instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: CastDuplexView::CastDuplexView(SystemTrayItem* owner,
CastConfigDelegate* config_delegate,
bool show_more) {
select_view_ = new CastSelectDefaultView(owner, config_delegate, show_more);
cast_view_ = new CastCastView(config_delegate);
SetLayoutManager(new views::FillLayout());
AddChildView(select_view_);
AddChildView(cast_view_);
ActivateSelectView();
}
Commit Message: Allow the cast tray to function as expected when the installed extension is missing API methods.
BUG=489445
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1145833003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#330663}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 119,710 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t SampleTable::setSyncSampleParams(off64_t data_offset, size_t data_size) {
if (mSyncSampleOffset >= 0 || data_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mSyncSampleOffset = data_offset;
uint8_t header[8];
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, header, sizeof(header)) < (ssize_t)sizeof(header)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (U32_AT(header) != 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mNumSyncSamples = U32_AT(&header[4]);
if (mNumSyncSamples < 2) {
ALOGV("Table of sync samples is empty or has only a single entry!");
}
mSyncSamples = new uint32_t[mNumSyncSamples];
size_t size = mNumSyncSamples * sizeof(uint32_t);
if (mDataSource->readAt(mSyncSampleOffset + 8, mSyncSamples, size)
!= (ssize_t)size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < mNumSyncSamples; ++i) {
mSyncSamples[i] = ntohl(mSyncSamples[i]) - 1;
}
return OK;
}
Commit Message: SampleTable: check integer overflow during table alloc
Bug: 15328708
Bug: 15342615
Bug: 15342751
Change-Id: I6bb110a1eba46506799c73be8ff9a4f71c7e7053
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 1 | 173,376 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t OMXNodeInstance::allocateBufferWithBackup(
OMX_U32 portIndex, const sp<IMemory> ¶ms,
OMX::buffer_id *buffer, OMX_U32 allottedSize) {
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
if (allottedSize > params->size()) {
return BAD_VALUE;
}
BufferMeta *buffer_meta = new BufferMeta(params, true);
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header;
OMX_ERRORTYPE err = OMX_AllocateBuffer(
mHandle, &header, portIndex, buffer_meta, allottedSize);
if (err != OMX_ErrorNone) {
CLOG_ERROR(allocateBufferWithBackup, err,
SIMPLE_BUFFER(portIndex, (size_t)allottedSize, params->pointer()));
delete buffer_meta;
buffer_meta = NULL;
*buffer = 0;
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
CHECK_EQ(header->pAppPrivate, buffer_meta);
*buffer = makeBufferID(header);
addActiveBuffer(portIndex, *buffer);
sp<GraphicBufferSource> bufferSource(getGraphicBufferSource());
if (bufferSource != NULL && portIndex == kPortIndexInput) {
bufferSource->addCodecBuffer(header);
}
CLOG_BUFFER(allocateBufferWithBackup, NEW_BUFFER_FMT(*buffer, portIndex, "%zu@%p :> %u@%p",
params->size(), params->pointer(), allottedSize, header->pBuffer));
return OK;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE omx: check buffer port before using
Bug: 28816827
Change-Id: I3d5bad4a1ef96dec544b05bb31cc6f7109aae0a5
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 173,525 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void pipe_unlock(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe)
{
if (pipe->files)
mutex_unlock(&pipe->mutex);
}
Commit Message: new helper: copy_page_from_iter()
parallel to copy_page_to_iter(). pipe_write() switched to it (and became
->write_iter()).
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 0 | 44,153 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct user_namespace *userns_owner(struct ns_common *ns)
{
return to_user_ns(ns)->parent;
}
Commit Message: userns: also map extents in the reverse map to kernel IDs
The current logic first clones the extent array and sorts both copies, then
maps the lower IDs of the forward mapping into the lower namespace, but
doesn't map the lower IDs of the reverse mapping.
This means that code in a nested user namespace with >5 extents will see
incorrect IDs. It also breaks some access checks, like
inode_owner_or_capable() and privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(), so a process
can incorrectly appear to be capable relative to an inode.
To fix it, we have to make sure that the "lower_first" members of extents
in both arrays are translated; and we have to make sure that the reverse
map is sorted *after* the translation (since otherwise the translation can
break the sorting).
This is CVE-2018-18955.
Fixes: 6397fac4915a ("userns: bump idmap limits to 340")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Tested-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 76,205 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void mpv_reconstruct_mb_internal(MpegEncContext *s, int16_t block[12][64],
int lowres_flag, int is_mpeg12)
{
const int mb_xy = s->mb_y * s->mb_stride + s->mb_x;
if (CONFIG_XVMC &&
s->avctx->hwaccel && s->avctx->hwaccel->decode_mb) {
s->avctx->hwaccel->decode_mb(s);//xvmc uses pblocks
return;
}
if(s->avctx->debug&FF_DEBUG_DCT_COEFF) {
/* print DCT coefficients */
int i,j;
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "DCT coeffs of MB at %dx%d:\n", s->mb_x, s->mb_y);
for(i=0; i<6; i++){
for(j=0; j<64; j++){
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "%5d",
block[i][s->idsp.idct_permutation[j]]);
}
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "\n");
}
}
s->current_picture.qscale_table[mb_xy] = s->qscale;
/* update DC predictors for P macroblocks */
if (!s->mb_intra) {
if (!is_mpeg12 && (s->h263_pred || s->h263_aic)) {
if(s->mbintra_table[mb_xy])
ff_clean_intra_table_entries(s);
} else {
s->last_dc[0] =
s->last_dc[1] =
s->last_dc[2] = 128 << s->intra_dc_precision;
}
}
else if (!is_mpeg12 && (s->h263_pred || s->h263_aic))
s->mbintra_table[mb_xy]=1;
if ((s->avctx->flags & AV_CODEC_FLAG_PSNR) || s->frame_skip_threshold || s->frame_skip_factor ||
!(s->encoding && (s->intra_only || s->pict_type == AV_PICTURE_TYPE_B) &&
s->avctx->mb_decision != FF_MB_DECISION_RD)) { // FIXME precalc
uint8_t *dest_y, *dest_cb, *dest_cr;
int dct_linesize, dct_offset;
op_pixels_func (*op_pix)[4];
qpel_mc_func (*op_qpix)[16];
const int linesize = s->current_picture.f->linesize[0]; //not s->linesize as this would be wrong for field pics
const int uvlinesize = s->current_picture.f->linesize[1];
const int readable= s->pict_type != AV_PICTURE_TYPE_B || s->encoding || s->avctx->draw_horiz_band || lowres_flag;
const int block_size= lowres_flag ? 8>>s->avctx->lowres : 8;
/* avoid copy if macroblock skipped in last frame too */
/* skip only during decoding as we might trash the buffers during encoding a bit */
if(!s->encoding){
uint8_t *mbskip_ptr = &s->mbskip_table[mb_xy];
if (s->mb_skipped) {
s->mb_skipped= 0;
av_assert2(s->pict_type!=AV_PICTURE_TYPE_I);
*mbskip_ptr = 1;
} else if(!s->current_picture.reference) {
*mbskip_ptr = 1;
} else{
*mbskip_ptr = 0; /* not skipped */
}
}
dct_linesize = linesize << s->interlaced_dct;
dct_offset = s->interlaced_dct ? linesize : linesize * block_size;
if(readable){
dest_y= s->dest[0];
dest_cb= s->dest[1];
dest_cr= s->dest[2];
}else{
dest_y = s->sc.b_scratchpad;
dest_cb= s->sc.b_scratchpad+16*linesize;
dest_cr= s->sc.b_scratchpad+32*linesize;
}
if (!s->mb_intra) {
/* motion handling */
/* decoding or more than one mb_type (MC was already done otherwise) */
if(!s->encoding){
if(HAVE_THREADS && s->avctx->active_thread_type&FF_THREAD_FRAME) {
if (s->mv_dir & MV_DIR_FORWARD) {
ff_thread_await_progress(&s->last_picture_ptr->tf,
lowest_referenced_row(s, 0),
0);
}
if (s->mv_dir & MV_DIR_BACKWARD) {
ff_thread_await_progress(&s->next_picture_ptr->tf,
lowest_referenced_row(s, 1),
0);
}
}
if(lowres_flag){
h264_chroma_mc_func *op_pix = s->h264chroma.put_h264_chroma_pixels_tab;
if (s->mv_dir & MV_DIR_FORWARD) {
MPV_motion_lowres(s, dest_y, dest_cb, dest_cr, 0, s->last_picture.f->data, op_pix);
op_pix = s->h264chroma.avg_h264_chroma_pixels_tab;
}
if (s->mv_dir & MV_DIR_BACKWARD) {
MPV_motion_lowres(s, dest_y, dest_cb, dest_cr, 1, s->next_picture.f->data, op_pix);
}
}else{
op_qpix = s->me.qpel_put;
if ((!s->no_rounding) || s->pict_type==AV_PICTURE_TYPE_B){
op_pix = s->hdsp.put_pixels_tab;
}else{
op_pix = s->hdsp.put_no_rnd_pixels_tab;
}
if (s->mv_dir & MV_DIR_FORWARD) {
ff_mpv_motion(s, dest_y, dest_cb, dest_cr, 0, s->last_picture.f->data, op_pix, op_qpix);
op_pix = s->hdsp.avg_pixels_tab;
op_qpix= s->me.qpel_avg;
}
if (s->mv_dir & MV_DIR_BACKWARD) {
ff_mpv_motion(s, dest_y, dest_cb, dest_cr, 1, s->next_picture.f->data, op_pix, op_qpix);
}
}
}
/* skip dequant / idct if we are really late ;) */
if(s->avctx->skip_idct){
if( (s->avctx->skip_idct >= AVDISCARD_NONREF && s->pict_type == AV_PICTURE_TYPE_B)
||(s->avctx->skip_idct >= AVDISCARD_NONKEY && s->pict_type != AV_PICTURE_TYPE_I)
|| s->avctx->skip_idct >= AVDISCARD_ALL)
goto skip_idct;
}
/* add dct residue */
if(s->encoding || !( s->msmpeg4_version || s->codec_id==AV_CODEC_ID_MPEG1VIDEO || s->codec_id==AV_CODEC_ID_MPEG2VIDEO
|| (s->codec_id==AV_CODEC_ID_MPEG4 && !s->mpeg_quant))){
add_dequant_dct(s, block[0], 0, dest_y , dct_linesize, s->qscale);
add_dequant_dct(s, block[1], 1, dest_y + block_size, dct_linesize, s->qscale);
add_dequant_dct(s, block[2], 2, dest_y + dct_offset , dct_linesize, s->qscale);
add_dequant_dct(s, block[3], 3, dest_y + dct_offset + block_size, dct_linesize, s->qscale);
if (!CONFIG_GRAY || !(s->avctx->flags & AV_CODEC_FLAG_GRAY)) {
if (s->chroma_y_shift){
add_dequant_dct(s, block[4], 4, dest_cb, uvlinesize, s->chroma_qscale);
add_dequant_dct(s, block[5], 5, dest_cr, uvlinesize, s->chroma_qscale);
}else{
dct_linesize >>= 1;
dct_offset >>=1;
add_dequant_dct(s, block[4], 4, dest_cb, dct_linesize, s->chroma_qscale);
add_dequant_dct(s, block[5], 5, dest_cr, dct_linesize, s->chroma_qscale);
add_dequant_dct(s, block[6], 6, dest_cb + dct_offset, dct_linesize, s->chroma_qscale);
add_dequant_dct(s, block[7], 7, dest_cr + dct_offset, dct_linesize, s->chroma_qscale);
}
}
} else if(is_mpeg12 || (s->codec_id != AV_CODEC_ID_WMV2)){
add_dct(s, block[0], 0, dest_y , dct_linesize);
add_dct(s, block[1], 1, dest_y + block_size, dct_linesize);
add_dct(s, block[2], 2, dest_y + dct_offset , dct_linesize);
add_dct(s, block[3], 3, dest_y + dct_offset + block_size, dct_linesize);
if (!CONFIG_GRAY || !(s->avctx->flags & AV_CODEC_FLAG_GRAY)) {
if(s->chroma_y_shift){//Chroma420
add_dct(s, block[4], 4, dest_cb, uvlinesize);
add_dct(s, block[5], 5, dest_cr, uvlinesize);
}else{
dct_linesize = uvlinesize << s->interlaced_dct;
dct_offset = s->interlaced_dct ? uvlinesize : uvlinesize*block_size;
add_dct(s, block[4], 4, dest_cb, dct_linesize);
add_dct(s, block[5], 5, dest_cr, dct_linesize);
add_dct(s, block[6], 6, dest_cb+dct_offset, dct_linesize);
add_dct(s, block[7], 7, dest_cr+dct_offset, dct_linesize);
if(!s->chroma_x_shift){//Chroma444
add_dct(s, block[8], 8, dest_cb+block_size, dct_linesize);
add_dct(s, block[9], 9, dest_cr+block_size, dct_linesize);
add_dct(s, block[10], 10, dest_cb+block_size+dct_offset, dct_linesize);
add_dct(s, block[11], 11, dest_cr+block_size+dct_offset, dct_linesize);
}
}
}//fi gray
}
else if (CONFIG_WMV2_DECODER || CONFIG_WMV2_ENCODER) {
ff_wmv2_add_mb(s, block, dest_y, dest_cb, dest_cr);
}
} else {
/* Only MPEG-4 Simple Studio Profile is supported in > 8-bit mode.
