prior to a hearing (or time where responsibility is determined). Notably, these requirements depart from past ED guidance by requiring, for institutions of higher education, a quasi-judicial proceeding in the form of a live hearing. Each party may question the other side, and cross-examination must be conducted by a party's advisor. The proposed regulations would also significantly alter the ultimate decisionmaking requirements for schools. For instance, the decisionmaker in a proceeding may not be the investigator or the school's Title IX Coordinator. This would bar the practice of some universities that have used a single investigator to both examine allegations and reach a decision regarding culpability. And in contrast to past guidance from ED, the new regulations permit schools to apply either a preponderance of the evidence standard or a clear and convincing standard. However, schools may apply the former only if they use that same standard for conduct violations other than sexual harassment that carry the same maximum disciplinary penalty. Further, schools must apply the same standard of evidence for complaints against students as it does for employees and faculty. A schools may, but is not required to, allow appeals of decisions. If it does so, it must allow both parties to appeal. A school may also, at any point before reaching a final determination, facilitate an informal resolution process as long as it obtains the parties' written consent and notifies them of the requirements of the process. As discussed above, the antidiscrimination mandate of Title IX, enacted in 1972, prohibits discrimination "on the basis of sex" in educational programs in general terms. The statute does not expressly refer to or address sex discrimination in the form of sexual abuse, sexual harassment, or sexual assault. Nor does the statute address when, by whom, or under what circumstances such conduct will amount to a Title IX violation. Given the statute's silence on these issues, federal courts have largely determined when relief is available for individual victims of sexual abuse or harassment. Indeed, in creating the remedial scheme for a private right of action to address such claims, the Supreme Court sought to "'infer how the [1972] Congress would have addressed the issue'" if there had been an express provision in the statute, an approach that the Court observed "inherently entails a degree of speculation, since it addresses an issue on which Congress has not specifically spoken." Likewise, given the sparse statutory language, federal agencies have issued shifting guidelines at to the responsibilities of educational institutions in complying with Title IX. As a general matter, Congress enjoys substantial discretion to modify the terms of Title IX to clarify the appropriate standard in private suits for damages as well as in the administrative enforcement context. Congress could, for instance, amend Title IX to define the specific conduct that amounts to a violation of the statute regarding sexual abuse or harassment. In addition, an amendment could also clarify whether liability for harassment should be handled differently in elementary and secondary schools, as opposed to the university context. Likewise, legislation could distinguish between harassment by teachers from that between students. Further, because the private right of action under Title IX has been judicially implied, rather than expressly codified in statute, Congress could modify the legal standards that apply in a private suit for damages. Finally, aside from directly amending Title IX, Congress could also direct federal agencies to alter their administrative enforcement of the statute. For example, Congress could direct ED to promulgate regulations that distinguish between various types of sexual harassment or treat harassment differently depending on the context.	[ "Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (Title IX) provides an avenue of legal relief for victims of sexual abuse and harassment at educational institutions. It bars discrimination \"on the basis of sex\" in an educational program or activity receiving federal funding. Although Title IX makes no explicit reference to sexual harassment or abuse, the Supreme Court and federal agencies have determined that such conduct can sometimes constitute discrimination in violation of the statute; educational institutions in some circumstances can be held responsible when a teacher sexually harasses a student or when one student harasses another. Title IX is mainly enforced (1) through private rights of action brought directly against schools by or on behalf of students subjected to sexual misconduct; and (2) by federal agencies that provide funding to educational programs. To establish liability in a private right of action, a party seeking damages for a Title IX violation must satisfy the standards set forth by the Supreme Court in Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District, decided in 1998, and Davis Next Friend LaShonda D. v. Monroe County Board of Education, decided the next year. Gebser provides that when a teacher commits harassment against a student, a school district is liable only when it has actual knowledge of allegations by an \"appropriate person,\" and so deficiently responds to those allegations that its response amounts to deliberate indifference to the discrimination. Davis instructs that, besides showing actual knowledge by an appropriate person and deliberate indifference, a plaintiff suing for damages for sexual harassment committed by a student must show that the conduct was \"so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive\" that it denied the victim equal access to educational opportunities or benefits. Taken together, the Supreme Court's decisions set forth a high threshold for a private party seeking damages against an educational institution based on its response to sexual harassment. In turn, federal appellate courts have differed in how to apply the standards set in Gebser and Davis, diverging on the nature and amount of evidence sufficient to support a claim. In each of the last several presidential administrations, the Department of Education (ED) issued a number of guidance documents that instruct schools on their responsibilities under Title IX when addressing allegations of sexual harassment. These documents—while sometimes subject to change—generally reflected a different standard than the Supreme Court case law addressing private rights of action for damages for sexual abuse or harassment (the Court in Davis acknowledged that the threshold for liability in a private right of action could be higher than the standard imposed in the administrative enforcement context). Those guidance documents had, among other things, established that sometimes a school could be held responsible for instances of sexual harassment by a teacher, irrespective of actual notice; and schools could be held responsible for student-on-student harassment if a \"responsible employee\" knew or should have known of the harassment (constructive notice). ED's previous guidance also instructed educational institutions that they sometimes could be responsible for responding to incidents of sexual harassment occurring off campus. ED also cautioned schools on the use of mediation to resolve allegations of sexual harassment. With regard to the procedures used by schools to resolve sexual harassment allegations, ED informed schools that they must use the preponderance of the evidence standard to establish culpability, and the agency strongly discouraged schools from allowing parties in a hearing to personally cross-examine one another. In response to guidance from ED, as well as increased oversight from the department's Office for Civil Rights (OCR) between 2011 and 2016, schools developed several procedures to ensure that their responses to allegations of sexual harassment and assault complied with Title IX. A number of students faced with disciplinary action by public universities raised constitutional challenges to the Title IX procedures used to find them responsible for sexual misconduct, arguing that universities violated the Due Process Clause in handling their case. ED issued a notice of proposed rulemaking in late 2018, after revoking some of its previous guidance to schools in 2017. The proposed regulations would, in several ways, tether the administrative requirements for schools to the standard set by the Supreme Court in Gebser and Davis. In doing so, the proposed regulations would depart from the standards set by ED in previous guidance documents (some of which have since been rescinded). The new regulations would require \"actual notice,\" rather than constructive notice, of harassment by an education institution to trigger a school's Title IX responsibilities, and provide that a school's response to allegations of sexual harassment will violate Title IX only if it amounts to deliberate indifference. In addition, the new regulations would more narrowly define what conduct qualifies as sexual harassment under Title IX, and also impose new procedural requirements, which appear to reflect due process concerns, when schools investigate sexual harassment or assault allegations and make determinations of culpability." ]	14,692	gov_report	en	null	5ff322b828f3adf54570798244cb178e360f53f0d6bbaf80
NSF relies on two programs for bringing rotators into the agency: (1) the IPA program and (2) the VSEE program. The Office of Personnel Management develops policies on agencies’ use of the IPA program and promulgates program regulations. Rotators in NSF’s IPA and VSEE programs differ in key respects, including their employment status and compensation. IPA rotators. NSF enters into written agreements with rotators’ home institutions for all IPA assignments. The agreements detail rotators’ salaries and health, retirement, and other fringe benefits at their home institutions, as well as the cost-sharing amounts NSF and home institutions are to pay during rotators’ assignments. NSF reimburses its cost-sharing amounts to home institutions, which continue to pay rotators’ full salaries and benefits. NSF does not cap the salaries of IPA rotators; as a result, IPA rotators may receive salaries that exceed the maximum federal salary for the position they hold at NSF. In contrast, if an IPA rotator’s salary is less than the minimum federal salary for the position, NSF will supplement the salary to the minimum rate. VSEE rotators. NSF appoints VSEE rotators as federal employees on a nonpaid leave of absence from their home institutions. VSEE rotators receive their salaries directly from NSF but are not eligible for certain federal benefits, such as retirement; instead, NSF reimburses home institutions for the employer’s share of retirement, life insurance, and health benefits that would otherwise be discontinued. NSF’s policy is to set salaries for VSEE rotators that are generally comparable to the salaries the rotators would receive at their home institutions. In setting salaries, NSF also takes into account other sources of income, such as consulting, and allows for locality pay adjustments applicable to employees in the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area. However, because VSEE rotators are federal employees, NSF caps their salaries at the federal maximum for the position they hold at NSF. Both IPA and VSEE rotators are eligible for certain other types of reimbursement. In particular, rotators have the option of having NSF pay their moving expenses to and from Washington, D.C., or receiving per diem allowances in accordance with federal travel regulations for up to 2 years. In addition, NSF may reimburse rotators for travel-related expenses related to their participation in NSF’s Independent Research and Development program, which enables NSF staff to maintain their involvement with their professional research and research-related activities at their home institutions. Table 1 shows additional information on IPA and VSEE rotator expenses. Rotators are generally assigned to one of NSF’s seven directorates that support science and engineering research and education (see table 2). Each directorate is headed by an assistant director and deputy assistant director. Directorates are further subdivided into divisions, offices, or sections. Each division is headed by a division director and typically a deputy division director, and each office is headed by an office director and typically a deputy office director. All these positions are executive positions at NSF. At the staff level, NSF uses program directors—subject matter experts in the scientific areas they manage—to conduct reviews of proposals and recommend which projects the agency should fund. With an annual budget of about $7.5 billion, NSF funds approximately 24 percent of all federally supported basic research conducted by colleges and universities in the United States. In 2016, NSF established the Steering Committee for Policy and Oversight of the IPA Program. The steering committee serves as the primary body for considering policy on NSF’s use of IPA rotators and overseeing common approaches to budgeting and implementation of the IPA program. The committee’s membership includes NSF’s chief human capital officer, who serves as the chair, and several other NSF officials. The steering committee has established strategic principles for management of the IPA program. These principles include maintaining a balance between IPA rotators and federal staff and a commitment to ongoing improvement of the program. NSF officials told us that there is no similar steering committee for overseeing VSEE rotators. Instead, each VSEE rotator is individually overseen by his or her respective supervisor. For the agency as a whole, NSF’s Office of Information and Resource Management and its Division of Human Resource Management conduct human capital management. NSF officials stated that the head of the Office of Information and Resource Management serves as the Chief Human Capital Officer and develops and oversees NSF’s human capital approaches and strategies. These officials also told us that the Deputy Chief Human Capital Officer serves as the division director of Human Resource Management and is responsible for administering the division’s day-to-day operations. The Division of Human Resource Management administers the agency’s human capital policies as set forth in NSF’s personnel manual. The numbers of rotators and their costs to NSF in proportion to other staff have remained relatively stable. Most rotators were IPA rotators, and were used in both executive and program director (staff-level) positions. NSF generally used VSEE rotators in program director positions. Most rotators at NSF were IPA rotators, and the proportion of rotators relative to other staff has remained relatively stable over time (see fig. 1). During the 10-year period we reviewed, from fiscal year 2008 through fiscal year 2017, IPA and VSEE rotators comprised about 12 percent and about 3 percent, respectively, of NSF’s total workforce; and the number of IPA rotators ranged from 162 to 190 (about 11 to 12 percent of total staff), and the number of VSEE rotators ranged from 22 to 52 (about 1 to 3 percent of total staff). NSF primarily used rotators across its seven scientific directorates, using IPA rotators in executive and program director positions and VSEE rotators in program director positions. The agency used rotators in these positions alongside NSF’s permanent staff to perform day-to-day agency operations, including managing the agency’s merit review process for determining which projects to fund. NSF used IPA rotators in executive positions such as assistant director. According to agency officials, individuals in executive positions at NSF are responsible for setting the direction for the scientific area they are assigned, leading scientific and technical matters, establishing an organizational culture, overseeing outreach and collaboration with NSF stakeholders, and contributing to NSF and national policy development and implementation. For example, an executive IPA rotator that we interviewed told us that he emphasized forming partnerships with industry when setting the direction for his directorate, including issuing joint solicitations for research proposals with industry partners. In addition, according to NSF officials, individuals in executive positions provide guidance and team management for staff. The proportion of IPA rotators to federal employees in executive positions within NSF’s seven scientific directorates and other staff offices has generally increased since fiscal year 2012. As shown in figure 4, from fiscal year 2008 through fiscal year 2017, the number and proportion of executive positions filled by IPA rotators ranged from 18 of 98 (about 18 percent) in 2008 to 30 of 108 (about 28 percent) in fiscal year 2016. In November 2017, IPA rotators filled 29 of 88 (about 33 percent) executive positions within NSF’s seven scientific directorates. At that time, the proportion of executive positions filled by IPA rotators varied among directorates, as shown in table 3. For example, IPA rotators filled 4 of 8 (50 percent) of the executive positions in the Directorate for Social, Behavioral, and Economic Sciences and 2 of 14 (about 14 percent) of the executive positions in the Directorate for Mathematical and Physical Sciences. According to NSF officials, NSF often pairs IPA rotators and federal employees at the executive level so that each can benefit from the other’s experience and perspective. For example, in all but one directorate, an IPA rotator filled the assistant director position and a federal employee filled the corresponding deputy assistant director position. Two NSF executives we interviewed, including an IPA rotator and a federal employee, commented positively on the pairing of IPA rotators and federal employees at the executive level. For example, they said that rotators maintain close ties to the research community and federal employees may have more experience with NSF’s institutional history. One NSF executive told us that IPA rotators help keep the agency at the forefront of science because they have deep ties with the research community and regularly publish their own research. Additionally, a federal program director we interviewed told us that in one previous instance in which an IPA rotator filled an executive position without being paired with a federal employee, the rotator’s lack of institutional knowledge of NSF and the steep learning curve for the position caused inefficiencies during the rotator’s first year at NSF. The agency, however, does not require pairing IPA rotators and federal employees at the executive level, according to NSF officials. For example, in November 2017, IPA rotators filled both the division director and deputy division director positions in the Division of Behavioral and Cognitive Science and Division of Undergraduate Education. In our interviews with a nongeneralizable sample of NSF employees and rotators, we found mixed perceptions about the effect of NSF’s use of IPA rotators on opportunities for advancement for permanent employees. For example, in response to a question about this effect, one permanent NSF employee told us that she advanced to an executive position and that opportunities exist for advancement within the agency. In contrast, another NSF employee we interviewed told us that she did not feel there were opportunities for advancement because, in her view, executive vacancies created by the departure of rotators were exclusively filled with other rotators. NSF officials said that the agency has no policy that restricts repeatedly filling certain executive positions with rotators and that such a situation is a common practice. Nevertheless, NSF officials told us 32 of the 88 executives (about 36 percent) in NSF’s seven scientific directorates in November 2017 had held staff-level positions within the agency before becoming executives. NSF uses both IPA and VSEE rotators in program director positions, which are staff-level positions. In fiscal year 2016, NSF had a total of 506 program directors, including 139 IPA rotators (about 27 percent) and 39 VSEE rotators (about 8 percent). According to NSF officials, program directors are responsible for conducting long-range planning and developing budgets for the areas of science represented by their program and for administrating the merit review process. In particular, IPA and VSEE rotators who serve as program directors help determine the projects that NSF funds. To do so, they review proposals, identify experts in their field to serve as external reviewers, and make funding recommendations to their respective division directors. NSF officials told us that, similar to the pairing of IPA rotators and federal employees at the executive level, permanent and rotating program directors frequently work together on a shared program so that each can benefit from the other’s experience and perspective. For example, a rotating program director we interviewed told us that she worked under the guidance of a program lead, who is typically a permanent employee. Another rotating program director told us that NSF’s permanent federal employees are good at training incoming rotators. Beginning in fiscal year 2017, NSF adopted rotator program cost- management strategies expected to achieve the greatest savings with the least harm to recruitment, but NSF officials said it is too soon to determine the full results because these new strategies are being phased in for new IPA agreements only. NSF considered other strategies to manage rotator costs, but it did not adopt them, generally because NSF anticipated negative effects on rotator recruitment or because it estimated the resulting cost savings would be small. NSF has adopted three strategies to manage rotators’ costs in fiscal year 2017, but, NSF officials said it is too soon to determine the full results because these new strategies are being phased in for new IPA agreements only. All three of these strategies relate to IPA rotators; NSF officials told us that they have not considered or adopted any cost- management strategies related to VSEE rotators. The officials explained that any such strategies could affect NSF’s entire federal workforce because VSEE rotators are federal employees. The three strategies are: (1) obtaining a minimum 10 percent cost-share from each IPA rotator’s home institution, (2) limiting IPA rotators’ paid trips to their home institutions to 12 per year, and (3) no longer reimbursing IPA rotators for consulting income that they forgo while at NSF. NSF officials told us they expect to issue a report with the results of evaluations of all three strategies in December 2018. In October 2016, NSF implemented a cost-sharing pilot program that requires institutions covered by the program—those who entered into negotiations for new IPA agreements in fiscal year 2017—to pay for at least 10 percent of the IPA rotators’ salaries and fringe benefits. Implementing this cost-management strategy, and the other strategies that NSF adopted, was consistent with recommendations from NSF’s steering committee for oversight of IPA rotators. This cost-management strategy targeted NSF’s costs for IPA rotators’ salary and fringe benefits, which constitute the largest component of IPA rotators’ costs. For example, these costs were about $34.7 million, or about 89 percent of IPA rotator costs in fiscal year 2017. Previously, according to NSF officials, the agency requested an optional cost-share amount of 15 percent from rotators’ home institutions, but it typically received less because of variations in the amounts that home institutions provided. According to an October 2016 report from the task force on fiscal oversight, NSF decided on 10 percent for the cost-sharing pilot program because, historically, few home institutions provided the full 15 percent and NSF believed a requirement of 10 percent would not significantly affect its ability to recruit and hire IPA rotators. If a home institution is unable to provide the full 10 percent, the institution may request that NSF waive the cost-sharing requirement. According to NSF officials, such requests must be signed by a senior administrator at the rotator’s home institution and include the rationale for not being able to provide the required amount, the financial impact on the institution if it were to provide the full 10 percent, and associated documentation, among other things. Changes made in implementing this strategy, and the other strategies that NSF adopted, applied to new IPA agreements made in fiscal year 2017. These changes did not apply to IPA rotators with agreements made prior to 2017—even if those agreements are subsequently extended or renewed—or that were being negotiated at the time of the policy change, provided that the rotators’ appointment memoranda were already being reviewed by NSF’s Division of Human Resource Management. NSF officials told us that as of March 2018, the agency had not conducted full evaluations of this strategy or the other strategies because it was too soon to determine their full effects and NSF had not yet collected enough data to do so. Instead, NSF issued reports in January and March 2018 containing its preliminary analyses. In general, these preliminary reports found that the cost-management strategies resulted in savings to NSF. Similarly, our analysis of data from NSF found that cost sharing as a percentage of IPA rotators’ salary and fringe benefits increased from about 7 percent in fiscal year 2016 to about 8 percent in fiscal year 2017. NSF officials told us that of the 55 IPA rotators who were subject to the cost-sharing requirement in fiscal year 2017: the home institutions for 54 rotators met or exceeded the 10 percent cost-share requirement, and of those, 16 exceeded the cost-share requirement; and the home institution for 1 rotator did not cost-share because the rotator was from a Federally Funded Research and Development Center and NSF waived the cost-share requirement because cost- sharing would not decrease the overall federal cost. In November 2017, NSF decided to extend the cost-sharing pilot through at least the end of fiscal year 2018, to ensure a full evaluation could be conducted. In particular, NSF officials told us that they need more data and experience with this pilot program to better understand its effects, such as the ability to recruit potential IPA rotators. For example, one IPA rotator that we interviewed expressed concern with the cost-sharing requirement’s potential effect on small or publicly funded universities, which may lack funds to contribute to the cost of an IPA assignment. According to NSF officials, their evaluation will include an analysis of the cost of IPA rotators under the cost-sharing requirement and its effect on the IPA program, including recruitment. Beginning in fiscal year 2017, for IPA rotators who entered into negotiations for new agreements in that fiscal year, NSF placed a limit of 12 agency-funded trips per year that rotators may take to their home institutions under the Independent Research and Development program. In our analysis of data from NSF, we found that NSF’s costs for IPA rotators under this program decreased from about $1.5 million (about 3 percent of IPA rotator costs) in fiscal year 2016 to $1.1 million (about 3 percent of IPA rotator costs) in fiscal year 2017. NSF officials told us that the new limit applies only to an IPA rotator’s trips to their home institution and does not limit travel to other locations for fieldwork or scientific conferences, among other things. These officials explained that NSF chose not to limit trips to these other locations because they are considered fundamental to IPA rotators’ research and are infrequent—occurring one to three times per year, on average, per IPA rotator. Additionally, rotators are permitted to use annual leave, leave without pay, or flexitime to take trips using non-NSF funds for activities performed on a rotator’s own time. In adopting this cost-management strategy, NSF sought to balance the benefits of IPA rotators’ travel with the travel costs. According to the Task Force on Fiscal Oversight’s October 2016 report, NSF’s support for travel benefits the agency by providing a way for program directors and executives to stay current in their scientific fields, conduct outreach with scientific communities, and provide oversight and stewardship of NSF’s programs and awards. NSF officials told us that the agency sought to control travel costs under the Independent Research and Development program by setting a reasonable limit to NSF-funded trips that would cause the least harm to rotators’ research so as not to discourage them from coming to NSF. As a result, NSF decided on a maximum of 12 trips per year under this program because, historically, more than 80 percent of the IPA rotator participants traveled to their home institution less than once per month. In fiscal year 2017, for IPA rotators who entered into new agreements in that fiscal year, NSF ended reimbursements for consulting income that the rotators forgo as a result of their assignment to NSF. Previously, when an IPA rotator discontinued consulting activities during an IPA assignment, NSF would reimburse the rotator up to $10,000 a year. IPA rotators who entered into negotiations or agreements with NSF prior to this change may still receive this reimbursement. In fiscal year 2017, NSF’s cost for lost consulting reimbursements to IPA rotators was $150,000. This amount represented a decrease of about $160,000, or about 52 percent, from fiscal year 2016. NSF made this change because it determined that doing so would not negatively affect the IPA program. In particular, NSF found that other federal science agencies typically did not reimburse IPA rotators for lost consulting income and it concluded that IPA rotators typically do not expect NSF to offer reimbursement. In addition to the three adopted strategies, NSF’s Task Force on Fiscal Oversight identified other potential cost management strategies for the IPA program. The task force reviewed various data on the costs that make up the IPA program, such as the number of IPA rotators who received a particular form of compensation or who would be affected by the potential strategies. In addition, the task force took into account anecdotal and other evidence on how IPA rotators might react to the strategies. Using input from the task force, NSF opted against the other potential strategies because it either (1) expected the resulting cost savings to be small or (2) anticipated potential negative effects from implementing them, such as increased difficulty in hiring IPA rotators. These potential cost-management strategies primarily related to IPA rotator compensation, as described below. Capping IPA rotators’ salaries. NSF decided against establishing a salary cap for IPA rotators at various levels between about $185,000 and $240,000 annually. The task force found that salary caps at lower levels would have greater cost savings because of the higher number of individuals covered by the cap, but that the caps would also pose a significant risk to NSF’s ability to recruit IPA rotators. In particular, the task force found that salary caps at lower levels would disproportionately affect IPA rotators in two of its directorates—the Directorate for Computer and Information Science and Engineering and the Directorate for Engineering—because of the higher salaries of individuals in positions associated with those fields. As a result, the task force recommended that NSF first assess the effects of its cost-sharing pilot program before proceeding with any cap on IPA rotators’ salaries. Reducing or eliminating IPA rotators’ supplemental pay. NSF decided against reducing or eliminating the supplemental pay that IPA rotators receive when their salary at their home institution is below the minimum for their NSF position. In fiscal year 2017, NSF’s cost for IPA rotators’ supplemental pay was $1.0 million (about 3 percent of IPA rotator costs). The task force recommended against this potential cost-management strategy because it would disproportionately affect IPA rotators in two of its directorates—the Directorate for Biological Sciences and the Directorate for Geosciences. In addition, the task force expected that any cost savings associated with this strategy would be small. Reducing IPA rotators’ per diem payments. NSF decided against reducing or eliminating per diem payments for lodging (excluding taxes), meals, and incidental expenses incurred during the length of rotators’ assignments. In fiscal year 2017, NSF’s cost for per diem payments was $3.1 million (about 8 percent of IPA costs). The task force concluded, based on its analysis of per diem costs and anecdotal evidence, that many IPA rotators would opt to depart NSF if NSF did not provide per diem payments. As a result, the task force recommended against this strategy. As of June 2018, NSF had not developed an agency-wide workforce strategy for using rotators, as its IPA program steering committee recommended. In addition, NSF has not fully evaluated or developed plans to evaluate both IPA and VSEE rotator program results in terms of progress toward NSF’s human capital goals or programmatic results. As of June 2018, NSF had not developed an agency-wide workforce strategy that includes use of rotators, as NSF’s IPA program steering committee had recommended. In an August 2016 report on the IPA program, the steering committee stated that NSF did not have an agency- wide workforce strategy; instead, each directorate made decisions on its own about when and how to use IPA rotators in executive and program director positions. According to the report, an agency-wide framework would enable NSF to ensure an optimal balance of federal and rotator executives and program directors, which is a strategic principle that the steering committee developed for the IPA program. In February 2017, the committee issued an internal report to agency leadership that recommended expanding what was originally envisioned as a workforce strategy for the IPA program into a comprehensive agency-wide workforce strategy. The report stated that expanding the scope of the workforce strategy would have the greatest impact across the agency and would help NSF leadership in making strategic human capital decisions. The report outlined a process for developing a workforce strategy with various steps, including the following: Job analyses. The report recommended job analyses to review the roles and responsibilities of executive and staff-level positions and to identify the skills and capabilities required for successful performance of the work. According to the report, the steering committee’s working group for developing a workforce strategy found, based on its initial efforts to review position descriptions and roles and responsibilities, that some functions may be better served if performed by permanent federal employees and other functions by rotators. However, the working group concluded that NSF should obtain additional input and evidence before initiating large-scale changes in its workforce. Analysis of workforce gaps and surpluses. The report stated that identifying gaps and surpluses in the demand and supply for federal and rotator scientific staff would inform opportunities to optimize recruitment and retention efforts. The report recommended separate analyses for executive and scientific staff- level positions. Development of strategies to close workforce gaps and address surpluses. According to the steering committee’s report, examples of strategies include succession planning and rebalancing the mix of permanent federal staff and rotators to ensure an optimal workforce with the skills, experience, and capabilities to accomplish NSF’s science-related work. According to NSF officials, the agency’s Division of Human Resource Management was responsible for implementing the steering committee’s recommendation. In particular, it undertook an effort to work with senior leadership to develop a broad strategic workforce plan for the agency. However, in June 2018, NSF officials told us that they shifted their focus from developing a separate workforce strategy in order to focus instead on (1) development of a human capital operating plan, which agencies are required to develop and approve annually, and update as needed, under OPM regulations that went into effect on April 11, 2017; and (2) an Office of Management and Budget (OMB) memorandum issued in April 2017 directing agency heads to develop reform plans that identify ways to improve the efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability of their respective agencies. The NSF officials explained that they recognized the value in having a workforce strategy, but they did not consider it appropriate for the Division of Human Resource Management to develop a workforce strategy at the same time that the agency was completing the OPM and OMB plans. NSF did not specify how its efforts to complete the OPM and OMB plans would address the need the steering committee identified for an agency- wide framework that would enable NSF to ensure an optimal balance of federal and rotator executives and program directors. In particular, NSF’s human capital operating plan, which it approved in April 2018, does not discuss NSF’s use of rotators or include information on balancing the agency’s use of rotators with permanent staff. Furthermore, NSF has not yet determined how it will address its use of rotators as part of its agency reform plan. In particular, NSF officials told us in June 2018 that they may address the agency’s use of rotators under the workforce focus area of its reform plan, but that they were only just beginning to identify and select initiatives under this focus area and that these initiatives have not yet been finalized. The process the NSF steering committee laid out in its internal report, when implemented, would align with two key principles GAO has identified for effective strategic workforce planning. Specifically, it would align with the principles of (1) determining the skills and competencies that are critical to successfully achieving missions and goals, and (2) developing human capital strategies to address gaps and enable the contribution of critical skills and competencies needed for mission success. By incorporating the NSF’s steering committee’s recommendation for a workforce strategy—and the process outlined by the steering committee for developing this strategy—into its human capital operating plan or agency reform plan, NSF could better manage its use of rotators and balance them with its permanent staff. We have previously found that high-performing organizations recognize the fundamental importance of measuring both the outcomes of human capital strategies and how these outcomes have helped the organizations accomplish their missions and programmatic goals. However, as of May 2018, NSF had not fully evaluated and did not have plans to evaluate the results of its IPA and VSEE rotator programs in terms of progress toward human capital goals and the contributions the programs made toward achieving programmatic results. One of GAO’s key principles for effective strategic workforce planning states that agencies should monitor and evaluate progress toward the agencies’ human capital goals and the contribution that human capital results have made toward achieving programmatic results. In particular, we previously found that evaluation activities can improve the effectiveness of workforce strategies by identifying shortfalls in performance and other improvement opportunities. OPM also requires agencies to develop a human capital operating plan that will support the evaluation of the agency’s human capital strategies. In March 2014, NSF published a summary of the results of focus groups with IPA rotators and their supervisors. This summary outlined benefits and challenges of the program from the perspectives of both groups, such as the benefit of bringing fresh perspective and new ideas to NSF and the challenge of recruiting and retaining qualified IPA rotators. However, the summary did not provide the agency’s assessment of progress towards programmatic results and human capital goals. For example, it summarized the benefits of the program from the standpoint of rotators and did not provide NSF’s assessment of how individual IPA rotators or the program as a whole contributed to NSF’s scientific mission. In addition, the summary did not provide an assessment of the extent to which the current workforce balance of federal and rotator executives and program directors is aligned with NSF’s work. In our semistructured interviews with federal staff and rotators in executive and staff-level positions at NSF, most were comfortable with the current balance, but three individuals raised concerns about the use of rotators in executive positions, suggesting that NSF could benefit from further analysis of its balance of rotators and federal staff. In April 2018, NSF adopted its human capital operating plan which identifies specific, short-term actions that the agency will take to achieve its human capital goals. In its plan, NSF identified strategies derived from NSF’s commitment to ongoing improvement, such as reviewing and realigning its workforce to meet future needs. Also, NSF’s process for developing a workforce strategy, outlined in the steering committee’s February 2017 internal report, included recommendations to conduct an assessment of the outcomes of workforce strategies and the impact of these outcomes on helping NSF accomplish its scientific mission and related programmatic goals. However, plans for this assessment did not include an evaluation of the agency’s rotator programs. Moreover, neither the steering committee’s February 2017 internal report nor NSF’s April 2018 report committed to conducting such an evaluation or specified how assessments described in its reports would address NSF’s rotator programs. For example, neither report specified how NSF would evaluate the extent to which the rotator programs have achieved NSF’s objectives, which we identified through our review of NSF documentation and interviews with NSF officials. These objectives include: bringing fresh perspectives from across the country and across all fields of science and engineering supported by NSF; helping influence new directions for research in science, engineering, and education, including emerging interdisciplinary fields; providing scientific leadership and management of NSF’s research and education programs; and providing opportunities for researchers to gain first-hand knowledge of the philosophy and mechanisms of federal support for research and bring this knowledge back to their home institutions. According to NSF officials, the agency has not separately evaluated the results of its rotator programs in part because rotators are blended into its permanent federal workforce, making it difficult to evaluate the results of its rotator programs separately from those of its overall workforce. In our December 2003 report on key principles for effective strategic workforce planning, we found that federal agencies in general have experienced difficulties in defining practical and meaningful measures that assess the effects human capital strategies have on programmatic results. However, without an evaluation of the extent of the rotator programs’ contributions toward NSF’s human capital goals or programmatic results, NSF is limited in its ability to demonstrate the programs’ benefits to external stakeholders, such as the Congress, and to adjust the programs, if warranted. Such adjustments could include increasing or decreasing the use of rotators overall or in certain types of positions, such as executive or staff-level positions. In recent years, NSF has recognized the need to think more strategically about its use of rotators and has taken positive steps to manage its rotator programs. For example, beginning in fiscal year 2017, NSF adopted several strategies to manage the cost of rotators. However, as of June 2018, NSF had decided against developing a separate agency-wide strategy for balancing its use of IPA rotators and federal staff, as NSF’s steering committee for the IPA program recommended in February 2017. NSF officials said that they recognized the value in having a workforce strategy but wanted to focus instead on addressing OPM and OMB requirements related to workforce planning. By following through on the steering committee’s recommendation for a workforce strategy, NSF could better manage its use of rotators and balance them with its permanent staff. Moreover, as of June 2018, NSF had not fully evaluated the results of the rotator programs, as called for by key principles for effective strategic workforce planning. NSF officials told us they have not done so, in part, because rotators are blended into NSF’s permanent federal workforce, making it difficult to evaluate the results of its rotator program separately from those of its overall workforce. However, without an evaluation of the extent of the rotator programs’ contributions toward NSF’s human capital goals or programmatic results, NSF is limited in its ability to demonstrate the programs’ benefits to external stakeholders, such as the Congress, and to adjust the programs, if warranted. We are making the following two recommendations to NSF: The NSF Director of Human Resource Management should complete the development of an agency-wide workforce strategy for balancing the agency’s use of IPA and VSEE rotators with permanent staff as part of NSF’s current agency reform planning efforts or updates to its human capital operating plan. (Recommendation 1) The NSF Director of Human Resource Management should evaluate the contributions of the IPA and VSEE rotator programs toward NSF’s human capital goals and the contributions the programs have made toward achieving programmatic results. (Recommendation 2) We provided a draft of this report to NSF for comment. In its written comments, which are reproduced in appendix I, NSF concurred with our recommendations and stated that implementation of the recommendations will enhance efforts to fulfill the agency’s mission and strengthen its workforce. NSF also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. We are sending copies to the appropriate Congressional Committees, the Director of the National Science Foundation, and other interested parties. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-3841 or neumannj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix II. In addition to the individual named above, Joseph Cook (Assistant Director), Nkenge Gibson, Kathryn Smith, and Douglas Hunker made key contributions to this report. Also contributing to this report were Antoinette Capaccio, Serena Lo, Timothy Guinane, Cynthia Norris, and Sara Sullivan.	[ "NSF has identified potential benefits and challenges associated with its use of rotators. Benefits include fresh perspectives and close connections to the scientific community, while challenges include staffing turnover and higher costs for some rotators compared with permanent employees. GAO was asked to review NSF's use and management of the IPA and VSEE rotator programs, among other things. This report examines (1) the number, costs, and uses of NSF rotators for fiscal year 2008 through fiscal year 2017; (2) the strategies NSF has used to manage rotator costs and the results of these efforts; and (3) the extent to which NSF has a workforce strategy for using rotators and has evaluated the results of its rotator programs. GAO analyzed summary-level data on NSF's rotators; reviewed key documents; interviewed NSF officials; conducted semistructured interviews with a nongeneralizable sample of rotators and permanent federal employees selected from different scientific directorates within NSF; and compared NSF's management of the program to key principles for effective strategic workforce planning. The numbers of rotators—outside scientists, engineers, and educators on temporary assignment—at the National Science Foundation (NSF) and their costs in proportion to other staff remained relatively stable in fiscal years 2008 through 2017. Most rotators joined NSF under its Intergovernmental Personnel Act (IPA) mobility program. IPA rotators comprised about 12 percent of NSF's workforce and 17 percent of staff costs on average and were not subject to a federal salary cap. They remain employees of their home institutions, with NSF reimbursing the institutions for most of their salaries and benefits. The remaining rotators are considered temporary federal employees under the Visiting Scientist, Engineer, and Educator (VSEE) program; their salaries could not exceed the federal maximum for their positions. Beginning in fiscal year 2017, NSF adopted IPA rotator program cost management strategies expected to achieve the greatest savings with the least harm to recruitment, but NSF officials said it is too soon to determine the full results. For example, for new IPA rotators who had not yet begun negotiating their assignments, NSF began requiring their home institutions to pay for 10 percent of the rotators' salary and benefits. NSF officials told GAO they expect to issue a report evaluating the strategies in December 2018. NSF's IPA program steering committee recommended developing a workforce strategy for balancing the agency's use of rotators with federal staff, but as of June 2018, NSF had not developed a strategy or fully evaluated the IPA and VSEE rotator programs' results, as called for by GAO's key principles for effective strategic workforce planning. NSF officials said they recognized the value of a workforce strategy but were focusing instead on other workforce planning efforts, and they had not fully evaluated program results in part because rotators are blended into the agency's permanent workforce, making a separate evaluation difficult. Without a workforce strategy and evaluation of results, NSF is limited in its ability to manage and, if warranted, adjust its use of rotators. GAO recommends that NSF develop an agency-wide strategy for balancing the agency's use of rotators with permanent staff and evaluate the contributions of its rotator programs toward NSF's human capital goals and programmatic results. NSF agreed with GAO's recommendations." ]	5,856	gov_report	en	null	1cc2cbc27f3df5062fc6902a5b039e5c1c6d89f0f221e97f
The 116 th Congress may consider a variety of housing-related issues. These may involve assisted housing programs, such as those administered by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and issues related to housing finance, among other things. Specific topics of interest may include ongoing issues such as interest in reforming the nation's housing finance system, how to prioritize appropriations for federal housing programs in a limited funding environment, oversight of the implementation of changes to certain housing programs that were enacted in prior Congresses, and the possibility of extending certain temporary housing-related tax provisions. Additional issues may emerge as the Congress progresses. This report provides a high-level overview of the most prominent housing-related issues that may be of interest during the 116 th . It is meant to provide a broad overview of major issues and is not intended to provide detailed information or analysis. However, it includes references to more in-depth CRS reports on these issues where possible. This section provides background on housing and mortgage market conditions to provide context for the housing policy issues discussed in the remainder of the report. This discussion of market conditions is at the national level. However, it is important to be aware that local housing market conditions can vary dramatically, and national housing market trends may not reflect the conditions in a specific area. Nevertheless, national housing market indicators can provide an overall sense of general trends in housing. In general, rising home prices, relatively low interest rates, and rising rental costs have been prominent features of housing and mortgage markets in recent years. Although interest rates have remained low, rising house prices and rental costs that in many cases have outpaced income growth have led to increased concerns about housing affordability for both prospective homebuyers and renters. Most homebuyers take out a mortgage to purchase a home. Therefore, owner-occupied housing markets and the mortgage market are closely linked, although they are not the same. The ability of prospective homebuyers to obtain mortgages, and the costs of those mortgages, impact housing demand and affordability. The following subsections show current trends in selected owner-occupied housing and mortgage market indicators. As shown in Figure 1 , nationally, nominal house prices have been increasing on a year-over-year basis in each quarter since the beginning of 2012, with year-over-year increases exceeding 5% for much of that time period and exceeding 6% for most quarters since mid-2016. These increases follow almost five years of house price declines in the years during and surrounding the economic recession of 2007-2009 and associated housing market turmoil. House price increases slowed somewhat during 2018, but year-over-year house prices still increased by nearly 6% during the fourth quarter of 2018. House prices, and changes in house prices, vary greatly across local housing markets. Some areas of the country are experiencing rapid increases in house prices, while other areas are experiencing slower or stagnating house price growth. Similarly, prices have fully regained or even exceeded their pre-recession levels in nominal terms in many parts of the country, but in other areas prices remain below those levels. House price increases affect participants in the housing market differently. Rising prices reduce affordability for prospective homebuyers, but they are generally beneficial for current homeowners due to the increased home equity that accompanies them (although rising house prices also have the potential to negatively impact affordability for current homeowners through increased property taxes). For several years, mortgage interest rates have been low by historical standards. Lower interest rates increase mortgage affordability and make it easier for some households to purchase homes or refinance their existing mortgages. As shown in Figure 2 , average mortgage interest rates have been consistently below 5% since May 2010 and have been below 4% for several stretches during that time. After starting to increase somewhat in late 2017 and much of 2018, mortgage interest rates showed declines at the end of 2018 into early 2019. The average mortgage interest rate for February 2019 was 4.37%, compared to 4.46% in the previous month and 4.33% a year earlier. House prices have been rising for several years on a national basis, and mortgage interest rates, while still low by historical standards, have also risen for certain stretches. While incomes have also been rising in recent years, helping to mitigate some affordability pressures, on the whole house price increases have outpaced income increases. These trends have led to increased concerns about the affordability of owner-occupied housing. Despite rising house prices, many metrics of housing affordability suggest that owner-occupied housing is currently relatively affordable. These metrics generally measure the share of income that a median-income family would need to qualify for a mortgage to purchase a median-priced home, subject to certain assumptions. Therefore, rising incomes and, especially, interest rates that are still low by historical standards contribute to monthly mortgage payments being considered affordable under these measures despite recent house price increases. However, some factors that affect housing affordability may not be captured by these metrics. For example, several of the metrics are based on certain assumptions (such as a borrower making a 20% down payment) that may not apply to many households. Furthermore, because they typically measure the affordability of monthly mortgage payments, they often do not take into account other affordability challenges that homebuyers may face, such as affording a down payment and other upfront costs of purchasing a home (costs that generally increase as home prices rise). Other factors—such as the ability to qualify for a mortgage, the availability of homes on the market, and regional differences in house prices and income—may also make homeownership less attainable for some households. Some of these factors may have a bigger impact on affordability for specific demographic groups, as income trends and housing preferences are not uniform across all segments of the population. Given that house price increases are showing some signs of slowing and interest rates have remained low, the affordability of owner-occupied homes may hold steady or improve. Such trends could potentially impact housing market activity, including home sales. In general, annual home sales have been increasing since 2014 and have improved from their levels during the housing market turmoil of the late 2000s, although in 2018 the overall number of home sales declined from the previous year. While home sales have been improving somewhat in recent years (prior to falling in 2018), the supply of homes on the market has generally not been keeping pace with the demand for homes, thereby limiting home sales activity and contributing to house price increases. Home sales include sales of both existing and newly built homes. Existing home sales generally number in the millions each year, while new home sales are usually in the hundreds of thousands. Figure 3 shows the annual number of existing and new home sales for each year from 1995 through 2018. Existing home sales numbered about 5.3 million in 2018, a decline from 5.5 million in 2017 (existing home sales in 2017 were the highest level since 2006). New home sales numbered about 622,000 in 2018, an increase from 614,000 in 2017 and the highest level since 2007. However, the number of new home sales remains appreciably lower than in the late 1990s and early 2000s, when they tended to be between 800,000 and 1 million per year. The number and types of homes on the market affect home sales and home prices. On a national basis, the supply of homes on the market has been relatively low in recent years, and in general new construction has not been creating enough new homes to meet demand. However, as noted previously, national housing market indicators are not necessarily indicative of local conditions. While many areas of the country are experiencing low levels of housing inventory that contribute to higher home prices, other areas, particularly those experiencing population declines, face a different set of housing challenges, including surplus housing inventory and higher levels of vacant homes. On a national basis, the inventory of homes on the market has been below historical averages in recent years, though the inventory, of new homes in particular, has begun to increase somewhat of late. Homes come onto the market through the construction of new homes and when current homeowners decide to sell their existing homes. Existing homeowners' decisions to sell their homes can be influenced by expectations about housing inventory and affordability. For example, current homeowners may choose not to sell if they are uncertain about finding new homes that meet their needs, or if their interest rates on new mortgages would be substantially higher than the interest rates on their current mortgages. New construction activity is influenced by a variety of factors including labor, materials, and other costs as well as the expected demand for new homes. One measure of the amount of new construction is housing starts. Housing starts are the number of new housing units on which construction is started in a given period and are typically reported monthly as a "seasonally adjusted annual rate." This means that the number of housing starts reported for a given month (1) has been adjusted to account for seasonal factors and (2) has been multiplied by 12 to reflect what the annual number of housing starts would be if the current month's pace continued for an entire year. Figure 4 shows the seasonally adjusted rate of starts on one-unit homes for each month from January 1995 through December 2018. Housing starts for single-family homes fell during the housing market turmoil, reflecting decreased home purchase demand. In recent years, levels of new construction have remained relatively low by historical standards, reflecting a variety of considerations including labor shortages and the cost of building. Housing starts have generally been increasing since about 2012, but remain well below their levels from the late 1990s through the mid-2000s. For 2018, the seasonally adjusted annual rate of housing starts averaged about 868,000. In comparison, the seasonally adjusted annual rate of housing starts exceeded 1 million from the late 1990s through the mid-2000s. Furthermore, high housing construction costs have led to a greater share of new housing being built at the more expensive end of the market. To the extent that new homes are concentrated at higher price points, supply and price pressures may be exacerbated for lower-priced homes. When a lender originates a mortgage, it can choose to hold that mortgage in its own portfolio, sell it to a private company, or sell it to Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, two congressionally chartered government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs). Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac bundle mortgages into securities and guarantee investors' payments on those securities. Furthermore, a mortgage might be insured by a federal government agency, such as the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) or the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). Most FHA-insured or VA-guaranteed mortgages are included in mortgage-backed securities that are guaranteed by Ginnie Mae, another government agency. The shares of mortgages that are provided through each of these channels may be relevant to policymakers because of their implications for mortgage access and affordability as well as the federal government's exposure to risk. As shown in Figure 5 , during the first three quarters of 2018, about two-thirds of the total dollar volume of mortgages originated was either backed by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac (45%) or guaranteed by a federal agency such as FHA or VA (22%). Nearly one-third of the dollar volume of mortgages originated was held in bank portfolios, while close to 2% was included in a private-label security without government backing. The shares of mortgage originations backed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and held in bank portfolios are roughly similar to their respective shares in the early 2000s. The share of private-label securitization has been, and continues to be, very small since the housing market turmoil of the late 2000s, while the FHA/VA share is higher than it was in the early and mid-2000s. The share of mortgages insured by FHA or guaranteed by VA was low by historical standards during that time period as many households opted for other types of mortgages, including subprime mortgages. As has been the case in owner-occupied housing markets, affordability has been a prominent concern in rental markets in recent years. In the years since the housing market turmoil of the late 2000s, the number and share of renter households has increased, leading to lower rental vacancy rates and higher rents in many markets. The housing and mortgage market turmoil of the late 2000s led to a substantial decrease in the homeownership rate and a corresponding increase in the share of households who rent their homes. As shown in Figure 6 , the share of renters increased from about 31% in 2005 and 2006 to a high of about 36.6% in 2016, before decreasing slightly to 36.1% in 2017 and continuing to decline to 35.6% in 2018. The homeownership rate correspondingly fell from a high of 69% in the mid-2000s to 63.4% in 2016, before rising to 63.9% in 2017 and continuing to rise to 64.4% in 2018. The overall number of occupied housing units also increased over this time period, from nearly 110 million in 2006 to 121 million in 2018; most of this increase has been in renter-occupied units. The number of renter-occupied units increased from about 34 million in 2006 to about 43 million in 2018. The number of owner-occupied housing units fell from about 75 million units in 2006 to about 74 million in 2014, but has since increased to about 78 million units in 2018. The higher number and share of renter households has had implications for rental vacancy rates and rental housing costs. More renter households increases competition for rental housing, which may in turn drive up rents if there is not enough new rental housing created (whether through new construction or conversion of owner-occupied units to rental units) to meet the increased demand. As shown in Figure 7 , the rental vacancy rate has generally declined in recent years and was under 7% at the end of 2018. Rental housing affordability is impacted by a variety of factors, including the supply of rental housing units available, the characteristics of those units (e.g., age and amenities), and the demand for available units. New housing units have been added to the rental stock in recent years through both construction of new rental units and conversions of existing owner-occupied units to rental housing. However, the supply of rental housing has not necessarily kept pace with the demand, particularly among lower-cost rental units, and low vacancy rates have been especially pronounced in less-expensive units. The increased demand for rental housing, as well as the concentration of new rental construction in higher-cost units, has led to increases in rents in recent years. Median renter incomes have also been increasing for the last several years, at times outpacing increases in rents. However, over the longer term, median rents have increased faster than renter incomes, reducing rental affordability. Rising rental costs and renter incomes that are not keeping up with rent increases over the long term can contribute to housing affordability problems, particularly for households with lower incomes. Under one common definition, housing is considered to be affordable if a household is paying no more than 30% of its income in housing costs. Under this definition, households that pay more than 30% are considered to be cost-burdened, and those that pay more than 50% are considered to be severely cost-burdened. The overall number of cost-burdened renter households has increased from 14.8 million in 2001 to 20.5 million in 2017, although the 20.5 million in 2017 represented a decrease from 20.8 million in 2016 and over 21 million in 2014 and 2015. (Over this time period, the overall number of renter households has increased as well.) While housing cost burdens can affect households of all income levels, they are most prevalent among the lowest-income households. In 2017, 83% of renter households with incomes below $15,000 experienced housing cost burdens, and 72% experienced severe cost burdens. A shortage of lower-cost rental units that are both available and affordable to extremely low-income renter households (households that earn no more than 30% of area median income), in particular, contributes to these cost burdens. A variety of housing-related issues may be of interest to the 116 th Congress, including housing finance, housing assistance programs, and housing-related tax provisions, among other things. Many of these are ongoing or perennial housing-related issues, though additional issues may emerge as the Congress progresses. Two major players in the U.S. housing finance system are Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) that were created by Congress to provide liquidity to the mortgage market. By law, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac cannot make mortgages; rather, they are restricted to purchasing mortgages that meet certain requirements from lenders. Once the GSEs purchase a mortgage, they either package it with others into a mortgage-backed security (MBS), which they guarantee and sell to institutional investors (which can be the mortgage originator), or retain it as a portfolio investment. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are involved in both single-family and multifamily housing, though their single-family businesses are much larger. In 2008, in the midst of housing and mortgage market turmoil, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac experienced financial trouble and entered voluntary conservatorship overseen by their regulator, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA). As part of the legal arrangements of this conservatorship, the Department of the Treasury contracted to purchase a maximum of $200 billion of new senior preferred stock from each of the GSEs; in return for this support, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac pay dividends on this stock to Treasury. These funds become general revenues. Several issues related to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac could be of interest to the 116 th Congress. These include the potential for legislative housing finance reform, new leadership at FHFA and the potential for administrative changes to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and certain issues that could affect Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's finances and mortgage standards, respectively. For more information on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, see CRS Report R44525, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in Conservatorship: Frequently Asked Questions . Since Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac entered conservatorship in 2008, policymakers have largely agreed on the need for comprehensive housing finance reform legislation that would resolve the conservatorships of these GSEs and address the underlying issues that are perceived to have led to their financial trouble and conservatorships. Such legislation could eliminate Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, possibly replacing them with other entities; retain the companies but transform their role in the housing finance system; or return them to their previous status with certain changes. In addition to addressing the role of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, housing finance reform legislation could potentially involve changes to the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) or other federal programs that support the mortgage market. While there is generally broad agreement on certain principles of housing finance reform—such as increasing the private sector's role in the mortgage market, reducing government risk, and maintaining access to affordable mortgages for creditworthy households—there is disagreement over how best to achieve these objectives and over the technical details of how a restructured housing finance system should operate. Since 2008, a variety of housing finance reform proposals have been put forward by Members of Congress, think tanks, and industry groups. Proposals differ on structural questions as well as on specific implementation issues, such as whether, and how, certain affordable housing requirements that currently apply to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac would be included in a new system. Previous Congresses have considered housing finance reform legislation in varying degrees. In the 113 th Congress, the House Committee on Financial Services and Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs considered different versions of comprehensive housing finance reform legislation, but none were ultimately enacted. The 114 th Congress considered a number of more-targeted reforms to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, but did not actively consider comprehensive housing finance reform legislation. At the end of the 115 th Congress, the House Committee on Financial Services held a hearing on a draft housing finance reform bill released by then-Chairman Jeb Hensarling and then-Representative John Delaney, but no further action was taken on it. In the 116 th Congress, Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Chairman Mike Crapo has released an outline for potential housing finance reform legislation. The committee held hearings on March 26 and March 27, 2019 on the outline. FHFA, an independent agency, is the regulator for Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan Bank System as well as the conservator for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The director of FHFA is appointed by the President, subject to Senate confirmation, for a five-year term. The term of FHFA Director Mel Watt expired in January 2019. President Trump nominated Mark Calabria to be the next FHFA director. The Senate confirmed the nomination on April 4, 2019, and Dr. Calabria was sworn in on April 15, 2019. FHFA has relatively wide latitude to make many changes to Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's operations without congressional approval, though it is subject to certain statutory constraints. In recent years, for example, FHFA has directed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to engage in risk-sharing transactions, develop a common securitization platform for issuing mortgage-backed securities, and undertake certain pilot programs. The prospect of new leadership at FHFA led many to speculate about possible administrative changes that FHFA could make to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac going forward. Any such changes could potentially lead to congressional interest and oversight. FHFA could make many changes to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, including changes to the pricing of mortgages they purchase, to their underwriting standards, or to certain product offerings. It could also make changes to pilot programs, start laying the groundwork for a post-conservatorship housing finance system, or take a different implementation approach to certain affordable housing initiatives required by statute, such as Duty to Serve requirements. Because the new FHFA director has been critical of certain aspects of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the past, some have expressed concerns that the new leadership could result in the agency taking steps to reduce Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's role in the mortgage market. In March 2019, nearly 30 industry groups sent a letter to Acting Director Otting urging that FHFA proceed cautiously with any administrative changes to ensure that they do not disrupt the mortgage market. That same month, President Trump issued a memorandum directing the Secretary of the Treasury to work with other executive branch agencies to develop a plan to end the GSEs' conservatorship, among other goals. Certain other issues related to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac may be of interest during the 116 th Congress. A new accounting standard (current expected credit loss, or CECL) that could require the GSEs to increase their loan loss reserves goes into effect in 2020. CECL could result in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac needing to draw on their support agreements with Treasury. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act ( P.L. 111-203 ) requires mortgage lenders to document and verify a borrower's ability to repay (ATR). If a mortgage lacks certain risky features and a lender complies with the ATR regulations, the mortgage is considered to be a qualified mortgage (QM), which provides the lender certain protections against lawsuits claiming that the ATR requirements were not met. Mortgages purchased by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac currently have an exemption (known as the QM Patch) from the debt-to-income ratio ATR rule. This exemption expires in early 2021 (or earlier if Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac exit conservatorship before that date). For several years, concern in Congress about federal budget deficits has led to increased interest in reducing the amount of discretionary funding provided each year through the annual appropriations process. This interest manifested most prominently in the enactment of the Budget Control Act of 2011( P.L. 112-25 ), which set enforceable limits for both mandatory and discretionary spending. The limits on discretionary spending, which have been amended and adjusted since they were first enacted, have implications for HUD's budget, the largest source of funding for direct housing assistance, because it is made up almost entirely of discretionary appropriations. In FY2020, the discretionary spending limits are slated to decrease, after having been increased in FY2018 and FY2019 by the Bipartisan Budget Act of FY2018 (BBA; P.L. 115-123 ). The nondefense discretionary cap (the one relevant for housing programs and activities) will decline by more than 9% in FY2020, absent any additional legislative changes. More than three-quarters of HUD's appropriations are devoted to three rental assistance programs serving more than 4 million families: the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher (HCV) program, Section 8 project-based rental assistance, and the public housing program. Funding for the HCV program and project-based rental assistance has been increasing in recent years, largely because of the increased costs of maintaining assistance for households that are currently served by the programs. Public housing has, arguably, been underfunded (based on studies undertaken by HUD of what it should cost to operate and maintain it) for many years. Despite the large share of total HUD funding these rental assistance programs command, their combined funding levels only permit them to serve an estimated one in four eligible families, which creates long waiting lists for assistance in most communities. A similar dynamic plays out in the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Rural Housing Service budget. Demand for housing assistance exceeds the supply of subsidies, yet the vast majority of the RHS budget is devoted to maintaining assistance for current residents. In a budget environment with limits on discretionary spending, the pressure to provide increased funding to maintain current services for existing rental assistance programs must be balanced against the pressure from states, localities, and advocates to maintain or increase funding for other popular programs, such as HUD's Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program, grants for homelessness assistance, and funding for Native American housing. The Trump Administration's budget request for FY2020 proposes an 18% decrease in funding for HUD's programs and activities as compared to the prior year. It proposes to eliminate funding for several programs, including multiple HUD grant programs (CDBG, the HOME Investment Partnerships Program, and the Self-Help and Assisted Homeownership Opportunity Program (SHOP)), and to decrease funding for most other HUD programs. In proposing to eliminate the grant programs, the Administration cites budget constraints and proposes that state and local governments take on more of a role in the housing and community development activities funded by these programs. Additionally, the budget references policy changes designed to reduce the cost of federal rental assistance programs, including the Making Affordable Housing Work Act of 2018 (MAHWA) legislative proposal, released by HUD in April 2018. If enacted, the proposal would make a number of changes to the way tenant rents are calculated in HUD rental assistance programs, resulting in rent increases for assisted housing recipients, and corresponding decreases in the cost of federal subsidies. Further, it would permit local program administrators or property owners to institute work requirements for recipients. In announcing the proposal, HUD described it as setting the programs on "a more fiscally sustainable path," creating administrative efficiency, and promoting self-sufficiency. Low-income housing advocates have been critical of it, particularly the effect increased rent payments may have on families. Beyond HUD, the Administration's FY2020 budget request for USDA's Rural Housing Service would eliminate funding for most rural housing programs, except for several loan guarantee programs. It would continue to provide funding to renew existing rental assistance, but also proposes a new minimum rent policy for tenants designed to help reduce federal subsidy costs. For more on HUD appropriations trends in general, see CRS Report R42542, Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD): Funding Trends Since FY2002 . For more on the FY2020 budget environment, including discretionary spending caps, see CRS Report R44874, The Budget Control Act: Frequently Asked Questions . Several pieces of assisted housing legislation that were enacted in prior Congresses are expected to be implemented during the 116 th Congress. In the FY2016 HUD appropriations law, Congress mandated that HUD expand the Moving to Work (MTW) demonstration by 100 public housing authorities (PHAs). MTW is a waiver program that allows a limited number of participating PHAs to receive exceptions from HUD for most of the rules and regulations governing the public housing and voucher programs. MTW has been controversial for many years, with PHAs supporting the flexibility it provides (e.g., allowing PHAs to move funding between programs), and low-income housing advocates criticizing some of the policies being adopted by PHAs (e.g., work requirements and time limits). Most recently, GAO issued a report raising concerns about HUD's oversight of MTW, including the lack of monitoring of the effects of policy changes under MTW on tenants. HUD was required to phase in the FY2016 expansion and evaluate any new policies adopted by participating PHAs. Following a series of listening sessions and advisory committee meetings, and several solicitations for comment, HUD issued a solicitation of interest for the first two expansion cohorts in December 2018. As of the date of this report, no selections had yet been made for those cohorts. The Rental Assistance Demonstration (RAD) was an Obama Administration initiative initially designed to test the feasibility of addressing the estimated $25.6 billion backlog in unmet capital needs in the public housing program by allowing local PHAs to convert their public housing properties to either Section 8 Housing Choice Vouchers or Section 8 project-based rental assistance. PHAs are limited in their ability to mortgage, and thus raise private capital for, their public housing properties because of a federal deed restriction placed on the properties as a condition of federal assistance. When public housing properties are converted under RAD, that deed restriction is removed. As currently authorized, RAD conversions must be cost-neutral, meaning that the Section 8 rents the converted properties may receive must not result in higher subsidies than would have been received under the public housing program. Given this restriction, and without additional subsidy, not all public housing properties can use a conversion to raise private capital, potentially limiting the usefulness of a conversion for some properties. While RAD conversions have been popular with PHAs, and HUD's initial evaluations of the program have been favorable, a recent GAO study has raised questions about HUD's oversight of RAD, and about how much private funding is actually being raised for public housing through the conversions. RAD, as first authorized by Congress in the FY2012 HUD appropriations law, was originally limited to 60,000 units of public housing (out of roughly 1 million units). However, Congress has since expanded the demonstration. Most recently, in FY2018, Congress raised the cap so that up to 455,000 units of public housing will be permitted to convert to Section 8 under RAD, and it further expanded the program so that Section 202 Housing for the Elderly units can also convert. Not only is HUD currently implementing the FY2018 expansion, but the President's FY2020 budget request to Congress requests that the cap on public housing RAD conversions be eliminated completely. Several major disasters that have recently affected the United States have led to congressional activity related to disaster response and recovery programs. When such incidents occur, the President may authorize an emergency or major disaster declaration under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act; P.L. 93-288 , as amended), making various housing assistance programs, including programs provided by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) , available to disaster survivors. FEMA-provided housing assistance may include short-term, emergency sheltering accommodations under Section 403—Essential Assistance—of the Stafford Act (e.g., the Transitional Sheltering Assistance (TSA) program, which is intended to provide short-term hotel/motel accommodations). Interim housing needs may be met through the Individuals and Households Program (IHP) under Section 408—Federal Assistance to Individuals and Households—of the Stafford Act. IHP assistance may include financial (e.g., assistance to rent alternate housing accommodations ) and/or direct assistance (e.g., multi family lease and repair , Transportable Temporary Housing Units , or direct lease ) to eligible individuals and households who, as a result of an emergency or disaster, have uninsured or under-insured necessary expenses and serious needs that cannot be met through other means or forms of assistance. IHP assistance is intended to be temporary and is generally limited to a period of 18 months following the date of the declaration , but it may be extended by FEMA. The Disaster Recovery Reform Act of 2018 (DRRA, Division D of P.L. 115-254 ), which became law on October 5, 2018, is the most comprehensive reform of FEMA's disaster assistance programs since the passage of the Sandy Recovery Improvement Act of 2013 (SRIA, Division B of P.L. 113-2 ) and, prior to that, the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 (PKEMRA, P.L. 109-295 ). The DRRA legislation focuses on improving pre-disaster planning and mitigation, response, and recovery, and increasing FEMA accountability. As such, it amends many sections of the Stafford Act. In addition to those amendments, DRRA includes new standalone authorities and requires reports to Congress, rulemaking, and other actions. The 116 th Congress has expressed interest in the oversight of DRRA's implementation, including sections that amend FEMA's temporary housing assistance programs under the Stafford Act. These sections include the following: DRRA Section 1211—State Administration of Assistance for Direct Temporary Housing and Permanent Housing Construction—amends Stafford Act Section 408(f)—Federal Assistance to Individuals and Households, State Role—to allow state, territorial, or tribal governments to administer Direct Temporary Housing Assistance and Permanent Housing Construction, in addition to Other Needs Assistance (ONA). It also provides a mechanism for state and local units of government to be reimbursed for locally implemented housing solutions. This provision may allow states to customize disaster housing solutions and expedite disaster recovery; however, FEMA may need to provide guidance to clarify the requirements of the application and approval process for the state, territorial, or tribal government that seeks to administer these programs. DRRA Section 1212—Assistance to Individuals and Households—amends Stafford Act Section 408(h)—Federal Assistance to Individuals and Households, Maximum Amount of Assistance—to separate the cap on the maximum amount of financial assistance eligible individuals and households may receive for housing assistance and ONA. The provision also removes financial assistance to rent alternate housing accommodations from the cap, and creates an exception for accessibility-related costs. This may better enable FEMA's disaster assistance programs to meet the recovery-related needs of individuals, including those with disabilities and others with access and functional needs, and households who experience significant damage to their primary residence and personal property as a result of an emergency or major disaster. However, there is also the potential that this change may disincentivize sufficient insurance coverage because of the new ability for eligible individuals and households to receive separate and increased housing and ONA awards that more comprehensively cover disaster-related real and personal property losses. DRRA Section 1213—Multifamily Lease and Repair Assistance—amends Stafford Act Section 408(c)(1)(B)—Federal Assistance to Individuals and Households, Direct Assistance—to expand the eligible areas for multifamily lease and repair, and remove the requirement that the value of the improvements or repairs not exceed the value of the lease agreement. This may increase housing options for disaster survivors. The Inspector General of the Department of Homeland Security must assess the use of FEMA's direct assistance authority to justify this alternative to other temporary housing options, and submit a report to Congress. For more information on DRRA, see CRS Insight IN11055, The Disaster Recovery Reform Act: Homeland Security Issues in the 116th Congress . Additionally, tables of deadlines associated with the implementation actions and requirements of DRRA are available upon request. Native Americans living in tribal areas experience a variety of housing challenges. Housing conditions in tribal areas are generally worse than those for the United States as a whole, and factors such as the legal status of trust lands present additional complications for housing. In light of these challenges, and the federal government's long-standing trust relationship with tribes, certain federal housing programs provide funding specifically for housing in tribal areas. The Tribal HUD-Veterans Affairs Supportive Housing (Tribal HUD-VASH) program provides rental assistance and supportive services to Native American veterans who are homeless or at risk of homelessness. Tribal HUD-VASH is modeled on the broader HUD-Veterans Affairs Supportive Housing (HUD-VASH) program, which provides rental assistance and supportive services for homeless veterans. Tribal HUD-VASH was initially created and funded through the FY2015 HUD appropriations act ( P.L. 113-235 ), and funds to renew rental assistance have been provided in subsequent appropriations acts. However, no separate authorizing legislation for Tribal HUD-VASH currently exists. In the 116 th Congress, a bill to codify the Tribal HUD-VASH program ( S. 257 ) was ordered to be reported favorably by the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs in February 2019. A substantively identical bill passed the Senate during the 115 th Congress ( S. 1333 ), but the House ultimately did not consider it. For more information on HUD-VASH and Tribal HUD-VASH, see CRS Report RL34024, Veterans and Homelessness . The main federal program that provides housing assistance to Native American tribes and Alaska Native villages is the Native American Housing Block Grant (NAHBG), which was authorized by the Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act of 1996 (NAHASDA, P.L. 104-330 ). NAHASDA reorganized the federal system of housing assistance for tribes while recognizing the rights of tribal self-governance and self-determination. The NAHBG provides formula funding to tribes that can be used for a range of affordable housing activities that benefit primarily low-income Native Americans or Alaska Natives living in tribal areas. A separate block grant program authorized by NAHASDA, the Native Hawaiian Housing Block Grant (NHHBG), provides funding for affordable housing activities that benefit Native Hawaiians eligible to reside on the Hawaiian Home Lands. NAHASDA also authorizes a loan guarantee program, the Title VI Loan Guarantee, for tribes to carry out eligible affordable housing activities. The most recent authorization for most NAHASDA programs expired at the end of FY2013, although NAHASDA programs have generally continued to be funded in annual appropriations laws. (The NHHBG has not been reauthorized since its original authorization expired in FY2005, though it has continued to receive funding in most years. ) NAHASDA reauthorization legislation has been considered in varying degrees in the 113 th , 114 th , and 115 th Congresses but none was ultimately enacted. The 116 th Congress may again consider legislation to reauthorize NAHASDA. In general, tribes and Congress have been supportive of NAHASDA, though there has been some disagreement over specific provisions or policy proposals that have been included in reauthorization bills. Some of these disagreements involve debates over specific program changes that have been proposed. Others involve debate over broader issues, such as the appropriateness of providing federal funding for programs specifically for Native Hawaiians and whether such funding could be construed to provide benefits based on race. For more information on NAHASDA, see CRS Report R43307, The Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act of 1996 (NAHASDA): Background and Funding . In the past, Congress has regularly extended a number of temporary tax provisions that address a variety of policy issues, including certain provisions related to housing. This set of temporary provisions is commonly referred to as "tax extenders." Two housing-related provisions that have been included in tax extenders packages recently are (1) the exclusion for canceled mortgage debt, and (2) the deduction for mortgage insurance premiums, each of which is discussed further below. The most recently enacted tax extenders legislation was the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 ( P.L. 115-123 ) in the 115 th Congress. That law extended the exclusion for canceled mortgage debt and the ability to deduct mortgage insurance premiums through the end of 2017 (each had previously expired at the end of 2016). As of the date of this report, these provisions had not been extended beyond 2017. In the 116 th Congress, S. 617 , the Tax Extender and Disaster Relief Act of 2019, would extend each of these provisions through calendar year 2019. For more information on tax extenders in general, see CRS Report R45347, Tax Provisions That Expired in 2017 ("Tax Extenders") . Historically, when all or part of a taxpayer's mortgage debt has been forgiven, the forgiven amount has been included in the taxpayer's gross income for tax purposes. This income is typically referred to as canceled mortgage debt income. During the housing market turmoil of the late 2000s, some efforts to help troubled borrowers avoid foreclosure resulted in canceled mortgage debt. The Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007 ( P.L. 110-142 ), signed into law in December 2007, temporarily excluded qualified canceled mortgage debt income associated with a primary residence from taxation. The provision was originally effective for debt discharged before January 1, 2010, and was subsequently extended several times. Rationales put forth when the provision was originally enacted included minimizing hardship for distressed households, lessening the risk that nontax homeownership retention efforts would be thwarted by tax policy, and assisting in the recoveries of the housing market and overall economy. Arguments against the exclusion at the time included concerns that it makes debt forgiveness more attractive for homeowners, which could encourage homeowners to be less responsible about fulfilling debt obligations, and concerns about fairness given that the ability to realize the benefits depends on a variety of factors. More recently, because the economy, housing market, and foreclosure rates have improved significantly since the height of the housing and mortgage market turmoil, the exclusion may no longer be warranted. For more information on the exclusion for canceled mortgage debt, see CRS Report RL34212, Analysis of the Tax Exclusion for Canceled Mortgage Debt Income . Traditionally, homeowners have been able to deduct the interest paid on their mortgage, as well as property taxes they pay, as long as they itemize their tax deductions. Beginning in 2007, homeowners could also deduct qualifying mortgage insurance premiums as a result of the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006 ( P.L. 109-432 ). Specifically, homeowners could effectively treat qualifying mortgage insurance premiums as mortgage interest, thus making the premiums deductible if homeowners itemized and their adjusted gross incomes were below a specified threshold ($55,000 for single, $110,000 for married filing jointly). Originally, the deduction was to be available only for 2007, but it was subsequently extended several times. Two possible rationales for allowing the deduction of mortgage insurance premiums are that it assisted in the recovery of the housing market, and that it promotes homeownership. The housing market, however, has largely recovered from the market turmoil of the late 2000s, and it is not clear that the deduction has an effect on the homeownership rate. Furthermore, to the degree that owner-occupied housing is over subsidized, extending the deduction could lead to a greater misallocation of the resources that are directed toward the housing industry. In the past, Congress has regularly extended a number of temporary tax provisions that address a variety of policy issues, including certain provisions related to housing. This set of temporary provisions is commonly referred to as "tax extenders." Two housing-related provisions that have been included in tax extenders packages recently are (1) the exclusion for canceled mortgage debt, and (2) the deduction for mortgage insurance premiums, each of which is discussed further below. The most recently enacted tax extenders legislation was the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 ( P.L. 115-123 ) in the 115 th Congress. That law extended the exclusion for canceled mortgage debt and the ability to deduct mortgage insurance premiums through the end of 2017 (each had previously expired at the end of 2016). As of the date of this report, these provisions had not been extended beyond 2017. In the 116 th Congress, S. 617 , the Tax Extender and Disaster Relief Act of 2019, would extend each of these provisions through calendar year 2019. For more information on tax extenders in general, see CRS Report R45347, Tax Provisions That Expired in 2017 ("Tax Extenders") . Historically, when all or part of a taxpayer's mortgage debt has been forgiven, the forgiven amount has been included in the taxpayer's gross income for tax purposes. This income is typically referred to as canceled mortgage debt income. During the housing market turmoil of the late 2000s, some efforts to help troubled borrowers avoid foreclosure resulted in canceled mortgage debt. The Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007 ( P.L. 110-142 ), signed into law in December 2007, temporarily excluded qualified canceled mortgage debt income associated with a primary residence from taxation. The provision was originally effective for debt discharged before January 1, 2010, and was subsequently extended several times. Rationales put forth when the provision was originally enacted included minimizing hardship for distressed households, lessening the risk that nontax homeownership retention efforts would be thwarted by tax policy, and assisting in the recoveries of the housing market and overall economy. Arguments against the exclusion at the time included concerns that it makes debt forgiveness more attractive for homeowners, which could encourage homeowners to be less responsible about fulfilling debt obligations, and concerns about fairness given that the ability to realize the benefits depends on a variety of factors. More recently, because the economy, housing market, and foreclosure rates have improved significantly since the height of the housing and mortgage market turmoil, the exclusion may no longer be warranted. For more information on the exclusion for canceled mortgage debt, see CRS Report RL34212, Analysis of the Tax Exclusion for Canceled Mortgage Debt Income . Traditionally, homeowners have been able to deduct the interest paid on their mortgage, as well as property taxes they pay, as long as they itemize their tax deductions. Beginning in 2007, homeowners could also deduct qualifying mortgage insurance premiums as a result of the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006 ( P.L. 109-432 ). Specifically, homeowners could effectively treat qualifying mortgage insurance premiums as mortgage interest, thus making the premiums deductible if homeowners itemized and their adjusted gross incomes were below a specified threshold ($55,000 for single, $110,000 for married filing jointly). Originally, the deduction was to be available only for 2007, but it was subsequently extended several times. Two possible rationales for allowing the deduction of mortgage insurance premiums are that it assisted in the recovery of the housing market, and that it promotes homeownership. The housing market, however, has largely recovered from the market turmoil of the late 2000s, and it is not clear that the deduction has an effect on the homeownership rate. Furthermore, to the degree that owner-occupied housing is over subsidized, extending the deduction could lead to a greater misallocation of the resources that are directed toward the housing industry.	[ "The 116th Congress may consider a variety of housing-related issues. These could include topics related to housing finance, federal housing assistance programs, and housing-related tax provisions, among other things. Particular issues that may be of interest during the Congress include the following: The status of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, two government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) that have been in conservatorship since 2008. Congress might consider comprehensive housing finance reform legislation to resolve the status of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Furthermore, a new director for the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's regulator and conservator, was sworn in on April 15, 2019. Congress may take an interest in any administrative changes that FHFA might make to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac under new leadership. Appropriations for federal housing programs, including programs at the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and rural housing programs administered by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), particularly in light of discretionary budget caps that are currently scheduled to decrease for FY2020. Oversight of the implementation of certain changes to federal assisted housing programs that were enacted in prior Congresses, such as expansions of HUD's Moving to Work (MTW) program and Rental Assistance Demonstration (RAD) program. Considerations related to housing and the federal response to major disasters, including oversight of the implementation of certain changes related to Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) assistance that were enacted in the previous Congress. Consideration of legislation related to certain federal housing programs that provide assistance to Native Americans living in tribal areas. Consideration of legislation to extend certain temporary tax provisions that are currently expired, including housing-related provisions that provide a tax exclusion for canceled mortgage debt and allow for the deductibility of mortgage insurance premiums, respectively. Housing and mortgage market conditions provide context for these and other issues that Congress may consider, although housing markets are local in nature and national housing market indicators do not necessarily accurately reflect conditions in specific communities. On a national basis, some key characteristics of owner-occupied housing markets and the mortgage market in recent years include increasing housing prices, low mortgage interest rates, and home sales that have been increasing but constrained by a limited inventory of homes on the market. Key characteristics of rental housing markets include an increasing number of renters, low rental vacancy rates, and increasing rents. Rising home prices and rents that have outpaced income growth in recent years have led to policymakers and others increasingly raising concerns about the affordability of both owner-occupied and rental housing. Affordability challenges are most prominent among the lowest-income renter households, reflecting a shortage of rental housing units that are both affordable and available to this population." ]	7,818	gov_report	en	null	bd99c1742ebea14d67183ff4332f2a72de4389300c1536b5
The U.S. corporate income tax is based on worldwide economic activity. If all of a corporation's economic activity is in the United States, then tax administration and compliance is relatively straightforward. Many corporations, however, operate in several jurisdictions, which creates complications for tax administration and compliance. Further, corporations may actively choose where and how to organize to reduce their U.S. and worldwide tax liabilities. Some of these strategies have been referred to as expatriation, inversions, and mergers. This report begins with a brief discussion of relevant portions of the U.S. corporate income tax system before examining how inversions were commonly structured. The report then looks at how Congress and the Department of the Treasury have reduced the benefits of inversions. The report concludes with an examination of remaining methods for inverting and policy options available to prevent or limit these inversions. Achieving tax savings using an inversion became more difficult with the enactment of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (JOBS Act; P.L. 108-357 ). The JOBS Act denied or restricted the tax benefits of an inversion if the owners of the new company were not substantially different from the owners of the original company. The act also allowed a firm to invert only if it had substantial business operations in the country where the new headquarters was to be located. Although the 2004 legislation largely prevented the types of inversions that drew attention prior to its adoption, several companies have successfully inverted in the past few years by using the substantive business operations mechanism or merging. Treasury regulations have subsequently limited the former mechanism. In spring 2014, several high-profile companies indicated an interest in merging or plans to merge with a non-U.S. firm, including Pfizer, Chiquita, and Omnicom (an advertising firm). News reports indicated that a group of Walgreens investors was also urging such a move. Although the Pfizer and Omnicon mergers and Walgreens headquarters shifts ultimately did not take place, other firms announced mergers in the late spring and early summer. A number of firms in the medical device or pharmaceuticals fields announced mergers or proposed mergers with a shift of headquarters: Medtronics, Salix, AbbVie, Mylan, and Hospira. In August 2014, concern about inversions increased with the announcement that Burger King was in talks to merge with Tim Hortons, a Canadian firm, with the merged firm's headquarters in Canada. An agreement was announced on August 26. Although Burger King is a smaller firm than AbbVie, for example, it is a household name and this proposed inversion garnered much attention. In September 2014, the Treasury Department released a notice of regulatory changes that would restrict some aspects of inversions or their benefits and indicated that other actions may follow. AbbVie, Chiquita, and some other firms canceled their plans in the wake of these Treasury regulations, although new merger proposals were also announced. In November 2015, the Treasury announced additional regulatory restrictions. Although new inversions slowed significantly, others continued but in many cases have been structured to avoid the regulations by reducing ownership below 60%. Most notable of these is the proposed merger of Pfizer with Allergan in November 2015. Pfizer terminated the merger after the release of the April 4, 2016, regulations. This "second wave" of inversions again raised concerns about an erosion of the U.S. tax base. While the substantial business avenue appears to have been largely eliminated by Treasury regulations that increased the required share of activity, the option of merging with a smaller foreign company remains. U.S. firms may also merge with larger firms, although in this case the tax benefits are less likely to be key factors in the decision to merge. Data released by the Bureau of Economic Analysis indicated that acquisitions by foreigners, which rose substantially in 2015, fell by 15% in 2016, and by 32% in 2017. Some of the largest declines were in countries associated with inversions, such as Ireland, where acquisitions fell from $176 billion in 2015, to $35 billion in 2016, and to $7 billion in 2017. In December 2017, a tax revision ( P.L. 115-97 ), often called the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA), and subsequently referred to as the "Act," made major changes to the corporate tax and the international tax rules, along with some specific revisions aimed at discouraging inversions. Although data for 2018 are not yet available, one planned inversion, by Assurant, Inc., was revised to retain the headquarters in the United States. Ohio-based Dana, Inc. announced plans to merge and move the headquarters to the U.K., although the merger would leave the U.S. shareholders with less than 60% ownership, and therefore not make them subject to anti-inversion penalties. The United States uses a system that taxes both the worldwide income of U.S. corporations and the income of foreign firms earned within U.S. borders. All income earned within U.S. borders is taxed the same—in the year earned and at statutory tax rates of 21% (reduced from 35% by the Act). Under pre-Act law, U.S. corporate income earned outside the United States was also subject to U.S. taxation, though not necessarily in the year earned. This treatment occurred because U.S. corporations could defer U.S. tax on active income earned abroad in foreign subsidiaries until it was paid, or repatriated, to the U.S. parent company as a dividend. To mitigate double taxation, tax due on repatriated income was reduced by the amount of foreign taxes already paid. The Act substituted a new system (Global Intangible Low-Taxed Income, or GILTI) that taxed foreign source income of U.S. subsidiaries currently but with an exemption for a deemed return of 10% on tangible assets and a deduction from the remaining income (for 50% of income through 2025 and 37.5% afterward). It allows a credit for 80% of foreign taxes. The new system also allows U.S. firms a deduction for foreign derived intangible income, or FDII, which was designed to reduce tax rates on foreign earnings from the use of intangible assets held in the United States. The deduction is 37.5% of this estimated income through 2025 and 21.875% afterward. Income from certain foreign sources earned by subsidiaries—which generally includes passive types of income, such as interest, dividends, annuities, rents, and royalties, and is referred to as Subpart F income—is generally taxed in the year it is earned and was retained by the Act. Subpart F applies only to shareholders who may be able to influence location decisions at the corporate level. These subsidiaries are referred to as controlled foreign corporations (CFCs). The Act also adopted the Base Erosion and Anti-Abuse tax (BEAT), an alternative minimum tax with the tax based increased by certain payments to related foreign parties. Its primary focus was to address profit shifting between foreign parents and U.S. subsidiaries, but it applies in general. Notably, it excludes payments for costs of goods sold and for costs of services under some pricing rules. One way of shifting profits was to locate debt in high-tax countries. Preexisting thin capitalization rules limited interest to 50% of earnings before the deduction of interest, taxes, and amortization, deprec iation, and depletion (EBITA), although firms with a debt-to-asset rate of 1.5 or less were exempt. The new law adopted much stricter thin capitalization rules to prevent firms from deducting large amounts of interest. The new law lowers the cap to 30% of profits, eliminates the exemption based on the debt-to-asset ratio and, after 2021, measures the cap as a share of profits after amortization, depreciation, and depletion deductions. The Act also adopted some tax provisions targeted at discouraging inversions, which are discussed subsequently. A corporate inversion is a process by which an existing U.S. corporation changes its country of residence. After the inversion, the original U.S. corporation becomes a subsidiary of a foreign parent corporation. Corporate inversions occur through three different paths: the substantial activity test, merger with a larger foreign firm, and merger with a smaller foreign firm. Regardless of the form of the inversion, the typical result is that the new foreign parent company faces a lower home country tax rate and no tax on the company's foreign-source income. The U.S. firm can use inversions to reduce taxes using various techniques. Foreign operations in the future can be formed as subsidiaries of the new foreign parent in a country with a territorial tax, so that future foreign income can be exempt from tax. Accumulated and future foreign income from the U.S. company's foreign subsidiaries (which would be taxed by the United States if paid to the parent as a dividend) may be effectively repatriated tax free by lending or otherwise investing in the related foreign firm, such as a low-interest loan to the foreign parent holding company. These borrowed funds could then be used, for example, to pay dividends to shareholders or make loans to the U.S. firm. In addition, the combined firm can engage in "earnings stripping": reducing income in the U.S. firm by borrowing from the U.S. company and increasing interest deductions. For example, a foreign parent may lend to its U.S. subsidiary. This intercompany debt does not alter the overall company's debt, but does result in an interest expense in the United States (which reduces U.S. taxes paid) and an increased portion of company income being "booked" outside the United States. Royalty payments, management fees, and transfer pricing arrangements are other avenues for earnings stripping, but are thought to be of lesser importance than intercompany debt. In this form of inversion, a U.S. corporation with substantial business activity in a foreign company creates a foreign subsidiary. The U.S. corporation and foreign subsidiary exchange stock—resulting in each entity owning some of the other's stock. After the stock exchange, the new entity is a foreign corporation with a U.S. subsidiary, as the exchange is generally in proportion to the respective company valuations. As this form of inversion does not require any change in the effective control of the corporation, it is referred to as a "naked inversion." In this form of inversion, a U.S. corporation would like to bolster its foreign operations and, perhaps, lower its U.S. tax. To do so, the U.S. corporation merges with a larger foreign corporation, with the U.S. shareholders owning a minority share of the new merged company. This results in the effective control of the new company being outside U.S. borders. While this form of inversion may be driven by business considerations, tax considerations may also be part of the decision. An example of this can be seen in the following statement by the board of directors of a U.S. corporation recommending approval of a merger with a U.K. corporation. The board of directors pursued the merger in part because Ensco was headquartered in a jurisdiction that has a favorable tax regime and an extensive network of tax treaties, which can allow the combined company to achieve a global effective tax rate comparable to Pride's competitors. In this case, a U.S. firm, Pride, merged with a U.K. firm, Ensco, and the headquarters remained in the U.K. In this form of inversion, a U.S. corporation would like to bolster its foreign operations and lower its U.S. tax. To do so, the U.S. corporation merges with a smaller foreign corporation, with the U.S. shareholders owning a majority share of the new merged company. This merger results in the effective control of the new company staying with the shareholders of the U.S. corporations. While this form of inversion may be driven by business considerations, tax considerations may also be part of the decision. An example is the Eaton Cooper merger. The following is an excerpt of a U.S. corporation's (Eaton's) press release announcing the acquisition of an Irish company (Cooper), with the company headquartering in Ireland (with a 12.5% tax rate and a territorial system). At the close of the transaction ... Eaton and Cooper will be combined under a new company incorporated in Ireland, where Cooper is incorporated today. The newly created company, which is expected to be called Eaton Global Corporation Plc or a variant thereof ("New Eaton"), will be led by Alexander M. Cutler, Eaton's current chairman and chief executive officer. At the close of the merger, it was expected that the shareholders of the U.S. company would control 73% of the combined company, with the shareholders of the Irish company controlling the remaining 27%. The press release notes expected tax benefits from the merger at $165 million in 2016, out of $535 million of total cost savings. In this case, a U.S. corporation used a merger to achieve an inversion while its shareholders retained a significant majority of shares. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, news reports drew the attention of policymakers and the public to a phenomenon sometimes called corporate "inversions" or "expatriations": instances where firms that consist of multiple corporations reorganize their structure so that the "parent" element of the group is a foreign corporation rather than a corporation chartered in the United States. Among the more high-profile inversions were Ingersoll-Rand, Tyco, the PXRE Group, Foster Wheeler, Nabors Industries, and Coopers Industries. These corporate inversions apparently involved few, if any, shifts in actual economic activity from the United States abroad, at least in the near term. In particular, inverted firms typically continued to maintain headquarters in the United States and did not systematically shift capital or employment abroad post inversion. Further, Bermuda and the Cayman Islands were the location of many of the newly created parent corporations—jurisdictions that have no corporate income tax but that also do have highly developed legal, institutional, and communications infrastructures. A 2002 study by the U.S. Treasury Department concluded that while inversions were not new—the statutory framework making them possible has long been in existence—there had been a "marked increase" in their frequency, size, and visibility. Taken together, these facts suggested that tax savings were one goal of the inversion, if not the primary goal. Beyond taxes, firms engaged in the inversions cited a number of reasons for undertaking them, including creating greater "operational flexibility," improved cash management, and an enhanced ability to access international capital markets. The 2002 Treasury report identified three main concerns about corporate inversions: erosion of the U.S. tax base, a cost advantage for foreign-controlled firms, and a reduction in perceived fairness of the tax system. These concerns, along with a growing awareness of inversion transactions, may have resulted in congressional concern and debate about how to address the issues surrounding inversions, culminating with the enactment of an anti-inversion provision (Section 7874) in the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (AJCA; P.L. 108-357 ). The AJCA adopted two alternative tax regimes applicable to inversions occurring after March 4, 2003. The AJCA treats the inverted foreign parent company as a domestic corporation if it is owned by at least 80% of the former parent's stockholders. In these cases, the AJCA would deny the firm any tax benefits of the inversion (i.e., it would continue to be taxed on the combined group's worldwide income). The second regime applies when there is at least 60% continuity of ownership but less than 80%. In this case, the new foreign parent is not taxed like a domestic corporation, but any U.S. toll taxes (taxes on gains) that apply to transfers of assets to the new entity are not permitted to be offset by foreign tax credits or net operating losses. The AJCA also exempted corporations with substantial economic activity in the foreign country from the anti-inversion provisions, but it did not define substantial business activity in the statute. Although the 2004 act largely eliminated the generic naked inversions, two alternatives remained that allowed a firm to shift headquarters and retain control of the business: the naked inversion via the business activity exemption, and merger with a smaller company. Using the business activity route would require significant economic operations in the target country. An inversion by merger would require a large firm that would be at least 25% of the size of the U.S. firm. The post-2004 approaches to inversions no longer involved countries such as Bermuda and the Cayman Islands, but larger countries with substantial economic activity such as the U.K., Canada, and Ireland. The U.K., in particular, has become a much more attractive headquarters. Because of freedom of movement rules in the European Union, the U.K. cannot have anti-inversion laws, which may have played a role in both moving to a territorial tax and lowering the corporate tax rate. A 2012 report in the Wall Street Journal highlighted some recent moves abroad. This report claimed 10 companies had inverted since 2009, with 6 within the past year or so. This was a small number of companies, but it is useful to look at the methods involved. The Wall Street Journal article identified by name 5 of the 10 companies that had moved abroad recently: Aon, ENSCO, Rowan, Eaton, and DE Master Blenders 1763. (The article also referred to Transocean and Weatherford International, but these were firms that had inverted before the 2004 legislation: Transocean first to the Cayman Islands, and then Switzerland, and Weatherford first to Bermuda, and then Switzerland.) The remaining firm mentioned in the Wall Street Journal article is Eaton. Eaton's move abroad was a merger; it merged with Coopers, a firm effectively operating its headquarters in the United States, but one that had inverted prior to the 2004 law change. An article by Bret Wells identified Aon, ENSCO, and Rowan as having inverted via the substantial business activity exemption (where the only apparent objective is tax savings). All three moved to the United Kingdom, where a recent move to a territorial tax, as well as decisions in the European Court of Justice that limited their anti-abuse rules, had made their tax system more attractive. The U.K. was also in the process of lowering its own corporate rate. Two of the firms are oil drilling firms; drilling in the North Sea might have affected their ability to use this exemption. Aon is an insurance firm. Wells mentions another firm, Tim Hortons, which also used a naked inversion using the substantial business activity exemption in 2009 to relocate to Canada. In doing so, the firm was returning to its origins, as it was founded in Canada. It became an American company when Wendy's acquired it in 1995, but it was subsequently spun off in 2006. DE Master Blenders 1763, like Tim Hortons, was returning to its origins as well (a Netherlands firm), as it was spun off from Sara Lee, which had acquired it in 1978. In response to increased use of the substantial business activity exemption, Treasury Regulations (T.D. 9592, June 12, 2012) increased the safe harbor for the substantial business activities test from 10% to 25%, effectively closing off this avenue in the future. This action could be done by regulation because the statute did not specify how the substantial business activity test was to be implemented. A number of mergers have either been effectuated or were proposed: Chiquita, Actavis, and Perrigo (the latter two are pharmaceutical firms) moving to Ireland; Valeant Pharmaceuticals and Endo Health Services moving to Canada; and Liberty Global (a cable company) to the U.K. Subsequently, the new Irish firm Actavis (itself the result of two prior mergers) merged with Forest Labs. Omnicom (an advertising firm) planned a move to the U.K. (after proposed merger with a French firm, creating a Netherlands holding company, resident in the U.K. for tax purposes), but has abandoned its merger. Chiquita canceled its plans after Treasury regulations were issued in September 2014. Most of these firms are not household names or industry giants. Thus, perhaps none created as much interest as the attempt by pharmacy giant Pfizer to acquire AstraZeneca with a U.K. headquarters, or the urging of some stockholders of Walgreens to invert to Switzerland. Pfizer represented a significant potential loss of future tax revenue, as much as $1.4 billion per year. According to a study by Martin Sullivan, in 2005, when a temporary tax exclusion of 85% of dividends (the repatriation holiday) was in force, Pfizer repatriated $37 billion, the single largest amount of repatriations of any firm. In 2009, Pfizer repatriated $34 billion (and paid U.S. taxes on that amount) to finance the acquisition of Wyeth, but earnings abroad grew from $42 billion in 2009 (after the repatriation) to $73 billion by 2012. These earnings have not been repatriated and taxed in the United States. An inversion by Pfizer would, however, result in current shareholders paying capital gains taxes on any stock appreciation when they are converted into shares of the new company. Shares held in IRAs and 401(k)s would not typically owe this tax, but shares owned directly by individuals and in mutual funds would owe tax even if they did not sell their stock. Policymakers and the public remained interested in the issue of inversions through 2014. Although the initial Pfizer merger did not occur, the spate of mergers or proposed mergers in the medical device and pharmaceuticals industries continued in 2014. One example included one of the largest proposed mergers yet, AbbVie's acquisition of Shire, an Irish firm. The announcement of a proposed merger between Burger King and Tim Hortons also generated interest in the issue. As is the case with Chiquita, AbbVie canceled its plans after the issuance of Treasury regulations in September 2014, but Burger King planned to complete its merger and did so on December 12, 2014. Treasury continues to regulate inversions where regulations are possible. For example, in 2014 it took action to close a loophole stemming from the coordination of two sets of regulations—the "Anti-Killer B Regulations" and the "Helen of Troy Anti-Inversion Regulations"—that allowed Liberty Global shareholders to avoid some capital gains taxes. In response to the new wave of inversions, the Treasury Department released a notice of regulatory actions that would restrict inversions and their benefits. Treasury news releases, however, indicated that legislative action is the only way to fully rein in these transactions. Following this notice, several firms announced they were canceling plans to merge, and one firm, Medtronic, announced a change in financing plans (no longer using earnings abroad to pay acquisition costs). Other firms, however, have announced inversion plans. There is no way to know how many unannounced mergers were, or will be, prevented by these regulations. The regulatory actions address two basic aspects of inversions. One set of changes limits the ability to access the accumulated deferred earnings of foreign subsidiaries of U.S. firms. The second regulatory action restricts certain techniques used in inversion transactions that allowed firms to qualify with less than 80% ownership. This regulation is effective for inversions that closed on or after September 22, 2014. The regulations do not prevent inversions via merger and do not address earnings stripping by shifting debt to the U.S. firm, although Treasury has indicated future action in this area. In an inversion, the foreign subsidiaries of the original U.S. firm remain subsidiaries so that any dividends paid to the U.S. parent would be taxed. Regulations also treat other direct investments in U.S. property, such as loans to the U.S. parent, as dividends. Once a firm has inverted and the U.S. firm is now a subsidiary of a foreign parent, there are methods of accessing the earnings of overseas subsidiaries by transactions between the new foreign parent and the U.S. firm's foreign subsidiaries. The regulation is intended to address three such methods. First, the regulation prevents the access to funds by, for example, a loan from the U.S. company's foreign subsidiary to the new foreign parent (called "hopscotching"). Before the regulation, funds of this type could have been used to pay dividends to the individual shareholders or for other purposes. Under the regulation, acquiring any obligation (such as a loan) or stock of a foreign related person is treated as U.S. property subject to tax. Second, the regulation addresses "decontrolling," where the foreign acquiring corporation issues a note or transfer of property for stock in the U.S. firm's foreign subsidiaries. If a majority of stock is obtained, the U.S. firm's subsidiary is no longer a controlled foreign corporation (CFC) and not subject to Subpart F, which taxes currently certain passive or easily shifted income. However, even a less than majority share can allow partial access to deferred earnings without a U.S. tax. This regulation prevents this by treating acquisition of foreign subsidiary stock as acquisition of stock in the U.S. parent. Third, the regulation addresses transactions where the foreign acquiring corporation sells stock of the former U.S. parent corporation to that U.S. parent corporation's CFC in exchange for property or cash. If such a transaction is structured properly, some interpretations of the old regulations would have permitted the income to avoid taxation. The new regulations would prevent that and would apply regardless of the firm's inversion status. A firm can realize the tax benefits of an inversion only if the shareholders of the original U.S. firm retain, after the merger, less than 80% of the ownership in the new company. The regulation contains several provisions that limit certain techniques for achieving this goal. The avoidance techniques include inflating the foreign firm, shrinking the U.S. firm, and inverting only part of the U.S. firm. First, it prevents firms from reaching the less than 80% goal by inflating the size of the foreign merger partner (which must have more than 20% ownership subsequent to the merger) by use of passive assets (e.g., an interest bearing bank deposit). This notice disregards passive assets of the foreign firm if more than 50% of its value is in passive assets. (Banks and financial service companies are excluded.) Second, it prevents firms from shrinking the size of the U.S. firm by paying extraordinary dividends before the merger. The notice disregards this reduction in value. Third, it prevents an inversion of part of a U.S. company (a "spinversion") by spinning it off to a newly formed foreign corporation, by treating the new "foreign" company as a domestic corporation. After the 2014 Treasury regulations were issued, some firms revised their plans, and the pace of inversions slowed. Some mergers were structured to avoid the anti-inversion rules and Treasury regulations, by an ownership share of less than 60%. Among what appear to be inversions is the merger of telecom firm Arris and Pace (a U.K. firm), CF Industries (fertilizer) and OCI NB (a Netherlands firm), Terex with Konecranes (a Finnish firm), and a consolidation of European Coca-Cola bottling firms (one such firm, Coca-Cola Enterprises, was a U.S. headquartered firm). Waste Connections Inc. merged with Progressive Waste Solutions Ltd (a Canadian Firm), with 70% ownership and a headquarters in Canada. Monsanto's proposal to merge with Syngenta (a Swiss firm) was called off. Some mergers that did not qualify as inversions under the tax law also occurred. The most significant in size was the proposed Pfizer merger. On November 23, 2015, Pfizer announced a proposed merger with Allergan, an Irish company, and the move of its headquarters to Ireland. This merger, which would result in the largest pharmaceutical company in the world, is not covered under the anti-inversion rules because Pfizer will own 56% of the value of the new firm. Allergan itself is the product of a merger involving both stock and cash acquisition by Actavis in 2015, with former Allergen shareholders owning a minority of the new company. Thus, this merger as well was not an inversion under the tax law. Actavis, in turn, was a former U.S. firm that inverted by merger with Warner Chillcott, an Irish firm, in 2013 (where the former shareholders of the U.S. firm acquired 77% of the stock). Pfizer terminated its merger with Allergen after the April 4, 2016, regulations (discussed below). Other notable mergers not subject to anti-inversion rules were the acquisition of Salix, a pharmaceutical company, by Valeant (a Canadian company); the acquisition of Auxilium by Endo (after Auxilium backed out of an inversion with Canadian firm QLT); the merger of Cyberonics with Italy's Sorin (to be headquartered in the U.K.); and the merger of Broadcom (a chipmaker) with Avago (a Singapore firm). Information and analytics provider HIS announced a merger with Markit Ltd, a U.K. firm, to be headquartered in the U.K., but the ownership share of HIS would be less than 60% of the firm. Johnson Controls also merged with Tyco, one of the earlier inverted firms. The 2015 Treasury regulations appear to have more limited consequences for inversions than the 2014 regulations did. Three regulatory changes were made by the notice. First, in the case where the foreign parent is a tax resident of a third country, stock issued by that parent to the existing foreign firm will be disregarded for purposes of the ownership requirement. That change will prevent a U.S. firm from merging with a partner and then choosing a tax friendly third country to headquarter in. The second provision would clarify the so called "anti-stuffing" rules, where the foreign firm's size is inflated by adding assets to that firm. The notice clarifies that this rule applies to any assets, not just passive assets. Third, the current business activity exception requires 25% of business activity to be in the foreign country where the new parent is created or organized, but does not require it to be a foreign parent. This rule requires the business activity to be in the foreign parent. It prevents inversion based on the business activity test when the foreign parent has a tax residence in another country without substantial business activities. On April 4, 2016, the Treasury Department issued temporary and proposed regulations formalizing rules contained in Notices 2014-52 and 2015-79 limiting corporate tax inversions, as well as adding new rules addressing inversions and earnings-stripping transactions. In response to these new regulations, the proposed merger between Pfizer and Allergen PLC has been terminated. The April 4, 2016, Treasury regulations put in place several anti-inversion rules that target groups that have engaged in a series of inversion or acquisition transactions as well as a rule that restricts postinversion asset dilution. The temporary regulations target inversion transactions involving a new foreign parent that previously acquired one or more U.S. entities in inversions or acquisitions in which the new foreign parent issued stock. These prior acquisitions would generally increase the value of the foreign entity, enabling it to subsequently engage in an inversion transaction with a larger U.S. company while remaining below the 60% or 80% ownership thresholds. The temporary regulations disregard stock of the new foreign parent to the extent the value of such stock is attributable to its prior U.S. entity acquisitions during the prior three years. According to analysis by Americans for Tax Fairness, the implementation of this rule would have increased Pfizer's share of the merged company to roughly 70% from 56% prior to the rule. Similar to the multiple domestic entity acquisition rule, the multiple-step acquisition rule targets certain inversions that are structured as back-to-back foreign acquisitions. Specifically, it targets transactions that are part of a plan in which a foreign corporation acquires substantially all of the assets of a U.S. entity and, subsequent to this first acquisition, a second foreign corporation acquires substantially all of the assets of the first foreign corporation. The temporary regulations, under certain circumstances, treat each acquisition as an acquisition of a U.S. entity that may be subject to anti-inversion rules. Unlike the multiple domestic entity acquisition rule, which has a three-year look-back period, the multiple-step acquisition rule can be applied to all acquisitions that are part of the same plan regardless of time. A third rule modified existing regulations to restrict the ability of inverted companies to avoid paying tax on unrealized gains (under Section 965) through a transfer to a controlled foreign corporation (CFC) (under Section 351). This would address situations where a CFC of an inverted U.S. company engages in a postinversion exchange that could dilute a U.S. shareholder's indirect interest in the exchanged asset, allowing the U.S. shareholder to avoid U.S. tax on any realized gain in the asset that is not recognized at the time of the transfer. The rule requires a CFC of an inverted U.S. group to recognize all realized gain with respect to any such postinversion Section 351 exchange. The earnings-stripping regulations aim to restrict the ability of foreign-parent groups to shift earnings out of the United States through dividends or other economically similar transactions (under Section 385). In these cases certain related-party debt will be characterized as equity for tax purposes. The result of equity classification is that interest deductions will be disallowed, and withholding obligations of 30% (or lower rate based on an applicable income tax treaty) could ensue. The regulations do not normally apply for related-party debt that is incurred to fund actual business investment, such as building or equipping a factory. The regulations also require documentation of debt instruments issued and held by certain members of an expanded group to establish that such instruments are properly characterized as debt. The regulations also allow the IRS on audit to treat an instrument issued to a related party as in part debt and in part equity. The final regulations issued on October 21, 2016, scaled back the original regulations in response to the comment period. The final regulations removed the general bifurcation rule that would have allowed a debt instrument to be classified as part debt and part equity and an exemption for debt for foreign issuers. The rules also provided exemptions for cash pools (a pool of cash to be accessed for short-term needs), short-term loans, regulated financial entities, and pass-throughs (firms not taxed as corporations). The Treasury delayed documentation rules for a year on July 28, 2017. Treasury announced on July 7, 2017, that these debt-equity regulations were to be among eight rules targeted for review. The Treasury issued final regulations for the temporary regulations introduced in April 2016 on July 12, 2018, as TD 9834 with minor changes. Two days after the regulations were issued, Pfizer withdrew from its merger with Allergen, an Irish-based company that was an inverted firm. It appears that this merger was affected by the multiple-entity rule, which has come to be called "serial inversion." Mergers between Shire (Ireland based) and Basalta, and between HIS and Markit Group Inc. (U.K. based) went forward. The CF Industries merger with OCI NV (based in the Netherlands) was also called off; Johnson Controls and Tyco went forward. A merger between Konecranes (a Finnish firm) and Terex was scaled down to an acquisition of a share of Terex with the U.S. firm owning 25%, thus avoiding the effect of regulations. In May 2016 Cardtronics, Inc., an ATM operator, announced a plan to move to the U.K. using the substantial business activities test. Also in May, an oil and gas industry service and technology firm announced a merger with Technip SA (France) to form a U.K. company, with each firm holding about half the stock and thus avoiding any of the recent regulations and establishing a new headquarters in another country. In 2017, Praxaire (a U.S. industrial gas company) announced a merger with Linde AG (a German gas and technology company), also with each owning half of the new company. As noted in the introduction, statistical data suggest a decline in inversions from 2015 to 2016, and again from 2016 to 2017, and these data are consistent with the limited news reports of major inversions. Pfizer's CEO has recently indicated that deals are on hold generally while tax reform is being considered. The 2017 legislation not only made fundamental changes to the overall treatment of corporate income at home and abroad, but also adopted several provisions specifically aimed at inverted corporations (those with 60% to 80% ownership). Under the new law, existing untaxed earnings held abroad are taxed under a deemed repatriation rule, but at a lower rate (8% for earnings reinvested in noncash assets and 15.5% for earnings held as cash or cash equivalents). A special recapture rule applies on deemed repatriations of newly inverted firms. This recapture rule applies if a firm first becomes an expatriated entity at any time during the 10-year period beginning on December 22, 2017. In this case, the tax will be increased from 8% and 15.5% to 35% tax for the entire deemed repatriation, with no foreign tax credit allowed for the increase in tax rate. The additional tax is due on the full amount of the deemed repatriation in the first tax year in which the taxpayer becomes an expatriated entity. BEAT excludes payments which reduce gross receipts with the result that payment for the cost of goods sold is not included under BEAT. An exception applies for firms that invert after November 9, 2017, where payments to a foreign parent or any foreign firm in the affiliated for cost of goods sold is included in BEAT. The constructive ownership rules for purposes of determining 10% U.S. shareholders, whether a corporation is a CFC and whether parties satisfy certain relatedness tests, were expanded in the 2017 tax revision. Specifically, the new law treats stock owned by a foreign person as attributable to a U.S. entity owned by the foreign person (so-called "downward attribution"). As a result, stock owned by a foreign person may generally be attributed to (1) a U.S. corporation, 10% of the value of the stock of which is owned, directly or indirectly, by the foreign person; (2) a U.S. partnership in which the foreign person is a partner; and (3) certain U.S. trusts if the foreign person is a beneficiary or, in certain circumstances, a grantor or a substantial owner. The downward attribution rule was originally conceived to deal with inversions. In an inversion, without downward attribution, a subsidiary of the original U.S. parent could lose CFC status if it sold enough stock to the new foreign parent so the U.S. parent no longer had majority ownership. With downward attribution, the ownership of stock by the new foreign parent in the CFC is attributed to the U.S. parent, so that the subsidiary continues its CFC status, making it subject to any tax rules that apply to CFCs (such as Subpart F and repatriation taxes under the old law, and Subpart F and GILTI under the new law). Dividends (like capital gains) are allowed lower tax rates than the rates applied to ordinary income. The rates are 0%, 15%, and 20% depending on the rate bracket that ordinary income falls into. Certain dividends received from foreign firms (those that do not have tax treaties and PFICs ) are not eligible for these lower rates. Dividends paid by firms that inverted after the date of enactment of P.L. 115-97 are added to the list of those not eligible for the lower rates. In 2004, an excise tax of 15% was imposed on stock compensation received by insiders in an expatriated corporation; the new law increases it to 20%, effective on the date of enactment for corporations that first become expatriated after that date. As noted earlier, there are no aggregate data available yet for 2018, but there are also indications that most tax-motivated inversions had already been discouraged by the 2016 regulations. Considering announcements of individual companies, one planned inversion, by Assurant, Inc. was revised to retain the headquarters in the United States. Ohio-based Dana, Inc. announced plans to merge and move the headquarters to the U.K., although the merger would leave the U.S. shareholders with less than 60% ownership, and therefore not make them subject to anti-inversion penalties. A recent announcement indicated that the Dana merger was called off. Some firms may be considering reversing their headquarters decisions. The AJCA was successful at limiting a form of inversions, at least initially. In particular, the AJCA stopped the practice of basic "naked inversions," in which little activity or presence in the new jurisdiction is required and the new parent is domiciled in a tax haven. Further, through regulation, Treasury has limited the use of the substantial business activity test safe harbor to invert. Recent activity (as noted above), however, suggests that mergers continued to be used as a vehicle for corporate inversions after these changes. These more recent mergers have increasingly resulted in a U.K. parent company (e.g., FMC-Technip, HIS-Markit), due to policy decisions by the U.K. government. Specifically, the U.K. lowered its corporate tax rate and adopted a territorial tax system. In addition, anti-abuse provisions for foreign source income were weakened by the European Union courts. The U.K. has also proposed taxing certain intangible income at a 10% rate. (This is referred to as a patent box.) To restrict the occurrence of tax-motivated inversions, both a general reform of the U.S. corporate tax and specific provisions to deal with tax-motivated international mergers were discussed. Some important changes were made in 2017; other options remain. Interest in reforming the corporate income tax was long-standing, including calling for explicit accommodation of international concerns. As noted earlier, two aspects of the U.S. corporate tax system are particularly relevant to corporate location decisions: the corporate tax rate and the taxation of foreign-source earnings. Taken together, these factors, under prior law, could yield a substantial reduction in taxes paid. In the case of the proposed merger of Forest Laboratories Inc. (a U.S. company) and Actavis (an Irish company) in 2014, the tax reduction was estimated to be roughly $100 million per year. Prior to the 2017 changes, the U.S. corporate statutory tax rate was higher than both the average statutory rates of the other Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries and that of the 15 largest economies in the world. Many asserted that the U.S. statutory tax rate needed to be lowered to reduce the incentive for inversion transactions. With the rate lowered from 35% to 21%, the combined central and subnational corporate tax rates are similar to most rates in the OECD. While lowering the corporate tax rate would reduce the incentive to invert, there are reasons to suggest that it would be impractical to reduce the rate to the level needed to stop inversions. Namely, to stop inversions through a reduction in the corporate tax rate would require a U.S. corporate tax rate set equal to the lowest tax rate of a destination company, or zero. A lower corporate tax rate alone reduced the incentive for corporate inversions, primarily by reducing the tax rate applied to repatriated earnings. For a company like Pfizer, with large foreign earnings, a rate reduction could yield significantly lower taxes paid. However, as discussed below, the benefit of a lowered rate is negligible relative to the benefit to corporate taxpayers afforded by territorial tax systems, when income earned in low- or no-tax foreign jurisdictions is never subject to U.S. tax. Two factors present challenges for lowering the corporate tax rate further. First, if revenue neutrality is a goal, there may not be enough base-broadening provisions with revenue offsets to provide deep cuts in the corporate tax; and, if such offsets were found, they might have their own consequences for investment. Reducing the corporate tax without corresponding base broadening would likely reduce corporate tax revenue, adding to chronic budget deficits. Prior to the 2017 revision, the United States was one of the few countries that had a worldwide tax system and levied a tax on the foreign-source income of domestic corporations. Changing corporate tax residence to a country with a territorial tax system (where foreign earnings would not be taxed at all) was thought to drive inversion decisions. This issue led to proposals for the United States to adopt a territorial tax system to stop inversion transactions. One concern about adopting a territorial tax system is the strain it would likely place on the current transfer pricing system. From this perspective, the worldwide tax system provided a backstop on the amount of profit shifting or base erosion possible, because shifted profits will eventually be repatriated. Under a territorial tax system, this is not the case. Research has found evidence of significant profit shifting, especially related to mobile intellectual property, suggesting a lot of income from foreign sources is really U.S. income in disguise. Numerous other issues surround the adoption of a U.S. territorial tax. For example, while some supported a territorial tax to eliminate the incentive to keep earnings abroad, others opposed it because it likely discourages domestic investment and activity in the United States. The revisions in 2017 maintained a worldwide system, but with some changes. Income from U.S. subsidiaries is taxed on a current basis but at a lower rate and with an exemption for a deemed return on tangible assets. It also provided a subsidy for locating intangible assets with earnings from abroad in the United States. Many of the inverting firms had significant intangible assets, and it is not clear whether this new regime (a lower tax rate but on a current basis) is more or less generous to firms considering inverting. Moving closer to a pure territorial tax, as in the case of a rate reduction, would likely reduce corporate tax revenue and add to current budget pressures unless it is offset by other tax increases, although this effect would be less costly at the lower 21% tax rate. In 2027, GILTI is projected to raise $21 billion. GILTI could be retained and the rate lowered or the temporarily lower rate could be made permanent. There has been some agreement that adopting a territorial tax without some significant anti-abuse provisions could be problematic, as it would likely increase profit shifting abroad by U.S. firms. Evidence suggests that administrative remedies were successful at dramatically slowing inversions; the targeted legislative changes in the 2017 Act may have had some impact as well. There are further changes that could be made to discourage inversions. This section discusses the history of these proposals, both legislative and administrative. One approach would be to extend the rate recapture enacted in the 2017 Act for a period longer than 10 years, or to make it apply indefinitely to future inversions. A second alternative is to directly restrict the ability of U.S. firms to invert by merger. The President's FY2015, FY2016, and FY2017 budget proposals contained a provision that would have further restricted the use of inversions. The proposal would modify the 80% test enacted in the AJCA to a 50% test and eliminate the 60% test. In effect, this proposal would reduce the percentage of shareholders that are owners of the "old U.S. company" and the "new foreign merged company." The proposal would also require that the new foreign corporation be managed and controlled from outside the United States and prohibit transactions where the new foreign company has substantial business activities in the United States. In November 2015, then-Senate Finance Committee Chairman Hatch indicated the possibility of adding an anti-inversion provision to legislation to extend expired provisions. Many of these bills were introduced in the 115 th Congress. H.R. 1931 (Doggett), the Corporate EXIT Fairness Act, and H.R. 3434 (Levin) and S. 1636 (Durbin, along with a number of cosponsors), the Stop Corporate Inversions Act, would have treated all mergers as U.S. firms when the U.S. firm's shareholders hold more than 50% or when management and control primarily takes place in the United States. H.R. 1932 (Doggett) and S. 851 (Whitehouse), as with bills introduced in the 114 th Congress, would have included anti-inversion provisions as part of a broader proposal to address tax havens and deferral. H.R. 3603 (Levin) would have addressed earnings stripping of inverted corporations. H.R. 3424 (DeLauro) would disallow federal contracts for inverted firms. H.R. 1451 (Schakowsky) and S. 586 (Sanders) would make major changes in the tax treatment of foreign source income and include anti-inversion rules. Following the change in the international system adopted at the end of 2017, Representative Doggett and Senator Whitehouse introduced the "No Tax Break for Outsourcing Act" ( H.R. 5108 , S. 2459 ) which, in addition to other changes, would have treated foreign corporations that are managed and controlled in the United States as domestic corporations and treated inverted firms as U.S. firms when the shareholders of the former U.S. company own more than 50% of the shares. These bills would have also limited interest deductions in the United States to the proportionate share of the firm's assets. The last proposal (to allocate worldwide interest) was in both the House and Senate versions of the legislation ( H.R. 1 ; 115 th Congress) in somewhat different form but was not retained in the final legislation. While this proposal was not specifically targeted at inverted firms it would have increased the restrictions that limit earnings stripping. Former President Obama had encouraged Congress to act directly to limit inversions, but had also indicated on August 6, 2014, that administrative changes to limit inversions were under examination. Prior to that announcement, Steve Shay, a Harvard professor and former practitioner and Treasury official, outlined two regulatory actions that he believed could be taken. The first would limit earnings stripping by reclassifying debt as equity due to excessive related party debt in an inversion. (The second provision is no longer relevant under the new international tax regime.) A number of other administrative proposals that have been suggested (such as provisions relating to taxing accumulated deferred earnings) are no longer relevant and others have been adopted in the regulatory changes discussed above. Expanding the scope of Section 7874 (which treats inverted firms as U.S. firms) by combining multiple transactions into single ones, or vice versa. The scope of Section 7874 could also be expanded by treating certain stock as disqualified (because it is expected to be held temporarily or because it is accompanied by restrictions on voting rights); this provision was adopted in Treasury regulations; Potentially recognizing accumulated deferred earnings as currently taxable under authority such as Subpart F, Section 367, or other rules (this provision is no longer relevant with the end of deferral, but it may have influenced the decision to tax deferred earnings of newly inverted firms at the full 35% rate for the next 10 years); Issuing regulations that would generally tighten restrictions on interest deductions under the thin capitalization rules of Section 163(j). These changes would probably apply to corporations in general, and not just to inverted corporations (this change was made in the 2017 tax revision); Stricter regulations under Section 367 to immediately include foreign earnings in the case of actions that attempt to move foreign operations out from under the U.S. parent. This would make future earnings of these operations nontaxable; Strengthening and modernizing the effectively connected income rules that determined whether trade or business activity is taking place in the United States by foreign firms; and Closely monitoring the creation of non-U.S. subsidiaries owned by the foreign parent after inversion, and ensuring that assets (including intangibles such as inventions, knowhow, etc.) transferred from the U.S. firm are transferred at arms-length prices. There is disagreement among experts about whether the types of regulatory changes discussed in this section are feasible or desirable. A number of legislative proposals were advanced in 2014, when the wave of inversions through merger began. Representative Levin, the ranking member of the House Ways and Means Committee, introduced the Stop Corporate Inversions Act of 2014 ( H.R. 4679 ), which would have reflected the Administration's proposed changes, retroactive to May 8, 2014. The inversion would have not been recognized if the U.S. stockholders had 50% of the shares or if 25% of the business activity is in the United States. A companion bill, which would have sunset in two years to provide time for tax reform, was introduced in the Senate by Senator Levin in 2014 ( S. 2360 ). The Joint Committee on Taxation estimated the permanent proposal to gain $19.5 billion in revenue over FY2015-FY2024. The two-year proposal would have raise $0.8 billion over the same period. In the 114 th Congress, these legislative proposals were introduced as H.R. 415 (Levin) and S. 198 (Durbin). Senator Casey proposed an anti-inversion amendment to an education bill ( S. 1177 ). In the 114 th Congress, H.R. 297 (Doggett) and S. 174 (Whitehouse) included anti-inversion provisions as part of a broader proposal to address tax haven abuses and restrict the benefits of deferral. S. 922 (Sanders) and H.R. 1790 (Schakowsky) also included anti-inversion provisions, as well as earnings-stripping provisions (discussed below) and broader provisions, including the repeal of deferral. In 2014 a number of legislative proposals were introduced that would limit the tax benefits associated with inversions for certain corporations. For example, H.R. 1554 (Doggett), H.R. 3666 (DeLauro), H.R. 3793 (Maffei), S. 268 (Levin), S. 1533 (Levin), and S. 1844 (Shaheen) would each treat corporations managed and controlled from the United States as domestic corporations regardless of their legal tax home or status as an inverted company. This provision was also included in S. 922 (Sanders) and H.R. 1790 (Schakowsky). Other proposals in 2014, H.R. 694 (Schakowsky) and S. 250 (Sanders), would have eliminated deferral (taxing foreign source income currently), in addition to limiting the benefits of inversions when management and control continues to reside in the United States. Legislative proposals were also under discussion in 2014 by Representative Levin (announced July 31, 2014) and by Senator Schumer (announced August 14, 2014) to address earnings stripping, where foreign parent companies borrow from the U.S. subsidiary to increase interest deductions and reduce taxable income in the United States. Both of these proposals would have tightened the rules allowing interest deductions by reducing the current limit on interest deductions relative to adjusted income from 50% to 25% and repealing an alternative safe-harbor debt-to-equity test. Both proposals would have also eliminated or limited interest carryforwards. The Schumer proposal was intended to apparently apply to inverted firms while the Levin proposal would have applied generally. The Levin proposal would have also limited other transactions between related parties within the firm that allow untaxed investment of funds in the United States. The restrictions on interest in the Levin bill were the same as those initially proposed in the House in 2004. Senator Schumer introduced his proposal, S. 2786 , the Corporate Inverters Earnings Stripping Reform Act of 2014. Its limits on interest deductions would have applied to inverted firms where U.S. shareholders own more than 50% of the firm. The restriction also would have applied to firms that inverted using the substantial business activities test. The bill had nine Democratic cosponsors; five of them were on the Senate Finance Committee. In the 114 th Congress, S. 922 (Sanders) and H.R. 1790 (Schakowsky) included general earnings-stripping provisions for firms with a foreign parent. Earnings stripping provisions were also addressed in the report of the Senate Finance Committee's working group on Tax Reform. H.R. 5278 (DeLauro) and S. 2704 (Levin), introduced May 30, 2014, would have disallowed awarding federal contracts to inverted firms. These proposals were introduced in the 114 th Congress as H.R. 1809 (DeLauro) and S. 975 (Durbin). In 2014, Senators Brown and Durbin proposed S. 2895 , and Representative Doggett introduced H.R. 5549 , the Pay What You Owe Before You Go Act, that would have taxed the accumulated deferred earnings of inverting firms. Then Senate Finance Committee Chairman Ron Wyden had proposed having draft legislation in place in September 2014, and also referred to Schumer's earnings-stripping proposal. Senator Wyden had previously announced that any changes would be retroactive to May 8, 2014.	[ "News reports in the late 1990s and early 2000s drew attention to a phenomenon sometimes called corporate \"inversions\" or \"expatriations\": instances where U.S. firms reorganize their structure so that the \"parent\" element of the group is a foreign corporation rather than a corporation chartered in the United States. The main objective of these transactions was tax savings, and they involved little to no shift in actual economic activity. Bermuda and the Cayman Islands (countries with no corporate income tax) were the locations of many of the newly created parent corporations. These types of inversions largely ended with the enactment of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (JOBS Act; P.L. 108-357), which denied the tax benefits of an inversion if the original U.S. stockholders owned 80% or more of the new firm. The act effectively ended shifts to tax havens where no real business activity took place. However, two avenues for inverting remained. The act allowed a firm to invert if it has substantial business operations in the country where the new parent was to be located; the regulations at one point set a 10% level of these business operations. Several inversions using the business activity test resulted in Treasury regulations in 2012 that increased the activity requirement to 25%, effectively closing off this method. Firms could also invert by merging with a foreign company if the original U.S. stockholders owned less than 80% of the new firm. If the original U.S. shareholders owned less than 60%, the firm was not considered as inverting. Two features made a country an attractive destination: a low corporate tax rate and a territorial tax system that did not tax foreign source income. The U.K. joined countries such as Ireland, Switzerland, and Canada as targets for inverting when it adopted a territorial tax in 2009. At the same time, the U.K. also lowered its rate (from 25% to 20% by 2015). Inverted firms could reduce worldwide taxes by stripping taxable earnings out of the new U.S. subsidiary, largely through allocating debt to that subsidiary. Soon after, several high-profile companies indicated an interest in merging with a non-U.S. headquartered company, including Pfizer, Chiquita, AbbVie, and Burger King. This \"second wave\" of inversions again raised concerns about an erosion of the U.S. tax base. Chiquita and AbbVie canceled their plans in the wake of 2014 Treasury regulations, but Burger King and other firms completed merger plans. Pfizer subsequently terminated its planned merger with Allergan after Treasury regulations issued in 2016. Evidence suggests that these Treasury regulations have been an important factor in subsequently decreasing these merger-related inversions. Two policy options had been discussed in response: a general reform of the U.S. corporate tax and specific provisions to deal with tax-motivated international mergers. In December 2017, P.L. 115-97 (popularly known as the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act) lowered the corporate tax rate as part of broader tax reform which some argued would slow the rate of inversions. Other tax reform proposals suggested that if the United States moved to a territorial tax, the incentive to invert would be eliminated. There were concerns that a territorial tax could worsen the profit-shifting that already exists among multinational firms. P.L. 115-97, while moving in some ways to a territorial tax, also instituted a number of measures aimed at combatting profit shifting, including a global minimum tax on intangible income that limited the tax benefits of a territorial tax. The second option is to directly target inversions. The 2017 act included several provisions that discouraged inversions. In addition, further anti-inversion provisions have been introduced, most recently H.R. 5108 and S. 2459 in the 115th Congress, to treat all firms in which former U.S. shareholders have more than 50% ownership (or in which management and control is in the United States) as U.S. firms. These bills also provided that debt could also be allocated to the U.S. member of a worldwide operation in proportion to the U.S. ownership of assets." ]	9,230	gov_report	en	null	ab09c613e6b89a5b403421db577a621bb1f6abb330347dd8
As of June 30, 2017, the UN had carried out 71 peacekeeping operations since 1948, and had 16 active UN peacekeeping operations worldwide. Eight of these UN peacekeeping operations were in sub-Saharan Africa (see fig. 1). In their earliest days, UN peacekeeping operations were primarily military in nature and limited to monitoring cease-fire agreements and stabilizing situations on the ground while political efforts were being made to resolve conflicts. Today, in response to increasingly complex situations in which conflicts may be internal, involve many parties, and include civilians as deliberate targets, UN peacekeeping operations are more commonly “multidimensional”—deploying civilian and police personnel in addition to military personnel. Multidimensional peacekeeping operations seek to create a secure and stable environment while working with national authorities and actors to make sure the peace agreement or political process is implemented. According to the UN, multidimensional peacekeeping operations are designed to protect civilians and often assist in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants; support the organization of elections; protect and promote human rights; and assist in restoring the rule of law. Figure 2 shows examples of UN peacekeepers serving in different capacities as part of MINUSCA in Bangui, CAR. Each UN peacekeeping operation, including its mandated size and tasks, is authorized through a UN Security Council resolution. The operation’s budget and resources are subject to General Assembly approval. The UN’s approved budget for global peacekeeping operations in UN fiscal year 2017 was about $7.9 billion. Individual operation budgets ranged from about $36 million for the peacekeeping operation in Kosovo to more than $1.2 billion for the peacekeeping operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (see table 1). The UN reported in June 2017 that it maintained 95,544 uniformed peacekeepers, 5,004 international civilians, 10,149 local civilians, and 1,597 UN volunteers in support of its operations around the world. According to UN documents, civilian peacekeeping personnel are generally recruited to peacekeeping operations as individuals, while police and military personnel are volunteered by member states to participate as part of their country’s contribution to UN peacekeeping operations. The United States is the largest financial contributor to UN peacekeeping operations. From fiscal years 2014 to 2017, the United States contributed an average of about $2.1 billion per year to these operations. The UN General Assembly sets the assessment levels for UN member contributions to peacekeeping operations every 3 years. The United States’ assessment has averaged about 28.5 percent of the UN peacekeeping budget; however, Congress has authorized payment with appropriated funds at about 27 percent for U.S. fiscal years 2014 through 2016, and 25 percent for U.S. fiscal year 2017. In April 2014, UN Security Council Resolution 2149 established MINUSCA following escalating sectarian violence in CAR that resulted in the destruction of state institutions, thousands of deaths, and 2.5 million people—more than half of CAR’s entire population—in need of humanitarian aid, according to a UN report. The conflict also resulted in 174,000 people being internally displaced and over 400,000 fleeing to neighboring countries, according to the UN report. MINUSCA’s tasks include protecting civilians, given the security, humanitarian, human rights, and political crisis in CAR; supporting the implementation of the transition process, including efforts to extend state authority and preserve territorial integrity; facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance and promoting and protecting human rights; supporting justice and the rule of law; and facilitating the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, and repatriation processes. On November 15, 2017, UN Security Council Resolution 2387 (2017) extended MINUSCA’s mandate for a fourth time, through November 15, 2018. MINUSCA’s approved personnel levels for UN fiscal year 2017 comprised 10,750 military personnel, 400 individual police officers, and 1,680 formed police unit personnel, as well as 790 international civilian and 696 national civilian personnel, 238 UN volunteers, and 40 government- provided personnel, according to a UN Secretary-General report. Table 2 shows average annual personnel deployment for MINUSCA and the number of authorized positions for the first 3 full fiscal years of the operation. Based on data and other input from the UN, DOD, and State, we estimate that it would cost the United States more than twice as much as it would cost the UN to implement a hypothetical operation comparable to MINUSCA, the ongoing UN operation in the Central African Republic (CAR). In addition, the estimated cost of a U.S. operation in CAR far exceeds U.S. contributions to MINUSCA. Based on an estimate we developed in conjunction with DOD and State officials, a hypothetical, comparable U.S. operation would likely cost nearly $5.7 billion, more than twice as much as MINUSCA, the ongoing UN operation in CAR. Our comparison covers the time from which MINUSCA was established in April 2014 through the end of UN fiscal year 2017, which ended on June 30, 2017—a total of 3 years and 3 months, the first 39 months of MINUSCA. Over this time period, UN costs for MINUSCA totaled approximately $2.4 billion. Using roughly the same basic parameters for MINUSCA, including similar deployment levels of military and civilian personnel over the same time period, in consultation with DOD and State officials, we estimate that a comparable, hypothetical U.S. operation would likely cost nearly $5.7 billion, more than twice the UN cost for MINUSCA (see table 3 for a detailed comparison of estimated U.S. costs and actual UN costs). This estimate does not include, among other things, the cost for State diplomatic security and office space for civilian staff, the inclusion of which could further increase the total estimated U.S. cost for such an operation. During the same time period, from April 10, 2014 through June 30, 2017, the United States contributed approximately $700 million to the UN to support MINUSCA. Therefore, the estimated cost of a U.S. operation (nearly $5.7 billion) would be almost eight times greater than the United States’ contribution to MINUSCA. See figure 3 for a comparison of these costs with the U.S. estimate. Various factors contribute to the differences in costs between actual UN expenditures for MINUSCA from April 10, 2014 through June 30, 2017— the first 39 months of MINUSCA—and a hypothetical, comparable U.S. operation over the same time period, including disparities in the cost of sourcing and transporting equipment and supplies, staffing and compensating military and police personnel, and maintaining facilities and communications and intelligence systems. These disparities reflect operational, structural, and doctrinal differences in the way the United States likely would undertake a hypothetical, comparable operation, should such an operation be deemed in the U.S. national interest. High U.S. costs to source and transport supplies and equipment to the Central African Republic (CAR) contribute to the difference between our cost estimate for the hypothetical U.S. peacekeeping operation and the UN’s actual costs for MINUSCA. In the hypothetical U.S. operation, based on input from DOD and IDA officials and the output of the IDA cost estimating tool, the United States would fly in most of its consumable supplies from outside CAR. Specifically, materials such as water, ice, food, and other subsistence items would be airlifted into CAR from Italy, a supply location validated as reasonable by DOD and IDA officials given its proximity to the operation and because MINUSCA relies on a UN global service center there, one of two such UN centers in Europe. The estimated U.S. cost of airlifting water alone over the 39-month time period for the hypothetical operation would total nearly $700 million. The United States would still deploy its equipment and personnel to CAR from the United States, at a cost of nearly $600 million. Transportation of equipment and supplies within CAR would cost an additional estimated $316 million. In contrast, the UN does not fly in water or consumables on the same scale as the United States would in the hypothetical operation. Instead, the UN relies on some in-country or local infrastructure and consumables. Military and formed police unit equipment is provided by the troop- and police-contributing countries. The UN reimburses these countries for equipment at set rates. The UN cost of reimbursing countries for deploying their equipment to CAR likely would be less than the amount the United States would spend on airlifting the equipment to CAR alone. For example, the UN cost of freight, deployment, and country reimbursements for military and formed police equipment was approximately $229 million over a 2-year period (July 2014 through June 2016), while in the hypothetical operation the U.S. cost of deploying equipment alone would be over $382 million, which is about $154 million more than the UN cost over a similar 2-year period (September 2014 through August 2016). The United States would staff and compensate its military and police personnel differently than the UN, leading to differences between the estimated U.S. costs and actual UN costs. While neither the hypothetical U.S. cost estimate nor UN expenditures include the cost of salaries for active duty personnel or troops contributed by other countries, respectively, the United States would bear the additional cost of salaries for the share of personnel drawn from military reserves. According to DOD officials, 10 percent of infantry unit personnel would have been reservist personnel in a hypothetical, comparable U.S. operation, based on the average ratio of active to reserve personnel deployed by the United States in fiscal years 2015 through 2017, roughly the same time period as the first 39 months of MINUSCA. As a result, the total estimated cost of the hypothetical U.S. operation reflects the additional U.S. expense of paying full salaries and hardship duty pay for U.S. reservist military personnel. The estimate also includes the incremental costs the United States would incur for deploying active duty military personnel, including hardship duty pay that is not incurred when those personnel are in the United States. For military troops deployed to MINUSCA, the UN pays a standard troop cost reimbursement to the troop-contributing countries, which is intended also to cover incremental expenses but not the cost of troops’ salaries. U.S. costs for civilian police also are significantly higher than UN costs. The United States would pay over $167 million for U.S. civilian police for the duration of the hypothetical operation, while the UN spent $41 million on its individual police officers over the same time frame. The U.S. estimate includes the cost of police salaries and the additional costs of deployment, whereas UN costs for deploying individual police officers do not include salaries, which are borne by the police-contributing countries. Higher U.S. standards for certain aspects of the hypothetical peacekeeping operation in CAR would contribute to costs that exceed those of MINUSCA. Facilities. The higher estimated U.S. costs reflect higher U.S. standards for facilities, according to State officials. The U.S. cost estimate includes more than $1.1 billion for facilities and related costs, which include facility maintenance, food service, laundry, management and administration, and residential leases for civilian personnel. In contrast, the actual UN cost for facilities as part of MINUSCA totaled $292 million over the same time period. Communications and intelligence systems. The United States incurs costs associated with meeting U.S. intelligence standards that are not part of UN operations, which lack comparable intelligence capabilities. The U.S. cost estimate includes $140 million for the cost of Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence Systems, which represents additional operational costs to meet higher U.S. standards for U.S. communications and intelligence capabilities. Medical capability. Higher U.S. standards for medical care and medical evacuation capability as compared to the UN are another factor that would contribute to higher U.S. medical costs for a hypothetical operation, according to DOD and State officials. Some UN hospitals may not meet U.S. minimum standards for medical care, according to DOD officials. Although medical costs do not constitute a significant portion of the U.S. cost estimate, estimated U.S. medical costs ($132 million) greatly exceed actual UN medical costs ($8 million) over the same time period. UN and U.S. peacekeeping operations have various relative strengths, according to U.S. and UN officials we met with. Relative strengths of UN peacekeeping operations include international and local acceptance, access to global expertise, and the ability to leverage assistance from multilateral donors and development banks, according to these officials. Relative strengths of U.S. peacekeeping operations would include faster deployment and superior command and control, logistics, intelligence, and counterterrorism capabilities, according to U.S. and UN officials. According to U.S. and UN officials, UN peacekeeping operations benefit from greater international and local acceptance, access to global expertise, and the ability to leverage assistance from multilateral donors and development banks. UN peacekeeping operations also provide indirect benefits to the military capacity of participating countries. International and local acceptance. As a multilateral organization, the UN benefits from greater international and local acceptance for its peacekeeping operations, according to State, DOD, and UN officials. These officials noted that the UN’s multinational character contributes to a reputation for local impartiality. Conversely, the United States acting alone may not be viewed as impartial and could face challenges gaining or maintaining international or local support for peacekeeping operations, according to State and DOD officials. Global expertise. UN officials noted that the UN has unmatched convening power and access to expertise and experience from across the globe to implement the objectives of multidimensional peacekeeping operations. The UN is able to bring in people with subject matter expertise, native language skills, and knowledge of local customs to work for these operations, according to U.S. and UN officials. Leveraging multilateral assistance. U.S. officials told us that the UN is better able to leverage assistance from multilateral donors and multilateral development banks to expand the scope of assistance provided in support of the goals of peacekeeping operations. For example, according to a UN report, MINUSCA is partnering with the UN Development Fund to provide capacity building related to elections, police, courts, and prisons. The report also noted that the UN, European Union, and World Bank supported the Central African Republic government in developing a “National Recovery and Peacebuilding Plan” while harmonizing humanitarian and development funding to ensure complementarity with the UN peacekeeping operation. Developing international military capacity. U.S. officials told us that UN peacekeeping operations provide an indirect benefit of helping to professionalize the military units from many developing countries that contribute troops to the UN. We have previously reported that building military capacity of foreign partners to address security-related threats is an important goal of U.S. national security strategy and foreign policy. According to U.S. and UN officials, the relative strengths of U.S. peacekeeping operations would be faster deployment and superior command and control, logistics, intelligence, and counterterrorism capabilities. Deployment speed. State, DOD, and UN officials highlighted the United States’ ability to deploy troops and police to peacekeeping operations more quickly than the UN. Unlike the U.S. military, which can draw from a ready pool of military personnel, the UN must seek troops from UN member states, which takes time. UN officials told us that the UN faces a shortage of both troops and UN police, which slows deployment. Further, a 2015 report by the UN High-level Panel on Peacekeeping stated that the UN “has struggled to get sufficient forces on the ground quickly enough and relies on under-resourced uniformed capabilities.” The report also stated that aviation, medical, and engineering specialists, among others, are difficult to mobilize in advance of infantry units. Command and control. State, DOD, and UN officials told us that U.S. operations would enable the U.S. military to have direct command and control, whereas UN operations, which are inherently multinational, face challenges with command and control over troops from several different countries. The UN High-level Panel report noted that UN peacekeeping operations’ weak command and control is a well-known constraint that limits the type of operations the UN can undertake. Logistics support. U.S. and UN officials told us that U.S. operations have superior logistics systems. U.S. procurement likely would be faster than UN procurement, which lacks a standing supply chain and, therefore, relies on third-party vendors, according to UN officials. In addition, the UN High Level Panel report stated that UN peacekeeping operations’ logistics systems and structures in the field are under severe strain, which can limit the mobility of these operations. Intelligence capability. U.S. and UN officials agreed that U.S. operations would involve superior intelligence capability. The UN only recently established an intelligence policy—in May 2017—having recognized that some peacekeeping operations had been deployed in fragile political and security environments with asymmetrical and complex threats. However, UN officials acknowledged that the scope of UN intelligence capability remains limited. Counterterrorism capability. DOD officials told us that a U.S. peacekeeping operation would have the capability to include a counterterrorism component and would not be constrained in the use of force, if needed, in response to terrorist threats. UN peacekeeping operations, on the other hand, lack the capabilities and specialized military preparation to engage in counterterrorism operations, according to the UN High-level Panel report. The UN report stated that counterterrorism should be undertaken by the host government, a capable regional force, or an ad hoc coalition authorized by the UN Security Council. According to the UN report, UN peacekeeping operations may engage in proactive and preemptive use of force to protect civilians and UN personnel from threats; however, offensive force to degrade, neutralize or defeat an opponent is a fundamentally different type of posture that should be authorized by the Security Council only under limited and exceptional circumstances. We provided a draft of this report to DOD, State, and the UN for review and comment. DOD provided a letter, reproduced in appendix II, which stated that it had no comments. State did not provide comments. The UN provided technical comments, which we incorporated into our report as appropriate. We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretaries of Defense and State, and the Secretary- General of the United Nations. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-9601 or melitot@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made significant contributions to this report are listed in appendix III. The objectives of this report were to (1) compare the reported costs of a specific United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operation to the estimated costs of a hypothetical, comparable operation implemented by the United States; (2) identify factors that affect cost differences; and (3) identify stakeholder views on the relative strengths of UN and U.S. peacekeeping operations. To compare the reported costs of a specific UN peacekeeping operation to the estimated costs of a hypothetical, comparable operation implemented by the United States, we selected the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) as a case study. We compared the reported UN expenditures for MINUSCA, which included both military and civilian components, with estimated costs for a hypothetical U.S. operation with a similar level of military and civilian personnel. Our comparison covers a total of 3 years and 3 months—from MINUSCA’s establishment in April 2014 through June 30, 2017, the end of UN fiscal year 2017. We selected MINUSCA because it is in sub-Saharan Africa, where most UN peacekeeping operations established since 2003 have taken place, and has a typical scope and budget compared to other UN peacekeeping operations in sub-Saharan Africa, according to U.S. and UN officials. In addition, MINUSCA is one of the most recent UN peacekeeping operations; thus, initial expenditures for the operation are relatively current. Because the results of our cost comparison are based on a single case study, they cannot be generalized to all UN peacekeeping operations. To determine the UN’s costs for MINUSCA, we analyzed UN budget and expenditure data covering the initial start-up period (April 2014 to June 2014) and the first 3 UN fiscal years (July 1, 2014 to June 30, 2017). We spoke with officials of the UN Departments of Peacekeeping Operations, Field Support, and Management at UN Headquarters in New York, New York, to better understand the characteristics of MINUSCA and the different costs affecting MINUSCA’s budget and expenditures. We assessed UN expenditure data through discussions with cognizant UN officials and a review of external audits of UN budgetary information and found them sufficiently reliable for our purposes. We also analyzed data on U.S. contributions to UN peacekeeping operations for fiscal years 2014 through 2017 from the Department of State’s (State) Bureau of International Organization Affairs to determine total U.S. contributions to MINUSCA, and UN peacekeeping operations overall. To estimate the costs of a hypothetical, comparable operation implemented by the United States, we developed a hypothetical scenario for a U.S. operation based on the MINUSCA budget and supporting documents, assuming deployment of the same number of military, civilian, and police personnel in the Central African Republic (CAR) over the same time period (April 2014 through June 2017). To estimate the military portion of the operation, we interviewed Department of Defense (DOD) officials and staff at the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), a DOD-sponsored non-profit corporation involved in developing cost estimates for U.S. contingency operations. The Office of the Undersecretary of Defense-Comptroller and IDA generated a cost estimate for the military components included in the hypothetical operation using the Contingency Operations Support Tool (cost estimating tool). DOD uses this tool to develop cost estimates for all military contingency operations. The cost estimate included only the incremental costs of the operation—those directly attributable to the operation that would not be incurred if the operation did not take place. For example, the estimate produced by the cost estimating tool did not include the direct salaries of active duty personnel as those costs would be incurred by the United States regardless of a possible decision to undertake the hypothetical operation. We assessed the cost estimating tool’s applicability to developing a hypothetical cost estimate for the purposes of this report through discussions with DOD and IDA officials, and compared the tool to the accurate and comprehensive characteristics of a high-quality cost estimate, as described in the GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide. While we found the DOD cost estimating tool generated a sufficiently reliable cost estimate for a hypothetical U.S. peacekeeping operation, we did not assess the overall reliability of the tool or its capability to generate accurate or comprehensive estimates for future U.S. operations. To generate our estimate of U.S. military costs using the DOD’s estimating tool, we used UN military deployment numbers as a baseline for the scale of a hypothetical, comparable U.S. peacekeeping operation, while using unit sizes and rotations in deployment that were considered appropriate for the U.S. military, according to DOD and IDA officials. We based the hypothetical U.S. operation, and hence the cost estimate, on the following assumptions, which correspond approximately with MINUSCA’s actual UN personnel deployments: Theater of operation: Central African Republic (CAR) Type of operation: military contingency Operation time frame: April 10, 2014 through June 30, 2017 Military contingents: as of June 30, 2017, 11,495 total personnel Infantry: 10 units of 630-785 personnel per unit, approximately 90 percent active duty / 10 percent reserves Communication / signals: 1 unit, 124 personnel per unit Engineering: 4 units, 200 personnel per unit Military police: 1 unit, 120 personnel per unit Formed police units (military police): 12 units, 140 personnel per Hospital / medical: 1 level III hospital, 248 beds, 495 personnel Helicopter units: 2 UH-60 C3 units, 1 MH-60M Assault attack helicopter unit, 100 personnel per unit Quick reaction force: 1 unit, 160 personnel per unit Special forces: 1 tactical civilian affairs unit, 1 Marine special operations intelligence unit, 160 personnel per unit Unmanned aerial vehicle: 1 unit, 84 personnel Transportation: 1 heavy transport unit, 120 personnel per unit Operational tempo: 1.0 for all phases of operation and units, except aviation units (set at 1.5) Deployment schedule and phasing: phased deployment, including 14 days for predeployment (e.g., training), 5 days for deployment, 180 days for active duty unit sustainment and 270 days for reserve unit sustainment, 5 days for redeployment, and 0 days for reconstitution Housing: contractor-provided semi-permanent housing Transportation: personnel and equipment transported by airlift from the United States (primarily Fort Hood, Texas), material (such as water, food, and other consumables) transported by airlift from Italy We obtained input on the operational design for the military portion of the cost estimate from DOD officials in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense-Policy, and the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense-Comptroller, and IDA officials. However, the military portions of the scenario and their corresponding cost estimate have some limitations. As a result of rounding for some units, U.S. military personnel numbers do not exactly match the MINUSCA deployment levels. In addition, based on input from DOD officials, we attempted to select military units that would provide an essential function per U.S. common practices while keeping the overall personnel deployment level as close as possible to MINUSCA’s deployment level. An actual U.S. military plan may differ significantly from the UN plan as a result of differences between U.S. and UN military operations, structure, doctrine, and circumstances at the time of the operation. To estimate U.S. civilian costs, we matched the number of U.S. civilian police and personnel to the number serving in MINUSCA. We then estimated the costs of deploying these U.S. civilian personnel in CAR for the same time period as MINUSCA. We did not attempt to determine how the U.S. government would actually implement civilian components of a peacekeeping operation in CAR. To estimate U.S. civilian police costs, we met with State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) to identify State’s costs for civilian police contractors providing police training and technical assistance in sub-Saharan Africa. Based on INL’s input we assumed that the base salary of civilian police would be grade 13, step 5 on the Office of Personnel Management’s general schedule salary tables for federal employees. In addition to the average base salary, we identified other costs—with input from INL—including, among others, personal equipment, travel from the United States, and State’s published allowances specific to CAR for local cost of living, post hardship differential, danger pay, and living quarters. We applied the average cost per officer to the average number of UN civilian police officers deployed in MINUSCA. To estimate U.S. civilian personnel costs, we met with State’s Bureau of Budget and Planning to identify the costs of State Foreign Service officers and locally employed staff, based on the number of UN international and national civilian staff deployed to MINUSCA, respectively. We matched the number of State Foreign Service officers for the U.S. cost estimate to the number of UN international staff in MINUSCA, with input from State to align the grade levels. The estimated costs for Foreign Service officers include average salaries based on State’s Foreign Service salary tables and State’s allowances specific to CAR, including local cost of living, post hardship differential, and danger pay. We also met with State Bureau of Budget and Planning officials to estimate other costs for Foreign Service officers, which we included in our cost estimate, including post assignment travel, administrative support costs, residential furnishings, and residential guards, among others, but we did not assess the reliability of these additional costs provided by State. In addition, State’s Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations provided the actual costs of residential leases for Foreign Service officers in CAR in fiscal year 2017, which we used to estimate the cost of housing Foreign Service officers in CAR. We also matched the number of State locally employed staff to the number of UN national staff deployed to MINUSCA and added their average salaries and other costs in CAR based on data provided by State’s Bureau of the Comptroller and Global Financial Services. While MINUSCA’s expenditures also included costs for sending an annual average of up to about 200 UN volunteers to CAR, State officials told us that the United States generally would not send volunteers through its assistance efforts to a high-risk post, such as CAR. Therefore, we did not include any costs related to volunteers in the cost estimate. We also did not include costs related to host-government-provided personnel serving in MINUSCA. In addition, UN expenditures included about $7 million for “quick-impact projects” to support local government infrastructure and civil society initiatives. We did not include comparable costs for quick-impact projects in our U.S. cost estimate because we did not have a basis for matching these costs. To identify factors that affect cost differences between MINUSCA and a hypothetical, comparable operation implemented by the United States, we reviewed the U.S. cost estimate generated in conjunction with DOD, IDA, and State officials, and identified significant areas of cost for the United States and the assumptions incorporated in the estimate or factors specified by U.S. officials that drive those costs. We compared the U.S. cost estimate, including these significant areas of cost, to UN costs to identify differences. We interviewed U.S. and UN officials regarding U.S. and UN standards and policies that explain differences between MINUSCA costs and the estimated costs of a U.S. operation. To identify stakeholder views on the relative strengths of UN and U.S. peacekeeping operations, we reviewed UN reports on peacekeeping operations and interviewed UN, DOD, and State officials. In addition, we reviewed GAO’s 2006 report comparing the costs as well as the strengths of a UN peacekeeping operation in Haiti with those of a hypothetical U.S. operation. We conducted our review from February 2017 through February 2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. In addition to the individual named above, Drew Lindsey (Assistant Director), Howard Cott, Juan Pablo Avila-Tournut, Debbie Chung, Martin de Alteriis, Neil Doherty, Jennifer Leotta, Caitlin Mitchell, Elizabeth Repko, and Alex Welsh made significant contributions to this report.	[ "To promote international peace and security, the UN had 16 ongoing peacekeeping operations worldwide as of June 30, 2017, with a total budget of almost $8 billion in UN fiscal year 2017 and contributions of over 100,000 military, police, and civilian personnel from more than 120 countries. The United States is the largest financial contributor to UN peacekeeping operations, providing an average of about 28 percent of total funding annually. The Department of State Authorities Act, Fiscal Year 2017, includes a provision for GAO to compare the costs, strengths, and limitations of UN and U.S. peacekeeping operations. This report (1) compares the reported costs of a specific UN operation to the estimated costs of a hypothetical, comparable operation implemented by the United States; (2) identifies factors that affect cost differences; and (3) identifies stakeholder views on the relative strengths of UN and U.S. peacekeeping operations. GAO worked with the UN, DOD, and State to generate a cost estimate of a hypothetical U.S.-led operation in the Central African Republic comparable to MINUSCA. GAO developed this estimate using DOD's cost estimating tool for contingency operations and State data on civilian costs, assuming a U.S. operation using roughly the same levels of military and civilian personnel as MINUSCA. The cost estimate should not be construed as suggesting that the United States would likely implement such an operation in the Central African Republic or that it would implement such an operation in the same way. GAO is making no recommendations. Based on United Nations (UN) and Departments of Defense (DOD) and State (State) data, GAO estimates that it would cost the United States more than twice as much as it would cost the UN to implement a hypothetical operation comparable to the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA). MINUSCA cost the UN approximately $2.4 billion for the first 39 months of the operation. GAO estimates that a hypothetical U.S. peacekeeping operation in the Central African Republic of roughly the same size and duration would cost nearly $5.7 billion—almost eight times more than the $700 million the United States contributed to MINUSCA over the same time period. Various factors affect differences between the actual cost of MINUSCA and the estimated cost of a hypothetical, comparable U.S. operation in the Central African Republic. The United States and the UN would source and transport some supplies and equipment differently, affecting the cost of both operations; for example, the United States would airlift water into the Central African Republic, while the UN does not do so to the same extent. The United States also would incur the cost of civilian police and military reservist salaries, while the UN does not pay any troop or police salaries. Finally, some higher standards for facilities, intelligence, and medical services increase the U.S. cost estimate relative to UN costs for similar operational elements. UN and U.S. peacekeeping operations have various relative strengths, according to U.S. and UN officials. These officials said that, because the UN is a multilateral organization, UN peacekeeping operations have international acceptance and are more likely to be viewed as impartial. Officials also said that the UN enjoys global access to expertise and experience, and can leverage assistance from multilateral donors and development banks. Relative strengths of a U.S. peacekeeping operation would include faster deployment and superior command and control, logistics, intelligence, and counterterrorism capability, according to U.S. and UN officials." ]	5,006	gov_report	en	null	51cd5afed9cae995a94fc47f4fb54ba657f8b4e1cc91893d
The Small Business Act of 1953 (P.L. 83-163, as amended) authorized the U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) and justified the agency's existence on the grounds that small businesses are essential to the maintenance of the free enterprise system. In economic terms, the congressional intent was to assist small businesses as a means to deter monopoly and oligarchy formation within all industries and the market failures caused by the elimination or reduction of competition in the marketplace. Congress decided to allow the SBA to establish size standards to ensure that only small businesses were provided SBA assistance. Specifically, the Small Business Act of 1953 defines a small business as one that is organized for profit; has a place of business in the United States; operates primarily within the United States or makes a significant contribution to the U.S. economy through payment of taxes or use of American products, materials, or labor; is independently owned and operated; and is not dominant in its field on a national basis. The business may be a sole proprietorship, partnership, corporation, or any other legal form. The SBA conducts an analysis of various economic factors, such as each industry's overall competitiveness and the competitiveness of firms within each industry, to determine its size standards. The analysis is designed to ensure that only small businesses receive SBA assistance and that these small businesses are not dominant in their field on a national basis. The SBA currently uses two types of size standards to determine SBA program eligibility: (1) industry-specific size standards and (2) alternative size standards based on the applicant's maximum tangible net worth and average net income after federal taxes. The SBA's industry-specific size standards are also used to determine eligibility for federal small business contracting purposes. The SBA's industry-specific size standards determine program eligibility for firms in 1,036 industrial classifications (hereinafter industries) in 23 sub-industry activities described in the 2017 North American Industry Classification System (NAICS). Given its mandate to promote competition in the marketplace, the SBA includes an economic analysis of each industry's overall competitiveness and the competitiveness of firms within the industry in its size standards methodology. The size standards are based on four measures: (1) number of employees (505 industries), (2) average annual receipts in the previous three (may soon be the previous five) years (526 industries), (3) average asset size as reported in the firm's four quarterly financial statements for the preceding year (5 industries), or (4) a combination of number of employees and barrel per day refining capacity (1 industry). Overall, about 97% of all employer firms qualify as small. These firms represent about 30% of industry receipts. In the absence of precise statutory guidance and consensus on how to define small, the SBA's size standards have often been challenged, typically by industry representatives seeking to increase the number of firms eligible for assistance. The size standards have also been challenged by Members of Congress concerned that the size standards may not adequately target federal assistance to firms that they consider to be truly small. This report provides a historical examination of the SBA's size standards and assesses competing views concerning how to define a small business. It also discusses P.L. 111-240 , the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, which authorized the SBA to establish an alternative size standard using maximum tangible net worth and average net income after federal taxes for both the 7(a) and 504/CDC loan guaranty programs; established, until the SBA acted, an interim alternative size standard for the 7(a) and 504/CDC programs of not more than $15 million in tangible net worth and not more than $5 million in average net income after federal taxes (excluding any carry-over losses) for the two full fiscal years before the date of the application; and required the SBA to conduct a detailed review of not less than one-third of the SBA's industry size standards every 18 months beginning on the new law's date of enactment (September 27, 2010) and ensure that each size standard is reviewed at least once every five years. P.L. 112-239 , the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, which directs the SBA not to limit the number of size standards and to assign the appropriate size standard to each NAICS industrial classification. This provision addressed the SBA's practice of limiting the number of size standards it used and combining size standards within industrial groups as a means to reduce the complexity of its size standards and to provide greater consistency for industrial classifications that have similar economic characteristics. P.L. 114-328 , the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, which authorizes the SBA to establish different size standards for agricultural enterprises using existing methods and appeal processes. Previously, the small business size standard for agricultural enterprises was set in statute as having annual receipts not in excess of $750,000. P.L. 115-324 , the Small Business Runway Extension Act of 2018, which directs federal agencies proposing a size standard (and, based on report language accompanying the act, presumably the SBA as well) to use the average annual gross receipts from at least the previous five years, instead of the previous three years, when seeking SBA approval to establish a size standard based on annual gross receipts. Legislation introduced during the 112 th Congress ( H.R. 585 , the Small Business Size Standard Flexibility Act of 2011), 113 th Congress ( H.R. 2542 , the Regulatory Flexibility Improvements Act of 2013, and included in H.R. 4 , the Jobs for America Act), 114 th Congress ( H.R. 527 , the Small Business Regulatory Flexibility Improvements Act of 2015, and its Senate companion bill, S. 1536 ), and 115 th Congress ( H.R. 33 , the Small Business Regulatory Flexibility Improvements Act of 2017, and its Senate companion bill, S. 584 , and included in H.R. 5 , the Regulatory Accountability Act of 2017) to authorize the SBA's Office of Chief Counsel for Advocacy to approve or disapprove a size standard requested by a federal agency for purposes other than the Small Business Act or the Small Business Investment Act of 1958. The SBA's Administrator currently has that authority. In 2016 (the most recent available data), there were over 5.95 million employer firms and over 24.8 million nonemployer (self-employed) firms. As Table 1 indicates, there were 5,954,684 employer firms in the United States employing 126,752,238 people and providing total payroll of $6.43 trillion in 2016. Most employer firms (61.6%) had 4 or fewer employees, 78.6% had fewer than 10 employees, 89.1% had fewer than 20 employees, 98.1% had fewer than 100 employees, and 99.7% had fewer than 500 employees in 2016. The table also provides data concerning other economic factors that might be used to define a small business: an employer firm's number of employees as a share (cumulative percentage) of the total number of employer firms, as a share of employer firm total employment, and as a share of employer firm total annual payroll. As will be discussed, the SBA has traditionally applied economic factors to specific industries, not to cumulative statistics for all employer firms, to determine which firms are small businesses. Nonetheless, the data in Table 1 illustrate how the selection of economic factors used to define small business affects the definition's outcome. For example, for illustrative purposes only, if the mid-point (50%) for these three economic factors was used to define what is a small business, three different employee firm sizes would be used to designate firms as small: Businesses would be required to have no more than 4 employees to be defined as small if the definition for small used the mid-point (50%) share of the total number of employer firms (employer firms with no more than four employees accounted for 61.6% of the total number of employer firms in 2016). Businesses would be required to have no more than 999 employees to be defined as small if the definition for small used the mid-point (50%) share of employer firm total employment (employer firms with no more than 999 employees accounted for 52.6% of employer firm total employment in 2016). Businesses would be required to have no more than 1,999 employees to be defined as small if the definition for small used the mid-point (50%) share of employer firm total annual payroll (employer firms with no more than 1,999 employees accounted for 51.8% of employer firm total annual payroll in 2016). Other economic factors that might be used to define a small business include the value of the employer firm's assets or its market share, expressed as a firm's sales revenue from that market divided by the total sales revenue available in that market or as a firm's unit sales volume in that market divided by the total volume of units sold in that market. The Small Business Act of 1953 (P.L. 83-163, as amended) authorized the SBA to establish size standards for determining eligibility for SBA assistance. More than sixty years have passed since the SBA established its initial small business size standards on January 1, 1957. Yet, decisions made then concerning the rationale and criteria used to define small businesses established precedents that continue to shape current policy. Moreover, as mentioned previously, the SBA relies on an analysis of various economic factors, such as each industry's overall competitiveness and the competitiveness of firms within each industry, in its size standards methodology to ensure that businesses receiving SBA assistance are not dominant in their field on a national basis. However, in the absence of precise statutory guidance and consensus on how to define small, the SBA's size standards have often been challenged, typically by industry representatives seeking to increase the number of firms eligible for assistance and by Members of Congress concerned that the size standards do not adequately target the SBA's assistance to firms that they consider to be truly small. Over the years, the SBA typically reviewed its size standards piecemeal, reviewing specific industries when the SBA determined that an industry's market conditions had changed or the SBA was asked to undertake a review by an industry claiming that its market conditions had changed. On five occasions, in 1980, 1982, 1992, 2004, and 2008, the SBA proposed a comprehensive revision of its size standards. The SBA did not fully implement any of these proposals, but the arguments presented, both for and against the proposals, provide a context for understanding the SBA's current size standards, and the rationale and criteria that have been presented to retain and replace them. As mentioned previously, P.L. 111-240 requires the SBA to conduct a detailed review of not less than one-third of the SBA's industry size standards during the 18-month period beginning on the date of enactment (September 27, 2010) and during every 18-month period thereafter. The act also requires the SBA to review each size standard at least once every five years. The SBA completed its first five-year review of all SBA industry size standards in 2016. As a result of its five-year review, the SBA estimates that more than 72,000 small businesses gained SBA eligibility. There is no uniform or accepted definition for a small business. Instead, several criteria are used to determine eligibility for small business spending and tax programs. This was also the case when Congress considered establishing the SBA during the early 1950s. For example, in 1952, the House Select Committee on Small Business reviewed federal statutes, executive branch directives, and the academic literature to serve as a guide for determining how to define small businesses. The Select Committee began its review by asserting that the need to define the concept of small business was based on a general consensus that assisting small business was necessary to enhance economic competition, combat monopoly formation, inhibit the concentration of economic power, and maintain "the integrity of independent enterprise." It noted that the definition of small businesses in federal statutes reflected this consensus by taking into consideration the firm's size relative to other firms in its field and "matters of independence and nondominance." For example, the War Mobilization and Reconversion Act of 1944 defined a small business as either "employing 250 wage earners or less" or having "sales volumes, quantities of materials consumed, capital investments, or any other criteria which are reasonably attributable to small plants rather than medium- or large-sized plants." The Selective Service Act of 1948 classified a business as small for military procurement purposes if "(1) its position in the trade or industry of which it is a part is not dominant, (2) the number of its employees does not exceed 500, and (3) it is independently owned and operated." The Select Committee also found that, for data-gathering purposes, the executive branch defined small businesses in relative, as opposed to absolute, terms within specific industries. For example, the Bureau of Labor Statistics "defined small business in terms of an average for each industry based on the volume of employment or sales. All firms which fall below this average are deemed to be small." The U.S. Census Bureau also used different criteria for different industries. For example, manufacturing firms were classified as small if they had fewer than 100 employees, wholesalers were considered small if they had annual sales below $200,000, and retailers were considered small if they had annual sales below $50,000. According the Census Bureau, in 1952, small businesses accounted for "roughly 92 percent of all business establishments, 45 percent of all employees, and 34 percent of all dollar value of all sales." The Select Committee also noted that in 1951, the National Production Authority's Office of Small Business proposed defining all manufacturing firms with fewer than 50 employees as small and any with more than 2,500 employees as large. Manufacturers employing between these numbers of employees would be considered large or small depending on the general structure of the industry to which they belonged. The larger the percentage of total output produced by large firms, the larger the number of employees a firm could have to be considered small. Using this definition, most manufacturing firms with fewer than 50 employees would be classified as small, but others, such as an aircraft manufacturer, could have as many as 2,500 employees and still be considered small. For procurement purposes, the Select Committee found that executive branch agencies defined small businesses in absolute, as opposed to relative, terms, using 500 employees as the dividing line between large and small firms. Federal agencies defended the so-called 500 employee rule on the grounds that it "had the advantage of easy administration" across federal agencies. In reviewing the academic literature, the Select Committee reported that Abraham Kaplan's Small Business: Its Place and Problems defined small businesses as those with no more than $1 million in annual sales, $100,000 in total assets, and no more than 250 employees. Applying this definition would have classified about 95% of all business concerns as small, and would have accounted for about half of all nonagricultural employees. Based on its review of federal statutes, executive branch directives, and the academic literature, the Select Committee decided that it would not attempt "to formulate a rigid definition of small business" because "the concept of small business must remain flexible and adaptable to the peculiar needs of each instance in which a definition may be required." However, it concluded that the definition of small should be a relative one, as opposed to an absolute one, that took into consideration variations among economic sectors: This committee is also convinced that whatever limits may be established to the category of small business, they must vary from industry to industry according to the general industrial pattern of each. Public policy may demand similar treatment for a firm of 2,500 employees in one industry as it does for a firm of 50 employees in another industry. Each may be faced with the same basic problems of economic survival. Reflecting the view that formulating a rigid definition of small business was impractical, the Small Business Act of 1953 provided leeway in defining small businesses. It defined a small firm as "one that is independently owned and operated and which is not dominant in its field of operation." The SBA was authorized to establish and subsequently alter size standards for determining eligibility for federal programs to assist small business, some of which are administered by the SBA. The act specifies that the size standards "may utilize number of employees, dollar volume of business, net worth, net income, a combination thereof, or other appropriate factors." It also notes that the concept of small is to be defined in a relative sense, varying from industry to industry to the extent necessary to reflect "differing characteristics" among industries. The House Committee on Banking and Currency's report accompanying H.R. 5141, the Small Business Act of 1953, issued on May 28, 1953, provided the committee's rationale for not providing a detailed definition of small: It would be impractical to include in the act a detailed definition of small business because of the variation between business groups. It is for this reason that the act authorizes the Administration to determine within any industry the concerns which are to be designated small-business concerns for the purposes of the act. The report did not provide specific guidance concerning what the committee might consider to be small, but it did indicate that data on industry employment, as of March 31, 1948, "reveals that on the basis of employment, small business truly is small in size. Of the approximately 4 million business concerns, 87.4% had fewer than 8 employees and 95.2% of the total number of concerns, employed fewer than 20 people." Initially, the SBA created two sets of size standards, one for federal procurement preferences and another for the SBA's loan and management training services. At the request of federal agencies, the SBA adopted the then-prevailing small business size standard used by federal agencies for procurement, which was no more than 500 employees. The SBA retained the right to make exceptions to the no more than 500 employee procurement size standard if the SBA determined that a firm having more than 500 employees was not dominant in its industry. For the SBA's loan and management training services, the SBA's staff reviewed economic data provided by the Census Bureau to arrive at what Wendell Barnes, SBA's Administrator, described at a congressional hearing in 1956 as "a fairly accurate conclusion as to what comprises small business in each industry." Jules Abels, SBA's economic advisor to the Administrator, explained at that congressional hearing how the SBA's staff determined what constituted a small business: There are various techniques for the demarcation lines, but in a study of almost any industry, you will find a large cluster of small concerns around a certain figure.... On the other hand, above a certain dividing line you will find relatively few and as you map out a picture of an industry it appears that a dividing line at a certain point is fair. On January 5, 1956, the SBA published a notice of proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register announcing its first proposed small business size standards. During the public comment period, representatives of several industries argued that the proposed standards were too restrictive and excluded too many firms. In response, Mr. Abels testified that the SBA decided to adjust its figures to make them "a little bit more liberal because there was some feeling on the part of certain industries that they were too tight and that they excluded too many firms." The SBA published its final rule concerning its small business size standards on December 7, 1956, and they became effective on January 1, 1957. The SBA decided to use number of employees as the sole criterion for determining if manufacturing firms were small and annual sales or annual receipts as the sole criterion for all other industries. Mr. Abels explained at the congressional hearing the SBA's rationale for using number of employees for classifying manufacturing firms as small and annual sales or annual receipts for all other firms: in the absence of automation which would give one firm in an industry a great advantage over another, roughly speaking if the firms were mechanized to the same extent, a firm with 400 employees would have an output which would be twice as large as the output of a firm with 200 employees.... However when you depart from the manufacturing field and go into, say, a distributive field or trade, it then becomes necessary to discard the number of employees, because it is a matter of judicial notice, that one man for example in the distributive trades can sell as much as 100 men can sell. One small construction firm possibly can do a lot more business than one with a lot more employees. A service trade again has its volume geared to something other than the number of employees. So I think that one can say with reasonable certainty that it is only within the manufacturing field that the employee standard is the uniform yardstick, but that other than manufacturing the dollar volume is the appropriate yardstick. The SBA's initial size standards defined most manufacturing firms employing no more than 250 employees as small. In addition, the SBA considered manufacturing firms in some industries (e.g., metalworking and small arms) as small if they employed no more than 500 employees, and in some others (e.g., sugar refining and tractors) as small if they employed no more than 1,000 employees. To be considered small, wholesalers were required to have annual sales volume of $5 million or less; construction firms had to have average annual receipts of $5 million or less over the preceding three years; trucking and warehousing firms had to have annual receipts of $2 million or less; taxicab companies and most firms in the service trades had to have annual receipts of $1 million or less; and most retail firms had to have annual sales of $1 million or less. Mr. Abels testified that the SBA experienced "continual" protests of its size standards by firms denied financial or support assistance because they were not considered small. He also testified that in each case, the SBA denied the protest and determined, in his words, that the standard was "valid and accurate." In 1977, the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO, now the U.S. Government Accountability Office) was asked by the Senate Select Committee on Small Business to review the SBA's size standards. At that time, most of the SBA's size standards remained at their original 1957 levels, other than a one-time upward adjustment for inflation in 1975 for industries using annual sales and receipts to restore eligibility to firms that may have lost small-business status due solely to the effect of inflation. GAO's report, issued in 1978, found that the SBA's size standards "are often high and often are not justified by economic rationale." Specifically, GAO reported that many size standards may not direct assistance to the target group described in SBA regulations as businesses "struggling to become or remain competitive" because the loan and procurement size standards for most industries were established 15 or more years ago and have not been periodically reviewed; SBA records do not indicate how most standards were developed; and the standards often define as small a very high percentage of the firms in the industries to which they apply. GAO recommended that the SBA reexamine its size standards "by collecting data on the size of bidders on set-aside and unrestricted contracts, determining the size of businesses which need set-aside protection because they cannot otherwise obtain Federal contracts" and then consider reducing its size standards or "establishing a two-tiered system for set-aside contracts, under which certain procurements would be available for bidding only to the smaller firms and others would be opened for bidding to all businesses considered small under present standards." Citing the GAO report, several Members objected to the SBA's size standards at a House Committee on Small Business oversight hearing conducted on July 10, 1979. Representative John J. LaFalce, chair of the House Committee on Small Business Subcommittee on General Oversight and Minority Enterprise, stated that "what we have faced from 1953 to the present is virtually nothing other than acquiescence to the demands of the special interest groups. That is how the size standards have been set." Representative Tim Lee Carter, the subcommittee's ranking minority member, stated that "it seems to me that we may be fast growing into just a regular bank forum not just to small business but to all business." At that time, approximately 99% of all firms with employees were classified by the SBA as a small business. Roger Rosenberger, SBA's associate administrator for policy, planning and budgeting, testified at the hearing that the SBA would undertake a comprehensive economic analysis of industry data to determine if its size standards should be changed. However, he also defended the validity of the SBA's size standards, arguing that the task of setting size standards was a complicated and difficult one because of "how market structure and size distribution of firms vary from industry to industry." He testified that some industries are dominated by a few large firms, some are comprised almost entirely of small businesses, and others "can be referred to as a mixed industry." He argued that each market structure presents unique challenges for defining small businesses within that industry group. For example, he argued that it was debatable whether the SBA should provide any assistance to any of the businesses within industries where "smaller firms are flourishing." On March 10, 1980, the SBA issued a notice of proposed rulemaking designed to "reduce administrative complexity" by replacing its two sets of size standards, one for procurement preferences and another for its loan and consultative support services, with a single set of size standards for both purposes. The SBA also proposed to use a single factor, the firm's number of employees, for definitional purposes for nearly all industries instead of using the firm's number of employees for some industries, the firm's assets for others, and the firm's annual gross receipts for still others. The SBA argued that when size standards are denominated in dollars, i.e., annual revenues, its ability to help the small business sector is undermined by inflation. Using employment, as opposed to dollar sales, will provide greater stability for SBA and its clients; will remove inter-industry distortions generated by differential inflation rates; and reduce the need for SBA to make frequent revisions in the size standards merely to reflect price increases. In setting its proposed new size standards for each industry (ranging from no more than 15 to no more than 2,500 employees), the SBA first placed each industry into one of three groups: concentrated (characterized by a highly unequal distribution of sales among the firms in the industry), competitive (characterized by a more equal distribution of sales in the industry), or mixed (industries that do not meet the criteria of competitive or concentrated industries). The SBA determined that there were 160 concentrated industries, 317 competitive industries, and 249 mixed industries. The SBA argued that establishing a size standard for the 160 concentrated industries was a "straight-forward task—simply identify and exclude those few firms which account for a disproportionately large share of the industry's sales." For competitive industries, the SBA argued that the size standard should be set "relatively low, so as to support entry and moderate growth." The SBA argued that mixed industries require "relatively high size standards ... to reinforce competition and offset the pressures to increase the degree of concentration in these industries." The proposed new SBA size standards would have had the net effect of reducing the number of firms classified as small by about 225,000. In percentage terms, the number of firms classified as small would have been reduced from about 99% of all employer firms to 96%. Over 86% of the more than 1,500 public comments received by the SBA concerning its proposed new size standards criticized it. Most of the criticism was from firms that would no longer be considered small under the new size standards. In addition, several federal agencies indicated that the proposed size standards in the services and construction industries were set too low, reducing the number of small firms eligible to compete for procurement contracts below levels they deemed necessary to ensure adequate competition to prevent agency costs from rising. On October 21, 1980, Congress required the SBA to take additional time to consider the consequences of the proposed changes to the size standards by adopting the Small Business Export Expansion Act of 1980 ( P.L. 96-481 ). It prohibited "the SBA from promulgating any final rule or regulation relating to small business size standards until March 31, 1981." In the meantime, the Reagan Administration entered office, and, as is customary when there is a change in Administration, replaced the SBA's senior leadership. The SBA's new Administrator, Michael Cardenas, was sympathetic to the concerns of federal agencies that the proposed size standards in the services and construction industries were set too low to meet those agencies' procurement needs. As a result, he indicated that the SBA would modify its size standards proposal by (1) increasing the proposed size standards for 51 industries, mostly in the services and construction industries; (2) lowering the proposed size standards in 157 manufacturing industries (typically from no more than 2,500 employees to no more than 500 employees) to prevent one or more of the largest producers in those industries from being classified as small; and (3) increasing the SBA's proposed lowest size standard from no more than 15 employees to no more than 25 employees (affecting 93 service and trade industries). The net effect of these changes would have restored eligibility for approximately 60,000 of the 225,000 firms expected to lose eligibility under the previous Administration's proposal. The SBA subsequently met with various trade organizations and federal agency procurement officials to discuss the proposal. As these consultations took place, the SBA experienced another turnover in its senior leadership. The SBA, headed by the new appointee, James C. Sanders, issued a notice of proposed rulemaking concerning its size standards on May 3, 1982. The proposal differed from its March 10, 1980, predecessor in three ways: First, the range of size standards was narrowed to a range of 25 employees to 500 employees. This reflected a widespread view that 15 employees was too low a cutoff while 2,500 employees was too high. Second, SBA proposed a 500-employee ceiling, focusing on smaller firms. Third, SBA responded to sentiments within many procurement-sensitive industries that the proposed size standards in some cases were too low to accommodate the average procurement currently being performed by small business. Therefore, SBA proposed higher size standards in a number of procurement-sensitive industries, while maintaining the 500-employee cap. The SBA received over 500 comments on the proposed rule, with about 72% of those comments opposing the rule. Taking those comments into consideration, the SBA reexamined its size standards once again, and, after a year of further consultation with various trade organizations and federal agency procurement officials, issued another notice of proposed rulemaking on May 6, 1983. The 1983 proposal (1) replaced the use of two sets of size standards, one for procurement and another for the SBA's loan and consultative support services, with a single set for all programs; (2) retained most of the size standards that were expressed in terms of average annual sales or receipts; (3) adjusted those size standards for inflation (an upward adjustment of 81%); (4) retained most of the size standards for manufacturing; and (5) made relatively minor changes to the size standards in other industries, with a continued emphasis on a 500-employee ceiling for most industries. The SBA received 630 comments on the proposed rule, with almost 70% supporting it. SBA Administrator Sanders characterized the SBA's revised size standard proposal as "a fine-tuning of current standards which has the basic support of both the private sector and the Federal agencies that use the basic size standards to achieve their set-aside procurement goals." He also added that "since almost no size standard is proposed to decrease, and most will in fact increase, very few firms will lose their small business status. We estimate that about 39,000 firms will gain small business status." He testified that in percentage terms, in 1983, 97.9% of the nation's 5.2 million firms with employees were classified by the SBA as small. Under the SBA's proposal, 98.6% of all firms with employees would be classified as small. The final rule was published in the Federal Register on February 9, 1984. Representative Parren J. Mitchell, chair of the House Committee on Small Business, expressed disappointment in the SBA's final rule, stating at a congressional oversight hearing on July 30, 1985, that "the government and the business community are still victimized by that same ad hoc, sporadic system that the SBA promised to fix some six years ago." He introduced legislation ( H.R. 1178 , a bill to amend the Small Business Act) that would have required the SBA to adjust its size standard for an industrial classification downward by at least 20% if small business' share of that market equaled or exceeded 60%, and at least 40% of the market share was achieved through the receipt of federal procurement contracts. The bill also mandated a minimum 10% increase in the SBA's size standard for an industrial classification if small business' share of that market was less than 20% and less than 10% of the market share was achieved through the receipt of federal procurement contracts. The bill was opposed by various trade associations, the SBA, and federal agency procurement officials, and was not reported out of committee. On December 31, 1992, the SBA issued a notice of proposed rulemaking "to streamline its size standards" by reducing the number of fixed size standard levels from 30 to 9. The nine proposed size standards were no more than 100, 500, 750, 1,000, or 1,500 employees; and no more than $5 million, $10 million, $18 million, or $24 million in annual receipts. The annual receipts levels reflected an upward adjustment of 43% for inflation. The SBA argued that the proposed changes would make the size standards more user-friendly for small business owners and restore eligibility to nearly 20,000 firms that were no longer considered small solely because of the effects of inflation. The proposed rule was later withdrawn as a courtesy to allow the incoming Clinton Administration time to review it. The SBA ultimately decided not to pursue this approach because it felt that converting "receipts based size standards in effect at that time to one of four proposed receipts levels created a number of unacceptable anomalies." Over the subsequent decade, the SBA reviewed the size standards for some industries on a piecemeal basis and, in 1994, adjusted for inflation its size standards based on firm's annual sales or receipts (an upward adjustment of 48.2%). The SBA estimated that the adjustment would restore eligibility to approximately 20,000 firms that lost small-business status due solely to the effects of inflation. In 2002, the SBA adjusted for inflation its annual sales and receipts based size standards for the fourth time (an upward adjustment of 15.8%). The SBA estimated that the adjustment would restore eligibility to approximately 8,760 firms that lost small-business status due solely to the effects of inflation. The rule also included a provision that the SBA would assess the impact of inflation on its annual sales and receipts based size standards at least once every five years. Then, on March 19, 2004, the SBA, once again, issued a notice of proposed rulemaking to streamline its size standards. The proposed rule would have established size standards based on the firm's number of employees for all industries, avoiding the need to adjust for inflation size standards based on sales or receipts. At that time, the SBA size standards consisted of 37 different size levels: 30 based on annual sales or receipts, 5 on the number of employees (both full- and part-time), 1 on financial assets, and 1 on generating capacity. Under the proposed rule, the SBA would use 10 size standards, 5 new employee size standards (adding no more than 50, 150, 200, 300, and 400 employees), and the existing 5 employee size standards (no more than 100, 500, 750, 1,000, and 1,500 employees). The proposed rule would not have changed any existing size standards based on number of employees. The SBA argued that the use of a single size standard would "help to simplify size standards" and "tends to be a more stable measure of business size" than other measures. It added that the proposed rule would change 514 size standards and that, after the proposed conversion to the use of number of employees, of the "approximately 4.4 million businesses in the industries with revised size standards, 35,200 businesses could gain and 34,100 could lose small business eligibility, with the net effect of 1,100 additional businesses defined as small." A majority (51%) of the more than 4,500 comments on the proposed rule supported it, but with "a large number of comments opposing various aspects of SBA's approach to simplifying size standards." In addition, the chairs of the House Committee on Small Business and Senate Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship opposed the proposed rule, largely because they were concerned about potential job losses resulting from more than 34,000 small businesses losing program eligibility. The SBA withdrew the proposed rule on July 1, 2004. In 2005, the SBA adjusted for inflation size standards based on firms' annual sales or receipts (an upward adjustment of 8.7%). The SBA estimated that the adjustment restored eligibility to approximately 12,000 firms that lost small-business status due solely to inflation. In 2008, the SBA made another adjustment for inflation to its annual sales and receipts based standards (another upward adjustment of 8.7%). The SBA estimated that the adjustment restored eligibility for approximately 10,400 firms that lost small-business status due solely to inflation. In June 2008, the SBA announced that it would undertake a comprehensive, two-year review of its size standards, proceeding one industrial sector at a time, starting with Retail Trade (NAICS Sector 44-45), Accommodations and Food Services (NAICS Sector 72), and Other Services (NAICS Sector 81). The SBA argued that it was concerned that "not all of its size standards may now adequately define small businesses in the U.S. economy, which has seen industry consolidations, technological advances, emerging new industries, shifting societal preferences, and other significant industrial changes." It added that its reliance on an ad hoc approach "scrutinizing the limited number of specific industries during a year, while worthwhile, leaves unexamined many deserving industries for updating and may create over time a set of illogical size standards." The SBA announced that it would begin its analysis of its size standards by assuming that "$6.5 million [later increased to $7.5 million] is an appropriate size standard for those industries with receipts size standards and 500 employees for those industries with employee size standards." It would then analyze the following industry characteristics: "average firm size; average asset size (a proxy for startup costs); competition, as measured by the market share of the four largest firms in the industry; and, the distribution of market share by firm size—that is, are firms in the industry generally very small firms, or dominated by very large firms." Then, before making its final determination on the size standard, it would "examine the participation of small businesses in federal contracting and SBA's guaranteed loan program at the current size standard level. Depending on the level of small business participation, additional consideration may be given to the level of the current size standard and the analysis of industry factors." In April 2009, the SBA announced that was simplifying the administration and use of its size standards by reducing the number of receipts based size standards from 31 to 8 when establishing a new size standard or reviewing an existing size standard: For many years, SBA has been concerned about the complexity of determining small business status caused by a large number of varying receipts based size standards (see 69 FR 13130 (March 4, 2004) and 57 FR 62515 (December 31, 1992)). At the start of current comprehensive size standards review, there were 31 different levels of receipts based size standards. They ranged from $0.75 million to $35.5 million, and many of them applied to one or only a few industries. The SBA believes that to have so many different size standards with small variations among them is unnecessary and difficult to justify analytically. To simplify managing and using size standards, SBA proposes that there be fewer size standard levels. This will produce more common size standards for businesses operating in related industries. This will also result in greater consistency among the size standards for industries that have similar economic characteristics. Under the current comprehensive size standards review, SBA is proposing to establish eight "fixed-level" receipts based size standards: $5.0 million, $7.0 million, $10.0 million, $14.0 million, $19.0 million, $25.5 million, $30.0 million, and $35.5 million. These levels are established by taking into consideration the minimum, maximum and the most commonly used current receipts based size standards. These eight receipts based size standards were increased to $5.5 million, $7.5 million, $11.0 million, $15.0 million, $20.5 million, $27.5 million, $32.5 million, and $38.5 million in 2014 to account for inflation. The SBA also announced that it would use eight employee based size standards when establishing a new size standard or reviewing an existing size standard (no more than 50, 100, 150, 200, 250, 500, 750, and 1,000 employees) instead of seven (no more than 50, 100, 150, 500, 750, 1,000, and 1,500 employees); and continue to use one asset based size standard, one megawatt hours size standard (based on electrical output over the preceding fiscal year), and one size standard based on a combination of the number of employees and barrel per day refining capacity. The SBA also announced that "to simplify size standards further" it "may propose a common size standard for closely related industries." The SBA argued although the size standard analysis may support a separate size standard for each industry, SBA believes that establishing different size standards for closely related industries may not always be appropriate. For example, in cases where many of the same businesses operate in the same multiple industries, a common size standard for those industries might better reflect the Federal marketplace. This might also make size standards among related industries more consistent than separate size standards for each of those industries. Because SBA size standards remain in force until after they are reviewed, the number of size standards did not immediately drop from 41 to 19 in 2009. Instead, the number of size standards began to decline gradually as new size standard final rules were issued. In addition, from 2010 through 2016, the SBA decided, in most instances, not to lower size standards (which would have made it more difficult for businesses to qualify) even if the data supported lowering them because unemployment at that time was relatively high and doing so would "run counter to numerous Congressional and Administration's initiatives and programs to create jobs and boost economic growth." As a result of this policy decision, several size standards that would have otherwise been eliminated remained in place. Also, in 2016, the SBA added a new employee based size standard (no more than 1,250 employees) and reinstated the use of another (no more than 1,500 employees) when establishing a new, or revising an existing, size standard. The SBA's decisions in 2009 to reduce the number of receipts based size standards and to propose a common size standard for closely related industries were opposed by some industry groups. They argued that these policies could lead to the SBA to classify an industry "for the sake of convenience" into a size standard that the agency's own economic analysis indicates should be in a different (easier to qualify) size standard. Congress adopted legislation in 2013 ( P.L. 112-239 , National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013) that included provisions directing the SBA not to limit the number of size standards and to assign the appropriate size standard to each NAICS industrial classification. The SBA currently has 27 SBA industry size standards in effect (16 receipts based size standards, 9 employee based sized standards, 1 asset based size standard, and 1 size standard based on a combination of the number of employees and barrel per day refining capacity). That number is expected to increase given the SBA's directive not to limit the number of size standards. As mentioned previously, P.L. 111-240 requires the SBA to conduct a detailed review of not less than one-third of the SBA's industry size standards during the 18-month period beginning on the date of enactment (September 27, 2010) and during every 18-month period thereafter. The act directs the SBA to "make appropriate adjustments to the size standards" to reflect market conditions, and to report to the House Committee on Small Business and the Senate Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship and make publicly available "not later than 30 days" after the completion of each review information regarding the factors evaluated as part of each review, the criteria used for any revised size standard, and why the SBA did, or did not, adjust each size standard that was reviewed. The act also requires the SBA to ensure that each industry size standard is reviewed at least once every five years. On July 7, 2011, the SBA announced that its "comprehensive review of all small business size standards" would begin with the following six industries: Educational Services (final rule was issued on September 24, 2012); Health Care and Social Assistance Services (final rule was issued on September 24, 2012); Real Estate Rental and Leasing (final rule was issued on September 24, 2012); Administrative and Support, Waste Management and Remediation Services (final rule was issued on December 6, 2012); Information (final rule was issued on December 6, 2012); and Utilities (final rule was issued on December 23, 2013). The SBA subsequently completed size standard reviews for all industries in January 2016 (listed by when the final rule was issued): Professional, Scientific and Technical Services (final rule was issued on February 24, 2012); Transportation and Warehousing (final rule was issued on February 24, 2012); Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting (final rule was issued on June 20, 2013); Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation (final rule was issued on June 20, 2013); Finance and Insurance (final rule was issued on June 20, 2013); Management of Companies (final rule was issued on June 20, 2013); Support Activities for Mining (final rule was issued on June 20, 2013); Construction (final rule was issued on December 23, 2013); Wholesale Trade (final rule was issued on January 25, 2016); Industries with Employee Based Size Standards not Part of Manufacturing, Wholesale Trade, or Retail Trade (final rule was issued on January 26, 2016); and Manufacturing (final rule was issued on January 26, 2016). A summary of the final rules issued for each industry is provided in Table A-1 . During the first five-year review cycle, the SBA increased 621 size standards, decreased 3 (to exclude potentially dominant firms from being considered small), and retained 388 at their pre-existing levels. Of the 388 retained size standards, 214 were retained based on the results of the SBA's economic analysis and 174 were retained based on the SBA's policy of generally not lowering any size standard, even though the results of the economic analysis supported lowering them, due to national economic conditions. The SBA has started its second five-year review of its size standards and anticipates issuing its first final rules in the second five-year review cycle in 2019, using new size standard methodology announced in April 2018 (discussed in the next section). The SBA also announced in April 2018 that its policy of generally not lowering size standards when the analysis indicates that a lower standard is justified would no longer be in force, at least initially, during the second five-year review cycle: the decision to raise, lower, or retain a size standard will primarily be driven by analytical results, with due considerations of public comments, impacts of changes on the affected businesses, and other factors SBA considers important. All of these decisions will be detailed in individual rulemakings. It will take several years to complete the five-year review of all size standards … during which the state of the economy may change. It is, therefore, not possible to state now … what impact, if any, the future economic environment would have on the SBA's policy decision regarding size standards. As mentioned earlier, the SBA, relying on statutory language, defines a small business as a concern that is organized for profit; has a place of business in the United States; operates primarily within the United States or makes a significant contribution to the economy through payment of taxes or use of American products, materials, or labor; is independently owned and operated; and is not dominant in its field on a national basis. The business may be a sole proprietorship, partnership, corporation, or any other legal form. The SBA uses two measures to determine if a business is small: industry specific size standards or a combination of the business's net worth and net income. For example, the SBA's Small Business Investment Company (SBIC) program allows businesses to qualify as small if they meet the SBA's size standard for the industry in which the applicant is primarily engaged, or an alternative net worth and net income based size standard which has been established for the SBIC program. The SBIC's alternative size standard is currently set as a maximum net worth of not more than $19.5 million and average after-tax net income for the preceding two years of not more than $6.5 million. All of the company's subsidiaries, parent companies, and affiliates are considered in determining if it meets the size standard. The SBA decided to apply the net worth and net income measures to the SBIC program "because investment companies evaluate businesses using these measures to decide whether or not to make an investment in them." Businesses participating in the SBA's 504/Certified Development Company (504/CDC) loan guaranty program are to be deemed small if they did not have a tangible net worth in excess of $8.5 million and did not have an average net income in excess of $3 million after taxes for the preceding two years. As discussed below, P.L. 111-240 increased these threshold amounts on an interim basis to not more than $15 million in tangible net worth and not more than $5 million in average net income after federal taxes for the two full fiscal years before the date of the application. All of the company's subsidiaries, parent companies, and affiliates are considered in determining if it meets the size standard. Also, before May 5, 2009, businesses participating in the SBA's 7(a) loan guaranty program, including its express programs, were deemed small if they met the SBA's size standards for firms in the industries described in NAICS. Using authority provided under P.L. 111-5 , the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, the SBA temporarily applied the 504/CDC program's size standards as an alternative for 7(a) loans approved from May 5, 2009, through September 30, 2010. Firms applying for a 7(a) loan during that time period qualified as small using either the SBA's industry size standards or the 504/CDC program's size standard. The provision's intent was to enhance the ability of small businesses to access the capital necessary to create and retain jobs during the economic recovery. P.L. 111-240 made the use of alternative size standards for the 7(a) program permanent. The act directs the SBA to establish an alternative size standard for both the 7(a) and 504/CDC programs that uses maximum tangible net worth and average net income as an alternative to the use of industry standards. The act also establishes, until the date on which the alternative size standard is established, an interim alternative size standard for the 7(a) and 504/CDC programs of not more than $15 million in tangible net worth and not more than $5 million in average net income after federal taxes (excluding any carry-over losses) for the two full fiscal years before the date of the application. The SBA Administrator has the authority to establish and modify size standards for particular industries. Overall, about 97% of all employer firms qualify as small under the SBA's size standards. These firms account for about 30% of industry receipts. The SBA generally "prefers to use average annual receipts as a size measure because it measures the value of output of a business and can be easily verified by business tax returns and financial records." However, historically, the SBA has used the number of employees to determine if manufacturing and mining companies are small. Before a proposed change to the size standards can take effect, the SBA's Office of Size Standards (OSS) undertakes an analysis of the change's likely impact on the affected industry, focusing on the industry's overall degree of competition and the competitiveness of the firms within the industry. The analysis includes an assessment of the following four economic factors: "average firm size, average assets size as a proxy of start-up costs and entry barriers, the 4-firm concentration ratio as a measure of industry competition, and size distribution of firms." The SBA also considers the ability of small businesses to compete for federal contracting opportunities and, when necessary, several secondary factors "as they are relevant to the industries and the interests of small businesses, including technological change, competition among industries, industry growth trends, and impacts of size standard revisions on small businesses." The specifics of SBA's size standards methodology have evolved over the years with the availability of new industry and federal procurement data and staff research. For example, the SBA previously presumed less than $7.0 million (increased to less than $7.5 million in 2014 to account for inflation) as an appropriate "anchor" size standard for the services, retail trade, construction, and other industries with receipts based size standards; 500 or fewer employees as an appropriate anchor size standard for the manufacturing, mining and other industries with employee based size standards; and 100 or fewer employees as an appropriate anchor size standard for the wholesale trade industries. These three anchor size standards were used as benchmarks or starting points for the SBA's economic analysis. To the extent an industry displayed "differing industry characteristics," a size standard higher, or in some cases lower, than an anchor size standard was used. In April 2018, the SBA replaced the "anchor" approach with a "percentile" approach, primarily because the anchors were no longer representative of the size standards being used (just 24% of industries with receipt-based size standards and 22% of those with employee based size standards have the anchor size standards) and the anchor approach entails "grouping industries from different NAICS sectors thereby making it inconsistent with section 3(a)(7) of the [Small Business] Act," which limits the SBA's ability to create common size standards by grouping industries below the 4-digit NAICS level. Specifically, when assessing the appropriateness of the current size standards, the SBA now evaluates the structure of each industry in terms of four economic characteristics or factors, namely average firm size, average assets size as a proxy of start-up costs and entry barriers, the 4-firm concentration ratio as a measure of industry competition, and size distribution of firms using the Gini coefficient. For each size standard type ... SBA ranks industries both in terms each of the four industry factors and in terms of the existing size standard and computes the 20 th percentile and 80 th percentile values for both. SBA then evaluates each industry by comparing its value for each industry factor to the 20 th percentile and 80 th percentile values for the corresponding factor for industries under a particular type of size standard. If the characteristics of an industry under review within a particular size standard type are similar to the average characteristics of industries within the same size standard type in the 20 th percentile, SBA will consider adopting as an appropriate size standard for that industry the 20 th percentile value of size standards for those industries. For each size standard type, if the industry's characteristics are similar to the average characteristics of industries in the 80 th percentile, SBA will assign a size standard that corresponds to the 80 th percentile in the size standard rankings of industries. A separate size standard is established for each factor based on the amount of differences between the factor value for an industry under a particular size standard type and 20 th percentile and 80 th percentile values for the corresponding factor for all industries in the same type. Specifically, the actual level of the new size standard for each industry factor is derived by a linear interpolation using the 20 th percentile and 80 th percentile values of that factor and corresponding percentiles of size standards. Each calculated size standard will be bounded between the minimum and maximum size standards levels [see Table 2 ] ... the calculated value for a receipts based size standard for each industry factor is rounded to the nearest $500,000 and the calculated value for an employee based size standard is rounded to the nearest 50 employees for Manufacturing and industries in other sectors (except Wholesale and Retail Trade) and to the nearest 25 employees for employee based size standards for Wholesale Trade and Retail Trade. The SBA anticipates that its shift from using the anchor approach to the percentile approach will have minimal impact, both in terms of the direction and magnitude of changes, to its industry size standards. Any changes to size standards must follow the rulemaking procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act. A proposed rule changing a size standard is first published in the Federal Register , allowing for public comment. It must include documentation establishing that a significant problem exists that requires a revision of the size standard, plus an economic analysis of the change. Comments from the public, plus any other new information, are reviewed and evaluated before a final rule is promulgated establishing a new size standard. The SBA currently uses employment size to determine eligibility for 505 of 1,036 industries (48.6%), including all 360 manufacturing industries, 24 mining industries, and 71 wholesale trade industries. As of October 1, 2017, 98 manufacturing industries have an upper limit of 500 employees (27.2%); 91 have an upper limit of 750 employees (25.2%); 89 have an upper limit of 1,000 employees (24.7%); 56 have an upper limit of 1,250 employees (15.6%); and 26 have an upper limit of 1,500 employees (7.2%). 3 of the 24 mining industries have an upper limit of 250 employees (12.5%), 7 have an upper limit of 500 employees (29.2%), 7 have an upper limit of 750 employees (29.2%), 2 have an upper limit of 1,000 employees (8.3%), 3 have an upper limit of 1,250 employees (12.5%), and 2 have an upper limit of 1,500 employees (8.3%). 25 of the 71 wholesale trades industries have an upper limit of 100 employees (35.2%), 16 have an upper limit of 150 employees (22.5%), 21 have an upper limit of 200 employees (29.6%), and 9 have an upper limit of 250 employees (12.7%). The SBA currently has nine employee based industry size standards in effect (no more than 100, 150, 200, 250, 500, 750, 1,000, 1,250, and 1,500 employees). The SBA uses average annual receipts over the three (soon to be five) most recently completed fiscal years to determine program eligibility for most other industries (526 of 1,036 industries, or 50.8%). The SBA also uses average asset size as reported in the firm's four quarterly financial statements for the preceding year to determine eligibility for five finance industries, and a combination of number of employees and barrel per day refining capacity for petroleum refineries. The SBA currently has 16 receipts based industry size standards in effect. In some instances, there is considerable variation in the size standards used within each industrial sector. For example, the SBA uses 11 different size standards to determine eligibility for 66 industries in the retail trade sector. In general, most administrative and support service industries have an upper limit of either $15.0 million or $20.5 million in average annual sales or receipts; most agricultural industries have an upper limit of $0.75 million in average annual sales or receipts; most construction of buildings and civil engineering construction industries have an upper limit of $36.5 million in average annual sales or receipts, and most construction specialty trade contractors have an upper limit of $15.0 million in average annual sales or receipts; most educational services industries have an upper limit of either $7.5 million or $11.0 million in average annual sales or receipts; most health care industries have an upper limit of either $7.5 million or $15.0 million in average annual sales or receipts; most social assistance industries have an upper limit of $11.0 million in average annual sales or receipts; there is considerable variation within the professional, scientific, and technical service industries, ranging from an upper limit of $7.5 million in average annual sales or receipts to $38.5 million; there is considerable variation within the transportation and warehousing industrial sector, ranging from an upper limit of $7.5 million in average annual sales or receipts to $38.5 million for 43 industries and from an upper limit of 500 employees to 1,500 employees for 15 industries); and most finance and insurance industries have an upper limit of $38.5 million in average annual sales or receipts. The SBA also applies a $550 million average asset limit (as reported in the firm's four quarterly financial statements for the preceding year) to determine eligibility in five finance industries: commercial banks, saving institutions, credit unions, other depository credit intermediation, and credit card issuing. Many federal statutes provide special considerations for small businesses. For example, small businesses are provided preferences through set-asides and sole source awards in federal contracting and pay lower fees to apply for patents and trademarks. In most instances, businesses are required to meet the SBA's size standards to be considered a small business. However, in some cases, the underlying statute defines the eligibility criteria for defining a small business. In other cases, the statute authorizes the implementing agency to make those determinations. Under current law, a federal agency that decides that it would like to exercise its authority to establish its own size standard through the federal rulemaking process is required to, among other things, (1) undertake an initial regulatory flexibility analysis to determine the potential impact of the proposed rule on small businesses, (2) transmit a copy of the initial regulatory flexibility analysis to the SBA's Chief Counsel for Advocacy for comment, and (3) publish the agency's response to any comments filed by the SBA's Chief Counsel for Advocacy in response to the proposed rule and a detailed statement of any change made to the proposed rule in the final rule as a result of those comments. In addition, the federal agency must provide public notice of the proposed rule and an opportunity for the public to comment on the proposed rule, typically through the publication of an advanced notice of proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register and notification of interested small businesses and related organizations. Also, prior to issuing the final rule, the federal agency must have the approval of the SBA's Administrator. Under current practice, the SBA's Administrator, through the SBA's Office of Size Standards, consults with the SBA's Office of Advocacy prior to making a final decision concerning such requests. The Office of Advocacy is an independent office within the SBA. During the 112 th Congress, H.R. 585 , the Small Business Size Standard Flexibility Act of 2011, was reported by the House Committee on Small Business on November 16, 2011, by a vote of 13 to 8. The bill would have retained the SBA's Administrator's authority to approve or disapprove size standards for programs under the Small Business Act of 1953 (as amended) and the Small Business Investment Act of 1958 (as amended). The Office of Chief Counsel for Advocacy would have assumed the SBA Administrator's authority to approve or disapprove size standards for purposes of any other act. Similar legislative provisions have been introduced during the 113 th Congress ( H.R. 2542 , the Regulatory Flexibility Improvements Act of 2013, and included in H.R. 4 , the Jobs for America Act), 114 th Congress ( H.R. 527 , the Small Business Regulatory Flexibility Improvements Act of 2015, and its Senate companion bill, S. 1536 ), and 115 th Congress ( H.R. 33 , the Small Business Regulatory Flexibility Improvements Act of 2017, and its Senate companion bill, S. 584 , and included in H.R. 5 , the Regulatory Accountability Act of 2017). Advocates of splitting the SBA Administrator's small business size standards' authority between the Office of Chief Counsel for Advocacy and the SBA's Administrator have argued that Should an agency wish to draft a regulation that adopts a size standard different from the one already adopted by the Administrator in regulations implementing the Small Business Act, the agency must obtain approval of the Administrator. However, that requires the Administrator to have a complete understanding of the regulatory regime of that other act—knowledge usually outside the expertise of the SBA. However, the Office of the Chief Counsel for Advocacy, an independent office within the SBA, represents the interests of small businesses in rulemaking proceedings (as part of its responsibility to monitor agency compliance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 601-12, (RFA)) does have such expertise. Therefore, it is logical to transfer the limited function on determining size standards of small businesses for purposes other than the Small Business Act and Small Business Investment Act of 1958 to the Office of the Chief Counsel for Advocacy…. the Administrator is not the proper official to determine size standards for purposes of other agencies' regulatory activities. The Administrator is not fluent with the vast array of federal regulatory programs, is not in constant communication with small entities that might be affected by another federal agency's regulatory regime, and does not have the analytical expertise to assess the regulatory impact of a particular size standard on small entities. Furthermore, the Administrator's standards are: very inclusive, not developed to comport with other agencies' regulatory regimes, and lack sufficient granularity to examine the impact of a proposed rule on a spectrum of small businesses. Opponents have argued that When an agency is seeking to use a size standard other than those approved by the SBA, the agency may consult with the Office of Advocacy. Such consultation is sensible, as the Office of Advocacy has significant knowledge of the regulatory environment outside of the canon of SBA law. However, the SBA's Office of Size Standards, with its historical involvement, expertise, and staff resources in this area, remains the appropriate entity to approve such size standards…. While the legislation permits the SBA to continue to approve size standards for its enabling statutes, it removes SBA's authority to do so for other statutes. The result would be to create a duplicate size standard authority in both the SBA and the Office of Advocacy. Both the SBA and the Office of Advocacy would have personnel who would analyze and evaluate size standards. Through the bifurcation of these responsibilities, taxpayers would effectively be forgoing the economies of scale that are currently enjoyed by the operation of a single Office of Size Standards in the SBA…. Having two such entities that have the same mission is not a transfer of function, but an inefficient and duplicative reorganization.… Instead of having one central office, there will now be two—further muddling small businesses' relationship with the federal government. Two bills were introduced during the 114 th Congress ( H.R. 3714 , the Small Agriculture Producer Size Standards Improvements Act of 2015, and H.R. 4341 , the Defending America's Small Contractors Act of 2016) to authorize the SBA to establish size standards for agricultural enterprises not later than 18 months after the date of enactment. The size standard for agricultural enterprises was, at that time, set in statute as having annual receipts not in excess of $750,000. H.R. 4341 , among other provisions, would have also limited an industry category to a greater extent than provided under the North American Industry Classification codes for small business procurement purposes if further segmentation of the industry category is warranted. H.R. 4341 was introduced on January 7, 2016, and ordered to be reported with amendment by the House Committee on Small Business on January 13, 2016. H.R. 3714 was introduced on October 8, 2015, considered by the House under suspension of the rules on April 19, 2016, and agreed to by voice vote. P.L. 114-328 , the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, includes a provision which authorizes the SBA to establish different size standards for agricultural enterprises using existing methods and appeal processes. Also, as mentioned previously, P.L. 115-324 , the Small Business Runway Extension Act of 2018, directs federal agencies proposing a size standard (and, based on report language accompanying the act, presumably the SBA as well) to use the average annual gross receipts from at least the previous five years, instead of the previous three years, when seeking SBA approval to establish a size standard based on annual gross receipts. The SBA has not announced if it will continue to use the average annual gross receipts over three years to determine receipts-based size standards or if it will use the average annual gross receipts from the previous five years. Historically, the SBA has relied on economic analysis of market conditions within each industry to define eligibility for small business assistance. On several occasions in its history, the SBA attempted to revise its small business size standards in a comprehensive manner. However, because (1) the Small Business Act provides leeway in how the SBA is to define small business; (2) there is no consensus on the economic factors that should be used in defining small business; (3) federal agencies have generally opposed size standards that might adversely affect their pool of available small business contractors; and (4) the SBA's initial size standards provided program eligibility to nearly all businesses, the SBA's efforts to undertake a comprehensive reassessment of its size standards met with resistance. Firms that might lose eligibility objected. Federal agencies also objected. As a result, in each instance, the SBA's comprehensive revisions were not fully implemented. The SBA's congressionally mandated requirement to conduct a detailed review of at least one-third of the SBA's industry size standards every 18 months was imposed by P.L. 111-240 , the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, to prevent small business size standards from becoming outdated. More frequent reviews of the size standards were expected to increase their accuracy and, generally speaking, result in (1) increased numbers of small businesses found to be eligible for SBA assistance and (2) an increase in the number and amount of federal contracts awarded to small businesses (primarily by preventing large businesses from being misclassified as small and by increasing the number of small businesses eligible to compete for federal contracts). As expected, the SBA's economic analyses during the recent five-year review cycle often supported an increase in the size standards for many industries. However, the SBA's economic analyses also occasionally supported a decrease in the size standards for some industries. Despite the SBA's decision to, in most circumstances, make no changes when their economic analyses indicated that a decrease was warranted, it could be argued that the increased frequency of the reviews has generally prevented the SBA's size standards from becoming outdated. This, in turn, has, at least to a certain extent, improved the accuracy of the size standards (as measured by the extent to which the size standard is in alignment with the SBA's economic analyses). In a related matter, the SBA continues to adjust its receipts based size standards for inflation at least once every five years, or more frequently if inflationary circumstances warrant, to prevent firms from losing their small business eligibility solely due to the effects of inflation. The most recent adjustment for inflation took place on July 14, 2014. Prior to that, the last adjustment for inflation took place in 2008. The SBA also continues to review size standards within specific industries whenever it determines that market conditions within that industry have changed. Congress has several options related to the SBA's ongoing review of its size standards. For example, as part of its oversight of the SBA, Congress can wait for the agency to issue its proposed rule before providing input or establish a dialogue with the agency, either at the staff level or with Members involved directly, prior to the issuance of its proposed rule. Historically, Congress has tended to wait for the SBA to issue proposed rules concerning its size standards before providing input, essentially deferring to the agency's expertise in the technical and methodological issues involved in determining where to draw the line between small and large firms. Congress has then tended to respond to the SBA's proposed rules concerning its size standards after taking into consideration current economic conditions and input received from the SBA and affected industries. Waiting for the SBA to issue its proposed rule concerning its size standards before providing congressional input has both advantages and disadvantages. It provides the advantage of insulating the proposed rule from charges that it is influenced by political factors. It also has the advantage of respecting the separation of powers and responsibilities of the executive and legislative branches. However, it has the disadvantage of heightening the prospects for miscommunication, false expectations, and wasted effort, as evidenced by past proposed rules concerning the SBA's size standards that were either rejected outright, or withdrawn, after facing congressional opposition. Another policy option that has not received much congressional attention in recent years, but which Congress may choose to address, is the targeting of the SBA's resources. When the SBA reviews its size standards, it focuses on the competitive nature of the industry under review, with the goal of removing eligibility of firms that are considered large, or dominant, in that industry. There has been relatively little discussion of the costs and benefits of undertaking those reviews with the goal of targeting SBA resources to small businesses in industries that are struggling to remain competitive. GAO recommended this approach in 1978 and Roger Rosenberger, then SBA's associate administrator for policy, planning, and budgeting, testified at a congressional hearing in 1979 that it was debatable whether the SBA should provide any assistance to any of the businesses within industries where "smaller firms are flourishing." Revising the SBA's size standards using this more targeted approach would likely reduce the number of firms eligible for assistance. It would also present the possibility of increasing available benefits to eligible small firms in those industries deemed "mixed" or "concentrated" by the SBA without necessarily increasing overall program costs. Perhaps because previous proposals that would result in a reduction in the number of firms eligible for assistance have met with resistance, this alternative approach to determining program eligibility has not received serious consideration in recent years. Nonetheless, it remains an option available to Congress should it decide to change current policy.	[ "Small business size standards are of congressional interest because they have a pivotal role in determining eligibility for Small Business Administration (SBA) assistance as well as federal contracting and, in some instances, tax preferences. Although there is bipartisan agreement that the nation's small businesses play an important role in the American economy, there are differences of opinion concerning how to define them. The Small Business Act of 1953 (P.L. 83-163, as amended) authorized the SBA to establish size standards to ensure that only small businesses receive SBA assistance. The SBA currently uses two types of size standards to determine SBA program eligibility: industry-specific size standards and alternative size standards based on the applicant's maximum tangible net worth and average net income after federal taxes. The SBA's industry-specific size standards determine program eligibility for firms in 1,036 industrial classifications in 23 sub-industry activities described in the 2017 North American Industry Classification System (NAICS). The size standards are based on one of four measures: (1) number of employees, (2) average annual receipts in the previous three (may soon be the previous five) years, (3) average asset size as reported in the firm's four quarterly financial statements for the preceding year, or (4) a combination of number of employees and barrel per day refining capacity. Overall, about 97% of all employer firms qualify as small under the SBA's size standards. These firms represent about 30% of industry receipts. The SBA conducts an analysis of various economic factors, such as each industry's overall competitiveness and the competitiveness of firms within each industry, to determine its size standards. However, in the absence of precise statutory guidance and consensus on how to define small, the SBA's size standards have often been challenged, typically by industry representatives seeking to increase the number of firms eligible for assistance and by Members concerned that the size standards may not adequately target assistance to firms that they consider to be truly small. This report provides a historical examination of the SBA's size standards and assesses competing views concerning how to define a small business. It also discusses P.L. 111-240, the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, which authorized the SBA to establish an alternative size standard using maximum tangible net worth and average net income after federal taxes for both the 7(a) and 504/CDC loan guaranty programs; established, until the SBA acted, an interim alternative size standard for the 7(a) and 504/CDC programs of not more than $15 million in tangible net worth and not more than $5 million in average net income after federal taxes (excluding any carry-over losses) for the two full fiscal years before the date of the application; and required the SBA to conduct a detailed review of not less than one-third of the SBA's industry size standards every 18 months beginning on the new law's date of enactment (September 27, 2010) and ensure that each size standard is reviewed at least once every five years. P.L. 112-239, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, which directed the SBA not to limit the number of size standards and to assign the appropriate size standard to each NAICS industrial classification. This provision addressed the SBA's practice of limiting the number of size standards it used and combining size standards within industrial groups as a means to reduce the complexity of its size standards and to provide greater consistency for industrial classifications that have similar economic characteristics. P.L. 114-328, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, which authorizes the SBA to establish different size standards for agricultural enterprises using existing methods and appeal processes. Previously, the small business size standard for agricultural enterprises was set in statute as having annual receipts not in excess of $750,000. P.L. 115-324, the Small Business Runway Extension Act of 2018, which directs federal agencies proposing a size standard (and, based on report language accompanying the act, presumably the SBA as well) to use the average annual gross receipts from at least the previous five years, instead of the previous three years, when seeking SBA approval to establish a size standard based on annual gross receipts. Legislation introduced during recent Congresses (including H.R. 33, the Small Business Regulatory Flexibility Improvements Act of 2017, and its Senate companion bill, S. 584, during the 115th Congress) to authorize the SBA's Office of Chief Counsel for Advocacy to approve or disapprove a size standard requested by a federal agency for purposes other than the Small Business Act or the Small Business Investment Act of 1958. The SBA's Administrator currently has that authority." ]	12,598	gov_report	en	null	4ed664210e8729ef89226a2a1e92e6ec286054a05089b794
