instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameImpl::CommitFailedPerNavigationMojoInterfaceNavigation(
const CommonNavigationParams& common_params,
const CommitNavigationParams& commit_params,
bool has_stale_copy_in_cache,
int error_code,
const base::Optional<std::string>& error_page_content,
std::unique_ptr<blink::URLLoaderFactoryBundleInfo>
subresource_loader_factories,
mojom::NavigationClient::CommitFailedNavigationCallback
per_navigation_mojo_interface_callback) {
DCHECK(navigation_client_impl_);
DCHECK(IsPerNavigationMojoInterfaceEnabled());
CommitFailedNavigationInternal(
common_params, commit_params, has_stale_copy_in_cache, error_code,
error_page_content, std::move(subresource_loader_factories),
mojom::FrameNavigationControl::CommitFailedNavigationCallback(),
std::move(per_navigation_mojo_interface_callback));
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 139,538
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: clamp_default_icc(const fz_colorspace *cs, const float *src, float *dst)
{
int i;
fz_iccprofile *profile = cs->data;
for (i = 0; i < profile->num_devcomp; i++)
dst[i] = fz_clamp(src[i], 0, 1);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 296
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int check_clock(const clockid_t which_clock)
{
int error = 0;
struct task_struct *p;
const pid_t pid = CPUCLOCK_PID(which_clock);
if (CPUCLOCK_WHICH(which_clock) >= CPUCLOCK_MAX)
return -EINVAL;
if (pid == 0)
return 0;
rcu_read_lock();
p = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
if (!p || !(CPUCLOCK_PERTHREAD(which_clock) ?
same_thread_group(p, current) : has_group_leader_pid(p))) {
error = -EINVAL;
}
rcu_read_unlock();
return error;
}
Commit Message: posix-timers: Sanitize overrun handling
The posix timer overrun handling is broken because the forwarding functions
can return a huge number of overruns which does not fit in an int. As a
consequence timer_getoverrun(2) and siginfo::si_overrun can turn into
random number generators.
The k_clock::timer_forward() callbacks return a 64 bit value now. Make
k_itimer::ti_overrun[_last] 64bit as well, so the kernel internal
accounting is correct. 3Remove the temporary (int) casts.
Add a helper function which clamps the overrun value returned to user space
via timer_getoverrun(2) or siginfo::si_overrun limited to a positive value
between 0 and INT_MAX. INT_MAX is an indicator for user space that the
overrun value has been clamped.
Reported-by: Team OWL337 <icytxw@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180626132705.018623573@linutronix.de
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 81,093
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool OMXNodeInstance::handleMessage(omx_message &msg) {
const sp<GraphicBufferSource>& bufferSource(getGraphicBufferSource());
if (msg.type == omx_message::FILL_BUFFER_DONE) {
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *buffer =
findBufferHeader(msg.u.extended_buffer_data.buffer);
{
Mutex::Autolock _l(mDebugLock);
mOutputBuffersWithCodec.remove(buffer);
CLOG_BUMPED_BUFFER(
FBD, WITH_STATS(FULL_BUFFER(
msg.u.extended_buffer_data.buffer, buffer, msg.fenceFd)));
unbumpDebugLevel_l(kPortIndexOutput);
}
BufferMeta *buffer_meta =
static_cast<BufferMeta *>(buffer->pAppPrivate);
if (buffer->nOffset + buffer->nFilledLen < buffer->nOffset
|| buffer->nOffset + buffer->nFilledLen > buffer->nAllocLen) {
CLOG_ERROR(onFillBufferDone, OMX_ErrorBadParameter,
FULL_BUFFER(NULL, buffer, msg.fenceFd));
}
buffer_meta->CopyFromOMX(buffer);
if (bufferSource != NULL) {
bufferSource->codecBufferFilled(buffer);
msg.u.extended_buffer_data.timestamp = buffer->nTimeStamp;
}
} else if (msg.type == omx_message::EMPTY_BUFFER_DONE) {
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *buffer =
findBufferHeader(msg.u.buffer_data.buffer);
{
Mutex::Autolock _l(mDebugLock);
mInputBuffersWithCodec.remove(buffer);
CLOG_BUMPED_BUFFER(
EBD, WITH_STATS(EMPTY_BUFFER(msg.u.buffer_data.buffer, buffer, msg.fenceFd)));
}
if (bufferSource != NULL) {
bufferSource->codecBufferEmptied(buffer, msg.fenceFd);
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE omx: check buffer port before using
Bug: 28816827
Change-Id: I3d5bad4a1ef96dec544b05bb31cc6f7109aae0a5
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 173,530
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: scoped_refptr<EntryImpl> BackendImpl::ResurrectEntry(
scoped_refptr<EntryImpl> deleted_entry) {
if (ENTRY_NORMAL == deleted_entry->entry()->Data()->state) {
deleted_entry = nullptr;
stats_.OnEvent(Stats::CREATE_MISS);
Trace("create entry miss ");
return NULL;
}
eviction_.OnCreateEntry(deleted_entry.get());
entry_count_++;
stats_.OnEvent(Stats::RESURRECT_HIT);
Trace("Resurrect entry hit ");
return deleted_entry;
}
Commit Message: Blockfile cache: fix long-standing sparse + evict reentrancy problem
Thanks to nedwilliamson@ (on gmail) for an alternative perspective
plus a reduction to make fixing this much easier.
Bug: 826626, 518908, 537063, 802886
Change-Id: Ibfa01416f9a8e7f7b361e4f93b4b6b134728b85f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/985052
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Maks Orlovich <morlovich@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#547103}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 147,272
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void core_pmu_enable_all(int added)
{
struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc = &__get_cpu_var(cpu_hw_events);
int idx;
for (idx = 0; idx < x86_pmu.num_counters; idx++) {
struct hw_perf_event *hwc = &cpuc->events[idx]->hw;
if (!test_bit(idx, cpuc->active_mask) ||
cpuc->events[idx]->attr.exclude_host)
continue;
__x86_pmu_enable_event(hwc, ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_ENABLE);
}
}
Commit Message: perf/x86: Fix offcore_rsp valid mask for SNB/IVB
The valid mask for both offcore_response_0 and
offcore_response_1 was wrong for SNB/SNB-EP,
IVB/IVB-EP. It was possible to write to
reserved bit and cause a GP fault crashing
the kernel.
This patch fixes the problem by correctly marking the
reserved bits in the valid mask for all the processors
mentioned above.
A distinction between desktop and server parts is introduced
because bits 24-30 are only available on the server parts.
This version of the patch is just a rebase to perf/urgent tree
and should apply to older kernels as well.
Signed-off-by: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: jolsa@redhat.com
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: security@kernel.org
Cc: ak@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 31,660
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: notify_script_init(int extra_params, const char *type)
{
notify_script_t *script = MALLOC(sizeof(notify_script_t));
vector_t *strvec_qe;
/* We need to reparse the command line, allowing for quoted and escaped strings */
strvec_qe = alloc_strvec_quoted_escaped(NULL);
if (!strvec_qe) {
log_message(LOG_INFO, "Unable to parse notify script");
FREE(script);
return NULL;
}
set_script_params_array(strvec_qe, script, extra_params);
if (!script->args) {
log_message(LOG_INFO, "Unable to parse script '%s' - ignoring", FMT_STR_VSLOT(strvec_qe, 1));
FREE(script);
free_strvec(strvec_qe);
return NULL;
}
script->flags = 0;
if (vector_size(strvec_qe) > 2) {
if (set_script_uid_gid(strvec_qe, 2, &script->uid, &script->gid)) {
log_message(LOG_INFO, "Invalid user/group for %s script %s - ignoring", type, script->args[0]);
FREE(script->args);
FREE(script);
free_strvec(strvec_qe);
return NULL;
}
}
else {
if (set_default_script_user(NULL, NULL)) {
log_message(LOG_INFO, "Failed to set default user for %s script %s - ignoring", type, script->args[0]);
FREE(script->args);
FREE(script);
free_strvec(strvec_qe);
return NULL;
}
script->uid = default_script_uid;
script->gid = default_script_gid;
}
free_strvec(strvec_qe);
return script;
}
Commit Message: When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 76,131
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Element::scrollByUnits(int units, ScrollGranularity granularity)
{
document()->updateLayoutIgnorePendingStylesheets();
if (!renderer())
return;
if (!renderer()->hasOverflowClip())
return;
ScrollDirection direction = ScrollDown;
if (units < 0) {
direction = ScrollUp;
units = -units;
}
Node* stopNode = this;
toRenderBox(renderer())->scroll(direction, granularity, units, &stopNode);
}
Commit Message: Set Attr.ownerDocument in Element#setAttributeNode()
Attr objects can move across documents by setAttributeNode().
So It needs to reset ownerDocument through TreeScopeAdoptr::adoptIfNeeded().
BUG=248950
TEST=set-attribute-node-from-iframe.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17583003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152938 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 112,363
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ChromeContentBrowserClient::GetAdditionalSiteIsolationModes() {
if (SiteIsolationPolicy::IsIsolationForPasswordSitesEnabled())
return {"Isolate Password Sites"};
else
return {};
}
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <waffles@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 142,635
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int php_curl_ssl_mutex_create(void **m)
{
if (*((MUTEX_T *) m) = tsrm_mutex_alloc()) {
return SUCCESS;
} else {
return FAILURE;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 5,111
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct bio *bio_clone_mddev(struct bio *bio, gfp_t gfp_mask,
struct mddev *mddev)
{
if (!mddev || !mddev->bio_set)
return bio_clone(bio, gfp_mask);
return bio_clone_bioset(bio, gfp_mask, mddev->bio_set);
}
Commit Message: md: use kzalloc() when bitmap is disabled
In drivers/md/md.c get_bitmap_file() uses kmalloc() for creating a
mdu_bitmap_file_t called "file".
5769 file = kmalloc(sizeof(*file), GFP_NOIO);
5770 if (!file)
5771 return -ENOMEM;
This structure is copied to user space at the end of the function.
5786 if (err == 0 &&
5787 copy_to_user(arg, file, sizeof(*file)))
5788 err = -EFAULT
But if bitmap is disabled only the first byte of "file" is initialized
with zero, so it's possible to read some bytes (up to 4095) of kernel
space memory from user space. This is an information leak.
5775 /* bitmap disabled, zero the first byte and copy out */
5776 if (!mddev->bitmap_info.file)
5777 file->pathname[0] = '\0';
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Randazzo <benjamin@randazzo.fr>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 42,375
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct rtable *ip_route_output_key_hash(struct net *net, struct flowi4 *fl4,
const struct sk_buff *skb)
{
__u8 tos = RT_FL_TOS(fl4);
struct fib_result res = {
.type = RTN_UNSPEC,
.fi = NULL,
.table = NULL,
.tclassid = 0,
};
struct rtable *rth;
fl4->flowi4_iif = LOOPBACK_IFINDEX;
fl4->flowi4_tos = tos & IPTOS_RT_MASK;
fl4->flowi4_scope = ((tos & RTO_ONLINK) ?
RT_SCOPE_LINK : RT_SCOPE_UNIVERSE);
rcu_read_lock();
rth = ip_route_output_key_hash_rcu(net, fl4, &res, skb);
rcu_read_unlock();
return rth;
}
Commit Message: inet: switch IP ID generator to siphash
According to Amit Klein and Benny Pinkas, IP ID generation is too weak
and might be used by attackers.
Even with recent net_hash_mix() fix (netns: provide pure entropy for net_hash_mix())
having 64bit key and Jenkins hash is risky.
It is time to switch to siphash and its 128bit keys.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Amit Klein <aksecurity@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Benny Pinkas <benny@pinkas.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 91,129
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void serverLogFromHandler(int level, const char *msg) {
int fd;
int log_to_stdout = server.logfile[0] == '\0';
char buf[64];
if ((level&0xff) < server.verbosity || (log_to_stdout && server.daemonize))
return;
fd = log_to_stdout ? STDOUT_FILENO :
open(server.logfile, O_APPEND|O_CREAT|O_WRONLY, 0644);
if (fd == -1) return;
ll2string(buf,sizeof(buf),getpid());
if (write(fd,buf,strlen(buf)) == -1) goto err;
if (write(fd,":signal-handler (",17) == -1) goto err;
ll2string(buf,sizeof(buf),time(NULL));
if (write(fd,buf,strlen(buf)) == -1) goto err;
if (write(fd,") ",2) == -1) goto err;
if (write(fd,msg,strlen(msg)) == -1) goto err;
if (write(fd,"\n",1) == -1) goto err;
err:
if (!log_to_stdout) close(fd);
}
Commit Message: Security: Cross Protocol Scripting protection.
This is an attempt at mitigating problems due to cross protocol
scripting, an attack targeting services using line oriented protocols
like Redis that can accept HTTP requests as valid protocol, by
discarding the invalid parts and accepting the payloads sent, for
example, via a POST request.
For this to be effective, when we detect POST and Host: and terminate
the connection asynchronously, the networking code was modified in order
to never process further input. It was later verified that in a
pipelined request containing a POST command, the successive commands are
not executed.