TODO: Integrate 10-bit properly into mpegvideo.c so that ER works properly */
if (s->avctx->bits_per_raw_sample > 8){
const int act_block_size = block_size * 2;
s->idsp.idct_put(dest_y, dct_linesize, (int16_t*)(*s->block32)[0]);
s->idsp.idct_put(dest_y + act_block_size, dct_linesize, (int16_t*)(*s->block32)[1]);
s->idsp.idct_put(dest_y + dct_offset, dct_linesize, (int16_t*)(*s->block32)[2]);
s->idsp.idct_put(dest_y + dct_offset + act_block_size, dct_linesize, (int16_t*)(*s->block32)[3]);
dct_linesize = uvlinesize << s->interlaced_dct;
dct_offset = s->interlaced_dct ? uvlinesize : uvlinesize*block_size;
s->idsp.idct_put(dest_cb, dct_linesize, (int16_t*)(*s->block32)[4]);
s->idsp.idct_put(dest_cr, dct_linesize, (int16_t*)(*s->block32)[5]);
s->idsp.idct_put(dest_cb + dct_offset, dct_linesize, (int16_t*)(*s->block32)[6]);
s->idsp.idct_put(dest_cr + dct_offset, dct_linesize, (int16_t*)(*s->block32)[7]);
if(!s->chroma_x_shift){//Chroma444
s->idsp.idct_put(dest_cb + act_block_size, dct_linesize, (int16_t*)(*s->block32)[8]);
s->idsp.idct_put(dest_cr + act_block_size, dct_linesize, (int16_t*)(*s->block32)[9]);
s->idsp.idct_put(dest_cb + act_block_size + dct_offset, dct_linesize, (int16_t*)(*s->block32)[10]);
s->idsp.idct_put(dest_cr + act_block_size + dct_offset, dct_linesize, (int16_t*)(*s->block32)[11]);
}
}
/* dct only in intra block */
else if(s->encoding || !(s->codec_id==AV_CODEC_ID_MPEG1VIDEO || s->codec_id==AV_CODEC_ID_MPEG2VIDEO)){
put_dct(s, block[0], 0, dest_y , dct_linesize, s->qscale);
put_dct(s, block[1], 1, dest_y + block_size, dct_linesize, s->qscale);
put_dct(s, block[2], 2, dest_y + dct_offset , dct_linesize, s->qscale);
put_dct(s, block[3], 3, dest_y + dct_offset + block_size, dct_linesize, s->qscale);
if (!CONFIG_GRAY || !(s->avctx->flags & AV_CODEC_FLAG_GRAY)) {
if(s->chroma_y_shift){
put_dct(s, block[4], 4, dest_cb, uvlinesize, s->chroma_qscale);
put_dct(s, block[5], 5, dest_cr, uvlinesize, s->chroma_qscale);
}else{
dct_offset >>=1;
dct_linesize >>=1;
put_dct(s, block[4], 4, dest_cb, dct_linesize, s->chroma_qscale);
put_dct(s, block[5], 5, dest_cr, dct_linesize, s->chroma_qscale);
put_dct(s, block[6], 6, dest_cb + dct_offset, dct_linesize, s->chroma_qscale);
put_dct(s, block[7], 7, dest_cr + dct_offset, dct_linesize, s->chroma_qscale);
}
}
}else{
s->idsp.idct_put(dest_y, dct_linesize, block[0]);
s->idsp.idct_put(dest_y + block_size, dct_linesize, block[1]);
s->idsp.idct_put(dest_y + dct_offset, dct_linesize, block[2]);
s->idsp.idct_put(dest_y + dct_offset + block_size, dct_linesize, block[3]);
if (!CONFIG_GRAY || !(s->avctx->flags & AV_CODEC_FLAG_GRAY)) {
if(s->chroma_y_shift){
s->idsp.idct_put(dest_cb, uvlinesize, block[4]);
s->idsp.idct_put(dest_cr, uvlinesize, block[5]);
}else{
dct_linesize = uvlinesize << s->interlaced_dct;
dct_offset = s->interlaced_dct ? uvlinesize : uvlinesize*block_size;
s->idsp.idct_put(dest_cb, dct_linesize, block[4]);
s->idsp.idct_put(dest_cr, dct_linesize, block[5]);
s->idsp.idct_put(dest_cb + dct_offset, dct_linesize, block[6]);
s->idsp.idct_put(dest_cr + dct_offset, dct_linesize, block[7]);
if(!s->chroma_x_shift){//Chroma444
s->idsp.idct_put(dest_cb + block_size, dct_linesize, block[8]);
s->idsp.idct_put(dest_cr + block_size, dct_linesize, block[9]);
s->idsp.idct_put(dest_cb + block_size + dct_offset, dct_linesize, block[10]);
s->idsp.idct_put(dest_cr + block_size + dct_offset, dct_linesize, block[11]);
}
}
}//gray
}
}
skip_idct:
if(!readable){
s->hdsp.put_pixels_tab[0][0](s->dest[0], dest_y , linesize,16);
if (!CONFIG_GRAY || !(s->avctx->flags & AV_CODEC_FLAG_GRAY)) {
s->hdsp.put_pixels_tab[s->chroma_x_shift][0](s->dest[1], dest_cb, uvlinesize,16 >> s->chroma_y_shift);
s->hdsp.put_pixels_tab[s->chroma_x_shift][0](s->dest[2], dest_cr, uvlinesize,16 >> s->chroma_y_shift);
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: avcodec/idctdsp: Transmit studio_profile to init instead of using AVCodecContext profile
These 2 fields are not always the same, it is simpler to always use the same field
for detecting studio profile
Fixes: null pointer dereference
Fixes: ffmpeg_crash_3.avi
Found-by: Thuan Pham <thuanpv@comp.nus.edu.sg>, Marcel Böhme, Andrew Santosa and Alexandru RazvanCaciulescu with AFLSmart
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 81,755 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Dispose() { window_->RemovePostMessageTimer(this); }
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 125,878 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::OnPepperStopsPlayback(RenderFrameHostImpl* source,
int32_t pp_instance) {
pepper_playback_observer_->PepperStopsPlayback(source, pp_instance);
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 135,821 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TabContentsWrapper* Browser::CreateTabContentsForURL(
const GURL& url, const GURL& referrer, Profile* profile,
PageTransition::Type transition, bool defer_load,
SiteInstance* instance) const {
TabContentsWrapper* contents = TabContentsFactory(profile, instance,
MSG_ROUTING_NONE,
GetSelectedTabContents(), NULL);
if (!defer_load) {
contents->controller().LoadURL(url, referrer, transition);
}
return contents;
}
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 98,220 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: sc_get_openpgp_driver(void)
{
struct sc_card_driver *iso_drv = sc_get_iso7816_driver();
iso_ops = iso_drv->ops;
pgp_ops = *iso_ops;
pgp_ops.match_card = pgp_match_card;
pgp_ops.init = pgp_init;
pgp_ops.finish = pgp_finish;
pgp_ops.select_file = pgp_select_file;
pgp_ops.list_files = pgp_list_files;
pgp_ops.get_challenge = pgp_get_challenge;
pgp_ops.read_binary = pgp_read_binary;
pgp_ops.write_binary = pgp_write_binary;
pgp_ops.pin_cmd = pgp_pin_cmd;
pgp_ops.logout = pgp_logout;
pgp_ops.get_data = pgp_get_data;
pgp_ops.put_data = pgp_put_data;
pgp_ops.set_security_env= pgp_set_security_env;
pgp_ops.compute_signature= pgp_compute_signature;
pgp_ops.decipher = pgp_decipher;
pgp_ops.card_ctl = pgp_card_ctl;
pgp_ops.delete_file = pgp_delete_file;
pgp_ops.update_binary = pgp_update_binary;
pgp_ops.card_reader_lock_obtained = pgp_card_reader_lock_obtained;
return &pgp_drv;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 78,618 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool GLES2Implementation::IsExtensionAvailable(const char* ext) {
const char* extensions =
reinterpret_cast<const char*>(GetStringHelper(GL_EXTENSIONS));
if (!extensions)
return false;
int length = strlen(ext);
while (true) {
int n = strcspn(extensions, " ");
if (n == length && 0 == strncmp(ext, extensions, length)) {
return true;
}
if ('\0' == extensions[n]) {
return false;
}
extensions += n + 1;
}
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,063 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PaintLayerScrollableArea::RegisterForAnimation() {
if (HasBeenDisposed())
return;
if (LocalFrame* frame = GetLayoutBox()->GetFrame()) {
if (LocalFrameView* frame_view = frame->View())
frame_view->AddAnimatingScrollableArea(this);
}
}
Commit Message: Always call UpdateCompositedScrollOffset, not just for the root layer
Bug: 927560
Change-Id: I1d5522aae4f11dd3f5b8947bb089bac1bf19bdb4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1452701
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mason Freed <masonfreed@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#628942}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 130,100 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static Image *ReadRLEImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define SkipLinesOp 0x01
#define SetColorOp 0x02
#define SkipPixelsOp 0x03
#define ByteDataOp 0x05
#define RunDataOp 0x06
#define EOFOp 0x07
char
magick[12];
Image
*image;
int
opcode,
operand,
status;
MagickStatusType
flags;
MagickSizeType
number_pixels;
MemoryInfo
*pixel_info;
register IndexPacket
*indexes;
register ssize_t
x;
register PixelPacket
*q;
register ssize_t
i;
register unsigned char
*p;
size_t
bits_per_pixel,
map_length,
number_colormaps,
number_planes,
one;
ssize_t
count,
y;
unsigned char
background_color[256],
*colormap,
pixel,
plane,
*pixels;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Determine if this a RLE file.
*/
count=ReadBlob(image,2,(unsigned char *) magick);
if ((count == 0) || (memcmp(magick,"\122\314",2) != 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
do
{
/*
Read image header.
*/
(void) ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
(void) ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
image->columns=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
image->rows=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
flags=(MagickStatusType) ReadBlobByte(image);
image->matte=flags & 0x04 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
number_planes=1UL*ReadBlobByte(image);
bits_per_pixel=1UL*ReadBlobByte(image);
number_colormaps=1UL*ReadBlobByte(image);
map_length=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
if (map_length >= 64)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
one=1;
map_length=one << map_length;
if ((number_planes == 0) || (number_planes == 2) || (bits_per_pixel != 8) ||
(image->columns == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if (flags & 0x02)
{
/*
No background color-- initialize to black.
*/
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) number_planes; i++)
background_color[i]=0;
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
}
else
{
/*
Initialize background color.
*/
p=background_color;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) number_planes; i++)
*p++=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
}
if ((number_planes & 0x01) == 0)
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
colormap=(unsigned char *) NULL;
if (number_colormaps != 0)
{
/*
Read image colormaps.
*/
colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(number_colormaps,
map_length*sizeof(*colormap));
if (colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
p=colormap;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) number_colormaps; i++)
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) map_length; x++)
*p++=(unsigned char) ScaleShortToQuantum(ReadBlobLSBShort(image));
}
if ((flags & 0x08) != 0)
{
char
*comment;
size_t
length;
/*
Read image comment.
*/
length=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if (length != 0)
{
comment=(char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length,sizeof(*comment));
if (comment == (char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
count=ReadBlob(image,length-1,(unsigned char *) comment);
comment[length-1]='\0';
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"comment",comment);
comment=DestroyString(comment);
if ((length & 0x01) == 0)
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
}
}
if ((image_info->ping != MagickFalse) && (image_info->number_scenes != 0))
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
/*
Allocate RLE pixels.
*/
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
number_planes++;
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) image->columns*image->rows;
if ((number_pixels*number_planes) != (size_t) (number_pixels*number_planes))
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
pixel_info=AcquireVirtualMemory(image->columns,image->rows*number_planes*
sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixel_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
pixels=(unsigned char *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(pixel_info);
if ((flags & 0x01) && !(flags & 0x02))
{
ssize_t
j;
/*
Set background color.
*/
p=pixels;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) number_pixels; i++)
{
if (image->matte == MagickFalse)
for (j=0; j < (ssize_t) number_planes; j++)
*p++=background_color[j];
else
{
for (j=0; j < (ssize_t) (number_planes-1); j++)
*p++=background_color[j];
*p++=0; /* initialize matte channel */
}
}
}
/*
Read runlength-encoded image.
*/
plane=0;
x=0;
y=0;
opcode=ReadBlobByte(image);
do
{
switch (opcode & 0x3f)
{
case SkipLinesOp:
{
operand=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (opcode & 0x40)
operand=(int) ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
x=0;
y+=operand;
break;
}
case SetColorOp:
{
operand=ReadBlobByte(image);
plane=(unsigned char) operand;
if (plane == 255)
plane=(unsigned char) (number_planes-1);
x=0;
break;
}
case SkipPixelsOp:
{
operand=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (opcode & 0x40)
operand=(int) ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
x+=operand;
break;
}
case ByteDataOp:
{
operand=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (opcode & 0x40)
operand=(int) ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
p=pixels+((image->rows-y-1)*image->columns*number_planes)+
x*number_planes+plane;
operand++;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) operand; i++)
{
pixel=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
if ((y < (ssize_t) image->rows) &&
((x+i) < (ssize_t) image->columns))
*p=pixel;
p+=number_planes;
}
if (operand & 0x01)
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
x+=operand;
break;
}
case RunDataOp:
{
operand=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (opcode & 0x40)
operand=(int) ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
pixel=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
operand++;
p=pixels+((image->rows-y-1)*image->columns*number_planes)+
x*number_planes+plane;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) operand; i++)
{
if ((y < (ssize_t) image->rows) &&
((x+i) < (ssize_t) image->columns))
*p=pixel;
p+=number_planes;
}
x+=operand;
break;
}
default:
break;
}
opcode=ReadBlobByte(image);
} while (((opcode & 0x3f) != EOFOp) && (opcode != EOF));
if (number_colormaps != 0)
{
MagickStatusType
mask;
/*
Apply colormap affineation to image.
*/
mask=(MagickStatusType) (map_length-1);
p=pixels;
if (number_colormaps == 1)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) number_pixels; i++)
{
*p=colormap[*p & mask];
p++;
}
else
if ((number_planes >= 3) && (number_colormaps >= 3))
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) number_pixels; i++)
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_planes; x++)
{
*p=colormap[x*map_length+(*p & mask)];
p++;
}
}
/*
Initialize image structure.
*/
if (number_planes >= 3)
{
/*
Convert raster image to DirectClass pixel packets.
*/
p=pixels;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
SetPixelAlpha(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
else
{
/*
Create colormap.
*/
if (number_colormaps == 0)
map_length=256;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,map_length) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
p=colormap;
if (number_colormaps == 1)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
/*
Pseudocolor.
*/
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) i);
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) i);
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) i);
}
else
if (number_colormaps > 1)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum(*p);
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleCharToQuantum(*(p+map_length));
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum(*(p+map_length*2));
p++;
}
p=pixels;
if (image->matte == MagickFalse)
{
/*
Convert raster image to PseudoClass pixel packets.
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,*p++);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
y,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
(void) SyncImage(image);
}
else
{
/*
Image has a matte channel-- promote to DirectClass.
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(q,image->colormap[*p++].red);
SetPixelGreen(q,image->colormap[*p++].green);
SetPixelBlue(q,image->colormap[*p++].blue);
SetPixelAlpha(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
y,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
image->colormap=(PixelPacket *) RelinquishMagickMemory(
image->colormap);
image->storage_class=DirectClass;
image->colors=0;
}
}
if (number_colormaps != 0)
colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colormap);
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
/*
Proceed to next image.
*/
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
count=ReadBlob(image,2,(unsigned char *) magick);
if ((count != 0) && (memcmp(magick,"\122\314",2) == 0))
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
} while ((count != 0) && (memcmp(magick,"\122\314",2) == 0));
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 168,600 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Label::GetTooltipText(const gfx::Point& p, std::wstring* tooltip) {
DCHECK(tooltip);
if (!tooltip_text_.empty()) {
tooltip->assign(UTF16ToWideHack(tooltip_text_));
return true;
}
if (!is_multi_line_ &&
(font_.GetStringWidth(text_) > GetAvailableRect().width())) {
*tooltip = UTF16ToWideHack(text_);
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: wstring: remove wstring version of SplitString
Retry of r84336.
BUG=23581
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6930047
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@84355 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 100,911 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void flush_nat_entries(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, struct cp_control *cpc)
{
struct f2fs_nm_info *nm_i = NM_I(sbi);
struct curseg_info *curseg = CURSEG_I(sbi, CURSEG_HOT_DATA);
struct f2fs_journal *journal = curseg->journal;
struct nat_entry_set *setvec[SETVEC_SIZE];
struct nat_entry_set *set, *tmp;
unsigned int found;
nid_t set_idx = 0;
LIST_HEAD(sets);
if (!nm_i->dirty_nat_cnt)
return;
down_write(&nm_i->nat_tree_lock);
/*
* if there are no enough space in journal to store dirty nat
* entries, remove all entries from journal and merge them
* into nat entry set.
*/
if (enabled_nat_bits(sbi, cpc) ||
!__has_cursum_space(journal, nm_i->dirty_nat_cnt, NAT_JOURNAL))
remove_nats_in_journal(sbi);
while ((found = __gang_lookup_nat_set(nm_i,
set_idx, SETVEC_SIZE, setvec))) {
unsigned idx;
set_idx = setvec[found - 1]->set + 1;
for (idx = 0; idx < found; idx++)
__adjust_nat_entry_set(setvec[idx], &sets,
MAX_NAT_JENTRIES(journal));
}
/* flush dirty nats in nat entry set */
list_for_each_entry_safe(set, tmp, &sets, set_list)
__flush_nat_entry_set(sbi, set, cpc);
up_write(&nm_i->nat_tree_lock);
f2fs_bug_on(sbi, nm_i->dirty_nat_cnt);
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix race condition in between free nid allocator/initializer
In below concurrent case, allocated nid can be loaded into free nid cache
and be allocated again.
Thread A Thread B
- f2fs_create
- f2fs_new_inode
- alloc_nid
- __insert_nid_to_list(ALLOC_NID_LIST)
- f2fs_balance_fs_bg
- build_free_nids
- __build_free_nids
- scan_nat_page
- add_free_nid
- __lookup_nat_cache
- f2fs_add_link
- init_inode_metadata
- new_inode_page
- new_node_page
- set_node_addr
- alloc_nid_done
- __remove_nid_from_list(ALLOC_NID_LIST)
- __insert_nid_to_list(FREE_NID_LIST)
This patch makes nat cache lookup and free nid list operation being atomical
to avoid this race condition.