Over the last 3 decades employers have shifted away from sponsoring defined benefit (DB) plans and toward DC plans. This shift also transfers certain types of risk—such as investment risk—from employers to employee participants. DB plans generally offer a fixed level of monthly annuitized retirement income based upon a formula specified in the plan, which usually takes into account factors such as a participant’s salary, years of service, and age at retirement, regardless of how the plan’s investments perform. In contrast, benefit levels in DC plans—such as 401(k) plans—depend on the contributions made to the plan and the performance of the investments in individual accounts, which may fluctuate in value. As we have previously reported, some experts have suggested that the portability of DC plans make them better-suited for a mobile workforce, and that such portability may lead to early withdrawals of retirement savings. DOL reported there were 656,241 DC and 46,300 DB plans in the United States in 2016. Tax incentives are in place to encourage employers to sponsor retirement plans and employees to participate in plans. Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), employers may sponsor DC retirement plans, including 401(k) plans—the predominant type of DC plan, in which benefits are based on contributions to and the performance of the investments in participants’ individual accounts. To save in 401(k) plans, participants contribute a portion of their income into an investment account, and in traditional 401(k) plans taxes are deferred on these contributions and associated earnings, which can be withdrawn without penalty after age 59½ (if permitted by plan terms). As plan sponsors, employers may decide the amount of employer contributions (if any) and how long participants must work before having a non-forfeitable (i.e., vested) interest in their plan benefit, within limits established by federal law. Plan sponsors often contract with service providers to administer their plans and provide services such as record keeping (e.g., tracking and reporting individual account contributions); investment management (i.e., selecting and managing the securities included in a mutual fund); and custodial or trustee services for plan assets (e.g., holding the plan assets in a bank). Individuals also receive tax incentives to save for retirement outside of an employer-sponsored plan. For example, traditional IRAs provide certain individuals with a way to save pre-tax money for retirement, with withdrawals made in retirement taxed as income. In addition, Roth IRAs allow certain individuals to save after-tax money for retirement with withdrawals in retirement generally tax-free. IRAs were established under ERISA, in part, to (1) provide a way for individuals not covered by a pension plan to save for retirement; and (2) give retiring workers or individuals changing jobs a way to preserve assets from 401(k) plans by transferring their plan balances into IRAs. The Investment Company Institute (ICI) reported that 34.8 percent of households in the United States owned an IRA in 2017, a percentage that has generally remained stable since 2000. In 2017, IRA assets accounted for almost 33 percent (estimated at $9.2 trillion) of total U.S. retirement assets, followed by DC plans, which accounted for 27 percent ($7.7 trillion). Further, according to ICI, over 94 percent of funds flowing into traditional IRAs from 2000 to 2015 came from rollovers—primarily from 401(k) plans. IRS, within the Department of the Treasury, is responsible for enforcing IRA tax laws, while IRS and DOL share responsibility for overseeing prohibited transactions relating to IRAs. IRS also works with DOL’s Employee Benefits Security Administration (EBSA) to enforce laws governing 401(k) plans. IRS is primarily responsible for interpreting and enforcing provisions of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) that apply to tax- preferred retirement savings. EBSA enforces ERISA’s reporting and disclosure and fiduciary responsibility provisions, which, among other things, include requirements related to the type and extent of information that a plan sponsor must provide to plan participants. Employers sponsoring employee benefit plans subject to ERISA, such as a 401(k) plans, generally must file detailed information about their plan each year. The Form 5500 serves as the primary source of information collected by the federal government regarding the operation, funding, expenses, and investments of employee benefit plans. The Form 5500 includes information about the financial condition and operation of their plans, among other things. EBSA uses the Form 5500 to monitor and enforce plan administrators and other fiduciaries, and service providers’ responsibilities under Title I of ERISA. IRS uses the form to enforce standards that relate to, among other things, how employees become eligible to participate in benefit plans, and how they become eligible to earn rights to benefits. In certain instances, sponsors of 401(k) plans may allow participants to access their tax-preferred retirement savings prior to retirement. Plan sponsors have flexibility under federal law and regulations to choose whether to allow plan participants access to their retirement savings prior to retirement and what forms of access to allow. Typically, plans allow participants to access their savings in one or more of the following forms: Loans: Plans may allow participants to take loans and limit the number of loans allowed. If the plan provides for loans, the maximum amount that the plan can permit as a loan generally cannot exceed the lesser of (1) the greater of 50 percent of the vested account balance, or $10,000 or (2) $50,000 less the excess of the highest outstanding balance of loans during the 1-year period ending on the day before the day on which a new loan is made over the outstanding balance of loans on the day the new loan is made. Plan loans are generally not treated as early withdrawals unless they are not repaid within the terms specified under the plan. Hardship withdrawals: Plans may allow participants facing a hardship to take a withdrawal on account of an immediate and heavy financial need, and if the withdrawal is necessary to satisfy the financial need. Though plan sponsors can decide whether to offer hardship withdrawals and approve applications for hardship withdrawals, IRS regulations provide “safe harbor” criteria regarding circumstances when a withdrawal is deemed to be on account of an immediate heavy financial need. IRS regulations allow certain expenses to qualify under the safe harbor including: (1) certain medical expenses; (2) costs directly relating to the purchase of a principal residence; (3) tuition and related educational fees and expenses for the participant, and their spouse, children, dependents or beneficiary; (4) payments necessary to prevent eviction from, or foreclosure on, a principal residence; (5) certain burial or funeral expenses; and (6) certain expenses for the repair of damage to the employee’s principal residence. Plans that provide for hardship withdrawals generally specify what information participants must provide to the plan sponsor to demonstrate a hardship meets the definition of an immediate and heavy financial need. Early withdrawals of retirement savings may have short-term and long- term impacts on participants’ ability to accumulate retirement savings. In the short term, IRA owners and participants in 401(k) plans who received a withdrawal before reaching age 59½ generally pay an additional 10 percent tax for early distributions in addition to income taxes on the taxable portion of the distribution amount. The IRC exempts certain distributions from the additional tax, but the exceptions vary among 401(k) plans and IRAs. Early withdrawals of any type can result in the permanent removal of assets from retirement accounts thereby reducing the amounts participants can accumulate before retirement, including the loss of compounded interest or other earnings on the amounts over the participant’s career. According to DOL’s Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), U.S. workers are likely to have multiple jobs in their careers as average employee tenure has decreased. In 2017, BLS reported that from 1978 to 2014, workers held an average of 12 jobs between the ages of 18 and 50. BLS also reported in 2016 that the median job tenure for a worker was just over 4 years. Employees who separate from a job bear responsibility for deciding what to do with their accumulated assets in their former employer’s plan. Recent research estimated that 10 million people with a retirement plan change jobs each year, many of whom faced a decision on how to treat their account balance at job separation. Plan administrators must provide a tax notice detailing participants’ options for handling the balance of their accounts. When plan participants separate from their employers, they generally have one of three options: 1. They may leave the balance in the plan, 2. They may ask their employer to roll the money directly into a new qualified employer plan or IRA (known as a direct rollover), or 3. They may request a distribution. Once the participant receives the distribution he or she can (1) within 60 days, roll the distribution into a new qualified employer plan or IRA (in which case the money would remain tax-preferred); or (2) keep the distributed amount, and pay any income taxes or additional taxes associated with the distribution (known as a cashout). Sponsors of 401(k) plans may cash out or transfer separating participant accounts if an account balance falls below a certain threshold. The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA) amended the IRC to provide certain protections for separating participants with account balances between $1,000 and $5,000 by requiring, in the absence of participant direction, plan sponsors to either keep the account in the plan or to transfer the account balance to an IRA to preserve its tax-preferred status. Plan sponsors may not distribute accounts with balances of more than $5,000 without participant direction, but have discretion to distribute account balances of $1,000 or less. The IRC imposes an additional 10 percent tax (in addition to ordinary income tax) on certain early withdrawals from qualified retirement plans, which includes IRAs and 401(k) plans in an effort to discourage the use of plan funds for purposes other than retirement and ensure the favorable tax treatment for plan funds is used to provide retirement income. Employers are required to withhold 20 percent of the amount cashed out to cover anticipated income taxes unless the participant pursues a direct rollover into another qualified plan or IRA. Research has found that many employees are concerned about their level of savings and ability to manage their retirement accounts, and some employers provide educational services to improve employees’ financial wellness and financial literacy and encourage them to save for retirement. A 2017 survey on employee financial wellness in the workplace found more than one-half of workers experienced financial stress and that insufficient emergency savings was a top concern for employees. Research has also found that limited financial literacy is widespread among Americans over age 50, and those who lack financial knowledge are less likely to successfully plan for retirement. In 2018, the Federal Reserve reported that three-fifths of non-retirees with participant-directed retirement accounts had little to no comfort managing their own investments. As we have previously reported, some employers have developed comprehensive programs aimed at overall improvement in employees’ financial health. These programs, often called financial wellness programs, may help employees with budgeting, emergency savings, and credit management, in addition to the traditional information and assistance provided for retirement and health benefits. In 2013, individuals ages 25 to 55 withdrew at least $68.7 billion early from their retirement accounts. Of this amount, IRA owners in this age group withdrew the largest share (about 57 percent) and 401(k) plan participants in this age group withdrew the rest (about 43 percent) However, a total amount withdrawn from 401(k) plans cannot be determined due to data limitations. IRA withdrawals were the largest source of early withdrawals of retirement savings, accounting for an estimated $39.5 billion of the total $68.7 billion in early withdrawals made by individuals ages 25 to 55 in 2013. According to IRS estimates, 12 percent of IRA owners in this age group withdrew money early that year from their IRAs in 2013. The amount they withdrew early comprised a small percentage of their total IRA assets. Specifically, in 2013, the amount of early withdrawals was equivalent to 3 percent of the cohort’s total IRA assets and, according to IRS estimates, the total amount withdrawn by this cohort exceeded their total contributions to IRAs in that year. At least $29.2 billion left 401(k) plans in 2013 in the form of hardship withdrawals, cashouts at job separation, and unrepaid plan loans, according to our analysis of 2013 SIPP data and data from DOL’s Form 5500. Specifically, we found that: Hardship withdrawals were the largest source of early withdrawals from 401(k) plans with an estimated 4 percent (+/- 0.25) of plan participants ages 25 to 55 withdrawing an aggregate $18.5 billion in 2013. The amount of hardship withdrawals was equivalent to 0.5 percent (+/- 0.06) of the cohort’s total plan assets and 8 percent (+/- 0.9) of the cohort’s plan contributions made in 2013. Cashouts of account balances of $1,000 or more at job separation were the second largest source of early withdrawals from 401(k) plans. In 2013, an estimated 1.1 percent (+/- 0.11) of plan participants ages 25 to 55 withdrew an aggregate $9.8 billion from their plans that they did not roll into another qualified plan or IRA. Additionally, 86 percent (+/- 2.9) of these participants taking a cashout of $1,000 or more did not roll over the amount in 2013. The amounts cashed out and not rolled over were equivalent to 0.3 percent (+/- 0.05) of the cohort’s total plan assets and 4 percent (+/- 0.75) of the cohort’s total contributions made in 2013. Loan defaults accounted for at least $800 million withdrawn from 401(k) plans in 2013; however, the amount of distributions of unpaid plan loans is likely larger as DOL data cannot be used to quantify plan loan offsets that are deducted from participants’ account balances after they leave a plan. As a result, the amount of loan offsets among terminating participants ages 25 to 55 cannot be determined with certainty. Specifically, DOL’s Form 5500 instructions require plan sponsors to report unpaid loan balances in two separate places on the Form 5500, depending on whether the loan holder is an active or a terminated participant. For active participants, plan sponsors report loan defaults as a single line item on the Form 5500 (i.e., the $800 million in 2013 listed above). For terminated participants, plan sponsors report unrepaid plan loan balances as benefits paid directly to participants—a category that also includes rollovers to employer plans and IRAs. According to a DOL official, as a result of this commingling of benefits on this line item, isolating the amount of loan offsets for terminated participants using the Form 5500 data is not possible. Without better data of the amount of unrepaid plan loans, the amount of loan offsets and the characteristics of plan participants who did not repay their plan loans at job separation cannot be determined. IRA owners and plan participants taking early withdrawals paid $6.2 billion as a result of the additional 10 percent tax for early distributions in 2013, according to IRS estimates. Although the taxes are generally treated separately from the amounts withdrawn, IRA owners and plan participants are expected to pay any applicable taxes resulting from the additional 10 percent tax when filing their income taxes for the tax year in which the withdrawal occurred. Individuals with certain demographic and economic characteristics that we analyzed had higher incidence of early withdrawals of retirement savings, according to our analysis of SIPP data. The characteristics described below reflect statistically significant differences between comparison groups (a full listing of all demographic groups can be found in appendix III). Age. The incidence of IRA withdrawals was higher among individuals ages 45 to 54 (8 percent) than individuals ages 25 to 34 and 35 to 44. Education. Individuals with a high school education or less had higher incidence of cashouts (97 percent) and hardship withdrawals (7 percent) than individuals with some college or some graduate school education. Family size. Individuals in families of seven or more (8 percent) or in families of five to six (7 percent) had higher incidence of hardship withdrawals than individuals in smaller family groups we analyzed. Individuals living alone had higher incidence of IRA withdrawals than individuals living in the larger family groups. Marital status. Widowed, divorced, or separated individuals had higher incidence of IRA withdrawals (11 percent) and hardship withdrawals (7 percent) than married or never married individuals. Race. The incidence of hardship withdrawals among African American (10 percent) and Hispanic individuals (6 percent) was higher than among individuals who were White, Asian, or Other. Residence. The incidence of IRA withdrawals and hardship withdrawals was higher among individuals living in nonmetropolitan areas (7 percent and 6 percent, respectively) than among individuals living in metropolitan areas. Similarly, individuals with certain economic characteristics that we analyzed had higher incidence of early withdrawals of retirement savings, according to our analysis of SIPP data. The characteristics described below reflect statistically significant differences between comparison groups (a full listing of all demographic groups can be found in appendix III). Employer size. Individuals working for employers with fewer than 25 employees had higher incidence of IRA withdrawals (9 percent) than individuals working for employers with higher number of employees. Employment. Individuals working fewer than 35 hours per week had higher incidence of IRA withdrawals (7 percent) than employees working 35 hours or more. Household debt. Individuals with household debt of $5,000 up to $20,000 had higher incidence of IRA withdrawals (14 percent) than individuals with other debt amounts. Household income. Individuals with household income of less than $25,000 or $25,000 up to $50,000 had higher incidence of IRA withdrawals (12 percent and 9 percent, respectively) and hardship withdrawals (9 percent and 7 percent, respectively) than individuals with higher income amounts. Personal cash reserves. Individuals with personal cash reserves of less than $1,000 had higher incidence of IRA withdrawals (10 percent) and hardship withdrawals (6 percent) than individuals with larger reserves. Retirement assets. Individuals with combined IRA and 401(k) plan assets valued at less than $5,000 had higher incidence of hardship withdrawals (7 percent) than individuals with higher valued assets. Tenure in retirement plan. Individuals with fewer than 3 years in their retirement plan had higher incidence of hardship withdrawals (6 percent) than individuals with longer tenures. Stakeholders we interviewed said that plan rules related to the disposition of account balances at job separation can lead participants to remove more than they need, up to and including their entire balance. We previously reported U.S. workers are likely to change jobs multiple times in a career. Plan sponsors may cash out balances of $1,000 or less at job separation, although they are not required to do so. As a result, plan participants with such balances, including younger employees and others with short job tenures, risk having their account balances distributed in full each time they change jobs. As shown in table 1, a separating employee must take multiple steps to ensure that an account balance remains tax-preferred. Participants who take a distribution from a plan with the intent of rolling it into another qualified plan or IRA must acquire additional funds to complete the rollover and avoid adverse tax consequences. Plan sponsors are required to withhold 20 percent of the account balance to pay anticipated taxes on the distribution. As a result, the sponsor then sends 80 percent of the account balance to the participant, who must acquire outside funds to compensate for the 20 percent withheld or forgo the preferential tax treatment of that portion of their account balance. For example, a participant seeking to roll over a retirement account with a $10,000 balance would receive an $8,000 distribution after tax withholding, requiring them to locate an additional $2,000 to complete the rollover within the 60-day period to avoid a taxable distribution of the withheld amount. If participants can replace the 20 percent withheld and complete the rollover within the 60-day period, they do not owe taxes on the distribution. Stakeholders said that the complexity of rolling a 401(k) account balance from one employer to another may encourage participants to take the relatively simpler route of rolling their balance into an IRA or cashing out altogether. They noted that separating participants had many questions when evaluating their options and had difficulty understanding the notice provided. For example, participants may not fully understand how the decisions made at job separation can have a significant impact on their current tax situation and eventual retirement security. One plan sponsor, describing concerns about giving investment advice, said she watched participants make what she judged to be poor choices with their account balances and felt helpless to intervene. Stakeholders also noted that the lack of a standardized rollover process sometimes bred mistrust among employers and complicated separating participants’ ability to successfully facilitate a rollover between plans. For example, one stakeholder told us that some plans were hesitant to accept funds from other employer plans fearing that the funds might come from plans that have failed to comply with plan qualification requirements and could create problems for the receiving plan later on. Another stakeholder suggested that the requirement for plan sponsors to provide a notice to separating participants likely caused more participants to take the distribution. Stakeholders described loans as a useful source of funds in times of need and a way to avoid more expensive options, such as high-interest credit cards. They also noted that certain plan loan policies could lead to early withdrawals of retirement savings. (See fig. 1.) Loan repayment at job separation: Stakeholders said loan repayment policies can increase the incidence of defaults on outstanding loans. When participants do not repay their loan after separating from a job, the outstanding balance is treated as a distribution, which may subject it to income tax liability and, possibly, an additional 10 percent tax for early distributions. According to stakeholders, the process of changing jobs can inadvertently lead to a distribution of a participant’s outstanding loan balance, when the participant could have otherwise repaid the loan. Extended loan repayment periods: Some plan sponsors allow participants to take loans to purchase a home. Stakeholders told us that the amounts of these home loans tended to be larger than general purpose loans and had longer repayment periods that these extended from 15 to 30 years. A stakeholder further noted that these loans could make it more likely that participants would have larger balances to repay if they lost or changed jobs. Multiple loans: While some plan sponsors noted that their plans limited the number of loans participants can take from their retirement plan, others do not. Some plan sponsors limited participants to between one and three simultaneous loans, and one plan administrator indicated that 92 percent of their plan-sponsor clients allowed no more than two simultaneous loans. Other plan sponsors placed no limit on the number of participant loans or limited loans to one or two per calendar year, in which case a participant could take out a new loan at the start of a calendar year regardless of whether or not outstanding loans had been repaid. Stakeholders described some participants as “serial” borrowers, who take out multiple loans and have less disposable income as a result of ongoing loan payments. One plan administrator stated that repeat borrowing from 401(k) plans was common, and some participants took out new loans to pay off old loans. Other loan restrictions: Allowing no loans or one total outstanding loan can cause participants facing economic shocks to take a hardship withdrawal, resulting in the permanent removal of their savings and subjecting them to income tax liability and, possibly, an additional 10 percent tax for early distributions and a suspension on contributions. Minimum loan amounts: Minimum loan amounts may result in participants borrowing more than they need to cover planned expenses. For example, a participant may have a $500 expense for which they seek a loan, but may have to borrow $1,000 due to plan loan minimums. Stakeholders said that plan participants take plan loans and hardship withdrawals for pressing financial needs. Many plan sponsors we interviewed said they used the IRS safe harbor exclusively as criteria when reviewing a participant’s application for a hardship withdrawal. Stakeholders said the top two reasons participants took hardship withdrawals were to prevent imminent eviction or foreclosure and to cover out-of-pocket medical costs not covered by health insurance. Participants generally took loans to reduce debt, for emergencies, or to purchase a primary residence. Stakeholders also said that participants who experienced economic shocks stemming from job loss made early withdrawals. They said retirement plans often served as a form of insurance for those between jobs or facing a sudden economic shock and participants accessed their retirement accounts because, for many, they were the only source of savings. They cited personal debt, health care costs, and education as significant factors that affected employees across all income levels. Stakeholders said some participants also used their retirement savings to pay for anticipated expenses. Two plan administrators said education expenses were one of the reasons participants took hardship withdrawals. They said that participants accessed their retirement savings to address the cost of higher education, including paying off their own student loan debt or financing the college costs for family members. For example, plan administrators told us that some participants saved with the expectation of taking a hardship withdrawal to pay for college tuition. Other participants utilized hardship withdrawals to purchase a primary residence. IRA owners generally may take withdrawals at any time and IRS does not analyze the limited information it receives on the reasons for IRA withdrawals. IRA owners can withdraw any amount up to their entire account balance at any time. In addition, IRAs have certain exceptions from the additional 10 percent tax for early distributions. For example, IRA withdrawals taken for qualified higher education expenses, certain health insurance premiums, and qualified “first-time” home purchases (up to $10,000) are excepted from the additional 10 percent tax. IRA owners who make an IRA distribution receive a Form1099-R or similar statement from their provider. On the Form 1099-R, IRA providers generally identify whether the withdrawal, among other things, can be categorized as a normal distribution, an early distribution, or a direct distribution to a qualified plan or IRA. For an early distribution, the IRA provider may identify whether a known exception to the additional 10 percent tax applies. For their part, IRA owners are required to report early withdrawals on their income tax returns, as well as the reason for any exception from the additional 10 percent tax for a limited number of items. In written responses to questions, an IRS official indicated that IRS collected data on the exemption reason codes, but did not use them. Some plan sponsors we interviewed had policies in place that may reduce the long-term impact of early withdrawals of retirement savings taken at job separation. Policies suggested by plan sponsors included: Providing a periodic installment distribution option: Although some plan sponsors may require participants wanting a distribution to take their full account balance at job separation, other plan sponsors provided participants with an option of receiving their account balance in periodic installments. For example, one plan sponsor gives separating participants an option to receive periodic installment distributions at intervals determined by the participants. This plan sponsor said separating participants could select distributions on a monthly, quarterly, semi-annual or annual basis. These participants could also elect to stop distributions at any time, preserving the remaining balance in the employer’s plan. The plan sponsor said the plan adopted this option to help separating participants address any current financial needs, while preserving some of the account balance for retirement. Another plan sponsor adopted a similar policy to address the cyclical nature of the employer’s business, which can result in participants being terminated and rehired within one year. Offering partial distributions: One plan sponsor provided separated participants with the option of receiving a one-time, partial distribution. If a participant opted for partial distribution, the plan sponsor issued the distribution for the requested sum and preserved the remainder of the account balance in the plan. The plan sponsor adopted the partial distribution policy to provide separating participants with choices for preserving account balances, while simultaneously providing access to address any immediate financial needs. Providing plan loan repayment options for separated participants: Some plan sponsors allowed former participants to continue making loan repayments after job separation. Loan repayments after job separation reduce the loan default risk and associated tax implications for participants. Some plan sponsors said that separating participants who have the option to continue repaying an outstanding loan balance generally have three options: (1) to continue repaying the outstanding loan, (2) to repay the entire balance of the loan at separation within a set repayment period, or (3) not to repay the loan. Those participants who continue repaying their loans after separation generally have the option to set up automatic debit payments to facilitate the repayment. Those separated participants who do not set up loan repayment terms within established timeframes, or do not make a payment after the loan repayment plan has been established, default on their loan and face the associated tax consequences, including, possibly, an additional 10 percent tax for early distributions. Some plan sponsors we spoke with placed certain limits on participant loan activity, which may reduce the incidence of loan defaults (see fig. 2). Limiting loan amounts to participant contributions: Some plan sponsors said they limited plan loans to participant contributions and any investment earnings from those contributions to reduce early withdrawals of retirement savings. For example, one plan sponsor’s policy limited the amount a participant could borrow from their plan to 50 percent of participant contributions and earnings, compared to 50 percent of the total account balance. Implementing a waiting period after loan repayment before a participant can access a new loan: Some plan sponsors said they had implemented a waiting period between plan loans, in which a participant, having fully paid off the previous loan, was temporarily ineligible to apply for another. Among plan sponsors who implemented a waiting period, the length varied from 21 days to 30 days. Reducing the number of outstanding loans: Some plan sponsors we spoke with limited the number of outstanding plan loans to either one or two loans. One plan sponsor had previously allowed one new loan each calendar year, but subsequently revised plan policy to allow participants to have a total of two outstanding loans. The plan sponsor said the rationale was to balance limiting participant loan behavior with the ability of participants to access their account balance. Some plan sponsors said they had expanded the definition of immediate and heavy financial need beyond the IRS safe harbor to better align with the economic needs of their participants. For example, one plan sponsor approved a hardship withdrawal to help a participant pay expenses related to a divorce settlement. Another plan sponsor developed an expanded list of qualifying hardships, including past-due car, mortgage, or rent payments; and payday loan obligations. Some plan sponsors implemented loan programs outside their plan, contracting with third-party vendors to provide short-term loans to employees. For example, one plan sponsor instituted a loan program that allowed employees to borrow up to $5,000 from a third-party vendor that would be repaid through payroll deduction. This plan sponsor said the loan program featured an 8 to 12 percent interest rate, and approval was not based on a participant’s credit history. The plan sponsor also observed that they had fewer 401(k) loan applications since the third- party loan program was implemented. A second plan sponsor instituted a similar loan program that allowed employees to borrow up to $500 interest free from a third-party vendor. According to this sponsor, to qualify for a loan, an employee must demonstrate financial hardship and have no outstanding plan loans, and is required to attend a financial counseling course if their loans are approved. Some plan sponsors said they have provided workplace-based financial wellness resources for their participants to improve their financial literacy. Some implemented optional financial wellness programs that covered topics such as investment education, how plan loans work, and the importance of saving for emergencies. These plan sponsors told us they offered on-site financial counseling with representatives of the plan administrator to help provide guidance on financial decision-making; however, other plan sponsors said that—despite their investment in participant-specific financial education—participation in these programs was low. Stakeholders suggested strategies that they believed could help mitigate the long-term effects of early withdrawals of retirement savings on IRA owners and plan participants. They noted that any of these proposed strategies, if implemented, could (1) increase the costs of administering IRAs and plans, (2) require changes to federal law or regulations, and (3) involve tradeoffs between providing access to retirement savings and preserving savings for retirement. Stakeholders suggested several strategies that, if implemented, could help reduce early withdrawals from IRAs. These strategies centered on modifying existing rules to reduce early withdrawals from IRAs (and subsequently the amount paid as a result of the additional 10 percent tax for early distributions). Specifically, stakeholders suggested: Raising the age at which the additional 10 percent tax applies: Some stakeholders noted that raising the age at which the additional 10 percent tax for early distributions applies from 59½ to 62 would align it with the earliest age of eligibility to claim Social Security and may encourage individuals to consider a more comprehensive retirement distribution strategy. However, other stakeholders cautioned that it could have drawbacks for employees in certain situations. For example, individuals who lose a job late in their careers could face additional tax consequences for accessing an IRA before reaching the age 62. In addition, one stakeholder said some individuals may shift to a part-time work schedule later in their careers as they transition to retirement and plan on taking IRA withdrawals to compensate for their lower wages. Allowing individuals to roll existing plan loans into an IRA: Some stakeholders said that allowing individuals to include an existing plan loan as part of a rollover into an IRA, although currently not allowed, would likely reduce plan loan defaults by giving individuals a way to continue repaying the loan balance. One stakeholder suggested that rolling an existing plan loan into an IRA could be administratively challenging for IRA providers, but doing so to repay the loan may ultimately preserve retirement savings. Allowing IRA loans: While currently a prohibited transaction that could lead to the cessation of an IRA, some stakeholders suggested that IRA loans could theoretically reduce the amounts being permanently removed from the retirement system through early IRA withdrawals. One stakeholder said an IRA loan would present a good alternative to an early withdrawal from an IRA account because it would give the account holder access to the balance, defer any tax implications, and improve the likelihood the loaned amount would ultimately be repaid. However, another stakeholder said that allowing IRA loans could increase early withdrawals, given the limited oversight of IRAs, as well as additional administrative costs and challenges for IRA providers. Stakeholders suggested several strategies that, if implemented, could reduce the effect of cashouts at job separation from 401(k) plans. Simplifying the rollover process: Stakeholders proposed two modifications to the current rollover process that they believe could make the process more seamless and reduce the incidence of cashouts. First, stakeholders suggested that a third-party entity tasked with facilitating rollovers between employer plans for a separating participant would likely reduce the incidence of cashouts at job separation. Such an entity could automatically route a participant’s account balance from the former plan to a new one. One stakeholder said having a third-party entity facilitate the rollover would eliminate the need for a plan participant to negotiate the process. Such a service, however, would likely come at cost that may likely be passed onto participants. Stakeholders also suggested direct rollovers of account balances between plans could further reduce the incidence of cashouts. One stakeholder, however, cautioned that direct rollovers could have downsides for some participants. For example, participants who prefer to keep their balance in their former employer’s plan but provide no direction to the plan sponsor may inadvertently find their account balance rolled into a new employer’s plan. Restricting cashouts to participant contributions only: Some stakeholders suggested limiting the assets a participant may access at job separation. For example, some stakeholders said that participants should not be allowed to cash out vested plan sponsor contributions, thus preserving those contributions and their earnings for retirement. However, this strategy could result in participants overseeing and monitoring several retirement accounts. Stakeholders suggested several strategies that, if implemented, could limit the adverse effect of hardship withdrawals on retirement savings. Narrowing the IRS safe harbor: Although some plan sponsors are expanding the reasons for a hardship to align with perceived employee needs, some stakeholders said narrowing the IRS safe harbor would likely reduce the incidence of early withdrawals. For example, some stakeholders suggested narrowing the definition of a hardship to exclude the purchase of a primary residence or for postsecondary education costs. In addition, one stakeholder said alternatives exist to finance home purchases (mortgages) and postsecondary education (student loans). Stakeholders noted that eliminating the purchase of a primary residence and postsecondary education costs from the IRS safe harbor would make hardship withdrawals a tool more strictly used to avoid sudden and unforeseen economic shocks. In combination with the two exclusions, one stakeholder suggested consideration be given to either reducing or eliminating the additional 10 percent tax for early distributions that may apply to hardship withdrawals. Replacing hardship withdrawals with hardship loans: Stakeholders said replacing a hardship withdrawal, which permanently removes money from the retirement system, with a no-interest hardship loan, which would be repaid to the account, would reduce early withdrawals. Under this suggestion, if the loan were not repaid within this predetermined time frame, the remaining loan balance could be considered a deemed distribution and treated as income (similar to the way a hardship withdrawal is treated now). Incorporating emergency savings features into 401(k) plans: Stakeholders said incorporating an emergency savings account into the 401(k) plan structure may help participants absorb economic shocks and better prepare for both short-term financial needs and long-term retirement planning. (See fig. 3.) In addition, stakeholders said participants with emergency savings accounts could be better prepared to avoid high interest rate credit options, such as credit cards or payday loans, in the event of an economic shock. Stakeholders had several ideas for implementing emergency savings accounts. For example, one stakeholder suggested that, were it allowed, plan sponsors could revise automatic account features to include automatic contributions to an emergency savings account. Some stakeholders also said emergency savings accounts could be funded with after-tax participant contributions to eliminate the tax implications when withdrawing money from the account. However, another stakeholder said emergency savings contributions could reduce contributions to a 401(k) plan. In the United States, the amount of aggregate savings in retirement accounts continues to grow, with nearly $17 trillion invested in 401(k) plans and IRAs. Early access to retirement savings in these plans may incentivize plan participation, increase participant contributions, and provide participants with a way to address their financial needs. However, billions of dollars continue to leave the retirement system early. Although these withdrawals represent a small percentage of overall assets in these accounts, they can erode or even deplete an individual’s retirement savings, especially if the retirement account represents their sole source of savings. Employers have implemented plan policies that seek to balance the short- term benefits of providing participants early access to their accounts with the long-term need to build retirement savings. However, the way plan sponsors treat outstanding loans after a participant separates from employment has the potential to adversely affect retirement savings. In the event of unexpected job loss or separation, plan loans can leave participants liable for additional taxes. Currently, the incidence and amount of loan offsets in 401(k) plans cannot be determined due to the way DOL collects data from plan sponsors. Additional information on loan offsets would provide insight into how plan loan features might affect long-term retirement savings. Without clear data on the incidence of these loan offsets, which plan sponsors are generally required to include, (but not itemize) on the Form 5500, the overall extent of unrepaid plan loans in 401(k) plans cannot be known. To better identify the incidence and amount of loan offsets in 401(k) plans nationwide, we recommend that the Secretary of Labor direct the Assistant Secretary for EBSA, in coordination with IRS, to revise the Form 5500 to require plan sponsors to report qualified plan loan offsets as a separate line item distinct from other types of distributions. (Recommendation 1) We provided a draft of this product to the Department of Labor, the Department of the Treasury, and the Internal Revenue Service for review and comment. In its written comments, reproduced in appendixes IV and V, respectively, DOL and IRS generally agreed with our findings, but neither agreed nor disagreed with our recommendation. DOL said it would consider our recommendation as part of its overall evaluation of the Form 5500, and IRS said it would work with DOL as it responds to our recommendation. The Department of Treasury provided no formal written comments. In addition, DOL, IRS, Treasury and two third-party subject matter experts provided technical comments, which we incorporated in the report, as appropriate As agreed with your staff, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to the Secretary of Labor, Secretary of the Treasury, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and other interested parties. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-7215 or jeszeckc@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff making key contributions to this report are listed in appendix VI. The objectives of this study were to determine: (1) what are the incidence and amount of retirement savings being withdrawn early; (2) what is known about the factors that might lead individuals to access their retirement savings early; and (3) what strategies or policies, if any, might reduce the incidence and amount of early withdrawals of retirement savings. To examine the incidence and amount of early withdrawals from individual retirement accounts (IRA) and 401(k) plans, we analyzed the most recent nationally representative data available in three relevant federal data sources, focusing our analysis on individuals in their prime working years (ages 25 to 55), when possible. For consistency, we analyzed data from 2013 from each data source because it was the most recent year that data were available for all types of early withdrawals we examined. We adjusted all dollar-value estimates derived from each data source for inflation and reported them in constant 2017 dollars. We determined that the data from these sources were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our report. First, to examine recent incidence and amount of early withdrawals from IRAs and the associated tax consequences for individuals ages 25 to 55, we analyzed IRS estimates based on tax returns as filed by taxpayers before enforcement activity published by the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) Statistics of Income Division for tax year 2013. Specifically, we analyzed the number of taxpayers reporting early withdrawals from their IRAs in 2013 and the aggregate amount of these withdrawals. To provide additional context on the scope of these early withdrawals, we analyzed the age cohort’s total IRA contributions and the end-of-year fair market value of the IRAs, and compared these amounts to the aggregate amount withdrawn. To examine the incidence and amount of taxes paid as a result of the additional 10 percent tax for early distributions, we analyzed estimates on the additional 10 percent tax paid on qualified retirement plans in 2013. Although IRS did not delineate these data by age, we used these data as proxy because IRS assesses the additional 10 percent tax on distributions to taxpayers who have not reached age 59½. Given the delay between a withdrawal date and the date of the tax filing, it is possible that some of the taxes were paid in the year following the withdrawal. We reviewed technical documentation and developed the 95 percent confidence intervals that correspond to these estimates. Second, to examine the incidence and amount of early withdrawals from 401(k) plans, we analyzed data included in the 2014 panel of the U.S. Census Bureau’s Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP)—a nationally representative survey of household income, finances, and use of federal social safety net programs—along with retirement account contribution and withdrawal data included in the SIPP’s Social Security Administration (SSA) Supplement on Retirement, Pensions, and Related Content. Specifically, we developed percentage and dollar-value estimates of the incidence and amount of lump sum payments received and hardship withdrawals taken by participants in 401(k) plans in 2013. Because the SIPP is based upon a complex probability sample, we used Balanced Repeated Replication methods with a Fay adjustment to derive all percentage, dollar-total, and dollar-ratio estimates and their 95 percent confidence intervals. To better understand the characteristics of individuals who received a lump sum and/or took a hardship withdrawal in 2013, we analyzed a range of selected individual and household demographic variables and identified characteristics associated with a higher incidence of withdrawals. We applied domain estimation methods to make estimates for these subpopulations. (For a list of variables used and the results of our analysis, please see appendix III.) We attempted to develop a multiple regression model to estimate the unique association between each characteristic and withdrawals, but determined that the SIPP did not measure key variables in enough detail to develop persuasive causal explanations. The sample size of respondents receiving lump sums was too small to precisely estimate the partial correlations of many demographic variables at once. Even with adequate sample sizes, associations between broad demographic variables, such as age and income, likely reflected underlying causes, such as retirement and financial planning strategies, which SIPP did not measure in detail. Third, to examine the incidence and amount of unrepaid plan loans from 401(k) plans, we analyzed the latest filing of annual plan data that plan sponsors reported on the Form 5500 to the Department of Labor (DOL) for the 2013 plan year. We looked at unrepaid plan loans reported by sponsors of large plans (Schedule H) and small plans (Schedule I). For each schedule, we analyzed two variables related to unrepaid plan loans: (1) deemed distributions of participant loans (which captures the amount of loan defaults by active participants) and (2) benefits distributed directly to participants (which includes plan loan offsets for a variety of reasons, including plan loans that remain unpaid after a participant separates from a plan). Because plan sponsors report data in aggregate and do not differentiate by participant age, we calculated and reported the aggregate of loan defaults identified as deemed distributions in both schedules. We could not determine the amount of plan loan offsets based on the way that plan sponsors are required to report them. Specifically, plan sponsors are required to treat unrepaid loans occurring after a participant separates from a plan as reductions or offsets in plan assets, and are required to report them as part of a larger commingled category of offsets that also includes large-dollar items like rollovers of account balances to another qualified plan or IRA. As a result, we were unable to isolate and report the amount of this category of unrepaid plan loans. To identify what is known about the factors that might lead individuals to access their 401(k) plans and IRAs and what strategies or policies might reduce the early withdrawal of retirement savings, we performed a literature search using multiple databases to locate documents regarding early withdrawals of retirement savings published since 2008 and to identify experts for interviews. The search yielded a wide variety of scholarly articles, published articles from various think tank organizations, congressional testimonies, and news reports. We reviewed these studies and identified factors that lead individuals to withdraw retirement savings early, as well as potential strategies or policies that might reduce this behavior. The search also helped us identify additional potential interviewees. To answer our second and third objectives, we visited four metropolitan areas and conducted 51 interviews with a wide range of stakeholders that we identified in the literature. In some cases, to accommodate stakeholder schedules, we conducted phone interviews or accepted written responses. Specifically, we interviewed human resource professionals from 22 private-sector companies (including 4 written responses), representatives from 8 plan administrators, 13 retirement research experts (including 1 written response), representatives from 4 industry associations, representatives from 2 participant advocacy organizations, and representatives from 2 financial technology companies. We conducted in-person interviews at four sites to collect information from three different groups: (1) human resource officials in private-sector companies, (2) top 20 plan administrators or recordkeepers, and (3) retirement research experts. We selected site visit locations in four metropolitan locations that were home to representatives of each group. To select companies for potential interviews, we reached out to a broad sample of Fortune 500 companies that offered a 401(k) plan to employees and varied by geographic location, industry, and number of employees. We selected plan administrators based on Pensions and Investments rankings for assets under management and number of individual accounts. We selected retirement research experts who had published research on early withdrawals from retirement savings, as well as experts that we had interviewed in our prior work. Based on these criteria, we conducted site visits in Boston, Massachusetts; Chicago, Illinois; the San Francisco Bay Area, California; and Seattle, Washington. We held interviews with parties in each category who responded affirmatively to our request. In each interview, we solicited names of additional stakeholders to interview. We also interviewed representatives of organizations, such as financial technology companies, participant advocacy organizations, industry associations, and plan administrators focused on small businesses, whose work we deemed relevant to our study. We developed a common question set for each stakeholder category that we interviewed. We based our interview questions on our literature review, research objectives, and the kind of information we were soliciting from each stakeholder category. In each interview, we asked follow-up questions based on the specific responses provided by interviewees. In our company interviews, we asked how companies administered retirement benefits for employees; company policies and procedures regarding separating employees and the disposition of their retirement accounts; company policies regarding plan loans, hardship withdrawals, and rollovers from other 401(k) plans; and company strategies to reduce early withdrawals from retirement savings. In our interviews with plan administrators, we asked about factors that led individuals to access their retirement savings early, how plan providers interacted with companies and separating employees, available data on loans and hardship withdrawals from client retirement plans, and potential strategies to reduce the incidence and amount of early withdrawals. In our interviews with retirement research experts, financial technology companies, participant advocacy organizations, and industry associations we asked about factors that led individuals to make early withdrawals from their retirement savings and any potential strategies that may reduce the incidence and amount of early withdrawals. In our interviews with plan administrators and retirement research experts, we also provided a supplementary table outlining 37 potential strategies to reduce early withdrawals from retirement savings. We asked interviewees to comment on the strengths and weaknesses of each strategy in terms of its potential to reduce early withdrawals, and gave them opportunity to provide other potential strategies not listed in the tables. We developed the list of strategies based on the results of our literature review. Some interviewees also provided us with additional data and documents to assist our research. For example, some companies and plan administrators we interviewed provided quantitative data on the number of plan participants, the average cashout or rollover amounts, the percentage of participants who took loans or hardship withdrawals from their retirement accounts, and known reasons for these withdrawals. Some research experts also provided us with documentation, including published articles and white papers that supplemented our interviews and literature review. All data collected through these methods are nongeneralizable and reflect the views and experiences of the respondents and not the entire population of their respective constituent groups. To answer our second and third objectives, we analyzed the content of our stakeholder interview responses and corroborated our analysis with information obtained from our literature review and quantitative information provided by our interviewees. To examine what is known about the factors leading individuals to access retirement savings early, we catalogued common factors that stakeholders identified as contributing to early withdrawals from retirement savings. We also collected information on plan rules governing early participant withdrawals of retirement savings. To identify potential strategies or policies that might reduce the incidence and amount of early withdrawals, we analyzed interview responses and catalogued (1) company practices that employers identified as having an effect in reducing early withdrawals and (2) strategies that stakeholders suggested that could achieve a similar outcome. GAO is not endorsing or recommending any strategy in this report, and has not evaluated these strategies for their behavioral or other effects on retirement savings or on tax revenues. Appendix II: Selected Provisions Related to Early Withdrawals from 401(k) Plans and Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) Requirements Provides an exception for distributions for qualified higher education expenses and for qualified “first-time” home purchases made before age 59½ from the additional 10 percent tax for early distributions Defines “qualified first-time homebuyer distribution” and “first-time homebuyer,” and prescribes the lifetime dollar limit on such distributions, among other things. Allows eligible individuals to make tax-deductible contributions to individual retirement accounts, subject to limits based, for example, on income and pension coverage. Provides for the loss of exemption for an IRA if the IRA owner engages in a prohibited transaction, which results in the IRA being treated as distributing all of its assets to the IRA owner at the fair market value on the first day of the year in which the transaction occurred. Defines a prohibited transaction to include the lending of money or other extension of credit between a plan and a disqualified person. Requirements Allows eligible individuals to make contributions to a Roth IRA that are not tax- deductible. Distributions from the account can generally be treated as a qualified distribution if a distribution is made on or after the Roth IRA owner reaches age 59½ and the distributions is made after the 5-taxable year period beginning when the account was initially opened. Defines a prohibited transaction to include the lending of money or other extension of credit between a plan and a disqualified person. Appendix III: Estimated Incidence of Certain Early Withdrawals of Retirement Savings 401(k) plans 401(k) plans ($1000 or more) 401(k) plans 401(k) plans ($1000 or more) 401(k) plans 401(k) plans ($1000 or more) Legend: * Sampling error was too large to report an estimate. In addition to the contact named above, Dave Lehrer (Assistant Director); Jonathan S. McMurray (Analyst-in-Charge); Gustavo O. Fernandez; Sean Miskell; Jeff Tessin; and Adam Wendel made key contributions to this report. James Bennett, Holly Dye, Sara Edmondson, Sarah Gilliland, Sheila R. McCoy, Ed Nannenhorn, Katya Rodriguez, MaryLynn Sergent, Linda Siegel, Rachel Stoiko, Frank Todisco, and Sonya Vartivarian also provided support. The Nation’s Fiscal Health: Action Is Needed to Address the Federal Government’s Future. GAO-18-299SP. Washington, D.C.: June 21, 2018. The Nation’s Retirement System: A Comprehensive Re-evaluation is Needed to Better Promote Future Retirement Security. GAO-18-111SP. Washington, D.C.: October 18, 2017. Retirement Security: Improved Guidance Could Help Account Owners Understand the Risks of Investing in Unconventional Assets. GAO-17-102. Washington, D.C.: December 8, 2016. 401K Plans: Effects of Eligibility and Vesting Policies on Workers’ Retirement Savings. GAO-17-69. Washington, D.C.: October 21, 2016. Retirement Security: Low Defined Contribution Savings May Pose Challenges. GAO-16-408. Washington, D.C.: May 5, 2016. Retirement Security: Shorter Life Expectancy Reduces Projected Lifetime Benefits for Lower Earners. GAO-16-354. Washington, D.C.: March 25, 2016. Social Security’s Future: Answers to Key Questions. GAO-16-75SP. Washington, D.C.: October 27, 2015. Retirement Security: Federal Action Could Help State Efforts to Expand Private Sector Coverage. GAO-15-556. Washington, D.C.: September 10, 2015. Highlights of a Forum: Financial Literacy: The Role of the Workplace. GAO-15-639SP. Washington, D.C.: July 7, 2015. 401(K) Plans: Greater Protections Needed for Forced Transfers and Inactive Accounts. GAO-15-73. Washington, D.C.: November 21, 2014. Older Americans: Inability to Repay Student Loans May Affect Financial Security of a Small Percentage of Retirees. GAO-14-866T. Washington, D.C.: September 10, 2014. Financial Literacy: Overview of Federal Activities, Programs, and Challenges. GAO-14-556T. Washington, D.C.: April 30, 2014. Retirement Security: Trends in Marriage and Work Patterns May Increase Economic Vulnerability for Some Retirees. GAO-14-33. Washington, D.C.: January 15, 2014. 401(K) Plans: Labor and IRS Could Improve the Rollover Process for Participants. GAO-13-30. Washington, D.C.: March 7, 2013. Retirement Security: Women Still Face Challenges. GAO-12-699. Washington, D.C.: July 19, 2012. 401(K) Plans: Policy Changes Could Reduce the Long-term Effects of Leakage on Workers’ Retirement Savings. GAO-09-715. Washington, D.C: August 28, 2009.	[ "Federal law encourages individuals to save for retirement through tax incentives for 401(k) plans and IRAs—the predominant forms of retirement savings in the United States. In 2017, U.S. plans and IRAs reportedly held investments worth nearly $17 trillion dollars. Federal law also allows individuals to withdraw assets from these accounts under certain circumstances. DOL and IRS oversee 401(k) plans, and collect annual plan data—including financial information—on the Form 5500. For both IRAs and 401(k) plans, GAO was asked to examine: (1) the incidence and amount of early withdrawals; (2) factors that might lead individuals to access retirement savings early; and (3) policies and strategies that might reduce the incidence and amounts of early withdrawals. To answer these questions, GAO analyzed data from IRS, the Census Bureau, and DOL from 2013 (the most recent complete data available); and interviewed a diverse range of stakeholders identified in the literature, including representatives of companies sponsoring 401(k) plans, plan administrators, subject matter experts, industry representatives, and participant advocates. In 2013 individuals in their prime working years (ages 25 to 55) removed at least $69 billion (+/- $3.5 billion) of their retirement savings early, according to GAO's analysis of 2013 Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and Department of Labor (DOL) data. Withdrawals from individual retirement accounts (IRA)—$39.5 billion (+/- $2.1 billion)—accounted for much of the money removed early, were equivalent to 3 percent (+/- 0.15 percent) of the age group's total IRA assets, and exceeded their IRA contributions in 2013. Participants in employer-sponsored plans, like 401(k) plans, withdrew at least $29.2 billion (+/- $2.8 billion) early as hardship withdrawals, lump sum payments made at job separation (known as cashouts), and loan balances that borrowers did not repay. Hardship withdrawals in 2013 were equivalent to about 0.5 percent (+/-0.06 percent) of the age group's total plan assets and about 8 percent (+/- 0.9 percent) of their contributions. However, the incidence and amount of certain unrepaid plan loans cannot be determined because the Form 5500—the federal government's primary source of information on employee benefit plans—does not capture these data. Stakeholders GAO interviewed identified flexibilities in plan rules and individuals' pressing financial needs, such as out-of-pocket medical costs, as factors affecting early withdrawals of retirement savings. Stakeholders said that certain plan rules, such as setting high minimum loan thresholds, may cause individuals to take out more of their savings than they need. Stakeholders also identified several elements of the job separation process affecting early withdrawals, such as difficulties transferring account balances to a new plan and plans requiring the immediate repayment of outstanding loans, as relevant factors. Stakeholders GAO interviewed suggested strategies they believed could balance early access to accounts with the need to build long-term retirement savings. For example, plan sponsors said allowing individuals to continue to repay plan loans after job separation, restricting participant access to plan sponsor contributions, allowing partial distributions at job separation, and building emergency savings features into plan designs, could help preserve retirement savings (see figure). However, they noted, each strategy involves tradeoffs, and the strategies' broader implications require further study. GAO recommends that, as part of revising the Form 5500, DOL and IRS require plan sponsors to report the incidence and amount of all 401(k) plan loans that are not repaid. DOL and IRS neither agreed nor disagreed with our recommendation." ]	9,536	gov_report	en	null	44232460c46051f14ff84126be1fa952a911c9d8bffee9d0
Historically located between empires, various Georgian kingdoms and principalities were incorporated into the Russian Empire beginning in the early 19 th century. Georgia enjoyed a brief period of independence from 1918 until its forcible incorporation into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR, or Soviet Union) in 1921-1922. Georgia gained independence in 1991 with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Georgia is located in the South Caucasus, a region between the Black and Caspian Seas and separated from Russia by the Greater Caucasus mountain range. The South Caucasus also borders Iran and Turkey (see Figure 1 ). Georgia's South Caucasus neighbors, Armenia and Azerbaijan, have been locked in territorial conflict for almost three decades over the predominantly Armenian-populated region of Nagorno-Karabakh, formally part of Azerbaijan. Georgia has its own unresolved conflicts with two Russian-supported regions, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. These regions, in addition to being settled by ethnic Georgians, are home to ethnic groups that more closely identify with ethnic kin in Russia's North Caucasus, located across the Caucasus mountain range. After a short war with Georgia in 2008, Russia unilaterally recognized the independence of these breakaway regions and stationed military forces on their territory. Georgians speak and write their own distinct Caucasian language, with a written literary form that emerged at least as early as the fifth century. The Georgian Orthodox Church, to which most Georgians belong, is autocephalous (independent), with roots that date back to the fourth century. Today, many observers consider Georgia to be one of the most democratic states among the USSR's successor states. The U.S.-based nongovernmental organization (NGO) Freedom House considers Georgia to be the freest post-Soviet state (not including the Baltic states), followed by Ukraine, Moldova, and Armenia. Georgia has a parliamentary system of governance, resulting from constitutional reforms that came into effect in 2013 and 2018. The prime minister is the country's most powerful executive. Georgia's president is commander in chief of the armed forces and has the power to veto legislation and dissolve parliament under certain circumstances. Georgia's prime minister, Mamuka Bakhtadze (aged 36), assumed office in June 2018. Bakhtadze was Georgia's minister of finance from November 2017 to June 2018; he previously served as the head of Georgian Railways and the Georgian International Energy Corporation. Georgia's president, elected in November 2018, is Salome Zurabishvili (aged 67), a former member of parliament (2016-2018) and minister of foreign affairs (2004-2005) who was previously a French national and diplomat. The parliamentary chairman is Irakli Kobakhidze (aged 40), a former professor of law and politics. Georgia has a unicameral legislature with 150 members elected for four-year terms by two methods: 77 by party list and 73 by majoritarian district. The most recent parliamentary elections in 2016 resulted in a sizeable win for Georgia's center-left ruling party, Georgian Dream-Democratic Georgia (GD), which initially led a ruling coalition after coming to power in 2012 and now governs alone. GD won 49% of the party list vote and nearly all majoritarian races, leading to control of more than 75% of parliamentary seats (116 of 150 deputies). Before losing this supermajority in February 2019 (see " Ruling Party Tensions " below), GD had enough votes to unilaterally enact changes to Georgia's constitution. This led many observers and opposition supporters to express concern that there were insufficient checks and balances against the ruling party. GD's main competitor in 2016 was the center-right United National Movement (UNM), the former ruling party previously led by ex-president Mikheil Saakashvili. The UNM received 27% of the party vote and 27 seats (18%). After months of infighting, the UNM fragmented in 2017, and most of its deputies, including much of the party's senior leadership, formed a new opposition party called European Georgia-Movement for Liberty. A third electoral bloc, the nationalist-conservative Alliance of Patriots of Georgia-United Opposition, cleared the 5% threshold to enter parliament with six seats. Georgia's most recent local elections were in 2017. They provided a similar picture of ruling party dominance across the country. In the party-list portion of the vote to local councils, GD won in all 73 districts, with a total of 56% of the vote. The UNM and European Georgia won 27% of the vote (17% and 10%, respectively). The nationalist-conservative Alliance of Patriots won 7%. GD won more than 92% of majoritarian seats, giving it a total of 77% of seats in local councils nationwide. GD also won mayoral elections in all but two districts. The most recent presidential elections were held in two rounds in October and November 2018. The victor, Salome Zurabishvili, won 60% of the vote in the second round. Zurabishvili ran as an independent candidate, although she was supported by GD. UNM candidate Grigol Vashadze, like Zurabishvili an ex-foreign minister, received 40%. The first round of the election was a closer race (39% to 38%), but Zurabishvili appeared to benefit from greater turnout in the runoff (56%, compared to 46% in the first round). Domestic and international observers considered the election to be competitive but flawed. Observers noted instances of official pressure against state employees to support Zurabishvili, as well as incidents of ballot box stuffing. They also expressed concern about allegations of mass vote-buying, related to Prime Minister Bakhtadze's pre-runoff announcement that a philanthropic foundation associated with GD founder and chairman Bidzina Ivanishvili had agreed to purchase and forgive the small private debts of more than 600,000 individuals. The U.S. Department of State said it shared the concerns of observers and indicated "these actions are not consistent with Georgia's commitment to fully fair and transparent elections." Since 2018, GD has exhibited signs of internal tension. Many observers believe that GD founder Ivanishvili continued to maintain an influential behind-the-scenes role in government after stepping down as prime minister in 2013. Ivanishvili formally returned to politics as GD's party chairman in 2018, reportedly due to frustration with the party's growing internal divides. Then-Prime Minister Giorgi Kvirikashvili resigned less than two months later, citing "disagreements" with Ivanishvili. Kvirikashvili's resignation also followed a series of anti-government demonstrations against what protestors perceived to be heavy-handed police raids and judicial bias. Prime Minister Bakhtadze succeeded Kvirikashvili in June 2018. More recently, GD suffered parliamentary defections in February 2019, as a result of a dispute concerning judicial appointments (see " Dispute over Judicial Reforms " below). By the end of March 2019, eight members of parliament, led by Eka Beselia, former chairwoman of the parliamentary committee on legal affairs, had left GD. Beselia and most of the defecting MPs were expected to establish a new faction, while two MPs joined the Patriots of Georgia faction. The GD government also has had tense relations with the presidency. Ex-President Giorgi Margvelashvili, who was elected in 2013, initially was allied to GD. He subsequently adopted a more independent stance and fell out of favor with then-Prime Minister Ivanishvili. Margvelashvili frequently criticized the government and vetoed legislation several times, although parliament usually overrode his veto. Margvelashvili chose not to run for reelection in 2018. For the 2018 election, GD did not nominate its own presidential candidate. This possibly reflected a belief within the party leadership that the powers of the presidency were too limited to warrant fielding a candidate for the position. After some deliberation, however, GD decided to support Zurabishvili, an independent candidate. Before making this decision, government officials had criticized Zurabishvili for comments she made on the 10 th anniversary of the August 2008 war that appeared to blame Georgia's ex-leadership for the war. One of the government's internal disputes concerns judicial reform. A series of reforms from 2013 to 2017 restructured Georgia's judicial institutions. A High Council of Justice oversees the appointment and dismissal of judges. The council has 15 members, a majority of whom are selected by the Conference of Judges, the judiciary's self-governing body. In December 2018, several GD members of parliament criticized the High Council's decision to nominate several judges to Georgia's 28-seat Supreme Court whom they considered tainted by association with the UNM. The dispute sparked an intensive debate within the ruling party, as well as with some NGOs who sided with the dissenting GD members out of a concern that the nominated judges could be susceptible to corruption. Ultimately, the Supreme Court nominees withdrew their candidacies. GD's leadership agreed to further debate the rules of appointment and blamed the dispute on the opposition. Appointments to a nine-member Constitutional Court are divided between the parliament, president, and the Supreme Court. In recent years, the Constitutional Court has been the focus of various disputes concerning possible bias (sometimes against the government, other times against the opposition). In July 2018, the Constitutional Court received international attention for ruling that marijuana use was not a criminal offense, a decision government officials and church representatives heavily criticized. In response, parliament passed legislation imposing strict limitations on marijuana use. After GD won a supermajority in 2016, Georgia's parliament convened a State Constitutional Commission to draft additional reforms to the constitution intended to consolidate Georgia's transition to a parliamentary system of governance. Parliament passed the reforms in September 2017 by a vote of 117-2. Opposition parties, who opposed certain measures that appeared to strengthen the ruling party, refused to participate in the vote; civil society organizations also registered opposition. Then-President Margvelashvili vetoed the amendments and proposed alternative reforms. Parliament overrode his veto, and the president signed the amendments into law. The constitutional reforms entered into force after the 2018 presidential election. The reforms affect Georgia's parliamentary system in several ways. One of the main changes is the abolition of Georgia's directly elected presidency beginning in 2023. Instead, the president is to be indirectly elected by a college of electors made up of parliamentary deputies and local government representatives. Another major change is that parliamentary elections are to be held entirely on the basis of party lists, eliminating single-member districts. In theory, this change is expected to lead to greater opposition representation in parliament, as in Georgia parties that win the party-list vote tend to overwhelmingly win single-member districts. Although this change was to take effect in 2020, parliament voted to push back its implementation to 2024, a move many observers interpreted as an attempt to prolong the ruling party's dominance. In January 2019, several opposition parties launched a petition to pressure the government to implement the shift to a fully proportional system in advance of the 2020 parliamentary elections. In the course of adopting constitutional reforms, parliament considered several recommendations of the Council of Europe's Venice Commission, a legal and democratic advisory body. In the end, the commission provided a "positive assessment" of the reforms, although it noted "the postponement of the entry into force of the proportional election system to October 2024 is highly regrettable and a major obstacle to reaching consensus." The Venice Commission said the reform "completes the evolution of Georgia's political system towards a parliamentary system and constitutes a positive step towards the consolidation and improvement of the country's constitutional order, based on the principles of democracy, the rule of law and the protection of fundamental rights." For more than two decades, Georgia has been recovering from the severe economic decline it experienced after the Soviet Union collapsed. It remains a relatively poor country. In 2018, Georgia's GDP was around $16.7 billion (approximately 16 times less than that of Connecticut, a U.S. state with a similar population size). Its per capita GDP ($4,506) is midsized in comparison to Russia and other post-Soviet states. In 2017-2018, Georgia's economy appeared to enter a period of relatively strong growth. After average GDP growth of around 3% a year from 2013 to 2016, Georgia's GDP grew at 4.8% a year in 2017 and 2018. Increased economic growth has been based on strengthening domestic consumption and external demand, as well as "generally strong policy efforts," according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The IMF forecasts a sustained rate of GDP growth of around 4.9% annually from 2019 to 2021. In February 2019, the IMF commended Georgian authorities "for advancing structural reforms [but] stressed the need for continued efforts to promote inclusive growth and higher economic resilience to external shocks." Poverty has declined in recent years, although it is still relatively high. According to official data, 22% of the population lived in poverty in 2017 (down from 39% a decade before). In recent years, recorded unemployment has been around 14%; some surveys suggest a higher rate of unemployment. More than 40% of Georgian laborers work in agriculture, a sector of the economy that accounts for less than 10% of GDP. Georgia's economy depends in part on remittances from labor migration. From 2013 to 2017, remittances made up around 11% of Georgia's GDP. In 2017, Russia was estimated to be the source of almost 60% of Georgian remittances, followed by Ukraine (8%), Greece (5%), and Armenia (4%). In 2017, the IMF approved a three-year Extended Fund Facility arrangement to provide Georgia with around $285 million in loans to support economic reforms focusing, among other things, on financial stability and infrastructure investment. The IMF noted the need for Georgia to increase its agricultural productivity, improve its business environment, and reform its education system. Georgia has suffered in the past from energy shortages and gas cutoffs, but it has improved its energy security in recent years. Georgia has rehabilitated hydropower plants and constructed new ones. Nearly all its natural gas supplies come from neighboring Azerbaijan. In 2018, Georgia's three largest merchandise trading partners were Turkey ($1.7 billion, or 14% of Georgia's trade), Russia ($1.4 billion, 11%), Azerbaijan ($1.1 billion, 9%), and China ($1.0 billion, 8%). Trade with the European Union (EU), as a whole Georgia's largest trading partner, made up around 27% of total trade ($3.4 billion). More than half of Georgia's merchandise exports (51%) went to five countries: Azerbaijan, Russia, Armenia, Bulgaria, and Turkey. Its main exports were copper ores, beverages (wine, water, and spirits), motor vehicles, and iron and steel. Free trade agreements with the EU (signed in 2014) and China (signed in 2017) may improve Georgia's prospects for export-led growth. Georgia is also exploring a trade agreement with India. However, Georgia's manufacturing sector is small, and its top exports include used foreign cars and scrap metal, which provide low added value. The IMF indicates that Georgia could further diversify its agricultural exports but notes the need to improve quality and standards. Tourism to Georgia has increased in recent years and annual tourism-related income has more than quadrupled since 2010. In 2018, the number of international visitors who stayed in the country overnight was around 4.8 million, a 345% increase since 2010. Most tourists are from neighboring countries: Russia, Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Armenia. In recent years, foreign direct investment (FDI) appears to have exceeded the high levels Georgia enjoyed in 2006 to 2008, before the global financial crisis, when FDI averaged $1.5 billion a year. From 2014 to 2018, FDI averaged $1.64 billion a year. More than 60% of the total amount came from Azerbaijan, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and Turkey. During this period, most FDI was in transport and communications (28%); other leading sectors were finance (13%), construction (13%), and energy (10%). In 2017, the IMF noted that attracting FDI to sectors with high export potential, including tourism and agriculture, is "crucial to ensure growth in foreign markets." Georgia aspires to be a key transit hub for the growing East-West overland trade route between China and Europe. In pursuit of this goal, a U.S.-Georgian consortium is constructing a major new deepwater port and free industrial zone in Anaklia, which is located on Georgia's Black Sea coast and abuts the Russian-occupied region of Abkhazia. The port, scheduled to begin operations in 2021, is considered Georgia's largest-ever infrastructure investment and is to be accompanied by major government investments in Georgia's road and rail infrastructure. The Georgian government has long made closer integration with the EU and NATO a priority. According to recent polls, over 80% of the Georgian population supports membership in the EU and over 75% supports membership in NATO. In 2014, Georgia concluded an association agreement with the EU that included a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) and encouraged harmonization with EU laws and regulations. The EU granted Georgia visa-free travel in 2017. The EU also is a major provider of foreign aid to Georgia, providing on average over €120 million (around $135 million) a year in 2017 and 2018. As of 2018, the benefits of the EU free-trade agreement for Georgia remain unclear. In 2018, the total value of Georgian exports to the EU was 17% greater than in 2014. Exports to the EU as a share of Georgia's total exports, however, were the same in 2018 as they were in 2014 (22%). The EU asserts that Georgia is "reaping the benefits of economic integration" with the EU but notes that "further efforts are needed to stimulate exports and improve the trade balance." Georgia has close relations with NATO, which considers Georgia one of its "closest operational partners." A NATO-Georgia Commission, established in 2008, provides the framework for cooperation. At its 2014 Wales Summit, NATO leaders established a "Substantial NATO-Georgia Package" to help Georgia bolster its defense capabilities, including capacity-building, training, exercises, and enhanced interoperability. In 2015, Georgia joined the NATO Response Force, a rapid reaction force. Georgia is one of the top troop contributors (and the top non-NATO contributor) in the NATO-led Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan. At its height, Georgia's deployment to NATO's previous International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) reached over 1,500 troops, who served with no operational caveats. As of December 2018, Georgia is the fifth-largest contributor to the Resolute Support Mission, with 870 troops. Georgia also contributed more than 2,250 troops to the NATO-led Kosovo Force, or KFOR, between 1999 and 2008. In 2015, NATO opened a Joint Training and Evaluation Center in Georgia to provide training, evaluation, and certification opportunities to enhance interoperability and operational readiness. The center hosted its second joint NATO-Georgia exercise in March 2019 (the first one was held in 2016). Some NATO member states also participate in two sets of annual U.S.-Georgia military exercises: Agile Spirit and Noble Partner (see " Security Assistance Since the August 2008 War ," below). NATO also has established a Defense Institution Building School for professional development and training. Many observers consider that closer integration with the EU and NATO has not enabled Georgia to improve its near-term prospects for membership in these organizations. The EU is unlikely to consider Georgia a candidate for membership soon, given the EU's internal challenges and a lack of support for enlargement among many members. In 2008, NATO members agreed that Georgia and Ukraine would become members of NATO, but Georgia has not been granted a NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP) or other clear path to membership. Many observers attribute Georgia's lack of a clear path to NATO membership to some members' concerns that Georgia's membership could lead to a heightened risk of war with Russia, which currently occupies around 18% of Georgia's territory. Many believe that NATO will not move forward with membership as long as Russia occupies Georgian territory and the conflict remains unresolved. Georgia's secessionist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia broke away from Georgia in the early 1990s, during and after Georgia's pursuit of independence from the USSR. Since then, Georgia's relations with Russia have been difficult, as Tbilisi has blamed Moscow for obstructing Georgia's Western leanings. Many observers believe that Moscow supports Abkhazia and South Ossetia to prevent Georgia from joining NATO. Georgia's relations with Russia worsened after ex-President Saakashvili came to power in 2003 and sought to accelerate Georgia's integration with the West. After clashes increased between Georgian and secessionist forces, Russia invaded Georgia in August 2008 to prevent Georgia from reestablishing control over South Ossetia. Russia subsequently recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states. Over the last decade, Russia has tightened control over Abkhazia and South Ossetia. It has constructed border fencing and imposed transit restrictions across the administrative boundary lines dividing the two regions from the rest of Georgia. Russia has established military bases that reportedly house around 3,500 personnel each, and it also stations border guards in the two regions. In 2016, Russia finalized an agreement with the de facto authorities of Abkhazia, establishing a combined group of military forces. In 2017, Russia concluded an agreement with South Ossetia to integrate the breakaway region's military forces with its own. Since coming to power in 2012, the GD government has sought to improve relations with Russia, particularly economic ties. In 2013, Moscow lifted an embargo on popular Georgian exports (including wine and mineral water) that had been in place since 2006. As a result, Russia again became one of Georgia's main trading partners. The share of Georgia's merchandise exports to Russia as a percentage of its total exports rose from 2% in 2012 to 13% in 2018. Improved economic relations with Russia have not led to progress in resolving the conflicts over Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The EU leads an unarmed civilian Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM) that monitors compliance with the cease-fire agreements that ended the August 2008 war. Although the EUMM's mandate covers all of Georgia, local and Russian authorities do not permit it to operate in Abkhazia and South Ossetia; EUMM representatives have been allowed to cross the boundary line on a few occasions to address specific issues. All parties to the conflict, together with the United States, the EU, the United Nations (U.N.), and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), participate in the Geneva International Discussions, convened quarterly to address issues related to the conflict. They also participate in joint Incident Prevention and Response Mechanisms (IPRM), together with the U.N. and OSCE, designed to address local security issues and build confidence. Abkhaz and South Ossetian representatives periodically have suspended their participation in the IPRM, however; the IPRM for Abkhazia did not convene at all from 2012 to 2016. In general, efforts to rebuild ties across conflict lines or return internally displaced persons have made little progress. In 2018, the Georgian government unveiled a peace initiative and enacted related legislative amendments to facilitate greater engagement with Abkhazia and South Ossetia in trade and educational affairs. The United States and the EU have expressed support for this initiative. Whether Russia and the two regions will accept any of the initiative's elements remains to be seen. Improved relations with Russia do not appear to have led to greater public support in Georgia for closer integration with Russia. Several overtly pro-Russian parties performed poorly in the 2016 parliamentary elections. One electoral bloc critical of Georgia's European integration, the nationalist-conservative Alliance of Patriots, cleared the 5% threshold to enter parliament, but even this bloc's leadership did not campaign for membership in the Russia-led Eurasian Union. In a 2018 survey, less than 30% of respondents expressed support for joining the Eurasian Union. Georgia is one of the United States' closest partners among the post-Soviet states. With a history of strong economic aid and security cooperation, the United States and Georgia have deepened their strategic partnership since Russia's 2008 invasion of Georgia and 2014 invasion of Ukraine. A U.S.-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership, signed in 2009, provides the framework for much of the two countries' bilateral engagement. A Strategic Partnership Commission convenes annual plenary sessions and working groups to address political, economic, security, and people-to-people issues. Before the 2008 war, the United States supported granting Georgia a NATO Membership Action Plan and backed NATO's April 2008 pledge that Georgia eventually would become a member of NATO. In August 2017, U.S. Vice President Michael Pence said in Tbilisi that the Trump Administration "stand[s] by the 2008 NATO Bucharest statement, which made it clear that Georgia will one day become a member of NATO." At a press conference after the July 2018 NATO summit in Brussels, President Trump said that "at a certain point [Georgia will] have a chance" to join NATO, if "not right now." U.S. policy expressly supports Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity. In a visit to Tbilisi in August 2017, Vice President Michael Pence said the United States "strongly condemns Russia's occupation on Georgia's soil." In January 2018, the State Department indicated that "the United States' position on Abkhazia and South Ossetia is unwavering: The United States fully supports Georgia's territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders." The United States supports a resolution to the conflict within these parameters. The United States calls on Russia to comply with the terms of the 2008 cease-fire agreement, including withdrawal of its forces to prewar positions, and to reverse its recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states. The U.S. government has expressed support for Georgia's "commitment to dialogue and a peaceful resolution to the conflict," and in 2018 the State Department welcomed the new peace initiative that the government of Georgia unveiled. The State Department regularly participates in the Geneva International Discussions. Congress also has expressed firm support for Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017 ( P.L. 115-44 , Title II, §253) states that the United States "supports the policy known as the 'Stimson Doctrine' and thus does not recognize territorial changes effected by force, including the illegal invasions and occupations" of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and other territories occupied by Russia. As with previous appropriations, FY2019 foreign operations appropriations prohibit foreign assistance to governments that recognize Abkhazia or South Ossetia and restrict funds from supporting Russia's occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia ( P.L. 116-6 , §7047(c)). The 2014 Ukraine Freedom Support Act ( P.L. 113-272 ) provides for sanctions against Russian entities that transfer weapons to Georgian territory. In February 2019, the Georgia Support Act ( H.R. 598 ) was reintroduced in the House. The act originally passed the House by unanimous consent in December 2018, during the 115 th Congress. The act would express support for Georgia's sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity, as well as for its democratic development, Euro-Atlantic and European integration, and peaceful conflict resolution. The act would require the Secretary of State to submit to Congress reports on U.S. security assistance to Georgia, U.S.-Georgia cybersecurity cooperation, and a strategy to enhance Georgia's capabilities to combat Russian disinformation and propaganda. The act also would require the President to impose sanctions on those responsible for serious human rights abuses in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Many Members of Congress have expressed their support for Georgia in House and Senate resolutions. In September 2016, during the 114 th Congress, the House of Representatives passed H.Res. 660, which expressed support for Georgia's territorial integrity, in a 410-6 vote. The resolution condemned Russia's military intervention and occupation, called upon Russia to withdraw its recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states, and urged the U.S. government to declare unequivocally that the United States will not recognize Russia's de jure or de facto sovereignty over any part of Georgia under any circumstances. In January 2019, a resolution (H.Res. 93) was reintroduced in the House supporting Georgia's territorial integrity and condemning a decision by the Syrian government to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states. The Senate and House have passed other resolutions in support of Georgian sovereignty and territorial integrity: in 2011-2012 ( S.Res. 175 , H.Res. 526), in September 2008 ( S.Res. 690 ), and, before the conflict, in May-June 2008 (H.Res. 1166, S.Res. 550 ) and December 2007 ( S.Res. 391 ). Georgia has long been a leading recipient of U.S. foreign and military aid in Europe and Eurasia. In the 1990s (FY1992-FY2000), the U.S. government provided over $860 million in total aid to Georgia ($96 million a year on average). In the later part of the decade, the United States began to provide Georgia with increased amounts of aid to improve border and maritime security and to combat transnational crime, including through the development of Georgia's Coast Guard. In the 2000s, Georgia became the largest per capita recipient of U.S. aid in Europe and Eurasia. From FY2001 to FY2007, total aid to Georgia amounted to over $945 million ($135 million a year, on average). In 2005, Georgia also was awarded an initial five-year (2006-2011) $295 million grant from the U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) for road, pipeline, and municipal infrastructure rehabilitation, as well as for agribusiness development. The United States gave increased amounts of military aid to Georgia after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. At the time, the George W. Bush Administration considered Georgia part of a "second stage" in the "war on terror," together with Yemen and the Philippines, and supported Georgia with a two-year Train and Equip Program. This program was followed by a Sustainment and Stability Operations Program through 2007 that supported a Georgian troop deployment to Operation Iraqi Freedom. After Russia invaded Georgia in August 2008, the United States substantially increased its assistance to Georgia. The U.S. government immediately provided over $38 million in humanitarian aid and emergency relief, using U.S. aircraft and naval and coast guard ships. In September 2008, then-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice announced a total aid package worth at least $1 billion. Total U.S. assistance to Georgia for FY2008-FY2009 amounted to $1.04 billion, which included $250 million in direct budgetary support and an additional $100 million in MCC funds (taking the total amount of Georgia's initial MCC grant to $395 million). Since the 2008 war, Georgia has continued to be a major recipient of U.S. foreign aid in the Europe and Eurasia region. Nonmilitary aid totaled $60 million a year on average from FY2010 to FY2017. In addition, Georgia was awarded a second five-year (2014-2019) MCC grant of $140 million to support educational infrastructure and training, and to improve the study of science and technology. In FY2018, U.S. nonmilitary aid to Georgia totaled $70.8 million. For FY2019, Congress appropriated $89.8 million in nonmilitary aid. The president's FY2020 nonmilitary aid request for Georgia is $42.4 million. After the 2008 war, Georgia continued to receive U.S. military assistance, including around $144 million in postwar security and stabilization assistance in FY2008-FY2009. Since FY2010, Georgia has received further military assistance, primarily through Foreign Military Financing (FMF) aid, Coalition Support Funds, and Train and Equip and other capacity-building programs. These funds have been used to support Georgia's deployments to Afghanistan in ISAF and the follow-on Resolute Support Mission, as well as for Georgian border security, counterterrorism, and defense readiness. U.S. military assistance to Georgia in FY2010-FY2017 is estimated to have been around $74 million a year on average. For FY2018, military aid to Georgia is estimated to have totaled $40.4 million. This includes $35 million in FMF assistance, $2 million in International Military Education and Training (IMET), and $3.4 million for counter-weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capacity-building assistance. For FY2019, Congress again appropriated $35 million in FMF and $2 million in IMET funds. Additional defense funding includes $4.3 million in maritime capacity-building assistance and $2.5 million in counter-WMD capacity-building assistance. Outside of Afghanistan, the United States has gradually deepened its postwar defense cooperation with Georgia. The Obama Administration refrained from approving defensive (anti-tank and antiaircraft) arms sales to Georgia. Observers considered various reasons for this hesitation, including doubts regarding the deterrent effect of such weapons, concerns about encouraging potential Georgian offensives to retake territory, and a desire to avoid worsening relations with Russia as the Administration embarked on a new "reset" policy with Moscow. In testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee a year after Russia's invasion, then-Assistant Secretary of Defense Alexander Vershbow characterized U.S. defense cooperation with Georgia as "a methodical, yet patient, strategic approach … [focused] on building defense institutions, assisting defense sector reform, and building the strategic and educational foundations" for training and reform. He said the United States was "carefully examining each step [of its military assistance program] to ensure it would not be counterproductive to our goals of promoting peace and stability in the region." U.S.-Georgia defense cooperation deepened over time. In a 2012 visit to Georgia, then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said that increased cooperation would help improve Georgia's self-defense capabilities, promote defense reform and modernization, and provide training and equipment to support Georgia's ISAF deployment and NATO interoperability. U.S.-Georgia security cooperation expanded further in 2016. In July 2016, then-U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and then-Georgian Prime Minister Giorgi Kvirikashvili signed a Memorandum on Deepening the Defense and Security Relationship between the United States and Georgia. In December 2016, the two countries concluded a three-year framework agreement on security cooperation that would focus on "improving Georgia's defense capabilities, establishing [an] effective and sustainable system of defense, enhancing interoperability of the Georgian Armed Forces with NATO, and ensuring effective military management." The framework agreement led to the launching in February 2017 of a three-year, $35 million training initiative, the Georgia Defense Readiness Program. This initiative seeks to build the capacity of Georgia's armed forces "to generate, train and sustain forces in preparation for all national missions." Unlike the Obama Administration, the Trump Administration approved the provision of major defensive lethal weaponry to Georgia. In November 2017, the U.S. State Department approved a Foreign Military Sale of over 400 Javelin portable anti-tank missiles, as well as launchers, associated equipment, and training, at a total estimated cost of $75 million. The Georgian Ministry of Defense confirmed that the "first stage" of two sales was complete as of January 2018. In June 2018, then-U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Wess Mitchell said the United States seeks to "check Russian aggression," including by "building up the means of self-defense for those states most directly threatened by Russia militarily: Ukraine and Georgia." The United States and Georgia have held annual joint military exercises in Georgia since 2011. Initial exercises, dubbed Agile Spirit, began as a counterinsurgency and peacekeeping operations training exercise and shifted to a "conventional warfare focus" in 2015, the year after Russia's invasion of Ukraine. That year, Agile Spirit began to include other NATO partners. A second bilateral exercise, Noble Partner, was launched in 2015; the Department of Defense characterized it as the "most robust" U.S.-Georgia exercise ever, designed to support Georgia's integration into the NATO Response Force. In 2018, the United States was Georgia's seventh-largest source of merchandise imports and eighth-largest destination for exports. The value of Georgia's merchandise imports from the United States—mainly vehicles, industrial machinery, and meat—was $360 million in 2018. The value of merchandise exports to the United States—mainly iron and steel and inorganic chemicals—was $160 million in 2018. Since 2012, the United States and Georgia periodically have discussed the possibility of a free-trade agreement. The two countries have signed a bilateral investment treaty and a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement. They also have established a High-Level Dialogue on Trade and Investment. During Vice President Michael Pence's August 2017 visit to Georgia, he expressed the United States' "keen interest in expanding our trade and investment relationship with Georgia."	[ "Georgia is one of the United States' closest partners among the states that gained their independence after the USSR collapsed in 1991. With a history of strong economic aid and security cooperation, the United States has deepened its strategic partnership with Georgia since Russia's 2008 invasion of Georgia and 2014 invasion of Ukraine. U.S. policy expressly supports Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders, and Georgia is a leading recipient of U.S. aid to Europe and Eurasia. Many observers consider Georgia to be one of the most democratic states in the post-Soviet region, even as the country faces ongoing governance challenges. The center-left Georgian Dream-Democratic Georgia party (GD) has close to a three-fourths supermajority in parliament and governs with limited checks and balances. Although Georgia faces high rates of poverty and underemployment, its economy in 2017 and 2018 appeared to show stronger growth than it had in the previous four years. The GD led a coalition to victory in parliamentary elections in 2012 amid growing dissatisfaction with the former ruling party, Mikheil Saakashvili's center-right United National Movement, which came to power as a result of Georgia's 2003 Rose Revolution. In August 2008, Russia went to war with Georgia to prevent Saakashvili's government from reestablishing control over the regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which broke away from Georgia in the early 1990s and became informal Russian protectorates. Congress has expressed firm support for Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017 (P.L. 115-44, Title II, §253) states that the United States \"does not recognize territorial changes effected by force, including the illegal invasions and occupations\" of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and other territories occupied by Russia. In September 2016, the House of Representatives passed H.Res. 660, which condemns Russia's military intervention and occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In February 2019, the Georgia Support Act (H.R. 598), which originally passed the House by unanimous consent in the 115th Congress (H.R. 6219), was reintroduced in the 116th Congress. The act would express support for Georgia's sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity, as well as for its democratic development, Euro-Atlantic integration, and peaceful conflict resolution in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The United States provides substantial foreign and military aid to Georgia each year. Since 2010, U.S. nonmilitary aid to Georgia has totaled around $64 million a year on average, in addition to a five-year Millennium Challenge Corporation grant of $140 million to support education. In FY2019, Congress appropriated almost $90 million in nonmilitary aid to Georgia. Since 2010, U.S. military aid to Georgia has been estimated at around $68 million a year on average. In FY2019, Congress appropriated $35 million in Foreign Military Financing and $2 million in International Military Education and Training funds. Defense assistance also includes a three-year, $35 million training initiative, the Georgia Defense Readiness Program." ]	5,816	gov_report	en	null	1ab8b8752432e8ec7a89868dfe98842bf6c5ce6c96760fd8
Spinal cord injuries are complex, lifelong injuries that typically result from acute traumatic damage to the spinal cord or nerves within the spinal column. In spinal cord injury patients, certain nervous system functions may be impaired temporarily or permanently lost, depending on the level and severity of the patient’s injury. In addition to lower level nervous system functioning, spinal cord injury patients may develop secondary medical complications that can further decrease functional independence and quality of life, including, but not limited to: Autonomic dysreflexia: a condition that may result in life threatening hypertension—high blood pressure—due to impaired nervous system response, below the level of spinal cord injury. Depression: a medical mood disorder—commonly affecting about one in five spinal cord injury patients—that can cause physical and psychological symptoms (including changes in sleep and appetite, and thoughts of death or suicide). Impaired bowel and bladder functioning: potential inability to move waste through the colon and control, stop or release, urine—which can lead to other life-threatening illnesses (such as autonomic dysreflexia) and/or infections. Pressure ulcers: a common complication affecting up to 80 percent of spinal cord injury patients that results from an area of the skin or underlying tissue that is damaged due to decreased blood flow, which can occur after extended periods of inactive sitting or lying, among other ways. Pressure ulcers—also known as pressure sores or wounds—can occur years after initial injury and may also result in life- threatening infections or amputation. Spasticity: a common condition that affects 65 to 78 percent of spinal cord injury patients and can result in symptoms ranging from mild muscle stiffness to severe, uncontrollable leg movements. Syringomyelia: a rare disorder that occurs when cerebrospinal fluid— normally found outside of the spinal cord and brain—enters the interior of the spinal cord to form a cyst known as a syrinx. This cyst expands and elongates over time, destroying the center of the spinal cord. Symptoms can develop slowly and can include numbness, pain, effects on bowel and bladder function, or paralysis. While this condition can occur as a result of a trauma, such as a spinal cord injury, the majority of cases are associated with a complex brain abnormality. Acquired brain injuries occur after birth and are not hereditary, congenital, degenerative, or a result of birth trauma. Acquired brain injuries result in changes to the brain’s neuronal activity, which can affect the physical integrity, metabolic activity, or functional ability of nerve cells in the brain. Acquired brain injuries can be either non-traumatic or traumatic in nature: non-traumatic brain injuries are caused by an internal force—such as in the case of stroke, tumors, or drowning—and traumatic brain injuries are caused by an external force—such as in the case of car accidents, gunshot wounds, or falls. The severity of brain injury can often result in changes to physical, behavioral, and/or cognitive functioning. For example, according to one source, nearly 50 percent of all people with a traumatic brain injury experience depression within the first year after injury, and nearly two-thirds experience depression within 7 years post- injury. Depression can develop as a result of physical changes in the brain, emotional response to the injury, and other unrelated factors—such as family history. Due to impaired cognitive functioning, traumatic brain injury patients may also experience difficulty communicating, concentrating, and processing and understanding information. Acute care hospitals and LTCHs are paid under different Medicare payment systems by law. Acute care hospitals are paid under the inpatient prospective payment system (IPPS). LTCHs are paid under the LTCH PPS. Under both systems, Medicare classifies patients based on Medicare diagnosis groups, which organize patients based on their conditions and the care they receive. Medicare payments for LTCHs are typically higher than payments for acute care hospitals, to reflect the average resources required to treat Medicare beneficiaries who need long-term care. Traditionally, all LTCH discharges were paid at the LTCH PPS standard federal payment rate. The Pathway for SGR Reform Act of 2013 modified the LTCH PPS by establishing a two-tiered payment system— such that certain LTCH discharges continue to be paid at the standard rate and others are paid at a generally lower, site-neutral rate. In its March 2013 report, MedPAC described concerns regarding growth in the number of LTCHs and the extent to which some of their patients may otherwise be treated appropriately in less costly settings. To continue to be eligible for the standard rate, the discharge must generally have a preceding acute care hospital stay with either an intensive care unit stay of at least 3 days or an assigned diagnosis group based on the receipt of at least 96 hours of mechanical ventilation services in the LTCH, unless an exception applies. Discharges that do not qualify for the standard rate are to receive a blended site-neutral rate—equal to 50 percent of the site-neutral rate and 50 percent of the standard rate—for discharges in cost reporting periods beginning in fiscal years 2016 through 2019, and the full site-neutral rate for discharges in cost reporting periods beginning in fiscal year 2020. Beginning with cost reporting periods in fiscal year 2020, if fewer than half of an LTCH’s discharges meet the statutory requirements to be paid at the standard rate, the LTCH will no longer receive any payments at that rate for discharges in future cost reporting periods until eligibility for receiving payments under that rate is reinstated. Under this scenario, all discharges in succeeding cost reporting periods would be paid at the generally lower rate that an acute care hospital would receive for providing comparable care until eligibility for receiving payments at the standard rate is reinstated. According to officials from HHS, the department intends to establish a process for how hospitals would have their eligibility for receiving payments at the standard rate reinstated as part of the fiscal year 2020 rule-making cycle. Since the two qualifying hospitals are currently only excepted from the statutory two-tiered payment structure for cost reporting periods beginning during fiscal years 2018 and 2019, these two hospitals must also meet the statutory 50 percent threshold in fiscal year 2020 and beyond in order to receive the standard rate for any future discharges until reinstated. See table 1 for more information on Medicare’s LTCH PPS payment policies. Two LTCHs have qualified for the temporary exception to site-neutral payments, according to CMS officials. Craig Hospital is a private, not-for- profit facility that has specialized in medical treatment, research, and rehabilitation for patients with spinal cord and brain injury since 1956. Craig Hospital is classified as an LTCH for the purposes of Medicare payment, and is licensed as a general hospital by the state of Colorado— which does not have separate designations for LTCHs. Craig Hospital has been selected as one of 14 NIDILRR Spinal Cord Injury Model Systems and one of 16 Traumatic Brain Injury Model Systems and is accredited by the Joint Commission. Shepherd Center is a private, not-for-profit facility that specializes in medical treatment, research, and rehabilitation for people with traumatic spinal cord injury and brain injury—as well as neuromuscular disorders, including multiple sclerosis. Shepherd Center is classified as an LTCH for the purposes of Medicare payment, and as a specialty hospital—which includes LTCHs—by the state of Georgia. Shepherd Center is also currently designated as a NIDILRR Spinal Cord Injury Model System and is accredited by the Joint Commission. Shepherd Center also has several CARF International accredited specialty programs. Specifically, it has CARF-accredited inpatient rehabilitation specialty programs in spinal cord injury and brain injury—for adults, children, and adolescents; and interdisciplinary outpatient medical rehabilitation specialty programs in spinal cord injury and brain injury—for adults, children, and adolescents, among others. More than half of the Medicare discharges in fiscal year 2013 at the two qualifying hospitals—43 of 75 at Craig Hospital and 47 of 88 at Shepherd Center—were within the diagnosis groups designated in section 15009(a) of the 21st Century Cures Act. (See table 2 below for more information.) Patients treated for these diagnosis groups may receive treatment for spinal disorders and injuries; medical back problems; degenerative nervous system disorders; skin grafts for skin ulcers; acquired brain injuries, such as traumatic brain injuries; or other significant traumas with major complicating and comorbid (simultaneous) conditions. Both qualifying hospitals have a variety of specialized inpatient and outpatient programs to help treat the complex health care needs of their patients, including those covered by Medicare. For example, both hospitals have wheelchair positioning clinics that can help prevent skin complications, such as pressure ulcers, that can occur in spinal cord patients. Both hospitals also have programs for those patients who need ventilator support such as diaphragmatic pacing—support for patients with respiratory problems whose diaphragm, lungs, and nerves have limited function—and ventilator weaning programs. In addition to clinical programs, both qualifying hospitals also provide transitional support, such as providing counseling and education to families of patients with these injuries. We found that most Medicare beneficiaries at the two qualifying hospitals need specialized services to manage the chronic, long-term effects of a catastrophic spinal cord or brain injury. Most of these patients are younger than 65 and ineligible for Medicare at the time of their initial injury, according to officials from the qualifying hospitals. Instead, according to officials, these patients typically become eligible for Medicare 2 years or more after their initial injury due to disability. Medicare beneficiaries at the two qualifying hospitals typically need care to manage comorbidities or the associated long-term complications of their injury. Officials from Craig Hospital said a significant number of their Medicare beneficiaries have comorbid conditions—such as diabetes or cardiac problems—upon admission, that can be further complicated by their injury. The officials said managing these comorbidities is as much of a medical challenge as managing the spinal or brain injury. Officials from both qualifying hospitals noted their Medicare beneficiaries who have a spinal cord or brain injury also frequently seek care after initial injury to address secondary complications resulting from their injury, including urinary tract infections; respiratory problems; and pressure ulcers. While the qualifying hospitals primarily treated traumatic spinal cord or brain injuries, we found that their Medicare populations differed from each other during the period from fiscal year 2013 to 2016. Specifically, Craig Hospital. Our review of Medicare claims data indicates more than 50 percent of the 246 Medicare discharges during this time were associated with Medicare diagnosis groups for spinal cord conditions. Specifically, during this time, Craig Hospital’s Medicare discharges were commonly assigned to three diagnosis groups covering spinal procedures and spinal disorders and injuries. For example, officials from Craig Hospital told us that about 60 percent of Medicare beneficiaries in fiscal year 2016 required surgical care for a spinal cord injury. According to officials, most of these patients received surgery for syringomyelia—a complication in spinal cord patients that generally develops years after their initial injury. These officials told us that Craig Hospital provided the pre- and post-operative care for those patients in fiscal year 2016; however, currently, Craig Hospital is only responsible for pre-operative assessments. The remaining 40 percent of their Medicare beneficiaries in fiscal year 2016 received care for new spinal cord injuries. Shepherd Center. Our review of Medicare claims data indicates the most common diagnosis group of the 365 Medicare discharges during this time—fiscal year 2013 to fiscal year 2016—related to treatment for skin grafts that can be associated with pressure ulcers, among other things. Shepherd Center officials confirmed that most of their Medicare beneficiaries received treatment for a pressure ulcer that occurred after initial injury which, as previously noted, can be so severe as to result in life-threatening infections. According to officials, most of their post-injury Medicare beneficiaries receive post-operative care and other wound management services following surgery to treat pressure ulcers, to ensure that the site will not tear again and to avoid reoccurrence. Other diagnosis groups for Medicare patients at Shepherd Center included those for spinal disorders and injuries and extensive operating room procedures unrelated to principal diagnosis. According to officials, beneficiaries in these diagnosis groups received treatment for a range of conditions, including traumatic injuries, urinary tract infections, neurogenic bladder and bowel or respiratory complications. Officials told us the hospital also served Medicare beneficiaries recovering from other acquired brain injuries, such as stroke, and paralyzing neuromuscular conditions, such as multiple sclerosis. Stakeholders we interviewed—including providers at other facilities— noted that traumatic spinal cord and brain injury patients—including those covered by Medicare—require significant levels of care due to the complexity of their injuries as well as the immediate and long-term complications that can occur from the injuries. For example, most stakeholders told us these patients often require lifelong care due to the complexity and reoccurrence of comorbidities or secondary complications. Some of these stakeholders noted, for example, spinal cord and brain injury patients often face mental health or psychosocial conditions, such as depression or anxiety. Some stakeholders also emphasized that many spinal cord injury patients risk secondary complications that may not occur until years after injury, such as pneumonia, pressure ulcers, and other infections. A few stakeholders told us spinal cord and brain injury patients are often among the most complex patients they treat. As such, patients with spinal cord or brain injuries often require interdisciplinary care that covers a wide range of specialties—including physiatry (rehabilitation medicine), neurology, cardiology, and pulmonology—as well as specialized equipment or technology, such as eye glance tools to control call systems or the television. Simulations of Medicare payments illustrate the potential effects of Medicare’s site-neutral payment policies, which were required by law, on the qualifying hospitals. Specifically, our simulations calculated what the qualifying hospitals would have been paid for Medicare patient discharges that occurred in two baseline years—fiscal year 2013 (baseline year 1) and fiscal year 2016 (baseline year 2)—if applicable payment policies from future years (2017 through 2021) were applied to those discharges. We selected two baseline years to account for differences in data, such as the number of discharges, between fiscal year 2016—the most recent year of complete data available at the time we began our analysis—and fiscal year 2013. Table 3 below provides a summary of Medicare discharges and payments to the qualifying hospitals during these two baseline years. Variation in utilization and patient mix across the baseline years allows the simulations to cover a range of possible changes in payments for the two hospitals. Our simulations indicated how Medicare’s payment policies could have affected these baseline payments to each qualifying hospital: Fiscal Year 2017 Blended Site-Neutral Rate Policy: Discharges that do not meet criteria to receive the standard rate are to receive a blended site-neutral rate—equal to 50 percent of the site-neutral rate and 50 percent of the standard rate. We found that while some of the baseline discharges would qualify for the standard rate, most discharges would have been paid at the blended site-neutral rate. Specifically, 8 to 20 percent of Craig Hospital’s baseline Medicare discharges would have qualified for the standard rate, resulting in simulated payments of about $3.86 million (baseline year 1) and $3.22 million (baseline year 2) under blended site-neutral rate policy. For Shepherd Center, between 23 percent and 40 percent of baseline Medicare discharges would have qualified for the standard rate, resulting in simulated payments of about $5.16 million (baseline year 1) and $5.31 million (baseline year 2). Each of these simulated payments is an increase compared to actual payments made in the baseline years. Fiscal Years 2018 and 2019 Temporary Exception: The qualifying hospitals are receiving the standard rate for all discharges, due to the temporary exception. As a result, simulated payments under the temporary exception are about $3.74 million (baseline year 1) and $3.18 million (baseline year 2) for Craig Hospital and about $5.64 million (baseline year 1) and $5.75 million (baseline year 2) for Shepherd Center, which is an increase compared to actual payments made in the baseline years. Fiscal Year 2020 Two-Tiered Payment Rate: The temporary exception for the qualifying hospitals no longer applies; therefore, the site- neutral rate will apply to discharges not qualifying for the standard rate. We found that both qualifying hospitals would receive some payments at the standard rate, but that most of their discharges would be paid at the lower, site-neutral rate—assuming similar caseloads (e.g., patient mix). As a result, simulated baseline year payments at Craig Hospital are about $3.47 million (baseline year 1) and $3.03 million (baseline year 2), and simulated baseline payments to Shepherd are about $4.42 million (baseline year 1) and $4.55 million (baseline year 2). The simulated payments therefore decrease compared to those in fiscal year 2019, and also generally decrease compared to actual payments made in the baseline years. Future Years Under 50 Percent Threshold: Under statute, unless 50 percent or more of the hospital’s discharges in cost reporting periods beginning during or after fiscal year 2020 qualify for the standard rate, no subsequent payments will be made to a hospital at that rate in each succeeding cost reporting period. Most of the baseline year discharges did not qualify for the standard rate, and therefore simulated payments are based on the generally lower comparable acute care rate. However, simulated payments stayed about the same between fiscal year 2020 and 2021, in part due to differences in calculations for high-cost outlier payments. A high-cost outlier payment is made to hospitals for those cases that are extraordinarily costly, which can occur because of the severity of the case and/or a particularly long length of stay. Specifically, simulated payments were about $3.49 million (baseline year 1) and $3.02 million (baseline year 2) for Craig Hospital and about $4.24 million (baseline year 1) and $4.16 million (baseline year 2) for Shepherd Center. Without the high-cost outlier payments, the simulated payments would have decreased by at least $2 million. If the mix of patients at Craig Hospital and Shepherd Center changes so that they meet the 50 percent threshold in fiscal year 2020, then simulated payments for fiscal year 2021 could be higher. As of September 2018, Craig Hospital officials told us that they expect to meet the 50 percent threshold with their current patient mix. Shepherd Center officials told us they do not expect to meet the 50 percent threshold. See figures 1 and 2 below for the results of our simulations. Our simulations of payments assume the number and type of Medicare discharges at the two qualifying hospitals remain the same as those in fiscal years 2013 and 2016. However, the full effect of payment policy on future Medicare payments to the qualifying hospitals will depend on three key factors that are subject to change: 1. Severity of patient conditions: Medicare payment is typically higher for more severe injuries, such as a traumatic injury with major comorbidities or complications, relative to less severe injuries. In the two baseline years we used for our simulations—fiscal year 2013 and fiscal year 2016—more than half of the Medicare discharges at the qualifying hospitals were associated with conditions with multiple comorbidities and complications, as indicated by the diagnosis groups, and this level of severity is reflected in the simulation results. Future payments to qualifying hospitals will depend on the extent to which the severity of patient conditions changes over time. 2. Volume of discharges meeting criteria for the standard rate: As previously noted, for a hospital to receive the standard rate for a discharge, the discharge must meet certain criteria, such as having a preceding acute care hospital stay with either an intensive care unit stay of at least 3 days or an assigned diagnosis group based on the receipt of at least 96 hours of mechanical ventilation services in the LTCH. Our simulations reflect that in the two baseline years, about 23 percent of the fiscal year 2013 discharges and about 40 percent of the fiscal year 2016 discharges met the criteria to receive the standard rate for Shepherd Center; and about 8 percent of the fiscal year 2013 discharges and about 20 percent of the fiscal year 2016 discharges met the criteria for Craig Hospital. Changes to these amounts could affect future payments to the qualifying hospitals. In particular, if 50 percent or more of either hospital’s discharges beginning in fiscal year 2020 meet the standard rate criteria, then the hospitals would be eligible for payments at the standard rate in fiscal year 2021, which may result in higher payments compared to our simulations. 3. Payment adjustments: LTCHs may receive a payment adjustment for certain types of discharges, such as short-stay outliers, interrupted stays, or high-cost outliers. In particular, most discharges at Craig Hospital received high-cost outlier payments (additional payments for extraordinarily costly cases) during the two baseline years—76 percent in fiscal year 2013 and 85 percent in fiscal year 2016. At Shepherd Center, at least 40 percent of discharges during the two baseline years received high-cost outlier payments—about 42 percent in fiscal year 2013 and about 58 percent in fiscal year 2016. The amount of future payments to qualifying hospitals will depend on the extent to which they continue to have a high proportion of discharges with high-cost outlier payments. In addition to the effect on payments, officials from both qualifying hospitals and some stakeholders we interviewed noted that the LTCH site-neutral payment policies may result in fewer services provided and fewer patients served by the qualifying hospitals and other LTCHs. For example, officials from Craig Hospital told us they stopped providing post- operative care to patients requiring spinal surgery, such as patients with syringomyelia, in 2016—instead referring them to other facilities—in part because these discharges do not meet the criteria for the standard rate. As of September 2018, they told us they do not plan to provide this care in the future unless the temporary exception is extended. Officials from Shepherd Center told us while they have not yet made changes to services they offer to Medicare patients, they may limit which Medicare beneficiaries they serve in the future. For example, they told us that most of their Medicare beneficiaries were admitted from home or sought care in their outpatient clinic. When the temporary exception expires after fiscal year 2019, hospital officials expected that these patients will not qualify for the standard rate. Shepherd Center officials said they may not be able to serve similar patients in future years. MedPAC officials and some stakeholders—a specialty association and health care providers with experience treating patients with similar conditions at other LTCHs—told us that some LTCHs have changed the services they offer and the patients they treat to increase the proportion of discharges that qualify for the standard rate. For example, MedPAC officials cited reports that indicate how some LTCHs have adjusted to the site-neutral policies. For example, a 2018 MedPAC report indicated that LTCHs in one large for-profit chain were able to make adjustments so that, as of September 30, 2016, close to 100 percent of their Medicare discharges met the criteria to receive the standard rate. A representative from an LTCH association told us that many LTCHs have adjusted their patient mix by increasing the number of discharges that meet criteria for the standard rate and turning away some Medicare beneficiaries to reduce the number of discharges subject to the site-neutral rate. The representative noted that certain LTCHs have already been able to adjust their patient mix because they have existing programs in place that focus on chronic, critically ill patients who would have a preceding acute care hospital stay. The representative told us that some LTCHs specialize in care for patients who do not meet the criteria to receive the standard rate and would generally be paid at the site-neutral rate; therefore, changing their patient mix is not a viable strategy for these LTCHs. According to the stakeholder, as of February 2018, about two-thirds of all LTCHs are above the 50 percent threshold. Providers from another LTCH told us that before the site-neutral payment policy went into effect, only about 40 to 45 percent of its discharges met criteria for the standard rate. However, they worked to ensure most patients referred to the LTCH would qualify for the standard rate. Officials told us patients who do not meet the criteria for that rate typically either stay longer in the acute care hospital or are transferred to a different post-acute care setting, such as a skilled nursing facility. Officials noted that, in both cases, the patient may not receive the specialized services often required for their injuries, including those patients with spinal cord or brain injuries. A provider we interviewed from another LTCH said that, historically, the LTCH has accepted patients who acquire pressure ulcers at home following discharge, but they may choose not to continue this practice because the patients’ discharges would not meet the criteria to receive the standard rate. A few of these stakeholders told us some LTCHs are in markets that do not have alternative providers of care, such as skilled nursing facilities, for patients who do not meet the criteria. These LTCHs may have difficulty adjusting their patient mix to avoid site-neutral payments. For example, a provider from one LTCH said his facility continues to take “site-neutral patients” because those patients often do not have another option to receive the specialized services they need. The provider emphasized concerns about the long-term viability of caring for those patients at the facility, because their care is paid at lower rates. Our review of Medicare claims data, other information, and interviews with stakeholders indicated the two qualifying hospitals treated Medicare beneficiaries with different conditions than most of those treated at other LTCHs. Our analysis of Medicare claims data indicates Craig Hospital and Shepherd Center treat very few patients in the Medicare diagnosis groups that are most common to other LTCHs. Specifically, for several years, MedPAC has reported that LTCH patient discharges are concentrated in a relatively small number of diagnosis groups. For example, in March 2018, MedPAC reported that 20 diagnosis groups accounted for over 61 percent of LTCH discharges at both for-profit and not-for-profit facilities, in fiscal year 2016. However, in fiscal year 2016, these diagnosis groups accounted for approximately 30 percent of Medicare discharges—26 out of 88—at Shepherd Center, and most of these discharges fell within a single diagnosis group which covers a range of conditions. Craig Hospital did not discharge any Medicare beneficiaries assigned to these 20 diagnosis groups, in fiscal year 2016. The seven diagnosis groups that were used in the statutory criteria to except Craig Hospital and Shepherd Center from site-neutral payments were also not among these 20 diagnosis groups. For more information on the 20 diagnosis groups common to LTCHs in fiscal year 2016, see Appendix III, table 5. Our review of Medicare claims data and other information indicates the two qualifying hospitals also treat a relatively small number of Medicare beneficiaries, a key distinguishing factor from most other LTCHs. In March 2018, MedPAC reported that, on average, Medicare beneficiaries account for about two-thirds of LTCH discharges. However, Medicare claims data and other information provided by the two qualifying hospitals indicate Medicare beneficiaries account for a significantly smaller proportion (about 8 percent) of patients discharged from Craig Hospital and Shepherd Center in 2016. Specifically, 40 of the 486 patients discharged from Craig Hospital in fiscal year 2016 and 75 of the 912 patients discharged from Shepherd Center in calendar year 2016, were Medicare beneficiaries. Officials from the qualifying hospitals told us they treat few Medicare patients primarily because of the younger average age of persons with spinal cord injuries and acquired brain injuries. While patients with spinal cord and brain injuries may receive care in other LTCHs, most stakeholders we interviewed also suggested the two qualifying hospitals treat patients that are different from those treated at most other LTCHs, and can offer specialized care. Officials from the two qualifying hospitals told us that, relative to most other facilities—including most traditional LTCHs—they offer a more complete continuum of care to meet the needs of patients at different stages of spinal cord and brain injury treatment, without the need to transfer to different facilities. Officials also stated that, unlike most traditional LTCHs, they are able to offer more specialized care for patients with spinal cord and brain injuries, including more comprehensive rehabilitation services. Stakeholders we interviewed generally agreed that the two qualifying hospitals have developed expertise in treating spinal cord and brain injury patients and offer intensive rehabilitation services that are not provided in most other LTCHs. In addition, officials from the Colorado Department of Health Care Policy & Financing noted that Craig Hospital treats a patient population that is different from most other LTCHs in the state of Colorado. Specifically, according to officials, in comparison to other LTCHs in the state, Craig Hospital treats: (1) a higher percentage of patients with more severe conditions, (2) more patients from outside the state of Colorado, (3) fewer patients requiring ventilator weaning or requiring wound care— conditions typically characteristic of LTCH patients—and (4) patients that are, on average, younger than most other LTCHs in the state of Colorado. In addition, a 2014 study of LTCHs conducted for the Georgia Department of Community Health found Shepherd Center was “distinctly different” from other LTCHs in the state of Georgia, and most LTCHs nationwide. Most stakeholders we interviewed suggested some IRFs provide specialty care to patients with catastrophic spinal cord, acquired brain injuries, or other paralyzing neuromuscular conditions. Most of the stakeholders we interviewed noted that—like the two qualifying hospitals—some IRFs have the expertise to treat patients with catastrophic spinal cord, acquired brain injuries, or other paralyzing neuromuscular conditions patients and thus, may also treat patients with similar conditions. According to CMS officials, IRFs are specifically designed to provide post-acute rehabilitation services to patients with spinal cord injuries, brain injuries, and other neuromuscular conditions. CMS officials noted that patients with these conditions typically respond well to intensive rehabilitation therapy provided in a resource intensive inpatient hospital environment and to the specific interdisciplinary approach to care that is provided in the IRF setting. Stakeholders also noted that patients with spinal cord injuries, brain injuries, and other neuromuscular conditions may receive care in other settings. However, some stakeholders noted that some of these providers—such as skilled nursing facilities—generally do not offer the specialized care these patients generally require. Differences in payment systems and data limitations make it difficult to directly compare the attributes of Medicare beneficiaries discharged from the two qualifying hospitals and IRFs, including the costs of care they receive. Medicare uses separate payment systems to pay LTCHs and IRFs, for care provided to beneficiaries. LTCHs are paid pre-determined fixed amounts for care provided to Medicare beneficiaries, under the LTCH PPS. Medicare beneficiaries treated in LTCHs are assigned to diagnosis groups (MS-LTC-DRGs) for each stay—based on the patient’s primary and secondary diagnoses, age, gender, discharge status, and procedures performed. IRFs are also paid pre-determined fixed amounts for care provided to Medicare beneficiaries, but under a separate system—IRF PPS. Medicare beneficiaries treated in IRFs are assigned to case-mix groups—based on age, and level of motor and cognitive function—and then further assigned to one of four tiers (within these groups) based on the presence of specific comorbidities that may increase their cost of care. According to CMS officials, because the payment groups and assignments to those groups are different, it is difficult to directly compare LTCH patients, classified in diagnosis groups, with IRF patients, classified in case-mix groups. See Appendix II for more information on these payment systems. MedPAC has previously reported the differences in patient assessment tools used by post-acute care providers undermines Medicare’s ability to compare the patients admitted, costs of care, and outcomes beneficiaries achieve in these settings, on a risk-adjusted basis. MedPAC has also reported that while similar beneficiaries can receive care in each setting, payments can differ considerably for comparable conditions, due to differences in payment systems. It has made recommendations to address these issues. The Improving Medicare Post-Acute Care Transformation Act of 2014 also requires the Secretary of HHS to collect and analyze common patient assessment information and, in consultation with MedPAC, submit a report to Congress recommending a post-acute care PPS. Such efforts may make future comparison of beneficiaries, costs of services, and outcomes of care across these settings possible. While data limitations make a direct comparison difficult, based on our review of other data and information, and interviews with stakeholders, we identified similarities and differences between the qualifying hospitals and certain IRFs that provide specialty treatment for catastrophic spinal cord injuries, acquired brain injuries, or other paralyzing neuromuscular conditions. Key similarities and differences include the following: Volume of services. Our review of Medicare claims data, other information, and interviews with stakeholders indicate that—similar to the two qualifying hospitals—some IRFs treat a high volume (at least 100) of patients with complex spinal cord injury, brain injury, and other related conditions. Officials from the two qualifying hospitals, as well as some other stakeholders we interviewed—including officials from the Christopher & Dana Reeve Foundation and the Brain Injury Association of America—emphasized the importance of facilities treating a high volume of patients with these specialized conditions, which can be an indicator of expertise in treating these patients. Our review of Medicare claims data for 1,148 IRFs in fiscal year 2016 identified 21 IRFs that treated at least 100 Medicare beneficiaries with non-traumatic and traumatic spinal cord injuries and 109 IRFs that treated at least 100 Medicare beneficiaries with non-traumatic and traumatic brain injuries. Our review of Medicare claims data indicated that, similar to the two qualifying hospitals—some IRFs also treat a high volume of patients with “catastrophic” injuries—traumatic brain injury, traumatic spinal cord injury, and major multiple traumas with brain or spinal cord injuries. Specifically, we identified 25 IRFs that treated a high volume (at least 100) of Medicare beneficiaries with catastrophic injuries, in fiscal year 2016. In the absence of patient assessment data from the facilities, we did not independently evaluate the level and severity of these patients’ injuries, which can vary due to the presence of other co-morbid conditions. The Medicare case mix indexes we reviewed for these 25 IRFs indicated that, relative to other IRFs, most of these facilities treat patients who are more resource intensive. Specialty accreditation and designation as model systems. Like Shepherd Center, some IRFs receive CARF-accreditation for specialty programs to treat spinal cord and brain injuries. According to most stakeholders, this accreditation indicates expertise in treating these patients, as CARF International has established standards using evidence-based practices, among other factors. Officials from the two qualifying hospitals also noted CARF International has a specific focus on quality and outcomes. However, officials from Shepherd Center noted similarities in care and services offered at CARF-accredited facilities would depend on the specialties for which they are certified. Most of the stakeholders we interviewed also noted that designation as a NIDILRR model system is an indicator of similar expertise in treating patients with spinal cord and brain injuries. According to the Model Systems Knowledge Translation Center, spinal cord injury and brain injury model systems are recognized as national leaders in medical research and patient care and provide the highest level of comprehensive specialty services from the point of injury through eventual re-entry into full community life. While stakeholders we interviewed from NIDILRR model systems indicated the model system designation is focused primarily on research, rather than clinical care, most noted that model systems’ research often complements the facilities’ clinical efforts to address the unique needs of these patients. Officials from HHS’s Administration for Community Living also noted that all model system grantees must provide a continuum of care—emergency care, acute medical care, acute medical rehabilitation, and post-acute care—and that can happen in various provider types. According to officials from the qualifying hospitals and stakeholders from one other NIDILRR model system we interviewed, Craig Hospital and Shepherd Center are the only two LTCHs currently classified as spinal cord injury model systems; 12 of 14 spinal cord injury model systems are IRFs. Specialized programs and services. Similar to the two qualifying hospitals, some IRFs may also offer specialized programs and services for patients with brain and spinal cord injuries, but the availability of these programs and services may vary by facility. Officials from some of the IRFs that responded to our information request—which included both NIDILRR facilities and IRFs with CARF-accredited programs—told us they provide specialized programs and services for patients with similar conditions as those treated at two qualifying hospitals, and sometimes compete with the two qualifying hospitals for the same patients. For example, each IRF reported having interdisciplinary treatment teams; the capacity to provide medical management of medically complex and high acuity patients with spinal cord injury, traumatic brain injury, or other major multiple traumas associated with a brain or spinal cord injury; family education and training; and skin and wound programs or services, among other services. However, the availability of certain services—including but not limited to ventilator-dependent weaning programs, diaphragmatic pacing, and outpatient programs for spinal cord and traumatic brain injury patients—varied by facility. Staff with specialized training and clinical expertise. Similar to the two qualifying hospitals, most facilities that responded to our information request also reported having physicians, nurses, and physical and occupational therapists with specialty training in medical rehabilitation, spinal cord, and/or brain injury. However, the number of staff with these trainings, varied by facility. In comparison to the other facilities that responded to our information request, the number of nurses and physical and occupational therapists with these specialty trainings were generally higher at Craig Hospital and Shepherd Center. According to an American Spinal Injury Association consumer guideline that the Christopher & Dana Reeve Foundation typically provides to spinal cord injury patients and families, programs should regularly admit persons with spinal cord injury each year, to develop and maintain the necessary skills to manage a person with spinal cord injury, and a substantial portion of those admitted should have traumatic injuries. Out-of-state Admissions. Officials from the two qualifying hospitals emphasized they admit a significant number of patients from out-of-state, and our review of information provided by the qualifying hospitals and a select group of IRFs indicated the qualifying hospitals admit a higher percentage of patients from out-of-state. Specifically, information provided by these IRFs indicates that less than a quarter of patients admitted to these facilities, in 2016, were from out-of-state. Information provided by Craig Hospital and Shepherd Center indicate that about half of their patients were admitted from out-of-state in 2016. Officials from the Colorado Department of Health Care Policy & Financing also noted Craig Hospital treats a higher percentage of out-of-state patients, compared to IRFs in the state. Ability to treat medically complex patients. Officials from the two qualifying hospitals told us they treat more medically complex patients and provide a more complete range of medical services to spinal cord and brain injury patients, not provided by most IRFs. Specifically, officials from the two qualifying hospitals both noted they are able to treat patients much sooner in their recovery process than most IRFs, due to their LTCH status. Officials from the Shepherd Center noted that they have a 10-bed intensive care unit which allows them to take patients with certain injures that some IRFs may not be equipped to admit—such as patients requiring advance medical management and advanced level procedural services and monitoring. Information provided by Shepherd Center indicated that, in calendar year 2017, approximately 20 percent of all inpatients were admitted to this unit and 13 percent of all inpatients were internally transferred to this unit after developing medical complications. According to officials, Craig Hospital does not have an intensive care unit, but noted their ability to similarly care for medically complex patients—including telemetry (e.g., specialized heart monitoring) and one-to-one nursing care, if necessary. Most stakeholders we interviewed agreed that both qualifying hospitals’ LTCH status provides certain advantages over IRFs, such as the ability to admit some medically complex patients earlier in the recovery process and longer lengths of stay. Stakeholders from most of the IRFs we interviewed also reported having the flexibility to admit some medically complex patients requiring more advanced level monitoring and resources earlier in the recovery process—such as patients with disorders of consciousness. Officials from the two qualifying hospitals also said they offer a continuum of care that can meet patient’s changing needs, without the need to transfer them to different facilities. Information provided by Craig Hospital indicated that 83 percent of patients treated at its facility, in 2016, were discharged to home, 13 percent were discharged to another post-acute care facility, and 3 percent were discharged to an acute care hospital. In 2016, approximately 91 percent of patients treated at Shepherd Center were discharged to home, 7 percent were discharged to another post- acute care facility, and 2 percent were discharged to an acute care hospital. Information provided by the IRFs that responded to our written request varied by facility, but—similar to the two qualifying hospitals— each facility discharged more than 65 percent of patients to home. IRF payment criteria. CMS and most other stakeholders we interviewed noted that two Medicare payment policies applicable to IRFs, but not LTCHs, may contribute to their different patient populations. Specifically, to be classified for payment under Medicare’s IRF PPS, at least 60 percent of the IRF’s total inpatient population must require intensive rehabilitative treatment for one or more of 13 conditions—which includes both spinal cord and brain injury. To be admitted to an IRF, Medicare beneficiaries must reasonably be expected to actively participate in and benefit from the intensive rehabilitation therapy program, typically provided in IRFs. According to HHS, per industry standard, the intensive rehabilitation therapy program is often demonstrated by providing three hours of rehabilitation services per day for at least five days per week, but this is not the only way such intensity can be demonstrated. Officials from the two qualifying hospitals told us they generally use Medicare’s intensive rehabilitation requirement as a minimum standard for their rehabilitation patients—even though they are not held to this requirement, for the purposes of Medicare payment—but noted that some of their patients may not meet this requirement, due to their medical complexity. Length of stay and site-neutral payment requirements, for LTCHs. As previously noted, LTCHs—including the two qualifying hospitals—must have an average length of stay of greater than 25 days; IRFs are not subject to this requirement. The average length of stay for patients discharged from the Craig Hospital was about 60 days, in fiscal year 2016, and the average length of stay for patients discharged from Shepherd Center was about 53 days, in calendar year 2016. Stakeholders from the IRFs that responded to our information request reported average lengths of stay ranging from 14 to 31 days, for patients discharged in fiscal year 2016; the ranges of lengths of stay were slightly higher for spinal cord injury and traumatic brain injury inpatients for the IRFs, during the same period. LTCHs are also generally subject to site- neutral payment policy that is not applicable to IRFs and may decrease LTCHs payments for certain discharges, under Medicare. Other services provided. In addition to these Medicare specific differences, a few stakeholders we interviewed also noted the two qualifying hospitals receive additional funding from their strong philanthropic donor base that may allow them to provide other services and resources, not covered by Medicare or offered at some IRFs. For example, while a few IRFs that responded to our information request reported offering housing for families of injured patients, the two qualifying hospitals offer up to 30 days of free housing to families of newly injured rehabilitation patients, if both the family and patient live more than 60 miles from the hospital. Officials from Shepherd Center told us their revenues are supplemented by investment income and donor funds. Craig Hospital has also established a foundation that supports the hospital in achieving its goals through philanthropy. We provided a draft of this report to HHS. HHS provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. We also provided the two qualifying hospitals summaries of information we collected from them, to confirm the accuracy of statements included in our draft report. We incorporated their comments, as appropriate. We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Health and Human Services and other interested parties. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on GAO’s website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-7114 or at farbj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Office of Congressional Relations and Office of Public Affairs can be found on the last page of this report. Other major contributors to this report are listed in appendix IV. This appendix describes our methodology for conducting simulations of payments for the two qualifying hospitals. We used Medicare claims data to conduct simulations of payments for the two qualifying hospitals. We first identified discharges at each hospital in two baseline years—federal fiscal years 2013 and 2016. We selected fiscal year 2016 because it was the year with the most recent data available at the time of our analysis, and we selected a second baseline year because data for 2016 was different than data for other recent years. For example, the number of discharges for one qualifying hospital declined by nearly half between fiscal years 2013 and 2016. We chose fiscal year 2013 because data from that year was used to help determine which hospitals are subject to the temporary exception. To identify how to appropriately calculate the long-term care hospital (LTCH) payment for each of these discharges in future payment years, we reviewed applicable federal regulation and documents from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) and the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC), and interviewed officials from both organizations. See table 4 for the relevant components in the formulas, such as Medicare severity long-term care diagnosis related group (MS-LTC-DRG) weights, identified from final rule tables. When conducting these simulations, we made the following assumptions: For simulated payments for payment policies in effect for fiscal years 2017 and 2018, we used the base rates, relative weights (e.g., the MS-LTC-DRG weights), geometric mean length of stay, wage index, geographic adjustment factor, fixed-loss amounts, and outlier thresholds that were published in the final rule tables for LTCH and inpatient prospective payment system (IPPS) hospitals—also known as acute care hospitals—for each respective year. At the time we began our analysis, this information was not known for fiscal years 2019 through 2021. We chose to use the fiscal year 2018 rates when conducting simulations for payment policies in those years because historical trends showed that annual changes were minimal—about 1 percent. Therefore, to the extent that these values continue to change over time, our findings may understate or overstate the amount that the qualifying hospitals would have been paid in our baseline years based on these future payment policies. The site-neutral payment policy did not apply to discharges from the fiscal year 2013 baseline year. Therefore, we examined Medicare claims data to determine whether each discharge would have met the criteria to receive the LTCH standard rate in that year. Specifically, we determined whether each discharge had an acute care hospital stay that immediately preceded their LTCH stay. We then determined whether the time at the acute care hospital included three or more days in the intensive care unit or whether there was a code on the LTCH claim that indicated at least 96 hours of mechanical ventilation services were provided. Per Medicare’s payment policy, we assumed any discharge that met these two criteria would qualify for full LTCH payment rate, unless the case was a psychiatric or rehabilitation stay, as identified by the following MS-LTC-DRG codes: 876, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 894, 895, 896, 897, 945, or 946. Under statute, unless 50 percent or more of the hospital’s discharges beginning during or after 2020 qualify for the standard rate, no subsequent payments will be made to a hospital at that rate. Therefore, when calculating simulated payments for fiscal year 2021, we applied the 50 percent threshold. At the time of our analysis, CMS had not yet finalized this policy through rule-making. As of November 2018, CMS officials told us that it is unlikely that any payment adjustment under this provision would apply until 2022 because the percentage cannot be determined until after an LTCH’s cost reporting period has ended and data have been submitted. Shepherd Center’s fiscal year is different than the federal fiscal year. Therefore, the variables used to determine whether discharges in federal fiscal year 2016 met criteria to receive the standard rate were not available to use for some of the discharges that year. Of those discharges, we assumed that the same percentage of discharges that met the criteria to receive the standard rate in Shepherd’s fiscal year—30 percent—met the criteria in federal fiscal year 2016. When calculating site-neutral payments, we assumed that each discharge would be paid at a rate comparable to that for acute care hospitals—the IPPS comparable amount rate. Site-neutral payments may also be based on the estimated cost-of-care, if it is lower than the IPPS comparable amount rate. However, over 90 percent of discharges at the qualifying hospitals were paid at the IPPS comparable amount rate in fiscal year 2016. Per CMS’s recommendation, we applied the cost-to-charge ratio that was effective October 1, 2017, for each qualifying hospital, regardless of discharge date. For Craig Hospital this value was 0.442 and for Shepherd Center this value was 0.464. According to CMS officials, in general, these values do not change significantly when they are updated during the fiscal year. Therefore, they believe that using the values effective at the start of the fiscal year is a reasonable assumption. We excluded indirect medical education adjustments and disproportionate share hospital payments that are part of the IPPS comparable amount rate because, according to CMS, they were unlikely to have much impact for these hospitals. CMS reviewed each of these assumptions and agreed they were reasonable for purposes of our analysis. CMS also verified that we were correctly applying the formulas for calculating these payments and using the appropriate values from the final rules. Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the methodology for calculating Medicare payments under the long-term care hospital (LTCH) prospective payment system (PPS) and the inpatient rehabilitation facility (IRF) PPS, respectively, as reported by the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC). Appendix III: List of Common Diagnosis Groups for Long-Term Care Hospitals (LTCH) In its March 2018 annual report to the Congress, the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) reported that 20 diagnosis groups accounted for over 61 percent of LTCH discharges at both for-profit and not-for-profit facilities, in fiscal year 2016. Table 5 provides a list of these 20 diagnosis groups. In addition to the contact named above, Will Simerl, Assistant Director; Kathy King; Amy Leone, Analyst-in-Charge; Todd Anderson; Sam Amrhein; LaKendra Beard; Rich Lipinski; Jennifer Rudisill; and Eric Wedum made key contributions to this report. Also contributing were Leia Dickerson, Diona Martyn, Vikki Porter, and Lisa Rogers.	[ "The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services pays LTCHs for care provided to Medicare beneficiaries. There were about 400 LTCHs across the nation in 2016. The 21st Century Cures Act included a provision for GAO to examine certain issues pertaining to LTCHs. This report examines (1) the health care needs of Medicare beneficiaries who receive services from the two qualifying hospitals; (2) how Medicare LTCH payment polices could affect the two qualifying hospitals; and (3) how the two qualifying hospitals compare with other LTCHs and other facilities that may treat Medicare patients with similar conditions. GAO analyzed the most recently available Medicare claims and other data for the two qualifying hospitals and other facilities that treat patients with spinal cord injuries. GAO also interviewed HHS officials and stakeholders from the qualifying hospitals, other facilities that treat spinal cord patients, specialty associations, and others. GAO provided a draft of this report to HHS. HHS provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. We also provided the two qualifying hospitals summaries of information we collected from them, to confirm the accuracy of statements included in our draft report. We incorporated their comments, as appropriate. Spinal cord injuries may result in secondary complications that often lead to decreased functional independence and quality of life. The 21st Century Cures Act changed how Medicare pays certain long-term care hospitals (LTCH) that provide spinal cord specialty treatment. For these hospitals, the act included a temporary exception from how Medicare pays other LTCHs. Two LTCHs—Craig Hospital in Englewood, Colorado and Shepherd Center in Atlanta, Georgia—have qualified for this exception. GAO found that most Medicare beneficiaries treated at these two hospitals typically receive specialized care for multiple chronic conditions and other long-term complications that develop after initial injuries, such as pressure ulcers that can result in life-threatening infection. The two hospitals also provide specialty care for acquired brain injuries, such as traumatic brain injuries. GAO's simulations of Medicare payments to these two hospitals using claims data from two baseline years—fiscal years 2013 and 2016—illustrate potential effects of payment policies. LTCHs are paid under a two-tiered system for care provided to beneficiaries: they receive the LTCH standard federal payment rate—or standard rate—for certain patients discharged from the LTCH, and a generally lower rate—known as a “site-neutral” rate—for all other discharges. Under the temporary exception, Craig Hospital and Shepherd Center receive the standard rate for all discharges during fiscal years 2018 and 2019. Assuming their types of discharges remain the same as in fiscal years 2013 and 2016, GAO's simulations of Medicare payments in the baseline years indicate: Most of the discharges we examined would not qualify for the standard rate, if the exception did not apply. Medicare payments would generally decrease under fiscal year 2020 payment policy, once the exception expires. However, the actual effects of Medicare's payment policies on these two hospitals could vary based on factors, including the severity of patient conditions (e.g., Medicare payment is typically higher for more severe injuries), and whether hospitals' discharges meet criteria for the standard rate. Similarities and differences may exist between the two qualifying hospitals and other facilities that treat Medicare patients with spinal cord and brain injuries. Patients with spinal cord and brain injuries may receive care in other LTCHs, but GAO found that most Medicare beneficiaries at these other LTCHs are treated for conditions other than spinal cord and brain injuries. Certain inpatient rehabilitation facilities (IRF) also provide post-acute rehabilitation services to patients with spinal cord and brain injuries. While data limitations make a direct comparison between these facilities and the two qualifying hospitals difficult, GAO identified some similarities and differences. For example, officials from some IRFs we interviewed reported providing several of the same programs and services as the two qualifying hospitals to medically complex patients, but the availability of services and complexity of patients varied. Among other reasons, the different Medicare payment requirements that apply to LTCHs and IRFs affect the types of services they provide and the patients they treat." ]	8,494	gov_report	en	null	4bdece48fd21b6df53b6716155d6466eb3573a4390e175d2
Since the late 1700s, Congress has expressed public gratitude to individuals and groups by awarding medals and other similar decorations. The first Congressional Gold Medals were issued by the Continental Congress. Since that time, Congress has awarded gold medals to express public gratitude for distinguished contributions, dramatize the virtues of patriotism, and perpetuate the remembrance of great events. This tradition of authorizing individually struck gold medals bearing the portraits or actions of honorees is rich with history. Although Congress has approved legislation stipulating specific requirements for numerous other awards and decorations, there are no permanent statutory provisions specifically relating to the creation of Congressional Gold Medals. When such an award has been deemed appropriate, Congress has, by special action, provided for the creation of a personalized medal to be given in its name. The first Congressional Gold Medals were issued by the Continental Congress. As initially conceived, Congressional Gold Medals were awards "imbued with the conviction that only the very highest achievements [were] entitled to such a distinction, and that the value of a reward is enhanced by its rarity!" At that time, the Continental Congress concluded there was no better way to honor "and preserve the memory of illustrious characters and splendid events than medals—whether we take into consideration the imperishable nature of the substance whence they are formed, the facility of multiplying copies, or the practice of depositing them in the cabinets of the curious." The first gold medals were struck in Paris under the direction of Colonel David Humphrey. Following a long-standing historical practice, Congress commissioned gold medals as tributes for what were considered to be the most distinguished achievements. Silver and bronze medals, and ceremonial swords, were awarded for less eminent, but still notable, accomplishments. However, only the gold medal has been continuously awarded to the present day. The first Congressional Gold Medal was authorized on March 25, 1776, for George Washington, then commander of the Continental Army, for his "wise and spirited conduct" in bringing about British evacuation of Boston. During the next 12 years, the Continental Congress authorized an additional six gold medals for Revolutionary military leaders. Table 1 lists the Congressional Gold Medals issued by the Continental Congress, the year, the awardee, and the reason the medal was authorized. The gold medal conferred upon Major Henry "Light Horse Harry" Lee for his "remarkable prudence" and "bravery" during the surprise raid of Paulus Hook, NJ, was the first to be struck in the United States. Following the ratification of the Constitution, the first two Congressional Gold Medals were given in 1800 to Captain Thomas Truxtun for his gallant effort during the action between the U.S. frigate Constellation and the French ship La Vengeance and in 1805 to Commodore Edward Preble for gallantry and good conduct during the War with Tripoli. After those medals were awarded, Congress issued gold medals primarily for military achievements in the War of 1812 and the Mexican War. All told, 27 gold medals were awarded for the War of 1812, and a series of medals were awarded for expeditions led by Major General Zachary Taylor and Major General Winfield Scott in the Mexican War. General Taylor received three Congressional Gold Medals, while General Scott received one. In 1854, Congress began to broaden the scope of activities that merited a Congressional Gold Medal. This change was prompted by Commander Duncan N. Ingraham of the USS St. Louis 's rescue of Martin Koszta from illegal seizure and imprisonment about the Austrian war-brig Hussar . Subsequently, gold medals were issued to several individuals recognized for nonmilitary heroic activities or their work in specific fields. For example, in 1864 Cornelius Vanderbilt was honored for donating a steamship to the United States; in 1867 Cyrus W. Field was praised for his work in the laying of the transatlantic cable; and Private George F. Robinson was awarded for saving Secretary of State William H. Seward from an assassination attempt. At this time, Congress also established the Medal of Honor as a military award and increasingly focused the Congressional Gold Medal as an award for individuals and events. In the 20 th and 21 st centuries, Congress continued to broaden the scope of Congressional Gold Medals to include recognition of excellence in such varied fields as the arts, athletics, aviation, diplomacy, entertainment, exploration, medicine, politics, religion, and science. Several of the following individuals were the first in their specialties to be awarded gold medals: Composer George M. Cohan (1936) was the first entertainer to receive a gold medal, for his patriotic songs "Over There" and "A Grand Old Flag." Wilbur and Orville Wright (1909) were the first aeronautical or space pioneers to receive a gold medal, for their achievements in demonstrating to the world the potential of aerial navigation. Lincoln Ellsworth (1926) was the first explorer honored, for his polar flight in 1925 and transpolar flight in 1926. Major Walter Reed and his associates (1928) were the first scientists honored, for discovering the cause and means of transmission of yellow fever in 1921. Vice President Alben W. Barkley (1949) was the first political honoree. In the late 20 th and early 21 st centuries, numerous other individuals have been honored for a variety of contributions including civil rights activism and humanitarian contributions. For a complete list of Congressional Gold Medal recipients since 1776, see the Appendix . Once a Congressional Gold Medal bill is introduced, it is typically referred to the House Committee on Financial Services or the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. The process for considering legislation varies between the House and Senate. In the House, there are currently no chamber or committee rules regarding the procedures for gold medal bills. In some past Congresses, the House Financial Services Committee had adopted a committee rule that prohibited its Domestic Monetary Policy and Technology Subcommittee from holding a hearing on commemorative medal legislation—including Congressional Gold Medals—"unless the legislation is cosponsored by at least two-thirds of the members of the House." Informal practices regarding cosponosrship requirements, however, may still exist. In the Senate, the Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee in the 116 th Congress requires that at least 67 Senators cosponsor any Congressional Gold Medal bill before being considered by the committee. This committee rule presumably does not formally preclude committee consideration of a House bill referred to it. The committee rule also does not prevent the Senate from considering or passing gold medal legislation. Referred bills may be brought to the floor without committee consideration; in other cases, a bill may avoid being referred to committee at all. In current practice, many enacted gold medal bills receive no formal committee consideration. Rather, the Senate often discharges the committee of the bill by unanimous consent; however, it appears that this discharge practice only occurs after the requisite number of cosponsors sign on to a Senate bill. Although Congress has approved legislation stipulating requirements for numerous other awards and decorations, there are no permanent statutory provisions specifically relating to the creation of Congressional Gold Medals. When a Congressional Gold Medal has been deemed appropriate, Congress has, by legislative action, provided for the creation of a medal on an ad hoc basis. Additionally, there is no statutory limit on the number of Congressional Gold Medals that may be struck in a given year. Congressional Gold Medal legislation generally has certain features, including findings that summarize the subject's history and importance; specifications for awarding the medal; instructions, if any, for the medal's design and striking; permission to mint and sell duplicates; and certification that medals are minted pursuant to existing requirements for national medals (5 U.S.C. §5111). Congressional Gold Medal legislation typically includes a section of findings. These often include historical facts about the people or groups being awarded the medal. For example, the legislation to authorize the Congressional Gold Medal to the World War II members of the "Doolittle Tokyo Raiders" stated the following: Congressional Gold Medal legislation typically includes a section that provides details on the presentation, design, and striking of the medal. For example, the legislation to authorize the Congressional Gold Medal to the Foot Soldiers who participated in Bloody Sunday, Turnaround Tuesday, or the final Selma to Montgomery Voting Rights March in March of 1965 stated the following: Additionally, this section can contain specific instructions to the Smithsonian, when it is the recipient of the physical gold medal, on its display and availability to be loaned to other institutions. For example, the legislation authorizing the American Fighter Aces Congressional Gold Medal stated the following: Gold medal legislation also generally authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to strike and sell duplicate medals in bronze. The duplicates are generally sold in two sizes: 1.5 inches and 3 inches. Duplicates are sold at a price which allows the U.S. Mint to cover the cost of striking the gold medal. For example, legislation authorizing the 65 th Infantry Regiment, known as the Borinqueneers, Congressional Gold Medal stated the following: Gold medal legislation generally contains a statement that these awards are considered as national medals for the purpose of the U.S. Mint's statutory requirements for producing medals. For example, legislation authorizing the Montford Point Marines Congressional Gold Medal stated the following: In some cases, authorizing legislation includes language authorizing appropriations for a Congressional Gold Medal. In these examples, Congress has authorized a specific sum from the United States Mint Public Enterprise Fund to pay for the cost of the medal. In cases where the authorization of appropriations is provided, a provision requiring that proceeds from the sale of duplicates be deposited in the same Fund is generally included. For example, legislation authorizing the Women Airforce Service Pilots Congressional Gold Medal stated the following: Congressional Gold Medal designs vary for each issuance. In general, the authorizing legislation provides that the Secretary of the Treasury "shall strike a gold medal with suitable emblems, devices, and inscriptions, to be determined by the Secretary." When designing a Congressional Gold Medal, the Secretary consults with the Citizens Coinage Advisory Commission (CCAC) and the U.S. Commission of Fine Arts (CFA) before determining the final design. Established by P.L. 108-15 , the CCAC advises the Secretary of the Treasury on theme and design of all U.S. coins and medals. For Congressional Gold Medals, the CCAC advises the Secretary "on any theme or design proposals relating to ... Congressional Gold Medals." The CCAC consists of 11 members appointed by the Secretary of the Treasury, with four persons appointed upon the recommendation of the congressional leadership (one each by the Speaker of the House, the House minority leader, the Senate majority leader, and the Senate minority leader). The CCAC meets several times each year to consider design suggestions for coins and medals. For each coin considered, the CCAC provides advice to the Secretary "on thematic, technical, and design issues related to the production of coins." Recommendations are then published to the committee's website, at http://www.ccac.gov . In tandem with recommendations received from the CCAC, the U.S. Mint also seeks a recommendation from the U.S. Commission of Fine Arts. Established in 1910, the CFA advises "upon the location of statues, fountains, and monuments in the public squares, streets, and parks in the District of Columbia; the selection of models for statues, fountains, and monuments erected under the authority of the Federal Government; the selection of artists; and questions of art generally when required to do so by the President or a committee of Congress." This includes review of commemorative coins when they are presented by the U.S. Mint and the issuance of recommendations for a coin's design. For example, in March 2014, the U.S. Mint presented several alternative designs for the First Special Service Force Congressional Gold Medal. In a letter to the U.S. Mint, the CFA provided recommendations on the design for the gold medal. CFA's letter stated the following: After receiving advice from the CCAC and the CFA, the Secretary of the Treasury, through the U.S. Mint, finalizes the coin's design and schedules it for production. Figure 1 shows the final design of two Congressional Gold Medals: the New Frontier Gold Medal for Neil Armstrong, Michael Collins, Buzz Aldrin, and John Glenn; and the Jack Nicklaus Gold Medal. As Members of Congress contemplate introducing legislation, and the House or the Senate potentially consider Congressional Gold Medal measures, there are several issues that could be considered. These can be divided into issues for individual Members of Congress with respect to individual Congressional Gold Medals, and issues for Congress as an institution. Individual issues include choices Members may make about which people or groups might be honored and whether specific design elements might be specified statutorily. Institutional issues might include committee or chamber rules on the consideration of Congressional Gold Medals and creating standards for the issuance of gold medals. Some Congressional Gold Medals have honored individuals (e.g., Arnold Palmer, Muhammad Yunus), some discrete groups of individuals (e.g., General of the Army George Catlett Marshall and Fleet Admiral Ernest Joseph King, Ruth and Billy Graham), and some larger groups (e.g., military units such as Women Airforce Service Pilots ["WASP"], Monuments Men). In choosing whom or what to recognize, Members of Congress generally evaluate whether they believe that the individual's or group's activities merit recognition by Congress. Congressional Gold Medals are "the highest civilian honor award program ... [to] honor national achievement in patriotic, humanitarian, and artistic endeavors." There are no specific criteria to determine whether or not an individual or group meets those lofty goals. Instead, each individual or group is judged on their merits by Congress should the legislation be considered. Congressional Gold Medal authorizations generally do not specify design elements. Instead, they direct the Secretary of the Treasury to "strike a gold medal with suitable emblems, devices, and inscriptions to be determined by the Secretary." Should Congress want to specify particular design elements, they might be included in the authorizing legislation. This would provide the Secretary of the Treasury with congressional intent on what should be incorporated into the gold medal design. Similar statutory specificity is sometimes included in commemorative coin legislation. Such specification, however, could serve to limit design choices for the gold medal and might alter the cost structure of striking the award, if the required element diverges from standard practices. Congressional Gold Medal legislation for groups generally provides that only a single gold medal is struck and specifies where it will be located after it is formally awarded. In many cases, the gold medal is given to the Smithsonian for appropriate display and where it can be made available for research. In other cases, the gold medal is provided to an organization that represents the honored group. Since most gold medal legislation contains a provision on the medal's location, a Member of Congress can help determine where the medal will be located. As discussed above under " Authorizing Congressional Gold Medals ," neither the House nor Senate rules provide any restrictions specifically concerning consideration of Congressional Gold Medal legislation on the House or Senate floor. In the 116 th Congress, the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs requires that at least 67 Senators must cosponsor any Senate Congressional Gold Medal bill before being considered by the committee. Currently, the House Financial Services Committee has not adopted any specific rules concerning committee consideration of Congressional Gold Medal legislation, although it has required a minimum number of cosponsors in past Congresses for committee consideration. As demonstrated by the discontinuation of the House Financial Services Committee rule requiring a minimum number of cosponsors for committee gold medal legislation, committee rules can be changed from Congress to Congress. Should the committee want to place requirements on its consideration of gold medal legislation, the Financial Services Committee could readopt its former rule, or something similar. Adopting committee rules to require a minimum number of cosponsors might encourage bill sponsors to build support among Representatives for gold medal bills. Such a minimum requirement, however, could potentially limit the number or type of gold medal bills the committee considers. Since only the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs has a rule that imposes a formal qualification on the potential committee consideration of gold medal legislation, the possible path forward for a bill can be different within each chamber. Should the House, the Senate, or both want to adopt similar language for committee or chamber consideration of gold medal legislation, such language could be incorporated into future committee rules, into House and Senate Rules, or into law. Taking steps to formally codify the gold medal consideration process might provide sponsors with a single process for award consideration, which could make it easier for gold medal bills to meet minimum requirements for consideration across both the House and Senate. Such codification could also limit congressional flexibility and might result in fewer proposals or authorizations to comply with new standards. Currently, there is no statutory limit to the number of Congressional Gold Medals that can be authorized. Should Congress want to place a limit on the number of gold medals awarded, standards could be adopted to provide a maximum number of gold medals authorized in any year or Congress. Congress has previously adopted similar standards for commemorative coins—only two coins may be minted in any given calendar year. Legislation to place a limit on the number of gold medals authorized has previously been introduced and considered in the House. During the 109 th Congress (2005-2006), H.R. 54 passed the House and would have restricted the Secretary of the Treasury from striking "more than 2 congressional gold medals for presentation ... in any calendar year." Introduced by Representative Michael Castle, the stated purpose of the legislation was to "maintain the prestige of the medal by limiting the number that may be awarded each year," and to "clarify that recipients are individuals and not groups." Passage of the measure, he argued, would "ensure the future integrity and true honor of the award." H.R. 54 did not receive further consideration in the Senate. While proponents of a limit on the number of gold medals issued might make arguments similar to those made by Representative Castle, opponents believe that Congress should reserve the right to authorize as many gold medals as it deems necessary, without consideration of the number struck in any calendar year. Representative Joseph Crowley in opposing the legislation told his House colleagues, "We are rushing to act on an issue that does not represent a problem." "Who that received this medal in the past," he asked, "was not worthy of it?" Further, Crowley argued that "there are occasions when more than one person is justified to receive the medal for their honorable actions in tandem with others." He continued by emphasizing that had this bill already been law, "Congress would not have been able to issue" a Congressional Gold Medal "to the Little Rock Nine," to "President and Mrs. Reagan," or to "Martin Luther King and Coretta Scott King." Congressional Gold Medals have long been an important way for Congress to express public gratitude for important historical events and achievements. Congressional Gold Medals, which have been issued since the American Revolution, are "the highest civilian honor award program ... [to] honor national achievement in patriotic, humanitarian, and artistic endeavors." In recent years, the number of gold medals awarded has "soared from four or five per decade for most of its history to an average of almost twenty in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s." Each Congress, legislation to award Congressional Gold Medals is introduced. In the 113 th Congress (2013-2014), 52 bills were introduced, 34 in the House and 18 in the Senate, to award a gold medal. In the 114 th Congress (2015-2016), 52 bills were introduced, 38 in the House and 14 in the Senate. In the 115 th Congress (2017-2018), 55 bills were introduced, 33 in the House and 22 in the Senate. Based on the number of measures offered in both chambers, some Members of Congress clearly feel it is important to recognize individuals and groups for their patriotic, humanitarian, and artistic achievements. Several considerations appear important when Members decide to introduce gold medal legislation. These include who should be honored, how many medals should be awarded in a given Congress, and whether specific design elements should be prescribed for the medal design. As Congress continues to consider legislation to award future gold medals, these considerations and others will likely be important factors for issuing the award.	[ "Senators and Representatives are frequently asked to support or sponsor proposals recognizing historic events and outstanding achievements by individuals or institutions. Among the various forms of recognition that Congress bestows, the Congressional Gold Medal is often considered the most distinguished. Through this venerable tradition—the occasional commissioning of individually struck gold medals in its name—Congress has expressed public gratitude on behalf of the nation for distinguished contributions for more than two centuries. Since 1776, this award, which initially was bestowed on military leaders, has also been given to such diverse individuals as Sir Winston Churchill and Bob Hope, George Washington and Robert Frost, Joe Louis and Mother Teresa of Calcutta. Congressional gold medal legislation generally has a specific format. Once a gold medal is authorized, it follows a specific process for design, minting, and awarding. This process includes consultation and recommendations by the Citizens Coinage Advisory Commission (CCAC) and the U.S. Commission of Fine Arts (CFA), pursuant to any statutory instructions, before the Secretary of the Treasury makes the final decision on a gold medal's design. Once the medal has been struck, a ceremony will often be scheduled to formally award the medal to the recipient. In recent years, the number of gold medals awarded has increased, and some have expressed interest in examining the gold medal awarding process. Should Congress want to make such changes, several individual and institutional options might be available. The individual options include decisions made by Members of Congress as to what individual or groups might be honored; potential specification of gold medal design elements; and where gold medals for groups might be housed once the award is made. The institutional options could include House, Senate, or committee rules for the consideration of gold medal legislation and whether statutory standards on the number of gold medals issued per year or per Congress might be established for gold medals." ]	3,411	gov_report	en	null	2275b1cfb1730906621cffa517740e08f71691dc5391ee26
Cobra Dane and other radar systems can provide capabilities that contribute to a range of missions, such as ballistic missile defense, space surveillance, and intelligence-gathering missions. DOD uses Cobra Dane and other radar systems to provide information over a short period of time to ground-based interceptors so they can hit their targets. Such radar systems contribute to ballistic missile defense by tracking incoming missile threats, classifying the missile threat, and determining if a threat was intercepted successfully. In addition, some radar systems can provide discrimination capabilities, which allow for that radar to identify a warhead when a missile threat deploys decoys at the same time. Radar systems can also have the capability to contribute to a space surveillance mission, which provides an awareness of space objects within or near the Earth’s orbit and their movements, capabilities, and intent. Finally, radars can also contribute intelligence-gathering capabilities. Each radar system’s ability to contribute to various missions can be dependent on that radar’s inherent capabilities and physical location. See table 1 for a description of selected radar systems that can provide some or all of these capabilities. Various offices within the Air Force, in coordination with MDA, are responsible for the operation and sustainment of the Cobra Dane radar. Since 2013, Air Force Space Command has overseen the operation of Cobra Dane, and contributes to the sustainment of Cobra Dane’s site at Shemya Island. The Air Force Life Cycle Management Center has overall responsibility of the sustainment of the Cobra Dane radar. In addition, MDA works in coordination with the Air Force and combatant commands to develop, test, and field ballistic missile defense assets. MDA also shares funding with the Air Force to operate and sustain Cobra Dane. U.S. Northern Command and U.S. Strategic Command define priorities for the overall radar infrastructure and establish the various missions that those radar systems are intended to meet. U.S. Northern Command oversees the homeland ballistic missile defense mission, and establishes operational objectives for radar systems operating in its region. U.S. Northern Command officials told us that they are the end user for Cobra Dane. U.S. Strategic Command has established a ballistic missile defense and a space surveillance mission, both of which are supported by Cobra Dane. Further, U.S. Strategic Command’s components coordinate global missile defense and space operations planning. In its January 2018 report to Congress, the Air Force described how Cobra Dane and LRDR can meet mission requirements through their shared and unique capabilities, as well as how their locations affect their ability to provide those capabilities for DOD’s ballistic missile defense mission. MDA studies we reviewed found that locating LRDR at Clear Air Force Station allows for operational advantages and cost savings. The Air Force included information in its report to Congress on the ballistic missile defense capabilities of Cobra Dane and LRDR, and the effects of each radar’s location on those capabilities. Specifically, the Air Force report stated that both radars have the capabilities to track and classify missile threats. However, the report incorrectly stated that both radar systems have the inherent capability to determine if a missile threat is successfully intercepted. MDA documentation that we reviewed shows that Cobra Dane does not yet have this capability. When we shared our finding with Air Force and MDA officials, they agreed that this reported capability was incorrectly identified in the Air Force report to Congress. MDA officials also told us that Cobra Dane could provide this capability in the future if it implements software changes, but they are unlikely to do this until calendar year 2025. The Air Force report also noted that LRDR would have a unique capability, once it is operational, to discriminate missile threats from any deployed decoys. See table 2 for a summary of what the Air Force reported for the ballistic missile defense capabilities of Cobra Dane and LRDR. In addition to identifying ballistic missile defense capabilities of each radar, the Air Force report noted that both Cobra Dane and LRDR will have the inherent capabilities to support space surveillance and intelligence-gathering missions. DOD officials we spoke to confirmed that they have plans to use those inherent capabilities to support these other missions. For example, U.S. Strategic Command identified that DOD needs Cobra Dane to support its space surveillance mission. Further, Air Force and MDA officials told us that they use Cobra Dane to track small objects that no other radar system can track. MDA officials told us that LRDR could be used for space surveillance. However, Air Force and U.S. Strategic Command officials stated that there are no plans to use LRDR’s space surveillance capabilities as a replacement for Cobra Dane. Additionally, Air Force officials told us that neither Cobra Dane nor LRDR is required to support an intelligence-gathering mission. The Air Force also included information in its report on how the locations of Cobra Dane and LRDR affect their abilities to contribute to the ballistic missile defense mission. For example, the Air Force reported that Cobra Dane’s location at Shemya Island, Alaska, allows it to track missile threats from North Korea earlier in their trajectories than LRDR would be able to track at Clear Air Force Station, Alaska. This is consistent with an MDA analysis that we reviewed that outlined additional advantages provided by Cobra Dane’s location at Shemya Island. According to that analysis, Cobra Dane can begin tracking missile threats approximately 210 seconds earlier than LRDR. Air Force officials told us that the additional time to track missile threats allows the warfighter an earlier opportunity to intercept a missile threat and deploy additional interceptors if the first attempt fails. Further, the MDA analysis described a tracking gap between the areas covered by LRDR—once it is operational at Clear Air Force Station—and the two sets of AN/TPY-2 radars that are currently located in Japan. Without Cobra Dane’s coverage of this gap, the analysis found that the warfighter would have a more limited opportunity to intercept a missile threat from North Korea. Figure 2 shows how Cobra Dane covers a gap between the LRDR (once operational) and the two AN/TPY-2 radars in Japan. The Air Force report also noted that LRDR’s geographic location has its own advantages in contributing to ballistic missile defense compared to Cobra Dane’s location. For example, the Air Force report noted that LRDR’s location would allow it to track missile threats later in their trajectories beyond Cobra Dane’s coverage as those threats make their way to the continental United States. We also found that MDA has determined LRDR will have other advantages due to its location. For example, an MDA analysis that we reviewed found that LRDR’s location will allow for the radar system to contribute to ballistic missile defense from North Korean and Iranian threats. Absent LRDR, this analysis determined that there are no other radar systems that are located in a position to provide the capability to discriminate missile threats and determine if a threat was successfully intercepted. In addition to what the Air Force reported, we found that DOD decided to locate LRDR at Clear Air Force Station in Alaska after considering the advantages and disadvantages of other locations. For example, MDA completed studies that examined how LRDR could perform at various locations in Alaska, and the cost-effectiveness of constructing and sustaining the radar at those sites. In a June 2015 analysis, MDA compared how LRDR could perform in discriminating missile threats when co-locating it with Cobra Dane at Shemya Island or placing it at Clear Air Force Station. MDA determined that LRDR could provide more real-time discrimination information for missile threats targeting Alaska and the continental United States if it constructed the radar at Clear Air Force Station versus Shemya Island. Additionally, MDA identified in an October 2016 study that the department could obtain operational advantages and cost savings by constructing LRDR at Clear Air Force Station, Alaska, when compared to constructing it at Shemya Island, Alaska. Specifically, MDA determined that Clear Air Force Station could provide better results for 11 of the 13 factors it reviewed compared to Shemya Island. For example, MDA determined that locating LRDR at Clear Air Force Station would result in lower costs and enhanced system performance. According to DOD officials and documents we reviewed, other radar investments may reduce the department’s reliance on Cobra Dane for ballistic missile defense and space surveillance, given that U.S. Northern Command identified it has a need for Cobra Dane after DOD begins operating LRDR in fiscal year 2021. Specifically, the Pacific Radar and Space Fence may reduce DOD’s reliance on Cobra Dane to support ballistic missile defense and space surveillance, respectively. Pacific Radar: According to DOD officials, the department may no longer need Cobra Dane to meet the ballistic missile defense mission after MDA fields a new radar in the Pacific region in fiscal year 2025. MDA began developing the Pacific Radar to provide additional missile threat tracking and discrimination capabilities. According to U.S. Northern Command and MDA officials, the Pacific Radar may fill the gap in tracking missile threats currently covered by Cobra Dane. Space Fence: The Air Force has also determined it will no longer have a requirement for Cobra Dane to provide space surveillance once the Space Fence is fully operational. The Air Force plans for the Space Fence to be operational in fiscal year 2019. According to a U.S. Strategic Command briefing, the Space Fence will provide the same capabilities as Cobra Dane. Air Force officials noted that they want to continue relying on Cobra Dane for space surveillance when the Space Fence is operational, as long as the radar is available and used to contribute to ballistic missile defense. In its January 2018 report to Congress, the Air Force noted that Cobra Dane met its requirement for operational availability—i.e., the percentage of time that the radar system is able to meet its ballistic missile defense and space surveillance missions. Specifically, the Air Force report noted that Cobra Dane had been available an average of 91 percent of the time over a 2-year period (January 2016 through December 2017), which exceeded the 90 percent requirement for operational availability. Information that we reviewed from a more recent 2-year period (August 2016 through July 2018) showed that Cobra Dane’s 2-year average for operational availability had declined to approximately 88 percent—below the 90 percent requirement. Air Force officials stated that the decline in the operational availability over the more recent two-year period was due to a few instances where they needed to take Cobra Dane off-line for extended periods of scheduled downtime (e.g., regular operations and maintenance, calibration of instruments). Further, they noted that when Cobra Dane is not operationally available, the reason is usually due to scheduled downtime. Officials also told us there was one instance of unscheduled downtime (e.g., part or system failure) in that 2-year period which required emergency maintenance on the radar’s mission control hardware. We also reviewed Air Force data on the frequency of unscheduled downtime between August 2016 and July 2018, which show that Cobra Dane is able to contribute to its missions without unscheduled downtime 99.7 percent of the time. According to U.S. Northern Command and MDA officials, they can mitigate the effect on the ballistic missile defense mission if they know far enough in advance that Cobra Dane will not be operationally available— such as during scheduled downtime. Officials stated that they do this by moving a transportable radar, known as the Sea-Based X-band radar, to specific locations in the Pacific Ocean to provide additional tracking coverage of missile threats. A U.S. Northern Command analysis that we reviewed describes how DOD can deploy the Sea-Based X-band radar at particular locations in the Pacific Ocean to supplement Cobra Dane. This analysis found that U.S. Northern Command can lose the ability to track some missile threat trajectories if Cobra Dane is not available and the Sea-Based X-band radar is not deployed. We also reviewed Air Force data on space surveillance, which shows that the Air Force would face some limitations in its ability to complete its space surveillance mission when Cobra Dane is not operationally available. According to the data, Cobra Dane tracks 3,300 space objects each day that cannot be tracked by any other radar system. Air Force officials noted that when Cobra Dane is not operationally available for space surveillance for short periods (less than 24 hours), they can overcome that downtime without losing track of those unique objects. However, officials told us that it would take six months to reacquire all of the small space objects that Cobra Dane tracks, if they encounter any significant scheduled or unscheduled downtime. MDA officials told us there are no scheduled plans to take Cobra Dane down long enough to compromise DOD’s ability to conduct space surveillance. In its January 2018 report to Congress, the Air Force projected that the Air Force and MDA would contribute total funding of $278.6 million based on their fiscal year 2019 budget plans for the operation and sustainment of Cobra Dane. According to the report, the Air Force and MDA plan to share funding for the operation and maintenance of the Cobra Dane radar, and for three modernization projects that make up their sustainment plan for the radar. Table 3 outlines the plan for how the Air Force and MDA will share funding for the operation and maintenance of Cobra Dane. In addition, the Air Force included information in its report on how the Air Force and MDA plan to share funding to support Cobra Dane’s three modernization projects. Specifically, the Air Force and MDA plan to redesign parts for three sets of obsolete systems: (1) mission system replacement; (2) traveling wave tubes; and (3) transmitter groups. The Air Force has identified that it no longer has vendors that manufacture some critical parts, and failure of any of the three systems could result in Cobra Dane not being available to meet mission requirements. As such, the Air Force determined that it could sustain these three systems more effectively if they were redesigned. Table 4 summarizes the reported funding for the three projects that make up the Cobra Dane sustainment plan. In addition to what the Air Force reported, we identified that the Air Force developed a total cost estimate for its transmitter group replacement, but not for its other two projects. For the other two projects, Air Force officials stated that they plan to complete estimates for the total costs in conjunction with their fiscal year 2020 budget submission. In August 2016, the Air Force estimated that the transmitter group replacement would have a total cost of $91.2 million, but reported it would fund this project at $94.0 million through fiscal year 2023 (see table 4). Air Force officials plan to request the transfer of any unused funding to the other projects once it completes the transmitter group project. The Air Force also completed a partial cost estimate for the traveling wave tube redesign—covering the redesign of the parts and replacement of 1 of 12 groups of parts—estimating that the first phase would cost $16.0 million. Further, Air Force officials told us that they have not yet developed a total cost estimate for the mission system replacement. We also found that the Air Force and MDA expedited Cobra Dane’s mission system replacement project, but Air Force officials told us they face challenges in expediting the other two projects without compromising Cobra Dane’s operational availability. For the mission system replacement, MDA requested additional funding in fiscal year 2018. Air Force and MDA officials told us that the additional funding they received allowed them to prioritize the mission system replacement and advance its timeline earlier that year. Air Force officials stated that they explored ways to expedite the two other projects: the traveling wave tubes and transmitter groups. However, they stated that replacing too many parts at the same time will result in their having to take Cobra Dane off-line for longer periods of time. According to Air Force and MDA officials, they may look for opportunities to expedite timeframes for their other two projects as long as the amount of scheduled downtime is kept to acceptable levels. In its report to Congress, the Air Force identified that it plans to provide $140 million in funding for the sustainment and maintenance of operational access to Cobra Dane’s site at Shemya Island based on its fiscal year 2019 budget plans. According to the report, the Air Force is solely responsible for funding all work related to the operation and sustainment of Shemya Island, shared between two of its major commands: Air Force Space Command and Pacific Air Forces. Table 5 summarizes the information the Air Force included in its report on how funding will be shared for Shemya Island. We also reviewed a support agreement between Air Force Space Command and Pacific Air Forces that identifies how they will sustain the site and the calculation for sharing costs. The agreement describes the specific work to sustain the site, including maintaining the airfield, support facilities, and communication infrastructure. Air Force officials told us that they are constantly addressing challenges related to operational access to the site at Shemya Island, but Air Force Space Command and Pacific Air Forces work together to address those challenges. We provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and comment. DOD told us that it had no comments on the draft report. We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisitions and Sustainment; the Secretary of the Air Force; the Director of the Missile Defense Agency; and the Commanders of U.S. Northern Command and U.S. Strategic Command. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact Joe Kirschbaum at (202) 512-9971 or kirschbaumj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made contributions to the report are listed in Appendix I. In addition to the contact named above, Kevin O’Neill (Assistant Director), Scott Bruckner, Vincent Buquicchio, Martin De Alteriis, Amie Lesser, and Richard Powelson made key contributions to the report.	[ "First fielded in 1976 on Shemya Island in Alaska, the Cobra Dane radar faces growing sustainment challenges that DOD plans to address through modernization projects. Anticipating future needs, DOD began investing in new radar systems that share capabilities with Cobra Dane to support ballistic missile defense and space surveillance, including the LRDR (Alaska), the Space Fence (Marshall Islands), and the Pacific Radar (location to be determined). The conference report accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 included a provision that GAO review the Air Force's report to Congress on the operation and sustainment of Cobra Dane. This report identifies information included in the Air Force's report and describes additional information that GAO reviewed on (1) the capabilities of the Cobra Dane radar and other planned radars to meet DOD's mission requirements, (2) Cobra Dane's operational availability and the plan to mitigate the effect on those missions when Cobra Dane is not available, and (3) DOD's funding plan and project cost estimates for the operation and sustainment of Cobra Dane and its site at Shemya Island. GAO reviewed the Air Force report and related documentation, and interviewed relevant officials. In its January 2018 report to Congress, the Air Force reported how the Cobra Dane radar and the Long Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR) have shared and unique capabilities to support ballistic missile defense and space surveillance missions. The report noted that the respective locations of both radar systems affect their ability to provide those capabilities. The Department of Defense (DOD) also has other radar investments—the Pacific Radar and the Space Fence, which, according to DOD officials, may reduce DOD's reliance on Cobra Dane to provide ballistic missile defense and space surveillance capabilities. The Air Force's report to Congress noted that Cobra Dane met its requirement for operational availability, which refers to the percentage of time that the radar is able to meet its missions. GAO found that the Air Force has developed procedures to mitigate risks when Cobra Dane is not available. For example, U.S. Northern Command and Missile Defense Agency (MDA) officials stated that they can mitigate risks when Cobra Dane is not available by using the Sea-Based X-band radar to provide support for ballistic missile defense. The Air Force would face some limitations in its ability to conduct space surveillance if Cobra Dane were not available, as Cobra Dane tracks objects no other radar can track. However, MDA officials noted there are no plans to take Cobra Dane offline long enough to compromise space surveillance. The Air Force and MDA plan to contribute total funding of $278.6 million for the operation and sustainment of Cobra Dane, according to their fiscal year 2019 budget plans. Specifically, the Air Force and MDA plan to share funding for the operation and maintenance of the Cobra Dane radar and for three modernization projects that make up their sustainment plan for the radar. Further, the Air Force report noted that the Air Force also plans to provide $140 million in funding for the sustainment and maintenance of operational access to Cobra Dane's site at Shemya Island. In addition, GAO found that the Air Force developed a total cost estimate for one project—known as the transmitter group replacement—but not for its other two projects. Air Force officials plan to complete cost estimates for those two projects in conjunction with their fiscal year 2020 budget submission." ]	3,043	gov_report	en	null	ab8303246d0ac5ee12fbaface313b4cf72cda733b7f308ff
The DEA, within the Department of Justice, is responsible for ensuring the availability of controlled substances for legitimate uses while preventing their diversion through its administration and enforcement of the Controlled Substances Act and its implementing regulations. Under the Controlled Substances Act, all persons or entities that manufacture, distribute, or dispense controlled substances are required to register with DEA, unless specifically exempted. DEA regulates these entities to limit diversion and prevent abuse. For example, DEA regulates pharmaceutical companies that manufacture controlled substances, health care providers who prescribe them to patients, and pharmacies that dispense them. In October 2010, the Disposal Act amended the Controlled Substances Act to allow the public to deliver unused controlled substances to an entity authorized by DEA to dispose of the substances. DEA was given responsibility for promulgating the implementing regulations, and the Disposal Act stipulated that the regulations should prevent diversion of controlled substances while also taking into consideration public health and safety, ease and cost of implementation, and participation by various communities. In addition to disposal bins, DEA’s regulations describe two other options for the public to transfer controlled substances for the purpose of disposal: mail-back programs and take-back events. Law enforcement agencies may use all three methods of drug disposal without the need for authorization by DEA. The Disposal Act stipulates that the regulations cannot require an entity to participate in or establish any of the disposal options. To participate as authorized collectors of unused prescription drugs, eligible entities—retail pharmacies, hospitals/clinics with an on-site pharmacy, narcotic treatment programs, reverse distributors, distributors, and drug manufacturers that are already authorized by DEA to handle controlled substances—must modify their DEA registration. According to DEA officials, such modification is free and simple to do. Eligible retail pharmacies or hospitals/clinics that become authorized collectors are able to install and maintain disposal bins in long-term care facilities in addition to their own location. DEA’s website contains a public search feature to identify authorized collectors located near a specific zip code or address. Authorized collectors must install, manage, and maintain the disposal bins following DEA regulations. For example, under DEA’s regulations for maintaining the disposal bins, the disposal bin must be securely fastened to a permanent structure, securely locked, substantially constructed with a permanent outer container and removable inner liner, and have a small opening that allows contents to be added but not removed; the bin must also prominently display a sign indicating which types of substances are acceptable; users must dispose the unused prescriptions into the collection receptacle themselves without handing them to staff at the pharmacy; the disposal bin must typically be located in an area where an employee is present and near where controlled substances are stored, and the bin must be made inaccessible to the public when an employee is not present; the inner liner of the disposal bin must meet certain requirements, including being waterproof, tamper-evident, tear-resistant, opaque, and having the size and identification number clearly labeled; and the installation and removal of inner liners must be performed under the supervision of at least two employees of the authorized collector. DEA regulations also require that all controlled substances collected in the disposal bin’s inner liners must be destroyed in compliance with applicable federal, state, and local laws and rendered non-retrievable. According to DEA regulations, non-retrievable means that the physical and chemical conditions of the controlled substance must be permanently altered, thereby rendering the controlled substance unavailable and unusable for all practical purposes. Authorized collectors are permitted to destroy the inner liner on their premises if they have the capacity to do so. If not, the inner liners can be transported to a separate location to be destroyed. Typically, in this case, an authorized collector contracts with a reverse distributor to periodically remove, transport, and destroy the inner liners. DEA regulations require that two reverse distributor employees transport the inner liners directly to the disposal location without any unnecessary stops or stops of an extended duration. Authorized collectors must document certain information, including inner liner identification numbers and the dates that each liner is installed, removed, and transferred for destruction. The authorized collectors must maintain these records for 2 years. Figure 1 summarizes the steps involved in the collection of unused prescription drugs. About 3 percent of pharmacies and other eligible entities have voluntarily chosen to become DEA-authorized collectors of unused prescription drugs, according to DEA data. As of April 2017, 2,233 of the 89,550 (2.49 percent) of eligible entities—which are already authorized by DEA to handle controlled substances—had registered to use disposal bins to collect unused prescription drugs. Most of the authorized collectors— about 81 percent—were pharmacies, followed by hospitals or clinics. (See table 1). Narcotic treatment programs, reverse distributors, and distributors made up approximately 1 percent of the authorized collectors. We also found that participation rates varied by state, though in most states relatively few of the eligible entities had registered with DEA to become authorized collectors of unused prescription drugs. In 44 states, less than 5 percent of the eligible entities had registered. (See figure 2 and appendix I for more information on the participation rates of authorized collectors in each state). As of April 2017, Connecticut, Missouri, and Maine had the lowest participation rates, with 0.11, 0.22, and 0.70 percent, respectively. In contrast, North Dakota had the highest participation rate, with 32.0 percent of its pharmacies and other eligible entities registered to be authorized collectors. The state with next highest participation rate was Alaska, with 8.96 percent. In North Dakota, the state’s Board of Pharmacy provides funding for authorized collectors to purchase and maintain the disposal bins. According to a board official, the board decided to fund these activities to increase participation rates and plans to continue its funding indefinitely using revenue generated from prescription drug licensing fees it collects. In addition, our analysis shows that about 82 percent of all authorized collectors were located in urban areas as of April 2017. However, when comparing the entities registered to be authorized collectors with the total number of eligible entities, we found that a larger percentage of the eligible entities in rural areas became authorized collectors compared with those in urban areas (see table 2). The data we obtained on the number of eligible and participating authorized collectors and their locations are the only available DEA data on the use of disposal bins to collect unused prescription drugs. According to DEA officials, the agency does not collect any other information on the use of disposal bins, such as the extent to which the bins are used, or the amount and types of prescription drugs deposited into the bins. For example, to minimize the risk of diversion, DEA regulations do not allow authorized collectors to open and inspect the inner liners of the disposal bins, so information on their contents cannot be collected. According to DEA officials, the agency is not responsible for collecting information on the amount and types of prescription drugs destroyed through the disposal bins. DEA officials told us that the agency views its responsibility solely as giving pharmacies and other eligible entities the opportunity to become authorized collectors. Though we do not have information on the extent to which individuals use DEA’s prescription drug disposal bins, we were able to estimate that as of April 2017, about half of the country’s population lived less than 5 miles away from a pharmacy or other DEA-authorized entity offering a prescription disposal bin. In 21 states, at least 50 percent of the state’s population lived within 5 miles of a prescription disposal bin. (See figure 3). While close to half of the nation’s population lived less than 5 miles from a disposal bin as of April 2017, the availability of nearby disposal bins varied significantly for people depending on whether they lived in an urban or a rural area. Specifically, about 52 percent of the population in urban areas lived less than 5 miles away from a disposal bin, compared to about 13 percent of the population in rural areas. Furthermore, about 44 percent of the population in rural areas lived even further away—more than 30 miles away from a disposal bin. An exception to this is North Dakota, where about 86 percent of its urban population and about 64 percent of its rural population lived within 5 miles of a disposal bin. According to officials from the 11 stakeholder organizations we interviewed—which represent authorized collectors and long-term care facilities—several factors may explain why relatively few pharmacies and other eligible entities have chosen to become authorized collectors of unused prescription drugs. These factors include the associated costs of participating, uncertainty over proper implementation, and participation in other, similar efforts for disposing of unused prescription drugs. Costs: Stakeholders said that the costs associated with purchasing, installing, and managing the disposal bins is a factor that explains the relatively low rate of participation. One stakeholder told us that many eligible entities may decide that the benefit of participating does not outweigh the costs associated with doing so. Specifically, stakeholders told us that the major costs associated with participating include the one-time cost of purchasing and installing a disposal bin; the ongoing costs to train personnel to manage the bins; and the cost of contracting with a reverse distributor to periodically dispose of the bin’s inner liner and contents. Stakeholders gave varying examples of the specific costs associated with these investments. For example, one stakeholder estimated the yearly costs of maintaining a disposal bin ranged from $500 to $600 per location; another stakeholder said that the cost is thousands of dollars per location per year, but did not provide a specific estimate. These stakeholders added that costs can increase if the disposal bins fill more quickly and need to be emptied more often than expected. For their part, officials from the reverse distributor stakeholders we interviewed cited incinerating hazardous waste, the availability of incinerators, and the cost of personnel as factors that increase the cost of their services for authorized collectors. One reverse distributor stakeholder told us that there are not many incinerators available, requiring them to travel long distances to incinerate collected waste. The other reverse distributor stakeholder added that DEA’s requirement that a second employee be present during the transportation and disposal increases the cost of their services. While some stakeholders speculated that costs are a reason for low participation, a few stakeholders told us that the benefits are worth the costs. In fact, two stakeholders we spoke with told us that the benefit to the communities was so important that they decided to provide funding to retail pharmacies, alleviating an individual pharmacy’s concern about the cost of installing and maintaining the disposal bins. We found that as of April 2017, over a quarter of the 2,233 authorized collectors using disposal bins received external funding to pay for the costs associated with installing and maintaining the disposal bins. In addition, stakeholders told us that some localities have enacted laws known as extended producer responsibility ordinances, which require that pharmaceutical manufacturers pay for certain costs associated with drug disposal. When asked about the costs associated with operating disposal bins, DEA officials told us that addressing cost issues with eligible participants falls outside of their responsibilities. Uncertainty: Stakeholders also told us that uncertainty regarding how to comply with aspects of DEA’s regulations for prescription drug disposal bins affected their decisions to participate. One stakeholder added that many eligible entities decide not to participate because uncertainties over participation requirements could result in inadvertent non-compliance with DEA’s regulations. As an example of their uncertainty over some of the requirements governing the disposal bins, officials from both of the reverse distributor stakeholders we interviewed cited DEA’s non-retrievable standard for destruction of the inner liners of the bins. DEA requires that the method of destruction be sufficient to render all controlled substances non- retrievable, meaning that the physical and chemical conditions of the controlled substances must be permanently altered and unusable in order to prevent diversion for illicit purposes. Both reverse distributor stakeholders told us that they are uncertain about whether certain disposal methods meet this standard, and they said that the agency has not provided further guidance on how reverse distributors can meet this requirement. DEA officials told us that the agency responds to questions about whether a specific method of destruction meets the non-retrievable standard by telling the registrant to test the remnants after destruction, to see if any components of the controlled substance are still present. In its summary of the regulations implementing the Disposal Act, DEA stated that in order to allow for the development of various methods of destruction, the agency did not require a specific method of destruction as long as the desired result is achieved. However, DEA officials stated that to their knowledge, incineration is the only method known to meet the non-retrievable standard to date, but the officials hoped other methods will be developed in the future. When asked about the guidance they provide to authorized collectors of unused prescription drugs or those eligible to become authorized collectors, DEA officials told us that they post frequently-asked questions on their website, routinely answer questions from participants and others, and give training presentations at conferences that include information on the disposal bins. In our prior work, we found problems with DEA’s communication and guidance to stakeholders. In 2015, we recommended that DEA identify and implement cost-effective means for communicating regularly with pharmacies and other entities authorized to handle controlled substances. DEA agreed with the recommendation, and officials told us that, starting in August 2017, these entities can subscribe to DEA’s website to receive notifications when it is updated with new guidance. Stakeholders also noted that some DEA requirements related to disposal bins may conflict with other state and federal requirements governing the transportation and disposal of hazardous waste, which includes some controlled substances. For example, the two reverse distributor stakeholders told us that some incinerator permits issued by states require that hazardous waste be examined before incineration; however, DEA requirements do not allow the contents of the liners to be examined, even at the time of incineration. To address the incinerator permit requirements, one reverse distributor told us that they use the Environmental Protection Agency’s hazardous waste household exemption, which treats the liners as household waste and thereby allows incinerator facilities to destroy the liners without examining the contents or violating their state permit. In addition, some stakeholders raised concerns that DEA’s regulations may conflict with other federal regulations. For instance, one stakeholder noted that they recently learned that transporting the disposal bin’s inner liners could violate Department of Transportation regulations. DEA officials told us that they were aware of this, explaining that the conflict was between DEA’s requirement that controlled substances be transported in liners and the Department of Transportation’s requirement that this type of waste be transported in sturdy containers. According to DEA officials, this conflict has been resolved by the Department of Transportation allowing reverse distributors to place the liners inside sturdy containers kept on trucks. Participation in or Availability of Similar Efforts: Stakeholders said that some pharmacies and other eligible entities were already participating in other, similar efforts that allow for the safe disposal of controlled substances, and therefore they did not want to invest additional resources into participating as authorized collectors using disposal bins. For example, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services has an established process that long-term care facilities use to dispose of their unused controlled substances. As a result, all of the long-term care stakeholders told us that long-term care facilities may choose not to partner with pharmacies interested in placing disposal bins within their facilities because it adds significant cost and effort without any additional benefit. Furthermore, pharmacy stakeholders noted that because of the availability of other prescription drug collection efforts in their communities, they did not think that maintaining a disposal bin at their locations was needed. For example, two of the stakeholders explained that local law enforcement precincts already had a similar type of disposal bin in place to collect unused prescription drugs. DEA officials told us that they were aware of other options for the public and entities such as long-term care facilities that are not registered as authorized collectors to dispose of controlled substances. The officials also indicated that the availability of disposal options at law enforcement agencies contributes to the low participation rates among pharmacies as authorized collectors of unused prescription drugs. We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Justice for comment. DEA, part of the Department of Justice, provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to the Attorney General of the United States and the Administrator of DEA. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-7114 or draperd@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix II. In addition to the contact name above, Elizabeth H. Curda (Director), Will Simerl (Assistant Director), Kathryn Richter (Analyst-In-Charge), Nick Bartine, Giselle Hicks, Jessica Lin, and Emily Wilson made key contributions to this report. Also contributing were Muriel Brown and Krister Friday.	[ "In 2015, 3.8 million Americans reported misusing prescription drugs within the last month, and deaths from prescription opioids have more than quadrupled since 1999. About half of the people who reported misusing prescription drugs in 2015 received them from a friend or relative. One way to help prevent this kind of diversion and potential misuse is by providing secure and convenient ways to dispose of unused, unneeded, or expired prescription medications. The Secure and Responsible Drug Disposal Act of 2010 authorizes pharmacies and other entities already authorized by DEA to handle controlled substances to also collect unused prescription drugs for disposal. In 2014, DEA finalized regulations for the implementation of the Act, establishing a voluntary process for eligible entities to become authorized collectors of unused prescription drugs using disposal bins. GAO was asked to review participation among authorized collectors that maintain disposal bins. In this report GAO describes (1) participation rates among entities eligible to collect unused prescription drugs and (2) factors that affect participation. GAO analyzed the most currently available DEA data from April 2017 on entities eligible to participate and those participating as authorized collectors. GAO also conducted interviews with DEA officials and a nongeneralizable sample of 11 stakeholder organizations selected to illustrate different types of authorized collectors and long-term care facilities. GAO is not making any recommendations. DEA provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated as appropriate. GAO found that about 3 percent of pharmacies and other entities eligible to collect unused prescription drugs for disposal have volunteered to do so. The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) authorizes these entities to dispose of unused drugs to help reduce their potential misuse. Analysis of DEA data shows that as of April 2017, 2,233 of the 89,550 (2.49 percent) eligible entities—that is, certain entities already authorized by DEA to handle controlled substances—had registered with DEA to use disposal bins to collect unused prescription drugs. Most—about 81 percent—of the authorized collectors were pharmacies, followed by hospitals or clinics. GAO also found that participation rates varied by state, though in 44 states less than 5 percent of the state's pharmacies and other eligible entities had registered to become authorized collectors. Stakeholders cited several factors that may explain why relatively few pharmacies and other eligible entities have registered with DEA as authorized collectors of unused drugs. Most notably, stakeholders representing authorized collectors told GAO that because participation is voluntary, the cost associated with maintaining a disposal bin—which includes purchasing and installing the bin according to DEA requirements and paying for the destruction of its contents—is an important factor to weigh against potential benefits. DEA noted that availability of disposal by law enforcement agencies also contributes to low participation." ]	2,930	gov_report	en	null	472f8bd04a40ac32a4e44582f106714097d5acdabb59a978
The House of Representatives has standing rules that govern how bills and resolutions are to be taken up and considered on the floor. However, to expedite legislation receiving floor action, the House may temporarily set aside these rules for measures that are not otherwise privileged for consideration. This can be done by agreeing to a special order of business resolution (special rule) or by adopting a motion to suspend the rules and pass the underlying measure. In general, special rules enable the consideration of complex or contentious legislation, such as major appropriations or reauthorizations, while the suspension of the rules procedure is usually applied to broadly supported legislation that can be approved without floor amendments or extensive debate in the chamber. Most bills and resolutions that receive floor action in the House are called up and considered under suspension of the rules. The suspension procedure allows nonprivileged measures to be raised without a special rule, waives points of order, limits debate, and prohibits floor amendments. Motions to suspend the rules and pass the measure require a two-thirds vote, so the procedure is typically reserved for bills and resolutions that can meet a supermajority threshold. Decisions to schedule bills for consideration under suspension are generally based on how widely supported the measures are, how long Members wish to debate them, and whether they want to propose floor amendments. These decisions are not necessarily related to the subject matter of the measure. Accordingly, measures brought up under suspension cover a wide range of policy areas but most often address government operations, such as the designation of federal facilities. This report describes the suspension procedure, which is defined in clause 1 of House Rule XV, and provides an analysis of measures considered under suspension during the 114 th Congress (2015-2016). Figures 1- 8 display statistical data, including the prevalence and form of suspension measures, sponsors of measures, committee consideration, length of floor debate, voting, and resolution of differences between the chambers. Table 1 summarizes the final legislative status of measures initially considered in the House under the suspension of the rules. Finally, Figure A-1 depicts the use of the suspension procedure from the 110 th through the 114 th Congresses (2007-2016). The suspension of the rules procedure is established by clause 1 of House Rule XV. Bills, resolutions, House amendments to Senate bills, amendments to the Constitution, conference reports, and other types of business may be considered under suspension, even those "that would otherwise be subject to a point of order … [or have] not been reported or referred to any calendar or previously introduced." Suspension motions are in order on designated days. As Rule XV states, "the Speaker may not entertain a motion that the House suspend the rules except on Mondays, Tuesdays, and Wednesdays and during the last six days of a session of Congress." Suspension measures, however, may be considered on other days by unanimous consent or under the terms of a special order of business (special rule) reported by the Committee on Rules and agreed to by the House. A motion to suspend the rules is a compound motion to suspend the House rules and pass a bill or agree to a resolution. When considering such a motion, the House is voting on the two questions simultaneously. Once recognized, the Member making the motion will say, "Mr. [or Madam] Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass___." The House rules that are suspended under this procedure include those that "would impede an immediate vote on passage of a measure … such as ordering the previous question, third reading, recommittal, or division of the question." A measure considered under the suspension procedure is not subject to floor amendment. The motion to suspend and pass the measure, though, may provide for passage of the measure in an amended form. That is, the text to be approved may be presented in a form altered by committee amendments or by informal negotiations. Suspension measures that are passed with changes incorporated into the text are passed "as amended." There are no separate votes on the floor approving such amendments. Suspension motions are "debatable for 40 minutes, one-half in favor of the motion and one-half in opposition thereto." However, in most instances, a true opponent never claims half the time, and most speakers come to the floor to express support for the measure. Debate time is controlled by two floor managers, one from each party, who sit on a committee of jurisdiction. Each manager makes an opening statement and may yield increments of the 20 minutes they control to other Members to debate the measure. Once debate has concluded, a single vote is held on the motion to suspend the rules and pass the measure. The motion requires approval by "two-thirds of the Members voting, a quorum being present." Should the vote fall short of the two-thirds required for passage (290, if all Members vote), the measure is not permanently rejected. Before the end of the Congress, the House may consider the measure again under suspension, or the Committee on Rules may report a special rule that provides for floor consideration of the measure. As illustrated in Figure 1 , the majority of measures considered on the House floor during the 114 th Congress were called up under the suspension of the rules procedure. Sixty-two percent of all measures that received floor action were considered under suspension (743 out of the 1,200), compared to those under the terms of a special rule (14%), unanimous consent (7%), or privileged business (16%). Figure 2 displays the form of suspension measures. Most of the measures considered under suspension during the 114 th Congress (94%) were bills. House bills made up 83% of the suspension total, Senate bills 11%. As represented in Figure 3 , most suspension measures were sponsored by members of the majority party during the 114 th Congress. House or Senate majority-party members sponsored 69% of all bills and resolutions initially considered in the House under suspension, while House majority-party members sponsored 467 (71%) of the 660 House-originated measures (designated with an H.R., H.Res., H.Con.Res. or H.J.Res. prefix). Suspension is, however, the most common procedure used to consider minority-sponsored legislation in the House by a wide margin. In the 114 th Congress, 85% of the minority-sponsored measures that were considered on the House floor were raised under the suspension procedure. Members of the House or Senate minority parties sponsored 31% of all suspension measures originating in either chamber, compared to 9% of legislation subject to different procedures, including privileged business (17 measures), unanimous consent (21 measures), and special rules (one Senate bill). Minority-party House Members sponsored 193 (29%) of the 660 House measures considered under suspension. No minority-party House Member sponsored a House-originated measure that was considered under a special rule. Most suspension measures are referred to at least one House committee before their consideration on the chamber floor. In the 114 th Congress, 710 out of the 743 suspension measures considered (96%) were previously referred to a House committee. Of the 33 measures that were considered without a referral, 31 were Senate bills that were "held at the desk," and two were House resolutions that provided concurrence to Senate amendments. Measures may be referred to multiple House committees before receiving floor action. When a bill or resolution is referred to more than one House committee, the Speaker will designate one committee as primary, meaning it is the committee exercising jurisdiction over the largest part of the measure. Generally, the chair of the committee of primary jurisdiction works with majority party leadership to determine if and when a measure should be considered under suspension. Figure 4 shows the number and percentage of measures brought up under suspension from each House committee of primary jurisdiction. The House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform (now Oversight and Reform) was the committee of primary jurisdiction for the plurality of measures considered under suspension in the 114 th Congress: 106, or 14%, of the total number of suspension measures considered. Many of these bills designated names for post offices or other federal properties. For most House committees, the majority of their referred measures that reached the floor were raised under the suspension procedure. In the 114 th Congress, the four exceptions were the Committee on House Administration—which had several measures considered by unanimous consent—and the Committees on Appropriations, the Budget, and Armed Services, which had at least half of their measures considered pursuant to special rules. For the other committees, suspension measures ranged from 57% to 100% of the total number of the committee's measures receiving floor action ( Figure 5 ). Since suspension motions require a two-thirds majority for passage, House committees that handle less contentious subjects tend to have more of their measures considered under the suspension procedure in comparison to other committees. In the 114 th Congress, high-suspension committees included Small Business (100% of measures receiving floor action) and Veterans' Affairs (92%). The Small Business Committee's measures sought to authorize new business development programs. Veterans' Affairs measures included authorizations, reauthorizations, and bills designating federal facilities. While suspension measures are not subject to floor amendments, committees may recommend amendments to legislative texts during markup meetings or through informal negotiations. The motion to suspend the rules can include these proposed changes when a Member moves to suspend the rules and pass the measure "as amended." In the 114 th Congress, 396 suspension measures (53% of the total) were considered "as amended," meaning that the text to be approved differed from the measure's introduced text. Clause 2 of House Rule XIII requires that measures reported by House committees must be accompanied by a written report. Otherwise, they are not placed on a calendar of measures eligible for floor consideration. However, the written report requirement is among those rules suspended under the suspension procedure. Thus, measures may be called up on the floor under suspension of the rules even if a committee never ordered them to be reported or wrote an accompanying committee report. Instead, the motion to suspend the rules discharges the committee and moves the legislation directly to the House floor. In the 114 th Congress, 517 (70%) suspension measures were ordered to be reported by a House committee. Of this number, 398 were reported with an accompanying House committee report. Twenty measures that did not have a House report did have a Senate report, while 325 measures had no written report from either chamber (43% of the total number of suspension measures). Pursuant to Rule XV, motions to suspend the rules are regularly in order on Mondays, Tuesdays, and Wednesdays or on the last six days of a session of Congress. However, suspension motions may be considered on other days by unanimous consent or under the terms of a special rule reported by the Committee on Rules and agreed to by the House. As displayed in Figure 6 , in the 114 th Congress, the plurality of suspension measures were considered on Tuesdays (312, 42% of the total number considered), followed by Mondays (291, 39%) and Wednesdays (114, 15%). In addition, 25 suspension measures were considered on Thursdays and one on a Friday. Of these, one was considered by unanimous consent, while 25 were called up under suspension pursuant to permission included in a special rule reported by the Rules Committee and agreed to by the full House. Such special rules included a provision stating, "It shall be in order at any time on the legislative day of ___ for the Speaker to entertain motions that the House suspend the rules as though under clause 1 of rule XV." Pursuant to Rule XV, suspension measures are "debatable for 40 minutes, one-half in favor of the motion and one-half in opposition thereto." In practice, there is rarely a true opponent to a motion to suspend the rules, and the time is divided between two floor managers, usually one from each party, who both favor the motion. The floor managers each control 20 minutes of debate. The managers may be their parties' sole representative for or against the motion, or they may yield increments of the 20-minute allotment to other Members. Typically, the relevant committee chairs and ranking members select the majority and minority floor managers for particular bills and resolutions. These managers may be the measure's sponsor, the chair or ranking member of the measure's committee of primary jurisdiction, or another committee member. In the 114 th Congress, the measure's sponsor served as the majority manager on 26% of the suspension measures receiving floor action. The committee chair managed 29% of the measures. The minority manager was the measure's sponsor for 11% of the measures and the committee's ranking member for 26% of the measures considered. Occasionally, floor managers controlling time on a motion to suspend the rules ceded their control to other Members during debate. In two identified cases, both the majority and minority floor managers favored the measure, and another Member claimed the time in true opposition during the initial floor consideration of the measure. In at least one other instance, the minority manager asked unanimous consent to yield managerial control to another Member. A majority floor manager makes the motion to suspend the rules by stating, "Mr. [Madam] Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill [or resolution] ____." The Speaker [or Speaker pro tempore] responds, "Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman[woman] from [state] and the gentleman[woman] from [state] each will control twenty minutes." The majority and minority managers then, in turn, make opening statements regarding the measure using the 20 minutes each controls. If the majority and minority managers have secured additional speakers, the speakers generally alternate between the parties within the 40-minute limit. During the 114 th Congress, on a motion to suspend the rules, the average number of speakers in addition to the floor managers was fewer than two. On 83% of the measures (620) considered, there were one or two additional speakers. On 27% of the measures (199) considered, there were no additional speakers, and in 16% of the measures (120) considered, there were 3 to 12 additional speakers. Three measures had 20, 21, and 25 additional speakers, respectively. At the start of the debate period, the majority manager may request "unanimous consent that all Members may have five legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and add extraneous materials on this bill [resolution]." This request enables general leave statements to be inserted into the Congressional Record . In 29% of the suspension measures considered in the 114 th Congress, a written general leave statement appeared in the Record following in-person remarks, indicating that the remarks were submitted on the day the legislation was considered. General leave statements submitted on a day other than the day of consideration appear in the Extension of Remarks section of the Congressional Record . Suspension measures are limited to a maximum of 40 minutes of debate under Rule XV. However, if there are time gaps between speakers or procedural interruptions, such as a vote on a motion to adjourn, the time period between the start of the first speaker's remarks and the conclusion of debate may exceed 40 minutes. The statistics displayed in Figure 7 show the length of consideration of suspension measures as documented in Congress.gov, not the accumulated length of statements, as kept by official timekeepers in the chamber. In the 114 th Congress, the average length of consideration on a motion to suspend the rules was 13 minutes and 10 seconds, and half of the measures considered had a debate period of 10 minutes or less. Thus, while overall debate is limited to 40 minutes under the rule, on most suspension measures, only a fraction of that time was actually expended during consideration. Seventeen measures, however, had consideration periods that exceeded 40 minutes due to procedural delays or, in the case of one measure, a request for unanimous consent to extend debate by 10 minutes to each side. House leaders generally choose measures for suspension that are likely to achieve the two-thirds majority threshold for passage. Thus, almost all suspension measures were passed by the House in the 114 th Congress. The full House approved all House resolutions (28), concurrent resolutions (12), joint resolutions (2), and Senate bills (82) that were considered under suspension. The House also passed, via motions to suspend the rules, 612 of the 619 House bills that were initially considered under suspension. Seven bills did not receive the requisite supermajority. Two of these bills were later considered and approved under the terms of a special rule. The remaining five bills did not return to the floor and therefore did not pass the House. Most suspension motions are agreed to in the House by voice vote, which is the chamber's default method of voting on most questions. In 2015 and 2016, this method of voting led to the final approval of 72% (531) of the motions to suspend the rules and pass the measures (see Figure 8 ). After the initial voice vote, Members triggered an eventual record vote (often called a roll call vote) on 212 (28%) of the suspension measures considered in the 114 th Congress. This was done by demanding the "yeas and nays," objecting to the vote "on the grounds that a quorum is not present," or, in one case, demanding a recorded vote. In most instances, the chair elected to postpone the vote to a later period, within two additional legislative days, pursuant to clause 8 of House Rule XX. Of the 212 record votes, 3 immediately followed debate on the measure. The remaining 209 votes were postponed to another time on the legislative schedule, usually later the same day. In the 114 th Congress, 205 suspension motions were adopted by record vote, and 7 motions to suspend the rules were defeated by record votes. The defeat of a motion to suspend the rules, however, does not necessarily kill the legislation. The Speaker may choose to recognize a Member at a later time to make another motion to suspend the rules and pass the bill, or the House may consider the measure pursuant to a special rule reported by the Committee on Rules. Accordingly, two of the initially unsuccessful measures were later called up and passed under the terms of a special rule. Five measures were not considered again, via any House floor procedure, before the end of the 114 th Congress. Although suspension measures generally receive broad support, measures that receive the requisite two-thirds majority in the House are not guaranteed passage in the Senate. As noted in Table 1 , in the 114 th Congress, the Senate passed 197 of the 619 House bills initially considered under suspension (32%). Additionally, the Senate agreed to 1 of the 2 House joint resolutions and 5 of the 11 House concurrent resolutions considered under suspension of the rules. Of the number of suspension measures that passed the House and Senate, 60 required a resolution of differences between the chambers. Forty-four House measures and 15 Senate bills were subject to an amendment exchange process, and on one occasion, a conference committee was used to resolve the differences between the House and Senate versions of a House bill. The Senate passed three House bills, initially approved in the House under suspension, that did not become public law because the House did not agree to the final bill text, as amended by the Senate. In those instances, the House did not reconsider the bills once the Senate returned the Senate-amended versions to the House chamber. Thus, 194 House bills were presented to the President for signature. Of the measures initially considered under suspension during the 114 th Congress, President Obama was presented with 194 House bills, 82 Senate bills, and 1 House joint resolution for signature or veto. The President vetoed H.R. 1777 (Presidential Allowance Modernization Act of 2016) and S. 2040 (Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act). The House chose not to attempt a veto override on H.R. 1777 , so the measure did not become public law. Both the Senate and House voted to override the veto of S. 2040 , enabling it to become law without the President's signature ( P.L. 114-222 ). Thus, of the 703 law-making measures (bills and joint resolutions) initially considered under suspension of the rules, 193 House bills, 82 Senate bills, and 1 House joint resolution became public law (see Table 1 ).	[ "Suspension of the rules is the most commonly used procedure to call up measures on the floor of the House of Representatives. As the name suggests, the procedure allows the House to suspend its standing and statutory rules in order to consider broadly supported legislation in an expedited manner. More specifically, the House temporarily sets aside its rules that govern the raising and consideration of measures and assumes a new set of constraints particular to the suspension procedure. The suspension of the rules procedure has several parliamentary advantages: (1) it allows nonprivileged measures to be raised on the House floor without the need for a special rule, (2) it enables the consideration of measures that would otherwise be subject to a point of order, and (3) it streamlines floor action by limiting debate and prohibiting floor amendments. Given these features, as well as the required two-thirds supermajority vote for passage, suspension motions are generally used to process less controversial legislation. In the 114th Congress (2015-2016), measures considered under suspension made up 62% of the bills and resolutions that received floor action in the House (743 out of 1,200 measures). The majority of suspension measures were House bills (83%), followed by Senate bills (11%) and House resolutions (4%). The measures covered a variety of policy areas but most often addressed government operations, such as the designation of federal facilities or amending administrative policies. Most measures that are considered in the House under the suspension procedure are sponsored by a House or Senate majority party member. However, suspension is the most common House procedure used to consider minority-party-sponsored legislation regardless of whether the legislation originated in the House or Senate. In 2015 and 2016, minority-party members sponsored 31% of suspension measures, compared to 9% of legislation subject to different procedures, including privileged business (17 measures), unanimous consent (21 measures), and under the terms of a special rule (one Senate bill). Most suspension measures are referred to at least one House committee before their consideration on the floor. The House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform (now called the Committee on Oversight and Reform) was the committee of primary jurisdiction for the plurality of suspension measures considered in the 114th Congress. Additional committees—such as Energy and Commerce, Homeland Security, Natural Resources, Foreign Affairs, and Veterans' Affairs—also served as the primary committee for a large number of suspension measures. Suspension motions are debatable for up to 40 minutes. In most cases, only a fraction of that debate time is actually used. In the 114th Congress, the average amount of time spent considering a motion to suspend the rules was 13 minutes and 10 seconds. The House adopted nearly every suspension motion considered in 2015 and 2016. Approval by the House, however, did not guarantee final approval in the 114th Congress. The Senate passed or agreed to 40% of the bills, joint resolutions, and concurrent resolutions initially considered in the House under suspension of the rules, and 276 measures were signed into law. This report briefly describes the suspension of the rules procedure, which is defined in House Rule XV, and provides an analysis of measures considered under this procedure during the 114th Congress. Figures and one table display statistics on the use of the procedure, including the prevalence and form of suspension measures, sponsorship of measures by party, committee consideration, length of debate, voting, resolution of differences between the chambers, and the final status of legislation. In addition, an Appendix illustrates trends in the use of the suspension procedure from the 110th to the 114th Congress (2007-2016)." ]	3,420	gov_report	en	null	72b99d02c7eafbddc5b5923124537e49fd359ba557d3ae22
The National Cemeteries Act of 1973 created the modern veterans’ cemetery system. NCA, within VA, manages a majority of veterans’ cemeteries in the United States. In that role NCA maintains existing national cemeteries and builds new national cemeteries for the nation’s veterans and their family members. Since 1978 NCA has also provided funding through VA’s Veterans Cemetery Grants Program (Grants Program) to help establish, expand, or improve state and tribal veterans’ cemeteries. States and tribal governments seeking funding from the Grants Program must apply to the VA. Any cemetery established, expanded, or improved through funding from VA’s Grants Program must be maintained and operated in accordance with NCA’s operational standards. Veterans from all 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and some U.S. territories are served by national, state, or tribal cemeteries. In addition, over time NCA has changed its policies and procedures to better fulfill its mission to serve and honor veterans and their family members. For example, in 2011 NCA lowered its policy threshold for establishing new national cemeteries from an area having at least 170,000 veterans who are unserved by burial options to an area having 80,000 unserved veterans. NCA established this revised policy threshold in recognition that many highly populated areas still lacked reasonable access to a burial option, and based on data and analysis provided by an independent review of VA’s burial benefits program in 2008. This revised minimum veteran population threshold was chosen based on data showing that state veterans’ cemeteries funded through VA’s Grants Program were located in areas that typically served a maximum of 80,000 veterans within a 75-mile service area. According to VA documentation, moving to this lower threshold has enabled the agency to establish new national cemeteries in areas where states may not have been willing to place them because of the size and cost of operating a larger state veterans’ cemetery. NCA offers a variety of facilities to meet the burial needs of veterans, including various cemetery configurations that either provide burial options to eligible veterans or improve their access to burial options, as shown in table 1. NCA uses county-level population data to determine whether veterans currently have reasonable access to burial options and uses county-level population projections to support decisions about future cemetery locations. NCA makes its decisions regarding whether a veteran is served or unserved based on the county in which the veteran resided, without reference to the location of the veteran’s actual residence. NCA’s methodology uses a veteran’s county of residence as a proxy for being within 75 miles of a veterans’ cemetery. NCA’s plan entails establishing 18 new national cemeteries—comprised of five traditional national cemeteries and 13 urban and rural initiative national cemeteries—and awarding funds for new state veterans’ cemeteries. In 2014, we reported that NCA estimated approximately 90 percent of the veteran population had reasonable access to burial options, and that it expected to reach its strategic goal of providing reasonable access to 96 percent of veterans by the end of fiscal year 2017. Since 2014, NCA has revised its strategic goal to provide reasonable access to 95 percent of the veteran population, and NCA’s current long-range plan to achieve this goal covers fiscal years 2018- 2022. NCA’s 2014 plan to increase veterans’ access to burial options included building 18 new national cemeteries as follows: Five traditional national cemeteries, to be located in Western New York; Central East Florida; Southern Colorado; Tallahassee, Florida; and Omaha, Nebraska. Taken together, according to NCA, these cemeteries are intended to provide a burial option to an additional 550,000 veterans and their families. Five urban initiative cemeteries, to be located in Los Angeles, California; the San Francisco Bay Area, California; Chicago, Illinois; Indianapolis, Indiana; and New York, New York. Taken together, according to NCA, the urban initiative is intended to expand burial options for approximately 2.4 million additional veterans in certain urban areas. NCA announced this initiative in 2011 with the purpose of expanding burial options in urban areas through building columbaria-only (facilities for cremated remains) national cemeteries close to the urban core. Eight rural initiative cemeteries, to be located in Idaho, Maine, Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, Utah, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Taken together, according to NCA, the intent of the rural initiative is to increase the burial options for approximately 106,000 additional veterans in certain rural areas. NCA announced this initiative in 2012 with the purpose of increasing access by establishing new national cemeteries for states with no open national cemetery and a population of 25,000 or fewer veterans. In addition, since 1978, NCA has used the Grants Program to help increase veterans’ cemetery access. The Grants Program was established to complement national cemeteries by assisting state, territory, and tribal government applicants to establish, expand, or improve veterans’ cemeteries in order to provide gravesites for veterans in those areas where NCA cannot fully satisfy their burial needs. As noted earlier, states and tribal governments seeking grant funding must apply to the VA. States, funded by the Grants Program, often build in areas with veteran populations that are too small to qualify for a national cemetery. NCA prioritizes pending grant applications by giving the highest priority to cemetery construction projects in geographic locations with the greatest projected number of veterans who will benefit from the project, as determined by NCA based on county-level population projections. In 2018, NCA provided funding for a total of 15 grants for the expansion, improvement, or establishment of state and tribal government veterans’ cemeteries. This includes the establishment of two new state and tribal government veterans’ cemeteries. In 2019, NCA expects to provide funding for 17 state and tribal government veterans’ cemetery projects, three of which would be for new cemeteries. While NCA has made some progress in implementing its plan to increase burial access for veterans, that progress has been limited, as it is years behind its original schedule for opening new cemeteries. In its efforts, NCA has experienced three key challenges: (1) acquiring suitable land for new national cemeteries, (2) estimating the costs associated with establishing new national cemeteries, and (3) using all available data to inform how its Grants Program targets unserved veteran populations. In 2014, NCA planned to open 18 new sites by the end of fiscal year 2017 to better serve the burial needs of the veteran population. As of September 2019, NCA has opened four new traditional national cemeteries—Tallahassee National Cemetery in Tallahassee, Florida; Cape Canaveral National Cemetery in Mims, Florida; Omaha National Cemetery in Omaha, Nebraska; and Pikes Peak National Cemetery in Colorado Springs, Colorado. NCA also opened two of its eight planned rural initiative cemeteries—Yellowstone National Cemetery in Laurel, Montana, and Fargo National Cemetery in Harwood, North Dakota. As a result, according to NCA, by the end of fiscal year 2018 the percentage of veterans with reasonable access had increased from 90 percent to about 92 percent. As previously discussed, NCA’s goal is to provide 95 percent of veterans with reasonable access to burial options. As we reported in 2014, NCA had initially planned to open all of its 13 urban and rural initiative sites by the end of fiscal year 2017. As shown in figure 1, NCA had originally estimated completing all five of its urban initiative sites by the end of fiscal year 2015. However, the completion dates for all of these sites have slipped multiple times. In July 2019, NCA officials stated that the planned completion dates for the urban initiative sites were as follows: October 2019 for Los Angeles, sometime in 2020 for New York and Indianapolis, September 2021 for Chicago, and sometime in 2027 for San Francisco. As shown in figure 2, NCA has opened two of its rural initiative sites, in Laurel, Montana, and Fargo, North Dakota. However, the completion dates for the other six rural initiative sites have slipped multiple times. In September 2019, NCA officials stated that the planned completion dates for the rural initiative sites were currently Fall 2019 for Twin Falls, Idaho, Machias, Maine, and Rhinelander, Wisconsin; sometime in 2020 for Cheyenne, Wyoming; and Summer 2021 for Cedar City, Utah. NCA did not provide a specific estimated completion date for the site in Elko, Nevada, affirming that it would be completed “in a future year.” When we asked NCA officials why the rural and urban initiative sites were currently projected to take years longer to complete than originally planned, they replied that they might have overstated their 2014 expectations for having all initiative sites completed by the end of fiscal year 2017. NCA officials also stated that it takes at least 12 months for the land acquisition phase of cemetery construction projects; 9 to 12 months for the design phase; and 12 to 15 months—sometimes up to 30—for the construction phase. According to NCA officials, as of September 2019, five of the 11 initiative sites had reached the construction phase, and one of the sites no longer had an estimated completion date. There were still some outstanding or unresolved issues that had complicated NCA’s ability to estimate a completion date for the site in Elko, Nevada. See figure 3 for a timeline of each of NCA’s urban and rural initiative sites as of September 2019. In executing its plans to increase access to burial options for veterans, NCA has experienced three key challenges: (1) acquiring suitable land for new national cemeteries; (2) estimating the costs associated with establishing new national cemeteries; and (3) using all available data to inform how its Grants Program targets unserved veteran populations. The primary factor that has led NCA to adjust its timelines for completing these cemeteries concerns challenges in acquiring suitable land. Such challenges include difficulty in finding viable land for development, legal issues related to the acquisitions process, and resistance from the local community, among others. Four examples are described below, including two instances in which, as of July 2019, NCA had not yet acquired suitable land, which may further delay the opening of those specific urban and rural sites. Chicago, Illinois. NCA officials stated that they are on their fifth attempt to acquire land for the urban initiative site in Chicago, Illinois. In addition, they said that the environmental assessment process for the Chicago site is currently underway, and that a site viability decision will not occur until the environmental assessment process is completed later in 2019. According to NCA documentation we reviewed, NCA initiated the land acquisition process for the Chicago site in June 2011 and planned to complete the process by July 2018. If the fifth attempt to acquire land is not successful, then NCA will attempt—for the sixth time—to acquire land. According to NCA officials, this would result in an additional 12 to 18 months to identify and evaluate new property for potential acquisition, likely further delaying the opening of this site. See figure 4 for more details on NCA’s attempts to acquire land for the urban initiative site in Chicago. Elko, Nevada. NCA officials stated that they have identified a top- rated site for the rural initiative site in Elko, Nevada, on land currently owned by the Bureau of Land Management. However, according to NCA officials, Congress would need to enact legislation transferring this land from the Bureau of Land Management to VA before NCA could begin construction. As of June 2019, Congress had not done so. According to NCA officials, VA has opened dialogue with local officials about drafting a utility agreement for the city to construct infrastructure needed to supply water to the site. Implementation of a utility agreement would be dependent upon whether future legislation may potentially be introduced and subsequently passed authorizing the Bureau of Land Management to permanently transfer property to VA for national cemetery use. Also, according to NCA officials, once legislation has passed to allow the transfer of land from the Bureau of Land Management to VA, they estimate it will take 12 to 18 months for the land transfer to be completed. Indianapolis, Indiana. In a written response, NCA officials stated that construction for the urban initiative site in Indianapolis, Indiana, has been delayed by about a year due to a public protest of NCA’s acquisition of the site because of environmental concerns, which resulted in a land transfer with the previous landowner in January 2019. In addition, NCA had to conduct a partial project re-design for the exchanged property. According to NCA’s May 2018 plan of actions and milestones, it had expected to have acquired the land for the Indianapolis site by August 2018 and to have completed construction in December 2019. However, officials told us in September 2018 that, due to the delays in acquiring the land, NCA had revised its planned construction completion date to August 2020. Los Angeles, California. According to officials, NCA is partnering with the Veterans Health Administration, which transferred property for the proposed columbarium at the Los Angeles, California, urban initiative site. Officials stated that this project was delayed initially due to the need to remove existing encumbrances on the land (for example, leases with tenants), among other things. In July 2019, officials stated that the project is scheduled for completion in October 2019. According to NCA officials, unforeseen site conditions can also contribute to delays in cemetery construction projects. During the design phase, soil and geotechnical samples are taken but do not cover the entire site. After excavation begins, issues such as rock formations or hazardous waste not identified during the geotechnical investigation may create challenges to developing land for cemetery use. For example, in July 2019 NCA officials stated that the urban initiative site in San Francisco had encountered major geotechnical and soil issues, causing the project completion to slip to 2027. Also, according to NCA’s 2017 annual status report to Congress on new national cemeteries, the cemetery construction contract for a new cemetery construction project in Western New York could not begin solicitation until additional parcels of land had been acquired. Those parcels of land have a gas well and a gas pipeline that must be relocated. According to NCA officials, as of September 2019, six of the 11 urban and rural initiative sites had not yet begun to be excavated, and any issues that arise during the excavation process at these sites could pose further scheduling delays. NCA’s Cost Estimates for Most of Its Rural Initiative Sites Have Increased Significantly We found that NCA’s cost estimates for seven rural initiative sites have increased significantly above what NCA officials had initially estimated. In its strategy, NCA had estimated that the construction cost estimate for each of the seven rural initiative sites would be approximately $1 million (totaling approximately $7 million). However, NCA officials told us in August 2018 that the construction cost estimates for these sites had increased to more than $3 million each (totaling almost $24 million). This amounts to a cost increase of more than 200 percent. Further, the information they provided was not always consistent. For example, in July 2018 NCA officials provided us the average land acquisition and construction costs for the urban and rural initiatives. According to the document they provided, the average construction cost for each urban initiative cemetery is $7.5 million. However, in August 2018 NCA stated in a written response that the construction cost estimates for each of the urban initiatives ranged from approximately $9 million to more than $22 million, reflecting an average cost of $13.6 million. NCA’s cost-estimating guidance used to prepare construction cost estimates does not fully incorporate the 12 steps identified in our Cost Guide that should result in reliable and valid estimates that management can use to make informed decisions, as shown in table 2. Appendix I provides a detailed summary of our assessment of NCA’s cost-estimating guidance. Specifically, NCA’s cost-estimating guidance fully met one step, substantially met four steps, partially met four steps, minimally met two steps, and did not meet one step. For example: NCA’s cost-estimating guidance fully met the step of “obtaining the data” in that it requires a market survey that explores all factors that will affect the bid cost and collects valid and useful historical data to develop a sound cost estimate. NCA’s cost-estimating guidance substantially met the step of “updating the estimate” in that it requires cost estimates to be regularly updated. For instance, it requires an updated cost-estimating report at each stage of the design of the construction project. NCA’s cost-estimating guidance minimally met the step of “conducting a risk and uncertainty analysis” in that, while it mentions the inclusion of a risk analysis, it does not describe what a risk analysis is and how it relates to cost. Additionally, none of the guidance we reviewed contains any discussion of risk management. NCA’s cost-estimating guidance did not meet the step of “conducting a sensitivity analysis.” According to our Cost Guide, a sensitivity analysis should be included in all cost estimates because it examines the effects of changing assumptions and ground rules. Because uncertainty cannot be avoided, it is necessary to identify the cost elements that represent the most risk, and cost estimators should if possible quantify the risk. NCA uses multiple guidance documents on cost estimation and requires that managers and contractors use all of these documents in implementing their projects. Specifically, NCA uses VA’s 2011 Manual for Preparation of Cost Estimates and Related Documents for VA Facilities (Manual); VA’s 2011 Architect/Engineer (A/E) Submission Requirements for National Cemetery Projects Program Guide PG 18-15 Volume D (Guide); and NCA’s Construction Program Conceptual Estimate Worksheet. We refer to these documents collectively as “NCA’s cost- estimating guidance.” We previously reported on VA’s management of minor construction projects and made several recommendations, including that the Veterans Health Administration revise its cost-estimating guidance to incorporate the 12 steps presented in the Cost Guide, to help VA have greater assurance that its cost estimates for minor construction projects are reliable. VA concurred and stated that it would ensure that the Veterans Health Administration update its cost-estimating guidance by incorporating the 12 steps outlined in the Cost Guide, as applicable. As of August 2019, VA had not taken any action to implement this recommendation. The guidance document it plans to update, the VA Manual, is also used by NCA. Further, NCA uses additional guidance documents to develop cost estimates for its cemetery construction projects—including the urban and rural initiatives—that do not fully incorporate the 12 steps presented in the Cost Guide. Without NCA’s revising its cost-estimating guidance to more fully reflect the 12 steps in the Cost Guide, including “conducting a risk and uncertainty analysis,” NCA will not be well-positioned to provide reliable cost estimates to VA and enable it to make informed decisions regarding the management of cemetery construction projects. As noted earlier, the Grants Program is part of NCA’s plan to increase veterans’ reasonable access to burial options. According to NCA officials, their plan to meet their strategic goal of 95 percent of veterans being served by burial options relies, in part, on the state and tribal government efforts funded by the Grants Program. The Grants Program, in turn, relies on states and tribal governments applying for funding to build new cemeteries or expand existing cemeteries. An NCA official told us that NCA does not have the authority to formally request that a state seek grant funding to expand access in an unserved area. However, according to VA officials, the Grants Program has had informal discussions with states that it believes have larger concentrations of unserved veterans, in order to encourage grant applications to provide increased burial access for unserved veteran populations. When reviewing grant applications, NCA considers a number of factors, including how the grant would enhance access for unserved veterans. NCA officials stated that they use the VA’s county-level population data to identify veteran population areas unserved by national, state, or tribal government veterans’ cemeteries. This analysis also allows NCA to project where additional state and tribal government veterans’ cemeteries may be most needed. Specifically, NCA has ranked what it identified as the 40 largest currently unserved veteran population areas. NCA performs this ranking at the county level, not the more precise census tract level, although as we have previously reported it has the technical ability to use census tract data. In September 2014, we reported that NCA was using population data at the county level to identify veterans not served by burial options, and that using population data at the census tract level would enhance NCA’s management of the national cemetery program. Specifically, we recommended that NCA use its existing capabilities to estimate the served and unserved veteran populations using census tract data. This would have allowed them to make better-informed decisions concerning where to locate new national cemeteries, as well as identify which state and tribal government cemetery grant applications would provide reasonable burial access to the greatest number of veterans. However, VA did not concur with that recommendation. In its comments on our draft report, VA agreed that census tract data may yield more precise information than county-level population data, but it disagreed with our conclusion that the use of census tract data would have helped VA to make better-informed decisions regarding the location of burial options. For this review, we performed an analysis using census tract data to examine the 40 prospective sites that NCA has identified as the currently largest unserved areas, using current veteran population data. Our analysis yielded estimates for veterans in the service areas for these prospective sites that differed substantially in some instances from the numbers used by NCA (see figure 5). For example, NCA ranked Erie, Pennsylvania, as 4th on its list of prospective sites, based on its estimate that an additional 45,154 veterans could be served by a cemetery at this location. However, using census tract data we estimate that only about 10,000 veterans could be served there, resulting in a lower priority for Erie, Pennsylvania, on this list of prospective sites. Similarly, the county- based methodology used by NCA ranked Decatur, Alabama, as 25th on the list of prospective sites, while our methodology based upon nearby census tracts placed it 2nd on the list by estimated number of veterans in the service area. Thus, even though it could serve many additional veterans, Decatur, Alabama, would not be ranked highly on the list for funding using NCA’s methodology. By using the more precise census tract data to help inform its grant- making decisions, NCA could enhance its ability to implement its plan to provide burial options to unserved veterans. Comparing estimates of unserved veterans based on current census tract data with such estimates based on current county-level data can be a useful supplement to NCA’s current reliance on long-term projected county-level population data. Comparing census tract data with county-level data could also identify areas where the county-level projections might be overridden or require additional scrutiny. This could position NCA to better identify those areas of the country that will have the most significant unserved veteran populations. Additionally, this could help NCA refine its current plans or develop new ones, as it deems appropriate. We therefore continue to maintain the validity of our 2014 recommendation for VA to use census tract data to estimate the served and unserved veteran populations to help inform its plans for providing reasonable access to burial options. By NCA’s estimates, more than 2.1 million veterans—about 10 percent of the veterans in the United States—did not have reasonable access to burial options at the end of fiscal year 2013. According to NCA, its plan had helped increase the percentage served by burial options to about 92 percent of the veteran population by the end of fiscal year 2018. However, completion of some of the urban and rural sites that are part of NCA’s plan is currently estimated to take 5 years or longer than planned at significantly higher cost, in part because construction cost estimates for the remaining sites may be unreliable. Without NCA’s revising its cost- estimating guidance to more fully reflect the 12 steps in the Cost Guide, including “conducting a risk and uncertainty analysis,” NCA will not be well-positioned to provide reliable cost estimates to VA and enable it to make informed decisions regarding the funding and oversight of NCA’s ongoing minor construction projects to enhance veterans’ burial options. The Secretary of Veterans Affairs should ensure that the Under Secretary for Memorial Affairs update its cost-estimating procedures for cemetery construction projects to fully incorporate the 12 steps identified in the GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Developing and Managing Capital Program Costs. We provided a draft of this report to VA for review and comment. In written comments, VA concurred with our recommendation. VA also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. VA’s comments are printed in their entirety in appendix II. In its technical comments, VA disagreed with our finding that NCA had made limited progress implementing its plan for increasing burial access for veterans and stated that NCA had instead made significant progress. As we note in this report, in 2014, NCA planned to open 18 new sites by the end of fiscal year 2017 to better serve the burial needs of the veteran population. However, as of September 2019, only six of the planned sites were open, with NCA years behind its original schedule. For this reason, we characterized the progress as “limited.” While the progress has been limited, it is important to note that the opening of the six sites has increased accessibility of burial options to veterans. VA also stated that it continues to disagree with our 2014 recommendation that VA use census tract data to estimate the current served and unserved veteran populations to inform its plans for providing reasonable access to burial options. In its written response, VA stated that we recommended NCA use census tract rather than county-level data. However, that is not what we recommended. As we stated in this report, comparing estimates of unserved veterans based on current census tract data with estimates based on current county-level data would provide a useful supplement to NCA’s current reliance on long-term projected county-level population data. Specifically, NCA would be better positioned to identify those areas of the country that will have the most significant unserved veteran populations and refine its current plans or develop new ones, as it deems appropriate. We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional committees and the Secretary of Veterans Affairs. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-9627 or maurerd@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff members who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix III. We compared NCA’s cost-estimating guidance with the 12 steps identified in the GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Developing and Managing Capital Program Costs (Cost Guide). We found that NCA’s cost-estimating guidance on preparing cost estimates for cemetery construction projects—specifically Department of Veterans Affairs’ (VA) Manual for Preparation of Cost Estimates & Related Documents for VA Facilities (Manual), VA’s Architect/Engineer Submission Requirements for National Cemetery Projects, Program Guide 18-15 Volume D (Guide), and NCA’s Construction Program Conceptual Estimate Worksheet (Worksheet)—does not fully incorporate these 12 steps, as shown in table 3. The guidance incorporates some of the 12 steps to some degree, but not others, raising the possibility of unreliable cost estimates for NCA’s urban and rural initiatives. Specifically, NCA’s guidance on preparing cost estimates: fully or substantially met five of the 12 steps, partially met four of the 12 steps, and minimally met or did not meet three of the 12 steps. Diana Maurer, (202) 512-9627 or maurerd@gao.gov. In addition to the contact named above, Brian Lepore, Director (Retired); Maria Storts, Assistant Director; Pamela Nicole Harris, Analyst-in-Charge; Brian Bothwell, Jennifer Echard, Alexandra Gonzalez, Jason Lee, Amie Lesser, Serena Lo, John Mingus, Brenda Mittelbuscher, Maria Staunton, Frank Todisco, Cheryl Weissman, and John Wren made significant contributions to this report.	[ "The VA is responsible for ensuring that veterans have reasonable access to burial options in a national or state veterans' cemetery. In fiscal year 2018 VA estimated that about 92 percent of veterans had reasonable access to burial options, which was an increase from 90 percent in fiscal year 2014 but short of its goal of 96 percent by the end of fiscal year 2017. The House Appropriations Committee has expressed concerns that there are geographic pockets where veterans remain unserved by burial options. House Report 115-188 accompanying a bill for the Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2018, includes a provision for GAO to examine veterans' access to burial options. This report (1) describes VA's plan for increasing reasonable access to burial options for veterans and (2) assesses VA's progress in implementing its plan and any challenges experienced. GAO reviewed applicable VA and NCA documents, compared NCA's cost-estimating practices with GAO's cost-estimating 12 steps, and met with cognizant officials regarding NCA's efforts to provide reasonable access to burial options. Within the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), the National Cemetery Administration (NCA) has a plan to establish 18 new national cemeteries to increase reasonable access to burial options for veterans. NCA defines reasonable access as a national or state veterans' cemetery being located within 75 miles of veterans' homes. Key parts of NCA's plan include establishing 13 urban and rural initiative national cemeteries and awarding grant funds to state applicants for establishing new state veterans' cemeteries. NCA has made limited progress in implementing its plan to increase burial access and is years behind its original schedule for opening new cemeteries. For example, NCA has opened only two of its planned urban and rural initiative sites and is behind its original schedule for the other 11 (see fig. below). The primary factor delaying NCA's completion of these cemeteries has been challenges in acquiring suitable land. NCA has also been challenged in producing accurate estimates of construction costs for most of its rural initiative sites. Cost estimates have increased more than 200 percent (from about $7 million to $24 million) for these sites, and NCA's guidance for developing cost estimates for the cemeteries does not fully incorporate the 12 steps identified in cost-estimating leading practices—such as conducting a risk and uncertainty analysis or a sensitivity analysis. As a result, NCA is not well positioned to provide reliable and valid cost estimates to better inform decisions to enhance veterans' cemetery access. GAO recommends that NCA fully adopt cost-estimating leading practices into its procedures to assist in improving its cost estimates for establishing cemeteries. NCA concurred with our recommendation." ]	4,681	gov_report	en	null	1db8c890abd57fd394f87d7b7707ae294ee9edb1d71eda63
Election administration attracted significant attention in 2000, when issues with the vote count delayed the results of the presidential race. Administrative issues have also been reported in subsequent election cycles. For example, issues with voter registration were reported in multiple states in 2016 and 2018. Some responses to such reports focus on the rules of elections. The Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA; P.L. 107-252 ; 116 Stat. 1666), for example, requires states to establish a uniform standard of what counts as a vote for each voting system they use (52 U.S.C. §21081(a)(6)), and bills have been introduced in recent Congresses to change how voter registration is handled. Other responses focus on the systems that apply election rules. In the United States, that typically means state and local systems. The administration of elections in the United States is highly decentralized. Elections are primarily administered by thousands of state and local systems rather than a single, unified national system. Understanding how those state and local systems work may be relevant to Congress for at least two reasons. First, the way state and local election systems work can affect how well federal action on election administration serves its intended purposes. Most federal action on election administration is carried out by state and local election systems. Interactions between the workings of those systems and federal actions can help determine how effective the federal actions are at achieving their objectives. Second, Congress can require or encourage changes to the way state and local election systems work. Congress has a number of tools for influencing election administration policy. The use of these tools can—either intentionally or unintentionally—affect the workings of the state and local systems that administer federal elections. This report is intended to help Congress understand how state and local election systems work and how their workings might relate to federal activity on election administration. It starts by describing the distribution of election administration duties at the state and local levels and the structures of the state and local systems that conduct elections. It then uses examples from past federal action on election administration to illustrate some of the ways the duties and structures of state and local election systems interact with federal activity. It closes by introducing some considerations that may be relevant to Members interested in election administration. This report focuses on the administration of federal elections in the states by executive and legislative branches of state and local government. Much of the discussion applies to nonfederal as well as federal elections, but the report is intended explicitly to address only federal elections. The report also does not cover the federal role in administering federal elections, election administration in the U.S. territories, the role of law enforcement and the courts in election administration, or issues of constitutional or legal interpretation. The typical federal election process has three main parts: voter registration, vote casting, and vote counting. This report focuses on those three parts of the process rather than on other aspects of campaigns and elections, such as campaign finance and redistricting. Finally, the way federal elections are administered varies between and within states. A full accounting of the variations is beyond the scope of this report. Instead, the report describes general patterns and illustrates them with examples. Examples appear in text boxes like the box below, which describes the role the text boxes play in the report in more detail. Election administration involves making decisions about the rules of elections, such as whether voters should be able to register online, whether they should be required to show photo identification at the polls, and whether election results should be audited. It also involves conducting elections in accordance with those decisions and paying for the activities and resources required to conduct them. These three election administration duties can be described as policymaking, implementation, and funding. This section describes some common patterns in the distribution of these duties at the state and local levels. In the U.S. system, states generally play the primary decisionmaking role in election administration. State legislatures, with input from their governors, can make state laws about the administration of elections and make or initiate election administration amendments to their state constitutions. State laws and constitutions can also delegate or defer responsibility for decisions about the administration of elections to other state or local officials and to voters. The U.S. Constitution also provides for a federal role with respect to decisionmaking about elections, and Congress has exercised such powers in a number of instances. For more information about federal laws governing the state and local conduct of federal elections, see the Appendix . Box 1 uses examples from voter registration to illustrate a number of these approaches to policymaking. It starts with a discussion of a registration policy enacted by the federal government and then describes an adjustment to the policy made, respectively, by a state legislature on the recommendation of a state executive branch official, by state executive branch officials, and by voters. State and local officials may be granted decisionmaking authority explicitly by a variety of constitutional provisions, laws, charters, ordinances, and regulations at multiple levels of government. They may also be left discretion over policy details that are not specified in legislative or regulatory text. For example, states may set out general guidelines for voting technology and ballot design but leave decisions about exactly which machines to buy or how to lay out ballots to local officials. Voters have a say in election administration measures that are referred to the ballot by their state legislatures. Some states also offer citizen initiatives or popular referendums, which voters can use to propose their own state election administration statutes or state constitutional amendments or to repeal or affirm election administration laws adopted by their state legislatures. Table 1 lists the citizen initiative and popular referendum options available to voters in states that offer such mechanisms, as presented by the Initiative & Referendum Institute at the University of Southern California in January 2019. Box 2 uses examples from the November 2018 election to illustrate how states and voters have used ballot measures to make election administration policy. It describes a statewide proposal to enact automatic voter registration in Nevada that was initiated by citizens, and a statewide proposal to enact a voter ID requirement in North Carolina that was referred to the ballot by the state legislature. Early U.S. elections were conducted almost entirely locally. Some states have departed from that tradition. For example, in Alaska, the state conducts elections above the borough level, and, in Delaware, all elections are conducted by the state. Congress has also shifted some responsibility for conducting elections to the state level. For example, the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA; P.L. 99-410 ; 100 Stat. 924) requires states to designate a single state office to provide absent uniformed services and overseas voters with information about voter registration and absentee voting (52 U.S.C. §20302(b)). The NVRA requires states to designate a chief state election official to coordinate state responsibilities under the act (52 U.S.C. §20509), and HAVA requires chief state election officials to implement statewide voter registration lists and oversee development of plans for use of federal election administration funding (52 U.S.C. §21083(a)(1)(A); 52 U.S.C. §21005(a)). However, the day-to-day implementation of election administration policy is still mostly handled by localities. For example, localities typically add eligible voters to the voter rolls; design and print ballots; recruit and train poll workers; select and prepare polling places; store and transport voting equipment; and count, canvass, and report election results. The level of locality primarily responsible for conducting elections is typically the county, but there are some exceptions. The New England states, which have a strong tradition of township government, tend to assign primary responsibility to municipalities. Some states also split implementation duties between counties and municipalities. Responsibility for implementing election administration policy may also be divided between offices or agencies at the same level of local government. For example, according to one scholarly source, as of 2015, localities in about one-third of states split responsibility for conducting elections between two or more offices or agencies. Table 2 lists the states identified by those scholars. Election administration involves both intermittent and ongoing costs. Intermittent costs include irregular expenses like the costs of acquiring voting equipment. Ongoing costs include expenses that are linked to and recur with each individual election, such as the costs of printing ballots, paying poll workers, and transporting voting equipment to polling places, as well as expenses that are incurred whether or not there is an election, such as the costs of training election officials, maintaining voter registration lists, and providing IT support for online voter registration systems. The federal government does not supply ongoing funding to states and localities to conduct elections. To date, Congress has authorized significant federal funding for state and local election administration in one bill: HAVA. HAVA authorized $3.65 billion for three main types of formula-based payments to states as well as additional funding for a number of smaller grant and payment programs (52 U.S.C. §§20901-20906; 52 U.S.C. §§21001-21072). Congress appropriated most of the $3.65 billion for the three types of formula-based payments between FY2003 and FY2010 and appropriated an additional $380 million in March 2018. That means states and localities are responsible for most of the costs of conducting federal elections. Localities typically assume primary responsibility for those costs, with states contributing to varying degrees. All states have supplied or committed to supplying matching funds as required to receive federal HAVA funds (52 U.S.C. §21003(b)(5)(a)). All states but North Dakota, which does not have voter registration, have also contributed to establishing and maintaining the statewide voter registration lists required by HAVA (52 U.S.C. §21083(a)). State contributions to other costs vary. Many states used HAVA funding to help replace or update voting technology, and some have put additional money from state coffers toward those expenses. Table 3 lists state contributions to the costs of acquiring voting equipment, as reported by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) in 2018. Table 4 provides information from the same report about states' contributions to the costs of maintaining and operating voting equipment. As GAO uses the terms in the survey, operation costs "include things such as poll worker labor to set up equipment, postage for mailing absentee or vote-by-mail ballots, paper and printing supplies for paper ballots or voter-verified paper trails, and electricity to operate equipment during elections." Maintenance costs "include things such as labor to conduct maintenance between elections of any equipment hardware and software as well as any required parts." Some states cover or contribute to the costs of training local election officials, and some share election-specific costs, such as printing ballots and transporting voting equipment. Box 3 uses five examples of cost-sharing arrangements for election-specific costs of federal elections to illustrate the range of approaches states have taken to such arrangements. The structures of the state and local systems that conduct federal elections vary both between and within states. Common variations include differences related to the leadership of the election system; relationship between local election officials and the state; and population size and density of the jurisdiction served by the system. This section describes these structural variations. The state and local election systems that conduct federal elections may be led by an individual, such as the state secretary of state or a town or county clerk; a group, such as a state elections commission or a county board of elections; or a combination of individuals or groups, such as a state secretary of state and state board of elections, or a city clerk and city registrar of voters. Election system leadership may be chosen by voters or appointed by an authority such as the governor or state legislature. The selection method—and the leaders themselves—may be partisan, bipartisan, or nonpartisan. Federal law requires states to designate a chief election official to carry out certain tasks. Table 5 lists the titles of chief state election officials, as reported to CRS by the EAC, and the methods of selecting them, as listed by the National Association of Secretaries of State (NASS) and the National Association of State Legislatures (NCSL). The leadership types and selection methods of local election systems may vary within a state. Box 4 uses examples from Florida and Wisconsin to illustrate such variations. It describes the different causes of variation in the two states and a recent change in Florida to a more uniform selection process. The leadership structures of both state and local systems can also change over time. Box 5 uses the two states from Box 4 to illustrate the types of changes states might make, how they might make them, and how frequently they might make them. It describes one change that was approved by voters as a ballot measure and a number of others that were enacted legislatively. Another way in which the structures of election systems can vary is in the relationship between local election officials and the state. Some local election officials operate largely independently, whereas others rely on state officials or resources for some, most, or all basic functions. For example, as noted in " Funding ," states may provide some or all of the training for local election officials. As described in more detail in " Jurisdiction Size and Density ," local election officials who serve smaller or more rural jurisdictions may also depend on their states to provide specialized expertise, such as legal or technical know-how. States also have varying types and degrees of influence over local election officials. Choices about other structural features, such as the method used to select the leadership of local election systems, can shape this aspect of the state-local relationship. For example, in some states, state officials appoint and can remove local election officials. State officials in other states may have other options for influencing local officials. For example, state officials may have the power to initiate legal action against local officials, to provide or withhold funding for local election administration, or to certify and decertify voting systems. However, they tend to have less control over how local officials perform their election administration duties than state officials with appointment and removal authority. As described in more detail in " Compliance with Federal Requirements ," this dynamic may be especially pronounced for local officials who are popularly elected. Such officials are accountable primarily to voters rather than to the state. Other structural variations between election systems derive from differences in the population size and density of the jurisdictions they serve. Some election jurisdictions reported serving fewer than 100 eligible registered voters in the 2016 election, for example, whereas Los Angeles County reported serving 6.8 million. The eligible registered voters in that county alone reportedly outnumbered the eligible registrants in each of 40 other states. Election jurisdictions also differ in population density. For example, Los Angeles County is an urban center, and many small jurisdictions are rural. Jurisdictions with different population sizes and densities have different election administration advantages and face different administrative challenges. For example, voter registration list maintenance is typically more straightforward in small jurisdictions because their lists are shorter and election officials are more likely to know registrants personally. Meanwhile, large jurisdictions tend to have larger tax bases and more resources. Those differences between jurisdictions may be reflected in the internal structures of the election systems that serve them. One example of such a structural difference is the size and specialization of the system's staff. Larger jurisdictions, which typically have more personnel, may have much of the specialized expertise they need in-house. Smaller jurisdictions, which may have only one part-time employee dedicated to election administration, are more likely to rely on outside expertise. For example, according to law professors Steven F. Huefner, Daniel P. Tokaji, and Edward B. Foley, smaller jurisdictions in Illinois have looked to state attorneys for election law expertise and to voting equipment vendors for technical support. Another type of difference related to jurisdiction size and density is variation in the allocation of system resources. A study prepared for the U.S. Election Assistance Commission in 2013 found that election officials in rural jurisdictions were more likely than their urban counterparts to use paid print advertising for voter outreach. Election officials in urban jurisdictions were more likely to use websites and social media. Small jurisdictions may also allocate a larger share of their resources to meeting state and federal requirements than larger jurisdictions because there are often fixed start-up costs to required changes, and smaller jurisdictions may be less equipped to capitalize on economies of scale. For example, political scientists Heather M. Creek and Kimberly A. Karnes report, "There is a minimum cost to the acquisition and maintenance of voting technology that applies whether the district is purchasing 5 or 500 machines." The duties and structures of state and local election systems can affect the implementation of federal election administration laws. Perhaps as a result, Congress has specified how states and localities should distribute certain election administration duties and structure certain elements of their election systems. Changes to the duties and structures of state and local election systems have sometimes also been side effects of other federal activity on election administration. This section provides examples of ways in which the distribution of election administration duties at the state and local levels and the structures of state and local election systems can affect the implementation of federal election administration law. These examples include federal efforts to affect the administration of elections through (1) requirements, (2) funding, and (3) information sharing. Congress can use requirements to regulate how states and localities administer certain aspects of federal elections. How well such requirements serve their intended purposes depends in part on how closely states and localities comply with them. How closely states and localities comply with federal requirements may, in turn, be affected by the duties and structures of the state and local election systems that implement them. For example, UOCAVA assigns responsibility for complying with some of its requirements to the states (52 U.S.C. §20302), but the tasks required for compliance are often handled by local officials. One scholar, law professor Justin Weinstein-Tull, indicates that this means that the officials who are held liable for compliance with UOCAVA requirements may differ from the officials who take or fail to take the actions needed to comply. Box 6 provides an illustration of this phenomenon as reported by state officials in Alabama. The federal government can provide funding for state and local election administration, which may be conditional on the adoption of certain election administration policies or practices. How well such funding serves its intended purposes may depend in part on how timely it is and how well-tailored it is to its objectives. Duties and structures of state and local election systems may affect how quickly federal funding is claimed and used and how well the uses to which it is put serve federal objectives. For example, HAVA has authorized payments to states to meet its requirements (52 U.S.C. §21007). It has directed those payments to be disbursed to states (52 U.S.C. §21001(a)) and charged chief state election officials with overseeing decisions about how to spend them (52 U.S.C. §21005(a)). State election officials run federal elections in some states, but those states are the exception. As noted in " Implementation " and " Funding ," most states assign election administration implementation and funding duties to local officials. That means that the officials who receive HAVA funding and are charged with overseeing decisions about how to use it often differ from the officials who conduct and pay for the activities and resources it is intended to fund. That has had at least two reported consequences. First, in some cases, it has reportedly delayed access to or use of some HAVA funds. Directing HAVA funding to states introduces opportunities for state-level delays, such as decisions by state officials to wait to claim the funds or requirements in state law to obtain approval to do so. Second, some local officials have stated the view that their states' shares of HAVA funding were not put to what they considered the areas of greatest need. Box 7 provides examples of such consequences as described by state and local officials in Nevada, Minnesota, and Virginia. Congress can require or facilitate information sharing with states and localities by federal agencies. As with funding, the effectiveness of federal information sharing may depend in part on how timely it is. How quickly federal agencies share information with the appropriate state and local officials may be affected by the distribution of election administration duties at the state and federal levels. Box 8 provides an example of such an effect reported by NASS. Past federal action has resulted in both intentional and unintentional changes to state and local election systems. Some federal laws include provisions that are specifically designed to establish certain responsibilities for election administration at the state level. For example, the NVRA requires states to designate chief state election officials to coordinate state responsibilities under the act (52 U.S.C. §20509), and HAVA charges chief state election officials with implementing a statewide voter registration system (52 U.S.C. §21083(a)(1)(A)). Federal regulation has reportedly also had the side effect of shifting the distribution of other election administration duties. For example, the agency-based registration requirements in the NVRA divide voter registration responsibilities between traditional election offices and offices that had not historically been involved in election administration, such as motor vehicle and public assistance agencies (52 U.S.C. §20504; 52 U.S.C. §20506). According to Hale, Montjoy, and Brown, "the need to pass implementing legislation and the complexity of legal and technical requirements" in federal laws such as HAVA and the NVRA has also "led many states to grant new or additional rule-making power" to their chief state election officials. Congress has considered legislation—some of which has been enacted and some of which has not—that would change election rules or the state and local systems that implement them. The interactions between the duties and structures of state and local election systems and past federal actions suggest some considerations that may be relevant to future congressional consideration of proposals that would affect the administration of federal elections. The following questions may be of interest to Members as they consider making changes to election administration or maintaining current rules and structures: How would any proposed change interact with the duties and structures of state and local election systems? Would the duties and structures of state and local election systems make a proposed change difficult to implement? Would the design of a proposed change need to be adjusted to accommodate variations between or within states? Which of the policy tools available to Congress is best suited to achieving the purpose of a proposed change? For example, would it be more effective to advance a proposed change with a federal requirement, or incentivize it via federal funding? How might the nature of the state and local system inform a proposed change? For example, if it is a federal requirement, who is charged with compliance; who is responsible for the tasks required for compliance; and what is the relationship between the two? If it is federal funding, to whom should it be distributed, and who should be involved in making decisions about how to use it? Would a proposed change have the effect, either intentionally or unintentionally, of altering the duties or structures of state or local election systems? If so, what are the advantages and disadvantages of such changes? Are there complications with a proposed change that are not specifically related to election administration? For example, could there be federalism-related issues with intervening in the relationships between states and their political subdivisions?	[ "The administration of elections in the United States is highly decentralized. Elections are primarily administered by thousands of state and local systems rather than a single, unified national system. States and localities share responsibility for most election administration duties. Exactly how responsibilities are assigned at the state and local levels varies both between and within states, but there are some general patterns in the distribution of duties. States typically have primary responsibility for making decisions about the rules of elections (policymaking). Localities typically have primary responsibility for conducting elections in accordance with those rules (implementation). Localities, with varying contributions from states, typically also have primary responsibility for paying for the activities and resources required to conduct elections (funding). The structures of the state and local systems that conduct elections also vary between and within states. Common variations include differences related to the leadership of the system, the relationship between local election officials and the state, and the population size and density of the jurisdiction the system serves. The leadership of a state or local election system may be elected or appointed, and both the leaders and the methods used to select them may be partisan, bipartisan, or nonpartisan. State officials may have more or less direct influence over local election officials, and the extent of their influence may be affected by other structural features of the state's election systems, such as the methods used to select local officials. Finally, larger election jurisdictions have different administrative advantages and challenges than smaller ones, and more urban jurisdictions have different advantages and challenges than more rural ones. These differences between jurisdictions may be reflected in structural features of the election systems that serve them, such as how the systems allocate resources and where they find specialized expertise. Understanding the duties and structures of state and local election systems may be relevant to Congress for at least two reasons. First, the way state and local election systems work can affect how well federal action on election administration serves its intended purposes. The effectiveness of federal action depends in part on how it is implemented. How it is implemented can depend, in turn, on how the state and local election systems that implement it work. Second, Congress can make or incentivize changes to the way state and local election systems work. Congress has a number of policy tools it can use to affect the administration of federal elections. The use of these tools can—either intentionally or unintentionally—affect the state and local election systems that administer federal elections." ]	3,965	gov_report	en	null	5708feab96b741f84e0dba83cac3823b2215724702382865