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 70,067
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static BOOL update_send_pointer_new(rdpContext* context,
const POINTER_NEW_UPDATE* pointer_new)
{
wStream* s;
rdpRdp* rdp = context->rdp;
BOOL ret = FALSE;
s = fastpath_update_pdu_init(rdp->fastpath);
if (!s)
return FALSE;
if (!Stream_EnsureRemainingCapacity(s, 16))
goto out_fail;
Stream_Write_UINT16(s, pointer_new->xorBpp); /* xorBpp (2 bytes) */
update_write_pointer_color(s, &pointer_new->colorPtrAttr);
ret = fastpath_send_update_pdu(rdp->fastpath, FASTPATH_UPDATETYPE_POINTER, s,
FALSE);
out_fail:
Stream_Release(s);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8786
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 83,602
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SetFrameOwnerBasedOnFrameType(WebURLRequest::FrameType frame_type,
HTMLIFrameElement* iframe,
const AtomicString& potential_value) {
if (frame_type != WebURLRequest::kFrameTypeNested) {
document->GetFrame()->SetOwner(nullptr);
return;
}
iframe->setAttribute(HTMLNames::cspAttr, potential_value);
document->GetFrame()->SetOwner(iframe);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 138,800
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void UDPSocketWin::LogRead(int result, const char* bytes) const {
if (result < 0) {
net_log_.AddEventWithNetErrorCode(NetLog::TYPE_UDP_RECEIVE_ERROR, result);
return;
}
if (net_log_.IsLoggingAllEvents()) {
IPEndPoint address;
bool is_address_valid = ReceiveAddressToIPEndpoint(&address);
net_log_.AddEvent(
NetLog::TYPE_UDP_BYTES_RECEIVED,
CreateNetLogUDPDataTranferCallback(
result, bytes,
is_address_valid ? &address : NULL));
}
base::StatsCounter read_bytes("udp.read_bytes");
read_bytes.Add(result);
}
Commit Message: Map posix error codes in bind better, and fix one windows mapping.
r=wtc
BUG=330233
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/101193008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@242224 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 113,449
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: nfsd4_decode_create_session(struct nfsd4_compoundargs *argp,
struct nfsd4_create_session *sess)
{
DECODE_HEAD;
u32 dummy;
READ_BUF(16);
COPYMEM(&sess->clientid, 8);
sess->seqid = be32_to_cpup(p++);
sess->flags = be32_to_cpup(p++);
/* Fore channel attrs */
READ_BUF(28);
dummy = be32_to_cpup(p++); /* headerpadsz is always 0 */
sess->fore_channel.maxreq_sz = be32_to_cpup(p++);
sess->fore_channel.maxresp_sz = be32_to_cpup(p++);
sess->fore_channel.maxresp_cached = be32_to_cpup(p++);
sess->fore_channel.maxops = be32_to_cpup(p++);
sess->fore_channel.maxreqs = be32_to_cpup(p++);
sess->fore_channel.nr_rdma_attrs = be32_to_cpup(p++);
if (sess->fore_channel.nr_rdma_attrs == 1) {
READ_BUF(4);
sess->fore_channel.rdma_attrs = be32_to_cpup(p++);
} else if (sess->fore_channel.nr_rdma_attrs > 1) {
dprintk("Too many fore channel attr bitmaps!\n");
goto xdr_error;
}
/* Back channel attrs */
READ_BUF(28);
dummy = be32_to_cpup(p++); /* headerpadsz is always 0 */
sess->back_channel.maxreq_sz = be32_to_cpup(p++);
sess->back_channel.maxresp_sz = be32_to_cpup(p++);
sess->back_channel.maxresp_cached = be32_to_cpup(p++);
sess->back_channel.maxops = be32_to_cpup(p++);
sess->back_channel.maxreqs = be32_to_cpup(p++);
sess->back_channel.nr_rdma_attrs = be32_to_cpup(p++);
if (sess->back_channel.nr_rdma_attrs == 1) {
READ_BUF(4);
sess->back_channel.rdma_attrs = be32_to_cpup(p++);
} else if (sess->back_channel.nr_rdma_attrs > 1) {
dprintk("Too many back channel attr bitmaps!\n");
goto xdr_error;
}
READ_BUF(4);
sess->callback_prog = be32_to_cpup(p++);
nfsd4_decode_cb_sec(argp, &sess->cb_sec);
DECODE_TAIL;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 65,741
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: JsVarRef jsvGetLastChild(const JsVar *v) {
return (JsVarRef)(v->varData.ref.lastChild | (((v->flags >> JSV_LASTCHILD_BIT_SHIFT)&JSVARREF_PACKED_BIT_MASK))<<8);
}
Commit Message: fix jsvGetString regression
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 82,427
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void VerifyTestBookmarkDataInEntry(Entry* entry) {
const sync_pb::EntitySpecifics& specifics = entry->Get(syncable::SPECIFICS);
EXPECT_TRUE(specifics.has_bookmark());
EXPECT_EQ("PNG", specifics.bookmark().favicon());
EXPECT_EQ("http://demo/", specifics.bookmark().url());
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 105,112
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: dissect_common_timing_adjustment(packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, tvbuff_t *tvb,
int offset, struct fp_info *p_fp_info)
{
if (p_fp_info->channel != CHANNEL_PCH) {
guint8 cfn;
gint16 toa;
/* CFN control */
cfn = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_fp_cfn_control, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset++;
/* ToA */
toa = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_fp_toa, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset += 2;
col_append_fstr(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, " CFN=%u, ToA=%d", cfn, toa);
}
else {
guint16 cfn;
gint32 toa;
/* PCH CFN is 12 bits */
cfn = (tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset) >> 4);
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_fp_pch_cfn, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset += 2;
/* 4 bits of padding follow... */
/* 20 bits of ToA (followed by 4 padding bits) */
toa = ((int)(tvb_get_ntoh24(tvb, offset) << 8)) / 4096;
proto_tree_add_int(tree, hf_fp_pch_toa, tvb, offset, 3, toa);
offset += 3;
col_append_fstr(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, " CFN=%u, ToA=%d", cfn, toa);
}
return offset;
}
Commit Message: UMTS_FP: fix handling reserved C/T value
The spec puts the reserved value at 0xf but our internal table has 'unknown' at
0; since all the other values seem to be offset-by-one, just take the modulus
0xf to avoid running off the end of the table.
Bug: 12191
Change-Id: I83c8fb66797bbdee52a2246fb1eea6e37cbc7eb0
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15722
Reviewed-by: Evan Huus <eapache@gmail.com>
Petri-Dish: Evan Huus <eapache@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <buildbot-no-reply@wireshark.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 51,846
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: server_close_pipe (int *pipefd) /* see comments below */
{
close (pipefd[0]); /* close WRITE end first to cause an EOF on READ */
close (pipefd[1]); /* in giowin32, and end that thread. */
free (pipefd);
return FALSE;
}
Commit Message: ssl: Validate hostnames
Closes #524
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 58,445
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AbortRequestBeforeItStarts(ResourceMessageFilter* filter,
IPC::Message* sync_result,
int route_id,
int request_id) {
if (sync_result) {
SyncLoadResult result;
result.error_code = net::ERR_ABORTED;
ResourceHostMsg_SyncLoad::WriteReplyParams(sync_result, result);
filter->Send(sync_result);
} else {
filter->Send(new ResourceMsg_RequestComplete(
route_id,
request_id,
net::ERR_ABORTED,
false,
std::string(), // No security info needed, connection not established.
base::TimeTicks()));
}
}
Commit Message: Revert cross-origin auth prompt blocking.
BUG=174129
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12183030
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@181113 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 115,882
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: cmd_http_rxresp(CMD_ARGS)
{
struct http *hp;
int has_obj = 1;
(void)cmd;
(void)vl;
CAST_OBJ_NOTNULL(hp, priv, HTTP_MAGIC);
ONLY_CLIENT(hp, av);
assert(!strcmp(av[0], "rxresp"));
av++;
for(; *av != NULL; av++)
if (!strcmp(*av, "-no_obj"))
has_obj = 0;
else
vtc_log(hp->vl, 0,
"Unknown http rxresp spec: %s\n", *av);
http_rxhdr(hp);
http_splitheader(hp, 0);
hp->body = hp->rxbuf + hp->prxbuf;
if (!has_obj)
return;
else if (!strcmp(hp->resp[1], "200"))
http_swallow_body(hp, hp->resp, 1);
else
http_swallow_body(hp, hp->resp, 0);
vtc_log(hp->vl, 4, "bodylen = %s", hp->bodylen);
}
Commit Message: Do not consider a CR by itself as a valid line terminator
Varnish (prior to version 4.0) was not following the standard with
regard to line separator.
Spotted and analyzed by: Régis Leroy [regilero] regis.leroy@makina-corpus.com
CWE ID:
| 0
| 95,029
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderBox::paintRootBoxFillLayers(const PaintInfo& paintInfo)
{
const FillLayer* bgLayer = style()->backgroundLayers();
Color bgColor = style()->visitedDependentColor(CSSPropertyBackgroundColor);
RenderObject* bodyObject = 0;
if (!hasBackground() && node() && node()->hasTagName(HTMLNames::htmlTag)) {
HTMLElement* body = document()->body();
bodyObject = (body && body->hasLocalName(bodyTag)) ? body->renderer() : 0;
if (bodyObject) {
bgLayer = bodyObject->style()->backgroundLayers();
bgColor = bodyObject->style()->visitedDependentColor(CSSPropertyBackgroundColor);
}
}
paintFillLayers(paintInfo, bgColor, bgLayer, view()->documentRect(), BackgroundBleedNone, CompositeSourceOver, bodyObject);
}
Commit Message: Source/WebCore: Fix for bug 64046 - Wrong image height in absolutely positioned div in
relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <kulanthaivel@codeaurora.org> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
Test: fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html
* rendering/RenderBox.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBox::availableLogicalHeightUsing):
LayoutTests: Test to cover absolutely positioned child with percentage height
in relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <kulanthaivel@codeaurora.org> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent-expected.txt: Added.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html: Added.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@91533 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 101,622
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int debugMutexInit(void){ return SQLITE_OK; }
Commit Message: sqlite: safely move pointer values through SQL.
This lands https://www.sqlite.org/src/timeline?c=d6a44b35 in
third_party/sqlite/src/ and
third_party/sqlite/patches/0013-Add-new-interfaces-sqlite3_bind_pointer-sqlite3_resu.patch
and re-generates third_party/sqlite/amalgamation/* using the script at
third_party/sqlite/google_generate_amalgamation.sh.
The CL also adds a layout test that verifies the patch works as intended.
BUG=742407
Change-Id: I2e1a457459cd2e975e6241b630e7b79c82545981
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/572976
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <cmumford@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#487275}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 136,471
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ScriptLoader::execute(ScriptResource* resource)
{
ASSERT(!m_willBeParserExecuted);
ASSERT(resource);
if (resource->errorOccurred()) {
dispatchErrorEvent();
} else if (!resource->wasCanceled()) {
executeScript(ScriptSourceCode(resource));
dispatchLoadEvent();
}
resource->removeClient(this);
}
Commit Message: Apply 'x-content-type-options' check to dynamically inserted script.
BUG=348581
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/185593011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@168570 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 115,355
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void HandleMouseMoveEvent(int x, int y) {
WebMouseEvent event(
WebInputEvent::kMouseMove, WebFloatPoint(x, y), WebFloatPoint(x, y),
WebPointerProperties::Button::kNoButton, 0, WebInputEvent::kNoModifiers,
CurrentTimeTicksInSeconds());
event.SetFrameScale(1);
GetEventHandler().HandleMouseMoveEvent(event, Vector<WebMouseEvent>());
}
Commit Message: Reset virtual time state in scrollbar tests
This prevents ScrollbarTestWithVirtualTimer from polluting global state
for tests following it.
Bug: 791742
Change-Id: Iae3440451833408a6a5bd24b3319b307cd6d3547
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/969582
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Clarke <alexclarke@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#544691}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 132,189
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual void StopInputMethodDaemon() {}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 100,849
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void controloptions (lua_State *L, int opt, const char **fmt,
Header *h) {
switch (opt) {
case ' ': return; /* ignore white spaces */
case '>': h->endian = BIG; return;
case '<': h->endian = LITTLE; return;
case '!': {
int a = getnum(fmt, MAXALIGN);
if (!isp2(a))
luaL_error(L, "alignment %d is not a power of 2", a);
h->align = a;
return;
}
default: {
const char *msg = lua_pushfstring(L, "invalid format option '%c'", opt);
luaL_argerror(L, 1, msg);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Security: fix Lua struct package offset handling.
After the first fix to the struct package I found another similar
problem, which is fixed by this patch. It could be reproduced easily by
running the following script:
return struct.unpack('f', "xxxxxxxxxxxxx",-3)
The above will access bytes before the 'data' pointer.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 83,039
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static long kvm_dev_ioctl_check_extension_generic(long arg)
{
switch (arg) {
case KVM_CAP_USER_MEMORY:
case KVM_CAP_DESTROY_MEMORY_REGION_WORKS:
case KVM_CAP_JOIN_MEMORY_REGIONS_WORKS:
#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_APIC_ARCHITECTURE
case KVM_CAP_SET_BOOT_CPU_ID:
#endif
case KVM_CAP_INTERNAL_ERROR_DATA:
#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_MSI
case KVM_CAP_SIGNAL_MSI:
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_IRQ_ROUTING
case KVM_CAP_IRQFD_RESAMPLE:
#endif
return 1;
#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_IRQ_ROUTING
case KVM_CAP_IRQ_ROUTING:
return KVM_MAX_IRQ_ROUTES;
#endif
default:
break;
}
return kvm_dev_ioctl_check_extension(arg);
}
Commit Message: KVM: Improve create VCPU parameter (CVE-2013-4587)
In multiple functions the vcpu_id is used as an offset into a bitfield. Ag
malicious user could specify a vcpu_id greater than 255 in order to set or
clear bits in kernel memory. This could be used to elevate priveges in the
kernel. This patch verifies that the vcpu_id provided is less than 255.
The api documentation already specifies that the vcpu_id must be less than
max_vcpus, but this is currently not checked.
Reported-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 29,317
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int tree_content_remove(
struct tree_entry *root,
const char *p,
struct tree_entry *backup_leaf,
int allow_root)
{
struct tree_content *t;
const char *slash1;
unsigned int i, n;
struct tree_entry *e;
slash1 = strchrnul(p, '/');
n = slash1 - p;
if (!root->tree)
load_tree(root);
if (!*p && allow_root) {
e = root;
goto del_entry;
}
t = root->tree;
for (i = 0; i < t->entry_count; i++) {
e = t->entries[i];
if (e->name->str_len == n && !strncmp_icase(p, e->name->str_dat, n)) {
if (*slash1 && !S_ISDIR(e->versions[1].mode))
/*
* If p names a file in some subdirectory, and a
* file or symlink matching the name of the
* parent directory of p exists, then p cannot
* exist and need not be deleted.