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 85,264 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ext2_set_acl(struct inode *inode, struct posix_acl *acl, int type)
{
int name_index;
void *value = NULL;
size_t size = 0;
int error;
switch(type) {
case ACL_TYPE_ACCESS:
name_index = EXT2_XATTR_INDEX_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS;
if (acl) {
error = posix_acl_equiv_mode(acl, &inode->i_mode);
if (error < 0)
return error;
else {
inode->i_ctime = CURRENT_TIME_SEC;
mark_inode_dirty(inode);
if (error == 0)
acl = NULL;
}
}
break;
case ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT:
name_index = EXT2_XATTR_INDEX_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT;
if (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
return acl ? -EACCES : 0;
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
if (acl) {
value = ext2_acl_to_disk(acl, &size);
if (IS_ERR(value))
return (int)PTR_ERR(value);
}
error = ext2_xattr_set(inode, name_index, "", value, size, 0);
kfree(value);
if (!error)
set_cached_acl(inode, type, acl);
return error;
}
Commit Message: posix_acl: Clear SGID bit when setting file permissions
When file permissions are modified via chmod(2) and the user is not in
the owning group or capable of CAP_FSETID, the setgid bit is cleared in
inode_change_ok(). Setting a POSIX ACL via setxattr(2) sets the file
permissions as well as the new ACL, but doesn't clear the setgid bit in
a similar way; this allows to bypass the check in chmod(2). Fix that.
References: CVE-2016-7097
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-285 | 1 | 166,969 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void reset_interrupt(void)
{
debugt(__func__, "");
result(); /* get the status ready for set_fdc */
if (FDCS->reset) {
pr_info("reset set in interrupt, calling %pf\n", cont->error);
cont->error(); /* a reset just after a reset. BAD! */
}
cont->redo();
}
Commit Message: floppy: don't write kernel-only members to FDRAWCMD ioctl output
Do not leak kernel-only floppy_raw_cmd structure members to userspace.
This includes the linked-list pointer and the pointer to the allocated
DMA space.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <mattd@bugfuzz.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 39,421 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: clean_up(int rc)
{
#if ENABLE_SNMP
netsnmp_session *session = crm_snmp_init(NULL, NULL);
if (session) {
snmp_close(session);
snmp_shutdown("snmpapp");
}
#endif
#if CURSES_ENABLED
if (as_console) {
as_console = FALSE;
echo();
nocbreak();
endwin();
}
#endif
if (cib != NULL) {
cib->cmds->signoff(cib);
cib_delete(cib);
cib = NULL;
}
free(as_html_file);
free(xml_file);
free(pid_file);
if (rc >= 0) {
crm_exit(rc);
}
return;
}
Commit Message: High: core: Internal tls api improvements for reuse with future LRMD tls backend.
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 33,932 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void emulator_get_cpuid(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
u32 *eax, u32 *ebx, u32 *ecx, u32 *edx)
{
kvm_cpuid(emul_to_vcpu(ctxt), eax, ebx, ecx, edx);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Convert vapic synchronization to _cached functions (CVE-2013-6368)
In kvm_lapic_sync_from_vapic and kvm_lapic_sync_to_vapic there is the
potential to corrupt kernel memory if userspace provides an address that
is at the end of a page. This patches concerts those functions to use
kvm_write_guest_cached and kvm_read_guest_cached. It also checks the
vapic_address specified by userspace during ioctl processing and returns
an error to userspace if the address is not a valid GPA.
This is generally not guest triggerable, because the required write is
done by firmware that runs before the guest. Also, it only affects AMD
processors and oldish Intel that do not have the FlexPriority feature
(unless you disable FlexPriority, of course; then newer processors are
also affected).
Fixes: b93463aa59d6 ('KVM: Accelerated apic support')
Reported-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 28,813 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __init crypto_algapi_init(void)
{
crypto_init_proc();
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 45,470 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int equalizer_get_band(equalizer_context_t *context __unused, uint32_t freq)
{
int i;
ALOGV("%s: freq: %d", __func__, freq);
for (i = 0; i < NUM_EQ_BANDS; i++) {
if (freq <= equalizer_band_freq_range[i][1]) {
return i;
}
}
return NUM_EQ_BANDS - 1;
}
Commit Message: Fix security vulnerability: Equalizer command might allow negative indexes
Bug: 32247948
Bug: 32438598
Bug: 32436341
Test: use POC on bug or cts security test
Change-Id: I56a92582687599b5b313dea1abcb8bcb19c7fc0e
(cherry picked from commit 3f37d4ef89f4f0eef9e201c5a91b7b2c77ed1071)
(cherry picked from commit ceb7b2d7a4c4cb8d03f166c61f5c7551c6c760aa)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 164,537 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LayoutUnit RenderBox::computeReplacedLogicalWidthRespectingMinMaxWidth(LayoutUnit logicalWidth, bool includeMaxWidth) const
{
LayoutUnit minLogicalWidth = computeReplacedLogicalWidthUsing(style()->logicalMinWidth());
LayoutUnit maxLogicalWidth = !includeMaxWidth || style()->logicalMaxWidth().isUndefined() ? logicalWidth : computeReplacedLogicalWidthUsing(style()->logicalMaxWidth());
return max(minLogicalWidth, min(logicalWidth, maxLogicalWidth));
}
Commit Message: Source/WebCore: Fix for bug 64046 - Wrong image height in absolutely positioned div in
relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <kulanthaivel@codeaurora.org> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
Test: fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html
* rendering/RenderBox.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBox::availableLogicalHeightUsing):
LayoutTests: Test to cover absolutely positioned child with percentage height
in relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <kulanthaivel@codeaurora.org> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent-expected.txt: Added.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html: Added.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@91533 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 101,569 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void v4l_print_ext_ctrls(unsigned int cmd,
struct video_device *vfd, struct v4l2_ext_controls *c, int show_vals)
{
__u32 i;
if (!(vfd->debug & V4L2_DEBUG_IOCTL_ARG))
return;
dbgarg(cmd, "");
printk(KERN_CONT "class=0x%x", c->ctrl_class);
for (i = 0; i < c->count; i++) {
if (show_vals && !c->controls[i].size)
printk(KERN_CONT " id/val=0x%x/0x%x",
c->controls[i].id, c->controls[i].value);
else
printk(KERN_CONT " id=0x%x,size=%u",
c->controls[i].id, c->controls[i].size);
}
printk(KERN_CONT "\n");
};
Commit Message: [media] v4l: Share code between video_usercopy and video_ioctl2
The two functions are mostly identical. They handle the copy_from_user
and copy_to_user operations related with V4L2 ioctls and call the real
ioctl handler.
Create a __video_usercopy function that implements the core of
video_usercopy and video_ioctl2, and call that function from both.
Signed-off-by: Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart@ideasonboard.com>
Acked-by: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil@xs4all.nl>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 74,700 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: inline void Element::attributeChangedFromParserOrByCloning(const QualifiedName& name, const AtomicString& newValue, AttributeModificationReason reason)
{
if (RuntimeEnabledFeatures::customDOMElementsEnabled() && name == isAttr) {
document()->ensureCustomElementRegistry()->didGiveTypeExtension(this, newValue);
}
attributeChanged(name, newValue, reason);
}
Commit Message: Set Attr.ownerDocument in Element#setAttributeNode()
Attr objects can move across documents by setAttributeNode().
So It needs to reset ownerDocument through TreeScopeAdoptr::adoptIfNeeded().
BUG=248950
TEST=set-attribute-node-from-iframe.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17583003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152938 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 112,197 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int dcbnl_getpfcstate(struct net_device *netdev, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
u32 seq, struct nlattr **tb, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
if (!netdev->dcbnl_ops->getpfcstate)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
return nla_put_u8(skb, DCB_ATTR_PFC_STATE,
netdev->dcbnl_ops->getpfcstate(netdev));
}
Commit Message: dcbnl: fix various netlink info leaks
The dcb netlink interface leaks stack memory in various places:
* perm_addr[] buffer is only filled at max with 12 of the 32 bytes but
copied completely,
* no in-kernel driver fills all fields of an IEEE 802.1Qaz subcommand,
so we're leaking up to 58 bytes for ieee_ets structs, up to 136 bytes
for ieee_pfc structs, etc.,
* the same is true for CEE -- no in-kernel driver fills the whole
struct,
Prevent all of the above stack info leaks by properly initializing the
buffers/structures involved.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 31,099 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void xhci_register_types(void)
{
type_register_static(&xhci_info);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 5,742 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChromeContentBrowserClient::RequestFileSystemPermissionOnUIThread(
int render_process_id,
int render_frame_id,
const GURL& url,
bool allowed_by_default,
const base::Callback<void(bool)>& callback) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
extensions::WebViewPermissionHelper* web_view_permission_helper =
extensions::WebViewPermissionHelper::FromFrameID(
render_process_id, render_frame_id);
web_view_permission_helper->RequestFileSystemPermission(url,
allowed_by_default,
callback);
}
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <waffles@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 142,745 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static unsigned char *AcquireCompactPixels(Image *image)
{
size_t
packet_size;
unsigned char
*compact_pixels;
packet_size=image->depth > 8UL ? 2UL : 1UL;
compact_pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((9*
image->columns)+1,packet_size*sizeof(*compact_pixels));
if (compact_pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,GetMagickModule(),
ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed","`%s'",
image->filename);
}
return(compact_pixels);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/714
CWE ID: CWE-834 | 0 | 61,495 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: HTMLFormControlElement::~HTMLFormControlElement()
{
setForm(0);
}
Commit Message: Add HTMLFormControlElement::supportsAutofocus to fix a FIXME comment.
This virtual function should return true if the form control can hanlde
'autofocucs' attribute if it is specified.
Note: HTMLInputElement::supportsAutofocus reuses InputType::isInteractiveContent
because interactiveness is required for autofocus capability.
BUG=none
TEST=none; no behavior changes.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/143343003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165432 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 113,953 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int select_app_df(void)
{
sc_path_t path;
sc_file_t *file;
char str[80];
int r;
strcpy(str, "3F00");
if (opt_appdf != NULL)
strlcat(str, opt_appdf, sizeof str);
sc_format_path(str, &path);
r = sc_select_file(card, &path, &file);
if (r) {
fprintf(stderr, "Unable to select application DF: %s\n", sc_strerror(r));
return -1;
}
if (file->type != SC_FILE_TYPE_DF) {
fprintf(stderr, "Selected application DF is not a DF.\n");
return -1;
}
sc_file_free(file);
if (opt_pin_num >= 0)
return verify_pin(opt_pin_num);
else
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds writes
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting the problems.
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 78,881 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void update_cache_mode_entry(unsigned entry, enum page_cache_mode cache)
{
/* entry 0 MUST be WB (hardwired to speed up translations) */
BUG_ON(!entry && cache != _PAGE_CACHE_MODE_WB);
__cachemode2pte_tbl[cache] = __cm_idx2pte(entry);
__pte2cachemode_tbl[entry] = cache;
}
Commit Message: mm: Tighten x86 /dev/mem with zeroing reads
Under CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM, reading System RAM through /dev/mem is
disallowed. However, on x86, the first 1MB was always allowed for BIOS
and similar things, regardless of it actually being System RAM. It was
possible for heap to end up getting allocated in low 1MB RAM, and then
read by things like x86info or dd, which would trip hardened usercopy:
usercopy: kernel memory exposure attempt detected from ffff880000090000 (dma-kmalloc-256) (4096 bytes)
This changes the x86 exception for the low 1MB by reading back zeros for
System RAM areas instead of blindly allowing them. More work is needed to
extend this to mmap, but currently mmap doesn't go through usercopy, so
hardened usercopy won't Oops the kernel.
Reported-by: Tommi Rantala <tommi.t.rantala@nokia.com>
Tested-by: Tommi Rantala <tommi.t.rantala@nokia.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 66,870 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void *listening_get_next(struct seq_file *seq, void *cur)
{
struct inet_connection_sock *icsk;
struct hlist_nulls_node *node;
struct sock *sk = cur;
struct inet_listen_hashbucket *ilb;
struct tcp_iter_state *st = seq->private;
struct net *net = seq_file_net(seq);
if (!sk) {
ilb = &tcp_hashinfo.listening_hash[st->bucket];
spin_lock_bh(&ilb->lock);
sk = sk_nulls_head(&ilb->head);
st->offset = 0;
goto get_sk;
}
ilb = &tcp_hashinfo.listening_hash[st->bucket];
++st->num;
++st->offset;
if (st->state == TCP_SEQ_STATE_OPENREQ) {
struct request_sock *req = cur;
icsk = inet_csk(st->syn_wait_sk);
req = req->dl_next;
while (1) {
while (req) {
if (req->rsk_ops->family == st->family) {
cur = req;
goto out;
}
req = req->dl_next;
}
if (++st->sbucket >= icsk->icsk_accept_queue.listen_opt->nr_table_entries)
break;
get_req:
req = icsk->icsk_accept_queue.listen_opt->syn_table[st->sbucket];
}
sk = sk_nulls_next(st->syn_wait_sk);
st->state = TCP_SEQ_STATE_LISTENING;
read_unlock_bh(&icsk->icsk_accept_queue.syn_wait_lock);
} else {
icsk = inet_csk(sk);
read_lock_bh(&icsk->icsk_accept_queue.syn_wait_lock);
if (reqsk_queue_len(&icsk->icsk_accept_queue))
goto start_req;
read_unlock_bh(&icsk->icsk_accept_queue.syn_wait_lock);
sk = sk_nulls_next(sk);
}
get_sk:
sk_nulls_for_each_from(sk, node) {
if (!net_eq(sock_net(sk), net))
continue;
if (sk->sk_family == st->family) {
cur = sk;
goto out;
}
icsk = inet_csk(sk);
read_lock_bh(&icsk->icsk_accept_queue.syn_wait_lock);
if (reqsk_queue_len(&icsk->icsk_accept_queue)) {
start_req:
st->uid = sock_i_uid(sk);
st->syn_wait_sk = sk;
st->state = TCP_SEQ_STATE_OPENREQ;
st->sbucket = 0;
goto get_req;
}
read_unlock_bh(&icsk->icsk_accept_queue.syn_wait_lock);
}
spin_unlock_bh(&ilb->lock);
st->offset = 0;
if (++st->bucket < INET_LHTABLE_SIZE) {
ilb = &tcp_hashinfo.listening_hash[st->bucket];
spin_lock_bh(&ilb->lock);
sk = sk_nulls_head(&ilb->head);
goto get_sk;
}
cur = NULL;
out:
return cur;
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 18,997 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __init xfrm_user_init(void)
{
int rv;
printk(KERN_INFO "Initializing XFRM netlink socket\n");
rv = register_pernet_subsys(&xfrm_user_net_ops);
if (rv < 0)
return rv;
rv = xfrm_register_km(&netlink_mgr);
if (rv < 0)
unregister_pernet_subsys(&xfrm_user_net_ops);
return rv;
}
Commit Message: xfrm_user: return error pointer instead of NULL
When dump_one_state() returns an error, e.g. because of a too small
buffer to dump the whole xfrm state, xfrm_state_netlink() returns NULL
instead of an error pointer. But its callers expect an error pointer
and therefore continue to operate on a NULL skbuff.
This could lead to a privilege escalation (execution of user code in
kernel context) if the attacker has CAP_NET_ADMIN and is able to map
address 0.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 33,182 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: long long BlockGroup::GetDurationTimeCode() const { return m_duration; }
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 160,757 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LauncherView::ContinueDrag(const views::MouseEvent& event) {
gfx::Point drag_point(event.location());
views::View::ConvertPointToView(drag_view_, this, &drag_point);
int current_index = view_model_->GetIndexOfView(drag_view_);
DCHECK_NE(-1, current_index);
if (current_index == -1 ||
!delegate_->IsDraggable(model_->items()[current_index])) {
CancelDrag(-1);
return;
}
std::pair<int, int> indices(GetDragRange(current_index));
int last_drag_index = indices.second;
if (last_drag_index > last_visible_index_)
last_drag_index = last_visible_index_;
int x = 0, y = 0;
if (is_horizontal_alignment()) {
x = std::max(view_model_->ideal_bounds(indices.first).x(),
drag_point.x() - drag_offset_);
x = std::min(view_model_->ideal_bounds(last_drag_index).right() -
view_model_->ideal_bounds(current_index).width(),
x);
if (drag_view_->x() == x)
return;
drag_view_->SetX(x);
} else {
y = std::max(view_model_->ideal_bounds(indices.first).y(),
drag_point.y() - drag_offset_);
y = std::min(view_model_->ideal_bounds(last_drag_index).bottom() -
view_model_->ideal_bounds(current_index).height(),
y);
if (drag_view_->y() == y)
return;
drag_view_->SetY(y);
}
int target_index =
views::ViewModelUtils::DetermineMoveIndex(
*view_model_, drag_view_,
is_horizontal_alignment() ?
views::ViewModelUtils::HORIZONTAL :
views::ViewModelUtils::VERTICAL,
x, y);
target_index =
std::min(indices.second, std::max(target_index, indices.first));
if (target_index == current_index)
return;
model_->Move(current_index, target_index);
bounds_animator_->StopAnimatingView(drag_view_);
}
Commit Message: ash: Add launcher overflow bubble.