Grade-crossing safety has improved significantly since 1975, but since 2009, the number of crashes and fatalities at grade crossings has plateaued (see fig. 1). The yearly number of grade-crossing crashes declined from 12,126 in 1975 to 2,117 in 2017. In that time frame, fatalities dropped from 917 to 273. The most significant reductions in grade-crossing crashes and fatalities were achieved from 1975 to 1985, when states closed or improved the most dangerous crossings. Grade- crossing safety continued to improve until the mid-2000s, though at a slower rate. Since 2009, the number of grade-crossing crashes and fatalities remains at around 2,100 crashes and 250 fatalities a year. These fatalities typically make up less than one percent of all highway- related fatalities. The decrease in crashes and fatalities occurred as the volume of train and highway traffic generally increased over the years. FRA expects the traffic volumes to continue to increase and has expressed concern that grade-crossing crashes and fatalities may also increase. As a set-aside portion of FHWA’s much larger Highway Safety Improvement Program (HSIP), the Section 130 Program provides funds to state DOTs for the elimination of hazards at highway-rail grade crossings. States determine what improvements need to be made at grade crossings. FHWA has oversight responsibilities regarding the use of federal funds as part of its administration of federal-aid highway programs and funding, including HSIP funds. FHWA uses a statutory formula to distribute to states Section 130 Program funds, which averaged $235 million per year during the last 10 years (fiscal years 2009 through 2018). Section 130 Program projects are funded at a 90 percent federal share, with the state or the roadway authority funding the remaining 10 percent. States have 4 years to obligate their program funds before they expire, meaning that in any given fiscal year, states can obligate funds appropriated in that year as well as any unobligated funds from the previous 3 fiscal years. In addition, states may choose to combine funds from multiple years to fund relatively expensive projects. The Section 130 Program’s requirements direct states to establish an implementation schedule for grade-crossing-safety improvement projects that, at a minimum, include warning signs for all public grade crossings. Grade crossings are generally categorized as “active” or “passive” depending on the type of traffic control devices that are present. As of July 2018, according to FRA’s National Highway-Rail Crossing Inventory, there were approximately 68,000 public grade crossings with electronic, or active, traffic control devices in the United States. Another approximately 58,000 public grade crossings have passive traffic-control devices, which include signs and supplementary pavement markings. The requirements also specify that at least 50 percent of Section 130 Program funding must be dedicated to the installation of protective devices at grade crossings, including traffic control devices. States can use remaining program funds for any hazard elimination project. States may also use program funds to improve warning signs and pavement markings or to improve the way the roadway aligns with the tracks (e.g., to ensure low-clearance vehicles do not get stuck on the tracks). In addition, states can use up to 2 percent of the funds to improve their grade-crossing inventories and to collect and analyze data. See figure 2 for examples of the types of projects eligible for Section 130 Program funds and graphical depictions of grade crossings before and after safety improvements have been made. FHWA and FRA are the primary agencies responsible for safety at grade crossings, and they both play key—yet distinct—roles. FHWA oversees the Section 130 Program and monitors states’ uses of program funds through 52 division offices located in each state, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico and through headquarters staff in Washington, D.C. In addition, FHWA’s division staff reviews states’ processes for prioritizing and selecting grade-crossing-safety improvement projects. FHWA does not evaluate the appropriateness of individual grade-crossing projects, but instead helps states determine that projects meet program eligibility requirements. Division staff assists in the implementation of Section 130 Program state-administered projects, and they may participate in state- DOT-led, on-site reviews of grade crossings under consideration for Section 130 Program projects. FHWA headquarters staff is responsible for FHWA-wide initiatives, such as working with stakeholders to establish standards for traffic control devices and systems at grade crossings and for engineering oversight of state-administered safety improvement projects. FRA provides safety oversight of both freight and passenger railroads by: collecting and analyzing data; issuing and enforcing numerous safety regulations, including on grade-crossings’ warning systems; conducting focused inspections, audits, and accident providing technical assistance to railroads and other stakeholders. Specifically, FRA oversees rail safety through eight regional offices and through headquarters staff in Washington, D.C. Regional staff monitor railroads’ compliance with federal safety regulations through inspections and provide technical assistance and guidance to states. In 2017, FRA created a new discipline for grade-crossing safety and is hiring new grade-crossing inspectors. These inspectors conduct field investigations, identify regulatory defects and violations, recommend civil penalty assessments when appropriate, and may participate in state- DOT-led teams that conduct on-site reviews of grade crossings to evaluate potential safety improvements. According to FRA documentation, FRA’s new inspectors will also work with a variety of stakeholders to institute new types of training, explore new safety concepts and technologies, and assist in the development of new or modified highway-rail grade-crossing-safety regulations, initiatives, and programs. The inspectors will also work with FHWA and other DOT operating administrations in a cooperative effort to improve grade- crossing safety. FRA regional staff also investigates select railroad crashes, including those at grade crossings, to determine root causation and any contributing factors, so that railroads can implement corrective actions. FRA headquarters staff develops analytical tools for states to use to prioritize grade-crossing projects. In addition, headquarters staff manages research and development to support improved railroad safety, including at grade crossings. FRA’s Office of Railroad Safety maintains the National Highway-Rail Crossing Inventory database and the Railroad Accident/Incident Reporting System on grade-crossing crashes. Both states and railroads submit information to FRA’s crossing inventory, which is designed to contain information on every grade crossing in the nation. Railroads submit information such as train speed and volume; states submit information such as highway speed limits and average annual daily traffic. The Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008 added requirements for both railroads and states to periodically update the inventory; however, the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-21) repealed a provision providing DOT authority to issue implementing regulations that would govern states’ reporting to the inventory. According to FRA officials, while FRA’s regulations do not require states to report the information, FRA encourages them to do so. FRA regulations require railroads to report and update their information in the inventory every 3 years or sooner in some instances, such as if new warning devices are installed or the grade crossing is closed. FRA’s accident system contains details about each grade-crossing accident that has occurred. In addition to submitting immediate reports of fatal grade-crossing crashes, railroads are required to submit accident reports within 30 days after the end of the month in which the accident occurred and describe conditions at the time of the accident (e.g., visibility and weather); information on the grade crossing (e.g., type of warning device); and information on the driver (e.g., gender and age). In its role overseeing grade-crossing safety, FRA has sponsored a number of research efforts to better understand the causes of grade- crossing crashes and identify potential ways to improve engineering, education, and enforcement efforts. For example, FRA sponsored an in- depth data analysis of grade-crossing crashes to better identify which crossing characteristics increase the risk of an accident. The report, issued in 2017, found that the volumes of train and vehicle traffic at a crossing are the biggest predictors of grade-crossing crashes. Changes in vehicle and train traffic therefore affect the annual number of grade- crossing crashes. For example, as highway traffic decreased in 2008, possibly due to the economic recession and higher gas prices, so too did the number of grade-crossing crashes. As previously noted, FRA expects that the number of grade-crossing crashes will likely grow with anticipated increases in future train and highway traffic. As discussed below, vehicle and train volume are included in the U.S. DOT Accident Prediction Model, which some states use to select grade-crossing improvement projects. According to FRA officials, FRA is using the results of this recent in-depth data analysis to, in part, evaluate whether additional risk factors, such as the number of male drivers or trains carrying toxic materials, should be added to the model. FRA has targeted other research into understanding driver behavior at grade crossings, which is the leading cause of crashes. According to FRA’s accident data, in 2017, 71 percent of fatal crashes at public grade crossings occurred at those with gates. In 2004, the DOT Inspector General (IG) reported that 94 percent of grade-crossing crashes from 1994 to 2003 could be attributed to risky driver behavior or poor judgement. State officials we spoke with explained that drivers may become impatient waiting at a grade crossing and decide to go around the gates. Drivers may also line up over the grade crossing in heavy vehicular traffic, and be unable to exit before the gates come down. See figure 3 for examples of risky driver behavior at grade crossings. To better understand driver behavior, FRA sponsored a John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center (Volpe Center) study that recorded and analyzed drivers’ actions as they approached grade crossings. The researchers found that almost half of drivers were doing another task, such as eating, and over a third did not look in either direction while approaching passive grade crossings. We have previously reported, and many stakeholders we interviewed agreed, that in light of inappropriate driver behavior, technological solutions alone may not fully resolve safety issues at grade crossings. In addition, public-education and law-enforcement efforts can augment the effectiveness of technological solutions. According to FRA officials, they shared information on driver education with DOT’s National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) as NHTSA works more closely with states on driver education manuals. According to DOT officials, NHTSA updates its driver education materials every 2–3 years and plans to consider including grade-crossing-safety materials in the next versions. FRA is also working with states and localities to research and develop new protective devices and other safety measures targeted at improving driver behavior at grade crossings. As most fatal crashes happen at grade crossings already equipped with gates, FRA and state and local agencies are exploring whether additional safety measures can improve safety at those locations. For example, in 2016 and 2017, FRA’s Grade Crossing Task Force worked with the Volpe Center and the City of Orlando to test whether photo enforcement at grade crossings could reduce risky driver behavior. The City of Orlando installed automated photo-enforcement devices at a grade crossing, and instead of issuing fines to drivers who had violated its warning devices, sent drivers a warning notice and educational safety materials. Eight months after the photo-enforcement system was installed, grade crossing violations decreased by 15 percent. While FRA judged these enforcement efforts successful at changing driver behavior, a 2015 FRA whitepaper noted that photo enforcement equipment is costly—on average costing over $300,000 per crossing to install and operate for 2 years—and may not be cost-effective for most grade crossings. FRA found that due to costs and state laws prohibiting photo-enforcement, only two photo- enforcement cameras were currently in operation at grade crossings across the country. States, localities, and FHWA are also exploring whether new types of pavement markings at grade crossings can improve driver behavior. According to DOT officials, FHWA is working with two states to develop new cross-hatch pavement markings for grade crossings that would comply with the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices, similar to the “don’t block the box” type pavement markings used in intersections. FHWA also worked with a city to test the use of in-roadway lights to delineate the crossing. (See fig. 4). FRA and state DOTs are also trying to improve pedestrian safety at grade crossings by developing new safety measures. Grade-crossing accidents involving pedestrians are less frequent than those involving automobiles at grade crossings but have a higher fatality rate. While pedestrians were involved in only 9 percent of accidents at public crossings in 2017, almost 40 percent of fatal grade-crossing accidents involved pedestrians. To try to improve pedestrian safety, in 2012 the Volpe Center worked with New Jersey Transit to study whether adding additional pedestrian gate skirts— hanging gates that further block a crossing (see fig. 5)—would prevent people from ducking under the gates. The Volpe Center reported that these new gates had mixed success. While incidents of people going under and around the gates decreased, more people chose to cross the tracks in the street rather than at the sidewalk. Finally, FRA is exploring new automated and connected vehicle technologies that could reduce risky driver behavior at grade crossings. FRA, FHWA, and officials from one state we interviewed said they anticipate that such technology will be critical to further improving safety. Specifically, FRA and FHWA are coordinating with DOT’s Intelligent Transportation Systems Joint Program Office to develop pilot technology that would enable crossing infrastructure or trains to communicate wirelessly with vehicles. Vehicles can use this information to warn the driver that a crash or violation is imminent, or integrate with onboard active safety systems. According to FRA officials, they completed a proof of concept in 2013 and completed and tested a prototype of the technology in 2017. DOT officials said that DOT does not have a time frame for when automakers might begin incorporating such connected vehicle technologies and noted that retrofitting older cars with new equipment will likely make this a long-term effort. FRA shares information on its research in various ways with state DOTs, because states are responsible for deciding which safety measures to install at grade crossings. Specifically, FRA and FHWA jointly hold quarterly webinars with stakeholders, including state DOT officials, and conduct presentations at highway-rail safety workshops. Information on safety measures such as grade-crossing devices, signs, and markings are also included in the Railroad-Highway Grade Crossing Handbook. According to DOT officials, the handbook was developed jointly by FHWA and FRA. The last version of the handbook was updated in 2007 and includes some out of date information. FRA and FHWA officials said they began working on an update in 2017, but missed the July 2018 target completion date. According to FHWA officials, updating the handbook is a complex undertaking that has taken more time than they anticipated due to the extensive collaboration required among stakeholders. FHWA officials said they anticipate completing the update during the spring of 2019. The risk of crashes at public grade crossings within a state factors into states’ selection of over 1,000 new Section 130 Program projects nationally each fiscal year. FHWA requires states to develop a grade crossing program that considers relative risk. FHWA officials said they review the methods that states use to select projects to ensure that risk is considered. According to a 2016 academic study of 50 states, most states use mathematical formulas, or “accident prediction models,” to help assess risk and identify grade crossings for potential projects. More specifically, these accident prediction models use factors such as grade crossing characteristics and accident history to rank grade crossings by risk. DOT provides one such model—the Accident Prediction Model—and some states have developed their own models. The study reported that 19 states used DOT’s model and 20 states used a different model. It also found that the DOT and commonly used state models include some similar grade-crossing characteristics to predict accident risk. For example, the selected models reviewed all considered vehicle- and train- traffic volume, which FRA has found to be the strongest predictors of grade-crossing crashes. FRA makes its Accident Prediction Model available to states online through its Web Accident Prediction System. This system is an online tool that uses FRA’s crossing inventory, crossing collision history, and the DOT Accident Prediction Model to predict accident risk for grade crossings in each state. Only one of the eight states in our review used the system as its primary source for ranking grade-crossing risk. Most of the other states perform their own calculations to rank grade crossings. Officials from two states said that they believe their state-maintained data are more reliable than FRA’s crossing inventory and explained that they go directly to their contacts at railroads to get updated information on factors such as train volume. Accident prediction models are only one source of information states use when selecting Section 130 Program projects. According to the state officials we spoke with, a variety of other considerations can also influence their decisions, including the following: Proximity of projects together along a railroad “corridor” in order to gain efficiencies and reduce construction costs. Requests from local jurisdictions or railroads. These stakeholders may have information on upcoming changes at a grade crossing, such as higher train volume or new housing developments nearby, which would increase risk but would not be reflected yet in the accident prediction model. Availability of local funding to provide the required 10 percent match for Section 130 Program projects, while trying to spread the funds fairly across the state. States may also consider grade crossings that have had close calls in the past, such as where a car narrowly avoided being hit by a train. FRA does not require railroads to report on these close calls, or “near misses;” however, according to state officials, railroads sometimes provide this information to states on an ad-hoc basis. State officials from four of the eight states we spoke with said they considered near misses when selecting Section 130 Program projects. A 2004 Volpe Center report noted that studying close calls was a proactive way to improve safety. According to the report, FRA sponsored a workshop to learn about the benefits of collecting and analyzing close calls. However, stakeholders we interviewed noted challenges formalizing near-miss reporting. For example, Volpe Center officials said these reports are subjective in nature—what one engineer considers a close call, others may not. FRA developed another online tool—GradeDec—to allow states to compare the costs and benefits for various grade-crossing improvement projects. GradeDec uses models to analyze a project’s risk and calculate cost-benefit ratios and net present value for potential projects. FRA provides state DOTs with on-site GradeDec workshops upon request. While FRA officials noted that many state and local governments have registered to use the program, none of the state officials we spoke with identified GradeDec as a tool that they use to conduct cost-benefit analysis. Officials from two state DOTs we spoke with said that cost- benefit analyses could help them better identify and select the most cost- effective crossing safety projects in the future. According to the academic study of 50 states noted above, because of limited funding for grade-crossing improvements, states should consider the life-cycle costs of the projects as well as net present value to help select projects. As discussed later in this report, the small number of crashes at grade crossings can make it challenging to distinguish between different projects in terms of their effectiveness in reducing accidents. Finally, after they have considered risk factors and created a list of potential grade crossings for improvement, state officials, along with relevant stakeholders from railroads and local governments, conduct field reviews of the potential projects. According to state officials, these reviews help identify grade-crossing characteristics that may not be included in the accident prediction models, such as vegetation that would obstruct drivers’ views. In 2008, legislation was enacted mandating reporting by states and railroads to the National Highway-Rail Crossing Inventory. However, the fact that reporting to the inventory remained voluntary until 2015 has had lingering effects on the completeness of the data in the inventory. In 2015, as mandated by statute, FRA issued regulations requiring railroads to update certain data elements for all grade crossings every 3 years. However, our analysis of FRA’s crossing inventory found that 4 percent of grade crossings were last updated in 2009 or earlier. In addition, because MAP-21 repealed DOT’s authority to issue regulations that would govern state reporting to the inventory, state reporting of grade-crossing data remains voluntary, according to FRA officials, and all state-reported information is not complete. Our analysis of state-reported data in FRA’s crossing inventory found varying levels of completeness. For example, while some state-reported data fields were almost entirely complete, 33 percent of public grade crossings were missing data on posted highway speed. We also found that of the crossings for which states reported the year when the highway-traffic count was conducted, 64 percent of the highway-traffic counts for public grade crossings, another important risk factor, had not been updated since 2009, or earlier. According to the 2015 final rule, FRA will continue to evaluate whether additional regulations to address state reporting are needed to maintain the crossing inventory’s accuracy. FRA officials told us that improving inventory data will help them better deploy their limited resources, particularly their grade-crossing inspectors, and said that they have taken steps to help improve the data. In 2017, FRA regional officials conducted field reviews to verify the latitude and longitude data for grade crossings in the inventory, data that states are responsible for updating. In addition, FRA expects its grade-crossing inspectors as part of their inspections to review and identify issues with the railroad- and state-reported inventory data. According to FRA officials, FRA has begun to both transition its 19 grade-crossing managers into grade-crossing inspectors and also hire new inspectors, for an eventual total of 24 inspectors and eight regional specialists to supervise their activities. To help ensure railroads’ compliance with crossing inventory regulations, officials said that the inspectors will use spot checks to validate the inventory data by comparing grade-crossing characteristics in the field with the information railroads submitted to the inventory. In addition, FRA has incorporated information on inventory-reporting requirements into the grade-crossing inspectors’ training. Finally, FRA is currently developing guidelines for the grade-crossing inspections similar to those for other FRA safety disciplines. FRA headquarters officials acknowledged that they are still clarifying the details for the inspections that will be included in the compliance manuals that inspectors will use. Specifically, they said they are still determining appropriate inspector workloads and drafting specific guidelines that will need to be integrated into FRA’s regional inspection plans. FRA officials said they are working to develop and make available inventory inspection guidance to the grade-crossing managers and inspectors by December 31, 2018. In the meantime, FRA held training that included information on inventory-reporting requirements. In August 2018, FRA developed guidance for grade-crossing inspections specific to quiet zones in response to a recommendation we made in 2017. It is important that FRA meets its goal to issue similar guidance specific to reviewing the accuracy of the inventory data, as FRA cannot have reasonable assurance that inspections that are already under way are being conducted in such a manner that would allow them to consistently identify data reliability issues at each crossing. About 75 percent of all Section 130 Program projects states implemented in fiscal year 2016 involved installing or updating active grade-crossing equipment, including warning lights and protective gates (see fig. 6). The prevalence of this type of project is in part due to the Section 130 Program requirement that states spend at least 50 percent of funds on protective devices. Other than eliminating a grade crossing, adding protective devices has long been considered the most effective way of reducing the risk of a crash. Officials from six of eight state DOTs we interviewed told us that the numbers and types of grade-crossing projects they implement are dependent on the amount of Section 130 Program funding they receive and the cost of the projects. As previously described, funds are set aside from the Highway Safety Improvement Program and distributed to states by a statutory formula that includes factors such as the number of grade crossings in each state. Officials from six of the eight state DOTs we spoke to agreed that the set-aside nature of the program was crucial in allowing them to implement projects, many of which they said would not have been possible without Section 130 Program funds. For example, many said the formula funding ensures that grade-crossing projects are completed along with highway safety projects, particularly given the fact that fatalities resulting from grade-crossing crashes account for so few when compared to highway deaths. Overall, fatalities resulting from grade-crossing crashes account for less than 1 percent of all highway- related fatalities. In fiscal year 2018, the funds distributed ranged from a low of approximately $1.2 million for eight states and Washington, D.C., to over $16 million for California and over $19 million for Texas. The number of grade crossings in the eight states and Washington, D.C. ranged from 5 to 380, while California had almost 6,000 and Texas had over 9,000. Project implementation costs varied by project type and ranged widely depending on project scope. Based on 2016 DOT data, some typical project costs ranged as follows: adding signs to passive grade crossings—$500 to $1,500; adding flashing lights and two gates to passive grade crossings— $150,000 to $300,000; adding four gates to grade crossings with flashing lights—$250,000 - closing a grade crossing—$25,000 to $100,000; and separating a grade crossing from traffic (Grade Separation)—$5 million to $40 million. State officials we spoke with cited several challenges in pursuing certain types of controversial, innovative, and expensive projects that could help them address the evolving nature of risk at grade crossings and difficulty in measuring the effectiveness of their projects. First, most state DOT officials said that the cost of grade-separation projects and, at times, the controversy of eliminating grade crossings through closure reduces the number of these projects, while acknowledging that they are the most effective ways to improve safety. These types of projects made up only 3 percent of Section 130 Program projects in fiscal year 2016 (see fig. 6). Grade-separation projects are often more expensive than the annual Section 130 Program funding available to states. In 2018, only eight states received annual Section 130 Program funding sufficient to fund a $7-million grade-separation project. As discussed previously, to fund relatively expensive projects, states may choose to combine funds from multiple years. Also, states and railroads may make incentive payments to localities for the permanent closure of a grade crossing. In addition to the cost, most state DOT officials reported challenges obtaining local support for closing grade crossings. They said closures may inconvenience residents who use the road and force emergency responders to take longer routes, potentially slowing response times. Grade-separation projects address these safety concerns and may be more agreeable to residents, but they are substantially more expensive. While up to $7,500 in Section 130 Program funding can be used to help incentivize communities to close grade crossings, officials from some of our selected state DOTs said this amount is generally not enough to persuade local officials to support the closing. Second, officials from many state DOTs we interviewed also reported that the requirements of the Section 130 Program create challenges for them in implementing what they considered to be innovative projects. For example, the program requirement that 50 percent of funds be used on protective devices, combined with what one researcher described to us as the tendency by states to implement “known” projects—i.e., protective devices—may impede states’ selection of new, more innovative safety projects. Officials we interviewed from many state DOTs described challenges related to the program’s requirements. They noted that they are prevented from using Section 130 Program funds for new types of safety technologies not yet incorporated into FHWA’s Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices. As noted previously in this report, outside the Section 130 Program FHWA is working with states and localities to explore whether new types of pavement markings at grade crossings, not in the manual, can improve driver behavior. One state DOT official we interviewed suggested changes to allow states to fund one grade- crossing pilot project per year or to use a set percentage of program funds to finance a pilot project that could help them explore promising but as yet unproven technologies. Third, state DOT officials from four of the eight selected states also said it can be difficult to find funding for the required 10 percent state match. As previously mentioned, while certain rail-safety projects are eligible for up to 100 percent federal funding, Section 130 Program projects are funded at a 90 percent federal share. According to DOT documentation we reviewed, only some states have a dedicated source for such a match, and state DOT officials from one of our selected states said their state cannot use state funds for the 10 percent match. Some state DOT officials said this situation can drive project selection. For example, they sometimes chose projects based on which localities or railroads were willing to provide matching funds or offer cost savings. Finally, many state officials cited challenges in measuring the effectiveness of grade crossing projects in reducing crashes or the risk of crashes. In particular, state officials we spoke to said it can be difficult to use before-and-after crash statistics as a measure of effectiveness because of the low number and random nature of crashes. Also, as FRA research has shown and as FHWA and FRA have noted, reporting on before-and-after grade-crossing accident statistics can be misleading, given the infrequency of crashes and crashes that are not the result of grade crossing conditions. States’ required Section 130 Program annual progress reports to the Secretary of DOT call for states to report on the effectiveness of the improvements they made. FHWA reporting guidance suggests they define effectiveness as the reduction in the number of fatalities and serious injuries after grade-crossing projects were implemented, consistent with statutory requirements. In addition, FHWA guidance states that consideration should be given to quantifying effectiveness in the context of fatalities and serious injuries. However, states often report no differences in crashes after specific projects were implemented, and there have been instances where states reported a slight increase in crashes. Such an increase does not necessarily mean that the project was not effective in reducing the overall risk of a crash. Also, not all projects are implemented at grade crossings where there has been a crash. Among other information, states also typically report information on funding and data on the numbers and types of projects implemented. In addition, the extent to which states report projects’ effectiveness varies greatly. Given states’ responsibility for implementing the Section 130 Program and the differences in the amounts of funding they receive, FHWA officials said states should determine and report on the appropriate effectiveness metrics for their programs. According to FHWA officials, during the 2017 reporting year, a few states requested examples of what to include when reporting effectiveness, and FHWA responded with examples of various methods they could use, such as a benefit-cost ratio or the percentage decrease in fatalities, serious injuries, and crashes. Regardless of the difficulty in measuring the effectiveness of specific projects, most state DOT officials we interviewed stressed the importance of the Section 130 Program in funding grade-crossing projects. FHWA’s biennial report to Congress is intended to provide information to Congress on the progress being made by the states in implementing projects to improve safety and, in addition, make recommendations for future implementation of the program. FHWA reviews states’ annual Section 130 Program reports and uses them to formulate the report to Congress every 2 years. FHWA’s 2018 report highlights that the Section 130 Program has seen great success since 1975, with a decrease of approximately 74 percent in fatalities at the same time that there was an increase in vehicle and train traffic. The report described the latest available 10-year trend, from 2007 to 2016, as showing a 31 percent decrease in fatalities. Fatalities have also decreased when adjusted for train traffic. However, FHWA officials acknowledged in interviews with us that crashes and fatalities have remained constant since about 2009, with more recent data showing a slight increase in fatalities over the last 2 to 3 years, data that are consistent with the increases in overall roadway fatalities. The officials said increased train- and vehicle-traffic volumes could be contributing to that increase, in addition to other factors, such as more bicycle riders and pedestrians using grade crossings. As described earlier, states have generally already used Section 130 Program funding to address safety at the riskiest grade crossings by adding protective measures, typically lights and gates. Yet crashes continue to occur at these improved grade crossings. Given these trends and the challenges discussed earlier related to the requirements of the Section 130 Program, it is not clear whether the program remains effective in continuing to reduce the risk of crashes and fatalities at grade crossings. As required, FHWA’s biennial report includes a section on “recommendations for future implementation” of the Section 130 Program. As part of this, FHWA reports on challenges and actions being taken to address them. FHWA’s 2018 report identified one of the same challenges we heard about from state DOT officials related to the inability or unwillingness of local agencies to provide matching funds and the relatively low amount of funding designed to incentivize localities to close crossings. FHWA reported on its efforts to address these challenges, including by providing guidance, resources, and supportive training to states and local agencies and serving as a clearinghouse for innovative methods of supporting projects. However, with the exception of the funding challenge, FHWA’s most recent report does not include the other challenges state officials identified to us related to the requirements of the Section 130 Program discussed above. These include program funding requirements that may impede innovative approaches and the difficulties of using before-and-after crash statistics to measure effectiveness. Many state DOT officials we spoke with said there may be an opportunity to more broadly assess the Section 130 Program at the national level. It could be more informative to comprehensively assess more detailed crash trends, such as those that look forward over multiple years across the more than 1,700 crashes nationwide, rather than on the approximately 35 that occur on average within a state, and identify strategies to address those trends. Doing so could help FHWA learn more about why crashes are continuing and what types of projects may be effective. There could be ways to evaluate the program in a more comprehensive way; many state DOT officials we interviewed told us such a comprehensive evaluation could help improve program effectiveness in a number of ways, including by enabling the program to better keep up with the rapid pace of technological change and re- examining eligibility requirements that limit the flexibility of states to consider other types of projects beyond engineering. Also, most state DOT officials we interviewed agreed that education and enforcement efforts are crucial to further improving safety, as did 8 out of 10 other stakeholders we spoke to, as well as officials from Volpe Center and NTSB. However, according to FHWA officials, those project types are not allowed under the Section 130 Program’s requirements. The officials said FHWA has partnered with FRA and NHTSA on research efforts, such as driver-behavior studies, to inform grade-crossing safety issues. However, the officials said that FHWA has not conducted a program evaluation of the Section 130 Program to consider whether the program’s funding and other requirements allow states to adequately address ongoing safety issues such as driver behavior. FHWA officials said that there is no federal requirement for them to conduct such a program evaluation. We have previously reported that an important component of effective program management is through program performance assessment, which helps establish a program’s effectiveness—the extent to which a program is operating as it was intended and the extent to which a program achieves what the agency proposes to accomplish. This type of evaluative information helps the executive branch and congressional committees make decisions about the programs they oversee. Assessing program performance includes conducting program evaluations, which are individual systematic studies that answer specific questions about how well a program is meeting its objectives. In addition, federal internal-control standards state that management should identify, analyze, and respond to significant changes in a program’s environment that could pose new risks. FHWA officials said the fact that crashes and fatalities have held steady while the volume of train and vehicle traffic has increased is an indication that grade-crossing safety has continued to improve. However, specific to fatalities per million train-miles, FHWA’s 2018 biennial report shows this rate to be fairly constant since 2009. As noted previously, FRA expects train and traffic volumes to continue to increase and has expressed concern that grade-crossing crashes and fatalities may also increase. Without conducting a program evaluation, FHWA cannot ensure that the Section 130 Program is achieving one of the national goals of the federal- aid highway program, to reduce fatalities and injuries. In addition, It is difficult to see how FHWA, in its biennial reports to Congress, could make informed recommendations for future program implementation without conducting a program evaluation to assess, among other things, whether program requirements first established some four decades ago continue to reduce fatalities and injuries. We note that as part of a program evaluation, some changes that FHWA, working with FRA, identifies as potentially having merit to improve the program’s effectiveness could require a statutory change. The continued number of crashes and fatalities at grade crossings with devices intended to warn of a train’s presence calls into question whether the Section 130 Program is structured to help states continue making progress toward the national goal to reduce fatalities and injuries. An evaluation of the program’s requirements could help determine whether Congress should consider better ways to focus federal funds to address the key factor in crashes—risky driver behavior. An FHWA program evaluation could also help determine whether, for example, states could more strategically target emerging safety problems if changes were made to the types of projects eligible for funding under the Section 130 Program. FRA’s new grade-crossing inspectors are meant to increase the effectiveness of FRA’s rail-safety oversight activities, and accordingly, these FRA inspectors, along with FRA researchers, may be well positioned to help FHWA evaluate potential changes to improve the effectiveness of the Section 130 Program. The Administrator of FHWA, working with FRA, should evaluate the Section 130 Program’s requirements to determine whether they allow states sufficient flexibility to adequately address current and emerging grade-crossing safety issues. As part of this evaluation, FHWA should determine whether statutory changes to the program are necessary to improve its effectiveness. (Recommendation 1) We provided a draft of this report to DOT for review and comment. In written comments, reproduced in appendix II, DOT concurred with our recommendation. DOT also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of Transportation, the Administrator of the Federal Highway Administration, and the Administrator of the Federal Railroad Administration. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on GAO’s website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-2834 or flemings@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix III. This report examines (1) what has been the focus of Federal Railroad Administration’s (FRA) grade-crossing-safety research, (2) how states select and implement grade-crossing projects and what railroad- and state-reported data are available from FRA to inform states’ decisions, and (3) the challenges states reported in implementing and assessing projects and the extent to which the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) assesses the program’s effectiveness. The scope of this work focused on the nation’s more than 128,000 public grade crossings. We did not include private grade crossings, as states can only use Railway- Highway Crossings Program (commonly referred to as the Section 130 Program) funds to improve safety at public grade crossings. While FRA provides safety grants to address rail issues, including for grade-crossing projects, we focused our work on the Section 130 Program because it is the primary source of federal funding directed at grade-crossing-safety improvement. For each objective we reviewed: pertinent statutes and FHWA and FRA regulations and documents; interviewed FHWA and FRA program officials in headquarters; and conducted in-depth interviews with a non- generalizable sample of organizations that included officials from 4 freight and passenger railroads, 12 state agencies from 8 states, 6 FRA regional offices, and 8 FHWA state division offices. We also spoke with representatives from relevant associations and officials from NTSB and Volpe Center. We selected these organizations based on our initial background research, prior work, and input from other stakeholders, among other things. See the paragraph below for additional selection details and table 5 for a complete list of organizations we spoke with. We selected eight states as part of our non-generalizable sample for interviews. These states included Arizona, California, Florida, Illinois, Missouri, New Jersey, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania. The states were selected to include a mix of state experiences based on a variety of factors, including the number of grade crossings and crashes at those crossings, and the amount of Section 130 Program funding they received. Specifically, we selected four states from those in the top 25 percent of all states in terms of their number of grade crossings and the amount of Section 130 Program funds they received. We selected the other four states to include a mix of these factors. We also considered geographical diversity and recommendations from FRA and FHWA officials. Within these eight states, we conducted in-depth interviews with FHWA division staff, FRA regional staff, and state officials. A variety of state agencies administer the Section 130 Program within their state; the state officials we spoke with from our eight selected states worked for agencies such as state departments of transportation, corporation commissions, and public utility commissions. We also spoke with a non-generalizable sample of four railroads: Amtrak, CSX, Norfolk Southern, and Sierra Northern. We selected railroads based on a variety of factors including geographic location and stakeholder recommendations. We also conducted additional work related to each of the objectives. To describe the focus of FRA’s grade-crossing-safety research, we examined FRA research aimed at understanding the causes of grade- crossing crashes and identifying potential improvements and described FRA efforts to test new approaches that could improve safety. We did not assess the quality of FRA’s research, as that was beyond the scope of this engagement. Instead, we described the nature of the research. We also spoke with FRA research and development staff, Volpe researchers, and state partners about this work. To describe how states select and implement grade-crossing projects, and what FRA data are available to inform their decisions, we reviewed an academic study that included a literature review and interviews with state officials to describe how states select Section 130 Program projects. We spoke with the researcher and determined the study to be reliable for the purposes of our reporting objectives. We also spoke with officials from our eight selected states, FHWA division staff, and FRA regional staff, and reviewed the states’ 2017 Section 130 Program reports. As part of this objective, we also assessed the reliability of data reported for all railroads in FRA’s National Highway-Rail Crossing Inventory data as of August 31, 2018. For public grade crossings that were not closed, we examined a selection of fields within the database to identify the frequency of missing data (see table 1), data anomalies (see table 2), relational errors, where two related data fields had values that were incompatible (see table 3), and when the data was last updated (see table 4). Specifically, we conducted the following electronic tests on the crossing inventory data to determine if they were within reasonable ranges, were internally consistent, and appeared complete: Before conducting our analysis, we filtered the inventory data to only include open, public, at-grade crossings. To understand FRA’s efforts to improve its crossing inventory data, we interviewed FRA regional and headquarters staff and reviewed job descriptions for FRA’s new grade- crossing inspectors. Finally, to determine the challenges states reported in implementing and assessing grade-crossing safety projects and the extent to which FHWA assesses the program’s effectiveness, we reviewed program requirements and state project data and other components from FHWA’s 2016 and 2018 Section 130 Program biennial reports to Congress. We also reviewed FHWA’s summary of fiscal year 2018 program funds provided to states and federal laws and guidance related to implementing projects and measuring performance. We interviewed state DOT officials from the eight selected states and other stakeholders on the challenges states reported in implementing and assessing projects, and FHWA and FRA officials for their perspectives on managing the program, including how FHWA measures performance and assesses program effectiveness. We compared information collected from FHWA and FRA to federal internal-control standards and criteria on program evaluation identified in our previous work. In addition, we reviewed FHWA and FRA documents designed to guide states, such as the Grade Crossing Handbook, the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices, the Action Plan and Project Prioritization Noteworthy Practices Guide, and other related documents. We conducted this performance audit from November 2017 to November 2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Susan A. Fleming, (202) 512-2834, Flemings@gao.gov. In addition to the individual named above, Maria Edelstein (Assistant Director); Gary Guggolz (Analyst in Charge); Steven Campbell; Tim Guinane; Ben Licht; Catrin Jones; Delwen Jones; SaraAnn Moessbauer; Malika Rice; Larry Thomas; and Crystal Wesco made key contributions to this report.	[ "Crashes at highway-rail grade crossings are one of the leading causes of railroad-related deaths. According to FRA data, in 2017, there were more than 2,100 crashes resulting in 273 fatalities. Since 2009 crashes have occurred at a fairly constant rate. The federal government provides states funding to improve grade-crossing safety through FHWA's Section 130 Program. The persistence of crashes and deaths raises questions about the effectiveness of the federal grade-crossing-safety program. GAO was asked to review federal efforts to improve grade-crossing safety. This report examines: (1) the focus of FRA's grade-crossing-safety research, (2) how states select and implement grade-crossing projects and what data are available from FRA to inform their decisions, and (3) the challenges states reported in implementing and assessing projects and the extent to which FHWA assesses the program's effectiveness. GAO analyzed FRA data; reviewed FRA's, FHWA's, and states' documents; reviewed a study of states' selection of projects; and interviewed FRA and FHWA headquarters and field staff, and officials from a non-generalizable sample of eight states, selected to include a mix in the number of grade crossings and crashes, and geographic diversity. Research sponsored by the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) has identified driver behavior as the main cause of highway-rail grade crossing crashes and that factors such as train and traffic volume can contribute to the risk of a crash. (See figure.) Over 70 percent of fatal crashes in 2017 occurred at grade crossings with gates. To meet the requirements of the federal grade-crossing program, states are responsible for selecting and ensuring the implementation of grade-crossing improvement projects. Most state DOT officials and other relevant transportation officials use local knowledge of grade crossings to supplement the results of models that rank grade crossings based on the risk of an accident. These states generally consider the same primary risk factors, such as vehicle and train traffic. FRA is taking steps to improve the data used in its model to help states assess risk factors at grade crossings. For example, FRA's grade-crossing inspectors will review and identify issues with railroad- and state-reported inventory data. FRA is currently developing guidelines, which it plans to finalize by the end of 2018, to implement these inspections as it has for other types of FRA inspections. Officials we spoke with in eight states reported challenges in pursuing certain types of projects that could further enhance safety, in part because of federal requirements. While safety has improved, many crashes occur at grade crossings with gates, and officials said there could be additional ways to focus program requirements to continue improving safety. States' and the Federal Highway Administration's (FHWA) reporting focuses on the program's funding and activity, such as the number and types of projects, yet the low number of crashes makes it difficult to assess the effectiveness of projects in reducing crashes and fatalities. FHWA reports the program has been effective in reducing fatalities by about 74 percent since 1975. However, since 2009, annually there have been about 250 fatalities—almost one percent of total highway fatalities. FRA expects future crashes to grow, in part, due to the anticipated increase in rail and highway traffic. An evaluation of the program should consider whether its funding and other requirements allow states to adequately address ongoing safety issues. FHWA officials said they are not required to perform such evaluations. GAO has previously reported on the importance of program evaluations to determine the extent to which a program is meeting its objectives. An evaluation of the program could lead FHWA to identify changes that could allow states to more strategically address problem areas. GAO recommends that FHWA evaluate the program's requirements to determine if they allow states the flexibility to address ongoing safety issues. The Department of Transportation concurred with GAO's recommendation." ]	7,675	gov_report	en	null	1d3a7aa618929e4e3e7f17d8542f5141de8afd669f292e43
Requirements for military awards and decorations can change over time. New events and changes in military, political, or social conditions can generate debate over who is eligible for various military awards. These changes tend to be controversial, especially with veterans groups. Congress has considered several pieces of legislation that would change who would be eligible to receive the Purple Heart, and under what conditions. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have greatly increased the number of servicemembers receiving the Purple Heart award as well as the potential conditions under which they receive the award. Increasingly acknowledged conditions, such as traumatic brain injuries (TBI) and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), as well as accidents and other events while deployed, bring up new questions as to when a servicemember deserves a Purple Heart. The July 17, 2015, shooting of servicemembers at a Marine recruiting office and a naval reserve center in Chattanooga, TN, again prompted questions about applying the Purple Heart to terrorist attacks versus criminal acts. Veterans groups often voice their views when Congress or the President proposes making changes to expand eligibility for the Purple Heart. These groups argue, for example, that a servicemember who acquires PTSD may not always deserve the same recognition as a servicemember killed or wounded in direct combat, while others contend that these medical conditions can debilitate servicemembers just as much as physical injuries and can have lasting effects on servicemembers' lives. Determining which actions and events make a servicemember qualified for receiving a Purple Heart, and whether expanding eligibility does a disservice to those who have already earned the award, are contentious elements of this debate. Although Congress has traditionally left many military award requirements to the executive branch, the Constitution does allow Congress to act in this area, and events have prompted changes regarding eligibility for the Purple Heart. On December 19, 2014, Congress passed The Carl Levin and Howard P. "Buck" McKeon National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2015. Section 571 of the NDAA for FY2015 expanded eligibility by redefining what should be considered an attack by a "foreign terrorist organization" for purposes of determining eligibility for the Purple Heart. As a result, servicemembers wounded and killed in the 2009 shootings in Little Rock, AR, and at Fort Hood, TX, were awarded Purple Hearts in 2015. Congressional offices often receive questions about Purple Heart eligibility from constituents, especially when eligibility rules change. The number of these questions is likely to increase as servicemembers return from conflicts around the world and if eligibility requirements are again changed. This report will examine the history of the Purple Heart and changes in eligibility over time as well as current issues facing Congress. In 1782, George Washington created the Badge of Military Merit to reward "any singularly meritorious action" displayed by a soldier, noncommissioned officer, or officer in the Continental Army. This award was intended to encourage gallantry and fidelity among soldiers, and would later become known as the Purple Heart. The Badge of Military Merit was designed as a purple heart of cloth edged with a narrow lace. Records are incomplete and researchers debate how many soldiers received this award. According to Military Order of the Purple Heart, three soldiers from Connecticut were the first to receive the Badge of Military Merit during the American Revolutionary War. All three were noncommissioned officers and the only recipients who received the award from General Washington. The soldiers were Sergeant William Brown, 5 th Connecticut Regiment of the Connecticut Line on May 3, 1783; Sergeant Elijah Churchill, 2 nd Continental Light Dragoons on May 3, 1783; and Sergeant Daniel Bissell, 2 nd Connecticut Regiment of the Connecticut Line, on June 10, 1783. However, the Badge of Military Merit fell into disuse shortly after its conception. The Badge of Military Merit was not seriously considered again until General Douglas MacArthur (then Army Chief of Staff) revived the award on February 22, 1932, the 200 th anniversary of George Washington's birth. This award, renamed the "Purple Heart," was redesigned to its modern appearance: a purple heart-shaped medal with bronze border and George Washington's coat of arms between two green spray leaves. See Figure 1 . General MacArthur also redefined the eligibility requirements to those who received Meritorious Service Citation certificates from World War I or those authorized to wear wound chevrons by Army Regulation (AR) 600-8-22, Military Awards . It was at this point that the Purple Heart became focused on soldiers killed and wounded in combat, rather than "any singularly meritorious act." In 1942, President Franklin Roosevelt extended the Purple Heart award, which to this point was exclusively an Army award, to Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard members serving in World War II. In 1952, President Truman retroactively awarded Purple Hearts to personnel in the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard that qualified after April 5, 1917, thus including World War I veterans of all services. From 1962 until 1998, eligibility for the Purple Hearts was changed on several occasions. President Kennedy authorized Purple Hearts to all servicemembers, and civilians serving with the Armed Forces, who were engaged in armed conflict against an opposing military or hostile foreign force. This expansion was written to permit U.S. servicemembers, and the civilians that accompanied them, who were killed or wounded in Vietnam to receive the Purple Heart, as many of those servicemembers were officially considered advisors to the Republic of Vietnam, rather than combatants. Purple Heart eligibility was expanded again by President Reagan to include military personnel and government civilians killed or wounded in international terrorist attacks after March 28, 1973, or those serving in peacekeeping operations outside of the United States. This expansion was in response to increased terrorist attacks against U.S. servicemembers abroad, namely the Marine Corps Barracks bombing in Beirut, Lebanon, in 1983. The NDAA for Fiscal Year 1996 expanded eligibility to prisoners of war injured or wounded in captivity prior to 1962, a group of servicemembers previously not covered for Purple Heart eligibility by President Kennedy's executive order. In 1997, President Clinton signed the NDAA for Fiscal Year 1998, which limited future awards of the Purple Heart to military personnel. It has since remained a military-only award. The Department of Defense does not maintain a record of the number of Purple Heart recipients. However, some military historians estimated more than 1 million Purple Hearts have been awarded mostly to soldiers since 1932. Likewise, the National Purple Heart Hall of Honor estimates 1.8 million Purple Hearts have been awarded since the medal was established by the Army in 1932. During the 115 th Congress (2017-2018), H.R. 7097 was introduced as the "Find our Hearts Act." It would have amended Title 10, United States Code, to require the establishment of a searchable database containing the names and citations of members of the Armed Forces who have been awarded the Purple Heart. H.R. 7097 was referred to the House Armed Services Committee but saw no further action. See Table 1 for current Purple Heart legislation. Currently, the Purple Heart is authorized for any member of the U.S. Armed Forces who has been wounded or died from wounds sustained under one of the following conditions: (1) In accordance with E.O. 11016, subject to the provisions of Sections 1129, 1129a, and 1131 of Title 10, U.S.C., and P.L. 104-106 , the Secretary of a Military Department, will, in the name of the President of the United States, award the PH, with suitable ribbons and appurtenances, to any Service member under the jurisdiction of that Department who, after April 5, 1917, has been wounded, killed, or who has died or may hereafter die of wounds received under any of the following circumstances: (a) In action against an opposing armed force of a foreign country in which U.S. Armed Forces are or have been engaged. (b) In any action with an opposing armed force of a foreign country in which the Military Services are or have been engaged. (c) While serving with friendly foreign forces engaged in armed conflict against an opposing armed force in which the United States is not a belligerent party. (d) As a result of an act of any such enemy or opposing armed forces. (e) As the result of an act of any hostile foreign force. (f) After March 28, 1973, as a result of an international terrorist attack against the United States or a foreign nation friendly to the United States, recognized as such an attack for purposes of award of the PH by the Secretary of the Military Department concerned, or jointly by the Secretaries of the Military Departments concerned if members from more than one Military Department are wounded in the attack. The Secretary of the Military Department concerned shall notify the Under Secretary for Personnel and Readiness USD(P&R) prior to awarding the PH for an international terrorist attack that occurs in the United States or its territories. (g) After March 28, 1973, as a result of military operations while serving outside the territory of the United States as part of a peacekeeping force. (h) On or after December 7, 1941, pursuant to Section 1129 of Title 10, U.S.C., a service member who is killed or wounded in action as the result of action by friendly weapon fire while directly engaged in combat, other than as a result of an act of an enemy of the United States, unless (in the case of a wound) the wound is the result of willful misconduct of the member. (i) Before April 25, 1962, pursuant to Section 521 of P.L. 104-106 which held as a prisoner of war (POW), or while being taken captive in the same manner as a former POW who is wounded on or after that date while held as a POW. A person will be considered to be a former POW if the person is eligible for the POW Medal under Section 1128 of Title 10, U.S.C. (j) On or after December 7, 1941, to a Service member who is killed or dies while in captivity as a prisoner of war (POW) under circumstances establishing eligibility for the POW medal pursuant to section 1128 of Title 10, U.S.C., and Volume 2 of DoD Manual 1348.33, Manual of Military Decorations and Awards , unless compelling evidence is presented that shows that the member's death was not the result of enemy action. (k) After September 11, 2001, pursuant to section 1129a of Title 10, U.S.C., to a Service member on active duty who is killed or wounded in an attack by a foreign terrorist organizations in circumstances where the death or wound is the result of an attack targeted on the member due to such member's status as a member of the armed forces. An attack by an individual or entity shall be considered to be a foreign terrorist attack if the individual or entity was in communication with the foreign terrorist organization before the attack and the attack was inspired or motivated by the foreign terrorist organization. An award is not authorized if the death or wound was the result of the willful misconduct of the Service member. To assist in making a PH determination pursuant to section 1129a of Title 10, U.S.C., the Military Department Secretary concerned may request an intelligence assessment from the Defense Intelligence Agencies' Defense Combating Terrorism Center (DCTC). The DCTC assessment of potential foreign terrorist attacks by an individual or entity will assess whether the individual or entity was in communication with the foreign terrorist organization before the attack, and if the attack was inspired or motivated by the foreign terrorist organization. The assessment shall include supporting citations and rationale. (2) A wound for which the award is made must have been of such severity that it required treatment, not just examination, by a military medical officer. (a) Treatment must be noted in the Servicemember's medical record. (b) Award may be made of wounds treated by a medical professional other than a medical officer provided a medical officer issues a statement in the Service member's medical record that the extent of the wounds were such that the wounds would have required treatment from a medical officer if one had one been available to treat the wounds. (3) After May 17, 1998, pursuant to Section 1131 of Title 10, U.S.C., the PH may only be awarded to a person who is a Service member at the time the person is killed or wounded under circumstances otherwise qualifying that person for award of the PH. Before this date, the Secretary of the Military Department concerned was authorized to award the PH to U.S. civilian nationals who were serving under competent authority in any capacity with the armed forces of that department. For deceased servicemembers, the Purple Heart may be given to the representatives of the deceased as the individual Service Secretary considers appropriate. Servicemembers can be awarded multiple Purple Hearts for separate incidents. The servicemember receives the Purple Heart medal for the first award. Subsequent awards are indicated with oak leaf clusters or 5/16 inch service stars, depending on the rules of the recipient's service. Purple Hearts may not be awarded to foreign military personnel. Although the decision to award medals and other military decorations traditionally rests with the executive branch, Congress has been expanding its role in this area in recent decades, exercising its constitutional power "To Make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval forces." Previously, Congress took the lead and adjusted Purple Heart eligibility in both the NDAA for FY1996 and the NDAA for FY1998. See Appendix A . In response to some mass shootings in recent years, Congress passed a provision in the NDAA for FY2015 that expanded the Purple Heart's eligibility requirements. On June 1, 2009, a man who was allegedly angry over the killing of Muslims in Iraq and Afghanistan opened fire on two U.S. Army soldiers near a recruiting station in Little Rock, AR, killing one and wounding the other. On November 5, 2009, an Army major opened fire at Ft. Hood, TX, killing 13 and wounding 29, many of them servicemembers. Both men were charged with murder and other crimes. Federal and local law enforcement authorities initially considered these acts to be crimes, and the Defense Department reports the Fort Hood shooting as "workplace violence," not acts perpetrated by an enemy or hostile force, which made them ineligible for the Purple Heart. However, some believed these acts should be viewed as acts of war or domestic terrorism because they involved Muslim perpetrators angered over U.S. actions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Section 571 of the NDAA for FY2015 ( P.L. 113-291 ) expanded the eligibility for the Purple Heart by redefining what should be considered an attack by a "foreign terrorist organization" for purposes of determining eligibility for the Purple Heart. The law states that an event should be considered an attack by a foreign terrorist organization if the perpetrator of the attack "was in communication with the foreign terrorist organization before the attack" and "the attack was inspired or motivated by the foreign terrorist organization." Still, some are opposed to awarding the Purple Heart for terrorist acts that were initially deemed "workplace violence" by the Department of Defense (DOD) or a criminal act, and not earned on a battlefield. This act arguably sets a precedent for the future and could make Purple Heart eligibility more subjective, allowing public sentiment to determine what events are worthy of a Purple Heart. On April 10, 2015, then-Army Secretary John McHugh and Army Lieutenant General Sean MacFarland, 3 rd Corps and Fort Hood commanding general, presented Purple Hearts to the families of the 10 servicemembers killed and to the 26 servicemembers wounded during the attack. Defense of Freedom Medals were also awarded to DOD civilians killed and wounded during the attack. In a memorandum, Secretary McHugh directed the Army to "expedite certain other benefits for which soldiers receiving the Purple Heart are traditionally eligible." In addition to the victims of the Fort Hood shooting, the two victims of the June 2009, shooting at a recruiting station in Little Rock, Arkansas, received Purple Hearts on July 1, 2015. Army Private William Andrew "Andy" Long was killed and Army Private Quinton Ezeagwula was wounded in that attack by Abdulhakim Muhammad, who was convicted and sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. Encouraged by the expanded eligibility provision in the NDAA for FY2015, legislation was introduced during the 114 th Congress to award Purple Hearts to other military victims of domestic terrorism. Section 583 of the House-passed version of H.R. 1735 , the NDAA for FY2016, would have awarded the Purple Heart to servicemembers who were victims of the April 19, 1995, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma bombing. Supporters for awarding the Purple Heart to the victims of the Oklahoma City bombing refer to the FY2015 NDAA as precedent. However, critics contend that the bombing was an act of domestic terrorism and does not meet the current eligibility requirements of the assailant being inspired by or motivated by an international terrorist organization. The final version of the FY2016 NDAA ( P.L. 114-92 ) did not include this provision. On July 16, 2015, Muhammad Youssef Abdulazeez shot at a Marine Corps recruiting center and Naval Reserve Center in Chattanooga, TN. This incident again raised congressional interest regarding the eligibility for the Purple Heart for servicemembers killed and wounded during an attack inspired by or motivated by international terrorist organizations. Four marines were killed and one was injured during the rampage, and the lone sailor later died from his injuries. The FBI investigation later concluded that Abdulazeez was "motivated by foreign terrorist organization propaganda," but that it was difficult to determine which terrorist group may have inspired him. On December 16, 2015, then-Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus announced that the Purple Heart would be awarded to five servicemembers killed and one wounded in the July 2015 shootings at two naval centers in Chattanooga, Tennessee. Secretary Mabus stated that "following an extensive investigation, the FBI and NCIS have determined that this attack was inspired by a foreign terrorist group, the final criteria required for the awarding of the Purple Heart to this Sailor and these Marines." On January 14, 2016, then-Navy Vice Admiral Robin Braun presented the Purple Heart to the family of Logistics Specialist 2 nd Class Randall Smith at the Navy Operational Support Center Chattanooga. Brigadier General Terry V. Williams presented the Purple Heart on January 26, 2016, to Sergeant DeMonte R. Cheeley, who survived the attack, at a ceremony in Chattanooga. On April 20, 2016, Lieutenant General Rex McMillian, then-head of Marine Corps Forces Reserve, presented Purple Hearts to the families of Gunnery Sergeant Thomas Sullivan, Staff Sergeant David Wyatt, Sergeant Carson Holmquist, and Lance Corporal Squire "Skip" Wells in a ceremony at the Hunter Museum of American Art in Chattanooga. U.S. Airman 1 st Class Spencer Stone was onboard a train from Amsterdam to Paris with two friends, Anthony Sadler and Alek Skarlatos, when they subdued a heavily armed gunman who attempted to fire an AK-47 at the passengers. Stone was stabbed in the face and neck by the gunman as the trio restrained him before he could discharge his weapon. The vacationing Americans were hailed as heroes and awarded the French Legion of Honor on August 24, 2015. On September 14, 2015, Air Force Secretary Deborah Lee James announced that Stone would receive the Purple Heart along with the Airman's Medal, the Air Force's highest noncombat award. At the Pentagon on September 17, 2015, then-Defense Secretary Ash Carter presented Stone the Purple Heart and Airman's Medal. During the ceremony, Carter presented the Soldier's Medal to Oregon National Guard Specialist Alek Skarlatos, and civilian Anthony Sadler received the Secretary of Defense Medal for Valor. On June 12, 2016, a security guard, Omar Mateen, killed 49 people and wounded 53 others in an attack inside Pulse, a gay nightclub in Orlando, Florida. Army Reserve Captain Antonio Davon Brown was one of the 49 people killed and may be eligible for the Purple Heart depending on the outcome of the FBI investigation. According to the FBI, Mateen had pledged allegiance to the Islamic State group after his attack in a call to 911. At this time, it is unclear if the Army will make a decision regarding Captain Brown's eligibility for the Purple Heart. On September 28, 2016, H.R. 6234 was introduced to amend Title 18, U.S.C., to provide for penalties for the sale of any Purple Heart awarded to a member of the Armed Forces. This legislation would have made selling the medal punishable by fines and up to six months in prison. H.R. 6234 would have placed the Purple Heart into a new protected category, keeping it away from not just con artists but also memorabilia collectors. The measure was named for Private Corrado Piccoli, a World War II infantryman killed in action in 1944, whose Purple Heart was found for sale at an antique store in 2009. This bill was referred to the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, and Investigations but saw no further action in the 114 th Congress. This legislation was reintroduced in the 115 th Congress on January 13, 2017, as H.R. 544 , the Private Corrado Piccoli Purple Heart Preservation Act of 2017, and a related bill, S. 765 , was passed by the Senate on August 3, 2017. Both bills were referred to committee in the House but saw no further action. On January 15, 2019, S. 122 , Private Corrado Piccoli Purple Heart Preservation Act, was introduced in the 116 th Congress. The bill was read twice and referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee. The House version of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2019, H.R. 5515 , included a provision (Section 629) that would extend certain morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR) privileges to certain veterans, including Purple Hearts recipients, and their caregivers. This bill became P.L. 115-232 on August 13, 2018. Section 621 of the enacted bill adopted House Section 629, which extends eligibility of certain MWR and commissary privileges to certain veterans, including Purple Heart recipients, and their caregivers starting in 2020. For additional information see section, "Defense Commissary System," in CRS Report R45343, FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act: Selected Military Personnel Issues . For bill summaries of Purple Heart legislation in the 116 th Congress as introduced, see Table 1 . The large number of veterans with invisible wounds returning from Iraq and Afghanistan has the Department of Defense (DOD) reevaluating Purple Heart eligibility for traumatic brain injuries (TBI) and mental conditions such as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). DOD considers some TBIs eligible for the Purple Heart, as many of those injuries can be diagnosed using brain scans and other objective medical tests. However, there is continued debate on the inclusion of mental conditions, such as PTSD, as part of the appropriate criteria for the Purple Heart. Congress, as well as various executive agencies and departments, is funding and conducting studies regarding PTSD. The National Alliance on Mental Illness, a national grassroots advocacy group representing families and people affected by mental illness, is advocating that the Purple Heart be awarded for psychological wounds including PTSD to eliminate stigma and encourage servicemembers to seek care. At this time, DOD does not consider servicemembers with PTSD eligible for the Purple Heart. Army Regulation 600-8-22 allows "concussion injuries caused as a result of enemy generated explosions" but specifically disqualifies post-traumatic stress disorders. Army guidance emphasizes "the degree to which the enemy caused the injury" when determining eligibility and places PTSD in a column of noneligible injuries. The Marine Corps defines PTSD as a "severe combat stress injury" and says that combat stress injuries are "not directly caused by the enemy's intentional use of an outside force or agent," and thus do not qualify. Servicemembers are divided on this issue. Some servicemembers believe that mental injuries such as PTSD should be eligible for the Purple Heart, while others believe that it would dishonor those who have received Purple Hearts for physical injuries. Proponents argue that some veterans are less likely to seek help for their mental-health injuries because of the stigma associated with PTSD, and that stigma could be lessened by recognizing their injuries as real. Opponents, including some veterans from the Military Order of the Purple Heart and Veterans of Foreign Wars, are resistant to accepting PTSD as grounds for eligibility. A representative of The Military Order of the Purple Heart stated, "We believe strongly in and support the criteria that the wound or death should be sustained in combat at the hands of the enemies of the United States." In addition, the national spokesman for the Veterans of Foreign Wars, Joseph E. Davis, said, "Medals aren't awarded for illness or disease, but for 'achievement and valor.'" Appendix A. Timeline of Purple Heart Eligibility August 7, 1782: George Washington creates the Badge of Military Merit. Awarded to several Continental soldiers but it quickly falls from use. February 22, 1932: Army Chief of Staff General Douglas MacArthur revives the Badge of Military Merit as an Army award, renamed "the Purple Heart," and retroactively awarded to wounded WWI veterans. December 3, 1942: Executive Order 9277—President Franklin Roosevelt expands Purple Heart eligibility to include U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard. Retroactively awards Purple Hearts to December 6, 1941. November 12, 1952: Executive Order 10409—President Truman retroactively awards Purple Hearts to U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard veterans after April 5, 1917. April 25, 1962: Executive Order 11016—President Kennedy extends eligibility to civilians serving with military forces. February 23, 1984: Executive Order 12464—President Reagan awards Purple Hearts to those killed and wounded in terrorist attacks after March 28, 1973, or on peacekeeping missions outside the United States. February 10, 1996: National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (Section 521, P.L. 104-106 ) includes "prisoners of war wounded before April 25, 1962, while held as a prisoner of war (or while being taken captive) in the same manner as a former prisoner of war who is wounded on or after that date while held as a prisoner of war (or while being taken captive)." November 18, 1997: National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 (Section 571, P.L. 105-85 ) limits future Purple Heart awards to members of the Armed Forces. October 17, 2006: National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (Section 556, P.L. 109-364 ) includes prisoners of war captured after December 7, 1941. April 30, 2008: Purple Heart Family Equity Act of 2007 ( P.L. 110-207 ) revises the congressional charter of the Military Order of the Purple Heart to authorize associate membership for the spouse and siblings of a recipient of the Purple Heart medal. December 19, 2014: National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (Section 571, P.L. 113-291 ) expands eligibility for the Purple Heart by redefining what should be considered an attack by a foreign terrorist organization, and awards Purple Heart medals to servicemembers wounded or killed during the 2009 shootings at Ft. Hood, Texas, and Little Rock, Arkansas. Appendix B. Staffer Instructions for Medal Requests Members of Congress are able to directly request that a Service Secretary consider awarding military decorations to individuals or groups. Upon receiving a request from a Member's office, the Service Secretary concerned will review the proposal for the award or presentation of a decoration (or the upgrading of a decoration). Based on that review, the Secretary shall determine the merits of approving the award or presentation of the decoration and other necessary determinations. The Secretary shall submit a notice to the requesting Member, the Senate Armed Services Committee, and the House Armed Services Committee with one of the following results: (1) The award or presentation of the decoration does not warrant approval on the merits. A statement explaining the Secretary's reason will be included. (2) The award or presentation of the decoration warrants approval and a waiver by law of time restrictions prescribed by law is recommended. (3) The award or presentation of the decoration warrants approval on the merits and has been approved as an exception to policy. (4) The award or presentation of the decoration warrants approval on the merits, but a waiver of the time restrictions prescribed in law is not recommended. A statement explaining the Secretary's reason will be included. Source: Compiled from the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 ( P.L. 104-106 , §526), February 10, 1996.	[ "The Purple Heart is one of the oldest and most recognized American military medals, awarded to servicemembers who were killed or wounded by enemy action. The conflicts 2001 to the present have greatly increased the number of Purple Hearts awarded to servicemembers. Events over the past few years have spurred debate on the eligibility criteria for the Purple Heart. Shootings on U.S. soil and medical conditions such as traumatic brain injury (TBI) and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) have prompted changes to the eligibility requirements for the Purple Heart. Some critics believe that these changes may lessen the value of the medal and the sacrifices of past recipients on the battlefield. In the past, efforts to modify the Purple Heart's eligibility requirements were contentious, and veterans groups were vocal concerning eligibility changes. While medal requirements are often left to the military and executive branch to decide, Congress is involved in Purple Heart eligibility, utilizing its constitutional power \"To Make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces\" (U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 8, clause 14). The Carl Levin and Howard P. \"Buck\" McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (P.L. 113-291) included language that expands eligibility for the Purple Heart. Previous debates have raised several questions about the Purple Heart. In some respects, how an event is defined can determine eligibility: Is a servicemember the victim of a crime or a terrorist attack? Conversely, arguing that killed or wounded servicemembers \"should\" be eligible for the Purple Heart can redefine an event: Is the servicemember an advisor to a foreign military or a combatant? Are PTSD and other mental health conditions adequate injuries to warrant the Purple Heart? These are questions that Congress might consider if it chooses to act on this issue." ]	4,754	gov_report	en	null	8625a7e0b0cb0d069221e65122f0db0d02c2ea98099b8dfd
USDA’s Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) is responsible for promulgating SNAP program regulations, ensuring that state officials administer the program in compliance with program rules, and authorizing and monitoring retailers from which recipients may purchase food. States are responsible for determining applicant eligibility, calculating the amount of their benefits, issuing benefits on Electronic Benefit Transfer (EBT) cards—which can be used like debit cards to purchase food from authorized retailers—and investigating possible program violations by recipients. SNAP recipients are subject to various work requirements. Generally, all SNAP recipients ages 16 through 59, unless exempted by law or regulation, must comply with work requirements, including registering for work, reporting to an employer if referred by a state agency, accepting a bona fide offer of a suitable job, not voluntarily quitting a job or reducing work hours below 30 hours a week, and participating in a SNAP E&T program or a workfare program—in which recipients perform work on behalf of the state—if assigned by the state agency. SNAP recipients are generally exempt from complying with these work requirements if they are physically or mentally unfit, responsible for caring for a dependent child under age 6 or an incapacitated person, employed for 30 or more hours per week or receive weekly earnings which equal the minimum hourly rate set under federal law multiplied by 30, or are a bona fide student enrolled half-time or more in any recognized school training program, or institution of higher education, amongst other exemptions. SNAP recipients subject to the work requirements—known as work registrants— may lose their eligibility for benefits if they fail to comply with these requirements without good cause. One segment of the work registrant population, SNAP recipients ages 18 through 49 who are “able-bodied,” not responsible for a dependent child, and do not meet other exemptions—able-bodied adults without dependents (ABAWDs)—are generally subject to additional work requirements. In addition to meeting the general work requirements, ABAWDs must work or participate in a work program 20 hours or more per week, or participate in workfare, in which ABAWDs perform work to earn the value of their SNAP benefits. Participation in SNAP E&T, which is a type of work program, is one way for ABAWDs to meet the 20 hour per week ABAWD work requirement, but other work programs are acceptable as well. Unless ABAWDs meet these work requirements or are determined to be exempt, they are limited to 3 months of SNAP benefits in a 36-month period. At the request of states, FNS may waive the ABAWD time limit for ABAWDs located in certain areas of a state or an entire state under certain circumstances. A waiver may be granted if the area has an unemployment rate of over 10 percent or there are an insufficient number of jobs to provide employment for these individuals. If the time limit is waived, ABAWDs are not required to meet the ABAWD work requirement in order to receive SNAP for more than 3 months in a 36-month period yet they must still comply with the general work requirements. Federal requirements for state SNAP E&T programs were first enacted in 1985 and provide state SNAP agencies with flexibility in how they design their SNAP E&T programs, including who to serve and what services to offer. The state has the option to offer SNAP E&T services on a voluntary basis to some or all SNAP recipients, an approach commonly referred to as a voluntary program. Alternatively, the state can require some or all SNAP work registrants to participate in the SNAP E&T program as a condition of eligibility, an approach commonly referred to as a mandatory program. Further, states determine which service components to provide participants through their SNAP E&T programs, although they must provide at least one from a federally determined list. This list includes job search programs, job search training programs, workfare, programs designed to improve employability through work experience or training, education programs to improve basic skills and employability, job retention services, and programs to improve self-sufficiency through self- employment. Total federal expenditures on SNAP E&T programs were more than $337 million in fiscal year 2016. States are eligible to receive three types of federal funding available for state SNAP E&T programs: 100 percent funds—formula grants for program administration, 50 percent federal reimbursement funds, and ABAWD pledge funds—grants to states that pledge to serve all of their at-risk ABAWDs. The Office of Management and Budget has designated SNAP as a high- priority program due to the estimated dollar amount in improper payments—any payments that should not have been made or were made in an incorrect amount (including overpayments and underpayments) under statutory, contractual, administrative, or other legally applicable requirements. According to USDA’s fiscal year 2015 agency financial report, $2.6 billion, or 3.66 percent, of all SNAP benefits paid in fiscal year 2014 were improper, the most recent year for which data are available. SNAP improper payments are caused by variances in any of the key factors involved in determining SNAP eligibility and benefit amounts, and, according to USDA, household income was the most common primary cause of dollar errors. States review the accuracy of SNAP payments to recipients on an ongoing basis, and FNS assesses the accuracy of state reviews and determines a national improper payment rate annually. FNS and states share responsibility for addressing SNAP fraud, which can occur through the eligibility process and when benefits are being used. Specifically, recipients may commit eligibility fraud when they misrepresent their household size, income, or expenses in order to fraudulently obtain SNAP benefits. Another type of fraud—trafficking— occurs when recipients exchange benefits with authorized retailers or other individuals for cash or non-food items (e.g. rent or transportation). In a typical retailer trafficking situation, for example, a retailer may charge $100 to a recipient’s EBT card and give the recipient $50 in cash instead of $100 in food. The federal government reimburses the retailer $100, which results in a fraudulent $50 profit to the retailer. State agencies are directly responsible for preventing, detecting, investigating, and prosecuting recipient fraud, including eligibility fraud and trafficking by SNAP recipients, under the oversight and guidance of FNS. States play a key role in preventing fraud when determining eligibility for SNAP. State agencies collect applicant information, such as household income and employment, and verify it through data matches with other information sources. After benefits are issued, the agencies may monitor EBT transaction data to identify spending patterns that may indicate trafficking. If an individual or household intentionally violates SNAP rules, such as by trafficking or making false or misleading statements in order to obtain benefits, states conduct administrative disqualification hearings or, in some cases, refer the case for criminal prosecution. FNS is responsible for authorizing and overseeing retailers who participate in the program—totaling more than 263,000 in fiscal year 2017—including investigating potential retailer trafficking. In order to participate in SNAP, a retailer applies to FNS and demonstrates that they meet program requirements, such as those on the amount and types of food that authorized stores must carry. FNS verifies a retailer’s compliance with these requirements and generally authorizes retailers for 5 years. FNS then monitors retailers’ continued compliance with program requirements and administratively disqualifies, or assesses money penalties on, those who are found to have trafficked benefits. To this end, FNS officials collect and monitor EBT transaction data to detect irregular patterns of transactions that may indicate trafficking and also conduct undercover investigations. If found to be trafficking, retailers are generally permanently disqualified from SNAP or incur a monetary penalty in lieu of permanent disqualification. According to FNS data, about 14 percent of SNAP recipients, or about 6.1 million, were work registrants who were subject to work requirements, and about 0.5 percent of SNAP recipients, or about 200,000, participated in state SNAP E&T programs, in an average month of fiscal year 2016. (See fig. 1.) According to FNS, most SNAP recipients are exempt from work requirements. For example, according to FNS, almost two-thirds of SNAP recipients were children, elderly, or adults with a disability in an average month of fiscal year 2016—groups that are generally exempt. Further, adults who are already working at least 30 hours a week are also exempt from SNAP work requirements, and according to FNS data, more than 31 percent of non-elderly adult SNAP recipients were employed in an average month of fiscal year 2016. SNAP work registrants who are not participating in SNAP E&T programs may be participating in other activities to meet work requirements or eligible for other exemptions. FNS officials told us that the state data reported to FNS on SNAP E&T participants are the best and most recent data available on this group, yet they also have limitations, which we will continue to explore in our ongoing work. In recent years, the number and percentage of SNAP recipients and work registrants participating in SNAP E&T programs appears to have decreased, according to FNS data. From fiscal year 2008 through fiscal year 2016, the average monthly number of SNAP E&T participants decreased from about 256,000 to about 207,000, or by 19 percent, according to state data on SNAP E&T participants reported to FNS. (See fig. 2.) However, over the same time period, the average monthly number of SNAP recipients appears to have increased from about 27.8 million to about 43.5 million, and work registrants appears to have increased from about 3 million to about 6.1 million, according to FNS data. As a result, the percentage of total SNAP recipients participating in SNAP E&T programs decreased from about 0.9 to about 0.5 percent, and the percentage of SNAP work registrants participating in these programs decreased from approximately 8.1 percent to 3.4 percent, from fiscal year 2008 through fiscal year 2016. Available information suggests the characteristics of SNAP E&T participants are generally similar to those of SNAP work registrants who do not participate in these programs. A recent FNS study, which surveyed SNAP E&T participants and SNAP work registrants who had not participated in SNAP E&T, found that members of the two groups had similar demographic characteristics, including age and gender, and received similar monthly SNAP benefit amounts. Further, at the time they were surveyed, about one third of each group were employed, and their average wage rates were similar, at about $10 per hour. State SNAP agencies have broad flexibility in how they design their SNAP E&T programs, and the characteristics of these programs have changed in several ways over the last decade. For example, states have increasingly moved from mandatory to voluntary programs, focused on serving ABAWDs, and partnered with state and local organizations to deliver services. According to FNS data, states have increasingly moved from mandatory to voluntary SNAP E&T programs in recent years. In fiscal year 2010, 17 states operated voluntary programs; however, by fiscal year 2017, 35 states operated voluntary programs, according to FNS data. (See fig. 3.) FNS officials told us that they have been actively encouraging states to provide more robust employment and training services, such as vocational training or work experience, through voluntary programs. They said that they believe these types of robust services are more effective in moving participants toward self-sufficiency, but that funding may not be sufficient to provide these to the large numbers of participants served in mandatory programs. In addition, FNS officials told us that voluntary programs are less administratively burdensome than mandatory programs, as they allow states to focus on serving motivated participants rather than sanctioning non-compliant individuals. According to FNS officials, when states move to a voluntary program, they generally experience a decline in SNAP E&T participation—a trend consistent with our analysis of FNS data—which may have contributed to the decline in overall SNAP E&T participation. Of the 22 states or territories that changed from a mandatory to a voluntary program from fiscal year 2010 through fiscal year 2016, according to FNS data, 13 experienced a decrease in SNAP E&T participation—ranging from a 21 percent decrease to a 93 percent decrease. Overall, voluntary programs are generally smaller than mandatory programs, according to our analysis of FNS data. In fiscal year 2016, for example, the 32 states or territories operating voluntary programs together served less than half of the total number of SNAP E&T participants served by the 21 states or territories operating mandatory programs, although these two groups of states had similar numbers of new work registrants. Furthermore, states operating voluntary programs served an average of nearly 7,000 SNAP E&T participants per state, while states operating mandatory programs served an average of 23,000 SNAP E&T participants per state. Evidence suggests that states have increased their focus on serving ABAWDs—a sub-population of SNAP recipients subject to benefit time limits and additional work requirements—through SNAP E&T, as related waivers have expired in recent years, according to FNS data. During and after the 2007-2009 recession, the majority of states operated under statewide waivers of the ABAWD time limit due to economic conditions. However, as the economy recovered, most statewide waivers expired, and the ABAWD time limit was reinstated. For example, according to FNS data, in fiscal year 2011, 45 states or territories had a statewide waiver and 7 states had a partial waiver—one applying to certain localities. By fiscal year 2017, the number of states or territories with a statewide waiver had decreased to 9, while 27 states had partial waivers. FNS officials and state SNAP agency officials we spoke with in some states told us that, as the waivers have ended, state SNAP E&T programs have become increasingly focused on serving ABAWDs. Although state data on SNAP E&T programs reported to FNS suggest a greater percentage of ABAWDs have been participating in these programs in recent years, according to FNS officials, these data have limited usefulness in assessing state trends in serving ABAWDs for several reasons. For example, in recent years, FNS officials learned that there was widespread confusion among states regarding the need to track ABAWDs when waivers were in place, and that as a result, some states had not been tracking ABAWDs or properly documenting SNAP recipients’ ABAWD status. This is consistent with what some of the selected states we spoke with reported. As part of our ongoing work, we are continuing to explore the availability and reliability of data on ABAWDs. State SNAP agencies have increasingly partnered with other state and local organizations, such as workforce agencies, community-based social service providers, and community colleges, to provide services to SNAP E&T participants in recent years, according to FNS and states we selected for our review. In fiscal year 2018, nearly all states partnered with at least one other organization to deliver SNAP E&T services, with the majority partnering with more than one, according to an analysis by FNS. In recent years, FNS has urged states to make use of the broad network of American Job Centers. The American Job Centers, also known as one- stop centers, are funded through the Department of Labor’s Employment and Training Administration and designed to provide a range of employment-related services, such as training referrals, career counseling, job listings, and similar employment-related services, to job seekers under one roof. Our prior work has highlighted the value of coordination between federally funded employment and training programs to ensure the efficient and effective use of resources. Despite encouraging such partnerships, FNS officials said that American Job Centers typically provide lighter touch services to SNAP E&T participants, such as job search and job search training, and they therefore may not be well suited for SNAP E&T participants who have multiple barriers to employment. In our 2003 work on SNAP E&T, we found that while workforce system programs offered some of the activities needed by SNAP E&T participants, officials from 12 of the 15 states we contacted said that most participants were not ready for these activities, in part, because they lacked basic skills, such as reading and computer literacy, that would allow them to successfully participate. An alternative service delivery strategy that FNS has promoted is the development of third party partnerships with community-based social service providers, community colleges, and other entities to help states enhance their SNAP E&T programs. According to FNS, in this model, third party organizations use non-federal funding to provide allowable SNAP E&T services and supports, which are then eligible for 50 percent federal reimbursement funds through the state’s SNAP E&T program. According to FNS officials, third party partnerships enable states to leverage additional resources, grow their SNAP E&T programs, and reach more SNAP participants. In addition, FNS officials said that these partnerships allow states to improve their program outcomes by tapping into providers currently serving communities that include SNAP recipients. Federal 50 percent reimbursement funds expended increased from nearly $182 million to more than $223 million, or by 23 percent, from fiscal year 2007 to fiscal year 2016. FNS has taken steps to increase federal support of states’ SNAP E&T programs by increasing the number of federal staff responsible for SNAP E&T and providing additional technical assistance to states. Specifically, FNS officials said that in 2014, they created the Office of Employment and Training to provide support and oversight for the SNAP E&T program and expanded SNAP E&T staff in FNS headquarters from one to five fulltime employees. FNS has also taken steps to increase technical assistance to states. For example, they have developed tools, including the SNAP E&T Operations Handbook, intended to help states implement and grow their program, and by adding a dedicated SNAP E&T official in each of FNS’s seven regional offices. According to FNS, regional officials have targeted technical assistance to states on, for example, developing third-party partnerships, and they have emphasized evidence-based approaches to administering the program, such as providing skills-based training for in-demand occupations. FNS officials rely on various information sources to oversee states’ SNAP E&T programs, including participant outcome data reported by states for the first time in January 2018. For example, FNS officials conduct management evaluation reviews of states, annually review states’ SNAP E&T plans for compliance, and collect data from states on program participation and expenditures. In addition, as of January 2018, FNS has begun receiving new data on SNAP E&T program participants and outcomes from states. These data include employment outcomes, such as the number of SNAP E&T participants in unsubsidized employment after participation in the program, and participant characteristics, such as the number of participants entering the program with a high school degree or equivalent. FNS officials said that although states generally submitted the new data on time, states experienced challenges that likely affected the accuracy of the data. For example, some states needed to manually collect data on participant characteristics due to the limited capacity of their data systems. Further, according to FNS officials, some states did not correctly interpret certain reporting definitions or time periods. To address these challenges, FNS officials have been providing technical assistance to states to help them refine their participant and outcome data reports. Officials told us that they expect the states to submit revised reports by May 2018; we will examine these data and related issues in our ongoing work. FNS and the states partner to address issues that affect program integrity, including improper payments and fraud, and FNS has taken some steps to address challenges in these areas, but concerns remain. For example, regarding SNAP recipient and retailer fraud, FNS has taken some steps to address challenges identified in our 2006 and 2014 reports related to fraud committed by SNAP recipients and authorized retailers, but more remains to be done. We currently have ongoing work to assess the steps FNS and states have taken to address our recommendations related to recipient and retailer fraud and other program vulnerabilities. In 2016, we reviewed SNAP improper payment rates and found that states’ adoption of program flexibilities and changes in federal SNAP policy in the previous decade, as well as improper payment rate calculation methods, likely affected these rates. For example, when states adopted available SNAP policy flexibilities that simplified or lessened participant reporting requirements, these changes reduced the opportunity for error and led to a decline in the improper payment rate, according to a USDA study. In addition, we found that the methodology SNAP used to calculate its improper payment rate was generally similar to the methodologies used for other large federal programs for low- income individuals, including Medicaid, Earned Income Tax Credit, and Supplemental Security Income. However, we also found that some of the procedural and methodological differences in the rate calculation among these programs likely affected the resulting improper payment rates, such as how cases with insufficient information or certain kinds of errors were factored into the improper payment rate. In 2014, USDA identified SNAP improper payment data quality issues in some states and has since been working with the states to improve improper payment estimates. Although USDA reported national SNAP improper payment estimates for benefits paid through fiscal year 2014, USDA did not report a national SNAP improper payment estimate for benefits paid in fiscal years 2015 or 2016. In response to a report from USDA’s Office of Inspector General that identified concerns in the application of SNAP’s quality control process, which is used to identify improper payments, USDA began a review of state quality control systems in all states in 2014. According to USDA, due to the data quality issues uncovered in 42 of 53 states during the reviews, the improper payment rates for those states could not be validated, and the department was unable to calculate a national improper payment rate for benefits paid in fiscal year 2015. To address the data quality concerns, USDA updated guidance, provided training to relevant state and federal staff, and worked with states to update their procedures to ensure consistency with federal guidelines. According to USDA, the department also required individual states to develop corrective action plans to address issues identified and monitored progress to ensure states took identified actions. On June 30, 2017, USDA notified the states that the department would not release a national SNAP improper payment rate for benefits paid in fiscal year 2016 and remained focused on conducting the fiscal year 2017 review. FNS has increased its oversight of state anti-fraud activities in recent years by developing new guidance and providing training and technical assistance to states on detecting fraud by SNAP recipients and reporting on anti-fraud activities to FNS. In 2014, we reported on 11 selected states’ efforts to combat SNAP recipient fraud and made several recommendations to FNS to address the challenges states faced. We found that FNS and states faced challenges in the following areas: Guidance on use of data tools to detect fraud: States faced challenges using FNS-recommended data tools to detect fraud, and FNS is in the process of developing improved guidance to address this concern. Specifically, FNS’s guidance on the use of EBT transaction data to uncover potential patterns of benefit trafficking lacked the specificity states needed to uncover such activity, and we recommended FNS develop additional guidance. Since then, FNS contracted with a private consulting firm to provide 10 states with technical assistance in recipient fraud prevention and detection, which included exploring the use of data analytics to analyze and interpret eligibility and transaction data to identify patterns or trends and create models that incorporate predictive analytics. FNS officials also recently told us that the agency is developing a SNAP Fraud Framework to provide guidance to states on improving fraud prevention and detection. FNS officials anticipated releasing the framework in mid- 2018. Tools for monitoring e-commerce websites: We also found FNS- recommended tools for automatically monitoring potential SNAP trafficking on e-commerce websites to be of limited use and less effective than manual searches, and FNS has developed but not finalized guidance on using such tools. We recommended that FNS reassess the effectiveness of its current guidance and tools for states to monitor e-commerce and social media websites. In August 2017, FNS officials told us that they had developed revised guidance for states on using social media in detection of SNAP trafficking. According to FNS, the guidance will be incorporated into the SNAP Fraud Framework. Staff levels: During the time of our 2014 work, most of our 11 selected states reported difficulties conducting fraud investigations due to reduced or stagnant staff levels while numbers of SNAP recipients had greatly increased, but FNS decided not to make changes to address this issue. Specifically, 8 of the 11 states we reviewed reported inadequate staffing due to attrition, turnover, or lack of funding. Some states suggested changing the financial incentive structure to promote fraud investigations because agencies were not rewarded for cost-effective, anti-fraud efforts that could prevent ineligible people from receiving benefits. Specifically, when fraud by a SNAP recipient is discovered, a state may generally retain 35 percent of any recovered overpayments. However, there are no recovered funds when a state detects potential fraud by an applicant and denies the application. To help address states’ concerns about resources needed to conduct investigations, we recommended in our 2014 report that FNS explore ways that federal financial incentives could be used to better support cost-effective anti-fraud strategies. FNS reported that it took some steps to explore alternative financial incentives, through a review of responses to a Request for Information in the Federal Register. However, FNS decided not to pursue bonus awards for anti-fraud and program integrity activities. Given that FNS has not made changes in this area, state SNAP fraud agencies may continue to report resource concerns in addressing fraud. Reporting guidance: We also found that FNS did not have consistent and reliable data on states’ activities because of unclear reporting guidance, and FNS has since revised its data collection form and provided training on the changes. To improve FNS’s ability to monitor states and obtain information about more efficient and effective ways to combat recipient fraud, we recommended in 2014 that FNS take steps, such as providing guidance and training, to enhance the consistency of what states report on their anti-fraud activities. In response, FNS revised the form used to collect recipient integrity information and changed the reporting frequency from annual to quarterly, effective fiscal year 2017. FNS officials also reported providing training to approximately 400 state agency and FNS regional office personnel on the updates to the form and related instructions. In our ongoing work, we are further reviewing states’ use of data analytics to identify SNAP recipient fraud, including that which may be occurring during out-of-state transactions. Because transactions that may appear suspicious—such as those made out-of-state—may in fact be legitimate, states may use data analytic techniques to include additional factors that may help them better target their efforts to identify potential fraud. However, states may have different levels of capacity for using data analytics to detect fraud. We are examining how 7 selected states are using data analytics and identifying the advantages and challenges states have experienced in doing so. We are also assessing FNS’s efforts to assist states in implementing GAO’s leading practices for data analytics outlined in GAO’s Framework for Managing Fraud Risks in Federal Programs outlined in GAO’s Framework for Managing Fraud Risks in Federal Programs. In addition, we are conducting our own analysis of EBT out-of-state SNAP transaction data. We expect to report on our findings later this year. FNS has taken some steps to prevent, detect, and respond to retailers who traffic SNAP benefits since our last report on the issue in 2006, but trafficking continues to be a problem. For example, in February 2018, a federal jury convicted a grocery store operator in Baltimore on charges of wire fraud in connection with a scheme to traffic more than $1.6 million in SNAP benefits for food sales that never occurred. The grocery store operator paid cash for SNAP benefits, typically paying the recipient half the value of the benefits and keeping the other half for himself. In our 2006 report, we found that SNAP was vulnerable to retailer trafficking in several areas, including: Requirements for food that retailers must stock to participate in SNAP: In 2006, we found that FNS had minimal requirements for the amounts of food that retailers must stock, which could allow retailers more likely to traffic into the program, although the agency has since taken steps to increase these requirements. In our 2006 report, FNS officials said that they authorized stores with limited food stock to provide access to food in low-income areas where large grocery stores were scarce. At that time, retailers were generally required to stock a minimum of 12 food items (at least 3 varieties of 4 staple food categories, such as fruits and vegetables), but FNS rules did not specify how many items of each variety would constitute sufficient stock. FNS officials told us that a retailer that only carries small quantities of food, such as a few cans of one kind of vegetable, may intend to traffic. In 2016, FNS promulgated a final rule increasing food stock requirements. FNS officials told us that these new rules are designed to encourage stores to provide more healthy food options for recipients and discourage trafficking. According to FNS, retailers are now generally required to stock at least 36 food items (a certain variety and quantity of staple foods in each of the 4 staple food categories). Focus on high-risk retailers: We also found in 2006 that FNS had not conducted analyses to identify characteristics of retailers at high risk of trafficking and to target its resources—a shortcoming FNS has since taken some steps to address. For example, we reported that some stores may be at risk of trafficking because one or more previous owners had been found trafficking at the same location. However, FNS did not have a system in place to ensure that these retailers were quickly targeted for heightened attention. In addition, once a store was authorized to participate in the program, FNS staff typically would not inspect the store again until it applied for reauthorization 5 years later. We recommended that FNS identify the stores most likely to traffic and provide earlier, more targeted oversight to those stores. In 2009, FNS began establishing risk levels for each authorized retailer, identifying high-risk stores as those with a prior permanent disqualification at that location or a nearby location. In 2013, FNS required all high-risk retailers to go through reauthorization and to provide additional documentation regarding store ownership. That same year, FNS also consolidated its retailer management functions, including those for authorizing stores and analyzing EBT transaction data, into a single national structure known as the Retailer Operations Division. FNS officials told us that this structure enables the agency to identify and deploy their investigative resources to the areas of highest risk nationally, rather than within a given region. Penalties to deter retailer trafficking: We also found in our 2006 report that FNS’s penalties for retailer trafficking may be insufficient to deter traffickers, and since then, FNS has proposed—but not finalized—rules to increase them. FNS imposes administrative penalties for retailer trafficking—generally a permanent disqualification from the program or a monetary penalty. FNS relies on the USDA Office of Inspector General (OIG) and other law enforcement entities to conduct investigations that can lead to criminal prosecutions. In our 2006 report, we recommended that FNS develop a strategy to increase penalties for trafficking. The Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 (known as the 2008 Farm Bill) gave USDA authority to impose higher monetary penalties, and the authority to impose both a monetary penalty and program disqualification on retailers found to have violated relevant law or regulations (which includes those found to have trafficked). In 2012, FNS proposed regulatory changes to implement these authorities. However, FNS has not finalized these rules, and as of fall 2017, the rules were considered “inactive.” In our ongoing work, we are continuing to assess FNS’s efforts to prevent, detect, and respond to retailer trafficking, as well as examining what is known about the extent of retailer trafficking nationwide. As part of this work, we are continuing to review FNS’s response to our prior recommendations, as well as related recommendations made by USDA’s OIG. We are also studying FNS’s periodic estimates of the rate of retailer trafficking, expressed as the dollar value and percentage of all SNAP benefits that were trafficked and the percentage of retailers involved. These data suggest an increase in the estimated rate of retailer trafficking since our 2006 report. However, we and others, including a group of experts convened by FNS, have identified some limitations with the retailer trafficking estimates. For example, the trafficking rate is calculated based on a sample of retailers that FNS considers most likely to traffic. Although FNS adjusts the data to better represent the broader population of authorized retailers, it is uncertain whether the resulting estimates accurately reflect the extent of trafficking nationwide. We are reviewing these limitations and FNS’s efforts to address them in our ongoing work. Chairman Jordan, Chairman Palmer, Ranking Member Krishnamoorthi, Ranking Member Raskin, and Members of the Subcommittees, this completes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to respond to any questions that you may have at this time. If you or your staff have any questions about this testimony, please contact Kathryn Larin, Director, Education, Workforce, and Income Security Issues at (202) 512-7215 or LarinK@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. GAO staff who made key contributions to this testimony include Rachael Chamberlin, Celina Davidson, Swati Deo, Rachel Frisk, Alexander Galuten, Danielle Giese, Kristen Jones, Morgan Jones, Lara Laufer, Monica Savoy, and Kelly Snow. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.	[ "SNAP is the largest federally funded nutrition assistance program. In fiscal year 2017, it provided about $63 billion in benefits. USDA and the states jointly administer SNAP and partner to address issues that affect program integrity, including improper payments and fraud. GAO has previously reported on various aspects of SNAP, including state SNAP E&T programs, improper payment rates, recipient fraud, and retailer trafficking. This testimony discusses GAO's prior and ongoing work on (1) SNAP E&T programs, including program participants, design, and USDA oversight, and (2) USDA's efforts to address SNAP program integrity, including improper payments, as well as recipient and retailer fraud. As part of its ongoing work on SNAP E&T programs, GAO analyzed E&T expenditures and participation data from fiscal years 2007 through 2016, the most recent data available; reviewed relevant research from USDA; and interviewed USDA and selected state and local officials. The prior work discussed in this testimony is based on four GAO products on E&T programs (GAO-03-388), improper payments (GAO-16-708T), recipient fraud (GAO-14-641), and retailer trafficking (GAO-07-53). Information on the scope and methodology of our prior work is available in each product. Overseen by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and administered by states, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) Employment and Training (E&T) programs served about 0.5 percent of the approximately 43.5 million SNAP recipients in an average month of fiscal year 2016, according to the most recent USDA data available. These programs are generally designed to help SNAP recipients increase their ability to obtain regular employment through services such as job search and training. Some recipients may be required to participate. According to USDA, about 14 percent of SNAP recipients were subject to work requirements in an average month of fiscal year 2016, while others, such as children and the elderly, were generally exempt from these requirements. States have flexibility in how they design their E&T programs. Over the last several years, states have 1) increasingly moved away from programs that mandate participation, 2) focused on serving able-bodied adults without dependents whose benefits are generally time-limited unless they comply with work requirements, and 3) partnered with state and local organizations to deliver services. USDA has taken steps to increase support and oversight of SNAP E&T since 2014, including collecting new data on participant outcomes from states. GAO has ongoing work reviewing SNAP E&T programs, including USDA oversight. USDA and the states partner to address issues that affect program integrity, including improper payments and fraud, and USDA has taken some steps to address challenges in these areas, but issues remain. Improper Payments. In 2016, GAO reviewed SNAP improper payment rates and found that states' adoption of program flexibilities and changes in federal SNAP policy in the previous decade, as well as improper payment rate calculation methods, likely affected these rates. Although USDA reported improper payment estimates for SNAP in previous years, USDA did not report an estimate for benefits paid in fiscal years 2015 or 2016 due to data quality issues in some states. USDA has since been working with the states to improve improper payment estimates for the fiscal year 2017 review. Recipient Fraud. In 2014, GAO made recommendations to USDA to address challenges states faced in combatting recipient fraud. For example, GAO found that USDA's guidance on the use of transaction data to uncover potential trafficking lacked specificity and recommended USDA develop additional guidance. Since then, USDA has provided technical assistance to some states, including on the use of data analytics. GAO has ongoing work reviewing states' use of data analytics to identify SNAP recipient fraud. Retailer Trafficking. In 2006, GAO identified several ways in which SNAP was vulnerable to retailer trafficking—a practice involving the exchange of benefits for cash or non-food items. For example, USDA had not conducted analyses to identify high-risk retailers and target its resources. Since then, USDA has established risk levels for retailers based on various factors. GAO has ongoing work assessing how USDA prevents, detects, and responds to retailer trafficking and reviewing the usefulness of USDA's estimates of the extent of SNAP retailer trafficking. GAO is not making new recommendations. USDA generally concurred with GAO's prior recommendations." ]	5,657	gov_report	en	null	38a5830e9f6eb481ec9b4eb23eb5204a6f3d51831fdb2845
The combination of growing supplies of liquefied natural gas (LNG) and new requirements for less polluting fuels in the international maritime shipping industry has heightened interest in LNG as a maritime fuel. For decades, LNG tanker ships have been capable of burning boil-off gas from their LNG cargoes as a secondary fuel. However, using LNG as a primary fuel is a relatively new endeavor; the first LNG-powered vessel—a Norwegian ferry—began service in 2000. Several aspects of LNG use in shipping may be of congressional interest. LNG as an engine, or "bunker," fuel potentially could help the United States reduce harmful air emissions, it could create a new market for domestic natural gas, and it could create economic opportunities in domestic shipbuilding. However, U.S. ports would need specialized vessels and land-based infrastructure for LNG "bunkering" (vessel refueling) as well as appropriate regulatory oversight of the associated shipping and fueling operations. The storage, delivery, and use of LNG in shipping also has safety implications. These and other aspects of LNG bunkering may become legislative or oversight issues for Congress. One bill in the 115 th Congress, the Waterway LNG Parity Act of 2017 ( S. 505 ), would have imposed excise taxes on LNG used by marine vessels on inland waterways. This report discusses impending International Maritime Organization (IMO) standards limiting the maximum sulfur content in shipping fuels, the market conditions in which LNG may compete to become a common bunker fuel for vessel operators, and the current status of LNG bunkering globally and in the United States. A broader discussion of oil market implications is outside the scope of this report. The IMO is the United Nations organization that negotiates standards for international shipping. Its standards limiting sulfur emissions from ships, adopted in 2008, have led vessel operators to consider alternatives to petroleum-based fuels to power their ships. In 1973, the IMO adopted the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL). Annex VI of the convention, which came into force in 2005, deals with air pollution from ships. The annex established limits on nitrogen oxide (NO x ) emissions and set a 4.5% limit on the allowable sulfur content in vessel fuels. In 2008, the IMO announced a timeline to reduce the maximum sulfur content in vessel fuels from 4.5% to 0.5% by January 1, 2020. Annex VI requires vessel operators to either use fuels containing less than 0.5% sulfur or install exhaust gas-cleaning systems ("scrubbers") to limit a vessel's sulfur oxide (SO x ) emissions to a level equivalent to the required sulfur limit. MARPOL is implemented in the United States through the Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships (). The United States effectively ratified MARPOL Annex VI in 2008 when President Bush signed the Maritime Pollution Prevention Act ( P.L. 110-280 ). The act requires that the U.S. Coast Guard and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) jointly enforce the Annex VI emissions standards. MARPOL's Annex VI requirements are codified at 40 C.F.R. §1043. They apply to U.S.-flagged ships wherever located and to foreign-flagged ships operating in U.S. waters. In addition to its global sulfur standards, MARPOL Annex VI provides for the establishment of Emissions Control Areas (ECAs), which are waters close to coastlines where more stringent emissions controls may be imposed. The North American ECA limits the sulfur content of bunker fuel to 0.1% of total fuel weight, an even lower bar than that set by the IMO 2020 standards. This standard is enforced by Coast Guard and EPA in waters up to 200 miles from shore. Currently, most ships operating in the North American ECA meet the emissions requirements by switching to low-sulfur fuels once they enter ECA waters. The European Union also has an ECA with a 0.1% limit on sulfur in bunker fuels, and the Chinese government is considering putting the same standard in place. The IMO 2020 emissions requirement applies to vessels of 400 gross tons and over, which is estimated to cover about 110,000 vessels worldwide. However, analysts indicate that many of the smaller vessels in this group already burn low-sulfur fuel. Accounting for these smaller vessels, one estimate is that about 55,000 vessels currently burn high-sulfur fuel. Ship owners have two main options for meeting the emission requirements with existing engines: burn low-sulfur conventional fuel (or biofuels) or install scrubbers to clean their exhaust gases. Alternatively, ship owners may opt to install new LNG-fueled engines to comply with the IMO standard. The simplest option for vessel owners to comply with the IMO sulfur standards, and the one that appears most popular, is switching to low-sulfur fuel oils or distillate fuels. Although switching to low-sulfur fuels would increase fuel costs compared to conventional, high-sulfur fuels, it would require little or no upfront capital cost and would allow ocean carriers to use existing infrastructure to bunker ships at ports. Anticipating widespread adoption of this approach, many analysts predict that the implementation of the IMO 2020 regulations will drive up demand for low-sulfur fuel and, therefore, significantly increase its price above current levels. Such a trend could also reduce demand for high-sulfur fuels, increasing the price spread between low- and high-sulfur bunkers fuels. Switching to lower-sulfur fuel could increase fuel cost across the industry by up to $60 billion in 2020 for full compliance with the IMO standards. Moreover, while it may allow vessels to meet the existing IMO sulfur standards, low-sulfur fuel does not necessarily support compliance with potential future IMO emissions standards, especially with respect to greenhouse gases (GHGs) such as carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) discussed later in this report. Scrubbers are systems which remove sulfur from a vessel's engine exhaust emissions. A ship with a scrubber would be capable of meeting the IMO 2020 standard while using conventional high-sulfur fuel. Retrofitting a scrubber on an existing engine can cost several million dollars, however, before factoring in the lost revenue from taking the ship out of service for a month for the installation. Therefore, while using a scrubber will allow a ship to continue using (currently) cheaper high-sulfur fuel, it may take years to recover the initial investment. For example, one industry study estimates that, in the case of a typical tanker, a scrubber installation could cost $4.2 million with a payback time of approximately 4.8 years. Furthermore, scrubbers installed to capture sulfur emissions might have to be further refitted or replaced to comply with any future IMO standards for GHG emissions. The rate of scrubber adoption could affect the financial impacts of installing them in terms of fuel costs. Scrubbers ultimately offset some or all of their initial costs because they allow vessel operators to continue using relatively inexpensive high-sulfur fuel. However, the return on investment for scrubbers depends on the relative prices of high- and low-sulfur bunker fuels. The demand—and therefore, prices—for low-sulfur and high-sulfur fuels will be affected by how many vessels use the respective fuels under the IMO standards that take effect in 2020. For example, limited scrubber adoption could result in more vessels demanding more low-sulfur fuel oil, creating upward pressure on low-sulfur fuel prices. Under such a scenario, scrubbers would provide greater fuel cost savings for vessels that installed them. Alternatively, high-sulfur fuel could become more costly due to refinery production cutbacks (because shippers will not be allowed to burn it without scrubbers). In this case, the economic benefits of scrubbers would be diminished. Given the uncertain fuel supply and demand dynamics, it is difficult for vessel operators to know how big the market distortions from scrubber installation could be or how many other operators may choose to install scrubbers. As of September 2018, there were approximately 660 ships retrofitted with scrubbers and over 600 ships under construction with plans to install scrubbers. By 2020, projecting additional construction orders, some analysts predict about 2,000 vessels could have scrubbers installed. However, even with higher demand for the technology, the ability of vessel owners to install scrubbers is constrained; analysts estimate that current maximum capacity for installing scrubbers is be between 300 to 500 ships per year. Another option for ship owners to comply with the IMO 2020 sulfur standards is to switch to engines that burn LNG as a bunker fuel. LNG-fueled vessels emit only trace amounts of sulfur oxides in their exhaust gases—well below even the 0.1% fuel-equivalent threshold in some of the ECA zones—so they would be fully compliant with the IMO standards. As a secondary benefit, using LNG as an engine fuel also would reduce particulate matter (PM) emissions relative to both high- and low-sulfur marine fuel oils. Furthermore, LNG vessels have the potential to emit less CO 2 than vessels running on conventional, petroleum-based fuels. However, LNG vessels would have the potential to result in more fugitive emissions of methane, another GHG, because methane is the primary component of natural gas, further discussed below. Installing an LNG-fueled engine can add around $5 million to the cost of a new ship. Retrofitting existing ships appears to be less desirable because of the extra space required for the larger fuel tanks (new ships can be designed with the larger fuel tanks). The costs of retraining crews to work with LNG engines could also factor into a vessel operator's decision about switching to LNG. However, apart from their lower emissions, LNG-fueled engines may offset their capital costs with fuel cost advantages over engines burning petroleum-derived fuels. These savings would depend on the price spread between natural gas and fuel oil—which has been volatile in recent years. The likelihood that switching to LNG will produce long-term fuel costs savings relative to conventional fuels is, therefore, a critical consideration for many vessel owners. The 1920 Merchant Marine Act (known colloquially as the Jones Act) requires that vessels engaged in U.S. domestic transport be built domestically. Many newly built domestic ships receive a federal loan guarantee under the Maritime Administration's so-called "Title XI" program. In 2014, the program was modified to include the use of "alternative energy technologies" to power ships as part of the relevant criteria in evaluating a loan application. The Maritime Administration counts LNG-fueled engines as an "alternative energy technology" and may be more likely to approve loan applications for ships with LNG-capable engines. Since the North American ECA was established in 2015, Jones Act coastal ship operators have taken steps to transition their fleets to use cleaner burning fuels, including LNG. The three Jones Act operators that ship dry goods to Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico have taken delivery or have ordered LNG-fueled and LNG-capable vessels from U.S. shipyards in Philadelphia, PA, and Brownsville, TX. Harvey Gulf International has put into service five LNG-powered offshore supply vessels that service offshore oil rigs. Some Jones Act tanker operators that have recently built or ordered vessels have chosen to install LNG-ready engines while other operators have chosen to install scrubbers on their existing fleet. Ship engines and scrubbers for the Jones Act fleet do not have to be manufactured in the United States because they are not considered an integral part of the hull or superstructure of a ship. Seagoing barges, known as articulated tug barges, are also a significant portion of the domestic coastal fleet, especially for moving liquid cargoes. However, these vessels traditionally have burned lower-sulfur fuels and thus the ECA has not prompted fleet conversions. IMO fuel requirements do not apply to river barges operating on the nation's inland waterway system, although this fleet potentially could be a market for LNG as fuel. Bunkering vessels (small tankers with hoses for refueling ships) in U.S. waters must also be Jones Act compliant. Barges are the predominant method for bunkering ships in U.S. ports. An LNG bunkering vessel for the Port of Jacksonville—the first Jones Act-compliant LNG bunkering vessel to enter service in the United States—was built in 2017 by Conrad Shipyards in Orange, TX. Recent energy sector trends suggest that LNG may be cheaper in the long-run than petroleum-based, low-sulfur fuels. However, these price movements are correlated to some extent. Many existing long-term LNG contracts link LNG prices to oil prices (although such contract terms are on the decline), even in the spot market. Starting in 2008, the advent of shale natural gas production dramatically decreased natural gas prices in the United States. Natural gas spot prices in the United States at the Henry Hub—the largest U.S. trading hub for natural gas—averaged around $3/MMBtu (million British Thermal Units) in 2018, about a quarter of the peak in average price a decade before, just prior to the shale gas boom ( Figure 1 ). Liquefying natural gas into LNG adds around $2/MMBtu to the production cost. Including additional producer charges and service costs would bring the total cost of LNG available at a U.S. port (based on the 2018 average price in Figure 1 ) to approximately $6/MMBtu. Shipping of LNG from the United States to Asia or Europe adds from $1 to $2/MMBtu, so, based on the 2018 average cost in Figure 1 , LNG delivered to a port overseas would cost on the order of $7 to $8/MMbtu under long-term contracts, depending upon timing and location. Higher or lower prices could occur for specific long-term contracts and in the LNG spot market (i.e., for individual cargoes), based on the location and the supply and demand balance at the time. In general, the U.S. market will have the lowest-priced LNG. Northern Asia will have the highest LNG prices due to the region's comparative lack of pipeline gas supplies and its distance from LNG suppliers. Figure 2 compares LNG spot market prices in the Japan LNG market—the highest-priced LNG market—to spot prices for two common petroleum-based bunker fuels, low-sulfur gas oil and high-sulfur fuel oil. As the figure shows, over the last five years, Japan LNG generally has been cheaper than low-sulfur fuel and more expensive than high-sulfur fuel on an energy-equivalent basis (i.e., per MMbtu). However, Japan LNG and high-sulfur fuel prices converged in 2018. As the figure shows, spot prices for LNG deliveries to the Japan market fell below $6/MMBtu in 2016 from a high above $16/MMBtu in 2013. Likewise, low-sulfur gas oil prices have doubled, and high-sulfur fuel oil prices have tripled, since 2016. The volatility of the bunker fuel markets and the global LNG market lead to considerable unpredictability about the relative prices among fuels going forward. LNG may become increasingly price-competitive versus low-sulfur fuel as the 2020 IMO sulfur standards take effect. As discussed above, many analysts predict prices for low-sulfur gas oil, which are already higher than those for high-sulfur fuel oil, to increase significantly after 2020 due to a standards-driven rise in demand. Although fuel prices as shown in Figure 2 indicate favorable economics for LNG versus low-sulfur fuel, if prices for high-sulfur fuel oils collapse as some expect after the 2020 IMO regulations enter into force, it is possible that LNG could lose its price advantage over residual fuel oils. Likewise, the price spread between low-sulfur gasoil and high-sulfur fuel oil would increase, incentivizing more carriers to install scrubbers to capitalize on the savings in fuel costs by continuing to burn high-sulfur fuel. An additional complication is the variability of LNG prices by region. Many shipping lines are global operators seeking low-priced fuel worldwide, but unlike the global oil market, natural gas markets are regional. Because the price of LNG can vary significantly by region, the relative economics of LNG versus other bunker fuels would also vary by region. Another uncertainty in the market for LNG bunkering is the discrepancy between the spot price for traded LNG and the price for LNG sold as bunker fuel in ports. Added costs associated with marketing, storing and transporting LNG in bunkering operations (discussed below) would likely require ports to charge a rate for LNG bunker fuel above spot market prices. These additional overhead costs are likely to vary among ports. Before factoring in any effect of IMO standards on fuel prices, and assuming a favorable LNG-fuel oil price spread, it still could take years for the savings generated by using LNG to pay back the capital costs of switching fuels. Through May 2018, there were 122 LNG-powered vessels in operation and another 135 ordered or under construction. Many of the first LNG vessels delivered and ordered were Norwegian-flagged vessels, as the Norwegian government has subsidized LNG-fueled vessels with a "NO x Fund." The fund provides LNG-operated ships with an exemption from the country's tax on NO x emissions. As an alternative to committing to LNG as a fuel, some vessel owners may hedge their bets by opting to install "LNG-ready" engines, which can burn low-sulfur fuel oil currently, but are designed to make future LNG conversion easier. The number of LNG ships that may be in operation by 2030 is difficult to predict. First, as noted above, growth in LNG powered vessels is likely to be driven primarily by new builds rather than retrofits. However, the shipping industry has experienced nearly a decade of vessel overcapacity and slow growth. Weak growth in the shipping industry could result in slower growth in vessel orders overall and, therefore, fewer orders for LNG-powered vessels. Of new vessels ordered, or set to be delivered, in 2018 or after, 13.5% (by tonnage) are LNG-fueled—up from 1.4% in 2010. If this trend continues, demand for LNG from the shipping industry could still be relatively high, even if overall growth in the shipping industry remains slow. Because LNG bunkering infrastructure among global ports is currently limited, vessels that use large amounts of fuel and travel predictable routes—along which LNG is available—are the most suitable for LNG fuel. For this reason, cruise ships, vehicle ferries, and container ships initially may be the most likely vessel types to adopt LNG as bunker fuel. Order books have reflected this assessment: one quarter of all cruise ships on order by tonnage at the end of 2017 were LNG-powered. Likewise, a major container ship line, CMA CGM, recently announced that it was ordering nine extra-large container ships powered by LNG. The carrier stated that the fuel tanks will displace space for "just a few containers" and said it intends to refuel these ships just once on their round trip voyages between Asia and Europe. Conversely, LNG fuel adoption may be less likely for oil tankers. Half the global oil tanker fleet operates on the shipping spot market (also known as the "tramp" market), meaning that ship owners enter into contracts with cargo owners only for a single voyage. In this kind of trade, many oil tankers lack a consistent route. Having to limit spot contracts only to ports that may bunker LNG could reduce the arbitrage opportunities of tankers. Dry bulk cargo vessels (carrying grain, coal, and other commodities) also typically operate in the tramp market. LNG-powered vessels have lower direct exhaust emissions than comparable vessels using petroleum-derived fuels. However, the lifecycle—or "well-to-wake"—GHG emissions (especially of methane) and of volatile organic compound emissions from natural gas production, transportation, and liquefaction complicates the comparison. One study in 2015 concluded, "performing a ['well-to-wake'] GHG study on LNG used as a marine fuel is more complex than previously thought. Further studies are needed ... to investigate this subject." A 2016 study found that the relative GHG emissions benefits of LNG versus conventional fuel oil on a "well-to-wake" basis was highly dependent upon fugitive methane emissions in the LNG supply chain. A 2017 study funded by NGVA Europe, an association which promotes the use of natural gas in vehicles and ships, concluded that LNG as a bunker fuel provides a 21% well-to-wake reduction in GHG emissions compared to convention fuel oil. Evaluating such studies is beyond the scope of this report, although they indicate uncertainty about environmental benefits of LNG fuel, which may require further examination. Despite concerns over lifecycle emissions from the natural gas supply chain, in the short term, ships that pair LNG engines with newer vessel designs could reduce onboard GHG emissions. However, whether these GHG emission reductions would be sufficient to meet the future standards could become another issue for ship owners. The IMO has set a provisional goal of reducing GHG emissions from ships by 50% by 2050. Depending upon the state of engine technology, LNG-fueled ships might become less viable if GHG limits were to be established well before 2050. Concerns about such GHG limits might lead to a decrease in orders of LNG-powered ships over time. Commercial vessels have a typical lifespan of over 20 years, so firms ordering new ships have to take into account compliance with potential standards issued decades in the future. If renewable fuels, such as biodiesel, become more available and cheaper in the coming decades, renewable fuel-powered ships may take over part of the market that LNG-powered ships could occupy. A key requirement for ocean carriers to adopt LNG as an engine fuel is the availability of LNG bunkering facilities. Because LNG is extremely cold (-260 °F) and volatile, LNG bunkering requires specialized infrastructure for supply, storage, and fuel delivery to vessels. Depending upon the specific circumstances, LNG bunkering could require transporting LNG to a port from an offsite liquefaction facility for temporary storage at the port, or building an LNG liquefaction terminal on site. Alternatively, LNG could be delivered from offsite facilities directly to vessels in port via truck or supply vessel ( Figure 3 ). Truck-to-vessel LNG bunkering, in particular, provides some fueling capabilities without large upfront capital investments. LNG tanker trucks could also bring LNG to a storage tank built on site at the port, which could then bunker the LNG to arriving ships via pipeline. Supplying LNG using tanker trucks in this way may face capacity limitations due to truck size, road limitations, or other logistical constraints, but it has been demonstrated as a viable approach to LNG bunkering at smaller scales. The predominant method of bunkering today with high-sulfur fuel is vessel to vessel, either by a tank barge or smaller tanker. The type of infrastructure needed to temporarily store (if needed) and deliver LNG within a given port would depend on the size and location of the port, as well as the types of vessels expected to bunker LNG. Truck to ship bunkering is best suited for supporting smaller and mid-sized vessels, such as ferries or offshore supply vessels (OSVs) that support offshore oil platforms. Liquefaction facilities built on site can provide the greatest capacity of any LNG bunkering option, for example, to provide fuel for large vessels in transoceanic trade. However, constructing small-scale liquefaction facilities to produce and deliver LNG on site requires considerable planning and significant capital investment, in one case on the order of $70 million for a mid-sized port. Each LNG bunkering option in Figure 3 may be a viable means to begin LNG bunkering service in a given port. However, ports may face practical constraints as bunkering increases in scale. For example, a container port of significant size typically has multiple terminals, so even with an on-site liquefaction facility, it may need additional infrastructure or supply vessels for moving LNG to other port locations where a cargo ship might be berthed. There may also be port capacity and timing constraints upon the movement of LNG bunkering barges trying to refuel multiple large vessels in various locations around a crowded port. To date, the LNG bunkering operations already in place or in development are comparatively small, but scale constraints could become a factor as LNG bunkering grows and might require additional bunkering-related port investments. Early adoption of LNG bunkering occurred in Europe, where the first sulfur ECAs were created in 2006 and 2007. Through Directive 2014/94/EU, the European Union requires that a core network of marine ports be able to provide LNG bunkering by December 2025 and that a core network of inland ports provide LNG bunkering by 2030. This mandate has been promoted, in part, with European Commission funds to support LNG bunkering infrastructure development. In addition, the European Maritime Safety Agency published regulatory guidance for LNG bunkering in 2018. Over 40 European coastal ports have LNG bunkering capability currently in operation—primarily at locations on the North Sea and the Baltic Sea, and in Spain, France, and Turkey. These locations include major port cities such as Rotterdam, Barcelona, Marseilles, and London. Another 50 LNG bunkering facilities at European ports are in development. LNG bunkering is also advancing in Asia, led by Singapore, the world's largest bunkering port. Singapore has agreed to provide $4.5 million to subsidize the construction of two LNG bunkering vessels. The Port of Singapore plans to source imported LNG at the adjacent Jurong Island LNG terminal, loading it into the bunkering vessels for ship-to-ship fueling of vessels in port. Singapore also has signed a memorandum of understanding with 10 other partners—including a Japanese Ministry and the Chinese Port of Ningbo-Zhoushan—to create a focus group aimed at promoting the adoption of LNG bunkering at ports around the world. In Japan, one consortium is implementing plans to begin vessel-to-vessel LNG bunkering at the Port of Keihin in Tokyo Bay by 2020. Japan's NYK line, a large ship owner, recently announced that it had reached an agreement with three Japanese utilities to add LNG bunkering to ports in Western Japan. Asian countries, together with Australia and the United Arab Emirates, currently have around 10 coastal ports offering LNG bunkering, with another 15 projects in development. Some LNG bunkering operations in Europe and Asia are associated with existing LNG marine terminals, which already have LNG storage and port infrastructure in place. However, many smaller operations—including most of the projects in development—employ trucking, dedicated bunkering vessels, on-site liquefaction, and other means to extend LNG availability beyond the ports with major LNG terminals. LNG bunkering is not so advanced in South America, although with nine operating LNG marine terminals (one for export), and another six in development, South America also could support significant LNG bunkering operations in the near future. LNG bunkering in the United States currently takes place in two locations—Jacksonville, FL, and Port Fourchon, LA—with a third bunkering facility under development in Tacoma, WA. The LNG facilities in these ports serve the relatively small U.S.-flag domestic market. Bunkering of LNG-fueled cruise ships also is planned for Port Canaveral, FL. However, ports in North America have significant potential to expand the nation's LNG bunkering capability. Jacksonville is the largest LNG bunkering operation at a U.S. port. One bunkering facility at the port, developed by JAX LNG, initially began truck-to-ship refueling operations in 2016 for two LNG-capable container ships. (The LNG is sourced from a liquefaction plant in Macon, GA. ) In August 2018, upon delivery of the Clean Jacksonville bunker barge, the facility began to replace truck-to-ship bunkering with ship-to-ship bunkering. In the future, the barge plans to source LNG from a new, small-scale liquefaction plant which JAX LNG is currently constructing at the port. A second facility at Jacksonville's port, operated by Eagle LNG, provides LNG bunkering sourced from a liquefaction plant in West Jacksonville. Eagle LNG also is constructing an on-site liquefaction and vessel bunkering facility in another part of the port, expected to begin service in 2019. Taken together, the JAX LNG and Eagle LNG facilities is expected to establish Jacksonville as a significant LNG-bunkering location with the capability to serve not only the domestic fleet but larger international vessels as well. In 2015, Harvey Gulf International Marine (Harvey) began LNG bunkering operations in the Gulf of Mexico to fuel its small fleet of LNG-powered offshore supply vessels serving offshore oil rigs. Harvey has since constructed a $25 million facility at its existing terminal in Port Fourchon to store and bunker LNG sourced from liquefaction plants in Alabama and Texas. The facility can provide truck-to-ship bunkering services for LNG-fueled offshore supply vessels, tank barges, and other vessels. A Harvey subsidiary has ordered two LNG bunkering barges to enable ship-to-ship fueling in the future. Puget Sound Energy has proposed an LNG liquefaction and bunkering facility at the Port of Tacoma, WA. Vessels traveling between Washington and Alaska typically spend the entire journey within the 200-mile North America ECA. Consequently, vessel owners operating along these routes have been interested in LNG as bunker fuel. TOTE Maritime, for example, a ship owner involved in trade between Alaska and the lower 48 states, has begun the process of retrofitting the engines of two of its container ships to be LNG-compatible. The proposed Tacoma LNG facility would be capable of producing up to 500,000 gallons of LNG per day and would include an 8 million gallon storage tank. The facility would serve the dual purposes of providing fuel for LNG-powered vessels and providing peak-period natural gas supplies for the local gas utility system. Its total construction cost reportedly is expected to be $310 million. Community and environmental concerns have slowed the progress of the proposal, which is still under regulatory review. Puget Sound Energy originally planned to put the LNG facility into service in late 2019; however, permitting issues appear likely to delay its opening until 2020 or later—if it is eventually approved. Q-LNG Transport, a company 30% owned by Harvey, has placed orders for two LNG bunkering barges to provide ship-to-ship LNG fueling as well as "ship-to-shore transfers to small scale marine distribution infrastructure in the U.S. Gulf of Mexico and abroad." Q-LNG's first barge initially is expected to provide fuel to new LNG-fueled cruise ships based in Port Canaveral (and, potentially, Miami), while service from its second barge is still uncommitted. Initial plans are for the LNG to be sourced from the Elba Island LNG import/export terminal near Savannah, GA—approximately 230 nautical miles away—although the company may seek to develop an on-site LNG storage facility in the future. As noted above, U.S. LNG bunkering activities thus far have been limited to a handful of vessels in domestic trade and tourism. LNG bunkering for the much larger fleet of foreign-flag ships carrying U.S. imports and exports is still to be developed. As in Europe and Asia, domestic ports located near major LNG import or export terminals may serve as anchors for expanded LNG bunkering operations. Figure 4 shows existing LNG import and export terminals in North America. LNG can be liquefied from pipeline natural gas (or imported natural gas) and stored in large quantities at these facilities. The LNG can then be bunkered on site or transported to bunkering facilities elsewhere in the region by truck, rail, or barge. As discussed above, the distance between Port Canaveral and Elba Island in Q-LNG's bunker sourcing plan is 230 nautical miles. Taking this distance as a measure of how far away LNG can be sourced and barged economically, it is possible to extrapolate which U.S. ports are within reach of a potential supply of LNG for vessel bunkering. Table 1 lists the top 20 U.S. container shipment ports in the United States and their proximity to existing LNG import/export terminals. Of these top 20 ports, 12 are less than 230 nautical miles from an operating LNG terminal. Distances between LNG terminals and the other East Coast ports are not much greater, suggesting that LNG for vessel bunkering could be within reach of every U.S. port along the Eastern Seaboard and in the Gulf of Mexico. On the West Coast, the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach—the two largest U.S. ports—are relatively close to the Costa Azul LNG import terminal in Ensenada, MX. Seattle and Tacoma are far from Ensenada, but would be served by the proposed Tacoma LNG bunkering project, if constructed. LNG bunkering for Seattle and Tacoma alternatively could be sourced from an existing LNG port facility around 100 nautical miles north in Vancouver, BC, which is expanding to provide LNG bunkering services to international carriers. Alaska's existing LNG export terminal currently is inactive, but potentially could supply LNG bunker fuel in the Pacific Northwest as well. Although existing LNG import or export terminals in North America could supply LNG for regional bunkering operations, such activities would require additional investment for infrastructure such as LNG transfer facilities and bunker barges. CRS is not aware of any public announcements among the LNG terminals above to develop bunkering operations. However, at least one LNG terminal owner, Cheniere Energy, which operates LNG terminals in Louisiana and Texas, identifies vessel bunkering as one source of future LNG demand growth worldwide. The IMO adopted safety standards for ships using natural gas as a bunker fuel in 2015. The standards, which took effect in 2017, apply to all new ships and conversions of ships (except LNG tankers, which have their own standards). The IMO standards address engine design, LNG storage tanks, distribution systems, and electrical systems. They also establish new training requirements for crews handling LNG and other low flashpoint fuels. As is the case for the sulfur standards, the IMO LNG safety standards apply to all IMO member nations, including the United States. In addition, a number of U.S. federal agencies, especially the Coast Guard and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, have jurisdiction over specific aspects of domestic LNG storage infrastructure and bunkering operations. The Coast Guard has the most prominent role in LNG bunkering, given its general authority over port operations and waterborne shipping. In 2015, the Coast Guard issued two guidelines for the handling of LNG fuel and for waterfront facilities conducting bunkering operations. In 2017, the Coast Guard issued additional guidelines to Captains of the Port, the local Coast Guard officials responsible for port areas, for conducting safe LNG bunkering simultaneously with other port operations. The guidelines advise on quantitative risk assessment of facilities bunkering LNG, which allows Captains of the Port to assess the risks posed to crews and facilities. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) plays a role in LNG bunkering due to its jurisdiction over the siting of LNG import and export terminals under the Natural Gas Act of 1938. Specifically, FERC asserts approval authority over the place of entry and exit, siting, construction, and operation of new LNG terminals as well as modifications or extensions of existing LNG terminals. Notwithstanding this siting authority, FERC reportedly does not intend to assert jurisdiction over the permitting of LNG bunkering facilities, but it may require amendment of permits it has issued for LNG import or export terminals to account for bunkering operations added afterwards. In addition to the Coast Guard and FERC, other federal agencies may have jurisdiction over specific aspects of LNG bunkering operations in U.S. ports under a range of statutory authorities. For example, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration within the Department of Transportation regulates the safety of natural gas pipelines and certain associated LNG storage facilities (e.g., peak-shaving plants). LNG facilities also may need to comply with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration's regulations for Process Safety Management of Highly Hazardous Chemicals. Other federal agencies, including the Environmental Protection Agency, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and the Transportation Security Administration, may regulate other aspects of LNG bunkering projects. CRS is not aware of new regulations to date among these agencies specifically addressing LNG bunkering. World production of LNG has been rising rapidly over the last few years, driven by growth in the natural gas sector in new regions—especially Australia and the United States. According to one industry analysis ( Figure 5 ), global LNG supply is expected to increase from 300 to 400 million metric tons per annum (MMtpa) from 2017 to 2021 based on new LNG liquefaction projects already operating or under development. An additional 150 MMtpa appears likely to come online after that. Collectively, LNG supply from these new liquefaction projects could exceed projections of demand, which would put downward pressure on LNG prices. While increases in the global supply of LNG do not necessarily translate directly into an increase in LNG available for bunkering, such increases could provide options for LNG bunkering in more ports. Estimating potential demand for LNG in the maritime sector is complicated and uncertain. One study of future LNG demand for bunkering, specifically, projects that LNG-powered vessels in operation and under construction as of June 2018 will require between 1.2 and 3.0 MMt of LNG per year. The study's review of several LNG consumption forecasts in the maritime sector shows a consensus projection between 20 to 30 MMt per year by 2030. This level of demand growth implies an increase in LNG-powered vessel construction from the current rate of around 120 ships per year to between 400 and 600 new builds per year. If these levels were reached, they could create a significant new market for LNG suppliers. Assuming a Henry Hub spot market price of $4/MMBtu in 2030, the annual market for LNG in shipping could be worth $2.9 billion to $5.8 billion, before accounting for liquefaction and transportation charges. Some studies have projected the LNG bunkering market to be even larger and to grow more quickly. However, key variables—such as the prices of Henry Hub natural gas and crude oil, the number of new vessel orders, and the future costs of emissions technology—are notoriously hard to predict with accuracy. Thus, it is not assured that natural gas consumption in the maritime sector will absorb more than a small amount of the global liquefaction capacity in development. The IMO sulfur standards apply to ship owners globally, as does the development of new LNG supply and bunkering infrastructure. In addition to these factors, domestic LNG bunkering also may be influenced by considerations more specific to the United States. These considerations include growth of the U.S. natural gas supply, domestic shipbuilding opportunities, and LNG safety and security. Because of its leading role in global natural gas production, the United States has a particular interest in any new source of natural gas demand. According to the Energy Information Administration, the United States has been the world's top producer of natural gas since 2009, when it surpassed Russia. In 2017, increases in production outstripped increases in domestic gas consumption, leading to the United States becoming a net exporter of natural gas for the first time in nearly 60 years. As discussed above, North America (primarily the United States) is expected to add the most new LNG production capacity through 2030 when including projects that are operating, under construction, and likely (according to investment analysts). Past increases in U.S. LNG exports were driven by greater throughput at the Sabine Pass LNG export terminal—the only operating U.S. LNG export terminal in 2017. In March 2018, the Cove Point terminal in Maryland became the second operating U.S. LNG export terminal. Four additional projects under construction or commissioning are set to nearly triple U.S. liquefaction by the end of 2019. This increase in liquefaction capacity likely will motivate LNG producers to secure new buyers. Figure 6 shows estimated LNG prices for various locations around the world as of October 2018. As the figure shows, LNG prices are substantially lower in North America than in Asia, Europe, and South America. Even after adding $1.00 to $2.00/MMBtu to transport the LNG to overseas ports, LNG produced in the United States is globally competitive at these prices. If LNG from the new liquefaction capacity coming online can be produced and delivered with similar economics, the cost advantage may create an opportunity for U.S. LNG in bunker supply. There are over 400 petroleum fuel bunkering ports in the world, but 60% of bunkering in recent years has happened in six countries: Singapore, the United States, China, the United Arab Emirates, South Korea, and the Netherlands. Of these countries, only the United States is a significant LNG producer. Therefore, the United States could be a favorable source of LNG for domestic bunkering and for bunkering at the other major ports. While the LNG industry historically has had a good safety record, there are unique safety risks associated with LNG in vessel operations. Leakage of LNG during LNG shipping or bunkering can pose several hazards. LNG is stored at temperatures below -162 °C (-260 °F), far below the -20°C at which the carbon steels typically used in shipbuilding become brittle. Consequently, extreme care must be taken to ensure that LNG does not drip or spill onto ship hulls or decking because it could lead to brittle fracture, seriously damaging a ship or bunkering barge. LNG spilled onto water can pose a more serious hazard as it will rapidly and continuously vaporize into natural gas, which could ignite. The resulting "pool fire" would spread as the LNG spill expands away from its source and continues evaporating. A pool fire is intense, far hotter and burning far more rapidly than oil or gasoline fires, and it cannot be extinguished; all the LNG must be consumed before it goes out. Because an LNG pool fire is so hot, its thermal radiation may injure people and damage vessels or property a considerable distance from the fire itself. Many experts agree that a large pool fire, especially on water, is the most serious LNG hazard. Leaks of boil-off gas (the small amount of LNG that vaporizes in storage) can also release natural gas into a port area and cause fires or explosions. Major releases of LNG from large LNG carriers would be most dangerous within 500 meters of the spill and would pose some risk at distances up to 1,600 meters from the spill. While a bunkering barge or a vessel using LNG for fuel contains far less LNG than large LNG carriers, LNG spills in bunkering operations could still be a significant concern. Risks associated with bunkering LNG are complicated in ports seeking to engage in "simultaneous operations" during the bunkering process. Simultaneous operations entail loading and unloading cargo and personnel from a ship, maintenance, and other logistical operations performed while a ship is bunkering. Accidents that occur during such operations (for example, the operation of heavy machinery near pipes transporting LNG) can result in a spill of LNG which can threaten workers positioned near the site of operations. LNG tankers, bunkering vessels, and land-based facilities could be vulnerable to terrorism. Bunkering tanks or vessels might be physically attacked to destroy the LNG they hold—and vessels might be commandeered for use as weapons against port or coastal targets. Potential terrorist attacks on LNG terminals or tankers in the United States have long been a key concern of the public and policymakers in the context of large scale LNG imports or exports because such attacks could cause catastrophic fires in ports and nearby populated areas. For example, a 2007 report by the Government Accountability Office stated that, "the ship-based supply chain for energy commodities," specifically including LNG, "remains threatened and vulnerable, and appropriate security throughout the chain is essential to ensure safe and efficient delivery." Affected communities and federal officials continue to express concern about the security risks of LNG. The potential risks from terrorism to LNG bunkering infrastructure may be different than those of larger LNG import or export operations due to smaller quantities of LNG involved, but the risks may become more widespread if LNG bunkering operations are established in more locations. The Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA, P.L. 107-295 ) and the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code give the Coast Guard far-ranging authority over the security of hazardous materials in maritime shipping. The Coast Guard has developed port security plans addressing how to deploy federal, state, and local resources to prevent terrorist attacks. Under the MTSA, the Coast Guard has assessed the overall vulnerability of marine vessels, their potential to transport terrorists or terror materials, and their use as potential weapons. The Coast Guard has employed these assessments to augment port security as necessary and to develop maritime security standards for LNG port facilities. The IMO's overall framework for controlling vessels emissions (MARPOL Annex VI) has been in place since 2005. While the United States, as an IMO member, is subject to the IMO's 2020 sulfur standards, the international standards apply equally to all parties and all vessels. The impacts of sulfur standards on bunker fuel have been an important consideration, but IMO member nations have agreed to the standards independent of any particular energy policies. Moreover, MARPOL Annex VI preceded the U.S. shale gas boom, so commitment to that initial IMO framework could not have anticipated United States' current role as a dominant energy producer. Any changes within the international shipping fleet to install sulfur scrubbers, fuel engines with LNG, or switch to other low sulfur fuels, are being driven primarily by market forces in fuel supply, shipbuilding, and shipping—not by any particular push to favor one fuel over another. Nonetheless, given its particular status, the question arises whether the standards may create an economic opportunity for the United States, in energy or otherwise. More specifically, could international adoption of LNG as a bunker fuel create an important new market for U.S. natural gas producers, shipbuilders, or infrastructure developers? As discussed above, depending upon the adoption of LNG bunkering in the global fleet, the LNG bunker fuel market could grow to several billion dollars by 2030. If U.S. LNG producers were to supply a significant share of this market—on the strength of comparatively low LNG production costs—LNG bunkering could increase demand for U.S. natural gas production, transportation, and liquefaction. Opportunities in LNG-related shipbuilding might be more limited, as most of this occurs overseas, with the exception of Jones Act vessels. In the latter case, demand for domestically-constructed LNG bunkering barges could be one significant area of economic growth. Engineering and construction firms could benefit from new opportunities to develop new port infrastructure for LNG storage and transfer. While likely limited in number, such port facilities could be complex, high value projects costing tens or hundreds of millions of dollars to complete. Such projects could create jobs in engineering, construction, and operation, which could be important to local communities. Although LNG bunkering could present the United States with new economic opportunities, it may pose challenges as well. Rising demand for LNG in the maritime sector could increase natural gas prices for domestic consumers. In addition to being the world's largest natural gas producer, as of 2018, the United States is also the world's largest producer of crude oil and the second largest bunkering hub. Consequently, while vessel conversion to LNG bunkering may increase demand for U.S.-produced natural gas, it could be partially offset by reduced demand for U.S.-produced crude oil or refined products. Exactly how changing demand in one sector could affect the other is unclear. Furthermore, while LNG can reduce pollutant emissions from vessels, emissions and environmental impacts from increased natural gas production and transportation could increase overall emissions. Much of the net environmental impact depends upon practices in the natural gas industry, which are the subject of ongoing study and debate. Although new LNG bunkering infrastructure can create jobs, as the Tacoma LNG projects shows, the construction of such port facilities can be controversial for reasons of safety, security, and environmental impact. Overarching the considerations above is uncertainty about how the global shipping fleet will adapt to the IMO sulfur standards over time. This uncertainty complicates decisions related to both private investment and public policy. LNG-fueled ships still account for only a fraction of the U.S. and global fleets, and it may take several decades for significant benefits of LNG-powered vessels to be realized. It is also possible that alternative ship fuels, including biofuels, electric engines, and hybrid engines, will become more economically viable in coming years. Given the uncertainty surrounding the future of LNG as a ship fuel, it is hard to predict the potential benefits or costs that LNG bunkering may provide to the United States. Until now, the private sector has added LNG-fueled vessels to fleets in the United States in a piecemeal manner under existing federal statutes and regulation. Congress could encourage the growth of LNG bunkering by various means, such as providing tax incentives to support the construction of LNG bunkering facilities and vessels, addressing any statutory or regulatory barriers to bunkering facility siting or operations, and providing funding for technical support to domestic carriers seeking to adopt LNG technology. Alternatively, Congress could seek to encourage competing bunker fuel options, such as biofuels, by incentivizing them in similar ways. In addition, Congress could also affect growth in LNG bunkering through policies affecting the LNG industry or domestic shipping industry as a whole. Changes in federal regulation related to natural gas production, or changes to the Jones Act, for example, while not directed at LNG bunkering, could nonetheless affect its economics. Therefore, evaluating the potential implications on LNG bunkering of broader energy, environmental, or economic objectives may become an additional consideration in congressional oversight and legislative initiatives. If LNG bunkering expands significantly in U.S. ports, Congress also may examine the adequacy of existing measures to ensure the safety and security of LNG vessels, storage, and related facilities.	[ "The combination of growing liquefied natural gas (LNG) supplies and new requirements for less polluting fuels in the maritime shipping industry has heightened interest in LNG as a maritime fuel. The use of LNG as an engine (\"bunker\") fuel in shipping is also drawing attention from federal agencies and is beginning to emerge as an issue of interest in Congress. In 2008, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) announced a timeline to reduce the maximum sulfur content in vessel fuels to 0.5% by January 1, 2020. Annex VI of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships requires vessels to either use fuels containing less than 0.5% sulfur or install exhaust-cleaning systems (\"scrubbers\") to limit a vessel's airborne emissions of sulfur oxides to an equivalent level. An option for vessel operators to meet the IMO 2020 standards is to install LNG-fueled engines, which emit only trace amounts of sulfur. Adopting LNG engines requires more investment than installing scrubbers, but LNG-fueled engines may offset their capital costs with operating cost advantages over conventional fuels. Savings would depend on the price spread between LNG and fuel oil. Recent trends suggest that LNG may be cheaper in the long run than conventional fuels. LNG bunkering requires specialized infrastructure for supply, storage, and delivery to vessels. To date, the number of ports worldwide that have developed such infrastructure is limited, although growth in this area has accelerated. Early adoption of LNG bunkering is occurring in Europe where the European Union requires a core network of ports to provide LNG bunkering by 2030. LNG bunkering is also advancing in Asia, led by Singapore, the world's largest bunkering port. Asian countries, together with Australia and the United Arab Emirates, have about 10 coastal ports offering LNG bunkering, with another 15 projects in development. LNG bunkering in the United States currently takes place in Jacksonville, FL, and Port Fourchon, LA—with a third facility under development in Tacoma, WA. Bunkering of LNG-fueled cruise ships using barges also is planned for Port Canaveral, FL. The relative locations of other U.S. ports and operating LNG terminals suggest that LNG bunkering could be within reach of every port along the Eastern Seaboard and in the Gulf of Mexico. On the West Coast, the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, CA, are near the Costa Azul LNG terminal in Ensenada, MX. Seattle and Tacoma are adjacent to the proposed Tacoma LNG project. Since 2015, Jones Act coastal ship operators have taken steps to transition their fleets to use cleaner burning fuels, including LNG. Shippers of dry goods to Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico have taken delivery or have ordered LNG-fueled and LNG-capable vessels from U.S. shipyards in Philadelphia, PA, and Brownsville, TX. Another company operates five LNG-powered offshore supply vessels built in Gulfport, MS. Depending upon LNG conversions, the global LNG bunker fuel market could grow to several billion dollars by 2030. If U.S. LNG producers were to supply a significant share of this market—on the strength of comparatively low LNG production costs—LNG bunkering could increase demand for U.S. natural gas production, transportation, and liquefaction. Opportunities in LNG-related shipbuilding might be more limited, as most shipbuilding occurs overseas, although domestically-constructed LNG bunkering barges could be one area of economic growth. Finally, engineering and construction firms could benefit from new opportunities to develop port infrastructure for LNG storage and transfer. However, while vessel conversion to LNG fuel may increase demand for U.S.-produced natural gas, it partially could be offset by reduced demand for U.S.-produced crude oil or refined products. Furthermore, while LNG can reduce direct emissions from vessels, fugitive emissions and environmental impacts from natural gas production and transportation could reduce overall emissions benefits. While the LNG industry has experienced few accidents, the Coast Guard has been developing new standards to address unique safety and security risks associated with LNG in vessel operations. The overarching consideration about LNG bunkering in the United States is uncertainty about how the global shipping fleet will adapt to the IMO sulfur standards over time. This uncertainty complicates decisions related to both private investment and public policy. Although Congress has limited ability to influence global shipping, it could influence the growth of LNG bunkering through the tax code and regulation, or through policies affecting the LNG industry or domestic shipping industry as a whole. Evaluating the potential implications of LNG bunkering within the context of broader energy and environmental policies may become an additional consideration for Congress. If LNG bunkering expands significantly, Congress also may examine the adequacy of existing measures to ensure the safety and security of LNG vessels, storage, and related facilities." ]	8,129	gov_report	en	null	18be9c51dee8718e90751311e7b3a36cc589ba2f6388b97c
According to Education, 50.3 million students were enrolled in more than 98,000 public elementary and secondary schools nationwide in the 2014- 2015 school year. These individual public schools are overseen by approximately 16,000 local educational agencies (referred to in this report as school districts) which are, in turn, overseen and supported by state educational agencies. School districts can range in size from one school (for example, in rural areas) to hundreds of schools in large urban and suburban areas. For example, the 100 largest districts in the United States together have approximately 16,000 schools and enroll about 11 million students. In addition, charter schools are public schools created to achieve a number of goals, such as encouraging innovation in public education. Oversight of charter schools can vary, with some states establishing charter schools as their own school district and other states allowing charter schools to be either a distinct school district in themselves or part of a larger district. Charter schools are often responsible for their own facilities; these may be located in non-traditional school buildings, and may lease part or all of their space. Typically, state educational agencies are responsible for administering state and federal education laws, disbursing state and federal funds, and providing guidance to school districts and schools across the state. State educational agencies frequently provide funds for capital improvements to school facilities, which school districts may use to address issues related to lead in school drinking water, among other things. Different state agencies, including agencies for education, health, and environmental protection, may provide school districts with guidance on testing and remediation of lead in school drinking water. Within a school district, responsibility for water management may be held by individuals in different positions, such as facilities managers or environmental specialists. Lead is a neurotoxin that can accumulate in the body over time with long- lasting effects, particularly for children. According to the CDC, lead in drinking water can cause health effects if it enters the bloodstream and causes an elevated blood lead level. Lead in a child’s body can slow down growth and development, damage hearing and speech, and lead to learning disabilities. For adults, lead can have detrimental effects on cardiovascular, renal, and reproductive systems and can prompt memory loss. In pregnant women, lead stored in bones (due to lead exposure prior to and during pregnancy) can be released as maternal calcium used to form the bones of the fetus, reduce fetal growth, and increase risk of miscarriage and stillbirth. The presence of lead in the bloodstream can disappear relatively quickly, but bones can retain the toxin for decades. Lead in bones may be released into the blood, re-exposing organ systems long after the original exposure. The concentration of lead, total amount consumed, and duration of exposure influence the severity of health effects. The health consequences of lead exposure can differ from person to person and are affected by the cumulative dose of lead and the vulnerability of the individual person regardless of whether the lead exposure is from food, water, soil, dust, or air. Although there are medical therapies to remove lead from the body, they cannot undo the damage it has already caused. For these reasons, EPA, CDC, and others recommend the prevention of lead exposure to the extent possible, recognizing that lead is widespread in the environment. The SDWA authorizes EPA to set standards for drinking water contaminants in public water systems. For a given contaminant the act requires EPA to first establish a maximum contaminant level goal, which is the level at which no known or anticipated adverse effects on the health of persons occur and which allows an adequate margin of safety. EPA must then set an enforceable maximum contaminant level as close to the maximum contaminant level goal as is feasible, or require water systems to use a treatment technique to prevent known or anticipated adverse effects on the health of persons to the extent feasible. Feasible means the level is achievable using the best available technology or treatment technique. In 1991 EPA issued the LCR, which it revised in 2000 and 2007, establishing regulations for water systems covered by the SDWA. Lead concentration in water is typically measured in micrograms of lead per liter of water (also referred to as “parts per billion” or ppb). The rule established a maximum contaminant level goal of zero, because EPA concluded that there was no established safe level of lead exposure. EPA decided not to establish an enforceable maximum contaminant level, concluding that any level reasonably close to the goal would result in widespread noncompliance, and therefore was not feasible. Instead, the rule established an “action level” of 15 micrograms of lead per liter (15 ppb) in a one liter sample of tap water, a level that EPA believed was generally representative of what could be feasibly achieved at the tap. The action level is a screening tool for determining when certain follow-up actions are needed, which may include corrosion control treatment, public education, and lead service line replacement. Sample results that exceed the lead action level do not by themselves constitute violations of the rule. If the lead action level is exceeded in more than 10 percent of tap water samples collected during any monitoring period (that is, if the 90th percentile level is greater than the action level), a water system must take actions to reduce exposure. Several amendments to the SDWA are relevant to testing for lead in school drinking water. In 1988, the SDWA was amended by the Lead Contamination Control Act (LCCA), which banned the manufacture and sale of drinking water coolers with lead-lined tanks containing more than 8 percent lead; the statute defined a drinking water cooler as containing 8 percent lead or less as “lead-free.” The LCCA also required states to establish testing and remediation programs for schools. However, in 1996 a federal circuit court held that this requirement was unconstitutional. In 2011, Congress passed the Reduction of Lead in Drinking Water Act, which amended the SDWA by lowering the maximum allowable lead content in “lead-free” plumbing materials such as pipes. This provision became effective on January 4, 2014. In 2016, Congress passed the Water Infrastructure Improvements for the Nation Act which, among other things, amended the SDWA, to establish a grant program for states to assist school districts in voluntary testing for lead contamination in drinking water at schools. As a condition of receiving funds, school districts are required to test for lead using standards that are at least as stringent as those in federal guidance for schools. In March 2018, Congress appropriated $20 million to EPA for this grant program. Lead can enter drinking water when service lines or plumbing fixtures that contain lead corrode, especially where the water has high acidity or low mineral content. According to EPA, lead typically enters school drinking water as a result of interaction with lead-containing plumbing materials and fixtures within the building. Although lead pipes and lead solder were not commonly used after 1986, water fountains and other fixtures were allowed to have up to 8 percent lead until 2014, as previously mentioned. Consequently, both older and newer school buildings can have lead in drinking water. Some water in a school building is not for consumption, such as water from a janitorial sink or garden hose, so lead in these water sources presents less risk to students. (See fig. 1.) The best way to know if a school’s water is contaminated with lead is to test the water after it has gone through a school’s pipes, faucets, and other fixtures. To facilitate testing efforts, EPA suggests that schools implement programs for reducing lead in drinking water and developed the 3Ts for Reducing Lead in Drinking Water in Schools: Revised Technical Guidance (3Ts guidance) in 2006, which provides information on: (1) training school officials about the potential causes and health effects of lead in drinking water; (2) testing drinking water in schools to identify potential problems and take corrective actions as necessary; and (3) telling students, parents, staff, and the larger community about monitoring programs, potential risks, the results of testing, and remediation actions. The purpose of the 3Ts guidance is to help schools minimize students’ and staffs’ exposure to lead in drinking water. The guidance provides recommendations and suggestions for how to address lead in school drinking water, but does not establish requirements for schools to follow. According to the guidance, if school districts follow the procedures described in guidance, they will be assured their facilities do not have elevated levels of lead in their drinking water. The guidance recommends taking 250 milliliter samples of water from every drinking water source in a school building and having the samples analyzed by an accredited laboratory. Based on the test results of the samples, the guidance recommends remedial action if the samples are found to have an elevated concentration of lead, which is identified by using an action level. While school districts may have discretion to set their own action level, the 3Ts guidance strongly recommends taking remedial action if a school district finds lead at or above 20 ppb in a 250 milliliter sample of water. School districts can take a variety of actions including replacing pipes, replacing fixtures, running water through the system before consumption (known as flushing), or providing bottled water. However, since the amount of lead in school drinking water may change over time for a variety of reasons—for example, the natural aging of plumbing materials or a disturbance nearby, such as construction—the results obtained by one test are not necessarily indicative of results which may be obtained in the future. With no federal law requiring testing for lead in school drinking water, federal agencies play a limited role: Education’s mission includes fostering educational excellence and promoting student achievement, and the agency disseminates guidance to states and school districts about lead in school drinking water, but does not administer any related grants. EPA’s Office of Ground Water and Drinking Water provides voluntary guidance to schools on how to test for and remediate lead in school drinking water, as part of EPA’s mission to inform the public about environmental risks. In addition, EPA’s Office of Children’s Health Protection is responsible for working with EPA’s 10 regional offices via their healthy schools coordinators, who communicate with schools and help to disseminate the 3Ts guidance. CDC administers the School Health Policies and Practices Study, a periodic survey to monitor national health objectives that pertain to schools and school districts. The 2016 data, the most recent available, provide information on the number of school districts that periodically test for lead in their drinking water. Under the 2005 memorandum signed by these three agencies to encourage lead testing and remediation in schools, Education’s role includes working with EPA and other groups to encourage testing, and disseminating materials to schools. EPA agreed to update guidance for schools, and provide tools to facilitate testing for lead in school drinking water. CDC’s role includes identifying public health organizations to work with and facilitating dissemination of materials to state health organizations. Lead in School Drinking Water Survey Results at a Glance An estimated 43 percent of school districts tested for lead in school drinking water, but 41 percent did not, and 16 percent did not know. o Some districts tested drinking water in all sources of consumable water in all of their schools, while other school districts tested only some sources. o Among the reasons for not testing, school districts said they either did not identify a need to test or were not required to do so. Of those that tested, an estimated 37 percent of school districts found elevated lead levels—levels of lead above the district’s threshold for taking remedial action—in school drinking water. o School districts varied in terms of the threshold they used, with some using 15 ppb or 20 ppb and others using a lower threshold. School districts varied in whether they tested for lead in school drinking water and whether they discovered elevated levels of lead. For example, an estimated 88 percent of the largest 100 school districts tested compared with 42 percent of other school districts. All school districts that found elevated lead reported taking steps to reduce or eliminate the lead, including replacing water fountains or providing bottled water. Nationwide, school districts vary in terms of whether they have tested for lead in school drinking water, with many not testing. According to our survey of school districts, an estimated 43 percent tested for lead in school drinking water in at least one school in the last 12 months, while 41 percent had not tested. An estimated 35 million students were enrolled in districts that tested as compared with 12 million students in districts that did not test. An estimated 16 percent of school districts, enrolling about 6 million students, reported that they did not know whether they had tested or not. (See fig. 2.) Of school districts that tested for lead in school drinking water, some tested all consumable water sources in all of their schools, while others may have only tested some sources in all schools or all sources in some schools. Among the reasons provided by survey respondents for not testing in all schools, some said the age of the building was the primary consideration. For example, an official in one school district we visited told us they began testing in buildings constructed before 1989, but after receiving results that some water sources had elevated lead levels, the district decided to test all of their school buildings. Other reasons reported for testing some, but not all, schools included testing schools only when a complaint about discolored water was received or testing only new schools or schools that were renovated. In addition, school districts varied in whether they sampled from every consumable water source, or just some of the sources, in their schools. For example, one district official told us they took one sample from each type of water fountain in each school, assuming that, if a sampled fountain was found to have an elevated level of lead, then all of the other fountains of that type would also have elevated lead levels. However, EPA’s 3Ts guidance recommends that every water source that is regularly used for drinking or cooking be sampled. Further, stakeholders and environmental and educational officials we interviewed said that results from one water fountain, faucet, or any other consumable water source cannot be used to predict whether lead will be found in other sources. In our survey, the median amount spent by school districts to test for lead in school drinking water during the past 12 months varied substantially, depending on the number of schools in which tests were conducted (see table 1). School districts may have paid for services such as collecting water samples, analyzing and reporting results, and consultants. For example, an official in a small, rural school district—with three schools housed in one building—told us his district spent $180 to test all eight fixtures. In contrast, officials in a large, urban school district told us they spent about $2.1 million to test over 11,000 fixtures in over 500 schools. Some school districts, especially larger ones, incurred costs to hire consultants to advise them and help design a plan to take samples, among other things. EPA’s 3Ts guidance recommends determining how to communicate information about lead testing programs with parents, governing officials, and other stakeholders before testing. Of school districts that reported testing for lead in school drinking water in our survey, an estimated 76 percent informed their local school board and 59 percent informed parents about their plans to test; similar percentages provided information about the testing results. We identified a range of approaches to communicating testing efforts in the 17 school districts we interviewed. Some school districts reported issuing press releases, putting letters in multiple languages in students’ backpacks, sending emails to parents, holding public meetings, and releasing information through social media. Before testing, one district created a website with a list of dates when it planned to test the drinking water in every one of its schools. In contrast, other school districts communicated with parents and the press only upon request. Officials in one district we visited said they did not post lead testing results on their website, because they wanted to avoid causing undue concern, adding that “more information isn’t necessarily better, especially when tests showed just trace amounts of lead.” School districts generally have discretion to determine how frequently they test for lead in school drinking water except when prescribed in state law, and most school districts responding to our survey had no specific schedule for recurring testing. Specifically, an estimated: 27 percent of school districts plan to test “as needed,” 25 percent have no schedule to conduct recurring tests, and 15 percent do not know. The remaining school districts reported a range of frequencies for conducting additional tests or said they were developing a schedule to conduct tests on a recurring basis. School district officials and stakeholders we interviewed told us that it is important to test for lead in drinking water on a recurring basis, because lead can leach into school drinking water at any time. In our survey, we asked school districts reporting that they had not tested for lead in school drinking water in the last 12 months (41 percent of districts) to provide us with one or more reasons why they had not tested. Of these school districts, an estimated 53 percent reported that they did not identify a need to test and 53 percent reported they were not required to test (see fig. 3). Of school districts that reported testing for lead in school drinking water, an estimated 37 percent of districts found elevated levels of lead in school drinking water, while 57 percent of districts did not find lead (see fig. 4). Of those that found lead in drinking water, most found lead above their selected action level in some of their schools, while some districts found lead above their action level in all of their schools. For example, officials in one large school district told us they tested over 10,000 sources of water, including drinking fountains and food preparation fixtures, and found that over 3,600 water sources had lead at or above the district’s action level of 15 parts per billion (ppb). The findings resulted in extensive remediation efforts, officials said. Further, district officials reported different action levels they used to determine when to take steps such as replacing a water fountain or installing a filter. School districts generally may select their own action level, resulting in different action levels between districts. Of school districts that reported testing for lead in school drinking water, an estimated 44 percent set an action level between 15 ppb and 19 ppb. The action levels chosen by the rest of the school districts ranged from a low of 1 ppb whereby action would be taken if any lead at all was detected to a high 20 ppb where action would be taken if lead was found at or above 20 ppb. (See appendix II for the estimated percentage of school districts that set other action levels.) Though fewer than half of school districts reported testing for lead in school drinking water, our analysis of school districts’ survey responses shows that these estimates varied depending on the size and population density of the district as well as its geographic location. For example, among the largest 100 school districts, an estimated 88 percent reported they had tested for lead in school drinking water in at least one school in the last 12 months compared with 42 percent of all other districts nationwide. An estimated 59 percent of the largest 100 school districts that tested discovered elevated levels of lead compared to 36 percent of all other districts that tested (see table 2). In addition, an estimated 86 percent of school districts in the Northeast region of the United States tested for lead in school drinking water, compared to less than half of school districts in other geographic regions. Similarly, about half of school districts in the Northeast and about 8 percent in the South found elevated levels of lead, compared to their selected action level. (See fig. 5.) In our survey, every school district that reported finding lead in school drinking water above their selected action level reported taking steps to reduce or eliminate the lead. For example, an estimated 71 percent said they replaced water fountains, 63 percent took water fountains out of service without replacing them, and 62 percent flushed the school’s water system (see fig. 6). School districts officials we interviewed told us they took a range of remedial actions generally consistent with those reported to us in our survey. For example, an official in one district told us that 129 of the 608 fixtures tested above the district’s action level of “any detectable level.” He said they installed filters on all of the 106 sink faucets with elevated lead and replaced all of the 23 drinking fountains with elevated lead. The district official explained that they re-tested fixtures after the filters and new fountains were installed, and did not detect any lead in their drinking water. Officials in another school district told us that approximately 3,600 of their fixtures were found to have lead above their action level of 15 ppb. They told us the district turned off the water at the affected fixtures as an interim measure and provided bottled water to students and staff. Though they had not yet finalized their plans at the time of our interview, they said they were planning to replace the fixtures and replace old pipes with new pipes. District officials said they plan to pay for their remediation efforts using local capital improvement funds from a recently-approved bond initiative. Similar to the cost of testing, the median amount spent by school districts to remediate lead in school drinking water during the past 12 months varied substantially, depending on the number of schools in which a district took action to remediate lead (see table 3). The median expenditure for school districts taking action in one to four schools was $4,000 compared to a median expenditure for school districts taking action in 51 or more schools of $278,000. EPA regional officials provided examples of eight states that have requirements for schools to test for lead in drinking water as of September 2017: California, Illinois, Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Virginia, and the District of Columbia. State requirements differ in terms of which schools are included, testing protocols, communicating results, and funding. (See fig. 7.) (For a list of testing components for the eight states, see appendix IV.) According to stakeholders we interviewed, most state legislation on testing for lead in school drinking water has been introduced in the past 2 years. Of the eight states, three states have completed one round of required testing, while other states are in the early stages of implementation or have not yet begun, according to state officials. School districts in Illinois, New Jersey, and New York completed a round of testing for lead in school drinking water by December 2017. Testing in the District of Columbia was in progress as of April 2018. Minnesota requires school districts to develop a plan to test by July 2018 and California requires that water systems sample all covered public schools in their service area by July 2019. According to state officials, schools in Maryland must test by July 2020. In Virginia, no timeline for testing is indicated in the requirement. In addition, requirements in these eight states vary in terms of covered schools and frequency of testing. For example, in Maryland, all schools, including charter and private schools, are required to test their water for lead by July 2020 and must re-test every 3 years. After regulations were approved in July 2016, New Jersey required testing within a year in all traditional public schools, charter schools, and certain private schools, and re-testing every 6 years, according to state officials. Illinois’ requirement is for public and private elementary schools constructed before 2000 to test their drinking water for lead, and does not mandate re- testing. Seven of the eight states include at least some charter schools in their testing requirements (New York does not). State testing requirements also differ in terms of action level, sample sizes, and number of samples, according to state documents. States can choose their own lead threshold or action level for remediation, and the eight states have chosen levels ranging from any detectable level in Illinois to 20 ppb in Maryland. Six of the eight states have chosen to use 250 milliliter samples of water, while California is using a one liter sample size, and Virginia delegates to school districts to choose their action level and sample size. Some states specify that all drinking water sources in a building must be tested, such as in New York and New Jersey, or allow a smaller number of samples to be tested, such as in California, which recommends that water systems take between one and five samples per school. To implement its testing requirement, the District of Columbia has installed filters in all school drinking water sources, and plans to test the filtered water from each fixture for elevated lead annually. The responsibility for the costs of testing and remediation also differ by state. According to state officials, in Minnesota, the costs of testing may be eligible for reimbursement from the state, and in the District of Columbia, the Department of General Services is responsible for the cost. California requires that public water systems cover the cost of testing for all public schools in their jurisdiction. In all other states we looked at, schools or school districts are at least partially responsible for the costs of testing. Additionally, most schools or school districts are responsible for the costs of remediation, although Minnesota, New York, and the District of Columbia will provide funds to help with the costs of remediation as well. Seven of the eight state requirements have a provision for communicating the results of lead sampling and testing in schools. For example, Minnesota requires all test results be made public and New York requires that results be communicated to students’ families. Maryland and New Jersey require that results above the action level be reported to the responsible state agency, such as the Department of the Environment or the Department of Education, and that sample results that find elevated levels of lead be communicated to students’ families. Illinois requires that all results be made available to families and that individual letters to families also be sent if lead levels over 5 ppb are found. In contrast, Virginia does not include a provision to communicate testing results in its testing requirement for schools. According to stakeholders and state officials we interviewed, states have several other common issues to consider in implementing a state testing and remediation program. First, states need to ensure that their efforts, which can be significant given the thousands of schools that operate in each state, can be completed with limited resources and by a legislated deadline. Second, coordination between relevant state agencies, which will vary by state, may be challenging. Because of the nature of testing for lead in school drinking water, multiple government agencies may be involved, necessitating a balance of responsibilities and information- sharing between these state agencies. Finally, state officials told us that imposing requirements without providing funding to implement them may be a challenge for schools in complying with testing and remediation requirements. Apart from the states with requirements to test for lead in school drinking water discussed in this report, at least 13 additional states had also provided funding or in-kind support to school districts to assist with voluntary lead testing and remediation, according to EPA regional offices. Those states are Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Indiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Mexico, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington. In Massachusetts, for example, officials told us the state used $2.8 million from the state Clean Water Trust to fund a voluntary program for sampling and testing for all participating public schools in 2016 and 2017. Massachusetts contracted with a state university to assist schools with testing for lead in drinking water. When the program completed its first round of testing in February 2017, 818 schools throughout the state had participated, and the state has begun a second round of sampling with remaining funds from the Clean Water Trust. In Oregon, officials told us the state legislature provided funding for matching grants of up to $8 million to larger school districts for facilities improvements, and made $5 million of emergency funds available to reimburse school districts for laboratory fees associated with drinking water testing as part of the state’s efforts to address student safety. States can also provide technical assistance to support school districts in their efforts to test for and remediate lead in drinking water. The five states we visited provided a range of technical assistance to school districts. For example, to implement the voluntary assistance program in Massachusetts, the contracted university told us they hired 15 additional staff and assisted schools in designing sampling plans, taking samples, and sending them for testing. University officials told us they oversaw the sampling of all drinking water sources in each participating school and sent the sample to state certified laboratories for analysis. State officials encouraged schools to shut off all fixtures in which water tested at or above the action level of 15 ppb and provided guidance on actions to take, such as removing and replacing fixtures, using signage to indicate fixtures not to be used for drinking water, and implementing a flushing program. The state developed an online reporting tool so that all test results could be publicly posted. State officials also supported schools in communicating lead testing results to parents and the community. Other states we visited provided technical assistance to school districts through webinars, guidance documents, in-person presentations, and responding to inquiries. In Oregon, the state Department of Education and the state Health Authority collaborated in 2016 to provide guidance to schools on addressing lead in drinking water. The Governor issued a directive requesting all school districts test for lead in their buildings and the Health Authority requested that districts send them the results. In Texas, officials at the Commission for Environmental Quality have made presentations to schools on water sampling protocols and provided templates for school districts to communicate results. Officials told us that an increased number of school districts have contacted them in the past year seeking guidance, and, in response, they directed districts to EPA’s 3Ts guidance and a list of accredited laboratories. In Illinois, state officials partnered with the state chapter of the American Water Works Association to provide a guidance document for drinking water sampling and testing to assist schools in complying with new testing requirements. In Georgia, officials at the Department of Natural Resources told us they promote the 3Ts guidance on their website and have offered themselves as a resource on school testing at presentations with local water associations. EPA provides several voluntary resources, such as guidance, training, and technical assistance, to states and school districts regarding testing for and remediation of lead in school drinking water, but some school districts we surveyed and officials we interviewed said more information would be helpful. The Lead Contamination Control Act of 1988 (LCCA) required EPA to publish a guidance document and testing protocol to assist schools in their testing and remediation efforts. EPA’s Office of Ground Water and Drinking Water issued its 3Ts guidance which provides information on training school officials, testing drinking water in schools, and telling the school and broader community about these efforts. Of the school districts that reported in our survey using the 3Ts guidance to inform their lead testing efforts, an estimated 68 percent found the guidance extremely or very helpful for conducting tests. The Office of Ground Water and Drinking Water also developed an additional online resource—known as the 3Ts guidance toolkit—to further assist states and school districts with their lead in drinking water prevention programs by providing fact sheets and brochures for community members, among other things. Some states have used the 3Ts guidance as a resource for their state programs, according to EPA officials. For example, a New York regulation directs schools to use the 3Ts guidance as a technical reference when implementing their state- required lead testing and remediation programs. The Office of Ground Water and Drinking Water provides training to support states and school districts with their lead testing and remediation programs. In June 2017, EPA started a quarterly webinar series to highlight school district efforts to test for lead. These webinars include presentations from school officials and key partners that conducted lead testing and remediation. For example, on June 21, 2017, officials from Denver Public Schools and Denver Water presented on their efforts to test for lead in the public school system. EPA’s approach to providing guidance and technical assistance to states and school districts is determined by each of the 10 EPA regional offices. Some EPA regional offices provide the 3Ts guidance to school districts upon request and others conduct outreach to share the guidance, typically through their healthy schools coordinator when discussing other topics, such as indoor air quality and managing chemicals. EPA regional offices also provide technical assistance by request, typically through phone consultations with school districts that have questions regarding the 3Ts guidance, according to EPA headquarters officials. Officials also indicated that the agency has received more requests for technical assistance from schools over the past few years regarding lead in drinking water. Officials in EPA Regions 1 in Boston and 2 in New York City told us they provided technical assistance to school districts by conducting lead testing and analysis in school facilities and Region 9 in San Francisco provided technical assistance by reviewing school district testing protocols. For example, EPA Region 2 officials said between 2002 and 2016 they worked with one to two school districts per year to assist with their lead testing efforts. As part of this effort, the regional office provided funding for sampling and analysis. Officials said they prioritized school districts based on population size and whether the community had elevated blood lead levels. Other EPA regional office approaches included identifying resources and guidance for relevant state agencies and facilitating information sharing by connecting districts that have tested for lead with districts that are interested in doing so. However, most EPA regional offices do not provide technical assistance in the form of testing, analysis, or remediation to school districts, and some do little or no outreach to communicate the importance of testing for and remediating lead in school drinking water. According to federal standards for internal control, management should externally communicate the necessary quality information to achieve the entity’s objectives. Each EPA regional office’s approach to providing resources to states and school districts varies based on differing regional priorities and available resources, according to EPA headquarters officials. Additionally, officials said that this decentralized model of providing support and technical assistance related to lead testing and remediation in schools is appropriate because of the number of schools across the United States. However, based on our survey we found school district familiarity with the 3Ts guidance varied by geographic area (see fig. 8). An estimated 54 percent of school districts in the Northeast reported familiarity with the 3Ts guidance, compared with 17 percent of districts in the South. Furthermore, the Northeast was the only geographic area with more school districts reporting that they were familiar with the 3Ts guidance than not. This awareness corresponds with the efforts made by the state of Massachusetts and EPA’s regional offices in the Northeast to distribute the 3Ts guidance and conduct lead testing and remediation in school districts. By promoting further efforts to communicate the importance of lead testing to schools to help ensure that their lead testing programs are in line with good practices included in the 3Ts guidance, EPA regional offices that have not focused on this issue could leverage the recent efforts of other regional offices to provide technical assistance and guidance, and other forms of support. EPA’s 3Ts guidance emphasizes the importance of taking action to remediate elevated lead in school drinking water, but the agency’s guidance on a recommended action level for states and school districts is not current and contains elements that could be misleading. Although the guidance recommends that school districts prioritize taking action if lead levels from water fountains and other outlets used for consumption exceed 20 ppb (based on a 250 milliliter water sample), EPA officials told us when the guidance was originally developed in response to the 1988 LCCA requirement, the agency did not have information available to recommend an action level specifically designed for schools. Furthermore, EPA officials told us that the action level in the 3Ts guidance is not a health-based standard. However, there are statements in the guidance that appear to suggest otherwise. For example, the guidance states that EPA strongly recommends that all water outlets in all schools that provide water for drinking or cooking meet a “standard” of 20 ppb lead or less and that school officials who follow the steps included in the document, including using a 20 ppb action level, will be “assured” that school facilities do not have elevated lead in the drinking water. The use of the terms “standard” and “assured” are potentially misleading and could suggest that the 20 ppb action level is protective of health. Further, state and school district officials may be familiar with the 15 ppb action level (based on a 1 liter water sample) for public water systems aimed at identifying system-wide problems under the LCR, which may also create confusion around the 20 ppb action level included in the 3Ts guidance. According to our survey, an estimated 67 percent of school districts reported using an action level less than the 20 ppb recommended in the 3Ts guidance. We found that nearly half of school districts used action levels between 15 ppb and 19 ppb. Although these action levels— the 20 ppb from the 3Ts guidance and the 15 ppb from the LCR—are intended for different purposes, the difference creates confusion for some state and school district officials. Also, according to our survey, an estimated 56 percent of school districts reported they would find it helpful to have clearer guidance on what level of lead to use as the action level for deciding to take steps to remediate lead in drinking water. In addition, officials we interviewed in four of the five states we visited said there is a need for clearer guidance on the action level. EPA officials agreed that the difference between the two action levels creates confusion for states and school districts. In addition to wanting clearer guidance on choosing lead action levels, about half of the school districts we surveyed said they would also like additional information to help inform their lead testing and remediation programs. Specifically, school districts reported that they want information on a recommended schedule for lead testing, how to remediate elevated lead levels, and information associated with testing and remediation costs (see fig. 9). For example, an estimated 54 percent of school districts responded that they would like additional information on a testing schedule, as did officials in 10 of the 17 school districts and one of the five states we interviewed. EPA’s 3Ts guidance does not include information to help school districts determine a schedule for retesting their schools. Officials in one school district told us they need information for determining retesting schedules for lead in their school drinking water, and that—without guidance—they chose to retest every 5 years, acknowledging that this decision was made without a clear rationale. Further, an estimated 62 percent of school districts reported wanting additional information on remedial actions to take to address elevated lead. For example, officials from the Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection told us that they would like additional guidance on evaluating remedial actions to address elevated lead in the fixtures or the plumbing system. Officials with EPA’s Office of Ground Water and Drinking Water hold quarterly meetings with regional officials to obtain input on potential improvements to the 3Ts guidance, but have not made any revisions. EPA has not substantially updated the 3Ts guidance since October 2006 and does not have firm plans or time frames for providing additional information, including on the action level and other key topics such as a recommended schedule for testing. EPA officials said that they may update the 3Ts guidance before the LCR is updated, but did not provide a specific time frame for doing so. EPA has efforts underway to reconsider the action level for the LCR, which may include a change in the action level from one that is based on technical feasibility, to one that also considers lead exposure in vulnerable populations such as infants and young children, which EPA refers to as a health-based benchmark. EPA anticipates issuing comprehensive revisions to the LCR by February 2020. While the 3Ts guidance is not contingent on the LCR, EPA officials told us they would consider updates to the 3Ts guidance, including the 20 ppb action level, as they consider revisions to the LCR. By updating the 3Ts guidance to include an action level for school districts that incorporates available scientific modeling regarding vulnerable population exposures, EPA could have greater assurance that school districts are able to limit children’s exposure to lead. EPA has emphasized the importance of addressing elevated lead levels in school drinking water through its 3Ts guidance, but has not communicated necessary information about action levels and other key topics consistent with the external communication standard under federal standards for internal control. According to EPA, CDC, and others, eliminating sources of lead before exposure can occur is considered the best strategy to protect children from potential adverse health outcomes. EPA officials also told us that clear guidance is important because testing for lead in drinking water requires technical expertise. But without providing interim or updated guidance to help school districts choose an action level for lead remediation EPA will continue to provide schools with confusing information regarding whether to remediate, which may not adequately limit potential lead exposure to students and staff. Furthermore, without important information on key topics, such as a recommended schedule for lead testing, how to remediate elevated lead levels, and information associated with testing and remediation costs school districts are at risk of making misinformed decisions regarding their lead testing and remediation efforts. Education has not played a significant role in supporting state and school districts efforts to test for and remediate lead in school drinking water, and there has been limited collaboration between Education and EPA, according to officials. In 2005, Education, EPA, CDC, and other entities involved with drinking water signed the Memorandum of Understanding on Reducing Lead Levels in Drinking Water in Schools and Child Care Facilities (the memorandum) to encourage and support schools’ efforts to test for lead in drinking water and to support actions to reduce children’s exposure to lead. According to the memorandum, Education’s role is to identify the appropriate school organizations with which to work and facilitate dissemination of materials and tools to schools in collaboration with EPA. In addition, EPA’s role is to update relevant guidance documents for school districts—resulting in the production of the 3Ts guidance in 2006—raising awareness, and collaborating with other federal agencies and associations, among other things. Education officials told us that the agency does not have any ongoing efforts related to implementing the memorandum. However, Education and EPA officials were not aware of the memorandum being terminated by either agency and told us the memorandum remains in effect. Although Education does not have any ongoing efforts related to implementing the memorandum, the agency’s websites, including the Readiness and Emergency Management for Schools Technical Assistance Center (REMS TA Center) website, and the Green Strides portal, provide links to EPA guidance and webinars on lead testing and remediation. The REMS TA Center website, which is largely focused on emergency management planning, includes a link to EPA’s 3Ts guidance and other resources on lead exposure and children, but does not provide information regarding the importance of testing for lead in school drinking water. Education’s Green Strides portal includes a link to a number of EPA’s webinars on lead in school drinking water, but does not include all of the quarterly webinars started in June 2017 to highlight school district efforts to test for lead. An Education official told us that these EPA webinars are identified by Education without coordinating with EPA officials. Further, when searching on Education’s website for lead in school drinking water, the 3Ts guidance does not show up. Education officials acknowledged that information regarding lead testing and remediation is difficult to find on Education’s website and they could take steps to make federal guidance on lead in school drinking water more accessible. The federal government has developed guidelines to help federal agencies improve their experience with customers through websites. One such resource is Guidelines for Improving Digital Services developed by the federal Digital Services Advisory Group. It states that federal agencies should take steps to make guidance easy to find and accessible. Making guidance easy to find and accessible such as by clarifying which links contain guidance; highlighting new or important guidance; improving their websites’ search function; and categorizing guidance on Education’s websites could help raise school district awareness of the guidance, which is currently low in most areas of the country. Many school districts are not familiar with EPA guidance related to lead testing and remediation. Specifically, an estimated 60 percent of school districts reported in our survey that they were not familiar with the EPA’s 3Ts guidance. Most school district officials from our site visits told us they did not have contact with EPA prior to or during their lead testing and some said they would not have thought to go to EPA for guidance. Likewise, EPA officials reported they had received feedback from school district officials indicating that they do not know where to go for information about testing for and remediating lead in drinking water. Rather, school district officials may look to their state educational agency or Education for guidance on lead testing and remediation, as they might do when looking for guidance on other topics. Education and EPA do not regularly collaborate to support state and school districts’ efforts related to lead in school drinking water, according to EPA and Education officials. Education officials said the agency does not have a role in ensuring safe drinking water in schools, and that the mitigation of environmental health concerns in school facilities is a state and local function. Therefore, the agency does not collaborate with EPA to disseminate the 3Ts guidance beyond posting links to related guidance on their websites and newsletters. EPA officials told us they do not know which office they should collaborate with at Education. EPA regional officials also said they do not collaborate with Education to disseminate the guidance to states and school districts. However, in the 2005 memorandum, EPA and Education agreed to work together to encourage school districts to test drinking water for lead; disseminate results to parents, students, staff, and other interested stakeholders; and take appropriate actions to correct elevated lead levels. There are many school districts that have not tested for lead in school drinking water, and some conducted testing without the assistance of federal guidance—although the large majority (68 percent) of school districts who use the guidance reported finding it helpful. Officials in 11 of 17 school districts we interviewed that had conducted lead testing told us they were familiar with the 3Ts guidance and 9 of those districts said they found it helpful for designing their lead testing programs. Increased encouragement and dissemination of EPA resources about lead in school drinking water by Education and EPA could help school districts test for and remediate lead in drinking water using good practices and reduce the potential risk of exposure for students and staff. Children are particularly at risk of experiencing the adverse effects of lead exposure from a variety of sources, including drinking water. While there is no federal law requiring lead testing for drinking water in most schools, some states and school districts have decided to test for lead in the drinking water to help protect students. However, there are a number of school districts that have not tested for lead and some that do not know if they have tested for lead in their drinking water, according to our nationwide survey. Even in states and school districts that have opted to test, officials may choose different action levels to identify elevated lead and may choose different testing protocols that do not test all fixtures in all schools. EPA has developed helpful guidance—3Ts—and webinars for states and school districts to support efforts to test and remediate lead in school drinking water. However, some EPA regional offices have not communicated the importance of testing for and remediating lead to states and school districts. By promoting further efforts to communicate the importance of lead testing to school districts to help ensure that their lead testing programs are in line with good practices, including the 3Ts guidance, regional offices that have not focused on this issue could build on the recent efforts of other regional offices to provide technical assistance and guidance and other forms of support. State and school district officials can use EPA’s 3Ts guidance to help ensure that their drinking water testing and remediation efforts are in line with good practices and said that it has been helpful for establishing their programs. However, statements in the guidance—which has not been updated in over a decade—that suggest the action level described will ensure that school facilities do not have elevated lead in their drinking water are misleading. In addition, state and school district officials told us that additional guidance—including information on a recommended schedule for retesting as well as on costs associated with testing and remediation—could help school districts make more informed decisions regarding their testing and remediation efforts. Without providing interim or updated guidance, EPA is providing schools with confusing and out of date information, which can increase the risk of school districts making uninformed decisions. EPA officials said they would consider updates to the 3Ts action level while the revisions to the LCR are being completed. However, the longer school districts are without the additional information they need to conduct their efforts in line with good practices and continue to rely on confusing and misleading information, the more challenges they will face in trying to limit children’s exposure to lead. After EPA revises the LCR, the agency would have greater assurance that school districts are limiting children’s exposure to lead by considering whether to develop, as part of its guidance, a health-based level for schools that incorporates available scientific modeling regarding vulnerable population exposures. Finally, although Education provides information to states and school districts on lead testing and remediation through the agency’s websites, that information is difficult to find. Further, Education’s website does not include all of EPA’s quarterly webinars to highlight school district efforts to test for lead. By making guidance accessible, Education could improve school district awareness of EPA resources about lead in school drinking water. In addition, EPA and Education should improve their collaboration to encourage and support lead testing and remediation efforts by states and school districts. EPA has the expertise to develop guidance and provide technical assistance to states and school districts, while Education, based on its mission to promote student achievement, should collaborate with EPA to disseminate guidance and raise awareness of lead in drinking water as an issue that could impact student success. Although over one-third of districts that tested found elevated levels of lead, many districts have still not been tested. Unless EPA and Education encourage additional school districts to test for lead, many students and school staff may be at risk of lead exposure. We are making a total of seven recommendations, including five to EPA and two to Education: The Assistant Administrator for Water of EPA’s Office of Water should promote further efforts to communicate the importance of testing for lead in school drinking water to address what has been a varied approach by regional offices. For example, the Assistant Administrator could direct those offices with limited involvement to build on the recent efforts of several regional offices to provide technical assistance and guidance, and other forms of support. (Recommendation 1) The Assistant Administrator for Water of EPA’s Office of Water should provide interim or updated guidance to help schools choose an action level for lead remediation and more clearly explain that the action level currently described in the 3Ts guidance is not a health-based standard. (Recommendation 2) The Assistant Administrator for Water of EPA’s Office of Water should, following the agency’s revisions to the LCR, consider whether to develop a health-based level, to include in its guidance for school districts, that incorporates available scientific modeling regarding vulnerable population exposures and is consistent with the LCR. (Recommendation 3) The Assistant Administrator for Water of EPA’s Office of Water should provide information to states and school districts concerning schedules for testing school drinking water for lead, actions to take if lead is found in the drinking water, and costs of testing and remediation. (Recommendation 4) The Assistant Secretary for Elementary and Secondary Education should improve the usability of Education’s websites to ensure that the states and school districts can more easily find and access federal guidance to address lead in school drinking water, by taking actions such as clarifying which links contain guidance; highlighting new or important guidance; improving their websites’ search function; and categorizing guidance. (Recommendation 5) The Assistant Administrator for Water of EPA’s Office of Water and the Director of the Office of Children’s Health Protection should collaborate with Education to encourage testing for lead in school drinking water. This effort could include further dissemination of EPA guidance related to lead testing and remediation in schools or sending letters to states to encourage testing in all school districts that have not yet done so. (Recommendation 6) The Assistant Secretary for Elementary and Secondary Education should collaborate with EPA to encourage testing for lead in school drinking water. This effort could include disseminating EPA guidance related to lead testing and remediation in schools or sending letters to states to encourage testing in all school districts that have not yet done so. (Recommendation 7) We provided a draft of this report to EPA, Education, and CDC for review and comment. EPA and Education provided written comments that are reproduced in appendixes VII and VIII respectively. EPA also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. CDC did not provide comments. We also provided relevant excerpts to selected states and incorporated their technical comments as appropriate. In its written comments, EPA stated that it agreed with our recommendations and noted a number of actions it plans to take to implement them. For example, EPA said its Office of Ground Water and Drinking Water is holding regular meetings with regional offices and other EPA offices to obtain input on improving the 3Ts guidance. Potential revisions include updates to implementation practices, the sampling protocol, and the action level, including clarifying descriptions of different action levels and standards. Also, EPA said that while it has not yet determined the role of a health-based benchmark for lead in drinking water in the revised LCR, it sees value in providing states, drinking water systems, and the public with a greater understanding of the potential health implications for vulnerable populations of specific levels of lead in drinking water. EPA said it would continue to reach out to states and schools to provide information, technical assistance, and training and will continue to make the 3Ts guidance available. EPA also said it would work with Education to ensure that school districts and other stakeholders are aware of additional resources EPA is developing. In its written comments, Education stated that it agreed with our recommendations and noted a number of actions it plans to take to implement them. In response to our recommendation to improve Education’s websites, Education said it would identify and include an information portal dedicated to enhancing the usability of federal resources related to testing for and addressing lead in school drinking water. Also, Education said it is interested in increasing coordination across all levels of government and it shares the view expressed in our report that improved federal coordination, including with EPA, will better enhance collaboration to encourage testing for lead in school drinking water. Education said it would develop a plan for disseminating relevant resources to its key stakeholder groups and explore how best to coordinate with states to disseminate EPA’s guidance on lead testing and remediation to school districts. As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to interested congressional committees, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, the Secretary of Education, the Director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and other interested parties. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact us at (617) 788-0580 or nowickij@gao.gov or (202) 512-3841 or gomezj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix IX. In this report, we examined three objectives: (1) the extent to which school districts are testing for, finding, and remediating lead in school drinking water; (2) the extent to which states require or support testing for and remediating lead in school drinking water by school districts; and (3) the extent to which federal agencies are supporting state and school district efforts to test for and remediate lead. To address these objectives, we conducted a web-based survey of school districts, interviews with selected state and school district officials, a review of applicable requirements in selected states, a review of relevant federal laws and regulations, and interviews with federal agency officials and representatives of stakeholder organizations. We conducted this performance audit from October 2016 through July 2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. To examine the extent to which school districts are testing for and remediating lead in school drinking water, we designed and administered a generalizable survey of a stratified random sample of U.S. local educational agencies (LEA), which we refer to as school districts throughout the report. The survey included questions about school district efforts to test for lead in school drinking water, such as the number of schools in which tests were conducted, the costs of testing, and whether parents or others were notified about the testing efforts. We also asked questions about remediation efforts, such as whether lead was discovered in school drinking water, the specific remediation efforts that were implemented, and whether parents or others were notified about the remediation efforts. Further, we asked about officials’ familiarity with the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) guidance entitled 3Ts for Reducing Lead in Drinking Water in Schools, (3Ts guidance) whether the guidance was used, and the extent to which it was helpful in conducting tests, remediating lead, and communicating with parents and others. We directed the survey to school district superintendents or other cognizant officials, such as facilities directors. See appendix II which includes the survey questions and estimates. We defined our target population to be all school districts in the 50 U.S. states and the District of Columbia that are not under the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense or Bureau of Indian Education. We used the LEA Universe database from Department of Education’s (Education) Common Core of Data (CCD) for the 2014-2015 school year to our sampling frame. For the purpose of our survey, our sample was limited to school districts that: were located in the District of Columbia or the 50 states; had a LEA type code of 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, and 8; had one or more schools and one or more students; and were not closed according to the 2014-2015 School Year. The resulting sample frame included 16,452 school districts and we selected a stratified random sample of 549 school districts. We stratified the sampling frame into 13 mutually exclusive strata based on urban classification and poverty classification. We further stratified the school districts classified as being in a city by charter status. We selected the largest 100 school districts with certainty. We determined the minimum sample size needed to achieve precision levels of plus or minus 12 percentage points or fewer, at the 95 percent confidence level. We then increased the sample size within each stratum for an expected response rate of 70 percent. We defined the three urban classifications based on the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) urban-centric locale code. To build a general measure of the poverty level for each school district we used the proportion of students eligible for free or reduced-price lunch (FRPL) as indicated in the CCD data and classified these into the following three groups: High-poverty – More than 75 percent of students in the school district were eligible for FRPL; Mid-poverty – Between 25.1 and 75.0 percent of students in the school district were eligible for FRPL; and Low-poverty – 25 percent or fewer students in the school district were eligible for FRPL. We assessed the reliability of the CCD data by reviewing existing documentation about the data and performing electronic testing on required data elements and determined they were sufficiently reliable for the purpose of our report. We administered the survey from July to October 2017 (the survey asked school districts to report information based on the 12 months prior to their completing the survey.) To obtain the maximum number of responses to our survey, we sent reminder emails to nonrespondents and contacted nonrespondents over the telephone. We identified that four of the 549 sampled school districts were closed and one was a “cyber-school” with no building, so these were removed from the sample. Of the remaining 544 eligible sampled school districts, we received valid responses from 373, resulting in an unweighted response rate of 68 percent. We conducted an analysis of our survey results to identify potential sources of nonresponse bias using a multivariate logistic regression model. We examined the response propensity of the sampled school districts by several demographic characteristics. These characteristics included poverty, urbanicity, and charter status. We did not find any other population characteristics significantly affected survey response propensity except those used in stratification (charter schools and the largest 100 school districts). Based on the response bias analysis and the 68 percent response rate across stratum, we determined that estimates based on adjusted weights reflecting the response rate are generalizable to the population of eligible school districts and are sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. We took steps to minimize non-sampling errors, including pretesting draft instruments and using a web-based administration system. As we began to develop the survey, we met with officials from seven school districts to explore the feasibility of responding to the survey questions. We then pretested the draft instrument from April to June 2017 with officials in eight school districts—including one charter school district—in cities and suburbs in different states. In the pretests, we asked about the clarity of the questions and the flow and layout of the survey. The EPA also reviewed and provided us comments on a draft version of the survey. Based on feedback from the pretests and EPA’s review, we made revisions to the survey instrument. To further minimize non-sampling errors, we used a web-based survey, which allowed respondents to enter their responses directly into an electronic instrument. Using this method automatically created a record for each respondent and eliminated the errors associated with a manual data entry process. We express the precision of our particular sample’s results as a 95 percent confidence interval (for example, plus or minus 10 percentage points). This is the interval that would contain the actual population value for 95 percent of the samples we could have drawn. As a result, we are 95 percent confident that each of the confidence intervals in this report will include the true values in the study population. To analyze differences in the percentages of school districts that reported they tested for lead in school drinking water and those that discovered lead, we compared weighted survey estimates generated for school districts in different levels of the following subgroups: Poverty: low poverty, mid poverty, and high poverty; Racial composition: majority-minority and majority white; Region: Northeast, South, Midwest, and West; Population density: urban, suburban, and rural/town; Urban charter school: in urban areas, charter district and non-charter Largest 100: largest 100 districts (based on student enrollment) and all other districts. For each subgroup, we produced percentage estimates and standard errors for each level and used these results to confirm the significance of the differences between weighted survey estimates. To examine school districts’ testing and remediation efforts and state support of those efforts, we conducted site visits in five states—Georgia, Illinois, Massachusetts, Oregon, and Texas—from February to October 2017. We selected these states because they varied in the extent to which they required testing of school drinking water for lead and they are located in geographic areas covered by different EPA regional offices. Within these states, we selected 17 school districts that had tested for lead in school drinking water and to achieve variation in the size and population density (urban, suburban, and rural) of the district as well as including one charter school district. Site visits generally consisted of interviews with officials in state agencies and school districts and officials in the local EPA regional office: State interviews: We interviewed officials in state environment, education, and health agencies, depending on whether they had information related to school district testing for lead in school drinking water in their state. The topics we discussed were the agencies’ roles and responsibilities related to testing for and remediation of lead in school drinking water, any related state requirements, policies, and guidance, communication and public notification about testing and remediation efforts and, as appropriate, coordination among multiple state agencies. We also discussed similar topics related to lead-based paint. In Massachusetts, we interviewed representatives with the University of Massachusetts, because of their role in implementing the state’s program to support school district efforts to test for lead in school drinking water. School Districts: Within the five site visit states, we interviewed officials in 14 school districts in person and in three school districts by phone (because we were not able to meet with them in person). We also selected one charter school that functions as its own school district which had conducted tests for lead in school drinking water. Similar to our school district survey, the interview topics we discussed with district officials included testing for and remediation of lead in school drinking water, use of guidance (such as the 3Ts guidance) and efforts to communicate or coordinate with any federal, state, or local agencies, including any other school districts. Within 13 of the school districts, we visited at least one school in which the district had tested for lead in drinking water and, as needed, took remedial action in order to gain an in-depth understanding of their testing and remediation efforts. EPA Regional Offices: We interviewed officials in all 10 EPA Regional offices. We met in-person with officials in the regional offices 1, 4, 5, and 6 and conducted phone interviews with officials in regional offices 2, 3, 7, 8, 9, and 10. We generally discussed EPA officials’ roles and responsibilities related to testing for lead in school drinking water and paint and efforts in states and school districts in their region. Information we gathered from these interviews, while not generalizable, represents the conditions present in the states and school districts at the time of our interviews and may be illustrative of efforts in other states and school districts. As part of our effort to examine school districts’ testing and remediation efforts and state support of those efforts, we reviewed related state requirements. To determine whether states had related requirements, we asked all EPA regional offices if states in their region had requirements related to testing for lead in school drinking water. EPA provided examples of eight states (California, Illinois, Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Virginia, and the District of Columbia that had such requirements. We reviewed relevant laws, regulations, and policy documents for these states. We then confirmed the details of the related requirements with the appropriate state officials via structured questionnaires. Also, we used available documentation to corroborate and verify the testing requirements of the states that EPA identified. GAO did not conduct an independent search of state laws. To examine the extent to which federal agencies have collaborated in supporting state and school district efforts to test for and remediate lead, we reviewed relevant federal laws, including the Water Infrastructure Improvements for the Nation Act of 2016, Reduction of Lead in Drinking Water Act of 2011, the Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974, as amended, and the Lead Contamination Control Act of 1988; regulations, such as the Lead and Copper Rule; and guidance, such as the 3Ts guidance. We also reviewed documentation including the Memorandum of Understanding on Reducing Lead Levels in Drinking Water in Schools and Child Care Facilities signed in 2005 by EPA, Education and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC); Federal Partners in School Health Charter; EPA training webinar information; and other relevant guidance including the 3Ts guidance tool kit. We interviewed officials from EPA’s Office of Ground Water and Drinking Water and Office of Children’s Health Protection and officials in all 10 of EPA regional offices regarding their approach to providing support to states and school district on lead testing and remediation. We interviewed officials from Education’s Office of Safe and Healthy Students and officials from the CDC. During these interviews, we interviewed officials about the Memorandum of Understanding and about the Federal Partners in School Health initiative, both of which represent collaborative efforts that address lead in school drinking water, among other topics. We evaluated federal efforts to collaborate and support lead testing and remediation in schools against federal standards for internal control, which call for agencies to communicate quality information to external parties, among other things. We also evaluated federal efforts against the Memorandum of Understanding, in which EPA, Education, and CDC agreed to encourage testing drinking water for lead and communicate with key stakeholders, among other things. To inform all of our research objectives, we interviewed representatives with the National Conference of State Legislatures, National Center for Healthy Housing, National Alliance of Public Charter Schools, the DC Public Charter School Board, and the 21st Century School Fund. We also attended a workshop entitled “Eliminating Lead Risks in Schools and Child Care Facilities” in December 2017. The questions we asked in our survey of local educational agencies (referred to in this report as school districts) are shown below. Our survey was comprised of closed- and open-ended questions. In this appendix, we include all survey questions and aggregate results of responses to the closed-ended questions; we do not provide information on responses provided to the open-ended questions. Estimates noted with superscript “a” are based on 20 or fewer responses and were not included in our findings. For a more detailed discussion of our survey methodology, see appendix I. 1. Do any schools in your local educational agency (LEA) obtain drinking water from a public water system such as a city or municipal water plant? (Check one.) 95 percent confidence interval – lower bound (percentage) 95 percent confidence interval – upper bound (percentage) No (Skip to 20) Don’t know (Skip to 20) Section B: Testing for Lead in School Drinking Water 2. Is there a requirement that the drinking water in your LEA’s schools be tested for lead? (Please answer “Yes” regardless of whether that requirement comes from your state, municipality, local educational agency or any other governmental entity.) (Check one.) 95 percent confidence interval – lower bound (percentage) 3. Regardless of whether your LEA is required to test for lead in school drinking water, have tests been conducted for lead in the drinking water in at least one of your schools in the past 12 months? (Check one.) 95 percent confidence interval – lower bound (percentage) 95 percent confidence interval – upper bound (percentage) If yes to 3: 3A. What is the number of schools in which tests were conducted in the past 12 months? Estimated Number (Mean) 95 percent confidence interval – lower bound (number) 95 percent confidence interval – upper bound (number) (Respondent reported number) 3B. About how many samples were taken from sources of drinking water such as water fountains and sinks in each school? (Check one.) 95 percent confidence interval – lower bound (percentage) 3C. Did any of the following develop the sampling plan, draw the samples of water, and analyze the samples? (Check all that apply.) 95 percent confidence interval – lower bound (percentage) 95 percent confidence interval – upper bound (percentage) 3D. What size samples were taken? (Check one.) 95 percent confidence interval – lower bound (percentage) 95 percent confidence interval – upper bound (percentage) If ‘other’ to 3D: What sample size was used? 3E: To the best of your knowledge, did the personnel drawing or analyzing samples follow a testing protocol that offers guidance on developing the sampling plan, drawing samples of water, or analyzing samples? (Check one.) 95 percent confidence interval – lower bound (percentage) 95 percent confidence interval – upper bound (percentage) No (Skip to 3F) Don’t know (Skip to 3F) If ‘yes’ to 3E: a. To the best of your knowledge, were any of the following entities involved in developing the protocol? (Check one per row.) 95 percent confidence interval – lower bound (percentage) 95 percent confidence interval – upper bound (percentage) Contractor / water testing company EPA or another federal government agency A local government agency (aside from your LEA) If ‘other’ to 3Eh: What other entities were involved in developing the protocol? 3F. If tests were conducted in some schools in your LEA in the past 12 months—but were not conducted in every school—how was it determined which schools would be tested? (Check one per row.) Not applicable: tests were conducted in every school (Skip to 3G) 95 percent confidence interval – lower bound (percentage) 95 percent confidence interval – upper bound (percentage) 95 percent confidence interval – lower bound (percentage) 95 percent confidence interval – upper bound (percentage) If ‘other’ to 3Fe: In what other ways did your LEA use to determine which schools would be tested? 3G. How much do you estimate your LEA has spent on testing for lead in school drinking water in the past 12 months? (Please answer this question for lead testing only; the survey asks about expenditures to address concerns identified through testing later. Also, please include materials, labor, and any other expenditures related to lead testing in your estimate.) Estimated Number (Median) 95 percent confidence interval – lower bound (number) 95 percent confidence interval – upper bound (number) (Respondent reported number) 3H. Did your LEA use any of the following sources of funding for the testing in the past 12 months? (Check one per row). 95 percent confidence interval – lower bound (percentage) 95 percent confidence interval – upper bound (percentage) If ‘other’ to 3H: What other sources of funding did your LEA use? 3I. In the past 12 months, did your LEA notify the following groups that it was planning to test for lead in school drinking water before conducting the tests? (Check one per row). 95 percent confidence interval – lower bound (percentage) 95 percent confidence interval – upper bound (percentage) General public (e.g., media) If ‘other’ to 3I: What other groups did your LEA notify that it was planning to test for lead in school drinking water before conducting the tests? 3J. In the past 12 months, did your LEA report the testing results to the following groups after completing the tests? (Check one per row). 95 percent confidence interval – lower bound (percentage) 95 percent confidence interval – upper bound (percentage) General public (e.g., media) If ‘other’ to 3J: To what other groups did your LEA report the testing results? 3K. If ‘no’ to 3: Were any of the following a reason your LEA did not conduct any tests in any schools in the last 12 months? (Check one per row). 95 percent confidence interval – lower bound (percentage) 95 percent confidence interval – upper bound (percentage) If ‘other’ to 3K: For what other reasons did your LEA not conduct any tests in any schools in the last 12 months? 4. Does your LEA have a schedule for recurring tests to determine the amount of lead in the drinking water in your schools within any of the following time frames? (Check one.) 95 percent confidence interval – lower bound (percentage) 95 percent confidence interval – upper bound (percentage) Section C: Remediation of Lead in School Drinking Water 5. Has your LEA discovered any level of lead in the drinking water of any of your schools (as a result of testing) in the last 12 months? (Check one.) 95 percent confidence interval – lower bound (percentage) 95 percent confidence interval – upper bound (percentage) 5A. What lead concentration (measured in “parts per billion” or “ppb”) did your LEA use to initiate remedial action? (Check one.) 95 percent confidence interval – lower bound (percentage) 95 percent confidence interval – upper bound (percentage) If ‘other’ to 5A: What lead concentration did your LEA use to initiate remedial action? 5B. In the last 12 months, how many schools had at least one test result–including as few as one sample in one school–greater than the lead level your LEA used to initiate action? (Please answer regardless of whether these results were discovered in the first of multiple rounds of testing.) 5C.To address lead discovered in school drinking water, has your LEA taken any of the following actions in any of your schools in the past 12 months? 95 percent confidence interval – lower bound (percentage) 95 percent confidence interval – upper bound (percentage) 5D. If ‘no’ to every item in 5C: What are the reasons why your LEA has not taken actions in any of your schools in the past 12 months? 5E. If ‘yes’ to any item in 5C: How much do you estimate your LEA has spent on taking actions in the past 12 months? (Please include materials, labor, and any other expenditures related to lead remediation in your estimate.) Estimated Number (Median) 95 percent confidence interval – lower bound (number) 95 percent confidence interval – upper bound (number) (Respondent reported number) 5F. Did your LEA use any of the following sources of funding to take actions in the past 12 months? (Check one per row). 95 percent confidence interval – lower bound (percentage) 95 percent confidence interval – upper bound (percentage) If ‘other’ to 5F: What other sources of funding did your LEA use to take actions in the past 12 months? 5G. Did your LEA notify the following groups about its actions in the past 12 months? (Check one per row). 95 percent confidence interval – lower bound (percentage) 95 percent confidence interval – upper bound (percentage) General public (e.g., media) If ‘other’ to 5G: What other groups has your LEA notified about its remedial actions in the past 12 months? 6. Does your LEA have a schedule to flush the water system as a result of concerns about lead in drinking water in at least one of your schools within any of the following time frames? (Check one.) 95 percent confidence interval – lower bound (percentage) 95 percent confidence interval – upper bound (percentage) 7. Does your LEA have plans to take actions to eliminate or reduce lead in school drinking water (for example, replace drinking water fountains, replace pipes) in at least one of your schools? (Check one.) 95 percent confidence interval – lower bound (percentage) 95 percent confidence interval – upper bound (percentage) If ‘according to a schedule’ to 7: how would you describe the schedule that your LEA has developed? Section D: Guidance Regarding Lead Testing and Remediation 8. Prior to receiving this survey, were you familiar with guidance issued by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency entitled “3Ts for Reducing Lead in Drinking Water in Schools”? (Please answer “Yes” if you had read or used the”3Ts” prior to receiving this survey.) (Check one.) 95 percent confidence interval – lower bound (percentage) 95 percent confidence interval – upper bound (percentage) If ‘yes’ to 8: did your LEA (or a contractor working on behalf of your LEA) follow or refer to “3Ts” during your efforts to test for or remediate lead in school drinking water? (Check one.) 95 percent confidence interval – lower bound (percentage) 95 percent confidence interval – upper bound (percentage) If ‘yes’ to 8A: How helpful was 3Ts for conducting tests for lead in your schools’ drinking water? (Check one.) 95 percent confidence interval – lower bound (percentage) 95 percent confidence interval – upper bound (percentage) If ‘yes’ to 8A: How helpful was 3Ts for remediating lead in your schools’ drinking water? (Check one.) 95 percent confidence interval – lower bound (percentage) 95 percent confidence interval – upper bound (percentage) If ‘yes’ to 8A: How helpful was 3Ts for communicating with parents and other stakeholders about lead in your schools’ drinking water? (Check one.) 95 percent confidence interval – lower bound (percentage) 95 percent confidence interval – upper bound (percentage) What else, if anything, would make 3Ts more helpful? 9. Did your LEA (or a contractor working on behalf of your LEA) use any other guidance (for example, best practices, manuals, protocols, webinars) in your LEA’s efforts to test for lead in your schools’ drinking water, take remedial actions, or for notification purposes? (Check one.) 95 percent confidence interval – lower bound (percentage) 95 percent confidence interval – upper bound (percentage) What other guidance was used? 10. Would your LEA find any of the following helpful? (Check one per row). 95 percent confidence interval – lower bound (percentage) 95 percent confidence interval – upper bound (percentage) Clearer guidance on a level of lead in school drinking water at which we should take action Additional guidance on determining a schedule for 41 95 percent confidence interval – lower bound (percentage) 95 percent confidence interval – upper bound (percentage) regularly testing for lead in school drinking water Additional guidance on actions to take if lead is found in school drinking water Information on the costs of testing for lead in school drinking water Information on the costs of remediating lead in school drinking water 18 95 percent confidence interval – lower bound (percentage) 95 percent confidence interval – upper bound (percentage) If ‘other guidance or information’ to 10: What other guidance or information would be helpful? Section E: Inspecting Schools for Lead Based Paint Section F: Remediation of Lead Based Paint in Schools Section G: Other Questions 16. How many schools are owned or operated by your LEA? Estimated Number (Mean) 95 percent confidence interval – lower bound (number) 95 percent confidence interval – upper bound (number) (Respondent reported number) 17. How many schools in your LEA were built before 1986? (If a building has additions, we mean the original structure/the original part of the building.) Estimated Number (Mean) 95 percent confidence interval – lower bound (number) 95 percent confidence interval – upper bound (number) (Respondent reported number) 18. How many schools in your LEA were built before 1978? (If a building has additions, we mean the original structure/the original part of the building.) Estimated Number (Mean) 95 percent confidence interval – lower bound (number) 95 percent confidence interval – upper bound (number) (Respondent reported number) 19. Is there anything else you would like to share with us regarding lead testing, inspection, or remediation efforts in your school or LEA (drinking water or paint)? 20. What is the name, title, e-mail address, and telephone number of the person responsible for completing this survey? Section H: Completion 21. Please check one of the options below. Clicking on “Completed” indicates that your answers are official and final. Your answers will not be used unless you have done this. (Check one.) 95 percent confidence interval – lower bound (percentage) Charter schools comprise a small but growing group of public schools. In contrast to most traditional public schools, many charter schools are responsible for financing their own buildings and other facilities. As a result, charters schools vary in terms of whether they own their own building or pay rent, and whether they operate in buildings originally designed as a school or in buildings which have been redesigned for educational purposes. Sometimes charter schools may also share space in their building with others, such as non-profit organizations. In addition to differences in facility access and finance, charter school governance also varies. In some states, charter schools function as their own school district, while in other states, charter schools have the option to choose between being a distinct school district or part of a larger school district. To determine the extent to which charter school districts were testing for lead in school drinking water and finding and remediating lead, our survey included charter school districts in two ways: our sampling design included three strata specifically for charter school districts in urban areas; in addition, charter school districts were retained in the sampling population, such that they could be randomly selected in our other strata. While we generally received too few responses from charter school districts to report their data separately, we are able to estimate that about 36 percent of charter school districts tested for lead in school drinking water. To learn more about experiences of charter schools, we visited one charter school district and interviewed representatives of the DC Public Charter School Board (DC PCSB). The charter school district we visited consisted of one charter school in a building it leased. The school had 10 sources of consumable water, all of which were tested in 2016 and were found to have lead below the district’s selected action level of 15 parts per billion. Before testing, district officials met with the building owner who agreed to cover the cost of any remediation. Officials with the DC PCSB told us that it paid to have tests conducted in every charter school in the District of Columbia. According to DC PCSB officials, between March and June 2016, 95 charter schools were tested, and lead above their action level of 15 parts per billion was discovered in 20 schools. Officials estimated their testing costs to be about $100,000, which was subsequently reimbursed by the District of Columbia’s Office of State Superintendent of Education. They also said that charter schools were responsible for taking steps to remediate the lead and recommended schools flush their water systems and use filters. Communication of results Not specified 5 ppb in a 250 ml sample (from filtered fixture) The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) provides information on its website for the public on lead in drinking water. EPA’s website includes, among other documents, a December 2005 brochure for the public and school districts entitled “3Ts for Reducing Lead in Drinking Water in Schools” (see fig.10). In addition to the individuals named above, Diane Raynes (Assistant Director), Scott Spicer (Assistant Director), Jason Palmer (Analyst-in- Charge), Amanda K. Goolden, Rich Johnson, Grant Mallie, Jean McSween, Dae Park, James Rebbe, Sarah M. Sheehan, and Alexandra Squitieri made significant contributions to this report. Also contributing to this report were Susan Aschoff, David Blanding, Mimi Nguyen, Tahra Nichols, Dan C. Royer, Kiki Theodoropoulos, and Kim Yamane. Lead Paint in Housing: HUD Should Strengthen Grant Processes, Compliance Monitoring, and Performance Assessment. GAO-18-394. Washington, D.C.: June 19, 2018. Drinking Water: Additional Data and Statistical Analysis May Enhance EPA’s Oversight of the Lead and Copper Rule. GAO-17-424. Washington, D.C.: September 1, 2017. Environmental Health: EPA Has Made Substantial Progress but Could Improve Processes for Considering Children’s Health. GAO-13-254. Washington, D.C.: August 12, 2013. Lead in Tap Water: CDC Public Health Communications Need Improvement. GAO-11-279. Washington, D.C.: March 14, 2011. Environmental Health: High-level Strategy and Leadership Needed to Continue Progress toward Protecting Children from Environmental Threats. GAO-10-205. Washington, D.C.: January 28, 2010. Drinking Water: EPA Should Strengthen Ongoing Efforts to Ensure That Consumers Are Protected from Lead Contamination. GAO-06-148. Washington, D.C.: January 4, 2006.	[ "No federal law requires testing of drinking water for lead in schools that receive water from public water systems, although these systems are regulated by the EPA. Lead can leach into water from plumbing materials inside a school. The discovery of toxic levels of lead in water in Flint, Michigan, in 2015 has renewed awareness about the danger lead exposure poses to public health, especially for children. GAO was asked to review school practices for lead testing and remediation. This report examines the extent to which (1) school districts are testing for, finding, and remediating lead in drinking water; (2) states are supporting these efforts; and (3) federal agencies are supporting state and school district efforts. GAO administered a web-based survey to a stratified, random sample of 549 school districts, the results of which are generalizable to all school districts. GAO visited or interviewed officials with 17 school districts with experience in lead testing, spread among 5 states, selected for geographic variation. GAO also interviewed federal and state officials and reviewed relevant laws and documents. An estimated 43 percent of school districts, serving 35 million students, tested for lead in school drinking water in 2016 or 2017, according to GAO's nationwide survey of school districts. An estimated 41 percent of school districts, serving 12 million students, had not tested for lead. GAO's survey showed that, among school districts that did test, an estimated 37 percent found elevated lead (lead at levels above their selected threshold for taking remedial action.) (See figure.) All school districts that found elevated lead in drinking water reported taking steps to reduce or eliminate exposure to lead, including replacing water fountains, installing filters or new fixtures, or providing bottled water. According to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), at least 8 states have requirements that schools test for lead in drinking water as of 2017, and at least 13 additional states supported school districts' voluntary efforts with funding or in-kind support for testing and remediation. In addition, the five states GAO visited provided examples of technical assistance to support testing in schools. EPA provides guidance and other resources to states and school districts regarding testing and remediating lead in drinking water, and the Department of Education (Education) provides some of this information on its websites. School district officials that used EPA's written guidance said they generally found it helpful. Although EPA guidance emphasizes the importance of addressing elevated lead levels, GAO found that some aspects of the guidance, such as the threshold for taking remedial action, were potentially misleading and unclear, which can put school districts at risk of making uninformed decisions. In addition, many school districts reported a lack of familiarity with EPA's guidance, and their familiarity varied by region of the country. Education and EPA do not regularly collaborate to support state and school district efforts on lead in drinking water, despite agreeing to do so in a 2005 memorandum of understanding. Such collaboration could encourage testing and ensure that more school districts will have the necessary information to limit student and staff exposure to lead. GAO is making seven recommendations, including that EPA update its guidance on how schools should determine lead levels requiring action and for EPA and Education to collaborate to further disseminate guidance and encourage testing for lead. EPA and Education agreed with the recommendations." ]	14,909	gov_report	en	null	ef16ccc98f78a77f8d3a6f3f9b737247600407ee898985a7