*/
return 1;
if (!*slash1 || !S_ISDIR(e->versions[1].mode))
goto del_entry;
if (!e->tree)
load_tree(e);
if (tree_content_remove(e, slash1 + 1, backup_leaf, 0)) {
for (n = 0; n < e->tree->entry_count; n++) {
if (e->tree->entries[n]->versions[1].mode) {
hashclr(root->versions[1].sha1);
return 1;
}
}
backup_leaf = NULL;
goto del_entry;
}
return 0;
}
}
return 0;
del_entry:
if (backup_leaf)
memcpy(backup_leaf, e, sizeof(*backup_leaf));
else if (e->tree)
release_tree_content_recursive(e->tree);
e->tree = NULL;
e->versions[1].mode = 0;
hashclr(e->versions[1].sha1);
hashclr(root->versions[1].sha1);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: prefer memcpy to strcpy
When we already know the length of a string (e.g., because
we just malloc'd to fit it), it's nicer to use memcpy than
strcpy, as it makes it more obvious that we are not going to
overflow the buffer (because the size we pass matches the
size in the allocation).
This also eliminates calls to strcpy, which make auditing
the code base harder.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 55,145
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool NormalPage::contains(Address addr) {
Address blinkPageStart = roundToBlinkPageStart(getAddress());
ASSERT(blinkPageStart == getAddress() - blinkGuardPageSize);
return blinkPageStart <= addr && addr < blinkPageStart + blinkPageSize;
}
Commit Message: Call HeapObjectHeader::checkHeader solely for its side-effect.
This requires changing its signature. This is a preliminary stage to making it
private.
BUG=633030
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2698673003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#460489}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 147,550
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool spte_is_bit_cleared(u64 old_spte, u64 new_spte, u64 bit_mask)
{
return (old_spte & bit_mask) && !(new_spte & bit_mask);
}
Commit Message: nEPT: Nested INVEPT
If we let L1 use EPT, we should probably also support the INVEPT instruction.
In our current nested EPT implementation, when L1 changes its EPT table
for L2 (i.e., EPT12), L0 modifies the shadow EPT table (EPT02), and in
the course of this modification already calls INVEPT. But if last level
of shadow page is unsync not all L1's changes to EPT12 are intercepted,
which means roots need to be synced when L1 calls INVEPT. Global INVEPT
should not be different since roots are synced by kvm_mmu_load() each
time EPTP02 changes.
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Har'El <nyh@il.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xinhao Xu <xinhao.xu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@Intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 37,591
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void pdf_run_Tc(fz_context *ctx, pdf_processor *proc, float charspace)
{
pdf_run_processor *pr = (pdf_run_processor *)proc;
pdf_gstate *gstate = pr->gstate + pr->gtop;
gstate->text.char_space = charspace;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 498
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: std::string GLES2Util::GetStringEnum(uint32_t value) {
const EnumToString* entry = enum_to_string_table_;
const EnumToString* end = entry + enum_to_string_table_len_;
for (; entry < end; ++entry) {
if (value == entry->value)
return entry->name;
}
std::stringstream ss;
ss.fill('0');
ss.width(value < 0x10000 ? 4 : 8);
ss << std::hex << value;
return "0x" + ss.str();
}
Commit Message: Validate glClearBuffer*v function |buffer| param on the client side
Otherwise we could read out-of-bounds even if an invalid |buffer| is passed
in and in theory we should not read the buffer at all.
BUG=908749
TEST=gl_tests in ASAN build
R=piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I94b69b56ce3358ff9bfc0e21f0618aec4371d1ec
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1354571
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#612023}
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 153,367
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebRuntimeFeatures::EnablePushMessaging(bool enable) {
RuntimeEnabledFeatures::SetPushMessagingEnabled(enable);
}
Commit Message: Remove RequireCSSExtensionForFile runtime enabled flag.
The feature has long since been stable (since M64) and doesn't seem
to be a need for this flag.
BUG=788936
Change-Id: I666390b869289c328acb4a2daa5bf4154e1702c0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1324143
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Dave Tapuska <dtapuska@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#607329}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 154,668
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static OPJ_BOOL opj_tcd_code_block_enc_allocate(opj_tcd_cblk_enc_t *
p_code_block)
{
if (! p_code_block->layers) {
/* no memset since data */
p_code_block->layers = (opj_tcd_layer_t*) opj_calloc(100,
sizeof(opj_tcd_layer_t));
if (! p_code_block->layers) {
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
}
if (! p_code_block->passes) {
p_code_block->passes = (opj_tcd_pass_t*) opj_calloc(100,
sizeof(opj_tcd_pass_t));
if (! p_code_block->passes) {
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
}
return OPJ_TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Encoder: grow buffer size in opj_tcd_code_block_enc_allocate_data() to avoid write heap buffer overflow in opj_mqc_flush (#982)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 61,686
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Ewk_Hit_Test* ewk_frame_hit_test_new(const Evas_Object* ewkFrame, int x, int y)
{
EWK_FRAME_SD_GET_OR_RETURN(ewkFrame, smartData, 0);
EINA_SAFETY_ON_NULL_RETURN_VAL(smartData->frame, 0);
WebCore::FrameView* view = smartData->frame->view();
EINA_SAFETY_ON_NULL_RETURN_VAL(view, 0);
EINA_SAFETY_ON_NULL_RETURN_VAL(smartData->frame->contentRenderer(), 0);
WebCore::HitTestResult result = smartData->frame->eventHandler()->hitTestResultAtPoint
(view->windowToContents(WebCore::IntPoint(x, y)),
/*allowShadowContent*/ false, /*ignoreClipping*/ true);
if (result.scrollbar())
return 0;
if (!result.innerNode())
return 0;
Ewk_Hit_Test* hitTest = new Ewk_Hit_Test;
hitTest->x = result.point().x();
hitTest->y = result.point().y();
#if 0
hitTest->bounding_box.x = result.boundingBox().x();
hitTest->bounding_box.y = result.boundingBox().y();
hitTest->bounding_box.width = result.boundingBox().width();
hitTest->bounding_box.height = result.boundingBox().height();
#else
hitTest->bounding_box.x = 0;
hitTest->bounding_box.y = 0;
hitTest->bounding_box.w = 0;
hitTest->bounding_box.h = 0;
#endif
WebCore::TextDirection direction;
hitTest->title = eina_stringshare_add(result.title(direction).utf8().data());
hitTest->alternate_text = eina_stringshare_add(result.altDisplayString().utf8().data());
if (result.innerNonSharedNode() && result.innerNonSharedNode()->document()
&& result.innerNonSharedNode()->document()->frame())
hitTest->frame = EWKPrivate::kitFrame(result.innerNonSharedNode()->document()->frame());
hitTest->link.text = eina_stringshare_add(result.textContent().utf8().data());
hitTest->link.url = eina_stringshare_add(result.absoluteLinkURL().string().utf8().data());
hitTest->link.title = eina_stringshare_add(result.titleDisplayString().utf8().data());
hitTest->link.target_frame = EWKPrivate::kitFrame(result.targetFrame());
hitTest->image_uri = eina_stringshare_add(result.absoluteImageURL().string().utf8().data());
hitTest->media_uri = eina_stringshare_add(result.absoluteMediaURL().string().utf8().data());
int context = EWK_HIT_TEST_RESULT_CONTEXT_DOCUMENT;
if (!result.absoluteLinkURL().isEmpty())
context |= EWK_HIT_TEST_RESULT_CONTEXT_LINK;
if (!result.absoluteImageURL().isEmpty())
context |= EWK_HIT_TEST_RESULT_CONTEXT_IMAGE;
if (!result.absoluteMediaURL().isEmpty())
context |= EWK_HIT_TEST_RESULT_CONTEXT_MEDIA;
if (result.isSelected())
context |= EWK_HIT_TEST_RESULT_CONTEXT_SELECTION;
if (result.isContentEditable())
context |= EWK_HIT_TEST_RESULT_CONTEXT_EDITABLE;
hitTest->context = static_cast<Ewk_Hit_Test_Result_Context>(context);
return hitTest;
}
Commit Message: [EFL] fast/frames/frame-crash-with-page-cache.html is crashing
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85879
Patch by Mikhail Pozdnyakov <mikhail.pozdnyakov@intel.com> on 2012-05-17
Reviewed by Noam Rosenthal.
Source/WebKit/efl:
_ewk_frame_smart_del() is considering now that the frame can be present in cache.
loader()->detachFromParent() is only applied for the main frame.
loader()->cancelAndClear() is not used anymore.
* ewk/ewk_frame.cpp:
(_ewk_frame_smart_del):
LayoutTests:
* platform/efl/test_expectations.txt: Removed fast/frames/frame-crash-with-page-cache.html.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117409 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 107,661
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool HTMLSelectElement::valueMissing() const
{
if (!willValidate())
return false;
if (!isRequired())
return false;
int firstSelectionIndex = selectedIndex();
return firstSelectionIndex < 0 || (!firstSelectionIndex && hasPlaceholderLabelOption());
}
Commit Message: SelectElement should remove an option when null is assigned by indexed setter
Fix bug embedded in r151449
see
http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?revision=151449&view=revision
R=haraken@chromium.org, tkent@chromium.org, eseidel@chromium.org
BUG=262365
TEST=fast/forms/select/select-assign-null.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/19947008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@154743 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 103,128
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: blink::WebRTCDataChannelHandler* RTCPeerConnectionHandler::CreateDataChannel(
const blink::WebString& label,
const blink::WebRTCDataChannelInit& init) {
DCHECK(task_runner_->RunsTasksInCurrentSequence());
TRACE_EVENT0("webrtc", "RTCPeerConnectionHandler::createDataChannel");
DVLOG(1) << "createDataChannel label " << label.Utf8();
webrtc::DataChannelInit config;
config.reliable = false;
config.id = init.id;
config.ordered = init.ordered;
config.negotiated = init.negotiated;
config.maxRetransmits = init.max_retransmits;
config.maxRetransmitTime = init.max_retransmit_time;
config.protocol = init.protocol.Utf8();
rtc::scoped_refptr<webrtc::DataChannelInterface> webrtc_channel(
native_peer_connection_->CreateDataChannel(label.Utf8(), &config));
if (!webrtc_channel) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "Could not create native data channel.";
return nullptr;
}
if (peer_connection_tracker_) {
peer_connection_tracker_->TrackCreateDataChannel(
this, webrtc_channel.get(), PeerConnectionTracker::SOURCE_LOCAL);
}
++num_data_channels_created_;
return new RtcDataChannelHandler(task_runner_, webrtc_channel);
}
Commit Message: Check weak pointers in RTCPeerConnectionHandler::WebRtcSetDescriptionObserverImpl
Bug: 912074
Change-Id: I8ba86751f5d5bf12db51520f985ef0d3dae63ed8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1411916
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <hbos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#622945}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 152,929
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: person_get_frame_delay(const person_t* person)
{
return person->anim_frames;
}
Commit Message: Fix integer overflow in layer_resize in map_engine.c (#268)
* Fix integer overflow in layer_resize in map_engine.c
There's a buffer overflow bug in the function layer_resize. It allocates
a buffer `tilemap` with size `x_size * y_size * sizeof(struct map_tile)`.
But it didn't check for integer overflow, so if x_size and y_size are
very large, it's possible that the buffer size is smaller than needed,
causing a buffer overflow later.
PoC: `SetLayerSize(0, 0x7FFFFFFF, 0x7FFFFFFF);`
* move malloc to a separate line
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 75,078
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: const char *X86_group_name(csh handle, unsigned int id)
{
#ifndef CAPSTONE_DIET
return id2name(group_name_maps, ARR_SIZE(group_name_maps), id);
#else
return NULL;
#endif
}
Commit Message: x86: fast path checking for X86_insn_reg_intel()
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 94,019
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void voidMethodStringArgVariadicStringArgMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
if (UNLIKELY(info.Length() < 1)) {
throwTypeError(ExceptionMessages::failedToExecute("voidMethodStringArgVariadicStringArg", "TestObjectPython", ExceptionMessages::notEnoughArguments(1, info.Length())), info.GetIsolate());
return;
}
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_FOR_V8STRINGRESOURCE_VOID(V8StringResource<>, stringArg, info[0]);
V8TRYCATCH_VOID(Vector<String>, variadicStringArgs, toNativeArguments<String>(info, 1));
imp->voidMethodStringArgVariadicStringArg(stringArg, variadicStringArgs);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 122,890
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static FLOAT32 *ixheaacd_map_prot_filter(WORD32 filt_length) {
switch (filt_length) {
case 4:
return (FLOAT32 *)&ixheaacd_sub_samp_qmf_window_coeff[0];
break;
case 8:
return (FLOAT32 *)&ixheaacd_sub_samp_qmf_window_coeff[40];
break;
case 12:
return (FLOAT32 *)&ixheaacd_sub_samp_qmf_window_coeff[120];
break;
case 16:
return (FLOAT32 *)&ixheaacd_sub_samp_qmf_window_coeff[240];
break;
case 20:
return (FLOAT32 *)&ixheaacd_sub_samp_qmf_window_coeff[400];
break;
case 24:
return (FLOAT32 *)&ixheaacd_sub_samp_qmf_window_coeff[600];
break;
case 32:
return (FLOAT32 *)&ixheaacd_sub_samp_qmf_window_coeff[840];
break;
case 40:
return (FLOAT32 *)&ixheaacd_sub_samp_qmf_window_coeff[1160];
break;
default:
return (FLOAT32 *)&ixheaacd_sub_samp_qmf_window_coeff[0];
}
}
Commit Message: Fix for stack corruption in esbr
Bug: 110769924
Test: poc from bug before/after
Change-Id: I99c6e89902064849ea1310c271064bdeccf7f20e
(cherry picked from commit 7e90d745c22695236437297cd8167a9312427a4a)
(cherry picked from commit 5464927f0c1fc721fa03d1c5be77b0b43dfffc50)
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 162,971
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SoundTriggerHwService::soundModelCallback(struct sound_trigger_model_event *event,
void *cookie)
{
Module *module = (Module *)cookie;
if (module == NULL) {
return;
}
sp<SoundTriggerHwService> service = module->service().promote();
if (service == 0) {
return;
}
service->sendSoundModelEvent(event, module);
}
Commit Message: soundtrigger: add size check on sound model and recogntion data
Bug: 30148546
Change-Id: I082f535a853c96571887eeea37c6d41ecee7d8c0
(cherry picked from commit bb00d8f139ff51336ab3c810d35685003949bcf8)
(cherry picked from commit ef0c91518446e65533ca8bab6726a845f27c73fd)
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 158,090
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int get_dotl_openflags(V9fsState *s, int oflags)
{
int flags;
/*
* Filter the client open flags
*/
flags = dotl_to_open_flags(oflags);
flags &= ~(O_NOCTTY | O_ASYNC | O_CREAT);
/*
* Ignore direct disk access hint until the server supports it.