- Host a LauncherView in bubble to display overflown items;
- Mouse wheel and two-finger scroll to scroll the LauncherView in bubble in case overflow bubble is overflown;
- Fit bubble when items are added/removed;
- Keep launcher bar on screen when the bubble is shown;
BUG=128054
TEST=Verify launcher overflown items are in a bubble instead of menu.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10659003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@146460 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 106,223 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _write_path_table(struct archive_write *a, int type_m, int depth,
struct vdd *vdd)
{
unsigned char *bp, *wb;
struct isoent **ptbl;
size_t wbremaining;
int i, r, wsize;
if (vdd->pathtbl[depth].cnt == 0)
return (0);
wsize = 0;
wb = wb_buffptr(a);
wbremaining = wb_remaining(a);
bp = wb - 1;
ptbl = vdd->pathtbl[depth].sorted;
for (i = 0; i < vdd->pathtbl[depth].cnt; i++) {
struct isoent *np;
size_t len;
np = ptbl[i];
if (np->identifier == NULL)
len = 1; /* root directory */
else
len = np->id_len;
if (wbremaining - ((bp+1) - wb) < (len + 1 + 8)) {
r = wb_consume(a, (bp+1) - wb);
if (r < 0)
return (r);
wb = wb_buffptr(a);
wbremaining = wb_remaining(a);
bp = wb -1;
}
/* Length of Directory Identifier */
set_num_711(bp+1, (unsigned char)len);
/* Extended Attribute Record Length */
set_num_711(bp+2, 0);
/* Location of Extent */
if (type_m)
set_num_732(bp+3, np->dir_location);
else
set_num_731(bp+3, np->dir_location);
/* Parent Directory Number */
if (type_m)
set_num_722(bp+7, np->parent->dir_number);
else
set_num_721(bp+7, np->parent->dir_number);
/* Directory Identifier */
if (np->identifier == NULL)
bp[9] = 0;
else
memcpy(&bp[9], np->identifier, len);
if (len & 0x01) {
/* Padding Field */
bp[9+len] = 0;
len++;
}
wsize += 8 + (int)len;
bp += 8 + len;
}
if ((bp + 1) > wb) {
r = wb_consume(a, (bp+1)-wb);
if (r < 0)
return (r);
}
return (wsize);
}
Commit Message: Issue 711: Be more careful about verifying filename lengths when writing ISO9660 archives
* Don't cast size_t to int, since this can lead to overflow
on machines where sizeof(int) < sizeof(size_t)
* Check a + b > limit by writing it as
a > limit || b > limit || a + b > limit
to avoid problems when a + b wraps around.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 50,783 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void update_canvas_size(AVCodecContext *avctx, int w, int h)
{
WebPContext *s = avctx->priv_data;
if (s->width && s->width != w) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Width mismatch. %d != %d\n",
s->width, w);
}
s->width = w;
if (s->height && s->height != h) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Height mismatch. %d != %d\n",
s->height, h);
}
s->height = h;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/webp: Always set pix_fmt
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: 1434/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6314998085189632
Fixes: 1435/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6483783723253760
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Reviewed-by: "Ronald S. Bultje" <rsbultje@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 64,058 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WorkerProcessLauncherTest::StartWorker() {
launcher_.reset(new WorkerProcessLauncher(
task_runner_, launcher_delegate_.Pass(), &ipc_delegate_));
}
Commit Message: Validate and report peer's PID to WorkerProcessIpcDelegate so it will be able to duplicate handles to and from the worker process.
As a side effect WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate is now responsible for retrieving the client's PID and deciding whether a launch failed due to a permanent error condition.
BUG=134694
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11143025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@162778 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 118,826 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static qsize_t *f2fs_get_reserved_space(struct inode *inode)
{
return &F2FS_I(inode)->i_reserved_quota;
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix potential panic during fstrim
As Ju Hyung Park reported:
"When 'fstrim' is called for manual trim, a BUG() can be triggered
randomly with this patch.
I'm seeing this issue on both x86 Desktop and arm64 Android phone.
On x86 Desktop, this was caused during Ubuntu boot-up. I have a
cronjob installed which calls 'fstrim -v /' during boot. On arm64
Android, this was caused during GC looping with 1ms gc_min_sleep_time
& gc_max_sleep_time."
Root cause of this issue is that f2fs_wait_discard_bios can only be
used by f2fs_put_super, because during put_super there must be no
other referrers, so it can ignore discard entry's reference count
when removing the entry, otherwise in other caller we will hit bug_on
in __remove_discard_cmd as there may be other issuer added reference
count in discard entry.
Thread A Thread B
- issue_discard_thread
- f2fs_ioc_fitrim
- f2fs_trim_fs
- f2fs_wait_discard_bios
- __issue_discard_cmd
- __submit_discard_cmd
- __wait_discard_cmd
- dc->ref++
- __wait_one_discard_bio
- __wait_discard_cmd
- __remove_discard_cmd
- f2fs_bug_on(sbi, dc->ref)
Fixes: 969d1b180d987c2be02de890d0fff0f66a0e80de
Reported-by: Ju Hyung Park <qkrwngud825@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 86,045 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: __releases(ping_table.lock)
{
read_unlock_bh(&ping_table.lock);
}
Commit Message: ping: implement proper locking
We got a report of yet another bug in ping
http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2017/03/24/6
->disconnect() is not called with socket lock held.
Fix this by acquiring ping rwlock earlier.
Thanks to Daniel, Alexander and Andrey for letting us know this problem.
Fixes: c319b4d76b9e ("net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Daniel Jiang <danieljiang0415@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 69,392 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static yy_state_type yy_try_NUL_trans (yy_state_type yy_current_state , yyscan_t yyscanner)
{
int yy_is_jam;
struct yyguts_t * yyg = (struct yyguts_t*)yyscanner; /* This var may be unused depending upon options. */
char *yy_cp = yyg->yy_c_buf_p;
YY_CHAR yy_c = 1;
if ( yy_accept[yy_current_state] )
{
yyg->yy_last_accepting_state = yy_current_state;
yyg->yy_last_accepting_cpos = yy_cp;
}
while ( yy_chk[yy_base[yy_current_state] + yy_c] != yy_current_state )
{
yy_current_state = (int) yy_def[yy_current_state];
if ( yy_current_state >= 45 )
yy_c = yy_meta[(unsigned int) yy_c];
}
yy_current_state = yy_nxt[yy_base[yy_current_state] + (unsigned int) yy_c];
yy_is_jam = (yy_current_state == 44);
(void)yyg;
return yy_is_jam ? 0 : yy_current_state;
}
Commit Message: re_lexer: Make reading escape sequences more robust (#586)
* Add test for issue #503
* re_lexer: Make reading escape sequences more robust
This commit fixes parsing incomplete escape sequences at the end of a
regular expression and parsing things like \xxy (invalid hex digits)
which before were silently turned into (char)255.
Close #503
* Update re_lexer.c
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 70,513 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int hls_read_packet(AVFormatContext *s, AVPacket *pkt)
{
HLSContext *c = s->priv_data;
int ret, i, minplaylist = -1;
recheck_discard_flags(s, c->first_packet);
c->first_packet = 0;
for (i = 0; i < c->n_playlists; i++) {
struct playlist *pls = c->playlists[i];
/* Make sure we've got one buffered packet from each open playlist
* stream */
if (pls->needed && !pls->pkt.data) {
while (1) {
int64_t ts_diff;
AVRational tb;
ret = av_read_frame(pls->ctx, &pls->pkt);
if (ret < 0) {
if (!avio_feof(&pls->pb) && ret != AVERROR_EOF)
return ret;
reset_packet(&pls->pkt);
break;
} else {
/* stream_index check prevents matching picture attachments etc. */
if (pls->is_id3_timestamped && pls->pkt.stream_index == 0) {
/* audio elementary streams are id3 timestamped */
fill_timing_for_id3_timestamped_stream(pls);
}
if (c->first_timestamp == AV_NOPTS_VALUE &&
pls->pkt.dts != AV_NOPTS_VALUE)
c->first_timestamp = av_rescale_q(pls->pkt.dts,
get_timebase(pls), AV_TIME_BASE_Q);
}
if (pls->seek_timestamp == AV_NOPTS_VALUE)
break;
if (pls->seek_stream_index < 0 ||
pls->seek_stream_index == pls->pkt.stream_index) {
if (pls->pkt.dts == AV_NOPTS_VALUE) {
pls->seek_timestamp = AV_NOPTS_VALUE;
break;
}
tb = get_timebase(pls);
ts_diff = av_rescale_rnd(pls->pkt.dts, AV_TIME_BASE,
tb.den, AV_ROUND_DOWN) -
pls->seek_timestamp;
if (ts_diff >= 0 && (pls->seek_flags & AVSEEK_FLAG_ANY ||
pls->pkt.flags & AV_PKT_FLAG_KEY)) {
pls->seek_timestamp = AV_NOPTS_VALUE;
break;
}
}
av_packet_unref(&pls->pkt);
reset_packet(&pls->pkt);
}
}
/* Check if this stream has the packet with the lowest dts */
if (pls->pkt.data) {
struct playlist *minpls = minplaylist < 0 ?
NULL : c->playlists[minplaylist];
if (minplaylist < 0) {
minplaylist = i;
} else {
int64_t dts = pls->pkt.dts;
int64_t mindts = minpls->pkt.dts;
if (dts == AV_NOPTS_VALUE ||
(mindts != AV_NOPTS_VALUE && compare_ts_with_wrapdetect(dts, pls, mindts, minpls) < 0))
minplaylist = i;
}
}
}
/* If we got a packet, return it */
if (minplaylist >= 0) {
struct playlist *pls = c->playlists[minplaylist];
AVStream *ist;
AVStream *st;
ret = update_streams_from_subdemuxer(s, pls);
if (ret < 0) {
av_packet_unref(&pls->pkt);
reset_packet(&pls->pkt);
return ret;
}
/* check if noheader flag has been cleared by the subdemuxer */
if (pls->has_noheader_flag && !(pls->ctx->ctx_flags & AVFMTCTX_NOHEADER)) {
pls->has_noheader_flag = 0;
update_noheader_flag(s);
}
if (pls->pkt.stream_index >= pls->n_main_streams) {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_ERROR, "stream index inconsistency: index %d, %d main streams, %d subdemuxer streams\n",
pls->pkt.stream_index, pls->n_main_streams, pls->ctx->nb_streams);
av_packet_unref(&pls->pkt);
reset_packet(&pls->pkt);
return AVERROR_BUG;
}
ist = pls->ctx->streams[pls->pkt.stream_index];
st = pls->main_streams[pls->pkt.stream_index];
*pkt = pls->pkt;
pkt->stream_index = st->index;
reset_packet(&c->playlists[minplaylist]->pkt);
if (pkt->dts != AV_NOPTS_VALUE)
c->cur_timestamp = av_rescale_q(pkt->dts,
ist->time_base,
AV_TIME_BASE_Q);
/* There may be more situations where this would be useful, but this at least
* handles newly probed codecs properly (i.e. request_probe by mpegts). */
if (ist->codecpar->codec_id != st->codecpar->codec_id) {
ret = set_stream_info_from_input_stream(st, pls, ist);
if (ret < 0) {
av_packet_unref(pkt);
return ret;
}
}
return 0;
}
return AVERROR_EOF;
}
Commit Message: avformat/hls: Fix DoS due to infinite loop
Fixes: loop.m3u
The default max iteration count of 1000 is arbitrary and ideas for a better solution are welcome
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Previous version reviewed-by: Steven Liu <lingjiujianke@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 61,800 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool check_underflow(const struct ipt_entry *e)
{
const struct xt_entry_target *t;
unsigned int verdict;
if (!unconditional(e))
return false;
t = ipt_get_target_c(e);
if (strcmp(t->u.user.name, XT_STANDARD_TARGET) != 0)
return false;
verdict = ((struct xt_standard_target *)t)->verdict;
verdict = -verdict - 1;
return verdict == NF_DROP || verdict == NF_ACCEPT;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: check for bogus target offset
We're currently asserting that targetoff + targetsize <= nextoff.
Extend it to also check that targetoff is >= sizeof(xt_entry).
Since this is generic code, add an argument pointing to the start of the
match/target, we can then derive the base structure size from the delta.
We also need the e->elems pointer in a followup change to validate matches.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 52,382 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: vm_fault_t hugetlb_fault(struct mm_struct *mm, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long address, unsigned int flags)
{
pte_t *ptep, entry;
spinlock_t *ptl;
vm_fault_t ret;
u32 hash;
pgoff_t idx;
struct page *page = NULL;
struct page *pagecache_page = NULL;
struct hstate *h = hstate_vma(vma);
struct address_space *mapping;
int need_wait_lock = 0;
unsigned long haddr = address & huge_page_mask(h);
ptep = huge_pte_offset(mm, haddr, huge_page_size(h));
if (ptep) {
entry = huge_ptep_get(ptep);
if (unlikely(is_hugetlb_entry_migration(entry))) {
migration_entry_wait_huge(vma, mm, ptep);
return 0;
} else if (unlikely(is_hugetlb_entry_hwpoisoned(entry)))
return VM_FAULT_HWPOISON_LARGE |
VM_FAULT_SET_HINDEX(hstate_index(h));
} else {
ptep = huge_pte_alloc(mm, haddr, huge_page_size(h));
if (!ptep)
return VM_FAULT_OOM;
}
mapping = vma->vm_file->f_mapping;
idx = vma_hugecache_offset(h, vma, haddr);
/*
* Serialize hugepage allocation and instantiation, so that we don't
* get spurious allocation failures if two CPUs race to instantiate
* the same page in the page cache.
*/
hash = hugetlb_fault_mutex_hash(h, mm, vma, mapping, idx, haddr);
mutex_lock(&hugetlb_fault_mutex_table[hash]);
entry = huge_ptep_get(ptep);
if (huge_pte_none(entry)) {
ret = hugetlb_no_page(mm, vma, mapping, idx, address, ptep, flags);
goto out_mutex;
}
ret = 0;
/*
* entry could be a migration/hwpoison entry at this point, so this
* check prevents the kernel from going below assuming that we have
* a active hugepage in pagecache. This goto expects the 2nd page fault,
* and is_hugetlb_entry_(migration|hwpoisoned) check will properly
* handle it.
*/
if (!pte_present(entry))
goto out_mutex;
/*
* If we are going to COW the mapping later, we examine the pending
* reservations for this page now. This will ensure that any
* allocations necessary to record that reservation occur outside the
* spinlock. For private mappings, we also lookup the pagecache
* page now as it is used to determine if a reservation has been
* consumed.
*/
if ((flags & FAULT_FLAG_WRITE) && !huge_pte_write(entry)) {
if (vma_needs_reservation(h, vma, haddr) < 0) {
ret = VM_FAULT_OOM;
goto out_mutex;
}
/* Just decrements count, does not deallocate */
vma_end_reservation(h, vma, haddr);
if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYSHARE))
pagecache_page = hugetlbfs_pagecache_page(h,
vma, haddr);
}
ptl = huge_pte_lock(h, mm, ptep);
/* Check for a racing update before calling hugetlb_cow */
if (unlikely(!pte_same(entry, huge_ptep_get(ptep))))
goto out_ptl;
/*
* hugetlb_cow() requires page locks of pte_page(entry) and
* pagecache_page, so here we need take the former one
* when page != pagecache_page or !pagecache_page.
*/
page = pte_page(entry);
if (page != pagecache_page)
if (!trylock_page(page)) {
need_wait_lock = 1;
goto out_ptl;
}
get_page(page);
if (flags & FAULT_FLAG_WRITE) {
if (!huge_pte_write(entry)) {
ret = hugetlb_cow(mm, vma, address, ptep,
pagecache_page, ptl);
goto out_put_page;
}
entry = huge_pte_mkdirty(entry);
}
entry = pte_mkyoung(entry);
if (huge_ptep_set_access_flags(vma, haddr, ptep, entry,
flags & FAULT_FLAG_WRITE))
update_mmu_cache(vma, haddr, ptep);
out_put_page:
if (page != pagecache_page)
unlock_page(page);
put_page(page);
out_ptl:
spin_unlock(ptl);
if (pagecache_page) {
unlock_page(pagecache_page);
put_page(pagecache_page);
}
out_mutex:
mutex_unlock(&hugetlb_fault_mutex_table[hash]);
/*
* Generally it's safe to hold refcount during waiting page lock. But
* here we just wait to defer the next page fault to avoid busy loop and
* the page is not used after unlocked before returning from the current
* page fault. So we are safe from accessing freed page, even if we wait
* here without taking refcount.