The Department of Defense (DOD) obligates more than $300 billion annually to pay for goods and services (including research and development). Most of these acquisitions are governed by numerous statutes and regulations found in Title 10 of the United States Code, the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), and the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS). DOD can also enter into certain transactions without triggering most of the standard acquisition statutes and regulations by using other transaction (OT) authorities. In recent years, Congress has expanded these authorities and DOD is increasingly using OTs for research, prototyping, and production. This report examines (1) how OTs work, (2) why they were established, (3) potential benefits and risks of using OTs, and (4) whether there are data available against which to measure their effectiveness. Appendix A provides a legislative history of DOD's other transaction authorities. On October 4, 1957, the Soviet Union triggered a space race with the United States when it successfully launched Sputnik I into orbit, becoming the first nation to send a man-made satellite into space. Congress, concerned that the United States was falling behind in space, held a series of hearings on an "emergency" effort to respond to the Soviet launch of Sputnik. At the same time, a bill was introduced in the Senate to create an agency with the means to quickly and efficiently develop a national space program. These efforts led to passage of the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 (Space Act, P.L. 85-568) in July 1958, which established the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). In an effort to give the new agency "the necessary freedom to carry on research, development, and exploration ... to insure the full development of these peaceful and defense uses without unnecessary delay," the Space Act granted NASA broad authority to "enter into and perform such contracts, leases, cooperative agreements, or other transactions as may be necessary" to accomplish its mission of research and exploration (emphasis added). Congress extended different variations of OT authorities to other select agencies, granting the authority to DOD in the FY1990 & 1991 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, P.L. 101-189 ). For an analysis of which non-DOD agencies can use OTs and how the authorities differ by agency, see Appendix B . Other transactions are legally binding contracts that are generally exempt from federal procurement laws and regulations such as the Competition in Contracting Act and the Federal Acquisition Regulation. In contrast, traditional procurement contracts must adhere to the procurement rules set forth in statute and regulation. Generally, DOD can use other transaction authorities for three purposes: 1. conduct research, 2. develop prototypes, or 3. contract for follow-on production of a successful prototype project. DOD's other transaction authorities are found in two sections of law: 10 U . S . C . 2371 grants DOD the authority to use other transactions to carry out basic, applied, and advanced research projects. DOD regulations treat these projects as financial assistance instruments, not as contracts. 10 U . S . C . 2371b permits the use of other transactions to conduct prototype projects and follow-on production. OTs can only be used for prototypes if one of the following applies: at least one nontraditional defense contractor significantly participating in the project; all significant participants are small businesses or nontraditional defense contractors; at least one-third of the total cost of the prototype project is provided by nongovernment participants; or the senior procurement acquisition official provides in writing an explanation of the exceptional circumstances justifying an OT. Follow-on production can only be conducted when the underlying prototype OT was competitively awarded, and the prototype project was successfully completed. 10 U . S . C . 2373 , while generally not considered an o ther t ransaction authority , allows DOD to buy certain items and designs for experimental or test purposes without having to adhere to the procurement laws set forth in Chapter 137 of Title 10. OT authorities grant government officials the flexibility to include, amend, or exclude contract clauses and requirements that are mandatory in traditional procurements (e.g., termination clauses, payments, audit requirements, intellectual property, and contract disputes). OTs can be structured in numerous ways, including a direct relationship between a single government agency and a single provider; joint ventures; partnerships; multiple agencies joining together to fund an agreement encompassing multiple providers; or through a consortium. One common application of OTs is to forge an agreement with a consortium. A consortium is an organized group— it can consist of nonprofits, academic institutions, or contractors— focusing on a specific technology area. Generally, a lead entity coordinates and directs a consortium's activities. Consortia have consisted of a handful to as many as 1,000 members. Consortia can act to facilitate multiparty agreements whereby each member is akin to its own co-prime contractor with the government. In such a case, the government articulates the need or problem it is trying to solve, and the various members of the consortium can submit white papers for consideration. In this scenario, OTs can serve as an efficient way for all members to send unsolicited technology suggestions and solutions to solve a defined challenge. Consortia can also be used to develop an ecosystem of entities working together on a project, whereby members of a consortium pool resources and collaborate with DOD. A number of analysts argue that using consortia in this way gives the federal government a unique ability to leverage and pool the technological expertise and innovation of multiple entities in a particular sector, thereby strengthening and advancing a sector of the industrial base that may have defense applications. Seen like this, OTs can be considered a mechanism to promote defense technology and the defense industrial base, with the potential added benefit of advancing the domestic commercial technology base. Some analysts, however, have argued that many of today's consortia do not operate as collaborative organizations, but function more like managed multiple award task order contracts. These analysts argue that DOD should seek to foster more collaboration in consortia. Some analysts have argued that consortia reduce competition, since only members of the consortium under contract can participate in the project or submit white papers for consideration and funding. Others counter that even when an OT is signed with a single consortium, competition could be increased, since all members of the consortium are notified of the opportunity (expanding the pool of potential competitors aware of the opportunity), and the OT will foster internal competition among consortium members. OTs are not procurement contracts and thus are exempt from numerous procurement statutes and regulations, including the statutes in Chapter 137 of Title 10 ( Procurement Generally ). They are, however, bound by standard contract and other select laws and regulations. Examples of laws that do not apply include the Truth in Negotiations Act, Competition in Contracting Act, Cost Accounting Standards, Contract Disputes Act, and select intellectual property statutes such as the Bayh-Dole Act. A number of these laws are aimed at oversight and protecting the interests of taxpayers. While the Competition in Contracting Act does not apply, 10 U.S.C. 2371b requires that research and prototype projects be competed "to the maximum extent practicable." DOD policy mirrors the statutory language, stating "[C]ompetition is a good thing. It helps keep prices low, quality high, and gives the government leverage in negotiations." To the extent that OTs induce nontraditional contractors to work with DOD, OTs can be viewed as promoting competition among (and within) entities that would not normally compete for DOD contracts. However, the lack of explicitly defined competition requirements could result in less competition for certain OTs. OTs are not free from all legislative and regulatory requirements. Generally, statutes and regulations that are not procurement-specific apply, including the Trade Secrets Act, (18 U.S.C. 1905); the Economic Espionage Act (18 U.S.C. 1831-39); elements of the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552); and fiscal and property laws, such as the Anti-deficiency Act (31 U.S.C. 1341); and the Tucker Act (28 U.S.C. 1491). As can be seen by these citations, many of these statutes are not located in the procurement titles of Title 10 or Title 41. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has held that OTs are not procurement contracts, and therefore it will not review protests of such an award or solicitation. However, GAO will review "a timely protest that an agency is improperly using its other transaction authority." OT contracts can be protested to the Court of Federal Claims, although there is debate as to the extent of the court's jurisdiction. The limited protest jurisdiction of GAO is appealing to many government procurement officials. One senior Air Force official reportedly stated that OTs are "just so much faster and so much more attuned to getting something that we want today and not have to spend a couple of years going through a protest, going through this huge process to get something we wanted two years ago." It generally does not take that long to go through a GAO protest. By statute, GAO must issue an opinion on a protest within 100 days of the protest being filed, and 70% of cases are resolved in less than 60 days. While exempt from GAO bid protests, OTs are not exempt from GAO audits. Generally, OTs that include government payments exceeding $5 million are required to include a clause granting GAO the right to examine the records of any related party. However, this requirement has a number of limitations. Used properly, OTs can provide significant benefits to DOD. Along with the potential benefits come certain risks. Some of the potential benefits to OTs highlighted by analysts and officials include providing a mechanism to pool R&D resources with industry to facilitate development of, and obtain "the latest state-of-the-art, dual use technologies"; attracting nontraditional contractors with promising technological capabilities to work with DOD; lowering costs by eliminating requirements associated with the Federal Acquisition Regulations (i.e., costs associated with required reporting and administrative activities) or sharing costs with industry; and "speeding up" the acquisition process. A number of experts argue that OTs provide a unique mechanism for DOD to invest in, and influence the direction of, technology development even when the end result is not directly tied to a military capability. As one observer noted, the real benefit to DOD may be that [t]he R&D has been accomplished and is available to the technical and scientific communities. As a result, a subsequent phase of research can begin or a particular approach can be demonstrated to be of no value. Some argue that OTs have particular import today. Drawing parallels to the space race, these analysts argue that DOD is engaged in a defense technology race. According to the 809 Panel: DoD is now in a period during which the time a particular technology is a dominant force on the battlefield is getting increasingly shorter, disruptive technologies are emerging at a faster pace, and these technologies are more widely dispersed…In a world with rapidly changing technology, time is a valuable resource that must not be taken for granted. It is difficult to predict what capabilities DoD will need 5 to 10 years from now—biotechnology, nanotechnology, artificial intelligence, robotics, or a new technology area not even known today. It also is unclear on what plane the military will conduct warfare—traditional battlefields, space, cyberspace, or some other domain. The current acquisition system lacks the agility needed to adapt to new paradigms. These analysts argue that OTs and similar rapid acquisition authorities are critical for DOD to compete in such a fast-paced global environment where technology and innovation are no longer driven by DOD, but by industry and foreign competitors. In 1960, the United States accounted for 69% of global R&D, with U.S. defense-related R&D alone accounting for more than one-third of global R&D. The federal government funded approximately twice as much R&D as U.S. business. However, from 1960 to 2016, the U.S. share of global R&D fell to 28%, and the federal government's share of total U.S. R&D fell from 65% to 24%, while business's share more than doubled from 33% to 67%. As a result of these global, national, and federal trends, federal defense R&D's share of total global R&D fell to 3.7% in 2016. Given the shift in the global R&D landscape, and the diminishing influence of DOD as a market mover, analysts suggest that the current procurement system is overburdened by regulations and bureaucratic processes that slow the system, increase costs, and dissuade companies from doing business with DOD. In contrast, OTs are viewed as faster, attracting companies that would otherwise forgo working with DOD and promoting broader investment in critical defense capabilities. As one analyst wrote: OTAs are currently the only way to remove the barriers necessary to get these nontraditional sources of innovation to do business with the military. Properly constructed, OTAs help speed up the process, respect a company's IP through negotiation rather than regulatory fiat, and result in contracting under commercial terms and conditions. Congress also appears to have shifted its view on appropriate use of other transactions. In the FY1999 conference report, Congress stated that [OT] authority should only be used in the exceptional cases where it can be clearly demonstrated that a normal contract or grant will not allow sufficient access to affordable technologies. By comparison, in the FY2018 NDAA, Congress expanded OT authorities and stated the following: In the execution of science and technology and prototyping programs, the Secretary of Defense shall establish a preference, to be applied in circumstances determined appropriate by the Secretary, for using transactions other than contracts, cooperative agreements, and grants. Along with the potential benefits come potential risks, including that of diminished oversight and exemption from laws and regulations designed to protect government and taxpayer interests. Some analysts, while acknowledging the important role of OTs, raise concerns over transparency and how these agreements are being employed. As one industry official stated, OTs are a contracting method, not a substitute for good acquisition practices. Discussing a particular OT for cloud services that was protested and ultimately cancelled by DOD, one observer argued The cloud contract provides a teachable moment for procurement reform-minded officials in the Pentagon and Capitol Hill. The problem was not with the OTA mechanism, which remains an essential element of reforming Pentagon procurement. Rather, the problem was with a lack of transparency with how the mechanism was employed. Scott Amey, general counsel of the Project on Government Oversight, cautioned We have to seriously consider how we are using [OTs]; whether we are using them as intended, whether we are getting the goods and services that we really want and need, whether we are getting them at the best cost and process, and we are using this procurement vehicle as a way to just circumvent the rules and have contractors not have the administration and oversight they need to hold them accountable. I'm just afraid this is going to result in a lot of waste, fraud, and abuse in the future. Congress has expressed repeated concerns that OTs could be used to circumvent congressional intent. In the FY1999 NDAA, the committees emphasized that the authority should only be used in a limited manner. The conference report stated the following: The conferees are especially concerned that such authority not be used to circumvent the appropriate management controls in the standard acquisition and budgeting process. Congress echoed a similar concern in the FY2019 NDAA. According to the House report: The committee also urges the Department to reiterate through established guidelines that OTA is not a means for circumventing appropriate use of the Federal Acquisition Regulations, and that full and open competition should be used to the maximum extent possible to maintain a sense of integrity, fairness, and credibility in the Federal Procurement process. Other transactions are also exempt from many of the socioeconomic policies put in place by Congress to promote public policies, including some Buy America requirements. Some analysts have raised concerns that OTs are a way to circumvent many of the public policies enshrined in the acquisition process. A number of analysts and officials have raised concerns that if DOD uses OTs in ways not intended by Congress—or is perceived to abuse the authority—Congress could clamp down on the authority. Under Secretary of the Army Ryan McCarthy reportedly stated that the military department is "trying to be very judicious about this authority so we don't lose it." Some analysts argue that Congress is already clamping down on the use of OTs. These analysts point to language in the FY2019 NDAA and FY2019 appropriations legislation ( P.L. 115-245 ) requiring additional reporting and notification (see Appendix A ). Such notification and reporting requirements, however, are not new; when Congress expanded OT authorities in the past, reporting and notification requirements were commonly included. The reporting requirements may also be a result of congressional frustration with a lack of transparency and data on how DOD uses OTs. DOD lacks authoritative data that can be used to assess OT effectiveness and better understand broader trends associated with these agreements. The most frequently cited source for such data is the Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation (FPDS-NG), which is the primary source for tracking data on contract obligations, including other transactions for prototypes and follow-on production. FPDS-NG is configured to track data on cost-sharing, other transaction award type, and prevalence of nontraditional contractors. Obligations connected to OTs for research are tracked by the Defense Assistance Awards Data System, which is primarily used to track grants and cooperative agreements. This bifurcation of how OT data are tracked makes it more difficult to get a consolidated view of OT data. According to DOD, all OT data will be reported through FPDS-NG starting in late 2019. The procurement data in FPDS-NG are not fully reliable. There are quality issues relating to accuracy, completeness, and timeliness of data. CRS reviewed FPDS-NG data for prototype OT agreements signed or modified between FY2015 and FY2017 and found similar data inconsistencies. DOD officials acknowledge that they do not have sufficiently reliable data upon which to conduct analysis on the use of OTs and are taking steps to try to improve the data. The analyses below reflect CRS's effort to analyze DOD's use of other transaction authority based on the best available data. According to FPDS-NG, in FY2017, DOD obligated $2.1 billion—and received $360 million in cost-share contributions—on prototype other transaction agreements, representing less than 1% of DOD's total FY2017 contract obligations (approximately $320 billion). Despite the small percentage of obligations, OTs are growing quickly and are expected to continue to grow at a rapid pace. From FY2013 to FY2017, the number of new prototype agreements increased from 12 to 94, an increase of over 650% (see Table 1 ). DOD's Defense Innovation Unit (DIU, formerly known as the Defense Innovation Unit Experimental, or DIUx) was involved with approximately half of the prototype agreements executed in 2017. DOD officials have stated their intent to further increase the department's use of OTs. Officials say that this increase is due to Congress expanding the statutory authority. The Army executed more than 66% of the prototype OT agreements between FY2013 and FY2017, often on behalf of other military departments and components (see Table 2 ). Army Contracting Command-New Jersey at Picatinny Arsenal executes many of these agreements. DIU currently uses Picatinny Arsenal to execute all of its other transaction agreements. A number of private sector companies do not pursue federal government contracts because they are unwilling to forfeit intellectual property rights or adhere to some of the procurement regulations. One of the goals of OTs is to expand the defense marketplace by creating a mechanism for access to technologies and services of companies that would not otherwise work with DOD, particularly startups and companies developing innovative technology. As one industry representative stated: Because they are "outside" the FAR, OT agreements do not require such cumbersome oversight and audit requirements such as those imposed by the Truth in Negotiations Act, cost and pricing data or an expensive Cost Accounting System (CAS) qualified financial system. CAS compliant financial systems can cost a company millions of dollars to implement and maintain — and are therefore a significant, if not potentially fatal, barrier to government market entry for startups and small, innovative companies. These requirements tend to reinforce the "legacy advantage" of large traditional contractors, who can afford to hire and staff these requirements with large staffs of accountants and lawyers. A number of nontraditional companies told CRS that they are more likely to work with DOD because of the department's other transaction authorities. Despite these claims, some observers question whether OTs are effectively bringing nontraditional contractors into the defense marketplace. A DOD Inspector General report examining other transactions from FY1994 to FY2001 found that OTs did not attract significant numbers of nontraditional defense contractors to do business with DOD. The report found that of the 209 prototype agreements examined, traditional defense contractors received 95% of the $5.7 billion in funds awarded. A recent analysis of FPDS-NG data by Federal News Network had similar findings. According to the report, from FY2015 to FY2017, while nontraditional defense contractors were awarded most of the new OTs (66% vs. 33% for traditional defense contractors), the dollar value of the OTs favored traditional contractors ($20.8 billion vs. $7.4 billion for nontraditional contractors). Some observers have questioned the accuracy of the data published by Federal News Network. According to Charlie McBride, president of Consortium Management Group (which manages two consortia working with DOD through OTs), 88% of the total dollar value of awards to CMG Group has gone to nontraditional prime contractors, and nontraditional entities have participated in the remaining 12%. This debate highlights the lack of authoritative data on OTs. The currently available data may not accurately reflect the extent to which nontraditional contractors are engaged in OT agreements. FPDS-NG does not collect data regarding subcontractors or consortia composition, making it difficult to determine the nature and extent to which nontraditional defense contractors and entities may be working under OT agreements with DOD directly or as subcontractors. When Congress extended OT authority to DOD, it authorized inserting a clause requiring a person or entity to make payments to DOD as a condition of receiving support under the agreement. Such funds were to be merged into an account dedicated to support DARPA advanced research projects. The intent of this provision was to permit DARPA to "recoup the fruits of such arrangements, when there is a 'dual use' potential for commercial application" and reinvest the funds to develop other technologies. In addition to the recoupment authority, DOD can share costs with other parties under an OT. Using this approach, the amount of each party's share is negotiated and incorporated into the agreement. Congress believed that OTs and cooperative agreements were ideal vehicles for promoting DOD-industry collaboration in developing dual-use technologies. For example, the FY1992 & 1993 NDAA ( P.L. 102-190 ) authorized DOD to enter into cooperative and other transaction agreements to develop critical dual-use technologies as set forth in the Defense Critical Technologies Plan. According to the Senate report: ... the United States tends to underinvest in dual-use technologies. National security requirements alone often do not justify major DOD support, and market prospects alone often appear to be too long-term or high risk to justify US industry carrying the entire development burden.... The committee encourages use of cooperative agreements and other transactions in lieu of grants or contracts.... The provision would require that at least 50 percent of funding over the life of a partnership derive from non-federal sources but would allow for a smaller industry share at the start. In the 1990s, some DARPA OTs required participants to share costs because the types of work completed generally involved R&D that was mutually beneficial to government needs and industry commercial goals. In certain instances, present-day OTs have cost-sharing requirements that foster collaborative research. Some analysts believe that DOD is not always realizing all the benefits that OTs have to offer, such as sufficiently leveraging private capital or forming true consortia of multiple parties pooling resources. Some of these analysts believe that DOD does not sufficiently use consortia to leverage private investment through the pursuit of collaborative, mutually beneficial, dual-use technologies. Some observers argue that as the legislation on OTs has evolved, the cost-sharing provision for prototype projects has come to create an unfair playing field biased against traditional defense contractors. For prototype projects, traditional contractors generally are required to assume one-third of costs whereas nontraditional defense contractors and small businesses generally do not have to cost share. From a fairness perspective, these observers argue that traditional contractors should not have a mandatory cost share. These observers also point out that some nontraditional defense contractors are companies with billions of dollars of revenue that should not be granted a competitive cost advantage. Putting traditional defense contractors at a competitive disadvantage could deny DOD access to those companies with the most experience working on defense products, potentially depriving the military of access to leading defense-related research and technology. Other observers argue that the cost share as currently structured is appropriate: traditional defense contractors hold a significant competitive edge in their understanding of, and have the systems in place to manage, traditional contracts. In contrast, nontraditional and small businesses, which generally cannot compete with the traditional defense contractors, need the exemption from the cost-share requirement to be able to work with DOD. These observers also argue that traditional contractors are awarded the majority of dollars obligated to OTs, proving how difficult it is for nontraditional suppliers to break into the defense marketplace. Additionally, traditional contractors could avoid the cost-sharing requirement by teaming with a nontraditional contractor. DOD has not effectively tracked data on cost sharing. A 2017 report to Congress indicated that in FY2016 DOD obligated $1 billion for prototype agreements and received $68 million in cost-share contributions. A CRS review found numerous concerns with the data underlying the report, and with DOD's analytical conclusions. See Appendix C for further discussion. A number of analysts and industry officials have raised concerns that DOD could use OTs to avoid competitions, as OTs are exempt from the Competition in Contracting Act. According to statute, follow-on production using other transaction authority can only be awarded if the underlying R&D agreement was competed. In addition, 10 U.S.C. 2371b states that "to the maximum extent practicable" OTs must be competed. Determining whether OTs are being used to circumvent competition requires a two-step analysis: 1. Are OTs competed less often that traditional contracts? 2. Is there a benefit to these OTs being competed? Available FPDS-NG data suggest that DOD is broadly complying with 10 U.S.C. 2371b's competition mandate. Between FY2013 and FY2017, approximately 89% of all new OT prototype agreements were competed in some fashion. Many observers and analysts believe that OT agreements can be executed substantially faster, sometimes in a matter of weeks, compared to the months or years it typically takes to execute traditional contracts. Based in part on this belief, some officials and analysts are touting OTs as a new model for conducting acquisitions and the answer to many of the problems in defense acquisition. These analysts argue that in a world of increasingly fast technology development, DOD acquisitions must go faster or risk being left behind. Many acquisition professionals argue that OT contracts are not inherently faster than traditional contracting; instead, they are executed faster because they are not encumbered by the reviews, protests, and bureaucratic layers that have been overlaid on traditional contracting. According to these officials, OTs take just as long as traditional contracts if the same execution and oversight processes are applied. And because all terms are negotiable, complex negotiations could make OTs take longer to execute than traditional contracts that have required, nonnegotiable conditions. The Other Transactions Guide states The OT award process will not always be faster than the traditional procurement processes and sometimes can be as long or longer. The speed of award is tied to many factors, many of which are internal to the organization. DOD has not tracked data on the relative time it takes to execute OTs vs. traditional contracts, making it impossible to objectively assess these claims. Analysts and officials generally agree that the workforce plays a critical role in determining the success or failure of an acquisition. Because there are fewer predefined requirements, OTs can be more difficult to negotiate than traditional contracts, putting DOD at greater risk of not getting what it wants at a reasonable price. The complexity and difficulty of negotiations is particularly high when there are intellectual property/patent rights issues, as is the case with most OTs. Given these challenges, OTs often require more experienced and capable government representatives to ensure implementation of agreements that are in the government's best interest. Some analysts question the extent to which the workforce is sufficiently trained and equipped to negotiate OTs. In response to this concern, in the FY2018 NDAA, Congress required workforce education and training for OTs, and required DOD to establish a cadre of intellectual property experts to advise, assist, and provide resources to program offices that are developing intellectual property strategies for contracts and agreements (see Appendix A ). DOD officials acknowledge that more training and education is required. Given the complexity of OTs and the limited extent to which they are used, some analysts and industry officials suggested that there may be a benefit to establishing a centralized office within DOD responsible for executing or overseeing all other transaction agreements. Such a structure could help ensure that those members of the acquisition workforce engaged in other transactions are sufficiently experienced, trained, and qualified. A number of analysts have argued that DOD should take steps to improve its use of OTs. Many of these analysts have suggested that data are not consistently and accurately tracked, regulations and guidance on when and how to use OTs are vague or insufficient, and the workforce is not sufficiently prepared to effectively use OTs. A number of officials have acknowledged these shortcomings and DOD is reportedly taking steps to address them. For example, in December 2018, DOD issued an updated Other Transactions Guide , a comprehensive guide containing best practices, case studies, and a clarification of myths related to other transaction authorities. In addition, Defense Acquisition University developed new course materials addressing OTs and is working to expand its offerings of relevant training and classes. However, numerous acquisition officials question whether it is possible, or even desirable, to try to quickly implement training aimed at preparing the thousands of DOD acquisition officials to execute OTs. Some of these officials have suggested it might be appropriate to only allow a limited and vetted number of acquisition professionals to be OT agreements officers. Some argue that OTs are just one "tool in the tool box," appropriate for only specific types of contracts, and should not be used to avoid the statutory and regulatory framework or to try to accelerate the process just for the sake of speed. Others have suggested that OTs should be used to cut through bureaucracy, speed up the acquisition process, avoid regulations and bid protests, and perhaps eventually supplant the regular FAR-based contracting process. Given the benefits and risks associated with OTs, questions for Congress include the following: 1. To what extent and in what circumstances do the potential benefits of OTs in terms of cost, schedule, and added capabilities outweigh concerns over potential fraud, waste, abuse, diminished oversight, and other public policy objectives? 2. Should OT authorities be extended further, curtailed, or maintained? The FY2019 NDAA required DOD to submit a report annually through 2021, summarizing DOD's use of OTs, including organizations involved; number of transactions; amounts of payments; and purpose, description, and status of projects. The NDAA also required the Defense Innovation Unit to submit a report to Congress, to include the number of traditional and nontraditional defense contractors with DOD contracts or other transactions resulting directly from the unit's initiatives. The conference report for the FY2019 defense appropriations bill included language expressing the conferees' "[concern] with the lack of transparency surrounding the employment of OTA, particularly for follow-on production." The conferees directed DOD to provide quarterly reports to the House and Senate appropriations committees listing each active OT, and to include additional information for each agreement. The conferees also directed GAO to review DOD's use of OTs to determine whether the "employment of this authority conforms to applicable statutes and guidelines, to include the identification of any potential conflicts." GAO was also required to report on the extent to which OTs have been used since FY2016. The multitude of reporting requirements, and the questionable reliability of the available data, raise a number of questions that Congress may wish to explore, such as the following: 1. To what extent, if any, should the current reporting requirements be consolidated to create a more streamlined and consistent flow of information to Congress? 2. What specific data does Congress need in these reports to effectively conduct oversight? For example, what percentage of research OTs result in prototype projects and follow-on production? 3. To what extent are the data sufficiently reliable, and will such data be easily retrievable in the future, to allow Congress to conduct effective, timely, and ongoing oversight? If the data are not sufficiently reliable or accessible in the future, what other data collection and tracking methods could Congress mandate to ensure ongoing access to reliable data? 4. How are OTs being used? Where and when in the acquisition lifecycle is the authority being used? To what extent is the requirements process being circumvented when DOD awards an OT follow-on production contract for a major system? One analyst suggested that "no efficiency is lost if only the most able personnel are authorized to procure and administer" OT agreements and further argued that expanding the use of OTs would increase the training costs by expanding the number of people who can "weave complex agreements in a relatively unstructured environment." Congress may consider whether DOD should establish an acquisition innovation lab or center of excellence responsible for overseeing, executing, and approving all OTs across the department. Such a lab or center could be staffed and supported by a cadre of professionals with experience across the acquisition lifecycle who have a willingness and ability to embrace new ideas and rethink existing practices. Alternatively, such labs or centers could be established in the military departments. Having centers in each organization could allow for consideration of the different missions and business approaches of the departments and help educate the workforce on a more systematic basis. Proponents argue that such an office would help ensure that only experienced and capable officials, with the appropriate training, use OT authorities. Such an office could also help protect against layering internal DOD policies and bureaucracies onto OTs by placing OTs outside of the traditional bureaucratic acquisition process. Proponents could further argue that such an office could better propagate best practices and ensure that OTs are used appropriately and are consistent with guidance and legislation. Having a single office responsible for executing or approving all OTs could also help ensure more timely and accurate information, giving Congress more visibility into DOD's use of other transaction authorities. To the extent that a single, high-level official is responsible for managing and overseeing all OTs, Congress might wish to consider repealing or modifying existing statutory approval requirements. If such an office was able to provide timely and accurate information, Congress might also consider some of the current reporting requirements unnecessary, and may choose to repeal some of the reporting requirements. Opponents of such a proposal argue that centralizing OTs would have the opposite effect, increasing bureaucracy by adding yet another office within DOD. Opponents also argue that such an office could make it more time-consuming to get a project underway and may discourage program offices from attempting or suggesting OTs. Some also argue that a single office may not have the resources to execute and approve agreements in a timely manner, and would inhibit spreading expertise on how to execute OT agreements more broadly across the acquisition workforce. Even proponents who might in theory support establishing such an office could raise significant concerns regarding how such an office would function in practice. A number of alternative options could be pursued to address concerns raised by opponents of establishing a centralized office. Some of these alternative options include the following: Granting such an office primary, but not exclusive, authority to execute OTs. For example, agreement officers specifically authorized to do so could execute OTs, with the centralized office conducting a peer review. Under this construct, the office could also be charged with providing information and expertise/consulting services on the use of OTs to program offices contemplating using the authorities. Establishing centers within each military department, with a designated office in OSD serving a coordinating function (with nondelegable approval authority residing in the military department office designated for OTs). Creating the office as a pilot program for three years, to help DOD manage OTs until such time as the workforce becomes more experienced and proficient in using these agreements. Appendix A. Legislative History Other transaction authority first appeared in the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958. Since then, Congress has extended OT authorities to 11 federal agencies and a number of other federal offices (see Appendix B for information on other federal entities with similar authorities). This appendix traces the legislative history of OT authorities and select related statutes applicable to DOD. To read the full text of the three statutory provisions related to OTs (10 U.S.C. 2371, 2371b, and 2373), see Appendix D . National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 (P.L. 85-568) Creation of Other Transaction Authority On July 29, 1958 President Dwight D. Eisenhower signed into law the National Aeronautics and Space Act (P.L. 85-568), which established the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). The purpose of the act included the expansion of human knowledge, preservation of the role of the United States as a leader in space science and technology, and pursuing the most effective utilization of the scientific and engineering resources of the United States. Section 203(b)(5) of the Space Act provided NASA the authority (emphasis added) to enter into and perform such contracts, leases, cooperative agreements, or other transactions as may be necessary in the conduct of its work and on such terms as it may deem appropriate, with any instrumentality of the United States ... or with any person, firm, association, corporation, or educational institution. To the maximum extent practicable and consistent with the accomplishments of the purpose of this Act, such contracts, leases, agreements, and other transactions shall be allocated by the Administrator in a manner which will enable small-business concerns to participate equitably and proportionately in the conduct of the work of the Administration. Intellectual Property Rights The Space Act specifically addressed NASA's "property rights in inventions." Section 305 stated that any invention made in the performance of any work under any contract is the exclusive property of the United States "unless the Administrator waives all or any part of the rights." This was true even when the person who created the invention "was not employed or assigned to perform research, development, or exploratory work, but the invention is nevertheless related to the contract" and was made during working hours, or with a contribution of the government. The act granted the Administrator wide latitude to "waive all or any part of the rights of the United States under this section" if doing so was deemed to be in the best interests of the United States. When such rights were waived, NASA retained an irrevocable, nonexclusive, nontransferable royalty-free license by or on behalf of the United States. National Defense Authorization Act for FY1990 & FY1991 ( P.L. 101-189 ) The FY1990 & FY1991 NDAA granted DARPA temporary authority to enter into "cooperative agreements and other transactions" for the purpose of conducting advanced research projects. The statute clarified that OTs should only be used when "the use of standard contracts or grants is not feasible or appropriate." Congress restricted funding for OTs and cooperative agreements to $25 million of appropriated funds for FY1990 and FY1991, and set the authority to expire on September 30, 1991. Cost Sharing The FY1990 & FY1991 NDAA permitted OTs (or cooperative agreements) to include a clause requiring a person or entity to make payments to DOD as a condition of receiving support under the agreement. Such funds were to be merged into an account dedicated to supporting DARPA advanced research projects using cooperative agreements and other transactions. The act required, to the extent practicable, that funds provided by the government not exceed the total amount provided by the other parties to the project. According to the Senate report, one of the intents of the cost-sharing provision was to permit DARPA to "recoup the fruits of such arrangements, when there is a 'dual use' potential for commercial application" and to reinvest the funds to develop other technologies. Reporting Requirements The FY1990 & FY1991 NDAA required DOD to submit an annual report on the use of OTs and cooperative agreements, to include a description of each agreement and the technologies involved, the potential military and commercial utility of the technology, the reasons a contract or grant was not feasible to support the research, and the amount of payments, if any, received by the federal government under the agreement. National Defense Authorization Act for FY1991 ( P.L. 101-510 ) Section 244 increased the funds authorized for cooperative agreements and OTs from $25 million to $50 million. However, no such funding was appropriated. Reporting and Notification Requirements The conference report required DOD to submit to Congress a report listing the cooperative agreements and consortia intended to be used in FY1991-1992. The conference report also required DOD to provide the armed services and appropriations committees 30 days' notice prior to DOD signing a cooperative agreement or agreement with a consortia under OT authority. The Senate report focused on consortia as a method to pool resources, share research among numerous participants, and promote critical dual-use technology. Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1992 ( P.L. 102-172 ) Limitations on the Use of OTs Section 8113A of P.L. 102-172 placed temporary limitations on the use of agreements undertaken pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 2371: Section 8113A limited the use of OTs and cooperative agreements exclusively to DARPA (to the exclusion of the rest of DOD) for FY1992. Section 8113A limited DARPA to obligating or expending no more than $37.5 million in FY1992 for cooperative agreements or OTs undertaken pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 2371. Section 8113A further established that no more than $75 million could be obligated or expended by DARPA in FY1992 for DOD dual-use critical technology partnerships. National Defense Authorization Act for FY1992 & FY1993 ( P.L. 102-190 ) Expanded Authority Section 826 extended other transaction authority to the military departments, and established separate fund accounts in each department for cost sharing. Section 826 also repealed the sunset for cooperative agreements and OTs, making the authorities permanent. Section 821 authorized DOD to enter into cooperative and other transaction agreements to develop critical dual-use technologies as set forth in the Defense Critical Technologies Plan. According to the Senate report ... the United States tends to underinvest in dual-use technologies. National security requirements alone often do not justify major DOD support, and market prospects alone often appear to be too long-term or high risk to justify US industry carrying the entire development burden.... The committee encourages use of cooperative agreements and other transactions in lieu of grants or contracts.... The provision would require that at least 50 percent of funding over the life of a partnership derive from non-federal sources but would allow for a smaller industry share at the start. The conference report stated that the partnerships should focus on programs that fit into the security needs within DARPA. The conference report also stated that OTs are appropriate for those cases where the "regulations applicable to the allocation of patent and data rights under the procurement statutes may not be appropriate to partnership arrangements in certain cases." National Defense Authorization Act for FY1993 ( P.L. 102-484 ) Cost Sharing Section 4221 established 10 U.S.C. 2511, which required DOD to establish cooperative arrangements with industry, educational institutions, federal labs, and other entities, to pursue research, development, and application of dual-use technologies. The section authorized DOD to use grants, contracts, cooperative agreements, or OTs to create these partnerships, and that the Federal government should not contribute more than 50% of the costs related to projects under this authority. National Defense Authorization Act for FY1994 ( P.L. 103-160 ) Expanded Authority Section 827 established 10 U.S.C. 2358, which gave the Secretary of Defense and the Secretaries of the military departments the authority to conduct basic, advanced, and applied research through the use of contracts, cooperative agreements, grants, and OTs. Previously, OTs were only authorized for advanced research. Prototype Authorities Section 845 granted DARPA the authority to use OTs for prototype projects directly related to weapons or weapon systems proposed to be acquired by DOD. Section 845 required that "to the maximum extent practicable," prototypes be competitively awarded. This authority was set to terminate after three years. Section 845 remained as a note to 10 U.S.C. 2371 until separately codified as 10 U.S.C. 2371b in the FY2016 NDAA ( P.L. 114-92 ). Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 ( P.L. 103-355 ) Section 1301 redesignated the language in 10 U.S.C. 2358 (granting the authority to use OTs) to 10 U.S.C. 2371. Reporting Requirements Section 1301 also required DOD to submit an annual report to the armed services committees, to include a general description of the other transactions, including the technologies involved in the research, the potential military and, if any, commercial utility of such technologies, the reasons for not using a contract or grant to provide support for such research, and the amount of payments, if any, received during the fiscal year pursuant to a clause in the other transactions and to what accounts such payments were credited. National Defense Authorization Act for FY1997 ( P.L. 104-201 ) Section 203 required that a senior DOD official be designated in OSD, and that the officials' sole responsibility be developing policy related to, and ensuring implementation of, DOD's dual-use technology program. This section authorized DOD to use OTs (as well as contracts, cooperative agreements, and grants) for dual-use projects only if the project "is entered into through the use of competitive procedures." Section 743 granted DOD the authority to use OTs to conduct research on Gulf War Syndrome, to determine its relationship to possible exposures of members of the Armed Forces to chemical warfare agents and hazardous materials, and the use of inoculations and new drugs. Expanded Prototype Authorities Section 804 amended Section 845 of the FY1994 NDAA by extending to the military departments and officials designated by the Secretary of Defense, the authority to use OTs for certain prototype projects. This authority, originally granted solely to DARPA and set to expire after three years, was given a new termination date of September 30, 1999. Reporting Requirements Section 267 modified elements of the annual report to the armed services committees. National Defense Authorization Act for FY1998 ( P.L. 105-85 ) Section 832 amended 10 U.S.C. 2371 by clarifying that certain information submitted to DOD (i.e. a proposal, business plan, technical information) be protected from disclosure pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552 for a period of five years. Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for FY1999 ( P.L. 105-261 ) Section 241 extended the sunset day for the authority to use OTs for prototypes from September 30, 1999, to September 30, 2001. Section 817 amended Section 2371 of Title 10, United States Code, clarifying that information submitted by outside parties in cooperative agreements for basic, applied, and advanced research is protected from disclosure under Section 552 of Title 5, United States Code. Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1999 ( P.L. 105-262 ) While the enacted FY1999 defense appropriations bill ( P.L. 105-262 ) did not include legislative language addressing OTs, H.Rept. 105-591 , which accompanied the House-reported version of H.R. 4103 , included language expressing the House Appropriations Committee's "serious reservations" regarding the Air Force's then-proposed use of an OT agreement—instead of a contract— to develop the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program. The committee noted that "under [OTs] traditional safeguards which protect the government's interest in large acquisition programs are largely absent," and required the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (now the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment) and the DOD Inspector General to certify to the congressional defense committees that the use of an OT was appropriate for the EELV program, and that "adequate safeguards exist[ed] to protect the government's interest and monitor program performance." National Defense Authorization Act for FY2000 ( P.L. 106-65 ) Section 801 required that for prototypes using OT authorities, DOD ensure that GAO, under its audit authority, have access to records relating to other transaction prototype agreements exceeding $5 million. Section 801 allowed for a waiver to GAO access and exempted entities that over the last year have not entered into an agreement with DOD that provided for audit access by a government entity. According to the Senate report: Senior DOD officials have sought legislation to extend other transaction authority to production contracts. Under current authority, there is some debate about whether GAO has audit access to other transactions. As the size, costs, and complexity of programs being funded using other transactions increases, the committee wants to ensure that the GAO has audit access in relation to the higher levels of spending and added risks. Reporting Requirements The Senate report also addressed reporting requirements and congressional intent to review the use of OTs. The report stated the following: The committee is assessing the utility of other transaction prototype authority. The statement of managers accompanying the Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act of 1999 directed the Secretary of Defense to report on the use of this authority to the congressional defense committees, no later than March 1, 1999. In addition, both the Department of Defense Inspector General and the General Accounting Office are reviewing the use of other transaction prototype authority and will report to Congress in the coming year. The committee is interested in the extent that new commercial firms are entering the DOD marketplace through the use of other transaction authority, as well as the degree of cost sharing between the government and non-federal government parties. The committee is also interested in any lessons learned from the broad exemptions to federal law provided by other transaction authority. For example, other transactions are exempt from the Competition in Contracting Act, Truth in Negotiations Act, Contract Disputes Act, Antikickback Act of 1986, Procurement Integrity Act, Service Contract Act, Buy American Act, and chapter 137 of title 10, United States Code. Questions have been raised about whether the government's interest is adequately protected in the absence of the applicability of these statutes. Conversely, advocates of the view that the government should take advantage of the flexibility of other transactions have championed proposals to extend other transaction authority to production. The committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a new report that updates information in the March 1999 report on the use of other transaction prototype authority to the congressional defense committees by February 1, 2000. National Defense Authorization Act for FY2001 ( P.L. 106-398 ) Limitations on the Use of OTs Section 803 limited the use of OTs for prototype projects to only those circumstances when at least one nontraditional defense contractor significantly participates in the project, one-third of the total cost of the project is paid out of funds provided by parties to the transaction other than the federal government, or the senior procurement executive determines in writing that exceptional circumstances justify use of an OT. Nontraditional defense contractor was defined as an entity that for a period of one year has not entered into or performed "any contract that is subject to full coverage under the cost accounting standards" or "any other contract in excess of $500,000 to carry out prototype projects or to perform basic, applied, or advanced research projects for a Federal agency, that is subject to the Federal Acquisition Regulation.'' Section 803 also extended the authority to use OTs for prototypes from September 30, 2001, to September 30, 2004. According to the Senate report, the intent of using OTs for prototypes is to attract companies that typically do not do business with the Department of Defense and encourage cost sharing and experimentation in potentially more efficient ways of doing business with traditional defense contractors. Other transaction authority is an important acquisition tool that can facilitate the incorporation of commercial technology into military weapon systems. In an environment where, in many areas, commercial technology is now more advanced than defense technology, it is imperative that the Department continue to have the flexibility to use innovative contractual instruments that provide access to this technology. There are, however, improvements that can be made in managing and overseeing these contractual arrangements. Section 804 clarified the extent of GAO's access to records in instances where the party in question has only done business with the government in the preceding year through an OT or cooperative agreement. National Defense Authorization Act for FY2002 ( P.L. 107-107 ) Expanded Authority—Follow-on Production Section 822 of the FY2002 NDAA granted DOD the authority to award a follow-on production contract for prototype projects when at least one-third of the total cost of the prototype project is to be paid out of funds provided by non-federal government sources. Under this authority, such a follow-on contract could be awarded without competition if the prototype project was successfully completed, the number of units in the production contract does not exceed the number of units specified in the underlying prototype agreement, and the price for each unit does not exceed the price specified in the underlying transaction. Department of Defense and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States Act, 2002 ( P.L. 107-117 ) Establishment of Army Venture Capital Initiative (AVCI) Section 8150 designated $25 million of the FY2002 funds made available for Army Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) to be made available to the Secretary of the Army for the purpose of funding a venture capital investment corporation established pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 2371. A 2014 RAND report stated that OT authorities were used only to form the AVCI, and were not used to acquire products or services: "While OT authorities were used to form [AVCI] itself, any volume of the Army's purchase of products and services from [AVCI] companies is conducted under the FAR." National Defense Authorization Act for FY2004 ( P.L. 108-136 ) Expanded Authority Section 847 of the FY2004 NDAA extended the authority to use an OT for developing prototypes to improve weapons or weapon systems currently in use by the Armed Forces. Previously, such authority was restricted to prototypes "directly relevant to weapons or weapon systems proposed to be acquired or developed" by DOD. Section 847 also established a pilot program for transitioning prototypes to follow-on contracts for production for nontraditional defense contractors. Under the pilot program, such a follow-on contract could be treated as a commercial item or an item developed with both federal and private sector funds (for purposes of negotiating intellectual property rights). The pilot program was restricted to contracts with nontraditional defense contractors, where the value of the contract does not exceed $50 million (approximately $70 million in FY2018 dollars), and that are firm-fixed price or fixed price with economic adjustment. The pilot program was set to sunset September 30, 2008. Section 1441 authorized any agency that engages in basic, applied, or advanced research and development projects that facilitated defense against or recovery from terrorism or nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological attack to exercise the same general authority given to DOD as found in 10 U.S.C. 2371 (including for prototype projects). Reporting Requirements Section 1031 sunset the annual reporting requirement for OT after the report covering FY2006 was submitted. National Defense Authorization Act for FY2006 ( P.L. 109-163 ) Restricted Authority and Notification Requirements Section 212 of the FY2006 NDAA directed the Army to procure the Future Combat System using contract procedures set forth in part 15 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation, in lieu of an OT. Section 823 extended ethics requirements to OT prototype authority and required the congressional defense committees be notified in writing at least 30 days before such authority is exercised. Certification Requirements Section 823 also amended Section 845 of the FY1994 NDAA, requiring a written determination by a senior procurement executive for other transaction prototype projects estimated between $20 million and $100 million, and for a written determination by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics for prototype projects that exceed $100 million. According to the Senate report: Section 845 was intended to be used for limited prototype projects, particularly those in which the Department seeks to engage nontraditional defense contractors that may be averse to the requirements imposed by a standard Department procurement contract. For this reason, the statement of managers accompanying the Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 (Public Law 105–261) states: The conferees continue to believe that the section 845 authority should only be used in the exceptional cases where it can be clearly demonstrated that a normal contract or grant will not allow sufficient access to affordable technologies. The conferees are especially concerned that such authority not be used to circumvent the appropriate management controls in the standard acquisition and budgeting process. …. The committee does not believe that the $20.9 billion agreement entered between the Army and the Lead Systems Integrator for the FCS program is consistent with the language and intent of section 845 authority. Section 845 authority is intended to be used for limited prototype projects, particularly those in which the Department of Defense seeks to engage nontraditional defense contractors that may be averse to the requirements imposed by a standard Department contract. Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2007 ( H.R. 5631 ) Reporting Requirement The FY2007 defense appropriations bill ( P.L. 109-289 ) did not include language addressing OTs. The conference report ( H.Rept. 109-676 ) included language expressing the conferees' "[concern] with the continued use of OTA contracts by the Missile Defense Agency," as such contracts "lack the customary safeguards found under FAR-based contracts for organizational conflict of interest, truth in negotiations and submission of cost and pricing data." The conferees "strongly encourage[d]" the Missile Defense Agency to convert "large development and procurement contracts using OTA to FAR-based contracts," and directed the Missile Defense Agency to submit a report to the congressional defense committees on the use of OTs, to include the number, value, and justification for the use of such agreements. National Defense Authorization Act for FY2008 ( P.L. 110-181 ) Section 823 extended the authority for prototype projects for five more years, from September 30, 2008, to September 30, 2013. National Defense Authorization Act for FY2009 ( P.L. 110-417 ) Section 822 required DOD to issue guidance on rights in technical data under non-FAR agreements, including OTs. Section 822 also required that appropriate provisions relating to rights in technical data be included in non-FAR agreements, consistent with policy guidance. This requirements is in statute at 10 U.S.C. 2320 note. Section 824 expanded the scope of the pilot program for transition to follow-on contracts for certain prototype projects to include research projects carried out under 10 U.S.C. 2371. Authority to use the pilot program, set to expire September 30, 2008, was extended to September 30, 2010. Section 874 required OT data be included in the Federal Procurement Data System. National Defense Authorization Act for FY2011 ( P.L. 111-383 ) Section 866 changed the definition of nontraditional defense contractor, conforming the definition to that found in 10 U.S.C. 2302(9). National Defense Authorization Act for FY2013 ( P.L. 112-239 ) Section 863 extended the authority for using OTs for prototype projects from September 30, 2013, to September 30, 2018. Carl Levin and Howard P. "Buck" McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for FY2015 ( P.L. 113-291 ) Expanded Authority Section 812 expanded the authority to use OT for prototypes, to include those "directly related to enhancing the mission effectiveness of military personnel and the supporting platforms, systems, components, or materials proposed to be acquired or developed by the Department of Defense, or to improvement of platforms, systems, components, or materials in use by the Armed Forces." Prior to the FY2015 NDAA, OTs could only be used for prototypes relating to weapons or weapon systems proposed to be developed, or for the improvement of weapons or weapon systems currently in use. Reporting Requirements Section 1071 repealed the reporting requirement language found in 10 U.S.C. 2371, relating to OTs for research projects. National Defense Authorization Act for FY2016 ( P.L. 114-92 ) Until the FY2016 NDAA, the prototyping and follow-on production authority established in Section 845 of the FY1994 NDAA (as amended) was found in 10 U.S.C. 2371 note. Section 815 of the FY2016 NDAA simultaneously repealed Section 845 of the FY1994 NDAA and put the repealed language into the newly created 10 U.S.C. 2371b. The FY2016 NDAA also modified 2371b by making the authority permanent. Expanded Authority and Small Business The authorities in Section 2371b were expanded to allow their use when "all significant participants in the transaction other than the Federal government are small businesses or nontraditional contractors" and when the agency determines that using an OT would expand the defense supply base in a manner that could not be accomplished through a contract. Section 815 eased the restriction on follow-on production contracts or transactions. Section 815 amended the definition of a nontraditional defense contractor found in 10 U.S.C. 2302 to be an entity that is not currently performing, and for one year prior to an OT has not performed on any contract or subcontract that is subject to full coverage under the cost accounting standards pursuant to Section 1502 of Title 41, U.S.C. Section 815 also required DOD to update its guidance to reflect changes in the statute. The conference report stated that Congress believed OTs are an attractive option for firms and organizations that do not usually participate in government contracting due to typical overhead burdens and the "one size fits all" rules governing defense acquisition. The report also stated that OTs could support DOD's effort to access new sources of technological innovation, specifically with Silicon Valley startup firms and small commercial firms. National Defense Authorization Act for FY2018 ( P.L. 115-91 ) Expanded Authority Section 216 of the FY2018 NDAA authorized nonprofit research institutions to enter into OTs with DOD for prototype projects. Section 862 amended 10 U.S.C. 2358, granting the Secretary of Defense and the military departments the authority to pursue basic research, applied research, advanced research, and development projects under the OT authorities granted in Sections 2371 and 2371b of Title 10. Workforce Section 802 required DOD to establish a cadre of intellectual property experts to advise, assist, and provide resources to program offices who are developing intellectual property strategies for contracts and agreements. Section 863 required training and education for personnel involved in OTs and other innovative contracting methods. Certification Requirements and Small Business Section 864 adjusted the language of the statute to state that the dollar threshold relates to the specific transaction for a prototype project and not for the value of the entire project. Section 864 defined a transaction for follow-on production to include "all individual prototype sub-projects awarded under the transaction to a consortium of United States industry and academic institutions." Section 864 also increased the dollar thresholds for required approvals and defined the term small business to include small businesses under Section 9 of the Small Business Act to ensure that companies participating in the Small Business Innovation Research and Small Business Technology Transfer programs were considered small businesses for the purposes of the cost-sharing requirements. Miscellaneous Section 867 required the Secretary of Defense to establish a preference for OTs in the "execution of science and technology and prototyping programs." Section 1711 required DOD to carry out a pilot program to "assess the feasibility and advisability of increasing the manufacturing capability of the defense industrial base." Pursuant to the pilot, Section 1711 authorized DOD to use OTs to support production capabilities in small and medium-sized manufacturers. John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for FY2019 ( P.L. 115-232 ) Section 211 of the FY2019 NDAA clarified that follow-on production of a prototype or subproject within a consortium may occur if the individual prototype or subproject is complete; all projects associated with the consortium do not need to be completed before follow-on production of a specific prototype. Expanded Authority The FY2019 NDAA authorized the use of OTs to develop enhanced personal protective equipment (Section 226) and to carry out research under the Explosive Ordnance Disposal Defense Program (Section 311). Reporting Requirements Section 244 required the Defense Innovation Unit to submit a report to Congress, to include the number of traditional and nontraditional defense contractors with DOD contracts or other transactions resulting directly from the unit's initiatives. Section 873 required DOD to submit an annual report through 2021, summarizing DOD's use of OTs, including organizations involved; number of transactions; amounts of payments; and purpose, description, and status of projects. Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2019 ( P.L. 115-245 ) Reporting Requirements While the enacted FY2019 defense appropriations bill did not include legislative language addressing OTs, the conference report included language expressing the conferees' "[concern] with the lack of transparency surrounding the employment of OTA, particularly for follow-on production." The conferees directed DOD to provide quarterly reports to the House and Senate appropriations committees listing each active OT, and to include the following information on each agreement: funding military service or DOD component; major command (if applicable); contracting activity; appropriation title; budget line item; minimum and maximum award value; vendor; obligations and expenditures to date; product service code; period of performance; and indication if the OT agreement included an option for follow-on production (with a description of the scope of anticipated follow-on production). The conferees also directed GAO to review DOD's use of OTs to determine whether the "employment of this authority conforms to applicable statutes and guidelines, to include the identification of any potential conflicts." GAO was also required to report on the extent to which OTs have been used since FY2016. Notification Requirements The House report to accompany H.R. 6157 acknowledged OTs as an "important tool to provide flexibility and agility for cutting-edge research and development projects and prototypes." However, the report stated its concern "with the lack of transparency on the use of OTA authority for follow-on production procurements," and directed that no funds could be obligated or expended for a follow-on production contract or a transaction carried out under 10 U.S.C. 2371b, until 30 days after the Secretary of Defense provides the congressional defense committees with a notification of the proposed contract or transaction, to include a justification of why an OT is being used for production. Appendix B. Non-DOD Federal Agencies with Agency-Wide OT or Related Authorities A number of agencies have varying other transaction or similar authorities, as reflected in Table B-1 . The table below is not a comprehensive or definitive listing of every federal government entity with OT or related authorities. In some instances, offices, agencies, commissions, and other federal government entities have OT or related authorities that are only associated with certain programs or projects, such as the National Institutes of Health (which has OT authority for such specific activities such as the National Heart, Blood Vessel, Lung, and Blood Diseases and Blood Resources Program [42 U.S.C. §285b-3] and the Cures Acceleration Network [42 U.S.C. §287a]). Appendix C. Reliability of Data on Other Transactions All data have imperfections and limitations. FPDS-NG data can be used to identify broad trends and produce rough estimates, or to gather information about specific contracts. Some observers say that despite their shortcomings, FPDS-NG data are substantially more comprehensive than what is available in most other countries in the world. Understanding the limitations of government procurement data—including knowing when, how, and to what extent to rely on data—can help policymakers incorporate FPDS-NG data more effectively into their decisionmaking process. FPDS-NG OT Data Quality and Accuracy Issues Decisionmakers should be cautious when using data from FPDS-NG to develop policy or otherwise draw conclusions, especially with respect to OTs. In some cases, the data themselves may not be reliable. In other instances, a query for particular data may return differing results, depending on the parameters and timing of the analysis. In particular, all DOD data entered into FPDS-NG are subject to a 90-day delay, and updates to "data, including new actions, modifications, and corrections are made on a regular basis," which could result in changes to "data ... for current and/or prior fiscal years." Inconsistencies in FPDS-NG Data Within FPDS-NG, two primary collections of obligation data exist: one associated with standard government procurement contracts or modifications to such contracts, and the other associated with prototype OT agreements or modifications to such agreements. FPDS-NG's collection of prototype OT data allows for the input of additional data elements—such as nongovernment dollars associated with cost-share prototype OT agreements—not included in FPDS-NG's collection of standard government procurement contract data. More consequentially, FPDS-NG's prototype OT data include two similar data elements that allow users to identify the fiscal year a prototype OT agreement was signed or modified. One, labeled in the database as "Fiscal Year," appears to allow users entering data into the system to manually assign a fiscal year to a transaction. FPDS-NG users entering data into the system appear to have interpreted this data element in various, conflicting ways. For example, a Department of the Air Force OT agreement was signed in February 2016 for the development of rocket propulsion system prototypes under the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program. FPDS-NG records an obligation of $115 million in FY2020 for this agreement. Fiscal law bars DOD from obligating money now for future fiscal years that have not yet occurred. The second, labeled "Contract Fiscal Year," appears to be based on the date the prototype OT agreement was signed or modified. See Table C-1 for a comparison of the "Fiscal Year" and "Contract Fiscal Year" elements for selected new prototype OT agreements signed between FY2013 and FY2017. If a user selects the Fiscal Year data element when attempting to review high-level data on recent trends in the use of prototype OT agreements within DOD—such as the total amount obligated for prototype OT agreements on an annual basis—that user will obtain a substantially different result than if he or she selects the Contract Fiscal Year data element for a similar analysis. See Table C-2 for a comparison of action obligations and nongovernment contributions using the Fiscal Year and Contract Fiscal Year data elements for new prototype OT agreements signed between FY2013 and FY2017. DOD OT Data Analysis Methodological Issues in Congressional Reports A March 2017 report to Congress entitled "An Assessment of Cost-Sharing in Other Transaction Agreements for Prototype Projects," completed by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics indicated that In FY2016, DOD obligated (Note: Two outliers in 2016 excluded) $1 billion in section 2371b awards and received $68 million in cost-share contributions after excluding two significant trend outliers. DOD cited FPDS-NG as the source for its analysis, and defined the "significant trend outliers" excluded as "two $40 million OTAs with total cost-share of $270 million," likely referring to two DARPA prototype OT agreements conducted on a cost-share basis initiated in FY2016. However, a CRS analysis of the same FPDS-NG data identified numerous inconsistencies in DOD's methodological approach. Recreation of DOD Methodology Specifically, DOD appears to have conducted its analysis using the "Fiscal Year" data element referenced in this report's discussion of FPDS-NG OT data quality and accuracy issues, which would attribute some prototype OT activities to the wrong fiscal year for the purposes of comparative trend analysis. DOD also compared two disparate transaction types: the reported "$1 billion in Section 2371b awards" includes all action obligations associated with ongoing prototype OT activities in FY2016, including transactions associated with prototype OT indefinite delivery contracts, while the "$68 million in cost-share contributions" includes only cost-share contributions associated with new prototype OT agreements. If DOD used the "Contract Fiscal Year" data element, excluded the identified "trend outliers," and focused on all action obligations and cost-share contributions associated with ongoing prototype OT activities, it would have found instead that the department obligated $1.4 billion for prototype OT agreements in FY2016, with an additional $313.5 million in cost-share contributions from the private sector. On the other hand, if DOD used the "Contract Fiscal Year" data element, excluded the identified "trend outliers," and focused on only action obligations and cost-share contributions associated with new prototype OT agreements, it would have found instead that the department obligated $400 million for prototype OT agreements in FY2016, with an additional $272.1 million in cost-share contributions from the private sector. Appendix D. Other Transaction Authority Statutes 10 U.S.C. §2371. Research projects: transactions other than contracts and grants (a) ADDITIONAL FORMS OF TRANSACTIONS AUTHORIZED.— The Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of each military department may enter into transactions (other than contracts, cooperative agreements, and grants) under the authority of this subsection in carrying out basic, applied, and advanced research projects. The authority under this subsection is in addition to the authority provided in Section 2358 of this title to use contracts, cooperative agreements, and grants in carrying out such projects. (b) EXERCISE OF AUTHORITY BY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE.— In any exercise of the authority in subsection (a), the Secretary of Defense shall act through the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency or any other element of the Department of Defense that the Secretary may designate. (c) ADVANCE PAYMENTS.— The authority provided under subsection (a) may be exercised without regard to Section 3324 of Title 31. (d) RECOVERY OF FUNDS.— (1) A cooperative agreement for performance of basic, applied, or advanced research authorized by Section 2358 of this title and a transaction authorized by subsection (a) may include a clause that requires a person or other entity to make payments to the Department of Defense or any other department or agency of the Federal Government as a condition for receiving support under the agreement or other transaction. (2) The amount of any payment received by the Federal Government pursuant to a requirement imposed under paragraph (1) may be credited, to the extent authorized by the Secretary of Defense, to the appropriate account established under subsection (f). Amounts so credited shall be merged with other funds in the account and shall be available for the same purposes and the same period for which other funds in such account are available. (e) CONDITIONS.— (1) The Secretary of Defense shall ensure that- (A) to the maximum extent practicable, no cooperative agreement containing a clause under subsection (d) and no transaction entered into under subsection (a) provides for research that duplicates research being conducted under existing programs carried out by the Department of Defense; and (B) to the extent that the Secretary determines practicable, the funds provided by the Government under a cooperative agreement containing a clause under subsection (d) or a transaction authorized by subsection (a) do not exceed the total amount provided by other parties to the cooperative agreement or other transaction. (2) A cooperative agreement containing a clause under subsection (d) or a transaction authorized by subsection (a) may be used for a research project when the use of a standard contract, grant, or cooperative agreement for such project is not feasible or appropriate. (f) SUPPORT ACCOUNTS.— There is hereby established on the books of the Treasury separate accounts for each of the military departments and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency for support of research projects and development projects provided for in cooperative agreements containing a clause under subsection (d) and research projects provided for in transactions entered into under subsection (a). Funds in those accounts shall be available for the payment of such support. (g) EDUCATION AND TRAINING.—The Secretary of Defense shall— (1) ensure that management, technical, and contracting personnel of the Department of Defense involved in the award or administration of transactions under this section or other innovative forms of contracting are afforded opportunities for adequate education and training; and (2) establish minimum levels and requirements for continuous and experiential learning for such personnel, including levels and requirements for acquisition certification programs. (h) REGULATIONS.— The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe regulations to carry out this section. (i) Protection of Certain Information From Disclosure.-(1) Disclosure of information described in paragraph (2) is not required, and may not be compelled, under Section 552 of Title 5 for five years after the date on which the information is received by the Department of Defense. (2)(A) Paragraph (1) applies to information described in subparagraph (B) that is in the records of the Department of Defense if the information was submitted to the Department in a competitive or noncompetitive process having the potential for resulting in an award, to the party submitting the information, of a cooperative agreement for performance of basic, applied, or advanced research authorized by Section 2358 of this title or another transaction authorized by subsection (a). (B) The information referred to in subparagraph (A) is the following: (i) A proposal, proposal abstract, and supporting documents. (ii) A business plan submitted on a confidential basis. (iii) Technical information submitted on a confidential basis. 10 U.S.C. §2371b. Authority of the Department of Defense to carry out certain prototype projects (a) AUTHORITY.— (1) Subject to paragraph (2), the Director of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, the Secretary of a military department, or any other official designated by the Secretary of Defense may, under the authority of Section 2371 of this title, carry out prototype projects that are directly relevant to enhancing the mission effectiveness of military personnel and the supporting platforms, systems, components, or materials proposed to be acquired or developed by the Department of Defense, or to improvement of platforms, systems, components, or materials in use by the armed forces. (2) The authority of this section- (A) may be exercised for a transaction (for a prototype project) that is expected to cost the Department of Defense in excess of $100,000,000 but not in excess of $500,000,000 (including all options) only upon a written determination by the senior procurement executive for the agency as designated for the purpose of Section 1702(c) of Title 41, or, for the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency or the Missile Defense Agency, the director of the agency that- (i) the requirements of subsection (d) will be met; an d (ii) the use of the authority of this section is essential to promoting the success of the prototype project; and (B) may be exercised for a transaction (for a prototype project) that is expected to cost the Department of Defense in excess of $500,000,000 (including all options) only if- (i) the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics determines in writing that- (I) the requirements of subsection (d) will be met; an d (II) the use of the authority of this section is essential to meet critical national security objectives; and (ii) the congressional defense committees are notified in writing at least 30 days before such authority is exercised. (3) The authority of a senior procurement executive or director of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency or Missile Defense Agency under paragraph (2)(A), and the authority of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics under paragraph (2)(B), may not be delegated. (b) EXERCISE OF AUTHORITY.— (1) Subsections (e)(1)(B) and (e)(2) of such Section 2371 shall not apply to projects carried out under subsection (a). (2) To the maximum extent practicable, competitive procedures shall be used when entering into agreements to carry out projects under subsection (a). (c) COMPTROLLER GENERAL ACCESS TO INFORMATION.— (1) Each agreement entered into by an official referred to in subsection (a) to carry out a project under that subsection that provides for payments in a total amount in excess of $5,000,000 shall include a clause that provides for the Comptroller General, in the discretion of the Comptroller General, to examine the records of any party to the agreement or any entity that participates in the performance of the agreement. (2) The requirement in paragraph (1) shall not apply with respect to a party or entity, or a subordinate element of a party or entity, that has not entered into any other agreement that provides for audit access by a Government entity in the year prior to the date of the agreement. (3) (A) The right provided to the Comptroller General in a clause of an agreement under paragraph (1) is limited as provided in subparagraph (B) in the case of a party to the agreement, an entity that participates in the performance of the agreement, or a subordinate element of that party or entity if the only agreements or other transactions that the party, entity, or subordinate element entered into with Government entities in the year prior to the date of that agreement are cooperative agreements or transactions that were entered into under this section or Section 2371 of this title. (B) The only records of a party, other entity, or subordinate element referred to in subparagraph (A) that the Comptroller General may examine in the exercise of the right referred to in that subparagraph are records of the same type as the records that the Government has had the right to examine under the audit access clauses of the previous agreements or transactions referred to in such subparagraph that were entered into by that particular party, entity, or subordinate element. (4) The head of the contracting activity that is carrying out the agreement may waive the applicability of the requirement in paragraph (1) to the agreement if the head of the contracting activity determines that it would not be in the public interest to apply the requirement to the agreement. The waiver shall be effective with respect to the agreement only if the head of the contracting activity transmits a notification of the waiver to Congress and the Comptroller General before entering into the agreement. The notification shall include the rationale for the determination. (5) The Comptroller General may not examine records pursuant to a clause included in an agreement under paragraph (1) more than three years after the final payment is made by the United States under the agreement. (d) APPROPRIATE USE OF AUTHORITY.— (1) The Secretary of Defense shall ensure that no official of an agency enters into a transaction (other than a contract, grant, or cooperative agreement) for a prototype project under the authority of this section unless one of the following conditions is met: (A) There is at least one nontraditional defense contractor or nonprofit research institution participating to a significant extent in the prototype project. (B) All significant participants in the transaction other than the Federal Government are small businesses (including small businesses participating in a program described under Section 9 of the Small Business Act (15 U.S.C. 638)) or nontraditional defense contractors. (C) At least one third of the total cost of the prototype project is to be paid out of funds provided by sources other than other than the Federal Government. (D) The senior procurement executive for the agency determines in writing that exceptional circumstances justify the use of a transaction that provides for innovative business arrangements or structures that would not be feasible or appropriate under a contract, or would provide an opportunity to expand the defense supply base in a manner that would not be practical or feasible under a contract. (2) (A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the amounts counted for the purposes of this subsection as being provided, or to be provided, by a party to a transaction with respect to a prototype project that is entered into under this section other than the Federal Government do not include costs that were incurred before the date on which the transaction becomes effective. (B) Costs that were incurred for a prototype project by a party after the beginning of negotiations resulting in a transaction (other than a contract, grant, or cooperative agreement) with respect to the project before the date on which the transaction becomes effective may be counted for purposes of this subsection as being provided, or to be provided, by the party to the transaction if and to the extent that the official responsible for entering into the transaction determines in writing that- (i) the party incurred the costs in anticipation of entering into the transaction; and (ii) it was appropriate for the party to incur the costs before the transaction became effective in order to ensure the successful implementation of the transaction. (e) Definitions.—In this section: (1) The term "nontraditional defense contractor" has the meaning given the term under Section 2302(9) of this title. (2) The term "small business" means a small business concern as defined under Section 3 of the Small Business Act (15 U.S.C. 632). (f) FOLLOW-ON PRODUCTION CONTRACTS OR TRANSACTIONS.— (1) A transaction entered into under this section for a prototype project may provide for the award of a follow-on production contract or transaction to the participants in the transaction. A transaction includes all individual prototype subprojects awarded under the transaction to a consortium of United States industry and academic institutions. (2) A follow-on production contract or transaction provided for in a transaction under paragraph (1) may be awarded to the participants in the transaction without the use of competitive procedures, notwithstanding the requirements of Section 2304 of this title, if - (A) competitive procedures were used for the selection of parties for participation in the transaction; and (B) the participants in the transaction successfully completed the prototype project provided for in the transaction. (3) Contracts and transactions entered into pursuant to this subsection may be awarded using the authority in subsection (a), under the authority of Chapter 137 of this title, or under such procedures, terms, and conditions as the Secretary of Defense may establish by regulation. (g) AUTHORITY TO PROVIDE PROTOTYPES AND FOLLOW-ON PRODUCTION ITEMS AS GOVERNMENT-FURNISHED EQUIPMENT.— An agreement entered into pursuant to the authority of subsection (a) or a follow-on contract or transaction entered into pursuant to the authority of subsection (f) may provide for prototypes or follow-on production items to be provided to another contractor as Government-furnished equipment. (h) APPLICABILITY OF PROCUREMENT ETHICS REQUIREMENTS.— An agreement entered into under the authority of this section shall be treated as a Federal agency procurement for the purposes of Chapter 21 of Title 41. 10 U.S.C. §2373. Procurement for experimental purposes (a) AUTHORITY.— The Secretary of Defense and the Secretaries of the military departments may each buy ordnance, signal, chemical activity, transportation, energy, medical, space-flight, and aeronautical supplies, including parts and accessories, and designs thereof, that the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary concerned considers necessary for experimental or test purposes in the development of the best supplies that are needed for the national defense. (b) PROCEDURES.— Purchases under this section may be made inside or outside the United States and by contract or otherwise. Chapter 137 of this title applies only when such purchases are made in quantities greater than necessary for experimentation, technical evaluation, assessment of operational utility, or safety or to provide a residual operational capability.	[ "The Department of Defense (DOD) obligates more than $300 billion annually to buy goods and services, and to support research and development. Most of these acquisitions are governed by procurement statutes and regulations found in Title 10 (and parts of other select titles) of the United States Code, the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), and the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement. Under certain circumstances, DOD can enter into an other transaction (OT) agreement instead of a traditional contract. OT agreements are generally exempt from federal procurement laws and regulations. These exemptions grant government officials the flexibility to include, amend, or exclude contract clauses and requirements that are mandatory in traditional procurements (e.g., termination clauses, cost accounting standards, payments, audit requirements, intellectual property, and contract disputes). OT authorities also grant more flexibility to structure agreements in numerous ways, including joint ventures; partnerships; consortia; or multiple agencies joining together to fund an agreement encompassing multiple providers. Other transaction agreements are legally binding contracts; they are referred to as agreements to distinguish them from the traditional procurement contracts governed by the FAR and procurements laws. Other transaction authorities are set forth in two sections of law: 10 U.S.C. 2371—granting authority to use OTs for basic, applied, and advanced research projects. 10 U.S.C. 2371b—granting authority to use OTs for prototype projects and follow-on production. Under this authority, a prototype project can only be conducted if at least one nontraditional defense contractor significantly participates in the project; all significant participants are small businesses or nontraditional defense contractors; at least one-third of the total cost of the prototype project is provided by nongovernment participants; or the senior procurement acquisition official provides a written justification for using an OT. Follow-on production can only be conducted when the underlying prototype OT was competitively awarded, and the prototype project was successfully completed. OTs have the potential to provide significant benefits to DOD, including attracting nontraditional contractors with promising technological capabilities to work with DOD, establishing a mechanism to pool resources with other entities to facilitate development of, and obtain, state-of-the-art dual-use technologies, and offering a unique mechanism for DOD to invest in, and influence the direction of, technology development. A number of analysts warn that along with the potential benefits come significant risks, including potentially diminished oversight and exemption from laws and regulations designed to protect government and taxpayer interests. In FY2017, DOD obligated $2.1 billion on prototype OT agreements, representing less than 1% of contract obligations for the year. However, the use of OTs is expected to grow at a rapid pace, due in part to recent statutory changes expanding other transaction authorities. A number of analysts and officials have raised concerns that if DOD uses OTs in ways not intended by Congress—or is perceived to abuse the authority—Congress could clamp down on the authority. Generally, DOD lacks authoritative data that can be used to measure and evaluate the use of other transaction authorities." ]	14,640	gov_report	en	null	f205ea85a60f0353bd98268ae9f5f6ae702788629c9061be
R ecent high-profile data breaches and privacy violations have raised national concerns over the legal protections that apply to Americans' electronic data. While some concern over data protection stems from how the government might utilize such data, mounting worries have centered on how the private sector controls digital information, the focus of this report. Inadequate corporate privacy practices and intentional intrusions into private computer networks have exposed the personal information of millions of Americans. At the same time, internet connectivity has increased and varied in form in recent years, expanding from personal computers and mobile phones to everyday objects such as home appliances, "smart" speakers, vehicles, and other internet-connected devices. Americans now transmit their personal data on the internet at an exponentially higher rate than the past. Along with the increased connectivity, a growing number of "consumer facing" actors (such as websites) and "behind the scenes" actors (such as data brokers and advertising companies) collect, maintain, and use consumers' information. While this data collection can benefit consumers—for instance, by allowing companies to offer them more tailored products—it also raises privacy concerns, as consumers often cannot control how these entities use their data. As a consequence, the protection of personal data has emerged as a major issue for congressional consideration. Despite the increased interest in data protection, the legal paradigms governing the security and privacy of personal data are complex and technical, and lack uniformity at the federal level. The Supreme Court has recognized that the Constitution provides various rights protecting individual privacy, but these rights generally guard only against government intrusions and do little to prevent private actors from abusing personal data online. At the federal statutory level, while there are a number of data protection statutes, they primarily regulate certain industries and subcategories of data. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) fills in some of the statutory gaps by enforcing the federal prohibition against unfair and deceptive data protection practices. But no single federal law comprehensively regulates the collection and use of personal data. In contrast to the "patchwork" nature of federal law, some state and foreign governments have enacted more comprehensive data protection legislation. Some analysts suggest these laws, which include the European Union's (EU's) General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and state laws such as the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), will create increasingly overlapping and uneven data protection regimes. This fragmented legal landscape coupled with concerns that existing federal laws are inadequate has led many stakeholders to argue that the federal government should assume a larger role in data protection policy. However, at present, there is no consensus as to what, if any, role the federal government should play, and any legislative efforts at data protection are likely to implicate unique legal concerns such as preemption, standing, and First Amendment rights, among other issues. This report examines the current U.S. legal landscape governing data protection, contrasting the current patchwork of federal data protection laws with the more comprehensive regulatory models in the CCPA and GDPR. The report also examines potential legal considerations for the 116th Congress should it consider crafting more comprehensive federal data protection legislation. The report lastly contains an Appendix , which contains a table summarizing the federal data protection laws discussed in the report. Historically, the common law in the United States had little need to protect privacy—as one commentator has observed, "[s]olitude was readily available in colonial America." Although common law had long protected against eavesdropping and trespass, these protections said little to nothing about individual rights to privacy, per se. Over time, gradual changes in the technological and social environment caused a shift in the law. In 1890, Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren published a groundbreaking article in the Harvard Law Review entitled The Right to Privacy . Reacting to the proliferation of the press and advancements in technology such as more advanced cameras, the article argued that the law should protect individuals' "right to privacy" and shield them from intrusion from other individuals. The authors defined this emergent right as the "right to be let alone." Scholars have argued that this article created a "revolution" in the development of the common law. In the century that followed Brandeis's and Warren's seminal article, most states recognized the so-called "privacy torts"—intrusion upon seclusion, public disclosure of private facts, false light or "publicity," and appropriation. These torts revolve around the central idea that individuals should be able to lead, "to some reasonable extent, a secluded and private life." The Supreme Court described this evolution of privacy tort law as part of a "strong tide" in the twentieth century toward the "so-called right of privacy" in the states. Despite this "strong tide," some scholars have argued that these torts, which were developed largely in the mid-twentieth century, are inadequate to face the privacy and data protection problems of today. Furthermore, some states do not accept all four of these torts or have narrowed and limited the applicability of the torts so as to reduce their effectiveness. As discussed in greater detail below, state common law provides some other remedies and protections relevant to data protection, via tort and contract law. However, while all of this state common law may have some influence on data protection, the impact of this judge-made doctrine is unlikely to be uniform, as courts' application of these laws will likely vary based on the particular facts of the cases in which they are applied and the precedents established in the various states. As reflected in the common law's limited remedies, at the time of the founding, concerns about privacy focused mainly on protecting private individuals from government intrusion rather than on protecting private individuals from intrusion by others. Accordingly, the Constitution's Bill of Rights protects individual privacy from government intrusion in a handful of ways and does little to protect from non-governmental actors. Some provisions protect privacy in a relatively narrow sphere, such as the Third Amendment's protection against the quartering of soldiers in private homes or the Fifth Amendment's protection against self-incrimination. The most general and direct protection of individual privacy is contained in the Fourth Amendment, which states that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . ." For more than 100 years, the Fourth Amendment was generally read to prohibit only entry into private places rather than to provide general right to privacy. However, alongside the developments in the common law, constitutional law evolved over time to place a greater emphasis on protecting an individual's personal privacy. In particular, in 1967, the Supreme Court in Katz v. United States explained that the Fourth Amendment, while not creating a general "right to privacy," nonetheless protected "people, not places," and guarded individual privacy against certain types of governmental intrusion. This principle has continued to evolve over time, and has come to protect, to some extent, individuals' interest in their digital privacy. For example, in the 2018 case of Carpenter v. United States , the Supreme Court concluded that the Fourth Amendment's protection of privacy extended to protecting some information from government intrusion even where that information was shared with a third party. In Carpenter , the Court concluded that individuals maintain an expectation of privacy, protected by the Fourth Amendment, in the record of their movements as recorded by their cellular provider. Carpenter distinguished earlier cases which had relied upon the principle that information shared with third parties was generally not subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny, concluding that "an individual maintains a legitimate expectation of privacy in the record of his physical movements as captured through [his cellular phone]." The Court's holding means that, in the future, the government must obtain a warrant supported by probable cause to obtain this information. The Fourth Amendment thus provides a limited bulwark against government intrusion into digital privacy. In addition to the protection provided by the Fourth Amendment, in the 1960s and 1970s, the Court concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of "liberty" implied the existence of a more general right of privacy, protecting individuals from government intrusion even outside the "search and seizure" context. In the 1977 case Whalen v. Roe , the Supreme Court explained that this constitutional right of privacy "in fact involve[s] at least two different kinds of interests. One is the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and another is the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions." The second of these interests relates primarily to individual rights concerning the "intimacies of [persons'] physical relationship," as well as the right to abortion, and has little connection to data protection. However, the first of the interests listed in Whalen could potentially relate to data protection. This interest, the right to avoid certain disclosures, has come to be known as the right to "informational privacy." Despite its broad expression in Whalen , every Supreme Court case to consider the informational privacy right has rejected the constitutional claim and upheld the government program alleged to have infringed on the right. In Whalen itself, physicians and patients challenged a New York law that required the recording of the names and addresses of all persons who had obtained certain drugs for which there was both a lawful and unlawful market. Although the Court acknowledged that the statute "threaten[ed] to impair . . . [the plaintiffs'] interest in the nondisclosure of private information," the Court observed that the disclosures were an "essential part of modern medical practice" and the New York law had protections in place against unwarranted disclosure that showed a "proper concern" for the protection of privacy. Together, the Court found these factors sufficient to uphold the law. In the wake of Whalen and Nixon v. Administrator of General Services —a case decided the same year as Whalen that also considered the right to informational privacy—courts have struggled to articulate the precise contours of the right. The most recent Supreme Court case to consider the right to informational privacy, NASA v. Nelson , went so far as to suggest that the right might not exist, "assuming without deciding" that the right existed in the course of rejecting the constitutional claim challenge to a government background check program for hiring. Despite the Supreme Court's lack of clarity about the right to informational privacy, "most federal circuit courts" recognize the right to various extents. All of the constitutional rights involving privacy, like the common law privacy torts, focus on public disclosure of private facts. This focus limits their potential influence on modern data privacy debates, which extends beyond the disclosure issue to more broadly concern how data is collected, protected, and used. Perhaps more importantly, whatever the reach of the constitutional right to privacy, the "state action doctrine" prevents it from being influential outside the realm of government action. Under this doctrine, only government action is subject to scrutiny under the Constitution, but purely private conduct is not proscribed, "no matter how unfair that conduct may be." As a result, neither the common nor constitutional law provides a complete framework for considering many of the potential threats to digital privacy and consumer data. Rather, the most important data protection standards come from statutory law. Given the inherent limitations in common law and constitutional protections, Congress has enacted a number of federal laws designed to provide statutory protections of individuals' personal information. In contrast with the scheme prevalent in Europe and some other countries, rather than a single comprehensive law, the United States has a "patchwork" of federal laws that govern companies' data protection practices. These laws vary considerably in their purpose and scope. Most impose data protection obligations on specific industry participants—such as financial institutions, health care entities, and communications common carriers—or specific types of data, such as children's data. Other laws, however, supplement the Constitution's limited privacy protections and apply similar principles to private entities. The Stored Communications Act (SCA), for instance, generally prohibits the unauthorized access or disclosure of certain electronic communications stored by internet service providers. Lastly, some laws prohibit broad categories of conduct that, while not confined to data protection, limit how companies may handle personal data. Most notably, the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act) prohibits "unfair or deceptive acts or practices." As some scholars have pointed out, the FTC has used its authority under the FTC Act to develop norms and principles that effectively fill in the gaps left by other privacy statutes. These laws are organized below, beginning with those most narrowly focused on discrete industries and moving toward more generally applicable laws. In light of its gap-filling function, this section lastly discusses the FTC Act—along with the Consumer Financial Protection Act (CFPA), which covers similar types of conduct. The Appendix to this report contains a table summarizing the federal data protection laws discussed. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) imposes several data protection obligations on financial institutions. These obligations are centered on a category of data called "consumer" "nonpublic personal information" (NPI), and generally relate to: (1) sharing NPI with third parties, (2) providing privacy notices to consumers, and (3) securing NPI from unauthorized access. First, unless an exception applies, GLBA and its implementing regulations prohibit financial institutions from sharing NPI with non-affiliated third parties unless they first provide the consumers with notice and an opportunity to "opt-out." Furthermore, financial institutions are prohibited altogether from sharing account numbers or credit card numbers to third parties for use in direct marketing. Second, financial institutions must provide "clear and conspicuous" initial and annual notices to customers describing their privacy "policies and practices." These notices must include, among other things, the categories of NPI collected and disclosed, the categories of third parties with which the financial institution shares NPI, and policies and practices with respect to protecting the confidentiality and security of NPI. Third, GLBA and its implementing regulations (often referred to as the "Safeguards Rule" ) require financial institutions to maintain "administrative, technical, and physical safeguards" to "insure the security and confidentiality" of "customer" (as opposed to "consumer") NPI, and to protect against "any anticipated threats or hazards" or "unauthorized access" to such information. Financial institutions regulated by federal banking agencies are further required to implement a program for responding to the unauthorized access of customer NPI. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), FTC, and federal banking agencies share civil enforcement authority for GLBA's privacy provisions. However, the CFPB has no enforcement authority over GLBA's data security provisions. Under the data security provisions, federal banking regulators have exclusive enforcement authority for depository institutions, and the FTC has exclusive enforcement authority for all non-depository institutions. GLBA does not specify any civil remedies for violations of the Act, but agencies can seek remedies based on the authorities provided in their enabling statutes, as discussed below. GLBA also imposes criminal liability on those who "knowingly and intentionally" obtain or disclose "customer information" through false or fraudulent statements or representations. Criminal liability can result in fines and up to five years' imprisonment. GLBA does not contain a private right of action that would allow affected individuals to sue violators. Under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has enacted regulations protecting a category of medical information called "protected health information" (PHI). These regulations apply to health care providers, health plans, and health care clearinghouses (covered entities), as well as certain "business associates" of such entities. The HIPAA regulations generally speak to covered entities': (1) use or sharing of PHI, (2) disclosure of information to consumers, (3) safeguards for securing PHI, and (4) notification of consumers following a breach of PHI. First, with respect to sharing, HIPAA's privacy regulations generally prohibit covered entities from using PHI or sharing it with third parties without patient consent, unless such information is being used or shared for treatment, payment, or "health care operations" purposes, or unless another exception applies. Covered entities generally may not make treatment or services conditional on an individual providing consent. Second, with respect to consumer disclosures, covered entities must provide individuals with "adequate notice of the uses and disclosures of [PHI] that may be made by the covered entity, and of the individual's rights and the covered entity's legal duties with respect to [PHI]." These notices must be provided upon consumer request, and covered entities maintaining websites discussing their services or benefits must "prominently post" the notices on their websites. Furthermore, an individual has the right to request that a covered entity provide him with a copy of his PHI that is maintained by the covered entity. In some cases, an individual may also request that the covered entity provide information regarding specific disclosures of the individual's PHI, including the dates, recipients, and purposes of the disclosures. Third, with respect to data security, covered entities must maintain safeguards to prevent threats or hazards to the security of electronic PHI. Lastly, HIPAA regulations contain a data breach notification requirement, requiring covered entities to, among other things, notify the affected individuals within 60 calendar days after discovering a breach of "unsecured" PHI. Violations of HIPAA's privacy requirements can result in criminal or civil enforcement. HHS possesses civil enforcement authority and may impose civil penalties, with the amount varying based on the level of culpability. The Department of Justice has criminal enforcement authority and may seek fines or imprisonment against a person who, in violation of HIPAA's privacy requirements, "knowingly" obtains or discloses "individually identifiable health information" or "uses or causes to be used a unique health identifier." HIPAA does not, however, contain a private right of action that would allow aggrieved individuals to sue alleged violators. The Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) covers the collection and use of information bearing on a consumer's creditworthiness. FCRA and its implementing regulations govern the activities of three categories of entities: (1) credit reporting agencies (CRAs), (2) entities furnishing information to CRAs (furnishers), and (3) individuals who use credit reports issued by CRAs (users). In contrast to HIPAA or GLBA, there are no privacy provisions in FCRA requiring entities to provide notice to a consumer or to obtain his opt-in or opt-out consent before collecting or disclosing the consumer's data to third parties. FCRA further has no data security provisions requiring entities to maintain safeguards to protect consumer information from unauthorized access. Rather, FCRA's requirements generally focus on ensuring that the consumer information reported by CRAs and furnishers is accurate and that it is used only for certain permissible purposes. With respect to accuracy, CRAs must maintain reasonable procedures to ensure the accuracy of information used in "consumer reports." CRAs must further exclude adverse information, such as "accounts placed in collection" or civil judgements, from consumer reports after a certain amount of time has elapsed. Furnishers must similarly establish reasonable policies and procedures to ensure the accuracy of the information reported to CRAs and may not furnish to a CRA any consumer information if they have reasonable cause to believe that information is inaccurate. Consumers also have the right to review the information CRAs have collected on them to ensure such information is accurate. CRAs must disclose information contained in a consumer's file upon the consumer's request, as well as the sources of the information and the identity of those who have recently procured consumer reports on the consumer. Should a consumer dispute the accuracy of any information in his file, CRAs and furnishers must reinvestigate the accuracy of the contested information. In addition to the accuracy requirements, under FCRA consumer reports may be used only for certain permissible purposes such as credit transactions. Accordingly, a CRA may generally furnish consumer reports to a user only if it "has a reason to believe" the user intends to use it for a permissible purpose. Likewise, users may "use or obtain a consumer report" only for a permissible purpose. Along with the permissible purpose requirement, users must further notify consumers of any "adverse action" taken against the consumer based on the report. Adverse actions include refusing to grant credit on substantially the terms requested, reducing insurance coverage, and denying employment. The FTC and the CFPB share civil enforcement authority over FCRA, with each agency possessing enforcement authority over entities subject to their respective jurisdictions. In addition to government enforcement, FCRA provides a private right of action for consumers injured by willful or negligent violations of the Act. Consumers bringing such actions for negligent violations of the Act may recover actual damages, attorney's fees, and other litigation costs. For willful violations, consumers may recover either actual damages or statutory damages ranging from $100 to $1,000, attorney's fees, other litigation costs, and "such amount of punitive damages as the court may allow." FCRA also imposes criminal liability on any individual who knowingly and willfully obtains consumer information from a CRA under false pretenses and on any officer or employee of a CRA who knowingly and willfully provides consumer information to a person not authorized to receive that information. The Communications Act of 1934 (Communications Act or Act), as amended, established the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and provides a "comprehensive scheme" for the regulation of interstate communication. Most relevant to this report, the Communications Act includes data protection provisions applicable to common carriers, cable operators, and satellite carriers. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 amended the Communications Act to impose data privacy and data security requirements on entities acting as common carriers. Generally, common carrier activities include telephone and telegraph services but exclude radio broadcasting, television broadcasting, provision of cable television, and provision of broadband internet. The privacy and security requirements imposed on entities acting as common carriers are primarily centered on a category of information referred to as "customer proprietary network information (CPNI)." CPNI is defined as information relating to the "quantity, technical configuration, type, destination, location, and amount of use of a telecommunications service subscribed to by any customer of a telecommunications carrier," and is "made available to the carrier by the customer solely by virtue of the carrier-customer relationship." Section 222(c) of the Communications Act and the FCC's implementing regulations set forth carriers' obligations regarding CPNI. These provisions cover three main issues. First, carriers must comply with certain use and disclosure rules. Section 222(c) imposes a general rule that carriers may not "use, disclose, or permit access to" "individually identifiable" CPNI without customer approval, unless a particular exception applies. Before a carrier may solicit a customer for approval to use or disclose their CPNI, it must notify customers of their legal rights regarding CPNI and provide information regarding the carrier's use and disclosure of CPNI. Second, carriers must implement certain safeguards to ensure the proper use and disclosure of CPNI. These safeguards must include, among other things, a system by which the "status of a customer's CPNI approval can be clearly established" prior to its use, employee training on the authorized use of CPNI, and "reasonable measures" to discover and protect against attempts to gain unauthorized access to CPNI." Lastly, carriers must comply with data breach requirements. Following a "breach" of customers' CPNI, a carrier must disclose such a breach to law enforcement authorities no later than seven days following a "reasonable determination of the breach." After it has "completed the process of notifying law enforcement," it must notify customers whose CPNI has been breached. In addition to the CPNI requirements, the Communications Act contains three other potentially relevant data privacy and security provisions pertaining to common carriers. First, Section 222(a) of the Act states that carriers must "protect the confidentiality of proprietary information" of "customers." Second, Section 201(b) of the Act declares unlawful "any charge, practice, classification, and regulation" in connection with a carrier's communication service that is "unjust or unreasonable." Lastly, Section 202(a) provides that it shall "be unlawful for any common carrier to make any unjust or unreasonable discrimination in charges, practices, classification, regulations, facilities, or services . . . ." In a 2016 rule, which was subsequently overturned pursuant to the Congressional Review Act, the FCC attempted to rely on these three provisions to regulate a broad category of data called "customer proprietary information" (customer PI). While customer PI is not defined in the statute, the FCC's 2016 rule defined it broadly to include CPNI, as well as other "personally identifiable information" and the "content of communications." The FCC reasoned that Section 222(a) imposes a general duty, independent from Section 222(c), on carriers to protect the confidentiality of customer PI. It further maintained that Sections 201(b) and 202(a) provide independent "backstop authority" to ensure that no gaps are formed in commercial data privacy and security practices, similar to the FTC's authority under the FTC Act. However, given that Congress overturned the 2016 rule, the FCC may be prohibited under the CRA from relying on these three provisions to regulate data privacy and security. Under the CRA, the FCC may not reissue the rule in "substantially the same form" or issue a "new rule that is substantially the same" as the overturned rule "unless the reissued or new rule is specifically authorized by a law enacted after the date of the joint resolution disapproving the original rule." The FCC is empowered to enforce civil violations of the Communications Act's provisions, including its common carrier provisions. The FCC may impose a "forfeiture penalty" against any person who "willfully or repeatedly" violates the Act or the FCC's implementing regulations. The Communications Act further imposes criminal penalties on those who "willfully and knowingly" violate the statute or the FCC's implementing regulations. Along with its general civil and criminal provisions, the Communications Act provides a private right of action for those aggrieved by violations of its common carrier provisions; in such actions, plaintiffs may seek actual damages and reasonable attorney's fees. In addition to common carriers, the Communications Act imposes a number of data privacy and security requirements on how "cable operators" and "satellite carriers" (i.e., covered entities) treat their subscribers' "personally identifiable information" (PII). These requirements relate to: (1) data collection and disclosure; (2) subscribers' access to, and correction of, their data; (3) data destruction; (4) privacy policy notification; and (5) data security. First, covered entities must obtain the "prior written or electronic consent" of a subscriber before collecting the subscriber's PII or disclosing it to third parties. There are several exceptions to this consent requirement. Among other things, covered entities may collect a subscriber's PII in order to obtain information necessary to render service to the subscriber, and they may disclose a subscriber's PII if the disclosure is necessary to "render or conduct a legitimate business activity" related to the service they provide. Second, covered entities must provide subscribers, at "reasonable times and a convenient place," with access to all of their PII "collected and maintained," and they must further provide subscribers a reasonable opportunity to correct any error in such information. Third, covered entities are obligated to destroy PII if it is "no longer necessary for the purpose for which it is was collected" and there are "no pending requests or orders for access to such information." Fourth, covered entities must provide subscribers with a privacy policy notice at the "time of entering into an agreement" for services and "at least once a year thereafter." These notices must describe, among other things: (1) the nature of the subscriber's PII that has been, or will be, collected, (2) the nature, frequency, and purpose of any disclosure of such information and the types of persons to whom the disclosure is made, and (3) the times and place at which the subscriber may have access to such information. Lastly, the Communications Act imposes a general data security requirement on covered entities; they must "take such actions as are necessary to prevent unauthorized access to [PII] by a person other than the subscriber" or the covered entity. The Communications Act provides a private right of action for "[a]ny person aggrieved by any act" of a covered entity in violation of these requirements. In such actions, a court may award actual damages, punitive damages, and reasonable attorneys' fees and other litigation costs. Additionally, covered entities violating these provisions may be subject to FCC civil enforcement and criminal penalties that, as previously noted, are generally applicable to violations of the Communications Act. The Video Privacy Protection Act (VPPA) was enacted in 1988 in order to "preserve personal privacy with respect to the rental, purchase, or delivery of video tapes or similar audio visual materials." The VPPA does not have any data security provisions requiring entities to maintain safeguards to protect consumer information from unauthorized access. However, it does have privacy provisions restricting when covered entities can share certain consumer information. Specifically, the VPPA prohibits "video tape service providers" —a term that includes both digital video streaming services and brick-and-mortar video rental stores —from knowingly disclosing PII concerning any "consumer" without that consumer's opt-in consent. The VPPA provides several exceptions to this general rule. In particular, video tape service providers may disclose PII to "any person if the disclosure is incident to the ordinary course of business." Providers may also disclose PII if the disclosure solely includes a consumer's name and address and does not identify the "title, description, or subject matter of any video tapes or other audio visual material," and the consumer has been provided with an opportunity to opt out of such disclosure. The VPPA does not empower any federal agency to enforce violations of the Act and there are no criminal penalties for violations, but it does provide for a private right of action for persons aggrieved by the Act. In such actions, courts may award actual damages, punitive damages, preliminary and equitable relief, and reasonable attorneys' fees and other litigation costs. The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA) creates privacy protections for student education records. "Education records" are defined broadly to generally include any "materials which contain information directly related to a student" and are "maintained by an educational agency or institution." FERPA defines an "educational agency or institution" to include "any public or private agency or institution which is the recipient of funds under any applicable program." FERPA generally requires that any "educational agency or institution" (i.e., covered entities) give parents or, depending on their age, the student (1) control over the disclosure of the student's educational records, (2) an opportunity to review those records, and (3) an opportunity to challenge them as inaccurate. First, with respect to disclosure, covered entities must not have a "policy or practice" of permitting the release of education records or "personally identifiable information contained therein" without the consent of the parent or the adult student. This consent requirement is subject to certain exceptions. Among other things, covered entities may disclose educational records to (1) certain "authorized representatives," (2) school officials with a "legitimate educational interest," or (3) "organizations conducting studies" for covered entities "for the purpose of developing, validating, or administering predictive tests, administering student aid programs, and improving instructions." Covered entities may also disclose the information without consent if it constitutes "directory information" and the entity has given notice and a "reasonable period of time" to opt out of the disclosure. Second, in addition to the disclosure obligations, covered entities must not have a "policy of denying" or "effectively prevent[ing]" parents or an adult student from inspecting and reviewing the underlying educational records. Covered entities must further "establish appropriate procedures" to grant parents' review requests "within a reasonable period of time, but in no case more than forty-five days after the request has been made." Lastly, covered entities must provide an "opportunity for a hearing" to challenge the contents of the student's education records as "inaccurate, misleading, or otherwise in violation of the privacy rights of students." Covered entities must further "provide an opportunity for the correction or deletion of any such inaccurate, misleading or otherwise inappropriate data contained therein and to insert into such records a written explanation of the parents respecting the content of such records." Parents or adult students who believe that their rights under FERPA have been violated may file a complaint with the Department of Education. FERPA authorizes the Secretary of Education to "take appropriate actions," which may include withholding federal education funds, issuing a "cease and desist order," or terminating eligibility to receive any federal education funding. FERPA does not, however, contain any criminal provisions or a private right of action. While federal securities statutes and regulations do not explicitly address data protection, two requirements under these laws have implications for how companies prevent and respond to data breaches. First, federal securities laws may require companies to adopt controls designed to protect against data breaches. Under Section 13(b)(2)(B) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act), public companies and certain other companies are required to "devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances" that "transactions are executed in accordance with management's general or specific authorization," and that "access to assets is permitted only in accordance with management's general or specific authorization." In a recent report, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) suggested that, in order to comply with this requirement, companies should consider "cyber-related threats" when formulating accounting controls. The report discussed the SEC's investigation of companies that wrongly transferred millions of dollars in response to fraudulent emails, generally noting that "companies should pay particular attention to the obligations imposed by Section 13(b)(2)(B)" in light of the "risks associated with today's ever expanding digital interconnectedness." Second, federal securities laws may require companies to discuss data breaches when making required disclosures under securities laws. The Exchange Act, Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act), and their implementing regulations require certain companies to file a number of disclosures with the SEC. Specifically, the Securities Act requires companies issuing securities in a public offering to file detailed statements registering the offering (registration statements), and the Exchange Act requires public companies to file periodic reports on an annual, quarterly, and ongoing basis. These filings must contain certain categories of information, such as a description of the most significant factors that make investing in the company speculative or risky (known as "risk factors") and a description of any "events, trends, or uncertainties that are reasonably likely to have a material effect on its results of operations, liquidity, or financial condition . . . ." Further, when making these filings, or any other statements in connection with the purchase or sale of a security, companies are required to include any "material" information necessary to make the statements made therein "not misleading." In interpretive guidance issued in February 2018, the SEC indicated that, pursuant to these obligations, companies may be required to disclose in their filings cyber incidents such as data breaches. The SEC can enforce violations of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act, including the accounting controls requirement and the disclosure requirements, through civil actions filed in court or administrative "cease and desist" proceedings. The SEC may seek civil penalties, disgorgement, and injunctive relief (in civil actions) or a cease and desist order (in administrative proceedings). Furthermore, under both the Exchange Act and the Securities Act, individuals aggrieved by a company's misrepresentation or omission of a material fact in connection with the purchase or sale of a security may sue the company for actual damages incurred by the individual. There is not, however, a private right of action for violations of the Exchange Act's accounting controls requirement. Lastly, in addition to civil enforcement, both the Securities Act and the Exchange Act impose criminal liability; any person who "willfully" violates the acts or their implementing regulations may be subject to fines and imprisonment. The Children's Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) and the FTC's implementing regulations regulate the online collection and use of children's information. Specifically, COPPA's requirements apply to: (1) any "operator" of a website or online service that is "directed to children," or (2) any operator that has any "actual knowledge that it is collecting personal information from a child" (i.e., covered operators). Covered operators must comply with various requirements regarding data collection and use, privacy policy notifications, and data security. First, COPPA and the FTC's implementing regulations prohibit covered operators from collecting or using "personal information" from children under the age of thirteen without first obtaining parental consent. Such consent must be "verifiable" and must occur before the information is collected. Second, covered operators must provide parents with direct notice of their privacy policies, describing their data collection and sharing policies. Covered operators must further post a "prominent and clearly labeled link" to an online notice of its privacy policies at the home page of its website and at each area of the website in which it collects personal information from children. Lastly, covered operators that have collected information from children must establish and maintain "reasonable procedures" to protect the "confidentiality, security, and integrity" of the information, including ensuring that the information is provided only to third parties that will similarly protect the information. They must also comply with certain data retention and deletion requirements. Under COPPA's safe harbor provisions, covered operators will be deemed to have satisfied these requirements if they follow self-regulatory guidelines the FTC has approved. COPPA provides that violations of the FTC's implementing regulations will be treated as "a violation of a rule defining an unfair or deceptive act or practice" under the FTC Act. Under the FTC Act, as discussed in more detail below, the FTC has authority to enforce violations of such rules by seeking penalties or equitable relief. COPPA also authorizes state attorneys general to enforce violations affecting residents of their states. COPPA does not contain any criminal penalties or any provision expressly providing a private right of action. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) was enacted in 1986, and is composed of three acts: the Wiretap Act, the Stored Communications Act (SCA), and the Pen Register Act. Much of ECPA is directed at law enforcement, providing "Fourth Amendment like privacy protections" to electronic communications. However, ECPA's three acts also contain privacy obligations relevant to non-governmental actors. ECPA is perhaps the most comprehensive federal law on electronic privacy, as it is not sector-specific, and many of its provisions apply to a wide range of private and public actors. Nevertheless, its impact on online privacy practices has been limited. As some commentators have observed, ECPA "was designed to regulate wiretapping and electronic snooping rather than commercial data gathering," and litigants attempting to apply ECPA to online data collection have generally been unsuccessful. The Wiretap Act applies to the interception of a communication in transit. A person violates the Act if, among other acts, he "intentionally intercepts . . . any wire, oral, or electronic communication." The Wiretap Act defines an "electronic communication" broadly, and courts have held that the term includes information conveyed over the internet. Several thresholds must be met for an act to qualify as an unlawful "interception." Of particular relevance are three threshold issues. First, the communication must be acquired contemporaneously with the transmission of the communication. Consequently, there is no "interception" where the communication in question is in storage. Furthermore, the acquired information must relate to the "contents" of the communication, defined as information concerning the "substance, purport, or meaning of that communication." As a result, while the Act applies to information like the header or body of an email, the Act does not apply to non-substantive information automatically generated about the characteristics of the communication, such as IP addresses. Third, individuals do not violate the Wiretap Act if they are a "party to the communication" or received "prior consent" from one of the parties to the communication. The party-to-the-communication and consent exceptions have been subject to significant litigation; in particular, courts have often relied on the exceptions to dismiss suits alleging Wiretap Act violations due to online tracking, holding that websites or third-party advertisers who tracked users' online activity were either parties to the communication or received consent from a party to the communication. The SCA prohibits the improper access or disclosure of certain electronic communications in storage. With respect to improper access, a person violates the SCA if he obtains an "electronic communication" in "electronic storage" from "a facility through which an electronic communication service is provided" by either: (1) "intentionally access[ing] [the facility] without authorization" or (2) "intentionally exceed[ing] an authorization." Although the statute does not define the term "facility," most courts have held that the term is limited to a location where network service providers store communications. However, courts have differed over whether a personal computer is a "facility." Most courts have excluded personal computers from the reach of the SCA, but some have disagreed. With respect to improper disclosure, the SCA generally prohibits entities providing "electronic communication services" or "remote computing services" from knowingly divulging the contents of a communication while holding the communication in electronic storage. Similar to the Wiretap Act, the SCA's access and disclosure prohibitions are subject to certain exceptions. In particular, individuals do not violate the SCA if they are the sender or intended recipient of the communication or when a party to the communication consents to the access or disclosure. As with the Wiretap Act, courts have relied on these two exceptions to dismiss suits under the SCA related to online tracking. The Pen Register Act prohibits the installation of a "pen register" or "trap and trace device" without a court order. A pen register is a "device or process" that "records or decodes" outgoing "dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information," and a trap and trace device is a "device or process" that "captures the incoming . . . dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling information." In contrast to the Wiretap Act, the Pen Register Act applies to the capture of non-content information, as the definitions of pen registers and trap and trace devices both exclude any device or process that captures the "contents of any communication." Furthermore, the Pen Register Act prohibits only the use of a pen register or trap and trace device and does not separately prohibit the disclosure of non-content information obtained through such use. The statute does, however, have several exceptions similar to those contained in the Wiretap Act and SCA. Among other things, providers of an electronic or wire communication service will not violate the Act when they use a pen register or trap and trace device in order to "protect their rights or property" or "where the consent of the user of that service has been obtained." The Wiretap Act and the SCA both provide for private rights of action. Persons aggrieved by violations of either act may bring a civil action for damages, equitable relief, and reasonable attorney's fees. For actions under the Wiretap Act, damages are the greater of: (1) actual damages suffered by the plaintiff, or (2) "statutory damages of whichever is the greater of $100 a day for each day of violation or $10,000." For actions under the SCA, damages are "the sum of the actual damages suffered by the plaintiff and the profits made by the violator," provided that all successful plaintiffs are entitled to receive at least $1,000. Violations of the Wiretap Act and SCA are also subject to criminal prosecution and can result in fines and imprisonment. In contrast, the Pen Register Act does not provide for a private right of action, but knowing violations can result in criminal fines and imprisonment. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) was originally intended as a computer hacking statute and is centrally concerned with prohibiting unauthorized intrusions into computers, rather than addressing other data protection issues such as the collection or use of data. Specifically, the CFAA imposes liability when a person "intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains . . . information from any protected computer." A "protected computer" is broadly defined as any computer used in or affecting interstate commerce or communications, functionally allowing the statute to apply to any computer that is connected to the internet. Violations of the CFAA are subject to criminal prosecution and can result in fines and imprisonment. The CFAA also allows for a private right of action, allowing aggrieved individuals to seek actual damages and equitable relief, such as an injunction against the defendant. As with ECPA, internet users have attempted to use this private right of action to sue companies tracking their online activity, arguing that companies' use of tracking devices constitutes an unauthorized access of their computers. In this vein, CFAA is theoretically a more generous statute than ECPA for such claims because it requires authorization from the owner of the computer (i.e., the user), rather than allowing any party to a communication (i.e., either the user or the website visited by the user) to give consent to the access. In practice, however, such claims have typically been dismissed due to plaintiffs' failure to meet CFAA's damages threshold. Specifically, as a threshold to bring a private right of action, a plaintiff must show damages in excess of $5,000 or another specific type of damages such as physical injury or impairment to medical care. The FTC Act has emerged as a critical law relevant to data privacy and security. As some commentators have noted, the FTC has used its authority under the Act to become the "go-to agency for privacy," effectively filling in gaps left by the aforementioned federal statutes. While the FTC Act was originally enacted in 1914 to strengthen competition law, the 1938 Wheeler-Lea amendment revised Section 5 of the Act to prohibit a broad range of unscrupulous or misleading practices harmful to consumers. The Act gives the FTC jurisdiction over most individuals and entities, although there are several exemptions. For instance, the FTC Act exempts common carriers, nonprofits, and financial institutions such as banks, savings and loan institutions, and federal credit unions. The key provision of the FTC Act, Section 5, declares unlawful "unfair or deceptive acts or practices" (UDAP) "in or affecting commerce." The statute provides that an act or practice is "unfair" only if it "causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition." While the statute does not define "deceptive," the FTC has clarified in guidance that an act or practice is to be considered deceptive if it involves a material "representation, omission, or practice that is likely to mislead [a] consumer" who is "acting reasonably in the circumstances." Under the FTC Act, the agency may enact rules defining specific acts or practices as UDAPs, often referred to as "trade regulation rules" (TRRs) or "Magnuson-Moss" rulemaking. However, to enact TRRs the FTC must comply with several procedures that are not required under the notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures set forth in Section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which are the default rulemaking procedures for federal agencies. Among other things, these additional procedures require the FTC to publish an advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM), give interested persons an opportunity for an informal hearing, and issue a statement accompanying the rule regarding the "prevalence of the acts or practices treated by the rule." Consequently, the FTC rarely uses its TRR rulemaking authority and has not enacted any TRRs regarding data protection. Rather, as discussed further below, the agency largely uses enforcement actions to signal the types of acts and practices it considers to be impermissible UDAPs. The FTC has brought hundreds of enforcement actions against companies alleging deceptive or unfair data protection practices. Most of these actions result in companies entering into consent decrees requiring the companies to take certain measures to prevent any further violations. While these consent decrees are not legally binding on those who are not a party to them, they are significant because they reflect the type of practices that the FTC views as "unfair" or "deceptive." Indeed, some scholars view the principles arising from them as a type of "common law of privacy." Given the uniquely important role FTC enforcement plays in the U.S. data protection landscape, it is worth noting the types of data protection practices the FTC has viewed as "unfair" or "deceptive." Perhaps the most settled principle of the FTC's "common law of privacy" is that companies are bound by their data privacy and data security promises. The FTC has taken the position that companies act deceptively when they gather, use, or disclose personal information in a way that contradicts their posted privacy policy or other statements, or when they fail to adequately protect personal information from unauthorized access despite promises that that they would do so. In addition to broken promises, the FTC has alleged that companies act deceptively when they make false representations in order to induce disclosure of personal information. For example, in FTC v. Sun Spectrum Commc'ns Org., Inc. , the FTC alleged that several telemarketers acted "deceptively" by misrepresenting themselves as a credit card company and requesting personal information from individuals, ostensibly for the purpose of providing non-existent credit cards to the individuals. The FTC has further maintained that companies act deceptively when their privacy policies or other statements provide insufficient notice of their privacy practices. For instance, in In the Matter of Sears Holdings Management Co. , the FTC alleged that Sears acted deceptively by failing to disclose the extent to which downloadable software would monitor users' internet activity, merely telling users that it would track their "online browsing." Along with "deceptive claims," the FTC has also alleged that certain data privacy or data security practices may be "unfair." Specifically, the FTC has maintained that it is unfair for a company to retroactively apply a materially revised privacy policy to personal data that it collected under a previous policy. The FTC has also taken the position that certain default privacy settings are unfair. In the case FTC v. Frostwire , for example, the FTC alleged that a peer-to-peer file sharing application had unfair privacy settings because, immediately upon installation, the application would share the personal files stored on users' devices unless the users went through a burdensome process of unchecking many pre-checked boxes. With respect to data security, the FTC has more recently maintained that a company's failure to safeguard personal data may be "unfair," even if the company did not contradict its privacy policy or other statements. While at least one court has agreed that such conduct may be "unfair" under the FTC Act, a recent U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit case, LabMD v. FTC , suggests that any FTC cease and desist order based on a company's "unfair" data security measures must allege specific data failures and specific remedies. In LabMD , the court noted that the FTC's order "contain[ed] no prohibitions" but "command[ed] [the company] to overhaul and replace its data-security program to meet an indeterminable standard of reasonableness." The court concluded that such an order was unenforceable, reasoning that the order "effectually charge[d] the district court [enforcing the order] with managing the overhaul." The court further suggested that penalizing a company for failing to comply with an imprecise standard "may constitute a denial of due process" because it would not give the company fair notice of the prohibited conduct. Ultimately, while LabMD did not decide whether inadequate data security measures may be "unfair" under the FTC Act, the decision is nevertheless a potentially significant limitation on the FTC's ability to remedy such violations of the statute. LabMD is also a notable case because it adds to the relatively sparse case law on the FTC Act's "unfair or deceptive" prohibition. As mentioned, the large majority of the FTC enforcement actions are settled, with parties entering into consent decrees. To the extent FTC allegations are contested, the FTC may either commence administrative enforcement proceedings or civil litigation against alleged violators. In an administrative enforcement proceeding, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) hears the FTC's complaint and may issue a cease and desist order prohibiting the respondent from engaging in wrongful conduct. In civil litigation, the FTC may seek equitable relief, such as injunctions or disgorgement, when a party "is violating, or is about to violate," the FTC Act. The FTC may only seek civil penalties, however, if the party has violated a cease and desist order, consent decree, or a TRR. The FTC Act does not provide a private right of action, and it does not impose any criminal penalties for violations of Section 5. Similar to the FTC Act, the CFPA prohibits covered entities from engaging in certain unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts. Enacted in 2010 as Title X of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, the CFPA created the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) as an independent agency within the Federal Reserve System. The Act gives the CFPB certain "organic" authorities, including the authority to take any action to prevent any "covered person" from "committing or engaging in an unfair, deceptive, or abusive act or practice" (UDAAP) in connection with offering or providing a "consumer financial product or service." The CFPB's UDAAP authority under the CFPA is very similar to the FTC's UDAP authority under the FTC Act; indeed, the CFPA contains the same definition of "unfair" as in the FTC Act, and the CFPB has adopted the FTC's definition of "deceptive" acts or practices. However, there are several important differences. First, the CFPA's UDAAP prohibition includes "abusive" practices, as well as unfair or deceptive ones. An act or practice is abusive if it either (1) "materially interferes with the ability of a consumer to understand a term or condition of a consumer financial product or service" or (2) "takes unreasonable advantage of" a consumer's (a) lack of understanding, (b) inability to protect her own interest in selecting or using a consumer financial product or service, or (c) reasonable reliance on a covered person to act in her interest. While abusive conduct may also be unfair or deceptive, abusiveness is a separate standard that may cover additional conduct. Second, the CFPA prohibits UDAAPs only in connection with offering or providing a "consumer financial product or service." A product or service meets this standard if it is one of the specific financial product or services listed in the CFPA and is offered or provided to consumers primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. Lastly, the CFPA applies only to "covered persons" or "service providers." The statute defines "covered persons" as persons who offer or provide a consumer financial product or service, and it defines "service providers" as those who provide a "material service" to a "covered person" in connection with offering or providing a consumer financial product or service. As some commentators have noted, the CFPB could follow in the FTC's footsteps and use its UDAAP authority to regulate data protection. However, the CFPB has generally been inactive in the data privacy and security space. Indeed, to date, it has brought only one such enforcement action, which involved allegations that an online payment platform, Dwolla, Inc., made deceptive statements regarding its data security practices and the safety of its online payments system. To the extent it does use its authority, the CFPB has some powerful procedural advantages in comparison with the FTC. In particular, the CFPB can enact rules identifying and prohibiting particular UDAAP violations through the standard APA rulemaking process, whereas the FTC must follow the more burdensome Magnuson-Moss rulemaking procedures. Regarding enforcement, the CFPA authorizes the CFPB to bring civil or administrative enforcement actions against entities engaging in UDAAPs. Unlike the FTC, the CFPB can seek civil penalties in all such enforcement actions, as well as equitable relief such as disgorgement or injunctions. However, as with the FTC Act, the CFPA does not provide a private right of action that would allow adversely affected individuals to sue companies violating the Act. The statute also does not impose any criminal penalties for UDAAP violations. Adding to the complex federal patchwork of data protection statutes are the laws of the fifty states. First and foremost, major regulators of privacy and data protection in the states include the courts, via tort and contract law. With respect to tort law, in addition to the "privacy" causes of action that developed at the state level during the early 20th century (discussed above), negligence and other state tort law claims serve as a means to regulate businesses that are injured from data security issues or otherwise fail to protect their customers from foreseeable harm. Contracts, implied contracts, and other commercial causes of action can also form important bulwarks for privacy. The common law, however, is not perfect: it is subject to variability from state to state, and within states, from judge to judge and jury to jury. In addition to the common law, most states have their own statutory framework which may affect data protection and the use of data by private entities. For example, many states have a consumer protection law, sometimes prohibiting unfair or deceptive practices, often referred to as "little FTC Acts." These laws, like the FTC Act, are increasingly being used to address privacy matters. In addition, each state has passed a data breach response law, requiring some form of response or imposing liability on companies in the event of a breach of their data security. While an examination of every state data security law is beyond the scope of this report, at least one state has undertaken a general and ambitious effort to regulate data security. Specifically, the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), enacted in 2018, has captured significant attention. Unlike the federal patchwork provisions, neither the method of data collection nor the industry that the business operates in limits the potential application of the CCPA. Instead, the CCPA applies to any company that collects the personal information of Californians, is for-profit, does business in California, and satisfies a basic set of thresholds. Analysts have suggested that these thresholds are low enough that the law could reach a considerable number of even "relatively small" businesses with websites accessible in California. The CCPA also does not distinguish between the sources of the data that comes within its scope. Rather, the CCPA regulates all "personal information," which, by the CCPA's definition, covers nearly any information a business would collect from a consumer. The law does not require the presence of any individual identifier, such as a name or address, for data to fall within the meaning of personal information. Rather, the CCPA broadly defines personal information as "information that identifies, relates to, describes, or is capable of being associated with, or could reasonably be linked, directly or indirectly, with a particular consumer or household." Following this definition, the CCPA provides some telling illustrations of what constitutes personal information, including any "electronic network activity [such as] browsing history, search history, and information regarding a consumer's interaction with an Internet Web site, application, or advertisement" and "inferences drawn from any of" this information. The CCPA provides consumers with three main "rights." The first of these is a " right to know " the information that businesses have collected or sold about them. This right requires that businesses must, in advance of any collection, "inform [by mail or electronically] consumers as to the categories of personal information to be collected and the purposes" to which the information will be put. Second, the CCPA provides consumers with the " right to opt out " of the sale of a consumer's information. Under the new law, businesses must inform consumers of this right, and if a consumer so affirmatively opts out, the business cannot again sell the consumer's information unless the consumer subsequently provides the business express authorization. Finally, the CCPA gives consumers the right, in certain circumstances, to request that a business delete any information collected about the consumer (i.e., " right to delete "). Under the law, a business that receives such a request must delete the information collected and direct its "service providers" to do the same. The primary means to enforce the CCPA are actions brought by the California Attorney General. According to the statute, businesses that fail to provide the protections required by the CCPA and fail to cure those violations within 30 days are liable for civil penalties of up to $7,500 per violation. Penalties or settlements collected under the CCPA are to be deposited with the newly created Consumer Privacy Fund, the funds for which are used only to offset costs incurred in connection with the administration of the CCPA. While the CCPA provides for a private cause of action, allowing for individual and class action lawsuits against businesses, this cause of action is only available in the case of a consumer whose "nonencrypted or nonredacted personal information" is subject to "unauthorized access and exfiltration, theft, or disclosure" as a result of a failure to "implement and maintain reasonable security procedures." Further, such actions can be brought only if a consumer provides a business with 30 days' written notice and provides the business with opportunity to cure the violation, unless the consumer suffered actual pecuniary damages. The statute does not specify how a business could "cure" a violation of this type. Consumers may obtain damages under this section of no less than $100 and no more than $750 "per incident," or actual damages, whichever is greater, as well as injunctive relief. Statements by some Members of Congress during Congressional hearings have already noted the CCPA's likely importance to future federal legislative efforts. Further, some outside commentators have argued explicitly that the CCPA should be preempted by a future federal law. These statements may be motivated by the likely fact that, if left intact, the California law could shape industry and consumer concerns both inside and outside California. First, the law is likely to be the "first in a long line of similar pieces of legislation," all of which may model themselves after the CCPA, or will have to respond to its impact. Second, even though the statute is the product of a single state, its broad jurisdictional reach would bring companies throughout the United States and from around the world into its sweep. These factors combined are likely to make the CCPA important to federal legislators. Furthermore, some of the provisions of the California law could form a model for future federal regulation—although along those lines, another potential model it has to compete with is Europe's GDPR. In addition to U.S. states like California, some foreign nations have enacted comprehensive data protection legislation. The EU, in particular, has long applied a more wide-ranging data protection regulatory scheme. Whereas privacy principles in the U.S. Constitution focus on government intrusions into private life and U.S. data privacy statutes generally are sector-specific, European privacy regulations have generally concerned any entity's accumulation of large amounts of data. As a result, foundational EU treaties provide individuals with a general right to "protection of personal data" from all potential interferences. The objective of the EU's most recent data privacy legislation—the GDPR—is to safeguard this right to personal data protection, while ensuring that data moves freely within the EU. Beginning in the 1970s, individual European countries began enacting broad, omnibus national statutes concerning data protection, privacy, and information practices. Although these domestic laws shared certain features, their differing data privacy and protection standards occasionally impeded the free flow of information between European countries. As a consequence, the EU attempted to harmonize its various national privacy laws by adopting an EU-wide data privacy and protection initiative—the 1995 Directive on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data (Data Protection Directive). While the Data Protection Directive applied on an EU-wide basis, EU law authorized each member-nation to implement the directive's requirements into the country's national law. By 2012, the European Commission—the executive body of the EU —came to view differing implementations of the Data Protection Directive at the national level as problematic. The Commission concluded that a single regulation should be developed in order to eliminate the fragmentation and administrative burdens created by the directive-based system. The Commission also sought to bring EU law up to date with developments in technology and globalization that changed the way data is collected, accessed, and used. In pursuit of these goals, the EU developed and adopted the GDPR, which replaced the 1995 Data Protection Directive and went into effect on May 25, 2018. The GDPR regulates the processing of personal data that meet its territoriality requirements, discussed below. Processing includes collection, use, storage, organization, disclosure or any other operation or set of operations performed on personal data, unless an exception applies. Personal data is defined as any information relating to an identified or identifiable person, and it can include names, identification numbers, location data, IP addresses, cookies, and any other information through which an individual can be directly or indirectly identified. The GDPR applies different requirements for controllers and processors of personal data. In general, a controller determines the purposes and means of processing personal data, and a processor is responsible for processing data on behalf of a controller. From a territorial perspective, the GDPR applies to organizations that have an "establishment" in the EU and that process personal data in the context of the activities of that establishment. The GDPR does not define "establishment," but states that it "implies the effective and real exercise of activity through stable arrangements." In a pre-GDPR case, the Court of Justice of the European Union stated that the concept of establishment under the 1995 Data Protection Directive extended "to any real and effective activity—even a minimal one—exercised through stable arrangements." Entities that meet the establishment requirement are subject to the GDPR even if their data processing activities take place outside the EU. The GDPR also applies to non-EU-established entities that offer goods or services to individuals in the EU or monitor individuals' behavior in the EU. Because many businesses with an online presence offer goods and services to EU individuals, the GDPR applies to many businesses outside the EU. The GDPR lays out seven guiding principles for the processing of personal data. While these principles are not "hard and fast rules" themselves, they inform the interpretation of the GDPR and its more concrete requirements, discussed below. The GDPR requires data controllers and processors to have a lawful basis to process personal data. The regulation delineates six possible legal bases: (1) consent; (2) performance of contract; (3) compliance with a legal obligations; (4) protection of the "vital interests" (i.e., the life) of the data subject or another individual; (5) tasks carried out in the public interest (e.g., by a government entity); and (6) the "legitimate interests" of the controller or a third party, unless the fundamental rights and freedom of the data subject override those interests. Commentators describe the "legitimate interests" category as the most flexible and as the potential basis for a host of common activities, such as processing carried out in the normal course of business, provided that the processing is not unethical, unlawful, or otherwise illegitimate. When data processing is premised on consent, the consent must be freely given, specific, informed, and unambiguous, and it can be withdrawn at any time. Additional consent requirements and restrictions apply to especially sensitive data, such as children's information and data that reveals ethnic origins, political opinions, religious beliefs, union status, sexual orientation, health information, and criminal histories. The GDPR provides a series of rights to individuals and corresponding obligations for data controllers, unless an exception applies. The GDPR requires organizations to implement a range of measures designed to ensure and demonstrate that they are in compliance with the regulation. When proportionate in relation to the processing activities, such measures may include adopting and implementing data protection policies and taking a "data protection by design and default" approach whereby the organization implements compliance measures into all stages of data processing. Measures may also include the following: establishing GDPR-conforming contracts with data processors; maintaining records of processing activities; conducting impact assessments on personal data use that is likely to risk individual rights and freedoms; appointing a data protection officer; and adhering to relevant codes of conduct and compliance certification schemes. The GDPR also requires controllers and processors to implement technical and organizational measures to ensure a level of data security that is "appropriate to the risk" presented by the data processing. In implementing data security measures, organizations must consider the "state of the art, the costs of implementation," the nature, scope, and context, and purposes of processing, and the likelihood and potential severity of an infringement on individual rights if data security were to be violated. The GDPR does not impose a "one-size-fits-all" requirement for data security, and security measures that are "appropriate" (and therefore mandatory) will depend on the specific circumstances and risks. For example, a company with an extensive network system that holds a large amount of sensitive or confidential information presents greater risk, and therefore must install more rigorous data security protections than an entity that holds less data. When appropriate, organizations should consider encryption and pseudonymization —the processing of personal data such that the data can no longer be attributed to a specific individual. Security measures should ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and resilience of processing systems; be able to restore access to personal data in the event of an incident; and include a process for testing security effectiveness. In the event of a personal data breach, the GDPR requires controllers to notify the designated EU government authority "without undue delay" and no later than 72 hours after learning of the breach, unless the breach is "unlikely to result in a risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons." For example, whereas a company must report the theft of a customer database that contains information that could be used for future identity fraud given the high level of risk to individuals, it may not need to report the loss of more innocuous data, such as a directory of staff office phone numbers. When notification to the government is required, the notification must describe the nature and likely consequences of the breach, identify measures to address the breach, and identify the employee responding to the incident. When data processors experience a breach, they must notify the controller without undue delay. In addition to governmental notification, controllers must notify the individuals whose data has been compromised if the breach is likely to result in a "high risk to the rights and freedoms" of individuals. The "high risk" threshold is higher than the threshold for notifying the government authority, but it could met in circumstances when individuals may need to take steps to protect themselves from the effects of a data breach. According to the United Kingdom's data protection regulatory authority, for example, a hospital that disclosed patient medical records as a result of a data breach may present a "high risk" to individuals, but a university that accidentally deleted, but was able to re-create, an alumni contact information database may not meet the mandatory individual reporting threshold. Notification to the individual must describe the breach in clear and plain language and contain at least the same information as provided in the governmental notifications. Notification to the individual is not required in the following cases: the controller implemented appropriate technical and organizational protection measures, such as encryption, that will render the data unintelligible; the controller took subsequent measures that will ensure that the high risk to individual rights and freedom are no longer likely to materialize; or individual notifications would involve disproportionate efforts, in which case the controller must provide public notice of the breach. Regardless of whether notification is required, controllers must document all data breaches so that government supervisory authorities can verify compliance at a later date. The EU has long regulated the transfer of data from EU member states to foreign countries, and the GDPR continues to restrict such international data transfers. Like the 1995 Data Protection Directive, the GDPR authorizes data transfer from within the EU to a non-EU country if the receiving country ensures an adequate level of protection for personal data. To meet this requirement, the non-EU country must offer a level of protection that is "essentially equivalent to that ensured" by the GDPR. If the European Commission previously made an adequacy decision under the Data Protection Directive's legal framework, that decision remains in force under the GDPR. U.S. and EU officials previously developed a legal framework—the U.S.-EU Privacy Shield—for protecting transatlantic data flow into the United States. Under the Privacy Shield framework, U.S.-based organizations self-certify to the International Trade Administration in the Department of Commerce that they will comply with the framework's requirements for protecting personal data by complying with, among other provisions, notice requirements, data retention limits, security requirements, and data processing purpose principles. In 2016, the European Commission concluded that the Privacy Shield framework provided adequate protections under the Data Protection Directive. That adequacy determination continues to apply under the GDPR, although the European Commission annually reviews whether the Privacy Shield framework continues to provide an adequate level of protection. In the absence of an adequacy decision from the European Commission, the GDPR permits data transfers outside the EU when (1) the recipient of the data has itself established appropriate safeguards , and (2) effective legal remedies exist for individuals to enforce their data privacy and protection rights. Appropriate safeguards include: a legally binding agreement between public authorities or bodies; binding corporate rules; standard contract clauses adopted by the European Commission; and approved codes of conduct and certification mechanisms. U.S. companies that do not participate in Privacy Shield often must rely on standard contract clauses to be able to receive data from the EU. The GDPR also identifies a list of circumstances in which data may be transferred outside the EU even without appropriate safeguards or an adequacy decision. These circumstances include, among other reasons, when: an individual has provided informed consent; transfer is necessary for the performance of certain contracts involving the data subject; or the transfer is necessary for important reasons of public interests. One of the most commented-upon aspects of the GDPR is its high ceiling for administrative fines. For the most serious infractions of the GDPR, regulatory bodies within individual EU countries may impose fines up to 20 million euro (approximately $22 million) or 4% of global revenue, whichever is higher, for certain violations of the GDPR. The GDPR also provides tools for individuals to enforce compliance with its terms. Individuals whose personal data is processed in a way that does not comport with the GDPR may lodge a complaint with regulatory authorities. Individuals also have the right to an "effective judicial remedy" (i.e., to pursue a lawsuit) against the responsible data processor or controller, and individuals may obtain compensation for their damages from data processors or controllers. The GDPR may be relevant to the 116th Congress' consideration of data protection initiatives in several ways. Because the GDPR applies to U.S. companies that offer goods and services to individuals in the EU, many U.S. companies have developed new data protection practices in an effort to comply with its requirements. Other businesses reported that they withdrew from the European market rather than attempt to obtain compliance GDPR. For those companies that remained in the European market, some have stated that they will apply their GDPR-compliant practices on a company-wide basis rather than changing their model only when doing business in the EU. Consequently, the GDPR already directly impacts the data protection practices of some U.S. companies. The GDPR also has served as a prototype for comprehensive data protection legislation in other governments. For example, commentators have described China's Personal Information Security Specification, which defines technical standards related to the collection, storage, use, transfer, and disclosure of personal information, as modeled on the GDPR. And the CCPA includes elements similar to the GDPR, such as an enumeration of individual rights related to data privacy. If this trend continues, GDPR-like data protection laws may become more commonplace internationally. Finally, some argue that Congress should consider enacting comprehensive federal data protection legislation similar to the GDPR. As discussed below, however, other observers and some officials in the Trump Administration have criticized the GDPR, describing the regulation as overly prescriptive and likely to result in negative unintended consequences. Regardless of the merits of these positions, the GDPR may remain a focal point of discussion in the debate over whether the United States should develop a more comprehensive data protection policy. Although some commentators argue that the federal government should supplement the current patchwork of federal data protection laws with more comprehensive legislation modeled on the CCPA or GDPR, some Trump Administration officials have criticized these legislative approaches and questioned whether they will improve data privacy outcomes. The Administration has argued that many comprehensive data privacy models have resulted in "long, legal, regulator-focused privacy policies and check boxes, which only help a very small number of users[.]" Rather than pursuing a prescriptive model in which the government defines (or prescribes) data protection rules, the Trump Administration advocates for what it describes as an outcome-based approach whereby the government focuses on the "outcomes of organizational practices, rather than on dictating what those practices should be." In September 2018, the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) in the Department of Commerce issued a request for public comments on the Trump Administration's efforts to develop an outcome-based approach to advancing consumer privacy that also protects prosperity and innovation. According to NTIA, changes in technology have led consumers to conclude that they are losing control over their personal information, while at the same time that foreign and state privacy laws have led to a fragmented regulatory landscape that disincentives innovation. Accordingly, NTIA is attempting to develop a set of "user-centric" privacy outcomes and goals that would underpin the protections that should be produced by any federal actions related to consumer privacy. NTIA's proposed policy focuses on a set of outcomes that the Trump Administration seeks to achieve: In addition to identifying desired outcomes, NTIA's request for public comments states that the Trump Administration is in the process of developing "high-level goals for Federal action" related to data privacy. NTIA's proposed privacy framework shares certain elements of prescriptive legal regimes like the GDPR and CCPA. Common features include a right to withdraw consent to certain uses of personal data; accountability for third-party vendors and servicers; and a right to access, amend, complete, correct, or delete personal data. But NTIA's request for public comments does not specifically describe how the Trump Administration intends to accomplish its outcomes and goals. Instead, it states that NTIA "understand[s] that there is considerable work to be done to achieve" the identified objectives. The comment period closed on November 9, 2018, and NTIA received input from more than 200 individuals and entities. The debate over whether Congress should consider federal legislation regulating data protection implicates numerous legal variables and options. "Data protection" itself is an expansive concept that melds the fields of data privacy (i.e., how to control the collection, use, and dissemination of personal information) and data security (i.e., how to protect personal information from unauthorized access or use and respond to such unauthorized access or use). There is no single model for data protection legislation in existing federal, state, or foreign law. For example, some state laws focus solely on data security or address a particular security concern, such as data breach notifications. Other state laws isolate a single privacy-related issue, such as the transparency of data brokers—companies that aggregate and sell consumers' information, but that often do not have a direct commercial relationship with consumers. Recent data protection laws such as the CCPA and GDPR appear to indicate a trend toward combining data privacy and security into unified legislative initiatives. These unified data protection paradigms typically are structured on two related features: (1) an enumeration of statutory rights given to individuals related to their personal information and (2) the creation of legal duties imposed on the private entities that possess personal information. The specific list and nature of rights and duties differ depending on the legislation, and some have proposed to define new rights in federal legislation that do not have a clear analog in existing state or foreign law. Consequently, at present, there is no agreed-upon menu of data protection rights and obligations that could be included in federal legislation. Although data protection laws and proposals are constantly evolving, some frequently discussed legal rights include: the right to know what personal data is being collected, used, and disseminated, and how those activities are occurring; the right to control the use and dissemination of personal data, which may include the right to opt out or withhold consent to the collection or sharing of such data; the right to review personal data that has been collected and to delete or correct inaccurate information; the right to obtain a portable copy of personal data; the right to object to improper activities related to personal data; and the right to learn when a data breach occurs; Commonly discussed obligations for companies that collect, use, and disseminate personal data include rules defining: how data is collected from individuals; how companies use data internally; how data is disseminated or disclosed to third parties; what information companies must give individuals related to their data; how data is kept secure; when breaches of security must be reported; the accuracy of data; and reporting requirements to ensure accountability and compliance. Whether to enact federal data protection legislation that includes one or more of these rights and obligations has been the subject of a complex policy debate and multiple hearings in recent Congresses. Part of the legislative debate concerns how to enforce such rights and obligation and raises questions over the role of federal agencies, state attorneys general, and private citizen suits. In addition, some elements of the data protection proposals and models could implicate legal concerns and constitutional limitations. While the policy debate is outside the scope of this report, the following sections discuss legal considerations relevant to federal data protection proposals that the 116th Congress may choose to consider. These sections begin by analyzing legal issues related to the internal structure and definition of data protection-related rights and obligations and then move outward toward an examination of external legal constraints. A primary conceptual point of debate concerning data protection legislation is whether to utilize the so-called "prescriptive" method or an "outcome-based" approach to achieve a particular law's objectives. Under the prescriptive approach, the government defines data protection rules and requires regulated individuals and entities to comply with those rules. Both the GDPR and CCPA use a prescriptive approach, and some legislation proposed in the 116th Congress would use this method by delineating certain data protection requirements. The Trump Administration, however, has argued that a prescriptive approach can stymie innovation and result in compliance checklists without providing measurable privacy benefits. As an alternative methodology, the Administration advocated for what it described as an outcome-based approach whereby the government focuses on the outcomes of organizational practices, rather than defining the practices themselves. Some federal information technology laws, such as the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA), use an outcome-oriented approach to achieve federal objectives, although agency implementation of such laws may become prescriptive in nature. The Administration has not specified how it intends to achieve its desired data protection goals without prescribing data protection rules, but additional direction appears to be forthcoming, according to the NTIA's request for public comment. Another issue that may be considered in crafting federal data protection policy is how to define the contours of the data that the federal government proposes to protect or the specific entities or industries that it proposes to regulate. The patchwork of existing data protection statutes define protected information in a variety of ways, many of which depend on the context of the law. For example, HIPAA is limited to "protected health information" and GLBA governs "financial information" that is personally identifiable but not publicly available. By contrast, GDPR and CCPA regulate all "personal" information—a term defined in both laws as information that is associated with a particular individual or is capable of being associated with an individual. Some federal data proposals would apply a similar scope to those of the GDPR and CCPA. If enacted, such broad data protection laws have the potential to create multiple layers of federal data protection requirements: (1) general data protection requirements for "personal" information and (2) sector-specific requirements for data regulated by the existing "patchwork" of data protection laws. Other legislative proposals have sought to avoid dual layers of regulations by stating that the proposed data protection requirements would not apply to individuals or entities covered by certain existing federal privacy laws. Agency enforcement is another key issue to consider when crafting any future federal data protection legislation. As discussed, under the current patchwork of federal data protection laws, there are multiple federal agencies responsible for enforcing the myriad federal statutory protections, such as the FTC, CFPB, FCC, and HHS. Of these agencies, the FTC is often viewed—by industry representatives, privacy advocates, and FTC commissioners themselves —as the appropriate primary enforcer of any future national data protection legislation, given its significant privacy experience. There are, however, several relevant legal constraints on the FTC's enforcement authority. First, the FTC generally lacks the ability to issue fines for first-time offenses. In UDAP enforcement actions, the FTC may issue civil penalties only in certain limited circumstances, such as when a person violates a consent decree or a cease and desist order. Consequently, the FTC often enters into consent decrees addressing a broad range of conduct, such as a company's data security practices, seeking penalties for violations of those decrees. However, as the LabMD case discussed earlier in this report suggests, if the FTC imposes penalties based on imprecise legal standards provided in a rule or order, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment may constrain the agency's authority. Second, the plain text of the FTC Act deprives the FTC of jurisdiction over several categories of entities, including banks, common carriers, and nonprofits. Third, the FTC generally lacks authority to issue rules under the APA's notice-and-comment process that is typically used by agencies to issue regulations. Rather, the FTC must use a more burdensome—and, consequently, rarely used—process under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. As some FTC Commissioners and commentators have noted, these legal limitations may be significant in determining the appropriate federal enforcement provisions in any national data security legislation. While Congress may not be able to legislate around constitutional constraints, future legislation could address some of these limitations—for instance, by allowing the FTC to seek penalties for first-time violations of rules, expanding its jurisdictions to include currently excluded entities, or providing the FTC notice-and-comment rulemaking authority under the APA. These current legal constraints on FTC authority may also be relevant in determining whether national legislation should allow private causes of action or enforcement authority for state attorneys general, as some commentators have suggested that private causes of action and enforcement by state attorneys general are essential supplements to FTC enforcement. Legislation involving privacy may propose to allow individuals to seek private remedy for violations in the courts. Congress may seek to establish a private right of action allowing a private plaintiff to bring an action against a third party based directly on that party's violation of a public statute. As it has done with many sector-specific privacy laws, Congress, in a data protection statute, could provide not only for this right, but also for specific remedies beyond compensatory damages, such as statutory damages or even treble damages for injured individuals. However, it may be very difficult to prove that someone has been harmed in a clear way by many of the violations that might occur under a hypothetical data protection and privacy regime. Victims of data breaches and other privacy violations, generally speaking, do not experience clear and immediate pecuniary or reputational harm. This obstacle might threaten not only a consumer's ability to obtain monetary relief, but also could run up against the limits of the federal courts' "judicial power" under Article III of the U.S. Constitution. Article III extends the judicial power of the federal courts to only "cases" and "controversies." As part of that limitation, the Supreme Court has stated that courts may adjudicate a case only where a litigant possesses Article III standing. A party seeking relief from a federal court must establish standing. Specifically, the party must show that he has a genuine stake in the relief sought because he has personally suffered (or will suffer): (1) a concrete, particularized and actual or imminent injury; (2) that is traceable to the allegedly unlawful actions of the opposing party; and (3) that is redressable by a favorable judicial decision. These requirements, particularly the requirement of "imminence," form significant barriers for lawsuits based on data protection. Imminence, according to the Supreme Court in Clapper v. Amnesty International , requires that alleged injury be " certainly impending " to constitute injury-in-fact. Speculation and assumptions cannot be the basis of standing. This reasoning has caused courts to dismiss data breach claims where plaintiffs cannot show actual misuse of data, but can only speculate that future thieves may someday cause them direct harm. These requirements are constitutional in nature and apply regardless of whether a statute purports to give a party a right to sue. This constitutional requirement limits Congress' ability to use private rights of action as an enforcement mechanism for federal rights, as the recent Supreme Court case Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins illustrates. Spokeo involved a Federal Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) lawsuit brought by Thomas Robins against a website operator that allowed users to search for particular individuals and obtain personal information harvested from a variety of databases. Robins alleged that Spokeo's information about him was incorrect, in violation of the FCRA requirement that consumer reporting agencies "follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy" of consumer reports. As discussed earlier in this report, FCRA provides for a private right of action making any person who willfully fails to comply with its requirements liable to individuals for, among other remedies, statutory damages. The lower court understood that Robins did not specifically allege any actual damages he had suffered, such as the loss of money resulting from Spokeo's actions. Nonetheless, the court concluded that the plaintiff had standing to seek statutory damages because his injury was sufficiently particular to him—FCRA had created a statutory right for Robins and his personal interest was sufficient for standing. The Supreme Court disagreed with the lower court, however, explaining that the lower court had erred by eliding the difference between Article III's "concreteness" and "particularization" requirements. Specifically, the Court concluded that a plaintiff must demonstrate a concrete injury separate from a particularized injury, meaning that plaintiffs must show that their injury "actually exist[s]." While tangible injuries, like monetary loss, are typically concrete, a plaintiff with an "intangible injury" must show that it is "real" and not "abstract" in order to demonstrate concreteness. For example, the Spokeo Court suggested that the mere publication of an incorrect zip code, although it could violate FCRA, would not be a sufficiently concrete injury for standing purposes. As a result, the Court remanded the case to the lower court to determine if the injury alleged in the case was both particularized and concrete. Spokeo does not eliminate Congress' role in creating standing where it might not otherwise exist. The Supreme Court explained that the concreteness requirement is "grounded in historical practice" and, as a result, Congress' judgment on whether an intangible harm is sufficiently concrete can be "instructive." However, as Spokeo explained, Congress cannot elevate every privacy violation to the status of a concrete injury. Both before and after Spokeo , the lower courts have resolved standing disputes in lawsuits involving privacy and data protection, where parties argue about whether particular injuries are sufficiently concrete for purpose of Article III. Congress can possibly resolve some of these disputes by elevating some otherwise intangible injuries to concrete status. But Spokeo illustrates that there may be a residuum of harmless privacy violations for which Congress cannot provide a judicial remedy. Another legal issue Congress may need to consider with respect to any federal program involving data protection and privacy is how to structure the federal-state regime—that is, how to balance whatever federal program is enacted with the programs and policies in the states. Federal law, under the Supremacy Clause, has the power to preempt or displace state law. As discussed above, there are a host of different state privacy laws, and some states have begun to legislate aggressively in this area. The CCPA in particular represents a state law that is likely to have a national effect. Ultimately, unless Congress chooses to occupy the entire field of data protection law, it is likely that the state laws will end up continuing to have a role in this area. Further, given that the states are likely to continue to experiment with legislation, the CCPA being a prime example, it is likely that preemption will be a highly significant issue in the debate over future federal privacy legislation. As the Supreme Court has recently explained, preemption can take three forms: "conflict," "express," and "field." Conflict preemption requires any state laws that conflict with a valid federal law to be without effect. Conflict preemption can occur when it is impossible for a private party to simultaneously comply with both federal and state requirements, or when state law amounts to an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes of Congress. Express preemption occurs when Congress expresses its intent in the text of the statute as to which state laws are displaced under the federal scheme. Finally, field preemption occurs when federal law occupies a 'field' of regulation "so comprehensively that it has left no room for supplementary state legislation." Ultimately, the preemptive scope of any federal data protection legislation will turn on the "purpose" of Congress and the specific language used to effectuate that purpose. If Congress seeks to adopt a relatively comprehensive system for data protection, perhaps the most obvious means to preempt a broad swath of state regulation would be to do so "expressly" within the text of the statute by including a specific preemption provision in the law. For example, several existing federal statutes expressly preempt all state law that "relate to" a particular subject matter. The Supreme Court has held that this "related to" language encompasses any state law with a "connection with, or reference to" the subject matter referenced. Similar language can be used to displace all state laws in the digital data privacy sphere to promote a more uniform scheme. Congress could alternatively take a more modest approach to state law. For example, Congress could enact a data protection framework that expressly preserves state laws in some ways and preempts them in others. A number of federal statutes preempt state laws that impose standards "different from" or "in addition to" federal standards, or allow the regulator in charge of the federal scheme some authority to approve certain state regulations. These approaches would generally leave intact state schemes parallel to or narrower than the federal scheme. For example, a statute could permit a state to provide for additional liability or different remedies for violation of a federal standard. Congress could do the same with federal data protection legislation, using statutory language to try to ensure the protection of the provisions of state law that it sought to preserve. Although legislation on data protection could take many forms, several approaches that would seek to regulate the collection, use, and dissemination of personal information online may have to confront possible limitations imposed by the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The First Amendment guarantees, among other rights, "freedom of speech." Scholars have split on how the First Amendment should be applied to proposed regulation in the data protection sphere. In one line of thinking, data constitutes speech, and regulation of this speech, even in the commercial context, should be viewed skeptically. Other scholars have argued that an expansive approach would limit the government's ability to regulate ordinary commercial activity, expanding the First Amendment beyond its proper role. This scholarly debate informs the discussion, but does not provide clear guidance on how to consider any particular proposed regulation. The Supreme Court has never interpreted the First Amendment as prohibiting all regulation of communication. Instead, when confronting a First Amendment challenge to a regulation, a court asks a series of questions in order to determine whether a particular law or rule runs afoul of the complicated thicket of case law that has developed in this area. The first question courts face when considering a First Amendment challenge is whether the challenged regulation involves speech or mere non-expressive conduct. As the Supreme Court has explained, simply because regulated activity involves "communication" does not mean that it comes within the ambit of the First Amendment. Where speech is merely a "component" of regulated activity, the government generally can regulate that activity without inviting First Amendment scrutiny. For example, "a law against treason…is violated by telling the enemy the Nation's defense secrets," but that does not bring the law within the ambit of First Amendment scrutiny. Assuming the regulation implicates speech rather than conduct, it typically must pass First Amendment scrutiny. However, not all regulations are subject to the same level of scrutiny. Rather, the Court has applied different tiers of scrutiny to different types of regulations. For example, the Court has long considered political and ideological speech at the "core" of the First Amendment—as a result, laws which implicate such speech generally are subject to strict scrutiny. Pursuant to this standard, the government must show that such laws are narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. By contrast, the Court has historically applied less rigorous scrutiny to laws regulating "commercial speech." Commercial speech is subject to a lower level of scrutiny known as the Central Hudson test, which generally requires the government to show only that its interest is "substantial" and that the regulation "directly advances the governmental interest asserted" without being "more extensive than necessary to serve that interest." These principles have provided general guidance to lower courts in deciding cases that intersect with data protection, but implicit disagreements between these courts have repeatedly demonstrated the difficulty in striking the balance between First Amendment interests and data-protection regulation. For example, in 2001 in Trans Union Corp. v. FTC , the D.C. Circuit upheld an FTC order that prohibited Trans Union from selling marketing lists containing the names and addresses of individuals. The court assumed that disclosing or using the marketing lists was speech, not conduct, but concluded that the FTC's restrictions on the sale of the marketing lists generally concerned "no public issue," and, as such, was subject to "reduced constitutional protection." The court derived its "no public issue" rule from the Supreme Court's case law on defamation, which generally views speech that is solely in the private interest of the speaker as being subject to lower First Amendment protection from defamation suits than speech regarding matters of a public concern. Applying this "reduced constitutional protection" to the context of Trans Union's marketing lists, the court determined that the regulations were appropriately tailored. While the Trans Union court did not cite to Central Hudson , other courts have gone on to apply similar reasoning to uphold data protection laws from constitutional challenge under the ambit of Central Hudson 's commercial speech test. In contrast with the relatively lenient approach applied to a privacy regulation in Trans Union , in U.S. West v. FCC , the Tenth Circuit struck down FCC regulations on the use and disclosure of Consumer Proprietary Network Information (CPNI). The regulations stated that telecommunications carriers could use or disclose CPNI only for the purpose of marketing products to customers if the customer opted in to this use. The court determined that these provisions regulated commercial speech because they limited the ability of carriers to engage in consumer marketing. Applying Central Hudson , the court held that although the government alleged a general interest in protecting consumer privacy, this interest was insufficient to justify the regulations. The panel ruled that the regulations did not materially advance a substantial state interest because the government failed to tie the regulations to specific and real harm, supported by evidence. The court also concluded that a narrower regulation, such as a consumer opt-out, could have served the same general purpose. After the Tenth Circuit's decision in U.S. West , the FCC responded by making minor changes to its regulations, maintaining some elements of the opt-in procedure for the use of CPNI and reissuing them with a new record. After this reissuance, the D.C. Circuit considered these modified-but-similar regulations in a 2009 case. In that case, the D.C. Circuit upheld the regulations without attaching much significance to the FCC's changes, and apparently implicitly disagreeing with the Tenth Circuit about both the importance of the privacy interest at stake and whether the opt-in procedure was proportional to that interest. The Supreme Court's first major examination of the First Amendment in this context came in 2011. That year, the Court decided Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc. , a case that is likely to be critical to understanding the limits of any future data protection legislation. In Sorrell , the Court considered the constitutionality of a Vermont law that restricted certain sales, disclosures, and uses of pharmacy records. Pharmaceutical manufacturers and data miners challenged this statute on the grounds that it prohibited them from using these records in marketing, thereby imposing what they viewed to be an unconstitutional restriction on their protected expression. Vermont first argued that its law should be upheld because the "sales, transfer, and use of prescriber-identifying information" was mere conduct and not speech. The Court explained that, as a general matter, "the creation and dissemination of information are speech within the meaning of the First Amendment," and thus there was "a strong argument that prescriber identifying information is speech for First Amendment purposes." Ultimately, however, the Court stopped short of fully embracing this conclusion, merely explaining that it did not matter whether the actual transfer of prescriber-identifying information was speech because the law nonetheless impermissibly sought to regulate the content of speech—the marketing that used that data, as well as the identities of speakers—by regulating an input to that speech. As the Court explained, the Vermont law was like "a law prohibiting trade magazines from purchasing or using ink." Second, Vermont argued that, even if it was regulating speech, its regulations passed the lower level of scrutiny applicable to commercial speech. The Court disagreed. The Court explained that the Vermont law enacted "content- and speaker-based restrictions on the sale, disclosure and use of prescriber identifying information" because it specifically targeted pharmaceutical manufacturers and prohibited certain types of pharmaceutical marketing. As the Court stated in a previous case, "[c]ontent-based regulations are presumptively invalid" because they "raise[] the specter that the Government may effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace." Further, the Sorrell Court observed that the legislature's stated purpose was to diminish the effectiveness of marketing by certain drug manufacturers, in particular those that promoted brand-name drugs, suggesting to the Court that the Vermont law went "beyond mere content discrimination, to actual viewpoint discrimination." As a result, the Court concluded that some form of "heightened scrutiny" applied. Nevertheless, the Court reasoned that, even if Central Hudson 's less rigorous standard of scrutiny applied, the law failed to meet that standard because its justification in protecting physician privacy was not supported by the law's reach in allowing prescriber-identifying information's use "for any reason save" marketing purposes. Most of the lower courts outside the data protection and privacy context that have considered Sorrell have held that Sorrell 's reference to "heightened scrutiny" did not override the Central Hudson test in commercial speech cases, even where those cases include content- or speaker- based restrictions. Others, however, have held that content- and speaker-based restrictions must comport with something more rigorous than the traditional Central Hudson test, but it is not clear what this new standard requires or where it leads to a different outcome than Central Hudson . As a result, while Sorrell 's impact on privacy and data protection regulation has been considered by a few courts, no consensus exists on the impact it will have. However, a few commentators have observed that the case will likely have an important effect on the future of privacy regulation, if nothing else, by having all but concluded that First Amendment principles apply to the regulation of the collection, disclosure, and use of personally identifiable information as speech, not conduct. With respect to such future regulation, policymakers will likely want, at the minimum, to meet the Central Hudson requirement of ensuring that any restrictions on the creation, disclosure or use of information are justified by a substantial interest and that the regulations are no more extensive than necessary to further that interest. To illustrate, the Court in Sorrell identified HIPAA as a permissible "privacy" regulation because it allowed "the information's sale or disclosure in only a few narrow and well-justified circumstances." This dictum suggests that Congress is able to regulate in the data protection sphere as long as it avoids the pitfalls of the law in Sorrell . However, it may not always be easy to determine whether any given law involves speaker or content discrimination. In Sorrell itself, for instance, three dissenting Justices argued that the content and speaker discrimination that took place under the Vermont law was inevitable in any economic regulation. As a result, resolving these issues as data privacy legislation becomes more complex is likely to create new challenges for legislators. The current legal landscape governing data protection in the United States is complex and highly technical, but so too are the legal issues implicated by proposals to create unified federal data protection policy. Except in extreme incidents and cases of government access to personal data, the "right to privacy" that developed in the common law and constitutional doctrine provide few safeguards for the average internet user. Although Congress has enacted a number of laws designed to augment individual's data protection rights, the current patchwork of federal law generally is limited to specific industry participants, specific types of data, or data practices that are unfair or deceptive. This patchwork approach also extends to certain state laws. Seeking a more comprehensive data protection system, some governments—such as California and the EU—have enacted wide-ranging laws regulating many forms of personal data. Some argue that Congress should consider creating similar protections in federal law, but others have criticized the EU's and California's approach to data protection. Should the 116th Congress consider a comprehensive federal data protection program, its legislative proposals may involve numerous decision points and legal considerations. An initial decision point is the scope and nature of any legislative proposal. There are numerous data protection issues that could be addressed in any future legislation, and different possible approaches for addressing those issues (such as using a "prescriptive" or "outcome-based" approach). Other decision points may include defining the scope of any protected information and determining the extent to which any future legislation should be enforced by a federal agency. Further, to the extent Congress wants to allow individuals to enforce data protection laws and seek remedies for the violations of such laws in court, it must account for Article III's standing requirements. Under the Supreme Court's 2016 Spokeo Inc. v. Robins decision, plaintiffs must experience more than a "bare procedural violation" of a federal privacy law to satisfy Article III and to sue to rectify a violation of that law. Federal preemption also raises complex legal questions—not only of whether to preempt state law, but what form of preemption Congress should employ. Finally, from a First Amendment perspective, Supreme Court jurisprudence suggests that while some "privacy" regulations are permissible, any federal law that restricts protected speech, particularly if it targets specific speakers or content, may be subject to more stringent review by a reviewing court.	[ "Recent high-profile data breaches and other concerns about how third parties protect the privacy of individuals in the digital age have raised national concerns over legal protections of Americans' electronic data. Intentional intrusions into government and private computer networks and inadequate corporate privacy and cybersecurity practices have exposed the personal information of millions of Americans to unwanted recipients. At the same time, internet connectivity has increased and varied in form in recent years. Americans now transmit their personal data on the internet at an exponentially higher rate than in the past, and their data are collected, cultivated, and maintained by a growing number of both \"consumer facing\" and \"behind the scenes\" actors such as data brokers. As a consequence, the privacy, cybersecurity and protection of personal data have emerged as a major issue for congressional consideration. Despite the rise in interest in data protection, the legislative paradigms governing cybersecurity and data privacy are complex and technical, and lack uniformity at the federal level. The constitutional \"right to privacy\" developed over the course of the 20th century, but this right generally guards only against government intrusions and does little to shield the average internet user from private actors. At the federal statutory level, there are a number of statutes that protect individuals' personal data or concern cybersecurity, including the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Children's Online Privacy Protection Act, and others. And a number of different agencies, including the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the Consumer Finance Protection Bureau (CFPB), and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), enforce these laws. But these statutes primarily regulate certain industries and subcategories of data. The FTC fills in some of the statutory gaps by enforcing a broad prohibition against unfair and deceptive data protection practices. But no single federal law comprehensively regulates the collection and use of consumers' personal data. Seeking a more fulsome data protection system, some governments—such as California and the European Union (EU)—have recently enacted privacy laws regulating nearly all forms of personal data within their jurisdictional reach. Some argue that Congress should consider creating similar protections in federal law, but others have criticized the EU and California approaches as being overly prescriptive and burdensome. Should the 116th Congress consider a comprehensive federal data protection law, its legislative proposals may involve numerous decision points and legal considerations. Points of consideration may include the conceptual framework of the law (i.e., whether it is prescriptive or outcome-based), the scope of the law and its definition of protected information, and the role of the FTC or other federal enforcement agency. Further, if Congress wants to allow individuals to enforce data protection laws and seek remedies for the violations of such laws in court, it must account for standing requirements in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution. Federal preemption also raises complex legal questions—not only of whether to preempt state law, but what form of preemption Congress should employ. Finally, from a First Amendment perspective, Supreme Court jurisprudence suggests that while some privacy, cybersecurity, or data security regulations are permissible, any federal law that restricts protected speech, particularly if it targets specific speakers or content, may be subject to more stringent review by a reviewing court." ]	18,048	gov_report	en	null	642cbca15cea50e376cef6d3e81f3dc4e046cc649f6119f4
A high-quality, reliable cost estimate is a key tool for budgeting, planning, and managing the 2020 Census. According to OMB, programs must maintain current and well-documented estimates of program costs, and these estimates must encompass the full life-cycle of the program. Among other things, OMB states that generating reliable program cost estimates is a critical function necessary to support OMB’s capital programming process. Without this capability, agencies are at risk of experiencing program cost overruns, missed deadlines, and performance shortfalls. A reliable cost estimate is critical to the success of any federal government program. With the information from reliable estimates, managers can: make informed investment decisions, allocate program resources, measure program progress, proactively correct course when warranted, and ensure overall accountability for results. To be considered reliable, a cost estimate must meet the criteria for each of the four characteristics outlined in our Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide. According to our analysis, a cost estimate is considered reliable if the overall assessment ratings for each of the four characteristics are substantially or fully met. If any of the characteristics are not met, minimally met, or partially met, then the cost estimate does not fully reflect the characteristics of a high-quality estimate and cannot be considered reliable. Those characteristics are: Well-documented: An estimate is thoroughly documented, including source data and significance, clearly detailed calculations and results, and explanations of why particular methods and references were chosen. Data can be traced to their source documents. Accurate: An estimate is unbiased, the work is not overly conservative or overly optimistic, and is based on an assessment of most likely costs. Few, if any, mathematical mistakes are present. Credible: Any limitations of the analysis because of uncertainty or bias surrounding data or assumptions are discussed. Major assumptions are varied, and other outcomes are recomputed, to determine how sensitive they are to changes in the assumptions. Risk and uncertainty analysis is performed to determine the level of risk associated with the estimate. The estimate’s results are cross- checked, and an independent cost estimate (ICE) is conducted to see whether other estimation methods produce similar results. Comprehensive: An estimate has enough detail to ensure that cost elements are neither omitted nor double counted. All cost-influencing ground rules and assumptions are detailed in the estimate’s documentation. Meeting best practices outlined in our Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide for a reliable cost estimate has been a long-standing challenge for the Bureau. In 2008 we reported that the 2010 Census cost estimate was not reliable because it lacked documentation and was not comprehensive, accurate, or credible. For example, in our 2008 report on the Bureau’s cost estimation process, Bureau officials were unable to provide documentation that supported the assumptions for the initial 2001 life-cycle cost estimate as well as the updates. Consequently, we recommended that the Bureau establish guidance, policies, and procedures for estimating costs that would meet best practices criteria. The Bureau agreed with the recommendation and said at the time that it already had efforts underway to improve its future cost estimation methods and systems. Moreover, weaknesses in the life-cycle cost estimate were one reason we designated the 2010 Census a GAO High- Risk Area in 2008. In 2012 we reported that, while the Bureau was taking steps to strengthen its life-cycle cost estimates, it had not yet established guidance for developing cost estimates. We recommended that the Bureau finalize its guidance, policies, and procedures for cost estimation in accordance with best practices. The Bureau agreed with the overall theme of the report but did not comment on the recommendation. During this review we found that the Bureau took steps to address this recommendation, which is discussed later in this report. Such guidance can help to institutionalize best practices and ensure consistent processes and operations for producing reliable estimates. In a 2016 report we found that the October 2015 version of the Bureau’s life-cycle cost estimate for the 2020 Census was not reliable. Overall, we reported that the 2020 Census life-cycle cost estimate partially met two of the characteristics of a reliable cost estimate (comprehensive and accurate) and minimally met the other two (well-documented and credible). We recommended that the Bureau take specific steps to ensure its cost estimate meets the characteristics of a high-quality estimate. The Bureau agreed with this recommendation, and took steps to improve the reliability of its cost estimate, which we focus on later in this report. Consequently, an unreliable life-cycle cost estimate is one of the reasons we designated the 2020 Census a GAO High-Risk Area in 2017. In October 2015, the Bureau estimated the cost of the 2020 Census to be $12.3 billion. According to the Bureau, the October 2015 version was the Bureau’s first attempt to model the life-cycle cost of its planned 2020 Census, in contrast to its earlier 2011 estimate, which the Bureau said was intended to produce an approximation of potential savings and to begin developing the methodology for producing decennial life-cycle cost estimates covering all phases of the decennial life cycle. To help control costs while maintaining accuracy, the Bureau introduced significant change to how it conducts the decennial census in 2020. Its planned innovations include reengineering how it builds its address list, improving self-response by encouraging the use of the Internet and telephone, using administrative records to reduce field work, and reengineering field operations using technology to reduce manual effort and improve productivity. In contrast to the estimated $12.3 billion in 2015, the 2020 Census would cost $17.8 billion in constant 2020 dollars if the Bureau repeated the 2010 Census design and methods, according to the Bureau’s estimates. In October 2017, Commerce announced that it had updated the October 2015 life-cycle cost estimate, projecting the life-cycle cost of the 2020 Census to be $15.6 billion, an increase of over $3 billion (27 percent) over its 2015 estimate. (See figure 1.) In developing the 2017 version of the cost estimate, Bureau cost estimators identified cost inputs, their ranges for possible outcomes, and overall cost estimating relationships (i.e., logical or mathematical formulas, or both). To identify cost inputs and the ranges of potential outcomes, the Bureau worked with subject matter experts and used historical data to support assumptions and generate inputs. The Bureau’s cost estimation team used a software tool to generate the cost estimate. Because cost estimates predict future program costs, uncertainty is always associated with them. For example, data from the past (such as fuel prices) may not always be relevant in the future. Risk and uncertainty refer to the fact that because a cost estimate is a forecast, there is always a chance that the actual cost will differ from the estimate. One way to determine whether a program is realistically budgeted is to perform an uncertainty analysis, so that the probability associated with achieving its point estimate can be determined, usually relying on simulations such as those of Monte Carlo methods. This can be particularly useful in portraying the uncertainty implications of various cost estimates. Consistent with cost estimation practices outlined in our Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide, the estimate was compared with two independent cost estimates (ICE), developed by Commerce’s Office of Acquisition Management (OAM) and the Bureau’s Office of Cost Estimation, Analysis, and Assessment. The offices producing the ICEs and the cost estimate team worked together to examine the process each used, an effort known as the reconciliation process. Through this reconciliation, the Bureau identified areas where discrepancies existed and elements that could require additional review and possible improvement. According to Bureau documentation the estimate will be updated as the program meets milestones and to reflect changes in technical or program assumptions. Figure 2 details the Bureau’s cost estimation process. OAM was involved extensively in the development of the 2017 estimate, an increased involvement compared to 2015, according to Bureau officials. OAM participated in regular review meetings throughout the development of the estimate and also developed an independent cost estimate, as shown in the figure below. End-to-end system testing activities for the 2020 Census are currently underway in Providence, Rhode Island. According to the Bureau, information collected from the test, such as overall response rates and the use of administrative records to inform census records, will inform future versions of the life-cycle cost estimate. Some updates from the test will be incorporated into the next cost estimate, which will be available in the first quarter of the coming fiscal year. Since our June 2016 report, in which we reviewed the Bureau’s 2015 version of the cost estimate, the Bureau has made significant progress. For example, the Bureau has put into place a work breakdown structure (WBS) that defines the work, products, activities, and resources necessary to accomplish the 2020 Census and is standardized for use in budget planning, operational planning, and cost estimation. However, the Bureau’s October 2017 cost estimate for the 2020 Census does not fully reflect characteristics of a high-quality estimate as described in our Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide and cannot be considered reliable. Our Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide describes best practices for developing reliable cost estimates. For our reporting needs, we collapsed these best practices into four characteristics for sound cost estimating— comprehensive, well-documented, accurate, and credible—and identified specific best practices for each characteristic. To be considered reliable, an organization must meet or substantially meet each characteristic. Our review found the Bureau met or substantially met three out of the four characteristics of a reliable cost estimate, while it partially met one characteristic: well-documented. When compared to the October 2015 estimate, the 2017 estimate shows considerable improvement. (See figure 3 below.) Cost estimates are considered valid if they are well-documented to the point they can be easily repeated or updated and can be traced to original sources through auditing, according to best practices. The Bureau only partially met the criteria for well-documented, as set forth in our Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide. A cost estimate that does not fully meet the criteria for well-documented cannot be used by management to make informed and effective implementation decisions. The well-documented characteristic comprises five best practices. The Bureau substantially met two out of five best practices (as shown in figure 4). First, the estimate describes in sufficient detail the calculations performed and the estimating methodology used to derive each element’s cost, and the cost estimate had been reviewed by management. Since cost estimates can inform key decisions and budget requests, it is vital that management review and understand how the estimate was developed, including risks associated with the underlying data and methods. The cost estimate only partially met three best practices for the characteristic of being well-documented. In general, some documentation was missing, inconsistent, or difficult to understand. First, we found that source data did not always support the information described in the basis of estimate document or could not be found in the files provided for two of the Bureau’s largest field operations: Address Canvassing and Non- Response Follow-Up (NRFU). For example, the cost estimate documentation referred to actual data from the 2010 Census and information obtained from experts as sources for address canvassing rework rates. However, the folder source documents provided as support for the basis of estimate did not include this information. Next, in several cases, we could not replicate calculations, such as for mileage costs, using the description provided. Lastly, we found that some of the cost elements did not trace clearly to supporting spreadsheets and assumption documents. Failure to document an estimate in enough detail makes it more difficult to replicate calculations, or to detect possible errors in the estimate; reduces transparency of the estimation process; and can undermine the ability to use the information to improve future cost estimates or even to reconcile the estimate with another independent cost estimate. The Bureau told us it would continue to make improvements to ensure the estimate is well- documented. For the estimate to be considered well-documented, the Bureau will need to address these issues. An accurate cost estimate supports measurement of program progress by providing unbiased and correct data, which can help management ensure accountability for scheduled results. We found the Bureau’s cost estimate substantially met the criteria for accuracy. As shown in figure 5, and in line with best practices outlined in our Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide, the estimate was not overly optimistic; appeared to be free of errors; was based on historical data or input from subject matter experts; and, according to Bureau officials, is updated regularly as information becomes available. The Bureau can enhance the accuracy of their estimate by increasing the level of detail included in the documentation, such as detail on specific inflation indices used, and by monitoring actual costs against estimates. We identified areas for improvement, which, according to Bureau officials, will be addressed as part of its ongoing efforts. For example, while the basis of estimate document describes different inflation indexes, it was not clear exactly which indexes were applied to the various cost elements in the estimate. Also, evidence of how variances between estimated costs and actual expenses would be tracked over time was not available at the time of our analysis. Tools to track variance enable management to measure progress against planned outcomes. Bureau officials stated that they already have systems in place that can be adapted for tracking estimated and actual costs. All estimates include a certain amount of informed judgment about the future. Assumptions made at the start of a program can turn out to be inaccurate. Credible cost estimates identify limitations due to uncertainty or bias surrounding data or assumptions, and control for these uncertainties by identifying and quantifying cost elements that represent the most risk. We found that the Bureau’s cost estimate substantially met the criteria for credible, as shown in figure 6 below. The Bureau’s cost estimate clearly identifies risks and uncertainties, and describes approaches taken to mitigate them. In line with best practices outlined in our Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide, the Bureau did the following: Sensitivity analysis. The Bureau conducted sensitivity analysis to identify possible changes to estimated costs for the 2020 Census based on varying major assumptions, parameters, and data inputs. For example, the Bureau calculated the likely cost implications for a range of possible response rates to identify a range of projected costs and to calculate appropriate reserves for risk. Bureau officials stated that they also identified the estimate input parameters that contributed the most to estimate uncertainty. Risk and uncertainty analysis. A cost estimate is a forecast, and as such, there is always a chance that the actual cost will differ from the estimate. Uncertainty is the indefiniteness about the outcome of a situation. Uncertainty is assessed in cost estimate models to estimate the risk (or probability) that a specific funding level will be exceeded. We found the Bureau performed an uncertainty analysis on a portion of the estimate to determine whether estimated costs were realistic and to establish the probability of achieving projections outlined in the estimate. The Bureau used a combination of modeling based on Monte Carlo analysis and allocations of funding for risks. The Monte Carlo simulation was performed on a portion of the estimate to account for uncertainty around various operational parameters for which a range of outcomes was possible, including Internet response rates and the extent to which data collection issues might be resolved using administrative records. To account for the inherent uncertainty of assumptions included within the life-cycle cost estimate, the Bureau added funding to the cost estimate totaling approximately $292 million to account for risks based on the results of the Monte Carlo analysis. For other risks, such as acquisition lead time and the possibility of delays in information technology (IT) development, contingency funding was added to the estimate to reflect the potential cost of resolving these issues, through use of a backup system or an alternative approach. These are described as “special risks” in the Bureau’s basis of estimate, and total approximately $171 million. Based on additional sensitivity analysis, the Bureau added approximately $965 million to the cost estimate to reflect discrete risks outlined in the risk register as well as those associated with (1) variability in self-response rates, (2) the effect of fluctuations in the size and wage rate of the temporary workforce on the cost of field operations, and (3) the potential need to reduce the enumerator-to- manager staffing ratio in case expected efficiencies in field operations are not realized. In addition to these provisions, the Secretary of Commerce added a contingency amount of about $1.2 billion to account for what the Bureau refers to as unknown-unknowns. Bureau documentation states that conducting a decennial census is an extremely complex, high-risk operation. In order to mitigate some of the risk, contingency funding must be available to initiate ad hoc activities necessary to overcome unforeseen issues. According to Bureau documentation these include such risks as natural disasters or cyber-attacks. The Bureau provides a description of how the general risk contingency is calculated. However, this description does not clearly link calculated amounts to the risks themselves. In our June 2016 report we reported the Bureau had not properly accounted for risk and recommended the Bureau, in part; improve control over how risk and uncertainty are accounted for. We continue to believe the prior recommendation from our June 2016 report remains valid and should be addressed: that the Bureau properly account for risk in the 2020 Census cost estimate, among other things. As such, risks need to be linked to the $1.2 billion general risk contingency fund. Independent cost estimate. According to best practices outlined in our Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide, an independent cost estimate should be performed to determine whether alternate estimate approaches produce similar results. The Bureau compared their estimate with two independent cost estimates, developed by Commerce’s Office of Acquisition Management and the Bureau’s Office of Cost Estimation and Assessment. As part of their process for finalizing the cost estimate, Bureau officials reconciled differences between the estimates in discussions with the two offices, resulting in more conservative assumptions by the Bureau around risk and uncertainty in both cases. In addition to implementing our recommendation to properly account for risk, going forward, while the Bureau substantially met the credibility characteristic it will be important for them to also integrate regular cross-checks of methodology into their cost estimation process. In our analysis we observed that no specific cross-checks of cost methodology were performed. According to the Bureau, cross- checks were not performed because the Bureau considered the independent cost estimates as overall cross-checks on the reliability of their methodology and did not conduct additional cross-checks. The main purpose of cross-checking is to determine whether alternative methods for specific cost elements within the cost estimate could produce similar results. An independent cost estimate, though important for the credibility of an estimate, does not fulfill the same function as a targeted cross-check of individual elements. Comprehensive estimates have enough detail to ensure that cost elements are neither omitted nor double-counted, all cost-influencing assumptions are detailed in the estimate’s documentation, and a work breakdown structure is defined. Our analysis of the 2017 cost estimate demonstrates improvement over the 2015 cost estimate when the Bureau’s cost estimate only partially met the criteria for comprehensive. We found the Bureau met or substantially met all four best practices for the comprehensive characteristic, as shown in figure 7. For example, all life-cycle costs are included in the estimate along with a complete description of the 2020 Census program and current schedule. We also found that the Bureau substantially met criteria for documenting cost influencing ground rules and assumptions. A standardized WBS (as detailed in table 1) with supporting dictionary outlines the major work of the program and describes the activities and deliverables at the project level where costs are tracked. In 2016, the Bureau’s WBS did not contain sufficient detail and we found significant differences in the presentation of the work between sources. In 2017, based on our review of Bureau documentation and interviews with Bureau officials, we found that the WBS is standardized and cost elements are presented in detail. The WBS is a necessary program management tool because it provides a basic framework for a variety of related tasks like estimating costs, developing schedules, identifying resources, determining where risks may occur, and providing the means for measuring program status. Although the Bureau’s updated life-cycle cost estimate reflects three of the four characteristics of a reliable cost estimate, we are not making any new recommendations to the Bureau in this report. We continue to believe the prior recommendation, made in 2016, remains relevant: that the Secretary of Commerce ensure that the Bureau finalizes the steps needed to fully meet the characteristics of a high-quality estimate, most notably in the well-documented area. The Bureau told us it has used our best practices for cost estimation to develop their cost estimate, and will focus on those best practices that require attention moving forward. Without a reliable cost estimate, the Bureau is limited in its ability to make informed decisions about program resources and to effectively measure progress against operational objectives. OMB, in its guidance for preparing and executing agency budgets, cites that credible cost estimates are vital for sound management decision making and for any program or capital project to succeed. A well- developed cost estimate serves as a tool for program development and oversight, supporting management to make informed decisions. According to the Bureau, the 2020 Census cost estimate is used as a management tool to guide decision making. Bureau officials stated the cost estimate is used to examine the cost impact of program changes. For example, the cost estimate served as the basis for the fiscal year 2019 funding request developed by the Bureau. The Bureau also said it used the 2020 Census life-cycle cost estimate to establish cost controls during budget formulation activities and to monitor spending levels for fiscal year 2019 activities. According to the Bureau, as detailed operational and implementation plans are defined, the 2020 Census life- cycle cost estimate has been and will continue to be used to support ongoing “what-if” analyses in determining the cost impacts of design decisions. Specifically, using the cost estimate to model the impact of changes on overall cost, the Bureau adjusted the scope of the Census Enterprise Data Collection and Processing (CEDCaP) operation. The processes for developing and updating estimates are designed to inform management about program progress and the use of program resources, supporting cost-driven planning efforts and well-informed decision making. Our work has identified a number of best practices for use in developing guidance related to cost estimation and analysis that are the basis of effective program cost estimating and should result in reliable and valid cost estimates that management can use for making informed decisions. In 2012 we reported that the Bureau had not yet established guidance for developing cost estimates. We recommended that the Bureau establish guidance, policies, and procedures for developing cost estimates that would meet best practice criteria. The Bureau agreed with the theme of the report but did not specifically agree with the recommendation. Moreover, in June 2016, we also reported that the cost estimation team did not record how and why it changed assumptions that were provided to it and did not document the sources of all data it used. The documentation of these changes to assumptions did not happen because the Bureau lacked written guidance and procedures for the cost estimation team to follow. During this review we found the Bureau has since established reliable guidance, processes, and policies for developing cost estimates and managing the cost estimation process. The following documents, shown in table 2, establish roles and responsibilities for oversight and approval of cost estimation processes, provide a detailed description of the steps taken to produce a high-quality cost estimate, and clarify the process for updating the cost estimate and associated documents over the life of a project. The Decennial Census Program’s Cost Estimate and Analysis Process, which provides a detailed description of the steps taken to produce a high-quality estimate, is reliable as it met the criteria for 8 steps and substantially met the criteria for 4 steps of the 12 best steps outlined in our Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide, as shown below in figure 8. To avoid cost overruns and to support high performance, it will be important for the Bureau to abide by their newly developed policies and guidance and continue to use the life-cycle cost estimate as a management tool. The 2017 life-cycle cost estimate includes significantly higher costs than those included in the 2015 estimate. In 2015, the Bureau estimated that they could conduct the operation at a cost of $12.3 billion in constant 2020 dollars. The Bureau’s latest cost estimate, announced in October 2017, reflects the same design, but at an expected cost of $15.6 billion. Figure 9 below shows the change in cost by WBS category for 2015 and 2017. The largest increases occurred in the Response, Managerial Contingency, and Census/Survey Engineering categories. Increased costs of $1.3 billion in the response category (costs related to collecting, maintaining, and processing survey response data) were in part due to reduced assumptions for self-response rates, leading to increases in the amount of data collected in the field, which is more costly to the Bureau. Contingency allocations increased overall from $1.35 billion in 2015 to $2.6 billion in 2017, as the Bureau gained a greater understanding of risks facing the 2020 Census. Increases of $838 million in the Census/Survey Engineering category were due mainly to the cost of an IT contract for integrating decennial survey systems that was not included in the 2015 cost estimate. Bureau officials attribute a decrease of $551 million in estimated costs for Program Management to changes in the categorization of costs associated with risks: In the 2017 version of the estimate, estimated costs related to program risks were allocated to their corresponding WBS element. More generally, factors that contributed to cost fluctuations between the 2015 and 2017 cost estimates include: changes in assumptions for census operations, improved ability to anticipate and quantify risk, an overall increase in IT costs, and more defined contract requirements. Several assumptions for the implementation of the 2020 Census have changed since the 2015 cost estimate. Some assumptions contributing to cost changes, mainly in the Response (related to collecting and processing response data) and Frame (the mapping and collecting addresses to frame enumeration activities) categories, include the following: Self-response rates. Changes in assumptions for expected self- response rates contributed to increases in the response category, as the assumed rate decreased from 63.5 percent in 2015 to 60.5 percent in 2017, thereby increasing the anticipated percentage and associated cost of nonresponse follow-up. When the Bureau does not receive responses by mail, phone, or Internet, census enumerators visit each nonresponding household to obtain data. Thus, reduced self-response rates lead to increases in the amount of data collected in the field, which is more costly to the Bureau. Bureau officials attributed this decrease to a forecasted reduction in Internet response due to added authentication steps at log in and the elimination of the function allowing users to save their responses and return later to complete the survey. Productivity rates. The productivity of enumerators collecting data for NRFU is another variable in the cost estimate that was updated, contributing to cost increases in the response category. Expected productivity rates for NRFU decreased from the 2015 estimate of 4 attempts per hour to 2.9. According to Bureau documentation, this more conservative estimate is based on historical data, rather than research and test data. In-office address canvassing rates. The Bureau will not go door-to- door to conduct in-field address canvassing across the country to update address and map information for every housing unit, as it has in prior decennial censuses. Rather, some areas would only need a review of their address and map information using computer imagery and third-party data sources—what the Bureau calls “in-office” address canvassing procedures. However, in March 2017, citing budget uncertainty the Bureau decided to discontinue one of the phases of in-office review address canvassing for the 2020 Census. The cancellation of that phase of in-office review is expected to increase the number of housing units canvassed in-field by 5 percent (from 25 to 30 percent of all canvassed housing units). In-field canvassing is more labor intensive compared to in office procedures. The 2017 version of the cost estimate reflects this increase in workload for in-field address canvassing, though overall changes in estimated costs for the Frame category, of which Address Canvassing is a part, were minimal. Staffing. Updated analysis resulted in changes to several staffing assumptions, which resulted in decreases across WBS categories. Changes included reduced pay rates for field data collection staff based on current labor market conditions and reductions in the length of staff engagement. In general, contingency allocations increased overall from $1.35 billion in 2015 to $2.6 billion in 2017. This increase in contingency can be attributed, in part, to the Bureau gaining a clearer understanding of risk and uncertainty in the 2020 Census as it approaches. The Bureau developed some of its contingency based on proven risk management techniques, including Monte Carlo analysis and allocated funding for known risk scenarios. The 2017 estimate includes close to $1.4 billion in estimated costs for these risks, almost three times the amount included in the 2015 estimate. The basis of estimate contains detail on the various risks and the process for calculating the associated contingency. The 2017 version also includes a contingency amount of $1.2 billion for general risks, or unknown-unknowns, such as natural disasters and cyber-attacks. Contingency amounts were reallocated within the WBS to more closely reflect the nature of the risk: Bureau officials attribute a decrease from the 2015 estimate of $551 million in estimated costs for program management to changes in the categorization of costs associated with risks. Officials stated that, in 2015, discrete program risks were previously consolidated as program management costs. In 2017, these discrete costs were reallocated to associate risks with the appropriate WBS element. For example, contingency amounts related to the likelihood of achieving a certain response rate previously included in the program management work breakdown category are now a part of the “response” work breakdown category. Increases in IT costs, totaling $1.59 billion, represented almost 50 percent of the total cost increase from 2015 to 2017. The total share of IT costs as a percentage of total census costs increased from 28 percent in 2015 to 32 percent in 2017, or from $3.41 billion to approximately $5 billion. Increases in IT costs are spread across seven cost categories. Figure 10 shows the IT and non-IT cost by WBS for the 2017 cost estimate. IT costs in infrastructure, response data, and census/survey WBSs account for the majority of the approximately $5 billion. The Bureau’s October 2015 cost estimate included IT costs for, among other things, system engineering, test and evaluation, and infrastructure, as well as for a portion of the Census Enterprise Data Collection and Processing (CEDCaP) program. The 2017 estimated IT cost increases were due, in large part, to the Bureau (1) updating the cost estimate for CEDCaP; (2) including an estimate for technical integration services that contributed to increases in the Census and Survey Engineering category; and (3) updating costs related to other major contracts (such as mobile device as a service, field IT services, and payroll systems). Bureau documents described an overall improvement in the Bureau’s ability to define and specify contract requirements. This resulted in updated estimates for several contracts, including for the Census Questionnaire Assistance (CQA) contract. Assumptions regarding call volume to the CQA were increased by 5 percent to account for expected response by phone after the elimination of the option to save Internet responses and return to complete the form later. The Bureau also cited updated cost data and the results of reconciliation with independent cost estimates as factors contributing to the increased costs of other major contracts, including for the procurement of data collection devices. The Secretary of Commerce provided comments on a draft of this report on August 2, 2018. The comments are reprinted in appendix II. The Department of Commerce generally agreed with our findings regarding the improvements the Census Bureau has made in its cost estimates. However, Commerce did not agree with our assessment that the Bureau’s 2017 lifecycle cost estimate is “not reliable.” Commerce noted that it had conducted two independent cost analyses and was satisfied that the cost estimate was reliable. The Bureau also provided technical comments that we incorporated, as appropriate. We maintain that, to be considered reliable, a cost estimate must meet or substantially meet the criteria for each of the four characteristics outlined in our Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide. These characteristics are derived from measures consistently applied by cost estimating organizations throughout the federal government and industry and are considered best practices for the development of reliable cost estimates. Without a reliable cost estimate, the Bureau is limited in its ability to make informed decisions about program resources and to effectively measure progress against operational objectives. Thus, while the Bureau has made considerable progress in all four of the characteristics, it has only partially met the criteria for the characteristic of being well-documented. Until the Bureau meets or substantially meets the criteria for this characteristic, the cost estimate cannot be considered reliable. As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the report date. At that time, we will send copies of the report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of Commerce, the Under Secretary of Economic Affairs, the Acting Director of the U.S. Census Bureau, and other interested parties. In addition, this report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-2757 or goldenkoffr@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix III. The purpose of our review was to evaluate the reliability of the Census Bureau’s (Bureau) life-cycle cost estimate using our Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide. We reviewed (1) the extent to which the Bureau’s life-cycle cost estimate and associated guidance met our best practices for cost estimation using documentation and information obtained in discussions with the Bureau related to the 2020 life-cycle cost estimate and (2) compared the 2015 and 2017 life-cycle cost estimates to describe key drivers of cost growth. For both objectives we reviewed documentation from the Bureau on the 2020 life-cycle cost estimate and interviewed Bureau and Department of Commerce officials. For the first objective, we relied on our Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide as criteria. Our cost specialists assessed measures consistently applied by cost-estimating organizations throughout the federal government and industry and considered best-practices for developing reliable cost estimates. We analyzed the cost estimating practices used by the Bureau against these best practices and evaluated them in four categories: comprehensive, well-documented, accurate, and credible. Comprehensive. The cost estimate should include both government and contractor costs of the program over its full life-cycle, from inception of the program through design, development, deployment, and operation and maintenance to retirement of the program. It should also completely define the program, reflect the current schedule, and be technically reasonable. Comprehensive cost estimates should be structured in sufficient detail to ensure that cost elements are neither omitted nor double counted. Specifically, the cost estimate should be based on a product-oriented work breakdown structure (WBS) that allows a program to track cost and schedule by defined deliverables, such as hardware or software components. Finally, where information is limited and judgments are made, the cost estimate should document all cost-influencing assumptions. Well-documented. A good cost estimate—while taking the form of a single number—is supported by detailed documentation that describes how it was derived and how the expected funding will be spent in order to achieve a given objective. Therefore, the documentation should capture in writing such things as the source data used, the calculations performed and their results, and the estimating methodology used to derive each WBS element’s cost. Moreover, this information should be captured in such a way that the data used to derive the estimate can be traced back to, and verified against, their sources so that the estimate can be easily replicated and updated. The documentation should also discuss the technical baseline description and how the data were normalized. Finally, the documentation should include evidence that the cost estimate was reviewed and accepted by management. Accurate. The cost estimate should provide for results that are unbiased, and it should not be overly conservative or optimistic. An estimate is accurate when it is based on an assessment of most likely costs; adjusted properly for inflation; and contains few, if any, minor mistakes. In addition, a cost estimate should be updated regularly to reflect significant changes in the program—such as when schedules or other assumptions change—and actual costs, so that it is always reflecting current status. During the update process, variances between planned and actual costs should be documented, explained, and reviewed. Among other things, the estimate should be grounded in a historical record of cost estimating and actual experiences on other comparable programs. Credible. The cost estimate should discuss any limitations of the analysis because of uncertainty or biases surrounding data or assumptions. Major assumptions should be varied, and other outcomes recomputed to determine how sensitive they are to changes in the assumptions. Risk and uncertainty analysis should be performed to determine the level of risk associated with the estimate. Further, the estimate’s cost drivers should be cross-checked, and an independent cost estimate conducted by a group outside the acquiring organization should be developed to determine whether other estimating methods produce similar results. If any of the characteristics are not met, minimally met, or partially met, then the cost estimate does not fully reflect the characteristics of a high- quality estimate and cannot be considered reliable. We also analyzed the Bureau’s cost estimation and analysis guidance and evaluated them against a 12-step process outlined in our Cost Estimation and Assessment Guide. A high-quality cost estimating process integrates the following: 1. Define estimate’s purpose. 2. Develop estimating plan. 3. Define program characteristics. 4. Determine estimating structure. 5. Identify ground rules and assumptions. 6. Obtain data. 7. Develop point estimate and compare it to an independent cost estimate. 8. Conduct sensitivity analysis. 9. Conduct risk and uncertainty analysis. 10. Document the estimate. 11. Present estimate to management for approval. 12. Update the estimate to reflect actual costs and changes. These 12 steps, when followed correctly, should result in reliable and valid cost estimates that management can use for making informed decisions. If any of the steps in the Bureau’s process do not meet, minimally meet, or partially meet the 12 steps, then the cost estimate guidance does not fully reflect best practices for developing a high-quality estimate and cannot be considered reliable. Lastly, to describe key drivers of cost growth, we compared cost information included in the 2015 and 2017 cost estimates. We analyzed both summary and detailed cost information to assess key changes in totals overall, by WBS category, and by information technology (IT) vs. Non-IT costs. We used this analysis in conjunction with information received from the Bureau during interviews and through document transfers to describe overall changes in the cost estimate from 2015 to 2017. We conducted this performance audit from December 2017 to August 2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. In addition to the contact named above, Lisa Pearson (Assistant Director), Karen Cassidy (Analyst in Charge), Brian Bothwell, Jackie Chapin, Ann Czapiewski, Jason Lee, Ty Mitchell, Kayla Robinson, and Tim Wexler made significant contributions to this report.	[ "In October 2017, the Department of Commerce (Commerce) announced that the projected life-cycle cost of the 2020 Census had climbed to $15.6 billion, a more than $3 billion (27 percent) increase over its 2015 estimate. A high-quality, reliable cost estimate is a key tool for budgeting, planning, and managing the 2020 Census. Without this capability, the Bureau is at risk of experiencing program cost overruns, missed deadlines, and performance shortfalls. GAO was asked to evaluate the reliability of the Bureau's life-cycle cost estimate. This report evaluates the reliability of the Bureau's revised life-cycle cost estimate for the 2020 Census and the extent to which the Bureau is using it as a management tool, and compares the 2015 and 2017 cost estimates to describe key drivers of cost growth. GAO reviewed documentary and testimonial evidence from Bureau officials responsible for developing the 2020 Census cost estimate and used its cost assessment guide ( GAO-09-3SP ) as criteria. Since 2015, the Census Bureau (Bureau) has made significant progress in improving its ability to develop a reliable cost estimate. While improvements have been made, the Bureau's October 2017 cost estimate for the 2020 Census does not fully reflect all the characteristics of a reliable estimate. (See figure.) Specifically, for the characteristic of being well-documented, GAO found that some of the source data either did not support the information described in the cost estimate or was not in the files provided for two of its largest field operations. In GAO's assessment of the 2015 version of the 2020 Census cost estimate, GAO recommended that the Bureau take steps to ensure that each of the characteristics of a reliable cost estimate is met. The Bureau agreed and has taken steps, but has not fully implemented this recommendation. A reliable cost estimate serves as a tool for program development and oversight, helping management make informed decisions. During this review, GAO found the Bureau used the cost estimate to inform decision making. Factors that contributed to cost fluctuations between the 2015 and 2017 cost estimates include: Changes in assumptions. Among other changes, a decrease in the assumed rate for self-response from 63.5 percent in 2015 to 60.5 percent in 2017 increased the cost of collecting responses from nonresponding housing units. Improved ability to anticipate and quantify risk. In general, contingency allocations designed to address the effects of potential risks increased overall from $1.3 billion in 2015 to $2.6 billion in 2017. An overall increase in information technology (IT) costs. IT cost increases, totaling $1.59 billion, represented almost 50 percent of the total cost increase from 2015 to 2017. GAO is not making any new recommendations but maintains its earlier recommendation—that the Secretary of Commerce direct the Bureau to take specific steps to ensure its cost estimate meets the characteristics of a high-quality estimate. In its response to this report, Commerce generally agreed with the findings related to cost estimation improvements, but disagreed that the cost estimate was not reliable. However, until GAO's recommendation is fully implemented the cost estimate cannot be considered reliable." ]	6,712	gov_report	en	null	e621311fc19bbb808ee0e1898b3cfffdffd5dc88a6f88878
Article I, Section 6, of the U.S. Constitution, states that the compensation of Members of Congress shall be "ascertained by law, and paid out of the Treasury of the United States." Additionally, the Twenty-Seventh Amendment to the Constitution states, "No law, varying the compensation for the services of the Senators and Representatives, shall take effect, until an election of Representatives shall have intervened." This amendment was submitted to the states on September 25, 1789, along with 11 other proposed amendments, 10 of which were ratified and became the Bill of Rights. It was not ratified until May 7, 1992. Since FY1983, Member salaries have been funded in a permanent appropriations account. The most recent pay adjustment for Members of Congress was in January 2009. Since then, the compensation for most Senators, Representatives, Delegates, and the Resident Commissioner from Puerto Rico has been $174,000. The only exceptions include the Speaker of the House ($223,500) and the President pro tempore of the Senate and the majority and minority leaders in the House and Senate ($193,400). This report provides historical tables on the rate of pay for Members of Congress since 1789; details on enacted legislation with language prohibiting the automatic annual pay adjustment since the most recent adjustment; the adjustments projected by the Ethics Reform Act as compared with actual adjustments in Member pay; and Member pay in constant and current dollars since 1992. Additional CRS products also address pay and benefits for Members of Congress: For information on actions taken each year since the establishment of the Ethics Reform Act adjustment procedure, see CRS Report 97-615, Salaries of Members of Congress: Congressional Votes, 1990-2018 , by Ida A. Brudnick. Members of Congress only receive salaries during the terms for which they are elected. Following their service, former Members of Congress may be eligible for retirement benefits, which are discussed in CRS Report RL30631, Retirement Benefits for Members of Congress , by Katelin P. Isaacs. For information on health insurance options available to Members, see CRS Report R43194, Health Benefits for Members of Congress and Designated Congressional Staff: In Brief , by Ada S. Cornell. For an overview of compensation, benefits, allowances, and selected limitations, see CRS Report RL30064, Congressional Salaries and Allowances: In Brief , by Ida A. Brudnick. There are three basic ways to adjust Member pay. Specific legislation was enacted to adjust Member pay prior to 1968. It has been used periodically since, most recently affecting pay for 1991. The second method by which Member pay can be increased is pursuant to recommendations from the President, based on those made by a quadrennial salary commission. In 1967, Congress established the Commission on Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Salaries to recommend salary increases for top-level federal officials (P.L. 90-206). Three times (in 1969, 1977, and 1987) Congress received pay increases made under this procedure; on three occasions it did not. Effective with passage of the Ethics Reform Act of 1989 ( P.L. 101-194 ), the commission ceased to exist. Its authority was assumed by the Citizens' Commission on Public Service and Compensation. Although the first commission under the 1989 act was to have convened in 1993, it did not meet. The third method by which the salary of Members can be changed is by annual adjustments. Prior to 1990, the pay of Members, and other top-level federal officials, was tied to the annual comparability increases provided to General Schedule (GS) federal employees. This procedure was established in 1975 ( P.L. 94-82 ). Such increases were recommended by the President, subject to congressional acceptance, disapproval, or modification. Congress accepted 5 such increases for itself—in 1975, 1979 (partial), 1984, 1985, and 1987—and declined 10 (1976, 1977, 1978, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1986, 1988, and 1989). The Ethics Reform Act of 1989 changed the method by which the annual adjustment is determined for Members and other senior officials. This procedure employs a formula based on changes in private sector wages and salaries as measured by the Employment Cost Index (ECI). The annual adjustment automatically goes into effect unless 1. Congress statutorily prohibits the adjustment; 2. Congress statutorily revises the adjustment; or 3. The annual base pay adjustment of GS employees is established at a rate less than the scheduled adjustment for Members, in which case Members would be paid the lower rate. Under this revised method, annual adjustments were accepted 13 times (adjustments scheduled for January 1991, 1992, 1993, 1998, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2008, and 2009) and denied 16 times (adjustments scheduled for January 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1999, 2007, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, and 2019). Although discussion of the Member pay adjustment sometimes occurs during consideration of annual appropriations bills, these bills do not contain funds for the annual salaries or pay adjustment for Members. Nor do they contain language authorizing an increase. The use of appropriations bills as vehicles for provisions prohibiting the automatic annual pay adjustments for Members developed by custom. A provision prohibiting an adjustment to Member pay could be offered to any bill, or be introduced as a separate bill. The maximum potential January 2020 Member pay adjustment of 2.6%, or $4,500, was known when the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) released data for the change in the Employment Cost Index (ECI) during the 12-month period from December 2017 to December 2018 on January 31, 2019. Each year, the adjustment takes effect automatically unless it is either denied or modified statutorily by Congress, or limited by the General Schedule (GS) base pay adjustment, since the percentage increase in Member pay is limited by law to the GS base pay percentage increase. The maximum potential January 2019 Member pay adjustment of 2.3%, or $4,000, was known when the BLS released data for the change in the ECI during the 12-month period from December 2016 to December 2017 on January 31, 2018. Each year, the adjustment takes effect automatically unless it is either denied or modified statutorily by Congress, or limited by the GS base pay adjustment, since the percentage increase in Member pay is limited by law to the GS base pay percentage increase. The 2019 GS base pay adjustment was 1.4%, automatically limiting any Member pay adjustment to $2,400. The House-passed ( H.R. 5894 ) and Senate-reported versions ( S. 3071 ) of the FY2019 legislative branch appropriations bill both contained provisions to prevent this adjustment. The Member pay provision was included in the bills as introduced and no separate votes were held on this provision. Division B of P.L. 115-244 , enacted September 21, 2018, included the pay freeze provision. The maximum potential January 2018 member pay adjustment of 1.8%, or $3,100, was known when the BLS released data for the change in the ECI during the 12-month period from December 2015 to December 2016 on January 31, 2017. Each year, the adjustment takes effect automatically unless it is either denied or modified statutorily by Congress, or limited by the GS base pay adjustment, since the percentage increase in Member pay is limited by law to the GS base pay percentage increase. The 2018 GS base pay adjustment was 1.4%, automatically limiting any Member pay adjustment to $2,400. The House-passed ( H.R. 3162 ) and Senate-reported versions ( S. 1648 ) of the FY2018 legislative branch appropriations bill both contained provisions to prevent this adjustment. The Member pay provision was included in the bills as introduced and no separate votes were held on this provision. Neither bill was enacted prior to the start of FY2018, and legislative branch activities were initially funded through a series of continuing appropriations resolutions (CRs) ( P.L. 115-56 , through December 8, 2017; P.L. 115-90 , through December 22, 2017; P.L. 115-96 , through January 19, 2018; P.L. 115-120 , through February 8, 2018; P.L. 115-123 , through March 23, 2018). P.L. 115-56 contained a provision, extended in the subsequent CRs, continuing "section 175 of P.L. 114-223 , as amended by division A of P.L. 114-254 ." This provision prohibited a Member pay adjustment in FY2017. Section 7 of the FY2018 Consolidated Appropriations Act ( P.L. 115-141 ) prohibited the adjustment for the remainder of the year. The maximum potential January 2017 Member pay adjustment of 1.6%, or $2,800, was known when the BLS released data for the change in the ECI during the 12-month period from December 2014 to December 2015 on January 30, 2016. Both the House-passed ( H.R. 5325 ) and Senate-reported ( S. 2955 ) versions of the FY2017 legislative branch appropriations bill—which would provide approximately $4.4 billion in funding for the activities of the House of Representatives, Senate, and legislative branch support agencies —contained a provision that would prohibit this adjustment. The Member pay provision was included in the bills as introduced and no separate votes were held on this provision. No further action was taken on H.R. 5325 or S. 2955 , but the pay prohibition language was included in the Further Continuing and Security Assistance Appropriations Act, 2017 ( P.L. 114-254 ). Absent the statutory prohibition on a Member pay adjustment, Members of Congress would have automatically been limited to a 1.0% ($1,700) salary increase to match the increase in base salaries for GS employees. The maximum potential January 2016 Member pay adjustment of 1.7%, or $3,000, was known when the BLS released data for the change in the ECI during the 12-month period from December 2013 to December 2014 on January 30, 2015. The House-passed and Senate-reported versions of the FY2016 legislative branch appropriations bill ( H.R. 2250 ) both contained a provision prohibiting this adjustment. The pay adjustment prohibition was subsequently included in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 ( P.L. 114-113 ). Absent the statutory prohibition on a Member pay adjustment, Members of Congress would have automatically been limited to a 1.0% ($1,700) salary increase to match the increase in base salaries for GS employees. The maximum potential January 2015 pay adjustment of 1.6%, or $2,800, was known when the BLS released data for the change in the ECI during the 12-month period from December 2012 to December 2013 on January 31, 2014. Each year, the adjustment takes effect automatically unless it is either denied statutorily by Congress, or limited by the GS base pay adjustment, since the percentage increase in Member pay is limited by law to the GS base pay percentage increase. The FY2015 legislative branch appropriations bill ( H.R. 4487 ), as reported by the Committee on Appropriations and passed by the House on May 1, 2014, contained a provision prohibiting this adjustment. This provision was continued in the House-passed and Senate-reported versions of this bill, with no separate vote on the Member pay provision. No further action on this bill was taken, but the provision was subsequently included in Section 8 of Division Q of the FY2015 Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, which was enacted on December 16, 2014. On August 29, 2014, President Obama issued an "alternative pay plan for federal civilian employees," which called for a 1.0% increase in base salaries for General Schedule employees. Absent the statutory prohibition on a Member pay adjustment, Members of Congress would have automatically been limited to a 1.0% ($1,700) salary increase. The maximum potential 2014 pay adjustment of 1.2%, or $2,100, was known when the BLS released data for the change in the ECI during the 12-month period from December 2011 to December 2012 on January 31, 2013. The Continuing Appropriations Act, 2014 ( P.L. 113-46 , enacted October 17, 2013), however, prohibited the scheduled 2014 pay adjustment for Members of Congress. Each year, the adjustment takes effect automatically unless it is either denied statutorily by Congress, or limited by the GS base pay adjustment, since the percentage increase in Member pay is limited by law to the GS base pay percentage increase. The scheduled January 2014 across-the-board increase in the base pay of GS employees under the annual adjustment formula was 1.3%. A scheduled GS annual pay increase may be altered only if the President issues an alternative plan or if a different increase, or freeze, is enacted. The President issued an alternate pay plan for civilian federal employees on August 30, 2013. This plan called for a January 2014 across-the-board pay increase of 1.0% for federal civilian employees, the same percentage as proposed in the President's FY2014 budget. Legislation was not enacted to prohibit or alter the GS adjustment, and Executive Order 13655, issued on December 23, 2013, implemented a 1.0% increase for GS employees. Had the Member pay adjustment not been prohibited by law, the GS base pay adjustment would have automatically limited a salary adjustment for Members of Congress to 1.0% ($1,700). The maximum potential 2013 pay adjustment of 1.1%, or $1,900, was known when the BLS released data for the change in the ECI during the 12-month period from December 2010 to December 2011 on January 31, 2012. The adjustment takes effect automatically unless (1) denied statutorily by Congress or (2) limited by the GS base pay adjustment, since the percentage increase in Member pay is limited by law to the GS base pay percentage increase. The President's budget, submitted on February 13, 2012, proposed an average (i.e., base and locality) 0.5% adjustment for GS employees. President Obama later stated in a letter to congressional leadership on August 21, 2012, that the current federal pay freeze should extend until FY2013 budget negotiations are finalized. Section 114 of H.J.Res. 117 , the Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2013, which was introduced on September 10, 2012, extended the freeze enacted by P.L. 111-322 through the duration of this continuing resolution. H.J.Res. 117 was passed by the House on September 13 and the Senate on September 22. It was signed by the President on September 28, 2012 ( P.L. 112-175 ). A delay in the implementation of pay adjustments for GS employees automatically delays any scheduled Member pay adjustment. On December 27, 2012, President Obama issued Executive Order 13635, which listed the rates of pay for various categories of officers and employees that would be effective after the expiration of the freeze extended by P.L. 112-175 . The executive order included a 0.5% increase for GS base pay, which automatically lowered the maximum potential Member pay adjustment from 1.1% to 0.5%. As in prior years, schedule 6 of the 2012 executive order listed the pay rate for Members of Congress for the upcoming year. This executive order indicated that an annual adjustment would take effect after the expiration of the freeze included in P.L. 112-175 . As stated above, the annual adjustments take effect automatically if legislation is not enacted preventing them. The executive order, however, by establishing the GS pay adjustment at a lower rate than the scheduled Member pay adjustment, automatically lowered the Member pay adjustment rate since by law Member pay adjustments cannot be higher than GS pay adjustments. Subsequently, a provision in H.R. 8 , the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, which was enacted on January 2, 2013 ( P.L. 112-240 ), froze Member pay at the 2009 level for 2013. The language was included in S.Amdt. 3448 , a substitute amendment agreed to by unanimous consent. The bill, as amended, passed the Senate (89-8, vote #251) and the House (257-167, roll call #659) on January 1, 2013. This freeze was subsequently reflected in Executive Order 13641, which was signed April 5, 2013. This represented the second time, the first being in 2006, that Member pay was statutorily frozen for only a portion of the following year at the time of the issuance of the executive order. In both instances, the executive order listed new pay rates and indicated an effective date following the expiration of the statutory freeze. Pay adjustments in both years were further frozen pursuant to subsequent laws. As stated above, projected Member pay adjustments are calculated based on changes in the ECI. The projected 2011 adjustment of 0.9% was known when the BLS released data for the ECI change during the 12-month period from December 2008 to December 2009 on January 29, 2010. This adjustment would have equaled a $1,600 increase, resulting in a salary of $175,600. The 2011 pay adjustment was prohibited by the enactment of H.R. 5146 ( P.L. 111-165 ) on May 14, 2010. H.R. 5146 was introduced in the House on April 27 and was agreed to the same day (Roll no. 226). It was agreed to in the Senate the following day by unanimous consent. Other legislation was also introduced to prevent the scheduled 2011 pay adjustment. Additionally, P.L. 111-322 , which was enacted on December 22, 2010, prevents any adjustment in GS base pay before December 31, 2012. Since the percentage adjustment in Member pay may not exceed the percentage adjustment in the base pay of GS employees, Member pay is also frozen during this period. If not limited by GS pay, Members could have received a salary adjustment of 1.3% in January 2012 under the ECI formula. Pay for Members of Congress remained $174,000. Under the formula established in the Ethics Reform Act, Members were originally scheduled to receive a pay adjustment in January 2010 of 2.1%. This adjustment was denied by Congress through a provision included in the FY2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act. Section 103 of Division J of the act states, "Notwithstanding any provision of section 601(a)(2) of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 (2 U.S.C. 31(2)), the percentage adjustment scheduled to take effect under any such provision in calendar year 2010 shall not take effect." Had this provision not been enacted, the 2.1% projected adjustment would have been automatically reduced to 1.5% to match the 2010 GS base pay adjustment. As in previous Congresses, legislation was introduced in the 116 th Congress to repeal the automatic pay adjustment provision (for example, H.R. 751 and H.R. 1466 ); change the procedure by which pay for Members of Congress is adjusted or disbursed by linking it to congressional actions or economic indicators, including passage of a budget resolution, passage of appropriations, or reaching the debt limit (for example, S. 39 , S. 44 , S. 949 , H.R. 86 , H.R. 102 , H.R. 129 , H.R. 236 , H.R. 298 , H.R. 834 , H.R. 1172 , H.R. 1178 , H.R. 1466 , H.R. 1612 , H.J.Res. 10 , and H.J.Res. 51 ); and prohibit pay for Members of Congress during a lapse in appropriations resulting in a government shutdown (for example, S. 74 , S. 949 , H.R. 26 , H.R. 211 , H.R. 845 , and H.R. 1612 ). Legislation was introduced in the 115 th Congress to prohibit adjustments in pay (for example, H.R. 342 ); repeal the automatic pay adjustment provision (for example, H.R. 668 and H.R. 5946 ); change the procedure by which pay for Members of Congress is adjusted or disbursed by linking it to congressional actions or economic indicators, including passage of a budget resolution or reaching the debt limit (for example, H.R. 429 , H.R. 536 , H.R. 646 , H.R. 1779 , H.R. 1951 , H.R. 2153 , H.R. 2665 , H.R. 3675 , H.R. 4512 , and H.R. 5946 , and S. 14 ); reduce the pay of Members of Congress (for example, H.R. 1786 and H.R. 5539 ); and prohibit pay for Members of Congress during a lapse in appropriations resulting in a government shutdown (for example, H.R. 1789 , H.R. 1794 , H.R. 2214 , H.R. 4852 , H.R. 4870 , and S. 2327 ). Legislation was introduced in the 114 th Congress to prohibit adjustments in pay (for example, H.R. 109 and H.R. 302 ); repeal the automatic pay adjustment provision (for example, H.R. 179 , H.R. 513 , H.R. 688 , H.R. 1585 , and S. 17 ); change the procedure by which pay for Members of Congress is adjusted or disbursed by linking it to congressional actions or economic indicators, including the passage of a budget resolution or existence of a deficit (for example, H.Con.Res. 27 , S.Con.Res. 11 , H.R. 92 , H.R. 110 , H.R. 174 , H.R. 187 , H.R. 3757 , H.R. 4814 , H.R. 4476 , and S. 39 ); reduce the pay of Members of Congress (for example, H.R. 179 and H.R. 688 ); and prohibit or reduce pay for Members of Congress during a lapse in appropriations resulting in a government shutdown (for example, S. 2074 , H.R. 3562 , H.R. 2023 , and H.R. 1032 ). The House budget resolution for FY2016, H.Con.Res. 27 , included a policy statement that Congress should agree to a concurrent budget resolution each year by April 15, and if not, congressional salaries should be held in escrow (Section 819). The statement proposed that salaries would be released from the escrow account either when a chamber agrees to a concurrent resolution on the budget or the last day of the Congress, whichever is earlier. The House agreed to this resolution on March 25, 2015, and no further action was taken. The Senate agreed to its resolution on the FY2016 budget, S.Con.Res. 11 , on March 27, 2015, without this language. The conference report for S.Con.Res. 11 —agreed to in the House on April 30 and in the Senate on May 5, 2015—contains a "Policy Statement on 'No Budget, No Pay'" (Section 6216), which refers to actions by the House. Legislation was introduced in the 113 th Congress to prohibit adjustments in pay (for example, H.R. 54 , H.R. 243 , H.R. 636 , S. 18 , S. 30 ); repeal the automatic pay adjustment provision (for example, H.R. 134 , H.R. 150 , H.R. 196 , S. 65 , and H.R. 398 ); change the procedure by which pay for Members of Congress is adjusted or disbursed by linking it to congressional actions or economic indicators, including passage of a budget resolution or reaching the debt limit (for example, H.R. 108 , H.R. 167 , H.R. 284 , H.R. 308 , H.R. 310 , H.R. 325 , H.R. 372 , H.R. 397 , H.R. 396 , H.R. 522 , H.R. 593 , H.R. 1884 , H.R. 2335 , H.R. 3234 , S. 18 , S. 30 , and S. 263 ); reduce the pay of Members of Congress (for example, H.R. 37 , H.R. 150 , H.R. 391 , H.R. 396 , H.R. 398 , and H.R. 1467 ); prohibit pay for Members of Congress during a lapse in appropriations resulting in a government shutdown (for example, H.R. 3160 , H.R. 3215 , H.R. 3224 , H.R. 3234 , and H.R. 3236 ); and apply any sequester to Member pay (for example, S. 436 , H.R. 1181 , H.R. 1478 , and H.R. 2677 ). H.R. 325 , which (1) included language holding congressional salaries in escrow if a concurrent resolution on the budget was not agreed to by April 15, 2013, and (2) provided for a temporary extension of the debt ceiling through May 18, 2013, was introduced on January 21, 2013. Salaries would have been held in escrow for Members in a chamber if that chamber had not agreed to a concurrent resolution by that date. Salaries would have been released from the escrow account either when that chamber agreed to a concurrent resolution on the budget or the last day of the 113 th Congress, whichever was earlier. H.R. 325 was agreed to in the House on January 23, 2013, and the Senate on January 31, 2013. It was enacted on February 4, 2013 ( P.L. 113-3 ). Both the House and Senate agreed to a budget resolution prior to that date, however, and salaries were not held in escrow. H.R. 807 , the Full Faith and Credit Act, was introduced in the House on February 25, 2013. The bill would have prioritized certain payments in the event the debt reaches the statutory limit. An amendment, H.Amdt. 61 , was offered on May 9, 2013, that would clarify that these obligations would not include compensation for Members of Congress. It was agreed to the same day. The bill passed the House on May 13, 2013. No further action was taken in the 113 th Congress. The House-passed version of H.J.Res. 59 , the Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2014, also contained a provision addressing actions by the Secretary of the Treasury in the event that the debt limit is reached and not raised. The provision (Section 138) would, in part, prohibit borrowing to provide pay for Members of Congress in the event that the debt reaches the statutory limit prior to December 15, 2014. The bill passed the House on September 20, 2013. It was enacted on December 26, 2013, without this section. Legislation was introduced in the 112 th Congress to repeal the automatic pay adjustment provision (for example, S. 133 , S. 148 , H.R. 187 , H.R. 235 , H.R. 246 , H.R. 343 , H.R. 431 , H.R. 3673 ); change the procedure by which pay for Members of Congress is adjusted or disbursed by linking it to other action or economic indicators (for example, H.R. 124 , H.R. 172 , H.R. 236 , H.R. 994 , H.R. 1454 , H.R. 3136 , H.R. 3565 , H.R. 3774 , H.R. 3799 , H.R. 3883 , H.R. 4036 , H.R. 6438 , S. 1442 ); reduce the pay of Members of Congress (for example, H.R. 204 , H.R. 270 , H.R. 335 , H.R. 1012 , H.R. 4399 ); otherwise alter or restrict pay for Members under certain conditions (for example, H.R. 6108 ); and freeze Member pay (for example, S. 1931 , S. 1936 , S. 2065 , S. 2079 , S. 2210 , H.R. 3858 , H.R. 6474 , H.R. 6720 , H.R. 6721 , H.R. 6722 ). Legislation was also introduced in the 112 th Congress that would have affected Member pay in the event of a lapse of appropriations resulting in a government shutdown. These included H.R. 819 , H.R. 1255 , H.R. 1305 , H.Con.Res. 56 , and S. 388 . The Senate passed S. 388 on March 1, 2011. The bill would have prohibited Members of the House and Senate from receiving pay, including retroactive pay, for each day that there is a lapse in appropriations or the federal government is unable to make payments or meet obligations because of the public debt limit. The House passed H.R. 1255 on April 1, 2011. The bill would have prohibited the disbursement of pay to Members of the House and Senate during either of these situations. No further action was taken on either bill. On April 8, 2011, the Speaker of the House issued a "Dear Colleague" letter indicating that in the event of a shutdown, Members of Congress would continue to be paid pursuant to the Twenty-Seventh Amendment to the Constitution, which as stated above, states: "No law, varying the compensation for the services of the Senators and Representatives, shall take effect, until an election of Representatives shall have intervened"—although Members could elect to return any compensation to the Treasury. Additional legislation to prohibit any Member pay adjustment in 2013 was introduced but not enacted in the 112 th Congress, including the following: Section 5421(b)(1) of H.R. 3630 , as introduced in the House, would have prohibited any adjustment for Members of Congress prior to December 31, 2013. Section 706 of the motion to recommit also contained language freezing Member pay. On December 13, 2011, the motion to recommit failed (183-244, roll call #922), and the bill passed the House (234-193, roll call #923). The House-passed version of the bill was titled the "Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2011." The Senate substitute amendment, which did not address pay adjustments, passed on December 17. It was titled the "Temporary Payroll Tax Cut Continuation Act of 2011." The bill was enacted on February 22, 2012 ( P.L. 112-96 ), without the pay freeze language. H.R. 3835 , introduced on January 27, 2012, also would have extended the pay freeze for federal employees, including Members of Congress, to December 31, 2013. This bill passed the House on February 1, 2012. H.R. 6726 , introduced on January 1, 2013, would have extended the pay freeze for federal employees, including Members of Congress, to December 31, 2013. This bill passed the House on January 2, 2013. Table 1 provides a history of the salaries of Members of Congress since 1789. For each salary rate, both the effective date and the statutory authority are provided. Table 2 provides information on pay adjustments for Members since 1992, which was the first full year after the Ethics Reform Act that Representatives and Senators received the same salary. The table provides the projected percentage changes under the formula based on the Employment Cost Index and the actual percentage adjustment. The differences between the projected and actual Member pay adjustments resulted from the enactment of legislation preventing the increase (adjustments for 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1999, 2007, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, and 2019); limits on the percentage increase of Member pay because of the percentage increase in GS base pay (adjustments for 1994, 1995, 1996, 1998, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2007, 2008, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, and 2019); and a combination of the above. In some years, the percentage adjustment for Member pay would have been lowered to match the percentage adjustment in GS base pay if Congress had not passed legislation denying the adjustment (adjustments for 1994, 1995, 1996, 1999, 2007, 2010, 2011, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, and 2019). If Members of Congress had received every adjustment prescribed by the ECI formula since 1992, and the 2 U.S.C. §4501 limitation regarding the percentage base pay increase for GS employees remained unchanged, the 2019 salary would be $210,900. Table 3 lists the laws which have previously delayed or prohibited Member pay adjustments, the dates these laws were enacted, and the text of the provision. While many of the bills in this list are appropriations bills, a prohibition on Member pay adjustments could be included in any bill, or be introduced as a separate bill. Figure 1 , which follows, shows the salary of Members of Congress in current and constant (inflation adjusted) dollars since 1992. It shows that Member salaries, when adjusted for inflation, decreased 15% from 2009 until 2019.	[ "Congress is required by Article I, Section 6, of the Constitution to determine its own pay. In the past, Congress periodically enacted specific legislation to alter its pay; the last time this occurred affected pay in 1991. More recently, pay has been determined pursuant to laws establishing formulas for automatic adjustments. The Ethics Reform Act of 1989 established the current automatic annual adjustment formula, which is based on changes in private sector wages as measured by the Employment Cost Index (ECI). The adjustment is automatic unless denied statutorily, although the percentage may not exceed the percentage base pay increase for General Schedule (GS) employees. Member pay has since been frozen in two ways: (1) directly, through legislation that freezes salaries for Members but not for other federal employees, and (2) indirectly, through broader pay freeze legislation that covers Members and other specified categories of federal employees. Members of Congress last received a pay adjustment in January 2009. At that time, their salary was increased 2.8%, to $174,000. A provision in P.L. 111-8 prohibited any pay adjustment for 2010. Under the pay adjustment formula, Members were originally scheduled to receive an adjustment in January 2010 of 2.1%, although this would have been revised downward automatically to 1.5% to match the GS base pay adjustment. Members next were scheduled to receive a 0.9% pay adjustment in 2011. The pay adjustment was prohibited by P.L. 111-165. Additionally, P.L. 111-322 prevented any adjustment in GS base pay before December 31, 2012. Since the percentage adjustment in Member pay may not exceed the percentage adjustment in the base pay of GS employees, Member pay was also frozen during this period. If not limited by GS pay, Member pay could have been adjusted by 1.3% in 2012. The ECI formula established a maximum potential pay adjustment in January 2013 of 1.1%. P.L. 112-175 extended the freeze on GS pay rates for the duration of this continuing resolution, which also extended the Member freeze since the percentage adjustment in Member pay may not exceed the percentage adjustment in GS base pay. Subsequently, Member pay for 2013 was further frozen in P.L. 112-240. The maximum potential 2014 pay adjustment of 1.2%, or $2,100, was denied by P.L. 113-46. The maximum potential January 2015 Member pay adjustment was 1.6%, or $2,800. President Obama proposed a 1.0% increase in the base pay of GS employees, which would automatically have limited any Member pay adjustment to 1.0%. P.L. 113-235 contained a provision prohibiting any Member pay adjustment. The maximum potential January 2016 pay adjustment of 1.7%, or $3,000, would have been limited to 1.0%, or $1,700, due to the GS base pay increase. Member pay for 2016 was frozen by P.L. 114-113. The maximum potential January 2017 pay adjustment of 1.6%, or $2,800, would have been limited to 1.0%, or $1,700, due to the GS base pay increase. Member pay for 2017 was frozen by P.L. 114-254. The maximum potential January 2018 pay adjustment of 1.8%, or $3,100, was automatically limited to 1.4%, or $2,400, before being frozen by P.L. 115-141. The maximum potential January 2019 pay adjustment of 2.3%, or $4,000, was automatically limited to 1.4%, or $2,400, before being frozen at the 2009 level by P.L. 115-244. The maximum potential January 2020 pay adjustment is 2.6%, or $4,500. If Members of Congress had received every adjustment prescribed by the ECI formula since 1992, and the 2 U.S.C. §4501 limitation regarding the percentage base pay increase for GS employees remained unchanged, the 2019 salary would be $210,900. When adjusted for inflation, Member salaries have decreased 15% since the last pay adjustment in 2009. Both the automatic annual adjustments and funding for Members' salaries are provided pursuant to other laws (2 U.S.C. §4501)—not the annual appropriations bills—and a provision prohibiting a scheduled adjustment could be included in any bill, or introduced as a separate bill." ]	5,069	gov_report	en	null	cef812f3c41935467814666961515098228f2ad4cc16f9b1
DOD has defined various types of unwanted sexual behaviors, including sexual assault, sexual harassment, and domestic violence. Sexual assault: DOD defines sexual assault as intentional sexual contact, characterized by use of force, threats, intimidation, abuse of authority, or when the victim does not or cannot consent. The term includes a broad category of sexual offenses consisting of the following specific Uniform Code of Military Justice offenses: rape, sexual assault, aggravated sexual contact, abusive sexual contact, forcible sodomy (forced oral or anal sex), or attempts to commit these acts. Sexual harassment: DOD defines sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination that involves unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature when (1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of a person’s job, pay, or career; (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by a person is used as a basis for career or employment decisions affecting that person; or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual’s work performance or creates an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment. However, as noted earlier, a provision of the NDAA for FY 2017 changed the definition of sexual harassment for the military for purposes of investigations by commanding officers so that it is no longer defined solely as a form of sex discrimination, but is recognized as an adverse behavior on the spectrum of behavior that can contribute to an increase in the incidence of sexual assault. We discuss this changed definition of sexual harassment later in this report. Domestic violence: DOD defines domestic violence as an offense under the United States Code, the Uniform Code of Military Justice, or state law involving the use, attempted use, or threatened use of force or violence against a person, or a violation of a lawful order issued for the protection of a person who is a current or former spouse, a person with whom the abuser shares a child in common or a current or former intimate partner with whom the abuser shares or has shared a common domicile. Sexual assault of spouses and intimate partners is a subset of domestic violence. Various offices and organizations within DOD play a role in addressing unwanted sexual behaviors in the military. The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness is responsible for developing the overall policy and guidance for the department’s efforts to prevent and respond to instances of sexual assault, except for criminal investigative policy matters assigned to the DOD Inspector General and legal processes in the Uniform Code of Military Justice. The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness oversees the Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office (SAPRO), which serves as the department’s single point of authority, accountability, and oversight for its sexual assault prevention and response program. The responsibilities of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and SAPRO with regard to sexual assault prevention and response include providing the military services with guidance and technical support and facilitating the identification and resolution of issues; developing programs, policies, and training standards for the prevention of, reporting of, and response to sexual assault; developing strategic program guidance and joint planning objectives; overseeing the department’s collection and maintenance of data on reported alleged sexual assaults involving servicemembers; establishing mechanisms to measure the effectiveness of the department’s sexual assault prevention and response program; and preparing the department’s mandated annual reports to Congress on sexual assaults involving servicemembers. The Secretaries of the military departments are responsible for establishing policies for preventing and responding to sexual assault within their respective military service, and for ensuring compliance with DOD’s policy. Further, they are responsible for establishing policies that ensure commander accountability for program implementation and execution. Each military service has established an office that is responsible for overseeing and managing the military service’s sexual assault prevention and response program. Each military service also maintains a primary policy document on its sexual assault prevention and response program. Much like DOD’s directive and instruction on sexual assault prevention and response, the military service policies outline responsibilities of relevant stakeholders, including commanders, sexual assault response coordinators, and victim advocates and training requirements for all personnel. The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness has responsibility for developing the overall policy for DOD’s military equal opportunity program and monitoring compliance with the department’s policy. According to the policy, all servicemembers are afforded equal opportunity in an environment free from harassment, including sexual harassment, and unlawful discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, religion, sex (including gender), and sexual orientation. The chain of command is used as the primary and preferred channel to (1) identify and correct unlawful discrimination practices, (2) process and resolve complaints of unlawful discrimination or harassment, to include sexual, and (3) ensure that military equal opportunity matters are taken seriously and acted on as necessary. The Office of Diversity Management and Equal Opportunity (ODMEO) oversees the department’s efforts to promote equal opportunity, diversity, and inclusion management, and to help prevent unlawful discrimination and harassment throughout DOD. The Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute develops training and studies on equal opportunity. Behaviors under the purview of the military equal opportunity program include unlawful discrimination on the basis of color, national origin, race, religion, or sex. The Secretaries of the military departments are responsible for developing policies to prevent unlawful discrimination and harassment, (including sexual harassment), ensuring compliance with DOD’s policy, and establishing both formal and informal means of resolving complaints. The chain of command is the primary and preferred channel for identifying and correcting discriminatory practices and resolving servicemembers’ complaints of sexual harassment. The military services encourage servicemembers to resolve any complaints of sexual harassment they may have at the lowest possible level first. For servicemembers who wish to report a complaint of sexual harassment, DOD provides two complaint options—formal and informal. A formal complaint is an allegation of sexual harassment that a complainant submits in writing to the authority designated for the receipt of such complaints in military service implementing guidance. Formal complaints require specific actions to be taken, are subject to timelines, and require documentation of the actions taken, in accordance with federal law. In contrast, an informal complaint is an allegation of sexual harassment, made either orally or in writing, which is not submitted as a formal complaint. Informal complaints may be resolved directly by the complainant, such as by confronting the individual or by involving another individual or the chain of command. Servicemembers who elect to resolve their complaints informally may submit a formal complaint if they are dissatisfied with the outcome of the informal process. In 2014, DOD directed the military services to develop implementing instructions and mechanisms for reporting instances of sexual harassment anonymously. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Military Community and Family Policy under the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness is responsible for the development and oversight of policy for the military departments to implement a coordinated community response approach to addressing domestic abuse. The DOD Family Advocacy Program (FAP) office provides guidance and technical assistance to the military departments and DOD components to support their efforts to address, among other things, domestic abuse. The Secretaries of the military departments are responsible for developing military service-wide policies, supplementary standards, and instructions to provide for the requirements within their respective installations FAPs. Each military service has established a FAP that is responsible for overseeing and managing, among other things, the installation-level FAPs and the military service’s domestic violence and domestic abuse prevention and response programs. When domestic abuse does occur, the military service installation FAP conducts a risk assessment and works to ensure the safety of the victims and help military families overcome the effects as well as change destructive patterns. CDC is one of the major operating components of the Department of Health and Human Services, which serves as the federal government’s principal agency for protecting the health of U.S. citizens. As part of its health-related mission, CDC serves as the national focal point for developing and applying disease prevention and control, environmental health, and health promotion and education activities. CDC, among other things, conducts research to enhance prevention, develops and advocates public health policies, implements prevention strategies, promotes healthy behaviors, fosters safe and healthful environments, and provides associated training. In 1992, CDC established the National Center for Injury Prevention and Control as the lead federal organization for violence prevention. The center’s Division of Violence Prevention focuses on stopping violence, including sexual violence, before it begins and works to achieve this by conducting research on the factors that put people at risk for violence, examining the effective adoption and dissemination of prevention strategies, and evaluating the effectiveness of violence prevention programs. In 2004, CDC published a framework for effective sexual violence prevention strategies. This framework includes prevention concepts and strategies, such as identifying risk and protective factors (i.e., factors that may put a person at risk for committing sexual assault or that, alternatively, may prevent harm). CDC’s framework defines sexual violence as including non-contact unwanted sexual behaviors, sexual harassment, and physical sexual assault. DOD has acknowledged that connections exist across the continuum of unwanted sexual behaviors including sexual harassment and sexual assault and that this continuum of harm is reflected in key documents that guide prevention and response activities. For example, SAPRO has also reported that certain behavior and activities, such as hazing, can lead to sexual assault. Additionally, DOD’s Prevention Roundtable and 2014- 2016 Sexual Assault Prevention Strategy have both adopted CDC’s definition of “prevention” as it applies to sexual violence. CDC defines sexual violence to include sexual harassment and sexual assault. In 2014 and 2017, DOD contracted with RAND to conduct independent assessments of behaviors across the continuum of harm, including sexual assault and sexual harassment. In its 2014 report, RAND found that (1) 34 percent of male servicemembers who were surveyed reported that the sexual assault was part of a hazing incident, (2) servicemembers who experienced sexual harassment or gender discrimination in the past year also experienced higher rates of sexual assault, and (3) approximately one-third of servicemembers who are sexually assaulted stated the offender sexually harassed them before the assault. In its 2017 report, RAND found that (1) people are more likely to engage in problematic behaviors, such as sexual harassment, if that person perceives that peers and leaders condone those actions and (2) some organizations responsible for addressing unlawful discrimination and sexual harassment lack adequate policies, plans, information systems, and resources needed to establish a departmental approach to certain behavioral issues, inform senior leadership about these problems, and ensure that leadership’s decisions about problematic behaviors are uniformly enforced. CDC research revealed that behaviors such as bullying and homophobic teasing in early adolescence are significant predictors of sexual harassment over time. According to the CDC, these youth are at an increased potential to perpetrate sexual violence and engage in sexually harassing behavior. In response, CDC recommends that communities work to prevent all types of violence from occurring and coordinate and integrate responses to violence in a way that recognizes these connections. CDC’s research has also established that survivors of one form of violence are more likely to be victims of other forms of violence, that survivors of violence are at higher risk for behaving violently, and that people who behave violently are more likely to commit other forms of violence. Further, CDC states that violence prevention and intervention efforts that focus on only one form of violence can be broadened to address multiple, connected forms of violence to increase the public health impact. DOD’s policies on sexual harassment include some but not all of CDC’s principles and most relevant legislative elements. OSD and military service-specific sexual harassment policies generally include prevention strategies that CDC has identified in its principles for sexual violence prevention but leave out risk and protective factors, as well as risk domains. Additionally, DOD’s sexual harassment policies include most elements identified in section 579 of the NDAA for FY 2013, but do not consistently include mechanisms for anonymous reporting. ODMEO officials stated that they plan to issue a new policy that is intended to focus on sexual harassment and other forms of harassment, but it is too early to know whether that policy will include all the CDC principles or mechanisms for anonymous reporting. We also noted during our review that most existing policies have not yet been updated to reflect a provision in the fiscal year 2017 NDAA that redefined sexual harassment for certain purposes so it is no longer defined solely as a form of sex discrimination but is recognized also as an adverse behavior on the spectrum of behaviors that can contribute to an increase in the incidence of sexual assault. DOD’s sexual harassment policies include some of the principles that have been developed by CDC as part of a framework for preventing sexual violence, but other principles are not included. OSD includes sexual harassment as part of its broader military equal opportunity policy. It addresses, among other things, processes for preventing and responding to cases of discrimination, including sexual harassment; education and training in equal opportunity; and complaints processing. The military services’ policies on sexual harassment cover similar topics, such as chain of command responsibilities, complaint processing, and definitions for sexual harassment; however, they have some differences. For example, while all policies include provisions on sexual harassment prevention training, the Army’s and the Navy’s policies include specific characteristics of effective training. Both policies also specify what should be included in trainings for different levels of the chain of command. The Marine Corps and Air Force policies simply state that commanders must conduct sexual harassment prevention training. CDC’s framework defines sexual violence as including non-contact unwanted sexual behaviors, sexual harassment, and physical sexual assault. We applied six principles for sexual violence prevention from CDC’s framework to DOD’s sexual harassment policies. These principles are: Risk factors: Factors that may put people at risk for sexual violence perpetration or victimization, such as an organizational climate that either explicitly or implicitly condones sexual harassment. Protective factors: Factors that may protect high-risk people from harm, such as an organizational climate that promotes respect amongst personnel at all levels. Primary strategies for prevention: Strategies that occur before sexual violence takes place to prevent initial perpetration, such as sexual harassment prevention training. Secondary strategies for prevention: Immediate responses after sexual violence has occurred to address the early identification of victims and the short-term consequences of violence, such as mechanisms for reporting instances of sexual harassment and immediate interventions. Tertiary strategies for prevention: Long-term responses after sexual violence has occurred to address the lasting consequences of violence and sex-offender treatment interventions, such as long-term treatment of the victim and perpetrator. Risk domains: Levels at which risk and protective factors should be categorized, including: individual, relationship, community, and societal. In its sexual assault prevention strategy, DOD adapted risk domains to the military population, using the levels of: individual, relationship, leaders at all levels, military community, and society. Our comparison of DOD sexual harassment policies with CDC’s framework for preventing sexual violence showed that the policies include some of the principles in the framework but not others (see table 1.) Our analysis showed that the OSD and the Air Force policies each include two of the six principles in CDC’s framework, and the Army, the Navy, and the Marine Corps policies include three principles. Specifically, the policies generally identify sexual harassment prevention training for the armed forces, a primary strategy for prevention. In addition, the policies generally outline mechanisms for reporting and responding to sexual harassment, considered a secondary strategy for prevention. The Army, the Navy, and the Marine Corps policies outline counseling support and referral services, as well as specifying the options available for administrative or judicial punishment, including discharge from service for perpetrators, which can be considered to be tertiary strategies for prevention. Common elements missing from DOD’s sexual harassment policies are risk factors and protective factors, which identify conditions or behaviors that might heighten or lower the risk of sexual harassment victimization or perpetration, respectively. Examples of risk factors for sexual violence identified by the CDC include, but are not limited to, alcohol and drug use, hypermasculinity, emotionally unsupportive family environments, general tolerance of sexual violence within the community, and societal norms that support male superiority and sexual entitlement. Examples of protective factors from the CDC include emotional health and connectedness, and empathy and concern for how one’s actions affect others. Additionally, RAND identified an organizational climate that is oppositional to sexual violence as a protective factor. The policies also did not include risk domains, which would categorize risk and protective factors at the individual, relationship, community, and society levels. ODMEO officials told us that they are familiar with the CDC framework and are considering using it as a source of best practices for a new sexual harassment prevention strategy. DOD has previously used CDC’s sexual violence prevention framework to guide its sexual assault prevention strategy. In the absence of more comprehensive policies on sexual harassment that fully include principles in the CDC framework for sexual violence prevention, DOD may be missing opportunities to address and potentially reduce incidents of sexual harassment in the military population based on risk and protective factors and effective, tested strategies. Specifically, DOD may be missing the opportunity to identify risk factors, which would help to recognize situations where individuals and populations may be at a higher risk of sexual harassment perpetration or victimization; identify protective factors to lower the risk of sexual harassment; develop mechanisms to address sexual harassment across risk domains—at the individual, relationship, community, and society levels; and develop tertiary strategies, or long-term responses after sexual violence has occurred to address the lasting consequences of violence and sex- offender treatment interventions. DOD’s sexual harassment policies include three elements required by section 579 of the NDAA for FY 2013 but some do not include one element involving the anonymous reporting of incidents. Section 579 mandated that DOD, among other things, develop a comprehensive sexual harassment policy that includes the following elements: (1) prevention training for members of the armed forces; (2) mechanisms for reporting sexual harassment, including mechanisms for anonymous reporting; and (3) mechanisms for resolving sexual harassment that include the prosecution of perpetrators. In 2014, the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness issued a policy memorandum addressing the provisions of Section 579 and directed the military services to develop implementing instructions that include mechanisms for anonymous reporting. We compared DOD’s policies with the required elements in section 579 and found that OSD and military service policies generally include required elements except for the element focused on DOD including anonymous reporting in its policies for sexual harassment. The OSD, Army, and Marine Corps policies do not include anonymous reporting, while the Air Force policy and a new Navy policy do. Officials from ODMEO said that providing an option for anonymous reporting is important because it increases the odds that incidents will be reported. ODMEO officials also told us that the services have hotlines that servicemembers can use to anonymously report complaints of sexual harassment, and the Air Force and Navy policies note that their respective military servicemembers have options for anonymous reporting. While the military services may have mechanisms in place for anonymous reporting of sexual harassment, these mechanisms are not included in OSD’s policy—as required by section 579—or the policies of two of the Services, those of the Army and the Marine Corps. Without including anonymous reporting of sexual harassment complaints in DOD’s sexual harassment policies, the statutory requirement for anonymous reporting may be interpreted and applied inconsistently throughout the military services, or left unmet. OSD is developing a new policy—planned to be issued in fiscal year 2018—that will specifically focus on various forms of harassment, including sexual harassment, hazing, and bullying. ODMEO officials who are developing the new policy stated that it is intended, among other things, to enhance oversight of sexual harassment prevention and response within the department. However, because the policy is under development, it is too early to determine how the policy will address the CDC principles and anonymous reporting, as discussed earlier. Further, it is unclear how OSD plans to improve oversight and whether it intends to include performance goals, objectives, milestones, and metrics as we previously recommended in 2011. Although OSD in 2014 directed the military services to improve their oversight of sexual harassment, none of the military services were able to demonstrate that they had implemented all the required elements. Specifically, DOD’s 2014 policy memorandum addressing the provisions of section 579 also directs the military services to develop a sexual harassment oversight framework to be reviewed quarterly by a senior leadership forum that includes long-term goals, objectives, and milestones; criteria for measuring progress; results-oriented performance measures to assess effectiveness of service sexual harassment policies and programs; standards for holding leaders accountable for promoting, supporting, and enforcing policies, plans and programs; and strategies to implement the oversight framework. While some of the military services have included elements of the oversight framework directive from the 2014 policy memorandum, none of them were able to provide information that demonstrated that they had fulfilled all requirements set forth by that policy memorandum. For instance, when asked, none of the military services were able to provide details that they have senior leader forums that review their oversight efforts on a quarterly basis. Officials from the Air Force told us that they were waiting for ODMEO to release a new sexual harassment policy before establishing the oversight framework. Officials from the Navy referred us to their July 2017 sexual harassment policy, which instructs the Navy Sexual Harassment Prevention and Equal Opportunity Office to develop and implement standards for holding leaders accountable for promoting, supporting, and enforcing sexual harassment prevention and response policies, plans, and programs, and to develop results-oriented performance measures to assess the effectiveness of sexual harassment prevention and response policies and programs. Officials from the Army referred us to their SHARP Campaign Plan, which outlines methods to hold leaders accountable for taking appropriate action to address sexual harassment; goals and objectives for the program; and ways to measure program effectiveness. The Marine Corps did not respond to our request for information regarding an oversight framework for sexual harassment. A new department-wide policy on sexual harassment could be helpful to the military services as they review and update their respective policies. As noted earlier, military service policies have some differences in how they address aspects of sexual harassment. The Marine Corps told us that they have been waiting for additional guidance from OSD before updating their sexual harassment policies. However, following publicized incidents of Marines posting inappropriate photos on line of female servicemembers without their consent, the Marine Corps updated its guidance in May 2017 adding “the distribution or broadcasting of an intimate image, without consent” to its list of sexual harassment incidents that mandate separation processing. Additionally, in May 2017, a Marine Corps official said the service was revising its sexual harassment policy. The Navy updated its sexual harassment policy in July 2017 without additional guidance from OSD. We also noted during our review that most existing policies have not yet been updated to reflect a provision in the fiscal year 2017 NDAA that redefined sexual harassment for certain purposes so it is no longer defined solely as a form of sex discrimination but is recognized also as an adverse behavior on the spectrum of behavior that can contribute to an increase in the incidence of sexual assault. We asked DOD officials from several offices about the implications of this change. They identified some actions they will take, but the full implications, if any, of the change are unclear. Officials from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness said that there are no significant implications of the sexual harassment definition change beyond making conforming revisions to policy documents and guidance. ODMEO officials said that adjusting to the new definition of sexual harassment would not significantly affect their work at the OSD level, since they are already updating their sexual harassment policy to reflect this change and since sexual harassment is expected to remain within the responsibilities of ODMEO. They added that the military services will likely have to adjust to the new definition of sexual harassment, but did not offer details in how they would have to adjust. The Navy’s new policy dated July 2017 reflects the new definition, but the other military services have yet to incorporate the change. Officials from SAPRO said that they are working with ODMEO to revise surveys on unwanted sexual behaviors to reflect the new definition. SAPRO officials further stated that sexual harassment should remain under ODMEO’s purview since ODMEO personnel are trained specifically in sexual harassment response. Officials from the Army’s SHARP program said that the new definition means that sexual harassment will more often be considered misconduct, and taken more seriously. Since OSD is in the process of updating its policy, we are not making any recommendations. However, it will be important for OSD and the military services to address our prior recommendation regarding improving the oversight framework as well as incorporating the new definition of sexual harassment required by the fiscal year 2017 NDAA while updating their policies. DOD has processes for maintaining and reporting consistent data on sexual assault incidents and domestic violence incidents that involve sexual assault, but the department does not have similar assurance of consistent data on incidents of sexual harassment. SAPRO and FAP each use centralized databases that enable them to maintain and report consistent data on those incidents that fall under their purview. In contrast, DOD relies on military service-specific databases on sexual harassment incidents and does not have assurance of consistent data from these databases because it has not established standard data elements and definitions to guide the military services in maintaining and reporting these data. DOD uses centralized databases to maintain and report data on sexual assault incidents in the military and domestic violence incidents involving sexual assault. Specifically, SAPRO and the military services use the Defense Sexual Assault Incident Database (DSAID), and FAP uses the DOD Central Registry. These databases maintain data on incidents that are included in statutorily required annual reports to Congress on sexual assaults in the military. In 2011, Congress mandated that DOD provide annual reports that include: the number of sexual assaults committed against and by members of the armed forces that were reported to military officials, including unsubstantiated and substantiated reports with a synopsis of each substantiated case organized by offense and the action taken, including disciplinary actions; the policies, processes, and procedures implemented by the Secretary concerned during the year covered by the report in response to incidents of sexual assaults; the number of substantiated sexual assault cases in which the victim is deployed where the assailant is a foreign national; and a description of the implementation of the accessibility plan, including a description of the steps taken to ensure that trained personnel, appropriate supplies, and transportation resources are available to deployed units. The most recent DOD annual report on sexual assault was issued in May 2017 and covered fiscal year 2016. The report includes data on the number of both restricted and unrestricted reports of sexual assault involving servicemembers. The report also contains separate enclosures for the Army, the Navy (including the Marine Corps), the Air Force, and the National Guard, as well as annexes on the Workplace and Gender Relations Survey of Active Duty Members (WGRA) and the Military Investigation and Justice Experience Survey (MIJES). The WGRA annex discusses topics including the continuum of harm and the MIJES annex contains information on closed cases of sexual assault. SAPRO and FAP both contributed sexual assault incident data to the fiscal year 2016 report, and our review of the underlying databases found that data elements and definitions were defined and management was able to process the data into consistent information. Specifically, the two databases used are the: DSAID Data on Sexual Assault Incidents: DSAID captures DOD-wide data on certain incidents of sexual assault that involve a servicemember or in some cases, when a sexual assault involves a servicemember’s spouse or adult family member or a DOD civilian or contractor. However, FAP-related sexual assault incidents are not captured in DSAID. Using information generated by DSAID, SAPRO includes both substantiated and unsubstantiated reports of sexual assault in its annual report. In 2017, we reviewed DSAID and found that DOD had taken steps to ensure the quality and consistency of data in DSAID as well as to monitor the data entered into the system. In addition, OSD had provided the military services with definitions for required data elements in the database, which include details on the incident, victim, and alleged offender. In addition, we identified several technical challenges with the system, including issues with the system’s speed and ease of use; interfaces with other external DOD databases; and users’ ability to query data and generate reports. At the time of the report’s release, DOD had plans to modify DSAID. As of July 2017, DOD officials told us that they are still in the process of making modifications to DSAID to resolve or alleviate the technical challenges for users. DOD Central Registry Data on Domestic Abuse Incidents Involving Sexual Assault: The DOD Central Registry captures DOD-wide data on reports of domestic abuse on populations within FAP’s purview, including on family members of servicemembers as well as on their intimate partners. The DOD Central Registry includes details of each case such as the status of cases, the demographics of the perpetrator and victim, the specific type of abuse, and other details surrounding the incident. FAP officials explained that they do not use the “substantiated” and “unsubstantiated” terminology like SAPRO does. Rather, FAP, which is not responsible for determining criminal or legal disposition, uses the terms “met criteria” and “not met criteria” for maltreatment. This difference in terminology has to do with FAP’s process for determining if an incident meets the clinical criteria to be classified as abuse for the purpose of developing an intervention/treatment plan for both the victim and the offenders involved in the allegations of domestic violence. Incidents that are determined as having met criteria are entered into the DOD Central Registry. We reviewed the DOD Central Registry and found that it includes well defined data elements and descriptions for collecting data on cases of domestic violence including those that involve sexual assault. The data in the DOD Central Registry includes 46 discrete data elements, including the relationship between the victim and perpetrator, the timeline of the case, and actions taken and treatments administered in response to the incident. The elements are defined and described in an OSD policy. In its annual reporting to Congress, FAP provides the number of domestic violence incidents involving sexual assault that met criteria and the total number of instances of domestic violence that did not meet criteria. However, FAP does not maintain or report data on the total number of reported domestic violence incidents that specifically involve sexual assault. That is because only the details of cases that meet criteria are recorded in the DOD Central Registry. A FAP official said that the military services likely have more detailed information about cases that did not meet the criteria, but it does not collect these data in the DOD Central Registry. A provision in the NDAA for FY 2017 requires DOD to submit an annual report on child abuse and domestic abuse incident data, including the number of incidents reported during the year involving the physical or sexual abuse of a spouse, intimate partner, or child. This report is to be submitted simultaneously with submission of DOD’s annual sexual assault report to Congress. FAP officials told us that they are currently working with SAPRO to ensure that all reported incidents of domestic violence involving sexual assault, including those that did not meet the criteria, are included in the annual sexual assault report. Though not required to do so, DOD has included sexual harassment incident data in an appendix of its annual report on sexual assault in the military. The appendix provides information on the total number of sexual harassment reports over the fiscal year and the total number of substantiated sexual harassment reports. It also breaks down complaints by sex, service, and pay grade. ODMEO generates the reported data through annual data calls to each military service; however, it does not have assurance that the services maintain consistent data on sexual harassment incidents consistent with federal standards of internal control. The military services maintain sexual harassment incident data in military service-specific databases, and there is no centralized database similar to DSAID or the Central Registry. The military service databases are intended to collect data on formal complaints. According to the military services, the Army, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps use web-based systems, and the Navy tracks data using an Excel spreadsheet. Each service has a discrete process for entering and performing quality checks on sexual harassment incident data in its respective database, as shown in table 2. Although the military services perform some data quality checks as shown in table 2, ODMEO does not have assurance the military services are maintaining consistent data because it has not defined standard data elements and definitions for the information in their databases. Rather, the individual military services have established their own data elements and definitions. We compared data elements and definitions from each of the military services and found that there are several data elements that remain consistent throughout the services. For example, each military service records whether the complainant and offender are in the same unit, what their relationship is to each other, and the disposition of cases. However, we also found inconsistencies in data fields and their definitions across the military services, and some of the military services have data fields and definitions that do not exist in other databases. For example, the Marine Corps records whether or not the incident involves alcohol or drug use, which the rest of the military services do not record, and the military services record dates differently between their respective databases. For example, the Air Force records an initial date, the date the complaint form was signed, the date the general court martial was sent, the date the legal review was completed, and the final review date. The Marine Corps records the date the incident was reported, the date the incident occurred and whether the incident occurred over multiple dates; the dates associated with notifications and status updates to general courts martial proceedings; the dates associated with steps in the investigation, including any extensions; the dates associated with dispositions; and the dates associated with appeals. Additionally, the military services have different ways of categorizing sexual harassment incidents, as shown in table 3. As shown in table 3, while some data descriptions are similar—for instance, each of the military services include crude/offensive behavior, unwanted sexual attention, and sexual coercion—there are differences as well. The Air Force also categorizes sexual harassment into verbal, nonverbal, physical, and other, for example, whereas the other military services’ top-level categories are different. The Navy has a “not applicable” category that it describes as sexual harassment complaints that do not fall under sexual harassment, and only the Air Force has an “other” category. Because the military services have different descriptors for similar data fields, DOD cannot ensure that the services are categorizing similar types of sexual harassment in the same way. In addition, we found that the Army is more detailed in characterizing different types of sexual harassment. Specifically, as shown in table 4, the Army has an additional data field that provides more detailed descriptions of three types of sexual harassment; the other military services’ respective databases do not have this level of detail. Because the Army has this additional data field, it can capture information on multiple types of harassment that may occur in a single incident. The other military services, in contrast, do not have this capability in their respective databases. To illustrate, if one case of sexual harassment involved both verbal and nonverbal forms of sexual harassment, the Army could choose a more specific characterization to describe the incident, while the other military services would characterize the incident in more general terms. ODMEO officials are considering adapting an existing system to track instances of sexual harassment department-wide. That system, called Force Risk Reduction (FR2), is currently used to track safety issues like military injuries, civilian workers’ compensation claims, and casualty notifications at DOD. ODMEO recently completed a pilot of the system with the Marine Corps, the Navy, and the Army to test whether it would be useable for adaptation for sexual harassment data, and is planning a second pilot to include the Air Force and the National Guard Bureau. According to ODMEO officials, their adaptation of FR2 is intended to collect aggregate-level sexual harassment data from the military services, and the military services will continue to operate and rely on their individual databases to maintain more detailed case-level information on incidents. For example, ODMEO’s adaptation of FR2 would not have details such as descriptions of specific incidents, or information on dates associated with investigations or appeals. These types of data will continue to be maintained in the service systems. ODMEO officials told us that their new data system, if implemented, is not designed to collect case-level details in order to avoid personally identifiable information. Federal internal control standards state that management should define the identified information requirements at the relevant level and requisite specificity for appropriate personnel. Management should also process the obtained data into quality information. Consistency of information meets the identified information requirements when relevant data from reliable sources are used. While DOD is exploring implementing a system to track instances of sexual harassment department-wide, as currently planned this system will not collect case-level details and individual military service systems will continue to be relied upon for this type of information. Inconsistencies in data elements and definitions among the military services generally mean that one military service may be maintaining sexual harassment data that are more or less detailed than sexual harassment data maintained by other military services, or that is simply different from the data maintained by other military services. Additionally, inconsistent data elements and definitions may create difficulties in reporting sexual harassment data from the military services to OSD for a department-wide report, since ODMEO has to adapt data from the services to fit reporting requirements. Without standard data elements and definitions for sexual harassment data, DOD will continue to lack assurance about the consistency of these data across the military services. DOD has several overarching efforts to address unwanted sexual behaviors across the continuum of harm. Specifically, the department established an office to oversee the integration and coordination of unwanted sexual behaviors in 2015 and is in the process of developing an overarching prevention strategy. However, because the strategy is under development, it is unclear whether it will contain key elements for long-term and results-oriented strategic planning. DOD also has ongoing collaborative efforts to address unwanted sexual behaviors along the continuum of harm. Specifically, we identified 15 collaborative efforts, including regular meetings, Integrated Product Teams, and working groups that involve multiple entities that address unwanted sexual behaviors. DOD has taken steps to integrate activities related to the continuum of harm and is in the process of developing an overarching prevention strategy. Based on its research, DOD has sought to understand and define the continuum of harm, including the shared characteristics that contribute to increased unwanted sexual behaviors along the continuum and implications for prevention and response efforts. Also, in November 2015, DOD established a new entity—the Office of the Executive Director for Force Resiliency, within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness—to oversee policies and initiatives related to the continuum of harm. Specifically, the Executive Director for Force Resiliency was expected to provide senior leader policy guidance and oversight on high visibility departments that include SAPRO and ODMEO. In November 2016, the Office of the Executive Director for Force Resiliency was absorbed under the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness. According to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness, the functions of the Office of the Executive Director for Force Resiliency remain and coordination of the efforts of several offices that address the continuum of harm continues. Officials from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness and SAPRO told us that they are drafting an overarching prevention strategy to encompass behaviors along the continuum of harm. However, because the strategy is still under development, its contents and timelines are unclear. We have previously identified six elements of strategic management planning that are key for establishing a long-term, results- oriented strategic planning framework: (1) a mission statement, (2) long- term goals, (3) strategies to achieve goals, (4) external factors that could affect goals, (5) the use of metrics to gauge progress, and (6) evaluations of the plan to monitor goals and objectives. By incorporating the elements of a comprehensive and results-oriented strategy into its overarching prevention strategy, the department will be better positioned to effectively coordinate and integrate prevention activities and reduce unwanted sexual behaviors. A mission statement, along with long-term goals and strategies to achieve those goals, should help to focus efforts in integrating prevention activities, and metrics and evaluations will allow the department to gauge progress and make changes as necessary, while also accounting for external factors that may impact progress towards goals. Our review identified 15 collaborative efforts that DOD has used to address behaviors along the continuum of harm, including sexual harassment, sexual assault, and domestic violence involving sexual assault. Three of these efforts are cross-cutting between all three of the key OSD stakeholders—ODMEO, FAP, and SAPRO—and five involve cross-cutting efforts by at least two of the key stakeholders. Figure 1 lists DOD’s 15 collaborative efforts. Regarding the three cross-cutting efforts involving all three of the key stakeholders, The Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Integrated Product Team provides a forum for OSD, the military departments, and the National Guard Bureau to address sexual assault prevention efforts. The team meets bimonthly and serves as the implementation and oversight arm for DOD’s Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) program. The team also coordinates new policies; reviews existing SAPR policies and programs to ensure they are consistent with applicable instructions; and monitors the progress of program elements including DOD’s SAPR strategic plan tasks, DOD’s sexual assault prevention strategy tasks, and implementation of NDAA- related sexual assault issues. SAPRO leads this effort. The Prevention Collaboration Forum and working group develops coordinated prevention approaches that address factors impacting personnel readiness such as sexual harassment, sexual assault, and domestic violence involving sexual assault. According to its proposed charter, the focus of the forum is on enhancing the health of military unit and family climates as well as strengthening and promoting the resiliency and readiness of the total force through a coordinated effort around integrated policies, collaborative direction of research, alignment of resources, analysis of gaps, and synchronization of activities. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness leads this effort with SAPRO providing administrative and facilitation support. The Victim Assistance Leadership Council advises the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness on policies and practices related to victim assistance across DOD. According to its charter, the council provides a forum for senior leaders to exchange information and collaborate on issues affecting victims of all forms of crime and harassment within DOD, including but not limited to victims of sexual harassment, sexual assault, and domestic violence involving sexual abuse. Leadership rotates between SAPRO, FAP, and ODMEO and other offices. Regarding the cross-cutting efforts involving two of the three key stakeholders, the Sexual Harassment Prevention and Response Working Group is led by ODMEO and includes SAPRO. The group was established to evaluate how to best position sexual harassment prevention and response policy and oversight and to leverage technology to automate annual reporting requirements. The four other cross-cutting efforts are (1) the hazing and bullying working group, (2) retaliation working groups created under the SAPR Integrated Process Team, (3) domestic abuse rapid improvement events, and (4) ODMEO and SHARP meetings. The remaining collaborative efforts we identified are specific to FAP, SAPRO, and ODMEO. For example, the Sexual Assault Prevention Roundtable is a forum for representatives from OSD, the military departments, and the National Guard Bureau to share information on sexual assault prevention efforts and requirements. According to its charter, the roundtable’s activities include, among other things, sharing promising practices and prevention updates; discussing challenges in prevention program implementation, including servicemember training, and identifying approaches to address them; identifying metrics to assess the impact and effectiveness of prevention efforts, and opportunities to collaborate on research projects; and tracking the implementation of prevention tasks identified in the DOD SAPR strategy. SAPRO leads this effort. The Defense Diversity Working Group is an ODMEO-specific group that collaborates with various OSD and military service offices on military and civilian diversity and inclusion issues and implements mandated diversity plans and programs. Studies by DOD and others have shown that unwanted sexual behaviors do not exist in isolation but are part of a range of interconnected, inappropriate behaviors that are connected to the occurrence of a sexual assault. While DOD has policies and procedures to prevent and respond to these types of unwanted behaviors, some of the policies do not include key elements like anonymous reporting of sexual harassment and principles in the CDC framework for sexual violence prevention. Fully including these elements in the department’s policies can help ensure that the military services are interpreting and applying prevention and response efforts consistently and may also decrease the risk of perpetration or victimization related to instances on unwanted sexual behaviors. Further, DOD has developed reliable data systems for collecting and reporting data on some of the unwanted sexual behaviors including sexual assault and instances of domestic violence with sexual assault. However, inconsistencies in sexual harassment data elements and definitions may be creating difficulties in developing department-wide reports on unwanted sexual behaviors. Improving and standardizing data collection efforts will not only improve the quality of data that DOD and the military services collect but may also increase the ability for DOD to further develop its understanding of the connection between unwanted sexual behaviors. Finally, DOD officials have stated that they are in the early stages of developing an overarching strategy to address the interconnected nature of the range of unwanted sexual behaviors. To ensure that the department is appropriately concentrating its efforts to prevent and respond to the full range of unwanted behaviors, it is important that DOD include elements of a long-term, results-oriented strategy into its overarching prevention strategy. In doing so, DOD will be in a better position to effectively coordinate and integrate prevention activities and ultimately reduce instances of unwanted sexual behaviors. We are making the following four recommendations to DOD: The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness should fully include in the new policy for sexual harassment the principles in the Centers for Disease Control’s framework for sexual violence prevention, including risk and protective factors, risk domains, and tertiary strategies. (Recommendation 1) The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness should include in the new policy for sexual harassment mechanisms for anonymous reporting of incidents consistent with section 579 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2013. (Recommendation 2) The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness should (1) direct the Office of Diversity Management and Equal Opportunity to develop standard data elements and definitions for maintaining and reporting information on sexual harassment incidents at the military service level, and (2) direct the military services to incorporate these data elements and definitions into their military service-specific databases. (Recommendation 3) The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness should direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness to incorporate in its continuum of harm prevention strategy all the elements that are key for establishing a long-term, results-oriented strategic planning framework. The elements are (1) a mission statement, (2) long-term goals, (3) strategies to achieve goals, (4) external factors that could affect goals, (5) use of metrics to gauge progress, and (6) evaluations of the plan to monitor goals and objectives. (Recommendation 4) We provided a draft of this report to DOD and CDC for review and comment. In its written comments, DOD concurred with three recommendations and partially concurred with one, noting planned actions to address this recommendation. DOD’s comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix II. DOD and CDC also provided technical comments, which we incorporated into the report as appropriate. DOD concurred with our three recommendations that DOD fully include in the new policy for sexual harassment the principles in the CDC's framework for sexual violence prevention, that DOD also include in the new sexual harassment policy mechanisms for anonymous reporting, and that DOD incorporate in its continuum of harm strategy all the elements that are key for establishing a long-term, results-oriented strategic planning framework. With regard to our recommendation that DOD develop standard data elements and definitions for maintaining and reporting information on sexual harassment incidents and direct the military services to incorporate these into their databases, DOD partially concurred and stated that while a 2013 policy memorandum provides standard data elements and definitions, the services collect other data elements based on their unique needs. DOD stated that ODMEO will conduct a review to determine compliance with DOD reporting requirements and identify emerging policy modifications or changes/additions to standard definitions. We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, and the Director, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-3604 or farrellb@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix III. To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has policies on sexual harassment that include Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) principles and relevant legislative elements, we obtained and reviewed Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and service-level sexual harassment policies. We compared the policies with a framework developed by the CDC for preventing sexual violence, which CDC defines as including non-contact unwanted sexual behaviors, sexual harassment, and physical sexual assault. CDC’s model is based on the concept of addressing the health of a given population based on common risk and protective factors and effective, tested strategies. We reviewed CDC’s framework for preventing sexual violence as well as our report on DOD’s sexual assault prevention strategy to identify six principles that an organization can include in a sexual violence prevention strategy or policy: Risk factors: Factors that may put people at risk for sexual violence perpetration or victimization, such as an organizational climate that either explicitly or implicitly condones sexual harassment; Protective factors: Factors that may protect high-risk people from harm, such as an organizational climate that promotes respect among personnel at all levels; Primary strategies for prevention: Strategies that occur before sexual violence takes place to prevent initial perpetration, such as sexual harassment prevention training; Secondary strategies for prevention: Immediate responses after sexual violence has occurred to address the early identification of victims and the short-term consequences of violence, such as reporting mechanisms and immediate interventions; Tertiary strategies for prevention: Long-term responses after sexual violence has occurred to address the lasting consequences of violence and sex-offender treatment interventions, such as the long- term treatment of the victim and perpetrator; and Risk domains: Levels at which risk and protective factors should be categorized, including: individual, relationship, community, and society. DOD has previously adapted risk domains to the military population, using the levels of: individual, relationship, leaders at all levels, military community, and society. DOD previously used CDC’s framework for preventing sexual violence in the department’s 2014-2016 Sexual Assault Prevention Strategy. In addition, we reviewed the OSD and service-level sexual harassment policies to determine the extent to which they included three elements identified in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY 2013, which directed DOD to develop a comprehensive policy that includes sexual harassment prevention training for the armed forces; mechanisms for reporting incidents, including mechanisms for anonymous reporting; and mechanisms for responding to and resolving instances of sexual harassment, including for the prosecution of perpetrators. Two GAO analysts independently reviewed the policies and determined whether or not each element was included. Any discrepancies were resolved through discussion and consultation with a third analyst. We interviewed officials in the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness’ Office of Diversity Management and Equal Opportunity, who oversee department- wide policy on sexual harassment, to obtain an understanding of their roles and processes regarding sexual harassment as well as the status of policy development in that area. We also interviewed officials from military equal opportunity offices in the Air Force, the Navy, and the Marine Corps, as well as officials from the Army’s Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention Office to obtain an understanding of the service sexual harassment offices and roles, as well as the status of updates to their respective policies. To determine the extent to which DOD has processes for maintaining and reporting consistent data on incidents of unwanted sexual behaviors, we reviewed DOD reports to Congress that provide incident data regarding unwanted sexual behaviors, including DOD’s most recent annual report on sexual assault in the military. We identified the databases that generate the reported data and evaluated the processes for assuring the quality and consistency of data in those databases—including the Defense Sexual Assault Incident Database, which maintains sexual assault data; the Central Registry database, which maintains data on domestic violence involving sexual assault; and various military service- level databases that maintain sexual harassment data. To evaluate DOD’s reported data we reviewed pertinent statutory provisions, DOD guidance, and the Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government that address agencies’ use of quality data and our prior reports evaluating sexual assault data. In evaluating the reported data, we obtained and reviewed statutory provisions with reporting requirements, as well as DOD guidance on data collection for sexual harassment, sexual assault, and domestic violence involving sexual abuse. With regard to DOD efforts to collect and maintain sexual assault data, we met with OSD, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps officials in their respective Sexual Assault Prevention and Response offices as well as officials in the Army’s Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention office. We also reviewed our prior report on DOD’s Defense Sexual Assault Incident Database and our prior report that evaluated sexual assault data across agencies. To determine whether DOD has processes for collecting and maintaining consistent data for domestic violence with sexual assault, we obtained and compared data elements and processes from DOD’s Central Registry database, which contains data for domestic violence throughout the department. We also obtained and reviewed policies that outline processes for collecting and reporting domestic violence involving sexual abuse data, and interviewed officials from Family Advocacy Program offices in OSD and the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force to determine data reliability and comprehensiveness. To determine the extent to which reports of sexual assault, including reports of sexual assault among servicemembers and reports of domestic abuse involving sexual assault, meet statutory requirements for reporting, we reviewed DOD reports to Congress that provide sexual assault incident data, including DOD’s most recent annual report on sexual assault in the military and compared those reports with requirements in the NDAA for FY 2011, which directs DOD to report the total number of substantiated and unsubstantiated sexual assault incidents, among other things. With regard to sexual harassment data, we interviewed officials in the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness’ Office of Diversity Management and Equal Opportunity, as well as officials from the Military Equal Opportunity offices in the Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy, and officials from the Army Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention office. We collected and compared data fields and data definitions from the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force offices that address sexual harassment. We compared the data elements to determine whether the data elements and definitions across the services are consistent. To identify the extent to which DOD has overarching efforts, including a prevention strategy, to address unwanted sexual behaviors across the continuum of harm, we met with officials in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness and DOD’s Sexual Assault Prevention and Response office. We reviewed our prior work and provisions from the Government Performance and Results Act to identify key elements that should be included in strategic plans as well as standards for coordinating within agencies. Key elements include (1) mission statement, (2) long-term goals, (3) strategies to achieve goals, (4) external factors that could affect goals, (5) use of metrics to gauge progress, and (6) evaluations of the plan to monitor goals and objectives. We identified and reviewed coordinating mechanisms used by OSD and the service offices that guide and oversee efforts to address unwanted sexual behaviors. We reviewed DOD, RAND Corporation, and CDC reports that addressed the continuum of harm and the relationship between the various forms of unwanted sexual behaviors. We interviewed officials from OSD and service-level Sexual Assault Prevention and Response, Family Advocacy, and Military Equal Opportunity offices and the Army’s Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention to identify the various efforts in which they participate. We also collected and reviewed charters and meeting notes for integrated product teams and working groups to identify their intended purposes, their activities, their membership, and whether they involved multiple offices addressing unwanted sexual behaviors. In identifying DOD’s collaborative efforts, we also reviewed our prior work on collaboration among federal agencies but we did not assess the effectiveness of department’s collaborative efforts. We conducted this performance audit from August 2016 to December 2017 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. In addition to the staff named above, key contributors to this report include Thomas Gosling (Assistant Director); Isabel Band; Matthew Bond; Vincent Buquicchio; Caroline DeCelles; Mae Jones; Kirsten Lauber; and Brian Pegram. Sexual Assault: Better Resource Management Needed to Improve Prevention and Response in the Army National Guard and Army Reserve. GAO-17-217. Washington, D.C.: February 27, 2017. Military Personnel: DOD Has Processes for Operating and Managing Its Sexual Assault Incident Database. GAO-17-99. Washington, D.C.: January 10, 2017. Sexual Violence Data: Actions Needed to Improve Clarity and Address Differences Across Federal Data Collection Efforts. GAO-16-546. Washington, D.C.: July 19, 2016. DOD and Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Increase Oversight and Management Information on Hazing Incidents Involving Servicemembers. GAO-16-226. Washington, D.C.: February 9, 2016. Sexual Assault: Actions Needed to Improve DOD’s Prevention Strategy and to Help Ensure It Is Effectively Implemented. GAO-16-61. Washington, D.C.: November 4, 2015. Military Personnel: Actions Needed to Address Sexual Assaults of Male Servicemembers. GAO-15-284. Washington, D.C.: March 19, 2015. Military Personnel: DOD Needs to Take Further Actions to Prevent Sexual Assault during Initial Military Training. GAO-14-806. Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2014. Military Personnel: DOD Has Taken Steps to Meet the Health Needs of Deployed Servicewomen, but Actions Are Needed to Enhance Care for Sexual Assault Victims. GAO-13-182. Washington, D.C.: January 29, 2013. Preventing Sexual Harassment: DOD Needs Greater Leadership Commitment and an Oversight Framework. GAO-11-809. Washington, D.C.: September 21, 2011. Military Justice: Oversight and Better Collaboration Needed for Sexual Assault Investigations and Adjudications. GAO-11-579. Washington, D.C.: June 22, 2011. Military Personnel: DOD’s and the Coast Guard’s Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Programs Need to Be Further Strengthened. GAO-10-405T. Washington, D.C.: February 24, 2010. Military Personnel: Additional Actions Are Needed to Strengthen DOD’s and the Coast Guard’s Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Programs. GAO-10-215. Washington, D.C.: February 3, 2010. Military Personnel: DOD’s and the Coast Guard’s Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Programs Face Implementation and Oversight Challenges. GAO-08-924. Washington, D.C.: August 29, 2008. Military Personnel: The DOD and Coast Guard Academies Have Taken Steps to Address Incidents of Sexual Harassment and Assault, but Greater Federal Oversight Is Needed. GAO-08-296. Washington, D.C.: January 17, 2008.	[ "Unwanted sexual behaviors in the military—including sexual harassment, sexual assault, and domestic violence involving sexual assault—undermine core values, unit cohesion, combat readiness, and public goodwill. Recent studies suggest that these behaviors are part of a “continuum of harm,” which DOD defines as a range of interconnected, inappropriate behaviors that are connected to the occurrence of sexual assault and that support an environment that tolerates these behaviors. Senate Report 114-255 included a provision for GAO to review efforts by DOD to prevent unwanted sexual behaviors in the military. GAO assessed the extent to which DOD has (1) policies on sexual harassment that include CDC principles and relevant legislative elements; (2) processes for maintaining and reporting consistent data on incidents of unwanted sexual behaviors; and (3) overarching efforts, including a prevention strategy, to address unwanted sexual behaviors across the continuum of harm. GAO reviewed DOD policies and pertinent databases, and interviewed agency officials. The Department of Defense's (DOD) policies on sexual harassment include some but not all of the Centers for Disease Control's (CDC) principles for preventing sexual violence and include most relevant legislative elements. GAO identified six principles from CDC's framework for preventing sexual violence, which CDC defines as including sexual harassment. GAO found that Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and military service policies generally include CDC's principles regarding prevention strategies, but none address risk and protective factors, which identify conditions or behaviors that might heighten or lower the risk of sexual harassment victimization or perpetration, respectively. Additionally, a statutory provision in fiscal year 2013 mandated that DOD, among other things, develop a comprehensive sexual harassment policy that includes prevention training, mechanisms for anonymous reporting, and mechanisms for resolving incidents of sexual harassment. OSD and service policies are generally consistent with those required elements except for the inclusion of anonymous reporting. DOD is developing a new department-wide policy that will address sexual harassment, but it is too early to determine how the policy will address these issues. Without policies that include CDC's principles and mechanisms for anonymous reporting, DOD may miss opportunities to address and potentially reduce incidents of unwanted sexual behaviors. Finally, a statutory change in fiscal year 2017 redefined sexual harassment for certain purposes so it is no longer defined solely as a form of sex discrimination but is recognized also as an adverse behavior on the spectrum of behavior that can contribute to an increase in the incidence of sexual assault. While officials indicated a need to update policies, they were unclear on the full implications, if any, of this change. DOD has processes for maintaining and reporting consistent data on incidents of unwanted sexual behaviors including sexual assault and incidents of domestic violence that involve sexual assault, but does not have similar processes for maintaining and reporting data on incidents of sexual harassment. Specifically, DOD uses centralized databases to maintain and report data on incidents of sexual assault and domestic violence that involve sexual assault, but relies on military service-specific databases for information on incidents of sexual harassment. DOD has not established standard data elements and definitions to guide the services in maintaining and reporting data on sexual harassment. Inconsistencies in data elements and definitions generally mean that one service may be maintaining data that is more or less detailed than, or that differs from, the data maintained by other services. Such inconsistencies may create difficulties in reporting department-wide sexual harassment data, since the individual service data must be adapted to fit reporting requirements. DOD has several overarching efforts to address unwanted sexual behaviors across the continuum of harm, including developing an overarching prevention strategy. However, it is unclear whether the strategy under development will contain key elements for long-term and results-oriented strategic planning such as long-term goals, strategies to achieve goals, and metrics to gauge progress. Without incorporating these elements into its overarching prevention strategy, DOD may not be in a position to effectively coordinate and integrate prevention activities and reduce instances of unwanted sexual behaviors. GAO recommends that DOD fully include in its new policy on sexual harassment CDC's principles for sexual violence prevention and mechanisms for anonymous reporting, develop standard data elements and definitions for reporting sexual harassment incidents, and incorporate in its overarching prevention strategy elements key for a long-term, results-oriented strategy. DOD generally concurred with the recommendations." ]	10,143	gov_report	en	null	dfac814ff0822cacb9cbfcad27e38bf53c2bdbecec14f63d