*/
flags &= ~O_DIRECT;
return flags;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 1,460
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: linux_md_start_data_unref (LinuxMdStartData *data)
{
data->refcount--;
if (data->refcount == 0)
{
g_object_unref (data->daemon);
g_free (data->uuid);
g_free (data);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 11,758
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int profile_graph_entry(struct ftrace_graph_ent *trace)
{
function_profile_call(trace->func, 0, NULL, NULL);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: tracing: Fix possible NULL pointer dereferences
Currently set_ftrace_pid and set_graph_function files use seq_lseek
for their fops. However seq_open() is called only for FMODE_READ in
the fops->open() so that if an user tries to seek one of those file
when she open it for writing, it sees NULL seq_file and then panic.
It can be easily reproduced with following command:
$ cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing
$ echo 1234 | sudo tee -a set_ftrace_pid
In this example, GNU coreutils' tee opens the file with fopen(, "a")
and then the fopen() internally calls lseek().
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1365663302-2170-1-git-send-email-namhyung@kernel.org
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung.kim@lge.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 30,257
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ahci_irq_lower(AHCIState *s, AHCIDevice *dev)
{
DeviceState *dev_state = s->container;
PCIDevice *pci_dev = (PCIDevice *) object_dynamic_cast(OBJECT(dev_state),
TYPE_PCI_DEVICE);
DPRINTF(0, "lower irq\n");
if (!pci_dev || !msi_enabled(pci_dev)) {
qemu_irq_lower(s->irq);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 0
| 5,864
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int sb1053a_get_interface(struct mp_port *mtpt, int port_num)
{
unsigned long option_base_addr = mtpt->option_base_addr;
unsigned int interface = 0;
switch (port_num)
{
case 0:
case 1:
/* set GPO[1:0] = 00 */
outb(0x00, option_base_addr + MP_OPTR_GPODR);
break;
case 2:
case 3:
/* set GPO[1:0] = 01 */
outb(0x01, option_base_addr + MP_OPTR_GPODR);
break;
case 4:
case 5:
/* set GPO[1:0] = 10 */
outb(0x02, option_base_addr + MP_OPTR_GPODR);
break;
default:
break;
}
port_num &= 0x1;
/* get interface */
interface = inb(option_base_addr + MP_OPTR_IIR0 + port_num);
/* set GPO[1:0] = 11 */
outb(0x03, option_base_addr + MP_OPTR_GPODR);
return (interface);
}
Commit Message: Staging: sb105x: info leak in mp_get_count()
The icount.reserved[] array isn't initialized so it leaks stack
information to userspace.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 29,447
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PageSerializer::addFontToResources(FontResource* font)
{
if (!font || !shouldAddURL(font->url()) || !font->isLoaded() || !font->resourceBuffer()) {
return;
}
RefPtr<SharedBuffer> data(font->resourceBuffer());
addToResources(font, data, font->url());
}
Commit Message: Revert 162155 "This review merges the two existing page serializ..."
Change r162155 broke the world even though it was landed using the CQ.
> This review merges the two existing page serializers, WebPageSerializerImpl and
> PageSerializer, into one, PageSerializer. In addition to this it moves all
> the old tests from WebPageNewSerializerTest and WebPageSerializerTest to the
> PageSerializerTest structure and splits out one test for MHTML into a new
> MHTMLTest file.
>
> Saving as 'Webpage, Complete', 'Webpage, HTML Only' and as MHTML when the
> 'Save Page as MHTML' flag is enabled now uses the same code, and should thus
> have the same feature set. Meaning that both modes now should be a bit better.
>
> Detailed list of changes:
>
> - PageSerializerTest: Prepare for more DTD test
> - PageSerializerTest: Remove now unneccesary input image test
> - PageSerializerTest: Remove unused WebPageSerializer/Impl code
> - PageSerializerTest: Move data URI morph test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move data URI test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move namespace test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move SVG Image test
> - MHTMLTest: Move MHTML specific test to own test file
> - PageSerializerTest: Delete duplicate XML header test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move blank frame test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move CSS test
> - PageSerializerTest: Add frameset/frame test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move old iframe test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move old elements test
> - Use PageSerizer for saving web pages
> - PageSerializerTest: Test for rewriting links
> - PageSerializer: Add rewrite link accumulator
> - PageSerializer: Serialize images in iframes/frames src
> - PageSerializer: XHTML fix for meta tags
> - PageSerializer: Add presentation CSS
> - PageSerializer: Rename out parameter
>
> BUG=
> R=abarth@chromium.org
>
> Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/68613003
TBR=tiger@opera.com
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/73673003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@162156 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 118,853
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void list_response(const char *extname, const mbentry_t *mbentry,
uint32_t attributes, struct listargs *listargs)
{
int r;
struct statusdata sdata = STATUSDATA_INIT;
struct buf specialuse = BUF_INITIALIZER;
if ((attributes & MBOX_ATTRIBUTE_NONEXISTENT)) {
if (!(listargs->cmd == LIST_CMD_EXTENDED)) {
attributes |= MBOX_ATTRIBUTE_NOSELECT;
attributes &= ~MBOX_ATTRIBUTE_NONEXISTENT;
}
}
else if (listargs->scan) {
/* SCAN mailbox for content */
if (!strcmpsafe(mbentry->name, index_mboxname(imapd_index))) {
/* currently selected mailbox */
if (!index_scan(imapd_index, listargs->scan))
return; /* no matching messages */
}
else {
/* other local mailbox */
struct index_state *state;
struct index_init init;
int doclose = 0;
memset(&init, 0, sizeof(struct index_init));
init.userid = imapd_userid;
init.authstate = imapd_authstate;
init.out = imapd_out;
r = index_open(mbentry->name, &init, &state);
if (!r)
doclose = 1;
if (!r && index_hasrights(state, ACL_READ)) {
r = (imapd_userisadmin || index_hasrights(state, ACL_LOOKUP)) ?
IMAP_PERMISSION_DENIED : IMAP_MAILBOX_NONEXISTENT;
}
if (!r) {
if (!index_scan(state, listargs->scan)) {
r = -1; /* no matching messages */
}
}
if (doclose) index_close(&state);
if (r) return;
}
}
/* figure out \Has(No)Children if necessary
This is mainly used for LIST (SUBSCRIBED) RETURN (CHILDREN)
*/
uint32_t have_childinfo =
MBOX_ATTRIBUTE_HASCHILDREN | MBOX_ATTRIBUTE_HASNOCHILDREN;
if ((listargs->ret & LIST_RET_CHILDREN) && !(attributes & have_childinfo)) {
if (imapd_namespace.isalt && !strcmp(extname, "INBOX")) {
/* don't look inside INBOX under altnamespace, its children aren't children */
}
else {
char *intname = NULL, *freeme = NULL;
/* if we got here via subscribed_cb, mbentry isn't set */
if (mbentry)
intname = mbentry->name;
else
intname = freeme = mboxname_from_external(extname, &imapd_namespace, imapd_userid);
mboxlist_mboxtree(intname, set_haschildren, &attributes, MBOXTREE_SKIP_ROOT);
if (freeme) free(freeme);
}
if (!(attributes & MBOX_ATTRIBUTE_HASCHILDREN))
attributes |= MBOX_ATTRIBUTE_HASNOCHILDREN;
}
if (attributes & (MBOX_ATTRIBUTE_NONEXISTENT | MBOX_ATTRIBUTE_NOSELECT)) {
int keep = 0;
/* extended get told everything */
if (listargs->cmd == LIST_CMD_EXTENDED) {
keep = 1;
}
/* we have to mention this, it has children */
if (listargs->cmd == LIST_CMD_LSUB) {
/* subscribed children need a mention */
if (attributes & MBOX_ATTRIBUTE_CHILDINFO_SUBSCRIBED)
keep = 1;
/* if mupdate is configured we can't drop out, we might
* be a backend and need to report folders that don't
* exist on this backend - this is awful and complex
* and brittle and should be changed */
if (config_mupdate_server)
keep = 1;
}
else if (attributes & MBOX_ATTRIBUTE_HASCHILDREN)
keep = 1;
if (!keep) return;
}
if (listargs->cmd == LIST_CMD_LSUB) {
/* \Noselect has a special second meaning with (R)LSUB */
if ( !(attributes & MBOX_ATTRIBUTE_SUBSCRIBED)
&& attributes & MBOX_ATTRIBUTE_CHILDINFO_SUBSCRIBED)
attributes |= MBOX_ATTRIBUTE_NOSELECT | MBOX_ATTRIBUTE_HASCHILDREN;
attributes &= ~MBOX_ATTRIBUTE_SUBSCRIBED;
}
/* As CHILDINFO extended data item is not allowed if the
* RECURSIVEMATCH selection option is not specified */
if (!(listargs->sel & LIST_SEL_RECURSIVEMATCH)) {
attributes &= ~MBOX_ATTRIBUTE_CHILDINFO_SUBSCRIBED;
}
/* no inferiors means no children (this basically means the INBOX
* in alt namespace mode */
if (attributes & MBOX_ATTRIBUTE_NOINFERIORS)
attributes &= ~MBOX_ATTRIBUTE_HASCHILDREN;
/* you can't have both! If it's had children, it has children */
if (attributes & MBOX_ATTRIBUTE_HASCHILDREN)
attributes &= ~MBOX_ATTRIBUTE_HASNOCHILDREN;
/* remove redundant flags */
if (listargs->cmd == LIST_CMD_EXTENDED) {
/* \NoInferiors implies \HasNoChildren */
if (attributes & MBOX_ATTRIBUTE_NOINFERIORS)
attributes &= ~MBOX_ATTRIBUTE_HASNOCHILDREN;
/* \NonExistent implies \Noselect */
if (attributes & MBOX_ATTRIBUTE_NONEXISTENT)
attributes &= ~MBOX_ATTRIBUTE_NOSELECT;
}
if (config_getswitch(IMAPOPT_SPECIALUSEALWAYS) ||
listargs->cmd == LIST_CMD_XLIST ||
listargs->ret & LIST_RET_SPECIALUSE) {
specialuse_flags(mbentry, &specialuse, listargs->cmd == LIST_CMD_XLIST);
}
if (listargs->sel & LIST_SEL_SPECIALUSE) {
/* check that this IS a specialuse folder */
if (!buf_len(&specialuse)) return;
}
/* can we read the status data ? */
if ((listargs->ret & LIST_RET_STATUS) && mbentry) {
r = imapd_statusdata(mbentry->name, listargs->statusitems, &sdata);
if (r) {
/* RFC 5819: the STATUS response MUST NOT be returned and the
* LIST response MUST include the \NoSelect attribute. */
attributes |= MBOX_ATTRIBUTE_NOSELECT;
}
}
print_listresponse(listargs->cmd, extname,
imapd_namespace.hier_sep, attributes, &specialuse);
buf_free(&specialuse);
if ((listargs->ret & LIST_RET_STATUS) &&
!(attributes & MBOX_ATTRIBUTE_NOSELECT)) {
/* output the status line now, per rfc 5819 */
if (mbentry) print_statusline(extname, listargs->statusitems, &sdata);
}
if ((listargs->ret & LIST_RET_MYRIGHTS) &&
!(attributes & MBOX_ATTRIBUTE_NOSELECT)) {
if (mbentry) printmyrights(extname, mbentry);
}
if ((listargs->ret & LIST_RET_METADATA) &&
!(attributes & MBOX_ATTRIBUTE_NOSELECT)) {
if (mbentry)
printmetadata(mbentry, &listargs->metaitems, &listargs->metaopts);
}
}
Commit Message: imapd: check for isadmin BEFORE parsing sync lines
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 95,231
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int compute_score2(struct sock *sk, struct net *net,
__be32 saddr, __be16 sport,
__be32 daddr, unsigned int hnum, int dif)
{
int score;
struct inet_sock *inet;
if (!net_eq(sock_net(sk), net) ||
ipv6_only_sock(sk))
return -1;
inet = inet_sk(sk);
if (inet->inet_rcv_saddr != daddr ||
inet->inet_num != hnum)
return -1;
score = (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) ? 2 : 1;
if (inet->inet_daddr) {
if (inet->inet_daddr != saddr)
return -1;
score += 4;
}
if (inet->inet_dport) {
if (inet->inet_dport != sport)
return -1;
score += 4;
}
if (sk->sk_bound_dev_if) {
if (sk->sk_bound_dev_if != dif)
return -1;
score += 4;
}
if (sk->sk_incoming_cpu == raw_smp_processor_id())
score++;
return score;
}
Commit Message: udp: properly support MSG_PEEK with truncated buffers
Backport of this upstream commit into stable kernels :
89c22d8c3b27 ("net: Fix skb csum races when peeking")
exposed a bug in udp stack vs MSG_PEEK support, when user provides
a buffer smaller than skb payload.
In this case,
skb_copy_and_csum_datagram_iovec(skb, sizeof(struct udphdr),
msg->msg_iov);
returns -EFAULT.
This bug does not happen in upstream kernels since Al Viro did a great
job to replace this into :
skb_copy_and_csum_datagram_msg(skb, sizeof(struct udphdr), msg);
This variant is safe vs short buffers.
For the time being, instead reverting Herbert Xu patch and add back
skb->ip_summed invalid changes, simply store the result of
udp_lib_checksum_complete() so that we avoid computing the checksum a
second time, and avoid the problematic
skb_copy_and_csum_datagram_iovec() call.
This patch can be applied on recent kernels as it avoids a double
checksumming, then backported to stable kernels as a bug fix.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-358
| 0
| 70,471
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int tcp_v4_send_synack(struct sock *sk, struct dst_entry *dst,
struct request_sock *req,
struct request_values *rvp)
{
const struct inet_request_sock *ireq = inet_rsk(req);
struct flowi4 fl4;
int err = -1;
struct sk_buff * skb;
/* First, grab a route. */
if (!dst && (dst = inet_csk_route_req(sk, &fl4, req)) == NULL)
return -1;
skb = tcp_make_synack(sk, dst, req, rvp);
if (skb) {
__tcp_v4_send_check(skb, ireq->loc_addr, ireq->rmt_addr);
err = ip_build_and_send_pkt(skb, sk, ireq->loc_addr,
ireq->rmt_addr,
ireq->opt);
err = net_xmit_eval(err);
}
dst_release(dst);
return err;
}
Commit Message: net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5.
Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the
partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons.
MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and
other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.)
Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly
unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic
regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and
use a full 32-bit sequence number.
For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence
number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well.
Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <dan@doxpara.com>
Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 25,204
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int hub_resume(struct usb_interface *intf)
{
struct usb_hub *hub = usb_get_intfdata(intf);
dev_dbg(&intf->dev, "%s\n", __func__);
hub_activate(hub, HUB_RESUME);
/*
* This should be called only for system resume, not runtime resume.
* We can't tell the difference here, so some wakeup requests will be
* reported at the wrong time or more than once. This shouldn't
* matter much, so long as they do get reported.
*/
report_wakeup_requests(hub);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: USB: check usb_get_extra_descriptor for proper size
When reading an extra descriptor, we need to properly check the minimum
and maximum size allowed, to prevent from invalid data being sent by a
device.
Reported-by: Hui Peng <benquike@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Mathias Payer <mathias.payer@nebelwelt.net>
Co-developed-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Hui Peng <benquike@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Payer <mathias.payer@nebelwelt.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 75,510
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void nested_mark_vmcs12_pages_dirty(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
gfn_t gfn;
/*
* Don't need to mark the APIC access page dirty; it is never
* written to by the CPU during APIC virtualization.
*/
if (nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW)) {
gfn = vmcs12->virtual_apic_page_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
kvm_vcpu_mark_page_dirty(vcpu, gfn);
}
if (nested_cpu_has_posted_intr(vmcs12)) {
gfn = vmcs12->posted_intr_desc_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
kvm_vcpu_mark_page_dirty(vcpu, gfn);
}
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Don't allow L2 to access the hardware CR8
If L1 does not specify the "use TPR shadow" VM-execution control in
vmcs12, then L0 must specify the "CR8-load exiting" and "CR8-store
exiting" VM-execution controls in vmcs02. Failure to do so will give
the L2 VM unrestricted read/write access to the hardware CR8.
This fixes CVE-2017-12154.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 62,995
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebGLRenderingContextBase::clear(GLbitfield mask) {
if (isContextLost())
return;
if (mask &
~(GL_COLOR_BUFFER_BIT | GL_DEPTH_BUFFER_BIT | GL_STENCIL_BUFFER_BIT)) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "clear", "invalid mask");
return;
}
const char* reason = "framebuffer incomplete";
if (framebuffer_binding_ && framebuffer_binding_->CheckDepthStencilStatus(
&reason) != GL_FRAMEBUFFER_COMPLETE) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_FRAMEBUFFER_OPERATION, "clear", reason);
return;
}
ScopedRGBEmulationColorMask emulation_color_mask(this, color_mask_,
drawing_buffer_.Get());
if (ClearIfComposited(mask) != kCombinedClear) {
if (!framebuffer_binding_ &&
GetDrawingBuffer()->HasImplicitStencilBuffer() &&
(mask & GL_DEPTH_BUFFER_BIT)) {
mask |= GL_STENCIL_BUFFER_BIT;
}
ContextGL()->Clear(mask);
}
MarkContextChanged(kCanvasChanged);
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 133,780
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: psf_fclose (SF_PRIVATE *psf)
{ int retval ;
while ((retval = close (psf->file.filedes)) == -1 && errno == EINTR)
/* Do nothing. */ ;
if (retval == -1)
psf_log_syserr (psf, errno) ;
psf->file.filedes = -1 ;
return retval ;
} /* psf_fclose */
Commit Message: src/file_io.c : Prevent potential divide-by-zero.
Closes: https://github.com/erikd/libsndfile/issues/92
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 45,209
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void read_pnm_header(FILE *reader, struct pnm_header *ph)
{
int format, end, ttype;
char idf[256], type[256];
char line[256];
if (fgets(line, 250, reader) == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "\nWARNING: fgets return a NULL value");
return;
}
if (line[0] != 'P') {
fprintf(stderr, "read_pnm_header:PNM:magic P missing\n");
return;
}
format = atoi(line + 1);
if (format < 1 || format > 7) {
fprintf(stderr, "read_pnm_header:magic format %d invalid\n", format);
return;
}
ph->format = format;
ttype = end = 0;
while (fgets(line, 250, reader)) {
char *s;
int allow_null = 0;
if (*line == '#') {
continue;
}
s = line;
if (format == 7) {
s = skip_idf(s, idf);
if (s == NULL || *s == 0) {
return;
}
if (strcmp(idf, "ENDHDR") == 0) {
end = 1;
break;
}
if (strcmp(idf, "WIDTH") == 0) {
s = skip_int(s, &ph->width);
if (s == NULL || *s == 0) {
return;
}
continue;
}
if (strcmp(idf, "HEIGHT") == 0) {
s = skip_int(s, &ph->height);
if (s == NULL || *s == 0) {
return;
}
continue;
}
if (strcmp(idf, "DEPTH") == 0) {
s = skip_int(s, &ph->depth);
if (s == NULL || *s == 0) {
return;
}
continue;
}
if (strcmp(idf, "MAXVAL") == 0) {
s = skip_int(s, &ph->maxval);
if (s == NULL || *s == 0) {
return;
}
continue;
}
if (strcmp(idf, "TUPLTYPE") == 0) {
s = skip_idf(s, type);
if (s == NULL || *s == 0) {
return;
}
if (strcmp(type, "BLACKANDWHITE") == 0) {
ph->bw = 1;
ttype = 1;
continue;
}
if (strcmp(type, "GRAYSCALE") == 0) {
ph->gray = 1;
ttype = 1;
continue;
}
if (strcmp(type, "GRAYSCALE_ALPHA") == 0) {
ph->graya = 1;
ttype = 1;
continue;
}
if (strcmp(type, "RGB") == 0) {
ph->rgb = 1;
ttype = 1;
continue;
}
if (strcmp(type, "RGB_ALPHA") == 0) {
ph->rgba = 1;
ttype = 1;
continue;
}
fprintf(stderr, "read_pnm_header:unknown P7 TUPLTYPE %s\n", type);
return;
}
fprintf(stderr, "read_pnm_header:unknown P7 idf %s\n", idf);
return;
} /* if(format == 7) */
/* Here format is in range [1,6] */
if (ph->width == 0) {
s = skip_int(s, &ph->width);
if ((s == NULL) || (*s == 0) || (ph->width < 1)) {
return;
}
allow_null = 1;
}
if (ph->height == 0) {
s = skip_int(s, &ph->height);
if ((s == NULL) && allow_null) {
continue;
}
if ((s == NULL) || (*s == 0) || (ph->height < 1)) {
return;
}
if (format == 1 || format == 4) {
break;
}
allow_null = 1;
}
/* here, format is in P2, P3, P5, P6 */
s = skip_int(s, &ph->maxval);
if ((s == NULL) && allow_null) {
continue;
}
if ((s == NULL) || (*s == 0)) {
return;
}
break;
}/* while(fgets( ) */
if (format == 2 || format == 3 || format > 4) {
if (ph->maxval < 1 || ph->maxval > 65535) {
return;
}
}
if (ph->width < 1 || ph->height < 1) {
return;
}
if (format == 7) {
if (!end) {
fprintf(stderr, "read_pnm_header:P7 without ENDHDR\n");
return;
}
if (ph->depth < 1 || ph->depth > 4) {
return;
}
if (ttype) {
ph->ok = 1;
}
} else {
ph->ok = 1;
if (format == 1 || format == 4) {
ph->maxval = 255;
}
}
}
Commit Message: pgxtoimage(): fix write stack buffer overflow (#997)
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 61,896
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static CURLcode parse_proxy_auth(struct Curl_easy *data,
struct connectdata *conn)
{
char proxyuser[MAX_CURL_USER_LENGTH]="";
char proxypasswd[MAX_CURL_PASSWORD_LENGTH]="";
CURLcode result;
if(data->set.str[STRING_PROXYUSERNAME] != NULL) {
strncpy(proxyuser, data->set.str[STRING_PROXYUSERNAME],
MAX_CURL_USER_LENGTH);
proxyuser[MAX_CURL_USER_LENGTH-1] = '\0'; /*To be on safe side*/
}
if(data->set.str[STRING_PROXYPASSWORD] != NULL) {
strncpy(proxypasswd, data->set.str[STRING_PROXYPASSWORD],
MAX_CURL_PASSWORD_LENGTH);
proxypasswd[MAX_CURL_PASSWORD_LENGTH-1] = '\0'; /*To be on safe side*/
}
result = Curl_urldecode(data, proxyuser, 0, &conn->http_proxy.user, NULL,
FALSE);
if(!result)
result = Curl_urldecode(data, proxypasswd, 0, &conn->http_proxy.passwd,
NULL, FALSE);
return result;
}
Commit Message: Curl_close: clear data->multi_easy on free to avoid use-after-free
Regression from b46cfbc068 (7.59.0)
CVE-2018-16840
Reported-by: Brian Carpenter (Geeknik Labs)
Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/CVE-2018-16840.html
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 77,806
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Camera3Device::setErrorStateLocked(const char *fmt, ...) {
va_list args;
va_start(args, fmt);
setErrorStateLockedV(fmt, args);
va_end(args);
}
Commit Message: Camera3Device: Validate template ID
Validate template ID before creating a default request.
Bug: 26866110
Bug: 27568958
Change-Id: Ifda457024f1d5c2b1382f189c1a8d5fda852d30d
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 161,093
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: u8 dcb_getapp(struct net_device *dev, struct dcb_app *app)
{
struct dcb_app_type *itr;
u8 prio = 0;
spin_lock(&dcb_lock);
if ((itr = dcb_app_lookup(app, dev->ifindex, 0)))
prio = itr->app.priority;
spin_unlock(&dcb_lock);
return prio;
}
Commit Message: dcbnl: fix various netlink info leaks
The dcb netlink interface leaks stack memory in various places:
* perm_addr[] buffer is only filled at max with 12 of the 32 bytes but
copied completely,
* no in-kernel driver fills all fields of an IEEE 802.1Qaz subcommand,
so we're leaking up to 58 bytes for ieee_ets structs, up to 136 bytes
for ieee_pfc structs, etc.,
* the same is true for CEE -- no in-kernel driver fills the whole
struct,
Prevent all of the above stack info leaks by properly initializing the
buffers/structures involved.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 31,081
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebPagePrivate::notifyTransformedContentsSizeChanged()
{
m_previousContentsSize = contentsSize();
const IntSize size = transformedContentsSize();
m_backingStore->d->contentsSizeChanged(size);
m_client->contentsSizeChanged();
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 104,311
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: find_writeable_file(struct nfs4_file *f)
{
struct file *ret;
spin_lock(&f->fi_lock);
ret = find_writeable_file_locked(f);
spin_unlock(&f->fi_lock);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 65,466
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int rsa_priv_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8)
{
const unsigned char *p;
int pklen;
if (!PKCS8_pkey_get0(NULL, &p, &pklen, NULL, p8))
return 0;
return old_rsa_priv_decode(pkey, &p, pklen);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 3,617
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void sk_prot_clear_portaddr_nulls(struct sock *sk, int size)
{
unsigned long nulls1, nulls2;
nulls1 = offsetof(struct sock, __sk_common.skc_node.next);
nulls2 = offsetof(struct sock, __sk_common.skc_portaddr_node.next);
if (nulls1 > nulls2)
swap(nulls1, nulls2);
if (nulls1 != 0)
memset((char *)sk, 0, nulls1);
memset((char *)sk + nulls1 + sizeof(void *), 0,
nulls2 - nulls1 - sizeof(void *));
memset((char *)sk + nulls2 + sizeof(void *), 0,
size - nulls2 - sizeof(void *));
}
Commit Message: net: sock: validate data_len before allocating skb in sock_alloc_send_pskb()
We need to validate the number of pages consumed by data_len, otherwise frags
array could be overflowed by userspace. So this patch validate data_len and
return -EMSGSIZE when data_len may occupies more frags than MAX_SKB_FRAGS.
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 20,143
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static gboolean netscreen_read(wtap *wth, int *err, gchar **err_info,
gint64 *data_offset)
{
gint64 offset;
int pkt_len;
char line[NETSCREEN_LINE_LENGTH];
char cap_int[NETSCREEN_MAX_INT_NAME_LENGTH];
gboolean cap_dir;
char cap_dst[13];
/* Find the next packet */
offset = netscreen_seek_next_packet(wth, err, err_info, line);
if (offset < 0)
return FALSE;
/* Parse the header */
pkt_len = parse_netscreen_rec_hdr(&wth->phdr, line, cap_int, &cap_dir,
cap_dst, err, err_info);
if (pkt_len == -1)
return FALSE;
/* Convert the ASCII hex dump to binary data, and fill in some
struct wtap_pkthdr fields */
if (!parse_netscreen_hex_dump(wth->fh, pkt_len, cap_int,
cap_dst, &wth->phdr, wth->frame_buffer, err, err_info))
return FALSE;
/*
* If the per-file encapsulation isn't known, set it to this
* packet's encapsulation.
*
* If it *is* known, and it isn't this packet's encapsulation,
* set it to WTAP_ENCAP_PER_PACKET, as this file doesn't
* have a single encapsulation for all packets in the file.
*/
if (wth->file_encap == WTAP_ENCAP_UNKNOWN)
wth->file_encap = wth->phdr.pkt_encap;
else {
if (wth->file_encap != wth->phdr.pkt_encap)
wth->file_encap = WTAP_ENCAP_PER_PACKET;
}
*data_offset = offset;
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Fix packet length handling.
Treat the packet length as unsigned - it shouldn't be negative in the
file. If it is, that'll probably cause the sscanf to fail, so we'll
report the file as bad.
Check it against WTAP_MAX_PACKET_SIZE to make sure we don't try to
allocate a huge amount of memory, just as we do in other file readers.
Use the now-validated packet size as the length in
ws_buffer_assure_space(), so we are certain to have enough space, and
don't allocate too much space.
Merge the header and packet data parsing routines while we're at it.