*/
if (need_wait_lock)
wait_on_page_locked(page);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'page-refs' (page ref overflow)
Merge page ref overflow branch.
Jann Horn reported that he can overflow the page ref count with
sufficient memory (and a filesystem that is intentionally extremely
slow).
Admittedly it's not exactly easy. To have more than four billion
references to a page requires a minimum of 32GB of kernel memory just
for the pointers to the pages, much less any metadata to keep track of
those pointers. Jann needed a total of 140GB of memory and a specially
crafted filesystem that leaves all reads pending (in order to not ever
free the page references and just keep adding more).
Still, we have a fairly straightforward way to limit the two obvious
user-controllable sources of page references: direct-IO like page
references gotten through get_user_pages(), and the splice pipe page
duplication. So let's just do that.
* branch page-refs:
fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
mm: prevent get_user_pages() from overflowing page refcount
mm: add 'try_get_page()' helper function
mm: make page ref count overflow check tighter and more explicit
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 96,998 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PeopleHandler::OnPinLoginAvailable(bool is_available) {
FireWebUIListener("pin-login-available-changed", base::Value(is_available));
}
Commit Message: [signin] Add metrics to track the source for refresh token updated events
This CL add a source for update and revoke credentials operations. It then
surfaces the source in the chrome://signin-internals page.
This CL also records the following histograms that track refresh token events:
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToValidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToInvalidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenRevoked.Source
These histograms are needed to validate the assumptions of how often tokens
are revoked by the browser and the sources for the token revocations.
Bug: 896182
Change-Id: I2fcab80ee8e5699708e695bc3289fa6d34859a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1286464
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Roger <droger@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Sherman <isherman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mihai Sardarescu <msarda@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606181}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 143,212 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ps_parser_load_field( PS_Parser parser,
const T1_Field field,
void** objects,
FT_UInt max_objects,
FT_ULong* pflags )
{
T1_TokenRec token;
FT_Byte* cur;
FT_Byte* limit;
FT_UInt count;
FT_UInt idx;
FT_Error error;
T1_FieldType type;
/* this also skips leading whitespace */
ps_parser_to_token( parser, &token );
if ( !token.type )
goto Fail;
count = 1;
idx = 0;
cur = token.start;
limit = token.limit;
type = field->type;
/* we must detect arrays in /FontBBox */
if ( type == T1_FIELD_TYPE_BBOX )
{
T1_TokenRec token2;
FT_Byte* old_cur = parser->cursor;
FT_Byte* old_limit = parser->limit;
/* don't include delimiters */
parser->cursor = token.start + 1;
parser->limit = token.limit - 1;
ps_parser_to_token( parser, &token2 );
parser->cursor = old_cur;
parser->limit = old_limit;
if ( token2.type == T1_TOKEN_TYPE_ARRAY )
{
type = T1_FIELD_TYPE_MM_BBOX;
goto FieldArray;
}
}
else if ( token.type == T1_TOKEN_TYPE_ARRAY )
{
count = max_objects;
FieldArray:
/* if this is an array and we have no blend, an error occurs */
if ( max_objects == 0 )
goto Fail;
idx = 1;
/* don't include delimiters */
cur++;
limit--;
}
for ( ; count > 0; count--, idx++ )
{
FT_Byte* q = (FT_Byte*)objects[idx] + field->offset;
FT_Long val;
FT_String* string;
skip_spaces( &cur, limit );
switch ( type )
{
case T1_FIELD_TYPE_BOOL:
val = ps_tobool( &cur, limit );
goto Store_Integer;
case T1_FIELD_TYPE_FIXED:
val = PS_Conv_ToFixed( &cur, limit, 0 );
goto Store_Integer;
case T1_FIELD_TYPE_FIXED_1000:
val = PS_Conv_ToFixed( &cur, limit, 3 );
goto Store_Integer;
case T1_FIELD_TYPE_INTEGER:
val = PS_Conv_ToInt( &cur, limit );
/* fall through */
Store_Integer:
switch ( field->size )
{
case (8 / FT_CHAR_BIT):
*(FT_Byte*)q = (FT_Byte)val;
break;
case (16 / FT_CHAR_BIT):
*(FT_UShort*)q = (FT_UShort)val;
break;
case (32 / FT_CHAR_BIT):
*(FT_UInt32*)q = (FT_UInt32)val;
break;
default: /* for 64-bit systems */
*(FT_Long*)q = val;
}
break;
case T1_FIELD_TYPE_STRING:
case T1_FIELD_TYPE_KEY:
{
FT_Memory memory = parser->memory;
FT_UInt len = (FT_UInt)( limit - cur );
if ( cur >= limit )
break;
/* we allow both a string or a name */
/* for cases like /FontName (foo) def */
if ( token.type == T1_TOKEN_TYPE_KEY )
{
/* don't include leading `/' */
len--;
cur++;
}
else if ( token.type == T1_TOKEN_TYPE_STRING )
{
/* don't include delimiting parentheses */
/* XXX we don't handle <<...>> here */
/* XXX should we convert octal escapes? */
/* if so, what encoding should we use? */
cur++;
len -= 2;
}
else
{
FT_ERROR(( "ps_parser_load_field:"
" expected a name or string\n"
" "
" but found token of type %d instead\n",
token.type ));
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
goto Exit;
}
/* for this to work (FT_String**)q must have been */
/* initialized to NULL */
if ( *(FT_String**)q != NULL )
{
FT_TRACE0(( "ps_parser_load_field: overwriting field %s\n",
field->ident ));
FT_FREE( *(FT_String**)q );
*(FT_String**)q = NULL;
}
if ( FT_ALLOC( string, len + 1 ) )
goto Exit;
FT_MEM_COPY( string, cur, len );
string[len] = 0;
*(FT_String**)q = string;
}
break;
case T1_FIELD_TYPE_BBOX:
{
FT_Fixed temp[4];
FT_BBox* bbox = (FT_BBox*)q;
FT_Int result;
result = ps_tofixedarray( &cur, limit, 4, temp, 0 );
if ( result < 4 )
{
FT_ERROR(( "ps_parser_load_field:"
" expected four integers in bounding box\n" ));
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
goto Exit;
}
bbox->xMin = FT_RoundFix( temp[0] );
bbox->yMin = FT_RoundFix( temp[1] );
bbox->xMax = FT_RoundFix( temp[2] );
bbox->yMax = FT_RoundFix( temp[3] );
}
break;
case T1_FIELD_TYPE_MM_BBOX:
{
FT_Memory memory = parser->memory;
FT_Fixed* temp;
FT_Int result;
FT_UInt i;
if ( FT_NEW_ARRAY( temp, max_objects * 4 ) )
goto Exit;
for ( i = 0; i < 4; i++ )
{
result = ps_tofixedarray( &cur, limit, (FT_Int)max_objects,
temp + i * max_objects, 0 );
if ( result < 0 || (FT_UInt)result < max_objects )
{
FT_ERROR(( "ps_parser_load_field:"
" expected %d integers in the %s subarray\n"
" "
" of /FontBBox in the /Blend dictionary\n",
max_objects,
i == 0 ? "first"
: ( i == 1 ? "second"
: ( i == 2 ? "third"
: "fourth" ) ) ));
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
goto Exit;
}
skip_spaces( &cur, limit );
}
for ( i = 0; i < max_objects; i++ )
{
FT_BBox* bbox = (FT_BBox*)objects[i];
bbox->xMin = FT_RoundFix( temp[i ] );
bbox->yMin = FT_RoundFix( temp[i + max_objects] );
bbox->xMax = FT_RoundFix( temp[i + 2 * max_objects] );
bbox->yMax = FT_RoundFix( temp[i + 3 * max_objects] );
}
FT_FREE( temp );
}
break;
default:
/* an error occurred */
goto Fail;
}
}
#if 0 /* obsolete -- keep for reference */
if ( pflags )
*pflags |= 1L << field->flag_bit;
#else
FT_UNUSED( pflags );
#endif
error = FT_Err_Ok;
Exit:
return error;
Fail:
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
goto Exit;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 17,279 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: png_read_image(png_structp png_ptr, png_bytepp image)
{
png_uint_32 i, image_height;
int pass, j;
png_bytepp rp;
png_debug(1, "in png_read_image");
if (png_ptr == NULL)
return;
#ifdef PNG_READ_INTERLACING_SUPPORTED
pass = png_set_interlace_handling(png_ptr);
#else
if (png_ptr->interlaced)
png_error(png_ptr,
"Cannot read interlaced image -- interlace handler disabled.");
pass = 1;
#endif
image_height=png_ptr->height;
png_ptr->num_rows = image_height; /* Make sure this is set correctly */
for (j = 0; j < pass; j++)
{
rp = image;
for (i = 0; i < image_height; i++)
{
png_read_row(png_ptr, *rp, png_bytep_NULL);
rp++;
}
}
}
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
TBR=darin@chromium.org
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 131,343 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static MagickBooleanType WriteImageChannels(const PSDInfo *psd_info,
const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image,Image *next_image,
const MagickBooleanType separate,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
size_t
channels,
packet_size;
unsigned char
*compact_pixels;
/*
Write uncompressed pixels as separate planes.
*/
channels=1;
packet_size=next_image->depth > 8UL ? 2UL : 1UL;
compact_pixels=(unsigned char *) NULL;
if (next_image->compression == RLECompression)
{
compact_pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(2*channels*
next_image->columns,packet_size*sizeof(*compact_pixels));
if (compact_pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
if (IsImageGray(next_image) != MagickFalse)
{
if (next_image->compression == RLECompression)
{
/*
Packbits compression.
*/
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,1);
WritePackbitsLength(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,
compact_pixels,GrayQuantum,exception);
if (next_image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
WritePackbitsLength(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,
compact_pixels,AlphaQuantum,exception);
}
WriteOneChannel(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,compact_pixels,
GrayQuantum,MagickTrue,exception);
if (next_image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
WriteOneChannel(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,compact_pixels,
AlphaQuantum,separate,exception);
(void) SetImageProgress(image,SaveImagesTag,0,1);
}
else
if (next_image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
if (next_image->compression == RLECompression)
{
/*
Packbits compression.
*/
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,1);
WritePackbitsLength(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,
compact_pixels,IndexQuantum,exception);
if (next_image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
WritePackbitsLength(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,
compact_pixels,AlphaQuantum,exception);
}
WriteOneChannel(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,compact_pixels,
IndexQuantum,MagickTrue,exception);
if (next_image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
WriteOneChannel(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,compact_pixels,
AlphaQuantum,separate,exception);
(void) SetImageProgress(image,SaveImagesTag,0,1);
}
else
{
if (next_image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
(void) NegateCMYK(next_image,exception);
if (next_image->compression == RLECompression)
{
/*
Packbits compression.
*/
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,1);
WritePackbitsLength(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,
compact_pixels,RedQuantum,exception);
WritePackbitsLength(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,
compact_pixels,GreenQuantum,exception);
WritePackbitsLength(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,
compact_pixels,BlueQuantum,exception);
if (next_image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
WritePackbitsLength(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,
compact_pixels,BlackQuantum,exception);
if (next_image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
WritePackbitsLength(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,
compact_pixels,AlphaQuantum,exception);
}
(void) SetImageProgress(image,SaveImagesTag,0,6);
WriteOneChannel(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,compact_pixels,
RedQuantum,MagickTrue,exception);
(void) SetImageProgress(image,SaveImagesTag,1,6);
WriteOneChannel(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,compact_pixels,
GreenQuantum,separate,exception);
(void) SetImageProgress(image,SaveImagesTag,2,6);
WriteOneChannel(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,compact_pixels,
BlueQuantum,separate,exception);
(void) SetImageProgress(image,SaveImagesTag,3,6);
if (next_image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
WriteOneChannel(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,compact_pixels,
BlackQuantum,separate,exception);
(void) SetImageProgress(image,SaveImagesTag,4,6);
if (next_image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
WriteOneChannel(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,compact_pixels,
AlphaQuantum,separate,exception);
(void) SetImageProgress(image,SaveImagesTag,5,6);
if (next_image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
(void) NegateCMYK(next_image,exception);
}
if (next_image->compression == RLECompression)
compact_pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(compact_pixels);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Commit Message: Fixed overflow.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 1 | 170,118 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __init max_loop_setup(char *str)
{
max_loop = simple_strtol(str, NULL, 0);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: loop: fix concurrent lo_open/lo_release
范龙飞 reports that KASAN can report a use-after-free in __lock_acquire.
The reason is due to insufficient serialization in lo_release(), which
will continue to use the loop device even after it has decremented the
lo_refcnt to zero.
In the meantime, another process can come in, open the loop device
again as it is being shut down. Confusion ensues.
Reported-by: 范龙飞 <long7573@126.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 84,756 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct net_device_stats *ipip6_get_stats(struct net_device *dev)
{
struct pcpu_tstats sum = { 0 };
int i;
for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
const struct pcpu_tstats *tstats = per_cpu_ptr(dev->tstats, i);
sum.rx_packets += tstats->rx_packets;
sum.rx_bytes += tstats->rx_bytes;
sum.tx_packets += tstats->tx_packets;
sum.tx_bytes += tstats->tx_bytes;
}
dev->stats.rx_packets = sum.rx_packets;
dev->stats.rx_bytes = sum.rx_bytes;
dev->stats.tx_packets = sum.tx_packets;
dev->stats.tx_bytes = sum.tx_bytes;
return &dev->stats;
}
Commit Message: net: don't allow CAP_NET_ADMIN to load non-netdev kernel modules
Since a8f80e8ff94ecba629542d9b4b5f5a8ee3eb565c any process with
CAP_NET_ADMIN may load any module from /lib/modules/. This doesn't mean
that CAP_NET_ADMIN is a superset of CAP_SYS_MODULE as modules are
limited to /lib/modules/**. However, CAP_NET_ADMIN capability shouldn't
allow anybody load any module not related to networking.
This patch restricts an ability of autoloading modules to netdev modules
with explicit aliases. This fixes CVE-2011-1019.
Arnd Bergmann suggested to leave untouched the old pre-v2.6.32 behavior
of loading netdev modules by name (without any prefix) for processes
with CAP_SYS_MODULE to maintain the compatibility with network scripts
that use autoloading netdev modules by aliases like "eth0", "wlan0".
Currently there are only three users of the feature in the upstream
kernel: ipip, ip_gre and sit.
root@albatros:~# capsh --drop=$(seq -s, 0 11),$(seq -s, 13 34) --
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: fffffff800001000
CapEff: fffffff800001000
CapBnd: fffffff800001000
root@albatros:~# modprobe xfs
FATAL: Error inserting xfs
(/lib/modules/2.6.38-rc6-00001-g2bf4ca3/kernel/fs/xfs/xfs.ko): Operation not permitted
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit
sit: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit0
sit0 Link encap:IPv6-in-IPv4
NOARP MTU:1480 Metric:1
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
sit 10457 0
tunnel4 2957 1 sit
For CAP_SYS_MODULE module loading is still relaxed:
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: ffffffffffffffff
CapEff: ffffffffffffffff
CapBnd: ffffffffffffffff
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
xfs 745319 0
Reference: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/24/203
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 35,360 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::AdjustSurfaceProtection() {
bool surface_is_protected =
current_surface_ ||
!host_->is_hidden() ||
(current_surface_is_protected_ &&
(pending_thumbnail_tasks_ > 0 ||
current_surface_in_use_by_compositor_));
if (current_surface_is_protected_ == surface_is_protected)
return;
current_surface_is_protected_ = surface_is_protected;
++protection_state_id_;
if (!surface_route_id_ || !shared_surface_handle_.parent_gpu_process_id)
return;
RenderWidgetHostImpl::SendFrontSurfaceIsProtected(
surface_is_protected,
protection_state_id_,
surface_route_id_,
shared_surface_handle_.parent_gpu_process_id);
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 1 | 171,376 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t store_max_read_buffer_kb(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr,
const char *buf, size_t count)
{
struct comedi_device_file_info *info = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
unsigned long new_max_size_kb;
uint64_t new_max_size;
struct comedi_subdevice *const read_subdevice =
comedi_get_read_subdevice(info);
if (strict_strtoul(buf, 10, &new_max_size_kb))
return -EINVAL;
if (new_max_size_kb != (uint32_t) new_max_size_kb)
return -EINVAL;
new_max_size = ((uint64_t) new_max_size_kb) * bytes_per_kibi;
if (new_max_size != (uint32_t) new_max_size)
return -EINVAL;
mutex_lock(&info->device->mutex);
if (read_subdevice == NULL ||
(read_subdevice->subdev_flags & SDF_CMD_READ) == 0 ||
read_subdevice->async == NULL) {
mutex_unlock(&info->device->mutex);
return -EINVAL;
}
read_subdevice->async->max_bufsize = new_max_size;
mutex_unlock(&info->device->mutex);
return count;
}
Commit Message: staging: comedi: fix infoleak to userspace
driver_name and board_name are pointers to strings, not buffers of size
COMEDI_NAMELEN. Copying COMEDI_NAMELEN bytes of a string containing
less than COMEDI_NAMELEN-1 bytes would leak some unrelated bytes.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 41,313 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::OnExtendSelectionAndDelete(int before, int after) {
if (!GetRenderWidget()->ShouldHandleImeEvent())
return;
ImeEventGuard guard(GetRenderWidget());
frame_->extendSelectionAndDelete(before, after);
}
Commit Message: Add logging to figure out which IPC we're failing to deserialize in RenderFrame.