The Secret Service plays a critical role in protecting the President, Vice President, their immediate families, and national leaders, among others. In addition, the component is responsible for safeguarding the nation’s currency and financial payment systems. To accomplish its mission, Secret Service officials reported that, as of June 2018, the component had approximately 7,100 employees (including the Uniformed Division, special agents, and administrative, professional, and technical staff). These employees were assigned to the component’s headquarters in Washington, D.C., and 133 field offices located throughout the world (including 115 domestic offices and 18 international offices). The Secret Service’s employees are heavily dependent on the component’s IT infrastructure and communications systems to perform their daily duties. According to data reported on the Office of Management and Budget’s IT Dashboard, the component planned to spend approximately $104.8 million in fiscal year 2018 to modernize and maintain its IT environment. To manage this IT environment, the Secret Service hired a full-time CIO in November 2015. In addition, in an effort to improve its management structure, the component consolidated all IT staff and assets under this new CIO in March 2017. OCIO officials stated that these staff include the government employees who provide direct and indirect support of the day-to-day operations of the Secret Service’s enterprise systems and services. According to Secret Service officials, the component’s IT workforce included 190 staff, as of July 2018. These officials stated that 166 of these employees were located in the component’s headquarters in Washington, D.C., and 24 were located in domestic field offices. The officials also reported that these July 2018 staffing levels were below their current approved staffing level of 220 staff (which included 44 positions in domestic field offices). Secret Service IT staff also deploy to other locations, as necessary, to provide support for certain security activities. For example, the Secret Service reported that, in 2017, OCIO deployed over 79 staff to New York, N.Y., to provide communications support during the United Nations General Assembly. As a component of DHS, the Secret Service must follow the department’s policies and processes for managing acquisitions, including IT acquisitions. DHS categorizes its acquisition programs according to three levels that are determined by the life cycle costs of the programs. These levels then determine the extent of required program and project management and the acquisition decision authority (the individual responsible for management and oversight of the acquisition). The department also categorizes its acquisition programs as major or non- major based on expected cost. Table 1 describes the levels of DHS’s acquisition programs and their associated acquisition decision authorities. DHS’s policies and processes for managing major acquisition programs are primarily set forth in its Acquisition Management Directive 102-01 and Acquisition Management Instruction 102-01-001. In particular, these policies establish that a major acquisition program’s decision authority is to review the program at a series of predetermined acquisition decision events to assess whether the program is ready to proceed through the acquisition life cycle phases. Figure 1 depicts the acquisition life cycle established in DHS acquisition management policy. DHS’s Acquisition Management Directive and Instruction do not establish an acquisition life cycle framework for the department’s non-major acquisition programs. Instead, according to the Instruction, Component Acquisition Executives (i.e., the senior acquisition official within a component that is responsible for implementation, management, and oversight of the component’s acquisition process) are required to establish component-specific non-major acquisition policies and guidance that support the “spirit and intent” of the department’s acquisition policies. To that end, the Secret Service developed a policy that establishes an acquisition life cycle framework for its non-major acquisition programs. This acquisition framework for the component’s non-major acquisition programs is consistent with the acquisition framework that DHS established for its major acquisition programs. In particular, the Secret Service’s framework includes the same phases and decision events as DHS’s framework (e.g., acquisition decision event 2A, the point at which the acquisition decision authority determines whether a program may proceed into the obtain phase). In addition, DHS’s Systems Engineering Life Cycle Instruction and Guidebook outline a framework of major systems engineering activities and technical reviews that are to be conducted by all DHS programs and projects, both major and non-major. This framework is intended to ensure that appropriate systems engineering activities are planned and implemented, and that a program’s development effort is meeting the business need. In particular, the systems engineering life cycle framework consists of nine major activities (e.g., requirements definition, integration, and testing) and a set of related technical reviews (e.g., preliminary design review) and artifacts (e.g., requirements documents). DHS policy allows programs to tailor these activities, technical reviews, and artifacts based on the unique characteristics of the program (e.g., scope, complexity, and risk). For example, a program may combine systems engineering technical reviews and artifacts, or add additional reviews. This tailored approach must be documented in a program’s systems engineering life cycle tailoring plan. The systems engineering technical reviews are intended to provide DHS the opportunity to determine how well a program has completed the necessary systems engineering activities. Each technical review includes a minimum set of exit criteria that must be satisfied before a program may move on to the next systems engineering activity. At the end of the technical review, the program manager must develop a technical review completion letter that documents the outcome of the review, including stakeholder concurrence that the exit criteria were satisfied. Moreover, DHS’s agile instruction, which was first issued in April 2016 and updated in April 2018, identifies agile as the preferred development approach for the department’s IT programs and projects. Agile is a type of incremental (i.e., modular) development, which calls for the rapid delivery of software in small, short increments rather than in the typically long, sequential phases of a traditional waterfall approach. DHS’s agile instruction also states that component CIOs are to set modular (i.e., incremental) outcomes and target measures to monitor progress in achieving agile implementation for IT programs and projects. To that end, the department identified core metrics that its agile IT programs are to use to monitor progress, including the number of story points completed per release and the number of releases per quarter. Further, DHS policy and guidance have established an acquisition (i.e., contract) review process that is intended to enable the DHS CIO to review and effectively guide the department’s IT expenditures. According to the department’s IT acquisition review guidance, DHS components with a CIO (which includes the Secret Service) are to submit to DHS OCIO for review, IT acquisitions that (1) have total estimated procurement values of $2.5 million or more; and (2) are funded by a level 1, 2, or 3 program with a life cycle cost estimate of at least $50 million (i.e., a major investment, as defined by DHS’s capital planning and investment control guidance). DHS policies and guidance also establish numerous responsibilities for the department’s component-level CIOs that are aimed at ensuring proper oversight and management of the components’ IT investments. Among other things, these component-level CIO responsibilities relate to topics such as IT budgeting, portfolio management, and oversight of programs’ systems engineering life cycles. Table 2 identifies 14 selected IT oversight responsibilities for DHS’s component CIOs. The Secret Service acquires IT infrastructure and services that are intended to improve its ability to execute its investigation and protection missions. According to data reported on the Office of Management and Budget’s IT Dashboard, the Secret Service planned to spend about $104.8 million on IT in fiscal year 2018, which included approximately $34.6 million for the development and modernization of its IT infrastructure and services, and about $70.2 million for the operations and maintenance of this infrastructure (including 21 existing IT systems). Also according to data reported on the IT Dashboard, as of April 2018, the Secret Service had one major IT investment (called the Information Integration and Technology Transformation and discussed in more detail later in this report), seven non-major IT investments, and one non- standard infrastructure investment. Figure 2 depicts the Secret Service’s planned IT spending for fiscal year 2018. The Secret Service has faced long-standing challenges in managing its IT infrastructure. For example, A National Security Agency audit of the Secret Service’s IT environment in 2008 identified network and system vulnerabilities that needed immediate remediation to protect the component’s systems and electronic information. The Secret Service determined in 2010 that it had IT capability gaps associated with three key areas: network security, information sharing and situational awareness, and operational communications. The component reported that it required a significant IT modernization effort with sustained investment of resources to replace dated and restrictive network and communications capabilities. The Secret Service also reported in 2010 that it had 42 mission- support applications that were operating on a 1980’s mainframe that lacked multi-level security (i.e., the ability to view classified information from two security levels, such as secret and top secret, at the same time), was beyond its equipment life cycle, and was at risk of failing. Further, in 2011, DHS’s Office of Inspector General reported that the Secret Service’s existing infrastructure did not meet current operational requirements. According to the Secret Service, this dated infrastructure was unable to support newer technologies (e.g., Internet protocol), share common DHS enterprise services, or migrate to the department’s consolidated data centers. To address challenges with its IT environment, in 2009, the Secret Service initiated the IITT investment, which is intended to modernize and enhance the component’s infrastructure, communications systems, applications, and processes. In particular, IITT is a portfolio of programs and projects that are meant to, among other things, improve systems availability in support of the Secret Service’s business operations, increase interoperability with other government systems and networks, enhance the component’s system and network security, and enable scalability to support growth. From 2010 to July 2018, according to OCIO officials, the Secret Service spent approximately $392 million on IITT. In fiscal year 2018, the component had planned to spend approximately $42.7 million on IITT (i.e., about 40 percent of its total planned IT spending for the fiscal year), according to data reported on the Office of Management and Budget’s IT Dashboard. In total, the planned life cycle cost estimate for IITT is at least $811 million. As of June 2018, IITT was a major investment comprised of two programs (one of which included three projects) and one standalone project (i.e., it was not part of another program) that had capabilities that were in planning or development and modernization. These programs and project were the Enabling Capabilities program, Enterprise Resource Management System program (which included three projects that were each being implemented using an agile methodology: Uniformed Division Resource Management System, Events Management, and Enterprise-wide Scheduling), and the Multi-Level Security project. Table 3 describes the IITT programs and projects that had capabilities that were in planning or development and modernization, as of June 2018. The table also includes the associated level, acquisition decision authority, estimated life cycle costs, and planned or actual dates of operational capability for each of the programs and projects. (Appendix II also provides additional information on these programs and projects.) The Enabling Capabilities program within IITT is designated as a major acquisition program. As such, its acquisition decision authority is the DHS Under Secretary for Management, and both DHS and the Secret Service provide oversight to this program. IITT’s other program and project—the Enterprise Resource Management System program (which includes three projects, as discussed earlier) and Multi-Level Security project—are designated non-major acquisition programs. In June 2011, DHS’s Under Secretary for Management delegated acquisition decision authority for this non-major program and project to the Secret Service Component Acquisition Executive. As such, oversight of the Enterprise Resource Management System program (including its three projects) and the Multi- Level Security project is conducted primarily at the component level. The Secret Service also implemented other capabilities that are now in operations and maintenance (i.e., the capabilities have been fielded and are operational) as part of the IITT investment, such as a capability to move data between systems in separate classification levels (e.g., top secret and secret) and communications interoperability. Table 4 describes IITT capabilities that are in operations and maintenance. DHS, including the Secret Service, has faced long-standing challenges in effectively managing its workforce. In January 2003, we designated the implementation and transformation of DHS as high risk, including its management of human capital, because it had to transform 22 agencies—several with major management challenges—into one department. This represented an enormous and complex undertaking that would require time to achieve in an effective and efficient manner. Since that time, the department has made important progress in strengthening and integrating its management functions. Nevertheless, we have continued to report that significant work remains for DHS to improve these management functions. Among other things, we previously reported that the department had lower average employee morale than the average for the rest of the federal government. We also reported that, in 2011, based on employee responses to the Office of Personnel Management’s Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey—a tool that measures employees’ perceptions of whether and to what extent conditions characterizing successful organizations are present in their agency—DHS was ranked 31st out of 33 large agencies on the Partnership for Public Service’s Best Places to Work in the Federal Government rankings. The most recent results of these surveys in 2017 showed that DHS continues to maintain its low rankings. DHS’s Office of Inspector General has reported on challenges that the Secret Service has faced in managing its IT workforce. Specifically, in October 2016, the Inspector General reported that the Secret Service CIO did not have oversight of, or authority over, all IT resources, including the workforce; in particular, almost all of the component’s IT employees were located in a division outside of OCIO; and the Secret Service had vacancies in key positions responsible for managing IT, including not having a full-time CIO from December 2014 through November 2015. As previously discussed, the Secret Service has taken actions to address these two issues with the management of its IT workforce. These actions included hiring its full-time CIO in November 2015 and consolidating the workforce and all IT assets under this CIO in March 2017. Of the 14 selected responsibilities established for component-level CIOs in DHS’s IT management policies, the Secret Service CIO had fully implemented 11 responsibilities and had partially implemented 3 responsibilities. Table 5 summarizes the extent to which the Secret Service CIO had implemented each of the 14 responsibilities. The Secret Service CIO fully implemented 11 of the 14 selected component-level CIO responsibilities. Examples of the responsibilities that the CIO fully implemented are as follows: Develop, implement, and maintain a detailed IT strategic plan. Consistent with DHS’s IT Integration and Management directive, in January 2017, the Secret Service CIO developed an IT strategic plan that outlined the CIO’s strategic IT goals and objectives, as well as tasks intended to meet the goals and objectives. The CIO maintained this strategic plan, to include updating it in January 2018. The CIO also took steps to implement the tasks identified within the strategic plan, such as working to develop an IT training program. In particular, as part of this effort to develop an IT training program, OCIO identified recommended training for the office’s various IT workforce groups (discussed in more detail later in this report). Concur with each program’s and/or project’s systems engineering life cycle tailoring plan. In accordance with DHS’s Systems Engineering Life Cycle instruction, the Secret Service CIO concurred with the systems engineering life cycle tailoring plan for one program and three projects included in the Secret Service’s IITT investment. Specifically, the CIO documented his approval via his signature on the tailoring plans for IITT’s Enabling Capabilities program, and Multi-Level Security, Uniformed Division Resource Management System, and Events Management projects. Participate on DHS’s CIO Council, Enterprise Architecture Board, or other councils/boards as appropriate, and appoint employees to serve when necessary. As required by DHS’s IT Integration and Management directive, the Secret Service CIO participated on two required DHS-level councils/boards, and appointed a delegate to serve in his place, when necessary. Specifically, the Secret Service CIO or the CIO’s delegate—the Deputy CIO—attended bi-monthly meetings of the DHS CIO Council. In addition, another Secret Service CIO appointee—the component’s Chief Architect—attended an ad hoc meeting of the Enterprise Architecture Board in June 2017. In addition, the Secret Service CIO had partially implemented three component-level CIO responsibilities, as follows. Manage the component IT investment portfolio, including establishing a component-level IT acquisition review process that enables component and DHS review of component acquisitions (i.e., contracts) that contain IT. As directed in DHS’s Capital Planning and Investment Control directive and guidebook, the Secret Service CIO took steps to manage the component’s IT investment portfolio, including reviewing certain contracts containing IT. For example, among our random sample of 33 IT contracts that the Secret Service awarded between October 1, 2016, and June 30, 2017, we found that the CIO or the CIO’s delegate had reviewed 31 of these contracts. However, the CIO had not established and documented a defined process for reviewing contracts containing IT, which may have contributed to why the CIO or the CIO’s delegate did not review 2 of the 33 contracts in our sample. OCIO officials were unable to explain why neither of these officials reviewed the 2 contracts, which had a combined planned total procurement value of approximately $1.75 million. In particular, one of the contracts, with a planned total procurement value of about $1,122,934, was to provide credentialing services for the 2017 Presidential Inauguration. The other contract, with a planned total procurement value of about $629,337, was to provide maintenance support for a logistics system. The OCIO officials acknowledged that both contracts should have been approved by one of these officials. Without establishing and documenting an IT acquisition review process that ensures that the CIO or the CIO’s delegate reviews all contracts containing IT, as appropriate, the CIO’s ability to analyze the contracts to ensure that they are a cost-effective use of resources and are aligned with the component’s missions and goals is limited. Ensure all component IT policies are in compliance and alignment with DHS IT directives and instructions. As required by DHS’s IT Integration and Management directive, the Secret Service CIO had ensured that certain component IT policies were in compliance and alignment with DHS IT directives and instructions. For example, in alignment with the department’s IT Integration and Management directive, the Secret Service’s Investment Governance for IT policy specifies that the component CIO (in conjunction with each Secret Service Office) is responsible for developing the component IT spend plan, as well as developing and maintaining an IT strategic plan. However, the Secret Service’s enterprise governance policy was not in compliance with DHS’s IT Integration and Management directive. Specifically, while the department’s policy states that the Secret Service CIO is responsible for developing and reviewing the component’s IT budget formulation and execution, the Secret Service’s enterprise governance policy does not specify this as the CIO’s responsibility. According to OCIO officials, the Secret Service CIO participates in the development and review of the IT budget formulation and execution as a member of the Executive Resources Board (the Secret Service’s highest-level governing body, which has the final decision authority and responsibility for enterprise governance), and the Secret Service Deputy CIO is a voting member of the Enterprise Governance Council (the Secret Service’s second-level governance body and advisory council to the Executive Resources Board). However, the Secret Service’s enterprise governance policy has not been updated to reflect these roles. The Secret Service did not update its enterprise governance policy to properly reflect the CIO’s and Deputy CIO’s roles on the Executive Resources Board or Enterprise Governance Council because OCIO officials were not aware that these roles were not properly documented in the component’s policy until we identified this issue during our review. Further compounding the issue of the Secret Service’s enterprise governance policy not properly reflecting the CIO’s and Deputy CIO’s roles and responsibilities on the component’s governance boards is that the Secret Service has not developed a charter for its Executive Resources Board. We have previously reported that a best practice for effective investment management is to define and document the board’s membership, roles, and responsibilities. One such way to do so is via a charter. According to Secret Service officials, the component does not have a charter for the board because, while the Secret Service has established the board pursuant to law, there is little statutory guidance on how the board must be formalized, including whether a charter is required. The officials acknowledged that development of a board charter is a best practice. They stated that, in response to our review, the component has begun efforts to develop a charter for the Executive Resources Board, but they did not know when it would be completed. Until the Secret Service updates its enterprise governance policy to specify (1) the CIO’s current role and responsibilities on the Executive Resources Board, to include developing and reviewing the IT budget formulation and execution, and (2) the Deputy CIO’s role and responsibilities on the Enterprise Governance Council, the CIO’s ability to develop and review the component’s IT budget may be limited. Further, until the Secret Service develops a charter for its Executive Resources Board that specifies the roles and responsibilities of all board members, including the CIO, the Secret Service will not be effectively positioned to ensure that all members understand their roles and responsibilities on the board and will perform them as expected. Set modular outcomes and target measures to monitor the progress in achieving agile implementation for IT programs and/or projects within their component. Consistent with DHS policy, the Secret Service CIO has set modular outcomes and target measures to monitor the progress of two IITT projects that the component is implementing using an agile methodology—Uniformed Division Resource Management System and Events Management. For example, the modular outcomes set for these projects included measuring planned and actual burndown (i.e., the number of user stories completed). In addition, the projects were to measure their velocity (i.e., the rate of work completed) for each sprint (i.e., a set period of time during which the development team is expected to complete tasks related to developing a piece of working software). However, the modular outcomes and target measures did not include product quality or post-deployment user satisfaction, although such measures are leading practices for managing agile projects. According to Secret Service OCIO officials, the component does not mandate the specific metrics that its agile projects are to use; instead, each project is to determine the metrics based on stakeholder requirements and unique project characteristics. The officials further stated that these metrics are to be documented in an acquisition program baseline and program management plan; this baseline and program management plan are then to be approved by the CIO. To its credit, the component’s one agile project that, as of May 2018, had deployed its system to users—the Uniformed Division Resource Management System—did measure product quality. OCIO officials also stated that they regularly receive verbal, undocumented feedback from users on the system and they plan to conduct a documented user satisfaction survey on this system by September 2018. Nevertheless, without ensuring that product quality and post- deployment user satisfaction metrics are included in the modular outcomes and target measures that the CIO sets for monitoring agile projects, the Secret Service lacks assurance that the Events Management project or other future agile projects will measure product quality or post-deployment user satisfaction. Without guidance specifying that agile projects track these metrics, the projects may not do so and the CIO may be limited in his knowledge of the progress being made on these projects. Workforce planning and management is essential for ensuring that federal agencies have the talent, skill, and experience mix they need to execute their missions and program goals. To help agencies effectively conduct workforce planning and management, the Office of Personnel Management, the Chief Human Capital Officers Council, DHS, the Secret Service, and we have identified numerous leading practices related to five workforce areas: strategic planning, recruitment and hiring, training and development, employee morale, and performance management. Table 6 identifies the five workforce areas and 15 selected leading practices associated with these areas (3 practices within each area). Of the five selected workforce planning and management areas, the Secret Service had substantially implemented two of the areas and minimally implemented three of the areas for its IT workforce. In addition, of the 15 selected leading practices associated with these workforce planning and management areas, the Secret Service had fully implemented 3 practices, partly implemented 8 practices, and did not implement any aspects of 4 practices. Table 7 summarizes the extent to which the Secret Service had implemented for its IT workforce the five selected workforce planning and management areas and 15 selected leading practices associated with those areas, as of June 2018. Strategic workforce planning is an essential activity that an agency needs to conduct to ensure that its human capital program aligns with its current and emerging mission and programmatic goals, and that the agency is able to meet its future needs. We previously identified numerous leading practices related to IT strategic workforce planning, including that an organization should (1) establish and maintain a strategic workforce planning process, including developing all competency and staffing needs; (2) regularly assess competency and staffing needs, and analyze the IT workforce to identify gaps in those areas; and (3) develop strategies and plans to address gaps in competencies and staffing. The Secret Service minimally implemented the three selected leading practices associated with the IT strategic workforce planning area. Specifically, the component partly implemented two of the practices and did not implement one practice. Table 8 lists these selected leading practices and provides our assessment of the Secret Service’s implementation of the practices. Establish and maintain a strategic workforce planning process, including developing all competency and staffing needs—partly implemented. The Secret Service took steps to establish a strategic workforce planning process for its IT workforce. For example, the Secret Service CIO developed and maintained a plan that identified strategic workforce planning tasks, to include analyzing the staffing requirements of the IT workforce. In addition, the Secret Service defined general core competencies (e.g., communication and customer service) for its workforce, including IT staff. However, OCIO did not identify all required knowledge and skills needed to support this office’s functions. In particular, while OCIO identified certain technical competencies that its IT workforce needs, such as cybersecurity, the office did not identify and document all of the technical competencies that it needs. OCIO officials stated that they did not identify and document the technical competencies that the office needs because the Secret Service was focused on reorganizing the IT workforce under a single, centralized reporting chain within the CIO’s office. Consequently, the officials stated that they had not completed the work to identify all required IT knowledge and skills necessary to support the office. Yet, the Secret Service completed the IT workforce reorganization effort over a year ago, in March 2017 and, since then, OCIO has not identified all of the required IT knowledge and skills that the office needs. OCIO officials told us that they plan to identify all of the technical competency needs for the IT workforce, but they were unable to specify a time frame for when these needs would be fully identified. Until OCIO identifies all of the required knowledge and skills for the IT workforce, the office will be limited in its ability to identify and address any competency gaps associated with this workforce. In addition, the Secret Service did not reliably determine the number of IT staff that it needs in order to support OCIO’s functions. Specifically, in January 2017, an independent review of the staffing model that the component used to identify its IT workforce staffing needs found that the model was not based on any verifiable underlying data. In late August 2018, Office of Human Resources officials reported that they had hired a contractor in early August 2018 to update the staffing model to improve the quality of the data. These officials expected the contractor to finish updating the model by August 2019. The officials plan to use the updated model to identify the Secret Service’s IT workforce staffing needs for fiscal year 2021. Updating the staffing model to incorporate verifiable workload data should increase the likelihood that the Secret Service is able to appropriately identify its staffing needs for its IT workforce. Regularly assess competency and staffing needs, and analyze the IT workforce to identify gaps in those areas—not implemented. The Secret Service regularly assessed the competency and staffing needs for 1 of the occupational series within its IT workforce (i.e., the 2210 IT Specialist series). However, it did not regularly assess the competency and staffing needs for the remaining 11 occupational series that are associated with the component’s IT workforce, nor identify any gaps that it had in those areas. OCIO officials stated that they had not assessed these needs or identified competency or staffing gaps because, among other things, the Secret Service was focused on reorganizing the IT workforce under a single, centralized reporting chain within the CIO’s office. However, as previously mentioned, the component completed this effort in March 2017, but OCIO did not subsequently assess its competency and staffing needs, nor identify gaps in those areas. OCIO officials reported that they plan to assess the competencies of the IT workforce to identify any gaps that may exist; however, they were unable to identify a specific date by which they expect to have the capacity to complete this assessment. Until OCIO regularly analyzes the IT workforce to identify its competency needs and any gaps it may have, OCIO will be limited in its ability to determine whether its IT workforce has the necessary knowledge and skills to meet its mission and goals. Further, Office of Human Resources officials reported that they plan to update the staffing model that they use to identify their IT staffing needs to include more reliable workload data. However, as discussed earlier, the Secret Service had not yet developed that updated model to determine its IT staffing needs. Office of Human Resources officials reported that once they update the staffing model they plan to re- evaluate the Secret Service’s IT staffing needs. The officials also stated that, going forward, they plan to reassess these needs each year as part of the annual budget cycle. Regular assessments of the IT workforce’s staffing needs should increase the likelihood that the Secret Service is able to appropriately identify the number of IT staff it needs to meet its mission and programmatic goals. Develop strategies and plans to address gaps in competencies and staffing—partly implemented. The Secret Service developed recruiting and hiring strategies to address certain competency and staffing needs (e.g., cybersecurity) for its IT workforce. These strategies included, among other things, participating in DHS-wide recruiting events and using special hiring authorities. However, because OCIO did not identify all of its IT competency and staffing needs, and lacked a current analysis of its entire IT workforce, the Secret Service could not provide assurance that the recruiting and hiring strategies it developed were specifically targeted towards addressing current OCIO competency and staffing gaps. For example, without an analysis of the IT workforce’s skills, OCIO did not know the extent to which it had gaps in areas such as device management and cloud computing. As a result, the Secret Service’s recruiting strategies may not have been targeted to address any gaps in those areas. Until the Secret Service updates its recruiting and hiring strategies and plans to address all IT competency and staffing gaps identified (after OCIO completes its analysis of the entire IT workforce, as discussed earlier), the Secret Service will be limited in its ability to effectively recruit and hire staff to fill those gaps. According to the Office of Personnel Management, the Chief Human Capital Officers Council, and our prior work, once an agency has determined the critical skills and competencies that it needs to achieve programmatic goals, and identifies any competency or staffing gaps in its current workforce, the agency should be positioned to build effective recruiting and hiring programs. It is important that an agency has these programs in place to ensure that it can effectively recruit and hire employees with the appropriate skills to meet its various mission requirements. The Office of Personnel Management, the Chief Human Capital Officers Council, and we have also identified numerous leading practices associated with effective recruitment and hiring programs. Among these practices, an agency should (1) implement recruiting and hiring activities to address skill and staffing gaps by using the strategies and plans developed during the strategic workforce planning process; (2) establish and track metrics to monitor the effectiveness of the recruitment program and hiring process, including their effectiveness at addressing skill and staffing gaps, and report to agency leadership on progress addressing those gaps; and (3) adjust recruitment plans and hiring activities based on recruitment and hiring effectiveness metrics. The Secret Service minimally implemented the selected three leading practices associated with the recruitment and hiring workforce area. Specifically, the component partly implemented one of the three practices and did not implement the other two practices. Table 9 lists these selected practices and provides our assessment of the Secret Service’s implementation of the practices. Implement recruiting and hiring activities to address skill and staffing gaps by using the strategies and plans developed during the strategic workforce planning process—partly implemented. OCIO officials implemented the activities identified in the Secret Service’s recruiting and hiring plans. For example, as identified in its recruiting plan, OCIO participated in a February 2017 career fair to recruit job applicants at a technology conference. In addition, in August 2017, OCIO participated in a DHS-wide recruiting event. Secret Service officials reported that, during this event, they conducted four interviews for positions in OCIO. However, as previously discussed, OCIO did not identify all of its IT competency and staffing needs, and lacked a current analysis of its entire IT workforce. Without complete knowledge of its current IT competency and staffing gaps, the Secret Service could not provide assurance that the recruiting and hiring strategies that it had implemented fully addressed these gaps. Establish and track metrics to monitor the effectiveness of the recruitment program and hiring process, including their effectiveness at addressing skill and staffing gaps, and report to agency leadership on progress addressing those gaps—not implemented. The Secret Service had not established and tracked metrics for monitoring the effectiveness of its recruitment and hiring activities for the IT workforce. Officials in the Office of Human Resources attributed this to staffing constraints and said their priority was to address existing staffing gaps associated with the Secret Service’s law enforcement groups. In June 2018, Office of Human Resources officials stated that they plan to implement metrics to monitor the effectiveness of the hiring process for the IT workforce by October 2018. The officials also stated that they were in the process of determining (1) the metrics that are to be used to monitor the effectiveness of their workforce recruiting efforts and (2) whether they need to acquire new technology to support this effort. However, the officials did not know when they would implement the metrics for assessing the effectiveness of the recruitment activities and whether they would report the results to leadership. Until the Office of Human Resources (1) develops and tracks metrics to monitor the effectiveness of the Secret Service’s recruitment activities for the IT workforce, including their effectiveness at addressing skill and staffing gaps; and (2) reports to component leadership on those metrics, the Secret Service and the Office of Human Resources will be limited in their ability to analyze the recruitment program to determine whether the program is effectively addressing IT skill and staffing gaps. Further, Secret Service leadership will lack the information necessary to make effective recruitment decisions. Adjust recruitment plans and hiring activities based on recruitment and hiring effectiveness metrics—not implemented. While the Secret Service CIO stated in June 2018 that he planned to adjust the office’s recruiting and hiring strategies to focus on entry- level staff rather than mid-career employees, this planned adjustment was not based on metrics that the Secret Service was tracking. Instead, the CIO stated that he planned to make this change because his office determined that previous mid-career applicants were often unwilling or unable to wait for the Secret Service’s lengthy, required background investigation process to be completed. However, as previously mentioned, the Secret Service did not develop and implement any metrics for assessing the effectiveness of the recruitment and hiring activities for the IT workforce. As a result, the Office of Human Resources and OCIO were not able to use such metrics to inform adjustments to their recruiting and hiring plan and activities, thus, reducing their ability to target potential candidates for hiring. Until the Office of Human Resources and OCIO adjust their recruitment and hiring plans and activities as necessary, after establishing and tracking metrics for assessing the effectiveness of these activities for the IT workforce, the Secret Service will be limited in its ability to ensure that its recruiting plans and activities are appropriately targeted to potential candidates. In addition, the component will lack assurance that these plans and activities will effectively address skill and staffing gaps within its IT workforce. An organization should invest in training and developing its employees to help ensure that its workforce has the information, skills, and competencies that it needs to work effectively. In addition, training and development programs are an integral part of a learning environment that can enhance an organization’s ability to attract and retain employees with the skills and competencies needed to achieve cost-effective and timely results. DHS, the Secret Service, and we have previously identified numerous leading training and development-related practices. Among those practices, an organization should (1) establish a training and development program to assist the agency in achieving its mission and goals; (2) use tracking and other control mechanisms to ensure that employees receive appropriate training and meet certification requirements, when applicable; and (3) collect and assess performance data (including qualitative or quantitative measures, as appropriate) to determine how the training program contributes to improved performance and results. The Secret Service minimally implemented the selected three leading practices associated with the training and development workforce area. Specifically, the component partly implemented two of the three practices and did not implement one practice. Table 10 lists these selected leading practices and provides our assessment of the Secret Service’s implementation of the practices. Establish a training and development program to assist the agency in achieving its mission and goals—partly implemented. OCIO was in the process of developing a training program for its IT workforce. For example, OCIO developed a draft training plan that identified recommended training for the office’s various IT workforce groups (e.g., voice communications employees). However, the office had not defined the required training for each IT workforce group. In addition, OCIO officials had not yet determined which activities they would implement as part of the training program (e.g., soliciting employee feedback after training is completed and evaluating the effectiveness of specific training courses), nor did they implement those activities. OCIO officials stated that they had not yet fully implemented a training program because their annual training budget for fiscal year 2018 was not sufficient to implement such a program. However, resource constrained programs especially benefit from identifying and prioritizing training activities to inform training budget decisions. Until OCIO (1) defines the required training for each IT workforce group, (2) determines the activities that it will include in its IT workforce training and development program based on its available training budget, and (3) implements those activities, the office may be limited in its ability to ensure that the IT workforce has the necessary knowledge and skills for their respective positions. Use tracking and other control mechanisms to ensure that employees receive appropriate training and meet certification requirements, when applicable—partly implemented. OCIO used a training system to track that the managers for IITT’s programs had met certain certification requirements for their respective positions. In addition, OCIO manually tracked the technical training that certain IT staff took. However, as discussed earlier, OCIO did not define the required training for each IT workforce group. As such, the office was unable to ensure that IT staff received the appropriate training relevant to their respective positions. Until it ensures that IT staff complete training specific to their positions (after defining the training required for each workforce group), OCIO will have limited assurance that the workforce has the necessary knowledge and skills. Collect and assess performance data (including qualitative or quantitative measures, as appropriate) to determine how the training program contributes to improved performance and results—not implemented. As previously discussed, OCIO did not fully implement a training program for the IT workforce; as such, the office was unable to collect and assess performance data related to such a program. OCIO officials stated that, once they fully implement a training program, they intend to collect and assess data on how this program contributes to improved performance. However, the officials were unable to specify a time frame for when they would do so. Until OCIO collects and assesses performance data (including qualitative or quantitative measures, as appropriate) to determine how the IT training program contributes to improved performance and results (once the training program is implemented), the office may be limited in its knowledge of whether the training program is contributing to improved performance and results. Employee morale is important to organizational performance and an organization’s ability to retain talent to perform its mission. We have previously identified numerous leading practices for improving employee morale. Among other things, we have found that an organization should (1) determine root causes of employee morale problems by analyzing employee survey results using techniques such as comparing demographic groups, benchmarking against similar organizations, and linking root cause findings to action plans; and develop and implement action plans to improve employee morale; (2) establish and track metrics of success for improving employee morale, and report to agency leadership on progress improving morale; and (3) maintain leadership support and commitment to ensure continued progress in improving employee morale, and demonstrate sustained improvement in morale. With regard to its IT workforce, the Secret Service substantially implemented the selected three practices associated with the employee morale workforce area. Specifically, the component fully implemented two of the selected practices and partly implemented one practice. Table 11 lists these selected practices and provides our assessment of the Secret Service’s implementation of the practices. Determine root causes of employee morale problems by analyzing employee survey results using techniques such as comparing demographic groups, benchmarking against similar organizations, and linking root cause findings to action plans. Develop and implement action plans to improve employee morale—fully implemented. The Secret Service used survey analysis techniques to determine the root causes of its low employee morale, on which we have previously reported. For example, the component conducted a benchmarking exercise where it compared the morale of the Secret Service’s employees, including IT staff, to data on the morale of employees at other agencies, including the U.S. Capitol Police, U.S. Coast Guard, and the Drug Enforcement Administration. As part of this exercise, the Secret Service also compared its employee work-life offerings (e.g., on-site childcare and telework program) to those available at other agencies. In addition, the Secret Service developed and implemented action plans for improving employee morale. Among these action plans, for example, the component implemented a student loan repayment program and expanded its tuition assistance program’s eligibility requirements. Establish and track metrics of success for improving employee morale, and report to agency leadership on progress improving morale—fully implemented. The Secret Service tracked metrics for improving employee morale and reported the results to leadership. For example, the component tracked metrics on the percentage of the workforce, including IT staff, that participated in the student loan repayment and tuition assistance programs. In addition, the Chief Strategy Officer reported to the Chief Operating Officer the results related to meeting those metrics. Maintain leadership support and commitment to ensure continued progress in improving employee morale, and demonstrate sustained improvement in morale—partly implemented. Secret Service leadership developed and implemented initiatives that demonstrated their commitment to improving the morale of the Secret Service’s workforce. For example, since 2014, the Secret Service had worked with a contractor to identify ways to improve the morale of its entire workforce, including IT staff. However, as of June 2018, the Secret Service was unable to demonstrate that it had sustained improvement in the morale of the component’s IT staff. In particular, the component was only able to provide IT workforce-specific results from one employee morale assessment that was conducted subsequent to the consolidation of this workforce into OCIO in March 2017. These results were from an assessment conducted by the component’s Inspection Division in December 2017 (the assessment found that the majority of the Secret Service’s IT employees rated their morale as “very good” or “excellent.”) While the component also provided certain employee morale results from the Office of Personnel Management’s Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey in 2017, these results were not specific to the IT workforce. Instead, this workforce’s results were combined with those from staff in another Secret Service division. According to OCIO officials, the results were combined because, at the time of the survey, the IT workforce was administratively identified as being part of that other division. OCIO officials stated that, going forward, they plan to continue to assess the morale of the IT workforce on an annual basis as part of the Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey. In addition, the officials stated that OCIO-specific results may be available as part of the 2018 survey results, which the officials expect to receive by September 2018. By measuring employee satisfaction on an annual basis, the Secret Service should have increased knowledge of whether its initiatives that are aimed at improving employee morale are in fact increasing employee satisfaction. Agencies can use performance management systems as a tool to foster a results-oriented organizational culture that links individual performance to organizational goals. We have previously identified numerous leading practices related to performance management that are intended to enhance performance and ensure individual accountability. Among the performance management practices, agencies should (1) establish a performance management system that differentiates levels of staff performance and defines competencies in order to provide a fuller assessment of performance, (2) explicitly align individual performance expectations with organizational goals to help individuals see the connection between their daily activities and organizational goals, and (3) periodically provide individuals with regular performance feedback. The Secret Service substantially implemented the selected three leading practices associated with the performance management workforce area. Specifically, the component fully implemented one of the three practices and partly implemented the other two practices. Table 12 lists these selected leading practices and provides our assessment of the Secret Service’s implementation of the practices. Establish a performance management system that differentiates levels of staff performance and defines competencies in order to provide a fuller assessment of performance—partly implemented. The Secret Service’s performance management process requires leadership to make meaningful distinctions between levels of staff performance. In particular, the component’s performance plans for IT staff, which are developed by the Office of Human Resources and tailored by OCIO, as necessary, specify the criteria that leadership use to determine if an individual has met or exceeded the expectations associated with each competency identified in their respective performance plan. The performance plans include pre-established, department-wide competencies that are set by DHS, as well as occupational series-specific goals that may be updated by the Secret Service. However, because OCIO did not fully define and document all of its technical competency needs for the IT workforce, as discussed earlier, the Secret Service’s performance plans for IT staff did not include performance expectations related to the full set of technical competencies required for their respective positions. In addition, because OCIO officials were unable to specify a time frame for when they will identify all of the technical competency needs for the IT workforce (as previously discussed), the officials were also unable to specify a time frame for when they would update the IT workforce’s performance plans to include those relevant technical competencies. Until OCIO updates the performance plans for each occupational series within the IT workforce to include the relevant technical competencies, once identified, against which IT staff performance should be assessed, the office will be limited in its ability to provide IT staff with a complete assessment of their performance. In addition, Secret Service management will have limited knowledge of the extent to which IT staff are meeting all relevant technical competencies. Explicitly align individual performance expectations with organizational goals to help individuals see the connection between their daily activities and organizational goals—partly implemented. The Secret Service’s performance plans for IT staff identified certain goals that appeared to be related to organizational goals and objectives. For example, the performance plan for the Telecommunications Specialist occupational series (which is one of the series included in OCIO’s IT workforce) identified a goal for staff to support the voice, wireless, radio, satellite, and video systems serving the Secret Service’s protective and investigative mission. This performance plan goal appeared to be related to the component’s strategic goal on Advanced Technology, which included an objective to create the infrastructure needed to fulfill mission responsibilities. However, the Secret Service was unable to provide documentation that explicitly showed how individual employee performance links to organizational goals, such as a mapping of the goals identified in employee performance plans to organizational goals. Specifically, while Office of Human Resources officials stated that each Secret Service directorate is responsible for ensuring that employee goals map to high-level organizational goals, OCIO officials stated that they did not complete this mapping. The officials were unable to explain why they did not align the goals in their employees’ performance plans to the component’s high-level goals. According to the officials, the Secret Service is in the process of implementing a new automated tool that will require each office to explicitly align individual performance expectations to organizational goals. The officials stated that OCIO plans to use this tool to create employees’ fiscal year 2019 performance plans. By explicitly demonstrating how individual performance expectations align with organizational goals, the Secret Service’s IT staff should have a better understanding of how their daily activities contribute towards achieving the Secret Service’s goals. Periodically provide individuals with regular performance feedback—fully implemented. Secret Service leadership periodically provided their IT staff with performance feedback. Specifically, on an annual basis, OCIO staff received feedback during a mid-year and end-of-year performance feedback assessment. In our prior work, we have stressed that candid and constructive feedback can help individuals maximize their contribution and potential for understanding and realizing the goals and objectives of an organization. Further, this feedback is one of the strongest drivers of employee engagement. According to leading practices of the Software Engineering Institute, effective program oversight includes monitoring program performance and conducting reviews at predetermined checkpoints or milestones. This is done by, among other things, comparing actual cost, schedule, and performance data with estimates in the program plan and identifying significant deviations from established targets or thresholds for acceptable performance levels. In addition, the Software Engineering Institute previously identified leading practices for effectively monitoring the performance of agile projects. According to the Institute, agile development methods focus on delivering usable, working software frequently; as such, it is important to measure the value delivered during each iteration of these projects. To that end, the Institute reported that agile projects should be measured on velocity (i.e., number of story points completed per sprint or release), development progression (e.g., the number of user stories planned and accepted), product quality (e.g., number of defects), and post-deployment user satisfaction. DHS and the Secret Service had fully implemented the selected leading practice for monitoring the performance of one program and three projects within the IITT investment, and conducting reviews of this program and these projects at predetermined checkpoints. In addition, with regard to the selected leading practice for monitoring agile projects, the Secret Service had fully implemented this practice for one of its two projects being implemented using agile and had partially implemented this practice for the other project. Table 13 provides a summary of DHS’s and the Secret Service’s implementation of these leading practices, as relevant for one program and three projects within IITT. Monitor program performance and conduct reviews at predetermined checkpoints or milestones. Consistent with leading practices, DHS and the Secret Service monitored the performance of IITT’s program and projects by comparing actual cost, schedule, and performance information against planned targets and conducting reviews at predetermined checkpoints. For example, within the Secret Service: The Enabling Capabilities program and Multi-Level Security project monitored their contractors’ costs spent to-date on a monthly basis and compared them to the total contract amounts. OCIO used integrated master schedules to monitor the schedule performance of the Enabling Capabilities program and Multi-Level Security project. OCIO also monitored the cost, schedule, and performance of the Uniformed Division Resource Management System and Events Management projects during monthly status reviews. In addition, DHS and the Secret Service conducted acquisition decision event reviews and systems engineering life cycle technical reviews of IITT’s program and projects at predetermined checkpoints and, when applicable, identified deviations from established cost, schedule, and performance targets. For example: Secret Service OCIO met with DHS’s Office of Program Accountability and Risk Management in February 2017, and with DHS’s Acting Under Secretary for Management in June 2017, to discuss a schedule breach for the Enabling Capabilities program. In particular, the Enabling Capabilities program informed DHS that the program needed to change the planned date for acquisition decision event 3 (the point at which a decision is made to fully deploy the system) in order to conduct tests in an operational environment prior to that decision event. This delay was due to the Secret Service misunderstanding the tests that it was required to conduct prior to that decision event. Specifically, the Enabling Capabilities program had conducted tests on “production representative” systems, but these tests were not sufficient to meet the requirements for acquisition decision event 3. The project team for Multi-Level Security identified that certain technical issues they had experienced would delay system deployment and full operational capability (the point at which an investment becomes fully operational). As such, in October 2017, the project notified the Secret Service Component Acquisition Executive of these expected delays. In particular, the web browser that was intended to provide users on “Sensitive But Unclassified” workstations the ability to view information from different security levels, experienced technical delays in meeting personal identity verification requirements. The project team also described for the executive how the schedule delay would affect the project’s performance metrics and funding, and subsequently updated the project plan accordingly. Measure and monitor agile projects on, among other things, velocity (i.e., number of story points completed per sprint or release), development progression (e.g., the number of features and user stories planned and accepted), product quality (e.g., number of defects), and post-deployment user satisfaction. Secret Service OCIO measured its two agile projects—Uniformed Division Resource Management System and Events Management— using certain agile metrics. In particular, OCIO officials measured the Uniformed Division Resource Management System and Events Management projects using key metrics related to velocity and development progression. For example, the officials measured development progression for both projects on a daily basis. In addition, OCIO officials monitored each project’s progress against these metrics during bi-weekly reviews that they conducted with each project team. The OCIO officials also tracked product quality metrics for the Uniformed Division Resource Management System. For example, on a monthly basis, the officials tracked the number of helpdesk tickets that had been resolved related to the system. In addition, on a quarterly basis, they tracked the number of Uniformed Division Resource Management System defects that (1) had been fixed and (2) were in the backlog. However, while OCIO officials received certain post-deployment user satisfaction information from end-users of the Uniformed Division Resource Management System by, among other things, tracking the number of helpdesk tickets related to the system and via daily verbal, undocumented feedback from certain Uniformed Division officers, OCIO officials had not fully measured and documented post- deployment user satisfaction with the system, such as via a survey of employees who use the system. The officials stated that they had not conducted and documented a survey because they were focused on (1) addressing software performance issues that occurred after they deployed the system to a limited number of users, and (2) continuing system deployment to the remaining users after they addressed the performance issues. OCIO officials stated that they plan to conduct such a documented survey by the end of September 2018. The results of the user satisfaction survey should provide OCIO with important information on whether the Uniformed Division Resource Management System is meeting users’ needs. The Secret Service’s full implementation of 11 of 14 component-level CIO responsibilities constitutes a significant effort to establish CIO oversight for the component’s IT portfolio. Additional efforts to fully implement the remaining 3 responsibilities, including ensuring that all IT contracts are reviewed, as appropriate; ensuring that the Secret Service’s enterprise governance policy appropriately specifies the CIO’s role in developing and reviewing the component’s IT budget formulation and execution; and ensuring agile projects measure product quality and post-deployment user satisfaction, will further position the CIO to effectively manage the Secret Service’s IT portfolio. When effectively implemented, IT workforce planning and management activities can facilitate the successful accomplishment of an agency’s mission. However, the Secret Service had not fully implemented all of the 15 selected practices for its IT workforce for any of the five areas— strategic planning, recruitment and hiring, training and development, employee morale, and performance management. The Secret Service’s lack of (1) a strategic workforce planning process, including the identification of all required knowledge and skills, assessment of competency gaps, and targeted strategies to address specific gaps in competencies and staffing; (2) targeted recruiting activities, including metrics to monitor the effectiveness of the recruitment program and adjustment of the recruitment program and hiring efforts based on metrics; (3) a training program, including the identification of required training for IT staff, ensuring that staff take required training, and assessment of performance data regarding the training program; and (4) a performance management system that includes all relevant technical competencies, greatly limits its ability to ensure the timely and effective acquisition and maintenance of the Secret Service’s IT infrastructure and services. On the other hand, by monitoring program performance and conducting reviews at predetermined checkpoints for one program and three projects associated with the IITT investment, in accordance with leading practices, the Secret Service and DHS provided important oversight needed to guide that program and those projects. Measuring projects on leading agile metrics also provided the Secret Service CIO with important information on project performance. We are making the following 13 recommendations to the Director of the Secret Service: The Director should ensure that the CIO establishes and documents an IT acquisition review process that ensures the CIO or the CIO’s delegate reviews all contracts containing IT, as appropriate. (Recommendation 1) The Director should update the enterprise governance policy to specify (1) the CIO’s current role and responsibilities on the Executive Resources Board, to include developing and reviewing the IT budget formulation and execution; and (2) the Deputy CIO’s role and responsibilities on the Enterprise Governance Council. (Recommendation 2) The Director should ensure that the Secret Service develops a charter for its Executive Resources Board that specifies the roles and responsibilities of all board members, including the CIO. (Recommendation 3) The Director should ensure that the CIO includes product quality and post-deployment user satisfaction metrics in the modular outcomes and target measures that the CIO sets for monitoring agile projects. (Recommendation 4) The Director should ensure that the CIO identifies all of the required knowledge and skills for the IT workforce. (Recommendation 5) The Director should ensure that the CIO regularly analyzes the IT workforce to identify its competency needs and any gaps it may have. (Recommendation 6) The Director should ensure that, after OCIO completes an analysis of the IT workforce to identify any competency and staffing gaps it may have, the Secret Service updates its recruiting and hiring strategies and plans to address those gaps, as necessary. (Recommendation 7) The Director should ensure that the Office of Human Resources (1) develops and tracks metrics to monitor the effectiveness of the Secret Service’s recruitment activities for the IT workforce, including their effectiveness at addressing skill and staffing gaps; and (2) reports to component leadership on those metrics. (Recommendation 8) The Director should ensure that the Office of Human Resources and OCIO adjust their recruitment and hiring plans and activities, as necessary, after establishing and tracking metrics for assessing the effectiveness of these activities for the IT workforce. (Recommendation 9) The Director should ensure that the CIO (1) defines the required training for each IT workforce group, (2) determines the activities that OCIO will include in its IT workforce training and development program based on its available training budget, and (3) implements those activities. (Recommendation 10) The Director should ensure that the CIO ensures that the IT workforce completes training specific to their positions (after defining the training required for each workforce group). (Recommendation 11) The Director should ensure that the CIO collects and assesses performance data (including qualitative or quantitative measures, as appropriate) to determine how the IT training program contributes to improved performance and results (once the training program is implemented). (Recommendation 12) The Director should ensure that the CIO updates the performance plans for each occupational series within the IT workforce to include the relevant technical competencies, once identified, against which IT staff performance should be assessed. (Recommendation 13) DHS provided written comments on a draft of this report, which are reprinted in appendix III. In its comments, the department concurred with all 13 of our recommendations and provided estimated completion dates for implementing each of them. For example, with regard to recommendation 2, the department stated that the Secret Service would update its enterprise governance policy and related policies to outline the roles and responsibilities of the CIO and Deputy CIO, among others, by March 31, 2019. In addition, for recommendation 13, the department stated that the Secret Service OCIO will include relevant technical competencies in performance plans, as appropriate, in the next performance cycle that starts in July 2019. If implemented effectively, these actions should address the weaknesses we identified. The department also identified a number of other actions that it said had been taken to address our recommendations. For example, in response to recommendation 8, which calls for the Office of Human Resources to (1) develop and track metrics to monitor the effectiveness of the Secret Service’s recruitment activities for the IT workforce and (2) report to component leadership on those metrics, DHS stated that the Secret Service’s Office of Human Resources’ Outreach Branch provides to the department metrics on recruitment efforts toward designated priority mission-critical occupations. However, for fiscal year 2017, only 1 of the 12 occupational series associated with the Secret Service’s IT workforce was designated as a mission-critical occupation for the component (i.e., the 2210 IT Specialist series). The 11 other occupational series were not designated as mission- critical occupations. In addition, for fiscal year 2018, none of these 12 occupational series were designated as mission-critical occupations. As such, metrics on recruiting for these IT series may not have been reported to DHS leadership. Moreover, while we requested documentation of the recruiting metrics for the Secret Service’s IT workforce and, during the course of our review, had multiple subsequent discussions with the Secret Service regarding such metrics, the component did not provide documentation that demonstrated it had established recruiting metrics for its IT workforce. Tracking such metrics and reporting the results to Secret Service leadership, as we recommended, would provide management with important information necessary to make effective recruitment decisions. Further, in response to recommendation 10, which among other things, calls for the CIO to define the required training for each IT workforce group, the department stated that the Secret Service OCIO recently developed training requirements for each workforce group, which were issued during our audit. However, while during our audit OCIO provided a list of recommended training courses, the office did not identify them as being required courses. Defining training that is required for each IT workforce group, as we recommended, would inform OCIO of the necessary training for each position and enable the office to prioritize this training, to ensure that its staff have the needed knowledge and skills. In addition to the aforementioned comments, we received technical comments from DHS and Secret Service officials, which we incorporated, as appropriate. We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of the Secret Service, and other interested parties. In addition, this report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. Should you or your staffs have any questions on information discussed in this report, please contact me at (202) 512-4456 or HarrisCC@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV. Our objectives were to evaluate the extent to which: (1) the U.S. Secret Service (Secret Service) Chief Information Officer (CIO) has implemented selected information technology (IT) oversight responsibilities, (2) the Secret Service has implemented leading workforce planning and management practices for its IT workforce, and (3) the Secret Service and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) have implemented selected performance and progress monitoring practices for the Information Integration and Technology Transformation (IITT) investment. To address the first objective, we analyzed DHS’s policies and guidance on IT management to identify the responsibilities that were to be implemented by the component-level CIO related to overseeing the Secret Service’s IT portfolio, including existing systems, acquisitions, and investments. From the list of 33 responsibilities that we identified, we then excluded the responsibility that was associated with information security, which is expected to be addressed as part of a separate, subsequent GAO review. We also excluded those responsibilities that were significantly large in scope (e.g., implement an enterprise architecture) or that, in our professional judgment, lacked specificity (e.g., provide timely delivery of mission IT services). As a result, we excluded from consideration for this review a total of 10 CIO responsibilities. For the 23 that remained, we then combined certain responsibilities that overlapped with other related responsibilities. For example, we combined related responsibilities on the component CIO’s review of IT contracts. As a result, we identified 14 responsibilities for review. We validated with the acting DHS CIO that these responsibilities were key responsibilities for the department’s component-level CIOs. We then included all 14 of the responsibilities in our review. The 14 selected component-level CIO responsibilities were: 1. Develop and review the component IT budget formulation and execution. 2. Manage the component IT investment portfolio, including establishing an IT acquisition review process that enables component and DHS review of component acquisitions (i.e., contracts) that contain IT. 3. Develop, implement, and maintain a detailed IT strategic plan. 4. Ensure all component IT policies are in compliance and alignment with DHS IT directives and instructions. 5. Concur with each program’s and/or project’s systems engineering life cycle tailoring plan. 6. Support the Component Acquisition Executive to ensure processes are established that enable systems engineering life cycle technical reviews and that they are adhered to by programs and/or projects. 7. Ensure that all systems engineering life cycle technical review exit criteria are satisfied for each of the component’s IT programs and/or projects. 8. Ensure the necessary systems engineering life cycle activities have been satisfactorily completed as planned for each of the component’s IT programs and/or projects. 9. Concur with the systems engineering life cycle technical review completion letter for each of the component’s IT programs and/or projects. 10. Maintain oversight of their component’s agile development approach for IT by appointing the responsible personnel, identifying investments for adoption, and reviewing artifacts. 11. With Component Acquisition Executives, evaluate and approve the application of agile development for IT programs consistent with the component’s agile development approach. 12. Set modular outcomes and target measures to monitor the progress in achieving agile implementation for IT programs and/or projects within their component. 13. Participate on DHS’s CIO Council, Enterprise Architecture Board, or other councils/boards as appropriate, and appoint employees to serve when necessary. 14. Meet the IT competency requirements established by the DHS CIO, as required in the component CIO’s performance plan. To determine the extent to which the Secret Service CIO has implemented these responsibilities, we obtained and assessed relevant component documentation and compared it to the responsibilities. Specifically, we obtained and analyzed documentation including evidence of the CIO’s participation on the Secret Service governance board that has final decision authority and responsibility for enterprise governance, including the IT budget; monthly program management reports showing the CIO’s oversight of IT programs, projects, and systems; monthly status reports on program spending; the Secret Service’s IT strategic plan; the Secret Service’s enterprise governance policy; meeting minutes from the DHS board and council on which the CIO participated (i.e., the CIO Council and Enterprise Architecture Board); and documentation demonstrating whether the CIO met the IT competency requirements. In addition, we obtained and analyzed relevant documentation related to the CIO’s oversight of the major IT investments on which the Secret Service was spending development, modernization, and enhancement funds during fiscal year 2017. As of July 2017, the component had one investment—IITT—that met this criterion. IITT is a portfolio investment that, as of July 2017, included two programs (one of which included three projects) and one standalone project (i.e., it was not part of another program) that had capabilities that were in planning or development and modernization: the Enabling Capabilities program, Enterprise Resource Management System program (which included three projects, called Uniformed Division Resource Management System, Events Management, and Enterprise-wide Scheduling), and Multi-Level Security project. In particular, we obtained and analyzed documentation related to the CIO’s oversight of the systems engineering life cycles for IITT’s Enabling Capabilities program and the Uniformed Division Resource Management System, Events Management, and Multi-Level Security projects. This documentation included acquisition program baselines, systems engineering life cycle tailoring plans, and systems engineering life cycle technical review briefings and completion letters. We then compared the documentation against the five selected systems engineering life cycle oversight responsibilities (responsibilities 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9). We also obtained and analyzed documentation related to the CIO’s oversight of two projects that the Secret Service was implementing using an agile methodology—Uniformed Division Resource Management System and Events Management. Specifically, we obtained and assessed documentation of (1) the CIO’s approval for these projects to be implemented using an agile methodology and (2) the agile development metrics that the CIO established for each of these projects. We then compared this documentation to the three agile development-related component-level CIO responsibilities (responsibilities 10, 11, and 12). Further, to determine the extent to which the Secret Service CIO had established an IT acquisition (i.e., contract) review process that enabled component and DHS review of component contracts that contain IT (which is part of responsibility 2), we first asked Secret Service officials to provide us with a list of all new, unclassified IT contracts that the component awarded between October 1, 2016, and June 30, 2017. The Secret Service officials provided a list of 54 contracts. We validated that these were contracts for IT or IT services by: (1) searching for them in the Federal Procurement Data System – Next Generation; (2) identifying their associated product or service codes, as reported in that system; and (3) determining whether those codes were included in the universe of 79 IT product or service codes identified by the Category Management Leadership Council. In validating the list of 54 contracts provided by the Secret Service, we determined that 5 of the contracts were not associated with an IT product or service code. As such, we removed those contracts from the list. In addition, we found that three other items identified by the component were not in the Federal Procurement Data System – Next Generation. Secret Service officials subsequently confirmed that these three items were not contracts. We therefore removed these three items from the list. As such, the final list of validated contracts identified by the Secret Service included 46 IT contracts. In addition, to identify any IT contracts that were not included in the list provided by the Secret Service, we conducted a search of the Federal Procurement Data System – Next Generation to identify all unclassified contracts that (1) the component awarded between October 1, 2016, and June 30, 2017; (2) were not a modification of a contract; and (3) were associated with 1 of the 79 IT product or service codes identified by the Category Management Leadership Council. Based on these criteria, we identified 144 Secret Service IT contracts in the Federal Procurement Data System – Next Generation (these 144 contracts included the 46 contracts previously identified by Secret Service officials). We then asked Secret Service officials to validate the accuracy, completeness, and reliability of these data, which they did. From each of these two lists of IT contracts (i.e., the list of 46 IT contracts identified by the Secret Service and the list of 144 IT contracts that we identified from the Federal Procurement Data System – Next Generation), we then selected random, non-generalizable samples of contracts, as described below. First, from the list of 46 IT contracts identified by Secret Service officials, we removed 4 contracts that had total values of less than $10,000. To ensure that we selected across all contract sizes, we randomly selected 12 contracts from the remaining list of 42 contracts, using the following cost ranges: $10,000 to $50,000 (4 contracts), more than $50,000 to less than $250,000 (4 contracts), and more than $250,000 (4 contracts). Second, from our list of 144 IT contracts that we identified from the Federal Procurement Data System – Next Generation, we removed the 46 contracts identified by Secret Service officials. We also removed 12 contracts that had total values of less than $10,000. To ensure that we selected across all contract sizes, we randomly selected 21 contracts from the remaining list of 86 contracts, using the following cost ranges: $10,000 to $50,000 (7 contracts), more than $50,000 to less than $250,000 (7 contracts), and more than $250,000 (7 contracts). In total, we selected 33 IT contracts for review. We separated the contracts into the three cost ranges identified above in order to ensure that contracts of different value levels had been selected. This enabled us to determine the extent to which the CIO appropriately reviewed contracts of all values. To determine the extent to which the CIO had established an IT contract approval process that enabled the Secret Service and DHS, as appropriate, to review IT contracts, we first asked Secret Service Office of the CIO (OCIO) officials for documentation of their IT contract approval process. These officials were unable to provide such documentation. Instead, the officials stated that the Secret Service CIO or the CIO’s delegate approves all IT contracts prior to award. The officials also provided documentation that identified four staff to whom the CIO had delegated his approval authority. Further, the officials stated that, in accordance with DHS’s October 2016 IT acquisition review guidance, they submitted to DHS OCIO for approval any IT contracts that met DHS’s thresholds for review, including those that (1) had total estimated procurement values of $2.5 million or more, and (2) were associated with a major investment. Based on the IT acquisition review process that Secret Service OCIO officials described, we then obtained and analyzed each of the 33 selected IT contracts and associated approval documentation to determine whether or not the Secret Service CIO or the CIO’s delegate had approved each of the contracts. In particular, we (1) reviewed the name of the contract approver on the approval documentation, and (2) compared the signature dates that were on the contracts to the signature dates that were identified on the associated approval documentation. In addition, to determine whether or not the Secret Service CIO submitted to DHS OCIO for approval the IT contracts that (1) had total estimated procurement values of $2.5 million or more, and (2) were associated with major investments, we first analyzed the 144 Secret Service IT contracts that we had previously pulled from the Federal Procurement Data System – Next Generation to determine which contracts met the $2.5 million threshold. We identified 4 contracts that met this threshold. We then requested that OCIO identify the levels (i.e., major or non-major) of the investments associated with these contracts. According to OCIO officials, 3 of the 4 contracts were associated with non-major investments and 1 was not associated with an investment. As such, based on DHS’s October 2016 IT acquisition review guidance, none of these contracts needed to be submitted to DHS OCIO for review. We also interviewed Secret Service officials, including the CIO and Deputy CIO, regarding the CIO’s implementation of the 14 selected component-level responsibilities. We assessed the evidence against the selected responsibilities to determine the extent to which the CIO had implemented them. To address the second objective—determining the extent to which the Secret Service had implemented leading workforce planning and management practices for its IT workforce—we first identified seven topic areas associated with human capital management based on the following sources: The Office of Personnel Management’s Human Capital Framework. Office of Personnel Management and the Chief Human Capital Officers Council Subcommittee for Hiring and Succession Planning, End-to-End Hiring Initiative. GAO, High-Risk Series: Progress on Many High-Risk Areas, While Substantial Efforts Needed on Others. GAO, IT Workforce: Key Practices Help Ensure Strong Integrated Program Teams; Selected Departments Need to Assess Skill Gaps. GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Taking Further Action to Better Determine Causes of Morale Problems Would Assist in Targeting Action Plans. GAO, Human Capital: A Guide for Assessing Strategic Training and Development Efforts in the Federal Government. GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Creating a Clear Linkage between Individual Performance and Organizational Success. DHS acquisition guidance. Secret Service acquisition guidance. Among these topic areas, we then selected five areas that, in our professional judgment, were of particular importance to successful workforce planning and management. They were also previously identified as part of our high-risk and key issues work on human capital management. These areas include: (1) strategic planning, (2) recruitment and hiring, (3) training and development, (4) employee morale, and (5) performance management. We also reviewed these same sources and identified numerous leading practices associated with the five topic areas. Among these leading practices, we then selected three leading practices within each of the five areas (for a total of 15 selected practices). The selected practices were foundational practices that, in our professional judgment, were of particular importance to successful workforce planning and management. Table 14 identifies the five selected workforce areas and 15 selected associated practices. To determine the extent to which the Secret Service had implemented the selected leading workforce planning and management practices for its IT workforce, we obtained and assessed documentation and compared it against the 15 selected practices. In particular, we analyzed the Secret Service’s human capital strategic plan, human capital staffing plan, IT strategic plan, documentation of the component’s staffing model that it used to determine the number of IT staff needed, an independent verification and validation report on the component’s staffing models, documentation of the current number of IT staff, the Secret Service’s recruitment and outreach plans, documentation of DHS’s hiring authorities (which are applicable to the Secret Service), the Secret Service’s training strategic plan, IT workforce training plan, action plans for improving employee morale, and templates used for measuring and reporting employee performance. We also interviewed Secret Service officials—including the CIO, Deputy CIO, and workforce planning staff—about the component’s workforce- related policies and documentation. Further, we discussed with the officials the Secret Service’s efforts to implement the selected workforce practices for its IT workforce. Regarding our assessments of the Secret Service’s implementation of the 15 selected workforce planning and management practices, we assessed a practice as being fully implemented if component officials provided supporting documentation that demonstrated all aspects of the practice. We assessed a practice as not implemented if the officials did not provide any supporting documentation for that practice, or if the documentation provided did not demonstrate any aspect of the practice. We assessed a practice as being partly implemented if the officials provided supporting documentation that demonstrated some, but not all, aspects of the selected practice. In addition, related to our assessments of the Secret Service’s implementation of the five selected overall workforce areas, we assessed each area as follows, based on the implementation of the three selected practices within each area: Fully implemented: The Secret Service provided evidence that it had fully implemented all three of the selected practices within the workforce area; Substantially implemented: The Secret Service provided evidence that it had either fully implemented two selected practices and partly implemented the remaining one selected practice within the workforce area, or fully implemented one selected practice and partly implemented the remaining two selected practices within the workforce area; Partially implemented: The Secret Service provided evidence that it had partly implemented each of the three selected practices within the workforce area; Minimally implemented: The Secret Service provided evidence that it partly implemented two selected practices and not implemented the remaining one selected practice within the workforce area, or partly implemented one selected practice and not implemented the remaining two selected practices within the workforce area; or Not implemented: The Secret Service did not provide evidence that it had implemented any of the three selected practices within the workforce area. To address the third objective—determining the extent to which the Secret Service and DHS have implemented selected performance and progress monitoring practices for IITT—we reviewed leading project monitoring practices and guidance from the Software Engineering Institute. First, we reviewed the practices within the Project Monitoring and Control process area of the Institute’s Capability Maturity Model Integration® for Acquisition. Based on our review, we identified four practices associated with monitoring program performance and progress. In our professional judgment, all four of these practices were of significance to managing the IITT investment given the phase of the life cycle that the investment was in. As such, we elected to include all four of these practices in our review, and combined them into one practice, as follows: Monitor program performance and conduct reviews at predetermined checkpoints or milestones by, among other things, comparing actual cost, schedule, and performance data with estimates in the program plan and identifying significant deviations from established targets or thresholds for acceptable performance levels. Next, given the agile development methodology that the Secret Service was using for certain projects within IITT, we reviewed the Software Engineering Institute’s technical note on the progress monitoring of agile contractors. Based on our review, and in consultation with an internal expert, we selected four agile metrics that the Institute identified as important for successful agile implementations and that, in our professional judgment, were of most significance to monitoring the performance of IITT’s agile projects. We then combined these four metrics into one practice, as follows: Measure and monitor agile projects on velocity (i.e., number of story points completed per sprint or release), development progression (e.g., the number of features and user stories planned and accepted), product quality (e.g., number of defects), and post-deployment user satisfaction. To determine the extent to which DHS and the Secret Service had implemented the first selected practice, we analyzed relevant program management and governance documentation for IITT’s Enabling Capabilities program, and Multi-Level Security, Uniformed Division Resource Management System, and Events Management projects. In particular, we analyzed acquisition program baselines, DHS acquisition decision event memorandums, artifacts from DHS and Secret Service program oversight reviews, cost monitoring reports, program integrated master schedules, and program status briefings, and compared this documentation to the selected practice. We also interviewed Secret Service OCIO officials regarding the Secret Service’s and DHS’s efforts to monitor the IITT investment’s performance and progress. To determine the extent to which the Secret Service had implemented the second selected practice related to measuring and monitoring agile projects on agile metrics (i.e., velocity, development progression, product quality, and post-deployment user satisfaction), we obtained and analyzed agile-related documentation for the two projects that the Secret Service was implementing using an agile methodology—Uniformed Division Resource Management System and Events Management. Specifically, to determine the extent to which the Secret Service was measuring and monitoring these two projects on metrics for velocity and development progression, we obtained and analyzed documentation, such as sprint burndown charts and monthly program status reports, and compared it to the selected practice. In addition, the agile metrics for product quality and post-deployment user satisfaction were only applicable to projects that had been deployed to users. As such, these metrics were applicable to the Uniformed Division Resource Management System (which the Secret Service had deployed to users) and were not applicable to Events Management (which the Secret Service had not yet deployed to users, as of early May 2018). We therefore obtained and analyzed documentation demonstrating that Secret Service OCIO measured product defects for the Uniformed Division Resource Management System. We also requested documentation demonstrating that OCIO had measured and monitored post-deployment user satisfaction for this project, including via a survey. OCIO officials stated that they had not conducted such a survey and were unable to provide documentation demonstrating they had measured post- deployment user satisfaction for the Uniformed Division Resource Management System. To assess the reliability of the cost, schedule, and agile-related data that were in DHS and the Secret Service’s program management and governance documentation for the IITT investment, we (1) analyzed related documentation and assessed the data against existing agency records to identify consistency in the information, and (2) examined the data for obvious outliers, incomplete, or unusual entries. We determined that the data in these documents were sufficiently reliable for our purpose, which was to evaluate the extent to which DHS and the Secret Service had implemented processes for monitoring the IITT investment’s performance and progress. We conducted this performance audit from May 2017 to November 2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. As of June 2018, the Secret Service’s Information Integration and Technology Transformation (IITT) investment included two programs (one of which included three projects) and one project that had capabilities that were in planning or development and modernization, as described below: Enabling Capabilities. This program is intended to, among other things, (1) modernize and enhance the Secret Service’s information technology (IT) network infrastructure, including increasing bandwidth and improving the speed and reliability of the Secret Service’s IT system performance; (2) enhance cybersecurity to protect against potential intrusions and viruses; and (3) provide counterintelligence and data mining capabilities to improve officials’ ability to perform the Secret Service’s investigative mission. Enterprise Resource Management System. This program comprises three projects that are intended to provide: a system that will enable the Secret Service’s Uniformed Division to efficiently and effectively plan, provision, and schedule missions (this project is referred to as Uniformed Division Resource Management System), a system that will unify the logistical actions (e.g., assigning personnel) surrounding special events that Secret Service agents need to protect, such as the United Nations General Assembly (this project is referred to as Events Management), and a capability for creating schedules for Secret Service agents and administrative, professional, and technical staff, as well as the ability to generate reports on information such as monthly hours worked (this project is referred to as Enterprise-wide Scheduling). Multi-Level Security. This project is intended to enable authorized Secret Service users to view two levels of classified information on a single workstation. Previously, data at various security levels were contained and used in multiple disparate systems. Multi-Level Security is intended to streamline users’ access to information at different security levels in order to enable them to more quickly and effectively perform their duties. Table 15 provides the planned life cycle cost and schedule estimates (threshold values) for each IITT program and project that had capabilities in planning or development and modernization, as of June 2018. In addition, the table describes any changes in those cost and schedule estimates, as well as the key reasons for any changes, as identified by officials from the Secret Service’s Office of the Chief Information Officer. In addition to the contact named above, the following staff made key contributions to this report: Shannin O’Neill (Assistant Director), Emily Kuhn (Analyst-in-Charge), Quintin Dorsey, Rebecca Eyler, Javier Irizarry, and Paige Teigen.	[ "Commonly known for protecting the President, the Secret Service also plays a leading role in investigating and preventing financial and electronic crimes. To accomplish its mission, the Secret Service relies heavily on the use of IT infrastructure and systems. In 2009, the component initiated the IITT investment—a portfolio of programs and projects that are intended to, among other things, improve systems availability and security in support of the component's business operations. GAO was asked to review the Secret Service's oversight of its IT portfolio and workforce. This report discusses the extent to which the (1) CIO implemented selected IT oversight responsibilities, (2) Secret Service implemented leading IT workforce planning and management practices, and (3) Secret Service and DHS implemented selected performance monitoring practices for IITT. GAO assessed agency documentation against 14 selected component CIO responsibilities established in DHS policy; 15 selected leading workforce planning and management practices within 5 topic areas; and two selected leading industry project monitoring practices that, among other things, were, in GAO's professional judgment, of most significance to managing IITT. The U.S. Secret Service (Secret Service) Chief Information Officer (CIO) fully implemented 11 of 14 selected information technology (IT) oversight responsibilities, and partially implemented the remaining 3. The CIO partially implemented the responsibilities to establish a process that ensures the Secret Service reviews IT contracts; ensure that the component's IT policies align with the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) policies; and set incremental targets to monitor program progress. Additional efforts to fully implement these 3 responsibilities will further position the CIO to effectively manage the IT portfolio. Of the 15 selected practices within the 5 workforce planning and management areas, the Secret Service fully implemented 3 practices, partly implemented 8, and did not implement 4 (see table). Within the strategic planning area, the component partly implemented the practice to, among other things, develop IT competency needs. While the Secret Service had defined general core competencies for its workforce, the Office of the CIO (OCIO) did not identify all of the technical competencies needed to support its functions. As a result, the office was limited in its ability to address any IT competency gaps that may exist. Also, while work remains to improve morale across the component, the Secret Service substantially implemented the employee morale practices for its IT staff. Secret Service officials said the gaps in implementing the workforce practices were due to, among other things, their focus on reorganizing the IT workforce within OCIO. Until the Secret Service fully implements these practices for its IT workforce, it may be limited in its ability to ensure the timely and effective acquisition and maintenance of the component's IT infrastructure and services. Of the two selected IT project monitoring practices, DHS and the Secret Service fully implemented the first practice to monitor the performance of the Information Integration and Technology Transformation (IITT) investment. In addition, for the second practice—to monitor projects on incremental development metrics—the Secret Service fully implemented the practice on one of IITT's projects and partially implemented it on another. In particular, OCIO did not fully measure post-deployment user satisfaction with the system on one project. OCIO plans to conduct a user satisfaction survey of the system by September 2018, which should inform the office on whether the system is meeting users' needs. GAO is making 13 recommendations, including that the Secret Service establish a process that ensures the CIO reviews all IT contracts, as appropriate; and identify the skills needed for its IT workforce. DHS concurred with all recommendations and provided estimated dates for implementing each of them." ]	14,900	gov_report	en	null	2ffa8e41905ff69637e32b478476fd68758395f1ac7d3dcd
The issue of who gets disciplined and why is complex. Studies we reviewed suggest that implicit bias—stereotypes or unconscious associations about people—on the part of teachers and staff may cause them to judge students’ behaviors differently based on the students’ race and sex. Teachers and staff sometimes have discretion to make case- by-case decisions about whether to discipline, and the form of discipline to impose in response to student behaviors, such as disobedience, defiance, and classroom disruption. Studies show that these decisions can result in certain groups of students being more harshly disciplined than others. Further, the studies found that the types of offenses that Black children were disciplined for were largely based on school officials’ interpretations of behavior. For example, one study found that Black girls were disproportionately disciplined for subjective interpretations of behaviors, such as disobedience and disruptive behavior. A separate study used eye-tracking technology to show that, among other things, teachers gazed longer at Black boys than other children when asked to look for challenging behavior based on video clips. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) reported that this research has highlighted implicit bias as a contributing factor in school discipline and may shed some light on the persistent disparities in expulsion and suspension practices, even though the study did not find that teacher gazes were indicative of how they would discipline students. Children’s behavior in school may be affected by health and social challenges outside the classroom that tend to be more acute for poor children, including minority children who experience higher rates of poverty. Research shows that experiencing trauma in childhood may lead to educational challenges, such as lower grades and more suspensions and expulsions; increased use of mental health services; and increased involvement with the child welfare and juvenile justice systems, according to HHS’s Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA). Further, a substantial share of children nationwide are estimated to have experienced at least one trauma, referred to as an adverse childhood experience (ACE), according to the National Survey of Children’s Health. Additionally, as we recently reported, there has been an increase in certain mental health issues within the school age population. For example, from 2005 to 2014, the suicide rate of youth ages 15 to 19 rose slightly, with older youth having a much higher rate of suicide than younger youth, and since 2007, the percentage of youth ages 12-17 experiencing a major depressive episode increased. About 50 million students were enrolled in K-12 public schools during the 2013-14 school year, according to the CRDC. About 90 percent of students attended traditional public schools; the remainder were enrolled at public charters, magnets, and other types of schools (see table 1). About half of all public school students were White and the other half fell into one of several minority groups, with Hispanic and Black students being the largest minority groups (see fig. 1). The number of boys and girls in public schools was almost evenly split. A larger percentage of boys were students with disabilities. Nearly half of all public school students went to schools where 50 percent or more of the students were low-income, and about a quarter went to schools where 75 percent or more of the students were low-income (see table 2). Discipline of students dropped between 2011-12 and 2013-14 over the six broad categories of discipline reported in Education’s CRDC, which were (1) out-of-school suspensions, (2) in-school suspensions, (3) referrals to law enforcement, (4) expulsions, (5) corporal punishment, and (6) school- related arrests. For example, in school year 2011-12 about 3.4 million (or 6.9 percent) of K-12 public school students were suspended out-of-school at least once, and in school year 2013-14 these suspensions fell to about 2.8 million (or 5.7 percent). Other disciplinary actions affected a much smaller portion of the student body—specifically, less than 0.5 percent of all K-12 public school students were expelled, referred to law enforcement, had a school-related arrest, or experienced corporal punishment in 2013-14, according to Education’s reported data. Education’s Office for Civil Rights and Justice’s Civil Rights Division are responsible for enforcing a number of civil rights laws, which protect students from discrimination on the basis of certain characteristics (see table 3). As part of their enforcement responsibilities, both agencies conduct investigations in response to complaints or reports of possible discrimination. Education also carries out agency-initiated investigations, which are called compliance reviews and which target problems that Education has determined are particularly acute. Education may also withhold federal funds if a recipient is determined to be in violation of the civil rights laws and the agency is unable to reach agreement with the parties involved. In addition, Justice has the authority to file suit in federal court to enforce the civil rights of students in public education. Education and Justice have also issued guidance to assist public schools in meeting their obligations under federal law to administer school discipline without unlawfully discriminating against students on the basis of race, color, or national origin. According to the guidance, public schools are prohibited by federal law from discriminating in the administration of student discipline based on protected characteristics. Further, Education and Justice have noted in their guidance that disciplinary policies and practices can result in unlawful discrimination based on race, for example, in two ways: first, if students are intentionally subject to different treatment on account of their race; and second, if a policy is neutral on its face but has a disproportionate and unjustified effect on students of a particular race, referred to as disparate impact. According to Education and Justice guidance, significant and unexplained racial disparities in student discipline give rise to concerns that schools may be engaging in racial discrimination that violates federal civil rights laws; however, data showing such disparities, taken alone, do not establish whether unlawful discrimination has occurred. Two significant, recently enacted laws include provisions related to school discipline: the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA) and the Child Care and Development Block Grant Act of 2014 (CCDBG Act of 2014). ESSA, enacted in December 2015, amended Title I program requirements to allow states’ accountability systems to use multiple indicators of success, which can include measures of school climate and safety. As we previously reported in 2017, some states were considering measures related to suspension rates or school attendance. Additionally, ESSA amended the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 to authorize the Student Support and Academic Enrichment Program, under which school districts may use grant funding to, among other things, design and implement a locally-tailored plan to reduce exclusionary discipline practices in elementary and secondary schools. These grants also allow the use of funding to expand access to school- based mental health services, including counseling. In addition, the CCDBG Act of 2014 allows states to use certain funds to support the training and professional development of child care workers through activities such as behavior management strategies and training that promote positive social and emotional development and reduce challenging behaviors, including reducing expulsions of young children for those behaviors. Black students, boys, and students with disabilities were disproportionately disciplined in K-12 public schools, according to our analysis of Education’s most recent CRDC data. This pattern of disproportionate discipline persisted regardless of the type of disciplinary action, level of school poverty, or type of public school these students attended. Across each disciplinary action, Black students, boys, and students with disabilities experienced disproportionate levels of discipline. Black students were particularly overrepresented among students who were suspended from school, received corporal punishment, or had a school- related arrest (see fig. 2). For example, Black students represented 15.5 percent of all public school students and accounted for 39 percent of students suspended from school, an overrepresentation of about 23 percentage points. Differences in discipline were particularly large between Black and White students. Although there were approximately 17.4 million more White students than Black students attending K-12 public schools in 2013-14, nearly 176,000 more Black students than White students were suspended from school that school year. See appendix IV, table 12 for additional data on the disciplinary experiences of different racial or ethnic groups. For example, American Indian and Alaska Native students had higher than average rates of receiving each of the six disciplinary actions. This pattern of disproportionate discipline affected both Black boys and Black girls—the only racial group for which both sexes were disproportionately disciplined across all six actions. For example, Black girls were suspended from school at higher rates than boys of multiple racial groups and every other racial group of girls (see fig. 3). Further, boys as a group were overrepresented, while girls were underrepresented among students disciplined across each action. Specifically, boys accounted for just over half of all public school students, but were at least two-thirds of students disciplined across each of the six actions, according to our analysis of Education’s school year 2013-14 data. Boys were particularly overrepresented among students who received corporal punishment, by about 27 percentage points (see fig. 4). These kinds of disparities presented as early as pre-school (see sidebar). Additional information about discipline for pre-school students is in appendix IV, table 17. Regardless of the level of school poverty, Black students, boys, and students with disabilities were suspended from school at disproportionately higher rates than their peers (see fig. 6). This was particularly acute for Black students in high-poverty schools, where they were overrepresented by nearly 25 percentage points in suspensions from school. This pattern persisted across all six disciplinary actions, as well. A similar pattern emerged for boys and students with disabilities. However, unlike Black students, boys and students with disabilities were particularly overrepresented among students suspended from low-poverty public schools (poverty less than 25 percent). Effect of School Poverty on Discipline GAO used a regression model to examine the independent effect of school poverty on discipline in school year 2013-14. The model showed that increases in the percentage of low-income students in a school were generally associated with significantly higher rates for each of the six disciplinary actions GAO reviewed (in-school and out-of-school suspensions, referrals to law enforcement, expulsions, corporal punishment, and school- related arrests). In these schools, boys and students with disabilities were overrepresented by approximately 24 and 20 percentage points, respectively. See appendix IV, table 14 for more information on discipline by the poverty level of the school. In addition, see sidebar for regression results that were relevant to poverty and school discipline. Full results from our regression model are in appendix I, table 10. Regardless of the type of public school a student attended—traditional, magnet, charter, alternative, or special education—Black students, boys, and students with disabilities were disciplined at disproportionately higher rates than their peers, with few exceptions (see fig. 7). For example, Black students were disproportionately suspended from all types of public schools, and this was particularly acute in charter schools. That is, although they represented about 29 percent of all students in charter schools, Black students accounted for more than 60 percent of the students suspended from charter schools (about 32 percentage points higher than their representation in those schools). Boys and students with disabilities were particularly overrepresented among students suspended from traditional public schools (roughly 19 and 14 percentage points, respectively, above their representation in traditional public schools). Effect of School Type on Discipline GAO used a regression model to examine the independent effect of attending different types of public schools on disciplinary outcomes. The model showed several significant associations between school type and the likelihood of receiving discipline. For example, attending an alternative school was associated with a significantly higher likelihood of being suspended (in-school or out-of-school), expelled, referred to law enforcement, or arrested for a school-related incident, compared to attending a traditional public school. The model also showed that students were significantly less likely to be suspended (in-school or out-of-school) if they attended a magnet, charter, or special education school as compared to a traditional public school. We found a few exceptions to the general pattern of Black students, boys, and students with disabilities receiving disproportionately high rates of discipline by school type. For example, Black students attending special education schools did not receive corporal punishment at disproportionate levels. See appendix IV, table 15 for additional information on discipline by the type of public school. In addition, see sidebar for regression results that were relevant to school type and school discipline. Full results from our regression model are in appendix I, table 10. We also found a regional component to discipline in public schools. For example, corporal punishment generally occurred in southern states. See appendix II for maps showing the rates of disciplinary actions by public school district. We spoke with school officials at five school districts about how they are addressing discipline, including challenges they face in responding to student conduct given the complex issues influencing student behavior. Several school officials noted a range of issues, including complex issues such as the effects of poverty, mental health issues, and family dysfunction, that they said contributed to behavior that leads to discipline (see fig. 8). For example, officials at a high-poverty Georgia high school said that their students have additional responsibilities, such as raising or watching siblings or working to support their family, which may cause students to be late to, or skip, class. This observation is consistent with our recent report on child well-being, which cited research showing that children in poverty are more likely to face academic and social challenges than their peers, and with our analysis of CRDC data, which showed that rates of chronic absenteeism (being absent 15 or more days in a school year), were higher in high-poverty schools. See appendix IV, table 19 for detailed data on chronic absenteeism. At one high school in Georgia, officials said that attendance issues were the reason for a majority of disciplinary actions at their school. They said that if students were repeatedly late to school or did not get to their next class within the set amount of time, students could amass enough infractions to warrant suspension from school. In contrast, an official at an elementary school in Georgia said that they usually do not discipline their students for being late to school, as they have found that it was often due to circumstances beyond the child’s control. According to several school officials, some groups such as homeless youth, American Indian, or Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, or Questioning (LGBTQ) students have had greater attendance problems than others. For example, education officials in California said that homeless and foster youth frequently miss school because of all the transitions and instability in their lives. In a school in Texas, officials also reported attendance issues with students who are homeless or in foster care because they lack transportation and clothing. Similarly, we previously reported that American Indian students face school attendance challenges, including access to reliable transportation. In addition, American Indian and Alaska Native students had the highest rates of chronic absenteeism in school year 2013-14, compared to students of other races, according to our analysis of CRDC data (see appendix IV). LGBTQ students are at a high risk of suicide and other emotional issues during adolescence, and often feel disconnected from their peers and families, according to county education officials in California. According to these officials, this can contribute to attendance problems. Officials in our five selected school districts also described what they perceived as a growing trend of behavioral challenges or provided examples related to mental health and trauma, such as increased anxieties, thoughts of and attempts at suicide, and depression among students. For example, state education officials in Georgia said they viewed a growing number of their students as being “trauma complex.” Officials at one school in Massachusetts said that they involve the mental health clinicians or social worker for additional support when students are dealing with traumatic experiences, depression, or are struggling to self- regulate. Further, officials at another school in Massachusetts said that many of their students have experienced trauma and this may lead to more aggressive behaviors at the elementary school level, and to more self-destructive behaviors at the middle school level. Specifically, these officials said that children who have experienced trauma may kick, bite, and punch others when they are younger and cut themselves or become suicidal when older. Similarly, officials at a school in Texas said that they have seen a growth in suicidal ideation and self-harm among the students. Some school officials also said that they felt ill-equipped or that schools lacked resources to deal with the increase in students with mental health issues and the associated behaviors. School officials in all five of the selected states also said that social media results in conflicts or related behavioral incidents among students, such as related bullying and arguments. Officials at a school in Georgia said that social media arguments can cause students who were not part of the original situation to be pulled in, creating classroom disruptions that end in discipline for a larger group. Moreover, officials in a North Dakota middle school said that disagreements on social media last for longer periods of time. They said that social media has also been used to facilitate the purchase of illegal drugs, which can result in students being arrested in school and expelled. Use of Corporal Punishment in School for Five Selected States California, Massachusetts, and North Dakota: Corporal punishment in schools is prohibited. Texas: If a school district adopts a policy to permit corporal punishment, school staff may use corporal punishment unless the student’s parent has provided a written, signed statement prohibiting it. None of the schools GAO visited used corporal punishment, according to officials. Georgia: Boards of education are authorized to determine policies related to corporal punishment, including allowing school staff, at their discretion, to administer corporal punishment in order to maintain discipline. However, none of the schools GAO visited used corporal punishment, according to officials. School district officials from three of the five selected districts we visited stated that officials at individual schools generally have a lot of discretion in determining what discipline a student receives. In several schools, officials said they often try other avenues first to address behavior, such as detention, alerting or having a discussion with the parent, or taking away certain privileges such as making the student eat lunch with the teacher instead of with their friends. However, for certain offenses, officials in most districts said that discipline was automatically more severe. Gun possession, for example, prompts an automatic expulsion at most of the school districts we visited. In another example, school district officials in Texas said drug-related incidents, physical assault of a teacher or student, or extreme sexual behaviors can result in a student being placed in an alternative school. School officials at one alternative school we visited stated that 80 to 90 percent of their students are there due to drug-related incidents. Officials in several of the school districts said their districts had School Resource Officers who only become involved in school disciplinary issues when requested by school administrators. In a Texas high school with over 3,800 students, a school official said School Resource Officers patrol school grounds, monitor gang activity, and may become involved when there are illegal drug issues. Officials also said that School Resource Officers sometimes provide trainings for students, parents, or school staff on subjects such as safety, good decision making, substance abuse, and peer pressure. Further, although corporal punishment was legal in two of the five states we visited (see sidebar), the school district officials with whom we spoke in those states said it was not used anymore in their districts. Our analysis of schools nationwide using school year 2013-14 data showed that corporal punishment tended to be most prevalent in southern states (see maps in appendix II). While there is no one-size-fits-all solution to addressing challenging student behavior, or to the evident disparities in discipline for certain student groups, officials in two school districts we visited told us they recognize the importance of finding alternatives to discipline that unnecessarily removes children from the learning environment. Some school officials said they have begun to specifically address disparities for certain student groups. Officials in all selected school districts reported they are implementing efforts to better address student behavior or reduce the use of exclusionary discipline. For example, officials in all school districts said that they are implementing alternative discipline models that emphasize preventing challenging student behavior and focus on supporting individuals and the school community, such as positive behavioral interventions and supports (PBIS), restorative justice practices, and social emotional learning (SEL) (see sidebar). For example, officials at a selected school district in Texas said they have implemented a classroom management model that uses positive behavior techniques. Texas state law allows schools to develop and implement positive behavior programs as disciplinary alternatives for very young students. This was also true in California, where state law specifically lists suggested alternatives to suspension, including restorative justice, a positive behavior support approach with tiered interventions, and enrollment in programs that teach positive social behavior or anger management. Examples of Alternatives to Discipline that Removes Students from the Classroom Positive Behavioral Interventions and Supports (PBIS): A school-wide framework that focuses on positive behavioral expectations. By teaching students what to do instead of what not to do, the school can focus on the preferred behaviors. All of the selected school districts used some form of positive behavioral intervention and supports. One school official told us that PBIS has significantly reduced their discipline referral numbers and provided teachers more tools to get behavior situations under control. Restorative Justice Practices: This approach focuses on repairing harm done to relationships and people. The aim is to teach students empathy and problem-solving skills that can help prevent inappropriate behavior in the future. For example, according to officials we interviewed at one school, their restorative practices help students take ownership of their actions and work collaboratively to restore relationships that may have been strained. Officials at another school said schools use mediation techniques as alternatives to suspensions. Social and Emotional Learning (SEL): SEL enhances students’ abilities to deal effectively and ethically with daily tasks and challenges. SEL integrates the following five core competencies: self-awareness, self- management, social awareness, relationship skills, and responsible decision making. At a school implementing this model, officials said that they are strengthening their SEL program to improve the whole child instead of treating discipline and mental and behavioral health separately. With regard to directly addressing disparities in school discipline, officials at one school district in California said they created a new leadership team for equity, culture, and support services, and developed a district- wide equity plan that includes mandatory training on implicit bias for principals. Officials from that district also said they had recently changed a policy to increase the consistency of discipline actions across the district’s schools. Similarly, officials at a school district in Massachusetts reported they were working to build awareness among school leadership to address racial bias and the achievement gap through multiyear trainings. Officials we spoke with at a school within that district said they conduct trainings for staff on implicit bias and other related issues to reduce school discipline disparities. As some of the schools and districts we visited have begun implementing alternative discipline models and efforts to reduce the use of exclusionary discipline in recent years, we heard from officials in two districts that there has been difficulty with implementation due to limited resources, staffing turnover, and resistance on the part of some parents. During our visits to schools, we observed classroom spaces that school officials used to manage student behavior, including through various alternative approaches to discipline (see fig. 9). Officials in two school districts said they are moving away from exclusionary discipline because it decreases the amount of academic instruction. Officials at one school district in Georgia said that the district had a history of overusing exclusionary discipline and they understood that schools cannot “suspend their way out of behavioral and discipline issues.” Officials at that district said they are currently rolling out PBIS to their schools, although progress has been slow. While they said discipline rates have decreased and they have received fewer parent and staff complaints, change is difficult because of limited resources, staff turnover, and some resistance to alternative discipline versus punitive discipline on the part of both some school staff and parents. State education officials in all five states said that changes to state law were made or considered related to school discipline in the past several years. For example, California officials said that state law now prohibits suspensions and expulsions for children in grades K-3 for willful defiance. For all ages suspensions may only be used when other means of correction fail to bring about proper conduct. Similarly, Massachusetts law requires that during a student meeting or a hearing to decide disciplinary consequences for a student, school administrators consider ways to re-engage students in the learning process and that expulsion only be used after other remedies and consequences have failed. Massachusetts also revised its state law effective July 2014 to require that schools provide educational services for expelled students. Georgia state law includes a preference for reassignment of disruptive students to alternative educational settings in lieu of suspending or expelling such students. In addition, most of the selected states plan to include school discipline or absenteeism as measures of school quality in their state ESSA Title I plans (see sidebar). According to administrative data from Education, the Office for Civil Rights (OCR) resolved over 2,500 K-12 school discipline cases between 2011 and summer 2017 through several means, including voluntary resolution (leading to agreed-upon actions and subsequent monitoring), dismissal, or closure due to insufficient evidence. These cases stemmed both from external complaints and reviews self-initiated by Education. When we analyzed a non-generalizable sample of resolved cases, we found that most of them focused on alleged racial discrimination or disability status. In the four cases we selected for more in-depth review, the school districts agreed to address discipline issues by, for example, designating a discipline supervisor, training staff, revising district policies, holding student listening sessions, and regularly reviewing data to identify disparities (see case descriptions below). Some of these remedies are designed to reduce exclusionary discipline or improve overall school climate, and others are more directly focused on addressing disparities in school discipline. For example, having school leadership regularly review data, particularly when disaggregated by race and other student characteristics, would increase awareness of disparities. Education Case 1: Race and Exclusionary Discipline in a Mississippi School District. OCR’s 2014 investigation of the Tupelo Public School District found that Black students were disproportionately disciplined in nearly all categories of offenses. These commonly included subjective behaviors like disruption, defiance, disobedience, and “other misbehavior as determined by the administration.” The consequences for “other misbehavior” in high school could be severe, ranging from detention to referral to an alternative school. Once at the alternative school, students were searched thoroughly each day upon entry, escorted by security officers when changing classes, and not allowed to carry purses or book bags. OCR concluded that the district’s discipline codes afforded administrators broad discretion, and found different treatment of Black students when looking at specific disciplinary records. For example, among several students who were disciplined for the first offense of using profanity, Black students were the only ones who were suspended from school, while White students received warnings and detention for substantially similar behavior. To address these issues, the district entered into a voluntary resolution agreement whereby it committed to taking specific actions to ensure that all students have an equal opportunity to learn in school. It agreed, among other things, to revise its student discipline policies, practices, and procedures to include clear and objective definitions of misconduct, eliminate vague and subjective offense categories, and describe criteria for selection within the range of possible penalties when imposing sanctions. The district also agreed to require that alternatives to suspension and other forms of exclusionary discipline be considered in all cases except where immediate safety of students or staff is threatened, and where the behavior in question is such that the disruption to the educational environment can only be remedied by removal, or where the student’s removal is a result of the district’s progressive discipline policy. Education Case 2: Disability and Restraint & Seclusion in a Non- Public California School. This 2016 OCR investigation focused on restraint and seclusion of a student with disabilities who was placed at the non-public school with which Oakland Unified School District contracted to provide the student with certain services, including developing and implementing behavior intervention plans. OCR found the use of prone restraint on this student to be severe, persistent, and pervasive: staff held the student face-down 92 times over a period of 11 months, with the longest duration of a single face-down restraint being 93 minutes. Examples of behaviors that led to the use of restraint included disruptive behavior, not following directions, pushing desks, and ripping up assignments. Staff said that the student wanted to be disciplined and understood prone restraint to be disciplinary. OCR determined that the district allowed the student to be treated differently for non-dangerous behavior on the basis of disability. The district entered into a resolution agreement, committing to resolve these issues by offering individual relief to the student—arranging for an evaluation of the student for adverse effects of the restraint and seclusion, with recommendations for addressing areas of harm—and implementing district-wide policy changes related to restraint and seclusion. The latter included establishing a protocol for responding to any contracted non-public schools’ reports of restraining or secluding district students, and providing training on positive interventions. Excerpt from Christian County, KY Case An African American 10th grader was assigned 1-day out-of-school suspension for skipping school. In comparison, a white 12th grader was assigned a conference with the principal for skipping school. The African American student had 19 previous disciplinary referrals, while the white student had 28 previous disciplinary referrals. Education reported that it would be difficult for the district to demonstrate how excluding a student from attending school in response to the student’s efforts to avoid school meets an important educational goal. Education Case 3: Race and Exclusionary Discipline in a Kentucky School District. In this 2014 case, OCR found that Christian County School District disciplined Black students more frequently or harshly than similarly situated White students. Specifically, Black students were more than 10 times more likely than White students to receive out-of-school suspension for disorderly conduct, and Black students were more likely to be assigned to an “Isolated Classroom Environment” when discipline was for a violation that afforded discretion. OCR also found that the district’s discipline code did not define 61 types of violations, including ones that involve interpretation, such as disorderly conduct, failure to follow directions, deliberate classroom disruption, and profanity. OCR found that administrators had wide discretion in determining the consequences for such actions, and noted that the discipline code allowed for virtually every type of sanction, including expulsion, for each type of violation. OCR also found inconsistencies in treatment of students in different racial groups when looking at individual records (see sidebar). Although district officials said they were aware of the higher rates of discipline for Black students, OCR found that there were no safeguards to ensure that discretion would be exercised in a nondiscriminatory manner. To resolve these issues, the district agreed to ensure as much as possible that misbehavior is addressed in a way that avoids exclusionary discipline, collaborate with experts on research-based strategies to prevent discrimination in discipline, and provide support services to decrease behavioral difficulties, among other things. Education Case 4: Race and Informal Removals in a California Charter School. In this 2015 case, OCR investigated whether Black students were disproportionately disciplined at a charter school which emphasizes Hmong culture and language. The complaint noted that the student’s parents had been asked to take him home on a few occasions because he was disruptive in class. School administrators confirmed the practice of “early dismissal” in response to misbehavior, but said they did not consider the dismissal to be disciplinary. Because the school did not maintain records of these removals, OCR was unable to determine if the student was subjected to discriminatory discipline. However, OCR noted that the practice of removing students from school for disciplinary reasons without appropriate recordkeeping and due process makes it almost impossible for the school to assess whether it is fully meeting its duty of ensuring nondiscrimination with respect to discipline. To resolve these issues, the school agreed, among other things, to revise its discipline policies, provide due process and alternatives to exclusionary discipline, and clearly prohibit the kinds of informal suspensions that OCR observed. Justice also investigates discrimination in school discipline based on complaints filed under federal civil rights statutes and as part of monitoring desegregation orders. Three recently-resolved cases investigated exclusionary discipline or restraint and seclusion for students of color and those with disabilities (see case descriptions below). Justice Case 1: Race and Exclusionary Discipline in an Arkansas School District. This Justice case, originally stemming from a desegregation order, focused on whether the Watson Chapel School District was discriminating against Black students in its administration of school discipline. Justice found that the district suspended and expelled Black students at significantly higher rates than White students, and that district policies and procedures were responsible for this difference. The parties signed a Consent Order in 2016, under which the school district agreed to implement positive interventions and supports, transition away from exclusionary discipline, revise the code of conduct to list specific levels of disciplinary infractions and consequences, prohibit corporal punishment, establish a memorandum of agreement with any law enforcement agency that supplies school resource officers, and provide training to staff. In addition, the district agreed to provide due process before students receive out-of-school suspensions, expulsions, or referrals to the alternative education program because of disruptive behavior. Justice Case 2: Race and Disability in a Maryland School District. Justice investigated complaints that discipline policies in the Wicomico County Public School District resulted in the discriminatory suspension of Black and Latino students and students with disabilities. After the investigation, Justice and the district negotiated and entered into a voluntary out-of-court settlement agreement in January 2017. The district agreed to hire a consultant to implement positive behavioral interventions and supports and restorative practices, revise the code of conduct to include objective definitions of behavioral infractions and incorporate alternatives to exclusionary discipline, establish clear guidelines for when law enforcement intervention is appropriate, and provide appropriate due process procedures. Justice Case 3: Race and Restraint & Seclusion in a Kentucky School District. This 2017 Justice case investigated whether Covington Independent Schools’ disciplinary practices, including the use of exclusionary discipline, restraint, and seclusion, discriminated on the basis of race, national origin, or disability. The parties agreed to negotiate a settlement agreement under which the district agreed to develop a process to regularly identify students who disproportionately had disciplinary referrals, with a focus on offenses that may be the result of unaddressed behavioral needs such as disruptive behavior or aggression, defiance, and being “beyond control.” The district also agreed to discontinue the use of “calm rooms” (where students are isolated during an episode of misbehavior) and prohibit the use of physical restraint except in the case of imminent danger that could not be addressed through de-escalation techniques. The district agreed to adopt an intervention procedure to meet the needs of students with disabilities who may need support beyond the standard discipline policies. In addition, if parents of students with disabilities were asked to come to the school to become involved in an ongoing instance of misbehavior, the district could no longer require the parent to take the student home unless the student had been assigned an out-of-school suspension or expulsion. Education and Justice collaborated on a “Rethink Discipline” campaign in 2014 to address what they viewed as widespread overuse of suspensions and expulsions. This awareness campaign included comprehensive guidance to help states and schools implement alternatives to exclusionary discipline, reduce discrimination, and identify root causes of disparities (see sidebar). The agencies have also collaborated to provide guidance encouraging school districts that use school resource officers to formalize partnerships with local law enforcement agencies and clarify that school resource officers should not administer discipline in schools. Education has also issued special guidance related to the discipline of students with disabilities, including an explanation of the requirement to provide appropriate strategies to address behavior in students’ individualized education programs (IEPs). This guidance stated that when a student with a disability is regularly sent home early from school for behavior reasons, it is likely that the child’s opportunity to make progress in the general education curriculum is significantly impeded (see sidebar). The guidance states that being sent home regularly in this way constitutes a disciplinary removal, which comes with statutory reporting obligations and other considerations. For further information on available federal guidance related to discipline in public schools, see appendix III. available could result in an inappropriately restrictive placement. demonstrates that disciplinary measures such as short-term removals from the current placement (e.g., suspension), or other exclusionary disciplinary measures that significantly impede the implementation of the individualized education program (IEP), generally do not help to reduce or eliminate reoccurrence of the misbehavior. Education and other federal entities have also awarded grants and established special initiatives related to student behavior and school discipline, many of which started around the same time as the federal Rethink Discipline campaign and were designed to be complementary. For example, Education awarded about $130 million from 2014-2016 to states and school districts through the School Climate Transformation Grant, which was established in 2014 to support districts taking steps to improve behavioral outcomes. According to Education, nearly 3,000 schools have worked to implement these behavioral support systems through the grant, and preliminary outcomes data have shown increased student attendance and fewer disciplinary referrals. In addition, Education awarded about $68 million for fiscal years 2015-2019 to over 20 school districts under Project Prevent—a grant to promote conflict resolution skills in students, particularly when they have been exposed to pervasive violence. According to the districts’ grant summary documents, these districts have experienced nearly 10,000 fewer violent behavioral incidents and have provided access to mental health services for over 5,000 students. Justice’s research arm, the National Institute of Justice, also started the Comprehensive School Safety Initiative in 2014 and has since provided about $84 million to fund nearly 40 research projects and interventions that address school discipline and safety, such as implementing restorative practices and studying the root causes of the school-to-prison pipeline. More recently, Education collaborated with HHS to fund the Pyramid Equity Project for early learning programs, which is designed to address implicit bias in school discipline, implement culturally responsive practices in addressing student behavior, and use data systems to understand equity issues. For ongoing technical assistance related to student behavior and school discipline, Education sponsors centers on supportive learning environments, improving student engagement and attendance, and implementing positive behavioral interventions and supports (PBIS). For example, the National Center on Safe Supportive Learning Environments provides information and resources on addressing school discipline, mental health, substance abuse, physical safety, student engagement, and other related issues. Justice funds a technical assistance center on school-justice partnerships that works to enhance collaboration among schools, mental and behavioral health specialists, and law enforcement officials. This center recently published a bulletin on the intersection of exclusionary school discipline and the juvenile justice system, which offers tips for judges who handle school-related cases and information on successful efforts to reduce the number of school-based referrals to law enforcement. For a list of other technical assistance centers related to student behavior or discipline, see appendix III. Lastly, to help identify discipline disparities among the nation’s schools, Education collects comprehensive data on school discipline every other year through the CRDC. The agency publicly releases highlights from these data through their “First Look” documents and in annual reports, which typically focus on a limited number of disciplinary actions (primarily suspensions) and student demographics (usually race and disability status). Education’s public analyses of school discipline data have not included school characteristics like poverty level or type of school. Education encourages districts and schools to disaggregate their data by various student demographics and examine it for disparities. In addition, Education’s Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services recently examined racial and ethnic disparities for students with disabilities using data collected under IDEA, Part B. This IDEA report provides the public with information on whether districts had significant disproportionality on the basis of race or ethnicity in the discipline of students with disabilities. We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Education and Justice for review and comment. These agencies provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. We also provided selected draft excerpts relevant to officials we interviewed in state agencies, school districts, and school officials. We received technical comments from those officials in four of our five selected states, which we incorporated as appropriate. As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of Education, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Attorney General, and other interested parties. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (617) 788-0580 or nowickij@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V. The objectives of this report were to examine (1) the patterns in disciplinary actions among public schools, (2) the challenges selected school districts reported with student behavior and how they are approaching school discipline, and (3) the actions the Department of Education (Education) and the Department of Justice (Justice) have taken to identify and address any disparities or discrimination in school discipline. To conduct this work we (1) analyzed federal discipline data by student demographics and school characteristics; (2) visited five school districts to provide illustrative examples of approaches to school discipline; and (3) interviewed federal agency officials and reviewed agency documentation, federal laws, regulations and policies, selected state laws, and a selection of resolved school discipline cases. To inform all aspects of our work, we interviewed representatives from several nonfederal civil rights organizations and advocacy organizations that represent parents and families, individuals with disabilities, and people from specific racial or ethnic backgrounds, such as Hispanic, African-American, and American Indian communities. We also met with academic subject matter experts to discuss issues related to school discipline, including disparities in school discipline and initiatives intended to reduce exclusionary discipline. In addition, we reviewed two dozen articles containing research that had been published since 2010 to further understand the context of school discipline issues and programs. We evaluated the methods used in the research and eliminated the research if we felt the methods were not appropriate or rigorous. The following sections contain detailed information about the scope and methodology for this report. To determine the patterns in disciplinary actions among public schools, we used Education’s Civil Rights Data Collection (CRDC) to analyze discipline data from all public schools by student demographics (e.g., race, sex, disability) and school characteristics (e.g., school type, such as charter or magnet school). Our analyses of this data, taken alone, do not establish whether unlawful discrimination has occurred. The CRDC is a biennial survey that is mandatory for every public school and district in the United States. Conducted by Education’s Office for Civil Rights, the survey collects data on the nation’s public schools (pre-K through 12th grade), including disciplinary actions as well as student characteristics and enrollment, educational and course offerings, and school environment, such as incidents of bullying. CRDC data are self-reported by districts and schools, and consequently there is potential for misreporting of information. In school years 2011-12 and 2013-14, the CRDC collected data from nearly every public school in the nation (approximately 17,000 school districts, 96,000 schools, and 50 million students in school year 2013-14). Using the public-use data file of the CRDC, we focused our analysis primarily on data for school year 2013- 14, the most recent data available at the time of our analysis. We also compared disciplinary data from school years 2011-12 and 2013-14 to analyze how discipline may have changed over that period. The 2013-14 CRDC collected data on six broad types of disciplinary actions: (1) out-of-school suspensions, (2) in-school suspensions, (3) referrals to law enforcement, (4) expulsions, (5) corporal punishment, and (6) school-related arrests. The CRDC did not collect data on less severe forms of discipline, such as detentions, Saturday school, or removing privileges to engage in extracurricular activities, such as athletic teams or field trips. As shown in table 4, we combined related variables for out-of- school suspension and expulsion; we also provide a crosswalk of discipline variables used in this report and those captured in the CRDC. For each of the six disciplinary actions in our review, we examined discipline counts and rates both overall and disaggregated by student demographic characteristics. Specifically, we examined counts and rates for each disciplinary action by student sex (boy or girl), race or ethnicity (see table 5), disability status (students with or without disabilities), and English Language Learners. Using the CRDC, we also examined race and sex intersectionally, for example, disciplinary rates for Black boys or White girls. In order to analyze discipline counts and rates by the poverty level of the school, we pulled in data on free or reduced-price lunch eligibility from the 2013-14 Common Core of Data (CCD), and matched it to schools in the 2013-14 CRDC, which did not collect eligibility data. The CCD is administered by Education’s National Center for Education Statistics, and annually collects nonfiscal data about all public schools in the nation. A student is generally eligible for free or reduced-price lunch based on federal income eligibility guidelines that are tied to the federal poverty level and the size of the family. State education agencies supply these data for their schools and school districts. We then sorted schools into quartiles based on the percentage of students eligible for free or reduced-price lunch as follows: 0 to 25 percent, 25.1 to 49.9 percent, 50 to 74.9 percent, and 75 to 100 percent (see table 6). The poverty thresholds and measure of poverty discussed here and throughout this report were commonly used in the literature and also aligned with how Education analyzed its data. To analyze discipline counts and rates by the type of public school a student attended, we sorted schools into mutually exclusive categories and reviewed disciplinary data by student demographic information. The 2013-14 CRDC allowed schools to self-identify as special education, magnet, charter, and alternative schools (see table 7). The categories of public schools in the CRDC were not mutually exclusive; that is, schools could select multiple school types to describe their school, such as a charter school that was also an alternative school. To create mutually exclusive categories for analytical purposes, we applied the following criteria: Alternative school: all schools that selected “alternative” as the school type in the CRDC, even if they selected other types as well. Special education school: schools that selected “special education” as the school type in the CRDC, except those schools that also selected the alternative school type. Charter school: schools that selected “charter” as the school type in the CRDC, except those schools that also selected the alternative school type and/or the special education school type. Magnet school: schools that selected “magnet” as the school type in the CRDC, except those schools that also selected the alternative school type, the special education school type, and/or the charter school type. Traditional school: schools that did not select any other school type in the CRDC. Table 8 provides the breakdown of students and schools captured in the 2013-14 CRDC after applying these criteria. For each of our school discipline analyses, we also examined disparities in disciplinary rates by student demographics. Specifically, we compared each student groups’ representation among students disciplined to their representation in the overall student population. For example, if boys accounted for 50 percent of all K-12 public school students, but represented 75 percent of students that received a given disciplinary action, then boys would be overrepresented among students that received that type of discipline by 25 percentage points. We also compared disciplinary rates across student groups and similarly examined disparities based on school poverty level and school type for all students. We also analyzed CRDC data on discipline of pre-school students. The disciplinary data for pre-school students that was collected in the CRDC for school year 2013-14 was different than disciplinary data collected for K-12 students. Specifically, data on pre-school discipline was limited to out-of-school suspensions and expulsions. Findings from our analysis of pre-school discipline data are included where applicable in the report and additional data are provided in appendix IV, table 17. In addition to analyzing data on school discipline, we also analyzed data on chronic absenteeism, which was defined as students who were absent 15 or more days during the school year for any reason, which could include for suspensions and expulsions. The CRDC also collected data on instances in which students were restrained—both physically and mechanically—or secluded at school. Education has provided a resource document with principles to school districts that indicates restraint and seclusion should only be used in instances where a student’s “behavior poses imminent danger of serious physical harm to self or others,” and should never be used as punishment or discipline. However, multiple sources, including civil rights complaints filed with Education, news stories, and other reports have alleged that these practices have been used in response to student misbehavior, in particular for students with disabilities. We included data on chronic absenteeism and restraint and seclusion in our analyses, and present related findings in appendix IV, tables 18 and 19. We determined that the data we used from the CRDC and CCD were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report by reviewing technical documentation, conducting electronic testing, and interviewing officials from Education’s Office for Civil Rights and National Center for Education Statistics. For our analysis of the 2013-14 CRDC, we used the final data file that was publicly available as of June 2017 because it corrected errors in the original data previously submitted by several school districts. We conducted a generalized linear regression using the 2013-14 CRDC and CCD data to explore whether and to what extent certain school-level characteristics were associated with higher rates of each disciplinary action. Such a model allowed us to test the association between a given school characteristic and the percentage of students receiving a given disciplinary action, while holding other school characteristics constant. We selected different school characteristics (our independent variables) for the regression based on factors that Education’s Office for Civil Rights and other researchers have identified as potential drivers of school discipline rates (our dependent, or outcome variables). Table 9 lists the variables we included in our regression model. We conducted a separate regression for each of the six disciplinary actions listed as an outcome variable. We excluded some schools from our regression model. Specifically, we excluded schools that met one or more of the following criteria: Data were not available in both the CRDC and CCD data sets, and therefore we were unable to determine the percentage of students eligible for free or reduced-price lunch in these schools or whether these schools were located in rural, suburban, or urban areas. School was listed as “ungraded” in the CRDC because we could not determine if these schools offered grade 6 or above. School only offered pre-school because pre-school disciplinary data were reported separately and differently than K-12 disciplinary data in the CRDC. School identified as a juvenile justice facility in the CRDC. In the 2013-14 CRDC, schools could identify as a juvenile justice facility, and select one of the other school types in our analysis (i.e., traditional, magnet, charter, alternative, and special education schools). Due to this overlap, and because it is reasonable to expect discipline within a juvenile justice facility could function differently than discipline in other schools, we excluded these schools from our regression model. School had less than 10 students enrolled because in smaller schools minor fluctuations in the numbers of students receiving a given disciplinary action could have a large effect on disciplinary rates. In the 2013-14 data, these exclusions reduced the total number of public schools in our regression model from a universe of 95,507 public schools to 86,769 public schools. All regression models are subject to limitations and for this model the limitations included: Data we analyzed were by school rather than student. Consequently, we were not able to describe the association between our independent variables and a student’s rate of different disciplinary actions, while controlling for characteristics of an individual student, such as sex, race or ethnicity, disability status, or grade level. Instead, the school-level nature of the CRDC data limited our description of the associations between school characteristics and disciplinary rates to whether there was an increase, decrease, or no effect on disciplinary rates for schools with a given characteristic, controlling for other characteristics of the entire school’s population, such as percent of students who are boys or are Black. Some variables that may be related to student behavior and discipline are not available in the data. For example, in this context, it could be that parent education or household type (single- versus multiple- headed household) could be related to student behaviors, such as those that lead to receiving the six disciplinary actions we analyzed. Results of our analyses are associational and do not imply a causal relationship because, for example, CRDC data were not gathered by a randomized controlled trial, where students would be randomized to attend schools with certain characteristics. Typically, a generalized linear regression model provides an estimated incidence rate ratio, where a value greater than one indicates a higher or positive association, in this case, between the disciplinary outcome and the independent variable of interest, such as being a charter school or having a higher percentage of Black students. An estimated incidence rate ratio less than one indicates a lower incidence of a given disciplinary action when a factor is present. Given the limitations of our model as described above, we present the results of our regression model in table 10 by describing the direction of the associations, rather than an estimated rate (incidence) of disciplinary outcomes. For categorical variables in table 10, we provided the comparison school characteristic in brackets and italics. For example, the results in this table should be interpreted as students attending alternative schools were significantly more likely than students attending traditional schools to be suspended out of school. For continuous variables (i.e., those starting with “Percent”), the results in this table should be interpreted as the likelihood of receiving a given disciplinary action as the percentage of students in the school with a given characteristic increased. For example, as the percentage of students eligible for free or reduced- price lunch increased, we found that the likelihood of receiving each of the six disciplinary actions also increased. It should be noted that interactions (i.e., where we combine both race and sex variables) should be interpreted differently than other variables in table 10. Though an interaction may be “negative,” it does not necessarily imply that the group presented in the interaction was significantly less likely to receive the given disciplinary action because interactions are interpreted relative to the main effect of each variable in the interaction. For example, as shown in table 10, the interaction for percentage of Black boys was negative for out-of-school suspensions; however, the estimated incidence of out-of-school suspensions for a school with a higher than average percentage of Black students and a higher than average percentage of boys was positive. Since the contribution for an interaction coefficient is relative, in this example the contribution of the main effects outweighed that of the interaction, resulting in a positive effect altogether, despite the negative interaction. To obtain information on how selected school districts are addressing discipline issues, including any challenges they face in doing so, we selected five school districts to serve as illustrative examples. To select school districts, we used CRDC data to sort school districts into categories based on district size; the presence of disparities in out-of- school suspension rates for boys, Black students, or students with disabilities; and whether the out-of-school suspension rate was increasing or decreasing between the two most recent CRDC collections. With regard to size, we collapsed several categories that Education has previously used into three groupings, each with roughly one-third of all students attending public schools in school year 2013-14: Large School District: 25,000 or more students (34.7% of all students in 2013-14) Medium School District: 5,000 to 24,999 students (33.2% of all students in 2013-14) Small School District: Less than 5,000 students (32.1% of all students in 2013-14) Further, we focused on out-of-school suspensions for selection purposes because this disciplinary action was one of the most frequently reported disciplinary actions employed by schools in Education’s two most recent data collection efforts on the issue (2011-12 and 2013-14 CRDC). Moreover, out-of-school suspensions are an exclusionary disciplinary action; that is, they remove or exclude students from the usual instructional or learning environment. Selecting districts with a range of out-of-school suspension rate was intended to generate a mix of districts that commonly use exclusionary discipline, as well as those that may employ alternatives. For site selection, we used out-of-school suspension data in two ways. First, we excluded districts that did not have a disparity in out-of-school suspension rates for Black students, boys, or students with disabilities. Prior GAO work and Education’s data showed that these groups were particularly vulnerable to discipline disparities, and the purpose of this research objective was to understand district efforts to identify and address such disparities. Second, we grouped school districts by whether their out-of-school suspension rate increased or decreased between 2011-12 and 2013-14. Exploring school districts that changed in different ways over time was intended to help us identify successful efforts to reduce suspensions as well as challenges districts face in addressing disparate discipline. Using the above criteria, we grouped school districts into the following categories: Category 1 and 2: Large school district and out-of-school suspension rate that increased (or decreased) from 2011-12 to 2013-14 Category 3 and 4: Medium school district and out-of-school suspension rate that increased (or decreased) from 2011-12 to 2013- 14 Category 5 and 6: Small school district and out-of-school suspension rate that increased (or decreased) from 2011-12 to 2013-14. After sorting school districts into the above categories, we randomized the list within each category to improve the methodological rigor of selecting school districts. In addition, we applied a series of post-checks to our list of districts in each grouping to ensure we had appropriate variety to consider other key factors in school discipline. Specifically, we checked for variety in: types of public schools in the district, geographic diversity both in terms of region of the country and use of corporal punishment in the district, and use of restraint or seclusion in the district. To select specific districts, we started with the district in each category that was at the top of the randomized list and then applied the above post-checks. We then conducted outreach to district superintendents or their designees via telephone and email to obtain their agreement to participate in this review. When school districts were unresponsive to our outreach or unwilling to participate, we contacted additional districts that had similar characteristics in order to achieve variety in our final selections. This resulted in the selection of five schools districts, one each in California, Georgia, Massachusetts, North Dakota, and Texas (see table 11). We visited each district and interviewed district-level officials involved in school discipline and school climate initiatives. These officials included superintendents, assistant superintendents, program managers, and directors of applicable district departments (e.g., student support services and special education). We also reviewed district-level discipline data, school district discipline policies, and relevant state laws related to school discipline to better understand the local context in each selected district. In the five districts we visited, we also interviewed officials at a total of 19 schools. At each school, we typically met with principals and/or assistant principals, and in some instances, spoke with other personnel at the school, such as counselors, attendance coordinators, school resource officers (i.e., law enforcement officers), and teachers. In each district, we selected a variety of schools to visit based on grade level, school type, and disciplinary data. For each selected district, we also interviewed officials from the state educational agency that oversees that district to better understand the statewide context around discipline, such as state laws that may affect district disciplinary policies, statewide initiatives related to discipline, and state-level monitoring of district-level disciplinary actions. In California, we also met with the county office of education that oversees the district we selected because, in that state, counties have a primary role in the local school district accountability structure. Because we selected these school districts judgmentally, we cannot generalize the findings about these districts’ approaches to discipline, and the challenges they face, to all school districts and schools nationwide. To determine the extent to which, and in what ways, Education and Justice are identifying and addressing discipline disparities and discrimination, we interviewed agency officials at headquarters and regional offices, reviewed agency documentation and administrative data, reviewed federal laws and regulations, and reviewed a non-generalizable sample of seven recently resolved school discipline investigations undertaken by Education and Justice (which we refer to as cases). With both agencies, we interviewed officials about each agency’s responsibilities with respect to federal civil rights laws and regulations, as well as the actions the agencies took to enforce them. We also discussed each agency’s guidance, support to school districts on these issues (e.g., grants and technical assistance), and data collection activities. In addition, we collected and reviewed relevant agency procedures and guidance documents. We also requested and reviewed Education’s data on the number of civil rights complaints received and cases related to school discipline investigated from 2011 to August 2017 to better understand the scope of the agency’s efforts. Education provided these data from their internal database, where investigators categorized cases as being related to school discipline. We assessed the reliability of this source through discussion with knowledgeable officials and reviewing key documents and determined the data to be reliable for our purposes. To select resolved school discipline cases to review, we searched Education’s and Justice’s respective online repositories of resolved investigations and compliance reviews, as well as Education’s annual reports, to create a list of resolved cases related to school discipline. We then narrowed the list to cases resolved in approximately the past 3 years (from 2014 to May 2017) and excluded long-standing cases that were opened several decades ago to help ensure the information in the cases reflected recent policies and practices in each agency. We also excluded cases regarding institutions of higher education because they were outside the scope of this review. This resulted in a list of 12 relevant resolved cases—9 for Education and 3 for Justice. From this list, we selected 7 cases to review in depth to better understand Education’s and Justice’s investigatory processes and resolutions with regard to school discipline cases in pre-K through 12th grade, and to provide illustrative examples in our report. We selected 4 cases from Education that provided a mix of the type of alleged discrimination (e.g., race or disability) and type of discipline (e.g., suspension, expulsion, arrest, etc.). We selected all 3 relevant cases from Justice. For each case, we reviewed the type of investigation (complaint investigation or compliance review); the reason for the investigation; any applicable findings or recommendations; and the ultimate resolution of the investigation, such as a voluntary agreement with the school district or remedies to address findings. In all instances, we are presenting Education’s and Justice’s findings and do not reach any independent conclusions regarding the cases. We conducted this performance audit from November 2016 to March 2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. This appendix contains maps showing rates of disciplinary actions by school district for each of the six disciplinary actions captured in the Department of Education’s Civil Rights Data Collection for school year 2013-14. Funded by Department of Education (Education): National Center on Safe Supportive Learning Environments: offers information and technical assistance focused on improving student supports and academic enrichment. This includes resources on using positive approaches to discipline, as well as promoting mental health for students and ensuring the safety and effectiveness of physical learning environments. https://safesupportivelearning.ed.gov/. National Student Attendance, Engagement, and Success Center: a center that disseminates evidence-based practices and facilitates communities of practice to help students attend school every day, be engaged in school, and succeed academically, so that they graduate high school prepared for college, career, and civic life. It offers webinars on identifying the root causes of chronic absence, linking school climate and exclusionary discipline to absenteeism, and improving attendance for vulnerable students. http://new.every1graduates.org/nsaesc/ National Technical Assistance Center for the Education of Neglected or Delinquent Children and Youth: provides technical assistance to state agencies with Title I, Part D programs and works to improve education services for children and youth who are neglected, delinquent, or at risk. This includes running the Supportive School Discipline Communities of Practice, which brings together education and justice leaders for knowledge-sharing events and offers webinars on discipline initiatives such as restorative practices. https://www.neglected-delinquent.org/ Positive Behavioral Interventions and Supports Technical Assistance Center: funded by Education’s Office of Special Education Programs, this center supports implementation of a multi- tiered approach to social, emotional and behavior support. In addition, it offers resources on cultural responsiveness, addressing discipline disproportionality, and interconnecting mental health with behavior support systems, among other issues. https://www.pbis.org/. Funded by Department of Health and Human Services (HHS): Center of Excellence for Infant and Early Childhood Mental Health Consultation: supports states, tribes, and communities in promoting mental health and school readiness. It provides training to leaders in early childhood education around mental health and school readiness issues. https://www.samhsa.gov/iecmhc Center for School Mental Health: works to strengthen policies and programs in school mental health to improve learning and promote success for youth. This center is supported in full by HHS’s Maternal and Child Health Bureau, Division of Child, Adolescent and Family Health Adolescent Health Branch in the Health Resources and Service Administration. http://csmh.umaryland.edu/ National Center for Trauma-Informed Care and Alternatives to Seclusion and Restraint: works to develop approaches to eliminate the use of seclusion, restraints, and other coercive practices and to further advance the knowledge base related to implementation of trauma-informed approaches. https://www.samhsa.gov/nctic National Child Traumatic Stress Network: works to improve access to care, treatment, and services for children and adolescents exposed to traumatic events. The group provides a comprehensive focus on childhood trauma by collaborating with the health, mental health, education, law enforcement, child welfare, juvenile justice, and military family service systems. http://nctsn.org/ National Resource Center for Mental Health Promotion and Youth Violence Prevention: offers resources and technical assistance to states, tribes, territories, and local communities to promote overall child wellness and prevent youth violence. http://www.healthysafechildren.org/ Now Is the Time Technical Assistance Center: provides national training and technical assistance to recipients of the Healthy Transitions (youth access to mental health) and Project Advancing Wellness and Resilience Education (AWARE) grants. https://www.samhsa.gov/nitt-ta/about-us Funded by Department of Justice (Justice): School-Justice Partnership National Resource Center: provides trainings and webinars, and partners with stakeholders in the law enforcement, juvenile justice, mental health, and public education arenas. The National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges operates this center. https://schooljusticepartnership.org/ Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) This appendix contains several tables that show the underlying data used throughout this report, as well as additional analyses we conducted using the Department of Education’s Civil Rights Data Collection (CRDC) and Common Core of Data (CCD) for school year 2013-14. Our analyses of Education’s data, as reflected in these tables, taken alone, do not establish whether unlawful discrimination has occurred. The following tables and information are included in this appendix: Table 12: students who received disciplinary actions captured in the CRDC, disaggregated by student sex, race or ethnicity, and English Language Learner status. Table 13: students with or without disabilities who received disciplinary actions captured in the CRDC, disaggregated by student sex and race or ethnicity. Table 14: students who received disciplinary actions captured in the CRDC, disaggregated by the poverty level of the school and other student characteristics. Table 15: students who received disciplinary actions captured in the CRDC, disaggregated by the type of public school and other student characteristics. Table 16: students who received disciplinary actions captured in the CRDC, disaggregated by the grades offered in the school and other student characteristics. Table 17: pre-school students who were suspended from school, disaggregated by student sex and race or ethnicity, as well as the poverty level of school and the type of public school. Table 18: students who were restrained—mechanically or physically—or secluded, disaggregated by student sex, race or ethnicity, and disability status as well as the poverty level of school and the type of public school. Table 19: students who were chronically absent, disaggregated by student sex, race or ethnicity, and disability status, as well as the poverty level of school and the type of public school. Table 20: schools that reported having access to a school counselor or sworn law enforcement officer, disaggregated by the poverty level of school and the type of public school. Table 21: students disciplined for harassment or bullying, disaggregated by student sex, race or ethnicity, and disability status. In addition to the contact named above, Sherri Doughty (Assistant Director), Amy Moran Lowe (Analyst-in-Charge), James Bennett, Holly Dye, Aaron Karty, Jean McSween, John Mingus, James Rebbe, Sonya Vartivarian, and David Watsula made key contributions to this report. Also contributing were Johana Ayers, Deborah Bland, Irina Carnevale, Caitlin Croake, Vijay D’Souza, Gretta Goodwin, Gloria Hernandez-Saunders, Reginald Jones, DuEwa Kamara, John Karikari, Ted Leslie, Sheila R. McCoy, Brittni Milam, Cady Panetta, Moon Parks, Caroline Prado, Steven Putansu, Maria Santos, Margie K. Shields, Ruth Solomon, Alexandra Squitieri, and Barbara Steel-Lowney.	[ "Research has shown that students who experience discipline that removes them from the classroom are more likely to repeat a grade, drop out of school, and become involved in the juvenile justice system. Studies have shown this can result in decreased earning potential and added costs to society, such as incarceration and lost tax revenue. Education and Justice are responsible for enforcing federal civil rights laws that prohibit discrimination in the administration of discipline in public schools. GAO was asked to review the use of discipline in schools. To provide insight into these issues, this report examines (1) patterns in disciplinary actions among public schools, (2) challenges selected school districts reported with student behavior and how they are approaching school discipline, and (3) actions Education and Justice have taken to identify and address disparities or discrimination in school discipline. GAO analyzed discipline data from nearly all public schools for school year 2013-14 from Education's Civil Rights Data Collection; interviewed federal and state officials, as well as officials from a total of 5 districts and 19 schools in California, Georgia, Massachusetts, North Dakota, and Texas. We selected these districts based on disparities in suspensions for Black students, boys, or students with disabilities, and diversity in size and location. We also reviewed federal laws and a non-generalizable sample of seven recently resolved federal school discipline investigations (selected in part based on the type of alleged discrimination). We incorporated technical comments from the agencies as appropriate. Black students, boys, and students with disabilities were disproportionately disciplined (e.g., suspensions and expulsions) in K-12 public schools, according to GAO's analysis of Department of Education (Education) national civil rights data for school year 2013-14, the most recent available. These disparities were widespread and persisted regardless of the type of disciplinary action, level of school poverty, or type of public school attended. For example, Black students accounted for 15.5 percent of all public school students, but represented about 39 percent of students suspended from school—an overrepresentation of about 23 percentage points (see figure). Officials GAO interviewed in all five school districts in the five states GAO visited reported various challenges with addressing student behavior, and said they were considering new approaches to school discipline. They described a range of issues, some complex—such as the effects of poverty and mental health issues. For example, officials in four school districts described a growing trend of behavioral challenges related to mental health and trauma. While there is no one-size-fits-all solution for the issues that influence student behavior, officials from all five school districts GAO visited were implementing alternatives to disciplinary actions that remove children from the classroom, such as initiatives that promote positive behavioral expectations for students. Education and the Department of Justice (Justice) documented several actions taken to identify and address school discipline issues. For example, both agencies investigated cases alleging discrimination. Further, to help identify persistent disparities among the nation's schools, Education collects comprehensive data on school discipline every other year through its Civil Rights Data Collection effort." ]	11,834	gov_report	en	null	9b6fabdffaa8eaf6c613e829f3507a8af89929d8c5b974c4
The federal government owns roughly 640 million acres, more than a quarter of the land in the United States. These lands are heavily concentrated in 12 western states (including Alaska), where t he federal government owns roughly half of the overall land area. Four federal agencies—the National Park Service (NPS), Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), and Bureau of Land Management (BLM), all in the Department of the Interior (DOI), and the U.S. Forest Service (FS) in the Department of Agriculture—administer about 95% of those lands. No single law provides authority for these four agencies to acquire and/or disposal of lands. Rather, Congress provided various acquisition and disposal authorities through laws enacted over more than a century. This report describes the primary authorities of the four agencies. The extent to which each of the agencies has authority to acquire and dispose of land, and the nature of the authorities, varies considerably. Some of the agencies have relatively broad authority to acquire and/or dispose of land. Most notably, the BLM has relatively broad authority for both acquisitions and disposals. By contrast, the NPS has no general authority to acquire land to create new park units or to dispose of park lands. The extent of the acquisition and disposal authorities for the FS and the FWS are not nearly as broad as the BLM's but not nearly as restrictive as the NPS's. The FS authority to acquire lands is mostly limited to lands within or contiguous to the boundaries of a national forest. The agency has various authorities to dispose of land, but they are relatively constrained and infrequently used. The FWS has various authorities to acquire lands but no general authority to dispose of its lands. The acquisition authorities differ as to the circumstances in which they apply, and the disposal authorities likewise differ as to their purposes. Thus, where a specific acquisition or disposal by an agency is contemplated, the particular authority at issue should be consulted. In general, the acquisition authorities are designed to allow federal agencies to acquire lands that could be viewed as benefitting from federal management. Among other circumstances, acquisition might be authorized to bring inholdings or lands adjacent to federal lands into federal ownership to improve or simplify management of federal lands. Acquisitions also might be authorized to conserve species, protect natural and cultural resources, and increase opportunities for recreation. The disposal authorities generally are designed to allow federal agencies to dispose of land that is no longer required for a federal purpose, might be inefficient to manage, or might be chiefly valuable for another purpose. For instance, disposal might be authorized to allow lands to be used for agriculture, community development, mineral extraction, or educational purposes. Agencies also acquire and dispose of federal land in exchanges. Exchanges are not discussed separately in this report, as often the authorities to acquire and dispose of lands also apply to land exchange. However, there are provisions of law particularly applicable to exchanges. The exchange authorities for the NPS and the FWS are relatively narrow. The Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA; 43 U.S.C. §§1701-1781) provides broader exchange authority and is the main authority governing exchanges by the BLM and the FS. Congress often faces questions on the adequacy of existing acquisition and disposal authorities; the nature, extent, and location of their use; the extent of federal land ownership overall; and the sources and levels of land acquisition funds, among other issues. The suitability of the acquisition and disposal authorities, and the extent and circumstances of their use by the agencies, forms the backdrop for congressional consideration of measures to establish, modify, or eliminate the use of authorities. With regard to the establishment of new authorities, for instance, some 115 th Congress proposals would authorize states to exchange land grant parcels for federal lands. Other measures would authorize the BLM and FS to convey small tracts to adjacent landowners and to govern the use of proceeds from these conveyances. Proposals to modify authorities include measures in the 115 th Congress to reauthorize and amend BLM authority to sell or exchange land under the Federal Land Transaction Facilitation Act (FLTFA; 43 U.S.C. §§2301 et seq.), as well as bills to amend the Small Tracts Act (16 U.S.C. §521e) regarding the type and value of FS lands that can be disposed of and the use of related proceeds. Among the provisions to eliminate the use of authorities are those to prevent the disposal of federal land under the General Mining Law of 1872, which have been contained in annual Interior appropriations laws since FY1995. In addition, Congress frequently considers legislation authorizing and governing the acquisition or disposal of specific parcels. For example, Title XXX of P.L. 113-291 contained various provisions to authorize the acquisition and/or disposal of land. Congress may consider such legislation to provide an agency with acquisition or disposal authority in a particular instance because it is lacking. In other cases, Congress directs a particular acquisition or disposal to facilitate the action. For instance, the legislation may seek to direct an acquisition based on Congress's assessment of public needs and priorities. It may expedite the process for acquiring a parcel of land, such as by limiting the assessments and evaluations that ordinarily would be required under law. The legislation also might authorize actions not ordinarily permitted, such as the conveyance of land at reduced or no cost rather than at fair market value. Congress also addresses acquisition and disposal policy in the context of deliberations on the role and goals of the federal government in owning and managing land generally. The extent to which the federal government should own land remains controversial. Many westerners contend that there is excessive federal influence over their lives and economies and that the federal government should divest itself of many lands. Many others support the policy of retaining lands in federal ownership on behalf of the public and sometimes advocate adding more lands to enhance protection. Recent Congresses considered diverse bills pertaining to the extent of federal land ownership. Among others, 115 th Congress measures would authorize or direct the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Agriculture to offer to sell a certain percentage of land in each of several fiscal years. Other bills provide that where a land management agency acquires land, an equal number of acres is to be offered for sale. Another set of issues pertains to the sources and levels of funds for land acquisition. The principal financing mechanism for federal land acquisition is discretionary appropriations under the Land and Water Conservation Fund (LWCF). Provisions of the Land and Water Conservation Fund Act of 1965 (LWCF Act; 54 U.S.C. §§200301 et seq.) had provided for $900 million in specified revenues to be deposited in the LWCF annually. These provisions expired September 30, 2018. Each year, Congress determines the level of appropriations from the LWCF for federal land acquisition. Total appropriations for land acquisition and the amount provided to each of the federal land management agencies have varied substantially since the program's origin in 1965. In the 115 th Congress, some measures propose permanent reauthorization of the LWCF and/or mandatory appropriations at the authorized level. Advocates of such bills typically seek stable, predictable funding to promote a strong federal role in acquiring and managing sensitive resources. Other measures would direct a portion of funding to particular purposes, such as acquisitions in areas with restricted access for fishing, hunting, and other types of recreation. Still other proposals would allow LWCF to be used for a broader array of purposes, including nonacquisition purposes, due to concerns about the extent of federal land ownership and the availability of funding for other federal activities. Additional sources of funding are available for some agencies or under certain authorities. For instance, the FWS has a mandatory source of funds for land acquisition through the Migratory Bird Conservation Fund, as discussed below. As another example, the BLM also has mandatory spending authorities that allow the agency to keep the proceeds of land sales and use these proceeds for subsequent acquisitions and other purposes. These authorities are discussed below. The application of mandatory spending authorities, including the uses of the proceeds, has been the subject of congressional debate. As noted above, various laws authorizing and governing specific land acquisitions have been enacted. In addition, the four federal land management agencies have different standing authorities for acquiring lands. In general, all four agencies are authorized to accept land as gifts and bequests. In addition, each generally is authorized to use eminent domain —taking private property, through condemnation, for public use—while compensating the landowner. However, this practice is controversial, and it is rarely used by the land management agencies. The primary land acquisition authorities are described below for each of the four federal land management agencies. In general, the agencies are presented in the order of the breadth of their authorities, with the NPS (the narrowest authorities) first and the BLM (the broadest authorities) last. The NPS does not have standing authority to acquire lands for new or existing units of the National Park System, except in limited circumstances. Rather, most units have been created by Congress, and the law creating a park unit typically includes specific authority for the NPS to acquire nonfederal inholdings within the identified boundaries of that park. The Secretary of the Interior is authorized to make certain boundary adjustments of park units for "proper preservation, protection, interpretation, or management" and to acquire the nonfederal lands within the adjusted boundary, under specified provisions and conditions (54 U.S.C. §100506(c)). Some of these conditions have been interpreted to apply particularly to boundary adjustments requiring land purchases, as opposed to those in which added lands are acquired by donation, transfer, or exchange. The President has authority to create national monuments on federal lands under the Antiquities Act of 1906 (54 U.S.C. §§320301 et seq.). In total, 158 monuments have been created by presidential proclamation. Most are managed by the NPS, but some are managed by the BLM and other agencies. Under law, the Secretary of the Interior and the NPS have responsibilities related to the potential acquisition of lands for the National Park System. Among other requirements, the Secretary is directed "to investigate, study, and continually monitor the welfare of" areas that could potentially be added to the system and to report to Congress on possible additions (54 U.S.C. §100507). Furthermore, the general management plan for each unit is to include potential changes to the boundaries of the unit and the reasons for such changes (54 U.S.C. §100502). The Secretary also is to conduct a "systematic and comprehensive review of certain aspects of the National Park System" and to submit a related report to Congress at least every three years (54 U.S.C. §100505(a)) that includes a list of all authorized but unacquired lands within the boundaries of park units and a priority listing of these unacquired parcels (54 U.S.C. §100505(c)). The Secretary of Agriculture has various authorities to acquire lands for the National Forest System (NFS). The NFS consists of 284 units covering 232.4 million acres of federal and nonfederal land, including national forests, national grasslands, purchase units, land utilization projects, and other areas. Today, only an act of Congress can create new NFS units, but the Secretary may acquire lands within or contiguous to the proclaimed exterior boundaries of an NFS unit. The NFS contains substantial acreage of nonfederal lands within the proclaimed boundaries of the system, particularly in the east, where national forests were established after extensive settlement. NFS units in the Eastern and Southern Regions average about 46% nonfederal land within their boundaries, while Western Region NFS units average about 10%. The FS has very limited regulatory authority over the uses of the 39.5 million acres of nonfederal land within the NFS. The FS's primary land acquisition authority is the Weeks Act of 1911 (16 U.S.C. §515), which was used to acquire many of the lands that became the eastern national forests. The Weeks Act authority continues to be the agency's primary authority to acquire lands; however, acquisitions are now limited to lands within (or adjacent to) established NFS unit boundaries. The Weeks Act also authorizes the Secretary to modify the NFS unit boundary as needed to encompass new acquisitions. Other laws authorize the FS to acquire lands for the national forests, typically in specific areas or for specific purposes. For example, Section 205 of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA; P.L. 94-579 ) authorizes the acquisition of access corridors—including easements—to national forests across nonfederal lands (43 U.S.C. §1715(a)). Another example is the Act of August 3, 1956 (7 U.S.C. §428(a)), which authorizes the FS to acquire lands without any geographical limitations but does require a provision be made in a specific appropriation or other law. Another law authorizes proceeds from certain land sales or exchanges to be used for acquisitions, including for administrative sites and enhancement of recreational access. However, the acquisitions are limited to the state in which FS previously conveyed NFS land under specific disposal authorities, as discussed later in this report. Several other acquisition authorities apply to specific national forests, such as the Act of June 11, 1940, which authorizes the purchase of lands within the Angeles National Forest in California. In addition, the Secretary of Agriculture and the secretary of a military department that has lands within or adjacent to proclaimed NFS land may interchange lands, without reimbursement or transfer of funds. Many of the acquisition authorities also allow the FS to accept donations of land as specified. Within the NFS, the Secretary of Agriculture also is authorized to acquire privately owned lands within or adjacent to designated wilderness areas (16 U.S.C. §1134(c)), Wild and Scenic River corridors (16 U.S.C. §1277), and certain segments of designated National Trails (16 U.S.C. §1244), as specified by the law creating the trail. Lands may be added to the National Wildlife Refuge System (NWRS) in a number of ways, including through congressional and administrative actions and donations. A principal FWS land acquisition authority is the Migratory Bird Conservation Act of 1929 (MBCA; 16 U.S.C. §§715 et seq.). This act authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to recommend areas "necessary for the conservation of migratory birds" to the Migratory Bird Conservation Commission, after consulting with the relevant governor (or state agency) and appropriate local government officials (16 U.S.C. §715a and §715c). In addition, the state in which the purchase is located must have consented to the acquisition by law (16 U.S.C. §715f and §715k-5). The Secretary may then purchase or rent areas or interests therein approved by the commission and acquire by gift or devise any area or interest therein (16 U.S.C. §715d). The MBCA authority is used frequently because of the availability of funding through the Migratory Bird Conservation Fund (MBCF, 16 U.S.C. §718d). The MBCF is supported by multiple sources of funding, including three major sources: the sale of hunting and conservation stamps (commonly known as duck stamps); import duties on arms and ammunition; and a portion of certain refuge entrance fees. MBCF funds are permanently appropriated to the extent of receipts and, after paying certain administrative costs, may be used for the "location, ascertainment, and acquisition of suitable areas for migratory bird refuges ..." (16 U.S.C. §718d(b)). The predictability of funding and permanent authority for use makes the MBCF, and thus the MBCA, particularly important for FWS land acquisition and unique among the four agencies. Other laws provide general authority to expand the NWRS, including the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act of 1934 (16 U.S.C. §§661-667a), the Fish and Wildlife Act of 1956 (16 U.S.C. §§742a et seq.), and the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (16 U.S.C. §§1531-1544). The National Wildlife Refuge System Administration Act of 1966 (16 U.S.C. §§668dd-668ee) authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to acquire land or interests therein through donated funds or exchange (16 U.S.C. §668dd(b)). Further, FLPMA authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to withdraw lands from the public domain for creating or adding to refuges (which would be an interagency transfer), although withdrawals exceeding 5,000 acres are subject to congressional approval (43 U.S.C. §1714(c)). In contrast to NPS and FS land acquisition, where the lands generally must be within the boundaries of established units, the FWS can acquire new lands to create a new refuge or to expand an existing one under the general FWS authorities cited above, as well as under certain other laws. Some national wildlife refuge (NWR) units have been created by specific acts of Congress, such as Protection Island NWR (WA) and Bayou Sauvage Urban NWR (LA) (16 U.S.C. §668dd note). Units also can be created by executive order; for example, the Midway Atoll NWR was created by President Clinton in Executive Order 13022. The BLM has broad, general authority to acquire lands, principally under Section 205 of FLPMA. Specifically, the Secretary of the Interior is authorized to acquire, by purchase, exchange, donation, or use of eminent domain, lands or interests therein (43 U.S.C. §1715(a)). The BLM acquires land or interests in land, including inholdings, for a variety of reasons. These include to protect natural and cultural resources, to increase opportunities for public access and recreation, and to improve management of lands. As noted above, various laws directing the disposal of particular lands sometimes have been enacted. In addition, the four federal land management agencies have different standing authorities for disposing of lands. The specific disposal authorities are discussed below for each of the four agencies in the order of their apparent breadth, with the NPS (the narrowest authorities) first and the BLM (the broadest authorities) last. The NPS does not have general authority to dispose of National Park System lands. Units and lands of the Park System that were established by acts of Congress can be disposed of only by acts of Congress. Preservation of park units is a management goal and provisions of law limit the power of the Secretary of the Interior to dispose of land in changing park boundaries. Although the Secretary can, under specified conditions, make boundary changes that concurrently add and remove land within the boundary, minor boundary revisions solely to remove NPS acreage can be made only by Congress. Also, the Secretary can acquire by exchange lands that are adjacent to a boundary revision, but the Secretary cannot dispose of NPS land to do so (54 U.S.C. §100506(c)). Presidents have modified the boundaries of national monuments established by previous presidential proclamations, in some cases reducing the size of the monument. However, no president has terminated a monument established by proclamation. The FWS does not have general authority to dispose of its lands. With certain exceptions, wildlife refuge lands administered by the FWS can be disposed only by an act of Congress (16 U.S.C. §§668dd(a)(5) and (6)). For refuge lands reserved from the public domain, FLPMA prohibits the Secretary of the Interior from modifying or revoking any withdrawal which added lands to the NWRS (43 U.S.C. §1714(j)). For acquired lands, disposal is allowed only if: (1) the disposal is part of an authorized land exchange (16 U.S.C. §§668dd(a)(6) and (b)(3)); or (2) the Secretary determines the lands are no longer needed and the Migratory Bird Conservation Commission approves the disposal (16 U.S.C. §668dd(a)(5)). In the latter case, the disposal must recover the acquisition cost or be at the fair market value (whichever is higher), and the receipts must be deposited in the Migratory Bird Conservation Fund. The Secretary of Agriculture has numerous authorities to convey lands within proclaimed NFS boundaries out of federal ownership—through sale or exchange—although previous, broader authorities have been modified or revoked. Many of the authorities put constraints on land disposal, such as applying only to a specific geographical area or to the disposal of particular administrative properties or facilities. Many of the authorities are used in conjunction with FLPMA and other federal law and as such may place requirements on the sale or exchange of land. This includes obtaining at least fair market value for the sale of federal lands; requiring that nonfederal land exchanged for federal land be in the same state; and requiring exchanged lands to be of equal value, although value may be partially equalized with a cash payment (43 U.S.C. §1716). The General Exchange Act of 1922 (16 U.S.C. §485) authorizes the exchange of NFS land or timber that was reserved from the public domain if the Secretary determines it will be in the public interest. The nonfederal land must be within the same state and within the exterior boundary of a national forest, and it must be chiefly valuable for national forest purposes, among other provisions. The Weeks Act of 1911 allows for similar exchanges for acquired NFS lands (16 U.S.C. §516). The 1983 Small Tracts Act authorizes the Secretary to dispose of NFS land by sale or exchange, generally up to certain specified acreage limits. The disposal may be To improve management efficiencies where NFS lands are interspersed with nonfederal mineral rights owners, or if the Secretary determines the parcels to be inaccessible, physically isolated from other federal land, or to have lost national forest character (40 acres maximum); To relieve encroachments including due to erroneous surveys, or encroachments by a permanent habitable improvement if there is no evidence that the encroachment was intentional or due to negligence (10 acres maximum); To dispose of unneeded federal rights-of-way substantially surrounded by nonfederal lands (no specified acreage limitation); and If the parcel is used as a cemetery, landfill, or sewage plant pursuant to a special use authorization for the use and occupancy of NFS land (no specified acreage limitation) (16 U.S.C. §521e). The conveyance must be determined to be in the public interest and the tracts may not be valued at more than $500,000. The land can be disposed of for cash, lands, interests in land (such as an easement), or any combination thereof for at least the value of the land being sold or exchanged (16 U.S.C. §521d) plus "all reasonable costs of administration, survey, and appraisal incidental to such conveyance" (16 U.S.C. §521f). In some cases, the proceeds may be used for specified land acquisition purposes. The 1958 Townsites Act authorizes the Secretary to transfer up to 640 acres of NFS land adjacent to communities in Alaska or the 11 western states for townsites, if the "indigenous community objectives ... outweigh the public objectives and values which would be served by maintaining such tract in Federal ownership" (16 U.S.C. §478a). Public notice of the application for such transfer is required, and upon a "satisfactory showing of need," the Secretary may offer the land to a local governmental entity at "not less than the fair market value." The Education Land Grant Act, also known as the Sisk Act (16 U.S.C. §479a), authorizes the Secretary to transfer up to 80 acres of NFS land for a nominal cost upon written application of a public school district. It provides for reversion of the title to the federal government if the lands are not used for the educational purposes for which they were acquired. There are a few other specific authorities that allow for the disposal of NFS lands. For example, the 1911 Weeks Act authorizes the disposal of NFS lands that are "chiefly valuable for agriculture" but were acquired inadvertently or otherwise, if agricultural use will not injure the forests or streamflows and the lands are not needed for public purposes. The lands can be sold as homesteads in parcels of up to 80 acres (16 U.S.C. §519). The Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant Act of 1937 (7 U.S.C. §§1010-1012) also authorizes the disposal of lands acquired under its authority, although the FS has adopted regulations stating that the Bankhead-Jones lands comprising the national grasslands will be held permanently (36 C.F.R. §213.1(b)). The BLM can dispose of land under several authorities. They include (1) exchanges and sales under FLPMA, (2) sales or exchanges under the FLTFA, (3) transfers to other governmental units or nonprofit entities for public purposes, (4) patents under the General Mining Law of 1872, and (5) geographically limited sale authorities. With regard to exchanges under FLPMA, the exchanges must serve the public interest, and the federal and nonfederal lands in the exchange must be located in the same state and be of equal value (with cash equalization payments possible), among other requirements (43 U.S.C. §1716). With regard to sales under FLPMA, the BLM is authorized to sell certain tracts of public land that are identified through the land-use planning process. Such tracts must meet specific criteria (43 U.S.C. §1713(a)): (1) such tract because of its location or other characteristics is difficult and uneconomic to manage as part of the public lands, and is not suitable for management by another Federal department or agency; or (2) such tract was acquired for a specific purpose and the tract is no longer required for that or any other Federal purpose; or (3) disposal of such tract will serve important public objectives, including but not limited to, expansion of communities and economic development, which cannot be achieved prudently or feasibly on land other than public land and which outweigh other public objectives and values, including, but not limited to, recreation and scenic values, which would be served by maintaining such tract in Federal ownership. The size of the tracts for sale is determined by "the land use capabilities and development requirements." Proposals to sell tracts of more than 2,500 acres first must be submitted to Congress and can be disapproved by Congress. Lands may not be sold at less than their fair market value. They generally must be sold through competitive bidding, although modified competition and noncompetitive sales are allowed. FLTFA provides for the sale or exchange of BLM lands identified for disposal under BLM land- use plans. The law create s a separate Treasury account for most of the proceeds (96%) from the sale or exchange, and it provide s for the use of those funds by the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Agriculture. The Secretaries may acquire nonfederal lands, specifically inholdings , lands adjacent to federal lands that contain exceptional resources , and areas adjacent to inaccessible lands that are open to recreation. Up to 20% of the funds in the account may be used for administrative costs, and at least 80% of the funds for acquisition are to be in the state in which the funds are generated . The Recreation and Public Purposes Act (43 U.S.C. §869) authorizes the Secretary, upon application by a qualified applicant, to dispose of any public lands to a State, Territory, county, municipality, or other State, Territorial, or Federal instrumentality or political subdivision for any public purposes, or to a nonprofit corporation or nonprofit association for any recreational or any public purpose consistent with its articles of incorporation or other creating authority. The lands can be sold or leased, and the act specifies conditions, qualifications, and acreage limitations for transfer. The price of the land depends on the type of entity that will receive it, for instance, whether a state government or a nonprofit organization. The price also depends on the intended use of the land, with some sales and leases made at no cost. Although the BLM can dispose of lands through patents under the General Mining Law of 1872, since FY1995 a series of annual moratoria on issuing mineral patents has been enacted into law. These moratoria, contained in the annual Interior appropriations laws, have effectively prevented this means of federal land disposal. Specifically, the Mining Law allows access to and development of hardrock minerals on federal lands that have not been withdrawn from entry. With evidence of valuable minerals and sufficient developmental effort, the Mining Law allows mining claims to be patented, with full title (of surface and mineral rights) transferred to the claimant upon payment of the appropriate fee. Nonmineral lands used for associated milling or other processing operations can also be patented (30 U.S.C. §42). Patented lands may be used for purposes other than mineral development. The BLM also has geographically limited land sale authorities. The program with the largest revenue stream has been the Southern Nevada Public Land Management Act of 1998, which allows the Secretary of the Interior to sell or exchange certain lands around Las Vegas. The BLM and the local government unit jointly decide on the lands to be offered for sale or exchange. In general, 85% of the proceeds are deposited into a special account, and are available to the Secretary of the Interior for land acquisition in Nevada and other purposes in the state, such as certain capital improvements and development of parks, trails, and natural areas. The other 15% of the proceeds are for state or local purposes, specifically the State of Nevada General Education Fund (5%) and the Southern Nevada Water Authority (10%). Other provisions of law similarly provide for BLM land sales in particular areas (mostly in Nevada), with specific allocations of the proceeds. Further, the BLM continues to dispose of land in Alaska as required by law, such as through transfers to the state of Alaska and to Alaska native corporations. A total of about 150 million acres in Alaska will be transferred from federal to state and private ownership.	[ "The federal government owns roughly 640 million acres, heavily concentrated in 12 western states. Four agencies—the National Park Service (NPS), Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), and Bureau of Land Management (BLM) in the Department of the Interior, and the U.S. Forest Service (FS) in the Department of Agriculture—administer about 95% of those lands. The extent to which each of these four federal agencies have authority to acquire and dispose of land varies considerably. The BLM has relatively broad authority for both acquisitions and disposals under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA). The agency also has other authorities for disposing of land, including two laws that allow the agency to retain the proceeds for subsequent land acquisition, among other purposes, and a law that allows transfers to governmental units and other entities for public purposes. By contrast, the NPS has no general authority to acquire land to create new park units or to dispose of park lands. The FS authority to acquire lands is mostly limited to lands within or contiguous to the boundaries of a national forest. The agency has various authorities to dispose of land, but they are relatively constrained and infrequently used. The FWS has various authorities to acquire lands but no general authority to dispose of its lands. The agency frequently uses acquisition authority under the Migratory Bird Conservation Act of 1929 because of the availability of funding through the Migratory Bird Conservation Fund. The nature of the acquisition and disposal authorities of the four federal agencies also varies. In general, the acquisition authorities are designed to allow the four agencies to bring into federal ownership lands that many contend could benefit from federal management. Disposal authorities generally are designed to allow agencies to convey land that is no longer needed for a federal purpose or that might be chiefly valuable for another purpose. Some of the authorities specify particular circumstances where they can be used, such as the conveyance of FS land for educational purposes and the disposal of BLM land for recreation and public purposes. Congress often faces questions on the adequacy of existing acquisition and disposal authorities; the nature, extent, and location of their use; and the extent of federal land ownership overall. The current acquisition and disposal authorities form the backdrop for consideration of measures to establish, modify, or eliminate authorities, or to provide for the acquisition or disposal of particular lands. In some cases, Congress enacts bills to provide authority to acquire or dispose of particular parcels where no standing authority exists and, in other cases, to direct or facilitate land transactions. Congress also addresses acquisition and disposal policy in the context of debates on the role and goals of the federal government in owning and managing land generally, and it has considered broader measures to dispose of lands or to promote acquisition. Other issues for Congress pertain to the sources and levels of funds for land acquisition. The Land and Water Conservation Fund (LWCF) is the primary source of funding for land acquisition. Congress has considered diverse measures related to the LWCF, such as legislation to make LWCF funding permanent and bills to direct LWCF monies to additional, nonacquisition purposes. Additionally, the FWS has the Migratory Bird Conservation Fund, an account with mandatory spending authority supported by revenue from three sources. The BLM also has mandatory spending authorities that allow the proceeds from land sales to be used for land acquisition, among other purposes." ]	4,882	gov_report	en	null	c4ab4348f446ef7a62ecfabeda590f9b4b94f3680c136037
A complicated body of rules, precedents, and practices governs the legislative process on the floor of the House of Representatives. The official manual of House rules is more than 1,000 pages long and is supplemented by 30 volumes of precedents, with more volumes to be published in coming years. Yet there are two reasons why gaining a fundamental understanding of the House's legislative procedures is not as difficult as the sheer number and size of these documents might suggest. First, the ways in which the House applies its rules are largely predictable, at least in comparison with the Senate. Some rules are certainly more complex and more difficult to interpret than others, but the House tends to follow similar procedures under similar circumstances. Even the ways in which the House frequently waives, supplants, or supplements its standing rules with special, temporary procedures generally fall into a limited number of recognizable patterns. Second, underlying most of the rules that Representatives may invoke and the procedures the House may follow is a fundamentally important premise—that a majority of Members should ultimately be able to work their will on the floor. Although House rules generally recognize the importance of permitting any minority—partisan or bipartisan—to present its views and sometimes propose its alternatives, the rules do not enable that minority to filibuster or use other parliamentary devices to prevent the majority from prevailing without undue delay. This principle provides an underlying coherence to the various specific procedures discussed in this report. Article I of the Constitution imposes a few restrictions on House (and Senate) procedures—for example, requirements affecting quorums and roll-call votes—but otherwise the Constitution authorizes each house of Congress to determine for itself the "Rules of its Proceedings" (Article 1, Section 5). This liberal grant of authority has several important implications. First, the House can amend its rules unilaterally; it need not consult with either the Senate or the President. Second, the House is free to suspend, waive, or ignore its rules whenever it chooses to do so. By and large, the Speaker or whatever Representative is presiding usually does not enforce the rules at his or her own initiative. Instead, Members must protect their own rights by affirmatively making points of order whenever they believe the rules are about to be violated. In addition, House rules include several formal procedures for waiving or suspending certain other rules, and almost any rule can be waived by unanimous consent. Thus, the requirements and restrictions discussed in this report generally apply only if the House chooses to enforce them. If for no other reason than the size of its membership, the House has found it necessary to limit the opportunities for each Representative to participate in floor deliberations. Whenever a Member is recognized to speak on the floor, there is always a time limit on his or her right to debate. The rules of the House never permit a Representative to hold the floor for more than one hour. Under some parliamentary circumstances, there are more stringent limits, with Members being allowed to speak for no more than 5 minutes, 20 minutes, or 30 minutes. Furthermore, House rules sometimes impose a limit on how long the entire membership of the House may debate a motion or measure. Most bills and resolutions, for instance, are considered under a set of procedures called "suspension of the rules" (discussed later in this report) that limits all debate on a measure to a maximum of 40 minutes. Under other conditions, when there is no such time limit imposed by the rules, the House (and to some extent, the Committee of the Whole as well) can impose one by simple majority vote. These debate limitations and debate-limiting devices generally prevent a minority of the House from thwarting the will of the majority. House rules also limit debate in other important respects. First, all debate on the floor must be germane to whatever legislative business the House is conducting. Representatives may speak on other subjects only in one-minute speeches most often made at the beginning of each day's session, special order speeches occurring after the House has completed its legislative business for the day, and during morning hour debates that are scheduled on certain days of the week. Second, all debate on the floor must be consistent with certain rules of courtesy and decorum. For example, a Member should not question or criticize the motives of a colleague. When a House committee reports a public bill or resolution that had been referred to it, the measure is placed on the House Calendar or the Union Calendar. In general, tax, authorization, and appropriations bills are placed on the Union Calendar; all others go to the House Calendar. In effect, the calendars are catalogues of measures that have been approved, with or without proposed amendments, by one or more House committees and are now available for consideration on the floor. Placement on a calendar does not guarantee that a measure will receive floor consideration at a specified time or at all. Because it would be impractical or undesirable for the House to take up measures in the chronological order in which they are reported and placed on one of the calendars, there must be some procedures for deciding the order in which measures are to be brought from the calendars to the House floor—in other words, procedures for determining the order of business. Clause 1 of Rule XIV lists the daily order of business on the floor, beginning with the opening prayer, the approval of the Journal (the official record of House proceedings required by the Constitution), and the Pledge of Allegiance. Apart from these routine matters, however, the House never follows the order of business laid out in this rule. Instead, certain measures and actions are privileged, meaning they may interrupt the regular order of business. In practice, all the legislative business that the House conducts comes to the floor by interrupting the order of business under Rule XIV, either by unanimous consent or under the provisions of another House rule. Every bill and resolution that cannot be considered by unanimous consent must become privileged business if it is going to reach the floor at all. There is no one single set of procedures that the House always follows when it considers a public bill or resolution on the floor. Instead, there are several modes of consideration, or different sets of procedural rules, that the House uses. In some cases, House rules require that certain kinds of bills be considered in certain ways. By various means, however, the House chooses to use whichever mode of consideration is most appropriate for a given bill. Which of these modes the House uses depends on such factors as the importance and potential cost of the bill and the amount of controversy the bill has generated among Members. The differences among these sets of procedures rest largely on the balance that each strikes between the opportunities for Members to debate and propose amendments, on the one hand, and the ability of the House to act promptly, on the other. Regardless of which procedure the House uses to consider legislation, the House majority party leadership generally tries to post the text of measures coming to the chamber floor in advance on an internet website created for that purpose. The House most frequently resorts to a set of procedures that enables it to act quickly on bills that enjoy overwhelming but not unanimous support. Although this set is called "suspension of the rules," clause 1 of Rule XV provides for these procedures as an alternative to the other modes of consideration. The essential components of suspension of the rules are (1) a 40-minute limit on debate, (2) a prohibition against floor amendments, and (3) a two-thirds vote of those present and voting for passage. On every Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday—and at other times by special arrangement—the Speaker may recognize Members to move to suspend the rules and pass a particular bill (or take some other action, such as agreeing to the Senate's amendments to a House bill). Once such a motion is made, the motion and the bill itself together are debatable for a maximum of 40 minutes. Half of the time is controlled by the Representative making the motion, often the chair of the committee with jurisdiction over the bill; the other half is usually controlled by the ranking minority member of the committee (or sometimes the subcommittee) of jurisdiction, especially when he or she opposes the motion. The suspension motion itself may propose to pass the bill with certain amendments, but no Member may propose an amendment from the floor. During the debate, the two Members who control the time yield parts of it to other Members who wish to speak. Once the 40 minutes is either used or yielded back, a single vote occurs on suspending the rules and simultaneously passing the bill. If two-thirds of the Members present vote "Aye," the motion is agreed to and the bill is passed. If the motion fails, the House may debate the bill again at another time, perhaps under another mode of consideration that permits floor amendments and more debate and requires only a simple majority vote for passage. The House frequently considers several suspension motions on the same day, which could result in a series of electronically recorded votes taking place at 40-minute intervals if such votes are requested. For the convenience of the House, therefore, clause 8 of Rule XX permits the Speaker to postpone electronic votes that Members have demanded on motions to suspend the rules until a later time on the same day or the following day. When the votes do take place, they are clustered together, occurring one after the other without intervening debate. One of the ironies of the legislative process on the House floor is that the House does relatively little business under the basic rules of the House. Instead, most of the debate and votes on amendments to major bills occur in Committee of the Whole (discussed below). This is largely because of the rule that generally governs debate in the House itself. The rule controlling debate during meetings of the House (as opposed to meetings of the Committee of the Whole) is clause 2 of Rule XVII, which states in part that a "Member, Delegate, or Resident Commissioner may not occupy more than one hour in debate on a question in the House." In theory, this rule permits each Representative to speak for as much as an hour on each bill, on each amendment to each bill, and on each of the countless debatable motions that Members could offer. Thus, there could be more than four hundred hours of debate on each such question, a situation that would make it virtually impossible for the House to function effectively. In practice, however, this "hour rule" usually means that each measure considered "in the House" is debated by all Members for no more than a total of only one hour before the House votes on passing it. The reason for this dramatic difference between the rule in theory and the rule in practice lies in the consequences of a parliamentary motion to order what is called the "previous question." When a bill or resolution is called up for consideration in the House—and, therefore, under the hour rule—the Speaker recognizes the majority floor manager to control the first hour of debate. The majority floor manager is usually the chair of the committee or subcommittee with jurisdiction over the measure and most often supports its passage without amendment. This Member will yield part of his or her time to other Members and may allocate control of half of the hour to the minority floor manager (usually the ranking minority member of the committee or subcommittee). However, the majority floor manager almost always yields to other Representatives "for purposes of debate only." Thus, no other Member may propose an amendment or make any motion during that hour. During the first hour of debate, or at its conclusion, the majority floor manager invariably "moves the previous question." This nondebatable motion asks the House if it is ready to vote on passing the bill. If a majority votes for the motion, no more debate on the bill is in order, nor can any amendments to it be offered; after disposing of the motion, the House usually votes immediately on whether to pass the bill. If the House defeats the previous question, however, opponents of the bill would then be recognized to control the second hour of debate, and might use that time to try to amend the measure. Because of this, it is unusual for the House not to vote for the previous question—the House disposes of most measures considered in the House, under the hour rule, after no more than one hour of debate and with no opportunity for amendment from the floor. These are not very flexible and accommodating procedural ground rules for the House to follow in considering most legislation. Debate on a bill is usually limited to one hour, and only one or two Members control this time. Before an amendment to the bill can even be considered, the House must first vote against a motion to order the previous question. For these reasons, most major bills are not considered in the House under the hour rule. In current practice, the most common type of legislation considered under the hour rule in the House are procedural resolutions reported by the House Committee on Rules that are commonly referred to as "special rules" (discussed below). Much of the legislative process on the floor occurs not "in the House" but in a committee of the House known as the Committee of the Whole (formally, the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union). Every Representative is a member of the Committee of the Whole, and it is in this committee, meeting in the House chamber, that many major bills are debated and amended before being passed or defeated by the House itself. Most bills are first referred to, considered in, and reported by a standing legislative committee of the House before coming to the floor. In much the same way, once bills do reach the floor, many of them then are referred to a second committee, the Committee of the Whole, for further debate and for the consideration of amendments. The Speaker presides over meetings of the House but not over meetings of the Committee of the Whole. Instead, the Speaker appoints another Member of the majority party to serve as the chair of the Committee of the Whole during the time the committee is considering a particular bill or resolution. In addition, the rules that apply in Committee of the Whole are somewhat different from those that govern meetings of the House itself. The major differences are discussed in the following sections of this report. In general, the combined effect of these differences is to make the procedures in Committee of the Whole—especially the procedures for offering and debating amendments—considerably more flexible than those of the House. Clause 3 of Rule XVIII requires that most bills affecting federal taxes and spending be considered in Committee of the Whole before the House votes on passing them. Most other major bills are also considered in this way. Most commonly, the House adopts a resolution, reported by the Rules Committee, that authorizes the Speaker to declare the House "resolved" into Committee of the Whole to consider a particular bill. There are two distinct stages to consideration in Committee of the Whole. First, there is a period for general debate, which is routinely limited to an hour. Each of the floor managers usually controls half the time, yielding parts of it to other Members who want to participate in the debate. During general debate, the two floor managers and other Members discuss the bill, the conditions prompting the committee to recommend it, and the merits of its provisions. Members may describe and explain the reasons for the amendments that they intend to offer, but no amendments can actually be proposed at this time. During or after general debate, the majority floor manager may move that the committee "rise"—in other words, that the committee transform itself back into the House. When the House agrees to this motion, it may resolve into Committee of the Whole again at another time to resume consideration of the bill. Alternatively, the Committee of the Whole may proceed immediately from general debate to the next stage of consideration: the amending process. The Committee of the Whole may consider a bill for amendment section by section or, in the case of appropriations measures, paragraph by paragraph. Amendments to each section or of the bill are in order after the part they would amend has been read or designated and before the next section is read or designated. Alternatively, the bill may be open to amendment at any point, usually by unanimous consent. The first amendments considered to each part of the bill are those (if any) recommended by the committee that reported it. Thereafter, members of the committee are usually recognized before other Representatives to offer their own amendments. All amendments must be germane to the text they would amend. Germaneness is a subject matter standard more stringent than one of relevancy and reflects a complex set of criteria that have developed by precedent over the years. The Committee of the Whole votes only on amendments; it does not vote directly on the bill as a whole. And like the standing committees of the House, the Committee of the Whole does not actually amend the bill; it only votes to recommend amendments to the House. The motion to order the previous question may not be made in Committee of the Whole, so, under a purely open amendment process, Members may offer whatever germane amendments they wish. After voting on the last amendment to the last portion of the bill, the committee rises and reports the bill back to the House with whatever amendments it has agreed to. Purely open amendment processes have been rare in recent Congresses; the amendment process is far more frequently structured by the terms of a special rule reported by the Rules Committee and adopted by the House. This process is discussed in the next section of this report. An amendment to a bill is a first-degree amendment. After such an amendment is offered, but before the committee votes on it, another Member may offer a perfecting amendment to make some change in the first degree amendment. In current floor practice, this is rare. A perfecting amendment to a first-degree amendment is a second-degree amendment. After debate, the committee first votes on the second-degree perfecting amendment and then on the first-degree amendment as it may have been amended. Clause 6 of Rule XVI also provides that a Member may offer a substitute for the first-degree amendment before or after a perfecting amendment is offered, and this substitute may also be amended. Although a full discussion of these possibilities is beyond the scope of this report, it is important to note that the amending process can become complicated, with Members proposing several competing policy choices before the Committee of the Whole votes on any of them. Debate on amendments in Committee of the Whole is governed by the five-minute rule, not the hour rule that regulates debate in the House. The Member offering each amendment (or the majority floor manager, in the case of a committee amendment) is first recognized to speak for five minutes. Then a Member opposed to the amendment may claim five minutes for debate. Other Members may also speak for five minutes each by offering a motion "to strike the last word." Technically, this motion is an amendment that proposes to strike out the last word of the amendment being debated. But it is a "pro forma amendment" that is offered merely to secure time for debate and so is not voted on when the five minutes expire. In this way, each Representative may speak for five minutes on each amendment. However, a majority of the Members can vote (or agree by unanimous consent) to end the debate on an amendment immediately or at some specified time. Also, as mentioned, if the amendment process is governed by a special rule reported by the Rules Committee and adopted by the House, that resolution will limit the number, order, and form of amendments that can be considered. When the committee finally rises and reports the bill back to the House, the House proceeds to vote on the amendments the committee has adopted. It usually approves all these amendments by one voice vote, though Members can demand separate votes on any or all of them as a matter of right. After a formal and routine stage called "third reading and engrossment" (when only the title of the bill is read), there is then an opportunity for a Member, virtually always from the minority party, to offer a motion to recommit the bill to committee. If the House agrees to a "simple" or "straight" motion to recommit, which only proposes to return the bill to committee, the bill is taken from the floor and returned to committee. Although the committee technically has the power to re-report the bill, in practice, the adoption of a straight motion to recommit is often characterized as effectively "killing" the measure. "Straight" motions to recommit are rare. Alternatively, motions to recommit far more frequently include instructions that the committee report the bill back to the House "forthwith" with an amendment that is stated in the motion. If the House agrees to such a motion, which is debatable for 10 minutes, evenly divided, it then immediately votes on the amendment itself, so a motion to recommit with instructions is really a final opportunity for the minority party to amend the bill before the House votes on whether to pass it. Thus, this complicated mode of consideration, which the House uses to consider most major bills, begins in the House with a decision to resolve into Committee of the Whole to consider a particular bill. General debate and the amending process take place in Committee of the Whole, but ultimately it is the House that formally amends and then passes or rejects the bill. Clause 1(m) of Rule X authorizes the Rules Committee to report resolutions affecting the order of business. Such a resolution—called a "rule" or "special rule"—usually proposes to make a bill in order for floor consideration so that it can be debated, amended, and passed or defeated by a simple majority vote. In effect, each special rule recommends to the House that it take from the Union or House Calendar a measure that is not otherwise privileged business and bring it to the floor out of its order on that calendar. Typically, such a resolution begins by providing that, at any time after its adoption, the Speaker may declare the House resolved into Committee of the Whole for the consideration of that bill. Because the special rule is itself privileged, under clause 5(a) of Rule XIII, the House can debate and vote on it promptly. If the House accepts the Rules Committee's recommendation, it proceeds to consider the bill itself. One fundamental purpose of most special rules, therefore, is to make another bill or resolution privileged so that it may interrupt the regular order of business. Their other fundamental purpose is to set special procedural ground rules for considering that measure; these ground rules may either supplement or supplant the standing rules of the House. For example, the special rule typically sets the length of time for general debate in Committee of the Whole and specifies which Members are to control that time. In addition, the special rule normally includes provisions that expedite final House action on the bill after the amending process in Committee of the Whole has been completed. Special rules may also waive points of order that Members could otherwise make against consideration of the bill, against one of its provisions, or against an amendment to be offered to it. The most controversial provisions of special rules affect the amendments that Members can offer to the bill that the resolution makes in order. As noted above, an "open rule" permits Representatives to propose any amendment that meets the normal requirements of House rules and precedents—for example, the requirement that each amendment must be germane. A "modified open rule" permits amendments to be offered that otherwise comply with House rules but imposes a time limit on the consideration of amendments or requires them to be preprinted in the Congressional Record . At the other extreme, a "closed rule" prohibits all amendments except perhaps for committee amendments and pro forma amendments ("to strike the last word") offered only for purposes of debate. A "structured" rule, which is the most common type of rule, permits only certain specific amendments to be considered on the floor. These provisions are very important because they can prevent Representatives from offering amendments as alternatives to provisions of the bill, thereby limiting the policy choices that the House can make. Open rules have been rare in recent Congresses. However, like other committees, the Rules Committee only makes recommendations to the House. As noted above, Members debate each of its procedural resolutions in the House under the hour rule and then vote to adopt or reject it. If the House votes against ordering the previous question on a special rule, a Member could offer an amendment to it, proposing to change the conditions under which the bill itself is to be considered. Because the adoption of a special rule is often viewed as a "party loyalty" vote, however, such a development is exceedingly rare. All the same, it is important to remember that while the Rules Committee is instrumental in helping the majority party leadership formulate its order of business and in setting appropriate ground rules for considering each bill, the House retains ultimate control over what it does, when, and how. Legislation is sometimes brought before the House of Representatives for consideration by the unanimous consent of its Members. Long-standing policies announced by the Speaker regulate unanimous consent requests for this purpose. Among other things, the Speaker will recognize a Member to propound a unanimous consent request to call up an unreported bill or resolution only if that request has been cleared in advance with both party floor leaders and with the bipartisan leadership of the committee of jurisdiction. Before any bill can become law, both the House and the Senate must pass it, and the two houses must agree on each and every one of its provisions. This basic constitutional requirement means that the House must have procedures to respond when the House and Senate pass different versions of the same bill. For example, the House may pass a Senate bill with House amendments, or the Senate may pass a House bill with Senate amendments and then send its amendments to the House. In either case, the two houses must resolve their differences over these amendments before the legislative process is completed. There are essentially two ways to approach this stage of the process: (1) by dealing with the amendments individually through a process of exchanging amendments between the chambers, with the bill being sent back and forth between the House and Senate, or (2) by dealing with the amendments collectively through a conference committee of Representatives and Senators who negotiate a series of compromises and concessions that are compiled in a conference report that the two houses can vote to accept. Because the process of resolving differences between the houses can be quite complicated, only some of its basic elements are summarized here. The House normally considers Senate amendments to a House bill by unanimous consent or by suspension of the rules; the House may accept the amendments (concur in them) or amend them (concur in them with House amendments). Alternatively, the committee with jurisdiction over the bill may authorize its chair to move that the House disagree to the Senate's amendments and send them to a conference committee. When the House amends and passes a Senate bill, it may request a conference with the Senate immediately, or it may simply send its amendments to the Senate in the hope that the Senate will accept them. If the Senate refuses to do so, it may request a conference with the House instead. On the other hand, if the House and Senate can reach agreement by proposing amendments to each other's positions, the bill can be sent to the President for his signature or veto without the need to create a conference committee. This method of resolving differences is sometimes colloquially called "ping-pong," because each chamber acts in turn, shuttling the legislation back and forth as each proposes amendments to the position of the other. If the House and Senate agree to send their versions of the bill to a conference committee, the Speaker appoints the House conferees. These conferees are usually drawn from the standing committee (or committees) with jurisdiction over the bill, although the Speaker may appoint some other Representatives as well. When the House and Senate conferees meet, they are to deal only with provisions of the bill on which the two houses disagree. They should not insert new provisions or change provisions that both houses have already approved. Furthermore, as the conferees resolve each provision or amendment in disagreement, they accept the House position, the Senate position, or a compromise between them. Like almost all other House rules, the rules limiting the authority of conferees are enforced only if Members make points of order at the appropriate time. The House may also adopt a special rule, reported by the Rules Committee, waiving points of order against a conference report. To complete their work successfully, a majority of the House conferees and a majority of the Senate conferees must sign a report that recommends all the agreements they have reached. The conferees also sign a "joint explanatory statement" that describes the original House and Senate positions and the conferees' recommendations and is the functional equivalent of a legislative committee report. After Representatives have had three days to examine a conference report, it is privileged for floor consideration; it may be called up at any time that the House is not already considering something else. The report may be debated in the House under the hour rule, so the vote almost always occurs after no more than one hour of debate. No amendments to the report are in order. In practice, however, the House almost always considers conference reports under the terms of a special rule from the Rules Committee that waives all points of order against the report and its consideration. The conference report is a proposed package settlement of a number of disagreements, so the House and Senate may accept it or reject it, but they may not change it. If the two houses agree to the report by simple majority vote, all their differences have been resolved and the bill is then "enrolled," or reprinted, for formal presentation to the President. In rare instances, conferees cannot reach agreement on one or more of the amendments in conference, or they may reach an agreement that they cannot include in their conference report because their proposal exceeds the scope of the differences between the House and Senate positions (and thus violates the rules governing the content of conference reports). In either case, the conferees may report back to the two houses with an amendment (or amendments) in disagreement. After acting on the conference report and dealing collectively with all the other amendments that were sent to conference, the House acts on each of the amendments in disagreement by considering motions such as a motion to accept the Senate's amendment or a motion to amend it with a new House amendment. The Senate takes similar action until the disagreements on these amendments are resolved or until the two houses agree to create a new conference committee only to address the remaining amendments that are still in disagreement. The bill cannot become law until the two houses resolve all the differences between their positions. Whenever Representatives vote on the floor, there is almost always first a "voice vote," in which the Members in favor of the bill, amendment, or motion vote "Aye" in unison, followed by those voting "No." Before the Speaker (or the chair of the Committee of the Whole) announces the result, any Representative can demand a "division vote," in which the Members in favor stand up to be counted, again followed by those opposed. But before the result of either a voice vote or a division vote is announced, a Member may try to require another vote in which everyone's position is recorded publicly. This recorded vote is taken by using the House's electronic voting system. In Committee of the Whole, an electronic vote is ordered when 25 Members request it. In the House, such a vote occurs when demanded by at least one-fifth of the Members present. Alternatively, any Member can demand an electronically recorded vote in the House if a quorum of the membership is not present on the floor when the voice or division vote takes place. The Constitution requires that a quorum must be present on the floor when the House is conducting business. In the House, a quorum is a majority of the Representatives; in Committee of the Whole, it is only 100 Members. However, the House has traditionally assumed that a quorum is always present unless a Member makes a point of order that it is not. The rules restrict when Members can make such points of order, and they occur most often when the House or the Committee of the Whole is voting. In the House, for example, a Representative can object to a voice or division vote on the grounds that a quorum is not present and make that point of order. If a quorum is not present, the Speaker automatically orders an electronically recorded vote during which Members record their presence on the floor by casting their votes. The issue is decided and a quorum is established at the same time. A voice or division vote is valid even if less than a quorum participates in the vote so long as no one makes a point of order that a quorum is not present. For this reason, Members can continue to meet in their committees or fulfill their other responsibilities off the floor when the House is doing business that does not involve publicly recorded votes. On most days, the House will meet two hours prior to scheduled legislative business for Morning Hour Debate, a period in which Members can make speeches of up to five minutes on subjects of their choosing. Later, the House will meet for legislative session. After the opening prayer on each day by the House chaplain (or perhaps by a guest chaplain), the Speaker announces approval of the Journal of the previous day's proceedings. A Member may require a recorded vote on agreeing to the Speaker's approval of the Journal. Following the Pledge of Allegiance, some Members may then ask unanimous consent to address the House for one minute each on whatever subjects they wish, including subjects unrelated to the scheduled legislative business of the day. The ability to set the House's floor schedule is one of the primary powers and responsibilities of the majority party leaders, and in doing so they often consult with minority party leaders. Generally speaking, to the extent possible, majority party leaders and the committee chairmen arrange the legislative schedule for each week in advance. During the last floor session of the week, the majority leader normally announces the expected schedule for the coming week in a traditional "wrap-up" colloquy with a minority party leader. Changes in the schedule may be announced as they are made. On a Monday, Tuesday, or Wednesday, the House will commonly consider multiple measures under the "suspension of the rules" procedure. Typically, recorded votes on such measures, if requested, are clustered together and taken at the end of the day. On other days of the week, the House will usually consider a major bill pursuant to a special rule reported by the House Committee on Rules. Such a special rule would be debated in the House under the hour rule, at the end of which the majority manager of the special rule would "move the previous question," which, when adopted, brings the resolution to a vote. Once adopted, the House would ordinarily consider a measure in Committee of the Whole pursuant to the terms for general debate and amendment established by the special rule. Following consideration in the Committee of the Whole, the House would take the final votes on the measure after voting on the amendments recommended by the committee and on a minority motion to recommit, which would likely be made with amendatory instructions. As each item of business is completed, the Speaker anticipates which Member should be seeking recognition to call up the next bill or resolution. If another Representative requests to be recognized instead, t he Speaker may ask, "For what purpose does the gentleman seek recognition?" The Speaker may decline to recognize that Member if the Speaker wants the House to consider another privileged measure, motion, or report. At the end of legislative business on most days, some Members address the House for as much as an hour each on subjects of their choice. These "special order" speeches are arranged in advance and organized by the party leadership. In this way, Representatives can comment at length on current national and international issues and discuss bills that have not yet reached the House floor. The House often adjourns by early evening, although it may remain in session later when the need arises or when the end of the annual session or some other deadline approaches. The House rules for each Congress are published in a volume often called the House manual but officially entitled Constitution, Jefferson's Manual and Rules of the House of Representatives . A new edition of this collection is published each Congress. The precedents of the House established through 1935 have been compiled in the 11-volume set of Hinds' and Cannon's Precedents of the House of Representatives . More recent precedents are published as Deschler's or Deschler-Brown -Johnson Precedents of the U.S. House of Representatives ; 18 volumes of this set now are available. Volume 1 of a fourth series of House precedents, Precedents of the United States House of Representatives , was initiated in 2017, and additional volumes are expected in the future. The House's procedures are summarized in House Practice: A Guide to the Rules, Precedents and Procedures of the House , by Charles W. Johnson, John V. Sullivan, and Thomas J. Wickham Jr., Parliamentarians of the House. The most recent version of House Practice was published in 2017. The Parliamentarian and his assistants welcome inquiries about House procedures and offer expert assistance compatible with their other responsibilities. CRS Report 98-995, The Amending Process in the House of Representatives , by Christopher M. Davis. CRS Report RL32200, Debate, Motions, and Other Actions in the Committee of the Whole , by Bill Heniff Jr. and Elizabeth Rybicki. CRS Report 97-552, The Discharge Rule in the House: Principal Features and Uses , by Richard S. Beth. CRS Report RL30787, Parliamentary Reference Sources: House of Representatives , by Richard S. Beth and Megan S. Lynch. CRS Report 98-696, Resolving Legislative Differences in Congress: Conference Committees and Amendments Between the Houses , by Elizabeth Rybicki. CRS Report 97-780, The Speaker of the House: House Officer, Party Leader, and Representative , by Valerie Heitshusen. CRS Report 98-314, Suspension of the Rules in the House: Principal Features , by Elizabeth Rybicki. CRS Report 98-870, Quorum Requirements in the House: Committee and Chamber , by Christopher M. Davis.	[ "The daily order of business on the floor of the House of Representatives is governed by standing rules that make certain matters and actions privileged for consideration. On a day-to-day basis, however, the House can also decide to grant individual bills privileged access to the floor, using one of several parliamentary mechanisms. The standing rules of the House include several different parliamentary mechanisms that the body may use to act on bills and resolutions. Which of these will be employed in a given instance usually depends on the extent to which Members want to debate and amend the legislation. In general, all of the procedures of the House permit a majority of Members to work their will without excessive delay. The House considers most legislation by motions to suspend the rules, with limited debate and no floor amendments, with the support of at least two-thirds of the Members voting. Occasionally, the House will choose to consider a measure on the floor by the unanimous consent of Members. The Rules Committee is instrumental in recommending procedures for considering major bills and may propose restrictions on the floor amendments that Members can offer or bar them altogether. Many major bills are first considered in Committee of the Whole before being passed by a simple majority vote of the House. The Committee of the Whole is governed by more flexible procedures than the basic rules of the House, under which a majority can vote to pass a bill after only one hour of debate and with no floor amendments. Although a quorum is supposed to be present on the floor when the House is conducting business, the House assumes a quorum is present unless a quorum call or electronically recorded vote demonstrates that it is not. However, the standing rules preclude quorum calls at most times other than when the House is voting. Questions are first decided by voice vote, although any Member may then demand a division vote. Before the final result of a voice or division vote is announced, Members can secure an electronically recorded vote instead if enough Members desire it or if a quorum is not present in the House. The constitutional requirements for making law mean that each chamber must pass the same measure with the identical text before transmitting it to the President for his consideration. When the second chamber of Congress amends a measure sent to it by the first chamber, the two chambers must resolve legislative differences to meet this requirement. This can be accomplished by shuttling the bill back and forth between the House and Senate, with each chamber proposing amendments to the position of the other, or by establishing a conference committee to try to negotiate a compromise version of the legislation." ]	6,694	gov_report	en	null	ddc72d28a1a4b317307130a46e60fb1d482edb9790b9e742