Bug: 12396
Change-Id: I7f981f9cdcbea7ecdeb88bfff2f12d875de2244f
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15176
Reviewed-by: Guy Harris <guy@alum.mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 167,146
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Box *rvcc_New()
{
ISOM_DECL_BOX_ALLOC(GF_RVCConfigurationBox, GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_RVCC);
return (GF_Box *)tmp;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 80,367
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __init ipsec_pfkey_init(void)
{
int err = proto_register(&key_proto, 0);
if (err != 0)
goto out;
err = register_pernet_subsys(&pfkey_net_ops);
if (err != 0)
goto out_unregister_key_proto;
err = sock_register(&pfkey_family_ops);
if (err != 0)
goto out_unregister_pernet;
err = xfrm_register_km(&pfkeyv2_mgr);
if (err != 0)
goto out_sock_unregister;
out:
return err;
out_sock_unregister:
sock_unregister(PF_KEY);
out_unregister_pernet:
unregister_pernet_subsys(&pfkey_net_ops);
out_unregister_key_proto:
proto_unregister(&key_proto);
goto out;
}
Commit Message: af_key: initialize satype in key_notify_policy_flush()
This field was left uninitialized. Some user daemons perform check against this
field.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 31,393
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CSoundFile::NoteSlide(ModChannel *pChn, uint32 param, bool slideUp, bool retrig) const
{
uint8 x, y;
if(m_SongFlags[SONG_FIRSTTICK])
{
x = param & 0xF0;
if (x)
pChn->nNoteSlideSpeed = (x >> 4);
y = param & 0x0F;
if (y)
pChn->nNoteSlideStep = y;
pChn->nNoteSlideCounter = pChn->nNoteSlideSpeed;
} else
{
if (--pChn->nNoteSlideCounter == 0)
{
pChn->nNoteSlideCounter = pChn->nNoteSlideSpeed;
pChn->nPeriod = GetPeriodFromNote
((slideUp ? 1 : -1) * pChn->nNoteSlideStep + GetNoteFromPeriod(pChn->nPeriod), 8363, 0);
if(retrig)
{
pChn->position.Set(0);
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: [Fix] Possible out-of-bounds read when computing length of some IT files with pattern loops (OpenMPT: formats that are converted to IT, libopenmpt: IT/ITP/MO3), caught with afl-fuzz.
git-svn-id: https://source.openmpt.org/svn/openmpt/trunk/OpenMPT@10027 56274372-70c3-4bfc-bfc3-4c3a0b034d27
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 83,319
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void sigchld_handler(int s) {
int status;
int* i;
pid_t pid;
while((pid=waitpid(-1, &status, WNOHANG)) > 0) {
if(WIFEXITED(status)) {
msg3(LOG_INFO, "Child exited with %d", WEXITSTATUS(status));
}
i=g_hash_table_lookup(children, &pid);
if(!i) {
msg3(LOG_INFO, "SIGCHLD received for an unknown child with PID %ld", (long)pid);
} else {
DEBUG2("Removing %d from the list of children", pid);
g_hash_table_remove(children, &pid);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fix buffer size checking
Yes, this means we've re-introduced CVE-2005-3534. Sigh.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 18,454
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void putname(struct filename *name)
{
BUG_ON(name->refcnt <= 0);
if (--name->refcnt > 0)
return;
if (name->name != name->iname) {
__putname(name->name);
kfree(name);
} else
__putname(name);
}
Commit Message: path_openat(): fix double fput()
path_openat() jumps to the wrong place after do_tmpfile() - it has
already done path_cleanup() (as part of path_lookupat() called by
do_tmpfile()), so doing that again can lead to double fput().
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.11+
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 42,342
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int perform_http_xact(void)
{
/* use free instead of g_free so that we can use xstr* functions from
* libreport/lib/xfuncs.c
*/
GHashTable *problem_info = g_hash_table_new_full(g_str_hash, g_str_equal,
free, free);
/* Read header */
char *body_start = NULL;
char *messagebuf_data = NULL;
unsigned messagebuf_len = 0;
/* Loop until EOF/error/timeout/end_of_header */
while (1)
{
messagebuf_data = xrealloc(messagebuf_data, messagebuf_len + INPUT_BUFFER_SIZE);
char *p = messagebuf_data + messagebuf_len;
int rd = read(STDIN_FILENO, p, INPUT_BUFFER_SIZE);
if (rd < 0)
{
if (errno == EINTR) /* SIGALRM? */
error_msg_and_die("Timed out");
perror_msg_and_die("read");
}
if (rd == 0)
break;
log_debug("Received %u bytes of data", rd);
messagebuf_len += rd;
total_bytes_read += rd;
if (total_bytes_read > MAX_MESSAGE_SIZE)
error_msg_and_die("Message is too long, aborting");
/* Check whether we see end of header */
/* Note: we support both [\r]\n\r\n and \n\n */
char *past_end = messagebuf_data + messagebuf_len;
if (p > messagebuf_data+1)
p -= 2; /* start search from two last bytes in last read - they might be '\n\r' */
while (p < past_end)
{
p = memchr(p, '\n', past_end - p);
if (!p)
break;
p++;
if (p >= past_end)
break;
if (*p == '\n'
|| (*p == '\r' && p+1 < past_end && p[1] == '\n')
) {
body_start = p + 1 + (*p == '\r');
*p = '\0';
goto found_end_of_header;
}
}
} /* while (read) */
found_end_of_header: ;
log_debug("Request: %s", messagebuf_data);
/* Sanitize and analyze header.
* Header now is in messagebuf_data, NUL terminated string,
* with last empty line deleted (by placement of NUL).
* \r\n are not (yet) converted to \n, multi-line headers also
* not converted.
*/
/* First line must be "op<space>[http://host]/path<space>HTTP/n.n".
* <space> is exactly one space char.
*/
if (prefixcmp(messagebuf_data, "DELETE ") == 0)
{
messagebuf_data += strlen("DELETE ");
char *space = strchr(messagebuf_data, ' ');
if (!space || prefixcmp(space+1, "HTTP/") != 0)
return 400; /* Bad Request */
*space = '\0';
alarm(0);
return delete_path(messagebuf_data);
}
/* We erroneously used "PUT /" to create new problems.
* POST is the correct request in this case:
* "PUT /" implies creation or replace of resource named "/"!
* Delete PUT in 2014.
*/
if (prefixcmp(messagebuf_data, "PUT ") != 0
&& prefixcmp(messagebuf_data, "POST ") != 0
) {
return 400; /* Bad Request */
}
enum {
CREATION_NOTIFICATION,
CREATION_REQUEST,
};
int url_type;
char *url = skip_non_whitespace(messagebuf_data) + 1; /* skip "POST " */
if (prefixcmp(url, "/creation_notification ") == 0)
url_type = CREATION_NOTIFICATION;
else if (prefixcmp(url, "/ ") == 0)
url_type = CREATION_REQUEST;
else
return 400; /* Bad Request */
/* Read body */
if (!body_start)
{
log_warning("Premature EOF detected, exiting");
return 400; /* Bad Request */
}
messagebuf_len -= (body_start - messagebuf_data);
memmove(messagebuf_data, body_start, messagebuf_len);
log_debug("Body so far: %u bytes, '%s'", messagebuf_len, messagebuf_data);
/* Loop until EOF/error/timeout */
while (1)
{
if (url_type == CREATION_REQUEST)
{
while (1)
{
unsigned len = strnlen(messagebuf_data, messagebuf_len);
if (len >= messagebuf_len)
break;
/* messagebuf has at least one NUL - process the line */
process_message(problem_info, messagebuf_data);
messagebuf_len -= (len + 1);
memmove(messagebuf_data, messagebuf_data + len + 1, messagebuf_len);
}
}
messagebuf_data = xrealloc(messagebuf_data, messagebuf_len + INPUT_BUFFER_SIZE + 1);
int rd = read(STDIN_FILENO, messagebuf_data + messagebuf_len, INPUT_BUFFER_SIZE);
if (rd < 0)
{
if (errno == EINTR) /* SIGALRM? */
error_msg_and_die("Timed out");
perror_msg_and_die("read");
}
if (rd == 0)
break;
log_debug("Received %u bytes of data", rd);
messagebuf_len += rd;
total_bytes_read += rd;
if (total_bytes_read > MAX_MESSAGE_SIZE)
error_msg_and_die("Message is too long, aborting");
}
/* Body received, EOF was seen. Don't let alarm to interrupt after this. */
alarm(0);
if (url_type == CREATION_NOTIFICATION)
{
messagebuf_data[messagebuf_len] = '\0';
return run_post_create(messagebuf_data);
}
/* Save problem dir */
int ret = 0;
unsigned pid = convert_pid(problem_info);
die_if_data_is_missing(problem_info);
char *executable = g_hash_table_lookup(problem_info, FILENAME_EXECUTABLE);
if (executable)
{
char *last_file = concat_path_file(g_settings_dump_location, "last-via-server");
int repeating_crash = check_recent_crash_file(last_file, executable);
free(last_file);
if (repeating_crash) /* Only pretend that we saved it */
goto out; /* ret is 0: "success" */
}
#if 0
/* At least it should generate local problem identifier UUID */
problem_data_add_basics(problem_info);
#endif
create_problem_dir(problem_info, pid);
/* does not return */
out:
g_hash_table_destroy(problem_info);
return ret; /* Used as HTTP response code */
}
Commit Message: make the dump directories owned by root by default
It was discovered that the abrt event scripts create a user-readable
copy of a sosreport file in abrt problem directories, and include
excerpts of /var/log/messages selected by the user-controlled process
name, leading to an information disclosure.
This issue was discovered by Florian Weimer of Red Hat Product Security.
Related: #1212868
Signed-off-by: Jakub Filak <jfilak@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 96,387
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ext4_ext_binsearch(struct inode *inode,
struct ext4_ext_path *path, ext4_lblk_t block)
{
struct ext4_extent_header *eh = path->p_hdr;
struct ext4_extent *r, *l, *m;
if (eh->eh_entries == 0) {
/*
* this leaf is empty:
* we get such a leaf in split/add case
*/
return;
}
ext_debug("binsearch for %u: ", block);
l = EXT_FIRST_EXTENT(eh) + 1;
r = EXT_LAST_EXTENT(eh);
while (l <= r) {
m = l + (r - l) / 2;
if (block < le32_to_cpu(m->ee_block))
r = m - 1;
else
l = m + 1;
ext_debug("%p(%u):%p(%u):%p(%u) ", l, le32_to_cpu(l->ee_block),
m, le32_to_cpu(m->ee_block),
r, le32_to_cpu(r->ee_block));
}
path->p_ext = l - 1;
ext_debug(" -> %d:%llu:[%d]%d ",
le32_to_cpu(path->p_ext->ee_block),
ext_pblock(path->p_ext),
ext4_ext_is_uninitialized(path->p_ext),
ext4_ext_get_actual_len(path->p_ext));
#ifdef CHECK_BINSEARCH
{
struct ext4_extent *chex, *ex;
int k;
chex = ex = EXT_FIRST_EXTENT(eh);
for (k = 0; k < le16_to_cpu(eh->eh_entries); k++, ex++) {
BUG_ON(k && le32_to_cpu(ex->ee_block)
<= le32_to_cpu(ex[-1].ee_block));
if (block < le32_to_cpu(ex->ee_block))
break;
chex = ex;
}
BUG_ON(chex != path->p_ext);
}
#endif
}
Commit Message: ext4: use ext4_get_block_write in buffer write
Allocate uninitialized extent before ext4 buffer write and
convert the extent to initialized after io completes.
The purpose is to make sure an extent can only be marked
initialized after it has been written with new data so
we can safely drop the i_mutex lock in ext4 DIO read without
exposing stale data. This helps to improve multi-thread DIO
read performance on high-speed disks.
Skip the nobh and data=journal mount cases to make things simple for now.
Signed-off-by: Jiaying Zhang <jiayingz@google.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 57,432
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int_multiply_cmp(int x, int y, int v)
{
if (x == 0 || y == 0) return -1;
if (x < INT_MAX / y) {
int xy = x * y;
if (xy > v) return 1;
else {
if (xy == v) return 0;
else return -1;
}
}
else
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Fix CVE-2019-13225: problem in converting if-then-else pattern to bytecode.
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 89,169
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int xt_register_match(struct xt_match *match)
{
u_int8_t af = match->family;
mutex_lock(&xt[af].mutex);
list_add(&match->list, &xt[af].match);
mutex_unlock(&xt[af].mutex);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: check for bogus target offset
We're currently asserting that targetoff + targetsize <= nextoff.
Extend it to also check that targetoff is >= sizeof(xt_entry).
Since this is generic code, add an argument pointing to the start of the
match/target, we can then derive the base structure size from the delta.
We also need the e->elems pointer in a followup change to validate matches.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 52,431
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: EnrollmentScreenActor* OobeUI::GetEnrollmentScreenActor() {
return enrollment_screen_actor_;
}
Commit Message: One polymer_config.js to rule them all.
R=michaelpg@chromium.org,fukino@chromium.org,mfoltz@chromium.org
BUG=425626
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1224783005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#337882}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 123,666
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool mouse_enter() const { return mouse_enter_; }
Commit Message: Pass ui::LatencyInfo correct with unified gesture detector on Aura.
BUG=379812
TEST=GestureRecognizerTest.LatencyPassedFromTouchEvent
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/309823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@274602 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 112,105
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static Object* Create() { return new Object(); }
Commit Message: [oilpan] Fix GCInfoTable for multiple threads
Previously, grow and access from different threads could lead to a race
on the table backing; see bug.
- Rework the table to work on an existing reservation.
- Commit upon growing, avoiding any copies.
Drive-by: Fix over-allocation of table.
Bug: chromium:841280
Change-Id: I329cb6f40091e14e8c05334ba1104a9440c31d43
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1061525
Commit-Queue: Michael Lippautz <mlippautz@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#560434}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 153,771
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DesktopWindowTreeHostX11::DispatchMouseEvent(ui::MouseEvent* event) {
if (content_window() && content_window()->delegate()) {
int flags = event->flags();
gfx::Point location_in_dip = event->location();
GetRootTransform().TransformPointReverse(&location_in_dip);
int hit_test_code =
content_window()->delegate()->GetNonClientComponent(location_in_dip);
if (hit_test_code != HTCLIENT && hit_test_code != HTNOWHERE)
flags |= ui::EF_IS_NON_CLIENT;
event->set_flags(flags);
}
if (event->IsAnyButton() || event->IsMouseWheelEvent())
FlashFrame(false);
if (!g_current_capture || g_current_capture == this) {
SendEventToSink(event);
} else {
DCHECK_EQ(ui::GetScaleFactorForNativeView(window()),
ui::GetScaleFactorForNativeView(g_current_capture->window()));
ConvertEventLocationToTargetWindowLocation(
g_current_capture->GetLocationOnScreenInPixels(),
GetLocationOnScreenInPixels(), event->AsLocatedEvent());
g_current_capture->SendEventToSink(event);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix PIP window being blank after minimize/show
DesktopWindowTreeHostX11::SetVisible only made the call into
OnNativeWidgetVisibilityChanged when transitioning from shown
to minimized and not vice versa. This is because this change
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1437263
considered IsVisible to be true when minimized, which made
IsVisible always true in this case. This caused layers to be hidden
but never shown again.