BUG=369553
R=creis@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/263833020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@268565 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 110,181 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DataReductionProxyConfig::UpdateConfigForTesting(
bool enabled,
bool secure_proxies_allowed,
bool insecure_proxies_allowed) {
enabled_by_user_ = enabled;
network_properties_manager_->ResetWarmupURLFetchMetrics();
network_properties_manager_->SetIsSecureProxyDisallowedByCarrier(
!secure_proxies_allowed);
if (!insecure_proxies_allowed !=
network_properties_manager_->HasWarmupURLProbeFailed(
false /* secure_proxy */, true /* is_core_proxy */)) {
network_properties_manager_->SetHasWarmupURLProbeFailed(
false /* secure_proxy */, true /* is_core_proxy */,
!insecure_proxies_allowed);
}
}
Commit Message: Disable all DRP URL fetches when holdback is enabled
Disable secure proxy checker, warmup url fetcher
and client config fetch when the client is in DRP
(Data Reduction Proxy) holdback.
This CL does not disable pingbacks when client is in the
holdback, but the pingback code is going away soon.
Change-Id: Icbb59d814d1452123869c609e0770d1439c1db51
Bug: 984964
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1709965
Commit-Queue: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#679649}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 137,894 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: long jpc_bitstream_getbits(jpc_bitstream_t *bitstream, int n)
{
long v;
int u;
/* We can reliably get at most 31 bits since ISO/IEC 9899 only
guarantees that a long can represent values up to 2^31-1. */
assert(n >= 0 && n < 32);
/* Get the number of bits requested from the specified bit stream. */
v = 0;
while (--n >= 0) {
if ((u = jpc_bitstream_getbit(bitstream)) < 0) {
return -1;
}
v = (v << 1) | u;
}
return v;
}
Commit Message: Changed the JPC bitstream code to more gracefully handle a request
for a larger sized integer than what can be handled (i.e., return
with an error instead of failing an assert).
CWE ID: | 1 | 168,732 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FindMainResponseExclusionsInWorkingSet() {
FindMainResponseExclusions(false);
}
Commit Message: Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 151,345 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_asconf_update_ip(struct sctp_association *asoc,
union sctp_addr *laddr,
struct sockaddr *addrs,
int addrcnt,
__be16 flags)
{
sctp_addip_param_t param;
struct sctp_chunk *retval;
union sctp_addr_param addr_param;
union sctp_addr *addr;
void *addr_buf;
struct sctp_af *af;
int paramlen = sizeof(param);
int addr_param_len = 0;
int totallen = 0;
int i;
int del_pickup = 0;
/* Get total length of all the address parameters. */
addr_buf = addrs;
for (i = 0; i < addrcnt; i++) {
addr = addr_buf;
af = sctp_get_af_specific(addr->v4.sin_family);
addr_param_len = af->to_addr_param(addr, &addr_param);
totallen += paramlen;
totallen += addr_param_len;
addr_buf += af->sockaddr_len;
if (asoc->asconf_addr_del_pending && !del_pickup) {
/* reuse the parameter length from the same scope one */
totallen += paramlen;
totallen += addr_param_len;
del_pickup = 1;
pr_debug("%s: picked same-scope del_pending addr, "
"totallen for all addresses is %d\n",
__func__, totallen);
}
}
/* Create an asconf chunk with the required length. */
retval = sctp_make_asconf(asoc, laddr, totallen);
if (!retval)
return NULL;
/* Add the address parameters to the asconf chunk. */
addr_buf = addrs;
for (i = 0; i < addrcnt; i++) {
addr = addr_buf;
af = sctp_get_af_specific(addr->v4.sin_family);
addr_param_len = af->to_addr_param(addr, &addr_param);
param.param_hdr.type = flags;
param.param_hdr.length = htons(paramlen + addr_param_len);
param.crr_id = i;
sctp_addto_chunk(retval, paramlen, ¶m);
sctp_addto_chunk(retval, addr_param_len, &addr_param);
addr_buf += af->sockaddr_len;
}
if (flags == SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP && del_pickup) {
addr = asoc->asconf_addr_del_pending;
af = sctp_get_af_specific(addr->v4.sin_family);
addr_param_len = af->to_addr_param(addr, &addr_param);
param.param_hdr.type = SCTP_PARAM_DEL_IP;
param.param_hdr.length = htons(paramlen + addr_param_len);
param.crr_id = i;
sctp_addto_chunk(retval, paramlen, ¶m);
sctp_addto_chunk(retval, addr_param_len, &addr_param);
}
return retval;
}
Commit Message: net: sctp: fix NULL pointer dereference in af->from_addr_param on malformed packet
An SCTP server doing ASCONF will panic on malformed INIT ping-of-death
in the form of:
------------ INIT[PARAM: SET_PRIMARY_IP] ------------>
While the INIT chunk parameter verification dissects through many things
in order to detect malformed input, it misses to actually check parameters
inside of parameters. E.g. RFC5061, section 4.2.4 proposes a 'set primary
IP address' parameter in ASCONF, which has as a subparameter an address
parameter.
So an attacker may send a parameter type other than SCTP_PARAM_IPV4_ADDRESS
or SCTP_PARAM_IPV6_ADDRESS, param_type2af() will subsequently return 0
and thus sctp_get_af_specific() returns NULL, too, which we then happily
dereference unconditionally through af->from_addr_param().
The trace for the log:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000078
IP: [<ffffffffa01e9c62>] sctp_process_init+0x492/0x990 [sctp]
PGD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[...]
Pid: 0, comm: swapper Not tainted 2.6.32-504.el6.x86_64 #1 Bochs Bochs
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa01e9c62>] [<ffffffffa01e9c62>] sctp_process_init+0x492/0x990 [sctp]
[...]
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
[<ffffffffa01f2add>] ? sctp_bind_addr_copy+0x5d/0xe0 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e1fcb>] sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init+0x21b/0x340 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e3751>] sctp_do_sm+0x71/0x1210 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e5c09>] ? sctp_endpoint_lookup_assoc+0xc9/0xf0 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e61f6>] sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv+0x116/0x230 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01ee986>] sctp_inq_push+0x56/0x80 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01fcc42>] sctp_rcv+0x982/0xa10 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01d5123>] ? ipt_local_in_hook+0x23/0x28 [iptable_filter]
[<ffffffff8148bdc9>] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0
[<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[<ffffffff8148bf86>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120
[<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[...]
A minimal way to address this is to check for NULL as we do on all
other such occasions where we know sctp_get_af_specific() could
possibly return with NULL.
Fixes: d6de3097592b ("[SCTP]: Add the handling of "Set Primary IP Address" parameter to INIT")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 35,857 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ap_bus_match(struct device *dev, struct device_driver *drv)
{
struct ap_device *ap_dev = to_ap_dev(dev);
struct ap_driver *ap_drv = to_ap_drv(drv);
struct ap_device_id *id;
/*
* Compare device type of the device with the list of
* supported types of the device_driver.
*/
for (id = ap_drv->ids; id->match_flags; id++) {
if ((id->match_flags & AP_DEVICE_ID_MATCH_DEVICE_TYPE) &&
(id->dev_type != ap_dev->device_type))
continue;
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 47,578 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RenderWidgetHostViewGuest::RenderWidgetHostViewGuest(
RenderWidgetHost* widget_host,
BrowserPluginGuest* guest)
: host_(RenderWidgetHostImpl::From(widget_host)),
is_hidden_(false),
guest_(guest) {
host_->SetView(this);
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 115,044 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void JBIG2Stream::readGenericRefinementRegionSeg(Guint segNum, GBool imm,
GBool lossless, Guint length,
Guint *refSegs,
Guint nRefSegs) {
JBIG2Bitmap *bitmap, *refBitmap;
Guint w, h, x, y, segInfoFlags, extCombOp;
Guint flags, templ, tpgrOn;
int atx[2], aty[2];
JBIG2Segment *seg;
if (!readULong(&w) || !readULong(&h) ||
!readULong(&x) || !readULong(&y) ||
!readUByte(&segInfoFlags)) {
goto eofError;
}
extCombOp = segInfoFlags & 7;
if (!readUByte(&flags)) {
goto eofError;
}
templ = flags & 1;
tpgrOn = (flags >> 1) & 1;
if (!templ) {
if (!readByte(&atx[0]) || !readByte(&aty[0]) ||
!readByte(&atx[1]) || !readByte(&aty[1])) {
goto eofError;
}
}
if (nRefSegs == 0 || imm) {
if (pageH == 0xffffffff && y + h > curPageH) {
pageBitmap->expand(y + h, pageDefPixel);
}
}
if (nRefSegs > 1) {
error(getPos(), "Bad reference in JBIG2 generic refinement segment");
return;
}
if (nRefSegs == 1) {
seg = findSegment(refSegs[0]);
if (seg == NULL || seg->getType() != jbig2SegBitmap) {
error(getPos(), "Bad bitmap reference in JBIG2 generic refinement segment");
return;
}
refBitmap = (JBIG2Bitmap *)seg;
} else {
refBitmap = pageBitmap->getSlice(x, y, w, h);
}
resetRefinementStats(templ, NULL);
arithDecoder->start();
bitmap = readGenericRefinementRegion(w, h, templ, tpgrOn,
refBitmap, 0, 0, atx, aty);
if (imm) {
pageBitmap->combine(bitmap, x, y, extCombOp);
delete bitmap;
} else {
bitmap->setSegNum(segNum);
segments->append(bitmap);
}
if (nRefSegs == 1) {
discardSegment(refSegs[0]);
} else {
delete refBitmap;
}
return;
eofError:
error(getPos(), "Unexpected EOF in JBIG2 stream");
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 1,207 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2Implementation::EndQueryEXT(GLenum target) {
QueryTracker::Query* query = nullptr;
{
GPU_CLIENT_SINGLE_THREAD_CHECK();
GPU_CLIENT_LOG("[" << GetLogPrefix() << "] EndQueryEXT("
<< GLES2Util::GetStringQueryTarget(target) << ")");
query = query_tracker_->GetCurrentQuery(target);
if (!query_tracker_->EndQuery(target, this)) {
return;
}
CheckGLError();
} // GPU_CLIENT_SINGLE_THREAD_CHECK ends here
if (target == GL_READBACK_SHADOW_COPIES_UPDATED_CHROMIUM) {
DCHECK(capabilities_.chromium_nonblocking_readback);
DCHECK(query);
auto serial = readback_buffer_shadow_tracker_->buffer_shadow_serial();
readback_buffer_shadow_tracker_->IncrementSerial();
auto buffers = readback_buffer_shadow_tracker_->TakeUnfencedBufferList();
query->SetCompletedCallback(
base::BindOnce(&GLES2Implementation::BufferShadowWrittenCallback,
std::move(buffers), serial));
}
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 140,948 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mov_read_cmov(MOVContext *c, AVIOContext *pb, MOVAtom atom)
{
#if CONFIG_ZLIB
AVIOContext ctx;
uint8_t *cmov_data;
uint8_t *moov_data; /* uncompressed data */
long cmov_len, moov_len;
int ret = -1;
avio_rb32(pb); /* dcom atom */
if (avio_rl32(pb) != MKTAG('d','c','o','m'))
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
if (avio_rl32(pb) != MKTAG('z','l','i','b')) {
av_log(c->fc, AV_LOG_ERROR, "unknown compression for cmov atom !");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
avio_rb32(pb); /* cmvd atom */
if (avio_rl32(pb) != MKTAG('c','m','v','d'))
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
moov_len = avio_rb32(pb); /* uncompressed size */
cmov_len = atom.size - 6 * 4;
cmov_data = av_malloc(cmov_len);
if (!cmov_data)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
moov_data = av_malloc(moov_len);
if (!moov_data) {
av_free(cmov_data);
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
avio_read(pb, cmov_data, cmov_len);
if (uncompress (moov_data, (uLongf *) &moov_len, (const Bytef *)cmov_data, cmov_len) != Z_OK)
goto free_and_return;
if (ffio_init_context(&ctx, moov_data, moov_len, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL) != 0)
goto free_and_return;
atom.type = MKTAG('m','o','o','v');
atom.size = moov_len;
ret = mov_read_default(c, &ctx, atom);
free_and_return:
av_free(moov_data);
av_free(cmov_data);
return ret;
#else
av_log(c->fc, AV_LOG_ERROR, "this file requires zlib support compiled in\n");
return AVERROR(ENOSYS);
#endif
}
Commit Message: mov: reset dref_count on realloc to keep values consistent.
This fixes a potential crash.
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 54,512 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: obtain_nonce(unsigned char* nonce)
{
NTSTATUS status;
status = BCryptGenRandom(NULL, nonce, 8,
BCRYPT_USE_SYSTEM_PREFERRED_RNG);
if (!NT_SUCCESS(status))
return (-1);
return (0);
}
Commit Message: fix filling out of initresp
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 91,183 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LayerTreeHostImpl::SetTreeLayerTransformMutated(
ElementId element_id,
LayerTreeImpl* tree,
const gfx::Transform& transform) {
if (!tree)
return;
PropertyTrees* property_trees = tree->property_trees();
DCHECK_EQ(
1u, property_trees->element_id_to_transform_node_index.count(element_id));
const int transform_node_index =
property_trees->element_id_to_transform_node_index[element_id];
property_trees->transform_tree.OnTransformAnimated(
transform, transform_node_index, tree);
if (LayerImpl* layer = tree->LayerByElementId(element_id))
layer->set_was_ever_ready_since_last_transform_animation(false);
}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
TBR=danakj@chromium.org, creis@chromium.org
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 137,380 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(openssl_verify)
{
zval **key;
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
int err;
EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
const EVP_MD *mdtype;
long keyresource = -1;
char * data; int data_len;
char * signature; int signature_len;
zval *method = NULL;
long signature_algo = OPENSSL_ALGO_SHA1;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "ssZ|z", &data, &data_len, &signature, &signature_len, &key, &method) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (method == NULL || Z_TYPE_P(method) == IS_LONG) {
if (method != NULL) {
signature_algo = Z_LVAL_P(method);
}
mdtype = php_openssl_get_evp_md_from_algo(signature_algo);
} else if (Z_TYPE_P(method) == IS_STRING) {
mdtype = EVP_get_digestbyname(Z_STRVAL_P(method));
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unknown signature algorithm.");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (!mdtype) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unknown signature algorithm.");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
pkey = php_openssl_evp_from_zval(key, 1, NULL, 0, &keyresource TSRMLS_CC);
if (pkey == NULL) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "supplied key param cannot be coerced into a public key");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
EVP_VerifyInit (&md_ctx, mdtype);
EVP_VerifyUpdate (&md_ctx, data, data_len);
err = EVP_VerifyFinal (&md_ctx, (unsigned char *)signature, signature_len, pkey);
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
if (keyresource == -1) {
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
}
RETURN_LONG(err);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 14,223 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ap_recv(ap_qid_t qid, unsigned long long *psmid, void *msg, size_t length)
{
struct ap_queue_status status;
status = __ap_recv(qid, psmid, msg, length);
switch (status.response_code) {
case AP_RESPONSE_NORMAL:
return 0;
case AP_RESPONSE_NO_PENDING_REPLY:
if (status.queue_empty)
return -ENOENT;
return -EBUSY;
case AP_RESPONSE_RESET_IN_PROGRESS:
return -EBUSY;
default:
return -ENODEV;
}
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 47,625 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int sc_path_print(char *buf, size_t buflen, const sc_path_t *path)
{
size_t i;
if (buf == NULL || path == NULL)
return SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS;
if (buflen < path->len * 2 + path->aid.len * 2 + 1)
return SC_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
buf[0] = '\0';
if (path->aid.len) {
for (i = 0; i < path->aid.len; i++)
snprintf(buf + strlen(buf), buflen - strlen(buf), "%02x", path->aid.value[i]);
snprintf(buf + strlen(buf), buflen - strlen(buf), "::");
}
for (i = 0; i < path->len; i++)
snprintf(buf + strlen(buf), buflen - strlen(buf), "%02x", path->value[i]);
if (!path->aid.len && path->type == SC_PATH_TYPE_DF_NAME)
snprintf(buf + strlen(buf), buflen - strlen(buf), "::");
return SC_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds writes
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting the problems.