This report addresses frequently asked questions related to the overtime provisions in the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) for executive, administrative, and professional employees (the "EAP" or "white collar" exemptions). For a history of DOL regulations on the EAP exemptions, see CRS Report R45007, Overtime Exemptions in the Fair Labor Standards Act for Executive, Administrative, and Professional Employees , by David H. Bradley. For a broader overview of the FLSA, see CRS Report R42713, The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA): An Overview . This report proceeds in three sections. First, there is an overview of the main federal statute on overtime pay—the FLSA—and of defining and delimiting the EAP exemptions. Second, there is a discussion of the applicability of the EAP exemptions. Finally, there is information on the EAP exemptions in the 2019 proposed rule and the 2016 final rule (which was finalized but invalidated before it took effect). The FLSA, enacted in 1938, is the main federal law that establishes minimum wage and overtime pay requirements for most, but not all, private and public sector employees. Section 7(a) of the FLSA specifies that unless an employee is specifically exempted in the FLSA, he or she is considered to be a covered "nonexempt" employee and must receive pay at the rate of one-and-a-half times ("time and a half") the employee's regular rate for any hours worked in excess of 40 hours in a workweek. When the FLSA was enacted, Section 13(a)(1) provided an exemption, from both the minimum wage (Section 6) and overtime (Section 7) provisions of the act, for "any employee employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, and professional capacity." Rather than define the terms executive, administrative, or professional employee, the FLSA authorizes the Secretary of Labor to define and delimit these terms "from time to time" by regulations . The general rationale for including the EAP exemption in the FLSA at the time of enactment was twofold. One, the nature of the work performed by EAP employees seemed to make standardization difficult and thus output of EAP employees was not as clearly associated with hours of work per day as it was for typical nonexempt workers. Two, bona fide EAP employees were considered to have other forms of compensation (e.g., above-average benefits, greater opportunities for advancement) not available to nonexempt workers. As mentioned, the Secretary of Labor is authorized to define and delimit the EAP exemptions. Including the first rulemaking on EAP exemptions in 1938, DOL has finalized nine rules. Although the determinations have changed over time, to qualify for an exemption currently under Section 13(a)(1) of the FLSA (i.e., not to be entitled to overtime pay), an employee generally has to meet three criteria: 1. The "salary basis" test: the employee must be paid a predetermined and fixed salary. 2. The "duties" test: the employee must perform executive, administrative, or professional duties. 3. The "salary level" test: the employee must be paid above the threshold established in the rulemaking process, typically expressed as a per week rate. To qualify for the EAP exemption, an employee must be paid on a "salary basis," rather than on a per hour basis. That is, an EAP employee must receive a predetermined and fixed payment that is not subject to reduction due to variations in the quantity or quality of work. The salary must be paid on a weekly or less-frequent basis. Job titles alone do not determine exemption status for an employee. Rather, the Secretary of Labor, through issuance of regulations, specifies the duties that EAP employees must perform to be exempt from the overtime pay requirements of the FLSA. To qualify for the exemption for executive employees , all of the following job duties tests must be met: the employee's primary duty "is management of the enterprise in which the employee is employed or of a customarily recognized department or subdivision thereof"; the employee "customarily and regularly directs the work of two or more other employees"; and the employee "has the authority to hire or fire other employees or whose suggestions and recommendations as to the hiring, firing, advancement, promotion or any other change of status of other employees are given particular weight." To qualify for the exemption for administrative employees , both of the following job duties tests must be met: the employee's primary duty "is the performance of office or non-manual work directly related to the management or general business operations of the employer or the employer's customers"; and the employee's primary duty "includes the exercise of discretion and independent judgment with respect to matters of significance." To qualify for the exemption for professional employees , the following job duties test must be met: The employee's primary duty is the performance of work requiring "knowledge of an advanced type in a field of science or learning customarily acquired by a prolonged course of specialized intellectual instruction"; or work "requiring invention, imagination, originality or talent in a recognized field of artistic or creative endeavor." In addition to the duties test, an employee must earn above a certain salary in order to qualify for the EAP exemption. Since the FLSA was enacted and the first salary thresholds were established in 1938, the standard salary level thresholds have been raised nine times. Prior to 2004, the salary level for exemption varied by the type of employee and the type of duty test. In addition to the standard salary level, in 2004 DOL created a "highly compensated employee" (HCE) exemption in which employees earning an amount above the standard EAP salary threshold annually are exempt from overtime requirements if they perform at least one (among many) of the duties of an EAP employee. Because the FLSA applies to "employees," individuals who are classified as independent contractors are not covered by the FLSA provisions. Yes. There is no general exemption for nonprofits in the FLSA or the EAP overtime regulations. Coverage for workers in nonprofits, like other entities, is determined by the enterprise and individual coverage tests. It is important to note, however, that charitable activities often associated with nonprofits do not count as ordinary commercial activities and thus do not count toward the $500,000 threshold for enterprise coverage under the FLSA. Only the commercial activities of nonprofits (e.g., gift shops, fee for service activities) count toward that threshold. On the other hand, even if a nonprofit does not meet the enterprise test for coverage, individual employees in an otherwise exempt nonprofit may be covered by the FLSA and the overtime rules if they engage in interstate commerce (e.g., regularly making out of state phone calls, processing credit card transactions). Yes. Both the FLSA and the EAP overtime regulations apply to institutions of higher education (IHEs). Due to other provisions of the FLSA, however, many personnel at IHEs are not eligible for overtime on the basis of the duties test alone and thus are unaffected by changes in the EAP standard salary level for exemption. For example, in general, bona fide teachers are exempt regardless of salary level and thus are not eligible for overtime. Similarly, academic administrative personnel are exempt from overtime pay if they are paid at least the EAP salary level threshold or are paid at least equal to the entrance salary for teachers at the same institution. On the other hand, some IHE workers would be affected by changes in the EAP salary level for exemption, including postdoctoral researchers who are employees, nonacademic administrative employees, and other salaried workers who are not covered by another exemption. Finally, like some public sector employers, but unlike private sectors employers, public IHEs may have the option of using compensatory time (i.e., a rate of 1.5 hours for each hour of overtime), rather than cash payment, to meet the obligation of providing overtime compensation. Yes. There is no blanket exemption from FLSA and overtime rule coverage for state and local governments. In general, employees of state and local governments are covered by the overtime provisions of the FLSA and thus are affected by EAP rulemaking updating the salary level threshold for the EAP exemptions. That said, other FLSA provisions apply to state and local governments that affect the applicability of overtime rules to these public sector employees. One way in which FLSA overtime rules apply differently in the public sector relates to the mode of compensation. State and local governments may have the option of using compensatory time, at a rate of 1.5 hours for each hour of overtime, rather than cash payment to meet the obligation of providing overtime compensation—an alternative not available to private sector employers. Additionally, some public sector employees are not covered by the FLSA. For instance, certain state and local employees—elected officials, their appointees and staff who are not subject to civil service laws, and legislative branch employees not subject to civil service laws—are not covered and will not be affected by changes to the EAP exemptions. The FLSA provides partial exemptions from the overtime requirements for fire protection and law enforcement employees. Specifically, fire protection and law enforcement employees are exempt from overtime pay requirements if they are employed by an agency with fewer than five fire protection or law enforcement employees. In addition, the FLSA allows overtime for all fire protection and law enforcement employees (not just those in small agencies) to be calculated on a "work period" (i.e., 7 to 28 consecutive days) rather than the standard "workweek" period (i.e., 7 consecutive 24-hour periods). Yes. The FLSA overtime provisions apply to employees in the U.S. territories—American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. While the exemption for American Samoa has traditionally been set at 84% of the standard salary level, the other territories have been subject to the standard level. The application of the provisions of the FLSA is determined by the Congressional Accountability Act (CAA, P.L. 104-1 ), which was enacted in 1995 and extends some FLSA provisions, including overtime provisions, and other labor and workplace laws to congressional employees. In addition, the CAA created the Office of Compliance (now the Office of Congressional Workplace Rights), headed by a five-member Board of Directors (Board), to enforce the CAA. Rulemaking on the EAP exemptions would apply to congressional staff if the Board adopts them and Congress approves the Board's regulations, pursuant to the process established in the CAA. In other words, regulations adopted by the Board do not have legal effect until they are approved by Congress. When the Secretary of Labor issued new regulations to update the EAP exemptions in 2004, the Board adopted them; but thus far, Congress has apparently not approved the 2004 overtime regulations. Thus, overtime regulations that were adopted by the Board and approved by Congress in 1996, based on DOL regulations originally promulgated in 1975, currently apply to congressional staff. In the absence of action by the Board and by Congress, the provisions in any future final rules would not change the status quo. Congress can pass legislation to repeal rules or compel new rules. For example, prior to the publication of the 2016 final rule, legislation was introduced that would have prohibited the Secretary of Labor from enforcing the final rule and would have required additional analysis from the Secretary before the issuance of any substantially similar rule in the future. Given that rulemaking on the EAP exemptions typically includes increases in the salary level threshold for the EAP exemption, a greater number of employees become eligible for overtime pay with each upward adjustment of the salary level. To comply with the proposed regulations, employers would have several options, including the following: pay overtime to newly covered EAP employees if they work more than 40 hours in a workweek; increase the weekly pay for workers near the salary threshold to a level above it so that the EAP employees would become exempt and thus not be eligible for overtime pay; reduce work hours of nonexempt (covered) employees to 40 or fewer so that overtime pay would not be triggered; hire additional workers to offset the reduction in hours from nonexempt employees; or reduce base pay of nonexempt workers and maintain overtime hours so that base pay plus overtime pay would not exceed, or would remain close to, previous employer costs of base pay plus overtime. This section provides an overview of the main provisions of the 2019 proposed rule on EAP exemptions. For context, some provisions of the 2016 final rule are discussed. A final rule updating the EAP exemptions was published in the Federal Register on May 23, 2016, with an effective date of December 1, 2016. However, on November 22, 2016, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas issued a preliminary injunction blocking the implementation of the rule. On August 31, 2017, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas ruled that DOL exceeded its authority by setting the threshold at the salary level in the 2016 final rule ($913 per week) and thus invalidated it. Subsequently, DOJ appealed that decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which granted DOJ's motion to hold the appeal in abeyance until DOL issued new rulemaking on the EAP salary level. Thus, DOL is currently enforcing the EAP regulations in effect on November 30, 2016, which include a standard salary level of $455 per week. DOL issued a request for information (RFI) related to the EAP exemptions on July 26, 2017, seeking information from the public to assist in formulating a proposal to revise the exemptions. On March 22, 2019, a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) was published in the Federal Register to define and delimit EAP exemptions. The proposed rule would not only revise the regulations on the EAP exemptions but would also formally rescind the 2016 final rule. Such a rescission would provide that if any or all of the substantive provisions of the 2019 rule were invalidated or not put into effect, the EAP regulations would revert to those promulgated in the 2004 final rule. Due to the invalidation of the 2016 final rule (discussed above), DOL currently enforces the provisions of the 2004 final rule. The main changes to the EAP exemptions in the 2019 proposed rule, as summarized in Table 1 , include the following: an increase in the salary level test from the current $455 per week ($23,660 annually) to $679 per week ($35,308 annually); an increase in the annual salary threshold for the HCE exemption from $100,000 to $147,414; an allowance that up to 10% of the standard salary level may be comprised of nondiscretionary bonuses, incentive payments, and commissions; a salary level of $455 per week for the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands, and of $380 in American Samoa; and an increase in the "base rate" weekly salary level for employees in the motion picture industry from $695 per week to $1,036 per week. Since the FLSA was enacted in 1938, the salary level threshold has been increased eight times, including the proposed 2019 increase. Each of the previous increases have occurred through intermittent rulemaking by the Secretary of Labor, with periods between adjustments ranging from 2 years (1938–1940) to 29 years (1975–2004). Since 1938, measures of the salary level have fluctuated according to DOL's identification of data sources most suitable for studying wage distributions and the department's determinations of the proportion and types of workers who should be below salary thresholds, as well as its determinations of whether regional, industry, or cost-of-living considerations should be factored into salary tests. Starting with the 2004 final rule, DOL has used survey data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) in determining the salary level for the EAP exemptions, albeit with different methodological choices. Effective January 2020 (approximately), the standard salary level threshold would equal the 20 th percentile of weekly earnings of full-time non-hourly workers in the lowest-wage Census region, which in 2019 is the South, and/or in the retail sector nationwide. In 2020, about 20% of full-time salaried workers in the South region and/or the retail sector nationwide are estimated to earn at or below $679 per week ($35,308 annually). Effective January 2020 (approximately), the HCE salary level for the EAP exemptions would equal the annual earnings equivalent of the 90 th percentile of the weekly earnings of full-time non-hourly workers nationally. In 2020, 90% of full-time non-hourly workers are estimated to earn at or below $147,414 per year. Effective January 2020 (approximately), the salary level for the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands would be $455 per week, and in American Samoa it would be $380 per week. Except for American Samoa, this would depart from past regulations by establishing a salary threshold for the territories below the standard level. Effective January 2020 (approximately), the motion picture industry employee salary level for the EAP exemption would be $1,036 per week. This level was derived by increasing the previous threshold ($695 per week) proportionally to the increase in the standard salary level. This would continue a special salary test created in 1953 for the motion picture industry that provides an exception to the "salary basis" test. Specifically, employees in the motion picture industry may be classified as exempt if they meet the duties tests for EAP exemption and are paid a "base rate" (rather than on a "salary basis") equal to the salary level for this exemption. The 2019 proposed rule would implement a commitment by DOL to update the EAP salary level thresholds every four years by submitting an NPRM for comment. If the 2019 proposed rule is finalized, DOL would publish its first proposed update on January 1, 2023, and subsequent updates every four years thereafter. The future salary level updates would be based on the same data source (CPS) and methodology of the salary levels established in the 2019 proposed rule: the standard salary level would be adjusted to the 20 th percentile of weekly earnings of full-time salaried workers in the lowest-wage Census region and/or in the retail sector, the HCE salary level threshold would be adjusted to the 90 th percentile of annual earnings of full-time non-hourly workers nationally, and the quadrennial NPRM would seek comment on whether to update the salary level for the territories established in the 2019 proposed rule. The 2019 proposed rule would expand overtime coverage to EAP employees through a higher salary level threshold rather than through additional classes of employees. As such, EAP employees making between $455 per week (the current effective level) and the new rate of $679 per week in 2019 would likely become nonexempt (i.e., covered) by the overtime provisions and entitled to overtime pay for hours worked in excess of 40 per workweek. It is difficult to project the number of employees currently exempt under the EAP exemptions who would no longer be exempt under the 2019 proposed rule. This is due in part to uncertainty about potential employer responses, such as increasing salaries above the new threshold to maintain exemption for EAP employees. DOL estimates, with caveats, that approximately 4.9 million workers would be affected by the proposed rule. DOL identifies two groups in particular that would be affected—newly covered workers and workers with strengthened protections. Specifically, DOL estimates the following: In the first year under the provisions of the 2019 proposed rule, about 1.3 million EAP employees would become newly entitled to overtime pay due to the increase in the salary threshold: about 1.1 million employees in this group meet the duties test for the EAP exemption but earn between the current standard salary threshold ($455 per week) and the proposed threshold ($679 per week); and an additional 201,000 employees in this group meet the HCE duties test for exemption, but not the standard test, and earn at least the current HCE salary threshold ($100,000 per year) but less than the proposed threshold ($147,414 per year). An additional 3.6 million workers would receive "strengthened" overtime protections, including the following: An additional 2.0 million white collar workers who are paid on a salary basis and earn between the current salary threshold of $455 per week and the proposed threshold of $679 per week but do not meet the EAP duties test (i.e., they perform nonexempt work but might be misclassified) would gain overtime protections because their exemption status would not depend on the duties test. In other words, this group of workers would gain overtime coverage because the higher salary threshold would create a clearer line exemption test and reduce misclassification for exemption purposes. About 1.6 million salaried workers in blue collar occupations whose overtime coverage would have been clearer with the higher salary threshold. As DOL notes, this group of workers should currently be covered by overtime provisions but may not be due to worker classification. By comparison, DOL estimated that in the first year under the provisions of the 2016 final rule, approximately 13.1 million workers would have been affected. This total would have included about 4.2 million EAP employees who would have become newly entitled to overtime pay due to the increase in the salary threshold and an additional 8.9 million workers who would have received "strengthened" overtime protections. The data in Table 2 provide a summary of the estimated numbers of affected workers under the 2019 proposed rule and the 2016 final rule.	[ "The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), enacted in 1938, is the main federal law that establishes general wage and hour standards for most, but not all, private and public sector employees. Among other protections, the FLSA establishes that covered nonexempt employees must be compensated at one-and-a-half times their regular rate of pay for each hour worked over 40 hours in a workweek. The FLSA also establishes certain exemptions from its general labor market standards. One of the major exemptions to the overtime provisions in the FLSA is for bona fide \"executive, administrative, and professional\" employees (the \"EAP\" or \"white collar\" exemptions). The FLSA grants authority to the Secretary of Labor to define and delimit the EAP exemption \"from time to time.\" To qualify for this exemption from the FLSA's overtime pay requirement, an employee must be salaried (the \"salary basis\" test); perform specified executive, administrative, or professional duties (the \"duties\" test); and earn above an established salary level threshold (the \"salary level\" test). In March 2019, the Secretary of Labor published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) to make changes to the EAP exemptions. The 2019 proposed rule would become effective around January 2020. The major changes in the 2019 proposed rule include increasing the standard salary level threshold from the previous level of $455 per week to $679 per week and committing the Department of Labor (DOL) to updating the EAP exemptions every four years through the rulemaking process. The 2019 proposed rule does not change the duties and responsibilities that employees must perform to be exempt. Thus, the 2019 proposed rule would affect EAP employees at salary levels between $455 and $679 per week in 2020. DOL estimates that about 4.9 million workers would be affected in the first year, including about 1.3 million EAP employees who would become newly entitled to overtime pay and an additional 3.6 million workers who would have overtime protection clarified and thereby strengthened. This report answers frequently asked questions about the overtime provisions of the FLSA, the EAP exemptions, and the 2019 proposed rule that would define and delimit the EAP exemptions." ]	3,568	gov_report	en	null	ed4cf9cae692b961a7266646aafefec8f83ffa09c62c5887
On February 12, 2018, the Trump Administration submitted to Congress its FY2019 budget request, which included $41.86 billion of base (or enduring) funds for the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS). Of that amount, $13.26 billion would have been for State operations, international broadcasting, and related agencies and $28.60 billion for foreign operations. Comparing the request with the FY2018 actual SFOPS funding levels, the FY2019 request represented a 23.3% decrease in SFOPS funding. The proposed State and related agency funding would have been 18.7% below FY2018 funding levels, and the foreign operations funding would have been reduced by 25.2%. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 ( P.L. 116-6 ), signed into law on February 15, included a total of $54.377 billion for SFOPS accounts, a 0.3% decrease over the FY2018 funding level and about 30% more than the Administration's request. An account-by-account comparison of the SFOPS request with the FY2018 actual funding and FY2019 enacted appropriation is provided in Appendix A . International Affairs 150 function funding levels are detailed in Appendix B . A chart depicting the components of the SFOPS appropriations bill is in Appendix C . A glossary is provided in Appendix D . The appropriations process for FY2019 was shaped by the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA, H.R. 1892 , P.L. 115-123 ), which Congress passed on February 9, 2018. The act raised the overall revised discretionary spending limits set by the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA, P.L. 112-25 ) from $1.069 trillion for FY2017 to $1.208 trillion for FY2018 and to $1.244 trillion for FY2019. The BBA increased FY2019 defense funding levels by $85 billion, from $562 billion to $647 billion, and nondefense funding (including SFOPS) by $68 billion, from $529 billion to $597 billion. It also extended direct spending reductions from FY2021 in the original BCA through FY2027, as amended. Every year since FY2012, the Administration has distinguished SFOPS spending as either enduring (base) funds or those to support overseas contingency operations (OCO). The OCO designation gained increased significance with enactment of the BCA, which specified that emergency or OCO funds do not count toward the spending limits established by the act. In early years of requesting OCO funds, the Obama Administration described OCO requests for "extraordinary, but temporary, costs of the Department of State and USAID in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan." Syria and other countries were added in later years, and the Trump Administration expanded OCO use in its first budget request in FY2018 to be available for longer-term, core activities and more countries. For FY2019, because the BBA raised spending limits, the Administration did not seek foreign affairs OCO funds, but requested the entire SFOPS budget within base funds. The final legislation, P.L. 116-6 , included $8.0 billion designated as OCO, or about 15% of enacted SFOPS funding. For funding trends, see Table 1 . House and Senate SFOPS Legislation . FY2019 SFOPS legislation was introduced and approved by the full appropriations committee in each chamber. The House legislation, H.R. 6385 , included total SFOPS funding of $54.18 billion, 0.6% lower than FY2018 funding and 29% more than requested. The Senate proposal, S. 3108 , would have provided $54.602 billion for SFOPS accounts, which is about 0.1% more than FY2018 funding and 30% more than requested. Neither bill received floor consideration in its respective chamber. Continuing Resolutions . On September 28, 2018, the President signed into law P.L. 115-245 , legislation which included the Continuing Appropriations Act, 2019 (CR) to continue funding for SFOPS accounts (among seven other appropriations that were not completed by the start of FY2019) at a prorated 2018 funding level through December 7, 2018. Funds designated as OCO in 2018 appropriations continued to be so designated for SFOPS in the CR. On December 3, 2018, Congress and the Administration extended funding through December 21, 2018 by enacting P.L. 115-298 . After December 21, funding lapsed and a partial shutdown of the government occurred. On January 25, an agreement was reached to continue funding for SFOPS and other appropriations that had lapsed through February 15, at the FY2018 level ( P.L. 116-5 ). Enacted Legislation . On February 14 Congress passed, and the President later signed into law, a full year appropriation ( P.L. 116-6 , Division F) that included $54.38 billion in total SFOPS funding, a 0.3% decrease from the FY2018 funding level and about 30% more than the Administration's request. Of that total, $16.46 billion was for State Department operations and related agencies; $37.92 billion for foreign operations accounts. About 14.7%, or $8.0 billion, was designated as OCO. The State Department sought to cut funding for the Department of State and Related Agency category by 19% in FY2019 from FY2018 funding levels, to $13.26 billion. Conversely, both the House and Senate committee bills sought to maintain funding near previous fiscal year levels. The House committee bill would have increased funding in this category to $16.38 billion, or 0.4% above the FY2018 funding level. The Senate committee bill would have raised funding to $16.34 billion, around $40 million less than the House committee bill and approximately 0.1% more than the FY2018 funding level. Similar to the House and Senate committee bills, the FY2019 enacted appropriation ( P.L. 116-6 ) maintained funding for the State Department and Related Agency category slightly above FY2018 funding level. It provided $16.46 billion for this category, or 0.9% more than the F2018 level. The State Department's request sought to fund the entirety of this category through base (or enduring) funding. Following passage of the BBA and the resulting increase in discretionary spending cap levels for FY2018 and FY2019, the State Department moved the $3.69 billion request for Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) in this category into the base budget request. Both the House and Senate committee bills sought to retain OCO funding within the Department of State and Related Agency category. The House committee bill would have provided $3.03 billion for OCO, or around 28% less than the FY2018 figure of $4.18 billion. The Senate committee bill would have provided $4.11 billion, which constituted about 2% less than FY2018 level. While the House committee bill would have afforded approximately $1.08 billion less for OCO than the Senate committee bill, the House committee bill provided around $1.12 billion more in enduring funding ($13.35 billion) than the Senate committee bill ($12.23 billion). As with the House and Senate committee bills, P.L. 116-6 retained OCO funding for the Department of State and Related Agency category. The law provided a total of $4.37 billion for OCO, or 4.5% more than the FY2018 funding level. While the law provided more for OCO than either the Senate or House committee bills, it provided less in enduring funding ($12.09 billion). Areas where the State Department's proposed cuts were focused included the diplomatic security accounts (the Worldwide Security Protection programmatic allocation within the Diplomatic Programs account and, separately, the Embassy Security, Construction, and Maintenance account), Contributions to International Organizations, and Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities. In most cases, P.L. 116-6 , in a manner similar to the House and Senate committee bills, maintained annual budget authority for these accounts closer to the FY2018 funding levels than the Administration requested (see following sections for more detailed analysis). The State Department also requested $246.2 million to implement the Leadership and Modernization Impact Initiative, which serves as the implementation phase of the department's "Redesign" efforts. While neither the House nor the Senate committee bill directly addressed the Impact Initiative, both included provisions enabling Congress to conduct oversight of any broader reorganization efforts at the department. The enacted legislation, P.L. 116-6 , took the same approach. Table 3 provides an overview of proposed changes to selected accounts within the State Department and Related Agency category. Under the State Department's budget request, the Diplomatic Programs account, which is the State Department's principal operating appropriation, would have declined by 11% from the FY2018 funding level of $8.82 billion, to $7.81 billion. According to the State Department, this account provides funding for "core people, infrastructure, security, and programs that facilitate productive and peaceful U.S. relations" with foreign governments and international organizations. The House and Senate committee bills would have provided $8.80 billion and $8.92 billion, respectively, for Diplomatic Programs. For FY2019 enacted, P.L. 116-6 provided $9.17 billion, or 4% more than the FY2018 funding level and 17% more than the State Department's request. In Section 7081 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 ( P.L. 115-31 ), Congress authorized the establishment of a new "Consular and Border Security Programs" (CBSP) account into which consular fees shall be deposited for the purposes of administering consular and border security programs. As a result, consular fees retained by the State Department to fund consular services will be credited to this new account. The State Department thus requested that Congress rename the former Diplomatic and Consular Programs account "Diplomatic Programs." However, because many consular fees are generated and retained by the State Department to administer consular programs, they do not comprise part of the department's annual appropriations and therefore do not count against overall funds appropriated annually for this account. The FY2019 enacted legislation, P.L. 116-6 , authorized the renaming of Diplomatic and Consular Programs to Diplomatic Programs, as did the House and Senate committee bills. The Diplomatic Programs account provides funds for a large share of U.S. direct hire positions, including but not limited to State Department Foreign Service and Civil Service officers. Although the Trump Administration lifted the federal hiring freeze upon issuance of OMB M-17-22 on April 12, 2017, the State Department elected to keep its own hiring freeze in place. The Department of State released guidance in May 2018 lifting the hiring freeze and allowing the department to increase staffing to December 31, 2017 levels. Some Members of Congress expressed concern with the hiring freeze and the continued impacts of perceived personnel shortages at the Department of State. Both the House and Senate committee bills, and the committee reports accompanying those bills, included oversight provisions pertaining to State Department personnel levels. In this vein, Section 7073 of P.L. 116-6 required that no appropriated funds may be used to expand or reduce the size of the State Department and USAID's Civil Service, Foreign Service, eligible family member, and locally employed staff workforce from the on-board levels as of December 31, 2017 without consultation with the Committees on Appropriations and Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committees on Appropriations and Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives. Section 7073 also required the Secretary of State to submit reports to Congress, beginning 60 days after enactment of the law, and every 60 days thereafter until September 30, 2020, regarding the State Department's on-board personnel levels, hiring, and attrition of the Civil Service, Foreign Service, eligible family member, and locally employed staff workforce. These reports were also required to include a hiring plan for maintaining Foreign Service and Civil Service personnel numbers at not less than December 31, 2017, levels through FY2019. Among other personnel-related provisions, the joint explanatory statement accompanying this law noted that keeping personnel at these levels reflected "minimum necessary hiring" and encouraged the Secretary of State to work with Congress to increase hiring above such levels as appropriate. The Human Resources funding category within Diplomatic Programs provides funding for the Charles B. Rangel International Affairs and Thomas R. Pickering Foreign Affairs fellowship programs to promote greater diversity in the Foreign Service, as authorized by Section 47 of the State Department Basic Authorities Act (P.L. 84-885). While Congress required the State Department to expand the number of fellows participating in the Rangel and Pickering programs by 10 apiece pursuant to Section 706 of the Department of State Authorities Act, 2017 ( P.L. 114-323 ), it has provided the department the discretion to fund these programs at levels it deems appropriate from monies appropriated for Human Resources. P.L. 116-6 , like the House and Senate committee bills, continued to provide such discretion to the State Department. In addition, the House committee report indicated support for department efforts to increase diversity in hiring, including through the Rangel and Pickering programs. It also encouraged the Secretary of State to explore more opportunities to further the goal of increasing workforce diversity. The Senate committee report recommended the continued expansion of the department's workforce diversity programs and directed that qualified graduates of the Rangel and Pickering programs shall be inducted into the Foreign Service. While neither P.L. 116-6 nor the accompanying joint explanatory statement addressed the Rangel and Pickering programs specifically or Foreign Service diversity more generally, the joint explanatory statement did not negate any of the language in the House and Senate committee reports. The Diplomatic Programs account also provides funding for a number of overseas programs. These include programs carried out by the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations and the department's regional bureaus. Activities of the department's Bureau of Medical Services, which is responsible for providing health care services to U.S. government employees and their families assigned to overseas posts, are also funded through this account. Public diplomacy programs are among the overseas programs funded through Diplomatic Programs, which include the Global Engagement Center's (GEC's) countering state disinformation (CSD) program. According to the State Department, planned CSD activities, for which $20 million was requested, included "coordinating U.S. government efforts in specific sub-regions; enhancing the capacity of local actors to build resilience against disinformation, including thwarting attacks on their IT systems; providing attribution of adversarial disinformation; and convening anti-disinformation practitioners, journalists, and other influencers to exchange best practices, build networks, and generate support for U.S. efforts against disinformation." The House committee report registered concern regarding "foreign propaganda and disinformation that threatens United States national security, especially as carried out by China, Russia, and extremists groups" and asserted that the GEC "is expected to use a wide range of technologies and techniques to counter these campaigns," consistent with its statutory mandate. The Senate committee report recommended up to $75.4 million for the GEC, including up to $40 million for countering foreign state propaganda and disinformation. The joint explanatory statement accompanying for the FY2019-enacted legislation ( P.L. 116-6 ) included up to $55.4 million for the GEC and up to $20 million for CSD, a funding level for CSD identical to the department's request. Section 1284 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 ( P.L. 115-232 ) authorized the Department of Defense (DOD) to transfer not more than $60 million to the GEC for each of FY2019 and FY2020; DOD has previously transferred funds to the GEC under similar authorities. The State Department's FY2019 budget request sought to provide approximately $5.36 billion for the department's key embassy security accounts: $3.70 billion for the Worldwide Security Protection (WSP) programmatic allocation within the Diplomatic Programs account and $1.66 billion for the Embassy Security, Construction, and Maintenance (ESCM) account. The House committee bill would have provided $3.76 billion for WSP and $2.31 billion for ESCM, for a total funding level of $6.07 billion for these accounts. While the House bill would have funded the ESCM account exclusively through the base budget, it would have provided approximately $2.38 billion of overall funding for WSP through OCO. The Senate committee bill would have provided $3.82 billion for WSP and $1.92 billion for ESCM, for a total funding level of $5.74 billion. As with the House committee measure, the Senate committee bill would have funded the ESCM account with base budget funds only. For WSP, the Senate committee measure, like the House committee bill, would provide $2.38 billion of total account funds through OCO. The FY2019 enacted appropriations provided a total of $4.10 billion for WSP and $1.98 billion for ESCM, for a total funding level of $6.08 billion in budget authority for these accounts. Like the House and Senate committee bills, P.L. 116-6 funded ESCM exclusively through the base budget. Of the $4.10 billion provided for WSP in the law, $2.63 billion was done so through OCO. Had the Administration's request been enacted, it would have marked a decline of 2% for WSP and 28% for ESCM relative to the FY2018 figures of approximately $3.76 billion and $2.31 billion, respectively. The enacted legislation provided 9% more funding for WSP and 15% less for ESCM relative to FY2018 levels. Over the past several years, Congress has provided no-year appropriations for both WSP and ESCM, thereby authorizing the State Department to indefinitely retain appropriated funds beyond the fiscal year for which they were appropriated. As a result, the department has carried over large balances of unexpired, unobligated funds each year that it is authorized to obligate for programs within both accounts when it deems appropriate to do so. For example, for FY2018, the State Department carried over more than $7.6 billion in previously appropriated funds for ESCM. Both the House and Senate committee bills would have continued this practice with respect to WSP, and the Senate committee bill would have continued with respect to ESCM, as well. The House committee bill, if enacted, would have provided that all funds appropriated for ESCM remained available until September 30, 2023, rather than indefinitely. P.L. 116-6 provided no-year appropriations for WSP. For ESCM, the law stipulated that while funds for worldwide security upgrades and for purposes of acquisition and construction would remain available until expended, all other monies within this account (such as funds for preserving, maintaining, repairing, and planning for real property that State Department owns) would remain available only until September 30, 2023. The Worldwide Security Protection (WSP) allocation within the Diplomatic Programs account supports the Bureau of Diplomatic Security's (DS's) implementation of security programs located at over 275 overseas posts and 125 domestic offices of the State Department, including a worldwide guard force protecting overseas diplomatic posts, residences, and domestic offices. The State Department revisited previous assumptions for funding for the U.S. security presence, which prompted it to ask for a rescission of $301.20 million for WSP OCO funds provided through the Further Continuing and Security Assistance Appropriations Act, 2017 (SAAA) ( P.L. 114-254 ). State Department officials noted that this funding was "intended to support diplomatic reengagements in Syria, Libya, and Yemen that were predicated on different security and political conditions." The department maintained that this proposed cancellation was based on evolving security and political conditions, and would not affect DS operations. While neither the House nor the Senate committee bill included a rescission, P.L. 116-6 provided for a rescission of $301.2 million of SAAA funds appropriated for Diplomatic Programs and designated them more generally for OCO. The Embassy Security, Construction, and Maintenance (ESCM) account funds the Bureau of Overseas Building Operations (OBO), which is responsible for providing U.S. diplomatic and consular missions overseas with secure, safe, and functional facilities. The State Department's request included $869.54 million to provide its share of what it maintains is the $2.20 billion in annual funding that the Benghazi Accountability Review Board (ARB) recommended for the Capital Security Cost Sharing (CSCS) and Maintenance Cost Sharing (MCS) programs (the remainder of the funding is provided through consular fee revenues and contributions from other agencies). These programs are used to fund the planning, design, and construction of new overseas posts and the maintenance of existing diplomatic facilities. The House committee report maintained that funds the House bill made available for ESCM would allow for the State Department's CSCS and MCS contributions, when combined with those from other agencies and consular fees, to exceed the ARB's annual recommended funding and support " the accelerated multi-year program to construct new secure replacement facilities for the most vulnerable embassies and consulates." The Senate committee bill stipulated that of funds made available for ESCM by it and prior acts making appropriations for SFOPS, not less than $1.02 billion shall be made available for the department's FY2019 CSCS and MCS contributions; the joint explanatory statement accompanying P.L. 116-6 indicated that Congress provided the same amount for this purpose for FY2019. In FY2019, OBO intended to fund four CSCS projects and one MCS project (see Table 4 ). The House committee report noted concern with the cost of new embassy and consulate compound projects, including ongoing projects in Beirut, Lebanon; Mexico City, Mexico; New Delhi, India; Erbil, Iraq; and Jakarta, Indonesia. Like Section 7004(h) of the House bill, as noted in the joint explanatory statement accompanying P.L. 116-6 , Congress mandated that the State Department provide more detailed reports regarding the costs of these projects than previously required. The State Department maintained that the "construction of a new U.S. Embassy facility in Jerusalem is a high priority for the Administration ... planning and interagency coordination for the Jerusalem Embassy move is ongoing and the department intends to realign CSCS project funding, as necessary, to execute this project." It later attached a timeframe to its intent, and the United States opened a new U.S. embassy in Jerusalem in May 2018. This new embassy is located in a building that housed consular operations of the former U.S. Consulate General in Jerusalem. The State Department has said that one of its next steps would be to construct an embassy annex to the current building, while also considering options for a permanent embassy over the long term. The department could choose to draw upon the unexpired, unobligated funds previously appropriated by Congress to the ESCM account for any construction expenses related to interim and permanent embassy facilities in Jerusalem. The Senate committee report requires the Secretary of State to "regularly inform the Committee" on the status of plans for a permanent New Embassy Compound in Jerusalem. Neither P.L. 116-6 nor its joint explanatory statement addresses this issue or negates the Senate committee report language. The State Department's FY2019 budget request included a combined request of $2.29 billion for the Contributions to International Organizations (CIO) and Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities (CIPA) accounts, a 20% reduction from the FY2018 funding levels for these accounts. The CIO account is the source for funding for annual U.S. assessed contributions to 45 international organizations, including the United Nations and its affiliated organizations and other international organizations, including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The State Department's FY2019 request for CIO totaled approximately $1.10 billion. Following passage of the BBA, the department increased its request for CIO by approximately $100 million to fund a higher U.S. contribution to the U.N. regular budget at a rate of 20% of the overall U.N. budget (the U.S. assessment is 22%). According to the department, U.N. assessments of U.S. contributions to the United Nations and its affiliated agencies exceeded the request for funds to pay these contributions. Therefore, if the department's request was enacted, the United States may have accumulated arrears to some organizations. The Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities (CIPA) account provides U.S. funding for U.N. peacekeeping missions around the world that the State Department says "seek to maintain or restore international peace and security." The State Department's FY2019 request for CIPA totaled $1.20 billion. According to the department, this request "reflects the Administration's commitment to seek reduced costs by reevaluating the mandates, design, and implementation of peacekeeping missions and sharing the funding burden more fairly among U.N. members." Under this request, no U.S. contribution would have exceeded 25% of all assessed contributions for a single operation, which is the cap established in Section 404(b) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995 ( P.L. 103-236 ). The State Department maintained that it expected that the "unfunded portion of U.S. assessed expenses will be met through a combination of a reduction in the U.S. assessed rate of contributions, reductions in the number of U.N. peacekeeping missions, and significant reductions in the budgets of peacekeeping missions across the board." The department also requested that Congress provide two-year funds for CIPA (in other words, that Congress make funds available for both the fiscal year for which the funds were appropriated and the subsequent fiscal year) "due to the demonstrated unpredictability of the requirements in this account from year to year and the nature of multi-year operations that have mandates overlapping U.S. fiscal years." The House committee bill would have provided $1.36 billion for CIO and $1.59 billion for CIPA, for a combined total of $2.95 billion for these accounts, which was 29% higher than the department's request and 4% higher than the FY2018 funding levels. The Senate committee bill would have provided $1.44 billion for CIO and $1.68 billion for CIPA, for a combined total of $3.12 billion. This figure was 36% higher than the department's request and 9% higher than the FY2018 level. The Senate committee bill included a provision not present in recent appropriations laws mandating that funds appropriated for CIO "are made available to pay not less than the full fiscal year 2019 United States assessment for each respective international organization." With regard to CIPA, both the House and Senate committee reports noted that appropriated monies were intended to support an assessed peacekeeping cost at the statutory level of 25% rather than the U.N. assessed rate for the United States of 28.4%. Both committee reports called on the department to review peacekeeping missions for cost savings and work to renegotiate rates of assessment. For FY2019, P.L. 116-6 provided $1.36 billion for CIO and $1.55 billion for CIPA, for a total of $2.91 billion—slightly less than both the House and Senate committee bills. This figure was still 2% higher than the FY2018 figure and 27% higher than the department's request. While the law did not include the aforementioned Senate committee bill provision regarding payment of full U.S. assessments for organizations funded through the CIO account, the law's joint explanatory statement noted that it assumed the payment of the full United States assessment for each relevant organization (with some exceptions, including organizations from which the United States has withdrawn) and required the Secretary of State to consult with the Committees on Appropriations with respect to any decision not to provide the full assessment for any such organization. With respect to CIPA, the joint explanatory statement noted that sufficient funds are provided for contributions to peacekeeping missions at the statutory level of 25%. The enacted legislation, like the House and Senate committee bills, provided a share of CIPA funds as two-year funds, as requested by the department. The State Department requested $246.2 million for FY2019 to implement the Leadership and Modernization Impact Initiative (hereinafter, the Impact Initiative). The Impact Initiative constitutes the implementation phase of the State Department's "Redesign" project. Former Secretary Tillerson initiated the redesign in 2017 to implement Executive Order 13781 and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Memorandum M-17-22, which aim to "improve the efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability of the executive branch." The Impact Initiative constitutes 16 keystone modernization projects in three focus areas: Modernizing Information Technology and Human Resources Operations; Modernizing Global Presence, and Creating and Implementing Policy; and Improving Operational Efficiencies (see Table 5 ). According to the State Department, these focus areas and modernization projects are derived from the results of the listening tour that former Secretary Tillerson launched in May 2017, which included interviews conducted with approximately 300 individuals that the department said comprised a representative cross-section of its broader workforce, and a survey completed by 35,000 department personnel that asked them to discuss the means they use to help complete the department's mission and obstacles they encounter in the process. Of the $246.2 million requested, $150.0 million was requested from the IT Central Fund (which is funded through funds appropriated by Congress to the Capital Investment Fund account and, separately, expedited passport fees) and $96.2 million from the D&CP account to implement modernization projects. Proceeds from the IT Central Fund were intended to implement projects focused on IT, including modernizing existing IT infrastructure, systems, and applications based on a roadmap to be created in FY2018 and centralizing management of all WiFi networks. Funds from the D&CP account were intended to implement modernization projects focusing on Human Resources issues, including leadership development, management services consolidation, data analytics, and workforce readiness initiatives. Like the House and the Senate committee bills and reports, neither P.L. 116-6 nor the joint explanatory statement accompanying the law specifically mentioned the Impact Initiative by name. However, both the law and the joint explanatory statement included provisions explicitly prohibiting the Department of State from using appropriated funds to implement a reorganization without prior consultation, notification, and reporting to Congress (for example, see Section 7073 of P.L. 116-6 ). Like the Senate committee bill, P.L. 116-6 stated that no funds appropriated for SFOPs may be used to "downsize, downgrade, consolidate, close, move, or relocate" the State Department's Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration. Foreign operations accounts, together with food aid appropriated through the Agriculture appropriations bill, constitute the foreign aid component of the international affairs budget. These accounts fund bilateral economic aid, humanitarian assistance, security assistance, multilateral aid, and export promotion programs. For FY2019, the Administration requested $28.60 billion for foreign aid programs within the international affairs (function 150) budget, about 28% less than the FY2018 actual funding level. None of the requested funds were designated as OCO. The FY2019 enacted appropriation provided $37.92 billion for foreign operations account, including $3.63 billion designated as OCO. Together with food aid accounts in the Agriculture appropriation, total enacted foreign aid within the international affairs budget was $39.85 billion, or 0.7% below the FY2018 actual funding level and 39% above the FY2019 request. Table 6 shows foreign aid funding by type for FY2017 and FY2018 actual, and the FY2019 request, committee-approved legislation, and enacted legislation. Account Mergers and Eliminations . The Administration aimed to simplify the foreign operations budget in part by channeling funds through fewer accounts and eliminating certain programs. These account mergers and eliminations were also proposed in the FY2018 budget request Under bilateral economic assistance, the Development Assistance (DA), Economic Support Fund (ESF), Assistance to Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia (AEECA) and Democracy Fund (DF) accounts were zero funded in the FY2019 request. Programs currently funded through these accounts would have been funded through a new Economic Support and Development Fund (ESDF) account. The proposed funding level for ESDF, $5.063 billion, was more than 36% below the FY2018 funding for the accounts it would have replaced. Fifteen countries that received DA, ESF, or AEECA in FY2017 would no longer have received funding from these accounts or from ESDF under the FY2019 request. Within multilateral assistance, the International Organizations & Programs (IO&P) account, which funds U.S. voluntary contributions to many U.N. entities, including UNICEF, U.N. Development Program, and UN Women, would also have been zeroed out. Budget documents suggested that some unspecified activities currently funded through IO&P could have received funding through the ESDF or other accounts. Related to humanitarian assistance, the P.L. 480 Title II food aid account in the Agriculture appropriation would have been zero-funded and all food assistance would have been funded through the International Disaster Assistance (IDA) account, which would have nevertheless declined by about 17% from FY2018 actual funding (see " Humanitarian Assistance " section below). The Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance (ERMA) account would have been subsumed into the Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA) account. Closeout of Inter-American Foundation and U.S.-Africa Development Foundation . The FY2019 request proposed to terminate the Inter-American Foundation (IAF) and the U.S.-Africa Development Foundation (ADF), independent entities that implement small U.S. assistance grants, often in remote communities. The Administration proposed to consolidate all small grant programs aimed at reaching the poor under USAID, as a means of improving their integration with larger development programs and U.S. foreign policy objectives, as well as improving efficiency. Funds were requested for IAF and ADF only for the purposes of an orderly closeout. Development Finance Institution . The Administration requested, for the first time in FY2019, the consolidation of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) and USAID's Development Credit Authority (DCA) into a new standalone Development Finance Institution (DFI). The request called for $96 million for administrative expenses and $38 million for credit subsidies for DFI, but assumed that these expenses would be more than offset by collections, resulting in a net income of $460 million (based on OPIC's projected offsetting collections). In addition, $56 million in ESDF funds would have been used to support DFI activities. The Administration sought congressional authority for the new standalone entity, which it described as a means of incentivizing private sector investment in development and improving the efficiency of U.S. development finance programs. Both the House and Senate committee bills, as well as the enacted FY2019 appropriation, rejected these account changes, with the exception of the elimination of the ERMA account, which the House bill eliminated and the Senate and final bill funded with $1 million. All the FY2019 SFOPS legislation, including P.L. 116-6 , used the same bilateral account structure used for FY2018, not a new ESDF, and funded IAF and ADF at the FY2018 levels. Prior to enactment of the final FY2019 SFOPS appropriation, Congress passed the BUILD Act ( P.L. 115-254 ), which authorized the establishment of a new International Development Finance Corporation (IDFC), consistent with the Administration's DFI proposal. The IDFC is expected to become operational near the end of FY2019, and P.L. 116-6 made FY2019 appropriations for OPIC and DCA using the same account structure as in prior years, but authorized $5 million in the OPIC noncredit account to be used for transition costs. Top Country Recipients . Under the FY2019 request, top foreign assistance recipients would not have changed significantly, continuing to include strategic allies in the Middle East (Israel, Egypt, Jordan) and major global health and development partners in Africa (see Table 7 ). Israel would have seen an increase of $200 million from FY2017, reflecting a new 10-year security assistance Memorandum of Understanding. Zambia and Uganda would both have seen an 11% increase. All other top recipients would have seen reduced aid in FY2019 compared with FY2017 (comprehensive FY2018 country allocations were not yet available), though unallocated global health and humanitarian funds (added to the request after passage of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018) may have changed these totals. Figure 1 and Table 7 show the requested FY2019 foreign operations budget allocations by region and country. Under the FY2019 request, foreign assistance for every region would have been reduced compared to FY2018 funding. The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region and Sub-Saharan Africa would continue to be the top regional recipients, together comprising nearly 80% of aid allocated by region ( Figure 2 ). Proposed cuts ranged from 61% in Europe and Eurasia to 2% in the MENA. Aid to Sub-Saharan Africa would have declined by 31%, aid to East Asia and Pacific by approximately half (51%), aid to South and Central Asia by about 4%, and aid to Western Hemisphere by 35%. The House bill ( H.R. 6385 ) and accompanying report did not provide comprehensive country and regional allocations, but did specify aid levels for some countries and regional programs, including Israel ($3.300 billion), Egypt ($1.457 billion), Jordan ($1.525 billion), Ukraine ($441 million), the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America ($595 million), and the Countering Russian Influence Funds ($250 million). The Senate bill ( S. 3108 ) and report specified aid allocations for several countries and regional programs, including Israel ($3.300 billion), Egypt ($1.082 billion), Jordan ($1.525 billion), Iraq ($429 million), West Bank & Gaza ($286 million), Afghanistan ($698 million), Pakistan ($271 million), Colombia ($391 million), Ukraine $426 million), U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America ($515 million) and the Countering Russian Influence Fund ($300 million). The enacted legislation, P.L. 116-6 , and the accompanying explanatory statement, specified FY2019 aid levels for several countries, including Israel ($3.300 billion), Egypt ($1.419 billion), Jordan ($1.525 billion), Iraq ($407 million), Colombia ($418 million), Mexico ($163 million), and Ukraine ($446 million), as well as for the U.S. Strategy for engagement in Central America ($528 million) and the Countering Russian Influence Fund ($275 million). The budget submission did not identify any new foreign assistance initiatives. The FY2019 request called for decreases in foreign aid funding generally while continuing to prioritize the aid sectors that have long made up the bulk of U.S. foreign assistance: global health, humanitarian, and security assistance. The Administration requested $6.70 billion for global health programs in FY2019. This was a 23% reduction from the FY2018 funding level, yet global health programs would have increased slightly as a proportion of the foreign aid budget, from 22% of total aid in FY2018 to 23% in the FY2019 request, due to deeper proposed cuts elsewhere. HIV/AIDS programs, for which funding would have been cut about 27% from FY2018 actual levels, would have continued to make up the bulk (69%) of global health funding, as they have since the creation of the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) in 2004. Family planning and reproductive health services (for which the Administration proposed no funding for FY2018) would have received $302 million, a 42% reduction from FY2018 funding. Assistance levels would have been reduced for every health sector compared to FY2018, including maternal and child health (-25%), tuberculosis (-31%), malaria (-11%), neglected tropical diseases (-25%), global health security (-0.1%, funded through a proposed repurposing of FY2015 Ebola emergency funds), and nutrition (-37%). The House committee bill included $8.69 billion for global health programs, the same as FY2018 funding. While total funding would remain the same, the House proposal would have reduced funding for family planning and reproductive health by about 12% compared to FY2018, while slightly increasing funding for polio, nutrition, and maternal and child health, and more than doubling funding for global health security and emerging threats. The Senate committee bill would have funded global health programs $8.792 billion, 1.2% above the FY2018 level. No subsectors would have received reduced funding and allocations for tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS, family planning, nutrition, neglected tropical diseases and vulnerable children would all have increased slightly. While both bills included long-standing language preventing the use of appropriated funds to pay for abortions, the House bill, but not the Senate bill, also included a provision prohibiting aid to any foreign nongovernmental organizations that "promotes or performs" voluntary abortion, with some exceptions, regardless of the source of funding for such activities. P.L. 116-6 provides $8.84 billion for global health programs for FY2019, a 1.7% increase over FY2018 funding. Every health subsector was funded at the same or slightly higher level than in FY2018. The Trump Administration's FY2019 budget request for humanitarian assistance totaled $6.358 billion, which was roughly 32% less than FY2018 actual funding ($9.37 billion) and about 22% of the total FY2019 foreign aid request. The request included $2,800.4 million for the Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA) account (-17% from FY2018) and $3,557.4 million for the International Disaster Assistance (IDA) account (-17%) ( Figure 2 ). As in its FY2018 request, the Administration proposed to eliminate the Food for Peace (P.L. 480, Title II) and Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance (ERMA) accounts, asserting that the activities supported through these accounts can be more efficiently and effectively funded through the IDA and MRA accounts, respectively. (Congress did not adopt the proposed changes to Food for Peace for FY2018, appropriating $1.716 billion for the account through the Agriculture appropriation, but did appropriate only $1 million for ERMA, a 98% reduction from FY2017 funding.) The Administration also sought authority to transfer and merge IDA and MRA base funds (current authority only applies to OCO-designated funds). The Administration described its IDA request as focused "on crises at the forefront of U.S. security interests, such as Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Nigeria, Somalia, and South Sudan." The MRA request focused on "conflict displacement in Afghanistan, Burma, Iraq, Somalia, South Sudan, Syria and Yemen," as well as strengthening bilateral relationships with "key refugee hosting countries such as Kenya, Turkey, Jordan, Ethiopia and Bangladesh." Consistent with last year, the request suggested that the proposed funding reduction assumes that other donors will shoulder an increased share of the overall humanitarian assistance burden worldwide. The House committee bills proposed $9.145 billion for humanitarian assistance accounts, about 2% less than FY2018 funding. The total included $1.5 billion for Food for Peace from the Agriculture appropriation but would not have funded the ERMA account. The Senate committee bills proposed $9.534 billion for humanitarian assistance, about 2% more than FY2018 funding. The total included $1.716 billion for Food for Peace and $1 million for the ERMA account. Neither bill included language authorizing broad transfers and mergers between the IDA and MRA base funding account, though both bills include provisions allowing for the transfer and merger of funds from several accounts, including IDA and MRA, as an extraordinary measure in response to a severe international infectious disease outbreak. As in FY2018, Congress did not adopt the significant humanitarian aid changes proposed by the Administration. P.L. 116-6 provided a total of $9.534 billion for humanitarian assistance in FY2019, almost level with FY2018 funding (-0.5%), of which about 21% was designated as OCO. This total included $3.434 billion in MRA funds, $1 million for ERMA, and $4.385 billion for IDA in the SFOPS division of the bill, as well as $1.716 billion for Food for Peace in the Agriculture division. The FY2019 security assistance request within foreign operations accounts totaled $7.304 billion, a 19% reduction from the FY2018 actual funding level and about 26% of the total foreign aid request. Consistent with recent years, 63% of the entire security assistance request was for FMF aid to Israel and Egypt. However, six countries were identified in the request as joint Department of Defense (DOD) and State Department security sector assistance priorities: Philippines, Vietnam, Ukraine, Lebanon, Tunisia, and Colombia. The International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) account would have been reduced by about 36% from FY2018 actual levels, Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related (NADR) by 21%, and International Military Education and Training (IMET) by about 14%. In each of these cases, the Administration described the proposed reductions as concentrating resources where they offer the most value and U.S. national security impact. As in the FY2018 request, the Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) account, which supports most non-U.N. multilateral peacekeeping and regional stability operations, including U.S. training and equipment for African militaries and funding for the U.N. Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS), would have seen the biggest reduction (-46%) under the FY2019 request. This is because Administrations generally request UNSOS funds through the CIPA account, while Congress usually funds the office through the PKO account. The Foreign Military Financing (FMF) account would have been reduced by 13% compared to FY2018, with specific allocations for 11 countries and a proposed $75 million Global Fund to be allocated flexibly. This was a notable change from the FY2018 FMF request, in which funds were allocated to four countries and a larger global fund, and from FY2018-enacted funding, for which allocations were specified for more than 20 countries. The House committee bill would have provided $9.274 billion for security assistance, a 3% increase over FY2018 funding, with funding increases proposed for the INCLE (+7%) and FMF (+4%) accounts and a reduction proposed for the PKO account (-9%). Consistent with the request, and in contrast to recent year appropriations, no security assistance funding in the House committee bill was designated as OCO. The Senate committee bill included $8.789 billion for security assistance programs, a 2.6% total decrease from FY2018 funding. The INCLE account would have increased by 2.6% while the FMF and PKO accounts would be reduced by 3% and 11%, respectively. About 16% of the security assistance funding in the Senate bill was designated as OCO. In the final FY2019 appropriation, P.L. 116-6 , security assistance funding totaled $9.153 billion, a 1.4% increase from FY2018. Of the total, $555 million within the PKO and FMF accounts (6% of total security funding) was designated as OCO. Funding provided for most accounts was similar to FY2018 levels, with the exception of INCLE, which increased by 9.4% in part to support increased efforts to address the flow of illegal opioids, and PKO, for which funding decreased by about 9.2%. Bilateral economic development assistance is the broad category that includes programs focused on education, agricultural development and food security, good governance and democracy promotion, microfinance, environmental management, and other sectors. While the majority of this aid is implemented by USAID, it also includes the programs carried out by the independent Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), Peace Corps, Inter-American Foundation and the U.S.-Africa Development Foundation. Excluding global health assistance, bilateral economic development assistance in the Administration's FY2019 request totaled $6.354 billion, a 33% reduction from FY2018 funding levels. Proposed FY2019 allocations for key sectors, compared with FY2018 levels prescribed in legislation, included the following: food security, $518 million (-48% from FY2018); democracy promotion programs, $1,235 million (-47% from FY2018); and education, $512 million (-51% from FY2018). The Administration requested $800 million for MCC and $396 million for Peace Corps, representing cuts of 12% and 3%, respectively. As discussed above, the budget request also proposed to merge I-AF and USADF into USAID, and requested only small amounts of funding to close out their independent activities. The House committee bill would have provided $9.383 billion for economic development assistance and specified allocations for several development sectors, including education ($1.035 billion), conservation programs ($360 million), food security and agricultural development ($1.001 million), microenterprise and microfinance ($265 million), water and sanitation ($400 million) and democracy programs ($2.4 billion). The Senate committee bill would have provided $9.764 billion for economic development activities and specifies allocations for education ($750 million), environment and renewable energy ($943 million), food security and agricultural development ($1.001 billion), small and micro credit ($265 million), water and sanitation ($435 million), and democracy programs ($2.4 billion), among others. Both the House and Senate bills would have funded the I-AF, USADF, Peace Corp, and MCC at the FY2018 funding level, and both bills explicitly rejected the Administration's proposal to merge I-AF and USADF into USAID. The enacted appropriation for FY2019, P.L. 116-6 , provided about $9.239 billion for nonhealth economic development aid. Minimum allocations specified for key sectors included $1.035 billion for education (basic and higher), $285 million for biodiversity conservation, $125 million for sustainable landscapes, $1.001 billion for food security and agricultural development, $265 million to support micro and small enterprises, $67 million to combat trafficking in persons, and $435 million for water and sanitation programs. The independent agencies were all funded at the same level as in FY2018. Appendix A. State Department, Foreign Operations, and Related Agencies Appropriations, by Account Appendix B. International Affairs Budget The International Affairs budget, or Function 150, includes funding that is not in the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs appropriation: foreign food aid programs (P.L. 480 Title II Food for Peace and McGovern-Dole International Food for Education and Child Nutrition programs) are in the Agriculture Appropriations, and the Foreign Claim Settlement Commission and the International Trade Commission are in the Commerce, Justice, Science appropriations. In addition, the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs appropriation measure includes funding for certain international commissions that are not part of the International Affairs Function 150 account. Appendix C. SFOPS Organizational Chart Appendix D. Glossary	[ "The Trump Administration submitted to Congress its FY2019 budget request on February 12, 2018. The proposal included $41.86 billion for the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS). Of that amount, $13.26 billion was for State Department operations, international broadcasting, and related agencies, and $28.60 billion for foreign operations. With the enactment of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA; P.L. 115-123, February 9, 2018), which raised discretionary spending limits set by the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA; P.L. 112-25), the Administration's FY2019 foreign affairs funding request was entirely within enduring (base) funds; no Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding was included the SFOPS request for the first time since FY2012. The FY2019 request would have represented a 23.3% decrease in SFOPS funding compared with FY2018 actual funding levels. The proposed State and related agency funding would have been 18.7% below FY2018 funding and the foreign operations funding would have been reduced by 25.2%. In the State and related programs budget, cuts were proposed for several accounts, including the diplomatic security accounts, contributions to international organizations, and contributions for international peacekeeping activities. In the foreign operations budget, cuts would have been applied across all accounts, with disproportionately large cuts proposed for humanitarian assistance, multilateral assistance, and funding for bilateral development programs focused on agriculture, education, and democracy promotion. Both the House and Senate appropriations committees approved FY2019 SFOPS bills that included funding at higher levels than the Administration requested and closer to FY2018 funding. H.R. 6385, approved by the House appropriations committee on June 20, 2018, would have funded SFOPS accounts at $54.177 billion. S. 3108, approved by the Senate appropriations committee on June 21, 2018, would have provided $54.602 billion for SFOPS accounts. FY2019 began with seven appropriations bills, including SFOPS, unfinished. Congress and the President approved continuing resolutions to fund the affected federal agencies through December 21, 2018 at the FY2018 level (P.L. 115-245, Division C and P.L. 115-298). After December 21, a partial shutdown of the government, including SFOPS funded agencies, occurred. On January 25, 2019, an agreement was reached to continue funding for SFOPS and other appropriations that had lapsed through February 15, at the FY2018 level (P.L. 116-5). On February 14, Congress passed, and the President later signed into law, a full year omnibus appropriation that included SFOPS funding (P.L. 116-6, Division F). P.L. 116-6 included a total of $54.377 billion for SFOPS accounts in FY2019, a 0.3% decrease from the FY2018 funding level and about 30% more than the Administration's request. Of that enacted total, $8.0 billion, or 14.7%, was designated as OCO. This report provides an account-by-account comparison of the FY2019 SFOPS request, House and Senate SFOPS legislation and the final FY2019 SFOPS appropriation to FY2018 funding in Appendix A. The International Affairs (function 150) budget in Appendix B provides a similar comparison. This report will not be further updated unless there is further congressional activity on FY2019 appropriations." ]	7,853	gov_report	en	null	679f8b9b9a028f34abb79be22c978d1d4b377ce6ca1f12f9
State is the lead agency involved in implementing American foreign policy and representing the United States abroad. According to State and USAID’s joint strategic plan for fiscal years 2018 through 2022, State’s goals are to (1) protect America’s security at home and abroad, (2) renew America’s competitive advantage for sustained economic growth and job creation, (3) promote American leadership through balanced engagement, and (4) ensure effectiveness and accountability to the American taxpayer. State’s Foreign Service employees serve in a variety of functions at overseas posts as either generalists or specialists. Foreign Service generalists help formulate and implement U.S. foreign policy and are assigned to work in one of five career tracks: consular, economic, management, political, or public diplomacy. Generalists at overseas posts collect information and engage with foreign governments and citizens of foreign countries and report the results of these interactions back to State headquarters in Washington, D.C., among other functions. Foreign Service specialists abroad support and maintain the functioning of overseas posts and serve in one of 25 different skill groups, in positions such as security officer or information management. Specialists at overseas posts play a critical role in ensuring the security and maintenance of the posts’ facilities, computer networks, and supplies as well as the protection of post staff, their family members, and local staff, among other functions. State may require Foreign Service employees to be available for service anywhere in the world, as needed, and State has the authority to direct Foreign Service employees to any of its posts overseas or to its headquarters in Washington, D.C. However, as noted in our 2012 report, State generally does not use this authority, preferring other means of filling high-priority positions, according to State officials. The process of assigning Foreign Service employees to their positions typically begins when they receive a list of upcoming vacancies for which they may compete. Foreign Service employees then submit a list of positions for which they would like to be considered, known as bids, to the Office of Career Development and Assignments and consult with their career development officer. The process varies depending on an officer’s grade and functional specialty, and State uses a variety of incentives to encourage Foreign Service employees to bid on difficult-to-fill posts. State groups countries of the world—and corresponding U.S. overseas posts in these countries—into areas of responsibility under six geographic regional bureaus: Bureau of African Affairs Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs Overseas posts report to State headquarters through their respective regional bureaus. For example, because the Bureau of African Affairs has responsibility for developing and managing U.S. policy concerning parts of the African continent, U.S. overseas posts in Nigeria report through the bureau to State headquarters. According to State officials, State maintains personnel data on State employees in its GEMS database. GEMS includes information on Foreign Service and Civil Service positions; in particular, it shows the total number of authorized Foreign Service positions at State and whether each position is currently filled or vacant. As displayed in figure 1, the GEMS data show that the majority of Foreign Service employees (73 percent) work in positions at overseas posts. However, some Foreign Service staff (27 percent) are assigned to positions in the United States, where they may complete required language or other training, serve as desk officers for the regional bureaus, or work in other functions at State headquarters. According to State data, the number of both staffed and vacant overseas Foreign Service positions increased between 2008 and 2018. As shown in figure 2, the number of positions staffed grew from 6,979 in 2008 to 8,574 in 2018—a more than 20 percent increase. Despite the increase in the number of positions staffed, our analysis found that as of March 31, 2018, overall, 13 percent of State’s overseas Foreign Service positions were vacant. This vacancy percentage is similar to the percentages of vacancies in overseas Foreign Service positions that we reported in 2012 and 2008. In 2012, we reported that 14 percent of State’s overseas Foreign Service positions were vacant as of October 31, 2011, and we reported that the same percentage of overseas Foreign Service positions—14 percent—were vacant as of September 30, 2008. According to State officials, State’s ability to hire Foreign Service employees to fill persistent vacancies has been affected by factors such as reduced appropriations. For instance, according to State officials and State’s Five Year Workforce Plan, because of funding cuts enacted in fiscal year 2013, State could only hire one employee for every two leaving the Foreign Service. From fiscal years 2014 to 2016, funding for State’s annual appropriations supported hiring to replace Foreign Service employees projected to leave the agency, according to State officials. These officials indicated, however, that Foreign Service hiring was again impacted from January 2017 through May 2018 by a hiring freeze. As a result, State hired below levels required to replace full projected attrition of Foreign Service employees. While State’s data show persistent vacancies in both generalist and specialist positions at overseas posts, specialist positions remain vacant at a higher rate. State’s data show that 12 percent (680 of 5,660) of overseas Foreign Service generalist positions were vacant as of March 31, 2018, a slight decrease from the 14 percent of overseas Foreign Service generalist positions that we reported vacant in 2012. State’s data also show that 14.2 percent (594 of 4,188) of all overseas Foreign Service specialist positions were vacant, close to the 14.8 percent vacancy rate that we reported in 2012. State’s data show persistent vacancies in Foreign Service generalist positions responsible for analysis, engagement, and reporting at overseas posts. As shown in table 1, among Foreign Service generalist career tracks, the political, economic, and “other” tracks had the largest percentage of vacant positions, with, respectively, 20 percent, 16 percent, and 14 percent of positions vacant as of March 31, 2018. Our 2012 report noted vacancies in the same three career tracks. Political officers at overseas posts are responsible for collecting and analyzing information on political events, engaging with foreign governments, and reporting back to State headquarters. Economic officers at overseas posts work with foreign governments and other U.S. agencies on technology, science, economic, trade, and environmental issues. The “other” generalist career track includes positions designated as “Executive” or “International Relations,” which, according to State officials, may be filled by generalists from any of State’s five career tracks. State’s data show persistent vacancies in Foreign Service specialist positions that support and maintain the functioning of overseas posts. Among the 10 largest Foreign Service specialist skill groups, security officer, office management specialist, and information management had the largest percentages of vacant positions. As shown in figure 3, in these three groups, respectively, 16 percent, 16 percent, and 14 percent of positions were vacant. The vacancies in these three specialist skill groups are persistent; in 2012, we reported that the same three groups had the largest numbers of vacant positions. Security officers are typically responsible for responding to various threats to the physical security of overseas posts and for ensuring the protection of post staff, their family members, and local staff. Office management specialists provide professional management and administrative support. Information management staff are typically responsible for maintaining and ensuring the security of State’s computer networks and communications systems at overseas posts. State officials said that State has had difficulty in recruiting and hiring Foreign Service employees to fill specialist positions in some skill groups at overseas posts. According to State officials and staff at overseas posts, some vacant specialist positions are more difficult to fill than others because candidates for these positions must often possess skills in fields such as medicine or information technology that tend to be highly sought after in the private sector. According to staff at overseas posts, it is not uncommon for specialist candidates in these fields to choose higher- paying jobs in the private sector rather than specialist positions in the Foreign Service. Additionally, in some circumstances, State must compete with other federal agencies to recruit specialists from the same limited pool of talent. Consequently, according to State officials, State has been unable to attract and retain personnel with the skills necessary to fill some Foreign Service specialist positions, which has led to persistent vacancies in specialist positions. Vacancies in Foreign Service specialist positions at overseas posts present additional challenges because specialized skills and competencies are often required to perform the work of these positions. According to State officials, because Foreign Service generalists may be assigned to work outside of their career tracks, in some circumstances, State has more flexibility in filling a generalist vacancy than a specialist vacancy. For example, generalists outside the consular career track can serve as a consular officer for one or more tours of duty. However, specialist positions often require specialized skills or experience that generalists may not possess. In addition, according to staff at overseas posts, it is generally not possible for a Foreign Service specialist from one skill group to perform the work of a Foreign Service specialist from a different skill group. For instance, a Foreign Service specialist assigned to the medical section at a post will not be able to help address the workload of a vacant position in the information management section. Thus, according to staff at overseas posts, vacancies in specialist positions at the posts may create greater challenges than vacancies in generalist positions. According to State’s data, as of March 31, 2018, overseas posts with State’s highest foreign policy priorities had the highest percentages of vacant Foreign Service positions. Using its Overseas Staffing Model process, State assigns each embassy to one of seven categories based primarily on the level and type of work required to pursue the U.S. government’s diplomatic relations with the host country at post. As we previously reported, the rankings are closely associated with the department’s foreign policy priorities; the higher the category, the greater the resources needed to conduct the work of the overseas post and the higher the post’s foreign policy priority. For example, the highest-level category, level 5+, includes the largest, most comprehensive full-service posts, where the host country’s regional and global role requires extensive U.S. personnel resources. The lowest-level category includes small embassies with limited requirements for advocacy, liaison, and coordination in the host country’s government. As shown in table 2, according to State’s data, as of March 31, 2018, overseas posts in the “Embassy 5+” category had the highest percentage of vacant positions. The results of this analysis were similar to those we reported in 2012. While State has Foreign Service vacancies worldwide, as of March 31, 2018, the highest percentages of vacancies were in the South and Central Asian Affairs Bureau (SCA) and Near Eastern Affairs Bureau (NEA)—bureaus representing regions with heightened security risks that could threaten U.S. foreign policy interests, according to State. SCA, which includes countries such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India, faces a host of security and stability challenges that could threaten U.S. interests, according to a February 2018 report from State’s Office of Inspector General. NEA includes countries, such as Egypt, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, which have faced numerous security threats in recent years that could also threaten U.S. interests overseas. As shown in figure 4, among State’s regional bureaus, as of March 31, 2018, SCA and NEA had the highest percentages of overseas Foreign Service vacancies at 21 percent (238 of 1,115 positions) and 18 percent (234 of 1,279 positions), respectively. In 2012, we reported that these two bureaus also had the highest percentages of overseas Foreign Service vacancies among regional bureaus. Vacancies in Foreign Service positions at overseas posts increase workloads and adversely affect the morale of Foreign Service employees. According to State officials in headquarters and staff at overseas posts, when a Foreign Service position at an overseas post is vacant, Foreign Service employees at that post are generally responsible for covering the workload of the vacant position. Further, Foreign Service employees at some posts—particularly posts with fewer Foreign Service staff—may be responsible for covering the workload of multiple vacant positions. For example, at two African posts we heard examples of Foreign Service employees covering the workload of multiple vacant Foreign Service positions. As a result of increased workloads, Foreign Service employees are also more likely to have less time available to perform some important functions, according to staff at overseas posts. According to staff at overseas posts, such functions include training and supervising entry- level Foreign Service employees, local staff, and eligible family members (EFM); reducing the risk of fraud, waste, and abuse; improving and innovating processes at post that could reduce inefficiencies; initiating and implementing projects that could enhance various diplomatic efforts; and conducting maintenance of systems. In addition, according to staff at overseas posts, vacancies adversely affect staff morale. Staff at multiple posts said that vacancies and the resulting increased workloads had created substantial stress and increased “burnout” of Foreign Service employees at the posts. They noted that these levels of stress and burnout had contributed to Foreign Service employees’ ending their overseas assignments early for medical or personal reasons. These curtailments, in turn, had increased the overall vacancies and their effects at overseas posts. According to staff at overseas posts, vacancies in Foreign Service generalist positions at overseas posts adversely affect State’s diplomatic readiness. Among Foreign Service generalist career tracks, the political and economic career tracks had the two largest percentages of vacant positions—20 percent and 16 percent, respectively—as of March 31, 2018. According to staff at overseas posts, vacancies in political and economic positions at overseas posts—particularly posts with fewer Foreign Service employees—limit the amount of reporting on political and economic developments that posts are able to submit back to State headquarters. For example, Foreign Service employees from three posts in Africa told us that persistent, long-term vacancies in those posts’ political and economic positions had constrained their abilities to provide full reporting on political and economic developments in their host countries. According to staff at overseas posts, reporting on political and economic developments in other countries—submitted by overseas posts back to State headquarters—is essential for State to make informed foreign policy decisions. Foreign Service employees from two posts in large countries in East and South Asia also told us that vacancies in these sections had limited their capacity to engage with host government officials on important, strategic issues for the United States, such as reducing nuclear proliferation or enhancing trade and investment relationships with the United States. Vacancies in the political and economic career tracks at overseas posts could adversely affect State’s ability to achieve two of the goals in State and USAID’s joint strategic plan for fiscal years 2018 through 2022—(1) renew America’s competitive advantage for sustained economic growth and job creation and (2) promote American leadership through balanced engagement. According to staff at overseas posts, vacancies in Foreign Service specialist positions at overseas posts may heighten the level of security risk at the posts and disrupt post operations. Among Foreign Service specialist skill groups with the highest number of vacant positions, security officer, office management specialist, and information management had the largest percentages of vacant positions—16 percent, 16 percent, and 14 percent, respectively—as of March 31, 2018. According to staff at overseas posts, vacancies in security officer positions at overseas posts reduce the amount of time that security staff can spend identifying, investigating, and responding to potential security threats to the post. Security officers are also responsible for identifying and analyzing host-country intelligence-gathering efforts at their respective overseas posts—and post staff told us that, because of vacancies in these positions, some security officers had been unable to complete this work for their posts, potentially increasing the risk of foreign government officials gaining access to sensitive information. Also, post staff told us that security officer vacancies limit the amount of time that security officers present at posts can devote to important security oversight activities, including regular training, drilling, and supervising of local guard forces and security contractors. Post staff noted, for example, that security officers at overseas posts should conduct regular training and drilling exercises to evaluate their local guard force’s effectiveness in searching a vehicle entering the post compound for explosive devices. According to post staff, when these important security oversight activities are not properly and regularly conducted, the level of security risk at these overseas posts may increase. According to State officials in headquarters and staff at overseas posts, as well as reporting by State’s OIG, vacancies in information management positions at overseas posts have increased the vulnerability of posts’ computer networks to potential cybersecurity attacks and other malicious threats. State officials told us that the Foreign Service had faced chronic shortages of information management staff available to fill these positions worldwide. According to State officials, because of ongoing information management vacancies, some required tasks—such as conducting planned network maintenance—were performed infrequently or not at all. In another example, staff at overseas posts said that because of vacancies, information management staff had been unable to regularly check their computer system logs to ensure that security breaches had not taken place. Post staff added that, if a breach did occur, vacancies could increase the amount of time needed to identify an attack and deploy countermeasures, further increasing the risks to posts’ computer networks. Inspections conducted by State’s OIG from fall 2014 to spring 2016 found that information management staff at 33 percent of overseas posts had not performed various required information management duties. According to State’s OIG, neglect of these duties may leave the department vulnerable to increased cybersecurity attacks. According to staff at overseas posts, the office management specialist position at overseas posts has evolved considerably over time; these specialists increasingly play a critical role in ensuring that the work of overseas posts is effectively completed. Post staff said that office management specialists provide administrative and other support services to other Foreign Service employees and are assigned to various sections of post. For example, staff at one post noted that office management specialists assigned to the Security Officer sections at overseas posts reduce the workload of security officers by completing more routine security tasks and allowing the security officers to focus on more challenging or involved tasks necessary to secure overseas posts. Post staff told us that vacancies in office management specialist positions reduce the amount of work that can be completed by other Foreign Service employees at overseas posts. For example, when office management specialist positions assigned to the Security Officer or Information Management sections of posts are vacant, these vacancies further exacerbate the higher number of vacancies that already exist in these sections. According to staff at overseas posts, higher numbers of office management specialist vacancies require other Foreign Service employees to spend a significant amount of time on administrative tasks, reducing the amount of time these staff can spend on mission-critical activities. Officials in headquarters and at overseas posts described various State efforts to help address overseas Foreign Service vacancies. According to State officials, Foreign Service vacancies at overseas posts are a complex problem that multiple offices within State address on an individual basis. State’s various efforts to address overseas Foreign Service vacancies are not guided by an integrated action plan to reduce persistent vacancies. Our 2017 High-Risk Series report calls for agencies to, among other things, design and implement action plan strategies for closing skills gaps. The action plan should (1) define the root cause of all skills gaps within an agency and (2) provide suggested corrective measures, including steps necessary to implement solutions. This report also emphasizes the high risk that mission-critical skills gaps in the federal workforce pose to the nation. While various State offices have implemented the efforts we identified, State lacks an action plan that is integrated—or consolidated—across its relevant offices to guide its efforts to address persistent overseas Foreign Service vacancies. Moreover, some staff at overseas posts acknowledged that the efforts State has taken to help address vacancies have not reduced persistent Foreign Service vacancies, notably in specialist positions. In response to our inquiry about an action plan, State officials said that the agency does not have a single document that addresses Foreign Service staffing gaps at overseas posts. Instead, State officials directed us to State’s Five Year Workforce Plan: Fiscal Years 2016-2020, stating that it was the most comprehensive document that outlines State’s efforts to address Foreign Service vacancies at overseas posts. The workforce plan notes that it provides a framework to address State’s human capital requirements and highlights State’s challenges and achievements in recruiting, hiring, staffing, and training Foreign Service staff. However, in reviewing the portions of the workforce plan that State indicated were most relevant, we found that the workforce plan does not include an integrated action plan that defines the root causes of the persistent overseas Foreign Service vacancies we identified or suggest corrective measures to reduce vacancies in these positions, including steps necessary to implement solutions. State officials also noted that they frequently meet to discuss and address workforce issues. For example, they said they convene a multi-bureau planning group that meets biweekly to discuss strategic workforce issues such as hiring needs based on attrition and other issues. However, according to State officials, this group has not developed an action plan to reduce persistent Foreign Service vacancies at overseas posts. State lacks an integrated action plan to guide its efforts to address persistent Foreign Service vacancies that includes corrective measures to address the root causes of the vacancies. Without defining the root causes of persistent Foreign Service vacancies at overseas posts and identifying appropriate corrective measures, overseas vacancies may persist and continue to adversely affect State’s ability to achieve U.S. foreign policy goals. Foreign Service generalists and specialists at overseas posts are critical to advancing U.S. foreign policy and economic interests abroad. However, for at least a decade, the Foreign Service has had persistent vacancies in both generalist and specialist positions at overseas posts. In particular, large numbers of vacant positions have persisted over time in certain overseas Foreign Service positions, such as information management and security officer positions. These vacancies in critical positions at overseas posts have adversely affected State’s ability to carry out its mission effectively and threaten State’s ability to ensure the security and safety of its employees, their families, and post facilities. While State has made some efforts to address Foreign Service vacancies, addressing chronic vacancies in critical positions at overseas posts requires a thoughtful, coherent, and integrated action plan that defines the root causes of persistent Foreign Service vacancies at overseas posts along with suggested corrective measures to reduce such vacancies, following what was called for in our 2017 High-Risk Series report. Developing such an action plan would help State address its persistent staffing gaps, improve its ability to achieve U.S. foreign policy goals, and help ensure secure and efficient operations. The Secretary of State should develop an integrated action plan that defines the root causes of persistent Foreign Service vacancies at overseas posts and provides suggested corrective measures to reduce such vacancies, including steps necessary to implement solutions. (Recommendation 1) We provided a draft of this report to State for review and comment. In its comments, reproduced in appendix III, State concurred with our recommendation. State also noted that it has taken actions and identified some causes of vacancies, but acknowledged that it lacks an integrated action plan and will take steps to develop such a plan. State also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of State, and other interested parties. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-6881 or bairj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV. This report examines (1) vacancies in the Department of State’s (State) Foreign Service staffing at overseas posts, (2) reported effects of Foreign Service vacancies on diplomatic readiness, and (3) State’s efforts to address Foreign Service vacancies. To address these three objectives, we interviewed State officials from the department’s Bureau of Human Resources and Bureau of Consular Affairs as well as State officials representing the Offices of the Executive Director for State’s six regional bureaus. We also interviewed staff at 10 overseas posts. We conducted in-person interviews with staff at 3 of these posts—the U.S. Embassy in Beijing and the U.S. Consulate in Shanghai, China, and the U.S. Embassy in New Delhi, India. We conducted telephone interviews with staff at the other 7 posts—the U.S. Embassies in Abuja, Nigeria; Bogota, Colombia; Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of the Congo; Kabul, Afghanistan; Mexico City, Mexico; and N’Djamena, Chad; and the U.S. Consulate in Frankfurt, Germany. We used the following criteria to select overseas posts for interviews: (1) posts with larger numbers of Foreign Service vacancies; (2) posts with diversity in the types of Foreign Service positions that were vacant; (3) posts with higher relative importance to U.S. economic, national security, and other foreign policy interests; and (4) posts in a range of geographic locations by State region. To examine vacancies in State’s Foreign Service staffing at overseas posts, we analyzed State’s personnel data on Foreign Service staffing at overseas posts from the department’s Global Employment Management System (GEMS), as of March 2018. Our analysis of the GEMS data includes Foreign Service positions filled by permanent Foreign Service employees as well as positions filled by nonpermanent Foreign Service employees, such as Consular Fellows. This analysis does not include the number of staffed and vacant positions at overseas posts in Libya, Syria, and Yemen, which, at the time of our review, were in suspended operations status, as well as U.S. Mission Somalia, which was operating under special circumstances at a different location. To calculate vacancy rates, we divided the total number of positions by the number of positions listed as vacant in GEMS. For example, a post with 10 positions and 2 vacancies would have a vacancy rate of 20 percent. We calculated vacancy rates for each of the following categories: type (i.e., generalist or specialist), function (e.g., consular or information management), regional bureau (i.e., Bureau of African Affairs or Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs), and embassy and nonembassy rankings from State’s Overseas Staffing Model (i.e., Embassy 3+ or 5). According to State officials, the data in GEMS have a number of limitations: The number of vacant positions at overseas posts listed in GEMS may be overstated, because State has not yet decided to remove some of these positions from its database. Some of the vacancies in GEMS are short-term or temporary. Foreign Service employees periodically rotate out of their positions at their overseas posts, sometimes creating temporary vacancies until the positions are filled by incoming Foreign Service employees. The GEMS data show larger numbers of vacant Foreign Service positions at posts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan than actually were unstaffed at these posts. According to State officials, this discrepancy results from State’s relying heavily on shorter-term assignments to fill Foreign Service positions at these locations. These shorter-term assignments are not reflected in GEMS, and the positions therefore appear vacant. The GEMS data may not reflect Foreign Service employees who have been temporarily reassigned from one overseas post to another. The GEMS data may show positions as filled although the Foreign Service employee filling the position has not yet arrived at post. To assess the reliability of the GEMS database, we asked State officials whether State had made any major changes to the database since our 2012 report, when we assessed the GEMS data to be sufficiently reliable. State officials indicated that no major changes had been made. We also tested the data for completeness, confirmed the general accuracy of the data with officials at selected overseas posts, and interviewed knowledgeable officials from State’s Office of Resource Management and Organizational Analysis concerning the data’s reliability. We found the GEMS data to be reliable for the purpose of determining the numbers and percentages of vacant Foreign Service positions at overseas posts. We did not validate whether the total number of authorized overseas Foreign Service positions was appropriate or met State’s needs. We also reviewed State workforce planning documents and budget documents, such as State’s Five Year Workforce and Leadership Succession Plan: Fiscal Years 2016-2020 and Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review. In addition, we reviewed State Office of Inspector General reports as well as our previous reports on human capital challenges at State and effective strategic human capital management across the federal government. In particular, our report High-Risk Series: Progress on Many High-Risk Areas, While Substantial Efforts Needed on Others notes that strategic human capital management is a high-risk issue across the federal government and lists five key elements as a road map for agency efforts to improve and ultimately address such issues. For our third objective, we assessed whether State’s efforts to address vacancies were guided by a corrective action plan that identifies the root causes of persistent Foreign Service vacancies at overseas posts and suggests corrective measures to reduce such vacancies, including steps necessary to implement solutions. We conducted this performance audit from August 2017 to March 2019 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. The “Economic” generalist career track includes positions from the “Science Officer” staffing skill group in the GEMS data. 170 Foreign Service employees were not staffed to one of the six regional bureaus. In addition to the contact named above, Godwin Agbara (Assistant Director), Ian Ferguson (Analyst-in-Charge), Anthony Costulas, Natalia Pena, Debbie Chung, Chris Keblitis, Reid Lowe, Justin Fisher, and Alexander Welsh made key contributions to this report.	[ "State staffs Foreign Service employees to more than 270 embassies and consulates worldwide to advance U.S. foreign policy and economic interests. In 2009 and 2012, GAO identified ongoing Foreign Service staffing gaps. GAO was asked to review State's Foreign Service staffing. This report examines (1) vacancies in State's Foreign Service staffing at overseas posts, (2) reported effects of Foreign Service vacancies on diplomatic readiness, and (3) State's efforts to address Foreign Service vacancies. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed State's Global Employment Management System data as of March 2018. The system includes information on Foreign Service and Civil Service positions, including the total number of authorized Foreign Service positions and whether each position is filled or vacant. GAO also reviewed its relevant prior reports and State workforce planning documents. In addition, GAO interviewed State staff at 10 overseas posts, selected on the basis of large numbers of Foreign Service vacancies and diversity in the types of Foreign Service positions that were vacant at these posts, among other factors. The Department of State's (State) data show persistent Foreign Service vacancies at overseas posts since 2008. According to the data, 13 percent of overseas Foreign Service positions were vacant as of March 2018. This percentage is similar to the percentages GAO reported for 2008 and 2012, when 14 percent of these positions were vacant. In addition, State's data show persistent vacancies at overseas posts in generalist positions that help formulate and implement U.S. foreign policy and in specialist positions that support and maintain the functioning of overseas posts. State's data also show persistent Foreign Service vacancies at overseas posts with State's highest foreign policy priorities and in regions with security risks that could threaten U.S. foreign policy interests. According to staff at overseas posts, Foreign Service vacancies adversely affect State's ability to carry out U.S. foreign policy. Staff at overseas posts told us that vacancies increase workloads, contributing to low morale and higher stress for Foreign Service staff and that vacancies in Political and Economic positions—20 percent and 16 percent, respectively—limit the reporting on political and economic issues that posts are able to provide to State headquarters. Notably, officials also stated that vacancies in specialist positions may heighten security risks at overseas posts and disrupt post operations. For instance, some overseas post staff said that vacancies in Information Management positions had increased the vulnerability of posts' computer networks to potential cybersecurity attacks and other malicious threats. State described various efforts—implemented by multiple offices in the department —to help address overseas Foreign Service vacancies, but these efforts are not guided by an integrated action plan to reduce persistent vacancies. An example of State's efforts is the “Hard-to-Fill” program, which allows Civil Service staff an opportunity to fill a Foreign Service vacancy on a single overseas tour. According to GAO's 2017 High-Risk Series report, an agency should design and implement an action plan—integrated across its relevant offices—that defines the root causes of all skills gaps and suggests corrective measures. However, State has not developed such an action plan for reducing persistent overseas Foreign Service vacancies. Without developing an integrated action plan, overseas Foreign Service vacancies may persist. As a result, State's ability to achieve U.S. foreign policy goals and help ensure secure and efficient operations could be adversely impacted. GAO recommends that State develop an integrated action plan that defines the root causes of persistent Foreign Service vacancies at overseas posts and suggests corrective measures to reduce such vacancies. State concurred with our recommendation and noted that it will take steps to develop an integrated action plan." ]	5,041	gov_report	en	null	f2959e5d7c9617dc799cbdeb28146597113a2c0221903cf3
Oil and petroleum products markets have changed substantially in the years since the establishment of the SPR. Specifically, U.S. domestic crude oil production has generally been increasing, consumption has been relatively stable, and crude oil and petroleum products markets have become increasingly global. Additionally, U.S. crude oil production is projected to rise further in the future, according to EIA and IEA projections, further reversing a decades-long decline. Recent technological improvements have made onshore production from shale formations economically viable, and domestic crude oil production began to rise in about 2008. The combination of increasing production and relatively stable consumption has resulted in declining net crude oil and petroleum products imports, from a high of about 12 million barrels per day in 2005 to fewer than 4 million barrels per day in 2017. Since these trends are expected to continue, the IEA and EIA both project net U.S. crude oil and petroleum products imports will decline to zero sometime in the late 2020s and the United States will become a net exporter shortly thereafter. Since the IEA 90-day reserve obligation is based on a country’s net imports, there is no such obligation for net exporters; therefore, the United States would have no 90-day reserve obligation as long as it is a net exporter, though it would still be obligated to release reserves in response to supply disruptions. Over the longer term, EIA’s projections show U.S. net exports peaking in 2037 and the United States again becoming a net importer between 2040 and 2050. At the time of the Arab oil embargo, price controls in the United States prevented the prices of oil and petroleum products from increasing as much as they otherwise might have, contributing to a physical oil shortage that caused long lines at gasoline stations throughout the United States. In addition, in the 1970s, oil prices were often set in long-term contracts, which meant that prices would not automatically rise in the face of greater scarcity. This generally reduced incentives for producers to expand production and sales as well as for consumers to reduce consumption in the face of greater scarcity caused by a supply disruption. Now that crude oil and petroleum product markets are global, the prices of these commodities are determined in the world market, primarily on the basis of supply and demand. In the absence of long-term contracted prices or price controls, scarcity from a supply disruption is generally expressed in the form of higher prices, as purchasers are free to bid as high as they are willing to pay to secure oil supply. In a global market, a large enough supply disruption anywhere in the world raises prices everywhere. This creates incentives for producers unaffected by the disruption to increase their production and release existing inventories and for consumers everywhere to reduce consumption in the ways they find most efficient and least disruptive. While it can take time for some of these actions to affect crude oil and petroleum product markets—according to DOE officials, it can take approximately 6 months from when a producer drills an oil well until oil production comes on line—all these actions tend to mitigate the effects of supply disruptions. The Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 authorized the creation of the SPR, partly in response to the Arab oil embargo of 1973-1974 that caused a shortfall in the international oil market. The purposes of the SPR are, among other things, to reduce the impact of disruptions in supplies of petroleum products and to carry out obligations of the United States under the international energy program. Specifically, the 1974 International Energy Program Agreement, a joint strategy and treaty, established the IEA to address oil security issues on an international scale. The SPR is owned by the federal government, managed by DOE’s Office of Petroleum Reserves, and maintained by Fluor Federal Petroleum Operations LLC. The SPR stores crude oil in underground salt caverns along the Gulf Coast in Louisiana and Texas. The SPR currently maintains four storage sites—Bayou Choctaw, Big Hill, Bryan Mound, and West Hackberry—with a design capacity of 713.5 million barrels. Under conditions prescribed by the Energy Policy and Conservation Act, as amended, the President has discretion to authorize the release of petroleum products from the SPR to minimize significant supply disruptions. When oil is released from the SPR, it is distributed through commercial pipelines or on waterborne vessels to refineries, where it is converted into gasoline and other petroleum products, and then transported to distribution centers for sale to the public. According to DOE documents, well-functioning infrastructure is fundamental to the SPR’s ability to maintain operational readiness and meet mission requirements. However, most of the critical infrastructure for moving SPR oil has exceeded its serviceable life, which has led to increasing maintenance costs and decreasing system reliability. Specifically, the reserve relies on a complex system of salt caverns, pipelines, wells, and pumps, with other infrastructure and equipment. Any failures, such as ruptured pipelines, could affect the readiness of a site for an oil release. According to DOE officials, a growing backlog of major maintenance needs raises concerns about the ability of the system to operate as designed. In addition, there have been equipment failures that have rendered parts of the system temporarily inoperable. For example, the SPR has experienced at least five major equipment failures since fiscal year 2013, including the Big Hill site pipe failure shown in figure 1. The United States has two regional petroleum product reserves—the Northeast Home Heating Oil Reserve and the Northeast Gasoline Supply Reserve. The Northeast Home Heating Oil Reserve, which is not part of the SPR, holds 1 million barrels of ultra low sulfur distillate, a petroleum product essentially equivalent to diesel fuel but that is also used for heating oil. The Northeast United States is heavily dependent on the use of heating oil in winter months. The distillate is stored in leased commercial tank storage in terminals in Connecticut, Massachusetts, and New Jersey. In 2000, the President directed the creation of the reserve to hold approximately 10 days of inventory, the time required for ships to carry additional heating oil from the Gulf of Mexico to New York Harbor. The Northeast Gasoline Supply Reserve, a part of the SPR, holds 1 million barrels of gasoline for consumers in the northeastern United States. According to DOE’s website, this region is particularly vulnerable to gasoline disruptions as a result of hurricanes and other natural events. For example, Hurricane Sandy caused widespread gasoline shortages in the region in 2012. DOE conducted a test sale of the SPR in 2014 and used a portion of the proceeds from the sale to create the reserve. The gasoline is stored in leased commercial tank storage in terminals in Maine, Massachusetts, and New Jersey. The SPR helps the United States meet its IEA obligation to hold the equivalent of 90 days of net imports of crude oil and petroleum products. In order to meet the IEA 90-day reserve obligation, countries, including the United States, can count existing private reserves of crude oil and petroleum products in addition to public reserves (in the United States, the SPR). In most years, the United States has met its 90-day reserve obligation with a combination of SPR and private reserves. The days of import protection may vary based on actual net U.S. crude oil and petroleum products imports as well as the inventory levels of the SPR and private reserves. As discussed previously, because the IEA 90-day reserve obligation is based on a country’s net imports, there is no such reserve obligation for countries that are net exporters of crude oil and petroleum products. The United States also relies on the SPR to meet its IEA obligation to release reserves in the event of a collective action to respond to a supply disruption. Countries contribute to an IEA collective action based on their share of IEA oil consumption, and they can meet their obligation by whatever measure they choose, including release of public or private reserves, or demand restraint. IEA collective actions are designed to mitigate the negative effects of sudden supply shortages by making additional crude oil and petroleum products available to the global market through a combination of emergency response measures, which include increasing supply and reducing demand. In the event of a global market disruption, IEA member countries can call for a collective action after reaching consensus on whether a response is needed. DOE stated that the collective action IEA obligation is more relevant to the SPR’s mission of protecting the U.S. economy from severe petroleum supply interruptions than the 90-day reserve obligation. The United States has participated in each of the three IEA collective actions. In 1991, with the commencement of Operation Desert Storm, DOE released 17.3 million barrels of SPR crude oil. After Hurricane Katrina in 2005, DOE released 11 million barrels of SPR crude oil. Most recently, in June 2011, in response to crude oil supply disruptions driven by hostilities in Libya, DOE released 30.6 million barrels of crude oil from the SPR. The Libya collective action is an example of how, in practice, member countries participate according to national circumstances. After consultations with IEA member countries, all IEA member countries agreed to the Libya collective action, under which 12 of the 28 members at that time contributed to the action. In addition to the three IEA collective actions, the SPR has been used 10 times in response to U.S. domestic supply disturbances that were not IEA collective actions, most notably in response to severe weather events. In terms of how they meet their IEA obligations, most other IEA members differ from the United States in two basic ways. Specifically, as of December 2017, most IEA members rely at least in part on private rather than public reserves to meet their obligations, and most hold significant proportions of these reserves as petroleum products rather than as crude oil. In December 2017, before Mexico joined the IEA in early 2018, there were 29 member countries. Of these 29 countries, 25 IEA members had two common attributes: (1) as net importers, they had a 90-day reserve obligation and met that obligation, and (2) they had formal processes for holding and releasing these reserves. As of December 2017, 18 of these 25 members relied entirely or in part on private reserves to meet their reserve obligations. Specifically, based on IEA data as of December 2017, these 18 countries met their 90-day reserve obligation through private reserves and either had no public reserves or had public reserves of less than 90 days. According to a 2014 IEA report, some of these countries require industry to hold reserves and, when needed, release them. For example, according to a 2014 IEA report and documentation provided by government officials, the United Kingdom meets its entire obligation by requiring private industry to hold reserves. In contrast, New Zealand had publicly held reserves amounting to 26 days of net imports, according to IEA data as of December 2017. According to a 2014 IEA report, New Zealand relied on industry reserves held for commercial purposes to meet the rest of its 90-day reserve obligation, although New Zealand does not formally require industry to hold reserves specifically for this purpose. Unlike the 18 countries that rely at least in part on private reserves, as of December 2017, the United States and 6 other IEA members met the 90- day reserve obligation exclusively through public reserves. Specifically, according to IEA data on member reserves, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Japan, and the United States held public reserves equal to 90 days or more of net imports. Although the United States currently meets its IEA 90-day reserve obligation solely with public reserves, for most of the SPR’s existence, public reserves were insufficient to meet this obligation, so the United States also had to rely on private reserves. Specifically, according to EIA data, the United States has relied, at least in part, on private reserves together with the SPR to meet the 90-day reserve obligation with the exception of two time periods (1984-1987 and 2012-present), when the United States has relied solely on the SPR. The United States does not require industry to hold reserves for the purposes of meeting IEA obligations. Figure 2 compares the United States’ reserves in days of net imports to the IEA’s 90-day reserve obligation. According to a 2014 IEA report, most IEA members hold at least a third of their reserves as petroleum products, such as gasoline and diesel fuel, rather than as crude oil. Holding petroleum products can be advantageous during certain disruptions because such reserves can be directly distributed to consumers, whereas crude oil must first be refined and turned into products, adding response time. According to the IEA’s 2014 report, Germany’s stockholding agency holds 55 percent of its reserve as petroleum products. Similarly, France holds only petroleum products that are distributed geographically across the country so that the reserves can be used quickly in the event of a supply disruption. In contrast, more than 99 percent of the SPR (665.5 million barrels as of March 2018) is held as crude oil, all of which is stored at the four storage sites in Louisiana and Texas. The exception is the Northeast Gasoline Supply Reserve, which, as mentioned previously, is a 1 million barrel gasoline reserve in terminals in Maine, Massachusetts, and New Jersey that was established in 2014 after Hurricane Sandy and that is considered part of the SPR. According to DOE officials, there are several reasons the SPR holds predominantly crude oil, including that it is more costly to store petroleum products than crude oil and that the United States has the largest refining capacity of any IEA member country. Because of the large U.S. refining sector, crude oil from the SPR can be domestically refined into petroleum products to meet demand. Some IEA member countries store some of their reserves abroad, though the United States does not. According to a 2014 IEA report, some IEA member countries allow part of their reserves to be stored abroad to leverage spare storage capacity or more cost-effective storage by utilizing available storage space or excess private reserves in other countries. For example, approximately 30 percent of Ireland’s reserves are held in other European Union countries. In some of these cases, countries use short-term contracts, also known as tickets, instead of directly acquiring and storing oil and petroleum products. For example, according to documents provided by government officials, since 1995 the United Kingdom has increased its reserves held under ticket agreements outside of the country from around 10 percent of its total reserves to more than 25 percent. In addition, unlike the United States, some IEA countries specify the size of their public or private reserves in terms of net imports or consumption, rather than a specific volume. In the United States, the total volume of crude oil and petroleum products held in the SPR is the result of amounts historically purchased to fill the reserve and subsequent sales as mandated by Congress or released in response to a supply disruption. According to DOE, it cannot otherwise reduce or increase volumes held in reserve without congressional action—either through requirements to purchase additional oil or laws authorizing or mandating sales. On the other hand, some IEA countries have tied their reserves’ volumes of crude oil and petroleum products to a metric such as days of net imports or a percent of consumption. For example, according to documentation provided by government officials, in 2015 Japan changed how it specifies its target reserves from a specified amount to days of net imports. In specifying the size of reserves in this way, the amount held is adjusted as market conditions change—for example, if net imports change and require more or fewer reserves to meet the IEA 90-day reserve obligation, or when other underlying factors affecting a nation’s energy security needs change. While DOE has examined a range of sizes for the SPR, it has not identified the optimal size for the SPR to meet U.S. energy security needs and IEA obligations, and DOE’s analysis of SPR sizes was limited in three ways. DOE also has not identified whether additional regional petroleum product reserves should be part of the SPR in U.S. regions identified as vulnerable to fuel supply disruptions. DOE has not identified the optimal size for the SPR and though the agency examined a range of SPR sizes, its analysis was limited in at least three ways. In response to direction from Congress and recommendations from GAO and the DOE Inspector General, DOE developed and published a long-term strategic review of the SPR in August 2016. In DOE’s 2016 review, the agency examined the expected economic benefits of SPR sizes ranging from 430 million to 695 million barrels of oil over a 25-year time horizon (2016 through 2040), but it did not recommend an optimal size for the reserve. DOE’s review did not identify the optimal size for the SPR because of three limitations: DOE did not fully evaluate implications of market fluctuations and estimate needs. DOE did not fully evaluate the implications of falling net imports of crude oil and petroleum products with respect to meeting IEA obligations to hold the equivalent of 90 days of net imports and to respond to collective actions. As mentioned previously, the United States is expected to become a net exporter of crude oil and petroleum products by the late 2020s. Since the IEA 90-day reserve obligation is based on a country’s net imports, this means that at that point the United States would not have a 90-day reserve obligation. However, even as a net exporter, the United States would still have to meet the IEA obligation to respond to a collective action. Yet, DOE’s analysis did not evaluate the SPR’s configuration as it relates to projected fluctuations in net imports or estimate the minimal amount of reserves needed to meet potential future collective actions. Without considering projected fluctuations in net imports or providing an analysis of how much oil is estimated to be needed to meet IEA collective actions, DOE cannot fully advise Congress on the optimal size of the SPR. DOE did not consider private-sector response. DOE’s analyses in its 2016 review focused on the publicly held reserves in the SPR as the only means to respond to oil supply disruptions and did not consider a response from the private sector or through consumers reducing demand. According to DOE’s 2016 review, the underlying analysis for the benefits of the SPR did not consider a response from the private sector for three reasons: (1) while U.S. commercial stocks could conceivably address part of a supply disruption, private industry could also hold oil inventories in a crisis instead of releasing them; (2) unlike most other IEA member countries, the United States does not require private-sector response; and (3) research on the exact nature of private-sector response during a disruption is needed. DOE officials told us the agency has not studied the extent to which SPR releases of crude oil displace what would otherwise have been private releases of inventories. As we reported in September 2014, changing market conditions— most importantly the significant increase in domestic production of oil—have implications for the SPR’s size because increased production has led to increasing private reserves. According to IEA data as of December 2017, U.S. private reserves held the equivalent of 194 days of net import protection coverage, up from about 59 days in 2006. Further, private reserves in the United States consist of both crude oil and petroleum products with more than half in the latter category. For example, as of January 2018, total private reserves of crude oil and petroleum products were about 1.215 billion barrels, of which about 420 million barrels were in the form of crude oil and 795 million barrels were petroleum products, according to the EIA. As of 2013, these private reserves were distributed across the entire country in more than 1,400 terminals, according to the EIA. As we reported in December 2007, international trade in oil and petroleum products has expanded significantly over the past 2 decades, making markets for gasoline and other petroleum products increasingly global in nature. In such a global oil market, higher levels of private reserves can benefit the United States and the rest of the world by helping mitigate a supply disruption. Most experts and stakeholders we interviewed generally agreed that the private sector is in a better position to respond to supply disruptions than they were when the SPR was created. With regard to demand response, DOE officials told us they do not consider this because there is no mechanism to require industry to respond to supply disruptions or consumers to reduce demand in response to a supply disruption. However, DOE has not studied how voluntary response to changes in petroleum product prices affects the need for or efficacy of strategic releases. Without conducting an analysis of how private parties respond to supply disruptions, DOE cannot advise Congress on the optimal size of the SPR because it cannot know how effective such private responses could be in mitigating supply disruptions. DOE did not fully examine costs of differently sized reserves. DOE’s review of the expected economic benefits of differently sized reserves did not fully examine the corresponding costs of those sizes. According to DOE officials, there was no requirement or need to conduct a formal cost benefit analysis of the SPR because the SPR’s oil acquisition and initial capital costs to create the reserve are sunk costs and the ongoing operational costs to maintain the reserve are minimal in comparison. However, this does not take into account the opportunity cost to the government that holding reserves represents; as Congress has mandated several times recently, crude oil from the reserve can be sold to fund other federal priorities. Without additional analysis, such as of the costs and benefits of SPR’s size, DOE cannot fully advise Congress on the optimal size of the SPR. When we reviewed the SPR in 2006 and 2014, we found that DOE had not periodically re-examined the strategic reserves. In 2006, we recommended that the Secretary of Energy reexamine the appropriate size of the SPR. In its response to our recommendation, DOE stated that its reexamination had taken the form of more “actionable items,” including not requesting expansion funding in its 2011 budget and canceling and redirecting the prior year’s expansion funding to general operations of the SPR, based on the Administration’s decision that the SPR’s current size at the time was adequate. Similarly, as previously mentioned, in 2014 we found that changing market conditions have implications for the size, location, and composition of the SPR, but DOE had not reexamined the SPR’s size since 2005. Accordingly, we recommended that the Secretary of Energy undertake a comprehensive reexamination of the appropriate size of the SPR. In response to our recommendation, the 2014 DOE Inspector General recommendation mentioned previously, and the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015, DOE published its 2016 review. As previously mentioned and reported, crude oil and petroleum markets are constantly changing, but DOE conducted its full evaluations of the SPR more than a decade apart. According to DOE officials, there is no formal policy to periodically reevaluate the SPR. We previously found that federal programs should be reexamined if there have been significant changes in the country or the world that relate to the reason for initiating the program. In that report, we found that many federal programs and policies were designed decades ago to respond to trends and challenges that existed at the time of their creation. Moreover, the Office of Management and Budget Circular A-94 for benefit-cost analysis of federal programs includes guidelines that apply to any analysis used to support government decisions to initiate, renew, or expand programs or projects that would result in a series of measurable benefits or costs extending for 3 or more years into the future. Given changing market conditions and future projections, without conducting additional analysis to supplement its 2016 review and thereafter periodically reexamining the SPR to take into account changes in market conditions and include a thorough consideration of the costs and benefits of a wide range of SPR sizes, DOE cannot provide information to Congress to inform decisions about the appropriate size of the SPR and risks holding too much or too little in the SPR to meet the United States’ evolving energy security needs and IEA obligations. DOE has also not fully identified whether additional regional petroleum product reserves should be part of the SPR. Because the SPR stores oil nearly exclusively along the Gulf Coast, the SPR is configured primarily to respond to global oil supply disruptions. However, as we reported in November 2017, the SPR has primarily been used in response to domestic disruptions. The SPR is limited in its ability to respond to domestic disruptions because reserves are almost entirely composed of crude oil and not refined petroleum products, which may not be effective in responding to disruptions that affect the refining sector. For example, as we reported in November 2017, Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria damaged infrastructure and property, caused the loss of life, and disrupted the operations of refineries representing at least 15 percent of the nation’s refining capacity. DOE has identified regions subject to product supply vulnerabilities as shown in Figure 3. The Quadrennial Energy Review of 2015 recommended that the agency analyze the need for additional or expanded regional product reserves by undertaking updated cost-benefit analyses for all of the regions of the United States that have been identified as vulnerable to fuel supply disruptions. In response to this recommendation, DOE studied the costs and benefits of regional petroleum product reserves in the West Coast and Southeast Coast. According to DOE officials, weather events in the Southeast Coast are of higher probability but lower consequence, and events in the West Coast are of lower probability but higher consequence. DOE did not finalize its 2015 studies on regional petroleum product reserves and make them publicly available. However, the draft 2015 studies concluded that a product reserve in the Southeast would provide significant net economic benefits to the region and the United States, particularly in the event of a major hurricane, while further analyses are needed to determine the potential benefits of a reserve on the West Coast. A prior DOE study also suggests that petroleum product reserves merit consideration—in 2011, DOE carried out a cost-benefit study of the establishment of a refined product reserve in the Southeast and estimated that such a reserve would reduce the average gasoline price rise by 50 percent to 70 percent in the weeks immediately after a hurricane landfall, resulting in consumer cost savings, according to the Quadrennial Energy Review of 2015. According to DOE officials, the agency has no plans to conduct additional studies. DOE’s 2016 review of the SPR did not fully assess whether there is a need for additional regional product reserves in other U.S. regions identified as vulnerable to fuel supply disruptions, as recommended by DOE’s studies and the 2015 Quadrennial Energy Review. Without completing studies on the costs and benefits of regional petroleum product reserves for all the vulnerable U.S. regions and publicly releasing the results, DOE cannot ensure that it and Congress have the information they need to make decisions about whether additional regional product reserves are needed. DOE has taken steps to take into account the effects of congressionally mandated oil sales in its plans for modernizing the SPR, though DOE’s current plans are based on information largely developed prior to the most recent congressionally mandated oil sales. According to DOE, the SPR modernization program is focused on a life extension project to modernize aging infrastructure to ensure the SPR will be able to meet its mission requirements for the next several decades. The project’s scope of work has undergone several revisions since its inception in response to changing conditions and requirements, according to the agency. DOE has estimated the total cost for the SPR’s modernization at up to $1.4 billion. DOE raised about $323 million for modernization through the sale of SPR oil in fiscal year 2017, and the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2018 provided that DOE is to draw down and sell an amount of crude oil not to exceed $350 million for modernization in fiscal year 2018. As of the end of February 2018, DOE has spent $22 million on modernization efforts and the additional funds will allow DOE to continue moving forward with the project, according to agency officials. According to DOE’s modernization plans, the first major construction is scheduled for fiscal year 2019. However, these plans are largely based on information DOE analyzed before recent congressionally mandated sales of an additional 117 million barrels of oil. Since the most recent mandated sales, DOE has taken steps to update its modernization plans and has changed its assumptions for SPR’s modernization. For example, DOE now assumes that the reserve will hold about 405 million barrels of oil and that one of the four SPR sites may close after congressionally mandated sales are completed at the end of fiscal year 2027, according to agency officials. However, DOE has not fully updated the SPR’s modernization plans based on these assumptions. According to DOE officials, in March 2018, DOE commenced a study—the SPR post-sale configuration study—to examine potential future reserve configurations. This study is to take into account the effects of congressionally mandated sales on the reserve and its modernization, and is targeted for completion in October 2018, according to agency officials. Information from the study will inform DOE’s updates to the SPR’s modernization plans, according to DOE officials. As part of its post-sale configuration study, DOE plans to examine how the agency may handle the potentially excess SPR facilities created by the mandated sales. In January 2017, the SPR had a design capacity to hold 713.5 million barrels of oil and actually held 695 million barrels. As shown in figure 4, without action by DOE to reduce the SPR’s design capacity or otherwise use SPR facilities, congressionally mandated sales will cause excess storage capacity to grow to 308 million barrels or more by the end of fiscal year 2027—meaning that about 43 percent of the SPR’s total design capacity to store oil would be unused. DOE plans to explore some options to use these potentially excess SPR assets in its ongoing post-sale configuration study. In withdrawing oil to meet congressionally mandated oil sales currently in place (290 million barrels through fiscal year 2027), DOE could close at least one SPR site based on our analysis of projected excess storage capacity. For example, if DOE were to close the smallest SPR site, Bayou Choctaw, the agency could also explore selling the connected pipeline and marine terminal, which are currently being leased to a private company. DOE could also consider leasing excess storage capacity to other countries so that they could store oil at the SPR. DOE has not entered into any such leases with other countries and has not considered such leases because, according to DOE, the SPR has historically lacked capacity to store additional oil. DOE has not proposed any of these options or explored the revenue the agency could generate by selling or leasing these assets. According to DOE officials, the agency will examine the feasibility of such options in the ongoing SPR post-sale configuration study. As DOE takes steps to plan for the SPR’s modernization, ongoing uncertainty regarding the SPR’s long-term size and configuration have complicated DOE’s efforts. According to DOE officials, this uncertainty makes it extremely difficult to effectively perform any mid-to long-range planning efforts for the SPR’s modernization project, including the execution of major maintenance projects. Congress has generally set the SPR’s size by mandating purchases or sales of oil, and has established and amended the minimum size of the SPR as it pertains to the release of oil for emergency protection. Since 2015, Congress has, across six pieces of legislation, mandated 290 million barrels in additional oil sales. However, DOE developed its modernization plans in 2016. DOE officials told us they do not know whether additional sales will be mandated over the next 10 years or whether other changes may be required to the configuration of the reserve. Any additional congressionally mandated sales or direction to pursue additional petroleum product reserves would require DOE to again revisit its modernization plans and assessments of the potential uses of any excess SPR assets. Oil market projections also have implications for the future of the SPR. Under current projections, the United States may fluctuate between being a net importer and net exporter over the next several decades. Specifically, the United States is projected to become a net exporter by the late 2020s and would then no longer have a 90-day reserve obligation, but it is projected to return to being a net importer between 2040 and 2050. These projected fluctuations could affect the desired size of the SPR in the future. This uncertainty creates risks for DOE’s modernization plans, as DOE may end up spending funds on facilities that later turn out to be unnecessary should Congress ultimately decide on a larger- or smaller-sized SPR than DOE anticipates. Having a long-term target for the size and configuration of reserves helps other IEA member countries manage their reserves. For example, as previously discussed, unlike the United States, some other IEA members have specified in dynamic terms the amount of reserves to be held, such as days of net import protection or days of consumption, rather than specifying a specific static volume amount. Under such approaches, the amount held varies over time as entities managing the reserve acquire or sell reserves in order to meet the target. Setting a long-term target for the size and configuration of the SPR—taking into account projections for oil production, consumption, and IEA obligations—could better position DOE to ensure that funds spent on the SPR’s modernization do not modernize a system that is no longer needed and that DOE is able to adequately plan for potentially excess SPR assets. In the course of our work, we also identified other options for handling potentially excess SPR assets that DOE is not planning on examining, largely because DOE does not currently have the authority to pursue them, according to agency officials. First, DOE could explore leasing storage capacity to private industry. U.S. oil production has generally increased over the last decade. As a result, the private sector may want to lease excess SPR capacity, which may be cheaper than above-ground storage, according to a representative of a private company we spoke with. Fees for doing so could help defray public reserve storage costs. However, officials told us that the Energy Policy and Conservation Act gives DOE authority to lease underutilized storage to other countries, but not to the private sector. Second, if Congress determines that the SPR holds oil in excess of that needed domestically, DOE could explore selling contracts or tickets for the excess oil rather than selling the oil outright. Australian and New Zealand officials told us that if DOE were to sell tickets for SPR oil, tickets would help these countries meet their IEA 90- day reserve obligations. Australian officials told us they have discussed this option with DOE. Currently the United States and Australia have agreed, through an arrangement, to allow Australia to contract for petroleum stocks located in the United States and controlled by commercial entities. According to DOE officials, the arrangement would permit Australia to receive credit from the IEA for tickets it purchases from the U.S. private sector. While the arrangement does not cover government-owned oil in the SPR, if it did, based on our analysis, DOE could generate up to approximately $15 million annually if Australia purchased the maximum allowable amount of oil specified in an arrangement through tickets for excess SPR oil. However, although the Energy Policy and Conservation Act allows DOE to lease underutilized storage to other countries, DOE lacks the authority to sell tickets and does not plan to seek this authority, according to DOE officials. DOE officials told us that they do not plan to examine these options. According to DOE’s real property asset management order, the agency is to identify real property assets that are no longer needed to meet the program’s mission needs and that may be candidates for reuse or disposal. Once identified, the agency is to undertake certain actions, including determining whether to dispose of these assets by sale or lease. As part of its SPR post-sale configuration study, DOE plans to determine whether it is appropriate to close SPR facilities, and the relative benefit of any closures would be informed by potential lease revenues from maintaining sites so they could be leased, according to officials. However, without examining a full range of options in the post-sale configuration study, DOE risks missing beneficial ways to modernize the SPR while saving taxpayer resources. Given changing crude oil and petroleum product market conditions and the constrained budget environment, it is important that DOE ensures the SPR is effective at meeting U.S. energy security needs and IEA obligations while being managed and maintained in an efficient manner. In response to congressional direction and recommendations from GAO and DOE Inspector General, DOE conducted a long-term strategic review of the SPR in 2016 after its last comprehensive examination in 2005. In its review, DOE did not determine an optimal size for the SPR, and its analysis was limited in several ways. In particular, DOE did not fully consider recent and expected future changes in crude oil and petroleum market conditions such as the implications of projected fluctuations in U.S. net imports or the role that increased levels of private reserves could play in responding to supply disruptions. DOE also did not perform a full cost-benefit analysis of holding different volumes of reserves. Without supplementing its 2016 strategic review by conducting additional analysis, and periodically conducting such analyses going forward, DOE cannot provide information to Congress to inform decisions about the appropriate amounts of crude oil and petroleum products to hold in the SPR and risks holding too much or too little in the SPR to meet the United States’ energy security needs and international obligations. Such information is needed on a timely basis, to reflect the pace of change in oil and petroleum markets and other relevant factors that affect the optimal size of the SPR. Though the SPR has primarily been used in response to domestic supply disruptions, such as hurricanes, the reserve is limited in this role because it is almost entirely composed of crude oil, and not petroleum products. In this regard, the Quadrennial Energy Review of 2015 recommended that DOE analyze the need for additional regional product reserves for U.S. regions that have been identified as vulnerable to fuel supply disruptions. DOE has not identified whether additional regional product reserves should be part of the SPR or completed studies of all vulnerable U.S. regions, and it has no plans to do so, according to DOE officials. Without conducting or completing studies for all the vulnerable U.S. regions and releasing the results, DOE cannot ensure it and Congress have the information they need to make decisions about potential additional regional product reserves. In the face of declining net U.S. imports, Congress has taken repeated steps to reduce the size of the reserve. Given that net imports are projected to continue to decline through the late 2020s and fluctuate in the future, there may be additional congressionally mandated SPR oil sales. This has created long-term uncertainty regarding the future size and configuration of the SPR. Congress could address this uncertainty by identifying a long-term target for the size of the SPR—either by volume or in terms tied to factors, such as consumption or net import protection, that affect the country’s energy security needs and IEA obligations. Setting such a long-term target could better position DOE to ensure the efficiency and efficacy of federal funds spent on the reserve. DOE has recently begun to study the potential effects of congressionally mandated sales on its modernization plans. As part of its SPR post-sale configuration study, DOE plans to determine whether it is appropriate to close SPR facilities, and the relative benefit of any closures would be informed by potential lease revenues from maintaining sites so they could be leased, according to officials. However, we identified other options for handling potentially excess SPR assets that DOE is not planning to examine in its study, inconsistent with the agency’s order on real property asset management. Although DOE does not currently have the authority to implement these options, according to officials, examining their potential use, including possible revenue enhancement, could inform Congress as it examines whether it should grant such authority. Without examining a full range of options in the post-sale configuration study for handling potentially excess SPR assets, DOE risks missing beneficial ways to modernize the SPR while saving taxpayer resources. We are making the following matter for congressional consideration: Congress may wish to consider setting a long-range target for the size and configuration of the SPR that takes into account projections for future oil production, oil consumption, the efficacy of the existing SPR to respond to domestic supply disruptions, and U.S. IEA obligations. (Matter 1) We are making four recommendations to DOE: The Secretary of Energy should supplement the agency’s 2016 long-term strategic review by conducting an additional analysis that takes into account private-sector response, oil market projections, and costs and benefits of a wide range of different SPR sizes. (Recommendation 1) The Secretary of Energy should take actions to ensure that the agency periodically conducts and provides to Congress a strategic review of the SPR that, among other things, takes into account changes in crude oil and petroleum product market conditions and contains additional analysis, such as the costs and benefits of a wide range of different SPR sizes. (Recommendation 2) The Secretary of Energy should conduct or complete studies on the costs and benefits of regional petroleum product reserves for all U.S. regions that have been identified as vulnerable to fuel supply disruptions, and the Secretary should report the results to Congress. (Recommendation 3) The Secretary of Energy, in completing DOE’s ongoing study on the effects of congressionally mandated sales, should consider a full range of options for handling potentially excess assets and, if needed, request congressional authority for the disposition of these assets. (Recommendation 4) We provided a draft of this report to DOE for review and comment. DOE provided written comments, which are reproduced in appendix I. Of the four recommendations, DOE agreed with two, partially agreed with one, and disagreed with one. Regarding our recommendation that DOE supplement its 2016 long- term strategic review with an additional analysis that takes into account private sector response, oil market projections, and costs and benefits of a wide range of different SPR sizes, the agency partially agreed with the recommendation. DOE agreed to conduct an additional analysis to assess the purpose, goals, and objectives of the SPR, taking into account private sector response, oil market projections, and any other relevant factors, that will lead to an evaluation of possible optimal sizes of the SPR in the future. In response to taking into account the costs and benefits of a wide range of different SPR sizes, DOE stated that the agency determined the projected benefits of a wide range of different SPR sizes ranging from 430 million barrels of oil to 695 million barrels of oil in its 2016 review. However, the minimum SPR size considered by DOE is greater than the projected SPR size after congressionally mandated sales have occurred. Further, the SPR size after congressionally mandated sales is projected to be far in excess of the IEA obligation to hold a minimum of 90 days of net imports. DOE must also consider the minimum size needed to meet its IEA obligations in the event of a collective action. In conducting additional analysis, DOE should consider a smaller lower bound, in line with congressionally mandated sales, for the size of the SPR, and more fully consider the size needed to meet the IEA 90-day net import and collective action obligations. Regarding our recommendation that DOE conduct periodic reviews of the SPR, the agency agreed with the recommendation. DOE stated that a 5-year time interval between reviews would strike an appropriate balance between the need to periodically conduct a strategic assessment and evaluation of the SPR and the limitations on resources to plan and conduct such a review. Regarding our recommendation that DOE conduct or complete studies on the costs and benefits of regional petroleum product reserves, the agency disagreed. DOE stated that it is the agency's position that government owned and operated regional petroleum product reserves are an inefficient and expensive solution to respond to regional fuel supply disruptions. DOE further stated, based on studies done in 2015 that DOE officials told us were pre-decisional and therefore could not be reported, that there are additional concerns associated with government-owned and operated regional refined petroleum product reserves, including little to no storage capacity for lease in commercial terminals and high costs for government owned and operated regional product reserves. However, these same studies took these concerns into account, and concluded that a product reserve in the Southeast would provide significant net economic benefits (benefits minus costs) to the region and the United States in the event of a major hurricane. These studies also concluded that additional analyses are required to inform decisions regarding the potential benefits of a similar reserve on the West Coast. Further, the Quadrennial Energy Review of 2015 recommended that similar analyses be completed for other areas deemed by DOE to be vulnerable to fuel supply disruptions. Therefore, we continue to believe that conducting these analyses, as recommended in the Quadrennial Energy Review of 2015, will provide Congress with information needed to make decisions about regional product reserves. Regarding our recommendation that DOE consider a full range of options for handling potentially excess assets, DOE agreed with the recommendation. DOE stated that in its ongoing study, the agency will include an assessment of disposition options for any potential excess or underutilized SPR assets, to include the need for new legislative authority, as necessary, for the disposition of assets. DOE expects this study to be completed in October 2018. DOE also provided technical comments, which we incorporated, as appropriate. As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of Energy, and other interested parties. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-3841 or ruscof@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix II. In addition to the individual named above, Quindi Franco (Assistant Director), Nkenge Gibson (Analyst-in-Charge), Philip Farah, Ellen Fried, Cindy Gilbert, Greg Marchand, Celia Mendive, Patricia Moye, Camille Pease, Oliver Richard, Dan Royer, Rachel Stoiko, and Marie Suding made key contributions to this report.	[ "More than 4 decades ago, Congress authorized the creation of the SPR to reduce the impact of disruptions in supplies of petroleum products. DOE manages the SPR. As a member of the International Energy Agency, the United States is obligated to maintain reserves equivalent to at least 90 days of the previous year's net imports (imports minus exports). The SPR's storage and related infrastructure is aging, and DOE has plans to modernize these facilities. Since 2015, Congress has mandated crude oil sales. As of March 2018, the SPR held about 665 million barrels of crude oil. GAO was asked to examine the SPR's ability to meet U.S. energy security needs. This report examines, among other things, the extent to which (1) DOE has identified the optimal size of the SPR, and (2) DOE's plans for modernizing the SPR take into account the effects of congressionally mandated crude oil sales. GAO reviewed DOE's plans and studies, and interviewed agency officials and nine experts selected based on prior work, referrals, and a literature review. The Department of Energy (DOE) has not identified the optimal size of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR). In 2016, DOE completed a long-term strategic review of the SPR after its last comprehensive examination conducted in 2005. The 2016 review examined the benefits of several SPR sizes, but it did not identify an optimal size and its review was limited in several ways. In particular, DOE did not fully consider recent and expected future changes in market conditions, such as the implications of falling net imports, or the role that increased levels of private reserves (reserves held by private companies for their own purposes) may play in responding to supply disruptions. These changes have contributed to SPR and private reserves reaching historically high levels on a net imports basis (see figure). These changes are expected to continue to evolve—according to government projections, the United States will become a net exporter in the late 2020s before again becoming a net importer between 2040 and 2050. GAO has found that agencies should reexamine their programs if conditions change. Without addressing the limitations of its 2016 review and periodically performing reexaminations in the future, DOE cannot be assured that the SPR will be sized appropriately into the future. DOE has taken steps to take into account congressionally mandated sales of SPR crude oil in its $1.4 billion modernization plans for SPR's infrastructure and facilities. The SPR is projected to hold 405 million barrels of oil by the end of fiscal year 2027. However, DOE's current plans are based on information analyzed prior to recently mandated sales. According to DOE officials, the agency began a study in March 2018 to assess the effects of these sales on the SPR's modernization. However, this study is not examining all options for handling any excess SPR assets that may be created by currently mandated sales or any additional sales that may be mandated in the future, inconsistent with an agency order on real property asset management that calls for identifying excess assets. For example, DOE does not plan to examine the potential to lease unused SPR storage capacity to the private sector because DOE is not currently authorized to enter into such leases, according to agency officials. If authorized, leasing capacity could generate revenues that could help offset the costs of modernization. By not examining a full range of options, DOE risks missing beneficial ways to modernize the SPR while saving taxpayer resources. GAO is making four recommendations, including that DOE (1) supplement the 2016 review by conducting an additional analysis, (2) ensure that the agency periodically reexamines the size of the SPR, and (3) consider a full range of options for handling potentially excess assets as it conducts its study, among other things. DOE agreed with two, partially agreed with one, and disagreed with another recommendation on refined product reserve studies. GAO maintains that the recommendations are valid." ]	7,913	gov_report	en	null	7cf40ec70a9bf0a46b6c1afe757c32949ad664e11b409d4c
For over a decade, each of VA’s 170 medical centers used VHA’s legacy MSPV program to order medical supplies, such as bandages and scalpels. Many of those items were purchased using the Federal Supply Schedules, which provided medical centers with a great deal of flexibility. However, as we reported in 2016, this legacy program prevented VHA from standardizing items used across its medical centers and affected its ability to leverage its buying power to achieve greater cost avoidance. Standardization is a process of narrowing the range of items purchased to meet a given need, such as buying 10 varieties of bandages instead of 100, in order to improve buying power, simplify supply chain management, and provide clinical consistency. In part because of the legacy MSPV program’s limited standardization, VHA decided to transition to a new iteration, called MSPV-NG. The transition to MSPV-NG has been a major effort, involving the MSPV- NG program office, stakeholders from the VHA’s Procurement and Logistics Office and VA’s Strategic Acquisition Center (SAC)—a VA-wide contracting organization—and logistics and clinical personnel at every medical center. The program also includes hundreds of new contracts with individual supply vendors and a new set of prime vendor contracts to distribute the supplies. VA’s goals for the MSPV-NG program include (1) standardizing requirements for supply items for greater clinical consistency; (2) demonstrating cost avoidance by leveraging VA’s substantial buying power when making competitive awards; (3) achieving greater efficiency in ordering and supply chain management, including a metric of ordering 40 percent of medical centers’ supplies from the MSPV-NG formulary; and (4) involving clinicians in requirements development to ensure uniform clinical review of medical supplies. VHA launched the MSPV-NG program in December 2016, but allowed a 4-month transition period. After April 2017, medical centers could no longer use the legacy program. MSPV-NG now restricts ordering to a narrow formulary. VHA policy requires medical centers to use MSPV- NG—as opposed to other means such as open market purchase card transactions—when purchasing items that are available in the formulary. Leading hospital networks we spoke with have similar goals to VA in managing their supply chains, including clinical standardization and reduced costs. These hospital networks reported they analyze their spending to identify items purchased most frequently, and which ones would be the best candidates to standardize first to yield cost savings. The hospitals’ supply chain managers reported establishing consensus with clinicians through early and frequent collaboration, understanding that clinician involvement is critical to the success of any effort to standardize their medical supply chain. By following these practices, these hospital networks have reported they have achieved significant cost savings in some cases, and the potential for improved patient care, while maintaining buy-in from their clinicians. VHA’s implementation of the MSPV-NG program—from its initial work to identify a list of supply requirements in early 2015, through its roll-out of the formulary to medical centers in December 2016—was not executed in line with leading practices. Specifically, VHA lacked a documented program strategy, leadership stability, and workforce capacity for the transition that, if in place, could have facilitated buy-in for the change throughout the organization. Further, the initial requirements development process and tight time frames contributed to ineffective contracting processes. As a result, VHA developed an initial formulary that did not meet the needs of the medical centers and has yet to achieve utilization and cost avoidance goals. VA made some changes in the second phase of requirements development to address deficiencies identified in the initial roll out. Key among these was to increase the level of clinical involvement, that is, to obtain input from the doctors and nurses at VA’s individual medical facilities. Despite changes aimed at improving implementation, the agency continues to face challenges that prevent the program from fully achieving its goals. VA did not document a clear overall strategy for the MSPV-NG program at the start and has not done so to date. About 6 months after our initial requests for a strategy or plan, a VHA official provided us with an October 2015 plan focusing on the mechanics of establishing the MSPV-NG formulary. However, this plan was used only within the VHA Procurement and Logistics Office and had not been approved by VHA or VA leadership. Leading practices for organizational transformation state that agencies must have well-documented plans and strategies for major initiatives (such as MSPV-NG) and communicate them clearly and consistently to all involved—which included VHA headquarters, the SAC, and all 170 medical centers. Without such a strategy, VA could not reasonably ensure that all stakeholders understood VHA’s approach for MSPV-NG and worked together in a coordinated manner to achieve program goals. In our November 2017 report, we recommended that the Director of the MSPV-NG program office should, with input from SAC, develop, document, and communicate to stakeholders an overarching strategy for the program, including how the program office will prioritize categories of supplies for future phases of requirement development and contracting. VA agreed with this recommendation and reported it would have a strategy in place by December 2017. Leadership instability and workforce challenges also made it difficult for VA to execute its transition to MSPV-NG. Our work has shown that leadership buy-in is necessary to ensure that major programs like MSPV- NG have the resources and support they need to execute their missions. Due to a combination of budget and hiring constraints, and lack of prioritization within VA, the MSPV-NG program office has never been fully staffed and has experienced instability in its leadership. As of January 2017, 24 of the office’s 40 positions were filled, and program office officials stated that this lack of staff affected their ability to implement certain aspects of the program within the planned time frames. In addition, since the inception of MSPV-NG, the program office has had four directors, two of whom were acting and two of whom were fulfilling the director position while performing other collateral duties. For instance, one of the acting MSPV-NG program office directors was on detail from a regional health network to fulfill the position, but had to abruptly leave and return to her prior position due to a federal hiring freeze. In our November 2017 report, we recommended that VHA prioritize the hiring of a MSPV- NG program director on a permanent basis. VA agreed with this recommendation and indicated a vacancy announcement will be posted by the end of 2017. The MSPV-NG program office initially developed requirements for items to be included in the formulary based almost exclusively on prior supply purchases, with limited clinician involvement. The program office concluded in its October 2015 formulary plan that relying on data from previous clinician purchases would be a good representation of medical centers’ needs and that clinician input would not be required for identifying which items to include in the initial formulary. Further, rather than standardizing purchases of specific categories of supplies—such as bandages or scalpels—program officials told us they identified medical and surgical items on which VA had spent $16,000 or more annually and ordered at least 12 times per year, and made those items the basis for the formulary. Officials said this analysis initially yielded a list of about 18,000 items, which the program office further refined to about 6,000 items by removing duplicate items or those that were not considered consumable commodities, such as medical equipment. This approach to requirements development stood in sharp contrast to those of the leading hospital networks we met with, which rely heavily on clinician input to help drive the standardization process and focus on individual categories of supplies that provide the best opportunities for cost savings. Based on the requirements developed by the program office, SAC began to issue competitive solicitations for the 6,000 items on the initial formulary in June 2015. Medical supply companies had responded to about 30 percent of the solicitations as of January 2016. As a result, according to SAC officials, they conducted outreach and some of these companies responded that VHA’s requirements did not appear to be based on clinical input and instead consisted of manufacturer-specific requirements that favored particular products instead of broader descriptions. Furthermore, SAC did not solicit large groups of related items, but rather issued separate solicitations for small groups of supply items—consisting of three or fewer items. This is contrary to industry practices of soliciting large groups of related supplies together. Therefore, according to SAC officials, some medical supply companies told them that submitting responses to SAC’s solicitations required more time and resources than they were willing to commit. By its April 2016 deadline for having 6,000 items on the formulary, SAC had been working on the effort for over a year and had established competitive agreements for about 200 items, representing about 3 percent of the planned items. Without contracts for the items on the formulary in place, VA delayed the launch of the MSPV-NG program until December 2016 and SAC began establishing non-competitive agreements in the last few months before the launch of MSPV-NG. As shown in figure 1, these non-competitive agreements accounted for approximately 79 percent of the items on the January 2017 version of the formulary. While this approach enabled the MSPV-NG program office to establish the formulary more quickly, it did so at the expense of one of the primary goals of the MSPV-NG program—leveraging VA’s buying power to obtain cost avoidance through competition. Once VA’s MSPV-NG initial formulary was established in December 2016, each medical center was charged with implementing it. According to logistics officials we spoke with at selected medical centers, they had varying levels of success due, in part, to incomplete guidance from the program office. Without clear guidance, many medical centers reported they were unable to find direct matches or substitutes on the MSPV-NG formulary for a substantial number of items they routinely used, which negatively impacted utilization rates for the initial formulary. In our November 2017 report, we recommended that the Director of the MSPV- NG program office provide complete guidance to medical centers for matching equivalent supply items. VA agreed with this recommendation and indicated it would provide this guidance to medical centers by December 2017. According to SAC, as of June 2017, only about a third of the items on the initial version of the formulary were being ordered in any significant quantity by medical centers, indicating that many items on the formulary were not those that are needed by medical centers. Senior VHA acquisition officials attributed this mismatch to shortcomings in their initial requirements development process as well as with VA’s purchase data. VA had set a target that medical centers would order 40 percent of their supplies from the MSPV-NG formulary, but utilization rates were below this target with a nationwide average utilization rate across medical centers of about 24 percent as of May 2017. Specifically, Chief Supply Chain Officers—who are responsible for managing the ordering and stocking of medical supplies at six selected medical centers—told us that many items they needed were not included in the MSPV-NG formulary. As such, we found that these six medical centers generally fell below VA’s stated utilization target. As shown in figure 2, among the six selected medical centers we reviewed, one met the target, while the remaining five were below 25 percent utilization. Instead of fully using MSPV-NG, the selected medical centers are purchasing many items through other means, such as purchase cards or new contracts awarded by their local contracting office, in part, because they said the formulary does not meet their needs. These approaches run counter to the goals of the MSPV-NG program and contribute to VA not making the best use of taxpayer dollars. Greater utilization of MSPV-NG is essential to VA achieving the cost avoidance goal of $150 million for its supply chain transformation effort. Under the legacy MSPV program, the National Acquisition Center tracked cost avoidance achieved by comparing prices for competitively-awarded MSPV supply contracts with prices available elsewhere. However, VHA officials stated that they are not currently tracking cost avoidance related specifically to MSPV-NG. In our November 2017 report, we recommended that the VHA Chief Procurement and Logistics Officer, in coordination with SAC, should calculate cost avoidance achieved by MSPV-NG on an ongoing basis. VA agreed with this recommendation and reported it would develop a new metric to measure cost avoidance by June 2018. In Phase 2 of MSPV-NG, the program office has taken some steps to incorporate greater clinical involvement in subsequent requirements development, but both its requirements development and SAC’s contracting efforts have been hampered by staffing and schedule constraints. In the fall of 2016, the program office began to establish panels of clinicians to serve on MSPV-NG integrated product teams (IPT) assigned to the task of developing updated requirements for the second phase of the formulary. Program officials said they had difficulty recruiting clinicians to participate. We found that slightly more than half (20 of the 38) of the IPTs had begun their work to review items and develop updated requirements by the time the MSPV-NG program launched in December 2016. Staff on the IPTs had to complete their responsibilities by the end of March 2017 while simultaneously managing their regular workload as physicians, surgeons, or nurses. By early March 2017, the IPTs still had about 4,200 items to review. Faced with meeting this unrealistic time frame, the MSPV-NG program office had 9 IPT members travel to one location—with an additional 10 members participating virtually—to meet for 5 days to review the remaining items. Members told us that this time pressure limited the extent to which they were able to pursue the goal of standardizing supplies, and that their review ended up being more of a data validation exercise than a standardization review. VHA ultimately met this compressed timeline, but in a rushed manner that limited the impact of clinician involvement. In our November 2017 report, we recommended that the VHA Chief Procurement and Logistics Officer use input from national clinical program offices to prioritize its requirements development and standardization efforts beyond Phase 2 to focus on supply categories that offer the best opportunity for standardization and cost avoidance. VA agreed with this recommendation and stated it is in the process of finalizing guidance that will detail the importance of involving the national clinical program offices in MSPV-NG requirements development and standardization efforts. The SAC plans to replace the existing Phase 1 non-competitive agreements with competitive awards based on the Phase 2 requirements generated by the IPTs, but it may not be able to keep up with expiring agreements due to an unrealistic schedule. Because they were made on a non-competitive basis, the Phase 1 agreements were established for a period of 1 year. In order to keep the full formulary available, the SAC director said the staff must award 200 to 250 contracts before the Phase 1 agreements expire later this year. SAC officials acknowledged that it is unlikely that they will be able to award the contracts by the time the existing agreements expire. According to SAC officials, they are in the process of hiring more staff to deal with the increased workload. Further, the SAC division director told us that they canceled all outstanding Phase 2 solicitations in September 2017 due to low response rates, protests from service-disabled veteran-owned small businesses, and changes in overall MSPV-NG strategy. In our November 2017 report, we recommended that the MSPV-NG program office and SAC should establish a plan for how to mitigate the potential risk of gaps in contract coverage while SAC is still working to make competitive Phase 2 awards, which could include prioritizing supply categories that are most likely to yield cost avoidance. VA agreed with this recommendation and indicated it has developed a plan to mitigate the risk of gaps in contract coverage with short- and mid-term procurement strategies to ensure continued provision of medical and surgical supplies to VHA facilities. The department also stated that it plans to replace the current MSPV-NG contract and formulary process with a new approach where the prime vendor would develop the formulary. However, VA will likely face challenges in this new approach until it fully addresses the existing shortcomings in the MSPV-NG program. Chairman Roe, Ranking Member Walz, and Members of the Committee, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to respond to any questions that you may have at this time. If you or your staff have any questions about this statement, please contact Shelby S. Oakley at 202-512-4841 or OakleyS@gao.gov. In addition, contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. Individuals who made key contributions to the report on which this testimony is based are Lisa Gardner, Assistant Director; Emily Bond; Matthew T. Crosby; Lorraine Ettaro; Michael Grogan; Jeff Hartnett; Katherine Lenane; Teague Lyons; Roxanna Sun; and Colleen Taylor. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.	[ "VA spends hundreds of millions of dollars annually on medical supplies to meet the health care needs of about 7 million veterans. To provide a more efficient, cost-effective way for its medical centers to order supplies, the VA established the MSPV-NG program. The program's goals include involving clinicians in requirements development, leveraging buying power when making competitive awards, and consolidating supplies used across medical centers. VA began developing requirements in early 2015 and launched the program in December 2016. This testimony summarizes key information contained in GAO's November 2017 report, GAO-18-34 . Specifically, it addresses the extent to which VA's implementation of MSPV-NG has been effective in meeting program goals. GAO analyzed VA's requirements development and contracting processes, and identified key supply chain practices cited by four leading hospital networks. GAO also met with contracting and clinical officials at six medical centers, selected based on high dollar contract obligations in fiscal years 2014-2016 and geographic representation. The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) established the Medical Surgical Prime Vendor-Next Generation (MSPV-NG) program to provide an efficient, cost-effective way for its facilities to order supplies, but its initial implementation did not have an overarching strategy, stable leadership, and workforce capacity that could have facilitated medical center buy-in for the change. VA also developed requirements for a broad range of MSPV-NG items with limited clinical input. Further, starting in June 2015, VA planned to award competitive contracts, but instead, 79 percent of the items available for purchase under MSPV-NG were added through non-competitive agreements. (See figure). As a result, the program did not meet the needs of medical centers, and usage remained below VA's 40 percent target. (See figure.) VA has taken steps to address some deficiencies and is developing a new approach to the program. However, VA will likely continue to face challenges in meeting its goals until it fully addresses these existing shortcomings. GAO made 10 recommendations in its November 2017 report, including that VA develop an overarching strategy, expand clinician input in requirements development, and establish a plan for awarding future competitive contracts. VA agreed with GAO's recommendations." ]	2,869	gov_report	en	null	c6a96fdafd983c9c430e24123e2b28035825e7c4b58974c2
Names for Navy ships traditionally have been chosen and announced by the Secretary of the Navy, under the direction of the President and in accordance with rules prescribed by Congress. For most of the 19 th century, U.S. law included language explicitly assigning the Secretary of the Navy the task of naming new Navy ships. The reference to the Secretary of the Navy disappeared from the U.S. Code in 1925. The code today (10 U.S.C. §8662) is silent on the issue of who has the authority to name new Navy ships, but the Secretary of the Navy arguably retains implicit authority, given the location of Section 8662 in subtitle C of Title 10, which covers the Navy and Marine Corps. In discussing its name-selection process, the Naval History and Heritage Command—the Navy's in-house office of professional historians—cites the above-mentioned laws and states the following: As with many other things, the procedures and practices involved in Navy ship naming are as much, if not more, products of evolution and tradition than of legislation. As we have seen, the names for new ships are personally decided by the Secretary of the Navy. The Secretary can rely on many sources to help him reach his decisions. Each year, the Navy History and Heritage Command (NHHC) compiles primary and alternate ship name recommendations and forwards these to the Chief of Naval Operations by way of the chain of command. These recommendations are the result of research into the history of the Navy and by suggestions submitted by service members, Navy veterans, and the public. Ship name source records at NHHC reflect the wide variety of name sources that have been used in the past, particularly since World War I. Ship name recommendations are conditioned by such factors as the name categories for ship types now being built, as approved by the Secretary of the Navy; the distribution of geographic names of ships of the fleet; names borne by previous ships that distinguished themselves in service; names recommended by individuals and groups; and names of naval leaders, national figures, and deceased members of the Navy and Marine Corps who have been honored for heroism in war or for extraordinary achievement in peace. In its final form, after consideration at the various levels of command, the Chief of Naval Operations signs the memorandum recommending names for the current year's building program and sends it to the Secretary of the Navy. The Secretary considers these nominations, along with others he receives, as well as his own thoughts in this matter. At appropriate times, he selects names for specific ships and announces them. While there is no set time for assigning a name, it is customarily done before the ship is christened. The ship's sponsor─the person who will christen the ship─is also selected and invited by the Secretary. In the case of ships named for individuals, an effort is made to identify the eldest living direct female descendant of that individual to perform the role of ship's sponsor. For ships with other name sources, it is customary to honor the wives of senior naval officers or public officials. A July 2012 Navy report to Congress on the Navy's policies and practices for naming ships (see next section) states the following: Once a type/class naming convention [i.e., a general rule or guideline for how ships of a certain type or class are to be named] is established, Secretaries can rely on many sources to help in the final selection of a ship name. For example, sitting Secretaries can solicit ideas and recommendations from either the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) or the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC), or both. They can also task the Naval Heritage and History Command to compile primary and alternate ship name recommendations that are the result of research into the history of the Navy's battle force or particular ship names. Secretaries also routinely receive formal suggestions for ship names from concerned citizens, active and retired service members, or members of Congress. Finally, Congress can enact provisions in Public Law that express the sense of the entire body about new ship naming conventions or specific ship names. Regardless of the origin of the recommendations, however, the final selection of a ship's name is the Secretary's to make, informed and guided by his own thoughts, counsel, and preferences. At the appropriate time—normally sometime after the ship has been either authorized or appropriated by Congress and before its keel laying or christening—the Secretary records his decision with a formal naming announcement. On July 13, 2012, the Navy submitted to Congress a 73-page report on the Navy's policies and practices for naming ships. The report was submitted in response to Section 1014 of the FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act ( H.R. 1540 / P.L. 112-81 of December 31, 2011). The executive summary of the Navy's report is reprinted here as Appendix A . Rules for giving certain types of names to certain types of Navy ships have evolved over time. Attack submarines, for example, were once named for fish, then later for cities, and most recently for states, while cruisers were once named for cities, then later for states, and most recently for battles. State names, to cite another example, were given to battleships, then later to nuclear-powered cruisers and ballistic missile submarines, and are now being given to attack submarines. The Naval History and Heritage Command states the following: "How will the Navy name its ships in the future? It seems safe to say that the evolutionary process of the past will continue; as the fleet itself changes, so will the names given to its ships. It seems equally safe, however, to say that future decisions in this area will continue to demonstrate regard for the rich history and valued traditions of the United States Navy." The July 2012 Navy report to Congress states that "US Navy ship-naming policies, practices, and 'traditions' are not fixed; they evolve constantly over time." The report also states that "Just as [ship] type naming conventions change over time to accommodate technological change as well as choices made by Secretaries, they also change over time as every Secretary makes their own interpretation of the original naming convention." There have been numerous exceptions to the Navy's ship-naming rules, particularly for the purpose of naming a ship for a person when the rule for that type of ship would have called for it to be named for something else. The July 2012 report to Congress cites exceptions to ship naming rules dating back to the earliest days of the republic, and states that "a Secretary's discretion to make exceptions to ship-naming conventions is one of the Navy's oldest ship-naming traditions." The report argues that exceptions made for the purpose of naming ships for Presidents or Members of Congress have occurred frequently enough that, rather than being exceptions, they constitute a "special cross-type naming convention" for Presidents and Members of Congress. This CRS report continues to note, as exceptions to basic class naming rules, instances where ships other than aircraft carriers have been named for Presidents or Members of Congress. Some observers have perceived a breakdown in, or corruption of, the rules for naming Navy ships. Such observers might cite, for example, the three-ship Seawolf (SSN-21) class of attack submarines— Seawolf (SSN-21), Connecticut (SSN-22), and Jimmy Carter (SSN-23)—which were named for a fish, a state, and a President, respectively, reflecting no apparent class naming rule. The July 2012 Navy report to Congress states the following: "Current ship naming policies and practices fall well within the historic spectrum of policies and practices for naming vessels of the Navy, and are altogether consistent with ship naming customs and traditions." For ship types now being procured for the Navy, or recently procured for the Navy, naming rules (and exceptions thereto) are summarized below. The July 2012 Navy report to Congress discusses current naming rules (and exceptions thereto) at length. On December 14, 2016, the Navy named the first of its 12 planned next-generation ballistic missile submarines Columbia (SSBN-826), in honor of the District of Columbia. The 12 planned boats are consequently now referred to as Columbia -class or SSBN-826 class boats. The Navy has not stated what the naming rule for these ships will be. Given the selection of Columbia as the name of the lead ship, possibilities for the naming rule include (but are not necessarily limited to) cities, capital cities, or states and federal districts and territories. It is also possible that the name Columbia will turn out to be an exception to the naming rule for the class. The current USS Columbia (SSN-771)—a Los Angeles (SSN-688) class attack submarine that was named for Columbia, SC; Columbia, IL; and Columbia, MO —entered service in 1995 and will reach the end of its 33-year expected service life in 2028, at about the time that construction of SSBN-826 is scheduled to be completed. If the service life of SSN-771 is extended for several years, it would remain in service after the commissioning of SSBN-826. This would create an issue to be resolved, since 10 U.S.C. §8662(a) states, "Not more than one vessel of the Navy may have the same name." One possible step for resolving such an issue would be to change the name of SSBN-826 to something else, such as District of Columbia —a step that could be viewed as somewhat similar to the below-discussed instance in which the name of the Los Angles-class submarine SSN-705 was changed from Corpus Christi to City of Corpus Christi (see " Congressional Responses to Announced Navy Ship-Naming Decisions " below). Virginia (SSN-774) class attack submarines are being named for states. An exception occurred on January 8, 2009, when then-Secretary of the Navy Donald Winter announced that SSN-785 would be named for former Senator John Warner. Another exception occurred on January 9, 2014, when then-Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus announced that SSN-795, the second of the two Virginia-class boats procured in FY2015, would be named for Admiral Hyman G. Rickover, who served for many years as director of the Navy's nuclear propulsion program. As of May 6, 2019, the Navy has announced names for all Virginia-class boats through SSN-801, the second of two Virginia-class boats procured in FY2018. A total of 30 Virginia-class boats have been procured through FY2019, of which 26 have been named for states. (Two were named for people and the two procured in FY2019 have not yet been named.) The Navy's shipbuilding plan calls for procuring three additional Virginia-class boats in FY2020 and two per year FY2021 and subsequent years. The 26 state-named Virginia-class boats procured through FY2018, together with the additional Virginia-class boats planned for procurement in FY2020 and subsequent years and the 17 existing state-named Ohio (SSBN-726) class SSBNs and cruise missile submarine (SSGNs), could make for a total of more than 50 boats starting around FY2022. Thus, starting around FY2022, the Navy might run out of state names for Virginia-class boats, and consequently might need to either amend the Virginia-class naming rule or begin making a series of exceptions to the rule. The July 2012 Navy report to Congress states that "while carrier names are still 'individually considered,' they are now generally named in honor of past US Presidents." Of the 14 most recently named aircraft carriers (those with hull numbers 67 through 80), 10 have been named for U.S. Presidents and 2 for Members of Congress. The Navy is currently procuring Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) class carriers. On January 16, 2007, the Navy announced that CVN-78, the lead ship in the CVN-78 class, would be named for President Gerald R. Ford. On May 29, 2011, the Navy announced that CVN-79, the second ship in the class, would be named for President John F. Kennedy. On December 1, 2012, the Navy announced that CVN-80, the third ship in the class, would be named Enterprise . The Navy made the announcement on the same day that it deactivated the 51-year-old aircraft carrier CVN-65, also named Enterprise . CVN-80 is the ninth Navy ship named Enterprise . CVN-80 was procured in the FY2018 budget, which Congress considered in 2017. If CVN-80, like most Navy ships, had been named at about the time of procurement, or later, rather than in 2012, it would have been named by the current Secretary of the Navy, Richard Spencer. The July 2012 Navy report to Congress, which was produced when Ray Mabus was the Secretary of the Navy, states that Secretary [of the Navy Ray] Mabus values the ability to consider [aircraft] carrier names on an individual, case‐by‐case basis, for two reasons. First, it will allow a future Secretary to name a future fleet aircraft carrier for someone or something other than a former President. Indeed, Secretary Mabus has a particular name in mind. With the scheduled decommissioning of USS Enterprise (CVN 65), perhaps the most famous ship name in US Navy history besides USS Constitution will be removed from the Naval Vessel Register. Secretary Mabus believes this circumstance could be remedied by bestowing the Enterprise's storied name on a future carrier. Prior to the naming of CVN-80, the most recent carrier that was not named for a President or Member of Congress was the second of the 14 most recently named carriers, Nimitz (CVN-68), which was procured in FY1967. Destroyers traditionally have been named for famous U.S. naval leaders and distinguished heroes. The July 2012 Navy report to Congress discusses this tradition and states more specifically that destroyers are being named for deceased members of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard, including Secretaries of the Navy. Exceptions since 2012 (all of which involve Arleigh Burke [DDG-51] class destroyers) include the following: On May 7, 2012, the Navy announced that it was naming DDG-116 for a living person, Thomas Hudner. On May 23, 2013, the Navy announced that it was naming DDG-117 for a living person, Paul Ignatius, and that it was naming DDG-118 for the late Senator Daniel Inouye, who served in the U.S. Army during World War II. On March 31 and April 5, 2016, it was reported that the Navy was naming DDG-120 for a living person, former Senator Carl Levin. On July 28, 2016, the Navy announced that it was naming DDG-124 for a living person, Harvey C. Barnum Jr. On July 11, 2018, Secretary of the Navy Richard Spencer announced that the Navy was expanding the name of the destroyer John. S. McCain (DDG-56) to include a living person, Senator John S. McCain III (for additional discussion, see the next section below). On May 6, 2019, the Navy announced that it was naming DDG-133 for a living person, former Senator Sam Nunn, who had served in the Coast Guard from 1959 to 1960, and in the Coast Guard Reserve from 1960 until 1968 (for additional discussion, see the section following the next section). As of May 6, 2019, the Navy had announced names for all DDG-51 class destroyers procured through DDG-131, the second of three DDG-51s procured in FY2019, and DDG-133, one of three DDG-51s requested for procurement in FY2020. On July 11, 2018, Secretary of the Navy Richard Spencer announced that the Navy was expanding the name of the destroyer John. S. McCain (DDG-56), originally named for Admiral John S. "Slew" McCain (1884-1945) and his son, Admiral John S. "Jack" McCain, Jr. (1911-1981), to also include Senator John S. McCain III, the grandson of Admiral John S. McCain and the son of Admiral John S. McCain, Jr. DDG-56 was procured in FY1989 and was commissioned into service on July 2, 1994. John S. McCain III served as a Member of the House of Representatives from 1983 to 1987, and as a Senator from 1987 to 2018. Among his committee chairmanships, he was the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee from January 3, 2015, until his death on August 25, 2018. He was the Republican Party candidate for President in 2008. On May 6, 2019, the Navy announced that it was naming DDG-133 for former Senator Sam Nunn. Nunn served in the Coast Guard from 1959 to 1960, and in the Coast Guard Reserve from 1960 until 1968. He was a Senator from 1972 to 1997. During his time in the Senate, he was, among other things, the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee from January 1987 to January 1995. The Navy in 2017 initiated a new program, called the FFG(X) program, to build a class of 20 guided-missile frigates (FFGs). The Navy wants to procure the first FFG(X) in FY2020, the second in FY2021, and the remaining 18 at a rate of two per year in FY2022-FY2030. As of May 6, 2019, the Navy had not announced a naming rule for this planned new class of ships. Previous classes of U.S. Navy frigates, like Navy destroyers, were generally named for naval leaders and heroes. Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs) were at first named for U.S. mid-tier cities, small towns, and other U.S. communities. The naming rule was later adjusted to regionally important U.S. cities and communities. An exception occurred on February 10, 2012, when the Navy announced that it was naming LCS-10 for former Representative Gabrielle Giffords. Another exception occurred on February 23, 2018, when President Trump, in a press conference with Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull, announced that an LCS would be named Canberra , in honor of HMAS Canberra (D33), an Australian cruiser named for the capital city of Australia that fought alongside U.S. Navy forces World War II and was scuttled after being damaged by Japanese attack in the Battle of Savo Island on August 9, 1942. The Navy has identified the LCS to be named Canberra as LCS-30. A previous U.S. Navy ship, the gun cruiser Canberra (CA-70), which served from 1943 to 1947 and again from 1956 to 1970, was similarly named in honor of HMAS Canberra . There is also a current HMAS Canberra (L02), an amphibious assault ship (i.e., helicopter carrier) that entered service in 2014 and now serves as the flagship of the Australian navy. The situation of LCS-30 and L02 sharing the same name will presumably not violate 10 U.S.C. §8662(a)—which states that "not more than one vessel of the Navy may have the same name"—because 10 U.S.C. §8662 is a statute governing the naming of U.S. Navy ships and L02 is not a U.S. Navy ship. As of May 6, 2019, the Navy had posted or announced names for all LCSs up through LCS-30, plus LCS-32, LCS-34, LCS-36, and LCS-38. The Navy also announced on October 9, 2018, that one additional LCS would be named for Cleveland, OH, but the Navy did not specify which LCS would receive this name. A total of 35 LCSs have been procured through FY2019. In addition to LCSs 1-30, 32, 34, 36, and 38, the Navy has identified the 35 th LCS as LCS-31. As of May 6, 2019, this ship was listed by the Navy as having no name. The Navy does not want to procure any more LCSs beyond the 35 that have been procured. If no additional LCSs are procured beyond the 35 that have been procured, LCS-31 will be the last LCS to be named. Given the Navy's October 9, 2018, announcement that one additional LCS would be named for Cleveland, OH, it is possible the Navy will name LCS-31 for Cleveland. Amphibious assault ships (LHAs), which look like medium-sized aircraft carriers, are being named for important battles in which U.S. Marines played a prominent part, and for famous earlier U.S. Navy ships that were not named for battles. The Navy announced on June 27, 2008, that the first LHA-6 class amphibious assault ship, LHA-6, would be named America , a name previously used for an aircraft carrier (CV-66) that served in the Navy from 1965 to 1996. The Navy announced on May 4, 2012, that LHA-7, the second ship in the class, LHA-7, would be named Tripoli , the location of famous Marine battles in the First Barbary War. The Navy reaffirmed this name selection with a more formal announcement on May 30, 2014. On November 9, 2016, the Navy announced that the third ship in the class, LHA-8, will be named Bougainville , the location of a famous World War II campaign in the Pacific. San Antonio (LPD-17) class amphibious ships are being named for major U.S. cities and communities (with major being defined as being one of the top three population centers in a state), and cities and communities attacked on September 11, 2001. An exception occurred on April 23, 2010, when the Navy announced that it was naming LPD-26, the 10 th ship in the class, for the late Representative John P. Murtha. Another exception occurred on May 2, 2018, when the Navy announced that it was naming LPD-29, the 13 th ship in the class, for Navy Captain Richard M. McCool, Jr., who received the Medal of Honor for his actions in World War II and later served in the Korean and Vietnam wars. As of May 6, 2019, the Navy had not announced a name for LPD-30, which was funded in FY2018, and which is to be the first of a new version, or flight, of the LPD-17 class design called the LPD-17 Flight II design. On January 6, 2016, then-Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus announced that the Navy's new oilers will be named for "people who fought for civil rights and human rights," and that the first ship in the class, TAO-205, which was procured in FY2016, will be named for Representative John Lewis. The ships in this class consequently are now referred to as John Lewis (TAO-205) class ships. The Navy wants to procure a total of 20 John Lewis-class ships. On July 28, 2016, it was reported that the Navy would name the second through sixth ships in the class (i.e., TAOs 206 through 210) for Harvey Milk, Earl Warren, Robert F. Kennedy, Lucy Stone, and Sojourner Truth, respectively. All these names were later posted by the Navy for these ships. The Navy's 14 Lewis and Clark (TAKE-1) class cargo and ammunition ships were named for famous American explorers, trailblazers, and pioneers. The Navy announced on October 9, 2009, that the 13 th ship in the class was being named for the civil rights activist Medgar Evers. The Navy announced on May 18, 2011, that the 14 th ship in the class would be named for civil rights activist Cesar Chavez. Expeditionary Fast Transports (EPFs), which until May 2011 were being procured by the Army as well as by the Navy, were at first named for American traits and values. In December 2009, the naming rule for EPFs was changed to small U.S. cities. At some point between December 2010 and October 2011, it was adjusted to small U.S. cities and counties. As of May 6, 2019, the Navy had posted names for all EPFs through EPF-12, which was procured in FY2016. A 13 th EPF was funded by Congress in FY2018, and a 14 th was funded by Congress in FY2019. The Navy's two Expeditionary Transport Docks (ESDs 1 and 2) and its Expeditionary Sea Bases (ESB 3 and higher) are being named for famous names or places of historical significance to U.S. Marines. Two of these ships have been named for living persons—ESD-2, which was named John Glenn , and ESB-4, which was named for Hershel "Woody" Williams. On November 4, 2017, Secretary of the Navy Richard Spencer announced that the third ESB (ESB-5), which was procured in FY2016, would be named for Marine Corps Vietnam veteran and Medal of Honor recipient Lance Corporal Miguel Keith. This was Spencer's first announced naming of a Navy ship. A fourth ESB (ESB-6) was procured in FY2018, and a fifth (ESB-7) was procured in FY2019. Navy plans calls for procuring a total of six ESBs. On March 12, 2019, the Navy announced that that TATS-6, the first ship in a new class of towing, salvage, and rescue ships (TATSs), would be named Navajo, "in honor of the major contributions that the Navajo people have made to the armed forces," and that ships in this class will be named for prominent Native Americans or Native American tribes. It has been a long time since ships named for certain states were last in commissioned service with the Navy as combat assets. While there is no rule requiring the Navy, in selecting state names for ships, to choose states for which the most time has passed since a ship named for the state has been in commissioned service with the Navy as a combat asset, advocates of naming a ship for a certain state may choose to point out, among other things, the length of time that has transpired since a ship named for the state has been in commissioned service with the Navy as a combat asset. In its announcement of April 13, 2012, that the Navy was naming the Virginia class attack submarines SSNs 786 through 790 for Illinois, Washington, Colorado, Indiana, and South Dakota, respectively, the Department of Defense stated, "None of the five states has had a ship named for it for more than 49 years. The most recent to serve was the battleship Indiana, which was decommissioned in October 1963." The July 2012 Navy report to Congress states the following: "Before deciding on which names to select [for the five submarines], [then-]Secretary [of the Navy Ray] Mabus asked for a list of State names that had been absent the longest from the US Naval Register...." In its announcement of November 19, 2012, that the Navy was naming the Virginia class attack submarine SSN-791 for Delaware, the Department of Defense quoted then-Secretary Mabus as saying, "It has been too long since there has been a USS Delaware in the fleet...." A Navy News Service article about the Navy's September 18, 2014, announcement that the Virginia class attack submarine SSN-792 was being named for Vermont stated that "This is the first ship named for Vermont since 1920[,] when the second USS Vermont was decommissioned." A Navy News Service article about the Navy's October 10, 2014, announcement that the Virginia class attack submarine SSN-793 was being named for Oregon stated that the previous USS Oregon "was a battleship best known for its roles in the Spanish American War when it helped destroy Admiral Cervera's fleet and in the Philippine-American War; it performed blockade duty in Manila Bay and off Lingayen Gulf, served as a station ship, and aided in the capture of Vigan." A Navy News Service article about the Navy's January 19, 2016, announcement that the Virginia-class attack submarine SSN-801 was being named for Utah stated, "The future USS Utah will be the second naval vessel to bear the name; the first, a battleship designated BB-31, was commissioned in 1911 and had a long, honorable time in service.... While conducting anti-gunnery exercises in Pearl Harbor, BB-31 was struck by a torpedo and capsized during the initial stages of the Japanese attack [on December 7, 1941]. She was struck from the Navy record Nov. 13, 1944 and received a battle star for her service in World War I." The Navy's naming announcements for Virginia-class submarines have reduced the group of states for which several decades had passed since a ship named for the state had been in commissioned service with the Navy as a combat asset, and for which no ship by that name is currently under construction. This group used to include Illinois, Delaware, Vermont, Oregon, and Montana, but Virginia-class attack submarines have now been named for these states. (See the Virginia-class attack submarine naming announcements of April 13, 2012; November 19, 2012; September 18, 2014; October 10, 2014; and September 2, 2015, respectively.) As shown in Table 1 , the three states for which the most time now appears to have passed since a ship named for the state has been in commissioned service with the Navy as a combat asset, and for which no ship by that name is currently under construction, are Kansas, Arizona, and Oklahoma. As of May 6, 2019, it has been more than 97 years since the decommissioning on December 16, 1921, of the battleship Kansas (BB-21), the most recent ship named for the state of Kansas that was in commissioned service with the Navy as a combat asset. As discussed earlier in the section on rules for naming SSNs, starting around FY2022, the Navy might run out of state names for Virginia-class boats, and consequently might need to either amend the Virginia-class naming rule or begin making a series of exceptions to the rule. The Navy historically has only rarely named ships for living persons, meaning (throughout this CRS report) persons who were living at the time the name was announced. The Navy stated in February 2012 that The Navy named several ships for living people (ex. George Washington, Ben Franklin, etc.) in the early years of our Republic. The Naval History and Heritage Command (NHHC) believes that the last ship to be named by the Navy in honor of a living person prior to [the aircraft carrier] CARL VINSON (CVN-70) was the brig JEFFERSON (launched in April 1814). Between 1814 and November 18, 1973, when President Nixon announced the naming of CARL VINSON, NHHC does not believe that any ships had been named for a living person by the Navy as NHHC does not have records that would indicate such. The July 2012 Navy report to Congress, noting a case from 1900 that was not included in the above passage, states that the practice of naming ships in honor of deserving Americans or naval leaders while they are still alive can be traced all the way back to the Revolutionary War. At the time, with little established history or tradition, the young Continental Navy looked to honor those who were fighting so hard to earn America's freedom. Consequently, George Washington had no less than five ships named for him before his death; John Adams and James Madison, three apiece; John Hancock, two; and Benjamin Franklin, one. The practice of naming ships after living persons was relatively commonplace up through 1814, when a US Navy brig was named in honor of Thomas Jefferson. However, after the War of 1812, with the US Navy older and more established, and with the list of famous Americans and notable naval heroes growing ever longer, the practice of naming ships after living persons fell into disuse. Indeed, the only exception over the next 150 years came in 1900, when the Navy purchased its first submarine from its still living inventor, John Philip Holland, and Secretary of the Navy John D. Long named her USS Holland (SS 1) in his honor.... [In the early 1970s], however, Department of the Navy leaders were considering the name for CVN 70. Secretary of the Navy John Warner knew the 93 rd Congress had introduced no less than three bills or amendments (none enacted) urging that CVN 70 be named for in honor of Carl Vinson, who served in the House for 50 years and was known as the "Father of the Two-Ocean Navy." Although Secretary Warner felt Congressman Vinson was more than worthy of a ship name, the former Congressman was still alive. Naming a ship for this giant of naval affairs would therefore violate a 160-year old tradition. After considering the pros and cons of doing so, Secretary Warner asked President Richard Nixon's approval to name CVN 70 for the 90-year old statesman. President Nixon readily agreed. Indeed, he personally announced the decision on January 18, 1974.... In hindsight, rather than this decision being a rare exception, it signaled a return to the Continental Navy tradition of occasionally honoring famous living persons with a ship name. Since then, and before the appointment of current Secretary [now then-Secretary] of the Navy Ray Mabus, Secretaries of the Navy have occasionally chosen to follow this new, "old tradition," naming ships in honor of still living former Presidents Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and Gerald R. Ford; Secretary of the Navy Paul Nitze; Navy Admirals Hyman G. Rickover, Arleigh Burke, and Wayne E. Meyer; Senators John C. Stennis and John Warner; and famous entertainer Bob Hope. Moreover, it is important to note that three of these well-known Americans—Gerald R. Ford, John C. Stennis, and Bob Hope—were so honored after Congress enacted provisions in Public Laws urging the Navy to do so. By its own actions, then, Congress has acknowledged the practice of occasionally naming ships for living persons, if not outright approved of it. In other words, while naming ships after living persons remains a relatively rare occurrence—about three per decade since 1970—it is now an accepted but sparingly used practice for Pragmatic Secretaries [of the Navy] of both parties. For them, occasionally honoring an especially deserving member of Congress, US naval leader, or famous American with a ship name so that they might end their days on earth knowing that their life's work is both recognized and honored by America's Navy-Marine Corps Team, and that their spirit will accompany and inspire the Team in battle, is sometimes exactly the right thing to do. As shown in Table 2 , since the naming of CVN-70 for Carl Vinson in 1974, at least 21 U.S. military ships have been named for persons who were living at the time the name was announced. Eight of the 21 were announced between January 2012 and March 2016, including three announced in 2012 and four announced in 2016. In four of the six most-recent instances, the ships were named for current or former Members of Congress. The most recent instance occurred on May 6, 2019, when the Navy announced that it was naming the destroyer DDG-51 for former Senator Sam Nunn. (For further discussion of that naming action, see the earlier section on names for destroyers.) A June 15, 2017, blog post states the following: Four [past U.S. Navy] ships have been named for Confederate officers: the [ballistic missile submarine/attack submarine] USS Robert E. Lee (SSBN-601[/SSN-601]) [commissioned 1960; decommissioned 1983], the [ballistic missile submarine] USS Stonewall Jackson (SSBN-634) [commissioned 1964; decommissioned 1995], the [submarine tender] USS Hunley (AS-31) [commissioned 1962; decommissioned 1994], and the [submarine tender] USS Dixon (AS-37) [commissioned 1971; decommissioned 1995]. H. L. Hunley built the Confederate submarine that sank with him on board before it engaged in combat. A subsequent Confederate submarine was built and named for him. Commanded by George Dixon, the CSS Hunley carried out the world's first submarine attack when it struck the [sloop-of-war] USS Housatonic in February1864. Currently in the fleet is the [Ticonderoga (CG-47) class Aegis cruiser] USS Chancellorsville (CG-62) [commissioned 1989], named for Lee's greatest victory over the U.S. Army. Chancellorsville also was the battle in which Gen. Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson was mortally wounded by friendly fire. The purpose of erecting monuments and naming U.S. ships after Confederates—enemies of the United States—seems to be to recognize their perceived status as noble warriors rather than to remember the cause for which they waged war: the dissolution of the United States to preserve the "peculiar institution" of human slavery. This view of history is not shared by millions of Americans who see the monuments to Confederates as glorifying, even justifying the "lost cause" and the enslavement of humans. Other ships have been named for enemies [of the United States], probably because they were considered "noble warriors" too. [The ballistic missile submarine] USS Tecumseh (SSBN-628) [commissioned 1964; decommissioned 1993] and [the harbor tug] USS Osceola (YTB-129) [commissioned 1938; sold for scrapping 1973] were named after American Indian leaders who fought wars against the United States. Regarding the Chancellorsville , the Navy states that the cruiser is The first U.S. Navy ship named for a Civil War battle fought just south of the Rappahannock and Rapidan Rivers in Virginia (1–5 May 1863). Gen. Robert E. Lee, CSA, who led the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia, held Gen. Joseph Hooker, USA, who commanded the Union Army and Department of the Potomac, in position while Lt. Gen. Thomas J. Jackson, CSA, enveloped the Union right flank, surprising and rolling up the Federal's right. Lee's victory, combined with the urgent need to relieve pressure on Vicksburg, Miss., prompted the South's thrust into Pennsylvania that summer, resulting in the pivotal Battle of Gettysburg. An August 16, 2017, press report states the following: As America churns through a bloody debate over the place Confederate monuments occupy in the modern day United States, a Navy cruiser named in honor of a Confederate Civil War victory is unlikely to see its named changed, a service official said Wednesday [August 16]. The guided-missile cruiser Chancellorsville [CG-62] was commissioned in 1989 and derives its name from an 1863 battle considered to be the greatest victory of Confederate Gen. Robert E. Lee.... But a Navy official speaking on the condition of anonymity Wednesday said that even though the Chancellorsville is named after a Confederate victory, the name comes from a battle, not an individual, and soldiers on both sides died. The week-long battle resulted in major casualties for both sides—13,000 Confederates and 17,000 Union troops, according to the National Parks [sic: Park] Service. The Navy official did say, however, that there remains a chance the ship's crest could be altered. The predominance of gray in the ship's crest speaks to "General Robert E. Lee's spectacular military strategies and his dominance in this battle," according to the ship's website. An inverted wreath also memorializes the Confederacy's second-best known general, Stonewall Jackson, who was mortally wounded in the battle. While the rupture of the country during the Civil War is reflected in the crest, it also features Jackson's order to "press on." "Maybe that is worth re-looking at or redoing," the official said. "There's a fine line." In recent years, the Navy on a few occasions has announced names for ships years before those ships were procured. Although announcing a name for a ship years before it is procured is not prohibited, doing so could deprive a future Secretary of the Navy (or, more broadly, a future Administration) of the opportunity to select a name for the ship. It could also deprive Congress of an opportunity to express its sense regarding potential names for a ship, and create a risk of assigning a name to a ship that eventually is not procured for some reason, a situation that could be viewed as potentially embarrassing to the Navy. As noted earlier, the July 2012 Navy report to Congress states the following: At the appropriate time—normally sometime after the ship has been either authorized or appropriated by Congress and before its keel laying or christening—the Secretary records his decision with a formal naming announcement. At the end of the above passage, there is a footnote (number 3) in the Navy report that states the following: Although there is no hard and fast rule, Secretaries most often name a ship after Congress has appropriated funds for its construction or approved its future construction in some way—such as authorization of either block buys or multi-year procurements of a specific number of ships. There are special cases, however, when Secretaries use their discretion to name ships before formal Congressional approval, such as when Secretary John Lehman announced the namesake for a new class of Aegis guided missile destroyers would be Admiral Arleigh Burke, several years before the ship was either authorized or appropriated. In connection with the quoted footnote passage immediately above, it can be noted that the lead ship of the DDG-51 class of destroyers was named for Arleigh Burke on November 5, 1982, about two years before the ship was authorized and fully funded. Recent examples of Navy ships whose names were announced more than two years before they were procured include the following: The destroyer Zumwalt (DDG-1000). On July 4, 2000, President Bill Clinton announced that DDG-1000, the lead ship in a new class of destroyers, would be named Zumwalt in honor of Admiral Elmo Zumwalt Jr., the Chief of Naval Operations from 1970 to 1974, who had died on January 2, 2000. At the time of the naming announcement, Congress was considering the Navy's proposed FY2001 budget, under which DDG-1000 was scheduled for authorization in FY2005, a budget that Congress would consider in 2004, which was then about four years in the future. The aircraft carrier Enterprise (CVN-80). As noted earlier, on December 1, 2012, the Navy announced that CVN-80, the third Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) class aircraft carrier, would be named Enterprise . At the time of the announcement, CVN-80 was scheduled for procurement in FY2018, the budget for which Congress was to consider in 2017, which was then more than four years in the future. (CVN-80 was in fact procured in FY2018.) The ballistic missile submarine ( SSBN-826 ) Columbia . As noted earlier, on July 28, 2016, it was reported that the first Ohio replacement ballistic missile submarine (SSBN-826) will be named Columbia in honor of the District of Columbia. This ship is scheduled for procurement in FY2021, the budget for which Congress is to consider in 2020, which in July 2016 was about four years in the future. Three John Lewis (TAO- 205) class oilers. As noted earlier, on July 28, 2016, it was reported that the Navy would name the second through sixth John Lewis (TAO-205) class oilers (i.e., TAOs 206 through 210) for Harvey Milk, Earl Warren, Robert F. Kennedy, Lucy Stone, and Sojourner Truth, respectively. In 2016, these five ships were scheduled for procurement in FY2018, FY2019, FY2020, FY2021, and FY2022, respectively, the budgets for which Congress has considered or will consider in 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, and 2021, respectively. Thus, using the procurement dates that were scheduled in 2016, the name for TAO-208 ( Robert F. Kennedy ) was announced about three years before it was to be procured, the name for TAO-209 ( Lucy Stone ) was announced about four years it was to be procured, and the name for TAO-210 ( Sojourner Truth ) was announced about five years before it was to be procured. As discussed in the CRS report on the TAO-205 class program, the first six ships in the TAO-205 class are being procured under a block buy contract that Congress authorized as part of its action on the FY2016 defense budget. The procurement of each ship under this contract remains subject to the availability of appropriations for that purpose. Members of the public are sometimes interested in having Navy ships named for their own states or cities, for earlier U.S. Navy ships (particularly those on which they or their relatives served), for battles in which they or their relatives participated, or for people they admire. Citizens with such an interest sometimes contact the Navy, the Department of Defense, or Congress seeking support for their proposals. An October 2008 news report, for example, suggested that a letter-writing campaign by New Hampshire elementary school students that began in January 2004 was instrumental in the Navy's decision in August 2004 to name a Virginia-class submarine after the state. The July 2012 Navy report to Congress states the following: In addition to receiving input and recommendations from the President and Congress, every Secretary of the Navy receives numerous requests from service members, citizens, interest groups, or individual members of Congress who want to name a ship in honor of a particular hometown, or State, or place, or hero, or famous ship. This means the "nomination" process is often fiercely contested as differing groups make the case that "their" ship name is the most fitting choice for a Secretary to make. Members of the public may also express their opposition to an announced naming decision. The July 2012 Navy report to Congress cites and discusses five recent examples of ship-naming decisions that were criticized by some observers: the destroyer DDG-1002 (named for President Lyndon Johnson), the Littoral Combat Ship LCS-10 (named for former Representative Gabrielle Giffords), the amphibious ship LPD-26 (named for late Representative John P. Murtha), the auxiliary ship TAKE-13 (named for Medgar Evers), and the auxiliary ship TAKE-14 (named for Cesar Chavez). Congress has long maintained an interest in how Navy ships are named, and has influenced or may have influenced pending Navy decisions on the naming of certain ships, including but not limited to the following: One source states that "[the aircraft carriers] CVN 72 and CVN 73 were named prior to their start [of construction], in part to preempt potential congressional pressure to name one of those ships for Admiral H.G. Rickover ([instead,] the [attack submarine] SSN 709 was named for the admiral)." There was a friendly rivalry of sorts in Congress between those who supported naming the aircraft carrier CVN-76 for President Truman and those who supported naming it for President Reagan; the issue was effectively resolved by a decision announced by President Clinton in February 1995 to name one carrier (CVN-75) for Truman and another (CVN-76) for Reagan. One press report suggests that the decision to name CVN-77 for President George H. W. Bush may have been influenced by a congressional suggestion. Section 1012 of the FY2007 John Warner National Defense Authorization Act ( H.R. 5122 / P.L. 109-364 of October 17, 2006), expressed the sense of the Congress that the aircraft carrier CVN-78 should be named for President Gerald R. Ford. The Navy announced on January 16, 2007, that CVN-78 would be named Gerald R. Ford . In the 111 th Congress, H.Res. 1505 , introduced on July 1, 2010, expressed the sense of the House of Representatives that the Secretary of the Navy should name the next appropriate naval ship in honor of John William Finn. The measure was not acted on after being referred to the House Armed Services Committee. On February 15, 2012, the Navy announced that DDG-113, an Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class destroyer, would be named John Finn . Section 1012 of the FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act ( H.R. 1540 / P.L. 112-81 of December 31, 2011) expressed the sense of Congress that the Secretary of the Navy is encouraged to name the next available naval vessel after Rafael Peralta. On February 15, 2012, the Navy announced that DDG-113, an Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class destroyer, would be named Rafael Peralta . The July 2012 Navy report to Congress states that every Secretary of the Navy, regardless of point of view [on how to name ships], is subject to a variety of outside influences when considering the best names to choose. The first among these comes from the President of the United States, under whose direction any Secretary works... Secretaries of the Navy must also consider the input of Congress.... Given the vital role Congress plays in maintaining the Navy-Marine Corps Team, any Secretary is sure to respect and consider its input when considering ships names. Sometimes, the Secretary must also balance or contend with differences of opinion between the President and Congress. The Navy suggests that congressional offices wishing to express support for proposals to name a Navy ship for a specific person, place, or thing contact the office of the Secretary of the Navy to make their support known. Congress may also pass legislation relating to ship names (see below). Congress can pass legislation regarding a ship-naming decision that has been announced by the Navy. Such legislation can express Congress's views regarding the Navy's announced decision, and if Congress so desires, can also suggest or direct the Navy to take some action. The following are three examples of such legislation: S.Res. 332 of the 115 th Congress is an example of a measure that appears to reflect support for an announced Navy ship-naming decision. This measure, introduced in the Senate on November 15, 2017, and considered and agreed to without amendment and with a preamble by unanimous consent the same day, summarizes the military career of Hershel "Woody" Williams and commemorates the christening of ESB-4, an expeditionary sea base ship named for Williams (see " Legislative Activity in 115th and 116th Congress .") H.Res. 1022 of the 111 th Congress is an example of a measure reflecting support for an announced Navy ship-naming decision. This measure, introduced on January 20, 2010, and passed by the House on February 4, 2010, congratulates the Navy on its decision to name a naval ship for Medgar Evers. H.Con.Res. 312 of the 97 th Congress is an example of a measure that appears to reflect disagreement with an announced Navy ship-naming decision. This measure expressed the sense of Congress that the Los Angeles (SSN-688) class attack submarine Corpus Christi (SSN-705) should be renamed, and that a nonlethal naval vessel should instead be named Corpus Christi . (Los Angeles-class attack submarines were named for cities, and SSN-705 had been named for Corpus Christi, TX.) H.Con.Res. 312 was introduced on April 21, 1982, and was referred to the Seapower and Strategic and Critical Materials subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee on April 28, 1982. On May 10, 1982, the Navy modified the name of SSN-705 to City of Corpus Christi . On April 12, 2013, then-Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus announced that LPD-27, a San Antonio (LPD-17) class amphibious ship, would be named for Portland, OR. LPD-27 is to be the third Navy ship to bear the name Portland. The first, a cruiser (CA-33), was named for Portland, ME. It was commissioned into service in February 1933, decommissioned in July 1946, and maintained in reserve status until struck from the Navy list in March 1959. The second, an amphibious ship (LSD-37), was named for both Portland, ME, and Portland, OR. It was commissioned into service in October 1970, decommissioned in October 2003, and stricken from the Naval Vessel Register in March 2004. An April 18, 2013, press release from Senator Angus King stated that "U.S. Senators Susan Collins and Angus King today sent a letter to Ray Mabus, the Secretary of the Navy, asking that the USS Portland [LPD-27], a new San Antonio-class amphibious transport dock ship named after the city of Portland, Oregon, also be named in honor of Portland, Maine, consistent with the long history and tradition of U.S. Navy ships bestowed with the name USS Portland." In reply, the Navy sent letters dated April 24, 2013, to Senators Collins and King that stated the following in part: In addition to [the ballistic missile submarine] USS MAINE (SSBN 743), Secretary [of the Navy Ray] Mabus recently honored the state of Marine through his naming of [the expeditionary fast transport ship] USNS MILLINOCKET (JHSV 3) [now called T-EPF 3] which was christened last weekend and will proudly represent our Nation as part of the fleet for decades to come. The Secretary of the Navy has tremendous appreciation for the state of Maine, its citizens and the incredible support provided by them to our Navy and our Nation. However, Oregon is the only state in our Nation that does not currently have a ship in the fleet named for the state, its cities or communities. Secretary Mabus named LPD 27 after Portland, Oregon, to correct that oversight and acknowledge the support and contributions made by the men and women of Portland and Oregon. As noted elsewhere in this report, on October 10, 2014, the Navy announced that it was naming the Virginia-class attack submarine SSN-793 for Oregon. A May 21, 2016, Navy blog post about the ship's christening states that "LPD-27 will be the third Navy ship named Portland, honoring both the Oregon seaport and Maine's largest city." That statement is not correct, as the Navy confirms that LPD-27 is named solely for Portland, OR. A July 5, 2017, Navy News Service report states correctly that "LPD 27 is named for the city of Portland, Oregon, and follows the World War II heavy cruiser CA 33 and the amphibious ship LSD 37 as the third U.S. Navy ship to bear the name Portland." LPD-27 is scheduled to be commissioned in Portland, OR, on April 21, 2018. Table 3 shows past enacted provisions going back to the 100 th Congress regarding future ship-naming decisions. All of these measures expressed the sense of the Congress (or of the Senate or House) about how a future Navy ship should be named. Table 4 shows past examples of proposed bills and amendments regarding future ship-naming decisions going back to the 93 rd Congress. Some of these measures expressed the sense of the Congress about how a Navy ship should be named, while others would mandate a certain name for a ship. Although few of these measures were acted on after being referred to committee, they all signaled congressional interest in how certain ships should be named, and thus may have influenced Navy decisions on these matters. S.Con.Res. 10 of the 115 th Congress was introduced in the Senate on March 21, 2017; no further actions for the measure are listed at Congress.gov. The text of S.Con.Res. 10 as introduced was as follows: CONCURRENT RESOLUTION Expressing the sense of Congress that the Secretary of the Navy should name the next nuclear powered submarine of the United States Navy the "USS Los Alamos". Whereas the people of Los Alamos and the Navy have a 74-year relationship that continues from the Manhattan Project through the creation of a nuclear Navy and into the current ocean-borne leg of the strategic nuclear triad of the United States; Whereas the contributions of the people of Los Alamos and surrounding communities allowed the Navy to keep its offensive edge from World War II, through the Cold War, continuing to the emerging conflicts as of the date of adoption of this resolution; Whereas Captain "Deke" Parsons was one of the first residents of Los Alamos and, along with Laureate Ramsey, oversaw the safe delivery, assembly and loading of the nuclear bomb that led to the surrender of Japan in World War II; Whereas the people of Los Alamos and surrounding communities played a critical role in designing the nuclear portion of the first nuclear weapon to enter the arsenal of the Navy, known as the Regulus, along with atomic depth bombs, torpedoes, rockets, and even next generation weapon systems like the B61–12 precision-guided nuclear bomb; Whereas the people of Los Alamos designed the warheads that armed the first generation Trident submarine-launched ballistic missiles of the Navy and the follow-on Trident II missile warheads used by the Navy; Whereas the research into nuclear energy conducted by Los Alamos during World War II advanced the technical basis for the development of the nuclear propulsion systems of the Navy used aboard Los Angeles, Seawolf, Ohio, and Virginia Class submarines along with multiple naval aircraft carriers today; Whereas the people of Los Alamos and Los Alamos National Laboratory host United States Naval Academy midshipmen every year to provide hands-on scientific and engineering experience working to solve real world challenges in national security, thereby directly contributing to the development of future Navy leadership; Whereas the people of Los Alamos carry the solemn responsibility to assess the sea-based nuclear deterrent carried aboard Navy fleet ballistic missile submarines; Whereas naming a submarine Los Alamos will recognize and continue to forge the longstanding relationship between the Navy and Los Alamos; Whereas the year 2018 will mark the 75th anniversary of Los Alamos National Laboratory; and Whereas the distinctive service and contributions from the people of Los Alamos to the Navy merits naming a vessel that embodies the heritage, service, fidelity, and achievements of the residents of Los Alamos and surrounding communities in partnership with the United States Navy: Now, therefore, be it Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That it is the sense of the Congress that the Secretary of the Navy should name the next nuclear powered submarine of the United States Navy as the "USS Los Alamos". Appendix A. Executive Summary of July 2012 Navy Report to Congress This appendix reprints the executive summary of the July 2012 Navy report to Congress on the Navy's policies and practices for naming its ships. The text of the executive summary is as follows: Executive Summary This report is submitted in accordance with Section 1014 of P.L. 112-81 , National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2012, dated 31 December 2011, which directs the Secretary of Defense to submit a report on "policies and practices of the Navy for naming vessels of the Navy." As required by the NDAA, this report: Includes a description of the current policies and practices of the Navy for naming vessels of the Navy, and a description of the extent to which theses policies and practices vary from historical policies and practices of the Navy for naming vessels of the Navy, and an explanation for such variances; Assesses the feasibility and advisability of establishing fixed policies for the naming of one or more classes of vessels of the Navy, and a statement of the policies recommended to apply to each class of vessels recommended to be covered by such fixed policies if the establishment of such fixed policies is considered feasible and advisable; and Identifies any other matter relating to the policies and practices of the Navy for naming vessels of the Navy that the Secretary of Defense considers appropriate. After examining the historical record in great detail, this report concludes: Current ship naming policies and practices fall well within the historic spectrum of policies and practices for naming vessels of the Navy, and are altogether consistent with ship naming customs and traditions. The establishment of fixed policies for the naming of one or more classes of vessels of the Navy would be highly inadvisable. There is no objective evidence to suggest that fixed policies would improve Navy ship naming policies and practices, which have worked well for over two centuries. In addition, the Department of the Navy used to routinely publish lists of current type naming rules for battle force ships, and update it as changes were made to them. At some point, this practice fell into disuse, leading to a general lack of knowledge about naming rules. To remedy this problem, the Naval History and Heritage Command will once again develop and publish a list of current type naming rules to help all Americans better understand why Secretaries of the Navy choose the ship names they do. This list will be updated as required.	[ "Names for Navy ships traditionally have been chosen and announced by the Secretary of the Navy, under the direction of the President and in accordance with rules prescribed by Congress. Rules for giving certain types of names to certain types of Navy ships have evolved over time. There have been exceptions to the Navy's ship-naming rules, particularly for the purpose of naming a ship for a person when the rule for that type of ship would have called for it to be named for something else. Some observers have perceived a breakdown in, or corruption of, the rules for naming Navy ships. On July 13, 2012, the Navy submitted to Congress a 73-page report on the Navy's policies and practices for naming ships. For ship types now being procured for the Navy, or recently procured for the Navy, naming rules can be summarized as follows: The first Ohio replacement ballistic missile submarine (SSBN-826) has been named Columbia in honor of the District of Columbia, but the Navy has not stated what the naming rule for these ships will be. Virginia (SSN-774) class attack submarines are being named for states. Aircraft carriers are generally named for past U.S. Presidents. Of the past 14, 10 were named for past U.S. Presidents, and 2 for Members of Congress. Destroyers are being named for deceased members of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard, including Secretaries of the Navy. The Navy has not yet announced a naming rule for its planned new class of FFG(X) frigates, the first of which the Navy wants to procure in FY2021. Previous classes of U.S. Navy frigates, like Navy destroyers, were generally named for naval leaders and heroes. Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs) are being named for regionally important U.S. cities and communities. Amphibious assault ships are being named for important battles in which U.S. Marines played a prominent part, and for famous earlier U.S. Navy ships that were not named for battles. San Antonio (LPD-17) class amphibious ships are being named for major U.S. cities and communities, and cities and communities attacked on September 11, 2001. John Lewis (TAO-205) class oilers are being named for people who fought for civil rights and human rights. Expeditionary Fast Transports (EPFs) are being named for small U.S. cities. Expeditionary Transport Docks (ESDs) and Expeditionary Sea Bases (ESBs) are being named for famous names or places of historical significance to U.S. Marines. Navajo (TATS-6) class towing, salvage, and rescue ships are being named for prominent Native Americans or Native American tribes. Since 1974, at least 21 U.S. military ships have been named for persons who were living at the time the name was announced. The most recent instance occurred on May 6, 2019, when the Navy announced that it was naming the destroyer DDG-51 for former Senator Sam Nunn. Members of the public are sometimes interested in having Navy ships named for their own states or cities, for older U.S. Navy ships (particularly those on which they or their relatives served), for battles in which they or their relatives participated, or for people they admire. Congress has long maintained an interest in how Navy ships are named, and has influenced the naming of certain Navy ships. The Navy suggests that congressional offices wishing to express support for proposals to name a Navy ship for a specific person, place, or thing contact the office of the Secretary of the Navy to make their support known. Congress may also pass legislation relating to ship names. Measures passed by Congress in recent years regarding Navy ship names have all been sense-of-the-Congress provisions." ]	9,736	gov_report	en	null	485cad417645da4a987f6cc72805f40ba94bfc240f84064c
The U.S. Fourth National Climate Assessment, released in 2018, concluded that "the impacts of global climate change are already being felt in the United States and are projected to intensify in the future—but the severity of future impacts will depend largely on actions taken to reduce greenhouse g as [GHG] emissions and to adapt to the changes that will occur." Although a variety of efforts seeking to reduce GHG emissions are currently underway on the international and sub-national level, federal policymakers and stakeholders have different viewpoints over what to do, if anything, about future climate change and related impacts. Their views regarding climate change cover a wide range of perspectives. For example, some contend that climate change poses a "direct, existential threat" to human society and that nations must start making significant reductions in GHG emissions in order to avoid "dire effects." To support this argument, proponents of climate change mitigation highlight the evidence and conclusions from recent reports that are generally considered authoritative, including: 1. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Global W arming of 1.5°C , 2018; and 2. The U.S. Global Change Research Program, Fourth National Climate Assessment , Volume II: Impacts, Risks, and Adaptation in the United States , 2018. On the other hand, some question whether there are sufficient risks of climate change to merit a federal program requiring GHG emission reductions. In addition, others argue that a unilateral approach to climate change by the United States could disproportionately impact domestic industries while achieving minimal results in global climate change mitigation. If Congress were to consider establishing a program to reduce GHG emissions, one option would be to apply a tax or fee on GHG emissions or the inputs that produce them. This type of approach is commonly called a carbon tax or a GHG emissions fee (see "Terminology Issues: A Carbon Tax or an Emissions Fee?"). This report does not compare and analyze the multiple policy tools available to Congress that could address climate change (see text box "Other Policy Options for Addressing GHG Emissions"). This report focuses on the policy considerations and potential impacts of using a carbon tax or GHG emissions fee to control GHG emissions. The key human-related GHG is CO 2 , which is generated primarily through the combustion of fossil fuels: coal, oil, and natural gas. In 2016, fossil fuel combustion accounted for 94% of U.S. CO 2 emissions and 76% of U.S. GHG emissions. A carbon tax could apply either directly to GHG emissions or to the materials—based on their carbon contents—that ultimately generate the emissions (i.e., "emissions inputs"). A carbon price on emissions or their emissions inputs—mainly fossil fuels—would increase the relative price of the more carbon-intensive energy sources, particularly coal. This result could spur innovation in less carbon-intensive technologies (e.g., renewable energy, nuclear power, carbon capture and sequestration [CCS]) and stimulate other behavior that may decrease emissions, such as efficiency improvements. The energy price increases could also have both economy-wide impacts and negative effects on specific industries and particular demographic groups. A carbon tax approach has received some attention and debate in recent years. In the 115 th Congress, Members introduced nine carbon tax or fee proposals. Outside of Congress, the Climate Leadership Council—a bipartisan group of former policymakers and industry leaders—published a conceptual carbon tax approach in 2017 that generated some interest. Some of the industry leaders on the council represent major energy companies, including Shell, BP, and ExxonMobil. On the other hand, many Members have expressed their opposition to a carbon tax. Starting in the 112 th Congress and going through the 115 th Congress, Members have introduced resolutions in both the House and Senate expressing the view that a carbon tax is not in the economic interests of the United States. In 2018, the House passed a resolution "expressing the sense of Congress that a carbon tax would be detrimental to the United States economy" ( H.Con.Res. 119 ). An analogous resolution was not introduced in the Senate in the 115 th Congress. The first section of this report examines carbon tax design issues, including the point of taxation, the rate of taxation, and potential border carbon adjustments. The second section discusses issues related to the distribution of carbon tax revenues. The third section discusses additional considerations associated with a carbon tax program, including estimates of GHG emissions, federal revenue, and fossil fuel prices and changes in energy use. The fourth section provides concluding observations. If policymakers decide to establish a carbon tax system, Congress would face several key design decisions, including the point of taxation—where to impose the tax and what to tax—the rate of taxation, and whether and/or how to address imported carbon-intensive materials. Alternatively, Congress could direct one or more federal agencies to determine these design features through a rulemaking procedure. Although a few of the GHG emission reduction proposals in prior Congresses delegated such authority to an agency, such as the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), all of the proposals since the 111 th Congress have included some degree of design details in the statutory language. (A later section discusses carbon tax revenue application considerations.) The point of taxation would determine which entities would be required to (1) make tax payments based on emissions or emission inputs, such as fossil fuels, (2) monitor emissions or emission inputs, and (3) maintain records of relevant activities and transactions. This section provides some considerations for policymakers deciding which GHG emissions and/or emission sources to cover in a carbon tax system. Throughout the U.S. economy, millions of discrete sources generate GHG emissions: power plants, industrial facilities, motor vehicles, households, commercial buildings, livestock, etc. Administrative costs and challenges would likely increase with a broader scope of an emissions tax. A carbon tax may apply to CO 2 emissions alone, which account for most U.S. GHG emissions, or to multiple GHGs. Carbon tax proposals that apply only to CO 2 generally attach a price to a metric ton of CO 2 emissions (mtCO 2 ). Some sources emit non-CO 2 GHGs, such as methane, nitrous oxides, and sulfur hexafluoride. GHG emissions from these sources could be addressed by attaching a price to a metric ton of CO 2 emissions-equivalent (mtCO 2 e). This term of measure is used because GHGs vary by global warming potential (GWP). At these sources, the determined GWP values would be an important issue. Policymakers may consider limiting the tax to sectors or sources that emit above a certain percentage of total U.S. GHG emissions, many of which currently report their emissions to the government. For more than 20 years, monitoring devices or systems have been installed in smokestacks of most large facilities, such as power plants, which are required to periodically report emissions data to EPA. In addition, since 2010, EPA has collected annual emissions data from approximately 8,000 facilities that directly release above certain amounts of GHG emissions. Using these established monitoring frameworks, policymakers could employ a "downstream" approach, applying a carbon tax at the point where the GHGs from these facilities are released to the atmosphere. Alternatively, the tax could be applied to reliable proxies for emissions, such as emission inputs. For example, the carbon content of fossil fuels—coal, natural gas, petroleum—can serve as a proxy for the emissions released when the fuels are combusted. Applying a tax on emission inputs allows for the consideration of various points of taxation. For instance, emission inputs could be taxed at "upstream" (e.g., wells) or "midstream" stages in that process (e.g., refineries), the latter allowing for potential tax administration advantages that may be provided by specific infrastructure chokepoints in the fossil fuel market. For example, with respect to petroleum, the number of upstream sources—wells that produce crude oil—is over 445,000, but the number of midstream sources—facilities that refine crude oil—is only 137. Table A-1 (in Appendix A) lists the top GHG emission sources in the United States. These sources combined to account for approximately 95% of U.S. GHG emissions in 2016. Table A-1 identifies the number of entities for each source category (e.g., number of coal mines, number of steel production facilities) and the percentage of total U.S. GHG emissions the category contributes. In the case of fossil fuel combustion—which accounted for 76% of total U.S. GHG emissions—the table provides several options for segmenting the universe of sources if policymakers choose to implement a carbon tax. It identifies the number of entities that might be subject to the carbon tax under a particular option (pending any exclusions). For example, policymakers could address fossil fuel combustion emissions by applying a carbon tax to fossil fuels (based on their carbon content) at the following entities, which include both upstream and midstream infrastructure chokepoints: 137 petroleum refineries (based on 2017 data) and 166 petroleum importers (based on 2018 data); 671 coal mines and eight companies supplying imported coal (based on 2017 data); and 1,679 entities that report natural gas deliveries to the Energy Information Administration (EIA) on Form EIA-176 and 123 natural gas fractionators (based on 2016 data). Some of the above points of taxation might take advantage of the administrative frameworks for existing federal excise taxes. For example, a per-barrel federal excise tax on crude oil at the refinery supports the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund. An excise tax on the sale or use of coal supports the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund. A central policy choice when establishing a price on GHG emissions is the rate of the carbon tax. Several approaches, which are discussed below, could inform the decision. One approach would set the carbon tax rate at a level or pathway—based on modeling estimates—that would achieve a specific GHG emissions target. For example, a 2018 study estimated the carbon tax rate needed to meet the U.S. GHG emission reduction targets established under the 2015 Paris Agreement: 26%-28% below 2005 net GHG emission levels by 2025. The study found that a constant tax rate of $43/ton starting in 2019 would meet the 2025 reduction target. Emissions reduction estimates from carbon tax programs are based on multiple assumptions. Accordingly, such estimates provide different tax rates needed to meet a particular emissions target depending on these assumptions. See " Impacts on GHG Emission Levels " for selected analyses of emission reductions for a given carbon price and rate of price increase. Under another approach, policymakers could base the carbon tax rate on the estimated marginal net benefits associated with reduced CO 2 emissions. The net benefits would be the avoided net damages (i.e., costs) of climate change. The estimates of net benefits of avoided emissions often rely on analyses of the social cost of carbon (SC-CO 2 ) or the social cost of greenhouse gases (SC-GHG ). Therefore, policymakers could use SC-CO 2 measurements—as the basis for an estimate of the net benefits of a marginal change in emissions—to set the rate of a carbon tax or emissions fee. One potential challenge of relying on SC-CO 2 estimates to set a carbon fee are methodological concerns. For example, the existing estimates in peer-reviewed research cover a wide range. In addition, some argue that the underlying simulation models for estimating the SC-CO 2 values are insufficient. For any level of emissions, the projected increase in global average temperature may cover multiple degrees Fahrenheit, and other measures of climate change, such as precipitation patterns, may encompass directional uncertainties. No estimates of impacts are comprehensive at this time, and many of the risks are difficult to estimate and value. When valuing the SC-CO 2 , analysts encounter a range of views on methods and assumptions, and establishing study parameters may be challenging. For example, estimates of the monetary values of climate change impacts may be difficult or controversial to estimate, such as the monetary values associated with human deaths or sickness. A related framework question is whether to include global climate impacts or just domestic impacts. In addition, the element of time in climate change impacts particularly complicates the valuation. The fact that many impacts of climate change will occur in the distant future requires consideration of society's willingness to pay in the near term to reduce emissions that would cause future damages, mostly to future generations. To take time into account, economists discount future values to a calculated "present value." Economists do not agree on the appropriate discount rate(s) to use for a multi-generational, largely nonmarket issue such as human-induced climate change. The choice of discount rate can significantly increase or decrease values of the SC-CO 2 . A low discount rate would give greater value today to future impacts than would a higher discount rate. High discount rates can reduce the value today of future climate change impacts to a small fraction of their undiscounted values. A high discount rate would recommend applying fewer of today's resources to addressing climate change impacts in the future. Since 2008, federal agencies have used SC-CO 2 estimates in dozens of final rulemakings as a method to estimate the net benefits of abating CO 2 emissions. An Interagency Working Group prepared SC-CO 2 estimates, which were updated over time and subjected to expert and public comment. On March 28, 2017, President Trump issued Executive Order 13783, "Promoting Energy Independence and Economic Growth," which effectively withdrew the federal SC-CO 2 estimates. Nonetheless, federal agencies have used new, interim values generated by EPA in 2017, modified from the withdrawn technical support documents, in regulatory and other decisions. Legislation could set a carbon price citing any of these SC-CO 2 values or others available from nonfederal researchers or prescribe methods for estimating new ones. Using SC-CO 2 estimates to set the tax rate would involve a cost-benefit framework. Although many posit that a cost-benefit framework remains the best option, some economists argue that a cost-benefit framework may be inappropriate for climate change policy for these reasons Many experts expect climate change—and policies to address it—to cause nonmarginal changes to economies and ecosystems. The changes are expected to increase disproportionately with incremental climate change with a potential for crossing critical "tipping points" after which systems change dramatically and rapidly. Climate change impacts are multi-generational, and uncertainty and disagreement exists about whether and how to assign a present value to social costs and benefits over generations. Some impacts from climate change may be irreversible on the timescale of human civilizations, such as melting of major ice sheets in Antarctica or Greenland. Policymakers might consider a carbon tax as a fiscal tool to help reduce the federal deficit, reduce other taxes, or pay for specific programs that may or may not be related to climate change policy. In addition, some have proposed a phased-in approach, setting a rate that is initially lower but increases at an announced or adjustable rate either for a fixed period or indefinitely. Advantages of this approach include providing an opportunity for consumers and investors to adjust their behavior before the higher tax rates go into effect, such as purchasing more energy efficient appliances or investing in low-emissions technologies. Phasing in a carbon tax, however, could delay climate-related benefits. If Congress finds agreement in principle on carbon pricing, the rate(s) could emerge from the process of reaching political agreement. Elements that might be considered include the options described above or consideration of the magnitude of overall economic impact; impacts on certain economic sectors, regions, or population groups; timing to motivate and allow an orderly transition to a lower-GHG economy; or other factors. Many stakeholders have voiced concerns over how a U.S. carbon price system would interact with policies in other nations, particularly if the United States were to enact a carbon tax system that covers more sources or is more stringent than enacted elsewhere. A central concern is that a U.S. carbon tax could raise U.S. prices more than the prices of goods manufactured abroad, potentially creating a competitive disadvantage for some domestic businesses. Certain businesses may become less profitable, lose market share, and reduce jobs. The industries generally expected to experience disproportionate impacts under a U.S. carbon tax are often described as "emission-intensive, trade-exposed" industries. An industry's CO 2 emission intensity is a function of both direct CO 2 emissions from its manufacturing process (e.g., CO 2 from cement or steel production) and indirect CO 2 emissions from the inputs to the manufacturing process (e.g., electricity, natural gas). Such industries are likely to experience greater cost increases than less carbon intensive industries, all else being equal. In general, trade-exposed industries are those that face greater international competition compared to other domestic industries. A carbon tax could present a particular challenge for these industries, because they might be less able to pass along the tax in the form of higher prices, because they may lose global market share—and jobs—to competitors in countries lacking comparable carbon policies. Policymakers might consider approaches to mitigate these potential economic impacts in several ways. One approach that has received interest in recent years is a border adjustment mechanism, which is often described as a border carbon adjustment (BCA) in the carbon tax context. A BCA would apply a tariff to emission-intensive, imported goods such as steel, aluminum, cement, and certain chemicals. Each of the carbon price proposals in the 115 th Congress would have established a BCA to address emission-intensive imports. Another rationale for adding a BCA to a carbon tax system is the possibility that it would encourage other nations to adopt comparable carbon price policies. Many of the recently proposed BCA mechanisms allow for exemptions for nations with comparable programs. To date, no nations have implemented a BCA as part of their climate change policies. Establishing an economically efficient BCA would likely present substantial challenges. For example, policymakers must decide which goods and/or industries would be covered by a BCA and how the adjustment program would assess the comparability of varied climate-related policies in other nations. In addition, accurately determining and verifying the volume of GHG emissions embodied in a particular imported product would be data intensive and challenging. To alleviate some of the measurement complexity, policymakers could limit the program to selected industries and apply default values and assumptions to particular manufacturing processes. However, this simplified approach could result in less accurate import price adjustments, which could potentially affect the accuracy of GHG emission reductions achieved by the carbon tax program. Another option would be to allow companies to provide measured, independently verified emissions data as an alternative to default values. In addition, the border adjustment approach would likely raise concerns of violating international trade rules. Further, some researchers have highlighted the potential for unintended consequences from a BCA. For example, some studies have found that a border adjustment may lead to lower net exports than the carbon price alone, due to the adjustment's terms-of-trade effect on U.S. currency. These issues are beyond the scope of this report, but some of the concerns may be lessened to some degree if a larger number of nations establish comparable emission reduction policies, as many have agreed to do under the Paris Agreement. Another possible rationale for a BCA is to address the concern of "emissions leakage" (or "carbon leakage"). Emissions leakage "occurs when economic activity is shifted as a result of the emission control regulation [e.g., a carbon tax program] and, as a result, emission abatement achieved in one location that is subject to emission control regulation is [diminished] by increased emissions in unregulated locations." The concern of emissions leakage has been central in the debate over whether the United States (or any nation) should unilaterally address GHG emissions. A BCA may diminish the potential for emissions leakage by reducing the incentive to shift economic activity to a nation without a comparable carbon tax. However, some recent studies raise questions regarding the degree to which emissions leakage would be a concern under a unilateral U.S. carbon tax. Although a tax may be levied on fossil fuels or GHG emission sources at various points in the economy, the carbon tax impacts may be experienced elsewhere. Policymakers have multiple options to address these expected impacts. Policymakers would face challenging decisions regarding the distribution of the new carbon tax revenues. As discussed below, some economic analyses indicate that certain distributions of tax revenue—depending on the level of the tax—would have a greater economic impact than the direct effects from the tax or fee on GHG emissions. Carbon tax revenues could be treated as general fund revenue without a dedication to a specific purpose in the enacting legislation (i.e., subject to the annual appropriations process), or policymakers could state that the new revenues would support deficit (or debt) reduction. Alternatively, the enacting legislation could return the tax revenue to the economy in some manner, sometimes called "revenue recycling." All of the carbon tax legislative proposals in recent Congresses have proposed some manner of revenue recycling, specifically directing the carbon tax revenue to support specific policy objectives. Carbon tax revenues may be used to support a variety of policy goals. When deciding how to allocate the new revenue stream, policymakers would likely encounter trade-offs among objectives, including: reducing the economy-wide costs resulting from a carbon tax program; alleviating the costs borne by subgroups in the U.S. population, particularly low-income households and/or communities most dependent on carbon-intensive economic activity; and supporting specific policy objectives, such as domestic employment, climate change adaptation, energy efficiency, technological advance, energy diversity, or federal deficit reduction, among others. In general, economic carbon tax studies have found that the relative ranking of revenue recycling options to mitigate the economy-wide impacts is generally the opposite of the relative ranking for alleviating distributional impacts. The contrasting relative rankings highlight a central tradeoff policymakers would face when deciding how to allocate carbon tax revenues. The following sections discuss these trade-offs and some of the revenue application options that have received attention in recent years. A large body of economic literature has examined the economic impacts of hypothetical carbon tax programs, particularly the impacts of using the carbon tax revenues for different purposes. Many of the economic studies cited below were prepared prior to the enactment of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA, P.L. 115-97 ). Signed by President Trump in December 2017, the act changed various elements of the U.S. federal tax system. In particular, the act lowered the corporate income tax rate from 35% to 21%. As discussed below, adjusting the corporate income tax rate is one of the central policy options generally considered in carbon tax economic literature both before and after enactment of P.L. 115-97 . Based on a selected review of the economic literature that includes the tax code changes in P.L. 115-97 , the central conclusions from carbon tax literature regarding revenue recycling appear to be largely unchanged. A primary concern with a carbon tax is the potential economy-wide costs that may result. Generally, a tax or fee on GHG emissions or the fuels that generate them would increase certain energy prices, namely fossil fuels, in the near- to medium-term as well as the prices of goods and services produced using these materials, like electricity. This outcome is inherent to the carbon tax, as its purpose is to increase the relative price of the more carbon-intensive energy sources compared to less carbon-intensive alternatives, encourage innovation in less carbon-intensive technologies, and promote other activity (e.g., energy efficiency) that may decrease emissions. These expected outcomes will have some economy-wide impacts. Ultimately, the economy-wide effects would depend on a number of factors, including, but not limited to, the magnitude and scope of the carbon tax and, most importantly, use of the ensuing revenues. Economy-wide costs (referred to as macroeconomic costs) are often measured in terms of changes in projected gross domestic product (GDP) or another societal-scale metric, such as economic welfare. The magnitude of macroeconomic impacts from a carbon tax has been a subject of debate among policymakers and stakeholders. In addition, results of economy-wide impacts will not include comparisons of impacts to different subpopulations or geographic regions, which may be of interest to policymakers. Multiple economic studies and models have examined and compared various options for addressing the economy-wide impacts that may result from a carbon tax. One option for reducing the economic cost of a carbon tax is using the revenue to reduce existing taxes, such as those on labor, income, and investment. Economists generally describe such taxes as distortionary, because the taxes discourage economically beneficial activity, such as employment and investment. Another option for policymakers is to use the tax revenues to address the national debt. Fewer studies have examined deficit reduction scenarios, because "modeling the effects of budget deficits is much more difficult than modeling the effects of tax cuts." Some studies have concluded that using tax revenues for this purpose would help alleviate economy-wide costs from a carbon tax because of the reduced need to impose distortionary taxes in the future. These studies indicate that the economy-wide benefit would be delayed and its realization assumes policymakers would, sometime in the future, address the deficit by raising taxes. Many recent legislative proposals would distribute the carbon tax revenue back to households in lump-sum payments. Policymakers have generally included this carbon tax revenue application to address distribution impacts (discussed below). These payments could take multiple forms. Economic analyses typically assume an equal payment to individuals or households regardless of their income or location or the effects of the carbon price on them individually. Alternatively, payments could be targeted or scaled to different segments of the population. Among the options mentioned above, economic studies indicate that using carbon tax revenues to offset reductions in existing, distortionary taxes would be the most economically efficient use of the revenues and yield the greatest benefit to the economy overall. This concept is sometimes referred to as a "tax swap." Using carbon tax or fee revenues to offset other distortionary taxes (e.g., labor or capital) may yield a "double-dividend," which includes: reduced GHG emissions; and reduced market distortions by reducing other distortionary taxes, such as investment or income. The economic models that examine the economic impacts of a carbon tax differ in their frameworks and underlying assumptions and often include multiple scenarios involving different uses of carbon tax revenue. In general, the economic models find that certain revenue recycling options may reduce the economy-wide carbon tax impacts but may not eliminate them entirely. Some studies cite particular economic modeling scenarios in which a carbon tax with certain revenue recycling applications would produce a net increase in GDP or economic welfare compared to a baseline scenario. These results indicate that, in certain modeling conditions, the economic improvements gained by reducing existing distortionary taxes would be greater than the costs imposed by the new carbon tax (without including the intended climate benefits of the policy). For example, results from a 2018 study demonstrated a net increase in GDP, compared to baseline conditions, when carbon tax revenues were used to finance proportionate reductions in labor tax rates (payroll tax). In general, the economic carbon tax studies usually agree on the relative ranking of revenue recycling options in terms of their ability to mitigate the economy-wide impacts of a carbon tax program. The studies indicate that the approaches that use carbon tax revenue to proportionately lower existing tax rates are able to mitigate more of the carbon tax economy-wide costs than using the revenue to provide a lump-sum distribution to individuals or households. Researchers prepared multiple carbon tax analyses prior to the enactment of the TCJA in 2017 that estimated the magnitude GDP impacts. As with other estimates relating to carbon tax impacts, the results depend on the scope of the carbon tax, underlying assumptions in the analytical model, and the terms of measurement: Some estimates measure GDP growth rates; others measure actual GDP. Figure 1 illustrates the modeled GDP results from a 2018 carbon tax analysis that includes the changes made by the TCJA. This study assessed the GDP impacts under a $50/mtCO 2 e carbon tax (starting in 2020 and increasing by 2% annually) that would apply to CO 2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion and methane emissions from fossil fuel production activities. The figure compares projected GDP impacts under a baseline scenario (i.e., no carbon tax) with three carbon tax revenue applications: a payroll tax rate reduction tax swap, a lump-sum distribution to households, and a scenario that would use tax revenue to reduce the national debt for 10 years and then use revenues for a lump-sum distribution to households. The figure projects GDP impacts in 2020, 2024, 2029, and 2039. As the figure indicates, the payroll tax rate scenario would result in a 0.1% loss of GDP in the first year (2020), but would yield GDP gains in subsequent years compared to baseline. The lump-sum distribution approach would yield GDP losses each year, ranging from 0.3% to 0.4% below the projected baseline. The deficit reduction approach would yield a range of GDP losses in the first 10 years—ranging from 0.4% to 0.04%—but would yield a GDP gain in 2039 (if not before), compared to baseline. Opponents of a carbon tax approach often highlight the GDP losses that would result from a carbon tax. Policymakers and stakeholders may have different perspectives regarding whether the magnitude of the GDP impacts are significant. In addition, GDP impact estimates may be presented in several ways. For example, one could compare the differences in GDP value for a particular year between carbon tax scenarios and a baseline scenario. This approach is employed in the above figure. Alternatively, one could present the GDP losses with a cumulative measure. For instance, if one were to add up the annual GDP losses (for example, over a 10-year period) from the lump-sum scenario compared to the baseline scenario, the resulting sum would be much larger. These types of calculations would require assumptions about annual GDP growth rates. Some may point out that the GDP impact estimates do not account for the environmental and public health benefits for reducing GHG emissions and that the GDP projections should be compared with the climate benefits achieved from the program as well as the estimated costs of taking no action. As discussed above, estimates of climate-related benefits and costs often contain considerable uncertainty and have generated debate in recent years. Many economic analyses have found that a carbon tax (before revenue recycling) would produce a regressive outcome among households, with lower-income households facing a larger impact from the tax than higher-income households. However, "the degree to which a carbon tax is found to disproportionately burden low-income households varies across studies, based on the metrics against which analysts measure costs." Entities that pay the carbon tax may pass its costs back to fuel producers or forward to fuel consumers. If entities pass the costs forward, consumers would face higher prices for fuels and electricity and carbon-intensive products. When the carbon tax is passed forward to consumers, lower-income households in particular would likely face a disproportionate impact (i.e., regressive outcome), because a larger percentage of their income is used to pay for energy needs, such as electricity, gasoline, or home heating oil. Many economic analyses of carbon price scenarios assume that the vast majority (if not all) of the carbon tax impact is passed forward to consumers, leading to a regressive outcome. On the other hand, if entities pass the costs backward to producers, the tax impacts would fall on labor through reduced wages or owners of capital through reduced returns on investment. Economic models that assume this outcome produce more progressive results (absent revenue recycling), with lower-income households experiencing smaller impacts than higher-income households. The economic analyses appear to agree that the distributional effects among households (i.e., regressive vs. progressive) of a carbon tax program would be largely dependent on how the carbon tax revenues were used. A number of economic studies have used models to estimate the impacts of a carbon tax across households under several revenue distribution scenarios. The results vary because the studies use different modeling frameworks, carbon tax rates and scopes, underlying assumptions, and ways to measure impacts. For example, a 2018 study assessed the impacts to household income for different household quintiles under a carbon tax of $50/mtCO 2 e, starting in 2020. This study examined four revenue distribution scenarios: 1. reduce federal deficit, 2. reduce corporate income tax rate, 3. reduce payroll tax rate, and 4. provide a per-capita rebate to households. This report highlights this study, because it includes carbon tax revenue applications that have generated interest in recent years. In addition, this analysis was prepared after the 2017 tax rate changes in P.L. 115-97 . Figure 2 illustrates the modeled results, which the study measured as percentage reductions to household income. Thus, negative percentages illustrated in the figure are gains to household income. The per-capita rebate approach provides the most progressive result, yielding a net benefit for the bottom three household quintiles but a net loss for the top quintile. The fourth quintile impact is zero. By comparison, the other approaches produce varying degrees of regressive outcomes while providing a net gain for wealthier groups in two particular instances. Of the four options, the payroll tax rate reduction approach estimates the smallest variance between the income quintiles, ranging from a 0.5% loss for the lowest quintile to a 0.2% gain for the fourth quintile. The fifth quintile impact is zero. The relative ranking among options for progressivity is generally the opposite of the relative ranking for mitigating economy-wide impacts. Other economic analyses have found similar relative rankings of revenue recycling options. The contrasting rankings highlight a central tradeoff policymakers would face when deciding how to allocate carbon tax revenues. Policymakers could allot some portion of the revenues to partially support both objectives. In a 2018 carbon tax study, economic modelers assessed a scenario in which a portion of the revenue was used to offset the welfare impacts for the lowest-income household quintile and the remaining revenue supported reductions in capital tax rates. The study's models estimated that a carbon tax's impacts on the lowest-income household quintile could be counteracted with approximately 10% of the revenue. This would allow for 90% of the revenue to be used to reduce capital tax rates and thus address the economy-wide impacts from the carbon tax. As discussed above, a carbon tax is projected to disproportionately impact certain industries, particularly those that are described as "emission-intensive, trade-exposed industries." To address these concerns, many of the recent carbon tax legislative proposals have included design mechanisms that would attach a carbon price to certain imported materials and products (see " Border Carbon Adjustments "). Another approach to addressing the competitiveness concerns of domestic industries would involve distributing a portion of the carbon tax revenues to emission-intensive, trade-exposed industries as rebates based on their output. Output rebate proposals generally determine rebate amounts by measuring emissions intensity at the relevant sector level or by a benchmark that would encourage facilities to reduce their emissions intensity. These rebates could be phased out over time or continue until other nations adopt comparable carbon price policies. Under a carbon tax system in Canada, which is scheduled to take effect in 2019, industries will be subject to an "output-based pricing system." Some contend that the data and administrative resources necessary to implement such a program would be substantial. A carbon tax system is also expected to disproportionately impact fossil fuel industries and the communities that rely on their employment. In particular, coal-mining communities are expected to experience substantial impacts based on the coal production declines predicted in carbon tax analyses. For example, one model estimates that under a $50/mtCO 2 e carbon tax, annual U.S. coal production would decline by almost 80% in 2030 compared to a reference case. Policymakers may consider supporting worker transition or community transition assistance to help mitigate the economic impacts. Several of the recent carbon tax proposals would have devoted carbon tax revenues for this objective. Policymakers may also consider using the carbon tax revenues to provide funding to support a range of objectives, which may include policy goals that are not directly related to climate change. Some options are identified below, and many have been included in recent legislative proposals or in state GHG mitigation programs that raise revenues: Technology development and deployment: Efforts to reduce the costs of emission mitigation technologies—particularly carbon capture, utilization, and sequestration—are often considered in carbon tax programs, and Congress has funded such programs in other legislation. Energy efficiency programs: Although a carbon tax would likely stimulate energy efficiency to some degree, Congress may consider using the revenues to provide additional incentives and/or technical assistance, particularly to encourage households and small businesses to increase efficiency, which would also reduce the effects of the tax on their energy bills. States in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) have used revenues from the program to support efficiency improvements, among other objectives. Biological sequestration: Trees, plants, and soils sequester carbon, removing it from the earth's atmosphere. Revenues could be used to promote carbon sequestration efforts, particularly forestry or agricultural activities, which would supplement the GHG reductions of the carbon tax. Adaptation to climate change: Regardless of emission reduction efforts taken today, climatic changes are expected due to the ongoing accumulation of GHGs in the atmosphere. Therefore, some advocate using revenues to reduce potential damage—domestically and internationally—of a changing climate. Deficit reduction: The possible contribution of a carbon tax to deficit reduction would depend on the magnitude and scope of the carbon tax, various market factors, and assumptions about the size of the deficit. Some carbon tax proposals in recent congressional sessions would have allotted a portion of revenues for deficit reduction. Infrastructure funding: Some recent proposals have provided funding for infrastructure projects. This objective could be combined with funding for adaptation activities. Multiple economic studies have estimated the emission reductions that particular carbon tax designs could achieve. Economic models provide estimates based on the best information available at the time. Comparing results from different studies is problematic, because the studies' scenarios differ in multiple ways, including the tax rate, start date, scope of the program, assumptions about economic growth and technological advances, and assumptions about other federal and state policies and their effects. A 2018 study avoided some of these comparison difficulties by inviting modeling teams to analyze a coordinated set of scenarios. The 2018 Stanford Energy Modeling Forum study ("EMF 32") assembled 11 modeling teams to analyze the economic impacts of four carbon tax scenarios starting in 2020: a $25/metric ton and $50/metric ton carbon tax, increasing annually by 1% and 5%. Within each of these carbon price frameworks, the models ran separate revenue distribution scenarios: a reduction in labor tax rates, a reduction in capital tax rates, and household rebates. Figure 3 illustrates the study's estimates of CO 2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion. The red lines in the figure display the average values for the 11 models. The shaded areas illustrate the range of results, highlighting the uncertainties in emission reduction estimates. Based on these results, the study authors concluded that each of the tax rate scenarios would likely achieve the U.S. CO 2 emission reduction targets under the Paris Agreement. As Figure 3 indicates, a carbon tax or emissions fee could be set with the expectation that it would achieve an emissions reduction target, but the resulting level of emissions would be uncertain. The uncertainty of resulting emissions may lead some stakeholders to disfavor a carbon tax or fee option to control GHG emissions. Although uncertain emissions are inherent with a carbon tax approach, Congress could employ certain design elements to enhance the emission control certainty. For example, the existing GHG emission reporting data could be used to track the impact and performance of a carbon price. If policymakers determine that emission reduction is not occurring at a desired pace, the price could be amended. Legislation could establish the conditions and process by which price changes could occur. Some may argue that adjusting the carbon price to reflect actual emissions performance would undermine the benefits of price certainty. Others may point out that unplanned adjustments to the carbon price could be politically unpalatable. For example, it may be difficult for policymakers to increase the tax rate, especially during periods of high energy prices. Some have suggested that Congress authorize an independent board or agency with the mandate to modify the tax rate administratively in order to meet pre-determined emission reduction objectives. Although this approach would likely improve emission certainty, long-term price certainty may be sacrificed to some degree, depending on the authority of the delegated entity to adjust the tax rate. Some would argue that potential year-to-year emission variations under a carbon tax would not undermine efforts to control climate change so long as long-term emission goals are achieved. Indeed, they would assert that annual emission fluctuations are preferable to price volatility that could result from an emissions cap program. They support their preference for price control by suggesting that CO 2 generates damages through its overall accumulation as concentrations in the atmosphere, not its annual flow. A potential concern of a carbon tax is whether it would be effective in reducing GHG emissions in all of its covered sectors, particularly emissions in the transportation sector. As of 2016, the transportation sector contributes the largest percentage (36%) of CO 2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion, with electric power second at 35%. Carbon tax analyses generally agree that the majority of the emission reductions resulting from a carbon tax program would occur in the electricity sector. By comparison, economic models generally conclude that a carbon tax would have much less of an impact on emissions in the transportation sector. Several factors explain this projected outcome. The transportation sector offers fewer opportunities to switch to less carbon-intensive fuels in the short term than does the electric power sector, which can displace coal with natural gas relatively quickly. In addition, short-term emission changes in the transportation sector are largely influenced by changes in driving demand, which has historically been relatively insensitive to gasoline price increases. Based on these projected outcomes, some may contend that to achieve deeper, long-term reductions in total GHG emissions, policymakers would need to complement a carbon tax with other programs, such as vehicle technology standards (e.g., Corporate Average Fuel Economy, CAFE) or fuel performance standards, among other options. The quantity of revenues generated under a carbon tax system depend on the program's design features, namely the tax base and rate, as well as such independent factors as prices in global energy markets. They would also depend on how covered emission sources respond to the carbon price, for example by adopting alternative technologies or changing behavior. Several carbon tax studies have prepared revenue estimates, which are presented in Table 1 . From a public finance perspective, a carbon tax may not be a reliable source of long-term funding, because a primary goal of the carbon tax is to reduce its tax base—GHG emissions. The estimates in Table 1 project carbon tax revenue values in 2020. Multiple studies have projected carbon tax revenue trajectories beyond 2020. In the 2018 EMF 32 study, all but one of eight models projected carbon tax revenue increases from 2020 through 2040. The carbon tax scenarios with larger annual rate increases resulted in steeper trajectories of increasing revenues through 2040. The models' estimates of annual carbon tax revenue in 2040 ranged from approximately $250 billion to $475 billion (under the tax rate scenario of $50/metric ton, increasing 5% annually). Fossil fuels have a wide range of CO 2 emission intensity (i.e., emissions per unit of energy). As illustrated in Figure 4 , the CO 2 emission intensity of coal is approximately 30% more than oil and approximately 80% more than natural gas. These emissions intensity differences would lead to different tax rates per unit of energy across different fuels in a carbon tax regime. Carbon taxes could affect fuel prices in complex ways. The change in consumer fuel prices would likely not be the same as the price paid by the party directly subject to the tax. Actual price impacts for consumers would depend on multiple factors, including whether: a carbon tax is applied at the beginning of the production process ("upstream") to fossil fuels; and the price impacts are passed through to end users and not absorbed by upstream energy producers or midstream entities, such as retailers. In addition, market participants such as electric power plant operators can avoid paying the increased costs by substituting fuels or technologies. Energy consumers may modify their behavior in the marketplace—energy conservation, consuming less or different products and services—to mitigate impacts from the increased prices. Table 2 includes estimates of price increases on coal, crude oil, natural gas, home heating oil, and motor gasoline based on a carbon tax rate of $25/mtCO 2 that applies CO 2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion. As indicated in the table, a carbon tax would have the greatest impact on the price of coal due to coal's relatively high CO 2 emissions intensity. By comparison, a carbon tax is expected to have less of an impact on the price of gasoline, increasing its price by 8%. Economic models have projected how carbon prices would impact energy use, particularly the consumption of different fossil fuels and less carbon-intensive alternatives, such as renewables or nuclear power. For example, the 2018 EMF 32 study, which included results from 11 modeling groups, assessed how several carbon tax scenarios would impact energy consumption. Highlights of these models' results (compared to reference case scenarios) include the following: Coal consumption could decline by 40% to nearly 100% by 2030 under a $50/mtCO 2 carbon tax, though one model projected an increase in coal due to the model incorporating CCS technology. Natural gas consumption estimates vary across the models, with some showing minimal change in 2030 and others showing declines ranging between 40% and 60%. Oil consumption estimates indicate that the largest decline (approximately 4% by 2030) would occur under the $50/mtCO 2 carbon tax scenario. Wind energy consumption could increase by 48% to 300% by 2030 under a $50/mtCO 2 carbon tax scenario. A carbon tax is one policy option to address U.S. GHG emission levels, which contribute to climate change and related impacts. Economic modeling indicates that a carbon tax would achieve emission reductions, the level of which would depend on which GHG emissions and sources are covered and the rate of the carbon tax. A carbon tax would generate a new revenue stream. The magnitude of the revenues would depend on the scope and rate of the tax and multiple market factors, which introduce uncertainty in the revenue projections. A 2018 CBO study estimated that a $25/metric ton tax on CO 2 emissions from energy-related activities and other selected GHG emission sources would yield approximately $100 billion in the first year of the program. To put this estimate in context, the CBO projected that total federal revenue would be $3.5 trillion in FY2019. Policymakers would face challenging decisions regarding the distribution of the new carbon tax revenues. Depending on the level of the tax, some economic analyses indicate that the distribution of tax revenue could yield greater economic impacts than the direct impacts of the tax. Some models indicate that the economic impacts are greatest in the early years of the carbon tax. Policymakers could apply the tax revenues to support a range of policy objectives. When deciding how to allocate the revenues, policymakers would encounter trade-offs among objectives. The central trade-offs involve minimizing economy-wide costs, lessening the costs borne by specific groups—particularly low-income households—and supporting a range of specific policy objectives. A primary concern with a carbon tax is the potential economy-wide costs that may result. The potential costs would depend on a number of factors, including the magnitude, design, and use of revenues of the carbon tax. In general, economic literature finds that some of the modeled revenue applications would reduce the economy-wide costs imposed by a carbon tax but may not eliminate them entirely. Policymakers and stakeholders may have different perspectives regarding whether these estimated economy-wide costs (typically measured in terms of GDP loss) represent a significant concern. Some argue that the estimated economy-wide costs should be compared with the policy option of not establishing a carbon tax. This comparison is uncertain as carbon tax analyses do not generally consider the benefits that would be gained by reducing GHG emissions and avoiding climate change and its adverse impacts. Some studies cite particular economic modeling scenarios in which a carbon tax and revenue recycling could produce a net increase in GDP or economic welfare, compared to a baseline scenario. These scenarios involve using carbon tax revenues to offset reductions in existing, distortionary taxes, such as corporate income or payroll taxes. Although the models indicate that these revenue applications would yield the greatest benefit to the economy overall, the models also find that lower-income households would likely face a disproportionate impact under such revenue applications. As lower-income households spend a greater proportion of their income on energy needs, these households are expected to experience disproportionate impacts from a carbon tax if revenues were not recycled back to them in some fashion, such as a lump-sum distribution. Carbon tax revenues that are used to offset the burden imposed on various sectors or specific population groups would not be available to support other objectives. An additional concern with a carbon tax involves potential disproportionate impacts to "emission-intensive, trade-exposed industries." Policymakers could select among several options to address these concerns, either by establishing a border carbon adjustment program or allocating some of the carbon tax revenues to selected industry sectors based on an output-based metric. If other nations were to adopt comparable carbon price policies, this concern may be alleviated to some degree. Relatedly, a carbon tax is projected to disproportionately impact fossil fuel industries, particularly coal, and the communities that rely on their employment. To alleviate these impacts, policymakers could allocate some of the carbon tax revenue to provide transition assistance to employees or affected communities. Table A-1 identifies sources of GHG emissions that account for 0.5% or more of total U.S. GHG emissions. The sources are listed in descending order by their percentage contribution. CO 2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion, which accounts for almost 76% of total U.S. GHG emissions, are broken down by fossil fuel type: petroleum, coal, and natural gas. The table identifies potential points in the economy at which a carbon tax could be applied. The table lists the approximate number of entities that would be involved with different tax applications. The number of entities listed is current as of the most recent data available and varies accordingly by category. See table notes for details. The right-hand column of the table provides additional comments for some of the emission sources. In some cases the comments discuss potential opportunities for additional GHG emissions coverage at a particular source. In other cases, the comments address potential limitations of covering all of the emissions from a particular source.	[ "The U.S. Fourth National Climate Assessment, released in 2018, concluded that \"the impacts of global climate change are already being felt in the United States and are projected to intensify in the future—but the severity of future impacts will depend largely on actions taken to reduce greenhouse gas [GHG] emissions and to adapt to the changes that will occur.\" Members of Congress and stakeholders articulate a wide range of perspectives over what to do, if anything, about GHG emissions, future climate change, and related impacts. If Congress were to consider establishing a program to reduce GHG emissions, one option would be to attach a price to GHG emissions with a carbon tax or GHG emissions fee. In the 115th Congress, Members introduced nine bills to establish a carbon tax or emissions fee program. However, many Members have expressed their opposition to such an approach. In particular, in the 115th Congress, the House passed a resolution \"expressing the sense of Congress that a carbon tax would be detrimental to the United States economy.\" Multiple economic studies have estimated the emission reductions that particular carbon tax would achieve. For example, a 2018 study analyzed various impacts of four carbon tax rate scenarios: a $25/metric ton of CO2 and $50/metric ton of CO2 carbon tax, increasing annually by 1% and 5%. The study concluded that each of the scenarios would likely achieve the U.S. GHG emission reduction target pledged under the international Paris Agreement (at least in terms of CO2 emissions). A carbon tax system would generate a new revenue stream, the magnitude of which would depend on the scope and rate of the tax, among other factors. In 2018, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that a $25/metric ton carbon tax would yield approximately $100 billion in its first year. CBO projected that federal revenue would total $3.5 trillion in FY2019. Policymakers would face challenging decisions regarding the distribution of the new carbon tax revenues. Congress could apply revenues to support a range of policy objectives but would encounter trade-offs among the objectives. The central trade-offs involve minimizing economy-wide costs, lessening the costs borne by specific groups—particularly low-income households and displaced workers in certain industries (e.g., coal mining)—and supporting other policy objectives. A primary argument against a carbon tax regards it potential economy-wide impacts, often measured as impacts to the U.S. gross domestic product (GDP). Some may argue that projected impacts should be compared with the climate benefits achieved from the program as well as the estimated costs of taking no action. The potential impacts would depend on a number of factors, including the program's magnitude and design and, most importantly, the use of carbon tax revenues. In general, economic literature finds that some of the revenue applications would reduce the economy-wide costs from a carbon tax but may not eliminate them entirely. In addition, some studies cite particular economic modeling scenarios in which certain carbon tax revenue applications produce a net increase in GDP compared to a baseline scenario. These scenarios involve using carbon tax revenues to offset reductions in other tax rates (e.g., corporate income or payroll taxes). Although economic models generally indicate that these particular revenue applications would yield the greatest benefit to the economy overall, the models also find that lower-income households would likely face a disproportionate impact under such an approach. As lower-income households spend a greater proportion of their income on energy needs (electricity, gasoline), these households are expected to experience disproportionate impacts from a carbon tax if revenues were not recycled back to them in some fashion (e.g., lump-sum distribution). A price on GHG emissions could create a competitive disadvantage for some industries, particularly \"emission-intensive, trade-exposed industries.\" Policymakers have several options to address this concern, including establishing a \"border carbon adjustment\" program, which would levy a fee on imports from countries without comparable GHG reduction programs. Alternatively, policymakers could allocate (indefinitely or for a period of time) some of the carbon tax revenues to selected industry sectors or businesses. Relatedly, a carbon tax system is projected to disproportionately impact fossil fuel industries, particularly coal, and the communities that rely on their employment. To alleviate these impacts, policymakers may consider using some of the revenue to provide transition assistance to employees or affected communities." ]	8,507	gov_report	en	null	eb21bd05c76ca2311382f8e825791447d89404c643025695