This is a reland of:
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1580103
Bug: 949199
Change-Id: I2151cd09e537d8ce8781897f43a3b8e9cec75996
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1584617
Reviewed-by: Scott Violet <sky@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: enne <enne@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654280}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 140,523
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int defined_frame_rate(AVFormatContext *s, AVStream *st)
{
AVRational rational_framerate = find_fps(s, st);
int rate = 0;
if (rational_framerate.den != 0)
rate = av_q2d(rational_framerate);
return rate;
}
Commit Message: avformat/movenc: Write version 2 of audio atom if channels is not known
The version 1 needs the channel count and would divide by 0
Fixes: division by 0
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_1.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_2.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_3.wav
Found-by: #CHEN HONGXU# <HCHEN017@e.ntu.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-369
| 0
| 79,285
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: pick_ipc_buffer(unsigned int max)
{
static unsigned int global_max = 0;
if (global_max == 0) {
const char *env = getenv("PCMK_ipc_buffer");
if (env) {
int env_max = crm_parse_int(env, "0");
global_max = (env_max > 0)? QB_MAX(MIN_MSG_SIZE, env_max) : MAX_MSG_SIZE;
} else {
global_max = MAX_MSG_SIZE;
}
}
return QB_MAX(max, global_max);
}
Commit Message: High: libcrmcommon: fix CVE-2016-7035 (improper IPC guarding)
It was discovered that at some not so uncommon circumstances, some
pacemaker daemons could be talked to, via libqb-facilitated IPC, by
unprivileged clients due to flawed authorization decision. Depending
on the capabilities of affected daemons, this might equip unauthorized
user with local privilege escalation or up to cluster-wide remote
execution of possibly arbitrary commands when such user happens to
reside at standard or remote/guest cluster node, respectively.
The original vulnerability was introduced in an attempt to allow
unprivileged IPC clients to clean up the file system materialized
leftovers in case the server (otherwise responsible for the lifecycle
of these files) crashes. While the intended part of such behavior is
now effectively voided (along with the unintended one), a best-effort
fix to address this corner case systemically at libqb is coming along
(https://github.com/ClusterLabs/libqb/pull/231).
Affected versions: 1.1.10-rc1 (2013-04-17) - 1.1.15 (2016-06-21)
Impact: Important
CVSSv3 ranking: 8.8 : AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Credits for independent findings, in chronological order:
Jan "poki" Pokorný, of Red Hat
Alain Moulle, of ATOS/BULL
CWE ID: CWE-285
| 0
| 86,598
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebGL2RenderingContextBase::pixelStorei(GLenum pname, GLint param) {
if (isContextLost())
return;
if (param < 0) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "pixelStorei", "negative value");
return;
}
switch (pname) {
case GL_PACK_ROW_LENGTH:
pack_row_length_ = param;
break;
case GL_PACK_SKIP_PIXELS:
pack_skip_pixels_ = param;
break;
case GL_PACK_SKIP_ROWS:
pack_skip_rows_ = param;
break;
case GL_UNPACK_ROW_LENGTH:
unpack_row_length_ = param;
break;
case GL_UNPACK_IMAGE_HEIGHT:
unpack_image_height_ = param;
break;
case GL_UNPACK_SKIP_PIXELS:
unpack_skip_pixels_ = param;
break;
case GL_UNPACK_SKIP_ROWS:
unpack_skip_rows_ = param;
break;
case GL_UNPACK_SKIP_IMAGES:
unpack_skip_images_ = param;
break;
default:
WebGLRenderingContextBase::pixelStorei(pname, param);
return;
}
ContextGL()->PixelStorei(pname, param);
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 133,440
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GahpClient::gt4_generate_submit_id (char ** submit_id)
{
static const char * command = "GT4_GENERATE_SUBMIT_ID";
if ( submit_id ) {
*submit_id = NULL;
}
if (server->m_commands_supported->contains_anycase(command)==FALSE) {
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
if ( !is_pending( command, NULL ) ) {
if ( m_mode == results_only ) {
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_NOT_SUBMITTED;
}
now_pending( command, NULL, normal_proxy );
}
Gahp_Args* result = get_pending_result( command, NULL );
if ( result ) {
if (result->argc != 2) {
EXCEPT( "Bad %s Result", command );
}
if ( strcasecmp(result->argv[1], NULLSTRING) ) {
*submit_id = strdup( result->argv[1] );
} else {
*submit_id = NULL;
}
delete result;
return 0;
}
if ( check_pending_timeout( command, NULL ) ) {
sprintf( error_string, "%s timed out", command );
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_TIMED_OUT;
}
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_PENDING;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134
| 0
| 16,199
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int mailimf_broken_date_parse(const char * message, size_t length,
size_t * indx,
int * pday, int * pmonth, int * pyear)
{
size_t cur_token;
int day;
int month;
int year;
int r;
cur_token = * indx;
month = 1;
r = mailimf_month_parse(message, length, &cur_token, &month);
if (r != MAILIMF_NO_ERROR)
return r;
day = 1;
r = mailimf_day_parse(message, length, &cur_token, &day);
if (r != MAILIMF_NO_ERROR)
return r;
year = 2001;
r = mailimf_year_parse(message, length, &cur_token, &year);
if (r != MAILIMF_NO_ERROR)
return r;
* pday = day;
* pmonth = month;
* pyear = year;
* indx = cur_token;
return MAILIMF_NO_ERROR;
}
Commit Message: Fixed crash #274
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 66,162
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Verify_StoreExistingGroupExistingCache(base::Time expected_update_time) {
EXPECT_TRUE(delegate()->stored_group_success_);
EXPECT_EQ(cache_.get(), group_->newest_complete_cache());
AppCacheDatabase::CacheRecord cache_record;
EXPECT_TRUE(database()->FindCache(1, &cache_record));
EXPECT_EQ(1, cache_record.cache_id);
EXPECT_EQ(1, cache_record.group_id);
EXPECT_FALSE(cache_record.online_wildcard);
EXPECT_TRUE(expected_update_time == cache_record.update_time);
EXPECT_EQ(100 + kDefaultEntrySize, cache_record.cache_size);
std::vector<AppCacheDatabase::EntryRecord> entry_records;
EXPECT_TRUE(database()->FindEntriesForCache(1, &entry_records));
EXPECT_EQ(2U, entry_records.size());
if (entry_records[0].url == kDefaultEntryUrl)
entry_records.erase(entry_records.begin());
EXPECT_EQ(1, entry_records[0].cache_id);
EXPECT_EQ(kEntryUrl, entry_records[0].url);
EXPECT_EQ(AppCacheEntry::MASTER, entry_records[0].flags);
EXPECT_EQ(1, entry_records[0].response_id);
EXPECT_EQ(100, entry_records[0].response_size);
EXPECT_EQ(100 + kDefaultEntrySize, storage()->usage_map_[kOrigin]);
EXPECT_EQ(1, mock_quota_manager_proxy_->notify_storage_modified_count_);
EXPECT_EQ(kOrigin, mock_quota_manager_proxy_->last_origin_);
EXPECT_EQ(100, mock_quota_manager_proxy_->last_delta_);
TestFinished();
}
Commit Message: Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 1
| 172,994
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int gather_hugetbl_stats(pte_t *pte, unsigned long hmask,
unsigned long addr, unsigned long end, struct mm_walk *walk)
{
struct numa_maps *md;
struct page *page;
if (pte_none(*pte))
return 0;
page = pte_page(*pte);
if (!page)
return 0;
md = walk->private;
gather_stats(page, md, pte_dirty(*pte), 1);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 20,979
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: explicit HostProcess(scoped_ptr<ChromotingHostContext> context)
: context_(context.Pass()),
config_(FilePath()),
#ifdef OFFICIAL_BUILD
oauth_use_official_client_id_(true),
#else
oauth_use_official_client_id_(false),
#endif
allow_nat_traversal_(true),
restarting_(false),
shutting_down_(false),
#if defined(OS_WIN)
desktop_environment_factory_(new SessionDesktopEnvironmentFactory(
context_->input_task_runner(), context_->ui_task_runner())),
#else // !defined(OS_WIN)
desktop_environment_factory_(new DesktopEnvironmentFactory(
context_->input_task_runner(), context_->ui_task_runner())),
#endif // !defined(OS_WIN)
desktop_resizer_(DesktopResizer::Create()),
exit_code_(kSuccessExitCode) {
network_change_notifier_.reset(net::NetworkChangeNotifier::Create());
curtain_ = CurtainMode::Create(
base::Bind(&HostProcess::OnDisconnectRequested,
base::Unretained(this)),
base::Bind(&HostProcess::OnDisconnectRequested,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
Commit Message: Fix crash in CreateAuthenticatorFactory().
CreateAuthenticatorFactory() is called asynchronously, but it didn't handle
the case when it's called after host object is destroyed.
BUG=150644
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11090036
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@161077 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 113,673
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void TestRenderWidgetHostView::SetBackgroundColor(SkColor color) {
background_color_ = color;
}
Commit Message: Correctly reset FP in RFHI whenever origin changes
Bug: 713364
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/482380
Commit-Queue: Ian Clelland <iclelland@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charles Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#466778}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 127,944
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void cfg80211_testmode_event(struct sk_buff *skb, gfp_t gfp)
{
void *hdr = ((void **)skb->cb)[1];
struct nlattr *data = ((void **)skb->cb)[2];
nla_nest_end(skb, data);
genlmsg_end(skb, hdr);
genlmsg_multicast(skb, 0, nl80211_testmode_mcgrp.id, gfp);
}
Commit Message: nl80211: fix check for valid SSID size in scan operations
In both trigger_scan and sched_scan operations, we were checking for
the SSID length before assigning the value correctly. Since the
memory was just kzalloc'ed, the check was always failing and SSID with
over 32 characters were allowed to go through.
This was causing a buffer overflow when copying the actual SSID to the
proper place.
This bug has been there since 2.6.29-rc4.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Luciano Coelho <coelho@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 26,656
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: crypto_retrieve_cert_sans(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plgctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context reqctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context idctx,
krb5_principal **princs_ret,
krb5_principal **upn_ret,
unsigned char ***dns_ret)
{
krb5_error_code retval = EINVAL;
if (reqctx->received_cert == NULL) {
pkiDebug("%s: No certificate!\n", __FUNCTION__);
return retval;
}
return crypto_retrieve_X509_sans(context, plgctx, reqctx,
reqctx->received_cert, princs_ret,
upn_ret, dns_ret);
}
Commit Message: PKINIT null pointer deref [CVE-2013-1415]
Don't dereference a null pointer when cleaning up.
The KDC plugin for PKINIT can dereference a null pointer when a
malformed packet causes processing to terminate early, leading to
a crash of the KDC process. An attacker would need to have a valid
PKINIT certificate or have observed a successful PKINIT authentication,
or an unauthenticated attacker could execute the attack if anonymous
PKINIT is enabled.
CVSSv2 vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:P/RL:O/RC:C
This is a minimal commit for pullup; style fixes in a followup.
[kaduk@mit.edu: reformat and edit commit message]
(cherry picked from commit c773d3c775e9b2d88bcdff5f8a8ba88d7ec4e8ed)
ticket: 7570
version_fixed: 1.11.1
status: resolved
CWE ID:
| 0
| 33,634
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: e1000e_intrmgr_stop_delay_timers(E1000ECore *core)
{
e1000e_intrmgr_stop_timer(&core->radv);
e1000e_intrmgr_stop_timer(&core->rdtr);
e1000e_intrmgr_stop_timer(&core->raid);
e1000e_intrmgr_stop_timer(&core->tidv);
e1000e_intrmgr_stop_timer(&core->tadv);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 0
| 5,995
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void do_smbios_option(QemuOpts *opts)
{
#ifdef TARGET_I386
smbios_entry_add(opts);
#endif
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 7,840
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: IntRect WebGLRenderingContextBase::GetImageDataSize(ImageData* pixels) {
DCHECK(pixels);
return GetTextureSourceSize(pixels);
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 133,632
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
unsigned char *q,md_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE*2];
#endif
EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
unsigned char *param,*p;
int al,j,ok;
long i,param_len,n,alg_k,alg_a;
EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
RSA *rsa=NULL;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
DH *dh=NULL;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL;
BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
int curve_nid = 0;
int encoded_pt_len = 0;
#endif
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
/* use same message size as in ssl3_get_certificate_request()
* as ServerKeyExchange message may be skipped */
n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B,
-1,
s->max_cert_list,
&ok);
if (!ok) return((int)n);
alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)
{
/*
* Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
* ciphersuite.