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 78,854 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GDataFileSystem::OnGetFileCompleteForTransferFile(
const FilePath& local_dest_file_path,
const FileOperationCallback& callback,
GDataFileError error,
const FilePath& local_file_path,
const std::string& unused_mime_type,
GDataFileType file_type) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
DCHECK(!callback.is_null());
if (error != GDATA_FILE_OK) {
callback.Run(error);
return;
}
GDataFileError* copy_file_error =
new GDataFileError(GDATA_FILE_OK);
util::PostBlockingPoolSequencedTaskAndReply(
FROM_HERE,
blocking_task_runner_,
base::Bind(&CopyLocalFileOnBlockingPool,
local_file_path,
local_dest_file_path,
copy_file_error),
base::Bind(&RunFileOperationCallbackHelper,
callback,
base::Owned(copy_file_error)));
}
Commit Message: Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 116,997 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int cac_read_file(sc_card_t *card, int file_type, u8 **out_buf, size_t *out_len)
{
u8 params[2];
u8 count[2];
u8 *out = NULL;
u8 *out_ptr;
size_t offset = 0;
size_t size = 0;
size_t left = 0;
size_t len;
int r;
params[0] = file_type;
params[1] = 2;
/* get the size */
len = sizeof(count);
out_ptr = count;
r = cac_apdu_io(card, CAC_INS_READ_FILE, 0, 0, ¶ms[0], sizeof(params), &out_ptr, &len);
if (len == 0) {
r = SC_ERROR_FILE_NOT_FOUND;
}
if (r < 0)
goto fail;
left = size = lebytes2ushort(count);
sc_debug(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE,
"got %"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u bytes out_ptr=%p count&=%p count[0]=0x%02x count[1]=0x%02x, len=0x%04"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"x (%"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u)",
len, out_ptr, &count, count[0], count[1], size, size);
out = out_ptr = malloc(size);
if (out == NULL) {
r = SC_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
goto fail;
}
for (offset += 2; left > 0; offset += len, left -= len, out_ptr += len) {
len = MIN(left, CAC_MAX_CHUNK_SIZE);
params[1] = len;
r = cac_apdu_io(card, CAC_INS_READ_FILE, HIGH_BYTE_OF_SHORT(offset), LOW_BYTE_OF_SHORT(offset),
¶ms[0], sizeof(params), &out_ptr, &len);
/* if there is no data, assume there is no file */
if (len == 0) {
r = SC_ERROR_FILE_NOT_FOUND;
}
if (r < 0) {
goto fail;
}
}
*out_len = size;
*out_buf = out;
return SC_SUCCESS;
fail:
if (out)
free(out);
*out_len = 0;
return r;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 78,257 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t BufferQueueConsumer::setConsumerUsageBits(uint32_t usage) {
ATRACE_CALL();
BQ_LOGV("setConsumerUsageBits: %#x", usage);
Mutex::Autolock lock(mCore->mMutex);
mCore->mConsumerUsageBits = usage;
return NO_ERROR;
}
Commit Message: Add SN logging
Bug 27046057
Change-Id: Iede7c92e59e60795df1ec7768ebafd6b090f1c27
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 161,333 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GfxIndexedColorSpace::~GfxIndexedColorSpace() {
delete base;
gfree(lookup);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 1,139 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int handle_getattr(struct fuse* fuse, struct fuse_handler* handler,
const struct fuse_in_header *hdr, const struct fuse_getattr_in *req)
{
struct node* node;
char path[PATH_MAX];
pthread_mutex_lock(&fuse->global->lock);
node = lookup_node_and_path_by_id_locked(fuse, hdr->nodeid, path, sizeof(path));
TRACE("[%d] GETATTR flags=%x fh=%"PRIx64" @ %"PRIx64" (%s)\n", handler->token,
req->getattr_flags, req->fh, hdr->nodeid, node ? node->name : "?");
pthread_mutex_unlock(&fuse->global->lock);
if (!node) {
return -ENOENT;
}
if (!check_caller_access_to_node(fuse, hdr, node, R_OK)) {
return -EACCES;
}
return fuse_reply_attr(fuse, hdr->unique, node, path);
}
Commit Message: Fix overflow in path building
An incorrect size was causing an unsigned value
to wrap, causing it to write past the end of
the buffer.
Bug: 28085658
Change-Id: Ie9625c729cca024d514ba2880ff97209d435a165
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 160,568 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void update_roland_altsetting(struct snd_usb_midi *umidi)
{
struct usb_interface *intf;
struct usb_host_interface *hostif;
struct usb_interface_descriptor *intfd;
int is_light_load;
intf = umidi->iface;
is_light_load = intf->cur_altsetting != intf->altsetting;
if (umidi->roland_load_ctl->private_value == is_light_load)
return;
hostif = &intf->altsetting[umidi->roland_load_ctl->private_value];
intfd = get_iface_desc(hostif);
snd_usbmidi_input_stop(&umidi->list);
usb_set_interface(umidi->dev, intfd->bInterfaceNumber,
intfd->bAlternateSetting);
snd_usbmidi_input_start(&umidi->list);
}
Commit Message: ALSA: usb-audio: avoid freeing umidi object twice
The 'umidi' object will be free'd on the error path by snd_usbmidi_free()
when tearing down the rawmidi interface. So we shouldn't try to free it
in snd_usbmidi_create() after having registered the rawmidi interface.
Found by KASAN.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Clemens Ladisch <clemens@ladisch.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: | 0 | 54,816 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: views::View* ExtensionInstallDialogView::CreateExtraView() {
if (!prompt_->has_webstore_data())
return nullptr;
views::Link* store_link = new views::Link(
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_EXTENSION_PROMPT_STORE_LINK));
store_link->set_listener(this);
return store_link;
}
Commit Message: [Extensions UI] Initially disabled OK button for extension install prompts and enable them after a 500 ms time period.
BUG=394518
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2716353003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461933}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 154,023 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int udf_delete_entry(struct inode *inode, struct fileIdentDesc *fi,
struct udf_fileident_bh *fibh,
struct fileIdentDesc *cfi)
{
cfi->fileCharacteristics |= FID_FILE_CHAR_DELETED;
if (UDF_QUERY_FLAG(inode->i_sb, UDF_FLAG_STRICT))
memset(&(cfi->icb), 0x00, sizeof(struct long_ad));
return udf_write_fi(inode, cfi, fi, fibh, NULL, NULL);
}
Commit Message: udf: avoid info leak on export
For type 0x51 the udf.parent_partref member in struct fid gets copied
uninitialized to userland. Fix this by initializing it to 0.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 34,077 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::StyleResolverMayHaveChanged() {
if (HasNodesWithPlaceholderStyle()) {
SetNeedsStyleRecalc(kSubtreeStyleChange,
StyleChangeReasonForTracing::Create(
StyleChangeReason::kCleanupPlaceholderStyles));
}
if (DidLayoutWithPendingStylesheets() &&
!GetStyleEngine().HasPendingScriptBlockingSheets()) {
pending_sheet_layout_ = kIgnoreLayoutWithPendingSheets;
DCHECK(!GetLayoutViewItem().IsNull() || ImportsController());
if (!GetLayoutViewItem().IsNull())
GetLayoutViewItem().InvalidatePaintForViewAndCompositedLayers();
}
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 134,170 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool AppCacheDispatcherHost::OnMessageReceived(const IPC::Message& message) {
bool handled = true;
IPC_BEGIN_MESSAGE_MAP(AppCacheDispatcherHost, message)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(AppCacheHostMsg_RegisterHost, OnRegisterHost)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(AppCacheHostMsg_UnregisterHost, OnUnregisterHost)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(AppCacheHostMsg_SetSpawningHostId, OnSetSpawningHostId)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(AppCacheHostMsg_GetResourceList, OnGetResourceList)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(AppCacheHostMsg_SelectCache, OnSelectCache)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(AppCacheHostMsg_SelectCacheForWorker,
OnSelectCacheForWorker)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(AppCacheHostMsg_SelectCacheForSharedWorker,
OnSelectCacheForSharedWorker)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(AppCacheHostMsg_MarkAsForeignEntry,
OnMarkAsForeignEntry)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER_DELAY_REPLY(AppCacheHostMsg_GetStatus, OnGetStatus)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER_DELAY_REPLY(AppCacheHostMsg_StartUpdate, OnStartUpdate)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER_DELAY_REPLY(AppCacheHostMsg_SwapCache, OnSwapCache)
IPC_MESSAGE_UNHANDLED(handled = false)
IPC_END_MESSAGE_MAP()
return handled;
}
Commit Message: AppCache: Use WeakPtr<> to fix a potential uaf bug.
BUG=554908
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1441683004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#359930}
CWE ID: | 0 | 124,241 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool DebuggerFunction::InitClientHost() {
if (!InitTabContents())
return false;
client_host_ = AttachedClientHosts::GetInstance()->Lookup(contents_);
if (!client_host_ ||
!client_host_->MatchesContentsAndExtensionId(contents_,
GetExtension()->id())) {
error_ = ExtensionErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(
keys::kNotAttachedError,
base::IntToString(tab_id_));
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 108,239 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int tm_ppr_active(struct task_struct *target,
const struct user_regset *regset)
{
if (!cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_TM))
return -ENODEV;
if (MSR_TM_ACTIVE(target->thread.regs->msr))
return regset->n;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: powerpc/tm: Flush TM only if CPU has TM feature
Commit cd63f3c ("powerpc/tm: Fix saving of TM SPRs in core dump")
added code to access TM SPRs in flush_tmregs_to_thread(). However
flush_tmregs_to_thread() does not check if TM feature is available on
CPU before trying to access TM SPRs in order to copy live state to
thread structures. flush_tmregs_to_thread() is indeed guarded by
CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM but it might be the case that kernel
was compiled with CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM enabled and ran on
a CPU without TM feature available, thus rendering the execution
of TM instructions that are treated by the CPU as illegal instructions.
The fix is just to add proper checking in flush_tmregs_to_thread()
if CPU has the TM feature before accessing any TM-specific resource,
returning immediately if TM is no available on the CPU. Adding
that checking in flush_tmregs_to_thread() instead of in places
where it is called, like in vsr_get() and vsr_set(), is better because
avoids the same problem cropping up elsewhere.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.13+
Fixes: cd63f3c ("powerpc/tm: Fix saving of TM SPRs in core dump")
Signed-off-by: Gustavo Romero <gromero@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Cyril Bur <cyrilbur@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 84,827 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void *arm_dma_alloc(struct device *dev, size_t size, dma_addr_t *handle,
gfp_t gfp, struct dma_attrs *attrs)
{
pgprot_t prot = __get_dma_pgprot(attrs, pgprot_kernel);
void *memory;
if (dma_alloc_from_coherent(dev, size, handle, &memory))
return memory;
return __dma_alloc(dev, size, handle, gfp, prot, false,
__builtin_return_address(0));
}
Commit Message: ARM: dma-mapping: don't allow DMA mappings to be marked executable
DMA mapping permissions were being derived from pgprot_kernel directly
without using PAGE_KERNEL. This causes them to be marked with executable
permission, which is not what we want. Fix this.
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 1 | 167,578 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int handle_invept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
u32 vmx_instruction_info, types;
unsigned long type;
gva_t gva;
struct x86_exception e;
struct {
u64 eptp, gpa;
} operand;
if (!(vmx->nested.nested_vmx_secondary_ctls_high &
SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_EPT) ||
!(vmx->nested.nested_vmx_ept_caps & VMX_EPT_INVEPT_BIT)) {
kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
return 1;
}
if (!nested_vmx_check_permission(vcpu))
return 1;
vmx_instruction_info = vmcs_read32(VMX_INSTRUCTION_INFO);
type = kvm_register_readl(vcpu, (vmx_instruction_info >> 28) & 0xf);
types = (vmx->nested.nested_vmx_ept_caps >> VMX_EPT_EXTENT_SHIFT) & 6;
if (type >= 32 || !(types & (1 << type))) {
nested_vmx_failValid(vcpu,
VMXERR_INVALID_OPERAND_TO_INVEPT_INVVPID);
return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
}
/* According to the Intel VMX instruction reference, the memory
* operand is read even if it isn't needed (e.g., for type==global)
*/
if (get_vmx_mem_address(vcpu, vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION),
vmx_instruction_info, false, &gva))
return 1;
if (kvm_read_guest_virt(&vcpu->arch.emulate_ctxt, gva, &operand,
sizeof(operand), &e)) {
kvm_inject_page_fault(vcpu, &e);
return 1;
}
switch (type) {
case VMX_EPT_EXTENT_GLOBAL:
/*
* TODO: track mappings and invalidate
* single context requests appropriately
*/
case VMX_EPT_EXTENT_CONTEXT:
kvm_mmu_sync_roots(vcpu);
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_TLB_FLUSH, vcpu);
nested_vmx_succeed(vcpu);
break;
default:
BUG_ON(1);
break;
}
return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Don't allow L2 to access the hardware CR8
If L1 does not specify the "use TPR shadow" VM-execution control in
vmcs12, then L0 must specify the "CR8-load exiting" and "CR8-store
exiting" VM-execution controls in vmcs02. Failure to do so will give
the L2 VM unrestricted read/write access to the hardware CR8.
This fixes CVE-2017-12154.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 62,966 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int catc_get_settings(struct net_device *dev, struct ethtool_cmd *cmd)
{
struct catc *catc = netdev_priv(dev);
if (!catc->is_f5u011)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
cmd->supported = SUPPORTED_10baseT_Half | SUPPORTED_TP;
cmd->advertising = ADVERTISED_10baseT_Half | ADVERTISED_TP;
ethtool_cmd_speed_set(cmd, SPEED_10);
cmd->duplex = DUPLEX_HALF;
cmd->port = PORT_TP;
cmd->phy_address = 0;
cmd->transceiver = XCVR_INTERNAL;
cmd->autoneg = AUTONEG_DISABLE;
cmd->maxtxpkt = 1;
cmd->maxrxpkt = 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: catc: Use heap buffer for memory size test
Allocating USB buffers on the stack is not portable, and no longer
works on x86_64 (with VMAP_STACK enabled as per default).
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 66,477 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void sock_valbool_flag(struct sock *sk, int bit, int valbool)
{
if (valbool)
sock_set_flag(sk, bit);
else
sock_reset_flag(sk, bit);
}
Commit Message: net: sock: validate data_len before allocating skb in sock_alloc_send_pskb()
We need to validate the number of pages consumed by data_len, otherwise frags
array could be overflowed by userspace. So this patch validate data_len and
return -EMSGSIZE when data_len may occupies more frags than MAX_SKB_FRAGS.
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 20,204 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: asmlinkage ssize_t sys_readahead(int fd, loff_t offset, size_t count)
{
ssize_t ret;
struct file *file;
ret = -EBADF;
file = fget(fd);
if (file) {
if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ) {
struct address_space *mapping = file->f_mapping;
pgoff_t start = offset >> PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT;
pgoff_t end = (offset + count - 1) >> PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT;
unsigned long len = end - start + 1;
ret = do_readahead(mapping, file, start, len);
}
fput(file);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: fix writev regression: pan hanging unkillable and un-straceable
Frederik Himpe reported an unkillable and un-straceable pan process.