Postal retiree health benefits are provided as part of the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP). FEHBP covers federal employees and retirees, including postal and nonpostal retirees, who receive health insurance from companies that contract with OPM. Retiree participation is voluntary; in fiscal year 2018, about 500,000 postal retirees have participated in FEHBP. Funding requirements for postal retiree health benefits are established by law, which divides responsibility among USPS, the federal government, and postal retirees. USPS is responsible for a specific percentage of premiums, the federal government is responsible for paying a prorated share, and retirees are responsible for the rest. The funding requirements for these benefits changed in 2006. Before then, a “pay-as- you-go” system governed USPS’s payments, which required USPS to pay its share of premiums for current postal retirees. The 2006 Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act (PAEA) required USPS to start fully “prefunding” retiree health benefits. This meant that USPS was required to make annual prefunding payments to a newly established fund to build up funds to cover USPS’s share of future postal retiree health benefit costs. PAEA also established the RHB Fund as a new fund in the U.S. Treasury for USPS to deposit money into, and specified that beginning in fiscal year 2017, the fund would be used by OPM to pay USPS’s share of postal retiree premiums for health benefits. Under PAEA, the first 10 years of prefunding payments were fixed—ranging from $5.4 billion to $5.8 billion annually from fiscal years 2007 to 2016. From fiscal years 2007 through 2016, USPS was also required to continue “pay-as-you-go” payments for its share of premiums for current retirees. The permanent schedule for USPS payments to prefund postal retiree health benefits under PAEA started in fiscal year 2017. We have reported that USPS’s financial condition continues to deteriorate and its outlook is bleak. We have separately issued reports and testimonies that examined USPS’s financial condition, including its liabilities, and identified strategies and options for USPS and Congress to reduce postal costs, generate revenue, and restructure the funding of USPS’s pension and retiree health benefits. Looking forward, we have reported that USPS is facing unsustainable financial challenges as First- Class Mail volume continues to decline. USPS has recently reported that its revenue generation options are constrained, including by the price cap on market-dominant mail, and that any cost-cutting opportunities within its control are “relatively limited and dwindling.” USPS stated that the opportunity for further cost savings within its control will not come close to filling its financial gap. With respect to actions taken by companies and state governments, we have previously reported on the long-term trend for these organizations to eliminate or reduce retiree health benefits. Factors contributing to this decline include financial challenges for companies and states, current and expected retiree health benefit costs, and the legal ability to change retiree health benefit programs. The RHB Fund is on an unsustainable path and is projected to be depleted in 12 years under the status quo. USPS has missed approximately $38 billion in payments to the fund since fiscal year 2010, and the fund’s balance is declining. Beginning in fiscal year 2017, OPM started drawing from the fund to pay USPS’s share of premiums for postal retirees’ health benefits. OPM’s payments in that year exceeded the fund’s income from interest, and OPM projects that, based on the status quo, future payments will continue to exceed the fund’s income from interest. As long as USPS continues to miss its annual payments—which were nearly $4.3 billion in fiscal year 2017 and are $4.5 billion in fiscal year 2018—the fund is on track to be depleted in fiscal year 2030 based on OPM projections requested by us (see fig. 1). We reported similar results in our December 2012 report on postal retiree health benefits. At our request, OPM conducted a sensitivity analysis in which alternative projections were made that assumed USPS made payments to the fund of $1 billion per year or $2 billion per year; these alternative projections extended the fund’s projected depletion date from fiscal year 2030 to fiscal years 2032 or 2035, respectively (see fig. 2). OPM estimates the number of postal retirees eligible for federal retiree health benefits will remain near the current level of 500,000 through fiscal year 2035. The outlook for the RHB Fund is poor as USPS has inadequate resources to cover its required payments to the RHB Fund and, in our view, based on past practices and USPS statements, appears unlikely to make partial payments. USPS has repeatedly testified that its required payments to the RHB Fund are “unaffordable” relative to its current financial situation and outlook. In this regard, USPS accumulated net losses of more than $65 billion in the last 11 years and has budgeted for a net loss of about $5 billion in fiscal year 2018. Further, USPS reached its statutory borrowing limit of $15 billion in 2012. Although USPS accumulated liquid assets (cash and cash equivalents) of about $10.5 billion at the end of fiscal year 2017, it did not make $6.9 billion in required payments for retiree health and pension benefits. According to USPS officials, USPS did not make these payments in order to preserve liquidity and cover operational costs. If the RHB Fund is depleted, PAEA requires USPS to fill the resulting financial gap by resuming “pay-as-you-go” payments for its share of retiree health premiums that are currently being paid by the fund. However, PAEA does not address how funding will be provided or whether benefits will be provided if the fund becomes depleted and USPS does not make payments to cover its share of premiums. OPM and USPS have identified the following issues should the fund be depleted: According to OPM: (1) The RHB Fund is the initial funding source for USPS’s share of postal retirees’ health insurance premiums as long as money remains in the fund. (2) If the fund is depleted, then USPS becomes the funding source responsible for paying USPS’s share of these premiums. (3) Regardless of whether funds are available to pay USPS’s share of premiums, postal retirees are statutorily entitled to remain enrolled in their FEHBP plans. (4) Therefore, if the fund is depleted and USPS does not pay its share of premiums, the providers of these FEHBP plans would be underpaid. According to USPS: (1) Current law does not appear to contemplate a situation in which USPS itself is unable to make payments to the RHB Fund after the fund is depleted. (2) The law does not condition postal retirees’ eligibility for health benefits upon the fund or the payment of government contributions by USPS and the federal government. (3) Therefore, USPS stated it is reasonable to expect that postal retirees would remain eligible for health coverage even if USPS is unable to make payments to the RHB Fund after it is depleted. Regarding who would pay for their health coverage at this point, USPS stated that ultimately, it would be up to Congress to legislate a resolution to the funding issue. As the above projections show, the RHB Fund could be depleted in as little as 12 years—and USPS may be unable to cover its share of retiree health insurance premiums should its financial condition remain precarious. Depletion of the fund could affect postal retirees—who have provided a vital service to the nation—as well as USPS, postal customers and other stakeholders, including the federal government. Survey data we reviewed indicate that most companies do not offer retiree health benefits and that the number of companies providing such benefits is decreasing over time. For example, the percentage of all private and public organizations (e.g., state or local governments) with more than 200 employees that offer employee health benefits and that also offer retiree health benefits is estimated to have declined from 40 percent in 1999 to 25 percent in 2017, according to annual surveys conducted by the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation and the Health Research & Educational Trust (Kaiser/HRET). Focusing specifically on the results for private for-profit companies, the 2017 Kaiser/HRET survey estimated that only 11 percent of companies with at least 200 employees that offered health benefits to active employees also offered retiree health benefits in 2017, the smallest percentage since comparable data were measured in 2012. The 2017 Kaiser/HRET survey also estimated that the percentage of companies offering retiree health benefits was greater among companies with at least 5,000 employees (35 percent) than those with 1,000 to 4,999 employees (18 percent) and those with 200 to 999 employees (9 percent) (see fig. 3). Surveys sponsored by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) have estimated similar trends for private sector establishments with at least 1,000 employees and with 100-999 employees. According to the AHRQ surveys, an estimated 25 percent of private sector establishments with at least 1,000 employees offered health insurance coverage to retirees age 65 and older in 2016, down from 41 percent in 2003. For retirees under 65, an estimated 32 percent offered such coverage in 2016, down from 42 percent in 2003 (see fig. 4). Based on reports we reviewed and experts we interviewed, many companies that have retained their retiree health benefits have done so by making changes to control costs, including tightening eligibility and restructuring benefits. Depending on the company, the changes have applied to new hires, current employees, or retirees. Specific changes have included the following: Tightening eligibility: Some companies have made new employees and/or employees hired after a given date ineligible to receive retiree health benefits, while other companies have increased the minimum age and/or length of service requirements for eligibility, according to reports and experts we interviewed. Restructuring benefits: Many companies have restructured retiree health benefits to reduce the level of the benefit, to shift costs to retirees, and to change how the benefits are provided. For example, some companies have shifted from an approach under which a company pays a percentage of premiums for a selected health benefit plan, to an approach under which a company pays a fixed dollar amount that employees may put toward health care costs. The 2017 Kaiser/HRET survey estimated that 30 percent of private and public organizations with 200 or more employees that offer retiree health benefits provide a fixed dollar amount that the retiree can use to purchase a retiree health plan they choose. Experts on retiree health benefits that we interviewed told us such companies often shift costs to retirees by maintaining defined contributions at the same level over time, even as overall health care costs increase. Based on multiple reports and experts, nearly all state governments continue to offer retiree health benefits to at least some state government retirees but generally have shifted some costs from the state to retirees and/or active employees in various ways. For example, in 2016, the Pew Charitable Trusts and the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation reported on the following recent changes at the state level related to eligibility for retiree health benefits, benefit levels, and aspects of how the benefits coordinate with Medicare: Tightening eligibility or limiting benefit levels: Most states varied eligibility for retiree health benefits based on factors such as age and years of service, and varied benefit levels based on factors such as date of hire, date of retirement, or vesting eligibility; some states varied benefit levels based on years of service. Between 2000 and 2015, more than a dozen states changed the minimum age or the number of state service years required for retirees to be eligible for health benefits. During that timeframe, at least 10 states adopted formulas for prorating benefits that required different premium-sharing amounts based on years of service, or altered existing prorating formulas, bringing the total to 31 states that used prorating in 2015. At least 5 states stopped making any contributions to health premiums for certain retirees. Medicare coordination: Thirty-five states provided employer- sponsored Medicare Advantage or Medicare Part D plans, known as Employer Group Waiver Plans, to provide health or prescription drug benefit coverage for Medicare-eligible retirees since these options were authorized in 2003. According to the report, “These cost- saving programs provide states with financial subsidies from the federal Medicare program to provide Medicare plus wraparound benefits.” We identified eight potential policy approaches to address the financial sustainability of postal retiree health benefits, primarily based on a review of legislative proposals and pertinent literature on actions that were taken by private companies and state governments and are discussed above. These approaches fall into three categories: (1) approaches that shift costs to the federal government; (2) approaches that reduce benefits or increase costs to postal retirees and/or postal employees; and (3) approaches that change how the benefits are financed. These eight approaches are not mutually exclusive, nor are they an exhaustive list of possible approaches. Each approach could include a range of specific options; thus, even if successfully implemented, no one approach would necessarily be sufficient to make postal retiree health benefits financially sustainable. Although our discussion of the various policy approaches specifically addresses postal retiree health benefits, most approaches could address federal retiree health benefits more broadly, as both postal and non-postal federal employees participate in the same federal health benefits program. All approaches we identified have different potential effects and would require congressional action because current law establishes certain requirements for postal retiree health benefit plans, including basic rules for benefits, enrollment, and participation, and how benefits are to be paid for. Because the RHB Fund has a large and growing financial gap, any approach that would have a significant financial impact could affect the federal government, postal retirees, postal employees, USPS, and customers to varying degrees. Medicare Integration: Various legislative proposals have been made to increase postal retirees’ participation in Medicare—a shift that would decrease USPS’s costs but increase Medicare’s costs, according to analyses by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). These proposals would establish a program within FEHBP for active postal employees and postal retirees. Under these bills, Medicare-eligible postal retirees enrolled in this program would generally also be required to be enrolled in Medicare Parts A, B, and D. According to CBO analyses, the bills would have resulted in USPS savings, in part because increased participation in Medicare would shift primary responsibility for covering certain health care services to Medicare for those who enroll. As we have previously reported, the primary policy decision for Congress to make is whether to increase postal retirees’ use of Medicare. Supplemental federal appropriations: If the RHB Fund becomes depleted and USPS does not fill the financial gap, supplemental federal appropriations could be an alternative if Congress wants benefits to continue at the same level. As previously noted, OPM officials told us that regardless of whether funds are available to pay USPS’s share of premiums, postal retirees are statutorily entitled to remain enrolled in their FEHBP plans. However, supplemental federal appropriations for postal retiree health benefits could increase the federal budget deficit. In addition, supplemental appropriations for postal retiree health benefits would be inconsistent with USPS functioning as a self-financing entity that covers its costs with revenue it generates. Tighten eligibility or reduce or eliminate retiree health benefits: As some companies and state governments have done, eligibility restrictions could be tightened for postal retiree health benefits, or other actions could reduce the level of benefits or even eliminate benefits, such as making new hires ineligible to receive retiree health benefits. The effects would depend on the specific changes and whether they were made to apply to current retirees, current employees, or future hires. Depending on the extent of the changes, this approach would reduce USPS’s liability for postal retiree health benefits and thereby reduce its unfunded liability. Increase premium payments by postal retirees and/or postal employees: As some companies and state governments have done, premium payments for postal retiree health benefits by postal retirees and/or postal employees could be increased. For example, as others have reported, some companies and state governments have required retirees to pay 100 percent of the health insurance premium for their retiree health benefits. Similarly, a larger share of retiree health premiums could be borne by postal retirees or postal employees could be required to pay for retiree health benefits before they retire. Such changes would require changes to current law that allocates specific financial responsibility for payments among USPS, the federal government, and retirees participating in FEHBP, as active postal employees make no payment for retiree health benefits under current law. The expenses of the RHB Fund could be decreased by these approaches that shift costs to postal retirees, postal employees, or both. Depending on how much of the costs are shifted, the additional costs could increase the challenge for retirees to ensure their accumulated resources last throughout retirement, or for postal employees to save for retirement. Further, as we have reported, rising health care costs can increase the overall amount individuals may need to save to ensure they have an adequate income once they retire. Change the federal contribution to a fixed subsidy: As some companies and state governments have done, postal retiree health benefits could be shifted to a structure with a fixed amount subsidizing the benefit. This amount could be adjusted over time; any adjustments might or might not keep up with costs. Depending on the initial size of the fixed subsidy and any adjustments over time, this approach could reduce the expenses of the RHB Fund and USPS’s required payments. RHB Fund expenses could be reduced over time if the fixed subsidy increases less than postal retiree health premiums. This approach would require changes to current law and regulations that prescribe the federal government’s financial contribution to FEHBP. For example, CBO recently identified one option to change FEHBP’s statutory structure from a premium-sharing structure that is required by law to fixed subsidies for health benefits. Under this option, the fixed subsidies would grow at the rate of inflation rather than at the average rate of growth for FEHBP premiums; CBO stated this change would be expected to slow the growth of federal contributions to FEHBP. A fixed subsidy for retiree health benefits could increase incentives for retirees to make less costly decisions with respect to health care. However, this approach could result in greater cost exposure for retirees, who may face difficult decisions regarding their health care, particularly if their financial resources are limited. As we have reported, individuals face the risk that rising and unpredictable health care or long-term care costs may lead them to draw down their retirement savings faster than expected. Establish a non-federal voluntary employees’ beneficiary association (VEBA) for postal retiree health benefits: As some companies have done to provide retiree health benefits separately from the employer, a VEBA outside the federal government could be established to manage postal retiree health benefits. This approach means that postal retiree health benefits would be provided through the VEBA instead of through the OPM-administered FEHBP. The non-federal VEBA would administer the postal retiree health benefits program, including determining the specific benefits that would be provided and the level of contributions from the VEBA members—who could include retirees and employees—and the investing of its assets. Such an approach would require determining the VEBA’s governance structure, funding sources, level of funding, type of investments, and associated market risks. One issue could be determining the source and level of initial funding for a new VEBA for postal retiree health benefits, such as whether initial funding would come from the RHB Fund, the Treasury, or both. Other issues could be what funds would be provided to the VEBA going forward, including the source(s) and level of funding, and what the benefit levels would be. If the entire RHB Fund were transferred into a VEBA, the current level of benefits would ultimately not be sustainable unless further funding is provided from one or more sources, such as from USPS, retirees, active employees, or the federal government. Thus, trade-offs would involve what level of benefits would be provided, who would bear the costs, and what might happen if VEBA assets decline or become depleted. Reduce the required level of prefunding: Proposed legislation includes an 80 percent funding target for postal retiree health benefits instead of the 100 percent target established by current law. This would reduce USPS’s required payments to the RHB Fund but could increase costs for future postal ratepayers and increase the risk that USPS may not be able to pay for these costs. As previously discussed in this report, state governments either do not prefund their retiree health benefits or generally have a low level of prefunding. We have expressed concern about a proposed 80 percent funding target for postal retiree health benefits that would have the effect of carrying a permanent unfunded liability equal to roughly 20 percent of USPS’s liability, which could be a significant amount. As we previously reported, an alternative could be to build in a schedule to achieve 100 percent funding in a later time period after the 80 percent level is achieved. Although USPS payments with an 80 percent funding target would reduce USPS’s required payments, fully funded benefits protect against an inability to make payments later, make promised benefits less vulnerable to cuts, and protect USPS’s long-term viability. Further, reducing the funding target is unlikely to have any effect as long as USPS continues to make no payments to the RHB Fund, as discussed earlier. We continue to believe that as long as USPS is required by law to pay its share of retiree health benefits premiums, it is important for USPS to prefund its retiree health benefit liability to the maximum extent that its finances permit. We recognize that multiple options exist to prefund benefits and amortize unfunded liability and that no prefunding approach will be viable unless USPS can make the payments and maintain liquidity. As we have reported, making affordable prefunding payments would protect the viability of USPS by not saddling it with bills later on, when employees are already retired and no longer helping it to generate revenue; making payments can also make the promised benefits more secure. We also have reported that deferring payments can pass costs from current to future postal ratepayers. To the extent prefunding is postponed by using a lower funding target, larger payments will be required later, when they likely would be supported by lower levels of profitable First-Class Mail volume. Outside investment: Proposed legislation would initially require 25 percent of the RHB Fund to be invested in index funds modeled after those used for federal Thrift Savings Plan investments. The objective of investing RHB Fund assets outside of U.S. Treasury securities would be to seek a greater rate of return on these assets in an attempt to reduce unfunded liabilities and the amount of required prefunding payments. Such outside investment would require legislation because current law limits RHB Fund assets to U.S. Treasury securities that are backed by the full faith and credit of the federal government. A higher rate of return on RHB Fund assets could reduce long-term funding needs. However, there are other considerations. For example, we have reported that if fund assets were invested in non-Treasury securities, the fund may experience losses in a market downturn and would thus have reduced assets available for health care. Assuming there would be no explicit federal guarantee of the value of the invested assets, we stated that USPS is not well positioned to deal with a potentially significant decline in their value, given its significant operating losses and continuing decline in mail volume. We also reported that the impact of any asset losses could be magnified because a market downturn that negatively affects asset value could be associated with a more general economic downturn that negatively affects USPS mail volume and revenues. About a half million postal retirees receive retiree health benefits. Postal retirees have provided a vital service to the nation, and resolving a key aspect of their future situation warrants congressional action. Failure to address the poor financial outlook of the RHB Fund could pose serious consequences for these retirees as well as USPS, postal customers, and other stakeholders, including the federal government. It is reasonable to believe that USPS will not be able to fill the financial gap once the RHB fund is depleted—a situation that could occur in as little as 12 years under the status quo. There is no certainty on what actions should be taken to address this problem. However, we have identified multiple approaches that could be used, individually or in combination, that Congress could consider to help address the financial shortfall in this area. All of these approaches have different potential effects, and it is up to Congress to consider the merits of the approaches and determine the most appropriate action to take. It would be preferable to take action when careful consideration is possible, rather than wait until lack of adequate funding could disrupt postal retiree health benefits. Congress should consider passing legislation to put postal retiree health benefits on a more sustainable financial footing. We provided a draft of this report to OPM and USPS for their review and comment. OPM provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. USPS provided a written response, which is reproduced in appendix II of this report. In its written response, USPS stated that it concurred with our matter for congressional consideration that congressional action is necessary to achieve a financially sustainable Postal Service Retiree Health Benefits Fund (RHB Fund). However, USPS said our discussion of potential policy approaches for postal retiree health benefits would benefit from additional context and balance. USPS also put forth additional information for three of the potential policy approaches highlighted in our report. Our report presents a high-level overview of eight potential policy approaches. It was not designed to be a comprehensive catalog of possible options with an analysis of the various considerations relevant to each. With regard to the Medicare integration approach, USPS stated that increased Medicare participation by postal retirees is not limited to the “full Medicare integration option,” as represented in our report and identified variations of such an approach. USPS said readers would benefit from a fuller picture of Medicare integration practices, stating that among employers that continue to provide retiree health benefits, full Medicare integration is a uniform best practice. USPS cited a 2014 report that said Medicare integration is the most common arrangement for employer-provided retiree health benefits, adding that retiree health benefits for Medicare-eligible employees are assumed to be merely supplemental to Medicare as a matter of course. Our report discussed Medicare integration by state governments, but did not present recent data on the percentage of private companies that coordinate their retiree health benefits with Medicare because such data are not publicly available. Additionally, USPS said our report framed the issue of Medicare integration as “solely” a tradeoff between USPS and Medicare costs while there are other factors to consider, such as the relative benefits to USPS compared to the overall cost for the Medicare program. As we noted in our report, the eight potential policy approaches were not designed to be mutually exclusive, nor an exhaustive list of possible approaches. Additionally, we recognize there are various factors related to this approach, but that the primary one is whether to increase postal retirees’ use of Medicare which would lead to further increasing Medicare costs. Second, USPS said it believed our statements about approaches for changing the level of prefunding for retiree health benefits below the 100 percent level were misplaced, citing “universally accepted practices” for other entities to “pay-as-you-go” (i.e., not prefund at all), or to prefund at much lower levels. We have reported on such funding levels in the past as well. However, a proposed 80 percent funding target for postal retiree health benefits would have the effect of carrying a permanent unfunded liability equal to roughly 20 percent of USPS’s liability, which could be a significant amount. As we previously reported, an alternative could be to build in a schedule to achieve 100 percent funding in a later time period after the 80 percent level is achieved. As our report also explained, although USPS payments with an 80 percent funding target would reduce USPS’s required payments, fully funded benefits protect against an inability to make payments later, make promised benefits less vulnerable to cuts, and protect USPS’s long-term viability. Finally, USPS said that our statements about potential risks associated with investment of assets outside the U.S. Treasury seem disproportionate given USPS’s view that diversification of assets set aside for retiree health benefits is “universally accepted” as a best practice. We recognize that a higher rate of return on RHB Fund assets could reduce long-term funding needs for the RHB Fund. However, there are considerations specific to USPS. For example, assuming there would be no explicit federal guarantee of the value of the invested assets, we stated that USPS is not well positioned to deal with a potentially significant decline in their value, given its significant operating losses and continuing decline in mail volume. We also noted that, as we have previously reported, the impact of any asset losses could be magnified because a market downturn that negatively affects asset value could be associated with a more general economic downturn that also negatively affects USPS mail volume and revenues. In summary, we believe our report presents a balanced description of a wide range of possible policy options; it does not endorse or recommend any particular option for Congress. As we concluded, all of these approaches have different potential effects, and the information we present, as well as the additional views presented by USPS, provide critical information for congressional decision-makers to assess as they consider the merits of the approaches and determine the most appropriate action to take. As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to the appropriate congressional committees; the Postmaster General; and the Director of the Office of Personnel Management. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please contact me at (202) 512-2834 or rectanusl@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff that made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix III. End of year net funded status (unfunded) (55.0) Missed USPS payments to the fund (53.5) (52.0) (48.6) (46.2) (47.8) (48.3) (48.9) (54.8) (52.1) payments due on Sept. 30, 2017, of $955 million for the amortization of USPS’s unfunded liability for postal retiree health benefits, and $3.3 billion for the “normal costs” of retiree health benefits. The “normal cost” is the annual expected growth in liability attributable to an additional year of employees’ service. In addition to the individual named above, Derrick Collins (Assistant Director); Kenneth John (Analyst-in-Charge); Amy Abramowitz; Taiyshawna Battle; William Colwell; Swati Deo; John Dicken; Leia Dickerson; William Hadley; James Leonard; Emei Li; Thanh Lu; Sara Ann Moessbauer; Joshua Parr; Malika Rice; Matthew Rosenberg; Amy Rosewarne; Frank Todisco; and Crystal Wesco made key contributions to this report.	[ "USPS is required to prefund its share of health benefits costs for its retirees. To do so, USPS is required to make payments into the RHB Fund, which is administered by OPM. However, USPS has not made any payments to the fund since fiscal year 2010. At the end of fiscal year 2017, USPS had missed $38.2 billion in payments, leaving the fund 44 percent funded. Pursuant to law, beginning in fiscal year 2017, OPM started drawing from the fund to cover USPS's share of postal retirees' health benefits premiums. GAO was asked to review issues related to the sustainability of the RHB Fund. This report examines (1) the financial outlook for the RHB Fund and (2) policy approaches for postal retiree health benefits, among other topics. GAO evaluated financial projections for the RHB Fund from OPM. GAO reviewed laws and regulations and identified policy approaches primarily by identifying legislative proposals, and literature on actions of companies and state governments to address retiree health benefits. These approaches are not exhaustive or mutually exclusive. GAO also interviewed experts in retiree health benefits and postal stakeholders, chosen on the basis of relevant publications and prior GAO work, and interviewed and obtained written responses from OPM and USPS officials. The financial outlook of the Postal Service Retiree Health Benefits Fund (RHB Fund) is poor. At the end of fiscal year 2017, the fund's assets declined to $49.8 billion and unfunded liabilities rose to $62.2 billion. Based on Office of Personnel Management (OPM) projections requested by GAO, the fund is on track to be depleted in fiscal year 2030 if the United States Postal Service (USPS) continues to make no payments into the fund. Annual payments of $1 billion or $2 billion into the fund would extend the projected depletion date by 2 to 5 years (see figure). USPS has said that its required payments to the fund are unaffordable relative to its current financial situation and outlook. For the past 11 years USPS has incurred large operating losses that it expects will continue. Additionally, USPS has stated that its opportunities for revenue generation and cost-cutting are limited. USPS reported that it did not make required fund payments in 2017 in order to preserve liquidity and cover operational costs. If the fund becomes depleted, USPS would be required by law to make the payments necessary to cover its share of health benefits premiums for current postal retirees. Current law does not address what would happen if the fund becomes depleted and USPS does not make payments to cover those premiums. Depletion of the fund could affect postal retirees as well as USPS, customers, and other stakeholders, including the federal government. About 500,000 postal retirees receive health benefits and OPM expects that number to remain about the same through 2035. GAO identified three categories of policy approaches for postal retiree health benefits, based on legislative proposals and pertinent literature. First, some approaches, such as generally requiring eligible postal retirees to participate in Medicare, would shift costs to the federal government. Second, some approaches would reduce benefits or increase costs to postal retirees and/or employees. Third, some approaches would change how benefits are financed (see table). All of these approaches have different potential effects and would require congressional action. Thus, it is up to Congress to consider the merits of different approaches and determine the most appropriate action to take. It would be preferable to take action when careful consideration is possible, rather than wait until lack of adequate funding could disrupt postal retiree health benefits. Congress should consider passing legislation to put postal retiree health benefits on a more sustainable financial footing. USPS agreed that congressional action is needed and offered views on some policy approaches discussed in this report." ]	5,219	gov_report	en	null	86a657d0330ec4cd8a81c74c1ad8e0c1ab6cab7c1d321292
NAS is a withdrawal condition within infants that can result from the prenatal use of opioids by pregnant women. Prenatal opioid use occurs when a woman, during the course of her pregnancy, uses an opioid- based medication or substance. Prenatal opioid use can take various forms, including (1) the use of prescriptions for pain management, such as fentanyl and oxycodone; (2) medication-assisted treatment for opioid addiction, such as methadone and buprenorphine; (3) prescription drug misuse or use disorder (such as using an opioid without a prescription, using a different dosage than prescribed, or continuing to use an opioid when it is no longer needed for pain); and (4) illicit opioid use, such as heroin use. These types of prenatal opioid use are not mutually exclusive. A 2014 study found that almost 22 percent of pregnant Medicaid beneficiaries filled a prescription for an opioid during their pregnancy. Medication-assisted treatment—an approach that combines the use of certain medications and behavioral therapy—is generally considered by HHS and medical specialty societies to be the standard of care for treating pregnant women with opioid use disorders, depending on the individual and her circumstances. SAMHSA and several medical specialty societies, including the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists and the American Society of Addiction Medicine, have noted that providing medication-assisted treatment during pregnancy prevents complications associated with illicit opioid use, encourages prenatal care, and reduces the risk of obstetric complications. Further, women may use multiple substances in addition to opioids during pregnancy—known as maternal polysubstance use—such as tobacco, alcohol, or anti-depressants, among others. GAO reported in 2015 that the gaps in efforts to address prenatal opioid use and NAS most commonly cited by federal agency officials and experts were related to the treatment of prenatal opioid use and NAS. Agency officials and experts said that there has not been adequate research comparing different types of treatment approaches and that research is needed on how best to treat a pregnant woman with an opioid use disorder so that the treatment is most effective for the woman while offering minimal risk to the fetus. See GAO-15-203. For more information on factors that can affect access to medication- assisted treatment, see GAO, Opioid Addiction: Laws, Regulations, and Other Factors Can Affect Medication-Assisted Treatment Access, GAO-16-833 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 2016). respiratory distress. There is currently no national standard of care for screening or treating NAS. There have been a few scoring tools developed to screen the infant to determine the appropriate course of treatment. Health care providers predominantly diagnose NAS using the Finnegan Neonatal Abstinence Scoring Tool, which calculates a score based on a variety of central nervous, metabolic, respiratory, and gastro-intestinal symptoms that might be observed. The American Academy of Pediatrics and the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists recommend that infants with NAS should not be initially treated with medication, known as pharmacologic treatment. Instead, these organizations recommend starting with non-pharmacologic treatment, which includes placing the infant in a dark and quiet environment, swaddling, breastfeeding, rooming-in with the mother, and providing high-calorie nutrition, among other things. For example, rooming-in—allowing the mother to reside with the infant during the infant’s treatment—may have benefits, such as helping to develop a bond between the mother and infant and to reduce the severity of the infant’s NAS symptoms. Pharmacologic treatment, such as using methadone or morphine, may be necessary only for the relief of moderate to severe signs of NAS. See figure 1 for more information on non-pharmacologic and pharmacologic treatment. HHS has published several guidance and educational resources related to NAS and prenatal opioid use. These documents serve as tools to help stakeholders, including state entities and health care providers, who work with this population. For example, SAMHSA published a clinical report for health care providers in 2016 that provides recommendations to help them when making decisions regarding the evaluation, care, and treatment of women with opioid use disorders and infants with NAS. As of July 2017, SAMHSA is in the process of producing a clinical guide based on this report and expects to publish an updated report later this year. In another example, SAMHSA published a guidance document in 2016 that aims to support the efforts of states, tribes, and local communities in addressing the needs of pregnant women with opioid use disorders and their infants. Among other things, the document includes strategies and guidance to promote care coordination among stakeholders, including child welfare agencies and medical professionals, when treating infants with NAS. (See app. II for a list of federal educational resources related to NAS and prenatal opioid use published by HHS.) As we previously noted, more than 80 percent of NAS cases are paid for by Medicaid, which is a federal-state health care program that finances health care coverage for low-income and medically needy populations, including children and aged or disabled adults. States administer their Medicaid programs within broad federal requirements and according to a state plan approved by CMS, the federal agency within HHS that oversees Medicaid. The Medicaid program allows states to design and implement their programs within certain federal parameters, resulting in more than 50 distinct state-based programs. For example, states generally determine the type and scope of services to cover, set payment rates that different health care providers will receive for various covered services, and pay these providers for claims submitted for services rendered. In addition, states vary in the extent to which they enroll beneficiaries in managed care versus delivering care through the more traditional fee-for-service model. Under a managed care delivery model, states typically contract with managed care plans to provide a specific set of Medicaid-covered services to beneficiaries and pay them a set amount per beneficiary—referred to as capitation payments—to provide those services. Under fee-for-service, Medicaid pays health care providers a fee for each service provided to a Medicaid beneficiary. Medicaid’s Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnostic, and Treatment benefit, which states are required to provide, covers comprehensive health screenings, preventive health services, and all medically necessary treatment and services—for Medicaid eligible-children under the age of 21—to correct or ameliorate health conditions discovered through screenings. According to the literature we reviewed, most infants with NAS in the United States are treated in a hospital setting, often in the neonatal intensive care unit (NICU), which has a relatively high daily cost of care. Stakeholders we interviewed told us that these infants may also be treated in other hospital settings. According to state and perinatal collaborative officials in the four selected states we reviewed, infants diagnosed with NAS begin—and most complete—treatment for the condition in various hospital settings which provide different levels of care: a well newborn nursery (level I), special care nursery (level II), or NICU (level III or IV). For example, according to these officials, most infants with NAS in Vermont are treated in well newborn nurseries, while most infants with NAS in Kentucky and Wisconsin are treated in NICUs. West Virginia perinatal collaborative officials told us that about a third of infants with NAS are treated in well newborn nurseries, while two-thirds receive treatment in either a special care nursery or NICU. According to perinatal collaborative officials and hospital providers in the four selected states, the severity of the infant’s NAS symptoms or the hospital’s capability to treat NAS can determine whether the infant receives care in a nursery or NICU. Health care providers in the four selected states described the general clinical approach for treating infants with NAS. According to these providers, they generally start with non-pharmacologic treatment—for example, swaddling or placing the infant in a quiet, dark room. Health care providers may continue to monitor and assess the severity of the infant’s NAS symptoms using one of the available scoring tools for NAS. If the infant’s symptoms meet or exceed a certain threshold, these providers may initiate pharmacologic treatment by administering morphine or methadone, for example. Some perinatal collaborative officials that we interviewed in the four selected states told us that not all hospitals may have the capability to provide pharmacologic treatment. For example, these officials told us that level I hospitals—hospitals with only well newborn nurseries—in Kentucky and Wisconsin may not provide pharmacologic treatment to infants with NAS because these hospitals may not have the staff expertise to administer the needed medication and monitor the infants who receive it. Instead, these hospitals may transfer infants with NAS who require pharmacologic treatment to hospitals with higher levels of care, such as those with a NICU. Table 1 provides information on the eight selected hospitals in our review that provide NAS services. According to a 2015 study we reviewed, nationwide, infants with NAS who require pharmacologic treatment generally have longer average hospital stays (23 days) compared with infants with NAS who do not require such medication (17 days). Health care providers from our selected hospitals also indicated a similar trend—the average length of hospital stay in calendar year 2016 for infants with NAS who received pharmacologic treatment ranged from 7 to 30 days, while the stays for infants who did not require such medication ranged from 3 to 7 days. Medicaid generally pays for NAS treatment services in our four selected states using a diagnosis-related group (DRG) based payment system, in which hospitals receive a fixed amount for a bundle of services. In general, the DRG-based system used in Medicaid pays for the medical services necessary for treating infants with NAS, such as medication, bed space, and nursing staff, according to CMS officials. CMS officials said that the DRG-based system generally does not pay for professional services, such as physician visits; instead, these services are typically paid under a fee-for-service payment schedule, in which states or contracted managed care plans pay health care providers directly for their services. Officials in our selected states said information on total Medicaid payments for hospital-based NAS services was not readily available. Several DRGs are typically used to bill Medicaid for services provided to infants. However, these codes alone cannot provide an accurate estimate of Medicaid payments for NAS treatment services because the codes are not used exclusively for NAS. For example, according to some health care providers we interviewed, two DRG codes that may be used to bill Medicaid and other payers for NAS treatment services are 791 (prematurity with major problems) and 793 (full term neonate with major problems). However, these codes could be used to bill for over 2,000 diagnoses—for example, pneumonia or measles. One state official said that while they could provide us with information on Medicaid payments for these infants, they could not parse out the costs by diagnosis codes, such as those related to NAS. Thus, estimates of total Medicaid payments based only on DRG codes likely overstate the amount paid for NAS hospital-based services. Officials from two of the four selected states told us that their state has a public health surveillance system that tracks the incidence of infants diagnosed with NAS; however, the surveillance systems do not capture financial information, including Medicaid payments for NAS. At our request, one of the states cross-referenced their surveillance and Medicaid data and estimated that in 2016, their state Medicaid program spent over $22 million to treat 1,565 infants with NAS. While selected states generally could not provide information on total Medicaid payments for infants with NAS, some hospitals in our selected states were able to generate this information at our request using diagnosis codes that they identified as related to NAS from hospital claims data. Six of our selected eight hospitals reported that in calendar year 2016, the average Medicaid payment for treating infants with NAS ranged from about $1,500 to about $20,200 per infant per stay. The wide range in Medicaid payment averages may be because the averages included both infants who did and did not require pharmacologic treatment and because these hospitals treated infants in various settings, such as a nursery or a NICU. The literature we reviewed also had limited information on Medicaid payments for NAS treatment services provided in hospitals. A recent study reported that from 2009 through 2012—the most recent data available at the time of the study—Medicaid payments to hospitals for NAS treatment services increased from about $564 million to $1.2 billion nationwide. While most infants with NAS typically complete treatment in a hospital setting, stakeholders told us that some of these infants may be transferred to a non-hospital setting to complete pharmacologic treatment and continue non-pharmacologic treatment. HHS officials told us that there is not a comprehensive list of facilities that may treat infants with NAS outside of the hospital. Based on information from the stakeholders we interviewed and the literature we reviewed, we identified two types of non-hospital settings available in certain states that treat infants with NAS: (1) outpatient clinics and programs and (2) neonatal withdrawal centers. For the purposes of this report, we defined neonatal withdrawal centers as facilities that can treat infants who are prenatally exposed to drugs, including infants with NAS, within the facility. Outpatient clinics and programs to treat NAS Through stakeholder interviews and the literature we reviewed, we identified examples of outpatient clinics and programs in certain states where infants with NAS can continue pharmacologic treatment after their discharge from the hospital. For example, some stakeholders we interviewed told us about a Neonatal Medical Follow-Up Clinic in Vermont used to follow-up with infants with NAS who have been discharged from the hospital and are being weaned off methadone on an outpatient basis. Hospital providers train the infant’s family on how to administer the infant’s medication at home and provide a referral to the clinic. After hospital discharge, the infant and family have follow-up visits in the clinic every 1 to 2 weeks, during which the family discusses with health care providers the weaning schedule and demonstrate how they administer the infant’s medication. Health care providers told us that they also encourage the family to continue providing non-pharmacologic treatment to the infant. After weaning is complete, the infant continues to follow-up at the clinic every 1 to 2 months until the infant reaches 12 to 18 months of age. Literature we reviewed indicated that other outpatient treatment clinics or programs such as the one in Vermont have been established or considered in other states. Specifically, four studies we reviewed described instances in which infants began their treatment in the hospital but completed their treatment through a dedicated outpatient program in Florida, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. Each study noted that the inpatient-to- outpatient approach can result in a shorter hospital length of stay. For example, one 2015 study found that infants who began treatment in a hospital and completed their treatment in an outpatient setting stayed in the hospital an average of 11 days, compared to infants who completed treatment in the hospital, where the stays averaged about 25 days. However, the studies also noted that the inpatient-to-outpatient approach resulted in a longer overall treatment duration across the two settings. Neonatal withdrawal centers to treat NAS Some stakeholders we interviewed, including health care providers, described examples of neonatal withdrawal centers in two states, where infants with NAS can continue pharmacologic treatment after their discharge from the hospital. Health care providers in these facilities told us that in Washington and West Virginia, some infants with NAS who began treatment in a hospital may be referred to these facilities, where they reside until they complete treatment and are discharged from the facility. These providers explained that in these facilities, the infants are placed in nursery rooms, where health care providers can monitor them and administer and adjust their medication as needed. In addition, nursing staff or other caregivers are responsible for providing continuous non-pharmacologic treatment, and mothers are encouraged to visit and continue this care. For example, health care providers told us that in Washington, two to three infants may share a nursery room where trained caregivers provide them with non-pharmacologic treatment. In West Virginia, health care providers said infants are typically placed in individual nursery rooms where nurses provide them with non- pharmacologic treatment. The rooms in the West Virginia facility are also equipped with a rocking chair to encourage mothers to visit and provide this care as well. Health care providers told us that the facility currently offers one nursery room equipped with a bed to help prepare mothers on what to expect after discharge; they also said that they encourage mothers to spend the night prior to the infant’s discharge from the facility. (See text box below). Treating infants with neonatal abstinence syndrome (NAS) in a neonatal withdrawal center One health care provider from a neonatal withdrawal center told us that the practice of rooming-in helps to facilitate the bond between the mother and infant. He also said that rooming-in allows health care providers to model care for the mothers and for mothers to learn how to care for their infants with NAS. Health care providers told us that the facility currently offers one nursery room equipped with a bed to help prepare mothers on what to expect after discharge and that they encourage mothers to spend the night prior to the infant’s discharge from the facility. One health care provider told us that one mother, after staying overnight with her infant, realized that she was not prepared to take care of her infant and consequently gave up custody of the infant. Because of rooming-in, health care providers were able to ensure that the infant was safe because the mother came to this realization at the facility, rather than alone at home. Although the lack of physical space at the facility currently makes it difficult to accommodate rooming-in for the entire course of the infant’s treatment, these providers noted the importance of this practice and that they are committed to parental involvement when treating infants with NAS at their facility. Figure 2 depicts nursery rooms in the neonatal withdrawal center in West Virginia. Efforts are also underway to open a neonatal withdrawal center in Arizona and Ohio, according to stakeholders we interviewed. Stakeholders we interviewed and the literature we reviewed suggest some limitations as well as benefits of treating infants with NAS in non- hospital settings, including factors to consider in these settings. Health care providers from one of the hospitals we visited in Vermont told us that their hospital is the only one in the state that allows infants with NAS to complete pharmacologic treatment through the Vermont outpatient clinic because they have established the necessary infrastructure to ensure families’ compliance and safe practices at home. These providers said that they worked with one local pharmacy to ensure proper dispensing of the medication. Additionally, these providers measured the amount of medication left over at each follow- up visit with the families. Some state and perinatal collaborative officials told us that neonatal withdrawal centers may not be the best environment to treat infants with NAS because these settings may limit a mother’s access to her infant, since she may not always be allowed to reside with the infant. Such limits, according to officials, do not facilitate bonding between mother and infant. Another state perinatal collaborative official, as well as health care providers and staff, told us that neonatal withdrawal centers may be better for treating infants with NAS because the environment is quieter and less stimulating than hospital settings, such as NICUs. Several studies we reviewed also emphasized that the inpatient-to- outpatient approach requires ongoing coordination, communication, and commitment from multidisciplinary providers, as well as the families. These studies highlighted instances in which these approaches reduced the length of the infants’ stay in a hospital, though the studies emphasized that more work needs to be done to determine whether these are the optimal approaches for infants with NAS, as well as the potential long-term benefits of such approaches. Medicaid pays for NAS treatment services provided in the non-hospital settings we identified in certain states, according to CMS officials and other stakeholders we spoke with, but generally pays for these services separately, in contrast with the single bundled payment paid to hospitals. State officials and health care providers in the non-hospital settings we examined described various ways in which Medicaid covered services they provided to treat infants with NAS. For example: Outpatient follow-up clinic in Vermont. State officials and staff at this facility told us that the Vermont Medicaid program pays for an infant’s outpatient physician visits using a fee-for-service payment schedule. They added that the Vermont Medicaid program also pays for the infant’s medication used in pharmacologic treatment and explained that the pharmacy that dispenses the medication bills Medicaid for these services. Neonatal withdrawal center in Washington. Health care providers at this facility told us that the Washington Medicaid program or their contracted managed care plans pay for physician visits using a fee- for-service payment schedule, noting that the facility decided to stop billing Medicaid for medical supplies because of the low reimbursement. Additionally, these providers suggested that because the facility does not meet the Medicaid standards required for receiving payment for hospital inpatient, nursing, or other covered facility services, the facility is ineligible to receive Medicaid payment for the costs of room and board. These providers said that they receive funding for the cost of these services through state appropriations, foster care payments, city contracts, grants, and private donations. Neonatal withdrawal center in West Virginia. State officials and health care providers at this facility told us that West Virginia pays for NAS services through two mechanisms, depending on whether the infant is in foster care. Specifically, if the infant is in foster care, the facility receives a bundled payment from the state Medicaid program and the Bureau of Children and Families. However, if the infant is not in foster care, the state Medicaid program pays for physician visits using a fee-for-service schedule. Additionally, the facility can receive payment under a per diem rate that is negotiated with state Medicaid managed care plans. The health care providers said that they also receive funding through grants and private donations to help cover the costs of NAS services. Stakeholders we interviewed and literature we reviewed suggest that the costs of treating infants with NAS in non-hospital settings were lower than treating them in hospital settings. However, supporting data and research of the costs in different settings are anecdotal or otherwise limited. For example: Health care providers from the neonatal withdrawal center in Washington told us that their facility could treat infants at a lower average cost per day than could hospitals—at about $700 per infant per day compared to an average cost of about $1,500-2,500 per infant per day in a hospital. These providers said that this cost savings is in part due to their limited staffing of nurses and their ability to leverage specially trained caregivers to provide infants with non-pharmacologic treatment and hands-on care, such as feeding and bathing. These providers also said they use volunteers to help with household duties, such as laundry and replenishing supplies. A health care provider from the neonatal withdrawal center in West Virginia conducted a study that found that the average daily charges per infant were about $400 in their facility, compared to about $2,600 in a special care nursery and $4,000 in a NICU. Two studies we reviewed found that inpatient-to-outpatient treatment approaches reduced hospital costs for NAS treatment; however, these studies were not generalizable and did not account for the duration of treatment across the two settings. Specifically, one study found that an inpatient-to-outpatient treatment approach reduced hospital length of stay by 55 percent—estimated to save hospitals $396 million annually—compared with treatment provided solely in a hospital. The second study found that infants who received care for NAS through an inpatient-to-outpatient treatment approach had an average length of stay of 13 days and cost about $14,000, while an inpatient- only approach had an average length of stay of 25 days and cost about $28,000. The 32 stakeholders we interviewed and the literature we reviewed identified several recommended practices for addressing NAS—that is, treating women with opioid use disorders during pregnancy or treating infants diagnosed with NAS after birth. The most frequently recommended practices were (1) prioritizing non-pharmacologic treatment, such as allowing the mother to reside with the infant during treatment, to facilitate the mother-infant bond; (2) educating mothers on prenatal care, treatment for NAS, and available resources for after an infant’s discharge; (3) educating health care providers on the stigma faced by women who use opioids during pregnancy and on how to screen for and treat NAS; and (4) using a protocol in a hospital or non-hospital setting for screening and treating infants with NAS. These recommended practices are described in more detail below. Volunteer programs to provide non- pharmacologic treatment for neonatal abstinence syndrome (NAS) Some stakeholders told us that some hospitals have established volunteer cuddler programs that train volunteers to help provide some of these non-pharmacologic treatments—-namely, swaddling, feeding, soothing, and coddling infants. However, health care providers at some facilities noted that volunteers are not necessarily available during late shifts. indicated that non-pharmacologic treatment may (1) facilitate the mother- infant bond, (2) reduce the severity of NAS symptoms, (3) reduce the need for pharmacologic treatment, and (4) reduce the length of an infant’s hospital stay. For example, two of the articles we reviewed noted that rooming-in has been shown to help decrease the need for pharmacologic treatment, the number of admissions to the NICU, and the length of an infant’s hospital stay. Additionally, 17 of the stakeholders we interviewed and nine articles we reviewed recommended that mothers be allowed to breastfeed while their infants are treated for NAS, as it helps to build a bond between the mother and infant. Most of these articles also noted that breastfeeding has been shown to reduce the severity of NAS. Educating mothers on prenatal care, treatment for NAS, and resources for after an infant’s hospital discharge. Most stakeholders we interviewed and several of the literature articles we reviewed recommended providing comprehensive, ongoing education to mothers on prenatal care and treatment for NAS and on the resources that are available after an infant’s discharge. (See text box below). The stakeholders and literature indicated that this education may (1) facilitate a non-combative relationship between the mother and health care providers; (2) help to reassure and support the mother, who may feel responsible for the infant’s suffering, in addition to facilitating treatment of NAS; and (3) help the mother understand her infant’s behavior and develop greater confidence in her parenting skills. For example, one article noted that an infant’s withdrawal behavior, such as fisting, back arching, and jaw clenching, may be misinterpreted by the mother as dislike of touch, and that educating mothers on these behaviors can help alleviate feelings of guilt. Education for mothers on prenatal care, treatment for neonatal abstinence syndrome (NAS), and resources for after an infant’s hospital discharge Explaining to the mother during the prenatal period what she can expect when the infant is born to help ensure she understands the effects of and treatment for NAS; Informing the mother about non-pharmacologic treatment techniques that can help reduce the severity of the infant’s NAS symptoms; Modeling good parenting skills, such as demonstrating how to comfort an infant who may be crying inconsolably for hours because of withdrawal; and Informing the mother about contraception for preventing future pregnancies. Educating health care providers on the stigma faced by women who use opioids during pregnancy, and how to screen for and treat NAS. Most stakeholders we interviewed and several of the literature articles we reviewed recommended educating health care providers, including providers who are not addiction specialists, on both the stigma faced by women who use opioids during pregnancy as well as on how to screen for and treat infants with NAS. The stakeholders and literature indicated that this education may: (1) improve care so that mothers with opioid use disorders feel more comfortable seeking and obtaining prenatal care, (2) help health care providers know how to recognize NAS symptoms to help ensure infants receive appropriate treatment, and (3) allow for more consistency among these providers in NAS screening and treatment. For example, 26 stakeholders told us that educating health care providers about stigma is important because provider attitudes affect how and if pregnant women obtain prenatal care and treatment for their opioid use disorders, which can affect the severity of NAS. Additionally, several articles we reviewed noted the importance of educating and training clinicians on how to administer the screening tools used to identify infants with NAS, which helps ensure infants are identified and receive optimal care. Using a protocol for screening and treating infants with NAS. While there is no single national standard of care for screening and treating NAS, most stakeholders we interviewed and several of the literature articles we reviewed recommended that hospital and non-hospital settings use a protocol to screen for and treat infants with NAS. The stakeholders and literature indicated that having a protocol can help: (1) identify infants at risk for NAS, (2) ensure that care is provided consistently, and (3) reduce the length of stay for infants receiving pharmacologic treatment. For example, the stakeholders we interviewed explained that a standard protocol also helps health care providers understand the tools used to assess the severity of NAS; know the types of medication used in treatment, including amounts and duration; and learn how to wean the infant off these medications. Similarly, one article we reviewed noted that infants who were treated at facilities that adopted standard treatment protocols experienced shorter durations of pharmacologic treatment compared with infants who were treated at facilities that did not use a standard protocol. Stakeholders we interviewed and literature we reviewed identified several challenges health care providers face in their efforts to address NAS. The most frequently cited challenges included (1) the use of multiple substances by pregnant women, which can exacerbate NAS; (2) the stigma faced by women who use opioids during pregnancy, which may affect whether they seek prenatal care to address NAS, among other things; (3) hospital staff burden and limited physical capacity to care for infants with NAS; (4) limited coordination of care for mothers and infants with NAS; and (5) gaps in research and data on NAS. These challenges are described in more detail below. The use of multiple substances by pregnant women, which can exacerbate NAS. Most stakeholders we interviewed and some of the literature we reviewed noted that the use of multiple substances by pregnant women, including opioids—referred to as maternal polysubstance use—can be a challenge, and some stated that the use of these substances can exacerbate NAS symptoms. According to the stakeholders, the substances can include methamphetamines, nicotine, alcohol, cocaine, marijuana, benzodiazepines, and Gabapentin. The stakeholders and literature indicated that maternal polysubstance use can lead to multiple conditions in the infant—such as prematurity or Hepatitis C—that can exacerbate NAS symptoms and prolong the length of an infant’s hospital stay. For example, one expert noted that many women with opioid use disorders are also heavy cigarette smokers, and the nicotine typically exacerbates NAS withdrawal symptoms. Additionally, officials from a hospital and non-hospital setting we visited told us that they had developed a separate protocol for treating infants exposed to multiple substances that includes the use of several medications to address the more severe NAS withdrawal symptoms. Stigma faced by women who use opioids which may affect whether they seek prenatal care to mitigate the severity of NAS, among other things. Most stakeholders we interviewed and several of the literature articles we reviewed noted that the stigma faced by pregnant women with opioid use disorders is a challenge in addressing NAS. The stakeholders and literature indicated that stigma may: (1) prevent pregnant women from seeking substance use treatment or prenatal care; (2) prevent them from disclosing their drug use to health care providers during pregnancy; or (3) cause the women to fear punitive effects, such as losing custody of their children, being detained, or losing their jobs. For example, officials from one perinatal quality collaborative told us that these women may fail to seek care because of stigma, which can ultimately make it more difficult for health care providers to build relationships with these women and identify infants at risk for NAS. Hospital staff burden and limited physical capacity to care for infants with NAS. According to most stakeholders we interviewed and some literature we reviewed, staff burden and a limited physical capacity at facilities can pose challenges for addressing NAS. The stakeholders and literature indicated that there is increased burden on staff to care for these infants because they require frequent, personal attention. For example, the stakeholders explained that a hospital may have to increase the number of nurses on duty in order to provide the care the infants need. Health care providers at one hospital said that nurses still struggle to care for infants with NAS, even with additional staff, because these infants are overstimulated, cry, and do not eat or sleep well. As a result, they require much time and one-on-one attention—including cuddling— from nurses. With respect to physical capacity, some stakeholders told us that limited physical capacity can make it difficult to (1) find space in the facility where the infants can be protected from high levels of stimulation and (2) facilitate the mother-infant bond. For example, some stakeholders told us that hospitals may not have a dedicated space for rooming-in, making it more difficult to facilitate bonding between mothers and infants. Limited coordination of care for mothers and infants with NAS. Most stakeholders we interviewed explained that the lack of coordination among health care providers and others for the mother and infant with NAS during the prenatal period, after the infant is born, and following the infant’s discharge can be a challenge. This coordination includes organizing patient care activities and sharing information among health care providers, social workers, and all other participants concerned with the mother and infant’s care. The stakeholders indicated that this lack of coordination can make it difficult for families to get the resources or support they need. (See text box below). For example, some stakeholders told us that women may miss health care visits because of a lack of access to enabling services such as transportation or child care. Limited coordination of care for mothers and infants with neonatal abstinence syndrome (NAS) One expert told us that there is a disproportionate number of infants with NAS born in rural areas. Infants in these areas may be discharged from the hospital without many follow-up services, such as transportation and care coordination. Gaps in research and data on NAS. Some stakeholders we interviewed noted that gaps in research and data on NAS make it challenging to conduct research on the affected population and fully understand the magnitude of the problem. The stakeholders indicated that there are gaps in adequate research and data on (1) the different types of treatment approaches for NAS; (2) the extent and effects of maternal polysubstance use among pregnant women; (3) the long-term effects of prenatal drug exposure, including the effects seen in childhood and adolescence; and (4) the efforts to ensure more consistent provider diagnosis and screening, such as through an improved screening tool. For example, the stakeholders told us that gaps in research and data may contribute to a lack of a national standard of care for screening and treating infants with NAS. According to some stakeholders, this may result in missed opportunities for identifying and treating infants with NAS. Some stakeholders also told us that because of gaps in research on the long- term effects of prenatal drug exposure, there is limited information on the types of services that infants with NAS may need in early childhood. Additionally, some stakeholders noted they found that because NAS was not consistently diagnosed and coded in medical records using diagnosis codes, the condition may be under-reported, and researchers may be limited in their ability to track these infants. In May 2017, HHS published the Protecting Our Infants Act: Report to Congress, which—among other things—presents a strategy that identifies key recommendations related to addressing NAS. Specifically, HHS’s strategy—known as the Protecting Our Infants Act: Final Strategy—made 39 recommendations related to the prevention, treatment, and related services for NAS and prenatal opioid use. Of the 39 recommendations HHS made in its report, we found that 28 of them directly relate to the recommended practices or challenges that we describe above. For example, the Strategy recommends the following: promoting non-pharmacologic treatment, such as rooming-in; providing continuing medical education to health care providers for managing and treating infants with NAS, such as on NAS treatment protocols; conducting research on the long-term effects of prenatal drug exposure so that appropriate services can be developed for infants with NAS; and establishing clear definitions of NAS and standardizing the use of diagnosis codes to collect more meaningful and actionable data on NAS. According to the Strategy, the recommendations will be used to inform planning and policy across HHS. However, HHS does not include any information in the Strategy on how the department and other stakeholders will implement the recommendations. Specifically, HHS does not include in its Strategy the following: the explicit priorities among the numerous recommendations and associated efforts the department has initiated related to NAS; timeframes for partial or full implementation of these recommendations; clear roles and responsibilities for the recommendations, such as the extent to which HHS will need to rely on the medical community and federal and public stakeholders for implementation; and the methods that will be used to assess the department’s progress in implementing any of these recommendations. HHS officials told us that they expect to develop a separate plan to guide implementation of the recommendations and that efforts to develop this plan were likely to begin in July 2017. However, as of September 2017, HHS could not provide any documentation that it had started to develop this implementation plan or establish a timeline for completing the plan; nor was HHS able to provide any information on what the plan may include. Having such a plan in place is important to ensure priorities are known and responsibilities are clear so that agencies and stakeholders can take appropriate action. Federal internal control standards call for agencies to have defined objectives clearly as part of their objective- setting process and to assign roles and responsibilities for achieving these objectives. Objectives defined in specific and measurable terms allow for the assessment of performance toward achieving objectives. Furthermore, leading principles on sound planning we have identified in our prior work call for developing robust plans to achieve agency goals. Until HHS finalizes an implementation plan that includes specific priorities, timeframes, responsibilities, and methods for evaluating progress, it is at risk of not being able to provide reasonable assurance that it can successfully implement these recommendations in a timely manner and assess the effectiveness of its efforts. The rising opioid crisis has caused a significant increase in the number of infants born and diagnosed with NAS, a condition that affects infants and their families, hospitals, and other health care providers who are treating them. The increase in infants born with NAS also increases medical and other treatment costs experienced by the federal government and states. HHS recently published a strategy with key recommendations that have the potential to address some of the challenges related to treating NAS. However, HHS lacks a sound plan for implementing these recommendations. The absence of such planning raises questions about whether and when HHS will be able to implement these recommendations in a timely manner and be able to assess its progress. The Secretary of HHS should expeditiously develop a plan—that includes priorities, timeframes, clear roles and responsibilities, and methods for assessing progress—to effectively implement the NAS-related recommendations identified in the Protecting Our Infants Act: Final Strategy. (Recommendation 1) We provided a draft of this report to HHS for review, and HHS provided written comments, which are reprinted in appendix III. HHS also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. In its written comments, HHS concurred with our recommendation to expeditiously take steps to address NAS and re-stated that its Strategy will be used to inform planning and policy across HHS. Specifically, HHS said that as part of its broader initiative to address the opioid crisis, the department will develop and implement a plan—that will include priorities, timeframes, roles and responsibilities, and methods for assessing progress—to address as appropriate and possible, the NAS-related recommendations in its Strategy. HHS also stated that full implementation would be contingent on funding, though it provided no information on how much funding was needed or how the funding would be used. Developing a plan to guide implementation can help the department determine what resources, if any, are needed to implement the recommendations in its Strategy. We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional addressees, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, and other interested parties. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on GAO’s website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-7114 or at iritanik@gao.gov. Contact points for our Office of Congressional Relations and Office of Public Affairs can be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV. To address our first three audit objectives to describe care settings for treating infants with neonatal abstinence syndrome (NAS), Medicaid payment for NAS treatment, and the recommended practices and challenges for addressing NAS, we selected 32 stakeholders based on their relevant experience to cover a range of perspectives on NAS. Specifically, these stakeholders included those from site visits we conducted to four states—Kentucky, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. We selected these states because they met the following criteria: 1. the state had one of the top 10 highest incidence rates of NAS, according to data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) for 2013, the most recent year of publicly available data; 2. the state provided variation in United States geographic regions with high rates of NAS, as of 2012; 3. more than 40 percent of births in the state were financed by Medicaid, according to a 2016 Kaiser Family Foundation Medicaid Budget Survey; and 4. the state has a perinatal quality collaborative—a state or multi-state network of teams working to improve health outcomes for mothers and infants—with work related to NAS, which we identified through the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists. As part of these site visits, we interviewed (1) officials from each of the four states, including Medicaid officials, Maternal and Child Health Directors, and Women’s Services Coordinators; (2) representatives from the four state perinatal collaboratives; (3) health care providers (including physicians or nurses) from eight hospitals of varying levels of care (two hospitals in each state), which were selected based on recommendations from the state perinatal collaboratives because of the hospitals’ experience treating NAS; and (4) officials from a residential treatment facility in each of the four states that provide prenatal and postpartum care to mothers, which were also selected based on recommendations from the state perinatal collaboratives regarding the facilities’ experience with pregnant women with opioid use disorders and their infants with NAS. In addition to our site visits, we selected 12 additional stakeholders that included health care providers or administrators in non-hospital settings across the United States; officials from medical specialty societies; and experts. Specifically, we spoke with (1) health care providers (including physicians or nurses) or administrators from four non-hospital settings in Arizona, Ohio, Washington, and West Virginia, which were selected based on recommendations from stakeholders we interviewed and on the availability of such settings and their experience treating NAS; (2) health care providers from five medical specialty societies, including the American Academy of Pediatrics, the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, the American Society of Addiction Medicine, MedNAX (a network of physicians that specialize in neonatal care, including NAS treatment), and the National Association of Neonatal Nurses; and (3) three experts, including the authors of published literature we reviewed. We interviewed each of these 32 stakeholders and requested information from stakeholders about treating infants with NAS, including the utilization of available hospital and non-hospital care settings and associated costs of treatment services. For example, we requested protocols for screening and treating infants with NAS from hospital and non-hospital care settings. We reviewed available protocols provided by hospitals and a non-hospital care setting. We also reviewed available information reported by state officials, hospital and non-hospital providers, and state perinatal collaboratives on the utilization of hospital and non-hospital care settings, the facilities’ cost of treating NAS in hospital and non-hospital settings, the lengths of stay for treating infants with NAS, or the amount of Medicaid payments for treating infants with NAS. We discussed the information provided by stakeholders and examined the information for obvious errors. The information obtained from these stakeholders is not generalizable to other states or other hospital and non-hospital settings. In addition, in some cases, stakeholders used different methods to collect the information they reported, including information on Medicaid payments; as a result, the information reported by stakeholders is not directly comparable. Additionally, we interviewed officials from HHS, including those from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) and HHS’s Behavioral Health Coordinating Council—which includes officials from the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), the Indian Health Service, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and the Food and Drug Administration, among others—concerning NAS treatment services, settings of care, Medicaid payment, and recommended practices and challenges related to addressing NAS. We also conducted a comprehensive literature review to identify relevant studies on NAS published in peer-reviewed journals from January 2013 to December 2016. We searched more than 40 databases for research published in relevant peer-reviewed journals, including BIOSIS Previews®, Embase®, Gale Group Health Periodicals Database, MEDLINE®, and New England Journal of Medicine. Key search terms included “neonatal abstinence syndrome,” “neonatal opioid withdrawal syndrome,” and “newborn infants.” After excluding duplicates, we identified and reviewed 325 abstracts. For those abstracts we found relevant, we obtained and reviewed the full study and selected 40 that were relevant to (1) hospital and non-hospital settings and related treatment services for infants with NAS; (2) the costs associated with treating infants with NAS, including Medicaid payments for services in these care settings; or (3) recommended practices and challenges for addressing NAS. We examined the methodologies for each of these studies and interviewed some of their authors. We determined that the studies were sufficiently reliable for our audit objectives. For a complete list of the studies we reviewed, see below. To examine our last audit objective on HHS’s strategy related to addressing NAS, we interviewed agency officials and reviewed agency documents on the agency’s efforts to develop a strategy. Specifically, we interviewed relevant officials from CMS and HHS’s Behavioral Health Coordinating Council concerning their efforts to develop a strategy related to addressing NAS. In reviewing relevant HHS documents, we focused on HHS’s Protecting Our Infants Act Report to Congress, which includes a strategy to address identified gaps, challenges, and recommendations related to NAS and prenatal opioid use. 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Blobaum. “Evidence-Based Interventions for Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome.” Pediatric Nursing, vol. 40, no. 4 (2014). Maguire, D. J., “Mothers on Methadone: Care in the NICU.” Neonatal Network, vol. 32, no. 6 (2013). Marcellus, L. “Supporting Women with Substance Use Issues: Trauma- Informed Care as a Foundation for Practice in the NICU.” Neonatal Network, vol. 33, no.6 (2014). McKeever, A. E., S. Spaeth-Brayton, and S. Sheerin. “The Role of Nurses in Comprehensive Care Management of Pregnant Women with Drug Addiction.” Nursing for Women’s Health, vol. 18, no.4 (2014). Meyer, M. and J. Phillips. “Caring for Pregnant Opioid Abusers in Vermont: A Potential Model for Non-Urban Areas.” Preventive Medicine, vol. 80 (2015). Newnam, K. M. “The Right Tool at the Right Time: Examining the Evidence Surrounding Measurement of Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome.” Advances in Neonatal Care, vol. 14, no.3 (2014). Orlando, S. “An Overview of Clinical Tools Used to Assess Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome.” Journal of Perinatal and Neonatal Nursing, vol. 28, no.3 (2014). Patrick, S.W., M.M. Davis, C.U. Lehman, and W.O. Cooper. “Increasing Incidence and Geographic Distribution of Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome: United States 2009 to 2012.” Journal of Perinatology, vol. 35 (2015). Patrick, S.W., H.C. Kaplan, M. Passarella, M.M. Davis, and S.A. Lorch. “Variation in Treatment of Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome in U.S. Children’s Hospitals, 2004-2011.” Journal of Perinatology, vol. 34, no. 11 (2014). Patrick, S.W., J. Dudley, P.R. Martin, F.E. Harrell, M.D. Warren, K.E. Hartmann, E.W. Ely, C.G. Grijalva, and W.O. Cooper. “Prescription Opioid Epidemic and Infant Outcomes.” Pediatrics, vol. 135, no.5 (2015). Patrick, S.W., R. E. Schumacher, J. D. Horbar, M. E. Buus-Frank, E. M. Edwards, K. A. Morrow, K. R. Ferrelli, A. P. Picarillo, M. Gupta, and R. F. Soll. “Improving Care for Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome.” Pediatrics, vol. 137, no. 5 (2016). Reece-Stremtan, S., and K. A. Marinelli. “ABM Clinical Protocol #21: Guidelines for Breastfeeding and the Drug-Dependent Woman, Revised 2015.” Breastfeeding Medicine, vol. 10, no.3 (2015). Shaw, M. R., C. Lederhos, M. Haberman, D. Howell, S. Fleming, and J. Roll. “Nurses Perceptions of Caring for Childbearing Women Who Misuse Opioids.” The American Journal of Maternal-Child Nursing, vol. 41, no. 1 (2016). Sublett, J. “Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome: Therapeutic Interventions.” The American Journal of Maternal-Child Nursing, vol. 38, no. 2 (2013). Sutter, M. B., L. Leeman, and A. Hsi. “Neonatal Opioid Withdrawal Syndrome.” Obstetrics and Gynecology Clinics of North America, vol. 41, issue 2 (2014). Teague, A. H., A. J. Jnah, and D. Newberry. “Intraprofessional Excellence in Nursing: Collaborative Strategies for Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome.” Neonatal Network, vol. 34, no.6 (2015). Terplan, M., A. Kennedy-Hendricks, and M. S. Chisolm. “Prenatal Substance Use: Exploring Assumptions of Maternal Unfitness.” Substance Abuse: Research and Treatment (2015). Tolia, V. N., S. W. Patrick, M. M. Bennett, K. Murthy, J. Sousa, P. B. Smith, R. H. Clark, and A. R. Spitzer. “Increasing Incidence of the Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome in U.S. Neonatal ICUs.” The New England Journal of Medicine, vol. 372, no. 22 (2015). Wiles, J. R., B. Isemann, L. P. Ward, A. A. Vinks, and H. Akinbi. “Current Management of Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome Secondary to Intrauterine Opioid Exposure.” Journal of Pediatrics, vol. 165, no. 3 (2014). The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has published several guidance and educational resources related to neonatal abstinence syndrome and prenatal opioid use. According to HHS, these documents serve as tools to help stakeholders, including state entities and health care providers, and policymakers. Examples of these resources are listed below. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Pregnancy and Opioid Medications Factsheet, accessed June 8, 2017, https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/pdf/pregnancy_opioid_pain_factsheet- a.pdf. CDC Public Health Grand Rounds, Primary Prevention and Public Strategies to Prevent Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome (Atlanta, GA: CDC, last updated August 18, 2016), accessed July 19, 2017, https://www.cdc.gov/cdcgrandrounds/archives/2016/August2016.htm. CDC, Treating for Two: Safer Medication Use in Pregnancy Initiative (Atlanta, GA: CDC, last updated May 5, 2016), accessed June 8, 2017, https://www.cdc.gov/pregnancy/meds/treatingfortwo. Department of Health and Human Services, Opioids: The Prescription Drug & Heroin Overdose Epidemic (Washington, D.C., last reviewed March 24, 2016), accessed June 8, 2017, https://www.hhs.gov/opioids/index.html. Department of Health and Human Services, National Center for Substance Abuse and Child Welfare, Resources & Topics on Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome, accessed June 8, 2017, https://www.ncsacw.samhsa.gov/resources/opioid-use-disorders-and-me dication-assisted-treatment/neonatal-abstinence-syndrome.aspx. Jean Y. Ko. et al., “CDC Grand Rounds: Public Health Strategies to Prevent Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome,” Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, March 10, 2017), accessed June 8, 2017, https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/66/wr/mm6609a2.htm. National Institute on Drug Abuse, Principles of Substance Abuse Prevention for Early Childhood: A Research Based Guide (last updated March 2016), accessed June 8, 2017, https://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/principles-substance-abuse-prev ention-early-childhood/principles-substance-abuse-prevention-early-child hood. National Institute on Drug Abuse, Substance Use in Women (last updated September 2016), accessed June 8, 2017, https://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/research-reports/substance-use-i n-women/summary. Reddy, Uma M. J. M. Davis, Z. Ren, and M. F. Greene, “Opioid Use in Pregnancy, Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome, and Childhood Outcomes: Executive Summary of a Joint Workshop.” Obstetrics and Gynecology, vol. 130, issue 1 (July 2017). Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, A Collaborative Approach to the Treatment of Pregnant Women with Opioid Use Disorders. HHS Publications No. (SMA) 16-4978. Rockville, MD: Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, 2016. Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, “Advancing the Care of Pregnant and Parenting Women With Opioid Use Disorder and Their Infants: A Foundation for Clinical Guidance,” Rockville, MD: Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, 2016. Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, “Methadone Treatment for Pregnant Women.” HHS Publication No. (SMA) 14-4124 (Rockville, MD: Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, revised 2014). In addition to the contact named above, Rashmi Agarwal, Assistant Director; Amy Leone, Analyst-in-Charge; Melissa Duong; Krister Friday; Jacquelyn Hamilton; Giao N. Nguyen; and Laurie Pachter made key contributions to this report. Drug Control Policy: Information on Status of Federal Efforts and Key Issues for Preventing Illicit Drug Use. GAO-17-766T. Washington, D.C.: July 26, 2017. Medicaid Expansion: Behavioral Health Treatment Use in Selected States in 2014. GAO-17-529. Washington, D.C.: July 21, 2017. VA Health Care: Actions Needed to Ensure Medical Facility Controlled Substance Inspection Programs Meet Agency Requirements. GAO-17-242. Washington, D.C.: February 15, 2017. Highlights of a Forum: Preventing Illicit Drug Use. GAO-17-146SP. Washington, D.C.: November 14, 2016. Opioid Addiction: Laws, Regulations, and Other Factors Can Affect Medication-Assisted Treatment Access. GAO-16-833. Washington, D.C.: September 27, 2016. Drug Enforcement Administration: Additional Actions Needed to Address Prior GAO Recommendations. GAO-16-737T. Washington, D.C.: June 22, 2016. Office of National Drug Control Policy: Progress toward Some National Drug Control Strategy Goals, but None Have Been Fully Achieved. GAO-16-660T. Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2016. Veterans Justice Outreach Program: VA Could Improve Management by Establishing Performance Measures and Fully Assessing Risks. GAO-16-393. Washington, D.C.: April 28, 2016. State Marijuana Legalization: DOJ Should Document Its Approach to Monitoring the Effects of Legalization. GAO-16-1. Washington, D.C.: December 30, 2015. Prescription Drugs: More DEA Information about Registrants’ Controlled Substances Roles Could Improve Their Understanding and Help Ensure Access. GAO-15-471. Washington, D.C.: June 25, 2015. Mental Health: Better Documentation Needed to Oversee Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration Grantees. GAO-15-405. Washington, D.C.: May 12, 2015. Prenatal Drug Use and Newborn Health: Federal Efforts Need Better Planning and Coordination. GAO-15-203. Washington, D.C.: February 10, 2015. Medicare Program Integrity: CMS Pursues Many Practices to Address Prescription Drug Fraud, Waste, and Abuse. GAO-15-66. Washington, D.C.: October 24, 2014. Office of National Drug Control Policy: Office Could Better Identify Opportunities to Increase Program Coordination. GAO-13-333. Washington D.C.: March 26, 2013. Child Welfare: States Use Flexible Federal Funds, But Struggle to Meet Service Needs. GAO-13-170. Washington, D.C.: January 30, 2013.	[ "As the opioid crisis has increased in recent years, so has the number of pregnant women who use opioids, which can result in NAS. A recent peer-reviewed study found that cases of NAS have grown nearly five-fold between 2000 and 2012 and that most infants with NAS are covered under Medicaid. The Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act of 2016 includes a provision for GAO to examine NAS in the United States and related treatment services covered under Medicaid. This report 1) describes the hospital and non-hospital settings for treating infants with NAS and how Medicaid pays for services, 2) describes recommended practices and challenges for addressing NAS, and 3) examines HHS's strategy for addressing NAS. GAO reviewed HHS documentation and interviewed HHS officials. GAO also conducted site visits to four states—Kentucky, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin—selected based on several factors, including incidence rates of NAS and geographic variation. GAO interviewed stakeholders from 32 organizations, including health care providers and state officials in the selected states. The prenatal use of opioids or other drugs can produce a withdrawal condition in newborns known as neonatal abstinence syndrome (NAS). Health care providers, state officials, and other stakeholders told GAO that most infants with NAS are treated in the hospital—such as in a neonatal intensive care unit—though some may be referred to a non-hospital setting—such as a neonatal withdrawal center with nursery rooms—to complete their treatment. The table below provides more information on settings for treating infants with NAS and on how Medicaid pays for services in these settings. According to stakeholders GAO interviewed and literature reviewed, there are several recommended practices and challenges associated with addressing NAS. The most frequently recommended practices included prioritizing non-pharmacologic treatment to infants—treatment that does not involve medications—such as allowing the mother to reside with the infant during treatment; educating mothers and health care providers on treatment of NAS, among other things; and using a protocol in the hospital or non-hospital setting for screening and treating infants with NAS. The most frequently cited challenges included the maternal use of multiple drugs—or polysubstance use—as it can exacerbate NAS symptoms; stigma faced by pregnant women who use opioids; hospital staff burden and limited physical capacity to care for infants with NAS; limited coordination of care for mothers and infants with NAS; and gaps in research and data on NAS, such as research on the long-term effects of the condition. In May 2017, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) published a strategy document that makes key recommendations to address NAS. The Strategy recommends, for example, that health care providers receive continuing education on managing and treating infants with NAS and promote non-pharmacologic treatment. According to HHS officials, these recommendations will inform planning and policy across the department. However, HHS has yet to determine how and when the recommendations will be implemented, including establishing priorities; the roles and responsibilities of other federal, state, and public stakeholders; implementation timeframes; and methods for assessing progress. HHS officials told GAO that they expect to develop an implementation plan sometime in 2017 but had no timeline for doing so. Without a plan that clearly specifies how HHS will implement the Strategy and assess its progress, the department increases the risk that its recommendations for addressing NAS will not be implemented. HHS should expeditiously develop a plan for implementing the recommendations included in its strategy related to addressing NAS. HHS concurred that it should expeditiously address NAS, but noted implementation of the strategy is contingent on funding." ]	9,838	gov_report	en	null	e936a7cb999bde8f159bc1cf269b648cd26c52f55ec3c3a0
To varying extents, Internet content providers—also called “edge providers”—and Internet service providers collect, use, and share information from their customers to enable their services, support advertising, and for other purposes. Many companies describe these and other privacy-related practices in privacy policies, to which consumers may be required to consent in order to use the service. Consumers access such services through a variety of devices, including mobile phones and tablets, computers, and other devices connected to the Internet by wired or wireless means. A nationwide survey that the U.S. Census Bureau conducted for NTIA in 2017 found that 78 percent of Americans ages 3 and older used the Internet. Another nationwide survey that the Pew Research Center conducted in 2018 found that 69 percent of American adults reported that they use some kind of social media platform such as Facebook. No comprehensive federal privacy law governs the collection, use, and sale or other disclosure of personal information by private-sector companies in the United States. Rather, the federal privacy framework for private-sector companies is comprised partly of a set of tailored laws that govern the use and protection of personal information for specific purposes, in certain situations, or by certain sectors or types of entities. These laws include the Fair Credit Reporting Act, which protects the security and confidentiality of personal information collected or used to help make decisions about individuals’ eligibility for such products as credit or for insurance or employment; the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, which protects nonpublic personal information that individuals provide to financial institutions or that such institutions maintain; and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act which establishes a set of national standards for the protection of certain health information. In addition, as detailed in this report, FTC addresses consumer concerns about Internet privacy using its broad authority to protect consumers from unfair and deceptive trade practices. We have reported on a variety of Internet privacy concerns in recent years that include the collection and use of data such as people’s Internet browsing histories, purchases, locations, and travel routes, including: Internet of things: In 2017, we found that as new and more devices become connected, they increase not only the opportunities for security and privacy breaches, but also the scale and scope of any resulting consequences. Vehicle data privacy: We found in 2017 that most selected automakers reported limiting their data collection, use, and sharing, but their written notices did not clearly identify data sharing and use practices. Information resellers: In a 2013 report on companies that collect and resell information on individuals, we found that no overarching federal privacy law governs the collection and sale of personal information among private-sector companies, including information resellers. We found that gaps exist in the federal privacy framework, which does not fully address changes in technology and the marketplace. Among the issues we noted were the potential need for changes to privacy controls for web tracking, mobile devices, and other technologies. We recommended that Congress consider strengthening the consumer privacy framework to reflect the effects of changes in technology and the marketplace. Such legislation has not been enacted to date. Mobile device location data: In 2012, we found that, according to privacy advocates, consumers are generally unaware of how their location data are shared with and used by third parties. We recommended that FTC consider issuing guidance establishing FTC’s views regarding mobile companies’ appropriate actions to protect location data privacy. FTC implemented that recommendation in 2013. To guide their privacy practices, many organizations and governments have used the Fair Information Practice Principles. As noted above, these principles—which are not limited to Internet privacy—address the collection and use of personal information, data quality and security, and transparency, among other things, and have served as the basis for many of the privacy recommendations federal agencies have made. The Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development developed a version of these principles in 1980 that has been widely adopted and was updated in 2013. In 2000, FTC recommended that Congress enact a consumer Internet privacy statute that would require companies to comply with broad and flexible definitions of the principles, and an FTC commissioner said in a 2014 speech that they are a solid framework and are flexible and effective. While they are principles, not legal requirements, they provide a possible approach for balancing the need for privacy with other interests. Table 1 provides more detailed information about the principles. FTC is primarily a law enforcement agency that, among other responsibilities, currently has the lead in overseeing Internet privacy at the federal level. Specifically, it addresses consumer concerns about Internet privacy, both for Internet service providers and content providers, using its general authority under section 5 of the FTC Act. Section 5, as amended in 1938, prohibits “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.” Although the FTC Act generally empowers FTC to take enforcement action, it prohibits FTC from taking action against common carriers such as telecommunication services, airlines, and railroads under certain circumstances. FTC also does not have jurisdiction over banks, credit unions, or savings and loans institutions. Even though the FTC Act does not speak in explicit terms about protecting consumer privacy, the Act authorizes such protection to the extent it involves practices FTC defines as unfair or deceptive. According to FTC, an act or practice is “unfair” if it causes, or is likely to cause, substantial injury not reasonably avoidable by consumers and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or competition as a result of the practice. FTC has used this “unfairness” authority to address situations where a company has allegedly failed to properly protect consumers’ data. According to FTC, a representation or omission is “deceptive” if it is material and is likely to mislead consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances. For example, the omission of terms in an advertisement would need to be material and likely to mislead consumers in order to be deceptive. FTC applies this “deceptive” authority to address deceptions or violations of written privacy policies and representations concerning data security. FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection investigates Internet privacy complaints from various sources, including consumers, other agencies, Congress, and industry, and also initiates investigations on its own. If the bureau has reason to believe that an entity is engaging in an unfair or deceptive practice, it may forward an enforcement recommendation to the commission. The commission then determines whether to pursue an enforcement action, which can include the following: litigating commission-filed administrative complaints before an FTC administrative law judge; filing and litigating complaints in federal district court seeking preliminary and permanent injunctions, monetary redress for consumers or other equitable relief; or referring complaints seeking civil penalties for violations of rules authorizing such penalties or for violations of administrative orders to the Department of Justice (DOJ) and assisting DOJ in litigating those cases (if DOJ does not take action, FTC can pursue the action on its own). FTC’s Internet privacy enforcement cases may be settled without the imposition of civil penalties. Instead, FTC typically enters into settlement agreements requiring companies to take actions such as: implementing reasonable privacy and security programs; being subject to long-term monitoring of compliance with the settlements by outside entities; providing monetary redress to consumers; forfeiting any money gained from the unfair or deceptive conduct; deleting illegally obtained consumer information; and providing transparency and choice mechanisms to consumers. If a company violates an FTC final consent order, the agency can then request civil monetary penalties in court for the violations. In addition, as discussed below, FTC can seek to impose civil monetary penalties directly for violations of certain privacy statutes and regulations such as the statute pertaining to the Internet privacy of children and its implementing regulations. Although FTC can levy civil penalties up to $41,484 per violation, per day, against an entity that violates a trade regulation rule under the FTC Act, it has not promulgated trade regulation rules under section 5 specific to privacy. Although FTC has not implemented its section 5 authority by issuing regulations regarding Internet privacy, it has issued regulations to implement other statutory authorities. Likewise, other federal agencies use regulations to implement the statutes they are charged with administering. The process by which federal agencies typically develop and issue regulations is spelled out in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Section 553 of the APA establishes procedures and requirements for what is known as “informal” rulemaking, also known as notice-and- comment rulemaking. Among other things, section 553 generally requires agencies to publish a notice of proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register. After giving interested persons an opportunity to comment on the proposal by providing “data, views, or arguments,” the statute then requires the agency to publish the final rule in the Federal Register. Regulations may be enforced in various ways, for example, by seeking civil penalties for non-compliance. FTC has authority to seek civil penalties, for example, when a company knowingly violates a regulation or, as discussed below, a final consent order. In contrast to the APA section 553 rulemaking process, the rulemaking process that FTC generally must follow to issue rules under the FTC Act is spelled out in the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act amendments to the FTC Act (Magnuson-Moss). The Magnuson-Moss amendments— enacted in 1975 partly in response to industry opposition to FTC’s trade regulations, and amended in 1980—require additional rulemaking steps beyond APA section 553. For example, Magnuson-Moss requires FTC to publish an advance notice of proposed rulemaking in addition to the notice of proposed rulemaking required by the APA, and to offer interested parties the opportunity for an informal hearing involving oral testimony. FTC has not promulgated any regulations using the Magnuson-Moss procedures since 1980; according to FTC staff, the additional steps required under Magnuson-Moss add time and complexity to the rulemaking process. The Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA), enacted in 1998, governs the online collection of personal information from children under the age of 13 by operators of websites or online services, including mobile applications. COPPA required FTC to issue and enforce regulations concerning children’s online privacy and directed FTC to promulgate these regulations using the APA section 553 notice-and- comment rulemaking process. COPPA contained a number of specific requirements that FTC was directed to implement by regulation, such as requiring websites to post a complete privacy policy, to notify parents directly about their information collection practices, and to obtain verifiable parental consent before collecting personal information from their children or sharing it with others. The commission’s original COPPA regulations became effective on April 21, 2000, and amended COPPA regulations took effect on July 1, 2013. According to an FTC staff member, COPPA and FTC’s implementing regulations reflect various principles that are similar to the Fair Information Practice Principles. FCC regulates the telecommunications industry pursuant to the Communications Act of 1934, as amended (Communications Act). FCC follows the APA section 553 notice-and-comment rulemaking process to promulgate regulations implementing the Communications Act. FCC also has an enforcement bureau that pursues violations of its regulations and the Communications Act. The Communications Act establishes separate definitions for “information services” and “telecommunications services” and treats these two types of services differently. Specifically, information services are subject to less regulation by FCC than telecommunications services under the Communications Act. However, FTC is prohibited from regulating telecommunications carriers (a provider of telecommunications services) under the common carrier exemption. Prior to 2015, Internet services were considered information services under the Communications Act, and thus FTC was not prohibited from considering the privacy practices of Internet service providers under its FTC Act authority to protect consumers from unfair and deceptive practices. This changed in 2015 when FCC classified broadband as a telecommunications service, which meant that broadband Internet service providers were considered telecommunications carriers and FCC asserted primary oversight over them. As a result of the reclassification, FTC no longer had jurisdiction over Internet service providers. Once FCC had asserted primary oversight over Internet service providers, FCC promulgated privacy regulations specific to them. However, before the privacy regulations went into effect, Congress repealed them under the Congressional Review Act. In December 2017, FCC reclassified broadband as an information service—reverting Internet service providers’ classification to what it had been prior to 2015. When that reclassification became effective in June 2018, jurisdiction of Internet privacy for Internet service providers was effectively transferred from FCC back to FTC. As a result, FCC currently has limited Internet privacy oversight responsibilities, as shown in figure 1. Perspectives on the benefits of and concerns about the collection and use of consumers’ data from the Internet varied somewhat across stakeholder groups. Various stakeholders we interviewed—including those from academia, industry, and government—said that there should be a balance between the freedom of companies to collect and use consumers’ data needed to provide services and the necessity to protect consumers’ privacy. In general, industry stakeholders highlighted the benefits of data collection and use, such as facilitating innovation, while consumer advocacy groups and other stakeholders emphasized concerns about consumers’ loss of control over their data and their lack of understanding of how companies collect and use their information. Additionally, surveys and other literature that we reviewed on Internet privacy highlighted concerns among consumers. The key benefits of information collection were identified as: Enables certain services. According to two industry stakeholders, the collection and use of consumer data from the Internet enable content providers to provide services. These stakeholders said that sometimes a content provider must collect and use information from consumers to provide the service. For example, a mapping service must collect and use consumers’ current location to provide them with up-to-date directions. Provides low-cost or free services. A representative from a content provider said that revenue from targeted advertising helps allow some content providers’ services to be offered to consumers at little or no charge. Instead of charging a subscription fee, a social media company may be able to provide free service because it uses information that it collects from consumers to target advertisements to users on a customized, user-by-user basis. These ads are targeted to users based on interests they express through their use of social media, among other things. According to a representative from an Internet search engine, using consumer data for targeted advertising may be relatively less important for some kinds of content providers, such as search engines. This company representative said that search engines may use keywords entered for a particular Internet search to provide advertisements relevant to the search. For example, a search for “car insurance” can offer the consumer advertisements from car insurance companies without any additional data from the consumer other than the search’s keywords. Supports innovation and customization. According to some stakeholders, the collection and use of data also benefit consumers through other means such as providing innovative products or customized services. According to a representative from a content provider, the collection of personal information, with consent, for commercial purposes can at times have benefits. The representative said, for example, that collection of images containing identifiable information, like faces, can help in the development of new technologies such as object and facial recognition. According to two content providers, consumers may also benefit from customized services and content. For example, according to a representative from a travel-related company, that company can collect information about a consumer to suggest travel itineraries and suggestions for activities. Additionally, representatives from a consumer advocacy group and a content provider stated that direct-marketing approaches are enabled through data collection. Such marketing approaches allow consumers to receive advertisements that are uniquely tailored to their interests. For example, a consumer that a content provider has identified as being a hiker may receive advertisements for hiking boots. Despite these benefits, public opinion surveys have shown concerns about the collection and use of consumers’ information on the Internet. For instance, recent analyses based on surveys by the Pew Research Center and NTIA showed that the public lacks trust in Internet privacy, a concern that may limit economic activities. NTIA’s survey results show that privacy concerns may lead to lower levels of economic productivity as people decline to make financial transactions on the Internet. According to the NTIA analysis, in 2017, 24 percent of American households surveyed avoided making financial transactions on the Internet due to privacy or security concerns. Consumers NTIA surveyed indicated that their specific concerns were identity theft, credit card or banking fraud, data collection by online services, loss of control over personal information, data collection by government, and threats to personal safety. Stakeholders we interviewed elaborated on some of these concerns: Public disclosure and data breaches. Some stakeholders, including representatives from content providers, said that personal information from the Internet can be publicly disclosed, including through data breaches. An academic and a former FCC commissioner told us that such disclosures are becoming more frequent. Various consumer advocacy groups and state governments continue to report data breaches. This personal information can include financial information such as credit card information, the disclosure of which can result in financial harm to the consumer. It can also include other kinds of sensitive information such as political views or medical conditions, the disclosure of which can cause non-financial harms such as embarrassment or harassment. According to public reports, the 2017 breach of consumer information from Equifax, a credit-reporting agency, resulted in the disclosure of 143 million American consumers’ sensitive information. According to NTIA’s 2017 survey, 45 percent of households surveyed reported major concerns about credit card fraud. Regarding non-financial information, in a recent case FTC alleged that an Internet-based company publicly disclosed patients’ sensitive medical information without their knowledge after patients submitted what they thought were confidential reviews of physicians. According to FTC, these reviews were then publicly posted on the company’s website. Financial and other harms. Stakeholders identified both potential financial and non-financial harms associated with misuse of personal information from the Internet. A former FTC acting chair has said that privacy and data-security incidents can cause injuries that do not only involve financial loss and that it may be difficult to measure this type of non-financial injury. In a February 2018 speech, this former acting FTC chair cited a case that the agency filed involving the misuse of personal information from the Internet that resulted in people losing jobs or job opportunities or being threatened, stalked, and harassed. The acting chair said that in another case, there was evidence that several people committed suicide after their names and other data were disclosed. The commission can, by bringing suit in district court, obtain an order compelling content providers to provide monetary relief to consumers if a data disclosure results in financial harm to a consumer. However, an academic noted that many data disclosures of sensitive information cannot be financially redressed; information can indefinitely persist on the Internet once it is disclosed. Consumers’ lack of understanding. A range of stakeholders we interviewed, including those from industry, said that consumers lack an understanding of how their data are collected and used. Some stakeholders said content providers are insufficiently transparent about how they collect and use data. For instance, content providers’ privacy policies, according to various stakeholders, may contain technical language that is difficult for typical consumers to understand, may be located in a difficult-to-access or inconspicuous part of the content provider’s website, or may be lengthy to the point where it becomes prohibitively difficult for a consumer to set aside enough time to read. Furthermore, according to an academic, companies may have an incentive to intentionally obscure their privacy practices, since clarity could put the companies at a competitive disadvantage. The academic also stated that different privacy policies may apply to different parts of a consumer’s experience on a single website. For example, the academic described how a website may have contracts with third-party vendors for specific services included on the website that consumers use, such as an online shopping cart’s features. The privacy policy for the website and the third-party shopping cart can be separate and unrelated to each other, and consumers may not be aware of this since these policies may never appear to consumers or be hard to obtain. A representative from a consumer advocacy group also mentioned that consumers may be unaware that companies track consumers’ Internet activity in order to target those consumers with customized prices. An academic said that these practices may disproportionately affect people with low computer literacy, as they may not be aware of tracking or know of ways to counteract it. In 2015, we found that the lack of computer and Internet skills is one of the primary barriers people face in using the Internet and that this is a particular problem for certain demographic segments who may lack exposure to or knowledge about computers, such as those of age 65 and older and those with low levels of income and education. Consumer lack of control. Some academics and consumer advocacy groups also identified a lack of control as a concern with respect to Internet privacy—consumers have little or no control over how their information is collected, used, and shared. In a 2015 survey conducted by Pew Research Center, 65 percent of respondents said it is very important to be in control of what information is collected about them. However, according to an academic and a consumer advocacy group we interviewed, privacy policies offer consumers little or no bargaining power, and consumers may be forced to either accept the terms of the policy as written or not use the application or service at all. Furthermore, we recently reported that sometimes consumers’ information is used for purposes that are altogether separate from what those consumers originally anticipated. For example, FTC alleged in an enforcement action that in 2009 and 2010, a company told consumers that it would track the websites they visited in order to provide them with personalized offers, when in fact the company was also transmitting credit card information it collected through such tracking to third parties. The company settled with FTC. We also recently reported on how devices that comprise the Internet of Things pose privacy concerns for consumers, including that information collected by such Internet-connected devices can be used in ways to which the consumer was not given the option to opt out. As discussed above, stakeholders described various types of harm that could result from Internet privacy violations. Regardless of whether violations involve financial or other types of harm, a challenging factor in providing Internet privacy oversight is identifying the responsible parties. A former federal government official with experience in privacy issues said that it frequently is difficult to identify which Internet entity in the chain is ultimately responsible for a privacy-related harm. For example, if a consumer is harmed by the theft of his or her Social Security number, it can be difficult to determine which entity is responsible if multiple entities have suffered data breaches of information systems that contained the Social Security number. In addition to the challenges in identifying responsible parties, the federal government has faced challenges in providing Internet privacy oversight. Our prior work has found that such efforts lack clearly defined roles, goals and performance measures, and that gaps exist in the current privacy framework. We found that during the last decade, FTC filed 101 Internet privacy enforcement actions for practices that the agency alleged were unfair, deceptive, a violation of COPPA, a violation of a settlement agreement, or a combination of those reasons. Most of these actions pertained to first-time violations of the FTC Act for which FTC does not have the authority to levy civil penalties. In those cases where a party violated an FTC regulation or settlement agreement, however, FTC does have the authority to impose civil penalties. The 101 cases—filed between July 1, 2008 and June 30, 2018—involved a variety of products, services, and industries that collect and use personal information from the Internet. During the years for which we examined full-year data, the number of enforcement actions taken per year ranged from 5 in 2010 and 2016 to 23 in 2015. For example, in recent years, FTC took enforcement action against the following entities for alleged conduct that the agency contended violated section 5 or COPPA: a toy manufacturer for collecting personal information from children online without providing direct notice and obtaining their parents’ consent; a computer manufacturer for pre-loading laptops with software that compromised security protections in order to deliver ads to consumers; a mobile ride-hailing business for misrepresenting the extent to which it monitored its employees’ access to personal information about users; a television manufacturer for installing software on its televisions to collect viewing data on 11 million consumers without their knowledge or consent and providing the viewing data to third parties; and a mobile advertising network for deceptively tracking the locations of hundreds of millions of consumers, including children, without their knowledge or consent, to serve them geographically targeted advertising. Of the 101 actions filed during the 10-year period, 51 involved Internet content providers, 21 involved software developers, 12 involved the sale of information or its use in advertising, 5 involved manufacturers, 1 involved an Internet service provider, and 11 involved a variety of different products, such as those provided by rent-to-own companies or certification services. In nearly all 101 cases, companies settled with FTC, which required the companies to make changes in their policies or practices as part of the settlement. FTC levied civil penalties against two of those companies for violating their settlement agreements. Also during this 10-year period, FTC levied civil penalties against 15 companies (a total of $12.7 million) for alleged violations of the COPPA regulations. The COPPA civil penalties ranged from $50,000 to $4 million and the average amount was $847,333. FTC can also seek to compel companies to provide monetary relief to those they have harmed. During this time period, FTC levied civil penalties against companies for violations of consent decrees or ordered monetary relief to consumers from companies for a total of $136.1 million. These payment orders ranged from $200,000 to $104.5 million and the average amount was $17 million. In the majority of these 101 enforcement actions that FTC settled, FTC alleged that companies engaged in practices that were deceptive. Examples of the charges FTC brought include: “Deceptive practices” cases (61 cases): In 2016, FTC alleged that Turn, Inc., an Internet advertising company, continued to track the Internet activities of consumers for targeted advertising purposes after the company had made representations that it would stop doing so. According to FTC, the company led consumers to believe they could turn off such tracking when in fact they were unable to do so. “Unfair practices” cases (4 cases): In 2014, FTC alleged that LeapLab, a data broker, knowingly provided scammers with hundreds of thousands of consumers’ sensitive personal information, including Social Security and bank account numbers. “Unfair and deceptive” practices cases (19 cases): In 2015, FTC alleged that Equiliv Investments, a software developer, lured consumers into downloading its “rewards” application, saying it would be free of malware, when the application’s main purpose was actually to load the consumers’ mobile phones with malicious software to mine virtual currencies for the developer. COPPA and COPPA regulations cases (6 cases): In 2011, FTC alleged that Broken Thumbs Apps, a software developer, had collected information from Internet applications that the developer specifically targeted toward children under the age of 13. FTC’s complaint stated that the company had, among other things, failed to provide notice of what information it collected and how it was used and also had failed to inform parents of these practices and receive their consent as COPPA required. Violation of settlement agreement cases (2 cases): In 2012, Google agreed to pay a $22.5 million civil penalty to settle FTC charges that it misrepresented to users of Apple’s Safari Internet browser that Google would not place tracking cookies or provide targeted ads to those users, violating an earlier settlement agreement between the company and FTC. In 14 of the 101 cases, FTC required companies to be audited by outside entities to monitor compliance with the terms of the settlement. The audit period ranged from 5 years to 20 years, with an average of 17.5 years. As noted above, 2 of the 101 cases involved a violation of FTC settlement agreements. In addition, in March 2018, FTC announced that it is investigating whether Facebook’s privacy practices violate a 2012 Facebook settlement agreement with FTC. In the case that resulted in the 2012 settlement, FTC charged Facebook with deceiving consumers by telling them they could keep their information private, but then allowing it to be shared and made public. Appendix II contains more detailed information about the 101 cases. As stated earlier, in 2015, FCC classified broadband Internet service as a telecommunications service, placing primary oversight of broadband Internet service providers’ privacy practices under FCC’s jurisdiction instead of FTC’s jurisdiction. In 2016, FCC filed a privacy enforcement action against a mobile Internet service provider, alleging, in part, violation of section 222 of the Communications Act and FCC’s Open Internet Transparency Rule. Section 222 requires telecommunications carriers to protect the confidentiality of customers’ proprietary information. In that case, FCC fined Verizon Wireless $1.4 million for failing to disclose that it was inserting “unique identifier headers,” also called “perma- cookies” or “super cookies” (mobile web tracking cookies that users cannot remove), into customers’ Internet traffic over its wireless network. Although the settlement was finalized during the 2015-2017 period when FCC had asserted jurisdiction over the privacy practices of Internet providers, the Verizon Wireless practices occurred prior to the classification of Internet service providers as telecommunications carriers. The investigation therefore did not rely upon FCC’s subsequent assertion of authority over Internet service providers’ privacy practices. In October 2016, after FCC had reclassified broadband as a telecommunications service, the commission issued Internet service provider privacy regulations, asserting its authority under section 222 of the Communications Act. In April 2017, however, Congress repealed these regulations under the Congressional Review Act before they took effect. In December 2017, FCC then reversed its 2015 classification of broadband, and oversight of broadband Internet service providers’ privacy practices reverted to FTC once the decision took effect in June 2018. In explaining the December 2017 decision, FCC’s new chair said that FTC’s privacy oversight approach regarding Internet service providers—using its authority to protect consumers against unfair, deceptive, and anti- competitive practices—had worked well in the past and that this action would “put the nation’s most experienced privacy cop back on the beat.” Under FCC’s new legal approach, it no longer asserts jurisdiction to take enforcement action against Internet service providers for privacy-related matters, including mobile Internet service providers. As part of FTC’s resumption of Internet service provider oversight, FCC and FTC entered into a memorandum of understanding in December 2017 spelling out their roles and responsibilities regarding oversight of these companies. FTC staff said that they regularly communicate with FCC and have an agreement to share Internet privacy complaints. As previously discussed, no federal statute comprehensively and specifically governs Internet privacy across all sectors. FTC oversees some aspects of Internet privacy by using its FTC Act section 5 authority to protect consumers from unfair and deceptive practices. FTC also uses its specific COPPA authority to police the collection and use of personal information from children by online services. Some industry representatives said that FTC’s enforcement has been effective because the agency has expertise and experience in privacy issues and has the flexibility to take enforcement action on a case-by-case basis. In addition, a content provider said that FTC has taken enforcement actions against companies of various sizes in different sectors and has a powerful tool by being able to require companies to be audited by outside entities for up to 20 years. Industry stakeholders we interviewed generally said that “direct enforcement” of a statute is preferable to promulgating and enforcing regulations implementing that statute (which constitutes enforcement of the statute as well). These stakeholders noted several key concerns they believe exist with regulatory versus statutory enforcement of Internet privacy: Regulations can stifle innovation. Two industry stakeholders said that regulations can hinder companies’ ability to innovate. For example, representatives from an Internet service provider said that innovation can stop during the rulemaking process as the industry waits for the regulation to be finalized. Regulations may create loopholes. Representatives from an Internet industry group and a content provider said that regulations can also contain loopholes that can be legally exploited because imprecise language in a regulation may allow a company to legally engage in an action that was originally unforeseen by the regulator. Regulations can become obsolete. Several industry stakeholders said regulations also may become obsolete quickly because the Internet industry is rapidly changing. An Internet industry representative noted that there can be large shifts in the Internet industry from year to year, while it often takes an agency much longer than a year to adopt a rule. Industry stakeholders said the flexibility of FTC’s approach allows FTC to adapt continuously to changing market conditions. Rulemakings can be lengthy. FCC officials said that in some cases, rulemakings can take a long time, especially when the issues are complex and there is no statutory deadline. Our previous work on rulemaking found that length of time required for the development and issuance of final rules varied both within and among agencies. Additionally, while some stakeholders suggested that regulations can clarify acceptable practices, other stakeholders, including from industry and academia, said that enforcement actions can send a similar message. According to both a representative from a content provider and an academic, enforcement actions such as settlement agreements, for example, establish precedents that companies can follow, similar to the way that case law developed by courts provides guidance for companies. Although some industry representatives we interviewed said that FTC’s use of settlement agreements provides companies with guidance, certain trade associations took a different position in a recent case brought before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp. 799 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2015). However, the court did not agree with the associations’ arguments. The case involved an enforcement action against Wyndham Worldwide Corporation where FTC alleged that data security failures led to three data breaches at the company in less than 2 years. The court considered whether FTC could bring an enforcement case involving cybersecurity using FTC’s section 5 “unfair practices” authority and, if so, whether Wyndham had “fair notice” that its specific cybersecurity practices could be deemed “unfair.” A group of companies and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce wrote a friend- of-the-court brief supporting Wyndham, criticizing FTC’s “regulation- through-settlements” approach. The companies argued this approach subjects businesses to “vague, unknowable, and constantly changing data-security standards” and businesses often are unaware of the standards to which they are held until after they receive a notice of investigation from FTC, at which point they must settle or expend considerable resources fighting the agency. Potential Limits on Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Remedies A recently decided federal appeals court case illustrates potential limits on the remedies that FTC can order in an “unfair practices” enforcement proceeding. In this 2018 case, LabMD, Inc. v. FTC, 891 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 2018), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found that FTC could not direct a medical laboratory to create and implement wholesale data-security protective measures as a remedy to the laboratory’s alleged unfair practices. FTC had filed a complaint against LabMD under section 5 of the FTC Act for allegedly committing an unfair act or practice by failing to provide reasonable and appropriate security for personal information on its computer networks. The commission found that LabMD’s inadequate security constituted an unfair act or practice and ordered LabMD to take various actions, including establishing and maintaining a reasonable and comprehensive information security program. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that FTC’s order exceeded its authority because it did not prohibit a specific act or practice but instead, mandated a complete overhaul of the company’s data-security program. FTC had argued that the FTC Act gives it broad discretion to prevent unfair or deceptive acts or practices that injure the general public and that FTC had spelled out standards for LabMD to craft a reasonable security program. The court ruled, however, that such a general approach would make it difficult for a reviewing court to determine if LabMD had complied with the order, in the event of a future FTC challenge. company can reasonably foresee that a court could construe its conduct as falling within the meaning of the statute.” A majority of non-industry stakeholders we interviewed identified limitations in the current Internet privacy oversight approach because they view regulations in conjunction with enforcement as being more effective. These stakeholders include all of the former FTC commissioners we interviewed, three of the four former FCC commissioners we interviewed, and representatives from consumer advocacy groups we interviewed. In addition, a former FCC commissioner said that the current Internet privacy oversight approach is limited in part because he viewed regulations applying equally to all players in the Internet ecosystem in conjunction with enforcement as being more effective. A representative from a consumer advocacy group also said that regulations in conjunction with enforcement are essential for effective privacy protection. Some of these stakeholders noted key ways that they believe Internet privacy regulations can provide clarity to industry and consumers, as well as fairness and flexibility in enforcement: Regulations can provide clarity. An Internet industry group representative said that various companies have favorable views of regulations because they can provide clear expectations about what actions are permissible. Similarly, a former congressional staff member with expertise on privacy issues said that some companies have favorable views of regulations because the regulations often provide clearer expectations about what the companies can do. FCC officials said that with respect to telephone privacy provisions of the Communications Act, the telephone industry wanted rules because it sought greater clarity about what it should be doing, what constituted a violation, how to comply, and what behaviors were acceptable. Regulations may promote fairness. Some other stakeholders discussed the ability of regulations to provide fairness. For example, a former federal enforcement official described regulations as creating a fair and consistent oversight regime across the entire industry in a way that case-by-case enforcement actions do not. Another former federal enforcement official said that regulations give companies fair notice of what actions may be violations and thus help those companies avoid surprising or unexpected enforcement. Regulations can be flexible. An academic said that by targeting behaviors and not specific technologies, regulations can be written in such a way that they do not become obsolete. An academic also said that regulations based on broad performance-standards principles can avoid being overly prescriptive. FCC officials also noted that regulations can be amended to adapt to changes in technology often faster than new laws can be enacted. Furthermore, regulations determined to be obsolete can be repealed. FTC staff told us that the agency systematically reviews all of its regulations every 10 years, even though it is only legally required to review its most significant ones, and that the number of FTC regulations has decreased because the agency determined prior ones were obsolete. The Regulatory Flexibility Act requires federal agencies to analyze the effect of their regulations on small entities. Regulations can be a deterrent. FCC officials said that rules can have a deterrent effect on bad practices in the industry or have a role in mitigating the negative effects of bad practices after they occur. They said, for example, that the practice of pretexting (improperly obtaining people’s telephone records) was greatly curtailed by an FCC regulation prohibiting such practices. They also said that rules can foreclose arguments by companies claiming that because no rule was in place, they had no reasonable notice or awareness that they should behave in a particular way. Consumer advocacy groups and other stakeholders, including some former FTC and FCC commissioners, had concerns about the efficacy of an enforcement approach such as FTC’s approach to Internet privacy oversight, which focuses on enforcing a statute rather than implementing regulations. They said that FTC’s enforcement approach limits the ability of the agency to affect companies’ behavior, and that any enforcement activity occurs after the violation, undesirable behavior, harm, or illegal action has already occurred. A former federal enforcement official also said that regulations can prevent companies from engaging in bad practices in the first instance and thus have a preventive effect. A former FCC commissioner said that by the nature of a direct statutory- enforcement approach (as opposed to rulemaking), an agency would only address a harm after it has occurred. As discussed above, for example, data often cannot be removed from the Internet because copies of the data can exist among many bad actors, and it can be difficult to identify the entity responsible for unwanted disclosures. Therefore, it may be more important to avoid such Internet privacy harms from occurring in the first place. Another former FCC commissioner told us that Internet privacy oversight should be returned to FCC because it has APA section 553 notice-and-comment rulemaking authority and considerable enforcement experience. Representatives from consumer advocacy groups said that FTC’s enforcement action has been insufficient because it investigates only a small portion of actual Internet-privacy violations or takes action regarding only the most egregious or outrageous cases that it can win. FTC has also stated in its strategic plan that it focuses on investigating and litigating cases that cause or are likely to cause substantial injury to consumers and that by focusing on practices that are actually harming or likely to harm consumers, FTC can best use its limited resources. Representatives from an Internet association said that FTC’s Internet- privacy enforcement actions should focus on concrete harms. An FTC staff member from the Division of Privacy and Identity Protection said that the agency has been effective with the limited enforcement resources it has available. Furthermore, the staff member said the agency uses no formal written criteria or template to assess individual cases but considers the size and scale of a company’s effect on consumer privacy when deciding whether to take enforcement action. However, a former FTC commissioner told us that the agency needs more resources to effectively oversee Internet privacy. We asked stakeholders whether it was clear under what circumstances FTC will take Internet privacy enforcement action. In response, some stakeholders said that FTC’s enforcement priorities are reflected in its settlement agreements, which provide information that is similar to a body of case law. Individual commissioners also may issue statements explaining their decisions. Two stakeholders also said that FTC’s closing letters, which the agency sends to companies and posts on its website when it closes an investigation without taking enforcement action, may explain its decisions. Other stakeholders said that more guidance would be helpful to provide additional clarity on how the agency uses its Internet privacy enforcement authority. FTC staff and other stakeholders also said that FTC has provided useful Internet privacy guidance. For example, in 2015, FTC published guidance for businesses on complying with COPPA. Various stakeholders we interviewed said that opportunities exist for enhancing Internet privacy oversight. A key component of FTC’s mission, as specified by the FTC Act, is to protect consumers against unfair and deceptive practices. As discussed earlier, some stakeholders believe that FTC’s reliance on its unfair and deceptive practices authority to address Internet privacy issues has limitations. In addition, although the Fair Information Practice Principles provide internationally recognized principles for protecting the privacy and security of personal information, they are not legal requirements and FTC cannot rely on them to define what constitutes unfair and deceptive practices related to privacy and data security. We stated in our 2013 information resellers report that the current U.S. privacy framework is not always aligned with the Fair Information Practice Principles and that these principles provide a framework for balancing the need for privacy with other interests. We found that there are limited privacy protections under federal law for consumer data used for marketing purposes. We said that although the Fair Information Practice Principles call for restraint in the collection and use of personal information, the scope of protections provided under current law has been narrow in relation to: (1) individuals’ ability to access, control, and correct their personal data; (2) collection methods and sources and types of consumer information collected; and (3) new technologies, such as tracking of web activity and the use of mobile devices. Although we recommended in that report that Congress consider strengthening the consumer privacy framework to reflect the effects of changes in technology and the marketplace, this matter for congressional consideration was not specific to Internet privacy or to the oversight authorities of any particular agency or agencies. As noted above, various stakeholders expressed concern about the ability of consumers to control their data and understand how that data are used. These concerns suggest that companies are not always following the Fair Information Practice Principles, such as that companies’ data practices should be transparent, allow consumers the right to access and edit their data, and limit the collection of data to the extent feasible. Those stakeholders who believe that FTC’s current authority and enforcement approach is unduly limited identified three main actions that could better protect Internet privacy: (1) enactment of an overarching federal privacy statute to establish general requirements governing Internet privacy practices of all sectors; (2) APA section 553 notice-and- comment rulemaking authority; and (3) civil penalty authority for any violation of a statutory or regulatory requirement, rather than allowing penalties only for violations of settlement agreements or consent decrees that themselves seek redress for a statutory or regulatory violation. Stakeholders from a variety of perspectives—including from academia, industry, consumer advocacy groups, and former FTC and FCC commissioners—told us that a privacy statute could enhance Internet privacy oversight by, for example, clearly articulating to consumers, industry, and privacy enforcers what behaviors are prohibited, among other things. In addition, a former FCC commissioner said that a new privacy statute could enhance Internet privacy oversight by creating uniform standards for all players in the Internet ecosystem that is focused on the consumer rather than the regulatory legacy of the companies involved (regulations that apply to specific types of companies based on what they are or used to be, such as telecommunications carriers, cable companies, broadcasters, and mobile wireless providers). The former FCC commissioner said that as companies, technologies, and markets change, there is a question about whether existing law should be modernized. In 2015, FTC staff recommended that Congress enact broad-based legislation that is flexible and technology-neutral, while also providing clear rules of the road for companies about such issues as how to provide choices to consumers about data collection and use practices. Some stakeholders suggested that such a framework could either designate an existing agency as responsible for privacy oversight (such as FTC) or create a new privacy-oriented agency. A representative from a consumer advocacy group mentioned that the European Union, for example, has established the European Data Protection Supervisor, an independent data protection authority, to monitor and ensure the protection of personal data and privacy. Similarly, in Canada, the Office of the Privacy Commissioner, an independent body that reports directly to the Parliament, was established to protect and promote individuals’ privacy rights. Some stakeholders also stated that the absence of a comprehensive Internet privacy statute affects FTC’s enforcement. For example, a former federal enforcement official said that FTC is limited in how it can use its authority to take action against companies’ unfair and deceptive trade practices for problematic Internet privacy practices. Similarly, another former federal enforcement official said that FTC is limited in how and against whom it can use its unfair and deceptive practices authority noting, for example, that it cannot pursue Internet privacy enforcement over exempted industries such as common carriers. In addition, a former FCC commissioner said that it is more difficult for FTC to take effective action because its enforcement comes only after a complaint and after an often lengthy review process. The former FCC commissioner also said that without “ex ante” rules (rules that define prohibited activity before it has occurred), there inevitably will be delay, confusion, and lack of knowledge about what is and is not acceptable behavior. In addition, some stakeholders—including a representative from a consumer group, a former federal enforcement official, and a former FCC commissioner—said FTC’s section 5 “unfair or deceptive practices” authority may not enable it to fully protect consumers’ Internet privacy because it can be difficult for FTC to establish that Internet privacy practices are legally “unfair.” For example, under section 5, FTC has charged companies with committing a “deceptive” practice if their privacy policies said they would not collect or use consumers’ personal information but then did so. However, a former congressional staff member said that companies often write broad and vague policy statements, making it difficult for FTC to charge companies with committing deceptive practices. Instead, according to a representative from a consumer advocacy group, FTC would have to show the companies’ actions were “unfair,” which, according to the representative, is legally difficult to establish. We found in our 2017 report on vehicle data privacy that most automakers’ written privacy notices used vague language. Similarly, we found in our 2012 report on mobile device location data that although companies’ policies stated that they shared location data with third parties, they were sometimes vague about which types of companies these were and why they were sharing the data. Some stakeholders said that FTC relies more heavily on its authority to take enforcement action against deceptive trade practices compared with the agency’s unfair trade practices authority. This was confirmed in our analysis of FTC’s Internet privacy enforcement actions discussed previously. However, a representative from a consumer advocacy group said that FTC’s ability to take such action is limited practically to instances where a company violates its own privacy policy—companies generally can collect and use data in any way they want if they include language in their policies asserting their intent to do so. According to a former FCC commissioner, a privacy statute could clarify the situations in which FTC could take enforcement action. Various stakeholders said that there are advantages to overseeing Internet privacy with a statute that provides APA section 553 notice-and- comment rulemaking authority. As discussed above, that provision lays out the basic process by which so-called informal agency rulemaking shall be conducted, namely, publication of proposed regulations in the Federal Register; an opportunity for public comment (written and possibly oral submission of data and views); and publication of final regulations in the Federal Register with an explanation of the rules’ basis and purpose. Also as noted above, Congress imposed additional rulemaking steps on FTC in the Magnuson-Moss Act when FTC is promulgating rules under section 5 of the FTC Act. These additional steps include providing the public and certain congressional committees with advance notice of proposed rulemaking (in addition to notice of proposed rulemaking). FTC’s rulemaking under Magnuson-Moss also calls for, among other things, oral hearings, if requested, presided over by an independent hearing officer, and preparation of a staff report after the conclusion of public hearings, giving the public the opportunity to comment on the report. Finally, Congress made it easier for the public to appeal FTC’s Magnuson-Moss rules by making the agency meet a higher standard when the rules are challenged in court. FTC staff said that these additional steps add time and complexity to the rulemaking process. In congressional testimony in 2010, the then-Director of FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection said that “if Congress enacts privacy legislation, the commission agrees that such legislation should provide APA rulemaking authority to the commission.” According to FTC, this testimony was voted on and approved by the commissioners and, therefore, constituted the commission’s official position at the time. Moreover, according to stakeholders, in many cases regulations can be used to implement statutes. Officials from other consumer and worker protection agencies we interviewed described their enforcement authorities and approaches. For example, officials from the CFPB and the FDA, both of which use APA section 553 notice-and-comment rulemaking, said that their rulemaking authority assists in their oversight approaches and works together with enforcement actions. OSHA officials said that the standards that the agency promulgates under its authority specify what employers are required to do to reduce safety and health risks to workers. Such standards lay out the workplace conditions that must be maintained by employers and require that employers implement certain practices, operations, or processes that ensure worker protections. EEOC officials said that regulations are used to guide investigations that establish whether enforcement action is appropriate. CPSC officials said that the agency conducts consumer protection not only by establishing and enforcing mandatory regulations, but also through collaborative actions such as educating industry, developing consensus voluntary safety standards, removing defective products from the marketplace through voluntary corrective actions, and litigating when necessary. In addition, in contrast to FTC’s approach, FCC has APA section 553 notice-and-comment rulemaking authority and has issued regulations implementing section 222 of the Communications Act using that rulemaking authority to protect the privacy of telephone users. Some stakeholders suggested that FTC’s current ability to levy civil penalties could also be enhanced. Currently, FTC can levy civil penalties against companies for violating certain regulations, such as COPPA regulations, or if the company violates the terms of a settlement agreement already in place. According to most former FTC commissioners and some other stakeholders we interviewed, FTC should be able to levy fines for initial violations of section 5 of the FTC Act. An academic told us that the power of an agency to levy a fine is a tangible way to hold industries accountable. Another academic noted, however, that fines may be relatively less effective in industries where there is limited competition because the costs of those fines may be more effectively passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices for services. In addition, some stakeholders said that payments required by FTC orders are not large enough to act as a deterrent and that companies may consider them to be a cost of doing business. There is a growing debate about the federal government’s role in overseeing Internet privacy. In a July 2018 congressional hearing, FTC’s new chair testified that the FTC Act cannot address all privacy and data- security concerns in the marketplace. The chair said, for example, that FTC’s lack of civil penalty authority for violations of the FTC Act reduces its deterrent capability. He also noted the agency lacks authority over non-profits and over common carrier activity, even though those entities and activities often have serious implications for consumer privacy and data security. In November 2018, FTC’s chair testified before Congress and urged Congress to consider enacting privacy legislation that would be enforced by FTC. A majority of the commission has indicated support for APA rulemaking and civil penalty authority for privacy. FTC also held hearings in September, November, and December 2018 to advance the discussion around privacy issues, among other topics, and FTC plans to hold an additional hearing on data security and consumer privacy in February 2019. In a Federal Register notice, FTC announced that it is interested in the benefits and costs of various state, federal and international privacy laws and regulations, including the potential conflicts among those standards. FTC also indicated that it is particularly interested in the efficacy of the commission’s use of its current authority and the identification of any additional tools or authorities the commission may need to adequately deter unfair and deceptive conduct related to privacy and data security. Also in July 2018, an NTIA official announced that NTIA, in coordination with the Commerce Department’s International Trade Administration and National Institute of Standards and Technology, had recently started holding stakeholder meetings to identify common ground and formulate core, high-level principles on data privacy. Regarding the development of the Administration’s approach to consumer privacy, in September 2018, NTIA requested comments on ways to advance consumer privacy while protecting prosperity and innovation. Our 2009 report on a framework for assessing proposals for modernizing the financial regulatory system similarly found that regulators should have the authority to carry out and enforce their statutory missions. We further said that a regulatory system should be flexible and forward looking, allowing regulators to readily adapt to market innovations and changes, including identifying and acting on emerging risks in a timely way without hindering innovation. These factors are useful considerations as the federal government explores how it can better oversee privacy and data security. Having sufficient and appropriate authorities and providing flexibility to address a rapidly evolving Internet environment could better ensure that the federal government can protect consumers’ privacy. Recent developments regarding Internet privacy suggest that this is an appropriate time for Congress to consider comprehensive Internet privacy legislation. Although FTC has been addressing Internet privacy through its unfair and deceptive practices authority, among other statutes, and other agencies have been addressing this issue using industry-specific statutes, there is no comprehensive federal privacy statute with specific standards. Debate over such a statute could provide a vehicle for consideration of the Fair Information Practice Principles, which are intended to balance privacy concerns with the need for using consumers’ data. Such a law could also empower a specific agency or agencies to provide oversight through means such as APA section 553 rulemaking, civil penalties for first time violations of a statute, and other enforcement tools. Comprehensive legislation addressing Internet privacy that establishes specific standards and includes APA notice-and-comment rulemaking and first-time violation civil penalty authorities could help enhance the federal government’s ability to protect consumer privacy, provide more certainty in the marketplace as companies innovate and develop new products using consumer data, and provide better assurance to consumers that their privacy will be protected. Congress should consider developing comprehensive legislation on Internet privacy that would enhance consumer protections and provide flexibility to address a rapidly evolving Internet environment. Issues that should be considered include: which agency or agencies should oversee Internet privacy; what authorities an agency or agencies should have to oversee Internet privacy, including notice-and-comment rulemaking authority and first-time violation civil penalty authority; and how to balance consumers’ need for Internet privacy with industry’s ability to provide services and innovate. We provided a draft of this report to FTC, FCC, and the Department of Commerce for their review and comment. FTC and FCC provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. The Department of Commerce indicated that it did not have comments. As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to the FTC chair, the FCC chair, the Secretary of Commerce, and interested congressional committees. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or members of your staff have any questions about this report, please contact Alicia Puente Cackley at (202) 512-8678 or cackleya@gao.gov or Mark Goldstein at (202) 512-2834 or goldsteinm@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix III. For this review, we interviewed staff from agencies with roles in Internet privacy; officials from other consumer- and worker-protection agencies; stakeholders from consumer advocacy groups, industry groups, Internet service providers, and Internet content providers; academics; and former government officials. To obtain a variety of perspectives, we selected Internet service providers that represented different industry sectors and Internet content providers that provide a variety of information and social media services. Academic stakeholders were selected because of their expertise in privacy, consumer protection, and regulatory issues. We also interviewed former Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and Federal Communications Commission (FCC) commissioners who served during the Barack Obama and George W. Bush administrations and are from different political parties. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) Department of Commerce, National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) Federal Communications Commission (FCC) Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Food and Drug Administration (FDA) Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) The following table identifies 101 Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Internet privacy enforcement actions filed between July 1, 2008 and June 30, 2018 in which the agency alleged a violation of either the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act) or the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) and implementing COPPA regulations and subsequently entered into a settlement agreement with the target entity. Although some of these cases may involve both Internet data privacy and security issues, this table does not include cases that involved data security issues only. In addition to the contact names above, Andrew Huddleston, Assistant Director; Kay Kuhlman, Assistant Director; Bob Homan, Analyst-in- Charge; Melissa Bodeau; John de Ferrari; Camilo Flores; Erica Miles; Josh Ormond; and Sean Standley made significant contributions to this report.	[ "In April 2018, Facebook disclosed that a Cambridge University researcher may have improperly shared the data of up to 87 million of its users with a political consulting firm. This disclosure followed other recent incidents involving the misuse of consumers' personal information from the Internet, which is used by about three-quarters of Americans. GAO was asked to review federal oversight of Internet privacy. This report addresses, among other objectives: (1) how FTC and FCC have overseen consumers' Internet privacy and (2) selected stakeholders' views on the strengths and limitations of how Internet privacy currently is overseen and how, if it all, this approach could be enhanced. GAO evaluated FTC and FCC Internet privacy enforcement actions and authorities and interviewed representatives from industry, consumer advocacy groups, and academia; FTC and FCC staff; former FTC and FCC commissioners; and officials from other federal oversight agencies. Industry stakeholders were selected to represent different sectors, and academics were selected because of their expertise in privacy, consumer protection, and regulatory issues. The United States does not have a comprehensive Internet privacy law governing the collection, use, and sale or other disclosure of consumers' personal information. At the federal level, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) currently has the lead in overseeing Internet privacy, using its statutory authority under the FTC Act to protect consumers from unfair and deceptive trade practices. However, to date FTC has not issued regulations for Internet privacy other than those protecting financial privacy and the Internet privacy of children, which were required by law. For FTC Act violations, FTC may promulgate regulations but is required to use procedures that differ from traditional notice-and-comment processes and that FTC staff said add time and complexity. In the last decade, FTC has filed 101 enforcement actions regarding Internet privacy; nearly all actions resulted in settlement agreements requiring action by the companies. In most of these cases, FTC did not levy civil penalties because it lacked such authority for those particular violations. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has had a limited role in overseeing Internet privacy. From 2015 to 2017, FCC asserted jurisdiction over the privacy practices of Internet service providers. In 2016, FCC promulgated privacy rules for Internet service providers that Congress later repealed. FTC resumed privacy oversight of Internet service providers in June 2018. Stakeholders GAO interviewed had varied views on the current Internet privacy enforcement approach and how it could be enhanced. Most Internet industry stakeholders said they favored FTC's current approach—direct enforcement of its unfair and deceptive practices statutory authority, rather than promulgating and enforcing regulations implementing that authority. These stakeholders said that the current approach allows for flexibility and that regulations could hinder innovation. Other stakeholders, including consumer advocates and most former FTC and FCC commissioners GAO interviewed, favored having FTC issue and enforce regulations. Some stakeholders said a new data-protection agency was needed to oversee consumer privacy. Stakeholders identified three main areas in which Internet privacy oversight could be enhanced: Statute . Some stakeholders told GAO that an overarching Internet privacy statute could enhance consumer protection by clearly articulating to consumers, industry, and agencies what behaviors are prohibited. Rulemaking . Some stakeholders said that regulations can provide clarity, enforcement fairness, and flexibility. Officials from two other consumer protection agencies said their rulemaking authority assists in their oversight efforts and works together with enforcement actions. Civil penalty authority. Some stakeholders said FTC's Internet privacy enforcement could be more effective with authority to levy civil penalties for first-time violations of the FTC Act. Comprehensive Internet privacy legislation that establishes specific standards and includes traditional notice-and-comment rulemaking and broader civil penalty authority could enhance the federal government's ability to protect consumer privacy. Congress should consider developing comprehensive legislation on Internet privacy that would enhance consumer protections and provide flexibility to address a rapidly evolving Internet environment. Issues that should be considered include what authorities agencies should have in order to oversee Internet privacy, including appropriate rulemaking authority." ]	10,178	gov_report	en	null	1d6cb23a8a9ac09788eb659031f96b915f76a7363d77edad
In November 2011, we reported that over the previous decade, the FBI and GSA conducted a number of studies to assess the Hoover Building and its other headquarters facilities’ strategic and mission needs. Through these studies, they determined the condition of the FBI’s current assets and identified gaps between current and needed capabilities, as well as studied a range of alternatives to meet the FBI’s requirements. According to these assessments, the FBI’s headquarters facilities did not fully support the FBI’s long-term security, space, and building condition requirements. Since our report, the assessment of the Hoover Building has not materially changed. For example: Security: Since September 11, 2001, the FBI mission and workforce have expanded, and the FBI has outgrown the Hoover Building. As a result, the FBI also operates in annexes, including some located in the National Capital Region. During our 2011 review, FBI security officials told us that they have some security concerns—to varying degrees— about the Hoover Building and some of the headquarters annexes. In our report, we noted that the dispersion of staff in annexes created security challenges, particularly for at least nine annexes that were located in multitenant buildings, where some space was leased by the FBI and other space was leased by nonfederal tenants. While this arrangement did not automatically put FBI operations at risk, it heightened security concerns. In addition, in January 2017, we found that the FBI occupies space leased from foreign owners in at least six different locations, including one in Washington, D.C. Further, federal officials who assess foreign investments told us at that time that leasing space in foreign-owned buildings could present security risks, such as espionage and unauthorized cyber and physical access. Space: In 2011, we reported that FBI and GSA studies showed that much of the Hoover building’s approximately 2.4 million gross square feet of space is unusable, and the remaining usable space is not designed to meet the needs of today’s FBI. Moreover, the Hoover Building’s original design is inefficient, according to GSA assessments, making it difficult to reconfigure space to promote staff collaboration. For example, in its fiscal year 2017 prospectus for the proposed FBI headquarters consolidation project, GSA noted that the Hoover Building was designed at a time when FBI operated differently, and it cannot be redeveloped to provide the necessary space to consolidate the FBI Headquarters components or to meet the agency’s current and projected operational requirements. As a result, the FBI reported facing several operational and logistical challenges. We similarly noted in our prior work in 2011 that space constraints at the Hoover Building and the resulting dispersion of staff sometimes prevented the FBI from physically locating certain types of analysts and specialists together, which in turn hampered collaboration and the performance of some classified work. Building condition: In our 2011 report, we noted that the condition of the Hoover Building was deteriorating, and GSA assessments had identified significant recapitalization needs. At that time, we found that GSA had decided to limit investments in the Hoover Building to those necessary to protect health and safety and keep building systems functioning while GSA assessed the FBI’s facility needs. We found that this decision increased the potential for building system failures and disruption to the FBI’s operations. Given that the FBI would likely remain in the building for at least several more years, we recommended that GSA evaluate its strategy to minimize major repair and recapitalization investments and take action to address any facility condition issues that could put FBI operations at risk and lead to further deterioration of the building. In 2014, in response to our recommendation, GSA evaluated its strategy for the Hoover Building and determined it needed to complete some repairs to ensure safety and maintain tenancy in the building. For example, in 2014, GSA funded contracts to waterproof portions of the building’s mezzanine level to prevent water intrusion into the building and repair the concrete facade, small sections of which had cracked and fallen from the building. In July 2017, GSA and FBI officials stated that they cancelled the procurement for the new FBI headquarters consolidation project, noting that the there was a lack of funding necessary to complete the procurement. GSA added that the cancellation of the procurement did not lessen the need for a new FBI headquarters, and that GSA and the FBI would continue to work together to address the space requirements of the FBI. In July 2014, we reported that the swap exchange approach can help GSA address the challenges of disposing of unneeded property and modernizing or replacing federal buildings. GSA officials told us that swap exchanges can help GSA facilitate construction projects given a growing need to modernize and replace federal properties, shrinking federal budgets, and challenges obtaining funding. Specifically, GSA officials noted that swap exchanges allow GSA to immediately apply the value of a federal property to be used in the exchange to construction needs, rather than attempting to obtain funds through the appropriations process. In our 2014 report, GSA officials stated that the exchanges can be attractive because the agency can get construction projects accomplished without having to request full upfront funding for them from Congress. In addition, because swap exchanges require developers or other property recipients to complete the agreed-upon GSA construction projects prior to the transfer of the title to the current property GSA is exchanging, federal agencies can continue to occupy the property during the construction process for the new project, eliminating the need for agencies to lease or acquire other space to occupy during the construction process. GSA has limited experience in successfully completing swap exchange transactions and has cancelled several recently proposed swap exchanges. More specifically, in 2016 we reported that GSA had only completed transactions using the swap exchange authority for two small (under $10-million each) swap exchanges completed in Atlanta, Georgia, in 2001 and in San Antonio, Texas, in 2012. Furthermore, GSA has faced a number of obstacles in its use of this authority. For example, for our 2014 report, we reviewed five projects identified since August 2012 in which GSA solicited market interest in exchanging almost 8-million square feet in federal property for construction services or newly constructed assets. However, GSA chose not to pursue swap-exchanges in all five of these projects, including the proposed FBI headquarters consolidation project. For example, GSA officials told us that there was little or no market interest in potential swap exchanges in Baltimore, Maryland, and Miami, Florida, and that GSA chose to pursue different approaches. Respondents to the solicitations for these two GSA swap exchanges noted that GSA did not provide important details, including the amount of investment needed in the federal properties and GSA’s specific construction needs. In addition, from 2012 to 2015, GSA pursued a larger swap exchange potentially involving up to 5 federal properties located in the Federal Triangle South area of Washington, D.C., to finance construction at GSA headquarters and other federal properties. In 2013, GSA decided to focus on exchanging two buildings, the GSA Regional Office Building and the Cotton Annex, based on input from potential investors. On February 18, 2016, GSA decided to end its pursuit of the exchange, saying in a memorandum supporting this decision that private investor valuations for the two buildings fell short of the government’s estimated values. After the discontinuation of the Federal Triangle swap exchange project, we reported in 2016 that GSA officials noted they planned to improve the swap exchange process, including the property appraisal process, outreach to stakeholders to identify potential project risks for future projects, and to the extent possible, mitigate such risks. However, we also reported that several factors may continue to limit the applicability of the agency’s approach. Specifically, the viability of swap exchanges may be affected by specific market factors, such as the availability of alternative properties. In addition, the specific valuation approach used by appraisers or potential investors may reduce the viability of the swap exchange. For example, in reviewing the proposed Federal Triangle project, we found in 2016 that the proposals from two of the investment firms valued the two federal buildings involved in the proposed swap substantially less than GSA’s appraised property value. In addition, swap exchanges can require developers to spend large sums on GSA’s construction needs before receiving title to the federal property used in the exchanges. We found in 2014 that GSA’s solicitations have not always specified these construction needs in sufficient detail. Consequently, developers may be unable to provide meaningful input, and GSA could miss swap exchange opportunities. In 2014, we recommended that GSA develop criteria for determining when to solicit market interest in a swap exchange. GSA agreed with the recommendation and has since updated its guidance to include these criteria. In January 2017, GSA agreed to a swap exchange for the U.S. Department of Transportation Volpe Center in Cambridge, Massachusetts. After a competitive process, GSA selected the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) as its exchange partner for the existing Department of Transportation (DOT) facility. Per the agreement, MIT will construct a new DOT facility on a portion of a 14 acre site to which DOT has title and, in exchange, will receive title to the remaining portion of the site that will not be used by DOT, which is located near its main campus. GSA indicated that, once completed, the project will provide $750 million in value to the federal government in the form of the design and construction services and value-equalization funds from MIT. Our prior work has identified a number of alternative approaches to funding real property projects. In March 2014, we reported that upfront funding is the best way to ensure recognition of commitments made in budgeting decisions and to maintain fiscal controls. However, obtaining upfront funding for large acquisitions such as the Hoover Building replacement can be challenging. Congress has provided some agencies with specific authorities to use alternative funding mechanisms for the acquisition, renovation, or disposal of federal real property without full, upfront funding. Table 1 outlines selected funding mechanisms, and considerations for each mechanism we identified in our 2014 report. Some of these alternative mechanisms allow selected agencies to meet their real property needs by leveraging other authorized resources, such as retained fees or land swaps with a private sector partner. Funding mechanisms leverage both monetary resources, such as retained fees, and non-monetary resources, such as property exchanged in a land swap or space offered in an enhanced use lease. In some cases, the funding mechanism may function as a public-private partnership intended to further an agency’s mission by working with a partner to leverage resources. Some of these mechanisms allow the private sector to provide the project’s capital—at their cost of borrowing. The U.S. federal government’s cost of borrowing is lower than the private sector’s. When the private sector provides the project capital, the federal government later repays these higher private sector borrowing costs (e.g., in the form of lease payments). In some cases, factors such as lower labor costs or fewer requirements could potentially help balance the higher cost of borrowing, making partner financing less expensive. Our 2014 report also identifies budgetary options—within the bounds of the current unified budget—to meet real property needs while helping Congress and agencies make more prudent long-term decisions. In 2014, we reported that projects with alternative funding mechanisms present multiple forms of risk that are shared between the agency and any partner or stakeholder. Further, we noted project decisions should reflect both the likely risk and the organization’s tolerance for risk. Incorporating risk assessment and management practices into decisions can help organizations recognize and prepare to manage explicit risks (e.g. financial and physical) and implicit risks (e.g. reputational). For example, clearly defined lease terms may help agencies manage risks of costs for unexpected building repairs. Further considerations we noted in our 2014 report include the availability of an appropriate partner—and that partners should bring complementary resources, skills, and financial capacities to the relationship—and management of the relationship with that partner. While different funding mechanisms have been used as an alternative to obtaining upfront funding for federal real property projects, changes to the budgetary structure itself—within the bounds of the unified budget that encompasses the full scope of federal programs and transactions—may also help agencies meet their real property needs. Such alternatives may include changing existing or introducing new account structures to fund real property projects. Our previous work identified options for changes within the current discretionary budget structure and options on the mandatory side of the budget. Alternative budgetary structures may change budgetary incentives for agencies and therefore help Congress and agencies make more prudent long-term fiscal decisions. Chairman Barrasso, Ranking Member Carper, and Members of the Committee, this concludes my prepared statement. I am happy to answer any questions you may have at this time. If you or your staff members have any questions concerning this testimony, please contact me at (202) 512-2834 or wised@gao.gov. In addition, contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. Individuals who made key contributions to this testimony are Mike Armes (Assistant Director), Colin Ashwood, Matt Cook, Joseph Cruz, Keith Cunningham, Alexandra Edwards, Carol Henn, Susan Irving, Hannah Laufe, Diana Maurer, John Mortin, Monique Nasrallah, Matt Voit, Michelle Weathers, and Elizabeth Wood. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.	[ "GSA, which manages federal real property on behalf of other federal agencies, faces challenges in funding new construction projects due to budget constraints—including obtaining upfront funding—among other reasons. One type of transaction, called a swap exchange, enables GSA to apply the value of federal property to finance construction without relying on appropriated funds. Under such an exchange, GSA transfers the title of the unneeded property to a private investor after receiving the agreed upon construction services at another location. GSA proposed a swap exchange procurement for construction of a new FBI headquarters building in exchange for the Hoover Building and appropriations to compensate for the difference in value between the Hoover Building and the new building. GSA cancelled this procurement in July 2017 due to lack of funding. This statement addresses (1) GSA's and FBI's assessments of the Hoover Building, (2) GSA efforts to implement swap exchanges, and (3) alternative approaches to funding real property projects. It is based on GAO's body of reports on real property from 2011 to 2017, and selected updates from GSA. In November 2011, GAO reported that, according to General Services Administration (GSA) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) assessments, the FBI's headquarters building (Hoover Building) and its accompanying facilities in Washington, D.C., did not fully support the FBI's long-term security, space, and building condition requirements. Since GAO's report, the assessments have not materially changed, for example: Security: GAO's prior work noted that the dispersion of staff in annexes creates security challenges, including where some space was leased by the FBI and other space was leased by nonfederal tenants. Earlier this year, GAO reported the FBI is leasing space in D.C. from foreign owners. Space : In 2011, GAO reported that FBI and GSA studies showed that much of the Hoover Building is unusable. GSA noted in its fiscal year 2017 project prospectus for the FBI headquarters consolidation that the Hoover Building cannot be redeveloped to meet the FBI's current needs. Building Condition: In GAO's 2011 report, GAO noted that the condition of the Hoover Building was deteriorating, and GSA assessments identified significant recapitalization needs. Since GAO's report and in response to GAO's recommendation, GSA has evaluated its approach to maintaining the building and completed some repairs to ensure safety. GSA has limited experience in successfully completing swap exchange transactions and chose not to pursue several proposed swap exchanges, most recently the planned swap exchange for the Hoover Building. GSA has developed criteria for determining when to solicit market interest in a swap exchange, in response to recommendations in GAO's 2014 report. In addition, GSA officials told GAO that they planned to improve the swap exchange process, including the property appraisal process, outreach to stakeholders to identify potential risks associated with future projects, and to the extent possible, mitigate such risks. Nevertheless, several factors may continue to limit use of swap exchanges, including market factors, such as the availability of alternative properties and an investor's approach for valuing properties. For example, in reviewing a proposed swap exchange in Washington, D.C., GAO found in a 2016 report that the proposals from two firms valued the two federal buildings involved in the proposed swap substantially less than GSA's appraised property value. In a 2014 report, GAO identified a number of alternative approaches to funding real property projects. Congress has provided some agencies with specific authorities to use alternative funding mechanisms—including the use of private sector funds or land swaps—for the acquisition, renovation, or disposal of federal real property without full, upfront funding, though GAO has previously reported that upfront funding is the best way to ensure recognition of commitments made in budgeting decisions and maintain fiscal controls. GAO has reported that projects with alternative funding mechanisms present multiple forms of risk that are shared between the agency and any partner or stakeholder. In addition, alternative budgetary structures could be established, such as changing existing or introducing new account structures to fund real property projects. GAO has made recommendations in the past to GSA on various real property issues, including to develop additional guidance for swap exchanges and to evaluate its approach to maintaining the Hoover Building. GSA agreed with these two recommendations and addressed them." ]	2,284	gov_report	en	null	72a62c8a1cee52bff44b2d77c4d96678b78fa80434f2694a
T he unemployment insurance (UI) system has two primary objectives: (1) to provide temporary, partial wage replacement for involuntarily unemployed workers and (2) to stabilize the economy during recessions. In support of these goals, several UI programs provide benefits for eligible unemployed workers. In general, when eligible workers lose their jobs, the joint federal-state Unemployment Compensation (UC) program may provide up to 26 weeks of income support through regular UC benefit payments. UC benefits may be extended for up to 13 weeks or 20 weeks by the Extended Benefit (EB) program if certain economic situations exist within the state. As of the date of this publication, although both the UC and EB programs are authorized, no state is in an active EB period. For an overview of EB, see the Appendix . The Social Security Act of 1935 (P.L. 74-271) authorizes the joint federal-state UC program to provide unemployment benefits. Most states provide up to a maximum of 26 weeks of UC benefits. Former federal workers may be eligible for unemployment benefits through the Unemployment Compensation for Federal Employees (UCFE) program. Former U.S. military servicemembers may be eligible for unemployment benefits through the Unemployment Compensation for Ex-Servicemembers (UCX) program. The Emergency Unemployment Compensation Act of 1991 ( P.L. 102-164 ) provides that ex-servicemembers be treated the same as other unemployed workers with respect to benefit levels, the waiting period for benefits, and benefit duration. Although federal laws and regulations provide broad guidelines on UC benefit coverage, eligibility, and determination, the specifics regarding UC benefits are determined by each state. This results in essentially 53 different programs. Generally, UC eligibility is based on attaining qualified wages and employment in covered work over a 12-month period (called a base period) prior to unemployment. All states require a worker to have earned a certain amount of wages or to have worked for a certain period of time (or both) within the base period to be eligible to receive any UC benefits. The methods states use to determine eligibility vary greatly. Most state benefit formulas replace approximately half of a claimant's average weekly wage up to a weekly maximum. Additionally, each state's UC law requires individuals to have lost their jobs through no fault of their own, and recipients must be able to work, available for work, and actively seeking work. These eligibility requirements help ensure that UC benefits are directed toward workers with significant labor market experience and who are unemployed because of economic conditions. The UC program is financed by federal taxes under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) and by state payroll taxes under each state's State Unemployment Tax Act (SUTA). The 0.6% effective net FUTA tax paid by employers on the first $7,000 of each employee's earnings (equaling no more than $42 per worker per year) funds federal and state administrative costs, loans to insolvent state UC accounts, the federal share (50%) of EB payments, and state employment services. SUTA taxes on employers are limited by federal law to funding regular UC benefits and the state share (50%) of EB payments. Federal law requires that the state tax be on at least the first $7,000 of each employee's earnings and that the maximum state tax rate be at least 5.4%. Federal law also requires each employer's state tax rate to be based on the amount of UC paid to former employees (known as "experience rating"). Within these broad requirements, each state has great flexibility in determining its SUTA structure. Generally, the more UC benefits paid out to its former employees, the higher the tax rate of the employer, up to a maximum established by state law. Funds from FUTA and SUTA are deposited in the appropriate accounts within the Unemployment Trust Fund (UTF). The sequester order required by the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA; P.L. 112-25 ) and implemented on March 1, 2013 (after being delayed by P.L. 112-240 ), affected some but not all types of UI expenditures. Regular UC, UCX, and UCFE payments are not subject to the sequester reductions. EB and most forms of administrative funding are subject to the sequester reductions. The FY2019 sequestration order requires a 6.2% reduction in all nonexempt nondefense mandatory expenditures, but no sequestration reductions are applicable to discretionary programs, projects, and activities. As a result, EB expenditures are required to be reduced 6.2% (only on the federal share of EB benefits) for weeks of unemployment during FY2019. As of January 22, 2019, EB has not been activated in any state during FY2019. The lapse in federal appropriations that occurred from December 22, 2018, until January 25, 2019, caused a partial government shutdown. As a result, during this lapse in appropriations, agencies without funding furloughed federal employees, and many federal employees excepted from furlough were working without pay. Furloughed federal employees may be eligible for UCFE benefits. States are required to operate the UCFE program under the same terms and conditions that apply to regular state UC. Therefore, UCFE eligibility is determined under the laws of the state in which an individual's official duty station in federal civilian service is located. Federal employees who are in furlough status on account of a government shutdown are generally treated by state law as laid off with an expectation of recall. Depending on state laws and regulations, the state may have an option to not require federal employees to search for work given an expected recall. However, according to guidance from U.S. Department of Labor (DOL), excepted federal employees who are performing services (but working without pay) would generally be ineligible for UCFE benefits based on states' definitions of "unemployment." Private-sector workers who are furloughed or laid off due to the partial government shutdown because they were employed by government contractors or other businesses may be eligible for regular UC benefits. UC eligibility for these workers would be based on the requirements set out under the state laws in the state where they had worked. In this climate, there has been congressional interest in assisting furloughed and excepted federal employees through the UI system. For example, as described below in the section on " Unemployment Compensation for Excepted Federal Employees During a Government Shutdown ," there are proposals to provide new authority to pay UCFE benefits to excepted federal workers who are working without pay. The most recent lapse in federal appropriations began December 22, 2018, and ended on January 25, 2019, with the enactment of H.J.Res. 28 . Because retroactive pay for furloughed and excepted federal employees was authorized under S. 24 , the Government Employee Fair Treatment Act of 2019 (enacted January 16, 2019), UCFE payments made to federal employee claimants during this lapse in appropriations may be deemed an overpayment, subject to state UC laws regarding overpayment recovery. According to guidance from the Office of Personnel Management on this issue The state UI agency will determine whether or not an overpayment exists and, generally, the recovery of the UCFE overpayment is a matter for state action under its law; however, some state UI laws require the employer to recover such overpayment by collecting the overpayment amount from the employee. The Federal and state agencies will need to coordinate to determine the required action in accordance with the individual state UI law. Federal agencies are encouraged to develop lists or spreadsheets that can be provided to the state(s) containing the employees' names, social security numbers, and the amounts and periods of time covered by the retroactive payment. If a recession is deep enough and if state unemployment tax (SUTA) revenue is inadequate for long periods of time, states may have insufficient funds to pay for UC benefits. Federal law, which requires states to pay these benefits, provides a loan mechanism within the UTF framework that an insolvent state may use to meet its UC benefit payment obligations. States must pay back these loans. If the loans are not paid back quickly (depending on the timing of the beginning of the loan period), states may face interest charges, and states' employers may face increased net FUTA rates until the loans are repaid. The U.S. Virgin Islands is the only jurisdiction with an outstanding loan. As of January 18, 2019, it had an outstanding loan of $68.4 million from the federal accounts within the UTF. At the end of 2017, fewer than half of states (24) had accrued enough funds in their accounts to meet or exceed the minimally solvent standard of an average high cost multiple (AHCM) of 1.0 in order to be prepared for a recession. Beginning in FY2015, DOL funded state efforts "addressing individual reemployment needs of UI claimants, and working to prevent and detect UI overpayments" through the voluntary Reemployment Services and Eligibility Assessment (RESEA) program. RESEA provides funding to states to conduct in-person interviews with selected UI claimants to (1) assure that claimants are complying with the eligibility rules, (2) determine if reemployment services are needed for the claimant to secure future employment, (3) refer the individual to reemployment services as necessary, and (4) provide labor market information that addresses the claimant's specific needs. Section 30206 of P.L. 115-123 codified the authority for DOL to administer a RESEA program. It also set out various requirements for states to use certain types of evidence-based interventions for UI claimants under RESEA and allocated discretionary funding for RESEA across three categories (base funding, outcome payments, and research and technical assistance). State RESEA programs must include reasonable notice and accommodations to participating UI beneficiaries. On April 4, 2019, DOL published a proposed methodology to allocate base RESEA funds and outcome payments. DOL requested state and public comments on this proposal by May 6, 2019. The President's budget for FY2020 proposes changes to several aspects of the UI system. It would create a new required standard for state account balances within the UTF and a new benefit entitlement for paid parental leave financed through state unemployment taxes. The President's FY2020 budget also proposes a set of additional integrity measures, including the required use of certain databases to confirm UC eligibility and requiring Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefits offset UI benefits. The President's budget proposal for FY2020 would require states to maintain a minimum level of solvency in their UTF account balances to be at least half (0.5) of the state's AHCM. The proposal would alter the rules for calculating the net FUTA rate, requiring a higher net FUTA rate on a state's employers if that state maintained an AHCM of less than 0.5 on January 1 of two or more consecutive years. The additional FUTA revenue would be deposited into the state UTF account and would be terminated once the state met the 0.5 AHCM criteria. The President's budget proposal for FY2020 would require states to establish a paid parental leave benefit by 2020, using the UC program as its base for an administrative framework. States would be required to provide six weeks of benefits to a worker on leave or otherwise absent from work for the birth or adoption of the worker's child. States would have discretion to determine the parameters of eligibility and financing for this new paid parental leave benefit. The President's 2020 budget would require states to use three specific data sources to confirm an individual's eligibility for UC benefits: the State Information Data Exchange System (SIDES, administered by Information Technology Support Center [ITSC] and DOL); the National Directory for New Hires (NDNH, administered by the Department of Health and Human Services); and the Prisoner Update Processing System (PUPS, administered by the Social Security Administration). The proposal would create several additional integrity measures, including giving the Secretary of Labor the authority to implement new corrective action measures in response to poor state administrative performance within the program; allowing states to retain a percentage of UC overpayments for program integrity use; requiring states to deposit all UC penalty and interest payments into a special state fund, with these funds required to be used for improving state UI administration as well as providing reemployment services for UI claimants; and offsetting SSDI benefits to account for concurrent receipt of UI benefits. Section 2105 of the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 ( P.L. 112-96 ; February 22, 2012) amended federal law to allow states to conduct two types of drug testing. First, it expanded the long-standing state option to disqualify UC applicants who were discharged from employment with their most recent employer (as defined under state law) for unlawful drug use by allowing states to drug test these applicants to determine UC benefit eligibility or disqualification. Second, it allowed states to drug test UC applicants for whom suitable work (as defined under state law) is available only in an occupation that regularly conducts drug testing, to be determined under new regulations issued by the Secretary of Labor. As required by P.L. 112-96 , on August 1, 2016, DOL promulgated 20 C.F.R. Part 620 , a new rule to implement the provisions of the law relating to the drug testing of UC applicants for whom suitable work (as defined under state law) is available only in an occupation that regularly conducts drug testing. Amid concerns voiced by stakeholders about the 2016 DOL rule, Congress repealed this UC drug testing rule using the Congressional Review Act (CRA) via H.J.Res. 42 / P.L. 115-17 . On November 5, 2018, DOL published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) to reissue the rule identifying occupations that regularly conduct drug testing for purposes of Section 2105 of P.L. 112-96 . The CRA prohibits an agency from reissuing the rule in "substantially the same form" or issuing a "new rule that is substantially the same" as the disapproved rule, "unless the reissued or new rule is specifically authorized by a law enacted after the date of the joint resolution disapproving the original rule." Notably, this is the first time an agency has proposed to reissue a rule after the original version was disapproved under the CRA. According to the 2018 NPRM, DOL has addressed the reissue requirements of the CRA by proposing a substantially different and more flexible approach to the statutory requirements than the 2016 Rule, enabling states to enact legislation to require drug testing for a far larger group of UC applicants than the previous rule permitted. This flexibility is intended to respect the diversity of states' economies and the different roles played by employment drug testing in those economies. Comments on the proposed 2018 rule were required to be submitted by January 4, 2019. On January 16, 2019, Senator Richard Blumenthal introduced S. 165 , the Federal Unemployment Compensation Equity Act of 2019. This proposal would amend UCFE law and create a new permanent UCFE eligibility category for excepted federal employees who are unpaid but required to work during a government shutdown due to a lapse in appropriations. During any shutdown beginning on or after December 22, 2018, all excepted federal workers would be deemed eligible for UCFE benefits. Additionally, these employees would not be subject to a one-week waiting period (otherwise often required under state laws) before UCFE benefits were to be paid. On January 23, 2019, Representative Debbie Dingell introduced H.R. 725 , the Pay Federal Workers Act. This proposal would also provide UCFE benefits in a similar manner to S. 165 , including permanently amending 5 U.S.C. Chapter 85 to provide federal authority for these benefits. On January 23, 2019, Representative Anthony Brown introduced H.R. 720 . This proposal would deem excepted federal employees during a government shutdown to be eligible for UCFE during FY2019. The authority to provide UCFE to these excepted workers would expire at the end of FY2019. On February 8, 2019, Representative Katie Hill introduced H.R. 1117 , the Shutdown Fairness Act of 2019. This proposal would deem excepted federal employees and unpaid military servicemembers during a government shutdown to be eligible for UCFE or UCX during FY2019. The authority to provide UCFE to these excepted workers would expire at the end of FY2019. On January 15, 2019, Senator Ron Wyden and Representative Danny Davis introduced S. 136 and H.R. 556 , the Economic Ladders to End Volatility and Advance Training and Employment Act of 2019 (the ELEVATE Act) . Among other provisions, this proposal would establish new self-employment and relocation assistance benefits for unemployed workers to be administered by the Social Security Administration, in consultation with DOL. The self-employment assistance benefits would provide weekly income replacement (half of prior earnings up to the maximum weekly benefit amount in the state) for up to of 26 weeks to individuals. They would be available to individuals who are (1) eligible for any type of UI benefit; or ineligible for any type of UI benefit, but became involuntarily unemployed over the previous 12 weeks; or were previously self-employed, but lost a hiring contract, and (2) have a viable business plan approved by their state department of labor, workforce board, or the Small Business Administration. Additionally, Section 3 of S. 136 and H.R. 556 would provide up to $2,000 (or more, depending on family size) to fund to up to 90% of certain relocation expenses for eligible individuals and their families. In order to be eligible for this relocation assistance, an individual must be a (1) dislocated worker, (2) long-term unemployed individual, or (3) underemployed individual and also have filed a claim for relocation assistance and obtained suitable work with an expectation of obtaining such work in a new geographic region. On March 7, 2019, Representative Karen Bass introduced H.R. 1585 , the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2019. Among many other provisions, Section 703 of H.R. 1585 would require states to consider an individual who quit employment because of sexual harassment, domestic violence, sexual assault, or stalking to be eligible for UC benefits. The House passed H.R. 1585 on April 4, 2019. On March 14, 2019, Representative Stephanie Murphy introduced H.R. 1759 , the Building on Reemployment Improvements to Deliver Good Employment (BRIDGE) for Workers Act. This proposal would extend eligibility to any claimant of unemployment benefits, including those profiled as likely to exhaust benefits (rather than limiting eligibility to those who were profiled as likely to exhaust benefits). The House passed H.R. 1759 on April 9, 2019. The Extended Benefit (EB) program was established by the Federal-State Extended Unemployment Compensation Act of 1970 (EUCA; P.L. 91-373) (26 U.S.C. §3304, note). EUCA may extend receipt of unemployment benefits (extended benefits) at the state level if certain economic conditions exist within the state. As of the date of this publication, EB is not active in any state. Extended Benefit Triggers The EB program is triggered when a state's insured unemployment rate (IUR) or total unemployment rate (TUR) reaches certain levels. All states must pay up to 13 weeks of EB if the IUR for the previous 13 weeks is at least 5% and is 120% of the average of the rates for the same 13-week period in each of the two previous years. States may choose to enact two other optional thresholds. (States may choose one, two, or none.) If the state has chosen one or more of the EB trigger options, it would provide the following: Option 1—up to an additional 13 weeks of benefits if the state's IUR is at least 6%, regardless of previous years' averages. Option 2—up to an additional 13 weeks of benefits if the state's TUR is at least 6.5% and is at least 110% of the state's average TUR for the same 13 weeks in either of the previous two years; up to an additional 20 weeks of benefits if the state's TUR is at least 8% and is at least 110% of the state's average TUR for the same 13 weeks in either of the previous two years. EB benefits are not "grandfathered" (phased out) when a state triggers "off" the program. When a state triggers "off" of an EB period, all EB benefit payments in the state cease immediately regardless of individual entitlement. The EB benefit amount is equal to the eligible individual's weekly regular UC benefits. Under permanent law, FUTA finances half (50%) of the EB payments and 100% of EB administrative costs. States fund the other half (50%) of EB benefit costs through their SUTA. On March 7, 2019, Representative Karen Bass introduced H.R. 1585 , the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2019. Among many other provisions, Section 703 of H.R. 1585 would require states to consider an individual who quit employment because of sexual harassment, domestic violence, sexual assault, or stalking to be eligible for UC benefits. The House passed H.R. 1585 on April 4, 2019. On March 14, 2019, Representative Stephanie Murphy introduced H.R. 1759 , the Building on Reemployment Improvements to Deliver Good Employment (BRIDGE) for Workers Act. This proposal would extend eligibility to any claimant of unemployment benefits, including those profiled as likely to exhaust benefits (rather than limiting eligibility to those who were profiled as likely to exhaust benefits). The House passed H.R. 1759 on April 9, 2019.	[ "The 116th Congress has begun to consider several issues related to two programs in the unemployment insurance (UI) system: Unemployment Compensation (UC) and Unemployment Compensation for Federal Employees (UCFE). The lapse in federal appropriations that occurred from December 22, 2018, to January 25, 2019, created a partial government shutdown. As a result, agencies without funding furloughed many federal employees, and many federal employees excepted from furlough were working without pay during the lapse in appropriations. Furloughed federal employees may be eligible for UCFE benefits. Private-sector workers who are furloughed or laid off due to the partial government shutdown because they were employed by government contractors may be eligible for regular UC benefits. But, according to guidance from the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL), excepted federal employees who are performing services (without pay) would generally be ineligible for UCFE benefits based on states' definitions of \"unemployment.\" In this climate, there has been congressional interest in assisting furloughed and excepted federal employees through the UI system. UI legislative issues currently facing the 116th Congress include the following: the effects of the FY2019 sequester order on UI programs and benefits, the role of UI in providing temporary income replacement during a government shutdown, state fiscal concerns related to financing UC benefits, reemployment services and eligibility assessments (RESEA), potential consideration of the UI proposals included in the President's FY2020 budget, and congressional oversight related to a proposed UC drug testing rule reissued by DOL after previously being disapproved using the Congressional Review Act. In the 116th Congress, policymakers have introduced legislation related to UCFE benefits in response to the recent partial government shutdown (S. 165, H.R. 720, H.R. 725, and H.R. 1117), legislation to provide self-employment and relocation assistance benefits (S. 136 and H.R. 556), legislation to require that states consider an individual who quit employment because of sexual harassment, domestic violence, sexual assault, or stalking to be eligible for UC benefits (H.R. 1585), and legislation to amend Title III of the Social Security Act to extend RESEA to all UC claimants (H.R. 1759). For a brief overview of UC, see CRS In Focus IF10336, The Fundamentals of Unemployment Compensation." ]	3,509	gov_report	en	null	718451981624500204d9248fd18aa0f62b9e16673d171e37
Justice Management Division (JMD) JMD provides the Federal Bureau of Prisons senior management with guidance as it relates to Department of Justice (DOJ) policy for all matters pertaining to organization, management, and administration, including the use of human capital flexibilities such as retention incentives. BOP is responsible for incarcerating all federal offenders sentenced to prison. To carry out its mission, BOP, under the oversight of DOJ’s JMD, manages the human resource operations of its institutions, including the use of retention incentives. BOP administers, monitors, and oversees retention incentives through its Central Office, regional offices, and institutions. Central Office. The Central Office serves as BOP’s headquarters and provides oversight of BOP operations and program areas. Within the Central Office is BOP’s Human Resource Management Division (HRMD) which is responsible for developing, implementing and administering human resource policies and programs, including the use of retention incentives that meet OPM and DOJ requirements. In addition, the Central Office’s Program Review Division (PRD) is responsible for assessing BOP programs, including human resources, to ensure that they are managed and operated effectively. Regional offices. BOP has six regional offices that cover the Mid- Atlantic, North Central, Northeast, South Central, Southeast, and Western regions of the United States. These offices, each led by a regional director, oversee the operations of the 122 federal institutions within their respective geographic regions of the country. According to BOP officials, regional office staff also provide local level oversight of institutions’ human capital programs, such as retention incentives, among other things. Institutions. BOP institutions are managed by a warden and other officials, including an executive assistant and associate warden who generally provide overall direction and, in part, administer the institution’s human capital policies, including policies on retention incentives. Correctional services staff represent the largest segment of each institution’s workforce and are responsible for the correctional treatment, custody, and supervision of inmates. Non-correctional services staff include, among others, those employees assigned to non-correctional services management, facility operations, and the health services unit. Workers in health services and psychology services are responsible for providing inmates with medical, dental, and mental health services and include, for example, dentists, pharmacists, physicians, nurses, psychologists, and drug treatment specialists. The Federal Employees Pay Comparability Act of 1990 first authorized OPM to allow federal agencies to give incentives, including retention incentives, to employees. The Federal Workforce Flexibility Act of 2004 provided federal agencies increased flexibilities regarding these incentives. For example, individual retention incentives that were capped at 25 percent of an employee’s basic pay rate could be increased up to 50 percent in cases of critical agency need with OPM’s approval. Generally, under OPM regulations, an agency is authorized to pay a retention incentive to employees. This happens when the agency determines that the unusually high or unique qualifications of the employee or a special need of the agency for the employee’s services makes it essential to retain the employee and that the employee would be likely to leave federal service in the absence of an incentive. In addition, OPM requires agencies to develop plans for using retention incentives outlining, in part, the required documentation for justifying the retention incentive and any criteria for determining the amount of incentive and the length of the service period. Generally, agencies must require that employees sign a written service agreement that outlines the terms of the service such as the employee’s agreement to remain a certain length of time with the agency. Additionally, according to OPM regulations, to qualify for a retention incentive, each employee must have a performance rating of at least “fully successful” or an agency’s equivalent performance rating. BOP funds the majority of its retention incentives through its Salaries and Expenses appropriation account which represented almost 93 percent of BOP’s budget in FY 2016. According to BOP officials, BOP’s Central Office allocates funding from the Salaries and Expenses account to the regional offices. These regional offices then determine how to allocate their budget among various salary and expense activities, including retention incentives. HRMD delegates retention incentive determinations to each institution. In accordance with OPM requirements and BOP’s October 2016 Program Statement on Compensation, the wardens make retention incentive requests based on documented evidence that the employee possesses unusually high or unique qualifications or meets a special need of the agency and has a performance rating of at least “successful or its equivalent.” These incentives are calculated as a percentage of the employee’s basic pay and are disbursed in installments to the employee each pay period. In addition to retention incentives, BOP has authority to provide other compensation-based human capital flexibilities to employees, in certain circumstances. The following summarizes some of the compensation- based human capital flexibilities that BOP uses in addition to retention incentives, to retain and recruit staff: Recruitment and relocation incentives. BOP pays recruitment incentives to new hires and relocation incentives to current employees who elect to move to a different geographic area, when a position is likely to be difficult to fill in the absence of an incentive. Student loan repayments. Using this authority, BOP may repay federally-insured student loans to attract job candidates or retain current employees. Special salary rates. With OPM approval, BOP may establish higher rates of pay for an occupation or group of occupations nationwide or in a local area when it finds the government’s recruitment or retention efforts are, or would likely become, significantly handicapped without those higher rates. Physicians and dental comparability allowances. Comparability allowances may be paid to certain eligible physicians or dental professionals who enter into service agreements. These allowances are paid only to categories of physicians and dentists for which the agency is experiencing recruitment and retention problems and are fixed at the minimum amounts necessary to deal with such problems. BOP retention incentive expenditures generally increased from $10.7 million in fiscal year 2012 to $14.0 million in fiscal year 2016. Additionally, as illustrated in table 1, the number of employees who received retention incentives increased each year from 2,024 employees in fiscal year 2012 to 2,460 employees in fiscal year 2016. In general, BOP employees who received retention incentives received the incentive for more than one year. For example, from fiscal year 2012 through fiscal year 2016, a total of 3,382 BOP employees received retention incentive payments. Of those, 82 percent (2,766 of 3,382) received retention incentive payments for at least 2 years and 39 percent received retention incentives all 5 years, as shown in figure 1. From fiscal years 2012 through 2016, BOP spent more than 97 percent of its total retention incentive expenditures on employees at four California institutions and for medical professionals nationwide. BOP’s total retention incentive expenditures for the four California institutions and medical professionals nationwide in fiscal year 2016 are provided in figure 2. Four California Institutions. The California institutions—United States Penitentiary (USP) Atwater, Federal Correctional Institution (FCI) Herlong, FCI Mendota, and Federal Correctional Complex (FCC) Victorville—constituted the largest portion of BOP’s total retention incentive expenditures, and the level of their expenditures remained relatively steady from fiscal year 2012 through 2016. BOP provides group retention incentives for staff at the General Schedule (GS) grades level 12 and below and those in the Federal Wage System at three institutions—USP Atwater, FCI Herlong, and FCC Victorville. BOP also provides individual retention incentives to its employees at GS grades level 12 and below and in the Federal Wage System at FCI Mendota. As shown in figure 3, our analysis of BOP data found that from fiscal years 2012 through 2016, these four California institutions had the largest percentage of retention incentive expenditures across institutions as well as the largest percentage of employees who received retention incentives. Additionally, the four California institutions’ retention incentive expenditures remained relatively steady—around $8.1 to $8.2 million during the 5-year period—even though the overall number of employees who received the incentives generally increased. BOP officials told us that these California institutions’ retention incentive expenditures remained relatively steady in spite of an overall increase in the number of employees receiving incentives, in part, because in fiscal year 2013 BOP reduced the retention incentive rate—the percentage of an employee’s basic pay that determines the employee’s retention incentive— by 3 percent at the four California institutions. BOP officials reported using retention incentives primarily at these four institutions to supplement correctional officers’ salaries and compensate for the gap between BOP’s and other institutions’ salaries. Specifically, officials told us that these four California institutions were consistently understaffed as a result of their lower salaries in comparison to salaries offered at California state and local prisons and at other BOP institutions in California metropolitan areas. The Department of Labor’s Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that the average salary for correctional officers in California in 2016 was $70,020. For the same year, the annual average salary for BOP correctional officers at these four institutions was $50,859. To bring these four California institutions’ salaries in line with those offered by state, local, and other BOP institutions in California metropolitan areas, BOP officials told us that they first use recruitment incentives to attract and hire staff and then provide retention incentives to employees with a performance rating of at least “successful.” Medical Professionals. From fiscal years 2012 through 2016, BOP retention incentive expenditures for medical professionals increased by an average of approximately 21 percent per year. Our analysis showed that most recently—for fiscal years 2015 and 2016—BOP retention incentive expenditures for medical professionals accounted for the largest portion of BOP’s total retention incentive expenditures across the various occupation groups and was primarily responsible for the overall increase in BOP’s total retention incentive expenditures from fiscal year 2012 through fiscal year 2016. For example, in fiscal year 2016, BOP spent approximately 42 percent of total retention incentives expenditures for medical professionals ($5.8 million), 27 percent on correctional officers ($3.8 million), and the remaining 31 percent on employees in other occupations. In total, BOP retention incentive expenditures for medical professionals increased from approximately $2.7 million in fiscal year 2012 to $5.8 million in fiscal year 2016, as shown in figure 4. The increase accounted for 92 percent of BOP’s total increase in retention incentive expenditures during the five-year period. In comparison, BOP’s retention incentive expenditures for correctional officers and all other occupations remained relatively steady from fiscal year 2012 through fiscal year 2016, increasing by an average of approximately 1 percent per year. According to our analysis, the increase in retention incentive expenditures for medical professionals during the five years is partially explained by the increase in the number of institutions providing retention incentives to medical professionals. Specifically, from fiscal years 2012 through 2016, the number of institutions providing retention incentives to medical professionals increased from 53 institutions with 341 employees in medical occupations receiving retention incentives to 84 institutions providing retention incentives to a total of 646 employees in medical occupations. According to BOP officials, BOP primarily uses retention incentives for medical professionals in an effort to retain these employees by supplementing BOP salaries which are generally lower than salaries offered to medical professionals in the private sector. Officials told us that BOP has designated medical professional positions as hard-to-fill and, therefore, BOP retaining these professionals in a correctional setting requires the use of a variety of incentives, including retention incentives, in order to increase pay. BOP has a number of internal controls in place to ensure that retention incentive applications meet BOP and other requirements. BOP officials told us that these controls are part of a multilayered application and review process that begins at the institution and culminates at BOP’s Central Office. Our review of a random sample of 40 application packet case files for retention incentives awarded from fiscal year 2014 through fiscal year 2016 found that they all generally incorporated the internal controls described by officials. The key controls in this process include: Application review at the institution and regional levels. According to BOP officials, the retention incentive application process begins with an institution’s human resources office, whose staff complete a retention incentive application on behalf of an employee. The institution’s human resources office verifies that the information in the application justifies a retention incentive and that funds are available to pay the incentive. Although it is not required, BOP officials said that they use a retention incentive application checklist to help institutions ensure that retention incentive applications are complete. The institution’s human resources office then submits the completed application packet, which includes supporting documentation, to the warden for review. Next, the application packet is forwarded to the respective BOP regional director who also reviews it for accuracy and completeness. The regional director then adds an approval statement and forwards the packet to the Central Office for final review and approval. Of the 40 randomly selected application packet case files that we reviewed, 36 included a retention incentive checklist used by the institutions and all contained information to justify the retention incentive as well as a statement of the regional director’s approval. Central Office’s final application approval. BOP policy requires that all retention incentive applications undergo two levels of review in BOP’s Central Office: first by the Human Resource Management Division’s (HRMD) Staffing and Employee Relations Section (SERS) and next by HRMD’s Personnel Director, for final review and approval. According to BOP officials, during the review process there is ongoing communication between the various entities to ensure that applications are complete and accurate; for example, if SERS finds an error in the application or requests additional information, SERS returns the application to the regional or institutional level for correction and re-review. All of the 40 BOP application packet case files that we reviewed included approvals by HRMD’s Personnel Director or an authorized official, as required by BOP policy. Annual review and re-certification to continue retention incentives. According to BOP policy, on an annual basis, institutions’ human resources offices are required to review employees’ retention incentives to determine whether the incentive is still warranted. Payment of a retention incentive may be recertified and continued as long as the conditions giving rise to the original determination to pay the incentive still exist and funds are available. For each retention incentive, an institution’s human resources office must determine whether to continue, adjust, or terminate the incentive within one year of the initial or most recent approval. If the human resources office decides to continue the retention incentive, the institution’s warden must again submit a retention incentive application. Applications to continue the retention incentive proceed through the same review and approval process as initial applications. Of the 40 application files that we reviewed, 29 were continuations and 8 were initial requests for a retention incentive. According to BOP officials, after the initial approval of a retention incentive, an institution’s human resources office has primary responsibility for the monitoring of retention incentive payments. According to officials, institutions use a variety of internal controls to monitor the expiration, continuation, or termination of retention incentives, for example: Monitoring expiration dates. BOP officials stated that institutions’ human resources offices monitor retention incentives in order to identify incentives that are approaching their expiration date and need to be terminated or renewed. For example, according to BOP officials from USP Atwater, FCC Butner and FCI Phoenix, staff from their institutions’ human resources offices may generate a retention incentive activity report and cross reference this report with their locally generated tracking sheets. This process helps identify retention incentives approaching their expiration dates so that the human resources offices can submit a request for continuation before the incentive expires. Using automated reminders to prompt file review. BOP officials stated that institutions use automated reminders to alert human resources staff to check the records of retention incentive recipients for human resources-related events such as promotions or relocations that could affect the continuation of a retention incentive. Following a checklist of steps for relocation processes. BOP officials told us that in April 2016 they instituted a checklist that outlines steps that an institution’s human resources staff must take when employees relocate to a different institution. Based on our review of this checklist, one step on the sheet prompts human resources staff to review the employee’s retention incentive. According to BOP policy, when an employee receiving a retention incentive transfers to another location, the human resources office where the employee was receiving the retention incentive is responsible for submitting a request to terminate the incentive. The termination must be effective the last day of the pay period that the employee occupies the position. Submitting forgiveness waivers. BOP officials told us that institutions submit forgiveness waivers if a request to continue a retention incentive is not submitted and approved prior to the retention incentive expiring. BOP officials said that a forgiveness waiver is considered an acknowledgement of an administrative error and is a late submission of a retention incentive renewal that was still warranted. The waiver is not a request to forgive an overpayment since the employee was still considered to be eligible for the retention incentive. Of the 40 retention incentive applications that we reviewed, 5 applications included forgiveness waivers to excuse the tardiness of the filing and request continuations of the retention incentive. According to BOP officials, BOP conducts periodic audits and reviews of its human capital activities and related internal controls, to ensure that retention incentives are being used appropriately. The following offices conduct various audits and reviews involving BOP’s retention incentives: BOP’s Program Review Division (PRD) audits regional and institutional human resources functions. PRD audits BOP’s regional and institutional human resources offices to ensure that they are in compliance with BOP policies and procedures. According to BOP officials, as part of the audit process, PRD audits retention incentives to ensure that they have the proper approvals and are justified. PRD audits each institution’s human resources office at least every three years. During these audits, PRD generates retention incentive activity reports (the same reports that institutions run when monitoring for expiration dates), to check the accuracy of retention incentive programs under review. Following each audit, PRD issues a final report with findings to the institution and to the staff operating the program area under audit. Institutions respond to the report with corrective actions that the institution will take to address the findings. When the institution has resolved all corrective actions from the audit, the audit is closed. Additionally, each quarter, PRD provides HRMD with a report that summarizes its quarterly audit findings. According to BOP officials, HRMD uses these reports to identify any agency-wide trends that need to be addressed. Our review of BOP data showed that between fiscal years 2012 and 2016, PRD conducted nearly 200 audits. For example, in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2016, PRD audited five institutions’ and regional offices’ human resource management functions. During these audits, PRD identified nine deficiencies, one of which pertained to retention incentives. Specifically, it found that one audited institution did not terminate an employee’s retention incentive after the employee had relocated to another institution. To correct the deficiency, the institution cancelled the retention incentive which discontinued future disbursements. According to BOP officials, a bill was generated to recoup the overpayment from the employee. BOP institutions conduct annual operation reviews of internal functions, such as human resources. BOP officials told us that each institution conducts annual operational reviews of various internal functions, such as human resources. According to BOP’s Program Review Guidelines for Human Resource Servicing Offices, during these reviews, institutions are required to review supporting documentation for staff currently receiving an incentive to determine if the incentives are still warranted. If the initial request for the retention incentive was made over the preceding 12 months, institutions are also required to ensure that it was approved. According to BOP officials, the results of these reviews are reported to PRD through the Central Office. DOJ’s Justice Management Division (JMD) audits BOP’s human resources programs. According to BOP officials, JMD conducts audits of component-level human resources programs to determine whether BOP’s systems are compliant with DOJ policy and aligned with DOJ’s Human Capital Strategic Plan. JMD’s most recent audit of BOP’s human resources programs that included a review of BOP’s retention incentives occurred in September 2010 at BOP’s Human Resource Service Center in Grand Prairie, Texas. JMD found that in some cases BOP granted retention incentives prior to the signing of service agreements. JMD also found that BOP lacked documentation to authorize a group retention incentive for employees at its Victorville, California institution. BOP’s written response to the findings stated that JMD incorrectly applied the service agreement requirement, as service agreements were not warranted in the specific case that it identified. Additionally, BOP stated that the documents JMD identified as missing from the case files in question were kept in separate files and not required to be part of the retention incentive application. JMD agreed with BOP’s responses and in January 2013, JMD closed out the audit’s findings noting that these responses satisfied all required corrective actions. While BOP takes a number of steps to determine current workforce needs and how to fill those needs, BOP does not strategically plan for how retention incentives can be used to meet long-term human capital goals. BOP officials stated that planning for human capital needs is conducted at institutions during quarterly workforce utilization meetings or manpower salary meetings. During these meetings, executive staff at the institution discuss the current state of the institution’s workforce. According to the BOP officials, while considering attrition, hiring, and turnover rates, the executive staff decide strategies they will employ to attract and retain employees for their current needs. While officials we spoke with at four institutions have discussed retention incentives at their workforce utilization meetings, details about the content of these discussions ranged. According to these officials and our review of meeting minutes from the four institutions, discussions about retention incentives respond to each institution’s short-term staffing situation rather than address future staffing needs based on an overall strategic human capital plan. For example: USP Atwater officials told us that they review the current turnover rate, budget, projected vacancies, and use of retention incentives at annual budget development meetings. Meeting minutes reflected the following on retention incentives: “retention … still necessary to retain staff and hard-to-fill positions.” FCC Butner is a medical facility that offers retention incentives to all medical officers (all types of doctors) and nurses (practitioners, registered, etc.) at the institution. According to Butner officials, during workforce utilization meetings, Butner officials discuss recruitment and staffing trends for the institution and plans for how to address any staffing challenges. Meeting minutes we reviewed did not indicate specific discussions about the use of retention incentives. FCC Pollock executive staff discuss current institutional salary expenditures and projections and the status of vacant positions at workforce utilization meetings. While meeting minutes we reviewed indicated discussions about projected expenditures for incentive awards, the minutes did not differentiate between retention incentive awards, and other incentive awards such as recruitment or relocation incentive awards. FCI Phoenix officials stated that in their workforce utilization meetings, executive staff discuss salary projections and vacancy statuses. Meeting minutes we reviewed did not indicate specific discussions about the use of retention incentives. BOP decisions about retention incentives are currently not tied to any strategic human capital plan for how to use human capital flexibilities— such as retention incentives—to address their ongoing challenge of retaining staff in hard-to-fill positions. According to officials, retention incentives are awarded on an as-needed basis, determined by an institution’s warden, if funds are available. According to key principles for effective strategic human capital planning, such planning is an important component of an agency’s effort to develop long-term strategies for acquiring, developing, and retaining staff needed for an agency to achieve its goals. Specifically, senior leaders should be involved in developing, communicating, and implementing strategic human capital plans. Within an agency’s strategic human capital plan, the human capital policies, practices, and programs—for example, an agency’s retention incentive program—should clearly link to the human capital and program goals of the organization. By not having a strategic human capital plan that clearly establishes strategies that will be used to achieve specific human capital goals, BOP cannot ensure that its institutions are strategically managing their workforces in a manner that meets the agency’s human capital needs. In August 2017, BOP officials told us that they began drafting a strategic human capital operating plan that will include strategic objectives, action plans, performance objectives and measures, and evaluation/reporting requirements. Officials stated that the plan will also include planning regarding the use of human capital flexibilities, such as retention incentives. BOP officials told us that they anticipate that the strategic human capital operating plan will be a supplement to their workforce utilization meetings and that an agency-wide plan will provide a set of strategies for all institutions to consider. However, BOP could not provide documentation of the project beginning or whether it would include a strategic approach specific to retention incentives. Including retention incentives in BOP’s strategic human capital operating plan would create a roadmap for the agency and the institutions to use to move from being reactive in their current workforce needs—for example, awarding retention incentives on an ad hoc basis when funds are available—to being strategic in how retention incentives are used and to ensure that these and other flexibilities help the agency achieve its long-term workforce goals. From fiscal year 2012 through fiscal year 2016, BOP spent more than $59 million on retention incentives but has not established any measures to evaluate their effectiveness. According to officials, BOP has not evaluated the effectiveness of its use of retention incentives because BOP officials consider a retention incentive successful if an employee does not leave the agency. However, BOP also uses other human capital flexibilities along with retention incentives to help retain staff. For example, BOP uses physician and dental comparability allowances—additional pay to a physician or dentist who enters into an agreement for a specified period of service—to help retain these medical personnel. According to officials, it would otherwise be difficult to compete with private sector salaries without the use of all available incentives. However, BOP has not studied whether or how retention incentives have contributed to employees’ retention in relation to other incentives such as physician and dental comparability allowances. According to our work on strategic human capital management and OPM’s guidance, it is crucial for organizations to evaluate the success of their human capital strategies, such as the use of retention incentives. In measuring the performance of these strategies and their contribution to key programmatic results, agencies can make adjustments, if necessary. For example, agencies can use evaluation results to make targeted investments in certain human capital strategies—such as the use of retention incentives—creating a cycle of strategic workforce management, where evaluation informs planning, planning dictates strategies, and strategies are evaluated for effectiveness. While BOP uses retention incentives to address critical skills gaps—such as with medical professionals—evaluating the effectiveness of retention incentives would help BOP determine whether and how retention incentives, as well as other human capital flexibilities, contribute to an employee’s continued employment at BOP or if adjustments to BOP retention strategies must be made for improved results. BOP officials agreed that evaluating the effectiveness of retention incentives would help them be more strategic about their human capital needs and spending on incentives. By including and implementing such an evaluation in its upcoming strategic human capital operating plan, BOP could better determine if it is making maximum use of its funds to retain the necessary qualified personnel or if changes must be made to most effectively retain its staff. As the largest employer within DOJ with some staff working in remote locations and undesirable conditions, BOP relies on a number of available flexibilities, including retention incentives, to help retain its employees. However, BOP currently lacks a strategic approach for using and evaluating retention incentives to address human capital goals. Given BOP’s ongoing staffing challenges, for example, retaining staff in hard-to- fill medical positions, developing a plan that includes a thoughtful blueprint for using retention incentives could help BOP better anticipate and address staffing needs. Moreover, evaluating its use of retention incentives could help BOP determine whether these incentives are effective or whether adjustments are needed to better retain its employees. By using evaluation results to inform planning, and planning to inform how retention incentives are used, BOP would be better positioned to achieve its long-term human capital goals and address its critical staffing needs. We are making two recommendations to BOP: 1. The Director of BOP should include in the forthcoming strategic human capital operating plan, 1) human capital goals and 2) strategies on how human capital flexibilities—including retention incentives—will be used to meet these goals. (Recommendation 1) 2. The Director of BOP should evaluate the effectiveness of BOP’s use of retention incentives to help determine whether the incentives have helped BOP achieve its human capital goals or if adjustments in retention incentives are needed. (Recommendation 2) We requested comments on a draft of this report from DOJ. In an email received November 15, 2017, the DOJ liaison stated that DOJ concurred with our recommendations. The Department did not provide official written comments to include in our report, but did provide written technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the Attorney General and the Director of BOP. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-9627 or maurerd@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in Appendix III. This report examines (1) how BOP has used its authority to pay retention incentives; (2) what internal controls are in place for the use of retention incentives; and (3) the extent to which BOP plans for and evaluates the use of retention incentives. To determine how BOP has used its authority to pay retention incentives, we reviewed BOP’s July 2012 report on its use of recruitment, relocation, and retention (3R) incentives. We then obtained underlying retention incentive expenditure data from DOJ’s Justice Management Division because it serves as the focal point for performance and financial information for all Department of Justice components and employees, including BOP. In particular, we obtained employee-level retention incentive payroll data for fiscal years 2012 through 2016. We selected this time period because it includes the most recent five complete fiscal years for which data were available and because we believe five years is sufficient time to identify trends in BOP’s retention incentive expenditures. We analyzed and aggregated the employee-level data by institution, occupation, and employee grade level. To identify trends, we compared per fiscal year expenditures across the various categories of occupations and locations across the five years. Additionally, we categorized institutions by BOP region, institutions that use group retention incentives, and institutions that use individual retention incentives. We also categorized occupations as medical professionals, correctional officers, and all other occupations and compared aggregate retention incentive expenditures for the different groups. Using information from BOP’s website and testimonial evidence from BOP officials on its health care system, for the purposes of this report, we defined medical professionals as BOP employees in occupations that provide medical, dental, and mental health care services and who do not solely provide these services in an administrative function. For the purposes of our analyses, medical professionals are dentists, dental assistants and hygienists, diagnostic radiological technologists, health aid and technicians, medical doctors (including psychiatrists), medical technologists, nurses, pharmacists, pharmacy technicians, physician assistants, and practical nurses and psychologists. To assess the employee-level retention incentive payroll data’s reliability, we obtained and analyzed documentation on systems’ capabilities and data control, interviewed data users and managers responsible for maintaining data, conducted checks for completeness and logical consistency, and compared the employee-level data to aggregated institution-level retention incentive expenditure data from BOP’s Financial Management Information System. We found the employee-level data to be sufficiently reliable for the purpose of this report. Additionally for this objective, we reviewed documents such as the DOJ’s Financial Management Information System Sub-Object Classification Code Guide and the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) Handbook of Occupational Groups and Families to respectively identify the system codes used to track retention incentives expenditures and to identify the names for each occupational series code in the datasets. We also interviewed BOP Human Resource Management headquarters officials to obtain information on the primary purposes for BOP’s use of retention incentives and their views on identified retention incentive expenditures trends. We also interviewed U.S. Department of Health and Human Services’ (HHS) Public Health Service (PHS) officials to better understand how BOP and PHS manage costs, including retention incentive expenditures, for PHS staff assigned to BOP. BOP partners with PHS to acquire medical staff to provide medical care for BOP’s inmate population. BOP reimburses PHS for the costs of compensation and benefits—including retention incentive payments, if applicable—for PHS staff assigned to BOP. PHS has final approval authority for retention incentives paid to PHS staff assigned to BOP facilities. Furthermore, we obtained aggregated retention incentive expenditure data from PHS on the total amount of funds BOP reimbursed PHS for fiscal years 2012 through 2016. For the reliability of PHS’s data, we reviewed the system’s data fields to check that the appropriate fields were used to provide data and interviewed data users and managers to discuss how expenditures are recorded and maintained. We found the PHS data to be sufficiently reliable for the purpose of this report. To identify and describe the internal controls that BOP has in place related to retention incentives, we obtained and analyzed documentation regarding BOP requirements and guidance for the use of retention incentives. We also interviewed officials from BOP’s Central Office who are responsible for the administration, management, and oversight of BOP’s human capital management systems, including retention incentives. We focused on the management and administrative controls used by BOP to review, approve, re-certify, and monitor retention incentives. Additionally, we interviewed the warden and human capital officers at 4 of the 122 institutions to obtain illustrative examples regarding the internal controls in place at these institutions to ensure the proper disbursement of retention incentives. We interviewed BOP officials at Federal Correctional Complex Pollock in Pollock, LA; Federal Correctional Complex Butner in Butner, NC; United States Penitentiary, Atwater in Atwater, CA and Federal Correctional Institution Phoenix, in Phoenix, AZ. These institutions were selected to ensure variation in the number and types of employees receiving retention incentives, BOP region, and security-level. Although the information we obtained from the interviews with officials at these four institutions cannot be generalized to other BOP institutions, these interviews provided important insights and perspectives about the use of retention incentives at BOP institutions. We also reviewed a non-generalizable random sample of 40 retention incentive application packet case files to determine the extent to which these files contained documentation on the internal control activities in place to monitor the application, approval, and funds disbursement processes of BOP’s retention incentive program. To identify our sample, we used employee-level expenditure data to randomly select 40 application files from the universe of BOP employees who received retention incentives from fiscal years 2014 through 2016. Each application file was reviewed by two GAO analysts who each assessed the extent to which each application contained the appropriate justification, approval signatures, and other documentation such as an application checklist and whether the application was an initial or continuation application. To determine the extent to which BOP plans for and evaluates the use of retention incentives, we interviewed BOP officials regarding their experiences with retention incentives, how they use retention incentives to strategically manage their workforce needs, how the agency evaluates the effectiveness of retention incentives, and how retention incentives contribute to BOP’s broader human capital goals. We then compared these efforts to our work on strategic human capital planning, specifically in terms of planning for and evaluating the use of human capital flexibilities. Additionally, we interviewed the warden and human capital officers at four BOP institutions mentioned above to obtain illustrative examples of how workforce planning occurs at these institutions. We also reviewed the DOJ’s Office of Inspector General Report 16-02 “Review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Medical Staffing Challenges” (March 2016) and our past work to better understand the challenges that BOP faces in retaining medical professionals and other staff. Table 2 provides the Bureau of Prisons’ (BOP) fiscal year 2016 retention incentive expenditures by various occupations and groups of occupations, such as medical professionals, correctional officers, and other occupations. A range of occupations are reflected in the table primarily as a result of four California institutions—United States Penitentiary (USP) Atwater, Federal Correctional Institution (FCI) Herlong, FCI Mendota, and Federal Correctional Complex Victorville—providing retention incentives to all employees at General Schedule grades level 12 and below and those in the Federal Wage System. In addition to the contact named above, Dawn Locke (Assistant Director) and Meghan Squires (Analyst-in-Charge) managed the work. Also, David Alexander, Renee Caputo, Willie Commons III, Jamarla Edwards, Robert Goldenkoff, Chelsa Gurkin, Eric Hauswirth, Janice Latimer, Lerone Reid, Rachel Stoiko, and Adam Vogt made significant contributions to this report.	[ "BOP is the largest employer within DOJ and is responsible for the care and custody of an inmate population of about 186,000. BOP has faced challenges retaining staff at correctional facilities, although it has used retention incentives, along with other human capital flexibilities. GAO was asked to review BOP's use of retention incentives. This report addresses: (1) how BOP used its authority to pay retention incentives; (2) internal controls BOP has in place for the use of retention incentives; and (3) the extent to which BOP plans for and evaluates the use of retention incentives. GAO obtained employee-level retention incentive expenditure data from DOJ's Justice Management Division for fiscal years 2012 through 2016. GAO also reviewed agency documentation, such as policy statements and 40 randomly selected retention incentive application packet case files from fiscal years 2014 through 2016. GAO also interviewed officials from BOP's Central Office and four correctional facilities that use retention incentives, selected to reflect variation in the number and types of employees receiving retention incentives, BOP regions, and BOP institution security levels. From fiscal years 2012 to 2016, the Department of Justice's (DOJ) Federal Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) total retention incentive expenditures generally increased from $10.7 to $14.0 million and the number of employees receiving retention incentives increased from 2,024 to 2,460. During those five years, BOP spent more than 97 percent of its total retention incentive expenditures on employees at four BOP institutions in California and for medical professionals nationwide. Further, total retention incentive expenditures for medical professionals increased by an average of 21 percent per year (see figure). According to BOP officials, BOP uses retention incentives, for example, to supplement BOP's medical professionals' salaries which are generally lower than private sector salaries. BOP has a variety of internal controls in place throughout the retention incentive process that help ensure retention incentive applications and approvals meet requirements. For example, each application goes through multiple levels of review to verify its accuracy and completeness. BOP takes steps to determine workforce needs and how to fill those needs, but has not strategically planned for and evaluated its use of retention incentives. According to BOP, planning for human capital needs is conducted at institutions during quarterly meetings, but discussions about these incentives respond to short-term staffing situations rather than proactively addressing future staffing needs. Including human capital goals and strategies in BOP's human capital plan would create a roadmap so the agency could move from being reactive to its current workforce needs to being strategic in trying to achieve its long-term workforce goals. Additionally BOP has not evaluated the effectiveness of its use of retention incentives in retaining staff. As a result, BOP does not know whether retention incentives have contributed to employees' retention in relation to other incentives used by BOP. Consistent with key principles for strategic human capital planning, planning for and evaluating the use of retention incentives could help BOP better determine if these incentives are an efficient and effective means by which to retain staff. GAO recommends that BOP (1) include human capital goals and how retention incentives will be used to achieve these goals in its human capital plan; and (2) evaluate the use of retention incentives. BOP concurred with GAO's recommendations." ]	6,244	gov_report	en	null	42b42abdc193b23ee5bb240e45bd4f5df99e66ea7044fed7
Safety defect vehicle recalls (auto recalls) are initiated when a defect in a vehicle or vehicle equipment creates an unreasonable safety risk, as determined by NHTSA or a manufacturer. After a recall is initiated, manufacturers are required to provide written notification to vehicle owners via First-Class Mail within 60 days and remedy the defect. Franchised dealers—which sell or lease an auto manufacturer’s new vehicles—perform the recall remedy. Before manufacturers send recall notification letters to affected vehicle owners, NHTSA reviews draft letters and envelopes to ensure they include required information about the safety defect. Required information includes, among other things, a clear description of the safety defect, an evaluation of the risk to vehicle safety, and a statement that the manufacturer will remedy the defect without charge. See appendix II for an example of a notification letter. The number of vehicles affected by safety defect vehicle recalls has increased dramatically since 2011 (see fig. 1). The increase reflects, in part, several large-scale recalls. For example, in 2014, General Motors initiated a recall of over 8 million vehicles with faulty ignition switches. Similarly, according to NHTSA in 2014 and 2015, some passenger vehicle manufacturers began recalling Takata air bag inflators, recalls that have grown to include approximately 34 million vehicles and 19 auto manufacturers. For the Takata recall, NHTSA issued various orders and established a Coordinated Remedy Program under which the agency oversees the supply of remedy parts and risk-based prioritization of vehicles for repair, and manages related recalls with the assistance of an Independent Monitor. The Independent Monitor assesses compliance with the applicable orders issued by NHTSA and makes recommendations aimed at enhancing the remedy program. According to NHTSA’s Strategic Plan 2016–2020, this unprecedented recall activity encouraged the agency to improve its system for identifying and addressing defective vehicles. For example, the plan states that NHTSA’s “vision is to achieve a 100-percent completion rate for every recall by improving communication at every level, at every step of the way.” Thus, according to the plan, NHTSA and the auto industry have committed to identifying and implementing effective strategies to inform consumers of safety defects and envision that their coordination will bolster recall efforts to improve completion rates. NHTSA reported that annual completion rates for passenger vehicle recalls have remained relatively flat, ranging from 63 to 67 percent between calendar year 2011 and calendar year 2014. See appendix III for completion rates by vehicle component and vehicle type. In part, to improve communication and encourage consumers to complete repairs, NHTSA and manufacturers provide auto recall information to the public on their websites. For example, certain motor vehicle manufacturers are required to allow consumers to search a vehicle’s recall remedy status on the Internet using the vehicle identification number (VIN). NHTSA also provides publicly available auto recall information on its website, including examples of recall notification letters. In December 2016, NHTSA began consolidating its websites into NHTSA.gov to provide a single access point for its auto recall content. One of these websites, safercar.gov, was once NHTSA’s primary method of communicating auto recall information to consumers; however, the agency is in the process of moving this information to NHTSA.gov. NHTSA’s Strategic Plan 2016–2020 states that the agency wants NHTSA.gov to be a comprehensive user-friendly platform that serves as the premier source of vehicle safety information by, for example, improving the website’s search capabilities. NHTSA also aims to encourage consumers to use its website’s auto recall information through its communications program. NHTSA’s Office of Communications and Consumer Information (OCCI) is the primary office responsible for implementing the agency’s public communication efforts. OCCI intends to increase public engagement with the agency’s information through its social media channels, such as Instagram, Twitter, and Facebook. The amount OCCI obligated to support the agency’s auto recall efforts has increased from nearly $.5 million in fiscal year 2011 to about $2.5 million in fiscal year 2016. According to NHTSA officials, these obligations supported various efforts, including public awareness campaigns, an auto recall hotline, advertising agencies, exhibits at auto shows, and NHTSA’s mobile application. As part of our focus group discussion sessions, consumers selected safety risk and convenience as the two most influential factors they considered when using auto recall information to decide whether to complete repairs. All factors considered: During each session, we first asked consumers to describe all the factors they considered. Across the sessions, consumers shared a wide variety of factors including availability of a loaner vehicle, time to schedule and complete the repair, safety risk, and other factors. For example, some consumers had not yet repaired their vehicles because they were “just waiting” for parts to become available. Other consumers considered their previous customer service experiences at the franchised dealership or the distance they would need to travel to complete the repair. For example, one consumer at our rural focus group location told us it would take roughly 2 hours to reach the dealership’s repair shop. Most influential factors considered: After the discussion of all factors, we then asked each consumer to select the single most influential factor they considered. Consumers in the sessions overwhelmingly selected safety risk and convenience as the two most influential factors (see table 1). More than half of consumers in our focus group discussion sessions selected safety risk as the most influential factor they considered when making repair decisions. They told us that their perception of the risk influenced whether or not they repaired their vehicle. For instance, some consumers stated that they completed repairs immediately, because the risks “sounded serious” or that they considered the defect a “safety concern.” Conversely, some consumers said they did not complete the repairs because the defect “didn’t sound very urgent.” While each recall notification letter is required to include an evaluation of the risk to vehicle safety reasonably related to the defect, consumers in our focus group sessions shared mixed opinions about the quality and clarity of safety risk information included in the notification letter they received. For example, some consumers told us the letter’s safety risk information seemed vague. For instance, one consumer told us the letter’s description of the safety defect did not clearly state the chances of an increased risk of injury and so he “had to figure out on his own.” In addition, some consumers commented that the safety risk information could be more prominent in the notification letter, that the letter could emphasize the severity of the risk, or that the letter could describe the risk in simpler language. However, other consumers stated the notification letter they received adequately described the recall’s safety risk. In June 2011, we recommended that NHTSA modify the requirements for defect notification letters to include additional information to obtain readers’ attention. In 2013, NHTSA responded to our recommendation by requiring manufacturers to include the statement “IMPORTANT SAFETY RECALL” at the top of auto recall notification letters. Focus Group Participant’s Comment “I don't want to be without a car for half the day or stay with my kids all day.” Consumers in our focus group discussion sessions selected convenience as the second most influential factor they considered in making repair decisions. While some consumers described the “hassle” of the repair and being “too busy” to schedule and fix the defect, other consumers told us they repaired their vehicles more easily because, for example, they could take advantage of previously scheduled service appointments to also repair the defect. Also, some consumers in our sessions stated that the letter or notification they received could better address the inconvenience of the recall, for example by including better estimates of how long repairs might take. In addition, some consumers recommended the letter include options for scheduling needed repairs. As we discuss later in the report, NHTSA officials told us they continue to work with auto manufacturers to identify ways to encourage consumers to complete needed repairs, while representatives from some manufacturers we met with described specific steps they have taken to address some of the inconveniences consumers may experience in completing repairs. For example, one manufacturer facilitated a pilot program for a third-party service provider in conjunction with dealers to repair vehicles at the owner’s home or place of work, while another manufacturer told us they work with individual dealers to hold events specifically for recall repairs when consumers can come in to have repairs performed after normal business hours. Industry stakeholders’ use of auto recall information varies because these stakeholders play different roles in the auto recall process. Auto manufacturers are primarily responsible for providing auto recall information to the public and others, including NHTSA and auto dealers. Franchised dealers are responsible for performing the recall remedy for manufacturers and therefore use manufacturer-provided information for that purpose. Specifically, all of the franchised dealers we interviewed told us they identify recalls on new vehicles in their inventory primarily by accessing auto recall information through internal manufacturer databases. These franchised dealers may also use information from third-party providers or publicly available auto recall information on NHTSA’s website to identify recalls affecting used vehicles. Independent dealers—which are not generally authorized by manufacturers to perform recall remedies—may use publicly available auto recall information to identify open recalls. Specifically, 2 of the 3 independent dealers we met with told us they use NHTSA’s VIN look-up tool to search for open recalls affecting vehicles in their inventory before selling them to consumers. However, these dealers told us that the current design of the tool takes too much time to use, because it requires users to search each VIN individually. For example, one dealer told us each search took about 15 seconds to perform, resulting in significant time and cost because the dealership has tens of thousands of vehicles in its inventory. These dealers told us being able to search multiple VINs in a single search (i.e., VIN-batch search) could save them time or money. Representatives from the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers stated they—in coordination with other industry stakeholders—are working with a third-party provider to develop a search tool that would address this concern by enabling VIN-batch searches for use by government agencies, such as state departments of motor vehicles, and commercial entities. The group anticipates the tool will be available in the first half of 2018. Although the vast majority of consumers who participated in our focus group discussion sessions reported a preference to receive auto recall notification by mail, most preferred to receive notifications by at least one additional electronic means such as e-mail, phone calls, and text messages. Eighty of the 94 consumers in our sessions reported a preference for receiving notification by mail, and all but 4 reported actually receiving mailed notification (see fig. 2). However, 69 of the 94 consumers in our sessions also reported a preference for receiving recall notification by electronic means, but only 7 reported actually receiving at least one type of electronic notification. This result suggests a gap between industry recall notification practices and notification preferences for most consumers in our focus groups, especially for younger consumers who were more likely to report a preference for notification by electronic means. For complete results of the questionnaire we administered to consumers for the discussion session, see appendix IV. As we discuss later in this report, in September 2016, NHTSA issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) that proposes to require auto manufacturers to notify consumers about auto recalls by electronic means in addition to First-Class Mail. NHTSA officials told us the agency is working with the administration on NHTSA’s regulatory portfolio and priorities, including this rulemaking. Some manufacturers told us they use additional methods to reach consumers, including notifying consumers by electronic means and translating recall information into Spanish. For example, representatives from one manufacturer told us they always notify consumers by e-mail before sending out the required First-Class Mail letter notification. These representatives told us using multiple recall notification means resulted in higher recall completion rates. In addition, eight of the remaining nine manufacturers told us they use supplemental electronic means notification on a case-by-case basis—generally using additional means to improve recall completion rates—while four manufacturers stated they consider safety risk severity when deciding when or how to use additional notification means for individual recalls. Also, representatives from 3 of the 10 manufacturers we spoke with told us they translate the entire mailed notification letter into Spanish. In late 2016, NHTSA launched its redesigned NHTSA.gov website, including the auto recall areas consumers assessed during our testing sessions. According to responses to a questionnaire we administered during our testing sessions, 78 of the 94 consumers found the auto recall areas of NHTSA.gov either “somewhat” or “very easy” to use (see fig. 3). See appendix V for complete participant responses to the questionnaire we administered to each consumer. To inform the development of the redesigned website, NHTSA worked with a contractor to conduct a usability study in 2015 to evaluate users’ reactions to the agency’s websites, including NHTSA.gov. According to agency officials, NHTSA implemented several changes based on the findings from the usability study, including: the creation of a dedicated “recalls” area of NHTSA.gov, and the ability for users to access the VIN look-up tool in three different ways—on the homepage, in the “recalls” area, and through direct links either in a NHTSA e-mail for subscribers or from an external website. In addition, NHTSA officials told us that Department of Transportation (DOT) and NHTSA staff meet as needed to discuss the website and consider improvements. For example, the officials said they monitor user searches for the relevance and accuracy of results and adjust the search software to better assist users in finding auto recall information. Officials also told us the agency collects a variety of other information about how visitors use NHTSA.gov, including how visitors access the website, and makes adjustments accordingly. For instance, NHTSA incorporated responsive web design as part of the agency’s ongoing consolidation effort—meaning the site is optimized for viewing on desktop, tablet, and mobile devices. In addition to monitoring searches and how visitors access NHTSA.gov, NHTSA officials told us they collect and consider online survey data to make website improvements and use web-analytic software to monitor, for example, where visitors choose to exit the website. Officials stated that such monitoring activities have allowed NHTSA to identify and correct problems with NHTSA.gov. We did not directly evaluate the accessibility of the auto recall areas of NHTSA.gov to ensure the ability of people with physical or mental disabilities to use the website. However, NHTSA officials provided us with an overview of several steps the agency takes to ensure NHTSA.gov complies with website accessibility requirements. For example, according to officials, NHTSA subscribes to a service that provides monthly accessibility scans of the agency’s websites. While most consumers in our usability testing sessions generally found the auto recall areas of NHTSA’s website easy to use, some consumers experienced difficulties completing tasks we asked them to perform (see table 2). Specifically, during each testing session we asked participants to perform tasks using the primary means NHTSA.gov provides for consumers to access information about auto recalls affecting their vehicles: searching for auto recalls using their vehicle’s VIN; searching for auto recalls using their vehicle’s year, make, and model; and locating NHTSA’s auto recall notification e-mail subscription service. In addition, an evaluation we requested to corroborate the results of our consumer usability testing, identified similar issues. As discussed below, consumers experienced these difficulties because the auto recall areas of NHTSA.gov do not always reflect federal and industry key website usability practices, which describe standards and guidelines for making websites easy to use. Following such practices can assist agencies in creating quality websites while providing the flexibility necessary to meet organizational needs. Website usability is particularly important for agencies, such as NHTSA, that are responsible for conveying safety information to the public. Federal standards for internal control state that agencies should communicate quality information externally and select appropriate methods for communicating with the public. While most consumers in our usability testing sessions found searching for recalls by VIN somewhat or very easy, some consumers found the search results did not provide the information they were seeking. When we asked consumers to perform VIN searches, they generally found the VIN look-up tool easy to use—88 of 94 consumers found searching with a VIN either somewhat or very easy. But some consumers experienced difficulties performing this task. Specifically, some consumers who had had their vehicles repaired expected to find the completed recall on the search results page. However, they were confused because the page is designed to display only open (i.e., unrepaired) recalls, not completed (i.e., repaired) recalls—leading these consumers to question the accuracy of the results. In addition, the evaluation conducted by website usability professionals found that, when an error occurred during a VIN search, the error message was too difficult to locate on the search results page. The evaluation recommended the error message have greater weight and more prominence on the page. Federal key website usability practices state that agencies should ensure that results of user searches provide the precise information being sought, and in a format matching users’ expectations. When users are confused by search results, or do not immediately find what they are searching for, they become frustrated and may abandon the search or the website entirely. Since NHTSA launched the VIN look-up tool in August 2014, the number of VIN searches performed has increased (see fig. 4). According to NHTSA officials, major increases occurred in mid-2015— when the Takata air bag inflator recalls were announced—and in early 2017, when NHTSA made the VIN look-up tool search function available on NHTSA.gov and displayed it prominently on the website. Ensuring the usability of NHTSA’s VIN look-up tool is particularly important because it is the only way on NHTSA.gov for a consumer to determine whether their specific vehicle has an open safety recall. Recall Search Using Vehicle Year, Make, and Model Some consumers’ vehicle year, make, and model searches were hampered by the information required to conduct an accurate search, as the content on the website is not always in plain language. We asked consumers to perform a recall search using their vehicles’ year, make, and model, and 78 of 94 consumers found the task to be either somewhat or very easy. However, some consumers found that they did not know enough information about their specific vehicles to feel confident that they were searching for the correct vehicle. For example, a year, make, and model search for a 2009 Toyota Tacoma may ask the consumer to choose among vehicle options, including “2009 TOYOTA TACOMA REGULAR CAB W/SAB RWD/AWD.” Acronyms such as “W/SAB”— which stands for “with side air bags”—may be confusing to consumers. Federal key website usability practices state that federal agencies should write website content using plain language, so website visitors can easily find and use what they need. Focus Group Participant’s Comment “I think [the Recall Notification E-mail System Sign-Up is] poorly placed. I had to scroll to find it. I had to search for it. You want at the top .” Recall Notification E-mail System Sign-Up Some consumers suggested improvements to make the Recall Notification E-mail System Sign-Up easier to locate on the homepage. NHTSA first made its Recall Notification E-mail System Sign-Up available in March 2008. Of the 94 consumers in our testing sessions, 66 found it either “somewhat” or “very easy” to find the Recall Notification E-mail System Sign-Up—making this the least easy of the three tasks we asked consumers to perform. Specifically, several consumers said the Recall Notification E-mail System Sign-Up should include a clearer description, be easier to find, and be located at the top of the homepage (see fig. 5). These improvements are particularly important because some consumers in our focus group sessions told us that the ability to sign up for auto recall e-mail notifications was the most useful part of the auto recall areas of NHTSA.gov. The website evaluation conducted by website usability professionals recommended that NHTSA streamline its homepage with more of a focus on primary website tasks. The evaluation also found that users must move through too many pages to sign up for recall e-mails. Federal key website design and usability practices state that agencies should put important items closer to the top of the page, where users can better locate the information. Key practices also state that agencies should design their websites so users can successfully complete the most common tasks in the fewest number of steps. The website usability difficulties that consumers in our focus groups experienced may be due to the fact that NHTSA has not studied the website’s usability since the agency redesigned NHTSA.gov in late 2016 and, therefore, may have been unaware of these difficulties prior to our review. NHTSA plans to conduct a website usability study with consumers after the consolidation effort, discussed above, is complete. However, NHTSA could not provide a general time frame for conducting the study because it has not yet determined when the consolidation effort will be complete. We have previously reported that it is essential for organizations to effectively guide their information technology efforts by establishing timelines to complete them, among other strategic planning best practices. Without establishing a completion date for its website consolidation effort, the website usability difficulties we identified may persist and limit the effectiveness of NHTSA’s primary means of providing consumers with safety recall information about their vehicles on NHTSA.gov. In January 2016, NHTSA launched a national advertising campaign encouraging consumers to check for open recalls using the agency’s VIN and year, make, and model look-up tools. Through March 2017, NHTSA spent about $1 million on its Safe Cars Save Lives campaign, which sponsors advertisements on Google, Facebook, and other media platforms. For example, Google might place NHTSA’s advertisement above other search results, when a consumer typed certain keywords— such as “recall,” “airbag recalls,” or “safercar.gov”—into the search. NHTSA evaluated the campaign’s effectiveness by monitoring website traffic performance reports to determine how frequently consumers clicked on NHTSA-sponsored advertisements and ultimately searched for open recalls using the agency’s look-up tools. NHTSA also compared results across media platforms and adjusted the campaign’s strategy to improve performance. For example, NHTSA optimized advertisements on mobile devices, since mobile-device users performed more recall searches than other users. According to NHTSA data, the awareness campaign resulted in consumers performing 1.1 million recall searches through March 2017—a cost of about $0.90 per search. Agency data indicate that this cost generally decreased as NHTSA improved the campaign’s strategy. Agency officials told us NHTSA plans to spend another approximately $1.8 million on Safe Cars Save Lives from September 2017 through September 2018 due to the campaign’s effectiveness in raising the public’s awareness about auto recalls. NHTSA began implementing a mandated 2-year pilot grant program intended to evaluate the feasibility and effectiveness of informing consumers about open auto recalls during state vehicle registration. In September 2016, NHTSA solicited applications to participate in the program, wherein selected states would inform consumers—at no charge—about open recalls using all means that permit consumers to register vehicles within the state (e.g., in person, Internet, and mail). According to NHTSA, only one state applied for the grant. In September 2017, NHTSA awarded the sole applicant $223,000. Under the program, the grantee needs to collect and report program performance data, including the extent to which open recalls have been identified and repaired. In addition, the grantee must report whether certain notification means were more effective than others and what could be done to improve the program. Upon completion of the pilot program, NHTSA is required to evaluate the extent to which open recalls identified have been remedied. Auto manufacturers we met with were generally supportive of the program. Specifically, representatives from 9 of the 10 manufacturers told us that notifying consumers about open recalls during vehicle registration can raise consumer awareness or improve recall completion rates. In September 2016, NHTSA issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), which proposes to require auto manufacturers to notify consumers about open recalls by electronic means—such as e-mails, phone calls, and text messages, in addition to First-Class Mail. As we described earlier, auto manufacturers are currently required to notify consumers about safety recalls affecting their vehicles via First-Class Mail. According to NHTSA, the NPRM aims to aid in efficiently and effectively improving recall completion rates, by proposing that manufacturers provide notification using electronic means in addition to First-Class Mail. Consumers in our focus groups as well as auto manufacturers and consumer associations we interviewed generally supported additional notification using electronic means. Consumers in our focus groups: As we discussed earlier, 69 of the consumers in our focus group discussion sessions reported they would prefer to receive additional notification by at least one type of electronic means. However, only 7 consumers actually received such notifications—suggesting a gap between industry notification practices and notification preferences for these consumers. Auto manufacturers: Representatives from 9 of 10 manufacturers we interviewed told us they generally support providing notification using electronic means. Although the NPRM proposes a broad definition of electronic means to give manufacturers flexibility to determine the most effective means, these representatives also shared implementation concerns. For example, representatives from 1 of the 9 manufacturers told us that—although the company collects e- mail addresses from some customers for other purposes—not all customers provide e-mail addresses, and those collected are not always accurate. As we discussed previously, most manufacturers we met with currently use supplemental electronic means notification on a case-by-case basis. Consumer associations: Similarly, both consumer associations we interviewed told us additional electronic notification can help reach consumers who do not complete repairs after receiving initial mailed notification. NHTSA’s proposal would maintain manufacturer reporting requirements, though it may result in additional reporting. This additional information could help the agency evaluate the effectiveness of various means of consumer notification. We previously found that NHTSA may be able to use manufacturers’ data to identify what factors make some recalls more or less successful than others. We recommended that NHTSA use the recall data it collects to analyze particular patterns or trends that may characterize successful recalls and determine whether these factors represent best practices. If the NPRM is finalized, manufacturers would provide NHTSA with representative copies of the newly required electronic notifications, in addition to mailed notifications, and would specify the electronic means used, such as e-mail or text message. According to NHTSA officials, this information could allow the agency to track and evaluate the effectiveness of various notification means used by manufacturers by, for example, comparing completion rates across means—a key step in identifying best practices that could encourage consumers to complete repairs. However, it is too early for NHTSA to conduct such an evaluation, because the agency has not issued a final rule. NHTSA officials told us the agency is working with the administration on NHTSA’s regulatory portfolio and priorities, including this rulemaking. NHTSA has also taken steps to collaborate with industry stakeholders and explore consumer education best practices. For example, in April 2015 NHTSA hosted a day-long workshop that brought together auto industry stakeholders to examine public education of the recall process. During the workshop, participants identified current barriers to the public’s awareness of auto recalls and discussed potential solutions to address them, such as using text messages and social media to communicate with younger consumers and using different delivery methods for recall notices. Similarly, in January 2016 NHTSA and 18 auto manufacturers adopted a set of Proactive Safety Principles to explore and employ new ways to increase safety recall participation rates. For example, NHTSA and auto manufacturers agreed to share industry best practices and policies based on lessons learned from ongoing safety recalls. The Independent Monitor of Takata in conjunction with NHTSA has also issued a set of coordinated communications recommendations based on consumer research, best practices observed during the Takata recall, and discussions with manufacturers. For example, the recommendations encourage manufacturers to: pursue a “multi-touch” communications strategy that employs non- traditional means, such as e-mail and text messages; convey risk in clear, accurate and urgent terms; and include a clear “call to action” designed to facilitate prompt and efficient scheduling of repairs. According to NHTSA officials, the agency relies on auto manufacturers to evaluate the effectiveness of these efforts. However, agency officials told us NHTSA reviews manufacturers communication plans as part of the Takata recall’s Coordinated Remedy Program and provides ongoing recommendations on manufacturers’ communication language, approach, and strategies. With the recent steep increase in safety defect vehicle recalls and continued low recall completion rates, it is vital for consumers to be able to easily access and use publicly available auto recall information. NHTSA has taken important steps to improve its website—which provides safety recall information to consumers—resulting in most consumers in our focus groups finding the website easy to use. However, the difficulties some experienced in attempting to complete essential auto recall tasks demonstrated that NHTSA.gov does not always reflect key website usability practices for website design. Although NHTSA plans to conduct a website usability study with consumers after consolidating its websites, it has not determined a completion date for this effort—an essential step for organizations to effectively guide their information technology efforts. Without such a date, the website usability difficulties may persist and limit the effectiveness of NHTSA.gov in providing consumers with recall information about their vehicles. By addressing these difficulties in the interim, NHTSA can better assure that consumers obtain this information, which can be vital to their safety. We are making the following two recommendations to NHTSA: The Administrator of NHTSA should determine a completion date for the agency’s website consolidation effort. (Recommendation 1) The Administrator of NHTSA should, while the agency continues its website consolidation effort, take interim steps to improve the usability of the auto recall areas of NHTSA.gov by addressing the website usability difficulties we identified. (Recommendation 2) We provided a draft of this report to DOT for review and comment. In its written comments, reproduced in appendix VI, DOT stated that it concurred with our recommendations. The department also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. We are sending copies of this report to relevant congressional committees, the Secretary of Transportation, and the Administrator of NHTSA. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-2834 or flemings@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix VII. This report examines the use of publicly available auto recall information for safety defects affecting passenger vehicles. The report addresses the following objectives: (1) How do consumers and industry stakeholders use publicly available auto recall information? (2) How easy or difficult to use do consumers find the auto recall areas of NHTSA.gov? (3) What steps, if any, has the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) taken to raise consumer awareness about auto recalls and how has NHTSA evaluated the effectiveness of these steps? We define publicly available auto recall information to include information on the auto recall areas of NHTSA.gov, such as examples of notification letters that manufacturers mail to consumers. This report focuses on safety defect vehicle recalls affecting passenger vehicles that are initiated when a defect in a vehicle or vehicle equipment creates an unreasonable safety risk, as determined by NHTSA or a manufacturer. To determine how consumers use publicly available auto recall information, we conducted and analyzed transcripts and questionnaires from 12 consumer focus groups we conducted with used and new vehicle owners who had experienced an auto recall in the last 24 months. Each focus group was split into two sessions: (1) a discussion session to explore participants’ thoughts, experiences, and preferences about auto recall information and (2) a website usability testing session. Also, we administered a questionnaire as part of each of these sessions. For the discussion session, we asked consumers about the recall notification process and how they used the recall information, and for the website usability testing session, we asked consumers to fill in a questionnaire during the session itself as they assessed the usability of the auto recall areas of NHTSA’s website. We conducted the 12 focus groups at six locations across the country, with each group including 7 or 8 consumers for a total of 94 participants. Half of the focus groups were comprised of consumers who had completed the repair and the remaining half included consumers who had not completed the repair. We selected the six focus group locations to provide population and geographic dispersion. To ensure geographic dispersion, we selected at least one location in each U.S. Census region (see table 3). To ensure population dispersion, we selected Metropolitan Statistical Areas representing a range of population sizes based on 2015 U.S. Census estimates. To ensure our selection included the perspectives of vehicle owners in geographically distant or isolated communities, we also selected a rural location, which we defined as a city or town that has a population of less than 50,000 inhabitants and is not an urbanized area contiguous and adjacent to a city or town that has a population of greater than 50,000 inhabitants. Using information provided by the participants, we selected focus group participants based on age, income, gender, education level, race, and ethnicity to ensure we collected a range of perspectives on auto recall information use. However, since we did not select a representative sample of participants, focus group results are not generalizable to all vehicle owners. During focus group discussion sessions, we asked participants to discuss factors they considered when deciding whether to repair their recalled vehicle and then to select the single most influential factor. Each of the 12 focus group sessions was audio recorded and transcriptions were created; transcripts served as the record for each group. We then evaluated those transcripts using systematic content analysis to identify the factors consumers considered when deciding whether to complete repairs and any suggested improvements to the auto recall communication process. The analysis was conducted in three steps. First, two analysts independently developed a code framework and then worked together to resolve any discrepancies. Second, each transcript was coded independently by analysts using the framework and any discrepancies were resolved by both analysts agreeing on the coding of the associated statement by a participant. Third, if needed, another analyst adjudicated any continued disagreement between coders. Because the transcripts did not include a unique identifier for each focus group participant, we conducted our analysis of focus group session discussions at the group level (i.e., of the 12 focus groups we conducted). We also administered and analyzed a questionnaire as part of each discussion session to quantify responses regarding consumers’ use of auto recall information, including how they received and preferred to receive auto recall notifications. Our analysis of the questionnaire responses was conducted at the individual consumer level (i.e., of the 94 consumers who participated). These focus group sessions were structured, guided by a moderator who used a standardized list of questions to encourage participants to share their thoughts, experiences, and preferences. We also conducted two pretest focus groups at our headquarters and made some revisions to the focus group guide prior to beginning the sessions with consumers. Methodologically, focus groups are not designed to demonstrate the extent of a problem or to generalize results to a larger population or provide statistically representative samples or reliable quantitative estimates. Instead, they are intended to generate in-depth information about the reasons for the focus group participants’ thoughts, experiences, and preferences on specific topics. The projectability of the information produced by our focus group sessions is limited. For example, the information includes only the responses from the vehicle owners from the 12 selected groups and their individual responses to questions we asked. The experiences and preferences expressed may not reflect other vehicle owners’ thoughts and preferences. In addition, while the composition of the groups was designed to ensure a range of age and education levels, among the other criteria mentioned previously, the groups were not constructed using a random sampling method. To determine how industry stakeholders use auto recall information, we interviewed selected auto manufacturers, selected franchised and independent auto dealerships, NHTSA program officials, and other industry stakeholders. Specifically, we interviewed representatives from the following 10 auto manufacturers, selected based on each manufacturer’s sales market share (small, medium, and large), place of ownership (foreign and domestic), and experience with auto recalls (lower to higher based on the average annual number of auto recall campaigns and average market share of each manufacturer from 2010 to 2014) to collect a range of perspectives on how manufacturers use auto recall information: Tesla Motors, Inc. To understand the perspective of auto dealers, we interviewed four franchised dealerships, one in each of the four U.S. Census regions where we conducted focus groups with consumers. We also interviewed three independent auto dealerships in two U.S. Census regions. The results of these interviews are not generalizable to all auto manufacturers and dealerships, but provide insights about how some industry stakeholders use auto recall information. We conducted interviews with NHTSA program officials to understand NHTSA’s role in the auto recall process. In addition, we interviewed other stakeholders, including the Independent Monitor of Takata, which assists NHTSA in overseeing the Takata recall, as well as officials from consumer associations and other industry groups (see table 4). To evaluate how easy or difficult consumers find the auto recall areas of NHTSA.gov to use, we reviewed various website usability resources to understand federal and industry key website usability practices for making websites easy to use, such as focusing on design and how easily users can find information. In addition, we reviewed federal standards for internal control related to communicating quality information externally. During our usability testing sessions, we asked consumers to attempt to complete auto recall tasks—the primary means NHTSA.gov provides for consumers to access information about auto recalls affecting their vehicles—and discuss their experiences. We then compared consumers’ experiences with the usability of the website against these practices. To identify key website usability practices, we analyzed guidance documents from NHTSA and other federal agencies. For example, we analyzed the General Services Administration’s (GSA) and the Department of Health and Human Services’ Research-Based Web Design & Usability Guidelines, which includes quantified, peer-reviewed guidelines intended to help federal agencies improve the design and usability of their information-based websites. We also analyzed GSA’s Requirements for Federal Websites and Digital Services, and the U.S. Digital Services Playbook to identify key practices for making websites easy to use. Identified key practices are: (1) design and content— focusing on the layout, headers, and design; (2) navigation—how easily users can find information; (3) clarity—the ability to read and digest content; (4) identity and purpose—whether the site clearly presents its purpose; and (5) accessibility—the ability of people with physical or mental disabilities to use the site. To analyze the results of focus group website testing sessions, we performed a systematic content analysis of the session transcripts using the same content analysis methods described above and an analysis of the questionnaire we administered to each participant during the website usability sessions. Specifically, we analyzed the transcripts from the website usability testing sessions to account for consumers’ experiences, including their initial impressions of the website and any suggested usability improvements. We also analyzed the results of the questionnaire that each participant completed where participants were asked to mark responses regarding their experience including an assessment of the usability of the auto recall areas of NHTSA.gov. Our analysis of the results from the questionnaire responses was conducted at the individual consumer level (i.e., of the 94 consumers who participated) while our analysis of focus group session discussions was conducted at the group level (i.e., of the 12 focus groups we conducted). To corroborate the results of usability testing sessions we conducted with the consumers in our focus groups, we requested that five website usability professionals from GSA’s Federal User Experience Community conduct an independent evaluation of the auto recall areas of NHTSA.gov against federal and industry key website usability practices (described above). The website usability professionals developed a website usability evaluation form, which they used to individually evaluate the auto recall areas of NHTSA’s website. The website usability professionals then met to form a consensus and provided us with one final group evaluation of the website usability of the auto recall areas of NHTSA.gov. Also, although neither our usability testing nor the website usability evaluation conducted by website usability professionals directly addressed accessibility, we interviewed responsible agency officials about how the agency assesses the accessibility of NHTSA.gov. We also requested and analyzed website data provided by NHTSA to understand how consumers access and use NHTSA.gov. Requested data included the number of subscribers to NHTSA’s Recall Notification E-mail System Sign-up; the number of weekly vehicle identification number (VIN) searches performed on NHTSA.gov from August 2014 through May 2017; and NHTSA.gov usage data by device (i.e., usage by mobile devices, tablets, and desktop computers). We assessed the reliability of these data by reviewing any supporting documents provided by the agency and interviewing responsible NHTSA officials, and concluded the data were sufficiently reliable for our reporting purposes. While we did not independently review the usability of auto manufacturers’ auto recall websites, we requested and reviewed the results of any audits that NHTSA performed of these websites, including whether the websites met statutory and regulatory requirements for providing auto recall information to the public. We then corroborated any audit findings by reviewing the auto recall websites of the selected auto manufacturers that we interviewed. To determine any steps NHTSA has taken to raise consumer awareness about auto recalls and how NHTSA evaluates the effectiveness of any steps, we reviewed relevant statutes, regulations, and proposed rules, including the Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act and a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking related to recall notification methods. We also reviewed agency and other documents that describe or evaluate NHTSA’s public awareness activities. For example, we analyzed NHTSA’s strategic planning documents—such as NHTSA’s Strategic Plan 2016–2020—to identify ongoing public awareness activities along with their related goals, objectives, or performance metrics. Similarly, we requested and analyzed any documents NHTSA uses to evaluate the effectiveness of its public awareness activities, including performance reports for NHTSA’s ongoing Safe Cars Save Lives campaign. To assess the reliability of data included in these performance reports— such as VIN searches performed—we reviewed agency documentation and interviewed agency officials about the reliability, accuracy, and completeness of the data and determined the data were sufficiently reliable for our reporting purposes. We reviewed performance management practices as provided in the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA), the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010, and standards for internal control in the federal government to identify any opportunities for improvement. We also performed a literature review to identify any related published articles and research studies. To understand how NHTSA implements and evaluates any public awareness activities, we also interviewed responsible agency officials from NHTSA’s Office of Communications and Consumer Information and other offices. In addition, we discussed NHTSA’s public awareness efforts during interviews with industry stakeholders, including selected auto manufacturers, selected franchised and independent auto dealerships, and other industry stakeholders. We analyzed the results of these interviews along with the focus group discussions we conducted with consumers (discussed above) to identify perspectives on the effectiveness of NHTSA’s public awareness steps. We conducted this performance audit from October 2016 to December 2017 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) is required to conduct a biennial analysis of vehicle safety recall completion rates and submit the results of its analysis in a report to certain congressional committees. The report must include, among other things, the annual recall completion rate by vehicle type and vehicle component (such as brakes, fuel systems, and air bags) for each of the 5 years preceding the year the report is submitted. According to NHTSA’s May 2017 report, completion rates for all vehicles combined ranged between 63 percent and 67 percent between calendar year 2011 and calendar year 2014 (see table 5). However, NHTSA reported wider variation when the recall completion rates are broken down by vehicle type. Similarly, the report found that completion rates for most component categories fall within a range of 60 percent to 75 percent (see table 6). The annual completion rate is a volume-based, weighted metric, such that the more vehicles affected by the recall, the more weight or influence it has on the computed rate. Focus group participants responded to a questionnaire we administered to collect information on consumers’ auto recall notification preferences during our discussion sessions. Table 7 shows participants’ responses to the administered questionnaire, by age group. We present these responses by age group, because consumers’ notification preferences may vary according to their ages. Focus group participants responded to a questionnaire we administered to collect information on the usability of NHTSA.gov during our usability testing sessions. Table 8 shows focus group participants’ responses to the administered questionnaire, by age group. We present these responses by age group, because consumers’ website usability needs or preferences may vary according to their ages. In addition to the individual named above, H. Brandon Haller (Assistant Director); Katherine Blair; Jason Blake; Melissa Bodeau; Alicia Cackley; William Colwell (Analyst in Charge); Lacey Coppage; Elizabeth Dretsch; Jaci Evans; Marcia Fernandez; Sarah Kaczmarek; Malika Rice; Todd Schartung; and Andrew Stavisky made key contributions to this report.	[ "The number of vehicles affected by safety defect recalls increased sharply in recent years—from nearly 13 million in 2011 to over 51 million in 2016. Once a defect is identified, auto manufacturers are required to send written notification to vehicle owners by mail. NHTSA also aims to enhance awareness of auto recalls by providing information on its website, NHTSA.gov . The Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act includes a provision requiring GAO to study the use of publicly available safety recall information. This report addresses: (1) how consumers and industry stakeholders use such information and (2) how easy to use do consumers find the auto recall areas of NHTSA.gov, among other objectives. To understand consumers' use of auto recall information and to test website usability, GAO conducted 12 focus groups with 94 consumers who had a recall. Focus groups were held in six locations selected for population and geographic variation. GAO identified key website usability practices and requested an evaluation by website usability professionals. GAO reviewed statutes, regulations, and NHTSA documents, and interviewed industry stakeholders—including 10 manufacturers selected based on sales market share and other factors. Consumers, manufacturers, and auto dealers use publicly available auto recall information differently. For example, the 94 consumers in 12 focus groups that GAO conducted used this information to decide whether to repair their vehicles. These consumers overwhelmingly cited safety risk and convenience as the two most influential factors they considered. Most consumers reported a preference for receiving recall notification by at least one electronic means, such as by e-mail or text message, in addition to mail. However, only 7 of 94 consumers reported receiving electronic notifications, suggesting a gap between the industry's auto recall notification practices and consumers' preferences. (See fig.). In response to a mandate in law, in September 2016, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) issued a proposed rule that, if finalized, would require manufacturers to notify consumers about auto recalls by electronic means in addition to mail. Most consumers in GAO's focus group website usability tests found the auto recall areas of NHTSA's website—NHTSA.gov—easy to use; however, some consumers experienced difficulties when asked to complete auto recall related tasks. For example, when consumers attempted to search for recalls affecting their specific vehicles, some found the search results confusing, leading them to question the accuracy of the results. Similarly, some consumers were hampered in searching for recalls by their vehicles' year, make, and model because the website did not always display model options using plain language. GAO found that the auto recall areas of NHTSA.gov do not always reflect federal and industry key website usability practices, and that an independent evaluation conducted by website usability professionals at GAO's request identified similar issues. NHTSA is in the process of consolidating its websites and plans to conduct a website usability study of NHTSA.gov with consumers after the consolidation is complete. However, the agency has not determined a completion date for the consolidation effort—an essential step for organizations to effectively guide their information technology efforts. Without establishing a completion date and taking interim steps to improve the usability of NHTSA.gov, consumers will likely continue to experience difficulties, which may limit the effectiveness of the website's primary means of providing consumers with information about recalls affecting their vehicles. GAO recommends that NHTSA determine a completion date for its website consolidation effort and take interim steps to improve the usability of NHTSA.gov by addressing the website usability difficulties GAO identified. The Department of Transportation concurred with the recommendations." ]	7,642	gov_report	en	null	ca06462f6a93c6c22a4a59c52fc1fed4a9978d7ecaaff86b