*/
if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE|SSL_kECDHE))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
goto f_err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
/* In plain PSK ciphersuite, ServerKeyExchange can be
omitted if no identity hint is sent. Set
session->sess_cert anyway to avoid problems
later.*/
if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
{
s->session->sess_cert=ssl_sess_cert_new();
if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
OPENSSL_free(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
s->ctx->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
}
#endif
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
return(1);
}
param=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
if (s->session->sess_cert != NULL)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
{
RSA_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp);
s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp=NULL;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp)
{
DH_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp);
s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp=NULL;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp)
{
EC_KEY_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp);
s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp=NULL;
}
#endif
}
else
{
s->session->sess_cert=ssl_sess_cert_new();
}
/* Total length of the parameters including the length prefix */
param_len=0;
alg_a=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
{
char tmp_id_hint[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
param_len = 2;
if (param_len > n)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
n2s(p,i);
/* Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used
* in ssl3_send_client_key_exchange. Assume that the
* maximum length of a PSK identity hint can be as
* long as the maximum length of a PSK identity. */
if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
{
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto f_err;
}
if (i > n - param_len)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += i;
/* If received PSK identity hint contains NULL
* characters, the hint is truncated from the first
* NULL. p may not be ending with NULL, so create a
* NULL-terminated string. */
memcpy(tmp_id_hint, p, i);
memset(tmp_id_hint+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
s->ctx->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(tmp_id_hint);
if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
{
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto f_err;
}
p+=i;
n-=param_len;
}
else
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
{
param_len = 2;
if (param_len > n)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
n2s(p,i);
if (i > n - param_len)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_N_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += i;
if (!(s->srp_ctx.N=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p+=i;
if (2 > n - param_len)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += 2;
n2s(p,i);
if (i > n - param_len)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_G_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += i;
if (!(s->srp_ctx.g=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p+=i;
if (1 > n - param_len)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += 1;
i = (unsigned int)(p[0]);
p++;
if (i > n - param_len)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_S_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += i;
if (!(s->srp_ctx.s=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p+=i;
if (2 > n - param_len)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += 2;
n2s(p,i);
if (i > n - param_len)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_B_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += i;
if (!(s->srp_ctx.B=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p+=i;
n-=param_len;
if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, &al))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
goto f_err;
}
/* We must check if there is a certificate */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
#else
if (0)
;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS)
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].x509);
#endif
}
else
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
{
if ((rsa=RSA_new()) == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
param_len = 2;
if (param_len > n)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
n2s(p,i);
if (i > n - param_len)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_MODULUS_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += i;
if (!(rsa->n=BN_bin2bn(p,i,rsa->n)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p+=i;
if (2 > n - param_len)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += 2;
n2s(p,i);
if (i > n - param_len)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_E_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += i;
if (!(rsa->e=BN_bin2bn(p,i,rsa->e)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p+=i;
n-=param_len;
/* this should be because we are using an export cipher */
if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
else
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp=rsa;
rsa=NULL;
}
#else /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
if (0)
;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE)
{
if ((dh=DH_new()) == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
goto err;
}
param_len = 2;
if (param_len > n)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
n2s(p,i);
if (i > n - param_len)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += i;
if (!(dh->p=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p+=i;
if (2 > n - param_len)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += 2;
n2s(p,i);
if (i > n - param_len)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += i;
if (!(dh->g=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p+=i;
if (2 > n - param_len)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += 2;
n2s(p,i);
if (i > n - param_len)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += i;
if (!(dh->pub_key=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p+=i;
n-=param_len;
if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh))
{
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
goto f_err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
#else
if (0)
;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS)
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].x509);
#endif
/* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp=dh;
dh=NULL;
}
else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) || (alg_k & SSL_kDHd))
{
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TRIED_TO_USE_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER);
goto f_err;
}
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
else if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE)
{
EC_GROUP *ngroup;
const EC_GROUP *group;
if ((ecdh=EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
/* Extract elliptic curve parameters and the
* server's ephemeral ECDH public key.
* Keep accumulating lengths of various components in
* param_len and make sure it never exceeds n.
*/
/* XXX: For now we only support named (not generic) curves
* and the ECParameters in this case is just three bytes. We
* also need one byte for the length of the encoded point
*/
param_len=4;
if (param_len > n)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
/* Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has
* sent an invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.
*/
if (!tls1_check_curve(s, p, 3))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
goto f_err;
}
if ((curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(p + 2))) == 0)
{
al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
goto f_err;
}
ngroup = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curve_nid);
if (ngroup == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (EC_KEY_set_group(ecdh, ngroup) == 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
EC_GROUP_free(ngroup);
group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh);
if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
(EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
{
al=SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
goto f_err;
}
p+=3;
/* Next, get the encoded ECPoint */
if (((srvr_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) ||
((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
encoded_pt_len = *p; /* length of encoded point */
p+=1;
if ((encoded_pt_len > n - param_len) ||
(EC_POINT_oct2point(group, srvr_ecpoint,
p, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx) == 0))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += encoded_pt_len;
n-=param_len;
p+=encoded_pt_len;
/* The ECC/TLS specification does not mention
* the use of DSA to sign ECParameters in the server
* key exchange message. We do support RSA and ECDSA.
*/
if (0) ;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509);
#endif
/* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
EC_KEY_set_public_key(ecdh, srvr_ecpoint);
s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp=ecdh;
ecdh=NULL;
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
bn_ctx = NULL;
EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
}
else if (alg_k)
{
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
goto f_err;
}
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
/* p points to the next byte, there are 'n' bytes left */
/* if it was signed, check the signature */
if (pkey != NULL)
{
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
{
int rv;
if (2 > n)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, p, pkey);
if (rv == -1)
goto err;
else if (rv == 0)
{
goto f_err;
}
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
#endif
p += 2;
n -= 2;
}
else
md = EVP_sha1();
if (2 > n)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
n2s(p,i);
n-=2;
j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
/* Check signature length. If n is 0 then signature is empty */
if ((i != n) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
{
/* wrong packet length */
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
{
int num;
unsigned int size;
j=0;
q=md_buf;
for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
{
EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,param,param_len);
EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,&size);
q+=size;
j+=size;
}
i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, p, n,
pkey->pkey.rsa);
if (i < 0)
{
al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
goto f_err;
}
if (i == 0)
{
/* bad signature */
al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
goto f_err;
}
}
else
#endif
{
EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,param,param_len);
if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx,p,(int)n,pkey) <= 0)
{
/* bad signature */
al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
goto f_err;
}
}
}
else
{
/* aNULL, aSRP or kPSK do not need public keys */
if (!(alg_a & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aSRP)) && !(alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
{
/* Might be wrong key type, check it */
if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s))
/* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/* still data left over */
if (n != 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
goto f_err;
}
}
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
return(1);
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
err:
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (rsa != NULL)
RSA_free(rsa);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
if (dh != NULL)
DH_free(dh);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
if (ecdh != NULL)
EC_KEY_free(ecdh);
#endif
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
return(-1);
}
Commit Message: Only allow ephemeral RSA keys in export ciphersuites.
OpenSSL clients would tolerate temporary RSA keys in non-export
ciphersuites. It also had an option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA which
enabled this server side. Remove both options as they are a
protocol violation.
Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan for reporting this issue.
(CVE-2015-0204)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 1
| 166,752
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool DevToolsDataSource::ShouldDenyXFrameOptions() const {
return false;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move front-end URL handling to DevToolsUIBindingds
BUG=662859
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2607833002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#440926}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 138,456
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebSocketJob::OnCreatedSpdyStream(int result) {
DCHECK(spdy_websocket_stream_.get());
DCHECK(socket_.get());
DCHECK_NE(ERR_IO_PENDING, result);
if (state_ == CLOSED) {
result = ERR_ABORTED;
} else if (result == OK) {
state_ = CONNECTING;
result = ERR_PROTOCOL_SWITCHED;
} else {
spdy_websocket_stream_.reset();
}
CompleteIO(result);
}
Commit Message: Use ScopedRunnableMethodFactory in WebSocketJob
Don't post SendPending if it is already posted.
BUG=89795
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7488007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93599 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 98,378
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::WasShown(const ui::LatencyInfo& latency_info) {
if (!is_hidden_)
return;
TRACE_EVENT0("renderer_host", "RenderWidgetHostImpl::WasShown");
is_hidden_ = false;
if (new_content_rendering_timeout_ &&
new_content_rendering_timeout_->IsRunning()) {
new_content_rendering_timeout_->Stop();
ClearDisplayedGraphics();
}
SendScreenRects();
RestartHangMonitorTimeoutIfNecessary();
bool needs_repainting = true;
needs_repainting_on_restore_ = false;
Send(new ViewMsg_WasShown(routing_id_, needs_repainting, latency_info));
process_->WidgetRestored();
bool is_visible = true;
NotificationService::current()->Notify(
NOTIFICATION_RENDER_WIDGET_VISIBILITY_CHANGED,
Source<RenderWidgetHost>(this),
Details<bool>(&is_visible));
WasResized();
}
Commit Message: Force a flush of drawing to the widget when a dialog is shown.
BUG=823353
TEST=as in bug
Change-Id: I5da777068fc29c5638ef02d50e59d5d7b2729260
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/971661
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#544518}
CWE ID:
| 1
| 173,226
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int parse_index(git_index *index, const char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
{
int error = 0;
unsigned int i;
struct index_header header = { 0 };
git_oid checksum_calculated, checksum_expected;
const char *last = NULL;
const char *empty = "";
#define seek_forward(_increase) { \
if (_increase >= buffer_size) { \
error = index_error_invalid("ran out of data while parsing"); \
goto done; } \
buffer += _increase; \
buffer_size -= _increase;\
}
if (buffer_size < INDEX_HEADER_SIZE + INDEX_FOOTER_SIZE)
return index_error_invalid("insufficient buffer space");
/* Precalculate the SHA1 of the files's contents -- we'll match it to
* the provided SHA1 in the footer */
git_hash_buf(&checksum_calculated, buffer, buffer_size - INDEX_FOOTER_SIZE);
/* Parse header */
if ((error = read_header(&header, buffer)) < 0)
return error;
index->version = header.version;
if (index->version >= INDEX_VERSION_NUMBER_COMP)
last = empty;
seek_forward(INDEX_HEADER_SIZE);
assert(!index->entries.length);
if (index->ignore_case)
git_idxmap_icase_resize((khash_t(idxicase) *) index->entries_map, header.entry_count);
else
git_idxmap_resize(index->entries_map, header.entry_count);
/* Parse all the entries */
for (i = 0; i < header.entry_count && buffer_size > INDEX_FOOTER_SIZE; ++i) {
git_index_entry *entry = NULL;
size_t entry_size = read_entry(&entry, index, buffer, buffer_size, last);
/* 0 bytes read means an object corruption */
if (entry_size == 0) {
error = index_error_invalid("invalid entry");
goto done;
}
if ((error = git_vector_insert(&index->entries, entry)) < 0) {
index_entry_free(entry);
goto done;
}
INSERT_IN_MAP(index, entry, &error);
if (error < 0) {
index_entry_free(entry);
goto done;
}
error = 0;
if (index->version >= INDEX_VERSION_NUMBER_COMP)
last = entry->path;
seek_forward(entry_size);
}
if (i != header.entry_count) {
error = index_error_invalid("header entries changed while parsing");
goto done;
}
/* There's still space for some extensions! */
while (buffer_size > INDEX_FOOTER_SIZE) {
size_t extension_size;
extension_size = read_extension(index, buffer, buffer_size);
/* see if we have read any bytes from the extension */
if (extension_size == 0) {
error = index_error_invalid("extension is truncated");
goto done;
}
seek_forward(extension_size);
}
if (buffer_size != INDEX_FOOTER_SIZE) {
error = index_error_invalid(
"buffer size does not match index footer size");
goto done;
}
/* 160-bit SHA-1 over the content of the index file before this checksum. */
git_oid_fromraw(&checksum_expected, (const unsigned char *)buffer);
if (git_oid__cmp(&checksum_calculated, &checksum_expected) != 0) {
error = index_error_invalid(
"calculated checksum does not match expected");
goto done;
}
git_oid_cpy(&index->checksum, &checksum_calculated);
#undef seek_forward
/* Entries are stored case-sensitively on disk, so re-sort now if
* in-memory index is supposed to be case-insensitive
*/
git_vector_set_sorted(&index->entries, !index->ignore_case);
git_vector_sort(&index->entries);
done:
return error;
}
Commit Message: index: convert `read_entry` to return entry size via an out-param
The function `read_entry` does not conform to our usual coding style of
returning stuff via the out parameter and to use the return value for
reporting errors. Due to most of our code conforming to that pattern, it
has become quite natural for us to actually return `-1` in case there is
any error, which has also slipped in with commit 5625d86b9 (index:
support index v4, 2016-05-17). As the function returns an `size_t` only,
though, the return value is wrapped around, causing the caller of
`read_tree` to continue with an invalid index entry. Ultimately, this
can lead to a double-free.
Improve code and fix the bug by converting the function to return the
index entry size via an out parameter and only using the return value to
indicate errors.
Reported-by: Krishna Ram Prakash R <krp@gtux.in>
Reported-by: Vivek Parikh <viv0411.parikh@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 1
| 169,299
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ec_get_version(struct cros_ec_dev *ec, char *str, int maxlen)
{
struct ec_response_get_version *resp;
static const char * const current_image_name[] = {
"unknown", "read-only", "read-write", "invalid",
};
struct cros_ec_command *msg;
int ret;
msg = kmalloc(sizeof(*msg) + sizeof(*resp), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!msg)
return -ENOMEM;
msg->version = 0;
msg->command = EC_CMD_GET_VERSION + ec->cmd_offset;
msg->insize = sizeof(*resp);
msg->outsize = 0;
ret = cros_ec_cmd_xfer(ec->ec_dev, msg);
if (ret < 0)
goto exit;
if (msg->result != EC_RES_SUCCESS) {
snprintf(str, maxlen,
"%s\nUnknown EC version: EC returned %d\n",
CROS_EC_DEV_VERSION, msg->result);
ret = -EINVAL;
goto exit;
}
resp = (struct ec_response_get_version *)msg->data;
if (resp->current_image >= ARRAY_SIZE(current_image_name))
resp->current_image = 3; /* invalid */
snprintf(str, maxlen, "%s\n%s\n%s\n%s\n", CROS_EC_DEV_VERSION,
resp->version_string_ro, resp->version_string_rw,
current_image_name[resp->current_image]);
ret = 0;
exit:
kfree(msg);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: platform/chrome: cros_ec_dev - double fetch bug in ioctl
We verify "u_cmd.outsize" and "u_cmd.insize" but we need to make sure
that those values have not changed between the two copy_from_user()
calls. Otherwise it could lead to a buffer overflow.
Additionally, cros_ec_cmd_xfer() can set s_cmd->insize to a lower value.
We should use the new smaller value so we don't copy too much data to
the user.
Reported-by: Pengfei Wang <wpengfeinudt@gmail.com>
Fixes: a841178445bb ('mfd: cros_ec: Use a zero-length array for command data')
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Gwendal Grignou <gwendal@chromium.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.2+
Signed-off-by: Olof Johansson <olof@lixom.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 51,118
|
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