Zero length iovecs can go into an infinite loop in writev, because the
iovec iterator does not always advance over them.
The sequence required to trigger this is not trivial. I think it
requires that a zero-length iovec be followed by a non-zero-length iovec
which causes a pagefault in the atomic usercopy. This causes the writev
code to drop back into single-segment copy mode, which then tries to
copy the 0 bytes of the zero-length iovec; a zero length copy looks like
a failure though, so it loops.
Put a test into iov_iter_advance to catch zero-length iovecs. We could
just put the test in the fallback path, but I feel it is more robust to
skip over zero-length iovecs throughout the code (iovec iterator may be
used in filesystems too, so it should be robust).
Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 58,841 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void StreamTcpRegisterTests (void)
{
#ifdef UNITTESTS
UtRegisterTest("StreamTcpTest01 -- TCP session allocation",
StreamTcpTest01);
UtRegisterTest("StreamTcpTest02 -- TCP session deallocation",
StreamTcpTest02);
UtRegisterTest("StreamTcpTest03 -- SYN missed MidStream session",
StreamTcpTest03);
UtRegisterTest("StreamTcpTest04 -- SYN/ACK missed MidStream session",
StreamTcpTest04);
UtRegisterTest("StreamTcpTest05 -- 3WHS missed MidStream session",
StreamTcpTest05);
UtRegisterTest("StreamTcpTest06 -- FIN, RST message MidStream session",
StreamTcpTest06);
UtRegisterTest("StreamTcpTest07 -- PAWS invalid timestamp",
StreamTcpTest07);
UtRegisterTest("StreamTcpTest08 -- PAWS valid timestamp", StreamTcpTest08);
UtRegisterTest("StreamTcpTest09 -- No Client Reassembly", StreamTcpTest09);
UtRegisterTest("StreamTcpTest10 -- No missed packet Async stream",
StreamTcpTest10);
UtRegisterTest("StreamTcpTest11 -- SYN missed Async stream",
StreamTcpTest11);
UtRegisterTest("StreamTcpTest12 -- SYN/ACK missed Async stream",
StreamTcpTest12);
UtRegisterTest("StreamTcpTest13 -- opposite stream packets for Async " "stream",
StreamTcpTest13);
UtRegisterTest("StreamTcp4WHSTest01", StreamTcp4WHSTest01);
UtRegisterTest("StreamTcp4WHSTest02", StreamTcp4WHSTest02);
UtRegisterTest("StreamTcp4WHSTest03", StreamTcp4WHSTest03);
UtRegisterTest("StreamTcpTest14 -- setup OS policy", StreamTcpTest14);
UtRegisterTest("StreamTcpTest15 -- setup OS policy", StreamTcpTest15);
UtRegisterTest("StreamTcpTest16 -- setup OS policy", StreamTcpTest16);
UtRegisterTest("StreamTcpTest17 -- setup OS policy", StreamTcpTest17);
UtRegisterTest("StreamTcpTest18 -- setup OS policy", StreamTcpTest18);
UtRegisterTest("StreamTcpTest19 -- setup OS policy", StreamTcpTest19);
UtRegisterTest("StreamTcpTest20 -- setup OS policy", StreamTcpTest20);
UtRegisterTest("StreamTcpTest21 -- setup OS policy", StreamTcpTest21);
UtRegisterTest("StreamTcpTest22 -- setup OS policy", StreamTcpTest22);
UtRegisterTest("StreamTcpTest23 -- stream memory leaks", StreamTcpTest23);
UtRegisterTest("StreamTcpTest24 -- stream memory leaks", StreamTcpTest24);
UtRegisterTest("StreamTcpTest25 -- test ecn/cwr sessions",
StreamTcpTest25);
UtRegisterTest("StreamTcpTest26 -- test ecn/cwr sessions",
StreamTcpTest26);
UtRegisterTest("StreamTcpTest27 -- test ecn/cwr sessions",
StreamTcpTest27);
UtRegisterTest("StreamTcpTest28 -- Memcap Test", StreamTcpTest28);
#if 0 /* VJ 2010/09/01 disabled since they blow up on Fedora and Fedora is
* right about blowing up. The checksum functions are not used properly
* in the tests. */
UtRegisterTest("StreamTcpTest29 -- Badchecksum Reset Test", StreamTcpTest29, 1);
UtRegisterTest("StreamTcpTest30 -- Badchecksum Overlap Test", StreamTcpTest30, 1);
UtRegisterTest("StreamTcpTest31 -- MultipleSyns Test", StreamTcpTest31, 1);
UtRegisterTest("StreamTcpTest32 -- Bogus CWR Test", StreamTcpTest32, 1);
UtRegisterTest("StreamTcpTest33 -- RST-SYN Again Test", StreamTcpTest33, 1);
UtRegisterTest("StreamTcpTest34 -- SYN-PUSH Test", StreamTcpTest34, 1);
UtRegisterTest("StreamTcpTest35 -- SYN-URG Test", StreamTcpTest35, 1);
UtRegisterTest("StreamTcpTest36 -- PUSH-URG Test", StreamTcpTest36, 1);
#endif
UtRegisterTest("StreamTcpTest37 -- Out of order FIN Test",
StreamTcpTest37);
UtRegisterTest("StreamTcpTest38 -- validate ACK", StreamTcpTest38);
UtRegisterTest("StreamTcpTest39 -- update next_seq", StreamTcpTest39);
UtRegisterTest("StreamTcpTest40 -- pseudo setup", StreamTcpTest40);
UtRegisterTest("StreamTcpTest41 -- pseudo setup", StreamTcpTest41);
UtRegisterTest("StreamTcpTest42 -- SYN/ACK queue", StreamTcpTest42);
UtRegisterTest("StreamTcpTest43 -- SYN/ACK queue", StreamTcpTest43);
UtRegisterTest("StreamTcpTest44 -- SYN/ACK queue", StreamTcpTest44);
UtRegisterTest("StreamTcpTest45 -- SYN/ACK queue", StreamTcpTest45);
/* set up the reassembly tests as well */
StreamTcpReassembleRegisterTests();
StreamTcpSackRegisterTests ();
#endif /* UNITTESTS */
}
Commit Message: stream: support RST getting lost/ignored
In case of a valid RST on a SYN, the state is switched to 'TCP_CLOSED'.
However, the target of the RST may not have received it, or may not
have accepted it. Also, the RST may have been injected, so the supposed
sender may not actually be aware of the RST that was sent in it's name.
In this case the previous behavior was to switch the state to CLOSED and
accept no further TCP updates or stream reassembly.
This patch changes this. It still switches the state to CLOSED, as this
is by far the most likely to be correct. However, it will reconsider
the state if the receiver continues to talk.
To do this on each state change the previous state will be recorded in
TcpSession::pstate. If a non-RST packet is received after a RST, this
TcpSession::pstate is used to try to continue the conversation.
If the (supposed) sender of the RST is also continueing the conversation
as normal, it's highly likely it didn't send the RST. In this case
a stream event is generated.
Ticket: #2501
Reported-By: Kirill Shipulin
CWE ID: | 0 | 79,216 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void btpan_set_flow_control(BOOLEAN enable) {
if (btpan_cb.tap_fd == -1)
return;
btpan_cb.flow = enable;
if (enable) {
btsock_thread_add_fd(pan_pth, btpan_cb.tap_fd, 0, SOCK_THREAD_FD_RD, 0);
bta_dmexecutecallback(btu_exec_tap_fd_read, (void *)btpan_cb.tap_fd);
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 158,792 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void sysbus_esp_gpio_demux(void *opaque, int irq, int level)
{
SysBusESPState *sysbus = ESP(opaque);
ESPState *s = &sysbus->esp;
switch (irq) {
case 0:
parent_esp_reset(s, irq, level);
break;
case 1:
esp_dma_enable(opaque, irq, level);
break;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 9,339 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void conn_reset_postponed_data(struct connectdata *conn, int num)
{
struct postponed_data * const psnd = &(conn->postponed[num]);
if(psnd->buffer) {
DEBUGASSERT(psnd->allocated_size > 0);
DEBUGASSERT(psnd->recv_size <= psnd->allocated_size);
DEBUGASSERT(psnd->recv_size ?
(psnd->recv_processed < psnd->recv_size) :
(psnd->recv_processed == 0));
DEBUGASSERT(psnd->bindsock != CURL_SOCKET_BAD);
free(psnd->buffer);
psnd->buffer = NULL;
psnd->allocated_size = 0;
psnd->recv_size = 0;
psnd->recv_processed = 0;
#ifdef DEBUGBUILD
psnd->bindsock = CURL_SOCKET_BAD; /* used only for DEBUGASSERT */
#endif /* DEBUGBUILD */
}
else {
DEBUGASSERT(psnd->allocated_size == 0);
DEBUGASSERT(psnd->recv_size == 0);
DEBUGASSERT(psnd->recv_processed == 0);
DEBUGASSERT(psnd->bindsock == CURL_SOCKET_BAD);
}
}
Commit Message: Curl_close: clear data->multi_easy on free to avoid use-after-free
Regression from b46cfbc068 (7.59.0)
CVE-2018-16840
Reported-by: Brian Carpenter (Geeknik Labs)
Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/CVE-2018-16840.html
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 77,787 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PrintWebViewHelper::PrintPreviewContext::FinalizePrintReadyDocument() {
DCHECK(IsRendering());
base::TimeTicks begin_time = base::TimeTicks::Now();
metafile_->FinishDocument();
if (print_ready_metafile_page_count_ <= 0) {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
UMA_HISTOGRAM_MEDIUM_TIMES("PrintPreview.RenderToPDFTime",
document_render_time_);
base::TimeDelta total_time =
(base::TimeTicks::Now() - begin_time) + document_render_time_;
UMA_HISTOGRAM_MEDIUM_TIMES("PrintPreview.RenderAndGeneratePDFTime",
total_time);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_MEDIUM_TIMES("PrintPreview.RenderAndGeneratePDFTimeAvgPerPage",
total_time / pages_to_render_.size());
}
Commit Message: Crash on nested IPC handlers in PrintWebViewHelper
Class is not designed to handle nested IPC. Regular flows also does not
expect them. Still during printing of plugging them may show message
boxes and start nested message loops.
For now we are going just crash. If stats show us that this case is
frequent we will have to do something more complicated.
BUG=502562
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1228693002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338100}
CWE ID: | 0 | 126,620 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: expr_op_type_to_string(enum expr_op_type type)
{
if (type >= _EXPR_NUM_VALUES)
return NULL;
return expr_op_type_strings[type];
}
Commit Message: xkbcomp: fix pointer value for FreeStmt
Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 79,010 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: char *CopyString( const char *in ) {
char *out;
if ( !in[0] ) {
return ( (char *)&emptystring ) + sizeof( memblock_t );
} else if ( !in[1] ) {
if ( in[0] >= '0' && in[0] <= '9' ) {
return ( (char *)&numberstring[in[0] - '0'] ) + sizeof( memblock_t );
}
}
out = S_Malloc( strlen( in ) + 1 );
strcpy( out, in );
return out;
}
Commit Message: All: Merge some file writing extension checks
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 95,623 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: hash2smartfield(gpointer key, gpointer value, gpointer user_data)
{
const char *name = key;
const char *s_value = value;
xmlNode *xml_node = user_data;
if (isdigit(name[0])) {
xmlNode *tmp = create_xml_node(xml_node, XML_TAG_PARAM);
crm_xml_add(tmp, XML_NVPAIR_ATTR_NAME, name);
crm_xml_add(tmp, XML_NVPAIR_ATTR_VALUE, s_value);
} else if (crm_element_value(xml_node, name) == NULL) {
crm_xml_add(xml_node, name, s_value);
crm_trace("dumped: %s=%s", name, s_value);
} else {
crm_trace("duplicate: %s=%s", name, s_value);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix: acl: Do not delay evaluation of added nodes in some situations
It is not appropriate when the node has no children as it is not a
placeholder
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 44,067 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: R_API char *r_bin_java_build_obj_key(RBinJavaObj *bin) {
char *jvcname = NULL;
char *cname = r_bin_java_get_this_class_name (bin);
ut32 class_name_len = cname ? strlen (cname) : strlen ("_unknown_");
jvcname = malloc (class_name_len + 8 + 30);
if (cname) {
snprintf (jvcname, class_name_len + 30, "%d.%s.class", bin->id, cname);
free (cname);
} else {
snprintf (jvcname, class_name_len + 30, "%d._unknown_.class", bin->id);
}
return jvcname;
}
Commit Message: Fix #10498 - Crash in fuzzed java file
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 79,688 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void sco_config_callback(UNUSED_ATTR bool success) {
LOG_INFO("%s postload finished.", __func__);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 158,968 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void *hashtable_get(hashtable_t *hashtable, const char *key)
{
pair_t *pair;
size_t hash;
bucket_t *bucket;
hash = hash_str(key);
bucket = &hashtable->buckets[hash % num_buckets(hashtable)];
pair = hashtable_find_pair(hashtable, bucket, key, hash);
if(!pair)
return NULL;
return pair->value;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2013-6401: Change hash function, randomize hashes
Thanks to Florian Weimer and Eric Sesterhenn for reporting, reviewing
and testing.
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 1 | 166,530 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CL_InitRenderer( void ) {
re.BeginRegistration( &cls.glconfig );
cls.charSetShader = re.RegisterShader( "gfx/2d/bigchars" );
cls.whiteShader = re.RegisterShader( "white" );
cls.consoleShader = re.RegisterShader( "console" );
g_console_field_width = cls.glconfig.vidWidth / SMALLCHAR_WIDTH - 2;
g_consoleField.widthInChars = g_console_field_width;
}
Commit Message: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s.
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 95,970 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SMB2_query_info_free(struct smb_rqst *rqst)
{
if (rqst && rqst->rq_iov)
cifs_small_buf_release(rqst->rq_iov[0].iov_base); /* request */
}
Commit Message: cifs: Fix use-after-free in SMB2_read
There is a KASAN use-after-free:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in SMB2_read+0x1136/0x1190
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880b4e45e50 by task ln/1009
Should not release the 'req' because it will use in the trace.
Fixes: eccb4422cf97 ("smb3: Add ftrace tracepoints for improved SMB3 debugging")
Signed-off-by: ZhangXiaoxu <zhangxiaoxu5@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> 4.18+
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 88,086 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: XMLRPC_VALUE XMLRPC_VectorNext(XMLRPC_VALUE value) {
XMLRPC_VALUE xReturn = NULL;
if(value && value->type == xmlrpc_vector && value->v) {
xReturn = (XMLRPC_VALUE)Q_Next(value->v->q);
}
return xReturn;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 12,175 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::Destroy(bool also_delete) {
DCHECK(!destroyed_);
destroyed_ = true;
NotificationService::current()->Notify(
NOTIFICATION_RENDER_WIDGET_HOST_DESTROYED, Source<RenderWidgetHost>(this),
NotificationService::NoDetails());
if (view_) {
view_->Destroy();
view_.reset();
}
process_->RemoveRoute(routing_id_);
g_routing_id_widget_map.Get().erase(
RenderWidgetHostID(process_->GetID(), routing_id_));
if (delegate_)
delegate_->RenderWidgetDeleted(this);
if (also_delete)
delete this;
}
Commit Message: Check that RWHI isn't deleted manually while owned by a scoped_ptr in RVHI
BUG=590284
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1747183002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#378844}
CWE ID: | 1 | 172,116 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int kvm_vm_ioctl_irq_line(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_irq_level *irq_event)
{
if (!irqchip_in_kernel(kvm))
return -ENXIO;
irq_event->status = kvm_set_irq(kvm, KVM_USERSPACE_IRQ_SOURCE_ID,
irq_event->irq, irq_event->level);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Convert MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME to use gfn_to_hva_cache functions (CVE-2013-1797)
There is a potential use after free issue with the handling of
MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME. If the guest specifies a GPA in a movable or removable
memory such as frame buffers then KVM might continue to write to that
address even after it's removed via KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION. KVM pins
the page in memory so it's unlikely to cause an issue, but if the user
space component re-purposes the memory previously used for the guest, then
the guest will be able to corrupt that memory.
Tested: Tested against kvmclock unit test
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 33,291 |
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