Cluster munitions are weapons that open in mid-air and disperse smaller submunitions—anywhere from a few dozen to hundreds—into an area. They can be delivered by aircraft or from ground systems such as artillery, rockets, and missiles. Cluster munitions are valued militarily because one munition can kill or destroy many targets within its impact area, and fewer weapons systems are needed to deliver fewer munitions to attack multiple targets. Cluster munitions also permit a smaller force to engage a larger adversary and are considered by some an "economy of force" weapon. Many cluster munitions rely on simple mechanical fuzes that arm the submunition based on its rate of spin and explode on impact or after a time delay. A newer generation of sensor-fuzed submunitions is being introduced by a number of nations to improve the munitions' and submunitions' accuracy and to reduce the large number of residual unexploded submunitions. These sensor-fuzed submunitions are designed to sense and destroy vehicles without creating an extensive hazard area of unexploded submunitions. Cluster bombs were first used in World War II, and inclusive of their debut, cluster munitions have been used in at least 21 states by at least 13 different countries. Cluster munitions were used extensively in Southeast Asia by the United States in the 1960s and 1970s, and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) estimates that in Laos alone, 9 million to 27 million unexploded submunitions remained after the conflict, resulting in over 10,000 civilian casualties to date. Cluster munitions were used by the Soviets in Afghanistan, by the British in the Falklands, by the Coalition in the Gulf War, and by the warring factions in Yugoslavia. In Kosovo and Yugoslavia in 1999, NATO forces dropped 1,765 cluster bombs containing approximately 295,000 submunitions. From 2001 through 2002, the United States dropped 1,228 cluster bombs containing 248,056 submunitions in Afghanistan, and U.S. and British forces used almost 13,000 cluster munitions containing an estimated 1.8 million to 2 million submunitions during the first three weeks of combat in Iraq in 2003. Senior U.S. government officials have stated that the United States has not used cluster munitions since 2003, during the intervention in Iraq. It is widely believed that confusion over U.S. cluster submunitions (BLU-97/B) that were the same color and size as air-dropped humanitarian food packets played a major role in the U.S. decision to suspend cluster munitions use in Afghanistan but not before using them in Iraq. In 2006, Israeli use of cluster munitions against Hezbollah forces in Lebanon resulted in widespread international criticism. Israel was said to have fired significant quantities of cluster munitions—primarily during the last 3 days of the 34-day war after a U.N. cease-fire deal had been agreed to —resulting in almost 1 million unexploded cluster bomblets to which the U.N. attributed 14 deaths during the conflict. Reports maintain that Hezbollah fired about 113 "cluster rockets" at northern Israel and, in turn, Israel's use of cluster munitions supposedly affected 26% of southern Lebanon's arable land and contaminated about 13 square miles with unexploded submunitions. One report states that there was a failure rate of upward of 70% of Israel's cluster weapons. The fundamental criticisms of cluster munitions are that they disperse large numbers of submunitions imprecisely over an extended area, that they frequently fail to detonate and are difficult to detect, and that submunitions can remain explosive hazards for decades. Civilian casualties are primarily caused by munitions being fired into areas where soldiers and civilians are intermixed, inaccurate cluster munitions landing in populated areas, or civilians traversing areas where cluster munitions have been employed but failed to explode. Two technical characteristics of submunitions—failure rate and lack of a self-destruct capability—have received a great deal of attention. There appear to be significant discrepancies among failure rate estimates. Some manufacturers claim a submunition failure rate of 2% to 5%, whereas mine clearance specialists have frequently reported failure rates of 10% to 30%. A number of factors influence submunition reliability. These include delivery technique, age of the submunition, air temperature, landing in soft or muddy ground, getting caught in trees and vegetation, and submunitions being damaged after dispersal, or landing in such a manner that their impact fuzes fail to initiate. Submunitions lacking a self-destruct capability—referred to as "dumb" munitions—are of particular concern because they can remain a hazard for decades, thereby increasing the potential for civilian casualties. Some nations are developing "smart" or sensor-fuzed weapons with greater reliability and a variety of self-destruct mechanisms intended to address the residual hazard of submunitions. Experts maintain that self-destruct features reduce—but do not eliminate—the unexploded ordnance problem caused by cluster munitions and that the advantage gained by using "smart" cluster munitions is negated when high-failure rate and/or "dumb" cluster munitions are used in the same area. For some nations, replacing "dumb" and high-failure rate cluster munitions may not be an option—China, Russia, and the Republic of Korea maintain that they cannot afford to replace all current submunitions with "smart" submunitions. In an effort to restrict or ban specific types of weapons used in armed conflicts, 51 states negotiated the CCW in 1980. When the treaty entered into force in December 1983, it applied only to incendiary weapons, mines and booby-traps, and weapons intended to cause casualties through very small fragments. Since then, some states-parties have added provisions through additional protocols to address other types of weapons. Acting in accordance with the recommendation of a group of experts established during the 2006 CCW review conference, states-parties to the convention decided in 2007 to "negotiate a proposal to address urgently the humanitarian impact of cluster munitions." Negotiations took place in 2008 and 2009, but the parties have not reached agreement on a new proposal. The experts group continued negotiations in 2011 "informed by" a Draft Protocol on Cluster Munitions. However, the CCW states-parties were unable to reach agreement on a protocol during their November 2011 review conference. Described as "frustrated with the CCW process," a number of CCW members—led by Norway—initiated negotiations in 2007 outside of the CCW to ban cluster munitions. On May 30, 2008, they reached an agreement to ban cluster munitions. The United States, Russia, China, Israel, Egypt, India, and Pakistan did not participate in the talks or sign the agreement. During the Signing Conference in Oslo on December 3-4, 2008, 94 states signed the convention and 4 of the signatories ratified the convention at the same time. China, Russia, and the United States did not sign the convention, but France, Germany, and the United Kingdom were among the 18 NATO members to do so. The convention was to enter into force six months after the deposit of the 30 th ratification. The United Nations received the 30 th ratification on February 16, 2010, and the convention entered into force on August 1, 2010. As of January 2, 2019, 105 states were party to the convention. The Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM), inter alia, bans the use of cluster munitions, as well as their development, production, acquisition, transfer, and stockpiling. The convention does not prohibit cluster munitions that can detect and engage a single target or explosive submunitions equipped with an electronic self-destruction or self-deactivating feature —an exemption that seemingly permits sensor-fuzed or "smart" cluster submunitions. U.S. officials were concerned that early versions of the CCM would prevent military forces from non-states-parties from providing humanitarian and peacekeeping support and significantly affect NATO military operations, but the version signed May 30, 2008, does permit states-parties to engage in military cooperation and operations with non-states-parties (Article 21, Paragraph 3). Then-Acting Assistant Secretary for Political-Military Affairs Stephen Mull stated in May 2008 that the United States relies on cluster munitions "as an important part of our own defense strategy," and that Washington's preferred alternative to a ban is "to pursue technological fixes that will make sure that these weapons are no longer viable once the conflict is over." U.S. officials note that Cluster munitions are available for use by every combat aircraft in the U.S. inventory, they are integral to every Army or Marine maneuver element and in some cases constitute up to 50 percent of tactical indirect fire support. U.S. forces simply can not fight by design or by doctrine without holding out at least the possibility of using cluster munitions. The United States also maintains that using cluster munitions reduces the number of aircraft and artillery systems needed to support military operations, and that if cluster munitions were eliminated, significantly more money would need to be spent on new weapons systems, ammunition, and logistical resources. Officials further suggest that if cluster munitions were eliminated, most militaries would increase their use of massed artillery and rocket barrages, which would likely increase destruction of key infrastructure. Then-Department of State Legal Adviser Harold Koh stated November 9, 2009, that the United States has determined that its "national security interests cannot be fully ensured consistent with the terms" of the CCM. The Barack Obama Administration announced on November 25, 2011, that the United States would continue to implement the DOD policy on cluster munitions issued June 19, 2008, which recognized the need to minimize harm to civilians and infrastructure but also reaffirmed that "cluster munitions are legitimate weapons with clear military utility." The central directive in the Pentagon's policy was the unwaiverable requirement that cluster munitions used after 2018 must leave less than 1% of unexploded submunitions on the battlefield. Prior to that deadline, U.S. use of cluster munitions that did not meet this criterion required combatant commander approval. On November 30, 2017, then-Deputy Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan issued a revised policy on cluster munitions. The memorandum describing the policy noted that [c]luster munitions provide the Joint Force with an effective and necessary capability to engage area targets, including massed formations of enemy forces, individual targets dispersed over a defined area, targets whose precise location are not known, and time-sensitive or moving targets. Cluster munitions are legitimate weapons with clear military utility, as they provide distinct advantages against a range of threats in the operating environment. Additionally, the use of cluster munitions may result in less collateral damage than the collateral damage that results from use of unitary munitions alone. Since the inception of the 2008 policy, in the midst of extended combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, we have witnessed important changes in the global security environment and experienced several years of budgets that under-invested in replacement systems and the modernization of the Joint Force more broadly. Our adversaries and our potential adversaries have developed advanced capabilities and operational approaches specifically designed to limit our ability to project power. Both Shanahan and Admiral Harry Harris Jr. have also argued that sustaining the current U.S. cluster munitions arsenal is necessary to prepare for a potential conflict with North Korea. The revised policy reverses the 2008 policy that established an unwaiverable requirement that cluster munitions used after 2018 must leave less than 1% of unexploded submunitions on the battlefield. Combatant commanders can use cluster munitions that do not meet the 1% or less unexploded submunitions standard in extreme situations to meet immediate warfighting demands. Furthermore, the new policy does not establish a deadline to replace cluster munitions exceeding the 1% rate, and these munitions will be removed only after new munitions that meet the 1% or less unexploded submunitions standard are fielded in sufficient quantities to meet combatant commander requirements. However, the new DOD policy stipulates that the department "will only procure cluster munitions containing submunitions or submunition warheads" meeting the 2008 UXO requirement or possessing "advanced features to minimize the risks posed by unexploded submunitions." Specifically, DOD's revised policy stipulates the following: Continuing or beginning with their respective FY2019 budgets, the military departments will program for capabilities to replace cluster munitions currently in active inventories that do not meet the above-described standards for procuring new cluster munitions. The department's annual Program and Budget Review will be used to assess the sufficiency of the replacement efforts. The department's operational planners should plan for the availability of cluster munitions. The approval authority to employ cluster munitions that do not meet the standards prescribed by this policy for procuring new cluster munitions, however, rests with the combatant commanders. In accordance with their existing authorities, commanders may use cluster munitions that meet the standards prescribed by this policy for procuring new cluster munitions. The military departments and combatant commands, in keeping with U.S. legal obligations under CCW Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War and consistent with past practices, will continue to record and retain information on the use of cluster munitions and provide relevant information to facilitate the removal or destruction of unexploded submunitions. The military departments and combatant commands will maintain sufficient inventories and a robust stockpile surveillance program to ensure operational quality and reliability of cluster munitions. In extremis, to meet immediate warfighting demand, combatant commanders may accept transfers of cluster munitions that do not meet the above-described cluster-munition procurement standards. Cluster munitions that do not meet the standards prescribed by this policy for procuring new cluster munitions will be removed from active inventories and demilitarized after their capabilities have been replaced by sufficient quantities of munitions that meet the standards in this policy. The department will not transfer cluster munitions except as provided for under U.S. law. The operational use of cluster munitions that include Anti-Personnel Landmines (APL) submunitions shall comply with presidential policy. Furthermore, the Deputy Secretary of Defense Expect(s) the Department to achieve the goals in this policy as rapidly as industry can support. Combatant Commanders will continue to ensure that the employment of cluster munitions is consistent with the law of war and applicable international agreements in order to minimize their harmful effects on civilian populations and infrastructure. In developing a new generation of cluster munitions less dangerous to civilians, DOD will need to determine whether such a high level of performance is achievable under both controlled laboratory conditions and real-world conditions. Factors such as delivery technique, landing in soft or muddy ground, getting caught in trees and vegetation, and submunitions being damaged after dispersal or landing could result in an appreciable number of dud submunitions, even if they have a self-deactivation feature. DOD and the services have been and are currently involved in efforts to reduce cluster munitions failure rates. The Army's Alternative Warhead Program (AWP) is intended to assess and recommend new technologies to reduce or eliminate cluster munitions failure rates. The AWP program is viewed as particularly relevant, as the Pentagon estimates that "upward of 80 percent of U.S. cluster munitions reside in the Army artillery stockpile." In December 2008, the Army decided to cease procurement of a Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) warhead—the Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munition (DPICM) warhead—because its submunitions had a dud rate up to 5%. The Air Force has also acquired cluster munitions that comply with the less than 1% failure rate—the CBU-97 Sensor Fuzed Weapon (SFW) and the CBU-105 WCMD/SFW. While DOD's new 2017 cluster munitions policy calls for DOD to continue its efforts to meet the 1% or less unexploded submunitions standard "as rapidly as industry can support," it is not yet known how this policy will affect the aforementioned programs or how it could result in the establishment of new programs. It may be argued that even with advances in "sensor-fuzed" type submunitions that seek out and destroy certain targets, cluster munitions are still essentially an indiscriminate area weapon in an era where precision weapons are increasingly becoming the military norm. In Operation Desert Storm in 1991, only about 10% of ordnance used were precision-guided, but by the time of the Iraq invasion in 2003, "the ratio of 'smart' to dumb weapons was nearly reversed." Since then, this trend toward greater precision has continued, if not accelerated with the development of precision rocket, artillery, mortar munitions, and smaller precision aerial bombs designed to reduce collateral damage. Given current and predicted future precision weaponry trends, cluster munitions might be losing their military relevance—much as chemical weapons did between World War I and World War II. According to the State Department, the U.S. military suspended its use of cluster munitions in Iraq and Afghanistan in 2003. For subsequent military operations, where cluster munitions would otherwise have been the weapon of choice, Congress might review what types of weapons were substituted in place of cluster munitions and how effective they were in achieving the desired tactical results. Also worth considering are effects-based weapons systems and operations, which seek to achieve the same or similar effect against a potential target without applying a "kinetic solution" such as a cluster munition. Such insights could prove valuable in analyzing U.S. policy options on the future of cluster munitions. DOD's November 2017 revised policy on cluster munitions potentially raises a number of issues for possible congressional consideration. With limits on cluster munition use after 2018 rescinded, how does this affect combatant commanders' operational plans in their respective theaters? Does this mean a lesser degree of military risk because combatant commanders can employ cluster munitions to meet warfighting demands, possibly translating into fewer forces needed to achieve the same result when the 2008 policy was in effect? Despite DOD emphasis on achieving a 1% or less unexploded submunitions standard "as rapidly as industry can support," will DOD funding restrictions slow or stall programs previously intended to replace those systems that exceeded 1% because there no longer is an urgent operational need to replace those systems? In a similar manner, will defense industry view this as a renewed opportunity to develop systems with a 1% or less unexploded submunitions standard or take a more sanguine view that since DOD is no longer time constrained to develop and field 1% or less weapons that funding these programs will be less of a priority and, therefore, an unprofitable venture? Another possible issue for consideration is how this U.S. policy reversal on the military use of cluster munitions will be perceived by the international community and how this might affect future U.S. and international military treaty initiatives. Consolidated Appropriations Acts The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010 ( P.L. 111-117 ), which the President signed into law December 16, 2009, prohibits the provision of military assistance for cluster munitions, the issuing of defense export licenses for cluster munitions, or the sale or transfer of cluster munitions or cluster munitions technology unless "the submunitions of the cluster munitions, after arming, do not result in more than 1 percent unexploded ordnance across the range of intended operational environments." Moreover, any agreement "applicable to the assistance, transfer, or sale of such cluster munitions or cluster munitions technology" must specify that the munitions "will only be used against clearly defined military targets and will not be used where civilians are known to be present or in areas normally inhabited by civilians." Subsequent appropriations laws have included similar provisions; the most recent is the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 ( P.L. 116-6 ), which the President signed into law on February 15, 2019.	[ "Cluster munitions are air-dropped or ground-launched weapons that release a number of smaller submunitions intended to kill enemy personnel or destroy vehicles. Cluster munitions were developed in World War II and are part of many nations' weapons stockpiles. Cluster munitions have been used frequently in combat, including the early phases of the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Cluster munitions have been highly criticized internationally for causing a significant number of civilian deaths, and efforts have been undertaken to ban and regulate their use. The Department of Defense (DOD) continues to view cluster munitions as a military necessity but in 2008 instituted a policy to reduce the failure rate of cluster munitions to 1% or less after 2018. In November 2017, a new DOD policy was issued that essentially reversed the 2008 policy. Under the new policy, combatant commanders can use cluster munitions that do not meet the 1% or less unexploded submunitions standard in extreme situations to meet immediate warfighting demands. In addition, the new policy does not establish a deadline to replace cluster munitions exceeding the 1% rate and states that DOD \"will retain cluster munitions currently in active inventories until the capabilities they provide are replaced with enhanced and more reliable munitions.\" Potential issues for Congress include cluster munitions in an era of precision weapons, other weapons in lieu of cluster munitions, and the potential impact of DOD's 2017 revised cluster munitions policy." ]	3,162	gov_report	en	null	e4eea9d45e8e72db3fdc0e635b52f25f54d5a933e26e5861
Major disaster declarations can trigger a variety of federal response and recovery programs for government and nongovernmental entities, households, and individuals. FEMA’s Office of Response and Recovery manages the PA grant program, providing funds to states, territorial governments, local government agencies, Indian tribes, authorized tribal organizations, and certain private nonprofit organizations in response to presidentially declared disaster declarations to repair damaged public infrastructure such as roads, schools, and bridges. Figure 1 shows the total amount of PA funds obligated by county from January 2009 through February 2017 for federal disaster declarations. To implement the PA program, FEMA’s staff includes a mix of temporary, reservist, and permanent employees under two authorities, the Stafford Act and Title 5. Reservists make up the largest share of the PA workforce, which consisted of 1,852 employees––1,041 reservists, 634 full-time equivalents, and 177 temporary Cadre of On-Call Response/Recovery Employees––as of June 2017, according to PA officials. Figure 2 summarizes the key characteristics for each type of employee. After a disaster, FEMA sends PA program staff to the affected area to work with state and local officials to assess the damage prior to a disaster declaration. FEMA officials establish a temporary Joint Field Office (JFO) to house staff who will manage response and recovery functions after a declared disaster (including operations, emergency response and support teams, planning, administration, finance, and logistics). Once the President has declared a disaster, PA staff work with grant applicants to help them document damages, identify eligible costs and work, and prepare requests for PA grant funds by developing project proposals. These proposals may include proposals for hazard mitigation if the hazard mitigation work is related to the repair of damaged facilities, referred to as permanent work projects. Immediate emergency measures, such as debris removal, are not eligible for hazard mitigation. Officials then review and obtain approval of the projects prior to FEMA obligating funds to state grantees. Figure 3 describes the process used to develop, review, and obligate PA projects. In addition to rebuilding and restoring infrastructure to its predisaster state, the PA program can be used to fund hazard mitigation measures that will reduce future risk to the infrastructure in conjunction with the repair of disaster-damaged facilities. There is no preset limit to the amount of PA funds a community may receive; however, PA hazard mitigation measures must be determined to be cost effective. Some examples of hazard mitigation measures that FEMA has predetermined to be cost effective, if they meet certain requirements, include installing shut-off valves on underground pipelines so that damaged sections can be isolated during or following a disaster; securing a roof using straps, clips, or other anchoring systems in locations subject to high winds; and installing shutters on windows or replacing glass with impact-resistant material. Applicants can also propose mitigation measures that are separate from the damaged portions of a facility, such as constructing floodwalls around damaged facilities to avoid future flooding. FEMA evaluates these proposals, considering how the proposed measure protects damaged portions of a facility and whether the measure is reasonable based on the extent of the damage, and determines eligibility on a case-by-case basis. FEMA’s Federal Insurance and Mitigation Administration (FIMA) deploys a cadre of mitigation staff to help coordinate and implement hazard mitigation activities during disaster recovery, including PA hazard mitigation. A primary task of these staff is to identify and assess opportunities to incorporate hazard mitigation into PA projects. Generally, if an applicant seeks to incorporate hazard mitigation measures into a PA project, FIMA’s hazard mitigation staff develop a hazard mitigation proposal. We, the DHS OIG, and others have reported past challenges with FEMA’s management of the PA program related to workforce management, information sharing, and hazard mitigation. For example, we reported in 2008 that the PA program had a shortage of experienced and knowledgeable staff, relied on temporary rotating staff, and provided limited training to their workforce, which impaired PA program delivery and delayed recovery efforts after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. We found that staff turnover, coupled with information sharing challenges, delayed projects when applicants had to provide the same information each time FEMA assigned new staff and that poorly trained staff provided incomplete and inaccurate information during their initial meetings with applicants or made inaccurate eligibility determinations, which also caused processing delays. We recommended that FEMA strengthen continuity among staff involved in administering the PA program by developing protocols to improve information and document sharing among FEMA staff. In response, in 2013 FEMA instituted a PA Consistency Initiative, which included hiring new managers for FEMA regional offices, stakeholder training on PA program administration, and using a newly developed internal website to allow staff to post and share information to address continuity and knowledge sharing concerns during disaster operations. FEMA also developed the Public Assistance Program Delivery Transition Standard Operating Procedure to facilitate the transfer of responsibility for PA program activities during cases of staff turnover during recovery operations. Despite FEMA’s efforts to implement our recommendations, the DHS-OIG, in 2016, found continuing challenges after Hurricane Sandy with workforce levels, skills, and performance of reservists, who make up the majority of the PA workforce. Regarding information sharing, in 2008, we also identified difficulties sharing documents among federal, state, and local participants in the PA process and difficulties tracking the status of projects. We recommended that FEMA improve information sharing within the PA process by identifying and disseminating practices that facilitate more effective communication among federal, state, and local entities. In response, FEMA proceeded with the implementation of a grant tracking and management system, called EMMIE, which was used previously in 2007. However, in subsequent years we found weaknesses in how FEMA developed the system and the DHS-OIG found that information sharing problems similar to the ones identified in our 2008 report persisted. Regarding hazard mitigation, we reported in 2015 that state and local officials experienced challenges in using PA hazard mitigation during the Hurricane Sandy recovery efforts because PA officials did not consistently prioritize hazard mitigation, and in some cases discouraged mitigation projects during the PA grant application process, among other challenges. We recommended that FEMA assess the challenges state and local officials reported, including the extent to which they can be addressed, and implement corrective actions, as needed. In response to our recommendation, FEMA developed a corrective action plan that included actions and milestones for reviewing, updating, and implementing PA hazard mitigation policy. FEMA also identified the PA new delivery model as a solution for some of the challenges state and local officials reported. Previously, the OIG also reported that PA program officials did not consistently identify eligible PA hazard mitigation projects, and that PA officials did not prioritize the identification of PA hazard mitigation opportunities at the onset of recovery efforts after the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes. See appendix I for a summary of findings and the status of our past recommendations on challenges with workforce management, information sharing, and hazard mitigation related to the PA program since our last review in December 2008. FEMA’s own internal reviews and outreach efforts have also identified similar challenges. For example, at FEMA’s request the Homeland Security Studies and Analysis Institute assessed the effectiveness and efficiency of the PA program in 2011. The institute’s report outlined 3 key findings and 23 recommendations relating to the PA preaward process. For example, the report found that FEMA could enhance training programs to develop a skilled and experienced workforce; utilize technology and employ web-based tools to support centralized processing, transparency, and efficient decision making; and identify and address potential special considerations, such as hazard mitigation proposals, as early as possible in the preaward process to improve consistency. In 2014, PA program officials analyzed the PA grant process and used input from agency staff and officials involved in various aspects of the program to identify potential improvements. The resulting Public Assistance Program Realignment report found that challenges in workforce management, information sharing, and hazard mitigation continued, and included recommendations for improvement. For example, the report concluded that a shortage of qualified staff, high turnover, unclear organizational responsibilities, and inconsistent training were long-standing and continuing challenges that impaired the PA pre-award process. In addition, from January 2015 to April 2015, FEMA conducted extensive outreach with more than 260 stakeholders across FEMA headquarters, all 10 regions, 43 states, and 4 tribal nations to discuss challenges in the PA program and opportunities for improvement. For example, stakeholders identified challenges with ineffective information collection during the preaward process and suggested identifying special considerations, such as hazard mitigation, earlier in the PA process as an idea for improvement. In response, FEMA began redesigning the PA preaward process to operationalize the results of its 2014 report and address areas for improvement identified through its outreach efforts. FEMA awarded a contract for program support to help PA officials implement a redesigned PA program in 2015. This included a new process to develop and review grant applications, and obligate PA funds to states affected by disasters; new positions, such as a new program delivery manager who is the single point of contact throughout the grant application process; a new Consolidated Resource Center (CRC) to support field operations by supplementing project development, validation, and review of proposed PA project applications; and a new information system to maintain and share PA grant application documents. As part of the new process, PA program officials identified the need to ensure that staff emphasize special considerations, such as hazard mitigation, earlier in the process. Taken together, these efforts represent FEMA’s “new delivery model” for awarding PA program grants. Enhancements in the PA program under the new delivery model are presented in figure 4. Regarding the new delivery model process, FEMA introduced several changes to enhance outreach to applicants during the “exploratory call”— the first contact between FEMA and local officials—and during the first in- person meeting, called the “recovery scoping meeting.” FEMA also revised decision points during the process, when program officials can request more information from applicants, and applicants can review and approve the completion of project development steps. FEMA also incorporated special considerations, such as hazard mitigation, earlier in the new process during the exploratory calls and recovery scoping meetings. The changes and enhancements to the PA grant award process in the new delivery model are presented in figure 5. The new process divides proposed PA projects based on complexity and type of work into three categories—100 percent completed, standard, and specialized—that PA staff manage to expedite review or assign skilled staff to technical projects as needed. If the applicant has already completed work following a disaster, such as debris removal, it is considered “100 percent completed” and JFO staff collect the necessary documents and provide the information to the CRC staff who complete the development of project applications, validate the information, and complete all necessary reviews. Projects that require repairs and further assistance from PA program staff at the JFO include “standard” and “specialized” projects, which include a site inspection to document damages, before the JFO staff provide the information to the CRC. Further, PA program officials assign PA staff based on their skills and experience to standard projects, which are less technically complex to develop, and specialized projects, which are more technically complex and costly. We discuss the new workforce positions FEMA developed for JFOs and CRCs, the new information system FEMA developed to maintain and share PA grant documents with applicants, and FEMA’s efforts to incorporate hazard mitigation into PA projects later in this report. Since 2015, FEMA has invested almost $9 million to redesign the PA program through the reengineering and implementation of the new delivery model, including about $4.7 million for contract support for implementation, and $4 million for acquisition of the new information system. FEMA tested the new delivery model in a series of selected disasters, using a continuous process improvement approach to assess and improve the process, workforce changes, and information system requirements, prior to implementing the new model for all future disasters. For example, FEMA first tested the new process in Iowa in July 2015 and, in February 2016, PA program officials expanded their test to include all of the new staff positions. In October 2016, PA program officials added the new information system to achieve a comprehensive implementation of all of the elements of the new delivery model for the agency’s response to Hurricane Matthew in Georgia, two additional disasters in Georgia in January 2017, and in Missouri, North Dakota, Wyoming, Vermont, and two disasters in New Hampshire from June through August 2017. The timeline for PA’s implementation of the new delivery model is shown in figure 6. According to program officials, FEMA planned to implement the new model for all future disasters beginning in January 2018. However, historic disaster activity during the 2017 hurricane season accelerated full implementation. As a result, on September 12, 2017, FEMA officials announced that, unless officials determined it would be infeasible in an individual disaster, the program would use the new delivery model in all future disasters. According to FEMA’s 2014 PA Program Realignment report and other program documents, PA officials designed the new delivery model to respond to persistent workforce management challenges related to identifying the required number of staff and needed skills and training, among other things, to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the PA preaward process. To address these challenges, PA program officials centralized much of the responsibility for processing PA projects in the CRCs, created additional new positions with specialized roles and responsibilities in JFOs, and established training and mentoring programs to help build the new staffs’ skills. In 2016, PA program officials centralized some of the project activities that otherwise were being carried out at individual JFOs at FEMA’s first new CRC in Denton, Texas. Officials did so by establishing 18 new positions, many of which directly correlated with positions that FEMA deployed to individual JFOs in the legacy PA delivery model. According to PA officials, centralizing positions will improve standardization in project processing, and result in a higher quality work product. As part of the new delivery model, PA program officials created a new hazard mitigation liaison position for PA program staff at the CRC that did not previously exist at individual JFOs. The other new positions that PA program officials either created or centralized at the CRC included two specialized positions responsible for costing and validating PA projects. Previously, the PA project specialist deployed to the JFO would complete these tasks and others; however, the consistency of project development varied across the regions and disasters. In contrast, CRC staff are full-time employees who receive training to specialize in completing standardized project development steps for PA projects from multiple disasters on an ongoing basis. Program officials anticipate that centralizing new specialized staff at the CRCs will also reduce PA administrative costs and staffing levels at the JFOs. For example, staff at the CRCs, such as the new hazard mitigation liaisons and insurance and costing specialists, could support project development for multiple disasters and regions simultaneously, whereas PA previously needed to deploy staff to each JFO to fulfill these roles. In addition, once JFOs operating under the new model send projects to the CRCs for processing and review, FEMA can more rapidly close its JFOs, reducing associated administrative costs. For example, following Hurricane Matthew, FEMA credited the new delivery model, in part, with its ability to close the JFO in Georgia sooner than several other JFOs in neighboring states not involved in the implementation of the new delivery model. PA program officials created new positions with more specialized roles and responsibilities to help PA staff at JFOs provide more consistency in the project development process and guidance to applicants. Program officials split the broad responsibilities previously managed at the JFOs by PA crew leaders and project specialists, into two new, specialized positions—the program delivery manager and site inspector. The program delivery manager serves as the applicant’s single point-of-contact throughout the preaward process, manages communication with the applicant, and oversees document collection. All three PA grant applicants we spoke to following Hurricane Matthew in Georgia greatly appreciated the knowledge and assistance provided by their program delivery managers. Site inspectors are responsible for conducting the site inspection to document all disaster-related damages; determining the applicant’s plans for recovery, coordinating with other specialists, and verifying the information collected with the applicant. Officials expect deployed staff at JFOs can complete the fieldwork faster and provide greater continuity of service to applicants. Further, program officials believe that specializing roles will enable them to provide more targeted training, and improve employee satisfaction. Site inspection, hazard mitigation, and environmental and historic preservation specialists, along with a new Public Assistance program mentor, conduct a site inspection with the applicant to document damages to a historic cemetery in Savannah, Georgia, following Hurricane Matthew in 2016. PA program officials designed new training and mentoring programs for the new positions at the CRCs and JFOs and used a continuous feedback process to update and improve the training, position guides, and task books throughout the implementation of the new delivery model, according to PA officials. According to a June 2017 update of the PA Cadre Training Plan, training for the new model has five major focuses: required training and skills for position qualification; on-site refresher training; mentor training; regional-based state, local, tribal, and territorial training; and training on the new information system. Specifically, officials developed six new training courses, and identified which are required for each position under the new delivery model. For example, a program delivery manager at the JFO is required to complete both the program delivery manager and site inspector specialist courses. As of June 2017, PA program officials had provided at least one new model training course to 93 percent of their cadre (including program delivery manager training to 366 individuals and site inspector training to 1,172 individuals) and planned to provide 28 additional courses through September 2017 to the PA cadre. According to regional and CRC officials, the training courses and mentoring from experienced staff helped maximize new staff’s capabilities in the new process. Throughout the third implementation of the new delivery model, JFO and CRC staff, as well as regional PA staff, stakeholders, and applicants, identified staff skills and training as a key area that needed more attention for full implementation of the new delivery model. Our work and FEMA’s after-action reports from the third test in Georgia identified problems with site inspector skills, which affected the timeliness and accuracy of projects. Specialists and managers at the CRC noted that poorly trained site inspectors did not consistently provide the necessary information from the field, which resulted in delays for the CRC staff to process projects, and after-action reports also identified challenges with site inspector skills. According to a PA applicant in Georgia, the inconsistency of skills and experience of their site inspector resulted in the need to conduct a “do-over” site inspection on one of the applicant’s projects, causing delays. PA staff and state officials attribute much of the site inspectors’ skill gaps to their lack of training and experience in the program. According to PA Region officials, providing timely training will be a resource-intensive challenge for implementing the new delivery model for all future disasters. For example, it can be difficult to train reservists before FEMA deploys them to disasters, and many of the program’s experienced reservists have retired or resigned, resulting in few mentors for the program and a high need to provide training to inexperienced and newly hired staff. PA officials and stakeholders also emphasized the need for FEMA to provide additional training for state and local officials to build capacity and support the goals of the new delivery model. For example, according to JFO officials at the third implementation, the new delivery model increases responsibilities for applicants, who will require more applicant training than FEMA currently provides. According to state officials, applicant capabilities vary, and FEMA should provide training to state and local officials on the new delivery model and the information system before a disaster. Skill gaps among applicants could result in inconsistent implementation of the new process, according to PA staff and stakeholders, and PA staff said that training was important to prevent applicants from reverting back to the legacy PA grant application process. To support full implementation of the new delivery model for all disasters, PA program officials have updated training courses for PA staff and applicants, and planned additional training to address these challenges and other lessons learned through the test implementation. For example, PA officials told us they updated the site inspector training program in May 2017 and scheduled a new site inspector training session in August 2017 to include more hands-on training to help address the skill gaps identified for site inspectors. PA officials created a new training course for FEMA’s regional offices, in part to enable regional PA staff to provide new delivery model training to state and local officials. PA officials also planned to develop a self-paced, online course for state and local officials by the end of 2017. PA officials have not fully assessed the workforce needed for JFO field operations, CRC staff, or FIMA’s hazard mitigation staff to support implementation of the new delivery model for all future disasters. PA program officials developed an initial assessment of the total number of staff needed in the field and the CRCs in 2016 to estimate cost savings associated with consolidating and specializing positions at the CRCs and deploying fewer staff to JFOs. However, the assessment did not identify the number of staff required to fill specific positions, including program delivery managers and hazard mitigation specialists, needed to support the new delivery model for full implementation. In reviewing the test implementations of the new delivery model, we found that inadequate staffing levels at the JFOs and CRCs, and with FIMA’s hazard mitigation staff, affected staffs’ ability to achieve the goals of the new delivery model. Staff levels at the JFO. We identified challenges with having the right number of program delivery managers and site inspection specialists to achieve program goals for customer satisfaction, efficiency, and quality in test implementations of the new delivery model. For example, in the second test implementation of the new delivery model in Oregon in 2016, PA did not deploy enough program delivery managers to the disaster, which resulted in unmanageable caseloads for program delivery managers, according to state and PA officials. PA program officials assigned program delivery managers an average caseload of 12 PA applicants, which was more than they could effectively manage, according to PA staff, and program officials aim for a caseload of 8 to 10 applicants. According to state officials, local officials reported they did not always receive the support they needed from program delivery managers who managed caseloads consisting of dozens of projects at multiple sites for each applicant during the Oregon implementation. As a result of overwhelmed program delivery managers, local officials faced challenges understanding their responsibilities, such as recognizing when they needed to provide information for the project development to proceed, according to state officials. PA staff involved with the third test implementation in Georgia in 2016 and 2017 said there were not enough site inspectors or program delivery managers to fully manage the workload at the JFO. Because of the specialization of roles, projects could not move forward when there were not enough staff to execute the next step in the process. For example, PA staff at the JFO said program delivery managers completed recovery scoping meetings rapidly, but faced a bottleneck in scheduling site inspections because there were more applicants awaiting site inspections than could be fulfilled by the number of site inspection specialists available. Staff levels at the CRC. Staff at the CRC reported challenges with staffing levels during the Oregon and Georgia test implementations, and expressed concerns about when PA officials will staff the CRCs to support full implementation of the new model for all disasters. During the Oregon test implementation, a CRC specialist said there were not enough technical specialists to manage the workload and, as a result, PA program officials had to redeploy site inspectors from their JFO field operations to the CRC to complete costing estimates. During the third test in Georgia, quality assurance specialists said that their workload resulted in added stress trying to complete the work in time while adhering to quality standards. According to CRC specialists in Denton, Texas, PA officials had not determined required staff levels for full implementation, but agreed that workload was too high and program officials needed to determine the appropriate staff levels for each CRC to support full implementation. PA officials were still evaluating CRC processing times and workload management from the Oregon and Georgia test implementations to determine staffing needs, according to PA officials. Further, PA program officials plan to establish a second CRC in Winchester, Virginia, before the end of 2017, but have not determined the number of additional permanent full-time staff needed to support the CRCs for full implementation of the new delivery model. Staff levels for the hazard mitigation specialists. PA officials have not identified the number of hazard mitigation specialists in FIMA’s hazard mitigation cadre needed for full implementation of the new delivery model. According to JFO staff, current hazard mitigation staff levels are insufficient to provide the desired in-person participation of hazard mitigation staff on all recovery scoping meetings to share information on hazard mitigation with applicants and help them identify potential mitigation opportunities. A PA program official said officials missed opportunities to pursue hazard mitigation during the test implementation after Hurricane Matthew in Georgia due to lack of hazard mitigation specialists. In addition, for the test implementation in Oregon, there were not enough hazard mitigation specialists to cover all site inspections and implement their new delivery model responsibilities, according to FEMA’s after-action reports. The absence of hazard mitigation specialists in the early stages of PA project development may cause delays in officials’ identifying hazard mitigation opportunities, according to a FIMA official. PA program officials said they did not work with FIMA to determine the appropriate levels of hazard mitigation staff under the new delivery model because they were refining the new process, but as of June 2017 were working with FIMA to do so. One of the key implementation activities in our Business Process Reengineering Assessment Guide includes addressing workforce management issues. Specifically, this includes identifying how many and which employees will be affected by the position changes and retraining. Further, our prior work has found that high-performing organizations identify their current and future workforce needs—including the appropriate number and deployment of staff across the organization— and address workforce gaps, to improve the contribution of critical skills and competencies needed for mission success. According to a PA program official, their initial workforce assessment was not comprehensive because they were still collecting data required to make informed decisions. PA officials agreed that updating their workforce assessments prior to full implementation could be helpful, and acknowledged that program officials needed to be more proactive applying the lessons learned as they pivot from testing to full implementation of the new delivery model in 2018. FEMA also conducts a standard agency wide workforce structure review every 2 to 3 years, which helps officials determine the appropriate disaster workforce levels. As of June 2017, PA officials were working with other offices within FEMA to expedite the agency-wide assessment of the PA and FIMA hazard mitigation cadres, but did not know when they would complete the assessment. PA officials also acknowledged that they faced an aggressive schedule to complete various planned activities for workforce management, training, and other efforts, in support of full implementation, and that they may not be able to complete all efforts as thoroughly as they would like in order to expedite the transition of the PA program to the new delivery model. The gaps in PA workforce assessment in the JFOs, CRCs, and for FIMA’s hazard mitigation cadre present a risk that PA program managers will not have a sufficient workforce to support the goals of the new delivery model. In addition, the timing and implementation of the hiring and training activities for new PA program staff could take multiple months, and program officials will need to know what staff levels are necessary for full implementation of the new delivery model to inform resource decisions for the program in coordination with other agency offices. According to PA program officials, workforce assessment efforts have been delayed as a result of disaster response and recovery efforts related to Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria. Completing a workforce assessment will help program officials identify gaps in their workforce and skills, which could help PA program officials minimize the effects of long- standing workforce staffing and training challenges on the PA program delivery and inform full implementation for all disasters. costs. For example, EMMIE does not collect information on all of the preaward activities that are part of the PA grant application process. As a result, PA program officials said they, and applicants, must use ad hoc reports and personal tracking documents to manage and monitor the progress of grant applications. PA officials added that EMMIE is not user- friendly and applicants often struggle to access the system. In response to these ongoing challenges, PA program officials developed FAC-Trax— a separate information system from EMMIE—with new capabilities designed to improve transparency, efficiency, and management of the PA program. Specifically, FAC-Trax allows FEMA staff (PA Grants Manager) and applicants (PA Grants Portal), to review, manage, and track current PA project status and documentation. For example, applicants can use FAC- Trax to submit requests for public assistance, upload required project documentation, approve grant application items, and send and receive notifications on grant progress and activities. In addition, the FAC-Trax system includes standardized forms, as well as required fields and tasks that PA program staff and applicants must complete before moving on to the next steps in the PA preaward process. According to PA officials, these capabilities increase transparency, encourage greater applicant involvement, and enhance collaboration and communication between FEMA and grant applicants, to improve efficiency in processing and awarding grant applications and enhance the quality of project development. Further, PA officials said that FAC-Trax could reduce challenges associated with staff turnover during the project development process because the system stores and maintains applicant information and project documentation, making it easier for transitioning staff to assist an applicant. They also said they use FAC-Trax to gather and analyze data that supports management of the PA process, including measuring the timeliness of the grant application process. For example, during the test implementation of the new delivery model in Georgia following Hurricane Matthew, officials were able to document that, on average, program delivery managers took 5 days to conduct the exploratory call and 14 days to hold the recovery scoping meeting with applicants, and CRC officials took 33 days to develop and review grant proposals. Managers use this data to assess staffing needs and identify bottlenecks in the PA process, according to PA officials. FAC-Trax is critical to the new PA delivery model and will be a primary means of sharing grant application documents, tracking ongoing PA projects, and ensuring that FEMA staff and applicants follow PA grant policies and procedures. Given the importance of developing and testing this new information sharing system, we evaluated its development against four key IT management controls—(1) project planning; (2) risk management; (3) requirements development; and (4) systems testing and integration. When implemented effectively, these controls provide assurance that IT systems will be delivered within cost and schedule and meet the capabilities needed by its users. We found that FEMA’s development of FAC-Trax fully satisfied best practices for project planning and risk management, but additional steps are needed to fully satisfy the areas of requirements development and systems testing and integration, as discussed below. See appendix II for the full assessment of each IT management control. PA program officials fully satisfied all five practices in the project planning control area, according to our assessment. Key project planning practices are (1) establishing and maintaining the program’s acquisition strategy, (2) developing and maintaining the overall project plan and obtaining commitment from relevant stakeholders, (3) developing and maintaining the program’s cost estimate, (4) establishing and maintaining the program’s schedule estimate, and (5) identifying the necessary knowledge and skills needed to carry out the program. To address the first and second practices, program officials established detailed plans that describe the acquisition strategy and objectives, the program’s scope, and its framework for using an Agile software development approach, among other key actions. Agile is a method of software development that utilizes an iterative process and constantly improves software based on user needs and feedback. Program officials also developed a plan detailing the program’s approach to deploy and maintain FAC-Trax and established stakeholder groups and an integrated product team to support and oversee the development of FAC-Trax. To address the third and fourth practices, they developed and maintained a master schedule of all implementation tasks and milestones through project completion, and developed a life-cycle cost estimate of over $19 million. Additionally, FAC-Trax’s acquisition performance baseline describes the system’s minimum acceptable and desired baselines for performance, schedule, and cost. Lastly, in regards to the fifth practice, program officials identified the knowledge and skills needed to carry out the program in the FAC-Trax Request for Proposal and FAC-Trax Capability Development Plan. PA program officials fully satisfied all four practices in the risk management control area, according to our assessment. Key risk management practices are (1) identifying risks, threats, and vulnerabilities that could negatively affect work efforts, (2) evaluating and categorizing each identified risk using defined risk categories and parameters, (3) developing risk mitigation plans for selected risks, and (4) monitoring the status of each risk periodically and implementing the risk mitigation plan as appropriate. To address the first and second practices, program officials identified key risks that could negatively affect FAC-Trax in a “risk register”—an online site used to track risks, issues, and mitigating actions. As of May 2017, officials had identified 13 risks in the risk register—four open and nine closed—and evaluated and categorized the identified risks based on the probability of occurrence and scope, schedule, and cost impacts. For example, program officials reported that two of its open risks have a “medium” risk rating—meaning the risk has the potential to slightly affect project cost, schedule, or performance. To address the third and fourth practices, program officials developed and documented risk mitigation plans for all identified risks. For example, program officials planned to mitigate the risk of limited engagement of subject matter experts by identifying and engaging with appropriate experts through workshops, and monitoring the capability development process to identify any issues that may cause project delays. In addition, PA program officials documented the responsible officials, reevaluation date, and risk status, among other things, for each risk in the register, and reviewed and updated risks during weekly and monthly program reviews with stakeholders throughout FEMA. PA program officials fully satisfied four out of five practices in the requirements development control area, according to our assessment. Key requirements development practices are (1) eliciting stakeholder needs, expectations, and constraints, and transforming them into prioritized customer requirements; (2) developing and reviewing operational concepts and scenarios to refine and discover requirements; (3) analyzing requirements to ensure that they are complete, feasible, and verifiable; (4) analyzing requirements to balance stakeholder needs and constraints; and (5) testing and validating the system as it is being developed. To address the first and second practices, program officials developed a requirements management plan outlining how officials capture, assess, and plan for FAC-Trax enhancements, and established a change control process to review, prioritize, and verify user requests for changes to the system and feedback. As of May 2017, the PA program office received 734 change requests related to FAC-Trax, of which program officials completed 420 changes and planned to address an additional 277 entries. Program officials also developed a functional requirements document outlining the high-level requirements for FAC- Trax and detailed operational concepts and scenarios for each phase of the preaward process in the system’s concept of operations. To address the fourth practice, program officials created a standard template to analyze and document the user needs and acceptance criteria for planned system capabilities in March 2017. In addition, PA program officials identified risks and dependencies for recommended changes to FAC-Trax, and balanced the cost and priority of system enhancements as part of the change control process. Lastly, regarding the fifth practice, program officials tested and evaluated FAC-Trax during development, which included validating system enhancements through user acceptance testing. However, program officials did not fully address the third practice— analyzing requirements to ensure they are complete, feasible, and verifiable—because they did not ensure detailed user requirements were necessary and sufficient by tracking them back to higher-level requirements. For example, although program officials reviewed change requests for completeness and followed up with users to verify requirements, officials did not track system enhancements, made in response to detailed user requirements (e.g., allowing users to search PA projects by project number), back to the high-level requirements (e.g., storing data and information provided by the applicant) identified in the FAC-Trax functional requirements document and performance work statement. Officials did not track system enhancements back to high-level requirements because they did not have a complete understanding of basic user needs and system requirements at the beginning of the FAC- Trax effort, according to the PA program manager. A PA official also said the change control process was a way to identify the basic capabilities FAC-Trax needed to have and that tracking enhancements back to high- level requirements could have made the change control process more difficult to manage, and reduced user participation if, for example, users needed to understand how their change requests related to high-level requirements. However, program officials could have tracked enhancements back to high-level requirements themselves using the change control process without putting any additional burden on users. Despite not having a complete understanding of user needs and system requirements at the beginning of the FAC-Trax effort, analyzing whether users’ change requests satisfy higher-level requirements identified in key design and planning documents would have provided officials with a basis for more detailed and precise requirements throughout project development and helped them better manage the project, according to IT management controls. Further, according to the PMBOK® Guide, tracking or measuring system capabilities against approved requirements is a key process for managing a project’s scope, measuring project completion, and ensuring the project meets user needs and expectations. Program officials acknowledged the importance of tracking system enhancements back to documented system requirements. Ensuring that FAC-Trax meets user needs and expectations is especially important because the information system is key to the success of the new delivery model, according to PA officials. By analyzing progress made on documented, high-level requirements, a step that reflects a key IT management control for requirements development, the PA program will have greater assurance that FAC-Trax will provide functionality that meets user needs and expectations. PA program officials did not fully satisfy either of the two practices in the systems testing and integration control area, according to our assessment. Key systems testing and integration practices are (1) developing test plans and test cases, which include a description of the overall approach for system testing, the set of tasks necessary to prepare for and perform testing, the roles and responsibilities for individuals or groups responsible for testing, and criteria to determine whether the system has passed or failed testing; and (2) developing a systems integration plan to identify all systems to be integrated, describe how integration problems are to be documented and resolved, define roles and responsibilities of all relevant participants, and establish a sequence and schedule for every integration step. In regards to the first practice, PA program officials and the FAC-Trax contractor established a test plan that identifies the method and strategy to perform testing, including the necessary tasks, such as responding to user feedback and testing errors, and incorporating necessary resolutions into future work, testing parameters, and the roles and responsibilities of the individuals responsible for testing. However, program officials have not developed system testing criteria to evaluate FAC-Trax, which would align with the practice described above of using criteria to determine whether the system has passed or failed testing. A key feature of Agile software development is the “definition of done”—a set of clear, comprehensive, and objective criteria, that the government should use to evaluate software after each iteration of development. PA program officials said they did not establish a definition of done because officials initially managing the FAC-Trax effort lacked familiarity with system development in the Agile environment. Officials acknowledged the importance of establishing a definition of done and said they are planning to develop one, but have not identified how or when to incorporate it into the development process. According to the TechFAR—the government’s handbook for procuring digital services using Agile processes—the government and vendor should establish this definition after contract award at the beginning of each cycle of software development. By establishing criteria, such as a definition of done, to evaluate the system—a step that reflects a key IT management control for system testing and is an effective practice for applying Agile to software development—the PA program will have greater assurance that FAC- Trax is usable and responsive to specified requirements. In regards to the second practice, PA program officials developed a systems integration plan in June 2017 that identified the potential for integration of FAC-Trax with four FEMA systems, including EMMIE. In addition, program officials included a description of how staff should document integration problems and the resolution of problems in FAC- Trax development and test plans. However, the systems integration plan does not define roles and responsibilities of all participants for system integration activities or establish a sequence and schedule for every integration step for the four FEMA systems. PA officials said that system integration planning for FAC-Trax is in the early stages, but acknowledged the importance of these elements of system integration planning. Officials plan to define roles and responsibilities of all participants for system integration activities and develop the sequence and schedule for every integration step as they add new systems to the FAC-Trax development plan and obtain funding needed for their integration. Nonetheless, FEMA has used FAC-Trax for selected PA disasters since October 2016 and plans to use FAC-Trax for all future disasters. According to IT management controls, agencies should establish the systems integration plan early in the project and revise it to reflect evolving and emerging user needs. By ensuring that the FAC- Trax systems integration plan defines the roles and responsibilities of relevant participants for all integration relationships and establishes a sequence and schedule for every integration step, the PA program will have greater assurance that FAC-Trax functions properly with other systems and meets user needs. FEMA’s new delivery model enhances participation of hazard mitigation staff with the goal of identifying opportunities for mitigation earlier in the PA preaward process, according to PA officials. Two key changes related to hazard mitigation under the new model include (1) an emphasis on engaging with hazard mitigation specialists at the JFO earlier in the PA process and involving them in specific PA preaward activities and (2) the establishment of the PA program’s hazard mitigation liaison at the CRC. For example, position guides direct program delivery managers to coordinate with FIMA’s hazard mitigation specialists prior to recovery scoping meetings, and site inspectors to coordinate with hazard mitigation specialists prior to site inspections to discuss a PA grant applicant’s damages and any potential mitigation opportunities. PA program officials also developed guidance for conducting the exploratory call and the recovery scoping meeting with applicants, which include questions for PA staff to ask on the applicant’s interest in or plans for incorporating hazard mitigation into potential projects. In addition, a new hazard mitigation liaison at the CRC is responsible for reviewing PA projects for hazard mitigation opportunities and serving as a mitigation subject matter expert for the PA program. According to data provided by FEMA, PA grant applicants incorporated hazard mitigation into approximately 18 percent of permanent work projects for all disasters nationwide from 2012 to 2015. During test implementation of the new delivery model, state, PA, and FIMA officials all reported an increase in the number of hazard mitigation activities on PA permanent work projects. For example, state officials who participated in the second new model test in Oregon said that effective communication and coordination between PA and hazard mitigation staff resulted in applicants incorporating hazard mitigation into over 60 percent of permanent work projects. Furthermore, PA officials reported an increase in hazard mitigation during the third test implementation of the new model in Georgia following Hurricane Matthew, where approximately 16 percent of permanent work projects included mitigation, as of June 2017. This represents an increase compared to the PA program’s estimate for the proportion of projects that incorporate hazard mitigation among previous PA hurricane disasters in Georgia, which was about 3 percent, according to PA officials. While PA officials are trying to increase hazard mitigation through the new delivery model, not all disasters present the same number of opportunities to incorporate hazard mitigation. First, the PA program only incorporates hazard mitigation measures for permanent work projects, such as repairs to roads, bridges, and buildings. For example, as of June 2017, approximately 60 percent of the projects FEMA funded in Georgia for the third test implementation after Hurricane Matthew were for emergency work, which is not eligible for hazard mitigation measures. Second, the PA program only funds mitigation measures that officials determine to be cost-effective. In addition, we have previously reported on other factors that affect whether applicants incorporate hazard mitigation into PA projects, such as their capacity to manage and ability to fund hazard mitigation projects. National Planning for Hazard Mitigation In our 2015 report on disaster resilience following Hurricane Sandy, we noted that disaster affected areas have different threats and vulnerabilities, and local stakeholders make the ultimate determination whether or not to incorporate hazard mitigation into a project. Further, without a strategic approach to making disaster resilience investments, the federal government and its nonfederal partners may be unable to fully capitalize on opportunities for mitigation on the greatest known threats and hazards. We recommended that the Mitigation Framework Leadership Group develop an investment strategy to help ensure that federal funds expended to enhance disaster resilience achieve the goal of reducing the nation’s fiscal exposure because of climate change and the rise in the number of federal major disaster declarations as effectively and efficiently as possible. In response, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) plans to issue a final National Mitigation Investment Strategy in 2018. The goals of this strategy include increasing the effectiveness of investments in reducing disaster losses and increasing resilience, and improving coordination of disaster risk management among federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, and private entities. Although the new model establishes hazard mitigation activities for PA and FIMA staff in the preaward process, it does not standardize and prioritize hazard mitigation planning at JFOs in the way FEMA has done with prior PA program policy. Specifically, FEMA’s 2007 PA program policy standardized planning for hazard mitigation across PA recovery efforts by stating that agency and state officials should issue a memorandum of understanding (MOU) early in the disaster, outlining how PA hazard mitigation will be addressed for the disaster, including what mitigation measures will be emphasized, and identifying applicable codes and standards, and any potential integration with other mitigation grant programs. However, PA program officials did not include guidance that standardizes planning for hazard mitigation, such as encouraging the use of an MOU, in FEMA’s 2010 PA program policy, the most recent update to the Public Assistance Program and Policy Guide in April 2017, or the New Delivery Model Operations Manual. As a result, FIMA officials said FEMA and state officials do not consistently issue MOUs that outline how FEMA and the state plan to promote PA hazard mitigation during the recovery effort, explaining that the use of the MOU is based on the preferences and priorities of the FEMA officials involved. When not issuing an MOU, FIMA hazard mitigation staff and PA officials at the JFO meet to determine the extent which hazard mitigation staff interact directly with applicants regarding PA hazard mitigation during the recovery process, according to a FIMA official. Having a consistent approach to planning for and prioritizing hazard mitigation across all disasters is important for FEMA, given that FEMA experienced challenges consistently prioritizing and integrating hazard mitigation across PA recovery efforts, according to GAO and others. For example, in our 2015 report on resilience in the Hurricane Sandy recovery, we found that state and local officials experienced challenges maximizing disaster resilience in the recovery effort because PA officials did not consistently prioritize hazard mitigation during project development. According to FEMA’s National Mitigation Framework, planning is vital for mitigation efforts during disaster recovery, and federal, state, and local officials should establish procedures that emphasize a coordinated delivery of mitigation activities and capitalize on opportunities to reduce future disaster losses. Similarly, the Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plan, which supports FEMA’s National Disaster Recovery Framework, identifies planning as a key task for identifying mitigation opportunities and integrating risk reduction considerations into decisions and investments during the recovery process. FIMA officials agreed that including the development of a formal plan, such as the historical 2007 PA program policy regarding the use of MOUs, for PA hazard mitigation in operations guidance would help program officials plan for and prioritize hazard mitigation. They noted that FIMA’s hazard mitigation field operations guide includes procedures for implementing proposed MOUs to achieve mitigation goals. PA program officials said that, in light of changes to the PA process under the new model and subsequent updates to program policies, the MOU policy from the 2007 PA program policy was outdated. But officials agreed that planning for and prioritizing hazard mitigation at the operational level is important and said they were examining additional ways to incorporate these activities early in the PA process. As FEMA continues to implement the new model, establishing procedures to standardize hazard mitigation planning for each disaster, as it did through prior policy, could improve the prioritization of hazard mitigation in PA recovery efforts and increase the effectiveness of mitigation for reducing disaster losses and increasing resilience. PA program officials developed performance objectives and measures for hazard mitigation in the new delivery model, but could add measures to better align performance assessment for the PA program with FEMA’s broader strategic goals for hazard mitigation. In its strategic plan for 2014–2018, FEMA established an agency-wide goal to increase the percentage of FEMA-funded disaster projects, such as those under the PA program, that provide mitigation above local, state, and federal building code requirements by 5 percentage points by the end of fiscal year 2018. For example, local building codes may require measures for new construction to mitigate against future damage. To align with FEMA’s strategic goal, PA officials would also need to measure the number of PA projects that included mitigation measures that bring any repaired infrastructure to a level above applicable building codes. However, under the new model, FEMA officials developed performance objectives (and associated measures) to increase the number of projects that include hazard mitigation by 5 percent, and increase the total dollars spent on hazard mitigation by 2 percent. While these measures could help to incentivize mitigation, they are not tied to building codes and do not include specific information that FEMA could use to continually assess the PA program’s contributions to meeting the agency’s strategic goal. According to Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, agency management should design control activities, such as establishing and reviewing performance measures, to achieve the agency’s objectives. In addition, our work on leading public sector organizations has found that such organizations assess the extent to which their programs and activities contribute to meeting their mission and desired outcomes, and strive to establish clear hierarchies of performance goals and measures. A clear connection between performance measures and program offices helps to both reinforce accountability and ensure that, in their day-to-day activities, managers keep in mind the outcomes their organization is striving to achieve. FEMA’s ability to evaluate and report on PA hazard mitigation data is constrained, but officials are addressing this challenge through the development of data reporting and analytics capabilities for the PA program’s new information system, according to PA officials. PA program officials developed measures they could use to evaluate the new model during test implementation and compare new model performance to the legacy PA process, and agreed that aligning PA program hazard mitigation goals with FEMA’s agency-wide strategic goals would be helpful. As FEMA continues to develop and implement the new model, developing performance measures and objectives to better inform and support the agency’s broader strategic goals could help to ensure that FEMA capitalizes on hazard mitigation opportunities in PA recovery efforts. FEMA’s Public Assistance grant program is a complicated, multi-billion dollar program that is critical to helping state and local communities rebuild and recover after a major disaster. In recent years, FEMA has undertaken a major reengineering effort to make the PA preaward process simpler and more efficient for applicants and to address challenges encountered during recovery from past disasters. FEMA’s new delivery model represents a significant opportunity to strengthen the PA program and address these past challenges, and growing pains are to be expected when implementing any large reengineering effort. Further, FEMA officials work to implement these changes while supporting response and recovery following disasters, including the catastrophic flooding from Hurricane Harvey in August 2017 and widespread damages from Hurricanes Irma and Maria in September 2017. As such, it is critical that feedback obtained and lessons learned while testing the new model inform decisions and actions as FEMA proceeds with full implementation for all disasters, including the complex recovery efforts in the states and territories affected by Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria. FEMA has redesigned the PA delivery model to address various challenges related to workforce management, information sharing with state and local grantees, and incorporating hazard mitigation into PA projects. FEMA has developed new workforce processes, training, and positions to address past challenges, but completing a workforce assessment that identifies the number of staff needed will inform workforce management and resource allocation decisions to help FEMA ensure a more successful implementation. This is particularly important as FEMA is using the new model for the long-term recovery from the 2017 hurricanes, and FEMA faces capacity challenges as its workforce is stretched thin. Further, FEMA’s new FAC-Trax information sharing system provides FEMA and state and local applicants and grantees with better capabilities to address past challenges in managing and tracking PA projects. In developing FAC-Trax, FEMA implemented many of the key IT management controls that can help ensure that new IT systems are implemented effectively. However, additional steps are needed to fully satisfy the areas of requirements development and systems testing and integration. Finally, FEMA has taken some actions to better promote hazard mitigation as part of its new PA model. However, more consistent planning for hazard mitigation following a PA disaster and developing specific performance measures and objectives that better align with and support the agency’s broader strategic goals related to hazard mitigation could help to ensure that mitigation is incorporated into recovery efforts, which presents an opportunity to encourage disaster resilience and reduce federal fiscal exposure from recurring catastrophic natural disasters. We are making the following five recommendations to FEMA’s Assistant Administrator for Recovery: The FEMA Assistant Administrator for Recovery should complete a workforce staffing assessment that identifies the appropriate number of staff needed at joint field offices, Consolidated Resource Centers, and in FIMA’s hazard mitigation cadre to implement the new delivery model nationwide. (Recommendation 1) The FEMA Assistant Administrator for Recovery should establish controls for tracking FAC-Trax capabilities to the system’s functional and operational requirements to more fully satisfy requirements development controls and ensure that the new information system provides capabilities that meets users’ needs and expectations. (Recommendation 2) The FEMA Assistant Administrator for Recovery should establish system testing criteria, such as a “definition of done,” to assess FAC- Trax as it is developed; define the roles and responsibilities of all participants; and develop the sequence and schedule for integration of other systems with FAC-Trax to more fully satisfy systems testing and integration controls. (Recommendation 3) The FEMA Assistant Administrator for Recovery, in coordination with the Associate Administrator of the Federal Insurance and Mitigation Administration, should implement procedures to standardize planning for addressing PA hazard mitigation at the joint field offices, for example, by requiring FEMA and state officials to develop a memorandum of understanding outlining how they will prioritize and address hazard mitigation following a disaster as it did through prior policy. (Recommendation 4) The FEMA Assistant Administrator for Recovery, in coordination with the Associate Administrator of the Federal Insurance and Mitigation Administration, should develop performance measures and associated objectives for the new delivery model to better align with FEMA’s strategic goal for hazard mitigation in the recovery process. (Recommendation 5) We provided a draft of this report to DHS and FEMA for review and comment. DHS provided written comments, which are reproduced in appendix III. In its comments, DHS concurred with our recommendations and described actions planned to address them. FEMA also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. With regard to our first recommendation, that FEMA complete a workforce staffing assessment that identifies the number of staff needed at joint field offices, Consolidated Resource Centers, and FIMA’s hazard mitigation cadre, DHS stated that PA, in coordination with the Field Operations Directorate and FIMA, will continue to refine and evaluate staffing needs and update the cadre force structures under the new delivery model. DHS estimated that this effort would be completed by June 28, 2019. This action, if fully implemented, should address the intent of the recommendation. With regard to our second recommendation, that FEMA establish controls for tracking FAC-Trax capabilities to ensure the new information system meets users’ needs, DHS stated that Recovery program managers will update the FAC-Trax Requirements Management Plan and the FAC-Trax Release Plan to ensure the tracking and traceability of FAC-Trax functional and operational requirements. DHS estimated that this effort would be completed by January 31, 2018. This action, if fully implemented, should address the intent of the recommendation. With regard to our third recommendation, that FEMA establish systems testing criteria to assess the development of FAC-Trax; and define the roles and responsibilities, and sequence and schedule for system integration, DHS stated that Recovery program managers will update the FAC-Trax System Integration Plan to include integration with the Deployment Tracking System, Enterprise Data Warehouse, Preliminary Damage Assessment interface, and State Grants Management system interface. DHS estimated that this effort would be completed by June 29, 2018. This action, if fully implemented, should address the intent of the recommendation. With regard to our fourth recommendation, that FEMA implement procedures to standardize planning for addressing PA hazard mitigation at the JFO, DHS stated that PA will update current process documents or develop new documents to better incorporate mitigation into the operational planning phase of the new delivery model. DHS estimated that this effort would be completed by July 31, 2018. This action, if fully implemented, should address the intent of the recommendation. With regard to our fifth recommendation, that PA coordinate with FIMA to develop performance measures and associated objectives for the new delivery model that better align with FEMA’s strategic goals for hazard mitigation in the recovery process, DHS stated that PA will reconvene the PA-Mitigation working group to develop and refine PA related hazard mitigation performance measures. DHS estimated that this effort would be completed by June 29, 2018. This action, if fully implemented, should address the intent of the recommendation. We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland Security and interested congressional committees. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (404) 679-1875 or CurrieC@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV. Appendix II: Assessment of Information Technology Management Controls for the FEMA Applicant Case Tracker (FAC-Trax) Table 2 shows details on the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Public Assistance (PA) program office’s implementation of key practices across four information technology (IT) management control areas for its new information system, the FEMA Applicant Case Tracker (FAC-Trax). PA developed FAC-Trax as a web-based project tracking and case management system to supplement the Emergency Management Mission Integrated Environment (EMMIE) and help resolve long-standing information sharing challenges. To determine the extent to which the FAC-Trax program office implemented IT management controls, we reviewed documentation from the FAC-Trax program and compared it to key management best practices, including the Software Engineering Institute’s Capability Maturity Model® Integration for Acquisition and Development, the Project Management Institute’s Guide to the Project Management Body of Knowledge (PMBOK® Guide), and the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers’ Standard for Software and System Test Documentation. We assessed the program as having fully implemented a practice if the agency provided evidence that it fully addressed the practice; partially implemented if the agency provided evidence that it addressed some, but not all, portions of the practice; and not implemented if the agency did not provide any evidence that it addressed the practice. Table 2. Public Assistance (PA) Program Office’s Implementation of Key Information Technology Management Controls for FAC-Trax PA program officials developed an acquisition plan for FAC-Trax identifying the capabilities the system is intended to deliver, the acquisition approach, and acquisition objectives. Additionally, program officials developed a capability development plan outlining a strategy for the program to obtain approval to acquire FAC-Trax. Lastly, program officials developed a systems engineering plan describing the program’s scope and its framework for using an Agile development approach, as well as a deployment, support, and maintenance plan for FAC-Trax. PA program officials developed an acquisition program baseline detailing FAC-Trax’s cost parameters and a life-cycle cost estimate for the system. As of May 2017, the life- cycle cost estimate for FAC-Trax through fiscal year (FY) 2023 is approximately $19.3 million. PA program officials updated the life-cycle cost estimate for FYs 2016 and 2017 after price negotiations with the FAC-Trax contractor, and will continue to update the estimate as annual budgets are approved, according to the Integrated Logistic Support Plan. The contracting officer’s representative for FAC-Trax performs a cost review at the end of each month, according to program officials. Furthermore, the contractor’s weekly status report includes information on the number of hours worked and the percent of contract value spent. Program officials also review program costs with Office of Response and Recovery, PA, Office of the Chief Information Officer (OCIO), and other program office stakeholders during a weekly program review. PA program officials developed an acquisition program baseline detailing FAC-Trax’s schedule parameters, as well as an integrated master schedule for the system. The integrated master schedule identifies tasks, major milestones, and task dependencies. The PA program manager reviews and updates the integrated master schedule on a weekly basis. Program officials also review FAC-Trax’s schedule with Office of Response and Recovery, PA, OCIO, and other program office stakeholders during a weekly program review. PA program officials identified the knowledge and skills needed to carry out the program in FAC-Trax contract documentation and the capability development plan. Specifically, program officials included an attachment to the FAC-Trax contract listing the required labor categories and corresponding functional position descriptions. Program officials also described the role, position type, minimum grade, and minimum certification for required personnel resources for the acquisition, development, and implementation of FAC-Trax. PA program officials developed, reviewed, and maintained project planning documents and obtained commitment from relevant stakeholders. For example, program officials reviewed and updated the integrated master schedule and costs on a weekly and monthly basis, respectively. Further, program officials reviewed the status of project elements, such as the schedule, quality and technical issues, stakeholders, staffing, cost, and risks, with Office of Response and Recovery, PA, OCIO, and other program office stakeholders during a weekly program review. PA program officials also established tactical, functional, and stakeholder groups, as well as an Integrated Product Team to support and oversee the development of FAC-Trax. FEMA’s Recovery Technology Programs Division (RTPD) has a division-level risk management plan that serves as guidance for all Recovery systems, including FAC- Trax. Program officials identified key risks that could negatively affect FAC-Trax work efforts in RTPD’s “risk register”—an online site used to track risks, issues, and mitigating actions for the division and each program office. Program officials also identified five technical, cost, and schedule risks in the FAC-Trax acquisition plan. Program officials included one of these risks in the risk register, while the remaining four were managed outside of the register. As of May 2017, program officials had identified 13 risks in its risk register—four open and nine closed. The four open risks were (1) limited subject matter expert engagement during requirements development, (2) vacancies in program management office support positions, (3) unresolved service level agreement support and funding issues, and (4) the loss of the authority to operate due to a Trusted Internet Connection that is not compliant with Department of Homeland Security security policy. Program officials evaluated and categorized the identified risks based on the probability of occurrence and scope, schedule, and cost impacts. These four points of measurement are used to calculate an overall risk score. The risk score helps program officials determine a risk’s risk rating—low, medium, or high. For example, program officials reported that two of its open risks have a “medium” risk rating—meaning the risk has the potential to slightly impact project cost, schedule, or performance. In addition, program officials detailed the risk category, probability, and impact for the five risks identified in the FAC-Trax acquisition plan. Program officials developed risk mitigation and contingency plans for each risk in the risk register. For example, program officials planned to mitigate the open risk concerning subject matter expert engagement, by identifying and engaging with appropriate subject matter experts through requirements development workshops scheduled in advance of the sprint they are to support, and monitoring the development of user stories to identify any issues that may cause delays. In addition, program officials described the risk management plan and responsible officials for the five risks identified in the FAC-Trax acquisition plan. PA program officials review and update program risks during a monthly program meeting. Program officials also review program risks with Office of Response and Recovery, PA, OCIO, and other program office stakeholders during a weekly program review. Furthermore, the FAC-Trax contractor provides a weekly status update which includes a section on identified risks. Program officials established re-evaluation dates and recorded updates, including any actions taken, for each risk in the risk register. In addition, program officials were able to provide updates on the four risks identified in the FAC-Trax acquisition plan and managed outside of the register. According to PA officials, these risks were addressed and closed by the approval of program planning documents, such as the mission needs statement, concept of operations, and operational requirements document, following the solutions engineering review, which demonstrates the readiness of the program to proceed with the procurement, in September 2016. Program officials established a requirements management plan outlining how it captures, assesses, and plans for FAC-Trax enhancements, and established a change control process to review, prioritize, and verify user requests for changes to the system and feedback. As of May 2017, the PA program office received 734 change requests related to FAC-Trax, of which program officials completed 420 changes and planned to address an additional 277 entries. PA program officials also facilitated workshops to gather requirements for specific user groups and obtained additional requirements for FAC-Trax through customer feedback on a temporary technology tool— an Access database referred to as the Public Assistance Recovery Information System—used to support an early stage of the new model implementation. Further, program officials developed a functional requirements document outlining the high-level functional and operational requirements for FAC-Trax. PA program officials developed a concept of operations for FAC-Trax detailing operating concepts and scenarios for each phase of the PA preaward process. Program officials also detailed the workflow, phases, business functions, and data inputs and outputs for the re-engineered PA process in FAC-Trax’s functional requirements document. In March 2017, program officials developed a standard template to describe the process, tasks, and data inputs and outputs for specific system capabilities. As part of the change control process, PA program officials meet three times a week to discuss and prioritize change requests. Specifically, program officials review submissions to the change control form to ensure completeness, validate impacts and root cause, and research details for incoming requests. PA program officials also follow up with users to understand and verify requirements. In March 2017, program officials developed a standard template to capture acceptance criteria for specific requirements. However, PA program officials do not track system enhancements back to the high-level requirements identified in FAC-Trax’s operational and functional requirements documentation and performance work statement. PA program officials identified system requirements and constraints in the FAC-Trax concept of operations and functional and operational requirements documents. Further, through its change control process, program officials collect suggestions, issues, and feedback on FAC-Trax and system enhancements from stakeholders, identify risks for change requests, and balance prioritized requirements and estimated level of efforts with projected costs prior to each sprint. In March 2017, program officials developed a standard template to analyze and document the urgency and need for specific requirements. PA program officials and the FAC-Trax contractor established a testing and evaluation plan for the system, developed acceptance criteria for user stories, and obtained feedback from users during and after testing. The testing process concludes with user acceptance testing (UAT). If a change request fails during UAT or a new requirement is discovered during development, the PA program will capture the failed request or new requirement in the product backlog for implementation in a future product release. Key practices Systems testing and integration Developing test plans and test cases PA program officials and the FAC-Trax contractor tested and evaluated the system during development. The FAC-Trax test plan identifies the method and strategy to perform the testing, including the necessary tasks, testing parameters, and the roles and responsibilities of the individuals responsible for testing. However, program officials did not develop system testing criteria to evaluate FAC-Trax. A key feature of Agile software development is the “definition of done”—a set of clear, comprehensive, and objective criteria, that the government should use to evaluate software after each iteration of development. PA program officials developed a systems integration plan in June 2017 that identifies potential integration of FAC-Trax and four FEMA systems, including the Emergency Management Mission Integrated Environment. Specifically, the plan includes data requirements and standards; descriptions of the four systems FEMA plans to integrate with FAC-Trax and the proposed relationship for each connection; and security and access management requirements. In addition, program officials included a description of how integration problems are to be documented and resolved in FAC-Trax development and test plans. However, the systems integration plan does not define roles and responsibilities of all participants for system integration activities or establish a sequence and schedule for every integration step for the four FEMA systems. ● Fully implemented: The agency provided evidence that it fully addressed this practice. ◐ Partially implemented: The agency provided evidence that it addressed some, but not all, portions of this practice. ◌ Not implemented: The agency did not provide any evidence that it addressed this practice. In addition to the contact named above, Chris Keisling (Assistant Director), Amanda R. Parker (Analyst-in-Charge), Mathew Bader, Allison Bawden, Anthony Bova, Eric Hauswirth, Susan Hsu, Rianna Jansen, Justin Jaynes, Tracey King, Matthew T. Lowney, Heidi Nielson, Claire Peachey, Brenda Rabinowitz, Ryan Siegel, Martin Skorczynski, Niti Tandon, Walter K. Vance, James T. Williams, and Eric Winter made key contributions to this report.	[ "FEMA, an agency of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), has obligated more than $36 billion in PA grants to state, local, and tribal governments to help communities recover and rebuild after major disasters since 2009. Further, costs are rising with disasters, such as Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria in 2017. FEMA recently redesigned how the PA program delivers assistance to state and local grantees to improve operations and address past challenges identified by GAO and others. FEMA tested the new delivery model in selected disasters and announced implementation in September 2017. GAO was asked to assess the redesigned PA program. This report examines, among other things, the extent to which FEMA's new delivery model addresses (1) past workforce management challenges and assesses future workforce needs; and (2) past information sharing challenges and key IT management controls. GAO reviewed FEMA policy, strategy, and implementation documents; interviewed FEMA and state officials, PA program applicants, and other stakeholders; and observed implementation of the new model at one test location following Hurricane Matthew in 2016. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) redesigned the Public Assistance (PA) grant program delivery model to address past challenges in workforce management, but has not fully assessed future workforce staffing needs. GAO and others have previously identified challenges related to shortages in experienced and trained FEMA PA staff and high turnover among these staff. These challenges often led to applicants receiving inconsistent guidance and to PA project delays. As part of its new model, FEMA is creating consolidated resource centers to standardize and centralize PA staff responsible for managing grant applications, and new specialized positions, such as hazard mitigation liaisons, program delivery managers, and site inspectors, to ensure more consistent guidance to applicants. However, FEMA has not assessed the workforce needed to fully implement the new model, such as the number of staff needed to fill certain new positions, or to achieve staffing goals for supporting hazard mitigation on PA projects. Fully assessing workforce needs will help to ensure that FEMA has the people and the skills needed to fully implement the new PA model and help to avoid the long-standing workforce challenges the program encountered in the past. FEMA designed a new PA information and case management system—called the FEMA Applicant Case Tracker (FAC-Trax)—to address past information sharing challenges, such as difficulties in sharing grant documentation among FEMA, state, and local officials and tracking the status of PA projects, but additional actions could better ensure effective implementation. Both FEMA and state officials involved in testing of the new model stated that the new information system allows them to better manage and track PA applications and documentation, which could lead to greater transparency and efficiencies in the program. Further, GAO found that this new system fully addresses two of four key information technology (IT) management controls—project planning and risk management—that are necessary to ensure systems work effectively and meet user needs. However, GAO found that FEMA has not fully addressed the other two controls—requirements development and systems testing and integration. By better analyzing progress on high-level user requirements, for example, FEMA will have greater assurance that FAC-Trax will meet user needs and achieve the goals of the new delivery model. GAO is making five recommendations, including that FEMA assess the workforce needed for the new delivery model and improve key IT management controls for its new information sharing and case management system, FAC-Trax. DHS concurred with all recommendations." ]	12,046	gov_report	en	null	99ca7f276ed86afefa3ba3fceed2092bed1be5a09ed5179c
The Energy and Water Development appropriations bill includes funding for civil works projects of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), the Department of the Interior's Central Utah Project (CUP) and Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation), the Department of Energy (DOE), and a number of independent agencies, including the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC). Figure 1 compares the major components of the Energy and Water Development bill from FY2017 through the FY2020 request. President Trump submitted his FY2020 detailed budget proposal to Congress on March 18, 2019 (after submitting a general budget overview on March 11). The budget requests for agencies included in the Energy and Water Development appropriations bill total $38.02 billion—$6.64 billion (15%) below the FY2019 appropriation. (See Table 3 .) A $1.309 billion increase (12%) is proposed for DOE nuclear weapons activities. For FY2019, the conference agreement on H.R. 5895 ( H.Rept. 115-929 ) provided total Energy and Water Development appropriations of $44.66 billion—3% above the FY2018 level and 23% above the FY2019 request. The bill was signed by the President on September 21, 2018 ( P.L. 115-244 ). Figures for FY2019 exclude emergency supplemental appropriations totaling $17.419 billion provided to USACE and DOE for natural disaster response by the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 ( P.L. 115-123 ), signed February 9, 2018. For more details, see CRS Report R45258, Energy and Water Development: FY2019 Appropriations , by Mark Holt and Corrie E. Clark, and CRS Report R45326, Army Corps of Engineers Annual and Supplemental Appropriations: Issues for Congress , by Nicole T. Carter. The FY2020 budget request proposes substantial reductions from the FY2019 enacted level for DOE energy research and development (R&D) programs, including a reduction of $178 million (-24%) in fossil fuels and $502 million (-38%) in nuclear energy. Energy efficiency and renewable energy R&D would decline by $1.724 billion (-83%). DOE science programs would be reduced by $1.039 billion (-16%). Programs targeted by the budget for elimination or phaseout include energy efficiency grants, the Advanced Research Projects Agency—Energy (ARPA-E), and loan guarantee programs. Funding would be reduced for USACE by $2.172 billion (-31%), and Reclamation and CUP by $462 million (-29%). Congress did not enact similar reductions included in the FY2018 and FY2019 budget requests. Congressional consideration of the annual Energy and Water Development appropriations bill is affected by certain procedural and statutory budget enforcement measures. These consist primarily of limits associated with the budget resolution on total discretionary spending and allocations of this amount that apply to spending under the jurisdiction of each appropriations subcommittee. Statutory budget enforcement is derived from the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA; P.L. 112-25 ). The BCA established separate limits on defense and nondefense discretionary spending. These limits are in effect for each of the fiscal years from FY2012 through FY2021, and are primarily enforced by an automatic spending reduction process called sequestration, in which a breach of a spending limit would trigger across-the-board cuts within that spending category. The BCA's statutory discretionary spending limits were increased for FY2018 and FY2019 by the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA 2018; P.L. 115-123 ), enacted February 9, 2018. However, the BCA discretionary spending limits have not been increased for FY2020. As a result, the limits currently in place for FY2020 are substantially lower than the limits that were in place for FY2019. For discretionary defense spending, the FY2020 limit drops from $647 billion to $576 billion (-11%), while the nondefense limit drops from $597 billion to $542 billion (-9%). A bill to raise the defense and nondefense spending limits for FY2020 and FY2021 was reported by the House Budget Committee April 5, 2019 ( H.R. 2021 , H.Rept. 116-35 ). (For more information, see CRS Report R44874, The Budget Control Act: Frequently Asked Questions , by Grant A. Driessen and Megan S. Lynch.) Several issues raised by the Administration's budget request could generate controversy during congressional consideration of Energy and Water Development appropriations for FY2020. The issues described in this section—listed approximately in the order the affected agencies appear in the Energy and Water Development bill—were selected based on the total funding involved, the percentage of proposed increases or decreases, and potential impact on broader public policy considerations. For USACE, the Trump Administration requested $4.827 billion for FY2020, which is $2.172 billion (-31%) below the FY2019 appropriation. The request includes no funding for initiating new studies and construction projects (referred to as new starts). The FY2020 request seeks to limit funding for ongoing navigation and flood risk-reduction construction projects to those whose benefits are at least 2.5 times their costs, or projects that address safety concerns. Many congressionally authorized USACE projects would not meet that standard. The Administration also proposes to transfer the Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program from USACE to DOE. For Reclamation, FY2020 funding would be reduced by $461.6 million (29%) from the FY2019 level, to $1.11 billion. For more details, see CRS In Focus IF11137, Army Corps of Engineers: FY2020 Appropriations , by Nicole T. Carter and Anna E. Normand; CRS In Focus IF11158, Bureau of Reclamation: FY2020 Appropriations , by Charles V. Stern; and CRS Report R45326, Army Corps of Engineers Annual and Supplemental Appropriations: Issues for Congress , by Nicole T. Carter. DOE's FY2020 budget request includes three mandatory proposals related to the Power Marketing Administrations (PMAs)—Bonneville Power Administration (BPA), Southeastern Power Administration (SEPA), Southwestern Power Administration (SWPA), and Western Area Power Administration (WAPA). PMAs sell the power generated by the dams operated by Reclamation and USACE. The Administration proposes to divest the assets of the three PMAs that own transmission infrastructure: BPA, SWPA, and WAPA. These assets consist of thousands of miles of high voltage transmission lines and hundreds of power substations. The budget request projects that mandatory savings from the sale of these assets would total approximately $5.8 billion over a 10-year period. The FY2020 budget request includes a proposal to repeal the borrowing authority for WAPA's Transmission Infrastructure Program, which facilitates the delivery of renewable energy resources. The FY2020 budget also proposes eliminating the statutory requirement that PMAs limit rates to amounts necessary to recover only construction, operations, and maintenance costs; the budget proposes that the PMAs instead transition to a market-based approach to setting rates. The Administration has estimated that this proposal would yield $1.9 billion in new revenues over 10 years. The budget also calls for repealing $3.25 billion in borrowing authority provided to WAPA for transmission projects enacted under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 ( P.L. 111-5 ). The proposal is estimated to save $640 million over 10 years. All of these proposals would need to be enacted in authorizing legislation, and no congressional action has been taken on them to date. The proposals have been opposed by groups such as the American Public Power Association and the National Rural Electrical Cooperative Association, and they have been the subject of opposition letters to the Administration from several regionally based bipartisan groups of Members of Congress. PMA reforms have been supported by some policy research institutes, such as the Heritage Foundation. For further information, see CRS Report R45548, The Power Marketing Administrations: Background and Current Issues , by Richard J. Campbell. The FY2020 budget request proposes to terminate both the DOE Weatherization Assistance Program and the State Energy Program (SEP). The Weatherization Assistance Program provides formula grants to states to fund energy efficiency improvements for low-income housing units to reduce their energy costs and save energy. The SEP provides grants and technical assistance to states for planning and implementation of their energy programs. Both the weatherization and SEP programs are under DOE's Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE). The weatherization program received $257 million and SEP $55 million for FY2019, after also having been proposed for elimination in that year's budget request, as well as in FY2018. According to DOE, the proposed elimination of the grant programs is "due to a departmental shift in focus away from deployment activities and towards early-stage R&D." Appropriations for DOE R&D on energy efficiency, renewable energy, nuclear energy, and fossil energy would be reduced from $4.133 billion in FY2019 to $1.729 billion (-58%) under the Administration's FY2020 budget request. Major proposed reductions include bioenergy technologies (-82%), vehicle technologies (-79%), natural gas technologies (-79%), advanced manufacturing (-75%), building technologies (-75%), wind energy (-74%), solar energy (-73%), geothermal technologies (-67%), and nuclear fuel cycle R&D (-66%). DOE says the proposed reductions would primarily affect the later stages of energy research, which tend to be the most costly. "The Budget focuses DOE resources toward early-stage R&D, where the Federal role is strongest, and reflects an increased reliance on the private sector to fund later-stage research, development, and commercialization of energy technologies," according to the FY2020 DOE request. Similar reductions proposed by the Administration for FY2019 were not enacted. The Administration's FY2020 budget request, for the first time since FY2010, would provide new funding for a proposed nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain, NV; similar Administration requests for the repository project were not included in the enacted funding measures for FY2018 and FY2019. Under the FY2020 request, DOE would receive $116 million to seek an NRC license for the repository and to develop interim nuclear waste storage capacity. NRC would receive $38.5 million to consider DOE's application. DOE's total of $116 million in nuclear waste funding would come from two appropriations accounts: $90 million from Nuclear Waste Disposal and $26 million from Defense Nuclear Waste Disposal (to pay for defense-related nuclear waste that would be disposed of at Yucca Mountain). DOE submitted a license application for the Yucca Mountain repository in 2008, but NRC suspended consideration in 2011 for lack of funding. The Obama Administration had declared the Yucca Mountain site "unworkable" because of opposition from the state of Nevada. The House voted to provide the Yucca Mountain funding requested for FY2018 and a $100 million increase for FY2019, but the Senate Appropriations Committee did not include it for FY2018, and it was not included in the Senate-passed bill for FY2019. Also as in FY2018, the FY2019 Senate bill included an authorization for a pilot program to develop an interim nuclear waste storage facility at a voluntary site (§304). The enacted FY2019 appropriations measure did not include the House-passed funding for Yucca Mountain or the Senate's nuclear waste pilot program provisions. For more background, see CRS Report RL33461, Civilian Nuclear Waste Disposal , by Mark Holt. The FY2020 budget request would halt further loans and loan guarantees under DOE's Advanced Technology Vehicles Manufacturing Loan Program and the Title 17 Innovative Technology Loan Guarantee Program. Similar proposals to eliminate the programs in FY2018 and FY2019 were not enacted. The FY2020 budget request would also halt further loan guarantees under DOE's Tribal Energy Loan Guarantee Program. Under the FY2020 budget proposal, DOE would continue to administer its existing portfolio of loans and loan guarantees. Unused prior-year authority, or ceiling levels, for loan guarantee commitments would be rescinded, as well as $169.5 million in unspent appropriations to cover loan guarantee "subsidy costs" (which are primarily intended to cover potential losses). On March 22, 2019, after the FY2020 budget request had been submitted, DOE provided $3.7 billion in additional Title 17 loan guarantees for two new reactors under construction at the Vogtle nuclear plant in Georgia. The Vogtle project had previously received $8.3 billion in loan guarantees under the DOE program. The Administration's request for DOE includes $107 million in FY2020 for the U.S. contribution to the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER), which is under construction in France by a multinational consortium. "ITER will be the first fusion device to maintain fusion for long periods of time" and is to lay the technical foundation "for the commercial production of fusion-based electricity," according to the consortium's website. The FY2020 DOE appropriation request, 19% below the FY2020 level, would pay for components supplied by U.S. companies for the project, such as central solenoid superconducting magnet modules. ITER has long attracted congressional concern about management, schedule, and cost. The United States is to pay 9% of the project's construction costs, including contributions of components, cash, and personnel. Other collaborators in the project include the European Union, Russia, Japan, India, South Korea, and China. The total U.S. share of the cost was estimated in 2015 at between $4.0 billion and $6.5 billion, up from $1.45 billion to $2.2 billion in 2008. DOE funding for the project was $122 million in FY2018 and $132 million in FY2019. The Trump Administration's FY2020 budget would eliminate the Advanced Research Projects Agency—Energy (ARPA-E) and rescind $287 million of the agency's unobligated balances. ARPA-E funds research on technologies that are determined to have potential to transform energy production, storage, and use. "This elimination facilitates opportunities to integrate the positive aspects of ARPA-E into DOE's applied energy research programs," according to the DOE request. The Administration also proposed to terminate ARPA-E in its FY2018 and FY2019 budget requests, but Congress increased the program's funding in both years. Because ARPA-E provides advance funding for projects for up to three years, oversight and management of the program would still be required during a phaseout period. According to the Administration budget request, "ARPA-E will utilize the remainder of its unobligated balances to execute the multi-year termination of the program, with all operations ceasing by FY 2022." The FY2020 budget request for DOE Weapons Activities is 12% greater than the FY2019 enacted level ($12.4 billion vs. $11.1 billion). Weapons Activities programs are carried out by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a semiautonomous agency within DOE. Under Weapons Activities, FY2020 funding for nuclear warhead life-extension programs (LEPs) would increase by 10% ($2.1 billion vs $1.9 billion). The two most notable increases within that account are the funding request for W80-4 LEP, which increases by 37% ($898.6 million vs. $654.8 million) and the initiation of funding for the W87-1 LEP. The increase in the request for the W80-4 warhead, which is due to be carried on the new long-range standoff weapon (a new cruise missile), apparently is the result of a new budget estimate, as the Department of Defense is not accelerating development of the missile. The FY2020 request seeks $112 million for the W87-1 warhead (formerly the Interoperable Warhead 1, or IW-I), which received $53 million in FY2019. This warhead is to be carried by the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent, a new land-based missile that is scheduled to enter the force in the 2030s. The FY2020 budget request seeks $10 million for the W76-2 LEP, down from $65 million in FY2019. Work on this warhead is nearly complete. It is a low-yield modification of the current W76 warhead carried by U.S. submarine-launched ballistic missiles. It remains controversial in Congress despite its relatively low price tag. In FY2020, NNSA is seeking $51.5 million, in the Stockpile Systems account, for surveillance efforts for the B83 gravity bomb, the most powerful bomb in the U.S. inventory. This effort represents a 47% increase over the $35 million request in FY2019. The Obama Administration had planned to retire this bomb, but the Trump Administration reversed that decision in its 2018 Nuclear Posture Review. This decision may also prove controversial, as several Senators have been vocal supporters of the plan to retire the bomb. Within the Strategic Materials account in the NNSA budget, funding for Plutonium Sustainment would increase 97%, from $361 million enacted for FY2019 to $712 million requested for FY2020. This increase would support the Administration's plans to produce plutonium pits (or cores) for nuclear warheads at two facilities—Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico and the Savannah River Site in South Carolina. The Administration is seeking $410 million to begin conceptual design and pre-Critical Decision (CD)-1 activities at Savannah River. For more information, see CRS Report R44442, Energy and Water Development Appropriations: Nuclear Weapons Activities , by Amy F. Woolf. DOE's Office of Environmental Management (EM) is responsible for environmental cleanup and waste management at the department's nuclear facilities. The total FY2020 appropriations request for EM activities of $6.469 billion would be a decrease of $706 million (-10%) from FY2019. The budgetary components of the EM program are Defense Environmental Cleanup (-9%), Non-Defense Environmental Cleanup (-20%), and the Uranium Enrichment Decontamination and Decommissioning Fund (-15%). The FY2020 request includes a proposal to transfer management of the Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP) from USACE to the Office of Legacy Management (LM), the DOE office responsible for long-term stewardship of remediated sites. The FY2020 LM budget request includes $141 million for FUSRAP, down from $150 million appropriated to USACE for the program in FY2019. According to the DOE budget justification, "USACE will continue to conduct cleanup of FUSRAP sites on a reimbursable basis." Table 1 indicates the steps during consideration of FY2020 Energy and Water Development appropriations. (For more details, see the CRS Appropriations Status Table at http://www.crs.gov/AppropriationsStatusTable/Index .) As of the publication date of this report, no markups had been held. Table 2 includes budget totals for energy and water development appropriations enacted for FY2011 through FY2019, plus the FY2020 request. The annual Energy and Water Development appropriations bill includes four titles: Title I—Corps of Engineers—Civil; Title II—Department of the Interior (Central Utah Project and Bureau of Reclamation); Title III—Department of Energy; and Title IV—Independent Agencies, as shown in Table 3 . Major programs in the bill are described in this section in the approximate order they appear in the bill. Previous appropriations and budget recommendations for FY2020 are shown in the accompanying tables, and additional details about many of these programs are provided in separate CRS reports as indicated. For a discussion of current funding issues related to these programs, see " Funding Issues and Initiatives ," above. Congressional clients may obtain more detailed information by contacting CRS analysts listed in CRS Report R42638, Appropriations: CRS Experts , by James M. Specht and Justin Murray. FY2020 budget justifications for the largest agencies funded by the annual Energy and Water Development appropriations bill can be found through the following links: Title I, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Civil Works, http://www.usace.army.mil/Missions/CivilWorks/Budget Title II Bureau of Reclamation, https://www.usbr.gov/budget/ Central Utah Project, https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/uploads/fy2020_cupca_budget_justification.pdf Title III, Department of Energy, https://www.energy.gov/cfo/downloads/fy-2020-budget-justification Title IV, Independent Agencies Appalachian Regional Commission, http://www.arc.gov/images/newsroom/publications/fy2020budget/FY2020PerformanceBudgetMar2019.pdf Nuclear Regulatory Commission, https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1906/ML19065A279.pdf Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, https://www.dnfsb.gov/about/congressional-budget-requests Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board, http://www.nwtrb.gov/about-us/plans USACE is an agency in the Department of Defense with both military and civilian responsibilities. Under its civil works program, which is funded by the Energy and Water appropriations bill, USACE plans, builds, operates, and in some cases maintains water resources facilities for coastal and inland navigation, riverine and coastal flood risk reduction, and aquatic ecosystem restoration. In recent decades, Congress has generally authorized Corps studies, construction projects, and other activities in omnibus water authorization bills, typically titled Water Resources Development Acts (WRDA), prior to funding them through appropriations legislation. Recent Congresses enacted the following omnibus water resources authorization acts: in June 2014, the Water Resources Reform and Development Act of 2014 (WRRDA, P.L. 113-121 ); in December 2016, the Water Resources Development Act of 2016 (Title I of P.L. 114-322 , the Water Infrastructure Improvements for the Nation Act [WIIN]); and in October 2018, the Water Resources Development Act of 2018 (Title I of P.L. 115-270 , America's Water Infrastructure Act of 2018 [AWIA 2018]). These acts consisted largely of authorizations for new USACE projects, and they altered numerous USACE policies and procedures. Unlike in highways and municipal water infrastructure programs, federal funds for USACE are not distributed to states or projects based on formulas or delivered via competitive grants. Instead, USACE generally is directly involved in planning, designing, and managing the construction of projects that are cost-shared with nonfederal project sponsors. Prior to FY2010, in addition to site-specific project funding included in the President's annual budget request for USACE, Congress, during the discretionary appropriations process, had identified many additional USACE projects to receive funding or had adjusted the funding levels for the projects identified in the President's request. Starting in the 112 th Congress, site-specific project line items added or increased by Congress (i.e., earmarks) became subject to House and Senate earmark moratorium policies. As a result, Congress generally has not added funding at the project level since FY2010. In lieu of the project-based increases, Congress has included "additional funding" for select categories of USACE projects and provided direction and limitations on the use of these funds. For more information, CRS In Focus IF11137, Army Corps of Engineers: FY2020 Appropriations , by Nicole T. Carter and Anna E. Normand. Previous appropriations and the President's request for FY2020 are shown in Table 4 . Most of the large dams and water diversion structures in the West were built by, or with the assistance of, the Bureau of Reclamation. While the Corps of Engineers built hundreds of flood control and navigation projects, Reclamation's original mission was to develop water supplies, primarily for irrigation to reclaim arid lands in the West for farming and ranching. Reclamation has evolved into an agency that assists in meeting the water demands in the West while working to protect the environment and the public's investment in Reclamation infrastructure. The agency's municipal and industrial water deliveries have more than doubled since 1970. Today, Reclamation manages hundreds of dams and diversion projects, including more than 300 storage reservoirs, in 17 western states. These projects provide water to approximately 10 million acres of farmland and 31 million people. Reclamation is the largest wholesale supplier of water in the 17 western states and the second-largest hydroelectric power producer in the nation. Reclamation facilities also provide substantial flood control, recreation, and other benefits. Reclamation facility operations are often controversial, particularly for their effect on fish and wildlife species and because of conflicts among competing water users during drought conditions. As with the Corps of Engineers, the Reclamation budget is made up largely of individual project funding lines, rather than general programs that would not be covered by congressional earmark requirements. Therefore, as with USACE, these Reclamation projects have often been subject to earmark disclosure rules. The current moratorium on earmarks restricts congressional steering of money directly toward specific Reclamation projects. Reclamation's single largest account, Water and Related Resources, encompasses the agency's traditional programs and projects, including construction, operations and maintenance, dam safety, and ecosystem restoration, among others. Reclamation also typically requests funds in a number of smaller accounts, and has proposed additional accounts in recent years. Implementation and oversight of the Central Utah Project (CUP), also funded by Title II, is conducted by a separate office within the Department of the Interior. For more information, see CRS In Focus IF11158, Bureau of Reclamation: FY2020 Appropriations , by Charles V. Stern. Previous appropriations and recommendations for FY2020 are shown in Table 5 . The Energy and Water Development bill has funded all DOE programs since FY2005. Major DOE activities include (1) research and development (R&D) on renewable energy, energy efficiency, nuclear power, fossil energy, and electricity; (2) the Strategic Petroleum Reserve; (3) energy statistics; (4) general science; (5) environmental cleanup; and (6) nuclear weapons and nonproliferation programs. Table 6 provides the recent funding history for DOE programs, which are briefly described further below. DOE's Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) conducts research and development on transportation energy technology, energy efficiency in buildings and manufacturing processes, and the production of solar, wind, geothermal, and other renewable energy. EERE also administers formula grants to states for making energy efficiency improvements to low-income housing units and for state energy planning. The Sustainable Transportation program area includes electric vehicles, vehicle efficiency, and alternative fuels. DOE's electric vehicle program aims to "reduce the cost of electric vehicle batteries by more than half, to less than $100/kWh [kilowatt-hour] (ultimate goal is $80/kWh), increase range to 300 miles, and decrease charge time to 15 minutes or less." DOE's vehicle fuel cell program is focusing on the costs of fuel cells and their hydrogen fuel. According to the FY2020 budget request, "To be cost competitive with gasoline-powered internal combustion engines on a cents-per-mile driven basis, the cost of hydrogen delivered and dispensed needs to be less than $4/gge [gasoline gallon equivalent] (untaxed), and the cost of a durable fuel cell system to be less than $40/kW." Bioenergy goals include the development of "drop-in" fuels—fuels that would be largely compatible with existing energy infrastructure and vehicles, with a goal of $3/gge. Renewable power programs focus on electricity generation from solar, wind, water, and geothermal sources. The solar energy program has a goal of achieving, by 2030, costs of 3 cents per kWh for unsubsidized, utility-scale photovoltaics (PV). Wind R&D is to focus on early-stage research and testing to reduce costs and improve performance and reliability. The geothermal program is to focus on developing "enhanced geothermal systems" with an electricity generation cost target of 20.8 cents/kWh by 2022. In the energy efficiency program area, the advanced manufacturing program focuses on improving the energy efficiency of manufacturing processes and on the manufacturing of energy-related products. The building technologies program includes R&D on lighting, space conditioning, windows, and control technologies to reduce building energy-use intensity. The energy efficiency program also provides weatherization grants to states for improving the energy efficiency of low-income housing units and state energy planning grants. For more details, see CRS Report R44980, DOE's Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE): Appropriations Status , by Corrie E. Clark. The Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER) was created from programs that were previously part of the Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability. The programs that were not moved into CESER became part of the DOE Office of Electricity (OE). OE's mission is to lead DOE efforts "to strengthen, transform, and improve energy infrastructure so that consumers have access to secure and resilient sources of energy." Major priorities of OE are developing a model of North American energy vulnerabilities, pursuing megawatt-scale electricity storage, integrating electric power system sensing technology, and analyzing electricity policy issues. The office also includes the DOE power marketing administrations, which are funded from separate appropriations accounts. CESER is the federal government's lead entity for energy sector-specific responses to energy security emergencies—whether caused by physical infrastructure problems or by cybersecurity issues. The office conducts R&D on energy infrastructure security technology; provides energy sector security guidelines, training, and technical assistance; and enhances energy sector emergency preparedness and response. DOE's Multiyear Plan for Energy Sector Cybersecurity describes the department's strategy to "strengthen today's energy delivery systems by working with our partners to address growing threats and promote continuous improvement, and develop game-changing solutions that will create inherently secure, resilient, and self-defending energy systems for tomorrow." The plan includes three goals that DOE has established for energy sector cybersecurity: strengthen energy sector cybersecurity preparedness; coordinate cyber incident response and recovery; and accelerate game-changing research, development, and demonstration (RD&D) of resilient energy delivery systems. DOE's Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) "focuses on three major mission areas: the nation's existing nuclear fleet, the development of advanced nuclear reactor concepts, and fuel cycle technologies," according to DOE's FY2020 budget justification. It calls nuclear energy "a key element of United States energy independence, energy dominance, electricity grid resiliency, national security, and clean baseload power." The Reactor Concepts program area includes research on advanced reactors, including advanced small modular reactors, and research to enhance the "sustainability" of existing commercial light water reactors. Advanced reactor research focuses on "Generation IV" reactors, as opposed to the existing fleet of commercial light water reactors, which are generally classified as generations II and III. R&D under this program focuses on advanced coolants, fuels, materials, and other technology areas that could apply to a variety of advanced reactors. To help develop those technologies, the Reactor Concepts program is developing a Versatile Test Reactor that would allow fuels and materials to be tested in a fast neutron environment (in which neutrons would not be slowed by water, graphite, or other "moderators"). Research on extending the life of existing commercial light water reactors beyond 60 years, the maximum operating period currently licensed by NRC, is being conducted by this program with industry cost-sharing. The Fuel Cycle Research and Development program includes generic research on nuclear waste management and disposal. One of the program's primary activities is the development of technologies to separate the radioactive constituents of spent fuel for reuse or solidifying into stable waste forms. Other major research areas in the Fuel Cycle R&D program include the development of accident-tolerant fuels for existing commercial reactors, evaluation of fuel cycle options, and development of improved technologies to prevent diversion of nuclear materials for weapons. The program is also developing sources of high-assay low enriched uranium (HALEU), in which uranium is enriched to between 5% and 20% in the fissile isotope U-235, for potential use in advanced reactors. For more information, see CRS Report R45706, Advanced Nuclear Reactors: Technology Overview and Current Issues , by Danielle A. Arostegui and Mark Holt. Much of DOE's Fossil Energy R&D Program focuses on carbon capture and storage for power plants fueled by coal and natural gas. Major activities include Advanced Coal Energy Systems and Carbon Capture, Utilization, and Storage (CCUS); Natural Gas Technologies; and Unconventional Fossil Energy Technologies from Petroleum—Oil Technologies. Advanced Coal Energy Systems includes R&D on modular coal-gasification systems, advanced turbines, solid oxide fuel cells, advanced sensors and controls, and power generation efficiency. Elements of the CCUS program include the following: Carbon Capture subprogram for separating CO 2 in both precombustion and postcombustion systems; Carbon Utilization subprogram for R&D on technologies to convert carbon to marketable products, such as chemicals and polymers; and Carbon Storage subprogram on long-term geologic storage of CO 2 , focusing on saline formations, oil and natural gas reservoirs, unmineable coal seams, basalts, and organic shales. For more information, see CRS In Focus IF10589, FY2019 Funding for CCS and Other DOE Fossil Energy R&D , by Peter Folger, and CRS Report R44472, Funding for Carbon Capture and Sequestration (CCS) at DOE: In Brief , by Peter Folger. The Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR), authorized by the Energy Policy and Conservation Act ( P.L. 94-163 ) in 1975, consists of caverns built within naturally occurring salt domes in Louisiana and Texas. The SPR provides strategic and economic security against foreign and domestic disruptions in U.S. oil supplies via an emergency stockpile of crude oil. The program fulfills U.S. obligations under the International Energy Program, which avails the United States of International Energy Agency (IEA) assistance through its coordinated energy emergency response plans, and provides a deterrent against energy supply disruptions. DOE has been conducting a major maintenance program to address aging infrastructure and a deferred maintenance backlog at SPR facilities. The federal government has not purchased oil for the SPR since 1994. Beginning in 2000, additions to the SPR were made with royalty-in-kind (RIK) oil acquired by DOE in lieu of cash royalties paid on production from federal offshore leases. In September 2009, the Secretary of the Interior announced a phaseout of the RIK Program. By early 2010, the SPR's capacity reached 727 million barrels. A series of oil sales and purchases since then have resulted in a net reduction of the SPR inventory. Currently, the SPR contains about 649 million barrels. Congress has enacted several laws since 2015 that mandate sales of SPR oil, including the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 ( P.L. 114-74 ), the Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act ( P.L. 114-94 ), the 21 st Century Cures Act of 2016 ( P.L. 114-255 ), the 2017 Tax Revision ( P.L. 115-97 ), the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 ( P.L. 115-123 ), and the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018. Broadly considered, this legislation requires oil to be sold from the reserve over the period FY2017 through FY2027, totaling 266 million barrels. For more information, see CRS Report R45577, Strategic Petroleum Reserve: Mandated Sales and Reform , by Robert Pirog, and CRS In Focus IF10869, Reconsidering the Strategic Petroleum Reserve , by Robert Pirog. The DOE Office of Science conducts basic research in six program areas: advanced scientific computing research, basic energy sciences, biological and environmental research, fusion energy sciences, high-energy physics, and nuclear physics. According to DOE's FY2020 budget justification, the Office of Science "is the Nation's largest Federal sponsor of basic research in the physical sciences and the lead Federal agency supporting fundamental scientific research for our Nation's energy future." DOE's Advanced Scientific Computing Research (ASCR) program focuses on developing and maintaining computing and networking capabilities for science and research in applied mathematics, computer science, and advanced networking. The program plays a key role in the DOE-wide effort to advance the development of exascale computing, which seeks to build a computer that can solve scientific problems 1,000 times faster than today's best machines. DOE has asserted that the department is on a path to have a capable exascale machine by the early 2020s. Basic Energy Sciences (BES), the largest program area in the Office of Science, focuses on understanding, predicting, and ultimately controlling matter and energy at the electronic, atomic, and molecular levels. The program supports research in disciplines such as condensed matter and materials physics, chemistry, and geosciences. BES also provides funding for scientific user facilities (e.g., the National Synchrotron Light Source II, and the Linac Coherent Light Source-II), and certain DOE research centers and hubs (e.g., Energy Frontier Research Centers, as well as the Batteries and Energy Storage and Fuels from Sunlight Energy Innovation Hubs). Biological and Environmental Research (BER) seeks a predictive understanding of complex biological, climate, and environmental systems across a continuum from the small scale (e.g., genomic research) to the large (e.g., Earth systems and climate). Within BER, Biological Systems Science focuses on plant and microbial systems, while Biological and Environmental Research supports climate-relevant atmospheric and ecosystem modeling and research. BER facilities and centers include four Bioenergy Research Centers and the Environmental Molecular Science Laboratory at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. Fusion Energy Sciences (FES) seeks to increase understanding of the behavior of matter at very high temperatures and to establish the science needed to develop a fusion energy source. FES provides funding for the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) project, a multinational effort to design and build an experimental fusion reactor. According to DOE, ITER "aims to provide fusion power output approaching reactor levels of hundreds of megawatts, for hundreds of seconds." However, many U.S. analysts have expressed concern about ITER's cost, schedule, and management, as well as the budgetary impact on domestic fusion research. The High Energy Physics (HEP) program conducts research on the fundamental constituents of matter and energy, including studies of dark energy and the search for dark matter. Nuclear Physics supports research on the nature of matter, including its basic constituents and their interactions. A major project in the Nuclear Physics program is the construction of the Facility for Rare Isotope Beams at Michigan State University. A separate DOE office, the Advanced Research Projects Agency—Energy (ARPA-E), was authorized by the America COMPETES Act ( P.L. 110-69 ) to support transformational energy technology research projects. DOE budget documents describe ARPA-E's mission as overcoming long-term, high-risk technological barriers to the development of energy technologies. For more details, see CRS Report R45150, Federal Research and Development (R&D) Funding: FY2019 , coordinated by John F. Sargent Jr. DOE's Loan Programs Office provides loan guarantees for projects that deploy specified energy technologies, as authorized by Title 17 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPACT05, P.L. 109-58 ), direct loans for advanced vehicle manufacturing technologies, and loan guarantees for tribal energy projects. Section 1703 of the act authorizes loan guarantees for advanced energy technologies that reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and Section 1705 established a temporary program for renewable energy and energy efficiency projects. Title 17 allows DOE to provide loan guarantees for up to 80% of construction costs for eligible energy projects. Successful applicants must pay an up-front fee, or "subsidy cost," to cover potential losses under the loan guarantee program. Under the loan guarantee agreements, the federal government would repay all covered loans if the borrower defaulted. Such guarantees would reduce the risk to lenders and allow them to provide financing at below-market interest rates. The following is a summary of loan guarantee amounts that have been authorized (loan guarantee ceilings) for various technologies: $8.3 billion for nonnuclear technologies under Section 1703; $2.0 billion for unspecified projects from FY2007 under Section 1703; $18.5 billion for nuclear power plants ($12.0 billion committed); $4 billion for loan guarantees for uranium enrichment plants; $1.18 billion for renewable energy and energy efficiency projects under Section 1703, in addition to other loan guarantee ceilings, which can include applications that were pending under Section 1705 before it expired; and In addition to the loan guarantee ceilings above, an appropriation of $161 million was provided for subsidy costs for renewable energy and energy efficiency loan guarantees under Section 1703. If the subsidy costs averaged 10% of the loan guarantees, this funding could leverage loan guarantees totaling about $1.6 billion. The only loan guarantees under Section 1703 were $8.3 billion in guarantees provided to the consortium building two new reactors at the Vogtle plant in Georgia. DOE committed an additional $3.7 billion in loan guarantees for the Vogtle project on March 22, 2019. Another nuclear loan guarantee is being sought by NuScale Power to build a small modular reactor in Idaho. In the absence of explosive testing of nuclear weapons, the United States has adopted a science-based program to maintain and sustain confidence in the reliability of the U.S. nuclear stockpile. Congress established the Stockpile Stewardship Program in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 ( P.L. 103-160 ). The goal of the program, as amended by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 ( P.L. 111-84 , §3111), is to ensure "that the nuclear weapons stockpile is safe, secure, and reliable without the use of underground nuclear weapons testing." The program is operated by NNSA, a semiautonomous agency within DOE established by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 ( P.L. 106-65 , Title XXXII). NNSA implements the Stockpile Stewardship Program through the activities funded by the Weapons Activities account in the NNSA budget. Most of NNSA's weapons activities take place at the nuclear weapons complex, which consists of three laboratories (Los Alamos National Laboratory, NM; Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, CA; and Sandia National Laboratories, NM and CA); four production sites (Kansas City National Security Campus, MO; Pantex Plant, TX; Savannah River Site, SC; and Y-12 National Security Complex, TN); and the Nevada National Security Site (formerly the Nevada Test Site). NNSA manages and sets policy for the weapons complex; contractors to NNSA operate the eight sites. Radiological activities at these sites are subject to oversight and recommendations by the independent Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, funded by Title IV of the annual Energy and Water Development appropriations bill. There are three major program areas in the Weapons Activities account. Directed Stockpile Work includes the life extension programs (LEPs) on existing warheads and stockpile services programs that monitor their condition; and maintaining warheads through repairs, refurbishment, and modifications. It also includes funding for research and development in support of specific warheads, and dismantlement of warheads that have been removed from the stockpile. This last activity received more significant funding as the number of warheads in the U.S. stockpile declined after the Cold War; it also provides a source for critical components for warheads remaining in the stockpile. Directed Stockpile Work also involves programs that work on the materials needed for nuclear warheads, including the plutonium pits that are the core of the weapons. Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) includes five programs that focus on "efforts to develop and maintain critical capabilities, tools, and processes needed to support science based stockpile stewardship, refurbishment, and continued certification of the stockpile over the long-term in the absence of underground nuclear testing." This area includes operation of some large experimental facilities, such as the National Ignition Facility at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. Infrastructure and Operations has, as its main funding elements, material recycle and recovery, recapitalization of facilities, and construction of facilities. The latter include two major projects that have generated congressional controversy: the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) at the Y-12 National Security Complex and the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) Project, which deals with plutonium, at Los Alamos National Laboratory. Nuclear Weapons Activities also has several smaller programs, including the following: Secure Transportation Asset, providing for safe and secure transport of nuclear weapons, components, and materials; Defense Nuclear Security, providing operations, maintenance, and construction funds for protective forces, physical security systems, personnel security, and related activities; and Information Technology and Cybersecurity, whose elements include cybersecurity, secure enterprise computing, and Federal Unclassified Information Technology. For more information, see CRS Report R44442, Energy and Water Development Appropriations: Nuclear Weapons Activities , by Amy F. Woolf, and CRS Report R45306, The U.S. Nuclear Weapons Complex: Overview of Department of Energy Sites , by Amy F. Woolf and James D. Werner. DOE's nonproliferation and national security programs provide technical capabilities to support U.S. efforts to prevent, detect, and counter the spread of nuclear weapons worldwide. These programs are administered by NNSA's Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation. The Materials Management and Minimization program conducts activities to minimize and, where possible, eliminate stockpiles of weapons-useable material around the world. Major activities include conversion of reactors that use highly enriched uranium (useable for weapons) to low-enriched uranium, removal and consolidation of nuclear material stockpiles, and disposition of excess nuclear materials. Global Materials Security has three major program elements. International Nuclear Security focuses on increasing the security of vulnerable stockpiles of nuclear material in other countries. Radiological Security promotes the worldwide reduction and security of radioactive sources, including the removal of surplus sources and substitution of technologies that do not use radioactive materials. Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence works to improve the capability of other countries to halt illicit trafficking of nuclear materials. Nonproliferation and Arms Control works to "to support U.S. nonproliferation and arms control objectives to prevent proliferation, ensure peaceful nuclear uses, and enable verifiable nuclear reductions," according to the FY2020 DOE justification. This program conducts reviews of nuclear export applications and technology transfer authorizations, implements treaty obligations, and analyzes nonproliferation policies and proposals. Other programs under Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation include research and development and construction, which advances nuclear detection and nuclear forensics technologies. Nuclear Counterterrorism and Incident Response provides "interagency policy, contingency planning, training, and capacity building" to counter nuclear terrorism and strengthen incident response capabilities, according to the FY2020 budget justification. The development and production of nuclear weapons during half a century since the beginning of the Manhattan Project resulted in a waste and contamination legacy managed by DOE that continues to present substantial challenges today. DOE also manages legacy environmental contamination at sites used for nondefense nuclear research. In 1989, DOE established the Office of Environmental Management primarily to consolidate its responsibilities for the cleanup of former nuclear weapons production sites that had been administered under multiple offices. DOE's nuclear cleanup efforts are broad in scope and include the disposal of large quantities of radioactive and other hazardous wastes generated over decades; management and disposal of surplus nuclear materials; remediation of extensive contamination in soil and groundwater; decontamination and decommissioning of excess buildings and facilities; and safeguarding, securing, and maintaining facilities while cleanup is underway. DOE's cleanup of nuclear research sites adds a nondefense component to the EM's mission, albeit smaller in terms of the scope of their cleanup and associated funding. DOE has identified more than 100 separate sites in over 30 states that historically were involved in the production of nuclear weapons and nuclear energy research for civilian purposes. The geographic scope of these sites is substantial, collectively encompassing a land area of approximately 2 million acres. Cleanup remedies are in place and operational at the majority of these sites. Responsibility for the long-term stewardship of them has been transferred to the Office of Legacy Management and other offices within DOE for the operation and maintenance of cleanup remedies and monitoring. Some of the smaller sites for which DOE initially was responsible were transferred to the Army Corps of Engineers in 1997 under the Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP). Once USACE completes the cleanup of a FUSRAP site, it is transferred back to DOE for long-term stewardship under the Office of Legacy Management, which is separate from EM and has its own funding account. Three appropriations accounts fund the Office of Environmental Management. The Defense Environmental Cleanup account is the largest in terms of funding, and it finances the cleanup of former nuclear weapons production sites. The Non-Defense Environmental Cleanup account funds the cleanup of federal nuclear energy research sites. Title XI of the Energy Policy Act of 1992 ( P.L. 102-486 ) established the Uranium Enrichment Decontamination and Decommissioning Fund to pay for the cleanup of three federal facilities that enriched uranium for national defense and civilian purposes. Those facilities are located near Paducah, KY; Piketon, OH (Portsmouth plant); and Oak Ridge, TN. Title X of P.L. 102-486 authorized the reimbursement of uranium and thorium producers for their costs of cleaning up contamination attributable to uranium and thorium sold to the federal government. The adequacy of funding for the Office of Environmental Management to attain cleanup milestones across the entire site inventory has been a recurring issue. Cleanup milestones are enforceable measures incorporated into compliance agreements negotiated among DOE, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the states. These milestones establish time frames for the completion of specific actions to satisfy applicable requirements at individual sites. DOE's four Power Marketing Administrations were established to sell the power generated by the dams operated by the Bureau of Reclamation and the Army Corps of Engineers. Preference in the sale of power is given to publicly owned and cooperatively owned utilities. The PMAs operate in 34 states; their assets consist primarily of transmission infrastructure in the form of more than 33,000 miles of high voltage transmission lines and 587 substations. PMA customers are responsible for repaying all power program expenses, plus the interest on capital projects. Since FY2011, power revenues associated with the PMAs have been classified as discretionary offsetting receipts (i.e., receipts that are available for spending by the PMAs), thus the agencies are sometimes noted as having a "net-zero" spending authority. Only the capital expenses of WAPA and SWPA require appropriations from Congress. For more information, see CRS Report R45548, The Power Marketing Administrations: Background and Current Issues , by Richard J. Campbell. Independent agencies that receive funding in Title IV of the Energy and Water Development bill include the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC), and the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board. NRC is by far the largest of the independent agencies, with a total budget of more than $900 million. However, as noted in the description of NRC below, about 90% of NRC's budget is offset by fees, so that the agency's net appropriation is less than half of the total funding in Title IV. The recent appropriations history for all the Title IV agencies is shown in Table 7 . Established in 1965, the Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC) is a regional economic development agency. It awards grants and contracts to state and local governments and nonprofit organizations to foster economic opportunities, improve workforce skills, build critical infrastructure, strengthen natural and cultural assets, and improve leadership skills and capacity in the region. ARC's authorizing statute defines the Appalachian Region as including all of West Virginia and parts of Alabama, Georgia, Kentucky, Maryland, Mississippi, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia. More than 25 million people currently live in the region as defined. ARC provides funding to several hundred projects each year, with particular focus on the region's most economically distressed counties. Major areas of infrastructure support broadband communication systems, transportation, and water and wastewater systems. ARC has supported development of the Appalachian Development Highway System (ADHS), a planned 3,000-mile system of highways that connect with the U.S. Interstate Highway System. According to ARC, 90.5% of ADHS is currently "complete, open to traffic, or under construction." NRC is an independent agency that establishes and enforces safety and security standards for nuclear power plants and users of nuclear materials. Major appropriations categories for NRC are shown in Table 8 . Nuclear Reactor Safety is NRC's largest program and is responsible for licensing and regulating the U.S. fleet of 98 power reactors, plus two under construction. NRC is also responsible for licensing and regulating nuclear waste facilities, such as the proposed underground nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain, NV. NRC is required by law to offset about 90% of its total budget, excluding specified items, through fees charged to nuclear reactor owners and other holders of NRC licenses. As a result, NRC's net appropriation can be as low as 10% of its total funding level, depending on the activities that Congress excludes from fee recovery. For example, excluded items in NRC's FY2019 enacted appropriation are prior-year balances, development of advanced reactor regulations, and international activities. The following hearings have been held by the Energy and Water Development subcommittees of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees on the FY2020 budget request. Testimony and opening statements are posted on most of the web pages cited for each hearing, along with webcasts in many cases. Department of Energy , March 26, 2019, https://appropriations.house.gov/legislation/hearings/budget-department-of-energy . Corps of Engineers (Civil Works) and the Bureau of Reclamation , March 27, 2019, https://appropriations.house.gov/legislation/hearings/budget-us-army-corps-of-engineers-and-bureau-of-reclamation . National Nuclear Security Administration , April 2, 2019, https://appropriations.house.gov/legislation/hearings/budget-department-of-energy-national-nuclear-security-administration. DOE Science, Energy, and Environmental Management Programs , April 3, 2019, https://appropriations.house.gov/legislation/hearings/budget-science-energy-and-environmental-management-programs. Department of Energy , March 27, 2019, https://www.appropriations.senate.gov/hearings/review-of-the-fy2020-budget-request-for-the-us-department-of-energy . National Nuclear Security Administration , April 3, 2019, https://www.appropriations.senate.gov/hearings/review-of-the-fy2020-budget-request-for-the-national-nuclear-security-administration . U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation , April 10, 2019, https://www.appropriations.senate.gov/hearings/review-of-the-fy2020-budget-requests-for-army-corps-of-engineers-and-bureau-of-reclamation .	[ "The Energy and Water Development appropriations bill provides funding for civil works projects of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE); the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation) and Central Utah Project (CUP); the Department of Energy (DOE); the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC); and several other independent agencies. DOE typically accounts for about 80% of the bill's funding. President Trump submitted his FY2020 detailed budget proposal to Congress on March 18, 2019 (after submitting a general budget overview on March 11). The budget requests for agencies included in the Energy and Water Development appropriations bill total $38.02 billion—$6.64 billion (15%) below the FY2019 appropriation. The largest exception to the overall decrease proposed for energy and water programs is a $1.309 billion increase (12%) for DOE nuclear weapons activities. For FY2019, the conference agreement on H.R. 5895 (H.Rept. 115-929) provided total Energy and Water Development appropriations of $44.66 billion—3% above the FY2018 level, excluding supplemental funding, and 23% above the FY2019 request. It was signed by the President on September 21, 2018 (P.L. 115-244). Emergency supplemental appropriations totaling $17.419 billion were provided to USACE and DOE for hurricane response by the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-123), signed February 9, 2018. Major Energy and Water Development funding issues for FY2020 are listed below. They were selected based on the total funding involved, the percentage of proposed increases or decreases, and potential impact on broader public policy considerations. Water Agency Funding Reductions. The Trump Administration requested reductions of 31% for USACE and 29% for Reclamation for FY2020 from the FY2019 enacted levels. The largest reductions would be from USACE Operation and Maintenance (-48%) and Reclamation's Water and Related Resources account (-31%). Similar reductions proposed by the Administration for FY2019 were not enacted. Power Marketing Administration (PMA) Reforms. DOE's FY2020 budget request includes mandatory proposals to sell PMA electricity transmission lines and other assets, repeal certain PMA borrowing authority, and eliminate cost-based limits on the electricity rates charged by the PMAs. The proposals would need to be enacted in authorizing legislation. Termination of Energy Efficiency Grants. DOE's Weatherization Assistance Program and State Energy Program would be terminated under the FY2020 budget request. The Administration had proposed to eliminate the grants in FY2018 and FY2019, but Congress continued funding. Reductions in Energy Research and Development. Under the FY2020 budget request, DOE research and development appropriations would be reduced for energy efficiency and renewable energy (EERE) by 83%, nuclear energy by 38%, and fossil energy by 24%. Similar reductions proposed by the Administration for FY2019 were not enacted. Nuclear Waste Repository. The Administration's budget request would provide new funding for the first time since FY2010 for a proposed nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain, NV. DOE would receive $116 million to seek an NRC license for the repository and develop interim waste storage capacity. NRC would receive $38.5 million to consider DOE's repository license application. Similar Administration funding requests for FY2018 and FY2019 were not enacted. Elimination of Advanced Research Projects Agency—Energy (ARPA-E). The Trump Administration proposes no new appropriations for ARPA-E in FY2020 and to cancel $287 million in unobligated balances from previous appropriations. Similar proposals to terminate ARPA-E in FY2018 and FY2019 were not enacted. Loan Programs Termination. The FY2020 budget request would terminate DOE's Title 17 Innovative Technology Loan Guarantee Program, the Advanced Technology Vehicles Manufacturing Loan Program, and the Tribal Energy Loan Guarantee Program. Administration proposals to eliminate the programs were not included in the enacted appropriations measures for FY2018 and FY2019. Weapons Activities. The FY2020 budget request for DOE Weapons Activities is 12% greater than it was in FY2019 ($12.4 billion vs. $11.1 billion), in contrast to a proposed 10% reduction in DOE's total funding. Notable proposed increases would be used for warhead life extension programs and preparations for increase production of plutonium pits (warhead cores)." ]	8,323	gov_report	en	null	f5b4cea3bba6c3989d58b4ea14b70c27bd7507269c704764
T he Public Safety Officers' Benefits (PSOB) program provides cash benefits to federal, state, and local law enforcement officers; firefighters; employees of emergency management agencies; and members of emergency medical services agencies who are killed or permanently and totally disabled as the result of personal injuries sustained in the line of duty. The Public Safety Officers' Educational Assistance (PSOEA) program, a component of the PSOB program, provides higher-education assistance to the children and spouses of public safety officers killed or permanently disabled in the line of duty. Both programs are administered by the PSOB Office of the Department of Justice (DOJ), Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA). Congress appropriates funds for these programs in the annual Departments of Commerce and Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act. For FY2019, the one-time lump-sum PSOB benefit is $359,316 and the monthly full-time attendance PSOEA assistance is $1,224. The PSOB and PSOEA benefit amounts are indexed to reflect changes in the cost of living. Table 1 shows PSOB and PSOEA claims and approvals as reported by DOJ. To be eligible for PSOB benefits for death or disability, a person must have served in one of the following categories of public safety officers: law enforcement officer, firefighter, or chaplain in a public agency; FEMA employee or a state, local, or tribal emergency management agency employee; or emergency medical services member. There is no minimum amount of time a person must have served to be eligible for benefits. To be eligible for PSOB benefits as a law enforcement officer, firefighter, or chaplain, a person must have served in a "public agency" in an official capacity, with or without compensation. For the purposes of PSOB eligibility, a public agency is defined as the federal government and any department, agency, or instrumentality of the federal government; and any state government, the District of Columbia government, and any U.S. territory or possession; and any local government, department, agency, or instrumentality of a state, the District of Columbia, or any U.S. territory or possession. For the purposes of PSOB eligibility, a law enforcement officer is defined as "an individual involved in crime and juvenile delinquency control or reduction, or enforcement of the criminal laws (including juvenile delinquency), including, but not limited to, police, corrections, probation, parole, and judicial officers." For the purposes of PSOB eligibility, the definition of firefighter includes both professional firefighters and persons serving as an "officially recognized or designated member of a legally organized volunteer fire department." A chaplain is eligible for PSOB benefits (1) if he or she is either an "officially recognized or designated member of a legally organized volunteer fire department or legally organized police department" or public employee of a police or fire department and (2) only if he or she was performing the duties of a chaplain in an official capacity while responding to a police, fire, or rescue emergency. Employees of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and state, local, or tribal emergency management agencies may be eligible for PSOB benefits under certain conditions provided in statute. A FEMA employee or an employee of a state, local, or tribal emergency management agency working with FEMA is eligible for PSOB benefits if he or she is performing official duties that are related to a major disaster or an emergency declared under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act) and that are considered hazardous by the FEMA Administrator or the head of the state, local, or tribal agency. A member, including a volunteer member, of a rescue squad or "ambulance crew" who is authorized or licensed by law and the applicable agency and is engaging in rescue services or providing emergency medical services may be eligible for PSOB benefits. The rescue squad or ambulance service may provide ground or air ambulance services and may be either a public agency or a nonprofit entity authorized to provide rescue or emergency medical services. By PSOB regulation, eligible emergency medical services workers include rescue workers, ambulance drivers, paramedics, health care responders, emergency medical technicians, or others who are trained in rescue activity or emergency medical services and have the legal authority and responsibility to provide such services. The PSOB program pays benefits if a public safety officer becomes permanently and totally disabled or dies "as the direct and proximate result of a personal injury sustained in the line of duty." To qualify for coverage under the PSOB program, a public safety officer's disability or death must have been the result of a personal injury. The PSOB regulation defines an injury for the purposes of benefit eligibility as a traumatic physical wound (or a traumatized physical condition of the body) directly and proximately caused by external force (such as bullets, explosives, sharp instruments, blunt objects, or physical blows), chemicals, electricity, climatic conditions, infectious disease, radiation, virii, or bacteria ... The regulation also provides that the definition of an injury does not include an occupational disease or a condition of the body caused by stress or strain, including psychological conditions such as post-traumatic stress disorder. However, the PSOB statute specifically provides for deaths caused by certain cardiovascular conditions. The death of a public safety officer due to a heart attack, stroke, or vascular rupture shall be presumed to be a death from a personal injury for the purposes of PSOB eligibility if the officer engaged in nonroutine stressful or strenuous physical activity as part of an emergency response or training exercise; and if the condition began during the physical activity, while the officer remained on duty after the physical activity, or within 24 hours of the physical activity. The PSOB program covers a public safety officer's death or disability if it occurred as the result of an injury incurred in the line of duty. The PSOB regulations provide that an injury occurs in the line of duty if it (1) is the result of the public safety officer's authorized activities while on duty, (2) occurs while responding to an emergency or request for assistance, or (3) occurs while commuting to or from duty in an authorized department or personal vehicle. In addition, if there is convincing evidence that the injury was the result of the individual's status as a public safety officer, that injury is covered by the PSOB program. The lump-sum PSOB death and disability benefit for FY2019 is $359,316. The benefit amount is adjusted annually to reflect changes in the cost of living using the annual percentage change in the Consumer Price Index for Urban Consumers (CPI-U) for the one-year period ending in the previous June. If a public safety officer receives a disability benefit and later dies from the same injury, the officer's survivors may not receive a PSOB death benefit. The payable benefit amount is based on the date of the public safety officer's death or the date of the injury that caused the disability, rather than on the date of application for benefits or disability determination. Thus, if a benefit increase occurs while an application is pending, the benefit is payable at the previous, lower, benefit level. Death and disability benefits are not subject to the federal income tax. In general, PSOB death and disability benefits are paid in addition to any other workers' compensation, life insurance, or other benefits paid for the death of a public safety officer. However, the PSOB death benefit is offset by the following benefits: benefits under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act (FECA) payable to state and local law enforcement officers injured or killed while enforcing federal law; benefits under the D.C. Retirement and Disability Act of 1916 for certain police officers and firefighters in the District of Columbia; and payments from the September 11 th Victim Compensation Fund (VCF). PSOB death benefits are payable to the eligible spouse and children of a public safety officer. A spouse is the person to whom the officer is legally married, even if physically separated, under the marriage laws of the jurisdiction where the marriage took place. Pursuant to regulations issued after the Supreme Court struck down the federal Defense of Marriage Act in United States v. Windsor , the legally married spouse of a public safety office may be of the same sex as the officer. A child is defined as any "natural, illegitimate, adopted, or posthumous child or stepchild" of the public safety officer who, at the time of the public safety officer's fatal or catastrophic injury, is 18 years of age or under; between 18 and 23 years of age and a full-time student in high school or undergraduate higher education; or over 18 years of age and incapable of self-support because of physical or mental disability. PSOB death benefits are paid to eligible survivors in the following order: 1. if the officer is survived by only a spouse, 100% of the death benefits are payable to the spouse; 2. if the officer is survived by a spouse and children, 50% of the death benefits are payable to the spouse and the remaining 50% is distributed equally among the officer's children; 3. if the officer is survived by only children, the death benefits are equally distributed among the officer's children; 4. if the officer has no surviving spouse or children, the death benefits are paid to the individual or individuals designated by the officer in the most recently executed designation of beneficiary on file at the time of the officer's death; or if the officer does not have a designation of beneficiary on file, the benefits are paid to the individual or individuals designated by the officer in the most recently executed life insurance policy on file at the time of the officer's death; 5. if the officer has no surviving spouse or eligible children, and the officer does not have a life insurance policy, the death benefits are equally distributed between the officer's surviving parents; or 6. if the officer has no surviving spouse, eligible children, or parents, and the officer did not have a designation of beneficiary or a life insurance policy on file at the time of his or her death, the death benefits are payable to surviving adult, nondependent, children of the officer. PSOB disability benefits are paid only in cases of permanent and total disability. There are no benefits payable for partial or short-term disabilities. A disability is considered permanent for the purposes of PSOB eligibility if, given the current state of medicine in the United States, there is a degree of medical certainty that the condition will remain constant or deteriorate over the person's lifetime or that the public safety officer has reached maximum medical improvement. A public safety officer is considered to be totally disabled for the purposes of PSOB eligibility if given the current state of medicine in the United States, there is a degree of medical certainty that the officer is unable to perform any gainful work. PSOB regulation defines gainful work as "full- or part-time activity that is compensated or commonly compensated." Applications for PSOB death and disability benefits are filed with the PSOB office, which determines benefit eligibility and commences benefit payment. Unless extended for good cause, application deadlines must be met. Complete benefit applications must be filed no later than for death benefits: three years after the death; one year after the determination of the officer's employing agency to award or deny death benefits payable by that agency; or one year after certification by the officer's employing agency that the agency is not authorized to pay any death benefits; and for disability benefits: three years after the date of the injury; one year after the determination of the officer's employing agency to award or deny workers' compensation or disability benefits payable by that agency; or one year after certification by the officer's employing agency that the agency is not authorized to pay any workers' compensation or disability benefits. A lump-sum interim payment of up to $3,000 may be made if a PSOB death benefit will "probably be paid." The interim payment amount reduces the final PSOB payment amount. If the ultimate decision is to deny death benefits, the interim payment must be returned to the federal government, unless this repayment is waived because it would create a hardship for the beneficiary. Section 611 of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act; P.L. 107-56 ) provides for expedited payment of PSOB death and disability benefits if the officer's injury occurred "in connection with prevention, investigation, rescue, or recovery efforts related to a terrorist attack." In such cases, PSOB benefits must be paid within 30 days of certification from the officer's employing agency that the officer's death or disability was related to terrorism. The Public Safety Officers' Education Assistance (PSOEA) program provides financial assistance with costs associated with higher education to the spouse or children of a public safety officer who is eligible for PSOB death or disability benefits. The spouse or child of a public safety officer who is eligible for PSOB death or disability benefits may be eligible for PSOEA benefits. To be eligible for PSOEA benefits, a spouse must have been married to an eligible public safety officer at the time of the officer's death or injury. A child is eligible for PSOEA benefits until the age of 27. This age limit can be extended by the Attorney General in extraordinary circumstances, or, pursuant to Section 3 of the Public Safety Officers' Benefits Improvement Act of 2017 ( P.L. 115-36 ), if there is a delay of more than one year in approving PSOB or PSOEA benefits. In addition, to be eligible for PSOEA benefits, the spouse or child must be enrolled at an eligible educational institution. For the purposes of PSOEA eligibility, an eligible education institution is one that meets the definition of an "institution of higher education" as provided by Section 102 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 and that is eligible for federal student aid. PSOEA benefits are payable to the claimant and may be used only to defray costs associated with higher education attendance, including tuition, room, board, book and supplies, and education-related fees. The monthly PSOEA benefit amount is equal to the monthly benefit amount payable under the GI Bill Survivors' and Dependents' Educational Assistance (DEA) program, which is administered by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) for spouses and dependents of veterans with disabilities or who died as a result of service-connected conditions. The PSOEA benefit amounts are adjusted annually to reflect changes in the cost of living in accordance with changes to the GI Bill DEA benefit amounts. For FY2019, the PSOEA monthly benefit for a student attending an educational institution full-time is $1,224. The PSOEA benefit rates are prorated for less than full-time attendance. The maximum duration of PSOEA benefits for any person is 45 months of full-time education or a proportionate duration of part-time education. A person is ineligible for PSOEA if he or she is in default on a federal student loan or is ineligible for federal benefits due to a drug trafficking or drug possession conviction. In addition, the Attorney General may discontinue PSOEA benefits for a student that fails to make satisfactory progress in his or her course of study as defined by Section 484(c) of the Higher Education Act of 1965. A claimant who is dissatisfied with a PSOB disability benefit denial may request a reconsideration. There is no reconsideration offered for denials of PSOB death or PSOEA benefits. A claimant who is dissatisfied with a PSOB or PSOEA benefit denial may request a de novo hearing before a hearing officer assigned by the director of the DOJ PSOB Office. The determination of a hearing officer may be appealed to the PSOB Office director. The director's determination is considered the final agency determination and is not subject to any further agency administrative review or appeal. However, provided all administrative appeals remedies have been exhausted, the PSOB Office director's determination may be appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The PSOB statute authorizes the BJA to prescribe the maximum fee that an attorney or other representative may charge a claimant for services rendered in connection with a claim, with attorney fees generally limited to between 3% and 6% of the total benefit paid, depending on the level in the administrative appeals process the claim is approved. Program regulation prohibits stipulated-fee and contingency-fee arrangements for PSOB representation. Congress provides funding for PSOB and PSOE benefits and associated administrative expenses in the annual Departments of Commerce and Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act. Funding for PSOB death benefits and associated administrative expenses is considered mandatory spending and Congress appropriates "such sums as may be necessary" for the payment of these benefits. Funding for PSOB disability and PSOEA benefits is considered discretionary and is subject to specific congressional appropriations. Annual appropriations language grants the Attorney General the authority to transfer from any available appropriations to the DOJ the funds necessary to respond to emergent circumstances that require additional funding for PSOB disability benefits and PSOEA benefits.	[ "The Public Safety Officers' Benefits (PSOB) program provides cash benefits to federal, state, and local law enforcement officers; firefighters; employees of emergency management agencies; and members of emergency medical services agencies who are killed or permanently and totally disabled as the result of personal injuries sustained in the line of duty. The Public Safety Officers' Educational Assistance (PSOEA) program, a component of the PSOB program, provides higher-education assistance to the children and spouses of public safety officers killed or permanently disabled in the line of duty. The PSOB and PSOEA programs are administered by the Department of Justice (DOJ), Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA). However, claimants dissatisfied with denials of benefits may pursue administrative appeals within DOJ and may seek judicial review before the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Each year, Congress appropriates funding for PSOB death benefits, which is considered mandatory spending, and for PSOB disability benefits and PSOEA benefits, which is subject to annual appropriations. For FY2019, the one-time lump-sum PSOB death and disability benefit is $359,316 and the PSOEA monthly benefit for a student attending an educational institution full-time is $1,224. In FY2017, the DOJ approved 399 claims for PSOB death benefits, 82 claims for PSOB disability benefits, and 601 claims for PSOEA benefits." ]	2,857	gov_report	en	null	a99bdfbaf9b146e61eb230aa7963a2a7938dfc5dcccc67cb
CDC—an operating division of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)—serves as the national focal point for disease prevention and control, environmental health, and promotion and education activities designed to improve the health of Americans. The agency is also responsible for leading national efforts to detect, respond to, and prevent illnesses and injuries that result from natural causes or the release of biological, chemical, or radiological agents. To achieve its mission and goals, the agency relies on an array of partners, including public health associations and state and local public health agencies. It collaborates with these partners on initiatives such as monitoring the public’s health, investigating disease outbreaks, and implementing prevention strategies. The agency also uses its staff located in foreign countries to aid in international efforts, such as guarding against global diseases. Table 1 describes the organization of CDC. CDC is staffed by approximately 20,000 employees across the United States and around the world. For fiscal year 2017, according to agency officials, the agency’s total appropriation was approximately $12 billion, of which it reported spending approximately $424 million on information technology. In addition, the officials stated that approximately $31 million (or about 7.3 percent of the amount spent on information technology) was for information security across all CDC information technology investments. CDC relies extensively on information technology to fulfill its mission and support related administrative needs. Among the approximately 750 systems reported in its inventory, the agency has systems dedicated to supporting public health science, practice, and administration. All of these systems rely on an information technology infrastructure that includes network components, critical servers, and data centers. At CDC, the chief information officer (CIO) is responsible for establishing and enforcing policies and procedures protecting information resources. The CIO is to lead the efforts to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the information and systems that support the agency and its operations, and is to report quarterly to the HHS CIO on the overall effectiveness of CDC’s information security and privacy program, including the progress of remedial actions. The CIO designated a chief information security officer (CISO), who is to oversee compliance with applicable information security and privacy requirements of the agency. The CISO, among other things, is responsible for providing information security protections commensurate with the risk and magnitude of the harm resulting from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, and disruption of information and information systems that support the operations and assets of the agency. To further ensure information security compliance, information systems security officers (ISSO) are responsible for managing the information security program within their respective organizations and report on security program matters to the CISO, including computer security-related incidents. ISSO responsibilities include ensuring that vendor-issued security patches are expeditiously installed and that system owners establish processes for timely removal of access privileges when a user’s system access is no longer necessary. In addition, security stewards are to perform operational security analyses supporting the efforts of the ISSO. Further, business stewards serve as program managers, accepting full accountability for the operations of the systems and ensuring that security is planned, documented, and properly resourced for each aspect of the information security program. The Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA) of 2014 provides a comprehensive framework for ensuring the effectiveness of information security controls over information resources that support federal operations and assets. FISMA assigns responsibility to the head of each agency for providing information security protections commensurate with the risk and magnitude of the harm resulting from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of information systems used or operated by an agency or by a contractor of an agency or other organization on behalf of an agency. The law also delegates to the agency CIO (or comparable official) the authority to ensure compliance with FISMA requirements. The CIO is responsible for designating a senior agency information security officer whose primary duty is information security. The law also requires each agency to develop, document, and implement an agency-wide information security program to provide risk-based protections for the information and information systems that support the operations and assets of the agency. In addition, FISMA requires agencies to comply with National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) standards, and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) requires agencies to comply with NIST guidelines. NIST Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) Publication 199 requires agencies to categorize systems based on an assessment of the potential impact that a loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability of such information or information system would have on organizational operations, organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, and the nation. NIST FIPS 200 requires agencies to meet minimum security requirements by selecting the appropriate security controls, as described in NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-53. This NIST publication provides a catalog of security and privacy controls for federal information systems and a process for selecting controls to protect organizational operations and assets. The publication provides baseline security controls for low-, moderate-, and high-impact systems, and agencies have the ability to tailor or supplement their security requirements and policies based on agency mission, business requirements, and operating environment. Further, in May 2017, the President issued an executive order requiring agencies to immediately begin using NIST’s Cybersecurity Framework for managing their cybersecurity risks. The framework, which provides guidance for cybersecurity activities, is based on five core security functions: Identify: Develop the organizational understanding to manage cybersecurity risk to systems, assets, data, and capabilities. Protect: Develop and implement the appropriate safeguards to ensure delivery of critical infrastructure services. Detect: Develop and implement the appropriate activities to identify the occurrence of a cybersecurity event. Respond: Develop and implement the appropriate activities to take action regarding a detected cybersecurity event. Recover: Develop and implement the appropriate activities to maintain plans for resilience and to restore any capabilities or services that were impaired due to a cybersecurity event. According to NIST, these 5 functions occur concurrently and continuously, and provide a strategic view of the life cycle of an organization’s management of cybersecurity risk. Within the 5 functions are 23 categories and 108 subcategories that include controls for achieving the intent of each function. Appendix II provides a description of the framework categories and subcategories of controls. We reported in June 2018 that CDC had implemented numerous controls over the 24 systems we reviewed, but had not always effectively implemented controls to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of these systems and the information maintained on them. Deficiencies existed in the technical controls and agency-wide information security program that were intended to (1) identify risk, (2) protect systems from threats and vulnerabilities, (3) detect cybersecurity events, (4) respond to these events, and (5) recover system operations. These deficiencies increased the risk that sensitive personally identifiable and health-related information, including information regarding the transfer of biological agents and toxins dangerous to public health, could be disclosed or modified without authorization. As shown in table 2, deficiencies existed in all 5 core security function areas for the selected systems we reviewed. Controls associated with the identify core security function are intended to help an agency develop an understanding of its resources and related cybersecurity risks to its systems, assets, data, and capabilities. These controls include identifying and assessing cybersecurity risk and establishing information security policies, procedures, and plans. We reported in June 2018 that, although CDC had taken steps to implement these controls, it had not (1) categorized the risk-related impact of a key system, identified threats, or reassessed risk for systems or facilities when needed; (2) sufficiently documented technical requirements in policies, procedures, and standards; and (3) described intended controls in facility security plans. CDC Categorized Systems Based on Potential Impact of Compromise, but Did Not Appropriately Categorize a Key General Support System As discussed earlier, FIPS Publication 199 requires agencies to categorize systems based on an assessment of the potential impact that a loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability of such information or information system would have on organizational operations, organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, and the nation. For networks and other general support systems, NIST SP 800-60 notes that the categorization should be based on the high water mark of supported information systems, and on the information types processed, transmitted across the network, or stored on the network or support system. Further, CDC’s architecture design principles state that high- impact systems are to be maintained on dedicated machinery and be physically and logically secured from lower-risk systems. CDC had categorized the 24 systems we reviewed, but the assigned impact level was not always appropriate. In this regard, the agency did not ensure that high-impact systems were logically secured from a lower- risk system. Specifically, seven selected high-impact systems relied on a general support system that the agency had categorized as a moderate- impact system (i.e., a lower-risk system). As a result, the high-impact systems were relying on controls in a less secure environment. Officials from the Office of the Chief Information Officer (OCIO) explained that the categorization of the supporting system was outdated based on changes to the agency’s operating environment and that they planned to re- evaluate the assigned impact level. CDC Assessed Risk at the System Level, but Did Not Assess Threats, Document Risk-based Decisions, or Reassess Risk When Needed According to NIST SP 800-30, risk is determined by identifying potential threats to an organization and vulnerabilities in its systems, determining the likelihood that a particular threat may exploit vulnerabilities, and assessing the resulting impact on the organization’s mission, including the effect on sensitive and critical systems and data. NIST also states that assessments should be monitored on an ongoing basis to keep current on risk-impacting changes to the operating environment. CDC had developed system-level risk assessments for the 8 selected mission-essential systems, and had summarized its risks in a risk assessment report. However, only two of the eight risk assessments had identified potential threats, and only one of these assessments determined the likelihood and impact of threats to that system. Further, CDC had not always documented risks associated with less secure configuration settings or monitored its assessments to address changes to the operating environment. For example, among the 94 technical control deficiencies that we identified for the 24 systems we reviewed, OCIO officials stated that the agency had not implemented controls for 20 deficiencies due to technical constraints. However, CDC did not address risks associated with decisions not to implement controls for these reasons in the system risk assessments. OCIO officials also partially attributed 5 of the 94 technical control deficiencies to new cybersecurity threats and to threat vectors that turned initially sound architecture decisions into vulnerabilities. However, CDC had not addressed such changes in the risk assessments for the affected systems. By not assessing threats or the likelihood of their occurrence and impact and by not documenting the risks, CDC cannot have assurance that appropriate controls are in place commensurate with the level of risk. CDC Had a Process in Place to Assess Risk to Systems from an Entity-wide Perspective Beyond the system level, newly discovered threats or vulnerabilities may require an agency to make risk decisions from an entity-wide perspective. An entity-wide perspective is needed because the threats and vulnerabilities may affect more than specific systems. CDC had a process in place to assess risk from an entity-wide perspective. This process included regular meetings among OCIO and program office staff to discuss policy, threats, and incidents. Specifically, ISSOs held monthly meetings as a continuous monitoring working group to discuss policy updates. In addition, an OCIO official held quarterly briefings that included presentations on incident response tools, incident statistics, and potential threats. OCIO officials also held ad hoc meetings, as necessary, regarding vulnerability and threat concerns when the agency received email alerts from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), or HHS. CDC Had Not Updated Facility Risk Assessments In addition to assessing risks for systems, agencies are to assess the risk to their facilities. The Interagency Security Committee (ISC) requires agencies to determine the security level for federal facilities, and to conduct risk assessments at least once every 5 years for Level I and Level II facilities and at least once every 3 years for Level III, Level IV, and Level V facilities. However, the two facility risk assessments that we reviewed had not been updated in a timely manner. Specifically, the risk assessments, covering Level III and Level IV facilities that house the 24 reviewed systems, had been last updated in January 2009 and March 2014—8 years earlier and just over 3 years earlier, at the time of our review in July 2017. According to a CDC physical security official, the agency had previously relied on a third-party assessor to perform the assessments. The official also said that the agency planned to conduct its own facility risk assessments and had recently developed procedures for conducting these assessments. Until it performs these assessments, CDC may not be aware of new risks to its facilities or the controls needed to mitigate the risks. FISMA requires each agency to develop, document, and implement an information security program that, among other things, includes policies and procedures that (1) are based on a risk assessment, (2) cost- effectively reduce information security risks to an acceptable level, (3) ensure that information security is addressed throughout the life cycle of each system, and (4) ensure compliance with applicable requirements. According to NIST SP 800-53, an agency should develop policies and procedures for each of the 18 NIST families of security controls to facilitate the implementation of the controls. CDC had documented numerous policies, procedures, and standards that addressed each of the 18 control families identified in NIST SP 800-53. For example, the agency had developed policies and procedures governing physical access to CDC facilities, role-based training of personnel with significant security responsibilities, security assessment and authorization of systems, and continuity of operations, in addition to standard operating procedures that covered numerous other controls. The agency had also developed the CDC IT Security Program Implementation Standards, which describes the agency’s security program requirements and minimum mandatory standards for the implementation of information security and privacy controls. In addition, the agency had documented configuration standards, which specified minimum configuration settings, for devices such as firewalls, routers, switches, as well as Unix and Windows servers. However, these policies and standards sometimes lacked the technical specificity needed to ensure controls were in place. To illustrate, the agency had not sufficiently documented detailed guidance or instructions to address numerous technical control deficiencies we identified, such as insecure network devices, insecure database configurations, not blocking certain email attachments, and not deploying a data loss prevention capability. According to OCIO officials, the agency’s periodic reviews and updates to existing cybersecurity policies and standards did not reveal and address these issues. Nevertheless, without clear and specific guidance or instructions for implementing technical controls, the agency had less assurance that controls were in place and operating as intended. FISMA requires each agency to develop, document, and implement an information security program that, among other things, includes subordinate plans for providing adequate information security for networks, facilities, and systems or a group of information systems, as appropriate. NIST states that plans should be reviewed and updated to ensure that they continue to reflect the correct information about the systems, such as changes in system owners, interconnections, and authorization status, among other things. HHS and CDC policies require that such plans be reviewed annually. In addition, the ISC requires that agencies develop and implement an operable and effective facility security plan. CDC standards require the organization to prepare a facility security plan (or similar document). CDC had developed security plans for the 8 selected mission-essential systems. With a few exceptions, the plans addressed the applicable security controls for those systems. The agency also had reviewed and updated the plans annually. However, CDC had not developed security plans for the facilities housing resources for the selected systems. Physical security officials stated that they had not developed security plans because they did not have a sufficient number of staff to develop them. Without comprehensive security plans for the facilities, CDC’s information and systems would be at an increased risk that controls to address emergency situations would not be in place and personnel at the facilities would not be aware of their roles and responsibilities for implementing sound security practices to protect systems housed at these CDC locations. The protect core security function is intended to help agencies develop and implement the appropriate safeguards for their systems to ensure achieving the agency’s mission and to support the ability to limit or contain the impact of a potential cybersecurity event. Controls associated with this function include implementing controls to limit access to authorized users, processes or devices; encrypting data to protect its confidentiality and integrity; configuring devices securely and updating software to protect systems from known vulnerabilities; and providing training for cybersecurity awareness and performing security-related duties. Although CDC had implemented controls that were intended to protect its operating environment, we reported in June 2018 that the agency did not consistently (1) implement access controls effectively, (2) encrypt sensitive data, (3) configure devices securely or apply patches in a timely manner, or (4) ensure staff with significant security responsibilities received role-based training. A basic management objective for any agency is to protect the resources that support its critical operations from unauthorized access. Agencies accomplish this objective by designing and implementing controls that are intended to prevent, limit, and detect unauthorized access to computing resources, programs, information, and facilities. Access controls include those related to identifying and authenticating users, authorizing access needed to perform job duties, protecting system boundaries, and physically protecting information system assets. However, CDC had not consistently implemented these controls. CDC Implemented Enterprise-wide Identification and Authentication Controls, but Did Not Consistently and Securely Configure Password Controls for Certain Accounts on Devices and Systems NIST SP 800-53 states that agencies should implement multi-factor authentication for their users of information systems. Multi-factor authentication involves using two or more factors to achieve authentication. A factor is something you know (password or personal identification number), something you have (token and personal identity verification (PIV) card), or something you are (biometric). Also, NIST and CDC policy state that information systems shall have password management controls established to include minimum password complexity requirements, password lifetime restrictions, prohibitions on password reuse, and user accounts temporarily locked out after a certain number of failed login attempts during a specified period of time. CDC had applied enterprise-wide solutions to ensure appropriate identification and multi-factor authentication of its general user community through, for example, the use of PIV cards. However, instances of weak password management controls existed for certain accounts on network devices, servers, and database systems. According to OCIO officials, password control deficiencies existed primarily due to technical constraints, administrators not being aware of technical requirements, or administrators not adequately monitoring configuration settings. Without more secure password settings, CDC’s information and systems are at an increased risk that unauthorized individuals could have guessed passwords and used them to obtain unauthorized access to agency systems and databases. CDC Authorized Users More Access than Needed to Perform Their Jobs NIST SP 800-53 states that agencies should employ the principle of least privilege, allowing only authorized access for users (or processes acting on behalf of users) that are necessary to accomplish assigned tasks. It also states that privileged accounts—those with elevated access permissions—should be strictly controlled and used only for their intended administrative purposes. CDC had implemented controls intended to ensure that users were granted the minimum level of access permissions necessary to perform their legitimate job-related functions. However, the agency had granted certain users more access than needed for their job functions, including excessive access permissions on a key server. According to OCIO officials, CDC systems had deficiencies related to restricting access primarily due to technical constraints or administrators not adequately monitoring configuration settings. By not appropriately restricting access, CDC’s information and systems are at an increased risk that individuals could deliberately or inadvertently compromise database systems or gain inappropriate access to information resources. CDC Did Not Effectively Implement Boundary Controls to Ensure Network Integrity NIST SP 800-53 states that agencies should control communications at information systems’ external boundaries. It states that, to manage risks, agencies should use boundary protection mechanisms to separate or partition computing systems and network infrastructures containing higher-risk systems from lower-risk systems. Although CDC had implemented multiple controls that were designed to protect system boundaries, the agency had not sufficiently separated higher-risk systems from lower-risk systems. According to OCIO officials, deficiencies in boundary protection controls existed due to new cybersecurity threats turning initially sound architecture decisions into vulnerabilities, technical constraints, and administrators not being aware of technical requirements or adequately monitoring configuration settings. Without stronger boundary controls, CDC’s information and systems are at an increased risk that an attacker could have exploited these boundary deficiencies and leveraged them to compromise CDC’s internal network. CDC Physically Protected Information System Assets, but Did Not Consistently Ensure Access Remained Appropriate NIST SP 800-53 states that agencies should implement physical access controls to protect employees and visitors, information systems, and the facilities in which they are located. In addition, NIST states that agencies should review access lists detailing authorized facility access by individuals at the agency-defined frequency. In its standards, CDC requires implementation of the NIST special publication and requires that access lists detailing authorized facility access by individuals be reviewed at least every 365 days. CDC had implemented physical security controls. The agency had implemented physical security measures to control access to certain areas and to ensure the safety and security of its employees, contractors, and visitors to CDC facilities. For example, CDC had issued PIV cards and Cardkey Proximity Cards to its employees and contractors, and had limited physical access to restricted areas based on the permissions it granted via these cards. However, the agency had not consistently reviewed authorized access lists. In this regard, CDC did not have a process in place for periodically reviewing the lists of individuals with access to rooms containing sensitive resources to ensure that such access remained appropriate. Without reviewing authorized access lists, CDC has reduced assurance that individual access to its computing resources and sensitive information is appropriate. NIST SP 800-53 states that agencies should encrypt passwords both while stored and transmitted, and configure information systems to establish a trusted communication path between the user and the system. Additionally, NIST requires that, when agencies use encryption, they use an encryption algorithm that complies with FIPS 140-2. CDC had used FIPS-compliant encryption for its PIV card implementation, but had not effectively implemented encryption controls in other areas. According to OCIO officials, encryption control deficiencies existed primarily due to technical constraints, administrators not being aware of a technical solution, or configuration settings not being adequately monitored. By not using encryption effectively, CDC limits its ability to protect the confidentiality of sensitive information, such as passwords. NIST SP 800-53 states that agencies should disable certain services with known security vulnerabilities. This includes configuring security control settings on operating systems in accordance with publicly available security checklists (or benchmarks) promulgated by NIST’s National Checklist Program repository. This repository contains, for example, the security configuration benchmarks established by the Center for Internet Security (CIS) for Windows servers. NIST also states that agencies should test and install newly-released security patches, service packs, and hot fixes in a timely manner. In addition, CDC policy required that software patches for remediating vulnerabilities designated as critical or high risk be applied to servers within 45 days of being notified that a patch is available or within 7 days of when an exploit is known to exist. Further, agency policy specified that administrators configure Windows servers in accordance with the CDC- approved security benchmarks. CDC had documented security configuration baselines, but had not always securely configured its systems or applied patches. In addition, the agency had not consistently configured security settings in accordance with prescribed security benchmarks or applied patches in a timely manner. For example: CDC had configured Windows servers to run unnecessary services. CDC had configured only about 62 percent of the security settings in accordance with prescribed benchmark criteria on the Windows and infrastructure servers supporting five systems that we reviewed. During our site visit in April 2017, CDC had not installed 21 updates on about 20 percent of the network devices, including 17 updates that the vendor considered to be critical or high-risk. The oldest of the missing updates dated back to January 2015. CDC had not updated database software supporting two selected systems to a more recent version that addressed vulnerabilities with a medium severity rating. According to OCIO officials, CDC had deficiencies in configuration and patching primarily due to administrators not being aware that there was a technical solution or did not adequately monitor configuration settings. By not securely configuring devices and installing updates and patches in a timely manner, the agency is at increased risk that individuals could have exploited known vulnerabilities to gain unauthorized access to agency computing resources. According to NIST SP 800-53, agencies should provide adequate security training to individuals in a role such as system/network administrator and to personnel conducting configuration management and auditing activities, tailoring the training to their specific roles. In addition, one of the cybersecurity cross-agency priority goals requires that agencies implement training that reduces the risk that individuals will introduce malware through email and malicious or compromised web sites. Consistent with NIST SP 800-53, CDC policy required network users to receive annual security awareness training. Accordingly, for fiscal year 2017, all CDC staff completed the required annual security awareness training. CDC policy also required that those staff identified as having significant security responsibilities receive role-based training every 3 years. However, not all staff with significant security responsibilities received role-based training within the defined time frames. The agency used a tracking system to monitor the status of role-based training for 377 individuals who had been identified as having significant security responsibilities. As of May 2017, 56 (about 15 percent) of the 377 individuals had not completed the training within the last 3 years, and 246 (about 65 percent) of them had not taken training within the last year. In addition, CDC had not identified at least 30 other staff with significant security responsibilities who required role-based training. Specifically, none of the 18 security and database administrators for four selected systems were included among the individuals being tracked, although these administrators had significant security responsibilities. Further, the agency provided us with a list of 42 individuals whose job series indicated that they required role-based training. However, 12 of the 42 were not included among the tracked individuals. Furthermore, given the number of deficiencies identified and the rapidly evolving nature of cyber threats, CDC’s requirement that staff take role-based training only once every 3 years is not sufficient for individuals with significant cybersecurity responsibilities. According to OCIO officials, managers are responsible for identifying those individuals with significant security responsibilities. The process used to track training was manual and required an individual’s manager to specify training requirements. The officials noted that the agency plans to implement a new HHS annual role-based training requirement in fiscal year 2018 and that they intend to work to enhance oversight as the new requirement is implemented. The officials also stated that at least 10 of the 94 technical control-related deficiencies identified in our June 2018 report had resulted, at least in part, from staff not being aware of control requirements or solutions to address the deficiencies. As a result, CDC’s information and systems are at increased risk that staff may not have the knowledge or skills needed to appropriately protect them. The detect core security function is intended to allow for the timely discovery of cybersecurity events. Controls associated with this function include logging and monitoring system activities and configurations, assessing security controls in place, and implementing continuous monitoring. In June 2018, we reported that, although CDC had implemented controls intended to detect the occurrence of a cybersecurity event, it had not sufficiently implemented logging and monitoring capabilities or effectively assessed security controls. NIST SP 800-53 states that agencies should enable system logging features and retain sufficient audit logs to support the investigations of security incidents and the monitoring of select activities for significant security-related events. In addition, National Archives and Records Administration records retention guidance states that system files containing information requiring special accountability that may be needed for audit or investigative purposes should be retained for 6 years after user accounts have been terminated or passwords altered, or when an account is no longer needed for investigative or security purposes, whichever is later. NIST also states that agencies should monitor physical access to facilities where their information systems reside to detect physical security incidents. Further, NIST SP 800-53 states that agencies should monitor and control changes to configuration settings. Although CDC had implemented centralized logging and network traffic monitoring capabilities, the capabilities were limited. For example, the agency’s centralized logging system used for security monitoring had a limited storage capacity and did not meet the National Archives and Records Administration requirements. In addition, CDC had not centrally collected and monitored security event data for many key assets connected to the network. As a result, increased risk existed that CDC would not have been able to detect anomalous activities that may have occurred from malware attacks over time. OCIO officials stated that, as a compensating measure, the agency prevents direct communications between workstations. However, such a measure does not allow the agency to detect potentially inconsistent activities that may have occurred from malware attacks within the same data center. CDC also had not consistently reviewed physical access logs to detect suspicious physical access activities, such as access outside of normal work hours and repeated access to areas not normally accessed. Program offices responsible for 7 of the 8 selected mission-essential systems did not conduct such a review. According to OCIO officials, the offices were not aware of the need for a review. However, without reviewing physical access logs, CDC has reduced assurance that the agency would detect suspicious physical access activities. Further, CDC had not routinely monitored the configuration settings of its systems to ensure that the configurations were securely set. For example, for at least 41 of 94 technical control deficiencies we identified, OCIO officials cited quality control gaps where the change management process or system administrators had not discovered deficiencies resulting from insecure configuration settings. Without an effective monitoring process in place for system configurations, the agency was not aware of insecure system configurations. FISMA requires each agency to periodically test and evaluate the effectiveness of its information security policies, procedures, and practices. The law also requires agencies to test the management, operational, and technical controls for every system identified in the agency’s required inventory of major information systems at a frequency depending on risk, but no less than annually. In addition, NIST SP 800- 53A identifies three assessment methods—interview, examine, and test— and describes the potential depth and coverage for each. Assessing a control’s effectiveness based on an interview is likely less rigorous than examining a control; similarly, examining a control is likely less rigorous than testing the control’s functionality. CDC had not sufficiently tested or assessed the effectiveness of the security controls for the 8 mission-essential systems that we reviewed. Although CDC annually assessed security controls of selected systems, the agency had only examined control descriptions in security plans to ensure accuracy. At least once every 3 years, the agency selected controls for a more in-depth assessment of the 8 mission-essential systems we reviewed. However, CDC had assessed only 191 (about 7 percent) of 2,818 controls described in the security plans for the selected systems. In addition, the agency used methods for assessing controls that were often not rigorous enough to identify the control deficiencies that we identified. For example, as depicted in figure 1, CDC relied exclusively on interviews—a less rigorous method—to assess 20 percent of the 191 controls it assessed for the selected systems. The security control tests and assessments were insufficient in part because CDC had not developed comprehensive security assessment plans or had not consistently implemented the plans for the 8 selected mission-essential systems we reviewed. For example, one system’s assessment plan indicated that five controls should be assessed using a testing methodology; instead, however, the assessor conducted interviews to determine whether controls were effective or not. OCIO officials stated that the security control test and assessment process is manual and staffing is limited. They stated that the agency intends to rely increasingly on automated tools—such as the tools implemented by the Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation program—for performing the assessments. Nevertheless, by not assessing controls in an in-depth and comprehensive manner, CDC has limited assurance that the security controls are in place and operating as intended. Further, without developing and implementing comprehensive assessment plans, assessments may not be performed with sufficient rigor to identify control deficiencies. The respond core security function is intended to support the ability to contain the impact of a potential cybersecurity event. Controls associated with this function include implementing an incident response capability and remediating newly-identified deficiencies. Although CDC had implemented controls for incident response to detect cybersecurity events, we reported in June 2018 that the agency had not maintained adequate information to support its incident response capability or taken timely corrective actions to remediate identified control deficiencies. NIST SP 800-53 and SP 800-61 state that agencies should develop and document an incident response policy with corresponding implementation procedures and an incident response plan, and keep them updated according to agency requirements. NIST also states that agencies should implement an incident handling capability, including an incident response team that consists of forensic/malicious code analysts. In addition, agencies are to provide incident response training for the team and test the incident response capability to determine the effectiveness of the response. Further, NIST states that agencies are to monitor incidents by tracking and documenting them and maintain records about each incident, including forensic analysis. Finally, National Archives and Records Administration guidance states that records and data relevant to security incident investigations should be retained for 3 years. CDC had implemented an incident response capability. The agency had developed policy, procedures, and a plan that addressed incident response, and updated them annually. CDC had an incident response team that managed all of the incident handling and response efforts for the agency, and conducted forensic analyses for reported security incidents. Team members had undergone training, such as an advanced network forensic and analysis course offered by a private firm. In addition, the agency had periodically tested its incident handling capability by conducting penetration testing exercises. These exercises allowed the team to test its real-time response capabilities. CDC’s incident response procedures state that incident tickets should include a description of actions taken, response time, and whether actions have been completed or not. The agency’s procedures also require that computers affected by an incident be removed from the network immediately. Nevertheless, CDC had shortcomings in implementing its incident response capability and monitoring procedures. For the 11 security incidents CDC considered most significant over a 19-month period ending in March 2017, the agency had not consistently described the actions taken, the response times, or whether remedial actions had been completed. The agency also had not maintained audit log records for its security incidents. For example, the agency described recommended actions for 10 of the 11 incidents, but did not describe the actions that had been taken. In addition, although incident response team officials told us that all incident ticket records had been saved, CDC had not retained system log data that supported incident resolution for at least five of the incidents. The agency’s policy did not address record retention in accordance with National Archives and Records Administration guidance. Further, for two of the security incidents, the security incident tickets did not clearly indicate when two compromised workstations had been removed from the network. According to OCIO officials, shortcomings in fully documenting incidents resulted from the organization being understaffed, primarily due to budget limitations and the inability to hire qualified personnel. Without effectively tracking and documenting information system security incidents, CDC’s systems are at increased risk that the impact of security incidents would not be fully addressed. FISMA requires each agency to develop, document, and implement an information security program that, among other things, includes a process for planning, implementing, evaluating, and documenting remedial actions to address any deficiencies in information security policies, procedures, or practices. NIST SP 800-53 states that agencies are to develop a plan of action and milestones (POA&M) for an information system to document the agency’s planned remedial actions to correct identified deficiencies. CDC policy was consistent with the NIST guidelines. CDC had developed POA&Ms for deficiencies identified by its security control assessments, but had not remediated the deficiencies in a timely manner. For each of the 8 selected mission-essential systems, the agency had created plans for correcting control deficiencies. However, the agency did not implement several remedial actions by their due date. For example, expected completion dates had passed for correcting deficiencies associated with 4 of the 8 selected mission-essential systems. For these 4 systems, the completion dates were 1 to 8 months beyond the due dates at the time of our review in September 2017. According to Office of the Chief Information Security Officer officials, program offices that own the systems did not always communicate updates on the status of remedial actions for their respective systems, noting that deficiencies may have been corrected. Without effective communication to update its POA&Ms, CDC was not in a position to effectively manage its remedial actions and correct known deficiencies in a timely manner. The recover core security function is intended to support timely recovery of normal operations to reduce the impact from a cybersecurity event. Controls associated with this function include developing and testing contingency plans to ensure that, when unexpected events occur, critical operations can continue without interruption or can be promptly resumed, and that information resources are protected. Losing the capability to process, retrieve, and protect electronically maintained information can significantly affect an agency’s ability to accomplish its mission. If contingency planning is inadequate, even relatively minor interruptions can result in lost or incorrectly processed data, which can cause financial losses, expensive recovery efforts, and inaccurate or incomplete information. NIST SP 800-53 states that agency systems should have a contingency plan that includes the identification of key personnel and the systems’ essential mission functions and addresses full information system restoration. For high-impact systems, NIST specifies that agencies test contingency plans at an alternate processing site that is separated from the primary processing site to reduce susceptibility to the same threats. In addition, NIST states that organizations should initiate corrective actions based on testing if they are needed. As we reported in June 2018, CDC had developed and fully tested contingency plans for each of the 8 selected mission-essential systems that we reviewed. Each plan identified key personnel and their contact information, essential mission functions of the systems, and instructions on how to fully restore the systems in the event of a disruption. Additionally, between January 2015 and May 2017, CDC had tested whether the 8 systems could be recovered at their respective alternate sites, and had initiated corrective actions based on the results of the tests. However, the alternate site for 6 of the 8 selected mission-essential systems was located in relatively close proximity to the main processing site. Although 2 systems had alternate sites located in another state, the alternate site for the other 6 systems was within the same metropolitan area. As a result, an event such as a natural disaster or substantial power outage could affect both the main and alternate sites for these systems, potentially rendering CDC unable to complete functions associated with its mission. Prompt restoration of service is necessary because the required recovery time for these systems ranged from 4 to 24 hours. Security plans for 3 of the systems recognized the hazards of having the sites within the same geographical region, but stated that CDC had accepted this risk. According to OCIO officials, having a site further away was cost prohibitive; however, the officials had not documented this analysis or the associated risk of having the agency’s processing sites located within the same geographical area. Without documenting the analysis and associated risk, CDC had less assurance that senior leadership was aware of the risk of agency systems being unavailable. As a consequence, senior leadership may not agree whether acceptance of the risk was warranted. An underlying reason for the information security deficiencies in selected systems was that, although the agency had developed and documented an agency-wide information security program, it had not consistently or effectively implemented elements of the program. FISMA requires each agency to develop, document, and implement an information security program that, among other things, includes the following elements: periodic assessments of the risk and magnitude of the harm that could result from the unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of information and information systems that support the operations and assets of the agency; policies and procedures that (1) are based on risk assessments, (2) cost-effectively reduce information security risks to an acceptable level, (3) ensure that information security is addressed throughout the life cycle of each system, and (4) ensure compliance with applicable requirements; plans for providing adequate information security for networks, facilities, and systems or group of information systems, as appropriate; security awareness training to inform personnel of information security risks and of their responsibilities in complying with agency policies and procedures, as well as training personnel with significant security responsibilities for information security; periodic testing and evaluation of the effectiveness of information security policies, procedures, and practices, to be performed with a frequency depending on risk, but no less than annually, and that includes testing of management, operational, and technical controls for every system identified in the agency’s required inventory of major information systems; a process for planning, implementing, evaluating, and documenting remedial actions to address any deficiencies in the information security policies, procedures, or practices of the agency; and plans and procedures to ensure continuity of operations for information systems. As discussed previously in this report, CDC had implemented aspects of each of these elements. For example, the agency had conducted risk assessments, developed security plans, assessed security controls, developed remedial action plans, and developed and tested contingency plans for each of the 8 selected mission-essential systems. In addition, the agency had documented numerous policies and procedures and ensured that staff had completed annual security awareness training. However, CDC’s program had shortcomings. For example, as discussed earlier in this report, CDC had not consistently or effectively: addressed threats, technical constraints, and the changing threat environment in its system risk assessments, or assessed the risk of having alternate processing sites within close proximity to each other; documented detailed technical requirements in policies and procedures, or facility controls in facility security plans; tracked and trained staff with significant security responsibilities; monitored configuration settings and comprehensively assessed remediated deficiencies in a timely manner; or documented its cost analysis and associated risk of having an alternate processing site within the same geographical region as its primary processing site. Until CDC addresses these shortcomings and consistently and effectively implements all elements of its information security program, the agency will lack reasonable assurance that its computing resources are protected from inadvertent or deliberate misuse. In our June 2018 report, we made 195 recommendations to CDC to strengthen its technical security controls and bolster its agency-wide information security program. Specifically, we recommended that the agency take 184 actions to resolve technical control deficiencies by implementing stronger access controls, encrypting sensitive data, configuring devices securely, applying patches in a timely manner, strengthening firewall rules, and implementing logging and monitoring controls more effectively, among other actions. We also made 11 recommendations for CDC to improve its information security program by, among other things, assessing risks as needed, documenting more detailed technical requirements, monitoring and assessing controls more comprehensively, and remediating deficiencies in a timely manner. Since the issuance of our June 2018 report, CDC has made significant progress in implementing the recommendations we made to resolve the technical security control deficiencies in the information systems we reviewed and to improve its information security program. In this regard, the agency has implemented many of the recommendations for improving technical security controls for the systems we reviewed and has developed plans to implement recommendations for enhancing its information security program. Specifically, as of August 3, 2018, CDC had fully implemented 102 (55 percent) of the 184 recommendations we made to fortify the technical security controls over the systems we reviewed. In addition, the agency had partially implemented 20 (11 percent) of the 184 recommendations. In these instances, CDC had made progress toward implementing the recommendations, but had not completed all of the necessary corrective actions for us to close the recommendations. Therefore, these recommendations remain open. Further, CDC did not provide any evidence that it had implemented the remaining 62 technical control- related recommendations. Table 3 summarizes the status of CDC’s efforts to implement the 184 recommendations that we made to resolve the technical control deficiencies, as of August 3, 2018. By implementing 102 recommendations, CDC (as of August 3, 2018) reduced some of the risks associated with certain key activities. Specifically, these efforts included protecting network boundaries and logging and monitoring security events for indications of inappropriate or unusual activity on systems—that we highlighted in our June 2018 report as being particularly vulnerable and requiring the agency’s greater priority and attention. In addition, the agency had implemented several of our recommendations to rectify a number of the security control deficiencies. These efforts included strengthening firewall rules, implementing stronger access controls, configuring devices securely, and expanding its audit monitoring capabilities. In addition, CDC had developed a plan of action and milestones (POA&M) for each of the identified technical control deficiencies and related recommendations that remained open as of August 3, 2018. The POA&Ms assigned organization responsibilities, identified estimated costs, identified points of contact, and established time frames for resolving the deficiencies and closing the related recommendations. The agency’s plans called for it to implement the majority of the remaining open technical control-related recommendations by September 2019, and all recommendations by September 2020, as shown in figure 2. Our June 2018 report also included 11 recommendations to CDC to improve its information security program. In particular, we recommended that the agency, among other things, evaluate system impact level categorizations to ensure they reflect the current operating environment; update risk assessments to identify threats and the likelihood of impact of the threat on the environment; and update the facility risk assessments. In addition, we recommended that the agency take the necessary steps to make sure staff with significant security roles and responsibilities are appropriately identified and receive role-based training; monitor the configuration settings of agency systems to ensure the settings are set as intended; update security control assessments to include an assessment of controls using an appropriate level of rigor; and remediate POA&Ms in a timely manner. Further, we recommended that the agency document the cost-benefit analysis with associated risk of having an alternate site within the same geographical region as the main site. As of August 3, 2018, the agency had partially implemented 1 of the 11 information security program-related recommendations, but had not provided any evidence that it had implemented the remaining 10 recommendations. Regarding the partially implemented recommendation, CDC had provided role-based training to all personnel performing significant security responsibilities. However, the agency still needed to establish and automate the identification process and the tracking of training records for individuals needing specialized security role-based training. CDC had developed plans to fully implement this recommendation and each of the remaining 10 information security program-related recommendations by July 2019. Fully implementing the open recommendations is essential to ensuring that the agency’s systems and sensitive information are not at increased and unnecessary risk of unauthorized use, disclosure, modification, or disruption. We received written comments on a draft of this report from CDC. In its comments, which are reprinted in appendix III, the agency stated that it recognizes the risks associated with operating a large, global information technology enterprise and has implemented processes, procedures, and tools to better ensure the prevention, detection, and correction of potential incidents. CDC also said cybersecurity remains a high priority and that it takes the responsibilities for protecting public health information and data entrusted to it seriously. To strengthen its cybersecurity program, the agency stated that it is restructuring and streamlining the cyber program and IT infrastructure of its Office of the Chief Information Officer. Further, CDC stated that it has leveraged GAO’s limited official use only report, issued in June 2018, to accelerate its implementation, infrastructure, and software deployments to complete phrases one and two of DHS’s Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation program. The agency also said it concurred with, and highlighted a number of actions that it had planned or begun taking to remediate, the 11 security program recommendations that we made to CDC in our June 2018 report. We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, and the department’s Office of the Inspector General, the Director of CDC, and interested congressional parties. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact Gregory C. Wilshusen at (202) 512-6244 or wilshuseng@gao.gov, or Dr. Nabajyoti Barkakati at (202) 512-4499 or barkakatin@gao.gov. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV. Our objective was to assess the extent to which CDC had effectively implemented an information security program and controls to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its information on selected information systems. In June 2018, we issued a report which detailed the findings from our work in response to this objective. In the report, we made 184 recommendations to CDC to resolve the technical security control deficiencies in the information systems we reviewed and 11 additional recommendations to improve its information security program. We designated that report as “limited official use only” (LOUO) and did not release it to the general public because of the sensitive information it contained. This report publishes the findings discussed in our June 2018 report, but we have removed all references to the sensitive information. Specifically, we deleted the names of the information systems and computer networks that we examined, disassociated identified control deficiencies from named systems, deleted certain details about information security controls and control deficiencies, and omitted an appendix that was contained in the LOUO report. The appendix contained sensitive details about the technical security control deficiencies in the CDC’s information systems and computer networks that we reviewed, and the 184 recommendations we made to mitigate those deficiencies. We also provided a draft of this report to CDC officials to review and comment on the sensitivity of the information contained herein and to affirm that the report can be made available to the public without jeopardizing the security of CDC’s information systems and networks. In addition, this report addresses a second objective that was not included in the June 2018 report. Specifically, this objective was to determine the extent to which CDC had taken corrective actions to address the previously identified security program and technical control deficiencies and related recommendations for improvement that we identified in the earlier report. As noted in our June 2018 report, we determined the extent to which CDC had effectively implemented an information security program and controls to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its information on selected information systems. To do this, we initially gained an understanding of the overall network environment, identified interconnectivity and control points, and examined controls for the agency’s networks and facilities. We conducted site visits at two CDC facilities in Atlanta, Georgia. To evaluate CDC’s controls over its information systems, we used our Federal Information System Controls Audit Manual, which contains guidance for reviewing information system controls that affect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of computerized information. We based our assessment of controls on requirements identified by the Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 (FISMA), which establishes key elements for an effective agency-wide information security program; NIST guidelines and standards; Department of Health and Human Services and CDC policies, procedures, and standards; and standards and guidelines from relevant security organizations, such as the National Security Agency, the Center for Internet Security, and the Interagency Security Committee. We had reviewed a non-generalizable sample of the agency’s information systems, focusing on those systems that (1) collect, process, and maintain private or potentially-sensitive proprietary business, medical, and personally identifiable information; (2) are essential to CDC’s mission; and (3) were assigned a Federal Information Processing Standard rating of moderate or high impact. Based on these criteria, we had selected eight mission-essential systems for our review. Of these systems, the agency had categorized 7 as high-impact systems and 1 as a moderate-impact system. For these 8 selected mission- essential systems, we had reviewed information security program-related controls associated with risk assessments, security plans, security control assessments, remedial action plans, and contingency plans. To assess the safeguards CDC implemented for its systems, we had examined technical security controls for 24 CDC systems, including systems the agency designated as high-value assets. These included 10 key systems, 8 of which were high- and moderate-impact mission- essential systems just described, 1 additional high-impact system, 1 additional moderate-impact system, and 14 general support systems. We selected the additional high-impact system because the agency re- categorized it as a high-impact system during our review. We selected the additional moderate-impact system because the agency used it to control physical access to highly sensitive CDC biologic lab facilities, including facilities that handle dangerous and exotic substances that cause incurable and deadly diseases. We selected 10 key systems, 8 of which were mission-essential systems, for review that (1) collect, process, and maintain private or potentially sensitive proprietary business, medical, and personally identifiable information; (2) are essential to CDC’s mission; (3) could have a catastrophic or severe impact on operations if compromised; or (4) could be of particular interest to potential adversaries. We also selected 14 general support systems that were part of the agency’s network infrastructure supporting the 10 key systems. To review controls over the 10 key systems and 14 general support systems, we had examined the agency’s network infrastructure and assessed the controls associated with system access, encryption, configuration management, and logging and monitoring. For reporting purposes, we had categorized the security controls that we assessed into the five core security functions described in the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s (NIST) cybersecurity framework. The five core security functions are: Identify: Develop the organizational understanding to manage cybersecurity risk to systems, assets, data, and capabilities. Protect: Develop and implement the appropriate safeguards to ensure delivery of critical infrastructure services. Detect: Develop and implement the appropriate activities to identify the occurrence of a cybersecurity event. Respond: Develop and implement the appropriate activities to take action regarding a detected cybersecurity event. Recover: Develop and implement the appropriate activities to maintain plans for resilience and to restore any capabilities or services that were impaired due to a cybersecurity event. These core security functions are described in more detail in appendix II. For the identify core security function, we had examined CDC’s reporting for its hardware and software assets; analyzed risk assessments for the eight selected mission-essential systems to determine whether threats and vulnerabilities were being identified; reviewed risk assessments for two facilities; analyzed CDC policies, procedures, and practices to determine their effectiveness in providing guidance to personnel responsible for securing information and information systems; and analyzed security plans for the eight selected systems to determine if those plans had been documented and updated according to federal guidance. We also evaluated the risk assessments for two facilities that housed the 8 mission-essential selected systems. For the protect core security function, we had examined access controls for the 24 systems. These controls included the complexity and expiration of password settings to determine if password management was being enforced; administrative users’ system access permissions to determine whether their authorizations exceeded the access necessary to perform their assigned duties; firewall configurations, among other things, to determine whether system boundaries had been adequately protected; and physical security controls to determine if computer facilities and resources were being protected from espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft. We also had examined configurations for providing secure data transmissions across the network to determine whether sensitive data were being encrypted. In addition, we had examined configuration settings for routers, network management servers, switches, firewalls, and workstations to determine if settings adhered to configuration standards, and inspected key servers and workstations to determine if critical patches had been installed and/or were up-to-date. Further, we had examined training records to determine if employees and contractors had received security awareness training according to federal requirements, and whether personnel who have significant security responsibilities had received training commensurate with those responsibilities. For the detect core security function, we had analyzed centralized logging and network traffic monitoring capabilities for key assets connected to the network; analyzed CDC’s procedures and results for assessing security controls to determine whether controls for the eight selected mission- essential systems had been sufficiently tested at least annually and based on risk. We also had reviewed the agency’s implementation of continuous monitoring practices to determine whether the agency had developed and implemented a continuous monitoring strategy to manage its information technology assets and monitor the security configurations and vulnerabilities for those assets. For the respond core security function, we had reviewed CDC’s implementation of incident response practices, including an examination of incident tickets for 11 incidents; and had examined the agency’s process for correcting identified deficiencies for the eight selected mission-essential systems. For the recover core security function, we had examined contingency plans for eight selected mission-essential systems to determine whether those plans had been developed and tested. In assessing CDC’s controls associated with this function, as well as the other four core functions, we had interviewed Office of the Chief Information Officer officials, as needed. Within the core security functions, as appropriate, we had evaluated the elements of CDC’s information security program based on elements required by FISMA. For example, we analyzed risk assessments, security plans, security control assessments, and remedial action plans for each of the 8 selected mission-essential systems. In addition, we had assessed whether the agency had ensured staff had completed security awareness training and whether those with significant security responsibilities received commensurate training. We also had evaluated CDC’s security policies and procedures. To determine the reliability of CDC’s computer-processed data for training and incident response records, we had evaluated the materiality of the data to our audit objective and assessed the data by various means, including reviewing related documents, interviewing knowledgeable agency officials, and reviewing internal controls. Through a combination of methods, we concluded that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our work. To accomplish our second objective—on CDC’s actions to address the previously identified security program and technical control deficiencies and related recommendations—we requested that the agency provide a status report of its actions to implement each of the recommendations. For each recommendation that CDC indicated it had implemented as of August 3, 2018, we examined supporting documents, observed or tested the associated security control or procedure, and/or interviewed the responsible agency officials to assess the effectiveness of the actions taken to implement the recommendation or otherwise resolve the underlying control deficiency. Based on this assessment and CDC status reports, we defined the status of each recommendation into the following 3 categories: closed-implemented—CDC had implemented the recommendation; open-partially implemented—CDC had made progress toward, but had not completed, implementing the recommendation; and open-not implemented—CDC had not provided evidence that it had acted to implement the recommendation. We conducted this performance audit from December 2016 to December 2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. The National Institute of Standards and Technology’s cybersecurity framework consists of five core functions: identify, protect, detect, respond, and recover. Within the five functions are 23 categories and 108 subcategories, as described in the table. In addition to the individuals named above, Gary Austin, Jennifer R. Franks, Jeffrey Knott, and Chris Warweg (assistant directors); Chibuikem Ajulu-Okeke, Angela Bell, Sa’ar Dagani, Nancy Glover, Chaz Hubbard, George Kovachick, Sean Mays, Kevin Metcalf, Brandon Sanders, Michael Stevens, Daniel Swartz, and Angela Watson made key contributions to this report. Edward Alexander, Jr. and Duc Ngo (assistant directors); David Blanding, and Christopher Businsky also provided assistance.	[ "CDC is responsible for detecting and responding to emerging health threats and controlling dangerous substances. In carrying out its mission, CDC relies on information technology systems to receive, process, and maintain sensitive data. Accordingly, effective information security controls are essential to ensure that the agency's systems and information are protected from misuse and modification. GAO was asked to examine information security at CDC. In June 2018, GAO issued a limited official use only report on the extent to which CDC had effectively implemented technical controls and an information security program to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its information on selected information systems. This current report is a public version of the June 2018 report. In addition, for this public report, GAO determined the extent to which CDC has taken corrective actions to address the previously identified security program and technical control deficiencies and related recommendations for improvement. For this report, GAO reviewed supporting documents regarding CDC's actions on previously identified recommendations and interviewed personnel at CDC. As GAO reported in June 2018, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) implemented technical controls and an information security program that were intended to safeguard the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its information systems and information. However, GAO identified control and program deficiencies in the core security functions related to identifying risk, protecting systems from threats and vulnerabilities, detecting and responding to cyber security events, and recovering system operations (see table below). GAO made 195 recommendations to address these deficiencies. As of August 2018, CDC had made significant progress in resolving many of the security deficiencies by implementing 102 of 184 (about 55 percent) technical control recommendations, and partially implementing 1 of 11 information security program recommendations made in the June 2018 report. The figure shows the status of CDC's efforts to implement the 195 recommendations. Additionally, CDC has created remedial action plans to implement the majority of the remaining open recommendations by September 2019. Until CDC implements these recommendations and resolves the associated deficiencies, its information systems and information will remain at increased risk of misuse, improper disclosure or modification, and destruction." ]	10,203	gov_report	en	null	b0913fe0502bb4d9c12dae570ca7cca66b027d35219aeaa2
In March 2015, Saudi Arabia established a coalition of nations (hereinafter referred to as the Saudi-led coalition or the coalition) to engage in military operations in Yemen against the Ansar Allah/Houthi movement and loyalists of the previous president of Yemen, the late Ali Abdullah Saleh. During 2014, the United States joined Saudi Arabia in demanding that Houthi forces reverse their campaign to occupy the Yemeni capital of Sanaa, but the rapid onset of hostilities in March 2015 forced the Obama Administration to react quickly. At the start of the Saudi-led intervention on March 25, 2015, the Administration announced that the United States would provide "logistical and intelligence support" to the coalition's operations without taking "direct military action in Yemen in support of this effort." Soon thereafter, a joint U.S.-Saudi planning cell was established to coordinate military and intelligence support for the campaign. At the United Nations Security Council, the United States supported the passage of Resolution 2216 (April 2015), which, among other things, required member states to impose an arms embargo against the Houthi-Saleh forces and demanded that the Houthis withdraw from all areas seized during the current conflict. Since the March 2015 Saudi-led coalition intervention in Yemen, Congress has taken an active role in debating and overseeing U.S. policy in the Arabian Peninsula. Members have considered legislative proposals seeking to reduce Yemeni civilian casualties resulting from the coalition's operations; improve deteriorating humanitarian conditions; end restrictions on the flow of goods and humanitarian aid; combat Iranian support for the Houthis; preserve maritime security in the Bab al Mandab Strait; and/or support continued Saudi-led coalition and U.S. efforts to counter Al Qaeda and Islamic State forces in Yemen. Beyond Yemen, many Members have appeared to view the conflict through the prism of a broader regional rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and the U.S. effort to limit Iran's malign regional influence. Others lawmakers have viewed the Yemen conflict as indicative of what they perceive as problems in the U.S.-Saudi relationship, a concern that deepened after the killing of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi by Saudi government personnel in October 2018. Congress has considered but has not enacted proposals to curtail or condition U.S. defense sales to Saudi Arabia. Responding to the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen also appears to be reinvigorating some Members' interest in strengthening the role of Congress in foreign policy vis-à-vis the executive branch. Debate in Congress over Yemen has featured bipartisan statements of interest in asserting the prerogatives of the legislative branch to limit executive branch power, specifically using war powers legislation and the appropriations and authorization processes to curb U.S. military involvement in support of coalition operations. Congressional scrutiny of U.S. policy in Yemen also has led to legislative changes to global authorities, such as the Department of Defense's authority to enter into and use acquisition and cross servicing agreements with partner militaries. Congressional interest in the Yemen conflict has evolved and grown gradually and was not widespread at the outset of the coalition's March 2015 intervention in Yemen. In early to mid-2015, congressional interest in U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East centered on the Iran nuclear deal and Operation Inherent Resolve against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. Several months after the March 2015 intervention, the Saudi-led coalition had not achieved a conclusive victory and what modest gains had been made on the ground were offset by mounting international criticism of growing civilian casualties from coalition air strikes. In Congress, several lawmakers began to express concern about the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Yemen. In late September 2015, Representative Ted W. Lieu wrote a letter to the Joint Chiefs of Staff advocating for a halt to U.S. support for the Saudi-led coalition until it instituted safeguards to prevent civilian casualties. In October 2015, 10 Members of Congress wrote a letter to President Obama urging him to "work with our Saudi partners to limit civilian casualties to the fullest extent possible." In October 2015, Senator Markey stated that "I fear that our failure to strongly advocate diplomacy in Yemen over the past two years, coupled with our failure to urge restraint in the face of the crisis last spring, may put the viability of this critical [U.S.-Saudi] partnership at risk." By the fall of 2015, as the Obama Administration tried to balance its concern for adhering to the laws of armed conflict with its support for Gulf partners, lawmakers began to express their concern over U.S. involvement in the coalition's intervention by scrutinizing U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia. When the Administration informally notified Congress of a proposed sale of precision guided munitions (PGMs) to Saudi Arabia, some Senators sought to delay its formal notification. After the formal notification in November 2015, Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) leaders jointly requested that the Administration notify Congress 30 days prior to associated shipments, marking the first use of this prior notification request authority. At that time, no related joint resolutions of disapproval on proposed sales of PGMs to the kingdom were introduced, but the delay and additional notification request demonstrated congressional concern. By the one-year anniversary of the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen, a more defined opposition to U.S. support for the coalition had begun to coalesce amid repeated international documentation of human rights abuses and errant coalition airstrikes. In April 2016, legislation was introduced that sought to place conditions on future proposed sale notifications, previously approved sales, or transfers of PGMs to Saudi Arabia. Proposed amendments to FY2017 defense legislation would have added some similar conditions on the use of funds to implement sales of PGMs or prohibited the transfer of cluster munitions to Saudi Arabia. The PGM amendment was not considered, but the cluster munitions amendment was narrowly defeated in a June 2016 House floor vote. In the spring and summer of 2016, the United Nations held multiple rounds of peace talks in Kuwait aimed at brokering an end to the conflict. From April 2016 to August 2016, the Saudi-led coalition had largely spared Yemen's capital Sanaa from aerial strikes as part of its commitment to the cessation of hostilities. When U.N.-mediated peace talks collapsed in August 2016, the Saudi-led coalition resumed bombing and the war intensified. During the summer of 2016, the Obama Administration reduced some U.S. support for Saudi Arabia's air campaign in Yemen by withdrawing U.S. personnel assigned to a joint U.S.-Saudi planning cell. Nevertheless, overall U.S.-Saudi cooperation continued and, in August 2016, the Obama Administration notified Congress of a proposed sale of M1A2S tanks to Saudi Arabia. In response, some lawmakers wrote to request that President Obama withdraw the proposal, citing concerns about Yemen. In September 2016, joint resolutions of disapproval of the proposed tank sale were introduced in the Senate ( S.J.Res. 39 ) and House ( H.J.Res. 98 ). On September 21, 2016, the Senate voted to table a motion to discharge the SFRC from further consideration of S.J.Res. 39 (71-27, Record Vote 145). During debate over the motion, many Senators argued in favor of continued U.S. support for Saudi Arabia, with Senator Lindsey Graham remarking "To those who want to vote today to suspend this aid to Saudi Arabia, people in Iran will cheer you on." In the wake of an October 2016 Saudi airstrike on a funeral hall in Sanaa that killed 140 people, the Obama Administration initiated a review of U.S. security assistance to Saudi Arabia. Based on that review, it put a hold on a planned sale of precision guided munitions (PGMs) to Saudi Arabia and limited intelligence sharing, but maintained counterterrorism cooperation and refueling for coalition aircraft. In the final months of the Obama Administration, U.S. Armed Forces briefly exchanged fire with forces party to the conflict. In October 2016, Houthi-Saleh forces launched anti-ship missiles at U.S. Navy vessels on patrol off the coast of Yemen. The attacks against the U.S. ships marked the first time U.S. Armed Forces had come under direct fire in the war. The Obama Administration responded to the attacks against U.S. naval vessels by directing the Armed Forces to fire cruise missiles against Houthi-Saleh radar installations. The Obama Administration described the U.S. strikes as self-defense and indicated that it did not want to deepen its direct involvement in the conflict. In August and November 2016, then-Secretary of State John Kerry made several attempts to broker a peace initiative in Oman, but his efforts were rejected by the parties themselves. By the end of 114 th Congress, the war in Yemen was becoming a more significant foreign policy issue for lawmakers. While a growing number of Members were becoming critical of the U.S. role in supporting the Saudi-led coalition amid a deteriorating humanitarian situation in Yemen, more lawmakers still viewed the conflict through a regional lens rather than as a localized affair. Amid significant congressional opposition to the 2015 nuclear agreement with Iran (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or JCPOA), some Members viewed Iran's support for the Houthi movement and the broader conflict in Yemen as an example of Iran's malign regional activities not directly addressed by the JCPOA. As the Houthis targeted Gulf state infrastructure on land and vessels at sea, their behavior was touted as evidence of Iran's growing capabilities to threaten U.S. and Gulf security. Just as some Members considered the Yemen conflict primarily a proxy war between the Iran-backed Houthis and the Saudi-led coalition, others viewed it as a test of long-standing U.S. commitments to supporting Saudi Arabian security. Supporters of the relationship, while acknowledging that Saudi Arabia's conduct of the war was at times problematic, argued that to curtail U.S. arms sales or other defense support to the kingdom would weaken a vital partner that was under threat from a hostile nonstate actor on its southern border. Others lawmakers charged that continued U.S. support for the coalition was not improving coalition behavior but damaging the U.S. reputation for upholding commitments to international law and human rights. Legislation seeking to limit U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia was not enacted in the 114 th Congress, but marked the beginning of the broader congressional debate that has continued. As the Trump Administration prepared to assume office, human rights organizations and aid groups were pressing Congress to become more attuned to the growing humanitarian crisis in Yemen. Though the Obama Administration had taken some steps, particularly in late 2016, to limit U.S.-coalition cooperation and restrict deliveries of PGMs to Saudi Arabia, nongovernmental groups deemed such action as insufficient. According to Human Rights Watch, "Whatever conditionality the Obama administration thought it had created—in holding up the transfer of precision munitions near the tail end of Obama's term and suspending cluster munition transfers earlier—ultimately did not have meaningful impact in reining in the continued Saudi-led coalition attacks on civilians." From the beginning of his Administration, President Donald Trump has signaled strong support for the Saudi-led coalition's operations in Yemen as a bulwark against Iranian regional interference. He initiated a review of U.S. policy toward Yemen, including President Obama's October 2016 restrictions on U.S. arms sales and intelligence sharing to the coalition. On March 19, 2017, just prior to his visit to Saudi Arabia, President Trump notified Congress that he was proceeding with three proposed direct commercial sales of precision guided munitions technology deferred by the Obama Administration, subject to congressional review. In May 2017, the Administration officially notified Congress of its intention to proceed with proposed sales of precision guided munitions technologies that the Obama Administration had deferred, while announcing plans to increase training for Saudi Arabia's air force on both targeting and the Law of Armed Conflict. Congress debated another resolution of disapproval ( S.J.Res. 42 ) of these proposed PGM sales in June 2017 (see below). After completing the policy review in July 2017, President Trump directed his Administration "to focus on ending the war and avoiding a regional conflict, mitigating the humanitarian crisis, and defending Saudi Arabia's territorial integrity and commerce in the Red Sea." As President Trump entered office, the dynamics of the conflict in Yemen were changing, and the coalition launched a new offensive along Yemen's 280-mile western coastal plain ultimately aimed at taking the strategic Houthi-held port city of Hudaydah. In early 2017, the coalition's gradual advance toward Hudaydah, coupled with an ongoing deterioration in humanitarian conditions, sparked some Members of Congress to implore the Administration to improve aid access and negotiate a cease-fire. In March 2017, several House Members wrote a letter to then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson urging him to "use all U.S. diplomatic tools to help open the Yemeni port of Hodeida [Hudaydah] to international humanitarian aid organizations." A month later, another group of House Members wrote to President Trump stating that Congress should approve any new U.S. support to the coalition amid its offensive against Hudaydah. On June 13, 2017, the Senate debated another resolution ( S.J.Res. 42 ) to disapprove of three direct commercial sales of PGMs to Saudi Arabia. During Senate floor consideration over the motion to discharge the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from further consideration of S.J.Res. 42 , Members once again weighed various issues, such as the U.S.-Saudi bilateral relationship, countering Iran, and limiting U.S. involvement in the war in Yemen. Some lawmakers suggested that U.S. arms sales and military support to the coalition had enabled alleged violations of international humanitarian law, while others argued that U.S. support to the coalition improved its effectiveness and helps minimize civilian casualties. For example, during floor debate, Senator Graham argued that "If we are worried about collateral damage in Yemen, I understand the concern. Precision weapons would help that cause, not hurt it." Senator Murphy retorted, saying "What we are asking for is to hold off on selling these precision-guided munitions until we get some clear promise—some clear assurance—from the Saudis that they are going to use these munitions only for military purposes and that they are going to start taking steps—real steps, tangible steps—to address the humanitarian crisis." On June 13, 2017, the Senate voted to reject the motion to discharge the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from further consideration (47-53, Record Vote 143), and a companion resolution was not taken up in the House ( H.J.Res. 102 ). Representative Ro Khanna introduced a concurrent resolution ( H.Con.Res. 81 ) pursuant to the War Powers Resolution ( P.L. 93-148 ) in a bid to end U.S. support for the coalition's military intervention. After consultation between House leaders and supporters of the resolution on a compromise approach, the House agreed to delay expedited consideration of the resolution until after the November 2016 election and then adopted a nonbinding alternative ( H.Res. 599 , 366-30, 1 Present, Roll no. 623). In his first year in office, while President Trump sought to improve relations with Saudi Arabia, counter Iran, and increase U.S. counterterrorism activity in Yemen, his Administration also at times took strong positions on the need for members of the coalition to improve humanitarian access, pursue a settlement to the conflict, and take measures to prevent civilian casualties. After a Houthi-fired missile with alleged Iranian origins landed deep inside Saudi Arabia in November 2017, the coalition instituted a full blockade of all of Yemen's ports, including the main port of Hudaydah, exacerbating the country's humanitarian crisis. The White House issued four press statements on the conflict between November 8 and December 8, including a statement on December 6 in which President Trump called on Saudi Arabia to "completely allow food, fuel, water, and medicine to reach the Yemeni people who desperately need it. This must be done for humanitarian reasons immediately." On December 20, 2017, the Saudi-led coalition announced that it would end its blockade of Hudaydah port for a 30-day period and permit the delivery of four U.S.-funded cranes to Yemen to increase the port's capability to off-load commercial and humanitarian goods. The next day, the White House issued a statement welcoming "Saudi Arabia's announcement of these humanitarian actions in the face of this major conflict." As the Saudi-led coalition intervention entered its fourth year, some in the Senate also proposed use of the War Powers Resolution as a tool for ending U.S. support for the coalition's military intervention. On February 28, 2018, Senator Bernie Sanders introduced S.J.Res. 54 , a joint resolution to "direct the removal of United States Armed Forces from hostilities in the Republic of Yemen that have not been authorized by Congress (except for those U.S. forces engaged in counterterrorism operations directed at al Qaeda or associated forces)." Efforts in the Senate followed a late 2017 attempt in the House (see Table 1 below), in which a concurrent resolution directing the President to remove U.S. forces from Yemen was tabled in favor of a House-passed nonbinding resolution. Throughout 2018, between Congress and the Trump Administration and within Congress itself, there was disagreement as to whether U.S. forces assisting the Saudi-led coalition have been introduced into active or imminent hostilities for purposes of the War Powers Resolution. Some Members claimed that by providing support to the Saudi-led coalition, U.S. forces have been introduced into a "situation where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated" based on the criteria of the War Powers Resolution. The Trump Administration disagreed. In February 2018, the Acting Department of Defense General Counsel wrote to Senate leaders describing the extent of current U.S. support , and reported that "the United States provides the KSA-led coalition defense articles and services, including air-to-air refueling; certain intelligence support; and military advice, including advice regarding compliance with the law of armed conflict and best practices for reducing the risk of civilian casualties." On March 20, 2018, the Senate considered S.J.Res. 54 on the floor. During debate, arguments centered on a number of issues, ranging from concern over exacerbating Yemen's humanitarian crisis to reasserting the role of Congress in authorizing the use of armed force abroad. After then-Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Senator Bob Corker promised to propose new legislation and hold hearings scrutinizing U.S. policy in Yemen, a majority of Senators voted to table a motion to discharge the Foreign Relations committee from further consideration of S.J.Res. 54 . Senator Robert Menendez made remarks expressing conditional support for Senator Corker's approach, a view shared by some other Senators who voted to table the motion. The Foreign Relations Committee held a hearing on Yemen a month later. In parallel testimony before Congress, U.S. defense officials stated that while the United States refueled Saudi aircraft and provided advice on targeting techniques, CENTCOM did not track coalition aircraft after they were refueled and did not provide advice on specific targets. Then-Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Robert S. Karem testified that "It's correct that we do not monitor and track all of the Saudi aircraft aloft over Yemen." During the same hearing, U.S. officials acknowledged that pressure from Congress has altered how the Administration deals with the coalition over the Yemen conflict. Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs David Satterfield told Senator Todd Young and the SFRC the following: Senator, your efforts, the efforts of your colleagues in this body and on this Committee have been exceedingly helpful in allowing the Administration to send a message from whole of government regarding the very specific concerns we have over any limitations, restrictions, constraints on the ability of both humanitarian and commercial goods specifically to include fuel to have unrestricted and expeditious entry into Yemen. And that messaging which comes from us, the Executive Branch, also comes from this body is extremely important. After the promised hearing, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee also proposed new legislation to place conditions on U.S. assistance to the coalition. In May, the committee reported S.J.Res. 58 to the Senate; it would have prohibited the obligation or expenditure of U.S. funds for in-flight refueling operations of Saudi and Saudi-led coalition aircraft that were not conducting select types of operations if certain certifications cannot be made and maintained. The Senate Armed Services Committee incorporated the provisions of the SFRC-reported text of S.J.Res. 58 as Section 1266 of the version of the FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) that it reported to the Senate on June 5, 2018 ( S. 2987 ). The provision was modified further and passed by both the House and Senate as Section 1290 of the conference version of the FY2019 NDAA ( H.R. 5515 ). It was signed into law as P.L. 115-232 in mid-August, giving the Administration until mid-September 2018 to make certain certifications. In a statement accompanying the President's signing of P.L. 115-232 into law, President Trump objected to provisions such as Section 1290, stating the Administration's view that such provisions "encompass only actions for which such advance certification or notification is feasible and consistent" with "[his] exclusive constitutional authorities as Commander in Chief and as the sole representative of the Nation in foreign affairs." As Congress continued to question the role of the United States in supporting coalition operations in Yemen, the pace and scale of fighting on the ground increased dramatically by the summer of 2018. On June 12, 2018, the Saudi-led coalition launched "Operation Golden Victory," aimed at retaking the Red Sea port city of Hudaydah. As coalition forces engaged Houthi militants in and around Hudaydah, humanitarian organizations warned that if port operation ceased, famine could become widespread throughout northern Yemen. On June 12, nine Senators wrote a letter to Secretary of State Pompeo and then-Secretary of Defense Mattis saying, "We are concerned that pending military operations by the UAE and its Yemeni partners will exacerbate the humanitarian crisis by interrupting delivery of humanitarian aid and damaging critical infrastructure. We are also deeply concerned that these operations jeopardize prospects for a near-term political resolution to the conflict." Several weeks later, Senator Robert Menendez, the ranking member on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, placed a hold on a potential U.S. sale of precision guided munitions to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. In a June 28 letter to Secretary of State Pompeo and Secretary of Defense Mattis, Senator Menendez said, I am not confident that these weapons sales will be utilized strategically as effective leverage to push back on Iran's actions in Yemen, assist our partners in their own self-defense, or drive the parties toward a political settlement that saves lives and mitigates humanitarian suffering…. Even worse, I am concerned that our policies are enabling perpetuation of a conflict that has resulted in the world's worst humanitarian crisis. On August 9, the coalition conducted an airstrike that hit a bus in a market near Dahyan, Yemen, in the northern Sa'ada governorate adjacent to the Saudi border. The strike reportedly killed 51 people, 40 of whom were children. The coalition claims that its airstrike was a "legitimate military operation" and conducted in response to a Houthi missile attack on the Saudi city of Jizan a day earlier that killed a Yemeni national in the kingdom. The U.S. State Department called on the Saudi-led coalition to conduct a "thorough and transparent investigation into the incident." Several Members of Congress wrote to the Administration seeking additional information regarding U.S. operations in the wake of the August 2018 coalition strike at Dahyan. Several Senators also submitted an amendment to the FY2019 Defense Department appropriations act ( H.R. 6157 ) that would have prohibited the use of funds made available by the act to support the Saudi-led coalition operations in Yemen until the Secretary of Defense certifies in writing to Congress that the coalition air campaign "does not violate the principles of distinction and proportionality within the rules for the protection of civilians." The provision did not apply to support for ongoing counterterrorism operations against Al Qaeda and the Islamic State in Yemen. On September 12, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo issued a certification that would allow the use of FY2019 defense funds to support in-flight refueling of coalition aircraft to continue, per the terms of Section 1290 (see discussion above) of the FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, P.L. 115-232 ). Some Members of Congress criticized the Administration's actions, asserting that the coalition has not met the act's specified benchmarks for avoiding civilian casualties in Yemen. On September 26, several House Members introduced H.Con.Res. 138 , which sought to direct the President to remove U.S. Armed Forces from hostilities in Yemen, except for Armed Forces engaged in operations authorized under the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force, within 30 days unless and until a declaration of war or specific authorization for such use has been enacted into law. In response to a similar initiative in the Senate, the Administration submitted a detailed argument expressing its view that U.S. forces supporting Saudi-led coalition operations are not engaged in hostilities in Yemen. By late 2018, the prospect of widespread famine in Yemen coupled with international reprobation over the killing of Jamal Khashoggi pressured the Administration and the coalition to accelerate moves toward peace talks. On October 30, then-Secretary of Defense James Mattis and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo called for all parties to reach a cease-fire and resume negotiations. On November 9, Secretary Mattis further announced that effective immediately, the coalition would use its own military capabilities—rather than U.S. capabilities—to conduct in-flight refueling in support of its operations in Yemen. Though fighting continued along several fronts, on December 13, 2018, Special Envoy of the United Nations Secretary-General for Yemen Martin Griffiths brokered a cease-fire centered on the besieged Red Sea port city of Hudaydah (Yemen's largest port). As part of the U.N.-brokered deal (known as the Stockholm Agreement), the coalition and the Houthis agreed to redeploy their forces outside Hudaydah city and port. The United Nations agreed to chair a Redeployment Coordination Committee (RCC) to monitor the cease-fire and redeployment. The international community praised the Stockholm Agreement as a first step toward broader de-escalation and a possible road map to a comprehensive peace settlement. Also on December 13, 2018, the Senate amended and passed S.J.Res. 54 (56-41), which, among other things, directed the President to remove U.S. forces from hostilities in Yemen, except U.S. forces engaged in operations directed at Al Qaeda or associated forces. In the House, lawmakers twice narrowly approved rules resolutions containing provisions that made similar resolutions directing the President to remove U.S. forces from hostilities in Yemen ineligible for expedited consideration ( H.Res. 1142 and H.Res. 1176 ). On December 13, the Senate also passed S.J.Res. 69 , which, among other things, expresses the sense of the Senate that Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is responsible for the murder of the journalist Jamal Khashoggi and that there is no statutory authorization for United States involvement in hostilities in the Yemen civil war. The 115th Congress frequently debated the extent and terms of the United States' involvement in the ongoing conflict in Yemen. Lawmakers questioned the extent to which successive Administrations have adhered to existing law related to providing security assistance, including sales or transfers of defense goods and defense services, while upholding international human rights standards (e.g., 22 U.S.C. §2754 or 22 U.S.C. §2304). They also enacted new legislation that would condition or prohibit the use of U.S. funds for some activities related to Yemen and extend legislative oversight over the executive branch's policy toward the war in Yemen. While the House and its Rules Committee voted to make resolutions with respect to war powers and Yemen ineligible for expedited consideration, the Senate passage of S.J.Res. 54 at the conclusion of the 115 th Congress demonstrated growth in congressional opposition to U.S. involvement in the Saudi-led coalition intervention in Yemen relative to previous years. Over time, the balance of votes shifted in favor of measures that could be described as critical or restrictive of U.S. support for Saudi-led coalition operations with regard to arms sales, oversight measures, and war powers measures. Nevertheless, after nearly four years of conflict, it remains difficult to identify the locus of congressional consensus about Yemen. Many in the House and Senate state that they seek to preserve cooperative U.S.-Saudi relations in broad terms and express concern about Iranian activities in Yemen, while also expressing support for expanded humanitarian access and efforts to bring the conflict to a close. Some lawmakers express opposition to the intervention and U.S. involvement on moral grounds, citing errant coalition airstrikes and the prospect of a looming famine. Others argue the conflict's continuation creates opportunities for Iran and Sunni Islamist extremist groups to expand their influence and operations in Yemen. Still others may have come to oppose continued U.S. support for the intervention based on factors not directly related to Yemen itself, including the opaque mechanisms used by the executive branch to support the coalition and/or anger with the Saudi government over the killing of Jamal Khashoggi. It remains to be seen whether recent congressional consideration of Yemen legislation is a harbinger of broader efforts by Members of Congress to reassert congressional prerogatives toward U.S. foreign policy writ large. Measures to enhance oversight over U.S. support to the Saudi-led coalition and U.S. strategy toward Yemen have received broad bipartisan support, while proponents of other recently considered arms sales and war powers measures have used mechanisms to ensure privileged consideration of their proposals. The 116 th Congress may continue to debate U.S. support for the Saudi-led coalition and Saudi Arabia's conduct of the war in Yemen. It is uncertain whether lawmakers may also broaden the scope of their oversight activities beyond the current conflict to more fully address the root causes of Yemen's chronic instability. Even if the United States is no longer an active supporter of coalition military efforts, Yemen itself has been devastated by years of war and remains the world's worst humanitarian crisis. Experts expect Yemen to require sustained international attention and financial assistance in order to help local actors reach and sustain a political settlement. This suggests that Congress may grapple with questions about the conduct of U.S. diplomacy, the provision of U.S. security support, and the investment of U.S. assistance and defense funds for years to come.	[ "This product provides an overview of the role Congress has played in shaping U.S. policy toward the conflict in Yemen. Summary tables provide information on legislative proposals considered in the 115th and 116th Congresses. Various legislative proposals have reflected a range of congressional perspectives and priorities, including with regard to the authorization of the activities of the U.S. Armed Forces related to the conflict; the extent of U.S. logistical, material, advisory, and intelligence support for the coalition led by Saudi Arabia; the approval, disapproval, or conditioning of U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia; the appropriation of funds for U.S. operations in support of the Saudi-led coalition; the conduct of the Saudi-led coalition's air campaign and its adherence to international humanitarian law and the laws of armed conflict; the demand for greater humanitarian access to Yemen; the call for a wider government assessment of U.S. policy toward Yemen and U.S. support to parties to the conflict; the nature and extent of U.S.-Saudi counterterrorism and border security cooperation; and the role of Iran in supplying missile technology and other weapons to the forces of the Houthi movement. The 116th Congress may continue to debate U.S. support for the Saudi-led coalition and Saudi Arabia's conduct of the war in Yemen, where fighting has continued since March 2015. The war has exacerbated a humanitarian crisis in Yemen that began in 2011; presently, the World Food Program reports that 20 million Yemenis face hunger in the absence of sustained food assistance. The difficulty of accessing certain areas of Yemen has made it hard for governments and aid agencies to count the war's casualties. Data collected by the U.S. and European-funded Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) suggest that 60,000 Yemenis have been killed since January 2016. The Trump Administration has opposed various congressional proposals, including initiatives to reject or condition proposed U.S. arms sales or to require an end to U.S. military support to Saudi-led coalition operations in Yemen. Many in Congress have condemned the October 2018 murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi by Saudi government personnel, and in general, the incident appears to have exacerbated existing congressional concerns about Saudi leaders and the pace, scope, and direction of change in the kingdom's policies. This product includes legislative proposals considered during the 115th and 116th Congresses. It does not include references to Yemen in Iran sanctions legislation, which are covered in CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions. For additional information on the war in Yemen and Saudi Arabia, please see the following CRS products. CRS Report R43960, Yemen: Civil War and Regional Intervention. CRS Report RL33533, Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations. CRS Insight IN10729, Yemen: Cholera Outbreak." ]	4,993	gov_report	en	null	88e9633a41a602e5b829a63882d3481d3e18112bc0da9cff

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